foreignpolicy--2020-10-09--Is a Vice President Who Doesn’t Know Much About Foreign Policy a National Security Risk?

Is a Vice President Who Doesn ’ t Know Much About Foreign Policy a National Security Risk ?
Emma Ashford : Good morning , Matt !
Anything new to report ?
Matthew Kroenig : There ’ s nothing going on in the world for us to discuss this week , is there ?
So maybe I can start by bragging about the Atlantic Council ’ s newest hire—welcome to our team , Emma !
We were so tired of you running circles around me in these debates that we decided we would rather have you with us than against us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ m excited to join the Scowcroft Center .
But me joining the same think tank just means that when COVID-19 is eventually resolved , I can yell at you down the hall , rather than just on here .
But oh my goodness , what a week it ’ s been .
I started a new job , the New York Times released the president ’ s tax returns , there was a vice presidential debate , Azerbaijan and Armenia went to war , and the president was hospitalized with COVID-19 while the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Allan Poe ’ s “ The Masque of the Red Death.
” All equally consequential , of course .
MK : Yes .
Much to discuss .
And somehow I have a feeling we will not run out of things to argue about , even with you just down the hall .
For example , I ’ m guessing you were less impressed by Mike Pence ’ s debate performance than I was ?
EA : I was very impressed by the fly on his head , which showed great poise !
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ debate between Pence and Kamala Harris after so many months of Trumpist absurdity .
But even if Pence ’ s delivery was more measured than his boss ’ s , the message was largely the same .
He blamed China for , well , everything and kept trying to imply that Joe Biden and Harris would be weak on foreign policy .
I ’ m not sure it worked .
You were impressed ?
MK : Well , like you , I was happy to see them seriously engage the issues , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good job .
On foreign policy , the debate moderator , Susan Page , started with a great question about America ’ s role in the world .
Harris ’ s answer was also good .
It is about credibility , standing with allies , and standing up to enemies .
I just think her line of attack against Donald Trump was not grounded in the facts .
Pence spent much of the time trying to tell Harris that his running mate killed more important bad guys than hers .
If that is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to , we have an issue .
She asserted again that Trump has been cozying up to dictators .
Democrats are so obsessed with the 2016 Russian election interference and Trump ’ s strange rhetorical deference to Vladimir Putin that they are overlooking the Trump administration ’ s actual policies .
Trump defeated the Islamic State , placed the toughest-ever sanctions on Iran and North Korea , killed the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani , armed the Ukrainians and built two new low-yield nuclear weapons to defend against Russia , and made great-power competition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a solid record of standing up to dictators and a tougher approach than anything Biden has shown in his time in office .
EA : It was still pretty superficial on foreign policy .
It ’ s a sign of how desperate we have become for any sign of competence or depth on foreign policy that even the small amount of discussion in the VP debate is better than the first—and probably only—presidential debate !
I agree with you on the Russia question .
The Biden campaign must believe tying Trump to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it comes up far out of proportion to its actual importance .
But I don ’ t think you can argue that Trump is tough on most dictators .
He has a better relationship with Recep Tayyip Erdogan than with Angela Merkel , for example .
Can we talk a bit about Suleimani ?
I thought the focus on his killing was a bit strange .
I ’ m happy I was wrong in predicting that it might lead to broader conflict with Iran .
But supporters of the assassination were also wrong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the region by his death .
MK : I guess the high-profile killing of a bad guy is something that resonates with the public .
And I think it was , on balance , the right move .
I did correctly predict that Iran would aim for a token response .
If they did nothing , the clerics would lose face , but if they did too much , they knew they could lose their heads .
And the strike didn ’ t magically stop all of Iran ’ s malign activity , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military option is back on the table in a way that it was not under Barack Obama and Biden .
EA : The Iranian response hardly seems token .
There are rumors flying that the United States is going to pull out of its embassy in Baghdad—perhaps the most heavily fortified compound on the planet—because attacks from Iranian proxies are so bad .
The Suleimani question is part of a bigger problem with Pence ’ s debate responses : He spent much of the foreign-policy time effectively trying to tell Harris that his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than hers .
If that is what U.S. foreign policy has been reduced to , we have an issue .
And when asked to talk about China , and the question of how the United States should deal with its biggest potential challenge in coming decades , Pence spent his time blaming China for COVID-19 .
Harris spent her time blaming Trump for losing the trade war with China .
Neither answered the question .
MK : Harris erred in the opposite direction .
She started by saying foreign policy is about standing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never took the opportunity to explain how she and Biden would confront the adversaries we face .
She did not criticize Xi Jinping or the Chinese Communist Party , which , as you point out correctly , is our biggest potential challenge in decades .
And she mentioned Iran only to advocate for diplomacy with the clerics .
The performance did not inspire confidence that she and Biden will be resolute against our adversaries .
EA : Well , perhaps Pence could lend her his “ resolve face ” ?
After all , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Look , neither Harris nor Pence was impressive on foreign policy .
And neither has a substantial background in the field , particularly Harris .
And I think we should take a moment to talk about that and about the national security implications of a White House COVID-19 outbreak that hospitalized the president and put most of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into quarantine .
The impact of the latter is minimal ; the chiefs can all do their work remotely .
But if the worst were to happen , I ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from a Harris administration on foreign policy .
I know for sure that I wouldn ’ t like a Pence administration .
What do you think ?
MK : Not to be morbid , but actuarial tables suggest that there is a decent chance that Harris or Pence could be commander in chief in the coming years .
EA : Right !
That ’ s what freaks me out .
MK : And even if Trump and Biden remain healthy , we could see Pence and Harris squaring off again at the top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2024 or 2028 .
I think what we saw last night is that—despite claims that Trump has fundamentally transformed the GOP—a Pence administration would be a return to normcore Republican .
EA : I think that ’ s probably right .
Pence was a George W. Bush neoconservative in the mid-2000s .
In fact , he was far more extreme ; when he was a congressman , he sponsored a bill that would have prevented Bush from withdrawing any troops from Iraq .
So while Pence pays lip service to Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea—I suspect that ’ s for show .
A Pence administration would continue Trump ’ s harsh approach to China , and Iran , but probably ramp up tensions again with North Korea and potentially commit more troops to the Middle East .
A Pence administration would continue Trump ’ s harsh approach to China , and Iran , but probably ramp up tensions again with North Korea and potentially commit more troops to the Middle East .
It ’ s out of step with public opinion , but that has never stopped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about a Harris administration ?
MK : Harris did seem shakier on foreign policy , even deferring in the debate to what Biden has taught her on the subject .
And it was the only issue of the night in which she occasionally stumbled in her word choice .
EA : Yes , with the presidency almost unilaterally powerful in foreign policy these days , it ’ s not exactly ideal to have an older president and a vice president with no experience .
But I interrupted you .
MK : Well , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and quarantine at the highest levels of the U.S. military command structure .
Combined with our likely domestic preoccupations in the coming weeks , this could be an ideal time for an adversary to present us with a fait accompli , such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan .
China has not ruled out the use of military force to retake the island , it has stepped up its military activity in the Taiwan Strait in recent weeks , and there are doubts about whether the United States can successfully contribute to Taiwan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Foreign Policy a couple of years ago even explained why the local weather conditions would make October the perfect month for an invasion .
So , Beijing might see this as its window of opportunity .
And while Taiwan and the Pentagon have made some progress in strengthening the island ’ s defenses , Taiwan is still not ready for this kind of attack .
I would add Russia to the list of possible opportunistic aggressors , but it looks as if Moscow has its hands full .
Their near abroad is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Belarus and now unrest in Kyrgyzstan and conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan .
EA : Wasn ’ t that the plot of a Tom Clancy novel ?
The idea that other states will use presidential illness to engage in strikes against the United States or allies seems about as probable to me as the idea of successfully hiding a Soviet submarine defection .
But there ’ s a grain of truth to what you ’ re saying about some of these conflicts .
When the cat ’ s away , the mice will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has almost entirely ignored conflicts around the world where once Washington might have acted as a mediator , tamping down conflict .
Under Trump , America has almost entirely ignored conflicts around the world where once we might have acted as a mediator , tamping down conflict .
I do worry about Nagorno-Karabakh .
It ’ s the longest-running territorial dispute in the former Soviet sphere , and like most of these so-called frozen conflicts , it has the potential to get quite ugly when unfrozen .
Already , as many as half @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been displaced by fighting .
MK : I take two lessons from these events .
First is the limits of Russia ’ s great-power status .
Putin dreams of resurrecting a sphere of influence over the territories of the former Soviet Union , but we are seeing that these are poorly governed and difficult to control places .
