foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--Obama’s Foreign Policy Is Winning the 2020 Democratic Primary

Throughout the Democratic presidential primary , Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren have been careful not to criticize Barack Obama directly—a wise move given his popularity in the party .
But their campaign proposals leave little doubt that they view the former U.S. president ’ s domestic legacy as a series of quarter-measures shaped by a fatalistic centrism .
“ Medicare for All ” is predicated on the notion that Obamacare—the president ’ s towering legislative achievement—was not close to enough .
Where Obama made it easier for college students to reduce their monthly loan repayments , Sanders and Warren propose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ free to attend public college .
The list goes on .
But is the gulf so wide between Obama and the left ’ s standard-bearers on the issue of foreign policy ?
Not nearly as wide as they like to suggest , or their supporters like to think .
When it comes to international trade agreements , it ’ s certainly true that Sanders and Obama are miles apart , with Warren splitting the difference .
Sanders has consistently viewed the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) as an unalloyed disaster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Trans-Pacific Partnership and was the only Senate-based candidate to vote against Trump ’ s successor to NAFTA , the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement ( USCMA ) , on Jan. 16 .
( With rare bipartisanship , the Senate passed it 89-10 . )
But on military intervention , the differences are far less clear .
Both Warren and Sanders also critique U.S. militarism as a force that enriches elites and harms the masses in terms that Obama never deployed .
As Warren ’ s campaign platform bluntly puts it : “ Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wealthy and well-connected at the expense of everyone else.
” Such rhetoric about the military sounds compelling , but what exactly does it mean in practice ?
The answer is less radical than it might appear .
Setting international trade agreements to one side , Sanders and Warren share more on foreign policy with Obama than supporters of each might care to admit .
During last week ’ s presidential debate in Iowa , Sanders fielded CNN host Wolf Blitzer ’ s first question : “ Why are you the best prepared person @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chief ?
” Sanders ’ s answer was a near carbon copy of Obama ’ s response to similar questions in 2007 and 2008 : “ In 2002 , when the Congress was debating whether or not to go into war in Iraq , invade Iraq , I got up on the floor of the House and I said that would be a disaster , it would lead to unprecedented chaos in the region.
” The parallel continues .
As Obama had Hillary Clinton , Sanders ’ s foil was Joe Biden : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dick Cheney and George Bush and Rumsfeld had to say .
I thought they were lying .
I didn ’ t believe them for a moment .
I took to the floor .
I did everything I could to prevent that war .
Joe saw it differently.
” In 2002 , Obama was an Illinois state senator ( albeit with grand ambitions ) , not a member of the House of Representatives .
But he , like Sanders today , repeatedly invoked his opposition to the Iraq War , with direct comparison to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that his foreign-policy instincts were best .
Later in the debate , Blitzer asked Sanders about the escalating crisis in Iran , noting archly that he and the supreme leader , Ayatollah Ali Khamenei , share a view that U.S. troops should be withdrawn from the Middle East .
After observing that the United States ’ two biggest foreign-policy catastrophes , Vietnam and Iraq , were launched based on lies , Sanders argued , “ What we need to do is have an international coalition .
We can not keep acting unilaterally .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Iran was worked on with a number of our allies.
” For Sanders , Obama ’ s Iran deal represents exemplary foreign-policy making .
The homage to Obama ( of varying vintages in both policy and rhetoric ) continued as the debate progressed .
Responding to whether the United States should withdraw all forces from the Middle East , Warren observed : “ We should stop asking our military to solve problems that can not be solved militarily .
Our keeping combat troops there is not helping .
We need to work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use our economic tools .
We need to use our diplomatic tools.
” In 2014 , during a signature speech at West Point , Obama expressed similar caution .
“ To say that we have an interest in pursuing peace and freedom beyond our borders , ” he declared , “ is not to say that every problem has a military solution .
… Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.
” Elaborating on the advantages of Middle East retrenchment , Sanders connected domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In America today , our infrastructure is crumbling .
Half of our people are living paycheck to paycheck , ” Sanders said .
“ The American people are sick and tired of endless wars , which have cost us trillions of dollars.
” In June 2011 , announcing the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan , Obama observed : “ We have spent a trillion dollars on war , at a time of rising debt and hard economic times .
Now we must invest in America ’ s greatest resource—our people .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ focus on nation building here at home .
… Let us responsibly end these wars and reclaim the American dream that is at the center of our story.
” “ Responsibly ” may be the operative word here .
“ Responsible Foreign Policy ” is the title of Sanders ’ s foreign relations campaign issue section .
Sanders and Warren would strenuously deny that any hypothetical withdrawal from the Middle East that they might endorse would be “ irresponsible.
” And their supporters at likeminded think tanks like the Quincy Institute for Responsible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” when deployed by Obama on how to withdraw from conflicts , is a rather establishment notion—one with a tendency to ensnare the United States in endless war .
But this is neither very new nor very different .
Obama was no admirer of what he dismissed as the “ Washington playbook.
” Eying the presidency in 2007 , he , too , urged “ bringing a responsible end to this war in Iraq and refocusing on the critical challenges in the broader region.
” He now regards the 2009 surge in Afghanistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instances when he followed that playbook—as his two gravest foreign-policy mistakes .
But , even then , Libya in 2011 was not Iraq in 2002-2003 .
Sanders ’ s own response to the prospect of Muammar al-Qaddafi perpetrating atrocities against his people reinforces this point .
Sanders co-sponsored a Senate resolution that called for “ the United Nations Security Council to take such further action as may be necessary to protect civilians in Libya from attack , including the possible imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan territory.
” Creating a no-fly zone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intervention .
As a skeptical defense secretary , Robert Gates , clarified at the time : “ Let ’ s just call a spade a spade .
A no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses .
That ’ s the way you do a no-fly zone.
” In 2011 , then , Sanders was more hawkish on Libya than Gates , the incumbent George W. Bush-appointed Pentagon chief .
Indeed , Sanders is not a straightforward anti-war candidate .
In 1999 , Sanders supported U.S.-led NATO military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republic of Yugoslavia to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo .
In 2001 , Sanders backed the Bush administration ’ s military action against Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks .
In 2014 , in her first major national security speech , Warren called for better training programs and decried civilian casualties as well as excessive force but made little or no reference to overall drone policy itself .
While in a 2015 interview with ABC ’ s George Stephanopoulos , Sanders said he would continue to use drones “ very , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the difference from Obama is one of degree , not of type .
And it is worth remembering that Obama departed sharply from his post-Cold War presidential predecessors in many respects .
Critics of U.S. empire and perpetual war tend to place Obama on a seamless post-Cold War continuum—Stephen Wertheim and Samuel Moyn wrote in the Washington Post that Obama “ cemented more than reversed America ’ s disregard of international constraints on warmaking.
” Yet Obama also opened relations with Cuba , negotiated a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran , withdrew @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pursued a very lonely path when he pulled back from the brink of military action against Syria , erasing the red line he had drawn after Bashar al-Assad ’ s use of chemical weapons breached it .
On troop withdrawals , Sanders once told Obama advisor Ben Rhodes , “ Obama doesn ’ t get enough credit for how many troops Obama took out from Afghanistan.
” These are no small things .
They riled not just Republicans who reflexively opposed everything he did but also figures at the heart of the Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nasr , then-dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies , wrote an entire book that criticized Obama for reducing United States to a lowly position as a “ dispensable nation.
” He lamented that cautious Obamian statecraft had ensured that “ [ g ] one is the exuberant American desire to lead the world.
” Hillary Clinton famously chided Obama for nominating “ don ’ t do stupid shit ” as his core strategic doctrine , noting grandly that “ great nations need organizing principles , and ‘ don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an organizing principle.
” Obama ’ s foreign policies surely made the right enemies .
Mainstream critiques of Obama , then , share common elements with those leveled at Warren and Sanders .
Biden presents himself as the Obama continuity-candidate , but Warren and Sanders have at least as strong a claim .
In seeking out a model for pragmatic , retrenchment-inclined , diplomacy-prioritizing foreign-policy leadership , Sanders and Warren could certainly do a lot worse than America ’ s 44th president .
They all share a common desire to do less in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at home—even if they sharply disagree on how much “ more ” is possible in a political system designed to check ambitious reform .
If Warren or Sanders is elected president , she or he will face similar dilemmas to those that confronted Obama regarding the use of force .
Previous form suggests that they may well respond in similar ways .
The burdens of office have a way of sullying the purest-sounding pre-presidential intentions .

David Milne and Christopher McKnight Nichols

Throughout the Democratic presidential primary, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren have been careful not to criticize Barack Obama directly—a wise move given his popularity in the party. But their campaign proposals leave little doubt that they view the former U.S. president’s domestic legacy as a series of quarter-measures shaped by a fatalistic centrism. “Medicare for All” is predicated on the notion that Obamacare—the president’s towering legislative achievement—was not close to enough. Where Obama made it easier for college students to reduce their monthly loan repayments, Sanders and Warren propose to forgive student debt and make it free to attend public college. The list goes on.
Throughout the Democratic presidential primary, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren have been careful not to criticize Barack Obama directly—a wise move given his popularity in the party. But their campaign proposals leave little doubt that they view the former U.S. president’s domestic legacy as a series of quarter-measures shaped by a fatalistic centrism. “Medicare for All” is predicated on the notion that Obamacare—the president’s towering legislative achievement—was not close to enough. Where Obama made it easier for college students to reduce their monthly loan repayments, Sanders and Warren propose to forgive student debt and make it free to attend public college. The list goes on.
