foreignpolicy--2020-01-23--Europe Is the New Front in Trump’s Trade War

Europe Is the New Front in Trump ’ s Trade War With a rejigged NAFTA passed by Congress and a mini trade deal with China in the books , the Trump administration is now planning to turn its trade bazooka on a familiar target : Europe .
Indeed , U.S. President Donald Trump already kicked off the latest chapter at the World Economic Forum this week in Davos , Switzerland , where he followed a “ friendly ” chat with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen by again threatening to levy huge tariffs on European cars if the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreement soon .
That was followed by further threats by U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to use the auto tariffs to punish European countries that tax American digital firms , further clouding the prospects for trade peace just days after France tendered an olive branch in the contentious fight over global tax rules .
Trump ’ s discordant performance in Davos , where he took his “ America First ” economic message to the very epicenter of the internationalist set , highlights the difficulties Europe will face this year in taming Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europeans were quietly celebrating what seemed to them the rebirth of a multilateral approach to trade disputes—a little-noticed agreement this month with the United States and Japan to tackle industrial subsidies—Trump again railed against an international trade order he thinks is stacked against him and that he is steadily dismantling .
On Wednesday , Trump declared that the United States is a “ developing nation , ” in need of the same preferential treatment under World Trade Organization rules as China and India , and called for a massive reform of the quarter-century-old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aim at Europe ’ s alleged trade abuses , describing the European Union as a worse offender than China .
After three years of steady , but still limited U.S. trade attacks on Europe—tariffs on steel and a host of other products , and a long-simmering fight over Europe ’ s support for Airbus—the EU is bracing this year to receive the full brunt of Trump ’ s trade anger .
“ The European Union tried to gain some time , and had Washington focused on Beijing , but now we are on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Elvire Fabry , a trade expert at the Institut Jacques Delors in Paris .
“ Trump will expect to have some new scalps to show from the European side.
” Trump may be emboldened by his relative success in browbeating Canada and Mexico to renegotiate parts of the North American Free Trade Agreement , and by his use of tariffs to force China to repeat some promises of reform and promise to buy more U.S. goods .
But there are several important differences between Trump ’ s previous trade fights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beyond the fact that the EU for decades has been a U.S. ally , not a rising strategic competitor like China .
First , China ’ s longtime , egregious abuse of economic levers including state-owned firms , industrial subsidies , theft of intellectual property , and forced technology transfer was never much in doubt and in fact generated bipartisan agreement in Washington on the need to confront Beijing .
Even at the height of Trump ’ s trade war with China , for example , Democratic presidential candidates vied among themselves to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; few turned a blind eye to the country ’ s well-documented abuses .
That ’ s not the case with Europe , where Trump ’ s invocation of a specious national security excuse to slap the EU with tariffs on steel and aluminum in 2018 met with protest among all mainstream economists and from both sides of the political aisle .
While it ’ s true that some European trade policies have long rankled successive U.S. administrations—including state support for the aerospace giant Airbus and a doggedly closed agricultural market and some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s reiterated protestations , has never been a worse trade offender than China .
( And those trade irritants work both ways : Boeing , too , enjoys state support , and Europeans are uncomfortable with U.S. efforts to force the rest of the world to swallow genetically modified foods and a hands-off approach to regulation . )
Those fundamental differences determine the tools that the United States can use in its trade fights with Europe .
While the trade war with China was predicated on a so-called Section 301 investigation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chinese economy , Trump ’ s war with Europe is predicated on fabricated national security grounds that likely have little standing under international trade law .
( U.S. measures are still awaiting their day in trade court . )
Trump ’ s steel and aluminum tariffs , and , more importantly , his threat to slap all auto imports with tariffs , are all based on the argument that buying steel pipes or sports cars from NATO allies represents a grave security threat to the United States .
Of course , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s impossible to know what the Trump administration actually determined in the course of a so-called Section 232 investigation .
The Commerce Department has refused to share the findings with Congress or the public , even though it is mandated to do so by law ; the Justice Department , meanwhile , is so scared the findings could be made public it has kept them classified .
Additionally , the lack of U.S. action on auto tariffs in the months after the conclusion of the investigation means the window has closed and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ implemented , at least legally .
One potential problem for the Trump administration ’ s showdown with Europe is that while tariffs seemed to work to get China to make some concessions , it was a viable approach because the duties did only moderate harm to most sectors of the U.S. economy , mainly small businesses ( and farmers caught in the crossfire ) , while consumers emerged largely unscathed .
Putting 25 percent tariffs on imports of European autos and auto parts , on the other hand , would cause immense and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , destroying hundreds of thousands of jobs and raising the cost of new cars by thousands of dollars .
That ’ s why many in Europe figure Trump has just one real arrow in his quiver , and it ’ s unlikely he ’ ll use it , as it would hurt the United States as much or more than Europe .
“ Trump ’ s main weapon are the auto tariffs , ” Fabry said .
But the auto tariffs would have such an immediate spillover effect on important sectors like autoworkers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aren ’ t as credible a threat as Trump ’ s tariffs on China .
“ The impact would be so huge on everybody , I don ’ t think that Trump can manage that cost ahead of the election.
” That ’ s why , despite the theatrics this week in Davos and the ever-present threat of new Trump tariffs , there is some optimism in Europe about reaching a trade accommodation with the United States .
The new EU trade commissioner , Phil Hogan , struck a conciliatory tone in his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Monday , French President Emmanuel Macron agreed to pause the new French digital tax while both sides look for a solution—avoiding another round of painful U.S. tariffs .
And von der Leyen on Wednesday again suggested that the framework for a limited trade agreement , focused on industrial tariffs and energy trade , could be wrapped up in a matter of weeks .
“ If we want to move on industrial tariffs , we can go quickly—that was the most advanced chapter ” of the now-moribund Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership , an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Union , Fabry said .
Coupled with some rhetorical concessions from Hogan on agricultural regulation , “ the signal from Brussels is that it is ready for negotiations , ” she said .
That doesn ’ t mean an end to trade tensions with the United States .
Beyond Trump ’ s need for some sort of victory ahead of this fall ’ s elections , the newly inked China deal still has to play out .
If Trump sees that he needs international cooperation to goad China into making more substantive reforms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more cooperation with Europe , like the recent three-way accord on industrial subsidies .
But if Trump pockets the Chinese promises of commodity purchases and limited reforms while turning his sights toward a new bogeyman , it could spell a turbulent year .
“ There will definitely still be tensions on the trans-Atlantic side , ” Fabry said .
“ We don ’ t expect a very smooth process in the spring .
”

With a rejigged NAFTA passed by Congress and a mini trade deal with China in the books, the Trump administration is now planning to turn its trade bazooka on a familiar target: Europe.
With a rejigged NAFTA passed by Congress and a mini trade deal with China in the books, the Trump administration is now planning to turn its trade bazooka on a familiar target: Europe.
Indeed, U.S. President Donald Trump already kicked off the latest chapter at the World Economic Forum this week in Davos, Switzerland, where he followed a “friendly” chat with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen by again threatening to levy huge tariffs on European cars if the two sides can’t reach a trade agreement soon. That was followed by further threats by U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to use the auto tariffs to punish European countries that tax American digital firms, further clouding the prospects for trade peace just days after France tendered an olive branch in the contentious fight over global tax rules.
Trump’s discordant performance in Davos, where he took his “America First” economic message to the very epicenter of the internationalist set, highlights the difficulties Europe will face this year in taming Trump’s unilateralist and protectionist instincts. While Europeans were quietly celebrating what seemed to them the rebirth of a multilateral approach to trade disputes—a little-noticed agreement this month with the United States and Japan to tackle industrial subsidies—Trump again railed against an international trade order he thinks is stacked against him and that he is steadily dismantling.
On Wednesday, Trump declared that the United States is a “developing nation,” in need of the same preferential treatment under World Trade Organization rules as China and India, and called for a massive reform of the quarter-century-old trading organization. And he again took aim at Europe’s alleged trade abuses, describing the European Union as a worse offender than China.
After three years of steady, but still limited U.S. trade attacks on Europe—tariffs on steel and a host of other products, and a long-simmering fight over Europe’s support for Airbus—the EU is bracing this year to receive the full brunt of Trump’s trade anger.
“The European Union tried to gain some time, and had Washington focused on Beijing, but now we are on the menu ahead of the presidential election,” said Elvire Fabry, a trade expert at the Institut Jacques Delors in Paris. “Trump will expect to have some new scalps to show from the European side.”
Trump may be emboldened by his relative success in browbeating Canada and Mexico to renegotiate parts of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and by his use of tariffs to force China to repeat some promises of reform and promise to buy more U.S. goods. But there are several important differences between Trump’s previous trade fights and the looming showdown with Europe—above and beyond the fact that the EU for decades has been a U.S. ally, not a rising strategic competitor like China.
