foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--Yet Another Opposition Leader Targeted in Belarus

MINSK , Belarus—The disappearance of Maria Kolesnikova in Minsk seems to have robbed the anti-government protest movement in Belarus of one of its most prominent figures—even as her precise whereabouts remain unknown .
According to two fellow activists , unidentified men took Kolesnikova off the city streets early on Monday and whisked her to the Ukrainian border , in what appeared to be an attempt to expel her .
The two activists , who were also taken to the border , said they saw Kolesnikova rip up her passport and clamber out of a car window in a desperate attempt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
The activists , who spoke to reporters in Kiev , said she remained at the border and was detained by Belarussian officials .
Nobody has heard from Kolesnikova since Monday , though the Belarusian government confirmed on Wednesday that she had been brought back to Minsk , where she is currently in detention .
Authorities in Belarus have for months been arresting or deporting members of the opposition movement , which is trying to oust President Alexander Lukashenko after 26 years of repressive rule .
Kolesnikova is one of three prominent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Belarus ’ s recent history .
In a country known for its political repression , she is an unlikely leader .
A classically trained musician , Kolesnikova spent much of the last decade in Stuttgart , Germany , performing at and running a cultural center .
She rose to prominence earlier this year as the campaign manager for Viktor Babryka , a former banker who intended to challenge Lukashenko in the Aug. 9 election .
But authorities imprisoned Babryka on charges of illegal financial dealings—in a move broadly believed to be politically motivated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , was also jailed , and a third fled the country , leaving the opposition in disarray .
In response , Kolesnikova and a woman from each of the other two parties formed a pact—setting aside political differences and vowing together to end Lukashenko ’ s 26-year rule .
One of those women was Svetlana Tikhanovskaya , wife of Sergei and the presidential candidate widely believed to be the real winner of the election on August 9 .
But while Tikhanovskaya and the third women in the troika , Veronika Tsepkalo , have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behind , living across the road from the headquarters of the country ’ s state security apparatus known as the KGB—where her former boss is being held .
The setbacks to the movement , including brutal crackdowns and the exile of several of its leaders , was widely expected to precipitate its collapse .
Instead , the opposition to Lukashenko has become more organized and more resilient in recent weeks and months .
Since the election , the movement has formed a “ coordination council ” to facilitate the transfer of power once @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prominent figures , including the former culture minister , Pavel Latushko , and the Nobel Prize-winning Belarusian author Svetlana Alexievich .
But it is Kolesnikova , also a council member , who has emerged as the face of the recent protests .
In the past weeks , she has visited striking factory workers , recorded and shared video statements on the messenger app Telegram , and given interviews to news outlets from around the world .
When pro-Lukashenko demonstrators tried to shout her down at a recent rally in the industrial town of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ We will forgive you ; we will have a dialogue with you , ” she shouted back .
Kolesnikova ’ s press secretary Gleb German told Foreign Policy that Tikhanovskaya had come to rely heavily on Kolesnikova during the election campaign .
“ Svetlana had a lot to say but didn ’ t know how to say it—that ’ s where Maria was important.
” The political role is new to her .
But people close to Kolesnikova say Belarus ’ s cultural sphere has been the main incubator for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent years—given how tightly controlled politics has been .
And friends say Kolesnikova ’ s activism went hand-in-hand with her musical career .
As a student at the Belarusian State Academy of Music , she often clashed with the dean over her unwillingness to participate in pro-government events .
In 2000 and 2006 , she took part in anti-government protests .
“ In Belarus , contemporary art now is very closely related to politics , ” said Ivan Kravtsov , a musician and one of the two aides expelled to Ukraine this week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ component of society , where ideas are generated , debated , and amplified .
It ’ s analogous to what politicians try to do.
” Lukashenko ’ s supporters have cast Kolesnikova as an out-of-touch cosmopolitan who can ’ t possibly understand the struggles of Belarus ’ s rural working class .
Lukashenko , in contrast , is billed as the protector of Belarus ’ s agricultural and industrial heartland .
But in the factories on the edge of Minsk , once a stronghold for Lukashenko , even workers who draw government salaries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heckled by factory workers at a speech on August 17 and called on to resign .
In another incident , he confronted a man filming his speech with a thinly veiled threat .
“ If somebody provokes something here , we will sort it out in a hard way , ” Lukashenko said .
Some pro-Lukashenko figures have attempted to cast the recent unrest in Belarus as Ukraine 2.0—a tug of war between Russia and the European Union or NATO .
But while protesters have occasionally called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reluctant to provoke Russia .
“ I think she understands all kinds of complex connections we have in the regional situation , ” Kravtsov said .
Russia accounts for more than 41 percent of Belarus ’ s exports , and until recently the open border between the countries meant that people could drive from Minsk to Moscow without showing their passports .
During the demonstrations , both Russian and EU flags are often seen waving alongside the red-and-white national flag .
For now , Putin appears to be supporting Lukashenko .
In a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ willing to deploy reserve forces to Belarus should “ extremist elements ” cross the line .
As far as Lukashenko is concerned , Kolesnikova may have already done that .
Until her disappearance , Kolesnikova had appeared in public regularly and vowed not to leave the country .
She has neither children nor a partner in Belarus—making her harder to intimidate .
“ We are stressed , yes—the threat of arrest is very stressful , ” Kravtsov said before disappearance .
“ But honestly , is she afraid ?
I don ’ t @ @ @ @

Maria Kolesnikova sits with former Minister of Culture Pavel Latushko (left) and Coordinating Council member Maksim Znak (right) on their way to a protest in Minsk, Belarus, on Aug. 23.
MINSK, Belarus—The disappearance of Maria Kolesnikova in Minsk seems to have robbed the anti-government protest movement in Belarus of one of its most prominent figures—even as her precise whereabouts remain unknown.
According to two fellow activists, unidentified men took Kolesnikova off the city streets early on Monday and whisked her to the Ukrainian border, in what appeared to be an attempt to expel her.
The two activists, who were also taken to the border, said they saw Kolesnikova rip up her passport and clamber out of a car window in a desperate attempt to avoid being thrown out of the country. The activists, who spoke to reporters in Kiev, said she remained at the border and was detained by Belarussian officials. Nobody has heard from Kolesnikova since Monday, though the Belarusian government confirmed on Wednesday that she had been brought back to Minsk, where she is currently in detention.
Authorities in Belarus have for months been arresting or deporting members of the opposition movement, which is trying to oust President Alexander Lukashenko after 26 years of repressive rule.
Kolesnikova is one of three prominent women leading the broadest protest movement in Belarus’s recent history. In a country known for its political repression, she is an unlikely leader. A classically trained musician, Kolesnikova spent much of the last decade in Stuttgart, Germany, performing at and running a cultural center. She rose to prominence earlier this year as the campaign manager for Viktor Babryka, a former banker who intended to challenge Lukashenko in the Aug. 9 election.
But authorities imprisoned Babryka on charges of illegal financial dealings—in a move broadly believed to be politically motivated. A second candidate, Sergei Tikhanovsky, was also jailed, and a third fled the country, leaving the opposition in disarray. In response, Kolesnikova and a woman from each of the other two parties formed a pact—setting aside political differences and vowing together to end Lukashenko’s 26-year rule. One of those women was Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, wife of Sergei and the presidential candidate widely believed to be the real winner of the election on August 9. But while Tikhanovskaya and the third women in the troika, Veronika Tsepkalo, have since fled Belarus, Kolesnikova has stayed behind, living across the road from the headquarters of the country’s state security apparatus known as the KGB—where her former boss is being held.
The setbacks to the movement, including brutal crackdowns and the exile of several of its leaders, was widely expected to precipitate its collapse. Instead, the opposition to Lukashenko has become more organized and more resilient in recent weeks and months. Since the election, the movement has formed a “coordination council” to facilitate the transfer of power once Lukashenko is ousted. It features some prominent figures, including the former culture minister, Pavel Latushko, and the Nobel Prize-winning Belarusian author Svetlana Alexievich.
But it is Kolesnikova, also a council member, who has emerged as the face of the recent protests. In the past weeks, she has visited striking factory workers, recorded and shared video statements on the messenger app Telegram, and given interviews to news outlets from around the world. When pro-Lukashenko demonstrators tried to shout her down at a recent rally in the industrial town of Zhodino, Kolesnikova struck a conciliatory tone. “We will forgive you; we will have a dialogue with you,” she shouted back.
Kolesnikova’s press secretary Gleb German told Foreign Policy that Tikhanovskaya had come to rely heavily on Kolesnikova during the election campaign. “Svetlana had a lot to say but didn’t know how to say it—that’s where Maria was important.”
The political role is new to her. But people close to Kolesnikova say Belarus’s cultural sphere has been the main incubator for the country’s new political ideas in recent years—given how tightly controlled politics has been. And friends say Kolesnikova’s activism went hand-in-hand with her musical career. As a student at the Belarusian State Academy of Music, she often clashed with the dean over her unwillingness to participate in pro-government events. In 2000 and 2006, she took part in anti-government protests.
“In Belarus, contemporary art now is very closely related to politics,” said Ivan Kravtsov, a musician and one of the two aides expelled to Ukraine this week. “It’s a vital component of society, where ideas are generated, debated, and amplified. It’s analogous to what politicians try to do.”
