foreignpolicy--2020-05-18--Beijing Is Pushing the Taiwanese Toward Independence Hard and Fast

Beijing Is Pushing the Taiwanese Toward Independence Hard and Fast On May 20 , Beijing ’ s public enemy No .
1 , Tsai Ing-wen , will be inaugurated for a second and final four-year term as president of Taiwan .
Tsai was reelected in January with 57 percent of the vote , beating her Beijing-friendly rival .
Her Democratic Progressive Party , which holds that Taiwan is already “ an independent country ” and not a part of China , also retained its legislative majority .
Beijing ’ s growing belligerence , its tightening grip on Hong Kong , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington propelled Tsai ’ s big victory .
But the primary driver behind her success is a more profound shift in Taiwanese identity .
In February , a staggering 83 percent of Taiwan ’ s residents self-identified as Taiwanese rather than Chinese , as compared to 56.9 percent last June .
But this burgeoning national identify still remains anathema to Beijing , which insists that the island ’ s inhabitants are Chinese—no matter what they may think .
For decades , the dispute was about which side really represented “ China.
” After @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , U.S. ally Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan , bringing with him the Republic of China government and its treasury .
For decades , both sides—the authoritarian Kuomintang ( KMT ) regime in Taipei on the one hand and Mao Zedong ’ s revolutionary communists in Beijing on the other—claimed to represent China and engaged in a costly dollar-diplomacy struggle for international recognition throughout the developing world .
Many poor countries took advantage and changed recognition several times , with each switch demanding ever more largesse from either Taipei or Beijing .
During @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Olympics Committee to admit the country as “ Formosa , ” and at Beijing ’ s behest the nation ’ s athletes ’ uniforms bore the name “ Taiwan ” at the 1964 and 1968 Games , rather than ‘ The Republic of China.
’ But times have changed .
Now , Taiwan ’ s people , generations removed from the mainland and increasingly accustomed to their democratic rights , have begun to see themselves as distinct .
Beijing , meanwhile , has become even more linguistically demanding , in baroque and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Taiwanese people .
In November 2018 , Beijing deemed a failed ballot initiative to change the island ’ s current Olympics name from “ Chinese Taipei ” to “ Taiwan ” so provocative that it threatened to force Taiwanese athletes to withdraw from international competitions .
Beijing ’ s power has grown apace with its ability to buy and coerce the world into pretending Taiwan ’ s independent government does not exist .
During Tsai ’ s first term it induced seven countries to cut ties with Taipei , leaving Taiwan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And amid the COVID-19 crisis , Beijing has done everything within its power to keep Taiwan from engaging meaningfully with the World Health Organization and participating , as an observer , in the World Health Assembly , the organization ’ s decision-making body .
These strong-arm tactics , which have continued unabated despite the global pandemic , have eroded the political ground beneath the feet of the KMT—the Chinese Communist Party ’ s erstwhile political collaborator—and rendered it one of many political parties on the island .
For instance , Beijing has criticized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predecessor ) has not accepted the so-called 1992 Consensus—an informal agreement between the KMT and the Chinese government that there is one China , but that each side can have its own definition of what that might mean .
Then , in his 2019 New Year ’ s address , Chinese President Xi Jinping redefined the 1992 Consensus as an understanding that “ the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China , jointly seeking to achieve cross-strait unification.
” Even the China-friendly KMT can not abide this change and has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the concept .
Public anger and fear among the Taiwanese electorate catalyzed by what many see as the repression of Hong Kongers ’ political rights made the change a requirement for the KMT ’ s political survival .
But Beijing might reconsider the likely consequences of further isolating Taiwan and intimidating its 24 million residents .
This approach has already convinced millions more Taiwanese that formal independence may be the only reasonable next step for their island .
Even so , Tsai is no rabble-rouser .
She has deliberately selected policy positions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s surging support within the Trump administration .
Nor has she disavowed the idea of the Republic of China in favor of an entirely separate Taiwanese identity , despite the fact that increasing numbers of Taiwanese view the idea of the Republic of China itself as a foreign construct imposed upon them by China .
The smart move for Beijing would be to engage Tsai and her twice-elected Democratic Progressive Party government to mollify their legitimate concerns and work toward a modus vivendi between the two sides .
To date , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tightening the knot than untying it .
One reason is because after decades of propagandizing their children about the inevitability of “ reunification ” and the evil of “ separatism , ” the pressure is now growing on China ’ s current leadership from a new generation of bellicose and nationalistic netizens to make good on their bluster and to take Taiwan , by force if necessary .
The rigidity of China ’ s rhetoric toward Taiwan , its primary core interest , has almost obligated Beijing to adopt aggressive policies that continue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yet , as China ’ s leaders work to tighten their grip and destroy the Taiwanese government , more and more of the island ’ s residents are self-identifying as Taiwanese , thus making it more likely that one day a “ Republic of Taiwan ” will replace the Republic of China .
Xi and his comrades can help stave off that day by adopting a more flexible approach to Taiwan that includes granting its people the space and respect they deserve , and finding a way to sit down with its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mutual concern .
Until they do , the promise of peaceful unification with Taiwan will continue to slip through their fingers .

On May 20, Beijing’s public enemy No. 1, Tsai Ing-wen, will be inaugurated for a second and final four-year term as president of Taiwan. Tsai was reelected in January with 57 percent of the vote, beating her Beijing-friendly rival. Her Democratic Progressive Party, which holds that the "Republic of China (Taiwan)" is already “ an independent country ” and not a part of China, also retained its legislative majority. Beijing’s growing belligerence, its tightening grip on Hong Kong, and Taipei’s stronger relations with Washington propelled Tsai’s big victory. But the primary driver behind her success is a more profound shift in Taiwanese identity. In February, a staggering 83 percent of Taiwan’s residents self-identified as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, as compared to 56.9 percent last June . But this burgeoning national identify still remains anathema to Beijing, which insists that the island’s inhabitants are Chinese—no matter what they may think.
On May 20, Beijing’s public enemy No. 1, Tsai Ing-wen, will be inaugurated for a second and final four-year term as president of Taiwan. Tsai was reelected in January with 57 percent of the vote, beating her Beijing-friendly rival. Her Democratic Progressive Party, which holds that the “Republic of China (Taiwan)” is already “an independent country” and not a part of China, also retained its legislative majority. Beijing’s growing belligerence, its tightening grip on Hong Kong, and Taipei’s stronger relations with Washington propelled Tsai’s big victory. But the primary driver behind her success is a more profound shift in Taiwanese identity. In February, a staggering 83 percent of Taiwan’s residents self-identified as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, as compared to 56.9 percent last June. But this burgeoning national identify still remains anathema to Beijing, which insists that the island’s inhabitants are Chinese—no matter what they may think.
For decades, the dispute was about which side really represented “China.” After losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949, U.S. ally Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan, bringing with him the Republic of China government and its treasury. For decades, both sides—the authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taipei on the one hand and Mao Zedong’s revolutionary communists in Beijing on the other—claimed to represent China and engaged in a costly dollar-diplomacy struggle for international recognition throughout the developing world. Many poor countries took advantage and changed recognition several times, with each switch demanding ever more largesse from either Taipei or Beijing.
During the 1960 Olympics, China successfully compelled the Olympics Committee to admit the country as “Formosa,” and at Beijing’s behest the nation’s athletes’ uniforms bore the name “Taiwan” at the 1964 and 1968 Games, rather than ‘The Republic of China.’ But times have changed. Now, Taiwan’s people, generations removed from the mainland and increasingly accustomed to their democratic rights, have begun to see themselves as distinct. Beijing, meanwhile, has become even more linguistically demanding, in baroque and arbitrary ways that emphasize their imaginary ownership of the Taiwanese people. In November 2018, Beijing deemed a failed ballot initiative to change the island’s current Olympics name from “Chinese Taipei” to “Taiwan” so provocative that it threatened to force Taiwanese athletes to withdraw from international competitions.
Beijing’s power has grown apace with its ability to buy and coerce the world into pretending Taiwan’s independent government does not exist. During Tsai’s first term it induced seven countries to cut ties with Taipei, leaving Taiwan with only 15 formal diplomatic partners. And amid the COVID-19 crisis, Beijing has done everything within its power to keep Taiwan from engaging meaningfully with the World Health Organization and participating, as an observer, in the World Health Assembly, the organization’s decision-making body.
These strong-arm tactics, which have continued unabated despite the global pandemic, have eroded the political ground beneath the feet of the KMT—the Chinese Communist Party’s erstwhile political collaborator—and rendered it one of many political parties on the island. For instance, Beijing has criticized Tsai because she (unlike her KMT predecessor) has not accepted the so-called 1992 Consensus—an informal agreement between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party that there is one China, but that each side can have its own definition of what that might mean.
Then, in his 2019 New Year’s address, Chinese President Xi Jinping redefined the 1992 Consensus as an understanding that “the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China, jointly seeking to achieve cross-strait unification.” Even the China-friendly KMT cannot abide this change and has been compelled to consider dropping its support for the concept. Public anger and fear among the Taiwanese electorate catalyzed by what many see as the repression of Hong Kongers’ political rights made the change a requirement for the KMT’s political survival.
