foreignpolicy--2020-05-06--4 Reads on a Frighteningly Plausible Vision of the Future

4 Reads on a Frighteningly Plausible Vision of the Future I ’ ve never written a book review before , but then again I ’ ve never had such an enjoyable discomfort in reading a book before .
Four versions of me read Burn-In : A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution , the newest novel by P.W .
Singer and August Cole , and all four of my personas—cop , spy , writer , and citizen—felt the same after finishing it : thrilled and then worried .
Because Burn-In is fiction , but for how long ?
Burn-In is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plausibly could take place five years from now or 50 years .
The lack of a specified date is deliberate , and it is one of the more effective and unsettling aspects of the book .
The changes on view are already happening ; logical and uncomfortable extensions of choices consumers and governments make every day .
From the first page , the reader is dropped into an environment in which technology , politics , and society feel somewhat strange but certainly not foreign , out on the far edge of familiar .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ exists in some fashion , though not yet to scale .
A sign of the blurring between fact and fantasy is that Burn-In is a piece of fiction with detailed footnotes and sourcing .
The novel revolves around FBI agent Lara Keegan as she investigates a cascade of seemingly unrelated crimes and incidents .
Keegan is tasked to try out a robot partner , TAMS ( Tactical Autonomous Mobility System ) , as proof of concept ( or disproof of concept ) .
The economy is even more unequal than it is today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1930s Bonus Army , with armed and disgruntled military veterans camped out in semi-autonomous swaths across the Washington , D.C. , area .
Keegan , a veteran herself , must navigate the different landscapes—from poverty to affluence—as well as the politics of drones and automation in law enforcement and in society at large .
I ’ m a local cop in my hometown of Savannah , Georgia , so I read Burn-In with some serious high-tech envy and a real sense of sadness at the continued death of the traditional beat cop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do with decades-old technology : Think of the infamously long procurement process of the federal government but with no money .
Local law enforcement databases are siloed by jurisdiction and by bad design .
Most are also cumbersome and unforgiving when it comes to spelling of names and dates of birth , nothing as forgiving and almost anticipatory as Google .
Burn-In doesn ’ t focus on local police—the FBI takes center stage in the book—but it does show local D.C. police with capabilities beyond what I experience day to day .
I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ my job ; I focus on people and connections .
Burn-In does as well , but it does so through link analysis and pattern recognition powered by an artificial intelligence ( AI ) that blurs the line between human and computer in terms of learning and leaps of logic and even faith.The world in Burn-In is , like our one , one of endless collection and verification .
As a beat cop , I have tried to maximize the number of times that my neighbors—by which I mean the whole of the community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police .
I do that by asking myself this simple question : If I didn ’ t have a badge and a gun , how would I handle this call ?
My neighbors get the benefit of doubt every time .
Very few are criminals , and I act accordingly .
I have actually become less jaded about people the more I work with my neighbors as a police officer .
I also don ’ t trace every single person every single time I encounter them .
Yet the world in Burn-In is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ endless collection and verification .
Everyone is checked by cameras and in databases automatically ; there is no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion requirements for reading or storing the license plates of every car on public roadways or the facial recognition systems of ubiquitous security cameras in public places .
This collection is endless , and , increasingly , it is total .
I wear a camera on my body that records my interactions with my neighbors , and I love these cameras as I have nothing to hide .
It protects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighbors from disrespect or worse from police .
The relentless collection portrayed in Burn-In is more seamless and widespread than my current reality but probably not for long .
Knowing who has an active arrest warrant is important for a police officer , but it makes me uncomfortable to know that within a few years , I or my colleagues could be constantly passively scanning my neighbors .
A part of me wants to say that by relying on data and not face-to-face interactions , the investigators in Burn-In know everything and yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s not really true , is it ?
If you have enough data about a person ’ s movements , purchases , heath conditions , social and family connections , income , hobbies , and employment , you actually know a great deal .
What you don ’ t have , however , is context in terms of culture , religion , or ethnicity .
There are built-in biases in programing just as there are in human intelligence collection .
The sheer amount of data can provide invaluable leads and insight , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of knowledge .
I was a CIA operations officer in an earlier life , and I know the value of travel patterns and personal details .
The more you know about someone , the more accurate your approach and recruitment of a person of interest .
Intelligence agencies understand there is no such thing as trivial information if it is part of a pattern.Intelligence agencies understand there is no such thing as trivial information if it is part of a pattern .
Burn-In drives this point home in almost every scene .
Spy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ information that we give to Amazon or Facebook or Google .
These companies hold the real crown jewels of intelligence : complete work-ups on billions of people updated in real time .
The robotic partner of the main character in Burn-In pulls crucial details not so much from classified files but from open-source records and the social media diaries of countless people seeking connections .
From the perspective of a former intelligence officer , I can ’ t overstate the power of so much information in the hands of AI-enabled systems .
Traditional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ informed questioning , and a deep understanding of motivation and need .
The robot in Burn-In uses signals intelligence at such an effective and immediate level that it is essentially human-source intelligence .
Again , this is fiction , but , in the age of Fitbit and Apple Watches collecting almost infinite personal physical details , for how long ?
In scene after scene , Singer and Cole show how biometrics and facial recognition are an important part of a massive torrent of information that humans can ’ t comprehend and certainly can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ AI programs and , yes , robots or drones .
The robot knows when you ’ re lying based on changes in biometric readings , facial and eye movements , and changes in vocal patterns .
But again , the robot or drone is only as wise as its programmer ; AI systems have already shown troubling biases and flaws ; facial recognition software has a much higher false ID rate with black , Asian , and Hispanic faces .
I used to publish short stories in an even earlier life and marvel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weave in Burn-In .
The book is tech-heavy for sure , but it is also intensely human .
The way they build the relationship between Keegan and her new partner is effective and , yes , realistic .
Distrust gives way to a wary acceptance and then actual trust , as real as in any human relationship , because the authors take their time .
This anthropomorphic setup is not new in fiction : Viewers cheered for R2-D2 and C-3PO in Star Wars , and some of us—fine , it was me—might have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when the robotic cyborg assassin sacrifices himself for John Connor and humanity .
What is new is that the drones and robots and AI in Burn-In don ’ t feel futuristic ; they feel all too real .
This is also a plot-driven novel , and it is indeed quite a plot .
The writers have a story to tell , and they tell it well , with good old-fashioned writing overlaying the cutting-edge technology .
There are also some flat-out gorgeous lines in the novel : “ Dressed in brown canvas overalls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ buttons , he looked like an out-of-work construction worker going out to a watch club dinner .
The discarded clothes of two men who would never meet.
” And , finally , as a citizen , I read Burn-In with a mixture of dread and hope , not just over what might happen but because of what is happening right now , as societies wonder how to use endless personal data to help track the spread of the coronavirus .
Corporations are now governments unto themselves , minus the need for periodic elections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Apple now have unprecedented power in the form of information about all of us and are using that power as they wish.I read Burn-In with a mixture of dread and hope , not just over what might happen but because of what is happening right now .
People such as myself who dismiss the power of microtargeted ads are still manipulated by them ; that ’ s the whole point of these ads .
People say these ads or articles or memes don ’ t really have the power to swing elections or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ didn ’ t work , why are these companies so rich ?
The answer is these data-driven personal approaches work—or at least these corporations say they work , and because they are choking out the competition , there are increasingly less alternatives .
Burn-In is a powerful book not because it focuses on the technology but because it focuses on how we use that technology or how it uses us .
The time to have a public debate over what it means to have a society that values convenience over privacy and trusts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pretty much passed because we ’ ve already decided in favor of convenience and corporations .
These corporations are already framing the ongoing coronavirus pandemic as a chance to increase their monitoring and tracking of consumers , this time under the guise of public health .
I don ’ t know how we begin to walk back from this path that ends with Burn-In being fact and no longer fiction , but the cop , the spy , the writer , and the citizen in me all know that we should try .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ my own AI-powered robot .

I’ve never written a book review before, but then again I’ve never had such an enjoyable discomfort in reading a book before. Four versions of me read Burn-In: A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution, the newest novel by P.W. Singer and August Cole, and all four of my personas—cop, spy, writer, and citizen—felt the same after finishing it: thrilled and then worried. Because Burn-In is fiction, but for how long?
