foreignpolicy--2020-06-30--Facing Trump, Putin, and Xi, London Needs Old Allies for New Ideas

Facing Trump , Putin , and Xi , London Needs Old Allies for New Ideas Hong Kong , where the sun finally set on the British Empire in 1997 , is now the fulcrum of London ’ s most fateful foreign-policy decisions since Brexit .
But as Beijing tosses away its past commitments and imposes a draconian new security law on the territory , a geopolitically intriguing club of three is emerging , as Canada , Australia , and the United Kingdom support one another against Beijing .
This collaboration is an old idea , but it ’ s one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vague ideas for “ CANZUK , ” which included New Zealand with the three , as an economic community have gathered steam inside conservative parties in Canada , Australia , and Britain for some years .
Like most analysts , I had dismissed these as imperial nostalgia projects that made little sense given the countries ’ widely divergent economic interests and the reality that such collaborations were likely to do little to reinforce the rules-based global order .
Last year , the University of Cambridge historian Christopher J. Hill dismissed the Five Eyes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Canada , New Zealand , the U.K. , and the United States , as a “ sub-optimal relic of war-time days ” that was “ never going to be an ‘ action organization ’ in the sense of formulating joint foreign policies.
” But events in China and Hong Kong should change everyone ’ s minds .
Five Eyes has shown itself to be a crucial tool for coordinating a global response to China in the age of Chinese companies ’ attempts to dominate 5G mobile communications networks .
Canada , Australia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statement on Hong Kong before a follow-up added the United States .
This club of three—as a new C-3 grouping of Canada , Australia , and Britain—has legs .
But the idea must be reclaimed from the nationalist right : Not only is deepening foreign-policy coordination among Ottawa , Canberra , and London increasingly attractive amid the accelerating decay of the American-led world order , but this grouping has shown itself over Hong Kong to be far more meaningful in world affairs than seemed possible .
Instead of being backward-looking , this is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Canada , Australia , and Britain are all facing a moment of crisis in their foreign policies .
Canada ’ s humiliating failure to make it onto the United Nations Security Council reflects that it can now be picked on by China , or even Saudi Arabia , as the United States weakens .
Australia is faced with cyberattacks and growing Chinese pressure .
Britain , now outside the European Union , has been repeatedly threatened by China over Hong Kong , Huawei , HSBC and nuclear power plants .
All three are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international politics , in the various G-groups , in global bodies , and in President Donald Trump ’ s Washington .
Not only are all three countries feeling increasingly lonely , but they are also threatened with real vulnerability if Trump wins again or a contested election plunges the United States into a protracted crisis this November .
But that loneliness is not something that can be made up for by gravitating toward Brussels .
Sadly , for all three , Germany and France are in a very different place from them on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by huge exports to China , wants to find a middle way between Washington and Beijing and is not ready to throw the EU into greater competition that could jeopardize critical trade for the sake of the interests of either Canada , Australia , or Britain .
Paris , similarly , thinks differently on Russia .
French President Emmanuel Macron ’ s emerging vision for a European Security Council or “ Eurogroup ” -style body including Russia , Turkey , and Britain is well outside the anti-authoritarian frame than Ottawa , Canberra , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fact , supported Trump in his desire to see Putin attend the now-canceled G-7 summit , something Canada and Britain opposed together—another example of this emerging entente .
The C-3 makes sense in this geopolitical breakdown .
There is no pan-Western alliance like NATO on China for the three to fall back on .
Nor , given Germany ’ s China strategy , is one likely to emerge .
Moreover , Chinese and Russian aggression against the democracies is likely to grow , the United States might critically weaken , and the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ path .
Instead of worrying about looking back to the past , leaders in Ottawa , Canberra , and London should embrace the idea and propose a significant deepening of their foreign-policy coordination .
This is most definitely not about “ getting the band back together , ” as one British Conservative member of Parliament greeted a trade talk announcement , but three middle powers building an anti-authoritarian group to resist great-power bullying in the 21st century .
The key to making this work is the right format .
Right-wing “ CANZUK ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ideas involving secretariats or free movement that make working closer together look like a pipe dream .
Successful foreign policy means coming down to earth , and the key to that is the right structure .
The increasingly used E-3 , a format uniting Britain , France , and Germany , offers a good model , but there is room to be more ambitious .
A mini C-3 format would offer the best approach : a summit with follow-up that is both flexible and lightweight enough to get off the ground but with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advancing dossiers and initiatives .
As the C-3 are all Commonwealth countries , summits could be timed to coincide with the biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting , where the leaders of Canada , Australia , and Britain regularly meet anyway .
As a central aim , this group should focus on automatically issuing joint statements on authoritarian rivals China and Russia .
But it should also do more : Drawing both on Britain ’ s joint initiative with Canada to block Putin attending the G-7 and on Canada ’ s humiliating experience @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s first tasks should be to coordinate joint positions inside the U.N. , G-7 and G-20 .
As far as major goals are concerned , this could include supporting any future attempts of Canada to win a seat on the U.N. Security Council and for Australia to formally join the G-7 .
Meanwhile , the C-3 permanent working group could set to work in the format the other G-groups employ : seeking ground for joint initiatives that could be presented together at other forums .
This could include promoting a “ D-10 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracies to work on the pooling of 5G resources or critical supply chains ; a joint proposal for a “ Global Kleptocracy Initiative ” to create common data tools , tracking teams , and payments databases to monitor illicit financial flows ; or a push for a “ Global Magnitsky Initiative ” to automatically block human rights violators and freeze their accounts .
This is not about replacing working with the EU or the United States but creating a group for Canada , Australia , and Britain to jointly present tougher anti-authoritarian packages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to individually present them alone .
The C-3 , like the E-3 to the EU , would be complementary to existing Euro-Atlantic bodies .
This C-3 could even grow into more sustained joint diplomacy toward Moscow and Beijing , including joint visits or ministerial staff accompanying a foreign secretary to indicate solidarity .
In the event of Trump ’ s reelection , or a serious American crisis , a joined-up position on the United States could become necessary too .
This could take the form of a C-3 joint position inside the Five @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an emboldened Trump administration .
Taken together , these measures could add another , stronger front to those seeking to defend the liberal world order : in the interests of both a potential Biden administration and the European Union , alike .
Moreover , the C-3 would fit well with the emerging vision of the Joe Biden camp for the United States to encourage different networks and groups of allies to do more together in partnership with Washington .
But as obvious as it may seem , strategically , much deeper cooperation between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an image problem .
For many , it smacks too much of imperial nostalgia or conservative culture politics to seem like the future .
For others , it feels too anchored on ethnic fraternity to feel right .
This is why , in order to work , the idea needs to be decolonized .
First up , that means making it less British .
It needs to be framed as not a Britain-led but a Britain-last initiative , with Canada and Australia taking the lead .
As a formal name , the C-3 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 3 ” instead of the “ Club of 3.
” The first summit , which could be virtual given the coronavirus pandemic , should certainly not be in London : a far better , more forward-looking location would be Vancouver .
The C-3 ’ s face should be Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and not his British counterpart , Boris Johnson .
Above all , the C-3 should explicitly reject a “ kith and kin ” basis .
Excluding Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern ’ s New Zealand from the grouping will make it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ideas of ethnic familiarity but geopolitics and values .
Wellington is simply not in the same place as Ottawa , Canberra , or London when it comes to China .
New Zealand sees itself as neutral in U.S.-China competition and has not signed either the U.K.-Australia-Canada statements over Hong Kong or those of the three with the United States .
This grouping should be about mutual support when it comes to the superpowers : Those unwilling to offer it have no place in such an alignment .
But what about other middle powers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan ?
This is where two critical principles of international politics come into play : Does your grouping have enough like-mindedness to be able to function and enough load-bearing capacity to get anything done ?
What Canada , Australia , and Britain are after is mutual geopolitical support ; adding members that aren ’ t willing to offer that risks creating another talking shop like the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism .
That group , which stretches from Chile to Kazakhstan , lacks the ability to agree on anything of substance—and the power to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is there are simply not a lot of like-minded democracies to go around .
Neither Japan , Chile , nor South Africa would sign on to strong enough statements or initiatives when it comes to Russia or China .
European states that might be partners , like the Netherlands or Sweden , are engaged in a European China policy that is pulling in another direction , and they are highly unlikely to break ranks when the Franco-German force of gravity lies elsewhere .
Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s India , which is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history with Russia , sees itself as nonaligned , and has far more serious and potentially bloody problems with China that Canada , Australia , and Britain need some distance from .
New Delhi is better engaged with through other ideas , like the more focused “ D-10.
” Many of the rest , like New Zealand , are simply too small and want to keep their heads down .
When it comes down to it , the three nations don ’ t actually have that much choice about whom they can deepen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and London didn ’ t need each other in a U.S.-led world order or in a relatively benign world without authoritarian superpowers .
But that system has decayed .
Deep divisions , not just between the Europeans and Donald Trump , but with much of the U.S. national security establishment , are breaking up the old Washington-led ideological West .
The common anti-authoritarian frame that once glued together Western foreign policy has come unstuck .
Ottawa , Canberra , and London find themselves with very different strategic visions from Paris and Berlin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In this world , the C-3 is a liberal international , not a nationalist , cause .
And the more of those that get off the ground , the better .

Hong Kong, where the sun finally set on the British Empire in 1997, is now the fulcrum of London’s most fateful foreign-policy decisions since Brexit. But as Beijing tosses away its past commitments and imposes a draconian new security law on the territory, a geopolitically intriguing club of three is emerging, as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom support one another against Beijing.
Hong Kong, where the sun finally set on the British Empire in 1997, is now the fulcrum of London’s most fateful foreign-policy decisions since Brexit. But as Beijing tosses away its past commitments and imposes a draconian new security law on the territory, a geopolitically intriguing club of three is emerging, as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom support one another against Beijing.
This collaboration is an old idea, but it’s one with a surprising valence right now. Vague ideas for “CANZUK,” which included New Zealand with the three, as an economic community have gathered steam inside conservative parties in Canada, Australia, and Britain for some years. Like most analysts, I had dismissed these as imperial nostalgia projects that made little sense given the countries’ widely divergent economic interests and the reality that such collaborations were likely to do little to reinforce the rules-based global order.
Last year, the University of Cambridge historian Christopher J. Hill dismissed the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, which unites Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the United States, as a “sub-optimal relic of war-time days” that was “never going to be an ‘action organization’ in the sense of formulating joint foreign policies.” But events in China and Hong Kong should change everyone’s minds. Five Eyes has shown itself to be a crucial tool for coordinating a global response to China in the age of Chinese companies’ attempts to dominate 5G mobile communications networks. Canada, Australia, and Britain produced their own strong joint statement on Hong Kong before a follow-up added the United States.
This club of three—as a new C-3 grouping of Canada, Australia, and Britain—has legs. But the idea must be reclaimed from the nationalist right: Not only is deepening foreign-policy coordination among Ottawa, Canberra, and London increasingly attractive amid the accelerating decay of the American-led world order, but this grouping has shown itself over Hong Kong to be far more meaningful in world affairs than seemed possible. Instead of being backward-looking, this is a progressive cause—and a worthwhile one.
Canada, Australia, and Britain are all facing a moment of crisis in their foreign policies. Canada’s humiliating failure to make it onto the United Nations Security Council reflects that it can now be picked on by China, or even Saudi Arabia, as the United States weakens. Australia is faced with cyberattacks and growing Chinese pressure. Britain, now outside the European Union, has been repeatedly threatened by China over Hong Kong, Huawei, HSBC , and nuclear power plants. All three are struggling to make their voices heard in international politics, in the various G-groups, in global bodies, and in President Donald Trump’s Washington.
Not only are all three countries feeling increasingly lonely, but they are also threatened with real vulnerability if Trump wins again or a contested election plunges the United States into a protracted crisis this November. But that loneliness is not something that can be made up for by gravitating toward Brussels. Sadly, for all three, Germany and France are in a very different place from them on the authoritarian powers. Berlin, constrained by huge exports to China, wants to find a middle way between Washington and Beijing and is not ready to throw the EU into greater competition that could jeopardize critical trade for the sake of the interests of either Canada, Australia, or Britain. Paris, similarly, thinks differently on Russia. French President Emmanuel Macron’s emerging vision for a European Security Council or “Eurogroup”-style body including Russia, Turkey, and Britain is well outside the anti-authoritarian frame than Ottawa, Canberra, and London share. Macron, in fact, supported Trump in his desire to see Putin attend the now-canceled G-7 summit, something Canada and Britain opposed together—another example of this emerging entente.
The C-3 makes sense in this geopolitical breakdown. There is no pan-Western alliance like NATO on China for the three to fall back on. Nor, given Germany’s China strategy, is one likely to emerge. Moreover, Chinese and Russian aggression against the democracies is likely to grow, the United States might critically weaken, and the EU seems firmly set on pursuing a middle path. Instead of worrying about looking back to the past, leaders in Ottawa, Canberra, and London should embrace the idea and propose a significant deepening of their foreign-policy coordination. This is most definitely not about “getting the band back together,” as one British Conservative member of Parliament greeted a trade talk announcement, but three middle powers building an anti-authoritarian group to resist great-power bullying in the 21st century.
The key to making this work is the right format. Right-wing “CANZUK” supporters have polluted the discourse with grandiose ideas involving secretariats or free movement that make working closer together look like a pipe dream. Successful foreign policy means coming down to earth, and the key to that is the right structure. The increasingly used E-3, a format uniting Britain, France, and Germany, offers a good model, but there is room to be more ambitious. A mini C-3 format would offer the best approach: a summit with follow-up that is both flexible and lightweight enough to get off the ground but with a permanent working group in foreign ministries advancing dossiers and initiatives. As the C-3 are all Commonwealth countries, summits could be timed to coincide with the biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, where the leaders of Canada, Australia, and Britain regularly meet anyway.
As a central aim, this group should focus on automatically issuing joint statements on authoritarian rivals China and Russia. But it should also do more: Drawing both on Britain’s joint initiative with Canada to block Putin attending the G-7 and on Canada’s humiliating experience at the U.N., among this C-3’s first tasks should be to coordinate joint positions inside the U.N., G-7 and G-20. As far as major goals are concerned, this could include supporting any future attempts of Canada to win a seat on the U.N. Security Council and for Australia to formally join the G-7.
Meanwhile, the C-3 permanent working group could set to work in the format the other G-groups employ: seeking ground for joint initiatives that could be presented together at other forums. This could include promoting a “D-10” of the world’s leading democracies to work on the pooling of 5G resources or critical supply chains; a joint proposal for a “Global Kleptocracy Initiative” to create common data tools, tracking teams, and payments databases to monitor illicit financial flows; or a push for a “Global Magnitsky Initiative” to automatically block human rights violators and freeze their accounts. This is not about replacing working with the EU or the United States but creating a group for Canada, Australia, and Britain to jointly present tougher anti-authoritarian packages to big powers than had they tried to individually present them alone. The C-3, like the E-3 to the EU, would be complementary to existing Euro-Atlantic bodies.
This C-3 could even grow into more sustained joint diplomacy toward Moscow and Beijing, including joint visits or ministerial staff accompanying a foreign secretary to indicate solidarity. In the event of Trump’s reelection, or a serious American crisis, a joined-up position on the United States could become necessary too. This could take the form of a C-3 joint position inside the Five Eyes security alliance to work to restrain an emboldened Trump administration. Taken together, these measures could add another, stronger front to those seeking to defend the liberal world order: in the interests of both a potential Biden administration and the European Union, alike. Moreover, the C-3 would fit well with the emerging vision of the Joe Biden camp for the United States to encourage different networks and groups of allies to do more together in partnership with Washington.
But as obvious as it may seem, strategically, much deeper cooperation between Britain, Canada, and Australia has an image problem. For many, it smacks too much of imperial nostalgia or conservative culture politics to seem like the future. For others, it feels too anchored on ethnic fraternity to feel right. This is why, in order to work, the idea needs to be decolonized.
First up, that means making it less British. It needs to be framed as not a Britain-led but a Britain-last initiative, with Canada and Australia taking the lead. As a formal name, the C-3 could even be called the “Canberra 3” instead of the “Club of 3.” The first summit, which could be virtual given the coronavirus pandemic, should certainly not be in London: a far better, more forward-looking location would be Vancouver. The C-3’s face should be Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and not his British counterpart, Boris Johnson.