But Beijing might reconsider the likely consequences of further isolating Taiwan and intimidating its 24 million residents. This approach has already convinced millions more Taiwanese that formal independence may be the only reasonable next step for their island.
Even so, Tsai is no rabble-rouser. She has deliberately selected policy positions and been careful not to overplay Taiwan’s surging support within the Trump administration. Nor has she disavowed the idea of the Republic of China in favor of an entirely separate Taiwanese identity, despite the fact that increasing numbers of Taiwanese view the idea of the Republic of China itself as a foreign construct imposed upon them by China.
The smart move for Beijing would be to engage Tsai and her twice-elected Democratic Progressive Party government to mollify their legitimate concerns and work toward a modus vivendi between the two sides. To date, however, Beijing has been more interested in tightening the knot than untying it. One reason is because after decades of propagandizing their children about the inevitability of “reunification” and the evil of “separatism,” the pressure is now growing on China’s current leadership from a new generation of bellicose and nationalistic netizens to make good on their bluster and to take Taiwan, by force if necessary. The rigidity of China’s rhetoric toward Taiwan, its primary core interest, has almost obligated Beijing to adopt aggressive policies that continue to undermine its own stated policy objectives.
Yet, as China’s leaders work to tighten their grip and destroy the Taiwanese government, more and more of the island’s residents are self-identifying as Taiwanese, thus making it more likely that one day a “Republic of Taiwan” will replace the Republic of China. Xi and his comrades can help stave off that day by adopting a more flexible approach to Taiwan that includes granting its people the space and respect they deserve, and finding a way to sit down with its legitimately elected government and discuss issues of mutual concern. Until they do, the promise of peaceful unification with Taiwan will continue to slip through their fingers.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-18--Firing of State Watchdog May Be Related to Saudi Arms Sales, Senior Democrat Says

Firing of State Watchdog May Be Related to Saudi Arms Sales , Senior Democrat Says Saudi Arabia is expected to pay off the balance of its overdue bills for flight hours in the controversial U.S.-led refueling campaign in Yemen by June , Foreign Policy has learned , even as Riyadh has been roped into the fallout over U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s firing of the State Department ’ s top watchdog .
An unusual coalition of conservative Republicans and progressive Democrats have banded together to try to halt U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in the war in Yemen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worst humanitarian crisis .
It has led to pitched battles between Capitol Hill and the Trump administration that strike at constitutional debates over a president ’ s ability to use military force without prior congressional approval .
Despite Trump ’ s close relationship with the Saudi government , lawmakers across the aisle have soured on U.S.-Saudi ties and sharply rebuked Saudi Arabia for not paying its bills for U.S. military support on time .
On Monday , U.S.-Saudi ties were unexpectedly dragged into a new political scandal , one that could put U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the crosshairs of Congress .
Trump abruptly fired the State Department ’ s top watchdog on Friday evening , and now the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel , says the watchdog was probing the U.S. decision to sell precision-guided munitions to the Persian Gulf kingdom over the disapproval of Congress last year .
Engel said in separate statements that Trump ’ s sacking of Inspector General Steve Linick may have been related to both his inquiry into Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s misuse of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia .
“ I have learned that there may be another reason for Mr. Linick ’ s firing .
His office was investigating—at my request—Trump ’ s phony declaration of an emergency so he could send weapons to Saudi Arabia , ” Engel said in a statement to Foreign Policy .
“ We don ’ t have the full picture yet , but it ’ s troubling that Secretary Pompeo wanted Mr. Linick pushed out before this work could be completed , ” he added .
Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s ability to do his job but declined to elaborate why .
Though lawmakers have fallen short on challenges to constrain U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Trump ’ s war powers to carry out strikes against Iran , including an effort led by Sen. Tim Kaine vetoed by the White House this month , Riyadh appears to be yielding to sustained congressional pressure to pay back refueling bills .
The Saudis made a third reimbursement payment to the United States for flight hours for the mission at the end of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaving Riyadh with a balance of $ 6.3 million , which it is scheduled to pay off in June .
The first reimbursements for $ 38 million in U.S. flight hours from Riyadh came in late September , a Senate aide said , nearly a year after the mission ended .
Congress stated in a War Powers Resolution vetoed by Trump last year to terminate Defense Department involvement in the conflict that U.S. refueling of coalition aircraft constituted involvement in “ hostilities.
” Saudi Arabia has made two subsequent payments , for $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million in March .
By law , the Defense Department is required to provide monthly reports on the status of Saudi repayments every 30 days , though the coronavirus pandemic and lower staffing levels in the Pentagon have delayed processing of those reports , an agency spokesperson said .
“ We continue to work with the Saudi-led Coalition to secure the remaining reimbursements for aerial refueling , to include $ 6.3 million in flight hour payments , ” said Maj .
Rob Lodewick , a Pentagon spokesperson .
“ These payments are ongoing.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ million to the Defense Department for fuel provided during the mission .
The State Department stopped adhering to a legal certification requirement from Congress last year that calls on the agency to ensure that the Saudi-led coalition is making a “ good faith effort ” to reduce civilian casualties in the five-year war , a move that would prevent the U.S. administration from resuming the refueling campaign .
Congress had been hearing for at least nine months that repayment was in process before the first paid bills came back in September , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presented a finalized $ 299 million bill for the mission last year , not including the tab for U.S. fuel for the Saudis , which had not been completed at the time .
In total , Saudi Arabia owes the United States $ 158 million for flight hours and $ 23 million for fuel .
The United Arab Emirates , which also received refueling support from the Pentagon from the conflict before it scaled back combat operations last year , paid back the full $ 118 million it owed the Pentagon by last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ UAE has no outstanding bills for the mission .
Then-Defense Secretary James Mattis framed the end of the refueling mission as one made by Riyadh and supported by the Pentagon , though he said the effort would continue with “ the coalition ’ s own military capabilities.
” But the long effort for the Trump administration to get Saudi Arabia to reimburse the mission , which Democrats in Congress said was not legally authorized , comes amid fears that the White House has given Riyadh unjustly cozy treatment despite Crown Prince Mohammed Bin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his rule .
“ It is overwhelmingly clear that this administration is willing to disregard the Constitution and Congress in order to hand over sweetheart deals to the Saudi dictatorship as it carries out its horrific war in Yemen , ” said Democratic Rep. Ro Khanna , who championed the 2019 War Powers Resolution .
“ For years , the White House has misrepresented the nature of U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led war , falsely claiming improvements in minimizing civilian harm and concealing the nature of thousands of U.S. midair refueling missions for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Food Program estimates that 14.4 million Yemenis are in dire need of food assistance to survive .
Expectations for repayment from Saudi Arabia could run into further trouble , however , as a U.S. troop surge to the Gulf kingdom is beginning to be rolled back .
CNN reported early this year that Riyadh had paid $ 500 million to cover the cost of the deployments , which were scaled up after the United States blamed Iran for a cruise missile attack on Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais .
The reimbursement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Defense Department plan to create a mechanism for Saudi Arabia to help compensate the cost of U.S. deployments to the region , officials said , using a Pentagon account that allows U.S. allies to offset “ burden-sharing ” support in their home countries .
“ The Saudi government has agreed to help underwrite the cost of these activities and has provided burden-sharing contributions to DoD ’ s activities that support regional security , ” said Lodewick , the Pentagon spokesperson .

Saudi Arabia is expected to pay off the balance of its overdue bills for flight hours in the controversial U.S.-led refueling campaign in Yemen by June, Foreign Policy has learned, even as Riyadh has been roped into the fallout over U.S. President Donald Trump’s firing of the State Department’s top watchdog.
Saudi Arabia is expected to pay off the balance of its overdue bills for flight hours in the controversial U.S.-led refueling campaign in Yemen by June, Foreign Policy has learned, even as Riyadh has been roped into the fallout over U.S. President Donald Trump’s firing of the State Department’s top watchdog.
An unusual coalition of conservative Republicans and progressive Democrats have banded together to try to halt U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in the war in Yemen, now considered the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. It has led to pitched battles between Capitol Hill and the Trump administration that strike at constitutional debates over a president’s ability to use military force without prior congressional approval. Despite Trump’s close relationship with the Saudi government, lawmakers across the aisle have soured on U.S.-Saudi ties and sharply rebuked Saudi Arabia for not paying its bills for U.S. military support on time.
On Monday, U.S.-Saudi ties were unexpectedly dragged into a new political scandal, one that could put U.S. support for the Saudi coalition back in the crosshairs of Congress. Trump abruptly fired the State Department’s top watchdog on Friday evening, and now the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel, says the watchdog was probing the U.S. decision to sell precision-guided munitions to the Persian Gulf kingdom over the disapproval of Congress last year.
Engel said in separate statements that Trump’s sacking of Inspector General Steve Linick may have been related to both his inquiry into Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s misuse of staff for personal errands and his inquiry into U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
“I have learned that there may be another reason for Mr. Linick’s firing. His office was investigating—at my request—Trump’s phony declaration of an emergency so he could send weapons to Saudi Arabia,” Engel said in a statement to Foreign Policy.
“We don’t have the full picture yet, but it’s troubling that Secretary Pompeo wanted Mr. Linick pushed out before this work could be completed,” he added. Trump has said he lost confidence in Linick’s ability to do his job but declined to elaborate why.
