foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--It’s Time to Stop Pandering to Beijing Over Taiwan

It ’ s Time to Stop Pandering to Beijing Over Taiwan Taiwan is the only developed country in the world right now where all schools are open , and one of the very few where professional baseball , basketball , and soccer are being played , though behind closed doors .
It ’ s a testament to the island state ’ s relative success in containing the novel coronavirus outbreak .
But besides playing ball at home , Taiwan is also doing its part in international coronavirus efforts , such as donating millions of face masks and cooperating in research @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recognized for its domestic coronavirus campaign and face mask donations to the United States , the European Union , Asian neighbors , and its allies .
Making it even more impressive is that Taiwan is doing all this without the help of the World Health Organization , whose officials have repeatedly ignored or made spurious claims about Taiwan .
That ’ s because Taiwan is a pariah state on the international arena , excluded from multilateral organizations like the United Nations and WHO because of China ’ s insistence that Taiwan is rightfully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yet the case for Taiwan to be recognized as a country and a national actor in multilateral institutions is stronger than ever .
Taiwan is a de facto independent state whose official name is the Republic of China .
This formal designation originated from when the Kuomintang ( KMT ) ruled China in the early 20th century after 1911 .
After losing the Chinese Civil War to the Communists , the KMT fled to Taiwan and reestablished the Republic of China there in 1949 .
After decades as an authoritarian state under the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1990s and has developed into the flourishing democracy it is today .
Only 15 countries in the world recognize Taiwan ( with the Republic of China name ) as a country because of the “ One China ” policy that Beijing attempts to force on the world .
This requires countries to acknowledge China ’ s claim to Taiwan , whether they agree or not , and thus refrain from recognizing Taiwan or the rights of the Taiwanese to be represented by their own government .
As such , countries that have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have the same with Taiwan .
This has led to Taiwan being excluded from the U.N. and its affiliated agencies like WHO .
Time after time , Taiwan has tried to become a member of the U.N. , a process that is also repeated with WHO .
This process always fails , despite pleas from Taiwan ’ s few allies as well as the United States , the EU , and Australia .
In the few multinational organizations it is allowed into , Taiwan participates under artificial names such as “ Chinese Taipei @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Olympics .
The United States is Taiwan ’ s strongest partner despite not officially recognizing it , having broken off relations with Taiwan in 1979 for diplomatic ties with China .
Instead , the United States also follows the “ One China ” policy in which it acknowledges but does not endorse Beijing ’ s claims that Taiwan is part of China .
The United States is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan militarily through sales of arms .
To this end , the United States has passed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase Taiwan ’ s participation in international organizations .
The United States has also stepped up arms sales to Taiwan , including a $ 2 billion deal in 2019 that included 108 tanks .
Meanwhile , Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen was allowed to visit NASA in Houston on a stopover in 2018 while visiting allies in Central America , the first time a Taiwanese president has ever visited a U.S. federal agency while in power .
While the United States and a few countries such as Japan and Australia support Taiwan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WHO World Health Assembly , it is still likely that Taiwan might still be stymied , as in previous years , due to China ’ s opposition .
China ’ s growing leadership and influence in many organizations , especially the U.N.-affiliated agencies , has been well documented .
The truth is very few countries other than the United States will dare defy China to openly support Taiwan .
Many countries , especially those in the developing world , will not risk harming trade with China , which is often their largest economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s official policy on Taiwan is basically determined by China .
The EU has a substantial relationship with Taiwan , but there is a limit to how far it will go .
“ The EU already supports a more active role for Taiwan in international organizations such as the WHO , ” said Brigitte Dekker , a researcher at Clingendael , a Dutch think tank , referring to official statements released by EU states and parliamentarians .
“ That said , I do not believe there is momentum now for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for the inclusion of Taiwan in international organizations beyond this scope.
” “ The EU will likely hold on to its One China policy to avoid disturbing its relationship with Beijing , ” Dekker said .
However , there is scope for European countries to deepen individual relations with Taiwan .
The Netherlands recently changed the name of its office , a sort of unofficial embassy , in Taiwan by removing the words “ Trade and Investment , ” signifying the fact that mutual relations had broadened beyond trade .
Even this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which threatened reprisals against the Netherlands .
Asian countries , with the notable exception of Japan , almost never speak out in support of Taiwan despite strong trading ties .
The United States , the EU , and other like-minded countries should look to interact with Taiwan in multilateral arenas that are less susceptible to Chinese influence .
For example , this could involve inviting Taiwan as a guest to G-7 meetings or to become a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) .
Taiwan has attended OECD @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this limited participation ended due to Chinese heavy-handedness .
The United States can still do more , such as send naval ships to call at Taiwanese ports and send cabinet-level officials on more frequent visits .
The last U.S. cabinet official to visit Taiwan was Environmental Protection Agency head Gina McCarthy in 2014 , and before that , Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater in 2000 .
Taiwan should also be invited to multilateral military drills such as the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific naval exercises for vessels from countries on both sides of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the last edition of the exercise in 2018 for its South China Sea militarization .
Taiwan is also being considered for membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership ( CPTPP ) , an Asia-Pacific regional trade pact led by Japan after the United States pulled out of the deal , then known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership , in 2017 .
China is not part of the CPTPP , which was set up mainly to reduce dependence on China .
All of these steps , if taken , would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but the benefits would be limited , because Taiwan would be treated like a guest and not a full member of the international community .
Taiwan ’ s participation would always be subject to China ’ s whims , such as when it was allowed to attend WHO ’ s assemblies as an observer between 2009 and 2016 because a China-friendly KMT government was in power then .
After the current president from the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2016 , Taiwan was barred again .
In effect , the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , even after it has been culpable for what might be the world ’ s worst crisis since World War II through its failure to contain the early spread of the coronavirus .
The ultimate option would be to officially recognize Taiwan as a country , an initiative led by the United States .
This would no doubt lead to serious repercussions from China , including the possibility of military action , especially against Taiwan .
Such a move would require an understanding from Taiwan of this risk , as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ onus for action would fall on the United States , but it would be crucial to get the EU and such nations as Japan , India , and Australia on board .
