foreignpolicy--2020-07-22--Russia’s Shadowy Mercenaries Offer Humanitarian Aid to Clean Image

The so-called Wagner Group , a quasi-private Russian military security contractor , has long been deft at finding opportunity amid chaos .
Since the group first appeared on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine in 2014 , it has become the Swiss Army knife of Russia ’ s overseas interference efforts and has been linked to activities including election meddling , gold mining , and front-line combat .
Now , amid the coronavirus pandemic , Wagner affiliates have found a new way to burnish their tarnished reputations : delivering coronavirus-related aid .
Much as other violent groups have done before them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to fragile states offers the opportunity for a quick publicity stunt in a bid to normalize their presence .
In April , a Wagner-linked Russian security contractor , Evro Polis , delivered 50 ventilators , 10,000 coronavirus test kits , and 2,000 items of protective clothing to Syria , according to reports in Syrian state media and a statement on the website of the Russian Embassy in Damascus .
Video footage shows the delivery was labeled “ from Russia with lots of love.
” “ We are a socially oriented company .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we will help , ” said company representative Ildar Zaripov at a press conference about the aid that was also attended by the Russian ambassador to Syria , Alexander Yefimov .
A U.S. defense official told Foreign Policy that the Russian government had provided coronavirus aid—including test kits , personnel , and medical supplies—to Algeria , the Democratic Republic of the Congo , Egypt , and Guinea .
In the early days of the pandemic , Russia delivered coronavirus aid to several countries including the United States in what one expert said at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the Russians.
” In April , the Sudan News Agency reported that Wagner-connected company Meroe Gold was planning to ship personal protective equipment , medicine , and other equipment to the country as part of its corporate social responsibility program , according to a statement by the company ’ s general manager , Mikhail Potepkin .
It ’ s unclear whether the aid was actually delivered , said Jack Margolin , a program director with the nonprofit Center for Advanced Defense Studies , which first identified the news reports on the aid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the promise of humanitarian aid , Wagner-connected entities have sought to position themselves as invested in the advancement of the countries they operate in , Margolin said .
“ They ’ re trying to represent themselves as a partner that is committed to African development that isn ’ t going to come with , sort of , American imperialism or the strings attached that come with Chinese aid , ” he said .
If Wagner affiliates are trying to burnish their image , that ’ s because it ’ s heavily tarnished .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Evro Polis ’ s usual mercenary activity in Syria , where a group of its employees was accused of torturing and beheading a Syrian civilian with impunity in 2017 .
In February 2018 , U.S. forces clashed with Russian mercenary forces in Syria ’ s Deir Ezzor province in the biggest military standoff between the two countries since the Cold War .
Between 200 and 300 Russian mercenaries were killed , many of whom are believed to have been working for Evro Polis .
Like a lot of entities associated with Wagner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and business activities and is reported to have signed a deal with Syria ’ s state-owned General Petroleum Corp. that would give the group 25 percent of the profits of the oil and gas fields it was able to liberate and secure from the Islamic State .
“ Private military contractors and mercenaries from Russia incite violence in the name of furthering Bashar Al Assad ’ s ill-fated quest for a military victory that preserves his rule and ignores the aspirations of the Syrian people , ” a U.S. State Department spokesperson said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Their presence fuels instability , exacerbates the humanitarian crisis , and prolongs the suffering of the Syrian people.
” In Libya , the Wagner Group ’ s stepped-up activities are increasingly concerning to U.S. defense officials .
In a quarterly report to Congress issued last week , the Defense Department ’ s inspector general for counterterrorism operations in the North Africa said there were between 800 and 2,500 Wagner mercenaries in Libya who were fighting in support of renegade Gen. Khalifa Haftar , who ended his assault on the capital of Tripoli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Africom , has been increasingly candid about the Wagner Group ’ s presence in Libya and in a statement last week accused Russian mercenaries of complicating cease-fire efforts in Libya by laying landmines and improvised explosive devices around Tripoli .
The command also released imagery of Russian aircraft being flown in Libya to support the work of private military companies that are described as being “ sponsored by the Russian government.
” “ Russia ’ s sustained involvement in Libya increases the violence and delays a political solution , ” U.S. Marine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Africom ’ s director of operations , said in a statement issued alongside the photos .
And Libya ’ s just the latest beachhead for the mercenary group , Africom says .
“ Russia employs state-sponsored Private Military Contractors ( PMCs ) in at least 16 African countries to obfuscate Moscow ’ s direct role and to afford plausible deniability , ” said Col. Christopher P. Karns , an Africom spokesperson .
“ Even Russia ’ s use of state-sponsored PMCs for counterterrorism support to our African partners is often tied to contracts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which can undermine African countries ’ capacity for economic development , ” he said .
For all of the Wagner Group ’ s notoriety , the irony is that there ’ s no evidence that a single organization known as the Wagner Group exists .
Rather , it is an opaque grouping of companies that are identified by their overlapping ownership structures and their ties to the Russian state and especially Yevgeny Prigozhin , a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin .
“ It ’ s not a PMC because all the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s very tightly connected to Russian military intelligence and the GRU [ Russia ’ s military intelligence agency ] , ” said Kimberly Marten , a professor of political science at Barnard College .
“ As far as I know , it ’ s unique in the world.
” Prigozhin is under U.S. sanctions for his role in U.S. election interference bankrolling the Internet Research Agency , a so-called Russian troll factory .
Evro Polis was sanctioned by the United States in 2018 due to Prigozhin ’ s control of the firm .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Sudan , Meroe Gold , along with its parent company , M Invest , was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury on July 15 for its role in formulating plans to rout pro-democracy demonstrators who succeeded in overthrowing former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 .
According to a statement by the Treasury Department , M Invest drew up plans for a social media disinformation campaign and advocated for “ the staging of public executions ” to distract the protesters .
“ Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his network are exploiting Sudan ’ s natural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ influence around the globe , ” U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement issued at the time .
Now , U.S. officials are pushing their European counterparts to match that kind of blacklisting to limit the Wagner Group ’ s ability to sow chaos in Libya , where the United States has been eyeing Russia ’ s increased presence along NATO ’ s southern flank with caution .
Last week , David Schenker , the State Department ’ s assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs , called out European countries for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wagner and countries violating the U.N. embargo on sending arms to Libya .
“ There is a lot more that they [ Europe ] could do .
They could , for example , designate the Wagner Group , ” he said .
“ If they aren ’ t going to take out a more robust role , then this thing is going to drag on .
”

The so-called Wagner Group, a quasi-private Russian military security contractor, has long been deft at finding opportunity amid chaos. Since the group first appeared on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine in 2014, it has become the Swiss Army knife of Russia’s overseas interference efforts and has been linked to activities including election meddling, gold mining, and front-line combat.
The so-called Wagner Group, a quasi-private Russian military security contractor, has long been deft at finding opportunity amid chaos. Since the group first appeared on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine in 2014, it has become the Swiss Army knife of Russia’s overseas interference efforts and has been linked to activities including election meddling, gold mining, and front-line combat.
Now, amid the coronavirus pandemic, Wagner affiliates have found a new way to burnish their tarnished reputations: delivering coronavirus-related aid. Much as other violent groups have done before them, including Hezbollah, providing humanitarian aid to fragile states offers the opportunity for a quick publicity stunt in a bid to normalize their presence.
In April, a Wagner-linked Russian security contractor, Evro Polis, delivered 50 ventilators, 10,000 coronavirus test kits, and 2,000 items of protective clothing to Syria, according to reports in Syrian state media and a statement on the website of the Russian Embassy in Damascus. Video footage shows the delivery was labeled “from Russia with lots of love.”
“We are a socially oriented company. We helped, we are helping, and we will help,” said company representative Ildar Zaripov at a press conference about the aid that was also attended by the Russian ambassador to Syria, Alexander Yefimov.
Russian medical gear isn’t just flowing into Syria.
