foreignpolicy--2020-07-08--How China Is Dividing Britain’s Tories

How China Is Dividing Britain’s Tories

When Britain ’ s then-prime minister , David Cameron , sat down for a pint of beer and fish and chips with Chinese President Xi Jinping in a Buckinghamshire pub in 2015 , it marked a “ new golden era ” of British-Chinese relations .
As the pair enjoyed the atmosphere of the Plough—a pub that would shortly afterward be purchased by a Chinese firm—the United Kingdom was well on its way to becoming China ’ s preferred gateway into Europe .
Under consecutive Conservative Party-led governments since 2010 , Britain has become overwhelmingly the largest recipient of Chinese investment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Germany , and the U.K. ’ s overall share of Chinese investment in Europe declined from 71 percent in 2017 to just 35 percent last year , Britain remained the continent ’ s second-largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment in 2019 , according to an April study by the Mercator Institute for China Studies , a Berlin-based think tank .
But in recent months , the governing Conservatives have changed tracks , attacking the Chinese government on a range of issues and backing away from Chinese partnerships .
And with not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of how to deal with Beijing is becoming a major fault line within the party .
Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said in April that “ there is no doubt we can ’ t have business as usual ” with China , expressing London ’ s anger over Beijing ’ s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and its disinformation campaigns .
The Tory government has also proposed the creation of a group of democratic nations that could develop its own 5G technology and equipment—so as not to have to rely on China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the United States of spying on behalf of the Beijing government .
London has also said it will reduce Huawei ’ s involvement in its own 5G network in the coming years .
And a plan codenamed “ Project Defend ” was launched in May to end Britain ’ s reliance on imports of vital products , like pharmaceuticals and high-tech electronics , from China .
London has also come down strongly on Beijing ’ s new security law , which threatens to undermine the autonomy of Hong Kong .
Prime Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kongers , saying the law broke the “ one country , two systems ” arrangement agreed on when the U.K. handed the territory over to China in 1997 .
“ The Tory Party has been high on rhetoric in terms of switching gear to a more hostile attitude towards China , ” said Jie Yu , a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House , a British think tank .
Leading the way are Conservative politicians connected to the new China Research Group , a hostile parliamentary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Group .
The group ’ s co-founder Tom Tugendhat , a Tory member of Parliament and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee , told Foreign Policy that “ China is not a point of division for the Conservative Party or even Parliament.
” Instead , he said , “ it has become clear since I set up the China Research Group that most MPs of all parties are in agreement on the challenges we face.
” Some party grandees are also on board .
David Davis , a former chairman of the Conservative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intervene in April to stop the government-controlled China Reform Holdings from buying out the leading British graphics chipmaker Imagination Technologies .
Damian Green , the chairman of the One Nation Conservative Caucus , a liberal-conservative faction , sent a letter signed by 14 other senior Tories to Johnson calling for a “ rethink and reset ” to British relations with China .
Former party leader Iain Duncan Smith has also said recently that “ our ridiculous addiction to China has now got to stop.
” Outside of Parliament , conservative ranks are also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jackson Society , a right-wing think tank that is thought to have close links to Michael Gove , an important member of Johnson ’ s cabinet , has argued of late that Britain must “ decouple ” from China .
Britain ’ s right-wing newspapers , such as the Daily Mail and the Telegraph , a Tory-aligned publication , have also ramped up their anti-Beijing messaging .
But the backlash doesn ’ t represent the views of all Tories , and a division within the party is emerging .
In May , Dean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ center-right think tank Policy Exchange , wrote that China has become “ a key Conservative fault line post Brexit.
” Writing the next month , Rachel Sylvester , a political columnist at the Times , called China “ the Tory party ’ s new Brexit divide.
” According to Peter Harris , an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University , the split in opinion has been “ papered over for the time being ” as the U.K. struggles to deal with the health impacts of the pandemic .
But he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely grow more polarized in the coming months as the country faces the economic fallout .
The looming fault line among the Tories lies between those who want to court even more Chinese investment in a post-Brexit economy and those who view China as an economic and security threat , especially if relations with Beijing jeopardize a free trade deal with the United States .
Reports emerged in May that U.S. negotiators have been pressuring London to choose between Washington and Beijing , and there are also suggestions that President Donald Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into any free trade deal with Britain that would allow it to retract certain parts if the U.K. were to sign a trade agreement with another country that the United States doesn ’ t approve of—like China .
The United States is Britain ’ s largest trading and investment partner , and prioritizing Washington makes sense .
The British Department for International Trade estimates that a U.K.-U.S. free trade deal could boost bilateral trade by about $ 19 billion and British wages by $ 2.3 billion , according to a ministerial paper .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure .
After London cut off Huawei ’ s involvement in its 5G network rollout , China ’ s ambassador to the U.K. , Liu Xiaoming , suggested that Beijing could retaliate by cutting its investment to Britain for several nuclear power station projects and the costly HS2 high-speed rail network .
Liu called London ’ s decision on Huawei “ a litmus test of whether Britain is a true and faithful partner of China.
” And with Britain ’ s economy expected to contract by 8 percent this year and unlikely to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forecasts by EY ITEM Club , choosing between the U.K. ’ s two largest non-European Union trading partners will be increasingly fraught .
Making matters even worse , London must navigate this superpower divide at the same time it leaves the EU , with the transition period expected to finish at the end of the year , even though negotiations for a trade deal with Brussels have stalled .
Chatham House ’ s Yu said it is “ unlikely ” for the Tories to reach a consensus over China because each constituency and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This is particularly true for Conservative members of Parliament from areas where Chinese investment is vital to local jobs .
Some , like Ian Liddell-Grainger , the Tory MP for Bridgwater and West Somerset—where China wants to fund another reactor at the Hinkley nuclear power station—are seeking to avoid economic reprisal from Beijing .
In May , Tory MP Richard Graham , the chairman of the All Party Parliamentary China Group , said , “ It might be tempting for everyone to want to treat China as a new national scapegoat , just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in recent years.
” But , he added , “ [ China ] is not the most important thing in the minds of our constituents .
The most important thing is going to be jobs .
And in that sense , having a strong partnership with China makes absolute sense.
” Tory MP Ruth Edwards , who once worked for BT , a telecommunications firm , was hesitant earlier this year when several party backbenchers tried to get the government to change its Huawei stance , commenting that “ there are no trusted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technology .
Tory MP Mark Logan , who previously served as a diplomat in the British Consulate in Shanghai , said in April that “ now [ wasn ’ t ] the time for ” critiques of China .
Trying to cut a middle path is Johnson , who was considered one of the most pro-China politicians within the Tory Party .
In 2013 , as mayor of London , he helped form the Conservative Friends of the Chinese .
Speaking to Parliament in June , he attempted to cut a moderate figure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and I believe that we must continue to work with this great and rising power , ” he said .
“ But when we have serious concerns … over the origins of COVID or the protection of our critical national infrastructure or indeed what is happening in Hong Kong , then we must feel absolutely free to raise those issues loud and clear with Beijing—and that is what we will continue to do.
” When it came to Brexit , the Tories wanted to have their cake and eat it too , preserving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requirements of the EU .
The same desire for “ cakeism ” is now on show with China .
As expressed by some Tory politicians , there is a sense that Britain can take a much tougher line on Beijing and , at the same time , keep all the economic benefits of trade and investment with China while not jeopardizing free trade negotiations with other partners .
But , as with Brexit , tough choices will eventually have to be made .

When Britain’s then-prime minister, David Cameron, sat down for a pint of beer and fish and chips with Chinese President Xi Jinping in a Buckinghamshire pub in 2015 , it marked a “ new golden era ” of British-Chinese relations. As the pair enjoyed the atmosphere of the Plough—a pub that would shortly afterward be purchased by a Chinese firm—the United Kingdom was well on its way to becoming China’s preferred gateway into Europe.
When Britain’s then-prime minister, David Cameron, sat down for a pint of beer and fish and chips with Chinese President Xi Jinping in a Buckinghamshire pub in 2015, it marked a “new golden era” of British-Chinese relations. As the pair enjoyed the atmosphere of the Plough—a pub that would shortly afterward be purchased by a Chinese firm—the United Kingdom was well on its way to becoming China’s preferred gateway into Europe.
Under consecutive Conservative Party-led governments since 2010, Britain has become overwhelmingly the largest recipient of Chinese investment in Europe. And even when France, Germany, and the U.K.’s overall share of Chinese investment in Europe declined from 71 percent in 2017 to just 35 percent last year, Britain remained the continent’s second-largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment in 2019, according to an April study by the Mercator Institute for China Studies, a Berlin-based think tank.
But in recent months, the governing Conservatives have changed tracks, attacking the Chinese government on a range of issues and backing away from Chinese partnerships. And with not all Tories on board, the question of how to deal with Beijing is becoming a major fault line within the party.
Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said in April that “there is no doubt we can’t have business as usual” with China, expressing London’s anger over Beijing’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and its disinformation campaigns. The Tory government has also proposed the creation of a group of democratic nations that could develop its own 5G technology and equipment—so as not to have to rely on China’s tech giant Huawei, which is accused by the United States of spying on behalf of the Beijing government. London has also said it will reduce Huawei’s involvement in its own 5G network in the coming years. And a plan codenamed “Project Defend” was launched in May to end Britain’s reliance on imports of vital products, like pharmaceuticals and high-tech electronics, from China. London has also come down strongly on Beijing’s new security law, which threatens to undermine the autonomy of Hong Kong. Prime Minister Boris Johnson pledged to admit 3 million Hong Kongers, saying the law broke the “one country, two systems” arrangement agreed on when the U.K. handed the territory over to China in 1997.
