foreignpolicy--2020-04-21--There’s No Such Thing as Good Liberal Hegemony

There ’ s No Such Thing as Good Liberal Hegemony Can we talk about something else for a moment ?
Although it is nearly impossible to wrest one ’ s mind away from COVID-19 and its implications , I ’ m going to give it a shot this week .
I want to explore a topic that my students and I were discussing a few days ago , in a class on realist and liberal conceptions of world order .
The question was whether the U.S. attempt to create a liberal world order during the brief “ unipolar moment ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be more specific : are the criticisms that I ( and others ) have leveled at the U.S. strategy of “ liberal hegemony ” really fair ?
Is it possible that creating a global order based on liberal values ( i.e.
, democracy , free markets , the rule of law , individual rights , etc . )
was more feasible than it now appears ?
Might this strategy have succeeded if U.S. leaders had been a little smarter , less arrogant , a lot more patient , and a bit luckier ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ fail , ” as John Mearsheimer suggested last spring , or were there plausible courses of action that would have led to the steady expansion and deep embedding of liberal values and institutions around the world ?
In the unlikely event that the United States found itself in a similar position of primacy again , could it learn from its past mistakes and do better the second time around ?
That the first attempt was a costly failure should be beyond dispute .
Instead of advancing , democracy has been in retreat around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the United States itself—and U.S.-led efforts at regime change have led not to thriving democracies but to failed states and costly occupations .
Hyperglobalization under U.S. auspices produced a grave financial crisis in 2008 , politically painful job displacement in a number of sectors , and helped trigger a wide-ranging populist backlash .
NATO enlargement helped poison relations with Russia , and policies such as dual containment in the Persian Gulf inspired anti-U.S. terrorism , including the 9/11 attacks and all the negative consequences that flowed from that event .
The end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partial retreat from globalization , the emergence of would-be autocrats in Hungary , Poland , and even in the United States , and revitalized authoritarianism in many other places .
Given where we are today , does it matter whether a more sophisticated version of liberal hegemony might have succeeded ?
In fact , this issue is of paramount importance , because plenty of people are still convinced that trying to create a U.S.-led , liberal world order was the right goal and that the United States just needs to learn from past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the future .
Defenders include unrepentant hawks such as Eric Edelman and Ray Takeyh , who think what the Middle East needs is even more U.S.-led regime change , but also liberal academics such as G. John Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney , who believe the liberal order remains surprisingly resilient .
Other proponents of this view are dedicated policy wonks such as Jake Sullivan , who thinks the problem is not the United States ’ basic strategy but rather the fact that Americans are increasingly skeptical of it , and one sees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brands , Peter Feaver , and other defenders of an expansive U.S. role .
If former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden wins the presidential election in November—and , to be clear , I hope he does—the apostles of U.S. primacy and its “ indispensable ” global role will be back in the saddle , and we are likely to see at least a partial attempt to turn the clock back to the halcyon days when the United States was actively trying to create a global liberal order .
Let ’ s give this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Imagine that you could travel back in time to 1992 , with full knowledge of all the mistakes that have been made since then .
Then imagine that you still wanted to create a liberal world order , while avoiding all the missteps that were made over the past quarter-century .
What would you do differently , and would this new approach work ?
To start with the most obvious point : a smarter approach to liberal hegemony would have to be a lot more patient .
In the 1990s , Americans felt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ success in a globalized world—what Thomas Friedman called “ DOScapital 6.0 ” —and that other countries couldn ’ t wait to become more like the United States .
The wind was at the United States ’ back , history was moving its way , and giving the world a healthy shove in the right direction would just accelerate the process .
This view was both self-congratulatory and naively optimistic , but one could still believe that “ the arc of history bends toward justice ” while acknowledging that bending the arc will take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The United States should adopt a slow , steady , and decidedly nonmilitary approach to spreading liberal values , therefore , and recognize that it will take several decades ( or more ) to bear fruit .
One might call this approach “ liberal hegemony lite.
” In practice , liberal hegemony lite would have eschewed NATO enlargement and gone with the so-called Partnership for Peace ( PfP ) instead .
PfP would have fostered security cooperation with the newly independent states of Eastern Europe—thereby helping strengthen their nascent democratic orders—but it would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promises U.S. officials made before the Soviet Union broke up .
Relations with Moscow might still have worsened as it regained some of its former strength , but not as fast and probably not as far .
Absent NATO enlargement ( and the misguided U.S. attempt to nominate Ukraine for a membership action plan in 2008 ) , it is hard to imagine matters in Ukraine would be as troubled as they are today .
With the benefit of hindsight , a wiser United States would have pursued a more measured approach to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and investment improves overall economic efficiency and is generally desirable , but taking it more slowly would have given the sectors that were harmed by greater foreign competition more time to adjust .
It was also a mistake to bring China into the World Trade Organization prematurely , based on the hope that it would hasten China ’ s transition to democracy and turn China into a “ responsible stakeholder.
” Instead , it just accelerated China ’ s emergence as a peer competitor .
Our time-traveling advisor would also caution against excessive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the dangers of loose money and asset bubbles , advice that would have made the financial crisis of 2008 less likely .
Hindsight would also warn against the policy of dual containment in the Persian Gulf , the attempt to create a Western-style democracy in Afghanistan after 9/11 , and the foolish decision to topple Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in 2003 .
A wiser United States would have taken a more measured approach to the Arab Spring , supporting Tunisia ’ s transition to democracy but not the forcible ouster of Libyan dictator @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Assad must go ” at the start of the Syrian civil war , the United States would have worked with all the interested parties ( including Iran ) to bring that conflict to an end quickly and with far less loss of life , even if the end result left President Bashar al-Assad in power .
In short , the United States could still have pushed for a more open , free , and essentially liberal world order , but in a more gradual and sophisticated way .
It would have given economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries that were genuinely trying to move in more liberal directions , and it could have worked harder to preserve the United States as a model that others would want to emulate .
But it would have refrained from attempting vast projects of social engineering in countries where the prerequisites for stable democracy were lacking , and it would have recognized that pushing the pace was going to trigger resistance from authoritarian leaders who had no intention of giving up power voluntarily .
Had the United States pursued liberal hegemony in this manner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actually occurred might have been avoided .
Progress toward a more liberal world order would have been slower , of course , but the forward momentum of the early 1990s might have been sustained .
Does this argument mean that liberal hegemony was the right course after all , and that a more sophisticated version should be adopted should the United States ever find itself in a position of primacy again ?
I don ’ t think so .
The flaw in the counterfactual described above should be obvious .
It assumes that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ knowledge of the results of their actions , then they could infallibly pick the right course of action at each critical point .
Armed with perfect foresight , for example , former U.S. President George W. Bush would not have chosen to invade Iraq in 2003 , or perhaps he would have devoted a lot more time and effort into preparing for the post-Saddam occupation .
Yet even perfect knowledge about what went wrong would not guarantee success the second time around .
First , even when we know what mistakes to avoid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of action that would yield a successful outcome .
The United States is very powerful , wealthy , and secure , but some tasks may simply be beyond its means and outside the limits of its understanding .
Trying to use military force to transform deeply divided societies into liberal democracies seems to be one of them .
Second , if the United States had taken a significantly different course of action at various critical points in the recent past , then history would have headed in a different direction and U.S. leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of choices whose results could not be known in advance .
In other words , the lessons drawn from events as they actually occurred may not help the United States decide what to do once history is following a different path .
Most importantly , even liberal hegemony lite entails a lot of complicated social engineering .
By definition , a liberal world order is one where certain key political principles—democracy ; sovereignty ; low barriers to trade , investment , and travel ; rule of law within multilateral institutions ; and individual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we live in a world where these values are not universally embraced .
Democracies have never been a majority , and millions of people think security , sovereignty , cultural values , national autonomy , and other political goals are more important—which means that trying to get others to embrace democracy requires considerable pressure and increases the risk of political instability .
Such efforts inevitably trigger local resentments of various kinds , especially in a world where nationalism and other forms of local identity make people resentful and suspicious of even well-intentioned foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the changes occurring among any group of people , the more unpredictable the results will be and the more unintended consequences are bound to arise .
Even progressive political change creates winners and losers , and the latter won ’ t necessarily accept their fates with forbearance .
Instead , they may take up arms to try to regain their former positions , thereby creating the sort of resistance that helped defeat U.S. efforts to promote a liberal order in the past .
Even if future policymakers avoided all of the errors made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nothing of the blunders U.S. President Donald Trump has made since then ) , we may be confident they will mishandle some of the unforeseen developments that are bound to arise on their watch .
The bottom line : Liberal hegemony lite might have worked slightly better than what the United States actually did , but it wouldn ’ t have achieved the ultimate goal of a single rules-based global liberal order .