There was even a Rand Corp. report from last year recommending democracy promotion in Belarus and stirring up trouble in the Caucasus as a way of overextending Moscow and deflecting its attention away from NATO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behind these latest developments , but recent events will have this effect nonetheless .
EA : Russia may well end up overextended here .
The country has always aimed to keep these regional conflicts tamped down .
This is typically to its own benefit , whether it ’ s in Moldova , Abkhazia , or the Donbass , but it also tends to keep the conflicts frozen in place .
In this case , however , Russia has an interest in supporting Armenia , and there ’ s another interested party—Turkey—with the will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey and Russia are often at odds : a few years back , Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet that entered its airspace .
More recently , Putin publicly humiliated Erdogan by filming his wait for a Kremlin meeting and playing it live on TV—complete with a countdown clock .
And the two have come to indirect blows in Syria , with Russian-backed regime forces killing Turkish forces .
In short , tensions are high , and the situation is ripe for further proxy or even direct conflict between the two .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
MK : The second lesson is that democracy ’ s appeal remains .
With Freedom House showing a decline in democracy around the world in each of the past 14 years and the supposed success of authoritarian state-led capitalism , many are pessimistic about the future of open government .
But the people of Belarus and Kyrgyzstan don ’ t like living under corrupt autocracies , and they are demanding change .
EA : Sure .
But again , there ’ s a lot of chaos in the streets in both places @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crises .
I ’ m not saying the United States needs to solve every global problem ; I certainly don ’ t believe that .
But it would be nice to see even just some thoughts from U.S. leaders on these issues or a phone call to relevant world leaders .
Not to put too fine a point on it : Russia and a NATO member might be about to trade potshots in a second country , and I ’ m not sure the Trump White House even knows where Nagorno-Karabakh is on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neither Pence nor Harris knows much about it .
That doesn ’ t bode well for the future .
MK : Yes .
In Washington , it is really only wonks and desk officers who know much about conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh .
Let ’ s hope the aspiring veeps are reading our column .
EA : I guess we ’ ll find out when the president tweets about us in all caps .

Emma Ashford: Good morning, Matt! Anything new to report?
Matthew Kroenig: There’s nothing going on in the world for us to discuss this week, is there? So maybe I can start by bragging about the Atlantic Council’s newest hire—welcome to our team, Emma! We were so tired of you running circles around me in these debates that we decided we would rather have you with us than against us.
EA: Thanks! I’m excited to join the Scowcroft Center. But me joining the same think tank just means that when COVID-19 is eventually resolved, I can yell at you down the hall, rather than just on here.
But oh my goodness, what a week it’s been. I started a new job, the New York Times released the president’s tax returns, there was a vice presidential debate, Azerbaijan and Armenia went to war, and the president was hospitalized with COVID-19 while the White House became a re-creation of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Masque of the Red Death.” All equally consequential, of course.
Emma Ashford is a senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
MK: Yes. Much to discuss. And somehow I have a feeling we will not run out of things to argue about, even with you just down the hall. For example, I’m guessing you were less impressed by Mike Pence’s debate performance than I was?
EA: I was very impressed by the fly on his head, which showed great poise! It was certainly surreal to see a semi-normal debate between Pence and Kamala Harris after so many months of Trumpist absurdity.
But even if Pence’s delivery was more measured than his boss’s, the message was largely the same. He blamed China for, well, everything and kept trying to imply that Joe Biden and Harris would be weak on foreign policy. I’m not sure it worked. You were impressed?
MK: Well, like you, I was happy to see them seriously engage the issues, and I thought they both did a pretty good job.
On foreign policy, the debate moderator, Susan Page, started with a great question about America’s role in the world. Harris’s answer was also good. It is about credibility, standing with allies, and standing up to enemies. I just think her line of attack against Donald Trump was not grounded in the facts.
Pence spent much of the time trying to tell Harris that his running mate killed more important bad guys than hers. If that is what U.S. foreign policy has been reduced to, we have an issue.
She asserted again that Trump has been cozying up to dictators. Democrats are so obsessed with the 2016 Russian election interference and Trump’s strange rhetorical deference to Vladimir Putin that they are overlooking the Trump administration’s actual policies.
Trump defeated the Islamic State, placed the toughest-ever sanctions on Iran and North Korea, killed the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, armed the Ukrainians and built two new low-yield nuclear weapons to defend against Russia, and made great-power competition with China its foremost priority. That is a solid record of standing up to dictators and a tougher approach than anything Biden has shown in his time in office.
EA: It was still pretty superficial on foreign policy. It’s a sign of how desperate we have become for any sign of competence or depth on foreign policy that even the small amount of discussion in the VP debate is better than the first—and probably only—presidential debate!
I agree with you on the Russia question. The Biden campaign must believe tying Trump to Russia polls well or something, because it comes up far out of proportion to its actual importance. But I don’t think you can argue that Trump is tough on most dictators. He has a better relationship with Recep Tayyip Erdogan than with Angela Merkel, for example.
Can we talk a bit about Suleimani? I thought the focus on his killing was a bit strange. I’m happy I was wrong in predicting that it might lead to broader conflict with Iran. But supporters of the assassination were also wrong; Iran has not been deterred in the region by his death.
MK: I guess the high-profile killing of a bad guy is something that resonates with the public. And I think it was, on balance, the right move. I did correctly predict that Iran would aim for a token response. If they did nothing, the clerics would lose face, but if they did too much, they knew they could lose their heads. And the strike didn’t magically stop all of Iran’s malign activity, but Tehran now knows that the U.S. military option is back on the table in a way that it was not under Barack Obama and Biden.
EA: The Iranian response hardly seems token. There are rumors flying that the United States is going to pull out of its embassy in Baghdad—perhaps the most heavily fortified compound on the planet—because attacks from Iranian proxies are so bad. The Suleimani question is part of a bigger problem with Pence’s debate responses: He spent much of the foreign-policy time effectively trying to tell Harris that his running mate killed more important bad guys than hers. If that is what U.S. foreign policy has been reduced to, we have an issue.
And when asked to talk about China, and the question of how the United States should deal with its biggest potential challenge in coming decades, Pence spent his time blaming China for COVID-19. Harris spent her time blaming Trump for losing the trade war with China. Neither answered the question.
MK: Harris erred in the opposite direction. She started by saying foreign policy is about standing up to enemies, but then she never took the opportunity to explain how she and Biden would confront the adversaries we face. She did not criticize Xi Jinping or the Chinese Communist Party, which, as you point out correctly, is our biggest potential challenge in decades. And she mentioned Iran only to advocate for diplomacy with the clerics. The performance did not inspire confidence that she and Biden will be resolute against our adversaries.
EA: Well, perhaps Pence could lend her his “resolve face”? After all, it worked so well against North Korea.
Look, neither Harris nor Pence was impressive on foreign policy. And neither has a substantial background in the field, particularly Harris. And I think we should take a moment to talk about that and about the national security implications of a White House COVID-19 outbreak that hospitalized the president and put most of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into quarantine.
The impact of the latter is minimal; the chiefs can all do their work remotely. But if the worst were to happen, I’m not sure what I would expect from a Harris administration on foreign policy. I know for sure that I wouldn’t like a Pence administration. What do you think?
MK: Not to be morbid, but actuarial tables suggest that there is a decent chance that Harris or Pence could be commander in chief in the coming years.
EA: Right! That’s what freaks me out.
MK: And even if Trump and Biden remain healthy, we could see Pence and Harris squaring off again at the top of their parties’ respective tickets in 2024 or 2028.
I think what we saw last night is that—despite claims that Trump has fundamentally transformed the GOP—a Pence administration would be a return to normcore Republican.
EA: I think that’s probably right. Pence was a George W. Bush neoconservative in the mid-2000s. In fact, he was far more extreme; when he was a congressman, he sponsored a bill that would have prevented Bush from withdrawing any troops from Iraq. So while Pence pays lip service to Trump’s more unusual foreign-policy choices—like meeting with North Korea—I suspect that’s for show.
A Pence administration would continue Trump’s harsh approach to China, and Iran, but probably ramp up tensions again with North Korea and potentially commit more troops to the Middle East.
A Pence administration would continue Trump’s harsh approach to China, and Iran, but probably ramp up tensions again with North Korea and potentially commit more troops to the Middle East. It’s out of step with public opinion, but that has never stopped Pence from supporting unpopular policies. What about a Harris administration?
MK: Harris did seem shakier on foreign policy, even deferring in the debate to what Biden has taught her on the subject. And it was the only issue of the night in which she occasionally stumbled in her word choice.
EA: Yes, with the presidency almost unilaterally powerful in foreign policy these days, it’s not exactly ideal to have an older president and a vice president with no experience. But I interrupted you.