“The Tory Party has been high on rhetoric in terms of switching gear to a more hostile attitude towards China,” said Jie Yu, a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House, a British think tank. Leading the way are Conservative politicians connected to the new China Research Group, a hostile parliamentary caucus modeled on the Euroskeptic European Research Group. The group’s co-founder Tom Tugendhat, a Tory member of Parliament and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, told Foreign Policy that “China is not a point of division for the Conservative Party or even Parliament.” Instead, he said, “it has become clear since I set up the China Research Group that most MPs of all parties are in agreement on the challenges we face.”
Some party grandees are also on board. David Davis, a former chairman of the Conservative Party, reportedly prompted the government to intervene in April to stop the government-controlled China Reform Holdings from buying out the leading British graphics chipmaker Imagination Technologies. Damian Green, the chairman of the One Nation Conservative Caucus, a liberal-conservative faction, sent a letter signed by 14 other senior Tories to Johnson calling for a “rethink and reset” to British relations with China. Former party leader Iain Duncan Smith has also said recently that “our ridiculous addiction to China has now got to stop.”
Outside of Parliament, conservative ranks are also gravitating around the position. The Henry Jackson Society, a right-wing think tank that is thought to have close links to Michael Gove, an important member of Johnson’s cabinet, has argued of late that Britain must “decouple” from China. Britain’s right-wing newspapers, such as the Daily Mail and the Telegraph, a Tory-aligned publication, have also ramped up their anti-Beijing messaging.
But the backlash doesn’t represent the views of all Tories, and a division within the party is emerging. In May, Dean Godson, the director of the influential center-right think tank Policy Exchange, wrote that China has become “a key Conservative fault line post Brexit.” Writing the next month, Rachel Sylvester, a political columnist at the Times, called China “the Tory party’s new Brexit divide.”
According to Peter Harris, an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University, the split in opinion has been “papered over for the time being” as the U.K. struggles to deal with the health impacts of the pandemic. But he expects that the narrative around China will likely grow more polarized in the coming months as the country faces the economic fallout. The looming fault line among the Tories lies between those who want to court even more Chinese investment in a post-Brexit economy and those who view China as an economic and security threat, especially if relations with Beijing jeopardize a free trade deal with the United States.
Reports emerged in May that U.S. negotiators have been pressuring London to choose between Washington and Beijing, and there are also suggestions that President Donald Trump’s administration wants to insert a clause into any free trade deal with Britain that would allow it to retract certain parts if the U.K. were to sign a trade agreement with another country that the United States doesn’t approve of—like China.
The United States is Britain’s largest trading and investment partner, and prioritizing Washington makes sense. The British Department for International Trade estimates that a U.K.-U.S. free trade deal could boost bilateral trade by about $19 billion and British wages by $2.3 billion, according to a ministerial paper.
But Beijing is also trying to apply pressure. After London cut off Huawei’s involvement in its 5G network rollout, China’s ambassador to the U.K., Liu Xiaoming, suggested that Beijing could retaliate by cutting its investment to Britain for several nuclear power station projects and the costly HS2 high-speed rail network. Liu called London’s decision on Huawei “a litmus test of whether Britain is a true and faithful partner of China.”
And with Britain’s economy expected to contract by 8 percent this year and unlikely to recover until 2023, according to recent forecasts by EY ITEM Club, choosing between the U.K.’s two largest non-European Union trading partners will be increasingly fraught. Making matters even worse, London must navigate this superpower divide at the same time it leaves the EU, with the transition period expected to finish at the end of the year, even though negotiations for a trade deal with Brussels have stalled.
Chatham House’s Yu said it is “unlikely” for the Tories to reach a consensus over China because each constituency and lawmakers have different wants and needs. This is particularly true for Conservative members of Parliament from areas where Chinese investment is vital to local jobs. Some, like Ian Liddell-Grainger, the Tory MP for Bridgwater and West Somerset—where China wants to fund another reactor at the Hinkley nuclear power station—are seeking to avoid economic reprisal from Beijing.
In May, Tory MP Richard Graham, the chairman of the All Party Parliamentary China Group, said, “It might be tempting for everyone to want to treat China as a new national scapegoat, just as the EU was a convenient scapegoat in recent years.” But, he added, “[China] is not the most important thing in the minds of our constituents. The most important thing is going to be jobs. And in that sense, having a strong partnership with China makes absolute sense.”
Tory MP Ruth Edwards, who once worked for BT, a telecommunications firm, was hesitant earlier this year when several party backbenchers tried to get the government to change its Huawei stance, commenting that “there are no trusted vendors” when it comes to 5G technology. Tory MP Mark Logan, who previously served as a diplomat in the British Consulate in Shanghai, said in April that “now [wasn’t] the time for” critiques of China.
Trying to cut a middle path is Johnson, who was considered one of the most pro-China politicians within the Tory Party. In 2013, as mayor of London, he helped form the Conservative Friends of the Chinese. Speaking to Parliament in June, he attempted to cut a moderate figure. “I am a Sinophile, and I believe that we must continue to work with this great and rising power,” he said. “But when we have serious concerns … over the origins of COVID or the protection of our critical national infrastructure or indeed what is happening in Hong Kong, then we must feel absolutely free to raise those issues loud and clear with Beijing—and that is what we will continue to do.”
When it came to Brexit, the Tories wanted to have their cake and eat it too, preserving trade preferences while avoiding the onerous legislative requirements of the EU. The same desire for “cakeism” is now on show with China. As expressed by some Tory politicians, there is a sense that Britain can take a much tougher line on Beijing and, at the same time, keep all the economic benefits of trade and investment with China while not jeopardizing free trade negotiations with other partners. But, as with Brexit, tough choices will eventually have to be made.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-08--‘Campaign of Bullying’ Prompts Key Trump Impeachment Witness to Quit Army

A key witness in the impeachment trial of President Donald Trump has retired after more than two decades of service in the U.S. military , reflecting the political fallout from Trump ’ s impeachment and undercutting claims from top administration officials that whistleblowers won ’ t be punished for coming forward with evidence of wrongdoing in government .
“ Today I officially requested retirement from the US Army , an organization I love .
My family and I look forward to the next chapter of our lives , ” Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman , a career Army officer and former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , said in a statement on Twitter on Wednesday .
His lawyer , David Pressman , said Vindman was retiring after facing a “ campaign of bullying , intimidation , and retaliation , ” in a statement to Foreign Policy .
Pressman indicated that Vindman ’ s career was stunted after being subpoenaed to testify in the politically fraught trial that at its height posed the biggest threat to Trump ’ s political career .
“ After more than 21 years of military service , Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman is retiring today after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future within the institution he has dutifully served will forever be limited , ” he wrote .
“ LTC Vindman did what the law compelled him to do ; and for that he was bullied by the president and his proxies .
And yet , LTC Vindman would not be intimidated and will not be corrupted .
He did what he has always done : put the interests of his country ahead of his own , ” Pressman added .
Following his acquittal after impeachment in February , Trump fired Vindman from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disciplinary action against him .
Vindman ’ s twin brother , Yevgeny Vindman , who served as a lawyer on the NSC , was sacked and escorted out of the White House despite not being involved in the impeachment hearings .
Despite Trump ’ s suggestions , top Defense Department officials had insisted that they would defend Vindman from potential retaliation and that it wouldn ’ t hamper his career .
“ He shouldn ’ t have any fear of retaliation—that ’ s DoD ’ s position , ” Defense Secretary Mark Esper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in October last year .
Those assurances did little to mollify Congress and whistleblower rights advocates , who said not enough had been done to protect Vindman .
Last week , Democratic Sen. Tammy Duckworth , herself a former U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and Iraq War veteran , placed a blanket hold on more than 1,000 U.S. military promotions until Esper confirmed to the Senate in writing that the Pentagon would not enable or facilitate retaliation on behalf of Trump against Vindman , who was due to take up a new assignment at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials made clear to Vindman that he would never get his promotion and was reportedly threatened with a “ rehabilitative assignment , ” such as manning a radar station in Alaska , according to CNN , which first reported Vindman ’ s retirement .
But officials said the Pentagon had been working on Vindman ’ s promotion up until the moment they learned of his retirement .
A senior defense official told Foreign Policy that the Army had sent up a list of officers to be promoted with Vindman ’ s name a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of his promotion package had gotten to Esper ’ s office on Thursday .
On Monday , the Pentagon ’ s office of personnel and readiness sent forward a finalized list of officers to be promoted from lieutenant colonel to colonel to Esper , with an attached action memo advising him to sign it .
Esper formally signed on Monday , and the Pentagon was preparing the list to send to the White House as the news broke Wednesday .
It ’ s not clear whether Vindman has formally filed his retirement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said the Office of the Secretary of Defense had not been aware of Vindman ’ s plans to retire or any efforts to reprimand Vindman by sending him to a rehabilitation post , as his attorney ’ s statement indicated .
An Army spokesperson , asked for comment , said the service doesn ’ t comment on personnel matters .
Esper will travel to Capitol Hill for a hearing with the House Armed Services Committee on Thursday , where he is likely to face questions about Vindman ’ s retirement .
For advocates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shows a high burden of proof for behind-the-scenes officials like the former NSC policy expert , who face challenges pinning down the services on specific retaliation claims , making it difficult for them to prove they are being retaliated against .
“ The burden on military whistleblowers is higher than even intelligence community whistleblowers , ” said Irvin McCullough , a national security analyst for the Government Accountability Project .