This realization is not an argument for U.S. disengagement or diplomatic passivity ; the situation we are all dealing with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ telling reminder that self-interest sometimes requires that the United States cooperate with other nations to solve global problems .
Rather , it is an argument against chasing idealistic chimeras , based on the mistaken belief that most of humankind shares U.S. values and that creating a liberal world order will therefore be easy to do .
The diplomat Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand may have been a great cynic , but he was right about at least one thing : “ Surtout , pas trop de zèle .
”

Can we talk about something else for a moment?
Although it is nearly impossible to wrest one’s mind away from COVID-19 and its implications, I’m going to give it a shot this week. I want to explore a topic that my students and I were discussing a few days ago, in a class on realist and liberal conceptions of world order. The question was whether the U.S. attempt to create a liberal world order during the brief “unipolar moment” was doomed from the start.
To be more specific: are the criticisms that I (and others) have leveled at the U.S. strategy of “liberal hegemony” really fair? Is it possible that creating a global order based on liberal values (i.e., democracy, free markets, the rule of law, individual rights, etc.) was more feasible than it now appears? Might this strategy have succeeded if U.S. leaders had been a little smarter, less arrogant, a lot more patient, and a bit luckier? Was liberal hegemony really “bound to fail,” as John Mearsheimer suggested last spring, or were there plausible courses of action that would have led to the steady expansion and deep embedding of liberal values and institutions around the world? In the unlikely event that the United States found itself in a similar position of primacy again, could it learn from its past mistakes and do better the second time around?
That the first attempt was a costly failure should be beyond dispute. Instead of advancing, democracy has been in retreat around the world for more than a decade—including in the United States itself—and U.S.-led efforts at regime change have led not to thriving democracies but to failed states and costly occupations. Hyperglobalization under U.S. auspices produced a grave financial crisis in 2008, politically painful job displacement in a number of sectors, and helped trigger a wide-ranging populist backlash. NATO enlargement helped poison relations with Russia, and policies such as dual containment in the Persian Gulf inspired anti-U.S. terrorism, including the 9/11 attacks and all the negative consequences that flowed from that event. The end result of these developments has been a partial retreat from globalization, the emergence of would-be autocrats in Hungary, Poland, and even in the United States, and revitalized authoritarianism in many other places.
Given where we are today, does it matter whether a more sophisticated version of liberal hegemony might have succeeded? In fact, this issue is of paramount importance, because plenty of people are still convinced that trying to create a U.S.-led, liberal world order was the right goal and that the United States just needs to learn from past mistakes and do it better and smarter in the future. Defenders include unrepentant hawks such as Eric Edelman and Ray Takeyh, who think what the Middle East needs is even more U.S.-led regime change, but also liberal academics such as G. John Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney, who believe the liberal order remains surprisingly resilient. Other proponents of this view are dedicated policy wonks such as Jake Sullivan, who thinks the problem is not the United States’ basic strategy but rather the fact that Americans are increasingly skeptical of it, and one sees similar impulses in the writings of Hal Brands, Peter Feaver, and other defenders of an expansive U.S. role. If former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden wins the presidential election in November—and, to be clear, I hope he does—the apostles of U.S. primacy and its “indispensable” global role will be back in the saddle, and we are likely to see at least a partial attempt to turn the clock back to the halcyon days when the United States was actively trying to create a global liberal order.
Let’s give this view the benefit of every doubt. Imagine that you could travel back in time to 1992, with full knowledge of all the mistakes that have been made since then. Then imagine that you still wanted to create a liberal world order, while avoiding all the missteps that were made over the past quarter-century. What would you do differently, and would this new approach work?
To start with the most obvious point: a smarter approach to liberal hegemony would have to be a lot more patient. In the 1990s, Americans felt they had found the magic formula for success in a globalized world—what Thomas Friedman called “DOScapital 6.0”—and that other countries couldn’t wait to become more like the United States. The wind was at the United States’ back, history was moving its way, and giving the world a healthy shove in the right direction would just accelerate the process.
This view was both self-congratulatory and naively optimistic, but one could still believe that “the arc of history bends toward justice” while acknowledging that bending the arc will take longer than one had previously thought. The United States should adopt a slow, steady, and decidedly nonmilitary approach to spreading liberal values, therefore, and recognize that it will take several decades (or more) to bear fruit. One might call this approach “liberal hegemony lite.”
In practice, liberal hegemony lite would have eschewed NATO enlargement and gone with the so-called Partnership for Peace (PfP) instead. PfP would have fostered security cooperation with the newly independent states of Eastern Europe—thereby helping strengthen their nascent democratic orders—but it would have have included Russia and fulfilled the promises U.S. officials made before the Soviet Union broke up. Relations with Moscow might still have worsened as it regained some of its former strength, but not as fast and probably not as far. Absent NATO enlargement (and the misguided U.S. attempt to nominate Ukraine for a membership action plan in 2008), it is hard to imagine matters in Ukraine would be as troubled as they are today.
With the benefit of hindsight, a wiser United States would have pursued a more measured approach to economic globalization. Reducing barriers to trade and investment improves overall economic efficiency and is generally desirable, but taking it more slowly would have given the sectors that were harmed by greater foreign competition more time to adjust. It was also a mistake to bring China into the World Trade Organization prematurely, based on the hope that it would hasten China’s transition to democracy and turn China into a “responsible stakeholder.” Instead, it just accelerated China’s emergence as a peer competitor. Our time-traveling advisor would also caution against excessive deregulation of financial markets and warn against the dangers of loose money and asset bubbles, advice that would have made the financial crisis of 2008 less likely.
Hindsight would also warn against the policy of dual containment in the Persian Gulf, the attempt to create a Western-style democracy in Afghanistan after 9/11, and the foolish decision to topple Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in 2003. A wiser United States would have taken a more measured approach to the Arab Spring, supporting Tunisia’s transition to democracy but not the forcible ouster of Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi. Instead of declaring “Assad must go” at the start of the Syrian civil war, the United States would have worked with all the interested parties (including Iran) to bring that conflict to an end quickly and with far less loss of life, even if the end result left President Bashar al-Assad in power.
In short, the United States could still have pushed for a more open, free, and essentially
liberal world order, but in a more gradual and sophisticated way. It would have given economic, diplomatic, and rhetorical support to countries that were genuinely trying to move in more liberal directions, and it could have worked harder to preserve the United States as a model that others would want to emulate. But it would have refrained from attempting vast projects of social engineering in countries where the prerequisites for stable democracy were lacking, and it would have recognized that pushing the pace was going to trigger resistance from authoritarian leaders who had no intention of giving up power voluntarily.
Had the United States pursued liberal hegemony in this manner, many of the negative repercussions that actually occurred might have been avoided. Progress toward a more liberal world order would have been slower, of course, but the forward momentum of the early 1990s might have been sustained.
Does this argument mean that liberal hegemony was the right course after all, and that a more sophisticated version should be adopted should the United States ever find itself in a position of primacy again? I don’t think so.
The flaw in the counterfactual described above should be obvious. It assumes that if policymakers in previous years had perfect knowledge of the results of their actions, then they could infallibly pick the right course of action at each critical point. Armed with perfect foresight, for example, former U.S. President George W. Bush would not have chosen to invade Iraq in 2003, or perhaps he would have devoted a lot more time and effort into preparing for the post-Saddam occupation. Yet even perfect knowledge about what went wrong would not guarantee success the second time around.
First, even when we know what mistakes to avoid, there may not be any course of action that would yield a successful outcome. The United States is very powerful, wealthy, and secure, but some tasks may simply be beyond its means and outside the limits of its understanding. Trying to use military force to transform deeply divided societies into liberal democracies seems to be one of them. Second, if the United States had taken a significantly different course of action at various critical points in the recent past, then history would have headed in a different direction and U.S. leaders would have faced a wholly different set of choices whose results could not be known in advance. In other words, the lessons drawn from events as they actually occurred may not help the United States decide what to do once history is following a different path.
Most importantly, even liberal hegemony lite entails a lot of complicated social engineering. By definition, a liberal world order is one where certain key political principles—democracy; sovereignty; low barriers to trade, investment, and travel; rule of law within multilateral institutions; and individual rights) are nearly universal. But we live in a world where these values are not universally embraced. Democracies have never been a majority, and millions of people think security, sovereignty, cultural values, national autonomy, and other political goals are more important—which means that trying to get others to embrace democracy requires considerable pressure and increases the risk of political instability. Such efforts inevitably trigger local resentments of various kinds, especially in a world where nationalism and other forms of local identity make people resentful and suspicious of even well-intentioned foreign interference.
