foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--Want to Fix the Deficit? Bring Home the Troops

Want to Fix the Deficit ?
Bring Home the Troops An active foreign policy is costly .
Intervention requires aid programs , trade initiatives , and diplomatic personnel .
Reliance on the military is especially expensive .
What are described as “ endless ” wars post-9/11 are expected to eventually cost , including veterans ’ care , more than $ 6 trillion .
And combat is not over : Approximately 12,000 service members are posted in Afghanistan , though the number is dropping under the peace accord with the Taliban , and some 6,000 troops remain in Iraq .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ special operations forces have been deployed in Yemen .
Peacetime deployments , some permanent , some temporary , also create a significant , ongoing burden .
For instance , the United States currently stations some 78,000 troops in East Asia , as many as 65,000 in the Persian Gulf , about 35,000 in Europe , and 6,000 to 7,000 in Africa .
Additional units in the United States back up these commitments .
Every military alliance and relationship requires additional force structure , wherever the troops are deployed at any given time .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy had been growing difficult to bear long before the economic crisis created by the coronavirus pandemic .
In June 2019 , the Congressional Budget Office forecast trillion-dollar annual deficits as far as the eye can see .
The agency warned : “ Large budget deficits over the next 30 years are projected to drive federal debt held by the public to unprecedented levels—from 78 percent of gross domestic product ( GDP ) in 2019 to 144 percent by 2049.
” For comparison : Greece was at a similar deficit level when it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the wake of the global financial crisis .
If interest rates in the United States grow by just 1 percent , in three decades the federal government ’ s debt will run 199 percent of GDP .
However , well before that level is reached , Washington would risk what the Congressional Budget Office terms “ a fiscal crisis—that is , a situation in which the interest rate on federal debt rises abruptly because investors have lost confidence in the U.S. government ’ s fiscal position.
” This would greatly intensify the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collapse and massive federal bailouts , the federal financial situation has dramatically worsened .
At the end of April , the budget office projected a 12 percent drop in real GDP this quarter , an unemployment rate of 14 percent , a likely annual deficit of $ 3.7 trillion in 2020 and $ 2.1 trillion next year , and debt at 101 percent of GDP by the end of the fiscal year .
Those numbers may well rise .
The Manhattan Institute ’ s Brian Riedl believes the red ink might even hit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so , Washington will borrow more this year than during 2014 to 2019 combined .
States also face enormous economic pressures .
Most are forced to at least nominally balance their budgets , as only Uncle Sam has a printing press , but their pension funds , which collectively faced a $ 1 trillion funding hole at the start of the year , are likely to have $ 1.5 trillion to $ 2 trillion in unfunded liabilities by December .
Some states , most notably Illinois , Kentucky , and New Jersey , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House has proposed including a state bailout in its proposal for another $ 3 trillion in aid .
The debt tsunami can not continue indefinitely .
Last year , Washington spent $ 4.4 trillion , of which nearly a quarter was borrowed .
There are no simple solutions .
Congress is unlikely to raise taxes .
In 2017 the federal budget was awash in red ink , but Congress passed a large tax cut .
Making ends meet was pushed even further into the future , when government programs presumably would be paid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is to scale back spending programs—but there isn ’ t much to cut .
Domestic discretionary outlays , which Congress normally targets when intent on reducing expenditures , ran only $ 661 billion in 2019 .
These expenditures , at 6.3 percent of GDP , already were below their historical average , 8.4 percent over the last half-century , and wiping out everything would still leave a deficit .
A trillion dollars went for Social Security and $ 644 billion for Medicare last year—both of which make up the traditional , untouchable third @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for reform abound , President Donald Trump has refused to trim either , and progressive activists continue to push for benefit increases .
Other mandatory entitlement programs , with benefits set by law , constituted $ 642 billion .
Medicaid ran $ 409 billion ; it already provides the lowest reimbursement rates of any government program or private health insurance .
Net interest payments came to $ 375 billion .
Interest rates have nowhere to go but up , and these outlays can not be cut without repudiating the debt .
Meanwhile , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 676 billion .
Today most of that is “ defense ” only in the sense of protecting allies , many of which can defend themselves and little of which can be considered essential for this nation ’ s security .
( Of course , the United States has other less-than-vital interests , in stability , for instance , and thus the defeat of a group like the Islamic State .
Yet Washington , too , has proved to be a major force for instability—as in the cases of Iraq and Libya .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ turning military alliances into welfare programs when the United States dominates the global economy .
But the calculations change when the federal government is racing toward insolvency .
In another decade or two , when entitlements are competing with the national debt in spiraling upward , priorities will finally have to be set .
And missions that are not essential , such as engaging in nation-building and protecting prosperous , populous allies , are likely to lose out .
Some right-leaning hawks acknowledge the imminent fiscal crunch but blame social programs .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : entitlements , not the Pentagon , should be slashed .
Alas , they have yet to find a credible presidential candidate willing to make that case .
Liberal interventionists have an even bigger problem , as most leading progressives want to spend more , much more , on domestic priorities .
Creating “ Medicare for All ” and wiping out student debt would cost trillions of dollars .
Despite the veneer of moderation retained by former Vice President Joe Biden , the presidential candidate has shifted leftward to bolster his support among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intervention are likely to resist any military cutbacks .
However , once a fiscal crisis hits , dramatic and rapid if not instant reductions will be required .
That risks creating a dangerous mismatch with international objectives .
Policymakers should begin , today , by scaling back their interventionist strategies that require such a large and expensive military , with hundreds of bases and hundreds of thousands of troops around the globe .
The military budget is the price of America ’ s foreign policy .
A new approach should exercise restraint , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ construct the force structure necessary to achieve more limited goals .
For instance , Washington could do a real pivot to Asia .
That would mean turning Europe ’ s defense over to Europe , which vastly outranges Russia on economic strength , population size , and technological advance .
Despite the president ’ s criticism of NATO , his administration added 4,500 troops to Europe last year .
An extra $ 5.9 billion is being spent this fiscal year on the European Deterrence Initiative .
Personnel should be demobilized and outlays cut @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NATO or separate organization tied to the European Union would be up to the Europeans .
Trans-Atlantic cooperation among equals to advance shared interests would replace continental dependence on the United States .
Afghanistan should be the United States ’ last attempt at gratuitous nation-building .
The United States should de-emphasize the Middle East , which no longer possesses a global energy stranglehold .
Washington should accept instability in the region , bring home U.S. troops , and encourage local powers to ratchet down tensions between Shiites and Sunnis and cooperate against common @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Afghanistan should be the United States ’ last attempt at gratuitous nation-building .
In Asia , Washington could shift to a strategy of offshore balancing , relying on allied states to ensure freedom of navigation and the independence of important Pacific states , most notably Japan , Australia , and the Philippines .
Ground troops should be withdrawn from South Korea and Japan .
With more than 50 times the GDP and twice the population of the North , the South Korea could take over its own defense .
As with Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from reducing force structure after reducing commitments .
Such an approach would be nothing like “ isolationism , ” the term of opprobrium routinely tossed at anyone who opposes today ’ s policy of promiscuous war-making .
Rather , this strategy would be the “ humble foreign policy ” that George W. Bush initially advocated , with fewer wars and lesser requirements for manpower and materiel—and , hence , lower Pentagon outlays .
That wouldn ’ t be enough to balance the federal budget , but it would help .
And it would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outlays on a far more responsible and sustainable path .

An active foreign policy is costly. Intervention requires aid programs, trade initiatives, and diplomatic personnel. Reliance on the military is especially expensive. What are described as “endless” wars post-9/11 are expected to eventually cost, including veterans’ care, more than $6 trillion . And combat is not over: Approximately 12,000 service members are posted in Afghanistan, though the number is dropping under the peace accord with the Taliban, and some 6,000 troops remain in Iraq. A few hundred work in Syria, while special operations forces have been deployed in Yemen. Peacetime deployments , some permanent, some temporary, also create a significant, ongoing burden. For instance, the United States currently stations some 78,000 troops in East Asia, as many as 65,000 in the Persian Gulf, about 35,000 in Europe, and 6,000 to 7,000 in Africa. Additional units in the United States back up these commitments. Every military alliance and relationship requires additional force structure, wherever the troops are deployed at any given time.
An active foreign policy is costly. Intervention requires aid programs, trade initiatives, and diplomatic personnel. Reliance on the military is especially expensive. What are described as “endless” wars post-9/11 are expected to eventually cost, including veterans’ care, more than $6 trillion. And combat is not over: Approximately 12,000 service members are posted in Afghanistan, though the number is dropping under the peace accord with the Taliban, and some 6,000 troops remain in Iraq. A few hundred work in Syria, while special operations forces have been deployed in Yemen. Peacetime deployments, some permanent, some temporary, also create a significant, ongoing burden. For instance, the United States currently stations some 78,000 troops in East Asia, as many as 65,000 in the Persian Gulf, about 35,000 in Europe, and 6,000 to 7,000 in Africa. Additional units in the United States back up these commitments. Every military alliance and relationship requires additional force structure, wherever the troops are deployed at any given time.