“ It ’ s like rolling a rock up a hill.
” Vindman ’ s departure comes after Esper received widespread criticism for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a political prop during the recent nationwide protests in the wake of the George Floyd killing .
Esper ’ s handling of the situation prompted outcry from former top civilian and military officials , including his predecessor James Mattis , who implicitly denounced the Pentagon chief referring to U.S. streets as a “ battlespace ” in a call with governors during the unrest .
Vindman is the latest official to either quit or be forced out of government after being swept up in the impeachment investigation centered on the president ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until it agreed to investigate former Vice President Joe Biden , his 2020 presidential rival .
Since Trump was acquitted of all charges on a mostly partisan vote in the Senate in February , his administration has sacked or forced out other government officials drawn into the impeachment firestorm .
In early April , Trump sacked the U.S. intelligence community ’ s inspector general , who drew the president ’ s ire after receiving a whistleblower complaint that sparked the impeachment investigation .
He fired the Pentagon inspector general days later , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Elaine McCusker to serve as the agency ’ s full-time comptroller after she raised questions about the nature of the Ukraine aid freeze .
The Pentagon ’ s policy chief , John Rood , was also forced out by Trump after he questioned the hold .
Update , July 8 , 2020 : This article was updated with new comments from a senior defense official .

A key witness in the impeachment trial of President Donald Trump has retired after more than two decades of service in the U.S. military, reflecting the political fallout from Trump’s impeachment and undercutting claims from top administration officials that whistleblowers won’t be punished for coming forward with evidence of wrongdoing in government.
A key witness in the impeachment trial of President Donald Trump has retired after more than two decades of service in the U.S. military, reflecting the political fallout from Trump’s impeachment and undercutting claims from top administration officials that whistleblowers won’t be punished for coming forward with evidence of wrongdoing in government.
“Today I officially requested retirement from the US Army, an organization I love. My family and I look forward to the next chapter of our lives,” Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, a career Army officer and former National Security Council (NSC) aide, said in a statement on Twitter on Wednesday. His lawyer, David Pressman, said Vindman was retiring after facing a “campaign of bullying, intimidation, and retaliation,” in a statement to Foreign Policy.
Pressman indicated that Vindman’s career was stunted after being subpoenaed to testify in the politically fraught trial that at its height posed the biggest threat to Trump’s political career. “After more than 21 years of military service, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman is retiring today after it has been made clear that his future within the institution he has dutifully served will forever be limited,” he wrote.
“LTC Vindman did what the law compelled him to do; and for that he was bullied by the president and his proxies. And yet, LTC Vindman would not be intimidated and will not be corrupted. He did what he has always done: put the interests of his country ahead of his own,” Pressman added.
Following his acquittal after impeachment in February, Trump fired Vindman from the NSC and suggested the military should take disciplinary action against him. Vindman’s twin brother, Yevgeny Vindman, who served as a lawyer on the NSC, was sacked and escorted out of the White House despite not being involved in the impeachment hearings.
Despite Trump’s suggestions, top Defense Department officials had insisted that they would defend Vindman from potential retaliation and that it wouldn’t hamper his career. “He shouldn’t have any fear of retaliation—that’s DoD’s position,” Defense Secretary Mark Esper told reporters before Vindman’s testimony in October last year.
Those assurances did little to mollify Congress and whistleblower rights advocates, who said not enough had been done to protect Vindman. Last week, Democratic Sen. Tammy Duckworth, herself a former U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and Iraq War veteran, placed a blanket hold on more than 1,000 U.S. military promotions until Esper confirmed to the Senate in writing that the Pentagon would not enable or facilitate retaliation on behalf of Trump against Vindman, who was due to take up a new assignment at a military service college. Senior military officials made clear to Vindman that he would never get his promotion and was reportedly threatened with a “rehabilitative assignment,” such as manning a radar station in Alaska, according to CNN, which first reported Vindman’s retirement.
But officials said the Pentagon had been working on Vindman’s promotion up until the moment they learned of his retirement. A senior defense official told Foreign Policy that the Army had sent up a list of officers to be promoted with Vindman’s name a couple of weeks ago and the last part of his promotion package had gotten to Esper’s office on Thursday. On Monday, the Pentagon’s office of personnel and readiness sent forward a finalized list of officers to be promoted from lieutenant colonel to colonel to Esper, with an attached action memo advising him to sign it. Esper formally signed on Monday, and the Pentagon was preparing the list to send to the White House as the news broke Wednesday.
It’s not clear whether Vindman has formally filed his retirement paperwork with the Army. The official said the Office of the Secretary of Defense had not been aware of Vindman’s plans to retire or any efforts to reprimand Vindman by sending him to a rehabilitation post, as his attorney’s statement indicated. An Army spokesperson, asked for comment, said the service doesn’t comment on personnel matters. Esper will travel to Capitol Hill for a hearing with the House Armed Services Committee on Thursday, where he is likely to face questions about Vindman’s retirement.
For advocates of military whistleblowers, the Vindman case shows a high burden of proof for behind-the-scenes officials like the former NSC policy expert, who face challenges pinning down the services on specific retaliation claims, making it difficult for them to prove they are being retaliated against. “The burden on military whistleblowers is higher than even intelligence community whistleblowers,” said Irvin McCullough, a national security analyst for the Government Accountability Project. “It’s like rolling a rock up a hill.”
Vindman’s departure comes after Esper received widespread criticism for not shielding the Pentagon from being used as a political prop during the recent nationwide protests in the wake of the George Floyd killing. Esper’s handling of the situation prompted outcry from former top civilian and military officials, including his predecessor James Mattis, who implicitly denounced the Pentagon chief referring to U.S. streets as a “battlespace” in a call with governors during the unrest.
Vindman is the latest official to either quit or be forced out of government after being swept up in the impeachment investigation centered on the president’s directives to withhold military aid to Ukraine until it agreed to investigate former Vice President Joe Biden, his 2020 presidential rival.
Since Trump was acquitted of all charges on a mostly partisan vote in the Senate in February, his administration has sacked or forced out other government officials drawn into the impeachment firestorm.
In early April, Trump sacked the U.S. intelligence community’s inspector general, who drew the president’s ire after receiving a whistleblower complaint that sparked the impeachment investigation. He fired the Pentagon inspector general days later, and the White House rescinded the nomination of Elaine McCusker to serve as the agency’s full-time comptroller after she raised questions about the nature of the Ukraine aid freeze. The Pentagon’s policy chief, John Rood, was also forced out by Trump after he questioned the hold.
Update, July 8, 2020: This article was updated with new comments from a senior defense official.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-08--Angela Merkel Is Back

Angela Merkel Is Back

Everyone deserves a second chance , including German Chancellor Angela Merkel .
After 15 years in office , she seems ready to tackle some unfinished business before stepping down next year .
And Germany ’ s presidency of the Council of the European Union , which started on July 1 and will last six months , gives Merkel the chance to do so , particularly when it comes to improving her country ’ s tepid performance on curbing climate change , going digital , and promoting overall European unity .
It has been several years since the idea of German @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past enemies alike .
The country had bounced back relatively well from the 2008 financial crisis and was recognized for its adoption of renewable energy .
Admiration for Germany grew , perhaps hitting a brief peak in 2015 thanks to its handling of that year ’ s refugee crisis , but since the last federal election in 2017 , it had become apparent that Merkel and her country ’ s trademark policies were losing their shine .
Always governing from the middle in partnership with the center-left Social Democrats , Merkel left her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holding back on progressives ’ ambitions for Eurobonds and tougher environmental regulations on industry .
Meanwhile , Germany ’ s pursuit of what it called noble self-interest—whether it be the climate , innovation , or EU crisis management—had to some degree backfired and threatened EU solidarity .
But in recent months , Germany seems to have taken up the leadership mantle once more .
Its handling of the coronavirus pandemic has thus far been exemplary .
Germany has been lauded for its testing capacity and a new contact-tracing app , which have kept @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and its mortality rate relatively low .
In turn , Merkel and Germany are poised to emerge stronger than before , which offers an opportunity for them to course-correct on key challenges .
Early in her tenure , Merkel was dubbed the “ climate chancellor.
” She has been a strong advocate for preventing climate change and has long pressured other countries to cut carbon emissions .
For example , as the host in 2007 of the G-8 , Merkel was able to persuade fellow leaders to agree to make substantial cuts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cajole others to do the hard work when you aren ’ t meeting your own climate goals .
Merkel ’ s zeal to quickly wean Germany off nuclear power , for example , might have made her country a trendsetter , but it also resulted in a situation where Europe ’ s largest economy has come to rely heavily on coal as the expansion of renewable energy has stalled .
The country eventually came clean in 2018 and admitted that it would not reach its 2020 goal of cutting carbon emissions by 40 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get back on track , the German parliament passed a $ 60 billion package of measures last fall to reduce emissions by 55 percent of 1990 levels by 2030 .
It was a smart move ; according to a YouGov poll , 62 percent of Germans would like their government to specifically support environment and climate-friendly technologies and companies in its post-pandemic economic recovery program .
Merkel is now charging ahead and has endorsed Brussels ’ s ambitious European Green Deal—which calls for no net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050—as part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opportunity for Merkel and Germany to regain their footing as leaders is through the push for European digital sovereignty from foreign tech giants .
In 2014 , the German government launched a three-year-long “ Digital Agenda ” to accompany economic and innovation policy .
The agenda outlined goals for increased broadband delivery , educational opportunities in the IT sector , and secure networks .