First, China’s longtime, egregious abuse of economic levers including state-owned firms, industrial subsidies, theft of intellectual property, and forced technology transfer was never much in doubt and in fact generated bipartisan agreement in Washington on the need to confront Beijing. Even at the height of Trump’s trade war with China, for example, Democratic presidential candidates vied among themselves to see who could be tougher on China; few turned a blind eye to the country’s well-documented abuses.
That’s not the case with Europe, where Trump’s invocation of a specious national security excuse to slap the EU with tariffs on steel and aluminum in 2018 met with protest among all mainstream economists and from both sides of the political aisle. While it’s true that some European trade policies have long rankled successive U.S. administrations—including state support for the aerospace giant Airbus and a doggedly closed agricultural market and some remaining tariff barriers—Europe, despite the administration’s reiterated protestations, has never been a worse trade offender than China. (And those trade irritants work both ways: Boeing, too, enjoys state support, and Europeans are uncomfortable with U.S. efforts to force the rest of the world to swallow genetically modified foods and a hands-off approach to regulation.)
Those fundamental differences determine the tools that the United States can use in its trade fights with Europe. While the trade war with China was predicated on a so-called Section 301 investigation, which highlighted real and systemic problems in the Chinese economy, Trump’s war with Europe is predicated on fabricated national security grounds that likely have little standing under international trade law. (U.S. measures are still awaiting their day in trade court.)
Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs, and, more importantly, his threat to slap all auto imports with tariffs, are all based on the argument that buying steel pipes or sports cars from NATO allies represents a grave security threat to the United States. Of course, in the case of auto imports, it’s impossible to know what the Trump administration actually determined in the course of a so-called Section 232 investigation. The Commerce Department has refused to share the findings with Congress or the public, even though it is mandated to do so by law; the Justice Department, meanwhile, is so scared the findings could be made public it has kept them classified. Additionally, the lack of U.S. action on auto tariffs in the months after the conclusion of the investigation means the window has closed and that the measures cannot now be implemented, at least legally.
One potential problem for the Trump administration’s showdown with Europe is that while tariffs seemed to work to get China to make some concessions, it was a viable approach because the duties did only moderate harm to most sectors of the U.S. economy, mainly small businesses (and farmers caught in the crossfire), while consumers emerged largely unscathed. Putting 25 percent tariffs on imports of European autos and auto parts, on the other hand, would cause immense and immediate pain for U.S. manufacturers and consumers, destroying hundreds of thousands of jobs and raising the cost of new cars by thousands of dollars.
That’s why many in Europe figure Trump has just one real arrow in his quiver, and it’s unlikely he’ll use it, as it would hurt the United States as much or more than Europe.
“Trump’s main weapon are the auto tariffs,” Fabry said. But the auto tariffs would have such an immediate spillover effect on important sectors like autoworkers that, seen from Europe, they aren’t as credible a threat as Trump’s tariffs on China. “The impact would be so huge on everybody, I don’t think that Trump can manage that cost ahead of the election.”
That’s why, despite the theatrics this week in Davos and the ever-present threat of new Trump tariffs, there is some optimism in Europe about reaching a trade accommodation with the United States. The new EU trade commissioner, Phil Hogan, struck a conciliatory tone in his visit to Washington last week. On Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron agreed to pause the new French digital tax while both sides look for a solution—avoiding another round of painful U.S. tariffs. And von der Leyen on Wednesday again suggested that the framework for a limited trade agreement, focused on industrial tariffs and energy trade, could be wrapped up in a matter of weeks.
“If we want to move on industrial tariffs, we can go quickly—that was the most advanced chapter” of the now-moribund Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, an Obama administration-era free-trade deal with the European Union, Fabry said. Coupled with some rhetorical concessions from Hogan on agricultural regulation, “the signal from Brussels is that it is ready for negotiations,” she said.
That doesn’t mean an end to trade tensions with the United States. Beyond Trump’s need for some sort of victory ahead of this fall’s elections, the newly inked China deal still has to play out. If Trump sees that he needs international cooperation to goad China into making more substantive reforms, that could open the door to more cooperation with Europe, like the recent three-way accord on industrial subsidies. But if Trump pockets the Chinese promises of commodity purchases and limited reforms while turning his sights toward a new bogeyman, it could spell a turbulent year.
“There will definitely still be tensions on the trans-Atlantic side,” Fabry said. “We don’t expect a very smooth process in the spring.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--Trump Will Unveil Middle East Peace Plan At Last

Trump Will Unveil Middle East Peace Plan At Last Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The Trump administration invites Israeli leaders to discuss its Middle East peace plan in Washington , global researchers seek treatments to slow the Wuhan virus , and a Venezuelan opposition politician seeks U.S. support for a new election .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. President Donald Trump has invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political rival Benny Gantz to Washington next week .
U.S. officials are expected to at last unveil some of the details @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , though it is not clear if it will be shared with the public .
The meetings will take place at the White House next Tuesday .
Netanyahu has already accepted the invitation and will travel to the United States on Sunday .
The Trump administration completed the plan last year , but it has not yet been publicized : Parts of it were seen as too politically sensitive ahead of Israel ’ s general elections in September .
Jared Kushner , Trump ’ s son-in-law and a White House advisor , announced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment in the Palestinian territories—at a conference in Bahrain in June .
The meetings were boycotted by Palestinian officials .
Will this shape Israel ’ s election ?
Vice President Mike Pence extended the invitation in Jerusalem this week .
Israeli observers say the invitation could boost Netanyahu , preparing for his third election in under a year in March—while facing corruption charges .
Gantz previously objected to the publication of Trump ’ s peace deal , arguing it could interfere with the vote .
He reversed that stance this week .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Trump administration is “ taking this out of the political realm , ” a source told Reuters .
What about the Palestinians ?
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was not invited to the White House .
Palestinian leaders have refused to discuss the plan since the Trump administration recognized Jerusalem as Israel ’ s capital and moved the U.S. embassy there two years ago .
The Palestinians rebuffed attempts to discuss the plan through European intermediaries and are expected to reject the plan once it becomes public .
World responds to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experimental anti-Ebola drug is working with researchers in the United States and China to assess whether it could be used to treat the Wuhan coronavirus , which has caused at least 25 deaths in China and around 830 cases worldwide .
While the treatment was ineffective against Ebola , researchers say it could fight coronaviruses .
Three other research teams are working on potential vaccines .
Global markets have been rattled by the outbreak , particularly ahead of the Lunar New Year this weekend .
Wuhan , where the virus was first reported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has shut down public transit .
On Thursday , the World Health Organization decided not to declare a global health emergency , though it called the crisis an “ emergency in China.
” Venezuelan opposition party seeks new vote .
Venezuelan opposition politician Henri Falcón has asked the United States to back a deal with the government of President Nicolás Maduro to nullify the 2018 presidential election—in which Maduro defeated Falcón—and hold it again .
Allies of opposition leader Juan Guaidó aren ’ t likely to go for the deal : Many have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election .
Still , it comes amid backchannel communications between Maduro allies and the Trump administration and follows a failed attempt by Guaidó at the World Economic Forum to push for EU sanctions against the Maduro government .
Erdogan and Merkel discuss migration deal .
German Chancellor Angela Merkel meets Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan today in Istanbul , where the leaders are expected to discuss a 2016 migration deal between Turkey and the European Union .
The agreement allocates $ 6.6 billion in two installments to Turkey to accommodate the approximately 4 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ankara alleges that the EU isn ’ t honoring the deal : It hasn ’ t paid out the first installment .
The deal is politically important for Merkel .
But since it was signed , EU-Turkish relations have deteriorated , particularly over human rights issues .
Poland ’ s judiciary .
Tensions are high in Poland after its supreme court ruled on Thursday that judges appointed under new rules put in place by the nationalist Law and Justice ( PiS ) party don ’ t have a right to issue judgments .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that would allow punishment of judges who criticize the PiS government ’ s reforms .
The dispute has set up a conflict with the European Union , which says that PiS is trying to silence judges .
Russia ’ s view on impeachment .
As Trump ’ s impeachment trial continues in the Senate , his supporters aren ’ t the only ones hoping for a swift conclusion : Many Russians feel the same way , wishing for a return to diplomatic normalcy at a time when their country has been cast as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Vladimir Putin could be frustrated by the chill with Washington , FP ’ s Reid Standish reports .
The U.S. ambassador to Bolivia .
The United States plans to send an ambassador to Bolivia for the first time since 2008 , when then-President Evo Morales ousted Ambassador Philip Goldberg after blaming him for opposition protests .
The move comes as the U.S.-Bolivian relationship has improved dramatically since Morales stepped down in November , with the interim president seeking to repair ties .
Indigenous reindeer herders in Sweden have won back their exclusive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 19-mile strip of Arctic Sweden—after nearly 30 years .
