foreignpolicy--2020-03-10--The Multilateral Health System Failed to Stop the Coronavirus

The Multilateral Health System Failed to Stop the Coronavirus An important soccer match in Milan plays to an empty stadium .
Tokyo Disneyland closes its doors .
The Mongolian president is under quarantine , and Iran releases 70,000 prisoners rather than risk their spreading the infection .
Europe brings the dangerous virus to sub-Saharan Africa rather than the reverse , via infected French and Italian travelers to Senegal and Nigeria .
An outbreak of COVID-19 rages in a residential care facility in Washington state .
The S & P 500 loses more than 18 percent of its value in two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to cut interest rates to stem the global economic fallout from a microbe .
These are not scenes from a novel , but from a world being swept by a virus born just a few months ago .
As of March 10 , the virus has infected over 115,000 people in more than 100 nations .
China has taken extraordinary measures to contain the spread of the virus , including restricting the movement of some 760 million people .
While those measures appear to be stabilizing China ’ s domestic situation and buying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the outbreak , they came too late to overcome the earlier missteps by the Chinese government that contributed to the spread of the virus worldwide .
To date , national governments have borne the brunt of global scrutiny for the outbreak , particularly in China , South Korea , Japan , Italy , and increasingly the United States , where Democrats have criticized President Donald Trump ’ s handling of the new coronavirus .
That scrutiny is healthy , warranted in many cases , and should continue .
Yet , that national focus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also failed at what it had been specifically redesigned in 2005 to do : prevent the denial and inaction of one nation from putting many other nations at risk of a pandemic of deadly disease .
That redesign was the result of failure in China .
In the 2002-2003 SARS outbreak , China ’ s Ministry of Health was aware for months of a dangerous new type of pneumonia in Guangdong province before sharing that information with other nations or issuing a nationwide bulletin to hospitals and health professionals on preventing the spread @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to 29 countries , sickened thousands of people , and killed 774 before being brought under control in July 2003 .
After SARS , the International Health Regulations ( IHR ) were revised in 2005 to grant extraordinary powers to the World Health Organization .
First , the IHR authorizes WHO to act upon nonstate sources of information and to question member states on their decision-making .
This authority is meant to allow WHO to respond to potential disease outbreaks in a timelier manner , because affected nations have a tendency to cover @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reasons .
Second , the IHR empowers the WHO director-general to declare an outbreak a public health emergency of international concern , even over the objections of the state or states most directly affected .
The WHO director-general may also issue outbreak-specific guidance to inform and influence how other states use trade and travel restrictions , so as to ensure that those restrictions are science-based and do not interfere unnecessarily with public health responses in other nations .
These authorities are rare among international organizations , enabling WHO to act on its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic , economic , and political responses to extraordinary events that threaten states .
Third , WHO has the authority to name and shame those nations that do not comply with the IHR requirements on outbreak detection , trade and travel bans , and enforcement of human rights .
According to leading political scientists , WHO ’ s naming and shaming efforts send credible signals that affect member states ’ behavior during a crisis situation .
Yet the revised IHR did not stop the Chinese government from actively suppressing information that might have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Local police punished and censored doctors and other whistleblowers who sought to raise early alarm over the novel coronavirus .
Between Jan. 12 and 20 , government officials chose not to report information about the infection of 15 health workers and clear evidence of human-to-human transmission .
The government also failed to share the basic public health information that might have helped thousands of Chinese people avoid infection themselves .
Instead , it held potluck banquets for 40,000 families to celebrate Lunar New Year and offered tens of thousands of tourists free coupons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , where the outbreak originated .
By Jan. 23 , six other countries had confirmed coronavirus cases , but the spread of undiagnosed cases was likely greater .
WHO has also been slow to exercise its emergency authorities under the IHR .
Amid reports of Chinese opposition , Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus did not pronounce the coronavirus to be a public health emergency of international concern until Jan. 30 , when the outbreak had already spread to 19 countries on four continents and infected nearly 8,000 people worldwide .
WHO has advised against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus outbreaks , deeming them ineffective , but has done little to criticize the dozens of countries , including the United States , that have nevertheless imposed bans .
And instead of naming and shaming China for its cover-up , WHO has opted to focus on events after Jan. 20 , lauding extraordinary measures that China took to slow further spread of the outbreak The “ world owes China a great debt , ” a WHO official recently said , suggesting that other countries should follow China ’ s lead in containing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many have defended WHO ’ s response as pragmatism based on the need to continue to work with China on the coronavirus and as a measure of solidarity amid a costly and tragic outbreak .
Those defenders also rightly note that WHO has done much that deserves commendation .
WHO has shared timely and science-based insights about this novel virus , warned against international overreaction , shared its technical expertise with affected countries , demonstrated transparency in its daily , livestreamed press briefings , and worked diligently to marshal resources to help prepare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic .
The problems of the multilateral systems for global health security are not specific to the coronavirus outbreak , China , or WHO ’ s current leadership , which is hardworking and well-intentioned .
Critics have pointed to China ’ s role in funding WHO , but even with smaller and less influential countries there have been political issues .
Similar delays in WHO exercising IHR authorities also occurred in the current Ebola virus outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the West Africa Ebola outbreak between 2013 and 2015 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the West Africa outbreak was reportedly the result of deference to pressure from the government of Guinea , which feared the consequences of prematurely declaring the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern .
Member state-driven decision-making explains why WHO tends to defer to national governments ’ wishes and agendas , even when they might contradict the organization ’ s primary mission .
Yet , deference to the sovereignty of one member state does not work if it puts other nations and their people at risk .
Like the Ebola virus outbreak @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deficiencies of a system built around a member state-driven institution like WHO , which , irrespective of the IHR , defers to the sovereignty and preferences of directly affected nations .
But more than Ebola did , the coronavirus has revealed the dangerous consequences of that approach .
The coronavirus spreads much more easily than the Ebola virus , and it may already be at pandemic levels .
The case fatality rate for the coronavirus may fall as testing reveals more undiagnosed cases and the scale of the global outbreak becomes more apparent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 3.4 percent .
In the aftermath of this outbreak , nations will need to consider new options to improve global health security .
For instance , there is already talk of the G-7 or G-20 creating a new funding institution , akin to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS , Tuberculosis , and Malaria , to fund country-level pandemic preparedness , surveillance , and response .
Those are promising ideas , but more money alone will not solve the structural problems that have slowed early control efforts and permitted nations to impose unscientific @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we may need a new mechanism to respond to dangerous disease events , a mechanism that has greater independence from affected member states .
The world has changed in ways , from expansions in global trade and travel to warming temperatures and fast-growing cities , that have increased our risk to the threat of emerging infections .
The coronavirus is going to bring a reckoning in global health governance .
Let ’ s make sure we heed its lessons .

An important soccer match in Milan plays to an empty stadium. Tokyo Disneyland closes its doors . The Mongolian president is under quarantine , and Iran releases 70,000 prisoners rather than risk their spreading the infection. Europe brings the dangerous virus to sub-Saharan Africa rather than the reverse, via infected French and Italian travelers to Senegal and Nigeria . An outbreak of COVID-19 rages in a residential care facility in Washington state. The S&P 500 loses more than 18 percent of its value in two weeks, leading the U.S. Federal Reserve to cut interest rates to stem the global economic fallout from a microbe.
An important soccer match in Milan plays to an empty stadium. Tokyo Disneyland closes its doors. The Mongolian president is under quarantine, and Iran releases 70,000 prisoners rather than risk their spreading the infection. Europe brings the dangerous virus to sub-Saharan Africa rather than the reverse, via infected French and Italian travelers to Senegal and Nigeria. An outbreak of COVID-19 rages in a residential care facility in Washington state. The S&P 500 loses more than 18 percent of its value in two weeks, leading the U.S. Federal Reserve to cut interest rates to stem the global economic fallout from a microbe.
These are not scenes from a novel, but from a world being swept by a virus born just a few months ago. As of March 10, the virus has infected over 115,000 people in more than 100 nations. China has taken extraordinary measures to contain the spread of the virus, including restricting the movement of some 760 million people. While those measures appear to be stabilizing China’s domestic situation and buying other countries more time to prepare for the outbreak, they came too late to overcome the earlier missteps by the Chinese government that contributed to the spread of the virus worldwide.
To date, national governments have borne the brunt of global scrutiny for the outbreak, particularly in China, South Korea, Japan, Italy, and increasingly the United States, where Democrats have criticized President Donald Trump’s handling of the new coronavirus. That scrutiny is healthy, warranted in many cases, and should continue. Yet, that national focus should not obscure that the multilateral system also failed at what it had been specifically redesigned in 2005 to do: prevent the denial and inaction of one nation from putting many other nations at risk of a pandemic of deadly disease.
That redesign was the result of failure in China. In the 2002-2003 SARS outbreak, China’s Ministry of Health was aware for months of a dangerous new type of pneumonia in Guangdong province before sharing that information with other nations or issuing a nationwide bulletin to hospitals and health professionals on preventing the spread of the disease. That virus spread to 29 countries, sickened thousands of people, and killed 774 before being brought under control in July 2003.