But is the gulf so wide between Obama and the left’s standard-bearers on the issue of foreign policy? Not nearly as wide as they like to suggest, or their supporters like to think.
When it comes to international trade agreements, it’s certainly true that Sanders and Obama are miles apart, with Warren splitting the difference. Sanders has consistently viewed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as an unalloyed disaster for American workers. He opposed Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership and was the only Senate-based candidate to vote against Trump’s successor to NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USCMA), on Jan. 16. (With rare bipartisanship, the Senate passed it 89-10.)
But on military intervention, the differences are far less clear. Both Warren and Sanders also critique U.S. militarism as a force that enriches elites and harms the masses in terms that Obama never deployed. As Warren’s campaign platform bluntly puts it: “Washington’s foreign policy today serves the wealthy and well-connected at the expense of everyone else.”
Such rhetoric about the military sounds compelling, but what exactly does it mean in practice? The answer is less radical than it might appear. Setting international trade agreements to one side, Sanders and Warren share more on foreign policy with Obama than supporters of each might care to admit.
During last week’s presidential debate in Iowa, Sanders fielded CNN host Wolf Blitzer’s first question: “Why are you the best prepared person on this stage to be commander in chief?” Sanders’s answer was a near carbon copy of Obama’s response to similar questions in 2007 and 2008: “In 2002, when the Congress was debating whether or not to go into war in Iraq, invade Iraq, I got up on the floor of the House and I said that would be a disaster, it would lead to unprecedented chaos in the region.” The parallel continues. As Obama had Hillary Clinton, Sanders’s foil was Joe Biden: “Joe and I listened to what Dick Cheney and George Bush and Rumsfeld had to say. I thought they were lying. I didn’t believe them for a moment. I took to the floor. I did everything I could to prevent that war. Joe saw it differently.” In 2002, Obama was an Illinois state senator (albeit with grand ambitions), not a member of the House of Representatives. But he, like Sanders today, repeatedly invoked his opposition to the Iraq War, with direct comparison to his principal opponent, to persuade voters that his foreign-policy instincts were best.
Later in the debate, Blitzer asked Sanders about the escalating crisis in Iran, noting archly that he and the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, share a view that U.S. troops should be withdrawn from the Middle East. After observing that the United States’ two biggest foreign-policy catastrophes, Vietnam and Iraq, were launched based on lies, Sanders argued, “What we need to do is have an international coalition. We cannot keep acting unilaterally. As you know, the nuclear deal with Iran was worked on with a number of our allies.” For Sanders, Obama’s Iran deal represents exemplary foreign-policy making.
The homage to Obama (of varying vintages in both policy and rhetoric) continued as the debate progressed. Responding to whether the United States should withdraw all forces from the Middle East, Warren observed: “We should stop asking our military to solve problems that cannot be solved militarily. Our keeping combat troops there is not helping. We need to work with our allies. We need to use our economic tools. We need to use our diplomatic tools.” In 2014, during a signature speech at West Point, Obama expressed similar caution. “To say that we have an interest in pursuing peace and freedom beyond our borders,” he declared, “is not to say that every problem has a military solution. … Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.”
Elaborating on the advantages of Middle East retrenchment, Sanders connected domestic challenges directly to those abroad. “In America today, our infrastructure is crumbling. Half of our people are living paycheck to paycheck,” Sanders said. “The American people are sick and tired of endless wars, which have cost us trillions of dollars.” In June 2011, announcing the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan, Obama observed: “We have spent a trillion dollars on war, at a time of rising debt and hard economic times. Now we must invest in America’s greatest resource—our people. … America, it is time to focus on nation building here at home. … Let us responsibly end these wars and reclaim the American dream that is at the center of our story.”
“Responsibly” may be the operative word here. “Responsible Foreign Policy” is the title of Sanders’s foreign relations campaign issue section. Sanders and Warren would strenuously deny that any hypothetical withdrawal from the Middle East that they might endorse would be “irresponsible.” And their supporters at likeminded think tanks like the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft might note that “responsibly,” when deployed by Obama on how to withdraw from conflicts, is a rather establishment notion—one with a tendency to ensnare the United States in endless war.
But this is neither very new nor very different. Obama was no admirer of what he dismissed as the “Washington playbook.” Eying the presidency in 2007, he, too, urged “bringing a responsible end to this war in Iraq and refocusing on the critical challenges in the broader region.” He now regards the 2009 surge in Afghanistan and the 2011 intervention in Libya—the two instances when he followed that playbook—as his two gravest foreign-policy mistakes.
But, even then, Libya in 2011 was not Iraq in 2002-2003. Sanders’s own response to the prospect of Muammar al-Qaddafi perpetrating atrocities against his people reinforces this point. Sanders co-sponsored a Senate resolution that called for “the United Nations Security Council to take such further action as may be necessary to protect civilians in Libya from attack, including the possible imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan territory.” Creating a no-fly zone does not happen bloodlessly—it is a military intervention. As a skeptical defense secretary, Robert Gates, clarified at the time: “Let’s just call a spade a spade. A no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses. That’s the way you do a no-fly zone.”
In 2011, then, Sanders was more hawkish on Libya than Gates, the incumbent George W. Bush-appointed Pentagon chief. Indeed, Sanders is not a straightforward anti-war candidate. In 1999, Sanders supported U.S.-led NATO military action against Slobodan Milosevic’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. In 2001, Sanders backed the Bush administration’s military action against Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In 2014, in her first major national security speech, Warren called for better training programs and decried civilian casualties as well as excessive force but made little or no reference to overall drone policy itself. While in a 2015 interview with ABC’s George Stephanopoulos, Sanders said he would continue to use drones “very, very selectively and effectively.” This suggests that the difference from Obama is one of degree, not of type.
In fact, if a President Sanders or President Warren came to resemble Obama in the sense that their plans for limiting U.S. commitments abroad and responsible use of hard power are complicated, say, by the renascence of the Islamic State or proxy conflicts or acts of terrorism stemming from the strike on Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani, it would scarcely reflect poorly on them.
And it is worth remembering that Obama departed sharply from his post-Cold War presidential predecessors in many respects. Critics of U.S. empire and perpetual war tend to place Obama on a seamless post-Cold War continuum—Stephen Wertheim and Samuel Moyn wrote in the Washington Post that Obama “cemented more than reversed America’s disregard of international constraints on warmaking.” Yet Obama also opened relations with Cuba, negotiated a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran, withdrew troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, and pursued a very lonely path when he pulled back from the brink of military action against Syria, erasing the red line he had drawn after Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons breached it. On troop withdrawals, Sanders once told Obama advisor Ben Rhodes, “Obama doesn’t get enough credit for how many troops Obama took out from Afghanistan.”
These are no small things. They riled not just Republicans who reflexively opposed everything he did but also figures at the heart of the Democratic Party establishment. In 2013, Vali Nasr, then-dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, wrote an entire book that criticized Obama for reducing United States to a lowly position as a “dispensable nation.” He lamented that cautious Obamian statecraft had ensured that “[g]one is the exuberant American desire to lead the world.” Hillary Clinton famously chided Obama for nominating “don’t do stupid shit” as his core strategic doctrine, noting grandly that “great nations need organizing principles, and ‘don’t do stupid stuff’ is not an organizing principle.” Obama’s foreign policies surely made the right enemies.
Mainstream critiques of Obama, then, share common elements with those leveled at Warren and Sanders. Biden presents himself as the Obama continuity-candidate, but Warren and Sanders have at least as strong a claim. In seeking out a model for pragmatic, retrenchment-inclined, diplomacy-prioritizing foreign-policy leadership, Sanders and Warren could certainly do a lot worse than America’s 44th president. They all share a common desire to do less in the world in order to achieve more at home—even if they sharply disagree on how much “more” is possible in a political system designed to check ambitious reform. If Warren or Sanders is elected president, she or he will face similar dilemmas to those that confronted Obama regarding the use of force. Previous form suggests that they may well respond in similar ways. The burdens of office have a way of sullying the purest-sounding pre-presidential intentions.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--Republican Lawmakers Questioned Trump’s Withholding of Ukraine Aid, Documents Show

Newly released documents show senior Republican lawmakers were privately questioning President Donald Trump ’ s administration over the withholding of U.S. military aid to Ukraine last year , indicating that concerns about the policy extended well beyond senior Trump advisors such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-National Security Advisor John Bolton .
Some of those Republican lawmakers , such as Sens .
Jim Inhofe and Rob Portman , are now sitting as jurors in Trump ’ s ongoing impeachment trial , which is largely focused on the question of whether the president abused his power by withholding military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into investigating his Democratic rival , former Vice President Joe Biden .
While much of the focus of the impeachment investigation has been on officials in the executive branch—including the State and Defense departments and the White House—these documents shed new light on how key Republican lawmakers and Trump allies were also concerned about the aid being withheld .
Despite months of depositions and new revelations about why Trump withheld the aid to Ukraine , so far no Republican lawmakers appear convinced that Trump committed any impeachable offenses .
On Tuesday evening , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dragged on past midnight , the White House Office of Management and Budget ( OMB ) released 192 pages of documents , including heavily redacted emails of exchanges between OMB officials and counterparts at the Pentagon .
The documents were released under a Freedom of Information Act ( FOIA ) request by American Oversight , a nonprofit government watchdog .