A U.S. defense official told Foreign Policy that the Russian government had provided coronavirus aid—including test kits, personnel, and medical supplies—to Algeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, and Guinea. In the early days of the pandemic, Russia delivered coronavirus aid to several countries including the United States in what one expert said at the time was a “PR coup for the Russians.”
In April, the Sudan News Agency reported that Wagner-connected company Meroe Gold was planning to ship personal protective equipment, medicine, and other equipment to the country as part of its corporate social responsibility program, according to a statement by the company’s general manager, Mikhail Potepkin. It’s unclear whether the aid was actually delivered, said Jack Margolin, a program director with the nonprofit Center for Advanced Defense Studies, which first identified the news reports on the aid.
In infusing their mercenary work with the promise of humanitarian aid, Wagner-connected entities have sought to position themselves as invested in the advancement of the countries they operate in, Margolin said.
“They’re trying to represent themselves as a partner that is committed to African development that isn’t going to come with, sort of, American imperialism or the strings attached that come with Chinese aid,” he said.
If Wagner affiliates are trying to burnish their image, that’s because it’s heavily tarnished.
The aid delivery was a sharp departure from Evro Polis’s usual mercenary activity in Syria, where a group of its employees was accused of torturing and beheading a Syrian civilian with impunity in 2017. In February 2018, U.S. forces clashed with Russian mercenary forces in Syria’s Deir Ezzor province in the biggest military standoff between the two countries since the Cold War. Between 200 and 300 Russian mercenaries were killed, many of whom are believed to have been working for Evro Polis.
Like a lot of entities associated with Wagner, Evro Polis seamlessly blends its military and business activities and is reported to have signed a deal with Syria’s state-owned General Petroleum Corp. that would give the group 25 percent of the profits of the oil and gas fields it was able to liberate and secure from the Islamic State.
“Private military contractors and mercenaries from Russia incite violence in the name of furthering Bashar Al Assad’s ill-fated quest for a military victory that preserves his rule and ignores the aspirations of the Syrian people,” a U.S. State Department spokesperson said in a statement to Foreign Policy. “Their presence fuels instability, exacerbates the humanitarian crisis, and prolongs the suffering of the Syrian people.”
In Libya, the Wagner Group’s stepped-up activities are increasingly concerning to U.S. defense officials. In a quarterly report to Congress issued last week, the Defense Department’s inspector general for counterterrorism operations in the North Africa said there were between 800 and 2,500 Wagner mercenaries in Libya who were fighting in support of renegade Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who ended his assault on the capital of Tripoli last month.
U.S. Africa Command, or Africom, has been increasingly candid about the Wagner Group’s presence in Libya and in a statement last week accused Russian mercenaries of complicating cease-fire efforts in Libya by laying landmines and improvised explosive devices around Tripoli. The command also released imagery of Russian aircraft being flown in Libya to support the work of private military companies that are described as being “sponsored by the Russian government.”
“Russia’s sustained involvement in Libya increases the violence and delays a political solution,” U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Bradford Gering, Africom’s director of operations, said in a statement issued alongside the photos. And Libya’s just the latest beachhead for the mercenary group, Africom says.
“Russia employs state-sponsored Private Military Contractors (PMCs) in at least 16 African countries to obfuscate Moscow’s direct role and to afford plausible deniability,” said Col. Christopher P. Karns, an Africom spokesperson.
“Even Russia’s use of state-sponsored PMCs for counterterrorism support to our African partners is often tied to contracts for Russia to extract raw materials, which can undermine African countries’ capacity for economic development,” he said.
For all of the Wagner Group’s notoriety, the irony is that there’s no evidence that a single organization known as the Wagner Group exists. Rather, it is an opaque grouping of companies that are identified by their overlapping ownership structures and their ties to the Russian state and especially Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
“It’s not a PMC because all the evidence we have is that it’s very tightly connected to Russian military intelligence and the GRU [Russia’s military intelligence agency],” said Kimberly Marten, a professor of political science at Barnard College. “As far as I know, it’s unique in the world.”
Prigozhin is under U.S. sanctions for his role in U.S. election interference bankrolling the Internet Research Agency, a so-called Russian troll factory. Evro Polis was sanctioned by the United States in 2018 due to Prigozhin’s control of the firm.
The group that planned to deliver aid to Sudan, Meroe Gold, along with its parent company, M Invest, was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury on July 15 for its role in formulating plans to rout pro-democracy demonstrators who succeeded in overthrowing former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. According to a statement by the Treasury Department, M Invest drew up plans for a social media disinformation campaign and advocated for “the staging of public executions” to distract the protesters.
“Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his network are exploiting Sudan’s natural resources for personal gain and spreading malign influence around the globe,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement issued at the time.
Now, U.S. officials are pushing their European counterparts to match that kind of blacklisting to limit the Wagner Group’s ability to sow chaos in Libya, where the United States has been eyeing Russia’s increased presence along NATO’s southern flank with caution.
Last week, David Schenker, the State Department’s assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs, called out European countries for not doing enough to push back against Wagner and countries violating the U.N. embargo on sending arms to Libya.
“There is a lot more that they [Europe] could do. They could, for example, designate the Wagner Group,” he said. “If they aren’t going to take out a more robust role, then this thing is going to drag on.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-22--Big-Power Rivalries Hamstring Top U.N. Missions

The U.N. effort to select a leader for an important new mission to promote peace and democracy in Sudan has foundered in the face of internal Sudanese divisions and big-power competition , pitting France against Russia and China and raising questions about the U.N. leader ’ s authority to select his own envoys .
Since early June , U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres has proposed two candidates to lead the newly established United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan , which was created to help Sudan ’ s new government in its fragile political transition to democracy .
Both have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Haysom of South Africa , a veteran U.N. troubleshooter who has led missions in Afghanistan and Somalia , was rejected by Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in early June .
The second , a French diplomat with extensive experience in Africa , Jean-Christophe Belliard , was subsequently blocked by China and Russia , on the grounds that he potentially lacked the support of the Sudanese military .
The dispute sheds light on the secretive , and highly politicized , process of selecting leaders of key U.N. peace missions , requiring closed-door politicking by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Security Council .
In the past three years , a growing proportion of U.N. mission chiefs , called special representatives of the secretary-general , or SRSGs , have been largely imposed by host governments or big powers , bypassing the U.N. ’ s competitive hiring process .
The trend has raised concerns among some U.N. insiders that the selection process may result in top envoys beholden to governments being foisted on the U.N. chief .
It also has fueled concern that U.N. mission chiefs may be unwilling to dole out tough love to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of internal deliberations or declared persona non grata .
The limits of Guterres ’ s authority in selecting his own representatives came into stark relief early in his tenure .
In February 2017 , he announced the appointment of a well-regarded former Palestinian prime minister , Salam Fayyad , to lead the U.N. mission in Libya , only to face protest from the Trump administration .
Nikki Haley , then-U.S. ambassador to the United Nations , argued that Palestinian nationals could not be considered for senior U.N. jobs ; the U.S. pushback effectively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The United States has also prevented the United Nations from appointing a new special representative for Libya .
Ghassan Salame , a former Lebanese culture minister and U.N. troubleshooter , resigned in March after complaining that key member states , including members of the Security Council , were exacerbating the conflict by channeling arms to the warring factions .
The United States has said it wants to split the responsibilities of the U.N. mission into two posts : a senior official responsible for managing the U.N. mission in Libya and a separate senior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s warring factions .
“ Because of the nature of the crisis in Libya , whoever is picked as [ U.N. envoy ] would spend all of his or her time running the humanitarian lifeline out of Tunisia into Tripoli , which leaves no time for high-level negotiations to resolve the conflict , ” one U.S. diplomatic source said .
But the United States has neglected to begin negotiations on a U.N. Security Council resolution required to create a two-headed leadership position .
The deadlock has left an American national , Stephanie @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acting special representative .
Williams is scheduled to leave the mission in early fall , potentially deepening the leadership vacuum .
In April , the United States blocked the appointment of two African candidates , including former Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra , to replace Salame .
Washington has since placed a hold on a second African candidate , Hanna Tetteh , a former Ghanaian foreign minister who serves as the U.N representative to the African Union .
