foreignpolicy--2020-03-31--The Shocking ‘Coronavirus Coup’ in Hungary Was a Wake-Up Call

The Shocking ‘ Coronavirus Coup ’ in Hungary Was a Wake-Up Call On Monday , the Hungarian parliament passed a coronavirus bill that gave Prime Minister Viktor Orban the power to rule by decree , with no end date , and established chilling new penalties on speech and on those who violate quarantine .
The draft legislation had been released a week earlier and drew criticism from civil society groups and the Council of Europe ’ s human rights chief , Dunja Mijatovic , among others .
Orban and his Fidesz party charged ahead with the move , which was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was effectively over .
It was a reminder of something we should already know : While much of the world has shut down in the face of the pandemic , history hasn ’ t stopped .
The coronavirus is—understandably—consuming an enormous share of our collective attention right now ; that means that other things that warrant our attentionOther things that warrant our attention are getting less of it than they otherwise would.—Russia ’ s plans to intervene in the 2020 U.S. presidential election , the pre-existing humanitarian catastrophe in Syria ’ s Idlib @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change policy , the geopolitical and security concerns surrounding 5G digital infrastructure , European right-wing populism , and so on—are getting less of it than they otherwise would .
This presents an opportunity for bad actors , not only because they think they can make moves while our attention is focused elsewhere but also because they know that even actions that don ’ t escape our attention are likely to be met with muted responses during a moment of crisis .
Thus , while on Monday former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ called for Hungary to be booted out of the European Union ( which is not really possible under EU rules , though suspension and sanctions are ) , there was little reason to hope that the EU itself was eager to take action .
EU Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders ( a former Belgian foreign minister who thought it was appropriate to wear blackface in 2015 ) responded to the latest news with a tweet that would fit well in a satire of official EU mealy-mouthedness .
Whether Hungary will face any consequences within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is also a member , remains to be seen .
But Orban ’ s move might inspire helpful caution as the international community moves forward with its coronavirus response .
The first phase of the outbreak played out in China ; the second phase is unfolding in Japan , South Korea , Australia , Europe , and North America .
The next phase of the pandemic , as public health experts assess and India ’ s national shutdown suggests , is likely to take place in the developing world .
The effects could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refugees .
The United States and other Western industrialized countries—even as they struggle to manage the crisis within their borders—must marshal resources and expertise to help mitigate the effects of the virus in the developing world for both humanitarian and self-interested economic reasons .
As these countries prepare to deploy aid , they should think about how to structure and deliver that assistance so that it does not exacerbate corruption problems .
They should warn recipients of consequences if they use the coronavirus emergency as cover for anti-democratic or unconstitutional power grabs .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis in a country at the heart of Europe , we must not feign surprise when we see similar efforts unfold elsewhere .
Front-end planning to deter such actions is essential .
The aim should be not only to deny the coronavirus its victims but also to deny leaders the opportunity to victimize their societies by using the virus as an excuse .
Yet , while we should keep Orban ’ s example in mind as we move forward in dealing with the pandemic , we should also recognize that our tendency today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refracted through the prism of the pandemic can also blind us .
The explanatory power of the coronavirus is limited : While it is the backdrop for almost every conversation in international politics right now , we shouldn ’ t let it , or the associated atmosphere of emergency , be a veil that prevents us from keeping a longer-term perspective.We shouldn ’ t let the coronavirus , or the associated atmosphere of emergency , be a veil that prevents us from keeping a longer-term perspective .
Orban ’ s power grab is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s democratic backsliding has been going on for well over a decade .
Orban—who started in politics as part of the wave of young leaders who planted new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism—and his right-of-center Fidesz party have long engaged in a systematic dismantling of the institutional protections that secured an independent judiciary and free media in Hungary .
They have used these and other institutional changes to secure and accumulate political power .
Orban ’ s exploitation of the current coronavirus moment is less reflective of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the collective failure of democratic actors and institutions—including the EU and NATO—to have put a check on Orban ’ s anti-democratic moves over the last 10 years .
Too many in the international community have been unwilling to confront Orban , in part because they have seen him ( and because he has presented himself ) as the more acceptable version of Hungarian right-wing populism .
“ Look , ” Orban and his cronies would tell concerned Europeans and Americans behind closed doors , “ would you rather see Fidesz or Jobbik @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Hungary ’ s neo-Nazi Jobbik party has been instrumentalized by Orban both domestically and internationally to achieve his own political objectives .
( Other European leaders on the right have similarly attempted to embrace the far-right populists in their countries but none with the cunning cynicism or disastrous constitutional consequences of Orban . )
Now the supposedly more acceptable right-wing populist has dismantled Hungary ’ s constitutional democracy by stacking the parliament with his lackeys and convincing them to cede their powers to him .
As we look to other struggling democracies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we can not be so naive as to console ourselves by choosing to accommodate the lesser of two evils .
The thing about two evils is that they are both evil .
Democracy problems are like credit card debt : They don ’ t get easier to address over time—they compound , and they become insurmountable .
The pandemic is not chiefly to blame for creating the permissive environment that allowed what some have called the “ coronavirus coup ” in Hungary .
The cancer on Hungarian democracy preceded the virus , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to stop it sooner .

On Monday, the Hungarian parliament passed a coronavirus bill that gave Prime Minister Viktor Orban the power to rule by decree, with no end date, and established chilling new penalties on speech and on those who violate quarantine. The draft legislation had been released a week earlier and drew criticism from civil society groups and the Council of Europe’s human rights chief, Dunja Mijatovic , among others. Orban and his Fidesz party charged ahead with the move, which was greeted by declarations that democracy in Hungary was effectively over.
On Monday, the Hungarian parliament passed a coronavirus bill that gave Prime Minister Viktor Orban the power to rule by decree, with no end date, and established chilling new penalties on speech and on those who violate quarantine. The draft legislation had been released a week earlier and drew criticism from civil society groups and the Council of Europe’s human rights chief, Dunja Mijatovic, among others. Orban and his Fidesz party charged ahead with the move, which was greeted by declarations that democracy in Hungary was effectively over.
It was a reminder of something we should already know: While much of the world has shut down in the face of the pandemic, history hasn’t stopped. The coronavirus is—understandably—consuming an enormous share of our collective attention right now; that means that other things that warrant our attention—Russia’s plans to intervene in the 2020 U.S. presidential election, the pre-existing humanitarian catastrophe in Syria’s Idlib region, the calamitous state of climate change policy, the geopolitical and security concerns surrounding 5G digital infrastructure, European right-wing populism, and so on—are getting less of it than they otherwise would.
Other things that warrant our attention are getting less of it than they otherwise would.
This presents an opportunity for bad actors, not only because they think they can make moves while our attention is focused elsewhere but also because they know that even actions that don’t escape our attention are likely to be met with muted responses during a moment of crisis. Thus, while on Monday former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and former U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice called for Hungary to be booted out of the European Union (which is not really possible under EU rules, though suspension and sanctions are), there was little reason to hope that the EU itself was eager to take action. EU Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders (a former Belgian foreign minister who thought it was appropriate to wear blackface in 2015) responded to the latest news with a tweet that would fit well in a satire of official EU mealy-mouthedness.
Whether Hungary will face any consequences within the EU or NATO, where it is also a member, remains to be seen. But Orban’s move might inspire helpful caution as the international community moves forward with its coronavirus response. The first phase of the outbreak played out in China; the second phase is unfolding in Japan, South Korea, Australia, Europe, and North America. The next phase of the pandemic, as public health experts assess and India’s national shutdown suggests, is likely to take place in the developing world. The effects could be especially devastating for vulnerable populations like refugees.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
The United States and other Western industrialized countries—even as they struggle to manage the crisis within their borders—must marshal resources and expertise to help mitigate the effects of the virus in the developing world for both humanitarian and self-interested economic reasons. As these countries prepare to deploy aid, they should think about how to structure and deliver that assistance so that it does not exacerbate corruption problems. They should warn recipients of consequences if they use the coronavirus emergency as cover for anti-democratic or unconstitutional power grabs. Having witnessed the opportunistic exploitation of the crisis in a country at the heart of Europe, we must not feign surprise when we see similar efforts unfold elsewhere. Front-end planning to deter such actions is essential. The aim should be not only to deny the coronavirus its victims but also to deny leaders the opportunity to victimize their societies by using the virus as an excuse.
