foreignpolicy--2020-01-23--Wuhan’s Virus and Quarantine Will Hit the Poor Hardest

Wuhan ’ s Virus and Quarantine Will Hit the Poor Hardest As morning dawns in Wuhan , a huge city in central China , train stations and airports are closed , roads blockaded , and the 11 million residents , many of whom were preparing for Lunar New Year trips , have been warned not to leave .
The quarantine , enacted Thursday following the rapid spread of a deadly coronavirus that has already infected more than 500 people , is an unprecedented step—the equivalent of closing down Chicago in the middle of the night two days before Thanksgiving .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that has already reached as far as the United States , Thailand , Japan , and South Korea .
But it ’ s not the residents of Washington state or Bangkok who are most at risk from the coronavirus .
It ’ s China ’ s poor—as in many countries , a critically underserved population when it comes to health care .
It ’ s the poor who were most likely to be in contact with the virus , it ’ s the poor among whom it will spread fastest , and it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be the main victims of over-repressive measures as the government , after weeks of what looked like a cover-up , snaps to action .
The Wuhan coronavirus appears to have emerged through animal-to-human contact in the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market .
Despite the name , the market sold a huge range of wildlife delicacies , from wolf cubs to the snakes or bats now believed to have been the initial vector of infection .
As in other live markets , the dirty , dangerous work of handling the animals was chiefly done by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Wuhan—itself a massive city formed from the merger of the three towns of Wuchang , Hanyang , and Hankou—is finding that its size has become a liability .
During the late 20th century , real estate developments grew the city ’ s economy and enveloped suburban townships in surrounding areas of Hubei province .
Wuhan ’ s health care system now strains to handle the full brunt of a health crisis impacting the entirety of its population .
Within this community , many migrants and college students on its many university campuses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time the Jan. 23 quarantine was set .
Now , as other regions of China struggle to calculate and report coronavirus cases from travelers taking their annual sojourn home , treatment and public health information has become the top policy priority for officials .
Despite the vast scale of this problem ’ s domestic dimension , word of cases in South Korea , Thailand , and other far-flung locations arrived far before reports of the spread of the infection to Wuhan ’ s neighboring cities and towns .
In all of those cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carried the virus were far better off than the average Chinese citizen—simply by virtue of having the resources to travel abroad .
( Less than 10 percent of China ’ s population owns a passport . )
Middle-class travelers coughing in economy class to Bangkok were far easier to detect than the sweating worker riding a shared truck back to the edge of Wuhan or taking a long-distance bus home to another province in advance of the Lunar New Year this Saturday .
Because of the nature of the service sector and dearth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been reluctant to abandon their sole chance for family reunions .
China is a surveillance society , but the net of surveillance has massive holes .
Middle-class Chinese lives are highly visible to technological profiling systems , the poor much less so .
Some do not even possess an ID card , supposed to be carried by all citizens at all times—either because they ’ ve lost them and been unable to replace them without an expensive trip to their hometown or because their birth was never registered with the government .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which require ID checks , they take difficult-to-monitor long-distance buses or use informal truck and van transport networks .
Even their online presence is severely curtailed ; despite claims that services like WeChat are ubiquitous , internet penetration in China is only around 60 percent .
Resources such as WeChat accounts or ID cards are sometimes pooled between families , with parents making use of children ’ s identities .
With rural areas often left in the dark , slower to receive preventative measures on hand-washing , face masks , and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good internet connections have an edge in finding out what to do to stay healthy .
As the coronavirus makes its way outside of Wuhan , public health resources also thin out , and medical supplies may be slower to reach more distant hospitals for adequate treatment .
Mask shortages in Shanghai and beyond have emerged at a time when manufacturing facilities wind down for the Lunar New Year .
One mask factory is offering three times regular wages for workers to return from holiday .
These supply scarcities , in conjunction with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the haves and the have-nots .
The poor affected by the virus are also much less likely to have seen a doctor .
China ’ s health care system , which combines public and private elements , is notoriously challenging to navigate even for middle-class patients .
Large portions of the population have little or no access to quality health care .
Even when rural or small-town resources are nominally available , resources are clustered , as per policy , into larger cities and metropolises .
Most Chinese doctors are only educated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less , and actual Doctors of Clinical Medicine ( the equivalent of an American M.D . )
almost exclusively work in large city hospitals , which are now filled to the brim with patients and staff increasingly stretched thin .
While public insurance exists , and has been expanded in recent years , it is also linked to the hukou—China ’ s ubiquitous residence permit that citizens are born into .
This policy challenge makes it impossible for rural residents to use their insurance in city hospitals with more qualified staff or for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from where they hold a hukou , to access the system at all .
As a result , they avoid using medical services except in dire need , often self-medicating—one reason for China ’ s tremendously high usage of over-the-counter antibiotics—or turning to traditional Chinese medicine practitioners .
Their often relatively poor health makes them more vulnerable to the virus and more likely to mistake it for a regular cold or flu .
All these factors are exacerbated by age .
From the limited data released , retirees – with a median age @ @ @ @ @ @ @ majority of the 17 dead so far , and older individuals with preexisting respiratory conditions remain among the most at risk .
But migrant workers , lacking access to proper pensions and good-quality care , can often be in their 40s , 50s , or older—and in worse condition , thanks to a lifetime of hard labor , than their middle-class counterparts .
The relative invisibility and perceived lack of importance of the poor may be one reason why the official number of cases—as of writing , more than 500—differs widely from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or more .
The system may simply have not been able to find patients , rather than covering up their existence .
( Some mixture of the two is most likely . )
The sudden rush of attention last weekend may go some way to fixing this , with free—or mandatory—diagnosis throughout the city and other key transport hubs .
But these resources are likely to be concentrated in the urban core—and are already badly overstretched , with reports of packed corridors and dangerously exhausted medical personnel .
In the aftermath of past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Tangshan earthquakes , the state also tends to neglect the countryside in favor of the cities , leaving rural people to fend for themselves .
Within Wuhan itself , residents are highly reliant on public transportation , including bus , subway lines , and ferries , which have now been shut down .
Lower-income nurses , junior-level doctors , and hospital personnel may find it harder to travel to necessary job shifts .
The poor may be less visible for diagnosis and treatment , but they ’ re more visible for repression @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , meanwhile , the poor are also far more likely to be the victims of brutality by the authorities .
Disaster often brings with it elite panic , singling out the poor or outsider groups .
After the Tangshan earthquake in 1976 , urban militias beat to death or shot country dwellers coming into the city seeking aid , claiming they were looters .
If fear—among the armed men who will have to enforce the quarantine or among the population trapped inside—spreads , these kinds of deadly confrontations may emerge , especially as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within a sealed-off Wuhan dwindle .
Disinformation has also emerged as both imposing risks and slower public response and as a vector for law enforcement crackdowns on “ rumormongers.
” As with other cases of Chinese law enforcement , the line between spreading fake information and criticism of the government remains blurred .
While the quarantine may help halt the spread of the virus , working-class Chinese—especially migrants—least visible to the system are already beyond the reach of even the most ideal public health campaign .
The Lunar New Year vacation may begin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their travels far earlier than white-collar workers—not least because they have longer and tougher journeys .
Finding them—and helping them—will be a huge challenge but an essential one .

As morning dawns in Wuhan, a huge city in central China, train stations and airports are closed, roads blockaded, and the 11 million residents, many of whom were preparing for Lunar New Year trips, have been warned not to leave. The quarantine, enacted Thursday following the rapid spread of a deadly coronavirus that has already infected more than 500 people, is an unprecedented step—the equivalent of closing down Chicago in the middle of the night two days before Thanksgiving. The move was prompted by an outbreak that has already reached as far as the United States, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea.
As morning dawns in Wuhan, a huge city in central China, train stations and airports are closed, roads blockaded, and the 11 million residents, many of whom were preparing for Lunar New Year trips, have been warned not to leave. The quarantine, enacted Thursday following the rapid spread of a deadly coronavirus that has already infected more than 500 people, is an unprecedented step—the equivalent of closing down Chicago in the middle of the night two days before Thanksgiving. The move was prompted by an outbreak that has already reached as far as the United States, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea.
But it’s not the residents of Washington state or Bangkok who are most at risk from the coronavirus. It’s China’s poor—as in many countries, a critically underserved population when it comes to health care. It’s the poor who were most likely to be in contact with the virus, it’s the poor among whom it will spread fastest, and it’s the poor who will likely be the main victims of over-repressive measures as the government, after weeks of what looked like a cover-up, snaps to action.
The Wuhan coronavirus appears to have emerged through animal-to-human contact in the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market. Despite the name, the market sold a huge range of wildlife delicacies, from wolf cubs to the snakes or bats now believed to have been the initial vector of infection. As in other live markets, the dirty, dangerous work of handling the animals was chiefly done by ordinary workers, many of them migrants. Wuhan—itself a massive city formed from the merger of the three towns of Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankou—is finding that its size has become a liability.
During the late 20th century, real estate developments grew the city’s economy and enveloped suburban townships in surrounding areas of Hubei province. Wuhan’s health care system now strains to handle the full brunt of a health crisis impacting the entirety of its population. Within this community, many migrants and college students on its many university campuses had already departed the city by the time the Jan. 23 quarantine was set. Now, as other regions of China struggle to calculate and report coronavirus cases from travelers taking their annual sojourn home, treatment and public health information has become the top policy priority for officials.
