foreignpolicy--2020-07-13--Modi’s Slide Toward Autocracy

Modi’s Slide Toward Autocracy

To understand how far Modi has bent the system , it ’ s critical to trace its origins as a reaction against British colonialism and an attempt to create a new , unified nation .
The democracy was founded along secular lines that set aside both India ’ s historical caste system and religious divisions to create a state in which all citizens would hold equal legal standing .
India would be equally the home of the low-caste Dalit Hindu , the high-caste Brahmin Hindu , the Buddhist , the Bengali , the Punjabi , the Tamil , the white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there , the Muslim , the Sikh , or , indeed , the atheist .
Each would be respected as an individual , but also each community would be given a degree of guaranteed representation at the state and federal level .
This social contract would be underpinned by a mixed-economy social democratic model where all levels and corners of society would gain from the social order and have a stake in it .
The idealistic framing descended from the Congress party ’ s liberal critique of the economic and political injustices of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with its discriminatory practices , high-handed administration , and violent suppression of dissent .
British power had been based on divide and rule to the extent that ethnicities were classified as “ martial ” or “ non-martial ” depending on their perceived loyalty in the 1857 uprising .
Indian power thus had to be based on unity .
It was not a typical form of nationalism .
But what other kind of nationalism could possibly appeal across such a large and diverse country ?
For the purposes of bureaucratic administration , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hindu ” as an overarching religious category .
Any Indian who was not a Muslim or one of the other readily identifiable religious traditions was labeled as part of the same “ indigenous ” group .
The “ Hindus ” included ethnic identities such as aboriginal Adivasi woodlands dwellers who could draw their descent in the land for tens of thousands of years , earlier than Homo sapiens had even arrived in Europe ; Indo-European Vedic peoples who migrated to the region some 3,000-3,500 years ago ; and even Zoroastrian Parsis and old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sought to create a single box to hold most of the inhabitants of a landmass the size of Europe , they developed a frame that would have consequences .
Islam was a religion that had originated outside India .
So for an Indian who opposed foreign imperial administration , and yearned for an independent government of local Indians , the British unintentionally provided a label : Hinduism .
As the Indian independence movement progressed , it developed two models of an independent India .
The Congress party believed it would be possible to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set aside and the new economy sought to improve the lot of the poorest .
At the same time , some strands of Hindu nationalism began taking a sectarian approach .
India could be unified only when all foreign influences were removed .
This saw the development of the Arya Samaj , a new syncretic religious tradition that introduced European-style monotheism and proselytizing to Hinduism in the 1870s .
The Arya Samaj laid the foundations for attempts to define “ Hindu-ness ” by a cadre of nationalist thinkers through the following decades .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the explicit articulation of an exclusionary notion of Hindu-ness and Hindu nationalism in a 1923 pamphlet called “ Essentials of Hindutva ” ( later retitled “ Hindutva : Who Is a Hindu ?
” ) by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar .
This duly formed the ideological basis for the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh ( RSS ) , founded two years later , arguing that an independent India should be a state for Hindus ( and Buddhists ) .
This split within the independence movement would lead to the young democracy ’ s original @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to this day .
Less than half a year after India won its independence from the British , Gandhi was assassinated by a member of the RSS who was angry that the constitution of the Indian state was to be inclusive of Muslims and Anglo-Indians .
Earlier iterations of the party found a small foothold , briefly ruling in the 1970s and slowly gaining some support nationally and in individual states during the 1980s , but it wasn ’ t until the emergence of Modi in the 2000s that the party became a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power nationally , Modi was chief minister of Gujarat state , which had a history of intercommunal violence that was often exploited for political gains by local politicians .
Modi was no exception .
In February 2002 , Modi declared that an attack on a train at Godhra was not related to communal violence but instead was an act of terrorism—implying that it had been carried out by Pakistani intelligence services .
A pogrom followed , with Hindu mobs killing hundreds of Muslims in well-organized and exceptionally brutal campaigns .
The Gujarat administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the violence or forced to flee to refugee camps .
The Indian Supreme Court eventually determined Modi was not responsible for directly instigating the violence ( though lawyers have argued that evidence was suppressed ) .
But for many years Modi and other BJP politicians have boasted about taming “ the enemy within ” and taunted Muslims for their supposed involvement in terrorism and sympathy for Pakistan .
His words were so strong that he was briefly subject to travel bans from the United States , Britain , and some European nations and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2005 .
The intervening years have only seen Modi strengthen his anti-Islam stance , helping to entrench Islamophobia among an eager audience .
In effect , he has taken the underlying ideology of the RSS and folded it into the government through laws that adversely affect Muslims .
Such efforts reached an apex in advance of the 2019 elections , when Modi engaged in large-scale voter suppression , removing an estimated 120 million eligible voters from the electoral roll by demanding documentation to prove residency .
The aim was to erase religious groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hindutva ideology , leading to the removal of some 70 million Muslims and Dalits .
In clearing the rolls , Modi played the odds , gambling that a combination of voter suppression of minorities and gaining the votes of the Hindu majority would be enough to guarantee electoral success .
This represented an expansion of the voter suppression in Assam in the 2016 state elections .
There , the BJP tried to bar Muslim immigrants who had arrived from neighboring Bangladesh between 1951 and 1971 , rebranding them as refugees .
Modi has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to have their “ bags packed ” and be ready to go “ back home.
” After its national election victory in 2019 , the BJP continued to expel what it called “ illegal infiltrators ” while placing others in detention camps .
Close to 2 million Muslim Indians are now subject to the whims of the state and federal executives , and at least some of them can probably look forward to forced deportations in the future .
Elsewhere , Modi has taken even more extreme steps to control Muslim populations .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ status of Jammu and Kashmir , the only region in India that has a majority of Muslims .
Within India , Kashmir had the unique right to define who was entitled to live there .
This status mattered as only those registered could own land and it gave privileged access to education and employment—something that allowed it to maintain a measure of protection for its Muslim population—an autonomy the BJP had long opposed .
Today , it remains under a state of intense control and occupation .
Modi has chosen this moment to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but also knowing he has the tacit ( if not active ) support of the United States , which has been silent on Kashmir .
Modi has linked his moves to Russia ’ s annexation of Crimea and the Trump administration ’ s support for Israel ’ s annexation of the Golan Heights , as , in his view , all he is doing is integrating a core part of India into the wider polity .
Modi ’ s linkage of his actions in Kashmir to other authoritarian regimes and those where democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If in the 1930s his predecessors courted Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini , Modi today has the support of the new global far-right .
His insistence that there is a difference between real Indians and others has gained the support of former White House strategist Steve Bannon , who sees his approach as part of the wider far-right movement .
In particular , his linkage of being part of the acceptable polity to being part of an identifiable religious group is a common feature to many of the emerging authoritarian regimes .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the preferred group is Russian Orthodox or Hungarian Catholic Christians or Myanmar ’ s Buddhists .
In India , the social contract underlying the very state is cracking up , and this is by design .
Modi and the BJP are waging a full-frontal assault on the Indian Constitution and the ideal of liberal , secular democracy that underpins it .
Flare-ups of tension and violence will continue to be a feature of Indian political life until some kind of resolution is arrived at .
Limiting democracy in this manner is a hallmark @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regimes .
But as Modi ’ s fellow travelers in Hungary , Brazil , Russia , the United States , and the U.K. are finding , even a “ managed , ” constricted democracy can be difficult to control .
At the moment , Modi ’ s popularity remains extremely high , with polls like Morning Consult putting him above 75 percent approval rating .
But such polls can be unreliable , and dissatisfaction among India ’ s growing pool of young voters is rising .
The BJP has started to face sustained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and its poor handling of the coronavirus crisis ( a failing the BJP shares with the other authoritarian nationalist governments ) .
And while a significant portion of the Hindu majority has come along for the ride with the BJP , a large number are concerned by its all-too-blatant attacks on India ’ s secular values .
The recent Hindu-dominated large-scale protests against the new citizenship laws and citizen registers targeting Muslims hint at how the political tide could turn against the Hindu Rashtra , or nation .
It is too early to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the battleground for this conflict is the very soul of India .
And the stake is the future of democracy in the country .
This presents Modi with a problem .
He can accept an ebbing of his electoral support as part of the dynamics of a functioning democracy .
But that assumes the BJP is a normal political party , able to share the same democratic space as contending movements .
It is not—its goals exclude different conceptions of what India is about .
At the moment , as in other states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system still exist and limit the prime minister ’ s scope to move in a more openly authoritarian direction .
However , most likely he will still try , drawing inspiration from how Viktor Orban has been able to create what is in effect a dictatorship in Hungary .
To achieve this , Modi will need an apparent crisis that justifies a shift to open authoritarianism .
This should worry everyone—the traditional source of major crises for India is either internal ethnic unrest or war with its neighbors .

When Narendra Modi was elected prime minister in 2014, India reached a crucial milestone for a postcolonial democracy: Modi became the first leader since independence to command a lower house parliamentary majority that did not belong to the Congress party of India’s founders Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. After 65 years, a dynastic founding party was subsumed by new blood. But in the six years since Modi won his first election, it has become clear that his style of leadership poses an existential threat to the world’s largest democracy. Through his wildly successful promotion of Hindutva ideology, Modi is poised to remake India into a Russian-style “managed democracy”—one retaining all the trappings of democracy while operating as a de facto autocracy.
