foreignpolicy--2020-01-28--The Standoff Between India’s Government and Its Protesters Can Only Be Broken by Elections

The Standoff Between India ’ s Government and Its Protesters Can Only Be Broken by Elections The images of protest and violence coming out of India in the past several weeks can not be pleasing for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) government .
In cities across India , tens of thousands of people have been demonstrating against an amendment to the country ’ s citizenship law , which was passed by parliament on Dec. 11 , 2019 , and is seen as discriminatory toward Muslims .
While there are Muslims among the protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many who do not usually take part in political protests .
This is by far the largest pan-Indian protest that the Modi government , more than six months into its second term , has faced .
The protests have been met with a strong state response , including the deployment of troops , internet blackouts , and the imposition of curfews .
The Indian Supreme Court has also begun hearing a clutch of petitions challenging the validity of the citizenship law amendment .
The Modi government , when it rammed through the new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreseen the kind of response that it would evoke .
Otherwise , a government that is usually adept at media management would not have been scrambling for a coherent response in the wake of the protests .
But once the government realized that its latest move had not gone over well with many people , it chose not to back down .
At one level , it sought to obfuscate the issue .
Though several BJP leaders , including Home Minister Amit Shah , had publicly and on the floor of parliament linked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Register of Citizens , Modi in a speech this past Dec. 22 claimed that it was never the government ’ s intention to link the two.Once the government realized that its latest move had not gone over well with many people , it chose not to back down .
At the same time , both Modi and Shah have vigorously defended the new citizenship law .
Indeed , they took the tack of labeling the protesters as anti-national .
While this might seem paradoxical and counterintuitive , the government ’ s digging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that divisive strategies and its Hindu majoritarian project pay political dividends .
While the BJP ’ s politics is often seen as driven by religion , more often than not it seeks to play up the division between its supporters and opponents on the issue of nationalism .
The Modi government ’ s chosen strategy in the face of any kind of protests or opposition is to construct an “ us versus them , ” “ national versus anti-national ” narrative .
This strategy is no different from that followed by populist leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s reaction to the protests against the citizenship law was similar .
The response has been explained by the analyst Pratap Bhanu Mehta as a way for the government to legitimize itself by constantly “ inventing enemies.
” The pernicious phrase “ tukde tukde gang ” ( the gang that wants to break up the country ) —which the government routinely uses to tar its opponents and critics—perhaps best sums up this strategy .
It was first used in 2016 to describe students at New Delhi ’ s elite and left-leaning Jawaharlal Nehru @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anniversary of the death of a man accused in a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament .
Some of the students were charged with sedition under a colonial-era law , and the government soon began employing the phrase “ tukde tukde gang ” to label anyone who criticized it .
Modi used it regularly in the 2019 national elections to tarnish the Indian National Congress party .
Ever since , it has regularly popped up in the BJP ’ s political discourse , never more so than in the context of the citizenship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law , Shah at a public rally this past Dec. 26 said it is time to punish the “ tukde tukde gang ” for its protests and attempts to fan unrest .
This line has been parroted by other senior ministers and has informed the government ’ s policy of clamping down on protesters—many of whom do not even belong to political parties—and isolating them .
It was even used by a senior minister to describe a Bollywood superstar when she stood in solidarity with a group of Jawaharlal Nehru University students protesting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , despite most of the protests being largely peaceful and consisting of sit-ins , readings from the constitution , and singing of the national anthem.The government ’ s strong-arm tactics are linked to the inability of both Modi and Shah to digest criticism .
The government ’ s strong-arm tactics are linked to the inability of both Modi and Shah to digest criticism .
This partly stems from both leaders having always operated in a situation , first in the state of Gujarat and now at the national level , where their party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has contributed to an intolerance toward protests and dissent and a proclivity to stamp them out rather hear out the other side .
It has also caused an inability to work with partners , which was demonstrated starkly in Maharashtra , where the BJP ’ s oldest ally , the Shiv Sena , deserted it in late 2019 to form the state government with opposition parties .
The intolerance for protests and the hubris that accompanies untrammeled power have become more pronounced in Modi ’ s second term after he won reelection last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2014 .
The question then is what happens next in the standoff between India ’ s protesters and its government .
There are arguably four important takeaways .
One , this is the first time that the country ’ s youth have come out in such large numbers to voice their discontent against the Modi government .
What a faltering economy and growing joblessness could not do has been achieved by the citizenship law and the government ’ s repression .
While this was largely a spontaneous reaction and one that will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant .
In both the 2014 and 2019 national elections , there is evidence to suggest that young voters backed Modi in large numbers .
The disillusionment of a section of the urban youth can not be good news for the BJP .
Two , this is also the first time that Muslims , who have largely been pushed around during Modi ’ s tenure , have found a voice .
While there is no party or leader who represents Muslims at the national level , that Muslims came out in large numbers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because it could potentially galvanize them against the BJP in a sustained manner .
Three , the government ’ s formulation of and response to the citizenship law have brought to the foreground the role of Shah in domestic policy .
Indeed , there is a consensus that Shah has been heard and seen far more than Modi in the aftermath of the passage of the new citizenship law .
It has been Shah , and not Modi , who has been the face of the most contentious decisions in Modi ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scrap Kashmir ’ s special status.The protests have tarnished the government ’ s image and India ’ s democratic credentials abroad .
Finally , the protests have tarnished the government ’ s image and India ’ s democratic credentials abroad .
For a government that has been so careful about optics in its first term , the past few weeks have been disastrous .
Neighbors and allies , such as Bangladesh , have also been alienated by the tone and content of the citizenship law , which implies that non-Muslim minorities have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prominent commentator from Nepal has described the new law as an “ act of geopolitical folly.
” Despite the significance of the protests , it might not signal a change in the way the Modi government operates .
The government believes divisive politics pays electoral dividends and that the protesters comprise those who might not have voted for the BJP .
The faith in such politics is yet to be shaken despite electoral setbacks in several state elections , partly because the BJP feels that this strategy delivered it an overwhelming mandate in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Modi had campaigned on a promise of vikas , or development , the 2019 national election was decisively influenced by a surge of nationalist fervor in the wake of a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir and New Delhi ’ s subsequent airstrike on Pakistan in response .
That ’ s why election reversals in Maharashtra or Jharkhand , where the BJP ’ s campaign focused heavily on both Modi and national issues such as Kashmir and the new citizenship law , have not triggered a course-correction .
The second reason why the BJP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ religious program in Modi ’ s second term is its belief that this moment represents the best opportunity of fulfilling its Hindu majoritarian agenda .
A strong majority in the lower house of parliament and favorable numbers in the upper house have allowed the Modi government to push through some of the BJP ’ s most contentious and divisive policies .
That Modi has done so despite a dramatic economic slowdown is the result of his belief that a significant number of Indians views his agenda favorably , which is itself a reflection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India ’ s electorate .
After all , the BJP ’ s campaign manifesto contained promises to enact the citizenship law and national citizens register that demonstrators are now protesting .
Finally , the focus on the BJP ’ s divisive politics have helped in diverting attention from a faltering economy .
The BJP can ’ t ignore large and sustained protests , however , especially because they are widely covered in the media and trigger a chain reaction of more dissent and a sense of the party ’ s fallibility .
Ultimately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perception .
If there are adverse outcomes in forthcoming elections in Delhi , Bihar , and later in West Bengal , the BJP might be forced to rethink its strategies .
Until then , the BJP will continue to claim that the nationwide protests are the handiwork of opposition parties and so-called anti-national elements—a deliberate and unfortunate misreading of recent events .