After SARS, the International Health Regulations (IHR) were revised in 2005 to grant extraordinary powers to the World Health Organization. First, the IHR authorizes WHO to act upon nonstate sources of information and to question member states on their decision-making. This authority is meant to allow WHO to respond to potential disease outbreaks in a timelier manner, because affected nations have a tendency to cover up their outbreaks for political or economic reasons.
Second, the IHR empowers the WHO director-general to declare an outbreak a public health emergency of international concern, even over the objections of the state or states most directly affected. The WHO director-general may also issue outbreak-specific guidance to inform and influence how other states use trade and travel restrictions, so as to ensure that those restrictions are science-based and do not interfere unnecessarily with public health responses in other nations. These authorities are rare among international organizations, enabling WHO to act on its own initiative to generate and guide the international diplomatic, economic, and political responses to extraordinary events that threaten states.
Third, WHO has the authority to name and shame those nations that do not comply with the IHR requirements on outbreak detection, trade and travel bans, and enforcement of human rights. According to leading political scientists, WHO’s naming and shaming efforts send credible signals that affect member states’ behavior during a crisis situation.
Yet the revised IHR did not stop the Chinese government from actively suppressing information that might have slowed or stopped the coronavirus outbreak. Local police punished and censored doctors and other whistleblowers who sought to raise early alarm over the novel coronavirus. Between Jan. 12 and 20, government officials chose not to report information about the infection of 15 health workers and clear evidence of human-to-human transmission. The government also failed to share the basic public health information that might have helped thousands of Chinese people avoid infection themselves. Instead, it held potluck banquets for 40,000 families to celebrate Lunar New Year and offered tens of thousands of tourists free coupons for events in the city of Wuhan, where the outbreak originated. By Jan. 23, six other countries had confirmed coronavirus cases, but the spread of undiagnosed cases was likely greater.
WHO has also been slow to exercise its emergency authorities under the IHR. Amid reports of Chinese opposition, Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus did not pronounce the coronavirus to be a public health emergency of international concern until Jan. 30, when the outbreak had already spread to 19 countries on four continents and infected nearly 8,000 people worldwide.
WHO has advised against travel or trade restrictions on countries experiencing coronavirus outbreaks, deeming them ineffective, but has done little to criticize the dozens of countries, including the United States, that have nevertheless imposed bans. And instead of naming and shaming China for its cover-up, WHO has opted to focus on events after Jan. 20, lauding extraordinary measures that China took to slow further spread of the outbreak The “world owes China a great debt,” a WHO official recently said, suggesting that other countries should follow China’s lead in containing the virus’ spread.
In fairness, many have defended WHO’s response as pragmatism based on the need to continue to work with China on the coronavirus and as a measure of solidarity amid a costly and tragic outbreak. Those defenders also rightly note that WHO has done much that deserves commendation. WHO has shared timely and science-based insights about this novel virus, warned against international overreaction, shared its technical expertise with affected countries, demonstrated transparency in its daily, livestreamed press briefings, and worked diligently to marshal resources to help prepare low- and middle-income nations for a potential pandemic.
The problems of the multilateral systems for global health security are not specific to the coronavirus outbreak, China, or WHO’s current leadership, which is hardworking and well-intentioned. Critics have pointed to China’s role in funding WHO, but even with smaller and less influential countries there have been political issues. Similar delays in WHO exercising IHR authorities also occurred in the current Ebola virus outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the West Africa Ebola outbreak between 2013 and 2015. For example, the delay in the West Africa outbreak was reportedly the result of deference to pressure from the government of Guinea, which feared the consequences of prematurely declaring the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern.
Member state-driven decision-making explains why WHO tends to defer to national governments’ wishes and agendas, even when they might contradict the organization’s primary mission. Yet, deference to the sovereignty of one member state does not work if it puts other nations and their people at risk.
Like the Ebola virus outbreak, the coronavirus outbreak has exposed the deficiencies of a system built around a member state-driven institution like WHO, which, irrespective of the IHR, defers to the sovereignty and preferences of directly affected nations. But more than Ebola did, the coronavirus has revealed the dangerous consequences of that approach. The coronavirus spreads much more easily than the Ebola virus, and it may already be at pandemic levels. The case fatality rate for the coronavirus may fall as testing reveals more undiagnosed cases and the scale of the global outbreak becomes more apparent, but it is currently estimated at 3.4 percent.
In the aftermath of this outbreak, nations will need to consider new options to improve global health security. For instance, there is already talk of the G-7 or G-20 creating a new funding institution, akin to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, to fund country-level pandemic preparedness, surveillance, and response. Those are promising ideas, but more money alone will not solve the structural problems that have slowed early control efforts and permitted nations to impose unscientific travel bans. To fix those problems, we may need a new mechanism to respond to dangerous disease events, a mechanism that has greater independence from affected member states.
The world has changed in ways, from expansions in global trade and travel to warming temperatures and fast-growing cities, that have increased our risk to the threat of emerging infections. The coronavirus is going to bring a reckoning in global health governance. Let’s make sure we heed its lessons.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-10--Will Putin Be Russia’s President For Life?

Will Putin Be Russia ’ s President For Life ?
The question of what comes next for Vladimir Putin after his current presidential term expires in 2024 has been the central question driving Russian politics .
The looming deadline has led to months of theories and speculation about how Putin would chart the country ’ s political future by exploring various ways to stay in power or slowly transition away from the Kremlin .
On Tuesday , that future became a little bit clearer when a series of choreographed political moves in Russia ’ s parliament set the stage for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s president for another 16 years .
The proposal , which was passed by the State Duma , Russia ’ s lower house of parliament , opens the door for the 67-year-old Putin—who has already ruled for more than 20 years—to serve as many as two more six-year terms , potentially extending his rule over Russia to 2036 , when he would be 83 .
The Russian president is required by the constitution to step down in 2024 when his second sequential presidential term ends , but the motion unexpectedly proposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constitution in a way that would reset Putin ’ s presidential term count back to zero .
Putin has already endorsed the amendment , but he said that the legislation must first be approved by Russia ’ s Constitutional Court , which is largely a formality given the country ’ s tightly controlled politics .
The forthcoming ruling from the court is part of a wider set of changes to Russia ’ s constitution that will be put to a national vote scheduled for April 22 and define the country ’ s trajectory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just happened ?
The proposal to reset Putin ’ s term limits was put forward during a parliamentary session by Valentina Tereshkova , a member of the ruling United Russia party who was also the first woman in space , who argued that the change was needed because , “ Putin needs to be there—in case something goes wrong.
” Lawmakers offered overwhelming support for the idea , and the session that was focused on amendments to the constitution was later suspended when Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said that he wanted to consult with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Putin then appeared in person in parliament , and in a televised half-hour speech he said that he agreed with the proposal and that he should be allowed to run again as president in order to ensure Russia ’ s political stability .
“ Russia has had enough revolutions , ” Putin said during his address .
“ The president is the guarantor of the constitution and , to say more simply , the guarantor of the security of our state , its internal stability and internal evolutionary development.
” Despite supporting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for himself , Putin said that future presidents should abide by a two-term limit .
The Russian leader also added that while “ stability ” is the country ’ s primary need at the moment , in the future when Russia is stronger , the country “ needs a guarantee that the people in power can be changed regularly.
” Putin also rejected an earlier proposal put forward during the session for early parliamentary elections , which are currently scheduled for 2021 .
Remarking on the day ’ s unexpected turn of events @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most prominent opposition figure , tweeted : “ It ’ s all clear : There won ’ t be early elections .
Putin will be president for life.
” This latest venture is part of a set of recent measures looking to answer the difficult question of what comes after 2024 .
In January , Putin announced sweeping constitutional reforms that would redistribute some of the powers of the presidency to the parliament and State Council , an obscure body that would grant its head extensive powers over Russian foreign and military policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intent to leave the presidency , and many analysts predicted that he would then remain as the head of the State Council , where he could still wield significant influence over the country .
But last week , Putin said that he did not intend to head the newly empowered State Council after 2024 , adding that him doing so would be “ destructive ” for Russia .
Tuesday ’ s announcement has only added to the confusion of what comes next , as earlier expectations that Putin intended to weaken the presidency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The decision to turn to the Constitutional Court comes as the booming energy prices and rising incomes that helped propel Putin ’ s popularity in the early days of his presidency have largely passed and the Russian economy continues to be hit by low oil prices during a spat with Saudi Arabia and hurt by the financial fallout from the spread of the coronavirus .
Moreover , while Putin still remains popular , his government has faced falling ratings and rising distrust that could only grow .
The dismissal of the unpopular government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minister of Mikhail Mishustin , who has since promised increased social benefits , were seen as moves to boost Putin ’ s popularity and reverse the tide .
A January poll from the Levada Center , an independent pollster based in Moscow , found that Putin ’ s approval rating stood at 68 percent , but trust in the president was down to 35 percent , the lowest since Russia ’ s annexation of Crimea in 2014 .
While Wednesday ’ s surprise turn of events has opened a new path for Putin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Kremlin ’ s course of action .
Rather , the dramatic move is widely seen as part of an effort to create options for the Russian leader .
