foreignpolicy--2020-10-12--Pompeo’s Next Mission, Like His First: Clinton’s Old Emails

Pompeo ’ s Next Mission , Like His First : Clinton ’ s Old Emails Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s push to release a new tranche of Hillary Clinton ’ s emails ahead of the November presidential election has prompted backlash from Democrats on Capitol Hill and unease within the State Department , according to four officials and several congressional aides .
The move came after President Donald Trump criticized Pompeo , one of his most loyal underlings , for not releasing Clinton ’ s emails from her tenure as secretary of state from 2009 to 2013 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Friday that the department had the emails and was pushing to release them “ as fast as we can , ” including a probable release before the election .
But his pronouncement has left more questions than answers—including what emails would be released , when , and why the sudden urgency for their release nearly eight years after Clinton stepped down as secretary of state .
Inside the State Department , some career officials are even questioning whether following Pompeo ’ s order could be a violation of the Hatch Act , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government employees in the course of their official duties .
One Democratic lawmaker took the step of explicitly warning officials that such a move would be illegal .
“ Any State Dept .
employee who helps him influence an election will be violating the law , ” tweeted Rep. Tom Malinowski , a Democrat from New Jersey and former senior State Department diplomat in the Obama administration .
“ Apart from that , if Secretary Pompeo spends a little less time messing up our foreign policy so that he can devote his full @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign , be my guest.
” Multiple State Department officials describe a diplomatic corps already exhausted and demoralized from being dragged into political battles in the Trump era .
Pompeo has abandoned the past practice of secretaries of state staying out of domestic politics by taking unprecedented steps to mix Trump ’ s campaign trail priorities with official State Department business .
This year also saw the State Department forced onto center stage during Trump ’ s impeachment trial , while Pompeo has repeatedly clashed with Capitol Hill .
“ It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just saying the things he ’ s said to appease the boss .
… If he ’ s really pushing internally for real action , that ’ s just way worse , ” said one official , speaking on condition of anonymity .
Such a move would constitute a “ complete loss of any nonpartisan ideas in foreign policy [ and a ] complete subjugation of government machinery for Trump ’ s election purposes.
” Another official criticized Pompeo ’ s move as “ total hypocrisy and completely political , ” citing Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Democratic-led House Foreign Affairs Committee on other matters .
“ We all see it as just a joke , ” the official fumed .
“ How does this advance foreign policy ?
What exactly do the American people need to know from emails four years ago that hasn ’ t already come out ?
” The State Department did not respond to a request for comment .
Other legal experts said the move could set the stage for a future Joe Biden administration to open probes into Pompeo ’ s and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the State Department .
“ What about all of the communications between Trump administration officials that are on State Department servers ?
” said Margaret Taylor , a fellow at the Brookings Institution and senior editor at Lawfare , a national security blog .
“ That seems to be something Mike Pompeo would want to think about when he makes these statements.
” A three-year State Department investigation into Clinton ’ s email server released last year found that 38 people committed 91 security violations among the 33,000 individual emails sent to or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as secretary of state .
However , it concluded that there was no widespread misuse of the server to mishandle classified information .
“ While there were some instances of classified information being inappropriately introduced into an unclassified system in furtherance of expedience , by and large , the individuals interviewed were aware of security policies and did their best to implement them in their operations , ” the State Department investigation concluded .
The State Department has released thousands of work-related emails during Clinton ’ s tenure as secretary of state .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Clinton ’ s emails are a constant refrain .
Trump fixated on Clinton ’ s use of a private email server during his presidential campaign against her in 2016 .
Pompeo , as a Republican congressman from Kansas , was one of the most vocal critics of Clinton during her tenure as secretary of state , using his perch on the House Select Committee on Benghazi to scrutinize her response into the 2012 terrorist attacks and railing against her use of a private email server while at the State Department .
Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last Friday , continued his years-old crusade against Clinton ’ s emails , arguing that having classified information on a private server was “ unacceptable behavior.
” But for some State Department officials , the irony is rich .
Even those who were critical of Clinton ’ s use of a private email server noted that senior Trump administration officials , including Ivanka Trump and her husband , Jared Kushner , use private email accounts and WhatsApp to conduct official government business and communicate with foreign government officials .
Other White House officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ staff Reince Priebus and advisor Stephen Miller , also used personal email accounts for official business , as the New York Times reported in 2017 .
The practices raised concerns among cybersecurity experts who have questioned WhatsApp ’ s communications encryption and data security since Facebook bought the app in 2014 .

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s push to release a new tranche of Hillary Clinton’s emails ahead of the November presidential election has prompted backlash from Democrats on Capitol Hill and unease within the State Department, according to four officials and several congressional aides.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s push to release a new tranche of Hillary Clinton’s emails ahead of the November presidential election has prompted backlash from Democrats on Capitol Hill and unease within the State Department, according to four officials and several congressional aides.
The move came after President Donald Trump criticized Pompeo, one of his most loyal underlings, for not releasing Clinton’s emails from her tenure as secretary of state from 2009 to 2013. Pompeo quickly buckled, telling Fox News on Friday that the department had the emails and was pushing to release them “as fast as we can,” including a probable release before the election.
But his pronouncement has left more questions than answers—including what emails would be released, when, and why the sudden urgency for their release nearly eight years after Clinton stepped down as secretary of state. Inside the State Department, some career officials are even questioning whether following Pompeo’s order could be a violation of the Hatch Act, a federal law limiting political activities of government employees in the course of their official duties.
One Democratic lawmaker took the step of explicitly warning officials that such a move would be illegal. “Any State Dept. employee who helps him influence an election will be violating the law,” tweeted Rep. Tom Malinowski, a Democrat from New Jersey and former senior State Department diplomat in the Obama administration. “Apart from that, if Secretary Pompeo spends a little less time messing up our foreign policy so that he can devote his full attention to hurting Hillary Clinton’s campaign, be my guest.”
Multiple State Department officials describe a diplomatic corps already exhausted and demoralized from being dragged into political battles in the Trump era. Pompeo has abandoned the past practice of secretaries of state staying out of domestic politics by taking unprecedented steps to mix Trump’s campaign trail priorities with official State Department business. This year also saw the State Department forced onto center stage during Trump’s impeachment trial, while Pompeo has repeatedly clashed with Capitol Hill.
“It’s bad if [Pompeo’s] just saying the things he’s said to appease the boss. … If he’s really pushing internally for real action, that’s just way worse,” said one official, speaking on condition of anonymity. Such a move would constitute a “complete loss of any nonpartisan ideas in foreign policy [and a] complete subjugation of government machinery for Trump’s election purposes.”
Another official criticized Pompeo’s move as “total hypocrisy and completely political,” citing Pompeo’s refusal to hand over documents to the Democratic-led House Foreign Affairs Committee on other matters. “We all see it as just a joke,” the official fumed. “How does this advance foreign policy? What exactly do the American people need to know from emails four years ago that hasn’t already come out?”
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment.
Other legal experts said the move could set the stage for a future Joe Biden administration to open probes into Pompeo’s and other former Trump officials’ management of the State Department. “What about all of the communications between Trump administration officials that are on State Department servers?” said Margaret Taylor, a fellow at the Brookings Institution and senior editor at Lawfare, a national security blog. “That seems to be something Mike Pompeo would want to think about when he makes these statements.”
A three-year State Department investigation into Clinton’s email server released last year found that 38 people committed 91 security violations among the 33,000 individual emails sent to or from her private server during her time as secretary of state. However, it concluded that there was no widespread misuse of the server to mishandle classified information.
“While there were some instances of classified information being inappropriately introduced into an unclassified system in furtherance of expedience, by and large, the individuals interviewed were aware of security policies and did their best to implement them in their operations,” the State Department investigation concluded.
The State Department has released thousands of work-related emails during Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state.
But for Trump, as for Pompeo, Clinton’s emails are a constant refrain. Trump fixated on Clinton’s use of a private email server during his presidential campaign against her in 2016. Pompeo, as a Republican congressman from Kansas, was one of the most vocal critics of Clinton during her tenure as secretary of state, using his perch on the House Select Committee on Benghazi to scrutinize her response into the 2012 terrorist attacks and railing against her use of a private email server while at the State Department.
Pompeo, in answering Trump’s summon last Friday, continued his years-old crusade against Clinton’s emails, arguing that having classified information on a private server was “unacceptable behavior.”
But for some State Department officials, the irony is rich. Even those who were critical of Clinton’s use of a private email server noted that senior Trump administration officials, including Ivanka Trump and her husband, Jared Kushner, use private email accounts and WhatsApp to conduct official government business and communicate with foreign government officials. Other White House officials, including former White House chief of staff Reince Priebus and advisor Stephen Miller, also used personal email accounts for official business, as the New York Times reported in 2017. The practices raised concerns among cybersecurity experts who have questioned WhatsApp’s communications encryption and data security since Facebook bought the app in 2014.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-12--The Government Can’t Save Ultra-Orthodox Jews From COVID-19. Religious Leaders Can.

