foreignpolicy--2020-09-05--How Turkey’s Soft Power Conquered Pakistan

Today , Turkish dizi—television dramas—are second only to American ones in terms of global distribution .
Turkish is now the most watched foreign language in the world , beating out French , Spanish , and Mandarin .
Ertugrul , which began filming in 2014 , first became popular on Netflix and has since been licensed to 72 countries .
Turkish dizi—television dramas—are second only to American ones in terms of global distribution .
When its finale aired on TRT , Turkey ’ s national public broadcast channel—serendipitously on the anniversary of the Ottoman capture of Constantinople and the fall of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ertugrul than for the Game of Thrones character Jon Snow , whose own show had ended 10 days earlier .
The series is set in 13th-century Anatolia as Ertugrul Ghazi , a warrior leading the Kayi tribe , battles Byzantines , Crusaders , and Mongols .
It is a superbly shot , emotive drama that plays out all of Turkey ’ s—and the Muslim world ’ s—fantasies and anxieties .
Ertugrul , played by Engin Altan Duzyatan , inhabits a time in which the sons of the Muslim world have never been humiliated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Prophet Mohammed received the word of God , and Islam ’ s dominion has expanded from Iberia to the Indus and promises to stretch across the Earth itself .
Ertugrul is portrayed as an honorable man , deserving of the glory and respect people and strangers alike bestow on him ; he is righteous , unafraid , and just , even as he is beset by spies and traitors .
Series after series , Ertugrul confronts avatars of today ’ s global forces—the Mongols , or China ; Byzantines , or the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a general stand-in for Christian powers .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has celebrated the show for “ entering the nation ’ s heart ” and is an enthusiastic supporter .
Its producer , Kemal Tekden , is a member of Erdogan ’ s Justice and Development Party ( AKP ) , and the show ’ s creator , Mehmet Bozdag , is , if not a member , an open admirer .
“ Eighty-six years of longing has come to an end , ” he tweeted after Erdogan and his cabinet offered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sophia after a court annulled the sixth-century Byzantine church ’ s status as a museum .
Nelson Mandela ’ s grandson , a member of South Africa ’ s parliament , visited the set and posed for photos decked out in Ertugrul ’ s Kayi tribal kit as did Venezuela ’ s head of state , Nicolás Maduro .
Maduro was so moved , Bozdag claimed , that he even considered converting to Islam after his visit .
Even before Pakistan ’ s independence , Muslims of the British Raj banded together under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the crumbling Ottoman Empire .
The Khilafat—or Caliphate—was a symbol of global Muslim unity , and though the movement collapsed after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk deposed Mehmed VI , the last sultan , Indian Muslims sent financial aid to the empire on its last legs .
As Asia grapples with sectarian strife , religious extremism , and geopolitical shifts—from Saudi Arabia ’ s rivalry with Iran to Narendra Modi ’ s India , which is tilting away from its secular roots and toward Hindu majoritarianism , to the specter of a rising China—Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with its particular brand of Islam-inspired modernity rather than the harsher alternative of Saudi Wahhabism .
Though bilateral relations have focused on political , military , and economic engagement , today Pakistan and Turkey are deepening their cultural connections .
Ertugrul ’ s popularity in Pakistan isn ’ t spontaneous in the way other dizi have been—Muhtesem Yuzyil ( “ Magnificent Century , ” known in Pakistan as Mera Sultan ) and Ask-i Memnu ( “ Forbidden Love , ” known as Ishq-e-Mamnoon ) were also both huge hits .
More than 55 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Pakistan—about one-fourth of the country ’ s population .
It was the first time in Pakistan ’ s history that a foreign show drew such high numbers .
Unlike previous dizi , Ertugrul ’ s popularity has a deeper political significance , however .
It is liked for all of the standard reasons—sophisticated production , dramatic tension , and conservative messaging that the whole family can enjoy together—but its widespread following in Pakistan , where it is known as Ertugrul Ghazi , is also a sign of the country ’ s fraught @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The West has had far greater cultural import on Pakistan than anyone else , ” said Shaheryar Mirza , a Pakistani executive producer at TRT World , who spoke to me in a personal capacity , noting that today Pakistan finds itself in an unusual position as a cultural and political battleground between Turkey , Iran , Saudi Arabia , and others .
“ Pakistan is a fault line .
… From its birth until now , it ’ s swung in wildly different directions.
” Pakistan makes up 25 percent of Ertugrul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pakistan Television ( PTV ) began broadcasting Ertugrul ’ s first season this year during Ramadan after a request by Prime Minister Imran Khan .
Khan often mentions the show in his speeches and sermons .
He recently bemoaned the “ thirdhand culture ” that was infecting Pakistan through Hollywood and Bollywood .
“ We have a culture with romance and history , as well .
However , it is also filled with Islamic values , ” Khan said .
TRT gifted Ertugrul to Pakistan , free of licensing costs ; it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off .
Pakistan makes up 25 percent of Ertugrul ’ s global audience on YouTube , and in the last week of May , TRT Ertugrul by PTV was YouTube ’ s 33rd-most watched channel in the world .
Mirza doesn ’ t think the Turks set out with the idea of capturing Pakistan ’ s affection as a cultural goal , “ but if it wasn ’ t before , it probably is now.
” Bozdag , Ertugrul ’ s creator and scriptwriter , has promised “ world-shaking deals ” between Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the countries have separate borders , “ the souls are of one nation.
” “ I am not doing this for Hollywood or Bollywood or anyone who hates Islam , ” Bozdag has said , echoing Khan .
“ We need to reexplain the art of Islam and the Islamic world because this art and history is a transcendent art , from the Taj Mahal to the Alhambra .
Today , we have to tell the whole world about the beautiful voice of Islam.
” When the United Arab Emirates , a key @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel in August , Erdogan suggested that he might cut diplomatic ties and recall Turkey ’ s ambassador to Abu Dhabi .
Speaking in Pakistan ’ s parliament in February , he lambasted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s communications siege of Kashmir .
“ There is no difference between Gallipoli and Kashmir , ” Erdogan thundered , comparing the struggle of Kashmiris to the Ottoman Empire ’ s fight against Allied powers during World War I .
This tussle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is playing out across numerous fronts , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the middle .
Despite Pakistan ’ s love for Turkey , Khan was the first world leader to welcome Saudi Arabia ’ s crown prince , Mohammed bin Salman , after the journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed and dismembered at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul—a crime that Erdogan helped expose after repeated Saudi denials and cover-ups .
Khan even received the crown prince in a gilded , horse-drawn carriage .
In August , on the first anniversary of Indian-administered Kashmir ’ s internet shutdown—the longest communications blackout imposed by any democratic country—Khan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support Pakistan ’ s position on Kashmir , or it would be forced to seek support from other states in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation .
Riyadh ’ s response was swift : It demanded that Islamabad cough up a $ 1 billion payment for oil deliveries and ended the loan and oil supplies agreement between the two countries , making clear how economically dependent Pakistan is .
Rumors abound that Saudi Arabia also demanded that Pakistan stop airing Ertugrul .
The UAE and Saudi Arabia , in a joint production , have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fire , a show about Arab resistance to the Ottoman Empire , going so far as to hire Peter Webber , a British director , for added cachet .
It was an expensive salvo against Turkey ’ s cultural neo-Ottomanism , but it has apparently failed ; no one seems to be watching .
Pakistan would like to be a leader of the Muslim world .
Pakistan would like to be a leader of the Muslim world but finds itself weakened by endemically corrupt governments , inept institutions , and terrorism .
On @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is beholden to a military establishment that ultimately determines the course of the country regardless of which prime minister is in office or what the people want .
As it depends on humiliating loans from the International Monetary Fund and U.S. aid , Khan ’ s Pakistan sees models of aspiration in Turkey and Malaysia .
Khan has called Erdogan , along with former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad , a personal hero .
Yet even as his admiration is often proclaimed , it is clear that he is unable to follow in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ General Assembly meeting , Khan announced that the three countries would together create a television channel aimed at combating Islamophobia .
But for all his declarations of brotherhood , Khan abruptly pulled out of a conference on the Muslim world organized by Malaysia in December 2019 .
“ Unfortunately , our friends , who are very close to Pakistan as well , felt that somehow the conference was going to divide the ummah , ” Khan said , hinting at but not naming Saudi Arabia .
