foreignpolicy--2020-03-13--The Coronavirus Pandemic Tells a Tale of 3 Leaders

The COVID-19 crisis has revealed not just the public health preparedness of the affected countries but also the character and ideologies of their political elites .
That became especially clear this week , when the leaders of the United States , France , and Germany each delivered televised addresses to their respective nations .
Each speech offered a bracing reflection of the leader ’ s deepest underlying political beliefs .
In short , in a time of crisis , Trump ’ s gon na Trump , Macron ’ s gon na Macron , and Merkel ’ s gon na Merkel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national address was mostly characterized by its attacks on travel freedom and boogeymen in the European Union .
In many ways , the speech was a snapshot of his presidency .
Primed by a three-year atrophy of the administrative state—including the White House ’ s shuttered pandemic readiness office and cuts to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) —Trump drew primarily on his instinctual vindictiveness against the EU .
From a public health perspective , the administration ’ s 30-day European travel ban was mostly a punitive distraction .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ his own script , suggesting that the ban would include European “ trade and cargo ” before his team clarified—against the backdrop of tumbling financial markets—that it would not .
His administration spent the next 24 hours trying to build a policy case around the travel ban .
His CDC director rationalized the travel restriction by stating that “ Europe is the new China , ” seeming to ignore that the botched testing rollout likely meant that thousands of cases remained unreported within U.S. borders .
Trump , for his part , justified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU had imposed unfair tax hikes on the United States during the Obama years .
Meanwhile , Europe burned white hot with ire at the lack of warning about the policy shift ( although Trump claimed that coordinating with the Europeans would have taken too long ) .
The media derisively mocked Trump , citing his quotes from the prior week about how the coronavirus would disappear on its own .
And Europe ’ s America watchers openly fretted about the United States ’ brittle resilience , thin public health and social safety @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Within 18 hours , it was Emmanuel Macron ’ s turn .
Addressing the public in a gilded hall in the Élysée Palace , the French president spoke in sweeping terms about the “ greatest health crisis in France in a century.
” He laid the seeds for a visionary agenda , including an economic relaunch of the EU , energetic global public health efforts , and a top-down agenda in France of school closures and state-financed stimulus , all powered by a new spirit of solidarity against the disease .
The speech @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was largely praised by the French public .
The expansiveness of Macron ’ s agenda echoed his citizens ’ outsized expectations of their government and also the tools available to the leader of a centralized state like France : As president , Macron is in a position to force stimulus measures quickly through a docile parliament .
But the speech also inadvertently demonstrated the constraints imposed by France ’ s middling political and economic power on the world ( and European ) stage—constraints that Macron has run up against repeatedly while in office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a mantle of international leadership during the present crisis , in reality , he only has the power to consult with the leaders of more powerful countries ( whether in Washington or Berlin ) to coordinate the expansive policies he desires .
In Germany , Angela Merkel dutifully waited until after Macron ’ s speech to begin her own press conference Thursday .
The chancellor entered an unspectacular press room in Berlin flanked by Bavarian Minister-President Markus Söder and Hamburg Mayor Peter Tschentscher—a clear nod to the federal nature of the German republic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day earlier , she stuck to low-key generalizations , commended German preparedness in contrast with other European countries , and ended with a vague platitude about European coordination .
She then turned the conference over to Söder , who , seeming more like the de facto chancellor , commanded the remainder of the evening with detailed operational policy decisions on school closures , testing , and hospital preparedness .
The press conference struck a lot of similar chords from Merkel ’ s fourth term in office—above all , in its overemphasis on her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this is a reflection of Germany ’ s constitutional order : Competencies on school closures , public transportation , and event-size restrictions rest with Germany ’ s 16 federal Länder ( states ) , not the national government .
But one thread running through Merkel ’ s career has been a decision not to wield all the power she indisputably does have at her disposal .
She has repeatedly delegated vast autonomy to members of her cabinet , and that has been no different in the present crisis .
Jens Spahn , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the symbol of political reassurance , while Finance Minister Olaf Scholz and Economic Minister Peter Altmaier independently announced unlimited liquidity assistance to German companies and even the possible nationalization of industries .
The coronavirus pandemic has so far lacked the moment where Merkel has taken the reins and changed the course of German policy in a big way , like with the 2011 Energiewende decision or the 2015 refugee crisis .
As Germany ’ s crisis management takes shape , it has been decidedly decentralized , with Merkel mostly conspicuous in her absence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been most apparent on the European level , which has been decidedly uncoordinated without strong German leadership .
Germany ’ s fiscal “ Whatever It Takes ” liquidity policy effectively nationalizes what had been a European Central Bank-driven , eurozone-wide policy in the euro crisis , leaving many to ask whether Germany is leaving Europe economically in the lurch .
Twenty-four hours , three leaders , three patterns of leadership : The coronavirus crisis forced three of the West ’ s most important leaders to reveal themselves .
Trump presented himself as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; Macron as an ambitious visionary clipped by capacity ; and Merkel as a diminished figure fading slowly into the background without leaving office .
The world can only hope they suffice .

The COVID-19 crisis has revealed not just the public health preparedness of the affected countries but also the character and ideologies of their political elites. That became especially clear this week, when the leaders of the United States, France, and Germany each delivered televised addresses to their respective nations. Each speech offered a bracing reflection of the leader’s deepest underlying political beliefs. In short, in a time of crisis, Trump’s gonna Trump, Macron’s gonna Macron, and Merkel’s gonna Merkel.
The COVID-19 crisis has revealed not just the public health preparedness of the affected countries but also the character and ideologies of their political elites. That became especially clear this week, when the leaders of the United States, France, and Germany each delivered televised addresses to their respective nations. Each speech offered a bracing reflection of the leader’s deepest underlying political beliefs. In short, in a time of crisis, Trump’s gonna Trump, Macron’s gonna Macron, and Merkel’s gonna Merkel.
President Donald Trump’s Wednesday national address was mostly characterized by its attacks on travel freedom and boogeymen in the European Union. In many ways, the speech was a snapshot of his presidency. Primed by a three-year atrophy of the administrative state—including the White House’s shuttered pandemic readiness office and cuts to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—Trump drew primarily on his instinctual vindictiveness against the EU. From a public health perspective, the administration’s 30-day European travel ban was mostly a punitive distraction. Although even here, Trump sloppily misread his own script, suggesting that the ban would include European “trade and cargo” before his team clarified—against the backdrop of tumbling financial markets—that it would not.
His administration spent the next 24 hours trying to build a policy case around the travel ban. His CDC director rationalized the travel restriction by stating that “Europe is the new China,” seeming to ignore that the botched testing rollout likely meant that thousands of cases remained unreported within U.S. borders. Trump, for his part, justified the travel ban by stating that the EU had imposed unfair tax hikes on the United States during the Obama years.
Meanwhile, Europe burned white hot with ire at the lack of warning about the policy shift (although Trump claimed that coordinating with the Europeans would have taken too long). The media derisively mocked Trump, citing his quotes from the prior week about how the coronavirus would disappear on its own. And Europe’s America watchers openly fretted about the United States’ brittle resilience, thin public health and social safety net, and flubbed early testing.
Within 18 hours, it was Emmanuel Macron’s turn. Addressing the public in a gilded hall in the Élysée Palace, the French president spoke in sweeping terms about the “greatest health crisis in France in a century.” He laid the seeds for a visionary agenda, including an economic relaunch of the EU, energetic global public health efforts, and a top-down agenda in France of school closures and state-financed stimulus, all powered by a new spirit of solidarity against the disease.
The speech was watched by 22 million people and was largely praised by the French public. The expansiveness of Macron’s agenda echoed his citizens’ outsized expectations of their government and also the tools available to the leader of a centralized state like France: As president, Macron is in a position to force stimulus measures quickly through a docile parliament. But the speech also inadvertently demonstrated the constraints imposed by France’s middling political and economic power on the world (and European) stage—constraints that Macron has run up against repeatedly while in office. Although Macron presented himself as seizing a mantle of international leadership during the present crisis, in reality, he only has the power to consult with the leaders of more powerful countries (whether in Washington or Berlin) to coordinate the expansive policies he desires.
In Germany, Angela Merkel dutifully waited until after Macron’s speech to begin her own press conference Thursday. The chancellor entered an unspectacular press room in Berlin flanked by Bavarian Minister-President Markus Söder and Hamburg Mayor Peter Tschentscher—a clear nod to the federal nature of the German republic. In contrast to her speech a day earlier, she stuck to low-key generalizations, commended German preparedness in contrast with other European countries, and ended with a vague platitude about European coordination. She then turned the conference over to Söder, who, seeming more like the de facto chancellor, commanded the remainder of the evening with detailed operational policy decisions on school closures, testing, and hospital preparedness.
The press conference struck a lot of similar chords from Merkel’s fourth term in office—above all, in its overemphasis on her own powerlessness. In one sense, this is a reflection of Germany’s constitutional order: Competencies on school closures, public transportation, and event-size restrictions rest with Germany’s 16 federal Länder (states), not the national government.
But one thread running through Merkel’s career has been a decision not to wield all the power she indisputably does have at her disposal. She has repeatedly delegated vast autonomy to members of her cabinet, and that has been no different in the present crisis. Jens Spahn, the energetic 39-year-old health minister, has been the symbol of political reassurance, while Finance Minister Olaf Scholz and Economic Minister Peter Altmaier independently announced unlimited liquidity assistance to German companies and even the possible nationalization of industries.
The coronavirus pandemic has so far lacked the moment where Merkel has taken the reins and changed the course of German policy in a big way, like with the 2011 Energiewende decision or the 2015 refugee crisis. As Germany’s crisis management takes shape, it has been decidedly decentralized, with Merkel mostly conspicuous in her absence. The problems with this approach have been most apparent on the European level, which has been decidedly uncoordinated without strong German leadership. Germany’s fiscal “Whatever It Takes” liquidity policy effectively nationalizes what had been a European Central Bank-driven, eurozone-wide policy in the euro crisis, leaving many to ask whether Germany is leaving Europe economically in the lurch.
Twenty-four hours, three leaders, three patterns of leadership: The coronavirus crisis forced three of the West’s most important leaders to reveal themselves. Trump presented himself as a rage-driven amateur defined by sloppiness and vindictiveness; Macron as an ambitious visionary clipped by capacity; and Merkel as a diminished figure fading slowly into the background without leaving office. The world can only hope they suffice.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-13--How Trump Is Tanking His Own Presidency