MK: Well, I am worried about the coronavirus outbreak and quarantine at the highest levels of the U.S. military command structure. Combined with our likely domestic preoccupations in the coming weeks, this could be an ideal time for an adversary to present us with a fait accompli, such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
China has not ruled out the use of military force to retake the island, it has stepped up its military activity in the Taiwan Strait in recent weeks, and there are doubts about whether the United States can successfully contribute to Taiwan’s self-defense. A good piece in Foreign Policy a couple of years ago even explained why the local weather conditions would make October the perfect month for an invasion. So, Beijing might see this as its window of opportunity. And while Taiwan and the Pentagon have made some progress in strengthening the island’s defenses, Taiwan is still not ready for this kind of attack.
I would add Russia to the list of possible opportunistic aggressors, but it looks as if Moscow has its hands full. Their near abroad is in tumult, with the protests in Belarus and now unrest in Kyrgyzstan and conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
EA: Wasn’t that the plot of a Tom Clancy novel? The idea that other states will use presidential illness to engage in strikes against the United States or allies seems about as probable to me as the idea of successfully hiding a Soviet submarine defection.
But there’s a grain of truth to what you’re saying about some of these conflicts. When the cat’s away, the mice will play, and under Trump, America has almost entirely ignored conflicts around the world where once Washington might have acted as a mediator, tamping down conflict.
Under Trump, America has almost entirely ignored conflicts around the world where once we might have acted as a mediator, tamping down conflict.
I do worry about Nagorno-Karabakh. It’s the longest-running territorial dispute in the former Soviet sphere, and like most of these so-called frozen conflicts, it has the potential to get quite ugly when unfrozen. Already, as many as half of the region’s residents have been displaced by fighting.
MK: I take two lessons from these events. First is the limits of Russia’s great-power status. Putin dreams of resurrecting a sphere of influence over the territories of the former Soviet Union, but we are seeing that these are poorly governed and difficult to control places. There was even a Rand Corp. report from last year recommending democracy promotion in Belarus and stirring up trouble in the Caucasus as a way of overextending Moscow and deflecting its attention away from NATO. The U.S. government wasn’t behind these latest developments, but recent events will have this effect nonetheless.
EA: Russia may well end up overextended here. The country has always aimed to keep these regional conflicts tamped down. This is typically to its own benefit, whether it’s in Moldova, Abkhazia, or the Donbass, but it also tends to keep the conflicts frozen in place. In this case, however, Russia has an interest in supporting Armenia, and there’s another interested party—Turkey—with the will and the potential to support Azerbaijan.
Turkey and Russia are often at odds: a few years back, Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet that entered its airspace. More recently, Putin publicly humiliated Erdogan by filming his wait for a Kremlin meeting and playing it live on TV—complete with a countdown clock. And the two have come to indirect blows in Syria, with Russian-backed regime forces killing Turkish forces. In short, tensions are high, and the situation is ripe for further proxy or even direct conflict between the two.
Wait, what was your second lesson?
MK: The second lesson is that democracy’s appeal remains. With Freedom House showing a decline in democracy around the world in each of the past 14 years and the supposed success of authoritarian state-led capitalism, many are pessimistic about the future of open government. But the people of Belarus and Kyrgyzstan don’t like living under corrupt autocracies, and they are demanding change.
EA: Sure. But again, there’s a lot of chaos in the streets in both places and no obvious path to resolving the crises. I’m not saying the United States needs to solve every global problem; I certainly don’t believe that. But it would be nice to see even just some thoughts from U.S. leaders on these issues or a phone call to relevant world leaders.
Not to put too fine a point on it: Russia and a NATO member might be about to trade potshots in a second country, and I’m not sure the Trump White House even knows where Nagorno-Karabakh is on a map. I’m confident neither Pence nor Harris knows much about it. That doesn’t bode well for the future.
MK: Yes. In Washington, it is really only wonks and desk officers who know much about conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh. Let’s hope the aspiring veeps are reading our column.
EA: I guess we’ll find out when the president tweets about us in all caps.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-09--Girls Have Greater Access to Education Than Ever

Girls Have Greater Access to Education Than Ever LONDON—When Adelaide Tsogo Masenya was six , she switched primary schools .
Her local school , Dr Knak Primary School , in the poor Johannesburg township of Alexandra , only taught in her native language of Sepedi .
Her new school , Marlboro Gardens Secondary School , had an English-only curriculum .
Years later when she asked her mother , a cashier who only had a primary school education , why they had moved her , her mother replied , “ You actually asked me to take you to an English school.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Masenya , who is now 30 , had enough agency to understand the importance of education for her future .
Masenya went on to attend university in Johannesburg—later working both in human resources and as a secondary school teacher .
She was also awarded a Chevening scholarship to obtain a master ’ s degree in education and development at University College London , something that likely wouldn ’ t have been available if she had not had access to a good recognized university for her undergraduate degree .
“ Education has taken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a young Black girl from Alex I would reach , ” she said , sitting in an outdoor café in west London , where she now lives and remotely runs the Tsogo Ya Bokamoso Foundation , an education nongovernmental organization she founded .
It focuses on mentoring secondary school girls back in her township .
“ It has made me live a life of freedom where I am able to provide for my family , I am able to work in any space that I want to , I am able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Education has made me who I am today.
” Masenya ’ s tale is unique , but it also exemplifies the stories of millions of girls and young women across the globe who , if given an opportunity for education , can run with it .
Through education , they can both better their own lives and benefit their families and communities through better health outcomes and delayed marriage and pregnancy .
These are related to better educational outcomes , which , in turn , can lead to improved economic performance for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ benefits have been long understood .
It was 25 years ago—not far off from when Masenya was asking her mother to change schools—that 189 countries unanimously adopted the landmark Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action ( BDPA ) to advance the rights of women and girls .
One of the aims in the BDPA was to get governments to increase access to education and training for women and girls .
It was the first time that girls ’ education was rolled into international development goals in a serious way .
In the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ education has become a mainstay for multilateral organizations , NGOs , private foundations , and individual governments that push forward agendas not only to get more girls enrolled in school but also to tackle some of the intersecting issues that take them out of school , including poverty , cultural norms , and sexuality .
A UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report released on Oct. 9 , “ A New Generation : 25 Years of Efforts for Gender Equality in Education , ” highlights some of the advances of the past decades .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ needs to be done for education for all children , including better-quality curricula and pedagogy , textbooks that are more inclusive , and increased access to female teachers and mentors beyond primary school .
The world ’ s progress in the past 25 years has been uneven .
Since 1995 , the global enrollment rate for girls has increased from 73 percent to 89 percent , with the biggest improvements in sub-Saharan Africa and Central and Southern Asia .
More than 180 million more girls were enrolled in primary and secondary school in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a 58 percent jump in girls enrolled in secondary school .
Over the past 25 years , female enrollment in tertiary education also rose by three times its total to 115 million women registered for programs in 2018 .
The global numbers are impressive , but they conceal regional disparities with many girls remaining out of school in the world ’ s poorest countries .
In at least 20 countries , mostly in sub-Saharan Africa but also in Pakistan , Haiti , Belize , and Papua New Guinea , hardly any poor rural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Another seemingly positive outcome is that globally gender parity has been reached in primary and secondary schooling .
In 1995 , there were only 90 girls enrolled for every 100 boys .
In 2018 , those figures were equal .
But , again , the headline figure masks huge differences .
India and China , with their huge populations , have reached gender parity ( the percentage of all girls attending is equivalent to the percentage of boys ) , balancing out almost every other country that hasn ’ t .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ schools and the quality of the education students are getting .
“ Definitely gone are the days that we pat ourselves on the back for reaching gender parity and enrollment , ” said Yona Nestel , Plan International ’ s senior education policy and advocacy advisor , in September over Zoom .
“ We know that girls can complete their education having experienced violence , harassment , and discrimination throughout their education and be spit out into a society that still doesn ’ t value them .
I take issue with these kinds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because it doesn ’ t help us understand the experience.
” The UNESCO report also makes clear that the world has a long way to go on improving the quality of the curricula that children and teenagers are getting in school .
It ’ s not just enough to have them enrolled and physically in the classroom ; it ’ s about educational outcomes as well .
Last year , UNESCO found that in low- and middle-income countries , 53 percent of children could not read and understand a simple story by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poor countries , that number was as high as 80 percent .
For many girls and young women—and their parents—attending a school where they don ’ t get a quality education feels pointless , while dropping out to get a job , help out at home , or get married might feel more beneficial .