Lukashenko’s supporters have cast Kolesnikova as an out-of-touch cosmopolitan who can’t possibly understand the struggles of Belarus’s rural working class. Lukashenko, in contrast, is billed as the protector of Belarus’s agricultural and industrial heartland. But in the factories on the edge of Minsk, once a stronghold for Lukashenko, even workers who draw government salaries have joined the protests.
A multistory carpark is filled with people waving flags and cheering as protesters flood the streets of Minsk in a march toward Independence Palace, the site of Lukashenko’s working residency, on Aug. 30.
Lukashenko was heckled by factory workers at a speech on August 17 and called on to resign. In another incident, he confronted a man filming his speech with a thinly veiled threat. “If somebody provokes something here, we will sort it out in a hard way,” Lukashenko said.
Some pro-Lukashenko figures have attempted to cast the recent unrest in Belarus as Ukraine 2.0—a tug of war between Russia and the European Union or NATO. But while protesters have occasionally called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to refrain from interfering, Kolesnikova has seemed reluctant to provoke Russia.
“I think she understands all kinds of complex connections we have in the regional situation,” Kravtsov said.
Russia accounts for more than 41 percent of Belarus’s exports, and until recently the open border between the countries meant that people could drive from Minsk to Moscow without showing their passports. During the demonstrations, both Russian and EU flags are often seen waving alongside the red-and-white national flag.
For now, Putin appears to be supporting Lukashenko. In a recent interview, he said he was willing to deploy reserve forces to Belarus should “extremist elements” cross the line.
As far as Lukashenko is concerned, Kolesnikova may have already done that. Until her disappearance, Kolesnikova had appeared in public regularly and vowed not to leave the country. She has neither children nor a partner in Belarus—making her harder to intimidate.
“We are stressed, yes—the threat of arrest is very stressful,” Kravtsov said before disappearance. “But honestly, is she afraid? I don’t think so.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--Trump Administration Orders U.S. Diplomats to Curtail Contact With WHO

Trump Administration Orders U.S. Diplomats to Curtail Contact With WHO Despite the White House decision to withdraw from the World Health Organization in the midst of a deadly pandemic , American officials have sought to maintain some U.S. influence at the global health agency , promoting a far-reaching reform initiative and granting U.S. diplomats the authority to continue working on WHO programs that fight polio , HIV , and other infectious diseases .
But that effort has been undercut by a new set of orders from the State Department to sharply curtail diplomatic contact with WHO officials—even though the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global health agency until next summer—as well as a U.S. decision to cut funding for the WHO .
The contradictory currents in U.S. policy underscore the challenges facing the Trump administration as it grapples with the fallout of a pandemic that has killed nearly 200,000 Americans : It wants to punish the WHO for what it claims is an unwillingness to hold China accountable for failing to act swiftly to contain the coronavirus .
But it that still relies on the U.N. agency to confront a broad range of deadly diseases that could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tackled abroad .
“ It seems the United States doesn ’ t want to completely cut its relationship with the WHO , ” said Yanzhong Huang , a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations .
“ Like it or not , the U.S. can ’ t live without this organization.
” Earlier this month , American allies Germany and France rebuffed a request from U.S. Assistant Health Secretary Brett Giroir to endorse a U.S.-drafted road map for WHO reform , preferring to develop their own initiative .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aimed at enhancing the WHO ’ s ability to respond rapidly to an emerging pandemic and strengthening its power to investigate outbreaks , as well as calling out countries that fail to fully disclose the emergence of infectious diseases on their soil .
“ We need to consider how best to strengthen Member States ’ responsibilities in an impartial and objective manner when they are not meeting obligations , ” read the confidential U.S. paper , which was obtained by Foreign Policy .
Giroir and Andrew Bremberg , President Donald Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , shared the draft with members of the G-7 nations and with WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus the first week of September .
In contrast to those U.S. efforts to maintain a leadership role in the WHO , the State Department has issued a sweeping directive to U.S. government personnel abroad to pare back interactions with the organization ’ s officials and require them to seek prior approval to participate in WHO-related events and meetings , a full year before the U.S. withdrawal from the body takes effect .
U.S. government personnel can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ specific , limited circumstances ” and must seek prior approval to participate in any WHO events that have a public or media component , according to a cable sent to all diplomatic and consular posts abroad that was obtained exclusively by Foreign Policy .
Still , the cable appears to offer wide latitude for exemptions for activities that promote U.S. national security and economic and commercial interests , including meetings on international standards for tobacco and pharmaceuticals .
It also offers exemptions for programs designed to protect global health , including efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some observers highlights how integral the WHO remains to American health and trade efforts beyond the coronavirus .
Trump announced in May that the United States would withdraw from the WHO , after accusing the organization of mishandling the coronavirus pandemic and catering too much to China .
The U.S. withdrawal would legally take effect next July , though Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden said he would reverse Trump ’ s decision if elected in November .
Many public health experts denounced the decision , fearing it will hamstring domestic and international efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department did not respond to a request for comment .
Last week , State Department officials said the Trump administration would redirect some $ 80 million it owes the WHO to other U.N. programs .
Alma Golden , a senior official at the U.S. Agency for International Development , said during a Sept. 2 briefing that there were exceptions to the U.S. government funding halt , and she said the United States would cooperate in cases “ in which WHO has the unique capabilities that an alternate partner could not replicate at this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensure that our withdrawal from WHO does not affect the level of our overall health assistance to the most vulnerable , ” Golden said .
Administration officials did not name what alternative partners they were referring to .
Nancy Cox , a virologist and former senior official at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , said a U.S. withdrawal from the WHO could heighten the risk of more deadly diseases spreading to the United States in the long run , even with one-time exemptions for specific programs .
She cited global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ It has been very , very difficult to get the number of polio cases down to where we currently are .
There ’ s a real fear that if the U.S. doesn ’ t provide additional personnel , and funding , and technical support , and so on , to complete eradication , there will be a surge in polio cases over the coming years , ” she said .
“ I also think that people here take these things for granted , that we ’ ve conquered a number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” she added .
“ But it ’ s hard to understand what the ripple effects might be because there ’ s so many aspects of WHO activities that could be compromised without U.S. funding and scientific and technical expertise.
” The United States , meanwhile , has been discussing its reform road map for several months with the health ministries of G-7 countries .
It calls for establishing a new early warning system , called an “ amber alert , ” that would trigger a swift response to an evolving threat , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.N. disease hunters to gain speedier access to outbreak areas .
In a veiled reference to the WHO ’ s effusive praise of China ’ s response to the pandemic , the paper urges “ increased objectivity and impartiality ” at the agency and calls for the creation of a new post , the chief scientist ’ s office , to improve the scientific quality of WHO ’ s work .
The paper calls for the establishment of a regular review of member states to ensure they are complying with their obligations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it also encourages states to collaborate in an effort to “ expedite the development , approval , manufacture , and distribution of safe , effective and affordable COVID-19 vaccines , diagnostics and therapeutics.
” But the Trump administration said last week it would not join a WHO-led effort to develop and distribute a coronavirus vaccine targeted at the most vulnerable populations globally , including front-line workers , the ill , and the elderly .
The United States—which has signed billions of dollars in contracts with pharmaceutical companies seeking to produce a vaccine—maintains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries once it has vaccinated the entire American population .
While Germany and France have expressed support for some of the reform proposals that would strengthen the global health agency , they decided to pursue their own separate reform initiative , highlighting the self-inflicted erosion of U.S. influence .
“ They quit the conversation , ” said Huang of the Council on Foreign Relations .
“ The U.S. wanted to play a leadership role and that upset their European counterparts.
” A senior diplomat familiar with the negotiations said Europeans were frustrated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the WHO and global health threats .
“ Everyone understands that global health is a highly politicized issue in U.S. domestic politics , but they have to fish or cut bait and decide if they want to be on the boat or not , ” the diplomat said .
America ’ s “ role as leader in coordinating global health related activities is being undermined , ” Huang added .
“ Basically , they have handed that leadership role to the Chinese on a silver platter .
”

Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer and Allison Meakem

Despite the White House decision to withdraw from the World Health Organization in the midst of a deadly pandemic, American officials have sought to maintain some U.S. influence at the global health agency, promoting a far-reaching reform initiative and granting U.S. diplomats the authority to continue working on WHO programs that fight polio, HIV, and other infectious diseases.
Despite the White House decision to withdraw from the World Health Organization in the midst of a deadly pandemic, American officials have sought to maintain some U.S. influence at the global health agency, promoting a far-reaching reform initiative and granting U.S. diplomats the authority to continue working on WHO programs that fight polio, HIV, and other infectious diseases.
But that effort has been undercut by a new set of orders from the State Department to sharply curtail diplomatic contact with WHO officials—even though the United States will remain a member of the global health agency until next summer—as well as a U.S. decision to cut funding for the WHO.
The contradictory currents in U.S. policy underscore the challenges facing the Trump administration as it grapples with the fallout of a pandemic that has killed nearly 200,000 Americans: It wants to punish the WHO for what it claims is an unwillingness to hold China accountable for failing to act swiftly to contain the coronavirus. But it still relies on the U.N. agency to confront a broad range of deadly diseases that could spread across U.S. borders if not properly tackled abroad.
“It seems the United States doesn’t want to completely cut its relationship with the WHO,” said Yanzhong Huang, a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Like it or not, the U.S. can’t live without this organization.”
Earlier this month, American allies Germany and France rebuffed a request from U.S. Assistant Health Secretary Brett Giroir to endorse a U.S.-drafted road map for WHO reform, preferring to develop their own initiative.