Furthermore, the more far-reaching the changes occurring among any group of people, the more unpredictable the results will be and the more unintended consequences are bound to arise. Even progressive political change creates winners and losers, and the latter won’t necessarily accept their fates with forbearance. Instead, they may take up arms to try to regain their former positions, thereby creating the sort of resistance that helped defeat U.S. efforts to promote a liberal order in the past. Even if future policymakers avoided all of the errors made between 1992 and 2016 (to say nothing of the blunders U.S. President Donald Trump has made since then), we may be confident they will mishandle some of the unforeseen developments that are bound to arise on their watch.
The bottom line: Liberal hegemony lite might have worked slightly better than what the United States actually did, but it wouldn’t have achieved the ultimate goal of a single rules-based global liberal order. This realization is not an argument for U.S. disengagement or diplomatic passivity; the situation we are all dealing with on a daily basis today is a telling reminder that self-interest sometimes requires that the United States cooperate with other nations to solve global problems. Rather, it is an argument against chasing idealistic chimeras, based on the mistaken belief that most of humankind shares U.S. values and that creating a liberal world order will therefore be easy to do. The diplomat Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand may have been a great cynic, but he was right about at least one thing: “Surtout, pas trop de zèle.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-21--Oil Price Nosedive Continues as Trump’s Deal Fails to Deliver

The oil market ’ s unprecedented convulsions continued Tuesday , with steep falls in benchmark crudes in both New York and London a day after a historic plunge sent U.S. oil prices into negative territory for the first time ever .
The oil collapse is due almost entirely to the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent shutdown of economic activity across much of the world , which has dried up global demand for oil even as producers keep pumping out near-record volumes .
And it ’ s a reflection that U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s brokered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia , and other big oil producers to curtail production has so far done nothing to reassure the oil market—making another big agreement , or dramatic , unilateral U.S. action , increasingly likely .
How on earth did the price of U.S. oil fall to almost - $ 40 a barrel on Monday ?
The unprecedented collapse in the price of a key U.S. grade of oil is due to a combination of factors .
Oil storage space is rapidly filling up , which leaves few places to stash physical barrels of oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And the May futures contract , which fell so sharply on Monday , expires April 21—which forced traders still holding that contract to liquidate it any way they could , forcing the price ever lower .
The storage issue is particularly acute because the main terminal in Cushing , Oklahoma , is getting close to full capacity .
While it normally has a maximum capacity on paper of about 80 million barrels of oil , in reality , due to tank maintenance , it can hold closer to 73 million barrels , said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That means there is only a little over 20 million barrels of storage space left , and it could fill to the brim by the beginning of May .
Does that mean oil is literally worthless right now ?
Not quite yet .
The negative prices for oil referred to the May futures contract , which was thinly traded even during the carnage on Monday .
A more indicative measure of the true price of oil in the United States is the June futures contract , which on Monday was holding steady above @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the other global crude benchmark , Brent crude , trading in London , was also holding fairly steady on Monday because those contracts don ’ t have the same physical storage constraints as the U.S. contracts do .
That gave some market observers hope that the dramatic collapse in the May contract was more of a mirage than meaningful .
But those hopes started to fade by Tuesday .
The June contract , which had been resilient on Monday , went into freefall as well , falling more than 40 percent in pre-market @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent , down to less than $ 15 a barrel .
( Whoops : Hours later , make that down 38 percent to under $ 13 a barrel . )
Even Brent crude , which is more isolated from the vagaries of the U.S. oil market , fell almost 20 percent on Tuesday to just over $ 20 a barrel—underscoring that Monday ’ s price collapse wasn ’ t just a fluke caused by the futures market but a real indication that vaporized demand for oil will keep pushing prices lower until some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aren ’ t lower oil prices good for the U.S. economy ?
Trump was celebrating cheap gasoline just a few weeks ago .
Historically , as the world ’ s biggest oil consumer , yes .
That ’ s why Trump , like all U.S. presidents before him , had until recently been pushing Saudi Arabia and other big oil producers to pump more oil and bring prices down .
But two things are different right now .
First , over the past decade , the United States has itself become the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means that the economy in states like Texas , North Dakota , and Louisiana needs higher—not lower—oil prices to keep companies in business and payrolls intact .
U.S. oil producers have much higher production costs than rivals in the Middle East , so they need oil around $ 40 a barrel to break even .
The second big difference is due to the pandemic and the resulting shutdowns .
In normal times , cheaper oil and gasoline allow consumers to fill up their tanks a lot more cheaply , which amounts to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stimulus .
But with many parts of the U.S. economy still shut down , there ’ s often nowhere to drive even with cheap gas .
And while airlines would normally benefit from dirt-cheap oil , few planes are flying , so there ’ s no help there .
Is there any way to halt the slide in oil prices ?
There are two sides to the problem : supply and demand .
Right now , there is still way too much oil in the global market , despite a historic deal reached @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States , and other big oil producers to curtail production and put a floor under prices .
That agreement , which could remove anywhere from 9 million barrels a day to as much as 20 million barrels a day from the market , was meant to be implemented beginning in May , but that now looks too late .
As a result , big producers like Russia and Saudi Arabia are mulling making their production cuts immediately to try to slow down the rate at which global inventories fill and oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the United States—which agreed to keep monitoring the oil market situation after this month ’ s agreement—could also get together and agree on a further round of cuts to try to stop the bleeding .
Other producers , too , are cutting production more quickly—with countries like Canada , Venezuela , and Iraq already taking almost 2 million barrels a day off the market this month .
But U.S. shale producers haven ’ t yet turned off the taps .
U.S. oil production , about 13 million barrels a day in March @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last week , despite plenty of evidence of vanishing demand due to the pandemic .
That could force regulators like the Texas Railroad Commission to take more proactive steps and introduce rationing to force reluctant companies to cut supply ; the commission meets Tuesday morning to discuss taking steps it has so far been leery of implementing .
In the meantime , the United States could find a way to buy barrels of oil to slash them in the national Strategic Petroleum Reserve , which would take some pressure off commercial inventories like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ useful option still on the table for the Trump administration : tariffs on imported Saudi and Russian crude .
If implemented , tariffs would make imported oil less competitive with U.S. oil , though it would be disadvantageous for U.S. refiners that need the heavier , imported oil .
On Tuesday , Trump also signaled his desire for an oil-sector bailout , similar perhaps to the tens of billions of taxpayer dollars he ’ s given to farmers to make up for ag-market harms inflicted by his trade wars .
Ultimately , though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ find their footing , demand for crude has to make a comeback .
But that won ’ t happen until lockdowns and other measures that freeze economic activity are lifted .
Some U.S. states are planning to reopen parts of their economies as early as next week , while others are still enforcing shutdowns to limit the spread of the coronavirus .
But even with a nominal return to full activity , it ’ s not clear how quickly or how robustly oil demand will follow .
Economists who were hopeful just a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would quickly rebound in the second half of the year now expect an anemic recovery , at best .
Surveys suggest that U.S. consumers are gun-shy about resuming activities like eating out as long as the risk of the virus persists .
U.S. unemployment has skyrocketed during the pandemic , leaving many consumers with less disposable income .
And airlines have cut more than half their flights , and those that fly are nearly empty .
Apr .
21 : This article was updated to reflect the latest oil-price moves .
OPEC and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Slash Oil Output But even the unprecedented agreement ultimately reached Sunday shows there is no easy way to halt the rapid collapse in global oil demand due to the coronavirus pandemic .
Is the U.S. Also to Blame in the Oil Price War ?
Congress is accusing Saudi Arabia and Russia of waging “ economic warfare ” on the United States .
But companies in the United States , the biggest oil producer in the world , aren ’ t slowing down yet .

The oil market’s unprecedented convulsions continued Tuesday, with steep falls in benchmark crudes in both New York and London a day after a historic plunge sent U.S. oil prices into negative territory for the first time ever. The oil collapse is due almost entirely to the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent shutdown of economic activity across much of the world, which has dried up global demand for oil even as producers keep pumping out near-record volumes. And it’s a reflection that U.S. President Donald Trump’s brokered agreement this month with Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other big oil producers to curtail production has so far done nothing to reassure the oil market—making another big agreement, or dramatic, unilateral U.S. action, increasingly likely.
The oil market’s unprecedented convulsions continued Tuesday, with steep falls in benchmark crudes in both New York and London a day after a historic plunge sent U.S. oil prices into negative territory for the first time ever. The oil collapse is due almost entirely to the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent shutdown of economic activity across much of the world, which has dried up global demand for oil even as producers keep pumping out near-record volumes. And it’s a reflection that U.S. President Donald Trump’s brokered agreement this month with Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other big oil producers to curtail production has so far done nothing to reassure the oil market—making another big agreement, or dramatic, unilateral U.S. action, increasingly likely.