The release adds new documentation to the timeline of events in which Trump ordered the delay of military aid to Ukraine to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into investigating Biden and his son @ @ @ @ @ @ @ board of a Ukrainian energy company , allegations that are central to the impeachment trial .
The documents also underscore how , despite the fierce partisan disputes over impeachment , Democrats and Republicans alike still overwhelmingly back supplying military aid to Ukraine in its fight against Russian-backed separatists .
After the Pentagon approved nearly $ 250 million in security-related funds for Ukraine last June , the aid was temporarily withheld for months before being released in September .
The newly released emails show a behind-the-scenes glimpse into how Republican lawmakers and their staffers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the aid in the intervening months .
The emails show that as early as August , staffers for top Republican lawmakers and their staffers were pressing the White House to explain why military aid to Ukraine was being held up .
“ I heard today that OMB has put a pause on expending funds authorized for Ukrainian security assistance .
Is there someone there that I could talk to to understand why ?
” Josh Martin , the chief of staff to Rep. Mac Thornberry , wrote in an email to OMB officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee .
An OMB official in another email said they had received a “ similar inquiry ” from the office of Inhofe , who is also the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee .
On Aug. 23 , an aide to Portman also sent his own request asking for an explanation .
Also among the released documents is a letter from Republican Rep. Paul Cook to Mick Mulvaney , Trump ’ s acting chief of staff , on Aug. 23 .
“ We strongly urge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Security Assistance Initiative ( USAI ) funding proceed to execution as planned , ” he wrote .
“ Actions by the Office of Management and Budget that delay implementation of this critical funding could undermine our clear national security interests and signal the U.S. Government ’ s lack of commitment to Ukraine and our Eastern European allies , ” he warned in the letter .
Despite mounting pressure from Republican lawmakers in August , it would be weeks before Trump ultimately released the aid .
He agreed to do so after discussions with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sept. 11 , 2019 , which came after a whistleblower complaint was filed and after scrutiny in the media .
OMB declined to comment for the story , but in the past the office has maintained that it acted in accordance with the law and stressed that it directed the Pentagon to continue engaging in all activities related to Ukrainian security assistance short of obligating funds .
In a legal memo published by the Washington Post in December , OMB insisted the temporary hold in military aid was legal and done to examine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy , rather than being withheld for political reasons .
Trump has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and derided the impeachment investigation as a “ hoax ” and “ witch hunt.
” A nonpartisan federal watchdog agency , the Government Accountability Office , concluded in a report last week that OMB broke the law by withholding military aid—an assertion that the White House and other top Republican lawmakers sharply dispute .
The newly released emails also show repeated exchanges , albeit heavily redacted ones , between Mike Duffey , a senior Trump appointee overseeing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OMB officials , and Elaine McCusker , the deputy undersecretary of defense and comptroller for the Pentagon .
In one email exchange on Aug. 20 , Duffey told McCusker that funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative “ are not available for obligation until August 26 , 2019 to allow for an interagency process to determine the best use of such funds .
DOD may continue its planning and casework for the initiative during this period.
” Another section of his email was redacted .
McCusker replied that same day : “ Seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) past each other a bit .
We should probably have a call.
” Austin Evers , the executive director of American Oversight , said the new documents undercut the president and his lawyers ’ arguments that handing over documents is not necessary for the impeachment trial .
“ Despite the Trump Administration ’ s obstruction and the rhetoric at the trial , the public can now see even more evidence of the president ’ s corrupt scheme as it unfolded in real time , ” he said in a statement .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the volume of material still secreted away , only highlights how much the administration has withheld from the House , the Senate , and the American public .
”

Newly released documents show senior Republican lawmakers were privately questioning President Donald Trump’s administration over the withholding of U.S. military aid to Ukraine last year, indicating that concerns about the policy extended well beyond senior Trump advisors such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-National Security Advisor John Bolton.
Newly released documents show senior Republican lawmakers were privately questioning President Donald Trump’s administration over the withholding of U.S. military aid to Ukraine last year, indicating that concerns about the policy extended well beyond senior Trump advisors such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-National Security Advisor John Bolton.
Some of those Republican lawmakers, such as Sens. Jim Inhofe and Rob Portman, are now sitting as jurors in Trump’s ongoing impeachment trial, which is largely focused on the question of whether the president abused his power by withholding military aid in a bid to force Ukraine into investigating his Democratic rival, former Vice President Joe Biden.
While much of the focus of the impeachment investigation has been on officials in the executive branch—including the State and Defense departments and the White House—these documents shed new light on how key Republican lawmakers and Trump allies were also concerned about the aid being withheld. Despite months of depositions and new revelations about why Trump withheld the aid to Ukraine, so far no Republican lawmakers appear convinced that Trump committed any impeachable offenses.
On Tuesday evening, as the first day of the trial dragged on past midnight, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released 192 pages of documents, including heavily redacted emails of exchanges between OMB officials and counterparts at the Pentagon. The documents were released under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by American Oversight, a nonprofit government watchdog.
The release adds new documentation to the timeline of events in which Trump ordered the delay of military aid to Ukraine to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into investigating Biden and his son Hunter Biden, who sat on the board of a Ukrainian energy company, allegations that are central to the impeachment trial.
The documents also underscore how, despite the fierce partisan disputes over impeachment, Democrats and Republicans alike still overwhelmingly back supplying military aid to Ukraine in its fight against Russian-backed separatists.
After the Pentagon approved nearly $250 million in security-related funds for Ukraine last June, the aid was temporarily withheld for months before being released in September. The newly released emails show a behind-the-scenes glimpse into how Republican lawmakers and their staffers were pressing the White House to release the aid in the intervening months.
The emails show that as early as August, staffers for top Republican lawmakers and their staffers were pressing the White House to explain why military aid to Ukraine was being held up. “I heard today that OMB has put a pause on expending funds authorized for Ukrainian security assistance. Is there someone there that I could talk to to understand why?” Josh Martin, the chief of staff to Rep. Mac Thornberry, wrote in an email to OMB officials on Aug. 22. Thornberry is the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee.
An OMB official in another email said they had received a “similar inquiry” from the office of Inhofe, who is also the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. On Aug. 23, an aide to Portman also sent his own request asking for an explanation.
Also among the released documents is a letter from Republican Rep. Paul Cook to Mick Mulvaney, Trump’s acting chief of staff, on Aug. 23. “We strongly urge you to direct that all the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funding proceed to execution as planned,” he wrote.
“Actions by the Office of Management and Budget that delay implementation of this critical funding could undermine our clear national security interests and signal the U.S. Government’s lack of commitment to Ukraine and our Eastern European allies,” he warned in the letter.
Despite mounting pressure from Republican lawmakers in August, it would be weeks before Trump ultimately released the aid. He agreed to do so after discussions with Vice President Mike Pence and Portman on Sept. 11, 2019, which came after a whistleblower complaint was filed and after scrutiny in the media.
OMB declined to comment for the story, but in the past the office has maintained that it acted in accordance with the law and stressed that it directed the Pentagon to continue engaging in all activities related to Ukrainian security assistance short of obligating funds. In a legal memo published by the Washington Post in December, OMB insisted the temporary hold in military aid was legal and done to examine whether the spending was consistent with U.S. policy, rather than being withheld for political reasons. Trump has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and derided the impeachment investigation as a “hoax” and “witch hunt.”
A nonpartisan federal watchdog agency, the Government Accountability Office, concluded in a report last week that OMB broke the law by withholding military aid—an assertion that the White House and other top Republican lawmakers sharply dispute.
The newly released emails also show repeated exchanges, albeit heavily redacted ones, between Mike Duffey, a senior Trump appointee overseeing national security programs at OMB, other OMB officials, and Elaine McCusker, the deputy undersecretary of defense and comptroller for the Pentagon.
In one email exchange on Aug. 20, Duffey told McCusker that funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative “are not available for obligation until August 26, 2019 to allow for an interagency process to determine the best use of such funds. DOD may continue its planning and casework for the initiative during this period.” Another section of his email was redacted.
McCusker replied that same day: “Seems like we continue to talk (email) past each other a bit. We should probably have a call.”
Austin Evers, the executive director of American Oversight, said the new documents undercut the president and his lawyers’ arguments that handing over documents is not necessary for the impeachment trial. “Despite the Trump Administration’s obstruction and the rhetoric at the trial, the public can now see even more evidence of the president’s corrupt scheme as it unfolded in real time,” he said in a statement.
“The volume of material released, and the volume of material still secreted away, only highlights how much the administration has withheld from the House, the Senate, and the American public.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-23--The U.S. Can Deter Iran but Not Its Proxies

The U.S. Can Deter Iran but Not Its Proxies The assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani met with widespread concern that U.S. foreign-policy decisions are devoid of any overarching strategic vision .
As former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry wrote in a critique of President Donald Trump ’ s handling of the Middle East , “ Clearly he doesn ’ t do strategies , period.
” Yet the administration has articulated at least some strategy .
In addition to justifying the assassination on the grounds of preventing an imminent attack , the president and his allies argue that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increasing Iranian aggressiveness .
“ [ T ] he Suleimani strike , ” according to Sen. Tom Cotton , “ has already restored deterrence.
” In support of this deterrent strategy , Trump threatened , via his preferred medium of Twitter , massive further attacks should Iran choose to escalate the conflict .
While his initial suggestion that the United States would target cultural sites has been walked back , the underlying threat of escalation in support of deterrence stands .