I’ve never written a book review before, but then again I’ve never had such an enjoyable discomfort in reading a book before. Four versions of me read Burn-In: A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution, the newest novel by P.W. Singer and August Cole, and all four of my personas—cop, spy, writer, and citizen—felt the same after finishing it: thrilled and then worried. Because Burn-In is fiction, but for how long?
Burn-In is set in an unspecified future; it plausibly could take place five years from now or 50 years. The lack of a specified date is deliberate, and it is one of the more effective and unsettling aspects of the book. The changes on view are already happening; logical and uncomfortable extensions of choices consumers and governments make every day. From the first page, the reader is dropped into an environment in which technology, politics, and society feel somewhat strange but certainly not foreign, out on the far edge of familiar. Everything Singer and Cole write about already exists in some fashion, though not yet to scale. A sign of the blurring between fact and fantasy is that Burn-In is a piece of fiction with detailed footnotes and sourcing.
Burn-In: A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution, P. W. Singer, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 432 pp., .54, May 26, 2020
The novel revolves around FBI agent Lara Keegan as she investigates a cascade of seemingly unrelated crimes and incidents. Keegan is tasked to try out a robot partner, TAMS (Tactical Autonomous Mobility System), as proof of concept (or disproof of concept). The economy is even more unequal than it is today. There is a modern-day version of the 1930s Bonus Army, with armed and disgruntled military veterans camped out in semi-autonomous swaths across the Washington, D.C., area. Keegan, a veteran herself, must navigate the different landscapes—from poverty to affluence—as well as the politics of drones and automation in law enforcement and in society at large.
The cop’s read
I’m a local cop in my hometown of Savannah, Georgia, so I read Burn-In with some serious high-tech envy and a real sense of sadness at the continued death of the traditional beat cop. Local police departments tend to make do with decades-old technology: Think of the infamously long procurement process of the federal government but with no money. Local law enforcement databases are siloed by jurisdiction and by bad design. Most are also cumbersome and unforgiving when it comes to spelling of names and dates of birth, nothing as forgiving and almost anticipatory as Google.
Burn-In doesn’t focus on local police—the FBI takes center stage in the book—but it does show local D.C. police with capabilities beyond what I experience day to day. I don’t focus on weapons in my job; I focus on people and connections. Burn-In does as well, but it does so through link analysis and pattern recognition powered by an artificial intelligence (AI) that blurs the line between human and computer in terms of learning and leaps of logic and even faith.The world in Burn-In is, like our one, one of endless collection and verification.
As a beat cop, I have tried to maximize the number of times that my neighbors—by which I mean the whole of the community I serve—feel neither scrutinized nor suspected by police. I do that by asking myself this simple question: If I didn’t have a badge and a gun, how would I handle this call? My neighbors get the benefit of doubt every time. Very few are criminals, and I act accordingly. I have actually become less jaded about people the more I work with my neighbors as a police officer. I also don’t trace every single person every single time I encounter them.
Yet the world in Burn-In is, like our one, one of endless collection and verification. Everyone is checked by cameras and in databases automatically; there is no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion requirements for reading or storing the license plates of every car on public roadways or the facial recognition systems of ubiquitous security cameras in public places. This collection is endless, and, increasingly, it is total.
I wear a camera on my body that records my interactions with my neighbors, and I love these cameras as I have nothing to hide. It protects me from baseless allegations and protects my neighbors from disrespect or worse from police. The relentless collection portrayed in Burn-In is more seamless and widespread than my current reality but probably not for long. Knowing who has an active arrest warrant is important for a police officer, but it makes me uncomfortable to know that within a few years, I or my colleagues could be constantly passively scanning my neighbors.
A part of me wants to say that by relying on data and not face-to-face interactions, the investigators in Burn-In know everything and yet nothing about the people they pursue—but that’s not really true, is it? If you have enough data about a person’s movements, purchases, heath conditions, social and family connections, income, hobbies, and employment, you actually know a great deal. What you don’t have, however, is context in terms of culture, religion, or ethnicity. There are built-in biases in programing just as there are in human intelligence collection. The sheer amount of data can provide invaluable leads and insight, but it can also give the appearance of knowledge.
The spy’s read
I was a CIA operations officer in an earlier life, and I know the value of travel patterns and personal details. The more you know about someone, the more accurate your approach and recruitment of a person of interest. Intelligence agencies understand there is no such thing as trivial information if it is part of a pattern.Intelligence agencies understand there is no such thing as trivial information if it is part of a pattern.
Burn-In drives this point home in almost every scene. Spy agencies can only dream of having the information that we give to Amazon or Facebook or Google. These companies hold the real crown jewels of intelligence: complete work-ups on billions of people updated in real time. The robotic partner of the main character in Burn-In pulls crucial details not so much from classified files but from open-source records and the social media diaries of countless people seeking connections. From the perspective of a former intelligence officer, I can’t overstate the power of so much information in the hands of AI-enabled systems.
Traditional human-source espionage relies on rapport-based connections, informed questioning, and a deep understanding of motivation and need. The robot in Burn-In uses signals intelligence at such an effective and immediate level that it is essentially human-source intelligence. Again, this is fiction, but, in the age of Fitbit and Apple Watches collecting almost infinite personal physical details, for how long?
In scene after scene, Singer and Cole show how biometrics and facial recognition are an important part of a massive torrent of information that humans can’t comprehend and certainly can’t effectively use without relying on AI programs and, yes, robots or drones. The robot knows when you’re lying based on changes in biometric readings, facial and eye movements, and changes in vocal patterns. But again, the robot or drone is only as wise as its programmer; AI systems have already shown troubling biases and flaws; facial recognition software has a much higher false ID rate with black, Asian, and Hispanic faces.
The writer’s read
I used to publish short stories in an even earlier life and marvel at the narrative that Singer and Cole weave in Burn-In. The book is tech-heavy for sure, but it is also intensely human. The way they build the relationship between Keegan and her new partner is effective and, yes, realistic. Distrust gives way to a wary acceptance and then actual trust, as real as in any human relationship, because the authors take their time. This anthropomorphic setup is not new in fiction: Viewers cheered for R2-D2 and C-3PO in Star Wars, and some of us—fine, it was me—might have cried at the end of Terminator 2 when the robotic cyborg assassin sacrifices himself for John Connor and humanity. What is new is that the drones and robots and AI in Burn-In don’t feel futuristic; they feel all too real. This is also a plot-driven novel, and it is indeed quite a plot. The writers have a story to tell, and they tell it well, with good old-fashioned writing overlaying the cutting-edge technology. There are also some flat-out gorgeous lines in the novel: “Dressed in brown canvas overalls topped by a blue blazer with gold buttons, he looked like an out-of-work construction worker going out to a watch club dinner. The discarded clothes of two men who would never meet.”
The citizen’s read
And, finally, as a citizen, I read Burn-In with a mixture of dread and hope, not just over what might happen but because of what is happening right now, as societies wonder how to use endless personal data to help track the spread of the coronavirus. Corporations are now governments unto themselves, minus the need for periodic elections. Companies like Facebook and Google and Apple now have unprecedented power in the form of information about all of us and are using that power as they wish.I read Burn-In with a mixture of dread and hope, not just over what might happen but because of what is happening right now.
People such as myself who dismiss the power of microtargeted ads are still manipulated by them; that’s the whole point of these ads. People say these ads or articles or memes don’t really have the power to swing elections or referendums or purchases, but if they didn’t work, why are these companies so rich? The answer is these data-driven personal approaches work—or at least these corporations say they work, and because they are choking out the competition, there are increasingly less alternatives.
Burn-In is a powerful book not because it focuses on the technology but because it focuses on how we use that technology or how it uses us. The time to have a public debate over what it means to have a society that values convenience over privacy and trusts the motives of corporations over governments has pretty much passed because we’ve already decided in favor of convenience and corporations. These corporations are already framing the ongoing coronavirus pandemic as a chance to increase their monitoring and tracking of consumers, this time under the guise of public health. I don’t know how we begin to walk back from this path that ends with Burn-In being fact and no longer fiction, but the cop, the spy, the writer, and the citizen in me all know that we should try. And I would also very much like my own AI-powered robot.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-06--Singapore Is Trying to Forget Migrant Workers Are People

Singapore Is Trying to Forget Migrant Workers Are People In the evening of April 25 , residential blocks in Singapore burst into coordinated cacophony as people participated in “ Sing Together Singapore !