Yet Germany ranks well behind its European peers when it comes to digital public services ; according to data collected in 2019 , Germany ranks only 21st within what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lacks national champions in new technology sectors , and it has been slow to expand broadband access to follow through on its Digital Agenda .
But even as some commercial and private entities are waiting for better 4G service , the German government is already deliberating on how to competitively roll out 5G without compromising on security .
That push can be tied to the EU ’ s quest for digital sovereignty , and it can be extended to other e-government initiatives and cybersecurity .
One potential program is Gaia-X , a Franco-German @ @ @ @ @ @ @ platform not dependent on American or Chinese tech players .
Germany may have received poor marks for digital transformation so far , but it can turn the corner during its EU presidency as it maps out plans for the EU to remain relevant while protecting data privacy .
Germany has always been careful to operate within the framework of the EU to ease its neighbors ’ apprehensions about German power .
It was handed an opportunity to guide the bloc in the last decade as the EU faced multiple crises , ranging from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ realized it needed to salvage the eurozone ( and many praised Merkel for her humanitarian response in the face of massive migration flows ) , its approach caused division and strengthened populist parties within the EU .
Germany ’ s adherence to austerity and balanced budgets alienated fellow member states , and its desire for migration quotas was met with resentment in Hungary and Poland .
In time for Germany ’ s EU presidency , the country has had a change of heart on both .
Together with French President Emmanuel Macron , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which would allow for the pooling of national debt .
Such measures were previously anathema to Berlin .
Germany has also taken a conciliatory tone toward partners regarding mandatory allocation programs for migrants and is concentrating on better management of the EU ’ s external borders .
Germany , and particularly Merkel , is back in a leadership position .
The crisis-tested chancellor has navigated Germany through the pandemic so far and will now do the same for Europe .
In addition to the immediate need for economic recovery , Merkel wants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of climate change and digital transformation .
It is ironic that Germany ’ s EU agenda lists issue areas that Germany can not claim to have performed well in , but accepting mistakes is a feature of good leadership .
Merkel has another shot to improve Germany ’ s record , this time keeping EU solidarity in mind .

Everyone deserves a second chance, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel. After 15 years in office, she seems ready to tackle some unfinished business before stepping down next year. And Germany’s presidency of the Council of the European Union, which started on July 1 and will last six months, gives Merkel the chance to do so, particularly when it comes to improving her country’s tepid performance on curbing climate change, going digital, and promoting overall European unity.
Everyone deserves a second chance, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel. After 15 years in office, she seems ready to tackle some unfinished business before stepping down next year. And Germany’s presidency of the Council of the European Union, which started on July 1 and will last six months, gives Merkel the chance to do so, particularly when it comes to improving her country’s tepid performance on curbing climate change, going digital, and promoting overall European unity.
It has been several years since the idea of German leadership was popular among its allies and past enemies alike. The country had bounced back relatively well from the 2008 financial crisis and was recognized for its adoption of renewable energy. Admiration for Germany grew, perhaps hitting a brief peak in 2015 thanks to its handling of that year’s refugee crisis, but since the last federal election in 2017, it had become apparent that Merkel and her country’s trademark policies were losing their shine.
Always governing from the middle in partnership with the center-left Social Democrats, Merkel left her country’s conservatives frustrated while also holding back on progressives’ ambitions for Eurobonds and tougher environmental regulations on industry. Meanwhile, Germany’s pursuit of what it called noble self-interest—whether it be the climate, innovation, or EU crisis management—had to some degree backfired and threatened EU solidarity.
But in recent months, Germany seems to have taken up the leadership mantle once more. Its handling of the coronavirus pandemic has thus far been exemplary. Germany has been lauded for its testing capacity and a new contact-tracing app, which have kept demands on its health system in check and its mortality rate relatively low. In turn, Merkel and Germany are poised to emerge stronger than before, which offers an opportunity for them to course-correct on key challenges.
Early in her tenure, Merkel was dubbed the “climate chancellor.” She has been a strong advocate for preventing climate change and has long pressured other countries to cut carbon emissions. For example, as the host in 2007 of the G-8, Merkel was able to persuade fellow leaders to agree to make substantial cuts to emissions. But it is hard to cajole others to do the hard work when you aren’t meeting your own climate goals. Merkel’s zeal to quickly wean Germany off nuclear power, for example, might have made her country a trendsetter, but it also resulted in a situation where Europe’s largest economy has come to rely heavily on coal as the expansion of renewable energy has stalled.
The country eventually came clean in 2018 and admitted that it would not reach its 2020 goal of cutting carbon emissions by 40 percent compared to 1990 levels. To get back on track, the German parliament passed a $60 billion package of measures last fall to reduce emissions by 55 percent of 1990 levels by 2030. It was a smart move; according to a YouGov poll, 62 percent of Germans would like their government to specifically support environment and climate-friendly technologies and companies in its post-pandemic economic recovery program. Merkel is now charging ahead and has endorsed Brussels’s ambitious European Green Deal—which calls for no net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050—as part of Germany’s EU presidency.
Another opportunity for Merkel and Germany to regain their footing as leaders is through the push for European digital sovereignty from foreign tech giants. In 2014, the German government launched a three-year-long “Digital Agenda” to accompany economic and innovation policy. The agenda outlined goals for increased broadband delivery, educational opportunities in the IT sector, and secure networks. Yet Germany ranks well behind its European peers when it comes to digital public services; according to data collected in 2019, Germany ranks only 21st within what was then the 28-member EU. It lacks national champions in new technology sectors, and it has been slow to expand broadband access to follow through on its Digital Agenda.
But even as some commercial and private entities are waiting for better 4G service, the German government is already deliberating on how to competitively roll out 5G without compromising on security. That push can be tied to the EU’s quest for digital sovereignty, and it can be extended to other e-government initiatives and cybersecurity. One potential program is Gaia-X, a Franco-German foray into cloud computing to create a platform not dependent on American or Chinese tech players. Germany may have received poor marks for digital transformation so far, but it can turn the corner during its EU presidency as it maps out plans for the EU to remain relevant while protecting data privacy.
Germany has always been careful to operate within the framework of the EU to ease its neighbors’ apprehensions about German power. It was handed an opportunity to guide the bloc in the last decade as the EU faced multiple crises, ranging from sovereign debt to migration. Although Germany realized it needed to salvage the eurozone (and many praised Merkel for her humanitarian response in the face of massive migration flows), its approach caused division and strengthened populist parties within the EU.
Germany’s adherence to austerity and balanced budgets alienated fellow member states, and its desire for migration quotas was met with resentment in Hungary and Poland. In time for Germany’s EU presidency, the country has had a change of heart on both. Together with French President Emmanuel Macron, Merkel is crafting a coronavirus bond program, which would allow for the pooling of national debt. Such measures were previously anathema to Berlin. Germany has also taken a conciliatory tone toward partners regarding mandatory allocation programs for migrants and is concentrating on better management of the EU’s external borders.
Germany, and particularly Merkel, is back in a leadership position. The crisis-tested chancellor has navigated Germany through the pandemic so far and will now do the same for Europe. In addition to the immediate need for economic recovery, Merkel wants to make Europe resilient in the face of climate change and digital transformation. It is ironic that Germany’s EU agenda lists issue areas that Germany cannot claim to have performed well in, but accepting mistakes is a feature of good leadership. Merkel has another shot to improve Germany’s record, this time keeping EU solidarity in mind.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-09--Why The Clock Is Ticking On Syrian Aid Access

Why The Clock Is Ticking On Syrian Aid Access Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.N. Security Council is at odds ahead of a key deadline for Syrian aid , Ivory Coast Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly dies , and the United States sets another global record for new coronavirus cases .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Russia and China are squaring off against their Western counterparts at the United Nations Security Council over a plan to maintain U.N. cross-border aid flows to Syria as a Friday deadline approaches .
On Tuesday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cosponsored by Germany and Belgium that would have allowed the two current crossing points to remain open to U.N. aid traffic for another 12 months .
The next day , a resolution put forward by Russia that would have allowed one access point on the Turkey-Syria border to remain open for six months failed to garner enough votes .
Aid for Assad—or for Syrians ?
In rallying opposition against the Russian plan , U.N. ambassador Kelly Craft called the choice one of “ good versus evil.
” U.S. and EU leaders argue that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Hawa—would risk cutting off over a million Syrians in the area north of Aleppo from desperately needed humanitarian aid .
China and Russia believe that such aid can be delivered from within Syria and handled by government authorities—a claim the United States and EU reject , fearing it would give too much leverage to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad over areas currently outside of his control .
On Friday , the U.N. mandate for delivering aid expires .
However , Germany and Belgium are reported to have drafted a new resolution seeking to appease @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but only for the next six months .
A time to flex donor muscle ?
Writing in Foreign Policy on June 24 , Charles Thépaut outlined how the U.S. and European Union , who together contribute roughly 90 percent of U.N. humanitarian aid to Syria , could use that leverage to drive a solution that keeps aid flowing—while avoiding playing into Assad ’ s hands .
Meanwhile , the misery continues .
The great power back and forth comes at a time of increased misery for a war-ravaged Syrian populace , brought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collapsing economy , and a looming coronavirus pandemic .
Writing in Foreign Policy on Monday , Robbie Gramer and I looked at the hard choices aid agencies are having to make as the threat of infection hampers relief efforts .
The coronavirus pandemic has already destabilized the global economy , and it could soon make the world more violent .
Research by Jonathan D. Moyer and Oliver Kaplan , published in Foreign Policy on July 6 , says the pandemic has increased the risk of war in already tense environments .
