foreignpolicy--2020-07-09--Erdogan Is Libya’s Man Without a Plan

Erdogan Is Libya’s Man Without a Plan

To a group of supporters in London in late 2019 , Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared : “ Today , Turkey can launch an operation to protect its national security without seeking permission from anyone.
” It was stock-and-trade late Erdogan-era theatrics—grievance interlaced with ambition .
In the past , this kind of breast-beating might have been dismissed as politics , but this time the Turkish leader is not posturing .
It has been an unusually active and assertive moment in Turkish foreign policy , even by the standards set by the ruling Justice and Development Party ( AKP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power .
Yet unlike the “ zero problems ” principle of yore , which relied on Turkey ’ s power as a trading state and its good relations with all the players in the Middle East , Ankara has increasingly militarized its approach to the region in addition to its longer-term aggressive policies in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean .
In each of these areas , the Turks have raised the ire of some combination of the European Union , members of NATO , the United Nations , and the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been little more than hand-wringing , proving Erdogan correct that Turkey can shape its foreign-policy environment .
Ankara is no longer content to be just an asset to the trans-Atlantic alliance or an aspiring member of Europe but a power in its own right .
This is an achievement—but only a partial one .
For all the power and military swagger that Ankara has acquired , it is untethered from a coherent strategy , which may very well be Turkey ’ s undoing .
Nowhere has Turkey ’ s securitized foreign policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Last November , the Turks and Libya ’ s internationally recognized government agreed to demarcate their respective maritime jurisdictions .
The memorandum of understanding was expansive and had no basis in fact or international law—akin to drawing arbitrary lines on a map that split the Mediterranean .
The next month , the Government of National Accord in Tripoli requested Turkish military help to beat back the Libyan National Army under the command of Gen. Khalifa Haftar , who has sought to overthrow the Tripoli government .
Soon Turkish forces arrived , along @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been promised cash and Turkish citizenship to join the fight .
It is clear what is in the relationship for leaders in Tripoli , but it is less immediately apparent why Erdogan—who is struggling with economic problems and the attendant challenges of the coronavirus pandemic—would embark on a military adventure 1,200 miles from Ankara .
What Turkish interest could it possibly serve ?
Setting aside potential lucrative rebuilding contracts for Turkish firms , a combination of Turkish politics and three related geopolitical interests is behind Turkey ’ s willingness to wade into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Erdogan has long sought to highlight that principle drives Turkish foreign policy during the AKP era .
Like Ankara ’ s advocacy for Palestinian rights , its insistence that Syria ’ s Bashar al-Assad must go , and its opposition to Egypt ’ s July 2013 coup , support for the U.N.-recognized government in Libya was consistent with the idea that Erdogan has sought to cultivate that Ankara stands apart from international actors in its effort to uphold norms and standards .
Of course it is a self-serving narrative , but that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the ruling party ’ s base and allows Turkey ’ s supine press to laud their leader .
This is important as Erdogan looks ahead to 2023 elections with a persistently weak economy .
Second , Ankara ’ s moves in Libya are actually countermoves to the burgeoning ties among Greece , Egypt , Cyprus , and Israel .
Officially , there is no security component to what is intended to be a consortium to exploit gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean , but given each of these countries ’ strained—at best—relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to see in these ties what international relations scholars call “ bandwagoning.
” In addition , when the Turks looked at the combination of these growing ties , which have American support , and the interlocking nature of Greek , Egyptian , Cypriot , and Israeli exclusive economic zones , they could reasonably conclude that their freedom of navigation in the area could be choked off .
Third , Libya is a place where Turkey can challenge its two most ardent regional foes—Egypt and the United Arab Emirates .
The issues that divide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The two countries are on opposite sides of the major issues roiling the Middle East including Syria , Gaza , and the blockade of Qatar .
Turkey is also a leading supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood , permitting its Egyptian members to set up shop in Istanbul and beam anti-Egyptian regime propaganda around the world .
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Erdogan evince such disdain for each other that it has become somewhat of a spectator sport for analysts to observe the two leaders trolling each other at the annual meeting of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Libya is , of course , Egypt ’ s backyard , and because it believes that Islamists are part of the government in Tripoli , it has thrown its support behind Haftar .
In this , the Egyptians have had a partner in the UAE , which has played a major role in supporting Sisi and whose leader shares the Egyptian president ’ s antipathy for the Brotherhood , earning the ire of Erdogan .
The Turkish government and its mouthpieces in the press accuse the Emiratis of supporting the Kurdistan Workers ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ considers a terrorist organization ; backing al-Shabab in Somalia ; propping up Assad ; helping to destroy Yemen ; playing a role in the attempted 2016 coup in Turkey ; and generally sowing chaos around the Middle East .
A late May column in the ( very ) pro-Erdogan tribune Daily Sabah warned the Emiratis of unspecified revenge for these transgressions .
Apparently , there were few better places for the Turks to extract a pound of flesh from the Emiratis than in Libya .
For all the success the Turks have had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard to detect how rendering Tripoli a client of Ankara fits into an overall foreign and security policy strategy .
It is a statement of Turkey ’ s prowess and power , but it is not connected to a clear larger purpose other than national aggrandizement and revenge .
What makes the Libya adventure so striking is how far it deviates from a broader ( and more important ) set of Turkish foreign-policy and national security concerns that actually do make sense .
Whatever one thinks of Ankara ’ s military operations in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goals are clear and entirely rational—destroy the PKK and ensure that the Syrian civil war does not yield a Kurdish state along Turkey ’ s southern border that could threaten the country .
Similarly in the Aegean and in the Eastern Mediterranean , the Turks have been needlessly aggressive , but keeping Greece off balance , especially as its relations with the United States warm , and establishing a claim to Eastern Mediterranean gas are definable and , from the perspective of the presidential palace , entirely defensible goals .
Without a strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turks may find themselves exposed and overwhelmed .
It is not clear what makes Erdogan believe that he can discipline Libyan politics in a way that will end the country ’ s fragmentation and violence .
Even if Haftar waves the white flag , the Turks are setting themselves up to be the wards of a failing state .
Add to this the Egyptian and Emirati factors .
The Egyptians have a stake in Libya that it is going to make it hard for them to accommodate a robust Turkish presence next door @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may not have the same kind of technical proficiency as its Turkish counterpart , the Egyptians can bring a lot of force in terms of sheer numbers to bear in Libya .
Sisi ’ s late June warning about Egyptian red lines in Libya may be a bluff , but there is little doubt that they , along with the Emiratis , would be willing to use proxies to disrupt the Turks and their allies in Libya .
If it does not work with Haftar , they will find others .
Turkey has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new security strategy called “ Blue Homeland , ” which emerged from an anti-Western , fiercely nationalist , but pro-Russian worldview of a number of senior-ranking naval officers .
This toxic and confused brew is supposedly the guiding principle for Turkey ’ s more aggressive posture in the region , especially in the Mediterranean and Libya .
It is interesting—but only because it offers insight into the thinking of Turkey ’ s senior political and military leadership .
As a national strategy , it is mostly reactive and bound up in a combination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This isn ’ t to suggest that Turkish leaders are incapable of strategic thinking—just that Blue Homeland isn ’ t it .
So it should come as no surprise to anyone in Ankara that regional alliances have solidified against Turkey and that the Turkish military is engaged in an open-ended mission in Libya .
Having power is important , but what a country does with it is what matters .

To a group of supporters in London in late 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared: “Today, Turkey can launch an operation to protect its national security without seeking permission from anyone.” It was stock-and-trade late Erdogan-era theatrics—grievance interlaced with ambition. In the past, this kind of breast-beating might have been dismissed as politics, but this time the Turkish leader is not posturing.
To a group of supporters in London in late 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared: “Today, Turkey can launch an operation to protect its national security without seeking permission from anyone.” It was stock-and-trade late Erdogan-era theatrics—grievance interlaced with ambition. In the past, this kind of breast-beating might have been dismissed as politics, but this time the Turkish leader is not posturing.