The U.S. paper included an array of proposals aimed at enhancing the WHO’s ability to respond rapidly to an emerging pandemic and strengthening its power to investigate outbreaks, as well as calling out countries that fail to fully disclose the emergence of infectious diseases on their soil.
“We need to consider how best to strengthen Member States’ responsibilities in an impartial and objective manner when they are not meeting obligations,” read the confidential U.S. paper, which was obtained by Foreign Policy. Giroir and Andrew Bremberg, President Donald Trump’s ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, shared the draft with members of the G-7 nations and with WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus the first week of September.
In contrast to those U.S. efforts to maintain a leadership role in the WHO, the State Department has issued a sweeping directive to U.S. government personnel abroad to pare back interactions with the organization’s officials and require them to seek prior approval to participate in WHO-related events and meetings, a full year before the U.S. withdrawal from the body takes effect.
U.S. government personnel can only engage with WHO personnel in “specific, limited circumstances” and must seek prior approval to participate in any WHO events that have a public or media component, according to a cable sent to all diplomatic and consular posts abroad that was obtained exclusively by Foreign Policy.
Still, the cable appears to offer wide latitude for exemptions for activities that promote U.S. national security and economic and commercial interests, including meetings on international standards for tobacco and pharmaceuticals. It also offers exemptions for programs designed to protect global health, including efforts to eradicate polio and Ebola, that for some observers highlights how integral the WHO remains to American health and trade efforts beyond the coronavirus.
Trump announced in May that the United States would withdraw from the WHO, after accusing the organization of mishandling the coronavirus pandemic and catering too much to China. The U.S. withdrawal would legally take effect next July, though Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden said he would reverse Trump’s decision if elected in November.
Many public health experts denounced the decision, fearing it will hamstring domestic and international efforts to tackle the pandemic.
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment.
Last week, State Department officials said the Trump administration would redirect some $80 million it owes the WHO to other U.N. programs. Alma Golden, a senior official at the U.S. Agency for International Development, said during a Sept. 2 briefing that there were exceptions to the U.S. government funding halt, and she said the United States would cooperate in cases “in which WHO has the unique capabilities that an alternate partner could not replicate at this time.”
“USAID is determined to ensure that our withdrawal from WHO does not affect the level of our overall health assistance to the most vulnerable,” Golden said. Administration officials did not name what alternative partners they were referring to.
Nancy Cox, a virologist and former senior official at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, said a U.S. withdrawal from the WHO could heighten the risk of more deadly diseases spreading to the United States in the long run, even with one-time exemptions for specific programs.
She cited global polio eradication efforts as a prime example. “It has been very, very difficult to get the number of polio cases down to where we currently are. There’s a real fear that if the U.S. doesn’t provide additional personnel, and funding, and technical support, and so on, to complete eradication, there will be a surge in polio cases over the coming years,” she said.
“I also think that people here take these things for granted, that we’ve conquered a number of infectious diseases via global immunization programs,” she added. “But it’s hard to understand what the ripple effects might be because there’s so many aspects of WHO activities that could be compromised without U.S. funding and scientific and technical expertise.”
The United States, meanwhile, has been discussing its reform road map for several months with the health ministries of G-7 countries. It calls for establishing a new early warning system, called an “amber alert,” that would trigger a swift response to an evolving threat, and it seeks to increase the authority of U.N. disease hunters to gain speedier access to outbreak areas.
In a veiled reference to the WHO’s effusive praise of China’s response to the pandemic, the paper urges “increased objectivity and impartiality” at the agency and welcomes the creation in March 2019 of a new post, the chief scientist’s office, to improve the scientific quality of WHO’s work.
The paper calls for the establishment of a regular review of member states to ensure they are complying with their obligations to prepare for future pandemics. Ironically, it also encourages states to collaborate in an effort to “expedite the development, approval, manufacture, and distribution of safe, effective and affordable COVID-19 vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics.”
But the Trump administration said last week it would not join a WHO-led effort to develop and distribute a coronavirus vaccine targeted at the most vulnerable populations globally, including front-line workers, the ill, and the elderly. The United States—which has signed billions of dollars in contracts with pharmaceutical companies seeking to produce a vaccine—maintains it will share any effective vaccine with other countries once it has vaccinated the entire American population.
While Germany and France have expressed support for some of the reform proposals that would strengthen the global health agency, they decided to pursue their own separate reform initiative, highlighting the self-inflicted erosion of U.S. influence.
“They quit the conversation,” said Huang of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The U.S. wanted to play a leadership role and that upset their European counterparts.”
A senior diplomat familiar with the negotiations said Europeans were frustrated by America’s contradictory approach to the WHO and global health threats.
“Everyone understands that global health is a highly politicized issue in U.S. domestic politics, but they have to fish or cut bait and decide if they want to be on the boat or not,” the diplomat said.
America’s “role as leader in coordinating global health related activities is being undermined,” Huang added. “Basically, they have handed that leadership role to the Chinese on a silver platter.”
Correction, Sept. 15, 2020: A previous version of this article incorrectly stated that the United States urged the World Health Organization to create a new chief scientist post. The United States welcomed the appointment of a new WHO chief scientist, Soumya Swaminathan, who took up her assignment in March 2019.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--Biden Is Planning Change, Not Hope, for the Middle East

Biden Is Planning Change , Not Hope , for the Middle East The Middle East is the place where U.S. foreign-policy ideals in the post-Cold War era have gone to die : democracy promotion , nation-building , counterinsurgency , humanitarian intervention , and the two-state solution .
In the aftermath of 9/11 , in his 2005 second inaugural address , President George W. Bush said that the “ survival of liberty ” at home depended on the flourishing of liberty in the Middle East , where “ resentment and tyranny ” had spawned global terrorism .
Today , the argument @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but it is not the threat it was even five years ago ; nor does the United States need to depend on regional autocrats to ensure the supply of oil or to temper public anger at Israel to the degree it did until quite recently .
The Middle East “ matters markedly less ” to the United States than it used to , to quote a much-discussed 2019 article by Tamara Cofman Wittes , a former State Department official under President Barack Obama , and Mara Karlin , a former Pentagon official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they concluded , “ to put an end to wishful thinking ” about Washington ’ s ability to affect the internal dynamics or external calculations of regional actors .
This is the Middle East mission that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden would inherit should he win in November .
He will be in a far better position to follow Wittes and Karlin ’ s suggestion to “ pivot ” away from the generational obsession with this intractable region than was Obama , who was pulled back in by the civil wars in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Islamic State ’ s so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq .
Biden is likely to take advantage of that opportunity , though probably not to a degree that would satisfy the realists and progressives who would like to see the United States liquidate its military presence in the region .
Biden is , by temperament , almost as immune to transcendent visions as was former President George H.W .
Bush .
On the great question that would ultimately define Obama ’ s foreign policy—the use of force in the Middle East—then-Vice President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role .
In the fierce debates in the summer of 2009 over policy toward Afghanistan , as I mentioned in an earlier piece , Biden stood up to the generals when they argued for an ambitious counterinsurgency strategy .
He didn ’ t think it would work , and he thought that a counterterrorism approach would satisfy America ’ s national security interests .
Biden also opposed the 2011 intervention in Libya .
“ He was skeptical of some of the grand ideas for transformation in the region , ” said Daniel Benaim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle East advisor and foreign-policy speechwriter during his second term as vice president , “ including our capacity to steer the outcomes of Arab revolutions.
” In the wake of the nuclear agreement with Iran , a former aide said , “ there was a gradient of idealism ” about whether Iran could be nudged to a less adversarial posture toward the West .
( The campaign didn ’ t allow this advisor to speak on the record . )
Biden , he said , “ didn ’ t invest big hopes.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ life under a Biden administration , brave liberal reformers would certainly enjoy more support than they have over the last four years under President Donald Trump , but Biden would greet them more warily than Obama did , or than a President Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren would .
Biden , in short , occupied the realist wing of the Obama administration on Middle East issues .
Trump might claim residence for himself in that wing , too .
But if a “ realist ” is guided by objective interests rather than ephemeral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and value-free mercantilism in the region has emptied that term of all meaning .
He has truckled to brutal autocrats including Egypt ’ s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi Arabia ’ s Mohammed bin Salman even as they have meddled in civil wars in Libya and Yemen in a way that plainly harms U.S. interests .
Biden would not hesitate to criticize their behavior both at home and abroad .
He has said : “ I would end U.S. support for the disastrous Saudi-led war in Yemen and order a reassessment of our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be up to Saudi Arabia , he warned , “ to change its approach.
” The same principle would apply to the United Arab Emirates , which , however , has withdrawn from the Yemen war , made quiet overtures to Iran , and , of course , agreed to open diplomatic relations with Israel .
Biden would strike a new , more distant , equilibrium .
The former aide said that he expects Biden to “ resist pressure from progressives to punish them.
” He would continue working with repressive regimes even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exacerbating local conflicts .
The Middle East would almost certainly be demoted under a President Biden—but how far ?
One senior advisor—who requested anonymity to speak candidly about the campaign—predicts that the Middle East would be “ a distant fourth ” in the order of priorities , after Europe , the Indo-Pacific , and Latin America .
Yet Biden has deep ties to the region , and he is unlikely as president to turn his back on leaders and states that he has worked with closely for years .
In 2009 , Obama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cop of Iraqi politics , keeping that country ’ s sectarian kingpins from tearing one another to shreds and taking the country with them .