The financial burdens of this activist military policy had been growing difficult to bear long before the economic crisis created by the coronavirus pandemic. In June 2019, the Congressional Budget Office forecast trillion-dollar annual deficits as far as the eye can see. The agency warned: “Large budget deficits over the next 30 years are projected to drive federal debt held by the public to unprecedented levels—from 78 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 to 144 percent by 2049.” For comparison: Greece was at a similar deficit level when it was battered by its own debt crisis in the wake of the global financial crisis. If interest rates in the United States grow by just 1 percent, in three decades the federal government’s debt will run 199 percent of GDP. However, well before that level is reached, Washington would risk what the Congressional Budget Office terms “a fiscal crisis—that is, a situation in which the interest rate on federal debt rises abruptly because investors have lost confidence in the U.S. government’s fiscal position.” This would greatly intensify the fiscal crunch.
With the ongoing economic collapse and massive federal bailouts, the federal financial situation has dramatically worsened. At the end of April, the budget office projected a 12 percent drop in real GDP this quarter, an unemployment rate of 14 percent, a likely annual deficit of $3.7 trillion in 2020 and $2.1 trillion next year, and debt at 101 percent of GDP by the end of the fiscal year. Those numbers may well rise. The Manhattan Institute’s Brian Riedl believes the red ink might even hit $4.2 trillion this year. If so, Washington will borrow more this year than during 2014 to 2019 combined.
States also face enormous economic pressures. Most are forced to at least nominally balance their budgets, as only Uncle Sam has a printing press, but their pension funds, which collectively faced a $1 trillion funding hole at the start of the year, are likely to have $1.5 trillion to $2 trillion in unfunded liabilities by December. Some states, most notably Illinois, Kentucky, and New Jersey, already are at risk. The Democratic House has proposed including a state bailout in its proposal for another $3 trillion in aid.
The debt tsunami cannot continue indefinitely. Last year, Washington spent $4.4 trillion, of which nearly a quarter was borrowed.
There are no simple solutions. Congress is unlikely to raise taxes. In 2017 the federal budget was awash in red ink, but Congress passed a large tax cut. Making ends meet was pushed even further into the future, when government programs presumably would be paid by someone somehow sometime. The alternative is to scale back spending programs—but there isn’t much to cut. Domestic discretionary outlays, which Congress normally targets when intent on reducing expenditures, ran only $661 billion in 2019. These expenditures, at 6.3 percent of GDP, already were below their historical average, 8.4 percent over the last half-century, and wiping out everything would still leave a deficit. A trillion dollars went for Social Security and $644 billion for Medicare last year—both of which make up the traditional, untouchable third rail of U.S. politics. Although proposals for reform abound, President Donald Trump has refused to trim either, and progressive activists continue to push for benefit increases. Other mandatory entitlement programs, with benefits set by law, constituted $642 billion. Medicaid ran $409 billion; it already provides the lowest reimbursement rates of any government program or private health insurance. Net interest payments came to $375 billion. Interest rates have nowhere to go but up, and these outlays cannot be cut without repudiating the debt.
Meanwhile, last year’s military budget was $676 billion. Today most of that is “defense” only in the sense of protecting allies, many of which can defend themselves and little of which can be considered essential for this nation’s security. (Of course, the United States has other less-than-vital interests, in stability, for instance, and thus the defeat of a group like the Islamic State. Yet Washington, too, has proved to be a major force for instability—as in the cases of Iraq and Libya.) Americans may not mind their government turning military alliances into welfare programs when the United States dominates the global economy. But the calculations change when the federal government is racing toward insolvency. In another decade or two, when entitlements are competing with the national debt in spiraling upward, priorities will finally have to be set. And missions that are not essential, such as engaging in nation-building and protecting prosperous, populous allies, are likely to lose out.
Some right-leaning hawks acknowledge the imminent fiscal crunch but blame social programs. The answer, they argue, is simple: entitlements, not the Pentagon, should be slashed. Alas, they have yet to find a credible presidential candidate willing to make that case. Liberal interventionists have an even bigger problem, as most leading progressives want to spend more, much more, on domestic priorities. Creating “Medicare for All” and wiping out student debt would cost trillions of dollars. Despite the veneer of moderation retained by former Vice President Joe Biden, the presidential candidate has shifted leftward to bolster his support among activists.
The bipartisan advocates of promiscuous intervention are likely to resist any military cutbacks. However, once a fiscal crisis hits, dramatic and rapid if not instant reductions will be required. That risks creating a dangerous mismatch with international objectives.
Policymakers should begin, today, by scaling back their interventionist strategies that require such a large and expensive military, with hundreds of bases and hundreds of thousands of troops around the globe. The military budget is the price of America’s foreign policy. A new approach should exercise restraint, scale back national ambitions, and then construct the force structure necessary to achieve more limited goals.
For instance, Washington could do a real pivot to Asia. That would mean turning Europe’s defense over to Europe, which vastly outranges Russia on economic strength, population size, and technological advance. Despite the president’s criticism of NATO, his administration added 4,500 troops to Europe last year. An extra $5.9 billion is being spent this fiscal year on the European Deterrence Initiative. Personnel should be demobilized and outlays cut. Whether the vehicle is a European-led NATO or separate organization tied to the European Union would be up to the Europeans. Trans-Atlantic cooperation among equals to advance shared interests would replace continental dependence on the United States.
Afghanistan should be the United States’ last attempt at gratuitous nation-building. The United States should de-emphasize the Middle East, which no longer possesses a global energy stranglehold. Washington should accept instability in the region, bring home U.S. troops, and encourage local powers to ratchet down tensions between Shiites and Sunnis and cooperate against common threats, such as the Islamic State. Afghanistan should be the United States’ last attempt at gratuitous nation-building.
In Asia, Washington could shift to a strategy of offshore balancing, relying on allied states to ensure freedom of navigation and the independence of important Pacific states, most notably Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. Ground troops should be withdrawn from South Korea and Japan. With more than 50 times the GDP and twice the population of the North, the South Korea could take over its own defense. As with Europe, the most important savings would come from reducing force structure after reducing commitments.
Such an approach would be nothing like “isolationism,” the term of opprobrium routinely tossed at anyone who opposes today’s policy of promiscuous war-making. Rather, this strategy would be the “humble foreign policy” that George W. Bush initially advocated, with fewer wars and lesser requirements for manpower and materiel—and, hence, lower Pentagon outlays. That wouldn’t be enough to balance the federal budget, but it would help. And it would, at long last, put military outlays on a far more responsible and sustainable path.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--Why India and China Are Sparring

Why India and China Are Sparring

Why India and China Are Sparring Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief .
This week : What to make of a worrying buildup of troops along the India-China border , U.S. President Donald Trump suggests new plans to recall U.S. troops from Afghanistan , Uber downsizes in India , and a swarm of locusts attacks the region .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Perhaps predictably , U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted on Wednesday an offer to help resolve growing border tensions between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he described the situation as a “ now raging border dispute.
” Trump ’ s words were hyperbole , but they partially reflected the most serious tensions between the two nuclear powers—representing a third of the world ’ s population—in nearly three years .
In the best of times , both India and China restrict journalists from entering border areas , and the pandemic has made it more difficult to get accurate information .
Let ’ s start with what we know .
This month , Foreign Policy highlighted two clashes between Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and May 9 , at separate border areas in India ’ s east and north .
While no one was killed in those hand-to-hand combat skirmishes , more than 100 soldiers were injured .
The Indian press , aided by trickles of information from defense officials , has since reported that Chinese army brigades comprising thousands of soldiers have crossed into Indian territory to set up tents and trenches at key points near the Himalayas .
In response , India ’ s army has deployed reinforcements , sparking fears of a larger conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , New Delhi and Beijing activated a high-level diplomatic channel to diffuse tensions .
And China ’ s ambassador to India , Sun Weidong , struck a calming tone , telling reporters , “ We should never let differences overshadow our relations.
” The longer-term question is why tensions were sparked in the first place—and what that portends .
A few thoughts : First , the coronavirus pandemic may have strengthened—and sped up—Beijing ’ s growing conviction that it has the power to take bold moves around the world .
This may also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change the national security law in Hong Kong .
Even in 2008 , as the world reeled from the global financial crisis , Beijing responded with massive stimulus measures and a global lending spree , expanding its influence and power .
In other words , China may be taking advantage of a crisis .