“ Now the discussion is really around what are those skills and competencies that we should be focusing on beyond hard math and hard reading , ” Christina Kwauk , a fellow at the Brookings Institution ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ September over Zoom .
“ What are those social and emotional components ?
What are the 21st-century skills ?
” There is a clear shift , she continued , from the “ access story to one focused around what does it mean to be in school and what does it mean to be learning.
” Discrimination against girls and women in school likewise continues to be a challenge .
There are still two countries , Tanzania and Equatorial Guinea , that prevent girls from going to school if they are expecting .
( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similar ban . )
Meanwhile , it ’ s estimated that around 12 million girls a year are still getting married before they turn 18 , which is associated with less schooling and early pregnancy .
Parents often continue to prioritize their sons ’ education over their daughters as well .
“ If you are a young man and you don ’ t go to school , there is an element of your participation in that decision , ” Manos Antoninis , the director of UNESCO ’ s Global Education Monitoring Report , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ But if you are a girl , you have no choice if someone tells you not to go to school.
” Textbooks continue to be gender-biased , too , with women often represented in texts and illustrations in care positions while men are more likely to appear as leaders and executives .
That comes in part because , as the report states , many of the textbooks writers in countries such as Nepal tend to be men .
Even in Ethiopia , where there has been a major commitment to gender equality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highlighted stories of African kings , male freedom fighters , and leaders .
Women who were keenly involved in the struggle for independence were nowhere to be found .
As girls advance through their school career , they are less and less likely to see female teachers in the classroom .
Around the world , 94 percent of pre-primary teachers are women .
But by the time female students get to their tertiary education , only 43 percent of their teachers are women .
There is likewise a dearth of female mentors in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administrators all the way up to government ministers in charge of education .
“ In school we were never taught or told what you can study , where you can study , what is available in terms of funding , ” said Masenya in response to why she started her mentoring NGO .
“ I wanted to close the gap and make a way for girls to have access to education and information that I didn ’ t have growing up.
” The COVID-19 pandemic , of course , has had devastating consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the UNESCO report states that the pandemic risks deepening existing disparities .
But Nestel , for one , is hopeful that pandemic could bring about some positive outcomes .
“ I do feel like COVID has cracked open any illusion that we ’ re not facing some pretty great inequalities within education , ” she said .
“ And it will force the education sector to be more resilient and more responsive to the needs of those who are most vulnerable .
[ So ] it creates an opportunity for us to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quicker way than we ever have before .
”

LONDON—When Adelaide Tsogo Masenya was six, she switched primary schools. Her local school, Dr Knak Primary School, in the poor Johannesburg township of Alexandra, only taught in her native language of Sepedi. Her new school, Marlboro Gardens Secondary School, had an English-only curriculum. Years later when she asked her mother, a cashier who only had a primary school education, why they had moved her, her mother replied, “You actually asked me to take you to an English school.” Even at such a young age, Masenya, who is now 30, had enough agency to understand the importance of education for her future.
LONDON—When Adelaide Tsogo Masenya was six, she switched primary schools. Her local school, Dr Knak Primary School, in the poor Johannesburg township of Alexandra, only taught in her native language of Sepedi. Her new school, Marlboro Gardens Secondary School, had an English-only curriculum. Years later when she asked her mother, a cashier who only had a primary school education, why they had moved her, her mother replied, “You actually asked me to take you to an English school.” Even at such a young age, Masenya, who is now 30, had enough agency to understand the importance of education for her future.
Masenya went on to attend university in Johannesburg—later working both in human resources and as a secondary school teacher. She was also awarded a Chevening scholarship to obtain a master’s degree in education and development at University College London, something that likely wouldn’t have been available if she had not had access to a good recognized university for her undergraduate degree. “Education has taken me to places where I never thought as a young Black girl from Alex I would reach,” she said, sitting in an outdoor café in west London, where she now lives and remotely runs the Tsogo Ya Bokamoso Foundation, an education nongovernmental organization she founded. It focuses on mentoring secondary school girls back in her township. “It has made me live a life of freedom where I am able to provide for my family, I am able to work in any space that I want to, I am able to have a voice and express my rights. Education has made me who I am today.”
Masenya’s tale is unique, but it also exemplifies the stories of millions of girls and young women across the globe who, if given an opportunity for education, can run with it. Through education, they can both better their own lives and benefit their families and communities through better health outcomes and delayed marriage and pregnancy. These are related to better educational outcomes, which, in turn, can lead to improved economic performance for the community as a whole.
Those benefits have been long understood. It was 25 years ago—not far off from when Masenya was asking her mother to change schools—that 189 countries unanimously adopted the landmark Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPA) to advance the rights of women and girls. One of the aims in the BDPA was to get governments to increase access to education and training for women and girls.
It was the first time that girls’ education was rolled into international development goals in a serious way. In the two and a half decades since, girls’ education has become a mainstay for multilateral organizations, NGOs, private foundations, and individual governments that push forward agendas not only to get more girls enrolled in school but also to tackle some of the intersecting issues that take them out of school, including poverty, cultural norms, and sexuality.
A UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report released on Oct. 9, “A New Generation: 25 Years of Efforts for Gender Equality in Education,” highlights some of the advances of the past decades. However, it also pinpoints what more needs to be done for education for all children, including better-quality curricula and pedagogy, textbooks that are more inclusive, and increased access to female teachers and mentors beyond primary school.
The world’s progress in the past 25 years has been uneven. Since 1995, the global enrollment rate for girls has increased from 73 percent to 89 percent, with the biggest improvements in sub-Saharan Africa and Central and Southern Asia. More than 180 million more girls were enrolled in primary and secondary school in 2018 compared to 1995, which included a 58 percent jump in girls enrolled in secondary school. Over the past 25 years, female enrollment in tertiary education also rose by three times its total to 115 million women registered for programs in 2018. The global numbers are impressive, but they conceal regional disparities with many girls remaining out of school in the world’s poorest countries. In at least 20 countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa but also in Pakistan, Haiti, Belize, and Papua New Guinea, hardly any poor rural young women have completed upper secondary schooling.
Another seemingly positive outcome is that globally gender parity has been reached in primary and secondary schooling. In 1995, there were only 90 girls enrolled for every 100 boys. In 2018, those figures were equal. But, again, the headline figure masks huge differences. India and China, with their huge populations, have reached gender parity (the percentage of all girls attending is equivalent to the percentage of boys), balancing out almost every other country that hasn’t.
There are also the questions of discrimination in schools and the quality of the education students are getting. “Definitely gone are the days that we pat ourselves on the back for reaching gender parity and enrollment,” said Yona Nestel, Plan International’s senior education policy and advocacy advisor, in September over Zoom. “We know that girls can complete their education having experienced violence, harassment, and discrimination throughout their education and be spit out into a society that still doesn’t value them. I take issue with these kinds of quantitative statistics like gender parity, because it doesn’t help us understand the experience.”
The UNESCO report also makes clear that the world has a long way to go on improving the quality of the curricula that children and teenagers are getting in school. It’s not just enough to have them enrolled and physically in the classroom; it’s about educational outcomes as well. Last year, UNESCO found that in low- and middle-income countries, 53 percent of children could not read and understand a simple story by the end of primary school. In some poor countries, that number was as high as 80 percent. For many girls and young women—and their parents—attending a school where they don’t get a quality education feels pointless, while dropping out to get a job, help out at home, or get married might feel more beneficial. “Now the discussion is really around what are those skills and competencies that we should be focusing on beyond hard math and hard reading,” Christina Kwauk, a fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Universal Education, said in September over Zoom. “What are those social and emotional components? What are the 21st-century skills?” There is a clear shift, she continued, from the “access story to one focused around what does it mean to be in school and what does it mean to be learning.”
Discrimination against girls and women in school likewise continues to be a challenge. There are still two countries, Tanzania and Equatorial Guinea, that prevent girls from going to school if they are expecting. (Sierra Leone earlier this year overturned a similar ban.) Meanwhile, it’s estimated that around 12 million girls a year are still getting married before they turn 18, which is associated with less schooling and early pregnancy. Parents often continue to prioritize their sons’ education over their daughters as well. “If you are a young man and you don’t go to school, there is an element of your participation in that decision,” Manos Antoninis, the director of UNESCO’s Global Education Monitoring Report, pointed out this month over Zoom. “But if you are a girl, you have no choice if someone tells you not to go to school.”
Textbooks continue to be gender-biased, too, with women often represented in texts and illustrations in care positions while men are more likely to appear as leaders and executives. That comes in part because, as the report states, many of the textbooks writers in countries such as Nepal tend to be men. Even in Ethiopia, where there has been a major commitment to gender equality in education since the BDPA, textbooks highlighted stories of African kings, male freedom fighters, and leaders. Women who were keenly involved in the struggle for independence were nowhere to be found.