Above all, the C-3 should explicitly reject a “kith and kin” basis. Excluding Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s New Zealand from the grouping will make it explicit this is not about any distasteful ideas of ethnic familiarity but geopolitics and values. Wellington is simply not in the same place as Ottawa, Canberra, or London when it comes to China. New Zealand sees itself as neutral in U.S.-China competition and has not signed either the U.K.-Australia-Canada statements over Hong Kong or those of the three with the United States. This grouping should be about mutual support when it comes to the superpowers: Those unwilling to offer it have no place in such an alignment.
But what about other middle powers? Why not include, say, Japan? This is where two critical principles of international politics come into play: Does your grouping have enough like-mindedness to be able to function and enough load-bearing capacity to get anything done? What Canada, Australia, and Britain are after is mutual geopolitical support; adding members that aren’t willing to offer that risks creating another talking shop like the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism. That group, which stretches from Chile to Kazakhstan, lacks the ability to agree on anything of substance—and the power to act on it.
The sad truth is there are simply not a lot of like-minded democracies to go around. Neither Japan, Chile, nor South Africa would sign on to strong enough statements or initiatives when it comes to Russia or China. European states that might be partners, like the Netherlands or Sweden, are engaged in a European China policy that is pulling in another direction, and they are highly unlikely to break ranks when the Franco-German force of gravity lies elsewhere. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s India, which is not exactly like-minded, has a different history with Russia, sees itself as nonaligned, and has far more serious and potentially bloody problems with China that Canada, Australia, and Britain need some distance from. New Delhi is better engaged with through other ideas, like the more focused “D-10.” Many of the rest, like New Zealand, are simply too small and want to keep their heads down.
When it comes down to it, the three nations don’t actually have that much choice about whom they can deepen their partnerships with. Ottawa, Canberra, and London didn’t need each other in a U.S.-led world order or in a relatively benign world without authoritarian superpowers. But that system has decayed. Deep divisions, not just between the Europeans and Donald Trump, but with much of the U.S. national security establishment, are breaking up the old Washington-led ideological West. The common anti-authoritarian frame that once glued together Western foreign policy has come unstuck. Ottawa, Canberra, and London find themselves with very different strategic visions from Paris and Berlin about how to approach Moscow and Beijing. In this world, the C-3 is a liberal international, not a nationalist, cause. And the more of those that get off the ground, the better.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-30--Everyone Misunderstands the Reason for the U.S.-China Cold War

Everyone Misunderstands the Reason for the U.S.-China Cold War The United States is pretty polarized these days , but nearly everyone seems to agree that China is a big problem .
The Trump administration has been at odds with China on trade issues since day one , and its 2017 National Security Strategy labeled China a “ revisionist power ” and major strategic rival .
( President Donald Trump himself seems to have been willing to give Beijing a free pass if it would help him get reelected , but that ’ s just a sign of his own venality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other policies . )
Presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden may have started his campaign in 2019 downplaying fears that China was going to “ eat our lunch , ” but his campaign has grown increasingly hawkish over time .
Not surprisingly , hard-line Republican members of Congress like Josh Hawley and Matt Gaetz have been sounding the alarm as well , while progressives and moderates warn of a “ new cold war ” and call for renewed dialogue to manage the relationship .
Despite their differing prescriptions , all of these groups see @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vital importance .
Unfortunately , discussion of the Sino-American rivalry is also succumbing to a familiar tendency to attribute conflict to our opponents ’ internal characteristics : their ruling ideology , domestic institutions , or the personalities of particular leaders .
This tendency has a long history in the United States : The country entered World War I in order to defeat German militarism and make the world safe for democracy , and later it fought World War II to defeat fascism .
At the dawn of the Cold War , George Kennan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( “ The Sources of Soviet Conduct ” ) argued that Moscow had a relentless and internally motivated urge to expand , driven by the need for foreign enemies to justify the Communist Party ’ s authoritarian rule .
Appeasement would not work , he argued , and the only choice was to contain the Soviet Union until its internal system “ mellowed.
” More recently , U.S. leaders blamed America ’ s problems with Iraq on Saddam Hussein ’ s recklessly evil ambitions and portrayed Iran ’ s leaders as irrational religious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by ideological beliefs .
In all of these conflicts , trouble arose from the basic nature of these adversaries , not from the circumstances they found themselves in or the inherently competitive nature of international politics itself .
And so it is with China today .
Former National Security Advisor H.R .
McMaster maintains that China is a threat “ because its leaders are promoting a closed , authoritarian model as an alternative to democratic governance and free-market economics.
” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo agrees : In his view , relations have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different Chinese Communist Party today than it was 10 years ago .
… This is a Chinese Communist Party that has come to view itself as intent upon the destruction of Western ideas , Western democracies , Western values.
” According to Sen. Marco Rubio : “ Chinese Communist Party power serves no purpose but to strengthen the party ’ s rule and to spread its influence around the world .
… China is an untrustworthy partner in any endeavor whether it ’ s a nation-state project , an industrial capacity , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ avoid a conflict , Vice President Mike Pence said , is for China ’ s rulers to “ change course and return to the spirit of ‘ reform and opening ’ and greater freedom.
” Even far more sophisticated China watchers , such as former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd , attribute much of China ’ s increasingly assertive stance to President Xi Jinping ’ s centralization of power , and Rudd sees this behavior as “ an expression of Xi Jinping ’ s personal leadership temperament , which is impatient with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and with which the international community had become relaxed , comfortable , and thoroughly accustomed.
” The implication is that a different Chinese leader would be a much less serious problem .
Similarly , Timothy Garton Ash believes that the “ primary cause of this new cold war is the turn taken by the Chinese communist party leadership under Xi Jinping since 2012 : more oppressive at home , more aggressive abroad.
” Other observers point to rising nationalism ( whether spontaneous or government-sponsored ) as another key factor in China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ categories originally conceived by the late Kenneth Waltz , international relations scholars variously refer to such accounts as “ unit-level , ” “ reductionist , ” or “ second-image ” explanations .
The many variations within this broad family of theories all view a country ’ s foreign-policy behavior as primarily the result of its internal characteristics .
Thus , U.S. foreign policy is sometimes attributed to its democratic system , liberal values , or capitalist economic order , just as the behavior of other states is said to derive from the nature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ strategic culture , ” or leaders ’ personalities .
Explanations based on domestic characteristics are appealing in part because they seem so simple and straightforward : Peace-loving democracies act that way because they are ( supposedly ) based on norms of tolerance ; by contrast , aggressors act aggressively because they are based on domination or coercion or because there are fewer constraints on what leaders can do .
Focusing on the internal characteristics of other states is also tempting because it absolves us of responsibility for conflict and allows us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If we are on the side of the angels and our own political system is based on sound and just principles , then when trouble arises , it must be because Bad States or Bad Leaders are out there doing Bad Things .
This perspective also provides a ready solution : Get rid of those Bad States or those Bad Leaders !
Demonizing one ’ s opponents is also a time-honored way of rallying public support in the face of an international challenge , and that requires highlighting the negative qualities that are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as they are .
Unfortunately , pinning most of the blame for conflict on an opponent ’ s domestic characteristics is also dangerous .
For starters , if conflict is due primarily to the nature of the opposing regime ( s ) , then the only long-term solution is to overthrow them .
Accommodation , mutual coexistence , or even extensive cooperation on matters of mutual interest are for the most part ruled out , with potentially catastrophic consequences .
When rivals see the nature of the other side as a threat in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ becomes the only alternative .
What unit-level explanations either overlook or downplay are the broader structural factors that have made Sino-American rivalry inevitable .
First and foremost , the two most powerful countries in the international system are overwhelmingly likely to be at odds with each other .
Because each is the other ’ s greatest potential threat , they will inevitably eye each other warily , go to considerable lengths to reduce the other ’ s ability to threaten their core interests , and constantly look for ways to gain an advantage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other side does not gain an advantage over them .
Even if it were possible ( or worth the risk ) , internal changes in either the United States or China are unlikely to eliminate these incentives ( or at least not anytime soon ) .
Each country is trying—with varying degrees of skill and success—to avoid being in a position where the other can threaten its security , prosperity , or domestic way of life .
And because neither can be completely sure what the other might do in the future—a reality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. foreign policy in recent years—both are actively competing for power and influence in a variety of domains .
This troubling situation is exacerbated by the incompatibility of their respective strategic objectives , which derive in part from geography and from the legacies of the past century .
