foreignpolicy--2020-06-03--Biden Could End Kleptocracy’s Grip on the United States

Biden Could End Kleptocracy ’ s Grip on the United States Nothing reveals the limits of a system more clearly than a crisis .
Donald Trump ’ s presidency has demonstrated both the extent of Washington ’ s international financial power and the sway of kleptocracy in the United States itself .
As the Federal Reserve single-handedly props up global finance and Congress pumps money into the economy at unprecedented rates , U.S. cruise companies notionally based in Panama and Liberia seek bailouts , U.S. senators face scrutiny for opaque stock transactions , and drug money literally piles up thanks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The two sides of this coin are U.S. power and decay .
On the one hand , Trump himself built his business in an industry flush from money from kleptocratic regimes , easily laundered in the luxury real estate market , and has adapted the kind of closed-off governance by clique that pervades kleptocratic governance .
Yet the enormous power of the Fed and the entrenching of the dollar system show how much leverage the United States has to shut those same forces down .
It still holds immense power as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order , but the same order has facilitated the corruption of U.S. domestic politics and business by an international elite at ease with corruption .
The Trump years have made clear that kleptocracy is not just a phenomenon of corrupt states in the developing world or the former Soviet Union—it is an international network of financial practices that uses the global nature of the capitalist economy to escape democratic accountability and to extract profits by monetizing rents and holding back innovation .
Dirty money captured by kleptocratic regimes is laundered and protected by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states , which also enable the financial ecosystem that allows firms and rich individuals to avoid paying their share of taxes .
As the scholars Alexander Cooley and J.C. Sharman have extensively documented , Central Asian kleptocratic regimes depend on corrupt networks that span from traditional illicit offshore money centers to conventional capitals of global finance , including London and New York .
For example , a corrupt Central Asian official , in order to hide his illicitly acquired assets—often directly stolen from the public purse—can create a firm in Cyprus from which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he can swap shares in a valuable Kazakh company for worthless shares in a sock puppet Cyprus company .
This money is then used to purchase London real estate , exiting Cyprus into a new coterie of anonymous holding companies in another offshore center before purchasing luxury real estate in the West , ready to be sold as a so-called “ clean ” asset , as Global Witness has extensively documented in London .
These transactions are brokered along the way by a global network of lawyers , bankers , and consultants in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ branches in tax shelters like the British Virgin Islands not only to manage ill-gotten gains but also to access massive dollar holdings to fund transactions in the global Eurodollar market—the market for global dollars issued by private banks that lubricates world trade .
The unnerving parallel between a corrupt Central Asian official and U.S. corporations is obvious .
American kleptocrats use the exact same networks of professionals and jurisdictions to avoid taxation .
Take a major U.S. pharmaceutical company that books its profits in low-tax Ireland and then takes these profits back into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidiary for the use of its own intellectual property and deposits them into an account in the British Virgin Islands .
This complex transaction can be brokered by the exact same firm and achieve the exact same results .
The U.S. government , which likely issued the grants that made the pharmaceutical patent in the first place , is defrauded of tax income .
The problem of kleptocratic governance “ over there ” can ’ t be separated from the causes of America ’ s increasingly unequal economy .
The sorest financial cankers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of this contemporary world political economy : the oligarch , the tax-avoiding supercorporation , the offshore-owned luxury properties used to launder money , and the untraceable dark money circulating at home and from authoritarian states .
This makes the world safe for kleptocracy and authoritarianism and harms U.S. national interests by facilitating the corruption of business and political elites at home .
It is not just the place where global unfettered capitalism directly impacts the country ’ s national politics and security but where Democrats need to rise to the challenge .
Should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration must implement an anti-kleptocracy strategy that corrects previous administrations ’ complacency toward , and in some cases collusion with , this kleptocratic nexus .
The United States must wield the power it has exercised to stabilize the global monetary system to restructure the economic system that allows for kleptocratic governance to exist .
The next president should not hold back from mobilizing the potential of U.S. financial firepower to beat kleptocracy .
The crisis of the Trump presidency has shown that the boundaries between home and abroad are no longer firm .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ kleptocracy , and with it autocrats like Vladimir Putin , requires tracing dirty money through not just the Caymans and Kyiv , Ukraine , but Wilmington , Delaware , and Las Vegas .
The most vital step Washington can take to fight kleptocracy is banning anonymous shell companies within the United States itself .
States like Delaware and Nevada allow unsavory figures to set up anonymous companies that they then use for money laundering , sex and drug trafficking , nuclear proliferation , and corruption .
The Financial Action Task Force , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expressed “ significant concerns ” about this U.S. shortcoming .
These state-level policies have a disastrous effect on U.S. national interests .
Tax havens have modeled their laws on U.S. precedents and charge hypocrisy whenever Washington calls on them to improve .
Legislation already exists that a President Biden can champion .
The centerpiece of the U.S. response to this threat has been the Corporate Transparency Act .
The legislation would require all states to collect the information about the true owners of companies , so-called “ beneficial owners , ” eliminating U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measures in the past .
The Corporate Transparency Act passed the House in 2019 with bipartisan support but has so far languished in the Senate .
In the absence of legislative movement , the president can fight anonymity through executive action .
If the administration wants to take bold steps toward this , one powerful tool available is the fourth special measure of Section 311 of the Patriot Act .
This allows the administration to require foreign banks to disclose relevant information about their account holders to counterpart U.S. financial institutions .
Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ owner ( the “ real ” owner ) of any account that uses a “ correspondent account ” in the United States .
Correspondent accounts allow foreigners to access U.S. markets and transact in dollars .
This makes them central to the global financial system and ensures that greater disclosure requirements under Section 311 would have worldwide effects .
Combined with the existing requirement for U.S. banks to collect beneficial ownership information for their account holders , the measure would ensure blanket coverage for any entity that hopes to do business in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thwart global blowback by developing a white list of allies with high standards and acting strategically by imposing these Section 311 measures on a broad swath of entities and countries , spanning all types of economies .
This broad-based approach would ensure global fairness in two ways .
It would avoid solely bullying smaller countries dependent on the legal fees from providing shell companies , and it would make clear that major economies also enable global kleptocracy and make the United States itself a world leader through its willingness to tackle the problems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also limits unintended consequences .
Usually , when Washington imposes money laundering penalties , financial institutions overreact and cut off any connection with the target .
This would likely happen if the United States only applied Section 311 measures against a target like the British Virgin Islands .
However , it would be impossible for banks to cut off major European financial networks that failed to comply with the minimum standards necessary to meet the white list .
Instead , financial institutions would have to develop workable , transparent practices .
Rather than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to change their favored bases of operation , the United States would be changing the rules of the game .
After drawing on domestic sources of U.S. power like Section 311 to fix major gaps at home , a future administration should turn to cooperation with allies toward building new global norms and standards .
Fighting kleptocracy is at the heart of an internationalist foreign policy that recognizes that the modern world is deeply interconnected and thus national security depends on understanding and managing these gaps .
A Biden administration would have the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward these 21st-century challenges by tying U.S. domestic reform with a common set of anti-kleptocratic standards shared with the European Union and the United Kingdom .
Such measures would fit squarely with Biden ’ s goal of a “ foreign policy for the middle class ” but on a global scale .
In addition to these country-to-country projects , a foreign policy committed to fighting kleptocracy should look to multilateral organizations .
If Washington wants to shift its foreign-policy focus away from traditional geopolitical goals to an anti-kleptocracy approach aiming to fight for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , private control of global financial nodes will not do .
As a result , a Biden administration should seek greater governmental oversight of organizations like SWIFT .
Bringing together the European Union , China , and international organizations , Washington should make global financial infrastructures supranationally controlled .
Carrots are needed as well as sticks in a global order where smaller countries have often turned to money laundering in order to scrabble for a place in global finance .