Despite the vast scale of this problem’s domestic dimension, word of cases in South Korea, Thailand, and other far-flung locations arrived far before reports of the spread of the infection to Wuhan’s neighboring cities and towns. In all of those cases, of course, the travelers who carried the virus were far better off than the average Chinese citizen—simply by virtue of having the resources to travel abroad. (Less than 10 percent of China’s population owns a passport.) Middle-class travelers coughing in economy class to Bangkok were far easier to detect than the sweating worker riding a shared truck back to the edge of Wuhan or taking a long-distance bus home to another province in advance of the Lunar New Year this Saturday. Because of the nature of the service sector and dearth of labor benefits, many migrants may have been reluctant to abandon their sole chance for family reunions.
China is a surveillance society, but the net of surveillance has massive holes. Middle-class Chinese lives are highly visible to technological profiling systems, the poor much less so. Some do not even possess an ID card, supposed to be carried by all citizens at all times—either because they’ve lost them and been unable to replace them without an expensive trip to their hometown or because their birth was never registered with the government. Instead of traveling by train or plane, which require ID checks, they take difficult-to-monitor long-distance buses or use informal truck and van transport networks. Even their online presence is severely curtailed; despite claims that services like WeChat are ubiquitous, internet penetration in China is only around 60 percent. Resources such as WeChat accounts or ID cards are sometimes pooled between families, with parents making use of children’s identities.
With rural areas often left in the dark, slower to receive preventative measures on hand-washing, face masks, and other health news, families with phones and good internet connections have an edge in finding out what to do to stay healthy. As the coronavirus makes its way outside of Wuhan, public health resources also thin out, and medical supplies may be slower to reach more distant hospitals for adequate treatment. Mask shortages in Shanghai and beyond have emerged at a time when manufacturing facilities wind down for the Lunar New Year. One mask factory is offering three times regular wages for workers to return from holiday. These supply scarcities, in conjunction with previous inequities, will divide preventative capabilities between the haves and the have-nots.
The poor affected by the virus are also much less likely to have seen a doctor. China’s health care system, which combines public and private elements, is notoriously challenging to navigate even for middle-class patients. Large portions of the population have little or no access to quality health care. Even when rural or small-town resources are nominally available, resources are clustered, as per policy, into larger cities and metropolises. Most Chinese doctors are only educated to the undergraduate level, sometimes even less, and actual Doctors of Clinical Medicine (the equivalent of an American M.D.) almost exclusively work in large city hospitals, which are now filled to the brim with patients and staff increasingly stretched thin.
While public insurance exists, and has been expanded in recent years, it is also linked to the hukou—China’s ubiquitous residence permit that citizens are born into. This policy challenge makes it impossible for rural residents to use their insurance in city hospitals with more qualified staff or for migrant workers, who usually work far from where they hold a hukou, to access the system at all. As a result, they avoid using medical services except in dire need, often self-medicating—one reason for China’s tremendously high usage of over-the-counter antibiotics—or turning to traditional Chinese medicine practitioners. Their often relatively poor health makes them more vulnerable to the virus and more likely to mistake it for a regular cold or flu.
All these factors are exacerbated by age. From the limited data released, retirees – with a median age of 75 – make up the vast majority of the 17 dead so far, and older individuals with preexisting respiratory conditions remain among the most at risk. But migrant workers, lacking access to proper pensions and good-quality care, can often be in their 40s, 50s, or older—and in worse condition, thanks to a lifetime of hard labor, than their middle-class counterparts.
The relative invisibility and perceived lack of importance of the poor may be one reason why the official number of cases—as of writing, more than 500—differs widely from the estimates produced by foreign modeling of 1,700 or more. The system may simply have not been able to find patients, rather than covering up their existence. (Some mixture of the two is most likely.)
The sudden rush of attention last weekend may go some way to fixing this, with free—or mandatory—diagnosis throughout the city and other key transport hubs. But these resources are likely to be concentrated in the urban core—and are already badly overstretched, with reports of packed corridors and dangerously exhausted medical personnel. In the aftermath of past natural disasters, such as the Sichuan and Tangshan earthquakes, the state also tends to neglect the countryside in favor of the cities, leaving rural people to fend for themselves. Within Wuhan itself, residents are highly reliant on public transportation, including bus, subway lines, and ferries, which have now been shut down. Lower-income nurses, junior-level doctors, and hospital personnel may find it harder to travel to necessary job shifts.
The poor may be less visible for diagnosis and treatment, but they’re more visible for repression. As the quarantine tightens around Wuhan, meanwhile, the poor are also far more likely to be the victims of brutality by the authorities. Disaster often brings with it elite panic, singling out the poor or outsider groups. After the Tangshan earthquake in 1976, urban militias beat to death or shot country dwellers coming into the city seeking aid, claiming they were looters. If fear—among the armed men who will have to enforce the quarantine or among the population trapped inside—spreads, these kinds of deadly confrontations may emerge, especially as supplies for treatment and ongoing day-to-day activities within a sealed-off Wuhan dwindle. Disinformation has also emerged as both imposing risks and slower public response and as a vector for law enforcement crackdowns on “rumormongers.” As with other cases of Chinese law enforcement, the line between spreading fake information and criticism of the government remains blurred.
While the quarantine may help halt the spread of the virus, working-class Chinese—especially migrants—least visible to the system are already beyond the reach of even the most ideal public health campaign. The Lunar New Year vacation may begin Friday, but migrant workers often begin their travels far earlier than white-collar workers—not least because they have longer and tougher journeys. Finding them—and helping them—will be a huge challenge but an essential one.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--Imran Khan on Trump, Modi, and Why He Won’t Criticize China

Imran Khan on Trump , Modi , and Why He Won ’ t Criticize China Imran Khan rode a populist wave to become Pakistan ’ s prime minister in 2018 .
Since then , his tenure has been marked by economic turmoil , violence , skirmishes with neighboring India , and rising Islamic extremism .
On Jan. 22 , he met with Foreign Policy ’ s editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos , Switzerland .
The following conversation has been edited for brevity and syntax .
Jonathan Tepperman : How was your meeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Khan : The No .
1 thing that is very important for the United States and for Pakistan at the moment is Afghanistan .
The only other country , apart from Afghanistan , which wants peace after 40 years of conflict is Pakistan , because we get directly affected by what happens there .
The tribal areas which border Afghanistan have been devastated since 9/11 .
And we feel that the only way we can rebuild those areas is if there is peace in Afghanistan and trade between the two countries .
Of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corridor to Central Asia , so it ’ s very important that there is peace there .
Until recently , the U.S. believed that there was a military solution .
I , for one , have always opposed this military solution .
I always believed that the so-called war on terror was the wrong way to fight terrorism ; I felt that it created more terrorism due to collateral damage .
We were witness to that in our own country and in Pakistan ’ s tribal areas : the more drone attacks , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more people joined the militants .
I was opposed to this , and for that I was considered anti-American and pro-Taliban .
Now , the policy under President Trump is that there should be peace talks and a political settlement .
So we are on the same page , and that ’ s why Pakistan has , for the first time , a decent relationship with the United States—because relationships are built on common objectives .
Previously , we had this awful situation where the U.S. expected Pakistan to help them win the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have accepted this challenge , because we couldn ’ t deliver .
As a result , we were divided , we lost 70,000 people killed in the war on terror , and at the end , we were held responsible for the U.S. not succeeding .
Now , our objectives are the same .
The United States , Pakistan , and Afghanistan want peace .
JP : The last time you met , President Trump suggested he might be willing to get involved in Kashmir .
You ’ ve called to internationalize the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has always opposed it .
Is there any chance it ’ s going to happen ?
IK : I am a firm believer that military means are not a solution to ending conflicts .
So from day one , I believed that the only way forward was to try to have a peace settlement .
Because of my cricketing background , I probably am the one Pakistani who knows India better than anyone else and has more friendships in India than anyone .
I felt that made me ideally placed to improve the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after taking office I immediately reached out to Prime Minister Narendra Modi .
I was amazed by the reaction I got , which was quite weird .
The subcontinent hosts the greatest number of poor people in the world , and the best way to fight poverty is to have a trading relationship between the two countries rather than spending money on arms .
This is what I said to the Indian prime minister .
But I was met by brick wall .
Then this suicide attack in Pulwama on the Indian side @ @ @ @ @ @ @ got killed .
I immediately told Modi that if you can give us any actionable intelligence [ that Pakistanis were involved ] , we will act on it .
But rather than do so , they bombed us .
After Mr. Modi won a second election in 2019 , he unilaterally annexed Kashmir—a disputed territory between Pakistan and India , according to the U.N. From then on , things went from bad to worse .
Let me say one last word on what ’ s happening in India , because I think it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , especially for the people of Kashmir , who for over five months now are literally in an open prison , kept there by 900,000 troops .
It ’ s a disaster for India , because India is a multicultural society and a secular society .
That was the vision of Mahatma Gandhi and the first prime minister , Jawaharlal Nehru .
JT : India and Pakistan almost went to war last year .
How close to another major conflict are we ?
What can you and the rest of the world do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re not close to conflict right now , but it ’ s important that the United Nations act , that the U.S. act .
