foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Guo Wengui Is Sending Mobs After Chinese Dissidents

A prominent Chinese dissident pulls his children from school and flees his Texas home .
A California-based democracy activist faces days of threats and harassment from protesters gathered in his driveway .
Both were targets on a hit list of dissidents released last month by the exiled Chinese businessman Guo Wengui , who has claimed without evidence they are spies from the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) .
“ Let ’ s eliminate traitors in the world , ” a cigar-wielding Guo told his followers in a video posted online last month .
“ Let ’ s get started @ @ @ @ @ @ @ traitors first.
” In the days that followed , dozens of protesters have held daily demonstrations outside the Midland , Texas , home of Chinese pastor Bob Fu , a prominent figure among the evangelical Christians who make up a substantial number of U.S.-based Chinese dissidents .
They have refused to say who they were or where they traveled from—one man outside Fu ’ s home identified himself to local media as “ Texas Cowboy ” —but have made it clear they are heeding Guo ’ s calls to go after the founder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legal assistance to Christians facing persecution in China .
The actions of Guo and his followers have drawn the attention of the FBI , rebukes from Sens .
Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz , and a flurry of suspicion as to what the billionaire real estate magnate is actually up to .
“ I think this is a very well-funded , directed , orchestrated , sophisticated smear campaign , ” Fu told me after he and his family were placed in protective custody .
He now alleges the CCP itself is behind the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s the Robin Hood organizing a private militia to do justice , ” he said .
Foreign Policy reached out to Guo for comment , but his team , after saying they would translate the questions for Guo , failed to respond to further requests .
Accusations that others are really working for the CCP are not unknown in the bitterly contentious world of Chinese dissidents .
That ’ s not surprising , given that the CCP genuinely does spend considerable amounts of time , money , and energy targeting such organizations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat to its rule .
But it can also mean personal enmities become political paranoias .
And yet , Guo ’ s background and actions raise uncomfortable questions .
Guo was once a prominent player in the intertangled network of Chinese business and politics .
But he fled China in 2015 after his patron , Vice Minister of State Security Ma Jian , fell , leaving him dangerously exposed .
Since then he has attempted to frame himself as a principled critic of the CCP .
Upon arriving in the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategist and far-right operative Steve Bannon , who was arrested by federal agents on fraud charges while on Guo ’ s yacht off the shore of Connecticut in August .
The pair launched a self-proclaimed government in exile , the New Federal State of China , and the media company GTV Media Group , which is reportedly being investigated by the FBI and the Securities and Exchange Commission .
GTV ’ s outlets have served as mouthpieces for Guo and Bannon to spread disinformation about the origin of the coronavirus and publish conspiracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s son Hunter Biden that have reportedly seeped into Trump ’ s inner circle and the newsroom of the New York Post .
The outlets have also been used by Guo to smear dissidents such as Fu .
In January , Guo ’ s GNews website published an article titled “ About Bob Fu – A Fake Pastor ” that meanders from severe allegations—unsubstantiated accusations of human trafficking and sexual harassment , which Fu denies—to screenshots of Texas properties allegedly owned by Fu ’ s relatives and critical Google reviews of a winery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fu still laughs at the absurdity of Guo ’ s claims , but he took them seriously .
“ That was the start of when I thought , he is doing something real to threaten our family , ” he said .
Outside of one trespassing incident , the Midland protests have remained peaceful and law-abiding , and Guo has said he does not condone violence .
But they have inflamed lingering doubts about whether Guo Wengui is who he says he is .
Adrian Zenz , a senior fellow in China studies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who has known Fu for years , was cautious not to draw definitive conclusions but said Guo ’ s recent behavior , to him , “ looks like an influence operation.
” It ’ s not the first time Guo ’ s loyalties have been questioned .
Strategic Vision , a consultancy firm hired in 2018 by a company affiliated with Guo , accused him in court filings of being a “ dissident-hunter ” after being asked to investigate people Guo said had ties to top CCP officials .
A lawyer for Guo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to his house , that ’ s like a Communist Party pressure tactic , ” Zenz said .
“ It really raises the question of who is Guo Wengui ?
Is he a CCP spy ?
” The protests outside Fu ’ s house caused a stir in Midland , a Permian Basin oil town known for high school football rather than battles between Chinese dissidents .
Small groups began congregating in Fu ’ s driveway on Sept. 26 , when the pastor was at a Washington prayer service on the National Mall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people on the morning of Oct. 5 as Fu spoke from home at a virtual United Nations Human Rights Council event .
He and his family were escorted by Midland police to a safe location that day , but Guo ’ s followers canvassed the neighborhood and distributed flyers condemning the pastor and ChinaAid .
The town has not taken kindly to the newcomers .
“ Midlanders don ’ t do well or put up well with people who make threats , literally terrorist threats , against our citizens , ” Mayor Patrick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ An incensed Guo responded by threatening Payton in an online video , telling his followers : “ We must make him pay.
” Payton has since said Midland police have not been able to determine if the protesters are working directly for Guo or whether they have been paid .
Fu has not been the only target .
Wu Jianmin , a Chinese democracy activist in Southern California , said supporters of Guo showed up at his family ’ s home four times between Sept. 23 and Oct. 6 .
“ They would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ curb , shouting insulting obscenities while [ livestreaming ] on Twitter , ” he told me .
Like Fu , Wu said he had no prior connections to Guo before the billionaire and his followers began their pressure campaigns , but he believes Chinese authorities are “ very aggravated ” by his popular anti-CCP YouTube channel .
“ Only the CCP and its agents would desire [ the ] silencing of my voice , ” he said .
Guo ’ s supporters say they are avowed anti-communists .
His bizarre antics may be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any CCP connection ; the world of Beijing real estate is full of dirty tricks , some of which , like faking documents , Guo is accused of having used in the past .
He may effectively see Fu and other anti-CCP activists as rivals for funding and government backing in the United States .
Whatever Guo ’ s motives , his actions have already had a chilling effect .
Fu became more worried after Chinese Christians he assisted in coming to the United States told him they had been contacted by apparent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offices in early October due to the threats .
“ Their purpose , ” Fu said , “ is to make me shut up .
”

A prominent Chinese dissident pulls his children from school and flees his Texas home. A California-based democracy activist faces days of threats and harassment from protesters gathered in his driveway. Both were targets on a hit list of dissidents released last month by the exiled Chinese businessman Guo Wengui, who has claimed without evidence they are spies from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
A prominent Chinese dissident pulls his children from school and flees his Texas home. A California-based democracy activist faces days of threats and harassment from protesters gathered in his driveway. Both were targets on a hit list of dissidents released last month by the exiled Chinese businessman Guo Wengui, who has claimed without evidence they are spies from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
“Let’s eliminate traitors in the world,” a cigar-wielding Guo told his followers in a video posted online last month. “Let’s get started, let’s finish with these traitors first.”
In the days that followed, dozens of protesters have held daily demonstrations outside the Midland, Texas, home of Chinese pastor Bob Fu, a prominent figure among the evangelical Christians who make up a substantial number of U.S.-based Chinese dissidents. They have refused to say who they were or where they traveled from—one man outside Fu’s home identified himself to local media as “Texas Cowboy”—but have made it clear they are heeding Guo’s calls to go after the founder of the nonprofit ChinaAid, which provides legal assistance to Christians facing persecution in China.
The actions of Guo and his followers have drawn the attention of the FBI, rebukes from Sens. Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, and a flurry of suspicion as to what the billionaire real estate magnate is actually up to.
“I think this is a very well-funded, directed, orchestrated, sophisticated smear campaign,” Fu told me after he and his family were placed in protective custody. He now alleges the CCP itself is behind the attacks. “Guo Wengui thinks he’s the Robin Hood organizing a private militia to do justice,” he said.
Foreign Policy reached out to Guo for comment, but his team, after saying they would translate the questions for Guo, failed to respond to further requests.
Accusations that others are really working for the CCP are not unknown in the bitterly contentious world of Chinese dissidents. That’s not surprising, given that the CCP genuinely does spend considerable amounts of time, money, and energy targeting such organizations, which it sees as a deep threat to its rule. But it can also mean personal enmities become political paranoias.
And yet, Guo’s background and actions raise uncomfortable questions. Guo was once a prominent player in the intertangled network of Chinese business and politics. But he fled China in 2015 after his patron, Vice Minister of State Security Ma Jian, fell, leaving him dangerously exposed. Since then he has attempted to frame himself as a principled critic of the CCP. Upon arriving in the United States, he formed an alliance with former Trump strategist and far-right operative Steve Bannon, who was arrested by federal agents on fraud charges while on Guo’s yacht off the shore of Connecticut in August. The pair launched a self-proclaimed government in exile, the New Federal State of China, and the media company GTV Media Group, which is reportedly being investigated by the FBI and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
GTV’s outlets have served as mouthpieces for Guo and Bannon to spread disinformation about the origin of the coronavirus and publish conspiracy theories about presidential candidate Joe Biden’s son Hunter Biden that have reportedly seeped into Trump’s inner circle and the newsroom of the New York Post. The outlets have also been used by Guo to smear dissidents such as Fu. In January, Guo’s GNews website published an article titled “About Bob Fu – A Fake Pastor” that meanders from severe allegations—unsubstantiated accusations of human trafficking and sexual harassment, which Fu denies—to screenshots of Texas properties allegedly owned by Fu’s relatives and critical Google reviews of a winery owned by Fu’s wife.