The Government Can ’ t Save Ultra-Orthodox Jews From COVID-19 .
Religious Leaders Can .
By every measure , Israel ’ s war against the coronavirus pandemic has been a miserable failure ; it ’ s a stark turn after what appeared to be an initial success during a strict lockdown earlier this year .
Last month , it was the first country in the world to go into a second general lockdown , just four months after the first one ended .
In recent weeks , it has had one of the highest rates of COVID-19 deaths per capita @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been beset by confusion and petty politics , for which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu deserves most of the blame .
But there ’ s another factor behind Israel ’ s stunning failure : While Israelis have generally abided by the lockdown rules , the ultra-Orthodox Jews known as Haredim who make up about 10-12 percent of the population have generally not , due their unique and jealously guarded lifestyle .
The result is that they have accounted for as much as 40 percent of new daily confirmed cases .
The phenomenon is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ York City metropolitan area , another region with a large population of ultra-Orthodox Jews , communities have also been hit hard by the coronavirus .
In one , Kiryas Joel , about an hour north of the city , the average rate of positive test results recently was 28 percent , compared with 1 percent statewide .
In both Israel and New York , the question of how to address the problem has gotten enmeshed in politics .
Never well-liked by Israel ’ s secular majority because of their refusal to serve in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issues , such as marriage , Haredim have become a whipping boy in the mainstream media , which regales viewers with videos of mass gatherings in defiance of the rules and confrontations with the police .
In turn , Haredi leaders and apologists say they are being unfairly singled out .
In New York , many claim they are being targeted due to anti-Semitism .
More reasonably , they say that keeping the coronavirus under control is more difficult for them than for other populations .
To a degree , they have a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a lesser degree in the United States live in crowded conditions and have less access to information , not to mention fewer intellectual tools for fully understanding the pandemic by virtue of an education devoted almost exclusively to the study of religious texts .
However , unlike any other impoverished , undereducated minority , the Haredim have consciously chosen this way of life by adhering to an ideology that looks upon the modern world as a threat .
It undercuts the argument that they are blameless victims of a virus .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bigger problem .
In Israel—and increasingly in the United States—the ultra-Orthodox community is impoverished and uneducated in the skills that prepare them for life in the modern world .
Over the last decades , the Haredi ideal has been to be a “ society of learners , ” where men pursue a life of religious study to the exclusion of everything else well into adulthood .
In their role as sole family breadwinner , women get somewhat better schooling .
But with a limited education and an average fertility rate of seven children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to sustain their families is severely limited .
However , their vulnerability has another , more troubling dimension that would be in their control if they chose .
Much of ultra-Orthodox life revolves around being in public—long hours spent in schools and study halls , regular daily prayers in synagogues , and mass events like weddings and funerals for rabbinic leaders that can draw thousands or even hundreds of thousands .
The Haredi world has been loath to give any of this up even though these activities act as virus hothouses .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ makes them especially vulnerable to COVID-19 , the ultra-Orthodox share the same attitude of distrust and resistance to the dictates of nonbelieving world as fundamentalist Christians .
The threat of death and disease should be a powerful countervailing force , but Haredi leaders live in perpetual fear of their followers ’ religious observance slacking off and even of them leaving the community .
If the momentum of prayer , study , and mass gatherings is halted for even a few weeks , no one can predict what the consequences would be .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israeli Haredim leave the community .
Some Haredi leaders have urged the followers to be more cautious , but many more see these activities not only as critical to their way of life but also as an act of defiance against the outside world .
Outsiders , be they the secular Israeli establishment or the New York City Department of Health , which has clashed with the ultra-Orthodox over circumcision and measles , are viewed as hellbent on disrupting the age-old patterns of Jewish life .
Given the insularity of the community , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to frame the pandemic as a political or religious dispute of us versus them , rather than as a public health challenge of everyone versus the virus .
Strangely , this attitude has morphed into sentiment in favor of U.S. President Donald Trump in the ultra-Orthodox world that has grown even stronger as they see him opposing COVID-19 restrictions .
The coronavirus will eventually dissipate , but the conditions that made ultra-Orthodox communities so vulnerable to it will remain .
The American ultra-Orthodox world has increasingly mimicked the Israeli society of learners .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is enabled by a government that subsidizes them .
It doesn ’ t subsidize them enough to lift them out of poverty , but it does keep the community afloat .
In the United States , it ’ s more difficult because separation of church and state is strictly observed and access to government aid is severely constrained .
Even so , poverty among the Hasidic stream of the ultra-Orthodoxy in the greater New York area was estimated a decade ago at more than 40 percent ( the cutoff being annual household income @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is almost certainly higher .
Like their Israeli counterparts , American ultra-Orthodox schools are depriving the young of the basic skills needed for the job market , an issue that came to the fore two years ago when New York state tried to enforce core curriculum standards on their schools .
One study estimated that the youngest Haredi boys get about six hours a week of instruction of basic English and math , and even that paltry education comes to an end after they reach age 13 .
This poses a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ultra-Orthodox lifestyle in the United States that the community will have to grapple with .
In Israel , the Haredi society of learners is imposing a dangerous weight on the economy .
The high level of poverty—about 52 percent for the ultra-Orthodox versus 21 percent nationwide in 2018 based on annual income of around $ 33,000 for a family of four—is a financial burden on the government .
By denying its young a general education , Haredi society traps its members in a binary choice of perpetual religious study or low-paid work that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ household income .
The problem will grow more severe in the years ahead , because high ultra-Orthodox birthrates are forecast by the government to increase their share of the population to one-third by 2065 .
By then , the high-tech knowledge economy Israel has today will have long faded away for lack of human capital to sustain it .
More Haredim are working today than a few years ago but at jobs at the bottom of the skill and pay ladder .
The ultra-Orthodox have been able to keep change at bay because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Israel ’ s fractured parliamentary system .
In September , Israel ’ s coronavirus czar had proposed imposing curfews on the most severely infected communities , nearly all of them Haredi or Israeli Arab .
The ultra-Orthodox political leadership issued thinly veiled threats not to support Netanyahu at election time , and he quickly backed down .
The result is that the entire country is now in lockdown .
Change will not come as long as Netanyahu remains in office and may not come when he leaves so long as ultra-Orthodox parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Perhaps a grassroots rebellion against the Haredi burden will emerge , but recent history doesn ’ t offer much hope .
Efforts to require Haredi men to be drafted flare up often but fade quickly .
In Israel ’ s last election cycle , for instance , the former Netanyahu ally-turned-rival Avigdor Lieberman was able to briefly pose as a potential political kingmaker by capitalizing on the “ equal burden ” controversy , but by the time the last of three elections was over , the issue had taken a back seat to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the Haredi draft for months .
Israel ’ s only hope is that change will arise from inside the Haredi world .
In a closed , tightly bound community , change won ’ t come easily , but the toll of sickness and death may be the catalyst .

By every measure, Israel’s war against the coronavirus pandemic has been a miserable failure; it’s a stark turn after what appeared to be an initial success during a strict lockdown earlier this year. Last month, it was the first country in the world to go into a second general lockdown, just four months after the first one ended. In recent weeks, it has had one of the highest rates of COVID-19 deaths per capita in the world. Crisis management has been beset by confusion and petty politics, for which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu deserves most of the blame.
By every measure, Israel’s war against the coronavirus pandemic has been a miserable failure; it’s a stark turn after what appeared to be an initial success during a strict lockdown earlier this year. Last month, it was the first country in the world to go into a second general lockdown, just four months after the first one ended. In recent weeks, it has had one of the highest rates of COVID-19 deaths per capita in the world. Crisis management has been beset by confusion and petty politics, for which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu deserves most of the blame.
But there’s another factor behind Israel’s stunning failure: While Israelis have generally abided by the lockdown rules, the ultra-Orthodox Jews known as Haredim who make up about 10-12 percent of the population have generally not, due their unique and jealously guarded lifestyle. The result is that they have accounted for as much as 40 percent of new daily confirmed cases.
The phenomenon is not unique to Israel: In the New York City metropolitan area, another region with a large population of ultra-Orthodox Jews, communities have also been hit hard by the coronavirus. In one, Kiryas Joel, about an hour north of the city, the average rate of positive test results recently was 28 percent, compared with 1 percent statewide.
In both Israel and New York, the question of how to address the problem has gotten enmeshed in politics. Never well-liked by Israel’s secular majority because of their refusal to serve in the army and their control over personal issues, such as marriage, Haredim have become a whipping boy in the mainstream media, which regales viewers with videos of mass gatherings in defiance of the rules and confrontations with the police.