The Indian election campaign , which Modi won hands down , was built on jingoism and hatred for Pakistan .
So my worry is that things will get worse in India .
There are protests in India against these two new citizenship laws [ an amendment that fast-tracks citizenship for non-Muslims from Afghanistan , Bangladesh , and Pakistan , and a registry of citizens in Assam that requires @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ] .
To distract attention , they are bombing along the Line of Control .
If things get worse , they might increase the bombing .
That ’ s why the U.S. and the United Nations must take steps .
Why not send observers along the Line of Control ?
JT : Trump has a very close relationship now with Prime Minister Modi .
Were you worried by “ Howdy , Modi ” ?
IK : Not by “ Howdy , Modi.
” Their relationship is understandable , because India is a huge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would like the benefits of this huge market .
And that ’ s fine .
My concern is not about the U.S.-India relationship .
My concern is the direction in which India is going .
The sequence of events bears striking resemblance to what happened in Nazi Germany .
Between 1930 and 1934 , Germany went from a liberal democracy to a fascist , totalitarian , racist state .
If you look at what is happening in India under the BJP [ Bharatiya Janata Party ] in the last five years , look @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ll see the danger .
And you ’ re talking about a huge country of 1.3 billion people that is nuclear-armed .
JT : So since we ’ re at the World Economic Forum , let me ask about the economy .
Pakistan ’ s economy has crashed 13 times over the last 60 years and required an IMF bailout each time .
Fitch , the credit rating agency , recently gave Pakistan a B rating , saying its economy is , “ constrained by structural weaknesses , reflected in weak development @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s brand new social mobility index ranks Pakistan 79th , below Sri Lanka , Bangladesh , and India .
Pakistan is among the lowest investment rates in the world , and last year it imported twice as much as it exported .
You came into office promising a new Pakistan .
What kind of reforms are you making to break this cycle and fix the economy ?
And why should investors have any more confidence this time than in the past ?
IK : Pakistan in the 1960s was one of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than anyone else .
It was a model which was copied by a lot of countries .
My contention is that it ’ s not a lack of resources that make a country poor .
My contention is that it is corruption .
First , corruption destroys state institutions .
The justice system , the accountability bureau , the tax collection system have to be destroyed for officials to make money .
Second , because you have to take ill-gotten money out of the country or else it will be spotted .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currency .
And when the currency devalues , it leads to inflation , more poverty , and then the money that should be spent on human development invariably—and I can tell you from our experience—goes into mega projects that feature mega kickbacks .
What we are trying to do now is , No .
1 , to strengthen state institutions .
We have conducted a big accountability drive , which has never happened in Pakistan before .
Second , we have tightened up the laws on money laundering .
Even more important , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
We used to have these boom and bust cycles because we had a growth rate which was artificial , because it was led by imports .
And we inherited the biggest current account deficit .
We ’ ve cut it down by 70 percent .
We ’ ve brought down our imports .
We had to adjust our currency to make our exports more competitive with the other countries .
And for the first time , exports , which were stagnant for five years , are showing signs of improvement .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ stock market is the highest in a year .
And our investment in just two years has gone up 200 percent .
Obviously , there ’ s a lot of hard work remaining .
But I think we are headed in the right direction .
JT : And how much can you do to reform when the military remains so powerful and retains such vast business interests ?
IK : I can say that this is probably the first government that is totally supported by our military .
There ’ s no issue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the reason is that I think there is a broader trust there .
The reason why the previous clashes used to take place was that when the civilian government started making money , the military had these intelligence agencies which knew what was going on .
So therefore , there was always a clash—not because the military was interfering in the government , but because the civilian leadership were vulnerable because the military knew the extent of their corruption , so they wanted to control the military .
Now we have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve been very vocal about criticizing India ’ s treatment of its Muslims and the oppression of Muslims around the world , with one notable exception : China .
Why have you been so quiet about the persecution of China ’ s Muslims in Xinjiang and elsewhere ?
IK : Well , two reasons .
One main reason is that the scale of what is going on in China—and frankly , I don ’ t know much about it , I just occasionally read about it—is nothing compared to what is happening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ due respect , we ’ re talking about some 1 million to 2 million people being detained in Xinjiang .
That ’ s not nothing .
IK : But what is happening in Kashmir is 8 million people under siege for five months .
Over the last 30 years , about 100,000 people have been killed in Kashmir .
And all the top [ Kashmiri ] leadership is in jail .
So it ’ s the scale of what is happening .
As far as the Uighurs , look—China has helped us .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ we were at the rock bottom .
So we are really grateful to the Chinese government , and we decided that whatever issues we will have with China , we will deal with them privately .
We will not go public .
JT : The U.S. and others have warned that China is setting up Pakistan for a debt trap , as Sri Lanka and others have fallen into .
What are you doing to prevent that ?
IK : My finance minister is sitting here .
Can you please tell them exactly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
Finance Minister Abdul Hafeez Shaikh : Well , first of all , we have to recognize what China is doing in Pakistan .
Economic projects .
And the key component of that is building a port .
And the idea is to promote exports to Africa JT : But China has ended up owning the port it built in Sri Lanka .
AHS : No , that ’ s not true .
The port belongs to the people and government of Pakistan .
Obviously , you need a port to operate , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s better than government bureaucrats to have well-run private companies .
So that is the spirit .
The other point I want to make is that this network of roads to the port will benefit Pakistani society .
We are inviting foreign investment from every country , including the U.S. We are building this network of roads , ports , and electricity plants not meant exclusively for the Chinese .
JT : Are terrorist groups like the Haqqani network currently operating in Pakistan ?
IK : Absolutely not .
When I first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us that these groups are operating from within Pakistan .
When I spoke to the prime minister , I said , “ You point out , where are these groups.
” When the Americans asked us about these groups , we said , “ You come and tell us where these safe havens are.
” I can proudly say that they are a legacy of the past .
JT : Freedom House this year ranked Pakistan as “ partly free , ” in part because of the treatment of journalists there , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the security forces in the last year .
What are you going to do about it ?
IK : I invite you to come to Pakistan .
The criticism the prime minister has faced , the government has faced from the press has also included serious libel .
Look at what the media has printed .
I can honestly say that no democracy would allow this sort of thing .
I spent a lot of time in England .
I was in university there .
Their libel laws are such that no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that .
Imagine someone going on television there saying that , “ I ’ ve just heard that the prime minister ’ s wife has left him.
” You say that in England , and there are consequences .
If anything , we need regulations on the media .
There ’ s nothing better than criticism .
Criticism is the difference between a democracy and dictatorship .
But what my government has faced is propaganda .
And we find ourselves defenseless , because we can ’ t protect ourselves .
They accused me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I have been trying to get justice from the watchdog body .
And the prime minister hasn ’ t got justice .
So this is all wrong .
In the past , there might have been issues , but I honestly feel that the Pakistani media is more vibrant and free than any other media in the world .

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Lebanon’s Halloween Government

On Tuesday , after three months of protests and in the middle of a long-running economic crisis , Beirut finally announced the formation of a new government .
And in many ways , the selection is unprecedent .
The government of incoming Prime Minister Hassan Diab is the first to be composed entirely of technocrats since Lebanon ’ s post-civil war order was cemented some 30 years ago .
It also boasts a record number of female ministers , including the first female deputy prime minister , and defense minister .
But that is where the good news ends .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ first in Lebanon ’ s history that is exclusively beholden to a parliamentary coalition led by Iran ’ s Lebanese ally , Hezbollah .
And most of its purported technocratic ministers are in fact affiliated with the political establishment that drove the country into its current critical condition and that mass protests have been desperately trying to eject .
Protesters have already hit on the term “ Halloween Government ” to describe the thinly disguised ties between incoming ministers and Lebanon ’ s corrupt political bosses .
The term also hints at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the worst economic crisis in its hundred-year history .
The formation of the cabinet caps several weeks of political wrangling for spoils among the political allies of Hezbollah , an organization that wields disproportionate influence in the country due to its status as Lebanon ’ s preeminent military power .
Its partners are an unruly constellation of communal leaders tied in various ways to Iran and next-door Syria .
And among the ministries they most wanted were those like finance , health , and social services , which allow for the greatest use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of them—to distribute political patronage .
To end the impasse , Hezbollah ’ s leadership intervened repeatedly , and ultimately threatened to end all mediation efforts , before this allegedly nonpartisan government of experts was finally born .
The result is an administration far from what the popular uprising has demanded .
Its claim to independence from a chronically corrupt political establishment is dubious at best , and it is highly unlikely to deliver on the uprising ’ s basic demands , chief among them the promulgation of fair electoral laws and early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to succeed in implementing the most pressing reforms , including ending graft to the tune of billions of dollars in the state-owned electricity sector , particularly since the parliamentary majority on which the new government relies is itself accused of the embezzlement .
Hezbollah ’ s decision to midwife such an unpopular government may yet prove to be its greatest strategic blunder .
Historically , the Shiite militant group preferred not to assume the burden of actual governance in a country whose sectarian politics are notorious for their fecklessness .
Instead , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ borders , first fighting next-door Israel and then a multitude of Iran ’ s rivals throughout the Middle East .
Politics in Beirut were to be managed from a healthy distance by empowering allies and reaching favorable accommodations with traditional opponents like outgoing Sunni Prime Minister Saad Hariri , Druze leader Walid Jumblatt , and Christian chieftain Samir Geagea .