As girls advance through their school career, they are less and less likely to see female teachers in the classroom. Around the world, 94 percent of pre-primary teachers are women. But by the time female students get to their tertiary education, only 43 percent of their teachers are women. There is likewise a dearth of female mentors in school settings, from head teachers and administrators all the way up to government ministers in charge of education. “In school we were never taught or told what you can study, where you can study, what is available in terms of funding,” said Masenya in response to why she started her mentoring NGO. “I wanted to close the gap and make a way for girls to have access to education and information that I didn’t have growing up.”
The COVID-19 pandemic, of course, has had devastating consequences for every country around the world, and the UNESCO report states that the pandemic risks deepening existing disparities. But Nestel, for one, is hopeful that pandemic could bring about some positive outcomes. “I do feel like COVID has cracked open any illusion that we’re not facing some pretty great inequalities within education,” she said. “And it will force the education sector to be more resilient and more responsive to the needs of those who are most vulnerable. [So] it creates an opportunity for us to really move the needle in a much quicker way than we ever have before.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-09--Christian Victims in Nigeria Fear Future Attacks

Amaka Nwoke stood in front of St. Bernadine Catholic Church in Oyo , in Nigeria ’ s southwest region , holding a placard that read : “ Stop killings in Nigeria.
” Nwoke , 24 , had joined hundreds of Christians in the region to protest the growing killings and abductions happening across Nigerian Christian communities .
“ Every day , when I turn on the TV or on social media , I see killings and violence , targeted at Christians , ” Nwoke told me by phone .
“ I ’ m scared , ” she said .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and , on the increase , even in communities you thought were safe and could not be penetrated have been attacked.
” Insecurity still remains one of Nigeria ’ s biggest challenges , according to the Institute for Security Studies .
Across Nigeria , millions of Christians are living in fear because of the growing attacks by armed men or cattle herders from the Fulani ethnic group .
Abductions and killings by the cattle herders are frequent and random in Nigeria , and Christian ethnic groups are the main victims .
The herders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their cattle to pastures down south—an area mostly dominated by Christians .
Cattle grazing often destroys crops , causing friction between the herders and local farmers .
And since the herders are Muslims , it reignites the religious tension between them and Christians .
Under President Donald Trump , who depends on political support from white evangelicals , the United States has taken a renewed interest in religious freedom issues worldwide—with a specific focus on persecuted Christians .
On June 2 , Trump released an executive order on advancing international religious freedom .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Agency for International Development to take action to combat religious freedom violations and calls for a budget of at least $ 50 million for programs to fight religious violence and persecution abroad and protect religious minorities .
“ This new order demonstrates a continued commitment to promoting and protecting religious freedoms abroad by stopping crimes against people of faith—and it comes at a critical time for Nigeria , ” the International Committee on Nigeria , a nonprofit working to promote religious freedom and human dignity in Nigeria , said in a statement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fruit so far .
Multiple reports are coming in of increased killings this year , despite the country ’ s coronavirus-related lockdowns .
According to a report last December by the United Kingdom-based Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust , more than 1,000 Christians were killed in Nigeria in 2019 .
The organization further reported that at that point 6,000 Nigerians had been killed and 12,000 displaced since 2015 .
Attacks on Christian communities have spiked under President Muhammadu Buhari ’ s administration .
Buhari , who is also from the Fulani tribe and took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Christian leaders and human rights advocates of doing little to protect the vulnerable groups that have been facing attacks over the years .
Killings are often not investigated , and victims do not trust the government ’ s sincerity or its capabilities to bring perpetrators to justice .
The International Crisis Group , an independent nonprofit organization , says farmer-herder conflicts in the country have taken an even higher toll than the better-known Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast .
An estimated 2,500 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and herders have become increasingly violent , with over 8,000 people killed since 2011 and more than 200,000 displaced , a May report by the group says .
Christian religious communities are also being specifically targeted .
On Jan. 8 , four Catholic seminarians were abducted by gunmen in northern Nigeria from the institute where they were studying .
Three of them were later released , but Michael Nnadi , 18 , was killed because he professed his faith even in captivity , according to a confessional statement by one of the suspects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
Priests are not spared , either .
Last year , eight priests were kidnapped in different parts of the country .
Over the last two years , more than five priests have been killed by gunmen .
In August 2019 , more than 1,000 priests protested the killing of their colleagues and called for the government to protect them .
In January , the Boko Haram terrorist group , which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015 , beheaded a leader of the Christian Association of Nigeria after rejecting ransom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ December 2019 , the same group had executed 11 Christians in a released video .
The group said it was in retaliation for the killing of their leader by the United States government .
During Ash Wednesday , a large number of Catholics wore black to protest the continuous insecurity that has resulted to kidnappings , violence , and assassinations of Christians in the country .
“ The level of insecurity in Nigeria today is such that whether at home or on the road , most Nigerians , in all parts of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ repeated barbaric executions of Christians by the Boko Haram insurgents and the incessant cases of kidnapping for reasons linked to the same group and other terrorists have traumatized many citizens , ” the Catholic Bishops ’ Conference of Nigeria said in a statement .
Before the executive order , the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom ’ s 2020 Annual Report , which documents the state of religious freedoms around the world , listed Nigeria as a “ country of particular concern ” —a designation considered the most serious category of documenting religious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the U.S. State Department placed Nigeria on its Special Watch List for governments that have engaged or tolerated in severe violations of religious freedom .
“ Our prayers go out to the loved ones of those killed in recent attacks across Nigeria , ” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted after a series of killings in June .
“ We condemn this senseless violence and call on the Nigerian government to redouble its efforts to protect civilians.
” Nwoke said the government needs to take responsibility for the killings .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ family and friends , ” she said .
“ We want the authorities to know that people are being killed and nothing has been done about it .
”

Amaka Nwoke stood in front of St. Bernadine Catholic Church in Oyo, in Nigeria’s southwest region, holding a placard that read: “Stop killings in Nigeria.”
Amaka Nwoke stood in front of St. Bernadine Catholic Church in Oyo, in Nigeria’s southwest region, holding a placard that read: “Stop killings in Nigeria.”
Nwoke, 24, had joined hundreds of Christians in the region to protest the growing killings and abductions happening across Nigerian Christian communities.
“Every day, when I turn on the TV or on social media, I see killings and violence, targeted at Christians,” Nwoke told me by phone. “I’m scared,” she said. “These killings and abductions are so much and, on the increase, even in communities you thought were safe and could not be penetrated have been attacked.”
Insecurity still remains one of Nigeria’s biggest challenges, according to the Institute for Security Studies. Across Nigeria, millions of Christians are living in fear because of the growing attacks by armed men or cattle herders from the Fulani ethnic group.
Abductions and killings by the cattle herders are frequent and random in Nigeria, and Christian ethnic groups are the main victims. The herders are Muslims who make regular journeys with their cattle to pastures down south—an area mostly dominated by Christians.
Cattle grazing often destroys crops, causing friction between the herders and local farmers. And since the herders are Muslims, it reignites the religious tension between them and Christians.
Under President Donald Trump, who depends on political support from white evangelicals, the United States has taken a renewed interest in religious freedom issues worldwide—with a specific focus on persecuted Christians.
On June 2, Trump released an executive order on advancing international religious freedom. The order directs the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development to take action to combat religious freedom violations and calls for a budget of at least $50 million for programs to fight religious violence and persecution abroad and protect religious minorities.
“This new order demonstrates a continued commitment to promoting and protecting religious freedoms abroad by stopping crimes against people of faith—and it comes at a critical time for Nigeria,” the International Committee on Nigeria, a nonprofit working to promote religious freedom and human dignity in Nigeria, said in a statement.
But U.S. efforts have borne little fruit so far. Multiple reports are coming in of increased killings this year, despite the country’s coronavirus-related lockdowns. According to a report last December by the United Kingdom-based Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, more than 1,000 Christians were killed in Nigeria in 2019. The organization further reported that at that point 6,000 Nigerians had been killed and 12,000 displaced since 2015.
Attacks on Christian communities have spiked under President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration. Buhari, who is also from the Fulani tribe and took office in 2015, has been accused by Christian leaders and human rights advocates of doing little to protect the vulnerable groups that have been facing attacks over the years. Killings are often not investigated, and victims do not trust the government’s sincerity or its capabilities to bring perpetrators to justice.
The International Crisis Group, an independent nonprofit organization, says farmer-herder conflicts in the country have taken an even higher toll than the better-known Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast. An estimated 2,500 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced in 2016.