How on earth did the price of U.S. oil fall to almost -$40 a barrel on Monday?
The unprecedented collapse in the price of a key U.S. grade of oil is due to a combination of factors. Oil storage space is rapidly filling up, which leaves few places to stash physical barrels of oil that come out of the ground. And the May futures contract, which fell so sharply on Monday, expires April 21—which forced traders still holding that contract to liquidate it any way they could, forcing the price ever lower.
The storage issue is particularly acute because the main terminal in Cushing, Oklahoma, is getting close to full capacity. While it normally has a maximum capacity on paper of about 80 million barrels of oil, in reality, due to tank maintenance, it can hold closer to 73 million barrels, said Energy Aspects, an energy consultancy. That means there is only a little over 20 million barrels of storage space left, and it could fill to the brim by the beginning of May.
Does that mean oil is literally worthless right now?
Not quite yet. The negative prices for oil referred to the May futures contract, which was thinly traded even during the carnage on Monday. A more indicative measure of the true price of oil in the United States is the June futures contract, which on Monday was holding steady above $22 a barrel. Meanwhile, the other global crude benchmark, Brent crude, trading in London, was also holding fairly steady on Monday because those contracts don’t have the same physical storage constraints as the U.S. contracts do. That gave some market observers hope that the dramatic collapse in the May contract was more of a mirage than meaningful.
But those hopes started to fade by Tuesday. The June contract, which had been resilient on Monday, went into freefall as well, falling more than 40 percent in pre-market trading before moderating losses to about 28 percent, down to less than $15 a barrel. (Whoops: Hours later, make that down 38 percent to under $13 a barrel.) Even Brent crude, which is more isolated from the vagaries of the U.S. oil market, fell almost 20 percent on Tuesday to just over $20 a barrel—underscoring that Monday’s price collapse wasn’t just a fluke caused by the futures market but a real indication that vaporized demand for oil will keep pushing prices lower until some semblance of economic life resumes.
But aren’t lower oil prices good for the U.S. economy? Trump was celebrating cheap gasoline just a few weeks ago.
Historically, as the world’s biggest oil consumer, yes. That’s why Trump, like all U.S. presidents before him, had until recently been pushing Saudi Arabia and other big oil producers to pump more oil and bring prices down.
But two things are different right now. First, over the past decade, the United States has itself become the world’s biggest oil producer, which means that the economy in states like Texas, North Dakota, and Louisiana needs higher—not lower—oil prices to keep companies in business and payrolls intact. U.S. oil producers have much higher production costs than rivals in the Middle East, so they need oil around $40 a barrel to break even.
The second big difference is due to the pandemic and the resulting shutdowns. In normal times, cheaper oil and gasoline allow consumers to fill up their tanks a lot more cheaply, which amounts to a giant tax cut and acts as economic stimulus. But with many parts of the U.S. economy still shut down, there’s often nowhere to drive even with cheap gas. And while airlines would normally benefit from dirt-cheap oil, few planes are flying, so there’s no help there.
Is there any way to halt the slide in oil prices?
There are two sides to the problem: supply and demand. Right now, there is still way too much oil in the global market, despite a historic deal reached this month by OPEC, Russia, the United States, and other big oil producers to curtail production and put a floor under prices. That agreement, which could remove anywhere from 9 million barrels a day to as much as 20 million barrels a day from the market, was meant to be implemented beginning in May, but that now looks too late.
As a result, big producers like Russia and Saudi Arabia are mulling making their production cuts immediately to try to slow down the rate at which global inventories fill and oil prices collapse. OPEC, Russia, and the United States—which agreed to keep monitoring the oil market situation after this month’s agreement—could also get together and agree on a further round of cuts to try to stop the bleeding.
Other producers, too, are cutting production more quickly—with countries like Canada, Venezuela, and Iraq already taking almost 2 million barrels a day off the market this month. But U.S. shale producers haven’t yet turned off the taps. U.S. oil production, about 13 million barrels a day in March, was still at 12.3 million barrels last week, despite plenty of evidence of vanishing demand due to the pandemic. That could force regulators like the Texas Railroad Commission to take more proactive steps and introduce rationing to force reluctant companies to cut supply; the commission meets Tuesday morning to discuss taking steps it has so far been leery of implementing.
In the meantime, the United States could find a way to buy barrels of oil to slash them in the national Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which would take some pressure off commercial inventories like those in Cushing. Another, less useful option still on the table for the Trump administration: tariffs on imported Saudi and Russian crude. If implemented, tariffs would make imported oil less competitive with U.S. oil, though it would be disadvantageous for U.S. refiners that need the heavier, imported oil.
On Tuesday, Trump also signaled his desire for an oil-sector bailout, similar perhaps to the tens of billions of taxpayer dollars he’s given to farmers to make up for ag-market harms inflicted by his trade wars.
Ultimately, though, in order for oil prices to find their footing, demand for crude has to make a comeback. But that won’t happen until lockdowns and other measures that freeze economic activity are lifted. Some U.S. states are planning to reopen parts of their economies as early as next week, while others are still enforcing shutdowns to limit the spread of the coronavirus.
But even with a nominal return to full activity, it’s not clear how quickly or how robustly oil demand will follow. Economists who were hopeful just a month or two ago that the economy would quickly rebound in the second half of the year now expect an anemic recovery, at best. Surveys suggest that U.S. consumers are gun-shy about resuming activities like eating out as long as the risk of the virus persists. U.S. unemployment has skyrocketed during the pandemic, leaving many consumers with less disposable income. And airlines have cut more than half their flights, and those that fly are nearly empty.
Apr. 21: This article was updated to reflect the latest oil-price moves.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-21--The Coronavirus Could Upend Trump’s China Trade Deal

U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s multibillion-dollar trade deal with China could be yet another economic casualty of the spread of the novel coronavirus , according to a congressional report obtained by Foreign Policy .
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission , established by Congress two decades ago and appointed by members of both parties , said that stalled trade and depressed consumer demand in China from the virus “ raises the possibility that implementation could be disrupted , ” upending Trump ’ s efforts to end a two-year trade war with Beijing that he began in 2018 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the so-called phase one of the deal , which calls on China to buy $ 200 billion worth of U.S. energy and agricultural products , is set to move ahead as planned , even as the president himself took shots at Beijing from the White House podium over the weekend as the spread of the virus has now killed more than 40,000 Americans .
Yet China could invoke a clause in the agreement that allows for fresh trade consultations between the two countries “ in the event that a natural disaster or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of either party to verify that the clauses are being met , according to the commission report , a copy of which was obtained by Foreign Policy .
The stress to the trade deal from the coronavirus comes as Trump began to sharpen his attacks against China over the weekend amid news reports that the U.S. intelligence community is considering the possibility that the novel coronavirus may have accidentally escaped from a laboratory in Wuhan , where the first cases were detected .
Trump had said earlier this month that he ’ d @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” with China .
“ It could have been stopped in China before it started and it wasn ’ t , and the whole world is suffering because of it , ” Trump told a White House briefing on Saturday .
Trump ally Sen. Tom Cotton , an Arkansas Republican , also introduced legislation last week that would allow U.S. citizens to sue China for deaths and economic harm from the virus , and other lawmakers have called for the United States to consolidate supply chains for pharmaceuticals and other critical goods .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s role in the spread of the virus , he and his top economic advisors have offered up rosy predictions for the U.S. economy , saying the United States can quickly get back to business once the countrywide pandemic lockdowns lift .
“ I think it will be months , I definitely don ’ t think it will be years , ” Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin said of the economic recovery in an interview with CNN on Sunday .
“ Rightfully so , people are being cautious .
On the other hand , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I think we will see a big rebound.
” But the commission report offers up a smorgasbord of worrying data and statistics that point to long-term economic hardships for China—and painful knock-on effects for the rest of the global economy .
Despite the trade war , China remains the United States ’ largest trade partner , accounting for nearly $ 740 billion in trade in 2018 alone , meaning China ’ s economic hardships are likely to reverberate across the U.S. economy .
“ Because China is a global manufacturing hub , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have triggered shocks across the global economy and brought into sharp relief the risk of reliance on China as a source of intermediate and finished goods , ” the report reads .
Chinese consumer spending , a linchpin of the country ’ s economy , plummeted more than 20 percent in the first two months of 2020 compared to the same period in 2019 .
Labor shortages caused declines in production indicating “ a manufacturing contraction in February 2020 below the lowest figure seen in the 2008 financial crisis , ” the report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dropped 13.5 percent year on year— “ the largest contraction on record , ” the report says .