U.S. breaks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broke its own record for the most coronavirus infections recorded in one day on Wednesday with roughly 62,000 new cases reported .
It breaks the previous record of 58,910 cases set on July 3 .
Anthony Fauci , the government ’ s top infectious disease expert , said that states would have to reconsider reopening plans in the face of the nationwide rise in cases .
“ Any state that is having a serious problem , that state should seriously look at shutting down .
It ’ s not for me to say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he said .
Ivory Coast Prime Minister dies .
Ivory Coast Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly died in hospital on Wednesday after he had become unwell at a cabinet meeting , according to a statement from President Alassane Ouattara .
Coulibaly had just returned from France where he had spent two months receiving treatment for a heart condition .
His death complicates the upcoming presidential election on October 31 , as Coulibaly had been nominated in March as the candidate of the ruling RHDP alliance .
Mass graves in Burkina Faso .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ found in mass graves in northern Burkina Faso , Human Rights Watch ( HRW ) has reported .
The men are alleged to have been victims of extrajudicial executions , prompting the rights organization to call on the Burkinabé government to launch an impartial investigation .
“ Existing information points toward government security forces , so it ’ s critical to have impartial investigations , evidence properly gathered , and families informed about what happened to their loved ones , ” said Corinne Dufka , the Sahel director at HRW .
Fugitive Mexican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former PRI party governor of the Mexican state of Chihuahua , was arrested in Miami on Wednesday , more than three years after he fled his home country after being accused of embezzling $ 4.2 million in public funds .
On top of the corruption allegations , Duarte is alleged to have stolen hundreds of cows originally imported to his state to replace thinned-out herds following a damaging drought .
Duarte now faces extradition to Mexico .
Facebook targets Brazil disinformation .
Facebook has removed pages of a fake news network linked to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including the president ’ s sons .
The move is part of the social network ’ s crackdown on “ coordinated inauthentic behavior , ” defined as when groups or individuals work together to conceal their identities , motives , and activities on the platform .
The network involved the creation of fake journalist accounts and fake news outlets in order to criticize opposition parties and Brazilian journalists .
In all , 35 Facebook accounts and 38 Instagram accounts were removed .
The Brazilian Supreme Court began investigating the network in May .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ A former district chief of Narendra Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) was shot dead by suspected militants in Kashmir on Wednesday , according to local police .
Waseem Bari , along with his father and brother , were attacked at Bari ’ s shop in north Kashmir .
All three later died in of their wounds .
As Anik Joshi wrote in Foreign Policy on June 16 , tensions have increased in Kashmir after Narendra Modi ’ s government revoked the region ’ s special autonomy last year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ operators of a Tokyo theme park to refrain from screaming on recently reopened rollercoasters , lest it hasten the spread of the coronavirus .
The ban on screaming is part of a set of voluntary guidelines agreed upon by Japanese theme park associations as parks reopen across the country .
Hoping to model good behavior for its guests , a video posted by the Fuji-Q Highland amusement park features two of its executives riding the popular Fujiyama rollercoaster in total silence .
It ends with a plea to “ Please scream inside your @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.N. Security Council is at odds ahead of a key deadline for Syrian aid, Ivory Coast Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly dies, and the United States sets another global record for new coronavirus cases.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.N. Security Council is at odds ahead of a key deadline for Syrian aid, Ivory Coast Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly dies, and the United States sets another global record for new coronavirus cases.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Russia and China Clash With U.S. and EU on Syria Aid
Russia and China are squaring off against their Western counterparts at the United Nations Security Council over a plan to maintain U.N. cross-border aid flows to Syria as a Friday deadline approaches.
On Tuesday, Russia and China vetoed a plan cosponsored by Germany and Belgium that would have allowed the two current crossing points to remain open to U.N. aid traffic for another 12 months. The next day, a resolution put forward by Russia that would have allowed one access point on the Turkey-Syria border to remain open for six months failed to garner enough votes.
Aid for Assad—or for Syrians? In rallying opposition against the Russian plan, U.N. ambassador Kelly Craft called the choice one of “good versus evil.”
U.S. and EU leaders argue that closing off one of the crossing points—Bab al-Hawa—would risk cutting off over a million Syrians in the area north of Aleppo from desperately needed humanitarian aid. China and Russia believe that such aid can be delivered from within Syria and handled by government authorities—a claim the United States and EU reject, fearing it would give too much leverage to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad over areas currently outside of his control.
On Friday, the U.N. mandate for delivering aid expires. However, Germany and Belgium are reported to have drafted a new resolution seeking to appease Russia: Both crossings should remain open, but only for the next six months.
A time to flex donor muscle? Writing in Foreign Policy on June 24, Charles Thépaut outlined how the U.S. and European Union, who together contribute roughly 90 percent of U.N. humanitarian aid to Syria, could use that leverage to drive a solution that keeps aid flowing—while avoiding playing into Assad’s hands.
Meanwhile, the misery continues. The great power back and forth comes at a time of increased misery for a war-ravaged Syrian populace, brought on by rising food prices, a collapsing economy, and a looming coronavirus pandemic. Writing in Foreign Policy on Monday, Robbie Gramer and I looked at the hard choices aid agencies are having to make as the threat of infection hampers relief efforts.
Will the Coronavirus Fuel Conflict?
The coronavirus pandemic has already destabilized the global economy, and it could soon make the world more violent. Research by Jonathan D. Moyer and Oliver Kaplan, published in Foreign Policy on July 6, says the pandemic has increased the risk of war in already tense environments.
What We’re Following Today
U.S. breaks coronavirus record again. The United States broke its own record for the most coronavirus infections recorded in one day on Wednesday with roughly 62,000 new cases reported. It breaks the previous record of 58,910 cases set on July 3. Anthony Fauci, the government’s top infectious disease expert, said that states would have to reconsider reopening plans in the face of the nationwide rise in cases. “Any state that is having a serious problem, that state should seriously look at shutting down. It’s not for me to say, because each state is different,” he said.
Ivory Coast Prime Minister dies. Ivory Coast Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly died in hospital on Wednesday after he had become unwell at a cabinet meeting, according to a statement from President Alassane Ouattara. Coulibaly had just returned from France where he had spent two months receiving treatment for a heart condition. His death complicates the upcoming presidential election on October 31, as Coulibaly had been nominated in March as the candidate of the ruling RHDP alliance.
Mass graves in Burkina Faso. The corpses of 180 men have been found in mass graves in northern Burkina Faso, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has reported. The men are alleged to have been victims of extrajudicial executions, prompting the rights organization to call on the Burkinabé government to launch an impartial investigation. “Existing information points toward government security forces, so it’s critical to have impartial investigations, evidence properly gathered, and families informed about what happened to their loved ones,” said Corinne Dufka, the Sahel director at HRW.
Fugitive Mexican governor apprehended. César Duarte, a former PRI party governor of the Mexican state of Chihuahua, was arrested in Miami on Wednesday, more than three years after he fled his home country after being accused of embezzling $4.2 million in public funds. On top of the corruption allegations, Duarte is alleged to have stolen hundreds of cows originally imported to his state to replace thinned-out herds following a damaging drought. Duarte now faces extradition to Mexico.
Keep an Eye On
Facebook targets Brazil disinformation. Facebook has removed pages of a fake news network linked to allies of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, including the president’s sons. The move is part of the social network’s crackdown on “coordinated inauthentic behavior,” defined as when groups or individuals work together to conceal their identities, motives, and activities on the platform. The network involved the creation of fake journalist accounts and fake news outlets in order to criticize opposition parties and Brazilian journalists. In all, 35 Facebook accounts and 38 Instagram accounts were removed. The Brazilian Supreme Court began investigating the network in May.
BJP leader shot dead in Kashmir. A former district chief of Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was shot dead by suspected militants in Kashmir on Wednesday, according to local police. Waseem Bari, along with his father and brother, were attacked at Bari’s shop in north Kashmir. All three later died in of their wounds. As Anik Joshi wrote in Foreign Policy on June 16, tensions have increased in Kashmir after Narendra Modi’s government revoked the region’s special autonomy last year.
Odds and Ends
Japanese thrill-seekers have been urged by the operators of a Tokyo theme park to refrain from screaming on recently reopened rollercoasters, lest it hasten the spread of the coronavirus. The ban on screaming is part of a set of voluntary guidelines agreed upon by Japanese theme park associations as parks reopen across the country. Hoping to model good behavior for its guests, a video posted by the Fuji-Q Highland amusement park features two of its executives riding the popular Fujiyama rollercoaster in total silence. It ends with a plea to “Please scream inside your heart.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-09--The Post-Pandemic Economy Could Be Green and Clean—but Not With These Plans

The Post-Pandemic Economy Could Be Green and Clean—but Not With These Plans The collapse in economic activity resulting from the coronavirus pandemic has not only spurred government stimulus spending worth trillions of dollars , euros , and yen .
It has also prompted calls to “ build back better ” by making the recovery a greener , less carbon-intensive one—the subject of a virtual clean-energy summit today that brought together government ministers from countries responsible for 80 percent of the world ’ s emissions .
Yet current plans for green stimulus programs around the world focus too narrowly on how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how much they directly reduce carbon emissions.Current plans for green stimulus programs focus too narrowly on how many jobs they create right now and how much they directly reduce carbon emissions .
Of course we want more jobs and fewer emissions .
But government spending alone can not solve the climate problem , nor will immediate job creation address the long and deep economic contraction most industrial economies are likely to face .
For green stimulus to work on both counts , it must be designed for the long run .