U.N.-based diplomats say the United States has been holding out for a European envoy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ two European officials—former Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt and Bert Koenders , a former Dutch foreign minister who served as a special representative to the secretary-general in Ivory Coast and Mali—according to diplomatic sources .
Both have turned the job down .
Meanwhile , the United States and France have battled over who should lead the international body ’ s mission in Mali as terrorist groups gain strength in West Africa ’ s Sahel region .
Both countries are vying for greater influence over the mission : The Trump administration is pushing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while the French want an envoy from a French-speaking African country .
The permanent five members of the Security Council have long exercised quiet influence over the appointment of U.N. special representatives .
But some critics say Guterres has been too deferential to host countries and big powers in selecting his top envoys , undercutting the U.N. ’ s independence , or recalling them when they clash with the government ’ s leaders .
Guterres replaced two of his special representatives following complaints from host governments .
In 2018 , Guterres reassigned Susan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. mission in Haiti , to a job at U.N. headquarters following protests from the government that she had encouraged an investigation into government corruption .
Haysom , who was appointed special representative to Somalia in September 2018 , was declared persona non grata by the government in January 2019 .
The government was infuriated by a letter , issued under Haysom ’ s name , that encouraged Mogadishu to allow a former terrorist leader to participate in Somali elections .
The letter was written by Haysom ’ s subordinate when the special @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and he was unaware that it had been sent , according to U.N. officials .
Some U.N. officials privately complained that Guterres—who pressed the Somali leadership to reconsider its decision and publicly supported Haysom—did not mount a sufficiently robust defense of either official , sending a “ chilling signal ” to other U.N. field representatives .
“ The message this sends to all SRSGs is if you ever get into trouble with your host government , you are on your own , ” one former U.N. official said .
If a government is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the official said , it is “ always going to choose someone who is going to be its poodle , someone who will never report badly about your country to the Security Council and never criticize you for violations of human rights.
” But others have defended Guterres , noting that he has little power to prevent a country from rejecting the U.N. representative .
They also noted that Guterres recently refused an effort by Cameroon to withdraw the U.N. ’ s top official there , Allegra Maria Del Pilar Baiocchi , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ The secretary-general has always backed his envoys , in many circumstances in very robust dialague with member states , ” a senior U.N. official told Foreign Policy .
“ In the rare situations of absolute refusal by governments to work , cooperate or engage with the envoy , the secretary-general…has to acknowledge a situation that de facto renders the U.N. work and mandates nearly impossible.
” “ The Secretary-General ’ s envoy and representatives in the field operate with his full confidence , ” Stéphane Dujarric , the U.N. chief ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ written statement .
“ He has always ensured that they have the right tools to do their job and his political backing.
” While Guterres is responsible for senior hires he is also required to consult with the Security Council over appointments to positions mandated by the 15-nation council , Guterres added .
“ The core principle is always based on meirt and take into consideration geographic and gender diversity.
” In his first two years in office , Guterres appointed only about half of his top envoys through a competitive selection process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the Department of Peace Operations and obtained by Foreign Policy .
Last year , only six out of 16 special representatives were hired through a competitive selection process—the other 10 were selected by direct appointment .
( That not only underscores the growing influence of member states , but it has also undercut Guterres ’ s plans to promote gender parity .
While four of six heads of mission selected through a competitive hiring process were women , only one of the 10 mission heads appointed directly was a woman . )
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. position also highlights divisions within Sudan ’ s fragile post-revolution government , as well as France ’ s ambitions to expand its diplomatic role in the former British colony .
More than a year after protests ousted longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir , military and civilian leaders are in an uneasy coalition in a transitional government .
The military and civilian factions are at odds over who to back to be the new U.N. envoy , officials and people familiar with the matter said , emblematic of larger fissures that some analysts fear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Tapping a U.N. envoy for Sudan has become more urgent in light of the civilian-led government ’ s precarious position , as it faces headwinds from a weak economy , the coronavirus pandemic sweeping across East Africa , the looming power of the military and security services , and Sudanese people impatiently pushing for faster democratic reforms .
Khartoum-based foreign diplomats say a strong U.N. envoy could play a key role in helping to address these challenges .
“ If you have a good SRSG , they can help stem the influence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the Bashir era .
That ’ s not saying they will be the tipping point , but they can be part of a broader network of people that help push forward the democratic transition , ” one diplomat said .
Guterres initially approached Hamdok , the Sudanese prime minister , to inform him of his decision to appoint Haysom , whom he had appointed senior advisor in April 2019 to support the African Union ’ s mediation efforts in Sudan after Bashir was removed .
But Hamdok said no .
Haysom ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who ran Sudan after Bashir ’ s fall was rocky , as they associated him with the international effort to promote a transfer of power to civilian rule .
But Hamdok welcomed Haysom to Khartoum after he was sworn in as prime minister .
The relationship , according to U.N. insiders , was cordial and productive .
But Hamdok , who was being courted by France , and was hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris in late September , said he would prefer Belliard , the French candidate , for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ convinced that Belliard was in a better position to attract more funding from France , and the European Union .
But the deal was far from done .
Belliard faced opposition from within the Sudanese military , which enlisted the support of Moscow and Beijing to scuttle the appointment .
Russia is said to have raised concern about the need for broader geographical representation at the head of U.N. missions .
Russia also raised concern about a potential conflict of interest : Belliard is married to a Sudanese woman .
But France , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military to relent , has continued to press for Belliard .
Some U.N. diplomats have speculated that Russian opposition to the French candidate was fueled in part by the role France , along with Britain and the United States , played this year in blocking a senior Russian security official from being hired for a top-level job with the U.N .
Truce Supervision Organization , one of the U.N. oldest missions , in the Middle East .
“ This is a tit for tat for the Western powers blocking a Russian general for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a senior Western diplomat said .
Cameron Hudson , a former U.S. diplomat now at the Atlantic Council , said Guterres ’ s decision to select a candidate favored by the Sudanese government may suggest that he wants to put somebody in that would strengthen the power and influence of Sudan ’ s civilian prime minister during a particularly challenging transition .
But he worries the gambit might result in the U.N. developing too cozy a relationship with Hamdok .
“ I don ’ t think that is a successful strategy .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there have also been a number of missteps by the transitional government , ” Hudson said .
“ They need tough love by the international community .
Having an SRSG who is there as a friend of Hamdok ’ s and as a cheerleader is probably not what is needed.
” This story has been updated to include responses from senior U.N. officials .

The U.N. effort to select a leader for an important new mission to promote peace and democracy in Sudan has foundered in the face of internal Sudanese divisions and big-power competition, pitting France against Russia and China and raising questions about the U.N. leader’s authority to select his own envoys.
The U.N. effort to select a leader for an important new mission to promote peace and democracy in Sudan has foundered in the face of internal Sudanese divisions and big-power competition, pitting France against Russia and China and raising questions about the U.N. leader’s authority to select his own envoys.
Since early June, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres has proposed two candidates to lead the newly established United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, which was created to help Sudan’s new government in its fragile political transition to democracy. Both have faced pushback.
The first, Nicholas Haysom of South Africa, a veteran U.N. troubleshooter who has led missions in Afghanistan and Somalia, was passed over by Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in early June. The second, a French diplomat with extensive experience in Africa, Jean-Christophe Belliard, was subsequently blocked by China and Russia, on the grounds that he potentially lacked the support of the Sudanese military.
The dispute sheds light on the secretive, and highly politicized, process of selecting leaders of key U.N. peace missions, requiring closed-door politicking by the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council. In the past three years, a growing proportion of U.N. mission chiefs, called special representatives of the secretary-general, or SRSGs, have been largely imposed by host governments or big powers, bypassing the U.N.’s competitive hiring process.
The trend has raised concerns among some U.N. insiders that the selection process may result in top envoys beholden to governments being foisted on the U.N. chief. It also has fueled concern that U.N. mission chiefs may be unwilling to dole out tough love to governments for fear of being iced out of internal deliberations or declared persona non grata.