The Sami district of Girjas Sameby lost its hunting rights in 1993 , and the court case to win them back from the state has gone on for 10 years , reaching Sweden ’ s supreme court .
“ This is a blow for the Swedish state , which will hopefully mean they have to respect Sami rights , ” the district chairman told the Guardian .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The Trump administration invites Israeli leaders to discuss its Middle East peace plan in Washington, global researchers seek treatments to slow the Wuhan virus , and a Venezuelan opposition politician seeks U.S. support for a new election.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The Trump administration invites Israeli leaders to discuss its Middle East peace plan in Washington, global researchers seek treatments to slow the Wuhan virus, and a Venezuelan opposition politician seeks U.S. support for a new election.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Israeli Leaders Set to Visit the White House
U.S. President Donald Trump has invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political rival Benny Gantz to Washington next week. U.S. officials are expected to at last unveil some of the details of their delayed Middle East peace plan, though it is not clear if it will be shared with the public. The meetings will take place at the White House next Tuesday. Netanyahu has already accepted the invitation and will travel to the United States on Sunday.
The Trump administration completed the plan last year, but it has not yet been publicized: Parts of it were seen as too politically sensitive ahead of Israel’s general elections in September. Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and a White House advisor, announced the first part of the plan—expanding foreign investment in the Palestinian territories—at a conference in Bahrain in June. The meetings were boycotted by Palestinian officials.
Will this shape Israel’s election? Vice President Mike Pence extended the invitation in Jerusalem this week. Israeli observers say the invitation could boost Netanyahu, preparing for his third election in under a year in March—while facing corruption charges. Gantz previously objected to the publication of Trump’s peace deal, arguing it could interfere with the vote. He reversed that stance this week. By previewing the plan now and including Gantz, the Trump administration is “taking this out of the political realm,” a source told Reuters.
What about the Palestinians? Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was not invited to the White House. Palestinian leaders have refused to discuss the plan since the Trump administration recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moved the U.S. embassy there two years ago. The Palestinians rebuffed attempts to discuss the plan through European intermediaries and are expected to reject the plan once it becomes public.
What We’re Following Today
World responds to Wuhan virus. The company behind an experimental anti-Ebola drug is working with researchers in the United States and China to assess whether it could be used to treat the Wuhan coronavirus, which has caused at least 25 deaths in China and around 830 cases worldwide. While the treatment was ineffective against Ebola, researchers say it could fight coronaviruses. Three other research teams are working on potential vaccines. Global markets have been rattled by the outbreak, particularly ahead of the Lunar New Year this weekend.
Wuhan, where the virus was first reported, has been quarantined and nearby Huanggang has shut down public transit. On Thursday, the World Health Organization decided not to declare a global health emergency, though it called the crisis an “emergency in China.”
Venezuelan opposition party seeks new vote. Venezuelan opposition politician Henri Falcón has asked the United States to back a deal with the government of President Nicolás Maduro to nullify the 2018 presidential election—in which Maduro defeated Falcón—and hold it again. Allies of opposition leader Juan Guaidó aren’t likely to go for the deal: Many have criticized Falcón for participating in the 2018 election. Still, it comes amid backchannel communications between Maduro allies and the Trump administration and follows a failed attempt by Guaidó at the World Economic Forum to push for EU sanctions against the Maduro government.
Erdogan and Merkel discuss migration deal. German Chancellor Angela Merkel meets Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan today in Istanbul, where the leaders are expected to discuss a 2016 migration deal between Turkey and the European Union. The agreement allocates $6.6 billion in two installments to Turkey to accommodate the approximately 4 million Syrian refugees residing there, but Ankara alleges that the EU isn’t honoring the deal: It hasn’t paid out the first installment. The deal is politically important for Merkel. But since it was signed, EU-Turkish relations have deteriorated, particularly over human rights issues.
Keep an Eye On
Poland’s judiciary. Tensions are high in Poland after its supreme court ruled on Thursday that judges appointed under new rules put in place by the nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party don’t have a right to issue judgments. Meanwhile, the parliament approved a bill that would allow punishment of judges who criticize the PiS government’s reforms. The dispute has set up a conflict with the European Union, which says that PiS is trying to silence judges.
Russia’s view on impeachment. As Trump’s impeachment trial continues in the Senate, his supporters aren’t the only ones hoping for a swift conclusion: Many Russians feel the same way, wishing for a return to diplomatic normalcy at a time when their country has been cast as a villain in Washington. Even Russian President Vladimir Putin could be frustrated by the chill with Washington, FP’s Reid Standish reports.
The U.S. ambassador to Bolivia. The United States plans to send an ambassador to Bolivia for the first time since 2008, when then-President Evo Morales ousted Ambassador Philip Goldberg after blaming him for opposition protests. The move comes as the U.S.-Bolivian relationship has improved dramatically since Morales stepped down in November, with the interim president seeking to repair ties.
Odds and Ends
Indigenous reindeer herders in Sweden have won back their exclusive rights to hunt and fish in a 19-mile strip of Arctic Sweden—after nearly 30 years. The Sami district of Girjas Sameby lost its hunting rights in 1993, and the court case to win them back from the state has gone on for 10 years, reaching Sweden’s supreme court. “This is a blow for the Swedish state, which will hopefully mean they have to respect Sami rights,” the district chairman told the Guardian.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--Pentagon Steps Up Cruise Missile Defenses as Iranian Threat Grows

Just before dawn on Sept. 14 , more than two dozen small drones and cruise missiles descended on Saudi Arabia ’ s state-owned Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais , evading American-made missile defenses and wiping out half of Saudi Arabia ’ s oil production in just hours .
The attack , which U.S. and Saudi officials have attributed to Iran , shook the region and highlighted an acute vulnerability as these new types of weapons proliferate .
U.S.-made missile defenses are designed primarily to counter ballistic missiles—launched in a high arc with predictable trajectories—but have more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ low to the ground where radars struggle to spot them .
As Russia and China invest in long-range cruise missiles for potential future conflicts , the U.S. Defense Department has made improving the military ’ s ability to detect and defeat these types of weapons a top priority .
But the problem has taken on new urgency amid increased tension with Iran , which has been quietly been building up its own cruise missile capabilities for over a decade .
A key piece to solving this problem , commanders say , is beefing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spy satellites to better detect and track cruise missiles , drones , and the emerging threat of hypersonic weapons—missiles that fly at more than five times the speed of sound .
“ You can ’ t defend against something that you can ’ t see , ” said Gen. John Hyten , now-vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , in 2019 .
To this end , the newly established Space Development Agency—which will eventually become part of the new Space Force—aims to launch several dozen small , low-cost satellites into orbit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two years after that .
A “ tracking ” layer of satellites will track the threat , while a “ transport ” layer will broadcast that tracking data to traditional missile defense communications networks , said Derek Tournear , the director of the agency , this week at the Pentagon .
The goal is to have “ full global coverage ” by fiscal year 2026 , Tournear said .
Since the Cold War era , the U.S. military has built up a vast network of operators , weapons , and sensors dedicated to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defeating an incoming missile threat is detecting and tracking it .
This is best done from space , where satellites can cover much wider areas than lower-flying reconnaissance assets such as drones and surveillance planes .
The final piece is destroying the threat , traditionally achieved by an interceptor fired from a missile defense system .
But countering cruise missiles and small unmanned aerial vehicles is trickier than defeating ballistic missiles .
These weapons fly low to the ground at high speeds , and they have unpredictable flight patterns that challenge modern missile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons debris recovered from the Sept. 14 attacks showed that some of the craft , which originated from the north , took a roundabout path to the facility , flying over Iraq and Kuwait .
Just as critical as new sensors is a faster way to pass information between operators and the various lethal platforms that will defeat the threat .
Many legacy platforms can ’ t communicate directly with each other , and any decision requires multiple phone calls or internet chat messages that take up precious minutes .
In a world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reality , this timeframe is too slow , commanders say .
The Pentagon is in the nascent stages of building a network that operators and platforms across all domains of warfare—from a satellite to a Navy destroyer—can plug into to autonomously receive and transmit battlefield data in real time .
The Army and the Air Force have developed separate concepts to do so , with each service vying to be the primary locus of what the Pentagon is calling “ multi-domain operations.
” The Air Force seems to be the furthest ahead , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ December 2019 demonstrating some initial capability .
Will Roper , the Air Force ’ s top acquisition official , described the service ’ s solution—officially called the Advanced Battle Management System—as “ the internet of things inside the military.
” He said the network will use machine learning to crunch data and push it autonomously to operators across the world .
Roper compared it to the driving navigation app Waze .
“ It is helping you be a better driver , ” Roper said .
“ It understands your likes and dislikes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world around you … things that you may way to know to help you do your mission better , and the more you interact with the app the better the analytics get.
” Cruise missiles are only one threat the network will help the military counter , Roper said , but it is one of the most urgent .