In turn, Haredi leaders and apologists say they are being unfairly singled out. In New York, many claim they are being targeted due to anti-Semitism. More reasonably, they say that keeping the coronavirus under control is more difficult for them than for other populations.
To a degree, they have a point. Haredi Jews in Israel and to a lesser degree in the United States live in crowded conditions and have less access to information, not to mention fewer intellectual tools for fully understanding the pandemic by virtue of an education devoted almost exclusively to the study of religious texts. However, unlike any other impoverished, undereducated minority, the Haredim have consciously chosen this way of life by adhering to an ideology that looks upon the modern world as a threat. It undercuts the argument that they are blameless victims of a virus.
The crowding is one manifestation of a much bigger problem. In Israel—and increasingly in the United States—the ultra-Orthodox community is impoverished and uneducated in the skills that prepare them for life in the modern world. Over the last decades, the Haredi ideal has been to be a “society of learners,” where men pursue a life of religious study to the exclusion of everything else well into adulthood. In their role as sole family breadwinner, women get somewhat better schooling. But with a limited education and an average fertility rate of seven children per woman in Israel, their ability to sustain their families is severely limited.
However, their vulnerability has another, more troubling dimension that would be in their control if they chose. Much of ultra-Orthodox life revolves around being in public—long hours spent in schools and study halls, regular daily prayers in synagogues, and mass events like weddings and funerals for rabbinic leaders that can draw thousands or even hundreds of thousands.
The Haredi world has been loath to give any of this up even though these activities act as virus hothouses. Even as the intensity of their religious observance makes them especially vulnerable to COVID-19, the ultra-Orthodox share the same attitude of distrust and resistance to the dictates of nonbelieving world as fundamentalist Christians.
The threat of death and disease should be a powerful countervailing force, but Haredi leaders live in perpetual fear of their followers’ religious observance slacking off and even of them leaving the community. If the momentum of prayer, study, and mass gatherings is halted for even a few weeks, no one can predict what the consequences would be. One study estimates that 15 percent of young Israeli Haredim leave the community.
Some Haredi leaders have urged the followers to be more cautious, but many more see these activities not only as critical to their way of life but also as an act of defiance against the outside world. Outsiders, be they the secular Israeli establishment or the New York City Department of Health, which has clashed with the ultra-Orthodox over circumcision and measles, are viewed as hellbent on disrupting the age-old patterns of Jewish life.
Given the insularity of the community, it’s not hard for Haredim to frame the pandemic as a political or religious dispute of us versus them, rather than as a public health challenge of everyone versus the virus. Strangely, this attitude has morphed into sentiment in favor of U.S. President Donald Trump in the ultra-Orthodox world that has grown even stronger as they see him opposing COVID-19 restrictions.
The coronavirus will eventually dissipate, but the conditions that made ultra-Orthodox communities so vulnerable to it will remain.
The American ultra-Orthodox world has increasingly mimicked the Israeli society of learners. In Israel, a life of learning is enabled by a government that subsidizes them. It doesn’t subsidize them enough to lift them out of poverty, but it does keep the community afloat.
In the United States, it’s more difficult because separation of church and state is strictly observed and access to government aid is severely constrained. Even so, poverty among the Hasidic stream of the ultra-Orthodoxy in the greater New York area was estimated a decade ago at more than 40 percent (the cutoff being annual household income of under $50,000). Today, it is almost certainly higher.
Like their Israeli counterparts, American ultra-Orthodox schools are depriving the young of the basic skills needed for the job market, an issue that came to the fore two years ago when New York state tried to enforce core curriculum standards on their schools. One study estimated that the youngest Haredi boys get about six hours a week of instruction of basic English and math, and even that paltry education comes to an end after they reach age 13.
This poses a threat to the long-term sustainability of the ultra-Orthodox lifestyle in the United States that the community will have to grapple with. In Israel, the Haredi society of learners is imposing a dangerous weight on the economy. The high level of poverty—about 52 percent for the ultra-Orthodox versus 21 percent nationwide in 2018 based on annual income of around $33,000 for a family of four—is a financial burden on the government. By denying its young a general education, Haredi society traps its members in a binary choice of perpetual religious study or low-paid work that contributes little to the overall economy or household income.
The problem will grow more severe in the years ahead, because high ultra-Orthodox birthrates are forecast by the government to increase their share of the population to one-third by 2065. By then, the high-tech knowledge economy Israel has today will have long faded away for lack of human capital to sustain it. More Haredim are working today than a few years ago but at jobs at the bottom of the skill and pay ladder.
The ultra-Orthodox have been able to keep change at bay because they hold the balance of political power in Israel’s fractured parliamentary system. In September, Israel’s coronavirus czar had proposed imposing curfews on the most severely infected communities, nearly all of them Haredi or Israeli Arab. The ultra-Orthodox political leadership issued thinly veiled threats not to support Netanyahu at election time, and he quickly backed down. The result is that the entire country is now in lockdown.
Change will not come as long as Netanyahu remains in office and may not come when he leaves so long as ultra-Orthodox parties hold the key to political power. Perhaps a grassroots rebellion against the Haredi burden will emerge, but recent history doesn’t offer much hope.
Efforts to require Haredi men to be drafted flare up often but fade quickly. In Israel’s last election cycle, for instance, the former Netanyahu ally-turned-rival Avigdor Lieberman was able to briefly pose as a potential political kingmaker by capitalizing on the “equal burden” controversy, but by the time the last of three elections was over, the issue had taken a back seat to the coronavirus. No one has talked about the Haredi draft for months.
Israel’s only hope is that change will arise from inside the Haredi world. In a closed, tightly bound community, change won’t come easily, but the toll of sickness and death may be the catalyst.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-12--Trump Taps Loyalists for Top Pentagon Liaison Jobs

The Trump administration has tapped a new White House liaison at the Department of Defense , its third in the last year , part of an effort to install more loyalists in key agencies for if President Donald Trump wins a second term , officials say .
But these appointments could also have a lasting impact if Trump loses in November .
Joshua Whitehouse , a former New Hampshire state representative and Trump campaign worker , who was previously liaison for the Department of Homeland Security , took over as the Pentagon ’ s White House liaison in September , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Whitehouse rounded out his team with two more staffers this month : Parker Doyle , another former official in the White House liaison office at Homeland Security who joined the Pentagon as deputy liaison , and Peter O ’ Rourke , who serves as a special assistant in the office .
Both graduated college in 2018 and have limited government or national security experience .
The Defense Department did not respond to multiple requests for comment about the appointments .
Politico first reported on news of Whitehouse ’ s appointment .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ condition of anonymity , said that late in an election year a White House liaison typically aims to see which of the agency ’ s nearly 300 political appointees will stay for another term .
The goal , the former official said , is to find appointees who can translate into action the administration ’ s ambitious defense agenda , including the call for a 500-ship Navy by 2045 .
But multiple former Pentagon and U.S. officials who worked on personnel matters said the move was troubling because it raised the risk of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ positions that could undermine a possible Joe Biden administration .
White House liaisons can help write position descriptions for the career service to directly match the resumes of political appointees , one official said .
“ There ’ s no point to burrowing except to have your appointees influence your successor ’ s policy , ” a former senior official in the White House Office of Presidential Personnel said .
In past administrations , White House liaison offices have served as an influential link between executive branch agencies and Pennsylvania Avenue , providing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slots .
Liaisons typically come into these roles after years of executive branch experience .
Many first serve as senior veteran national security practitioners in think tanks or government , former officials said .
Trump is driving a different approach .
In September , Axios reported that White House chief of staff Mark Meadows asked John McEntee , the 30-year-old head of the White House Office of Presidential Personnel , to “ look at replacing ” the liaisons at many U.S. government agencies .
“ I ask that you encourage your teams to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they need to support your agency and the President ’ s agenda , ” Meadows said in the email obtained by Axios .
Bishop Garrison , who served as an acting White House liaison at the Pentagon during President Barack Obama ’ s administration , said that officials typically come into the job with years of relationships across government and regularly sat in on senior Defense Department staff meetings with the chairman or vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , the U.S. military ’ s highest-ranking officers .
“ It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he said .
“ It ’ s being thoughtful on the issues of organizational health as they relate to the administration ’ s policy goals .
I would argue that anyone fresh out of college isn ’ t going to understand that.
” Whitehouse is the third person to hold the liaison job in the last year , after retired Army Lt. Col. James O ’ Beirne was ousted in August 2019 .
In 2020 , the Trump administration has opted for recent graduates for liaison roles across the U.S. government .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the White House personnel office conducted a series of interviews with staffers at the Pentagon and in other agencies that officials considered to be loyalty tests to the president .
Officials say recent hires in liaison offices have trended toward the younger and less experienced .