It has been an unusually active and assertive moment in Turkish foreign policy, even by the standards set by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in its almost 18 years in power. Yet unlike the “zero problems” principle of yore, which relied on Turkey’s power as a trading state and its good relations with all the players in the Middle East, Ankara has increasingly militarized its approach to the region in addition to its longer-term aggressive policies in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. In each of these areas, the Turks have raised the ire of some combination of the European Union, members of NATO, the United Nations, and the United States, but the response from each has been little more than hand-wringing, proving Erdogan correct that Turkey can shape its foreign-policy environment. Ankara is no longer content to be just an asset to the trans-Atlantic alliance or an aspiring member of Europe but a power in its own right. This is an achievement—but only a partial one. For all the power and military swagger that Ankara has acquired, it is untethered from a coherent strategy, which may very well be Turkey’s undoing.
Nowhere has Turkey’s securitized foreign policy gained more recent attention than in Libya. Last November, the Turks and Libya’s internationally recognized government agreed to demarcate their respective maritime jurisdictions. The memorandum of understanding was expansive and had no basis in fact or international law—akin to drawing arbitrary lines on a map that split the Mediterranean. The next month, the Government of National Accord in Tripoli requested Turkish military help to beat back the Libyan National Army under the command of Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who has sought to overthrow the Tripoli government. Soon Turkish forces arrived, along with thousands of Syrian militia fighters who had been promised cash and Turkish citizenship to join the fight.
It is clear what is in the relationship for leaders in Tripoli, but it is less immediately apparent why Erdogan—who is struggling with economic problems and the attendant challenges of the coronavirus pandemic—would embark on a military adventure 1,200 miles from Ankara. What Turkish interest could it possibly serve? Setting aside potential lucrative rebuilding contracts for Turkish firms, a combination of Turkish politics and three related geopolitical interests is behind Turkey’s willingness to wade into Libya’s civil war.
First, Erdogan has long sought to highlight that principle drives Turkish foreign policy during the AKP era. Like Ankara’s advocacy for Palestinian rights, its insistence that Syria’s Bashar al-Assad must go, and its opposition to Egypt’s July 2013 coup, support for the U.N.-recognized government in Libya was consistent with the idea that Erdogan has sought to cultivate that Ankara stands apart from international actors in its effort to uphold norms and standards. Of course it is a self-serving narrative, but that is the point. It is good for the ruling party’s base and allows Turkey’s supine press to laud their leader. This is important as Erdogan looks ahead to 2023 elections with a persistently weak economy.
Second, Ankara’s moves in Libya are actually countermoves to the burgeoning ties among Greece, Egypt, Cyprus, and Israel. Officially, there is no security component to what is intended to be a consortium to exploit gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean, but given each of these countries’ strained—at best—relations with Turkey, it is hard not to see in these ties what international relations scholars call “bandwagoning.” In addition, when the Turks looked at the combination of these growing ties, which have American support, and the interlocking nature of Greek, Egyptian, Cypriot, and Israeli exclusive economic zones, they could reasonably conclude that their freedom of navigation in the area could be choked off.
Third, Libya is a place where Turkey can challenge its two most ardent regional foes—Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. The issues that divide Turkey and Egypt are well known. The two countries are on opposite sides of the major issues roiling the Middle East including Syria, Gaza, and the blockade of Qatar. Turkey is also a leading supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, permitting its Egyptian members to set up shop in Istanbul and beam anti-Egyptian regime propaganda around the world. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Erdogan evince such disdain for each other that it has become somewhat of a spectator sport for analysts to observe the two leaders trolling each other at the annual meeting of the U.N. General Assembly every September. Libya is, of course, Egypt’s backyard, and because it believes that Islamists are part of the government in Tripoli, it has thrown its support behind Haftar.
In this, the Egyptians have had a partner in the UAE, which has played a major role in supporting Sisi and whose leader shares the Egyptian president’s antipathy for the Brotherhood, earning the ire of Erdogan. The Turkish government and its mouthpieces in the press accuse the Emiratis of supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara considers a terrorist organization; backing al-Shabab in Somalia; propping up Assad; helping to destroy Yemen; playing a role in the attempted 2016 coup in Turkey; and generally sowing chaos around the Middle East. A late May column in the (very) pro-Erdogan tribune Daily Sabah warned the Emiratis of unspecified revenge for these transgressions. Apparently, there were few better places for the Turks to extract a pound of flesh from the Emiratis than in Libya.
For all the success the Turks have had so far in Libya, it is hard to detect how rendering Tripoli a client of Ankara fits into an overall foreign and security policy strategy. It is a statement of Turkey’s prowess and power, but it is not connected to a clear larger purpose other than national aggrandizement and revenge. What makes the Libya adventure so striking is how far it deviates from a broader (and more important) set of Turkish foreign-policy and national security concerns that actually do make sense. Whatever one thinks of Ankara’s military operations in Syria and Iraq, Turkey’s goals are clear and entirely rational—destroy the PKK and ensure that the Syrian civil war does not yield a Kurdish state along Turkey’s southern border that could threaten the country. Similarly in the Aegean and in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Turks have been needlessly aggressive, but keeping Greece off balance, especially as its relations with the United States warm, and establishing a claim to Eastern Mediterranean gas are definable and, from the perspective of the presidential palace, entirely defensible goals.
Without a strategy to guide them in Libya, the Turks may find themselves exposed and overwhelmed. It is not clear what makes Erdogan believe that he can discipline Libyan politics in a way that will end the country’s fragmentation and violence. Even if Haftar waves the white flag, the Turks are setting themselves up to be the wards of a failing state. Add to this the Egyptian and Emirati factors. The Egyptians have a stake in Libya that it is going to make it hard for them to accommodate a robust Turkish presence next door. And while Egypt’s military may not have the same kind of technical proficiency as its Turkish counterpart, the Egyptians can bring a lot of force in terms of sheer numbers to bear in Libya. Sisi’s late June warning about Egyptian red lines in Libya may be a bluff, but there is little doubt that they, along with the Emiratis, would be willing to use proxies to disrupt the Turks and their allies in Libya. If it does not work with Haftar, they will find others.
Turkey has been buzzing recently with talk of a new security strategy called “Blue Homeland,” which emerged from an anti-Western, fiercely nationalist, but pro-Russian worldview of a number of senior-ranking naval officers. This toxic and confused brew is supposedly the guiding principle for Turkey’s more aggressive posture in the region, especially in the Mediterranean and Libya. It is interesting—but only because it offers insight into the thinking of Turkey’s senior political and military leadership. As a national strategy, it is mostly reactive and bound up in a combination of grievances and romance about Turkish power. This isn’t to suggest that Turkish leaders are incapable of strategic thinking—just that Blue Homeland isn’t it.
So it should come as no surprise to anyone in Ankara that regional alliances have solidified against Turkey and that the Turkish military is engaged in an open-ended mission in Libya. Having power is important, but what a country does with it is what matters.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-09--Decolonize the State Department

Decolonize the State Department

The toppling of symbols of oppression—from King Leopold II ’ s statues in Belgium to Confederate monuments in the United States—has been a long time coming .
The former Belgian king was one of the cruelest leaders and colonizers in world history .
It ’ s fitting that statues honoring his legacy are being removed right as the Democratic Republic of the Congo—where his most violent crimes took place—celebrates 60 years of independence from Belgium on June 30 .
Monuments like those of Leopold are constant reminders of the dehumanization , exploitation , and silencing of Black people in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10 to 15 million Congolese were killed during Leopold ’ s reign of brutality .
Thanks to the Black Lives Matter movement , Belgium is beginning to publicly acknowledge the Congolese people ’ s suffering over the last 150 years , as the country finally listens to activists familiar with this pain .
Now it ’ s America ’ s turn to listen , particularly as it charts its own plans for foreign nations .
Calls for greater racial diversity are growing within the foreign-policy establishment .
As former U.S .
Ambassador to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the U.S. foreign-policy establishment is “ white , male , and Yale , ” and that must change .