After the world deals with the coronavirus pandemic , the United States should seriously consider recognizing Taiwan , as it would be the best chance to do so for three key reasons .
First , China bears heavy responsibility for the coronavirus pandemic , which has killed over 270,000 people and infected nearly 4 million .
The country censored and held @ @ @ @ @ @ @ early stages and is still not being forthright .
And instead of accepting responsibility , Beijing has claimed it bought the world time and gloated about its supposed triumph .
China also tried to push a conspiracy theory that the coronavirus originated in the United States , and it sent defective masks and equipment to numerous countries .
After Australia called for an official investigation into the origin and spread of the coronavirus , the Chinese ambassador to the country immediately threatened a Chinese boycott of Australian beef , wine , and universities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Guangzhou being ejected onto the streets and barred from restaurants have angered African nations , which traditionally have had warm relations with China .
All of this means China ’ s relations with the international community are at a very low point .
The country has acted more like an erratic and unreliable dictatorship rather than a responsible world power , even during a global crisis that it helped cause .
The second significant reason is China ’ s growing military aggressiveness , which has led to serious concerns of a Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years .
At the beginning of 2019 , Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly demanded that Taiwan “ unite ” with China or face potential military action .
Chinese military officials have also announced a desire to take Taiwan , with the Chinese Communist Party ’ s 100th anniversary in 2021 mentioned as a possible deadline .
To this end , China has ramped up naval shipbuilding , especially large surface combat vessels and amphibious assault ships .
The latter would be essential for any invasion of Taiwan .
In February , Chinese state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ units of body armor to outfit troops to fight against “ Taiwan secessionists ” and U.S. forces .
China ’ s provocative behavior has been building up for years , and it has even taken advantage of the pandemic to intensify this .
China ’ s aggression has not just been directed at Taiwan but also other countries such as Japan , Vietnam , and the Philippines , as can be seen regularly in the South China Sea .
Even if Taiwan ’ s international status remains unchanged , there is a strong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against Taiwan in the near future .
This thus removes the main reason for not recognizing Taiwan as a country , which is to avoid provoking China and maintain peace .
In fact , recognizing Taiwan ’ s nationhood might even act as a deterrent by making it clear the United States and the international community see Taiwan as an actual country and not part of China .
Third , while the global recession will strongly affect the United States , it will hit China hard too .
Reeling from a lockdown during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a weakened economy that has been slowing down since at least last year , China saw its first-quarter GDP fall by 6.8 percent , its first reported decrease since the 1970s .
Export orders are expected to remain weak due to declining demand from such markets as the United States and EU , while Chinese consumers will not spend as much as before .
China ’ s main method of enticing states is hefty so-called financial aid and a massive appetite for commodity imports as well as the world ’ s largest consumer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All three have been weakened and will continue to be so for the upcoming future , making it harder for China to tempt or punish countries through economic means .
After winning her second term in January , Tsai said Taiwan is already independent .
Most of the world should openly recognize this too , rather than continuing to pander to China ’ s ludicrous claim to Taiwan .
For the sake of not just Taiwan but the world , all options must be on the table when it comes to furthering Taiwan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

Taiwan is the only developed country in the world right now where all schools are open, and one of the very few where professional baseball, basketball, and soccer are being played, though behind closed doors. It’s a testament to the island state’s relative success in containing the novel coronavirus outbreak. But besides playing ball at home, Taiwan is also doing its part in international coronavirus efforts , such as donating millions of face masks and cooperating in research initiatives.
Taiwan is the only developed country in the world right now where all schools are open, and one of the very few where professional baseball, basketball, and soccer are being played, though behind closed doors. It’s a testament to the island state’s relative success in containing the novel coronavirus outbreak. But besides playing ball at home, Taiwan is also doing its part in international coronavirus efforts, such as donating millions of face masks and cooperating in research initiatives.
The island has been widely recognized for its domestic coronavirus campaign and face mask donations to the United States, the European Union, Asian neighbors, and its allies. Making it even more impressive is that Taiwan is doing all this without the help of the World Health Organization, whose officials have repeatedly ignored or made spurious claims about Taiwan.
That’s because Taiwan is a pariah state on the international arena, excluded from multilateral organizations like the United Nations and WHO because of China’s insistence that Taiwan is rightfully under Beijing’s domain. And yet the case for Taiwan to be recognized as a country and a national actor in multilateral institutions is stronger than ever.
Taiwan is a de facto independent state whose official name is the Republic of China. This formal designation originated from when the Kuomintang (KMT) ruled China in the early 20th century after 1911. After losing the Chinese Civil War to the Communists, the KMT fled to Taiwan and reestablished the Republic of China there in 1949. After decades as an authoritarian state under the KMT, Taiwan adopted multiparty elections in the 1990s and has developed into the flourishing democracy it is today.
Only 15 countries in the world recognize Taiwan (with the Republic of China name) as a country because of the “One China” policy that Beijing attempts to force on the world. This requires countries to acknowledge China’s claim to Taiwan, whether they agree or not, and thus refrain from recognizing Taiwan or the rights of the Taiwanese to be represented by their own government. As such, countries that have diplomatic relations with China cannot also have the same with Taiwan. This has led to Taiwan being excluded from the U.N. and its affiliated agencies like WHO.
Time after time, Taiwan has tried to become a member of the U.N., a process that is also repeated with WHO. This process always fails, despite pleas from Taiwan’s few allies as well as the United States, the EU, and Australia. In the few multinational organizations it is allowed into, Taiwan participates under artificial names such as “Chinese Taipei” in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the Olympics.
The United States is Taiwan’s strongest partner despite not officially recognizing it, having broken off relations with Taiwan in 1979 for diplomatic ties with China. Instead, the United States also follows the “One China” policy in which it acknowledges but does not endorse Beijing’s claims that Taiwan is part of China. The United States is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan militarily through sales of arms.
To this end, the United States has passed motions such as the TAIPEI Act to increase Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. The United States has also stepped up arms sales to Taiwan, including a $2 billion deal in 2019 that included 108 tanks. Meanwhile, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen was allowed to visit NASA in Houston on a stopover in 2018 while visiting allies in Central America, the first time a Taiwanese president has ever visited a U.S. federal agency while in power.