Rebekah Clark , who became the Department of Education ’ s White House liaison in March , according to her LinkedIn profile , served as a special assistant in the Department of Housing and Urban Development and a White House advance associate while finishing her bachelor ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she graduated in 2019 .
The race to the bottom in terms of the quality of liaison personnel reflects the dearth of eligible talent for many appointments , especially in the Pentagon , former officials said , as Trump ’ s chances for a second term appear to be fading quickly .
“ They all believe Trump will lose and they will be gone in a few months , ” a former senior Trump administration official said .
That has led to less-experienced and more politically motivated officials filling those roles , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 12 , 2020 : This article was updated to note Politico ’ s prior reporting of Whitehouse ’ s appointment

The Trump administration has tapped a new White House liaison at the Department of Defense, its third in the last year, part of an effort to install more loyalists in key agencies for if President Donald Trump wins a second term, officials say. But these appointments could also have a lasting impact if Trump loses in November.
The Trump administration has tapped a new White House liaison at the Department of Defense, its third in the last year, part of an effort to install more loyalists in key agencies for if President Donald Trump wins a second term, officials say. But these appointments could also have a lasting impact if Trump loses in November.
Joshua Whitehouse, a former New Hampshire state representative and Trump campaign worker, who was previously liaison for the Department of Homeland Security, took over as the Pentagon’s White House liaison in September, according to officials and his LinkedIn profile.
Whitehouse rounded out his team with two more staffers this month: Parker Doyle, another former official in the White House liaison office at Homeland Security who joined the Pentagon as deputy liaison, and Peter O’Rourke, who serves as a special assistant in the office. Both graduated college in 2018 and have limited government or national security experience.
The Defense Department did not respond to multiple requests for comment about the appointments. Politico first reported on news of Whitehouse’s appointment.
A former Pentagon official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that late in an election year a White House liaison typically aims to see which of the agency’s nearly 300 political appointees will stay for another term. The goal, the former official said, is to find appointees who can translate into action the administration’s ambitious defense agenda, including the call for a 500-ship Navy by 2045.
But multiple former Pentagon and U.S. officials who worked on personnel matters said the move was troubling because it raised the risk of the Trump administration burrowing loyalists into career positions that could undermine a possible Joe Biden administration. White House liaisons can help write position descriptions for the career service to directly match the resumes of political appointees, one official said.
“There’s no point to burrowing except to have your appointees influence your successor’s policy,” a former senior official in the White House Office of Presidential Personnel said.
In past administrations, White House liaison offices have served as an influential link between executive branch agencies and Pennsylvania Avenue, providing slates of candidates to fill presidentially appointed slots. Liaisons typically come into these roles after years of executive branch experience. Many first serve as senior veteran national security practitioners in think tanks or government, former officials said.
Trump is driving a different approach. In September, Axios reported that White House chief of staff Mark Meadows asked John McEntee, the 30-year-old head of the White House Office of Presidential Personnel, to “look at replacing” the liaisons at many U.S. government agencies. “I ask that you encourage your teams to equip the [liaisons] with everything they need to support your agency and the President’s agenda,” Meadows said in the email obtained by Axios.
Bishop Garrison, who served as an acting White House liaison at the Pentagon during President Barack Obama’s administration, said that officials typically come into the job with years of relationships across government and regularly sat in on senior Defense Department staff meetings with the chairman or vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. military’s highest-ranking officers.
“It’s not just pushing paper around,” he said. “It’s being thoughtful on the issues of organizational health as they relate to the administration’s policy goals. I would argue that anyone fresh out of college isn’t going to understand that.”
Whitehouse is the third person to hold the liaison job in the last year, after retired Army Lt. Col. James O’Beirne was ousted in August 2019.
In 2020, the Trump administration has opted for recent graduates for liaison roles across the U.S. government. This summer, two 20-something staffers at the White House personnel office conducted a series of interviews with staffers at the Pentagon and in other agencies that officials considered to be loyalty tests to the president.
Officials say recent hires in liaison offices have trended toward the younger and less experienced. Rebekah Clark, who became the Department of Education’s White House liaison in March, according to her LinkedIn profile, served as a special assistant in the Department of Housing and Urban Development and a White House advance associate while finishing her bachelor’s degree at Liberty University, where she graduated in 2019.
The race to the bottom in terms of the quality of liaison personnel reflects the dearth of eligible talent for many appointments, especially in the Pentagon, former officials said, as Trump’s chances for a second term appear to be fading quickly.
“They all believe Trump will lose and they will be gone in a few months,” a former senior Trump administration official said. That has led to less-experienced and more politically motivated officials filling those roles, the former official said.
Update, Oct. 12, 2020: This article was updated to note Politico’s prior reporting of Whitehouse’s appointment


foreignpolicy--2020-10-12--Beijing Believes Trump Is Accelerating American Decline

In August , the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence claimed publicly that China “ prefers that President Trump – whom Beijing sees as unpredictable – does not win reelection.
” But these assessments tell only half the story , and Chinese open sources suggest the need for a more nuanced view .
While Chinese leaders may wish for a reprieve from President Donald Trump ’ s recent aggressiveness , they also believe that he has weakened American power and accelerated American decline .
It is this latter judgement that is more consequential , encouraging Beijing to challenge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , too .
As I argue in my forthcoming book The Long Game : China ’ s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order , Chinese leaders have constantly assessed and reassessed American power .
Since the end of the Cold War , each leader has publicly anchored Chinese grand strategy to concepts like “ multipolarity ” and “ the international balance of forces ” that are essentially polite euphemisms for the relative balance between Chinese and American power .
When China ’ s perception of American strength shifts , its strategy generally changes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this has happened twice and produced two strategies .
The first time was after Tiananmen Square when the Soviet Union ’ s collapse led China to see the United States—once a Cold War quasi-ally—as a powerful and ideologically threatening adversary .
In response , Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin encouraged the country to “ hide its capabilities and bide its time.
” This first Chinese strategy was about quietly blunting American regional influence .
Beijing used asymmetric capabilities to thwart American military power , trade agreements to constrain American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions to stall American rule-setting and coalition-building .
A second strategic shift came 20 years later , when the global financial crisis of 2008 convinced Beijing that the United States was weakening .
Chinese leader Hu Jintao revised China ’ s Deng-era strategy to emphasize “ actively accomplishing something.
” This second Chinese strategy was about building regional order .
Beijing now openly pursued power projection capabilities to intervene in the region , used the Belt and Road Initiative and economic statecraft to create and wield leverage over others , and built international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are now living through a third strategic shift .
The process began four years ago when the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union and Donald Trump was elected president of the United States .
Beijing was shocked that the world ’ s most powerful democracies were withdrawing from the international order they had helped erect .
As Chen Jimin at China ’ s Central Party School observed , when it came to facilitating China ’ s rejuvenation , “ The Trump administration and Brexit delivered star performances.
” Shortly thereafter , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ euphemisms for U.S. power all began to point toward a belief that the Trump era was not merely contributing to American relative decline but accelerating it .
“ Multipolarity ” was now frequently deemed irreversible at the very highest levels .
The “ international balance of forces ” was said to be “ increasingly balanced.
” But most importantly , and only one week before Trump ’ s inauguration in early 2017 , China debuted a new phrase to guide its strategy—one that inverted a Qing dynasty-era statement of humiliation into a Xi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was experiencing “ great changes unseen in a century.
” This sweeping phrase has pride of place in most of Xi ’ s major speeches , in official white papers , and in thousands of articles by Chinese strategists and scholars .
The confidence behind this statement has been common in the party ’ s authoritative sources ever since 2016 .
One official commentary written for party cadres on an important foreign-policy speech by the Chinese leader noted , “ Although Western regimes appear to be in power , their willingness and ability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The United States may no longer want to be a provider of global security and public goods , and instead pursue a unilateral and even nationalist foreign policy.
” And as Xi himself put it at a foreign-policy gathering in 2018 that has been convened only a handful of times in the country ’ s history , “ China is in the best development period since modern times , and the world is in a state of great changes unseen in a century , and these two [ trends ] are simultaneously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign-policy scholars have been even more pointed in this period .
They have argued that the “ greatest change ” in the “ great changes unseen in a century ” is the shifting balance of power between China and the United States .
Zhu Feng , for example , declared that as Western countries were consumed by populism “ the East rises and the West falls.
” Yan Xuetong argued that “ Trump has ruined the U.S.-led alliance system ” and ushered in “ the best period of strategic opportunity for China since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wu Xinbo assessed that the United States was “ spiritually exhausted , physically weak , and could no longer carry the world.
” Jin Canrong modified an official formulation to note “ that world structure is changing from one superpower , many great powers , to two superpowers , many great powers.