Though lawmakers have fallen short on challenges to constrain U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Trump’s war powers to carry out strikes against Iran, including an effort led by Sen. Tim Kaine vetoed by the White House this month, Riyadh appears to be yielding to sustained congressional pressure to pay back refueling bills.
The Saudis made a third reimbursement payment to the United States for flight hours for the mission at the end of March, a Senate aide confirmed, leaving Riyadh with a balance of $6.3 million, which it is scheduled to pay off in June.
The first reimbursements for $38 million in U.S. flight hours from Riyadh came in late September, a Senate aide said, nearly a year after the mission ended. Congress stated in a War Powers Resolution vetoed by Trump last year to terminate Defense Department involvement in the conflict that U.S. refueling of coalition aircraft constituted involvement in “hostilities.”
Saudi Arabia has made two subsequent payments, for $75.7 million in February and $37.8 million in March. By law, the Defense Department is required to provide monthly reports on the status of Saudi repayments every 30 days, though the coronavirus pandemic and lower staffing levels in the Pentagon have delayed processing of those reports, an agency spokesperson said.
“We continue to work with the Saudi-led Coalition to secure the remaining reimbursements for aerial refueling, to include $6.3 million in flight hour payments,” said Maj. Rob Lodewick, a Pentagon spokesperson. “These payments are ongoing.”
The Saudis also owe $23 million to the Defense Department for fuel provided during the mission. The State Department stopped adhering to a legal certification requirement from Congress last year that calls on the agency to ensure that the Saudi-led coalition is making a “good faith effort” to reduce civilian casualties in the five-year war, a move that would prevent the U.S. administration from resuming the refueling campaign.
Congress had been hearing for at least nine months that repayment was in process before the first paid bills came back in September, the Senate aide said. The Defense Department presented a finalized $299 million bill for the mission last year, not including the tab for U.S. fuel for the Saudis, which had not been completed at the time. In total, Saudi Arabia owes the United States $158 million for flight hours and $23 million for fuel.
The United Arab Emirates, which also received refueling support from the Pentagon from the conflict before it scaled back combat operations last year, paid back the full $118 million it owed the Pentagon by last spring. The Defense Department confirmed the UAE has no outstanding bills for the mission.
Then-Defense Secretary James Mattis framed the end of the refueling mission as one made by Riyadh and supported by the Pentagon, though he said the effort would continue with “the coalition’s own military capabilities.”
But the long effort for the Trump administration to get Saudi Arabia to reimburse the mission, which Democrats in Congress said was not legally authorized, comes amid fears that the White House has given Riyadh unjustly cozy treatment despite Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s crackdown on dissenters to his rule.
“It is overwhelmingly clear that this administration is willing to disregard the Constitution and Congress in order to hand over sweetheart deals to the Saudi dictatorship as it carries out its horrific war in Yemen,” said Democratic Rep. Ro Khanna, who championed the 2019 War Powers Resolution. “For years, the White House has misrepresented the nature of U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led war, falsely claiming improvements in minimizing civilian harm and concealing the nature of thousands of U.S. midair refueling missions for Saudi airstrikes without reimbursement.”
The World Food Program estimates that 14.4 million Yemenis are in dire need of food assistance to survive.
Expectations for repayment from Saudi Arabia could run into further trouble, however, as a U.S. troop surge to the Gulf kingdom is beginning to be rolled back. CNN reported early this year that Riyadh had paid $500 million to cover the cost of the deployments, which were scaled up after the United States blamed Iran for a cruise missile attack on Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais.
The reimbursement for the troop surge is part of a Defense Department plan to create a mechanism for Saudi Arabia to help compensate the cost of U.S. deployments to the region, officials said, using a Pentagon account that allows U.S. allies to offset “burden-sharing” support in their home countries.
“The Saudi government has agreed to help underwrite the cost of these activities and has provided burden-sharing contributions to DoD’s activities that support regional security,” said Lodewick, the Pentagon spokesperson.


Will Zoomplomacy Last?

During the first week of April , at the peak of the coronavirus outbreak in New York City , the United Nations Security Council spent a week in intensive deliberations over the protocols that demanded official meetings be held only in a special chamber in the U.N. headquarters .
Although the Russians finally agreed to videoconferencing , taking debates online has done little to end the broader political impasse that regularly blocks consensus among the council ’ s five permanent members .
Indeed , in the greatest global crisis since World War II , the council in charge of “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” failed to adopt a single resolution .
The coronavirus has forced new constraints on the diplomatic profession .
Diplomats can not meet in person , make foreign trips , or organize high-level engagements .
Missions abroad are unable to fulfill their core advantage—meeting the locals and getting a feel for conditions on the ground .
Foreign services worldwide have had to get used to conducting a large part of their work online , through nonsecure networks .
Remote bilateral political-level meetings have become common , and multilateral Zoom conferences proliferate .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the next 12-18 months raises the question of whether this arrangement , call it Zoomplomacy , is the new normal .
It could have a lasting effect on the way international relations are conducted , or it may prove to be an ephemeral phenomenon that fades away with the virus .
Zoomplomacy has already yielded some results .
In early April , the OPEC energy ministers , meeting with external online support from the G-20 , succeeded in reaching a historic decision on a cut in oil production .
On the other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the onset of the virus have produced no concrete decisions .
These particular failures are likely better explained by the usual differing interests than by the medium .
But online conferencing tools are flawed mediums for diplomatic work , and normalizing them will take no small effort .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic . ]
In recent weeks , complaints have been piling up about the difficulties and downsides that remote diplomacy poses .
We spoke with a dozen serving U.S. , European , Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grievances .
Some note that it is difficult to conduct real negotiations and engage in actual give-and-take without human contact , side conversations , and even the ability to understand body language .
The capability to build and maintain significant relationships is undermined .
Similarly , day-to-day matters can be decided remotely at lower levels , but bigger decisions are elusive without the personal engagement of leaders .
For instance , in a multilateral summit , final details of many agreements are often reached through the personal diplomacy of leaders , which requires @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a summit .
Those opportunities are hard to replicate online .
Overall , there is an increased propensity for misperception and misunderstanding and a greater threat that a misrepresentation of facts will pass unnoticed .
Without side conversations , body language , or a sense of the other side ’ s intergroup dynamics , diplomats struggle to reach a deeper understanding .
Technical barriers , including connectivity , language , and time zones , make online platforms unreliable for time-sensitive negotiations and affect the ability to reach agreement on substance .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off the record ” any longer .
Diplomats are constantly aware that everything said on an online platform might be easily recorded—discouraging deviations from an official position and thus undercutting the subtlety of diplomatic work .
Lower barriers for organization of high-level meetings , meanwhile , might be tactically exploited by actors favoring brinkmanship .
Some diplomats said it is extremely difficult to prepare effective multilateral summits .
In contrast to the usual process of in-person pre-negotiations between diplomats of participating countries to prepare the agenda , remote communications impede the ability to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decisions for leaders to make when they are finally in the same room or , in the current situation , on the same screen .
Summits and leader meetings have traditionally been used as action-forcing events when deliverables are reached so that the leaders can take credit for them and have a stake in their implementation .
They usually contain both a public element—such as photo-ops and press conferences—and private talks .
Zoom meetings lack the drama , ceremony , and public component that often incentivize leaders to reach decisions .
Lower barriers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , might be tactically exploited by actors favoring brinkmanship .
When OPEC agreed on its oil production cut , Mexico refused to go along with the decision , leading to a second extraordinary ministerial-level videoconference days later to reduce Mexico ’ s obligation .
Lastly , online platforms face legitimate security questions .
They might be hacked by spy agencies , private intelligence organizations , or even criminals , all of which risk inhibiting candid exchanges .
There is also the intentional disruption of meetings , sometimes called “ Zoom-bombing.
” Recently , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ photo of a cabinet meeting that showed a clearly visible Zoom ID—a reminder of the growing danger of impostors ’ participation or hackers lurking in the shadows .
Paired with the employment of deep-fake video technology , the opportunities for mischief , and worse , are significant .
Criticism aside , some diplomats had positive feedback about online diplomacy , although it was mixed with apprehension that it could be used as a pretext for deep budget cuts and forced downsizing of foreign services .
One young diplomat told us that “ some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them and their old practices of diplomatic bureaucracy.
” “ It ’ s weird , but it works .
… There is no time for niceties , so you get straight to the point.
” Nickolay Mladenov , the U.N. Middle East envoy , has been using online diplomacy platforms extensively for the last month .
Mladenov said the platforms didn ’ t work well for confidential issues .
But day to day , meetings were more efficient : “ It ’ s weird , but it works .
… There is no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ straight to the point .
In that sense , it is more efficient than a meeting that requires travel time , starts with informal discussions , cups of coffee or meals , and only then gets into the substance at hand.
” From discussions with the practitioners , it is possible to identify a number of potential advantages and opportunities of Zoomplomacy .
For one , the practical barriers to organizing a high-level bilateral or multilateral meeting are far lower : There is no need to devote time for long-distance travel or to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , transportation , and catering .
With less protocol , fewer logistical requirements , and eased schedule constraints , there may , in fact , be greater opportunities to focus on details and find solutions .
Heads of state and leaders may well be able to speak more frequently .
And , when they do , diplomats might find it easier to stop leaders from improvising and taking a well-prepared agenda sideways , as online engagements are scheduled to be short and concrete .