The task @ @ @ @ @ @ @ projected to shrink by more than 5 percent this year .
In the United States alone , 35 million people are receiving unemployment insurance or waiting for it ; second-quarter U.S. GDP is projected to fall 33 percent .
In response , nations around the world have spent more than $ 15 trillion boosting their ailing economies .
The U.S. Congress has spent $ 3 trillion and is debating trillions more .
Leading economists caution that without further trillions in additional stimulus , the economic rebound will stall .
As a result of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emissions fell 17 percent compared to last year , but they are quickly rising again as economies reopen .
Given the urgency of addressing climate change , everyone from central bankers to environmental nongovernmental organizations has called for government stimulus spending that will put nations on a trajectory to lower carbon emissions .
So far , only Europe has demonstrated resolve to pursue such an approach , with the European Union earmarking a quarter of its $ 850 billion COVID-19 recovery package for climate priorities and several EU member nations such as Germany @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China and India , on the other hand , may actually double down on carbon-intensive investments to spur their recovery .
The good news is that stimulus spending presents a historic opportunity to put countries on a more sustainable path .
Effective green stimulus , however , requires designing measures that sensibly boost the economy while at the same time making meaningful progress on climate change .
Current green stimulus plans conceive of these goals too narrowly , and their aims fall short .
Jobs goals need to be based on a broader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be longer and deeper than most people think .
The U.S. Congressional Budget Office projects the recovery will take a decade , the chairman of the Federal Reserve recently warned Congress that this will be a deep downturn with a “ significant uncertainty ” when it comes to recovery , and former Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Jason Furman projects a high unemployment rate for many years .
Surging numbers of COVID-19 cases in many U.S. states have prompted fears that further lockdowns may be necessary .
Even short of that , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , travel , and many other forms of economic activity .
Yet current green stimulus proposals typically focus more on short-term job creation than the support required by a longer downturn .
A new study by the International Energy Agency evaluated myriad clean energy spending options by how many jobs they would create in the next three years .
It found , for example , that retrofitting buildings would create between 9 and 30 jobs per million dollars spent , while onshore wind projects would only create 1.5 jobs per million dollars .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ traditional definition of what it means for measures to be “ timely , temporary , and targeted ” —the criteria that constrained stimulus policy following the 2008 recession .
Since this downturn will likely be long , investments can be “ timely ” even if the benefits of spending do not materialize for years , such as in the case of public infrastructure .
Similarly , investments may be “ temporary ” even if they last for a decade , which is how long it may take to support the emergence of new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prosperity .
Government investments in infrastructure and innovation make good economic sense because they deliver high economic returns—higher over the long term than most of what currently falls under stimulus spending—and because the private sector will not adequately fund them .
These investments make even more sense today , when the real cost of government borrowing is negative .
The need to support economic growth for an extended time combined with the current ease at which government can borrow blurs the line between stimulus in the Keynesian sense of boosting demand for goods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that aims to develop specific sectors of the economy .
For clean energy , that widens the scope of sensible stimulus to include investments in mass transit , power transmission lines , electric car charging networks , and various areas of research , development , and demonstration .
At the same time that immediate job creation is not the only way to assess stimulus , tons of carbon reduced is not the only way to evaluate the climate effect of spending .
That is because government spending is not the key driver of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surely needed , any such spending will be dwarfed by the over $ 70 trillion that the International Energy Agency projects will need to be spent in the energy sector over the next two decades in order to meet the Paris climate agreement ’ s goals .
Although the $ 90 billion in green stimulus spent in the 2009 U.S. recovery package helped catalyze the expansion of solar and wind power , it did not fundamentally alter the trajectory of total U.S. emission levels .
That is because greenhouse gas emissions reflect the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firms about how they produce and consume energy .
Achieving not just modest carbon reductions , but truly transformational deep decarbonization , thus depends far more on a comprehensive climate policy that mandates or incentivizes different choices than on narrow spending measures .
To make this point clear : Past environmental crises like smog that blanketed Los Angeles , pollution that fouled the Hudson River , or acid rain that fell over the Ohio Valley were not primarily addressed with government spending but with laws that set limits on how much pollution could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or power plants .
The same is true for decarbonization .
The greenness of stimulus spending , therefore , should be judged not merely on tons of emissions reduced but also on whether it increases the likelihood of comprehensive long-term climate policy—such as standards , regulations , or a carbon price—that shifts private behavior and capital allocation decisions.History teaches that when economies are weak and people are struggling , passing climate legislation is more difficult .
To achieve that , three things will be necessary : First , green stimulus must do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic recovery .
History teaches that when economies are weak and people are struggling , passing climate legislation is more difficult .
The yellow vest protests against a climate tax on fuel in France are just a recent reminder that pocketbook concerns can constrain climate ambition .
Stimulus that delivers the most robust economic recovery is therefore greener .
Green spending must also not come at the expense of immediate economic rescue , like support for unemployed workers , small businesses , and state and local governments .
Second , stimulus can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comprehensive climate legislation passes .
For example , programs that invest in coal-dependent communities to support their finances can reduce the number of losers from strong climate policy , thereby laying the groundwork for climate policy by reducing political opposition to it .
Finally , recovery spending that drives down the cost of achieving deep decarbonization by investing in research , development , and demonstration can improve the prospects for transformational climate policy .
Current technologies like solar and wind power and batteries must be scaled up dramatically , but they will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of energy users , including heavy industry , aviation , and shipping .
Solar and wind power create electricity , but electricity is only around 20 percent of final energy consumption .
Some sectors could be electrified , but not all .
To both expand zero-carbon electricity and decarbonize sectors that can not switch to electricity will require technologies such as hydrogen , carbon capture , carbon removal , next-generation nuclear power , advanced storage , and digitalization .
Bringing the costs of such technologies down can make more ambitious climate policy more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the world will fall far short of climate goals no matter how much government money we spend .
Green recovery spending must therefore be viewed as a complement to , not a substitute for , future comprehensive climate policy .
Green stimulus and economic recovery spending should thus focus on areas where market failures will exist even with such broader climate policies .
For example , putting a price on carbon and thereby raising the cost of fuels such as coal will make solar and wind more economically attractive .
By contrast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ changes in electricity prices , while building owners don ’ t always pay utility bills and may thus have little incentive to invest in energy efficiency .
Green stimulus should therefore prioritize financial incentives to retrofit buildings over , say , expanding solar and wind power , which private capital will deliver given the appropriate policies , such as standards , carbon pricing , or regulatory reform .
Beyond today ’ s crisis of COVID-19 and the economic turmoil it wrought lies the slower-moving , longer-lasting crisis of climate change .
Smart government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make significant progress on the latter .
But to be truly effective , they must take a much longer view of the economic returns and lay the groundwork for the transformative policy changes needed for deep decarbonization .

The collapse in economic activity resulting from the coronavirus pandemic has not only spurred government stimulus spending worth trillions of dollars, euros, and yen. It has also prompted calls to “build back better” by making the recovery a greener, less carbon-intensive one—the subject of a virtual clean-energy summit today that brought together government ministers from countries responsible for 80 percent of the world's emissions. Yet current plans for green stimulus programs around the world focus too narrowly on how many jobs they create right now and how much they directly reduce carbon emissions.Current plans for green stimulus programs focus too narrowly on how many jobs they create right now and how much they directly reduce carbon emissions. Of course we want more jobs and fewer emissions. But government spending alone cannot solve the climate problem, nor will immediate job creation address the long and deep economic contraction most industrial economies are likely to face. For green stimulus to work on both counts, it must be designed for the long run.
The collapse in economic activity resulting from the coronavirus pandemic has not only spurred government stimulus spending worth trillions of dollars, euros, and yen. It has also prompted calls to “build back better” by making the recovery a greener, less carbon-intensive one—the subject of a virtual clean-energy summit today that brought together government ministers from countries responsible for 80 percent of the world’s emissions. Yet current plans for green stimulus programs around the world focus too narrowly on how many jobs they create right now and how much they directly reduce carbon emissions.Current plans for green stimulus programs focus too narrowly on how many jobs they create right now and how much they directly reduce carbon emissions. Of course we want more jobs and fewer emissions. But government spending alone cannot solve the climate problem, nor will immediate job creation address the long and deep economic contraction most industrial economies are likely to face. For green stimulus to work on both counts, it must be designed for the long run.
The task ahead is tremendous. Global GDP is projected to shrink by more than 5 percent this year. In the United States alone, 35 million people are receiving unemployment insurance or waiting for it; second-quarter U.S. GDP is projected to fall 33 percent. In response, nations around the world have spent more than $15 trillion boosting their ailing economies. The U.S. Congress has spent $3 trillion and is debating trillions more. Leading economists caution that without further trillions in additional stimulus, the economic rebound will stall.
As a result of the economic downturn, global greenhouse gas emissions fell 17 percent compared to last year, but they are quickly rising again as economies reopen. Given the urgency of addressing climate change, everyone from central bankers to environmental nongovernmental organizations has called for government stimulus spending that will put nations on a trajectory to lower carbon emissions. So far, only Europe has demonstrated resolve to pursue such an approach, with the European Union earmarking a quarter of its $850 billion COVID-19 recovery package for climate priorities and several EU member nations such as Germany doing something similar. Key emitters like China and India, on the other hand, may actually double down on carbon-intensive investments to spur their recovery.
The good news is that stimulus spending presents a historic opportunity to put countries on a more sustainable path. Effective green stimulus, however, requires designing measures that sensibly boost the economy while at the same time making meaningful progress on climate change. Current green stimulus plans conceive of these goals too narrowly, and their aims fall short.