But policymakers also need to ensure that as the field becomes more racially diverse , the contributions of diaspora communities are meaningful and robust .
One of the clearest ways to do so is to change the terms of who gets to develop formal policy .
Personnel is policy , and , as it stands , white foreign-policy experts dominate both the discussion and the decision-making .
But the United States is home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those from India , Nigeria , and Haiti , which possess specialized knowledge , lived experience , and expertise .
U.S. policymakers would be wise to seek out and include these voices .
With an approximate size of 4 million , the Indian diaspora has become influential in American politics and impacted U.S. foreign policy as a result .
Rep. Ami Bera currently serves as the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee ’ s Subcommittee on Asia , the Pacific , and Nonproliferation , and President Barack Obama appointed the first Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as U.S. ambassador to India in 2014 .
Former South Carolina Gov .
Nikki Haley also served as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. under President Donald Trump .
Though they make up only about 1 percent of the population , Indian Americans have been able to ascend to key foreign-policy roles in the last two decades and shape milestones in U.S.-India relations , including the U.S.-India nuclear deal under President George W Bush .
While Indian Americans are hardly a monolith , their growing influence in U.S.-India relations and American politics can not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump ’ s joint visit to Houston last year .
While the Indian diaspora has managed to gain a foothold in making policy , other large diaspora communities have been all but ignored .
As the United States finally reckons with institutionalized racism and seeks to eliminate it , policymakers must reevaluate who gets to sit at the table and who is being shut out .
The Congolese diaspora is an apt case in point .
The Second Congo War , from 1998 to 2003 , and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ World War II—with an estimated 5.4 million dead from violence , disease , and starvation by 2008 .
The violence stemming from this war continues to this day—which is why Congo was the largest source of refugees to the United States in 2019 .
In fact , Congolese refugees outnumbered those from the next four countries—Myanmar , Ukraine , Eritrea , and Afghanistan—combined .
But even as the Congolese American population grows , with thousands establishing new homes across the country , the foreign-policy establishment continues to disregard their voices .
This is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward Congo at a time when the country is arguably more vital than ever .
Congo ’ s strategic importance to the U.S. economy can not be overstated .
The country ’ s mineral wealth has powered Silicon Valley .
Coltan , used in smartphones and computers , and cobalt—a key element in lithium-ion batteries—fueled the technology revolution of the 2000s .
The supply chains of America ’ s most admired and profitable companies , including Apple , Hewlett Packard , and Tesla , are intricately linked to Congo because of these minerals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ utilized in missiles , jet engines , and other high-end electronics critical to defense weapons systems .
The United States and Congo ’ s national security ties , in fact , date back to World War II .
The uranium ore used to construct the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima came from the Shinkolobwe mine in Congo ’ s province of Katanga .
The Congolese people , however , have not benefited from the country ’ s mineral wealth .
In fact , by 2050 , as many as 40 percent of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to live in Congo and Nigeria .
Long-term peace and stability are at risk , too , as poverty and conflict are strongly interconnected .
As neighboring South Sudan has shown , conflicts disrupt and destroy the social safety net—increasing the risk of social and humanitarian crises .
Yet despite these real concerns for ongoing war and insecurity , the U.S. foreign-policy establishment rarely solicits Congolese perspectives on these matters , and there are limited mechanisms through which Congolese American experts can advise policymakers .
Overlooking U.S. citizens who have families , businesses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a loss for U.S. diplomacy in the region .
In 2019 , we launched the Congolese Diaspora Impact Summit to increase the visibility of Congolese American policy experts—because U.S. foreign policy is not determined at the ballot box but by advisors and policymakers in Congress and the executive branch .
During the Obama administration , just a handful of political appointees and congressional staffers were of Congolese descent—mostly in junior-level positions .
And there are very evident systemic barriers to entry for people of color into the highest ranks of the State Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stands , the Pickering and Rangel fellowships are the only two programs that are dedicated to diversifying the State Department ; however , they have been deemed insufficient—mainly by Black diplomats—in addressing the foreign-policy establishment ’ s race problem .
Formal U.S. government engagement with diaspora communities is underdeveloped and lacks focus .
The Obama administration launched the International Diaspora Engagement Alliance initiative in 2011 , which was a partnership between the secretary of state ’ s Office of Global Partnerships and the U.S. Agency for International Development .
The program , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The lack of strategic diaspora outreach is truly a missed opportunity for the U.S. government .
It is not only Congolese Americans who are frustrated with the scant inclusion of their perspectives in U.S. foreign policy .
The Haitian diaspora , too , has been discouraged by this reality and voiced their ire with the direction of U.S.-Haiti relations with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Rep. Frederica Wilson in October 2019 .
The successes of the Indian diaspora in U.S. policy should not be novel ; Congolese and other diasporas are increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Given the changing demographics of the United States , policymakers need to grasp that Congolese American immigrants and other diaspora communities are deeply invested in the affairs of their country of origin—and we intend to take our seat at the table .

The toppling of symbols of oppression—from King Leopold II’s statues in Belgium to Confederate monuments in the United States—has been a long time coming. The former Belgian king was one of the cruelest leaders and colonizers in world history. It’s fitting that statues honoring his legacy are being removed right as the Democratic Republic of the Congo—where his most violent crimes took place—celebrates 60 years of independence from Belgium on June 30.
The toppling of symbols of oppression—from King Leopold II’s statues in Belgium to Confederate monuments in the United States—has been a long time coming. The former Belgian king was one of the cruelest leaders and colonizers in world history. It’s fitting that statues honoring his legacy are being removed right as the Democratic Republic of the Congo—where his most violent crimes took place—celebrates 60 years of independence from Belgium on June 30.
Monuments like those of Leopold are constant reminders of the dehumanization, exploitation, and silencing of Black people in the Western world. It is estimated that 10 to 15 million Congolese were killed during Leopold’s reign of brutality. Thanks to the Black Lives Matter movement, Belgium is beginning to publicly acknowledge the Congolese people’s suffering over the last 150 years, as the country finally listens to activists familiar with this pain.
Now it’s America’s turn to listen, particularly as it charts its own plans for foreign nations. Calls for greater racial diversity are growing within the foreign-policy establishment. As former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice famously said, the U.S. foreign-policy establishment is “white, male, and Yale,” and that must change.
But policymakers also need to ensure that as the field becomes more racially diverse, the contributions of diaspora communities are meaningful and robust. One of the clearest ways to do so is to change the terms of who gets to develop formal policy.
Personnel is policy, and, as it stands, white foreign-policy experts dominate both the discussion and the decision-making. But the United States is home to sizable diaspora communities, such as those from India, Nigeria, and Haiti, which possess specialized knowledge, lived experience, and expertise. U.S. policymakers would be wise to seek out and include these voices.
With an approximate size of 4 million, the Indian diaspora has become influential in American politics and impacted U.S. foreign policy as a result. Rep. Ami Bera currently serves as the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation, and President Barack Obama appointed the first Indian American, Richard Verma, to serve as U.S. ambassador to India in 2014. Former South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley also served as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. under President Donald Trump. Though they make up only about 1 percent of the population, Indian Americans have been able to ascend to key foreign-policy roles in the last two decades and shape milestones in U.S.-India relations, including the U.S.-India nuclear deal under President George W Bush. While Indian Americans are hardly a monolith, their growing influence in U.S.-India relations and American politics cannot be denied, as seen through Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump’s joint visit to Houston last year.
While the Indian diaspora has managed to gain a foothold in making policy, other large diaspora communities have been all but ignored. As the United States finally reckons with institutionalized racism and seeks to eliminate it, policymakers must reevaluate who gets to sit at the table and who is being shut out. The Congolese diaspora is an apt case in point. The Second Congo War, from 1998 to 2003, and its aftermath, was the deadliest war since World War II—with an estimated 5.4 million dead from violence, disease, and starvation by 2008. The violence stemming from this war continues to this day—which is why Congo was the largest source of refugees to the United States in 2019. In fact, Congolese refugees outnumbered those from the next four countries—Myanmar, Ukraine, Eritrea, and Afghanistan—combined.