Erdogan was blunter .
“ Unfortunately , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” he said at the time .
No mention has been made of the television channel since last fall .
Ertugrul may be the No .
1 title on Pakistani Netflix , as of late July , but Dark Desire , The Kissing Booth , and the Polish soft-core porn caper 365 Days occupy spots five , seven , and eight—an illustration of the constant conflict between values , desire , and curiosity among the country ’ s more than 200 million people .
This confusion is most pronounced among Pakistan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who make up Khan ’ s political base are less torn : They are simply Muslim and proud .
And they see their version of Islam , for the most part , strikingly illuminated by Ertugrul .
The show is built on deeply conservative values , and there are no salacious love stories or scantily clad women .
Here , love stories are told through marriage or through chaste , polite yearning .
Many female characters wear tribal head coverings .
( In the hundreds of hours I spent watching dizi for my @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , until Ertugrul , I had come across only a few seconds of a woman in a hijab . )
Ertugrul himself can often be found kneeling in prayer .
Even as he deals with Byzantine spies and advancing hordes of Mongols , Ertugrul ’ s mother is there to remind him , after Halime ’ s death , that he really ought to get remarried .
“ It ’ s time to find a nice lady , ” she says around the time he has chopped off a Mongol ’ s hand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As with any adoration , there are shocks—such as Bilgic ’ s Instagram post .
Duzyatan , the man who plays Ertugrul , also elicited criticism after posing in an anniversary photo with his wife .
“ Pakistanis love you , ” one commenter wrote , “ but not in these kinds of pictures.
” ( His wife was wearing a tank top . )
Strangely , For all the fidelity Pakistanis profess for Ertugrul and its values , they seem to pay little attention to the show ’ s message of religious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ertugrul and its values , they seem to pay little attention to the show ’ s message of religious pluralism .
Ertugrul is not only benevolent but generous to believers of other faiths .
It ’ s a lesson Pakistan would do well to learn from .
While Pakistan ’ s Punjab province recently banned 100 books that it considered blasphemous , including school textbooks with illustrations of pigs , and passed legislation mandating exactly how the Prophet Mohammed must be referred to , Turkey is doing more than reimagining the Muslim ummah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ image .
Turkey understands the power of narratives .
It is a smooth employer of soft power , savvy to all the manipulations and delicate handling necessary to build a new image , rewrite history , and erase both the slander and the truth about a nation ’ s past .
Viewers see the Ottomans in their strongest and most capable avatars—never as sultans at the helm of a dying empire .
Riyaad Minty , the director of digital content at TRT , whose focus is the internationalization of the brand on digital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , whose mandate is “ value-based , family-friendly content , ” sees itself as “ the channel for the next 5 billion.
” The question for TRT is not how many viewers shows like Ertugrul can pull in but , as Minty says , “ Can a show like this inspire a generation of people ?
” Soft power only works if the power behind it is seen as credible .
Turkey ’ s government certainly has many problems—Erdogan has overseen a steep decline in press freedom , to cite just one example—but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saudi Arabia .
After all , the Turks don ’ t behead teenagers for attending protests or dismember journalists at their consulates .
If Pakistan is anything to go by , for now it doesn ’ t look as if Saudi Arabia ’ s heavy-handed but clumsy efforts will succeed in unseating Turkey as the victor of the Muslim world ’ s 21st-century culture wars .

When Esra Bilgic, the 27-year-old star of the popular Turkish television drama Dirilis: Ertugrul (“Resurrection: Ertugrul”), posted a picture of herself in a bralette and blazer on Instagram, she couldn’t have anticipated the collective lamentation that would follow. Bilgic, who plays Halime Hatun, a Seljuk warrior princess married to the titular Ertugrul Ghazi and the mother of Osman, eventual founder of the Ottoman Empire, received thousands of comments, but the response from a certain segment of fans was doleful, to say the least. “Where is halima Sultan i saw yesterday night,” one commenter inquired, echoing the distress of his compatriots and noting that he had been seeking repentance for himself as well as for the actress. “What will you do when Allah will ask you about your this posture. … Stay blessed Love from Pakistan.”
When Esra Bilgic, the 27-year-old star of the popular Turkish television drama Dirilis: Ertugrul (“Resurrection: Ertugrul”), posted a picture of herself in a bralette and blazer on Instagram, she couldn’t have anticipated the collective lamentation that would follow. Bilgic, who plays Halime Hatun, a Seljuk warrior princess married to the titular Ertugrul Ghazi and the mother of Osman, eventual founder of the Ottoman Empire, received thousands of comments, but the response from a certain segment of fans was doleful, to say the least. “Where is halima Sultan i saw yesterday night,” one commenter inquired, echoing the distress of his compatriots and noting that he had been seeking repentance for himself as well as for the actress. “What will you do when Allah will ask you about your this posture. … Stay blessed Love from Pakistan.”
Today, Turkish dizi—television dramas—are second only to American ones in terms of global distribution. Turkish is now the most watched foreign language in the world, beating out French, Spanish, and Mandarin. Ertugrul, which began filming in 2014, first became popular on Netflix and has since been licensed to 72 countries.
Turkish dizi—television dramas—are second only to American ones in terms of global distribution.
When its finale aired on TRT, Turkey’s national public broadcast channel—serendipitously on the anniversary of the Ottoman capture of Constantinople and the fall of the Byzantine Empire—more people searched YouTube for Ertugrul than for the Game of Thrones character Jon Snow, whose own show had ended 10 days earlier. The series is set in 13th-century Anatolia as Ertugrul Ghazi, a warrior leading the Kayi tribe, battles Byzantines, Crusaders, and Mongols. It is a superbly shot, emotive drama that plays out all of Turkey’s—and the Muslim world’s—fantasies and anxieties.
Ertugrul, played by Engin Altan Duzyatan, inhabits a time in which the sons of the Muslim world have never been humiliated. It is some 600 years since the Prophet Mohammed received the word of God, and Islam’s dominion has expanded from Iberia to the Indus and promises to stretch across the Earth itself. Ertugrul is portrayed as an honorable man, deserving of the glory and respect people and strangers alike bestow on him; he is righteous, unafraid, and just, even as he is beset by spies and traitors. Series after series, Ertugrul confronts avatars of today’s global forces—the Mongols, or China; Byzantines, or the West; and the Knights Templar as a general stand-in for Christian powers.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has celebrated the show for “entering the nation’s heart” and is an enthusiastic supporter. Its producer, Kemal Tekden, is a member of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), and the show’s creator, Mehmet Bozdag, is, if not a member, an open admirer. “Eighty-six years of longing has come to an end,” he tweeted after Erdogan and his cabinet offered the first Muslim prayers at the Hagia Sophia after a court annulled the sixth-century Byzantine church’s status as a museum. Nelson Mandela’s grandson, a member of South Africa’s parliament, visited the set and posed for photos decked out in Ertugrul’s Kayi tribal kit as did Venezuela’s head of state, Nicolás Maduro. Maduro was so moved, Bozdag claimed, that he even considered converting to Islam after his visit.
Pakistan is not the first country to lose itself to Ertugrul hysteria—Urdu is the fourth language the show has been dubbed into, following Arabic, Spanish, and Russian—but its affinity has broader geopolitical implications. Pakistan and Turkey have long held each other in reverence and call each other “brother countries.” Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Pakistan after its founding in 1947 and lobbied for its membership in the United Nations.
Even before Pakistan’s independence, Muslims of the British Raj banded together under the Khilafat Movement of 1919-1922 in support of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The Khilafat—or Caliphate—was a symbol of global Muslim unity, and though the movement collapsed after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk deposed Mehmed VI, the last sultan, Indian Muslims sent financial aid to the empire on its last legs.
As Asia grapples with sectarian strife, religious extremism, and geopolitical shifts—from Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran to Narendra Modi’s India, which is tilting away from its secular roots and toward Hindu majoritarianism, to the specter of a rising China—Pakistan has grown closer to Turkey, identifying with its particular brand of Islam-inspired modernity rather than the harsher alternative of Saudi Wahhabism.