The limits of Guterres’s authority in selecting his own representatives came into stark relief early in his tenure. In February 2017, he announced the appointment of a well-regarded former Palestinian prime minister, Salam Fayyad, to lead the U.N. mission in Libya, only to face protest from the Trump administration. Nikki Haley, then-U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, argued that Palestinian nationals could not be considered for senior U.N. jobs; the U.S. pushback effectively killed off Fayyad’s candidacy.
The United States has also prevented the United Nations from appointing a new special representative for Libya. Ghassan Salame, a former Lebanese culture minister and U.N. troubleshooter, resigned in March after complaining that key member states, including members of the Security Council, were exacerbating the conflict by channeling arms to the warring factions.
The United States has said it wants to split the responsibilities of the U.N. mission into two posts: a senior official responsible for managing the U.N. mission in Libya and a separate senior official to oversee peace negotiations between Libya’s warring factions.
“Because of the nature of the crisis in Libya, whoever is picked as [U.N. envoy] would spend all of his or her time running the humanitarian lifeline out of Tunisia into Tripoli, which leaves no time for high-level negotiations to resolve the conflict,” one U.S. diplomatic source said.
But the United States has neglected to begin negotiations on a U.N. Security Council resolution required to create a two-headed leadership position. The deadlock has left an American national, Stephanie Williams, as the mission’s acting special representative. Williams is scheduled to leave the mission in early fall, potentially deepening the leadership vacuum.
In April, the United States blocked the appointment of two African candidates, including former Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra, to replace Salame. Washington has since placed a hold on a second African candidate, Hanna Tetteh, a former Ghanaian foreign minister who serves as the U.N representative to the African Union. U.N.-based diplomats say the United States has been holding out for a European envoy.
The United States has approached at least two European officials—former Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt and Bert Koenders, a former Dutch foreign minister who served as a special representative to the secretary-general in Ivory Coast and Mali—according to diplomatic sources. Both have turned the job down.
Meanwhile, the United States and France have battled over who should lead the international body’s mission in Mali as terrorist groups gain strength in West Africa’s Sahel region. Both countries are vying for greater influence over the mission: The Trump administration is pushing to have an American fill the role, while the French want an envoy from a French-speaking African country.
The permanent five members of the Security Council have long exercised quiet influence over the appointment of U.N. special representatives. But some critics say Guterres has been too deferential to host countries and big powers in selecting his top envoys, undercutting the U.N.’s independence, or recalling them when they clash with the government’s leaders.
Guterres replaced two of his special representatives following complaints from host governments. In 2018, Guterres reassigned Susan Page, an American who headed the U.N. mission in Haiti, to a job at U.N. headquarters following protests from the government that she had encouraged an investigation into government corruption. Haysom, who was appointed special representative to Somalia in September 2018, was declared persona non grata by the government in January 2019.
The government was infuriated by a December 2018 letter, issued under Haysom’s name, to the security minister in Baidoa, Somalia, that raised concerns about the legality of the arrest and detention by U.N.-supported Somali security forces of a former al-Shabab terrorist leader and about 300 mostly child demonstrators. The incident resulted in the deaths of 15 people. The letter, which was signed by Haysom’s subordinate when the special representative was out of the country, also raised concern about a videotaped statement from a senior police commissioner in Baidoa, who issued a warning to demonstrators calling for the impeachment of the Somali president. “If you participate in a demonstration that we are not informed [about] and you support something bad, we will shoot you in the a** and the law allows for them [police] to kill you [demonstrators],” the police commissioner said, according to the letter.
Haysom was unaware the letter had been sent.
Some U.N. officials privately complained that Guterres—who pressed the Somali leadership to reconsider its decision and publicly supported Haysom—did not mount a sufficiently robust defense of either official, sending a “chilling signal” to other U.N. field representatives.
“The message this sends to all SRSGs is if you ever get into trouble with your host government, you are on your own,” one former U.N. official said. If a government is allowed to choose its own U.N. representative, the official said, it is “always going to choose someone who is going to be its poodle, someone who will never report badly about your country to the Security Council and never criticize you for violations of human rights.”
But others have defended Guterres, noting that he has little power to prevent a country from rejecting the U.N. representative. They also noted that Guterres recently refused an effort by Cameroon to withdraw the U.N.’s top official there, Allegra Maria Del Pilar Baiocchi, after Cameroon threatened to expel her.
“The secretary-general has always backed his envoys, in many circumstances in very robust dialogue with member states,” a senior U.N. official told Foreign Policy. “In the rare situations of absolute refusal by governments to work, cooperate, or engage with the envoy, the secretary-general … has to acknowledge a situation that de facto renders the U.N. work and mandates nearly impossible.”
“The Secretary-General’s envoy and representatives in the field operate with his full confidence,” Stéphane Dujarric, the U.N. chief’s top spokesperson, told Foreign Policy in a written statement. “He has always ensured that they have the right tools to do their job and his political backing.”
While Guterres is responsible for senior hires, he is also required to consult with the Security Council over appointments to positions mandated by the 15-nation council, Dujarric added. “The core principle is always based on merit and takes into consideration geographic and gender diversity.”
In his first two years in office, Guterres appointed only about half of his top envoys through a competitive selection process, according to internal U.N. figures produced by the Department of Peace Operations and obtained by Foreign Policy.
Last year, only six out of 16 special representatives were hired through a competitive selection process—the other 10 were selected by direct appointment. (That not only underscores the growing influence of member states, but it has also undercut Guterres’s plans to promote gender parity. While four of six heads of mission selected through a competitive hiring process were women, only one of the 10 mission heads appointed directly was a woman.)
Dujarric countered that under Guterres’s tenure the total percentage of women in senior field positions—including deputy heads of mission, the vast majority of whom are hired from within the U.N. ranks—reached 42 percent in 2019. Dujarric said that was “the highest proportion ever reached. He will continue his efforts towards full gender parity.”
In Khartoum, the wrangling over the U.N. position also highlights divisions within Sudan’s fragile post-revolution government, as well as France’s ambitions to expand its diplomatic role in the former British colony.
More than a year after protests ousted longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir, military and civilian leaders are in an uneasy coalition in a transitional government. The military and civilian factions are at odds over who to back to be the new U.N. envoy, officials and people familiar with the matter said, emblematic of larger fissures that some analysts fear are hampering Sudan’s democratic transition.
Tapping a U.N. envoy for Sudan has become more urgent in light of the civilian-led government’s precarious position, as it faces headwinds from a weak economy, the coronavirus pandemic sweeping across East Africa, the looming power of the military and security services, and Sudanese people impatiently pushing for faster democratic reforms. Khartoum-based foreign diplomats say a strong U.N. envoy could play a key role in helping to address these challenges.
“If you have a good SRSG, they can help stem the influence of the military and other bad actors from the Bashir era. That’s not saying they will be the tipping point, but they can be part of a broader network of people that help push forward the democratic transition,” one diplomat said.
Guterres initially approached Hamdok, the Sudanese prime minister, to inform him of his decision to appoint Haysom, whom he had appointed senior advisor in April 2019 to support the African Union’s mediation efforts in Sudan after Bashir was removed. But Hamdok demurred.
Haysom’s initial relationship with the military leaders who ran Sudan after Bashir’s fall was rocky, as they associated him with the international effort to promote a transfer of power to civilian rule. But Hamdok welcomed Haysom to Khartoum after he was sworn in as prime minister. The relationship, according to U.N. insiders, was cordial and productive.
But Hamdok, who was being courted by France, and was hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris in late September, said he would prefer Belliard, the French candidate, for the job. Diplomats say that Hamdok was convinced that Belliard was in a better position to attract more funding from France, and the European Union.
Guterres assented.
But the deal was far from done.
Belliard faced opposition from within the Sudanese military, which enlisted the support of Moscow and Beijing to scuttle the appointment. Russia is said to have raised concern about the need for broader geographical representation at the head of U.N. missions. Russia also raised concern about a potential conflict of interest: Belliard is married to a Sudanese woman.
