foreignpolicy--2020-02-27--Cults and Conservatives Spread Coronavirus in South Korea

South Korea initially seemed to have the COVID-19 epidemic under control , armed with efficient bureaucracy and state-of-the-art technology .
However , since Feb. 18 , the number of coronavirus cases in South Korea has exploded to more than 1,700 as of Thursday .
The battle plan against the epidemic was derailed by the oldest of problems : religion and politics .
When it came to preparation , it helped that South Korea had one hell of a practice run : the MERS outbreak in 2015 that caused 38 deaths .
At the time , the incompetent response by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put South Korea in the ignominious position of having the greatest number of cases outside of the Middle East .
The fallout , which contributed to the public distrust of government that culminated in Park ’ s impeachment and removal , pushed the South Korean government to significantly revamp its preparation for the next viral event .
South Korea has been preparing for a potential new strain of coronavirus since as early as November 2019 .
Without knowing what virus would hit the country next , the Korea Centers for Disease Control and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ method of testing for any type of coronavirus and eliminating known strains of coronavirus such as SARS or MERS to isolate the new variant of coronavirus .
For the first four weeks of the outbreak , South Korea marshaled high-tech resources to respond aggressively while promoting transparency .
The government tracked the movements of travelers arriving from China , for example by tracking the use of credit cards , checking CCTV footage , or mandating they download an app to report their health status every day .
For those infected , the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whereabouts , down to which seat they sat in at a movie theater .
The info was also presented ( with names removed ) in an interactive website that allows the public to trace the movement of every single individual with coronavirus .
To be sure , there were real privacy concerns—as when one unfortunate patient in Daejeon had news of their visit to a risqué lingerie store blasted to every smartphone in their city .
Yet on balance , these disclosures did much to calm the nerves and prevent unnecessary panic in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Korea ’ s tally of COVID-19 patients stood at 30 , with zero deaths .
Ten patients were fully cured and discharged , with some of the discharged patients declaring the disease was “ not something as serious as one might think.
” The government seemed ready to declare victory .
That all came to a crashing halt last week thanks to the 31st case .
Patient No .
31 , discovered on Feb. 18 , was a member of a quasi-Christian cult called Shincheonji , one of the many new religious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1984 , Shincheonji ( whose official name is Shincheonji , Church of Jesus , the Temple of the Tabernacle of the Testimony ) means “ new heaven and earth , ” a reference to the Book of Revelation .
Its founder Lee Man-hee claims to be the second coming of Jesus who is to establish the “ new spiritual Israel ” at the end of days .
The cult is estimated to have approximately 240,000 followers , and claims to have outposts in 29 countries in addition to South Korea .
Shincheonji ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health .
Shincheonji teaches illness is a sin , encouraging its followers to suffer through diseases to attend services in which they sit closely together , breathing in spittle as they repeatedly amen in unison .
If they were off on their own , that might be one thing—but according to Shin Hyeon-uk , a pastor who formerly belonged to the cult , Shincheonji believes in “ deceptive proselytizing , ” approaching potential converts without disclosing their denomination .
Shincheonji convinces its members to cover their tracks , providing a prearranged set of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they belong to the cult .
Often , even family members are in the dark about whether someone is a Shincheonji follower .
The net effect is that Shincheonji followers infect each other easily , then go onto infect the community at large .
It is not yet clear exactly how Shincheonji cultists were infected with COVID-19 in the first instance .
( KCDC said Patient No .
31 is likely not the first Shincheonji follower to be infected , given the timeline of her symptoms . )
Although investigations are still pending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the funeral of the brother of Shincheonji ’ s founder held in early February .
Shincheonji has 19 churches in China , including in Wuhan , and it may be possible that followers from around the world attended the funeral .
The infected Shincheonji members then spread coronavirus by sharing closed-off spaces , refusing to be quarantined , and hiding their membership .
Although Patient No .
31 ran a high fever , she attended two Shincheonji services which held more than a thousand worshippers each , in addition to attending a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scheme .
She visited a clinic after being involved in a minor traffic accident , but ignored the repeated recommendations by the doctors to receive testing for COVID-19 .
In other cases , a self-identified Shincheonji follower who came to a hospital complaining of high fever ran off during examination when the doctors informed her she may be quarantined .
One woman who donated her liver to her mother for transplant belatedly admitted she belonged to Shincheonji when her fever would not drop after the surgery .
( Both cases led to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ making the public health response to the coronavirus that much more difficult . )
In a tragicomic instance , one of the Daegu city officials in charge of infectious disease control was revealed to be a Shincheonji follower only after a diagnosis confirmed he was infected with coronavirus .
Since the discovery of Patient No .
31 , the number of COVID-19 cases in South Korea jumped from 30 to 977 in eight days .
Nearly all of the new cases are Shincheonji followers , or traceable to them .
Particularly tragic is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where the funeral for Lee Man-hee ’ s brother was held .
This hospital alone saw 114 cases , most of whom were long-term psychiatric patients .
Because these patients never left the hospital , much less traveled abroad , they were not tested early for coronavirus , nor were they properly quarantined .
This led to an advanced stage of the disease among many of the psychiatric patients , resulting in seven out of the 12 coronavirus deaths thus far .
The cult isn ’ t the only ideology helping push the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Park Geun-hye ’ s impeachment and removal in 2017 , have held large-scale rallies in the middle of Seoul each week for months .
Even as large corporations are advising their employees to work remotely and people are canceling meetings , these conservative groups—largely made up of a high-risk older population—continue to hold rallies , cavalierly ignoring the Seoul government ’ s advisory to the contrary .
Shouting down Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon ’ s plea to stop the rally , the conservative group leader and pastor Jeon Gwang-hun implausibly claimed it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while those attending claimed “ God was making the wind blow to drive out the virus.
” The more well-heeled South Korean conservatives , in the legislative halls or at the editorial desk , are not much more a help .
Since the outbreak began , South Korea ’ s conservatives have been a broken record , demanding over and over again that the government place a complete travel ban against China .
United Future Party chairman Hwang Gyo-ahn said on Feb. 24 : “ We once again strongly urge a ban on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the only available response.
” On the same day , the right-leaning newspaper JoongAng Ilbo made the extraordinary move of putting its editorial at the top of the front page titled : “ Implement Total Ban of Foreigners Entering from China Now.
” ( Apparently with no sense of irony , JoongAng Ilbo ran a large story immediately below the editorial complaining of the “ Koreaphobia ” displayed by the Israeli government when it turned away Korean tourists visiting Jerusalem . )
It is a cynical attack that is both red-baiting and race-baiting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Moon Jae-in , one of the conservatives ’ major attack points has been that Moon was too soft on China ’ s Communist government .
With COVID-19 , South Korea ’ s conservative politicians found a neat way to connect this point with the viral outbreak originating from China : Moon is too afraid of China to shut down travel from China .
This line of attack also whips up xenophobia against ethnic Chinese immigrants to South Korea , a convenient target , as South Korea is holding legislative elections in April @ @ @ @ @ @ @ connection between the coronavirus and China , South Korea ’ s conservative politicians and press persist in calling the viral disease “ Wuhan pneumonia ” or “ Wuhan corona ” in lieu of the official name .
The United Future Party went so far as to hold up the formation of a special legislative committee for COVID-19 response because it opposed any committee that did not have the word “ Wuhan ” in the name .
( The United Future Party finally relented on Feb. 26 , allowing the committee to form .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ failure of travel bans and experts ’ consensus against them—not to mention that there was no crossover between Shincheonji and ethnically Chinese areas .
As if to illustrate the point , United Future Party leadership , including parliamentary leader Shim Jae-cheol , was briefly quarantined following a large meeting with the Korean Federation of Teachers ’ Associations to criticize the Moon administration ’ s education policy , as the president of the association was infected with COVID-19 .
( The association ’ s president apparently was infected through his wife , who met @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yet , the government is carrying on .
Despite the sudden explosion of cases , South Korea is in the rare position of having an effective means of detecting the disease and the transparency to report the results accurately .
The seeming explosion compared to other countries may be a matter of testing as well as contamination .
Thus far , KCDC has administered more than 40,000 tests for coronavirus , and more than 7,500 coronavirus tests a day with an eye toward being able to test more than 10,000 a day by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrast , the United States has tested fewer than 500 people . )
Unlike the draconian quarantine measures implemented in China , the city of Daegu is still open for business , trusting its citizens to take adequate precautions .