” —an initiative aimed at expressing support for the country ’ s front-line and migrant workers .
The song of choice was “ Home , ” a popular patriotic song with poignant verses that seem particularly relevant at a difficult time : “ When there are troubles to go through / We ’ ll find a way to start anew / There is comfort in the knowledge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people too.
” But who is included in the “ people ” that “ home ” is about ?
While Singapore might be willing to organize a singalong as a show of # SGUnited solidarity , actual solidarity is in limited supply when it comes to the thousands of migrant workers now stuck in their dormitories as a second outbreak ravages the city-state that once prided itself on its success against the coronavirus .
Instead , policy and public discussions clearly segregate—both physically and rhetorically—migrant workers from the rest of the population .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ skyrocketed in migrant worker dormitories—where men from India , Bangladesh , and China live in cramped rooms of about 12 to 20 inhabitants , making social distancing impossible—the government adopted the strategy of treating the situation as one of “ two separate infections , ” one affecting migrant workers in dormitories and another circulating within “ our own community ” in Singapore , as relayed by National Development Minister Lawrence Wong .
Since then , daily reports have disaggregated case numbers into the following categories : imported , community cases ( referring to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on work visas ) , work permit holders not residing in dorms , and dorm residents .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic . ]
This separation of migrant workers from the rest of the community is nothing new .
Low-wage migrant workers have long existed in an underclass of their own : Unlike other immigrants who receive employment passes , migrant workers are given work permits that preclude any possibility of one day obtaining long-term residency status in Singapore .
Such is the determination to block @ @ @ @ @ @ @ permit holders are banned from marrying Singaporean citizens or permanent residents unless they receive permission from the government .
Most workers incur significant amounts of debt to pay the agent fees that allow them to come to Singapore to fill the roles that most locals are unwilling to take on at that low rate of pay : domestic workers , construction workers , shipyard workers , cleaners , etc .
While female migrant domestic workers live in their employers ’ homes , as required by law , male workers are put up in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , on-site lodgings , or privately rented accommodation .
Their work permits are also tied to their specific employers , who have the power to cancel the permit and repatriate them .
To handle community cases , Singapore is now in the middle of a partial lockdown the government prefers to call a “ circuit breaker.
” During this period , classes have shifted online , nonessential workplaces are shut , and anyone found breaching social distancing measures can be fined .
Originally meant to end on May 4 , the partial lockdown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For the purpose-built and factory-converted dormitories that house 323,000 migrant men , much harsher measures have been imposed—and here the government does use the word “ lockdown.
” More than 20 dormitories have been listed under the Infectious Diseases Act as “ isolation areas.
” Thousands of migrant workers have been confined into rooms of varying standards ; while some say they ’ re bored but otherwise doing all right , others have told me that their rooms are unbearably hot and stuffy as the tropical island sees temperatures that can go up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fasting for Ramadan have also reported issues with the quantity and quality of the catered food that they must now eat in their rooms .
Among the general population , the idea is still to flatten the curve ; in the dormitories , though , that curve may have bent far out of control .
As of May 6 , 17,758 dormitory residents have tested positive for the virus , forming 88 percent of all the cases in Singapore .
In some dormitories , COVID-19 has spread so far that anyone diagnosed with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have the coronavirus and isolated .
For now , these cases aren ’ t included in the daily situation report , which provides only the number of confirmed infections .
As of May 6 , 17,758 dormitory residents have tested positive for the virus , forming 88 percent of all the cases in Singapore .
The focus of Singapore ’ s approach is to ring-fence the virus within these dormitories , so as to prevent infections from spilling out into the wider population .
This might make sense to those of us who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of reported cases , but it ’ s cold comfort to the workers currently feeling trapped in their rooms .
While Singaporeans are urged—with limited success—to download apps like TraceTogether to aid in contact tracing efforts , within the crowded dorms it can feel much more like an exercise of “ getting infected together.
” When I spoke to workers over the phone about their confinement , they described an atmosphere of anxiety and fear that comes from not being able to practice social distancing properly even as they wonder if they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already been infected .
Ultimately , the government ’ s response to the outbreak within the migrant worker population is a demonstration of Singaporean utilitarianism .
Despite their large numbers—there are close to 1 million work permit holders in Singapore—migrant workers are viewed only as digits on a spreadsheet of menial labor , to be deployed as resources when necessary and kept out of sight when not .
Even before COVID-19 hit the dormitories hard , migrant labor rights groups were urging the government to come up with measures to address conditions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that leave workers vulnerable to outbreaks of disease .
The government has since taken steps to reduce density in the dormitories—but with a priority on moving out workers in essential services , such as those who clean public housing estates or maintain the broadband networks that allow everyone else to work , study , and socialize from home .
This utilitarian , dehumanizing approach has been heartily embraced by the mainstream discourse .
Salma Khalik , a senior health correspondent for the Straits Times ( Singapore ’ s only English-language general news broadsheet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exact numbers of [ migrant workers in dormitories ] getting infected each day are not of critical importance in terms of policy decisions ” since the workers are isolated and “ the virus has been contained within this group.
” The numbers will only become important again , she says , when Singapore begins to lift lockdown measures , because there would then be the potential of unidentified cases among these workers spreading COVID-19 to the rest of the population .
Within this formulation , the suffering among the migrant workers themselves is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the community , distinctions are being made .
First , there are citizens , permanent residents , and the white-collar expatriates with employment passes .
Then there are the work permit holders who don ’ t live in dormitories .
It ’ s obvious , Khalik says , why the number of COVID-19 cases in the first category are important , but she reminds the reader to pay attention to the second category since “ it includes domestic workers living with local families , as well as workers living in Housing Board @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sense to adopt different approaches to take into account the different ways COVID-19 affects different groups , Singaporean utilitarianism doesn ’ t see the struggles faced by work permit holders as real issues hurting a marginalized group of people .
In fact , it barely sees them as people at all .
Instead , it views the problem through the lens of “ Now , how will this inconvenience us ?
” In 2010 , Yeo Guat Kwang , the chairman of the Migrant Workers ’ Centre , an initiative by Singapore ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of employers , told China Labour Bulletin : “ When we look at the migrant workers ’ issue , we are not looking at it from the perspective of human rights .
We are looking at it on a need basis .
… Like it or not , we need to sustain and grow an economy that is able to generate an annual per capita [ GDP ] of US $ 35,000 .
At the end of the day , whatever factors would be able to help us to sustain the growth of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countrymen , for the benefit of our country ; we will definitely go for it.
” It ’ s this attitude that got Singapore into this situation in the first place ; for years , warnings and criticism from rights groups were brushed off as complaints , noise , and bleeding heart idealism .
While the government insists that migrant workers were on its radar from the beginning of the outbreak , it has also revealed that about 20 dormitory operators and an average of 1,200 employers are penalized each year for flouting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not only a long-standing problem but one that has not been effectively addressed .
Now that activists have been proved right in the most miserable way , Singapore still struggles with seeing migrant workers as equally valuable members of the community .
This posture throughout the COVID-19 outbreak will not only hamper efforts for systemic change post-pandemic but places migrant workers in an even more vulnerable position in society .
As the establishment continues to assure Singaporeans that there are two separate infections , and that only the outbreak among migrant workers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blaming the workers for destroying Singapore ’ s “ gold standard ” response .
Other online comments berate workers who raise issues with the quality of their food , telling them to be “ grateful ” that Singapore is providing them with food in the first place .
Already stigmatized as dirty and threats to public order ( when it comes to the mostly South Asian construction laborers ) , or potential homewreckers who need to be carefully watched ( for the female migrant domestic workers ) , the singling out of work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discourse perpetuates the notion of them as vectors of disease , further feeding the twin beasts of racism and xenophobia .