While Putin endorsed the proposal in parliament , he did not definitively say he would run again as president and addressed the Russian public at the end of his speech , saying : “ I ’ m sure that together , we will do many more great things , at least until 2024 .
Then , we will see.
” Still , the move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and reflects a lack of faith in many of the more sophisticated ways put forward for Putin maintaining power .
Some proposals have looked at granting retired presidents immunity from prosecution , while others would make Putin a lifetime senator in Russia ’ s upper house .
Another unsuccessful option saw the Kremlin pressure neighboring Belarus into agreeing to merge the country with Russia , allowing Putin to sidestep term limits as head of the new unified state .
Restarting the clock on Putin ’ s term limits will do little to satisfy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change , but it will certainly deliver for Russian elites who are anxious about preserving the status quo .
Putin is the top of the country ’ s authoritarian system and functions as an arbiter for high-level disputes , preventing palace intrigue from spilling out into public view and protecting the wealth of the elite .
With Putin removed from this role , many have speculated that the current system would become unstable , leading to power grabs and competition to fill the vacuum left by the president .
This presents a difficult @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years as the Kremlin looks for ways to contain public backlash and still keep elites in check .
With few alternatives , Putin until 2036 appears to be the most comfortable option for the Kremlin .

The question of what comes next for Vladimir Putin after his current presidential term expires in 2024 has been the central question driving Russian politics. The looming deadline has led to months of theories and speculation about how Putin would chart the country’s political future by exploring various ways to stay in power or slowly transition away from the Kremlin. On Tuesday, that future became a little bit clearer when a series of choreographed political moves in Russia’s parliament set the stage for the longtime leader to serve as the country’s president for another 16 years.
The question of what comes next for Vladimir Putin after his current presidential term expires in 2024 has been the central question driving Russian politics. The looming deadline has led to months of theories and speculation about how Putin would chart the country’s political future by exploring various ways to stay in power or slowly transition away from the Kremlin. On Tuesday, that future became a little bit clearer when a series of choreographed political moves in Russia’s parliament set the stage for the longtime leader to serve as the country’s president for another 16 years.
The proposal, which was passed by the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, opens the door for the 67-year-old Putin—who has already ruled for more than 20 years—to serve as many as two more six-year terms, potentially extending his rule over Russia to 2036, when he would be 83. The Russian president is required by the constitution to step down in 2024 when his second sequential presidential term ends, but the motion unexpectedly proposed in parliament on Tuesday would amend the constitution in a way that would reset Putin’s presidential term count back to zero.
Putin has already endorsed the amendment, but he said that the legislation must first be approved by Russia’s Constitutional Court, which is largely a formality given the country’s tightly controlled politics. The forthcoming ruling from the court is part of a wider set of changes to Russia’s constitution that will be put to a national vote scheduled for April 22 and define the country’s trajectory for decades to come.
So what just happened?
The proposal to reset Putin’s term limits was put forward during a parliamentary session by Valentina Tereshkova, a member of the ruling United Russia party who was also the first woman in space, who argued that the change was needed because, “Putin needs to be there—in case something goes wrong.” Lawmakers offered overwhelming support for the idea, and the session that was focused on amendments to the constitution was later suspended when Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said that he wanted to consult with Putin on lifting the term limits.
Putin then appeared in person in parliament, and in a televised half-hour speech he said that he agreed with the proposal and that he should be allowed to run again as president in order to ensure Russia’s political stability.
“Russia has had enough revolutions,” Putin said during his address. “The president is the guarantor of the constitution and, to say more simply, the guarantor of the security of our state, its internal stability and internal evolutionary development.”
Despite supporting the decision to allow two more presidential terms for himself, Putin said that future presidents should abide by a two-term limit. The Russian leader also added that while “stability” is the country’s primary need at the moment, in the future when Russia is stronger, the country “needs a guarantee that the people in power can be changed regularly.” Putin also rejected an earlier proposal put forward during the session for early parliamentary elections, which are currently scheduled for 2021.
Remarking on the day’s unexpected turn of events, Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most prominent opposition figure, tweeted: “It’s all clear: There won’t be early elections. Putin will be president for life.”
Why now?
This latest venture is part of a set of recent measures looking to answer the difficult question of what comes after 2024. In January, Putin announced sweeping constitutional reforms that would redistribute some of the powers of the presidency to the parliament and State Council, an obscure body that would grant its head extensive powers over Russian foreign and military policy. Putin appeared to be signaling his intent to leave the presidency, and many analysts predicted that he would then remain as the head of the State Council, where he could still wield significant influence over the country.
But last week, Putin said that he did not intend to head the newly empowered State Council after 2024, adding that him doing so would be “destructive” for Russia. Tuesday’s announcement has only added to the confusion of what comes next, as earlier expectations that Putin intended to weaken the presidency and empower the parliament have faded. The decision to turn to the Constitutional Court comes as the booming energy prices and rising incomes that helped propel Putin’s popularity in the early days of his presidency have largely passed and the Russian economy continues to be hit by low oil prices during a spat with Saudi Arabia and hurt by the financial fallout from the spread of the coronavirus.
Moreover, while Putin still remains popular, his government has faced falling ratings and rising distrust that could only grow. The dismissal of the unpopular government in January and the appointment as prime minister of Mikhail Mishustin, who has since promised increased social benefits, were seen as moves to boost Putin’s popularity and reverse the tide. A January poll from the Levada Center, an independent pollster based in Moscow, found that Putin’s approval rating stood at 68 percent, but trust in the president was down to 35 percent, the lowest since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Will Putin rule forever?
While Wednesday’s surprise turn of events has opened a new path for Putin, it has not eliminated ambiguity about the Kremlin’s course of action. Rather, the dramatic move is widely seen as part of an effort to create options for the Russian leader. While Putin endorsed the proposal in parliament, he did not definitively say he would run again as president and addressed the Russian public at the end of his speech, saying: “I’m sure that together, we will do many more great things, at least until 2024. Then, we will see.”
Still, the move offers a noteworthy shift from the Kremlin and reflects a lack of faith in many of the more sophisticated ways put forward for Putin maintaining power. Some proposals have looked at granting retired presidents immunity from prosecution, while others would make Putin a lifetime senator in Russia’s upper house. Another unsuccessful option saw the Kremlin pressure neighboring Belarus into agreeing to merge the country with Russia, allowing Putin to sidestep term limits as head of the new unified state.
Restarting the clock on Putin’s term limits will do little to satisfy the public’s growing desire for change, but it will certainly deliver for Russian elites who are anxious about preserving the status quo. Putin is the top of the country’s authoritarian system and functions as an arbiter for high-level disputes, preventing palace intrigue from spilling out into public view and protecting the wealth of the elite. With Putin removed from this role, many have speculated that the current system would become unstable, leading to power grabs and competition to fill the vacuum left by the president.
This presents a difficult balancing act for Putin in the coming years as the Kremlin looks for ways to contain public backlash and still keep elites in check. With few alternatives, Putin until 2036 appears to be the most comfortable option for the Kremlin.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-10--How Will South Asia Deal With the Coronavirus?

How Will South Asia Deal With the Coronavirus ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly South Asia Brief .
The highlights this week : Coronavirus cases rise across the region , Afghanistan ’ s president is sworn in , and why there ’ s a run on India ’ s fifth-biggest private bank .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday , please sign up here .
2020 was already going badly for most South Asian countries .
Growth was slowing across the region , Afghanistan was mired in political uncertainty , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Now the region is bracing for the spread of COVID-19 , which could further depress economic activity , damage supply chains , and stress already weak public health systems .
Steady rise .
The latest numbers show a pronounced jump in the number of confirmed cases of the new coronavirus across the region since this time last week , from 13 to 92 .
India has the most , with 56 cases .
Experts say that an epidemic there is likely , given a shortage of testing kits and poor reporting practices because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ care infrastructure .
If the experience of countries such as Italy is anything to go by , things will get worse before they get better .
Magical remedies ?
Misinformation makes crises worse , and flawed guidance is particularly dangerous during a potential pandemic , as India shows .
There , some legislators have falsely claimed that cow urine and cow dung could combat the coronavirus—part of an ongoing trend to promote Hindu nationalist pseudoscience , as Bhavya Dore reports for FP .
Meanwhile social media platforms , particularly WhatsApp , have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incorrect advisories .
In a sense , most South Asian countries have the perfect storm for a mass outbreak : high population density , generally poor hygiene practices , and large numbers of people on the internet but without high degrees of digital literacy .
Economic impacts .
Even if South Asia still has relatively few coronavirus cases , the region is already feeling the economic repercussions .
India sources 70 percent of its pharmaceutical ingredients and a quarter of its car parts from China , according to the Financial Times .
Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out as stores run out of supplies .
And it comes as India was already reeling from its slowest pace of growth in years .
If there ’ s one small fiscal consolation , South Asia ’ s economies are all net importers of energy , and a sharp drop in crude oil prices may be beneficial .
A $ 20 fall in the price of crude saves India annual import costs worth as much as 1 percent of its GDP .
Mapping the coronavirus outbreak : Follow our daily updates on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around the world here .
