foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--Can Cities Fix a Post-Pandemic World Order?

The coronavirus crisis sweeping the globe is exactly the type of emergency that the multilateral system , set up by the United States and its allies after World War II , was created to address .
Instead , international cooperation has been straining to meet the moment : A meeting of G-7 foreign ministers ended in acrimony when the United States insisted the group call the novel coronavirus the “ Wuhan virus , ” a phrase widely seen as inflammatory ; the G-20 took weeks to agree on suspending debt payments from poor countries , even as it is clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ catastrophe ; and many countries , especially early on , simply failed to heed the guidance of the World Health Organization , which has also been accused of acting slowly and protecting China—and for which U.S. President Donald Trump has now frozen American funding .
By contrast , mayors and governors have been taking decisive action , working around the clock on the front lines to save the lives of their residents , even as many national governments dawdled or refused .
Cities have been relying on networks and relationships that span the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and equipment in the scramble to act fast and protect their citizens .
Their global collaboration adds more urgency to a question that has been gaining momentum in recent years : Can city diplomacy help salvage the multilateral system ?
The pragmatism and innovation of local leaders , and their easy exchange of solutions , could be just the boost the international system needs—if nation-states will allow it .
Even before the pandemic , there were signs that cities ’ relationships with the United Nations and its agencies , the World Bank and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bodies needed attention .
The world has been rapidly urbanizing : By 2050 , two-thirds of the world ’ s population will likely live in cities , adding more than 2.5 billion people to their existing base .
More than 80 percent of the world ’ s GDP is already generated in metropolitan areas .
City leadership is thus becoming fundamental to solving many of the world ’ s toughest problems , going far beyond pandemic responses to other global challenges such as climate change , migration , and inequality.Mayors and governors have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national governments dawdled or refused .
These are the very issues that preoccupy the time , energy , and resources of the world ’ s multilateral diplomats , but to date , cities have had little to no official role in their negotiations and agreements .
The traditional multilateral system was set up by and for national governments .
Local leaders are outside the circle as the world develops its so-called collective response , despite being the ones who come face to face with the implications , and solutions , for real people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the challenge well .
U.S. states and cities set up their own systems to test for the virus , and in the absence of national or international procurement management , they have scrambled , in competition with each other and other localities around the world , to procure N95 masks , surgical gowns , and hand sanitizer .
At the same time , global cities are banding together to fill the gap in global cooperation .
On March 27 , Mayor Eric Garcetti of Los Angeles , using his position as chair of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ megacities fighting climate change , convened a virtual assembly of 45 mayors from every region of the world .
The mayors of Seoul and Milan shared their lessons and experiences , and mayors from London , Johannesburg , Jakarta , Kolkata and dozens more chimed in .
Perhaps the most important lesson was conveyed by mayors in the throes of their response to those not yet hit : Act much more quickly and aggressively than you think you need to .
A separate WhatsApp group of city staff started by Los Angeles quickly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on solving problems such as the spread of illness among health care workers and upticks in domestic violence .
The mayor of Berlin organized a coronavirus response call with Berlin ’ s partner cities around the world in which mayors discussed the right metrics for reopening and how to support small businesses .
It is hard to imagine such open , frank conversations among national leaders , given the inward focus of many today .
Such networks of cities have been growing in scale and impact .
In normal times , the C40 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focused on fighting the climate crisis and bending the curve of global greenhouse gas emissions , recognizing that cities consume over 67 percent of the world ’ s energy and emit 70 percent of its carbon dioxide emissions .
The members of the network are committed to peaking emissions by 2020—Los Angeles and some 30 other cities have already done so—and to halving emissions by 2030 , with interventions in the urban sectors where emissions are highest : buildings , transport , waste , and energy .
By 2030 , these commitments could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time when national commitments are flagging .
As governments begin to address the economic slump that the virus response has wrought , it will be these very cities that will fight hardest to ensure that a green and equitable recovery becomes the norm .
The mayor of Milan is chairing a global task force under the auspices of C40 to help cities plan for just that .
For its own part , Milan has already announced an ambitious plan to expand walking and cycling space across 22 miles of streets in the city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Angeles is devising strategies to ensure that the homeless population that moved to emergency shelters does not return to the streets after the pandemic .
Cities are exploring a variety of proposals that put equity and sustainability at the heart of rebuilding the economy.It will be the cities that will fight hardest to ensure that a green and equitable recovery becomes the norm .
Some city groupings take a strong political perspective .
In December 2019 , progressive capital cities in Slovakia , Hungary , the Czech Republic , and Poland—nations that oppose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change—came together to create the “ Pact of Free Cities.
” The message from the mayors to the EU seemed clear : Just deal with us directly .
The challenge for the EU , and for other multilateral institutions , is how to best leverage the leadership and creative solutions emerging from cities ’ pragmatism while continuing to serve the interests of their member states .
The pandemic has added new urgency to the widespread agreement that the multilateral system must evolve to be more effective in addressing global challenges , and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reform .
Supporting and learning from mayors , and inviting their perspective on key global policy decisions , offers a significant opportunity—but requires some reenvisioning of a world order meant to keep the peace among national governments that command militaries and manage global financial markets .
Nascent pathways have begun to link cities into the more formal proceedings of the international system .
When all 193 member states of the U.N. General Assembly agreed to the Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs ) in 2015 , the inclusion of a separate goal ( SDG @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signaled an acknowledgement by national governments of the importance of cities to their development priorities .
City leaders , however , once familiar with the SDGs , have not confined themselves to the city-specific goal , instead seeing themselves as having responsibility to advance all parts of the agenda .
Places as varied as Bristol , England ; Helsinki ; Kitakyushu , Japan ; Los Angeles ; Mannheim , Germany ; Mexico City ; and New York have positioned their city strategies within the SDGs and committed themselves to regularly reporting their local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the format of the national reviews that countries voluntarily submit , this growing movement of cities from around the world has upended the staid annual progress check-ins at the United Nations with their dynamism and innovative solutions .
The United Nations has made other overtures .
Secretary-General António Guterres personally attended the C40 mayors ’ summit in Copenhagen in October 2019 , acknowledging the importance of city leadership as “ first responders ” to the climate emergency and pledging that the U.N. system will do everything it can to support their efforts .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ initiative , indicating support for local efforts to advance sustainable development .
In 2018 , the outcomes of a Mayoral Forum hosted by Marrakech , Morocco , inserted a local perspective into the formal deliberations of new U.N. global agreements on migration and refugees.The current relationship of cities to the multilateral system is ad hoc and issue-dependent .
Beyond the U.N. , in 2017 the mayors of Paris and Buenos Aires jointly launched the Urban 20 , a collection of the largest cities from G-20 countries .
Now in its third year , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important G-20 affinity group , but it nonetheless has limited prospect , thus far , of influencing the agenda and decisions being made by G-20 heads of state .
While these few examples of emerging intersections are heartening , they also demonstrate that the current relationship of cities to the multilateral system is ad hoc and issue-dependent .
With a partial exception of one of the smallest agencies in the U.N. development system—the United Nations Human Settlement Programme , whose focus on improving informal settlements , slums , and housing gives it an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global and multilateral policymaking processes .
This especially holds true for financing : Municipalities can access loans from the World Bank and other multilateral development banks only when their national government approves , which is too often a binding constraint , given local politics .
Newer multilateral facilities such as the Green Climate Fund are creating structures that allow cities to apply directly , but these have not yet been enough to change long-standing practice ; the Green Climate Fund , for example , has not certified one city to receive its money @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gaining strength and credibility just as the multilateral system is under severe pressure , poised at a moment of great opportunity on one side and great danger of implosion on the other .
Never before has the multilateral system ’ s chief architect , the United States , been so active in undermining it while other nations , including China , aggressively resist its norms and values .
And even supporters recognize that major reform is necessary for the bureaucracy to be effective in responding to the problems that the system was designed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the real-life implications of global challenges that have grown ever more complex , the expectations for multilateralism have grown both in breadth and responsibility—and the system has struggled to meet them.City-to-city cooperation and city diplomacy are gaining strength and credibility just as the multilateral system is under severe pressure .
The immediate accountability of mayors to their constituents—because their records are visible on the streets of their cities—makes them more action-oriented than national-level politicians and more open to solutions , no matter what their origin .
They come to these global problems less @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Rivalries among mayors manifest as competition to deliver more and better for their residents .
Moreover , their limited role in national security frees them to be more welcoming to diverse types of international cooperation .
Even with the promise of more effective problem-solving , however , it will be difficult to convince some nation-states that their city leaders , who may not share their politics , deserve a role in traditional multilateral forums .
But in an era of worldwide political divisions and dissatisfaction with institutional leaders , people ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high .
Many mayors continue to benefit from reputations for being pragmatic and focused on solutions rather than bogged down in politics .