Yet, while we should keep Orban’s example in mind as we move forward in dealing with the pandemic, we should also recognize that our tendency today to see all things and all questions refracted through the prism of the pandemic can also blind us. The explanatory power of the coronavirus is limited: While it is the backdrop for almost every conversation in international politics right now, we shouldn’t let it, or the associated atmosphere of emergency, be a veil that prevents us from keeping a longer-term perspective.We shouldn’t let the coronavirus, or the associated atmosphere of emergency, be a veil that prevents us from keeping a longer-term perspective.
Orban’s power grab is shocking but not surprising: Hungary’s democratic backsliding has been going on for well over a decade. Orban—who started in politics as part of the wave of young leaders who planted new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism—and his right-of-center Fidesz party have long engaged in a systematic dismantling of the institutional protections that secured an independent judiciary and free media in Hungary. They have used these and other institutional changes to secure and accumulate political power. Orban’s exploitation of the current coronavirus moment is less reflective of the chaos caused by the pandemic than of the collective failure of democratic actors and institutions—including the EU and NATO—to have put a check on Orban’s anti-democratic moves over the last 10 years.
Read More A military patrol walks past the empty Louvre Pyramid in Paris on March 28. The country has introduced fines for people caught violating its nationwide lockdown measures intended to stop the spread of COVID-19. A military patrol walks past the empty Louvre Pyramid in Paris on March 28. The country has introduced fines for people caught violating its nationwide lockdown measures intended to stop the spread of COVID-19. Authoritarianism in the Time of the Coronavirus The pandemic offers dictators—and democracies alike—an opportunity for abuse. Argument | Florian Bieber Workers at unload protective gear bound for Italy from an Austrian Airlines flight from China, at Vienna Airport on March 23, 2020. Workers at unload protective gear bound for Italy from an Austrian Airlines flight from China, at Vienna Airport on March 23, 2020. How China is Exploiting the Coronavirus to Weaken Democracies Beijing is using the pandemic to drive wedges between members of the European Union, and to advance its propaganda war against the United States. Argument | Peter Rough Hungarian Prime Minsiter Viktor Orban (L) and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (R) hold a joint press conference after their meeting in Jerusalem on Feb. 19, 2019. Hungarian Prime Minsiter Viktor Orban (L) and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (R) hold a joint press conference after their meeting in Jerusalem on Feb. 19, 2019. Israel’s Supreme Court Must Not Repeat Hungary’s Mistake The judiciary needs to strike down Netanyahu’s judicial reform before he turns Israel into a sham democracy—just as Viktor Orban did in Hungary. Argument | Garvan Walshe
Too many in the international community have been unwilling to confront Orban, in part because they have seen him (and because he has presented himself) as the more acceptable version of Hungarian right-wing populism. “Look,” Orban and his cronies would tell concerned Europeans and Americans behind closed doors, “would you rather see Fidesz or Jobbik in charge?” For many years, Hungary’s neo-Nazi Jobbik party has been instrumentalized by Orban both domestically and internationally to achieve his own political objectives. (Other European leaders on the right have similarly attempted to embrace the far-right populists in their countries but none with the cunning cynicism or disastrous constitutional consequences of Orban.)
Now the supposedly more acceptable right-wing populist has dismantled Hungary’s constitutional democracy by stacking the parliament with his lackeys and convincing them to cede their powers to him. As we look to other struggling democracies elsewhere in Europe and around the world, we cannot be so naive as to console ourselves by choosing to accommodate the lesser of two evils. The thing about two evils is that they are both evil. Democracy problems are like credit card debt: They don’t get easier to address over time—they compound, and they become insurmountable. The pandemic is not chiefly to blame for creating the permissive environment that allowed what some have called the “coronavirus coup” in Hungary. The cancer on Hungarian democracy preceded the virus, and we did too little to try to stop it sooner.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-31--After Death of U.S. Citizen, State Department Floats Slashing Egypt Aid

After Death of U.S. Citizen , State Department Floats Slashing Egypt Aid The State Department recently raised the idea of slashing a significant chunk of Egypt ’ s $ 1.3 billion in annual military aid after a U.S. citizen died in an Egyptian jail in January , four sources familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy .
In a memo sent to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo by the agency ’ s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in early March and described to Foreign Policy , the nation ’ s most senior diplomat was given the option to cut up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aid to Egypt over the death of Mustafa Kassem , a dual American and Egyptian citizen who appealed unsuccessfully to U.S. President Donald Trump to secure his release in his final days .
The move could spark an effort to punish Egypt , a long-standing U.S. strategic ally , in Congress .
In a letter sent late last month , Democratic Sens .
Patrick Leahy and Chris Van Hollen also urged Pompeo to withhold $ 300 million in military assistance to Cairo and to sanction any Egyptian official “ directly or indirectly responsible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ death .
In two years on the job , Pompeo has twice decided to overlook human rights considerations to greenlight military aid to Egypt , leading some experts to cast doubt on whether the Trump administration will make cuts even after the death of a U.S. citizen .
But should the administration decide to punish Egypt over Kassem ’ s death , it would serve as a flash point in an increasingly cozy relationship dating back four decades .
Under Trump , the United States has been largely reluctant to challenge Egypt , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which provides the Department of Defense with overflight rights and the ability to navigate the Suez Canal .
Egypt has also cooperated with the United States and Israel , Washington ’ s most important ally in the region , on counterterrorism .
Despite the worsening human rights situation in Egypt , Trump has repeatedly feted and praised his Egyptian counterpart , Abdel Fattah al-Sisi , in bilateral visits and major diplomatic summits .
On the sidelines of a G-7 summit in France last August , Trump called out , “ Where ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ waiting for a meeting with Sisi .
Then , in September , he defended Sisi in the face of an uptick of protests in Egypt .
“ Everybody has demonstrations , ” Trump said as the two leaders met at the United Nations General Assembly in New York .
“ No , I ’ m not concerned with it .
Egypt has a great leader.
” Advocates for Kassem are worried that the delay in the Trump administration ’ s response indicates that it is not prepared to take action .
But on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ upon Kassem ’ s case as another example of Cairo ’ s mounting human rights violations since Sisi seized power .
Kassem had been on a liquid-only hunger strike and had not received proper medical treatment before dying of heart failure in January .
“ We recognize that the United States and Egypt share some important interests , ” Leahy and Van Hollen wrote in their Feb. 25 letter to Pompeo , which was obtained by Foreign Policy .
“ If we continue business as usual , we will be sending the dangerous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leverage to assist Americans , wrongfully imprisoned in Egypt , including the several that remain in Egyptian prisons today and that we will not hold the Egyptian government accountable when it commits such grave abuses against Americans.
” Leahy and Van Hollen said that they had written a similar letter to Trump on Jan. 16 but had not received a response .
“ Some would argue that applying the law in this manner does not go far enough , since the Sisi government would still receive $ 2 billion in U.S. military assistance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” they added .
“ However , it would send an important message that U.S. assistance is not an entitlement , that the U.S. government is serious about protecting the rights and safety of American citizens , and that we reject the Sisi government ’ s efforts to undermine the rule of law in Egypt.
” It remains unclear what impact the lawmakers ’ appeal had , if any , on the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs ’ recommendations , as they have yet to receive a formal response from the State Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy , a State Department official said the agency would not comment on internal deliberations .
“ We remain deeply saddened by the needless death in custody of Moustafa Kassem and we are reviewing our options and consulting with Congress , ” the official said .
“ In the wake of the tragic and avoidable death of Moustafa Kassem , we will continue to emphasize to Egypt our concerns regarding the treatment of detainees , including U.S. citizens.
” In his role as the top Democrat on the Senate Appropriations Committee , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s human rights record , has held up $ 105 million in military aid to Cairo to purchase Apache helicopters and Hellfire missiles .