This problem can ’ t be solved with singalongs , but a unified chorus might turn out to be as far as Singapore is prepared to go .

In the evening of April 25, residential blocks in Singapore burst into coordinated cacophony as people participated in “ Sing Together Singapore! ”—an initiative aimed at expressing support for the country’s front-line and migrant workers.
In the evening of April 25, residential blocks in Singapore burst into coordinated cacophony as people participated in “Sing Together Singapore!”—an initiative aimed at expressing support for the country’s front-line and migrant workers.
The song of choice was “Home,” a popular patriotic song with poignant verses that seem particularly relevant at a difficult time: “When there are troubles to go through / We’ll find a way to start anew / There is comfort in the knowledge / That home’s about its people too.”
But who is included in the “people” that “home” is about? While Singapore might be willing to organize a singalong as a show of #SGUnited solidarity, actual solidarity is in limited supply when it comes to the thousands of migrant workers now stuck in their dormitories as a second outbreak ravages the city-state that once prided itself on its success against the coronavirus. Instead, policy and public discussions clearly segregate—both physically and rhetorically—migrant workers from the rest of the population.
As the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases skyrocketed in migrant worker dormitories—where men from India, Bangladesh, and China live in cramped rooms of about 12 to 20 inhabitants, making social distancing impossible—the government adopted the strategy of treating the situation as one of “two separate infections,” one affecting migrant workers in dormitories and another circulating within “our own community” in Singapore, as relayed by National Development Minister Lawrence Wong. Since then, daily reports have disaggregated case numbers into the following categories: imported, community cases (referring to citizens, permanent residents, and expatriates on work visas), work permit holders not residing in dorms, and dorm residents.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
This separation of migrant workers from the rest of the community is nothing new. Low-wage migrant workers have long existed in an underclass of their own: Unlike other immigrants who receive employment passes, migrant workers are given work permits that preclude any possibility of one day obtaining long-term residency status in Singapore. Such is the determination to block their path to potential citizenship that work permit holders are banned from marrying Singaporean citizens or permanent residents unless they receive permission from the government.
Most workers incur significant amounts of debt to pay the agent fees that allow them to come to Singapore to fill the roles that most locals are unwilling to take on at that low rate of pay: domestic workers, construction workers, shipyard workers, cleaners, etc. While female migrant domestic workers live in their employers’ homes, as required by law, male workers are put up in large purpose-built dormitories, former industrial buildings, on-site lodgings, or privately rented accommodation. Their work permits are also tied to their specific employers, who have the power to cancel the permit and repatriate them.
To handle community cases, Singapore is now in the middle of a partial lockdown the government prefers to call a “circuit breaker.” During this period, classes have shifted online, nonessential workplaces are shut, and anyone found breaching social distancing measures can be fined. Originally meant to end on May 4, the partial lockdown has been extended to June 1.
For the purpose-built and factory-converted dormitories that house 323,000 migrant men, much harsher measures have been imposed—and here the government does use the word “lockdown.” More than 20 dormitories have been listed under the Infectious Diseases Act as “isolation areas.” Thousands of migrant workers have been confined into rooms of varying standards; while some say they’re bored but otherwise doing all right, others have told me that their rooms are unbearably hot and stuffy as the tropical island sees temperatures that can go up to 95 degrees Fahrenheit. Bangladeshi workers fasting for Ramadan have also reported issues with the quantity and quality of the catered food that they must now eat in their rooms.
Among the general population, the idea is still to flatten the curve; in the dormitories, though, that curve may have bent far out of control. As of May 6, 17,758 dormitory residents have tested positive for the virus, forming 88 percent of all the cases in Singapore. In some dormitories, COVID-19 has spread so far that anyone diagnosed with a respiratory illness is automatically deemed to have the coronavirus and isolated. For now, these cases aren’t included in the daily situation report, which provides only the number of confirmed infections.
As of May 6, 17,758 dormitory residents have tested positive for the virus, forming 88 percent of all the cases in Singapore.
The focus of Singapore’s approach is to ring-fence the virus within these dormitories, so as to prevent infections from spilling out into the wider population. This might make sense to those of us who are outside and alarmed by the increasing number of reported cases, but it’s cold comfort to the workers currently feeling trapped in their rooms.
While Singaporeans are urged—with limited success—to download apps like TraceTogether to aid in contact tracing efforts, within the crowded dorms it can feel much more like an exercise of “getting infected together.” When I spoke to workers over the phone about their confinement, they described an atmosphere of anxiety and fear that comes from not being able to practice social distancing properly even as they wonder if they, or those near them, have already been infected.
Ultimately, the government’s response to the outbreak within the migrant worker population is a demonstration of Singaporean utilitarianism. Despite their large numbers—there are close to 1 million work permit holders in Singapore—migrant workers are viewed only as digits on a spreadsheet of menial labor, to be deployed as resources when necessary and kept out of sight when not.
Even before COVID-19 hit the dormitories hard, migrant labor rights groups were urging the government to come up with measures to address conditions, such as overcrowding and sanitation issues, that leave workers vulnerable to outbreaks of disease. The government has since taken steps to reduce density in the dormitories—but with a priority on moving out workers in essential services, such as those who clean public housing estates or maintain the broadband networks that allow everyone else to work, study, and socialize from home.
This utilitarian, dehumanizing approach has been heartily embraced by the mainstream discourse. Salma Khalik, a senior health correspondent for the Straits Times (Singapore’s only English-language general news broadsheet), has argued that “the exact numbers of [migrant workers in dormitories] getting infected each day are not of critical importance in terms of policy decisions” since the workers are isolated and “the virus has been contained within this group.” The numbers will only become important again, she says, when Singapore begins to lift lockdown measures, because there would then be the potential of unidentified cases among these workers spreading COVID-19 to the rest of the population. Within this formulation, the suffering among the migrant workers themselves is of no interest.
Even among cases in the community, distinctions are being made. First, there are citizens, permanent residents, and the white-collar expatriates with employment passes. Then there are the work permit holders who don’t live in dormitories. It’s obvious, Khalik says, why the number of COVID-19 cases in the first category are important, but she reminds the reader to pay attention to the second category since “it includes domestic workers living with local families, as well as workers living in Housing Board flats and shophouses.”
While it makes sense to adopt different approaches to take into account the different ways COVID-19 affects different groups, Singaporean utilitarianism doesn’t see the struggles faced by work permit holders as real issues hurting a marginalized group of people. In fact, it barely sees them as people at all. Instead, it views the problem through the lens of “Now, how will this inconvenience us?”
In 2010, Yeo Guat Kwang, the chairman of the Migrant Workers’ Centre, an initiative by Singapore’s labor movement and the national federation of employers, told China Labour Bulletin: “When we look at the migrant workers’ issue, we are not looking at it from the perspective of human rights. We are looking at it on a need basis. … Like it or not, we need to sustain and grow an economy that is able to generate an annual per capita [GDP] of US$35,000. At the end of the day, whatever factors would be able to help us to sustain the growth of the economy for the benefit of our countrymen, for the benefit of our country; we will definitely go for it.”
It’s this attitude that got Singapore into this situation in the first place; for years, warnings and criticism from rights groups were brushed off as complaints, noise, and bleeding heart idealism. While the government insists that migrant workers were on its radar from the beginning of the outbreak, it has also revealed that about 20 dormitory operators and an average of 1,200 employers are penalized each year for flouting licensing laws—which suggests that substandard living conditions are not only a long-standing problem but one that has not been effectively addressed. Now that activists have been proved right in the most miserable way, Singapore still struggles with seeing migrant workers as equally valuable members of the community.
This posture throughout the COVID-19 outbreak will not only hamper efforts for systemic change post-pandemic but places migrant workers in an even more vulnerable position in society. As the establishment continues to assure Singaporeans that there are two separate infections, and that only the outbreak among migrant workers is bad, some Singaporeans are already blaming the workers for destroying Singapore’s “gold standard” response. Other online comments berate workers who raise issues with the quality of their food, telling them to be “grateful” that Singapore is providing them with food in the first place.
