foreignpolicy--2020-01-13--Trump Team Sends Muddled Message on Iran

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Trump ’ s national security team contradicts the president ’ s claims on Iran , warring factions agree to a cease-fire in Libya , and how the death of the Omani sultan could affect regional security .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Monday , please sign up here .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s top national security advisors appeared on Sunday television shows this weekend to defend the U.S. assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brink of war .
But the officials backed away from Trump ’ s assertion on Friday that Tehran planned to target four U.S. embassies in the Middle East , a justification he used for the decision to kill Suleimani , the architect of Iran ’ s regional security strategy .
National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien said on Fox News Sunday that there were threats to American “ facilities , ” but he noted the challenges in determining specific targets , even with “ exquisite intelligence.
” Meanwhile , Defense Secretary Mark @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Nation that he didn ’ t see specific evidence “ with regard to four embassies.
” But he added , “ I share the president ’ s view that probably—my expectation was they were going to go after our embassies.
” Esper ’ s Sunday TV appearances are yet another sign he is finding his voice as a relative newcomer to the administration , as FP ’ s Lara Seligman reports .
Congress is still skeptical .
The administration ’ s muddled messaging on Iran has added to the public debate over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lawmakers—both Democrats and Republicans—are still not satisfied with the evidence the administration has provided in classified briefings to back up the claim that Suleimani was planning an “ imminent ” attack .
Meanwhile , reports on Monday that Trump authorized the strike on Suleimani seven months ago could further undermine the administration ’ s justification .
Will Iran negotiate ?
Despite recent aggression from both sides , the Trump administration hopes that harsh U.S. sanctions and protests in the streets of Tehran will drive the regime to the negotiating table .
Trump tweeted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and in Farsi , saying the United States will “ continue to stand by you.
” But the former commander of U.S. Central Command cautions that Washington must remain vigilant , and that it would be a mistake to take Iran ’ s word that it does not seek further escalation .
NATO scrambles .
Senior NATO officials were not told in advance that Trump would call on the alliance to increase its involvement in the Middle East , U.S. and NATO officials told Foreign Policy —leaving U.S. and NATO officials scrambling to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Details are sparse on what Trump is asking for , besides a new name for the Middle East expansion .
A NATO delegation , led by Assistant Secretary General for Operations John Manza , was in Washington on Jan. 10 for meetings at the State Department to hash out how to respond to Trump ’ s request .
Protests in Iran .
Iran ’ s government faces a new round of popular unrest after admitting it mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane , killing all 176 on board , mostly Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people protested in the capital on Sunday , according to the news agency Fars , chanting slogans such as , “ They are lying that our enemy is America , our enemy is right here.
” In a symbolic act of defiance , students at Beheshti University in Tehran were recorded avoiding stepping on painted U.S. and Israeli flags .
This is the second wave of anti-government in Iran since last year .
Beginning last November , protesters took to the streets after officials raised fuel prices—with the demonstrations quickly turning into mass @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used force to quell the protests , and it remains to be seen if it will resort to the same tactics this time .
Cease-fire in Libya .
On Sunday , Libya ’ s warring factions entered a fragile cease-fire agreement brokered by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan .
Though few expect the ceasefire to last—the internationally recognized government in Tripoli has already reported gunfire on the frontlines—the cease-fire illuminates the increasing influence of Moscow and Ankara in Libya .
Moscow clandestinely sent 200 mercenaries to Libya in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s bid to take Tripoli , while Ankara recently deployed troops to support the government .
Death of the Omani sultan .
The longest serving ruler in the Middle East , Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said , died on Friday , drawing a global outpouring of grief .
Qaboos dominated political life in Oman for five decades , setting the country on the path to development .
Qaboos ruled with an authoritarian grip , but he did initiate infrastructure plans that saw the country transform into a modern power .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ affairs , Qaboos ’ s Oman was a key player in regional diplomacy , helping to broker the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the United States .
Qaboos will be replaced by his cousin , Haitham bin Tariq Al Said .
Pentagon moves .
Christopher Miller , a senior White House counterterrorism advisor , has moved to the Pentagon and will serve as deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism .
Breaking Defense ’ s Paul McLeary has more details on the move , which comes “ as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response ” to the assassination of Suleimani .
Bagram economy .
The residents of the town of Bagram in Afghanistan have long relied on the nearby Bagram Airfield , the largest U.S. military base in Afghanistan : It accounts for up to 80 percent of local economic activity .
The impending peace deal between the United States and the Taliban—likely to lead to U.S. troop withdrawal—has put locals in a state of uncertainty , the New York Times reports .
Adding to their insecurity , they also risk being seen as targets by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Now accepting applications .
Following a recent breakup with his girlfriend , the Japanese billionaire Yusaku Maezawa is seeking a new “ life partner ” to come to the moon with him during SpaceX ’ s first ever tourist voyage to the moon—tentatively scheduled for 2023 .
“ With that future partner of mine , I want to shout our love and world peace from outer space , ” he announced in his call for applications .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump’s national security team contradicts the president’s claims on Iran, warring factions agree to a cease-fire in Libya , and how the death of the Omani sultan could affect regional security.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump’s national security team contradicts the president’s claims on Iran, warring factions agree to a cease-fire in Libya, and how the death of the Omani sultan could affect regional security.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Monday, please sign up here.
Officials Play Down Trump’s Comments on Iranian Threat
U.S. President Donald Trump’s top national security advisors appeared on Sunday television shows this weekend to defend the U.S. assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani, which pushed both countries to the brink of war. But the officials backed away from Trump’s assertion on Friday that Tehran planned to target four U.S. embassies in the Middle East, a justification he used for the decision to kill Suleimani, the architect of Iran’s regional security strategy.
National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien said on Fox News Sunday that there were threats to American “facilities,” but he noted the challenges in determining specific targets, even with “exquisite intelligence.” Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on CBS’s Face the Nation that he didn’t see specific evidence “with regard to four embassies.” But he added, “I share the president’s view that probably—my expectation was they were going to go after our embassies.”
Esper’s Sunday TV appearances are yet another sign he is finding his voice as a relative newcomer to the administration, as FP’s Lara Seligman reports.
Congress is still skeptical. The administration’s muddled messaging on Iran has added to the public debate over the Jan. 3 strike against Suleimani. Lawmakers—both Democrats and Republicans—are still not satisfied with the evidence the administration has provided in classified briefings to back up the claim that Suleimani was planning an “imminent” attack. Meanwhile, reports on Monday that Trump authorized the strike on Suleimani seven months ago could further undermine the administration’s justification.
Will Iran negotiate? Despite recent aggression from both sides, the Trump administration hopes that harsh U.S. sanctions and protests in the streets of Tehran will drive the regime to the negotiating table. Trump tweeted support for the protesters both in English and in Farsi, saying the United States will “continue to stand by you.” But the former commander of U.S. Central Command cautions that Washington must remain vigilant, and that it would be a mistake to take Iran’s word that it does not seek further escalation.
NATO scrambles. Senior NATO officials were not told in advance that Trump would call on the alliance to increase its involvement in the Middle East, U.S. and NATO officials told Foreign Policy —leaving U.S. and NATO officials scrambling to come up with policy ideas to respond. Details are sparse on what Trump is asking for, besides a new name for the Middle East expansion. A NATO delegation, led by Assistant Secretary General for Operations John Manza, was in Washington on Jan. 10 for meetings at the State Department to hash out how to respond to Trump’s request.
What We’re Watching
Protests in Iran. Iran’s government faces a new round of popular unrest after admitting it mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane, killing all 176 on board, mostly Iranian and Canadian nationals. Up to 1,000 people protested in the capital on Sunday, according to the news agency Fars, chanting slogans such as, “They are lying that our enemy is America, our enemy is right here.” In a symbolic act of defiance, students at Beheshti University in Tehran were recorded avoiding stepping on painted U.S. and Israeli flags.
This is the second wave of anti-government in Iran since last year. Beginning last November, protesters took to the streets after officials raised fuel prices—with the demonstrations quickly turning into mass protests against the regime. The government used force to quell the protests, and it remains to be seen if it will resort to the same tactics this time.
Cease-fire in Libya. On Sunday, Libya’s warring factions entered a fragile cease-fire agreement brokered by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Though few expect the ceasefire to last—the internationally recognized government in Tripoli has already reported gunfire on the frontlines—the cease-fire illuminates the increasing influence of Moscow and Ankara in Libya. Moscow clandestinely sent 200 mercenaries to Libya in Sept. 2019 to support Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s bid to take Tripoli, while Ankara recently deployed troops to support the government.
Death of the Omani sultan. The longest serving ruler in the Middle East, Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said, died on Friday, drawing a global outpouring of grief. Qaboos dominated political life in Oman for five decades, setting the country on the path to development. Qaboos ruled with an authoritarian grip, but he did initiate infrastructure plans that saw the country transform into a modern power. Known for its neutral stance in foreign affairs, Qaboos’s Oman was a key player in regional diplomacy, helping to broker the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the United States. Qaboos will be replaced by his cousin, Haitham bin Tariq Al Said.