But France, which is trying to persuade the Sudanese military to relent, has continued to press for Belliard.
Some U.N. diplomats have speculated that Russian opposition to the French candidate was fueled in part by the role France, along with Britain and the United States, played this year in blocking a senior Russian security official from being hired for a top-level job with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization, one of the U.N. oldest missions, in the Middle East.
“This is a tit for tat for the Western powers blocking a Russian general for a mission earlier this year,” a senior Western diplomat said.
Cameron Hudson, a former U.S. diplomat now at the Atlantic Council, said Guterres’s decision to select a candidate favored by the Sudanese government may suggest that he wants to put somebody in that would strengthen the power and influence of Sudan’s civilian prime minister during a particularly challenging transition. But he worries the gambit might result in the U.N. developing too cozy a relationship with Hamdok.
“I don’t think that is a successful strategy. For all the hope and optimism in Sudan, there have also been a number of missteps by the transitional government,” Hudson said. “They need tough love by the international community. Having an SRSG who is there as a friend of Hamdok’s and as a cheerleader is probably not what is needed.”
This story has been updated to include responses from senior U.N. officials.
Correction, July 23, 2020: An earlier version of this story incorrectly stated that the U.N. sent a letter in December 2018 to the Somali government encouraging Mogadishu to allow a former terrorist leader to participate in Somali elections. The letter, which was obtained by Foreign Policy, expressed concern about the legality of the arrest and detention of a former al-Shabab official and 300 child demonstrators at a protest.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-22--With the Women, Peace, and Security Act, Washington Could Be a Model for the World

With the Women , Peace , and Security Act , Washington Could Be a Model for the World The U.S. Congress will soon turn its attention to assessing how well the executive branch is implementing the Women , Peace and Security Act .
The act , passed in Congress and signed by U.S. President Donald Trump in 2017 after years of civil society advocacy and strong bipartisan support , is the world ’ s most comprehensive law in support of women ’ s leadership in ending wars and building peace .
The law required a whole-of-government strategy on how the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laid out training requirements for all appropriate personnel , and required a progress report outlining common indicators to track progress .
This week , the House Committee on Oversight and Reform ’ s Subcommittee on National Security will hold its first-ever hearing on how well things are going .
In compliance with the law ’ s mandate , four U.S. departments and agencies—State , Defense , Homeland Security , and the U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) —recently released plans for how they would implement the 2019 governmentwide strategy on promoting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevention and resolution .
Among other details , the State Department identified 14 focus countries for its women , peace , and security efforts , including Myanmar , Iraq , and South Sudan ; USAID committed to increase women ’ s roles in countering violent extremism from Indonesia to Northern Nigeria ; and the Defense Department promised to be a model for increasing gender diversity and inclusion .
As former government officials who were both involved in developing and implementing the U.S. government ’ s earlier national action plan on women , peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is clear to us that making progress on this issue offers immense opportunities .
A plethora of research supports women ’ s participation as a proven strategy to improve global security .
Countries are more prosperous and stable as the gender gap closes : For example , the Women , Peace , and Security Index , produced by the Georgetown Institute for Women , Peace and Security , has found a direct correlation between women ’ s equality and societies ’ security and stability .
Studies by the Council on Foreign Relations have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace processes , from Colombia to Northern Ireland to the Philippines , increased the likelihood of warring parties reaching lasting peace agreements , as they organize across cultural and sectarian divides , mediate local cease-fires , and broaden the negotiating agenda to include issues critical to post-conflict recovery .
Women also provide insights and information critical to counterterrorism and the promotion of stability .
With this in mind , there are several areas the oversight hearings should examine .
The first is the extent to which agencies have fully integrated their women , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broader national security efforts around the globe .
There are too many missed opportunities where advancing women ’ s contributions to peace and security could have improved the effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic , development , and security efforts .
Despite years of bipartisan promises to protect Afghan women ’ s rights and set Afghanistan on a path to sustainable peace and stability , the Trump administration abandoned these commitments in order to procure a deal with the Taliban , leaving any guarantees for Afghan women and girls to an intra-Afghan process .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States aligned itself with China and Russia to undercut a resolution on conflict-related sexual violence and restrict services to survivors of rape used as a tool of war .
So far , the Department of Homeland Security has not applied the principles of the Women , Peace , and Security Act to its border security , refugee , or asylum policies .
To prevent further such omissions , security-related policies should view gender equality as integral to more effective outcomes—from the National Security Strategy to the forthcoming congressionally mandated global fragility strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whole-of-government approach to the prevention of conflict .
More broadly , agencies should make it standard practice for their policies and programs to address gender equality—by integrating that goal in their formal planning and budgeting processes and by requiring a gender analysis to ensure their efforts are informed by realities on the ground .
USAID does so already , and its plan reflects the benefits of this approach : It lays out regional commitments that reflect the value of , for example , women ’ s role in preventing violent extremism in Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and supporting Iraq ’ s stabilization operations .
The second way to measure the act is in terms of accountability .
Accountability is critical , and agencies must fulfill the requirements laid out by Congress .
But the agencies ’ current plans are inadequate .
The Women , Peace , and Security Act required the agencies to include specific and measurable goals , benchmarks , performance metrics , timetables , and monitoring and evaluation plans .
To date , none of the agencies have met all of these requirements .
State and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so far ; next , they should produce agencywide baselines that they can use to set specific targets and timelines ( for example , how many local women ’ s groups will they fund or how many security forces will they assist in recruiting more women and by when ) .
Agencywide benchmarks are critical to defining what success would look like ; these should be public and form the foundation for any future plans .
In contrast , the Defense Department plan lacks the necessary guidelines and takes the radical step of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to “ lethality , ” meaning the military ’ s deadliness on the battlefield .
The Department of Homeland Security ’ s plan , meanwhile , is at a nascent stage in examining how women ’ s contributions relate to its mandate ( despite the law ’ s passage three years ago ) .
Without stronger transparency frameworks , the agencies will not be able to demonstrate results , modify underperforming efforts , and improve future planning .
The third metric for the hearings should be funding .
Without adequate funding , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plans are empty mandates , yet none of the agencies identify the resources they need to fulfill their vision .
Increasing women ’ s participation is a cost-effective investment to advance U.S. diplomatic , development , and defense objectives ; agencies should recognize this and commit more from their existing budgets to make it happen .
Fourth , dedicated staff and agencywide training are necessary to implement the Women , Peace , and Security Act .
Agencies are hampered by gaps in both .
High-level leadership and agencywide commitment are necessary if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ business-as-usual approach to conflict prevention and resolution .
The cabinet secretaries and USAID administrator should designate a full-time senior executive who reports directly to them to best ensure the full integration of women , peace , and security across each of the designated agencies .
Moreover , the agencies should identify what additional personnel are needed to mobilize a whole-of-government effort .
Implementing the Women , Peace , and Security Act can not be left to well-meaning staff with insufficient capacity and no support from the top .
The 2017 law rightfully includes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at all levels on why promoting women ’ s meaningful participation contributes to preventing and resolving conflict and how doing so relates to their job responsibilities .
In their plans , neither Defense nor Homeland Security detailed how they will expand their training efforts , while State outlined its priorities but without specifics—only USAID laid out time-bound , specific training goals .
All the agencies should be pressured to do better .
Fifth , Congress should press each agency on how it is advancing women ’ s leadership in its own operation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ House strategy calls for U.S. diplomatic , defense , and development interventions to include the participation of American female personnel , yet only State ’ s and Defense ’ s plans even mention the need to improve women ’ s representation in their workforces .
None of the plans include diversity and leadership targets to address their inclusion shortcomings .
As the United States rightly encourages other governments to increase women ’ s participation , it should take its own advice to heart .
With the implementation of the groundbreaking Women , Peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government could be a model to the world , demonstrating that we are all more secure when women participate fully in preventing and resolving conflict .
Congressional oversight is critical if this is to become a reality .