Quite understandably , China ’ s leaders would like to live in as secure a neighborhood as possible , for the same reasons that the United States formulated and eventually enforced the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere .
Beijing need not impose one-party state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just wants all of its neighbors to be mindful of its interests and does not want any of them to pose a significant threat .
Toward that end , it would like to push the United States out of the region so that it no longer has to worry as much about U.S. military power and so that its neighbors can not count on American help .
This goal is hardly mystifying or irrational : Would any great power be happy if the world ’ s most powerful country had significant military forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with many of its immediate neighbors ?
The United States has good reasons to remain in Asia , however .
As John Mearsheimer and I have explained elsewhere , preventing China from establishing a dominant position in Asia strengthens U.S. security by forcing China to focus more attention closer to home and making it harder ( though of course not impossible ) for China to project power elsewhere in the world ( including areas closer to the United States itself ) .
This strategic logic would still apply if China were to liberalize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state capitalism .
The result , unfortunately , is a zero-sum conflict : Neither side can get what it wants without depriving the other .
Thus , the roots of the present Sino-American rivalry have less to do with particular leaders or regime types and more to do with the distribution of power and the particular strategies that the two sides are pursuing .
This is not to say that domestic politics or individual leadership do not matter at all , either in influencing the intensity of the competition or the skill with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders are more ( or less ) risk acceptant , and Americans are currently getting ( another ) painful demonstration of the harm that incompetent leadership can inflict .
But the more important point is that new leaders or profound domestic changes are not going to alter the inherently competitive nature of U.S.-Chinese relations .
From this perspective , both progressives and hard-liners in the United States are getting it wrong .
The former believe that China poses at most a modest threat to U.S. interests and that some combination of accommodation and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all of the friction and head off a new cold war .
I ’ m all for skillful diplomacy , but I do not believe it will suffice to prevent an intense competition that is primarily rooted in the distribution of power .
As Trump said of his trade war , hard-liners think a competition with China will be “ good and easy to win.
” In their view , all it takes is more and tougher sanctions , a decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies , a big increase in U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like-minded democracies to the U.S. side , with the ultimate goal of ending Chinese Communist Party rule .
Apart from the obvious costs and risks of this course of action , this view overstates Chinese vulnerabilities , understates the costs to the United States , and greatly exaggerates other states ’ willingness to join an anti-Beijing crusade .
China ’ s neighbors do not want it to dominate them and are eager to maintain ties with Washington , but they have no desire to get dragged into a violent conflict .
And there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supposedly more liberal China would be any less interested in defending its own interests and any more willing to accept permanent inferiority to the United States .
So what does a more structural view of this situation imply ?
First , it tells us that we are in it for the long haul ; no clever strategy or bold stroke of genius is going to solve this conflict once and for all—at least not anytime soon .
Second , it is a serious rivalry , and the United States should conduct in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal with an ambitious peer competitor with a bunch of amateurs in charge or with a president who puts his personal agenda ahead of the country ’ s .
It will take intelligent military investments , to be sure , but a major diplomatic effort by knowledgeable and well-trained officials is going to be of equal if not greater importance .
Maintaining a healthy set of Asian alliances is essential because the United States simply can not remain an influential power in Asia without a lot of local support .
The bottom line @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and feeding of those relationships to campaign contributors , party hacks , or dilettantes .
Third , and perhaps most important , both sides have a genuine and shared interest in keeping their rivalry within boundaries , both to avoid unnecessary clashes and to facilitate cooperation on issues where U.S. and Chinese interests overlap ( climate change , pandemic prevention , etc. )
.
One can not eliminate all risks and prevent future crises , but Washington must be clear about its own red lines and make sure it understands Beijing ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in : The rivalry may be hard-wired into today ’ s international system , but how each side handles the competition will be determined by who is in charge and by the quality of their domestic institutions .
I would not assume that America ’ s will fall short , but I wouldn ’ t be complacent about that either .

The United States is pretty polarized these days, but nearly everyone seems to agree that China is a big problem. The Trump administration has been at odds with China on trade issues since day one, and its 2017 National Security Strategy labeled China a “revisionist power” and major strategic rival. (President Donald Trump himself seems to have been willing to give Beijing a free pass if it would help him get reelected, but that’s just a sign of his own venality and inconsistent with the administration’s other policies.) Presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden may have started his campaign in 2019 downplaying fears that China was going to “ eat our lunch ,” but his campaign has grown increasingly hawkish over time.
The United States is pretty polarized these days, but nearly everyone seems to agree that China is a big problem. The Trump administration has been at odds with China on trade issues since day one, and its 2017 National Security Strategy labeled China a “revisionist power” and major strategic rival. (President Donald Trump himself seems to have been willing to give Beijing a free pass if it would help him get reelected, but that’s just a sign of his own venality and inconsistent with the administration’s other policies.) Presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden may have started his campaign in 2019 downplaying fears that China was going to “eat our lunch,” but his campaign has grown increasingly hawkish over time.
Not surprisingly, hard-line Republican members of Congress like Josh Hawley and Matt Gaetz have been sounding the alarm as well, while progressives and moderates warn of a “new cold war” and call for renewed dialogue to manage the relationship. Despite their differing prescriptions, all of these groups see the state of Sino-American relations as of vital importance.
Unfortunately, discussion of the Sino-American rivalry is also succumbing to a familiar tendency to attribute conflict to our opponents’ internal characteristics: their ruling ideology, domestic institutions, or the personalities of particular leaders. This tendency has a long history in the United States: The country entered World War I in order to defeat German militarism and make the world safe for democracy, and later it fought World War II to defeat fascism. At the dawn of the Cold War, George Kennan’s infamous “X” article (“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”) argued that Moscow had a relentless and internally motivated urge to expand, driven by the need for foreign enemies to justify the Communist Party’s authoritarian rule. Appeasement would not work, he argued, and the only choice was to contain the Soviet Union until its internal system “mellowed.” More recently, U.S. leaders blamed America’s problems with Iraq on Saddam Hussein’s recklessly evil ambitions and portrayed Iran’s leaders as irrational religious fanatics whose foreign-policy behavior is driven solely by ideological beliefs.
In all of these conflicts, trouble arose from the basic nature of these adversaries, not from the circumstances they found themselves in or the inherently competitive nature of international politics itself.
And so it is with China today. Former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster maintains that China is a threat “because its leaders are promoting a closed, authoritarian model as an alternative to democratic governance and free-market economics.” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo agrees: In his view, relations have deteriorated because “it’s a different Chinese Communist Party today than it was 10 years ago. … This is a Chinese Communist Party that has come to view itself as intent upon the destruction of Western ideas, Western democracies, Western values.” According to Sen. Marco Rubio: “Chinese Communist Party power serves no purpose but to strengthen the party’s rule and to spread its influence around the world. … China is an untrustworthy partner in any endeavor whether it’s a nation-state project, an industrial capacity, or financial integration.” The only way to avoid a conflict, Vice President Mike Pence said, is for China’s rulers to “change course and return to the spirit of ‘reform and opening’ and greater freedom.”
Even far more sophisticated China watchers, such as former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, attribute much of China’s increasingly assertive stance to President Xi Jinping’s centralization of power, and Rudd sees this behavior as “an expression of Xi Jinping’s personal leadership temperament, which is impatient with the incremental bureaucratism endemic to the Chinese system, and with which the international community had become relaxed, comfortable, and thoroughly accustomed.” The implication is that a different Chinese leader would be a much less serious problem. Similarly, Timothy Garton Ash believes that the “primary cause of this new cold war is the turn taken by the Chinese communist party leadership under Xi Jinping since 2012: more oppressive at home, more aggressive abroad.” Other observers point to rising nationalism (whether spontaneous or government-sponsored) as another key factor in China’s greater foreign-policy assertiveness.
Relying on categories originally conceived by the late Kenneth Waltz, international relations scholars variously refer to such accounts as “unit-level,” “reductionist,” or “second-image” explanations. The many variations within this broad family of theories all view a country’s foreign-policy behavior as primarily the result of its internal characteristics. Thus, U.S. foreign policy is sometimes attributed to its democratic system, liberal values, or capitalist economic order, just as the behavior of other states is said to derive from the nature of their domestic regime, ruling ideology, “strategic culture,” or leaders’ personalities.