Leahy imposed the funding freeze on Egypt two years ago in response to its detention of Kassem , its failure to fully cover the medical costs for an American citizen wounded in a botched 2015 Apache helicopter raid , and its refusal to permit adequate U.S. oversight of its use of American military assistance in its counterterrorism operations in Sinai .
Under laws passed since the Arab Spring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Egypt ’ s military aid unless the State Department asserts that Cairo has met a host of human rights conditions—or if it waives the requirement based on national security concerns .
Egypt has received about $ 1.3 billion in U.S. military assistance each year since 1979 , when it signed a peace deal with Israel brokered by then-U.S. President Jimmy Carter .
Though U.S. Vice President Mike Pence made multiple pleas to Sisi to secure the dual Egyptian-American citizen ’ s release , Kassem ’ s death did not spark immediate punishment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A senior State Department official told reporters in January it was “ premature ” to talk about penalties against Egypt for his death .
“ Mustafa [ Kassem ] died after years of suffering and futile U.S. efforts to get President Sisi to ‘ do the right thing , ’ ” said Praveen Madhiraju , Kassem ’ s lawyer and the general counsel at the International Crisis Group .
“ President Sisi is responsible for Mustafa ’ s death and the Trump Administration is letting him get away with it .
For Mustafa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of innocent Egyptians who are now in mortal danger , the US must take these first steps that the Senators have outlined.
” In a report sent to Congress obtained by Foreign Policy , the State Department said that Kassem had stopped appeals on his case in an Egyptian court in hopes that authorities would revoke the former New York cab driver ’ s citizenship and deport him back to the United States .
“ At the time of [ Kassem ’ s ] death on Jan. 13 , 2020 , all legislative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizenship had been completed , and we were waiting for the Ministry of Interior to rule on his citizenship renunciation request , ” said the report , sent to Jim Risch , the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , in late January .
The dual citizen—held without charges for much of his six-year detention—insisted he had been wrongly arrested during an August 2013 visit to his birth country that coincided with the deadly Rabaa Square massacre against demonstrators protesting the ouster of Muslim Brotherhood-backed President Mohamed Morsi .
Kassem ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Rabaa Square demonstrations .
He was in prison for over five years before an Egyptian court , without due process , sentenced him to 15 years in prison in 2018 .
There are at least three other American citizens—Reem Dessouky , Khaled Hassan , and Mohammed al-Amash—and two permanent residents—Ola Qaradawi and Hossam Khalaf—detained in Egypt on charges related to their political views , according to a bipartisan group of foreign-policy experts called the Working Group on Egypt that tracks the issue .
While other countries , including Iran and Lebanon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their custody due to health and humanitarian reasons , Egypt has so far shown no such inclination .
“ It is incomprehensible that Egypt , a close ally of the United States that receives some $ 1.5 billion annually in assistance from American taxpayers , would be less responsive than Iran , Lebanon , and other countries to repeated calls for the humanitarian release of detained Americans , ” the group of experts wrote in a statement released on March 26 .
An annual State Department report on human rights released last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carrying out arbitrary arrests and unlawful killings , and instances of torture and killings in government prisons and detention centers .
Two other Americans released from Egyptian custody—human rights advocate Mohamed Soltan , who was also arrested in August 2013 , and nongovernmental organization worker Aya Hijazi—have aired strong public criticisms of Sisi since returning to the United States .
Congressional efforts to hold Egypt accountable for a slew of alleged human rights abuses face significant obstacles .
A former U.S. official familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy that Trump ally Sen. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ final version of the State Department ’ s appropriations bill last year that would have withheld nearly $ 14 million in military aid until Egypt paid off the medical expenses for April Corley , an American mistakenly injured in an attack by Egyptian military forces in the nation ’ s western desert in 2015 .
“ The wild card is Graham , ” said Andrew Miller , a deputy director for policy at the Project on Middle East Democracy .
“ This is a portfolio that he holds close to the chest and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re going to have to wait to see is what impact if any Kassem ’ s death has had on Graham.
” Graham ’ s office told Foreign Policy that the South Carolina lawmaker is working to resolve Corley ’ s case but hopes to maintain the U.S. security relationship with Egypt .
“ Senator Graham has stressed the need to resolve Ms. Corley ’ s case with both the Egyptian and U.S. governments .
He will continue to work to bring the matter to closure , ” said Kevin Bishop , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same time , we need to work closely with the Egyptian military in our common fight against the threats to our security.
” But even as Kassem languished in prison despite efforts from Pence and Pompeo to secure his release , the State Department and Pentagon have been working on a high-level proposal to expand U.S. military aid to Egypt by several billion dollars , a congressional source told Foreign Policy .
The United States and Egypt set up a structured process of defense meetings to properly resource the nation ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amid massacres after Morsi ’ s ouster , but the forum “ has long devolved into a grab bag of weapons requests , ” said Miller , the Project on Middle East Democracy expert .
Michele Dunne , a former State Department official and Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , said the United States ’ continued delivery of military aid was strengthening the Egyptian military ’ s political hold over the country under Sisi .
“ By sending this amount of military assistance for such a long time—when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ billion over decades—what the United States has ended up doing is feeding the beast that ’ s devouring the whole country , ” she said , referring to the Egyptian military .
She said the Egyptian government should face repercussions for the death of an American citizen in its custody and questioned why the Trump administration hadn ’ t taken action yet .
“ I find it deeply troubling that the Egyptian authorities thought there would be no consequences for allowing an American unjustly imprisoned to die a death of despair in an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ But now it seems that U.S. officials proved that they were right , that there are no consequences yet.
” Update , March 31 , 2020 : This article was updated to include comment from a State Department spokesperson .
Correction , March 31 , 2020 : Mohamad Soltan was arrested at home in August 2013 , after the Rabaa Square demonstrations .
An earlier version of this story misstated the circumstances of his arrest .

Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer and Colum Lynch

The State Department recently raised the idea of slashing a significant chunk of Egypt’s $1.3 billion in annual military aid after a U.S. citizen died in an Egyptian jail in January, four sources familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy.
The State Department recently raised the idea of slashing a significant chunk of Egypt’s $1.3 billion in annual military aid after a U.S. citizen died in an Egyptian jail in January, four sources familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy.
In a memo sent to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo by the agency’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in early March and described to Foreign Policy, the nation’s most senior diplomat was given the option to cut up to $300 million in U.S. military aid to Egypt over the death of Mustafa Kassem, a dual American and Egyptian citizen who appealed unsuccessfully to U.S. President Donald Trump to secure his release in his final days.
The move could spark an effort to punish Egypt, a long-standing U.S. strategic ally, in Congress. In a letter sent late last month, Democratic Sens. Patrick Leahy and Chris Van Hollen also urged Pompeo to withhold $300 million in military assistance to Cairo and to sanction any Egyptian official “directly or indirectly responsible” for Kassem’s imprisonment and death.
In two years on the job, Pompeo has twice decided to overlook human rights considerations to greenlight military aid to Egypt, leading some experts to cast doubt on whether the Trump administration will make cuts even after the death of a U.S. citizen.
But should the administration decide to punish Egypt over Kassem’s death, it would serve as a flash point in an increasingly cozy relationship dating back four decades. Under Trump, the United States has been largely reluctant to challenge Egypt, the second-largest recipient of U.S. military aid, which provides the Department of Defense with overflight rights and the ability to navigate the Suez Canal. Egypt has also cooperated with the United States and Israel, Washington’s most important ally in the region, on counterterrorism.
Despite the worsening human rights situation in Egypt, Trump has repeatedly feted and praised his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, in bilateral visits and major diplomatic summits. On the sidelines of a G-7 summit in France last August, Trump called out, “Where’s my favorite dictator?” while waiting for a meeting with Sisi. Then, in September, he defended Sisi in the face of an uptick of protests in Egypt. “Everybody has demonstrations,” Trump said as the two leaders met at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. “No, I’m not concerned with it. Egypt has a great leader.”
Advocates for Kassem are worried that the delay in the Trump administration’s response indicates that it is not prepared to take action. But on Capitol Hill, Democratic lawmakers have seized upon Kassem’s case as another example of Cairo’s mounting human rights violations since Sisi seized power. Kassem had been on a liquid-only hunger strike and had not received proper medical treatment before dying of heart failure in January.