A slew of current and former mayors parlayed their local records into candidacies for U.S. president in 2019 and 2020 , echoing the politics of other countries , where the path from mayor to head of state is well trodden .
Today , Mexico , Indonesia , and the United Kingdom are all led by former mayors .
The coronavirus crisis has exposed the fissures and weaknesses in the multilateral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dynamism of local leadership .
Simple immediate acts could enable a closer relationship beneficial to both cities and the multilateral bodies : naming a special envoy for cities who reports to the U.N. secretary-general , for example , or mandating that mayors be included in national delegations that attend the U.N. General Assembly or G-20 summits .
The COP26 climate conference and other now-delayed negotiations could use the extra time to find ways to fully integrate subnational governments .
Over the long term , institutionalizing ways to embrace local leaders and their pragmatic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be the best step the multilateral system could take .

The coronavirus crisis sweeping the globe is exactly the type of emergency that the multilateral system, set up by the United States and its allies after World War II, was created to address. Instead, international cooperation has been straining to meet the moment: A meeting of G-7 foreign ministers ended in acrimony when the United States insisted the group call the novel coronavirus the “Wuhan virus,” a phrase widely seen as inflammatory; the G-20 took weeks to agree on suspending debt payments from poor countries, even as it is clear they are the most vulnerable to the catastrophe; and many countries, especially early on, simply failed to heed the guidance of the World Health Organization, which has also been accused of acting slowly and protecting China—and for which U.S. President Donald Trump has now frozen American funding.
The coronavirus crisis sweeping the globe is exactly the type of emergency that the multilateral system, set up by the United States and its allies after World War II, was created to address. Instead, international cooperation has been straining to meet the moment: A meeting of G-7 foreign ministers ended in acrimony when the United States insisted the group call the novel coronavirus the “Wuhan virus,” a phrase widely seen as inflammatory; the G-20 took weeks to agree on suspending debt payments from poor countries, even as it is clear they are the most vulnerable to the catastrophe; and many countries, especially early on, simply failed to heed the guidance of the World Health Organization, which has also been accused of acting slowly and protecting China—and for which U.S. President Donald Trump has now frozen American funding.
By contrast, mayors and governors have been taking decisive action, working around the clock on the front lines to save the lives of their residents, even as many national governments dawdled or refused. Cities have been relying on networks and relationships that span the globe to share experiences, knowledge, and equipment in the scramble to act fast and protect their citizens. Their global collaboration adds more urgency to a question that has been gaining momentum in recent years: Can city diplomacy help salvage the multilateral system? The pragmatism and innovation of local leaders, and their easy exchange of solutions, could be just the boost the international system needs—if nation-states will allow it.
Even before the pandemic, there were signs that cities’ relationships with the United Nations and its agencies, the World Bank and regional development banks, and other multilateral bodies needed attention. The world has been rapidly urbanizing: By 2050, two-thirds of the world’s population will likely live in cities, adding more than 2.5 billion people to their existing base. More than 80 percent of the world’s GDP is already generated in metropolitan areas. City leadership is thus becoming fundamental to solving many of the world’s toughest problems, going far beyond pandemic responses to other global challenges such as climate change, migration, and inequality.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
These are the very issues that preoccupy the time, energy, and resources of the world’s multilateral diplomats, but to date, cities have had little to no official role in their negotiations and agreements. The traditional multilateral system was set up by and for national governments. Local leaders are outside the circle as the world develops its so-called collective response, despite being the ones who come face to face with the implications, and solutions, for real people and communities.
Mayors and governors have been taking decisive action even as many national governments dawdled or refused.
The coronavirus pandemic illustrates the challenge well. U.S. states and cities set up their own systems to test for the virus, and in the absence of national or international procurement management, they have scrambled, in competition with each other and other localities around the world, to procure N95 masks, surgical gowns, and hand sanitizer.
At the same time, global cities are banding together to fill the gap in global cooperation. On March 27, Mayor Eric Garcetti of Los Angeles, using his position as chair of C40 Cities, a long-established network of megacities fighting climate change, convened a virtual assembly of 45 mayors from every region of the world. The mayors of Seoul and Milan shared their lessons and experiences, and mayors from London, Johannesburg, Jakarta, Kolkata and dozens more chimed in. Perhaps the most important lesson was conveyed by mayors in the throes of their response to those not yet hit: Act much more quickly and aggressively than you think you need to. A separate WhatsApp group of city staff started by Los Angeles quickly emerged as a forum to share advice on solving problems such as the spread of illness among health care workers and upticks in domestic violence. The mayor of Berlin organized a coronavirus response call with Berlin’s partner cities around the world in which mayors discussed the right metrics for reopening and how to support small businesses. It is hard to imagine such open, frank conversations among national leaders, given the inward focus of many today.
Such networks of cities have been growing in scale and impact. In normal times, the C40’s nearly 100 megacities are collectively focused on fighting the climate crisis and bending the curve of global greenhouse gas emissions, recognizing that cities consume over 67 percent of the world’s energy and emit 70 percent of its carbon dioxide emissions. The members of the network are committed to peaking emissions by 2020—Los Angeles and some 30 other cities have already done so—and to halving emissions by 2030, with interventions in the urban sectors where emissions are highest: buildings, transport, waste, and energy. By 2030, these commitments could deliver significant annual emissions reductions at a time when national commitments are flagging.
As governments begin to address the economic slump that the virus response has wrought, it will be these very cities that will fight hardest to ensure that a green and equitable recovery becomes the norm. The mayor of Milan is chairing a global task force under the auspices of C40 to help cities plan for just that. For its own part, Milan has already announced an ambitious plan to expand walking and cycling space across 22 miles of streets in the city center to reduce car use. Los Angeles is devising strategies to ensure that the homeless population that moved to emergency shelters does not return to the streets after the pandemic. Cities are exploring a variety of proposals that put equity and sustainability at the heart of rebuilding the economy.It will be the cities that will fight hardest to ensure that a green and equitable recovery becomes the norm.
Some city groupings take a strong political perspective. In December 2019, progressive capital cities in Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland—nations that oppose European Union policies on immigration and climate change—came together to create the “Pact of Free Cities.” The message from the mayors to the EU seemed clear: Just deal with us directly.
The challenge for the EU, and for other multilateral institutions, is how to best leverage the leadership and creative solutions emerging from cities’ pragmatism while continuing to serve the interests of their member states. The pandemic has added new urgency to the widespread agreement that the multilateral system must evolve to be more effective in addressing global challenges, and its toughest skeptics are clamoring ever louder for reform. Supporting and learning from mayors, and inviting their perspective on key global policy decisions, offers a significant opportunity—but requires some reenvisioning of a world order meant to keep the peace among national governments that command militaries and manage global financial markets.
Nascent pathways have begun to link cities into the more formal proceedings of the international system. When all 193 member states of the U.N. General Assembly agreed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, the inclusion of a separate goal (SDG 11) that focuses on urban areas signaled an acknowledgement by national governments of the importance of cities to their development priorities.
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City leaders, however, once familiar with the SDGs, have not confined themselves to the city-specific goal, instead seeing themselves as having responsibility to advance all parts of the agenda. Places as varied as Bristol, England; Helsinki; Kitakyushu, Japan; Los Angeles; Mannheim, Germany; Mexico City; and New York have positioned their city strategies within the SDGs and committed themselves to regularly reporting their local progress to the global community. Repurposing the format of the national reviews that countries voluntarily submit, this growing movement of cities from around the world has upended the staid annual progress check-ins at the United Nations with their dynamism and innovative solutions.
The United Nations has made other overtures. Secretary-General António Guterres personally attended the C40 mayors’ summit in Copenhagen in October 2019, acknowledging the importance of city leadership as “first responders” to the climate emergency and pledging that the U.N. system will do everything it can to support their efforts. His office has also launched the Local2030 initiative, indicating support for local efforts to advance sustainable development. In 2018, the outcomes of a Mayoral Forum hosted by Marrakech, Morocco, inserted a local perspective into the formal deliberations of new U.N. global agreements on migration and refugees.The current relationship of cities to the multilateral system is ad hoc and issue-dependent.
Beyond the U.N., in 2017 the mayors of Paris and Buenos Aires jointly launched the Urban 20, a collection of the largest cities from G-20 countries. Now in its third year, the group has developed credibility as an important G-20 affinity group, but it nonetheless has limited prospect, thus far, of influencing the agenda and decisions being made by G-20 heads of state.
While these few examples of emerging intersections are heartening, they also demonstrate that the current relationship of cities to the multilateral system is ad hoc and issue-dependent. With a partial exception of one of the smallest agencies in the U.N. development system—the United Nations Human Settlement Programme, whose focus on improving informal settlements, slums, and housing gives it an urban audience—cities are secondary or nonplayers in global and multilateral policymaking processes.