Explanations based on domestic characteristics are appealing in part because they seem so simple and straightforward: Peace-loving democracies act that way because they are (supposedly) based on norms of tolerance; by contrast, aggressors act aggressively because they are based on domination or coercion or because there are fewer constraints on what leaders can do.
Focusing on the internal characteristics of other states is also tempting because it absolves us of responsibility for conflict and allows us to pin the blame on others. If we are on the side of the angels and our own political system is based on sound and just principles, then when trouble arises, it must be because Bad States or Bad Leaders are out there doing Bad Things. This perspective also provides a ready solution: Get rid of those Bad States or those Bad Leaders! Demonizing one’s opponents is also a time-honored way of rallying public support in the face of an international challenge, and that requires highlighting the negative qualities that are supposedly making one’s rivals act as they are.
Unfortunately, pinning most of the blame for conflict on an opponent’s domestic characteristics is also dangerous. For starters, if conflict is due primarily to the nature of the opposing regime(s), then the only long-term solution is to overthrow them. Accommodation, mutual coexistence, or even extensive cooperation on matters of mutual interest are for the most part ruled out, with potentially catastrophic consequences. When rivals see the nature of the other side as a threat in itself, a struggle to the death becomes the only alternative.
What unit-level explanations either overlook or downplay are the broader structural factors that have made Sino-American rivalry inevitable. First and foremost, the two most powerful countries in the international system are overwhelmingly likely to be at odds with each other. Because each is the other’s greatest potential threat, they will inevitably eye each other warily, go to considerable lengths to reduce the other’s ability to threaten their core interests, and constantly look for ways to gain an advantage, if only to ensure that the other side does not gain an advantage over them.
Even if it were possible (or worth the risk), internal changes in either the United States or China are unlikely to eliminate these incentives (or at least not anytime soon). Each country is trying—with varying degrees of skill and success—to avoid being in a position where the other can threaten its security, prosperity, or domestic way of life. And because neither can be completely sure what the other might do in the future—a reality amply demonstrated by the erratic course of U.S. foreign policy in recent years—both are actively competing for power and influence in a variety of domains.
This troubling situation is exacerbated by the incompatibility of their respective strategic objectives, which derive in part from geography and from the legacies of the past century. Quite understandably, China’s leaders would like to live in as secure a neighborhood as possible, for the same reasons that the United States formulated and eventually enforced the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. Beijing need not impose one-party state capitalist regimes around its periphery; it just wants all of its neighbors to be mindful of its interests and does not want any of them to pose a significant threat. Toward that end, it would like to push the United States out of the region so that it no longer has to worry as much about U.S. military power and so that its neighbors cannot count on American help. This goal is hardly mystifying or irrational: Would any great power be happy if the world’s most powerful country had significant military forces arrayed nearby and had close military alliances with many of its immediate neighbors?
The United States has good reasons to remain in Asia, however. As John Mearsheimer and I have explained elsewhere, preventing China from establishing a dominant position in Asia strengthens U.S. security by forcing China to focus more attention closer to home and making it harder (though of course not impossible) for China to project power elsewhere in the world (including areas closer to the United States itself). This strategic logic would still apply if China were to liberalize or if America were to adopt Chinese-style state capitalism. The result, unfortunately, is a zero-sum conflict: Neither side can get what it wants without depriving the other.
Thus, the roots of the present Sino-American rivalry have less to do with particular leaders or regime types and more to do with the distribution of power and the particular strategies that the two sides are pursuing. This is not to say that domestic politics or individual leadership do not matter at all, either in influencing the intensity of the competition or the skill with which each side wages it. Some leaders are more (or less) risk acceptant, and Americans are currently getting (another) painful demonstration of the harm that incompetent leadership can inflict. But the more important point is that new leaders or profound domestic changes are not going to alter the inherently competitive nature of U.S.-Chinese relations.
From this perspective, both progressives and hard-liners in the United States are getting it wrong. The former believe that China poses at most a modest threat to U.S. interests and that some combination of accommodation and skillful diplomacy can eliminate most if not all of the friction and head off a new cold war. I’m all for skillful diplomacy, but I do not believe it will suffice to prevent an intense competition that is primarily rooted in the distribution of power.
As Trump said of his trade war, hard-liners think a competition with China will be “good and easy to win.” In their view, all it takes is more and tougher sanctions, a decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies, a big increase in U.S. defense spending, and a rallying of like-minded democracies to the U.S. side, with the ultimate goal of ending Chinese Communist Party rule. Apart from the obvious costs and risks of this course of action, this view overstates Chinese vulnerabilities, understates the costs to the United States, and greatly exaggerates other states’ willingness to join an anti-Beijing crusade. China’s neighbors do not want it to dominate them and are eager to maintain ties with Washington, but they have no desire to get dragged into a violent conflict. And there is little reason to believe that a supposedly more liberal China would be any less interested in defending its own interests and any more willing to accept permanent inferiority to the United States.
So what does a more structural view of this situation imply?
First, it tells us that we are in it for the long haul; no clever strategy or bold stroke of genius is going to solve this conflict once and for all—at least not anytime soon.
Second, it is a serious rivalry, and the United States should conduct in a serious way. You don’t deal with an ambitious peer competitor with a bunch of amateurs in charge or with a president who puts his personal agenda ahead of the country’s. It will take intelligent military investments, to be sure, but a major diplomatic effort by knowledgeable and well-trained officials is going to be of equal if not greater importance. Maintaining a healthy set of Asian alliances is essential because the United States simply cannot remain an influential power in Asia without a lot of local support. The bottom line: America cannot entrust the care and feeding of those relationships to campaign contributors, party hacks, or dilettantes.
Third, and perhaps most important, both sides have a genuine and shared interest in keeping their rivalry within boundaries, both to avoid unnecessary clashes and to facilitate cooperation on issues where U.S. and Chinese interests overlap (climate change, pandemic prevention, etc.). One cannot eliminate all risks and prevent future crises, but Washington must be clear about its own red lines and make sure it understands Beijing’s. This is where unit-level factors kick in: The rivalry may be hard-wired into today’s international system, but how each side handles the competition will be determined by who is in charge and by the quality of their domestic institutions. I would not assume that America’s will fall short, but I wouldn’t be complacent about that either.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-30--Is Israel’s July 1 Annexation Deadline About to Shift?

Is Israel ’ s July 1 Annexation Deadline About to Shift ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Israel may delay its controversial West Bank annexation plan after Benny Gantz says July 1 date isn ’ t “ sacred , ” India bans Chinese apps as feud continues , and pressure grows on the White House in Russian bounty case .
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Tensions in Israel ’ s coalition government have come to the fore days before a planned July @ @ @ @ @ @ @ West Bank .
On Monday , Blue and White party leader and Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz told U.S .
Ambassador to Israel David Friedman and White House representative Avi Berkowitz that the July 1 date was not “ sacred ” and that he was more concerned about the coronavirus pandemic .
In response , Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a meeting of Likud party members that the issue was “ not up to ” Gantz ’ s party .
“ They are not a factor either way , ” he added @ @ @ @ @ @ @ light to annexation ?
After a week of internal White House deliberations ended without a clear resolution , it ’ s not yet known whether the United States backs Netanyahu ’ s intended timeline for annexation—even though annexation itself is already approved in the White House peace plan .
“ There is yet no final decision on next steps for implementing the Trump plan , ” a senior administration official told NBC News on June 26 .
U.N. leads condemnation .
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet led international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is illegal .
Period , ” she said in a statement .
“ Any annexation .
Whether it is 30 percent of the West Bank , or 5 percent.
” “ The precise consequences of annexation can not be predicted , ” she added .
“ But they are likely to be disastrous for the Palestinians , for Israel itself , and for the wider region.
” The Middle East impact .
Writing in Foreign Policy , Ariane Tabatabai and Henry Rome argue that Israel ’ s annexation of parts of the West @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which is now desperate for a way to distract its citizens from a resurgent coronavirus epidemic and sanctions-induced economic hardship .
One thing that annexation is unlikely to halt is the pace of warming ties between Gulf nations and Israel , Jonathan Ferziger writes , as security , technology , and medical cooperation take precedence over politics and the Palestinian cause .
Pressure grows in Russian bounty case .