If the United States is going to scale up its use of penalties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will have to learn how to scale them down .
Too often , the United States has imposed sanctions or punished a jurisdiction for failing to follow anti-money laundering rules but then , once the target complied , has fallen short in welcoming it back into the financial system .
Sudan , for example , suffered a deep shock after reentering the global economy following the removal of sanctions , facing major inflation , currency depreciation , and falling imports .
For this reason , the new administration should scale up its ability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mean developing expert bureaucracies within the Treasury and State departments specifically focused on lifting restrictions and delivering “ carrots ” to countries that adopt sound anti-kleptocracy benefits .
It will also mean providing significant funding through U.S. and international development agencies so that former target countries have the resources and know-how to remake their economies .
This process will require political restraint as well : Policymakers must think twice before adopting punitive measures that are hard to lift on the back-end .
For example , a meaningful “ carrot ” policy will depend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flexibility in shaping and adapting anti-kleptocracy initiatives to changing political and diplomatic circumstances .
Together , these measures will ensure the successful transition away from the kleptocratic world order .
Integrating formerly kleptocratic states into a global monetary order means building a system they want to come back to .
A Biden administration will have to find ways to tie together global development , liquidity provision , and financial regulation to solve kleptocracy ’ s underlying causes .
This will mean developing a strategy to manage , or even surpass , the centrality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global payment system .
Such an approach will yield benefits beyond just the fight against kleptocracy .
Renegotiating the global monetary system to rely less on offshore centers to finance trade and development will also reduce the U.S. trade deficits created by global demand for dollar-denominated assets .
The battle against kleptocracy is more than a contest over corruption or development in faraway countries .
It is a vital front in the war to make the world more habitable for the global middle class , which includes America ’ s own long-suffering workers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first step to reconciling U.S. domestic and foreign policies and making the world more just , and safer , for Americans and others .

Yakov Feygin, Ben Judah and Edoardo Saravalle

Nothing reveals the limits of a system more clearly than a crisis. Donald Trump’s presidency has demonstrated both the extent of Washington’s international financial power and the sway of kleptocracy in the United States itself. As the Federal Reserve single-handedly props up global finance and Congress pumps money into the economy at unprecedented rates, U.S. cruise companies notionally based in Panama and Liberia seek bailouts, U.S. senators face scrutiny for opaque stock transactions, and drug money literally piles up thanks to the forced closure of business fronts.
Nothing reveals the limits of a system more clearly than a crisis. Donald Trump’s presidency has demonstrated both the extent of Washington’s international financial power and the sway of kleptocracy in the United States itself. As the Federal Reserve single-handedly props up global finance and Congress pumps money into the economy at unprecedented rates, U.S. cruise companies notionally based in Panama and Liberia seek bailouts, U.S. senators face scrutiny for opaque stock transactions, and drug money literally piles up thanks to the forced closure of business fronts.
The two sides of this coin are U.S. power and decay. On the one hand, Trump himself built his business in an industry flush from money from kleptocratic regimes, easily laundered in the luxury real estate market, and has adapted the kind of closed-off governance by clique that pervades kleptocratic governance. Yet the enormous power of the Fed and the entrenching of the dollar system show how much leverage the United States has to shut those same forces down. It still holds immense power as a stakeholder in the global political and economic order, but the same order has facilitated the corruption of U.S. domestic politics and business by an international elite at ease with corruption.
The Trump years have made clear that kleptocracy is not just a phenomenon of corrupt states in the developing world or the former Soviet Union—it is an international network of financial practices that uses the global nature of the capitalist economy to escape democratic accountability and to extract profits by monetizing rents and holding back innovation. Dirty money captured by kleptocratic regimes is laundered and protected by global offshore money centers, including U.S. states, which also enable the financial ecosystem that allows firms and rich individuals to avoid paying their share of taxes.
As the scholars Alexander Cooley and J.C. Sharman have extensively documented, Central Asian kleptocratic regimes depend on corrupt networks that span from traditional illicit offshore money centers to conventional capitals of global finance, including London and New York. For example, a corrupt Central Asian official, in order to hide his illicitly acquired assets—often directly stolen from the public purse—can create a firm in Cyprus from which, due to a tax treaty, he can swap shares in a valuable Kazakh company for worthless shares in a sock puppet Cyprus company. This money is then used to purchase London real estate, exiting Cyprus into a new coterie of anonymous holding companies in another offshore center before purchasing luxury real estate in the West, ready to be sold as a so-called “clean” asset, as Global Witness has extensively documented in London.
These transactions are brokered along the way by a global network of lawyers, bankers, and consultants in major financial capitals. Major banks establish branches in tax shelters like the British Virgin Islands not only to manage ill-gotten gains but also to access massive dollar holdings to fund transactions in the global Eurodollar market—the market for global dollars issued by private banks that lubricates world trade.
The unnerving parallel between a corrupt Central Asian official and U.S. corporations is obvious. American kleptocrats use the exact same networks of professionals and jurisdictions to avoid taxation. Take a major U.S. pharmaceutical company that books its profits in low-tax Ireland and then takes these profits back into the United States by charging its Irish subsidiary for the use of its own intellectual property and deposits them into an account in the British Virgin Islands. This complex transaction can be brokered by the exact same firm and achieve the exact same results. The U.S. government, which likely issued the grants that made the pharmaceutical patent in the first place, is defrauded of tax income. The problem of kleptocratic governance “over there” can’t be separated from the causes of America’s increasingly unequal economy.
The sorest financial cankers of the Trump era are all emanations of this contemporary world political economy: the oligarch, the tax-avoiding supercorporation, the offshore-owned luxury properties used to launder money, and the untraceable dark money circulating at home and from authoritarian states. This makes the world safe for kleptocracy and authoritarianism and harms U.S. national interests by facilitating the corruption of business and political elites at home. It is not just the place where global unfettered capitalism directly impacts the country’s national politics and security but where Democrats need to rise to the challenge.
U.S. President Donald Trump walks on the South Lawn of the White House in 2017. The crisis of the Trump presidency has shown that the boundaries between home and abroad are no longer firm.
Should Joe Biden win in November, his administration must implement an anti-kleptocracy strategy that corrects previous administrations’ complacency toward, and in some cases collusion with, this kleptocratic nexus. The United States must wield the power it has exercised to stabilize the global monetary system to restructure the economic system that allows for kleptocratic governance to exist. The next president should not hold back from mobilizing the potential of U.S. financial firepower to beat kleptocracy.
The crisis of the Trump presidency has shown that the boundaries between home and abroad are no longer firm. Undermining the international financial system that empowered kleptocracy, and with it autocrats like Vladimir Putin, requires tracing dirty money through not just the Caymans and Kyiv, Ukraine, but Wilmington, Delaware, and Las Vegas. The most vital step Washington can take to fight kleptocracy is banning anonymous shell companies within the United States itself. States like Delaware and Nevada allow unsavory figures to set up anonymous companies that they then use for money laundering, sex and drug trafficking, nuclear proliferation, and corruption. The Financial Action Task Force, the global anti-money laundering standard-setting organization, has expressed “significant concerns” about this U.S. shortcoming. These state-level policies have a disastrous effect on U.S. national interests. Tax havens have modeled their laws on U.S. precedents and charge hypocrisy whenever Washington calls on them to improve.
Legislation already exists that a President Biden can champion. The centerpiece of the U.S. response to this threat has been the Corporate Transparency Act. The legislation would require all states to collect the information about the true owners of companies, so-called “beneficial owners,” eliminating U.S. anonymous companies. Biden has supported similar measures in the past. The Corporate Transparency Act passed the House in 2019 with bipartisan support but has so far languished in the Senate.