But even as the Congolese American population grows, with thousands establishing new homes across the country, the foreign-policy establishment continues to disregard their voices. This is detrimental to crafting a robust U.S. policy toward Congo at a time when the country is arguably more vital than ever.
Congo’s strategic importance to the U.S. economy cannot be overstated. The country’s mineral wealth has powered Silicon Valley. Coltan, used in smartphones and computers, and cobalt—a key element in lithium-ion batteries—fueled the technology revolution of the 2000s. The supply chains of America’s most admired and profitable companies, including Apple, Hewlett Packard, and Tesla, are intricately linked to Congo because of these minerals. Coltan is also essential for technologies utilized in missiles, jet engines, and other high-end electronics critical to defense weapons systems. The United States and Congo’s national security ties, in fact, date back to World War II. The uranium ore used to construct the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima came from the Shinkolobwe mine in Congo’s province of Katanga.
The Congolese people, however, have not benefited from the country’s mineral wealth. In fact, by 2050, as many as 40 percent of the world’s extremely poor are projected to live in Congo and Nigeria. Long-term peace and stability are at risk, too, as poverty and conflict are strongly interconnected. As neighboring South Sudan has shown, conflicts disrupt and destroy the social safety net—increasing the risk of social and humanitarian crises.
Yet despite these real concerns for ongoing war and insecurity, the U.S. foreign-policy establishment rarely solicits Congolese perspectives on these matters, and there are limited mechanisms through which Congolese American experts can advise policymakers. Overlooking U.S. citizens who have families, businesses, and nonprofit organizations in Congo is a loss for U.S. diplomacy in the region.
In 2019, we launched the Congolese Diaspora Impact Summit to increase the visibility of Congolese American policy experts—because U.S. foreign policy is not determined at the ballot box but by advisors and policymakers in Congress and the executive branch. During the Obama administration, just a handful of political appointees and congressional staffers were of Congolese descent—mostly in junior-level positions. And there are very evident systemic barriers to entry for people of color into the highest ranks of the State Department, including Congolese Americans. As it stands, the Pickering and Rangel fellowships are the only two programs that are dedicated to diversifying the State Department; however, they have been deemed insufficient—mainly by Black diplomats—in addressing the foreign-policy establishment’s race problem.
Formal U.S. government engagement with diaspora communities is underdeveloped and lacks focus. The Obama administration launched the International Diaspora Engagement Alliance initiative in 2011, which was a partnership between the secretary of state’s Office of Global Partnerships and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The program, however, is no longer functional under Trump. The lack of strategic diaspora outreach is truly a missed opportunity for the U.S. government. It is not only Congolese Americans who are frustrated with the scant inclusion of their perspectives in U.S. foreign policy. The Haitian diaspora, too, has been discouraged by this reality and voiced their ire with the direction of U.S.-Haiti relations with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Rep. Frederica Wilson in October 2019. The successes of the Indian diaspora in U.S. policy should not be novel; Congolese and other diasporas are increasingly becoming more involved in American politics.
Given the changing demographics of the United States, policymakers need to grasp that Congolese American immigrants and other diaspora communities are deeply invested in the affairs of their country of origin—and we intend to take our seat at the table.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-09--Is India the Next Coronavirus Hotspot?

Is India the Next Coronavirus Hotspot?

Is India the Next Coronavirus Hotspot ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief , the newsletter that covers the region comprising Afghanistan , Bangladesh , Bhutan , India , the Maldives , Nepal , Pakistan , and Sri Lanka .
This week : India now has the third-highest number of coronavirus cases in the world , Pakistan ’ s foreign minister tests positive , China pulls back its troops from its border with India , and why Nepal ’ s cable operators are blacking out Indian TV channels .
As always , we ’ d love to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Earlier this week , India surpassed Russia to become the country with the third-highest number of confirmed coronavirus cases .
Only Brazil and the United States have more .
With nearly 800,000 cases and 21,595 deaths , the growth in infections in India is still rapid , with total numbers doubling around every three weeks .
And as the chart above shows , Pakistan and Bangladesh are also rising up the rankings , although not as rapidly as their neighbor .
One enduring puzzle is why South Asia ’ s countries have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases than other countries with large outbreaks .
India , for example , ranks third for cases but eight in the number of deaths .
Similarly , Pakistan ranks 12th for cases but only 19th for its number of deaths ; the corresponding rankings for Bangladesh are 17th and 27th .
What ’ s going on ?
It ’ s difficult to say .
On the one hand , South Asian countries still have among the lowest rates of testing in the world , which implies a far higher actual case count and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ startlingly low death rate .
On the other hand , some videos are emerging , for example from the Indian state of Karnataka , showing workers dumping bodies of COVID-19 victims into burial pits .
In general , even under normal circumstances , most deaths in the region are not medically certified—so there are clearly some reporting and verification issues .
But even those issues don ’ t fully explain South Asia ’ s low number of deaths so far .
If the region is simply lagging , however—given the time it takes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus—then it may soon see a steep rise in its accounting .
More broadly , concerns continue about the reopening of the region ’ s economies .
As Kapil Komireddi writes in FP this week about India , Prime Minister Narendra Modi “ is now seeking to alleviate the social and economic woe aggravated by his own mismanagement of the lockdown by serving up Indians to the virus.
” ( Even so , he remains widely popular .
A recent poll showed 74 percent of Indians approved of Modi ’ s leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zuha Siddiqui recounts in FP , “ there are growing signs that control of the government is sliding fast out of [ Prime Minister Imran ] Khan ’ s hands , ” as the military oversees the bulk of the country ’ s coronavirus response .
Both Pakistani Health Minister Zafar Mirza and Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi have tested positive for the coronavirus , suggesting that the disease has spread widely among Khan ’ s cabinet .
As always , here ’ s a weekly snapshot of the region ’ s countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four weeks .
The China-India conflict .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has weighed in on the ongoing tensions between the world ’ s two most populous countries .
In remarks on Wednesday , Pompeo said China took “ incredibly aggressive action ” that aligned with President Xi Jinping ’ s “ behavior throughout the region and , indeed , throughout the world.
” Pompeo ’ s remarks come as Indian sources tell various media that China has begun pulling back troops from along its contested border with India , where a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Fareed Zakaria points out in a Washington Post op-ed that “ China is not rising in a vacuum but in a region with other major countries such as Japan and India and Australia .
Every action Beijing takes should be considered in relation to the reaction it causes in those nations ’ capitals .
Thanks to its actions over the past few years under Xi , China today finds itself in the same strategic situation as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War—surrounded by countries that are growing increasingly hostile to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New Delhi will turn closer to Washington as it jostles with Beijing , Emily Tamkin writes in FP that one shouldn ’ t rule out Moscow as another potential partner .
“ The world has changed , but India and Russia have found ways for their relationship to hold firm , standing steady for each other at times when the rest of the world wouldn ’ t , ” she wrote this week .
Afghan prisoner release ?
Afghanistan ’ s release of Taliban prisoners has been a key sticking point in kick-starting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ militant group , and now Kabul says it has a revised list of prisoners from the Taliban that it is considering letting go , according to Reuters .
There is still no clarity , however , on when intra-Afghan talks may begin .
Nepal-India tensions .
Nepal ’ s cable TV operators blanked out Indian news channels on Thursday , as fallout from Kathmandu ’ s recent decision to amend its maps to include territory claimed by India continues .
Some Indian media had recently taken to suggesting a Chinese envoy in Nepal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Sharma Oli .
We “ request the media not to disseminate news that infringes on the sovereignty and self-respect of Nepalis , ” said Nepal ’ s information minister Yuba Raj Khatiwada at a press conference this week .
Bangladesh ’ s garment export businesses have suffered because of the coronavirus crisis : A drop in demand among major Western retailers has led to shocks further down the supply chain .
Bangladesh , of course , is South Asia ’ s biggest exporter of readymade garments .
But since when ?