Movers and Shakers
Pentagon moves. Christopher Miller, a senior White House counterterrorism advisor, has moved to the Pentagon and will serve as deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism. Breaking Defense’s Paul McLeary has more details on the move, which comes “as the U.S. braces for a covert Iranian response” to the assassination of Suleimani.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Bagram economy. The residents of the town of Bagram in Afghanistan have long relied on the nearby Bagram Airfield, the largest U.S. military base in Afghanistan: It accounts for up to 80 percent of local economic activity. The impending peace deal between the United States and the Taliban—likely to lead to U.S. troop withdrawal—has put locals in a state of uncertainty, the New York Times reports. Adding to their insecurity, they also risk being seen as targets by the Taliban under the new political arrangement.
Odds and Ends
Now accepting applications. Following a recent breakup with his girlfriend, the Japanese billionaire Yusaku Maezawa is seeking a new “life partner” to come to the moon with him during SpaceX’s first ever tourist voyage to the moon—tentatively scheduled for 2023. “With that future partner of mine, I want to shout our love and world peace from outer space,” he announced in his call for applications.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Dan Haverty contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-13--Why Is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy?

Why Is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy ?
In my last column , I described the “ brain-dead ” qualities of the Trump administration ’ s approach to the Middle East and especially Iran .
In particular , I stressed that the administration had no real strategy—if by that term one means a set of clear objectives , combined with a coherent plan of action to achieve them that takes the anticipated reactions of others into account .
What we have instead is brute force coercion , divorced from clear objectives and implemented by an ignorant president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three years in office , President Donald Trump has managed to increase the risk of war , push Iran to gradually restart its nuclear program , provoke Iraq into asking the United States to prepare to leave , raise serious doubts about U.S. judgment and reliability , alarm allies in Europe , and make Russia and China look like fonts of wisdom and order .
The Trump administration has made it clear that it thinks assassinating foreign officials is a legitimate tool of foreign policy and that war criminals should be lionized , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to welcome and imitate .
Unfortunately , this strategic myopia goes well beyond the Middle East .
Take , for example , the far more important issue of China .
To its credit , the Trump administration recognizes that China is the only possible peer competitor that the United States is likely to face for many decades .
This realization is no great feat of genius , however .
Reasonable people can disagree about the magnitude of the China challenge , but only a blind person could miss the worrisome implications of China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategically , you ’ d start looking for ways to limit Chinese influence at the least cost and risk to the United States itself .
You ’ d understand that the United States can not halt or reverse Chinese economic growth ( and certainly not without hurting itself ) , but you ’ d work hard to keep as many countries as possible on its side on the issues that matter , including advanced technology .
In fact , you ’ d get serious about trying to prevent China from achieving a dominant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ computing and artificial intelligence .
You ’ d be focused laserlike on maintaining a solid diplomatic position in Asia , and over time , you ’ d be looking for ways to drive a wedge between China and Russia , too .
And you ’ d try hard not to get distracted by secondary issues and waste time , attention , political capital , or resources on them .
What has the United States done instead ?
For starters , Trump abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership , a slap in the face to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to reach an agreement that would have provided some modest economic benefits and kept them more closely linked to the U.S. economy .
Then Trump launched his own trade war with China .
But instead of lining up other key economic powers , he threatened or waged trade wars with most of them , too .
Instead of presenting China with a united front , the United States has been facing China more or less alone , with substantially reduced leverage .
The predictable result : a face-saving trade compromise that rolls back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ real bones of contention with Beijing .
Next , Trump began his reality show approach to North Korea : at first threatening “ fire and fury ” and then getting bamboozled by Kim Jong Un ’ s empty promises at their initial meeting .
The result : no breakthrough in U.S. relations with North Korea , no halt to its nuclear program , and , across Asia , diminished confidence in U.S. judgment .
Meanwhile , Trump has spent most of the past three years gratuitously insulting key U.S. allies in Europe and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NATO .
Surprise , surprise : When U.S. officials then tried to convince America ’ s allies not to buy Chinese technology—and especially Huawei 5G digital equipment—they got the brushoff from governments that were now in no mood to do Trump any favors .
Chinese diplomats seeking to preserve Huawei ’ s position have been quick to take advantage of Trump ’ s repeated blunders , telling European officials that they are more committed to multilateralism and technological openness than the United States is and highlighting their support for the Paris climate agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
According to Julianne Smith of the German Marshall Fund of the United States : “ The Chinese have started brazenly claiming that it is China , not the United States , that shares more values with Europe .
[ They ] also frequently remind European audiences that unlike the United States , China believes in climate change and multilateralism , a message that is especially powerful in a place like Germany.
” Now consider this : At a moment when the U.S. State Department is in free fall , China is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more embassies , consulates , and other diplomatic posts than the United States does and in an era where the future alignment of a number of important countries could be up for grabs .
According to former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns : “ We ’ ve entered an era in which diplomacy matters more than ever , on an intensely competitive international landscape .
… China realizes that and is rapidly expanding its diplomatic capacity .
The U.S. , by contrast , seems intent on unilateral diplomatic disarmament.
” As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hope of balancing China in Asia requires the United States to preserve solid ties to an unwieldy coalition of Asian states , and that will require knowledgeable , sophisticated , patient , and dedicated diplomacy as least as much as credible military forces .
Lastly , instead of conducting a measured and gradual disengagement from the Middle East , and returning to the balance-of-power approach that the United States employed successfully from World War II to the end of the Cold War , Trump has allowed local client states , wealthy donors , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into a pointless confrontation with Iran .
One can only imagine the knowing smiles of foreign-policy mavens in Beijing as they watch the United States stumble toward yet another quagmire of its own making .
In short , despite recognizing that the China challenge was the most important item on America ’ s foreign-policy agenda—with the possible exception of climate change itself—Trump and company have pursued a series of policies that almost seem tailor-made to give China as many advantages as possible .
But that ’ s not the bad news .
Though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ no strategy ” approach to a new level , this problem has been apparent for some time .
Bill Clinton thought the United States could expand NATO eastward , contain Iraq and Iran simultaneously , bring China into the World Trade Organization prematurely , and promote hyperglobalization with abandon yet never face serious negative consequences .
George W. Bush believed ending tyranny and evil forever should be the central goal of U.S. foreign policy and thought the U.S. military could quickly transform the Middle East into a sea of pro-American democracies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the negative consequences of his actions did not emerge until after he had left office , but neither president ’ s actions left the United States in a stronger global position .
Barack Obama had a more realistic view of U.S. power and placed more weight on diplomacy , but he did little to reduce America ’ s military involvement overseas and fully backed the energetic use of U.S. military power .
Obama sent more troops to Afghanistan in 2009 , supported regime change in Libya and Syria , and expanded targeted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ special operations forces .
His administration failed to anticipate Russia ’ s reaction to Western efforts to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union and NATO , and he proved unable to unite the country behind his approach to climate change or Iran .
Nor should we forget that in his last year in office , the U.S. military dropped more than 26,000 bombs in seven different countries .
What ’ s going on here ?
When did the United States get so bad at strategy ?
Foreign policy is a challenging enterprise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sometimes inevitable .
But an inability to think strategically isn ’ t hard-wired into American DNA .
The Truman administration faced enormous challenges in the aftermath of World War II , but it came up with containment , the Marshall Plan , NATO , a set of bilateral alliances in Asia , and a set of economic institutions that served the United States and its allies well for decades .
Similarly , the first Bush administration ( 1989-1993 ) managed the collapse of the Soviet Union , the peaceful reunification of Germany , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subtlety , expertise , and restraint .
Neither administration was perfect , but their handling of complex and novel circumstances showed a sure grasp of what was most important and the ability to elicit the responses they wanted from both allies and adversaries .
In other words , they were good at strategy .
Paradoxically , part of the problem today is the remarkable position of primacy that the United States has enjoyed ever since the Cold War ended .
Because the United States is so powerful , wealthy , and secure , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its own actions .
When it makes mistakes , most of the costs are borne by others , and it hasn ’ t faced a peer competitor that might be quick to take advantage of mistakes .
The Iraq and Afghanistan wars may ultimately cost more than $ 6 trillion and thousands of soldiers ’ lives , but the lack of a draft limits public concerns about casualties , and the United States is paying for all of these wars by borrowing the money abroad , running up bigger deficits , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This situation helps explain why few Americans are interested in what is happening overseas or what the U.S. government is doing about it .
According to Diane Hessen , who has been conducting in-depth interviews with a panel of 500 Americans since 2016 , “ most voters don ’ t care much [ about foreign policy ] , and that ’ s a problem.
” Other recent surveys have asked Americans to list their top priorities , and foreign policy doesn ’ t even make the top 10 .
When most Americans can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and failure—at least in terms of immediate , tangible consequences—then policymakers will be under less pressure to come up with strategies that actually work and posturing will take precedence over actual performance .
And then there ’ s hubris .
Americans have always seen themselves as a model for others , and victory in the Cold War reinforced the belief that the United States had the magic formula for success in the modern world .