The White House is under increasing pressure to provide answers regarding reports of a Russian military intelligence-sponsored program offering cash bounties to Afghan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , FP ’ s Jack Detsch , Robbie Gramer , and Amy Mackinnon report .
On Monday , the Trump administration relented somewhat by providing a briefing on the issue to Republican House lawmakers .
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi requested an interagency briefing for the full House of Representatives .
“ The questions that arise are : was the President briefed , and if not , why not , and why was Congress not briefed .
Congress and the country need answers now , ” she wrote in a letter to CIA Director @ @ @ @ @ @ @ director of national intelligence , John Ratcliffe .
On Monday night , the New York Times reported that U.S. President Donald Trump was provided a written briefing on the bounty program as early as February .
India goes digital in China feud .
India has retaliated against China after its border clash on June 15 by banning 59 Chinese-made apps , including the popular apps TikTok and WeChat .
Tiktok has at least 200 million monthly users in India , which is one of the company ’ s largest user bases .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to ban the apps , as they were still available for download for both Android and Apple devices after the ban was announced .
TikTok , owned by the Chinese firm ByteDance , has also made inroads in the U.S. market in recent months , especially with teenagers and members of Generation Z .
Hoping to stave off privacy concerns raised by members of Congress , TikTok named former Disney executive Kevin Mayer as its CEO and ByteDance ’ s chief operations officer in May .
Separatists attack Pakistan Stock Exchange .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an attack on the Pakistan Stock Exchange in Karachi .
The dead included four of the assailants , who carried machine guns and threw a grenade at the stock exchange entrance during the assault .
The separatist Balochistan Liberation Army ( BLA ) claimed responsibility for the attack .
Pompeo condemns China ’ s treatment of Uighurs .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described reports of a campaign of population control among China ’ s Uighur minority as “ shocking ” and “ disturbing ” and called for an end to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ come after two investigations—one by the Associated Press and another by researcher and Foreign Policy contributor Adrian Zenz—were published on Sunday pointing to an increase in sterilizations , high rates of enforced contraception , and a corresponding decrease in population growth in Xinjiang .
Putting a price on health .
Gilead Sciences , the company behind the drug Remdesivir , has announced a global pricing scheme for its potential coronavirus treatment .
Gilead plans to charge governments in developed countries $ 390 a vial , or $ 2,340 for a five-day regimen of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Citizen called the price point “ offensive , ” arguing that Remdesivir could cost as little as $ 1 a day if manufactured in large quantities and sold as a generic drug .
Europe sours on global powers .
A new poll from the European Council of Foreign Relations shows the extent of the damage the coronavirus pandemic has wrought on attitudes toward the United States .
The decline was most dramatic in Germany , Denmark , and Portugal where at least 65 percent of respondents said that their view of the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s not just bad news for U.S.-Europe relations ; Russia and China also suffered reputational damage , according to the poll .
Israeli regulators have revoked the broadcasting license of an evangelical Christian television station for misrepresenting its mission .
Ward Simpson , the CEO of God TV and the station ’ s owner , had attracted the scrutiny of regulators after appearing in a fundraising video after the license was granted saying “ God has supernaturally opened the door for us to take the gospel of Jesus into the homes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people.
” He later clarified that he was not trying to convert Jews ; he was simply seeking to get them to accept Jesus as their messiah .
Israel ’ s Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Council said that the station had broken laws against proselytizing to minors , which is against Israeli law without parental consent .
Regulators said God TV is welcome to reapply for a license if it vows to describe the nature of its broadcasts more honestly .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Israel may delay its controversial West Bank annexation plan after Benny Gantz says July 1 date isn't “sacred,” India bans Chinese apps as feud continues, and pressure grows on the White House in Russian bounty case .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Israel may delay its controversial West Bank annexation plan after Benny Gantz says July 1 date isn’t “sacred,” India bans Chinese apps as feud continues, and pressure grows on the White House in Russian bounty case.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Gantz Suggest Delaying Israel’s Annexation Plans
Tensions in Israel’s coalition government have come to the fore days before a planned July 1 vote on annexing parts of the West Bank.
On Monday, Blue and White party leader and Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz told U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman and White House representative Avi Berkowitz that the July 1 date was not “sacred” and that he was more concerned about the coronavirus pandemic.
In response, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a meeting of Likud party members that the issue was “not up to” Gantz’s party. “They are not a factor either way,” he added.
Will the U.S. give the green light to annexation? After a week of internal White House deliberations ended without a clear resolution, it’s not yet known whether the United States backs Netanyahu’s intended timeline for annexation—even though annexation itself is already approved in the White House peace plan.
“There is yet no final decision on next steps for implementing the Trump plan,” a senior administration official told NBC News on June 26.
U.N. leads condemnation. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet led international condemnation of the move. “Annexation is illegal. Period,” she said in a statement. “Any annexation. Whether it is 30 percent of the West Bank, or 5 percent.”
“The precise consequences of annexation cannot be predicted,” she added. “But they are likely to be disastrous for the Palestinians, for Israel itself, and for the wider region.”
The Middle East impact. Writing in Foreign Policy, Ariane Tabatabai and Henry Rome argue that Israel’s annexation of parts of the West Bank would be a gift to Iran, which is now desperate for a way to distract its citizens from a resurgent coronavirus epidemic and sanctions-induced economic hardship.
One thing that annexation is unlikely to halt is the pace of warming ties between Gulf nations and Israel, Jonathan Ferziger writes, as security, technology, and medical cooperation take precedence over politics and the Palestinian cause.
What We’re Following Today
Pressure grows in Russian bounty case. The White House is under increasing pressure to provide answers regarding reports of a Russian military intelligence-sponsored program offering cash bounties to Afghan militants for killing U.S. and coalition forces, FP’s Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer, and Amy Mackinnon report.
On Monday, the Trump administration relented somewhat by providing a briefing on the issue to Republican House lawmakers. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi requested an interagency briefing for the full House of Representatives. “The questions that arise are: was the President briefed, and if not, why not, and why was Congress not briefed. Congress and the country need answers now,” she wrote in a letter to CIA Director Gina Haspel and Trump’s new director of national intelligence, John Ratcliffe. On Monday night, the New York Times reported that U.S. President Donald Trump was provided a written briefing on the bounty program as early as February.
India goes digital in China feud. India has retaliated against China after its border clash on June 15 by banning 59 Chinese-made apps, including the popular apps TikTok and WeChat. Tiktok has at least 200 million monthly users in India, which is one of the company’s largest user bases. It’s unclear how Indian authorities plan to ban the apps, as they were still available for download for both Android and Apple devices after the ban was announced.
TikTok, owned by the Chinese firm ByteDance, has also made inroads in the U.S. market in recent months, especially with teenagers and members of Generation Z. Hoping to stave off privacy concerns raised by members of Congress, TikTok named former Disney executive Kevin Mayer as its CEO and ByteDance’s chief operations officer in May.
Separatists attack Pakistan Stock Exchange. At least ten people were killed on Monday in an attack on the Pakistan Stock Exchange in Karachi. The dead included four of the assailants, who carried machine guns and threw a grenade at the stock exchange entrance during the assault. The separatist Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack.
Pompeo condemns China’s treatment of Uighurs. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described reports of a campaign of population control among China’s Uighur minority as “shocking” and “disturbing” and called for an end to “these dehumanizing abuses.” The remarks come after two investigations—one by the Associated Press and another by researcher and Foreign Policy contributor Adrian Zenz—were published on Sunday pointing to an increase in sterilizations, high rates of enforced contraception, and a corresponding decrease in population growth in Xinjiang.
Keep an Eye On
Putting a price on health. Gilead Sciences, the company behind the drug Remdesivir, has announced a global pricing scheme for its potential coronavirus treatment. Gilead plans to charge governments in developed countries $390 a vial, or $2,340 for a five-day regimen of the drug. The advocacy group Public Citizen called the price point “offensive,” arguing that Remdesivir could cost as little as $1 a day if manufactured in large quantities and sold as a generic drug.
Europe sours on global powers. A new poll from the European Council of Foreign Relations shows the extent of the damage the coronavirus pandemic has wrought on attitudes toward the United States. The decline was most dramatic in Germany, Denmark, and Portugal where at least 65 percent of respondents said that their view of the United States had worsened during the pandemic. It’s not just bad news for U.S.-Europe relations; Russia and China also suffered reputational damage, according to the poll.