The problem with this bellicose posture is not that it is inherently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a strategy designed for a very different kind of conflict than the one the United States faces with Iran .
To adapt former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ’ s phrase , you go to war against the adversary you have , not the adversary you want .
Iran is not the Soviet Union .
It has pursued a decades-long policy of cultivating alliances with armed proxy groups—and that means there ’ s a real risk this attempted deterrence will backfire , forcing an escalation sought by neither side .
In its most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is simple : If an adversary believes the costs of an attack are high enough , it will prefer not to engage in that attack in the first place .
Thus , the administration ’ s argument goes , if the United States threatens a massive response to Iranian aggression , they are likely to stand down .
But this logic rests on a couple of key assumptions .
Most importantly , in this instance , those who are threatened with punishment must in fact have the power to prevent the precipitating attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then , the Iranian regime itself must be in a position to decide whether or not attacks occur .
Iran has close ties to armed groups throughout the Middle East , from Yemen to Lebanon to Syria to Iraq .
Many of these relationships were built in part by Suleimani himself .
While these groups take weapons , training , support , and some degree of direction from Iran , they are also independent actors .
Their preferences are not always aligned with Iran ’ s , and they have shown themselves willing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is to their strategic advantage .
For instance , Iran-aligned Houthi rebels have engaged in escalatory violence over the objections of their Iranian backers .
This partial independence makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for attacks undertaken by such proxies .
Suppose one of the several armed Shiite groups with ties to Iran that are operative in Iraq engages in a significant attack in the coming days or weeks .
It will be unclear whether that attack was taken at Iran ’ s direction or not .
Will the United States extend its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Will it strike back at Iran for actions by Iraqis or Syrians ?
The answer may well be yes .
After all , it was not actions by the Iranian military but by Iranian proxies in Iraq that put in motion the chain of events leading to the killing of Suleimani .
Kataib Hezbollah , an Iran-linked Shiite militia , was responsible for the rocket attacks on Iraqi bases in December 2019 that killed an American contractor and injured several soldiers .
That event spurred a U.S. airstrike on Kataib Hezbollah ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the protests outside the U.S. Embassy that preceded the killing of Suleimani .
In an important sense , then , the United States has already shown that it can be provoked by Iranian proxies .
In so doing , America has put itself in a profoundly dangerous strategic position .
In an attempt to deter Iran with maximalist threats , the United States has given independent armed militias the power to escalate conflict between two sovereign nations .
The Iranians appear acutely aware of the risk .
Their initial response to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They wanted no misunderstanding .
Moreover , the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations recently argued that Iran was responsible for these public actions but that it ought not be held responsible for “ any sort of actions to be taken by others , ” a clear reference to the risk of provocation by Iran-linked militias .
The problem is that , having publicly responded with face-saving missile strikes that did limited damage , Iran may genuinely prefer de-escalation .
But its proxies , especially those operating in Iraq , may not .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the United States as an opportunity to end the ongoing U.S. presence in Iraq .
Or perhaps they see strategic advantages to operating within the chaos of increased civil conflict .
In this case , they may well have incentives to engage in attacks—for instance , on Americans in Iraq—that exploit the United States ’ more aggressive deterrent posture to manipulate it into greater conflict with Iran .
And Iran may not be in a position to prevent those actions , in which case Trump ’ s deterrent stance will have backfired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that groups not linked to Iran , like the Islamic State , that wish to spread discord and chaos might view this as an opportune moment to engage in false-flag operations that make it look as though Iranian proxies are engaged in escalatory violence .
Of course , proponents of a maximalist strategy will argue that the alternative , backing off the deterrent threat , invites further bad behavior by Iran itself .
And there is some truth to this .
That is what is so frustrating about the contemporary conflict space , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ associated with proxy groups , cyberwarfare , and terrorism .
To a significant degree , deterrence , which has been a hallmark of U.S. strategy for generations , simply ceases to be an effective way to conceptualize keeping the peace .
But frustrating as this state of affairs is , it won ’ t do to simply pretend matters are otherwise .
You fight the adversary you have .
Salvation will not come simply in the articulation of a strategy .
It requires a new vision , one better adapted to the contemporary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opportunity for ill-intentioned and impossible-to-deter actors to manipulate the situation , creating escalatory spirals that neither the United States nor Iran truly desires .

The assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani met with widespread concern that U.S. foreign-policy decisions are devoid of any overarching strategic vision. As former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry wrote in a critique of President Donald Trump’s handling of the Middle East, “Clearly he doesn’t do strategies, period.”
The assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani met with widespread concern that U.S. foreign-policy decisions are devoid of any overarching strategic vision. As former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry wrote in a critique of President Donald Trump’s handling of the Middle East, “Clearly he doesn’t do strategies, period.”
Yet the administration has articulated at least some strategy. In addition to justifying the assassination on the grounds of preventing an imminent attack, the president and his allies argue that it will deter what they describe as increasing Iranian aggressiveness. “[T]he Suleimani strike,” according to Sen. Tom Cotton, “has already restored deterrence.” In support of this deterrent strategy, Trump threatened, via his preferred medium of Twitter, massive further attacks should Iran choose to escalate the conflict. While his initial suggestion that the United States would target cultural sites has been walked back, the underlying threat of escalation in support of deterrence stands.
The problem with this bellicose posture is not that it is inherently unstrategic. The problem is that it is a strategy designed for a very different kind of conflict than the one the United States faces with Iran. To adapt former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s phrase, you go to war against the adversary you have, not the adversary you want. Iran is not the Soviet Union. It has pursued a decades-long policy of cultivating alliances with armed proxy groups—and that means there’s a real risk this attempted deterrence will backfire, forcing an escalation sought by neither side.
In its most straightforward form, the logic of deterrence is simple: If an adversary believes the costs of an attack are high enough, it will prefer not to engage in that attack in the first place. Thus, the administration’s argument goes, if the United States threatens a massive response to Iranian aggression, they are likely to stand down.
But this logic rests on a couple of key assumptions. Most importantly, in this instance, those who are threatened with punishment must in fact have the power to prevent the precipitating attacks. For such threats to work, then, the Iranian regime itself must be in a position to decide whether or not attacks occur.
Iran has close ties to armed groups throughout the Middle East, from Yemen to Lebanon to Syria to Iraq. Many of these relationships were built in part by Suleimani himself. While these groups take weapons, training, support, and some degree of direction from Iran, they are also independent actors. Their preferences are not always aligned with Iran’s, and they have shown themselves willing to contradict Iranian directives when doing so is to their strategic advantage. For instance, Iran-aligned Houthi rebels have engaged in escalatory violence over the objections of their Iranian backers. This partial independence makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for attacks undertaken by such proxies.
Suppose one of the several armed Shiite groups with ties to Iran that are operative in Iraq engages in a significant attack in the coming days or weeks. It will be unclear whether that attack was taken at Iran’s direction or not. Will the United States extend its belligerent deterrent stand to such acts? Will it strike back at Iran for actions by Iraqis or Syrians?
The answer may well be yes. After all, it was not actions by the Iranian military but by Iranian proxies in Iraq that put in motion the chain of events leading to the killing of Suleimani. Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-linked Shiite militia, was responsible for the rocket attacks on Iraqi bases in December 2019 that killed an American contractor and injured several soldiers. That event spurred a U.S. airstrike on Kataib Hezbollah’s headquarters in Iraq, which subsequently led to the protests outside the U.S. Embassy that preceded the killing of Suleimani.
In an important sense, then, the United States has already shown that it can be provoked by Iranian proxies. In so doing, America has put itself in a profoundly dangerous strategic position. In an attempt to deter Iran with maximalist threats, the United States has given independent armed militias the power to escalate conflict between two sovereign nations.
The Iranians appear acutely aware of the risk. Their initial response to the assassination was notably proportional and public. They wanted no misunderstanding. Moreover, the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations recently argued that Iran was responsible for these public actions but that it ought not be held responsible for “any sort of actions to be taken by others,” a clear reference to the risk of provocation by Iran-linked militias.
The problem is that, having publicly responded with face-saving missile strikes that did limited damage, Iran may genuinely prefer de-escalation. But its proxies, especially those operating in Iraq, may not. Perhaps they view greater conflict between Iran and the United States as an opportunity to end the ongoing U.S. presence in Iraq. Or perhaps they see strategic advantages to operating within the chaos of increased civil conflict.
In this case, they may well have incentives to engage in attacks—for instance, on Americans in Iraq—that exploit the United States’ more aggressive deterrent posture to manipulate it into greater conflict with Iran. And Iran may not be in a position to prevent those actions, in which case Trump’s deterrent stance will have backfired. Indeed, one might even worry that groups not linked to Iran, like the Islamic State, that wish to spread discord and chaos might view this as an opportune moment to engage in false-flag operations that make it look as though Iranian proxies are engaged in escalatory violence.
Of course, proponents of a maximalist strategy will argue that the alternative, backing off the deterrent threat, invites further bad behavior by Iran itself. And there is some truth to this. That is what is so frustrating about the contemporary conflict space, which is inevitably characterized by hard-to-attribute attacks associated with proxy groups, cyberwarfare, and terrorism. To a significant degree, deterrence, which has been a hallmark of U.S. strategy for generations, simply ceases to be an effective way to conceptualize keeping the peace.