Biden took on the job with a zeal , traveling to the region regularly and logging hundreds of hours on the phone .
At the time , as Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was persecuting Sunnis and guiding the country into the arms of Iran , Biden ’ s faith in endless palaver looked hollow .
Today , with Iraq still intact and the worldly Mustafa al-Kadhimi serving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomacy doesn ’ t seem quite so absurd .
While for both progressives and realists Iraq is the perfect example of a quagmire from which the United States needs to extricate itself altogether , Biden , according to his former aide , believes that Iraq “ has a chance to prevent a jihadist upsurge and be a harbinger of a less polarized and more pluralist Middle East , if they get it right.
” Biden would also fortify U.S. relations with moderate states like Jordan , which have been almost trampled underfoot in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gulf sheikdoms , above all Saudi Arabia and the UAE .
Most Middle East experts list thwarting terrorists , ensuring the global flow of oil , and containing Iran as the chief remaining U.S. interests in the region .
The Iran nuclear agreement was the Obama administration ’ s one notable accomplishment in the Middle East ; Trump ’ s unilateral abrogation of the pact has not only failed to rein in Iranian adventurism but has also caused Tehran to restart its nuclear program .
Biden has said that if Iran agrees to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he would do so as well “ as a starting point to work alongside our allies in Europe and other world powers to extend the deal ’ s nuclear constraints.
” That will not be easy : Iran has said that it will not return to the status quo ante—much less agree to extend the current terms—without significant concessions .
It ’ s not clear what kind of offer , if any , Biden would be prepared to make .
Trump has thrown in his lot with Israel as single-mindedly as he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made it clear that he would withdraw that blank check as well .
In a speech earlier this year to the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC , Biden said that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s annexation plans in the West Bank—now in abeyance— “ are taking Israel further from its democratic values , undermining support for Israel in the United States , especially among young people in both political parties.
” That said , Biden has a long history of staunch support for Israel , including as vice president .
He would not threaten @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military assistance to deter further settlement expansion .
Biden remains committed to a two-state solution .
Yet that long-sought goal has receded to a very remote horizon .
Biden could be the first U.S. president in a generation to devote little or no effort to this endlessly glimmering prospect , devoting himself instead to improving conditions for Palestinians and lowering tensions with Israel .
Perhaps the best way to think of Biden ’ s aspirations is to say that he would seek to normalize U.S. relations with the Middle East .
He would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but he also would not tolerate as much as Trump has .
He would be unlikely either to raise expectations or to dash them .
He would not withdraw all American troops from Iraq or Syria or from the network of U.S. bases around the region , but he would be very wary of deploying them in the middle of a civil war .
He would , if lucky , fulfill the dream of many of his predecessors to give the region no more attention than it merits .

The Middle East is the place where U.S. foreign-policy ideals in the post-Cold War era have gone to die: democracy promotion, nation-building, counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention, and the two-state solution. In the aftermath of 9/11, in his 2005 second inaugural address, President George W. Bush said that the “survival of liberty” at home depended on the flourishing of liberty in the Middle East, where “resentment and tyranny” had spawned global terrorism. Today, the argument seems fanciful. Terrorism has hardly vanished, but it is not the threat it was even five years ago; nor does the United States need to depend on regional autocrats to ensure the supply of oil or to temper public anger at Israel to the degree it did until quite recently.
The Middle East is the place where U.S. foreign-policy ideals in the post-Cold War era have gone to die: democracy promotion, nation-building, counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention, and the two-state solution. In the aftermath of 9/11, in his 2005 second inaugural address, President George W. Bush said that the “survival of liberty” at home depended on the flourishing of liberty in the Middle East, where “resentment and tyranny” had spawned global terrorism. Today, the argument seems fanciful. Terrorism has hardly vanished, but it is not the threat it was even five years ago; nor does the United States need to depend on regional autocrats to ensure the supply of oil or to temper public anger at Israel to the degree it did until quite recently.
The Middle East “matters markedly less” to the United States than it used to, to quote a much-discussed 2019 article by Tamara Cofman Wittes, a former State Department official under President Barack Obama, and Mara Karlin, a former Pentagon official under Obama. The time had come, they concluded, “to put an end to wishful thinking” about Washington’s ability to affect the internal dynamics or external calculations of regional actors.
This is the Middle East mission that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden would inherit should he win in November. He will be in a far better position to follow Wittes and Karlin’s suggestion to “pivot” away from the generational obsession with this intractable region than was Obama, who was pulled back in by the civil wars in Libya and Syria and the founding of the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Biden is likely to take advantage of that opportunity, though probably not to a degree that would satisfy the realists and progressives who would like to see the United States liquidate its military presence in the region.
Biden is, by temperament, almost as immune to transcendent visions as was former President George H.W. Bush. On the great question that would ultimately define Obama’s foreign policy—the use of force in the Middle East—then-Vice President Biden played a cautionary and sometimes contrary role. In the fierce debates in the summer of 2009 over policy toward Afghanistan, as I mentioned in an earlier piece, Biden stood up to the generals when they argued for an ambitious counterinsurgency strategy. He didn’t think it would work, and he thought that a counterterrorism approach would satisfy America’s national security interests.
Biden also opposed the 2011 intervention in Libya. “He was skeptical of some of the grand ideas for transformation in the region,” said Daniel Benaim, who served as Biden’s Middle East advisor and foreign-policy speechwriter during his second term as vice president, “including our capacity to steer the outcomes of Arab revolutions.” In the wake of the nuclear agreement with Iran, a former aide said, “there was a gradient of idealism” about whether Iran could be nudged to a less adversarial posture toward the West. (The campaign didn’t allow this advisor to speak on the record.) Biden, he said, “didn’t invest big hopes.” Should the Arab Spring flare back to life under a Biden administration, brave liberal reformers would certainly enjoy more support than they have over the last four years under President Donald Trump, but Biden would greet them more warily than Obama did, or than a President Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren would.
Biden, in short, occupied the realist wing of the Obama administration on Middle East issues. Trump might claim residence for himself in that wing, too. But if a “realist” is guided by objective interests rather than ephemeral values, then Trump’s crass and value-free mercantilism in the region has emptied that term of all meaning. He has truckled to brutal autocrats including Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman even as they have meddled in civil wars in Libya and Yemen in a way that plainly harms U.S. interests. Biden would not hesitate to criticize their behavior both at home and abroad. He has said: “I would end U.S. support for the disastrous Saudi-led war in Yemen and order a reassessment of our relationship with Saudi Arabia.” It would be up to Saudi Arabia, he warned, “to change its approach.”
The same principle would apply to the United Arab Emirates, which, however, has withdrawn from the Yemen war, made quiet overtures to Iran, and, of course, agreed to open diplomatic relations with Israel. Biden would strike a new, more distant, equilibrium. The former aide said that he expects Biden to “resist pressure from progressives to punish them.” He would continue working with repressive regimes even as he sought to deter them from exacerbating local conflicts.
The Middle East would almost certainly be demoted under a President Biden—but how far? One senior advisor—who requested anonymity to speak candidly about the campaign—predicts that the Middle East would be “a distant fourth” in the order of priorities, after Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and Latin America. Yet Biden has deep ties to the region, and he is unlikely as president to turn his back on leaders and states that he has worked with closely for years. In 2009, Obama assigned him to act as a traffic cop of Iraqi politics, keeping that country’s sectarian kingpins from tearing one another to shreds and taking the country with them. Biden took on the job with a zeal, traveling to the region regularly and logging hundreds of hours on the phone. At the time, as Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was persecuting Sunnis and guiding the country into the arms of Iran, Biden’s faith in endless palaver looked hollow. Today, with Iraq still intact and the worldly Mustafa al-Kadhimi serving as prime minister, his belief in diplomacy doesn’t seem quite so absurd.
While for both progressives and realists Iraq is the perfect example of a quagmire from which the United States needs to extricate itself altogether, Biden, according to his former aide, believes that Iraq “has a chance to prevent a jihadist upsurge and be a harbinger of a less polarized and more pluralist Middle East, if they get it right.” Biden would also fortify U.S. relations with moderate states like Jordan, which have been almost trampled underfoot in Trump’s rush to embrace wealthy Gulf sheikdoms, above all Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Most Middle East experts list thwarting terrorists, ensuring the global flow of oil, and containing Iran as the chief remaining U.S. interests in the region. The Iran nuclear agreement was the Obama administration’s one notable accomplishment in the Middle East; Trump’s unilateral abrogation of the pact has not only failed to rein in Iranian adventurism but has also caused Tehran to restart its nuclear program. Biden has said that if Iran agrees to return to the terms of the deal, he would do so as well “as a starting point to work alongside our allies in Europe and other world powers to extend the deal’s nuclear constraints.” That will not be easy: Iran has said that it will not return to the status quo ante—much less agree to extend the current terms—without significant concessions. It’s not clear what kind of offer, if any, Biden would be prepared to make.
Trump has thrown in his lot with Israel as single-mindedly as he has with Saudi Arabia. Biden has made it clear that he would withdraw that blank check as well. In a speech earlier this year to the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC, Biden said that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation plans in the West Bank—now in abeyance—“are taking Israel further from its democratic values, undermining support for Israel in the United States, especially among young people in both political parties.”