Though bilateral relations have focused on political, military, and economic engagement, today Pakistan and Turkey are deepening their cultural connections. Ertugrul’s popularity in Pakistan isn’t spontaneous in the way other dizi have been—Muhtesem Yuzyil (“Magnificent Century,” known in Pakistan as Mera Sultan) and Ask-i Memnu (“Forbidden Love,” known as Ishq-e-Mamnoon) were also both huge hits. More than 55 million people watched Ishq-e-Mamnoon’s finale in Pakistan—about one-fourth of the country’s population. It was the first time in Pakistan’s history that a foreign show drew such high numbers.
Unlike previous dizi, Ertugrul’s popularity has a deeper political significance, however. It is liked for all of the standard reasons—sophisticated production, dramatic tension, and conservative messaging that the whole family can enjoy together—but its widespread following in Pakistan, where it is known as Ertugrul Ghazi, is also a sign of the country’s fraught position at this particular moment.
“The West has had far greater cultural import on Pakistan than anyone else,” said Shaheryar Mirza, a Pakistani executive producer at TRT World, who spoke to me in a personal capacity, noting that today Pakistan finds itself in an unusual position as a cultural and political battleground between Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others. “Pakistan is a fault line. … From its birth until now, it’s swung in wildly different directions.”
Pakistan makes up 25 percent of Ertugrul’s global audience on YouTube.
Pakistan Television (PTV) began broadcasting Ertugrul’s first season this year during Ramadan after a request by Prime Minister Imran Khan. Khan often mentions the show in his speeches and sermons. He recently bemoaned the “thirdhand culture” that was infecting Pakistan through Hollywood and Bollywood. “We have a culture with romance and history, as well. However, it is also filled with Islamic values,” Khan said. TRT gifted Ertugrul to Pakistan, free of licensing costs; it was a gesture that has more than paid off.
Pakistan makes up 25 percent of Ertugrul’s global audience on YouTube, and in the last week of May, TRT Ertugrul by PTV was YouTube’s 33rd-most watched channel in the world. Mirza doesn’t think the Turks set out with the idea of capturing Pakistan’s affection as a cultural goal, “but if it wasn’t before, it probably is now.” Bozdag, Ertugrul’s creator and scriptwriter, has promised “world-shaking deals” between Pakistan and Turkey, noting that even if the countries have separate borders, “the souls are of one nation.”
“I am not doing this for Hollywood or Bollywood or anyone who hates Islam,” Bozdag has said, echoing Khan. “We need to reexplain the art of Islam and the Islamic world because this art and history is a transcendent art, from the Taj Mahal to the Alhambra. Today, we have to tell the whole world about the beautiful voice of Islam.”
The blistering and bombastic Erdogan may be divisive at home, but abroad, whether one likes him or hates him, he possesses a charisma that has been absent in the Muslim world for decades. And he is making a play to restore Turkey to its historic role as the leader of Sunni Muslims, displacing Saudi Arabia. After all, it was only after Mehmed VI was deposed that the House of Saud took custodianship of the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. The Ottoman Empire was once the custodian of the two mosques and thus the de facto leader of the Islamic ummah for 400 years—and it is this position to which Erdogan seeks to return.
When the United Arab Emirates, a key Saudi ally, announced its recognition of Israel in August, Erdogan suggested that he might cut diplomatic ties and recall Turkey’s ambassador to Abu Dhabi. Speaking in Pakistan’s parliament in February, he lambasted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s communications siege of Kashmir. “There is no difference between Gallipoli and Kashmir,” Erdogan thundered, comparing the struggle of Kashmiris to the Ottoman Empire’s fight against Allied powers during World War I.
This tussle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is playing out across numerous fronts, and Pakistan finds itself caught squarely in the middle. Despite Pakistan’s love for Turkey, Khan was the first world leader to welcome Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, after the journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed and dismembered at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul—a crime that Erdogan helped expose after repeated Saudi denials and cover-ups. Khan even received the crown prince in a gilded, horse-drawn carriage.
In August, on the first anniversary of Indian-administered Kashmir’s internet shutdown—the longest communications blackout imposed by any democratic country—Khan’s government called on Saudi Arabia to support Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, or it would be forced to seek support from other states in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Riyadh’s response was swift: It demanded that Islamabad cough up a $1 billion payment for oil deliveries and ended the loan and oil supplies agreement between the two countries, making clear how economically dependent Pakistan is.
Rumors abound that Saudi Arabia also demanded that Pakistan stop airing Ertugrul. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, in a joint production, have spent $40 million on Kingdoms of Fire, a show about Arab resistance to the Ottoman Empire, going so far as to hire Peter Webber, a British director, for added cachet. It was an expensive salvo against Turkey’s cultural neo-Ottomanism, but it has apparently failed; no one seems to be watching.
Pakistan would like to be a leader of the Muslim world. Pakistan would like to be a leader of the Muslim world but finds itself weakened by endemically corrupt governments, inept institutions, and terrorism. On top of its many woes, it is beholden to a military establishment that ultimately determines the course of the country regardless of which prime minister is in office or what the people want. As it depends on humiliating loans from the International Monetary Fund and U.S. aid, Khan’s Pakistan sees models of aspiration in Turkey and Malaysia. Khan has called Erdogan, along with former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, a personal hero.
Yet even as his admiration is often proclaimed, it is clear that he is unable to follow in their footsteps. At the 2019 U.N. General Assembly meeting, Khan announced that the three countries would together create a television channel aimed at combating Islamophobia. But for all his declarations of brotherhood, Khan abruptly pulled out of a conference on the Muslim world organized by Malaysia in December 2019. “Unfortunately, our friends, who are very close to Pakistan as well, felt that somehow the conference was going to divide the ummah,” Khan said, hinting at but not naming Saudi Arabia. Erdogan was blunter. “Unfortunately, we see that Saudi Arabia pressures Pakistan,” he said at the time. No mention has been made of the television channel since last fall.
A statue inspired by Dirilis Ertugrul has been erected in Lahore, Pakistan.
Pakistan remains confused over just what it means to be Pakistani. For the 73 years of the nation’s life, there has been no consensus over how modern or Islamic it ought to be. Modernity is both desired and feared as a Western export, and there is uncertainty over which version of Islam it should follow—the Sufi Islam of the subcontinent or the intolerant orthodoxy of Saudi Wahhabism.
Ertugrul may be the No. 1 title on Pakistani Netflix, as of late July, but Dark Desire, The Kissing Booth, and the Polish soft-core porn caper 365 Days occupy spots five, seven, and eight—an illustration of the constant conflict between values, desire, and curiosity among the country’s more than 200 million people.
This confusion is most pronounced among Pakistan’s elite. But the middle-class Pakistanis who make up Khan’s political base are less torn: They are simply Muslim and proud. And they see their version of Islam, for the most part, strikingly illuminated by Ertugrul. The show is built on deeply conservative values, and there are no salacious love stories or scantily clad women. Here, love stories are told through marriage or through chaste, polite yearning. Many female characters wear tribal head coverings. (In the hundreds of hours I spent watching dizi for my book, New Kings of the World, until Ertugrul, I had come across only a few seconds of a woman in a hijab.) Ertugrul himself can often be found kneeling in prayer. Even as he deals with Byzantine spies and advancing hordes of Mongols, Ertugrul’s mother is there to remind him, after Halime’s death, that he really ought to get remarried. “It’s time to find a nice lady,” she says around the time he has chopped off a Mongol’s hand for being fresh with a woman.
As with any adoration, there are shocks—such as Bilgic’s Instagram post. Duzyatan, the man who plays Ertugrul, also elicited criticism after posing in an anniversary photo with his wife. “Pakistanis love you,” one commenter wrote, “but not in these kinds of pictures.” (His wife was wearing a tank top.)
Strangely, For all the fidelity Pakistanis profess for Ertugrul and its values, they seem to pay little attention to the show’s message of religious pluralism.for all the fidelity Pakistanis profess for Ertugrul and its values, they seem to pay little attention to the show’s message of religious pluralism. Ertugrul is not only benevolent but generous to believers of other faiths. It’s a lesson Pakistan would do well to learn from. While Pakistan’s Punjab province recently banned 100 books that it considered blasphemous, including school textbooks with illustrations of pigs, and passed legislation mandating exactly how the Prophet Mohammed must be referred to, Turkey is doing more than reimagining the Muslim ummah; it is shaping it in its image.
Turkey understands the power of narratives. It is a smooth employer of soft power, savvy to all the manipulations and delicate handling necessary to build a new image, rewrite history, and erase both the slander and the truth about a nation’s past. Viewers see the Ottomans in their strongest and most capable avatars—never as sultans at the helm of a dying empire.