The Moon administration ’ s efforts to respond to the outbreak has been earning high marks overall , with a recent survey showing 64 percent approval in the government ’ s response to the COVID-19 outbreak .
Moon visited Daegu on Feb. 25 , urging for a “ clear inflection point within this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As the virus spreads worldwide , South Korea ’ s response may serve as a model for how a high-tech liberal democracy can respond to a global pandemic that pressures the weakest points of society .

South Korea initially seemed to have the COVID-19 epidemic under control, armed with efficient bureaucracy and state-of-the-art technology. However, since Feb. 18, the number of coronavirus cases in South Korea has exploded to more than 1,700 as of Thursday. The battle plan against the epidemic was derailed by the oldest of problems: religion and politics.
South Korea initially seemed to have the COVID-19 epidemic under control, armed with efficient bureaucracy and state-of-the-art technology. However, since Feb. 18, the number of coronavirus cases in South Korea has exploded to more than 1,700 as of Thursday. The battle plan against the epidemic was derailed by the oldest of problems: religion and politics.
When it came to preparation, it helped that South Korea had one hell of a practice run: the MERS outbreak in 2015 that caused 38 deaths. At the time, the incompetent response by the conservative administration of then President Park Geun-hye put South Korea in the ignominious position of having the greatest number of cases outside of the Middle East. The fallout, which contributed to the public distrust of government that culminated in Park’s impeachment and removal, pushed the South Korean government to significantly revamp its preparation for the next viral event.
South Korea has been preparing for a potential new strain of coronavirus since as early as November 2019. Without knowing what virus would hit the country next, the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) devised an ingenious method of testing for any type of coronavirus and eliminating known strains of coronavirus such as SARS or MERS to isolate the new variant of coronavirus.
For the first four weeks of the outbreak, South Korea marshaled high-tech resources to respond aggressively while promoting transparency. The government tracked the movements of travelers arriving from China, for example by tracking the use of credit cards, checking CCTV footage, or mandating they download an app to report their health status every day. For those infected, the government published an extremely detailed list of their whereabouts, down to which seat they sat in at a movie theater.
The info was also presented (with names removed) in an interactive website that allows the public to trace the movement of every single individual with coronavirus. To be sure, there were real privacy concerns—as when one unfortunate patient in Daejeon had news of their visit to a risqué lingerie store blasted to every smartphone in their city. Yet on balance, these disclosures did much to calm the nerves and prevent unnecessary panic in the population. By Feb. 17, South Korea’s tally of COVID-19 patients stood at 30, with zero deaths. Ten patients were fully cured and discharged, with some of the discharged patients declaring the disease was “not something as serious as one might think.” The government seemed ready to declare victory.
That all came to a crashing halt last week thanks to the 31st case. Patient No. 31, discovered on Feb. 18, was a member of a quasi-Christian cult called Shincheonji, one of the many new religious movements in the country. Founded in 1984, Shincheonji (whose official name is Shincheonji, Church of Jesus, the Temple of the Tabernacle of the Testimony) means “new heaven and earth,” a reference to the Book of Revelation. Its founder Lee Man-hee claims to be the second coming of Jesus who is to establish the “new spiritual Israel” at the end of days. The cult is estimated to have approximately 240,000 followers, and claims to have outposts in 29 countries in addition to South Korea.
Shincheonji’s bad theology makes for worse public health. Shincheonji teaches illness is a sin, encouraging its followers to suffer through diseases to attend services in which they sit closely together, breathing in spittle as they repeatedly amen in unison. If they were off on their own, that might be one thing—but according to Shin Hyeon-uk, a pastor who formerly belonged to the cult, Shincheonji believes in “deceptive proselytizing,” approaching potential converts without disclosing their denomination. Shincheonji convinces its members to cover their tracks, providing a prearranged set of answers to give when anyone asks if they belong to the cult. Often, even family members are in the dark about whether someone is a Shincheonji follower. The net effect is that Shincheonji followers infect each other easily, then go onto infect the community at large.
Although Patient No. 31 ran a high fever, she attended two Shincheonji services which held more than a thousand worshippers each, in addition to attending a wedding and a conference for a pyramid scheme.It is not yet clear exactly how Shincheonji cultists were infected with COVID-19 in the first instance. (KCDC said Patient No. 31 is likely not the first Shincheonji follower to be infected, given the timeline of her symptoms.) Although investigations are still pending, South Korean authorities have been focusing on the funeral of the brother of Shincheonji’s founder held in early February. Shincheonji has 19 churches in China, including in Wuhan, and it may be possible that followers from around the world attended the funeral.
The infected Shincheonji members then spread coronavirus by sharing closed-off spaces, refusing to be quarantined, and hiding their membership. Although Patient No. 31 ran a high fever, she attended two Shincheonji services which held more than a thousand worshippers each, in addition to attending a wedding and a conference for a pyramid scheme. She visited a clinic after being involved in a minor traffic accident, but ignored the repeated recommendations by the doctors to receive testing for COVID-19. In other cases, a self-identified Shincheonji follower who came to a hospital complaining of high fever ran off during examination when the doctors informed her she may be quarantined. One woman who donated her liver to her mother for transplant belatedly admitted she belonged to Shincheonji when her fever would not drop after the surgery. (Both cases led to a temporary shutdown of the hospitals involved, making the public health response to the coronavirus that much more difficult.) In a tragicomic instance, one of the Daegu city officials in charge of infectious disease control was revealed to be a Shincheonji follower only after a diagnosis confirmed he was infected with coronavirus.
Since the discovery of Patient No. 31, the number of COVID-19 cases in South Korea jumped from 30 to 977 in eight days. Nearly all of the new cases are Shincheonji followers, or traceable to them. Particularly tragic is the case of Cheongdo Daenam Hospital, where the funeral for Lee Man-hee’s brother was held. This hospital alone saw 114 cases, most of whom were long-term psychiatric patients. Because these patients never left the hospital, much less traveled abroad, they were not tested early for coronavirus, nor were they properly quarantined. This led to an advanced stage of the disease among many of the psychiatric patients, resulting in seven out of the 12 coronavirus deaths thus far.
The cult isn’t the only ideology helping push the virus forward. Conservatives, still recovering from Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and removal in 2017, have held large-scale rallies in the middle of Seoul each week for months. Even as large corporations are advising their employees to work remotely and people are canceling meetings, these conservative groups—largely made up of a high-risk older population—continue to hold rallies, cavalierly ignoring the Seoul government’s advisory to the contrary. Shouting down Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon’s plea to stop the rally, the conservative group leader and pastor Jeon Gwang-hun implausibly claimed it was impossible to contract coronavirus outdoors, while those attending claimed “God was making the wind blow to drive out the virus.”
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The more well-heeled South Korean conservatives, in the legislative halls or at the editorial desk, are not much more a help. Since the outbreak began, South Korea’s conservatives have been a broken record, demanding over and over again that the government place a complete travel ban against China. United Future Party chairman Hwang Gyo-ahn said on Feb. 24: “We once again strongly urge a ban on travel from China. That is virtually the only available response.” On the same day, the right-leaning newspaper JoongAng Ilbo made the extraordinary move of putting its editorial at the top of the front page titled: “Implement Total Ban of Foreigners Entering from China Now.” (Apparently with no sense of irony, JoongAng Ilbo ran a large story immediately below the editorial complaining of the “Koreaphobia” displayed by the Israeli government when it turned away Korean tourists visiting Jerusalem.)
It is a cynical attack that is both red-baiting and race-baiting. Since the election of the liberal President Moon Jae-in, one of the conservatives’ major attack points has been that Moon was too soft on China’s Communist government. With COVID-19, South Korea’s conservative politicians found a neat way to connect this point with the viral outbreak originating from China: Moon is too afraid of China to shut down travel from China. This line of attack also whips up xenophobia against ethnic Chinese immigrants to South Korea, a convenient target, as South Korea is holding legislative elections in April.