” This shifting perception of the United States preceded the COVID-19 pandemic .
And just as past reassessments of American power triggered strategic adjustment , so did this one .
During Trump ’ s first year in office , Xi delivered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was time to “ leave behind ” the era of “ hiding capabilities and biding time ” and to now move toward the “ world ’ s center stage.
” This third Chinese grand strategy is focused on expansion .
It seeks to spread China ’ s influence beyond Asia and contest the foundations of U.S. global order .
Since Trump ’ s election , Xi has repeatedly encouraged Beijing to “ lead in the reform of the global governance system ” and to offer “ Chinese solutions ” to various international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the country ’ s think tanks and universities .
As part of this global turn , Beijing has also begun to pursue a global military with overseas facilities , to directly challenge U.S. financial power with sovereign digital currencies , to reshape global and not merely regional institutions , and to self-consciously compete in the technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution—all with an eye toward filling a growing U.S. void .
The “ great changes unseen in a century , ” however , are not only about rewards but also risks .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ some anxiety that a declining United States will lash out in dangerous ways .
That view is reflected in Xi ’ s speeches and in China ’ s official white papers , which warn of American “ encirclement , constraint , confrontation , and threat.
” It is also mirrored in Beijing assessments of Trump , whom it sees as providing long-term benefits for China at the cost of high short-term risks .
Beijing certainly prefers that Washington would “ realize the decline of its hegemony in an elegant and decent way , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put it , but it is not necessary for it do so .
Many others believe American resistance can delay but not prevent China ’ s ascent to preeminence .
Nor is the upcoming U.S. election quite so consequential to some in Beijing , particularly if course-correction is impossible .
Another scholar argues Americans can no longer “ cherish fantasies about [ America ’ s ] ‘ capacity for self-rectification.
’ ” The American response to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic—which has left over 200,000 Americans dead , millions infected , and much of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reinforced preexisting Chinese views on American dysfunction and decline .
As Yuan Peng , the head of a Ministry of State Security think tank , argued , America ’ s poor response to COVID-19 “ is a blow to America ’ s soft and hard power , and America ’ s international influence has suffered a serious decline ” —with the pandemic ’ s implications as consequential for world politics as a great-power war .
The resultant confidence has likely encouraged Beijing to be more assertive in its neighborhood and less concerned about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong and the damage done by its increasingly off-putting public diplomacy .
That overconfidence may be unfounded , particularly as China faces a demographic slowdown , diplomatic setbacks , and a middle-income trap .
It may also be somewhat artificial , a product of a party line reproduced in key texts and academic commentaries that resembles propaganda rather than objective analysis .
Even so , Beijing ’ s confidence—justifiable or not—has an official imprimatur , shapes Chinese strategy , and encourages Beijing to take dangerous risks .
It can not be dismissed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ are complex , the logic behind them provides a fairly straightforward road map for U.S. policy in a Trump or Joe Biden administration .
For Beijing , a United States that is less engaged abroad , more divided at home , and seemingly uninterested in pandemic management or economic competitiveness is one with dim prospects .
The single most critical variable shaping China ’ s strategy has always been its assessment of American power .
And for that reason , the most urgent imperative in Washington is a policy—foreign but especially domestic—that proves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not in terminal decline .

In August, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence claimed publicly that China “prefers that President Trump – whom Beijing sees as unpredictable – does not win reelection.” But these assessments tell only half the story, and Chinese open sources suggest the need for a more nuanced view.
In August, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence claimed publicly that China “prefers that President Trump – whom Beijing sees as unpredictable – does not win reelection.” But these assessments tell only half the story, and Chinese open sources suggest the need for a more nuanced view.
While Chinese leaders may wish for a reprieve from President Donald Trump’s recent aggressiveness, they also believe that he has weakened American power and accelerated American decline. It is this latter judgement that is more consequential, encouraging Beijing to challenge Washington not only in Asia but globally, too.
As I argue in my forthcoming book The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order, Chinese leaders have constantly assessed and reassessed American power. Since the end of the Cold War, each leader has publicly anchored Chinese grand strategy to concepts like “multipolarity” and “the international balance of forces” that are essentially polite euphemisms for the relative balance between Chinese and American power. When China’s perception of American strength shifts, its strategy generally changes.
Over the last 30 years, this has happened twice and produced two strategies. The first time was after Tiananmen Square when the Soviet Union’s collapse led China to see the United States—once a Cold War quasi-ally—as a powerful and ideologically threatening adversary. In response, Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin encouraged the country to “hide its capabilities and bide its time.” This first Chinese strategy was about quietly blunting American regional influence. Beijing used asymmetric capabilities to thwart American military power, trade agreements to constrain American economic coercion, and membership in regional institutions to stall American rule-setting and coalition-building.
A second strategic shift came 20 years later, when the global financial crisis of 2008 convinced Beijing that the United States was weakening. Chinese leader Hu Jintao revised China’s Deng-era strategy to emphasize “actively accomplishing something.” This second Chinese strategy was about building regional order. Beijing now openly pursued power projection capabilities to intervene in the region, used the Belt and Road Initiative and economic statecraft to create and wield leverage over others, and built international institutions to set regional rules.
We are now living through a third strategic shift. The process began four years ago when the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union and Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. Beijing was shocked that the world’s most powerful democracies were withdrawing from the international order they had helped erect. As Chen Jimin at China’s Central Party School observed, when it came to facilitating China’s rejuvenation, “The Trump administration and Brexit delivered star performances.”
Shortly thereafter, the Chinese Communist Party’s familiar euphemisms for U.S. power all began to point toward a belief that the Trump era was not merely contributing to American relative decline but accelerating it. “Multipolarity” was now frequently deemed irreversible at the very highest levels. The “international balance of forces” was said to be “increasingly balanced.” But most importantly, and only one week before Trump’s inauguration in early 2017, China debuted a new phrase to guide its strategy—one that inverted a Qing dynasty-era statement of humiliation into a Xi Jinping-era statement of ascent: The world was experiencing “great changes unseen in a century.”
This sweeping phrase has pride of place in most of Xi’s major speeches, in official white papers, and in thousands of articles by Chinese strategists and scholars. The confidence behind this statement has been common in the party’s authoritative sources ever since 2016. One official commentary written for party cadres on an important foreign-policy speech by the Chinese leader noted, “Although Western regimes appear to be in power, their willingness and ability to intervene in world affairs is declining. The United States may no longer want to be a provider of global security and public goods, and instead pursue a unilateral and even nationalist foreign policy.” And as Xi himself put it at a foreign-policy gathering in 2018 that has been convened only a handful of times in the country’s history, “China is in the best development period since modern times, and the world is in a state of great changes unseen in a century, and these two [trends] are simultaneously interwoven and mutually interacting.”
Prominent Chinese foreign-policy scholars have been even more pointed in this period. They have argued that the “greatest change” in the “great changes unseen in a century” is the shifting balance of power between China and the United States. Zhu Feng, for example, declared that as Western countries were consumed by populism “the East rises and the West falls.” Yan Xuetong argued that “Trump has ruined the U.S.-led alliance system” and ushered in “the best period of strategic opportunity for China since the end of the Cold War.” Wu Xinbo assessed that the United States was “spiritually exhausted, physically weak, and could no longer carry the world.” Jin Canrong modified an official formulation to note “that world structure is changing from one superpower, many great powers, to two superpowers, many great powers.”
This shifting perception of the United States preceded the COVID-19 pandemic. And just as past reassessments of American power triggered strategic adjustment, so did this one. During Trump’s first year in office, Xi delivered a series of major speeches that suggested it was time to “leave behind” the era of “hiding capabilities and biding time” and to now move toward the “world’s center stage.”
This third Chinese grand strategy is focused on expansion. It seeks to spread China’s influence beyond Asia and contest the foundations of U.S. global order. Since Trump’s election, Xi has repeatedly encouraged Beijing to “lead in the reform of the global governance system” and to offer “Chinese solutions” to various international challenges—these are now the top-funded research priorities in the country’s think tanks and universities. As part of this global turn, Beijing has also begun to pursue a global military with overseas facilities, to directly challenge U.S. financial power with sovereign digital currencies, to reshape global and not merely regional institutions, and to self-consciously compete in the technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution—all with an eye toward filling a growing U.S. void.
The “great changes unseen in a century,” however, are not only about rewards but also risks. Alongside confidence in American decline has come some anxiety that a declining United States will lash out in dangerous ways. That view is reflected in Xi’s speeches and in China’s official white papers, which warn of American “encirclement, constraint, confrontation, and threat.” It is also mirrored in Beijing assessments of Trump, whom it sees as providing long-term benefits for China at the cost of high short-term risks.