Not this time , however .
Hezbollah seems to have ( likely mistakenly ) calculated that it will be better off assuming the burden of governance almost exclusively through trusted allies , mainly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bassil , rather than accommodating Hariri ’ s insistence of forming a technocratic government under his own stewardship .
Hezbollah judged that Hariri , who also bears some responsibility for the country ’ s morass but enjoys strong ties to the West , could not be trusted as Lebanon flounders and as Iran faces an ongoing campaign of “ maximum pressure ” from the United States .
But Hezbollah does not seem to fully appreciate the tremendous difficulties that lie ahead .
Any Lebanese government would struggle to survive under the weight of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dwindling foreign reserves , and a currency that has lost more than 30 percent of its value since the crises intensified in October 2019 .
A cabinet that must carry through deeply unpopular economic reforms while having virtually no support among the country ’ s Sunni and Druze communities , and only mixed support among Christians , has little hope of making it past its first birthday , let alone restoring social order .
And unlike in the past , when Hezbollah won at least some public credit for seeming to have largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is now widely recognized as the principle stakeholder .
With Hezbollah and allies at the helm , attracting much-needed foreign assistance will prove difficult among Lebanon ’ s traditional financial backers in Europe and the Arab Gulf states .
Alternately , requesting a rescue package from the International Monetary Fund will require radical restructuring that can only further inflame popular anger and contribute to unrest .
So , who can Lebanon ’ s incoming government call on as the going gets tough ?
Some Lebanese , including central bank governor Riad Salamé @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Qatar , whose leaders regularly traverse the unsettled waters between Iran and the West .
Qatar has helped Hezbollah in the past , and its emir and foreign minister have both visited Iran since the Jan. 3 killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani .
For Qatar , aid could buy it some goodwill in Beirut—historically an area of influence for rival Saudi Arabia—while also mitigating against a feared Iranian response targeting Qatari interests or the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar .
Some Western governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that such aid ( or their own donations ) could restore calm and preclude future waves of refugees from arriving on their shores .
But the announced government is inherently incapable of providing stability by virtue of its composition , which alienates significant communal and social forces at a time when credible and broad-based governance is most needed .
For the foreseeable future , Washington ’ s main goal must be to try to preserve its limited levers of influence in Beirut , including within the Lebanese Armed Forces ( LAF ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remnants of the Western-leaning anti-Iran coalition .
Indeed , Washington must warn the government against replacing key officials such as the LAF commander and the governor of the central bank with more pliant alternatives .
More broadly , the most prudent course of action for the Trump administration , which to date has been divided on Lebanon policy and on continuing with military assistance to the LAF , is one of strategic patience .
It should give this highly unpopular government , and the regional and local forces lurking behind it , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public pressure .
Leave it to the Lebanese to unmask those who have claimed power as independent technocrats .
Halloween , and its associated horrors , can not last forever .

On Tuesday, after three months of protests and in the middle of a long-running economic crisis, Beirut finally announced the formation of a new government. And in many ways, the selection is unprecedent. The government of incoming Prime Minister Hassan Diab is the first to be composed entirely of technocrats since Lebanon’s post-civil war order was cemented some 30 years ago. It also boasts a record number of female ministers, including the first female deputy prime minister, and defense minister. But that is where the good news ends.
On Tuesday, after three months of protests and in the middle of a long-running economic crisis, Beirut finally announced the formation of a new government. And in many ways, the selection is unprecedent. The government of incoming Prime Minister Hassan Diab is the first to be composed entirely of technocrats since Lebanon’s post-civil war order was cemented some 30 years ago. It also boasts a record number of female ministers, including the first female deputy prime minister, and defense minister. But that is where the good news ends.
Diab’s government will be the first in Lebanon’s history that is exclusively beholden to a parliamentary coalition led by Iran’s Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. And most of its purported technocratic ministers are in fact affiliated with the political establishment that drove the country into its current critical condition and that mass protests have been desperately trying to eject. Protesters have already hit on the term “Halloween Government” to describe the thinly disguised ties between incoming ministers and Lebanon’s corrupt political bosses. The term also hints at the human suffering that awaits a country facing the worst economic crisis in its hundred-year history.
The formation of the cabinet caps several weeks of political wrangling for spoils among the political allies of Hezbollah, an organization that wields disproportionate influence in the country due to its status as Lebanon’s preeminent military power. Its partners are an unruly constellation of communal leaders tied in various ways to Iran and next-door Syria. And among the ministries they most wanted were those like finance, health, and social services, which allow for the greatest use of state resources—or whatever little is left of them—to distribute political patronage. To end the impasse, Hezbollah’s leadership intervened repeatedly, and ultimately threatened to end all mediation efforts, before this allegedly nonpartisan government of experts was finally born.
The result is an administration far from what the popular uprising has demanded. Its claim to independence from a chronically corrupt political establishment is dubious at best, and it is highly unlikely to deliver on the uprising’s basic demands, chief among them the promulgation of fair electoral laws and early parliamentary elections. It is equally unlikely to succeed in implementing the most pressing reforms, including ending graft to the tune of billions of dollars in the state-owned electricity sector, particularly since the parliamentary majority on which the new government relies is itself accused of the embezzlement.
Hezbollah’s decision to midwife such an unpopular government may yet prove to be its greatest strategic blunder. Historically, the Shiite militant group preferred not to assume the burden of actual governance in a country whose sectarian politics are notorious for their fecklessness. Instead, it concentrated its efforts beyond Lebanon’s borders, first fighting next-door Israel and then a multitude of Iran’s rivals throughout the Middle East. Politics in Beirut were to be managed from a healthy distance by empowering allies and reaching favorable accommodations with traditional opponents like outgoing Sunni Prime Minister Saad Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and Christian chieftain Samir Geagea.
Not this time, however. Hezbollah seems to have (likely mistakenly) calculated that it will be better off assuming the burden of governance almost exclusively through trusted allies, mainly Christian leader and former Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, rather than accommodating Hariri’s insistence of forming a technocratic government under his own stewardship. Hezbollah judged that Hariri, who also bears some responsibility for the country’s morass but enjoys strong ties to the West, could not be trusted as Lebanon flounders and as Iran faces an ongoing campaign of “maximum pressure” from the United States.
But Hezbollah does not seem to fully appreciate the tremendous difficulties that lie ahead. Any Lebanese government would struggle to survive under the weight of some $90 billion in debt, dwindling foreign reserves, and a currency that has lost more than 30 percent of its value since the crises intensified in October 2019. A cabinet that must carry through deeply unpopular economic reforms while having virtually no support among the country’s Sunni and Druze communities, and only mixed support among Christians, has little hope of making it past its first birthday, let alone restoring social order.
And unlike in the past, when Hezbollah won at least some public credit for seeming to have largely abstained from participating in government corruption, it is now widely recognized as the principle stakeholder. With Hezbollah and allies at the helm, attracting much-needed foreign assistance will prove difficult among Lebanon’s traditional financial backers in Europe and the Arab Gulf states. Alternately, requesting a rescue package from the International Monetary Fund will require radical restructuring that can only further inflame popular anger and contribute to unrest.
So, who can Lebanon’s incoming government call on as the going gets tough?
Some Lebanese, including central bank governor Riad Salamé, are hoping to be rescued by Qatar, whose leaders regularly traverse the unsettled waters between Iran and the West. Qatar has helped Hezbollah in the past, and its emir and foreign minister have both visited Iran since the Jan. 3 killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani. For Qatar, aid could buy it some goodwill in Beirut—historically an area of influence for rival Saudi Arabia—while also mitigating against a feared Iranian response targeting Qatari interests or the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
Some Western governments, particularly in Europe, might believe that such aid (or their own donations) could restore calm and preclude future waves of refugees from arriving on their shores. But the announced government is inherently incapable of providing stability by virtue of its composition, which alienates significant communal and social forces at a time when credible and broad-based governance is most needed.
For the foreseeable future, Washington’s main goal must be to try to preserve its limited levers of influence in Beirut, including within the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the central bank, and among the remnants of the Western-leaning anti-Iran coalition. Indeed, Washington must warn the government against replacing key officials such as the LAF commander and the governor of the central bank with more pliant alternatives.
More broadly, the most prudent course of action for the Trump administration, which to date has been divided on Lebanon policy and on continuing with military assistance to the LAF, is one of strategic patience. It should give this highly unpopular government, and the regional and local forces lurking behind it, the time to collapse under the weight of public pressure. Leave it to the Lebanese to unmask those who have claimed power as independent technocrats. Halloween, and its associated horrors, cannot last forever.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--Brexit Could Spark a Return to Violence in Northern Ireland

Brexit Could Spark a Return to Violence in Northern Ireland The conflict in Northern Ireland was thought to have ended with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement .
The Troubles—as the conflict is known colloquially—was a low-level ethnonationalist war fought between militant republicans ( who strove to unify Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland ) on one side and militant loyalists ( who wanted to preserve the union between Northern Ireland and Britain ) on the other .
The conflict left more than 3,600 people dead , mostly at the hands of republican paramilitaries such as the Provisional Irish Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counterparts in the Ulster Defence Association and Ulster Volunteer Force .