Moreover , they also believed that almost everyone else around the world realized this and couldn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a U.S.-led world order , and gradually become just like them .
Convinced the tides of history were flowing their way , U.S. leaders believed they were pushing on an open door .
Who needs a coherent , sophisticated , and carefully designed strategy when powerful global trends were already pushing the world in the direction they wanted ?
Moreover , as Paul Pillar explains in his important book Why America Misunderstands the World , the United States ’ unusual historical experience , geographic isolation , large domestic market , and general ignorance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign-policy strategies .
Devising an effective foreign-policy strategy requires anticipating how others are likely to react , but government officials—let alone the public at large—frequently know very little about the countries whose actions they are trying to influence .
In addition , the enduring myth of the “ melting pot ” —which portrays immigrants to the United States as readily embracing a new American identity and merging seamlessly into the fabric of U.S. society—leads the country to discount the power of nationalism , ethnicity , and other enduring sources of local identity , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the difficulty of state- or nation-building in diverse societies .
Certain of its own rectitude and noble intentions , the United States is equally slow to recognize that other societies might have valid reasons to question its motives or to see it as dangerous .
Taken together , these blind spots are a serious obstacle to the development of effective foreign-policy strategy , especially toward parts of the world whose historical experiences and cultural elements are dramatically different from its own .
Key features of the U.S. democratic system also make it harder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and national security policy , especially when there is no clear and present danger to focus the mind and impose discipline on foreign-policy debates .
When most of the public is indifferent , the policy process is more easily captured by domestic and foreign lobbies , especially in an era when money plays such a central role in politics .
Instead of a genuine marketplace of ideas where competing policy prescriptions are carefully and honestly debated , foreign policy becomes an arena dominated by the loudest and best-funded voices or the preferences of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And as I ’ ve noted before , the United States is probably more vulnerable to foreign influence than any great power in modern history .
If a bunch of these special interest groups get at least some of what they want ( e.g.
, a bigger defense budget , more attention to human rights , rejection of climate change agreements , unconditional support for certain client states , etc . )
, the ability to develop an overall strategy to benefit the nation as a whole will erode .
At best , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at worst , it ends up pursuing policies that are mutually contradictory and therefore self-defeating .
Ideally , the institutions responsible for devising and conducting foreign policy would also learn from experience over time .
But as I ’ ve explored at length elsewhere , there is little accountability in today ’ s foreign-policy establishment .
Bad ideas survive no matter how often they are disproved , and people who get things wrong repeatedly routinely fail upward , while those who get things right are often marginalized .
Consider that the individuals and/or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bungled the Iraq War remain respected figures today , and some are considered eligible for future service .
Consider that the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal , New York Times , and Washington Post actually increased the number of regular columnists who supported that war yet still do not feature anyone who correctly anticipated that it would be a disaster .
If those who devise bad strategies pay no price and those who propose better alternatives go unrecognized , why should anyone expect the country to do better ?
One is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an inevitable consequence of America ’ s gradual transformation from a republic into a global empire , a powerful country that can not stop interfering all over the world .
The Founding Fathers warned that a republic could not engage in more or less constant warfare without becoming corrupted , and they were right .
Five-star general and former President Dwight D. Eisenhower understood it , too .
To wage war constantly requires powerful national security institutions , ever greater government secrecy , and the gradual expansion of executive power .
Checks and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international law are winked at , the media becomes partly co-opted and complicit , dissidents are silenced or marginalized , and presidents and their minions find it easier and easier to lie to retain popularity or win support for the policies they favor .
Once public discourse is debased and unmoored from the real world , coming up with strategies that will actually work in that world becomes nearly impossible .
As I said in my previous column , we have reached a point where foreign and national security policy in the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The results of U.S. actions don ’ t really matter—save to the soldiers , sailors , aircrews , and diplomats it tasks with carrying them out .
The only thing U.S. leaders care about is how it plays on TV , on Twitter , or among an electorate more interested in being entertained than enlightened or ably led .
Because the United States is still so powerful and secure , it can probably go on this way for quite some time .
Probably .
But it can ’ t do so forever , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make itself safer , more prosperous , and to build a society that lives up to its nobler ideals .

In my last column, I described the “brain-dead” qualities of the Trump administration’s approach to the Middle East and especially Iran. In particular, I stressed that the administration had no real strategy—if by that term one means a set of clear objectives, combined with a coherent plan of action to achieve them that takes the anticipated reactions of others into account.
In my last column, I described the “brain-dead” qualities of the Trump administration’s approach to the Middle East and especially Iran. In particular, I stressed that the administration had no real strategy—if by that term one means a set of clear objectives, combined with a coherent plan of action to achieve them that takes the anticipated reactions of others into account.
What we have instead is brute force coercion, divorced from clear objectives and implemented by an ignorant president with poor impulse control. After nearly three years in office, President Donald Trump has managed to increase the risk of war, push Iran to gradually restart its nuclear program, provoke Iraq into asking the United States to prepare to leave, raise serious doubts about U.S. judgment and reliability, alarm allies in Europe, and make Russia and China look like fonts of wisdom and order. The Trump administration has made it clear that it thinks assassinating foreign officials is a legitimate tool of foreign policy and that war criminals should be lionized, a move that nasty governments are likely to welcome and imitate.
Unfortunately, this strategic myopia goes well beyond the Middle East.
Take, for example, the far more important issue of China. To its credit, the Trump administration recognizes that China is the only possible peer competitor that the United States is likely to face for many decades. This realization is no great feat of genius, however. Reasonable people can disagree about the magnitude of the China challenge, but only a blind person could miss the worrisome implications of China’s rise.
If you thought strategically, you’d start looking for ways to limit Chinese influence at the least cost and risk to the United States itself. You’d understand that the United States cannot halt or reverse Chinese economic growth (and certainly not without hurting itself), but you’d work hard to keep as many countries as possible on its side on the issues that matter, including advanced technology. In fact, you’d get serious about trying to prevent China from achieving a dominant position in potentially game-changing technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence. You’d be focused laserlike on maintaining a solid diplomatic position in Asia, and over time, you’d be looking for ways to drive a wedge between China and Russia, too. And you’d try hard not to get distracted by secondary issues and waste time, attention, political capital, or resources on them.
What has the United States done instead?
For starters, Trump abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a slap in the face to the 11 Asia-Pacific countries that had worked hard to reach an agreement that would have provided some modest economic benefits and kept them more closely linked to the U.S. economy. Then Trump launched his own trade war with China. But instead of lining up other key economic powers, he threatened or waged trade wars with most of them, too. Instead of presenting China with a united front, the United States has been facing China more or less alone, with substantially reduced leverage. The predictable result: a face-saving trade compromise that rolls back the clock and no progress on the real bones of contention with Beijing.
Next, Trump began his reality show approach to North Korea: at first threatening “fire and fury” and then getting bamboozled by Kim Jong Un’s empty promises at their initial meeting. The result: no breakthrough in U.S. relations with North Korea, no halt to its nuclear program, and, across Asia, diminished confidence in U.S. judgment.
Meanwhile, Trump has spent most of the past three years gratuitously insulting key U.S. allies in Europe and threatening to pull the country out of NATO. Surprise, surprise: When U.S. officials then tried to convince America’s allies not to buy Chinese technology—and especially Huawei 5G digital equipment—they got the brushoff from governments that were now in no mood to do Trump any favors. Chinese diplomats seeking to preserve Huawei’s position have been quick to take advantage of Trump’s repeated blunders, telling European officials that they are more committed to multilateralism and technological openness than the United States is and highlighting their support for the Paris climate agreement (another deal that Trump foolishly abandoned). According to Julianne Smith of the German Marshall Fund of the United States: “The Chinese have started brazenly claiming that it is China, not the United States, that shares more values with Europe. [They] also frequently remind European audiences that unlike the United States, China believes in climate change and multilateralism, a message that is especially powerful in a place like Germany.”
Now consider this: At a moment when the U.S. State Department is in free fall, China is upping its game. China now has more embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic posts than the United States does and in an era where the future alignment of a number of important countries could be up for grabs. According to former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns: “We’ve entered an era in which diplomacy matters more than ever, on an intensely competitive international landscape. … China realizes that and is rapidly expanding its diplomatic capacity. The U.S., by contrast, seems intent on unilateral diplomatic disarmament.” As I’ve noted before, any hope of balancing China in Asia requires the United States to preserve solid ties to an unwieldy coalition of Asian states, and that will require knowledgeable, sophisticated, patient, and dedicated diplomacy as least as much as credible military forces.
Lastly, instead of conducting a measured and gradual disengagement from the Middle East, and returning to the balance-of-power approach that the United States employed successfully from World War II to the end of the Cold War, Trump has allowed local client states, wealthy donors, and hawkish advisors to drag him back into a pointless confrontation with Iran. One can only imagine the knowing smiles of foreign-policy mavens in Beijing as they watch the United States stumble toward yet another quagmire of its own making.
In short, despite recognizing that the China challenge was the most important item on America’s foreign-policy agenda—with the possible exception of climate change itself—Trump and company have pursued a series of policies that almost seem tailor-made to give China as many advantages as possible.