While the United States and a few countries such as Japan and Australia support Taiwan’s bid to attend this year’s WHO World Health Assembly, it is still likely that Taiwan might still be stymied, as in previous years, due to China’s opposition. China’s growing leadership and influence in many organizations, especially the U.N.-affiliated agencies, has been well documented.
The truth is very few countries other than the United States will dare defy China to openly support Taiwan. Many countries, especially those in the developing world, will not risk harming trade with China, which is often their largest economic partner. As such, almost every country’s official policy on Taiwan is basically determined by China.
The EU has a substantial relationship with Taiwan, but there is a limit to how far it will go. “The EU already supports a more active role for Taiwan in international organizations such as the WHO,” said Brigitte Dekker, a researcher at Clingendael, a Dutch think tank, referring to official statements released by EU states and parliamentarians. “That said, I do not believe there is momentum now for the EU to increase its current efforts and support for the inclusion of Taiwan in international organizations beyond this scope.”
“The EU will likely hold on to its One China policy to avoid disturbing its relationship with Beijing,” Dekker said.
However, there is scope for European countries to deepen individual relations with Taiwan. The Netherlands recently changed the name of its office, a sort of unofficial embassy, in Taiwan by removing the words “Trade and Investment,” signifying the fact that mutual relations had broadened beyond trade. Even this was met by outrage from China, which threatened reprisals against the Netherlands. Asian countries, with the notable exception of Japan, almost never speak out in support of Taiwan despite strong trading ties.
The United States, the EU, and other like-minded countries should look to interact with Taiwan in multilateral arenas that are less susceptible to Chinese influence. For example, this could involve inviting Taiwan as a guest to G-7 meetings or to become a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Taiwan has attended OECD committees in the past, but even this limited participation ended due to Chinese heavy-handedness.
The United States can still do more, such as send naval ships to call at Taiwanese ports and send cabinet-level officials on more frequent visits. The last U.S. cabinet official to visit Taiwan was Environmental Protection Agency head Gina McCarthy in 2014, and before that, Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater in 2000.
Taiwan should also be invited to multilateral military drills such as the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific naval exercises for vessels from countries on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. China was kicked out of the last edition of the exercise in 2018 for its South China Sea militarization.
Taiwan is also being considered for membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), an Asia-Pacific regional trade pact led by Japan after the United States pulled out of the deal, then known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in 2017. China is not part of the CPTPP, which was set up mainly to reduce dependence on China.
All of these steps, if taken, would be good for Taiwan and the world, but the benefits would be limited, because Taiwan would be treated like a guest and not a full member of the international community. Taiwan’s participation would always be subject to China’s whims, such as when it was allowed to attend WHO’s assemblies as an observer between 2009 and 2016 because a China-friendly KMT government was in power then. After the current president from the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2016, Taiwan was barred again.
In effect, the world would still be continuing to pander to China, even after it has been culpable for what might be the world’s worst crisis since World War II through its failure to contain the early spread of the coronavirus.
The ultimate option would be to officially recognize Taiwan as a country, an initiative led by the United States. This would no doubt lead to serious repercussions from China, including the possibility of military action, especially against Taiwan. Such a move would require an understanding from Taiwan of this risk, as well as guaranteed military support from Washington.
The onus for action would fall on the United States, but it would be crucial to get the EU and such nations as Japan, India, and Australia on board.
After the world deals with the coronavirus pandemic, the United States should seriously consider recognizing Taiwan, as it would be the best chance to do so for three key reasons.
First, China bears heavy responsibility for the coronavirus pandemic, which has killed over 270,000 people and infected nearly 4 million. The country censored and held back information about the outbreak in its early stages and is still not being forthright. And instead of accepting responsibility, Beijing has claimed it bought the world time and gloated about its supposed triumph. China also tried to push a conspiracy theory that the coronavirus originated in the United States, and it sent defective masks and equipment to numerous countries.
After Australia called for an official investigation into the origin and spread of the coronavirus, the Chinese ambassador to the country immediately threatened a Chinese boycott of Australian beef, wine, and universities. The recent shocking reports of Africans in Guangzhou being ejected onto the streets and barred from restaurants have angered African nations, which traditionally have had warm relations with China.
All of this means China’s relations with the international community are at a very low point. The country has acted more like an erratic and unreliable dictatorship rather than a responsible world power, even during a global crisis that it helped cause.
The second significant reason is China’s growing military aggressiveness, which has led to serious concerns of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan within the next few years.
At the beginning of 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly demanded that Taiwan “unite” with China or face potential military action. Chinese military officials have also announced a desire to take Taiwan, with the Chinese Communist Party’s 100th anniversary in 2021 mentioned as a possible deadline.
To this end, China has ramped up naval shipbuilding, especially large surface combat vessels and amphibious assault ships. The latter would be essential for any invasion of Taiwan. In February, Chinese state media announced China was purchasing 1.4 million units of body armor to outfit troops to fight against “Taiwan secessionists” and U.S. forces.
China’s provocative behavior has been building up for years, and it has even taken advantage of the pandemic to intensify this. China’s aggression has not just been directed at Taiwan but also other countries such as Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, as can be seen regularly in the South China Sea.
Even if Taiwan’s international status remains unchanged, there is a strong likelihood that China will initiate a conflict against Taiwan in the near future. This thus removes the main reason for not recognizing Taiwan as a country, which is to avoid provoking China and maintain peace. In fact, recognizing Taiwan’s nationhood might even act as a deterrent by making it clear the United States and the international community see Taiwan as an actual country and not part of China.
Third, while the global recession will strongly affect the United States, it will hit China hard too. Reeling from a lockdown during much of February and March, and a weakened economy that has been slowing down since at least last year, China saw its first-quarter GDP fall by 6.8 percent, its first reported decrease since the 1970s. Export orders are expected to remain weak due to declining demand from such markets as the United States and EU, while Chinese consumers will not spend as much as before.