But frustrating as this state of affairs is, it won’t do to simply pretend matters are otherwise. You fight the adversary you have. Salvation will not come simply in the articulation of a strategy. It requires a new vision, one better adapted to the contemporary challenge. Traditional deterrence provides too much opportunity for ill-intentioned and impossible-to-deter actors to manipulate the situation, creating escalatory spirals that neither the United States nor Iran truly desires.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-23--For Russia, Impeachment Can’t Be Over Soon Enough

For Russia , Impeachment Can ’ t Be Over Soon Enough MOSCOW—As the third-ever impeachment trial in U.S. history slogged through its third day on Thursday , supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump weren ’ t the only people hoping for a swift conclusion .
Many Russians said they felt the same way—from the highest levels of the Kremlin to people on the streets of Moscow .
Though Russians know their country has been cast as one of the main villains of the drama in Washington—since Trump ’ s 2016 election , no nation has hovered over his presidency quite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , like Americans , hope for a return to normalcy and a chance to reengage diplomatically .
And as far as Russian interference in U.S. politics goes , well , if it ’ s true , so what ?
Doesn ’ t every country do it ?
Even Russian President Vladimir Putin may be frustrated by the official chill between Moscow and Washington , experts say , although U.S. intelligence believes his security services are behind some of the discredited conspiracy theories that helped set the stage for Trump ’ s impeachment —mainly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than Russia , interfered in the 2016 U.S. election .
While many Russia analysts acknowledge that Moscow welcomes the ongoing chaos in Washington , which feeds Putin ’ s strategic aim of undermining U.S. power , they often caution that it also works to undercut the Russian president ’ s long-term goals and what the Kremlin hoped to gain from an anti-establishment president like Trump .
Primarily , that means trying to cut a strategic deal with the White House on a host of issues , including arms control and respecting spheres @ @ @ @ @ @ @ status quo enshrined after the end of the Cold War .
“ [ The Kremlin ] would like that everything would finish as fast as possible and that Trump could be more free from all this pressure he has inside of the country , ” said Tatiana Stanovaya , the founder of the political consultancy R.Politik and a scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center .
“ Moscow wants to profit from Trump and engage with him , but they can ’ t because he is too dependent on what ’ s going on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. intelligence community ’ s conclusion that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to the U.S. president ’ s reported affinity for Putin , the Kremlin ’ s ambitions and Moscow ’ s moves around the world have taken center stage in Washington and transformed U.S.-Russia relations into a part of the country ’ s domestic political debate .
Now , with a vote divided along party lines for the impeachment trial in the Republican-controlled Senate a real possibility , many in Moscow are hoping that a quick conclusion to the trial may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major focus of America ’ s increasingly divisive politics .
Such hopes may be disingenuous , given the huge scale of Russian interference in U.S. affairs , from disinformation campaigns to strategic hacking , and how U.S. political dysfunction bolsters the strategic goals of the Russian leadership .
On Wednesday in Washington , as Rep. Adam Schiff , a Democrat from California and head of the team of House managers , outlined evidence that Trump had sought to strong-arm Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into investigating his political rival , former Vice President Joe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role that Russian operatives played in interfering in the 2016 election and raised the specter of further meddling during the upcoming 2020 presidential vote .
To many Russians , such rhetoric only promises more of the same .
“ Russia wants to work together with the United States , but on its terms , ” Stanovaya said .
“ The Kremlin knows that [ the ] American establishment sees it as a threat that should be deterred and contained , so it ’ s looking for openings to counter that mainstream view.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a historic low , but Trump and Putin have a cordial relationship , with Trump even siding with the Russian leader ’ s denials of election interference over the assessments of U.S. intelligence agencies .
And despite the Kremlin ’ s alleged desire to stay out of the political fray in Washington , Russian-linked operatives continue to orbit around events linked to the ongoing impeachment proceedings .
Last week , the U.S. cybersecurity firm Area 1 Security said that last November , Russian military agents successfully hacked into Burisma , the Ukrainian gas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s impeachment trial .
Moreover , Russian security services may have played a role in spreading false claims about Ukraine in the 2016 election , a theory espoused by Trump .
While such allegations have been promoted by American figures , including right-wing journalists and Rudy Giuliani , Trump ’ s personal lawyer , the Washington Post reported in December that U.S. intelligence officials briefed lawmakers that Russian operatives played a key role in spreading the claims .
Russian state media , meanwhile , has covered both the House and Senate hearings in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican position , while Putin himself has taken to echoing Trump ’ s own talking points on impeachment .
“ First , they accuse Trump of collusion with Russia , then it turns out there was no collusion , so this can not be used as a basis for impeachment , ” Putin said in December during a news conference .
“ Now they ’ ve come up with the idea he put pressure on Ukraine .
I don ’ t know what it is all about.
” Similar skeptical views on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Russian interference seem to be shared across the broader Russian public , said Alexey Naumov , an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council and the deputy editor of the foreign desk at the Russian newspaper Kommersant , where he covers U.S. politics , including tracking the impeachment trial .
“ Russians are pretty cynical , ” he said .
“ Most people here believe a leader can get away with much more than the average person , and Trump asking another leader to do him a favor isn ’ t such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a general consensus among people who follow the news and don ’ t follow the news.
” Impeachment and the details of American government are not leading topics driving Russian news coverage , and a large section of the population remains apolitical .
Moreover , Putin ’ s surprise announcement last week to revise the constitution in a bid to extend his rule continues to dominate discussion and headlines in the country .
But the view on impeachment from Moscow , however limited , also provides a fun-house mirror reflection of the insecurities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Americans share about each other ’ s countries as Moscow and Washington are mired in growing geopolitical tension .
“ It looks like political theater to me , ” said Pavel Shakirov , a 33-year-old Muscovite who works in marketing , about the impeachment trial .
“ Russia is often said to be doing many things in America , but I think it is just a reason for Trump ’ s opponents to attack him.
” The issue of Russian meddling abroad , from election interference in the United States to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Skripal in the United Kingdom , has been met with official denials in Moscow and at times mockery on Russian state media , and opinion polls have tended to reflect that the public embraces this official narrative .
Many have also expressed incredulity that Russia could successfully undermine the United States .
“ Russians don ’ t think that Russia is as powerful as Americans think it is , ” Naumov , the Kommersant journalist , said .
“ We see incompetence here every day .
It ’ s hard for people to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well-oiled hybrid war machine aimed at the heart of a democratic United States.
” But according to Denis Volkov , the deputy director at the Levada Center , an independent pollster based in Moscow , on closer examination many Russians are willing to entertain that their country has interfered in other countries ’ affairs .
From his perch at the Levada Center , Volkov has been on the front lines of Russian public opinion and conducted a series of focus groups in 2018 about foreign interference where participants were willing to veer from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It gets denied at first , but in less formal conversations there is an acknowledgement , ” Volkov said .
“ But they will say that every great country does it , so why shouldn ’ t we ?
They say America interferes with other countries , and they are a great country , so if we are a great country , then we should be doing it , too .
”

MOSCOW—As the third-ever impeachment trial in U.S. history slogged through its third day on Thursday, supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump weren’t the only people hoping for a swift conclusion. Many Russians seem to feel the same way—from the highest levels of the Kremlin to people on the streets of Moscow.
MOSCOW—As the third-ever impeachment trial in U.S. history slogged through its third day on Thursday, supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump weren’t the only people hoping for a swift conclusion. Many Russians seem to feel the same way—from the highest levels of the Kremlin to people on the streets of Moscow.
Though Russians know their country has been cast as one of the main villains of the drama in Washington—since Trump’s 2016 election, no nation has hovered over his presidency quite like Russia—many in Moscow say that they, like Americans, hope for a return to normalcy and a chance to reengage diplomatically. And as far as Russian interference in U.S. politics goes, well, if it’s true, so what? Doesn’t every country do it?
Even Russian President Vladimir Putin may be frustrated by the official chill between Moscow and Washington, experts say, although U.S. intelligence believes his security services are behind some of the discredited conspiracy theories that helped set the stage for Trump’s impeachment —mainly Trump’s idea that Ukraine, more than Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. While many Russia analysts acknowledge that Moscow welcomes the ongoing chaos in Washington, which feeds Putin’s strategic aim of undermining U.S. power, they often caution that it also works to undercut the Russian president’s long-term goals and what the Kremlin hoped to gain from an anti-establishment president like Trump.
Primarily, that means trying to cut a strategic deal with the White House on a host of issues, including arms control and respecting spheres of influences, that could rewrite the status quo enshrined after the end of the Cold War.
“[The Kremlin] would like that everything would finish as fast as possible and that Trump could be more free from all this pressure he has inside of the country,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, the founder of the political consultancy R.Politik and a scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center. “Moscow wants to profit from Trump and engage with him, but they can’t because he is too dependent on what’s going on with internal U.S. politics.”
From the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to the U.S. president’s reported affinity for Putin, the Kremlin’s ambitions and Moscow’s moves around the world have taken center stage in Washington and transformed U.S.-Russia relations into a part of the country’s domestic political debate.
Now, with a vote divided along party lines for the impeachment trial in the Republican-controlled Senate a real possibility, many in Moscow are hoping that a quick conclusion to the trial may provide some temporary reprieve from being a major focus of America’s increasingly divisive politics.
Such hopes may be disingenuous, given the huge scale of Russian interference in U.S. affairs, from disinformation campaigns to strategic hacking, and how U.S. political dysfunction bolsters the strategic goals of the Russian leadership. On Wednesday in Washington, as Rep. Adam Schiff, a Democrat from California and head of the team of House managers, outlined evidence that Trump had sought to strong-arm Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into investigating his political rival, former Vice President Joe Biden, Schiff also focused on the role that Russian operatives played in interfering in the 2016 election and raised the specter of further meddling during the upcoming 2020 presidential vote.