“ With thinner inventories , less cash on hand , and narrower supply networks , U.S. small businesses are particularly poorly insulated from supply shortfalls in China , ” it says .
The report also warns that the fallout from the coronavirus could cause deeper political rifts between the United States and China , as the Pentagon and State Department have issued repeated warnings to allies about investing in Beijing ’ s Belt and Road @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leave allies vulnerable to Chinese snooping .
China is “ falling back on state intervention ” to spur economic growth in key industries , the report says , as Beijing-backed statistics marked a 7 percent drop in the nation ’ s GDP for the first quarter .
To cut down on costs for its recovery , Chinese officials have said they ’ re targeting “ new infrastructure ” projects , such as the expansion of 5G networks that have raised alarms within the Trump administration .
There has been an increased tit-for-tat in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ narrative , as the Ohio state prison system appeared to become the latest major U.S. hotspot for the disease on Monday .
In recent weeks , China has expelled reporters from the Washington Post , the New York Times , and the Wall Street Journal , after the State Department kicked 60 journalists from Chinese state-owned outlets out of the United States .
The spread of the virus is also likely to have ripple effects on a closely linked economic relationship that extends to travel , shipping , and U.S. universities , wiping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to American businesses , as the virus has shuttered factory floors and caused shipping bottlenecks .
Trump had boasted about his administration ’ s efforts to slash the U.S. trade deficit with China in the weeks after signing the deal .
But the coronavirus could put a wrench in those plans , the commission report said , with falling Chinese student enrollment in American degree programs likely to further chip away at $ 15 billion in U.S. service industry exports to China .
“ China ’ s policymakers made a trade-off in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activity in exchange for stringent control measures to curtail the virus ’ spread , ” the report states .
“ Subsequent policy responses have been carefully sequenced and highly targeted to attempt to mitigate the disruptive effects such measures exerted on businesses.
” The overall trend indicates that the United States is likely to become stingier about keeping its supply chain out of China ’ s reach , especially in the defense industry—which Pentagon officials said on Monday will need a significant bailout in another stimulus package to offset the economic impacts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to get a renationalization of defense design and supply and manufacturing , ” Kori Schake , the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior State Department official during the George W. Bush administration , told Foreign Policy earlier this month .
“ That was probably going to happen anyway because of Chinese behavior , but it will certainly happen now .
”

U.S. President Donald Trump’s multibillion-dollar trade deal with China could be yet another economic casualty of the spread of the novel coronavirus, according to a congressional report provided exclusively to Foreign Policy .
U.S. President Donald Trump’s multibillion-dollar trade deal with China could be yet another economic casualty of the spread of the novel coronavirus, according to a congressional report provided exclusively to Foreign Policy.
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, established by Congress two decades ago and appointed by members of both parties, said that stalled trade and depressed consumer demand in China from the virus “raises the possibility that implementation could be disrupted,” upending Trump’s efforts to end a two-year trade war with Beijing that he began in 2018.
Trump administration officials and Beijing have insisted that the so-called phase one of the deal, which calls on China to buy $200 billion worth of U.S. energy and agricultural products, is set to move ahead as planned, even as the president himself took shots at Beijing from the White House podium over the weekend as the spread of the virus has now killed more than 40,000 Americans.
Yet China could invoke a clause in the agreement that allows for fresh trade consultations between the two countries “in the event that a natural disaster or other unforeseeable event” postpones the ability of either party to verify that the clauses are being met, according to the commission report, a copy of which was obtained by Foreign Policy.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
The stress to the trade deal from the coronavirus comes as Trump began to sharpen his attacks against China over the weekend amid news reports that the U.S. intelligence community is considering the possibility that the novel coronavirus may have accidentally escaped from a laboratory in Wuhan, where the first cases were detected. Trump had said earlier this month that he’d “love to have a good relationship” with China.
“It could have been stopped in China before it started and it wasn’t, and the whole world is suffering because of it,” Trump told a White House briefing on Saturday. Trump ally Sen. Tom Cotton, an Arkansas Republican, also introduced legislation last week that would allow U.S. citizens to sue China for deaths and economic harm from the virus, and other lawmakers have called for the United States to consolidate supply chains for pharmaceuticals and other critical goods.
Even as Trump has scrutinized China’s role in the spread of the virus, he and his top economic advisors have offered up rosy predictions for the U.S. economy, saying the United States can quickly get back to business once the countrywide pandemic lockdowns lift.
“I think it will be months, I definitely don’t think it will be years,” Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin said of the economic recovery in an interview with CNN on Sunday. “Rightfully so, people are being cautious. On the other hand, as we get comfortable reopening the economy, I think we will see a big rebound.”
But the commission report offers up a smorgasbord of worrying data and statistics that point to long-term economic hardships for China—and painful knock-on effects for the rest of the global economy.
Despite the trade war, China remains the United States’ largest trade partner, accounting for nearly $740 billion in trade in 2018 alone, meaning China’s economic hardships are likely to reverberate across the U.S. economy.
“Because China is a global manufacturing hub, domestic supply chain disruptions sparked by COVID-19 have triggered shocks across the global economy and brought into sharp relief the risk of reliance on China as a source of intermediate and finished goods,” the report reads.
Chinese consumer spending, a linchpin of the country’s economy, plummeted more than 20 percent in the first two months of 2020 compared to the same period in 2019. Labor shortages caused declines in production indicating “a manufacturing contraction in February 2020 below the lowest figure seen in the 2008 financial crisis,” the report says. And industrial output in China dropped 13.5 percent year on year—“the largest contraction on record,” the report says.
“With thinner inventories, less cash on hand, and narrower supply networks, U.S. small businesses are particularly poorly insulated from supply shortfalls in China,” it says.
The report also warns that the fallout from the coronavirus could cause deeper political rifts between the United States and China, as the Pentagon and State Department have issued repeated warnings to allies about investing in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and Huawei-built digital infrastructure that could leave allies vulnerable to Chinese snooping.
China is “falling back on state intervention” to spur economic growth in key industries, the report says, as Beijing-backed statistics marked a 7 percent drop in the nation’s GDP for the first quarter. To cut down on costs for its recovery, Chinese officials have said they’re targeting “new infrastructure” projects, such as the expansion of 5G networks that have raised alarms within the Trump administration.
There has been an increased tit-for-tat in the battle for control of the coronavirus narrative, as the Ohio state prison system appeared to become the latest major U.S. hotspot for the disease on Monday. In recent weeks, China has expelled reporters from the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal, after the State Department kicked 60 journalists from Chinese state-owned outlets out of the United States.
The spread of the virus is also likely to have ripple effects on a closely linked economic relationship that extends to travel, shipping, and U.S. universities, wiping away billions of dollars in Chinese investments to American businesses, as the virus has shuttered factory floors and caused shipping bottlenecks.
Trump had boasted about his administration’s efforts to slash the U.S. trade deficit with China in the weeks after signing the deal. But the coronavirus could put a wrench in those plans, the commission report said, with falling Chinese student enrollment in American degree programs likely to further chip away at $15 billion in U.S. service industry exports to China.
“China’s policymakers made a trade-off in their preliminary response to COVID-19, shelving economic activity in exchange for stringent control measures to curtail the virus’ spread,” the report states. “Subsequent policy responses have been carefully sequenced and highly targeted to attempt to mitigate the disruptive effects such measures exerted on businesses.”
The overall trend indicates that the United States is likely to become stingier about keeping its supply chain out of China’s reach, especially in the defense industry—which Pentagon officials said on Monday will need a significant bailout in another stimulus package to offset the economic impacts of the virus.
“We are going to get a renationalization of defense design and supply and manufacturing,” Kori Schake, the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior State Department official during the George W. Bush administration, told Foreign Policy earlier this month. “That was probably going to happen anyway because of Chinese behavior, but it will certainly happen now.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--U.S. Senate Passes $484 Billion Coronavirus Aid Bill

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. Senate passes a $ 484 billion coronavirus aid package , oil prices continue to drop , and the World Food Programme warns of “ biblical ” famines .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
On Tuesday afternoon , the U.S. Senate passed a $ 484 billion aid package mostly designed to reduce the strain on U.S. businesses reeling from the shock of the pandemic .
The U.S. House of Representatives is expected to pass the bill on Thursday .
The majority of funds , $ 321 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Paycheck Protection Program—business loans that can be forgiven as long as companies spend the funds on normal business costs as well as by retaining and paying employees .
What about the coronavirus ?
$ 25 billion has been allocated for coronavirus testing and a further $ 75 billion has been set aside for hospitals .
The United States has averaged just over 146,000 coronavirus tests per day during the month of April , according to the COVID Tracking Project .
Despite the big numbers , per capita testing figures put the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heavy losses from the coronavirus .