The images of protest and violence coming out of India in the past several weeks cannot be pleasing for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government. In cities across India, tens of thousands of people have been demonstrating against an amendment to the country’s citizenship law, which was passed by parliament on Dec. 11, 2019, and is seen as discriminatory toward Muslims. While there are Muslims among the protesters, the majority are non-Muslims, including many who do not usually take part in political protests. This is by far the largest pan-Indian protest that the Modi government, more than six months into its second term, has faced. The protests have been met with a strong state response, including the deployment of troops, internet blackouts, and the imposition of curfews. The Indian Supreme Court has also begun hearing a clutch of petitions challenging the validity of the citizenship law amendment.
The images of protest and violence coming out of India in the past several weeks cannot be pleasing for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government. In cities across India, tens of thousands of people have been demonstrating against an amendment to the country’s citizenship law, which was passed by parliament on Dec. 11, 2019, and is seen as discriminatory toward Muslims. While there are Muslims among the protesters, the majority are non-Muslims, including many who do not usually take part in political protests. This is by far the largest pan-Indian protest that the Modi government, more than six months into its second term, has faced. The protests have been met with a strong state response, including the deployment of troops, internet blackouts, and the imposition of curfews. The Indian Supreme Court has also begun hearing a clutch of petitions challenging the validity of the citizenship law amendment.
The Modi government, when it rammed through the new citizenship law, had most likely not foreseen the kind of response that it would evoke. Otherwise, a government that is usually adept at media management would not have been scrambling for a coherent response in the wake of the protests. But once the government realized that its latest move had not gone over well with many people, it chose not to back down. At one level, it sought to obfuscate the issue. Though several BJP leaders, including Home Minister Amit Shah, had publicly and on the floor of parliament linked the new citizenship law with the controversial National Register of Citizens, Modi in a speech this past Dec. 22 claimed that it was never the government’s intention to link the two.Once the government realized that its latest move had not gone over well with many people, it chose not to back down.
At the same time, both Modi and Shah have vigorously defended the new citizenship law. Indeed, they took the tack of labeling the protesters as anti-national. While this might seem paradoxical and counterintuitive, the government’s digging in was entirely consistent with its view that divisive strategies and its Hindu majoritarian project pay political dividends. While the BJP’s politics is often seen as driven by religion, more often than not it seeks to play up the division between its supporters and opponents on the issue of nationalism. The Modi government’s chosen strategy in the face of any kind of protests or opposition is to construct an “us versus them,” “national versus anti-national” narrative. This strategy is no different from that followed by populist leaders elsewhere, and the BJP government’s reaction to the protests against the citizenship law was similar. The response has been explained by the analyst Pratap Bhanu Mehta as a way for the government to legitimize itself by constantly “inventing enemies.”
The pernicious phrase “tukde tukde gang” (the gang that wants to break up the country)—which the government routinely uses to tar its opponents and critics—perhaps best sums up this strategy. It was first used in 2016 to describe students at New Delhi’s elite and left-leaning Jawaharlal Nehru University who had gathered to mark the anniversary of the death of a man accused in a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. Some of the students were charged with sedition under a colonial-era law, and the government soon began employing the phrase “tukde tukde gang” to label anyone who criticized it. Modi used it regularly in the 2019 national elections to tarnish the Indian National Congress party. Ever since, it has regularly popped up in the BJP’s political discourse, never more so than in the context of the citizenship law. While defending the new citizenship law, Shah at a public rally this past Dec. 26 said it is time to punish the “tukde tukde gang” for its protests and attempts to fan unrest. This line has been parroted by other senior ministers and has informed the government’s policy of clamping down on protesters—many of whom do not even belong to political parties—and isolating them. It was even used by a senior minister to describe a Bollywood superstar when she stood in solidarity with a group of Jawaharlal Nehru University students protesting egregious violence inside their campus. This, despite most of the protests being largely peaceful and consisting of sit-ins, readings from the constitution, and singing of the national anthem.The government’s strong-arm tactics are linked to the inability of both Modi and Shah to digest criticism.
The government’s strong-arm tactics are linked to the inability of both Modi and Shah to digest criticism. This partly stems from both leaders having always operated in a situation, first in the state of Gujarat and now at the national level, where their party has enjoyed a large majority. This has contributed to an intolerance toward protests and dissent and a proclivity to stamp them out rather hear out the other side. It has also caused an inability to work with partners, which was demonstrated starkly in Maharashtra, where the BJP’s oldest ally, the Shiv Sena, deserted it in late 2019 to form the state government with opposition parties. The intolerance for protests and the hubris that accompanies untrammeled power have become more pronounced in Modi’s second term after he won reelection last year with a greater majority than in 2014.
The question then is what happens next in the standoff between India’s protesters and its government. There are arguably four important takeaways. One, this is the first time that the country’s youth have come out in such large numbers to voice their discontent against the Modi government. What a faltering economy and growing joblessness could not do has been achieved by the citizenship law and the government’s repression. While this was largely a spontaneous reaction and one that will be difficult to sustain, it is still significant. In both the 2014 and 2019 national elections, there is evidence to suggest that young voters backed Modi in large numbers. The disillusionment of a section of the urban youth cannot be good news for the BJP.
Two, this is also the first time that Muslims, who have largely been pushed around during Modi’s tenure, have found a voice. While there is no party or leader who represents Muslims at the national level, that Muslims came out in large numbers to protest is noteworthy, in part because it could potentially galvanize them against the BJP in a sustained manner.
Three, the government’s formulation of and response to the citizenship law have brought to the foreground the role of Shah in domestic policy. Indeed, there is a consensus that Shah has been heard and seen far more than Modi in the aftermath of the passage of the new citizenship law. It has been Shah, and not Modi, who has been the face of the most contentious decisions in Modi’s second term, including the decision to scrap Kashmir’s special status.The protests have tarnished the government’s image and India’s democratic credentials abroad.
Finally, the protests have tarnished the government’s image and India’s democratic credentials abroad. For a government that has been so careful about optics in its first term, the past few weeks have been disastrous. Neighbors and allies, such as Bangladesh, have also been alienated by the tone and content of the citizenship law, which implies that non-Muslim minorities have been mistreated by these neighboring countries. One prominent commentator from Nepal has described the new law as an “act of geopolitical folly.”
Despite the significance of the protests, it might not signal a change in the way the Modi government operates. The government believes divisive politics pays electoral dividends and that the protesters comprise those who might not have voted for the BJP. The faith in such politics is yet to be shaken despite electoral setbacks in several state elections, partly because the BJP feels that this strategy delivered it an overwhelming mandate in 2019. Unlike in 2014, when Modi had campaigned on a promise of vikas, or development, the 2019 national election was decisively influenced by a surge of nationalist fervor in the wake of a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir and New Delhi’s subsequent airstrike on Pakistan in response. That’s why election reversals in Maharashtra or Jharkhand, where the BJP’s campaign focused heavily on both Modi and national issues such as Kashmir and the new citizenship law, have not triggered a course-correction. The second reason why the BJP has resorted to fulfilling its cultural and religious program in Modi’s second term is its belief that this moment represents the best opportunity of fulfilling its Hindu majoritarian agenda. A strong majority in the lower house of parliament and favorable numbers in the upper house have allowed the Modi government to push through some of the BJP’s most contentious and divisive policies. That Modi has done so despite a dramatic economic slowdown is the result of his belief that a significant number of Indians views his agenda favorably, which is itself a reflection of a discernible Hindu nationalist shift in India’s electorate. After all, the BJP’s campaign manifesto contained promises to enact the citizenship law and national citizens register that demonstrators are now protesting. Finally, the focus on the BJP’s divisive politics have helped in diverting attention from a faltering economy.
The BJP can’t ignore large and sustained protests, however, especially because they are widely covered in the media and trigger a chain reaction of more dissent and a sense of the party’s fallibility. Ultimately, it may come down to public perception. If there are adverse outcomes in forthcoming elections in Delhi, Bihar, and later in West Bengal, the BJP might be forced to rethink its strategies. Until then, the BJP will continue to claim that the nationwide protests are the handiwork of opposition parties and so-called anti-national elements—a deliberate and unfortunate misreading of recent events.