Fu still laughs at the absurdity of Guo’s claims, but he took them seriously. “That was the start of when I thought, he is doing something real to threaten our family,” he said.
Outside of one trespassing incident, the Midland protests have remained peaceful and law-abiding, and Guo has said he does not condone violence. But they have inflamed lingering doubts about whether Guo Wengui is who he says he is.
Adrian Zenz, a senior fellow in China studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation who has known Fu for years, was cautious not to draw definitive conclusions but said Guo’s recent behavior, to him, “looks like an influence operation.”
It’s not the first time Guo’s loyalties have been questioned. Strategic Vision, a consultancy firm hired in 2018 by a company affiliated with Guo, accused him in court filings of being a “dissident-hunter” after being asked to investigate people Guo said had ties to top CCP officials. A lawyer for Guo has denied the claims
“Sending people to his house, that’s like a Communist Party pressure tactic,” Zenz said. “It really raises the question of who is Guo Wengui? Is he a CCP spy?”
The protests outside Fu’s house caused a stir in Midland, a Permian Basin oil town known for high school football rather than battles between Chinese dissidents. Small groups began congregating in Fu’s driveway on Sept. 26, when the pastor was at a Washington prayer service on the National Mall. The crowd grew to around 50 people on the morning of Oct. 5 as Fu spoke from home at a virtual United Nations Human Rights Council event. He and his family were escorted by Midland police to a safe location that day, but Guo’s followers canvassed the neighborhood and distributed flyers condemning the pastor and ChinaAid.
The town has not taken kindly to the newcomers. “Midlanders don’t do well or put up well with people who make threats, literally terrorist threats, against our citizens,” Mayor Patrick Payton told reporters earlier this month. An incensed Guo responded by threatening Payton in an online video, telling his followers: “We must make him pay.”
Payton has since said Midland police have not been able to determine if the protesters are working directly for Guo or whether they have been paid.
Fu has not been the only target. Wu Jianmin, a Chinese democracy activist in Southern California, said supporters of Guo showed up at his family’s home four times between Sept. 23 and Oct. 6. “They would park themselves outside my house on the curb, shouting insulting obscenities while [livestreaming] on Twitter,” he told me.
Like Fu, Wu said he had no prior connections to Guo before the billionaire and his followers began their pressure campaigns, but he believes Chinese authorities are “very aggravated” by his popular anti-CCP YouTube channel. “Only the CCP and its agents would desire [the] silencing of my voice,” he said.
Guo’s supporters say they are avowed anti-communists. His bizarre antics may be more a habit than a sign of any CCP connection; the world of Beijing real estate is full of dirty tricks, some of which, like faking documents, Guo is accused of having used in the past. He may effectively see Fu and other anti-CCP activists as rivals for funding and government backing in the United States.
Whatever Guo’s motives, his actions have already had a chilling effect. Fu became more worried after Chinese Christians he assisted in coming to the United States told him they had been contacted by apparent supporters of Guo. ChinaAid closed its offices in early October due to the threats. “Their purpose,” Fu said, “is to make me shut up.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Pompeo Courts the Maldives in Latest Bid to Check China’s Influence

Pompeo Courts the Maldives in Latest Bid to Check China ’ s Influence During a trip to the Maldives on Wednesday , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced plans to open the first U.S. Embassy in the country as the United States seeks to check China ’ s growing influence in the region , and as small island nations increasingly find themselves caught in the crosshairs of an escalating geopolitical tussle between Washington and Beijing .
The announcement , which follows the signing of a new defense agreement between the United States and the Maldives , a string of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comes as the country has been drawn deep into China ’ s so-called debt-trap diplomacy and is estimated to have racked up some $ 1.4 billion in debt to Beijing .
“ The Maldives has a tiny number of embassies , so it ’ s always a statement when anyone makes a point of committing to opening an embassy there , ” said Andrew Small , a senior trans-Atlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund ’ s Asia Program .
Some Chinese investment in infrastructure projects , such as a bridge connecting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ island that is home to the country ’ s main international airport , has been a boon for the tourism-dependent country .
But observers fear the scale of the country ’ s debt relative to its $ 5 billion GDP could be used as a Trojan horse for political leverage and power .
In Sri Lanka , the government handed control of the Hambantota Port and 15,000 acres of land around it to China in 2017 , giving Beijing a strategic foothold off of the coast of India , after it was unable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ build the port .
During a visit to Sri Lanka on Wednesday , Pompeo lashed out at China , calling the Chinese Communist Party a “ predator ” and the United States “ a friend and partner.
” “ What America offers almost always is companies and private investment , partnerships , and friendship .
That ’ s how we roll in the United States , ” Pompeo said in an interview with Sri Lanka ’ s Derana TV .
“ We won ’ t show up with state-sponsored enterprises .
We won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that a country can ’ t possibly repay .
We won ’ t attempt to use that debt to extort actions by the government.
” But Sri Lanka , which has increased its economic and political ties with China , appeared reluctant to be drawn into the great-power competition despite Pompeo ’ s messages .
“ # SriLanka will always maintain a neutral stand in foreign policy and will not get entangled in struggles between power blocs , ” Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa said on Twitter following Pompeo ’ s visit .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ economically than Sri Lanka ; it has a smaller economy , and a larger portion of its foreign debt is to China than Sri Lanka ’ s is , ” said Nilanthi Samaranayake , the director of the Strategy and Policy Analysis program at CNA .
But she added that the threat of Chinese influence in the Maldives was offset by the country ’ s long-standing security and defense ties with India .
While much has been made of China ’ s debt-trap diplomacy , Samaranayake noted in a paper last year that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk of falling into a “ middle-income trap , ” whereby they become wealthy enough to lose access to concessional assistance from international institutions but have difficulties seeking further assistance from other countries .
“ China is sort of a fallback option when they want to pursue these types of loans , ” she said .
A change of government in the Maldives in 2018 provided an opening for the United States as the authoritarian President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom , who had steered the country deeper into China ’ s and Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out and replaced by President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih .
Solih quickly moved to reorient the country ’ s foreign policy back toward India .
“ This is one of the sort of principal big success stories for the U.S. , for India and others in the region in the last few years … the return to democracy [ in the Maldives ] , but also effectively having a kind of friendly state in this strategically important maritime location , ” said Small of the German Marshall Fund .
While the temptation of Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries are increasingly aware of all the strings that come attached .
“ If you ’ re a dictator and you want to have your pockets lined , the Chinese approach is better .
But if you are a democratic society , looking at the long-term costs and benefits [ of Chinese financing ] , ” said Jeff Smith , a research fellow with the Heritage Foundation ’ s Asian Studies Center , “ I think the U.S. still has a compelling case to make.
” The U.S.-India relationship has strengthened in recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to check China ’ s increased assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region .
On Tuesday , Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper were in New Delhi , the first stop on a tour of four nations in Asia that Pompeo said will focus on the “ threats ” posed by Beijing .
“ Our leaders and our citizens see with increasing clarity that the CCP ( Chinese Communist Party ) is no friend to democracy , the rule of law , transparency , nor to freedom of navigation , the foundation of a free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pompeo said on Tuesday .
Pompeo and Esper signed a major new military agreement with their Indian counterparts during the trip , which would give New Delhi increased access to U.S. geospatial intelligence required for targeting missiles and armed drones .
The move comes as India and China are locked in an intense standoff at their shared border in the Himalayas , the most significant escalation of tensions in over four decades .
The Maldives aren ’ t the only small island nation to be roped into the Trump administration ’ s campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Esper visited Palau , a small Pacific island nation that has diplomatically aligned itself with the United States and is one of only 14 countries to have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than China .
Esper was the first U.S. defense secretary ever to visit Palau .
A 2019 study by the Rand Corp. , the Pentagon ’ s go-to think tank , described a group of small island nations in the Pacific as “ crucial to the promotion of Washington ’ s Indo-Pacific Strategy ” and “ tantamount to a power-projection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Pacific into Asia.
” While the Maldives lies outside this so-called highway , its geostrategic importance is cut from the same cloth , presenting the latest front in the simmering diplomatic battlegrounds of so-called great-power competition between Washington and Beijing .
Last month the largest province in the Solomon Islands , an archipelago off the northeast coast of Australia , announced plans to hold an independence referendum after the national government announced last year that it would end its 36-year relationship with Taiwan to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing .
Weeks after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million in aid to the province , which is 500 times the total amount of aid received by the province from all countries in 2018 , according to Australia ’ s ABC news .
A public affairs officer for the U.S. Embassy in Papua New Guinea , which is also responsible for the Solomons , told ABC that the move was not motivated by geopolitics and that the aid had been planned for two years .