Odds and Ends
Israeli regulators have revoked the broadcasting license of an evangelical Christian television station for misrepresenting its mission. Ward Simpson, the CEO of God TV and the station’s owner, had attracted the scrutiny of regulators after appearing in a fundraising video after the license was granted saying “God has supernaturally opened the door for us to take the gospel of Jesus into the homes and lives and hearts of his Jewish people.” He later clarified that he was not trying to convert Jews; he was simply seeking to get them to accept Jesus as their messiah.
Israel’s Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Council said that the station had broken laws against proselytizing to minors, which is against Israeli law without parental consent. Regulators said God TV is welcome to reapply for a license if it vows to describe the nature of its broadcasts more honestly.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-30--Tearing Down Statues Won’t Undo History

Tearing Down Statues Won’t Undo History

It ’ s not a new phenomenon .
Indeed , humans have always built statues and then torn them down .
Empires , and modes of thought , rise and fall .
And destruction of the old has often been a part of constructing the new .
In 1990 , amid the so-called Wende , or period of change , in Germany following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 , Eastern Germany produced an incredible 1.2 tons of trash per person .
That is three times the amount that an average Western German produced for the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to capitalism—was accompanied by a material change .
Eastern Germans wanted to get rid of the old , reminders of their former lives , and exchange it for things that were newer , that were less complicated , and that did not burden them with guilt by association with the old regime that was being pilloried in the international press .
The message was clear : out with the old , in with the new .
Humans have always built statues and then torn them down .
The Germans call it a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” and the word is used to describe the period immediately following political upheaval .
It was experienced after World War I and the collapse of Imperial Germany , and , most significantly , following the destruction of Nazi Germany in 1945 .
The Soviet Union likewise purged any symbols and iconography associated with tsarist Russia following the Russian Revolution in 1917 .
The human instinct toward iconoclasm is as old as time—the Counter-Reformation and the French Revolution are particularly well-known examples .
More recently , the world watched as a large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Baghdad with the encouragement of the U.S. Army .
I founded a museum in 2002 to preserve and present East Germany ’ s and the former Eastern Bloc ’ s discarded objects , including archives , consumer objects , and defaced art before they disappeared—not out of reverence for old communist leaders but because once they ’ re gone , evidence is lost .
Historians of the future depend on preservation of things of the present .
We can not and should not keep everything , but we can prioritize those things @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of instruction—and opportunities for reflection and evaluation .
Politically loaded and potentially offensive objects can be particularly instructive because of their power to provoke debate and visceral reactions .
In the 1990s , the post-socialist Hungarian government removed statues built by the previous regime and put them in a statue cemetery outside the city called Szoborpark , which translates to “ Memento Park.
” They were removed from their pedestals , and children now climb on them .
The message is clear : A bygone era ’ s symbols of power are now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ post-socialist Hungarian government removed statues built by the old regime from their pedestals and put them in a park .
Children now climb on them .
The message is clear : A bygone era ’ s symbols of power are now powerless .
The world witnessed what happened in Ukraine following the Euromaidan movement in February 2014 , when more than 300 statues of Vladimir Lenin were removed from public spaces or were destroyed .
The phenomenon was so popular , it even had a name : “ Leninopad , ” which translates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the time that the sculptures could be moved or reinterpreted with contextual information about the Soviet Union along the lines of “ Why do these exist ?
” —which , rather than their destruction , could have offered an opportunity for a history lesson in the streets or in an outdoor park like Szoborpark .
A similar bout of iconoclasm has been happening with Confederate statues in the Southern United States , and it ’ s happening now around the world as representations of racists , xenophobes , and murderers , carved in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being dismantled .
This includes the statues of Confederate Gen. Albert Pike in Washington , D.C. ; Francis Scott Key , the author of the U.S. national anthem and a slave owner , in San Francisco ; Christopher Columbus in Boston ; the 18th-century Franciscan friar Junípero Serra in Los Angeles ; and the British Victorian imperialist Cecil Rhodes at the University of Oxford .
The Black Lives Matter movement is not new , but its widespread support is a recent phenomenon .
According to recent New York Times polling analysis , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support that it did not have in 2017 and 2018 .
Attitudes about whether racism and discrimination are “ are a big problem ” have followed a similar pattern ( 76 percent of Americans now agree ) .
The wider the distance between what was and what is , the more the statues will be targeted for demolition and removal .
Those whom authorities once celebrated as heroes are now being challenged and contested like never before .
Removing statues from their pedestals or taking an ax to them are newsworthy images and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ winning , but the inevitable question is , “ Then what ?
” When physical remnants of a difficult past are erased , it doesn ’ t make the underlying problem just go away .
In fact , it ’ s often the opposite—erasure of such public reminders of repression makes it even more difficult to keep the discussion in the spotlight , scoring points for symbolic victory while preventing more lasting systemic change .
Statues were intended to be symbols when they were built .
Whereas some were always explicit in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the statue of the Confederate general and Ku Klux Klan leader Nathan Bedford Forrest in Memphis—others , such as representations of former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson , appear to celebrate his international contributions , rather than his domestic racism .
But , now , in the heat of the moment , both men are lumped together and their statues are seen as symbols of oppression .
The way these symbols have been interpreted has changed and will keep changing .
And when what happened becomes history , Americans will , once again , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things associated with it .
If the statues survive , they will become memorials instead of monuments , just in the way that sites of the Holocaust were first destroyed out of anger and then fastidiously preserved as evidence of historical crimes and injustices .
The barracks at the infamous concentration camp at Dachau were first removed and then later reconstructed , with furnishings from three different periods , presenting a three-phase narrative of the Holocaust while showing visitors the unspeakable conditions that prisoners faced .
The Berlin Wall offers another example of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the 1990s , graffiti-painted concrete segments of the Berlin Wall were hastily removed , ground up by machines that rolled along the border while physically chewing it up , and , poetically , turned into asphalt to repave the crumbling streets of the former East Berlin .
The people of Berlin , who had lived in the shadow of the wall for decades , celebrated the cement edifice ’ s demise .
They were so thorough , so confident in the righteousness of their cause , that nearly all of the original @ @ @ @ @ @ @ positions or destroyed .
Flash forward 30 years , and German media is full of talk about historical amnesia .
Young people do not remember the wall or what their parents had to endure .
A key lesson has been lost , the older generation contends .
Their solution ?
Segments of the Berlin Wall are being reproduced and replaced in strategic positions around the city , including at perhaps the most infamous , most public site of all : the former Checkpoint Charlie .
But , this time , there is an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the opportunity to talk about the wall as an oppressive structure that separated friends , colleagues , and families .
Many statues of racist historical figures will be removed from their original locations .
One option is for them to go to a statue cemetery like the one outside Budapest .
Another is to deliver them to museums where they can be adequately recontextualized .
Artists could be invited to edit or stage interventions to add another layer of interpretation to the statue where it stands—an act that both acknowledges the crimes of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to that past , especially by those who have been most harmed by the legacy of racism these symbols represent .
There is no single right way to handle historical symbols , and a customized approach—depending on the person represented and the historical context—will be more effective than a blanket , one-size-fits-all solution .
It ’ s impossible to deny the anger of the moment and the desire to right a wrong .
The irony is that if all statues fall or are destroyed , the most public reminders of systemic brutality could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a conversation , but it usually ends one .
With the right contextualized information presented in conjunction with the statues , those most impacted by historical injustices could remind everyone of the harm done to them and their ancestors—as they do at the Apartheid Museum in South Africa and at Holocaust museums around the world—and prevent a whitewashing of history in which the statues are , like so many other problematic things , simply put in a drawer or swept under a rug .
The United States and Europe are in the midst @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has begun .
The decisions being made now—in the heat of the moment—will have an impact on the future of history and whether bad memories are simply wiped away or we are forced to confront what once was .

Sculptures of Vladimir Lenin and other Soviet-era statues and busts sit in a former National Guard Armory in Culver City, California—now the permanent home of the Wende Museum—in 2014. Courtesy of the Wende Museum
The awakening and reckoning brought on by the Black Lives Matter movement have inspired a purge of the symbols and icons associated with oppressive systems of the past that are rightly being challenged in the present.
It’s not a new phenomenon. Indeed, humans have always built statues and then torn them down. Empires, and modes of thought, rise and fall. And destruction of the old has often been a part of constructing the new.