This especially holds true for financing: Municipalities can access loans from the World Bank and other multilateral development banks only when their national government approves, which is too often a binding constraint, given local politics. Newer multilateral facilities such as the Green Climate Fund are creating structures that allow cities to apply directly, but these have not yet been enough to change long-standing practice; the Green Climate Fund, for example, has not certified one city to receive its money.
City-to-city cooperation and city diplomacy are gaining strength and credibility just as the multilateral system is under severe pressure, poised at a moment of great opportunity on one side and great danger of implosion on the other. Never before has the multilateral system’s chief architect, the United States, been so active in undermining it while other nations, including China, aggressively resist its norms and values. And even supporters recognize that major reform is necessary for the bureaucracy to be effective in responding to the problems that the system was designed to address. As the pandemic highlights the real-life implications of global challenges that have grown ever more complex, the expectations for multilateralism have grown both in breadth and responsibility—and the system has struggled to meet them.City-to-city cooperation and city diplomacy are gaining strength and credibility just as the multilateral system is under severe pressure.
The immediate accountability of mayors to their constituents—because their records are visible on the streets of their cities—makes them more action-oriented than national-level politicians and more open to solutions, no matter what their origin. They come to these global problems less burdened by historical animosities and political baggage. Rivalries among mayors manifest as competition to deliver more and better for their residents. Moreover, their limited role in national security frees them to be more welcoming to diverse types of international cooperation. Even with the promise of more effective problem-solving, however, it will be difficult to convince some nation-states that their city leaders, who may not share their politics, deserve a role in traditional multilateral forums.
But in an era of worldwide political divisions and dissatisfaction with institutional leaders, people’s trust in their local governments has remained high. Many mayors continue to benefit from reputations for being pragmatic and focused on solutions rather than bogged down in politics. A slew of current and former mayors parlayed their local records into candidacies for U.S. president in 2019 and 2020, echoing the politics of other countries, where the path from mayor to head of state is well trodden. Today, Mexico, Indonesia, and the United Kingdom are all led by former mayors.
The coronavirus crisis has exposed the fissures and weaknesses in the multilateral system while highlighting the growing strength and dynamism of local leadership. Simple immediate acts could enable a closer relationship beneficial to both cities and the multilateral bodies: naming a special envoy for cities who reports to the U.N. secretary-general, for example, or mandating that mayors be included in national delegations that attend the U.N. General Assembly or G-20 summits. The COP26 climate conference and other now-delayed negotiations could use the extra time to find ways to fully integrate subnational governments. Over the long term, institutionalizing ways to embrace local leaders and their pragmatic, direct, problem-solving perspective might well be the best step the multilateral system could take.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--Making China Pay Would Cost Americans Dearly

China has few friends in United States these days , and it ’ s mostly Beijing ’ s own fault .
Over the last decade , the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) has taken an increasingly authoritarian direction , attempting to impose its policies not only on its own long-suffering people but on the residents of other nations .
But the COVID-19 crisis has greatly inflamed anti-China sentiments in a dangerous and counterproductive way .
The Xi Jinping regime responded badly , missing an opportunity to isolate Wuhan early and perhaps prevent the emergence of a pandemic .
Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attempts to blame the United States for the virus , created additional antagonism .
However , conspiracy theories that China intentionally created the virus and , accident or not , loosed it on the world are seriously short of evidence , despite the best attempts of the Trump administration to claim otherwise .
To be sure , China blundered badly , and some of its mistakes—censoring doctors and journalists—reflect the CCP ’ s oppressive rule .
Nevertheless , it is not the first government to be slow to acknowledge problems , timid in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to impose painful remedies , and unwilling to be open internationally about its problems .
Moreover , Beijing ’ s failings do not excuse the West , and the United States especially , for wasting months when officials should have been preparing for the arrival of COVID-19 .
Alas , the coronavirus hit during the political silly season in the run-up to the U.S. presidential election , and with 70,000 American deaths and counting , the silly has become dangerous .
The Trump administration ’ s unofficial rallying cry is to “ make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up the cause , and the Republican National Committee urges vulnerable candidates to demonize Beijing rather than defend the administration .
China is used to being treated as a campaign prop .
And Beijing deserves criticism , though that would be best delivered with multilateral backing in a nonpolitical setting .
Washington has an opportunity to build on global anger toward China and especially the CCP but risks losing the moment by shamelessly seeking partisan gain .
Alas , the Trump administration seems serious—or as serious as a team that moves on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China pay .
President Donald Trump has publicly mused about seeking damages from Beijing .
According to the Washington Post , the president “ fumed to aides and others in recent days about China.
” As a result , senior officials have begun “ mapping out a strategy for seeking retaliatory measures against China.
” An anonymous senior advisor declared : “ Punishing China is definitely where the president ’ s head is at right now.
” How ?
By sending it a bill ?
The ideas are many .
One is limiting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ routinely granted to other governments .
This would allow private and public—by states , for instance—lawsuits .
That has never been done on this scale , though in 2016 Congress voted to allow terrorism lawsuits against Saudi Arabia , a more limited action that proved to be quite controversial .
Another idea would be to cancel federal debt , principal or interest , purchased by China .
That would indirectly put money into Washington ’ s coffers .
The Trump administration also could impose high tariffs on Chinese products , raising funds directly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immunity and refusing interest repayments .
Rep. Jim Banks suggested going to the International Court of Justice .
Less discriminately , the Henry Jackson Society proposed that the world take advantage of a long list of potential legal forums to sue China .
Other policymakers urged legislation to push U.S. businesses to return from China .
Conservative activists are busy pushing a variety of their own schemes .
The Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen favored lifting immunity .
He argued : “ Somebody has to pay for this unprecedented damage .
That somebody @ @ @ @ @ @ @ With domestic judgments in hand , Americans could circle the globe seeking Chinese assets .
The Yale Law School professor E. Donald Elliott argued that China ’ s behavior required “ a strong response to prevent recurrences in the future.
” He wanted more than compensation : “ The first step should be to require China to pay for the harm that it has caused if we can .
That is necessary , but not sufficient , to deter future risk-taking with the lives and livelihoods of other people around the globe.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both stripping immunity and effectively garnishing Chinese revenues .
He suggested seeking a court order for Uncle Sam to send Chinese debt repayments to victims of the virus .
Elliott liked the idea of raising tariffs even more .
And he suggested another option , establishing “ a ‘ foreign claims tribunal ’ to pay the claims of the injured , either by voluntary agreement or by seizing the property of the guilty party .
For example , following the Iran hostage crisis , the United States seized Iranian assets in the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set up an international tribunal that has paid $ 2.5 billion out of the seized Iranian assets to settle 4,700 claims by victims.
” The Berkeley Law professor John Yoo and Ivana Stradner , a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute , proposed a detailed economic assault on China .
But they would not rely on international law : “ [ T ] he COVID-19 crisis has exposed the crisis of ineffectiveness and corruption of international institutions .
Instead of focusing on international law , the U.S. should thus protect its national interests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Some of their steps would be purely punitive .
For instance , they proposed sanctioning Chinese leaders and supporters , denying Chinese students and scholars access to university and research facilities , and enhancing “ efforts to exclude China from buying and selling advanced technologies , such as microchips , artificial intelligence , or biotechnology.
” However , Yoo and Stradner also argued that the administration “ needs to impose pain on CCP supporters so that they will want to change policy to alleviate their own economic losses.
” To do so , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he administration could also seize the assets of Chinese state-owned companies .
Under its Belt and Road Initiative , Beijing reportedly has loaned billions to developing nations in Africa , Eastern Europe , and Latin America , and then taken over their strategic ports and facilities once the debts fall due .
The U.S. could turn this strategy on its head by supporting the expropriation of these assets by legal process and the cancellation of these debts as compensation for coronavirus losses.
” This , Yoo and Stradner contended , would force China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The desire for compensation—and , frankly , vengeance—is understandable .
But it is a poor basis for public policy , a wonderful hope but an impossible dream .
None of the ideas being tossed about are good .
Some would be ineffective .
All would create costly blowback for the United States .
Yoo and Stradner are correct about relying on international panels .
China has a veto at the United Nations , international tribunals have no enforcement mechanisms , and the World Health Organization has been captured by China and has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Going this route might meet emotional needs and serve educational goals but would yield no damages .
Private commercial treaties have more teeth but don ’ t cover a case like COVID-19 .
The more punitive steps would be of limited effect without allied support .
Targeted sanctions would inconvenience those affected , not change Chinese government policy .
Denying Chinese commercial , educational , and research access would cost the United States as well and should be considered within a larger policy of dealing with concerns of espionage and theft of intellectual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appealing but foolish .
It would set an extraordinarily dangerous precedent .