Already stigmatized as dirty and threats to public order (when it comes to the mostly South Asian construction laborers), or potential homewreckers who need to be carefully watched (for the female migrant domestic workers), the singling out of work permit holders in Singapore’s COVID-19 discourse perpetuates the notion of them as vectors of disease, further feeding the twin beasts of racism and xenophobia. This problem can’t be solved with singalongs, but a unified chorus might turn out to be as far as Singapore is prepared to go.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-06--Trump Taps Point Man to Remove Pentagon Officials Seen as Disloyal

Trump Taps Point Man to Remove Pentagon Officials Seen as Disloyal In another move aimed at consolidating control over policy and messaging , the Trump administration is sending a White House loyalist to serve in a key Defense Department policy role that officials are worried is aimed at weeding out civilians not loyal to the president , Foreign Policy has learned .
Michael Cutrone , who has been detailed as Vice President Mike Pence ’ s top national security aide for South Asia , is set to arrive at the Pentagon to serve in a behind-the-scenes role vetting Defense Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to two current administration officials .
Some officials fear that the arrival of Cutrone and other planned personnel moves at the Pentagon could undercut Defense Secretary Mark Esper as the White House has looked to put in place more defense officials loyal to the president , headlined by the reported pick of retired Army Brig .
Gen. Anthony Tata as the agency ’ s top policy official , who caught President Donald Trump ’ s eye as a Fox News commentator .
“ He is pushing to replace and remove civilians in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House , ” one current senior administration official told Foreign Policy of Cutrone ’ s plans to reshuffle officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense .
“ Esper has no say in who the key people are going into senior positions.
” In the months since his impeachment trial in the Senate , Trump has purged officials considered independent and appointed political loyalists to a number of senior positions , ousting the U.S. government ’ s top oversight official , Glenn Fine , last month and nominating a permanent successor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the Pentagon .
Trump also fired the intelligence community ’ s top oversight official , Michael Atkinson , in April , who told lawmakers about the whistleblower complaint over the White House ’ s hold of military aid to Ukraine that launched an impeachment inquiry .
It was not immediately clear when Cutrone , who is leaving his career-track position as a CIA analyst to become a political appointee , will take on his new role as principal deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs .
He replaces Dave Trulio , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s undersecretary for policy , who filled the job temporarily before leaving the department this year .
Officials say the new job would allow Cutrone to scrutinize Pentagon staffing without a public-facing side to his job .
The Pentagon told Foreign Policy in a statement that it had “ no personnel announcement with regard to that person or that position , and we don ’ t have any information about any other speculation ” in the story .
A White House official told Foreign Policy that Cutrone was selected as a recognized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ portfolio , which includes overseeing policy for NATO bloc nations , Africa , and the Middle East .
This latest personnel move has drawn concern from veteran Pentagon officials , who fear that the few remaining appointees in place empowered to push back on underdeveloped policy ideas will be removed from their posts or undermined , marking much tighter White House control than it had under former Defense Secretary James Mattis , who was close to many of the agency ’ s political appointees .
Kathryn Wheelbarger , a former Senate Armed Services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ permanently holds the role set for Cutrone but has been serving as an acting assistant secretary for international affairs for more than 18 months .
The White House official told Foreign Policy that the move would not impact Wheelbarger , who was sent forward this year as the Trump administration ’ s intended nominee for undersecretary of intelligence .
But the current senior administration official told Foreign Policy that Wheelbarger ’ s ties to McCain , a noted Trump critic , and Mattis were preventing the administration from putting her up for any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wheelbarger ’ s nomination had been held up amid concerns from some Trump aides she was not sufficiently loyal to the president .
“ She ’ s the only person holding down the fort , and she ’ s vulnerable .
She has no top cover , ” said Bilal Saab , who was until recently a senior advisor on Middle East issues at the Pentagon .
“ Points of resistance to really bad policy ideas keep evaporating one after the other , ” added Saab , now a senior fellow at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cutrone is taking cues on staffing issues from Pence ’ s office , where he served for nearly three years .
Other former colleagues who worked with Cutrone said he was not an ideologue and had carved out a reputation as an expert on Afghanistan and other South Asia issues .
“ In the Pence office , there wasn ’ t a fealty box to check , ” said one person familiar with Cutrone , who has been detailed to the vice president ’ s office since 2017 .
Most of the ranks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Trump .
But in spite of that , there has been a more concerted focus by the Trump administration to remove appointees seen as close with former Defense Secretary Mattis , who pushed back on the president ’ s treatment of NATO allies , withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal , and abrupt exit from the counter-Islamic State mission in Syria , prompting the retired Marine Corps general to resign as Pentagon chief in December 2018 .
“ It ’ s becoming a bit of a purge , ” said Jim Townsend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Obama administration .
He said that as the administration stacks the Pentagon with a fresh wave of appointees who may not have as much defense policy experience , it can create friction between them and the civil service and military staffers .
That , in turn , can throw sand in the gears of the policymaking process .
“ Some of these true believers … they might not know how to work with the bureaucracy , they might not know the issues as well , and they ’ re feeling the pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Cutrone will be talking to deputy assistant secretaries , the key issue area managers for Pentagon policy , to vet for appointees not aligned with the White House , the senior administration official said .
Surprising many , Cutrone helped nix the appointment of Seth Jones , a well-respected former advisor to U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan who was set to become the Pentagon ’ s top policy official to the war-torn country , by pointing attention to the think tank expert ’ s contributions to non-Trump-aligned political candidates , officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ declined a request to comment for this story .
The sidelining of Jones comes as more appointees close to Trump have made headlines , including Lou Bremer , a former Navy SEAL about whom the White House filed notice of its formal intent to nominate as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict—a role that has been left without a Senate-confirmed appointee for almost a year .
Former officials said Owen West , the last full-time appointee to hold that role , his acting successor Mark Mitchell , and fired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were part of a Mattis-aligned contingent that pushed back on “ more extreme ” White House policy positions .
Simone Ledeen , another political loyalist , also recently took over as deputy assistant secretary for Middle East affairs .
Ledeen has served in positions at the Pentagon and Treasury Department in the past and as an executive at an international bank .
Her father , Michael Leeden , is a prominent conservative foreign-policy thinker who advised the Pentagon and State Department during the George W. Bush administration .
It is not clear whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other civilians for potential cuts , as the president has stepped in to appoint more loyalists to the Pentagon after Rood departed in February after staunchly opposing many of Trump ’ s initiatives , including up-tempo strikes against Iranian targets and the withholding of U.S. military aid for Ukraine that eventually triggered an impeachment inquiry .
Even amid the coronavirus pandemic , the Pentagon has looked to keep the pace of nominations moving forward .
On Thursday , the Senate Armed Services Committee will host Kenneth Braithwaite , Trump ’ s former ambassador @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Esper , for a confirmation hearing to be the next Navy secretary .
He will face questions from the Senate alongside James Anderson , tapped to be the Pentagon ’ s No .
2 policy official , and Gen. Charles Q .
Brown , nominated to be Air Force chief of staff .
Along with announcing his intent to nominate Bremer on Monday , Trump also said the administration would tap Shon Manasco as undersecretary of the Air Force , Michele Pearce to be Army general counsel , and John Whitley to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assessment and program evaluation .
But with lawmakers already squeezed into a tight legislative calendar by the coronavirus pandemic , former officials are worried that the administration could be pushing through too many unseasoned bureaucrats into high-level Pentagon roles .
“ The end of the administration is not when the seasoned , cool hands come in , ” said Townsend , the former Pentagon official .
“ It ’ s when they ’ re cramming people in .
”

In another move aimed at consolidating control over policy and messaging, the Trump administration is sending a White House loyalist to serve in a key Defense Department policy role that officials are worried is aimed at weeding out civilians not loyal to the president, Foreign Policy has learned.
In another move aimed at consolidating control over policy and messaging, the Trump administration is sending a White House loyalist to serve in a key Defense Department policy role that officials are worried is aimed at weeding out civilians not loyal to the president, Foreign Policy has learned.
Michael Cutrone, who has been detailed as Vice President Mike Pence’s top national security aide for South Asia, is set to arrive at the Pentagon to serve in a behind-the-scenes role vetting Defense Department officials for loyalty to the president, according to two current administration officials.