When the Good Friday Agreement went into effect , the bulk of those organizations ceased to operate , but a few small splinter groups continued to wage low-level campaigns of violence .
Splinter groups are common in post-conflict settings , and they typically wield outsized influence , because , even if an all-encompassing political settlement is reached , the infrastructure for terrorism is still readily available .
Paramilitaries usually retain access to at least some weapons , and the institutional memory of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ critical skills like bomb-making and surveillance detection is passed on .
Politics plays a role , too .
Splintering often occurs after a political settlement forces a reexamination of tactics , when one faction of the group chooses to pursue its aims by constitutional means and the more extreme elements continue to believe that only violence can achieve their objectives .
This was largely the case in Northern Ireland after 1998 .
For those reasons , even after robust disarmament and demobilization—as well as the rollout of reconciliation programs—splinter groups remain a serious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have gone on to become more violent than their parent organizations , especially if they can capitalize on changed political and socioeconomic circumstances and attract new recruits willing to resort to violence.Brexit seems to have given Northern Ireland ’ s constellation of splinter groups a new political edge .
This isn ’ t always the case , however .
Some groups will shed their political function and transition to criminal activity , leveraging the coercive capabilities they acquired in combat to profit from black markets and illicit economies .
Since the signing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Northern Ireland have become involved in a range of criminal activities— including smuggling , extortion , and drug trafficking .
But Brexit seems to have given Northern Ireland ’ s constellation of splinter groups a new political edge , enlivening terrorist campaigns that were once considered dormant .
According to a recent report from the Police Service of Northern Ireland , between Jan. 1 and Dec. 31 , 2019 , there was an increase in paramilitary violence from the previous reporting period .
There were 67 victims of paramilitary-style assaults during that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
A November 2019 report from the Independent Reporting Commission reinforced those findings , saying that “ although there has been a downward trend in the frequency of paramilitary style attacks and shootings and bombings since 2009/10 , the number of deaths linked to paramilitary organisations and the number of paramilitary style attacks carried out between 1 October 2018 and 30 September 2019 increased.
” When Northern Ireland voted by a slight majority for Remain in the 2016 referendum on whether the United Kingdom should leave the European Union—a result largely driven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used the result to push for a referendum on Irish unity , and there were fears that the possible construction of physical infrastructure along the border after Brexit could antagonize republican paramilitaries and rekindle their campaigns of violence .
Recent events give credence to that fear .
In January 2019 , the New IRA—a recent paramilitary group formed after the amalgamation of a series of smaller groups—was found responsible for detonating a car bomb outside the courthouse in Derry city , where the group is most active .
That April , members of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lyra McKee during a night of intense rioting in Derry .
Although republicans expressed regret for the killing , it led to overwhelming national and international condemnation .
More recently , in January 2019 , the New IRA kidnapped and shot a 15-year-old boy in the Creggan area of Derry .
Irish and EU negotiators were acutely aware of the security threat posed by a potential hard border , and their main priority throughout the Brexit negotiations was to ensure that the withdrawal agreement would not lead to a hard border in Ireland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May ’ s backstop proposal ( which was defeated three times in Parliament ) , as well as Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s recently approved arrangement that stipulates that Northern Ireland will technically remain part of the new U.K. customs union but that it will be aligned with the EU regulatory framework .
That arrangement has mostly quelled nationalist concerns .
But many unionists see Johnson ’ s deal as a betrayal .
Unionists largely voted Leave in the Brexit referendum , and although many of them preferred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ border in Ireland , they were absolutely opposed to any deal that treated Northern Ireland differently than the rest of the United Kingdom .
The Johnson deal ’ s arrangement will mean that goods passing between Northern Ireland and Britain must undergo customs checks in the Irish Sea , creating a clear distinction between these two constituent parts of the United Kingdom .
Unionists are almost universally opposed to this arrangement , and they have organized several protest events across the country , with some loyalist paramilitaries hinting at a possible return to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the security threat posed by a potential hard border .
For unionists , this is part of a longer process of political and social regression .
Unionist politicians lost their majority in the north ’ s devolved assembly in 2017 , and they recently watched their influence in the U.K. Parliament evaporate , losing two of their 10 seats and their status as kingmakers who kept May ’ s government in power ; Johnson , who enjoys a large majority , no longer needs their support .
Nationalist politicians have been the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ research shows that Catholic nationalists might soon make up the majority of the population at large in Northern Ireland , suggesting these trends will continue .
All of this , from the unionist perspective , is a sign of a broader loss of social status , a change that they feel is most outwardly manifested in disrespect for Protestant unionist cultural symbols and traditions .
Their response was put on international display in 2012 , when the Belfast City Council announced it would no longer fly the Union Jack every day of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in force , staging protests and riots that gripped Northern Ireland for months .
Taken in this context , unionists saw Brexit as a way of preserving Northern Ireland ’ s place inside the United Kingdom , and Johnson ’ s withdrawal deal was the ultimate betrayal .
After years of focusing almost exclusively on criminal activity in Protestant working-class areas , loyalist paramilitaries , like their republican counterparts , are beginning to take on a sharper political focus .
Although they have not committed the types of high-profile attacks that republican paramilitaries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vocal about their opposition to political change , they have been at the center of the unionist protest meetings held across the country since the deal was announced in October 2019 .
Moreover , research suggests that the rising number of paramilitary-style attacks in Northern Ireland are driven more by loyalist activity , suggesting that they now pose a greater security risk than do republicans .
Johnson ’ s Brexit deal did settle some of the most vexing issues , but much remains uncertain for the future of Northern Ireland .
Despite the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is still possible that a post-Brexit U.K.-EU trade deal could implement one anyway .
Nationalists know the possibility is real , and they are using the uncertainty to keep pressure on the governments in both Dublin and London for a unity referendum .
None of this even considers the fact that Northern Ireland is yet to feel the economic impact of Brexit , and if Brexit does bring economic strain to Northern Ireland—or worse—it could lead to political instability .
As always , the paramilitaries will watch these developments closely , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they feel best serves their longer-term interests .
The threat from paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland has grown since Brexit , and an increasingly uncertain post-Brexit future means their shadows will loom large over the coming months and years .

The conflict in Northern Ireland was thought to have ended with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement . The Troubles—as the conflict is known colloquially—was a low-level ethnonationalist war fought between militant republicans (who strove to unify Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland) on one side and militant loyalists (who wanted to preserve the union between Northern Ireland and Britain) on the other.
The conflict in Northern Ireland was thought to have ended with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The Troubles—as the conflict is known colloquially—was a low-level ethnonationalist war fought between militant republicans (who strove to unify Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland) on one side and militant loyalists (who wanted to preserve the union between Northern Ireland and Britain) on the other.
The conflict left more than 3,600 people dead, mostly at the hands of republican paramilitaries such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and their loyalist counterparts in the Ulster Defence Association and Ulster Volunteer Force. When the Good Friday Agreement went into effect, the bulk of those organizations ceased to operate, but a few small splinter groups continued to wage low-level campaigns of violence.
Splinter groups are common in post-conflict settings, and they typically wield outsized influence, because, even if an all-encompassing political settlement is reached, the infrastructure for terrorism is still readily available. Paramilitaries usually retain access to at least some weapons, and the institutional memory of intelligence techniques, operational security, and critical skills like bomb-making and surveillance detection is passed on. Politics plays a role, too.
Splintering often occurs after a political settlement forces a reexamination of tactics, when one faction of the group chooses to pursue its aims by constitutional means and the more extreme elements continue to believe that only violence can achieve their objectives. This was largely the case in Northern Ireland after 1998.
For those reasons, even after robust disarmament and demobilization—as well as the rollout of reconciliation programs—splinter groups remain a serious concern. In some cases, they have gone on to become more violent than their parent organizations, especially if they can capitalize on changed political and socioeconomic circumstances and attract new recruits willing to resort to violence.Brexit seems to have given Northern Ireland’s constellation of splinter groups a new political edge.
This isn’t always the case, however. Some groups will shed their political function and transition to criminal activity, leveraging the coercive capabilities they acquired in combat to profit from black markets and illicit economies. Since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, several paramilitaries in Northern Ireland have become involved in a range of criminal activities— including smuggling, extortion, and drug trafficking.
But Brexit seems to have given Northern Ireland’s constellation of splinter groups a new political edge, enlivening terrorist campaigns that were once considered dormant. According to a recent report from the Police Service of Northern Ireland, between Jan. 1 and Dec. 31, 2019, there was an increase in paramilitary violence from the previous reporting period. There were 67 victims of paramilitary-style assaults during that period, up from 51 the previous year. A November 2019 report from the Independent Reporting Commission reinforced those findings, saying that “although there has been a downward trend in the frequency of paramilitary style attacks and shootings and bombings since 2009/10, the number of deaths linked to paramilitary organisations and the number of paramilitary style attacks carried out between 1 October 2018 and 30 September 2019 increased.”
When Northern Ireland voted by a slight majority for Remain in the 2016 referendum on whether the United Kingdom should leave the European Union—a result largely driven by pro-EU Irish nationalists—nationalist politicians across Ireland used the result to push for a referendum on Irish unity, and there were fears that the possible construction of physical infrastructure along the border after Brexit could antagonize republican paramilitaries and rekindle their campaigns of violence.