Ghana’s Bauxite Boom

TANO-OFFIN FOREST RESERVE , Ghana—For centuries , the people of Kyekyewere , a tiny town nestled in a forest in the Ashanti region of Ghana , got their drinking water from a winding stream called Desere , which runs out of Offin River within the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve .
But today , deforestation upstream has muddied the water , making it unusable .
More than 2,000 people are forced to rely instead on a borehole .
Residents fear more such change to come .
Beneath the lush forest that envelops the town lie what local officials estimate is 350 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used to produce aluminum products from teaspoons to fighter jets .
As part of a controversial $ 2 billion deal struck with China in 2018 , Ghana has set its sights on mining the forests of the Upper Guinean Forest , a delicate tropical forest that is vital to the planet ’ s carbon dioxide cycle and is home to thousands of plant and animal species , including forest elephants , chimpanzees , leopards , and hippopotamus .
The Chinese firm Sinohydro will build the infrastructure on these sites , and Ghana will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its sales of refined bauxite .
Beijing released a first tranche of funding— $ 649 million—in November 2019 .
“ We hope that the rest will come through by March of 2020 , ” Ghanaian Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia said at a press conference that month .
Despite mounting concern among locals and environmentalists , road construction has already begun .
Ghana ’ s government designates both areas as Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas , which is supposed to limit commercial activities there to protect against species loss .
Atewa “ is of such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Alice Ruhweza , the Africa regional director at the World Wildlife Fund , told me this past December , “ that it seems inconceivable [ for it to be ] exploited.
” For its part , the government says that mining will not harm the environment .
But environmentalist campaigners accuse the project ’ s backers of ignoring scientific evidence—and the damage development has already done .
According to Ruhweza , the vast majority of the Upper Guinean Forest was cleared over the last century .
Endemic species are now reliant on small @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ There are plants , frogs and butterflies ( at least ) in Atewa that are found in no other forest in the world , and over 100 species that are threatened or near-threatened with global extinction , ” she told me in December via email .
The case for protecting the remaining stretches of forest , “ is so obvious and indisputable that it is hard to understand how [ mining ] is still being considered , ” she continued .
The government ’ s “ few recent press statements have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risks that their proposals represent.
” The government ’ s lack of transparency extends to the people its mining schemes will most affect .
In interviews this fall with two dozen people who live in Tano-Offin , residents said that the government had shut them out of discussions about the area ’ s future but also alerted them that they may need to relocate .
“ This community has been existing for over 250 years within the forest , ” said Isaac Anane Frimpong , a local assembly representative for the area .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to go.
” The consequences of deforestation are grim .
Around 34 percent of workers in Ghana are in agriculture .
But those farmers have experienced drought and soaring temperatures hitting 43 degrees Celsius ( 109 Fahrenheit ) , which researchers have linked to climate change from deforestation , because trees in tropical forests release water and regulate air temperature .
Over the past few decades , meanwhile , there has been 20 percent less rainfall because of climate change , according to Ghana ’ s Ministry of Environment , Science , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ farmer Prince Kakyere has lived in Awisesu , in Tano-Offin for 22 years .
He said longer , drier seasons were impacting his farm and causing cacao trees to die .
“ Cacao is the only income I have to take care of my family .
I have a wife and eight children , ” he said in September 2019 .
Pollution in parts of another major river , the Pra ( of which Offin River is a tributary ) , has been blamed on mines .
Reports suggest it was probably caused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not without problems , either .
“ They try to put a lot of pressure on you to sell your land to them , ” added Patience Antwi , who has a cacao farm near Atewa .
And those whose land has been used have seen little in return for their sacrifices .
“ A lot of the royalties and profits that those mines take go into Accra , so not that much is getting to local communities , ” Susan Keane , a policy analyst with the Natural Resources Defense Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ me this past December via telephone .
As Africa ’ s largest gold producer , Ghana is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative , a global accountability-setting body for mining .
Under Ghanaian law , at least 10 percent of mining royalties should be handed from the central government to local authorities within mining areas .
But actual payments have often been smaller , according to the transparency organization ’ s analysis .
And local authorities may misuse the funds rather than spending them on development .
Ghana ’ s Ministry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respond to requests for comment .
But new loans related to bauxite extraction could reverse those gains .
The IMF ’ s 2019 report warned of further debt risks given the amount of investment required to refine bauxite and the possibility that , even with such investment , the actual return on development of bauxite could lag .
According to some loan agreements , Ghana is required to set up an offshore escrow account for revenue generated from selling bauxite .
Yet “ committing future bauxite receivables to debt service and locking bauxite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the [ government of Ghana ’ s ] ability to exercise discretion of how the proceeds are allocated , ” the IMF noted .
The $ 2 billion bauxite deal with China is part of a much bigger $ 19 billion loan agreement between Accra and Beijing .
In turn , in December 2019 , the IMF forecasted Ghana ’ s debt would reach 63 percent of GDP from 59 percent in 2018 .
Making things worse , the $ 2 billion bauxite deal with China is part of a much bigger $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing .
Also included in that loan are 100 vehicles for the Ghana Police Service , a 300 million-yuan ( $ 43 million ) grant for implementing economic cooperation projects , and a 250 million-yuan ( $ 36 million ) debt write-off .
China has similar deals with other nations on the continent .
Between 2000 and 2017 , it loaned around $ 143 billion for African infrastructure projects .
Beyond the huge debt , the investment has led to some gains .
Bui Dam , Ghana ’ s second-largest hydroelectric plant , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ loan on cacao .
Chinese lending has provided telecommunication networks , highways , water supply expansion , and schools within Accra .
Skyscrapers , railways , and roads in Ethiopia ’ s capital , Addis Ababa—not to mention a $ 200 million African Union headquarters—have been built through Beijing-backed funding .
But that doesn ’ t change the fact that many projects , especially the bauxite deals , have been damaging .
According to a 2018 Human Rights Watch report , bauxite deals in Guinea had destroyed ancestral farmlands , damaged water sources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dust .
Such examples hit home for Yaw Donkoh , a member of the farming community of Juaso , near Atewa .
Pits of murky water dot the landscape .
A few months prior to our interview , he said , the banks of some dug-out trenches from mining activities broke their wooden fencing and flooded homes with sludge , according to residents .
“ We fear it will break again at night , ” Donkoh said .
Residents complained that in some areas , there were less than 100 feet between their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Goldfields , the mining firm operating nearby , did not comment for this story despite multiple requests . )
But there are some in the area who are optimistic about development .
“ There is only one school here which is the basic [ junior ] school , there is no network coverage , no hospital , ” Sampson Mensah , a farmer in Tano-Offin , told me in September .
“ At least it will help people get employment , get proper training on skills-related work.
” Francis Kwake , another farmer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the undergrowth as he cut cacao pods swiftly and with precision .
His three-acre farm in the town of Awisesu , in Tano-Offin , will be cut by new roads as part of the plan .
Despite that , he welcomed the deal .
“ Farming is not enough , ” said Kwake , who is 27 years old , in September .
“ They can take me on as a worker.
” But in reality , mining supports just a small percentage of jobs in the country .
The World Bank ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has provided financial incentives to Ghana to save its trees .
More than 15,000 hectares of land is now under sustainable management in the Northern Savannah Region .
An additional $ 50 million will be paid out for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation .
Meanwhile , Ghana ’ s Environmental Protection Agency recently began using NASA photos to track and close illegal gold mining sites .
Joyce Okyerewa , a teacher at Kibi Junior High School and member of a coalition group against bauxite mining , has been educating pupils on forest management @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should conserve the forest so that it will be there for future generations , ” she said .
“ The forest is very important to us .
We get food from plants , medicine from plants , the animals we eat are all in the forest , so if the forest is destroyed it means everything is gone .
Our life is gone.
” “ If the forest is destroyed it means everything is gone .
Our life is gone.