In the absence of legislative movement, the president can fight anonymity through executive action. If the administration wants to take bold steps toward this, one powerful tool available is the fourth special measure of Section 311 of the Patriot Act. This allows the administration to require foreign banks to disclose relevant information about their account holders to counterpart U.S. financial institutions. Foreign banks would have to reveal the beneficial owner (the “real” owner) of any account that uses a “correspondent account” in the United States.
Correspondent accounts allow foreigners to access U.S. markets and transact in dollars. This makes them central to the global financial system and ensures that greater disclosure requirements under Section 311 would have worldwide effects. Combined with the existing requirement for U.S. banks to collect beneficial ownership information for their account holders, the measure would ensure blanket coverage for any entity that hopes to do business in the United States.
The new administration could thwart global blowback by developing a white list of allies with high standards and acting strategically by imposing these Section 311 measures on a broad swath of entities and countries, spanning all types of economies. This broad-based approach would ensure global fairness in two ways. It would avoid solely bullying smaller countries dependent on the legal fees from providing shell companies, and it would make clear that major economies also enable global kleptocracy and make the United States itself a world leader through its willingness to tackle the problems at home.
A breadth of targets also limits unintended consequences. Usually, when Washington imposes money laundering penalties, financial institutions overreact and cut off any connection with the target. This would likely happen if the United States only applied Section 311 measures against a target like the British Virgin Islands. However, it would be impossible for banks to cut off major European financial networks that failed to comply with the minimum standards necessary to meet the white list. Instead, financial institutions would have to develop workable, transparent practices. Rather than simply playing whack-a-mole and just forcing kleptocrats to change their favored bases of operation, the United States would be changing the rules of the game.
After drawing on domestic sources of U.S. power like Section 311 to fix major gaps at home, a future administration should turn to cooperation with allies toward building new global norms and standards.
Fighting kleptocracy is at the heart of an internationalist foreign policy that recognizes that the modern world is deeply interconnected and thus national security depends on understanding and managing these gaps. A Biden administration would have the opportunity to reorient the U.S. alliance system toward these 21st-century challenges by tying U.S. domestic reform with a common set of anti-kleptocratic standards shared with the European Union and the United Kingdom. Such measures would fit squarely with Biden’s goal of a “foreign policy for the middle class” but on a global scale.
In addition to these country-to-country projects, a foreign policy committed to fighting kleptocracy should look to multilateral organizations. If Washington wants to shift its foreign-policy focus away from traditional geopolitical goals to an anti-kleptocracy approach aiming to fight for middle classes while maintaining an internationalist approach, private control of global financial nodes will not do. As a result, a Biden administration should seek greater governmental oversight of organizations like SWIFT. Bringing together the European Union, China, and international organizations, Washington should make global financial infrastructures supranationally controlled.
Carrots are needed as well as sticks in a global order where smaller countries have often turned to money laundering in order to scrabble for a place in global finance. If the United States is going to scale up its use of penalties and enforcement actions against kleptocracy, it will have to learn how to scale them down.
Dealers work at a foreign exchange office in Khartoum on Oct. 12, 2017, after the United States lifted its trade embargo. Sudan suffered a deep shock after re-entering the global economy following the removal of sanctions.
Too often, the United States has imposed sanctions or punished a jurisdiction for failing to follow anti-money laundering rules but then, once the target complied, has fallen short in welcoming it back into the financial system. Sudan, for example, suffered a deep shock after reentering the global economy following the removal of sanctions, facing major inflation, currency depreciation, and falling imports.
For this reason, the new administration should scale up its ability to lift restrictions sustainably. This will mean developing expert bureaucracies within the Treasury and State departments specifically focused on lifting restrictions and delivering “carrots” to countries that adopt sound anti-kleptocracy benefits. It will also mean providing significant funding through U.S. and international development agencies so that former target countries have the resources and know-how to remake their economies. This process will require political restraint as well: Policymakers must think twice before adopting punitive measures that are hard to lift on the back-end. For example, a meaningful “carrot” policy will depend on Congress giving the nimbler executive branch flexibility in shaping and adapting anti-kleptocracy initiatives to changing political and diplomatic circumstances. Together, these measures will ensure the successful transition away from the kleptocratic world order.
Integrating formerly kleptocratic states into a global monetary order means building a system they want to come back to. A Biden administration will have to find ways to tie together global development, liquidity provision, and financial regulation to solve kleptocracy’s underlying causes. This will mean developing a strategy to manage, or even surpass, the centrality of tax havens to today’s global payment system. Such an approach will yield benefits beyond just the fight against kleptocracy. Renegotiating the global monetary system to rely less on offshore centers to finance trade and development will also reduce the U.S. trade deficits created by global demand for dollar-denominated assets.
The battle against kleptocracy is more than a contest over corruption or development in faraway countries. It is a vital front in the war to make the world more habitable for the global middle class, which includes America’s own long-suffering workers. A focus on kleptocracy is a first step to reconciling U.S. domestic and foreign policies and making the world more just, and safer, for Americans and others.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-03--A Moment of National Shame and Peril—and Hope

The slide of the United States into illiberalism may well have begun on June 1 , 2020 .
Remember the date .
It may well signal the beginning of the end of the American experiment.Remember the date , because it may well signal the beginning of the end of the American experiment .
The president of the United States stood in the Rose Garden of the White House on Monday , railed against weak governors and mayors who were not doing enough , in his mind , to control the unrest and the rioters in their cities , and threatened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens .
It was a stunning moment .
But , in particular , it was notable for three important reasons .
First , Donald Trump expressed only the barest of condolences at the murder of George Floyd , but he also said nothing about the fundamental and underlying reasons for the unrest : systemic racism and inequality , a historic absence of respect , and a denial of justice .
All of these factors are centuries old and deeply engrained in an American society that systematically delivers white privilege at the expense of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mentioned George Floyd , but he did not touch on long-standing societal problems at all .
He sees the crisis as a black problem—not as something to be addressed by creating the basis and impetus for a move toward social justice , but as an opportunity to use force to portray himself as a “ law and order ” president .
The reasons were irrelevant to the opportunity .
Remember the supposed invasion of the southern border and his deployment of federal troops ahead of the 2018 midterm elections ?
The president ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the problem was on full display when , on Saturday , he attempted to explain that his supporters , the so-called Make America Great Again ( MAGA ) movement , “ love African American people .
They love black people .
MAGA loves the black people.
” Evidently his movement , MAGA , is a coherent thing , and it ’ s white , which leads to the next point about his speech .
Second , Trump was clear he views those engaged in the unrest and criminal acts in these riots as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so , ostensibly as justification to deploy the U.S. military to apply federal force—his “ personal ” force—against the riots .
Indeed , the secretary of defense used the military term “ battlespace ” to describe American cities .
While there may be some very accomplished criminals on both sides of the riots , the truth is that they are minuscule in numbers .
The vast majority of the people protesting in the streets are justifiably furious at the murder of George Floyd , but they ’ re even angrier over pervasive injustice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and an institutionalized devaluation of black lives and property .
And yes , as this anger has spilled over , violence and criminality have ensued .
But as much as the president would like them to be—indeed , needs them to be—terrorists , that is not what these people are .
The president and members of his administration seem bent on ensuring that the so-called antifa—or anti-fascist—movement is fully on display as a principal reason for the violence .
To deal with antifa , the president even tweeted that he intended to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he has no authority to designate any domestic movement as such .
Those of us who ’ ve looked closely at homegrown violent extremism do , in fact , agree that a domestic terrorism statute should exist .
And were such a statute to come into being , the obvious targets for designation as domestic terrorists are , first and foremost , violent white supremacist groups and individuals who provide material assistance to these groups.The obvious targets for designation as domestic terrorists are , first and foremost , violent white supremacist groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even if antifa is found to fit the statute as well , let me be clear : White supremacists have murdered , lynched , tortured , terrorized , oppressed , and discriminated against black Americans from the beginning of the idea of America .