Recent events give credence to that fear. In January 2019, the New IRA—a recent paramilitary group formed after the amalgamation of a series of smaller groups—was found responsible for detonating a car bomb outside the courthouse in Derry city, where the group is most active. That April, members of the group shot and killed the journalist Lyra McKee during a night of intense rioting in Derry. Although republicans expressed regret for the killing, it led to overwhelming national and international condemnation. More recently, in January 2019, the New IRA kidnapped and shot a 15-year-old boy in the Creggan area of Derry.
Irish and EU negotiators were acutely aware of the security threat posed by a potential hard border, and their main priority throughout the Brexit negotiations was to ensure that the withdrawal agreement would not lead to a hard border in Ireland. That was the rationale behind former U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May’s backstop proposal (which was defeated three times in Parliament), as well as Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s recently approved arrangement that stipulates that Northern Ireland will technically remain part of the new U.K. customs union but that it will be aligned with the EU regulatory framework. That arrangement has mostly quelled nationalist concerns.
But many unionists see Johnson’s deal as a betrayal. Unionists largely voted Leave in the Brexit referendum, and although many of them preferred a withdrawal agreement that left a soft border in Ireland, they were absolutely opposed to any deal that treated Northern Ireland differently than the rest of the United Kingdom.
The Johnson deal’s arrangement will mean that goods passing between Northern Ireland and Britain must undergo customs checks in the Irish Sea, creating a clear distinction between these two constituent parts of the United Kingdom. Unionists are almost universally opposed to this arrangement, and they have organized several protest events across the country, with some loyalist paramilitaries hinting at a possible return to violence.Irish and EU negotiators were acutely aware of the security threat posed by a potential hard border.
For unionists, this is part of a longer process of political and social regression. Unionist politicians lost their majority in the north’s devolved assembly in 2017, and they recently watched their influence in the U.K. Parliament evaporate, losing two of their 10 seats and their status as kingmakers who kept May’s government in power; Johnson, who enjoys a large majority, no longer needs their support. Nationalist politicians have been the primary beneficiaries in both cases, and research shows that Catholic nationalists might soon make up the majority of the population at large in Northern Ireland, suggesting these trends will continue.
All of this, from the unionist perspective, is a sign of a broader loss of social status, a change that they feel is most outwardly manifested in disrespect for Protestant unionist cultural symbols and traditions. Their response was put on international display in 2012, when the Belfast City Council announced it would no longer fly the Union Jack every day of the year. Unionists took to the streets in force, staging protests and riots that gripped Northern Ireland for months. Taken in this context, unionists saw Brexit as a way of preserving Northern Ireland’s place inside the United Kingdom, and Johnson’s withdrawal deal was the ultimate betrayal.
After years of focusing almost exclusively on criminal activity in Protestant working-class areas, loyalist paramilitaries, like their republican counterparts, are beginning to take on a sharper political focus. Although they have not committed the types of high-profile attacks that republican paramilitaries have, nor have they been as vocal about their opposition to political change, they have been at the center of the unionist protest meetings held across the country since the deal was announced in October 2019. Moreover, research suggests that the rising number of paramilitary-style attacks in Northern Ireland are driven more by loyalist activity, suggesting that they now pose a greater security risk than do republicans.
Johnson’s Brexit deal did settle some of the most vexing issues, but much remains uncertain for the future of Northern Ireland. Despite the deal envisaging no border in Ireland, it is still possible that a post-Brexit U.K.-EU trade deal could implement one anyway. Nationalists know the possibility is real, and they are using the uncertainty to keep pressure on the governments in both Dublin and London for a unity referendum. None of this even considers the fact that Northern Ireland is yet to feel the economic impact of Brexit, and if Brexit does bring economic strain to Northern Ireland—or worse—it could lead to political instability.
As always, the paramilitaries will watch these developments closely, and they will act in a way that they feel best serves their longer-term interests. The threat from paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland has grown since Brexit, and an increasingly uncertain post-Brexit future means their shadows will loom large over the coming months and years.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--Wuhan Is Going Under Quarantine

Wuhan Is Going Under Quarantine

Wuhan Is Going Under Quarantine Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : Wuhan goes under quarantine for the new coronavirus ahead of the Lunar New Year , Huawei ’ s CFO is fighting her extradition to the United States , and Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam appears at Davos .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
Wuhan , China ’ s seventh-largest city , will be under effective quarantine from 10 a.m. Chinese time on Thursday , the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The move is an attempt to contain the Wuhan coronavirus , which causes pneumonia and has spread with worrying speed .
Buses , train , and flights out of the city will be canceled , and the city ’ s 11 million people have been told not to travel without special reason .
The quarantine goes into effect as the Lunar New Year travel season kicks off , raising fears of contagion .
The scale of the virus , first reported on Dec. 31 , is growing , as shown below .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases and 17 deaths , and the numbers are rising daily .
In China , that could be the tip of the iceberg : The virus appears to have a long incubation period—eight to 10 days—and has likely spread further .
Several deaths from pneumonia appear to have gone officially uncounted , dismissed as the flu .
Five other countries , including the United States , have reported cases—all individuals traveling from central China .
Hard decisions .
As the number of cases climbs , the Wuhan government ’ s initial response has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weeks , fewer than 50 cases of the virus were reported—which now looks more like a cover-up similar to the reaction to SARS in 2002-2003 .
That doesn ’ t mean that the Chinese government is lying now .
It has at the very least acknowledged the crisis and threatened anyone who covers up new cases .
For the decision-makers at the top , weighing the need for control measures against the desire to avoid panic is tough .
After the Wuhan quarantine , expect more restrictive steps in the next few days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is avoiding blame—which at this point could mean implementing stronger measures at the local level , like travel restrictions .
But if the Wuhan quarantine is extended to other cities during the Lunar New Year travel period , it is likely to cause widespread fear and disruption .
Cancel your trips .
Until the situation is clearer , it ’ s probably not a good idea to travel to China .
The primary worry here isn ’ t the virus itself ; it ’ s that travel restrictions or quarantine could be imposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2009 , some travelers were stranded for up to a week—and the Wuhan coronavirus looks more serious .
Festival overshadowed .
The Lunar New Year is on Jan. 25 , so those lucky enough to get time off early are already on their way home .
For young , urban Chinese , the holiday is often more of a chore than a celebration , between the hassle of travel , relatives ’ interrogations , and working extra to compensate for time off .
But for older people and migrant workers , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to spend time with family—a joyous occasion marked by banquets , fireworks , and temple fairs .
The Wuhan coronavirus has cast a pall over that .
Fireworks and public gatherings in cities have already been restricted in the last few years .
Officials nervous about contagion may impose further limits , while fears of the virus could keep people indoors .
Migrant workers , who could face an even harder time getting home than usual , will be the worst off , especially if they come from near Wuhan or have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asked workers from Wuhan not to return home .
“ Protesters ” show up for Huawei CFO .
Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou appears in court this week in Vancouver , Canada , to fight her extradition to the United States on fraud charges .
But what seems to have been a propaganda attempt to support her went badly wrong .
Students and actors were recruited online to “ protest ” on behalf of Meng and paid 150 Canadian dollars ( around $ 114 ) .
Some believed they were extras in a movie @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who was behind the plan , which fell apart when reporters tried to interview the protesters .
Chinese state television broadcasted the images without question .
Pajama problems .
Local Chinese officials issued a rare apology this week after public outcry over the use of facial recognition technology to name and shame people for going out in their pajamas .
Wearing pajamas in public is common in urban neighborhoods where homes are small , shops and bathhouses are close , and the street is a shared space—the kind of areas that the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by officials , who see it as “ uncivilized , ” goes back to the 1920s but picked up ahead of the 2008 Olympics out of concerns for public image .
Carrie Lam appears at Davos .
Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam made an appearance at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos , Switzerland , where she attempted to defend her record and reassure the business elite that Hong Kong is still a place worth doing business .
Lam blamed unspecified “ propaganda ” for the protests , echoing mainland authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on foreign interference .
A common belief among young Hong Kongers is that their business elites have sold them out to China to preserve their privilege : Lam ’ s appearance at Davos isn ’ t likely to change their minds .
China ’ s bull market slows .
Chinese stocks were on a high ahead of the Lunar New Year , but the Wuhan coronavirus crisis has stopped that run .
Given the degree of government interference , there ’ s always a doubtful relationship between Chinese stocks and market realities , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stocks are soaring , including shares for antibiotic manufacturers , which can ’ t fight viruses like this one .
Growing suspicion in U.S. tech .
Chinese engineers in U.S. firms have long complained about an effective glass ceiling for Chinese workers .
In recent years , increasing suspicion of Chinese industrial espionage—and growing FBI restrictions—has cast a chill across the tech sector , with some firms sectioning off their China teams .
The dilemma is the same as with U.S. universities : How can you attract talent and maintain security ?
FP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a whole new way to explore and understand complex geopolitical issues like 5G—and distill them into actionable intelligence .
5G Explained : Technology and Infrastructure delivers an in-depth mapping of key players and relative influence in 5G , the competitive global landscape , risks and opportunities , and much more .
Dive into this first installment of a three-part series .
Available exclusively to FP Insider subscribers .
Nowhere to Call Home : A Tibetan in Beijing This film about the reporter Jocelyn Ford ’ s friendship with a Tibetan migrant worker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but it is currently on tour again in the United States .