Some officials fear that the arrival of Cutrone and other planned personnel moves at the Pentagon could undercut Defense Secretary Mark Esper as the White House has looked to put in place more defense officials loyal to the president, headlined by the reported pick of retired Army Brig. Gen. Anthony Tata as the agency’s top policy official, who caught President Donald Trump’s eye as a Fox News commentator.
“He is pushing to replace and remove civilians in OSD that are not aligned with the White House,” one current senior administration official told Foreign Policy of Cutrone’s plans to reshuffle officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Esper has no say in who the key people are going into senior positions.”
In the months since his impeachment trial in the Senate, Trump has purged officials considered independent and appointed political loyalists to a number of senior positions, ousting the U.S. government’s top oversight official, Glenn Fine, last month and nominating a permanent successor in his place for his day job at the Pentagon. Trump also fired the intelligence community’s top oversight official, Michael Atkinson, in April, who told lawmakers about the whistleblower complaint over the White House’s hold of military aid to Ukraine that launched an impeachment inquiry.
It was not immediately clear when Cutrone, who is leaving his career-track position as a CIA analyst to become a political appointee, will take on his new role as principal deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs. He replaces Dave Trulio, the former chief of staff for the Pentagon’s undersecretary for policy, who filled the job temporarily before leaving the department this year.
Officials say the new job would allow Cutrone to scrutinize Pentagon staffing without a public-facing side to his job. The Pentagon told Foreign Policy in a statement that it had “no personnel announcement with regard to that person or that position, and we don’t have any information about any other speculation” in the story.
A White House official told Foreign Policy that Cutrone was selected as a recognized national security professional to help lead the portfolio, which includes overseeing policy for NATO bloc nations, Africa, and the Middle East.
This latest personnel move has drawn concern from veteran Pentagon officials, who fear that the few remaining appointees in place empowered to push back on underdeveloped policy ideas will be removed from their posts or undermined, marking much tighter White House control than it had under former Defense Secretary James Mattis, who was close to many of the agency’s political appointees.
Kathryn Wheelbarger, a former Senate Armed Services Committee staffer for Sen. John McCain, permanently holds the role set for Cutrone but has been serving as an acting assistant secretary for international affairs for more than 18 months.
The White House official told Foreign Policy that the move would not impact Wheelbarger, who was sent forward this year as the Trump administration’s intended nominee for undersecretary of intelligence.
But the current senior administration official told Foreign Policy that Wheelbarger’s ties to McCain, a noted Trump critic, and Mattis were preventing the administration from putting her up for any confirmation. Politico reported in March that Wheelbarger’s nomination had been held up amid concerns from some Trump aides she was not sufficiently loyal to the president.
“She’s the only person holding down the fort, and she’s vulnerable. She has no top cover,” said Bilal Saab, who was until recently a senior advisor on Middle East issues at the Pentagon.
“Points of resistance to really bad policy ideas keep evaporating one after the other,” added Saab, now a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.
Defense officials believe Cutrone is taking cues on staffing issues from Pence’s office, where he served for nearly three years. Other former colleagues who worked with Cutrone said he was not an ideologue and had carved out a reputation as an expert on Afghanistan and other South Asia issues. “In the Pence office, there wasn’t a fealty box to check,” said one person familiar with Cutrone, who has been detailed to the vice president’s office since 2017.
Most of the ranks of those officials are already appointees tapped by Trump. But in spite of that, there has been a more concerted focus by the Trump administration to remove appointees seen as close with former Defense Secretary Mattis, who pushed back on the president’s treatment of NATO allies, withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, and abrupt exit from the counter-Islamic State mission in Syria, prompting the retired Marine Corps general to resign as Pentagon chief in December 2018.
“It’s becoming a bit of a purge,” said Jim Townsend, a former Pentagon policy official during the Obama administration. He said that as the administration stacks the Pentagon with a fresh wave of appointees who may not have as much defense policy experience, it can create friction between them and the civil service and military staffers. That, in turn, can throw sand in the gears of the policymaking process. “Some of these true believers … they might not know how to work with the bureaucracy, they might not know the issues as well, and they’re feeling the pressure from the bosses,” he said.
Cutrone will be talking to deputy assistant secretaries, the key issue area managers for Pentagon policy, to vet for appointees not aligned with the White House, the senior administration official said.
Surprising many, Cutrone helped nix the appointment of Seth Jones, a well-respected former advisor to U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan who was set to become the Pentagon’s top policy official to the war-torn country, by pointing attention to the think tank expert’s contributions to non-Trump-aligned political candidates, officials familiar with the matter say. Jones declined a request to comment for this story.
The sidelining of Jones comes as more appointees close to Trump have made headlines, including Lou Bremer, a former Navy SEAL about whom the White House filed notice of its formal intent to nominate as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict—a role that has been left without a Senate-confirmed appointee for almost a year. Former officials said Owen West, the last full-time appointee to hold that role, his acting successor Mark Mitchell, and fired Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John Rood were part of a Mattis-aligned contingent that pushed back on “more extreme” White House policy positions.
Simone Ledeen, another political loyalist, also recently took over as deputy assistant secretary for Middle East affairs. Ledeen has served in positions at the Pentagon and Treasury Department in the past and as an executive at an international bank. Her father, Michael Leeden, is a prominent conservative foreign-policy thinker who advised the Pentagon and State Department during the George W. Bush administration.
It is not clear whether Cutrone or the White House has identified other civilians for potential cuts, as the president has stepped in to appoint more loyalists to the Pentagon after Rood departed in February after staunchly opposing many of Trump’s initiatives, including up-tempo strikes against Iranian targets and the withholding of U.S. military aid for Ukraine that eventually triggered an impeachment inquiry.
Even amid the coronavirus pandemic, the Pentagon has looked to keep the pace of nominations moving forward. On Thursday, the Senate Armed Services Committee will host Kenneth Braithwaite, Trump’s former ambassador to Norway and a personal friend of Esper, for a confirmation hearing to be the next Navy secretary. He will face questions from the Senate alongside James Anderson, tapped to be the Pentagon’s No. 2 policy official, and Gen. Charles Q. Brown, nominated to be Air Force chief of staff.
Along with announcing his intent to nominate Bremer on Monday, Trump also said the administration would tap Shon Manasco as undersecretary of the Air Force, Michele Pearce to be Army general counsel, and John Whitley to be the Pentagon’s director of cost assessment and program evaluation.
But with lawmakers already squeezed into a tight legislative calendar by the coronavirus pandemic, former officials are worried that the administration could be pushing through too many unseasoned bureaucrats into high-level Pentagon roles.
“The end of the administration is not when the seasoned, cool hands come in,” said Townsend, the former Pentagon official. “It’s when they’re cramming people in.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-06--Want to Avoid the Next Pandemic? Hire a Devil’s Advocate.

Want to Avoid the Next Pandemic ?
Hire a Devil ’ s Advocate .
What should the Catholic Church do if the pope decides it ’ s a good idea to declare someone a saint but that person has weaknesses that the pope may have overlooked ?
For centuries , the Vatican had a solution for such situations : an official devil ’ s advocate , who combed through every potential canonization for weaknesses .
For centuries—from 1587 until Pope John Paul II effectively abolished the office in 1983—the Vatican ’ s devil ’ s advocate ( advocatus diaboli ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was to argue against the pro-canonization side , represented by God ’ s advocate ( advocatus dei ) , in the canonization process of would-be saints .
That seemingly arcane practice is highly relevant today .
Governments and companies knew about the risk of a pandemic , but they did too little .
To prevent the next one , they need designated devil ’ s advocates on the state payroll .
And to better anticipate devious attacks in cyberspace , they should hire another group of contrarians , too : hackers .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response offer a case in point .
“ For five days , the president along with some of his closest senior officials disseminated an egregiously false message to Americans , ” Ryan Goodman and Danielle Schulkin wrote in a New York Times op-ed on April 28 , referring to the last days of February .
“ We have contained this .
I won ’ t say airtight but pretty close to airtight , ” Larry Kudlow , the director of the National Economic Council , announced on CNBC on Feb. 25 .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and the government ’ s top doctor in the coronavirus battle , stuck to President Donald Trump ’ s argument that the coronavirus had been contained at the time .