During a trip to the Maldives on Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced plans to open the first U.S. Embassy in the country as the United States seeks to check China’s growing influence in the region, and as small island nations increasingly find themselves caught in the crosshairs of an escalating geopolitical tussle between Washington and Beijing.
During a trip to the Maldives on Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced plans to open the first U.S. Embassy in the country as the United States seeks to check China’s growing influence in the region, and as small island nations increasingly find themselves caught in the crosshairs of an escalating geopolitical tussle between Washington and Beijing.
The announcement, which follows the signing of a new defense agreement between the United States and the Maldives, a string of islands in the western Indian Ocean, comes as the country has been drawn deep into China’s so-called debt-trap diplomacy and is estimated to have racked up some $1.4 billion in debt to Beijing.
“The Maldives has a tiny number of embassies, so it’s always a statement when anyone makes a point of committing to opening an embassy there,” said Andrew Small, a senior trans-Atlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund’s Asia Program.
Some Chinese investment in infrastructure projects, such as a bridge connecting the capital, Male, to a nearby island that is home to the country’s main international airport, has been a boon for the tourism-dependent country. But observers fear the scale of the country’s debt relative to its $5 billion GDP could be used as a Trojan horse for political leverage and power.
In Sri Lanka, the government handed control of the Hambantota Port and 15,000 acres of land around it to China in 2017, giving Beijing a strategic foothold off of the coast of India, after it was unable to pay back Chinese loans used to build the port.
During a visit to Sri Lanka on Wednesday, Pompeo lashed out at China, calling the Chinese Communist Party a “predator” and the United States “a friend and partner.”
“What America offers almost always is companies and private investment, partnerships, and friendship. That’s how we roll in the United States,” Pompeo said in an interview with Sri Lanka’s Derana TV. “We won’t show up with state-sponsored enterprises. We won’t show up with debt packages that a country can’t possibly repay. We won’t attempt to use that debt to extort actions by the government.”
But Sri Lanka, which has increased its economic and political ties with China, appeared reluctant to be drawn into the great-power competition despite Pompeo’s messages. “#SriLanka will always maintain a neutral stand in foreign policy and will not get entangled in struggles between power blocs,” Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa said on Twitter following Pompeo’s visit.
“Maldives is in a worse situation economically than Sri Lanka; it has a smaller economy, and a larger portion of its foreign debt is to China than Sri Lanka’s is,” said Nilanthi Samaranayake, the director of the Strategy and Policy Analysis program at CNA. But she added that the threat of Chinese influence in the Maldives was offset by the country’s long-standing security and defense ties with India.
While much has been made of China’s debt-trap diplomacy, Samaranayake noted in a paper last year that smaller South Asian countries are also at risk of falling into a “middle-income trap,” whereby they become wealthy enough to lose access to concessional assistance from international institutions but have difficulties seeking further assistance from other countries. “China is sort of a fallback option when they want to pursue these types of loans,” she said.
A change of government in the Maldives in 2018 provided an opening for the United States as the authoritarian President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, who had steered the country deeper into China’s and Saudi Arabia’s orbits, was voted out and replaced by President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. Solih quickly moved to reorient the country’s foreign policy back toward India.
“This is one of the sort of principal big success stories for the U.S., for India and others in the region in the last few years … the return to democracy [in the Maldives], but also effectively having a kind of friendly state in this strategically important maritime location,” said Small of the German Marshall Fund.
While the temptation of Chinese loans is alluring, analysts say many countries are increasingly aware of all the strings that come attached. “If you’re a dictator and you want to have your pockets lined, the Chinese approach is better. But if you are a democratic society, looking at the long-term costs and benefits [of Chinese financing],” said Jeff Smith, a research fellow with the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, “I think the U.S. still has a compelling case to make.”
The U.S.-India relationship has strengthened in recent years as the countries have joined forces to check China’s increased assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. On Tuesday, Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper were in New Delhi, the first stop on a tour of four nations in Asia that Pompeo said will focus on the “threats” posed by Beijing.
“Our leaders and our citizens see with increasing clarity that the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) is no friend to democracy, the rule of law, transparency, nor to freedom of navigation, the foundation of a free and open and prosperous Indo-Pacific,” Pompeo said on Tuesday.
Pompeo and Esper signed a major new military agreement with their Indian counterparts during the trip, which would give New Delhi increased access to U.S. geospatial intelligence required for targeting missiles and armed drones. The move comes as India and China are locked in an intense standoff at their shared border in the Himalayas, the most significant escalation of tensions in over four decades.
The Maldives aren’t the only small island nation to be roped into the Trump administration’s campaign to counter China. In August, Esper visited Palau, a small Pacific island nation that has diplomatically aligned itself with the United States and is one of only 14 countries to have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than China. Esper was the first U.S. defense secretary ever to visit Palau.
A 2019 study by the Rand Corp., the Pentagon’s go-to think tank, described a group of small island nations in the Pacific as “crucial to the promotion of Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy” and “tantamount to a power-projection super-highway running through the heart of the North Pacific into Asia.”
While the Maldives lies outside this so-called highway, its geostrategic importance is cut from the same cloth, presenting the latest front in the simmering diplomatic battlegrounds of so-called great-power competition between Washington and Beijing.
Last month the largest province in the Solomon Islands, an archipelago off the northeast coast of Australia, announced plans to hold an independence referendum after the national government announced last year that it would end its 36-year relationship with Taiwan to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing.
Weeks after the announcement, Washington pledged $25 million in aid to the province, which is 500 times the total amount of aid received by the province from all countries in 2018, according to Australia’s ABC news.
A public affairs officer for the U.S. Embassy in Papua New Guinea, which is also responsible for the Solomons, told ABC that the move was not motivated by geopolitics and that the aid had been planned for two years.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Trump’s Middle East Legacy Is Failure

Trump’s Middle East Legacy Is Failure

My very first column as a regular contributor to Foreign Policy ran under the headline “ Trump ’ s Middle East Policy Is Totally Boring.
” The point of the piece was not to imbue the White House ’ s foreign policy with an intellectual framework but rather to show how banal it was .
Stripped of all the theatrics and peculiarities associated with President Donald Trump—who had been in office a little over a year—U.S .
policy in the Middle East resembled what was once a bipartisan consensus : support for Israel , tough on Iran and others outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and support for those partners regardless of the character of their regimes .
At the time , one of my friends who is a sophisticated observer of U.S. foreign policy , especially in the Middle East , sent me an email that read : “ Dude , I think you are imbuing way too much coherence to the administration ’ s thinking on these issues.
” In retrospect , my buddy was spot on .
A couple of years since that debut column appeared , and almost four years after Trump took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way to describe U.S. policy in the region is “ strategic incoherence.
” Every White House has trouble being consistent in its foreign policy .
The problem with Trump ’ s approach to the Middle East is not actually inconsistency but rather the scattershot quality of his encounters with the region .
This is what you get when the president trusts his own instincts over all else , undermining what is supposed to be a deliberative foreign-policy process .
The situation is made worse by Trump ’ s Lazy Susan approach to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Susans were often found in 1970s-era Chinese restaurants ( and sometimes still are ) .
Dishes would be placed on a large circle in the middle of a table that was spun to move the food around to different diners .
As a kid , I enjoyed turning the Lazy Susan as hard as I could and spooning onto my plate whatever dish happened to stop in front of me before turning the wheel again .
This is the way the president approaches his foreign policy : One spin and he gets Syria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a day or two before he spins it again to land on Venezuela ; another spin , NATO ; another spin , Iraq ; another spin , North Korea .
It goes on and on and on .
Of course , Trump is not alone in Washington at being unable to articulate what the United States wants in the Middle East , but he is the most consequential member of that group .
His wading in and out of conflicts and issues seemingly at random has risked further destabilizing the region .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of forever wars , and toward that end , he has greatly reduced the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan .
At the same time , he has pursued a maximum pressure campaign on Iran , which is a never-ending spiral of more and more pressure .
The risks of escalation and conflict in such an approach seem clear , suggesting that perhaps this is what the president or officials in his administration want .
Then again , Trump did not respond to Iran ’ s provocations in the Persian Gulf in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deployed thousands of troops there for a time .
Although the president studiously avoided confrontation with Iran in mid-2019 , he seemingly spun the Lazy Susan in early 2020 resulting in a drone strike on the commander of Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps , Qassem Suleimani , in Baghdad .
Foreign-policy analysts , columnists , editorial boards , Democrats , and Republicans praised the killing of the almost mythic Suleimani , who had copious amounts of blood on his hands , but the hit was untethered from an actual strategy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a big show—missile strikes on Iraq—and a more sustained lower-profile effort to drive the United States from Iraq .
Then there was the “ deal of the century , ” which was supposed to do what no other U.S. president has ever done before—produce a conflict-ending agreement between Israelis and Palestinians .
I don ’ t spend as much time on this issue as others , but it has been a few months since I ’ ve heard about what came to be known as the Trump/Kushner peace plan .
The plan went @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negotiate a final , ignominious surrender , something that anyone with even the mildest curiosity about the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians knows that they will not do .