Afghanistan ’ s new president ( s ) .
Ashraf Ghani was sworn in for a second term as Afghanistan ’ s president on Monday .
But rival politician Abdullah Abdullah , who refuses to recognize last September ’ s election results , staged his own unofficial swearing-in ceremony .
If that wasn ’ t enough chaos , Ghani ’ s official ceremony was interrupted by a rocket attack that hit the edge of the presidential palace compound .
There were no casualties .
Women ’ s Day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support of International Women ’ s Day in Pakistan ’ s capital was met with a counterdemonstration by Islamists from the Red Mosque brigade , who pelted marchers with sticks and stones , on Sunday .
Marches in other Pakistani cities remained peaceful , Reuters reports .
On March 17 , a South Asian country will mark the centenary of the birth of its founding father .
Which leader is being honored ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Run on Yes Bank .
Panicked customers of the private Indian bank Yes Bank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to withdraw money after the country ’ s central bank took over the troubled lender .
On Sunday , detectives arrested CEO Rana Kapoor on claims he laundered $ 581 million .
Yes Bank was India ’ s fifth-biggest private bank .
Name-calling .
Last Sunday , the comedian John Oliver took on the Indian TV anchor Arnab Goswami , who called him an “ ignoramus of exceedingly global proportions ” and a “ third-rate TV host.
” Why ?
The pro-government Goswami was criticizing Oliver for a segment on his show Last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Oliver ’ s segment didn ’ t air on Disney-owned streaming service Hotstar—likely because it feared government reprisals .
Holi in the time of coronavirus .
Indians are celebrating Holi , the festival of colors , in a muted fashion this year given fears about COVID-19 .
But in Mumbai , some communities at least found a novel way to take out their frustrations : In a festival that usually depicts the victory of good over evil , devotees burned an effigy representing the coronavirus .
Mujib served as Bangladesh ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1975 .
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was due to attend a celebration in Mujib ’ s honor next week but was forced to cancel the visit after Dhaka confirmed cases of the coronavirus .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: Coronavirus cases rise across the region, Afghanistan’s president is sworn in, and why there’s a run on India’s fifth-biggest private bank .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: Coronavirus cases rise across the region, Afghanistan’s president is sworn in, and why there’s a run on India’s fifth-biggest private bank.
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South Asia Can’t Avoid the Coronavirus
2020 was already going badly for most South Asian countries. Growth was slowing across the region, Afghanistan was mired in political uncertainty, and communal violence had rocked India. Now the region is bracing for the spread of COVID-19, which could further depress economic activity, damage supply chains, and stress already weak public health systems.
Steady rise. The latest numbers show a pronounced jump in the number of confirmed cases of the new coronavirus across the region since this time last week, from 13 to 92. India has the most, with 56 cases. Experts say that an epidemic there is likely, given a shortage of testing kits and poor reporting practices because of low literacy rates and weak health care infrastructure. If the experience of countries such as Italy is anything to go by, things will get worse before they get better.
Magical remedies? Misinformation makes crises worse, and flawed guidance is particularly dangerous during a potential pandemic, as India shows. There, some legislators have falsely claimed that cow urine and cow dung could combat the coronavirus—part of an ongoing trend to promote Hindu nationalist pseudoscience, as Bhavya Dore reports for FP.
Meanwhile social media platforms, particularly WhatsApp, have been a hotbed of hokum home remedies and incorrect advisories. In a sense, most South Asian countries have the perfect storm for a mass outbreak: high population density, generally poor hygiene practices, and large numbers of people on the internet but without high degrees of digital literacy.
Economic impacts. Even if South Asia still has relatively few coronavirus cases, the region is already feeling the economic repercussions. India sources 70 percent of its pharmaceutical ingredients and a quarter of its car parts from China, according to the Financial Times. Chinese smartphones—the top sellers in India—are reportedly selling out as stores run out of supplies. And it comes as India was already reeling from its slowest pace of growth in years.
If there’s one small fiscal consolation, South Asia’s economies are all net importers of energy, and a sharp drop in crude oil prices may be beneficial. A $20 fall in the price of crude saves India annual import costs worth as much as 1 percent of its GDP.
Mapping the coronavirus outbreak: Follow our daily updates on the epidemic and how it is affecting countries around the world here.
What We’re Following
Afghanistan’s new president(s). Ashraf Ghani was sworn in for a second term as Afghanistan’s president on Monday. But rival politician Abdullah Abdullah, who refuses to recognize last September’s election results, staged his own unofficial swearing-in ceremony. If that wasn’t enough chaos, Ghani’s official ceremony was interrupted by a rocket attack that hit the edge of the presidential palace compound. There were no casualties.
Women’s Day in Islamabad. A peaceful march in support of International Women’s Day in Pakistan’s capital was met with a counterdemonstration by Islamists from the Red Mosque brigade, who pelted marchers with sticks and stones, on Sunday. Marches in other Pakistani cities remained peaceful, Reuters reports.
Question of the Week
On March 17, a South Asian country will mark the centenary of the birth of its founding father. Which leader is being honored?
A) Mahatma Gandhi
B) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
C) Muhammad Ali Jinnah
D) D.S. Senanayake
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
Run on Yes Bank. Panicked customers of the private Indian bank Yes Bank are lining up at ATMs and branches to withdraw money after the country’s central bank took over the troubled lender. On Sunday, detectives arrested CEO Rana Kapoor on claims he laundered $581 million. Yes Bank was India’s fifth-biggest private bank.
Odds and Ends
Name-calling. Last Sunday, the comedian John Oliver took on the Indian TV anchor Arnab Goswami, who called him an “ignoramus of exceedingly global proportions” and a “third-rate TV host.” Why? The pro-government Goswami was criticizing Oliver for a segment on his show Last Week Tonight about communal tensions in India. Oliver’s segment didn’t air on Disney-owned streaming service Hotstar—likely because it feared government reprisals.
People dance as they celebrate Holi, the spring festival of colors, in Allahabad, India on March 10.
Holi in the time of coronavirus. Indians are celebrating Holi, the festival of colors, in a muted fashion this year given fears about COVID-19. But in Mumbai, some communities at least found a novel way to take out their frustrations: In a festival that usually depicts the victory of good over evil, devotees burned an effigy representing the coronavirus.
And the Answer Is…
B) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
Mujib served as Bangladesh’s first president. He was assassinated in 1975. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was due to attend a celebration in Mujib’s honor next week but was forced to cancel the visit after Dhaka confirmed cases of the coronavirus.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-10--Trump’s War on the Concept of Women’s Health

Trump ’ s War on the Concept of Women ’ s Health One of the signature marks of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s foreign policy has been deepening cooperation with authoritarian countries .
Among the starkest expressions of that trend has been Washington ’ s new alliance with some of the world ’ s worst violators of women ’ s rights ( including Saudi Arabia , Libya , Sudan , and the Democratic Republic of the Congo , among others ) to combat a seemingly innocuous bit of medical vocabulary—namely , “ sexual and reproductive health.
” Last September @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Services Alex Azar read a statement on behalf of this new U.S.-led coalition before the United Nations General Assembly condemning that phrase , and others like it , as “ ambiguous terms and expressions ” that can “ undermine the critical role of the family and promote practices , like abortion , in circumstances that do not enjoy international consensus and which can be misinterpreted by U.N. agencies.
” Notably , of the 20 other signatories , only two , Brazil and Poland , are consolidated democracies ( and even they are slipping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sexual and reproductive health and rights emerged in the mid-1990s .
Up until then , global health organizations had been working on the Malthusian assumption that population would outgrow the food supply , and they thus focused almost exclusively on family planning as a means of population control .
That paradigm eventually drew the ire of women ’ s rights groups for ignoring the individual needs and desires of women , prompting a shift toward a more expansive definition of reproductive health—one that included things like access to contraception and abortion , maternal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of female genital mutilation and sexual violence .
Today , the World Health Organization defines reproductive health as “ a state of complete physical , mental and social wellbeing in all matters relating to the reproductive system.
” The United States is the largest funder of these services , giving between $ 400 million and $ 600 million annually .
Ninety-five percent of that goes directly to implementing partners in recipient countries and , historically , 5 percent has been channeled through the United Nations Population Fund , the U.N. ’ s sexual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States helped create ) .
Like Republican administrations before his , Trump ’ s Department of State discontinued support for the agency , claiming it “ participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization.
” It has also proposed drastic cuts to funding for sexual and reproductive health for fiscal year 2020 .
The Trump administration also reinstated and dramatically expanded the Mexico City policy , which opponents refer to as the “ global gag rule.
” The policy prohibits foreign nongovernmental organizations from receiving U.S. funding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abortion as a method of family planning.
” Global restrictions on abortion have been implemented to varying degrees by conservative administrations from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush , but Trump ’ s cuts to sexual and reproductive health go deeper and are farther-reaching than ever before .
Egged on by the religious anti-abortion groups that form a core part of his base , Trump has employed a version of the Mexico City policy that extends not just to the $ 500 million or so in U.S. funds for family planning , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ roughly $ 10 billion in global health assistance .