Beijing certainly prefers that Washington would “realize the decline of its hegemony in an elegant and decent way,” as one Central Party School dean put it, but it is not necessary for it do so. Many others believe American resistance can delay but not prevent China’s ascent to preeminence. Nor is the upcoming U.S. election quite so consequential to some in Beijing, particularly if course-correction is impossible. Another scholar argues Americans can no longer “cherish fantasies about [America’s] ‘capacity for self-rectification.’”
The American response to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic—which has left over 200,000 Americans dead, millions infected, and much of the U.S. political leadership incapacitated with illness—has reinforced preexisting Chinese views on American dysfunction and decline. As Yuan Peng, the head of a Ministry of State Security think tank, argued, America’s poor response to COVID-19 “is a blow to America’s soft and hard power, and America’s international influence has suffered a serious decline”—with the pandemic’s implications as consequential for world politics as a great-power war. The resultant confidence has likely encouraged Beijing to be more assertive in its neighborhood and less concerned about the implications of its repression in Hong Kong and the damage done by its increasingly off-putting public diplomacy.
That overconfidence may be unfounded, particularly as China faces a demographic slowdown, diplomatic setbacks, and a middle-income trap. It may also be somewhat artificial, a product of a party line reproduced in key texts and academic commentaries that resembles propaganda rather than objective analysis. Even so, Beijing’s confidence—justifiable or not—has an official imprimatur, shapes Chinese strategy, and encourages Beijing to take dangerous risks. It cannot be dismissed.
While China’s views of Trump are complex, the logic behind them provides a fairly straightforward road map for U.S. policy in a Trump or Joe Biden administration. For Beijing, a United States that is less engaged abroad, more divided at home, and seemingly uninterested in pandemic management or economic competitiveness is one with dim prospects. The single most critical variable shaping China’s strategy has always been its assessment of American power. And for that reason, the most urgent imperative in Washington is a policy—foreign but especially domestic—that proves to Beijing that the United States is not in terminal decline.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-12--Pakistan Is Doing Its Own Political Reengineering in Kashmir

Pakistan Is Doing Its Own Political Reengineering in Kashmir Ahead of general elections in the Pakistan-administered region of Gilgit-Baltistan on Nov. 15 , 554 candidates had submitted their nomination forms to run .
India , which also claims the area as part of the broader dispute about the border between the two countries , has slammed the decision to hold the vote as an illegal annexation .
In some ways , New Delhi is right about Islamabad ’ s intentions .
It is holding the elections as part of an attempt to mainstream the area as a fifth province of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in reaction to India ’ s own decision last year to revoke Article 370 of its constitution , which had granted Indian-administered Kashmir some autonomy and had protected the region against any attempts from the central government to repopulate it with non-Kashmiris .
After Article 370 was revoked , Pakistan was quick to register its outrage , particularly focusing on the fate of Kashmir ’ s Muslims .
But the rhetoric was largely designed for domestic consumption , especially given that Islamabad has engaged in demographic engineering in Kashmir as well .
Following @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pakistan separated the region it was given to administer into two parcels—the Northern Areas ( the northern part of the broader Kashmir region ) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir—until a final settlement of the borders between it and India .
That divide was formalized in 1974 through the Northern Areas Council Legal Framework Order .
Following that order , Islamabad actively encouraged Pakistanis from the rest of the country to settle in the Northern Areas , which tilted the region ’ s demographics away from its Ismaili Shiite population .
Further , although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has enjoyed some token autonomy over the past 73 years , the Northern Areas have been ruled from the center , with Islamabad maintaining the area ’ s legal status quo ostensibly to protect its claim on the entirety of Kashmir if there is ever a settlement with India .
Over the course of that history , Islamabad has often faced dissent from protesters in the Northern Areas demanding that it be turned into an official fifth province and granted all the associated rights .
Faced with growing demands from the locals , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Areas “ Gilgit-Baltistan ” and gave the region its first legislative assembly .
Islamabad also created a legal framework to potentially provide anyone living in Gilgit-Baltistan , including those from outside of the region , with formal residency there .
More reforms , supposedly to give residents of Gilgit-Baltistan greater say in their governance , came in 2018 .
But when Islamabad maintained its tight-fisted control over Gilgit-Baltistan anyway , protests ensued .
The protests among Gilgit-Baltistan nationalists have been met with pushback from Kashmiri nationalists on both sides of the Line of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the region , who have condemned plans to alter the status of the Pakistani-administered territories .
In 2016 , one prominent figure , Syed Ali Shah Geelani , wrote a letter to then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif , calling the plans to elevate Gilgit-Baltistan a “ disaster ” for an independent Kashmir that includes all of the disputed regions .
Sayyid Abdullah Gilani , another prominent Kashmiri nationalist , has similarly urged Pakistan to reconsider the upcoming election .
But with locals in Gilgit-Baltistan increasingly forceful in their anger—and with Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after India ’ s own moves in Kashmir—now must seem like an opportune time for Islamabad to mainstream the area as a province .
In 2015 , Beijing set in motion the transformation of Gilgit-Baltistan when it formally inaugurated the now $ 87 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ) .
The corridor , meant to connect China ’ s Xinjiang with Pakistan ’ s coastline in Baluchistan , has to pass through Gilgit-Baltistan .
The CPEC is said to be China ’ s largest-ever overseas investment , and Beijing does not want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dispute over Kashmir .
The ongoing Chinese-Indian conflict in Ladakh , an Indian-administered region along the disputed Indian-Chinese border , has led to further militarization of the Pakistani-Indian dispute .
However , China ’ s muscle-flexing to establish itself as the region ’ s stand-alone power may suggest that Beijing is warning India off any tussles with Pakistan .
China is helping develop businesses and infrastructure in Gilgit-Baltistan , most notably the Diamer-Bhasha Dam .
The growing Chinese presence has reassured Islamabad that Beijing will have its back .
To be sure , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itching for a fight .
Despite some rhetoric about intervening in Gilgit-Baltistan , New Delhi is unlikely to be serious about taking actual control over the region while also skirmishing with China .
Similarly , even though India has been eying a greater role in Afghanistan , leaders since Indian independence have been wary of actually having to deal with the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan , which Gilgit-Baltistan ’ s improbable accession to India would geographically mandate .
Pakistan , too , is tied up with its own problems , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is also wary of angering China and endangering the CPEC .
( It is so afraid of losing its partner , in fact , that it has not only denied China ’ s abuses of its Uighur Muslim minority , but it has also turned a blind eye toward Beijing ’ s arrest of several Uighur women married to Pakistani men . )
Geopolitically , meanwhile , the CPEC has become the goose that lays the golden egg for Pakistan ’ s military , which is charged with managing the corridor , replacing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seven decades , was used to justify skewed defense budgets .
In other words , the basic outlines of the status quo in Gilgit-Baltistan served the powers involved just fine .
If anything , India and Pakistan are just following each other ’ s lead to formalize facts on the ground .
That will benefit the two national governments ’ plans for their respective administrative regions , especially with regards to long-pending development work .
But in doing so , they may also be ramping up tensions with each other and undermining peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition parties already on the same side , it is no surprise that actual issues in Gilgit-Baltistan haven ’ t been much of a feature in the campaigns before the vote .
With little over a month to go before the elections , the PTI hasn ’ t even bothered with any manifesto .
While all the parties may be on board when it comes to mainstreaming Gilgit-Balistan , they don ’ t have any plans for actually governing it .
It is no coincidence , too , that the opposition parties have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Staff Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa ahead of the November polls .
Just as for much of Pakistan ’ s history , the armed forces are presumed to have the defining say in electoral outcomes .
In fact , while the PDM continues to allege that the Khan government was “ selected ” by the Army , now its constituent parties are presenting their case for control of Gilgit-Baltistan to the brass .
This comes at a time when China has also given complete control over the CPEC , and in turn the region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In short , the elections in Gilgit-Baltistan may be a geopolitically interesting move , but they ’ ll mostly just reaffirm long-standing realities about Kashmir ’ s subjugation .
The latest chapter in that tale is being written by China and Pakistan on one side and India on the other , with the rivals politically matching each other move for move , as the fate of those living in the region remains outside of their own grasp .

Ahead of general elections in the Pakistan-administered region of Gilgit-Baltistan on Nov. 15, 554 candidates had submitted their nomination forms to run. India, which also claims the area as part of the broader dispute about the border between the two countries, has slammed the decision to hold the vote as an illegal annexation.
Ahead of general elections in the Pakistan-administered region of Gilgit-Baltistan on Nov. 15, 554 candidates had submitted their nomination forms to run. India, which also claims the area as part of the broader dispute about the border between the two countries, has slammed the decision to hold the vote as an illegal annexation.