To remind the public of the connection between the coronavirus and China, South Korea’s conservative politicians and press persist in calling the viral disease “Wuhan pneumonia” or “Wuhan corona” in lieu of the official name. The United Future Party went so far as to hold up the formation of a special legislative committee for COVID-19 response because it opposed any committee that did not have the word “Wuhan” in the name. (The United Future Party finally relented on Feb. 26, allowing the committee to form.) All this comes despite the proven failure of travel bans and experts’ consensus against them—not to mention that there was no crossover between Shincheonji and ethnically Chinese areas. As if to illustrate the point, United Future Party leadership, including parliamentary leader Shim Jae-cheol, was briefly quarantined following a large meeting with the Korean Federation of Teachers’ Associations to criticize the Moon administration’s education policy, as the president of the association was infected with COVID-19. (The association’s president apparently was infected through his wife, who met with a Shincheonji follower.)
And yet, the government is carrying on. Despite the sudden explosion of cases, South Korea is in the rare position of having an effective means of detecting the disease and the transparency to report the results accurately. The seeming explosion compared to other countries may be a matter of testing as well as contamination. Thus far, KCDC has administered more than 40,000 tests for coronavirus, and more than 7,500 coronavirus tests a day with an eye toward being able to test more than 10,000 a day by the end of February. (In contrast, the United States has tested fewer than 500 people.)
Unlike the draconian quarantine measures implemented in China, the city of Daegu is still open for business, trusting its citizens to take adequate precautions. The Moon administration’s efforts to respond to the outbreak has been earning high marks overall, with a recent survey showing 64 percent approval in the government’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Moon visited Daegu on Feb. 25, urging for a “clear inflection point within this week” in the number of cases. As the virus spreads worldwide, South Korea’s response may serve as a model for how a high-tech liberal democracy can respond to a global pandemic that pressures the weakest points of society.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-27--The United States Needs to Declare War on Proxies

The United States Needs to Declare War on Proxies There has been no shortage of debate about the killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and its effects on U.S. foreign policy toward Iran and the broader Middle East .
Not nearly enough has been said about whether it can broadly serve as a model for dealing with the problems posed by proxy forces elsewhere in the world .
By killing Suleimani , the United States indicated it would no longer tolerate Iran ’ s use of proxies to circumvent its responsibility for killing Americans and for other acts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to deal with the source of the terrorism , not its emissaries .
The same principle should apply to the many proxy regimes established by various states—Russia most prominently—to circumvent responsibility for illegal military occupations .
Countries around the world are increasingly realizing that the most convenient way to occupy foreign territories is to set up a proxy with the ceremonial trappings of a state , including governments , parliaments , and flags .
Why go through all that trouble ?
Because the norms of the liberal international order , which outlaw changing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions for the perpetrator state .
Creating a proxy regime generates a convenient falsehood that obfuscates reality and helps states evade such consequences .
The most systematic user of this tactic is Russia .
Since the early 1990s , it has manipulated ethnic conflicts in three different states and helped set up nominally independent entities over which it exerts control .
Moscow ’ s practice began in Moldova ’ s Transnistria region and in two breakaway territories of Georgia , Abkhazia and South Ossetia .
Following Vladimir Putin ’ s consolidation of power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s control of these territories became tighter .
Putin appointed Russian military and security officials to ministerial positions in the governing structures of these territories , indicating their direct subordination to Russia .
Following its 2008 war with Georgia , Russia established permanent military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and formally recognized the independence of the two territories .
This allowed Moscow to create a fictive legal basis for its military presence , based on so-called interstate agreements it signed with its proxies .
But until the 2008 war , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like an arbiter in these conflicts , long after it was clear it was in fact a party to them .
Twice a year , for example , Western powers approved extensions to the U.N. monitoring mission in the Abkhazia conflict that included overt praise for a Russian “ peacekeeping ” force that in fact was part of Moscow ’ s effort to shore up Abkhazia ’ s separation from Georgia .
Even today , only rarely do Western powers refer to these lands as what they are : occupied territories .
Moscow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undermining the statehood of Georgia and Moldova that the Kremlin decided to use the same tactic in eastern Ukraine .
And it worked : Contrast the international reaction to any of these conflicts with Moscow ’ s invasion of Crimea .
Unlike these other cases , Moscow annexed Crimea outright , thereby accepting responsibility for its actions .
This led to serious sanctions that remain in force to this day .
But where Moscow hid behind the fiction of a “ Donetsk People ’ s Republic , ” which it created from thin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consequences .
Similarly , Armenia not only occupied a sixth of Azerbaijan ’ s territory in the war in the early 1990s but evicted 700,000 occupants of these lands .
But Armenia is subject to no sanctions whatsoever , mainly because Yerevan hides behind the fiction that it is not really a party to the conflict at all but that the “ Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh ” is .
Never mind that Nagorno-Karabakh ’ s two most prominent leaders went on to serve as Armenia ’ s presidents for 20 years and that other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nagorno-Karabakh .
The entity ’ s most recent foreign minister was an Armenian diplomat for several decades , and on completion of his term in Nagorno-Karabakh , he returned to the Foreign Ministry in Yerevan .
Likewise , Armenia ’ s deputy chief of the general staff was immediately appointed to serve as the defense minister of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2015 .
As in Russia ’ s case , the fiction of a proxy regime seems enough to achieve impunity .
Even a considerable Armenian effort to build settlements in the occupied territories has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community .
Still , the United States has entertained the notion that Nagorno-Karabakh is somehow separate from Armenia .
The U.S. Justice Department record of foreign agents in the United States lists “ Nagorno Karabakh ” and allows the so-called “ Nagorno Karabakh Republic ” to present itself as a foreign government and not listed under the Armenia filing .
Several members of the U.S. Congress host meetings with the proxy representatives , often visit the region and hold direct meetings with Armenians from the occupied territory , and some even refer to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if any , Western leaders point out the exchange of personnel between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh , let alone impose any consequences for it .
Through establishing proxies , occupying states succeed to not be labeled as such .
U.S. officials rarely mention Armenia ’ s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh or Russia ’ s occupation of Abkhazia and Transnistria the way they refer to Russia ’ s occupation of Crimea or Israel ’ s occupation of the Golan Heights .
U.S. government-funded media broadcasts like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty use awkward wording to avoid saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nagorno-Karabakh : The “ region has been under the control of ethnic-Armenian forces that Azerbaijan says include troops supplied by Armenia ” and “ Armenia-backed separatist forces , ” ignoring the fact that they are official units of the military of Armenia and that Armenia ’ s press regularly reports that Armenian soldiers are killed in skirmishes in the conflict zone .
The U.S. government-sponsored broadcasts also avert stating that Moscow occupies regions of Ukraine and Georgia , preferring “ Moscow-backed separatists in Ukraine ’ s eastern regions of Donetsk ” and “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Ossetia.
” Why this double standard ?
Maybe because the United States , EU , and the international system writ large are happy to have an easy way out .
If accepting the fiction of a proxy helps reduce the load on their policy agenda , they appear happy to do so .
The U.S. State Department does not challenge these fictions .
It is a convenient non-truth that removes the issues from the State Department ’ s policy agenda .
In Europe , however , the European Court of Human Rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control ” in Transnistria and that Armenia does so in Nagorno-Karabakh .
The EU has yet to allow these determinations to guide its policies , but at least , key institutions have begun to question the fiction of the proxy regimes .
Why do proxies matter ?
Are they not just one of the many inequities in international politics that , while regrettable , are just a fact a of life ?
There are two key reasons the United States should pay more attention to this problem .
First , the fiction of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ areas important to U.S. national interests .
And second , they effectively serve to make conflict resolution impossible .
The danger of the use of proxies is that its effectiveness has made it increasingly popular .
When weighing options in Ukraine in 2014 and onward , Putin no doubt operated on the basis of the Russian experience in Georgia and Moldova : Setting up proxies in eastern Ukraine would achieve the goal of undermining Ukraine and blocking its move toward NATO while carrying few costs for Russia .
While Putin may have underestimated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , his calculation was essentially correct .
Thus , because the West tolerated the proxy fiction in small states like Georgia and Moldova , it now has to deal with a threat to a much larger European state .
If that works , the strategy will be used elsewhere , too .
Further , if the proxy model is allowed to continue , others will copy it .
What is to stop Israel from telling the Palestinians to talk to the “ Republic of Judea and Samaria ” any time they have a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ West Bank ?