Ideally , sensors will be able to detect the threat quickly and autonomously push targeting information to an operator with the means to take it out .
“ The idea with the ABMS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the glue , the information flows everywhere all at once , and the people are the assessors , the analyzers , the feedback providers that help the analytics that are doing the pushing get better and better , ” Roper said .
Army Lt. Gen. Eric Wesley , the deputy commanding general of U.S. Army Futures Command , said that the Air Force model should be scaled to enable Army weapons systems as well .
In parallel , the Army is working its own network concept , the Joint All-Domain Command and Control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similar concept in mind for the end product .
“ We can integrate all domains now , but it ’ s largely very episodic or industrial .
We want to be able to adjust rapidly and continuously , ” Wesley said .
“ We want to have the ability to very quickly take down a peer adversary.
” Realistically , though , such a network is years if not decades away .
Wesley said he wants to field the Army ’ s version by 2028 , but the Pentagon is hampered by bureaucratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slow pace compared to the commercial sector .
Until then , commanders in the Middle East must remain vigilant around the clock for potentially devastating attacks .
“ This is just going to be a long-term problem for us , to get our minds around : How do we defend against something like that ?
” said Maj. Gen. Alex Grynkewich , deputy commander of the U.S.-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State at U.S. Central Command .

Just before dawn on Sept. 14, more than two dozen small drones and cruise missiles descended on Saudi Arabia’s state-owned Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais, evading American-made missile defenses and wiping out half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production in just hours.
Just before dawn on Sept. 14, more than two dozen small drones and cruise missiles descended on Saudi Arabia’s state-owned Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais, evading American-made missile defenses and wiping out half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production in just hours.
The attack, which U.S. and Saudi officials have attributed to Iran, shook the region and highlighted an acute vulnerability as these new types of weapons proliferate. U.S.-made missile defenses are designed primarily to counter ballistic missiles—launched in a high arc with predictable trajectories—but have more difficulty stopping cruise missiles, which fly low to the ground where radars struggle to spot them.
As Russia and China invest in long-range cruise missiles for potential future conflicts, the U.S. Defense Department has made improving the military’s ability to detect and defeat these types of weapons a top priority. But the problem has taken on new urgency amid increased tension with Iran, which has been quietly been building up its own cruise missile capabilities for over a decade.
A key piece to solving this problem, commanders say, is beefing up the Pentagon’s network of spy satellites to better detect and track cruise missiles, drones, and the emerging threat of hypersonic weapons—missiles that fly at more than five times the speed of sound. “You can’t defend against something that you can’t see,” said Gen. John Hyten, now-vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2019.
To this end, the newly established Space Development Agency—which will eventually become part of the new Space Force—aims to launch several dozen small, low-cost satellites into orbit through 2022, and dozens more every two years after that. A “tracking” layer of satellites will track the threat, while a “transport” layer will broadcast that tracking data to traditional missile defense communications networks, said Derek Tournear, the director of the agency, this week at the Pentagon.
The goal is to have “full global coverage” by fiscal year 2026, Tournear said.
Since the Cold War era, the U.S. military has built up a vast network of operators, weapons, and sensors dedicated to missile defense. The first part of defeating an incoming missile threat is detecting and tracking it. This is best done from space, where satellites can cover much wider areas than lower-flying reconnaissance assets such as drones and surveillance planes. The final piece is destroying the threat, traditionally achieved by an interceptor fired from a missile defense system.
But countering cruise missiles and small unmanned aerial vehicles is trickier than defeating ballistic missiles. These weapons fly low to the ground at high speeds, and they have unpredictable flight patterns that challenge modern missile defenses. For example, analysis of weapons debris recovered from the Sept. 14 attacks showed that some of the craft, which originated from the north, took a roundabout path to the facility, flying over Iraq and Kuwait.
Just as critical as new sensors is a faster way to pass information between operators and the various lethal platforms that will defeat the threat. Many legacy platforms can’t communicate directly with each other, and any decision requires multiple phone calls or internet chat messages that take up precious minutes. In a world where hypersonic missiles are fast becoming a reality, this timeframe is too slow, commanders say.
The Pentagon is in the nascent stages of building a network that operators and platforms across all domains of warfare—from a satellite to a Navy destroyer—can plug into to autonomously receive and transmit battlefield data in real time. The Army and the Air Force have developed separate concepts to do so, with each service vying to be the primary locus of what the Pentagon is calling “multi-domain operations.”
The Air Force seems to be the furthest ahead, leading a live exercise in Florida in December 2019 demonstrating some initial capability. Will Roper, the Air Force’s top acquisition official, described the service’s solution—officially called the Advanced Battle Management System—as “the internet of things inside the military.” He said the network will use machine learning to crunch data and push it autonomously to operators across the world.
Roper compared it to the driving navigation app Waze.
“It is helping you be a better driver,” Roper said. “It understands your likes and dislikes, and it’s pulling information from the world around you … things that you may way to know to help you do your mission better, and the more you interact with the app the better the analytics get.”
Cruise missiles are only one threat the network will help the military counter, Roper said, but it is one of the most urgent. Ideally, sensors will be able to detect the threat quickly and autonomously push targeting information to an operator with the means to take it out.
“The idea with the ABMS is that the people are no longer the glue, the information flows everywhere all at once, and the people are the assessors, the analyzers, the feedback providers that help the analytics that are doing the pushing get better and better,” Roper said.
Army Lt. Gen. Eric Wesley, the deputy commanding general of U.S. Army Futures Command, said that the Air Force model should be scaled to enable Army weapons systems as well. In parallel, the Army is working its own network concept, the Joint All-Domain Command and Control project.
But both services have a similar concept in mind for the end product.
“We can integrate all domains now, but it’s largely very episodic or industrial. We want to be able to adjust rapidly and continuously,” Wesley said. “We want to have the ability to very quickly take down a peer adversary.”
Realistically, though, such a network is years if not decades away. Wesley said he wants to field the Army’s version by 2028, but the Pentagon is hampered by bureaucratic red tape and moves at a notoriously slow pace compared to the commercial sector.
Until then, commanders in the Middle East must remain vigilant around the clock for potentially devastating attacks.
“This is just going to be a long-term problem for us, to get our minds around: How do we defend against something like that?” said Maj. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, deputy commander of the U.S.-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State at U.S. Central Command.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--A New Scottish Independence Vote Seems All but Inevitable

A New Scottish Independence Vote Seems All but Inevitable GLASGOW , Scotland—In the British general election on Dec. 12 , 2019 , the Scottish National Party ( SNP ) won a resounding mandate from its constituents , taking 48 of Scotland ’ s 59 seats in the U.K. House of Commons and 45 percent of all ballots cast by Scottish voters .
A week later , on Dec. 19 , SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon sent a letter to Britain ’ s newly reelected Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson requesting the power to hold a second referendum on Scottish independence .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ place in September 2014 , resulted in a 10-point victory for the Anglo-Scottish union . )
On Jan. 14 , the prime minister delivered his answer .
“ I can not agree to any request … that would lead to further independence referendums , ” he wrote in a formal memorandum to Sturgeon .
“ The people of Scotland voted decisively on that promise to keep our United Kingdom together … The U.K. government will continue to uphold the democratic decision [ made in 2014 ] .
” Johnson ’ s response came @ @ @ @ @ @ @ included .
With the deadline for Brexit looming at the end of January and a raft of preelection spending pledges to implement , the last thing the Tory leader wants is a renewed battle over Scotland ’ s constitutional status and a scramble to shore up the U.K. ’ s increasingly tenuous political unity .
But that is precisely what he is going to get .
Spurred by widespread Scottish opposition to leaving the European Union—and , after December , a fresh electoral mandate from the Scottish public—the SNP plans to intensify its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Tories are likely to boost U.K. public spending and redouble their attacks on the SNP in an attempt to contain Scottish discontent .
But it may be too little , too late .
Even if Westminster continues to dismiss nationalist demands for another vote on separation from the U.K.—Alister Jack , the Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland , recently said Sturgeon should have to wait “ a lifetime ” before a rerun of the 2014 plebiscite—the Scottish party and its supporters seem convinced that their goal of an independent Scottish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That confidence was on full display in Glasgow on Saturday , Jan. 11 , when an estimated 80,000 Scots braved the winter rain to join a huge pro-independence march through the center of Scotland ’ s largest city .
Amid a riot of blue and white Saltires—the Scottish national flag—protesters carried placards embellished with separatist and anti-Tory slogans .
The mood was populist and defiant .
“ The election reinforces the fact that England and Scotland are going in completely different directions , ” Bob Duncan , a veteran SNP activist , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Glasgow Green , a public park on the banks of the River Clyde .
“ The Tories have no mandate to do anything up here.
” In the eyes of the SNP and wider Scottish nationalist movement , Johnson lacks the democratic legitimacy to govern Scotland .