Second , China ’ s incursions are likely also a response to years of Indian construction of roads and airstrips along the Line of Actual Control that divides the two countries , improving India ’ s military supply chain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s recent moves may also be a response to the 2017 standoff between the two countries in Doklam , in territory claimed by Bhutan , when India stopped Chinese troops from building a road .
Third , as Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet Pardesi wrote in Foreign Policy , since 1988 China and India have shared an understanding to keep the peace so they could focus on their domestic growth and stability .
But 32 years ago the two countries had similarly sized economies and spent nearly the same amount on defense .
Today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than five times that of India , and it spends four times as much on defense .
The dynamics of the relationship have completely changed .
There are , of course , other contributing factors , not least the fact that both countries are led by nationalist strongmen who are struggling to respond to the pandemic and its economic fallout .
Both India and China have jingoistic media and populations that increasingly enjoy a bit of muscle-flexing .
Even so , the worst of the current flare-up seems to have passed .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see more clashes in the future .
[ For more on this topic , I ’ m interviewing former U.S .
Ambassador to India Tim Roemer and Ashley Tellis , a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , in a virtual event hosted by the U.S.-India Business Council on Friday at 8:30 a.m. EDT .
You can register to watch here . ]
No exponential rise , yet .
While none of the eight countries in South Asia have reported a steep rise in coronavirus cases , they haven ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of infections .
As shown below , total cases are still doubling about every two weeks .
But the region ’ s countries also still have among the lowest rates of testing in the world .
Pakistan has now lifted all restrictions on movement , while India has taken some steps to begin reopening the economy .
The pandemic , a cyclone , and heat waves .
Now , locusts .
In what seems like a biblical array of disasters , parts of western India are experiencing the worst locust invasion in 25 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swarms took over Jaipur in the western state of Rajasthan on Monday and are now headed toward New Delhi .
Locusts can travel more than a hundred miles a day , and the average swarm consumes as much food as 35,000 people .
The bugs have made their way to India from Pakistan and Iran .
U.S. troop drawdown ?
On Wednesday , Trump renewed his calls for U.S. troops to return from Afghanistan .
“ After 19 years , it is time for them to police their own Country , ” he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a day after the New York Times reported that senior military officials presented an option for withdrawing all U.S. forces before the November presidential election .
U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan is already down to nearly 8,600—ahead of the schedule agreed with the Taliban—in part because of fears about the coronavirus .
The ongoing skirmishes between India and China got me thinking about borders .
Which pair of countries shares the world ’ s longest border ?
A ) Russia and Kazakhstan B ) Canada and the United States C ) China and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down for the answer .
Sri Lanka ’ s debt .
Reuters has a smart report this week on Sri Lanka ’ s fragile finances .
Nearly 70 percent of government revenue is currently being spent on debt interest payments—let alone the principal .
Sri Lanka ’ s central bank has called speculation about a default “ baseless , ” but it seems increasingly likely Colombo may have to approach the International Monetary Fund or other global lenders for assistance .
Since the start of the coronavirus pandemic , Argentina and Lebanon have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the World Bank , nearly 28 percent of Sri Lanka ’ s export-related income comes from international tourism—a sector that has been almost entirely shut down for three months .
India ’ s ride-hailing industry is in trouble .
This week Uber laid off a quarter of its workforce in India , or about 600 jobs .
The cuts represent another setback for Uber ’ s ambitions in the country after it sold its food delivery business Uber Eats to Zomato , a local rival backed by China ’ s Alibaba , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sale it regrets , given that food delivery is the part of its business that has thrived during the pandemic . )
But India should remain an important market for Uber , especially given the potential for growth in the ride-hailing business there .
And Uber ’ s not alone : Its main domestic rival Ola also laid off 1,400 employees last week .
In a letter to the company ’ s staff , CEO Bhavish Aggarwal wrote that Ola ’ s revenue was down 95 percent in the last two months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a long time for people to go out and about like before , ” he wrote .
A flying spy ?
In one of the stranger recent India-Pakistan stories , villagers on India ’ s side of the border spotted a pigeon with a ring on one of its legs .
They captured the bird and handed it over to the police , who tried to decipher a code inscribed on the ring .
A Pakistani villager now says the bird is his and that the code in question is his personal mobile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by a Pakistani newspaper as Habibullah , says his pigeon was innocent : “ This is my pet pigeon .
… It can never be a spy or a terrorist.
” But as the BBC reports , there is some recent history of India perceiving pigeons as spying tools , with birds arrested in 2015 and 2016 .
It is unclear whether New Delhi will release its latest capture .
C ) Canada and the United States .
At nearly 4,000 miles , the two countries share the longest land border in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China doesn ’ t even make the top 10 , but it remains the longest unmarked boundary—which partly explains the ongoing crisis .
India ’ s borders with Bangladesh and Pakistan are the world ’ s fifth and ninth longest , respectively .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. This week: What to make of a worrying buildup of troops along the India-China border , U.S. President Donald Trump suggests new plans to recall U.S. troops from Afghanistan , Uber downsizes in India , and a swarm of locusts attacks the region.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. This week: What to make of a worrying buildup of troops along the India-China border, U.S. President Donald Trump suggests new plans to recall U.S. troops from Afghanistan, Uber downsizes in India, and a swarm of locusts attacks the region.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Why India and China Are Sparring
Perhaps predictably, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted on Wednesday an offer to help resolve growing border tensions between India and China. More surprisingly, he described the situation as a “now raging border dispute.” Trump’s words were hyperbole, but they partially reflected the most serious tensions between the two nuclear powers—representing a third of the world’s population—in nearly three years.
In the best of times, both India and China restrict journalists from entering border areas, and the pandemic has made it more difficult to get accurate information. Let’s start with what we know. This month, Foreign Policy highlighted two clashes between Indian and Chinese soldiers, on May 5 and May 9, at separate border areas in India’s east and north. While no one was killed in those hand-to-hand combat skirmishes, more than 100 soldiers were injured.
The Indian press, aided by trickles of information from defense officials, has since reported that Chinese army brigades comprising thousands of soldiers have crossed into Indian territory to set up tents and trenches at key points near the Himalayas. In response, India’s army has deployed reinforcements, sparking fears of a larger conflict.
The Economist reports that on Wednesday, New Delhi and Beijing activated a high-level diplomatic channel to defuse tensions. And China’s ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, struck a calming tone, telling reporters, “We should never let differences overshadow our relations.”
The longer-term question is why tensions were sparked in the first place—and what that portends. A few thoughts:
First, the coronavirus pandemic may have strengthened—and sped up—Beijing’s growing conviction that it has the power to take bold moves around the world. This may also explain the timing of its decision to change the national security law in Hong Kong. Even in 2008, as the world reeled from the global financial crisis, Beijing responded with massive stimulus measures and a global lending spree, expanding its influence and power. In other words, China may be taking advantage of a crisis.
Second, China’s incursions are likely also a response to years of Indian construction of roads and airstrips along the Line of Actual Control that divides the two countries, improving India’s military supply chain connectivity in the area. Beijing’s recent moves may also be a response to the 2017 standoff between the two countries in Doklam, in territory claimed by Bhutan, when India stopped Chinese troops from building a road.
Third, as Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet Pardesi wrote in Foreign Policy, since 1988 China and India have shared an understanding to keep the peace so they could focus on their domestic growth and stability. But 32 years ago the two countries had similarly sized economies and spent nearly the same amount on defense. Today, China’s GDP is more than five times that of India, and it spends four times as much on defense. The dynamics of the relationship have completely changed.
There are, of course, other contributing factors, not least the fact that both countries are led by nationalist strongmen who are struggling to respond to the pandemic and its economic fallout. Both India and China have jingoistic media and populations that increasingly enjoy a bit of muscle-flexing. Even so, the worst of the current flare-up seems to have passed. But the trend lines suggest that we may see more clashes in the future.
[For more on this topic, I’m interviewing former U.S. Ambassador to India Tim Roemer and Ashley Tellis, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in a virtual event hosted by the U.S.-India Business Council on Friday at 8:30 a.m. EDT. You can register to watch here.]
What We’re Following
No exponential rise, yet. While none of the eight countries in South Asia have reported a steep rise in coronavirus cases, they haven’t been able to stop the spread of infections. As shown below, total cases are still doubling about every two weeks. But the region’s countries also still have among the lowest rates of testing in the world. Pakistan has now lifted all restrictions on movement, while India has taken some steps to begin reopening the economy.
The pandemic, a cyclone, and heat waves. Now, locusts. In what seems like a biblical array of disasters, parts of western India are experiencing the worst locust invasion in 25 years, according to scientists. Giant swarms took over Jaipur in the western state of Rajasthan on Monday and are now headed toward New Delhi. Locusts can travel more than a hundred miles a day, and the average swarm consumes as much food as 35,000 people. The bugs have made their way to India from Pakistan and Iran.