That said, Biden has a long history of staunch support for Israel, including as vice president. He would not threaten Israel with, for example, reduced military assistance to deter further settlement expansion. Biden remains committed to a two-state solution. Yet that long-sought goal has receded to a very remote horizon. Biden could be the first U.S. president in a generation to devote little or no effort to this endlessly glimmering prospect, devoting himself instead to improving conditions for Palestinians and lowering tensions with Israel.
Perhaps the best way to think of Biden’s aspirations is to say that he would seek to normalize U.S. relations with the Middle East. He would not ask as much as Obama did, but he also would not tolerate as much as Trump has. He would be unlikely either to raise expectations or to dash them. He would not withdraw all American troops from Iraq or Syria or from the network of U.S. bases around the region, but he would be very wary of deploying them in the middle of a civil war. He would, if lucky, fulfill the dream of many of his predecessors to give the region no more attention than it merits.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--This Election Has Become Dangerous for the U.S. Military

This Election Has Become Dangerous for the U.S. Military Amid fresh controversy over U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s record of mocking veterans and war dead as “ suckers ” and “ losers , ” the U.S. military is right where it least wants to be : in the middle of the 2020 presidential campaign minefield .
Backing its way out of danger will take some careful tiptoeing by military leaders , not to mention good order and discipline from the rank and file .
Memories of the civil-military crisis in June , when Trump proposed sending active-duty troops to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and one careless step could result in a blowup .
Specifically , the military faces four threats that could draw it even further into the U.S. presidential campaign .
The first threat is that continued protests on city streets will once again raise the prospect of Trump deploying active-duty troops to support local law enforcement .
When Trump first went down that road in June , military leaders really did not want the regular military to get that assignment .
A recent survey by the Military Times makes clear that this view @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But such an assignment would not be unprecedented and Trump seems to believe he enjoys a political advantage in stoking the violence—and then taking a heavy-handed approach in response .
Unfortunately , it ’ s reasonable to assume that this issue will return before Election Day .
Trump has politicized the military in a new and dangerously divisive way by claiming that the senior brass are warmongers .
The second threat that could draw the military even further into electoral politics is the Trump campaign ’ s reliance on portraying him as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ portrayal is belied by evidence that Trump ’ s popularity with the military has significantly declined—a loss of popularity that ’ s easily explainable given the mismatch between the military ’ s professional ethic , which prizes norms and standards , and Trump ’ s disdain for all norms and standards .
The threat is that Trump will overreact and overcompensate .
Shortly after the Military Times broke its story about Trump ’ s declining popularity among U.S. troops , the Trump campaign released a list of some 700 veterans who professed their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practice of trotting out officers in support of a candidate , which has been a regular part of the presidential election cycle for both Republicans and Democrats since 1992 , probably does more to politicize the military than help the candidate .
Yet every four years , the campaigns seek to outdo each other with ever longer lists of senior brass .
This time , the Trump campaign did not trot out senior officers .
Trump ’ s list of 700 veteran supporters is noteworthy for how underwhelming it was .
With some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the inconvenient truth is that any presidential candidate—even Kanye West—could find 700 low-level veterans to sign an endorsement letter , as the Trump campaign has just done .
The list was noteworthy for how few senior retired military were willing to put their names on it .
As was the Republican National Convention , where the only visible military were low-profile .
Perhaps both parties are keeping the heavy brass artillery in reserve for a future skirmish , but until now the striking fact is how junior , in military terms , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explain away his ringing lack of senior endorsements , Trump has politicized the senior brass in a new and dangerously divisive way by claiming that U.S. military leaders are warmongers opposed to the peacemaker Trump .
Trump ’ s view that he is more popular with the rank and file than the leadership may even have a kernel of truth : Negative opinions about Trump probably correlate with military rank , since the higher ranks are more likely to come into contact with the way he acts as commander in chief and be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ third threat is Trump ’ s history of anti-military statements , which are available to be dredged up and deployed as campaign fodder .
This happened most vividly in the recent story by Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic , alleging that Trump disparaged U.S. war dead at the time of the 2018 World War I centenary in France .
Goldberg said his reporting is ongoing , suggesting more stories like this in the offing .
Of course , each new report of Trump mocking soldiers risks driving him to overcompensate in some other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the daily campaign gyre .
But the really ominous threat is the fourth one : the prospect that the military will be asked to resolve a contested election by forcibly preventing the losing candidate from keeping or grabbing political power .
Unlike the other three threats , there really is no precedent in U.S. history for the military playing this role .
That , however , did not stop two prominent pundits from openly urging the military to prepare for precisely this mission a few weeks ago , or another law professor from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exercise that concluded the military might be pressed to intervene in a close election .
Even though other distinguished voices have pressed back against this dangerous narrative , the concerns are palpable and likely to grow .
The really ominous threat is the prospect that the military will be asked to resolve a contested election .
Thankfully , the senior military seem quite ill at ease with their current predicament .
The United States enjoys the fruits of having a powerful military and healthy civil-military relations—especially compared with other great military powers in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gotten completely comfortable playing a partisan political role .
The military ’ s revulsion reflex when it comes to partisan politics is healthy for U.S. democracy .
It should be allowed to quietly retreat from the campaign field while the civilians do the partisan fighting .

Amid fresh controversy over U.S. President Donald Trump’s record of mocking veterans and war dead as “suckers” and “losers,” the U.S. military is right where it least wants to be: in the middle of the 2020 presidential campaign minefield. Backing its way out of danger will take some careful tiptoeing by military leaders, not to mention good order and discipline from the rank and file. Memories of the civil-military crisis in June, when Trump proposed sending active-duty troops to quell urban protests, are still fresh, and one careless step could result in a blowup.
Amid fresh controversy over U.S. President Donald Trump’s record of mocking veterans and war dead as “suckers” and “losers,” the U.S. military is right where it least wants to be: in the middle of the 2020 presidential campaign minefield. Backing its way out of danger will take some careful tiptoeing by military leaders, not to mention good order and discipline from the rank and file. Memories of the civil-military crisis in June, when Trump proposed sending active-duty troops to quell urban protests, are still fresh, and one careless step could result in a blowup.
Specifically, the military faces four threats that could draw it even further into the U.S. presidential campaign.
The first threat is that continued protests on city streets will once again raise the prospect of Trump deploying active-duty troops to support local law enforcement. When Trump first went down that road in June, military leaders really did not want the regular military to get that assignment. A recent survey by the Military Times makes clear that this view is shared widely among career military professionals. But such an assignment would not be unprecedented and Trump seems to believe he enjoys a political advantage in stoking the violence—and then taking a heavy-handed approach in response. Unfortunately, it’s reasonable to assume that this issue will return before Election Day.
Trump has politicized the military in a new and dangerously divisive way by claiming that the senior brass are warmongers.
The second threat that could draw the military even further into electoral politics is the Trump campaign’s reliance on portraying him as the flag-embracing, pro-military candidate. This portrayal is belied by evidence that Trump’s popularity with the military has significantly declined—a loss of popularity that’s easily explainable given the mismatch between the military’s professional ethic, which prizes norms and standards, and Trump’s disdain for all norms and standards. The threat is that Trump will overreact and overcompensate.
Shortly after the Military Times broke its story about Trump’s declining popularity among U.S. troops, the Trump campaign released a list of some 700 veterans who professed their support for his reelection. This tawdry practice of trotting out officers in support of a candidate, which has been a regular part of the presidential election cycle for both Republicans and Democrats since 1992, probably does more to politicize the military than help the candidate. Yet every four years, the campaigns seek to outdo each other with ever longer lists of senior brass.
This time, the Trump campaign did not trot out senior officers. Trump’s list of 700 veteran supporters is noteworthy for how underwhelming it was. With some 18 million veterans still alive and kicking, the inconvenient truth is that any presidential candidate—even Kanye West—could find 700 low-level veterans to sign an endorsement letter, as the Trump campaign has just done. The list was noteworthy for how few senior retired military were willing to put their names on it. As was the Republican National Convention, where the only visible military were low-profile. Perhaps both parties are keeping the heavy brass artillery in reserve for a future skirmish, but until now the striking fact is how junior, in military terms, Trump’s endorsers are.
To explain away his ringing lack of senior endorsements, Trump has politicized the senior brass in a new and dangerously divisive way by claiming that U.S. military leaders are warmongers opposed to the peacemaker Trump. Trump’s view that he is more popular with the rank and file than the leadership may even have a kernel of truth: Negative opinions about Trump probably correlate with military rank, since the higher ranks are more likely to come into contact with the way he acts as commander in chief and be turned off by his behavior.
The third threat is Trump’s history of anti-military statements, which are available to be dredged up and deployed as campaign fodder. This happened most vividly in the recent story by Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic, alleging that Trump disparaged U.S. war dead at the time of the 2018 World War I centenary in France. Goldberg said his reporting is ongoing, suggesting more stories like this in the offing.
Of course, each new report of Trump mocking soldiers risks driving him to overcompensate in some other way that further drags the military into the daily campaign gyre.
But the really ominous threat is the fourth one: the prospect that the military will be asked to resolve a contested election by forcibly preventing the losing candidate from keeping or grabbing political power. Unlike the other three threats, there really is no precedent in U.S. history for the military playing this role. That, however, did not stop two prominent pundits from openly urging the military to prepare for precisely this mission a few weeks ago, or another law professor from reporting on the results of a war-gaming exercise that concluded the military might be pressed to intervene in a close election. Even though other distinguished voices have pressed back against this dangerous narrative, the concerns are palpable and likely to grow.
The really ominous threat is the prospect that the military will be asked to resolve a contested election.