“ No .
Right now , at this moment , there ’ s no need to change anything that you ’ re doing on a day-by-day basis , ” Fauci responded when asked whether Americans should change their habits .
Trump had , of course , consistently claimed the virus was under control and that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fake news .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic . ]
But what if Fauci had corrected the president ’ s policy before it reached the public—and had been tasked explicitly with second-guessing the White House ?
Knowing Trump ’ s history , he likely would have been fired , but in a less dysfunctional government , such a role could have saved thousands of lives and billions of dollars in economic losses .
Governments and companies knew about the risk of a pandemic , but they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next one , they need designated devil ’ s advocates .
Although the White House was particularly slow in treating the coronavirus as a full-blown crisis , most other organizations got the virus threat wrong , too .
The danger of a pandemic has long featured on national risk registers , a report of civil emergency risks published by some governments , including Britain ’ s , to inform and prepare the public .
But most governments or businesses , never mind the public , did little to prepare for this seemingly unlikely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ essential tool for risk management , but they can backfire with their overwhelming amount of detail , ” said Hélène Galy , who directs the Willis Research Network , the research arm of the global insurance broker Willis Towers Watson .
“ A risk register can also give the illusion that a comprehensive overview of risks , and an assessment of their impact and likelihood , means that these risks have been dealt with.
” In reality , of course , a risk register is simply words on a page .
One insurance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years ago—and had no takers .
Instead , businesses and households are trying to make coronavirus claims on other types of insurance .
So far U.K. insurers have paid out 1.2 billion pounds ( $ 1.5 billion ) connected to coronavirus-related cases in which people have claimed on business interruption insurance , wedding insurance , travel insurance , and the like .
But claiming the coronavirus on your wedding insurance policy is not going to fly in most cases .
If anything , the coronavirus crisis has brutally demonstrated that it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The problem is : Who ’ s going to point out that the seemingly sensible strategy won ’ t work ?
In most organizations , that person is a self-appointed devil ’ s advocate , whom everybody dislikes because he or she sees the gaps in everyone else ’ s ideas or decisions .
That ’ s where modern governments and businesses need to learn from the Catholic Church .
The point of the devil ’ s advocate was , of course , to save the Vatican from embarrassing blunders by identifying less-than-saintly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public noticed .
The devil ’ s advocate even spotted faults in the life of the Maid of Orléans before she was eventually declared a saint .
( Though the office no longer exists , the adversarial probing of saints does ; the due diligence is now carried out by a range of officials with less intimidating titles . )
If governments and businesses had official devil ’ s advocates , they too could avoid the extremely costly risk of intellectual complacency .
“ It ’ s important to hard-wire challenge into the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up both procedural and psychological safe spaces to do so , ” said Tim Dowse , a former director of intelligence and national security in the British Foreign Office .
“ It was the failure to sufficiently question accepted wisdom that lay behind a lot of the U.K. intelligence community ’ s mistakes in the Iraq WMD [ weapons of mass destruction ] case.
” Some governments have tried devil ’ s advocate-like schemes .
In 1976 , U.S. President Gerald Ford ’ s advisors , unconvinced by the CIA ’ s assessment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be at military parity with the United States , persuaded the president to appoint a second assessment team .
The so-called Team B concluded that the Soviets were , in fact , intent on achieving superiority—and its strong reasoning caused the CIA to change its assessment .
After 9/11 , the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) launched Red Cells , a scheme already used by other parts of the U.S. government .
But in the case of DHS , the participants— “ people with offbeat specialties and life @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2004—provided rather ad hoc input .
The outdated U.S. security apparatus was completely unprepared for the coronavirus pandemic .
In Cyberwar , There are No Rules Why the world desperately needs digital Geneva Conventions .
How an experimental unit transformed the intelligence community .
“ Typically the Red Cell team assembles 20 or so participants for a day-long session at leased offices in the Washington area .
Each session divides into smaller groups and takes up a different question , such as : If you were a terrorist , how would you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Post reported .
“ Another recent topic was : Why haven ’ t terrorists hit the United States since Sept. 11 , 2001 ?
” As for the CIA ’ s Red Cell , “ it always felt to me more like an interesting academic exercise than something with much effect on policy , though no doubt in London we didn ’ t see all its products , ” Dowse said .
Dowse still sees merit in the concept but said a team “ deliberately employed to be difficult is always going @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There will be a risk of driving those under scrutiny into a defensive huddle .
Of course , a lot depends on the authority and credibility that the individuals themselves carry.
” What ’ s more , the devil ’ s advocate slows decision-making down .
That ’ s an incentive to be even more innovative .
Why not appoint outsiders as official devil ’ s advocates ?
“ It would be helpful to designate someone independent , ” Galy said .
“ It couldn ’ t be a permanent appointment either , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advocate ’ s critical thinking could mellow.
” Outside reality-checkers parachuted in for a limited period of time are needed in another capacity , too : to help governments and businesses anticipate so-called grayzone attacks , attacks below the threshold of military ones ( think cyberattacks , disinformation campaigns , disruption of supply chains ) .
In military operations , anticipating your adversary ’ s moves is relatively easy : Your intelligence collects information about troop and equipment movements , which gives you a good idea of what ’ s afoot .
Indeed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ staff drafting Britain ’ s Joint Intelligence Committee assessments were tasked with seeing the world through the eyes of Nazi Germany .
But it ’ s not as straightforward to anticipate when or how hackers might probe a country ’ s voting system .
“ My job was to worry about every parade of horribles .
So I can not tell you that that did not cross my mind .
… We were worried about the supply chain for the voting machines .
Who were the makers ?
” Lisa Monaco , former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security advisor , told the Senate Intelligence Committee ’ s inquiry on Russian election interference in 2017 .
Monaco was a capable government official , but she was just that : a government official , supported by other government officials .
To have a better chance of anticipating grayzone aggression by Russia , China , Iran , North Korea , and their proxies , governments of liberal democracies—and businesses operating there—need people who think more like the aggressors .
Many government agencies and large businesses already have red teams that play the aggressor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ red team , playing the opponent , usually comprises members of the organization or a related outfit .
The DHS Red Cell comprised people from outside the government , not would-be terrorists .
Neither is wired to think like the enemy .
A more promising solution is emerging : involve almost adversaries .
At a recent event I hosted at the Royal United Services Institute , a senior BT Security executive explained how his company works with police forces to identify hackers who have nearly crossed over to the dark side and reeducate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies could do the same .
So—after security clearance—could governments .
With hackers recruited from the almost dark side playing the red team , governments and businesses would have a much better chance at anticipating their adversaries ’ next move .
And aided by the groupthink-busting services of devil ’ s advocates likewise recruited from the outside , governments and businesses alike would slash their risk of follies such as underestimating a pandemic or overestimating WMD intelligence .
In the U.K. , a group of eminent scientists have just set themselves up as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provide independent—and perhaps contrarian—coronavirus advice to the government .
Will the government listen to them ?
It may not .
But at least the scientists have a good chance of spotting holes in government policy before the public does .
The same is true for ethical hackers : Though companies are not obliged fix vulnerabilities detected by the almost devils , it ’ s clearly in their interest to do so .
Considering today ’ s inevitable probing by both adversaries and self-appointed devil ’ s advocates among the wider public , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proper one on one ’ s own team .
International security is changing .
It ’ s time to learn from both the Vatican and teenagers in basements .

What should the Catholic Church do if the pope decides it’s a good idea to declare someone a saint but that person has weaknesses that the pope may have overlooked? For centuries, the Vatican had a solution for such situations: an official devil’s advocate, who combed through every potential canonization for weaknesses. From 1587 until Pope John Paul II effectively abolished the office in 1983—the Vatican’s devil’s advocate (advocatus diaboli) was the probing official whose task it was to argue against the pro-canonization side, represented by God’s advocate (advocatus dei).
What should the Catholic Church do if the pope decides it’s a good idea to declare someone a saint but that person has weaknesses that the pope may have overlooked? For centuries, the Vatican had a solution for such situations: an official devil’s advocate, who combed through every potential canonization for weaknesses. From 1587 until Pope John Paul II effectively abolished the office in 1983—the Vatican’s devil’s advocate (advocatus diaboli) was the probing official whose task it was to argue against the pro-canonization side, represented by God’s advocate (advocatus dei).