U.S. troop drawdown? On Wednesday, Trump renewed his calls for U.S. troops to return from Afghanistan. “After 19 years, it is time for them to police their own Country,” he tweeted. Trump’s comments came a day after the New York Times reported that senior military officials presented an option for withdrawing all U.S. forces before the November presidential election. U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan is already down to nearly 8,600—ahead of the schedule agreed with the Taliban—in part because of fears about the coronavirus.
Question of the Week
The ongoing skirmishes between India and China got me thinking about borders. Which pair of countries shares the world’s longest border?
A) Russia and Kazakhstan
B) Canada and the United States
C) China and Mongolia
D) India and Bangladesh
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
Sri Lanka’s debt. Reuters has a smart report this week on Sri Lanka’s fragile finances. Nearly 70 percent of government revenue is currently being spent on debt interest payments—let alone the principal. Sri Lanka’s central bank has called speculation about a default “baseless,” but it seems increasingly likely Colombo may have to approach the International Monetary Fund or other global lenders for assistance.
Since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, Argentina and Lebanon have already defaulted on their debt. According to the World Bank, nearly 28 percent of Sri Lanka’s export-related income comes from international tourism—a sector that has been almost entirely shut down for three months.
India’s ride-hailing industry is in trouble. This week Uber laid off a quarter of its workforce in India, or about 600 jobs. The cuts represent another setback for Uber’s ambitions in the country after it sold its food delivery business Uber Eats to Zomato, a local rival backed by China’s Alibaba, this year. (This is likely a sale it regrets, given that food delivery is the part of its business that has thrived during the pandemic.) But India should remain an important market for Uber, especially given the potential for growth in the ride-hailing business there.
And Uber’s not alone: Its main domestic rival Ola also laid off 1,400 employees last week. In a letter to the company’s staff, CEO Bhavish Aggarwal wrote that Ola’s revenue was down 95 percent in the last two months. “It is going to take a long time for people to go out and about like before,” he wrote.
Odds and Ends
A flying spy? In one of the stranger recent India-Pakistan stories, villagers on India’s side of the border spotted a pigeon with a ring on one of its legs. They captured the bird and handed it over to the police, who tried to decipher a code inscribed on the ring. A Pakistani villager now says the bird is his and that the code in question is his personal mobile phone number.
The villager, identified by a Pakistani newspaper as Habibullah, says his pigeon was innocent: “This is my pet pigeon. … It can never be a spy or a terrorist.” But as the BBC reports, there is some recent history of India perceiving pigeons as spying tools, with birds arrested in 2015 and 2016. It is unclear whether New Delhi will release its latest capture.
And the Answer Is…
C) Canada and the United States.
At nearly 4,000 miles, the two countries share the longest land border in the world. The border between India and China doesn’t even make the top 10, but it remains the longest unmarked boundary—which partly explains the ongoing crisis. India’s borders with Bangladesh and Pakistan are the world’s fifth and ninth longest, respectively.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--All Roads to a Better Trade Deal Lead Through the WTO

All Roads to a Better Trade Deal Lead Through the WTO On Capitol Hill , calls for the United States to drop out of the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) are getting louder .
In early May , Republican Sen. Josh Hawley introduced a joint resolution for WTO withdrawal .
This was quickly followed by a similar proposal in the House of Representatives , brought forward by Democrats Peter DeFazio and Frank Pallone Jr .
These calls are noteworthy because they signaled some bipartisan congressional alignment on the issue with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the global trade body .
Trump has threatened withdrawal on a number of occasions , and his administration has already scuppered the WTO ’ s ability to resolve trade disputes.Trump himself has threatened withdrawal on a number of occasions , and his administration has even scuppered the WTO ’ s ability to resolve trade disputes by refusing to allow the appointment of new judges to its appellate body .
The proposals to withdraw hinge on three crucial questions .
Has the WTO failed ?
Is multilateralism on trade issues dead ?
And would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the WTO ?
To all three questions , the answer is unequivocally no .
This is true even—and especially—when factoring in serious trade concerns with China that the WTO framework has not been able to resolve so far .
The WTO has been around since 1995 .
It was installed as an upgrade of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade , a set of multilateral trade rules first established at the end of World War II .
The WTO set up a system to manage fast-growing global trade during an era when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and hundreds of millions of people were lifted out of poverty .
The system benefited rich and poor nations alike : In the United States , even after adjusting for inflation , per capita GDP is 45 percent higher today than when the WTO was created .
“ Hold on !
” a skeptic might say .
“ Just because those good things happened after the WTO was created does not mean the WTO can take the credit.
” That ’ s fair enough .
But it also means that one can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ else that has happened , such as how technological advancements and automation have reduced the share of manufacturing jobs in U.S. employment , contributing to social tensions and rising inequality .
That means we need to look more closely at the WTO ’ s direct and concrete achievements .
For one , it greatly expanded the share of global trade that is covered by rules that govern countries ’ behavior .
That means , for example , that U.S. companies and their workers now have a better shot at winning foreign government contracts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other services abroad .
The WTO has begun tackling barriers to U.S. agricultural exports—an area of trade that had originally been dropped , at U.S. insistence , from the global trade system in the 1950s .
And it has considerably improved worldwide protection for U.S. intellectual property , whether that applies to Hollywood films , apps and software , or life-saving medicines .
The WTO has also significantly enhanced the United States ’ ability to enforce these rules .
The U.S. government has brought dozens and dozens of cases before the WTO ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has won the vast majority of them , thereby forcing European Union countries , Canada , and even China to adhere to the rules U.S. negotiators had championed.Washington has won the vast majority of WTO dispute cases , forcing the European Union , Canada , and even China to adhere to the rules U.S. negotiators had championed .
In some other areas such as subsidies , the WTO ’ s achievements have been substantially more modest .
But rather than serving as an indictment of the institution , this is a reflection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including the United States .
Limiting unfair and trade-distorting subsidies has been less palatable because the United States and other WTO members did not want anything stricter .
While they might all believe that other countries ’ subsidies are intolerable , that never seems to apply to their own subsidies for their own favored companies and industries .
By excusing each country ’ s cherished subsidies , the system has ended up being fairly permissive .
That brings us to the second question : Has the WTO outlived its usefulness ?
After @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the United States has considerably less influence than its gigantic economy would suggest .
Maybe the issues of today , such as how to deal with China ’ s unequal and discriminatory trade practices , are better tackled directly as a bilateral issue between Washington and Beijing ?
But a multilateral approach to trade is arguably even more important today than when these institutions were first created .
Tariffs were a primary concern back in the late 1940s , when countries were mainly shipping finished goods to each other .
Countries liberalized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bilaterally , others multilaterally , some even unilaterally .
Today ’ s trade barriers are much different , however , even as trade has gotten more varied and complex .
Tariffs are no longer the main obstacle to international commerce .
Things like subsidies , taxation , and discriminatory regulations are a bigger source of friction , but these sorts of barriers are very difficult to resolve bilaterally between countries .
The reason is simple : They most often apply to all trading partners at once .
The Trump administration has come to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ failed negotiations with China .
The much-touted “ phase one ” trade deal may be already falling apart due to China not meeting its commitments to purchase U.S. products .
But more importantly , the January agreement was completely silent on some of the key issues that motivated Trump ’ s trade war in the first place , including unfair subsidies and protections benefiting Chinese state-owned companies .
The United States has entirely reasonable complaints about Beijing ’ s industrial subsidies and systematic expropriation of foreign technology .
But the United States is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany and Japan share many of these concerns and would benefit immensely if China reformed its economic policies .
This is why the administration ’ s go-it-alone approach toward China is unlikely to work—in trying to alter China ’ s general economic policies , the United States would effectively be working on behalf of Germany , Japan , and every other country that trades with China .
Regardless of what Trump might think , the United States simply does not have that much unilateral economic leverage .
More multilateralism , not less , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China to play by a fairer , more market-oriented set of rules .
Finally , would the United States be better off if it were to leave the WTO ?
The joint resolutions in Congress seem to envision U.S. withdrawal leading to other countries such as Britain and Japan following suit and joining the United States in new trade arrangements outside the WTO .
The problem , of course , is that the United States can unilaterally decide to exit the WTO , but it can ’ t force other countries to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade deals would require willing partners .
This is another lesson Trump had to learn the hard way when he couldn ’ t force other countries to follow the United States in abandoning the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership .
Japan , Canada , and the nine other countries that had negotiated the pact went ahead anyway , lowering trade and investment barriers among themselves , leaving U.S. companies out in the cold.The main result of a unilateral departure would be a more isolated United States with less ability to pressure China and at greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ truth for the United States is that no other major economy has shown any interest in abandoning the WTO .
The main result of any unilateral departure would be a more isolated United States with less ability to pressure China and at greater risk of falling behind economically .