Thankfully, the senior military seem quite ill at ease with their current predicament. The United States enjoys the fruits of having a powerful military and healthy civil-military relations—especially compared with other great military powers in history—precisely because the U.S. military has never gotten completely comfortable playing a partisan political role.
The military’s revulsion reflex when it comes to partisan politics is healthy for U.S. democracy. It should be allowed to quietly retreat from the campaign field while the civilians do the partisan fighting.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--‘Da 5 Bloods’ Forgot Vietnamese Lives Matter

Spike Lee ’ s recent Netflix Vietnam War film Da 5 Bloods is deliberately and forthrightly anti-war .
It includes footage of Martin Luther King Jr. , Muhammad Ali , and Malcolm X trenchantly connecting the United States ’ racism at home to imperialism abroad .
Its soundtrack is centered on Marvin Gaye ’ s 1971 anti-war album What ’ s Going On .
With deliberate didacticism , it points out that Black soldiers were drafted to fight in Vietnam at brutally disproportionate rates , and implicitly rebukes past films on the subject , from John Wayne and Ray Kellogg @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to classics such as Francis Ford Coppola ’ s 1979 film Apocalypse Now , which center the experience of white soldiers .
Yet the movie ’ s heist plot is at variance with its anti-war themes .
Four Black U.S. soldiers return to Vietnam decades after their service , and you are encouraged to cheer as they shoot anonymous Vietnamese gangsters while stealing Vietnamese gold .
Even as it condemns U.S. involvement in Vietnam , the movie reflexively restages that conflict for the usual violent thrills .
Lee ’ s anti-war and anti-racist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ genre he ’ s working in .
The rules of that genre say that U.S. Vietnam films must be about the United States .
They must show Vietnamese secondary characters getting shot down as part of the spiritual or material journey of the U.S. soldiers you are supposed to identify with .
As Viet Thanh Nguyen wrote in an article about Da 5 Bloods for the New York Times , “ For Vietnamese people , as well as Laotians , Cambodians and Hmong , their role [ in Hollywood films ] is almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ function : to be helpful , rescued , blamed , analyzed , mocked , abused , raped , killed , spoken for , spoken over , misunderstood or all of the above.
” It is difficult to create a U.S. anti-war film when the United States is unwilling to fully acknowledge the humanity , and the stories , of the roughly 1 million Vietnamese people it helped to kill .
That ’ s been the pattern throughout the United States ’ attempts to engage with Vietnam at the movies .
Instead of trying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , U.S. filmmakers have tried to convey anti-war messages through two related methods : showing that war is hell and trying to bring the war home .
The ultimate horror is for the United States to become what Vietnam is already assumed to be .
Movies such as Apocalypse Now , Platoon , and Full Metal Jacket use Hollywood ’ s full barrage of special effects to create panoramas of explosions , blood , and terror .
They emphasize the carnage and chaos of war to scare the U.S. public straight into pacifism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hyperbolic realism to create fanciful scenarios in which the war is transplanted to the United States .
In First Blood , the distinctly unheroic 1982 launch of the Rambo franchise , U.S. veteran John Rambo ( played by Sylvester Stallone ) terrorizes a small town in Washington state , using Viet Cong tactics to make them experience a war they thought they had safely left overseas and in the past .
Jacob ’ s Ladder , released in 1990 , is a hallucinatory paranoid fever dream , in which the military stalks a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a war he can never escape .
The problem with these movies is that intense identification with veterans does not necessarily lead to a repudiation of war .
On the contrary , the slogan “ support the troops ” is typically used in contemporary U.S. discourse by militarists who want to silence antiwar critiques .
First Blood , which was meant at least in part to show civilians the horror of war , gave way in its 1985 sequel , Rambo : First Blood Part II , to an orgy of violent validation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lots of people and blow up stuff .
To take the side of veterans can mean ending war , but much more often it means committing more viscerally to victory and killing the enemy .
That ’ s the case in Da 5 Bloods , which , like Rambo , has its veterans return to Vietnam to symbolically complete the mission they left unfinished the first time out .
Instead of suggesting that we owe veterans less war , these films suggest we owe veterans victory , in the form of cathartic victories @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In this vein , Da 5 Bloods ends up effectively conflating reparations owed to Black soldiers as Black people in the United States , which is a moral necessity , and reparations owed to Black soldiers as soldiers in a war of imperial conquest , which is much less righteous , especially when those funds are stolen from the people who were invaded .
The same dynamic is in effect with the “ war is hell ” films .
Violence may be meant to dissuade , but it ’ s also a cool @ @ @ @ @ @ @ becoming men and taking revenge .
Full Metal Jacket , in particular , shows Vietnam as a grubby fantasy of cheap sex workers and male bonding , concluding with the hero shooting a dying woman enemy while a companion breathes in awe , “ Hardcore.
” This is not a recipe for dissuading young men from enlisting .
Indeed , at least one former soldier has written about how the movie helped convince him to sign up .
As long as U.S. soldiers are the protagonists of Vietnam War films , viewers are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the protagonists are morally compromised , even if they die .
U.S. war films that center U.S. soldiers will always end up justifying U.S. wars .
It ’ s illuminating in this respect to look at Vietnamese films about what is known in Vietnam as the American War .
Vietnam ’ s film industry is not large , and movies available in English translation are few and far between .
There are some examples , though .
For instance , the 1975 film The Girl From Hanoi provides a starkly different view @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Girl From Hanoi is a frankly propagandistic North Vietnamese production .
It is about a young girl , Ha Ngoc ( played by Lan Huong Nguyen ) whose father goes off to fight the invading U.S. troops .
Her mother dies in a U.S. bombing while trying to save other children .
Ha Ngoc heads toward the front to find her father .
She is helped along the way by other soldiers and civilians , and is finally adopted by an artilleryman .
The movie ends with scenes of the Vietnamese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speech by North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh .
The Girl From Hanoi is not anti-war .
It is anti-imperialist , though , and it does considerably more to question the logic of U.S. intervention than Platoon or even Da 5 Bloods .
After watching U.S. Vietnam films all one ’ s life , it ’ s a shock to see the Vietnamese as the heroes , caring for each other as they are bombed and shot by the distant , implacable antagonist which is the U.S. military .
There are more subtle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dinh at the Guardian has noted that most U.S. Vietnam war movies portray Vietnam as an atavistic nightmare .
“ In Apocalypse Now , ” he writes , “ Vietnam is more or less one continuous jungle , with corpses casually dangling from trees , and arrows and spears flying out of the foliage.
” In fact , Vietnam was heavily urbanized even in the 1970s , and The Girl From Hanoi shows a densely populated country , with military tech advanced enough to challenge the United States with anti-aircraft guns , not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for hundreds of miles that defeated the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu , not jungle skills .
The Girl From Hanoi portrays Vietnamese people as contemporary peers , rather than as a backward culture to be swept away for its own good .
The 1984 film When the Tenth Month Comes is even more bracing for Western viewers .
Written and directed by Dang Nhat Minh in black and white , it may be the only Vietnamese film of the era that avoids being propaganda .
It tells the story @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , a woman whose husband has died fighting in the South .
She finds out about his death only a year afterward , and continues to keep the news from his father , her young son , and the village , to spare them and herself .
The only gunfire in the movie is the “ bang !
bang !
” noise that Duyen ’ s son makes when he fires the toy gun she buys him , pretending it ’ s a gift from his dad .
The story is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grief and the relationship between memory , fantasy , and violence .
Duyen is an actress who takes part in a traditional Vietnamese drama about a soldier who fails to return ; she breaks down and flees the stage after singing the lines , “ The seasons will pass , dead flowers and leaves will return to the land.
” At a shrine she meets ghosts of past battles in Vietnam , including her husband , reflecting a real and common belief in the literal hauntings of the land that persists in Vietnam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ living to have happiness , ” the ghost says quietly .
U.S. Vietnam War films , including Da 5 Bloods , restage combat over and over , trying to cauterize the wound with more blood .
When the Tenth Month Comes , in contrast , suggests that we honor the dead best by loving each other .
Dayun tries to imagine her way into a world where war didn ’ t take her husband from her .
Doing so doesn ’ t erase the past , but may point a way to a @ @ @

Spike Lee's recent Netflix Vietnam War film Da 5 Bloods is deliberately and forthrightly anti-war. It includes footage of Martin Luther King Jr. , Muhammad Ali , and Malcolm X trenchantly connecting the United States' racism at home to imperialism abroad. Its soundtrack is centered on Marvin Gaye's 1971 anti-war album What's Going On. With deliberate didacticism, it points out that Black soldiers were drafted to fight in Vietnam at brutally disproportionate rates , and implicitly rebukes past films on the subject, from John Wayne and Ray Kellogg’s 1968 film The Green Berets to classics such as Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 film Apocalypse Now, which center the experience of white soldiers.
Spike Lee’s recent Netflix Vietnam War film Da 5 Bloods is deliberately and forthrightly anti-war. It includes footage of Martin Luther King Jr., Muhammad Ali, and Malcolm X trenchantly connecting the United States’ racism at home to imperialism abroad. Its soundtrack is centered on Marvin Gaye’s 1971 anti-war album What’s Going On. With deliberate didacticism, it points out that Black soldiers were drafted to fight in Vietnam at brutally disproportionate rates, and implicitly rebukes past films on the subject, from John Wayne and Ray Kellogg’s 1968 film The Green Berets to classics such as Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 film Apocalypse Now, which center the experience of white soldiers.