To understand how far Modi has bent the system, it’s critical to trace its origins as a reaction against British colonialism and an attempt to create a new, unified nation. The democracy was founded along secular lines that set aside both India’s historical caste system and religious divisions to create a state in which all citizens would hold equal legal standing. India would be equally the home of the low-caste Dalit Hindu, the high-caste Brahmin Hindu, the Buddhist, the Bengali, the Punjabi, the Tamil, the white Englishman who had been born and raised there, the Muslim, the Sikh, or, indeed, the atheist.
Each would be respected as an individual, but also each community would be given a degree of guaranteed representation at the state and federal level. This social contract would be underpinned by a mixed-economy social democratic model where all levels and corners of society would gain from the social order and have a stake in it.
The idealistic framing descended from the Congress party’s liberal critique of the economic and political injustices of the imperial administration of the British Raj, with its discriminatory practices, high-handed administration, and violent suppression of dissent. British power had been based on divide and rule to the extent that ethnicities were classified as “martial” or “non-martial” depending on their perceived loyalty in the 1857 uprising. Indian power thus had to be based on unity. It was not a typical form of nationalism. But what other kind of nationalism could possibly appeal across such a large and diverse country?
Modi waves to a crowd in Varanasi, India, on March 4, 2017, while paying tribute to the Hindutva ideologue Madan Mohan Malaviya.
For the purposes of bureaucratic administration, the British offered their own construction of “Hindu” as an overarching religious category. Any Indian who was not a Muslim or one of the other readily identifiable religious traditions was labeled as part of the same “indigenous” group. The “Hindus” included ethnic identities such as aboriginal Adivasi woodlands dwellers who could draw their descent in the land for tens of thousands of years, earlier than Homo sapiens had even arrived in Europe; Indo-European Vedic peoples who migrated to the region some 3,000-3,500 years ago; and even Zoroastrian Parsis and old communities of Jews. As the British sought to create a single box to hold most of the inhabitants of a landmass the size of Europe, they developed a frame that would have consequences. Islam was a religion that had originated outside India. So for an Indian who opposed foreign imperial administration, and yearned for an independent government of local Indians, the British unintentionally provided a label: Hinduism.
As the Indian independence movement progressed, it developed two models of an independent India. The Congress party believed it would be possible to unify India only if religious differences were set aside and the new economy sought to improve the lot of the poorest. At the same time, some strands of Hindu nationalism began taking a sectarian approach. India could be unified only when all foreign influences were removed. This saw the development of the Arya Samaj, a new syncretic religious tradition that introduced European-style monotheism and proselytizing to Hinduism in the 1870s. The Arya Samaj laid the foundations for attempts to define “Hindu-ness” by a cadre of nationalist thinkers through the following decades. And the movement came into its own with the explicit articulation of an exclusionary notion of Hindu-ness and Hindu nationalism in a 1923 pamphlet called “Essentials of Hindutva” (later retitled “Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?”) by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. This duly formed the ideological basis for the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded two years later, arguing that an independent India should be a state for Hindus (and Buddhists).
This split within the independence movement would lead to the young democracy’s original sin, one whose aftershocks are felt to this day. Less than half a year after India won its independence from the British, Gandhi was assassinated by a member of the RSS who was angry that the constitution of the Indian state was to be inclusive of Muslims and Anglo-Indians.
Modi (center), at the time chief minister of the western Indian state of Gujarat, flashes a victory sign during a march in the village of Faghval, India, on Sept. 8, 2002.
Today, the RSS is more powerful than ever. Modi cut his teeth in sectarian politics as a member of the RSS, and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is one of a number of RSS offshoot organizations. Ideology is critical to its success. When the BJP stands for elections, it does not merely stand against other parties on policy grounds. It stands to challenge the secular constitutional order on which the Indian Republic was founded.
Earlier iterations of the party found a small foothold, briefly ruling in the 1970s and slowly gaining some support nationally and in individual states during the 1980s, but it wasn’t until the emergence of Modi in the 2000s that the party became a national political force.
Before coming to power nationally, Modi was chief minister of Gujarat state, which had a history of intercommunal violence that was often exploited for political gains by local politicians. Modi was no exception. In February 2002, Modi declared that an attack on a train at Godhra was not related to communal violence but instead was an act of terrorism—implying that it had been carried out by Pakistani intelligence services. A pogrom followed, with Hindu mobs killing hundreds of Muslims in well-organized and exceptionally brutal campaigns. The Gujarat administration did little to help those affected by the violence or forced to flee to refugee camps.
The Indian Supreme Court eventually determined Modi was not responsible for directly instigating the violence (though lawyers have argued that evidence was suppressed). But for many years Modi and other BJP politicians have boasted about taming “the enemy within” and taunted Muslims for their supposed involvement in terrorism and sympathy for Pakistan. His words were so strong that he was briefly subject to travel bans from the United States, Britain, and some European nations and was refused a U.S. travel visa in 2005.
The intervening years have only seen Modi strengthen his anti-Islam stance, helping to entrench Islamophobia among an eager audience. In effect, he has taken the underlying ideology of the RSS and folded it into the government through laws that adversely affect Muslims.
Such efforts reached an apex in advance of the 2019 elections, when Modi engaged in large-scale voter suppression, removing an estimated 120 million eligible voters from the electoral roll by demanding documentation to prove residency. The aim was to erase religious groups that are seen as non-Indian in the Hindutva ideology, leading to the removal of some 70 million Muslims and Dalits. In clearing the rolls, Modi played the odds, gambling that a combination of voter suppression of minorities and gaining the votes of the Hindu majority would be enough to guarantee electoral success.
This represented an expansion of the voter suppression in Assam in the 2016 state elections. There, the BJP tried to bar Muslim immigrants who had arrived from neighboring Bangladesh between 1951 and 1971, rebranding them as refugees. Modi has called for those who arrived after 1971 to have their “bags packed” and be ready to go “back home.” After its national election victory in 2019, the BJP continued to expel what it called “illegal infiltrators” while placing others in detention camps. Close to 2 million Muslim Indians are now subject to the whims of the state and federal executives, and at least some of them can probably look forward to forced deportations in the future.
A young girl holds an Indian flag and a placard as Muslim demonstrators condemn Modi and the country’s new citizenship law in Bengaluru, India, on Jan. 20.
Elsewhere, Modi has taken even more extreme steps to control Muslim populations. Last August, he revoked the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir, the only region in India that has a majority of Muslims. Within India, Kashmir had the unique right to define who was entitled to live there. This status mattered as only those registered could own land and it gave privileged access to education and employment—something that allowed it to maintain a measure of protection for its Muslim population—an autonomy the BJP had long opposed. Today, it remains under a state of intense control and occupation.
Modi has chosen this moment to inflame tensions in part for ideological reasons but also knowing he has the tacit (if not active) support of the United States, which has been silent on Kashmir. Modi has linked his moves to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Trump administration’s support for Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, as, in his view, all he is doing is integrating a core part of India into the wider polity.
Modi’s linkage of his actions in Kashmir to other authoritarian regimes and those where democracy is slipping away is no accident. If in the 1930s his predecessors courted Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, Modi today has the support of the new global far-right. His insistence that there is a difference between real Indians and others has gained the support of former White House strategist Steve Bannon, who sees his approach as part of the wider far-right movement. In particular, his linkage of being part of the acceptable polity to being part of an identifiable religious group is a common feature to many of the emerging authoritarian regimes. In this, it does not matter if the preferred group is Russian Orthodox or Hungarian Catholic Christians or Myanmar’s Buddhists. In India, the social contract underlying the very state is cracking up, and this is by design. Modi and the BJP are waging a full-frontal assault on the Indian Constitution and the ideal of liberal, secular democracy that underpins it. Flare-ups of tension and violence will continue to be a feature of Indian political life until some kind of resolution is arrived at.
Limiting democracy in this manner is a hallmark of the new wave of nationalist populist regimes. But as Modi’s fellow travelers in Hungary, Brazil, Russia, the United States, and the U.K. are finding, even a “managed,” constricted democracy can be difficult to control. At the moment, Modi’s popularity remains extremely high, with polls like Morning Consult putting him above 75 percent approval rating. But such polls can be unreliable, and dissatisfaction among India’s growing pool of young voters is rising. The BJP has started to face sustained domestic pressure over its poor economic record and its poor handling of the coronavirus crisis (a failing the BJP shares with the other authoritarian nationalist governments). And while a significant portion of the Hindu majority has come along for the ride with the BJP, a large number are concerned by its all-too-blatant attacks on India’s secular values. The recent Hindu-dominated large-scale protests against the new citizenship laws and citizen registers targeting Muslims hint at how the political tide could turn against the Hindu Rashtra, or nation. It is too early to say where this will go, but the battleground for this conflict is the very soul of India. And the stake is the future of democracy in the country.