Trump isn ’ t just going after abortion .
He ’ s going after what conservative religious groups decry as a broader feminist takeover of global health .
The results of these policies are already bearing out .
In 2018 , the HIV/AIDS research nonprofit amfAR conducted a survey of partners in 45 countries for the President ’ s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief to see how they were responding to U.S. restrictions .
The most common response ( 42 percent ) was that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reproductive health , which included cuts to pregnancy counseling .
But sexual and reproductive health care is about more than just abortions , which themselves can be an important component of reproductive care .
Services include HIV testing , cancer screening , and education about child marriage and human trafficking .
Trump ’ s cuts to sexual and reproductive health are affecting all of these services , too .
“ One of the realities of global health delivery is that you may only have one organization who ’ s serving huge swathes of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ realities of global health delivery is that you may only have one organization who ’ s serving huge swathes of the population , ” said Jennifer Sherwood , the public policy manager at amfAR .
“ If you had a Planned Parenthood affiliate close down , they were certainly not only providing contraception , but they were providing HIV testing , vaccines , mother and child health services , circumcisions , and all sorts of things like that .
So if you have a full clinic closure or even a reduction in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are really seeing cuts to all these different kinds of services.
” That ’ s a dangerous step backward for young women and girls , for whom sexual and reproductive health programming is a critical tool to learn not just about family planning , but also about safe pregnancy , sexual violence , prevention of sexually transmitted diseases , and more .
These are things that inevitably lead to women being more socially and economically empowered , a fact that may help explain why the United States was joined in its coalition almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ second-class citizens and generally resist calls for gender equality .
Gender equality is a fundamental principle of sexual and reproductive health and rights .
That the United States has planted its flag so firmly in their camp is an ominous sign for the world ’ s women and girls , who , despite recent progress , continue to face an onslaught of preventable health threats .
In the developing world , at least 10 million unintended pregnancies occur each year among girls and young women aged 15 to 19 years old , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leading cause of death for those in this age group globally .
Worldwide , an estimated 15 million adolescent girls and women aged 15 to 19 have experienced forced sex at some point in their life .
One in six women alive today were married as children .
In sub-Saharan Africa , seven in 10 young women do not have comprehensive knowledge about HIV , yet adolescent girls and young women are among the hardest hit by the disease .
They represent 10 percent of the population in that region but 20 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2017 , HIV was among the top five causes of death globally for girls aged 10 to 14 years old .
Efforts to combat HIV , which represent about 60 percent of all U.S. global health assistance , had been exempt from previous rollbacks of assistance to reproductive health programs .
The Trump administration ’ s more expansive approach threatens to worsen the spread of that virus .
In his recent State of the Union address , Trump vowed to “ eradicate the AIDS epidemic in America by the end of this decade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Nations .
But the previous executive director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS , Michel Sidibé , warned last year that “ services for adolescent girls and young women are especially failing to reach those who are falling the furthest behind.
” Cuts to sexual and reproductive health programming are likely making things worse .
“ There is sort of this fracturing of the civil society organizations among those who continue to receive U.S. money versus those who don ’ t. ” “ There is sort of this fracturing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continue to receive U.S. money versus those who don ’ t , ” said Sherwood , although she also noted that this fracturing may be precisely the point for the Trump administration .
“ Its intention is to sever referral networks specifically for abortion , ” she said .
“ But of course , that ’ s not how global health works .
If you sever the relationship between two organizations in relation to abortion , you ’ re also separating referral pathways to all those other services that a person might need.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ September , the minister for foreign trade and development of the Netherlands , Sigrid Kaag , issued one of her own .
This one was signed by 58 countries , including the United Kingdom , France , Spain , Germany , Mexico , South Africa , Tunisia , and Australia .
It said , “ Investing in comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services … is necessary to address the needs of women , girls , adolescents , and people in the most marginalized situations who need these the most.
” The message from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will continue to support sexual and reproductive health and rights , even if the United States and its newly minted coalition of largely authoritarian states do not .

One of the signature marks of U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy has been deepening cooperation with authoritarian countries. Among the starkest expressions of that trend has been Washington’s new alliance with some of the world’s worst violators of women’s rights (including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others) to combat a seemingly innocuous bit of medical vocabulary—namely, “sexual and reproductive health.”
One of the signature marks of U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy has been deepening cooperation with authoritarian countries. Among the starkest expressions of that trend has been Washington’s new alliance with some of the world’s worst violators of women’s rights (including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others) to combat a seemingly innocuous bit of medical vocabulary—namely, “sexual and reproductive health.”
Last September, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar read a statement on behalf of this new U.S.-led coalition before the United Nations General Assembly condemning that phrase, and others like it, as “ambiguous terms and expressions” that can “undermine the critical role of the family and promote practices, like abortion, in circumstances that do not enjoy international consensus and which can be misinterpreted by U.N. agencies.” Notably, of the 20 other signatories, only two, Brazil and Poland, are consolidated democracies (and even they are slipping into authoritarianism).
The concept of sexual and reproductive health and rights emerged in the mid-1990s. Up until then, global health organizations had been working on the Malthusian assumption that population would outgrow the food supply, and they thus focused almost exclusively on family planning as a means of population control. That paradigm eventually drew the ire of women’s rights groups for ignoring the individual needs and desires of women, prompting a shift toward a more expansive definition of reproductive health—one that included things like access to contraception and abortion, maternal health, safe sex, and prevention of female genital mutilation and sexual violence. Today, the World Health Organization defines reproductive health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing in all matters relating to the reproductive system.”
The United States is the largest funder of these services, giving between $400 million and $600 million annually. Ninety-five percent of that goes directly to implementing partners in recipient countries and, historically, 5 percent has been channeled through the United Nations Population Fund, the U.N.’s sexual and reproductive health agency (which the United States helped create). Like Republican administrations before his, Trump’s Department of State discontinued support for the agency, claiming it “participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization.” It has also proposed drastic cuts to funding for sexual and reproductive health for fiscal year 2020. The Trump administration also reinstated and dramatically expanded the Mexico City policy, which opponents refer to as the “global gag rule.” The policy prohibits foreign nongovernmental organizations from receiving U.S. funding if they “perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning.”
Global restrictions on abortion have been implemented to varying degrees by conservative administrations from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush, but Trump’s cuts to sexual and reproductive health go deeper and are farther-reaching than ever before. Egged on by the religious anti-abortion groups that form a core part of his base, Trump has employed a version of the Mexico City policy that extends not just to the $500 million or so in U.S. funds for family planning, but to all of the United States’ roughly $10 billion in global health assistance. Trump isn’t just going after abortion. He’s going after what conservative religious groups decry as a broader feminist takeover of global health.
The results of these policies are already bearing out. In 2018, the HIV/AIDS research nonprofit amfAR conducted a survey of partners in 45 countries for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief to see how they were responding to U.S. restrictions. The most common response (42 percent) was that organizations provided less information on sexual and reproductive health, which included cuts to pregnancy counseling.
But sexual and reproductive health care is about more than just abortions, which themselves can be an important component of reproductive care. Services include HIV testing, cancer screening, and education about child marriage and human trafficking. Trump’s cuts to sexual and reproductive health are affecting all of these services, too.
“One of the realities of global health delivery is that you may only have one organization who’s serving huge swathes of the population.”
“One of the realities of global health delivery is that you may only have one organization who’s serving huge swathes of the population,” said Jennifer Sherwood, the public policy manager at amfAR. “If you had a Planned Parenthood affiliate close down, they were certainly not only providing contraception, but they were providing HIV testing, vaccines, mother and child health services, circumcisions, and all sorts of things like that. So if you have a full clinic closure or even a reduction in their ability to do mobile outreach, you are really seeing cuts to all these different kinds of services.”
That’s a dangerous step backward for young women and girls, for whom sexual and reproductive health programming is a critical tool to learn not just about family planning, but also about safe pregnancy, sexual violence, prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, and more. These are things that inevitably lead to women being more socially and economically empowered, a fact that may help explain why the United States was joined in its coalition almost exclusively by states that treat women as second-class citizens and generally resist calls for gender equality. Gender equality is a fundamental principle of sexual and reproductive health and rights.
That the United States has planted its flag so firmly in their camp is an ominous sign for the world’s women and girls, who, despite recent progress, continue to face an onslaught of preventable health threats.
In the developing world, at least 10 million unintended pregnancies occur each year among girls and young women aged 15 to 19 years old, and complications from pregnancy and childbirth are the leading cause of death for those in this age group globally. Worldwide, an estimated 15 million adolescent girls and women aged 15 to 19 have experienced forced sex at some point in their life. One in six women alive today were married as children. In sub-Saharan Africa, seven in 10 young women do not have comprehensive knowledge about HIV, yet adolescent girls and young women are among the hardest hit by the disease. They represent 10 percent of the population in that region but 20 percent of all new HIV infections. In 2017, HIV was among the top five causes of death globally for girls aged 10 to 14 years old.