“We recognize that the United States and Egypt share some important interests,” Leahy and Van Hollen wrote in their Feb. 25 letter to Pompeo, which was obtained by Foreign Policy. “If we continue business as usual, we will be sending the dangerous message that we will not use our leverage to assist Americans, wrongfully imprisoned in Egypt, including the several that remain in Egyptian prisons today and that we will not hold the Egyptian government accountable when it commits such grave abuses against Americans.”
Leahy and Van Hollen said that they had written a similar letter to Trump on Jan. 16 but had not received a response.
“Some would argue that applying the law in this manner does not go far enough, since the Sisi government would still receive $2 billion in U.S. military assistance in fiscal years 2019 and 2020,” they added. “However, it would send an important message that U.S. assistance is not an entitlement, that the U.S. government is serious about protecting the rights and safety of American citizens, and that we reject the Sisi government’s efforts to undermine the rule of law in Egypt.”
It remains unclear what impact the lawmakers’ appeal had, if any, on the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ recommendations, as they have yet to receive a formal response from the State Department.
In a response to questions from Foreign Policy, a State Department official said the agency would not comment on internal deliberations. “We remain deeply saddened by the needless death in custody of Moustafa Kassem and we are reviewing our options and consulting with Congress,” the official said. “In the wake of the tragic and avoidable death of Moustafa Kassem, we will continue to emphasize to Egypt our concerns regarding the treatment of detainees, including U.S. citizens.”
In his role as the top Democrat on the Senate Appropriations Committee, Leahy, a long-standing critic of Egypt’s human rights record, has held up $105 million in military aid to Cairo to purchase Apache helicopters and Hellfire missiles. Leahy imposed the funding freeze on Egypt two years ago in response to its detention of Kassem, its failure to fully cover the medical costs for an American citizen wounded in a botched 2015 Apache helicopter raid, and its refusal to permit adequate U.S. oversight of its use of American military assistance in its counterterrorism operations in Sinai.
Under laws passed since the Arab Spring, Congress would freeze $300 million of Egypt’s military aid unless the State Department asserts that Cairo has met a host of human rights conditions—or if it waives the requirement based on national security concerns. Egypt has received about $1.3 billion in U.S. military assistance each year since 1979, when it signed a peace deal with Israel brokered by then-U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
Though U.S. Vice President Mike Pence made multiple pleas to Sisi to secure the dual Egyptian-American citizen’s release, Kassem’s death did not spark immediate punishment for Cairo from the Trump administration. A senior State Department official told reporters in January it was “premature” to talk about penalties against Egypt for his death.
“Mustafa [Kassem] died after years of suffering and futile U.S. efforts to get President Sisi to ‘do the right thing,’” said Praveen Madhiraju, Kassem’s lawyer and the general counsel at the International Crisis Group. “President Sisi is responsible for Mustafa’s death and the Trump Administration is letting him get away with it. For Mustafa, the several Americans and the thousands of innocent Egyptians who are now in mortal danger, the US must take these first steps that the Senators have outlined.”
In a report sent to Congress obtained by Foreign Policy, the State Department said that Kassem had stopped appeals on his case in an Egyptian court in hopes that authorities would revoke the former New York cab driver’s citizenship and deport him back to the United States. “At the time of [Kassem’s] death on Jan. 13, 2020, all legislative processes regarding his renunciation of his Egyptian citizenship had been completed, and we were waiting for the Ministry of Interior to rule on his citizenship renunciation request,” said the report, sent to Jim Risch, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in late January.
The dual citizen—held without charges for much of his six-year detention—insisted he had been wrongly arrested during an August 2013 visit to his birth country that coincided with the deadly Rabaa Square massacre against demonstrators protesting the ouster of Muslim Brotherhood-backed President Mohamed Morsi. Kassem’s advocates said he was not involved in the Rabaa Square demonstrations. He was in prison for over five years before an Egyptian court, without due process, sentenced him to 15 years in prison in 2018.
There are at least three other American citizens—Reem Dessouky, Khaled Hassan, and Mohammed al-Amash—and two permanent residents—Ola Qaradawi and Hossam Khalaf—detained in Egypt on charges related to their political views, according to a bipartisan group of foreign-policy experts called the Working Group on Egypt that tracks the issue.
While other countries, including Iran and Lebanon, have released or temporarily released Americans in their custody due to health and humanitarian reasons, Egypt has so far shown no such inclination.
“It is incomprehensible that Egypt, a close ally of the United States that receives some $1.5 billion annually in assistance from American taxpayers, would be less responsive than Iran, Lebanon, and other countries to repeated calls for the humanitarian release of detained Americans,” the group of experts wrote in a statement released on March 26.
An annual State Department report on human rights released last month tracked numerous reports of the government carrying out arbitrary arrests and unlawful killings, and instances of torture and killings in government prisons and detention centers.
Two other Americans released from Egyptian custody—human rights advocate Mohamed Soltan, who was also arrested in August 2013, and nongovernmental organization worker Aya Hijazi—have aired strong public criticisms of Sisi since returning to the United States.
Congressional efforts to hold Egypt accountable for a slew of alleged human rights abuses face significant obstacles. A former U.S. official familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy that Trump ally Sen. Lindsey Graham stopped a provision in the final version of the State Department’s appropriations bill last year that would have withheld nearly $14 million in military aid until Egypt paid off the medical expenses for April Corley, an American mistakenly injured in an attack by Egyptian military forces in the nation’s western desert in 2015.
“The wild card is Graham,” said Andrew Miller, a deputy director for policy at the Project on Middle East Democracy. “This is a portfolio that he holds close to the chest and that he decides himself. What we’re going to have to wait to see is what impact if any Kassem’s death has had on Graham.”
Graham’s office told Foreign Policy that the South Carolina lawmaker is working to resolve Corley’s case but hopes to maintain the U.S. security relationship with Egypt. “Senator Graham has stressed the need to resolve Ms. Corley’s case with both the Egyptian and U.S. governments. He will continue to work to bring the matter to closure,” said Kevin Bishop, a spokesman for Graham. “At the same time, we need to work closely with the Egyptian military in our common fight against the threats to our security.”
But even as Kassem languished in prison despite efforts from Pence and Pompeo to secure his release, the State Department and Pentagon have been working on a high-level proposal to expand U.S. military aid to Egypt by several billion dollars, a congressional source told Foreign Policy. The United States and Egypt set up a structured process of defense meetings to properly resource the nation’s military after the Obama administration suspended aid amid massacres after Morsi’s ouster, but the forum “has long devolved into a grab bag of weapons requests,” said Miller, the Project on Middle East Democracy expert.
Michele Dunne, a former State Department official and Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the United States’ continued delivery of military aid was strengthening the Egyptian military’s political hold over the country under Sisi. “By sending this amount of military assistance for such a long time—when you add it up its $40 billion over decades—what the United States has ended up doing is feeding the beast that’s devouring the whole country,” she said, referring to the Egyptian military.
She said the Egyptian government should face repercussions for the death of an American citizen in its custody and questioned why the Trump administration hadn’t taken action yet.
“I find it deeply troubling that the Egyptian authorities thought there would be no consequences for allowing an American unjustly imprisoned to die a death of despair in an Egyptian prison,” she said. “But now it seems that U.S. officials proved that they were right, that there are no consequences yet.”
Update, March 31, 2020: This article was updated to include comment from a State Department spokesperson.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-31--5G Explained – Part Three

5G Explained – Part Three

5G networks ’ switch from hardware-based core networks to software-dictated cloud-based core networks creates new , and potentially greater , cybersecurity risks than with 4G networks .
An attack on either the core network or the RAN can disrupt and intercept data flow , allowing malicious actors to hijack information or shut down key infrastructure .
Additionally , since 5G networks will eventually be managed by artificial intelligence-based software ( AI ) , an attacker who gains control of the software could also gain control over the entire network .
Since an AI-controlled software system would coordinate each separate server @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system would allow access to data originating anywhere within the network .
The broad reach of 5G networks ’ infrastructure , and the mass-scale connectivity create an increased attack surface through multiple vectors .