U.S. allies such as Japan and the countries of the European Union have shown that they are willing to confront China , and they have proposed new rules to address China ’ s problematic industrial subsidies and forced transfer of foreign technology .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like-minded countries within the WTO , not to abandon the rules-based global system entirely and try to bully China on their own .
What the United States needs to do now is to take them up on that offer and build on the foundation that the WTO already provides—instead of toppling the chess board and running away .

On Capitol Hill, calls for the United States to drop out of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are getting louder. In early May, Republican Sen. Josh Hawley introduced a joint resolution for WTO withdrawal. This was quickly followed by a similar proposal in the House of Representatives, brought forward by Democrats Peter DeFazio and Frank Pallone Jr. These calls are noteworthy because they signaled some bipartisan congressional alignment on the issue with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, which has been constant in its criticisms of the global trade body. Trump has threatened withdrawal on a number of occasions, and his administration has already scuppered the WTO's ability to resolve trade disputes.Trump himself has threatened withdrawal on a number of occasions, and his administration has even scuppered the WTO’s ability to resolve trade disputes by refusing to allow the appointment of new judges to its appellate body.
On Capitol Hill, calls for the United States to drop out of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are getting louder. In early May, Republican Sen. Josh Hawley introduced a joint resolution for WTO withdrawal. This was quickly followed by a similar proposal in the House of Representatives, brought forward by Democrats Peter DeFazio and Frank Pallone Jr. These calls are noteworthy because they signaled some bipartisan congressional alignment on the issue with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, which has been constant in its criticisms of the global trade body. Trump has threatened withdrawal on a number of occasions, and his administration has already scuppered the WTO’s ability to resolve trade disputes.Trump himself has threatened withdrawal on a number of occasions, and his administration has even scuppered the WTO’s ability to resolve trade disputes by refusing to allow the appointment of new judges to its appellate body.
The proposals to withdraw hinge on three crucial questions. Has the WTO failed? Is multilateralism on trade issues dead? And would the United States be better off outside the WTO? To all three questions, the answer is unequivocally no. This is true even—and especially—when factoring in serious trade concerns with China that the WTO framework has not been able to resolve so far.
The WTO has been around since 1995. It was installed as an upgrade of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a set of multilateral trade rules first established at the end of World War II. The WTO set up a system to manage fast-growing global trade during an era when national incomes rose, commerce grew significantly, and hundreds of millions of people were lifted out of poverty. The system benefited rich and poor nations alike: In the United States, even after adjusting for inflation, per capita GDP is 45 percent higher today than when the WTO was created.
“Hold on!” a skeptic might say. “Just because those good things happened after the WTO was created does not mean the WTO can take the credit.” That’s fair enough. But it also means that one cannot hold the WTO accountable for everything else that has happened, such as how technological advancements and automation have reduced the share of manufacturing jobs in U.S. employment, contributing to social tensions and rising inequality.
That means we need to look more closely at the WTO’s direct and concrete achievements. For one, it greatly expanded the share of global trade that is covered by rules that govern countries’ behavior. That means, for example, that U.S. companies and their workers now have a better shot at winning foreign government contracts, or at selling their IT or other services abroad. The WTO has begun tackling barriers to U.S. agricultural exports—an area of trade that had originally been dropped, at U.S. insistence, from the global trade system in the 1950s. And it has considerably improved worldwide protection for U.S. intellectual property, whether that applies to Hollywood films, apps and software, or life-saving medicines.
The WTO has also significantly enhanced the United States’ ability to enforce these rules. The U.S. government has brought dozens and dozens of cases before the WTO’s trade adjudication bodies. And it has won the vast majority of them, thereby forcing European Union countries, Canada, and even China to adhere to the rules U.S. negotiators had championed.Washington has won the vast majority of WTO dispute cases, forcing the European Union, Canada, and even China to adhere to the rules U.S. negotiators had championed.
In some other areas such as subsidies, the WTO’s achievements have been substantially more modest. But rather than serving as an indictment of the institution, this is a reflection of the interests and priorities of its members, including the United States. Limiting unfair and trade-distorting subsidies has been less palatable because the United States and other WTO members did not want anything stricter. While they might all believe that other countries’ subsidies are intolerable, that never seems to apply to their own subsidies for their own favored companies and industries. By excusing each country’s cherished subsidies, the system has ended up being fairly permissive.
That brings us to the second question: Has the WTO outlived its usefulness? After all, as one of 164 members, the United States has considerably less influence than its gigantic economy would suggest. Maybe the issues of today, such as how to deal with China’s unequal and discriminatory trade practices, are better tackled directly as a bilateral issue between Washington and Beijing?
But a multilateral approach to trade is arguably even more important today than when these institutions were first created. Tariffs were a primary concern back in the late 1940s, when countries were mainly shipping finished goods to each other. Countries liberalized in a variety of ways—some cut tariffs bilaterally, others multilaterally, some even unilaterally.
Today’s trade barriers are much different, however, even as trade has gotten more varied and complex. Tariffs are no longer the main obstacle to international commerce. Things like subsidies, taxation, and discriminatory regulations are a bigger source of friction, but these sorts of barriers are very difficult to resolve bilaterally between countries. The reason is simple: They most often apply to all trading partners at once.
The Trump administration has come to learn this the hard way in its failed negotiations with China. The much-touted “phase one” trade deal may be already falling apart due to China not meeting its commitments to purchase U.S. products. But more importantly, the January agreement was completely silent on some of the key issues that motivated Trump’s trade war in the first place, including unfair subsidies and protections benefiting Chinese state-owned companies.
The United States has entirely reasonable complaints about Beijing’s industrial subsidies and systematic expropriation of foreign technology. But the United States is not alone: Manufacturing powerhouses such as Germany and Japan share many of these concerns and would benefit immensely if China reformed its economic policies. This is why the administration’s go-it-alone approach toward China is unlikely to work—in trying to alter China’s general economic policies, the United States would effectively be working on behalf of Germany, Japan, and every other country that trades with China. Regardless of what Trump might think, the United States simply does not have that much unilateral economic leverage. More multilateralism, not less, is what’s needed to get China to play by a fairer, more market-oriented set of rules.
Finally, would the United States be better off if it were to leave the WTO? The joint resolutions in Congress seem to envision U.S. withdrawal leading to other countries such as Britain and Japan following suit and joining the United States in new trade arrangements outside the WTO. The problem, of course, is that the United States can unilaterally decide to exit the WTO, but it can’t force other countries to do the same. Furthermore, any new trade deals would require willing partners. This is another lesson Trump had to learn the hard way when he couldn’t force other countries to follow the United States in abandoning the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership. Japan, Canada, and the nine other countries that had negotiated the pact went ahead anyway, lowering trade and investment barriers among themselves, leaving U.S. companies out in the cold.The main result of a unilateral departure would be a more isolated United States with less ability to pressure China and at greater risk of falling behind.
The hard truth for the United States is that no other major economy has shown any interest in abandoning the WTO. The main result of any unilateral departure would be a more isolated United States with less ability to pressure China and at greater risk of falling behind economically.
U.S. allies such as Japan and the countries of the European Union have shown that they are willing to confront China, and they have proposed new rules to address China’s problematic industrial subsidies and forced transfer of foreign technology. But their approach is to build coalitions of like-minded countries within the WTO, not to abandon the rules-based global system entirely and try to bully China on their own. What the United States needs to do now is to take them up on that offer and build on the foundation that the WTO already provides—instead of toppling the chess board and running away.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--China’s Surging Nationalism Has Claimed Hong Kong

The moment that many people have dreaded may have finally come for Hong Kong after Beijing announced a bill on May 21 to “ safeguard national security ” in the city-state .
When this law comes into effect , it will effectively end Hong Kong ’ s autonomy under the “ one country , two systems ” arrangement that has been in place since 1997 .
But it isn ’ t just about Hong Kong .
The bold move is merely the latest example of belligerent nationalistic behavior from China directed at both domestic and international targets this year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ messages emanating from the top of the Chinese government .
The national security law would ban secession , terrorism , and “ foreign interference , ” thus criminalizing a host of activities critical of the authorities such as protests or social media posts .
In effect , Hong Kong would become just like mainland China , where any criticism or protest against the government and the Chinese Communist Party is forbidden .
The bill was announced the day before China ’ s National People ’ s Congress ( NPC ) opened for its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voted to approve the bill at the end of the meetings on May 28 .
The law will be added directly to the Basic Law , Hong Kong ’ s mini-constitution , completely bypassing Hong Kong ’ s legislature .
Hong Kongers have been protesting fiercely since last June over a proposed extradition law that would allow anybody in Hong Kong to be extradited to mainland China .
This national security law goes beyond the proposed anti-extradition law , which was subsequently withdrawn in October .