China’s main method of enticing states is hefty so-called financial aid and a massive appetite for commodity imports as well as the world’s largest consumer market and pool of overseas tourists. All three have been weakened and will continue to be so for the upcoming future, making it harder for China to tempt or punish countries through economic means.
After winning her second term in January, Tsai said Taiwan is already independent. Most of the world should openly recognize this too, rather than continuing to pander to China’s ludicrous claim to Taiwan.
For the sake of not just Taiwan but the world, all options must be on the table when it comes to furthering Taiwan’s presence on the international stage.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--The United States Doesn’t Get Israel Anymore

Ever since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz , the leader of the Blue and White coalition , reached a deal on an emergency government , my email inbox has reached a critical mass of commentary , analyses , warnings , invitations to virtual briefings , and calls to action by an alphabet soup of organizations in the United States .
The issue that has them so worked up is Israel ’ s planned annexation of land in the West Bank .
There ’ s indeed something shocking about this—but it ’ s less the annexation itself than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
There should be nothing surprising about either Israel ’ s intention to annex territory that does not belong to it or Gantz ’ s willingness to consent to that policy .
( His problem with the prime minister was always mostly about Netanyahu ’ s personal conduct . )
What we really need an explanation for is the dismayed reaction to the coming annexation among observers in the United States .
What exactly did these people imagine was going to happen ?
Over the last five decades , successive Israeli governments have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ towns in the West Bank as well as the infrastructure necessary to link them to cities and towns in Israel .
The unstated , but clear to the naked eye , goal was to render such places as Ofra , a town of 3,000 near Nablus , no different from Ramat Hasharon , a suburb of Tel Aviv—meaning an unquestioned and uncontested part of Israel .
It defies logic to believe that Israel would ever give up on this long-term project .
Yet that is exactly what folks inside the Beltway , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and opinion writers , have been doing for years .
It is not that these analysts are willfully ignorant .
But they have harbored a mythology around Israel , the peace process , and Palestine that has made it virtually impossible to grapple with the reality of Israeli annexation .
Now it may be too late .
There was a time when peace seemed possible both to Israelis and Americans—namely , the 1990s .
The United States was at the zenith of its power , the Palestine Liberation Organization recognized Israel ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well as Americans routinely engaged in diplomacy with Palestinian leaders .
Yasser Arafat visited the Oval Office multiple times and paid a condolence call at Yitzhak Rabin ’ s home after the Israeli leader was assassinated .
There were , of course , serious challenges during that era .
In addition to Rabin ’ s death at the hands of an Israeli extremist , Palestinian groups terrorized Israel ’ s cities with waves of bus bombings .
Yet negotiations continued .
Likud came back to power with Netanyahu as prime minister in 1996 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the views on Israel from the United States started to become divorced from reality .
It was during Netanyahu ’ s first stint as prime minister that the Hebron Protocol ( 1997 ) and Wye River Memorandum ( 1998 ) were signed .
These agreements were both monumental—for Washington , though not Israel ( where they never amounted to much ) .
What American diplomats , analysts , and journalists learned , or believed they learned , from them was that Israel could be nudged from a ruinous path of permanent occupation and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laid bare the bankruptcy of the peace process , which after almost a decade of investment collapsed swiftly in September 2000 .
The dirty small-scale war that ensued was a searing experience for Israelis and Palestinians alike .
A lot has been written about the its impact on Israeli society , but suffice it to say that the peace camp became irrelevant .
Israel ’ s national zeitgeist went from Prime Minister Shimon Peres ’ s “ New Middle East ” to Netanyahu ’ s “ there is no partner [ for peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This change has been a boon to the settlement project .
Those Israelis who oppose these policies have failed to offer a coherent alternative that overcomes the “ no partner ” obstacle .
And yet there remains in Washington the stubborn notion that peace is possible and therefore annexation must be avoided .
This hope is based on a belief baked into the peacemaking ethos that with enough encouragement , guarantees , and even implicit threats , Israelis could be brought around to make a deal .
The same logic applies to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ idea that the United States can bring the occupation/annexation to an end runs counter to experience as well as politics , psychology , and geography .
Throughout the 1990s , U.S. officials developed elaborate and ingenious bridging proposals and interim agreements ( like the aforementioned Hebron Protocol and Wye River Memorandum ) , but to no avail .
It was never enough to satisfy the minimum requirements for peace of either the Israelis or Palestinians .
Yet the idea that the United States can be decisive lives on .
While friends of Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concern ” and warned that unilateral actions—such as annexation—would make it more difficult to achieve a “ sustainable peace , ” others have argued that former Vice President Joe Biden , the presumptive presidential nominee for the Democratic Party , could convince the Israeli government to “ think twice ” about annexation or “ at least limit its scope.
” A Biden administration , if he wins in the November election , would apparently accomplish this through dialogue and threats both to limit U.S. diplomatic support to Israel in the face of international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Israel .
The Trump administration has reportedly told Israeli officials that it would only bless annexation of parts of the West Bank if Jerusalem recognized a Palestinian state under the terms of presidential advisor Jared Kushner ’ s peace plan .
That is tough stuff coming from a White House that has been singularly attentive to Netanyahu ’ s political needs .
But the truth is neither persuasion nor coercion are likely to work .
Well-meaning members of Congress and analysts overlook an important fact about the West Bank : For a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , annexation is an existential issue , and the rest—possibly the majority—either do not care enough about the issue , because to their minds there is no partner for peace , or they are too weak to do anything about it .
The view that the United States can cajole or pressure Israel into giving up annexation also does not make sense against the backdrop of the West Bank ’ s historical weight .
It is , after all , the cradle of Judaism , but it has also become the holy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , all the more so since Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ’ s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza—intended in part to strengthen Israel ’ s grip on the West Bank—resulted in a two-year-long barrage of rocket fire on adjacent towns .
The lesson Israelis apparently learned from that experience is clear : hold on to territory , international condemnation be damned .
Under these circumstances , it seems that , regardless of whatever incentives or threats the United States can bring to bear with the goal of forestalling annexation , they are unlikely to work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stakes—life or death .