But that’s not the bad news. Though the Trump administration may have taken the “no strategy” approach to a new level, this problem has been apparent for some time. Bill Clinton thought the United States could expand NATO eastward, contain Iraq and Iran simultaneously, bring China into the World Trade Organization prematurely, and promote hyperglobalization with abandon yet never face serious negative consequences. George W. Bush believed ending tyranny and evil forever should be the central goal of U.S. foreign policy and thought the U.S. military could quickly transform the Middle East into a sea of pro-American democracies. Clinton was luckier than Bush, insofar as the negative consequences of his actions did not emerge until after he had left office, but neither president’s actions left the United States in a stronger global position.
Barack Obama had a more realistic view of U.S. power and placed more weight on diplomacy, but he did little to reduce America’s military involvement overseas and fully backed the energetic use of U.S. military power. Obama sent more troops to Afghanistan in 2009, supported regime change in Libya and Syria, and expanded targeted killings of suspected terrorists with drones or special operations forces. His administration failed to anticipate Russia’s reaction to Western efforts to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union and NATO, and he proved unable to unite the country behind his approach to climate change or Iran. Nor should we forget that in his last year in office, the U.S. military dropped more than 26,000 bombs in seven different countries.
What’s going on here? When did the United States get so bad at strategy? Foreign policy is a challenging enterprise where uncertainties are rife and mistakes are sometimes inevitable. But an inability to think strategically isn’t hard-wired into American DNA. The Truman administration faced enormous challenges in the aftermath of World War II, but it came up with containment, the Marshall Plan, NATO, a set of bilateral alliances in Asia, and a set of economic institutions that served the United States and its allies well for decades. Similarly, the first Bush administration (1989-1993) managed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the peaceful reunification of Germany, and the first Gulf War with considerable subtlety, expertise, and restraint. Neither administration was perfect, but their handling of complex and novel circumstances showed a sure grasp of what was most important and the ability to elicit the responses they wanted from both allies and adversaries. In other words, they were good at strategy.
Paradoxically, part of the problem today is the remarkable position of primacy that the United States has enjoyed ever since the Cold War ended. Because the United States is so powerful, wealthy, and secure, it is mostly insulated from the consequences of its own actions. When it makes mistakes, most of the costs are borne by others, and it hasn’t faced a peer competitor that might be quick to take advantage of mistakes. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars may ultimately cost more than $6 trillion and thousands of soldiers’ lives, but the lack of a draft limits public concerns about casualties, and the United States is paying for all of these wars by borrowing the money abroad, running up bigger deficits, and sticking future generations with the bill.
This situation helps explain why few Americans are interested in what is happening overseas or what the U.S. government is doing about it. According to Diane Hessen, who has been conducting in-depth interviews with a panel of 500 Americans since 2016, “most voters don’t care much [about foreign policy], and that’s a problem.” Other recent surveys have asked Americans to list their top priorities, and foreign policy doesn’t even make the top 10. When most Americans can’t tell the difference between success and failure—at least in terms of immediate, tangible consequences—then policymakers will be under less pressure to come up with strategies that actually work and posturing will take precedence over actual performance.
And then there’s hubris. Americans have always seen themselves as a model for others, and victory in the Cold War reinforced the belief that the United States had the magic formula for success in the modern world. Moreover, they also believed that almost everyone else around the world realized this and couldn’t wait to follow their lead, join a U.S.-led world order, and gradually become just like them. Convinced the tides of history were flowing their way, U.S. leaders believed they were pushing on an open door. Who needs a coherent, sophisticated, and carefully designed strategy when powerful global trends were already pushing the world in the direction they wanted?
Moreover, as Paul Pillar explains in his important book Why America Misunderstands the World, the United States’ unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance has weakened its ability to fashion viable foreign-policy strategies. Devising an effective foreign-policy strategy requires anticipating how others are likely to react, but government officials—let alone the public at large—frequently know very little about the countries whose actions they are trying to influence. In addition, the enduring myth of the “melting pot”—which portrays immigrants to the United States as readily embracing a new American identity and merging seamlessly into the fabric of U.S. society—leads the country to discount the power of nationalism, ethnicity, and other enduring sources of local identity, which in turn leads it to underestimating the difficulty of state- or nation-building in diverse societies. Certain of its own rectitude and noble intentions, the United States is equally slow to recognize that other societies might have valid reasons to question its motives or to see it as dangerous. Taken together, these blind spots are a serious obstacle to the development of effective foreign-policy strategy, especially toward parts of the world whose historical experiences and cultural elements are dramatically different from its own.
Key features of the U.S. democratic system also make it harder to devise and implement a coherent foreign and national security policy, especially when there is no clear and present danger to focus the mind and impose discipline on foreign-policy debates. When most of the public is indifferent, the policy process is more easily captured by domestic and foreign lobbies, especially in an era when money plays such a central role in politics. Instead of a genuine marketplace of ideas where competing policy prescriptions are carefully and honestly debated, foreign policy becomes an arena dominated by the loudest and best-funded voices or the preferences of a small set of wealthy donors. And as I’ve noted before, the United States is probably more vulnerable to foreign influence than any great power in modern history. If a bunch of these special interest groups get at least some of what they want (e.g., a bigger defense budget, more attention to human rights, rejection of climate change agreements, unconditional support for certain client states, etc.), the ability to develop an overall strategy to benefit the nation as a whole will erode. At best, the United States ends up overcommitted; at worst, it ends up pursuing policies that are mutually contradictory and therefore self-defeating.
Ideally, the institutions responsible for devising and conducting foreign policy would also learn from experience over time. But as I’ve explored at length elsewhere, there is little accountability in today’s foreign-policy establishment. Bad ideas survive no matter how often they are disproved, and people who get things wrong repeatedly routinely fail upward, while those who get things right are often marginalized. Consider that the individuals and/or groups that conceived, sold, and bungled the Iraq War remain respected figures today, and some are considered eligible for future service. Consider that the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and Washington Post actually increased the number of regular columnists who supported that war yet still do not feature anyone who correctly anticipated that it would be a disaster. If those who devise bad strategies pay no price and those who propose better alternatives go unrecognized, why should anyone expect the country to do better?
One is tempted to see these various failures as an inevitable consequence of America’s gradual transformation from a republic into a global empire, a powerful country that cannot stop interfering all over the world. The Founding Fathers warned that a republic could not engage in more or less constant warfare without becoming corrupted, and they were right. Five-star general and former President Dwight D. Eisenhower understood it, too. To wage war constantly requires powerful national security institutions, ever greater government secrecy, and the gradual expansion of executive power. Checks and balances erode, violations of domestic and international law are winked at, the media becomes partly co-opted and complicit, dissidents are silenced or marginalized, and presidents and their minions find it easier and easier to lie to retain popularity or win support for the policies they favor. Once public discourse is debased and unmoored from the real world, coming up with strategies that will actually work in that world becomes nearly impossible.
As I said in my previous column, we have reached a point where foreign and national security policy in the United States is more like performance art. The results of U.S. actions don’t really matter—save to the soldiers, sailors, aircrews, and diplomats it tasks with carrying them out. The only thing U.S. leaders care about is how it plays on TV, on Twitter, or among an electorate more interested in being entertained than enlightened or ably led. Because the United States is still so powerful and secure, it can probably go on this way for quite some time. Probably. But it can’t do so forever, and it will continue to miss opportunities to make itself safer, more prosperous, and to build a society that lives up to its nobler ideals.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-14--Trump Has Made Sanctions a Path to Strikes

U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s decision to kill the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani , the architect of Iran ’ s political and military influence in the Middle East , and the Iranian response represent grave escalations in hostilities between the United States and Iran .
While both sides have signaled a desire to pull back since these strikes , the world should not exhale too deeply .
Trump has offered fresh threats of “ punishing economic sanctions ” on Iran , which he followed through with on Friday , imposing sanctions on more Iranian officials who had a direct @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well as more important economic sectors such as steel , aluminum , copper , and iron .
The continued use of U.S. sanctions , in the absence of negotiations and with a heightened military posture , means that the United States and Iran are locked into a confrontational stance with no plans for de-escalation .
In his speech on Jan. 8 addressing Iran ’ s attack on U.S. targets in Iraq , Trump said he wanted a new deal to replace the Iran nuclear accord .
He refrained from announcing fresh strikes on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ praised the move as a critical pause in hostilities .
But it would be going too far to call this a de-escalation .
In the press conference held by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin Friday , they framed these new sanctions as immediate , painful economic pressure on Iran .
This is consistent with the president ’ s aggressive sanctions posture since leaving the Iran nuclear deal .
His penchant for tough sanctions , alongside a willingness to use lethal force , suggests that the administration seeks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ To realize true de-escalation , Trump would need to signal the possibility for sanctions relief in the context of a meaningful and structured diplomatic process .
At the present moment , such measures appear remote , at best .
As a result , all sides remain prepared for the possibility of further hostilities .
The current tit-for-tat cycle of hostilities between the two countries can be traced to a particular tipping point : Trump ’ s reimposition of punishing financial sanctions on Iran in 2018 .