The Tories won an overwhelming majority of English constituencies on Dec. 12 , routing Jeremy Corbyn ’ s Labour Party in its working-class heartlands and dramatically reshaping England ’ s political landscape .
But north of the border—where discontent over Brexit is intense and mainstream opinion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ losing seven of the 13 Scottish seats they won in the last U.K. general election in June 2017 and dropping almost 4 points on their 2017 vote share .
It has now been more than 60 years since the Conservatives held a plurality of Scottish seats in the House of Commons .
Many nationalists , particularly at the grassroots level , are restive .
They want Sturgeon to call a nonbinding or so-called consultative independence referendum as soon as possible , with the aim of capitalizing on Scottish hostility toward Johnson ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s unlikely to happen .
Conscious of the ongoing judicial crisis in Spain over Catalonia ’ s attempts to secede—and keen to win credibility with EU policymakers—the Scottish first minister is determined to ensure that any future independence vote lies beyond legal challenge in the Scottish and U.K. courts .
For that to be the case , an agreement will have to be reached between Holyrood , Scotland ’ s devolved national legislature in Edinburgh , and the Tory government in London .
Senior SNP politicians believe Johnson , whose personal approval ratings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beginning of his premiership in July 2019 , will eventually concede another referendum—assuming he faces enough political pressure .
Kenny MacAskill served for seven years as justice secretary in the SNP government at Holyrood and was elected as the member of Parliament for East Lothian this past December .
He thinks nationalists need to build a “ broad civic coalition ” for independence , drawing in the trade union movement , the not-for-profit sector , and even elements of the traditionally pro-union Scottish Labour Party in a way that mirrors the bipartisan campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1990s .
If a clear consensus exists for a second referendum after the next Holyrood election in May 2021 , MacAskill said , Johnson will have no choice but to talk to the SNP .
“ Whatever they say now , when the electorate speaks , the Tories will have to listen , ” he told me .
The alternative is continued electoral decline for the right in Scotland , he added , compounded by a burgeoning sense among Scottish electors that their presence in the union is not entirely voluntary .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already starting to take shape .
On Dec. 15 , Monica Lennon , one of 23 Labour representatives in the Scottish Parliament , said Westminster should let Holyrood legislate for a new referendum .
“ The future of Scotland must be decided by the people of Scotland , ” she remarked .
Lennon ’ s comments were echoed by Grahame Smith , the general secretary of the Scottish Trades Union Congress , an influential umbrella body for the trade union movement in Scotland , who said on Jan. 3 that Labour—which lost six @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SNP in December—had “ nothing to fear and much to gain ” from debating the merits of independence .
Then , on Jan. 10 , the veteran Labour politician Ben Bradshaw said he believed it was now “ completely unsustainable ” for London to deny Scotland another vote .
“ I have no doubt that Scotland will become independent , ” Bradshaw—who held ministerial positions in the fiercely unionist Labour governments of both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown—told the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel .
“ For me , that is 100 percent certain.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal with Sturgeon at some point over the next 18 or 24 months , he may not encounter much resistance from his own—ostensibly unionist—political base .
According to a YouGov poll conducted last year , 63 percent of Conservative Party members would be happy for Scotland to leave the U.K. if it meant England could complete its departure from the EU without disruption .
Another poll , commissioned by the billionaire Conservative donor Michael Ashcroft , suggested that 76 percent of Tory Brexit voters in England felt the same way .
Michael Keating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Edinburgh , believes there is a growing culture of indifference toward the union among significant—predominantly center-right and Brexit-supporting—sections of English society .
This trend , driven by rising nationalist sentiment south of the Anglo-Scottish border , could weaken Johnson ’ s resolve to keep the union together .
“ Nobody wants to be the last prime minister of the U.K. , ” Keating said .
However , not all Scottish political observers are convinced that Johnson , who commands a sweeping Conservative majority of 80 in House of Commons , will accommodate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be able to outmaneuver him if he does consent to a second referendum .
“ I would never dismiss the sheer coalition of power that Johnson has behind him , ” Joyce McMillan , an Edinburgh-based columnist for the Scotsman , told me .
Moreover , although there is no sign of Johnson offering Scotland a Northern Ireland-style Brexit compromise deal , which would leave the Scottish economy in close regulatory alignment with the EU single market after Britain departs the European bloc , the Tories appear to be working on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to offset enthusiasm for independence among Scottish voters .
On Dec. 16 , four days after last month ’ s general election , the Financial Times reported that Johnson was considering a “ radical ” overhaul of the House of Lords that , once enacted , would hand the U.K. ’ s constituent nations a “ greater stake ” in the British Parliament ’ s legislative upper chamber .
Johnson has also committed to additional infrastructure expenditure across the U.K. , as well as a steady increase in funding for the National Health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one Conservative Party source said these initiatives would form part of a PR effort in Scotland , managed from Downing Street , in an effort to push back on the SNP ’ s domestic popularity .
Scottish nationalists certainly believe Scotland ’ s 300-year-old union with England is entering its final stages .
Emily St Denny , a politics lecturer at the University of Stirling , thinks the Tories ’ abrupt embrace of higher public spending , after nearly a decade of self-imposed austerity , represents a strategic attempt to reunite Britain in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between Scotland and England .
The Johnson administration is orchestrating “ a U.K.-wide push for regional investment aimed in part at disincentivizing Scots from joining the ranks of the independence supporters , ” she told me .
The prime minister ’ s overarching goal is to “ bring [ ordinary Scots ] onside ” before the widely anticipated negative economic consequences of Brexit start to kick in , she said .
But it ’ s not clear that more public money will be sufficient to paper over the increasingly pronounced cracks in Britain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Scottish independence has been edging toward the 50 percent mark since September 2014 , and Johnson ’ s ascendancy—fueled by a Euroskeptic English electorate with , at best , a vague desire to keep Scotland inside the U.K.—is likely to accelerate that trajectory .
Scottish nationalists certainly believe Scotland ’ s 300-year-old union with England is entering its final stages .
The boisterous march through Glasgow was the first of eight pro-independence events planned across Scotland throughout the year , with more protests scheduled in Kirkcaldy , Stirling , and Edinburgh over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the wake of its December election success , the SNP—which has held power at Holyrood since 2007—finds itself in a formidable political position , with its two main electoral rivals , the Conservatives and Labour , sidelined by the Scottish public .
Even the “ dogs in the street know there ’ s going to be [ a second ] independence referendum , ” Nicola Sturgeon said on Dec. 19 .
Despite his short-term denials , it may not be long before Boris Johnson , too , accepts the inevitability of another @ @ @

GLASGOW, Scotland—In the British general election on Dec. 12, 2019, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won a resounding mandate from its constituents, taking 48 of Scotland’s 59 seats in the U.K. House of Commons and 45 percent of all ballots cast by Scottish voters. A week later, on Dec. 19, SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon sent a letter to Britain’s newly reelected Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson requesting the power to hold a second referendum on Scottish independence. (The first referendum, which took place in September 2014, resulted in a 10-point victory for the Anglo-Scottish union.)
GLASGOW, Scotland—In the British general election on Dec. 12, 2019, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won a resounding mandate from its constituents, taking 48 of Scotland’s 59 seats in the U.K. House of Commons and 45 percent of all ballots cast by Scottish voters. A week later, on Dec. 19, SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon sent a letter to Britain’s newly reelected Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson requesting the power to hold a second referendum on Scottish independence. (The first referendum, which took place in September 2014, resulted in a 10-point victory for the Anglo-Scottish union.)
On Jan. 14, the prime minister delivered his answer. “I cannot agree to any request … that would lead to further independence referendums,” he wrote in a formal memorandum to Sturgeon. “The people of Scotland voted decisively on that promise to keep our United Kingdom together … The U.K. government will continue to uphold the democratic decision [made in 2014].”
Johnson’s response came as no surprise to anyone, Sturgeon included. With the deadline for Brexit looming at the end of January and a raft of preelection spending pledges to implement, the last thing the Tory leader wants is a renewed battle over Scotland’s constitutional status and a scramble to shore up the U.K.’s increasingly tenuous political unity.
But that is precisely what he is going to get. Spurred by widespread Scottish opposition to leaving the European Union—and, after December, a fresh electoral mandate from the Scottish public—the SNP plans to intensify its campaign for independence in the coming months. The Tories are likely to boost U.K. public spending and redouble their attacks on the SNP in an attempt to contain Scottish discontent. But it may be too little, too late.
Even if Westminster continues to dismiss nationalist demands for another vote on separation from the U.K.—Alister Jack, the Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, recently said Sturgeon should have to wait “a lifetime” before a rerun of the 2014 plebiscite—the Scottish party and its supporters seem convinced that their goal of an independent Scottish state is becoming more and more likely.