” Despite campaigners citing Akufo-Addo ’ s own remarks that mining has not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is unlikely his ruling New Patriotic Party will scrap bauxite plans .
For one , it is facing elections in November or December .
“ You must know that the ones [ bauxite deposits ] in Kyebi are of a particular concern to me , ” the president said at a press conference in December , “ and whatever we can do to make sure that [ mining ] happens , I ’ m gon na make sure that it happens .
Same with Nyinahin , same with Awaso.
” His @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quick to justify the deal .
“ Ghana has something that the rest of the world wants .
We have bauxite which is not being mined .
The rest of the world needs bauxite in a lot of industries , including steel , ” he said at a meeting in Nyinahin in November 2019 .
Still , locals plan to keep fighting .
In Kyekyewere , there is no electricity , no paved roads , no piped water .
Leaders are pushing for what they term a “ social contract ” to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resist any developers ’ entry into the forest if the government body responsible for implementing the plans , Ghana Integrated Aluminum Development Corporation , does not listen .
And in January , a group of more than 20 local nongovernmental organizations started the process of filing a civil action lawsuit against the Ghanaian government over mining plans .
“ They still keep talking about looking at concessions within Atewa , ” said Daryl Bosu , the deputy national director at the environmental group A Rocha , this week .
The organization has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s plan in Atewa while further supporting communities in Tano-Offin .
“ We ’ ve seen so many communities that they mine and after 15 years they neglect the community entirely , ” Anane Frimpong , the local assembly representative , said .
He vows that his town won ’ t be next .
This story was supported by a travel grant from the Africa-China Reporting Project , managed by the journalism department of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg .

TANO-OFFIN FOREST RESERVE, Ghana—For centuries, the people of Kyekyewere, a tiny town nestled in a forest in the Ashanti region of Ghana, got their drinking water from a winding stream called Desere, which runs out of Offin River within the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve. But today, deforestation upstream has muddied the water, making it unusable. More than 2,000 people are forced to rely instead on a borehole.
TANO-OFFIN FOREST RESERVE, Ghana—For centuries, the people of Kyekyewere, a tiny town nestled in a forest in the Ashanti region of Ghana, got their drinking water from a winding stream called Desere, which runs out of Offin River within the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve. But today, deforestation upstream has muddied the water, making it unusable. More than 2,000 people are forced to rely instead on a borehole.
Residents fear more such change to come.
Beneath the lush forest that envelops the town lie what local officials estimate is 350 million tons of bauxite, a valuable mineral used to produce aluminum products from teaspoons to fighter jets.
A billboard campaigns against the mining operation in Atewa in the market of Kwabeng, a small village on the outskirts of the forest, on Sept. 6, 2019.
As part of a controversial $2 billion deal struck with China in 2018, Ghana has set its sights on mining the forests of the Upper Guinean Forest, a delicate tropical forest that is vital to the planet’s carbon dioxide cycle and is home to thousands of plant and animal species, including forest elephants, chimpanzees, leopards, and hippopotamus.
The Chinese firm Sinohydro will build the infrastructure on these sites, and Ghana will pay back the costs with proceeds from its sales of refined bauxite. Beijing released a first tranche of funding—$649 million—in November 2019. “We hope that the rest will come through by March of 2020,” Ghanaian Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia said at a press conference that month. Despite mounting concern among locals and environmentalists, road construction has already begun.
As development continues, work in two areas in particular is proving controversial: Atewa, a mountainous stretch of the rainforest that, as the source of three rivers, provides drinking water to 5 million people, and the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve, which stretches 41,000 hectares along the hills of Nyinahin. Kyekyewere is the largest of around half a dozen farming communities inside this forest, which has lost more than 16 percent of old-growth plant life since 2001.
Ghana’s government designates both areas as Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas, which is supposed to limit commercial activities there to protect against species loss. Atewa “is of such exceptional biological and hydrological importance,” Alice Ruhweza, the Africa regional director at the World Wildlife Fund, told me this past December, “that it seems inconceivable [for it to be] exploited.”
FP Analytics Special Report Mining the Future: How China is set to dominate the next Industrial Revolution. Read Now
For its part, the government says that mining will not harm the environment. But environmentalist campaigners accuse the project’s backers of ignoring scientific evidence—and the damage development has already done. According to Ruhweza, the vast majority of the Upper Guinean Forest was cleared over the last century. Endemic species are now reliant on small fragments of remaining forest for their habitats. “There are plants, frogs and butterflies (at least) in Atewa that are found in no other forest in the world, and over 100 species that are threatened or near-threatened with global extinction,” she told me in December via email. The case for protecting the remaining stretches of forest, “is so obvious and indisputable that it is hard to understand how [mining] is still being considered,” she continued. The government’s “few recent press statements have revealed a very low understanding of the risks that their proposals represent.”
The government’s lack of transparency extends to the people its mining schemes will most affect. In interviews this fall with two dozen people who live in Tano-Offin, residents said that the government had shut them out of discussions about the area’s future but also alerted them that they may need to relocate. “This community has been existing for over 250 years within the forest,” said Isaac Anane Frimpong, a local assembly representative for the area. “This is the only place we have to go.”
There is no doubt that Bauxite extraction will be destructive. It often requires strip mining of topsoil, which means that forest cover has to go. And the rate of deforestation in the West African country already increased by 60 percent in 2018 compared to 2017. Much of the destruction came within protected areas , according to Global Forest Watch data.
The consequences of deforestation are grim. Around 34 percent of workers in Ghana are in agriculture. But those farmers have experienced drought and soaring temperatures hitting 43 degrees Celsius (109 Fahrenheit), which researchers have linked to climate change from deforestation, because trees in tropical forests release water and regulate air temperature. Over the past few decades, meanwhile, there has been 20 percent less rainfall because of climate change, according to Ghana’s Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation.
Daniel Kwamena Ewur explains the negative effects of gold mining activities to a farmer, Afia Nyame, on her cacao field on Sept. 6, 2019. Ewur is the collaborative resource management officer for A Rocha, an international network of Christian environmental organizations, that is raising awareness about the Atewa mining project among the local population.
The cocoa farmer Prince Kakyere has lived in Awisesu, in Tano-Offin for 22 years. He said longer, drier seasons were impacting his farm and causing cocao trees to die. “Cacao is the only income I have to take care of my family. I have a wife and eight children,” he said in September 2019. Pollution in parts of another major river, the Pra (of which Offin River is a tributary), has been blamed on mines. Reports suggest it was probably caused by illegal mining upstream. Legal mines are not without problems, either. “They try to put a lot of pressure on you to sell your land to them,” added Patience Antwi, who has a cocao farm near Atewa. And those whose land has been used have seen little in return for their sacrifices. “A lot of the royalties and profits that those mines take go into Accra, so not that much is getting to local communities,” Susan Keane, a policy analyst with the Natural Resources Defense Council, a nonprofit environmental group, told me this past December via telephone.
As Africa’s largest gold producer, Ghana is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a global accountability-setting body for mining. Under Ghanaian law, at least 10 percent of mining royalties should be handed from the central government to local authorities within mining areas. But actual payments have often been smaller, according to the transparency organization’s analysis. And local authorities may misuse the funds rather than spending them on development.
Ghana’s Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources did not respond to requests for comment.
In early 2017, Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo swept into power pledging a “Ghana Beyond Aid.” He has made progress on that promise, recently ending a four-year International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout. At the time he took office, he stabilized debt levels at around 57 percent of GDP and brought inflation down to 9 percent in 2019 from almost 17.5 percent in 2016.
But new loans related to bauxite extraction could reverse those gains. The IMF’s 2019 report warned of further debt risks given the amount of investment required to refine bauxite and the possibility that, even with such investment, the actual return on development of bauxite could lag. According to some loan agreements, Ghana is required to set up an offshore escrow account for revenue generated from selling bauxite. Yet “committing future bauxite receivables to debt service and locking bauxite sales receipts in the escrow account limits the [government of Ghana’s] ability to exercise discretion of how the proceeds are allocated,” the IMF noted.