With more lines of software being used to dictate the flow of data through the system , the volume of data will almost certainly exceed telecom companies ’ capacity to physically monitor everything that is flowing through the network , making cyber threats more difficult to detect .
These vulnerabilities require coordination among all actors involved in security .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but ultimately telecom providers , third-party firms , companies , and individuals will all be responsible for securing their own networks .
In addition , with the increased number of small cell radio towers needed to operate 5G networks , there are potentially thousands more access points for threats to access the network through .
Backdoors can be installed in the mobile base stations that make up the RAN , and they are nearly impossible to detect once installed .
In cybersecurity terms , a backdoor is a method of bypassing normal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or another physical product and is used for obtaining remote access and control over that computer system or device .
In addition to increased access to the network , the number of connected devices that could potentially be tapped into will increase exponentially with the Internet of Things , and Internet-connected devices , such as Nest , are already being hacked frequently .
In the near term , the impact from backdoor attacks is likely to be minimal , with the most obvious effect being a slowdown in Internet and download speeds or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when 5G enables entire electric grids and sewer systems to be put online , that sort of cyberattack could eventually cause mass-scale disruption and shut down entire cities .
Ultimately , those vulnerabilities mean that the security threat on 5G networks comes not only from the potential of Chinese interference—as is the focus of governments ’ and most media attention—but from any bad actor with the technical capability to exploit 5G networks ’ increased vulnerability .
As outlined in Part II of our series , The Competitive Landscape , the 5G supply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is true for both the hardware and software components used in developing 5G networks .
Before a component is placed into a 5G telecom network , it will have been through multiple suppliers and integrators .
The components used in final products range from resistors and capacitors to CPUs and are manufactured in nearly every country in the world .
The supplier of each of those components also provides accompanying software , generally in the form of a microcode inside a processor .
That microcode is called “ firmware , ” the software @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as a keyboard , a hard drive , or the smaller components used in building RAN equipment .
It is programmed to give permanent instructions to communicate with other devices and perform basic commands and functions .
Firmware interfaces with the hardware and operating systems to run application software on 5G telecom equipment .
Just like the hardware components used to assemble 5G telecom equipment , the accompanying software components are passed through the supply chain and built upon before making their way to the original equipment manufacturer ( OEM ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or Samsung , who ultimately supplies the telecom hardware to the network providers .
The OEM is responsible for integrating all of the external firmware and additional software built into each component with its custom software and any other software from third-party suppliers .
Huawei uses two suppliers for each individual component used in its product and works with a total of 92 companies from at least ten different countries .
That means that by the time the OEM , such as Huawei , ships a telecom product to the end-user , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potentially thousands of engineers at dozens of companies from around the globe , which means that even for companies such as Huawei , Ericsson , and Nokia , it is difficult to track where each part of their software code originates from .
Huawei ’ s telecom equipment had the most firmware backdoors embedded into its equipment of all OEM ’ s , with 55 percent of all equipment analyzed containing at least one potential backdoor .
The complexity of this supply chain system introduces multiple points of entry for actors looking to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two primary ways in which potential bad actors can exploit the supply chain : 1 ) installing hardware backdoors ; and 2 ) installing firmware and software backdoors .
Hardware backdoors , as their name implies , are installed into the hardware and allow an actor to monitor the network without detection .
Additionally , hardware backdoors need to be physically removed , since they can not be eliminated through software , making them significantly more difficult to combat than software backdoors .
The most widely publicized use of hardware backdoors regards Edward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , alleging that it used backdoors in Cisco routers to intercept communications on telecom networks .
While hardware backdoors are more effective , firmware backdoors are much easier to enable due to device firmware ’ s tendency to be full of vulnerabilities already .
But , while firmware backdoors are easier to detect overall than hardware backdoors , it is nearly impossible to detect their origin , allowing actors to deny culpability more plausibly if the backdoor is discovered .
Due to the number of potential actors who could install firmware or hardware @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is difficult to isolate and focus on any one actor as a primary threat .
However , a quantitative research review of major OEM component providers by the supply chain security consulting firm Finite State concluded that Huawei ’ s telecom equipment had the most firmware backdoors embedded into its equipment of all OEM ’ s , with 55 percent of all equipment analyzed containing at least one potential backdoor .

General Vulnerabilities in 5G Networks
5G networks’ switch from hardware-based core networks to software-dictated cloud-based core networks creates new, and potentially greater, cybersecurity risks than with 4G networks. An attack on either the core network or the RAN can disrupt and intercept data flow, allowing malicious actors to hijack information or shut down key infrastructure. Additionally, since 5G networks will eventually be managed by artificial intelligence-based software (AI), an attacker who gains control of the software could also gain control over the entire network. Since an AI-controlled software system would coordinate each separate server cluster, access to the overarching AI system would allow access to data originating anywhere within the network. The broad reach of 5G networks’ infrastructure, and the mass-scale connectivity create an increased attack surface through multiple vectors. With more lines of software being used to dictate the flow of data through the system, the volume of data will almost certainly exceed telecom companies’ capacity to physically monitor everything that is flowing through the network, making cyber threats more difficult to detect. These vulnerabilities require coordination among all actors involved in security. Governments can set security standards and directives, but ultimately telecom providers, third-party firms, companies, and individuals will all be responsible for securing their own networks.
In addition, with the increased number of small cell radio towers needed to operate 5G networks, there are potentially thousands more access points for threats to access the network through. Backdoors can be installed in the mobile base stations that make up the RAN, and they are nearly impossible to detect once installed. In cybersecurity terms, a backdoor is a method of bypassing normal authentication or encryption in a computer system or another physical product and is used for obtaining remote access and control over that computer system or device. In addition to increased access to the network, the number of connected devices that could potentially be tapped into will increase exponentially with the Internet of Things, and Internet-connected devices, such as Nest, are already being hacked frequently. In the near term, the impact from backdoor attacks is likely to be minimal, with the most obvious effect being a slowdown in Internet and download speeds or a loss of phone service. However, when 5G enables entire electric grids and sewer systems to be put online, that sort of cyberattack could eventually cause mass-scale disruption and shut down entire cities. Ultimately, those vulnerabilities mean that the security threat on 5G networks comes not only from the potential of Chinese interference—as is the focus of governments’ and most media attention—but from any bad actor with the technical capability to exploit 5G networks’ increased vulnerability.
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
As outlined in Part II of our series, The Competitive Landscape, the 5G supply chain is far-reaching and complicated. That is true for both the hardware and software components used in developing 5G networks. Before a component is placed into a 5G telecom network, it will have been through multiple suppliers and integrators. The components used in final products range from resistors and capacitors to CPUs and are manufactured in nearly every country in the world. The supplier of each of those components also provides accompanying software, generally in the form of a microcode inside a processor. That microcode is called “firmware,” the software programs permanently coded into a hardware device such as a keyboard, a hard drive, or the smaller components used in building RAN equipment. It is programmed to give permanent instructions to communicate with other devices and perform basic commands and functions. Firmware interfaces with the hardware and operating systems to run application software on 5G telecom equipment. Just like the hardware components used to assemble 5G telecom equipment, the accompanying software components are passed through the supply chain and built upon before making their way to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), such as Huawei, Nokia, Ericsson, or Samsung, who ultimately supplies the telecom hardware to the network providers. The OEM is responsible for integrating all of the external firmware and additional software built into each component with its custom software and any other software from third-party suppliers. Huawei uses two suppliers for each individual component used in its product and works with a total of 92 companies from at least ten different countries. That means that by the time the OEM, such as Huawei, ships a telecom product to the end-user, the product will contain software written by potentially thousands of engineers at dozens of companies from around the globe, which means that even for companies such as Huawei, Ericsson, and Nokia, it is difficult to track where each part of their software code originates from.
Huawei’s telecom equipment had the most firmware backdoors embedded into its equipment of all OEM’s, with 55 percent of all equipment analyzed containing at least one potential backdoor.