The most likely outcome is that the whoever is serving in the White House when the time comes will accommodate themselves to annexation of certain parts of the West Bank with Israeli promises not to go any further and to recommit to the peace process .
Of course , it is unlikely the Palestinians would agree to move forward under these conditions , extending a stalemate that only serves the long-term goal of annexation .
Observers in Washington can claim to be as shocked as they want , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this entirely predictable future .

Ever since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz, the leader of the Blue and White coalition, reached a deal on an emergency government, my email inbox has reached a critical mass of commentary, analyses, warnings, invitations to virtual briefings, and calls to action by an alphabet soup of organizations in the United States. The issue that has them so worked up is Israel’s planned annexation of land in the West Bank.
Ever since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz, the leader of the Blue and White coalition, reached a deal on an emergency government, my email inbox has reached a critical mass of commentary, analyses, warnings, invitations to virtual briefings, and calls to action by an alphabet soup of organizations in the United States. The issue that has them so worked up is Israel’s planned annexation of land in the West Bank.
There’s indeed something shocking about this—but it’s less the annexation itself than Washington’s red-alert reaction to it. There should be nothing surprising about either Israel’s intention to annex territory that does not belong to it or Gantz’s willingness to consent to that policy. (His problem with the prime minister was always mostly about Netanyahu’s personal conduct.) What we really need an explanation for is the dismayed reaction to the coming annexation among observers in the United States.
What exactly did these people imagine was going to happen? Over the last five decades, successive Israeli governments have invested in the development of cities and towns in the West Bank as well as the infrastructure necessary to link them to cities and towns in Israel. The unstated, but clear to the naked eye, goal was to render such places as Ofra, a town of 3,000 near Nablus, no different from Ramat Hasharon, a suburb of Tel Aviv—meaning an unquestioned and uncontested part of Israel. It defies logic to believe that Israel would ever give up on this long-term project.
Yet that is exactly what folks inside the Beltway, including long-term Israel watchers, former officials, and opinion writers, have been doing for years. It is not that these analysts are willfully ignorant. But they have harbored a mythology around Israel, the peace process, and Palestine that has made it virtually impossible to grapple with the reality of Israeli annexation. Now it may be too late.
There was a time when peace seemed possible both to Israelis and Americans—namely, the 1990s. The United States was at the zenith of its power, the Palestine Liberation Organization recognized Israel’s right to exist, and Israelis as well as Americans routinely engaged in diplomacy with Palestinian leaders. Yasser Arafat visited the Oval Office multiple times and paid a condolence call at Yitzhak Rabin’s home after the Israeli leader was assassinated.
There were, of course, serious challenges during that era. In addition to Rabin’s death at the hands of an Israeli extremist, Palestinian groups terrorized Israel’s cities with waves of bus bombings. Yet negotiations continued.
Likud came back to power with Netanyahu as prime minister in 1996. In retrospect, this is when the views on Israel from the United States started to become divorced from reality. It was during Netanyahu’s first stint as prime minister that the Hebron Protocol (1997) and Wye River Memorandum (1998) were signed. These agreements were both monumental—for Washington, though not Israel (where they never amounted to much). What American diplomats, analysts, and journalists learned, or believed they learned, from them was that Israel could be nudged from a ruinous path of permanent occupation and annexation.
The Second Intifada should have laid bare the bankruptcy of the peace process, which after almost a decade of investment collapsed swiftly in September 2000. The dirty small-scale war that ensued was a searing experience for Israelis and Palestinians alike. A lot has been written about the its impact on Israeli society, but suffice it to say that the peace camp became irrelevant. Israel’s national zeitgeist went from Prime Minister Shimon Peres’s “New Middle East” to Netanyahu’s “there is no partner [for peace]” and has never shifted back.
This change has been a boon to the settlement project. Those Israelis who oppose these policies have failed to offer a coherent alternative that overcomes the “no partner” obstacle. And yet there remains in Washington the stubborn notion that peace is possible and therefore annexation must be avoided.
This hope is based on a belief baked into the peacemaking ethos that with enough encouragement, guarantees, and even implicit threats, Israelis could be brought around to make a deal. The same logic applies to the problem of annexation, but the idea that the United States can bring the occupation/annexation to an end runs counter to experience as well as politics, psychology, and geography. Throughout the 1990s, U.S. officials developed elaborate and ingenious bridging proposals and interim agreements (like the aforementioned Hebron Protocol and Wye River Memorandum), but to no avail. It was never enough to satisfy the minimum requirements for peace of either the Israelis or Palestinians.
Yet the idea that the United States can be decisive lives on. While friends of Israel in the U.S. Congress have expressed “concern” and warned that unilateral actions—such as annexation—would make it more difficult to achieve a “sustainable peace,” others have argued that former Vice President Joe Biden, the presumptive presidential nominee for the Democratic Party, could convince the Israeli government to “think twice” about annexation or “at least limit its scope.” A Biden administration, if he wins in the November election, would apparently accomplish this through dialogue and threats both to limit U.S. diplomatic support to Israel in the face of international condemnation over annexation and to condition aid to Israel. The Trump administration has reportedly told Israeli officials that it would only bless annexation of parts of the West Bank if Jerusalem recognized a Palestinian state under the terms of presidential advisor Jared Kushner’s peace plan. That is tough stuff coming from a White House that has been singularly attentive to Netanyahu’s political needs.
But the truth is neither persuasion nor coercion are likely to work. Well-meaning members of Congress and analysts overlook an important fact about the West Bank: For a significant number of Israelis (including officials), annexation is an existential issue, and the rest—possibly the majority—either do not care enough about the issue, because to their minds there is no partner for peace, or they are too weak to do anything about it.
The view that the United States can cajole or pressure Israel into giving up annexation also does not make sense against the backdrop of the West Bank’s historical weight. It is, after all, the cradle of Judaism, but it has also become the holy of holies in terms of Israeli security, all the more so since Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza—intended in part to strengthen Israel’s grip on the West Bank—resulted in a two-year-long barrage of rocket fire on adjacent towns. The lesson Israelis apparently learned from that experience is clear: hold on to territory, international condemnation be damned. Under these circumstances, it seems that, regardless of whatever incentives or threats the United States can bring to bear with the goal of forestalling annexation, they are unlikely to work given the way Israelis have defined the stakes—life or death.