Riyaad Minty, the director of digital content at TRT, whose focus is the internationalization of the brand on digital platforms, told me that the broadcaster, whose mandate is “value-based, family-friendly content,” sees itself as “the channel for the next 5 billion.” The question for TRT is not how many viewers shows like Ertugrul can pull in but, as Minty says, “Can a show like this inspire a generation of people?”
Soft power only works if the power behind it is seen as credible. Turkey’s government certainly has many problems—Erdogan has overseen a steep decline in press freedom, to cite just one example—but it still fares well in comparison to Saudi Arabia. After all, the Turks don’t behead teenagers for attending protests or dismember journalists at their consulates.
If Pakistan is anything to go by, for now it doesn’t look as if Saudi Arabia’s heavy-handed but clumsy efforts will succeed in unseating Turkey as the victor of the Muslim world’s 21st-century culture wars.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-05--Who Lost Hong Kong?

Who Lost Hong Kong?

Hong Kong is dead—or at least , the rule of law and civil liberties there is .
The imposition of China ’ s wide-ranging national security law , enforced by mainland security agents empowered to drag suspects off to the mainland for trial , makes any criticism of both the Hong Kong and Chinese governments deeply dangerous .
Even foreigners will have to act as if they are living in the People ’ s Republic of China .
It wasn ’ t supposed to be this way .
In 1997 , the United Kingdom transferred Hong Kong to the PRC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ two systems , one country ” standard for 50 years .
Many Hong Kongers were skeptical that China would keep its promise and looked for an exit from the territory .
Some residents went elsewhere for citizenship and returned after the Special Administrative Region appeared to continue operating largely unchanged .
Still , the Chinese Communist Party ’ s forbearance never was likely to last a half century .
President Xi Jinping ’ s rise in 2012 accelerated the destruction of the territory ’ s uniquely liberal atmosphere .
He proved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rest of China and Hong Kong was unlikely to escape his ill attention .
Yet it took a few years for him to act .
What triggered his assault on the autonomous territory that had provided such benefit for the mainland ?
The PRC ’ s rapid economic growth and development of other financial centers diminished Hong Kong ’ s importance .
Xi also was more concerned than his predecessors about ensuring regime control and preserving national order .
Xi wanted nothing and no one to get in the way of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party authority slipping away , whether culturally , religiously , or legally , haunt his speeches .
At three critical points , Hong Kongers effectively challenged Xi ’ s vision of control—prompting a decisive and brutal revenge from Xi .
The fault remains his , not theirs , but the lessons learned are useful .
The first misstep was the 2014 Umbrella Revolution .
The grassroot protests demanding democracy , sparked by plans to change the method of choosing Hong Kong ’ s Chief Executive , were dramatic and might have succeeded in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movement was hampered by the lack of leaders who could negotiate and strike a bargain .
Worse , the Hong Kong authorities , who might have been inclined to deal , were not in real control .
Beijing was , and would never meet the demonstrators ’ demands for genuine democracy .
Although the Xi government might have been willing to make a deal to end the protests , it would never abandon control .
At the same time , the central government could not countenance the sort of chaos and disorder that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and intersections for 77 days .
If nothing else , Beijing realized that Hong Kong hosted a mass protest movement and the local authorities could not govern .
PRC officials blamed outsiders for instigating trouble in the SAR , which their own ideology insisted was the only possible explanation for the protestors ’ antagonism toward China .
The loss of a sense of Chinese—meaning , CCP-compliant—identity , as they saw it , was the root of the problem .
Events quieted down until 2016 .
Chinese interference in the territory escalated—for instance , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kidnapped and prosecuted in the mainland—but such activities were covert .
In October of that year , several democracy activists were elected to the Legislative Council .
That was no surprise : The voting system ensured establishment control but allowed some open elections to give people a voice .
However , this time a number of those elected used their oaths of office to show their contempt for Beijing .
They were disqualified but allowed to retake their oaths .
Unfortunately , their actions—foolishly juvenile and needlessly confrontational—split the democracy movement .
Far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong ’ s affairs .
The central government insisted that the affected candidates be barred from retaking the oath and that advocates of independence be disqualified from running , barring several other democracy activists .
Worse , the National People ’ s Congress insisted that it could interpret the Basic Law governing Hong Kong and set new election standards .
Events again quieted down , though with another increase in central government interference .
Presumably at Beijing ’ s behest , Hong Kong subsequently arrested leaders of the Umbrella Movement—charged for illegal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Several activists served prison terms of various lengths .
And advocacy of anything deemed to be pro-independence prevented people from running for office .
The third and final act occurred last year .
Millions of people protested a proposed extradition treaty that could send Hong Kongers to the mainland .
Chief Executive Carrie Lam at first suspended rather than withdrew the legislation .
The demonstrations became violent—though the police and CCP-allied thugs behaved much worse—and chaotic , such as blocking the airport and trashing the Legislative Council chamber .
Lam finally yielded , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ universal suffrage in electing the Hong Kong government .
Had democracy activists pocketed Lam ’ s concession and deescalated , perhaps Beijing would have waited .
However , the protestors again demonstrated that the local authorities were not in control and could never approve the long-delayed national security law .
Worse , activists seemed intent on making Hong Kong ungovernable unless Beijing granted their impossible demand for democracy .
Indeed , protestors appeared prepared to shut down commerce in the territory , something that might provide leverage in the West but which the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ misunderstood who and what they were fighting : a system that over the last seven decades had imposed mass repression , implemented totalitarian controls , and caused tens of millions of deaths on the mainland .
Against the Hong Kong government , they might have succeeded .
Against Beijing , they were doomed to failure .
Moreover , some protestors publicly and dramatically called for American assistance , waving U.S. flags at rallies , and urged congressional approval of sanctions legislation .
The Heritage Foundation ’ s Walter Lohman wondered if the “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limited impact American power could have on Beijing ’ s calculations ” ?
Apparently not .
Alas , Xi and other CCP grandees also saw those demonstrations .
The plea for U.S. intervention was sure to enrage , providing another humiliation at the hands of activists seen as enemies of China .
Such language also offered evidence for those who believed the United States instigated the protests and may have sparked fears of more direct American intervention in the future .
At that point , Hong Kong ’ s fate was sealed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ order , the situation in the territory had become intolerable .
It is hard to imagine anyone in Beijing arguing against a proposal to crush the protests , though the regime undoubtedly preferred to do so in a way that avoided mass casualties .
The regime also hoped to maintain the fiction of respecting “ two systems , one country.
” The National Security Law , with an assist from the COVID-19 epidemic , turned out to be an almost perfect vehicle .
Xi and his colleagues proved to be tragically perceptive in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition .
The loss of Hong Kong is a tragedy and offers important lessons in dealing with China—asking for what can not be given and insulting proud nationalists might be morally inspirational , but is a bad strategy .
Hong Kongers will pay the price for this .
Hong Kong will survive , but eventually will look like any other Chinese city—advanced , busy , and prosperous , but without many of its most creative and inventive residents , or the rule of law and relative transparency that underpinned business in the city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retake full control : The CCP does not want its people to be free .
Protests might have sped up the process , but a crackdown of some kind under Xi or his successors was inevitable .
But Beijing is also a loser here .
With Hong Kong increasingly treated like the mainland , where the CCP applies repressive legislation broadly , takes Westerners hostage in disputes with foreign governments , and treats economic information as secret , over time U.S. , European , and Asian companies will shrink their presence or leave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that its international commitments are worthless .
The West won ’ t be able to reverse China ’ s action , but it will approach the PRC with ever greater caution and skepticism in the future .

Hong Kong is dead—or at least, the rule of law and civil liberties there is. The imposition of China’s wide-ranging national security law, enforced by mainland security agents empowered to drag suspects off to the mainland for trial, makes any criticism of both the Hong Kong and Chinese governments deeply dangerous. Even foreigners will have to act as if they are living in the People’s Republic of China.