Likewise , with no space constraints , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and capabilities into a meeting .
Many other officials can join the session to listen , understand the essence of the sticking points , and suggest solutions .
The financial savings of having online meetings could enable foreign services to strengthen their headquarters and diplomatic missions .
It may also be easier to outsource certain tasks to external talent with skills and expertise not typically found in foreign services , allowing them to focus their human capital on core foreign-policy goals .
Lastly , online platforms could enable small , agile countries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comparable to major powers .
( On the other hand , countries and cities used to hosting summits could lose political prestige and income . )
Personal diplomacy will not disappear , but the balance between it and Zoomplomacy will likely change in favor of the latter .
But conducting online diplomacy demands a cultural and a mental switch , which is easier for some than for others .
Younger diplomats and those with technical skills are more likely to thrive .
Similarly , those whose diplomatic work doesn ’ t center on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likelier to succeed using online-only platforms .
It would be beneficial to study the experience of the European Union , which has used online tools for years , for better and worse .
Protocol experts should update the codes of diplomatic conduct online , and diplomats should be trained to work more efficiently in this medium .
One possible general outcome of the pandemic will be an increase in remote and online work in all fields , reinforced by the need to recalibrate professional processes due to dwindling budgets .
Foreign services should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than being forced to adapt due to budget cuts imposed by their treasuries .
When weighing the pros and cons of streamlining , missions should make sure that core expertise is retained in-house and that their embassies are organized to focus on activities that can not be done remotely , such as public engagement , building confidential relationships , and providing their capitals with the sound , local perspective derived from having boots on the ground .
Finally , strengthening the security and robustness of online diplomatic communication channels—a responsibility shared by governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaks , embarrassments , and miscommunication that can compromise successful diplomacy .
Mladenov said he doubted that online diplomacy would become the new normal .
“ When we can return to it , in-person diplomacy will resume .
… But I think online diplomacy will continue … and we will learn how to use it better , especially because we are likely to need to rely on it for a longer period than we think.
” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov , who was himself recently diagnosed with the coronavirus , predicted in an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in-person meetings would someday resume .
But we won ’ t return to the way things were .
Online diplomacy “ will take root in international affairs and will remain even when all quarantine restrictions have been lifted.
” The advent of Zoomplomacy seems to be accelerating changes in the fusty diplomatic arena .
Used effectively , it can enrich the foreign affairs toolbox and allow diplomats more flexibility and connectivity , which are natural to the character of their profession .
The pandemic may have coerced us into Zoomplomacy , but this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us for a long time to come , so we may as well figure out the best way to squeeze lemonade out of it .

During the first week of April, at the peak of the coronavirus outbreak in New York City, the United Nations Security Council spent a week in intensive deliberations over the protocols that demanded official meetings be held only in a special chamber in the U.N. headquarters. Although the Russians finally agreed to videoconferencing, taking debates online has done little to end the broader political impasse that regularly blocks consensus among the council’s five permanent members. Indeed, in the greatest global crisis since World War II, the council in charge of “the maintenance of international peace and security” failed to adopt a single resolution.
During the first week of April, at the peak of the coronavirus outbreak in New York City, the United Nations Security Council spent a week in intensive deliberations over the protocols that demanded official meetings be held only in a special chamber in the U.N. headquarters. Although the Russians finally agreed to videoconferencing, taking debates online has done little to end the broader political impasse that regularly blocks consensus among the council’s five permanent members. Indeed, in the greatest global crisis since World War II, the council in charge of “the maintenance of international peace and security” failed to adopt a single resolution.
The coronavirus has forced new constraints on the diplomatic profession. Diplomats cannot meet in person, make foreign trips, or organize high-level engagements. Missions abroad are unable to fulfill their core advantage—meeting the locals and getting a feel for conditions on the ground. Foreign services worldwide have had to get used to conducting a large part of their work online, through nonsecure networks. Remote bilateral political-level meetings have become common, and multilateral Zoom conferences proliferate.
The prospects that COVID-19 will not be eradicated in the next 12-18 months raises the question of whether this arrangement, call it Zoomplomacy, is the new normal. It could have a lasting effect on the way international relations are conducted, or it may prove to be an ephemeral phenomenon that fades away with the virus.
Zoomplomacy has already yielded some results. In early April, the OPEC energy ministers, meeting with external online support from the G-20, succeeded in reaching a historic decision on a cut in oil production. On the other hand, G-7 and G-20 video summits since the onset of the virus have produced no concrete decisions. These particular failures are likely better explained by the usual differing interests than by the medium. But online conferencing tools are flawed mediums for diplomatic work, and normalizing them will take no small effort.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
In recent weeks, complaints have been piling up about the difficulties and downsides that remote diplomacy poses. We spoke with a dozen serving U.S., European, Israeli, and U.N. diplomats who offered similar grievances. Some note that it is difficult to conduct real negotiations and engage in actual give-and-take without human contact, side conversations, and even the ability to understand body language. The capability to build and maintain significant relationships is undermined. Similarly, day-to-day matters can be decided remotely at lower levels, but bigger decisions are elusive without the personal engagement of leaders. For instance, in a multilateral summit, final details of many agreements are often reached through the personal diplomacy of leaders, which requires informal, private discussions on the sidelines of a summit. Those opportunities are hard to replicate online.
Overall, there is an increased propensity for misperception and misunderstanding and a greater threat that a misrepresentation of facts will pass unnoticed. Without side conversations, body language, or a sense of the other side’s intergroup dynamics, diplomats struggle to reach a deeper understanding. Technical barriers, including connectivity, language, and time zones, make online platforms unreliable for time-sensitive negotiations and affect the ability to reach agreement on substance. And there is no such thing as “off the record” any longer. Diplomats are constantly aware that everything said on an online platform might be easily recorded—discouraging deviations from an official position and thus undercutting the subtlety of diplomatic work.
Lower barriers for organization of high-level meetings, meanwhile, might be tactically exploited by actors favoring brinkmanship. Some diplomats said it is extremely difficult to prepare effective multilateral summits. In contrast to the usual process of in-person pre-negotiations between diplomats of participating countries to prepare the agenda, remote communications impede the ability to reach lower-level agreements while teeing up higher-level decisions for leaders to make when they are finally in the same room or, in the current situation, on the same screen. Summits and leader meetings have traditionally been used as action-forcing events when deliverables are reached so that the leaders can take credit for them and have a stake in their implementation. They usually contain both a public element—such as photo-ops and press conferences—and private talks. Zoom meetings lack the drama, ceremony, and public component that often incentivize leaders to reach decisions.
Lower barriers for organization of high-level meetings, meanwhile, might be tactically exploited by actors favoring brinkmanship. When OPEC agreed on its oil production cut, Mexico refused to go along with the decision, leading to a second extraordinary ministerial-level videoconference days later to reduce Mexico’s obligation.
Lastly, online platforms face legitimate security questions. They might be hacked by spy agencies, private intelligence organizations, or even criminals, all of which risk inhibiting candid exchanges. There is also the intentional disruption of meetings, sometimes called “Zoom-bombing.” Recently, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson tweeted a photo of a cabinet meeting that showed a clearly visible Zoom ID—a reminder of the growing danger of impostors’ participation or hackers lurking in the shadows. Paired with the employment of deep-fake video technology, the opportunities for mischief, and worse, are significant.
Criticism aside, some diplomats had positive feedback about online diplomacy, although it was mixed with apprehension that it could be used as a pretext for deep budget cuts and forced downsizing of foreign services. One young diplomat told us that “some elder diplomats fear that Zoom will replace them and their old practices of diplomatic bureaucracy.”
“It’s weird, but it works. … There is no time for niceties, so you get straight to the point.” Nickolay Mladenov, the U.N. Middle East envoy, has been using online diplomacy platforms extensively for the last month. Mladenov said the platforms didn’t work well for confidential issues. But day to day, meetings were more efficient: “It’s weird, but it works. … There is no time for niceties, so you get straight to the point. In that sense, it is more efficient than a meeting that requires travel time, starts with informal discussions, cups of coffee or meals, and only then gets into the substance at hand.”
From discussions with the practitioners, it is possible to identify a number of potential advantages and opportunities of Zoomplomacy. For one, the practical barriers to organizing a high-level bilateral or multilateral meeting are far lower: There is no need to devote time for long-distance travel or to pay for the airline tickets, accommodation, transportation, and catering. With less protocol, fewer logistical requirements, and eased schedule constraints, there may, in fact, be greater opportunities to focus on details and find solutions.
Heads of state and leaders may well be able to speak more frequently. And, when they do, diplomats might find it easier to stop leaders from improvising and taking a well-prepared agenda sideways, as online engagements are scheduled to be short and concrete.
Likewise, with no space constraints, it is easier to bring the best national knowledge and capabilities into a meeting. Many other officials can join the session to listen, understand the essence of the sticking points, and suggest solutions.
The financial savings of having online meetings could enable foreign services to strengthen their headquarters and diplomatic missions. It may also be easier to outsource certain tasks to external talent with skills and expertise not typically found in foreign services, allowing them to focus their human capital on core foreign-policy goals. Lastly, online platforms could enable small, agile countries, giving them tools to make an impact comparable to major powers. (On the other hand, countries and cities used to hosting summits could lose political prestige and income.)