Yet the movie’s heist plot is at variance with its anti-war themes. Four Black U.S. soldiers return to Vietnam decades after their service, and you are encouraged to cheer as they shoot anonymous Vietnamese gangsters while stealing Vietnamese gold. Even as it condemns U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the movie reflexively restages that conflict for the usual violent thrills. Lee’s anti-war and anti-racist commitments crumble before the firepower of the genre he’s working in.
The rules of that genre say that U.S. Vietnam films must be about the United States. They must show Vietnamese secondary characters getting shot down as part of the spiritual or material journey of the U.S. soldiers you are supposed to identify with. As Viet Thanh Nguyen wrote in an article about Da 5 Bloods for the New York Times, “For Vietnamese people, as well as Laotians, Cambodians and Hmong, their role [in Hollywood films] is almost always that of the extra, their function: to be helpful, rescued, blamed, analyzed, mocked, abused, raped, killed, spoken for, spoken over, misunderstood or all of the above.” It is difficult to create a U.S. anti-war film when the United States is unwilling to fully acknowledge the humanity, and the stories, of the roughly 1 million Vietnamese people it helped to kill.
That’s been the pattern throughout the United States’ attempts to engage with Vietnam at the movies. Instead of trying to see the war through Vietnamese eyes, U.S. filmmakers have tried to convey anti-war messages through two related methods: showing that war is hell and trying to bring the war home. The ultimate horror is for the United States to become what Vietnam is already assumed to be.
Movies such as Apocalypse Now, Platoon, and Full Metal Jacket use Hollywood’s full barrage of special effects to create panoramas of explosions, blood, and terror. They emphasize the carnage and chaos of war to scare the U.S. public straight into pacifism.
Other films move away from this hyperbolic realism to create fanciful scenarios in which the war is transplanted to the United States. In First Blood, the distinctly unheroic 1982 launch of the Rambo franchise, U.S. veteran John Rambo (played by Sylvester Stallone) terrorizes a small town in Washington state, using Viet Cong tactics to make them experience a war they thought they had safely left overseas and in the past. Jacob’s Ladder, released in 1990, is a hallucinatory paranoid fever dream, in which the military stalks a veteran through his civilian life, extending a war he can never escape.
The problem with these movies is that intense identification with veterans does not necessarily lead to a repudiation of war. On the contrary, the slogan “support the troops” is typically used in contemporary U.S. discourse by militarists who want to silence antiwar critiques. First Blood, which was meant at least in part to show civilians the horror of war, gave way in its 1985 sequel, Rambo: First Blood Part II, to an orgy of violent validation as Rambo returned to Vietnam to kill lots of people and blow up stuff.
To take the side of veterans can mean ending war, but much more often it means committing more viscerally to victory and killing the enemy. That’s the case in Da 5 Bloods, which, like Rambo, has its veterans return to Vietnam to symbolically complete the mission they left unfinished the first time out. Instead of suggesting that we owe veterans less war, these films suggest we owe veterans victory, in the form of cathartic victories over old enemies and cash payments. In this vein, Da 5 Bloods ends up effectively conflating reparations owed to Black soldiers as Black people in the United States, which is a moral necessity, and reparations owed to Black soldiers as soldiers in a war of imperial conquest, which is much less righteous, especially when those funds are stolen from the people who were invaded.
The same dynamic is in effect with the “war is hell” films. Violence may be meant to dissuade, but it’s also a cool and exciting part of narratives about boys becoming men and taking revenge. Full Metal Jacket, in particular, shows Vietnam as a grubby fantasy of cheap sex workers and male bonding, concluding with the hero shooting a dying woman enemy while a companion breathes in awe, “Hardcore.” This is not a recipe for dissuading young men from enlisting. Indeed, at least one former soldier has written about how the movie helped convince him to sign up. As long as U.S. soldiers are the protagonists of Vietnam War films, viewers are going to want to be those protagonists—even if the protagonists are morally compromised, even if they die. U.S. war films that center U.S. soldiers will always end up justifying U.S. wars.
It’s illuminating in this respect to look at Vietnamese films about what is known in Vietnam as the American War. Vietnam’s film industry is not large, and movies available in English translation are few and far between. There are some examples, though. For instance, the 1975 film The Girl From Hanoi provides a starkly different view of the conflict than any U.S. film.
The Girl From Hanoi is a frankly propagandistic North Vietnamese production. It is about a young girl, Ha Ngoc (played by Lan Huong Nguyen) whose father goes off to fight the invading U.S. troops. Her mother dies in a U.S. bombing while trying to save other children. Ha Ngoc heads toward the front to find her father. She is helped along the way by other soldiers and civilians, and is finally adopted by an artilleryman. The movie ends with scenes of the Vietnamese shooting down U.S. planes and an anti-imperialist speech by North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh.
The Girl From Hanoi is not anti-war. It is anti-imperialist, though, and it does considerably more to question the logic of U.S. intervention than Platoon or even Da 5 Bloods. After watching U.S. Vietnam films all one’s life, it’s a shock to see the Vietnamese as the heroes, caring for each other as they are bombed and shot by the distant, implacable antagonist which is the U.S. military.
There are more subtle tweaks to Hollywood narratives too. Linh Dinh at the Guardian has noted that most U.S. Vietnam war movies portray Vietnam as an atavistic nightmare. “In Apocalypse Now,” he writes, “Vietnam is more or less one continuous jungle, with corpses casually dangling from trees, and arrows and spears flying out of the foliage.” In fact, Vietnam was heavily urbanized even in the 1970s, and The Girl From Hanoi shows a densely populated country, with military tech advanced enough to challenge the United States with anti-aircraft guns, not arrows. It was heavy artillery dragged for hundreds of miles that defeated the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, not jungle skills. The Girl From Hanoi portrays Vietnamese people as contemporary peers, rather than as a backward culture to be swept away for its own good.
The 1984 film When the Tenth Month Comes is even more bracing for Western viewers. Written and directed by Dang Nhat Minh in black and white, it may be the only Vietnamese film of the era that avoids being propaganda. It tells the story of Duyen (played by Van Le), a woman whose husband has died fighting in the South. She finds out about his death only a year afterward, and continues to keep the news from his father, her young son, and the village, to spare them and herself.
The only gunfire in the movie is the “bang! bang!” noise that Duyen’s son makes when he fires the toy gun she buys him, pretending it’s a gift from his dad. The story is not about revenge or fighting, but about grief and the relationship between memory, fantasy, and violence. Duyen is an actress who takes part in a traditional Vietnamese drama about a soldier who fails to return; she breaks down and flees the stage after singing the lines, “The seasons will pass, dead flowers and leaves will return to the land.” At a shrine she meets ghosts of past battles in Vietnam, including her husband, reflecting a real and common belief in the literal hauntings of the land that persists in Vietnam today. “I want those still living to have happiness,” the ghost says quietly.
U.S. Vietnam War films, including Da 5 Bloods, restage combat over and over, trying to cauterize the wound with more blood. When the Tenth Month Comes, in contrast, suggests that we honor the dead best by loving each other. Dayun tries to imagine her way into a world where war didn’t take her husband from her. Doing so doesn’t erase the past, but may point a way to a better future.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--Don’t Trust Boris Johnson’s Britain

Don’t Trust Boris Johnson’s Britain

Back from the summer holidays , some London-based Brexit commentators quickly raised hopes for a deal with the EU .
Mujtaba Rahman of the Eurasia Group wrote on Twitter : “ The only Q that matters is whether @ BorisJohnson believes an EU deal is in his political interest … I remain of the view that ’ s the case .
I don ’ t buy the idea they ’ ve given up.
” Even an incendiary interview in the Mail on Sunday , in which Britain ’ s Chief Brexit negotiator David Frost asserted that his EU interlocutor Michel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ France , didn ’ t move them .
The optimists spoke too soon .
A government minister declared bluntly in the House of Commons that the government intended to “ break international law.
” Some said the noises from Downing Street were a “ cry for help.
” But if that was the bait , then came the switch .
The U.K. government announced on Tuesday that it would pass legislation to unilaterally override the Withdrawal Agreement .
And it wasn ’ t just any bit , but the most contentious part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protocol .
The protocol keeps Northern Ireland within the EU ’ s single market for trade in goods ( and some associated services ) , at the cost of requiring some tariffs to be paid on goods travelling from Northern Ireland to the island of Great Britain .
( The U.K. then promised to compensate Northern Irish businesses for those tariffs , as long as they fell within EU wide limits to state aid for companies ) .
This was the deal—in case COVID-19 has robbed the country of its memory—that Boris Johnson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ December ’ s general election , and which was ratified by his new majority of MPs when they passed the Withdrawal Agreement Act in January 2020 .
In the best Xi Jinping style , Johnson ’ s spokesman announced “ limited clarifications ” to the treaty while a government minister declared bluntly in the House of Commons that the government intended to “ break international law ” —a statement that even drew a rebuke from the usually conciliatory and rarely outspoken former Prime Minister Theresa May .
The legislation published later was even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ above “ any other legislation , convention or rule of international or domestic law whatsoever.
” The furious replies from abroad came instantly .
The French ambassador to Ireland warned ominously that “ negotiations on the future relationship would be affected.
” Ireland ’ s foreign minister adopted the lofty iciness once used by British officials commenting on Irish rebel outrages , calling it “ unwise.