The relationships between farming communities and herders have become increasingly violent, with over 8,000 people killed since 2011 and more than 200,000 displaced, a May report by the group says.
Christian religious communities are also being specifically targeted. On Jan. 8, four Catholic seminarians were abducted by gunmen in northern Nigeria from the institute where they were studying. Three of them were later released, but Michael Nnadi, 18, was killed because he professed his faith even in captivity, according to a confessional statement by one of the suspects. His killing caused outrage in the country.
Priests are not spared, either. Last year, eight priests were kidnapped in different parts of the country. Over the last two years, more than five priests have been killed by gunmen. In August 2019, more than 1,000 priests protested the killing of their colleagues and called for the government to protect them.
In January, the Boko Haram terrorist group, which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015, beheaded a leader of the Christian Association of Nigeria after rejecting ransom paid for his release. Back in December 2019, the same group had executed 11 Christians in a released video. The group said it was in retaliation for the killing of their leader by the United States government.
During Ash Wednesday, a large number of Catholics wore black to protest the continuous insecurity that has resulted to kidnappings, violence, and assassinations of Christians in the country.
“The level of insecurity in Nigeria today is such that whether at home or on the road, most Nigerians, in all parts of the country, live in fear; the repeated barbaric executions of Christians by the Boko Haram insurgents and the incessant cases of kidnapping for reasons linked to the same group and other terrorists have traumatized many citizens,” the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria said in a statement.
Before the executive order, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2020 Annual Report, which documents the state of religious freedoms around the world, listed Nigeria as a “country of particular concern”—a designation considered the most serious category of documenting religious freedom violations and infringement.
Last year, the U.S. State Department placed Nigeria on its Special Watch List for governments that have engaged or tolerated in severe violations of religious freedom.
“Our prayers go out to the loved ones of those killed in recent attacks across Nigeria,” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted after a series of killings in June. “We condemn this senseless violence and call on the Nigerian government to redouble its efforts to protect civilians.”
Nwoke said the government needs to take responsibility for the killings.
“I fear for the safety of my family and friends,” she said. “We want the authorities to know that people are being killed and nothing has been done about it.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-09--What Negotiations Over Nagorno-Karabakh Could Look Like

What Negotiations Over Nagorno-Karabakh Could Look Like On Sept. 27 , a Sunday morning , some residents of Yerevan , Armenia , woke up to find their internet hacked and their home Wi-Fi networks renamed “ KarabakhIsAzerbaijan ” —a direct quote from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev .
It was an announcement that war had begun .
Like a stalled car , decades of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh had slowed to a stop .
The OSCE Minsk Group , the sole negotiations track since 1994 , had delivered no breakthroughs .
It hadn ’ t even put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In the last four years , since the start of the Trump administration , it had gone almost completely quiet .
“ That void in real dialogue , ” as one analyst put it , set off a “ downward spiral ” in which rhetoric became sharper and positions hardened .
Both sides had made life difficult for the OSCE Minsk Group negotiators ; to date Azerbaijan and Armenia had made no room for agreement on any substantive issues , from the details of a peacekeeping or monitoring presence to the degree of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nagorno-Karabakh .
( They have demanded and begun building an independent state . )
Frustrated by a lack of diplomatic progress toward their goal , Azerbaijan and its allies in Turkey moved to settle the issue on the ground late last month .
Azerbaijan launched its well-coordinated operation with impeccable timing .
Election cycles and the global pandemic limited the interest of other countries that might otherwise intervene to stop the violence .
The intensity and duration of the fight caught the Armenians by surprise ; at nine days long , this is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the initial war in 1992-1994 .
If the goal was to force a military solution to a century-old dispute , the operations on the ground reflected a will to proceed to the finish .
Azerbaijan ’ s Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan both vowed to continue the fight until Nagorno-Karabakh and the land around it is under Azerbaijan ’ s control .
After 30 years of investment in an arsenal of weapons , including advanced drone technology , they felt confident they would wear down the Armenian forces in either @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Azerbaijan , with more than three times the population and vast petroleum wealth , has more troops and better weapons than the Armenian forces .
But Armenia holds mountainous terrain that ’ s nearly impenetrable in winter .
It also has significant firepower , including Russian-made Iskander missiles that can reach strategic targets , including the Azerbaijani capital , Baku .
As fighting intensifies , the potential for Armenian strikes on Azerbaijan ’ s energy production facilities , met by retaliatory strikes on Armenian soil , can not be ruled out .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ proper would trigger the Collective Security Treaty Organization , forcing Russia into the fight on the Armenian side .
“ There is an escalating potential here that is truly terrifying , ” said Laurence Broers of Chatham House on Tuesday .
That prospect became even more alarming the night of Oct. 1 , when an Azerbaijani drone , apparently on a reconnaissance mission , flew within 10 miles of Yerevan .
( A few others were a little further away . )
Armenia claims to have shot down four of them ; one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flaming wreckage .
A couple of days later , Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh targeted a military airport in Ganja , Azerbaijan ’ s second-largest city .
At the same time , Azerbaijan has inflicted severe damage and casualties on Armenia as well .
With both sides touting their progress on the battlefield , the details of who ’ s ahead are difficult to follow and nearly impossible to verify .
Western diplomats say that while major ground has not changed hands , Azerbaijan ’ s Turkish and Israeli drone technology is taking a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yet to actually win territory , Azerbaijani troops would need to push forward on foot , up the difficult mountainous terrain into Nagorno-Karabakh .
“ We could see a stalemate between aerial attrition and territorial control , ” Broers said .
That would come with devastating human losses , but the alternative—short of one side capitulating—could be a catastrophic escalation .
“ The question is who is ready to lead the process ?
Who can become a leader to connect all international actors and put effort into the peace process ?
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the International Crisis Group , in a phone interview from Baku .
He said it has to be someone who has the access and respect to reach top leadership levels , “ like a European George Mitchell ” —a reference to the U.S. special envoy for Northern Ireland under President Bill Clinton who paved the way for the Good Friday Agreement that led to peace in Ireland .
In previous times , the United States could play the role of lead mediator .
But given its domestic distractions , that seems unlikely .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the region , with leverage on both countries .
It sells weapons to both sides , helps export Azerbaijan ’ s oil , and keeps a close relationship with the leadership in Baku .
But its level of engagement has been notably lower than in flare-ups of the past .
Analysts say it ’ s unclear whether it has the political will to lean on the Azerbaijani side this time .
Turkey ’ s role in the conflict has meant it would take more pressure and more incentives to get Azerbaijan to back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ player now on the ground .
Its involvement gives Aliyev the feeling he can win this war , which is why he ’ s escalating so far , ” said Stefan Meister , speaking from his post at the Heinrich Boell Foundation ’ s office in Tbilisi , Georgia .
Now committed morally and materially to Azerbaijan ’ s success in the campaign , Turkey will not want it to back down without significant territorial concessions or another way to claim victory .
Erdogan has made this an issue for the Cooperation Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of countries across Central Asia that see themselves as an ethnically continuous bloc .
After making the fight for Nagorno-Karabakh common cause , he may want to tout it as a common victory .
For all those reasons , Turkey and Azerbaijan will hold fast to their demands .
The swiftest way to end the fighting may be through a Russian-Turkish agreement , possibly in exchange for interests in Syria and Libya , where the two powers both have a strong hand .
Without a radical U.S. intervention or Russian-led solution , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more intensive role for Europe .
This would be a thorny task for an already strained Brussels , especially in the context of other disputes with Turkey ( disputed gas exploration off the coast of Greece , for one ) .
But it fits the vision of Ursula von der Leyen , the president of the European Commission , for “ a truly geopolitical … more outward-looking Europe.
” “ My vision is of a Europe that helps reconcile those who are divided , a Europe that brings together those who are apart @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Forum in 2019 .
France , which serves as co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group , could lead the European charge , but it may need another partner to add heft to its side .
By calling for Turkey ’ s restraint in this round of conflict and chastising Azerbaijan ’ s use of Syrian mercenaries in the field , French President Emmanuel Macron burned some of his political capital in the eyes of Baku .
Germany may be the partner France needs .
It is well regarded by both sides , bolstered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ calls to leaders in Baku and Yerevan early in the conflict .
It is part of the wider OSCE Minsk Group along with Sweden , Finland , and Italy .
Switzerland also hosted efforts to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey through the Zurich Protocols in 2009 ; however far away that era may feel to the same actors today , it did prove the potential for the sides to come together .
On Oct. 8 , Switzerland hosted a new round of talks among the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs in an effort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expected little to come from the discussions .
The United Nations is another actor that could add credibility and leverage to cease-fire efforts .