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the region ’ s top garments exporter ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Venture capital dollars .
The VC firm Sequoia Capital announced this week it had secured $ 1.35 billion to expand its investments in startups in India and Southeast Asia .
As TechCrunch reports , Sequoia made more than 50 investments in India last year , more than any other venture fund .
The group recently recruited the former India heads of both Google and Uber to help identify and mentor new startups .
But all is not rosy with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Economist warned this week , New Delhi ’ s growing focus on “ self-reliance ” and local manufacturing—in part as a response to the coronavirus—is “ a long way from the pro-business , investor-friendly posture which first got Mr Modi elected in 2014.
” And when foreign companies do invest , they seem to have figured out that “ getting ahead in India requires a powerful local partner ” such as Mukesh Ambani or Gautam Adani , industrialists who are seen as close to Modi .
Going for gold .
An unusual diplomatic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arab Emirates and India after customs officials in Kerala found 66 pounds of gold hidden inside the airport ’ s bathroom fittings .
A package containing the gold was addressed to the UAE ’ s consulate in Thiruvananthapuram , raising suspicions of corruption among that consulate ’ s employees .
The UAE ’ s embassy in New Delhi tweeted that “ the culprits who not only committed a major crime but also south to tarnish the reputation of the UAE mission in India will not be spared.
” We often imagine that someone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have turned to violence as a last resort to escape difficult life conditions .
But that is not always true .
When Sri Lanka experienced a deadly coordinated series of suicide bombings on Easter Sunday in 2019 , it emerged that two of the bombers came from a very wealthy family in Colombo who lived in a grand residence some locals called “ the palace.
” The writer Samanth Subramanian published an excellent deep dive in the New York Times Magazine analyzing what happened .
“ Most of us associate violence with desperation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did the Ibrahim brothers have to be desperate about ?
” It ’ s a difficult question , and I ’ m not sure Subramanian manages to uncover how exactly the suicide bombers were radicalized , but his reporting is rich in detail and texture , and represents an important study of a major South Asian event that never got sustained international attention .
You can read the essay here .
C ) 2007 .
As the Indian newspaper Mint points out , Bangladesh exported readymade garments worth $ 9.21 billion in 2006-2007 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first time .
In the last fiscal year , Bangladesh ’ s exports of those garments were worth nearly $ 28 billion—almost twice as much as India ’ s exports .
Part of the reason why India has lagged behind Bangladesh , the article explains , is that the latter has put in place flexible laws for seasonal work and is more efficient in turning large orders around and transporting them from factories to ports .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia Brief here .
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Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the newsletter that covers the region comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This week: India now has the third-highest number of coronavirus cases in the world, Pakistan’s foreign minister tests positive , China pulls back its troops from its border with India, and why Nepal’s cable operators are blacking out Indian TV channels.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the newsletter that covers the region comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This week: India now has the third-highest number of coronavirus cases in the world, Pakistan’s foreign minister tests positive, China pulls back its troops from its border with India, and why Nepal’s cable operators are blacking out Indian TV channels.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Why South Asia Doesn’t Have as Many Coronavirus Deaths
Earlier this week, India surpassed Russia to become the country with the third-highest number of confirmed coronavirus cases. Only Brazil and the United States have more. With nearly 800,000 cases and 21,595 deaths, the growth in infections in India is still rapid, with total numbers doubling around every three weeks. And as the chart above shows, Pakistan and Bangladesh are also rising up the rankings, although not as rapidly as their neighbor.
One enduring puzzle is why South Asia’s countries have recorded a lower ratio of deaths to cases than other countries with large outbreaks. India, for example, ranks third for cases but eight in the number of deaths. Similarly, Pakistan ranks 12th for cases but only 19th for its number of deaths; the corresponding rankings for Bangladesh are 17th and 27th.
What’s going on? It’s difficult to say. On the one hand, South Asian countries still have among the lowest rates of testing in the world, which implies a far higher actual case count and, in turn, an even more startlingly low death rate. On the other hand, some videos are emerging, for example from the Indian state of Karnataka, showing workers dumping bodies of COVID-19 victims into burial pits. In general, even under normal circumstances, most deaths in the region are not medically certified—so there are clearly some reporting and verification issues. But even those issues don’t fully explain South Asia’s low number of deaths so far. If the region is simply lagging, however—given the time it takes to contract and then fall sick from the coronavirus—then it may soon see a steep rise in its accounting.
More broadly, concerns continue about the reopening of the region’s economies. As Kapil Komireddi writes in FP this week about India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi “is now seeking to alleviate the social and economic woe aggravated by his own mismanagement of the lockdown by serving up Indians to the virus.” (Even so, he remains widely popular. A recent poll showed 74 percent of Indians approved of Modi’s leadership.) Meanwhile in Pakistan, as Zuha Siddiqui recounts in FP, “there are growing signs that control of the government is sliding fast out of [Prime Minister Imran] Khan’s hands,” as the military oversees the bulk of the country’s coronavirus response. Both Pakistani Health Minister Zafar Mirza and Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi have tested positive for the coronavirus, suggesting that the disease has spread widely among Khan’s cabinet.
As always, here’s a weekly snapshot of the region’s countries and their total cases over the past four weeks.
What We’re Following
The China-India conflict. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has weighed in on the ongoing tensions between the world’s two most populous countries. In remarks on Wednesday, Pompeo said China took “incredibly aggressive action” that aligned with President Xi Jinping’s “behavior throughout the region and, indeed, throughout the world.”
Pompeo’s remarks come as Indian sources tell various media that China has begun pulling back troops from along its contested border with India, where a deadly skirmish took place on June 15.
Fareed Zakaria points out in a Washington Post op-ed that “China is not rising in a vacuum but in a region with other major countries such as Japan and India and Australia. Every action Beijing takes should be considered in relation to the reaction it causes in those nations’ capitals. Thanks to its actions over the past few years under Xi, China today finds itself in the same strategic situation as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War—surrounded by countries that are growing increasingly hostile to it.”
But while conventional wisdom suggests New Delhi will turn closer to Washington as it jostles with Beijing, Emily Tamkin writes in FP that one shouldn’t rule out Moscow as another potential partner. “The world has changed, but India and Russia have found ways for their relationship to hold firm, standing steady for each other at times when the rest of the world wouldn’t,” she wrote this week.
Afghan prisoner release? Afghanistan’s release of Taliban prisoners has been a key sticking point in kick-starting peace talks between the government and the militant group, and now Kabul says it has a revised list of prisoners from the Taliban that it is considering letting go, according to Reuters. There is still no clarity, however, on when intra-Afghan talks may begin.
Nepal-India tensions. Nepal’s cable TV operators blanked out Indian news channels on Thursday, as fallout from Kathmandu’s recent decision to amend its maps to include territory claimed by India continues. Some Indian media had recently taken to suggesting a Chinese envoy in Nepal had met with with Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli. We “request the media not to disseminate news that infringes on the sovereignty and self-respect of Nepalis,” said Nepal’s information minister Yuba Raj Khatiwada at a press conference this week.
Question of the Week
Bangladesh’s garment export businesses have suffered because of the coronavirus crisis: A drop in demand among major Western retailers has led to shocks further down the supply chain. Bangladesh, of course, is South Asia’s biggest exporter of readymade garments. But since when? In what year did Bangladesh overtake India as the region’s top garments exporter?
A) 2019
B) 2015
C) 2007
D) 1995
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
Venture capital dollars. The VC firm Sequoia Capital announced this week it had secured $1.35 billion to expand its investments in startups in India and Southeast Asia. As TechCrunch reports, Sequoia made more than 50 investments in India last year, more than any other venture fund. The group recently recruited the former India heads of both Google and Uber to help identify and mentor new startups. But all is not rosy with the India investment scene. As the Economist warned this week, New Delhi’s growing focus on “self-reliance” and local manufacturing—in part as a response to the coronavirus—is “a long way from the pro-business, investor-friendly posture which first got Mr Modi elected in 2014.” And when foreign companies do invest, they seem to have figured out that “getting ahead in India requires a powerful local partner” such as Mukesh Ambani or Gautam Adani, industrialists who are seen as close to Modi.