How Trump Is Tanking His Own Presidency

How Trump Is Tanking His Own Presidency Until now , none of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s many narcissistic foibles and failures of understanding has seriously hurt him , for the simple reason that his mistakes never really caught up with him .
Trump could start a trade war based on silly , debunked 18th-century concepts of economics and get away with it , because the U.S. economy was strong .
He could walk away from a critical climate pact , because global warming happens slowly .
He could discard a denuclearization treaty with Iran with no backup plan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reemerge .
Most people really didn ’ t notice or care .
But now , in the face of a global health threat that is immediate and all around us—and requires , more than anything , a coordinated global response—Trump finds that his errors are flying back in his face like clown pies almost every time he opens his mouth .
All the defining attributes of his presidency—his “ America First ” arrogance , his us-versus-them pettiness toward the rest of the world , his obvious desire for American self-isolation—are suddenly working against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before ; it appears to be all but shot now .
The markets , seesawing wildly all week , are having trouble believing him .
His own experts—even his own vice president—regularly contradict him .
More than that , all those policies that he found he could fecklessly throw out with no consequence—all that hostile neo-isolationism and xenophobia—may well help sink his No .
1 argument for reelection : the treasured U.S. economy that Trump declared last month , in another error-filled performance at the State of the Union , to be “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ His major policy response of the week , along with his declaration of a national emergency on Friday—the isolation of the United States from Europe and China—is likely to do serious economic damage on both sides of the Atlantic , further slowing an already stumbling world economy .
On Friday , at a Rose Garden news conference , the president suggested that the United Kingdom could also be cut off .
And all this is happening , critically , when Trump has very little time left to set things right , with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Joe Biden , bearing down ahead of the Nov. 3 election and making the now-very-credible claim that he , a nice-guy middle-of-the-road former vice president , can show Americans how a president ought to handle a crisis .
On Thursday , as Trump endured withering criticism over his disastrous speech to the nation the night before , Biden honed in , outlining specific steps he would take against the coronavirus .
“ Public fears are being compounded by a pervasive lack of trust in this president , ” he said in a speech @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Trump was in full damage control mode , declaring a state of emergency over a pandemic that he had only days before belittled as a minor annoyance even less damaging than the flu .
But , strikingly , he announced no fiscal stimulus and made no mention of coordinating a response to a global threat with any other nation .
Indeed , speaking in the Rose Garden , Trump actually said , “ We ’ re not going to be talking about the world right now.
” And as he has done @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump blamed whatever might be wrong on his predecessor , Barack Obama—in this case , the devastating lack of coronavirus testing kits throughout the country , which has been holding back the U.S. response .
“ For decades the @ CDCgov looked at , and studied , its testing system , but did nothing about it , ” Trump tweeted earlier Friday , referring to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under Obama .
“ President Obama made changes that only complicated things further.
” All this was an attempt to regain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the nation—clearly a panicky , ill-thought-out venture at which Trump announced a travel ban on Europe that he didn ’ t bother to alert the Europeans about .
Although two esteemed health experts , Anthony Fauci , the head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases , and Robert Redfield , the director of the Centers for Disease Control , later backed Trump up on the travel ban , Trump made errors of fact that were mind-boggling for a national address from the Oval Office , a rarely used platform @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He said there would be insurance coverage for treatment , and there isn ’ t .
He said there were coronavirus tests available , and there aren ’ t .
He said goods from Europe would be prohibited when they weren ’ t .
Nor did the president say anything about tests or federally directed efforts at containment .
The speech set the stage for a record plunge in the Dow the next day .
If it wasn ’ t clear then that Trump doesn ’ t grasp the concept of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so the day after his Oval Office address , when he casually allowed that he hadn ’ t bothered to talk to the Europeans because “ when they raise taxes on us , they don ’ t consult us , ” as if that situation could compare to a fast-spreading virus that has already jumped the Atlantic .
He went on to invoke , once again , his neo-isolationist view of America : “ Compared to other places , we are in really good shape , and we want to keep it that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And then the narcissistic kicker : The markets—the gold standard of Trumpian success—were “ still higher than they were when I came in , ” he said .
The Dow promptly plummeted again , ending its worst day since Black Monday in 1987 .
On Friday the markets rebounded dramatically after Trump announced that billions of dollars in emergency aid was available and millions of new testing kits would be coming soon , and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin reportedly came close to cutting a deal for economic relief with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t on board ) .
Even so , many more economic repercussions will follow as businesses start to close .
As Fauci said Friday : “ It ’ s certainly going to get worse before it gets better .
… There ’ s no doubt we have not peaked yet.
” When the economic hits come , the Dow may be within striking distance of that Trump inauguration-day mark of 19,827 .
If it gets there before November rolls around , then Trump , using his own favorite measure , will no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better now than they were four years ago .