This presents Modi with a problem. He can accept an ebbing of his electoral support as part of the dynamics of a functioning democracy. But that assumes the BJP is a normal political party, able to share the same democratic space as contending movements. It is not—its goals exclude different conceptions of what India is about. At the moment, as in other states, the wider structures of a democratic system still exist and limit the prime minister’s scope to move in a more openly authoritarian direction. However, most likely he will still try, drawing inspiration from how Viktor Orban has been able to create what is in effect a dictatorship in Hungary. To achieve this, Modi will need an apparent crisis that justifies a shift to open authoritarianism. This should worry everyone—the traditional source of major crises for India is either internal ethnic unrest or war with its neighbors.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-13--A polícia violenta e racista do Brasil

A polícia violenta e racista do Brasil

RIO DE JANEIRO—Sentado em frente a uma casa repleta de marcas de fuzil , Joel Luiz Costa , um advogado criminal do Rio de Janeiro , me contou o caso de um de seus ex-clientes , quando nos encontramos em Junho do ano passado .
Durante uma operação em 2018 , policiais patrulhando as vielas de Manguinhos , uma favela na zona norte do Rio , encontraram um rádio no chão , do lado de fora de uma das casas .
A polícia entrou na residência , onde um rapaz negro , Wellington , dormia ao lado da namorada .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ policiais levaram o jovem de 25 anos para a delegacia , alegando que ele trabalhava para o tráfico .
Segundo os policiais , o rádio era prova definitiva de que Wellington estava em contato constante com os traficantes locais .
Wellington – que prefere não usar seu nome completo por razões de segurança – já tinha passagens pela polícia , e por isso ficou oito meses atrás das grades , aguardando julgamento .
Costa tentou fazer com que seu cliente aguardasse julgamento em liberdade , mas o seu pedido de habeas corpus foi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Costa estava preparado e interrogou as testemunhas policiais de forma dura e firme .
Ele estava familiarizado com a área onde Wellington foi preso , e isso se refletiu nas suas perguntas .
“ Eu pedi aos policiais que descrevessem a rua , como era , se era reta , se era curva ; ele estava no final ou no início da rua ?
” Costa lembrou .
“ O que você estava fazendo lá , o que estava procurando ; você realmente ouviu alguém dizer ‘ Wellington , cê tá na escuta @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a presença de um inimigo interno – real ou imaginário – tende a aumentar a tolerância da população para com os excessos do estado .
Atualmente , no Brasil , a população carcerária é de 725.000 pessoas .
Em todo o mundo , apenas dois países encarceram um número maior que esse : a China tem 1,7 milhões de presos , os Estados Unidos têm 2,1 milhões .
Mais de 40 % dos presos no Brasil ainda estão aguardando julgamento , e desses , apenas 14 % estão presos por homicídios ou outros @ @ @ @ @ @ @ superlotados e deixados à mercê de poderosas organizações criminosas , são conhecidos no mundo do crime como “ faculdades ” .
“ Nós produzimos os nossos próprios homens-bomba ” , afirma o jornalista e pesquisador Bruno Paes Manso , que há anos estuda violência e crime organizado no Brasil .
“ A única diferença é que os nossos jihadistas preferem morrer ou ir para a cadeia antes dos 25 anos de idade , do que baixar a cabeça para um sistema que os humilha e os oprime.
” A polícia brasileira está entre @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a do Rio é a mais letal do Brasil .
O pai de Costa passou a maior parte de sua vida fugindo da polícia , supervisionando o tráfico de drogas no Jacarézinho , uma favela na zona norte do Rio , e usando o dinheiro que ganhava para pagar a educação do filho .
Agora com 31 anos , Costa está profundamente investido no movimento de descriminalização das drogas , com o objetivo de pôr fim a uma guerra cujas vítimas são na maioria jovens negros .
“ O problema não é de @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Costa , que , como mais da metade da população brasileira , é negro , quando o conheci no Rio no ano passado .
“ O problema da sociedade é com a pessoa que cometeu o crime , porque quando a esposa de um político corrupto compra uma bolsa de grife ou paga aulas de tênis na Suíça , ninguém questiona de onde o dinheiro vem.
” A polícia brasileira está entre as mais mortais do mundo , e a do Rio é a mais letal do Brasil .
No ano passado , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , foram 1.814 pessoas mortas a tiros por policiais , sendo mais de 75 % das vítimas pessoas negras , segundo dados do Instituto de Segurança Pública do estado .
A polícia brasileira também lidera o mundo no número de policiais mortos no cumprimento do dever : em 2018 , 343 policiais foram mortos em serviço .
Nem mesmo a chegada de uma pandemia global foi suficiente para conter a violência .
Até agora , no Alemão , foram registrados 108 casos de coronavírus , 37 mortes e 10 recuperações .
Vasconcelos explica @ @ @ @ @ @ @ combate ao vírus ; como a Foreign Policy já havia relatado , acessar hospitais ou conseguir uma cama tem sido quase impossível para os moradores da comunidade .
“ Como podemos ficar em auto-isolamento se a gente não se sente seguros em nossas próprias casas ?
Como evitar multidões se , quando a polícia faz esse tipo de coisa , nós somos forçados a se juntar pra recolher os corpos deixados pra trás ?
, ” disse Vasconcelos quando falei com ela por telefone .
Três dias após o banho de sangue no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ de 14 anos , foi morto dentro de sua própria casa por policiais em São Gonçalo , cidade oposta ao Rio , do outro lado da Baía de Guanabára .
João Pedro sonhava em ser jogador de futebol .
“ Ele sempre dizia : ‘ Pai , um dia você vai ter orgulho de mim ” , disse o pai ao jornal britânico The Guardian .
A casa de João Pedro recebeu mais de 70 balas de alto calibre , depois que policiais fortemente armados entraram na propriedade errada em busca de traficantes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meios de comunicação e plataformas online realizaram uma breve discussão sobre racismo , violência policial e a guerra às droga , mas a rotina logo voltou à normalidade .
As imagens da morte de George Floyd nos Estados Unidos dominaram os noticiários de TV no Brasil .
Assim como aconteceu um pouco por todo o mundo , brasileiros de todas as raças saíram às ruas para protestar contra o racismo , indignados .
A ironia , claro , é que um afro-americano a mais de 8.000 quilômetros de distância teve que ser assassinado @ @ @ @ @ @ @ os principais meios de comunicação do país , prestassem atenção ao problema racial no seu próprio quintal .
“ No Brasil , quando negros morrem , os brasileiros brancos ficam em silêncio ” , afirmou Manoel Soares , um dos poucos jornalistas negros nas telas da TV Globo .
“ Esse silêncio permite que a mídia , o governo e até os próprios negros normalizem essas mortes.
” Historicamente , o Brasil sempre tentou se alinhar aos Estados Unidos .
Existe até uma expressão para isso : complexo de vira-lata .
O termo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ depois que o Brasil perdeu a Copa do Mundo de 1950 .
Dizia-se que a seleção “ canarinha ” tinha medo de jogar seu estilo próprio de futebol – principalmente quando enfrentava a Argentina .
Com o tempo , o complexo de vira-lata evoluiu para se referir à baixa auto-estima da nação brasileira , que não acredita no poder de sua cultura , economia e conhecimento científico .
Por outro lado , o país geralmente considera tudo o que vem de fora , especialmente dos Estados Unidos , como superior a qualquer coisa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ um garoto de 18 anos foi morto a tiros .
Há relatos contraditórios sobre as afiliações da vítima .
Alguns dizem que ele foi baleado a caminho de uma loja para comprar uma pipa ; outros afirmam que ele trabalhava para o tráfico .
Rodrigo Felha , um cineasta nascido e criado na Cidade de Deus , disse que foi pego de surpresa quando a polícia abriu fogo : “ Como se a ausência do estado não bastasse , não contribuindo de em nada com os esforços de prevenção [ do coronavírus ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ o trabalho também , eles não deixam a gente ajudar a nossa comunidade.
” A história do Brasil está repleta de homens e mulheres que dedicaram suas vidas a denunciar os abusos cometidos pelo aparato de segurança do estado .
Uma dessas pessoas foi Marielle Franco , uma popular vereadora do Rio , eleita em 2016 com a quinta maior contagem de votos entre os membros da Câmara .
Feminista e defensora de direitos humanos , ela era conhecida por suas críticas ao poder , especialmente quando se tratava de abusos por parte @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Em Março de 2018 , Franco foi morta a tiros nas ruas do Rio , junto com seu motorista , quando voltava para casa , depois de ter ido a um evento no centro da cidade .
A investigação sobre seu assassinato ainda está em andamento , mas entre seus apoiadores há pouca esperança de que aqueles que ordenaram seu assassinato sejam encontrados .

RIO DE JANEIRO—Sentado em frente a uma casa repleta de buracos de bala, Joel Luiz Costa, um advogado criminal do Rio de Janeiro, me contou o caso de um de seus ex-clientes, quando nos encontramos em Junho do ano passado.
RIO DE JANEIRO—Sentado em frente a uma casa repleta de buracos de bala, Joel Luiz Costa, um advogado criminal do Rio de Janeiro, me contou o caso de um de seus ex-clientes, quando nos encontramos em Junho do ano passado.