They have killed black Americans by the thousands , often in the most horrific ways imaginable .
Far more damage to the United States has come from these terrorists—fascists , Klansmen , and neo-Nazis , all feeling newly empowered today—than those who have opposed them .
Finally , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if necessary , the combat power of the National Guard—to handle their respective crises .
If not , they can ask for federal assistance .
There is no precedent in modern U.S. history for a president to wield federal troops in a state or municipality over the objections of the respective governor .
Right now , the last thing the country needs—and , frankly , the U.S. military needs—is the appearance of U.S. soldiers carrying out the president ’ s intent by descending on American citizens .
This could wreck the high regard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much more .
Third , in a bid to create some appearance that he can empathize with those demonstrating peacefully in the streets , the president proclaimed himself the “ ally of peaceful protesters.
” But , at that very moment , just a few hundred feet away across Lafayette Park , fully equipped riot police and troops violently , and without provocation , set upon the peaceful demonstrators there , manhandling and beating many of them , employing flash-bangs , riot-control agents , and pepper spray throughout .
These demonstrators had done @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Media who were watching over the scene craned their cameras to try to understand what had happened to justify this violence , until it became clear for all to see .
The riot police had waded into these nonviolent American citizens—who were protesting massive social injustice—with the sole purpose of clearing the area around St. John ’ s Episcopal Church , on the other side of the park , so the self-proclaimed “ ally of peaceful protesters , ” Donald Trump , could pose there for a photo-op .
There had evidently been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inner circle about the efficacy of attempting a national statement to create a sense of unity in this moment of crisis .
Clearly , the argument in favor of such a statement did not carry the day .
The president has failed to show sympathy , empathy , compassion , or understanding—some of the traits the nation now needs from its highest office .
Perhaps sensing this moment as an opportunity for an easy victory after his appalling leadership failure in dealing with the coronavirus pandemic , the president came down hard : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ d labeled as weak , the same ones he ’ d left to fend for themselves during the pandemic , and hard on the Americans in the streets against whom he is preparing to dispatch “ thousands upon thousands of heavily armed soldiers , military personnel , and law enforcement.
” At the end of his speech , offhandedly saying something about going to pay homage to a national shrine , the president departed back into the White House.Donald Trump isn ’ t religious , has no need of religion , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , except insofar as they serve his political needs .
St. John ’ s Episcopal Church is one of the most historic churches in the United States , in which every president since James Madison has worshipped .
It had been damaged the night before , when a fire had been contained in the basement with little damage .
But on the afternoon of June 1 , it was surrounded by members of the U.S. Secret Service , other law enforcement personnel , and soldiers .
Tear gas was hanging in the air @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from demonstrators overcome by gas and pepper spray .
The debris of peaceful protesters attacked in the clearing operation littered the street .
As it became clear where the president was headed , and as the reality of what was unfolding set in , a horrified nation looked on .
The president stood in front of St. John ’ s , holding a Bible aloft , and expropriated the image of the church , the Holy Bible , and the Christian faith as the backdrop and basis for his words and deeds in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t enough that peaceful protesters had just been deprived of their first-amendment rights—this photo-op sought to legitimize that abuse with a layer of religion .
To make matters worse , he was joined in the church photo-op by the other members of his staff and cabinet , including the press secretary , the chief of staff , and the national security advisor .
Much worse still , he was joined in the picture by Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Attorney General William Barr .
One wonders , did Esper and Barr @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been attacked by riot police just minutes before , their civil right massively violated just to set the stage for their picture ?
Did it occur to them that in posing with the president and the Bible he held in front of a church , ostensibly calling down the authority of God on this cause , they were violating the spirit of one of the most important strictures in America , the separation of church and state ?
And if federal troops are indeed dispatched into the states to take action against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Christian God figure into the president ’ s deployment order ?
The framers of the Constitution intended the separation for a reason , and the commander in chief just trampled it .
In the immediate aftermath of this dark moment , late into the night , there was an eruption of theological debate about what it all meant on that historic day when a U.S. president weaponized the church and the Bible for a photo-op in order to justify his cause .
Bishop Mariann Budde of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order to settle the debate : “ Let me be clear : The president just used a Bible , the most sacred text of the Judeo-Christian tradition , and one of the churches of my diocese without permission as a backdrop for a message antithetical to the teachings of Jesus and everything that our churches stand for.
” Apart from the bishop ’ s truly righteous indignation , there really was no need for further discussion .
Donald Trump isn ’ t religious , has no need of religion , and doesn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insofar as they serve his political needs.The president failed to project any of the higher emotions or leadership desperately needed in every quarter of this nation during this dire moment .
We know why he did all this on Monday .
He even said so while holding the Bible and standing in front of the church .
It was about MAGA— “ making America great again.
” To even the casual observer , Monday was awful for the United States and its democracy .
The president ’ s speech was calculated to project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he failed to project any of the higher emotions or leadership desperately needed in every quarter of this nation during this dire moment .
And while Monday was truly horrific , no one should have been surprised .
Indeed , the moment was clarifying in so many ways .
So , what is to be done ?
At nearly the same moment that Americans were being beaten near the White House on behalf of their president , George Floyd ’ s brother Terrence Floyd visited the site of George ’ s murder .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ loudly upbraided the crowd for tarnishing his brother ’ s memory with violence and looting .
And then he told Americans what to do : vote .
“ Educate yourselves , ” he said , “ there ’ s a lot of us.
” So , while June 1 could easily be confused with a day of shame and peril if we listen to Donald Trump , if instead we listen to Terrence Floyd , it is a day of hope .
So mark your calendars—this could be the beginning of the change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but to enlightenment .
But it will have to come from the bottom up .
For at the White House , there is no one home .

The slide of the United States into illiberalism may well have begun on June 1, 2020. Remember the date. It may well signal the beginning of the end of the American experiment.
The president of the United States stood in the Rose Garden of the White House on Monday, railed against weak governors and mayors who were not doing enough, in his mind, to control the unrest and the rioters in their cities, and threatened to deploy the U.S. military against American citizens. It was a stunning moment. But, in particular, it was notable for three important reasons.
First, Donald Trump expressed only the barest of condolences at the murder of George Floyd, but he also said nothing about the fundamental and underlying reasons for the unrest: systemic racism and inequality, a historic absence of respect, and a denial of justice. All of these factors are centuries old and deeply engrained in an American society that systematically delivers white privilege at the expense of people of color.
Yes, he mentioned George Floyd, but he did not touch on long-standing societal problems at all. He sees the crisis as a black problem—not as something to be addressed by creating the basis and impetus for a move toward social justice, but as an opportunity to use force to portray himself as a “law and order” president. The reasons were irrelevant to the opportunity. Remember the supposed invasion of the southern border and his deployment of federal troops ahead of the 2018 midterm elections? The president’s failure to understand the reality of the problem was on full display when, on Saturday, he attempted to explain that his supporters, the so-called Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, “love African American people. They love black people. MAGA loves the black people.” Evidently his movement, MAGA, is a coherent thing, and it’s white, which leads to the next point about his speech.
Second, Trump was clear he views those engaged in the unrest and criminal acts in these riots as terrorists, an enemy. He said so, ostensibly as justification to deploy the U.S. military to apply federal force—his “personal” force—against the riots. Indeed, the secretary of defense used the military term “battlespace” to describe American cities.