Until now, none of U.S. President Donald Trump’s many narcissistic foibles and failures of understanding has seriously hurt him, for the simple reason that his mistakes never really caught up with him.
Until now, none of U.S. President Donald Trump’s many narcissistic foibles and failures of understanding has seriously hurt him, for the simple reason that his mistakes never really caught up with him.
Trump could start a trade war based on silly, debunked 18th-century concepts of economics and get away with it, because the U.S. economy was strong. He could walk away from a critical climate pact, because global warming happens slowly. He could discard a denuclearization treaty with Iran with no backup plan, because nuclear threats take time to reemerge. Most people really didn’t notice or care.
But now, in the face of a global health threat that is immediate and all around us—and requires, more than anything, a coordinated global response—Trump finds that his errors are flying back in his face like clown pies almost every time he opens his mouth. All the defining attributes of his presidency—his “America First” arrogance, his us-versus-them pettiness toward the rest of the world, his obvious desire for American self-isolation—are suddenly working against him. Trump had very little credibility before; it appears to be all but shot now. The markets, seesawing wildly all week, are having trouble believing him. His own experts—even his own vice president—regularly contradict him.
More than that, all those policies that he found he could fecklessly throw out with no consequence—all that hostile neo-isolationism and xenophobia—may well help sink his No. 1 argument for reelection: the treasured U.S. economy that Trump declared last month, in another error-filled performance at the State of the Union, to be “the best it has ever been.” His major policy response of the week, along with his declaration of a national emergency on Friday—the isolation of the United States from Europe and China—is likely to do serious economic damage on both sides of the Atlantic, further slowing an already stumbling world economy. On Friday, at a Rose Garden news conference, the president suggested that the United Kingdom could also be cut off.
And all this is happening, critically, when Trump has very little time left to set things right, with the leading candidate for the Democratic nomination, Joe Biden, bearing down ahead of the Nov. 3 election and making the now-very-credible claim that he, a nice-guy middle-of-the-road former vice president, can show Americans how a president ought to handle a crisis. On Thursday, as Trump endured withering criticism over his disastrous speech to the nation the night before, Biden honed in, outlining specific steps he would take against the coronavirus. “Public fears are being compounded by a pervasive lack of trust in this president,” he said in a speech.
By the end of the week, Trump was in full damage control mode, declaring a state of emergency over a pandemic that he had only days before belittled as a minor annoyance even less damaging than the flu. But, strikingly, he announced no fiscal stimulus and made no mention of coordinating a response to a global threat with any other nation. Indeed, speaking in the Rose Garden, Trump actually said, “We’re not going to be talking about the world right now.” And as he has done since the start of his presidency, Trump blamed whatever might be wrong on his predecessor, Barack Obama—in this case, the devastating lack of coronavirus testing kits throughout the country, which has been holding back the U.S. response. “For decades the @CDCgov looked at, and studied, its testing system, but did nothing about it,” Trump tweeted earlier Friday, referring to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under Obama. “President Obama made changes that only complicated things further.”
All this was an attempt to regain stature following his much-panned Wednesday night speech to the nation—clearly a panicky, ill-thought-out venture at which Trump announced a travel ban on Europe that he didn’t bother to alert the Europeans about. Trump made errors of fact that were mind-boggling for a national address from the Oval Office, a rarely used platform usually reserved for Cuban Missile Crisis-sized events. Although two esteemed health experts, Anthony Fauci, the head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and Robert Redfield, the director of the Centers for Disease Control, later backed Trump up on the travel ban, the president announced there would be insurance coverage for treatment, and there isn’t. He said there were coronavirus tests available, and there aren’t. He said goods from Europe would be prohibited when they weren’t. Nor did the president say anything about tests or federally directed efforts at containment. The speech set the stage for a record plunge in the Dow the next day.
If it wasn’t clear then that Trump doesn’t grasp the concept of a coordinated international crisis response, it became so the day after his Oval Office address, when he casually allowed that he hadn’t bothered to talk to the Europeans because “when they raise taxes on us, they don’t consult us,” as if that situation could compare to a fast-spreading virus that has already jumped the Atlantic. He went on to invoke, once again, his neo-isolationist view of America: “Compared to other places, we are in really good shape, and we want to keep it that way,” he told reporters.
And then the narcissistic kicker: The markets—the gold standard of Trumpian success—were “still higher than they were when I came in,” he said. The Dow promptly plummeted again, ending its worst day since Black Monday in 1987. On Friday the markets rebounded dramatically after Trump announced that billions of dollars in emergency aid was available and millions of new testing kits would be coming soon, and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin reportedly came close to cutting a deal for economic relief with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (though Trump later said he wasn’t on board). Even so, many more economic repercussions will follow as businesses start to close. As Fauci said Friday: “It’s certainly going to get worse before it gets better. … There’s no doubt we have not peaked yet.”
When the economic hits come, the Dow may be within striking distance of that Trump inauguration-day mark of 19,827. If it gets there before November rolls around, then Trump, using his own favorite measure, will no longer be able to say things are better now than they were four years ago.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-13--China’s Nuclear Arms Are a Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery

Two weeks ago , U.S. President Donald Trump agreed to a proposal that China join the four other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council at a summit to initiate a new round of arms control talks .
The goal , according to administration officials , is a three-way agreement among China , Russia , and the United States to limit nuclear weapons .
As National Security Adviser Robert O ’ Brien explained in early February , “ It shouldn ’ t just be the U.S. and Russia .
We think that China is going to need to become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” China , whose nuclear warheads number only in the low hundreds , may not seem a natural fit for negotiations with the United States ( 6,185 total warheads , of which 1,750 are deployed ) and Russia ( 6,490 total , 1,600 deployed ) .
Indeed , China has previously rejected participating in a trilateral nuclear arms deal on the grounds that its forces are too small .
China has previously rejected participating in a trilateral nuclear arms-control deal on the grounds that its forces are too small .
But Beijing ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recycling capacities capable of producing material for nuclear weapons would make it possible for China to achieve parity with the United States and Russia .
Moreover , given the current and perhaps enduring Sino-Russian strategic alignment , the United States can no longer assume that a military conflict with China will not also involve Russia ; while adding Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons numbers may not be appropriate , neither is considering them completely in isolation .
Before pulling Beijing into any arms control talks , however , U.S. officials need to understand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particular , they need to crack three strategic mysteries surrounding Beijing ’ s most threatening capabilities : its unclear doctrine for using nuclear weapons , its rising capacity to make nuclear explosives , and its development of anti-satellite operations .
The first mystery is how China might use its nuclear weapons .
Beijing has long maintained it would never launch its nuclear weapons first , that it would only fire them after having been attacked , and , even then , weeks might pass before China would respond .
As China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ China is always committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances , and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally.
” Chinese leaders also insist they can deter the United States so long as they have the ability to strike back at a limited number of targets , most likely American cities .
This policy of assured—and relatively limited—retaliation is what Chinese leaders have officially espoused .
There is only one problem : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces well beyond what ’ s needed merely to target a handful of American cities .
The question is why.China is currently building up its nuclear forces well beyond what ’ s needed merely to target a handful of American cities .
The question is why .
China will soon have deployed a nuclear triad of strategic land , sea , and air-launched nuclear systems akin to America ’ s .
The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency projects China ’ s nuclear warhead stockpile may double by 2030 .
The People ’ s Liberation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modern , nuclear-capable missiles , of various ranges , some fitted with penetration aids and multiple independently targetable warheads .
It is investing in a new , silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile—typically considered a first-strike weapon .
These missiles may be fitted with hypersonic glide vehicles , which travel at high speeds on irregular trajectories , making them difficult for missile defenses to intercept .
Taken together , these and other capabilities point to a China that is potentially preparing for far more extensive retaliation , nuclear first strikes , counterforce targeting , and/or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s intent , or does Beijing believe it needs all of these new capabilities merely to maintain deterrence through assured retaliation ?
Beijing has yet to offer a clear answer .
The second mystery surrounds China ’ s plans to significantly expand its facilities to enrich uranium and recycle plutonium .
While this capacity is nominally intended to meet the needs of civilian reactors , China plans to produce far more fuel than it could consume domestically or export to its known customers abroad .
Building up such nuclear fuel production capacity , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ making nuclear bombs .
If China were to build all of the enrichment capacity it plans , it could produce enough highly enriched uranium to make an additional 1,500 warheads each year—enabling Beijing to reach parity with the United States in five to 10 years if it chose to do so—even after supplying all of China ’ s civilian power reactors and meeting demand for exports .
China is also operating a reprocessing plant and building another one capable of separating enough plutonium from spent reactor fuel to make an additional 500 nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that , China plans to buy another plant from France that would allow it to produce enough plutonium for a further 1,600 nuclear warheads per year .
None of this makes economic sense—it would be far cheaper for China to use uranium to fuel its power reactors .
Why , then , is it launching such a massive reprocessing effort ?
The heightened potential for false alarms that comes with such a posture is hardly conducive to strategic stability .
It is unclear .
Beijing has not signaled any intent to grow its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wisdom is that China is not interested in racing to achieve nuclear parity with Russia or the United States but desires to maintain the option to do so .
This would go some way toward making sense of Chinese plans .
But again , Beijing has not yet explained itself .
The third and final mystery are China ’ s anti-satellite efforts .
Like its other official pronouncements , China ’ s repeated avowals to keep space peaceful sound reassuring .
Its actions in space , however , are anything but .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is developing space-based early warning reconnaissance capabilities that would enable a shift to a launch-on-warning nuclear posture—which involves heightened readiness , improved surveillance , and streamlined decision-making to enable a rapid response in case of attack .
The heightened potential for false alarms that comes with such a posture is hardly conducive to strategic stability .
Meanwhile , China ’ s anti-satellite capabilities—its ground-based lasers , anti-satellite missiles , and robot satellite killer operations—raise fears that China might , in the event of a crisis , blind or destroy America ’ s own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , instead of the official doctrine of embracing space as a global commons to which all have free access , China may well join Russia in contesting the domain and accelerating the arms race in space .
Why ?
The operational logic for China doing so is clear : Effective Chinese anti-satellite weapons will make it harder for U.S. forces to maintain intelligence operations and battlefield communications in case of a conflict in the Pacific .
Unfortunately , China ’ s investment in anti-satellite capabilities also heightens U.S. and allied fears of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
Here , too , it would be useful to understand China ’ s thinking .
For U.S. policymakers grappling with these three mysteries , the greatest frustration has been the endless stonewalling by their Chinese interlocutors .
When bilateral talks have happened in the past , they have too often focused on nuclear terrorism , the security of nuclear materials , and questions of declaratory policy .
For years , Chinese officials have refused to engage in meaningful dialogue that could give clarity on the issues described above .
But dialogue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are to gain a better understanding of the strategic capabilities in which the other is investing and why .
Toward this end , the Trump administration should make pursuit of a new strategic capabilities dialogue a key goal for 2020 .
Certainly , Beijing has concerns about the United States coming to its own conclusions about these mysteries—for Washington , any responsible assessment will require at least some consideration of a worst-case scenario .
China has an opportunity to shape those assessments .
Continuing to eschew that opportunity is unlikely to be in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of that is the task at hand .