Last year , this move galvanized Tehran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and energy targets , as well as U.S. installations and personnel , in the Middle East .
It also elevated Tehran ’ s demands for sanctions relief as a precursor for returning to any negotiations with Washington .
Trump ’ s ominous sanctions threats are not a middle ground policy option meant to create space for diplomatic negotiation or de-escalation .
His track record on Iran sanctions suggests that the White House sees sanctions as a windup to missile strikes or other hostile measures .
Sanctions are a new signaling tool to advise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also now appear to be a diplomatic démarche .
Sanctions exceptions permit the U.S. State Department to issue visas to Iranian political leaders to attend United Nations meetings .
But Trump just threw out this adherence to the U.N. Headquarters Agreement and denied Iran ’ s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif ’ s visa to travel to the U.N .
The strictures of sanctions can illuminate the possible future trajectories of U.S.-Iran tensions .
These economic measures box Iran and the United States in , foreclosing certain de-escalatory paths in the bilateral relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions make it difficult for Iran to communicate with the United States and others .
This can be a particular challenge for conflict management in tense times .
Sanctions also make humanitarian exchanges extraordinarily difficult .
This exacts a human toll on Iranians only exacerbated by Iran ’ s own mismanagement of funds for critical social spending .
As a political matter , the sanctions hamper a possible future move by the United States to permit further food and medicine delivery to Iran—an olive branch that could create a pause in frantic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. sanctions now , as Trump has promised , can make a climbdown politically infeasible with dug-in domestic constituencies in Iran and in the United States .
As Zarif said ahead of the September 2019 U.N. General Assembly , “ Abandon the illusion that Iran can be defeated by pressure.
” For Iran , each additional sanction is a freshly humiliating and offensive gesture by its greatest adversary .
For the United States , new sanctions are an affirmation of the policy of denunciation and distance from a repressive and brutal regime .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the small measure of political feasibility that exists to find an accommodation and seek de-escalation .
Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew saw sanctions with Iran as a way to forestall war and create leverage for diplomacy .
He suggested “ sanctions … give policymakers a unique capability to exert pressure beyond diplomacy but short of military force to achieve foreign-policy goals.
” Trump appears to agree that sanctions inhabit a middle ground between military moves and diplomatic talk .
This is why he invoked sanctions as a way to pause in hostilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a de-escalation or pivot toward diplomacy .
The lesson Trump is delivering to us now about sanctions is that the United States and Iran are entrenched in a middle ground of forever sanctions .
This is Trump ’ s preference and periodic , violent attacks by both sides are tolerable .
Forever sanctions may pull back adversaries from an escalation into all-out hostilities and another forever war in the Middle East .
But the economic pressure measures have their challenges , and they may ultimately forestall diplomacy and true de-escalation .

U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to kill the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani , the architect of Iran’s political and military influence in the Middle East, and the Iranian response represent grave escalations in hostilities between the United States and Iran. While both sides have signaled a desire to pull back since these strikes, the world should not exhale too deeply. Trump has offered fresh threats of “punishing economic sanctions” on Iran, which he followed through with on Friday, imposing sanctions on more Iranian officials who had a direct role in the missile attacks, as well as more important economic sectors such as steel, aluminum, copper, and iron.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to kill the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, the architect of Iran’s political and military influence in the Middle East, and the Iranian response represent grave escalations in hostilities between the United States and Iran. While both sides have signaled a desire to pull back since these strikes, the world should not exhale too deeply. Trump has offered fresh threats of “punishing economic sanctions” on Iran, which he followed through with on Friday, imposing sanctions on more Iranian officials who had a direct role in the missile attacks, as well as more important economic sectors such as steel, aluminum, copper, and iron.
The continued use of U.S. sanctions, in the absence of negotiations and with a heightened military posture, means that the United States and Iran are locked into a confrontational stance with no plans for de-escalation.
In his speech on Jan. 8 addressing Iran’s attack on U.S. targets in Iraq, Trump said he wanted a new deal to replace the Iran nuclear accord. He refrained from announcing fresh strikes on Iranian targets. Many relieved observers have praised the move as a critical pause in hostilities.
But it would be going too far to call this a de-escalation. In the press conference held by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin Friday, they framed these new sanctions as immediate, painful economic pressure on Iran. This is consistent with the president’s aggressive sanctions posture since leaving the Iran nuclear deal. His penchant for tough sanctions, alongside a willingness to use lethal force, suggests that the administration seeks Iranian capitulation rather than peaceful negotiations. To realize true de-escalation, Trump would need to signal the possibility for sanctions relief in the context of a meaningful and structured diplomatic process. At the present moment, such measures appear remote, at best. As a result, all sides remain prepared for the possibility of further hostilities.
The current tit-for-tat cycle of hostilities between the two countries can be traced to a particular tipping point: Trump’s reimposition of punishing financial sanctions on Iran in 2018. Last year, this move galvanized Tehran’s campaign of attacks on shipping and energy targets, as well as U.S. installations and personnel, in the Middle East. It also elevated Tehran’s demands for sanctions relief as a precursor for returning to any negotiations with Washington.
Trump’s ominous sanctions threats are not a middle ground policy option meant to create space for diplomatic negotiation or de-escalation. His track record on Iran sanctions suggests that the White House sees sanctions as a windup to missile strikes or other hostile measures. Sanctions are a new signaling tool to advise U.S. adversaries of lethal intent. They also now appear to be a diplomatic démarche. Sanctions exceptions permit the U.S. State Department to issue visas to Iranian political leaders to attend United Nations meetings. But Trump just threw out this adherence to the U.N. Headquarters Agreement and denied Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s visa to travel to the U.N.
The strictures of sanctions can illuminate the possible future trajectories of U.S.-Iran tensions. These economic measures box Iran and the United States in, foreclosing certain de-escalatory paths in the bilateral relationship. The forced isolation and stigma of sanctions make it difficult for Iran to communicate with the United States and others. This can be a particular challenge for conflict management in tense times.
Sanctions also make humanitarian exchanges extraordinarily difficult. This exacts a human toll on Iranians only exacerbated by Iran’s own mismanagement of funds for critical social spending. As a political matter, the sanctions hamper a possible future move by the United States to permit further food and medicine delivery to Iran—an olive branch that could create a pause in frantic, escalating hostilities.
Additionally, adding more U.S. sanctions now, as Trump has promised, can make a climbdown politically infeasible with dug-in domestic constituencies in Iran and in the United States. As Zarif said ahead of the September 2019 U.N. General Assembly, “Abandon the illusion that Iran can be defeated by pressure.” For Iran, each additional sanction is a freshly humiliating and offensive gesture by its greatest adversary. For the United States, new sanctions are an affirmation of the policy of denunciation and distance from a repressive and brutal regime. For all sides, further sanctions erode the small measure of political feasibility that exists to find an accommodation and seek de-escalation.
Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew saw sanctions with Iran as a way to forestall war and create leverage for diplomacy. He suggested “sanctions … give policymakers a unique capability to exert pressure beyond diplomacy but short of military force to achieve foreign-policy goals.”
Trump appears to agree that sanctions inhabit a middle ground between military moves and diplomatic talk. This is why he invoked sanctions as a way to pause in hostilities with Iran. But this is hardly a de-escalation or pivot toward diplomacy.
The lesson Trump is delivering to us now about sanctions is that the United States and Iran are entrenched in a middle ground of forever sanctions. This is Trump’s preference and periodic, violent attacks by both sides are tolerable. Forever sanctions may pull back adversaries from an escalation into all-out hostilities and another forever war in the Middle East. But the economic pressure measures have their challenges, and they may ultimately forestall diplomacy and true de-escalation.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-14--The Iran Deal Is Not Dead Yet, but It’s Getting There

The Iran Deal Is Not Dead Yet , but It ’ s Getting There Britain , France , and Germany on Tuesday bluntly dismissed U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s plea to abandon the landmark Iran nuclear pact , but they also confronted Iran for its increasing refusal to abide by critical provisions of the 2015 accord that limit its ability to restart its nuclear program .
In a joint letter , foreign ministers from the three European powers triggered the so-called dispute settlement mechanism in an effort to compel Iran to comply with its obligations under the pact , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) .
On Jan. 5 , Iran announced its fifth big breach of nuclear restraints , essentially throwing off all limits on its ability to enrich uranium , the necessary step to building a bomb .
The dispute settlement mechanism starts the clock on a 65-day period of intensive review by signatories of the deal , including input from the foreign ministers of Britain , China , France , Germany , Iran and Russia .
It remains unclear whether the United States , which is no longer a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any role .
If the dispute is not resolved according to the original terms of the agreement , the Europeans could declare the Iranians in breach of their obligations and reimpose a broad range of U.N. sanctions that were lifted after the nuclear pact was approved .
“ Together , we have stated unequivocally our regret and concern at the decision by the United States to withdraw from the JCPoA and to re-impose sanctions on Iran , ” the ministers stated .
“ Following Iran ’ s announcement in May 2019 that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under the JCPoA , we have sought to persuade Iran to change course.