The $2 billion bauxite deal with China is part of a much bigger $19 billion loan agreement between Accra and Beijing.
In turn, in December 2019, the IMF forecasted Ghana’s debt would reach 63 percent of GDP from 59 percent in 2018. Making things worse, the $2 billion bauxite deal with China is part of a much bigger $19 billion loan agreement between Accra and Beijing. Also included in that loan are 100 vehicles for the Ghana Police Service, a 300 million-yuan ($43 million) grant for implementing economic cooperation projects, and a 250 million-yuan ($36 million) debt write-off.
China has similar deals with other nations on the continent. Between 2000 and 2017, it loaned around $143 billion for African infrastructure projects. Beyond the huge debt, the investment has led to some gains. Bui Dam, Ghana’s second-largest hydroelectric plant, was constructed by Sinohydro through a barter loan on cocoa. Chinese lending has provided telecommunication networks, highways, water supply expansion, and schools within Accra. Skyscrapers, railways, and roads in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa—not to mention a $200 million African Union headquarters—have been built through Beijing-backed funding. But that doesn’t change the fact that many projects, especially the bauxite deals, have been damaging. According to a 2018 Human Rights Watch report, bauxite deals in Guinea had destroyed ancestral farmlands, damaged water sources, and coated homes and trees in dust.
A farmer rests on what remains of a former gold mine in Kibi on Sept. 6, 2019. A few years ago some of the cacao farms in the area were leased to a mining company, and tons of soil was removed and exposed to contamination.
Such examples hit home for Yaw Donkoh, a member of the farming community of Juaso, near Atewa. Pits of murky water dot the landscape. A few months prior to our interview, he said, the banks of some dug-out trenches from mining activities broke their wooden fencing and flooded homes with sludge, according to residents. “We fear it will break again at night,” Donkoh said. Residents complained that in some areas, there were less than 100 feet between their houses and mining activities. (Kibi Goldfields, the mining firm operating nearby, did not comment for this story despite multiple requests.)
But there are some in the area who are optimistic about development. “There is only one school here which is the basic [junior] school, there is no network coverage, no hospital,” Sampson Mensah, a farmer in Tano-Offin, told me in September. “At least it will help people get employment, get proper training on skills-related work.”
Francis Kwake, another farmer, concurred. He stepped lightly through the undergrowth as he cut cocoa pods swiftly and with precision. His three-acre farm in the town of Awisesu, in Tano-Offin, will be cut by new roads as part of the plan. Despite that, he welcomed the deal. “Farming is not enough,” said Kwake, who is 27 years old, in September. “They can take me on as a worker.” But in reality, mining supports just a small percentage of jobs in the country.
Joyce Okyerewa cleans her office in Kibi with the help of some of her students ahead of the opening of the academic year on Sept. 10, 2019. Okyerewa works as a teacher at the local secondary school and is a member of the Concerned Citizen of Atewa, actively involved in the campaign against the mining project.
Compared to other countries, Ghana “has much more capability in terms of environmental protection,” Maria Sarraf, the World Bank’s environment manager for West Africa, told me in December via video call from Washington, D.C. “If they actually implement their own policy.”
The World Bank’s $19.39 million Forest Investment Program has provided financial incentives to Ghana to save its trees. More than 15,000 hectares of land is now under sustainable management in the Northern Savannah Region. An additional $50 million will be paid out for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation. Meanwhile, Ghana’s Environmental Protection Agency recently began using NASA photos to track and close illegal gold mining sites.
Joyce Okyerewa, a teacher at Kibi Junior High School and member of a coalition group against bauxite mining, has been educating pupils on forest management. “We teach them how they should conserve the forest so that it will be there for future generations,” she said. “The forest is very important to us. We get food from plants, medicine from plants, the animals we eat are all in the forest, so if the forest is destroyed it means everything is gone. Our life is gone.”
“If the forest is destroyed it means everything is gone. Our life is gone.”
Despite campaigners citing Akufo-Addo’s own remarks that mining has not historically been beneficial for Ghana, though, it is unlikely his ruling New Patriotic Party will scrap bauxite plans. For one, it is facing elections in November or December. “You must know that the ones [bauxite deposits] in Kyebi are of a particular concern to me,” the president said at a press conference in December, “and whatever we can do to make sure that [mining] happens, I’m gonna make sure that it happens. Same with Nyinahin, same with Awaso.”
His vice president, Bawumia, is also quick to justify the deal. “Ghana has something that the rest of the world wants. We have bauxite which is not being mined. The rest of the world needs bauxite in a lot of industries, including steel,” he said at a meeting in Nyinahin in November 2019.
Still, locals plan to keep fighting.
Sampson Mensah and his wife are seen at their house in Kyekyewere, an area designated for a bauxite mining project, on Sept. 9, 2019.
Isaac Anane Frimpong, the elders council leader, gives a sermon at the small church in Kyekyewere on Sept. 9, 2019.
In Kyekyewere, there is no electricity, no paved roads, no piped water. Leaders are pushing for what they term a “social contract” to be cemented in Parliament. They plan to resist any developers’ entry into the forest if the government body responsible for implementing the plans, Ghana Integrated Aluminum Development Corporation, does not listen.
And in January, a group of more than 20 local nongovernmental organizations started the process of filing a civil action lawsuit against the Ghanaian government over mining plans. “They still keep talking about looking at concessions within Atewa,” said Daryl Bosu, the deputy national director at the environmental group A Rocha, this week. The organization has been leading the fight against the government’s plan in Atewa while further supporting communities in Tano-Offin.
“We’ve seen so many communities that they mine and after 15 years they neglect the community entirely,” Anane Frimpong, the local assembly representative, said. He vows that his town won’t be next.
This story was supported by a travel grant from the Africa-China Reporting Project, managed by the journalism department of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-30--Pompeo Heads to Ukraine Amid Trump Impeachment Trial

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo travels to Ukraine , the WHO again considers declaring a global health emergency , and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas plans to speak at the U.N. Security Council .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Later today , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will arrive in Kyiv , where he aims to dismiss suggestions that there are policy disagreements between U.S. President Donald Trump , Congress , the State Department , and the intelligence community when it comes to Ukraine .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NPR—in which Pompeo was quoted as saying , “ Do you think Americans care about Ukraine ?
” —and amid Trump ’ s impeachment trial in the U.S. Senate , which directly involves Ukraine .
Pompeo ’ s visit—which was rescheduled amid heightened tensions with Iran earlier this month—could be tricky , and his policy pitch is likely to be a tough sell .
He will likely emphasize U.S. support for Ukraine in its war with Russian separatists in the east , FP ’ s Reid Standish and Robbie Gramer report .
Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko and Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk on Friday .
British stopover .
The five-country trip began this week with a stop in the United Kingdom .
Before flying to Kyiv today , the secretary of state was scheduled to meet British Prime Minister Boris Johnson .
Pompeo will likely push Johnson on the issue of security and the Chinese firm Huawei , which the U.K. announced it would allow on its 5G wireless networks .
Pompeo will also visit Belarus , Kazakhstan , and Uzbekistan after Ukraine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meeting ?
Zelensky is still hoping for a meeting at the White House , while Ukraine ’ s political elite is frustrated that Trump ’ s impeachment has derailed relations between the countries , the Washington Post reports .
Writing in Foreign Policy this week , former U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker called on Pompeo to set a date for Zelensky ’ s White House visit .
WHO revisits declaring a global health emergency .
The World Health Organization ’ s committee of experts meets again today to reconsider declaring a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outbreak .
WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said the group is particularly concerned about human-to-human transmission in countries beyond China , such as Germany , Vietnam , and Japan .
Meanwhile , governments are taking action .