Two weeks ago, U.S. President Donald Trump agreed to a proposal that China join the four other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council at a summit to initiate a new round of arms control talks. The goal, according to administration officials, is a three-way agreement among China, Russia, and the United States to limit nuclear weapons. As National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien explained in early February, “It shouldn’t just be the U.S. and Russia. We think that China is going to need to become involved in any serious arms control negotiation.”
Two weeks ago, U.S. President Donald Trump agreed to a proposal that China join the four other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council at a summit to initiate a new round of arms control talks. The goal, according to administration officials, is a three-way agreement among China, Russia, and the United States to limit nuclear weapons. As National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien explained in early February, “It shouldn’t just be the U.S. and Russia. We think that China is going to need to become involved in any serious arms control negotiation.”
China, whose nuclear warheads number only in the low hundreds, may not seem a natural fit for negotiations with the United States (6,185 total warheads, of which 1,750 are deployed) and Russia (6,490 total, 1,600 deployed). Indeed, China has previously rejected participating in a trilateral nuclear arms deal on the grounds that its forces are too small. China has previously rejected participating in a trilateral nuclear arms-control deal on the grounds that its forces are too small. But Beijing’s ambitious plans for new enrichment and recycling capacities capable of producing material for nuclear weapons would make it possible for China to achieve parity with the United States and Russia. Moreover, given the current and perhaps enduring Sino-Russian strategic alignment, the United States can no longer assume that a military conflict with China will not also involve Russia; while adding Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons numbers may not be appropriate, neither is considering them completely in isolation.
Before pulling Beijing into any arms control talks, however, U.S. officials need to understand what China is up to. In particular, they need to crack three strategic mysteries surrounding Beijing’s most threatening capabilities: its unclear doctrine for using nuclear weapons, its rising capacity to make nuclear explosives, and its development of anti-satellite operations.
The first mystery is how China might use its nuclear weapons. Beijing has long maintained it would never launch its nuclear weapons first, that it would only fire them after having been attacked, and, even then, weeks might pass before China would respond. As China’s 2019 defense white paper put it, “China is always committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally.” Chinese leaders also insist they can deter the United States so long as they have the ability to strike back at a limited number of targets, most likely American cities.
This policy of assured—and relatively limited—retaliation is what Chinese leaders have officially espoused. There is only one problem: China is currently building up its nuclear forces well beyond what’s needed merely to target a handful of American cities. The question is why.China is currently building up its nuclear forces well beyond what’s needed merely to target a handful of American cities. The question is why.
China will soon have deployed a nuclear triad of strategic land, sea, and air-launched nuclear systems akin to America’s. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency projects China’s nuclear warhead stockpile may double by 2030. The People’s Liberation Army is fielding a large variety of modern, nuclear-capable missiles, of various ranges, some fitted with penetration aids and multiple independently targetable warheads. It is investing in a new, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile—typically considered a first-strike weapon. These missiles may be fitted with hypersonic glide vehicles, which travel at high speeds on irregular trajectories, making them difficult for missile defenses to intercept.
Taken together, these and other capabilities point to a China that is potentially preparing for far more extensive retaliation, nuclear first strikes, counterforce targeting, and/or nuclear warfighting. Is that China’s intent, or does Beijing believe it needs all of these new capabilities merely to maintain deterrence through assured retaliation? Beijing has yet to offer a clear answer.
The second mystery surrounds China’s plans to significantly expand its facilities to enrich uranium and recycle plutonium. While this capacity is nominally intended to meet the needs of civilian reactors, China plans to produce far more fuel than it could consume domestically or export to its known customers abroad. Building up such nuclear fuel production capacity, however, is all too useful for making nuclear bombs.
If China were to build all of the enrichment capacity it plans, it could produce enough highly enriched uranium to make an additional 1,500 warheads each year—enabling Beijing to reach parity with the United States in five to 10 years if it chose to do so—even after supplying all of China’s civilian power reactors and meeting demand for exports. China is also operating a reprocessing plant and building another one capable of separating enough plutonium from spent reactor fuel to make an additional 500 nuclear warheads a year. On top of that, China plans to buy another plant from France that would allow it to produce enough plutonium for a further 1,600 nuclear warheads per year. None of this makes economic sense—it would be far cheaper for China to use uranium to fuel its power reactors. Why, then, is it launching such a massive reprocessing effort?The heightened potential for false alarms that comes with such a posture is hardly conducive to strategic stability.
It is unclear. Beijing has not signaled any intent to grow its warhead stockpile so precipitously. The accepted wisdom is that China is not interested in racing to achieve nuclear parity with Russia or the United States but desires to maintain the option to do so. This would go some way toward making sense of Chinese plans. But again, Beijing has not yet explained itself.
The third and final mystery are China’s anti-satellite efforts. Like its other official pronouncements, China’s repeated avowals to keep space peaceful sound reassuring. Its actions in space, however, are anything but. According to the U.S. Defense Department, China is developing space-based early warning reconnaissance capabilities that would enable a shift to a launch-on-warning nuclear posture—which involves heightened readiness, improved surveillance, and streamlined decision-making to enable a rapid response in case of attack. The heightened potential for false alarms that comes with such a posture is hardly conducive to strategic stability. Meanwhile, China’s anti-satellite capabilities—its ground-based lasers, anti-satellite missiles, and robot satellite killer operations—raise fears that China might, in the event of a crisis, blind or destroy America’s own key military satellites.
In other words, instead of the official doctrine of embracing space as a global commons to which all have free access, China may well join Russia in contesting the domain and accelerating the arms race in space. Why? The operational logic for China doing so is clear: Effective Chinese anti-satellite weapons will make it harder for U.S. forces to maintain intelligence operations and battlefield communications in case of a conflict in the Pacific. Unfortunately, China’s investment in anti-satellite capabilities also heightens U.S. and allied fears of a Chinese first strike (nuclear or conventional). Here, too, it would be useful to understand China’s thinking.
For U.S. policymakers grappling with these three mysteries, the greatest frustration has been the endless stonewalling by their Chinese interlocutors. When bilateral talks have happened in the past, they have too often focused on nuclear terrorism, the security of nuclear materials, and questions of declaratory policy. For years, Chinese officials have refused to engage in meaningful dialogue that could give clarity on the issues described above. But dialogue is what is necessary if both countries are to gain a better understanding of the strategic capabilities in which the other is investing and why.
Toward this end, the Trump administration should make pursuit of a new strategic capabilities dialogue a key goal for 2020. Certainly, Beijing has concerns about the United States coming to its own conclusions about these mysteries—for Washington, any responsible assessment will require at least some consideration of a worst-case scenario. China has an opportunity to shape those assessments. Continuing to eschew that opportunity is unlikely to be in China’s interest. Convincing Beijing of that is the task at hand.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-13--Christianity Has Been Handling Epidemics for 2000 Years