While there may be some very accomplished criminals on both sides of the riots, the truth is that they are minuscule in numbers. The vast majority of the people protesting in the streets are justifiably furious at the murder of George Floyd, but they’re even angrier over pervasive injustice, mass incarceration, frequent false arrests, and an institutionalized devaluation of black lives and property. And yes, as this anger has spilled over, violence and criminality have ensued. But as much as the president would like them to be—indeed, needs them to be—terrorists, that is not what these people are. The president and members of his administration seem bent on ensuring that the so-called antifa—or anti-fascist—movement is fully on display as a principal reason for the violence. To deal with antifa, the president even tweeted that he intended to designate the group a terrorist organization—never mind that he has no authority to designate any domestic movement as such. Those of us who’ve looked closely at homegrown violent extremism do, in fact, agree that a domestic terrorism statute should exist. And were such a statute to come into being, the obvious targets for designation as domestic terrorists are, first and foremost, violent white supremacist groups and individuals who provide material assistance to these groups.The obvious targets for designation as domestic terrorists are, first and foremost, violent white supremacist groups and those who assist them. And even if antifa is found to fit the statute as well, let me be clear: White supremacists have murdered, lynched, tortured, terrorized, oppressed, and discriminated against black Americans from the beginning of the idea of America. They have killed black Americans by the thousands, often in the most horrific ways imaginable. Far more damage to the United States has come from these terrorists—fascists, Klansmen, and neo-Nazis, all feeling newly empowered today—than those who have opposed them.
Finally, the governors have sufficient law enforcement capacity—and, if necessary, the combat power of the National Guard—to handle their respective crises. If not, they can ask for federal assistance. There is no precedent in modern U.S. history for a president to wield federal troops in a state or municipality over the objections of the respective governor. Right now, the last thing the country needs—and, frankly, the U.S. military needs—is the appearance of U.S. soldiers carrying out the president’s intent by descending on American citizens. This could wreck the high regard Americans have for their military, and much more.
Third, in a bid to create some appearance that he can empathize with those demonstrating peacefully in the streets, the president proclaimed himself the “ally of peaceful protesters.” But, at that very moment, just a few hundred feet away across Lafayette Park, fully equipped riot police and troops violently, and without provocation, set upon the peaceful demonstrators there, manhandling and beating many of them, employing flash-bangs, riot-control agents, and pepper spray throughout. These demonstrators had done nothing to warrant such an attack. Media who were watching over the scene craned their cameras to try to understand what had happened to justify this violence, until it became clear for all to see. The riot police had waded into these nonviolent American citizens—who were protesting massive social injustice—with the sole purpose of clearing the area around St. John’s Episcopal Church, on the other side of the park, so the self-proclaimed “ally of peaceful protesters,” Donald Trump, could pose there for a photo-op.
There had evidently been a debate within the president’s inner circle about the efficacy of attempting a national statement to create a sense of unity in this moment of crisis. Clearly, the argument in favor of such a statement did not carry the day. The president has failed to show sympathy, empathy, compassion, or understanding—some of the traits the nation now needs from its highest office. Perhaps sensing this moment as an opportunity for an easy victory after his appalling leadership failure in dealing with the coronavirus pandemic, the president came down hard: hard on the governors and mayors he’d labeled as weak, the same ones he’d left to fend for themselves during the pandemic, and hard on the Americans in the streets against whom he is preparing to dispatch “thousands upon thousands of heavily armed soldiers, military personnel, and law enforcement.” At the end of his speech, offhandedly saying something about going to pay homage to a national shrine, the president departed back into the White House.Donald Trump isn’t religious, has no need of religion, and doesn’t care about the devout, except insofar as they serve his political needs.
St. John’s Episcopal Church is one of the most historic churches in the United States, in which every president since James Madison has worshipped. It had been damaged the night before, when a fire had been contained in the basement with little damage. But on the afternoon of June 1, it was surrounded by members of the U.S. Secret Service, other law enforcement personnel, and soldiers. Tear gas was hanging in the air, with vomit still on the street from demonstrators overcome by gas and pepper spray. The debris of peaceful protesters attacked in the clearing operation littered the street. As it became clear where the president was headed, and as the reality of what was unfolding set in, a horrified nation looked on.
The president stood in front of St. John’s, holding a Bible aloft, and expropriated the image of the church, the Holy Bible, and the Christian faith as the backdrop and basis for his words and deeds in dealing with this crisis. It wasn’t enough that peaceful protesters had just been deprived of their first-amendment rights—this photo-op sought to legitimize that abuse with a layer of religion. To make matters worse, he was joined in the church photo-op by the other members of his staff and cabinet, including the press secretary, the chief of staff, and the national security advisor. Much worse still, he was joined in the picture by Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Attorney General William Barr.
One wonders, did Esper and Barr know that hundreds of peaceful U.S. citizens had been attacked by riot police just minutes before, their civil rights massively violated just to set the stage for their picture? Did it occur to them that in posing with the president and the Bible he held in front of a church, ostensibly calling down the authority of God on this cause, they were violating the spirit of one of the most important strictures in America, the separation of church and state? And if federal troops are indeed dispatched into the states to take action against American civilians, where does the Bible and the Christian God figure into the president’s deployment order? The framers of the Constitution intended the separation for a reason, and the commander in chief just trampled it.
In the immediate aftermath of this dark moment, late into the night, there was an eruption of theological debate about what it all meant on that historic day when a U.S. president weaponized the church and the Bible for a photo-op in order to justify his cause. Bishop Mariann Budde of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington said all anyone needed to say in order to settle the debate: “Let me be clear: The president just used a Bible, the most sacred text of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and one of the churches of my diocese without permission as a backdrop for a message antithetical to the teachings of Jesus and everything that our churches stand for.” Apart from the bishop’s truly righteous indignation, there really was no need for further discussion. Donald Trump isn’t religious, has no need of religion, and doesn’t care about the devout, except insofar as they serve his political needs.The president failed to project any of the higher emotions or leadership desperately needed in every quarter of this nation during this dire moment. We know why he did all this on Monday. He even said so while holding the Bible and standing in front of the church. It was about MAGA—“making America great again.”
To even the casual observer, Monday was awful for the United States and its democracy. The president’s speech was calculated to project his abject and arbitrary power, but he failed to project any of the higher emotions or leadership desperately needed in every quarter of this nation during this dire moment. And while Monday was truly horrific, no one should have been surprised. Indeed, the moment was clarifying in so many ways.
So, what is to be done? At nearly the same moment that Americans were being beaten near the White House on behalf of their president, George Floyd’s brother Terrence Floyd visited the site of George’s murder. Overcome with grief and anger, he loudly upbraided the crowd for tarnishing his brother’s memory with violence and looting. And then he told Americans what to do: vote. “Educate yourselves,” he said, “there’s a lot of us.” So, while June 1 could easily be confused with a day of shame and peril if we listen to Donald Trump, if instead we listen to Terrence Floyd, it is a day of hope. So mark your calendars—this could be the beginning of the change of American democracy not to illiberalism, but to enlightenment. But it will have to come from the bottom up. For at the White House, there is no one home.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-03--Biden Resists Move Left on Foreign Policy

When Joe Biden ’ s campaign invited Bernie Sanders ’ s advisors to participate in a series of policy workshops aimed at integrating progressive ideas into the Democratic Party platform , one topic didn ’ t get mentioned : foreign policy .
As Biden , the presumptive Democratic nominee , shows signs of nudging his party to the left on domestic policy—proposing student debt relief , expanded health care , and police reforms aimed at outlawing chokeholds and the transfer of weapons of war to police departments—there has been little sign of a similar move over America ’ s relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Democratic Party ’ s progressive wing who favor a more restrained America , Biden appears to be a man of the past : an unapologetic champion of American exceptionalism .
He backed the resolution authorizing the Iraq War , remains committed to waging an open-ended global war on terrorism with drones and special forces , refuses to condition military aid to Israel to secure its commitment to a Palestinian state , and demonstrates little interest in curbing a U.S. defense budget that has swelled by more than $ 100 billion under Donald @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has been trying to burnish his foreign-policy credentials by portraying himself as tougher on China than Trump .