In some ways, New Delhi is right about Islamabad’s intentions. It is holding the elections as part of an attempt to mainstream the area as a fifth province of the country. The move also comes in reaction to India’s own decision last year to revoke Article 370 of its constitution, which had granted Indian-administered Kashmir some autonomy and had protected the region against any attempts from the central government to repopulate it with non-Kashmiris.
After Article 370 was revoked, Pakistan was quick to register its outrage, particularly focusing on the fate of Kashmir’s Muslims. But the rhetoric was largely designed for domestic consumption, especially given that Islamabad has engaged in demographic engineering in Kashmir as well. Following the Partition of India in 1947, Pakistan separated the region it was given to administer into two parcels—the Northern Areas (the northern part of the broader Kashmir region) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir—until a final settlement of the borders between it and India. That divide was formalized in 1974 through the Northern Areas Council Legal Framework Order. Following that order, Islamabad actively encouraged Pakistanis from the rest of the country to settle in the Northern Areas, which tilted the region’s demographics away from its Ismaili Shiite population.
Further, although Pakistan’s Azad Jammu and Kashmir has enjoyed some token autonomy over the past 73 years, the Northern Areas have been ruled from the center, with Islamabad maintaining the area’s legal status quo ostensibly to protect its claim on the entirety of Kashmir if there is ever a settlement with India.
Over the course of that history, Islamabad has often faced dissent from protesters in the Northern Areas demanding that it be turned into an official fifth province and granted all the associated rights. Faced with growing demands from the locals, in 2009, Pakistan renamed the Northern Areas “Gilgit-Baltistan” and gave the region its first legislative assembly. Islamabad also created a legal framework to potentially provide anyone living in Gilgit-Baltistan, including those from outside of the region, with formal residency there. More reforms, supposedly to give residents of Gilgit-Baltistan greater say in their governance, came in 2018. But when Islamabad maintained its tight-fisted control over Gilgit-Baltistan anyway, protests ensued.
The protests among Gilgit-Baltistan nationalists have been met with pushback from Kashmiri nationalists on both sides of the Line of Control between the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts of the region, who have condemned plans to alter the status of the Pakistani-administered territories. In 2016, one prominent figure, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, wrote a letter to then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, calling the plans to elevate Gilgit-Baltistan a “disaster” for an independent Kashmir that includes all of the disputed regions. Sayyid Abdullah Gilani, another prominent Kashmiri nationalist, has similarly urged Pakistan to reconsider the upcoming election.
But with locals in Gilgit-Baltistan increasingly forceful in their anger—and with Pakistan looking for an opportunity to needle India after India’s own moves in Kashmir—now must seem like an opportune time for Islamabad to mainstream the area as a province.
Of course, the growing nationalist movement in Gilgit-Baltistan was only one factor in Pakistan’s decision to move forward with the vote. Another came from China.
In 2015, Beijing set in motion the transformation of Gilgit-Baltistan when it formally inaugurated the now $87 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The corridor, meant to connect China’s Xinjiang with Pakistan’s coastline in Baluchistan, has to pass through Gilgit-Baltistan. The CPEC is said to be China’s largest-ever overseas investment, and Beijing does not want to see it embroiled in the protracted dispute over Kashmir.
The ongoing Chinese-Indian conflict in Ladakh, an Indian-administered region along the disputed Indian-Chinese border, has led to further militarization of the Pakistani-Indian dispute. However, China’s muscle-flexing to establish itself as the region’s stand-alone power may suggest that Beijing is warning India off any tussles with Pakistan. China is helping develop businesses and infrastructure in Gilgit-Baltistan, most notably the Diamer-Bhasha Dam. The growing Chinese presence has reassured Islamabad that Beijing will have its back.
To be sure, none of the three powers is particularly itching for a fight. Despite some rhetoric about intervening in Gilgit-Baltistan, New Delhi is unlikely to be serious about taking actual control over the region while also skirmishing with China. Similarly, even though India has been eying a greater role in Afghanistan, leaders since Indian independence have been wary of actually having to deal with the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which Gilgit-Baltistan’s improbable accession to India would geographically mandate.
Pakistan, too, is tied up with its own problems, including Baloch and Pashtun nationalist movements. It is also wary of angering China and endangering the CPEC. (It is so afraid of losing its partner, in fact, that it has not only denied China’s abuses of its Uighur Muslim minority, but it has also turned a blind eye toward Beijing’s arrest of several Uighur women married to Pakistani men.) Geopolitically, meanwhile, the CPEC has become the goose that lays the golden egg for Pakistan’s military, which is charged with managing the corridor, replacing Kashmir, which, for the past seven decades, was used to justify skewed defense budgets.
In other words, the basic outlines of the status quo in Gilgit-Baltistan served the powers involved just fine. If anything, India and Pakistan are just following each other’s lead to formalize facts on the ground. That will benefit the two national governments’ plans for their respective administrative regions, especially with regards to long-pending development work. But in doing so, they may also be ramping up tensions with each other and undermining peace in the region.
Given their significance, the upcoming elections in Gilgit-Baltistan have dominated politics and the media. The country’s main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, won smaller elections there five years ago. This time around, the PML-N is spearheading the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of all the country’s major opposition parties arrayed against Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).
With all the opposition parties already on the same side, it is no surprise that actual issues in Gilgit-Baltistan haven’t been much of a feature in the campaigns before the vote. With little over a month to go before the elections, the PTI hasn’t even bothered with any manifesto. While all the parties may be on board when it comes to mainstreaming Gilgit-Balistan, they don’t have any plans for actually governing it.
It is no coincidence, too, that the opposition parties have been holding meetings with Army Chief of Staff Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa ahead of the November polls. Just as for much of Pakistan’s history, the armed forces are presumed to have the defining say in electoral outcomes. In fact, while the PDM continues to allege that the Khan government was “selected” by the Army, now its constituent parties are presenting their case for control of Gilgit-Baltistan to the brass. This comes at a time when China has also given complete control over the CPEC, and in turn the region it traverses, to the Army.
In short, the elections in Gilgit-Baltistan may be a geopolitically interesting move, but they’ll mostly just reaffirm long-standing realities about Kashmir’s subjugation. The latest chapter in that tale is being written by China and Pakistan on one side and India on the other, with the rivals politically matching each other move for move, as the fate of those living in the region remains outside of their own grasp.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-12--QAnon’s Sound and Fury

QAnon’s Sound and Fury

On Tuesday , Facebook announced that it would remove content related to QAnon from its platforms ahead of next month ’ s U.S. presidential election .
The move , which another group might see as a major setback , was quickly wrapped into the movement ’ s lore : Supporters viewed the ban as a sign , the New York Times reported , that their increasingly complicated conspiracy theory about U.S. President Donald Trump leading a battle against a satanic “ deep state ” cult was true .
With just weeks until the election , we ’ ve collected our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how far it has spread , and what its theories mean for politics at home—and abroad .
QAnon , according to Syracuse University professor emeritus Michael Barkun , first appeared online in 2017 .
From the start , its claims about a secret plot hatched by the Trump administration fit well within the history of U.S. apocalyptic movements .
“ It might seem strange to call an online conspiracy theory an apocalyptic movement , ” Barkun wrote .
“ But at the heart of such beliefs , from those who expected the Second @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Taiping Rebellion across the Pacific , is the idea of revelation .
Believers are offered some special insight into the future and the knowledge that a great change is coming .
That ’ s part of what made QAnon so appealing.
” Another part of its appeal , explained Foreign Policy columnist Elisabeth Braw , has to do with the dissolution of American civic life : “ Without regular interaction courtesy of a social activity such as volunteering or an amateur bowling league , people are more likely to retreat into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and echo chamber approval.
” In many ways , that sense of community is exactly what the movement ’ s pseudonymous leader Q purports to offer , even as the group ’ s culture isolates and radicalizes its followers .
As Foreign Policy ’ s James Palmer wrote , “ the culture of both 4chan and 8chan , ” which host QAnon posts , “ is deliberately ironic , over the top , and extreme .
This gives cover for users to claim their posts are merely joking .
… The dehumanization involved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wearing away any residual empathy for others.
” The group might have remained a fringe movement , but as Foreign Policy ’ s Elias Groll reported in 2019 , the Trump administration embraced QAnon figures—sometimes winkingly and sometimes formally , as when one member was invited to “ attend a White House social media summit along with a coterie of right-wing cranks and trolls .
That meeting [ served ] as a who ’ s who of the right-wing online ecosystem.
” It also allowed Trump to “ embrace his most ardent supporters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Since then , the group has been linked to over 40 political candidates running in congressional , state legislature , and mayoral elections in 2020 .
QAnon hasn ’ t just found fertile soil in the United States .
The conspiracy has also popped up in Canada , where in July a QAnon follower equipped with a rifle crashed his truck through the gates around Prime Minister Justin Trudeau ’ s residence .