Imagine the rest of the world “ making America pay ” for Washington ’ s mistakes , failures , and crimes .
Sovereign immunity is a bit like diplomatic immunity .
Both are pragmatic responses to an imperfect world .
Occasional outrages result—such as when Washington spirited Anne Sacoolas , the wife of an American diplomat , out of the United Kingdom after she drove on the wrong side of the road and hit and killed a British citizen .
Diplomatic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The U.K. was angry but did not abandon the principle in response .
Much of domestic criminal law operates similarly .
Access to an attorney , prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures , and requirement of trial by jury all are vital in protecting the public from unfair and arbitrary conviction , though unjust results occasionally occur in particular cases .
What would happen if Congress voted to allow Americans to sue the Chinese government ?
The next day China would authorize its citizens to sue the United States .
A couple days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Venezuela , and Cuba would legalize suits .
A week or two later , Iraq , Syria , Somalia , Libya , Serbia , Haiti , and Yemen might adopt corresponding legislation .
Perhaps countries like Egypt , Vietnam , Laos , and Mexico would follow suit .
Much of Latin America might join in .
A deluge of lawsuits would be filed .
Think of the potential damages : Washington has bombed , invaded , and occupied more nations than any other in the last two decades .
The United States has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Cold War , the United States subsidized a gaggle of dictators , tyrants , thieves , thugs , and incompetents .
The State Department , CIA , and other agencies intervened in scores of foreign elections .
American trial attorneys would enthusiastically join foreign advocates and organize massive class action suits to bring Washington to justice .
If there are inadequate U.S. government assets available in individual countries , no problem .
Foreign regimes might seize private companies , instructing the owners to seek compensation from Washington .
Moreover , foreign litigants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ else U.S. monies , buildings , and companies are quartered .
Even if the retaliation were limited to China itself , there are hundreds of billions of private U.S. assets in China .
Then , to borrow from Yoo and Stradner , the United States could try to go to court and claim that China has violated international rules .
Even the Europeans might not be inclined to shield American assets , given Washington ’ s proclivity for sanctioning them .
They might see foreign creditors pursuing U.S. officials as a bit of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simply idiotic .
Trade sanctions would chiefly punish Americans , not the Chinese government .
Americans pay tariffs .
Some U.S. consumers pay the government directly .
Other U.S. consumers pay more for comparable products since tariffs inflate product prices overall .
Some Chinese firms would lose sales , but others would enjoy higher , tariff-induced prices paid by Americans .
In essence , Washington would tax Americans to compensate Americans .
Repudiating debt held by China , even if only interest , would ensure retaliation .
Beijing might ignore the difference between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is more American investment in China than Chinese investment in America .
Moreover , voiding Chinese holdings would lower barriers to international debt repudiation .
If the United States politicizes its debt , it would make foreign borrowers more willing to follow suit .
Worse , buyers , private investors , sovereign wealth , and governments would be more reluctant to purchase U.S. securities .
The Trump administration might argue that the case of China is sui generis , but Washington has already politicized its control of the financial system .
The United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions against its closest allies in Asia and Europe .
Last year , Congress even targeted a natural gas pipeline project , Nord Stream 2 , between Germany and Russia .
No one , no matter how close to the United States , could have any confidence in Washington ’ s promises .
Finally , any and all of these steps would have huge foreign-policy ramifications .
Relations between the United States and China were steadily worsening before the coronavirus .
Xi is returning to Maoism , Chinese foreign policy is becoming more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grown frustrated with Chinese economic and legal discrimination .
The challenge is great , but the response should be thoughtful , nuanced , and targeted .
Launching a full-scale economic war would roil relations across the board .
Attacking the Chinese economy and hunting Chinese assets worldwide would inflame nationalist sentiments there , even without the Chinese government ’ s assistance .
The regime could not help but battle back and do so in any forum available .
While economic conflict does not guarantee military confrontation , the disintegration of commercial cooperation and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the relationship between very different systems would yield an incendiary environment .
Moreover , Washington would put almost every country on Earth in the middle of a collision between the two most important—and by some measures , at least , most powerful—nations .
This would transmit great-power conflict around the globe .
Every government would have to decide who to support and who to defy .
The United States might be surprised at some decisions : Though many countries are angry with Beijing , they are not likely to appreciate America making them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be taken only after serious consideration and rigorous calculation .
Washington must expect and prepare for the consequences—and believe that pushing Chinese relations toward an abyss in a world already on edge after the worst pandemic in a century would advance U.S. interests .
That seems unlikely .
There is much to criticize about Chinese behavior .
Beijing ’ s response to COVID-19 is just one among many reasons .
Measured and intelligent steps can be taken to shore up U.S. interests and build coalitions to respond smartly to Beijing ’ s propaganda @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crusade to make China pay , no matter how appealing politically , would backfire badly .
Consciously blowing up a relationship already under great strain would be worse than irresponsible .
It could become the trigger for a new cold war or worse .

China has few friends in United States these days, and it’s mostly Beijing’s own fault. Over the last decade, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has taken an increasingly authoritarian direction, attempting to impose its policies not only on its own long-suffering people but on the residents of other nations.
China has few friends in United States these days, and it’s mostly Beijing’s own fault. Over the last decade, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has taken an increasingly authoritarian direction, attempting to impose its policies not only on its own long-suffering people but on the residents of other nations.
But the COVID-19 crisis has greatly inflamed anti-China sentiments in a dangerous and counterproductive way. The Xi Jinping regime responded badly, missing an opportunity to isolate Wuhan early and perhaps prevent the emergence of a pandemic. Beijing’s ham-handed propaganda afterward, including attempts to blame the United States for the virus, created additional antagonism.
However, conspiracy theories that China intentionally created the virus and, accident or not, loosed it on the world are seriously short of evidence, despite the best attempts of the Trump administration to claim otherwise. To be sure, China blundered badly, and some of its mistakes—censoring doctors and journalists—reflect the CCP’s oppressive rule. Nevertheless, it is not the first government to be slow to acknowledge problems, timid in responding to a serious challenge, reluctant to impose painful remedies, and unwilling to be open internationally about its problems. Moreover, Beijing’s failings do not excuse the West, and the United States especially, for wasting months when officials should have been preparing for the arrival of COVID-19.
Alas, the coronavirus hit during the political silly season in the run-up to the U.S. presidential election, and with 70,000 American deaths and counting, the silly has become dangerous. The Trump administration’s unofficial rallying cry is to “make China pay.” Republican legislators have taken up the cause, and the Republican National Committee urges vulnerable candidates to demonize Beijing rather than defend the administration.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
China is used to being treated as a campaign prop. And Beijing deserves criticism, though that would be best delivered with multilateral backing in a nonpolitical setting. Washington has an opportunity to build on global anger toward China and especially the CCP but risks losing the moment by shamelessly seeking partisan gain.
Alas, the Trump administration seems serious—or as serious as a team that moves on a mercurial president’s whims gets—about making China pay. President Donald Trump has publicly mused about seeking damages from Beijing. According to the Washington Post, the president “fumed to aides and others in recent days about China.” As a result, senior officials have begun “mapping out a strategy for seeking retaliatory measures against China.” An anonymous senior advisor declared: “Punishing China is definitely where the president’s head is at right now.”
How? By sending it a bill? The ideas are many. One is limiting or eliminating sovereign immunity, which is routinely granted to other governments. This would allow private and public—by states, for instance—lawsuits. That has never been done on this scale, though in 2016 Congress voted to allow terrorism lawsuits against Saudi Arabia, a more limited action that proved to be quite controversial. Another idea would be to cancel federal debt, principal or interest, purchased by China. That would indirectly put money into Washington’s coffers. The Trump administration also could impose high tariffs on Chinese products, raising funds directly.
Republican legislators have similarly proposed lifting immunity and refusing interest repayments. Rep. Jim Banks suggested going to the International Court of Justice. Less discriminately, the Henry Jackson Society proposed that the world take advantage of a long list of potential legal forums to sue China. Other policymakers urged legislation to push U.S. businesses to return from China.
Conservative activists are busy pushing a variety of their own schemes. The Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen favored lifting immunity. He argued: “Somebody has to pay for this unprecedented damage. That somebody should be the government of China.” With domestic judgments in hand, Americans could circle the globe seeking Chinese assets.
The Yale Law School professor E. Donald Elliott argued that China’s behavior required “a strong response to prevent recurrences in the future.” He wanted more than compensation: “The first step should be to require China to pay for the harm that it has caused if we can. That is necessary, but not sufficient, to deter future risk-taking with the lives and livelihoods of other people around the globe.”