Going for gold. An unusual diplomatic row has broken out between the United Arab Emirates and India after customs officials in Kerala found 66 pounds of gold hidden inside the airport’s bathroom fittings. A package containing the gold was addressed to the UAE’s consulate in Thiruvananthapuram, raising suspicions of corruption among that consulate’s employees. The UAE’s embassy in New Delhi tweeted that “the culprits who not only committed a major crime but also south to tarnish the reputation of the UAE mission in India will not be spared.”
What We’re Reading
TOPSHOT - Sri Lankan security personnel walk through debris following an explosion in St Sebastian's Church in Negombo, north of the capital Colombo, on April 21, 2019. - A series of eight devastating bomb blasts ripped through high-end hotels and churches holding Easter services in Sri Lanka on April 21, killing nearly 160 people, including dozens of foreigners. (Photo by STR / AFP) (Photo credit should read STR/AFP via Getty Images)
We often imagine that someone who has become a suicide bomber must have turned to violence as a last resort to escape difficult life conditions. But that is not always true. When Sri Lanka experienced a deadly coordinated series of suicide bombings on Easter Sunday in 2019, it emerged that two of the bombers came from a very wealthy family in Colombo who lived in a grand residence some locals called “the palace.” The writer Samanth Subramanian published an excellent deep dive in the New York Times Magazine analyzing what happened. “Most of us associate violence with desperation,” he writes. “What did the Ibrahim brothers have to be desperate about?”
It’s a difficult question, and I’m not sure Subramanian manages to uncover how exactly the suicide bombers were radicalized, but his reporting is rich in detail and texture, and represents an important study of a major South Asian event that never got sustained international attention. You can read the essay here.
And the Answer Is…
C) 2007. As the Indian newspaper Mint points out, Bangladesh exported readymade garments worth $9.21 billion in 2006-2007, inching ahead of India for the first time. In the last fiscal year, Bangladesh’s exports of those garments were worth nearly $28 billion—almost twice as much as India’s exports. Part of the reason why India has lagged behind Bangladesh, the article explains, is that the latter has put in place flexible laws for seasonal work and is more efficient in turning large orders around and transporting them from factories to ports.
That’s it for this week.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-09--Beijing Launches a Global Assault on Free Speech

The national security law imposed on Hong Kong by Beijing ’ s rubber-stamp , robotic National People ’ s Congress is the worst , most dangerous , and most overreaching law I have seen in over 25 years of human rights work .
It is an all-out assault on freedom—not just in Hong Kong , but worldwide .
Fast-tracked by Beijing over the course of a month , it shatters the promise that was made to Hong Kong at the handover almost exactly 23 years ago of a “ high degree of autonomy ” and—in the words of the last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Patten—that “ Hong Kong people are to run Hong Kong.. ” Hong Kong ’ s mini-constitution , known as the Basic Law , does require a national security law to be introduced at some stage .
But it explicitly requires Hong Kong to do so “ on its own.
” Imposing a law from Beijing without even the pretense of a process in Hong Kong ’ s Legislative Council makes a total mockery of “ one country , two systems.
” Moreover , media reports suggest that Hong Kong ’ s Chief Executive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know that the law had been passed until she heard it from reporters and was in the dark about the content of the legislation until she signed it .
The law criminalizes four acts : subversion , secession , collusion with foreign entities , and terrorism .
In a free society , few people would argue with—and most would support—proportionate counterterrorism measures .
I have missed a bombing by five minutes in Islamabad , and at least two of my friends have been assassinated , so I need no lessons in the importance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not about terrorism .
Under the new rules imposed on Hong Kong , a person who requests help from a foreign country , institution , organization , or individual is guilty of an offense .
So Hong Kongers who until this week messaged me daily , shared ideas and information with me , took part in webinars with members of the British Parliament at my invitation , or gave interviews to foreign journalists are now committing a criminal act .
Hong Kong pro-democracy activists who have testified at hearings in parliaments around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legally .
Calling for sanctions is now a crime .
Criticizing the Chinese Communist Party—deemed to be “ provoking hatred ” against the central government—is illegal .
Even talking about independence is a crime .
Even if you don ’ t commit violent actions or rise up in revolution , merely expressing an opinion can result in a jail sentence for life .
And then there ’ s the most absurd part of this law : its apparent extraterritorial application .
This law threatens us all .
We are all Hong Kongers now—not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
According to Article 38 of the law , anyone , anywhere in the world , could be accused under this new set of rules .
A non-Hong Kong resident living outside Hong Kong—indeed , theoretically , someone who has never been to Hong Kong or China—could be committing a supposed crime .
On one level this is comical .
This week I have spent every day giving interviews to international media from my home in London about this law .
In theory , I have committed many offenses .
In practice , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong in 2017 on Beijing ’ s orders and been subjected to a campaign of postal and email harassment by the regime ’ s agents—as was my mother—and so for me it ’ s water off a duck ’ s back .
But on another level it is more sinister .
The Chinese regime kidnapped Gui Minhai , a Swedish national , from Thailand in 2015 and sentenced him to 10 years in prison .
Countries should start reviewing their extradition agreements with Hong Kong , as Canada and Australia have already done @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elected by the people , accountable to the people , with safeguards for fundamental rights and freedoms , a security law would cause less controversy .
But the promise to give Hong Kongers universal suffrage—another vow made in the Basic Law—now seems a distant dream .
What is “ special ” about the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region any longer ?
Not the system of governance , that ’ s for sure .
It ’ s the people , who bravely turned out the day the law was enacted to protest , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent years .
And at least 370 of them were arrested , though only 10 specifically under the new law .
The new law is , as British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has said , a “ serious ” violation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration , an international treaty lodged at the United Nations and valid until 2047 .
The Chinese regime has not just destroyed Hong Kongers ’ liberties , it has launched an outright attack on the international rules-based order .
The response has to be to stand up and fight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ begun in London and Washington , D.C. , in the form of targeted sanctions and a generous offer of help to Hong Kongers who wish to flee , but so much more is needed .
Britain must lead the world in coordinating the response .
That ’ s why an international contact group—as proposed in a letter to Prime Minister Boris Johnson by seven former British foreign secretaries—is so urgent .
A political and diplomatic response , by moving ahead with recommendations already made by current and former United Nations officials for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rapporteur , or both .
And a humanitarian response—by agreeing among allies a lifeboat rescue package so that Hong Kongers who need to flee can find a place of sanctuary .
That should only ever be a last resort .
Our objective should not be for Hong Kongers to leave their hometown , it should be to make it safe and free for them to stay , but the reality is democratic governments need to plan for the worst-case scenario—and be ready to welcome the people of Hong Kong .
And let us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end of the matter .
If we fail to act , Taiwan will be next .
And after Taiwan , the rights of people of Chinese descent in the rest of the world , whom Beijing has repeatedly showed it treats as its own subjects , will be next to be targeted—whether they are Americans , British , Canadians , or Malaysians .
And beyond that , they will move on to anyone , or any institution , that speaks out against the Communist Party .
Hong Kong is today ’ s front @ @ @ @ @ @ @ late and dark , it is not too late to stand up for what it represents .

The national security law imposed on Hong Kong by Beijing’s rubber-stamp, robotic National People’s Congress is the worst, most dangerous, and most overreaching law I have seen in over 25 years of human rights work. It is an all-out assault on freedom—not just in Hong Kong, but worldwide.
The national security law imposed on Hong Kong by Beijing’s rubber-stamp, robotic National People’s Congress is the worst, most dangerous, and most overreaching law I have seen in over 25 years of human rights work. It is an all-out assault on freedom—not just in Hong Kong, but worldwide.
Fast-tracked by Beijing over the course of a month, it shatters the promise that was made to Hong Kong at the handover almost exactly 23 years ago of a “high degree of autonomy” and—in the words of the last British governor of the city, Chris Patten—that “ Hong Kong people are to run Hong Kong..”
Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, known as the Basic Law, does require a national security law to be introduced at some stage. But it explicitly requires Hong Kong to do so “on its own.” Imposing a law from Beijing without even the pretense of a process in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council makes a total mockery of “one country, two systems.” Moreover, media reports suggest that Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam—a puppet of Beijing—did not even know that the law had been passed until she heard it from reporters and was in the dark about the content of the legislation until she signed it.
The law criminalizes four acts: subversion, secession, collusion with foreign entities, and terrorism.
In a free society, few people would argue with—and most would support—proportionate counterterrorism measures. I have missed a bombing by five minutes in Islamabad, and at least two of my friends have been assassinated, so I need no lessons in the importance of countering extremism.
But this law is not about terrorism. Under the new rules imposed on Hong Kong, a person who requests help from a foreign country, institution, organization, or individual is guilty of an offense. So Hong Kongers who until this week messaged me daily, shared ideas and information with me, took part in webinars with members of the British Parliament at my invitation, or gave interviews to foreign journalists are now committing a criminal act. Hong Kong pro-democracy activists who have testified at hearings in parliaments around the world can no longer do so legally.
Calling for sanctions is now a crime. Criticizing the Chinese Communist Party—deemed to be “provoking hatred” against the central government—is illegal. Even talking about independence is a crime. Even if you don’t commit violent actions or rise up in revolution, merely expressing an opinion can result in a jail sentence for life.
And then there’s the most absurd part of this law: its apparent extraterritorial application. This law threatens us all. We are all Hong Kongers now—not just in spirit, but in reality.
According to Article 38 of the law, anyone, anywhere in the world, could be accused under this new set of rules. A non-Hong Kong resident living outside Hong Kong—indeed, theoretically, someone who has never been to Hong Kong or China—could be committing a supposed crime.
On one level this is comical. This week I have spent every day giving interviews to international media from my home in London about this law. In theory, I have committed many offenses. In practice, I was already denied entry to Hong Kong in 2017 on Beijing’s orders and been subjected to a campaign of postal and email harassment by the regime’s agents—as was my mother—and so for me it’s water off a duck’s back.
But on another level it is more sinister. The Chinese regime kidnapped Gui Minhai, a Swedish national, from Thailand in 2015 and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. Countries should start reviewing their extradition agreements with Hong Kong, as Canada and Australia have already done.
If Hong Kong had a government elected by the people, accountable to the people, with safeguards for fundamental rights and freedoms, a security law would cause less controversy. But the promise to give Hong Kongers universal suffrage—another vow made in the Basic Law—now seems a distant dream.
What is “special” about the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region any longer? Not the system of governance, that’s for sure. It’s the people, who bravely turned out the day the law was enacted to protest, as they have done so many times over recent years. And at least 370 of them were arrested, though only 10 specifically under the new law.
The new law is, as British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has said, a “serious” violation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, an international treaty lodged at the United Nations and valid until 2047. The Chinese regime has not just destroyed Hong Kongers’ liberties, it has launched an outright attack on the international rules-based order.
The response has to be to stand up and fight. The beginnings of the pushback have begun in London and Washington, D.C., in the form of targeted sanctions and a generous offer of help to Hong Kongers who wish to flee, but so much more is needed.
Britain must lead the world in coordinating the response. That’s why an international contact group—as proposed in a letter to Prime Minister Boris Johnson by seven former British foreign secretaries—is so urgent.
That international contact group should coordinate a three-pronged approach:
A punitive response, with coordinated, targeted sanctions.
A political and diplomatic response, by moving ahead with recommendations already made by current and former United Nations officials for the establishment of a U.N. special envoy or rapporteur, or both.
And a humanitarian response—by agreeing among allies a lifeboat rescue package so that Hong Kongers who need to flee can find a place of sanctuary. That should only ever be a last resort. Our objective should not be for Hong Kongers to leave their hometown, it should be to make it safe and free for them to stay, but the reality is democratic governments need to plan for the worst-case scenario—and be ready to welcome the people of Hong Kong.
And let us not think this security law is the end of the matter. If we fail to act, Taiwan will be next. And after Taiwan, the rights of people of Chinese descent in the rest of the world, whom Beijing has repeatedly showed it treats as its own subjects, will be next to be targeted—whether they are Americans, British, Canadians, or Malaysians. And beyond that, they will move on to anyone, or any institution, that speaks out against the Communist Party.
Hong Kong is today’s front line for freedom—and while the hour is late and dark, it is not too late to stand up for what it represents.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-09--North Korea Talks Stall Despite Trump Overtures on New Summit

North Korea Talks Stall Despite Trump Overtures on New Summit Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Another chapter begins in the stop-start North Korea nuclear talks , the Russian military seems to sour on Putin , and a star impeachment witness resigns from the military after alleging bullying and retaliation .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
U.S. President Donald Trump this week suggested that North Korea could be open to another face-to-face summit to advance the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be a hallmark diplomatic achievement of Trump ’ s presidency .
“ I understand they want to meet and we would certainly do that , ” Trump said in an interview with Voice of America on Tuesday .
“ I would do it if I thought it was going to be helpful.
” But on Thursday , his top envoy for North Korea , Stephen Biegun , returned from a visit to Seoul largely empty handed : There are no public signals that the North Koreans would return to talks .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trip mentioned “ continued U.S. readiness to engage in dialogue with the DPRK ” to dismantle its nuclear weapons program , but so far Pyongyang hasn ’ t shown any willingness to play ball .
Mixed messages .
The hot and cold nature of the talks is emblematic of North Korea ’ s longstanding strategy of opening up diplomatic channels with South Korea and the United States , and then abruptly closing them off and ratcheting up tensions to extract more concessions .
This pattern is now layered on top of the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s suggestion that he would meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un again came a just week after Biegun said such a meeting would be unlikely before the November U.S. elections .
New nuclear activity .
Meanwhile , new satellite images show a at a previously undeclared facility in North Korea potentially used to produce nuclear warheads , as CNN reports .
John Bolton , Trump ’ s former national security adviser , criticized aspects of the president ’ s summits with Kim and said the nuclear threat from Pyongyang is greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s summits .
Some veteran North Korea watchers predict that the country will begin a new round of saber-rattling before the U.S. election cycle wraps up , so watch this space .
Afghan bounties fallout continues .
Top U.S. lawmakers are demanding answers from the Trump administration on the nature of Russian bounties on U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan—and who knew what when .
Sen. Tammy Duckworth , a Democrat who is one of the president ’ s leading critics on the issue , sent a letter to Defense Secretary Mark Esper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she called a “ disappointing ” closed briefing to senators .
In the letter , Duckworth requests details on whether the Pentagon investigated whether U.S. service member deaths are related to the alleged Russian bounty program and whether there are concurrent investigations conducted by the U.S. intelligence community .
Putin on the fritz ?
An interesting trend has emerged from the results of the recent vote on Russia ’ s proposed constitutional amendments .
While 77.92 percent of Russians voted in favor of the changes—giving President Vladimir Putin far-reaching powers the potential to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country where members of the military and their families live recorded a noticeably high degree of opposition .
This could be a worrying trend in a country where the military is traditionally seen as one of Putin ’ s most loyal backers .
His authoritarian rule depends , in large part , on military strength .
Meanwhile , Putin ’ s not-so-effective response to the coronavirus pandemic and Russia ’ s ailing economy has eroded the president ’ s popularity , as a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ isn ’ t going anywhere , but his grip on the country is still eroding .
Gone with the Vindman .
The saga of a star impeachment witness took a big turn yesterday when Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman—once the National Security Council ’ s top Ukraine aide—announced his retirement from the military on Wednesday , telling Foreign Policy through a statement from his lawyer that he faced a “ campaign of bullying , intimidation , and retaliation ” that would hold back his career .
Trump had already fired Vindman and his twin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involved in the impeachment hearings .
But the news came as a surprise to the Office of the Secretary of Defense , which was preparing a list of promotions including Vindman ’ s name to send to the White House when the news of his retirement broke , a senior defense official told Foreign Policy .