Christianity Has Been Handling Epidemics for 2000 Years The modern world has suddenly become reacquainted with the oldest traveling companion of human history : existential dread and the fear of unavoidable , inscrutable death .
No vaccine or antibiotic will save us for the time being .
Because this experience has become foreign to modern people , we are , by and large , psychologically and culturally underequipped for the current coronavirus pandemic .
To find the moral resources to tackle COVID-19 , both its possible death toll and the fear that stalks our communities alongside the disease , we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the past .
For me , that means examining how people of my tradition , Christians , and especially Lutherans , have handled the plagues of the past .
And while people of all faiths , and none , are facing the disease , the distinctive approach to epidemics Christians have adopted over time is worth dusting off .
The Christian response to plagues begins with some of Jesus ’ s most famous teachings : “ Do unto others as you would have them do unto you ” ; “ Love your @ @ @ @ @ @ @ love has no man than this , that he should lay down his life for his friends.
” Put plainly , the Christian ethic in a time of plague considers that our own life must always be regarded as less important than that of our neighbor .
During plague periods in the Roman Empire , Christians made a name for themselves .
Historians have suggested that the terrible Antonine Plague of the 2nd century , which might have killed off a quarter of the Roman Empire , led to the spread of Christianity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and offered an spiritual model whereby plagues were not the work of angry and capricious deities but the product of a broken Creation in revolt against a loving God .
But the more famous epidemic is the Plague of Cyprian , named for a bishop who gave a colorful account of this disease in his sermons .
Probably a disease related to Ebola , the Plague of Cyprian helped set off the Crisis of the Third Century in the Roman world .
But it did something else , too : It triggered the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s sermons told Christians not to grieve for plague victims ( who live in heaven ) , but to redouble efforts to care for the living .
His fellow bishop Dionysius described how Christians , “ Heedless of danger … took charge of the sick , attending to their every need.
” Nor was it just Christians who noted this reaction of Christians to the plague .
A century later , the actively pagan Emperor Julian would complain bitterly of how “ the Galileans ” would care for even non-Christian sick people , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Christians ensured that “ good was done to all men , not merely to the household of faith.
” The sociologist and religious demographer Rodney Stark claims that death rates in cities with Christian communities may have been just half that of other cities .
This habit of sacrificial care has reappeared throughout history .
In 1527 , when the bubonic plague hit Wittenberg , Martin Luther refused calls to flee the city and protect himself .
Rather , he stayed and ministered to the sick .
The refusal to flee cost his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ produced a tract , “ Whether Christians Should Flee the Plague , ” where Luther provides a clear articulation of the Christian epidemic response : We die at our posts .
Christian doctors can not abandon their hospitals , Christian governors can not flee their districts , Christian pastors can not abandon their congregations .
The plague does not dissolve our duties : It turns them to crosses , on which we must be prepared to die .
For Christians , it is better that we should die serving our neighbor than surrounded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ got a chance to use .
And if we care for each other , if we share masks and hand soap and canned foods , if we “ are our brother ’ s keeper , ” we might actually reduce the death toll , too .
To modern people acquainted with the germ theory of disease , this can all sound a bit foolish .
Caring for the sick sounds nice , but it ’ s as likely to infect others as to save lives .
In an intensely professionalized medical environment , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of care ?
Here , a second element of the Christian approach appears : strict rules against suicide and self-harm .
Our bodies are gifts from God and must be protected .
Or , as Luther says in his essay on the topic , we must not “ tempt God.
” The catechism Luther wrote for Christian instruction elaborates on the Fifth Commandment ( “ Though shalt not murder ” ) by saying that this actually means we must never even endanger others through our negligence or recklessness .
Luther ’ s essay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fumigate their houses , and take precautions to avoid spreading the sickness .
The Christian motive for hygiene and sanitation does not arise in self-preservation but in an ethic of service to our neighbor .
We wish to care for the afflicted , which first and foremost means not infecting the healthy .
Early Christians created the first hospitals in Europe as hygienic places to provide care during times of plague , on the understanding that negligence that spread disease further was , in fact , murder .
Since religious bodies in South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong , and even Washington , D.C. , have been at the forefront of coronavirus transmission , this injunction is worth remembering .
Motivated by this concern , I have prepared an exhaustive handbook for churches about how they can fortify their services to reduce coronavirus transmission , informed by guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and my experiences working as a missionary in Hong Kong .
The first sacrifice Christians must make to care for our neighbor is our convenience , as we enthusiastically participate in aggressive sanitation measures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ humble care for others is a powerful force .
I ’ ve seen it at work in my neighbors in Hong Kong , whatever their beliefs .
The ubiquitous surgical masks may not actually prevent infection , but they serve as a visible reminder that we ’ re all watching each other ’ s backs .
When good sanitary procedure stops being about saving our own skin and starts being about loving our neighbor , it becomes not just life-saving but soul-enlivening .
This brings me to one of the more controversial elements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t cancel church .
The whole motivation of personal sacrifice to care for others , and other-regarding measures to reduce infection , presupposes the existence of a community in which we ’ re all stakeholders .
Even as we take communion from separate plates and cups to minimize risk , forgo hand-shaking or hugging , and sit at a distance from each other , we still commune .
Some observers will view this as a kind of fanaticism : Christians are so obsessed with church-going that they ’ ll risk epidemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s not that at all .
The coronavirus leaves over 95 percent of its victims still breathing .
But it leaves virtually every member of society afraid , anxious , isolated , alone , and wondering if anyone would even notice if they ’ re gone .
In an increasingly atomized society , the coronavirus could rapidly mutate into an epidemic of despair .
Church attendance serves as a societal roll call , especially for older people : Those who don ’ t show up should be checked on during the week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public gatherings , sports and hobbies , or even the outside world at all , humans do poorly .
We need the moral and mental support of communities to be the decent people we all aspire to be .
The Christian choice to defend the weekly gathering at church is not , then , a superstitious fancy .
It ’ s a clear-eyed , rational choice to balance trade-offs : We forgo other activities and take great pains to be as clean as possible so that we can meaningfully gather to support each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the citizens of Wuhan , China , can attest—and perhaps soon the people of Italy—life can quickly become unendurable .
Even non-Christians who eschew church-going can appreciate the importance of maintaining just one lifeline to a community of mutual care and support .
Be eager to sacrifice for others , even at the cost of your own life .
Obsessively maintain a scrupulous hygienic routine to avoid infecting others .
Maintain a lifeline to a meaningful human community that can care for your mind and soul .
These are the guiding stars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for millennia .
As the world belatedly wakes up to the fact that the age of epidemics is not over , these ancient ideas still have modern relevance .