Elliott acknowledged that doing so would require both stripping immunity and effectively garnishing Chinese revenues. He suggested seeking a court order for Uncle Sam to send Chinese debt repayments to victims of the virus. Elliott liked the idea of raising tariffs even more. And he suggested another option, establishing “a ‘foreign claims tribunal’ to pay the claims of the injured, either by voluntary agreement or by seizing the property of the guilty party. For example, following the Iran hostage crisis, the United States seized Iranian assets in the U.S. and the two countries then agreed to set up an international tribunal that has paid $2.5 billion out of the seized Iranian assets to settle 4,700 claims by victims.”
The Berkeley Law professor John Yoo and Ivana Stradner, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, proposed a detailed economic assault on China. But they would not rely on international law: “[T]he COVID-19 crisis has exposed the crisis of ineffectiveness and corruption of international institutions. Instead of focusing on international law, the U.S. should thus protect its national interests by opting for the self-help mechanism.”
Some of their steps would be purely punitive. For instance, they proposed sanctioning Chinese leaders and supporters, denying Chinese students and scholars access to university and research facilities, and enhancing “efforts to exclude China from buying and selling advanced technologies, such as microchips, artificial intelligence, or biotechnology.”
However, Yoo and Stradner also argued that the administration “needs to impose pain on CCP supporters so that they will want to change policy to alleviate their own economic losses.” To do so, they suggested: “[T]he administration could also seize the assets of Chinese state-owned companies. Under its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing reportedly has loaned billions to developing nations in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, and then taken over their strategic ports and facilities once the debts fall due. The U.S. could turn this strategy on its head by supporting the expropriation of these assets by legal process and the cancellation of these debts as compensation for coronavirus losses.” This, Yoo and Stradner contended, would force China to sue under international law for redress.
The desire for compensation—and, frankly, vengeance—is understandable. But it is a poor basis for public policy, a wonderful hope but an impossible dream. None of the ideas being tossed about are good. Some would be ineffective. All would create costly blowback for the United States.
Yoo and Stradner are correct about relying on international panels. China has a veto at the United Nations, international tribunals have no enforcement mechanisms, and the World Health Organization has been captured by China and has no means to penalize member states. Going this route might meet emotional needs and serve educational goals but would yield no damages. Private commercial treaties have more teeth but don’t cover a case like COVID-19.
The more punitive steps would be of limited effect without allied support. Targeted sanctions would inconvenience those affected, not change Chinese government policy. Denying Chinese commercial, educational, and research access would cost the United States as well and should be considered within a larger policy of dealing with concerns of espionage and theft of intellectual property.
Making China legally liable is appealing but foolish. It would set an extraordinarily dangerous precedent. Imagine the rest of the world “making America pay” for Washington’s mistakes, failures, and crimes.
Sovereign immunity is a bit like diplomatic immunity. Both are pragmatic responses to an imperfect world. Occasional outrages result—such as when Washington spirited Anne Sacoolas, the wife of an American diplomat, out of the United Kingdom after she drove on the wrong side of the road and hit and killed a British citizen. Diplomatic immunity, explained the State Department. The U.K. was angry but did not abandon the principle in response.
Much of domestic criminal law operates similarly. Access to an attorney, prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, and requirement of trial by jury all are vital in protecting the public from unfair and arbitrary conviction, though unjust results occasionally occur in particular cases.
What would happen if Congress voted to allow Americans to sue the Chinese government? The next day China would authorize its citizens to sue the United States. A couple days later, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba would legalize suits. A week or two later, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Serbia, Haiti, and Yemen might adopt corresponding legislation. Perhaps countries like Egypt, Vietnam, Laos, and Mexico would follow suit. Much of Latin America might join in.
A deluge of lawsuits would be filed. Think of the potential damages: Washington has bombed, invaded, and occupied more nations than any other in the last two decades. The United States has routinely applied ruinous economic sanctions. Throughout the Cold War, the United States subsidized a gaggle of dictators, tyrants, thieves, thugs, and incompetents. The State Department, CIA, and other agencies intervened in scores of foreign elections. American trial attorneys would enthusiastically join foreign advocates and organize massive class action suits to bring Washington to justice.
If there are inadequate U.S. government assets available in individual countries, no problem. Foreign regimes might seize private companies, instructing the owners to seek compensation from Washington. Moreover, foreign litigants could seek to satisfy their judgments wherever else U.S. monies, buildings, and companies are quartered. Even if the retaliation were limited to China itself, there are hundreds of billions of private U.S. assets in China. Then, to borrow from Yoo and Stradner, the United States could try to go to court and claim that China has violated international rules. Even the Europeans might not be inclined to shield American assets, given Washington’s proclivity for sanctioning them. They might see foreign creditors pursuing U.S. officials as a bit of rough justice.
The tariff idea is simply idiotic. Trade sanctions would chiefly punish Americans, not the Chinese government. Americans pay tariffs. Some U.S. consumers pay the government directly. Other U.S. consumers pay more for comparable products since tariffs inflate product prices overall. Some Chinese firms would lose sales, but others would enjoy higher, tariff-induced prices paid by Americans. In essence, Washington would tax Americans to compensate Americans.
Repudiating debt held by China, even if only interest, would ensure retaliation. Beijing might ignore the difference between public and private assets, and there is more American investment in China than Chinese investment in America. Moreover, voiding Chinese holdings would lower barriers to international debt repudiation. If the United States politicizes its debt, it would make foreign borrowers more willing to follow suit. Worse, buyers, private investors, sovereign wealth, and governments would be more reluctant to purchase U.S. securities.
The Trump administration might argue that the case of China is sui generis, but Washington has already politicized its control of the financial system. The United States has applied both secondary and financial sanctions against its closest allies in Asia and Europe. Last year, Congress even targeted a natural gas pipeline project, Nord Stream 2, between Germany and Russia. No one, no matter how close to the United States, could have any confidence in Washington’s promises.
Finally, any and all of these steps would have huge foreign-policy ramifications. Relations between the United States and China were steadily worsening before the coronavirus. Xi is returning to Maoism, Chinese foreign policy is becoming more aggressive, and even U.S. businesses have grown frustrated with Chinese economic and legal discrimination. The challenge is great, but the response should be thoughtful, nuanced, and targeted.
Launching a full-scale economic war would roil relations across the board. Attacking the Chinese economy and hunting Chinese assets worldwide would inflame nationalist sentiments there, even without the Chinese government’s assistance. The regime could not help but battle back and do so in any forum available. While economic conflict does not guarantee military confrontation, the disintegration of commercial cooperation and contact that once provided the glue in the relationship between very different systems would yield an incendiary environment.
Moreover, Washington would put almost every country on Earth in the middle of a collision between the two most important—and by some measures, at least, most powerful—nations. This would transmit great-power conflict around the globe. Every government would have to decide who to support and who to defy. The United States might be surprised at some decisions: Though many countries are angry with Beijing, they are not likely to appreciate America making them take sides.
Such a step should be taken only after serious consideration and rigorous calculation. Washington must expect and prepare for the consequences—and believe that pushing Chinese relations toward an abyss in a world already on edge after the worst pandemic in a century would advance U.S. interests. That seems unlikely.
There is much to criticize about Chinese behavior. Beijing’s response to COVID-19 is just one among many reasons. Measured and intelligent steps can be taken to shore up U.S. interests and build coalitions to respond smartly to Beijing’s propaganda and aggressive claims. However, a crusade to make China pay, no matter how appealing politically, would backfire badly. Consciously blowing up a relationship already under great strain would be worse than irresponsible. It could become the trigger for a new cold war or worse.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--China Has a Playbook for Managing Coronavirus Chaos

To governments around the world , the underlying threat of the current pandemic is not just death , but chaos .
The mandate of all governments is to seek the opposite—maintaining order .
The current competition between democratic societies in the West and authoritarian regimes such as China is about who can restore political order quickly and at what cost .
People desire predictability and fear chaos .
The world is seeing a great race between countries seeking to reestablish their previous order as the coronavirus and lockdowns rock the foundations of their societies and threaten chaos .
For the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to lag behind .
Meanwhile , China , the great authoritarian power , has reportedly flattened its curve—the rate at which the coronavirus spreads—and is on its way to somewhat reviving the economy .
Despite the government ’ s questionable statistical reporting , Chinese are going back to work .
Throughout this crisis , the Chinese government has been showcasing to the world its playbook for controlling chaos .
Chinese propaganda mocks Western countries for not being able to “ copy its homework ” in battling the virus .
This playbook is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the public to take part in fighting a “ people ’ s war.
” It assumes that chaos is the common enemy of state and society alike .
Well before Chinese President Xi Jinping took power , the Chinese Communist Party developed a set of tried and trusted tactics for controlling the chaos .
Although Mao Zedong relished political chaos , calling it an “ excellent ” situation , Chinese political leaders thereafter learned to fear it .
Since the Tiananmen democracy movement in 1989 , Beijing ’ s No .
1 political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stability by maximizing order and minimizing social chaos .