Secretary-General António Guterres has spoken out multiple times , calling for a cease-fire and condemning any attempt at a military solution .
The U.N. Security Council held emergency talks urging a halt to the fighting .
A U.N. special envoy or senior official could be deployed to support negotiation efforts .
The U.N. is well regarded by Azerbaijan , given that its past resolutions emphasize the territorial integrity of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be essential to both sides in managing the fallout of a final solution , from humanitarian assistance to potential peacekeeping forces .
For Armenians and Azerbaijanis , narratives around their countries ’ territorial claims run deep and emotional .
Both positions are maximalist by nature .
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 , almost all of the newly independent republics inherited the boundaries written by the Soviet state .
Azerbaijan points to its legal right to the territory within those internationally recognized borders .
It wants to fully reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first war , and integrate its governance under federal rule , with final authority in Baku .
Armenians , meanwhile , hold on to geopolitically quaint but emotionally potent arguments about democracy , autonomy , and self-determination .
The ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh , who have built a self-declared state and de facto government that ’ s nearly 30 years old , want to institutionalize the status quo .
The region also has its own president , fair and frequent elections , and civic structures it would like to keep .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beyond that , there is another Armenian argument that is perhaps more practical and more urgent : the fear of ethnic cleansing under Azerbaijani rule .
“ For Armenians it ’ s a struggle for survival .
If the Armenian Army leaves , the people of Nagorno-Karabakh would be killed .
At least the Armenians believe that ’ s true , and I would agree with them , ” said Raffi Elliott , a political risk analyst in Yerevan .
“ I don ’ t blame them , ” said Arzu Geybulla , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fears are justified after a 30-year period of social and educational conditioning , teaching a generation to kill the other side .
“ A lot needs to change .
A lot needs to take place .
A lot of confidence needs to be built .
And I just don ’ t know if it ’ s going to be an easy transition.
” What could peace finally look like ?
Past negotiations indicate that there is room for compromise ; at times , the two sides nearly agreed on peacekeeping forces and confidence-building @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the climate for negotiations has shifted now that both sides have tasted the consequences of an unchecked war .
To avoid bloodshed and appease all sides , Nagorno-Karabakh may need to come under something like a U.N. trusteeship , a shared territory with strong security guarantees .
The lands adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh , currently held by Armenian forces , may have to be given back to Azerbaijan or handed over to a custodian , like Russia , for a transition period .
A referendum of all residents , including the displaced , had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
None of these options will sound appealing to the warring parties , which have hardened their views and attitudes over time .
But the alternative of a larger war , with all its regional fallout , may be horrific enough to move new pieces into place .

On Sept. 27, a Sunday morning, some residents of Yerevan, Armenia, woke up to find their internet hacked and their home Wi-Fi networks renamed “KarabakhIsAzerbaijan”—a direct quote from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. It was an announcement that war had begun.
On Sept. 27, a Sunday morning, some residents of Yerevan, Armenia, woke up to find their internet hacked and their home Wi-Fi networks renamed “KarabakhIsAzerbaijan”—a direct quote from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. It was an announcement that war had begun.
Like a stalled car, decades of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh had slowed to a stop. The OSCE Minsk Group, the sole negotiations track since 1994, had delivered no breakthroughs. It hadn’t even put out a major proposal since 2007. In the last four years, since the start of the Trump administration, it had gone almost completely quiet.
“That void in real dialogue,” as one analyst put it, set off a “downward spiral” in which rhetoric became sharper and positions hardened. Both sides had made life difficult for the OSCE Minsk Group negotiators; to date Azerbaijan and Armenia had made no room for agreement on any substantive issues, from the details of a peacekeeping or monitoring presence to the degree of self-rule for the majority Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh. (They have demanded and begun building an independent state.) Frustrated by a lack of diplomatic progress toward their goal, Azerbaijan and its allies in Turkey moved to settle the issue on the ground late last month.
Azerbaijan launched its well-coordinated operation with impeccable timing. Election cycles and the global pandemic limited the interest of other countries that might otherwise intervene to stop the violence. The intensity and duration of the fight caught the Armenians by surprise; at nine days long, this is already the deadliest skirmish over the region since the initial war in 1992-1994. If the goal was to force a military solution to a century-old dispute, the operations on the ground reflected a will to proceed to the finish. Azerbaijan’s Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan both vowed to continue the fight until Nagorno-Karabakh and the land around it is under Azerbaijan’s control. After 30 years of investment in an arsenal of weapons, including advanced drone technology, they felt confident they would wear down the Armenian forces in either a quick flash or over continued attrition.
Part of the mythology around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is that both sides—two of the most heavily armed countries in the world per capita—have enough firepower aimed at the other’s critical assets to avoid all-out war. But that hypothesis is now put to rest.
Azerbaijan, with more than three times the population and vast petroleum wealth, has more troops and better weapons than the Armenian forces. But Armenia holds mountainous terrain that’s nearly impenetrable in winter. It also has significant firepower, including Russian-made Iskander missiles that can reach strategic targets, including the Azerbaijani capital, Baku.
As fighting intensifies, the potential for Armenian strikes on Azerbaijan’s energy production facilities, met by retaliatory strikes on Armenian soil, cannot be ruled out. And a strike by Azerbaijan on Armenia proper would trigger the Collective Security Treaty Organization, forcing Russia into the fight on the Armenian side. “There is an escalating potential here that is truly terrifying,” said Laurence Broers of Chatham House on Tuesday.
That prospect became even more alarming the night of Oct. 1, when an Azerbaijani drone, apparently on a reconnaissance mission, flew within 10 miles of Yerevan. (A few others were a little further away.) Armenia claims to have shot down four of them; one diplomat saw what appeared to be the flaming wreckage. A couple of days later, Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh targeted a military airport in Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second-largest city. At the same time, Azerbaijan has inflicted severe damage and casualties on Armenia as well.
With both sides touting their progress on the battlefield, the details of who’s ahead are difficult to follow and nearly impossible to verify. Western diplomats say that while major ground has not changed hands, Azerbaijan’s Turkish and Israeli drone technology is taking a deep and deadly toll on Armenian soldiers. Yet to actually win territory, Azerbaijani troops would need to push forward on foot, up the difficult mountainous terrain into Nagorno-Karabakh. “We could see a stalemate between aerial attrition and territorial control,” Broers said.
That would come with devastating human losses, but the alternative—short of one side capitulating—could be a catastrophic escalation.
To avoid either escalation or a draining slog, Armenia has offered to come back to negotiations. Azerbaijan has agreed, with steep preconditions. Among them are a timetable for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and an apology from Armenia’s leadership. In other words, the two sides remain far apart on how to get back to the table and what to do when they get there. It isn’t clear, moreover, who could press each side to make the needed concessions.
“The question is who is ready to lead the process? Who can become a leader to connect all international actors and put effort into the peace process?” said Zaur Shiriyev, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, in a phone interview from Baku. He said it has to be someone who has the access and respect to reach top leadership levels, “like a European George Mitchell”—a reference to the U.S. special envoy for Northern Ireland under President Bill Clinton who paved the way for the Good Friday Agreement that led to peace in Ireland.
In previous times, the United States could play the role of lead mediator. But given its domestic distractions, that seems unlikely. Russia was always the dominant power in the region, with leverage on both countries. It sells weapons to both sides, helps export Azerbaijan’s oil, and keeps a close relationship with the leadership in Baku. But its level of engagement has been notably lower than in flare-ups of the past. Analysts say it’s unclear whether it has the political will to lean on the Azerbaijani side this time. Turkey’s role in the conflict has meant it would take more pressure and more incentives to get Azerbaijan to back down.
“Turkey is the key player now on the ground. Its involvement gives Aliyev the feeling he can win this war, which is why he’s escalating so far,” said Stefan Meister, speaking from his post at the Heinrich Boell Foundation’s office in Tbilisi, Georgia. Now committed morally and materially to Azerbaijan’s success in the campaign, Turkey will not want it to back down without significant territorial concessions or another way to claim victory. Erdogan has made this an issue for the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, a platform of countries across Central Asia that see themselves as an ethnically continuous bloc. After making the fight for Nagorno-Karabakh common cause, he may want to tout it as a common victory.
For all those reasons, Turkey and Azerbaijan will hold fast to their demands. The swiftest way to end the fighting may be through a Russian-Turkish agreement, possibly in exchange for interests in Syria and Libya, where the two powers both have a strong hand.
Without a radical U.S. intervention or Russian-led solution, the last hope may be a higher-level and more intensive role for Europe. This would be a thorny task for an already strained Brussels, especially in the context of other disputes with Turkey (disputed gas exploration off the coast of Greece, for one). But it fits the vision of Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, for “a truly geopolitical … more outward-looking Europe.”