The modern world has suddenly become reacquainted with the oldest traveling companion of human history: existential dread and the fear of unavoidable, inscrutable death. No vaccine or antibiotic will save us for the time being. Because this experience has become foreign to modern people, we are, by and large, psychologically and culturally underequipped for the current coronavirus pandemic.
The modern world has suddenly become reacquainted with the oldest traveling companion of human history: existential dread and the fear of unavoidable, inscrutable death. No vaccine or antibiotic will save us for the time being. Because this experience has become foreign to modern people, we are, by and large, psychologically and culturally underequipped for the current coronavirus pandemic.
To find the moral resources to tackle COVID-19, both its possible death toll and the fear that stalks our communities alongside the disease, we have to look at the resources built in the past. For me, that means examining how people of my tradition, Christians, and especially Lutherans, have handled the plagues of the past. And while people of all faiths, and none, are facing the disease, the distinctive approach to epidemics Christians have adopted over time is worth dusting off.
The Christian response to plagues begins with some of Jesus’s most famous teachings: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”; “Love your neighbor as yourself”; “Greater love has no man than this, that he should lay down his life for his friends.” Put plainly, the Christian ethic in a time of plague considers that our own life must always be regarded as less important than that of our neighbor.
During plague periods in the Roman Empire, Christians made a name for themselves. Historians have suggested that the terrible Antonine Plague of the 2nd century, which might have killed off a quarter of the Roman Empire, led to the spread of Christianity, as Christians cared for the sick and offered an spiritual model whereby plagues were not the work of angry and capricious deities but the product of a broken Creation in revolt against a loving God.
But the more famous epidemic is the Plague of Cyprian, named for a bishop who gave a colorful account of this disease in his sermons. Probably a disease related to Ebola, the Plague of Cyprian helped set off the Crisis of the Third Century in the Roman world. But it did something else, too: It triggered the explosive growth of Christianity. Cyprian’s sermons told Christians not to grieve for plague victims (who live in heaven), but to redouble efforts to care for the living. His fellow bishop Dionysius described how Christians, “Heedless of danger … took charge of the sick, attending to their every need.”
Nor was it just Christians who noted this reaction of Christians to the plague. A century later, the actively pagan Emperor Julian would complain bitterly of how “the Galileans” would care for even non-Christian sick people, while the church historian Pontianus recounts how Christians ensured that “good was done to all men, not merely to the household of faith.” The sociologist and religious demographer Rodney Stark claims that death rates in cities with Christian communities may have been just half that of other cities.
This habit of sacrificial care has reappeared throughout history. In 1527, when the bubonic plague hit Wittenberg, Martin Luther refused calls to flee the city and protect himself. Rather, he stayed and ministered to the sick. The refusal to flee cost his daughter Elizabeth her life. But it produced a tract, “Whether Christians Should Flee the Plague,” where Luther provides a clear articulation of the Christian epidemic response: We die at our posts. Christian doctors cannot abandon their hospitals, Christian governors cannot flee their districts, Christian pastors cannot abandon their congregations. The plague does not dissolve our duties: It turns them to crosses, on which we must be prepared to die.
For Christians, it is better that we should die serving our neighbor than surrounded in a pile of masks we never got a chance to use. And if we care for each other, if we share masks and hand soap and canned foods, if we “are our brother’s keeper,” we might actually reduce the death toll, too.
To modern people acquainted with the germ theory of disease, this can all sound a bit foolish. Caring for the sick sounds nice, but it’s as likely to infect others as to save lives. In an intensely professionalized medical environment, should common people really assume a burden of care?
Here, a second element of the Christian approach appears: strict rules against suicide and self-harm. Our bodies are gifts from God and must be protected. Or, as Luther says in his essay on the topic, we must not “tempt God.” The catechism Luther wrote for Christian instruction elaborates on the Fifth Commandment (“Though shalt not murder”) by saying that this actually means we must never even endanger others through our negligence or recklessness. Luther’s essay encourages believers to obey quarantine orders, fumigate their houses, and take precautions to avoid spreading the sickness.
The Christian motive for hygiene and sanitation does not arise in self-preservation but in an ethic of service to our neighbor. We wish to care for the afflicted, which first and foremost means not infecting the healthy. Early Christians created the first hospitals in Europe as hygienic places to provide care during times of plague, on the understanding that negligence that spread disease further was, in fact, murder.
Since religious bodies in South Korea, Singapore, Iran, Hong Kong, and even Washington, D.C., have been at the forefront of coronavirus transmission, this injunction is worth remembering. Motivated by this concern, I have prepared an exhaustive handbook for churches about how they can fortify their services to reduce coronavirus transmission, informed by guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and my experiences working as a missionary in Hong Kong. The first sacrifice Christians must make to care for our neighbor is our convenience, as we enthusiastically participate in aggressive sanitation measures and social distancing.
This kind of humble care for others is a powerful force. I’ve seen it at work in my neighbors in Hong Kong, whatever their beliefs. The ubiquitous surgical masks may not actually prevent infection, but they serve as a visible reminder that we’re all watching each other’s backs. When good sanitary procedure stops being about saving our own skin and starts being about loving our neighbor, it becomes not just life-saving but soul-enlivening.
This brings me to one of the more controversial elements of historic Christian plague ethics: We don’t cancel church. The whole motivation of personal sacrifice to care for others, and other-regarding measures to reduce infection, presupposes the existence of a community in which we’re all stakeholders. Even as we take communion from separate plates and cups to minimize risk, forgo hand-shaking or hugging, and sit at a distance from each other, we still commune.
Some observers will view this as a kind of fanaticism: Christians are so obsessed with church-going that they’ll risk epidemic disease to show up.
But it’s not that at all. The coronavirus leaves over 95 percent of its victims still breathing. But it leaves virtually every member of society afraid, anxious, isolated, alone, and wondering if anyone would even notice if they’re gone. In an increasingly atomized society, the coronavirus could rapidly mutate into an epidemic of despair. Church attendance serves as a societal roll call, especially for older people: Those who don’t show up should be checked on during the week. Bereft of work, school, public gatherings, sports and hobbies, or even the outside world at all, humans do poorly. We need the moral and mental support of communities to be the decent people we all aspire to be.
The Christian choice to defend the weekly gathering at church is not, then, a superstitious fancy. It’s a clear-eyed, rational choice to balance trade-offs: We forgo other activities and take great pains to be as clean as possible so that we can meaningfully gather to support each other. Without this moral support, as the citizens of Wuhan, China, can attest—and perhaps soon the people of Italy—life can quickly become unendurable. Even non-Christians who eschew church-going can appreciate the importance of maintaining just one lifeline to a community of mutual care and support.
Be eager to sacrifice for others, even at the cost of your own life. Obsessively maintain a scrupulous hygienic routine to avoid infecting others. Maintain a lifeline to a meaningful human community that can care for your mind and soul. These are the guiding stars that have shepherded Christians through countless plagues for millennia. As the world belatedly wakes up to the fact that the age of epidemics is not over, these ancient ideas still have modern relevance.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-13--Anti-Trumpism Is Now Enough

Anti-Trumpism Is Now Enough

Anti-Trumpism Is Now Enough I was in Paris in the spring of 2017 when the French voted in their first round of presidential elections .
Friends of mine who typically voted for the Socialist party announced at dinner parties that they would be casting a vote utile—a practical vote , rather than an act of conviction—for the liberal upstart Emmanuel Macron .
In the face of the very real threat from right-wing nationalist—fascist , they said—Marine Le Pen , they were affirming the republican values the French cherish : secularism , tolerance , free speech .
I recall this episode @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is what American Democrats are now doing as they rally around Joe Biden .
The former vice president has done virtually nothing to provoke the massive shift of votes from Bernie Sanders ’ s column to his own ; he is the beneficiary of the vote utile .
If that ’ s right , then it appears that Americans—at least a meaningful number of us—needed four years of Donald Trump to arrive at the understanding the French achieved with no special prompting .
The French election featured five chief candidates : Macron and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Benoît Hamon , the center-right Republican François Fillon , and the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon , a standard-bearer , like Bernie Sanders , of anti-globalization forces .
Only two candidates would make it into the runoff .
Le Pen was a lock for one of those positions .
While Mélenchon ’ s support among angry workers and ideological leftists held steady , Macron benefited from a mass flight by Hamon supporters , who decided they could live with liberalism , and a more modest exodus by backers of Fillon , who appealed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the final round , while many Mélenchon voters stayed home or cast a spoiled ballot , the center-left and -right gravitated en masse to Macron , who won two out of every three votes .
Le Pen did herself no favors with a dreadful performance in a debate with Macron , a mental test that the French take very seriously .
But a better showing would only have slightly reduced Macron ’ s margin of victory .
Fear of fascism did the rest .
Only the oldest French citizens remember the collaborationist government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shame of that time remain deep in France ’ s collective imagination .
Nor have the French forgotten the reactionary populist movement known as Poujadism , which burned brightly in the mid-1950s .
France , in short , did not need a recent experience of anti-liberal rule to stimulate republican antibodies .
The same may well be true in Spain , which exited from Francisco Franco ’ s fascist state only 45 years ago and has , so far , experienced less virulent right-wing nationalism than other major European states .
In Italy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Matteo Salvini rose to a position of unrivaled influence in a coalition with eccentric leftists before overplaying his hand and falling from power .
Since Salvini remains easily the most popular political figure in the country , it is very premature to say that Italy has seen enough of his brand of anti-immigrant authoritarianism to bring back uneasy memories of Benito Mussolini .
( Or , worse still , those memories have become increasingly rosy . )
We are still very much in the middle of this epoch of reactionary populism .
Neither @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Poland has worn out his welcome .
In Brazil , Jair Bolsonaro ’ s support has plummeted almost from the time he took office , but the disgust with conventional politics there is so deep and widespread that he might not even need to muzzle or jail his opponents to win re-election .
In a recent poll , Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines , the craziest of all the right-wing populists , registered a stupefying favorability rating of 87 percent .
The obvious conclusion is that susceptibility to this political virus , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both on recent history and current political culture .
One reason why Americans did not rally in 2016 as the French did in 2017 is that they were more complacent in the face of an illiberal threat they had neither seen before nor recalled from the past .
A hopeful thought is that voters needed to experience the virus for four years in order to be able to throw it off .
Biden has sought to make himself the carrier of that reaction .
With every passing day , and every new victory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy and more about “ restoring decency , dignity , and honor to the White House , ” as he did in the aftermath of his primary victories earlier this week .
He appears to be right in thinking that that ’ s what people most want to hear .
Biden could still make a mess of the debate with Sanders this Sunday and thus awaken new doubts about his candidacy .
Trump could , of course , eat Biden ’ s lunch in the general election .
But Biden ’ s chances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden victory would raise another intriguing question : What kind of mandate do you get after a triumph of negative partisanship ?
In this respect , Biden could enjoy a major advantage over Macron .
The latter ran not to keep Le Pen out of office but to change France—to liberalize French labor markets , the economy , and even values .
Despite gaining overwhelming majorities in the National Assembly , Macron has encountered furious public resistance to his agenda .
Macron wanted to change France , but he was elected to stop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , by contrast , would consummate Biden ’ s agenda , since it would confirm the national commitment to democratic ( we can ’ t say “ republican ” here ) values .
Biden is the proud candidate of the status quo ante .
He would “ restore ” things—our NATO alliances , our respect for the press , our faith in the rule of law , and so on .
Like Macron , he would face tough sledding once he tried to do anything beyond the modestly incremental .
He may , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mandate to reverse Trump ’ s tax cuts for the rich but not to seriously reform a tax system written by lobbyists for the benefit of big corporations .
“ Big structural change ” would have to await his successor .
I wonder if America ’ s experience will prove paradigmatic .
Will the U.K. , for example , have to endure a full term of Boris Johnson before some kind of party realignment makes it possible to elect a very different successor ?
Will that successor , too , play the restorationist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large-scale changes needed to adapt to a post-industrial , demographically transformed world ?
American progressives rightly claim that Biden seems to have no insight into the forces that caused half the country to vote for Trump .
Maybe the response needs to unfold in two stages : first the return to sanity , then the marshaling of public energies to confront wrenching questions .
First the symptoms , then the disease .
One thing is for sure : If Democrats do not eventually manage to address the underlying causes of American angst , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would-be savior .
We say it couldn ’ t be worse ; but what about Duterte ?