To many Russians, such rhetoric only promises more of the same. “Russia wants to work together with the United States, but on its terms,” Stanovaya said. “The Kremlin knows that [the] American establishment sees it as a threat that should be deterred and contained, so it’s looking for openings to counter that mainstream view.”
Relations between Moscow and Washington remain at a historic low, but Trump and Putin have a cordial relationship, with Trump even siding with the Russian leader’s denials of election interference over the assessments of U.S. intelligence agencies. And despite the Kremlin’s alleged desire to stay out of the political fray in Washington, Russian-linked operatives continue to orbit around events linked to the ongoing impeachment proceedings. Last week, the U.S. cybersecurity firm Area 1 Security said that last November, Russian military agents successfully hacked into Burisma, the Ukrainian gas company at the center of Trump’s impeachment trial. Moreover, Russian security services may have played a role in spreading false claims about Ukraine in the 2016 election, a theory espoused by Trump. While such allegations have been promoted by American figures, including right-wing journalists and Rudy Giuliani, Trump’s personal lawyer, the Washington Post reported in December that U.S. intelligence officials briefed lawmakers that Russian operatives played a key role in spreading the claims.
Russian state media, meanwhile, has covered both the House and Senate hearings in terms sympathetic to Trump and the predominant Republican position, while Putin himself has taken to echoing Trump’s own talking points on impeachment.
“First, they accuse Trump of collusion with Russia, then it turns out there was no collusion, so this cannot be used as a basis for impeachment,” Putin said in December during a news conference. “Now they’ve come up with the idea he put pressure on Ukraine. I don’t know what it is all about.”
Similar skeptical views on the impeachment proceedings in Washington and the role of Russian interference seem to be shared across the broader Russian public, said Alexey Naumov, an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council and the deputy editor of the foreign desk at the Russian newspaper Kommersant, where he covers U.S. politics, including tracking the impeachment trial.
“Russians are pretty cynical,” he said. “Most people here believe a leader can get away with much more than the average person, and Trump asking another leader to do him a favor isn’t such a big deal. That’s a general consensus among people who follow the news and don’t follow the news.”
Impeachment and the details of American government are not leading topics driving Russian news coverage, and a large section of the population remains apolitical. Moreover, Putin’s surprise announcement last week to revise the constitution in a bid to extend his rule continues to dominate discussion and headlines in the country. But the view on impeachment from Moscow, however limited, also provides a fun-house mirror reflection of the insecurities, misconceptions, and similarities that Russians and Americans share about each other’s countries as Moscow and Washington are mired in growing geopolitical tension.
“It looks like political theater to me,” said Pavel Shakirov, a 33-year-old Muscovite who works in marketing, about the impeachment trial. “Russia is often said to be doing many things in America, but I think it is just a reason for Trump’s opponents to attack him.”
The issue of Russian meddling abroad, from election interference in the United States to the attempted assassination of Russian double agent Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom, has been met with official denials in Moscow and at times mockery on Russian state media, and opinion polls have tended to reflect that the public embraces this official narrative. Many have also expressed incredulity that Russia could successfully undermine the United States.
“Russians don’t think that Russia is as powerful as Americans think it is,” Naumov, the Kommersant journalist, said. “We see incompetence here every day. It’s hard for people to believe that [Russia] is a well-oiled hybrid war machine aimed at the heart of a democratic United States.”
But according to Denis Volkov, the deputy director at the Levada Center, an independent pollster based in Moscow, on closer examination many Russians are willing to entertain that their country has interfered in other countries’ affairs. From his perch at the Levada Center, Volkov has been on the front lines of Russian public opinion and conducted a series of focus groups in 2018 about foreign interference where participants were willing to veer from the state-sanctioned version of events.
“It gets denied at first, but in less formal conversations there is an acknowledgement,” Volkov said. “But they will say that every great country does it, so why shouldn’t we? They say America interferes with other countries, and they are a great country, so if we are a great country, then we should be doing it, too.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-23--Hong Kong’s Greatness Is Slipping Away

Hong Kong’s Greatness Is Slipping Away

The Lunar New Year is the most significant holiday in Hong Kong , but the mood this year is anything but festive .
With just a week to go before the holiday , police violently shut down a rally for democracy attended by tens of thousands of Hong Kongers last Sunday using tear gas after fights broke out between undercover agents and protesters .
Even the traditional New Year markets reflect the ongoing protests .
The 15 government-run markets are banning dry goods for the first time ever to prevent the sale of items with political slogans , while grassroots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that .
Three cases of the Wuhan virus have been detected in the city , and residents are fearful of a real outbreak .
Just a few weeks ago , Hong Kong saw Christmas mall protests and a million-person Jan. 1 march , which was prematurely stopped by the police by force after just less than three hours .
There will be no traditional parade for the Lunar New Year , nor will there be fireworks , which have also been canceled for New Year ’ s Eve .
Not surprisingly , all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economy .
Just this week , Moody ’ s downgraded Hong Kong ’ s credit rating , citing doubts over the ability of Hong Kong ’ s “ institutions and governance ” to deal with the concerns of the protest movement .
Last year , Hong Kong experienced a technical recession for the first time in 10 years after its GDP fell in two successive quarters , and it is expected the figures for 2019 will show a decline for the whole year .
Despite all this , daily life in Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is a long , long way to go before it turns into 1980s Beirut or Belfast during the Troubles—one of the most frequent periods referenced by Hong Kongers thanks to the cultural heritage of British colonialism .
And comparatively speaking , the toll of protests has been far worse in places such as Baghdad and Santiago , Chile .
But as a supposedly wealthy , global , commercial metropolis , Hong Kong is steadily withering .
At the core of this is the hard-line stance taken by the authorities against protesters and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shut down approved marches forcefully with tear gas and charges , used brute force in arrests , and targeted journalists and even paramedics .
The police have arrested around 7,000 people for protesting or related charges , with a significant proportion being teenagers .
This past November , several universities literally became battlegrounds as police besieged over a thousand students and protesters before forcing them to surrender .
The government often claims it is only targeting violent elements , but the authorities have also been cracking down on civic groups , activists , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they arrested four people from a nonprofit protester aid group for alleged money laundering and seized 70 million Hong Kong dollars ( about $ 9 million ) in the group ’ s bank account that had been raised from public donations .
Meanwhile , Hong Kong teachers can potentially be punished for social media remarks that are deemed inappropriate by the authorities , according to Education Minister Kevin Yeung .
Not content with taking down local protesters and their supporters , the authorities have also turned on international visitors , too .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rights Watch , was banned on Jan. 12 from entering Hong Kong .
Also banned this month was the photography professor Matthew Connors , who had covered local protests on previous visits last year .
The Chinese foreign ministry said Roth was banned for inciting separatists , which is a wild claim , while Connors was only told by Hong Kong immigration officials he did not “ meet the immigration requirements.
” This is reminiscent of the banning of the Financial Times editor Victor Mallet in November 2018 from Hong Kong after he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visa .
Clearly these men were all banned from Hong Kong for noncriminal political reasons , making a mockery of Hong Kong ’ s long-standing claim to be “ Asia ’ s world city.
” Beyond individual cases , tourist numbers have fallen significantly , by 56 percent in November 2019 year-on-year , while October saw a 43.7 percent year-on-year fall .
The number of visitors for July through November declined by 36 percent from the same period in 2018 .
Hong Kong ’ s airport saw a 4.2 percent year-on-year drop in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since 2009 , during the global financial crisis .
And obviously , locals are not shopping or eating out as much as before , putting heavy pressure on businesses .
For a city that prides itself as being all about business and has hosted many major conferences and exhibitions , the protests have been a huge blow .
Since last year , regional tech conferences , industry exhibitions , and even music festivals and sporting events have all been canceled .
And yet , things are not likely to get any better between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the start of the year , Beijing surprised many when it replaced the head of its Liaison Office in Hong Kong with Luo Huining , the former Communist Party head of Shanxi province .
Luo , who had no prior international or Hong Kong experience , as head of Shanxi province had clamped down on local corruption and misbehaving officials .
The appointment of Luo signifies that Beijing will not be treading softly in Hong Kong , where the protest movement has gone on for over seven months .
True to form , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the long-standing “ one country , two systems ” policy being a “ national security loophole , ” raising fears of future plans to implement a national security bill that would prohibit “ treason ” and “ secession.
” Back in 2003 , an attempt to impose this bill saw hundreds of thousands of Hong Kongers march against it , which ultimately prevented it from being made into law .
The truth is that before the anti-extradition bill protests began last June , Hong Kong had already been in decline .
While still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong was already languishing politically , with high poverty rates and shrinking civic and political liberties .
Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam ’ s brazen attempt last year to push forward a law that would allow extraditions of Hong Kongers to China may have sparked the protest movement , but public anger at Lam and Beijing had been building up for years .
A rare bright spot is that the protest movement has led to an outpouring of creativity and cooperation .
A major example is what ’ s known as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and eat at businesses that support the protests , such as the independent New Year markets , while shunning those run by pro-China tycoons or Chinese corporations .
Sometimes the protest movement ’ s aims might seem quixotic , but , fueled by Hong Kongers ’ love of their city , it has proven remarkably resilient .
Beijing wants to have it both ways with Hong Kong—to keep it as a financial hub while stifling its political and civic freedoms .