But the saga is not yet over on Capitol Hill : Sen. Duckworth is keeping a partial hold on 1,123 U.S. military promotions until Esper “ provides a transparent accounting ” of the Vindman case .
Esper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retaliation for his testimony , will be questioned on the issue when he heads to the House Armed Services Committee for a hearing later today .
Pentagon talking-point bingo .
When Esper and Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley head up to the House Armed Services Committee today to defend the Pentagon ’ s response to protests in Washington last month , they ’ ll be relying heavily on tried and true Pentagon jargon talking points .
Follow Jack—who will be tracking the hearing—to see how many Esper and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is ramping up its military arsenal after recent deadly border skirmishes with China .
Amid the mounting tensions , the Indian government approved a series of arms projects worth $ 5.55 billion , which included domestic projects worth $ 4.44 billion .
The United States has committed to reducing its troop presence in Afghanistan by this date as part of the peace deal with the Taliban by Monday , July 13 .
Undiplomatic .
Gordon Buoy , the South Sudanese deputy ambassador to the United States , caused a stir on social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was participating in a video conference panel discussion .
Friendly reminder to mute your Zoom lines and turn off the camera when you use the commode .
Trenched in .
Russian authorities have dug a series of trenches around the remote Siberian village of Shuluta to enforce a quarantine after dozens of villagers tested positive for COVID-19 .
The trenches surround Shuluta “ in an almost complete ring , ” with a stated purpose of both keeping villagers in and tourists out .
Last week we asked readers for some of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ names out there .
Thanks to all the readers who responded by email or Twitter .
Without further ado , the final list : H/T Joseph for first bringing Security Brief ’ s attention to this one .
Runner up : “ Dynamic Mongoose , ” a fan favorite NATO maritime exercise in the North Atlantic , presumably to hone the dynamism of NATO ’ s mongoose fleet .
“ Capable Logistician , ” h/t Anna , one of our readers , for flagging this adrenaline rush of a NATO exercise .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brief reader , Nick , who said he participated in this gloomy exercise as a British Army officer .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Another chapter begins in the stop-start North Korea nuclear talks , the Russian military seems to sour on Putin, and a star impeachment witness resigns from the military after alleging bullying and retaliation.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Another chapter begins in the stop-start North Korea nuclear talks, the Russian military seems to sour on Putin, and a star impeachment witness resigns from the military after alleging bullying and retaliation.
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No Steps Forward, One Step Back?
U.S. President Donald Trump this week suggested that North Korea could be open to another face-to-face summit to advance the long stalled nuclear talks that were supposed to be a hallmark diplomatic achievement of Trump’s presidency. “I understand they want to meet and we would certainly do that,” Trump said in an interview with Voice of America on Tuesday. “I would do it if I thought it was going to be helpful.”
But on Thursday, his top envoy for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, returned from a visit to Seoul largely empty handed: There are no public signals that the North Koreans would return to talks. The State Department readout of Biegun’s trip mentioned “continued U.S. readiness to engage in dialogue with the DPRK” to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, but so far Pyongyang hasn’t shown any willingness to play ball.
Mixed messages. The hot and cold nature of the talks is emblematic of North Korea’s longstanding strategy of opening up diplomatic channels with South Korea and the United States, and then abruptly closing them off and ratcheting up tensions to extract more concessions. This pattern is now layered on top of the Trump administration’s mixed messaging: Trump’s suggestion that he would meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un again came a just week after Biegun said such a meeting would be unlikely before the November U.S. elections.
New nuclear activity. Meanwhile, new satellite images show a flurry of activity at a previously undeclared facility in North Korea potentially used to produce nuclear warheads, as CNN reports. John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, criticized aspects of the president’s summits with Kim and said the nuclear threat from Pyongyang is greater today than it was before Trump’s summits. Some veteran North Korea watchers predict that the country will begin a new round of saber-rattling before the U.S. election cycle wraps up, so watch this space.
What We’re Watching
Afghan bounties fallout continues. Top U.S. lawmakers are demanding answers from the Trump administration on the nature of Russian bounties on U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan—and who knew what when. Sen. Tammy Duckworth, a Democrat who is one of the president’s leading critics on the issue, sent a letter to Defense Secretary Mark Esper on Thursday requesting more information after what she called a “disappointing” closed briefing to senators. In the letter, Duckworth requests details on whether the Pentagon investigated whether U.S. service member deaths are related to the alleged Russian bounty program and whether there are concurrent investigations conducted by the U.S. intelligence community.
Putin on the fritz? An interesting trend has emerged from the results of the recent vote on Russia’s proposed constitutional amendments. While 77.92 percent of Russians voted in favor of the changes—giving President Vladimir Putin far-reaching powers the potential to extend his rule to 2036—parts of the country where members of the military and their families live recorded a noticeably high degree of opposition. This could be a worrying trend in a country where the military is traditionally seen as one of Putin’s most loyal backers. His authoritarian rule depends, in large part, on military strength.
Meanwhile, Putin’s not-so-effective response to the coronavirus pandemic and Russia’s ailing economy has eroded the president’s popularity, as a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes. The constitutional changes mean that Putin isn’t going anywhere, but his grip on the country is still eroding.
Gone with the Vindman. The saga of a star impeachment witness took a big turn yesterday when Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman—once the National Security Council’s top Ukraine aide—announced his retirement from the military on Wednesday, telling Foreign Policy through a statement from his lawyer that he faced a “campaign of bullying, intimidation, and retaliation” that would hold back his career. Trump had already fired Vindman and his twin brother, Yevgeny, who was not involved in the impeachment hearings.
But the news came as a surprise to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which was preparing a list of promotions including Vindman’s name to send to the White House when the news of his retirement broke, a senior defense official told Foreign Policy. But the saga is not yet over on Capitol Hill: Sen. Duckworth is keeping a partial hold on 1,123 U.S. military promotions until Esper “provides a transparent accounting” of the Vindman case. Esper, who said Vindman would not face retaliation for his testimony, will be questioned on the issue when he heads to the House Armed Services Committee for a hearing later today.
Pentagon talking-point bingo. When Esper and Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley head up to the House Armed Services Committee today to defend the Pentagon’s response to protests in Washington last month, they’ll be relying heavily on tried and true Pentagon jargon talking points. Follow Jack—who will be tracking the hearing—to see how many Esper and Milley hit.
Neighborhood rivalry. India is ramping up its military arsenal after recent deadly border skirmishes with China. Amid the mounting tensions, the Indian government approved a series of arms projects worth $5.55 billion, which included domestic projects worth $4.44 billion.
The Week Ahead
The United States has committed to reducing its troop presence in Afghanistan by this date as part of the peace deal with the Taliban by Monday, July 13.
Odds and Ends
Undiplomatic. Gordon Buoy, the South Sudanese deputy ambassador to the United States, caused a stir on social media after he was recorded relieving himself while he was participating in a video conference panel discussion. Friendly reminder to mute your Zoom lines and turn off the camera when you use the commode.
Trenched in. Russian authorities have dug a series of trenches around the remote Siberian village of Shuluta to enforce a quarantine after dozens of villagers tested positive for COVID-19. The trenches surround Shuluta “in an almost complete ring,” with a stated purpose of both keeping villagers in and tourists out.
And the Winner Is…
Last week we asked readers for some of the best (and worst) military exercise names out there. Thanks to all the readers who responded by email or Twitter. Without further ado, the final list:
Winner: “Llama Fury,” an explosive ordnance disposal training exercise.
H/T Joseph for first bringing Security Brief’s attention to this one.
Runner up: “Dynamic Mongoose,” a fan favorite NATO maritime exercise in the North Atlantic, presumably to hone the dynamism of NATO’s mongoose fleet.
Honorable Mentions:
“Capable Logistician,” h/t Anna, one of our readers, for flagging this adrenaline rush of a NATO exercise.
“Winter Tears,” h/t another Security Brief reader, Nick, who said he participated in this gloomy exercise as a British Army officer.
That’s it for today.
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