According to the journalist Justin Ling , the incident shows that the conspiracy “ isn ’ t so much about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about a pernicious and dogged distrust in systems of power worldwide.
” Indeed , the German Marshall Fund ’ s Ariane Tabatabai wrote , “ although QAnon ’ s raison d ’ être is largely rooted in [ U.S. ] domestic politics … the conspiracy theory has recently developed an unlikely group of adherents : an Iranian dissident group that calls itself Restart.
” Although it is just a tiny group , Restart may have even gotten through to Trump : “ Responding to reporters ’ questions about U.S.-Iranian relations in June 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s make Iran great again .
Does that make sense ?
Make Iran great again.
’ ” Even if the comment was just a coincidence , Tabatabai points out , “ it raised the group ’ s profile among some parts of the president ’ s base.
” Even Germany isn ’ t immune to QAnon ’ s pull .
“ Germany has the second-highest number of QAnon believers after the United States .
NewsGuard has identified more than 448,000 QAnon followers in Europe .
On YouTube , Facebook , and Telegram , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over 200,000 followers in Germany alone , ” Tyson Barker , of the Aspen Institute Germany , explained .
But in Germany , he pointed out , such “ conspiracist groups risk violating Germany ’ s constitution , which has limitations on anti-Democratic and pro-Nazi speech owing to the country ’ s dark past .
Bavaria ’ s Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann pointed at QAnon ’ s use of anti-Semitic tropes.
” The question , of course , is what all of these followers can accomplish .
The group has effectively spread dangerous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The fragmented nature of social media chops conspiracies into little pieces , ” the journalist Elise Thomas noted , “ a factoid here , a false claim there—creating a kind of information petri dish for conspiracy cross-propagation , allowing half-true facts , decontextualized narratives , and false beliefs to flow and fold into one another and spread rapidly across the world.
” It was QAnon ’ s promotion of disinformation about the U.S. election that got itself banned from Facebook .
Then there ’ s the personal cost to the followers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Ling reported , “ posters speak of families split apart , relationships ended , friendships canceled .
The subreddit offers a painfully instructive window into how conspiracy theories manifest in everyday lives and how social media has become an incredibly powerful diffuser of even the most outlandish and foolish conspiracies.
” Moreover , he wrote , “ QAnon , perhaps even more so than many cults or online radical movements , has built-in antibodies ” to resist efforts to help its adherents .
“ It teaches its followers that everyone else @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are just part of the media conspiracy.
” More than anything , Ling wrote in another piece , QAnon is “ the culmination of more than a century in magical thinking , from cults that profess the end of the world to conspiracy theories that tell of a shadow world government to moral panics that warn of dark secrets behind every door .
It ’ s a world where individual people hold the keys to a hidden truth , if only they choose to look for it .
This is a reality where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but where the final battle of good versus evil is fast approaching .
“ This is the end of history .
We ’ ve never seen a movement that ties together a constellation of delusions and beliefs like this .
But the next one could be around the corner .
”

On Tuesday, Facebook announced that it would remove content related to QAnon from its platforms ahead of next month’s U.S. presidential election. The move, which another group might see as a major setback, was quickly wrapped into the movement’s lore: Supporters viewed the ban as a sign, the New York Times reported, that their increasingly complicated conspiracy theory about U.S. President Donald Trump leading a battle against a satanic “deep state” cult was true.
On Tuesday, Facebook announced that it would remove content related to QAnon from its platforms ahead of next month’s U.S. presidential election. The move, which another group might see as a major setback, was quickly wrapped into the movement’s lore: Supporters viewed the ban as a sign, the New York Times reported, that their increasingly complicated conspiracy theory about U.S. President Donald Trump leading a battle against a satanic “deep state” cult was true.
With just weeks until the election, we’ve collected our best reads on how QAnon started, how far it has spread, and what its theories mean for politics at home—and abroad.
QAnon, according to Syracuse University professor emeritus Michael Barkun, first appeared online in 2017. From the start, its claims about a secret plot hatched by the Trump administration fit well within the history of U.S. apocalyptic movements. “It might seem strange to call an online conspiracy theory an apocalyptic movement,” Barkun wrote. “But at the heart of such beliefs, from those who expected the Second Coming in 19th-century America to their counterparts in the Taiping Rebellion across the Pacific, is the idea of revelation. Believers are offered some special insight into the future and the knowledge that a great change is coming. That’s part of what made QAnon so appealing.”
Another part of its appeal, explained Foreign Policy columnist Elisabeth Braw, has to do with the dissolution of American civic life: “Without regular interaction courtesy of a social activity such as volunteering or an amateur bowling league, people are more likely to retreat into a social media-fueled world of egocentric concerns and echo chamber approval.” In many ways, that sense of community is exactly what the movement’s pseudonymous leader Q purports to offer, even as the group’s culture isolates and radicalizes its followers. As Foreign Policy’s James Palmer wrote, “the culture of both 4chan and 8chan,” which host QAnon posts, “is deliberately ironic, over the top, and extreme. This gives cover for users to claim their posts are merely joking. … The dehumanization involved in racist jokes also hardens participants, wearing away any residual empathy for others.”
The group might have remained a fringe movement, but as Foreign Policy’s Elias Groll reported in 2019, the Trump administration embraced QAnon figures—sometimes winkingly and sometimes formally, as when one member was invited to “attend a White House social media summit along with a coterie of right-wing cranks and trolls. That meeting [served] as a who’s who of the right-wing online ecosystem.” It also allowed Trump to “embrace his most ardent supporters and perhaps most effective media operatives.” Since then, the group has been linked to over 40 political candidates running in congressional, state legislature, and mayoral elections in 2020.
QAnon hasn’t just found fertile soil in the United States. The conspiracy has also popped up in Canada, where in July a QAnon follower equipped with a rifle crashed his truck through the gates around Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s residence. According to the journalist Justin Ling, the incident shows that the conspiracy “isn’t so much about a particular government or party but rather about a pernicious and dogged distrust in systems of power worldwide.”
Indeed, the German Marshall Fund’s Ariane Tabatabai wrote, “although QAnon’s raison d’être is largely rooted in [U.S.] domestic politics … the conspiracy theory has recently developed an unlikely group of adherents: an Iranian dissident group that calls itself Restart.” Although it is just a tiny group, Restart may have even gotten through to Trump: “Responding to reporters’ questions about U.S.-Iranian relations in June 2019, Trump noted, ‘Let’s make Iran great again. Does that make sense? Make Iran great again.’” Even if the comment was just a coincidence, Tabatabai points out, “it raised the group’s profile among some parts of the president’s base.”
Even Germany isn’t immune to QAnon’s pull. “Germany has the second-highest number of QAnon believers after the United States. NewsGuard has identified more than 448,000 QAnon followers in Europe. On YouTube, Facebook, and Telegram, accounts dealing with the QAnon conspiracy have over 200,000 followers in Germany alone,” Tyson Barker, of the Aspen Institute Germany, explained. But in Germany, he pointed out, such “conspiracist groups risk violating Germany’s constitution, which has limitations on anti-Democratic and pro-Nazi speech owing to the country’s dark past. Bavaria’s Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann pointed at QAnon’s use of anti-Semitic tropes.”
The question, of course, is what all of these followers can accomplish. The group has effectively spread dangerous misinformation, particularly during the coronavirus pandemic. “The fragmented nature of social media chops conspiracies into little pieces,” the journalist Elise Thomas noted, “a factoid here, a false claim there—creating a kind of information petri dish for conspiracy cross-propagation, allowing half-true facts, decontextualized narratives, and false beliefs to flow and fold into one another and spread rapidly across the world.” It was QAnon’s promotion of disinformation about the U.S. election that got itself banned from Facebook.
Then there’s the personal cost to the followers themselves—and their families. “On r/QAnonCasualties,” Ling reported, “posters speak of families split apart, relationships ended, friendships canceled. The subreddit offers a painfully instructive window into how conspiracy theories manifest in everyday lives and how social media has become an incredibly powerful diffuser of even the most outlandish and foolish conspiracies.” Moreover, he wrote, “QAnon, perhaps even more so than many cults or online radical movements, has built-in antibodies” to resist efforts to help its adherents. “It teaches its followers that everyone else needs to be deprogrammed. … Fact-checkers are just part of the media conspiracy.”
More than anything, Ling wrote in another piece, QAnon is “the culmination of more than a century in magical thinking, from cults that profess the end of the world to conspiracy theories that tell of a shadow world government to moral panics that warn of dark secrets behind every door. It’s a world where individual people hold the keys to a hidden truth, if only they choose to look for it. This is a reality where everyone in power has a dark purpose, but where the final battle of good versus evil is fast approaching.
“This is the end of history. We’ve never seen a movement that ties together a constellation of delusions and beliefs like this. But the next one could be around the corner.”