Efforts to combat HIV, which represent about 60 percent of all U.S. global health assistance, had been exempt from previous rollbacks of assistance to reproductive health programs. The Trump administration’s more expansive approach threatens to worsen the spread of that virus. In his recent State of the Union address, Trump vowed to “eradicate the AIDS epidemic in America by the end of this decade,” a goal shared by the United Nations. But the previous executive director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, Michel Sidibé, warned last year that “services for adolescent girls and young women are especially failing to reach those who are falling the furthest behind.” Cuts to sexual and reproductive health programming are likely making things worse.
“There is sort of this fracturing of the civil society organizations among those who continue to receive U.S. money versus those who don’t.”
“There is sort of this fracturing of the civil society organizations among those who continue to receive U.S. money versus those who don’t,” said Sherwood, although she also noted that this fracturing may be precisely the point for the Trump administration. “Its intention is to sever referral networks specifically for abortion,” she said. “But of course, that’s not how global health works. If you sever the relationship between two organizations in relation to abortion, you’re also separating referral pathways to all those other services that a person might need.”
After Azar’s statement last September, the minister for foreign trade and development of the Netherlands, Sigrid Kaag, issued one of her own. This one was signed by 58 countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Mexico, South Africa, Tunisia, and Australia. It said, “Investing in comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services … is necessary to address the needs of women, girls, adolescents, and people in the most marginalized situations who need these the most.”
The message from fellow donor countries was clear. They will continue to support sexual and reproductive health and rights, even if the United States and its newly minted coalition of largely authoritarian states do not.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-09--The Realist’s Guide to the Coronavirus Outbreak

The Realist ’ s Guide to the Coronavirus Outbreak The realist approach to international politics and foreign policy does not devote much , if any , attention to the issue of potential pandemics like the COVID-19 outbreak .
No theory explains everything , of course , and realism focuses primarily on the constraining effects of anarchy , the reasons why great powers compete for advantage , and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation among states .
It has little to say about interspecies viral transmission , epidemiology , or public health best practices , so you shouldn ’ t ask @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should start working from home .
Despite these obvious limitations , realism can still offer useful insights into some of the issues that the new coronavirus outbreak has raised .
It is worth remembering , for example , that a central event in Thucydides ’ account of the Peloponnesian War ( one of the founding texts in the realist tradition ) is the plague that struck Athens in 430 B.C .
and persisted for more than three years .
Historians believe the plague may have killed about a third of Athens ’ population—including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obvious negative effects on Athens ’ long-term power potential .
Might realism have something to say about the situation we find ourselves in today ?
First , and most obviously , the present emergency reminds us that states are still the main actors in global politics .
Every few years , scholars and pundits suggest that states are becoming less relevant in world affairs and that other actors or social forces ( i.e.
, nongovernmental organizations , multinational corporations , international terrorists , global markets , etc . )
are undermining sovereignty and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history .
When new dangers arise , however , humans look first and foremost to national governments for protection .
After 9/11 , Americans didn ’ t turn to the United Nations , Microsoft Corp. , or Amnesty International to protect them from al Qaeda ; they looked to Washington and the federal government .
And so it is today : All over the world , citizens are looking to public officials to provide authoritative information and to fashion an effective response .
As the journalist Derek Thompson wrote on Twitter last week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a pandemic.
” That is not to say that broader global efforts are not necessary as well ; it is simply to remind us that despite globalization , states remain the central political actors in the contemporary world .
Realists have emphasized this point for decades , and the coronavirus is providing yet another vivid reminder .
Second , although the more structural versions of realism tend to downplay differences among states ( apart from relative power ) , thus far responses to the coronavirus outbreak are exposing the strengths and weakness of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ previously suggested that rigid dictatorships are more vulnerable to famines , epidemics , and other disasters , largely because they tend to suppress information and top officials may not recognize the gravity of the situation until it is too late to prevent it .
This is precisely what appears to have happened in China and also Iran : People who tried to sound the alarm were silenced or punished , and top officials tried to hide what was happening instead of mobilizing promptly to address it .
Authoritarian governments can be good at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s ability to quarantine whole cities and impose other far-reaching controls—but only after the people at the top figure out and acknowledge what is going on .
Because information flows more freely in democracies—due in part to independent media and the ability of lower-level officials to sound the alarm without being punished—they should be better at identifying when a problem is emerging .
For democracies , however , problems may emerge when trying to fashion and implement timely responses .
This deficiency may be especially severe in the United States , because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do the real work in an emergency are mostly under the control of a plethora of state or local governments .
Unless there is adequate prior planning and effective coordination from Washington—something that is not easy to pull off in the best of circumstances—even accurate and timely warnings may not produce effective emergency measures .
The bungled reactions to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico are obvious cases in point .
Unfortunately , as Michelle Goldberg pointed out in a recent New York Times column , “ Donald @ @ @ @ @ @ @ combines the worst features of autocracy and of democracy , mixing opacity and propaganda with leaderless inefficiency.
” Having previously downgraded disaster preparedness throughout the federal government and in the White House itself , Trump has consistently downplayed the seriousness of the coronavirus outbreak , overruled or challenged the assessments of qualified scientists , failed to coordinate an effective federal response , picked fights with local officials who are on the front lines , and blamed it all on his predecessor , who has now been out of office for more than three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ charge of a decentralized democratic system , add a serious emergency , and this is the sort of train-wreck to expect .
Is there a silver lining ?
Realism suggests there might be a small one .
In a competitive world , states cast a wary eye on what others are doing and have a big incentive to imitate success .
New military innovations tend to be quickly adopted by others , for example , because failing to adapt can lead one to fall behind and become vulnerable .
This perspective suggests that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the coronavirus , others will quickly follow suit .
Over time , a set of global best practices will emerge , a process that will occur more rapidly if states share accurate information with one another and refrain from politicizing it or using it to gain advantage .
Unfortunately , realism also reminds us that achieving effective international cooperation on this issue may not be easy , despite the obvious need for it .
Realists recognize that cooperation happens all the time , and that norms and institutions can help states cooperate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do so .
But realists also warn that international cooperation is often fragile , either because states fear that others will not abide by their commitments , worry that cooperation will benefit others more than it benefits them , or want to avoid bearing a disproportionate share of the costs .
I don ’ t think such concerns will prevent states from doing a lot to help one another address this global problem , but any or all of them could make the collective response less effective .
Lastly , foreign-policy realism also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subside quickly and more or less permanently ( as the 2003 SARS epidemic did ) , it will reinforce the growing trend toward deglobalization that is already underway .
Back in the 1990s , apostles of globalization believed the world was becoming ever-more-tightly connected by trade , travel , global financial integration , the digital revolution , and the apparent superiority of liberal capitalist democracy , and concluded that we ’ d all get busy getting rich in an increasingly flat and borderless world .
The past decade or more has witnessed a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with more and more people willing to trade efficiency , growth , and openness for the sake of autonomy and the preservation of cherished ways of life .
As the Brexiteers in the United Kingdom put it , they want to “ take back control.
” For realists , this backlash is unsurprising .
As the realist Kenneth Waltz wrote in his landmark Theory of International Politics , “ the domestic imperative is ‘ specialize , ’ ” and “ the international imperative is ‘ take care of yourself ’ !
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ warning in the 1930s , writing that “ the development of international commerce , the increased economic interdependence among the nations , and the whole apparatus of a technological civilisation , increase the problems and issues between nations much more rapidly than the intelligence to solve them can be created.
” Liberal theorists have long argued that increasing interdependence between states would be a source of prosperity and an obstacle to international rivalry .
By contrast , realists warn that close ties are also a source of vulnerability and a potential cause of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saying is that ever-tighter connections between states create as many problems as they solve , sometimes more quickly than we can devise solutions for them .
For this reason , states—the critical building blocks of international politics—try to reduce risks and vulnerabilities by placing limits on their dealings with one another .
From a realist perspective , therefore , the coronavirus is likely to give states another reason to limit globalization .
Hyperglobalization made the global financial system more vulnerable to crises and created serious domestic political problems due to job displacement ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our exposure—literally—to the sort of global pandemic we may be witnessing today .
To be clear : Realism doesn ’ t predict a retreat to autarky or even the same level of deglobalization that occurred as a result of the two world wars and the Great Depression .
Contemporary states can not afford to sever all ties , even in the face of something like the coronavirus .
But I ’ m guessing that the high-water mark of contemporary globalization is now behind us , and that a virus that crossed the boundary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the reasons that borders between states will become a bit higher .

The realist approach to international politics and foreign policy does not devote much, if any, attention to the issue of potential pandemics like the COVID-19 outbreak. No theory explains everything, of course, and realism focuses primarily on the constraining effects of anarchy, the reasons why great powers compete for advantage, and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation among states. It has little to say about interspecies viral transmission, epidemiology, or public health best practices, so you shouldn’t ask a realist to tell you whether you should start working from home.
The realist approach to international politics and foreign policy does not devote much, if any, attention to the issue of potential pandemics like the COVID-19 outbreak. No theory explains everything, of course, and realism focuses primarily on the constraining effects of anarchy, the reasons why great powers compete for advantage, and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation among states. It has little to say about interspecies viral transmission, epidemiology, or public health best practices, so you shouldn’t ask a realist to tell you whether you should start working from home.