” The response of German TV may be best paraphrased by the old joke : “ Why does the sun never set on the British Empire ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ an Englishman in the dark.
” The joke however , is on them .
The reversal should not be a surprise .
Back in 2019 , Johnson calmed his worried MPs by telling them not to worry about the Withdrawal Agreement ; they could always change it later .
Like the work of all the best charlatans , his signature on the treaty was a lie in plain sight .
Yet this is more than just the chronic unreliability of a man who won ’ t even disclose the number of children he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deeper problem , rooted in the British understanding of sovereignty .
Britain likes to think its Parliament is all-powerful and sovereign : That is indeed why it had such trouble with EU law , and its enforcement by European courts .
Unlike smaller countries , Britain ’ s memory of its pre-EU existence is as a great power—in a time when there were few constraints on its international action .
As one acquaintance said to me on Twitter : “ The UK is a sovereign nation and can do what it wants , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” which would be “ deemed acceptable costs.
” This is a transactional view of international relations , where there are no unbreakable rules , and unreliability is merely a cost of doing business that needs to be balanced against the benefits it brings .
It suited the British Empire , which was powerful enough to absorb that cost , and this was generally how all European powers thought until 1939 .
Treaties were for the little guys ; the big boys relied on the balance of power .
In the heyday of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little guys ; the big boys relied on the balance of power .
The concept of a treaty directly contradicts the Brexiteers ’ understanding of sovereignty .
If a treaty is designed to control the behavior of its signatories , it can not be unilaterally overturned by any one of them .
Like any contract , it needs to be amended by mutual agreement .
What ’ s the point , after all , of signing a deal with a country that feels itself free to renege on it ?
Brexit is ostensibly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international restraints , of which the EU is only the most obvious .
The most clear-eyed Brexiteers , like my Twitter interlocutor , accept the high transaction costs that come with this freedom .
Johnson dismisses them , preferring to “ have his cake and eat it , ” so entered into the agreement with what Jesuit theologians call a “ mental reservation ” —a necessary lie .
Although everyone else seems to have forgotten , the potential perfidy of Albion didn ’ t escape Michel Barnier ’ s team who made sure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ punishable , as Holger Hestermeyer , an expert in international dispute resolution at Kings College London explained to me , by lump sum fines .
If those are not paid , the EU can suspend parts of any other agreements it has with the U.K .
Airline routes , the rights of British trucks to drive on EU roads , the City of London ’ s clearing operations , and so-called data adequacy rulings vital to the U.K. tech industry , would all be at risk .
So too would a trade agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement would be treated as a hostile act by the Irish lobby , and as the Pennsylvania Congressman Brendan Boyle explained on British Radio , it is likely to sink a U.S. trade deal .
And if unknown legislators don ’ t worry Downing Street , Johnson would do well to consider the wisdom of antagonizing another Irish Catholic from Pennsylvania who could be president in a few months : Joe Biden .
As things stand , the likely end result is no trade deal with the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , either .
This wasn ’ t the technical detail of what Brexiteers promised in the 2016 referendum , nor what Boris Johnson promised in the 2019 election campaign .
It is also unlikely to have been the deliberate aim of a government whose coronavirus response revealed that it has trouble planning for anything other than its preferred outcome .
But it is entirely in line with the transactional diplomacy and imperial-era sovereignty spirit of the Brexiteers .
It also has the hallmark of the make-it-up-as-you-go-along style of a government that is led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ author like Winston Churchill , but by a former columnist who was once fired from The Times for making up a quote , and has since propelled his career by making up lies about the EU .

Back from the summer holidays, some London-based Brexit commentators quickly raised hopes for a deal with the EU. Mujtaba Rahman of the Eurasia Group wrote on Twitter: “The only Q that matters is whether @BorisJohnson believes an EU deal is in his political interest ... I remain of the view that’s the case. I don’t buy the idea they’ve given up.”
Back from the summer holidays, some London-based Brexit commentators quickly raised hopes for a deal with the EU. Mujtaba Rahman of the Eurasia Group wrote on Twitter: “The only Q that matters is whether @BorisJohnson believes an EU deal is in his political interest … I remain of the view that’s the case. I don’t buy the idea they’ve given up.”
Even an incendiary interview in the Mail on Sunday, in which Britain’s Chief Brexit negotiator David Frost asserted that his EU interlocutor Michel Barnier was being abandoned by his native France, didn’t move them.
The optimists spoke too soon.
A government minister declared bluntly in the House of Commons that the government intended to “break international law.”
Some said the noises from Downing Street were a “cry for help.” But if that was the bait, then came the switch. The U.K. government announced on Tuesday that it would pass legislation to unilaterally override the Withdrawal Agreement. And it wasn’t just any bit, but the most contentious part of the 177-page text: the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol.
The protocol keeps Northern Ireland within the EU’s single market for trade in goods (and some associated services), at the cost of requiring some tariffs to be paid on goods travelling from Northern Ireland to the island of Great Britain. (The U.K. then promised to compensate Northern Irish businesses for those tariffs, as long as they fell within EU wide limits to state aid for companies).
This was the deal—in case COVID-19 has robbed the country of its memory—that Boris Johnson signed last November, campaigned for in December’s general election, and which was ratified by his new majority of MPs when they passed the Withdrawal Agreement Act in January 2020.
In the best Xi Jinping style, Johnson’s spokesman announced “limited clarifications” to the treaty while a government minister declared bluntly in the House of Commons that the government intended to “break international law”—a statement that even drew a rebuke from the usually conciliatory and rarely outspoken former Prime Minister Theresa May. The legislation published later was even more radical, attempting to put itself above “any other legislation, convention or rule of international or domestic law whatsoever.”
The furious replies from abroad came instantly. The French ambassador to Ireland warned ominously that “negotiations on the future relationship would be affected.” Ireland’s foreign minister adopted the lofty iciness once used by British officials commenting on Irish rebel outrages, calling it “unwise.” The response of German TV may be best paraphrased by the old joke: “Why does the sun never set on the British Empire? Because even God doesn’t trust an Englishman in the dark.”
The joke however, is on them. The reversal should not be a surprise. Back in 2019, Johnson calmed his worried MPs by telling them not to worry about the Withdrawal Agreement; they could always change it later. Like the work of all the best charlatans, his signature on the treaty was a lie in plain sight.
Yet this is more than just the chronic unreliability of a man who won’t even disclose the number of children he has. It’s a much deeper problem, rooted in the British understanding of sovereignty. Britain likes to think its Parliament is all-powerful and sovereign: That is indeed why it had such trouble with EU law, and its enforcement by European courts. Unlike smaller countries, Britain’s memory of its pre-EU existence is as a great power—in a time when there were few constraints on its international action.
As one acquaintance said to me on Twitter: “The UK is a sovereign nation and can do what it wants, there may be prices to pay,” which would be “deemed acceptable costs.”
This is a transactional view of international relations, where there are no unbreakable rules, and unreliability is merely a cost of doing business that needs to be balanced against the benefits it brings. It suited the British Empire, which was powerful enough to absorb that cost, and this was generally how all European powers thought until 1939. Treaties were for the little guys; the big boys relied on the balance of power.
In the heyday of imperial Britain, treaties were for the little guys; the big boys relied on the balance of power.
The concept of a treaty directly contradicts the Brexiteers’ understanding of sovereignty. If a treaty is designed to control the behavior of its signatories, it cannot be unilaterally overturned by any one of them. Like any contract, it needs to be amended by mutual agreement. What’s the point, after all, of signing a deal with a country that feels itself free to renege on it?
Brexit is ostensibly a mission to free Britain of all international restraints, of which the EU is only the most obvious. The most clear-eyed Brexiteers, like my Twitter interlocutor, accept the high transaction costs that come with this freedom. Johnson dismisses them, preferring to “have his cake and eat it,” so entered into the agreement with what Jesuit theologians call a “mental reservation”—a necessary lie.
Although everyone else seems to have forgotten, the potential perfidy of Albion didn’t escape Michel Barnier’s team who made sure breaches of the Withdrawal Agreement would be punishable, as Holger Hestermeyer, an expert in international dispute resolution at Kings College London explained to me, by lump sum fines. If those are not paid, the EU can suspend parts of any other agreements it has with the U.K.
Airline routes, the rights of British trucks to drive on EU roads, the City of London’s clearing operations, and so-called data adequacy rulings vital to the U.K. tech industry, would all be at risk.
So too would a trade agreement with the United States. Any breach of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement would be treated as a hostile act by the Irish lobby, and as the Pennsylvania Congressman Brendan Boyle explained on British Radio, it is likely to sink a U.S. trade deal. And if unknown legislators don’t worry Downing Street, Johnson would do well to consider the wisdom of antagonizing another Irish Catholic from Pennsylvania who could be president in a few months: Joe Biden.
As things stand, the likely end result is no trade deal with the EU, and none with the United States, either. This wasn’t the technical detail of what Brexiteers promised in the 2016 referendum, nor what Boris Johnson promised in the 2019 election campaign. It is also unlikely to have been the deliberate aim of a government whose coronavirus response revealed that it has trouble planning for anything other than its preferred outcome.
But it is entirely in line with the transactional diplomacy and imperial-era sovereignty spirit of the Brexiteers. It also has the hallmark of the make-it-up-as-you-go-along style of a government that is led, not by a serious journalist and author like Winston Churchill, but by a former columnist who was once fired from The Times for making up a quote, and has since propelled his career by making up lies about the EU.