Many Chinese people also accept the ideology that maintaining social stability is the most important public good the government can provide .
The Chinese fear of chaos is deeply ingrained in the national psyche .
The mandate of heaven given to Chinese rulers since the dynastic era promises the people a right to rebel if they no longer find the rulers legitimate .
Yet , in the recent era , the Chinese Communist Party has instilled in ordinary people a dread of chaos and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I spoke to for my book on grassroots mobilization felt that China needed to reform , but not at the cost of unleashing total chaos .
Chaos can be unleashed in three spheres : mental , cultural , and societal .
On the mental level , Chinese rulers have defined chaos as any way of thinking that diverges from that of the Chinese Communist Party .
It uses what ’ s known as “ thought work ” to tackle any divergence .
When Chinese university students belonging to Marxist groups and other activists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them rectify their thinking through confessions .
Chaos can also manifest itself in the cultural sphere .
The digital diary entries of the writer Fang Fang , who wrote from the initial epicenter of the coronavirus in Wuhan , is one such example .
Her diary , which attracted 3.8 million followers , outraged Chinese netizens who felt that she was exposing China ’ s internal chaos to Western audiences .
In the societal sphere , the state sees organized collective action as unleashing chaos .
The phrase “ social movements ” is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Instead , movements such as the recent Hong Kong protests are commonly described in both official media and social media posts as “ moving chaos ” or “ riotous chaos.
” Because of this deep-seated fear of chaos in multiple realms , citizens can be mobilized into action at every rung of society when the government declares chaos at hand .
But that playbook comes with its own risks .
Step one is to cover up the problem—trusting that most threats can be dampened early and pushed aside .
If that fails and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s time for step two : Restore order internally and blame chaos on outsiders .
The first step requires treating disorder like a wildfire : Douse water on it quickly and build barriers lest it spread to the rest of society .
The Hubei local government ’ s initial silencing of whistleblowers in the coronavirus outbreak is taken straight from this playbook—a cover-up tactic used by local officials across the country to silence dissidents .
Local officials , fearful of being sanctioned by their superiors for not maintaining local stability , routinely pay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are regularly taken out to tea with the state security , and some are even forced to go on vacation to keep them away from politics .
That Hubei officials hushed up netizens for circulating supposedly false news was nothing unusual or new .
In 2013 , Xi launched an anti-rumor campaign meant to sanction online critics such as the Chinese American businessman Charles Xue .
Most of the time these tactics are successful .
The government ’ s campaigns to silence human rights lawyers , labor activists , and ideological dissenters alike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not demobilized .
The Wuhan-based doctor Li Wenliang was just one among many individuals whose voices the government silenced .
Except this time , it caused a blowup that literally went viral .
But if the cover-up can no longer be suppressed , the next step is to restore domestic order at all cost .
The No .
1 political priority has always been to maintain social stability , a key pillar of the Chinese Communist Party ’ s legitimacy .
From day one , the Chinese government tackled the coronavirus outbreak as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a public health emergency .
It mobilized every unit of control , from state to society .
Once they received Beijing ’ s signal to clamp down at all cost , local governments organized quickly .
Citizens were told to monitor their neighbors .
Chinese tech companies supplied the police with data from health apps that determined whether citizens should be quarantined .
The normal movements of an estimated 60 million people in Wuhan were sacrificed for the greater good of social stability .
In any free society , these extreme control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even riots .
Not in China .
Though an online revolt surfaced after the death of the whistleblower doctor , Li , who was punished for telling the truth about the virus too early , the vast majority of Chinese people believe the government rescued them from the fate of the Italians and Americans .
Just as China ’ s domestic infections were getting under control , official propaganda shifted into another familiar mode : Blaming the cause and poor handling of the crisis on foreigners .
The tall tale that the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the virus is an old tactic , going back to the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement .
Then-leader Jiang Zemin accused Western scholars who assembled the Tiananmen Papers of trying to “ hype up the event to create internal chaos for us.
” Since then , the Chinese government has blamed many internal social movements on the West , including Charter 08 and the Jasmine Revolution .
When Hong Kongers took to the streets in the months before the coronavirus outbreak , the Chinese government also blamed protests on the “ black hand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s model of national emergency response was born out of controlling chaos .
It is indeed a system that can restore order and do it quickly , thanks to its historically strong state capacity .
However , it is a model that should not and can not be replicated in other countries .
Citizens in free societies are more comfortable with a degree of dissent and disorder ; they consider a limited degree of stability as the price of liberty .
If America is not just a country but also an idea , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is as valuable as life itself .
Is it any surprise , then , that as the United States crests 70,000 coronavirus-related deaths , a great many Americans are still defying social isolation orders ?
Recent anti-lockdown protesters in the United States seem to take literally the Founding Father Patrick Henry ’ s cry , “ give me liberty , or give me death.
” While this behavior is far from laudable , it reflects a fundamental difference in political values between China and the West .
In this great race , leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order quickly against preserving individuals ’ and local governments ’ liberties .
This has led to confused tactics , producing slow action and dithering debates over national lockdown measures .
But the race is not over .
The measures of success are different for different political systems .
For the Chinese government and the vast majority of its citizens , the goal is singular : restoring order , because what higher good is there ?
The fact that the Chinese government ’ s implementation of new surveillance technologies may persist long after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens .
The pandemic ’ s legacy for many may be that living in a Chinese-style dictatorship is far superior to living in the West ’ s free societies that can not harness disorder quickly .
For the governments and people of the so-called free world , restoring order also means , eventually , tearing down the restrictions on liberty the coronavirus forced .
The question is , will they be able to convince the rest of the world that freedom is still worth fighting for ?

To governments around the world, the underlying threat of the current pandemic is not just death, but chaos. The mandate of all governments is to seek the opposite—maintaining order. The current competition between democratic societies in the West and authoritarian regimes such as China is about who can restore political order quickly and at what cost.
To governments around the world, the underlying threat of the current pandemic is not just death, but chaos. The mandate of all governments is to seek the opposite—maintaining order. The current competition between democratic societies in the West and authoritarian regimes such as China is about who can restore political order quickly and at what cost.
People desire predictability and fear chaos. The world is seeing a great race between countries seeking to reestablish their previous order as the coronavirus and lockdowns rock the foundations of their societies and threaten chaos. For the moment, North America and Europe appear to lag behind. Meanwhile, China, the great authoritarian power, has reportedly flattened its curve—the rate at which the coronavirus spreads—and is on its way to somewhat reviving the economy. Despite the government’s questionable statistical reporting, Chinese are going back to work.
Throughout this crisis, the Chinese government has been showcasing to the world its playbook for controlling chaos. Chinese propaganda mocks Western countries for not being able to “copy its homework” in battling the virus.
This playbook is not new. It involves above all mobilizing the public to take part in fighting a “people’s war.” It assumes that chaos is the common enemy of state and society alike. Well before Chinese President Xi Jinping took power, the Chinese Communist Party developed a set of tried and trusted tactics for controlling the chaos. Although Mao Zedong relished political chaos, calling it an “excellent” situation, Chinese political leaders thereafter learned to fear it. Since the Tiananmen democracy movement in 1989, Beijing’s No. 1 political priority has been to maintain internal social stability by maximizing order and minimizing social chaos.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Many Chinese people also accept the ideology that maintaining social stability is the most important public good the government can provide. The Chinese fear of chaos is deeply ingrained in the national psyche. The mandate of heaven given to Chinese rulers since the dynastic era promises the people a right to rebel if they no longer find the rulers legitimate. Yet, in the recent era, the Chinese Communist Party has instilled in ordinary people a dread of chaos and disorder. Even some rights activists whom I spoke to for my book on grassroots mobilization felt that China needed to reform, but not at the cost of unleashing total chaos.
Chaos can be unleashed in three spheres: mental, cultural, and societal. On the mental level, Chinese rulers have defined chaos as any way of thinking that diverges from that of the Chinese Communist Party. It uses what’s known as “thought work” to tackle any divergence. When Chinese university students belonging to Marxist groups and other activists cross the line, the government makes them rectify their thinking through confessions.
Chaos can also manifest itself in the cultural sphere. The digital diary entries of the writer Fang Fang, who wrote from the initial epicenter of the coronavirus in Wuhan, is one such example. Her diary, which attracted 3.8 million followers, outraged Chinese netizens who felt that she was exposing China’s internal chaos to Western audiences.
In the societal sphere, the state sees organized collective action as unleashing chaos. The phrase “social movements” is not used in the official lexicon. Instead, movements such as the recent Hong Kong protests are commonly described in both official media and social media posts as “moving chaos” or “riotous chaos.”
Because of this deep-seated fear of chaos in multiple realms, citizens can be mobilized into action at every rung of society when the government declares chaos at hand.