Despite these obvious limitations, realism can still offer useful insights into some of the issues that the new coronavirus outbreak has raised. It is worth remembering, for example, that a central event in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War (one of the founding texts in the realist tradition) is the plague that struck Athens in 430 B.C. and persisted for more than three years. Historians believe the plague may have killed about a third of Athens’ population—including prominent leaders such as Pericles—and it had obvious negative effects on Athens’ long-term power potential. Might realism have something to say about the situation we find ourselves in today?
First, and most obviously, the present emergency reminds us that states are still the main actors in global politics. Every few years, scholars and pundits suggest that states are becoming less relevant in world affairs and that other actors or social forces (i.e., nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, international terrorists, global markets, etc.) are undermining sovereignty and pushing the state toward the dustbin of history. When new dangers arise, however, humans look first and foremost to national governments for protection. After 9/11, Americans didn’t turn to the United Nations, Microsoft Corp., or Amnesty International to protect them from al Qaeda; they looked to Washington and the federal government. And so it is today: All over the world, citizens are looking to public officials to provide authoritative information and to fashion an effective response. As the journalist Derek Thompson wrote on Twitter last week: “There are no libertarians in a pandemic.” That is not to say that broader global efforts are not necessary as well; it is simply to remind us that despite globalization, states remain the central political actors in the contemporary world. Realists have emphasized this point for decades, and the coronavirus is providing yet another vivid reminder.
Second, although the more structural versions of realism tend to downplay differences among states (apart from relative power), thus far responses to the coronavirus outbreak are exposing the strengths and weakness of different types of regimes. Scholars have previously suggested that rigid dictatorships are more vulnerable to famines, epidemics, and other disasters, largely because they tend to suppress information and top officials may not recognize the gravity of the situation until it is too late to prevent it. This is precisely what appears to have happened in China and also Iran: People who tried to sound the alarm were silenced or punished, and top officials tried to hide what was happening instead of mobilizing promptly to address it. Authoritarian governments can be good at mobilizing resources and undertaking ambitious responses—witness Beijing’s ability to quarantine whole cities and impose other far-reaching controls—but only after the people at the top figure out and acknowledge what is going on.
Because information flows more freely in democracies—due in part to independent media and the ability of lower-level officials to sound the alarm without being punished—they should be better at identifying when a problem is emerging. For democracies, however, problems may emerge when trying to fashion and implement timely responses. This deficiency may be especially severe in the United States, because the first responders and other agencies that do the real work in an emergency are mostly under the control of a plethora of state or local governments. Unless there is adequate prior planning and effective coordination from Washington—something that is not easy to pull off in the best of circumstances—even accurate and timely warnings may not produce effective emergency measures. The bungled reactions to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico are obvious cases in point.
Unfortunately, as Michelle Goldberg pointed out in a recent New York Times column, “Donald Trump’s response to the coronavirus combines the worst features of autocracy and of democracy, mixing opacity and propaganda with leaderless inefficiency.” Having previously downgraded disaster preparedness throughout the federal government and in the White House itself, Trump has consistently downplayed the seriousness of the coronavirus outbreak, overruled or challenged the assessments of qualified scientists, failed to coordinate an effective federal response, picked fights with local officials who are on the front lines, and blamed it all on his predecessor, who has now been out of office for more than three years. Put a would-be authoritarian in charge of a decentralized democratic system, add a serious emergency, and this is the sort of train-wreck to expect.
Is there a silver lining? Realism suggests there might be a small one. In a competitive world, states cast a wary eye on what others are doing and have a big incentive to imitate success. New military innovations tend to be quickly adopted by others, for example, because failing to adapt can lead one to fall behind and become vulnerable. This perspective suggests that as some states develop more effective responses to the coronavirus, others will quickly follow suit. Over time, a set of global best practices will emerge, a process that will occur more rapidly if states share accurate information with one another and refrain from politicizing it or using it to gain advantage.
Unfortunately, realism also reminds us that achieving effective international cooperation on this issue may not be easy, despite the obvious need for it. Realists recognize that cooperation happens all the time, and that norms and institutions can help states cooperate when it is in their interest to do so. But realists also warn that international cooperation is often fragile, either because states fear that others will not abide by their commitments, worry that cooperation will benefit others more than it benefits them, or want to avoid bearing a disproportionate share of the costs. I don’t think such concerns will prevent states from doing a lot to help one another address this global problem, but any or all of them could make the collective response less effective.
Lastly, foreign-policy realism also suggests that if the epidemic does not subside quickly and more or less permanently (as the 2003 SARS epidemic did), it will reinforce the growing trend toward deglobalization that is already underway. Back in the 1990s, apostles of globalization believed the world was becoming ever-more-tightly connected by trade, travel, global financial integration, the digital revolution, and the apparent superiority of liberal capitalist democracy, and concluded that we’d all get busy getting rich in an increasingly flat and borderless world. The past decade or more has witnessed a steady retreat from that optimistic vision, with more and more people willing to trade efficiency, growth, and openness for the sake of autonomy and the preservation of cherished ways of life. As the Brexiteers in the United Kingdom put it, they want to “take back control.”
For realists, this backlash is unsurprising. As the realist Kenneth Waltz wrote in his landmark Theory of International Politics, “the domestic imperative is ‘specialize,’” and “the international imperative is ‘take care of yourself’!” The Christian realist Reinhold Niebuhr offered a similar warning in the 1930s, writing that “the development of international commerce, the increased economic interdependence among the nations, and the whole apparatus of a technological civilisation, increase the problems and issues between nations much more rapidly than the intelligence to solve them can be created.”
Liberal theorists have long argued that increasing interdependence between states would be a source of prosperity and an obstacle to international rivalry. By contrast, realists warn that close ties are also a source of vulnerability and a potential cause of conflict. What Waltz and Niebuhr are saying is that ever-tighter connections between states create as many problems as they solve, sometimes more quickly than we can devise solutions for them. For this reason, states—the critical building blocks of international politics—try to reduce risks and vulnerabilities by placing limits on their dealings with one another.
From a realist perspective, therefore, the coronavirus is likely to give states another reason to limit globalization. Hyperglobalization made the global financial system more vulnerable to crises and created serious domestic political problems due to job displacement; we now know that it also increased our exposure—literally—to the sort of global pandemic we may be witnessing today.
To be clear: Realism doesn’t predict a retreat to autarky or even the same level of deglobalization that occurred as a result of the two world wars and the Great Depression. Contemporary states cannot afford to sever all ties, even in the face of something like the coronavirus. But I’m guessing that the high-water mark of contemporary globalization is now behind us, and that a virus that crossed the boundary between two species is going to one of the reasons that borders between states will become a bit higher.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-12--Disasters Like The Coronavirus Don’t Happen In a Vacuum

Disasters Like The Coronavirus Don ’ t Happen In a Vacuum It ’ s tempting to think of catastrophes as existing in their own special bubbles , ellipses separated from our normal , real lives .
They resonate with the feeling of unreality that comes when what seemed solid and indisputable a week ago—bridges , the earth beneath your feet , open schools , and full shelves in the supermarket—is shaken or destroyed overnight .
But thinking about disasters as special cases obscures the ways broader policies have contributed to these crises .
It may be comforting to think that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and intense interlude will end and everything will go back to the way it was .
But disasters do not occur in a vacuum , and to properly prepare for them—and deal with the aftermath—requires tackling the ways they are rooted in societies .
Disaster exceptionalism—this idea that crises are extra-ordinary and demand extra-ordinary answers and laws—is already being applied to the accelerating outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States .
In his Oval Office speech on Wednesday night , Trump said of the pandemic , “ This is just a temporary moment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frame the virus as both foreign and likely to disappear on its own .
Other Republican politicians have also been singling out the crisis as an unusual moment in health policy .
The Huffington Post , in a story about members of the GOP who “ seem open to reimbursing hospitals for treating the uninsured , ” quotes Republican Rep. Mike Johnson as saying , “ I think a pandemic is a distinct issue from the overall health care proposals that have been on the table for a while.
” The pandemic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change from the noncrisis health care situation in the United States but a continuation of it .
It ’ s dangerous—and , consciously or otherwise , deceptive—to claim that disasters are special “ moments in time , ” completely separate from our day-to-day lives .
Imagine , for example , that the U.S. government had taken immediate action to address the “ distinct issue ” of the pandemic and made all treatment related to COVID-19 free .
As welcome as that move would have been , the crisis would still be tied to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for information about the shift in policy to filter through the population .
Even once people knew about it , those like me , who have been burned in the past by health insurance duplicity , might still be cautious : Would they be charged if they took the test and it came back negative ?
Would all the extras that U.S. hospitals delight in throwing into bills be taken care of ?
Hospitals would need time to work out new procedures and processes for intake to deal with the unusual case of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for .
The damage of inaccessible medical care—untreated or undertreated chronic diseases—would still make large segments of the population more susceptible to the effects of the virus , as would poverty , substandard housing , and poor nutrition .
According to a report from the Commonwealth Fund , the United States has the highest chronic disease burden , among the highest number of hospitalizations from preventable causes , and the highest rate of avoidable deaths when compared to its peer nations in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development .