“ A return back to normal , or a return back to the Obama administration , is not that compelling at this point.
” The development has been particularly dispiriting for left-wing Democrats , who felt they had altered the course of the party ’ s foreign-policy thinking during the primary campaign and demonstrated widespread popular support among Democratic voters for scaled-down military spending and a more restrained foreign policy .
“ There is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or at least controlled , the debate on foreign policy during the primaries , ” said Stephen Wertheim , a historian at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and critic of what he views as America ’ s excessive reliance on military solutions .
“ A return back to normal , or a return back to the Obama administration , is not that compelling at this point.
” During the primaries , Biden premised his campaign on his relationship with former President Barack Obama and their accomplishments together .
But until the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president was being soundly beaten by Sanders , who favored deep cuts in military spending , denounced decades of U.S. trade policy that killed jobs for American workers , and advocated human rights for Tibetans and other minorities in China .
While many progressives are willing to swallow hard and support Biden now , they are also expecting that Sanders ’ s strong early performance should be rewarded with a broad turn leftward by the party , including on foreign policy .
For the moment , the debate over foreign policy has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home , where a videotaped recording of a Minneapolis police officer asphyxiating a black man , George Floyd , ignited nationwide protests against police abuse that has resulted in violent exchanges between protesters and police from Atlanta and Los Angeles to Minneapolis and New York .
On Monday , Trump unleashed military police on peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square outside the White House and threatened to deploy the military in U.S. cities to quell the violence .
“ When peaceful protesters are dispersed by the order of the president from the doorstep of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House—using tear gas and flash grenades—in order to stage a photo-op at a noble church , we can be forgiven for believing that the president is more interested in power than in principle , ” Biden said in a speech Tuesday .
The president , he added , is “ more interested in serving the passions of his base than the needs of the people in his care.
” Biden ’ s reluctance to give more ground to the left threatens to deepen friction in the party over the course of foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the discontent will seriously affect voter turnout , which will be crucial to a Biden victory in November , according to interviews with more than a dozen advisors , analysts , former officials , and congressional aides in the progressive camp .
Indeed , there is little evidence that progressives will ultimately break ranks with Biden , given the overwhelming sense of urgency they place on preventing Trump ’ s reelection .
Staffers from the primary campaigns of Sanders and Sen. Elizabeth Warren have already migrated to the swelling ranks of the Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possibility of bringing the Massachusetts senator onto the ticket .
“ We are not looking to start a giant food fight inside the party—everyone is aligned behind the idea that Biden needs to be our next president because we can ’ t survive another four years of Trump , ” one progressive foreign-policy advisor said .
“ But I see it as the role of the progressive community to keep the pressure on the campaign ” to pursue a more progressive course .
“ Is Biden going to try to outhawk Trump on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who is tougher with foreigners , a game that the Democrats will never win and which will make our policies and debate worse ?
” “ The overriding objective for the Biden administration will be to establish the credibility and the standing that the United States enjoyed prior to 2017 , ” said Peter Mulrean , who served at the State Department for nearly 30 years .
“ But you can ’ t achieve that by just turning back the clock and resume the policy positions we held under Obama .
Too much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. has changed and even attitudes in the U.S. have changed , particularly among progressives within the Democratic Party.
’ ’ Many progressives say U.S. credibility before Trump was already on the wane , citing the diplomatic damage done to the United States by disastrous U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Libya .
Progressives have been prodding Biden , with little success , to commit to embracing their calls for reduced military spending , a halt to the nuclear modernization program , and a more nuanced diplomatic approach to dealing with U.S. rivals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe is critical for making progress on the international effort to stem the spread of the coronavirus and to scale back the production of greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming .
“ Is Biden going to try to outhawk Trump on China and get into the game of who is tougher with foreigners , a game that the Democrats will never win and which will make our policies and debate worse ?
” Wertheim asked .
“ Or will he seek to cooperate with them in international organizations ?
” The dispute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asian economic powerhouse followed the April 18 release of a Biden campaign ad accusing Trump of going soft on China in the critical weeks after the first outbreak of the virus , a period during which Trump praised China ’ s response .
“ But Trump rolled over for the Chinese .
He took their word for it , ” the ad stated .
“ Trump praised the Chinese 15 times in January and February as the coronavirus spread across the world.
” The ad drew a sharp rebuke from Asian American activists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president ’ s effort to blame China for spreading the coronavirus in the United States was exposing Chinese American citizens to abuse .
“ We share the Biden campaign ’ s goal of defeating Trump in November , ” Asian American activists wrote in an open letter .
The ad , the letter continued , “ exacerbates anti-Asian racism in many ways , none clearer than when it implies that the country would have been saved by a stricter travel ban on China.
” Some progressives say the Biden campaign has accepted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has since softened his tone on China .
“ They took those concerns and criticisms on board , and they understand a hawkish race to the bottom is foolish politically and policy-wise , ” said Matt Duss , Sanders ’ s chief foreign-policy advisor .
Other progressives see China ’ s increasingly assertive foreign policy—it has recently stepped up its crackdown on political freedoms in Hong Kong—and its military buildup as posing threats to U.S. security and the promotion of values that progressives care about , including human rights and democracy , around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far more hawkish position than Obama on trade with China , citing the loss of millions of U.S. manufacturing jobs .
“ The extreme positions on both sides are overly simplistic and naive , ” one progressive said .
Hawks in the Trump administration , including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sen. Tom Cotton , “ are looking to instigate a conflict ” without considering that there may be a more nuanced approach to advancing U.S. interests .
At the same time , “ there is some oversimplification among progressives that they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the conflict with China because it is not consistent with our preferred narrative.
” That reality , the source said , will strengthen the Defense Department ’ s case for continued high levels of funding .
“ There is not a lot that suggests to me that the Biden administration is going to take a different route than previous administrations , which is that we give the Defense Department as much as we can stand to , as we can , at any given time , ” said Laicie Heeley , a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ budgeting for foreign affairs and defense program .
“ There is not a lot that suggests to me that the Biden administration is going to take a different route than previous administrations , which is that we give the Defense Department as much as we can stand to , as we can , at any given time.
” Nowhere has the fault line between progressives and establishment Democrats been sharper than on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , where leading candidates , including Sanders and Warren , have expressed greater sympathy for Palestinian rights and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that undermines diplomatic efforts to negotiate the creation of a Palestinian state .
Both candidates expressed a willingness to condition billions of dollars in U.S. military assistance to Israel .
Biden ’ s refusal to consider conditioning military assistance to Israel is “ not really in line with the views of most Democrats , especially younger Democrats , ” Duss told Foreign Policy .
“ If you look at polling , including a recent survey from the Center for American Progress , the majority of Democrats are in favor of conditioning aid or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ If you say you support a two-state solution but also say there will be no consequences for Israeli policies aimed at foreclosing that solution , why would you expect anything to change ?
” Duss said .
Biden has spoken out critically against Israel ’ s announcement that it plans to annex key parts of the West Bank , warning that “ it ’ ll choke off any hope of peace.
” He is also expected to take steps to improve relations with the Palestinians , restoring financial assistance that was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ otherwise charted a far more deferential approach to Israel .
Asked whether he would reverse controversial Trump policies , such as the moving of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem , or apply economic pressure on Israel to make compromises with the Palestinians , Biden has offered resounding noes .
“ My commitment to Israel is absolutely unshakeable , ” he said .
“ Biden is the product of the last 40 years of Democratic mainstream politics and foreign policy , which has not only grown increasingly supportive of Israel but really loathes to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mulrean said .