Durante uma operação em 2018, policiais patrulhando as vielas de Manguinhos, uma favela na zona norte do Rio, encontraram um rádio no chão, do lado de fora de uma das casas. A polícia entrou na residência, onde um rapaz negro, Wellington, dormia ao lado da namorada. Depois de arrancá-lo da cama, os policiais levaram o jovem de 25 anos para a delegacia, alegando que ele trabalhava para o tráfico. Segundo os policiais, o rádio era prova definitiva de que Wellington estava em contato constante com os traficantes locais. Wellington – que prefere não usar seu nome completo por razões de segurança – já tinha passagens pela polícia, e por isso ficou oito meses atrás das grades, aguardando julgamento. Costa tentou fazer com que seu cliente aguardasse julgamento em liberdade, mas o seu pedido de habeas corpus foi negado.
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No dia da audiência, Costa estava preparado e interrogou as testemunhas policiais de forma dura e firme. Ele estava familiarizado com a área onde Wellington foi preso, e isso se refletiu nas suas perguntas. “Eu pedi aos policiais que descrevessem a rua, como era, se era reta, se era curva; ele estava no final ou no início da rua?” Costa lembrou. “O que você estava fazendo lá, o que estava procurando; você realmente ouviu alguém dizer ‘Wellington, cê tá na escuta?’
“Não demorou muito para os policiais começarem a se contradizer”, afirmou Costa com orgulho. O juiz considerou o réu inocente. Depois de oito mêses atrás das grades por um rádio encontrado no chão em frente à sua casa, Wellington foi solto. A constituição brasileira estipula que todos os cidadãos têm direito a um advogado, mas a maioria dos que passam pelo sistema judicial não tem conhecimento disso. Se Costa não tivesse se interessado pelo caso de Wellington, o jovem provavelmente ainda estaria na prisão, aguardando sua vez de ser ouvido por um juiz.
Manifestantes nas ruas de São Paulo. 6 de Junho.
Nos países em guerra, a presença de um inimigo interno – real ou imaginário – tende a aumentar a tolerância da população para com os excessos do estado. Atualmente, no Brasil, a população carcerária é de 725.000 pessoas. Em todo o mundo, apenas dois países encarceram um número maior que esse: a China tem 1,7 milhões de presos, os Estados Unidos têm 2,1 milhões. Mais de 40% dos presos no Brasil ainda estão aguardando julgamento, e desses, apenas 14% estão presos por homicídios ou outros crimes violentos.
Os presídios brasileiros, superlotados e deixados à mercê de poderosas organizações criminosas, são conhecidos no mundo do crime como “faculdades”. “Nós produzimos os nossos próprios homens-bomba”, afirma o jornalista e pesquisador Bruno Paes Manso, que há anos estuda violência e crime organizado no Brasil. “A única diferença é que os nossos jihadistas preferem morrer ou ir para a cadeia antes dos 25 anos de idade, do que baixar a cabeça para um sistema que os humilha e os oprime.”
A polícia brasileira está entre as mais mortais do mundo, e a do Rio é a mais letal do Brasil.
O pai de Costa passou a maior parte de sua vida fugindo da polícia, supervisionando o tráfico de drogas no Jacarézinho, uma favela na zona norte do Rio, e usando o dinheiro que ganhava para pagar a educação do filho. Agora com 31 anos, Costa está profundamente investido no movimento de descriminalização das drogas, com o objetivo de pôr fim a uma guerra cujas vítimas são na maioria jovens negros.
“O problema não é de onde vem o dinheiro”, disse Costa, que, como mais da metade da população brasileira, é negro, quando o conheci no Rio no ano passado. “O problema da sociedade é com a pessoa que cometeu o crime, porque quando a esposa de um político corrupto compra uma bolsa de grife ou paga aulas de tênis na Suíça, ninguém questiona de onde o dinheiro vem.”
A polícia brasileira está entre as mais mortais do mundo, e a do Rio é a mais letal do Brasil. No ano passado, apenas no estado do Rio de Janeiro, foram 1.814 pessoas mortas a tiros por policiais, sendo mais de 75% das vítimas pessoas negras, segundo dados do Instituto de Segurança Pública do estado. A polícia brasileira também lidera o mundo no número de policiais mortos no cumprimento do dever: em 2018, 343 policiais foram mortos em serviço. Nem mesmo a chegada de uma pandemia global foi suficiente para conter a violência.
Manifestantes carregam faixa com a frase “Vidas Negras Importam” durante um protesto em São Paulo. 14 de Junho.
Às 6 horas da manhã de 15 de Maio, Tiê Vasconcelos acordou ao som de artilharia pesada. “Minha primeira reação, como sempre, foi deitar no chão”, relata a ativista comunitária e Youtuber de 25 anos, moradora do Complexo do Alemão, na zona norte do Rio. “Isso durou até cerca das 10:30 da manhã. Houve uma intensa troca de tiros, barulhos pesados, sons de guerra, explosões de granadas, caveirão na rua.” O tiroteio foi o resultado de uma incursão policial liderada pelo Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais, BOPE, com o objetivo de capturar traficantes locais. Resultado final: oito fuzis apreendidos e 13 mortes. Os corpos das vítimas, deixados expostos no meio da rua, tiveram que ser removidos pelos próprios moradores.
Até agora, no Alemão, foram registrados 108 casos de coronavírus, 37 mortes e 10 recuperações. Vasconcelos explica que as ações da polícia dificultam o combate ao vírus; como a Foreign Policy já havia relatado, acessar hospitais ou conseguir uma cama tem sido quase impossível para os moradores da comunidade. “Como podemos ficar em auto-isolamento se a gente não se sente seguros em nossas próprias casas? Como evitar multidões se, quando a polícia faz esse tipo de coisa, nós somos forçados a se juntar pra recolher os corpos deixados pra trás?,” disse Vasconcelos quando falei com ela por telefone.
Três dias após o banho de sangue no Alemão, João Pedro Mattos Pinto, de 14 anos, foi morto dentro de sua própria casa por policiais em São Gonçalo, cidade oposta ao Rio, do outro lado da Baía de Guanabára. João Pedro sonhava em ser jogador de futebol. “Ele sempre dizia: ‘Pai, um dia você vai ter orgulho de mim”, disse o pai ao jornal britânico The Guardian. A casa de João Pedro recebeu mais de 70 balas de alto calibre, depois que policiais fortemente armados entraram na propriedade errada em busca de traficantes. Após o assassinato do adolescente, meios de comunicação e plataformas online realizaram uma breve discussão sobre racismo, violência policial e a guerra às droga, mas a rotina logo voltou à normalidade.
As imagens da morte de George Floyd nos Estados Unidos dominaram os noticiários de TV no Brasil. Assim como aconteceu um pouco por todo o mundo, brasileiros de todas as raças saíram às ruas para protestar contra o racismo, indignados. A ironia, claro, é que um afro-americano a mais de 8.000 quilômetros de distância teve que ser assassinado, para que os brasileiros brancos e os principais meios de comunicação do país, prestassem atenção ao problema racial no seu próprio quintal. “No Brasil, quando negros morrem, os brasileiros brancos ficam em silêncio”, afirmou Manoel Soares, um dos poucos jornalistas negros nas telas da TV Globo. “Esse silêncio permite que a mídia, o governo e até os próprios negros normalizem essas mortes.”
Historicamente, o Brasil sempre tentou se alinhar aos Estados Unidos. Existe até uma expressão para isso: complexo de vira-lata. O termo foi cunhado pelo escritor Nelson Rodrigues, depois que o Brasil perdeu a Copa do Mundo de 1950. Dizia-se que a seleção “canarinha” tinha medo de jogar seu estilo próprio de futebol – principalmente quando enfrentava a Argentina. Com o tempo, o complexo de vira-lata evoluiu para se referir à baixa auto-estima da nação brasileira, que não acredita no poder de sua cultura, economia e conhecimento científico. Por outro lado, o país geralmente considera tudo o que vem de fora, especialmente dos Estados Unidos, como superior a qualquer coisa encontrada no Brasil.
O presidente brasileiro Jair Bolsonaro vê em seu colega estadunidense um exemplo a ser seguido; assim como Donald Trump, desde que foi eleito, Bolsonaro tem tido um papel fundamental na polarização racial da sociedade brasileira. No início deste ano, ativistas indígenas prometeram processar o presidente de extrema-direita por racismo depois de mais um desabafo chocante. Em uma de suas transmissões semanais no Facebook, Bolsonaro declarou: “Os índios estão, sem dúvida, mudando. … Eles estão cada vez mais se tornando seres humanos como nós.”
Um manifestante segura uma placa que diz “Pele negra não é crime. Racismo é!” num protesto nas ruas de São Gonçalo, Brasil, em 5 de junho. Cerca de 300 pessoas gritaram slogans contra o governo do presidente Jair Bolsonaro e protestaram contra a morte do americano George Floyd e do adolescente João Pedro Mattos Pinto.