That seemingly arcane practice is highly relevant today. Governments and companies knew about the risk of a pandemic, but they did too little. To prevent the next one, they need designated devil’s advocates on the state payroll. And to better anticipate devious attacks in cyberspace, they should hire another group of contrarians, too: hackers.
The United States’ botched pandemic preparation and response offer a case in point. “For five days, the president along with some of his closest senior officials disseminated an egregiously false message to Americans,” Ryan Goodman and Danielle Schulkin wrote in a New York Times op-ed on April 28, referring to the last days of February. “We have contained this. I won’t say airtight but pretty close to airtight,” Larry Kudlow, the director of the National Economic Council, announced on CNBC on Feb. 25.
Even Anthony Fauci, the much-admired director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and the government’s top doctor in the coronavirus battle, stuck to President Donald Trump’s argument that the coronavirus had been contained at the time. “No. Right now, at this moment, there’s no need to change anything that you’re doing on a day-by-day basis,” Fauci responded when asked whether Americans should change their habits. Trump had, of course, consistently claimed the virus was under control and that any suggestions to the contrary amounted to fake news.
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But what if Fauci had corrected the president’s policy before it reached the public—and had been tasked explicitly with second-guessing the White House? Knowing Trump’s history, he likely would have been fired, but in a less dysfunctional government, such a role could have saved thousands of lives and billions of dollars in economic losses.
Governments and companies knew about the risk of a pandemic, but they did too little. To prevent the next one, they need designated devil’s advocates.
Although the White House was particularly slow in treating the coronavirus as a full-blown crisis, most other organizations got the virus threat wrong, too. The danger of a pandemic has long featured on national risk registers, a report of civil emergency risks published by some governments, including Britain’s, to inform and prepare the public.
But most governments or businesses, never mind the public, did little to prepare for this seemingly unlikely scenario. “Risk registers are an essential tool for risk management, but they can backfire with their overwhelming amount of detail,” said Hélène Galy, who directs the Willis Research Network, the research arm of the global insurance broker Willis Towers Watson. “A risk register can also give the illusion that a comprehensive overview of risks, and an assessment of their impact and likelihood, means that these risks have been dealt with.” In reality, of course, a risk register is simply words on a page.
One insurance broker even offered stand-alone pandemic insurance two years ago—and had no takers. Instead, businesses and households are trying to make coronavirus claims on other types of insurance. So far U.K. insurers have paid out 1.2 billion pounds ($1.5 billion) connected to coronavirus-related cases in which people have claimed on business interruption insurance, wedding insurance, travel insurance, and the like. But claiming the coronavirus on your wedding insurance policy is not going to fly in most cases.
If anything, the coronavirus crisis has brutally demonstrated that it’s exceedingly risky to ignore unlikely calamities. The problem is: Who’s going to point out that the seemingly sensible strategy won’t work? In most organizations, that person is a self-appointed devil’s advocate, whom everybody dislikes because he or she sees the gaps in everyone else’s ideas or decisions.
That’s where modern governments and businesses need to learn from the Catholic Church. The point of the devil’s advocate was, of course, to save the Vatican from embarrassing blunders by identifying less-than-saintly traits among those being canonized before the public noticed.
The devil’s advocate even spotted faults in the life of the Maid of Orléans before she was eventually declared a saint. (Though the office no longer exists, the adversarial probing of saints does; the due diligence is now carried out by a range of officials with less intimidating titles.)
If governments and businesses had official devil’s advocates, they too could avoid the extremely costly risk of intellectual complacency. “It’s important to hard-wire challenge into the policymaking process, and that requires opening up both procedural and psychological safe spaces to do so,” said Tim Dowse, a former director of intelligence and national security in the British Foreign Office. “It was the failure to sufficiently question accepted wisdom that lay behind a lot of the U.K. intelligence community’s mistakes in the Iraq WMD [weapons of mass destruction] case.”
Some governments have tried devil’s advocate-like schemes. In 1976, U.S. President Gerald Ford’s advisors, unconvinced by the CIA’s assessment that the Soviet Union was content to be at military parity with the United States, persuaded the president to appoint a second assessment team. The so-called Team B concluded that the Soviets were, in fact, intent on achieving superiority—and its strong reasoning caused the CIA to change its assessment.
After 9/11, the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched Red Cells, a scheme already used by other parts of the U.S. government. But in the case of DHS, the participants—“people with offbeat specialties and life experiences,” the Washington Post reported in 2004—provided rather ad hoc input.
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“Typically the Red Cell team assembles 20 or so participants for a day-long session at leased offices in the Washington area. Each session divides into smaller groups and takes up a different question, such as: If you were a terrorist, how would you target the G-8 economic summit,” the Post reported. “Another recent topic was: Why haven’t terrorists hit the United States since Sept. 11, 2001?” As for the CIA’s Red Cell, “it always felt to me more like an interesting academic exercise than something with much effect on policy, though no doubt in London we didn’t see all its products,” Dowse said.
Dowse still sees merit in the concept but said a team “deliberately employed to be difficult is always going to have a problem getting impact. There will be a risk of driving those under scrutiny into a defensive huddle. Of course, a lot depends on the authority and credibility that the individuals themselves carry.” What’s more, the devil’s advocate slows decision-making down.
That’s an incentive to be even more innovative. Why not appoint outsiders as official devil’s advocates? “It would be helpful to designate someone independent,” Galy said. “It couldn’t be a permanent appointment either, as over time the devil’s advocate’s critical thinking could mellow.”
Outside reality-checkers parachuted in for a limited period of time are needed in another capacity, too: to help governments and businesses anticipate so-called grayzone attacks, attacks below the threshold of military ones (think cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, disruption of supply chains). In military operations, anticipating your adversary’s moves is relatively easy: Your intelligence collects information about troop and equipment movements, which gives you a good idea of what’s afoot. Indeed, during World War II, the staff drafting Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee assessments were tasked with seeing the world through the eyes of Nazi Germany.
But it’s not as straightforward to anticipate when or how hackers might probe a country’s voting system. “My job was to worry about every parade of horribles. So I cannot tell you that that did not cross my mind. … We were worried about the supply chain for the voting machines. Who were the makers?” Lisa Monaco, former U.S. President Barack Obama’s homeland security advisor, told the Senate Intelligence Committee’s inquiry on Russian election interference in 2017.
Monaco was a capable government official, but she was just that: a government official, supported by other government officials. To have a better chance of anticipating grayzone aggression by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and their proxies, governments of liberal democracies—and businesses operating there—need people who think more like the aggressors.
Many government agencies and large businesses already have red teams that play the aggressor side in tabletop exercises simulating aggression—but the red team, playing the opponent, usually comprises members of the organization or a related outfit. The DHS Red Cell comprised people from outside the government, not would-be terrorists. Neither is wired to think like the enemy.
A more promising solution is emerging: involve almost adversaries. At a recent event I hosted at the Royal United Services Institute, a senior BT Security executive explained how his company works with police forces to identify hackers who have nearly crossed over to the dark side and reeducate them as “ethical hackers.” More companies could do the same. So—after security clearance—could governments.
With hackers recruited from the almost dark side playing the red team, governments and businesses would have a much better chance at anticipating their adversaries’ next move. And aided by the groupthink-busting services of devil’s advocates likewise recruited from the outside, governments and businesses alike would slash their risk of follies such as underestimating a pandemic or overestimating WMD intelligence.
In the U.K., a group of eminent scientists have just set themselves up as a volunteer devil’s advocate to provide independent—and perhaps contrarian—coronavirus advice to the government. Will the government listen to them? It may not. But at least the scientists have a good chance of spotting holes in government policy before the public does. The same is true for ethical hackers: Though companies are not obliged fix vulnerabilities detected by the almost devils, it’s clearly in their interest to do so. Considering today’s inevitable probing by both adversaries and self-appointed devil’s advocates among the wider public, it’s vastly preferable to have a proper one on one’s own team.
International security is changing. It’s time to learn from both the Vatican and teenagers in basements.