The complexity of this supply chain system introduces multiple points of entry for actors looking to hack into telecom systems. There are two primary ways in which potential bad actors can exploit the supply chain: 1) installing hardware backdoors; and 2) installing firmware and software backdoors. Hardware backdoors, as their name implies, are installed into the hardware and allow an actor to monitor the network without detection. Additionally, hardware backdoors need to be physically removed, since they cannot be eliminated through software, making them significantly more difficult to combat than software backdoors. The most widely publicized use of hardware backdoors regards Edward Snowden’s allegations against the NSA, alleging that it used backdoors in Cisco routers to intercept communications on telecom networks. While hardware backdoors are more effective, firmware backdoors are much easier to enable due to device firmware’s tendency to be full of vulnerabilities already. But, while firmware backdoors are easier to detect overall than hardware backdoors, it is nearly impossible to detect their origin, allowing actors to deny culpability more plausibly if the backdoor is discovered. Due to the number of potential actors who could install firmware or hardware backdoors into 5G network equipment, it is difficult to isolate and focus on any one actor as a primary threat. However, a quantitative research review of major OEM component providers by the supply chain security consulting firm Finite State concluded that Huawei’s telecom equipment had the most firmware backdoors embedded into its equipment of all OEM’s, with 55 percent of all equipment analyzed containing at least one potential backdoor.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-31--Coronavirus and the Dawn of Post-Democratic Europe

Coronavirus and the Dawn of Post-Democratic Europe The dismantling of Hungary ’ s democracy by the country ’ s nationalist prime minister , Viktor Orban , and his Fidesz party has occurred piece by piece over the past 10 years .
Orban began by sidelining opposition media and undermining the independence of Hungary ’ s judiciary , before pressing further by circumscribing the work of watchdog organizations and waging a nasty propaganda and legal war against Central European University , founded by the philanthropist George Soros .
The European Union reprimanded Orban along the way , but his party proceeded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s most recent general election in 2018 , Fidesz ’ s 49 percent of the vote translated into nearly 70 percent of the seats in parliament—a supermajority that completely disempowers the paltry , divided opposition .
With nearly every check on power eliminated or co-opted , Fidesz rule in Hungary—in the form of a heavily fortified “ illiberal democracy , ” to quote Orban—appeared probable for many years to come .
Then the coronavirus arrived , and Orban decided to make a likelihood into a certainty .
With the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pouncing on the opportunity to secure his power in the long run , even at the expense of Hungary ’ s remaining vestiges of democracy .
The question now is whether Europe will treat this as the crossing of a red line—and , if it does , what it can do about it .
On March 30 , the Fidesz parliament passed an emergency law granting the government indefinite , sweeping powers .
The new statute goes well beyond those emergency statutes passed just about everywhere in Europe during the present crisis or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Amid the pandemic , leaders across the continent have delimited standard civil liberties , but they are checked by critical legislatures and have explicit , short-term timeframes .
The Hungarian law enables Orban to rule by decree , bypassing the legislature on any law , as long as the crisis lasts .
All elections until then will be suspended .
Moreover , the statute allows the government wide-ranging discretion to censure media that it claims obstructs the state ’ s response to the pandemic .
Journalists found guilty of spreading supposedly false information @ @ @ @ @ @ @ five years .
“ Now Orban can do whatever he wants , ” said Paul Lendvai , a Hungarian-born Austrian author of a 2018 biography of Orban .
“ No other democratic government in Europe has gone this far .
And polls show most Hungarians aren ’ t dissatisfied with him.
” There wouldn ’ t be a groundswell of protest even if Hungarians could mass on the streets , he said .
“ This is another step toward Hungarian becoming an authoritarian regime , ” said Andras Biro-Nagy , a Hungarian political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this new law becomes the new normal—and not just a temporary measure—then we ’ re talking about a form of dictatorship.
” But , said Biro-Nagy , “ We ’ ll have to see how Orban uses it.
” In a rare act of unity , Hungary ’ s opposition parties all voted against the bill .
Their primary objection was the absence of a sunset clause .
The Orban government itself will determine when the crisis is over and the special powers should be suspended .
This bodes ill for Hungary , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to expand his power .
The 2015-2016 refugee crisis was a seminal moment for Orban : The emergency powers invoked for that crisis have been renewed every six months since then , right up to today , even though Hungary ’ s number of refugees is negligible .
Biro-Nagy worries that the meaning of “ crisis ” could be extended to , say , a financial crisis , one that could unfold after the heath crisis has passed .
“ My fear is that Orban will find a reason , as he always @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” he said .
Orban ’ s power grab may seem confusing in light of the extent of power he already wielded and the public popularity he enjoyed .
But the seemingly disproportionate steps can be explained by the cracks that have begun to sprout in Fidesz ’ s armor .
In local elections in 2019 , opposition politicos captured the mayoral race in Budapest as well as in 10 other large cities—a stinging defeat for Fidesz .
Also , opinion polls show that the dilapidated health care system is Hungarians ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wages of doctors and nurses , as well as chronic underfunding of hospitals , has caused droves of health care professionals to leave the country .
Should Hungary , which currently claims only around 400 detected cases of the new coronavirus and 15 deaths , experience an outbreak like that in northern Italy , the government might come under intense pressure from the population .
The government might then require all of its munition to contain angry demonstrations and win in elections in 2022 .
Until now , the EU ’ s reproaches @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as in Poland , have been quite mild .
It took years before the European People ’ s Party , the main conservative alliance in the European Parliament , suspended Fidesz from its ranks last year .
But the EU as such might finally be compelled to act more authoritatively .
The Council of Europe and the European Parliament have expressed concern but without proposing a concrete strategy of how to make Orban back down .
The president of the EU ’ s executive , Ursula von der Leyen , released @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by name but was obviously aimed at Orban : “ Democracy can not work without free and independent media .
… Any emergency measures must be limited to what is necessary and strictly proportionate .
They must not last indefinitely , ” she said .
On March 30 , Italy ’ s former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi tweeted that “ after what Orban has done today , the European Union MUST act and make him change his mind .
Or , simply , expel Hungary from the Union.
” There is , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for expelling a member .
One of the reasons for the EU ’ s hesitant approach to date is that its options to sanction members require a unanimous vote in the 27-member European Council .
According to Article 7 of the European Union treaty , the council has the power to suspend some of a country ’ s membership rights , such as voting rights in the council itself .
In 2018 , the European Parliament voted to pursue disciplinary action against Hungary for being “ at clear risk of a serious breach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measure died in the council , where it was certain that Poland would vote against it .
Orban has shot back , typically , by lashing out at the criticism—and the EU .
In a blog post , his spokesperson wrote : “ Just as in wartime , a state of emergency could extend until the end of hostilities .
Today , we confront not a military power but are in a warlike state to defend our people against a pandemic the likes of which we have not seen in a century.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supply deliveries , Turkey and China have done more to help Hungary in the crisis than the EU—although Hungary receives about $ 7 billion annually from EU pots .
“ Orban and his people tell the EU to mind its own business , ” Lendvai said .
“ He never talks about EU aid to Hungary , just that the EU should be grateful that Hungary stays in the EU.
” Orban clearly saw the coronavirus crisis as a political opportunity—but it may also be his undoing .
Lendvai and other experts concur @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of infections and deaths in Hungary .
The media has reported on numerous individuals who have begged hospitals to test them for the virus but were denied .
The government has proceeded very slowly with testing , fudging the real number of infections , which could be many times what has thus far been acknowledged , according to some experts .
If these failings eventually lead to mass public unrest , Orban ’ s emergency laws will only be able to provide him with so much protection .

The dismantling of Hungary’s democracy by the country’s nationalist prime minister, Viktor Orban, and his Fidesz party has occurred piece by piece over the past 10 years. Orban began by sidelining opposition media and undermining the independence of Hungary’s judiciary, before pressing further by circumscribing the work of watchdog organizations and waging a nasty propaganda and legal war against Central European University, founded by the philanthropist George Soros. The European Union reprimanded Orban along the way, but his party proceeded to design election laws ensuring that in the country’s most recent general election in 2018, Fidesz’s 49 percent of the vote translated into nearly 70 percent of the seats in parliament—a supermajority that completely disempowers the paltry, divided opposition.