The U.S. Congress will soon turn its attention to assessing how well the executive branch is implementing the Women, Peace and Security Act . The act, passed in Congress and signed by U.S. President Donald Trump in 2017 after years of civil society advocacy and strong bipartisan support, is the world’s most comprehensive law in support of women’s leadership in ending wars and building peace. The law required a whole-of-government strategy on how the United States would promote this goal, laid out training requirements for all appropriate personnel, and required a progress report outlining common indicators to track progress. This week, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security will hold its first-ever hearing on how well things are going.
The U.S. Congress will soon turn its attention to assessing how well the executive branch is implementing the Women, Peace and Security Act. The act, passed in Congress and signed by U.S. President Donald Trump in 2017 after years of civil society advocacy and strong bipartisan support, is the world’s most comprehensive law in support of women’s leadership in ending wars and building peace. The law required a whole-of-government strategy on how the United States would promote this goal, laid out training requirements for all appropriate personnel, and required a progress report outlining common indicators to track progress. This week, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security will hold its first-ever hearing on how well things are going.
In compliance with the law’s mandate, four U.S. departments and agencies—State, Defense, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—recently released plans for how they would implement the 2019 governmentwide strategy on promoting women’s meaningful participation in conflict prevention and resolution. Among other details, the State Department identified 14 focus countries for its women, peace, and security efforts, including Myanmar, Iraq, and South Sudan; USAID committed to increase women’s roles in countering violent extremism from Indonesia to Northern Nigeria; and the Defense Department promised to be a model for increasing gender diversity and inclusion. As former government officials who were both involved in developing and implementing the U.S. government’s earlier national action plan on women, peace, and security in 2011, it is clear to us that making progress on this issue offers immense opportunities.
A plethora of research supports women’s participation as a proven strategy to improve global security. Countries are more prosperous and stable as the gender gap closes: For example, the Women, Peace, and Security Index, produced by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, has found a direct correlation between women’s equality and societies’ security and stability. Studies by the Council on Foreign Relations have documented how women’s participation in peace processes, from Colombia to Northern Ireland to the Philippines, increased the likelihood of warring parties reaching lasting peace agreements, as they organize across cultural and sectarian divides, mediate local cease-fires, and broaden the negotiating agenda to include issues critical to post-conflict recovery. Women also provide insights and information critical to counterterrorism and the promotion of stability. With this in mind, there are several areas the oversight hearings should examine.
The first is the extent to which agencies have fully integrated their women, peace, and security commitments into their broader national security efforts around the globe.
There are too many missed opportunities where advancing women’s contributions to peace and security could have improved the effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic, development, and security efforts. Despite years of bipartisan promises to protect Afghan women’s rights and set Afghanistan on a path to sustainable peace and stability, the Trump administration abandoned these commitments in order to procure a deal with the Taliban, leaving any guarantees for Afghan women and girls to an intra-Afghan process. At the United Nations last year, the United States aligned itself with China and Russia to undercut a resolution on conflict-related sexual violence and restrict services to survivors of rape used as a tool of war. So far, the Department of Homeland Security has not applied the principles of the Women, Peace, and Security Act to its border security, refugee, or asylum policies.
To prevent further such omissions, security-related policies should view gender equality as integral to more effective outcomes—from the National Security Strategy to the forthcoming congressionally mandated global fragility strategy, a 2019 initiative to muster a whole-of-government approach to the prevention of conflict. More broadly, agencies should make it standard practice for their policies and programs to address gender equality—by integrating that goal in their formal planning and budgeting processes and by requiring a gender analysis to ensure their efforts are informed by realities on the ground. USAID does so already, and its plan reflects the benefits of this approach: It lays out regional commitments that reflect the value of, for example, women’s role in preventing violent extremism in Pakistan, encouraging Myanmar’s peace negotiations, and supporting Iraq’s stabilization operations.
The second way to measure the act is in terms of accountability. Accountability is critical, and agencies must fulfill the requirements laid out by Congress. But the agencies’ current plans are inadequate.
The Women, Peace, and Security Act required the agencies to include specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, performance metrics, timetables, and monitoring and evaluation plans. To date, none of the agencies have met all of these requirements. State and USAID have submitted the most comprehensive plans so far; next, they should produce agencywide baselines that they can use to set specific targets and timelines (for example, how many local women’s groups will they fund or how many security forces will they assist in recruiting more women and by when). Agencywide benchmarks are critical to defining what success would look like; these should be public and form the foundation for any future plans. In contrast, the Defense Department plan lacks the necessary guidelines and takes the radical step of linking women, peace, and security to “lethality,” meaning the military’s deadliness on the battlefield. The Department of Homeland Security’s plan, meanwhile, is at a nascent stage in examining how women’s contributions relate to its mandate (despite the law’s passage three years ago). Without stronger transparency frameworks, the agencies will not be able to demonstrate results, modify underperforming efforts, and improve future planning.
The third metric for the hearings should be funding. Without adequate funding, the White House strategy and its associated implementation plans are empty mandates, yet none of the agencies identify the resources they need to fulfill their vision. Increasing women’s participation is a cost-effective investment to advance U.S. diplomatic, development, and defense objectives; agencies should recognize this and commit more from their existing budgets to make it happen.
Fourth, dedicated staff and agencywide training are necessary to implement the Women, Peace, and Security Act. Agencies are hampered by gaps in both. High-level leadership and agencywide commitment are necessary if the government is to move beyond its inadequate business-as-usual approach to conflict prevention and resolution. The cabinet secretaries and USAID administrator should designate a full-time senior executive who reports directly to them to best ensure the full integration of women, peace, and security across each of the designated agencies. Moreover, the agencies should identify what additional personnel are needed to mobilize a whole-of-government effort. Implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act cannot be left to well-meaning staff with insufficient capacity and no support from the top.
The 2017 law rightfully includes a focus on training U.S. government personnel at all levels on why promoting women’s meaningful participation contributes to preventing and resolving conflict and how doing so relates to their job responsibilities. In their plans, neither Defense nor Homeland Security detailed how they will expand their training efforts, while State outlined its priorities but without specifics—only USAID laid out time-bound, specific training goals. All the agencies should be pressured to do better.
Fifth, Congress should press each agency on how it is advancing women’s leadership in its own operation.
To lead by example, the White House strategy calls for U.S. diplomatic, defense, and development interventions to include the participation of American female personnel, yet only State’s and Defense’s plans even mention the need to improve women’s representation in their workforces. None of the plans include diversity and leadership targets to address their inclusion shortcomings. As the United States rightly encourages other governments to increase women’s participation, it should take its own advice to heart.
With the implementation of the groundbreaking Women, Peace, and Security Act, the U.S. government could be a model to the world, demonstrating that we are all more secure when women participate fully in preventing and resolving conflict. Congressional oversight is critical if this is to become a reality.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-22--Xi Wants Chinese Students Back in the Countryside

Xi Wants Chinese Students Back in the Countryside As the novel coronavirus outbreak waned in China , millions of wary students in select provinces and cities have gradually returned from their bedrooms to their classrooms .
Myriad health safety measures await them , as does a new policy designed to promote their physical activity .
The cause isn ’ t COVID-19 but a renewed ideological campaign barely noticed outside the country .
China ’ s cabinet , the State Council , and the powerful Central Committee quietly announced joint guidelines on March 26 to improve China ’ s “ labor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ biggest shortcoming ” in China ’ s education system by a top official , the measures look to reverse declining physical activity among Chinese youth while instilling “ the Marxist view of labor.
” “ Over the years , some youth have become less appreciative , less willing , and less able to perform manual labor , ” the document states .
The newly released rules call for more manual labor activities in curriculums across academia to inculcate students with a “ hard-working spirit.
” Schools from the elementary to the university @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including vague activities that “ work up a sweat ” and household chores like doing laundry .
While the policy is short on specific activities , it hints that students will do work at companies , farms , and factories .
The policy is the latest undertaking in a broader government initiative to reshape Chinese education along increasingly tight ideological lines .
President Xi Jinping has stressed modernizing China ’ s exam-oriented education system while ensuring it remains firmly tethered to Communist Party orthodoxy and Chinese socialist principles .