It is finding that this is easier said than done .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ why it is trying to find alternatives such as promoting reforms in nearby Shenzhen and , more amusingly , looking to convert the gambling hub of Macao , China ’ s other special administrative region , into a financial center .
But Hong Kong ’ s long-standing international advantages are not easily replicated elsewhere—and some of them , like its rule of law , are fundamentally incompatible with Beijing ’ s ambitions .
With an ineffectual leader and government , a resilient protest movement , and a police force at war with its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chance of reaching a solution anytime soon .

The Lunar New Year is the most significant holiday in Hong Kong, but the mood this year is anything but festive. With just a week to go before the holiday, police violently shut down a rally for democracy attended by tens of thousands of Hong Kongers last Sunday using tear gas after fights broke out between undercover agents and protesters. Even the traditional New Year markets reflect the ongoing protests. The 15 government-run markets are banning dry goods for the first time ever to prevent the sale of items with political slogans, while grassroots markets have sprung up to sell just that. Three cases of the Wuhan virus have been detected in the city, and residents are fearful of a real outbreak.
The Lunar New Year is the most significant holiday in Hong Kong, but the mood this year is anything but festive. With just a week to go before the holiday, police violently shut down a rally for democracy attended by tens of thousands of Hong Kongers last Sunday using tear gas after fights broke out between undercover agents and protesters. Even the traditional New Year markets reflect the ongoing protests. The 15 government-run markets are banning dry goods for the first time ever to prevent the sale of items with political slogans, while grassroots markets have sprung up to sell just that. Three cases of the Wuhan virus have been detected in the city, and residents are fearful of a real outbreak.
Just a few weeks ago, Hong Kong saw Christmas mall protests and a million-person Jan. 1 march, which was prematurely stopped by the police by force after just less than three hours. There will be no traditional parade for the Lunar New Year, nor will there be fireworks, which have also been canceled for New Year’s Eve.
Not surprisingly, all this has had a drastic effect on the economy.
Just this week, Moody’s downgraded Hong Kong’s credit rating, citing doubts over the ability of Hong Kong’s “institutions and governance” to deal with the concerns of the protest movement. Last year, Hong Kong experienced a technical recession for the first time in 10 years after its GDP fell in two successive quarters, and it is expected the figures for 2019 will show a decline for the whole year.
Despite all this, daily life in Hong Kong is still largely intact, and there is a long, long way to go before it turns into 1980s Beirut or Belfast during the Troubles—one of the most frequent periods referenced by Hong Kongers thanks to the cultural heritage of British colonialism. And comparatively speaking, the toll of protests has been far worse in places such as Baghdad and Santiago, Chile. But as a supposedly wealthy, global, commercial metropolis, Hong Kong is steadily withering. At the core of this is the hard-line stance taken by the authorities against protesters and the general public. The police have shut down approved marches forcefully with tear gas and charges, used brute force in arrests, and targeted journalists and even paramedics. The police have arrested around 7,000 people for protesting or related charges, with a significant proportion being teenagers. This past November, several universities literally became battlegrounds as police besieged over a thousand students and protesters before forcing them to surrender.
The government often claims it is only targeting violent elements, but the authorities have also been cracking down on civic groups, activists, and pro-democracy politicians. In December 2019, they arrested four people from a nonprofit protester aid group for alleged money laundering and seized 70 million Hong Kong dollars (about $9 million) in the group’s bank account that had been raised from public donations. Meanwhile, Hong Kong teachers can potentially be punished for social media remarks that are deemed inappropriate by the authorities, according to Education Minister Kevin Yeung.
Not content with taking down local protesters and their supporters, the authorities have also turned on international visitors, too.
Kenneth Roth, the head of Human Rights Watch, was banned on Jan. 12 from entering Hong Kong. Also banned this month was the photography professor Matthew Connors, who had covered local protests on previous visits last year.
The Chinese foreign ministry said Roth was banned for inciting separatists, which is a wild claim, while Connors was only told by Hong Kong immigration officials he did not “meet the immigration requirements.” This is reminiscent of the banning of the Financial Times editor Victor Mallet in November 2018 from Hong Kong after he was refused a renewal of his work visa. Clearly these men were all banned from Hong Kong for noncriminal political reasons, making a mockery of Hong Kong’s long-standing claim to be “Asia’s world city.”
Beyond individual cases, tourist numbers have fallen significantly, by 56 percent in November 2019 year-on-year, while October saw a 43.7 percent year-on-year fall. The number of visitors for July through November declined by 36 percent from the same period in 2018. Hong Kong’s airport saw a 4.2 percent year-on-year drop in visitors for 2019, the biggest fall since 2009, during the global financial crisis. And obviously, locals are not shopping or eating out as much as before, putting heavy pressure on businesses.
For a city that prides itself as being all about business and has hosted many major conferences and exhibitions, the protests have been a huge blow. Since last year, regional tech conferences, industry exhibitions, and even music festivals and sporting events have all been canceled.
And yet, things are not likely to get any better between the government and the public.
At the start of the year, Beijing surprised many when it replaced the head of its Liaison Office in Hong Kong with Luo Huining, the former Communist Party head of Shanxi province. Luo, who had no prior international or Hong Kong experience, as head of Shanxi province had clamped down on local corruption and misbehaving officials. The appointment of Luo signifies that Beijing will not be treading softly in Hong Kong, where the protest movement has gone on for over seven months.
True to form, Luo is already making ominous statements about the long-standing “one country, two systems” policy being a “national security loophole,” raising fears of future plans to implement a national security bill that would prohibit “treason” and “secession.” Back in 2003, an attempt to impose this bill saw hundreds of thousands of Hong Kongers march against it, which ultimately prevented it from being made into law.
The truth is that before the anti-extradition bill protests began last June, Hong Kong had already been in decline. While still outwardly a thriving financial hub, Hong Kong was already languishing politically, with high poverty rates and shrinking civic and political liberties. Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s brazen attempt last year to push forward a law that would allow extraditions of Hong Kongers to China may have sparked the protest movement, but public anger at Lam and Beijing had been building up for years.
A rare bright spot is that the protest movement has led to an outpouring of creativity and cooperation. A major example is what’s known as the yellow economy, in which people shop and eat at businesses that support the protests, such as the independent New Year markets, while shunning those run by pro-China tycoons or Chinese corporations. Sometimes the protest movement’s aims might seem quixotic, but, fueled by Hong Kongers’ love of their city, it has proven remarkably resilient.
Beijing wants to have it both ways with Hong Kong—to keep it as a financial hub while stifling its political and civic freedoms. It is finding that this is easier said than done. The central government knows this, which is why it is trying to find alternatives such as promoting reforms in nearby Shenzhen and, more amusingly, looking to convert the gambling hub of Macao, China’s other special administrative region, into a financial center. But Hong Kong’s long-standing international advantages are not easily replicated elsewhere—and some of them, like its rule of law, are fundamentally incompatible with Beijing’s ambitions.
With an ineffectual leader and government, a resilient protest movement, and a police force at war with its own public, Hong Kong has little chance of reaching a solution anytime soon.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-23--What to Watch Today in Trump’s Impeachment Trial

What to Watch Today in Trump ’ s Impeachment Trial Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s impeachment trial continues in the Senate , new details emerge of an attack on a U.S. military outpost in Kenya , and the State Department taps a new envoy to counter Chinese influence at the United Nations .
If you would like to receive Security Brief Plus in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Today marks the second day of the historic impeachment trial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wednesday , House Democrats gave nine hours of opening arguments to the Senate about what they said was irrefutable evidence that Trump withheld military aid from Ukraine to pressure it to investigate his Democratic political rival , former Vice President Joe Biden , and then obstructed the subsequent investigation in Congress .
Just in time for the trial , a new trove of internal emails shed new light on the behind-the-scenes confusion during the months that the Trump administration withheld the military aid last year , FP ’ s Robbie Gramer reports .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Management and Budget officials , Pentagon officials , and Republican lawmakers show the Pentagon was confused about why military aid to Ukraine was withheld , while impatient Republican lawmakers quietly pushed the White House to lift the hold .
Wednesday highlights .
The House Democrats leading the prosecution outlined why Trump should be impeached to U.S. senators , who appeared impassive , bored , or restless during the long day .
In his closing argument , Democratic Rep. Adam Schiff urged senators to be open to receiving new evidence during the trial and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what happened .
“ More emails are going to come out .
More witnesses are going to come forward , ” he said .
“ And the only question is , do you want to hear it now ?
Do you want to know the full truth ?
” Meanwhile , Trump raged about the proceedings with 142 tweets alone on Wednesday .
What to watch for today .
House Democrats will flesh out their arguments , alleging Trump ’ s abuse of power .
One of the biggest unanswered questions is whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will likely be behind-the-scenes wrangling as Democrats push to win four Republican votes to gain a majority to vote for allowing witnesses in the trial .
Republicans have pushed for Hunter Biden , Joe Biden ’ s son and the former board member of a Ukrainian energy company accused of corruption , to testify .
Democrats want to call former National Security Advisor John Bolton as a witness .
Manda Bay attack .
The New York Times went behind the scenes of a deadly attack by al Shabab fighters on a U.S. military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Kenya , that killed three U.S. troops and destroyed a U.S. surveillance plane .
News of the attack was overshadowed hostilities with Iran after the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani .
But the Kenya attack—the worst on U.S. personnel since the October 2017 ambush in Niger that killed four U.S. soldiers— highlights the precarious nature of the U.S. military presence in Africa .
The attack comes as the Pentagon considers winding down its footprint on the continent , though Defense Secretary Mark Esper said this week that no final decisions had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drawn criticism from members of Congress , including Trump ally Sen. Lindsey Graham .
Trump meets Iraqi counterpart .
Trump met with Iraqi President Barham Saleh on Wednesday on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos , Switzerland .
It was the first meeting between the leaders since the U.S. assassination of Suleimani .
After the strike , the Iraqi parliament passed a resolution calling for the immediate and full withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country , and Washington responded by threatening to impose sanctions .
At Davos , neither @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threats , but both leaders discussed the importance of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship .
The meeting occurred against the backdrop of renewed threats from Shiite militia groups in Iraq against the United States .
Kataeb Hezbollah , an Iran-backed group , warned Saleh not to speak to Trump and previously threatened lawmakers from voting against the resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops .
Pompeo meets Guaidó .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó on the sidelines of a counterterrorism conference in Bogotá on Monday .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ I would fully expect there will be further action that the United States would take to continue to support President Guaidó and the Venezuelan people.
” On Tuesday , the United States blacklisted 15 planes that belonged to the state oil company .
Pompeo ’ s comments came just weeks after tensions rose between Guaidó and Nicolás Maduro ’ s government , which blocked Guaidó and opposition lawmakers from entering the National Assembly .
The Berlin conference on Libya .
World powers met in Berlin on Sunday in the latest attempt to help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to an end .
Turkey , Russia , Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—all major players in the conflict—attended , as well as representatives from the United States , the United Kingdom , France , and Germany .
The leaders of the two main factions , the Government of National Accord Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj and leading warlord Gen. Khalifa Haftar , attended but did not participate .
The powers signed a communiqué pledging to respect a U.N.-imposed arms embargo , an attempt to build upon a cease-fire forged by Russia and Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the NSC .
The National Security Council ’ s senior director for Europe and Eurasia , Andrew Peek , was abruptly placed on administrative leave pending a security-related investigation , though it ’ s unclear what it is about .
He will be temporarily replaced by a Pentagon staffer , Tom Williams , according to CNN .
The last two people in Peek ’ s position , Fiona Hill and Tim Morrison , departed their jobs before testifying in the ongoing impeachment investigation .
New envoy at State .
FP ’ s Colum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mark Lambert , a former U.S. envoy for North Korea , has been tapped as new special envoy charged with countering China ’ s clout in international organizations .
Until now , the Trump administration has largely ignored that growing influence .
Revolving door .
Steven Walker , the former director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA ) , who left the Pentagon late last year , began his new job as vice president and chief technology officer of Lockheed Martin effective Jan. 13 .
Walker is credited with reinvigorating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efforts , as well as developing and fielding a new long range anti-ship Missile—built by Lockheed .
Found in translation .
The Monterey County Weekly obtained a cache of documents through Freedom of Information Act requests from the Pentagon ’ s Defense Language Institute .
The result is a fascinating deep dive into what the Pentagon ’ s foreign language programs reveal about shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities over time .
Indian space robot .
The Indian Space Research Organization recently unveiled a robot called Vyom Mitra that will lead a mission to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resemble a human woman .
Though it is limited in its mobility , it is highly sophisticated in other ways : notably in its ability to recognize and communicate with other astronauts , respond to their questions , and detect environmental changes .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: U.S. President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial continues in the Senate, new details emerge of an attack on a U.S. military outpost in Kenya , and the State Department taps a new envoy to counter Chinese influence at the United Nations.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: U.S. President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial continues in the Senate, new details emerge of an attack on a U.S. military outpost in Kenya, and the State Department taps a new envoy to counter Chinese influence at the United Nations.
If you would like to receive Security Brief Plus in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Impeachment Day Two Kicks Off
Today marks the second day of the historic impeachment trial against U.S. President Donald Trump. On Wednesday, House Democrats gave nine hours of opening arguments to the Senate about what they said was irrefutable evidence that Trump withheld military aid from Ukraine to pressure it to investigate his Democratic political rival, former Vice President Joe Biden, and then obstructed the subsequent investigation in Congress.
Just in time for the trial, a new trove of internal emails shed new light on the behind-the-scenes confusion during the months that the Trump administration withheld the military aid last year, FP’s Robbie Gramer reports. Email exchanges between White House Office of Management and Budget officials, Pentagon officials, and Republican lawmakers show the Pentagon was confused about why military aid to Ukraine was withheld, while impatient Republican lawmakers quietly pushed the White House to lift the hold.
Wednesday highlights. The House Democrats leading the prosecution outlined why Trump should be impeached to U.S. senators, who appeared impassive, bored, or restless during the long day. In his closing argument, Democratic Rep. Adam Schiff urged senators to be open to receiving new evidence during the trial and learn the “full truth” of what happened. “More emails are going to come out. More witnesses are going to come forward,” he said. “And the only question is, do you want to hear it now? Do you want to know the full truth?”
Meanwhile, Trump raged about the proceedings with 142 tweets alone on Wednesday.
What to watch for today. House Democrats will flesh out their arguments, alleging Trump’s abuse of power. One of the biggest unanswered questions is whether the trial will have witnesses. There will likely be behind-the-scenes wrangling as Democrats push to win four Republican votes to gain a majority to vote for allowing witnesses in the trial.
Republicans have pushed for Hunter Biden, Joe Biden’s son and the former board member of a Ukrainian energy company accused of corruption, to testify. Democrats want to call former National Security Advisor John Bolton as a witness.
What We’re Watching
Manda Bay attack. The New York Times went behind the scenes of a deadly attack by al Shabab fighters on a U.S. military outpost on Jan. 5 in Manda Bay, Kenya, that killed three U.S. troops and destroyed a U.S. surveillance plane. News of the attack was overshadowed hostilities with Iran after the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani. But the Kenya attack—the worst on U.S. personnel since the October 2017 ambush in Niger that killed four U.S. soldiers— highlights the precarious nature of the U.S. military presence in Africa.
The attack comes as the Pentagon considers winding down its footprint on the continent, though Defense Secretary Mark Esper said this week that no final decisions had been made. The potential drawdown has drawn criticism from members of Congress, including Trump ally Sen. Lindsey Graham.
Trump meets Iraqi counterpart. Trump met with Iraqi President Barham Saleh on Wednesday on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. It was the first meeting between the leaders since the U.S. assassination of Suleimani. After the strike, the Iraqi parliament passed a resolution calling for the immediate and full withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country, and Washington responded by threatening to impose sanctions. At Davos, neither Trump nor Saleh committed walking back the threats, but both leaders discussed the importance of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship.
The meeting occurred against the backdrop of renewed threats from Shiite militia groups in Iraq against the United States. Kataeb Hezbollah, an Iran-backed group, warned Saleh not to speak to Trump and previously threatened lawmakers from voting against the resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
Pompeo meets Guaidó. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó on the sidelines of a counterterrorism conference in Bogotá on Monday. There, Pompeo told journalists that “I would fully expect there will be further action that the United States would take to continue to support President Guaidó and the Venezuelan people.” On Tuesday, the United States blacklisted 15 planes that belonged to the state oil company. Pompeo’s comments came just weeks after tensions rose between Guaidó and Nicolás Maduro’s government, which blocked Guaidó and opposition lawmakers from entering the National Assembly.
The Berlin conference on Libya. World powers met in Berlin on Sunday in the latest attempt to help bring Libya’s long civil war to an end. Turkey, Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—all major players in the conflict—attended, as well as representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The leaders of the two main factions, the Government of National Accord Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj and leading warlord Gen. Khalifa Haftar, attended but did not participate. The powers signed a communiqué pledging to respect a U.N.-imposed arms embargo, an attempt to build upon a cease-fire forged by Russia and Turkey earlier this month.
Movers and Shakers
Another shake-up at the NSC. The National Security Council’s senior director for Europe and Eurasia, Andrew Peek, was abruptly placed on administrative leave pending a security-related investigation, though it’s unclear what it is about. He will be temporarily replaced by a Pentagon staffer, Tom Williams, according to CNN. The last two people in Peek’s position, Fiona Hill and Tim Morrison, departed their jobs before testifying in the ongoing impeachment investigation.
New envoy at State. FP’s Colum Lynch broke the story on Wednesday that Mark Lambert, a former U.S. envoy for North Korea, has been tapped as new special envoy charged with countering China’s clout in international organizations. Until now, the Trump administration has largely ignored that growing influence.
Revolving door. Steven Walker, the former director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), who left the Pentagon late last year, began his new job as vice president and chief technology officer of Lockheed Martin effective Jan. 13. Walker is credited with reinvigorating DARPA’s hypersonic weapons and space efforts, as well as developing and fielding a new long range anti-ship Missile—built by Lockheed.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Found in translation. The Monterey County Weekly obtained a cache of documents through Freedom of Information Act requests from the Pentagon’s Defense Language Institute. The result is a fascinating deep dive into what the Pentagon’s foreign language programs reveal about shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities over time.
Odds and Ends
Indian space robot. The Indian Space Research Organization recently unveiled a robot called Vyom Mitra that will lead a mission to space. The robot is designed to resemble a human woman. Though it is limited in its mobility, it is highly sophisticated in other ways: notably in its ability to recognize and communicate with other astronauts, respond to their questions, and detect environmental changes.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Dan Haverty contributed to this report.