Quase 20 anos depois que a Cidade de Deus, um complexo de favelas na zona oeste do Rio, ficou conhecida internacionalmente com o filme pelo mesmo nome em inglês – City of God – muito pouco mudou para quem mora lá. Dirigido por Fernando Meirelles e Kátia Lund, o filme de 2002 com um elenco majoritariamente negro conta a história de dois jovens que escolhem caminhos diferentes enquanto crescem no Rio nos anos 70. Buscapé, interpretado por Alexandre Rodrigues, é um jovem fotógrafo que documenta a vida cotidiana em seu bairro. Zé Pequeno, interpretado por Leandro Firmino da Hora, é um ambicioso traficante de drogas que usa as fotos de Buscapé para aumentar sua fama, enquanto trava uma guerra contra seu rival, Mané Galinha, interpretado por Seu Jorge. Como muitas outras favelas no Rio, a mostrada no filme também tem uma longa história de violentas incursões policiais. Uma delas ocorreu três dias antes da morte de George Floyd. Soldados do BOPE entraram sem aviso, prontos para atirar, impedindo os voluntários locais de distribuir alimentos e álcool-gel para a população.
Nas comunidades que visitei ao longo dos anos, moradores foram quase unânimes na visão de que a polícia não contribui em nada para a qualidade de vida das pessoas
Dessa vez, um garoto de 18 anos foi morto a tiros. Há relatos contraditórios sobre as afiliações da vítima. Alguns dizem que ele foi baleado a caminho de uma loja para comprar uma pipa; outros afirmam que ele trabalhava para o tráfico. Rodrigo Felha, um cineasta nascido e criado na Cidade de Deus, disse que foi pego de surpresa quando a polícia abriu fogo: “Como se a ausência do estado não bastasse, não contribuindo de em nada com os esforços de prevenção [ do coronavírus], eles não deixam a gente fazer o trabalho também, eles não deixam a gente ajudar a nossa comunidade.”
A história do Brasil está repleta de homens e mulheres que dedicaram suas vidas a denunciar os abusos cometidos pelo aparato de segurança do estado. Uma dessas pessoas foi Marielle Franco, uma popular vereadora do Rio, eleita em 2016 com a quinta maior contagem de votos entre os membros da Câmara. Feminista e defensora de direitos humanos, ela era conhecida por suas críticas ao poder, especialmente quando se tratava de abusos por parte da polícia contra moradores de favelas. Em Março de 2018, Franco foi morta a tiros nas ruas do Rio, junto com seu motorista, quando voltava para casa, depois de ter ido a um evento no centro da cidade. A investigação sobre seu assassinato ainda está em andamento, mas entre seus apoiadores há pouca esperança de que aqueles que ordenaram seu assassinato sejam encontrados.
Nas comunidades que visitei ao longo dos anos, moradores foram quase unânimes na visão de que a polícia não contribui em nada para a qualidade de vida das pessoas, e de que o dia-a-dia seria melhor se não houvesse presença policial nas favelas. “Quem traz o caos pra favela é a polícia. Da mesma forma que você anda por Ipanema sem problemas,” disse Felha, referindo-se a um dos bairros mais nobres do Rio,”eu teria o maior prazer de te mostrar a Cidade de Deus.” Depois ele acrescenta: “Sem a polícia lá, claro, porque a qualquer momento o caveirão pode entrar.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-13--The EU Needs a New Balkan Strategy

The EU Needs a New Balkan Strategy

The EU Needs a New Balkan Strategy On June 27 , Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was due to meet his Kosovar counterpart , Hashim Thaci , at the White House for talks brokered by U.S. special envoy Richard Grenell .
The aim of this summit was to normalize relations between their two countries , which have been locked in a state of frozen conflict ever since Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008 .
But then , just three days before the planned meeting in Washington , the Specialist Prosecutor ’ s Office in The Hague announced that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kosovo Specialist Chambers charging Thaci , a former guerilla leader , and several of his associates with war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Kosovo Liberation Army ( KLA ) forces against civilians , including ethnic Serbs , during the 1998-99 Kosovo War .
Thaci , who was a senior figure in the KLA , promptly canceled his trip to the United States , and the White House meeting quickly disintegrated .
Vucic and Kosovar Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti traveled to Brussels to meet separately with the president of the European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instead .
The peculiar timing of the announcement immediately unleashed a wave of speculation that the European Union was actively trying to derail the U.S.-brokered talks .
Normally , accusations of this nature veer dangerously close to conspiracy theory , but in this particular case they ’ re entirely plausible : Ever since the meeting was first announced in mid-June , there have been fears in European capitals that Grenell—who did not exactly endear himself to EU leaders during his stint as U.S. ambassdor to Germany—was planning to push through a controversial land @ @ @ @ @ @ @ standoff by redrawing the two countries ’ borders along ethnic lines .
Both Vucic and Thaci support such a resolution , but the EU fears that it could lead to a return to violence and bloodshed in the Balkans by triggering other sectarian border disputes across the region .
Persuading Serbia to formally recognize Kosovo ’ s independence is a top geostrategic goal in the Balkans for both the U.S. government and the EU , but these Western powers are fiercely divided over how this should be achieved .
Persuading Serbia to formally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top geostrategic goal in the Balkans for both the U.S. government and the EU , but these Western powers are fiercely divided over how this should be achieved .
The prevailing view in Brussels is that this should be done by giving Serbia incentives to accept the status quo and willingly relinquish its claim to the breakaway province—an approach that the government in Belgrade has repeatedly rejected .
The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump , on the other hand , is far more flexible and has said in the past that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” between Belgrade and Pristina , which would presumably include border adjustments .
Such a deal would go firmly against Brussels ’ interests , which is why some believe that the timing of the charges against Thaci was not entirely coincidental .
First proposed in August 2018 , the prospective land swap would transfer four Serb-majority municipalities situated north of Kosovo ’ s Ibar River to Serbia in exchange for the Presevo Valley , which sits along Kosovo ’ s eastern border and is home to a predominantly ethnic Albanian population .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a settlement , and the bloc ’ s special envoy to the Balkans , Miroslav Lajcak , reiterated Brussels ’ opposition to the plan in May , telling the Austrian Press Agency that a land swap “ is not on the agenda and should not be on the agenda ” and that “ we need an agreement that calms the situation … this would be the exact opposite.
” The Trump administration , by contrast , seems willing to wave through any resolution that it can hold up as a foreign-policy win for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election .
Grenell ’ s meeting with Vucic and Thaci may have been called off for now , but the fact that it was ever scheduled to take place at all should serve as a wake-up call for Brussels .
Over the past decade , the EU has been so absorbed by its own overlapping crises that it has had little capacity to engage with the Balkans .
This retreat has caused Europe ’ s influence in the region to wane and left a power vacuum that is increasingly being filled by China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Persian Gulf states .
If the EU wants to avoid being sidelined in its own backyard , it needs to take a more muscular approach to Balkan affairs by edging out its rivals and coercing regional leaders—particularly Vucic—into compliance with its aims .
Although Thaci appeared open to the idea of a land swap , the plan has largely been propelled by Serbia .
Indeed , in his eight years in high-level government posts , this is the only concrete proposal that Vucic has shown any willingness to engage with , and he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any urgency to resolve the issue : In March , Vucic told Foreign Policy that “ if you ask the vast majority of people in Serbia , they would prefer a frozen conflict to any single solution.
” Even if Vucic doesn ’ t identify with that majority , he contends that the only deal that he can sell to voters back home is one that “ would be a defeat for both sides.
” A land swap fits this criterion because it goes against the current status quo , which many in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unfairly favours the Kosovars .
Vucic knows that he can not reclaim the breakaway province for his supporters , but if he can claw back a small sliver of it and reunite its ethnic Serbian population with the rest of the country , he will be able to spin his deal as an improvement rather than a capitulation .
Russophilia is widespread in Serbia for historical and cultural reasons , but it has been further strengthened in recent years by Russia ’ s unwavering support for Belgrade over the Kosovo issue .
Opinion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vladimir Putin is the most popular foreign leader in the country and , according to the Serbia expert and Foreign Policy contributor Vuk Vuksanovic , the Russian president has the power to sink any agreement negotiated by the government in Belgrade : “ Vucic is aware that if Putin were to veto any deal that Serbia negotiates on Kosovo , it would be his political downfall as the Serbian public would perceive that situation as indicating that the Russian leadership is more mindful of Serbia ’ s national interests than the Serbian leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The stakes are high for Vucic , which is why the EU will have to apply considerable pressure to make him acquiesce .
Brussels ’ strategy in the Balkans has always relied on using the prospect of EU membership to tempt Serbia into compliance over Kosovo .
However , Vucic can see just as well as anyone that the bloc is suffering from enlargement fatigue and is unlikely to be welcoming new members anytime soon , which means that he has little incentive to compromise .
But even if this weren ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claims that he would reject the offer of EU membership if it meant accepting the status quo : “ In reply to a possible offer [ to Serbia ] to recognize Kosovo and that Kosovo enters the U.N. , and we receive nothing in return , except EU membership , our answer would be ‘ no , ’ ” he told reporters ahead of his aborted meeting in Washington .
It would be a mistake to dismiss this comment as the bluster of a politician playing hardball .
Although he styles himself as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in European values .
During his time in power , he has methodically dismantled Serbia ’ s democracy to the extent that the political watchdog Freedom House recently downgraded the country from a “ semi-consolidated democracy ” to a “ hybrid regime ” in its annual Nations in Transit report .