Hong Kong suspended cross-border travel to the mainland via train or ferry from today , with flights significantly reduced .
Various international airlines are canceling flights , too .
Palestinians to push U.N. to take action over peace plan .
After U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled his long-delayed Middle East peace plan at the White House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plans to speak at the U.N. Security Council to voice his opposition to the proposal , which undermines Palestinian hopes for sovereignty and gives Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a boost .
If the United States vetoes the Palestinians ’ Security Council resolution to condemn the plan—which is likely—Abbas could call an emergency General Assembly Session , forcing a nonbinding vote .
Venezuelan president proposes resuming ties with Colombia .
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro said Wednesday that he was open to resuming consular relations with Colombia after suspending ties last year .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a standoff over a fugitive Colombian politician recently captured in Venezuela .
Colombia is the primary destination for Venezuelans fleeing political and economic crisis .
On Wednesday , the Colombian government announced it would grant hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan migrants work permits , bringing them into the legal economy .
The death of an environmental activist .
The Mexican environmental activist Homero Gómez González was found dead on Wednesday , more than two weeks after his disappearance .
Gómez González was a well-known defenders of Mexico ’ s monarch butterfly population , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Fellow activists suspect the involvement of loggers and criminal groups in his death .
Mali ’ s army .
The prime minister of Mali announced on Wednesday that the country would increase the size of its army by 50 percent this year—adding 10,000 soldiers—as it combats violent Islamist extremists .
France intervened in the country in 2013 , but jihadist attacks have increased again , with the United States threatening to cut its military presence in the Sahel region .
Democratic dissatisfaction .
A recent survey by the University of Cambridge finds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the state of democracy in various countries is the highest it ’ s been in 25 years .
The survey included residents of both developed and developing countries , but with the increase in dissatisfaction attributed to those in developed countries .
Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg said Wednesday that she has applied to trademark her name , as well as the Fridays for Future movement she started in 2018 .
Doing so would allow her to take legal action against those seeking to using her name for illegitimate purposes , particularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other school strikers have absolutely no interest in trademarks , ” Thunberg wrote on Instagram .
“ But unfortunately it needs to be done.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo travels to Ukraine, the WHO again considers declaring a global health emergency , and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas plans to speak at the U.N. Security Council.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo travels to Ukraine, the WHO again considers declaring a global health emergency, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas plans to speak at the U.N. Security Council.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
After Delay, Pompeo Travels to Ukraine
Later today, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will arrive in Kyiv, where he aims to dismiss suggestions that there are policy disagreements between U.S. President Donald Trump, Congress, the State Department, and the intelligence community when it comes to Ukraine. The trip comes after an explosive interview with NPR—in which Pompeo was quoted as saying, “Do you think Americans care about Ukraine?”—and amid Trump’s impeachment trial in the U.S. Senate, which directly involves Ukraine.
Pompeo’s visit—which was rescheduled amid heightened tensions with Iran earlier this month—could be tricky, and his policy pitch is likely to be a tough sell. He will likely emphasize U.S. support for Ukraine in its war with Russian separatists in the east, FP’s Reid Standish and Robbie Gramer report. Pompeo will meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as well as Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko and Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk on Friday.
British stopover. The five-country trip began this week with a stop in the United Kingdom. Before flying to Kyiv today, the secretary of state was scheduled to meet British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Pompeo will likely push Johnson on the issue of security and the Chinese firm Huawei, which the U.K. announced it would allow on its 5G wireless networks. Pompeo will also visit Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan after Ukraine.
Will Zelensky get a White House meeting? Zelensky is still hoping for a meeting at the White House, while Ukraine’s political elite is frustrated that Trump’s impeachment has derailed relations between the countries, the Washington Post reports. Writing in Foreign Policy this week, former U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker called on Pompeo to set a date for Zelensky’s White House visit.
What We’re Following Today
WHO revisits declaring a global health emergency. The World Health Organization’s committee of experts meets again today to reconsider declaring a global emergency over China’s coronavirus outbreak. WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said the group is particularly concerned about human-to-human transmission in countries beyond China, such as Germany, Vietnam, and Japan. Meanwhile, governments are taking action. Hong Kong suspended cross-border travel to the mainland via train or ferry from today, with flights significantly reduced. Various international airlines are canceling flights, too.
Palestinians to push U.N. to take action over peace plan. After U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled his long-delayed Middle East peace plan at the White House on Tuesday, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas plans to speak at the U.N. Security Council to voice his opposition to the proposal, which undermines Palestinian hopes for sovereignty and gives Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a boost. If the United States vetoes the Palestinians’ Security Council resolution to condemn the plan—which is likely—Abbas could call an emergency General Assembly Session, forcing a nonbinding vote.
Venezuelan president proposes resuming ties with Colombia. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro said Wednesday that he was open to resuming consular relations with Colombia after suspending ties last year. The two countries are in the midst of a standoff over a fugitive Colombian politician recently captured in Venezuela. Colombia is the primary destination for Venezuelans fleeing political and economic crisis. On Wednesday, the Colombian government announced it would grant hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan migrants work permits, bringing them into the legal economy.
Keep an Eye On
The death of an environmental activist. The Mexican environmental activist Homero Gómez González was found dead on Wednesday, more than two weeks after his disappearance. Gómez González was a well-known defenders of Mexico’s monarch butterfly population, fighting back against loggers threatening their habitat. Fellow activists suspect the involvement of loggers and criminal groups in his death.
Mali’s army. The prime minister of Mali announced on Wednesday that the country would increase the size of its army by 50 percent this year—adding 10,000 soldiers—as it combats violent Islamist extremists. France intervened in the country in 2013, but jihadist attacks have increased again, with the United States threatening to cut its military presence in the Sahel region.
Democratic dissatisfaction. A recent survey by the University of Cambridge finds that the number of people not satisfied with the state of democracy in various countries is the highest it’s been in 25 years. The survey included residents of both developed and developing countries, but with the increase in dissatisfaction attributed to those in developed countries.
Odds and Ends
Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg said Wednesday that she has applied to trademark her name, as well as the Fridays for Future movement she started in 2018. Doing so would allow her to take legal action against those seeking to using her name for illegitimate purposes, particularly commercial ones. “I and the other school strikers have absolutely no interest in trademarks,” Thunberg wrote on Instagram. “But unfortunately it needs to be done.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-29--The Only Sensible Iran Strategy Is Containment

The Only Sensible Iran Strategy Is Containment I trace my interest in the Middle East back to the Iranian hostage crisis—those 444 days of yellow ribbons , daily Nightline updates , and an unrelenting wave of anger that swept through the United States .
People actually walked around with “ Fuck Iran ” buttons on their jackets , and a comedian named Steve Dahl wrote a song called “ Ayatollah ” —to the tune of the Knack ’ s “ My Sharona ” —that threatened the Iranians with nuclear annihilation .
It was a confusing moment for a little kid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world beyond soccer practice , the New York Yankees , and Wonderama .
The subject hasn ’ t gotten any less confusing since .
In the past 40 years , U.S. policymakers have endlessly debated a central issue in U.S.-Middle East policy : What should the United States do about Iran ?
The answer has often proved to be elusive in large part because of domestic politics .
The traumas of the late 1970s and early 1980s have rendered parts of the U.S. policy community needlessly bellicose , others credulously dovish , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a “ just right ” strategy to modify Iran ’ s behavior .
But the central question has now taken on a new urgency .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s decision to kill Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in a drone strike on Jan. 3 has raised fears of violent escalation—even war—between the United States and Iran .
It ’ s time to directly address the question of what exactly the United States can do about Iran—and fortunately , there ’ s a good answer available , even if it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What ’ s already clear is that the current U.S. approach needs improvement .
Despite his hit on Suleimani , it is not at all clear what the president wants to achieve regarding Iran .
He has combined hawkish rhetoric with periodic offers to negotiate with Tehran while pursuing a “ maximum pressure ” policy that until recently did not employ military force .