Perhaps Israel would have spared itself a lot of headaches if it had declared a so-called independent state in the occupied territories .
Why should Myanmar not blame Rakhine forces for the killing of Rohingya and thus evade international responsibility as a sovereign ?
It works for Russia and Armenia .
Similarly , the proxy fiction by design makes conflict resolution impossible .
Whenever there is pressure on Armenia to make concessions in its conflict with Azerbaijan , for example , Armenian leaders emphasize that negotiations should really be held @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” thus evading responsibility for their military occupation—and escaping any consequences for it .
The fact that Armenia is not willing to even admit that its forces are actively at war with Azerbaijan is not a basis for confidence-building in the peace process .
The proxies also facilitate illicit activity .
With no state formally acknowledging its control and therefore responsibility for activity in the proxy regimes , these regions have become centers of human trafficking , money laundering , and counterfeit goods production .
They are also likely locations of sanctions violations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In the Middle East , the Trump administration understood that Iran ’ s use of proxies was helping it undermine U.S. interests and the stability of a half-dozen states in its neighborhood .
It is now working to put an end to this subterfuge .
The time has now come for Washington to take steps to call the bluff in Eurasia as well and stop effectively rewarding the use of proxies that undermine conflict resolution efforts and the stability of key U.S. partners .

There has been no shortage of debate about the killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and its effects on U.S. foreign policy toward Iran and the broader Middle East. Not nearly enough has been said about whether it can broadly serve as a model for dealing with the problems posed by proxy forces elsewhere in the world.
There has been no shortage of debate about the killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and its effects on U.S. foreign policy toward Iran and the broader Middle East. Not nearly enough has been said about whether it can broadly serve as a model for dealing with the problems posed by proxy forces elsewhere in the world.
By killing Suleimani, the United States indicated it would no longer tolerate Iran’s use of proxies to circumvent its responsibility for killing Americans and for other acts of terrorism and mass bloodshed. Washington decided to deal with the source of the terrorism, not its emissaries. The same principle should apply to the many proxy regimes established by various states—Russia most prominently—to circumvent responsibility for illegal military occupations.
Countries around the world are increasingly realizing that the most convenient way to occupy foreign territories is to set up a proxy with the ceremonial trappings of a state, including governments, parliaments, and flags. Why go through all that trouble? Because the norms of the liberal international order, which outlaw changing boundaries by force, risk leading to sanctions for the perpetrator state. Creating a proxy regime generates a convenient falsehood that obfuscates reality and helps states evade such consequences.
The most systematic user of this tactic is Russia. Since the early 1990s, it has manipulated ethnic conflicts in three different states and helped set up nominally independent entities over which it exerts control. Moscow’s practice began in Moldova’s Transnistria region and in two breakaway territories of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Following Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of power in the early 2000s, the Kremlin’s control of these territories became tighter. Putin appointed Russian military and security officials to ministerial positions in the governing structures of these territories, indicating their direct subordination to Russia. Following its 2008 war with Georgia, Russia established permanent military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and formally recognized the independence of the two territories. This allowed Moscow to create a fictive legal basis for its military presence, based on so-called interstate agreements it signed with its proxies.
But until the 2008 war, the United States and European Union treated Russia like an arbiter in these conflicts, long after it was clear it was in fact a party to them. Twice a year, for example, Western powers approved extensions to the U.N. monitoring mission in the Abkhazia conflict that included overt praise for a Russian “peacekeeping” force that in fact was part of Moscow’s effort to shore up Abkhazia’s separation from Georgia. Even today, only rarely do Western powers refer to these lands as what they are: occupied territories.
Moscow’s tactic proved so successful in undermining the statehood of Georgia and Moldova that the Kremlin decided to use the same tactic in eastern Ukraine. And it worked: Contrast the international reaction to any of these conflicts with Moscow’s invasion of Crimea. Unlike these other cases, Moscow annexed Crimea outright, thereby accepting responsibility for its actions. This led to serious sanctions that remain in force to this day. But where Moscow hid behind the fiction of a “Donetsk People’s Republic,” which it created from thin air, it has largely escaped those consequences.
Similarly, Armenia not only occupied a sixth of Azerbaijan’s territory in the war in the early 1990s but evicted 700,000 occupants of these lands. But Armenia is subject to no sanctions whatsoever, mainly because Yerevan hides behind the fiction that it is not really a party to the conflict at all but that the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” is. Never mind that Nagorno-Karabakh’s two most prominent leaders went on to serve as Armenia’s presidents for 20 years and that other senior officials rotate seamlessly between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The entity’s most recent foreign minister was an Armenian diplomat for several decades, and on completion of his term in Nagorno-Karabakh, he returned to the Foreign Ministry in Yerevan. Likewise, Armenia’s deputy chief of the general staff was immediately appointed to serve as the defense minister of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2015. As in Russia’s case, the fiction of a proxy regime seems enough to achieve impunity. Even a considerable Armenian effort to build settlements in the occupied territories has led to a yawn in the international community.
Still, the United States has entertained the notion that Nagorno-Karabakh is somehow separate from Armenia. The U.S. Justice Department record of foreign agents in the United States lists “Nagorno Karabakh” and allows the so-called “Nagorno Karabakh Republic” to present itself as a foreign government and not listed under the Armenia filing. Several members of the U.S. Congress host meetings with the proxy representatives, often visit the region and hold direct meetings with Armenians from the occupied territory, and some even refer to Nagorno-Karabakh as a state. Few, if any, Western leaders point out the exchange of personnel between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, let alone impose any consequences for it.
Through establishing proxies, occupying states succeed to not be labeled as such. U.S. officials rarely mention Armenia’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh or Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and Transnistria the way they refer to Russia’s occupation of Crimea or Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights. U.S. government-funded media broadcasts like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty use awkward wording to avoid saying directly that Armenia’s forces occupy Nagorno-Karabakh: The “region has been under the control of ethnic-Armenian forces that Azerbaijan says include troops supplied by Armenia” and “Armenia-backed separatist forces,” ignoring the fact that they are official units of the military of Armenia and that Armenia’s press regularly reports that Armenian soldiers are killed in skirmishes in the conflict zone. The U.S. government-sponsored broadcasts also avert stating that Moscow occupies regions of Ukraine and Georgia, preferring “Moscow-backed separatists in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk” and “Moscow-backed breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”
Why this double standard? Maybe because the United States, EU, and the international system writ large are happy to have an easy way out. If accepting the fiction of a proxy helps reduce the load on their policy agenda, they appear happy to do so. The U.S. State Department does not challenge these fictions. It is a convenient non-truth that removes the issues from the State Department’s policy agenda. In Europe, however, the European Court of Human Rights has established that Russia exerts “effective control” in Transnistria and that Armenia does so in Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU has yet to allow these determinations to guide its policies, but at least, key institutions have begun to question the fiction of the proxy regimes.
Why do proxies matter? Are they not just one of the many inequities in international politics that, while regrettable, are just a fact a of life? There are two key reasons the United States should pay more attention to this problem. First, the fiction of proxies has directly caused greater instability in areas important to U.S. national interests. And second, they effectively serve to make conflict resolution impossible.
The danger of the use of proxies is that its effectiveness has made it increasingly popular. When weighing options in Ukraine in 2014 and onward, Putin no doubt operated on the basis of the Russian experience in Georgia and Moldova: Setting up proxies in eastern Ukraine would achieve the goal of undermining Ukraine and blocking its move toward NATO while carrying few costs for Russia. While Putin may have underestimated the tenacity of the U.S.-led sanctions regime, his calculation was essentially correct. Thus, because the West tolerated the proxy fiction in small states like Georgia and Moldova, it now has to deal with a threat to a much larger European state. If that works, the strategy will be used elsewhere, too.
Further, if the proxy model is allowed to continue, others will copy it. What is to stop Israel from telling the Palestinians to talk to the “Republic of Judea and Samaria” any time they have a problem with soldiers or settlers in the West Bank? Perhaps Israel would have spared itself a lot of headaches if it had declared a so-called independent state in the occupied territories. Why should Myanmar not blame Rakhine forces for the killing of Rohingya and thus evade international responsibility as a sovereign? It works for Russia and Armenia.