Per capita , Italy has tested twice as many residents as the United States has .
Will more stimulus follow ?
In an interview with Politico , Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said he would prefer to wait until the Senate comes back from its recess on May 4 before considering any further measures .
“ We need to see how things are working , see what needs to be corrected , and I do think that the next time we pass a coronavirus rescue bill we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ engaged , ” he said .
Oil continues to slide .
After yesterday ’ s oil rout on May futures , it was the turn of June futures to fall on Tuesday as investors continue to worry about oil demand remaining low well into the summer .
June WTI contracts fell by 43 percent on Tuesday , closing at just over $ 12 a barrel .
FP ’ s Keith Johnson explains why oil has taken such a nosedive , and explores whether there are any measures that could arrest the plunge .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ prices to find their footing , demand for crude has to make a comeback , ” he writes .
Trump to issue executive order suspending green cards .
President Trump is expected to sign an executive order today halting permanent residency approvals for 60 days .
In a climbdown from the president ’ s Monday night tweet suggesting a broad immigration suspension , temporary work visas , including those used for agricultural and tech workers , are unlikely to be affected after industry leaders pushed back against the plan .
The New York @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are still reviewing whether the president has the authority to carry out the order .
Obtaining U.S. permanent residency , or a green card , is a notoriously drawn-out process , taking many years in some cases , so the executive order is more likely to frustrate than halt that avenue of immigration .
The executive order seems to be based on an anti-immigrant ideology rather than any public health concern : In 2019 , the United States issued approximately 1,031,000 green cards ; 55 percent of those recipients were living in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Mozambique .
Islamist insurgents killed 52 people in the village of Xitaxi in northern Mozambique , according to local police .
The killings took place on April 7 , as the group attempted to recruit young villagers .
“ The young men were about to be recruited but they resisted , which provoked the ire of the bandits that killed the 52 indiscriminately , ” police spokesman Orlando Modumane said .
The province of Cabo Delgado , where the killings occurred , has seen increased attacks recently .
In March , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dennis Jett , argued that the country—led by the Mozambique Liberation Front ( Frelimo ) government—is a failed state more focused on protecting its oil revenues than its people .
“ Some of the money that does not find its way to bank accounts abroad will go toward paying for more weapons and more mercenaries to maintain Frelimo ’ s dominance , ” he wrote in FP , “ As a result , the insurgency and terrorism in the north will remain.
” World Food Programme warns of “ biblical ” famines .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ WFP ) has warned of “ multiple famines of biblical proportions ” in the coming year , with food insecurity only increasing with the economic shocks caused by the coronavirus pandemic .
Yemen , South Sudan , and Afghanistan have the highest proportion of acutely food-insecure people according to the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises report .
David Beasley , head of the WFP , urged global action at the report ’ s launch , “ I do believe that with our expertise and our partnerships , we can bring together the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certain the COVID-19 pandemic does not become a human and food crisis catastrophe , ” he said .
U.S.-China trade deal could be coronavirus casualty .
China could invoke a clause in its “ phase one ” trade deal with the United States to call for fresh trade talks , potentially upending a deal that would have seen China buy $ 200 billion of U.S. energy and agricultural products , according to a new congressional report , obtained by FP .
The report warns that sluggish trade flows and depressed Chinese consumer demand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ epidemic risk disrupting the trade deal , FP ’ s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer write .
Still no sign of Kim Jong Un .
As North Korea failed to report any appearances by its leader , the health of Kim Jong Un is still a matter of speculation .
When asked about Kim ’ s condition at a White House briefing yesterday , U.S. President Donald Trump was curt , “ I can only say this , I wish him well , ” he said .
In FP , Morten Soendergaard Larsen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coverage of Pyongyang may more be due to the media ’ s coronavirus fatigue than anything concrete , “ Whether or not the North Korean leader is dead , gravely ill , recovering , or perfectly fine is still unknown and most likely will be until anything official is released from Pyongyang , ” he writes .
Americans are increasingly negative on China .
A new survey published by the Pew Research Center reports that American attitudes toward China have stiffened over the past year : 66 percent of Americans say they hold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 6 points on the previous year .
Only 26 percent have a favorable view .
Republicans are more likely to have an unfavorable view than Democrats , although the difference is slim : 72 percent of Republicans have an unfavorable opinion on China , and 62 percent of Democrats do .
The numbers suggest that attacks on China will become a prominent fixture in the 2020 presidential race : On Sunday the Biden campaign released an ad alleging President Trump “ rolled over for the Chinese ” on its coronavirus response and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the former vice president as “ Beijing Biden.
” Companies that want you to stay at home continue to reap the benefits of worldwide lockdown measures .
On Tuesday , the streaming platform Netflix announced it had added almost 16 million new subscribers to its service in the first quarter of 2020 , bringing its total user base to more than 180 million .
It ’ s not all rosy for Netflix , as production on future projects has largely been put on hold due to the coronavirus pandemic .
The platform also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which now has over 50 million subscribers .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Senate passes a $484 billion coronavirus aid package , oil prices continue to drop, and the World Food Programme warns of “biblical” famines .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Senate passes a $484 billion coronavirus aid package, oil prices continue to drop, and the World Food Programme warns of “biblical” famines.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S. Senate Passes $484 Billion Coronavirus Aid Package It’s a sign of how dire the U.S. economy is looking that a new spending bill amounting to roughly half of the 2008 financial crisis bailout package now looks small.
On Tuesday afternoon, the U.S. Senate passed a $484 billion aid package mostly designed to reduce the strain on U.S. businesses reeling from the shock of the pandemic. The U.S. House of Representatives is expected to pass the bill on Thursday.
The majority of funds, $321 billion, go into replenishing the overwhelmed Paycheck Protection Program—business loans that can be forgiven as long as companies spend the funds on normal business costs as well as by retaining and paying employees.
What about the coronavirus? $25 billion has been allocated for coronavirus testing and a further $75 billion has been set aside for hospitals. The United States has averaged just over 146,000 coronavirus tests per day during the month of April, according to the COVID Tracking Project.
Despite the big numbers, per capita testing figures put the United States far behind other countries that have suffered heavy losses from the coronavirus. Per capita, Italy has tested twice as many residents as the United States has.
Will more stimulus follow? In an interview with Politico, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said he would prefer to wait until the Senate comes back from its recess on May 4 before considering any further measures. “We need to see how things are working, see what needs to be corrected, and I do think that the next time we pass a coronavirus rescue bill we need to have everyone here and everyone engaged,” he said.
What We’re Following Today
Oil continues to slide. After yesterday’s oil rout on May futures, it was the turn of June futures to fall on Tuesday as investors continue to worry about oil demand remaining low well into the summer. June WTI contracts fell by 43 percent on Tuesday, closing at just over $12 a barrel. FP’s Keith Johnson explains why oil has taken such a nosedive, and explores whether there are any measures that could arrest the plunge. “Ultimately … in order for oil prices to find their footing, demand for crude has to make a comeback,” he writes.
Trump to issue executive order suspending green cards. President Trump is expected to sign an executive order today halting permanent residency approvals for 60 days. In a climbdown from the president’s Monday night tweet suggesting a broad immigration suspension, temporary work visas, including those used for agricultural and tech workers, are unlikely to be affected after industry leaders pushed back against the plan. The New York Times reports that U.S. Justice Department lawyers are still reviewing whether the president has the authority to carry out the order.
Obtaining U.S. permanent residency, or a green card, is a notoriously drawn-out process, taking many years in some cases, so the executive order is more likely to frustrate than halt that avenue of immigration. The executive order seems to be based on an anti-immigrant ideology rather than any public health concern: In 2019, the United States issued approximately 1,031,000 green cards; 55 percent of those recipients were living in the United States already.
Islamists kill 52 in Mozambique. Islamist insurgents killed 52 people in the village of Xitaxi in northern Mozambique, according to local police. The killings took place on April 7, as the group attempted to recruit young villagers. “The young men were about to be recruited but they resisted, which provoked the ire of the bandits that killed the 52 indiscriminately,” police spokesman Orlando Modumane said. The province of Cabo Delgado, where the killings occurred, has seen increased attacks recently.
In March, a former U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique, Dennis Jett, argued that the country—led by the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) government—is a failed state more focused on protecting its oil revenues than its people. “Some of the money that does not find its way to bank accounts abroad will go toward paying for more weapons and more mercenaries to maintain Frelimo’s dominance,” he wrote in FP, “As a result, the insurgency and terrorism in the north will remain.”