Hong Kong is dead—or at least, the rule of law and civil liberties there is. The imposition of China’s wide-ranging national security law, enforced by mainland security agents empowered to drag suspects off to the mainland for trial, makes any criticism of both the Hong Kong and Chinese governments deeply dangerous. Even foreigners will have to act as if they are living in the People’s Republic of China.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. In 1997, the United Kingdom transferred Hong Kong to the PRC with the promise that Beijing would apply the “two systems, one country” standard for 50 years. Many Hong Kongers were skeptical that China would keep its promise and looked for an exit from the territory. Some residents went elsewhere for citizenship and returned after the Special Administrative Region appeared to continue operating largely unchanged.
Still, the Chinese Communist Party’s forbearance never was likely to last a half century. President Xi Jinping’s rise in 2012 accelerated the destruction of the territory’s uniquely liberal atmosphere. He proved intent on dramatically tightening CCP control over the rest of China and Hong Kong was unlikely to escape his ill attention.
Yet it took a few years for him to act. What triggered his assault on the autonomous territory that had provided such benefit for the mainland?
The PRC’s rapid economic growth and development of other financial centers diminished Hong Kong’s importance. Xi also was more concerned than his predecessors about ensuring regime control and preserving national order. Xi wanted nothing and no one to get in the way of his plans for the PRC. Fears of party authority slipping away, whether culturally, religiously, or legally, haunt his speeches.
At three critical points, Hong Kongers effectively challenged Xi’s vision of control—prompting a decisive and brutal revenge from Xi. The fault remains his, not theirs, but the lessons learned are useful.
The first misstep was the 2014 Umbrella Revolution. The grassroot protests demanding democracy, sparked by plans to change the method of choosing Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, were dramatic and might have succeeded in a Western nation. However, the movement was hampered by the lack of leaders who could negotiate and strike a bargain. Worse, the Hong Kong authorities, who might have been inclined to deal, were not in real control. Beijing was, and would never meet the demonstrators’ demands for genuine democracy.
Although the Xi government might have been willing to make a deal to end the protests, it would never abandon control. At the same time, the central government could not countenance the sort of chaos and disorder that resulted when protestors shut down major roads and intersections for 77 days. If nothing else, Beijing realized that Hong Kong hosted a mass protest movement and the local authorities could not govern. PRC officials blamed outsiders for instigating trouble in the SAR, which their own ideology insisted was the only possible explanation for the protestors’ antagonism toward China. The loss of a sense of Chinese—meaning, CCP-compliant—identity, as they saw it, was the root of the problem.
Events quieted down until 2016. Chinese interference in the territory escalated—for instance, publishers of books critical of China were kidnapped and prosecuted in the mainland—but such activities were covert. In October of that year, several democracy activists were elected to the Legislative Council. That was no surprise: The voting system ensured establishment control but allowed some open elections to give people a voice.
However, this time a number of those elected used their oaths of office to show their contempt for Beijing. They were disqualified but allowed to retake their oaths. Unfortunately, their actions—foolishly juvenile and needlessly confrontational—split the democracy movement. Far worse, the controversy drew Beijing into Hong Kong’s affairs. The central government insisted that the affected candidates be barred from retaking the oath and that advocates of independence be disqualified from running, barring several other democracy activists. Worse, the National People’s Congress insisted that it could interpret the Basic Law governing Hong Kong and set new election standards.
Events again quieted down, though with another increase in central government interference. Presumably at Beijing’s behest, Hong Kong subsequently arrested leaders of the Umbrella Movement—charged for illegal protests years after the events occurred. Several activists served prison terms of various lengths. And advocacy of anything deemed to be pro-independence prevented people from running for office.
The third and final act occurred last year. Millions of people protested a proposed extradition treaty that could send Hong Kongers to the mainland. Chief Executive Carrie Lam at first suspended rather than withdrew the legislation. The demonstrations became violent—though the police and CCP-allied thugs behaved much worse—and chaotic, such as blocking the airport and trashing the Legislative Council chamber. Lam finally yielded, but protestors expanded their demands, including universal suffrage in electing the Hong Kong government.
Had democracy activists pocketed Lam’s concession and deescalated, perhaps Beijing would have waited. However, the protestors again demonstrated that the local authorities were not in control and could never approve the long-delayed national security law. Worse, activists seemed intent on making Hong Kong ungovernable unless Beijing granted their impossible demand for democracy. Indeed, protestors appeared prepared to shut down commerce in the territory, something that might provide leverage in the West but which the PRC could never accept. Democracy activists misunderstood who and what they were fighting: a system that over the last seven decades had imposed mass repression, implemented totalitarian controls, and caused tens of millions of deaths on the mainland. Against the Hong Kong government, they might have succeeded. Against Beijing, they were doomed to failure.
Moreover, some protestors publicly and dramatically called for American assistance, waving U.S. flags at rallies, and urged congressional approval of sanctions legislation. The Heritage Foundation’s Walter Lohman wondered if the “protesters in Hong Kong ever understood the limited impact American power could have on Beijing’s calculations”? Apparently not. Alas, Xi and other CCP grandees also saw those demonstrations. The plea for U.S. intervention was sure to enrage, providing another humiliation at the hands of activists seen as enemies of China. Such language also offered evidence for those who believed the United States instigated the protests and may have sparked fears of more direct American intervention in the future.
At that point, Hong Kong’s fate was sealed. For a government dedicated to control and order, the situation in the territory had become intolerable. It is hard to imagine anyone in Beijing arguing against a proposal to crush the protests, though the regime undoubtedly preferred to do so in a way that avoided mass casualties. The regime also hoped to maintain the fiction of respecting “two systems, one country.” The National Security Law, with an assist from the COVID-19 epidemic, turned out to be an almost perfect vehicle. Xi and his colleagues proved to be tragically perceptive in how to quickly and effectively break the opposition.
The loss of Hong Kong is a tragedy and offers important lessons in dealing with China—asking for what cannot be given and insulting proud nationalists might be morally inspirational, but is a bad strategy. Hong Kongers will pay the price for this.
Hong Kong will survive, but eventually will look like any other Chinese city—advanced, busy, and prosperous, but without many of its most creative and inventive residents, or the rule of law and relative transparency that underpinned business in the city.
China was always going to eventually retake full control: The CCP does not want its people to be free. Protests might have sped up the process, but a crackdown of some kind under Xi or his successors was inevitable. But Beijing is also a loser here. With Hong Kong increasingly treated like the mainland, where the CCP applies repressive legislation broadly, takes Westerners hostage in disputes with foreign governments, and treats economic information as secret, over time U.S., European, and Asian companies will shrink their presence or leave entirely. And Beijing has also demonstrated that its international commitments are worthless. The West won’t be able to reverse China’s action, but it will approach the PRC with ever greater caution and skepticism in the future.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-08--No-Deal Brexit Is Back on the Table

No-Deal Brexit Is Back on the Table

No-Deal Brexit Is Back on the Table Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The Brexit process heats up again as the British government sets a deadline , Russia looks to deepen its economic involvement in Syria , and West African leaders pressure Mali ’ s junta to appoint a new transitional government .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The announcement comes as the British government is working to push legislation through Parliament that would override key parts of last year ’ s Brexit withdrawal agreement .
The Financial Times reported on Sunday that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to remove the legal force of the highly contentious Northern Ireland protocol , which observers have long argued is vital to preserving peace and stability in Ireland after Brexit .
Irish border question revisited .
The Northern Ireland protocol was included in the withdrawal agreement as a way of preventing the return of physical infrastructure along the Irish border , which both the Irish government and the European Union argued could disrupt travel and trade , deal a blow to decades of peace efforts , and antagonize republican paramilitary groups that seek to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the south .
Under the terms of the withdrawal agreement , Northern Ireland would nominally operate inside a new U.K. customs union but would continue to be subject to EU trade regulations , effectively placing the United Kingdom ’ s new economic border in the Irish Sea .
The arrangement enraged Northern Ireland ’ s unionists , who insist on maintaining Northern Ireland ’ s equal place inside the United Kingdom .
Unionist influence .
On Sunday , the Democratic Unionist Party ’ s Sammy Wilson said that the withdrawal agreement needed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ betraying Northern Ireland .
Johnson will reportedly tell the European Union today that the withdrawal agreement must be rewritten to protect the union between Britain and Northern Ireland .
On Monday , EU officials warned London that there would be no trade deal if it tried to renege on the withdrawal agreement .
Economic impact .
Economists have consistently warned that the economic impact of a no-deal Brexit could be severe .
On Monday , business leaders in Britain doubled-down on those warnings , telling Johnson that securing a Brexit deal was essential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recovery following the coronavirus pandemic .