Resistance to Israel ’ s occupation and steadfastness under the duress of that occupation are important components of Palestinian identity .
When it became clear that the Palestinians were not interested in such a one-sided deal , the president lost interest .
Team Trump has touted its record on “ defeating ” terrorism , and as a result , the president has vowed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are still there , albeit in smaller numbers .
A modest contingent remains in Syria , for example , but it is not clear why .
They are there , in the president ’ s words , to “ protect the oil ” or keep an eye on the Iranians or gain leverage over the Russians—or some combination of all three .
It is important to remember that these forces are still in Syria despite Trump twice promising Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that they were leaving .
Yet by promising to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assent to Turkish attacks on America ’ s Syrian Kurdish allies despite the critical role they played in the fight against the Islamic State .
When the Turks rolled into northeastern Syria , the leading edge of their forces comprised Syrian militiamen , some of whom were linked to extremists like al Qaeda .
It was irony piled on top of irony , but by that time , Trump had spun the Lazy Susan and was on to some other issue .
It hardly seems worth it to raise human rights because it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seem to be on the wheel .
Throughout the last four years , Trump has remained uniquely indifferent to the suffering of others at the hands of his friends .
To be sure , a U.S. president ’ s policy options are limited when it comes to preventing or stopping human rights violations , especially among U.S. partners and allies .
Yet the person in the Oval Office has the world ’ s biggest platform from which to be a moral voice in global affairs .
Instead , Trump has called Egypt ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his “ favorite dictator.
” The most generous interpretation of that episode was a president being inappropriately cheeky , but such off-the-cuff remarks are hardly funny given the scale of repression in Sisi ’ s Egypt .
What is Trump ’ s excuse for offering to the media that Saudi Arabia ’ s crown prince , Mohammed bin Salman , should come up with a better cover story for the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi ?
When it comes to the multiyear purge that has destroyed the lives of tens of thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their shoulders given what they freely admit is the president ’ s personal fondness for Erdogan .
It is one thing to understand that U.S. interests may dictate working with authoritarian leaders and understanding there is little Washington can do about the quality of politics in Egypt , Saudi Arabia , and Turkey , but it is quite another to befriend , run cover for , and stay silent over their considerable violations of human and political rights .
To be fair , in this mess , there have been accomplishments of sorts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle Eastern dictators to secure the release of some Americans abroad who had languished in the region ’ s jails .
The Abraham Accords between the United Arab Emirates and Israel and the possible normalization of ties between Israel and Sudan have happened on Trump ’ s watch .
Of course , when it comes to the former , the role of the White House is really about paying the bill for the agreement in the form of weaponry delivered to Gulf Arab states .
The latter seems to be normalization through coercion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change Sudan ’ s behavior by threatening to withhold economic aid .
( Yes , normal Israel-Sudan relations is a Trump success but not an edifying one . )
The U.S. State Department has also pushed for maritime boundary talks between Israel and Lebanon , which may set the stage for broader talks down the road , but the Lebanese willingness to hold talks may have more to do with their direct economic situation than anything else .
It may be too much to ask for success—however defined—in the Middle East .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the American people a strategy .
After four years , the Trump administration has failed on that count .
It has offered just episodic attention to whatever issue stops in front of the president before the next turn of the metaphoric Lazy Susan atop the Resolute Desk .
There ’ s no reason to think another four years would offer anything better .

My very first column as a regular contributor to Foreign Policy ran under the headline “ Trump’s Middle East Policy Is Totally Boring .” The point of the piece was not to imbue the White House’s foreign policy with an intellectual framework but rather to show how banal it was. Stripped of all the theatrics and peculiarities associated with President Donald Trump—who had been in office a little over a year—U.S. policy in the Middle East resembled what was once a bipartisan consensus: support for Israel, tough on Iran and others outside America’s coalition of regional partners, and support for those partners regardless of the character of their regimes.
My very first column as a regular contributor to Foreign Policy ran under the headline “Trump’s Middle East Policy Is Totally Boring.” The point of the piece was not to imbue the White House’s foreign policy with an intellectual framework but rather to show how banal it was. Stripped of all the theatrics and peculiarities associated with President Donald Trump—who had been in office a little over a year—U.S. policy in the Middle East resembled what was once a bipartisan consensus: support for Israel, tough on Iran and others outside America’s coalition of regional partners, and support for those partners regardless of the character of their regimes.
At the time, one of my friends who is a sophisticated observer of U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, sent me an email that read: “Dude, I think you are imbuing way too much coherence to the administration’s thinking on these issues.” In retrospect, my buddy was spot on. A couple of years since that debut column appeared, and almost four years after Trump took the oath of office, the only way to describe U.S. policy in the region is “strategic incoherence.” Every White House has trouble being consistent in its foreign policy. The problem with Trump’s approach to the Middle East is not actually inconsistency but rather the scattershot quality of his encounters with the region.
This is what you get when the president trusts his own instincts over all else, undermining what is supposed to be a deliberative foreign-policy process. The situation is made worse by Trump’s Lazy Susan approach to the world. To the uninitiated, Lazy Susans were often found in 1970s-era Chinese restaurants (and sometimes still are). Dishes would be placed on a large circle in the middle of a table that was spun to move the food around to different diners. As a kid, I enjoyed turning the Lazy Susan as hard as I could and spooning onto my plate whatever dish happened to stop in front of me before turning the wheel again. This is the way the president approaches his foreign policy: One spin and he gets Syria, an issue that occupies his mind for a day or two before he spins it again to land on Venezuela; another spin, NATO; another spin, Iraq; another spin, North Korea. It goes on and on and on.
Of course, Trump is not alone in Washington at being unable to articulate what the United States wants in the Middle East, but he is the most consequential member of that group. His wading in and out of conflicts and issues seemingly at random has risked further destabilizing the region. The president says he wants to get out of forever wars, and toward that end, he has greatly reduced the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, he has pursued a maximum pressure campaign on Iran, which is a never-ending spiral of more and more pressure. The risks of escalation and conflict in such an approach seem clear, suggesting that perhaps this is what the president or officials in his administration want. Then again, Trump did not respond to Iran’s provocations in the Persian Gulf in the summer of 2019, though he deployed thousands of troops there for a time.
Although the president studiously avoided confrontation with Iran in mid-2019, he seemingly spun the Lazy Susan in early 2020 resulting in a drone strike on the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Qassem Suleimani, in Baghdad. Foreign-policy analysts, columnists, editorial boards, Democrats, and Republicans praised the killing of the almost mythic Suleimani, who had copious amounts of blood on his hands, but the hit was untethered from an actual strategy. Predictably, the Iranians responded both with a big show—missile strikes on Iraq—and a more sustained lower-profile effort to drive the United States from Iraq.
Then there was the “deal of the century,” which was supposed to do what no other U.S. president has ever done before—produce a conflict-ending agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. I don’t spend as much time on this issue as others, but it has been a few months since I’ve heard about what came to be known as the Trump/Kushner peace plan. The plan went nowhere because it demanded that the Palestinians negotiate a final, ignominious surrender, something that anyone with even the mildest curiosity about the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians knows that they will not do. Resistance to Israel’s occupation and steadfastness under the duress of that occupation are important components of Palestinian identity. When it became clear that the Palestinians were not interested in such a one-sided deal, the president lost interest.
Team Trump has touted its record on “defeating” terrorism, and as a result, the president has vowed to bring U.S. forces home. Well, they are still there, albeit in smaller numbers. A modest contingent remains in Syria, for example, but it is not clear why. They are there, in the president’s words, to “protect the oil” or keep an eye on the Iranians or gain leverage over the Russians—or some combination of all three. It is important to remember that these forces are still in Syria despite Trump twice promising Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that they were leaving. Yet by promising to leave, the president signaled his implicit assent to Turkish attacks on America’s Syrian Kurdish allies despite the critical role they played in the fight against the Islamic State. When the Turks rolled into northeastern Syria, the leading edge of their forces comprised Syrian militiamen, some of whom were linked to extremists like al Qaeda. It was irony piled on top of irony, but by that time, Trump had spun the Lazy Susan and was on to some other issue.
It hardly seems worth it to raise human rights because it is the one issue that does not seem to be on the wheel. Throughout the last four years, Trump has remained uniquely indifferent to the suffering of others at the hands of his friends. To be sure, a U.S. president’s policy options are limited when it comes to preventing or stopping human rights violations, especially among U.S. partners and allies. Yet the person in the Oval Office has the world’s biggest platform from which to be a moral voice in global affairs. Instead, Trump has called Egypt’s leader, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, his “favorite dictator.” The most generous interpretation of that episode was a president being inappropriately cheeky, but such off-the-cuff remarks are hardly funny given the scale of repression in Sisi’s Egypt. What is Trump’s excuse for offering to the media that Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, should come up with a better cover story for the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi? When it comes to the multiyear purge that has destroyed the lives of tens of thousands of Turks, Trump administration officials lamely shrug their shoulders given what they freely admit is the president’s personal fondness for Erdogan. It is one thing to understand that U.S. interests may dictate working with authoritarian leaders and understanding there is little Washington can do about the quality of politics in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, but it is quite another to befriend, run cover for, and stay silent over their considerable violations of human and political rights.