Depending on whom one asks or who is doing the asking , the administration is seeking either full-scale regime change or simply a more robust nuclear deal than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ JCPOA ) —the agreement negotiated by the Obama administration , which set limits on Iran ’ s nuclear program .
This confusion comes against the backdrop of the Democratic presidential primary , in which all the leading candidates have declared their intention to return to the JCPOA so long as Iran maintains its commitment to the agreement ( Joe Biden , Pete Buttigieg , Elizabeth Warren ) —or , in the case of Bernie Sanders , without any conditions at all .
Yet just because the Trump administration and the politics of U.S.-Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policymakers—regime change or the existing nuclear agreement—does not mean that there are no other possibilities .
The U.S. government could pursue , for example , a “ grand bargain ” with Iran that would settle all the outstanding issues—notably , the nuclear program , Iran ’ s use of proxies to meddle in the region , and the release of Americans held in Tehran—between the two countries .
Yet the most rational option under the present circumstances is another strategy that no longer goes mentioned in Washington : containment .
Consider the other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has , for obvious reasons , become a scary term and a policy one would think officials and analysts would want to avoid given the U.S. experience in Iraq , but it remains an option if only because influential people continue to advocate for it .
It would not necessarily require a march on Tehran , but it would be costly , requiring the United States to provide far more military , political , and financial resources to Iran ’ s opponents around the region than current policy .
This seems an unlikely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) The potential for further regional chaos is high , and 2 ) the American people and Congress would likely be reluctant to support policies that would undoubtedly include augmenting the already sizable deployment of almost 45,000 American soldiers , sailors , and airmen in the Persian Gulf .
Returning to the JCPOA or negotiating a new nuclear deal that addresses some of the defects in the original agreement—for example , the failure to set limits on Iran ’ s ballistic missile program—is the flip side of Washington ’ s Iran debate .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran ’ s alleged right to develop nuclear technology , sanctions relief , and the normalization of Tehran ’ s commercial ties with the world .
It would also require implicit acceptance of Iran ’ s role in the region , especially its influential positions in Lebanon and Syria .
The problems with returning to the JCPOA or an enhanced agreement that addresses Iran ’ s missile program , for example , are similar to the one ’ s the Obama administration encountered , including opposition from regional allies and hawks in Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one additional , notable challenge : Iran ’ s leaders would likely be reluctant to enter an agreement with the United States after the Trump administration breached the JCPOA in May 2018 .
The Iranians would also resist limits on their ballistic missiles given their reliance on those weapons for regional deterrence .
There are also constraints on the U.S. side : In order for the Trump administration to make a new agreement work , it would need to convince its regional allies of its wisdom .
This would be a hard sell—not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Saudis continue to have zero trust that the Iranians would uphold their commitments in a deal but because leaders in Jerusalem , Abu Dhabi , and Riyadh are no longer confident that Trump would hold Tehran accountable for whatever violations might occur .
This is especially the case after the Trump administration ’ s halfhearted response to Iran ’ s provocations during the summer of 2019 , culminating with the attack on Saudi oil processing facilities .
A return to the nuclear agreement or a new JCPOA would create the same dynamics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the authors and signatories have incentive to overlook violations or other related problems , such as Iran ’ s irredentist approach to the region .
This gives other regional powers incentive to push back on their own , thus further destabilizing the region .
The inadequacy of an updated and expanded JCPOA raises the possibility of a grand bargain .
In this scenario , Iran would relinquish its nuclear capabilities for an explicit U.S. recognition of the country ’ s role as a regional leader and a partner in developing the regional rules @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a grand bargain is that once Iran ’ s demands for a seat at the table are recognized , it will end its malevolent activities around the region .
It ’ s a tempting thought—but entirely unrealistic , given the utter absence of trust in the region .
The safeguards that would be needed to persuade Israel , Saudi Arabia , and the United Arab Emirates of the wisdom of such a deal—including an end to Iran ’ s support for allies around the region , restrictions on its military , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claims on its neighbors—would render it anathema to the Iranians , who would likely view it as little more than regime change by another name .
The United States , of course , could forgo restrictions on Iran that would satisfy its allies and instead pressure Israel , Saudi Arabia , and the UAE to accept a grand bargain .
But that would not diminish the ability of U.S. allies to leverage their political clout in Washington and make mischief regionally in an effort to undermine a grand bargain .
In other words @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same fate as the Obama administration ’ s JCPOA or a JCPOA 2.0 .
That leaves the United States with the most realistic option : containment .
The record over the last four decades indicates that the United States can not change Iran ’ s behavior through either coercion or incentive .
And it does not have the kind of influence to force other countries in the region to alter their own approaches to Iran and the broader region .
Under these circumstances , anything that ’ s possible is better than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what ’ s possible is containment .
Containment , which guided Washington in its confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War , is a way in which the United States can restrain Iran and its effort to undermine U.S. policies and goals in the region .
The Clinton administration pursued this policy—along with containment of Iraq—with success in the 1990s .
Sure , there were problems with Tehran at the time , but the relationship between the United States and Iran was more stable in that outright conflict and escalation were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and Iran established an equilibrium of sorts in which everyone understood some basic rules of the game that made it possible to manage crises .
Containment requires U.S. forces in the region , and possibly the application of violence , in order to demonstrate what is acceptable .
It is not risk-free for the United States .
But the approach does reduce the possibility of escalation because U.S. policymakers would cease to consider regime change an option .
With both the idea of regime change and the necessity of defending a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the stakes for the U.S.-Iranian relationship will be demonstrably lower , thereby stabilizing Gulf .
This leaves the gnarly issue of what to do about an Iranian nuclear program unfettered by any international agreement .
But containment is capable of handling any outcome that produces .
Indeed , that is precisely what U.S. policy has been toward nuclear-armed North Korea .
Nobody would argue that this has been an ideal outcome , but it has been better than any easily identifiable alternatives—and it ’ s hard to understand why it should be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indeed , the Gulf states are less worried about Iranian nukes and more concerned about its desire to extend its influence around the region .
The Israelis would eventually need more security assistance , but that shouldn ’ t be a deal breaker for containment , given the other available policy options .
Containment would not preclude dialogue between Iran and the United States and may even improve it , given the way it would produce implicit but well-understood rules for behavior .
It would also provide the United States some much needed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like Yemen , Syria , and Iraq .
The Iranians are more apt to press their advantages in these places so long as they believe the United States might end their regime or look the other way .
Most important , containing Iran represents the most realistic assessment of what either U.S. or Iranian politics can bear .
It is not as romantic as the idea of secret meetings in Oman or long negotiation sessions in Vienna .
It lacks the bravado of bringing down leaders of a system that has vexed , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is nevertheless the best option .
It simultaneously reduces the risk of war , protects Americans , and renders the U.S. presence in the region less expensive .
It would be foreign-policy malpractice not to embrace it .

I trace my interest in the Middle East back to the Iranian hostage crisis—those 444 days of yellow ribbons, daily Nightline updates, and an unrelenting wave of anger that swept through the United States. People actually walked around with “Fuck Iran” buttons on their jackets, and a comedian named Steve Dahl wrote a song called “ Ayatollah ”—to the tune of the Knack’s “My Sharona”—that threatened the Iranians with nuclear annihilation. It was a confusing moment for a little kid who was just waking up to the world beyond soccer practice, the New York Yankees, and Wonderama .
I trace my interest in the Middle East back to the Iranian hostage crisis—those 444 days of yellow ribbons, daily Nightline updates, and an unrelenting wave of anger that swept through the United States. People actually walked around with “Fuck Iran” buttons on their jackets, and a comedian named Steve Dahl wrote a song called “Ayatollah”—to the tune of the Knack’s “My Sharona”—that threatened the Iranians with nuclear annihilation. It was a confusing moment for a little kid who was just waking up to the world beyond soccer practice, the New York Yankees, and Wonderama.