I was in Paris in the spring of 2017 when the French voted in their first round of presidential elections. Friends of mine who typically voted for the Socialist party announced at dinner parties that they would be casting a vote utile—a practical vote, rather than an act of conviction—for the liberal upstart Emmanuel Macron. In the face of the very real threat from right-wing nationalist—fascist, they said—Marine Le Pen, they were affirming the republican values the French cherish: secularism, tolerance, free speech.
I was in Paris in the spring of 2017 when the French voted in their first round of presidential elections. Friends of mine who typically voted for the Socialist party announced at dinner parties that they would be casting a vote utile—a practical vote, rather than an act of conviction—for the liberal upstart Emmanuel Macron. In the face of the very real threat from right-wing nationalist—fascist, they said—Marine Le Pen, they were affirming the republican values the French cherish: secularism, tolerance, free speech.
I recall this episode because it seems to me that this is what American Democrats are now doing as they rally around Joe Biden. The former vice president has done virtually nothing to provoke the massive shift of votes from Bernie Sanders’s column to his own; he is the beneficiary of the vote utile. If that’s right, then it appears that Americans—at least a meaningful number of us—needed four years of Donald Trump to arrive at the understanding the French achieved with no special prompting.
The French election featured five chief candidates: Macron and Le Pen, the Socialist Party’s Benoît Hamon, the center-right Republican François Fillon, and the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a standard-bearer, like Bernie Sanders, of anti-globalization forces. Only two candidates would make it into the runoff. Le Pen was a lock for one of those positions. While Mélenchon’s support among angry workers and ideological leftists held steady, Macron benefited from a mass flight by Hamon supporters, who decided they could live with liberalism, and a more modest exodus by backers of Fillon, who appealed to older and more religious voters. In the final round, while many Mélenchon voters stayed home or cast a spoiled ballot, the center-left and -right gravitated en masse to Macron, who won two out of every three votes.
Le Pen did herself no favors with a dreadful performance in a debate with Macron, a mental test that the French take very seriously. But a better showing would only have slightly reduced Macron’s margin of victory. Fear of fascism did the rest. Only the oldest French citizens remember the collaborationist government of Vichy, but the horror and shame of that time remain deep in France’s collective imagination. Nor have the French forgotten the reactionary populist movement known as Poujadism, which burned brightly in the mid-1950s.
France, in short, did not need a recent experience of anti-liberal rule to stimulate republican antibodies. The same may well be true in Spain, which exited from Francisco Franco’s fascist state only 45 years ago and has, so far, experienced less virulent right-wing nationalism than other major European states. In Italy, by contrast, the populist rabble-rouser Matteo Salvini rose to a position of unrivaled influence in a coalition with eccentric leftists before overplaying his hand and falling from power. Since Salvini remains easily the most popular political figure in the country, it is very premature to say that Italy has seen enough of his brand of anti-immigrant authoritarianism to bring back uneasy memories of Benito Mussolini. (Or, worse still, those memories have become increasingly rosy.)
We are still very much in the middle of this epoch of reactionary populism. Neither Viktor Orbán in Hungary nor Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland has worn out his welcome. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro’s support has plummeted almost from the time he took office, but the disgust with conventional politics there is so deep and widespread that he might not even need to muzzle or jail his opponents to win re-election. In a recent poll, Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, the craziest of all the right-wing populists, registered a stupefying favorability rating of 87 percent.
The obvious conclusion is that susceptibility to this political virus, and a subsequent immune response, depend both on recent history and current political culture. One reason why Americans did not rally in 2016 as the French did in 2017 is that they were more complacent in the face of an illiberal threat they had neither seen before nor recalled from the past. A hopeful thought is that voters needed to experience the virus for four years in order to be able to throw it off. Biden has sought to make himself the carrier of that reaction. With every passing day, and every new victory, he seems to say less about policy and more about “restoring decency, dignity, and honor to the White House,” as he did in the aftermath of his primary victories earlier this week. He appears to be right in thinking that that’s what people most want to hear.
Biden could still make a mess of the debate with Sanders this Sunday and thus awaken new doubts about his candidacy. Trump could, of course, eat Biden’s lunch in the general election. But Biden’s chances look better all the time. A Biden victory would raise another intriguing question: What kind of mandate do you get after a triumph of negative partisanship?
In this respect, Biden could enjoy a major advantage over Macron. The latter ran not to keep Le Pen out of office but to change France—to liberalize French labor markets, the economy, and even values. Despite gaining overwhelming majorities in the National Assembly, Macron has encountered furious public resistance to his agenda. Macron wanted to change France, but he was elected to stop LePen.
The very act of winning, by contrast, would consummate Biden’s agenda, since it would confirm the national commitment to democratic (we can’t say “republican” here) values. Biden is the proud candidate of the status quo ante. He would “restore” things—our NATO alliances, our respect for the press, our faith in the rule of law, and so on. Like Macron, he would face tough sledding once he tried to do anything beyond the modestly incremental. He may, for example, have enough of a mandate to reverse Trump’s tax cuts for the rich but not to seriously reform a tax system written by lobbyists for the benefit of big corporations. “Big structural change” would have to await his successor.
I wonder if America’s experience will prove paradigmatic. Will the U.K., for example, have to endure a full term of Boris Johnson before some kind of party realignment makes it possible to elect a very different successor? Will that successor, too, play the restorationist role, postponing for another day the large-scale changes needed to adapt to a post-industrial, demographically transformed world? American progressives rightly claim that Biden seems to have no insight into the forces that caused half the country to vote for Trump. Maybe the response needs to unfold in two stages: first the return to sanity, then the marshaling of public energies to confront wrenching questions. First the symptoms, then the disease.
One thing is for sure: If Democrats do not eventually manage to address the underlying causes of American angst, frustrated voters will look for another loud-mouthed would-be savior. We say it couldn’t be worse; but what about Duterte?


foreignpolicy--2020-03-13--Did Trump Cave to the Taliban?