The most likely outcome is that the whoever is serving in the White House when the time comes will accommodate themselves to annexation of certain parts of the West Bank with Israeli promises not to go any further and to recommit to the peace process. Of course, it is unlikely the Palestinians would agree to move forward under these conditions, extending a stalemate that only serves the long-term goal of annexation. Observers in Washington can claim to be as shocked as they want, but they would be better off reckoning with this entirely predictable future.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--Germany’s Angst Is Killing Its Coronavirus Tracing App

Germany has long been Europe ’ s cradle of techno-ambivalence .
So when Berlin raced to embrace digital technologies to fight COVID-19 , some observers took it as a new chapter in the country ’ s economic leadership .
If it seemed too good to be true , however , that ’ s because it was .
Berlin ’ s efforts are floundering in a sudden , and telling , fashion .
Even at a time of unprecedented crisis , Germany seems fated to slow down the continent ’ s technological advancement .
The early signs had been auspicious .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ hackathon , # WirVsVirus , drawing more than 28,000 participants and generating 1,500 crowdsourced ideas for combating COVID-19 .
The Robert Koch Institute ( RKI ) , Germany ’ s equivalent of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , rolled out a symptom tracker app connected to fitness bracelets and smartwatches that racked up 400,000 users , providing RKI with swaths of heart rate , temperature , and activity data to monitor COVID-19 development patterns .
Across German society , popular willingness surged to reevaluate the country ’ s stringent and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solutions to stop the virus in its tracks .
The tech euphoria culminated in the launch of the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing ( PEPP-PT ) initiative , which would seek to use Bluetooth technology to trace human-to-human infection contact via smartphones while also adhering to European-level privacy regulations .
The project was announced on April 1 with the support of the Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute , RKI , and 130 leading European computer scientists .
Most importantly , it had the support of German Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s government , which even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops from the German military .
Fronted by Germany ’ s top artificial intelligence cheerleader Hans-Christian Boos , PEPP-PT began to gain momentum , with eight governments announcing support , including France and Italy .
But within weeks , it came crashing down .
Government funding for hackathon projects has been slow to materialize .
RKI ’ s symptom tracker app came under attack from Chaos Computer Club , Germany ’ s influential hacker association , which revealed that the app runs personal data through Big Tech intermediaries and allows German health authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is deleted .
But the biggest domino to fall was PEPP-PT .
An open letter signed by some 300 tech experts viciously criticized the centralized data processing of contract tracing apps .
The PEPP-PT app was designed to provide anonymized data to national health authorities with users ’ consent .
For the letter authors , this was “ mission creep ” toward greater surveillance .
Other critics claimed that PEPP-PT lacked transparency because its founders were unwilling to openly publish their code .
Still others questioned the claim that it was truly a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from France and others , PEPP-PT was essentially a German project .
Also , and not least , the cybersecurity proved shoddy ; the Federal Office for Information Security , Germany ’ s cyber-authority , said the Android version was riddled with vulnerabilities .
The criticism led to an exodus among the app ’ s founding supporters .
PEPP-PT ’ s death nail came from Apple , one half of the Big Tech duopoly that controls 99 percent of German smartphone operating systems .
Unlike Google , Apple refused to unlock its operating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bluetooth data .
Faced with increasing hurdles , the German government shifted its support away from the centralized PEPP-PT to an as-yet-undetermined decentralized option .
Out of the ashes , alternative app projects have taken center stage in the private sector .
The latest standout , the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing ( DP-3T ) —developed by a Swiss-led consortium of techies and civil society—would store data on users ’ phones , relying on decentralized data storage and processing rather than a central hub .
DP-3T has won the support of privacy advocates , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ April 17 for Android and iOS .
But DP-3T ’ s fully decentralized approach is not without its critics—including from within the German government .
Health Minister Jens Spahn exasperatedly questioned why tech civil society would prefer a decentralized option that locally processes data through U.S.-developed operating systems and thus privileges American Big Tech in controlling data rather than national health authorities .
He is not alone .
The decentralized option has increased fears among German tech companies—start-ups and national champions alike—that the COVID-19 crisis will consolidate Germany ’ s dependence on U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GesundZusammen ( “ Healthy Together ” ) coalition of start-ups criticized the government for not seizing contact tracing apps as an opportunity to emancipate European tech from Silicon Valley .
Germany ’ s own legacy tech giants , Deutsche Telekom and SAP , have embraced similar arguments .
The German government has tacitly endorsed their argument , informally tasking those companies with creating a decentralized Stopp Corona app at the end of April .
But , even then , the operating systems for such decentralized apps will remain in the hands of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ German parliament member dryly noted , SAP and Deutsche Telekom aren ’ t exactly known for their app development prowess , in any case . )
Germany ’ s app wars have resurrected familiar tech fault lines .
The country ’ s resistance to centralized data storage and processing is a reflection of historical anxieties .
Postwar West Germany reacted to the experience of totalitarianism by establishing the principle of “ informational self-determination , ” a strict notion of data protection as a human right .
Eventually , Germany exported the principle at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Data Protection Regulation , which , since 2018 , has become a de facto global standard .
Germany continues to have one of the lowest cloud adoption rates in Europe , owing , in part , to a suspicion of potential data abuse by outsiders , a perception reinforced for many by the U.S. National Security Agency and Cambridge Analytica scandals .
Many Germans—not just citizens but businesses and governments—prefer to keep their data physically close , be it in their phones , in on-site servers , or regulated through tough data localization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also confronted Germany with a vexing paradox of Big Tech .
Opting for a decentralized system might be better for privacy in some sense , but it also means relying more heavily on Google or Apple , reinforcing the sense that Europe has sleepwalked through the tech boom of the past decade .
Strangely , the EU itself has played little role in Germany ’ s app debates .
The European Parliament called for a decentralized option , but member states have split into two camps , with France , Italy , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Austria , Switzerland , and Spain backing a decentralized approach .
The U-turn toward a decentralized option by the German government will likely prove decisive .