That confidence was on full display in Glasgow on Saturday, Jan. 11, when an estimated 80,000 Scots braved the winter rain to join a huge pro-independence march through the center of Scotland’s largest city. Amid a riot of blue and white Saltires—the Scottish national flag—protesters carried placards embellished with separatist and anti-Tory slogans.
The mood was populist and defiant. “The election reinforces the fact that England and Scotland are going in completely different directions,” Bob Duncan, a veteran SNP activist, told me as the crowd pressed toward Glasgow Green, a public park on the banks of the River Clyde. “The Tories have no mandate to do anything up here.”
In the eyes of the SNP and wider Scottish nationalist movement, Johnson lacks the democratic legitimacy to govern Scotland. The Tories won an overwhelming majority of English constituencies on Dec. 12, routing Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party in its working-class heartlands and dramatically reshaping England’s political landscape. But north of the border—where discontent over Brexit is intense and mainstream opinion leans to the left—they went backward, losing seven of the 13 Scottish seats they won in the last U.K. general election in June 2017 and dropping almost 4 points on their 2017 vote share. It has now been more than 60 years since the Conservatives held a plurality of Scottish seats in the House of Commons.
Many nationalists, particularly at the grassroots level, are restive. They want Sturgeon to call a nonbinding or so-called consultative independence referendum as soon as possible, with the aim of capitalizing on Scottish hostility toward Johnson’s right-wing, pro-Brexit administration.
That’s unlikely to happen. Conscious of the ongoing judicial crisis in Spain over Catalonia’s attempts to secede—and keen to win credibility with EU policymakers—the Scottish first minister is determined to ensure that any future independence vote lies beyond legal challenge in the Scottish and U.K. courts. For that to be the case, an agreement will have to be reached between Holyrood, Scotland’s devolved national legislature in Edinburgh, and the Tory government in London.
Senior SNP politicians believe Johnson, whose personal approval ratings in Scotland have been underwater since the beginning of his premiership in July 2019, will eventually concede another referendum—assuming he faces enough political pressure.
Kenny MacAskill served for seven years as justice secretary in the SNP government at Holyrood and was elected as the member of Parliament for East Lothian this past December. He thinks nationalists need to build a “broad civic coalition” for independence, drawing in the trade union movement, the not-for-profit sector, and even elements of the traditionally pro-union Scottish Labour Party in a way that mirrors the bipartisan campaign for Scottish devolution in the 1980s and 1990s.
If a clear consensus exists for a second referendum after the next Holyrood election in May 2021, MacAskill said, Johnson will have no choice but to talk to the SNP. “Whatever they say now, when the electorate speaks, the Tories will have to listen,” he told me. The alternative is continued electoral decline for the right in Scotland, he added, compounded by a burgeoning sense among Scottish electors that their presence in the union is not entirely voluntary.
There are signs that a broad consensus is already starting to take shape. On Dec. 15, Monica Lennon, one of 23 Labour representatives in the Scottish Parliament, said Westminster should let Holyrood legislate for a new referendum. “The future of Scotland must be decided by the people of Scotland,” she remarked. Lennon’s comments were echoed by Grahame Smith, the general secretary of the Scottish Trades Union Congress, an influential umbrella body for the trade union movement in Scotland, who said on Jan. 3 that Labour—which lost six of its seven Scottish seats to the SNP in December—had “nothing to fear and much to gain” from debating the merits of independence.
Then, on Jan. 10, the veteran Labour politician Ben Bradshaw said he believed it was now “completely unsustainable” for London to deny Scotland another vote. “I have no doubt that Scotland will become independent,” Bradshaw—who held ministerial positions in the fiercely unionist Labour governments of both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown—told the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel. “For me, that is 100 percent certain.”
If Johnson does negotiate a referendum deal with Sturgeon at some point over the next 18 or 24 months, he may not encounter much resistance from his own—ostensibly unionist—political base. According to a YouGov poll conducted last year, 63 percent of Conservative Party members would be happy for Scotland to leave the U.K. if it meant England could complete its departure from the EU without disruption. Another poll, commissioned by the billionaire Conservative donor Michael Ashcroft, suggested that 76 percent of Tory Brexit voters in England felt the same way.
Michael Keating, a constitutional expert at the University of Edinburgh, believes there is a growing culture of indifference toward the union among significant—predominantly center-right and Brexit-supporting—sections of English society. This trend, driven by rising nationalist sentiment south of the Anglo-Scottish border, could weaken Johnson’s resolve to keep the union together. “Nobody wants to be the last prime minister of the U.K.,” Keating said.
However, not all Scottish political observers are convinced that Johnson, who commands a sweeping Conservative majority of 80 in House of Commons, will accommodate the SNP’s demands—or that Sturgeon will be able to outmaneuver him if he does consent to a second referendum. “I would never dismiss the sheer coalition of power that Johnson has behind him,” Joyce McMillan, an Edinburgh-based columnist for the Scotsman, told me.
Moreover, although there is no sign of Johnson offering Scotland a Northern Ireland-style Brexit compromise deal, which would leave the Scottish economy in close regulatory alignment with the EU single market after Britain departs the European bloc, the Tories appear to be working on a number of political and economic reforms designed to offset enthusiasm for independence among Scottish voters.
On Dec. 16, four days after last month’s general election, the Financial Times reported that Johnson was considering a “radical” overhaul of the House of Lords that, once enacted, would hand the U.K.’s constituent nations a “greater stake” in the British Parliament’s legislative upper chamber. Johnson has also committed to additional infrastructure expenditure across the U.K., as well as a steady increase in funding for the National Health Service. Speaking to Politico Europe, one Conservative Party source said these initiatives would form part of a PR effort in Scotland, managed from Downing Street, in an effort to push back on the SNP’s domestic popularity.
Scottish nationalists certainly believe Scotland’s 300-year-old union with England is entering its final stages.
Emily St Denny, a politics lecturer at the University of Stirling, thinks the Tories’ abrupt embrace of higher public spending, after nearly a decade of self-imposed austerity, represents a strategic attempt to reunite Britain in the face of the deepening political divide between Scotland and England. The Johnson administration is orchestrating “a U.K.-wide push for regional investment aimed in part at disincentivizing Scots from joining the ranks of the independence supporters,” she told me. The prime minister’s overarching goal is to “bring [ordinary Scots] onside” before the widely anticipated negative economic consequences of Brexit start to kick in, she said.
But it’s not clear that more public money will be sufficient to paper over the increasingly pronounced cracks in Britain’s creaking constitutional architecture. Support for Scottish independence has been edging toward the 50 percent mark since September 2014, and Johnson’s ascendancy—fueled by a Euroskeptic English electorate with, at best, a vague desire to keep Scotland inside the U.K.—is likely to accelerate that trajectory.
Scottish nationalists certainly believe Scotland’s 300-year-old union with England is entering its final stages. The boisterous march through Glasgow was the first of eight pro-independence events planned across Scotland throughout the year, with more protests scheduled in Kirkcaldy, Stirling, and Edinburgh over the next few months. And, in the wake of its December election success, the SNP—which has held power at Holyrood since 2007—finds itself in a formidable political position, with its two main electoral rivals, the Conservatives and Labour, sidelined by the Scottish public.
Even the “dogs in the street know there’s going to be [a second] independence referendum,” Nicola Sturgeon said on Dec. 19. Despite his short-term denials, it may not be long before Boris Johnson, too, accepts the inevitability of another Scottish vote.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--Impeachment Trials and Conspiracy Theories: A Match Made in Hell

On Jan. 3 , 2017 , weeks before Donald Trump was inaugurated as U.S. president , an inconspicuous blog post went live on an obscure and now defunct U.S. website , Washington ’ s Blog .
Titled “ Why Crowdstrike ’ s Russian Hacking Story Fell Apart—Say Hello to Fancy Bear , ” the post alleged how it was Ukraine , not Russia , behind the 2016 U.S. election hacks , relying on a raft of rumors , vague accusations , and debunked conspiracy theories .
The allegations in the blog post could have floated off into obscurity , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They began seeping into the bloodstream of social media , blogs , and news reports on the left and right and then into the mouths of some Republican lawmakers and the president .
Eventually , this narrative became a cornerstone of the skulduggery that led to Trump ’ s impeachment .
The Washington ’ s Blog post appears to be one , if not the first , mention of a now infamous and debunked conspiracy theory : that the cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike , at Ukraine ’ s bidding , hacked the Democratic National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election and pinned the blame on Russia and that the DNC server was somehow based in Ukraine .
“ I would like you to find out what happened with this whole situation with Ukraine .
They say CrowdStrike—I guess you have one of your wealthy people—the server , they say Ukraine has it , ” Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a July 25 call that is at the center of the impeachment trial , according to an official White House release .
There ’ s no easily defined path to follow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ theory wound its way from the periphery of the internet into the center of a historic U.S. political scandal , according to 10 experts and U.S. officials who spoke to Foreign Policy for this story .