Similarly, the proxy fiction by design makes conflict resolution impossible. Whenever there is pressure on Armenia to make concessions in its conflict with Azerbaijan, for example, Armenian leaders emphasize that negotiations should really be held with the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh,” thus evading responsibility for their military occupation—and escaping any consequences for it. The fact that Armenia is not willing to even admit that its forces are actively at war with Azerbaijan is not a basis for confidence-building in the peace process.
The proxies also facilitate illicit activity. With no state formally acknowledging its control and therefore responsibility for activity in the proxy regimes, these regions have become centers of human trafficking, money laundering, and counterfeit goods production. They are also likely locations of sanctions violations, for Russia and for Iran.
In the Middle East, the Trump administration understood that Iran’s use of proxies was helping it undermine U.S. interests and the stability of a half-dozen states in its neighborhood. It is now working to put an end to this subterfuge. The time has now come for Washington to take steps to call the bluff in Eurasia as well and stop effectively rewarding the use of proxies that undermine conflict resolution efforts and the stability of key U.S. partners.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-27--Uneasy Calm in Delhi After Days of Riots

Uneasy Calm in Delhi After Days of Riots Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Delhi falls quiet after days of religious violence , Saudi Arabia bans pilgrims and China fears reinfection from abroad as the coronavirus spreads , and Greek islanders protest against the construction of new migrant detention centers .
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An uneasy calm has settled over Delhi after three days of riots , with the death toll from the unrest rising to 27 on Wednesday .
More @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rocks , bullets , beatings , stabbings , and even acid burns .
The clashes between Hindus and Muslims began amid protests over India ’ s new controversial citizenship law passed in December , which eases the pathway to citizenship for some immigrants from neighboring countries but excludes Muslims .
Although India ’ s national security advisor has said the situation is “ under control , ” the religious violence has been the worst in the capital in decades , the Guardian reports .
Mobs have chanted pro-Hindu slogans and burned or vandalized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ properties .
Police and paramilitary forces have been deployed in the hardest-hit areas of the city , where many Muslims have now abandoned their homes .
Sporadic violence continued on Thursday .
How did the violence start ?
Many have blamed Kapil Mishra , a local leader from the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) , for inciting the violence .
On Sunday , Mishra gave a speech threatening to send a mob to clear a protest against the citizenship law and warning the police that his followers would act @ @ @ @ @ @ @ took hold on social media .
By that evening , gangs of Hindus and Muslims began throwing rocks at each other—after which the violence quickly spiraled out of control .
Modi ’ s response .
The start of the violence coincided with U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s state visit , during which he met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi .
On Wednesday , Modi at last weighed in on the violence , tweeting , “ I appeal to my sisters and brothers of Delhi to maintain peace and brotherhood at all times.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ people in connection with the violence .
Saudi Arabia bans pilgrims as coronavirus spreads .
Saudi Arabia has banned the entry of Muslim pilgrims heading to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in an effort to halt the spread of the coronavirus .
Saudi officials announced they are “ suspending entry to the kingdom for the purpose of umrah and visiting the Prophet ’ s Mosque temporarily.
” The traditional Islamic pilgrimage can take place at any time of year and approximately 8 million Muslims travel to Saudi Arabia annually—many during the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ April this year .
The pilgrimage has been a vector for disease in the past : Cholera outbreaks killed an estimated 20,000 pilgrims in 1821 and another 15,000 in 1865 .
Although the kingdom has in the past barred pilgrims from some countries due to health concerns—as was the case for West Africans during the Ebola outbreak in 2014—there is no precedent for a worldwide ban .
China tightens screening for returning travelers .
As the coronavirus threatens to become a pandemic , China is now seeking to stop travelers from bringing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Some city governments have begun stricter health screenings for travelers to China and even quarantining those arriving from countries with new outbreaks .
China itself has reported a slowdown in new cases , with the virus now spreading faster outside its borders than within .
Brazil confirmed Latin America ’ s first case on Wednesday , and U.S. health officials have warned a pandemic is likely—even as Trump tries to calm markets .
There are still worrying signs from inside China , however .
Officials aren ’ t sharing specific data about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have contracted the virus , the Washington Post reports .
And amid the crisis , China ’ s People ’ s Liberation Army—which usually plays a role in disaster relief—has been missing in action , Elizabeth Phu and Anish Goel write in FP .
Greeks protest migrant centers .
Police dispersed hundreds of demonstrators on the Greek island of Lesbos on Wednesday after a second day of unrest .
The residents are protesting against plans for a new migrant detention center to replace unsafe and overcrowded refugee camps .
Border closures along the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thousands stranded on the islands near Turkey .
The government recently announced a decision to accelerate construction of the facilities , which would affect five Aegean islands , where locals fear the centers will become permanent .
Erdogan threatens another push against Syrian forces .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that Turkish troops will clear Syrian government forces away from military observation posts this week , even as the Syrian troops have made advances in northwest Idlib province .
Turkey has sent thousands of troops into Syria in recent weeks in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holdout there .
But on Wednesday , Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s forces made new gains in the province , taking several villages .
The Syrian campaign has displaced nearly 1 million people .
East Africa ’ s locust swarms .
Desert locusts are still descending on East Africa ’ s crops in the most alarming numbers in decades .
Exacerbated by climate shocks , the pests are fueling food insecurity in an already precarious region .
“ The fear is that this could push as many as 3 million people into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ International Development Administrator Mark Green tells FP ’ s Robbie Gramer .
Bolsonaro backs anti-democracy protests in Brazil .
Far-right Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro appeared to endorse anti-democracy protests set for March 15 , sharing a propaganda video via his personal WhatsApp account .
The promotion sparked anger in Brazil , which threw off a dictatorship in 1985 .
Some of the far-right activists have proposed a return to military rule under Bolsonaro ’ s leadership .
Ethiopia ’ s giant dam .
Ethiopia has requested a delay for the final round of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Blue Nile .
The U.S.-mediated talks were scheduled for today and Friday .
Egypt , Ethiopia , and Sudan were expected to sign an agreement on the controversial dam by the end of this month .
But the trickiest technical questions remain unresolved , as FP ’ s Keith Johnson reported in January .
Britain ’ s Prince Harry dropped his royal title at an event in Edinburgh , Scotland , on Wednesday , weeks before he steps back from royal duties on March 31 .
Before addressing the audience , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ name only—not as Sir or Royal Highness .
Harry and his wife , Meghan , made the decision to stop representing the royal family earlier this year .
It ’ s not just the titles : Last week , the pair were told they couldn ’ t use the word “ royal ” in personal branding .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Delhi falls quiet after days of religious violence , Saudi Arabia bans pilgrims and China fears reinfection from abroad as the coronavirus spreads, and Greek islanders protest against the construction of new migrant detention centers.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Delhi falls quiet after days of religious violence, Saudi Arabia bans pilgrims and China fears reinfection from abroad as the coronavirus spreads, and Greek islanders protest against the construction of new migrant detention centers.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Sporadic Violence Continues in Delhi
An uneasy calm has settled over Delhi after three days of riots, with the death toll from the unrest rising to 27 on Wednesday. More than 200 people have been injured by rocks, bullets, beatings, stabbings, and even acid burns. The clashes between Hindus and Muslims began amid protests over India’s new controversial citizenship law passed in December, which eases the pathway to citizenship for some immigrants from neighboring countries but excludes Muslims.
Although India’s national security advisor has said the situation is “under control,” the religious violence has been the worst in the capital in decades, the Guardian reports. Mobs have chanted pro-Hindu slogans and burned or vandalized mosques, shops, and other Muslim properties. Police and paramilitary forces have been deployed in the hardest-hit areas of the city, where many Muslims have now abandoned their homes. Sporadic violence continued on Thursday.
How did the violence start? Many have blamed Kapil Mishra, a local leader from the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), for inciting the violence. On Sunday, Mishra gave a speech threatening to send a mob to clear a protest against the citizenship law and warning the police that his followers would act if they did not. The speech took hold on social media. By that evening, gangs of Hindus and Muslims began throwing rocks at each other—after which the violence quickly spiraled out of control.
Modi’s response. The start of the violence coincided with U.S. President Donald Trump’s state visit, during which he met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. On Wednesday, Modi at last weighed in on the violence, tweeting, “I appeal to my sisters and brothers of Delhi to maintain peace and brotherhood at all times.” Police have so far arrested 106 people in connection with the violence.