But the markets already seem to have responded negatively to the latest news .
On Monday , the pound took a slight tumble against the U.S. dollar , losing 1 percent of its value on the first day of talks .
September 8-10 .
The eighth round of Brexit negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union takes place .
September 8 .
U.S. and U.K. trade representatives meet for the latest round of trade talks .
September 8 .
Trial begins for former South African @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in court on corruption charges .
September 10-11 .
French President Emmanuel Macron hosts the Med7 summit with leaders from Cyprus , Greece , Italy , Malta , Portugal , and Spain .
September 11-12 .
EU finance ministers will meet for their first in-person gathering since the beginning of the coronavirus outbreak .
Navalny is responsive after poisoning .
The Berlin hospital that has been caring for Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny said that he is now out of his coma and is responsive , after confirming last week that he had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ It remains too early to gauge the potential long-term effects of his severe poisoning , ” the hospital said in a statement .
The revelation that Navalny , one of Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s fiercest critics , was poisoned has strained relations between Germany and Russia .
German Chancellor Angela Merkel suggested that it could jeopardize the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline if Moscow didn ’ t take action over the suspected attack .
Khashoggi assailants sentenced .
A Saudi Arabian court sentenced eight people to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of journalist Jamal Khashoggi , a prominent critic of the Saudi Arabian government under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman .
U.N. officials and human rights campaigners criticized the trial because the real culprits of the murder would be allowed to go free .
“ The Saudi authorities are closing the case without the world knowing the truth of who is responsible for Jamal ’ s murder , ” Hatice Cengiz , Khashoggi ’ s fiancée , wrote in a statement .
Suspicion has long swirled around the crown prince for his alleged role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s death in October 2018 led to international condemnation of the Saudi regime and severely damaged bin Salman ’ s carefully cultivated image as a reformist .
Syria wants more Russian help .
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said he wants to expand his country ’ s economic and business ties to Russia as a way of bypassing crippling U.S. sanctions during talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Monday .
Lavrov hinted that Russia was prepared to come to Assad ’ s aid , noting during a subsequent press conference that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its economy now that Assad is in control of most of the territory he lost during the country ’ s brutal civil war .
The meeting was Lavrov ’ s first visit to the country since 2012 , demonstrating Moscow ’ s continued interest in Syria after providing Assad with critical military support throughout the civil war .
Mali junta under pressure .
The heads of state of the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) have told Mali ’ s newly formed junta that it has until Sept. 15 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president and prime minister at the head of a new transitional government .
Talks between the coup leaders and opposition figures began on Saturday but made little progress after opposition figures protested the proceedings .
As Philip Obaji Jr. recently wrote for Foreign Policy , a democratic transition in Mali that tackles the problem of corruption is vital to prevent the further destabilization of the region .
The bloc ’ s announcement is its latest attempt to pressure Mali ’ s junta as it tries to force a return to civilian rule .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ECOWAS imposed a series of sanctions on Mali to demonstrate its opposition to the military takeover .
African leaders have been far less critical of elected leaders who use constitutional tricks to hold on to power , Adem Abebe argued recently in FP—and to remain credible they will need to condemn both military and constitutional coups .
Libya talks underway .
Representatives of Libya ’ s U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord ( GNA ) and its rival , the eastern-based House of Representatives , met in Morocco on Sunday as the country continues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its near-decade-long civil war .
The meeting took place two weeks after both sides declared a surprise nationwide cease-fire .
Although Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said he “ will applaud [ the Libyans ] regardless of the outcome ” of the talks , he stressed that the final resolution would need to be brokered by the United Nations .
As Anas El Gomati recently wrote for Foreign Policy , Libyan National Army chief Khalifa Haftar ’ s failure to seize the capital of Tripoli helped create a military stalemate that could leave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the country .
The leaders of the rival groups are expected to meet for talks in Switzerland today .
The San Bernardino unit of the California Fire Department confirmed on Sunday that a gender reveal party using a “ smoke-generating pyrotechnic device ” appears to have sparked one of the many wildfires currently ravaging California .
The fire started on Saturday and has now spread to more than 8,500 acres , part of a much wider series of wildfires that have unleashed widespread destruction in California .
Several nearby communities have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t the first time a gender reveal party was behind the start of a wildfire .
In 2017 , an expectant father in Arizona fired a rifle at a target packed with explosives which sparked a 47,000-acre fire .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The Brexit process heats up again as the British government sets a deadline, Russia looks to deepen its economic involvement in Syria, and West African leaders pressure Mali’s junta to appoint a new transitional government.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The Brexit process heats up again as the British government sets a deadline, Russia looks to deepen its economic involvement in Syria, and West African leaders pressure Mali’s junta to appoint a new transitional government.
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Will the U.K. Crash Out of the EU? U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has set a deadline of Oct. 15 for the United Kingdom’s talks with the European Union as the latest round of negotiations gets underway today to determine the post-Brexit EU-U.K. economic relationship, again raising concerns that the United Kingdom could crash out of the bloc without a deal in place.
The announcement comes as the British government is working to push legislation through Parliament that would override key parts of last year’s Brexit withdrawal agreement. The Financial Times reported on Sunday that the so-called internal market bill is expected to remove the legal force of the highly contentious Northern Ireland protocol, which observers have long argued is vital to preserving peace and stability in Ireland after Brexit.
Irish border question revisited. The Northern Ireland protocol was included in the withdrawal agreement as a way of preventing the return of physical infrastructure along the Irish border, which both the Irish government and the European Union argued could disrupt travel and trade, deal a blow to decades of peace efforts, and antagonize republican paramilitary groups that seek to unify Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic in the south.
Under the terms of the withdrawal agreement, Northern Ireland would nominally operate inside a new U.K. customs union but would continue to be subject to EU trade regulations, effectively placing the United Kingdom’s new economic border in the Irish Sea. The arrangement enraged Northern Ireland’s unionists, who insist on maintaining Northern Ireland’s equal place inside the United Kingdom.
Unionist influence. On Sunday, the Democratic Unionist Party’s Sammy Wilson said that the withdrawal agreement needed to be scrapped and accused Johnson of betraying Northern Ireland. Johnson will reportedly tell the European Union today that the withdrawal agreement must be rewritten to protect the union between Britain and Northern Ireland. On Monday, EU officials warned London that there would be no trade deal if it tried to renege on the withdrawal agreement.
Economic impact. Economists have consistently warned that the economic impact of a no-deal Brexit could be severe. On Monday, business leaders in Britain doubled-down on those warnings, telling Johnson that securing a Brexit deal was essential for the United Kingdom’s economic recovery following the coronavirus pandemic.
But the markets already seem to have responded negatively to the latest news. On Monday, the pound took a slight tumble against the U.S. dollar, losing 1 percent of its value on the first day of talks.
The World This Week
September 8-10. The eighth round of Brexit negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union takes place.
September 8. U.S. and U.K. trade representatives meet for the latest round of trade talks.
September 8. Trial begins for former South African President Jacob Zuma, who is appearing in court on corruption charges.
September 9-12. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ministerial meeting takes place.
September 10-11. French President Emmanuel Macron hosts the Med7 summit with leaders from Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain.
September 11-12. EU finance ministers will meet for their first in-person gathering since the beginning of the coronavirus outbreak.
September 11-13. Russian local elections take place.
What We’re Following Today
Navalny is responsive after poisoning. The Berlin hospital that has been caring for Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny said that he is now out of his coma and is responsive, after confirming last week that he had been poisoned by the nerve agent Novichok. “It remains too early to gauge the potential long-term effects of his severe poisoning,” the hospital said in a statement.
The revelation that Navalny, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fiercest critics, was poisoned has strained relations between Germany and Russia. German Chancellor Angela Merkel suggested that it could jeopardize the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline if Moscow didn’t take action over the suspected attack.
Khashoggi assailants sentenced. A Saudi Arabian court sentenced eight people to prison for their involvement in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent critic of the Saudi Arabian government under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. U.N. officials and human rights campaigners criticized the trial because the real culprits of the murder would be allowed to go free. “The Saudi authorities are closing the case without the world knowing the truth of who is responsible for Jamal’s murder,” Hatice Cengiz, Khashoggi’s fiancée, wrote in a statement.