Personal diplomacy will not disappear, but the balance between it and Zoomplomacy will likely change in favor of the latter. But conducting online diplomacy demands a cultural and a mental switch, which is easier for some than for others. Younger diplomats and those with technical skills are more likely to thrive. Similarly, those whose diplomatic work doesn’t center on complex topics or building new relationships are likelier to succeed using online-only platforms. It would be beneficial to study the experience of the European Union, which has used online tools for years, for better and worse. Protocol experts should update the codes of diplomatic conduct online, and diplomats should be trained to work more efficiently in this medium.
One possible general outcome of the pandemic will be an increase in remote and online work in all fields, reinforced by the need to recalibrate professional processes due to dwindling budgets. Foreign services should initiate and lead these revisions, rather than being forced to adapt due to budget cuts imposed by their treasuries. When weighing the pros and cons of streamlining, missions should make sure that core expertise is retained in-house and that their embassies are organized to focus on activities that cannot be done remotely, such as public engagement, building confidential relationships, and providing their capitals with the sound, local perspective derived from having boots on the ground. Finally, strengthening the security and robustness of online diplomatic communication channels—a responsibility shared by governments and platform operators—will be imperative to preventing leaks, embarrassments, and miscommunication that can compromise successful diplomacy.
Mladenov said he doubted that online diplomacy would become the new normal. “When we can return to it, in-person diplomacy will resume. … But I think online diplomacy will continue … and we will learn how to use it better, especially because we are likely to need to rely on it for a longer period than we think.”
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, who was himself recently diagnosed with the coronavirus, predicted in an interview with the Russian newspaper AiF that in-person meetings would someday resume. But we won’t return to the way things were. Online diplomacy “will take root in international affairs and will remain even when all quarantine restrictions have been lifted.”
The advent of Zoomplomacy seems to be accelerating changes in the fusty diplomatic arena. Used effectively, it can enrich the foreign affairs toolbox and allow diplomats more flexibility and connectivity, which are natural to the character of their profession. The pandemic may have coerced us into Zoomplomacy, but this new method of connecting will be with us for a long time to come, so we may as well figure out the best way to squeeze lemonade out of it.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-18--The Next Pandemic Crisis Is Mental Health

The Next Pandemic Crisis Is Mental Health Lois has bipolar disorder and a 16-month-old baby .
In normal circumstances , her condition is manageable .
Under the United Kingdom ’ s lockdown , in which trips outside are tightly limited and seeing family or friends impossible , her mental health has deteriorated .
No one is picking up the phone in her National Health Service ( NHS ) recovery team , part of a branch of mental health services for people with long-term mental health conditions , and the soonest appointment she can get with them is two months away @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a serious mental health condition , is at particularly high risk .
But as lockdowns across the world continue because of the global coronavirus crisis , people with preexisting mental health conditions are seeing symptoms worsen .
As Mental Health Awareness week begins in the UK , tens of thousands of people there are already painfully aware of the damage being done , even as the government overlooks psychological costs in favor of economic calculations .
According to research from the charity Rethink Mental Illness , 80 percent of people living with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disorder and psychosis thought that their mental health was worse because of the impact of coronavirus .
Twenty-eight percent described their symptoms as much worse .
I have seen my own mental health fluctuate under lockdown conditions , with the difficulties of loneliness and lack of routine .
I have struggled with intrusive thoughts about suicide and depressive days where doing basic tasks to care for myself are near impossible .
Although there is some evidence that lockdown measures have allowed anxiety in some people with generalized anxiety disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off from vital treatment , important daily routines , and regular coping mechanisms .
Kirsten , who suffers from complex post-traumatic stress disorder , can not visit the gym or be hugged by her family members .
“ It ’ s nigh on impossible to get any help at the best of times , let alone just now , ” she said .
“ So many services aren ’ t available.
” Spike is in alcoholism recovery and has borderline personality disorder , attention deficit hyperactivity disorder , and body dysmorphia .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through a painful recovery process .
Spike spent the first three weeks of lockdown “ in darkness , ” drinking again , frightened and feeling utterly alone .
Without face-to-face meetings , Spike ’ s recovery has stalled .
Other people who spoke to Foreign Policy reported canceled mental-health appointments , therapy over the phone or Zoom that just didn ’ t feel effective , and general practitioners scrapping mental-health reviews .
The lockdown has stripped away most of the routines and mechanisms needed to manage mental health conditions .
People can not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in-person therapy sessions or other mental-health appointments , go to groups or classes , or even leave their home as many times a day as they wish to .
Regular routines , a critical part of well-being , have been disrupted and replaced with an anxious and uncertain future .
Other aspects of the coronavirus crisis are putting huge pressure on mental health .
Loss of livelihood and fears about money and where the next meal is coming from are hitting vulnerable families hard .
The Trussell Trust , the United Kingdom ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reported distributing more food parcels in the first two weeks of the COVID-19 lockdown than ever before , an 81 percent increase on the same period last year .
Around the world , coronavirus has seen a rise in domestic violence and the mental and physical harm that comes with it .
Financial insecurity and domestic violence are force multipliers for the impact of mental-health problems , turning manageable problems into crises .
So is the isolation of lockdown .
A possible and tragic outcome for sufferers who feel that they can not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police have recorded “ early signs ” of an increase in suicides and attempted suicides , but say it is too soon to describe this as a trend .
However , Fraser Nelson , editor of the Spectator and political columnist for the Daily Telegraph , has said that there could be 150,000 avoidable deaths caused by the U.K. ’ s lockdown measures , a figure that seems to come from his own speculation .
Australian scientists have calculated that the likely deaths from suicide caused by loneliness , isolation , and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be massively outweighed by the lives saved by the lockdown measures—but all such models rely on uncertain assumptions in an unprecedented time .
As countries build up experience , the costs may become more apparent .
When asked about the potential spike in suicide rates caused by lockdown measures at his daily briefing , British Prime Minister Boris Johnson replied with the assurance that more money would be directed towards mental-health charities .
While charities do undeniably important work in Britain and around the world , prioritizing them over the mental-health arm of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As a department , mental health has been chronically underfunded after a decade of Conservative Party rule in the U.K. , while austerity has stripped away other sources of protection and aid .
A mental-health nurse , Cara , told Foreign Policy : “ Not enough is being done to ensure mental-health services remain accessible but I ’ m most worried about how services cope when we start to reemerge from this crisis .
I can foresee how services are just going to collapse—they ’ re already stretched and I don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cope with the collective trauma and grief that ’ s going to come out of this.
” A spokesperson from Samaritans , which operates the U.K. ’ s best-known suicide hotline , told Foreign Policy : “ Samaritans is a critical service , needed now more than ever .
There ’ s no doubt that these uncertain and challenging times can affect our mental health and wellbeing .
“ Our volunteers are as busy as ever providing emotional support to people who are struggling .
Currently , one in three calls for help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are continuing to hear about struggles with mental health , access to services as well as the impact on basic needs such as food , housing and employment.
” The NHS urgently needs parity of esteem between mental and physical health , which means that both are treated and funded equally .
Mental health problems account for 23 percent of the burden of disease in the U.K. , but only 11 percent of the NHS budget is spent on supporting people who are struggling with mental illness .
Routine appointments such as mental-health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ahead for all patients , over the phone or via apps such as Zoom , along with consistent and clear messaging about lockdown measures to prevent further confusion .
Governments worldwide need to treat this growing crisis with the same seriousness that they apply to economic matters—and realize that , in the absence of strong measures such as universal income that alleviate fears , financial stresses will inevitably become mental health issues , and vice versa .
Mental ill health will cost Britain and other countries dearly in the future if it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lives are at stake .

Lois has bipolar disorder and a 16-month-old baby. In normal circumstances, her condition is manageable. Under the United Kingdom’s lockdown, in which trips outside are tightly limited and seeing family or friends impossible, her mental health has deteriorated. No one is picking up the phone in her National Health Service (NHS) recovery team, part of a branch of mental health services for people with long-term mental health conditions, and the soonest appointment she can get with them is two months away.
Lois has bipolar disorder and a 16-month-old baby. In normal circumstances, her condition is manageable. Under the United Kingdom’s lockdown, in which trips outside are tightly limited and seeing family or friends impossible, her mental health has deteriorated. No one is picking up the phone in her National Health Service (NHS) recovery team, part of a branch of mental health services for people with long-term mental health conditions, and the soonest appointment she can get with them is two months away.
Lois, as a young mother with a serious mental health condition, is at particularly high risk. But as lockdowns across the world continue because of the global coronavirus crisis, people with preexisting mental health conditions are seeing symptoms worsen. As Mental Health Awareness week begins in the UK, tens of thousands of people there are already painfully aware of the damage being done, even as the government overlooks psychological costs in favor of economic calculations. According to research from the charity Rethink Mental Illness, 80 percent of people living with serious mental illnesses such as borderline personality disorder and psychosis thought that their mental health was worse because of the impact of coronavirus. Twenty-eight percent described their symptoms as much worse.
I have seen my own mental health fluctuate under lockdown conditions, with the difficulties of loneliness and lack of routine. I have struggled with intrusive thoughts about suicide and depressive days where doing basic tasks to care for myself are near impossible.