What We’re Following Today
Saudi Arabia bans pilgrims as coronavirus spreads. Saudi Arabia has banned the entry of Muslim pilgrims heading to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in an effort to halt the spread of the coronavirus. Saudi officials announced they are “suspending entry to the kingdom for the purpose of umrah and visiting the Prophet’s Mosque temporarily.” The traditional Islamic pilgrimage can take place at any time of year and approximately 8 million Muslims travel to Saudi Arabia annually—many during the month of Ramadan that starts in late April this year.
The pilgrimage has been a vector for disease in the past: Cholera outbreaks killed an estimated 20,000 pilgrims in 1821 and another 15,000 in 1865. Although the kingdom has in the past barred pilgrims from some countries due to health concerns—as was the case for West Africans during the Ebola outbreak in 2014—there is no precedent for a worldwide ban.
China tightens screening for returning travelers. As the coronavirus threatens to become a pandemic, China is now seeking to stop travelers from bringing the disease back and causing reinfection from abroad. Some city governments have begun stricter health screenings for travelers to China and even quarantining those arriving from countries with new outbreaks. China itself has reported a slowdown in new cases, with the virus now spreading faster outside its borders than within. Brazil confirmed Latin America’s first case on Wednesday, and U.S. health officials have warned a pandemic is likely—even as Trump tries to calm markets.
There are still worrying signs from inside China, however. Officials aren’t sharing specific data about the number of health care workers who have contracted the virus, the Washington Post reports. And amid the crisis, China’s People’s Liberation Army—which usually plays a role in disaster relief—has been missing in action, Elizabeth Phu and Anish Goel write in FP.
Greeks protest migrant centers. Police dispersed hundreds of demonstrators on the Greek island of Lesbos on Wednesday after a second day of unrest. The residents are protesting against plans for a new migrant detention center to replace unsafe and overcrowded refugee camps. Border closures along the migrant route north of Greece have left thousands stranded on the islands near Turkey. The government recently announced a decision to accelerate construction of the facilities, which would affect five Aegean islands, where locals fear the centers will become permanent.
Erdogan threatens another push against Syrian forces. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that Turkish troops will clear Syrian government forces away from military observation posts this week, even as the Syrian troops have made advances in northwest Idlib province. Turkey has sent thousands of troops into Syria in recent weeks in a bid to support the last rebel holdout there. But on Wednesday, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces made new gains in the province, taking several villages. The Syrian campaign has displaced nearly 1 million people.
Keep an Eye On
East Africa’s locust swarms. Desert locusts are still descending on East Africa’s crops in the most alarming numbers in decades. Exacerbated by climate shocks, the pests are fueling food insecurity in an already precarious region. “The fear is that this could push as many as 3 million people into food insecurity,” U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Mark Green tells FP’s Robbie Gramer.
Bolsonaro backs anti-democracy protests in Brazil. Far-right Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro appeared to endorse anti-democracy protests set for March 15, sharing a propaganda video via his personal WhatsApp account. The promotion sparked anger in Brazil, which threw off a dictatorship in 1985. Some of the far-right activists have proposed a return to military rule under Bolsonaro’s leadership.
Ethiopia’s giant dam. Ethiopia has requested a delay for the final round of talks on its proposed hydropower dam on the Blue Nile. The U.S.-mediated talks were scheduled for today and Friday. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan were expected to sign an agreement on the controversial dam by the end of this month. But the trickiest technical questions remain unresolved, as FP’s Keith Johnson reported in January.
Odds and Ends
Britain’s Prince Harry dropped his royal title at an event in Edinburgh, Scotland, on Wednesday, weeks before he steps back from royal duties on March 31. Before addressing the audience, he asked to be introduced by his first name only—not as Sir or Royal Highness. Harry and his wife, Meghan, made the decision to stop representing the royal family earlier this year. It’s not just the titles: Last week, the pair were told they couldn’t use the word “royal” in personal branding.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-26--The End of Volodymyr Zelensky’s Honeymoon

When Volodymyr Zelensky catapulted to Ukraine ’ s presidency in April 2019 , the actor-turned-statesman promised a fresh start , a rejection of politics as usual , and a thorough overhaul of Ukraine ’ s political and economic system .
Parliamentary elections three months later gave Zelensky ’ s Servant of the People party a majority of 254 out of 424 available seats .
With a clear mandate from his country , the wildly popular president put into place a government and inner circle with a reputation for honesty and integrity .
He has jump-started reform , scoring a number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continued foreign and domestic enthusiasm over Ukraine ’ s new direction , Zelensky is now facing a grim reality : Dramatic change in Ukraine is difficult , yet public expectations are high .
As the new president struggles to deliver on promises of radical change made during his campaign , confidence in his government is beginning to erode .
To be sure , Zelensky has already launched reforms that used to be unthinkable in Ukraine .
His administration has turned more than 500 state-owned companies over to the State Property Fund for rapid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no Ukrainian leader has been able to deliver for three decades—is on the verge of passage in parliament .
Also in the works is a major banking reform that would prevent corrupt oligarchs from claiming compensation for banks that were nationalized after having been stripped of their assets by dubious related-party loans .
Above all , the people Zelensky has put into office have in the main been untarnished by association with oligarchs and largely immune to corruption .
Indeed , Zelensky demonstrated his independence from Ukraine ’ s traditional power brokers by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ billionaire businessman whose TV channel was a bedrock of the president ’ s rise to power.Many of the promises on which Zelensky ran are encountering resistance .
But despite these accomplishments , many of the promises on which Zelensky ran are encountering resistance .
Ukraine needs a thorough overhaul of its legal system if it wants to tackle endemic corruption—yet it remains to be seen whether mass firings in the prosecutor ’ s office and changes in the security services will help .
Criminal prosecutions for corruption are stalled in backward courts .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with 2020 growth projected at a moderate 3.5 percent—a similar rate as in 2018 and 2019 but very far from the 7 percent promised last year by the inexperienced new prime minister , Oleksiy Honcharuk .
What ’ s more , a major source of Zelensky ’ s popularity was his promise to do whatever it takes to secure a peace deal with Russia .
That promise , however , is coming up against Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s unacceptable demand that Ukraine surrender part of its sovereignty over the Donbass @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control over the region .
As an outsider with no previous experience in politics , Zelensky also faces resistance from much of Ukraine ’ s civil society and intellectual class .
In part , this is because of their contempt for his background in entertainment—and for his reliance on a trusted inner circle of entertainers , comedians , and TV producers .
Critics also see him as insufficiently committed to Ukraine ’ s national and cultural identity .
A case in point was his New Year ’ s address , in which he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite their many differences .
An innocuous , uplifting message , one would think—but to many Ukrainian intellectuals , Zelensky ’ s unity speech seemed to suggest that it made no difference whether one supported a pro-Western Ukraine committed to liberal democracy , the rule of law , and market economics—or a pro-Russian Ukraine indifferent to democracy , lacking its own cultural identity and steeped in Soviet-era nostalgia like the occupied eastern province .
As long as Ukraine is at war with Russia , his many critics felt , Zelensky should be articulating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ waters by suggesting that there is no fundamental difference between the European Union ’ s declared values and those of Putin ’ s small but influential coterie of Ukrainian admirers .
While Zelensky remains trusted ( in large measure because he is seen as personally incorruptible ) , there has been a steep erosion of public trust in the country ’ s ability to move forward .
The share of voters who believe Ukraine is heading in the right direction has dropped from 57 percent in September 2019 to only 25 percent today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Razumkov Centre , a Kyiv-based think tank .
Over the same period , the share of voters who say the country is moving in the wrong direction has risen from 17 to 53 percent .
Today , only 21 percent believe Ukraine will be able to surmount its many challenges in the next few years , according to the same poll.While Zelensky remains trusted … there has been a steep erosion of public trust in the country ’ s ability to move forward .
There are yet more signs that Zelensky ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He is now facing the same sort of political intrigue and sabotage that brought down his predecessor , Petro Poroshenko .
Someone released a secretly made recording of Honcharuk , the prime minister , saying that Zelensky was a greenhorn in economic issues .
Anti-Zelensky media have spread the ( unfounded ) claim that Andriy Yermak , Zelensky ’ s newly appointed chief of staff , is a Russian agent .