To be fair, in this mess, there have been accomplishments of sorts. Trump has used his relationship with Middle Eastern dictators to secure the release of some Americans abroad who had languished in the region’s jails. The Abraham Accords between the United Arab Emirates and Israel and the possible normalization of ties between Israel and Sudan have happened on Trump’s watch. Of course, when it comes to the former, the role of the White House is really about paying the bill for the agreement in the form of weaponry delivered to Gulf Arab states. The latter seems to be normalization through coercion, with the United States managing to change Sudan’s behavior by threatening to withhold economic aid. (Yes, normal Israel-Sudan relations is a Trump success but not an edifying one.) The U.S. State Department has also pushed for maritime boundary talks between Israel and Lebanon, which may set the stage for broader talks down the road, but the Lebanese willingness to hold talks may have more to do with their direct economic situation than anything else.
It may be too much to ask for success—however defined—in the Middle East. But the president of the United States owes the American people a strategy. After four years, the Trump administration has failed on that count. It has offered just episodic attention to whatever issue stops in front of the president before the next turn of the metaphoric Lazy Susan atop the Resolute Desk. There’s no reason to think another four years would offer anything better.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Indian Americans Stir Blue Wave in Deep Red Texas

“ Texas might be turning purple , ” said Devesh Kapur , the director of Asia programs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies .
“ You see in that area there are a lot of Asian Americans , not just Indian Americans but other Asian Americans .
That ’ s the group that will make or break it.
” Indeed , there are few other immigrant groups that have done more to remake the U.S. electorate .
Around two-thirds of Indian Americans came to the United States in the past 20 years—a higher rate than any immigrant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indian American community is by no means a monolith , but polls show a majority are leaning blue .
Despite Trump touting close ties with India—hosting Prime Minister Narendra Modi in front of 50,000 fans in a Houston football stadium last year—polls show that Indian Americans are turning decisively to the left , alienated by the Republican Party ’ s divisive rhetoric toward immigrants and minority groups .
According to a recent YouGov poll in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , Johns Hopkins , and the University of Pennsylvania , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan to support Biden , compared with just 22 percent for Trump .
Political action groups are picking up on the trend and mobilizing in Texas on an unprecedented scale .
“ Where we ’ re spending the vast majority of our time , our energy is in Texas , ” said Varun Nikore , the president of the AAPI Victory Fund , a progressive super PAC focused on mobilizing Asian American and Pacific Islander ( AAPI ) voters .
That could be a problem for the Republican Party going forward , whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indian Americans have also emerged as more powerful than other immigrant voting blocs : In the 2020 Democratic primary season , Indian Americans , many in Silicon Valley , gave more to campaigns than all of Hollywood .
They ’ re wealthier than most other U.S. immigrant groups and are represented in the highest levels of government and U.S. tech companies—and they tend to be better assimilated into suburban communities .
Texas is still a long way off from being a solid blue bastion for Democrats , but the trendlines are hard to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hopeful Mitt Romney won Texas by about 16 percentage points .
In 2016 , Trump won the state and its 38 electoral votes ( minus two defections ) by 9 points .
The latest polls show that Trump ’ s advantage in Texas has whittled down to 4 points ahead of Biden , and the nonpartisan Cook Political Report officially moved the state to a “ toss-up ” on Wednesday .
“ If Texas is not listed as a battleground this election , it will be in the next four years , during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
“ All of the demographic trends are going in that direction , and AAPIs are the fastest-growing population in Texas.
” The dynamic is playing out in the Houston suburbs , where the Indian American ex-foreign service officer Sri Preston Kulkarni has thrown his hat into the ring to flip Texas ’ s 22nd Congressional District to the Democrats .
As one indication of how drastically demographic trendlines in Texas have shifted , Kulkarni ’ s campaign has organized phone banking events in 27 different languages—including six of the most commonly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a handful of local and national left-leaning voter groups mobilized in the area , such as South Asian American Voter Empowerment Texas .
Prominent Indian American conservatives have risen to top jobs in U.S. politics too , such as recent U.S .
Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley and former Louisiana Gov .
Bobby Jindal , but they are Christian , unlike more recent immigrants who are practicing Sikhs , Muslims , and Hindus .
Though Trump has spoken to their concerns about the rise of China , Indian Americans have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ racially tinged rhetoric and fear that a second term could mean further curbs to U.S. H-1B immigrant visas for highly skilled workers in technology .
The demographic trendlines—and controversies from incumbent Republican leaders—could hurt other GOP politicians down the ballot .
Texas Republicans had to apologize after releasing a campaign ad likening the party ’ s elephant symbol to the Hindu deity Ganesha during the 2018 campaign cycle .
During that cycle , Texas Republican Rep. Pete Olson drew fire for calling Kulkarni , his Democratic opponent , an “ Indo-American who is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2018 but announced he would be retiring from office ahead of the 2020 elections .
“ What ’ s happening , and Texas is emblematic of this , is [ AAPI voters ] are certainly questioning Trump out of the gate , but they ’ re questioning , why did we even vote for Republicans ?
Because that party ’ s platforms , that party ’ s ideals and words and actions are antithetical to us even being in this country , ” Nikore said .
“ You see South Asians mobilizing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than the right , ” said Milan Vaishnav , the director of the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Texas native .
“ They are concentrated in largely urban sections of Dallas , Fort Worth , and Houston .
That gives them power in those electoral districts .
I think that is a trend to look out for.
” But pro-Modi Indian nationals have also mobilized in the United States , after Modi ’ s rally with Trump in Texas and a sold-out appearance at Madison Square @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) would get involved in the 2020 campaign .
In August , the party ’ s American wing—the Overseas Friends of BJP-USA—registered as a foreign agent with the U.S. Justice Department , after leaders asked American members not to campaign for either side .
Though the so-called “ Howdy Modi ” rally in Houston became fodder for Trump campaign ads earlier in the election cycle , experts said the gatherings haven ’ t mobilized Republican voters .
Instead , they “ have kind of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are an important political constituency here , ” Vaishnav said .
“ I think there is a tendency in many immigrant communities where the first generation really does focus on assimilation , really trying not to rock the boat , trying to take care of the basics , ” Vaishnav said .
“ The second generation is when the political awakening happens .
I think we are seeing that .
”

It would have been nearly unthinkable to see Texas in the toss-up column just four years ago. But less than a week out from Election Day, pollsters see President Donald Trump and his rival Joe Biden in a dead heat, and the Biden campaign’s hopes are riding on a growing community of 160,000 Indian American voters in the Lone Star State to help turn the tide.
It would have been nearly unthinkable to see Texas in the toss-up column just four years ago. But less than a week out from Election Day, pollsters see President Donald Trump and his rival Joe Biden in a dead heat, and the Biden campaign’s hopes are riding on a growing community of 160,000 Indian American voters in the Lone Star State to help turn the tide.
“Texas might be turning purple,” said Devesh Kapur, the director of Asia programs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “You see in that area there are a lot of Asian Americans, not just Indian Americans but other Asian Americans. That’s the group that will make or break it.”
Indeed, there are few other immigrant groups that have done more to remake the U.S. electorate. Around two-thirds of Indian Americans came to the United States in the past 20 years—a higher rate than any immigrant community other than Mexican Americans. The Indian American community is by no means a monolith, but polls show a majority are leaning blue.
Despite Trump touting close ties with India—hosting Prime Minister Narendra Modi in front of 50,000 fans in a Houston football stadium last year—polls show that Indian Americans are turning decisively to the left, alienated by the Republican Party’s divisive rhetoric toward immigrants and minority groups. According to a recent YouGov poll in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Pennsylvania, 72 percent of registered Indian American voters plan to support Biden, compared with just 22 percent for Trump.
Political action groups are picking up on the trend and mobilizing in Texas on an unprecedented scale. “Where we’re spending the vast majority of our time, our energy is in Texas,” said Varun Nikore, the president of the AAPI Victory Fund, a progressive super PAC focused on mobilizing Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) voters.
That could be a problem for the Republican Party going forward, whether or not Trump wins on Tuesday. Indian Americans have also emerged as more powerful than other immigrant voting blocs: In the 2020 Democratic primary season, Indian Americans, many in Silicon Valley, gave more to campaigns than all of Hollywood. They’re wealthier than most other U.S. immigrant groups and are represented in the highest levels of government and U.S. tech companies—and they tend to be better assimilated into suburban communities.
Texas is still a long way off from being a solid blue bastion for Democrats, but the trendlines are hard to ignore. In 2012, Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney won Texas by about 16 percentage points. In 2016, Trump won the state and its 38 electoral votes (minus two defections) by 9 points. The latest polls show that Trump’s advantage in Texas has whittled down to 4 points ahead of Biden, and the nonpartisan Cook Political Report officially moved the state to a “toss-up” on Wednesday.
“If Texas is not listed as a battleground this election, it will be in the next four years, during the next presidential campaign,” Nikore said. “All of the demographic trends are going in that direction, and AAPIs are the fastest-growing population in Texas.”