Although there is some evidence that lockdown measures have allowed anxiety in some people with generalized anxiety disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder to lessen, the lockdown is cutting people off from vital treatment, important daily routines, and regular coping mechanisms. Kirsten, who suffers from complex post-traumatic stress disorder, cannot visit the gym or be hugged by her family members. “It’s nigh on impossible to get any help at the best of times, let alone just now,” she said. “So many services aren’t available.”
Spike is in alcoholism recovery and has borderline personality disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and body dysmorphia. Even before the pandemic, he was going through a painful recovery process. Spike spent the first three weeks of lockdown “in darkness,” drinking again, frightened and feeling utterly alone. Without face-to-face meetings, Spike’s recovery has stalled.
Other people who spoke to Foreign Policy reported canceled mental-health appointments, therapy over the phone or Zoom that just didn’t feel effective, and general practitioners scrapping mental-health reviews.
The lockdown has stripped away most of the routines and mechanisms needed to manage mental health conditions. People cannot visit their friends or family, attend in-person therapy sessions or other mental-health appointments, go to groups or classes, or even leave their home as many times a day as they wish to. Regular routines, a critical part of well-being, have been disrupted and replaced with an anxious and uncertain future.
Other aspects of the coronavirus crisis are putting huge pressure on mental health. Loss of livelihood and fears about money and where the next meal is coming from are hitting vulnerable families hard. The Trussell Trust, the United Kingdom’s leading network of food banks, reported distributing more food parcels in the first two weeks of the COVID-19 lockdown than ever before, an 81 percent increase on the same period last year.
Around the world, coronavirus has seen a rise in domestic violence and the mental and physical harm that comes with it. Financial insecurity and domestic violence are force multipliers for the impact of mental-health problems, turning manageable problems into crises. So is the isolation of lockdown.
A possible and tragic outcome for sufferers who feel that they cannot continue in pain is suicide. British police have recorded “early signs” of an increase in suicides and attempted suicides, but say it is too soon to describe this as a trend.
However, Fraser Nelson, editor of the Spectator and political columnist for the Daily Telegraph, has said that there could be 150,000 avoidable deaths caused by the U.K.’s lockdown measures, a figure that seems to come from his own speculation. Australian scientists have calculated that the likely deaths from suicide caused by loneliness, isolation, and a lack of access to mental health would be massively outweighed by the lives saved by the lockdown measures—but all such models rely on uncertain assumptions in an unprecedented time. As countries build up experience, the costs may become more apparent.
When asked about the potential spike in suicide rates caused by lockdown measures at his daily briefing, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson replied with the assurance that more money would be directed towards mental-health charities.
While charities do undeniably important work in Britain and around the world, prioritizing them over the mental-health arm of the NHS is a dubious choice. As a department, mental health has been chronically underfunded after a decade of Conservative Party rule in the U.K., while austerity has stripped away other sources of protection and aid. A mental-health nurse, Cara, told Foreign Policy: “Not enough is being done to ensure mental-health services remain accessible but I’m most worried about how services cope when we start to reemerge from this crisis. I can foresee how services are just going to collapse—they’re already stretched and I don’t know how they’re going to cope with the collective trauma and grief that’s going to come out of this.”A spokesperson from Samaritans, which operates the U.K.’s best-known suicide hotline, told Foreign Policy: “Samaritans is a critical service, needed now more than ever. There’s no doubt that these uncertain and challenging times can affect our mental health and wellbeing.
“Our volunteers are as busy as ever providing emotional support to people who are struggling. Currently, one in three calls for help to Samaritans are about coronavirus and we are continuing to hear about struggles with mental health, access to services as well as the impact on basic needs such as food, housing and employment.”
The NHS urgently needs parity of esteem between mental and physical health, which means that both are treated and funded equally. Mental health problems account for 23 percent of the burden of disease in the U.K., but only 11 percent of the NHS budget is spent on supporting people who are struggling with mental illness.
Routine appointments such as mental-health reviews and individual therapy sessions should go ahead for all patients, over the phone or via apps such as Zoom, along with consistent and clear messaging about lockdown measures to prevent further confusion.
Governments worldwide need to treat this growing crisis with the same seriousness that they apply to economic matters—and realize that, in the absence of strong measures such as universal income that alleviate fears, financial stresses will inevitably become mental health issues, and vice versa. Mental ill health will cost Britain and other countries dearly in the future if it is not treated and managed during lockdown. Lives are at stake.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-18--The 5 Ways U.S.-China Competition Is Hardening

That U.S.-China relations have plummeted over the course of the pandemic is no secret .
An internal Chinese government think tank report , which leaked this week , even warned China ’ s top leaders that there was increasing risk of the U.S.-China relationship sliding into conflict .
But why exactly is U.S.-China competition hardening at this moment ?
After all , foreign-policy analysts often argue that despite their tensions , Washington and Beijing should still be able to cooperate on global issues where their interests align , such as pandemics and climate change .
The COVID-19 crisis has ravaged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their strained relationship to spiral further was not a foregone conclusion .
Of course , before the coronavirus pandemic , experts in the United States and China appeared to be converging around the idea that the other would be its primary political competitor for decades to come .
Major international shocks can break prior trends of this sort , changing the course of events .
But they can also intensify forces already in motion—and that is precisely what has been happening in at least five areas in which competition was already substantial , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sight .
Before the coronavirus , Sino-American military competition was already acute .
Once content to shelve territorial disputes with its neighbors , Beijing has used its decades-long economic expansion to build up a formidable military arsenal .
China has intimidated neighboring states , seized disputed territory , interfered with freedom of navigation close to its shores , and raised the risks to the U.S. military of operating in Asia .
Many U.S. officials believe Beijing intends to weaken U.S. alliances and eventually expel U.S. forces and bases from Asia altogether .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sino-American military rivalry .
Beijing recently announced new administrative districts in the South China Sea , trailed Malaysian and Philippine vessels , and conducted dangerous maneuvers seemingly intended to intimidate Japan , Vietnam , and Taiwan .
With its rivals hobbled and its neighbors overwhelmed , Beijing appears to see the pandemic as an opportunity to press its advantage and more forcibly assert its authority .
In Washington , these actions are intensifying beliefs that more needs to be done to deter China in Asia .
In early April , U.S. Indo-Pacific Command @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proposed defense investments to Congress .
While they have yet to hammer out the specifics , the desire to bolster U.S. capabilities and reassure nervous allies facing an increasingly assertive China has bipartisan backing .
And although the pandemic ’ s economic shock will likely constrain the overall defense budget , the military and legislators are likely to agree on the need to preserve resources allocated to military competition with China .
Before the pandemic , there was a growing debate about whether the U.S. and Chinese economies had grown too interdependent , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risks to supply chains , U.S. jobs , and to national security—particularly where Chinese companies were linked to the central government or could use foreign data for national gain .
These concerns led policymakers to consider whether to “ decouple ” the U.S. and Chinese economies , what steps Washington would need to take to constrain Chinese investment in sensitive industries , and how the United States could keep its own economy competitive .
The pandemic has given these questions new urgency , revealing shortages of critical life-supporting equipment and materials .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their on China for pharmaceutical products , medical masks , and other health care supplies , preexisting debates have shifted from a focus on higher-end technologies and investments to lower-end manufacturing .
A bipartisan bill to reduce U.S. reliance on China for the production of pharmaceuticals is now advancing through Congress , and talk of national industrial planning is gaining traction .
Economic ties were once seen as the ballast of the U.S.-China relationship , but the pandemic will fray them .
Before the pandemic , Washington and Beijing were competing in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ digital surveillance , artificial intelligence , and most notably 5G wireless technology .
Thanks to government subsidies that allowed Chinese companies to offer digital infrastructure more quickly and cheaply than U.S. or European counterparts , telecommunications giant Huawei was poised to dominate the 5G market , although it denies government backing .
Because China ’ s political system makes it impossible for the private sector to reject government requests for data , the United States argued that Huawei ’ s 5G networks could never be fully secured , but the administration of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its efforts to persuade other countries not to work with Huawei .
This problem will be amplified in post-coronavirus tech competition .
The Chinese government has already made clear that it will press ahead with its effort to dominate new technological spaces .
As part of its economic recovery plan , the Chinese Communist Party announced an expansion of its efforts to roll out 5G networks and data centers around the world , while U.S. allies reconsider whether they should work with Huawei at all .
Moreover , it would not be surprising @ @ @ @ @ @ @ digital infrastructure ; its Belt and Road Initiative relies on state-owned enterprises and state-linked banks , and digital projects are cheaper than energy or transportation projects .
China is also one of several Asian countries using digital surveillance technology for pandemic management , which it may well seek to export as part of its Digital Silk Road reinvigoration .
Particularly if the United States fails to adopt its own digital solutions , China ’ s increased digital push may intensify technological competition .
Before the pandemic , the United States and China were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the international order—the norms , rules , and institutions that govern international politics .
As China has continued to rise , U.S. strategists have worried that Beijing is seeking to undermine or erode components of the liberal international order .
They pointed to China ’ s weakening of human rights norms , its violation of maritime laws and rules in the South China Sea , and its sprawling , opaque Belt and Road Initiative , which spreads a Chinese model of development that puts recipient states at a disadvantage .