Others are trying to discredit Yermak as an opponent of Zelensky ’ s reforms .
Some of this backstabbing and rumormongering has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the former benefactor with whom Zelensky has broken ties .
In part , though , Zelensky has himself to blame if the mood is souring .
His decision to appoint politically inexperienced personnel to key posts is taking its toll , overshadowing the optimism that accompanied his victory .
Mistakes and missteps have become all too frequent , especially in parliament and government .
Confusion in the corridors of power abounds , including in some legislative committees and in several ministries and government agencies .
The health bureaucracy , for example , hasn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public information about the global coronavirus outbreak , leading to shameful scenes of protesters throwing stones at buses carrying Ukrainians evacuated from China .
To avoid derailing his presidency , Zelensky therefore needs to quickly refocus .
First , he has to secure his power base in parliament to pass critical legislation .
That means transforming his politically inexperienced deputies into an effective legislative majority—without concentrating too much authority in his own hands .
It also requires better defining the ideas and principles that will make Servant of the People a political party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a president .
Zelensky ’ s team seems to understand this and has started to redefine the party as avowedly centrist , taking what is best from free market liberalism and social democracy .
With a party identity and a firm set of principles , Zelensky ’ s deputies will be less likely to fall under the sway of oligarchs and their money .
Second , Zelensky should pivot on his promise to end the war with Russia and its separatist allies as soon as possible .
He should acknowledge reality : It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the occupied territories as long as Russia sends snipers to kill Ukrainian soldiers , fills key administrative posts with Russian officials , expands the distribution of Russian passports in the Donbass , and recruits and trains inhabitants of the region for the Russian secret service .
Instead , he should redouble efforts to challenge Russia ’ s occupation in international courts , intensify communication with Ukrainians living under Russian rule via the media , and strengthen Ukraine ’ s military potential .
He should also abandon his endless overtures to Putin , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and civil society members as naive at best and treasonous at worst.Zelensky ’ s chances , should he seize them , are still good .
Third , despite continued moderate economic growth , Ukraine needs a game-changer to recharge and accelerate its economy .
One high-impact reform could be the establishment of a powerful economic arbitration court , for which the Justice Ministry is currently preparing legislation .
Such a court—possibly staffed with experienced , untarnished judges from the West—would have broad powers to enforce contracts and protect property rights , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Implementing all these approaches ( most of which are under discussion inside the government , parliament , and presidential team ) will require a coordinated , systematic response .
Zelensky ’ s chances , should he seize them , are still good .
Despite his administration ’ s missteps and attacks from his enemies , he can still count on broad support among Ukrainians .
His approval rating , while down from 74 percent a few months ago , was still at a decent 49 percent in February .
And one sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidency a boost is his decision on Feb. 11 to remove his abrasive chief of staff , Andriy Bohdan , a Kolomoisky associate .
Yermak , who replaced him , is Ukraine ’ s seasoned negotiator with the Putin and Donald Trump administrations and seems to signify a new seriousness in Kyiv .
2020 will be the pivotal year for Zelensky ’ s presidency .
If he goes on as before , he will meet increasing obstacles , watch his support melt away , and fail to truly reform Ukraine .
If he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he has a chance not only to preserve his personal popularity but to take his place in history—as post-independence Ukraine ’ s most successful president .

Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander J. Motyl

When Volodymyr Zelensky catapulted to Ukraine’s presidency in April 2019, the actor-turned-statesman promised a fresh start, a rejection of politics as usual, and a thorough overhaul of Ukraine’s political and economic system. Parliamentary elections three months later gave Zelensky’s Servant of the People party a majority of 254 out of 424 available seats.
When Volodymyr Zelensky catapulted to Ukraine’s presidency in April 2019, the actor-turned-statesman promised a fresh start, a rejection of politics as usual, and a thorough overhaul of Ukraine’s political and economic system. Parliamentary elections three months later gave Zelensky’s Servant of the People party a majority of 254 out of 424 available seats.
With a clear mandate from his country, the wildly popular president put into place a government and inner circle with a reputation for honesty and integrity. He has jump-started reform, scoring a number of impressive legislative achievements. But despite continued foreign and domestic enthusiasm over Ukraine’s new direction, Zelensky is now facing a grim reality: Dramatic change in Ukraine is difficult, yet public expectations are high. As the new president struggles to deliver on promises of radical change made during his campaign, confidence in his government is beginning to erode.
To be sure, Zelensky has already launched reforms that used to be unthinkable in Ukraine. His administration has turned more than 500 state-owned companies over to the State Property Fund for rapid privatization. A sweeping land privatization bill—something no Ukrainian leader has been able to deliver for three decades—is on the verge of passage in parliament. Also in the works is a major banking reform that would prevent corrupt oligarchs from claiming compensation for banks that were nationalized after having been stripped of their assets by dubious related-party loans. Above all, the people Zelensky has put into office have in the main been untarnished by association with oligarchs and largely immune to corruption. Indeed, Zelensky demonstrated his independence from Ukraine’s traditional power brokers by breaking links with Ihor Kolomoisky, the billionaire businessman whose TV channel was a bedrock of the president’s rise to power.Many of the promises on which Zelensky ran are encountering resistance.
But despite these accomplishments, many of the promises on which Zelensky ran are encountering resistance. Ukraine needs a thorough overhaul of its legal system if it wants to tackle endemic corruption—yet it remains to be seen whether mass firings in the prosecutor’s office and changes in the security services will help. Criminal prosecutions for corruption are stalled in backward courts. The economy also hasn’t improved, with 2020 growth projected at a moderate 3.5 percent—a similar rate as in 2018 and 2019 but very far from the 7 percent promised last year by the inexperienced new prime minister, Oleksiy Honcharuk.
What’s more, a major source of Zelensky’s popularity was his promise to do whatever it takes to secure a peace deal with Russia. That promise, however, is coming up against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unacceptable demand that Ukraine surrender part of its sovereignty over the Donbass, which would perpetuate de facto Russian control over the region.
As an outsider with no previous experience in politics, Zelensky also faces resistance from much of Ukraine’s civil society and intellectual class. In part, this is because of their contempt for his background in entertainment—and for his reliance on a trusted inner circle of entertainers, comedians, and TV producers. Critics also see him as insufficiently committed to Ukraine’s national and cultural identity. A case in point was his New Year’s address, in which he called on Ukrainians to be one nation despite their many differences. An innocuous, uplifting message, one would think—but to many Ukrainian intellectuals, Zelensky’s unity speech seemed to suggest that it made no difference whether one supported a pro-Western Ukraine committed to liberal democracy, the rule of law, and market economics—or a pro-Russian Ukraine indifferent to democracy, lacking its own cultural identity and steeped in Soviet-era nostalgia like the occupied eastern province. As long as Ukraine is at war with Russia, his many critics felt, Zelensky should be articulating a clear pro-Western vision—and not muddy the waters by suggesting that there is no fundamental difference between the European Union’s declared values and those of Putin’s small but influential coterie of Ukrainian admirers.
While Zelensky remains trusted (in large measure because he is seen as personally incorruptible), there has been a steep erosion of public trust in the country’s ability to move forward. The share of voters who believe Ukraine is heading in the right direction has dropped from 57 percent in September 2019 to only 25 percent today, according to a recent poll by the Razumkov Centre, a Kyiv-based think tank. Over the same period, the share of voters who say the country is moving in the wrong direction has risen from 17 to 53 percent. Today, only 21 percent believe Ukraine will be able to surmount its many challenges in the next few years, according to the same poll.While Zelensky remains trusted … there has been a steep erosion of public trust in the country’s ability to move forward.
There are yet more signs that Zelensky’s honeymoon as president is over. He is now facing the same sort of political intrigue and sabotage that brought down his predecessor, Petro Poroshenko. Someone released a secretly made recording of Honcharuk, the prime minister, saying that Zelensky was a greenhorn in economic issues. Anti-Zelensky media have spread the (unfounded) claim that Andriy Yermak, Zelensky’s newly appointed chief of staff, is a Russian agent. Others are trying to discredit Yermak as an opponent of Zelensky’s reforms. Some of this backstabbing and rumormongering has been provoked by loyalists of Kolomoisky, the former benefactor with whom Zelensky has broken ties.