The dismantling of Hungary’s democracy by the country’s nationalist prime minister, Viktor Orban, and his Fidesz party has occurred piece by piece over the past 10 years. Orban began by sidelining opposition media and undermining the independence of Hungary’s judiciary, before pressing further by circumscribing the work of watchdog organizations and waging a nasty propaganda and legal war against Central European University, founded by the philanthropist George Soros. The European Union reprimanded Orban along the way, but his party proceeded to design election laws ensuring that in the country’s most recent general election in 2018, Fidesz’s 49 percent of the vote translated into nearly 70 percent of the seats in parliament—a supermajority that completely disempowers the paltry, divided opposition.
With nearly every check on power eliminated or co-opted, Fidesz rule in Hungary—in the form of a heavily fortified “illiberal democracy,” to quote Orban—appeared probable for many years to come. Then the coronavirus arrived, and Orban decided to make a likelihood into a certainty. With the pandemic crisis as an alibi, he is pouncing on the opportunity to secure his power in the long run, even at the expense of Hungary’s remaining vestiges of democracy. The question now is whether Europe will treat this as the crossing of a red line—and, if it does, what it can do about it.
On March 30, the Fidesz parliament passed an emergency law granting the government indefinite, sweeping powers. The new statute goes well beyond those emergency statutes passed just about everywhere in Europe during the present crisis or indeed in any EU country ever. Amid the pandemic, leaders across the continent have delimited standard civil liberties, but they are checked by critical legislatures and have explicit, short-term timeframes. The Hungarian law enables Orban to rule by decree, bypassing the legislature on any law, as long as the crisis lasts. All elections until then will be suspended. Moreover, the statute allows the government wide-ranging discretion to censure media that it claims obstructs the state’s response to the pandemic. Journalists found guilty of spreading supposedly false information can face jail sentences of up to five years.
“Now Orban can do whatever he wants,” said Paul Lendvai, a Hungarian-born Austrian author of a 2018 biography of Orban. “No other democratic government in Europe has gone this far. And polls show most Hungarians aren’t dissatisfied with him.” There wouldn’t be a groundswell of protest even if Hungarians could mass on the streets, he said.
“This is another step toward Hungarian becoming an authoritarian regime,” said Andras Biro-Nagy, a Hungarian political analyst. “If the content of this new law becomes the new normal—and not just a temporary measure—then we’re talking about a form of dictatorship.” But, said Biro-Nagy, “We’ll have to see how Orban uses it.”
In a rare act of unity, Hungary’s opposition parties all voted against the bill. Their primary objection was the absence of a sunset clause. The Orban government itself will determine when the crisis is over and the special powers should be suspended.
This bodes ill for Hungary, as Orban has exploited crisis after crisis to expand his power. The 2015-2016 refugee crisis was a seminal moment for Orban: The emergency powers invoked for that crisis have been renewed every six months since then, right up to today, even though Hungary’s number of refugees is negligible.
Biro-Nagy worries that the meaning of “crisis” could be extended to, say, a financial crisis, one that could unfold after the heath crisis has passed. “My fear is that Orban will find a reason, as he always has, to maintain such crisis measures,” he said.
Orban’s power grab may seem confusing in light of the extent of power he already wielded and the public popularity he enjoyed. But the seemingly disproportionate steps can be explained by the cracks that have begun to sprout in Fidesz’s armor. In local elections in 2019, opposition politicos captured the mayoral race in Budapest as well as in 10 other large cities—a stinging defeat for Fidesz. Also, opinion polls show that the dilapidated health care system is Hungarians’ No. 1 gripe. The low wages of doctors and nurses, as well as chronic underfunding of hospitals, has caused droves of health care professionals to leave the country. Should Hungary, which currently claims only around 400 detected cases of the new coronavirus and 15 deaths, experience an outbreak like that in northern Italy, the government might come under intense pressure from the population. The government might then require all of its munition to contain angry demonstrations and win in elections in 2022.
Until now, the EU’s reproaches of infringements of democracy in Hungary, as well as in Poland, have been quite mild. It took years before the European People’s Party, the main conservative alliance in the European Parliament, suspended Fidesz from its ranks last year. But the EU as such might finally be compelled to act more authoritatively. The Council of Europe and the European Parliament have expressed concern but without proposing a concrete strategy of how to make Orban back down. The president of the EU’s executive, Ursula von der Leyen, released a statement that did not mention Hungary by name but was obviously aimed at Orban: “Democracy cannot work without free and independent media. … Any emergency measures must be limited to what is necessary and strictly proportionate. They must not last indefinitely,” she said.
On March 30, Italy’s former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi tweeted that “after what Orban has done today, the European Union MUST act and make him change his mind. Or, simply, expel Hungary from the Union.” There is, however, no clause in the EU treaties for expelling a member.
One of the reasons for the EU’s hesitant approach to date is that its options to sanction members require a unanimous vote in the 27-member European Council. According to Article 7 of the European Union treaty, the council has the power to suspend some of a country’s membership rights, such as voting rights in the council itself. In 2018, the European Parliament voted to pursue disciplinary action against Hungary for being “at clear risk of a serious breach of EU values,” but the measure died in the council, where it was certain that Poland would vote against it.
Orban has shot back, typically, by lashing out at the criticism—and the EU. In a blog post, his spokesperson wrote: “Just as in wartime, a state of emergency could extend until the end of hostilities. Today, we confront not a military power but are in a warlike state to defend our people against a pandemic the likes of which we have not seen in a century.” Orban has claimed that, with medical supply deliveries, Turkey and China have done more to help Hungary in the crisis than the EU—although Hungary receives about $7 billion annually from EU pots.
“Orban and his people tell the EU to mind its own business,” Lendvai said. “He never talks about EU aid to Hungary, just that the EU should be grateful that Hungary stays in the EU.”
Orban clearly saw the coronavirus crisis as a political opportunity—but it may also be his undoing. Lendvai and other experts concur that Budapest is lying about the low number of infections and deaths in Hungary. The media has reported on numerous individuals who have begged hospitals to test them for the virus but were denied. The government has proceeded very slowly with testing, fudging the real number of infections, which could be many times what has thus far been acknowledged, according to some experts. If these failings eventually lead to mass public unrest, Orban’s emergency laws will only be able to provide him with so much protection.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-31--Spain’s King Isn’t an Obstacle to Dialogue. Catalonia’s Separatists Are.

Spain ’ s King Isn ’ t an Obstacle to Dialogue .
Catalonia ’ s Separatists Are .
On Feb. 25 , Mark Nayler published an article in Foreign Policy arguing in favor of a political solution to Catalonia ’ s crisis .
He suggests that the main obstacle to success for the recently opened political negotiations between Spain ’ s left-wing governing coalition and representatives of the Catalan government and secessionist organizations is King Felipe VI , whom he accuses of endorsing the previous central government , “ whose actions have only radicalized Catalonia ’ s secessionist movement.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ease relations between Madrid and Barcelona and find a way to “ balance recognition of autonomy with national unity.
” Both assertions are misleading .
The Spanish monarch does not have the political or legal power that Nayler attributes to him , and the negotiators do not expect to reach any substantial agreement given that both sides have red lines they are unwilling to cross .
Catalonia already has a high level of self-government .
Catalan nationalists are not interested in finding any balance between autonomy and unity .
For them , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secession .
Nayler blames Felipe for hindering the solution to the political crisis , claiming that the king is standing in the way of negotiations and accusing him of inflexibility .
He seems to ignore that the king always adopts a conciliatory role in national politics .
By constitutional requirement , he never takes initiative without the prior consent of the Spanish government .
All of the king ’ s decisions require approval by the head of the Spanish government or relevant ministers .
The king can not and has never stood in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Spanish Constitution establishes that “ the King is the Head of State , the symbol of its unity and permanence.
” After the illegal Catalan independence referendum in October 2017 , Felipe requested a firm and united response from public institutions and citizens to defend Spain ’ s territorial and political integrity .
The king ’ s speech supported a decision that was also endorsed by now-Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez , who was then the opposition leader .
The public intervention was part of his constitutional duty .