Did Trump Cave to the Taliban?

Did Trump Cave to the Taliban ?
In mid-February , as talks with the Taliban were nearing completion , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was asked a direct question by Democratic Rep. Tom Malinowski : Would the new truce commit the Afghan government , which wasn ’ t party to the negotiations , to releasing Taliban prisoners ?
It would not , Pompeo responded during the back-and-forth at the Munich Security Conference .
But in the end , the deal did .
Not only that , but the Taliban managed to extract a commitment from the U.S. side—without consulting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ up to ” 5,000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for only 1,000 captives from the Afghan national forces .
The disproportionate release was to have taken place by March 10 , which was also supposed to be the start of the intra-Afghan peace talks that the American side insists are central to the agreement .
Now that eleventh-hour U.S. concession threatens to blow up the peace talks , which are stalled .
On Wednesday the Taliban rejected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani ’ s offer to release 1,500 prisoners ahead of talks , saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could start .
To some critics of the U.S.-Taliban deal , like Malinowski , the concession was emblematic of a deeply flawed agreement that could ultimately cede Afghanistan back to the Taliban after 18 years of immense American expense and bloodshed—a defeat that could be a model for anti-American insurgencies around the world .
“ You could not go further in delegitimizing the Afghan government , ” former U.S .
Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker told Foreign Policy .
“ To agree on behalf of the government of Afghanistan for early prisoner release @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Is further derogation of their sovereignty .
One thing you do not do is put 5,000 fighters back in the battle before you ’ ve even started a [ peace ] negotiation.
” Since the truce was signed Feb. 29 , the Taliban have made clear they do not consider the war against Afghan national forces to be over , having launched dozens of fresh attacks on Afghans even as they avoid assaults on U.S. forces .
In a statement on March 10 , a State Department spokesperson , Morgan Ortagus , blamed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confusion inside the Afghan government , with Ghani and his political rival , Abdullah Abdullah , conducting dual inaugurations this week after a disputed election , as well as on Taliban violence .
But Ortagus did not mention the ongoing dispute over the prisoner swap .
“ While preparations for intra-Afghan negotiations are underway , the Presidential electoral crisis in Afghanistan has delayed the naming of a national negotiating team , ” Ortagus said .
“ President Ghani has told us he is consulting with Dr. Abdullah and other Afghan leaders and will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ few days .
Other challenges remain .
The current high level of violence by the Taliban is unacceptable .
We acknowledge the Taliban have taken steps to stop attacks against the Coalition and in cities .
But they are killing too many Afghans in the countryside .
This must change.
” The State Department did not respond to a request for comment on the prisoner swap , but the concession was believed to be a last-minute offer made by U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad to the Taliban and their Pakistani allies , who were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump ’ s withdrawal plans , according to a former senior regional official familiar with the talks .
“ That does strike me as the most credible explanation , ” Malinowski told Foreign Policy .
“ It doesn ’ t make sense that Pompeo would just lie to me .
My impression is that he could just as easily have said , ‘ I can ’ t answer that question because the deal is not finalized , ’ but he went out of his way to say , ‘ I assure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ” The Feb. 29 deal was followed by a phone call between Trump and Taliban political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar , after which Trump called it a “ good talk ” and reportedly sought to put pressure on Ghani , who had refused initially to honor a prisoner release pact in which he had no part .
Reuters reported earlier this week that Ghani agreed to release some Taliban prisoners in exchange for a U.S. endorsement of his inauguration , which Khalilzad attended .
Even so , the U.S.-Taliban agreement still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government , referring vaguely to the “ future political roadmap of Afghanistan ” and calling only for a “ new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government.
” Some critics of the deal , such as former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani , say it is fatally full of holes—including the central concession of the Taliban that they will not permit al Qaeda to return to Afghanistan .
“ All the Taliban are committing to is not allowing al Qaeda and other groups to have territory under their control .
They can always say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” he said .
In a statement this week , Pompeo welcomed Ghani ’ s cooperation .
“ Conscious of the yearning of the Afghan people for peace , the United States is working to achieve an agreement by the two sides and will remain steadfast in the effort to drive all parties toward that goal , ” he said .

In mid-February, as talks with the Taliban were nearing completion, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was asked a direct question by Democratic Rep. Tom Malinowski: Would the new truce commit the Afghan government, which wasn’t party to the negotiations, to releasing Taliban prisoners?
In mid-February, as talks with the Taliban were nearing completion, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was asked a direct question by Democratic Rep. Tom Malinowski: Would the new truce commit the Afghan government, which wasn’t party to the negotiations, to releasing Taliban prisoners?
It would not, Pompeo responded during the back-and-forth at the Munich Security Conference. But in the end, the deal did. Not only that, but the Taliban managed to extract a commitment from the U.S. side—without consulting the Afghan government—to force Kabul to release “up to” 5,000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for only 1,000 captives from the Afghan national forces. The disproportionate release was to have taken place by March 10, which was also supposed to be the start of the intra-Afghan peace talks that the American side insists are central to the agreement.
Now that eleventh-hour U.S. concession threatens to blow up the peace talks, which are stalled. On Wednesday the Taliban rejected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s offer to release 1,500 prisoners ahead of talks, saying they wanted all 5,000 freed before negotiations could start.
To some critics of the U.S.-Taliban deal, like Malinowski, the concession was emblematic of a deeply flawed agreement that could ultimately cede Afghanistan back to the Taliban after 18 years of immense American expense and bloodshed—a defeat that could be a model for anti-American insurgencies around the world.
“You could not go further in delegitimizing the Afghan government,” former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker told Foreign Policy. “To agree on behalf of the government of Afghanistan for early prisoner release and not to consult with the government Is further derogation of their sovereignty. One thing you do not do is put 5,000 fighters back in the battle before you’ve even started a [peace] negotiation.”
Since the truce was signed Feb. 29, the Taliban have made clear they do not consider the war against Afghan national forces to be over, having launched dozens of fresh attacks on Afghans even as they avoid assaults on U.S. forces.
In a statement on March 10, a State Department spokesperson, Morgan Ortagus, blamed the delay in peace talks on the confusion inside the Afghan government, with Ghani and his political rival, Abdullah Abdullah, conducting dual inaugurations this week after a disputed election, as well as on Taliban violence. But Ortagus did not mention the ongoing dispute over the prisoner swap.
“While preparations for intra-Afghan negotiations are underway, the Presidential electoral crisis in Afghanistan has delayed the naming of a national negotiating team,” Ortagus said. “President Ghani has told us he is consulting with Dr. Abdullah and other Afghan leaders and will announce an inclusive team in the coming few days. Other challenges remain. The current high level of violence by the Taliban is unacceptable. We acknowledge the Taliban have taken steps to stop attacks against the Coalition and in cities. But they are killing too many Afghans in the countryside. This must change.”
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment on the prisoner swap, but the concession was believed to be a last-minute offer made by U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad to the Taliban and their Pakistani allies, who were threatening to walk away and jeopardize U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal plans, according to a former senior regional official familiar with the talks.
“That does strike me as the most credible explanation,” Malinowski told Foreign Policy. “It doesn’t make sense that Pompeo would just lie to me. My impression is that he could just as easily have said, ‘I can’t answer that question because the deal is not finalized,’ but he went out of his way to say, ‘I assure you it’s not in there.’”
The Feb. 29 deal was followed by a phone call between Trump and Taliban political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, after which Trump called it a “good talk” and reportedly sought to put pressure on Ghani, who had refused initially to honor a prisoner release pact in which he had no part. Reuters reported earlier this week that Ghani agreed to release some Taliban prisoners in exchange for a U.S. endorsement of his inauguration, which Khalilzad attended.
Even so, the U.S.-Taliban agreement still guarantees no role for the current elected government, referring vaguely to the “future political roadmap of Afghanistan” and calling only for a “new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government.”
Some critics of the deal, such as former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani, say it is fatally full of holes—including the central concession of the Taliban that they will not permit al Qaeda to return to Afghanistan. “All the Taliban are committing to is not allowing al Qaeda and other groups to have territory under their control. They can always say there is territory we do not control,” he said.
In a statement this week, Pompeo welcomed Ghani’s cooperation. “Conscious of the yearning of the Afghan people for peace, the United States is working to achieve an agreement by the two sides and will remain steadfast in the effort to drive all parties toward that goal,” he said.