Clamping down on dissent in Hong Kong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shatter the “ one country , two systems ” model that the territory is governed under suggests Beijing does not care about reducing tensions with the protest movement in Hong Kong or international opinion .
Beijing is willing to sacrifice Hong Kong ’ s financial hub status for the sake of political domination .
These days , China doesn ’ t worry about international opinion .
In fact , it seems almost willing to defy it .
In recent months , Chinese diplomats have engaged in spats on social media and in public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since been referred to as “ wolf warrior ” diplomacy , named after two nationalistic Chinese action movies .
Since 2019 , dozens of Chinese ambassadors , embassies , and consulates have opened accounts on Twitter and Facebook and have been very active in issuing insults , warnings , and threats .
Two of the most notorious wolf warriors are Foreign Ministry spokespeople Zhao Lijian and Hua Chunying .
Zhao called former U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice a “ disgrace ” and tried to spread a ludicrous conspiracy theory that the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personnel .
China openly threatened Australia after it called for an independent inquiry into the coronavirus outbreak and went after the Netherlands for changing the name of its Taiwan representative office to signify warming ties .
New Zealand and France have also come into China ’ s verbal firing line , the former for supporting Taiwan ’ s participation in the World Health Assembly and the latter for agreeing to sell naval system upgrades to Taiwan .
China then further escalated its threats to Australia with the imposition of tariffs on barley imports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meat producers .
This has led to a growing debate in Australia on its trade dependency on China .
Chinese belligerence hasn ’ t been limited to just verbal threats or tariffs .
There are now mounting tensions with India after Chinese troops recently faced off against their Indian counterparts in multiple locations along their shared border .
In addition to physical conflicts that involved fistfights and sticks in May , Chinese helicopters also flew near Indian airspace several times in April .
As a result , both sides are stepping up their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ physical clashes .
China has laid claim to parts of Indian territory along their shared border—or Line of Control—which has never been demarcated .
Over the last few months , Chinese coast guard and fishing ships have been involved in incidents with Vietnamese , Japanese , and Taiwanese ships .
In April , China also sent a survey vessel into Malaysian waters for a month and designated part of the South China Sea it controls as two administrative districts , thus officially signaling that it was Chinese territory .
China has continued to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including a first-ever night flight , and sailed an aircraft carrier group around the island .
For China , ending one country , two systems in Hong Kong and cracking down on the protest movement are extensions of its increased repressiveness against its own people , from human rights activists and lawyers to the Uighur minority in Xinjiang .
China cited terrorism and vocational education in justifying the imprisonment of at least a million Uighurs in detention camps since 2018 .
In reality , the camps enforce indoctrination by compelling them to give @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The authorities ’ iron grip on the media and internet , plus its intensive propaganda , has intensified even during the coronavirus pandemic by promoting China ’ s supposedly successful response and contrasting it with the West ’ s flailing performance .
The Chinese government has also cultivated a personality cult for President Xi Jinping while bringing back Mao Zedong-era slogans and messages .
Xi has specifically made “ rejuvenating the nation ” and restoring Chinese greatness his core goals .
He has made clear that the party will remain the sole @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at home while asserting itself overseas .
Meanwhile , Chinese state media has presented a heavily distorted picture of the Hong Kong protests by playing up images of confrontations and vandalism while refusing to show the peaceful mass marches and report on the actual grievances of the protesters .
The authorities have constantly squeezed the space available for expression of different opinions , including even shutting down a popular joke-sharing app .
A rare window of expression sprung up in February after Li Wenliang , a whistleblower doctor in Wuhan who had been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus , leading to an outpouring of grief and criticism from netizens .
Soon after , this window was quickly shut while the authorities co-opted the doctor ’ s death by branding him a martyr—stripping his heroism of any political edge by giving him the state ’ s imprimatur and denouncing a few local officials in Wuhan for silencing him .
In March , when another doctor , Ai Fen , gave an interview criticizing the official withholding of data , she went missing , presumably detained , and has not been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cryptic video on her Weibo account .
While dissenting and moderate voices have been silenced , this has given rise to surging nationalism on social media .
Earlier this year , the Wuhan writer Wang Fang wrote a diary during the city ’ s lockdown when it was being ravaged by the coronavirus .
After initially attracting a following , Wang suddenly became the target of vicious cyberattacks after she inked a deal to have her diary translated into English , which it was , and the translation was released in May .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ bad and undermining the supposed success of the country ’ s coronavirus efforts .
The wolf warrior attitude isn ’ t just limited to Chinese diplomats .
It ’ s also apparent among social media commentators who promote the idea of war with Taiwan and the United States or claims that neighboring countries wish to become part of China .
The latter provoked a diplomatic spat with Kazakhstan after a Chinese article claimed the Central Asian country was historically part of China and would welcome becoming one again .
The idea of invading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it , has also been mooted by Chinese commentators on social media , such as the university professor Tian Feilong , though an ex-general publicly spoke up against the idea , urging that China focus on domestic development first .
Taiwan ’ s international profile has risen this year due to its relative success in containing the coronavirus on its shores and its ensuing donations of face masks and other protective equipment to countries around the world .
This has brought the issue of Taiwan ’ s international isolation to the fore , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Health Organization .
While China has continued to issue warnings and threats , there is no doubt that Taiwan ’ s relations with the United States and other countries have strengthened .
The solidifying of a Taiwanese identity , as well as President Tsai Ing-wen ’ s winning a second term in January in the face of pro-China domestic propaganda promoting her opponent , has gone hand in hand with a realization , as exemplified by the situation in Hong Kong , that any sort of unification with China , as Beijing insists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ question .
State media in China stokes anti-Western sentiment among the public through biased narratives while urging civil servants to beware of dating foreign “ spies.
” This has contributed to a noticeable xenophobia , amplified by the coronavirus .
In April , Africans in Guangzhou were singled out for coronavirus tests and quarantine , and as a result , many were evicted from their apartments and banned from entering hospitals and restaurants—sparking a diplomatic spat with various African countries .
The wolf warrior diplomats ’ aggressive verbal attacks on foreign countries and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us-versus-the-world attitude among the Chinese public .
As some have noted , these messages , while not gaining China any international friends , are meant for the Chinese public .
The fact that China is choosing this time to launch verbal and military provocations against so many parties at the same time is surprising , but there are several factors at play .
First , there are Xi ’ s constant messages of rejuvenating China , which strongly assume that China is becoming a dominant power that can assert itself against other countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , given that the United States , the European Union , and other major countries are seemingly incapacitated by the coronavirus and are perceived to be weaker and unable to push back against Chinese aggression .
Taiwan would be a tantalizing target as the United States , its main protector , would not be able to offer as much help as under normal circumstances .
However , China is experiencing worsening economic crisis and decreased international standing given the ongoing U.S.-China trade war and the coronavirus pandemic .
This is also fueled by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries over China ’ s coronavirus cover-up , its ensuing propaganda efforts , and the many faulty personal protective equipment shipments from Chinese companies .
China ’ s international standing in recent times has never been more threatened or under scrutiny , especially with the continuing turbulence in Hong Kong .
Despite the immense consequences of Beijing ’ s sudden move to force a national security law on Hong Kong , things won ’ t stop there .
There is a strong possibility that China ’ s nationalism will continue escalating and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s bad news for the world—especially China ’ s other neighbors .

The moment that many people have dreaded may have finally come for Hong Kong after Beijing announced a bill on May 21 to “safeguard national security” in the city-state. When this law comes into effect, it will effectively end Hong Kong’s autonomy under the “one country, two systems” arrangement that has been in place since 1997.
The moment that many people have dreaded may have finally come for Hong Kong after Beijing announced a bill on May 21 to “safeguard national security” in the city-state. When this law comes into effect, it will effectively end Hong Kong’s autonomy under the “one country, two systems” arrangement that has been in place since 1997.
But it isn’t just about Hong Kong. The bold move is merely the latest example of belligerent nationalistic behavior from China directed at both domestic and international targets this year. It follows several years of increasingly nationalistic messages emanating from the top of the Chinese government.
The national security law would ban secession, terrorism, and “foreign interference,” thus criminalizing a host of activities critical of the authorities such as protests or social media posts. In effect, Hong Kong would become just like mainland China, where any criticism or protest against the government and the Chinese Communist Party is forbidden.
The bill was announced the day before China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) opened for its annual meetings. The NPC delegates then voted to approve the bill at the end of the meetings on May 28. The law will be added directly to the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, completely bypassing Hong Kong’s legislature.
Hong Kongers have been protesting fiercely since last June over a proposed extradition law that would allow anybody in Hong Kong to be extradited to mainland China. This national security law goes beyond the proposed anti-extradition law, which was subsequently withdrawn in October.