It is a gripping narrative that remains one of the single greatest accounts of ethnicity , poverty , and women ’ s status in China of the decade .
It ’ s also a film that moves both Chinese audiences and Western ones .
That ’ s it for this week .
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Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Wuhan goes under quarantine for the new coronavirus ahead of the Lunar New Year, Huawei’s CFO is fighting her extradition to the United States, and Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam appears at Davos.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Wuhan goes under quarantine for the new coronavirus ahead of the Lunar New Year, Huawei’s CFO is fighting her extradition to the United States, and Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam appears at Davos.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Travel Suspended From Wuhan as Lunar New Year Kicks Off
Wuhan, China’s seventh-largest city, will be under effective quarantine from 10 a.m. Chinese time on Thursday, the government has announced (link in Chinese). The move is an attempt to contain the Wuhan coronavirus, which causes pneumonia and has spread with worrying speed. Buses, train, and flights out of the city will be canceled, and the city’s 11 million people have been told not to travel without special reason. The quarantine goes into effect as the Lunar New Year travel season kicks off, raising fears of contagion.
The scale of the virus, first reported on Dec. 31, is growing, as shown below. Today, Chinese official figures confirmed 544 cases and 17 deaths, and the numbers are rising daily. In China, that could be the tip of the iceberg: The virus appears to have a long incubation period—eight to 10 days—and has likely spread further. Several deaths from pneumonia appear to have gone officially uncounted, dismissed as the flu. Five other countries, including the United States, have reported cases—all individuals traveling from central China.
The Spread of the Wuhan Coronavirus Total Numbers and Dates Per Government Reports
Source: Reuters, AP, Al Jazeera, and Government Reports
Hard decisions. As the number of cases climbs, the Wuhan government’s initial response has come under scrutiny. For nearly three weeks, fewer than 50 cases of the virus were reported—which now looks more like a cover-up similar to the reaction to SARS in 2002-2003. That doesn’t mean that the Chinese government is lying now. It has at the very least acknowledged the crisis and threatened anyone who covers up new cases.
For the decision-makers at the top, weighing the need for control measures against the desire to avoid panic is tough. After the Wuhan quarantine, expect more restrictive steps in the next few days. For lower-level officials, the priority is avoiding blame—which at this point could mean implementing stronger measures at the local level, like travel restrictions. But if the Wuhan quarantine is extended to other cities during the Lunar New Year travel period, it is likely to cause widespread fear and disruption.
Cancel your trips. Until the situation is clearer, it’s probably not a good idea to travel to China. The primary worry here isn’t the virus itself; it’s that travel restrictions or quarantine could be imposed suddenly. During the H1N1 flu outbreak in 2009, some travelers were stranded for up to a week—and the Wuhan coronavirus looks more serious.
What We’re Following
Festival overshadowed. The Lunar New Year is on Jan. 25, so those lucky enough to get time off early are already on their way home. For young, urban Chinese, the holiday is often more of a chore than a celebration, between the hassle of travel, relatives’ interrogations, and working extra to compensate for time off. But for older people and migrant workers, the Lunar New Year is a rare chance to spend time with family—a joyous occasion marked by banquets, fireworks, and temple fairs.
The Wuhan coronavirus has cast a pall over that. Fireworks and public gatherings in cities have already been restricted in the last few years. Officials nervous about contagion may impose further limits, while fears of the virus could keep people indoors. Migrant workers, who could face an even harder time getting home than usual, will be the worst off, especially if they come from near Wuhan or have been working there. Already some villages have asked workers from Wuhan not to return home.
“Protesters” show up for Huawei CFO. Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou appears in court this week in Vancouver, Canada, to fight her extradition to the United States on fraud charges. But what seems to have been a propaganda attempt to support her went badly wrong. Students and actors were recruited online to “protest” on behalf of Meng and paid 150 Canadian dollars (around $114). Some believed they were extras in a movie scene. It’s not certain who was behind the plan, which fell apart when reporters tried to interview the protesters. Chinese state television broadcasted the images without question.
Pajama problems. Local Chinese officials issued a rare apology this week after public outcry over the use of facial recognition technology to name and shame people for going out in their pajamas. Wearing pajamas in public is common in urban neighborhoods where homes are small, shops and bathhouses are close, and the street is a shared space—the kind of areas that the government has tried hard to destroy. Pajama-shaming by officials, who see it as “uncivilized,” goes back to the 1920s but picked up ahead of the 2008 Olympics out of concerns for public image.
Tech and Business
Carrie Lam appears at Davos. Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam made an appearance at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, where she attempted to defend her record and reassure the business elite that Hong Kong is still a place worth doing business. Lam blamed unspecified “propaganda” for the protests, echoing mainland authorities’ attempts to pin the democracy movement on foreign interference. A common belief among young Hong Kongers is that their business elites have sold them out to China to preserve their privilege: Lam’s appearance at Davos isn’t likely to change their minds.
China’s bull market slows. Chinese stocks were on a high ahead of the Lunar New Year, but the Wuhan coronavirus crisis has stopped that run. Given the degree of government interference, there’s always a doubtful relationship between Chinese stocks and market realities, but events can nonetheless intervene. Pharmaceuticals stocks are soaring, including shares for antibiotic manufacturers, which can’t fight viruses like this one.
Growing suspicion in U.S. tech. Chinese engineers in U.S. firms have long complained about an effective glass ceiling for Chinese workers. In recent years, increasing suspicion of Chinese industrial espionage—and growing FBI restrictions—has cast a chill across the tech sector, with some firms sectioning off their China teams. The dilemma is the same as with U.S. universities: How can you attract talent and maintain security?
FP Analytics Report—Introducing Power Maps by FP Analytics, a whole new way to explore and understand complex geopolitical issues like 5G—and distill them into actionable intelligence. 5G Explained: Technology and Infrastructure delivers an in-depth mapping of key players and relative influence in 5G, the competitive global landscape, risks and opportunities, and much more. Dive into this first installment of a three-part series. Available exclusively to FP Insider subscribers.
What We’re Watching
Nowhere to Call Home: A Tibetan in Beijing
This film about the reporter Jocelyn Ford’s friendship with a Tibetan migrant worker and her son was made in 2014, but it is currently on tour again in the United States. It is a gripping narrative that remains one of the single greatest accounts of ethnicity, poverty, and women’s status in China of the decade. It’s also a film that moves both Chinese audiences and Western ones.
That’s it for this week.
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foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--The Global Trust Crisis

The Global Trust Crisis

As the world ’ s political and business elites ruminate on world affairs at the Swiss ski resort of Davos , this year they must contend with grave public discontent with the global system .
In recent months , protests have multiplied across the globe : self-determination riots in Catalonia and Hong Kong ; rebellions fueled by inequality and corruption in Algeria , Chile , Ecuador , Egypt , and Sudan , to name just a few ; and the climate-focused strikes around the world led by the activist Greta Thunberg .
Unlike previous waves of protests such as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a central objective , the latest uprisings are calling for a fundamental change in the world ’ s systems of political and economic governance .
Unless the leaders convening at Davos can formulate far-reaching reforms , the continued spread of populism , growing anti-capitalist sentiment , more trade wars , and many other dislocations are likely .
Why are so many people so disillusioned ?
There are four broad reasons , and they apply globally .
The Edelman report singles out the first cause : disillusionment with rising inequality and an increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people in 21 out of 28 surveyed countries are worried about being left behind and “ losing the respect and dignity ” they once enjoyed .
Although economic growth and employment are robust in developed markets , trust is lagging because people feel that the benefits of prosperity are accruing to a narrow group of elites .
Less than 1 in 3 people in developed markets believe that they will be better off in five years ’ time , and 83 percent of workers are deeply concerned about losing their jobs due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy , lack of training , cheaper foreign competition , and immigration .
A second driver of mistrust is growing polarization between different segments of society .
In India , for example , Muslims feel increasingly marginalized under the Hindu nationalist government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi .
The country was recently rocked by days of violent protests after the government introduced a new citizenship law that discriminated against Muslim refugees from neighboring Afghanistan , Bangladesh , and Pakistan .
In the West , persistent gender inequity has mounted in the form of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ annual Women ’ s March , which drew an estimated crowd of 3.3 million to 5.2 million participants across the United States in 2017—reportedly the largest protest in U.S. history .
Meanwhile , the diverging economic fortunes of high-wage knowledge workers in densifying cities and blue-collar labor in deindustrializing rural areas have contributed to populist movements like Brexit and Trumpism .
Third , public alarm about climate change , which is intrinsically linked to the world ’ s resource-intensive production model , appears to be escalating .
Many people view the recurrent flooding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vast forest fires in Australia , the Amazon , and California as signs of what is to come .
However , the public is becoming increasingly exasperated by the lack of a broader institutional response to the climate crisis , combined with statements like U.S. President Donald Trump branding climate change activists as “ prophets of doom ” and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison going on holiday during the country ’ s intensifying forest fires .
Fourth , many citizens of developed countries believe that international trade contributes to job losses and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manufacturing and tradeable service industries have migrated to lower-cost countries .
Support for the North American Free Trade Agreement , for example , almost halved among Republican voters between 2004 and 2017 .
In developing countries , trade has widened the inequality gap between workers employed in high-productivity traded sectors and those still engaged in the informal economy .