The Constitutional Court reminded the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ referendum that the contents of the constitution could be modified but that it was to follow the rule of law and not to attempt a unilateral bid for independence .
Both the king and the Constitutional Court respected the law and their legal duty by stating that the constitution and Spanish legal framework must be followed .
No European Union government can ignore the basic values of European integration : democracy , respect for the rule of law , and human rights .
Moreover , the territorial integrity that Nayler seems to disregard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracies in Europe and elsewhere .
The negotiations , which exclude nonsecessionist political forces on the Catalan side , seem to be a political performance .
So far , the secessionist leaders have followed a maximalist strategy , insisting that any outcome of the talks must include an independence referendum—which they know is incompatible with the Spanish Constitution .
The separatists are not interested in solutions that seek a better fit for Catalonia within Spain .
For example , they oppose a federal solution and multilateral forums involving all regions .
They instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even though Catalonia is not a sovereign territory with the right to secede .
Instead of making hasty assessments and advocating unrealistic outcomes , as Nayler does , we must address the roots of the polarization of Catalan society .
In Catalonia , as in the rest of Spain , the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis were severe , with high levels of unemployment and austerity .
At the same time , the nationalist Catalan government was involved in several corruption scandals .
In 2012 , the traditionally moderate conservative party , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shift and embraced secessionism .
The party saw the opportunity to deflect attention from its mismanagement of the financial crisis .
The decision came at the cost of deepening polarization .
Over the following years , nationalist governments in Catalonia have tried to break ties with Spain and ignored the majority of the population that opposes secession .
A November 2019 survey showed that 47.9 percent of Catalans oppose independence , with 43.7 percent supporting it .
Moreover , the nationalists ’ obsession with breaking away from Spain has fueled paralysis in many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The exclusion of nonsecessionist Catalans and opposition parties from the negotiations with the Spanish government , together with the uncompromising approach of the secessionist leaders , constitute the real obstacle to success for the current dialogue-based approach .
The problem is not Catalonia but the secessionist minority , who have divided the population and ignored the basic rule of law—inspired by an outdated conception of nationalism .
The historian Stanley Payne rightly calls the Catalan crisis “ a rebellion of the rich against the poor , ” and the economist Thomas Piketty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ base of the territorial conflict .
The international principle of self-determination was not intended for the secession of wealthy regions in already decentralized democracies , as in the case of Spain .
The coalition led by Sánchez can not offer an independence referendum .
The repeated attempts of the Catalan government and the separatist organizations to undermine Spain and its domestic and international reputation are more of an obstacle to reconciliation and prosperity than the king .
Even in the middle of the coronavirus crisis , which requires national unity , the Catalan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ delegitimized the actions of the central government .
A political and democratic response to the secessionist challenge does require dialogue .
However , it must be grounded at minimum in institutional loyalty .
Any long-lasting solution must take into consideration the rights and views of the entire Catalan and Spanish population—not just those of a mostly privileged minority .

José Javier Olivas Osuna, Rafael Martínez and Natividad Fernández Sola

On Feb. 25, Mark Nayler published an article in Foreign Policy arguing in favor of a political solution to Catalonia’s crisis. He suggests that the main obstacle to success for the recently opened political negotiations between Spain’s left-wing governing coalition and representatives of the Catalan government and secessionist organizations is King Felipe VI, whom he accuses of endorsing the previous central government, “whose actions have only radicalized Catalonia’s secessionist movement.” Nayler naively argues that the negotiations could ease relations between Madrid and Barcelona and find a way to “balance recognition of autonomy with national unity.”
On Feb. 25, Mark Nayler published an article in Foreign Policy arguing in favor of a political solution to Catalonia’s crisis. He suggests that the main obstacle to success for the recently opened political negotiations between Spain’s left-wing governing coalition and representatives of the Catalan government and secessionist organizations is King Felipe VI, whom he accuses of endorsing the previous central government, “whose actions have only radicalized Catalonia’s secessionist movement.” Nayler naively argues that the negotiations could ease relations between Madrid and Barcelona and find a way to “balance recognition of autonomy with national unity.”
Both assertions are misleading. The Spanish monarch does not have the political or legal power that Nayler attributes to him, and the negotiators do not expect to reach any substantial agreement given that both sides have red lines they are unwilling to cross. Catalonia already has a high level of self-government. Catalan nationalists are not interested in finding any balance between autonomy and unity. For them, the negotiations are only an intermediary step toward secession.
Nayler blames Felipe for hindering the solution to the political crisis, claiming that the king is standing in the way of negotiations and accusing him of inflexibility. He seems to ignore that the king always adopts a conciliatory role in national politics. By constitutional requirement, he never takes initiative without the prior consent of the Spanish government. All of the king’s decisions require approval by the head of the Spanish government or relevant ministers. The king cannot and has never stood in the way of Spanish governments.
The Spanish Constitution establishes that “the King is the Head of State, the symbol of its unity and permanence.” After the illegal Catalan independence referendum in October 2017, Felipe requested a firm and united response from public institutions and citizens to defend Spain’s territorial and political integrity. The king’s speech supported a decision that was also endorsed by now-Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who was then the opposition leader. The public intervention was part of his constitutional duty.
The Constitutional Court reminded the Parliament of Catalonia several times before the referendum that the contents of the constitution could be modified but that it was to follow the rule of law and not to attempt a unilateral bid for independence. Both the king and the Constitutional Court respected the law and their legal duty by stating that the constitution and Spanish legal framework must be followed. No European Union government can ignore the basic values of European integration: democracy, respect for the rule of law, and human rights. Moreover, the territorial integrity that Nayler seems to disregard is a shared principle among Western liberal democracies in Europe and elsewhere.
The negotiations, which exclude nonsecessionist political forces on the Catalan side, seem to be a political performance. So far, the secessionist leaders have followed a maximalist strategy, insisting that any outcome of the talks must include an independence referendum—which they know is incompatible with the Spanish Constitution. The separatists are not interested in solutions that seek a better fit for Catalonia within Spain. For example, they oppose a federal solution and multilateral forums involving all regions. They instead hope to organize a secession referendum, even though Catalonia is not a sovereign territory with the right to secede.
Instead of making hasty assessments and advocating unrealistic outcomes, as Nayler does, we must address the roots of the polarization of Catalan society. In Catalonia, as in the rest of Spain, the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis were severe, with high levels of unemployment and austerity. At the same time, the nationalist Catalan government was involved in several corruption scandals. In 2012, the traditionally moderate conservative party, Convergence and Union, made a radical shift and embraced secessionism. The party saw the opportunity to deflect attention from its mismanagement of the financial crisis. The decision came at the cost of deepening polarization.
Over the following years, nationalist governments in Catalonia have tried to break ties with Spain and ignored the majority of the population that opposes secession. A November 2019 survey showed that 47.9 percent of Catalans oppose independence, with 43.7 percent supporting it. Moreover, the nationalists’ obsession with breaking away from Spain has fueled paralysis in many policy areas and aggravated existing social problems.
The exclusion of nonsecessionist Catalans and opposition parties from the negotiations with the Spanish government, together with the uncompromising approach of the secessionist leaders, constitute the real obstacle to success for the current dialogue-based approach. The problem is not Catalonia but the secessionist minority, who have divided the population and ignored the basic rule of law—inspired by an outdated conception of nationalism. The historian Stanley Payne rightly calls the Catalan crisis “a rebellion of the rich against the poor,” and the economist Thomas Piketty suggests that economic competition is at the base of the territorial conflict.
The international principle of self-determination was not intended for the secession of wealthy regions in already decentralized democracies, as in the case of Spain. The coalition led by Sánchez cannot offer an independence referendum. The repeated attempts of the Catalan government and the separatist organizations to undermine Spain and its domestic and international reputation are more of an obstacle to reconciliation and prosperity than the king. Even in the middle of the coronavirus crisis, which requires national unity, the Catalan government has challenged, obstructed, and delegitimized the actions of the central government.
A political and democratic response to the secessionist challenge does require dialogue. However, it must be grounded at minimum in institutional loyalty. Any long-lasting solution must take into consideration the rights and views of the entire Catalan and Spanish population—not just those of a mostly privileged minority.