Without serious domestic political reform , there ’ s little chance that Serbia would ever be allowed into the European club .
Vucic knows that he will first have to surrender the autocracy that he has painstakingly built up over the past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into the EU , and there is good reason to doubt whether he sees much value in taking his country into the bloc at all .
EU membership certainly isn ’ t in his own interests : Throughout his time in office , the Serbian president has ruled his country like a personal fiefdom , using his power to the benefit of those around him , such as his brother Andrej who has allegedly been at the center of a number of shady deals .
It is fanciful to think that he would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also found that by moving closer to the Chinese , he is able to extract greater financial benefits from the EU : At the peak of the coronavirus crisis , Vucic used a press conference to lambaste Brussels for banning the export of essential medical equipment to non-EU countries , heaping praise on China for sending medical aid while angrily proclaiming that “ European solidarity does not exist .
That was a fairy tale on paper.
” This caused such panic in Brussels that the EU drew up a 93 million euro support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the former Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito , Vucic evidently sees the benefit of nonalignment .
By sitting between the East and the West , he is able to prey on EU fears that China is looking to expand into its sphere of influence and use his ties with Beijing as leverage against Europe for Serbia ’ s economic benefit , an outcome that helps offset the disadvantages of remaining outside of the bloc .
Vucic seems more than happy with this arrangement , and his government ’ s propaganda machine has already created @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country receives more economic aid from China than the EU .
Brussels has always viewed Vucic as a man that it can do business with , but it is becoming increasingly evident that the Serbian president is actively sabotaging the EU ’ s aims in the Balkans .
The current strategy of appeasement has clearly failed , and if Europe really wants to get its way over Kosovo , it needs to stop showering Vucic with the economic and political support that sustains his government and redirect it towards civil society groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agencies such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a model to imitate : “ By establishing such agencies , the EU would also find it easier to channel funds to , say , reformist mayors or hospitals rather than mismanaged governments , ” its authors wrote .
This would allow Brussels to put pressure on the Serbian government while still supporting the Europeanization of the Serbian state .
As things stand , nonalignment is working too well for Vucic ; Brussels needs to put him in a position that forces him to level @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side .

On June 27, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was due to meet his Kosovar counterpart, Hashim Thaci, at the White House for talks brokered by U.S. special envoy Richard Grenell. The aim of this summit was to normalize relations between their two countries, which have been locked in a state of frozen conflict ever since Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008.
On June 27, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was due to meet his Kosovar counterpart, Hashim Thaci, at the White House for talks brokered by U.S. special envoy Richard Grenell. The aim of this summit was to normalize relations between their two countries, which have been locked in a state of frozen conflict ever since Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008.
But then, just three days before the planned meeting in Washington, the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in The Hague announced that it had filed a 10-count indictment with the Kosovo Specialist Chambers charging Thaci, a former guerilla leader, and several of his associates with war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) forces against civilians, including ethnic Serbs, during the 1998-99 Kosovo War.
Thaci, who was a senior figure in the KLA, promptly canceled his trip to the United States, and the White House meeting quickly disintegrated. Vucic and Kosovar Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti traveled to Brussels to meet separately with the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, instead.
The peculiar timing of the announcement immediately unleashed a wave of speculation that the European Union was actively trying to derail the U.S.-brokered talks. Normally, accusations of this nature veer dangerously close to conspiracy theory, but in this particular case they’re entirely plausible: Ever since the meeting was first announced in mid-June, there have been fears in European capitals that Grenell—who did not exactly endear himself to EU leaders during his stint as U.S. ambassdor to Germany—was planning to push through a controversial land swap proposal that would resolve the Serbia-Kosovo standoff by redrawing the two countries’ borders along ethnic lines. Both Vucic and Thaci support such a resolution, but the EU fears that it could lead to a return to violence and bloodshed in the Balkans by triggering other sectarian border disputes across the region.
Persuading Serbia to formally recognize Kosovo’s independence is a top geostrategic goal in the Balkans for both the U.S. government and the EU, but these Western powers are fiercely divided over how this should be achieved.
Persuading Serbia to formally recognize Kosovo’s independence is a top geostrategic goal in the Balkans for both the U.S. government and the EU, but these Western powers are fiercely divided over how this should be achieved. The prevailing view in Brussels is that this should be done by giving Serbia incentives to accept the status quo and willingly relinquish its claim to the breakaway province—an approach that the government in Belgrade has repeatedly rejected.
The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, on the other hand, is far more flexible and has said in the past that it will recognize any “mutually satisfactory settlement” between Belgrade and Pristina, which would presumably include border adjustments. Such a deal would go firmly against Brussels’ interests, which is why some believe that the timing of the charges against Thaci was not entirely coincidental.
First proposed in August 2018, the prospective land swap would transfer four Serb-majority municipalities situated north of Kosovo’s Ibar River to Serbia in exchange for the Presevo Valley, which sits along Kosovo’s eastern border and is home to a predominantly ethnic Albanian population.
The EU has consistently refused to countenance such a settlement, and the bloc’s special envoy to the Balkans, Miroslav Lajcak, reiterated Brussels’ opposition to the plan in May, telling the Austrian Press Agency that a land swap “is not on the agenda and should not be on the agenda” and that “we need an agreement that calms the situation … this would be the exact opposite.” The Trump administration, by contrast, seems willing to wave through any resolution that it can hold up as a foreign-policy win for the president ahead of November’s election.
Grenell’s meeting with Vucic and Thaci may have been called off for now, but the fact that it was ever scheduled to take place at all should serve as a wake-up call for Brussels. Over the past decade, the EU has been so absorbed by its own overlapping crises that it has had little capacity to engage with the Balkans. This retreat has caused Europe’s influence in the region to wane and left a power vacuum that is increasingly being filled by China, Russia, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf states. If the EU wants to avoid being sidelined in its own backyard, it needs to take a more muscular approach to Balkan affairs by edging out its rivals and coercing regional leaders—particularly Vucic—into compliance with its aims.
Although Thaci appeared open to the idea of a land swap, the plan has largely been propelled by Serbia. Indeed, in his eight years in high-level government posts, this is the only concrete proposal that Vucic has shown any willingness to engage with, and he doesn’t appear to be in any urgency to resolve the issue: In March, Vucic told Foreign Policy that “if you ask the vast majority of people in Serbia, they would prefer a frozen conflict to any single solution.”
Even if Vucic doesn’t identify with that majority, he contends that the only deal that he can sell to voters back home is one that “would be a defeat for both sides.” A land swap fits this criterion because it goes against the current status quo, which many in Serbia regard as a Western-dictated settlement that unfairly favours the Kosovars. Vucic knows that he cannot reclaim the breakaway province for his supporters, but if he can claw back a small sliver of it and reunite its ethnic Serbian population with the rest of the country, he will be able to spin his deal as an improvement rather than a capitulation.
It won’t be easy to move Vucic from this position. What’s often overlooked in Brussels is that the Serbian president doesn’t have the freedom to cave in to Europe’s demands even if he wanted to. That’s because, aside from satisfying his own electorate, Vucic also needs to negotiate a deal that will be approved by Moscow.
Russophilia is widespread in Serbia for historical and cultural reasons, but it has been further strengthened in recent years by Russia’s unwavering support for Belgrade over the Kosovo issue. Opinion polls from 2018 showed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is the most popular foreign leader in the country and, according to the Serbia expert and Foreign Policy contributor Vuk Vuksanovic, the Russian president has the power to sink any agreement negotiated by the government in Belgrade: “Vucic is aware that if Putin were to veto any deal that Serbia negotiates on Kosovo, it would be his political downfall as the Serbian public would perceive that situation as indicating that the Russian leadership is more mindful of Serbia’s national interests than the Serbian leaders themselves,” Vuksanovic wrote on Medium.
The stakes are high for Vucic, which is why the EU will have to apply considerable pressure to make him acquiesce. Brussels’ strategy in the Balkans has always relied on using the prospect of EU membership to tempt Serbia into compliance over Kosovo. However, Vucic can see just as well as anyone that the bloc is suffering from enlargement fatigue and is unlikely to be welcoming new members anytime soon, which means that he has little incentive to compromise.
But even if this weren’t the case, the Serbian president claims that he would reject the offer of EU membership if it meant accepting the status quo: “In reply to a possible offer [to Serbia] to recognize Kosovo and that Kosovo enters the U.N., and we receive nothing in return, except EU membership, our answer would be ‘no,’” he told reporters ahead of his aborted meeting in Washington.
It would be a mistake to dismiss this comment as the bluster of a politician playing hardball. Although he styles himself as a pro-European, Vucic is no believer in European values. During his time in power, he has methodically dismantled Serbia’s democracy to the extent that the political watchdog Freedom House recently downgraded the country from a “semi-consolidated democracy” to a “hybrid regime” in its annual Nations in Transit report.