These four factors have converged into a Great Trust Crisis—a tinderbox of disaffection that could erupt with unpredictable consequences .
First , to ensure economic security for the working population , government and business @ @ @ @ @ @ @ innovative new approaches to make basic needs like housing , education , child care , and health care more accessible and affordable .
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics , the real cost of medical care has more than doubled and college tuition almost quadrupled in the United States since 1980 .
The rising cost of basic social services creates a drag on household income and dampens overall economic growth .
For example , without affordable child care , parents ( especially women ) find it more difficult to return to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drop out of the workforce altogether .
Government and business must also collaborate to invest in the development of human capital and regional economies .
Taking a cue from the flexicurity program in Denmark , in countries that invest in lifelong learning and job placement services , workers are more likely to secure well-paid jobs in high-growth , knowledge-intensive sectors .
In parallel , efforts to transition to a greener economy also provide opportunities to revitalize rural areas through public and private investments into infrastructure and the green economy .
Many policies designed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fight social polarization .
But to enable constructive political dialogue , the second pillar of the global system that must be held to higher standards is the media .
For example , proposals have been put forward in the United Kingdom to place a fiduciary duty on social media and other digital information platforms to prevent the spread of fake news and harmful content .
Third , more countries need make concrete steps to achieve a carbon neutral economy .
The governments of the European Union are poised to show the way forward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ released in March .
The plan will target a 50-55 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 .
New directives are also expected on the accelerated deployment of renewable energy , energy efficiency initiatives , and emissions trading markets .
Outside of Europe , China is aiming to introduce a carbon trading scheme in 2020 , which will cover a quarter of global carbon dioxide emissions .
And New York City is committed to having net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 under its OneNYC plan .
Fourth , governments must move beyond damaging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international trade .
In the recent “ phase one ” trade agreement between the United States and China , China ’ s commitment to purchase $ 200 billion in U.S. goods over the next two years only serves to temporarily redraw the balance between the two countries .
The two superpowers have made few advances in key areas such as industrial subsidies , labor standards , intellectual property protection , digital trade , and environmental sustainability standards .
In the absence of a new model of international trade , these unresolved issues will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For example , as part of the EU ’ s Green Deal , proposals are also expected for a carbon border tax to protect green EU companies against unfair competition from other regions with less stringent environmental regulations .
As world leaders deliberate the future direction of the global economy in Davos , they would do well to heed the impatient public outcry for genuine systematic reform in the era of the Great Trust Crisis .
If they don ’ t , they could be swept aside as pressure boils over into @ @ @

As the world’s political and business elites ruminate on world affairs at the Swiss ski resort of Davos, this year they must contend with grave public discontent with the global system. In recent months, protests have multiplied across the globe: self-determination riots in Catalonia and Hong Kong; rebellions fueled by inequality and corruption in Algeria, Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, and Sudan, to name just a few; and the climate-focused strikes around the world led by the activist Greta Thunberg.
As the world’s political and business elites ruminate on world affairs at the Swiss ski resort of Davos, this year they must contend with grave public discontent with the global system. In recent months, protests have multiplied across the globe: self-determination riots in Catalonia and Hong Kong; rebellions fueled by inequality and corruption in Algeria, Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, and Sudan, to name just a few; and the climate-focused strikes around the world led by the activist Greta Thunberg.
Unlike previous waves of protests such as the Arab Spring, which sought regime change as a central objective, the latest uprisings are calling for a fundamental change in the world’s systems of political and economic governance. Unless the leaders convening at Davos can formulate far-reaching reforms, the continued spread of populism, growing anti-capitalist sentiment, more trade wars, and many other dislocations are likely.
The Edelman Trust Barometer, an annual study of the level of trust in institutions across 28 countries, shows the erosion of faith in the system. The results of the recently released 2020 report show low confidence in government and media, with business and NGOs fairing slightly better. This year’s survey also showed a worrying 14 percent “trust divide” at the global level between the “informed public”—defined as wealthier, more educated citizens who are more frequent consumers of news—and the general population. A record eight countries—Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Russia, and Spain—registered the highest-ever gaps between these two groups. A full 23 countries recorded a double-digit gap. Overall, less than 20 percent of the global population expressed trust in the system, and 73 percent supported a change in the current system of global capitalism.
Why are so many people so disillusioned? There are four broad reasons, and they apply globally.
The Edelman report singles out the first cause: disillusionment with rising inequality and an increasingly insecure economic future. The majority of people in 21 out of 28 surveyed countries are worried about being left behind and “losing the respect and dignity” they once enjoyed. Although economic growth and employment are robust in developed markets, trust is lagging because people feel that the benefits of prosperity are accruing to a narrow group of elites. Less than 1 in 3 people in developed markets believe that they will be better off in five years’ time, and 83 percent of workers are deeply concerned about losing their jobs due to factors such as automation, the gig economy, lack of training, cheaper foreign competition, and immigration.
A second driver of mistrust is growing polarization between different segments of society. In India, for example, Muslims feel increasingly marginalized under the Hindu nationalist government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The country was recently rocked by days of violent protests after the government introduced a new citizenship law that discriminated against Muslim refugees from neighboring Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
In the West, persistent gender inequity has mounted in the form of movements such as #MeToo and the annual Women’s March, which drew an estimated crowd of 3.3 million to 5.2 million participants across the United States in 2017—reportedly the largest protest in U.S. history. Meanwhile, the diverging economic fortunes of high-wage knowledge workers in densifying cities and blue-collar labor in deindustrializing rural areas have contributed to populist movements like Brexit and Trumpism.
Third, public alarm about climate change, which is intrinsically linked to the world’s resource-intensive production model, appears to be escalating. Many people view the recurrent flooding in cities like Venice and Jakarta and the vast forest fires in Australia, the Amazon, and California as signs of what is to come. However, the public is becoming increasingly exasperated by the lack of a broader institutional response to the climate crisis, combined with statements like U.S. President Donald Trump branding climate change activists as “prophets of doom” and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison going on holiday during the country’s intensifying forest fires.
Fourth, many citizens of developed countries believe that international trade contributes to job losses and stagnating wages, as a host of manufacturing and tradeable service industries have migrated to lower-cost countries. Support for the North American Free Trade Agreement, for example, almost halved among Republican voters between 2004 and 2017. In developing countries, trade has widened the inequality gap between workers employed in high-productivity traded sectors and those still engaged in the informal economy.
These four factors have converged into a Great Trust Crisis—a tinderbox of disaffection that could erupt with unpredictable consequences.
Given the profound nature of the grievances, restoring public trust will require a reset of the order that has been defined by the Washington Consensus since the 1980s. It’s time for governments, businesses, and the media to demonstrate new leadership and collaboration to effect positive change in four key aspects of the global system: economic security for workers; restored faith in the media; the transition to a carbon neutral economy; and a more equitable model for trade. Government and business must come together—at venues like Davos—to develop innovative new approaches to make basic needs like housing, education, child care, and health care more accessible and affordable.
First, to ensure economic security for the working population, government and business must come together—at venues like Davos—to develop innovative new approaches to make basic needs like housing, education, child care, and health care more accessible and affordable. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the real cost of medical care has more than doubled and college tuition almost quadrupled in the United States since 1980. The rising cost of basic social services creates a drag on household income and dampens overall economic growth. For example, without affordable child care, parents (especially women) find it more difficult to return to full-time work after giving birth and may drop out of the workforce altogether.
Government and business must also collaborate to invest in the development of human capital and regional economies. Taking a cue from the flexicurity program in Denmark, in countries that invest in lifelong learning and job placement services, workers are more likely to secure well-paid jobs in high-growth, knowledge-intensive sectors. In parallel, efforts to transition to a greener economy also provide opportunities to revitalize rural areas through public and private investments into infrastructure and the green economy.
Many policies designed to support economic security will also help fight social polarization. But to enable constructive political dialogue, the second pillar of the global system that must be held to higher standards is the media. For example, proposals have been put forward in the United Kingdom to place a fiduciary duty on social media and other digital information platforms to prevent the spread of fake news and harmful content.
Third, more countries need make concrete steps to achieve a carbon neutral economy. The governments of the European Union are poised to show the way forward with their 10-point Green Deal to be released in March. The plan will target a 50-55 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. New directives are also expected on the accelerated deployment of renewable energy, energy efficiency initiatives, and emissions trading markets. Outside of Europe, China is aiming to introduce a carbon trading scheme in 2020, which will cover a quarter of global carbon dioxide emissions. And New York City is committed to having net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 under its OneNYC plan.
Fourth, governments must move beyond damaging trade disputes to reforming the model for international trade. In the recent “phase one” trade agreement between the United States and China, China’s commitment to purchase $200 billion in U.S. goods over the next two years only serves to temporarily redraw the balance between the two countries. The two superpowers have made few advances in key areas such as industrial subsidies, labor standards, intellectual property protection, digital trade, and environmental sustainability standards. In the absence of a new model of international trade, these unresolved issues will come to a head again and again. For example, as part of the EU’s Green Deal, proposals are also expected for a carbon border tax to protect green EU companies against unfair competition from other regions with less stringent environmental regulations.
As world leaders deliberate the future direction of the global economy in Davos, they would do well to heed the impatient public outcry for genuine systematic reform in the era of the Great Trust Crisis. If they don’t, they could be swept aside as pressure boils over into anti-establishment revolt.