Clamping down on dissent in Hong Kong by imposing a security law that would shatter the “one country, two systems” model that the territory is governed under suggests Beijing does not care about reducing tensions with the protest movement in Hong Kong or international opinion. Beijing is willing to sacrifice Hong Kong’s financial hub status for the sake of political domination.
These days, China doesn’t worry about international opinion. In fact, it seems almost willing to defy it. In recent months, Chinese diplomats have engaged in spats on social media and in public with other countries, actions that have since been referred to as “wolf warrior” diplomacy, named after two nationalistic Chinese action movies.
Since 2019, dozens of Chinese ambassadors, embassies, and consulates have opened accounts on Twitter and Facebook and have been very active in issuing insults, warnings, and threats. Two of the most notorious wolf warriors are Foreign Ministry spokespeople Zhao Lijian and Hua Chunying. Zhao called former U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice a “disgrace” and tried to spread a ludicrous conspiracy theory that the coronavirus was brought to China by U.S. military personnel.
China openly threatened Australia after it called for an independent inquiry into the coronavirus outbreak and went after the Netherlands for changing the name of its Taiwan representative office to signify warming ties. New Zealand and France have also come into China’s verbal firing line, the former for supporting Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly and the latter for agreeing to sell naval system upgrades to Taiwan. China then further escalated its threats to Australia with the imposition of tariffs on barley imports as well as bans on several Australian meat producers. This has led to a growing debate in Australia on its trade dependency on China.
Chinese belligerence hasn’t been limited to just verbal threats or tariffs.
There are now mounting tensions with India after Chinese troops recently faced off against their Indian counterparts in multiple locations along their shared border. In addition to physical conflicts that involved fistfights and sticks in May, Chinese helicopters also flew near Indian airspace several times in April. As a result, both sides are stepping up their troop presence near the site of their physical clashes. China has laid claim to parts of Indian territory along their shared border—or Line of Control—which has never been demarcated.
Over the last few months, Chinese coast guard and fishing ships have been involved in incidents with Vietnamese, Japanese, and Taiwanese ships. In April, China also sent a survey vessel into Malaysian waters for a month and designated part of the South China Sea it controls as two administrative districts, thus officially signaling that it was Chinese territory. China has continued to launch provocative military exercises near Taiwan, including a first-ever night flight, and sailed an aircraft carrier group around the island.
For China, ending one country, two systems in Hong Kong and cracking down on the protest movement are extensions of its increased repressiveness against its own people, from human rights activists and lawyers to the Uighur minority in Xinjiang.
China cited terrorism and vocational education in justifying the imprisonment of at least a million Uighurs in detention camps since 2018. In reality, the camps enforce indoctrination by compelling them to give up their Muslim beliefs and Uighur customs.
The authorities’ iron grip on the media and internet, plus its intensive propaganda, has intensified even during the coronavirus pandemic by promoting China’s supposedly successful response and contrasting it with the West’s flailing performance. The Chinese government has also cultivated a personality cult for President Xi Jinping while bringing back Mao Zedong-era slogans and messages.
Xi has specifically made “rejuvenating the nation” and restoring Chinese greatness his core goals. He has made clear that the party will remain the sole arbiter in the political and economic spheres at home while asserting itself overseas.
Meanwhile, Chinese state media has presented a heavily distorted picture of the Hong Kong protests by playing up images of confrontations and vandalism while refusing to show the peaceful mass marches and report on the actual grievances of the protesters.
The authorities have constantly squeezed the space available for expression of different opinions, including even shutting down a popular joke-sharing app. A rare window of expression sprung up in February after Li Wenliang, a whistleblower doctor in Wuhan who had been detained in late December, died from the coronavirus, leading to an outpouring of grief and criticism from netizens. Soon after, this window was quickly shut while the authorities co-opted the doctor’s death by branding him a martyr—stripping his heroism of any political edge by giving him the state’s imprimatur and denouncing a few local officials in Wuhan for silencing him. In March, when another doctor, Ai Fen, gave an interview criticizing the official withholding of data, she went missing, presumably detained, and has not been heard from since, other than a cryptic video on her Weibo account.
While dissenting and moderate voices have been silenced, this has given rise to surging nationalism on social media.
Earlier this year, the Wuhan writer Wang Fang wrote a diary during the city’s lockdown when it was being ravaged by the coronavirus. After initially attracting a following, Wang suddenly became the target of vicious cyberattacks after she inked a deal to have her diary translated into English, which it was, and the translation was released in May. She was accused of making China look bad and undermining the supposed success of the country’s coronavirus efforts.
The wolf warrior attitude isn’t just limited to Chinese diplomats. It’s also apparent among social media commentators who promote the idea of war with Taiwan and the United States or claims that neighboring countries wish to become part of China. The latter provoked a diplomatic spat with Kazakhstan after a Chinese article claimed the Central Asian country was historically part of China and would welcome becoming one again.
The idea of invading Taiwan, which China claims belongs to it, has also been mooted by Chinese commentators on social media, such as the university professor Tian Feilong, though an ex-general publicly spoke up against the idea, urging that China focus on domestic development first.
Taiwan’s international profile has risen this year due to its relative success in containing the coronavirus on its shores and its ensuing donations of face masks and other protective equipment to countries around the world. This has brought the issue of Taiwan’s international isolation to the fore, especially its continued exclusion by the World Health Organization. While China has continued to issue warnings and threats, there is no doubt that Taiwan’s relations with the United States and other countries have strengthened. The solidifying of a Taiwanese identity, as well as President Tsai Ing-wen’s winning a second term in January in the face of pro-China domestic propaganda promoting her opponent, has gone hand in hand with a realization, as exemplified by the situation in Hong Kong, that any sort of unification with China, as Beijing insists on, is completely out of the question.
State media in China stokes anti-Western sentiment among the public through biased narratives while urging civil servants to beware of dating foreign “spies.” This has contributed to a noticeable xenophobia, amplified by the coronavirus. In April, Africans in Guangzhou were singled out for coronavirus tests and quarantine, and as a result, many were evicted from their apartments and banned from entering hospitals and restaurants—sparking a diplomatic spat with various African countries.
The wolf warrior diplomats’ aggressive verbal attacks on foreign countries and officials seem calculated to ingrain a defiant us-versus-the-world attitude among the Chinese public. As some have noted, these messages, while not gaining China any international friends, are meant for the Chinese public.
The fact that China is choosing this time to launch verbal and military provocations against so many parties at the same time is surprising, but there are several factors at play.
First, there are Xi’s constant messages of rejuvenating China, which strongly assume that China is becoming a dominant power that can assert itself against other countries.
Add to this overconfidence and opportunism, given that the United States, the European Union, and other major countries are seemingly incapacitated by the coronavirus and are perceived to be weaker and unable to push back against Chinese aggression. Taiwan would be a tantalizing target as the United States, its main protector, would not be able to offer as much help as under normal circumstances.
However, China is experiencing worsening economic crisis and decreased international standing given the ongoing U.S.-China trade war and the coronavirus pandemic. This is also fueled by strong criticism from the United States and other countries over China’s coronavirus cover-up, its ensuing propaganda efforts, and the many faulty personal protective equipment shipments from Chinese companies. China’s international standing in recent times has never been more threatened or under scrutiny, especially with the continuing turbulence in Hong Kong.
Despite the immense consequences of Beijing’s sudden move to force a national security law on Hong Kong, things won’t stop there. There is a strong possibility that China’s nationalism will continue escalating and will soon find other targets. That’s bad news for the world—especially China’s other neighbors.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--It’s Not Time to End the Uzbek Cotton Boycott Yet

It ’ s Not Time to End the Uzbek Cotton Boycott Yet In their March 28 Foreign Policy article “ The Boycott on Uzbek Cotton Needs to End , ” Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Oybek Shaykhov argued that the international boycott of Uzbek cotton helped create real progress on the issue of forced labor in the industry but that it must now come to an end in order to further modernize and privatize the wider economy .
We argue that ending the boycott must be matched with more ironclad commitments for responsible sourcing and investment that respect labor and human rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American and European companies , including companies we represent through the American Apparel & Footwear Association and the U.S .
Fashion Industry Association , have supported a pledge not to knowingly source cotton from Uzbekistan until forced labor practices have been eliminated .
The boycott is spearheaded by the Cotton Campaign , a multistakeholder coalition that also includes international labor and human rights advocates , trade unions , and responsible investors who are all working toward ending forced labor in the Uzbek cotton industry .
Now , as Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and activists are determining how to hold him accountable and permanently end forced labor in the Uzbek cotton industry .
At its peak , more than 1 million people were forcibly mobilized each year to pick cotton in Uzbekistan , a practice that was directed and regulated by the government , which implemented strict production quotas that help to incentivize forced labor .
The government ’ s unwillingness to acknowledge and address this reality , coupled with the demand for Uzbek cotton on the global market , made it clear to activists and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ necessary and potentially effective tool to raise awareness and force reform.Ending the boycott must be matched with more ironclad commitments for responsible sourcing .