Without serious domestic political reform, there’s little chance that Serbia would ever be allowed into the European club. Vucic knows that he will first have to surrender the autocracy that he has painstakingly built up over the past six years before Serbia is ever admitted into the EU, and there is good reason to doubt whether he sees much value in taking his country into the bloc at all. EU membership certainly isn’t in his own interests: Throughout his time in office, the Serbian president has ruled his country like a personal fiefdom, using his power to the benefit of those around him, such as his brother Andrej who has allegedly been at the center of a number of shady deals. It is fanciful to think that he would surrender this privilege willingly.
Russia is not the only obstacle to European objectives in the region. The prospect of EU membership may have tempted Serbian leaders in the past, but the growing presence of China in the Balkans has significantly dampened its appeal. Over the past several years, Vucic has managed to devise an alternative to EU membership by building closer economic and political ties with Beijing—a partnership that has helped him secure some $4 billion in direct investments and $5 billion in loans and infrastructure projects for his country.
He has also found that by moving closer to the Chinese, he is able to extract greater financial benefits from the EU: At the peak of the coronavirus crisis, Vucic used a press conference to lambaste Brussels for banning the export of essential medical equipment to non-EU countries, heaping praise on China for sending medical aid while angrily proclaiming that “European solidarity does not exist. That was a fairy tale on paper.” This caused such panic in Brussels that the EU drew up a 93 million euro support package for Serbia within days.
Like the former Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito, Vucic evidently sees the benefit of nonalignment. By sitting between the East and the West, he is able to prey on EU fears that China is looking to expand into its sphere of influence and use his ties with Beijing as leverage against Europe for Serbia’s economic benefit, an outcome that helps offset the disadvantages of remaining outside of the bloc. Vucic seems more than happy with this arrangement, and his government’s propaganda machine has already created a distorted perception among Serbian citizens that the country receives more economic aid from China than the EU.
Brussels has always viewed Vucic as a man that it can do business with, but it is becoming increasingly evident that the Serbian president is actively sabotaging the EU’s aims in the Balkans. The current strategy of appeasement has clearly failed, and if Europe really wants to get its way over Kosovo, it needs to stop showering Vucic with the economic and political support that sustains his government and redirect it towards civil society groups.
One recent proposal pointed to aid agencies such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a model to imitate: “By establishing such agencies, the EU would also find it easier to channel funds to, say, reformist mayors or hospitals rather than mismanaged governments,” its authors wrote. This would allow Brussels to put pressure on the Serbian government while still supporting the Europeanization of the Serbian state.
As things stand, nonalignment is working too well for Vucic; Brussels needs to put him in a position that forces him to level with the Serbian people and pick a side.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-13--Washington Needs to Get to Know Jordan’s Next King

Washington Needs to Get to Know Jordan ’ s Next King For such a small country , Jordan receives a fair share of media attention .
Every so often , some source of tension between Jordan and Israel or domestic unrest garners coverage and renews international concerns about Jordanian stability .
As a Jordanian American , however , what keeps me up at night is not the future of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty .
It ’ s Jordanian succession—specifically , whether anyone is prepared for some freak event that leaves the 26-year-old Crown Prince Hussein in charge of the kingdom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the subject with family or colleagues , I ’ ve been met with horrified reactions : It elicits the same “ la samah Allah ” ( God forbid ) whether the conversation is in English or Arabic .
I wholeheartedly share that sentiment , but hoping for the best isn ’ t policy ; the U.S. government needs to talk about what comes next for Jordan .
It ’ s never too early to consider how succession might affect a small but strategically important ally .
After all , Jordanian children are still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s accession to the throne just before his 17th birthday—including that the king faced hostility and frequent assassination attempts .
One such tale involved an investigation of numerous dead cats on the palace grounds , which turned up evidence of a Syrian poisoning plot against the king .
The immediate succession path is less troubling than the possible challenges resulting from the accession of a young and untested king .
To be clear , there is no reason to believe 58-year-old King Abdullah II is on his way out anytime soon .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and supported by numerous allies .
Yet almost 70 years after King Hussein took power as a teenager , Jordan still faces myriad threats .
For starters , in the age of COVID-19 , you never know if a leader could be gone in a week .
And as the monarch inches towards 60 , it is not out of line to consider whether the stress of managing Jordan ’ s constant state of crisis could lead to health problems—or a heart attack .
Then there are more sinister risks .
King Abdullah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1951 , setting King Hussein on the path to power after a brief period of rule by Abdullah I ’ s eldest son , King Talal .
Before dying of cancer at age 63 , King Hussein survived at least 12 assassination plots and seven coup attempts .
Like his predecessors , Abdullah II could face threats from within Jordan .
Jordanian security and intelligence services are known for their effectiveness and reach across the country , but the rare terrorist attack gets through—and plots are regularly foiled before they get off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be surprising if a few of those foiled plots involve attempts on the king ’ s life .
The General Intelligence Directorate may be adept at disrupting terrorist cells , but all it takes is one smart lone wolf .
With all these risks , more people should be worried about Jordanian succession .
The lack of U.S. interest is probably due to Jordan ’ s relatively boring royal dynamics .
Unlike its Persian Gulf neighbors ’ , Jordan ’ s succession scenario is not up in the air .
There are no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the royal family mostly works together to manage the country .
At the very least , Jordan should enjoy a relatively uneventful transition of power when the day comes .
But the immediate succession path is less troubling than the possible challenges resulting from the accession of a young and untested king .
It ’ s nowhere near guaranteed that the 26-year-old crown prince could easily maintain control over a kingdom with a contracting economy , a bulging youth population , and unfolding threats such as climate change .
Jordan ’ s economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and now it is spiraling .
The kingdom is quite literally surrounded by instability ; it has an eastern border with Iraq , a northern border with Syria , and a western border with Israel and the Palestinian territories .
In recent months and days , Israeli leaders have threatened to annex the West Bank and Jordan Valley , which would be a huge blow to the Jordanian monarchy and Jordanians of Palestinian origin ; it could even jeopardize the 1994 peace treaty with Israel .
It ’ s a miracle Abdullah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic and security challenges while maintaining such strong ties in the region and in the United States .
It ’ s a lot to ask a 26-year-old to do the same , though he has been groomed exceptionally well and would presumably have help from his seasoned uncles—including Prince Faisal , who plays the most prominent supporting role to the king .
Even a well-intentioned young leader could make missteps , with long-lasting consequences .
Additionally , the future king may need to work to earn the support of his population .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ king relies on a traditional tribal power base of so-called East Bankers—those with roots in the kingdom and not in Palestine .
Yet , that base ’ s role is rapidly changing and shrinking .
There are no precise statistics , but it ’ s widely believed that half—if not more—of Jordan ’ s population consists of Palestinian “ West Bankers.
” This estimate includes both registered Palestinian refugees and Palestinians that have been largely assimilated into the population and are considered Jordanian by official counts .
The Office of the United Nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are also 660,000 registered Syrian refugees , approximately 70,000 Iraqi refugees , 15,000 Yemeni refugees , and 6,000 Sudanese refugees in Jordan .
In addition to being outnumbered , many Jordanian tribes and Bedouins are marginalized , mired in poverty , and susceptible to extremism .
It ’ s not clear how popular Crown Prince Hussein would be among those tribes or that their support would be as relevant as in the past , given the increasingly diverse Jordanian population .
Predictions that tribes are turning against the royal family or losing all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s safe to assume that the future King Hussein II will not necessarily be able to rely on the fabled traditional base .
And events in nearby countries don ’ t inspire confidence .
The rise of other young leaders in the Middle East has brought about mistakes , clashes with domestic opponents , and spats with the United States .
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has received the most attention , for allegedly ordering the murder of his enemies , prosecuting a brutal war in Yemen , his attempts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his assault on domestic opposition .
Thankfully , it ’ s unlikely Crown Prince Hussein will jump headlong into regional adventures .
By every indicator , he is competent , responsible , and devoted to his country .
It ’ s also far-fetched to suggest that Hussein would do anything to jeopardize Jordan ’ s relations with the United States .
Even so , it ’ s natural to expect him to make mistakes as a new leader , and he might find it difficult to manage competing agendas from Jordanians , Gulf @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel .
He could also be more vulnerable to coercion by wealthy Gulf neighbors , or even U.S. politicians who are not satisfied with Jordan ’ s response to Israeli aggression , including annexation threats .
It should make U.S. policymakers uneasy to consider how this would impact Jordanian stability and U.S. interests in the region .
After all , plenty of Jordanian leaders have made their own mistakes .
Jordanian elites today still go to great lengths to explain and apologize for King Hussein ’ s role in initiating early Arab wars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when the Six-Day War broke out in 1967 , he was young and beholden to more influential pan-Arabist leaders such as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser .
Records suggest it is true that he was reluctant to attack Israel , but felt had no choice but to participate in the war .
As a consequence , Israel captured East Jerusalem and the West Bank , with consequences that remain at the center of the region ’ s political tensions to this day .
Indeed , if Crown Prince Hussein ’ s grandfather and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prominent enough to discourage his Arab counterparts from launching a war , Jordan might face a very different strategic reality than it does today .
To guard against the worst potential consequences of a Jordanian power transition , U.S. policymakers must make more of an effort to get to know the young crown prince and brace themselves for a highly unlikely but potentially catastrophic succession scenario .