Some experts , including Trump ’ s former top White House aide on Russia and Eurasia , believe its origins lie in Russia .
After all , Russian officials in 2016 began leveling vague accusations at Ukraine for meddling in the U.S. election .
Beyond that , U.S. intelligence has laid out a massive case demonstrating the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election .
The yearlong investigation by special counsel Robert Mueller found that the Russian government interfered in the U.S. election “ in sweeping and systematic fashion.
” ( Several Trump officials were charged with lying to FBI investigators about their contacts with Russian officials during the campaign . )
But other experts and digital sleuths say there ’ s no evidence ( or , at least , unclassified evidence ) that shows Russia is the mastermind of the so-called “ Ukraine did it ” theory .
They also caution against overestimating Russia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Russia ’ s trolls may have seized on the Ukraine accusations later in a mad dash of digital opportunism , but the conspiracy itself was firmly homegrown .
If those questions aren ’ t easily answered , the murky path of this conspiracy theory still reflects some of the biggest challenges swirling around impeachment : how easily foreign actors can worm their way into Washington ’ s hyperpartisan politics , how to defend against it , and how to sort out truth from lies .
It takes on particular importance during an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ falsehoods pushed by the president ’ s advisors and sharply opposing narratives put forth by both Democrats and Republicans .
House impeachment managers are expected to wrap up their third day of arguments on Friday before the Senate , and Trump ’ s defense team will lay out their arguments Saturday through Tuesday .
Thus far , despite hours of arguments and impassioned speeches from Democratic Rep. Adam Schiff , no Republicans appear to be swayed to vote in favor of impeachment nor Democrats swayed to vote against .
Since the impeachment investigation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s allies in Congress have seized on the idea that Kyiv may have sought to sway the 2016 presidential election in favor of Hillary Clinton during the House impeachment investigation as justification of his request that Zelensky investigate CrowdStrike .
“ Once you understand that Ukrainian officials were cooperating directly with President Trump ’ s political opponents to undermine his candidacy , it ’ s easy to understand why the president would want to learn the full truth about these operations and why he would be skeptical of Ukraine , ” Rep. Devin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House Intelligence Committee , said in November during the impeachment hearings .
Nunes , who helped oversee the impeachment investigation , stressed in his remarks that Republicans agreed Russia interfered in the 2016 election but that Ukraine could have , as well .
“ It is entirely possible for two separate nations to engage in election meddling at the same time .
And Republicans believe we should take meddling seriously by all foreign countries , regardless of which campaign is the target.
” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham , one of Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he accepted the conclusion of U.S. intelligence that Russia , not Ukraine , hacked the DNC , what really mattered was that “ the president believes that the Ukraine interfered in our election , ” as Graham said Thursday .
Fiona Hill , Trump ’ s former senior director for Russia and Eurasia on the National Security Council and a respected Russia scholar , offered a sharp rebuke of this notion during her public testimony , describing it as a fictional narrative that has been “ has been perpetrated and propagated by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that while the Ukrainian government had sought to curry favor with the Clinton campaign , operating on the assumption that the former secretary of state would win , many countries around the world had similarly “ bet on the wrong horse.
” Hill noted that this was not comparable to Russian interference efforts , which were directed from the top down by Vladimir Putin and involved Russian intelligence services .
But as the impeachment investigation escalated last fall , senators and their aides were briefed by U.S. intelligence officials that Russia had engaged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for its hacking of the DNC during the 2016 presidential campaign .
Russian intelligence officials likely seeded the idea with prominent Russians and Ukrainians , according to the New York Times , which first reported on the briefing .
From there , it passed through a network of oligarchs , businessmen , and intermediaries before bubbling up in the United States .
Last November , Republican Sen. John Kennedy also suggested in a Fox News interview that Ukraine was responsible for hacking the DNC .
He later walked back the claim , refuted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the committee .
But he maintained that “ both Russia and Ukraine meddled in the 2016 election.
” “ It ’ s hard to find that line between what is legitimate and weird and what is just totally nutty , ” said Bret Schafer , an expert on digital disinformation .
Documents from the Mueller investigation released in November revealed how in the summer of 2016 , as the presidential campaign was reaching fever pitch , Trump ’ s former campaign chairman , Paul Manafort , suggested that Ukraine may have been responsible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Deputy campaign manager Rick Gates told the FBI during an interview conducted as part of the special counsel investigation that the narrative was also supported by one of Manafort ’ s business partners , Konstantin Kilimnik , who is alleged in U.S. court filings to be a former Russian intelligence officer with ties to Russian intelligence services .
Russian President Vladimir Putin also reportedly influenced Trump ’ s views on Ukraine during their private bilateral meetings in Finland and Germany , according to unnamed former senior officials in the Washington Post .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ characters , and the convoluted web of claims and counterclaims , is difficult , even for researchers who do so full time .
“ It ’ s hard to find that line between what is legitimate and weird and what is just totally nutty , ” said Bret Schafer , an expert on digital disinformation at the German Marshall Fund ’ s Alliance for Securing Democracy .
“ With all the names involved , it ’ s enormously confusing keeping track of who ’ s who and where the connections are , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukrainian and what is Russian is enormously difficult , even for people who work in this space.
” “ I am very sympathetic to the average American reader or viewer who comes away from this not having any clue at all what to believe .
… It ’ s all very messy , ” he said .
That ’ s precisely how other Russian disinformation operations are so effective—not necessarily because of their sophistication but because of their capacity to flood the zone .
When Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Buk missile , it triggered a Russian disinformation campaign unlike any seen before .
A spectrum of actors , from the Russian Defense Ministry to the state-owned media , internet trolls , and even Russian arms manufacturers , leapt to action to push out alternate—and sometimes conflicting—theories about the plane ’ s fate .
The purpose being not to convince the world of any one argument but to sow just enough confusion and chaos to muddy the findings of international investigations .
Was the Ukraine-CrowdStrike conspiracy theory the result of a calculated Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ professor at Johns Hopkins University who has studied in-depth election interference and digital disinformation , is skeptical .
He researched information from more than 10 million tweets attributed to the Internet Research Agency , the high-profile Russian troll farm with ties to the Kremlin , and found that fewer than 100 referred to CrowdStrike .
He also cautioned against overstating Russian disinformation campaigns , a key fixture in the breathless news cycle of Trump ’ s Washington over the past three years .
“ We ’ ve overstated the effectiveness of Russian disinformation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he said .
“ We ’ ve overstated the effectiveness of Russian disinformation by an order of magnitude , ” said Thomas Rid , a professor at Johns Hopkins University .
Nina Jankowicz , a disinformation fellow at the Wilson Center , said the success of Kremlin disinformation campaigns hinged on their ability to exacerbate fissures that already exist in society .
“ Until we recognize that demonizing our adversaries doesn ’ t solve anything , but building a more resilient society can , we are unlikely to make progress in fighting disinformation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the forthcoming book How to Lose the Information War .
Jankowicz said that while Russia would have been happy to undermine Ukraine by furthering the conspiracy theory that it was Kyiv that interfered in the 2016 election , she was similarly skeptical that Russia planted the narrative .
Even as the impeachment trial plays out , new evidence and documents are coming to light about the Trump administration ’ s Ukraine policy .
But when the dust settles , it remains to be seen if a clear picture will emerge on how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into the halls of power in Washington—particularly as Republicans and Democrats dig their heels in on their own narratives of whether Trump committed impeachable offenses or not .
“ At the end of the rainbow , there ’ s not going to be some revelation that clears everything up .
It ’ s going to remain messy and tangled , ” said Schafer of the German Marshall Fund .
“ And even if we keep establishing more and more pieces of evidence that leads to what you consider to be a set of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think we ’ re ever going to find the magical email that clears it all up for us .
”

On Jan. 3, 2017, weeks before Donald Trump was inaugurated as U.S. president, an inconspicuous blog post went live on an obscure and now defunct U.S. website, Washington’s Blog. Titled “Why Crowdstrike’s Russian Hacking Story Fell Apart—Say Hello to Fancy Bear,” the post alleged how it was Ukraine, not Russia, behind the 2016 U.S. election hacks, relying on a raft of rumors, vague accusations, and debunked conspiracy theories.
On Jan. 3, 2017, weeks before Donald Trump was inaugurated as U.S. president, an inconspicuous blog post went live on an obscure and now defunct U.S. website, Washington’s Blog. Titled “Why Crowdstrike’s Russian Hacking Story Fell Apart—Say Hello to Fancy Bear,” the post alleged how it was Ukraine, not Russia, behind the 2016 U.S. election hacks, relying on a raft of rumors, vague accusations, and debunked conspiracy theories.
The allegations in the blog post could have floated off into obscurity, but instead they had a different fate: They began seeping into the bloodstream of social media, blogs, and news reports on the left and right and then into the mouths of some Republican lawmakers and the president. Eventually, this narrative became a cornerstone of the skulduggery that led to Trump’s impeachment.