” Why did the Europeans take this step ?
The move represented a desperate attempt by the Europeans to salvage a core arms control treaty that has been steadily unraveling since May 8 , 2018 , when Trump announced that the United States intended to withdraw from the nuclear pact , which was negotiated during President Barack Obama ’ s administration .
The United States has since expanded sanctions against Iran and threatened to punish foreign businesses that do business @ @ @ @ @ @ @ governments to partially circumvent U.S. sanctions through the creation of a financial vehicle , known as Instex , has largely faltered .
But without any economic benefits from the deal , Tehran has repeatedly argued that it has little reason to keep complying with its terms .
Despite their frustrations with the Trump administration over its decision to withdraw from the nuclear pact , European leaders expressed alarm at the prospect of a rejuvenated Iranian nuclear program .
With the series of recent breaches , especially in terms of uranium enrichment capacity , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a bomb from about a year to a matter of months .
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said the Europeans “ could no longer leave the growing Iranian violations of the nuclear agreement unanswered.
” “ Our goal is clear , ” he added .
“ We want to preserve the accord and come to a diplomatic solution within the agreement.
” While the European ministers said they remain committed to the Iran nuclear deal , British Prime Minister Boris Johnson , a close ally of Trump ’ s , suggested that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ replacement for the pact .
“ The problem with the agreement is that from the American perspective is that it is a flawed agreement , ” he said , suggesting a new so-called “ Trump deal.
” “ That ’ s what we need to see , and I think that will be a great way forward.
” Why does Trump oppose the nuclear deal ?
Trump has displayed contempt for the Iran nuclear deal since his 2016 election campaign .
The basic flaw , he contends , is that it lifted U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ballistic missile program , returned Iranian funds held overseas , and granted limited sanctions relief to Tehran in exchange for a partial , and perhaps temporary , pause in Iran ’ s ability to pursue nuclear weapons .
Trump argues that Iran used that economic breathing space to finance pro-Iranian militias that have killed American soldiers , fired rockets at Israel , and promoted terrorism throughout the Middle East .
The president and his backers have often presented misleading characterizations of the deal—for instance , falsely claiming that Obama gave billions of dollars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the deal .
The relief involved Iranian money that had been held in Western banks .
It didn ’ t help that the Iran deal was negotiated by Trump ’ s predecessor .
What part did Iran play in this crisis ?
Until Trump pulled out of the Iran deal , Iran had—by the Trump administration ’ s own admission—complied with its obligations under the terms of the agreement .
Iran has responded by incrementally halting the implementation of key provisions of the deal that are designed to limit its capacity to enrich @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at nuclear facilities .
Iran continues to maintain that its program is designed to generate electricity , not to produce a nuclear bomb , though that is harder to maintain now that Iran has begun openly enriching uranium above the levels necessary for power generation .
Since May 8 , 2019 , when Tehran announced it would no longer be bound by limits imposed by the nuclear pact on its stockpiling of heavy water and enriched uranium , Iran has announced five expansions in its nuclear activities .
Following the U.S. assassination of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ though following Iran ’ s pre-announced schedule for breaching the pact ) , Iran retreated further from the deal .
On Jan. 5 , it announced that it would no longer limit the number of centrifuges it can use to enrich uranium—a key factor in the speed at which it can create a weapons-grade stockpile—and lift all “ operational restrictions ” on its nuclear program .
At the same time , Iran has not announced plans to fully withdraw from the pact and pledged to continue to permit inspections of its nuclear facilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Energy Agency .
Iran says that if it gets sanctions relief , it will come back into compliance with the accord .
The dispute mechanism invoked by the Europeans will refer the question of Iran ’ s compliance to a joint commission comprising states that signed and remain in the nuclear pact .
They will be given 15 days to review the complaint .
If they can ’ t resolve the matter—it ’ s almost certain they won ’ t—then they can ask for more time or kick the ball to foreign ministers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 15 days or more .
If they still can ’ t resolve the situation , then the matter would be sent to a three-member advisory board , which would be given 15 days to issue a nonbinding opinion .
If the big powers can ’ t agree on the opinion in the following 15 days , the matter gets kicked back to the joint commission for another five days .
If the joint commission remains stuck , the Europeans will have the option of pressing the U.N. Security Council to take a vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Iran should continue to be lifted .
But there is a risk in pursuing this course .
The United States would likely veto it .
If that resolution is not adopted within 30 days , the so-called snapback provision would come into effect : that is , a range of sanctions imposed on Iran before the nuclear deal was struck would be reimposed .
In short , the nuclear deal would be formally , finally , irremediably dead .
“ The Europeans clearly want to preserve the JCPOA and to encourage the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into compliance , ” Daryl Kimball , the executive director of the Arms Control Association , told Foreign Policy .
“ But by triggering the disputes resolution mechanism , they theoretically open the door to the snapback provision and the reimposition of sanctions.
” The United States has not indicated what role , if any , it intends to play in the deliberations over Iranian compliance .
Many of the signatories are likely to argue that the United States , which has formally withdrawn from the pact , lacks the legal authority to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see sanctions reimposed .
But some diplomats indicate that the United States could argue that it has a role to play .
As mentioned , the Europeans run the risk of setting off a series of events that could culminate in the reimposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran , a goal that Europeans are keen to avoid .
The Iran pact , however , does provide an off-ramp for the Europeans , who must declare Iran in breach of the agreement before referring the final decision on sanctions to the Security Council .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council , the United States would have the right to block any decision to maintain sanctions , a move that would trigger the snapback provision .

Britain, France, and Germany on Tuesday bluntly dismissed U.S. President Donald Trump’s plea to abandon the landmark Iran nuclear pact, but they also confronted Iran for its increasing refusal to abide by critical provisions of the 2015 accord that limit its ability to restart its nuclear program.
Britain, France, and Germany on Tuesday bluntly dismissed U.S. President Donald Trump’s plea to abandon the landmark Iran nuclear pact, but they also confronted Iran for its increasing refusal to abide by critical provisions of the 2015 accord that limit its ability to restart its nuclear program.
What’s the latest?
In a joint letter, foreign ministers from the three European powers triggered the so-called dispute settlement mechanism in an effort to compel Iran to comply with its obligations under the pact, which is known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). On Jan. 5, Iran announced its fifth big breach of nuclear restraints, essentially throwing off all limits on its ability to enrich uranium, the necessary step to building a bomb.
The dispute settlement mechanism starts the clock on a 65-day period of intensive review by signatories of the deal, including input from the foreign ministers of Britain, China, France, Germany, Iran and Russia. It remains unclear whether the United States, which is no longer a party to the deal, will play any role. If the dispute is not resolved according to the original terms of the agreement, the Europeans could declare the Iranians in breach of their obligations and reimpose a broad range of U.N. sanctions that were lifted after the nuclear pact was approved.
“Together, we have stated unequivocally our regret and concern at the decision by the United States to withdraw from the JCPoA and to re-impose sanctions on Iran,” the ministers stated. “Following Iran’s announcement in May 2019 that it would cease meeting some of its commitments under the JCPoA, we have sought to persuade Iran to change course.”
Why did the Europeans take this step?
The move represented a desperate attempt by the Europeans to salvage a core arms control treaty that has been steadily unraveling since May 8, 2018, when Trump announced that the United States intended to withdraw from the nuclear pact, which was negotiated during President Barack Obama’s administration. The United States has since expanded sanctions against Iran and threatened to punish foreign businesses that do business with Iran. An effort by European governments to partially circumvent U.S. sanctions through the creation of a financial vehicle, known as Instex, has largely faltered. But without any economic benefits from the deal, Tehran has repeatedly argued that it has little reason to keep complying with its terms.
Despite their frustrations with the Trump administration over its decision to withdraw from the nuclear pact, European leaders expressed alarm at the prospect of a rejuvenated Iranian nuclear program. With the series of recent breaches, especially in terms of uranium enrichment capacity, Iran has shrunk its theoretical breakout time to a bomb from about a year to a matter of months.
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said the Europeans “could no longer leave the growing Iranian violations of the nuclear agreement unanswered.”
“Our goal is clear,” he added. “We want to preserve the accord and come to a diplomatic solution within the agreement.”
While the European ministers said they remain committed to the Iran nuclear deal, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, a close ally of Trump’s, suggested that it might be time to consider a replacement for the pact. “The problem with the agreement is that from the American perspective is that it is a flawed agreement,” he said, suggesting a new so-called “Trump deal.” “That’s what we need to see, and I think that will be a great way forward.”
Why does Trump oppose the nuclear deal?
Trump has displayed contempt for the Iran nuclear deal since his 2016 election campaign. The basic flaw, he contends, is that it lifted U.N. Security Council restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program, returned Iranian funds held overseas, and granted limited sanctions relief to Tehran in exchange for a partial, and perhaps temporary, pause in Iran’s ability to pursue nuclear weapons. Trump argues that Iran used that economic breathing space to finance pro-Iranian militias that have killed American soldiers, fired rockets at Israel, and promoted terrorism throughout the Middle East. The president and his backers have often presented misleading characterizations of the deal—for instance, falsely claiming that Obama gave billions of dollars to the Iranians in exchange for signing the deal. The relief involved Iranian money that had been held in Western banks. It didn’t help that the Iran deal was negotiated by Trump’s predecessor.