The dynamic is playing out in the Houston suburbs, where the Indian American ex-foreign service officer Sri Preston Kulkarni has thrown his hat into the ring to flip Texas’s 22nd Congressional District to the Democrats. As one indication of how drastically demographic trendlines in Texas have shifted, Kulkarni’s campaign has organized phone banking events in 27 different languages—including six of the most commonly spoken dialects in India.
There are a handful of local and national left-leaning voter groups mobilized in the area, such as South Asian American Voter Empowerment Texas. Prominent Indian American conservatives have risen to top jobs in U.S. politics too, such as recent U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley and former Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal, but they are Christian, unlike more recent immigrants who are practicing Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus.
Though Trump has spoken to their concerns about the rise of China, Indian Americans have been turned off by the president’s racially tinged rhetoric and fear that a second term could mean further curbs to U.S. H-1B immigrant visas for highly skilled workers in technology. The demographic trendlines—and controversies from incumbent Republican leaders—could hurt other GOP politicians down the ballot.
Texas Republicans had to apologize after releasing a campaign ad likening the party’s elephant symbol to the Hindu deity Ganesha during the 2018 campaign cycle. During that cycle, Texas Republican Rep. Pete Olson drew fire for calling Kulkarni, his Democratic opponent, an “Indo-American who is a carpetbagger.” Olson narrowly beat Kulkarni in 2018 but announced he would be retiring from office ahead of the 2020 elections.
“What’s happening, and Texas is emblematic of this, is [AAPI voters] are certainly questioning Trump out of the gate, but they’re questioning, why did we even vote for Republicans? Because that party’s platforms, that party’s ideals and words and actions are antithetical to us even being in this country,” Nikore said.
“You see South Asians mobilizing as interest groups on the left more than the right,” said Milan Vaishnav, the director of the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Texas native. “They are concentrated in largely urban sections of Dallas, Fort Worth, and Houston. That gives them power in those electoral districts. I think that is a trend to look out for.”
But pro-Modi Indian nationals have also mobilized in the United States, after Modi’s rally with Trump in Texas and a sold-out appearance at Madison Square Garden in New York stoked concerns that members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) would get involved in the 2020 campaign. In August, the party’s American wing—the Overseas Friends of BJP-USA—registered as a foreign agent with the U.S. Justice Department, after leaders asked American members not to campaign for either side.
Though the so-called “Howdy Modi” rally in Houston became fodder for Trump campaign ads earlier in the election cycle, experts said the gatherings haven’t mobilized Republican voters. Instead, they “have kind of brought home to Indian Americans that they are an important political constituency here,” Vaishnav said.
“I think there is a tendency in many immigrant communities where the first generation really does focus on assimilation, really trying not to rock the boat, trying to take care of the basics,” Vaishnav said. “The second generation is when the political awakening happens. I think we are seeing that.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--How Does it Feel for 2020 to Be Your Generation’s Defining Year?

How Does it Feel for 2020 to Be Your Generation ’ s Defining Year ?
After going on for what feels like an eternity , the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign has finally entered its final lap .
Everything just feels longer and more tedious in the Zoomiverse , where so many of us are living , working , and studying these days .
That applies especially to politics—and in particular for those Americans voting in a presidential election for the very first time .
College-age Americans have vague recollections of global affairs before the Trump era : the killing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the Iraq War .
For the most part , however , the 2016 election was when they awoke to politics—and the 2020 election is when they can finally do something about it .
It is time to take stock of this generation coming of age during the Raging ’ 20s , what they know about politics , and how they imagine the United States ’ role in the world .
What do the members of this generation know so far ?
They know that U.S. elections seem especially vulnerable to foreign interference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether Russian meddling tipped the scales for now-President Donald Trump ’ s narrow victory in 2016 .
They know that four years later , Russia and other countries are meddling again , and they have some questions about the resilience of the electoral process they are joining .
They know that eight months into a once-in-a-century pandemic , leaders at the federal , state , and local levels are still struggling to develop safe and effective public health measures that can enjoy broad public support .
Young people in the United States today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And they know that they face bleak economic prospects , calling their hopes and dreams into doubt .
We believe this all adds up to a grim picture : Young people in the United States today feel an extraordinary level of powerlessness .
Even if it ’ s a characteristic trait for youth to feel disempowered , the defining experiences for this generation—the COVID-19 pandemic , economic disruptions , foreign election interference—have probably magnified its sense of helplessness .
As a result , when young voters head to the polls next week , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ powerful sense of the importance of their ballot coupled with doubts about the legitimacy and efficacy of that act .
It is no surprise , then , that an October report found young people around the world to be more disgruntled with democracy than any previous generation at their age .
Only 19 percent of young Americans believe their country is on the right track , and their growing frustration undermines the long-term health of U.S. democracy from within just as foreign election interference undermines it from without .
That , of course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s campaign .
But we believe U.S. democracy will survive in the long run , because even though young Americans are dissatisfied , they are mobilized and engaged .
A higher percentage of young voters say they intend to vote than in any election since 2008 .
According to a recent poll , 40 percent of young people have been paying more attention to the news during the COVID-19 crisis—and only 26 percent have been tuning in less .
There may be disillusionment and apathy , but the era of Russian disinformation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new level of civic engagement .
What ’ s more , the new generation of voters is deeply concerned about global affairs .
This generation has been energized by issues such as climate change and the need for international cooperation to address it .
Persistent inequality across racial , gender , and other social lines is seen as a global issue , not just a domestic one .
If digital natives made up a larger part of the politically engaged population , the country might be better able to resist foreign interference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a lead on their elders in developing better defenses against foreign disinformation and domestic fake news .
Research suggests that older voters are more easily swayed by misinformation .
According to a 2019 report , people over 65 shared seven times as much fake news on Facebook as people between 18 and 29 .
Jeff Hancock , a psychologist at Stanford University , told the New York Times that seniors “ have a lot less experience [ online ] and are less likely to know what ’ s dangerous.
” If young digital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the politically engaged population , the United States might be better equipped to resist foreign interference .
Still , foreign attacks on U.S. democracy and the COVID-19 pandemic will profoundly impact this generation in ways that are only dimly visible today .
Consider how the 2020 generation might differ from those who immediately preceded it .
Those who came of age in the mid-to-late 2000s , with wars raging in Iraq and Afghanistan , are more skeptical of the U.S. role in the world .
In contrast , the current generation is watching @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestic stability in real time .
The United States ’ failure to facilitate and lead a global pandemic response has dealt a knockout blow to an already damaged perception of American exceptionalism among the country ’ s youth .
Perhaps paradoxically , we believe young Americans could well emerge from this era with a distinct appreciation for the importance of U.S. resilience , strength , and leadership .
We believe young Americans will not resign themselves to their country ’ s decline but will instead look for it to regain leadership on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for this : First , they are keenly aware that today ’ s problems are global and require global solutions .
They know that a better coordinated and more robust international effort would have mitigated the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic .
Young Americans will apply this lesson to efforts to stop climate change , which 80 percent of American voters between the ages of 18 and 29 believe is a major threat to humanity .
Their conclusion is that U.S. involvement is critical to solving these and other global issues .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary of State Madeleine Albright , who made famous the idea that America is “ the indispensable nation , ” is enormously popular on our college campus .
The second reason young Americans will lean toward greater international engagement is that they ’ d like to feel proud of their country .
Coming of age in the Trump era has caused a jarring dissonance between the country they learned about in history class and the one they live in today .
A friend recently described this feeling by saying that “ people are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before.
” In other words , this generation is probably more embarrassed by and critical of the United States than any generation since the 1970s , and they may no longer see it as the beacon of democracy .
Young Americans want a government that leads the world and makes them proud while doing it .
This generation is probably more critical of the United States than any generation since the 1970s .
The third reason for the new generation ’ s support of U.S. global leadership is that Americans who are maturing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strong , resilient United States as the antidote to outside meddling .
Young Americans have seen foreign disinformation campaigns pitting Americans against each other , contributing to an atmosphere of division and discord .
This generation will want to shed the powerlessness it feels and demand that their country punish and deter election interference .
Today ’ s youth will not tolerate permanent challenges to its elections and , by extension , its sovereignty .
Instead , they will seek forceful responses and international leadership .
As this chapter in U.S. history is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happen over the next few months that radically alters how young Americans see the future of their country .
The successful development and distribution of a vaccine could restore faith in U.S. leadership .
A contested election result , on the other hand , could erode confidence in democracy even further .
Yet one thing seems certain : Foreign election meddling , a global pandemic , and worries about the earth ’ s climate could be turning young Americans into the most internationally minded generation in many decades .
That makes us optimistic @ @ @ @ @ @ @

After going on for what feels like an eternity, the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign has finally entered its final lap. Everything just feels longer and more tedious in the Zoomiverse , where so many of us are living, working, and studying these days. That applies especially to politics—and in particular for those Americans voting in a presidential election for the very first time.
After going on for what feels like an eternity, the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign has finally entered its final lap. Everything just feels longer and more tedious in the Zoomiverse, where so many of us are living, working, and studying these days. That applies especially to politics—and in particular for those Americans voting in a presidential election for the very first time.