The Washington’s Blog post appears to be one, if not the first, mention of a now infamous and debunked conspiracy theory: that the cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike, at Ukraine’s bidding, hacked the Democratic National Committee (DNC) during the 2016 election and pinned the blame on Russia and that the DNC server was somehow based in Ukraine.
“I would like you to find out what happened with this whole situation with Ukraine. They say CrowdStrike—I guess you have one of your wealthy people—the server, they say Ukraine has it,” Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a July 25 call that is at the center of the impeachment trial, according to an official White House release.
There’s no easily defined path to follow that shows how exactly this particular conspiracy theory wound its way from the periphery of the internet into the center of a historic U.S. political scandal, according to 10 experts and U.S. officials who spoke to Foreign Policy for this story. Some experts, including Trump’s former top White House aide on Russia and Eurasia, believe its origins lie in Russia. After all, Russian officials in 2016 began leveling vague accusations at Ukraine for meddling in the U.S. election.
A transcript of a phone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is displayed during testimony on Capitol Hill in Washington on Nov. 19, 2019.
Beyond that, U.S. intelligence has laid out a massive case demonstrating the extent of Russian interference in the 2016 election. The yearlong investigation by special counsel Robert Mueller found that the Russian government interfered in the U.S. election “in sweeping and systematic fashion.” (Several Trump officials were charged with lying to FBI investigators about their contacts with Russian officials during the campaign.)
But other experts and digital sleuths say there’s no evidence (or, at least, unclassified evidence) that shows Russia is the mastermind of the so-called “Ukraine did it” theory. They also caution against overestimating Russia’s hand in this; the hordes of Russia’s trolls may have seized on the Ukraine accusations later in a mad dash of digital opportunism, but the conspiracy itself was firmly homegrown.
If those questions aren’t easily answered, the murky path of this conspiracy theory still reflects some of the biggest challenges swirling around impeachment: how easily foreign actors can worm their way into Washington’s hyperpartisan politics, how to defend against it, and how to sort out truth from lies. It takes on particular importance during an impeachment investigation surrounded by conspiracy theories and falsehoods pushed by the president’s advisors and sharply opposing narratives put forth by both Democrats and Republicans.
House impeachment managers are expected to wrap up their third day of arguments on Friday before the Senate, and Trump’s defense team will lay out their arguments Saturday through Tuesday. Thus far, despite hours of arguments and impassioned speeches from Democratic Rep. Adam Schiff, no Republicans appear to be swayed to vote in favor of impeachment nor Democrats swayed to vote against. Since the impeachment investigation began in September, the president’s allies in Congress have seized on the idea that Kyiv may have sought to sway the 2016 presidential election in favor of Hillary Clinton during the House impeachment investigation as justification of his request that Zelensky investigate CrowdStrike.
“Once you understand that Ukrainian officials were cooperating directly with President Trump’s political opponents to undermine his candidacy, it’s easy to understand why the president would want to learn the full truth about these operations and why he would be skeptical of Ukraine,” Rep. Devin Nunes, the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, said in November during the impeachment hearings.
Nunes, who helped oversee the impeachment investigation, stressed in his remarks that Republicans agreed Russia interfered in the 2016 election but that Ukraine could have, as well. “It is entirely possible for two separate nations to engage in election meddling at the same time. And Republicans believe we should take meddling seriously by all foreign countries, regardless of which campaign is the target.”
Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham, one of Trump’s most vocal defenders, conceded that while he accepted the conclusion of U.S. intelligence that Russia, not Ukraine, hacked the DNC, what really mattered was that “the president believes that the Ukraine interfered in our election,” as Graham said Thursday.
Fiona Hill, Trump’s former senior director for Russia and Eurasia on the National Security Council and a respected Russia scholar, offered a sharp rebuke of this notion during her public testimony, describing it as a fictional narrative that has been “has been perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services themselves.”
She noted that while the Ukrainian government had sought to curry favor with the Clinton campaign, operating on the assumption that the former secretary of state would win, many countries around the world had similarly “bet on the wrong horse.” Hill noted that this was not comparable to Russian interference efforts, which were directed from the top down by Vladimir Putin and involved Russian intelligence services.
But as the impeachment investigation escalated last fall, senators and their aides were briefed by U.S. intelligence officials that Russia had engaged in a yearslong campaign to frame Ukraine for its hacking of the DNC during the 2016 presidential campaign. Russian intelligence officials likely seeded the idea with prominent Russians and Ukrainians, according to the New York Times, which first reported on the briefing. From there, it passed through a network of oligarchs, businessmen, and intermediaries before bubbling up in the United States.
Last November, Republican Sen. John Kennedy also suggested in a Fox News interview that Ukraine was responsible for hacking the DNC. He later walked back the claim, refuted by both Democrats and some Republicans on the committee. But he maintained that “both Russia and Ukraine meddled in the 2016 election.”
“It’s hard to find that line between what is legitimate and weird and what is just totally nutty,” said Bret Schafer, an expert on digital disinformation.
Documents from the Mueller investigation released in November revealed how in the summer of 2016, as the presidential campaign was reaching fever pitch, Trump’s former campaign chairman, Paul Manafort, suggested that Ukraine may have been responsible for hacking the DNC, not Russia. Deputy campaign manager Rick Gates told the FBI during an interview conducted as part of the special counsel investigation that the narrative was also supported by one of Manafort’s business partners, Konstantin Kilimnik, who is alleged in U.S. court filings to be a former Russian intelligence officer with ties to Russian intelligence services. Russian President Vladimir Putin also reportedly influenced Trump’s views on Ukraine during their private bilateral meetings in Finland and Germany, according to unnamed former senior officials in the Washington Post.
Keeping track of the long cast of characters, and the convoluted web of claims and counterclaims, is difficult, even for researchers who do so full time. “It’s hard to find that line between what is legitimate and weird and what is just totally nutty,” said Bret Schafer, an expert on digital disinformation at the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy. “With all the names involved, it’s enormously confusing keeping track of who’s who and where the connections are, and, of course, untangling what is Ukrainian and what is Russian is enormously difficult, even for people who work in this space.”
“I am very sympathetic to the average American reader or viewer who comes away from this not having any clue at all what to believe. … It’s all very messy,” he said.
That’s precisely how other Russian disinformation operations are so effective—not necessarily because of their sophistication but because of their capacity to flood the zone. When Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine in 2014 by a Russian-made Buk missile, it triggered a Russian disinformation campaign unlike any seen before. A spectrum of actors, from the Russian Defense Ministry to the state-owned media, internet trolls, and even Russian arms manufacturers, leapt to action to push out alternate—and sometimes conflicting—theories about the plane’s fate. The purpose being not to convince the world of any one argument but to sow just enough confusion and chaos to muddy the findings of international investigations.
Was the Ukraine-CrowdStrike conspiracy theory the result of a calculated Russian disinformation campaign? Thomas Rid, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who has studied in-depth election interference and digital disinformation, is skeptical. He researched information from more than 10 million tweets attributed to the Internet Research Agency, the high-profile Russian troll farm with ties to the Kremlin, and found that fewer than 100 referred to CrowdStrike. He also cautioned against overstating Russian disinformation campaigns, a key fixture in the breathless news cycle of Trump’s Washington over the past three years.
“We’ve overstated the effectiveness of Russian disinformation by an order of magnitude,” he said.
“We’ve overstated the effectiveness of Russian disinformation by an order of magnitude,” said Thomas Rid, a professor at Johns Hopkins University.
Nina Jankowicz, a disinformation fellow at the Wilson Center, said the success of Kremlin disinformation campaigns hinged on their ability to exacerbate fissures that already exist in society. “Until we recognize that demonizing our adversaries doesn’t solve anything, but building a more resilient society can, we are unlikely to make progress in fighting disinformation,” said Jankowicz, the author of the forthcoming book How to Lose the Information War.
Jankowicz said that while Russia would have been happy to undermine Ukraine by furthering the conspiracy theory that it was Kyiv that interfered in the 2016 election, she was similarly skeptical that Russia planted the narrative.
Even as the impeachment trial plays out, new evidence and documents are coming to light about the Trump administration’s Ukraine policy. But when the dust settles, it remains to be seen if a clear picture will emerge on how exactly fringe conspiracy theories wound their way into the halls of power in Washington—particularly as Republicans and Democrats dig their heels in on their own narratives of whether Trump committed impeachable offenses or not.
“At the end of the rainbow, there’s not going to be some revelation that clears everything up. It’s going to remain messy and tangled,” said Schafer of the German Marshall Fund. “And even if we keep establishing more and more pieces of evidence that leads to what you consider to be a set of provable facts, I don’t think we’re ever going to find the magical email that clears it all up for us.”