Chinese thinkers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States to be a hypocritical leader of global order , abiding by rules and norms only where it suited its interests and unwilling to make more space for China ; they championed a new concept , the “ community of shared future , ” which would make the international order friendlier for nondemocracies .
The early weeks of pandemic crisis leadership were , themselves , a competition over the future of the international order .
After China brought its own domestic outbreak under control , it sprang into international action , with offers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries .
It touted its COVID-19 response as a success of the Chinese political model and resurrected mothballed global health slogans .
Meanwhile , when it has asserted itself , Washington has seemed more committed to blocking Beijing than to advancing a positive recovery agenda .
It thwarted action at the G-7 summit and U.N. Security Council , insisting on the use of divisive virus terminology , and has suspended funding to the World Health Organization because of alleged Chinese influence at the height of the epochal global health crisis .
If international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington and Beijing to assert their prerogatives , this will accelerate perceptions that prevailing forms of order are failing , and Washington and Beijing will point to the other as the guilty party .
The United States , accustomed to thinking its system and liberal values had universal appeal , has long promoted them to the world .
Meanwhile , as it has risen Beijing has touted the benefits of modern authoritarianism , pointing to China ’ s rapid economic growth and social cohesion—if not its social controls .
In 2017 , Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.
” Experts debate the extent to which Xi ’ s is a fully developed political model , but there is little question that China has increasingly sought to make the world safer for autocracy , and to use strategic messaging to further its case .
But China ’ s information approach appears to have shifted significantly during the pandemic , too .
Though it has long been focused on spreading narratives favorable to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that are unfavorable , China ’ s strategy has recently become much more assertive and global .
Some Chinese officials are now using Russian-style disinformation campaigns that seek to create confusion and make the truth unknowable , as with the outlandish claim that the novel coronavirus was planted by the U.S. military .
Despite his early praise for Xi ’ s pandemic leadership , Trump has also shifted to blaming China for the virus ’ s spread , likely with the hope of deflecting from his own domestic mismanagement before the November election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders seeking to obscure their own governance failings , the cycle of mutual recriminations seems likely to continue .
Where does this end ?
Strategic competition should not preclude necessary cooperation to combat the pandemic .
Although they will continue to see themselves as competitors , the United States and China share incentives to facilitate a global economic recovery , because neither of their economies can return to full strength while the world remains hobbled .
The G-20 pledge for debt relief to low-income countries is a small step in the right direction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while the United States and China perceive themselves to be competing in their search for the COVID-19 vaccine , neither country will be safe as long as outbreaks continue anywhere , so both share an interest in a global vaccine .
But neither should this cooperation obscure the reality that competition will endure .
The contests for economic advantage , military dominance , technological prowess , and ideology will be part of geopolitics for years to come .
The pandemic has only made this more clear .
Recognizing that the competition between the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stay , Washington will need to find a way to navigate this reality through the pandemic and beyond .

That U.S.-China relations have plummeted over the course of the pandemic is no secret. An internal Chinese government think tank report, which leaked this week, even warned China’s top leaders that there was increasing risk of the U.S.-China relationship sliding into conflict.
That U.S.-China relations have plummeted over the course of the pandemic is no secret. An internal Chinese government think tank report, which leaked this week, even warned China’s top leaders that there was increasing risk of the U.S.-China relationship sliding into conflict.
But why exactly is U.S.-China competition hardening at this moment? After all, foreign-policy analysts often argue that despite their tensions, Washington and Beijing should still be able to cooperate on global issues where their interests align, such as pandemics and climate change. The COVID-19 crisis has ravaged both countries; that it should cause their strained relationship to spiral further was not a foregone conclusion.
Of course, before the coronavirus pandemic, experts in the United States and China appeared to be converging around the idea that the other would be its primary political competitor for decades to come. Major international shocks can break prior trends of this sort, changing the course of events. But they can also intensify forces already in motion—and that is precisely what has been happening in at least five areas in which competition was already substantial, with few countervailing and stabilizing forces in sight.
1. Military competition
Before the coronavirus, Sino-American military competition was already acute. Once content to shelve territorial disputes with its neighbors, Beijing has used its decades-long economic expansion to build up a formidable military arsenal. China has intimidated neighboring states, seized disputed territory, interfered with freedom of navigation close to its shores, and raised the risks to the U.S. military of operating in Asia. Many U.S. officials believe Beijing intends to weaken U.S. alliances and eventually expel U.S. forces and bases from Asia altogether.
The pandemic already appears to be intensifying the Sino-American military rivalry. Beijing recently announced new administrative districts in the South China Sea, trailed Malaysian and Philippine vessels, and conducted dangerous maneuvers seemingly intended to intimidate Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan. With its rivals hobbled and its neighbors overwhelmed, Beijing appears to see the pandemic as an opportunity to press its advantage and more forcibly assert its authority. In Washington, these actions are intensifying beliefs that more needs to be done to deter China in Asia. In early April, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command submitted a $20 billion list of proposed defense investments to Congress. While they have yet to hammer out the specifics, the desire to bolster U.S. capabilities and reassure nervous allies facing an increasingly assertive China has bipartisan backing. And although the pandemic’s economic shock will likely constrain the overall defense budget, the military and legislators are likely to agree on the need to preserve resources allocated to military competition with China.
2. Economic decoupling
Before the pandemic, there was a growing debate about whether the U.S. and Chinese economies had grown too interdependent, with many believing that economic entanglement created risks to supply chains, U.S. jobs, and to national security—particularly where Chinese companies were linked to the central government or could use foreign data for national gain. These concerns led policymakers to consider whether to “decouple” the U.S. and Chinese economies, what steps Washington would need to take to constrain Chinese investment in sensitive industries, and how the United States could keep its own economy competitive.
The pandemic has given these questions new urgency, revealing shortages of critical life-supporting equipment and materials. As the United States and other countries recognize their dependency on China for pharmaceutical products, medical masks, and other health care supplies, preexisting debates have shifted from a focus on higher-end technologies and investments to lower-end manufacturing. A bipartisan bill to reduce U.S. reliance on China for the production of pharmaceuticals is now advancing through Congress, and talk of national industrial planning is gaining traction. Economic ties were once seen as the ballast of the U.S.-China relationship, but the pandemic will fray them.
3. Technology
Before the pandemic, Washington and Beijing were competing in a number of emerging technology areas, including digital surveillance, artificial intelligence, and most notably 5G wireless technology. Thanks to government subsidies that allowed Chinese companies to offer digital infrastructure more quickly and cheaply than U.S. or European counterparts, telecommunications giant Huawei was poised to dominate the 5G market, although it denies government backing. Because China’s political system makes it impossible for the private sector to reject government requests for data, the United States argued that Huawei’s 5G networks could never be fully secured, but the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump had largely failed in its efforts to persuade other countries not to work with Huawei.
This problem will be amplified in post-coronavirus tech competition. The Chinese government has already made clear that it will press ahead with its effort to dominate new technological spaces. As part of its economic recovery plan, the Chinese Communist Party announced an expansion of its efforts to roll out 5G networks and data centers around the world, while U.S. allies reconsider whether they should work with Huawei at all. Moreover, it would not be surprising to see China place more emphasis on digital infrastructure; its Belt and Road Initiative relies on state-owned enterprises and state-linked banks, and digital projects are cheaper than energy or transportation projects. China is also one of several Asian countries using digital surveillance technology for pandemic management, which it may well seek to export as part of its Digital Silk Road reinvigoration. Particularly if the United States fails to adopt its own digital solutions, China’s increased digital push may intensify technological competition.
4. The future of order
Before the pandemic, the United States and China were in a competition over the future of the international order—the norms, rules, and institutions that govern international politics. As China has continued to rise, U.S. strategists have worried that Beijing is seeking to undermine or erode components of the liberal international order. They pointed to China’s weakening of human rights norms, its violation of maritime laws and rules in the South China Sea, and its sprawling, opaque Belt and Road Initiative, which spreads a Chinese model of development that puts recipient states at a disadvantage. Chinese thinkers, for their part, believed the United States to be a hypocritical leader of global order, abiding by rules and norms only where it suited its interests and unwilling to make more space for China; they championed a new concept, the “community of shared future,” which would make the international order friendlier for nondemocracies.
The early weeks of pandemic crisis leadership were, themselves, a competition over the future of the international order. After China brought its own domestic outbreak under control, it sprang into international action, with offers of medical supplies and coordination to foreign countries. It touted its COVID-19 response as a success of the Chinese political model and resurrected mothballed global health slogans. Meanwhile, when it has asserted itself, Washington has seemed more committed to blocking Beijing than to advancing a positive recovery agenda. It thwarted action at the G-7 summit and U.N. Security Council, insisting on the use of divisive virus terminology, and has suspended funding to the World Health Organization because of alleged Chinese influence at the height of the epochal global health crisis. If international organizations and high-level groupings remain venues for Washington and Beijing to assert their prerogatives, this will accelerate perceptions that prevailing forms of order are failing, and Washington and Beijing will point to the other as the guilty party.
5. Information competition
The United States, accustomed to thinking its system and liberal values had universal appeal, has long promoted them to the world. Meanwhile, as it has risen Beijing has touted the benefits of modern authoritarianism, pointing to China’s rapid economic growth and social cohesion—if not its social controls. In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that China “offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” Experts debate the extent to which Xi’s is a fully developed political model, but there is little question that China has increasingly sought to make the world safer for autocracy, and to use strategic messaging to further its case.