College-age Americans have vague recollections of global affairs before the Trump era: the killing of Osama bin Laden, older relatives arguing about the Iraq War. For the most part, however, the 2016 election was when they awoke to politics—and the 2020 election is when they can finally do something about it. It is time to take stock of this generation coming of age during the Raging ’20s, what they know about politics, and how they imagine the United States’ role in the world.
What do the members of this generation know so far? They know that U.S. elections seem especially vulnerable to foreign interference, with reasonable doubts raised as to whether Russian meddling tipped the scales for now-President Donald Trump’s narrow victory in 2016. They know that four years later, Russia and other countries are meddling again, and they have some questions about the resilience of the electoral process they are joining.
They know that eight months into a once-in-a-century pandemic, leaders at the federal, state, and local levels are still struggling to develop safe and effective public health measures that can enjoy broad public support.
Young people in the United States today feel an extraordinary level of powerlessness.
And they know that they face bleak economic prospects, calling their hopes and dreams into doubt.
We believe this all adds up to a grim picture: Young people in the United States today feel an extraordinary level of powerlessness. Even if it’s a characteristic trait for youth to feel disempowered, the defining experiences for this generation—the COVID-19 pandemic, economic disruptions, foreign election interference—have probably magnified its sense of helplessness. As a result, when young voters head to the polls next week, they will be torn between competing emotions—a powerful sense of the importance of their ballot coupled with doubts about the legitimacy and efficacy of that act.
It is no surprise, then, that an October report found young people around the world to be more disgruntled with democracy than any previous generation at their age. Only 19 percent of young Americans believe their country is on the right track, and their growing frustration undermines the long-term health of U.S. democracy from within just as foreign election interference undermines it from without. That, of course, is precisely the goal of Russia’s campaign.
But we believe U.S. democracy will survive in the long run, because even though young Americans are dissatisfied, they are mobilized and engaged. A higher percentage of young voters say they intend to vote than in any election since 2008. According to a recent poll, 40 percent of young people have been paying more attention to the news during the COVID-19 crisis—and only 26 percent have been tuning in less. There may be disillusionment and apathy, but the era of Russian disinformation and COVID-19 could also end up breeding a new level of civic engagement.
What’s more, the new generation of voters is deeply concerned about global affairs. This generation has been energized by issues such as climate change and the need for international cooperation to address it. Persistent inequality across racial, gender, and other social lines is seen as a global issue, not just a domestic one.
If digital natives made up a larger part of the politically engaged population, the country might be better able to resist foreign interference.
In fact, youth may have a lead on their elders in developing better defenses against foreign disinformation and domestic fake news. Research suggests that older voters are more easily swayed by misinformation. According to a 2019 report, people over 65 shared seven times as much fake news on Facebook as people between 18 and 29. Jeff Hancock, a psychologist at Stanford University, told the New York Times that seniors “have a lot less experience [online] and are less likely to know what’s dangerous.” If young digital natives made up a higher percentage of the politically engaged population, the United States might be better equipped to resist foreign interference.
Still, foreign attacks on U.S. democracy and the COVID-19 pandemic will profoundly impact this generation in ways that are only dimly visible today. Consider how the 2020 generation might differ from those who immediately preceded it. Those who came of age in the mid-to-late 2000s, with wars raging in Iraq and Afghanistan, are more skeptical of the U.S. role in the world. In contrast, the current generation is watching the erosion of U.S. global leadership and domestic stability in real time. The United States’ failure to facilitate and lead a global pandemic response has dealt a knockout blow to an already damaged perception of American exceptionalism among the country’s youth. Perhaps paradoxically, we believe young Americans could well emerge from this era with a distinct appreciation for the importance of U.S. resilience, strength, and leadership.
We believe young Americans will not resign themselves to their country’s decline but will instead look for it to regain leadership on the international stage. There are three reasons for this: First, they are keenly aware that today’s problems are global and require global solutions. They know that a better coordinated and more robust international effort would have mitigated the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Young Americans will apply this lesson to efforts to stop climate change, which 80 percent of American voters between the ages of 18 and 29 believe is a major threat to humanity. Their conclusion is that U.S. involvement is critical to solving these and other global issues. It is perhaps no accident that former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who made famous the idea that America is “the indispensable nation,” is enormously popular on our college campus.
The second reason young Americans will lean toward greater international engagement is that they’d like to feel proud of their country. Coming of age in the Trump era has caused a jarring dissonance between the country they learned about in history class and the one they live in today. A friend recently described this feeling by saying that “people are more aware of their Americanness than ever before.” In other words, this generation is probably more embarrassed by and critical of the United States than any generation since the 1970s, and they may no longer see it as the beacon of democracy. Young Americans want a government that leads the world and makes them proud while doing it.
This generation is probably more critical of the United States than any generation since the 1970s.
The third reason for the new generation’s support of U.S. global leadership is that Americans who are maturing during the election interference age see a strong, resilient United States as the antidote to outside meddling. Young Americans have seen foreign disinformation campaigns pitting Americans against each other, contributing to an atmosphere of division and discord. This generation will want to shed the powerlessness it feels and demand that their country punish and deter election interference. Today’s youth will not tolerate permanent challenges to its elections and, by extension, its sovereignty. Instead, they will seek forceful responses and international leadership.
As this chapter in U.S. history is being written, a lot can still happen over the next few months that radically alters how young Americans see the future of their country. The successful development and distribution of a vaccine could restore faith in U.S. leadership. A contested election result, on the other hand, could erode confidence in democracy even further. Yet one thing seems certain: Foreign election meddling, a global pandemic, and worries about the earth’s climate could be turning young Americans into the most internationally minded generation in many decades. That makes us optimistic about the country’s future.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Afghans See No Good Choices in the U.S. Election

Afghans See No Good Choices in the U.S. Election KABUL—When Donald Trump was elected in 2016 , he was an unknown entity in Afghanistan , a reality TV show host who ’ d spent years belittling the American incursion in the country at a time when the government in Kabul was hoping for a continued U.S. troop presence to check the rise of the Taliban and other militant groups .
Four years later , as the United States faces one of the most momentous elections in its history , the situation couldn ’ t be more different .
In February @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Taliban as part of Trump ’ s plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan after almost 20 years .
Now , Kabul is hoping that whoever wins the election will stay that course—withdrawing U.S. troops , not leaving them in Afghanistan forever .
“ At this point , we really do want them gone .
It took us a long time to see it , but now we know they are only holding us back , ” said a senior security official who did not want to be named .
In Kabul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around the world , government officials are watching this year ’ s election on tenterhooks because the stakes are so high—for both countries .
“ Right now , our biggest concern is what happens in seven days , ” the official said of a Trump defeat , which polls suggest is likely .
Kabul is used to contested elections—the last two presidential races here ended in monthslong disputes and accusations of widespread fraud .
But Afghans worry that if Trump loses , the fallout will be a lot worse than anything that happened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Millions of Trump ’ s supporters are armed .
They ’ re also highly racist—that ’ s a recipe for disaster .
Right now , we ’ re really hoping things go well in the U.S. , ” the official said .
But the stakes are huge for Afghanistan , as well .
The peace process kicked off this year has so far delivered anything but .
A recent United Nations report on civilian casualties found that despite the start of intra-Afghan talks with the Taliban , “ [ h ] igh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact on civilians , with Afghanistan remaining among the deadliest places in the world to be a civilian.
” If Trump wins , few Afghans have confidence in his ability to carry out his own promises in a timely fashion.In Kabul , the concerns are twofold—and neither outcome is particularly appealing .
If Trump wins , few Afghans have confidence in his ability to carry out his own promises in a timely fashion , when delay will just mean more civilian deaths .
Edris Lutfi , a former advisor to Afghanistan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump does win , it will be difficult to convince the president to pay due attention to Afghanistan .
“ Trump is unpredictable , ” Lutfi said .
For instance , in an Oct. 7 tweet , Trump managed to blindside both the U.S. Defense Department and officials in Kabul .
“ We should have the small remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas , ” he wrote .
The Afghan security official said that although the tweet caught Kabul by surprise , they couldn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe him .
We believe that he believes what he says , but everyone knows it ’ s impossible to recall thousands of troops over a two-month period in a pandemic , ” the official said .
As impetuous as Trump is , a Joe Biden presidency breeds its own uncertainty for Afghanistan .
Afghans who were against the peace process—which essentially gives the Taliban a dominant voice in Afghanistan ’ s future , in exchange for very little—had initially placed their hope in Biden , saying he would scrap the whole idea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little to instill confidence in Kabul .
Over the summer , one high-level government advisor had told other high officials that “ there is no peace process—Biden will undo it as soon as he wins , ” but now even he admits he was wrong .
“ He hasn ’ t said anything different from Trump , so let us make our own decisions for ourselves finally , ” the government advisor said .
And while Biden has repeatedly said he agrees with a U.S. troop withdrawal , he has made many other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Lutfi said he is most worried by a statement Biden made during the New Hampshire Democratic primary debate , where he said : “ I was totally against the whole notion of nation building in Afghanistan .