The subject hasn’t gotten any less confusing since. In the past 40 years, U.S. policymakers have endlessly debated a central issue in U.S.-Middle East policy: What should the United States do about Iran? The answer has often proved to be elusive in large part because of domestic politics. The traumas of the late 1970s and early 1980s have rendered parts of the U.S. policy community needlessly bellicose, others credulously dovish, and the remaining wary of both in search of a “just right” strategy to modify Iran’s behavior.
But the central question has now taken on a new urgency. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to kill Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in a drone strike on Jan. 3 has raised fears of violent escalation—even war—between the United States and Iran. It’s time to directly address the question of what exactly the United States can do about Iran—and fortunately, there’s a good answer available, even if it’s not satisfying for anyone in Washington.
What’s already clear is that the current U.S. approach needs improvement. Despite his hit on Suleimani, it is not at all clear what the president wants to achieve regarding Iran. He has combined hawkish rhetoric with periodic offers to negotiate with Tehran while pursuing a “maximum pressure” policy that until recently did not employ military force. Depending on whom one asks or who is doing the asking, the administration is seeking either full-scale regime change or simply a more robust nuclear deal than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the agreement negotiated by the Obama administration, which set limits on Iran’s nuclear program. This confusion comes against the backdrop of the Democratic presidential primary, in which all the leading candidates have declared their intention to return to the JCPOA so long as Iran maintains its commitment to the agreement (Joe Biden, Pete Buttigieg, Elizabeth Warren)—or, in the case of Bernie Sanders, without any conditions at all.
Yet just because the Trump administration and the politics of U.S.-Iran relations have imposed a binary choice on policymakers—regime change or the existing nuclear agreement—does not mean that there are no other possibilities. The U.S. government could pursue, for example, a “grand bargain” with Iran that would settle all the outstanding issues—notably, the nuclear program, Iran’s use of proxies to meddle in the region, and the release of Americans held in Tehran—between the two countries. Yet the most rational option under the present circumstances is another strategy that no longer goes mentioned in Washington: containment.
Consider the other potential strategies in turn. Regime change has, for obvious reasons, become a scary term and a policy one would think officials and analysts would want to avoid given the U.S. experience in Iraq, but it remains an option if only because influential people continue to advocate for it. It would not necessarily require a march on Tehran, but it would be costly, requiring the United States to provide far more military, political, and financial resources to Iran’s opponents around the region than current policy. This seems an unlikely scenario for two important reasons: 1) The potential for further regional chaos is high, and 2) the American people and Congress would likely be reluctant to support policies that would undoubtedly include augmenting the already sizable deployment of almost 45,000 American soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the Persian Gulf.
Returning to the JCPOA or negotiating a new nuclear deal that addresses some of the defects in the original agreement—for example, the failure to set limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program—is the flip side of Washington’s Iran debate. Reviving the JCPOA would mean acceptance of Iran’s alleged right to develop nuclear technology, sanctions relief, and the normalization of Tehran’s commercial ties with the world. It would also require implicit acceptance of Iran’s role in the region, especially its influential positions in Lebanon and Syria.
The problems with returning to the JCPOA or an enhanced agreement that addresses Iran’s missile program, for example, are similar to the one’s the Obama administration encountered, including opposition from regional allies and hawks in Washington determined to scuttle a deal, with one additional, notable challenge: Iran’s leaders would likely be reluctant to enter an agreement with the United States after the Trump administration breached the JCPOA in May 2018. The Iranians would also resist limits on their ballistic missiles given their reliance on those weapons for regional deterrence. There are also constraints on the U.S. side: In order for the Trump administration to make a new agreement work, it would need to convince its regional allies of its wisdom.
This would be a hard sell—not only because the Israelis, Emiratis, and Saudis continue to have zero trust that the Iranians would uphold their commitments in a deal but because leaders in Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh are no longer confident that Trump would hold Tehran accountable for whatever violations might occur. This is especially the case after the Trump administration’s halfhearted response to Iran’s provocations during the summer of 2019, culminating with the attack on Saudi oil processing facilities. A return to the nuclear agreement or a new JCPOA would create the same dynamics as the original deal, in which the authors and signatories have incentive to overlook violations or other related problems, such as Iran’s irredentist approach to the region. This gives other regional powers incentive to push back on their own, thus further destabilizing the region.
The inadequacy of an updated and expanded JCPOA raises the possibility of a grand bargain. In this scenario, Iran would relinquish its nuclear capabilities for an explicit U.S. recognition of the country’s role as a regional leader and a partner in developing the regional rules of the road. The underlying assumption of a grand bargain is that once Iran’s demands for a seat at the table are recognized, it will end its malevolent activities around the region. It’s a tempting thought—but entirely unrealistic, given the utter absence of trust in the region. The safeguards that would be needed to persuade Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates of the wisdom of such a deal—including an end to Iran’s support for allies around the region, restrictions on its military, and a clear statement from Tehran renouncing territorial claims on its neighbors—would render it anathema to the Iranians, who would likely view it as little more than regime change by another name. The United States, of course, could forgo restrictions on Iran that would satisfy its allies and instead pressure Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to accept a grand bargain. But that would not diminish the ability of U.S. allies to leverage their political clout in Washington and make mischief regionally in an effort to undermine a grand bargain. In other words, a grand bargain would likely meet the same fate as the Obama administration’s JCPOA or a JCPOA 2.0.
That leaves the United States with the most realistic option: containment. The record over the last four decades indicates that the United States cannot change Iran’s behavior through either coercion or incentive. And it does not have the kind of influence to force other countries in the region to alter their own approaches to Iran and the broader region. Under these circumstances, anything that’s possible is better than aspirations that bear little resemblance to reality—and what’s possible is containment. Containment, which guided Washington in its confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is a way in which the United States can restrain Iran and its effort to undermine U.S. policies and goals in the region. The Clinton administration pursued this policy—along with containment of Iraq—with success in the 1990s. Sure, there were problems with Tehran at the time, but the relationship between the United States and Iran was more stable in that outright conflict and escalation were less likely. That is because the United States and Iran established an equilibrium of sorts in which everyone understood some basic rules of the game that made it possible to manage crises. Containment requires U.S. forces in the region, and possibly the application of violence, in order to demonstrate what is acceptable. It is not risk-free for the United States. But the approach does reduce the possibility of escalation because U.S. policymakers would cease to consider regime change an option.
With both the idea of regime change and the necessity of defending a flawed nuclear deal taken off the table, the stakes for the U.S.-Iranian relationship will be demonstrably lower, thereby stabilizing Gulf. This leaves the gnarly issue of what to do about an Iranian nuclear program unfettered by any international agreement. But containment is capable of handling any outcome that produces. Indeed, that is precisely what U.S. policy has been toward nuclear-armed North Korea. Nobody would argue that this has been an ideal outcome, but it has been better than any easily identifiable alternatives—and it’s hard to understand why it should be anathema when it comes to Iran. Indeed, the Gulf states are less worried about Iranian nukes and more concerned about its desire to extend its influence around the region. The Israelis would eventually need more security assistance, but that shouldn’t be a deal breaker for containment, given the other available policy options.
Containment would not preclude dialogue between Iran and the United States and may even improve it, given the way it would produce implicit but well-understood rules for behavior. It would also provide the United States some much needed diplomatic room to help manage regional crises like Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. The Iranians are more apt to press their advantages in these places so long as they believe the United States might end their regime or look the other way. Most important, containing Iran represents the most realistic assessment of what either U.S. or Iranian politics can bear.
It is not as romantic as the idea of secret meetings in Oman or long negotiation sessions in Vienna. It lacks the bravado of bringing down leaders of a system that has vexed, maimed, and killed Americans. Containment is nevertheless the best option. It simultaneously reduces the risk of war, protects Americans, and renders the U.S. presence in the region less expensive. It would be foreign-policy malpractice not to embrace it.