World Food Programme warns of “biblical” famines. The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has warned of “multiple famines of biblical proportions” in the coming year, with food insecurity only increasing with the economic shocks caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Yemen, South Sudan, and Afghanistan have the highest proportion of acutely food-insecure people according to the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises report. David Beasley, head of the WFP, urged global action at the report’s launch, “I do believe that with our expertise and our partnerships, we can bring together the teams and the programs necessary to make certain the COVID-19 pandemic does not become a human and food crisis catastrophe,” he said.
Keep an Eye On
U.S.-China trade deal could be coronavirus casualty. China could invoke a clause in its “phase one” trade deal with the United States to call for fresh trade talks, potentially upending a deal that would have seen China buy $200 billion of U.S. energy and agricultural products, according to a new congressional report, obtained by FP. The report warns that sluggish trade flows and depressed Chinese consumer demand as the country emerges from its coronavirus epidemic risk disrupting the trade deal, FP’s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer write.
Still no sign of Kim Jong Un. As North Korea failed to report any appearances by its leader, the health of Kim Jong Un is still a matter of speculation. When asked about Kim’s condition at a White House briefing yesterday, U.S. President Donald Trump was curt, “I can only say this, I wish him well,” he said.
In FP, Morten Soendergaard Larsen reports from Seoul on why the breathless coverage of Pyongyang may more be due to the media’s coronavirus fatigue than anything concrete, “Whether or not the North Korean leader is dead, gravely ill, recovering, or perfectly fine is still unknown and most likely will be until anything official is released from Pyongyang,” he writes.
Americans are increasingly negative on China. A new survey published by the Pew Research Center reports that American attitudes toward China have stiffened over the past year: 66 percent of Americans say they hold an unfavorable view of China, up 6 points on the previous year. Only 26 percent have a favorable view. Republicans are more likely to have an unfavorable view than Democrats, although the difference is slim: 72 percent of Republicans have an unfavorable opinion on China, and 62 percent of Democrats do.
The numbers suggest that attacks on China will become a prominent fixture in the 2020 presidential race: On Sunday the Biden campaign released an ad alleging President Trump “rolled over for the Chinese” on its coronavirus response and a pro-Trump super PAC has attempted to tar the former vice president as “Beijing Biden.”
Odds and Ends
Companies that want you to stay at home continue to reap the benefits of worldwide lockdown measures. On Tuesday, the streaming platform Netflix announced it had added almost 16 million new subscribers to its service in the first quarter of 2020, bringing its total user base to more than 180 million. It’s not all rosy for Netflix, as production on future projects has largely been put on hold due to the coronavirus pandemic. The platform also faces stiff competition from newcomer Disney+, which now has over 50 million subscribers.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--After Coronavirus, Terrorism Won’t Be the Same

After Coronavirus , Terrorism Won ’ t Be the Same As the coronavirus pandemic has spread , terrorist groups have reacted in different ways .
Traditional terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and al Qaeda and its many affiliates are for the most part confused in their response to COVID-19 .
Some see chaos that they can take advantage of ( in places such as West Africa ) , others divine retribution on nonbelievers ( as the Islamic State and the Turkistan Islamic Party , a Uighur group , have suggested ) , while others an opportunity to show @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban and Hezbollah ) .
Governments have redeployed some counterterrorism capabilities to support the coronavirus response while contorting legal definitions of terrorism to prosecute people committing antisocial acts such as coughing on others .
So far , the number of acts that could reasonably be called terrorism have been quite limited .
It is for the most part generic anti-establishmentarianism fed by conspiracy theories .
Fear of 5G technology being linked to the spread of the disease has led to the burnings of cell-phone towers across Europe .
In the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bomb plan targeting a Kansas City , Kansas , hospital preparing for virus response and an attempt to derail a train in the Port of Los Angeles shipyard .
Some more enterprising jihadis have sought to weaponize the coronavirus , while the extreme right wing has largely only talked about doing it .
These acts have a unifying theme .
Like most terrorism , they are fundamentally acts of revolt against the established order .
In the United States there is a rich tradition of anti-government activity , drawing on a broader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American body politic .
Oklahoma City just marked the 25th anniversary of Timothy McVeigh ’ s attack on the Alfred P. Murrah building in 1995 that led to 168 deaths .
McVeigh emerged from a broader U.S. movement called “ Patriots ” by federal investigators , who had long worried about these extreme libertarians ’ potential for violence and their propensity for gathering lots of weapons .
More recently , this movement has expressed itself through sovereign citizen groups , which reject federal regulations and target police .
For those whose mindset is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the massive expansion of the state that follows a national crisis like a pandemic outbreak will be a concern .
For such individuals , the fear is as much about expansion of the state as it is distrust in government ’ s activity in general .
Some expressions of this anger are already visible in places such as Michigan , Kentucky , and North Carolina .
This sense of disenfranchisement is further exacerbated thanks to the growing distrust that is visible in government globally .
Given the propensity of leaders to publicly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collective faith in government is being eroded .
Various criminal organizations have spotted this and sought to offer themselves as alternatives .
Terrorist groups such as Hezbollah , the Taliban , and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham that control pieces of territory have used the chaos to showcase their own public health capabilities , as thin as they are .
Criminal groups in Brazil , El Salvador , and Mexico are seeking to display their power and resources .
These moves are not particularly altruistic , however , with most groups undertaking them out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minds they could win through these acts .
Others on the fringes are taking this distrust to its violent extreme , and their number is likely to increase over time .
The current COVID-19 response is going to expand the presence of the state , draw attention to inequalities that will be exacerbated in the post-coronavirus economy , and ultimately highlight the budget-tightening that is going to have to follow .
Some may fear big government , but others will instead grow angry if it is not seen to be dealing with their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open up narratives ripe for exploitation by anti-government factions , racist groups , political extremists of every type , and extremist Luddites or other fringe groups .
The growing army of the disenfranchised will create a community of those who are open to placing the blame on someone else .
In the West there has been a growing push to blame China—something that is happening among senior officials ( such as Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger and Sen. Ted Cruz in the United States or the heads of the parliamentary defense and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and increasingly in the general population in countries where the tone of anti-Chinese sentiment is growing .
This anger is also straining existing social tensions around migrants , something visible in the nasty racist tinge that colors a lot of COVID-19 discourse .
Unfortunately , once anti-Chinese sentiment catches on among the general public , it tends to be less discerning—resulting in abuse and violence toward all those who appear to be of East Asian ethnicity .
And while hate crimes do not always equate to terrorism , they are often a precursor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crimes produce provide fodder to those who are prone to violence to act out on their nasty impulses , as well as providing a rich environment for groups seeking to advance divisive ideologies .
Once anti-Chinese sentiment catches on among the general public , it results in abuse and violence toward all those who appear to be of East Asian ethnicity .
This problem is not exclusive to the West .
In Indonesia , researchers have warned of a growing tension toward Chinese nationals within the country .
This draws on a rich @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the country—in part stemming from historical ethnic tensions , but more recently being exacerbated by Beijing ’ s treatment of its Muslim Uighur minority .
There have even been warnings of this sentiment resulting in terrorism against Chinese residents of Indonesia , with a cell reported as having discussed targeting Chinese workers .
This might lay the foundations for a more violent expression of anti-Chinese terrorism in Southeast Asia .
Chinese relations with Southeast Asia are often strained , and there are other expressions of anger against China more generally at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an online spat with China when young Thais took umbrage at Chinese online warriors attacking prominent Thai actors for expressing views in solidarity with Taiwan and Hong Kong .
The resulting “ milk tea alliance ” —so called because people in the countries are generally fans of sweet milk tea—has angered Beijing and dragged in the local embassy to express the usual Chinese anger at others recognizing the independence of places Beijing sees as part of China .
In Kazakhstan , a post on the Chinese internet that appeared to suggest that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drew enough ire to prompt the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs to haul in the Chinese ambassador and demand an apology .
In neighboring Kyrgyzstan , anti-Chinese sentiment coalesced around the idea of Chinese nationals being spreaders of the disease and has seen a member of parliament make statements about how Chinese citizens should be avoided .
None of this is terrorism , of course , but there is a clearer focus of public anger toward China .
As China becomes a more dominant player in world affairs , it will increasingly become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part driven by Beijing ’ s treatment of minorities at home .
This could crystallize into attacks on Chinese nationals or companies .
At the even darker fringes , even the 5G telephone pole-burning phenomenon might be a prelude to something else .
The Luddites were a group of textile workers in the U.K. who emerged in the 19th centur .
They were known for violently protesting as technology developed that was slowly displacing their jobs .
In more modern times , Ted Kaczynski , better known as the Unabomber , carried forward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two-decade-long bombing campaign that culminated in the publication of his manifesto , “ Industrial Society and Its Future ” —a screed about how modern technology was eroding personal freedoms .