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But that playbook comes with its own risks. Step one is to cover up the problem—trusting that most threats can be dampened early and pushed aside. If that fails and the issue blows up, it’s time for step two: Restore order internally and blame chaos on outsiders.
The first step requires treating disorder like a wildfire: Douse water on it quickly and build barriers lest it spread to the rest of society. The Hubei local government’s initial silencing of whistleblowers in the coronavirus outbreak is taken straight from this playbook—a cover-up tactic used by local officials across the country to silence dissidents. Local officials, fearful of being sanctioned by their superiors for not maintaining local stability, routinely pay off or intimidate would-be critics. Troublemakers are regularly taken out to tea with the state security, and some are even forced to go on vacation to keep them away from politics.
That Hubei officials hushed up netizens for circulating supposedly false news was nothing unusual or new. In 2013, Xi launched an anti-rumor campaign meant to sanction online critics such as the Chinese American businessman Charles Xue. Most of the time these tactics are successful. The government’s campaigns to silence human rights lawyers, labor activists, and ideological dissenters alike have left civil society embattled, though not demobilized. The Wuhan-based doctor Li Wenliang was just one among many individuals whose voices the government silenced. Except this time, it caused a blowup that literally went viral.
But if the cover-up can no longer be suppressed, the next step is to restore domestic order at all cost. The No. 1 political priority has always been to maintain social stability, a key pillar of the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy.
From day one, the Chinese government tackled the coronavirus outbreak as a domestic security threat, not just as a public health emergency. It mobilized every unit of control, from state to society. Once they received Beijing’s signal to clamp down at all cost, local governments organized quickly. Citizens were told to monitor their neighbors. Chinese tech companies supplied the police with data from health apps that determined whether citizens should be quarantined. The normal movements of an estimated 60 million people in Hubei Province were sacrificed for the greater good of social stability.
In any free society, these extreme control measures would have provoked protests, perhaps even riots. Not in China. Though an online revolt surfaced after the death of the whistleblower doctor, Li, who was punished for telling the truth about the virus too early, the vast majority of Chinese people believe the government rescued them from the fate of the Italians and Americans.
Just as China’s domestic infections were getting under control, official propaganda shifted into another familiar mode: Blaming the cause and poor handling of the crisis on foreigners. The tall tale that the Chinese foreign ministry spun about the U.S. origins of the virus is an old tactic, going back to the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement. Then-leader Jiang Zemin accused Western scholars who assembled the Tiananmen Papers of trying to “hype up the event to create internal chaos for us.” Since then, the Chinese government has blamed many internal social movements on the West, including Charter 08 and the Jasmine Revolution. When Hong Kongers took to the streets in the months before the coronavirus outbreak, the Chinese government also blamed protests on the “black hand” of Western powers.
China’s model of national emergency response was born out of controlling chaos. It is indeed a system that can restore order and do it quickly, thanks to its historically strong state capacity. However, it is a model that should not and cannot be replicated in other countries. Citizens in free societies are more comfortable with a degree of dissent and disorder; they consider a limited degree of stability as the price of liberty.
If America is not just a country but also an idea, then its central idea is that liberty is as valuable as life itself. Is it any surprise, then, that as the United States crests 70,000 coronavirus-related deaths, a great many Americans are still defying social isolation orders? Recent anti-lockdown protesters in the United States seem to take literally the Founding Father Patrick Henry’s cry, “give me liberty, or give me death.” While this behavior is far from laudable, it reflects a fundamental difference in political values between China and the West.
In this great race, leaders of Western free societies must balance restoring order quickly against preserving individuals’ and local governments’ liberties. This has led to confused tactics, producing slow action and dithering debates over national lockdown measures.
But the race is not over. The measures of success are different for different political systems. For the Chinese government and the vast majority of its citizens, the goal is singular: restoring order, because what higher good is there? The fact that the Chinese government’s implementation of new surveillance technologies may persist long after the pandemic is over does not disturb its citizens.
The pandemic’s legacy for many may be that living in a Chinese-style dictatorship is far superior to living in the West’s free societies that cannot harness disorder quickly. For the governments and people of the so-called free world, restoring order also means, eventually, tearing down the restrictions on liberty the coronavirus forced. The question is, will they be able to convince the rest of the world that freedom is still worth fighting for?


foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--It’s Syrian vs. Syrian in Libya

It’s Syrian vs. Syrian in Libya

Mohammad Abu al-Saar , a mechanic at a car repair shop in Homs , Syria , was detained and tortured by the country ’ s ruling regime , like thousands of other protesters , in one of its dungeons .
( His name is changed in this article at his request . )
The day he was released , he picked up a weapon to seek revenge , guard his city , and usher in a new era of political freedom .
It was April 2012 , just a year into the rebellion—there was still hope for a positive outcome @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a hired gun , fighting in someone else ’ s war , over 1,200 miles away in Libya .
And when he looks across the Libyan battlefield , there ’ s a good chance that he could be facing another Syrian .
Saar is among the Syrian rebels paid by Turkey to fight alongside the forces of the Government of National Accord ( GNA ) , one of the sides claiming power in the protracted Libyan conflict , which began with an uprising against Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011 and is now a battle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The GNA is recognized by the United Nations and backed by the Muslim Brotherhood , a transnational group that propagates political Islam with the support of powerful allies such as Turkey ’ s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan .
Shared allegiance with the Brothers brought Turkey to the interim government ’ s aid , and its enhanced military support has recently turned the tide of the war in the GNA ’ s favor .
Saar , however , is just a pair of hands in the broader struggle .
A 38-year-old father of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a mercenary as a consequence of prolonged privations inflicted by unending war in Syria .
“ My wife and four children live in a tent .
I don ’ t have money to buy cement blocks to build a room for them , ” he told Foreign Policy over the phone from Libya .
“ When my wife gave birth , I didn ’ t even have money to buy diapers and milk for the baby.
” In 2014 , Homs was lost to Bashar al-Assad ’ s regime forces , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Aleppo .
There he joined the Sultan Murad Division , a rebel group made up mainly of Syrian Turkmen trained and funded by Turkey .
But Turkey ’ s intentions were not entirely altruistic ; it supported the rebels , but it also beckoned them to fight for its own interests .
Saar is an Arab , not a Turkmen , but he chose to join the group to earn a living .
In 2018 , he was among the rebels hired by Turkey to oust Kurdish militias and hundreds of thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( Turkey accuses the Kurdish militias of conducting terrorist attacks inside Turkey and instigating secession . )
In Afrin , Saar was paid 450 Turkish liras , a paltry stipend that comes to $ 46 a month .
Libya , however , is a much more profitable assignment .
“ In my four months in Libya , I have earned more than I did in years of fighting in Syria .
I earn $ 2,000 a month , ” he said , sounding relieved at the whopping jump in his income .
Back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , dealing with the same deprivation , were being enticed to join the same war—but on the side of the commander Khalifa Haftar , the GNA ’ s main rival backed by Russia , the United Arab Emirates , and Egypt .
As Turkey flooded Libya with its Syrian proxies , it also provided state-of-the-art drones and air defense systems .
In March , Russia turned to Syria for reinforcements .
It roped in its Syrian ally Assad to back its preferred Libyan warlord and began scouting for men willing to render services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cash .
Syrian rebels say the man tasked with leading this recruitment drive was Col. Alexander Zorin , who in 2016 served as the Russian defense ministry ’ s envoy at the Geneva-based task force on cessation of hostilities in Syria .
Zorin is better known in Syria as “ the godfather ” of reconciliation deals between the regime and rebels in Ghouta , Daraa , and Quneitra .
A Russian source confirmed that in early April , Zorin visited southern Syria , a region believed to be especially fertile ground for Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but also owing to the absence of support from any other regional or global power .
Many rebels in the area had already switched their allegiance to Assad in July 2018 after the United States refused them further help .
In cooperation with Assad ’ s intelligence officials , Zorin is believed to have initiated negotiations with a number of rebel groups to send them to fight in Libya .
Abu Tareq ( his name has been changed for this article ) , the leader of a rebel group that fought the Islamic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told Foreign Policy he met Zorin and agreed to go to Libya along with his fighters .
“ We met him , and he told us we were going to Libya with the security company [ Wagner ] , ” said Tareq from Syria .
“ He made a generous offer , $ 5,000 per month for a commander and $ 1,000 for a fighter .
Of course , we agreed , because the financial situation is horrible in our area.
” Tareq added that the rebels were enticed not just with monetary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who fled the draft and those against whom the regime kept a file for payback later .
Abu Jafer Mamtineh , the leader of another rebel group in southern Syria , also proved credulous .
He bused out over a hundred young men to be trained by the Russians at a training base in Homs in mid-April .
Ahmad Khatib , an insider with rebel factions in the south , backed Tareq ’ s account .