But it remains unclear to what extent countries ’ regulatory frameworks will allow apps developed in Berlin , Bordeaux , and Barcelona to work across the EU .
Germany ’ s intense debates about surveillance technology—and the trade-offs it brings in terms of autonomy , privacy , and dignity—may not really be about the current crisis at all but rather the next one .
In some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general purpose technologies and lead to new forms of discrimination .
They could also become backdoors to a social scoring system and other deeper forms of surveillance .
Some have called for a task force for coronavirus digital architecture to examine the implications not only of surveillance apps but also blockchain-based immunity passports , fitness symptom monitors , AI-powered triage systems , and social media disinformation monitoring .
That might lead to more oversight from Germany ’ s parliament , which has largely been sidelined in the COVID-19 crisis thus far .
Largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is whether a contact tracing app will work at all .
Despite the political rancor and moral ambivalence around contact tracing apps , Germany ’ s political elite still continues to put a lot of faith—at least rhetorically—in them as the bridge to a post-vaccine future .
But it isn ’ t even clear yet whether the technology will be effective .
The testing that apps rely on abounds with false positive and false negative cases .
Meanwhile , 60 to 70 percent of the population must use the nonmandatory apps in order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ damage done by the polarizing debate around the apps might put that goal in question .
A poll by the German broadcaster ZDF revealed that 47 percent of Germans surveyed would be willing to install a social tracing app—but 42 percent would not .
Taken together , the debate is bit of a Rorschach test for Germany in the global geotech age , one that reveals the country is obsessed , moralizing , and anxious about getting left behind .
It remains to be seen whether Germany—and Europe with it—will do anything about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ app for that .

Germany has long been Europe’s cradle of techno-ambivalence. So when Berlin raced to embrace digital technologies to fight COVID-19, some observers took it as a new chapter in the country’s economic leadership.
Germany has long been Europe’s cradle of techno-ambivalence. So when Berlin raced to embrace digital technologies to fight COVID-19, some observers took it as a new chapter in the country’s economic leadership.
If it seemed too good to be true, however, that’s because it was. Berlin’s efforts are floundering in a sudden, and telling, fashion. Even at a time of unprecedented crisis, Germany seems fated to slow down the continent’s technological advancement.
The early signs had been auspicious. In March, Berlin launched a nationwide hackathon, #WirVsVirus, drawing more than 28,000 participants and generating 1,500 crowdsourced ideas for combating COVID-19. The Robert Koch Institute (RKI), Germany’s equivalent of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, rolled out a symptom tracker app connected to fitness bracelets and smartwatches that racked up 400,000 users, providing RKI with swaths of heart rate, temperature, and activity data to monitor COVID-19 development patterns. Across German society, popular willingness surged to reevaluate the country’s stringent and popular data protection rules in favor of solutions to stop the virus in its tracks.
The tech euphoria culminated in the launch of the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) initiative, which would seek to use Bluetooth technology to trace human-to-human infection contact via smartphones while also adhering to European-level privacy regulations. The project was announced on April 1 with the support of the Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute, RKI, and 130 leading European computer scientists. Most importantly, it had the support of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government, which even announced it would test the app using troops from the German military. Fronted by Germany’s top artificial intelligence cheerleader Hans-Christian Boos, PEPP-PT began to gain momentum, with eight governments announcing support, including France and Italy.
But within weeks, it came crashing down. Government funding for hackathon projects has been slow to materialize. RKI’s symptom tracker app came under attack from Chaos Computer Club, Germany’s influential hacker association, which revealed that the app runs personal data through Big Tech intermediaries and allows German health authorities access to data even after the app is deleted.
But the biggest domino to fall was PEPP-PT. An open letter signed by some 300 tech experts viciously criticized the centralized data processing of contract tracing apps. The PEPP-PT app was designed to provide anonymized data to national health authorities with users’ consent. For the letter authors, this was “mission creep” toward greater surveillance. Other critics claimed that PEPP-PT lacked transparency because its founders were unwilling to openly publish their code. Still others questioned the claim that it was truly a pan-European initiative; despite some token additions from France and others, PEPP-PT was essentially a German project. Also, and not least, the cybersecurity proved shoddy; the Federal Office for Information Security, Germany’s cyber-authority, said the Android version was riddled with vulnerabilities.
The criticism led to an exodus among the app’s founding supporters. PEPP-PT’s death nail came from Apple, one half of the Big Tech duopoly that controls 99 percent of German smartphone operating systems. Unlike Google, Apple refused to unlock its operating system interface to allow central processing of Bluetooth data. Faced with increasing hurdles, the German government shifted its support away from the centralized PEPP-PT to an as-yet-undetermined decentralized option.
Out of the ashes, alternative app projects have taken center stage in the private sector. The latest standout, the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T)—developed by a Swiss-led consortium of techies and civil society—would store data on users’ phones, relying on decentralized data storage and processing rather than a central hub. DP-3T has won the support of privacy advocates, and a prototype has been available since April 17 for Android and iOS. But DP-3T’s fully decentralized approach is not without its critics—including from within the German government. Health Minister Jens Spahn exasperatedly questioned why tech civil society would prefer a decentralized option that locally processes data through U.S.-developed operating systems and thus privileges American Big Tech in controlling data rather than national health authorities.
He is not alone. The decentralized option has increased fears among German tech companies—start-ups and national champions alike—that the COVID-19 crisis will consolidate Germany’s dependence on U.S. tech giants. The country’s GesundZusammen (“Healthy Together”) coalition of start-ups criticized the government for not seizing contact tracing apps as an opportunity to emancipate European tech from Silicon Valley. Germany’s own legacy tech giants, Deutsche Telekom and SAP, have embraced similar arguments. The German government has tacitly endorsed their argument, informally tasking those companies with creating a decentralized Stopp Corona app at the end of April. But, even then, the operating systems for such decentralized apps will remain in the hands of the U.S. tech giants. (As one German parliament member dryly noted, SAP and Deutsche Telekom aren’t exactly known for their app development prowess, in any case.)