“My vision is of a Europe that helps reconcile those who are divided, a Europe that brings together those who are apart,” she told the Paris Peace Forum in 2019.
France, which serves as co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, could lead the European charge, but it may need another partner to add heft to its side. By calling for Turkey’s restraint in this round of conflict and chastising Azerbaijan’s use of Syrian mercenaries in the field, French President Emmanuel Macron burned some of his political capital in the eyes of Baku.
Germany may be the partner France needs. It is well regarded by both sides, bolstered by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone calls to leaders in Baku and Yerevan early in the conflict. It is part of the wider OSCE Minsk Group along with Sweden, Finland, and Italy. Switzerland also hosted efforts to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey through the Zurich Protocols in 2009; however far away that era may feel to the same actors today, it did prove the potential for the sides to come together. On Oct. 8, Switzerland hosted a new round of talks among the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs in an effort to jog negotiations forward, but experts expected little to come from the discussions.
The United Nations is another actor that could add credibility and leverage to cease-fire efforts. Secretary-General António Guterres has spoken out multiple times, calling for a cease-fire and condemning any attempt at a military solution. The U.N. Security Council held emergency talks urging a halt to the fighting. A U.N. special envoy or senior official could be deployed to support negotiation efforts. The U.N. is well regarded by Azerbaijan, given that its past resolutions emphasize the territorial integrity of sovereign states. The U.N. would also be essential to both sides in managing the fallout of a final solution, from humanitarian assistance to potential peacekeeping forces.
Whether Russia unveils a quietly arranged peace deal with Turkey or a new diplomatic intervention creates a breakthrough, what do we get if the negotiations track moves forward? A slowdown in the loss of human lives and another opportunity to work out complex, thorny issues that need international energy to solve.
For Armenians and Azerbaijanis, narratives around their countries’ territorial claims run deep and emotional. Both positions are maximalist by nature. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, almost all of the newly independent republics inherited the boundaries written by the Soviet state. Azerbaijan points to its legal right to the territory within those internationally recognized borders. It wants to fully reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh, resettle displaced Azeris who left after the first war, and integrate its governance under federal rule, with final authority in Baku.
Armenians, meanwhile, hold on to geopolitically quaint but emotionally potent arguments about democracy, autonomy, and self-determination. The ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, who have built a self-declared state and de facto government that’s nearly 30 years old, want to institutionalize the status quo. The region also has its own president, fair and frequent elections, and civic structures it would like to keep. But the prospects for that are daunting.
Beyond that, there is another Armenian argument that is perhaps more practical and more urgent: the fear of ethnic cleansing under Azerbaijani rule. “For Armenians it’s a struggle for survival. If the Armenian Army leaves, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh would be killed. At least the Armenians believe that’s true, and I would agree with them,” said Raffi Elliott, a political risk analyst in Yerevan.
“I don’t blame them,” said Arzu Geybulla, an Azerbaijani journalist. She said those fears are justified after a 30-year period of social and educational conditioning, teaching a generation to kill the other side. “A lot needs to change. A lot needs to take place. A lot of confidence needs to be built. And I just don’t know if it’s going to be an easy transition.”
What could peace finally look like? Past negotiations indicate that there is room for compromise; at times, the two sides nearly agreed on peacekeeping forces and confidence-building measures. But it is unclear how the climate for negotiations has shifted now that both sides have tasted the consequences of an unchecked war.
To avoid bloodshed and appease all sides, Nagorno-Karabakh may need to come under something like a U.N. trusteeship, a shared territory with strong security guarantees. The lands adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, currently held by Armenian forces, may have to be given back to Azerbaijan or handed over to a custodian, like Russia, for a transition period. A referendum of all residents, including the displaced, had been on the table in negotiations past. None of these options will sound appealing to the warring parties, which have hardened their views and attitudes over time. But the alternative of a larger war, with all its regional fallout, may be horrific enough to move new pieces into place.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-10--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

It ’ s overly simplistic to suggest that the coronavirus pandemic will spell the end of globalization .
After all , much of the interconnectedness of today ’ s world doesn ’ t depend on capital flows or controls , sprawling supply chains , or border walls ; the dark cloud of climate disaster , for example , represents a sort of ecological globalization we can ’ t escape—while cyberspace itself is virtually boundless .
Meanwhile , the prime minister of Armenia grapples with the consequences of his own nationalism—which compelled him to abandon negotiations mediated by the Organization for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bloody fight in Nagorno-Karabakh .
And the man behind Veep offers his thoughts on whether the Trump era qualifies as comedy .
1 .
COVID-19 Might Not Change the World It ’ s too early to know whether the coronavirus pandemic will become a critical juncture in history .
But much of the early alarmism about the fate of the liberalism is unfounded : In fact , recent polling suggests COVID-19 has actually emboldened democracies and hampered China ’ s rise , rather than the other way around , Joseph S. Nye Jr. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Armenia , Azerbaijan Has the Upper Hand in Nagorno-Karabakh Since he came to power in 2018 , Armenian premier Nikol Pashinyan has undermined tenuous treaties between his country and Azerbaijan over the disputed oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh .
Now , the fate of Armenia ’ s leader—and that of his country as a whole—rests in Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s hands , Robert M. Cutler writes .
Armando Iannucci , the creator of Veep , is glad he doesn ’ t have to write a comedy show about Washington in the year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be placed against the backdrop of the Trump administration , wildly incompetent Vice President Selina Meyer would likely emerge as a “ hero figure , ” he tells Foreign Policy ’ s Amy Mackinnon in an interview .
4 .
Why We Still Need Democracy Republican Sen. Mike Lee raised more than a few eyebrows on Wednesday when he suggested that the United States shouldn ’ t be a democracy .
That ’ s a dangerous claim , because it suggests leaders view accountability—democracy ’ s backbone—as trivial , Malka Older writes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has spiked under President Muhammadu Buhari , who came to power in 2015 .
All the while , U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s ostensible support for persecuted Christians has yet to materialize , Patrick Egwu reports .

It’s overly simplistic to suggest that the coronavirus pandemic will spell the end of globalization. After all, much of the interconnectedness of today’s world doesn’t depend on capital flows or controls, sprawling supply chains, or border walls; the dark cloud of climate disaster, for example, represents a sort of ecological globalization we can’t escape—while cyberspace itself is virtually boundless.
It’s overly simplistic to suggest that the coronavirus pandemic will spell the end of globalization. After all, much of the interconnectedness of today’s world doesn’t depend on capital flows or controls, sprawling supply chains, or border walls; the dark cloud of climate disaster, for example, represents a sort of ecological globalization we can’t escape—while cyberspace itself is virtually boundless.
Meanwhile, the prime minister of Armenia grapples with the consequences of his own nationalism—which compelled him to abandon negotiations mediated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe over the bloody fight in Nagorno-Karabakh.
And the man behind Veep offers his thoughts on whether the Trump era qualifies as comedy.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Paramilitary police march near the U.S. consulate in Chengdu, China on July 26.
It’s too early to know whether the coronavirus pandemic will become a critical juncture in history. But much of the early alarmism about the fate of the liberalism is unfounded: In fact, recent polling suggests COVID-19 has actually emboldened democracies and hampered China’s rise, rather than the other way around, Joseph S. Nye Jr. writes.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gives an interview in Yerevan on Oct. 6.
Since he came to power in 2018, Armenian premier Nikol Pashinyan has undermined tenuous treaties between his country and Azerbaijan over the disputed oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh. Now, the fate of Armenia’s leader—and that of his country as a whole—rests in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hands, Robert M. Cutler writes.
Armando Iannucci
Armando Iannucci, the creator of Veep, is glad he doesn’t have to write a comedy show about Washington in the year 2020. Were the characters of Veep to be placed against the backdrop of the Trump administration, wildly incompetent Vice President Selina Meyer would likely emerge as a “hero figure,” he tells Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon in an interview.
Working in bipartisan pairs, canvassers process mail-in ballots in a warehouse at the Anne Arundel County Board of Elections headquarters in Glen Burnie, Maryland, on Oct. 7.
Republican Sen. Mike Lee raised more than a few eyebrows on Wednesday when he suggested that the United States shouldn’t be a democracy. That’s a dangerous claim, because it suggests leaders view accountability—democracy’s backbone—as trivial, Malka Older writes.
Christians hold signs as they march on the streets of Abuja, Nigeria.
Violence against Nigeria’s Christians has spiked under President Muhammadu Buhari, who came to power in 2015. All the while, U.S. President Donald Trump’s ostensible support for persecuted Christians has yet to materialize, Patrick Egwu reports.