Since Mirziyoyev began rolling out reforms in late 2017 , significant progress has been made toward ending systemic forced labor and advancing structural reforms in cotton production .
But two major challenges remain .
First , reforms must fully complete the process of eliminating the deep legacy of forced labor , which began in the early Stalinist period .
As Batmanghelidj and Shaykhov note , despite the reforms , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least 102,000 people were still forced to pick cotton in the late 2019 harvest .
This high number , though substantially reduced from the number just several years ago , reflects the scale of the task of dismantling such an entrenched system of command-and-control production and replacing it with voluntary labor and private farmers .
Although this reduction in forced labor does represent real progress , it persists at an unacceptable level for global brands that have zero tolerance for forced labor in their supply chains .
The end of the cotton production @ @ @ @ @ @ @ announced by the government in March , has the potential to accelerate the elimination of forced labor by removing their primary structural driver , as long as equivalent progress is made in developing fair recruitment systems to ensure a voluntary labor supply .
Second , Uzbekistan must catch up with the last two decades of international standards and expectations that compel global apparel brands to demonstrate responsible sourcing from fields to factories .
Even as reform moves forward , Uzbekistan still lags behind several internationally accepted best practices and must work with brands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ zero tolerance for forced labor .
Apparel brands want to source in countries with basic civic freedoms—freedom of association , assembly , and expression—and space for civil society voices and advocates that can hold both governments and private sector actors accountable .
The Uzbek government must remove impediments to the registration of independent labor and human rights nongovernmental organizations and bring its NGO code in line with its obligation to protect the rights of association , expression , and assembly .
Movement on this front will reinforce the transparency and accountability that will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advance structural reforms that protect human rights at the same time .
Batmanghelidj and Shaykhov write that “ a new , cooperative framework to protect labor rights in Uzbekistan ’ s cotton industry ” is necessary .
Such an approach is crucial , and that is why the Cotton Campaign , in consultation with its partners , is developing such a framework for responsible sourcing agreements .
This positive outcome can only be achieved while guaranteeing the protections of workers and farmers .
Responsible sourcing agreements would ensure adherence to international labor rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by local civil society ; reporting by suppliers on their due diligence efforts to prevent and mitigate any remaining forced labor ; providing grievance and remedy mechanisms to address abuses affecting workers and farmers ; and tracking responsibly harvested cotton through brands ’ supply chains .
These agreements would be enforced through the purchasing power of participating brands , which would commit to curtailing orders from suppliers that violate agreement terms and fail to take remedial actions .
The establishment and implementation of such agreements must in turn be complemented by transparent and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government at the national , regional , and local levels to protect the rights of workers and to bring a definitive end to forced labor .
If such commitments and assurances can be made and implemented , brands would gain the confidence to source cotton products from Uzbekistan responsibly .
Moving forward along these lines will encourage and facilitate responsible sourcing of Uzbek cotton and investment in its apparel production industry .
Only when apparel brands see progress within this framework—and concurrently by the Uzbek government toward eliminating forced labor altogether—can the international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end .
The brands and activists that spearheaded the boycott could then turn their attention to an even wider commitment to responsible sourcing and investment that could have an impact beyond the cotton sector—contributing to the economic and social development of a modern , reforming Uzbekistan .
But this positive outcome can only be achieved while guaranteeing the protections of workers and farmers to ensure that Uzbekistan ’ s growth is safe , responsible , and sustainable .

In their March 28 Foreign Policy article “The Boycott on Uzbek Cotton Needs to End,” Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Oybek Shaykhov argued that the international boycott of Uzbek cotton helped create real progress on the issue of forced labor in the industry but that it must now come to an end in order to further modernize and privatize the wider economy. We argue that ending the boycott must be matched with more ironclad commitments for responsible sourcing and investment that respect labor and human rights in the country.
In their March 28 Foreign Policy article “The Boycott on Uzbek Cotton Needs to End,” Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Oybek Shaykhov argued that the international boycott of Uzbek cotton helped create real progress on the issue of forced labor in the industry but that it must now come to an end in order to further modernize and privatize the wider economy. We argue that ending the boycott must be matched with more ironclad commitments for responsible sourcing and investment that respect labor and human rights in the country.
Over 300 North American and European companies, including companies we represent through the American Apparel & Footwear Association and the U.S. Fashion Industry Association, have supported a pledge not to knowingly source cotton from Uzbekistan until forced labor practices have been eliminated. The boycott is spearheaded by the Cotton Campaign, a multistakeholder coalition that also includes international labor and human rights advocates, trade unions, and responsible investors who are all working toward ending forced labor in the Uzbek cotton industry. Now, as Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is beginning to roll out reforms, leaders and activists are determining how to hold him accountable and permanently end forced labor in the Uzbek cotton industry.
At its peak, more than 1 million people were forcibly mobilized each year to pick cotton in Uzbekistan, a practice that was directed and regulated by the government, which implemented strict production quotas that help to incentivize forced labor. The government’s unwillingness to acknowledge and address this reality, coupled with the demand for Uzbek cotton on the global market, made it clear to activists and brands alike that a boycott was a necessary and potentially effective tool to raise awareness and force reform.Ending the boycott must be matched with more ironclad commitments for responsible sourcing.
Since Mirziyoyev began rolling out reforms in late 2017, significant progress has been made toward ending systemic forced labor and advancing structural reforms in cotton production. But two major challenges remain.
First, reforms must fully complete the process of eliminating the deep legacy of forced labor, which began in the early Stalinist period. As Batmanghelidj and Shaykhov note, despite the reforms, the International Labour Organization estimates that at least 102,000 people were still forced to pick cotton in the late 2019 harvest. This high number, though substantially reduced from the number just several years ago, reflects the scale of the task of dismantling such an entrenched system of command-and-control production and replacing it with voluntary labor and private farmers.
Although this reduction in forced labor does represent real progress, it persists at an unacceptable level for global brands that have zero tolerance for forced labor in their supply chains. The end of the cotton production quotas and enforcement of their delivery, announced by the government in March, has the potential to accelerate the elimination of forced labor by removing their primary structural driver, as long as equivalent progress is made in developing fair recruitment systems to ensure a voluntary labor supply.
Second, Uzbekistan must catch up with the last two decades of international standards and expectations that compel global apparel brands to demonstrate responsible sourcing from fields to factories. Even as reform moves forward, Uzbekistan still lags behind several internationally accepted best practices and must work with brands committed to meeting these requirements, including zero tolerance for forced labor.
Apparel brands want to source in countries with basic civic freedoms—freedom of association, assembly, and expression—and space for civil society voices and advocates that can hold both governments and private sector actors accountable. The Uzbek government must remove impediments to the registration of independent labor and human rights nongovernmental organizations and bring its NGO code in line with its obligation to protect the rights of association, expression, and assembly. Movement on this front will reinforce the transparency and accountability that will boost efforts to eliminate forced labor and advance structural reforms that protect human rights at the same time.
Batmanghelidj and Shaykhov write that “a new, cooperative framework to protect labor rights in Uzbekistan’s cotton industry” is necessary. Such an approach is crucial, and that is why the Cotton Campaign, in consultation with its partners, is developing such a framework for responsible sourcing agreements. This positive outcome can only be achieved while guaranteeing the protections of workers and farmers.
Responsible sourcing agreements would ensure adherence to international labor rights standards. Agreements would require independent monitoring by local civil society; reporting by suppliers on their due diligence efforts to prevent and mitigate any remaining forced labor; providing grievance and remedy mechanisms to address abuses affecting workers and farmers; and tracking responsibly harvested cotton through brands’ supply chains. These agreements would be enforced through the purchasing power of participating brands, which would commit to curtailing orders from suppliers that violate agreement terms and fail to take remedial actions.
The establishment and implementation of such agreements must in turn be complemented by transparent and accountable commitments and assurances by the Uzbek government at the national, regional, and local levels to protect the rights of workers and to bring a definitive end to forced labor. If such commitments and assurances can be made and implemented, brands would gain the confidence to source cotton products from Uzbekistan responsibly.
Moving forward along these lines will encourage and facilitate responsible sourcing of Uzbek cotton and investment in its apparel production industry. Only when apparel brands see progress within this framework—and concurrently by the Uzbek government toward eliminating forced labor altogether—can the international boycott of Uzbek cotton come to an end.
The brands and activists that spearheaded the boycott could then turn their attention to an even wider commitment to responsible sourcing and investment that could have an impact beyond the cotton sector—contributing to the economic and social development of a modern, reforming Uzbekistan. But this positive outcome can only be achieved while guaranteeing the protections of workers and farmers to ensure that Uzbekistan’s growth is safe, responsible, and sustainable.