“ I ’ m a little concerned that the Biden team ’ s instinct could be to fall back on the old playbook , rather than come up with something that addresses the new changes.
” Others in the progressive camp say Biden still shares a good deal with progressives .
“ So , look , I would be lying if I said I was totally thrilled with their positions ” on the Israeli-Palestinian issue , the progressive foreign-policy advisor said .
“ But he is committed to a two-state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meaningful rights and representation for the Palestinians .
He said he is unequivocally opposed to annexation of the West Bank or any form of unilateral action , which is consistent with what progressives want.
” “ Joe Biden believes strongly in keeping your differences as far as possible between friends , behind doors , maintaining as little distance in public as possible.
” During the Obama administration , Biden was among the staunchest supporters of the Israeli government , backing a decision to veto a 2011 U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weeks of Obama ’ s presidency to abstain on a subsequent U.N. resolution condemning settlements , according to a former senior White House official .
His position was previously reported by Peter Beinart in the Jewish Currents .
“ Joe Biden believes strongly in keeping your differences as far as possible between friends , behind doors , maintaining as little distance in public as possible , ” Antony Blinken , a top advisor to Biden , said last month during an event organized by the pro-Israel group Democratic Majority for Israel .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ annexing portions of the West Bank , including the Jordan Valley , will provide an early test .
“ If annexation does not occur , there is no cost to pay [ for an uncritically pro-Israel stance ] , ” said Mulrean , who recently served as the director of the representative office for the U.N. Palestinian refugee relief organization in New York .
“ If annexation does occur , he and his team need to find a way to thread the needle and to lay down a marker signaling that this is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel .
My guess is progressive Democrats are not going to remain silent.
” In May , Biden and Sanders established a series of six working groups , headed by progressives such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and establishment stalwarts like John Kerry , on climate change , criminal justice reform , economy , education , health care , and immigration .
But there was nothing on foreign policy .
The pressure from progressives to lurch leftward , however , is not as salient on foreign-policy matters as it is on domestic issues like inequality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ There is nothing to suggest a fundamental rethinking of the policy , ” a former Obama White House official said .
Biden would face strong counterpressure from constituencies that “ would feel aggrieved if Biden were to change tact ” on Israel , the official said .
Biden ’ s attitude toward the use of force , the official added , is not as hawkish as some of his critics on the left fear .
Biden is more of an “ iconoclast ” who sees the U.S. military as a force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vigorously backed U.S. military interventions , from the Balkans in the 1990s to Iraq in 2003 .
But he has grown more cautious about the risks of military interventions , advocating a stronger drawdown of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and opposing the U.S. intervention in Libya .
“ I can ’ t fit him into a box , ” the official said .
“ Has he evolved , or has he always had an ambiguous attitude about the use of force ?
” The reality and constraints of governing may limit even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to satisfy his or her more progressive followers .
But even a moderate shift would be preferable for progressives than the current administration .
“ I think it ’ s an insufficient course correction given how much the U.S. role in the world has changed , ” the official said .
“ But going back to an Obama-like or Clinton-like policy or Bush-like policy would be huge progress from where we are .
”

When Joe Biden’s campaign invited Bernie Sanders’s advisors to participate in a series of policy workshops aimed at integrating progressive ideas into the Democratic Party platform, one topic didn’t get mentioned: foreign policy. As Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee, shows signs of nudging his party to the left on domestic policy—proposing student debt relief, expanded health care, and police reforms aimed at outlawing chokeholds and the transfer of weapons of war to police departments—there has been little sign of a similar move over America’s relations with the world.
When Joe Biden’s campaign invited Bernie Sanders’s advisors to participate in a series of policy workshops aimed at integrating progressive ideas into the Democratic Party platform, one topic didn’t get mentioned: foreign policy. As Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee, shows signs of nudging his party to the left on domestic policy—proposing student debt relief, expanded health care, and police reforms aimed at outlawing chokeholds and the transfer of weapons of war to police departments—there has been little sign of a similar move over America’s relations with the world.
For many in the Democratic Party’s progressive wing who favor a more restrained America, Biden appears to be a man of the past: an unapologetic champion of American exceptionalism. He backed the resolution authorizing the Iraq War, remains committed to waging an open-ended global war on terrorism with drones and special forces, refuses to condition military aid to Israel to secure its commitment to a Palestinian state, and demonstrates little interest in curbing a U.S. defense budget that has swelled by more than $100 billion under Donald Trump’s presidency. Recently, he has been trying to burnish his foreign-policy credentials by portraying himself as tougher on China than Trump.
“A return back to normal, or a return back to the Obama administration, is not that compelling at this point.”
The development has been particularly dispiriting for left-wing Democrats, who felt they had altered the course of the party’s foreign-policy thinking during the primary campaign and demonstrated widespread popular support among Democratic voters for scaled-down military spending and a more restrained foreign policy.
“There is a real sense in which progressives won, or at least controlled, the debate on foreign policy during the primaries,” said Stephen Wertheim, a historian at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and critic of what he views as America’s excessive reliance on military solutions. “A return back to normal, or a return back to the Obama administration, is not that compelling at this point.”
During the primaries, Biden premised his campaign on his relationship with former President Barack Obama and their accomplishments together. But until the South Carolina primary, the former vice president was being soundly beaten by Sanders, who favored deep cuts in military spending, denounced decades of U.S. trade policy that killed jobs for American workers, and advocated human rights for Tibetans and other minorities in China. While many progressives are willing to swallow hard and support Biden now, they are also expecting that Sanders’s strong early performance should be rewarded with a broad turn leftward by the party, including on foreign policy.
For the moment, the debate over foreign policy has been widely eclipsed by more pressing crises at home, where a videotaped recording of a Minneapolis police officer asphyxiating a black man, George Floyd, ignited nationwide protests against police abuse that has resulted in violent exchanges between protesters and police from Atlanta and Los Angeles to Minneapolis and New York. On Monday, Trump unleashed military police on peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square outside the White House and threatened to deploy the military in U.S. cities to quell the violence.
“When peaceful protesters are dispersed by the order of the president from the doorstep of the people’s house, the White House—using tear gas and flash grenades—in order to stage a photo-op at a noble church, we can be forgiven for believing that the president is more interested in power than in principle,” Biden said in a speech Tuesday. The president, he added, is “more interested in serving the passions of his base than the needs of the people in his care.”
Biden’s reluctance to give more ground to the left threatens to deepen friction in the party over the course of foreign policy, though it remains unclear whether the discontent will seriously affect voter turnout, which will be crucial to a Biden victory in November, according to interviews with more than a dozen advisors, analysts, former officials, and congressional aides in the progressive camp.
Indeed, there is little evidence that progressives will ultimately break ranks with Biden, given the overwhelming sense of urgency they place on preventing Trump’s reelection. Staffers from the primary campaigns of Sanders and Sen. Elizabeth Warren have already migrated to the swelling ranks of the Biden campaign, which has flirted with the possibility of bringing the Massachusetts senator onto the ticket.
“We are not looking to start a giant food fight inside the party—everyone is aligned behind the idea that Biden needs to be our next president because we can’t survive another four years of Trump,” one progressive foreign-policy advisor said. “But I see it as the role of the progressive community to keep the pressure on the campaign” to pursue a more progressive course.
“Is Biden going to try to outhawk Trump on China and get into the game of who is tougher with foreigners, a game that the Democrats will never win and which will make our policies and debate worse?”
“The overriding objective for the Biden administration will be to establish the credibility and the standing that the United States enjoyed prior to 2017,” said Peter Mulrean, who served at the State Department for nearly 30 years. “But you can’t achieve that by just turning back the clock and resume the policy positions we held under Obama. Too much has changed. The attitude towards the U.S. has changed and even attitudes in the U.S. have changed, particularly among progressives within the Democratic Party.’’