Even if we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instant a crisis hits , an underlying substandard health care system and high percentage of people made vulnerable by poverty would still worsen outcomes .
None of this is meant to suggest that we shouldn ’ t be pushing for the best response we can manage right now .
Rather , we should be holding our governments accountable for the choices they made before the disaster as well as during it .
Disasters may feel like alternate universes—consider the eerie photos of empty highways , airports , and subway cars—but they are deeply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do not occur in historical vacuums , ” writes Steve Kroll-Smith in his book Recovering Inequality , on the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and 2005 ’ s Hurricane Katrina .
“ Rather they take shape and form in part through the social , political , and economic forces in play at the moment of impact.
” In the practice of disaster risk-reduction , experts distinguish the disaster ( the damage , deaths , injuries , chaos ) from the hazard ( hurricane , earthquake , drought , highly contagious virus ) .
An @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well-constructed buildings ( or no buildings at all ) may be only an incident , while the same earthquake in a place with poor construction triggers a catastrophe .
Compare , for example , the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile .
Although the Chilean tremor was far stronger , it caused around 500 deaths , while the numbers in Haiti were more than 300,000 .
As Hurricane Katrina showed us in 2005 , early-warning communications , the accessibility of public transport , the quality of drainage , and the robustness of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can be the difference between an annoying weather pattern and people dying .
The same is true for epidemics and pandemics .
Even if the government is creating new task forces and unleashing special response teams , they are limited by existing infrastructure , physical and human .
If hospitals are lacking in medical technology and bed space before the epidemic , it ’ s going to be that much harder to ramp up .
Doctors and nurses can only be trained so fast .
The impacts of the disease will depend on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; dissemination of critical information will depend on existing communications networks , and adoption of that information will depend on education and social norms .
This is playing out now in real time : Low media literacy and a history of deliberate misinformation campaigns are hampering crisis communications .
Changing mindsets also takes time .
Disaster protocol may state that bureaucratic strictures should be loosened , but if people have worked for their entire careers with certain attitudes , it ’ s not going to be easy to adjust .
My research on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manuals emphasizing that those closest to the disaster should be in charge , those farther away—and higher up the hierarchy—consistently attempted to take over , sometimes successfully .
Initial approaches to the disaster are likely to reflect noncrisis tendencies : If a government is increasingly using digital surveillance , for example , that will be one of the first tools its bureaucrats think of when it comes to managing the epidemic .
If a health care system is profit-driven , it ’ s going to take decisionmakers some extra effort—or extra outcry from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during a pandemic .
Once the effort to downplay COVID-19 is absolutely irredeemable , you are likely to hear the government playing it up instead .
If past disasters are any indication , the epidemic will be described as “ unprecedented ” and “ unimaginable ” —in other words , exceptional—despite the historical record of previous epidemics and the existence of an entire field of study based on them .
Emphasizing the cataclysmic nature of the hazard is most obviously an excuse for shortfalls in the response but also another way to untether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Disasters , and their responses , provide a powerful lens for critiquing the societies in which they occur .
We should not let the focus on the hazard , which we can do nothing about , distract us from the underlying conditions that turned it into a disaster .
Those , at least , we can change before the next crisis hits .

It’s tempting to think of catastrophes as existing in their own special bubbles, ellipses separated from our normal, real lives. They resonate with the feeling of unreality that comes when what seemed solid and indisputable a week ago—bridges, the earth beneath your feet, open schools, and full shelves in the supermarket—is shaken or destroyed overnight.
It’s tempting to think of catastrophes as existing in their own special bubbles, ellipses separated from our normal, real lives. They resonate with the feeling of unreality that comes when what seemed solid and indisputable a week ago—bridges, the earth beneath your feet, open schools, and full shelves in the supermarket—is shaken or destroyed overnight.
But thinking about disasters as special cases obscures the ways broader policies have contributed to these crises. It may be comforting to think that, at some point, this uncomfortable and intense interlude will end and everything will go back to the way it was. But disasters do not occur in a vacuum, and to properly prepare for them—and deal with the aftermath—requires tackling the ways they are rooted in societies.
Disaster exceptionalism—this idea that crises are extra-ordinary and demand extra-ordinary answers and laws—is already being applied to the accelerating outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States. In his Oval Office speech on Wednesday night, Trump said of the pandemic, “This is just a temporary moment of time,” and continued to frame the virus as both foreign and likely to disappear on its own.
Other Republican politicians have also been singling out the crisis as an unusual moment in health policy. The Huffington Post, in a story about members of the GOP who “seem open to reimbursing hospitals for treating the uninsured,” quotes Republican Rep. Mike Johnson as saying, “I think a pandemic is a distinct issue from the overall health care proposals that have been on the table for a while.” The pandemic, however, isn’t a magical change from the noncrisis health care situation in the United States but a continuation of it. It’s dangerous—and, consciously or otherwise, deceptive—to claim that disasters are special “moments in time,” completely separate from our day-to-day lives.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
Imagine, for example, that the U.S. government had taken immediate action to address the “distinct issue” of the pandemic and made all treatment related to COVID-19 free. As welcome as that move would have been, the crisis would still be tied to its context. It would take time for information about the shift in policy to filter through the population. Even once people knew about it, those like me, who have been burned in the past by health insurance duplicity, might still be cautious: Would they be charged if they took the test and it came back negative? Would all the extras that U.S. hospitals delight in throwing into bills be taken care of?
Hospitals would need time to work out new procedures and processes for intake to deal with the unusual case of something that won’t be billed for. The damage of inaccessible medical care—untreated or undertreated chronic diseases—would still make large segments of the population more susceptible to the effects of the virus, as would poverty, substandard housing, and poor nutrition. According to a report from the Commonwealth Fund, the United States has the highest chronic disease burden, among the highest number of hospitalizations from preventable causes, and the highest rate of avoidable deaths when compared to its peer nations in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Even if we could imagine a perfect response from the instant a crisis hits, an underlying substandard health care system and high percentage of people made vulnerable by poverty would still worsen outcomes.
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None of this is meant to suggest that we shouldn’t be pushing for the best response we can manage right now. Rather, we should be holding our governments accountable for the choices they made before the disaster as well as during it. Disasters may feel like alternate universes—consider the eerie photos of empty highways, airports, and subway cars—but they are deeply rooted in their context. “Catastrophes do not occur in historical vacuums,” writes Steve Kroll-Smith in his book Recovering Inequality, on the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and 2005’s Hurricane Katrina. “Rather they take shape and form in part through the social, political, and economic forces in play at the moment of impact.”
In the practice of disaster risk-reduction, experts distinguish the disaster (the damage, deaths, injuries, chaos) from the hazard (hurricane, earthquake, drought, highly contagious virus). An earthquake that occurs in a place with well-constructed buildings (or no buildings at all) may be only an incident, while the same earthquake in a place with poor construction triggers a catastrophe. Compare, for example, the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile. Although the Chilean tremor was far stronger, it caused around 500 deaths, while the numbers in Haiti were more than 300,000. As Hurricane Katrina showed us in 2005, early-warning communications, the accessibility of public transport, the quality of drainage, and the robustness of the electrical grid, among other factors, can be the difference between an annoying weather pattern and people dying.
The same is true for epidemics and pandemics. Even if the government is creating new task forces and unleashing special response teams, they are limited by existing infrastructure, physical and human. If hospitals are lacking in medical technology and bed space before the epidemic, it’s going to be that much harder to ramp up. Doctors and nurses can only be trained so fast. The impacts of the disease will depend on the baseline health profile of the population; dissemination of critical information will depend on existing communications networks, and adoption of that information will depend on education and social norms. This is playing out now in real time: Low media literacy and a history of deliberate misinformation campaigns are hampering crisis communications.
Changing mindsets also takes time. Disaster protocol may state that bureaucratic strictures should be loosened, but if people have worked for their entire careers with certain attitudes, it’s not going to be easy to adjust. My research on the Fukushima Dai-ichi crisis found that despite manuals emphasizing that those closest to the disaster should be in charge, those farther away—and higher up the hierarchy—consistently attempted to take over, sometimes successfully. Initial approaches to the disaster are likely to reflect noncrisis tendencies: If a government is increasingly using digital surveillance, for example, that will be one of the first tools its bureaucrats think of when it comes to managing the epidemic. If a health care system is profit-driven, it’s going to take decisionmakers some extra effort—or extra outcry from users—to realize that may not be practical during a pandemic.
Once the effort to downplay COVID-19 is absolutely irredeemable, you are likely to hear the government playing it up instead. If past disasters are any indication, the epidemic will be described as “unprecedented” and “unimaginable”—in other words, exceptional—despite the historical record of previous epidemics and the existence of an entire field of study based on them. Emphasizing the cataclysmic nature of the hazard is most obviously an excuse for shortfalls in the response but also another way to untether it from its causes in long-term policy. Disasters, and their responses, provide a powerful lens for critiquing the societies in which they occur. We should not let the focus on the hazard, which we can do nothing about, distract us from the underlying conditions that turned it into a disaster. Those, at least, we can change before the next crisis hits.