But China’s information approach appears to have shifted significantly during the pandemic, too. Though it has long been focused on spreading narratives favorable to the Chinese Communist Party and suppressing those that are unfavorable, China’s strategy has recently become much more assertive and global. Some Chinese officials are now using Russian-style disinformation campaigns that seek to create confusion and make the truth unknowable, as with the outlandish claim that the novel coronavirus was planted by the U.S. military. Despite his early praise for Xi’s pandemic leadership, Trump has also shifted to blaming China for the virus’s spread, likely with the hope of deflecting from his own domestic mismanagement before the November election. With both the U.S. and Chinese leaders seeking to obscure their own governance failings, the cycle of mutual recriminations seems likely to continue.
Where does this end?
Strategic competition should not preclude necessary cooperation to combat the pandemic. Although they will continue to see themselves as competitors, the United States and China share incentives to facilitate a global economic recovery, because neither of their economies can return to full strength while the world remains hobbled. The G-20 pledge for debt relief to low-income countries is a small step in the right direction if China adheres to it. And while the United States and China perceive themselves to be competing in their search for the COVID-19 vaccine, neither country will be safe as long as outbreaks continue anywhere, so both share an interest in a global vaccine.
But neither should this cooperation obscure the reality that competition will endure. The contests for economic advantage, military dominance, technological prowess, and ideology will be part of geopolitics for years to come. The pandemic has only made this more clear. Recognizing that the competition between the United States and China is here to stay, Washington will need to find a way to navigate this reality through the pandemic and beyond.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-18--Pompeo’s State Department Faces Yet a New Oversight Battle With Capitol Hill

Pompeo ’ s State Department Faces Yet a New Oversight Battle With Capitol Hill Two senior Democratic lawmakers say the U.S. State Department is withholding information on its longstanding diversity challenges based on legally dubious claims that the department does not provide information to its oversight committees that are “ internal documents and non-publicly available , ” according to a letter obtained by Foreign Policy .
Their claims raise questions about whether the State Department will withhold other information to lawmakers who sit on committees with jurisdiction over the Trump administration ’ s foreign policy .
It comes just after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into President Donald Trump ’ s abrupt decision to fire the State Department ’ s top watchdog on May 15—the fourth inspector general he has fired in the past two months .
The decision came after State Department Inspector General Steve Linick opened an investigation into Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s misuse of staff for personal reasons , congressional sources told Foreign Policy .
As president , Trump has the power to appoint and remove inspector generals .
In a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi , Trump wrote that he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do his job , but he didn ’ t offer specifics .
Rep. Eliot Engel , the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , and Rep. Joaquin Castro , the head of the committee ’ s body on oversight and investigations , rebuked the department in the newest letter for refusing to hand over information on the department ’ s diversity issues by making a claim that is “ not a legally-cognizable basis for withholding information from Congress.
” The two Democrats wrote that the department is constitutionally mandated to share @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has shared internal information regularly in the past .
The new letter from Engel and Castro follows a February report from the Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) , an independent federal agency , concluding that the State Department has struggled to overcome long-standing and systemic challenges to increase diversity within its ranks .
The lawmakers wrote that the department gave an initial briefing on the issue to staff , but the department has “ failed to demonstrate any serious effort to address the lack of workforce diversity at the mid-career and senior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State Department ’ s diversity challenges , released in February and based on data from 2002 to 2018 , found that the department is falling short of improving diversity across the board , with several exceptions .
Among the study ’ s findings : The proportion of racial or ethnic minorities in the foreign service increased from 17 to 24 percent , but in the civil service it decreased from 44 to 43 percent .
The number of women working at the State Department also fell from 44 to 43 percent , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being promoted in the civil service was “ statistically significantly lower ” than for white men .
The study appeared to contradict statements in recent years by senior State Department officials , who have insisted the department is improving its efforts to diversify its workforce , while conceding it still has room for improvement .
“ GAO ’ s findings that minorities face barriers to promotion at the State Department are deeply concerning , ” a committee aide told Foreign Policy .
“ Now , the Department is compounding the problem by refusing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how they are addressing this critical workforce issue.
” The State Department did not respond to a request for comment .
Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee have frequently clashed with the State Department and Pompeo in the past .
The Democratic-led House Foreign Affairs Committee also oversaw investigations into politically motivated retaliation by Trump administration officials against career diplomats , and parts of the impeachment investigation into Trump .
During the impeachment investigation , Engel and other Democratic lawmakers rebuked the administration for withholding some documents from Congress and blocking witnesses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Engel and Castro wrote that on May 8 , the department informed congressional staff “ after several queries that it will not provide documents to its Committee of jurisdiction claiming that these documents are ‘ internal documents and non-publicly available ’ ” —a claim Engel and Castro dispute .
“ As part of the constitutionally-mandated process of congressional oversight , the State Department has a long-shared information with congressional committees , ” they wrote .
They added that the department “ appropriately produced significant amounts of non-public material to the Foreign Affairs Committee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prohibited personnel practices at State during the Trump Administration.
” “ We trust that any misperception that the Department can withhold materials from its committee of jurisdiction simply because they are ‘ internal ’ and ‘ not publicly available ’ will be swiftly corrected by agency counsel , ” they wrote .
Update , May 18 , 2020 : This article was updated with comment from a House Foreign Affairs Committee aide .

Two senior Democratic lawmakers say the U.S. State Department is withholding information on its longstanding diversity challenges based on legally dubious claims that the department does not provide information to its oversight committees that are “internal documents and non-publicly available,” according to a letter obtained by Foreign Policy .
Two senior Democratic lawmakers say the U.S. State Department is withholding information on its longstanding diversity challenges based on legally dubious claims that the department does not provide information to its oversight committees that are “internal documents and non-publicly available,” according to a letter obtained by Foreign Policy.
Their claims raise questions about whether the State Department will withhold other information to lawmakers who sit on committees with jurisdiction over the Trump administration’s foreign policy.
It comes just after House and Senate Democrats launched an inquiry into President Donald Trump’s abrupt decision to fire the State Department’s top watchdog on May 15—the fourth inspector general he has fired in the past two months. The decision came after State Department Inspector General Steve Linick opened an investigation into Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s misuse of staff for personal reasons, congressional sources told Foreign Policy. As president, Trump has the power to appoint and remove inspector generals. In a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Trump wrote that he lost confidence in Linick’s ability to do his job, but he didn’t offer specifics.
Rep. Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Rep. Joaquin Castro, the head of the committee’s body on oversight and investigations, rebuked the department in the newest letter for refusing to hand over information on the department’s diversity issues by making a claim that is “not a legally-cognizable basis for withholding information from Congress.” The two Democrats wrote that the department is constitutionally mandated to share information with its committee of jurisdiction and has shared internal information regularly in the past.
The new letter from Engel and Castro follows a February report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent federal agency, concluding that the State Department has struggled to overcome long-standing and systemic challenges to increase diversity within its ranks. The lawmakers wrote that the department gave an initial briefing on the issue to staff, but the department has “failed to demonstrate any serious effort to address the lack of workforce diversity at the mid-career and senior levels.”
The GAO report on the State Department’s diversity challenges, released in February and based on data from 2002 to 2018, found that the department is falling short of improving diversity across the board, with several exceptions.
Among the study’s findings: The proportion of racial or ethnic minorities in the foreign service increased from 17 to 24 percent, but in the civil service it decreased from 44 to 43 percent. The number of women working at the State Department also fell from 44 to 43 percent, and the chance of minority men or women being promoted in the civil service was “statistically significantly lower” than for white men. The study appeared to contradict statements in recent years by senior State Department officials, who have insisted the department is improving its efforts to diversify its workforce, while conceding it still has room for improvement.
“GAO’s findings that minorities face barriers to promotion at the State Department are deeply concerning,” a committee aide told Foreign Policy. “Now, the Department is compounding the problem by refusing to provide the Committee with information about how they are addressing this critical workforce issue.”
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment.
Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee have frequently clashed with the State Department and Pompeo in the past. The Democratic-led House Foreign Affairs Committee also oversaw investigations into politically motivated retaliation by Trump administration officials against career diplomats, and parts of the impeachment investigation into Trump. During the impeachment investigation, Engel and other Democratic lawmakers rebuked the administration for withholding some documents from Congress and blocking witnesses from testifying.
In their letter, Engel and Castro wrote that on May 8, the department informed congressional staff “after several queries that it will not provide documents to its Committee of jurisdiction claiming that these documents are ‘internal documents and non-publicly available’”—a claim Engel and Castro dispute.
“As part of the constitutionally-mandated process of congressional oversight, the State Department has a long-shared information with congressional committees,” they wrote. They added that the department “appropriately produced significant amounts of non-public material to the Foreign Affairs Committee in connection with its related investigation of prohibited personnel practices at State during the Trump Administration.”
“We trust that any misperception that the Department can withhold materials from its committee of jurisdiction simply because they are ‘internal’ and ‘not publicly available’ will be swiftly corrected by agency counsel,” they wrote.
Update, May 18, 2020: This article was updated with comment from a House Foreign Affairs Committee aide.