Jobs goals need to be based on a broader view, because this downturn is going to be longer and deeper than most people think. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office projects the recovery will take a decade, the chairman of the Federal Reserve recently warned Congress that this will be a deep downturn with a “significant uncertainty” when it comes to recovery, and former Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Jason Furman projects a high unemployment rate for many years. Surging numbers of COVID-19 cases in many U.S. states have prompted fears that further lockdowns may be necessary. Even short of that, consumer fears could discourage shopping, dining, travel, and many other forms of economic activity.
Yet current green stimulus proposals typically focus more on short-term job creation than the support required by a longer downturn. A new study by the International Energy Agency evaluated myriad clean energy spending options by how many jobs they would create in the next three years. It found, for example, that retrofitting buildings would create between 9 and 30 jobs per million dollars spent, while onshore wind projects would only create 1.5 jobs per million dollars.
Instead, policymakers should think beyond the traditional definition of what it means for measures to be “timely, temporary, and targeted”—the criteria that constrained stimulus policy following the 2008 recession. Since this downturn will likely be long, investments can be “timely” even if the benefits of spending do not materialize for years, such as in the case of public infrastructure. Similarly, investments may be “temporary” even if they last for a decade, which is how long it may take to support the emergence of new technologies that can improve economic productivity and prosperity. Government investments in infrastructure and innovation make good economic sense because they deliver high economic returns—higher over the long term than most of what currently falls under stimulus spending—and because the private sector will not adequately fund them. These investments make even more sense today, when the real cost of government borrowing is negative.
The need to support economic growth for an extended time combined with the current ease at which government can borrow blurs the line between stimulus in the Keynesian sense of boosting demand for goods and services, and an industrial policy that aims to develop specific sectors of the economy. For clean energy, that widens the scope of sensible stimulus to include investments in mass transit, power transmission lines, electric car charging networks, and various areas of research, development, and demonstration.
At the same time that immediate job creation is not the only way to assess stimulus, tons of carbon reduced is not the only way to evaluate the climate effect of spending. That is because government spending is not the key driver of decarbonization. While more government spending is surely needed, any such spending will be dwarfed by the over $70 trillion that the International Energy Agency projects will need to be spent in the energy sector over the next two decades in order to meet the Paris climate agreement’s goals.
Although the $90 billion in green stimulus spent in the 2009 U.S. recovery package helped catalyze the expansion of solar and wind power, it did not fundamentally alter the trajectory of total U.S. emission levels. That is because greenhouse gas emissions reflect the collective decisions of millions of individuals and firms about how they produce and consume energy. Achieving not just modest carbon reductions, but truly transformational deep decarbonization, thus depends far more on a comprehensive climate policy that mandates or incentivizes different choices than on narrow spending measures.
To make this point clear: Past environmental crises like smog that blanketed Los Angeles, pollution that fouled the Hudson River, or acid rain that fell over the Ohio Valley were not primarily addressed with government spending but with laws that set limits on how much pollution could be emitted by cars, industrial facilities, or power plants. The same is true for decarbonization.
The greenness of stimulus spending, therefore, should be judged not merely on tons of emissions reduced but also on whether it increases the likelihood of comprehensive long-term climate policy—such as standards, regulations, or a carbon price—that shifts private behavior and capital allocation decisions.History teaches that when economies are weak and people are struggling, passing climate legislation is more difficult.
To achieve that, three things will be necessary:
First, green stimulus must do no harm to the strength of the economic recovery. History teaches that when economies are weak and people are struggling, passing climate legislation is more difficult. The yellow vest protests against a climate tax on fuel in France are just a recent reminder that pocketbook concerns can constrain climate ambition. Stimulus that delivers the most robust economic recovery is therefore greener. Green spending must also not come at the expense of immediate economic rescue, like support for unemployed workers, small businesses, and state and local governments.
Second, stimulus can be green if it improves the odds that comprehensive climate legislation passes. For example, programs that invest in coal-dependent communities to support their finances can reduce the number of losers from strong climate policy, thereby laying the groundwork for climate policy by reducing political opposition to it.
Finally, recovery spending that drives down the cost of achieving deep decarbonization by investing in research, development, and demonstration can improve the prospects for transformational climate policy. Current technologies like solar and wind power and batteries must be scaled up dramatically, but they will not be sufficient to decarbonize the full range of energy users, including heavy industry, aviation, and shipping. Solar and wind power create electricity, but electricity is only around 20 percent of final energy consumption. Some sectors could be electrified, but not all. To both expand zero-carbon electricity and decarbonize sectors that cannot switch to electricity will require technologies such as hydrogen, carbon capture, carbon removal, next-generation nuclear power, advanced storage, and digitalization. Bringing the costs of such technologies down can make more ambitious climate policy more affordable.
Absent broader regulation and legislation, the world will fall far short of climate goals no matter how much government money we spend. Green recovery spending must therefore be viewed as a complement to, not a substitute for, future comprehensive climate policy.
Green stimulus and economic recovery spending should thus focus on areas where market failures will exist even with such broader climate policies. For example, putting a price on carbon and thereby raising the cost of fuels such as coal will make solar and wind more economically attractive. By contrast, homeowners are not very sensitive to changes in electricity prices, while building owners don’t always pay utility bills and may thus have little incentive to invest in energy efficiency. Green stimulus should therefore prioritize financial incentives to retrofit buildings over, say, expanding solar and wind power, which private capital will deliver given the appropriate policies, such as standards, carbon pricing, or regulatory reform.
Beyond today’s crisis of COVID-19 and the economic turmoil it wrought lies the slower-moving, longer-lasting crisis of climate change. Smart government investments to ameliorate the former can also make significant progress on the latter. But to be truly effective, they must take a much longer view of the economic returns and lay the groundwork for the transformative policy changes needed for deep decarbonization.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-09--U.S. Carriers Send a Message to Beijing Over South China Sea

U.S. Carriers Send a Message to Beijing Over South China Sea Faced with increasingly brazen Chinese efforts to exercise control over the entirety of the South China Sea , the U.S. military is using a series of big aircraft carrier operations to show allies that the United States isn ’ t about to turn its back on the hotly contested region .
Over the weekend , the USS Ronald Reagan and the USS Nimitz sailed into the South China Sea , another challenge to China ’ s claims of maritime sovereignty in the area that have been consistently challenged by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passage of the type meant to assert the right to free navigation , the exercise reportedly included the use of jets , reconnaissance planes , and helicopters , while Chinese sailors held competing drills near the Paracel Islands , which are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan .
Current and former defense officials worry that China has seized on the coronavirus pandemic to ramp up its efforts to militarize the so-called nine-dashed line , Beijing ’ s sweeping claim to sovereignty over the vast majority of the South China Sea , a conduit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a potential motherlode of oil and natural gas .
Since earlier this year , while the United States and other countries were grappling with the spread of the pandemic , China has systematically stepped up its efforts to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake , installing floating and land-based monitoring systems on and around artificial islands , browbeating neighbors such as Vietnam and Malaysia that sought to drill for oil , and crossing sabers with Philippine warships .
China has also redoubled its administrative reach in the South China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to turn atolls and islets into an extension of the mainland .
China ’ s ongoing aggression in the South China Sea has gotten a boost as the economic headwinds from the pandemic , which originated in China , has given Beijing more incentive to fuel nationalism through aggressive foreign-policy actions .
“ It seems as though their foreign-policy adventurism has not in any way been clipped since coronavirus , ” said Randall Schriver , who served as the Pentagon ’ s assistant secretary for Indo-Pacific security affairs until December 2019 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ time when they ’ re struggling at home.
” The high-profile U.S. carrier operations are seen as a way to signal continued U.S. resolve , after another carrier , the USS Theodore Roosevelt , was laid up in Guam for two months after nearly 1,000 sailors contracted the virus .
“ I think there were some questions after the Roosevelt was out of commission for a bit as to whether our capacity to do things was diminished , ” said Schriver , who is now chairman of the Project 2049 Institute , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Asia .
“ It ’ s a long-term play to demonstrate that the Chinese haven ’ t changed the nature of that water.
” The U.S. deployment is driven in part by demands by America ’ s allies in the region to push back more against China ’ s behavior .
Schriver said allied navies have reported an uptick in threats from the People ’ s Liberation Army Navy and the Chinese coast guard in attempting to transit the sea ; Chinese vessels regularly shadow and threaten ships transiting what are still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exercises has been driven by demand from allies , particularly Vietnam and Taiwan , and especially renewed interest from the Philippines to push back .
The Philippines , a U.S. treaty ally , had under President Rodrigo Duterte become increasingly cozy with China , even moving to abrogate a military forces agreement with Washington this February .
But the growing threat from China has Manila rethinking—it has put the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement on hold for now while it seeks U.S. muscle to counter Beijing .
“ China is just pushing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense official , who requested anonymity to speak candidly , told Foreign Policy .
“ I ’ m worried at some point that the dam is going to break somewhere .
This business will get out of control.
” Since the accession to power of Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2012 , Beijing has taken a more aggressive stance toward its neighbors and territorial disputes—at a cost .
Last month , it was involved in deadly border clashes with India in the most heated showdown between the two nuclear neighbors in decades , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soured .
A new national security law for Hong Kong will bring the city to heel , but it risks hurting Beijing ’ s ability to access international trade and capital markets .
Former U.S. officials wonder at what point China ’ s own economic self-interest could rein in its land grab in one of the world ’ s most important waterways .