The only thing we should be doing is dealing with terrorism in that region.
” Biden continued : “ There is no possibility of uniting that country , no possibility at all of making it a whole country.
” Lutfi fears the full implications of what Biden said .
“ Does he believe Afghanistan is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a lost cause ?
” The comments from Biden , who once defended a continued , if reduced , U.S. troop presence in the country , explain why even onetime Afghan backers of an extended U.S. force are washing their hands.
“ Does [ Biden ] believe Afghanistan is too divided and that it ’ s a lost cause ?
” “ What have they left here ?
Fundamentally what have they actually built here ?
Their presence here is affecting our economic and foreign policies , but we haven ’ t seen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” the security source said .
Another concern is that a Biden victory would slow the final implementation of the peace process since it would be far from a priority in a term filled with much more urgent domestic emergencies .
That dalliance will ultimately only lead to more bloodshed , said Orzala Nemat , the director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit , a leading Kabul-based think tank .
“ This was all Trump ’ s political move .
His intention was always to win support ahead of elections by saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops home , ” she said .
“ It ’ s never been about the Afghan people.
” And the Taliban , who already hit the jackpot with the Trump administration , would likely try to run the table with a new and unproven administration , she said , which would only further slow the peace process and add to the civilian body count .
Yet for many Afghans , there is one potential bright spot to a Biden victory : Everyone Foreign Policy spoke to said Kabul ’ s biggest hope for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zalmay Khalilzad , the current U.S. special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation .
Khalilzad , an Afghan-born academic who served as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan under George W. Bush , has become a highly problematic figure for his handling of the current peace process .
“ The Republicans gave a lot to the Taliban , ” Nemat said .
Since the announcement of the peace process in February , violence across the country has spiked .
According to the U.N. , the number of civilian deaths attributed to the Taliban increased by 6 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
The Taliban ’ s recent effort to overrun the southern province of Helmand has called their dedication to peace into question .
For many observers , this is more proof of Khalilzad ’ s failure to hold the group accountable .
Lutfi says Khalilzad has been seen as a “ failed diplomat ” so far .
Others have been less charitable .
Last year , Hamdullah Mohib , the current Afghan national security advisor , said Khalilzad has ambitions of becoming a “ viceroy ” in a possible “ caretaker government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against .
In the end , no matter who wins the U.S. election next week , the road ahead will be littered with the same obstacles , and neither candidate has laid out a coherent framework for either a smooth withdrawal or a continued counterterrorism presence .
Afghanistan is ready to start moving on—whether Washington has sorted itself out or not .
The security source said he speaks for millions of Afghans .
“ If they want to be involved in Afghanistan , they are free to invest , but we don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he said .

KABUL—When Donald Trump was elected in 2016, he was an unknown entity in Afghanistan, a reality TV show host who’d spent years belittling the American incursion in the country at a time when the government in Kabul was hoping for a continued U.S. troop presence to check the rise of the Taliban and other militant groups.
KABUL—When Donald Trump was elected in 2016, he was an unknown entity in Afghanistan, a reality TV show host who’d spent years belittling the American incursion in the country at a time when the government in Kabul was hoping for a continued U.S. troop presence to check the rise of the Taliban and other militant groups.
Four years later, as the United States faces one of the most momentous elections in its history, the situation couldn’t be more different. In February, Washington signed a peace deal with the Taliban as part of Trump’s plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan after almost 20 years. Now, Kabul is hoping that whoever wins the election will stay that course—withdrawing U.S. troops, not leaving them in Afghanistan forever.
“At this point, we really do want them gone. It took us a long time to see it, but now we know they are only holding us back,” said a senior security official who did not want to be named.
In Kabul, as in so many other capitals around the world, government officials are watching this year’s election on tenterhooks because the stakes are so high—for both countries.
“Right now, our biggest concern is what happens in seven days,” the official said of a Trump defeat, which polls suggest is likely. Kabul is used to contested elections—the last two presidential races here ended in monthslong disputes and accusations of widespread fraud. But Afghans worry that if Trump loses, the fallout will be a lot worse than anything that happened in Afghanistan in 2014 and 2019.
“Millions of Trump’s supporters are armed. They’re also highly racist—that’s a recipe for disaster. Right now, we’re really hoping things go well in the U.S.,” the official said.
But the stakes are huge for Afghanistan, as well. The peace process kicked off this year has so far delivered anything but. A recent United Nations report on civilian casualties found that despite the start of intra-Afghan talks with the Taliban, “[h]igh levels of violence continue with a devastating impact on civilians, with Afghanistan remaining among the deadliest places in the world to be a civilian.”
If Trump wins, few Afghans have confidence in his ability to carry out his own promises in a timely fashion.In Kabul, the concerns are twofold—and neither outcome is particularly appealing. If Trump wins, few Afghans have confidence in his ability to carry out his own promises in a timely fashion, when delay will just mean more civilian deaths. Edris Lutfi, a former advisor to Afghanistan’s chief executive, said that even if Trump does win, it will be difficult to convince the president to pay due attention to Afghanistan. “Trump is unpredictable,” Lutfi said.
For instance, in an Oct. 7 tweet, Trump managed to blindside both the U.S. Defense Department and officials in Kabul. “We should have the small remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas,” he wrote.
The Afghan security official said that although the tweet caught Kabul by surprise, they couldn’t take it seriously. “We believe him. We believe that he believes what he says, but everyone knows it’s impossible to recall thousands of troops over a two-month period in a pandemic,” the official said.
As impetuous as Trump is, a Joe Biden presidency breeds its own uncertainty for Afghanistan. Afghans who were against the peace process—which essentially gives the Taliban a dominant voice in Afghanistan’s future, in exchange for very little—had initially placed their hope in Biden, saying he would scrap the whole idea, but his subsequent statements have done little to instill confidence in Kabul.
Over the summer, one high-level government advisor had told other high officials that “there is no peace process—Biden will undo it as soon as he wins,” but now even he admits he was wrong. “He hasn’t said anything different from Trump, so let us make our own decisions for ourselves finally,” the government advisor said.
And while Biden has repeatedly said he agrees with a U.S. troop withdrawal, he has made many other comments that have sown plenty of doubts.
Lutfi said he is most worried by a statement Biden made during the New Hampshire Democratic primary debate, where he said: “I was totally against the whole notion of nation building in Afghanistan. The only thing we should be doing is dealing with terrorism in that region.” Biden continued: “There is no possibility of uniting that country, no possibility at all of making it a whole country.”
Lutfi fears the full implications of what Biden said. “Does he believe Afghanistan is too divided and that it’s a lost cause?”
The comments from Biden, who once defended a continued, if reduced, U.S. troop presence in the country, explain why even onetime Afghan backers of an extended U.S. force are washing their hands.“Does [Biden] believe Afghanistan is too divided and that it’s a lost cause?”
“What have they left here? Fundamentally what have they actually built here? Their presence here is affecting our economic and foreign policies, but we haven’t seen enough actual change to warrant that,” the security source said.
Another concern is that a Biden victory would slow the final implementation of the peace process since it would be far from a priority in a term filled with much more urgent domestic emergencies. That dalliance will ultimately only lead to more bloodshed, said Orzala Nemat, the director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, a leading Kabul-based think tank.
“This was all Trump’s political move. His intention was always to win support ahead of elections by saying he ended this war and brought their troops home,” she said. “It’s never been about the Afghan people.”
And the Taliban, who already hit the jackpot with the Trump administration, would likely try to run the table with a new and unproven administration, she said, which would only further slow the peace process and add to the civilian body count.
Yet for many Afghans, there is one potential bright spot to a Biden victory: Everyone Foreign Policy spoke to said Kabul’s biggest hope for a Biden administration is a replacement for Zalmay Khalilzad, the current U.S. special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation. Khalilzad, an Afghan-born academic who served as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan under George W. Bush, has become a highly problematic figure for his handling of the current peace process.
“The Republicans gave a lot to the Taliban,” Nemat said.
Since the announcement of the peace process in February, violence across the country has spiked. According to the U.N., the number of civilian deaths attributed to the Taliban increased by 6 percent in the first nine months of this year. The Taliban’s recent effort to overrun the southern province of Helmand has called their dedication to peace into question.
For many observers, this is more proof of Khalilzad’s failure to hold the group accountable. Lutfi says Khalilzad has been seen as a “failed diplomat” so far. Others have been less charitable. Last year, Hamdullah Mohib, the current Afghan national security advisor, said Khalilzad has ambitions of becoming a “viceroy” in a possible “caretaker government,” something Kabul has adamantly stood against.
In the end, no matter who wins the U.S. election next week, the road ahead will be littered with the same obstacles, and neither candidate has laid out a coherent framework for either a smooth withdrawal or a continued counterterrorism presence. Afghanistan is ready to start moving on—whether Washington has sorted itself out or not.
The security source said he speaks for millions of Afghans. “If they want to be involved in Afghanistan, they are free to invest, but we don’t need their soldiers anymore,” he said.