In 1990, amid the so-called Wende, or period of change, in Germany following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, Eastern Germany produced an incredible 1.2 tons of trash per person. That is three times the amount that an average Western German produced for the same period.
Geopolitical change—the shift from communism to capitalism—was accompanied by a material change.
Eastern Germans wanted to get rid of the old, reminders of their former lives, and exchange it for things that were newer, that were less complicated, and that did not burden them with guilt by association with the old regime that was being pilloried in the international press. The message was clear: out with the old, in with the new.
Humans have always built statues and then torn them down.
The Germans call it a “Müllphase,” or “trash phase,” and the word is used to describe the period immediately following political upheaval. It was experienced after World War I and the collapse of Imperial Germany, and, most significantly, following the destruction of Nazi Germany in 1945. The Soviet Union likewise purged any symbols and iconography associated with tsarist Russia following the Russian Revolution in 1917. The human instinct toward iconoclasm is as old as time—the Counter-Reformation and the French Revolution are particularly well-known examples. More recently, the world watched as a large statue of Saddam Hussein was pulled down in Baghdad with the encouragement of the U.S. Army.
I founded a museum in 2002 to preserve and present East Germany’s and the former Eastern Bloc’s discarded objects, including archives, consumer objects, and defaced art before they disappeared—not out of reverence for old communist leaders but because once they’re gone, evidence is lost. Historians of the future depend on preservation of things of the present.
We cannot and should not keep everything, but we can prioritize those things that are the most valuable in terms of instruction—and opportunities for reflection and evaluation.
Politically loaded and potentially offensive objects can be particularly instructive because of their power to provoke debate and visceral reactions.
Clockwise from top: A segment of the Berlin Wall is photographed in West Germany, circa January 1989; the Communist coat of arms in the center of a flag of the Socialist Republic of Romania was removed in 1989; and a bust of Lenin, made during the mid-1960s, was painted pink and blue by protesters in 1989 during one of the weekly “Monday demonstrations” in the East German City of Leipzig, preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall on Nov. 9, 1989.
Statues are among the most problematic of all historical artifacts, because they are not merely objects but a public, physical expression of politics at the moment in which they were created. Statues designate heroes, instill narratives, and project power. But what happens when the statues don’t change, but the politics do? They are too big to be quietly tucked away in a drawer as so many museum curators have done when an exhibit is deemed out of date.
In the 1990s, the post-socialist Hungarian government removed statues built by the previous regime and put them in a statue cemetery outside the city called Szoborpark, which translates to “Memento Park.” They were removed from their pedestals, and children now climb on them. The message is clear: A bygone era’s symbols of power are now powerless.
In the 1990s, the post-socialist Hungarian government removed statues built by the old regime from their pedestals and put them in a park. Children now climb on them. The message is clear: A bygone era’s symbols of power are now powerless.
The world witnessed what happened in Ukraine following the Euromaidan movement in February 2014, when more than 300 statues of Vladimir Lenin were removed from public spaces or were destroyed. The phenomenon was so popular, it even had a name: “Leninopad,” which translates to “Leninfall.” I argued at the time that the sculptures could be moved or reinterpreted with contextual information about the Soviet Union along the lines of “Why do these exist?”—which, rather than their destruction, could have offered an opportunity for a history lesson in the streets or in an outdoor park like Szoborpark.
Symbols of the Soviet era—including, from left, the Workers Movement Memorial, former Soviet premier Vladimir Lenin, and a memorial to Bela Kun, Jeno Landler, and Tibor Szamuely—are preserved in Szoborpark (Memento Park), a statue cemetery located outside Budapest.
A similar bout of iconoclasm has been happening with Confederate statues in the Southern United States, and it’s happening now around the world as representations of racists, xenophobes, and murderers, carved in stone and cast in bronze, are being dismantled. This includes the statues of Confederate Gen. Albert Pike in Washington, D.C.; Francis Scott Key, the author of the U.S. national anthem and a slave owner, in San Francisco; Christopher Columbus in Boston; the 18th-century Franciscan friar Junípero Serra in Los Angeles; and the British Victorian imperialist Cecil Rhodes at the University of Oxford.
The Black Lives Matter movement is not new, but its widespread support is a recent phenomenon. According to recent New York Times polling analysis, the Black Lives Matter movement has broad public support that it did not have in 2017 and 2018. Attitudes about whether racism and discrimination are “are a big problem” have followed a similar pattern (76 percent of Americans now agree). The wider the distance between what was and what is, the more the statues will be targeted for demolition and removal.
Those whom authorities once celebrated as heroes are now being challenged and contested like never before. Removing statues from their pedestals or taking an ax to them are newsworthy images and make protesters feel like they’re winning, but the inevitable question is, “Then what?” When physical remnants of a difficult past are erased, it doesn’t make the underlying problem just go away. In fact, it’s often the opposite—erasure of such public reminders of repression makes it even more difficult to keep the discussion in the spotlight, scoring points for symbolic victory while preventing more lasting systemic change.
Statues were intended to be symbols when they were built. Whereas some were always explicit in their support for a system of white supremacy—like the statue of the Confederate general and Ku Klux Klan leader Nathan Bedford Forrest in Memphis—others, such as representations of former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, appear to celebrate his international contributions, rather than his domestic racism. But, now, in the heat of the moment, both men are lumped together and their statues are seen as symbols of oppression. The way these symbols have been interpreted has changed and will keep changing. And when what happened becomes history, Americans will, once again, develop a much different relationship to the things associated with it.
A visitor walks through the entrance gate bearing the inscription “Work Will Set You Free” at the former concentration camp in Dachau, southern Germany, on Dec. 9, 2019.
If the statues survive, they will become memorials instead of monuments, just in the way that sites of the Holocaust were first destroyed out of anger and then fastidiously preserved as evidence of historical crimes and injustices. The barracks at the infamous concentration camp at Dachau were first removed and then later reconstructed, with furnishings from three different periods, presenting a three-phase narrative of the Holocaust while showing visitors the unspeakable conditions that prisoners faced.
The Berlin Wall offers another example of what happens following a Müllphase. Beginning in the 1990s, graffiti-painted concrete segments of the Berlin Wall were hastily removed, ground up by machines that rolled along the border while physically chewing it up, and, poetically, turned into asphalt to repave the crumbling streets of the former East Berlin. The people of Berlin, who had lived in the shadow of the wall for decades, celebrated the cement edifice’s demise. They were so thorough, so confident in the righteousness of their cause, that nearly all of the original pieces were either removed from their original positions or destroyed.
Flash forward 30 years, and German media is full of talk about historical amnesia. Young people do not remember the wall or what their parents had to endure. A key lesson has been lost, the older generation contends. Their solution? Segments of the Berlin Wall are being reproduced and replaced in strategic positions around the city, including at perhaps the most infamous, most public site of all: the former Checkpoint Charlie. But, this time, there is an audio guide, ample signage, and the opportunity to talk about the wall as an oppressive structure that separated friends, colleagues, and families.
A Lenin statue is prepped for its move from Latvia to the Wende Museum in 2011.
Many statues of racist historical figures will be removed from their original locations. One option is for them to go to a statue cemetery like the one outside Budapest. Another is to deliver them to museums where they can be adequately recontextualized. Artists could be invited to edit or stage interventions to add another layer of interpretation to the statue where it stands—an act that both acknowledges the crimes of the past and allows for critical response to that past, especially by those who have been most harmed by the legacy of racism these symbols represent. There is no single right way to handle historical symbols, and a customized approach—depending on the person represented and the historical context—will be more effective than a blanket, one-size-fits-all solution.
It’s impossible to deny the anger of the moment and the desire to right a wrong. The irony is that if all statues fall or are destroyed, the most public reminders of systemic brutality could disappear. Erasing sculptures does not start a conversation, but it usually ends one.
With the right contextualized information presented in conjunction with the statues, those most impacted by historical injustices could remind everyone of the harm done to them and their ancestors—as they do at the Apartheid Museum in South Africa and at Holocaust museums around the world—and prevent a whitewashing of history in which the statues are, like so many other problematic things, simply put in a drawer or swept under a rug.
The United States and Europe are in the midst of a new Wende—and a new Müllphase has begun. The decisions being made now—in the heat of the moment—will have an impact on the future of history and whether bad memories are simply wiped away or we are forced to confront what once was.