Today , the rapid shift to online work by a growing proportion of workers is going to dramatically accelerate in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic .
Companies are shrinking volumes of staff and trying to work more online or remotely .
Things that were previously done in person are now migrating online .
Having been made redundant by online tools , disgruntled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mobilize a backlash .
While many will return to working in the ways they did before the crisis , a surprisingly high number might find their work pattern permanently altered or face redundancy as a result of the cost savings that companies now see they can make while still achieving the same result .
This might create an angry movement that draws together disgruntled ex-workers using the very tools that they are angry about for displacing them .
Having been made redundant by online tools , they could very well repurpose them to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the spaces where government is perceived to have failed or where people feel they are being excluded from the system .
The pandemic is likely to lower people ’ s sense of trust in authority even further .
The result will be increased problems from those who turn angry enough to want to use violence to articulate their grievances .
The world has already seen a failure in international cooperation when it comes to responding to the coronavirus , and while there have been innumerable acts of kindness between citizens , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will follow will create new forms of political violence .
Some will draw on long-standing ideologies and groups , while others will emerge in surprising ways .
Terrorism will not end in the wake of the coronavirus ; instead , it is likely to evolve in ever more extreme ways .

As the coronavirus pandemic has spread, terrorist groups have reacted in different ways.
Traditional terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and al Qaeda and its many affiliates are for the most part confused in their response to COVID-19. Some see chaos that they can take advantage of (in places such as West Africa), others divine retribution on nonbelievers (as the Islamic State and the Turkistan Islamic Party, a Uighur group, have suggested), while others an opportunity to show their governance capabilities (such as the Taliban and Hezbollah). Governments have redeployed some counterterrorism capabilities to support the coronavirus response while contorting legal definitions of terrorism to prosecute people committing antisocial acts such as coughing on others.
So far, the number of acts that could reasonably be called terrorism have been quite limited. It is for the most part generic anti-establishmentarianism fed by conspiracy theories. Fear of 5G technology being linked to the spread of the disease has led to the burnings of cell-phone towers across Europe.
In the United States, fear of big government has resulted in a bomb plan targeting a Kansas City, Kansas, hospital preparing for virus response and an attempt to derail a train in the Port of Los Angeles shipyard. Some more enterprising jihadis have sought to weaponize the coronavirus, while the extreme right wing has largely only talked about doing it.
These acts have a unifying theme. Like most terrorism, they are fundamentally acts of revolt against the established order. In the United States there is a rich tradition of anti-government activity, drawing on a broader narrative of libertarianism than runs through the American body politic.
Oklahoma City just marked the 25th anniversary of Timothy McVeigh’s attack on the Alfred P. Murrah building in 1995 that led to 168 deaths. McVeigh emerged from a broader U.S. movement called “Patriots” by federal investigators, who had long worried about these extreme libertarians’ potential for violence and their propensity for gathering lots of weapons. More recently, this movement has expressed itself through sovereign citizen groups, which reject federal regulations and target police.
For those whose mindset is shaped by this history of anti-government activity, the massive expansion of the state that follows a national crisis like a pandemic outbreak will be a concern. For such individuals, the fear is as much about expansion of the state as it is distrust in government’s activity in general. Some expressions of this anger are already visible in places such as Michigan, Kentucky, and North Carolina.
This sense of disenfranchisement is further exacerbated thanks to the growing distrust that is visible in government globally. Given the propensity of leaders to publicly utter untruths or half-truths, citizens’ collective faith in government is being eroded. Various criminal organizations have spotted this and sought to offer themselves as alternatives.
Terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, the Taliban, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham that control pieces of territory have used the chaos to showcase their own public health capabilities, as thin as they are. Criminal groups in Brazil, El Salvador, and Mexico are seeking to display their power and resources. These moves are not particularly altruistic, however, with most groups undertaking them out of recognition of the battle for hearts and minds they could win through these acts.
Others on the fringes are taking this distrust to its violent extreme, and their number is likely to increase over time. The current COVID-19 response is going to expand the presence of the state, draw attention to inequalities that will be exacerbated in the post-coronavirus economy, and ultimately highlight the budget-tightening that is going to have to follow. Some may fear big government, but others will instead grow angry if it is not seen to be dealing with their problems and concerns. These fissures all open up narratives ripe for exploitation by anti-government factions, racist groups, political extremists of every type, and extremist Luddites or other fringe groups.
The growing army of the disenfranchised will create a community of those who are open to placing the blame on someone else. In the West there has been a growing push to blame China—something that is happening among senior officials (such as Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger and Sen. Ted Cruz in the United States or the heads of the parliamentary defense and foreign select committees in the U.K.) and increasingly in the general population in countries where the tone of anti-Chinese sentiment is growing. This anger is also straining existing social tensions around migrants, something visible in the nasty racist tinge that colors a lot of COVID-19 discourse.
Unfortunately, once anti-Chinese sentiment catches on among the general public, it tends to be less discerning—resulting in abuse and violence toward all those who appear to be of East Asian ethnicity. And while hate crimes do not always equate to terrorism, they are often a precursor to it. The intercommunal tensions hate crimes produce provide fodder to those who are prone to violence to act out on their nasty impulses, as well as providing a rich environment for groups seeking to advance divisive ideologies.
Once anti-Chinese sentiment catches on among the general public, it results in abuse and violence toward all those who appear to be of East Asian ethnicity.
This problem is not exclusive to the West. In Indonesia, researchers have warned of a growing tension toward Chinese nationals within the country. This draws on a rich seam of anger toward China more generally in the country—in part stemming from historical ethnic tensions, but more recently being exacerbated by Beijing’s treatment of its Muslim Uighur minority. There have even been warnings of this sentiment resulting in terrorism against Chinese residents of Indonesia, with a cell reported as having discussed targeting Chinese workers. This might lay the foundations for a more violent expression of anti-Chinese terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Chinese relations with Southeast Asia are often strained, and there are other expressions of anger against China more generally at the moment as well. Thailand became embroiled in an online spat with China when young Thais took umbrage at Chinese online warriors attacking prominent Thai actors for expressing views in solidarity with Taiwan and Hong Kong. The resulting “milk tea alliance”—so called because people in the countries are generally fans of sweet milk tea—has angered Beijing and dragged in the local embassy to express the usual Chinese anger at others recognizing the independence of places Beijing sees as part of China.
In Kazakhstan, a post on the Chinese internet that appeared to suggest that Kazakhstan wanted to become part of China drew enough ire to prompt the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs to haul in the Chinese ambassador and demand an apology. In neighboring Kyrgyzstan, anti-Chinese sentiment coalesced around the idea of Chinese nationals being spreaders of the disease and has seen a member of parliament make statements about how Chinese citizens should be avoided.
None of this is terrorism, of course, but there is a clearer focus of public anger toward China. As China becomes a more dominant player in world affairs, it will increasingly become a target, something that is in part driven by Beijing’s treatment of minorities at home. This could crystallize into attacks on Chinese nationals or companies.
At the even darker fringes, even the 5G telephone pole-burning phenomenon might be a prelude to something else. The Luddites were a group of textile workers in the U.K. who emerged in the 19th centur. They were known for violently protesting as technology developed that was slowly displacing their jobs. In more modern times, Ted Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, carried forward the Luddite mantle by leading an almost two-decade-long bombing campaign that culminated in the publication of his manifesto, “Industrial Society and Its Future”—a screed about how modern technology was eroding personal freedoms.
Today, the rapid shift to online work by a growing proportion of workers is going to dramatically accelerate in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. Companies are shrinking volumes of staff and trying to work more online or remotely. Things that were previously done in person are now migrating online.
Having been made redundant by online tools, disgruntled ex-workers could very well repurpose them to mobilize a backlash.
While many will return to working in the ways they did before the crisis, a surprisingly high number might find their work pattern permanently altered or face redundancy as a result of the cost savings that companies now see they can make while still achieving the same result. This might create an angry movement that draws together disgruntled ex-workers using the very tools that they are angry about for displacing them. Having been made redundant by online tools, they could very well repurpose them to mobilize a backlash.
Terrorism often emerges in the spaces where government is perceived to have failed or where people feel they are being excluded from the system. The pandemic is likely to lower people’s sense of trust in authority even further. The result will be increased problems from those who turn angry enough to want to use violence to articulate their grievances.
The world has already seen a failure in international cooperation when it comes to responding to the coronavirus, and while there have been innumerable acts of kindness between citizens, the larger sense of anger and disenfranchisement that will follow will create new forms of political violence. Some will draw on long-standing ideologies and groups, while others will emerge in surprising ways. Terrorism will not end in the wake of the coronavirus; instead, it is likely to evolve in ever more extreme ways.