He has repeatedly called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quintessential qualities : “ morality , intellect , physical ability , aesthetics , and work ethic [ labor ] ” —a mantra that harks back to Mao Zedong ’ s first educational policy in 1957 .
Since the founding of the People ’ s Republic of China in 1949 , China ’ s education system has oscillated between politics and scholarship .
Slogans spoke of being both “ red and expert , ” but the two were more often in contention .
William Saywell , a former top Canadian diplomat , wrote in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ education as a party device designed to inculcate and sustain revolutionary values and education as a governmental instrument used to promote modernization.
” As with virtually everything else in China under Xi , the pendulum has swung hard back toward redness .
This time , instead of inculcating revolutionary values , it ’ s their ideological cousin , “ Xi Jinping Thought ” —the blueprint for national rejuvenation that ’ s enshrined in the party ’ s constitution .
At the national education conference in 2018 , Xi elevated the ideological importance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in training China ’ s future “ builders and successors of socialism.
” Not one to forgo a symbolic opportunity , the Chinese leader announced the strategic shift on Teacher ’ s Day .
“ While promoting a spirit of labor , education must guide students to uphold and respect labor , as well as understand that it is the most glorious , most lofty , most grand , and most beautiful principle , ” Xi said .
The first indication that Xi ’ s labor agenda was being put into practice appeared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s daunting college entrance exam .
Students participating in the exam that summer were tested on the five qualities championed by Xi , including “ labor ” for the first time .
Xi ’ s own reverence for the red virtues of labor traces back to his experience as a teenager toiling among peasants in the yellow-silted terrain of China ’ s rural northwest .
Mobilized under Mao ’ s notorious “ Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement , ” Xi was one of around 17 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s countryside to be reeducated in the bucolic beliefs of the common citizenry .
In 1970 alone , 10 percent of China ’ s urban population was sent away , a program that continued into the 1980s in some areas .
Even recently , Xi has championed a “ rural rejuvenation ” that culminated in a Communist Party program to send university and vocational students on voluntary trips to China ’ s backcountry .
For many of the sent-down teenagers , the experience was a deeply traumatic one , especially for young women @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Others remember their youth through rose-tinted glasses—including , it seems , Xi himself , for whom the countryside was a refuge from the murderous intrigues that caught up his politically exulted family .
According to Chinese state media , the 15-year-old Xi ’ s experience doing hard labor toughened him into the dogmatic yet down-to-earth leader he is today .
In 2003 , Xi wrote that “ the hard life of the grassroots can cultivate one ’ s will.
” Other fellow rusticated youth—many of whom occupy the highest rungs of Communist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have become relics of a foregone era in Chinese cosmopolitan cities .
A 67-year-old Xi is now looking to rectify the extravagance of the present by renewing China ’ s relationship with its austere past , and that starts with education .
The labor education guidelines state the need to redress “ wrong ideas ” that include “ idolizing wealth , ” “ seeking pleasure , ” and “ reaping without sowing.
” Xi ’ s labor campaign to toughen Chinese students reflects the government ’ s deep-seated fear over the country ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fear of a countrywide decline in masculinity .
These worries have only been exacerbated in recent years with the rise in popularity of effeminate Chinese celebrities ( or “ sissies ” as one editorial by the state-run Xinhua news agency wrote ) and the realization that China ’ s one-child policy abetted a generation of needy boys devoid of self-reliance .
Pockets of state media have depicted masculinity ’ s decline as a national “ crisis ” that runs antithetical to the country ’ s strongman image embodied by Xi .
Chinese officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as China ’ s national status has been historically tied to the overall stature of its male population .
Against the backdrop of Western intrusion during the Qing Dynasty , local elites linked China ’ s decline on the world stage to Chinese male insecurity .
Later , amid the Republican era in the early 20th century , Chinese intellectuals concluded that the country ’ s backwardness was a consequence of “ weak bodies , ” among others .
Physical exercise was linked to military drills and an assertive new masculinity .
Mao @ @ @ @ @ @ @ climbing mountains and swimming rivers to telegraph the importance of physical activity , believed from early in his career that improving physical education was a key ingredient in enhancing China ’ s national power .
In theory , Xi ’ s labor education guidelines are part of a wider effort to steer China ’ s shift to an innovation-driven economy along the road to national rejuvenation .
The plan is to rapidly move China up the global value-added chain—a country where product labels read “ designed in China ” as opposed to “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that by underscoring creativity and innovation in schooling , the party can meet looming national goals—even as creativity and innovation are actively discouraged as censorship grows and teachers are banned from using foreign textbooks or referencing outside ideas .
What ’ s more , Xi is under additional pressure as 2021 marks the first milestone of the party ’ s “ two centenary goals ” —the building of a moderately prosperous society coinciding with the Communist Party ’ s 100th anniversary .
Even while top officials venerate labor with rhetoric and policy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ labor is viewed much differently .
The Chinese government has long been suspicious of student-organized movements and campus activism for social causes like labor .
Such suspicions have intensified under Xi—even avowed Marxists advocating on behalf of workers ’ rights have been punished by the state , sometimes with assistance from universities themselves .
In 2018 , leftist students from Beijing ’ s prestigious Renmin University disappeared or were reportedly forced to participate in staged public confessions after joining a labor protest in the southeastern metropolis of Shenzhen .
A professor of education @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who asked for anonymity out of safety concerns over China ’ s new national security law for Hong Kong said the impetus behind Xi ’ s labor education push is more about politics than economics .
“ On one side , he wants to be the world leader in high-end areas like 5G , ” the professor said .
“ In the meantime , he will also want to control people in the basic and higher education systems , so he ’ s reemphasized labor education.
” The professor added that the reemphasis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government .
It ’ s also to compartmentalize society , said the education scholar .
“ For that policy [ labor education ] —it ’ s a kind of social stratification to keep a high number of youthful students in the center layer of the labor market , ” the professor said .
If recent educational reforms were intended to promote creativity and innovation , it hasn ’ t manifested in practice .
An English lecturer at a university in China ’ s southeastern Fujian province who requested anonymity said there is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ isn ’ t a priority .
“ Year on year , they ’ ve become more indoctrinated , ” the Fujian-based teacher said .
“ It ’ s become more difficult to get across the idea that you can think critically about something or , at the very least , look at something with a different perspective.
” In the hypercompetitive upbringing familiar to Chinese youth , the outsized importance attached to academic performance explains why many students are less than eager to perform manual forms of labor .
Physical activities like manual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that maintains test scores as the pinnacle of achievement .
In life after academia , wealth , social mobility , and status appear as markers of success—albeit , with many young , middle-class Chinese growing increasingly apathetic to them .
Yang Jieyi , a 24-year-old Chinese graduate student studying anthropology at University College London , said younger generations , specifically urbanites , have become “ very self-centered ” over the years .
“ It ’ s all about showing how successful you are on social media and how great you are by owning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s labor education initiative aims to politically sanitize such social ills .
The policy is most importantly a means to remedy younger citizens ’ lack of mental and physical fortitude by way of Xi ’ s party-centric ideology .
Whether a renewed ideological focus through labor education produces greater political adherence among future generations , only time will tell .
In the meantime , one aspect remains certain—labor education isn ’ t going away anytime soon .
The reason : Officials plan on amending China ’ s Education Law to include the @ @ @ @ @

As the novel coronavirus outbreak waned in China, millions of wary students in select provinces and cities have gradually returned from their bedrooms to their classrooms. Myriad health safety measures await them, as does a new policy designed to promote their physical activity. The cause isn’t COVID-19 but a renewed ideological campaign barely noticed outside the country.
As the novel coronavirus outbreak waned in China, millions of wary students in select provinces and cities have gradually returned from their bedrooms to their classrooms. Myriad health safety measures await them, as does a new policy designed to promote their physical activity. The cause isn’t COVID-19 but a renewed ideological campaign barely noticed outside the country.