Suspicion has long swirled around the crown prince for his alleged role in ordering the crime, and Khashoggi’s death in October 2018 led to international condemnation of the Saudi regime and severely damaged bin Salman’s carefully cultivated image as a reformist.
Syria wants more Russian help. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said he wants to expand his country’s economic and business ties to Russia as a way of bypassing crippling U.S. sanctions during talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Monday. Lavrov hinted that Russia was prepared to come to Assad’s aid, noting during a subsequent press conference that Syria needed international assistance to help rebuild its economy now that Assad is in control of most of the territory he lost during the country’s brutal civil war.
The meeting was Lavrov’s first visit to the country since 2012, demonstrating Moscow’s continued interest in Syria after providing Assad with critical military support throughout the civil war.
Keep an Eye On
Mali junta under pressure. The heads of state of the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have told Mali’s newly formed junta that it has until Sept. 15 to appoint civilians to the positions of president and prime minister at the head of a new transitional government. Talks between the coup leaders and opposition figures began on Saturday but made little progress after opposition figures protested the proceedings. As Philip Obaji Jr. recently wrote for Foreign Policy, a democratic transition in Mali that tackles the problem of corruption is vital to prevent the further destabilization of the region.
The bloc’s announcement is its latest attempt to pressure Mali’s junta as it tries to force a return to civilian rule. Shortly after the Aug. 18 coup, ECOWAS imposed a series of sanctions on Mali to demonstrate its opposition to the military takeover. African leaders have been far less critical of elected leaders who use constitutional tricks to hold on to power, Adem Abebe argued recently in FP—and to remain credible they will need to condemn both military and constitutional coups.
Libya talks underway. Representatives of Libya’s U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and its rival, the eastern-based House of Representatives, met in Morocco on Sunday as the country continues to look for a way out of its near-decade-long civil war. The meeting took place two weeks after both sides declared a surprise nationwide cease-fire. Although Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said he “will applaud [the Libyans] regardless of the outcome” of the talks, he stressed that the final resolution would need to be brokered by the United Nations.
As Anas El Gomati recently wrote for Foreign Policy, Libyan National Army chief Khalifa Haftar’s failure to seize the capital of Tripoli helped create a military stalemate that could leave partition as the only viable long-term solution for the country. The leaders of the rival groups are expected to meet for talks in Switzerland today.
Odds and Ends
The San Bernardino unit of the California Fire Department confirmed on Sunday that a gender reveal party using a “smoke-generating pyrotechnic device” appears to have sparked one of the many wildfires currently ravaging California. The fire started on Saturday and has now spread to more than 8,500 acres, part of a much wider series of wildfires that have unleashed widespread destruction in California. Several nearby communities have been forced to evacuate.
It isn’t the first time a gender reveal party was behind the start of a wildfire. In 2017, an expectant father in Arizona fired a rifle at a target packed with explosives which sparked a 47,000-acre fire.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Photo credit: Daniel Leal-Olivas/AFP via Getty Images


foreignpolicy--2020-09-08--The Czech Republic Is Caught in a Nuclear Tug of War

The Czech Republic Is Caught in a Nuclear Tug of War When U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo landed in Prague in mid-August , the first stop on a tour of U.S. allies in Central and Eastern Europe , he had two things on his mind : China and Russia .
Over the last decade , the two Eastern giants have won significant influence among the region ’ s young democracies .
And the Trump administration , reversing its predecessor ’ s blacklisting of recalcitrant regimes in Central and Eastern Europe , seeks to reengage and quash the pair ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis , who founded the ruling ANO 2011 party , has welcomed U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s embrace .
But his stance looks less than certain as the country prepares to face one of its sternest geopolitical tests since the fall of communism 30 years ago : choosing a partner to expand its Soviet-built nuclear power capacity .
A controversial billionaire who toes a populist—albeit centrist—line , Babis has earned brownie points with the White House by becoming Europe ’ s loudest critic of the Chinese telecommunications firm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security risk .
Although many allies have ignored the United States ’ calls to bar the firm , the Czech leader ( who reportedly dislikes comparisons to the U.S. president ) blocked it from working on his country ’ s critical communications networks in late 2018 .
Part of Pompeo ’ s mission to the Czech Republic was to convince Babis that it would pose a similar risk as Huawei should China or Russia win an upcoming tender to build a new 1.2-gigawatt reactor at the Dukovany nuclear power plant , at an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ If you choose one of these countries , it will jeopardize your freedom and sovereignty , ” Pompeo reportedly stressed to the Czech leader .
However , Babis ’ s government is weak , and he faces building pressure at home and abroad to lean east .
In turn , he has declined to exclude Chinese and Russian state-owned companies from bidding for the project and , despite welcoming Pompeo enthusiastically , demurred on signing a proffered cooperation agreement on nuclear energy .
“ I ’ m surprised , ” Vaclav @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ambassador for energy security , said at an event in late 2018 , “ that 30 years after the Velvet Revolution we ’ re still working on where we belong.
” Yet like many similarly small countries , the Czech Republic has long sought to perch precariously on the geopolitical fence .
And so , although European Union and NATO membership are cornerstones of the government ’ s official foreign policy , political and business ties to the East remain numerous .
The ambiguity has heightened as the populist tide has swept the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on rising public mistrust in the political class , earning greater sway and provoking a domestic political tussle over just where the Czech Republic ’ s interests lie .
Babis does not have a free hand .
He ’ s reliant on President Milos Zeman , a crude and outspoken populist nationalist , and associated extremist parties on the left and right for support in Parliament .
In turn , Babis has generally failed since he was elected in 2017 to challenge the efforts of Zeman and the shadowy cabal of political and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Beijing and Moscow .
Into this void has stepped a rump liberal political establishment , consisting of the security services and media , as well as the opposition .
The media have enthusiastically picked up ever more urgent warnings from the security services of the threat of growing Chinese and Russian influence .
And spats spurred by opposition politicians have provoked such anger in Beijing and Moscow that one senior foreign ministry official complained in off-the-record comments last November that his job has become significantly more difficult .
In the face of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , Babis has stiffened his resolve a little , for example by blocking Huawei , which infuriated Zeman .
However , the nuclear project puts the Czech prime minister in another tight spot .
“ Zeman and his advisors would not like to exclude China and Russia from the tender , and Babis needs the president ’ s supporters politically , ” Ivana Karaskova , a specialist on Czech-Chinese relations at the Prague-based Association for International Affairs , said in August .
“ At the same time , Babis is under significant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The disagreement over funding saw plans to build two new units at Temelin scrapped in 2014 .
The two finalists in that race—which also brought a U.S. secretary of state to Prague—were the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom and U.S.-based Westinghouse .
They ’ ve sat in the background in Prague since , awaiting the starting gun for new projects .
In the Dukovany showdown , they ’ re set to be joined by bidders from China , France , and South Korea .
For Beijing , the project would be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ low-priced nuclear technology to European customers .
For Russia , nuclear is a rare high-tech , value-added export .
As such , these bidders , which “ do not have purely economic motivations , can put in a lower price , ” Jan Lipavsky , an opposition member of the Czech Parliament and vice chair of its foreign policy and security committees , said in August .
A representative from Rosatom said that it will “ be happy to provide our best offer and create healthy market competition with maximum localization in partnership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the fear is that such a partnership could turn the Czech Republic , a NATO ally , into another Hungary .
Russia agreed in 2014 to fund and build the expansion of Hungary ’ s Paks nuclear plant .
In the meantime , Budapest ’ s illiberal government has drawn closer to the East , helping disrupt attempts to pull Ukraine closer to NATO and opposing EU attempts to pressure Beijing on human rights and security issues .
“ I think the U.S. understands the risk of the Hungarian scenario , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ becomes too entangled with China and Russia then they have a problem in NATO.
” For his part , Lipavsky rues the fact that the Czech government has not found the “ political will ” to oust the Russian and Chinese suitors from the bidding .
At the same time , it has resisted Zeman ’ s encouragement to replicate the “ Paks model.
” All of this will come to a head this year , according to Rene Nedela , deputy industry and trade minister for energy , with the selection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2022 .
Lipavsky said that the tender is already a regular topic with representatives of those countries that will bid , including the French and U.S. ambassadors .
Public opinion is also key .
Following Pompeo ’ s visit , Westinghouse launched a search for new senior PR operatives .
Babis sits squarely in the path of this approaching maelstrom .