( His name is changed at his request to protect his identity . )
“ Col .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ former rebels may expand their power and increase the number of their fighters on the condition that they send at least 1,000 men each to Libya , ” Khatib said .
However , Tareq and Mamtineh , and the men fighting for them , soon discovered they had been misled .
They were lured with the assurance that they would merely guard oil installations in Haftar-controlled eastern Libya , but upon arrival at their training center in Homs , they found out that they were expected to fight and die for Haftar—and that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , only about $ 200 .
“ Another Russian general at the base in Homs , I didn ’ t know his name , read out the terms of the contract before all of us .
It wasn ’ t what Zorin promised .
We refused and asked to be sent back home , ” said Tareq from Quneitra .
Russia has generally found it harder than Turkey to build a Syrian proxy force in Libya .
But Libyan analysts say Syrians are already in eastern Libya strengthening Haftar ’ s defenses .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ director of the first public policy think tank established in Tripoli , Libya , said that , while Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group led the offensive in Haftar ’ s yearlong attempt to conquer Tripoli , Syrians had been sent to back up the warlord in eastern Libya .
“ Haftar and the Assad régime have a strong relationship , and loyalists have been sent to Libya in recent months , ” he said .
“ Haftar is increasingly reliant on foreign powers to prop up his campaign .
Mercenaries come at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know the lay of the land , and are struggling to make ground in urban terrain.
” Haftar called a truce for Ramadan , but only after his self-styled Libyan National Army lost a string of towns to the Government of National Accord .
He seems to be buying time to gather his ground troops and convince Russia to counter Turkey ’ s military might with yet more reinforcements of its own .
Russia is still hedging its bets , pretending to be equidistant from all sides in Libya .
But if it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Moscow , like Ankara , will have plenty of desperate Syrians to choose from as potential recruits .
Meanwhile , the proxy fighters already in Libya are just hoping to make it back home alive .
“ I know my life is in danger here , many of us have been captured , ” Saar said .
“ If I really make it back alive , I will open a shop .
”

Mohammad Abu al-Saar, a mechanic at a car repair shop in Homs, Syria, was detained and tortured by the country’s ruling regime, like thousands of other protesters, in one of its dungeons. (His name is changed in this article at his request.) The day he was released, he picked up a weapon to seek revenge, guard his city, and usher in a new era of political freedom. It was April 2012, just a year into the rebellion—there was still hope for a positive outcome.
Mohammad Abu al-Saar, a mechanic at a car repair shop in Homs, Syria, was detained and tortured by the country’s ruling regime, like thousands of other protesters, in one of its dungeons. (His name is changed in this article at his request.) The day he was released, he picked up a weapon to seek revenge, guard his city, and usher in a new era of political freedom. It was April 2012, just a year into the rebellion—there was still hope for a positive outcome.
Eight years later, he is a hired gun, fighting in someone else’s war, over 1,200 miles away in Libya. And when he looks across the Libyan battlefield, there’s a good chance that he soon could be facing another Syrian.
Saar is among the Syrian rebels paid by Turkey to fight alongside the forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA), one of the sides claiming power in the protracted Libyan conflict, which began with an uprising against Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011 and is now a battle for lucrative oil deals and regional influence. The GNA is recognized by the United Nations and backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational group that propagates political Islam with the support of powerful allies such as Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Shared allegiance with the Brothers brought Turkey to the interim government’s aid, and its enhanced military support has recently turned the tide of the war in the GNA’s favor.
Saar, however, is just a pair of hands in the broader struggle. A 38-year-old father of four, Saar metamorphosed from a rebel to a mercenary as a consequence of prolonged privations inflicted by unending war in Syria. “My wife and four children live in a tent. I don’t have money to buy cement blocks to build a room for them,” he told Foreign Policy over the phone from Libya. “When my wife gave birth, I didn’t even have money to buy diapers and milk for the baby.”
In 2014, Homs was lost to Bashar al-Assad’s regime forces, and Saar moved with his family to rebel-held Aleppo. There he joined the Sultan Murad Division, a rebel group made up mainly of Syrian Turkmen trained and funded by Turkey. But Turkey’s intentions were not entirely altruistic; it supported the rebels, but it also beckoned them to fight for its own interests.
Saar is an Arab, not a Turkmen, but he chose to join the group to earn a living. In 2018, he was among the rebels hired by Turkey to oust Kurdish militias and hundreds of thousands of civilians from Afrin in northern Syria. (Turkey accuses the Kurdish militias of conducting terrorist attacks inside Turkey and instigating secession.) In Afrin, Saar was paid 450 Turkish liras, a paltry stipend that comes to $46 a month. Libya, however, is a much more profitable assignment. “In my four months in Libya, I have earned more than I did in years of fighting in Syria. I earn $2,000 a month,” he said, sounding relieved at the whopping jump in his income.
Back home in Syria, other former rebels, dealing with the same deprivation, were being enticed to join the same war—but on the side of the commander Khalifa Haftar, the GNA’s main rival backed by Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt.
As Turkey flooded Libya with its Syrian proxies, it also provided state-of-the-art drones and air defense systems. In March, Russia turned to Syria for reinforcements. It roped in its Syrian ally Assad to back its preferred Libyan warlord and began scouting for men willing to render services in a foreign conflict in exchange for cash.
Syrian rebels say the man tasked with leading this recruitment drive was Col. Alexander Zorin, who in 2016 served as the Russian defense ministry’s envoy at the Geneva-based task force on cessation of hostilities in Syria. Zorin is better known in Syria as “the godfather” of reconciliation deals between the regime and rebels in Ghouta, Daraa, and Quneitra. A Russian source confirmed that in early April, Zorin visited southern Syria, a region believed to be especially fertile ground for Russian recruitment not only due to rampant poverty but also owing to the absence of support from any other regional or global power. Many rebels in the area had already switched their allegiance to Assad in July 2018 after the United States refused them further help.
In cooperation with Assad’s intelligence officials, Zorin is believed to have initiated negotiations with a number of rebel groups to send them to fight in Libya. Abu Tareq (his name has been changed for this article), the leader of a rebel group that fought the Islamic State in Quneitra in southern Syria, told Foreign Policy he met Zorin and agreed to go to Libya along with his fighters. “We met him, and he told us we were going to Libya with the security company [Wagner],” said Tareq from Syria. “He made a generous offer, $5,000 per month for a commander and $1,000 for a fighter. Of course, we agreed, because the financial situation is horrible in our area.” Tareq added that the rebels were enticed not just with monetary inducement but also with amnesty for those who fled the draft and those against whom the regime kept a file for payback later. Abu Jafer Mamtineh, the leader of another rebel group in southern Syria, also proved credulous. He bused out over a hundred young men to be trained by the Russians at a training base in Homs in mid-April.
Ahmad Khatib, an insider with rebel factions in the south, backed Tareq’s account. (His name is changed at his request to protect his identity.) “Col. Zorin’s message was that the former rebels may expand their power and increase the number of their fighters on the condition that they send at least 1,000 men each to Libya,” Khatib said.
However, Tareq and Mamtineh, and the men fighting for them, soon discovered they had been misled. They were lured with the assurance that they would merely guard oil installations in Haftar-controlled eastern Libya, but upon arrival at their training center in Homs, they found out that they were expected to fight and die for Haftar—and that the monthly salary would be much lower, only about $200. “Another Russian general at the base in Homs, I didn’t know his name, read out the terms of the contract before all of us. It wasn’t what Zorin promised. We refused and asked to be sent back home,” said Tareq from Quneitra.
Russia has generally found it harder than Turkey to build a Syrian proxy force in Libya. But Libyan analysts say Syrians are already in eastern Libya strengthening Haftar’s defenses. Anas El Gomati, the founder and director of the first public policy think tank established in Tripoli, Libya, said that, while Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group led the offensive in Haftar’s yearlong attempt to conquer Tripoli, Syrians had been sent to back up the warlord in eastern Libya. “Haftar and the Assad régime have a strong relationship, and loyalists have been sent to Libya in recent months,” he said. “Haftar is increasingly reliant on foreign powers to prop up his campaign. Mercenaries come at a cost, they don’t know the lay of the land, and are struggling to make ground in urban terrain.”
Haftar called a truce for Ramadan, but only after his self-styled Libyan National Army lost a string of towns to the Government of National Accord. He seems to be buying time to gather his ground troops and convince Russia to counter Turkey’s military might with yet more reinforcements of its own. Russia is still hedging its bets, pretending to be equidistant from all sides in Libya. But if it decides to ramp up its Libyan intervention, Moscow, like Ankara, will have plenty of desperate Syrians to choose from as potential recruits.
Meanwhile, the proxy fighters already in Libya are just hoping to make it back home alive. “I know my life is in danger here, many of us have been captured,” Saar said. “If I really make it back alive, I will open a shop.”