China’s cabinet, the State Council, and the powerful Central Committee quietly announced joint guidelines on March 26 to improve China’s “labor education.” Once referred to as the “biggest shortcoming” in China’s education system by a top official, the measures look to reverse declining physical activity among Chinese youth while instilling “the Marxist view of labor.” “Over the years, some youth have become less appreciative, less willing, and less able to perform manual labor,” the document states.
The newly released rules call for more manual labor activities in curriculums across academia to inculcate students with a “hard-working spirit.” Schools from the elementary to the university level must provide mandatory labor classes, including vague activities that “work up a sweat” and household chores like doing laundry. While the policy is short on specific activities, it hints that students will do work at companies, farms, and factories.
The policy is the latest undertaking in a broader government initiative to reshape Chinese education along increasingly tight ideological lines. President Xi Jinping has stressed modernizing China’s exam-oriented education system while ensuring it remains firmly tethered to Communist Party orthodoxy and Chinese socialist principles. He has repeatedly called for an education system that cultivates five quintessential qualities: “morality, intellect, physical ability, aesthetics, and work ethic [labor]”—a mantra that harks back to Mao Zedong’s first educational policy in 1957.
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s education system has oscillated between politics and scholarship. Slogans spoke of being both “red and expert,” but the two were more often in contention. William Saywell, a former top Canadian diplomat, wrote in 1980 that Chinese education shifts “between education as a party device designed to inculcate and sustain revolutionary values and education as a governmental instrument used to promote modernization.” As with virtually everything else in China under Xi, the pendulum has swung hard back toward redness. This time, instead of inculcating revolutionary values, it’s their ideological cousin, “Xi Jinping Thought”—the blueprint for national rejuvenation that’s enshrined in the party’s constitution.
At the national education conference in 2018, Xi elevated the ideological importance of labor education by designating it a requirement in training China’s future “builders and successors of socialism.” Not one to forgo a symbolic opportunity, the Chinese leader announced the strategic shift on Teacher’s Day. “While promoting a spirit of labor, education must guide students to uphold and respect labor, as well as understand that it is the most glorious, most lofty, most grand, and most beautiful principle,” Xi said.
The first indication that Xi’s labor agenda was being put into practice appeared in 2019 with a modified gaokao, China’s daunting college entrance exam. Students participating in the exam that summer were tested on the five qualities championed by Xi, including “labor” for the first time.
Xi’s own reverence for the red virtues of labor traces back to his experience as a teenager toiling among peasants in the yellow-silted terrain of China’s rural northwest. Mobilized under Mao’s notorious “Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement,” Xi was one of around 17 million young urban intellectuals relocated to China’s countryside to be reeducated in the bucolic beliefs of the common citizenry. In 1970 alone, 10 percent of China’s urban population was sent away, a program that continued into the 1980s in some areas. Even recently, Xi has championed a “rural rejuvenation” that culminated in a Communist Party program to send university and vocational students on voluntary trips to China’s backcountry.
For many of the sent-down teenagers, the experience was a deeply traumatic one, especially for young women who often became victims of sexual abuse. Others remember their youth through rose-tinted glasses—including, it seems, Xi himself, for whom the countryside was a refuge from the murderous intrigues that caught up his politically exulted family. According to Chinese state media, the 15-year-old Xi’s experience doing hard labor toughened him into the dogmatic yet down-to-earth leader he is today. In 2003, Xi wrote that “the hard life of the grassroots can cultivate one’s will.” Other fellow rusticated youth—many of whom occupy the highest rungs of Communist power—lament that values like frugality and perseverance have become relics of a foregone era in Chinese cosmopolitan cities. A 67-year-old Xi is now looking to rectify the extravagance of the present by renewing China’s relationship with its austere past, and that starts with education. The labor education guidelines state the need to redress “wrong ideas” that include “idolizing wealth,” “seeking pleasure,” and “reaping without sowing.”
Xi’s labor campaign to toughen Chinese students reflects the government’s deep-seated fear over the country’s perceived physically and mentally weak youth—particularly fear of a countrywide decline in masculinity. These worries have only been exacerbated in recent years with the rise in popularity of effeminate Chinese celebrities (or “sissies” as one editorial by the state-run Xinhua news agency wrote) and the realization that China’s one-child policy abetted a generation of needy boys devoid of self-reliance. Pockets of state media have depicted masculinity’s decline as a national “crisis” that runs antithetical to the country’s strongman image embodied by Xi.
Chinese officials’ current worries stem from past precedents as China’s national status has been historically tied to the overall stature of its male population. Against the backdrop of Western intrusion during the Qing Dynasty, local elites linked China’s decline on the world stage to Chinese male insecurity. Later, amid the Republican era in the early 20th century, Chinese intellectuals concluded that the country’s backwardness was a consequence of “weak bodies,” among others. Physical exercise was linked to military drills and an assertive new masculinity. Mao, who used personal outdoor excursions like climbing mountains and swimming rivers to telegraph the importance of physical activity, believed from early in his career that improving physical education was a key ingredient in enhancing China’s national power.
In theory, Xi’s labor education guidelines are part of a wider effort to steer China’s shift to an innovation-driven economy along the road to national rejuvenation. The plan is to rapidly move China up the global value-added chain—a country where product labels read “designed in China” as opposed to “made in China.” Chinese officials hope that by underscoring creativity and innovation in schooling, the party can meet looming national goals—even as creativity and innovation are actively discouraged as censorship grows and teachers are banned from using foreign textbooks or referencing outside ideas. What’s more, Xi is under additional pressure as 2021 marks the first milestone of the party’s “two centenary goals”—the building of a moderately prosperous society coinciding with the Communist Party’s 100th anniversary.
Even while top officials venerate labor with rhetoric and policy, in the hands of student groups, labor is viewed much differently. The Chinese government has long been suspicious of student-organized movements and campus activism for social causes like labor. Such suspicions have intensified under Xi—even avowed Marxists advocating on behalf of workers’ rights have been punished by the state, sometimes with assistance from universities themselves. In 2018, leftist students from Beijing’s prestigious Renmin University disappeared or were reportedly forced to participate in staged public confessions after joining a labor protest in the southeastern metropolis of Shenzhen.
A professor of education policy at a leading Hong Kong university who asked for anonymity out of safety concerns over China’s new national security law for Hong Kong said the impetus behind Xi’s labor education push is more about politics than economics. “On one side, he wants to be the world leader in high-end areas like 5G,” the professor said. “In the meantime, he will also want to control people in the basic and higher education systems, so he’s reemphasized labor education.”
The professor added that the reemphasis on labor education suggests a recentralization of government. It’s also to compartmentalize society, said the education scholar. “For that policy [labor education]—it’s a kind of social stratification to keep a high number of youthful students in the center layer of the labor market,” the professor said.
If recent educational reforms were intended to promote creativity and innovation, it hasn’t manifested in practice. An English lecturer at a university in China’s southeastern Fujian province who requested anonymity said there is a common perception among students that critical thinking isn’t a priority. “Year on year, they’ve become more indoctrinated,” the Fujian-based teacher said. “It’s become more difficult to get across the idea that you can think critically about something or, at the very least, look at something with a different perspective.”
In the hypercompetitive upbringing familiar to Chinese youth, the outsized importance attached to academic performance explains why many students are less than eager to perform manual forms of labor. Physical activities like manual labor hold little importance in a society that maintains test scores as the pinnacle of achievement. In life after academia, wealth, social mobility, and status appear as markers of success—albeit, with many young, middle-class Chinese growing increasingly apathetic to them. Yang Jieyi, a 24-year-old Chinese graduate student studying anthropology at University College London, said younger generations, specifically urbanites, have become “very self-centered” over the years. “It’s all about showing how successful you are on social media and how great you are by owning a nice house and car.”
Xi’s labor education initiative aims to politically sanitize such social ills. The policy is most importantly a means to remedy younger citizens’ lack of mental and physical fortitude by way of Xi’s party-centric ideology. Whether a renewed ideological focus through labor education produces greater political adherence among future generations, only time will tell. In the meantime, one aspect remains certain—labor education isn’t going away anytime soon. The reason: Officials plan on amending China’s Education Law to include the word “labor.”