In part, though, Zelensky has himself to blame if the mood is souring. His decision to appoint politically inexperienced personnel to key posts is taking its toll, overshadowing the optimism that accompanied his victory. Mistakes and missteps have become all too frequent, especially in parliament and government. Confusion in the corridors of power abounds, including in some legislative committees and in several ministries and government agencies. The health bureaucracy, for example, hasn’t provided even a minimum of public information about the global coronavirus outbreak, leading to shameful scenes of protesters throwing stones at buses carrying Ukrainians evacuated from China.
To avoid derailing his presidency, Zelensky therefore needs to quickly refocus.
First, he has to secure his power base in parliament to pass critical legislation. That means transforming his politically inexperienced deputies into an effective legislative majority—without concentrating too much authority in his own hands. It also requires better defining the ideas and principles that will make Servant of the People a political party, not just a movement to elect a president. Zelensky’s team seems to understand this and has started to redefine the party as avowedly centrist, taking what is best from free market liberalism and social democracy. With a party identity and a firm set of principles, Zelensky’s deputies will be less likely to fall under the sway of oligarchs and their money.
Second, Zelensky should pivot on his promise to end the war with Russia and its separatist allies as soon as possible. He should acknowledge reality: It will be impossible to hold elections in the occupied territories as long as Russia sends snipers to kill Ukrainian soldiers, fills key administrative posts with Russian officials, expands the distribution of Russian passports in the Donbass, and recruits and trains inhabitants of the region for the Russian secret service. Instead, he should redouble efforts to challenge Russia’s occupation in international courts, intensify communication with Ukrainians living under Russian rule via the media, and strengthen Ukraine’s military potential. He should also abandon his endless overtures to Putin, which strike most Ukrainian intellectuals, war veterans, and civil society members as naive at best and treasonous at worst.Zelensky’s chances, should he seize them, are still good.
Third, despite continued moderate economic growth, Ukraine needs a game-changer to recharge and accelerate its economy. One high-impact reform could be the establishment of a powerful economic arbitration court, for which the Justice Ministry is currently preparing legislation. Such a court—possibly staffed with experienced, untarnished judges from the West—would have broad powers to enforce contracts and protect property rights, a prerequisite for any boom in foreign investment.
Implementing all these approaches (most of which are under discussion inside the government, parliament, and presidential team) will require a coordinated, systematic response.
Zelensky’s chances, should he seize them, are still good. Despite his administration’s missteps and attacks from his enemies, he can still count on broad support among Ukrainians. His approval rating, while down from 74 percent a few months ago, was still at a decent 49 percent in February. And one sign that Zelensky is serious about giving his presidency a boost is his decision on Feb. 11 to remove his abrasive chief of staff, Andriy Bohdan, a Kolomoisky associate. Yermak, who replaced him, is Ukraine’s seasoned negotiator with the Putin and Donald Trump administrations and seems to signify a new seriousness in Kyiv.
2020 will be the pivotal year for Zelensky’s presidency. If he goes on as before, he will meet increasing obstacles, watch his support melt away, and fail to truly reform Ukraine. If he refocuses his administration and gets things right, he has a chance not only to preserve his personal popularity but to take his place in history—as post-independence Ukraine’s most successful president.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-26--Top U.S. Aid Chief Warns of Locust Devastation in East Africa

Top U.S. Aid Chief Warns of Locust Devastation in East Africa One of the world ’ s most impoverished regions faces yet another crisis .
Swarms of voracious desert locusts are descending on East Africa in alarming numbers not seen in decades .
Climate shocks—droughts followed by an unusually high number of cyclones—created the perfect storm of conditions for the tiny critters to breed and travel across the region from the Arabian Peninsula en masse , devouring virtually everything in their path .
The tiny pests are a ticking humanitarian time bomb , fueling food insecurity with the potential to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region .
Locust swarms have been tracked in northeastern Kenya as large as 926.6 square miles—an estimated 192 billion locusts .
Some swarms can consume as much food as 35,000 people in a single day and , with the right winds , travel up to 100 miles a day .
The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization said it would need $ 76 million to combat the crisis immediately , though as of Feb. 21 it had only a fraction of that amount ready .
The U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to combat the locust swarms .
Foreign Policy spoke to the Trump administration ’ s top aid chief , USAID Administrator Mark Green , about the scale of the crisis and how the United States is responding .
Foreign Policy : How alarmed are you by the locust swarms , and what are the knock-on effects we could see in East Africa ?
Mark Green : From a development perspective , many of the countries currently afflicted are focus countries for us in our food security work , our Feed the Future program @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ethiopia .
We ’ ve all been making investments and building capacity for these countries to be able to not only provide for their own food needs but also to develop their economies along food production and value-added agriculture lines .
This has the potential to undo a lot of that , and that would be a tragedy in a number of ways .
In parts of this region , these are also countries for which we have been dedicating a lot of humanitarian assistance .
Somalia and Ethiopia , in particular , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there have been humanitarian , food-related needs for some time .
This just makes that worse .
On one hand , the timing could have been worse in the sense that harvests are in , so this doesn ’ t have the worst-case scenario effect .
However , we need to be involved , all of us , the U.S. and other donors , to help take care of the infestation before the next planting season gets underway [ between March and May in this part of Africa ] so that we don @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a lost season .
Now is the time for us to act .
For a modern American audience , it is hard to convey just how devastating swarms of locusts can be .
The swarms that we ’ re talking about can move up to 100 miles in a day .
They eat as much as 35,000 people .
You really have to go back to decades ago in the U.S. , to Dust Bowl days , to understand just how devastating this can be .
So it really is a crisis .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ here ?
How big of a humanitarian crisis could this become if the swarms aren ’ t eradicated ?
MG : It ’ s hard to fully judge , and hopefully we never have to find out .
But if we have such swarms of locusts hitting in the early days after planting , that would be devastating .
That would hit at the worst time in terms of wiping out full crops .
The fear is that this could push as many as 3 million people into food insecurity .
In many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the edge from a food security standpoint anyway , and this is just one more force that could turn it from food insecurity into something far worse .
Thus , the reason that we act .
We ’ ve been working with the governments in this region for some time .
We have helped with technical assistance , early warning systems .
They moved early on , but this has overwhelmed them in terms of the scope and scale .
Note : The boundaries and names on this map do not imply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Map created on Feb. 3 , 2020 .
Source : USAID/OFDA .
FP : Senior U.N. officials say they need $ 76 million now to address the locust swarms and might need 15 times that much if we don ’ t act quickly .
As of Feb. 21 , the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization said it had only $ 22 million of that .
So is USAID ’ s pledge of just $ 8 million really enough to fight these locust swarms ?
MG : Obviously , this is not intended @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have in the region .
We turn to our donor partners to work with us , as we always do , and we ’ ll continue to monitor the situation as we always do .
But I think it is fair to raise the alarm bells—of course we are , too—and that ’ s one of the reasons for the announcement [ of $ 8 million ] and the technical assistance that we ’ ve also sent into the area .
We ’ re helping to train pest control experts and scouts , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equipment .
These are countries that are close allies and development partners , and we ’ ll continue to monitor and help as we can .
We have humanitarian representatives in the region who are working with governments on a technical basis to help manage and monitor the response .
The food security investments that we have made are certainly helpful .
FP : Even with U.S. and international support , are you confident these developing countries , including Somalia and South Sudan , have the capacity to fight these swarms ?
MG @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re engaging with them and we ’ ll continue to do so .
We have some idea of capacity , and we ’ re looking to boost it .
That ’ s also part of what we ’ re sending there—technical assistance and training .
Obviously , these countries need to lead , and they are leading .
Our job , as their partners and allies , is to work with them and help them in their response .
FP : Many experts attribute the conditions that caused this swarm to climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assessment , and do you think locust swarms of this nature could become more frequent in the future ?
MG : Locusts aren ’ t new .
As you just heard , we had locust infestation and outbreaks in other parts of Africa over the years , sadly .
We did have an unusual convergence of conditions over the last year , but we look at it in terms of what we see as the challenge in front of us .
I think it ’ s a little early to draw broader conclusions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with our partners to help them deal with the fallout from weather and climate , whatever that may be .

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