What part did Iran play in this crisis?
Until Trump pulled out of the Iran deal, Iran had—by the Trump administration’s own admission—complied with its obligations under the terms of the agreement. Iran has responded by incrementally halting the implementation of key provisions of the deal that are designed to limit its capacity to enrich uranium and the work it can do at nuclear facilities. Iran continues to maintain that its program is designed to generate electricity, not to produce a nuclear bomb, though that is harder to maintain now that Iran has begun openly enriching uranium above the levels necessary for power generation.
Since May 8, 2019, when Tehran announced it would no longer be bound by limits imposed by the nuclear pact on its stockpiling of heavy water and enriched uranium, Iran has announced five expansions in its nuclear activities.
Following the U.S. assassination of top Iranian military leader Qassem Suleimani (though following Iran’s pre-announced schedule for breaching the pact), Iran retreated further from the deal. On Jan. 5, it announced that it would no longer limit the number of centrifuges it can use to enrich uranium—a key factor in the speed at which it can create a weapons-grade stockpile—and lift all “operational restrictions” on its nuclear program. At the same time, Iran has not announced plans to fully withdraw from the pact and pledged to continue to permit inspections of its nuclear facilities by international inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran says that if it gets sanctions relief, it will come back into compliance with the accord.
What’s next?
The dispute mechanism invoked by the Europeans will refer the question of Iran’s compliance to a joint commission comprising states that signed and remain in the nuclear pact. They will be given 15 days to review the complaint. If they can’t resolve the matter—it’s almost certain they won’t—then they can ask for more time or kick the ball to foreign ministers, who would be given an additional 15 days or more. If they still can’t resolve the situation, then the matter would be sent to a three-member advisory board, which would be given 15 days to issue a nonbinding opinion. If the big powers can’t agree on the opinion in the following 15 days, the matter gets kicked back to the joint commission for another five days.
If the joint commission remains stuck, the Europeans will have the option of pressing the U.N. Security Council to take a vote on a resolution asking whether U.N. sanctions on Iran should continue to be lifted. But there is a risk in pursuing this course. The United States would likely veto it. If that resolution is not adopted within 30 days, the so-called snapback provision would come into effect: that is, a range of sanctions imposed on Iran before the nuclear deal was struck would be reimposed. In short, the nuclear deal would be formally, finally, irremediably dead.
“The Europeans clearly want to preserve the JCPOA and to encourage the United States and Iran to get back into compliance,” Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association, told Foreign Policy. “But by triggering the disputes resolution mechanism, they theoretically open the door to the snapback provision and the reimposition of sanctions.”
The wild card
The United States has not indicated what role, if any, it intends to play in the deliberations over Iranian compliance. Many of the signatories are likely to argue that the United States, which has formally withdrawn from the pact, lacks the legal authority to invoke its powers under the agreement to see sanctions reimposed. But some diplomats indicate that the United States could argue that it has a role to play.
As mentioned, the Europeans run the risk of setting off a series of events that could culminate in the reimposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran, a goal that Europeans are keen to avoid. The Iran pact, however, does provide an off-ramp for the Europeans, who must declare Iran in breach of the agreement before referring the final decision on sanctions to the Security Council. Once the matter is before the Security Council, the United States would have the right to block any decision to maintain sanctions, a move that would trigger the snapback provision.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-14--Oman’s Renaissance—and What Will Follow

Oman’s Renaissance—and What Will Follow

For the most part , international news coverage of the Middle East suggests an endless cycle of instability , belligerence , and sectarianism .
Incessant reports of war and crisis dominate headlines , with those pockets of relative tranquility mostly ignored .
The most outstanding example of these is the Sultanate of Oman whose ruler , Qaboos bin Said , died on Jan. 10 at the age of 79 after a long illness .
Qaboos , the 14th generation of the ruling dynasty of Al Said , ascended to the throne on July 23 , 1970 , after overthrowing his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whose restrictive and isolationist policies had rendered the country among the poorer and most restrictive in the world .
The 29-year-old Qaboos , a recent graduate of the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst , England , soon embarked on daunting task : laying out a vision for Oman ’ s future development and progress .
In pursuit of his goals , he combined charisma and political acumen , uniting disparate factions throughout the country in common cause .
During his long reign , Qaboos turned Oman into a modern , stable , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ending only months short of what would have been a widely celebrated golden jubilee , Qaboos turned Oman into a modern , stable , and inclusive state where three Islamic traditions—Sunni , Shiite , and Ibadhi—peacefully coexist along with adherents of other faith traditions .
In fact , the country ’ s constitution , the Basic Statute of the State , prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion .
And in an Arab country where sectarian violence is virtually unknown , Muslims of all persuasions intermarry , work , and pray together @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s 2019 Global Competitiveness Report , meanwhile , the country was ranked as fully free of terrorism .
Fueled largely by revenues from oil exports which , though modest in comparison to those of its neighbors in the surrounding Gulf Cooperation Council countries , generate between 70 and 85 percent of government revenues , Qaboos ’ s economic development plan was ambitious .
In 1970 , Oman was isolated from much of the world , desperately poor , and almost totally devoid of modern infrastructure and amenities .
When Qaboos ascended to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years .
There were just over six miles of paved road , three public schools ( enrolling less than 1,000 boys ) , and minimal medical care .
Today , bridges , roads and highways , dams and desalination plants , public utilities , high-speed internet , world-class sports and cultural centers , and hundreds of education and health care facilities , both public and private , attest to the success of his modernization program .
Life expectancy exceeds 77 years , and literacy is estimated at 96 percent of the adult population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modern state , Qaboos also pushed for the creation of a better institutional framework , including a national constitution , a bicameral parliament—consisting of both an upper , appointed , house and a lower , elected , consultative assembly—and a variety of ministries to manage the effective functioning of a modern state .
And while , in the strictest sense , he served as absolute monarch , holding a number of portfolios ( including chief of the armed forces , minister of defense , minister of foreign affairs , and chairman of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ himself with trusted advisors and traveled throughout the land periodically on royal tours to meet with the public and help him frame priorities and respond to the people ’ s demands .
Such efforts helped endear Qaboos to Omanis across the spectrum , uniting an ethnically mixed and tribally diverse population into a nationally cohesive citizenry .
He is revered as the father of the Omani renaissance ( “ al-Nahda ” ) , which increased the sultanate ’ s profile on the world stage as a member of the United Nations , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ host of other international organizations and also ushered his country into the modern age .
During the 2011 Arab Spring , which toppled a succession of long-standing regimes , Oman was largely spared widespread dissent .
Demonstrations in the sultanate were largely confined to two areas of the country , where citizen protests focused on corruption , salaries , and employment .
In response , Qaboos shuffled his cabinet , dismissed ministers , increased wages , and promised to introduce 50,000 public sector jobs , effectively quelling protest—at least for the moment .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Qaboos advocated greater gender equality by introducing universal suffrage in 2002 , appointing women to positions of power , and creating employment opportunities for all , including “ equal pay for equal work , ” in both the private and public sectors .
In 2004 , he appointed the first Omani woman to a cabinet position , the minister of higher education .
Others followed , not only in the cabinet , but also in the upper house of the Omani parliament , whose members are appointed by the head of state , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abroad .
Beyond all this , Qaboos ’ s most enduring legacy will likely be his foreign policy , based on both principle and pragmatism .
Independent since 1650 and mindful of its history and the realpolitik of its neighborhood , Oman has adopted a policy of moderation and dialogue in international affairs .
The sultanate has doggedly pursued a path of independence and nonalignment— “ friend to all , enemy to none , ” the saying goes—even at the risk of reproach from its Arab brethren .
And so , in an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there are no Omani “ boots on the ground ” outside the borders of the sultanate .
And so , in an area wracked by warfare and division , there are no Omani “ boots on the ground ” outside the borders of the sultanate ; not in Yemen , Syria , Libya , or elsewhere .
In 1979 , in the wake of the Camp David Accords , Oman was among the few members of the Arab League that did not sever diplomatic relations with Anwar Sadat ’ s Egypt .
Following @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the governments of Oman and Israel initially opened trade offices in Muscat and Tel Aviv .
Oman has hosted Israeli Prime Ministers Shimon Peres , Yitzhak Rabin , and Benjamin Netanyahu , while also maintaining friendly ties with the Palestinian Authority .
Throughout the course of the ongoing war in Syria , Oman ’ s embassy in Damascus has remained open , unlike those of the majority of Arab states .
And since 2017 , Oman has pursued of path of neutrality in the boycott against neighboring Qatar , imposed by Saudi Arabia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Egypt .
As an ally of the United States—with friendly relations beginning in the presidency of George Washington and Oman becoming the first Arab country to send a diplomatic envoy to the United States in 1840—the sultanate under Qaboos endeavored to preserve and strengthen that friendship .