Crown Prince Hussein is mostly an unknown commodity to Americans and Westerners , and his portfolio as king would be considerably bigger and less charming .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ introductory tour—not of Silicon Valley but of Congress , the White House , and Washington think tanks—and a major televised interview to ensure that he has strong support from Congress and the U.S. public .
The Jordanian government should also make more of an effort to highlight the crown prince ’ s priorities and role in managing the country .
The Jordanian government excels at public relations , but in this case , bringing the crown prince into the limelight is overdue .
Hussein II has slowly started playing a more visible role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important U.S. private-sector players .
He is constantly seen in the background of video reels and Instagram photos with his father , a noticeable change from just three years ago , when he was finishing his education at Georgetown University and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst .
He is stepping up to lead Jordanian youth initiatives and call for technological innovation and a response to climate change .
These are all good signs , as all of these issues are critical to Jordan ’ s future prosperity .
But as much as everyone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expeditions and motorcycle rides , they ’ re no substitute for a real policy discussion among Jordanian officials and their American friends .

For such a small country, Jordan receives a fair share of media attention. Every so often, some source of tension between Jordan and Israel or domestic unrest garners coverage and renews international concerns about Jordanian stability. As a Jordanian American, however, what keeps me up at night is not the future of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. It’s Jordanian succession—specifically, whether anyone is prepared for some freak event that leaves the 26-year-old Crown Prince Hussein in charge of the kingdom.
For such a small country, Jordan receives a fair share of media attention. Every so often, some source of tension between Jordan and Israel or domestic unrest garners coverage and renews international concerns about Jordanian stability. As a Jordanian American, however, what keeps me up at night is not the future of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. It’s Jordanian succession—specifically, whether anyone is prepared for some freak event that leaves the 26-year-old Crown Prince Hussein in charge of the kingdom.
Every time I’ve broached the subject with family or colleagues, I’ve been met with horrified reactions: It elicits the same “la samah Allah” (God forbid) whether the conversation is in English or Arabic. I wholeheartedly share that sentiment, but hoping for the best isn’t policy; the U.S. government needs to talk about what comes next for Jordan.
It’s never too early to consider how succession might affect a small but strategically important ally. After all, Jordanian children are still told tales of the late King Hussein’s accession to the throne just before his 17th birthday—including that the king faced hostility and frequent assassination attempts. One such tale involved an investigation of numerous dead cats on the palace grounds, which turned up evidence of a Syrian poisoning plot against the king.
The immediate succession path is less troubling than the possible challenges resulting from the accession of a young and untested king.
To be clear, there is no reason to believe 58-year-old King Abdullah II is on his way out anytime soon. He’s young, healthy, and supported by numerous allies. Yet almost 70 years after King Hussein took power as a teenager, Jordan still faces myriad threats. For starters, in the age of COVID-19, you never know if a leader could be gone in a week. And as the monarch inches towards 60, it is not out of line to consider whether the stress of managing Jordan’s constant state of crisis could lead to health problems—or a heart attack.
Then there are more sinister risks. King Abdullah I was assassinated by a Palestinian nationalist in 1951, setting King Hussein on the path to power after a brief period of rule by Abdullah I’s eldest son, King Talal. Before dying of cancer at age 63, King Hussein survived at least 12 assassination plots and seven coup attempts.
Like his predecessors, Abdullah II could face threats from within Jordan. Jordanian security and intelligence services are known for their effectiveness and reach across the country, but the rare terrorist attack gets through—and plots are regularly foiled before they get off the ground. It wouldn’t be surprising if a few of those foiled plots involve attempts on the king’s life. The General Intelligence Directorate may be adept at disrupting terrorist cells, but all it takes is one smart lone wolf.
With all these risks, more people should be worried about Jordanian succession. The lack of U.S. interest is probably due to Jordan’s relatively boring royal dynamics. Unlike its Persian Gulf neighbors’, Jordan’s succession scenario is not up in the air. There are no high-profile rivalries or competing bloodlines, and the royal family mostly works together to manage the country. At the very least, Jordan should enjoy a relatively uneventful transition of power when the day comes.
But the immediate succession path is less troubling than the possible challenges resulting from the accession of a young and untested king. It’s nowhere near guaranteed that the 26-year-old crown prince could easily maintain control over a kingdom with a contracting economy, a bulging youth population, and unfolding threats such as climate change.
Jordan’s economy was already under massive pressure before COVID-19, and now it is spiraling. The kingdom is quite literally surrounded by instability; it has an eastern border with Iraq, a northern border with Syria, and a western border with Israel and the Palestinian territories. In recent months and days, Israeli leaders have threatened to annex the West Bank and Jordan Valley, which would be a huge blow to the Jordanian monarchy and Jordanians of Palestinian origin; it could even jeopardize the 1994 peace treaty with Israel.
It’s a miracle Abdullah II has guided Jordan through these overwhelming economic and security challenges while maintaining such strong ties in the region and in the United States. It’s a lot to ask a 26-year-old to do the same, though he has been groomed exceptionally well and would presumably have help from his seasoned uncles—including Prince Faisal, who plays the most prominent supporting role to the king. Even a well-intentioned young leader could make missteps, with long-lasting consequences.
Additionally, the future king may need to work to earn the support of his population. It’s common knowledge that the Jordanian king relies on a traditional tribal power base of so-called East Bankers—those with roots in the kingdom and not in Palestine. Yet, that base’s role is rapidly changing and shrinking. There are no precise statistics, but it’s widely believed that half—if not more—of Jordan’s population consists of Palestinian “West Bankers.” This estimate includes both registered Palestinian refugees and Palestinians that have been largely assimilated into the population and are considered Jordanian by official counts. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has said there are also 660,000 registered Syrian refugees, approximately 70,000 Iraqi refugees, 15,000 Yemeni refugees, and 6,000 Sudanese refugees in Jordan.
In addition to being outnumbered, many Jordanian tribes and Bedouins are marginalized, mired in poverty, and susceptible to extremism. It’s not clear how popular Crown Prince Hussein would be among those tribes or that their support would be as relevant as in the past, given the increasingly diverse Jordanian population. Predictions that tribes are turning against the royal family or losing all influence may be overly hyped, but it’s safe to assume that the future King Hussein II will not necessarily be able to rely on the fabled traditional base.
And events in nearby countries don’t inspire confidence. The rise of other young leaders in the Middle East has brought about mistakes, clashes with domestic opponents, and spats with the United States. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has received the most attention, for allegedly ordering the murder of his enemies, prosecuting a brutal war in Yemen, his attempts to strong-arm regional friends and foes—including Abdullah—and his assault on domestic opposition.
Thankfully, it’s unlikely Crown Prince Hussein will jump headlong into regional adventures. By every indicator, he is competent, responsible, and devoted to his country. It’s also far-fetched to suggest that Hussein would do anything to jeopardize Jordan’s relations with the United States. Even so, it’s natural to expect him to make mistakes as a new leader, and he might find it difficult to manage competing agendas from Jordanians, Gulf partners, the United States, and Israel.
He could also be more vulnerable to coercion by wealthy Gulf neighbors, or even U.S. politicians who are not satisfied with Jordan’s response to Israeli aggression, including annexation threats. It should make U.S. policymakers uneasy to consider how this would impact Jordanian stability and U.S. interests in the region.
After all, plenty of Jordanian leaders have made their own mistakes. Jordanian elites today still go to great lengths to explain and apologize for King Hussein’s role in initiating early Arab wars against Israel. At 31 years old when the Six-Day War broke out in 1967, he was young and beholden to more influential pan-Arabist leaders such as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Records suggest it is true that he was reluctant to attack Israel, but felt had no choice but to participate in the war. As a consequence, Israel captured East Jerusalem and the West Bank, with consequences that remain at the center of the region’s political tensions to this day. Indeed, if Crown Prince Hussein’s grandfather and namesake had not participated or had been prominent enough to discourage his Arab counterparts from launching a war, Jordan might face a very different strategic reality than it does today.
To guard against the worst potential consequences of a Jordanian power transition, U.S. policymakers must make more of an effort to get to know the young crown prince and brace themselves for a highly unlikely but potentially catastrophic succession scenario.
Crown Prince Hussein is mostly an unknown commodity to Americans and Westerners, and his portfolio as king would be considerably bigger and less charming. It’s time for a real introductory tour—not of Silicon Valley but of Congress, the White House, and Washington think tanks—and a major televised interview to ensure that he has strong support from Congress and the U.S. public.
The Jordanian government should also make more of an effort to highlight the crown prince’s priorities and role in managing the country. The Jordanian government excels at public relations, but in this case, bringing the crown prince into the limelight is overdue.
Hussein II has slowly started playing a more visible role through international speaking engagements and visits with important U.S. private-sector players. He is constantly seen in the background of video reels and Instagram photos with his father, a noticeable change from just three years ago, when he was finishing his education at Georgetown University and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He is stepping up to lead Jordanian youth initiatives and call for technological innovation and a response to climate change. These are all good signs, as all of these issues are critical to Jordan’s future prosperity.
But as much as everyone loves Jordanian promotional videos of royal skydiving expeditions and motorcycle rides, they’re no substitute for a real policy discussion among Jordanian officials and their American friends.