“ The thing I ’ ve never understood about China is since the end of World War II , the U.S. Navy has kept the sea lines available for everybody @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former Navy secretary during the Obama administration .
“ If they start messing around with sea lanes and trying to close them down , they ’ re going to do themselves pretty incredible economic harm , which I don ’ t think they can take right now.
” The use of multiple carrier strike groups is a step up from the usual use of smaller surface ships to assert navigational rights in the region , and it ’ s a departure of sorts from how the Pentagon operated under former Defense Secretary James @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cut back on the use of the U.S. military ’ s most visible power-projection platform .
Using pairs of the multibillion-dollar ships serves several purposes .
Operating in pairs , they can defend each other and conduct 24-hour flight operations , whereas a single flattop can only operate about half that time .
And pushing America ’ s big nuclear carriers into the South China Sea offers Washington a chance to underscore China ’ s relative weakness in one area of naval competition where the United States has an unquestioned superiority over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese navy .
“ The U.S. can do high-end multi-carrier operations , with the not so subtle dig at the Chinese that their carriers are not at the level , ” said Bryan Clark , a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute who served on the Navy headquarters staff during his time on active duty .
China has two conventionally fueled aircraft carriers with less capability to conduct flight operations than the massive U.S. nuclear supercarriers .
“ It ’ s a way of demonstrating to the Chinese that they ’ re still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Clark said .
But the use of carriers in the Pacific also shows an ongoing paradigm shift in the way that the Pentagon conducts operations , after past Navy studies conducted with Iranian military expatriates showed that the large ships did little to deter Iran in the Persian Gulf , Clark said .
Given the threat of Chinese surface- , land- , and submarine-based missiles , carriers are more likely to be used for sea control where they can operate outside of extended Chinese weapon ranges , he said .
Complicating matters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t reached a level of mutual understanding with China about what military actions are out of bounds in the South China Sea , from “ shouldering ” vessels aside forcibly to non-kinetic attacks , or combat patrols of air defense zones .
Some organizations have called for the United States to establish a code of conduct with China in the South China Sea , giving the Pentagon a series of options to respond to Chinese provocations .
The lack of mutually agreed rules on how to handle confrontations in a crowded stretch of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vulnerability of their biggest naval assets .
For years , China has poured resources into anti-ship missiles , especially so-called carrier killers that could take out the expensive ships from a distance , potentially forcing them to operate even farther away from the islands where the United States is eager to show the flag .
“ Nobody can deny that a U.S. aircraft carrier carries a shit-ton of striking power , ” said the former defense official .
“ The problem is it ’ s also vulnerable and the Chinese have spent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make it vulnerable.
” “ It ’ s kind of like the old Dirty Harry question , ” the former official said .
“ Do they feel lucky ?
”

Faced with increasingly brazen Chinese efforts to exercise control over the entirety of the South China Sea, the U.S. military is using a series of big aircraft carrier operations to show allies that the United States isn’t about to turn its back on the hotly contested region.
Faced with increasingly brazen Chinese efforts to exercise control over the entirety of the South China Sea, the U.S. military is using a series of big aircraft carrier operations to show allies that the United States isn’t about to turn its back on the hotly contested region.
Over the weekend, the USS Ronald Reagan and the USS Nimitz sailed into the South China Sea, another challenge to China’s claims of maritime sovereignty in the area that have been consistently challenged by American allies. More than a routine passage of the type meant to assert the right to free navigation, the exercise reportedly included the use of jets, reconnaissance planes, and helicopters, while Chinese sailors held competing drills near the Paracel Islands, which are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan.
Current and former defense officials worry that China has seized on the coronavirus pandemic to ramp up its efforts to militarize the so-called nine-dashed line, Beijing’s sweeping claim to sovereignty over the vast majority of the South China Sea, a conduit for trillions of dollars in annual trade and a potential motherlode of oil and natural gas.
Since earlier this year, while the United States and other countries were grappling with the spread of the pandemic, China has systematically stepped up its efforts to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake, installing floating and land-based monitoring systems on and around artificial islands, browbeating neighbors such as Vietnam and Malaysia that sought to drill for oil, and crossing sabers with Philippine warships. China has also redoubled its administrative reach in the South China Sea, which could give it greater ability to turn atolls and islets into an extension of the mainland.
China’s ongoing aggression in the South China Sea has gotten a boost as the economic headwinds from the pandemic, which originated in China, has given Beijing more incentive to fuel nationalism through aggressive foreign-policy actions.
“It seems as though their foreign-policy adventurism has not in any way been clipped since coronavirus,” said Randall Schriver, who served as the Pentagon’s assistant secretary for Indo-Pacific security affairs until December 2019. “Stoking nationalism is helpful for a time when they’re struggling at home.”
The high-profile U.S. carrier operations are seen as a way to signal continued U.S. resolve, after another carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, was laid up in Guam for two months after nearly 1,000 sailors contracted the virus.
“I think there were some questions after the Roosevelt was out of commission for a bit as to whether our capacity to do things was diminished,” said Schriver, who is now chairman of the Project 2049 Institute, a Washington-based think tank focused on U.S. policy in Asia.
“It’s a long-term play to demonstrate that the Chinese haven’t changed the nature of that water.”
The U.S. deployment is driven in part by demands by America’s allies in the region to push back more against China’s behavior. Schriver said allied navies have reported an uptick in threats from the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the Chinese coast guard in attempting to transit the sea; Chinese vessels regularly shadow and threaten ships transiting what are still international waters. The surge in American exercises has been driven by demand from allies, particularly Vietnam and Taiwan, and especially renewed interest from the Philippines to push back.
The Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, had under President Rodrigo Duterte become increasingly cozy with China, even moving to abrogate a military forces agreement with Washington this February. But the growing threat from China has Manila rethinking—it has put the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement on hold for now while it seeks U.S. muscle to counter Beijing.
“China is just pushing on all fronts,” another former defense official, who requested anonymity to speak candidly, told Foreign Policy. “I’m worried at some point that the dam is going to break somewhere. This business will get out of control.”
Since the accession to power of Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2012, Beijing has taken a more aggressive stance toward its neighbors and territorial disputes—at a cost. Last month, it was involved in deadly border clashes with India in the most heated showdown between the two nuclear neighbors in decades, and economic ties between the two countries soured. A new national security law for Hong Kong will bring the city to heel, but it risks hurting Beijing’s ability to access international trade and capital markets. Former U.S. officials wonder at what point China’s own economic self-interest could rein in its land grab in one of the world’s most important waterways.
“The thing I’ve never understood about China is since the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy has kept the sea lines available for everybody,” said Ray Mabus, a former Navy secretary during the Obama administration. “If they start messing around with sea lanes and trying to close them down, they’re going to do themselves pretty incredible economic harm, which I don’t think they can take right now.”
On Monday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo continued the Trump administration’s renewed push against China’s claims to offshore resources in the South China Sea, calling the moves “completely unlawful” and arguing that the so-called nine-dashed line had “no coherent basis” in international and maritime law. The United States had not previously taken a position to explicitly reject Beijing’s claims.
The use of multiple carrier strike groups is a step up from the usual use of smaller surface ships to assert navigational rights in the region, and it’s a departure of sorts from how the Pentagon operated under former Defense Secretary James Mattis, who urged the department to cut back on the use of the U.S. military’s most visible power-projection platform.
Using pairs of the multibillion-dollar ships serves several purposes. Operating in pairs, they can defend each other and conduct 24-hour flight operations, whereas a single flattop can only operate about half that time. And pushing America’s big nuclear carriers into the South China Sea offers Washington a chance to underscore China’s relative weakness in one area of naval competition where the United States has an unquestioned superiority over the rapidly growing, and technologically improving, Chinese navy.
“The U.S. can do high-end multi-carrier operations, with the not so subtle dig at the Chinese that their carriers are not at the level,” said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute who served on the Navy headquarters staff during his time on active duty. China has two conventionally fueled aircraft carriers with less capability to conduct flight operations than the massive U.S. nuclear supercarriers. “It’s a way of demonstrating to the Chinese that they’re still far behind in this capability area,” Clark said.
But the use of carriers in the Pacific also shows an ongoing paradigm shift in the way that the Pentagon conducts operations, after past Navy studies conducted with Iranian military expatriates showed that the large ships did little to deter Iran in the Persian Gulf, Clark said. Given the threat of Chinese surface-, land-, and submarine-based missiles, carriers are more likely to be used for sea control where they can operate outside of extended Chinese weapon ranges, he said.
Complicating matters, the United States still hasn’t reached a level of mutual understanding with China about what military actions are out of bounds in the South China Sea, from “shouldering” vessels aside forcibly to non-kinetic attacks, or combat patrols of air defense zones. Some organizations have called for the United States to establish a code of conduct with China in the South China Sea, giving the Pentagon a series of options to respond to Chinese provocations.
The lack of mutually agreed rules on how to handle confrontations in a crowded stretch of water comes as U.S. officials fret about the vulnerability of their biggest naval assets. For years, China has poured resources into anti-ship missiles, especially so-called carrier killers that could take out the expensive ships from a distance, potentially forcing them to operate even farther away from the islands where the United States is eager to show the flag.
“Nobody can deny that a U.S. aircraft carrier carries a shit-ton of striking power,” said the former defense official. “The problem is it’s also vulnerable and the Chinese have spent a lot of time thinking about how to make it vulnerable.”
“It’s kind of like the old Dirty Harry question,” the former official said. “Do they feel lucky?”
Update, July 13, 2020: This article was updated with new U.S. policy developments regarding the South China Sea.