He traveled to the United States on two state visits , in 1974 and 1983 .
A facilities access agreement , signed in 1980 ( and renewed periodically ) has served as the foundation for ongoing military cooperation between the two countries .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Free Trade Agreement with the United States , brokered by Oman ’ s representative in Washington—the first female Arab ambassador to the United States—has enhanced opportunities for bilateral economic cooperation .
At the same time , Oman under Qaboos has maintained cordial relations with its neighbor Iran .
In doing so , Oman has been able to frequently serve as an interlocutor between the two adversaries , mediating the release of U.S. hostages from Iran , advocating for restraint during times of crisis , and hosting the secret discussions leading to the 2015 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Qaboos bin Said almost 50 years ago is ongoing .
His legacy will endure , yet challenges lie ahead .
Successive leaders in the sultanate and , indeed , in the Gulf region beyond its borders are rapidly confronting large , young , and tech-savvy populations .
The traditional Middle Eastern social contract , between a supposedly generous state and grateful citizenry , is being challenged .
The aspirations of the next generation are clear : greater freedom of expression , a loosening of controls on media , robust political debate , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greater employment opportunities , and genuine economic reform .
Thanks to Qaboos , Oman is at least in a better position to address these challenges than many of its neighbors .
He is the only leader the majority of Omanis have ever known .
He catapulted their country from abject poverty and relative obscurity to being a consequential player on the world stage .
The foundation of a modern state is firmly in place .
The transition to power of Haitham bin Tariq , Qaboos ’ s first cousin and personal choice for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The new sultan , with the support of his fellow Omanis , has a unique opportunity to continue on the path established by his predecessor toward peace , prosperity , and modernity .

For the most part, international news coverage of the Middle East suggests an endless cycle of instability, belligerence, and sectarianism. Incessant reports of war and crisis dominate headlines, with those pockets of relative tranquility mostly ignored. The most outstanding example of these is the Sultanate of Oman whose ruler, Qaboos bin Said, died on Jan. 10 at the age of 79 after a long illness.
For the most part, international news coverage of the Middle East suggests an endless cycle of instability, belligerence, and sectarianism. Incessant reports of war and crisis dominate headlines, with those pockets of relative tranquility mostly ignored. The most outstanding example of these is the Sultanate of Oman whose ruler, Qaboos bin Said, died on Jan. 10 at the age of 79 after a long illness.
Qaboos, the 14th generation of the ruling dynasty of Al Said, ascended to the throne on July 23, 1970, after overthrowing his father, Sultan Said bin Taimur, whose restrictive and isolationist policies had rendered the country among the poorer and most restrictive in the world. The 29-year-old Qaboos, a recent graduate of the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, England, soon embarked on daunting task: laying out a vision for Oman’s future development and progress. In pursuit of his goals, he combined charisma and political acumen, uniting disparate factions throughout the country in common cause.
During his long reign, Qaboos turned Oman into a modern, stable, and inclusive state.
During his long reign, ending only months short of what would have been a widely celebrated golden jubilee, Qaboos turned Oman into a modern, stable, and inclusive state where three Islamic traditions—Sunni, Shiite, and Ibadhi—peacefully coexist along with adherents of other faith traditions. In fact, the country’s constitution, the Basic Statute of the State, prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. And in an Arab country where sectarian violence is virtually unknown, Muslims of all persuasions intermarry, work, and pray together. In the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Report, meanwhile, the country was ranked as fully free of terrorism.
Fueled largely by revenues from oil exports which, though modest in comparison to those of its neighbors in the surrounding Gulf Cooperation Council countries, generate between 70 and 85 percent of government revenues, Qaboos’s economic development plan was ambitious. In 1970, Oman was isolated from much of the world, desperately poor, and almost totally devoid of modern infrastructure and amenities. When Qaboos ascended to the throne, life expectancy was around 50 years. There were just over six miles of paved road, three public schools (enrolling less than 1,000 boys), and minimal medical care. Today, bridges, roads and highways, dams and desalination plants, public utilities, high-speed internet, world-class sports and cultural centers, and hundreds of education and health care facilities, both public and private, attest to the success of his modernization program. Life expectancy exceeds 77 years, and literacy is estimated at 96 percent of the adult population.
Pledging to transform Oman into a modern state, Qaboos also pushed for the creation of a better institutional framework, including a national constitution, a bicameral parliament—consisting of both an upper, appointed, house and a lower, elected, consultative assembly—and a variety of ministries to manage the effective functioning of a modern state. And while, in the strictest sense, he served as absolute monarch, holding a number of portfolios (including chief of the armed forces, minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs, and chairman of the Central Bank), he also surrounded himself with trusted advisors and traveled throughout the land periodically on royal tours to meet with the public and help him frame priorities and respond to the people’s demands.
Such efforts helped endear Qaboos to Omanis across the spectrum, uniting an ethnically mixed and tribally diverse population into a nationally cohesive citizenry. He is revered as the father of the Omani renaissance (“al-Nahda”), which increased the sultanate’s profile on the world stage as a member of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, and a host of other international organizations and also ushered his country into the modern age.
During the 2011 Arab Spring, which toppled a succession of long-standing regimes, Oman was largely spared widespread dissent. Demonstrations in the sultanate were largely confined to two areas of the country, where citizen protests focused on corruption, salaries, and employment. In response, Qaboos shuffled his cabinet, dismissed ministers, increased wages, and promised to introduce 50,000 public sector jobs, effectively quelling protest—at least for the moment.
Throughout his tenure on the throne, Qaboos advocated greater gender equality by introducing universal suffrage in 2002, appointing women to positions of power, and creating employment opportunities for all, including “equal pay for equal work,” in both the private and public sectors. In 2004, he appointed the first Omani woman to a cabinet position, the minister of higher education. Others followed, not only in the cabinet, but also in the upper house of the Omani parliament, whose members are appointed by the head of state, and to a variety of ambassadorial posts abroad.
Beyond all this, Qaboos’s most enduring legacy will likely be his foreign policy, based on both principle and pragmatism. Independent since 1650 and mindful of its history and the realpolitik of its neighborhood, Oman has adopted a policy of moderation and dialogue in international affairs. The sultanate has doggedly pursued a path of independence and nonalignment—“friend to all, enemy to none,” the saying goes—even at the risk of reproach from its Arab brethren.
And so, in an area wracked by warfare and division, there are no Omani “boots on the ground” outside the borders of the sultanate.
And so, in an area wracked by warfare and division, there are no Omani “boots on the ground” outside the borders of the sultanate; not in Yemen, Syria, Libya, or elsewhere. In 1979, in the wake of the Camp David Accords, Oman was among the few members of the Arab League that did not sever diplomatic relations with Anwar Sadat’s Egypt. Following the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel, the governments of Oman and Israel initially opened trade offices in Muscat and Tel Aviv. Oman has hosted Israeli Prime Ministers Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, and Benjamin Netanyahu, while also maintaining friendly ties with the Palestinian Authority. Throughout the course of the ongoing war in Syria, Oman’s embassy in Damascus has remained open, unlike those of the majority of Arab states. And since 2017, Oman has pursued of path of neutrality in the boycott against neighboring Qatar, imposed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt.
As an ally of the United States—with friendly relations beginning in the presidency of George Washington and Oman becoming the first Arab country to send a diplomatic envoy to the United States in 1840—the sultanate under Qaboos endeavored to preserve and strengthen that friendship. He traveled to the United States on two state visits, in 1974 and 1983. A facilities access agreement, signed in 1980 (and renewed periodically) has served as the foundation for ongoing military cooperation between the two countries. And on the economic front, the 2009 Free Trade Agreement with the United States, brokered by Oman’s representative in Washington—the first female Arab ambassador to the United States—has enhanced opportunities for bilateral economic cooperation.
At the same time, Oman under Qaboos has maintained cordial relations with its neighbor Iran. In doing so, Oman has been able to frequently serve as an interlocutor between the two adversaries, mediating the release of U.S. hostages from Iran, advocating for restraint during times of crisis, and hosting the secret discussions leading to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.
The journey begun by Qaboos bin Said almost 50 years ago is ongoing. His legacy will endure, yet challenges lie ahead. Successive leaders in the sultanate and, indeed, in the Gulf region beyond its borders are rapidly confronting large, young, and tech-savvy populations. The traditional Middle Eastern social contract, between a supposedly generous state and grateful citizenry, is being challenged. The aspirations of the next generation are clear: greater freedom of expression, a loosening of controls on media, robust political debate, meaningful participation in the legislative process, greater employment opportunities, and genuine economic reform.
Thanks to Qaboos, Oman is at least in a better position to address these challenges than many of its neighbors. He is the only leader the majority of Omanis have ever known. He catapulted their country from abject poverty and relative obscurity to being a consequential player on the world stage. The foundation of a modern state is firmly in place. The transition to power of Haitham bin Tariq, Qaboos’s first cousin and personal choice for succession, has been swift and smooth. The new sultan, with the support of his fellow Omanis, has a unique opportunity to continue on the path established by his predecessor toward peace, prosperity, and modernity.