Many progressives say U.S. credibility before Trump was already on the wane, citing the diplomatic damage done to the United States by disastrous U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Libya.
Progressives have been prodding Biden, with little success, to commit to embracing their calls for reduced military spending, a halt to the nuclear modernization program, and a more nuanced diplomatic approach to dealing with U.S. rivals, including China, whose cooperation they believe is critical for making progress on the international effort to stem the spread of the coronavirus and to scale back the production of greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming.
“Is Biden going to try to outhawk Trump on China and get into the game of who is tougher with foreigners, a game that the Democrats will never win and which will make our policies and debate worse?” Wertheim asked. “Or will he seek to cooperate with them in international organizations?”
The dispute over Biden’s approach to the Asian economic powerhouse followed the April 18 release of a Biden campaign ad accusing Trump of going soft on China in the critical weeks after the first outbreak of the virus, a period during which Trump praised China’s response. “But Trump rolled over for the Chinese. He took their word for it,” the ad stated. “Trump praised the Chinese 15 times in January and February as the coronavirus spread across the world.”
The ad drew a sharp rebuke from Asian American activists in the party, who complained that the president’s effort to blame China for spreading the coronavirus in the United States was exposing Chinese American citizens to abuse. “We share the Biden campaign’s goal of defeating Trump in November,” Asian American activists wrote in an open letter. The ad, the letter continued, “exacerbates anti-Asian racism in many ways, none clearer than when it implies that the country would have been saved by a stricter travel ban on China.”
U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden delivers remarks during the joint opening session of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China in Washington, D.C., on June 23, 2015.
Some progressives say the Biden campaign has accepted the criticism as legitimate, and Biden has since softened his tone on China. “I think they took those concerns and criticisms on board, and they understand a hawkish race to the bottom is unwise both politically and on policy,” said Matt Duss, Sanders’s chief foreign-policy advisor.
Other progressives see China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy—it has recently stepped up its crackdown on political freedoms in Hong Kong—and its military buildup as posing threats to U.S. security and the promotion of values that progressives care about, including human rights and democracy, around the global. Sanders also took a far more hawkish position than Obama on trade with China, citing the loss of millions of U.S. manufacturing jobs.
“The extreme positions on both sides are overly simplistic and naive,” one progressive said. Hawks in the Trump administration, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sen. Tom Cotton, “are looking to instigate a conflict” without considering that there may be a more nuanced approach to advancing U.S. interests. At the same time, “there is some oversimplification among progressives that they can wish away the military aspect of the conflict with China because it is not consistent with our preferred narrative.”
That reality, the source said, will strengthen the Defense Department’s case for continued high levels of funding.
“There is not a lot that suggests to me that the Biden administration is going to take a different route than previous administrations, which is that we give the Defense Department as much as we can stand to, as we can, at any given time,” said Laicie Heeley, a former fellow with the Stimson Center’s budgeting for foreign affairs and defense program.
“There is not a lot that suggests to me that the Biden administration is going to take a different route than previous administrations, which is that we give the Defense Department as much as we can stand to, as we can, at any given time.”
Nowhere has the fault line between progressives and establishment Democrats been sharper than on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where leading candidates, including Sanders and Warren, have expressed greater sympathy for Palestinian rights and a willingness to openly criticize Israeli conduct that undermines diplomatic efforts to negotiate the creation of a Palestinian state. Both candidates expressed a willingness to condition billions of dollars in U.S. military assistance to Israel.
Biden’s refusal to consider conditioning military assistance to Israel is “not really in line with the views of most Democrats, especially younger Democrats,” Duss told Foreign Policy. “If you look at polling, including a recent survey from the Center for American Progress, the majority of Democrats are in favor of conditioning aid or other consequences in response to settlement growth.
“If you say you support a two-state solution but also say there will be no consequences for Israeli policies aimed at foreclosing that solution, why would you expect anything to change?” Duss said.
Biden has spoken out critically against Israel’s announcement that it plans to annex key parts of the West Bank, warning that “it’ll choke off any hope of peace.” He is also expected to take steps to improve relations with the Palestinians, restoring financial assistance that was cut by Trump. But he has otherwise charted a far more deferential approach to Israel. Asked whether he would reverse controversial Trump policies, such as the moving of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, or apply economic pressure on Israel to make compromises with the Palestinians, Biden has offered resounding noes. “My commitment to Israel is absolutely unshakeable,” he said.
“Biden is the product of the last 40 years of Democratic mainstream politics and foreign policy, which has not only grown increasingly supportive of Israel but really loathes to ever question Israel in public,” Mulrean said. “I’m a little concerned that the Biden team’s instinct could be to fall back on the old playbook, rather than come up with something that addresses the new changes.”
Others in the progressive camp say Biden still shares a good deal with progressives.
“So, look, I would be lying if I said I was totally thrilled with their positions” on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the progressive foreign-policy advisor said. “But he is committed to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and supports meaningful rights and representation for the Palestinians. He said he is unequivocally opposed to annexation of the West Bank or any form of unilateral action, which is consistent with what progressives want.”
“Joe Biden believes strongly in keeping your differences as far as possible between friends, behind doors, maintaining as little distance in public as possible.”
During the Obama administration, Biden was among the staunchest supporters of the Israeli government, backing a decision to veto a 2011 U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlements and opposing a decision in the final weeks of Obama’ s presidency to abstain on a subsequent U.N. resolution condemning settlements, according to a former senior White House official. His position was previously reported by Peter Beinart in the Jewish Currents.
“Joe Biden believes strongly in keeping your differences as far as possible between friends, behind doors, maintaining as little distance in public as possible,” Antony Blinken, a top advisor to Biden, said last month during an event organized by the pro-Israel group Democratic Majority for Israel.
A decision by Israel to press ahead with annexing portions of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, will provide an early test. “If annexation does not occur, there is no cost to pay [for an uncritically pro-Israel stance],” said Mulrean, who recently served as the director of the representative office for the U.N. Palestinian refugee relief organization in New York. “If annexation does occur, he and his team need to find a way to thread the needle and to lay down a marker signaling that this is not just another day in relations with Israel. My guess is progressive Democrats are not going to remain silent.”
In May, Biden and Sanders established a series of six working groups, headed by progressives such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and establishment stalwarts like John Kerry, on climate change, criminal justice reform, economy, education, health care, and immigration. But there was nothing on foreign policy.
The pressure from progressives to lurch leftward, however, is not as salient on foreign-policy matters as it is on domestic issues like inequality, health care, and college debt.
U.S. Sen. Joe Biden, then ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, speaks in his office Feb. 5, 2003, about the possibility of war with Iraq. Biden backed the war, a decision that’s he’s since called a mistake.
“There is nothing to suggest a fundamental rethinking of the policy,” a former Obama White House official said. Biden would face strong counterpressure from constituencies that “would feel aggrieved if Biden were to change tact” on Israel, the official said.
Biden’s attitude toward the use of force, the official added, is not as hawkish as some of his critics on the left fear.
Biden is more of an “iconoclast” who sees the U.S. military as a force for good in the world and has vigorously backed U.S. military interventions, from the Balkans in the 1990s to Iraq in 2003. But he has grown more cautious about the risks of military interventions, advocating a stronger drawdown of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and opposing the U.S. intervention in Libya. “I can’t fit him into a box,” the official said. “Has he evolved, or has he always had an ambiguous attitude about the use of force?”
The reality and constraints of governing may limit even a more progressive president’s ability to satisfy his or her more progressive followers. But even a moderate shift would be preferable for progressives than the current administration. “I think it’s an insufficient course correction given how much the U.S. role in the world has changed,” the official said. “But going back to an Obama-like or Clinton-like policy or Bush-like policy would be huge progress from where we are.”