His instincts draw him to the West , not least because his agrochemicals empire Agrofert stretches throughout the EU .
The premier , who dominates the ruling ANO party , also seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a trait that may be key to preventing a democratic decline in the Czech Republic similar to those in neighboring Hungary and Poland .
But his survival instincts also keep him wary of Zeman ’ s power , the maintenance of which could also prove his last chance to escape a jail sentence stemming from alleged EU subsidies fraud .
The key to surviving this political squeeze could be in the timing .
Zeman ’ s second and final term will end in March 2023 .
If Babis can delay the selection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he would be free to elbow Russia and China out of the way .
Indeed , “ Babis is doing whatever he can to postpone the decision until after the next presidential election , when Zeman will be around no longer , ” Karaskova noted .
“ That looks like a sensible strategy .
”

When U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo landed in Prague in mid-August, the first stop on a tour of U.S. allies in Central and Eastern Europe, he had two things on his mind: China and Russia. Over the last decade, the two Eastern giants have won significant influence among the region’s young democracies. And the Trump administration, reversing its predecessor’s blacklisting of recalcitrant regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, seeks to reengage and quash the pair’s sway.
When U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo landed in Prague in mid-August, the first stop on a tour of U.S. allies in Central and Eastern Europe, he had two things on his mind: China and Russia. Over the last decade, the two Eastern giants have won significant influence among the region’s young democracies. And the Trump administration, reversing its predecessor’s blacklisting of recalcitrant regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, seeks to reengage and quash the pair’s sway.
The minority government of Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis, who founded the ruling ANO 2011 party, has welcomed U.S. President Donald Trump’s embrace. But his stance looks less than certain as the country prepares to face one of its sternest geopolitical tests since the fall of communism 30 years ago: choosing a partner to expand its Soviet-built nuclear power capacity.
A controversial billionaire who toes a populist—albeit centrist—line, Babis has earned brownie points with the White House by becoming Europe’s loudest critic of the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei, which Washington insists is a security risk. Although many allies have ignored the United States’ calls to bar the firm, the Czech leader (who reportedly dislikes comparisons to the U.S. president) blocked it from working on his country’s critical communications networks in late 2018.
Part of Pompeo’s mission to the Czech Republic was to convince Babis that it would pose a similar risk as Huawei should China or Russia win an upcoming tender to build a new 1.2-gigawatt reactor at the Dukovany nuclear power plant, at an estimated cost of over $7 billion. “If you choose one of these countries, it will jeopardize your freedom and sovereignty,” Pompeo reportedly stressed to the Czech leader.
However, Babis’s government is weak, and he faces building pressure at home and abroad to lean east. In turn, he has declined to exclude Chinese and Russian state-owned companies from bidding for the project and, despite welcoming Pompeo enthusiastically, demurred on signing a proffered cooperation agreement on nuclear energy.
Energy is a leading issue in the U.S. drive to reengage in Central and Eastern Europe, not least because Russia has traditionally dominated the sector there. In turn, the Dukovany bidding is a bellwether, a competition that puts the government under deadline to make a definitive statement on the Czech Republic’s geopolitical stance.
“I’m surprised,” Vaclav Bartuska, the country’s longtime ambassador for energy security, said at an event in late 2018, “that 30 years after the Velvet Revolution we’re still working on where we belong.” Yet like many similarly small countries, the Czech Republic has long sought to perch precariously on the geopolitical fence. And so, although European Union and NATO membership are cornerstones of the government’s official foreign policy, political and business ties to the East remain numerous.
The ambiguity has heightened as the populist tide has swept the country. Russia and China have seized on rising public mistrust in the political class, earning greater sway and provoking a domestic political tussle over just where the Czech Republic’s interests lie.
Babis does not have a free hand. He’s reliant on President Milos Zeman, a crude and outspoken populist nationalist, and associated extremist parties on the left and right for support in Parliament. In turn, Babis has generally failed since he was elected in 2017 to challenge the efforts of Zeman and the shadowy cabal of political and economic figures surrounding him to deepen ties with Beijing and Moscow.
Into this void has stepped a rump liberal political establishment, consisting of the security services and media, as well as the opposition. The media have enthusiastically picked up ever more urgent warnings from the security services of the threat of growing Chinese and Russian influence. And spats spurred by opposition politicians have provoked such anger in Beijing and Moscow that one senior foreign ministry official complained in off-the-record comments last November that his job has become significantly more difficult.
In the face of public mistrust of the East, especially China, Babis has stiffened his resolve a little, for example by blocking Huawei, which infuriated Zeman. However, the nuclear project puts the Czech prime minister in another tight spot. “Zeman and his advisors would not like to exclude China and Russia from the tender, and Babis needs the president’s supporters politically,” Ivana Karaskova, a specialist on Czech-Chinese relations at the Prague-based Association for International Affairs, said in August. “At the same time, Babis is under significant pressure from the U.S. and other bidders.”
The expansion of the country’s two nuclear power plants—Dukovany and Temelin—are at the center of the Czech Republic’s long-term energy strategy. However, the government has struggled for years to find a financing model agreeable to the minority shareholders at state-controlled energy group CEZ, which is tasked with building and running the nuclear energy infrastructure.
The disagreement over funding saw plans to build two new units at Temelin scrapped in 2014. The two finalists in that race—which also brought a U.S. secretary of state to Prague—were the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom and U.S.-based Westinghouse.
They’ve sat in the background in Prague since, awaiting the starting gun for new projects. In the Dukovany showdown, they’re set to be joined by bidders from China, France, and South Korea.
For Beijing, the project would be a way to showcase the reliability of its low-priced nuclear technology to European customers. For Russia, nuclear is a rare high-tech, value-added export. As such, these bidders, which “do not have purely economic motivations, can put in a lower price,” Jan Lipavsky, an opposition member of the Czech Parliament and vice chair of its foreign policy and security committees, said in August. A representative from Rosatom said that it will “be happy to provide our best offer and create healthy market competition with maximum localization in partnership with Czech companies.”
For the West, the fear is that such a partnership could turn the Czech Republic, a NATO ally, into another Hungary. Russia agreed in 2014 to fund and build the expansion of Hungary’s Paks nuclear plant.
In the meantime, Budapest’s illiberal government has drawn closer to the East, helping disrupt attempts to pull Ukraine closer to NATO and opposing EU attempts to pressure Beijing on human rights and security issues.
“I think the U.S. understands the risk of the Hungarian scenario,” Lipavsky said. “When a state becomes too entangled with China and Russia then they have a problem in NATO.”
For his part, Lipavsky rues the fact that the Czech government has not found the “political will” to oust the Russian and Chinese suitors from the bidding. At the same time, it has resisted Zeman’s encouragement to replicate the “Paks model.” All of this will come to a head this year, according to Rene Nedela, deputy industry and trade minister for energy, with the selection of a vendor due by the end of 2022.
In the wake of Pompeo’s trip to Prague, lobbying around the nuclear plant will ramp up. “Russia has been extremely active in lobbying for the past couple of years,” Karaskova said. “The U.S., through Mike Pompeo’s comments, also showed a strong interest, probably the first time so openly and publicly.” Petr Trescak, an opposition MP, veteran of the nuclear sector, and member of the government committee for new nuclear plants said that he expects intense lobbying will soon start.
Lipavsky said that the tender is already a regular topic with representatives of those countries that will bid, including the French and U.S. ambassadors. Public opinion is also key. Following Pompeo’s visit, Westinghouse launched a search for new senior PR operatives.
Babis sits squarely in the path of this approaching maelstrom. His instincts draw him to the West, not least because his agrochemicals empire Agrofert stretches throughout the EU. The premier, who dominates the ruling ANO party, also seems to enjoy consorting with world leaders, a trait that may be key to preventing a democratic decline in the Czech Republic similar to those in neighboring Hungary and Poland. But his survival instincts also keep him wary of Zeman’s power, the maintenance of which could also prove his last chance to escape a jail sentence stemming from alleged EU subsidies fraud.
The key to surviving this political squeeze could be in the timing. Zeman’s second and final term will end in March 2023. If Babis can delay the selection of a contractor until the president is gone, he would be free to elbow Russia and China out of the way. Indeed, “Babis is doing whatever he can to postpone the decision until after the next presidential election, when Zeman will be around no longer,” Karaskova noted. “That looks like a sensible strategy.”