Germany’s app wars have resurrected familiar tech fault lines. The country’s resistance to centralized data storage and processing is a reflection of historical anxieties. Postwar West Germany reacted to the experience of totalitarianism by establishing the principle of “informational self-determination,” a strict notion of data protection as a human right. Eventually, Germany exported the principle at the European Union level through the General Data Protection Regulation, which, since 2018, has become a de facto global standard.
Germany continues to have one of the lowest cloud adoption rates in Europe, owing, in part, to a suspicion of potential data abuse by outsiders, a perception reinforced for many by the U.S. National Security Agency and Cambridge Analytica scandals. Many Germans—not just citizens but businesses and governments—prefer to keep their data physically close, be it in their phones, in on-site servers, or regulated through tough data localization laws.
The COVID-19 app wars have also confronted Germany with a vexing paradox of Big Tech. Opting for a decentralized system might be better for privacy in some sense, but it also means relying more heavily on Google or Apple, reinforcing the sense that Europe has sleepwalked through the tech boom of the past decade.
Strangely, the EU itself has played little role in Germany’s app debates. The European Parliament called for a decentralized option, but member states have split into two camps, with France, Italy, and Britain in favor of a centralized solution and Austria, Switzerland, and Spain backing a decentralized approach. The U-turn toward a decentralized option by the German government will likely prove decisive. But it remains unclear to what extent countries’ regulatory frameworks will allow apps developed in Berlin, Bordeaux, and Barcelona to work across the EU.
Germany’s intense debates about surveillance technology—and the trade-offs it brings in terms of autonomy, privacy, and dignity—may not really be about the current crisis at all but rather the next one. In some instances, contact tracing apps can become general purpose technologies and lead to new forms of discrimination. They could also become backdoors to a social scoring system and other deeper forms of surveillance. Some have called for a task force for coronavirus digital architecture to examine the implications not only of surveillance apps but also blockchain-based immunity passports, fitness symptom monitors, AI-powered triage systems, and social media disinformation monitoring. That might lead to more oversight from Germany’s parliament, which has largely been sidelined in the COVID-19 crisis thus far.
Largely left out of the discussion in Germany is whether a contact tracing app will work at all. Despite the political rancor and moral ambivalence around contact tracing apps, Germany’s political elite still continues to put a lot of faith—at least rhetorically—in them as the bridge to a post-vaccine future. But it isn’t even clear yet whether the technology will be effective. The testing that apps rely on abounds with false positive and false negative cases. Meanwhile, 60 to 70 percent of the population must use the nonmandatory apps in order to work, but the public opinion damage done by the polarizing debate around the apps might put that goal in question. A poll by the German broadcaster ZDF revealed that 47 percent of Germans surveyed would be willing to install a social tracing app—but 42 percent would not.
Taken together, the debate is bit of a Rorschach test for Germany in the global geotech age, one that reveals the country is obsessed, moralizing, and anxious about getting left behind. It remains to be seen whether Germany—and Europe with it—will do anything about it. Maybe there’s an app for that.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--The Pandemic Has Triggered Dramatic Shifts in the Global Criminal Underworld

The Pandemic Has Triggered Dramatic Shifts in the Global Criminal Underworld To say that COVID-19 changes everything is already a cliché .
But it ’ s also true .
The pandemic is deepening tension between China and the United States , accelerating the digitalization of commerce , and shining a bright light on the inequalities that divide our societies .
It is also triggering dramatic knock-on effects in the criminal underworld .
After a temporary lull in homicidal violence in some countries , there are signs that it is rising once more .
Meanwhile , crime groups are migrating online @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left to their own devices , they could make the world a more dangerous place.Police shortages and market shocks are triggering fresh waves of violence in Brazil , Colombia , and Mexico , where criminal groups are fighting over a diminishing pie .
Many countries actually witnessed declines in some types of crime and increases in others shortly after the imposition of social distancing and lockdowns to slow the virus .
In much of North America and Western Europe , for example , murder and violent assault plummeted as people stayed at home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestic abuse and sexual violence exploded .
Predictably , the confinement of people to their homes increased exposure to abusive partners .
Some of the world ’ s most violent nations recorded dramatic drops in violent crime .
U.S. cities such as Chicago , Los Angeles , and New York experienced stunning declines in robbery and rape .
El Salvador , routinely ranked among the most dangerous countries , saw homicides drop from 114 in February to 65 in March .
South Africa , the continent ’ s crime capital , registered just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of lockdown , compared with 326 during the same period the year before .
Although welcome , these improvements in safety could be fleeting .
Physical distancing , curfews , and shelter-in-place orders are not deterring drug cartels , gangs , and militias .
To the contrary , a combination of police shortages and supply and demand shocks in the drug market are triggering fresh waves of violence , especially in Brazil , Colombia , and Mexico , where criminal groups are fighting over a diminishing pie .
The deterioration in security also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ release of inmates from the region ’ s notoriously violent prisons—some of whom are already settling old scores .
Brazil ’ s three-year decline in homicide has come to screeching halt .
In São Paulo , home to one of Latin America ’ s most powerful drug trafficking organizations , murders were up 10 percent between March 2019 and March 2020 .
And in the northern state of Ceará , violent crimes ( including homicide ) spiked by 98 percent in just 10 days in March .
Levels of reported domestic violence have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by more than 50 percent in Rio de Janeiro alone .
Mexico also witnessed a dramatic escalation in lethal violence , especially in states like Chihuahua , Michoacán , and especially Guanajuato , which are dominated by drug cartels .
The authorities registered more than 2,500 homicides nationwide in March , the highest monthly toll since records started being kept in 1997 .
With the armed forces and police distracted with pandemic control measures , Mexico ’ s more than 200 criminal groups are fighting over control of drug routes and industrial-scale syphoning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are enforcing lockdown orders in informal settlements and slums .
Even El Salvador ’ s remarkable crime decline was shattered by a sharp increase in gang violence over the past weeks .
After dozens of people were slaughtered over a single weekend in late April , the president ramped up arrests and authorized lethal force to stem the bloodshed .
These iron-fisted measures could make a bad situation worse : Gangs already control the country ’ s jails , and the mixing of rival factions is a recipe for disaster .
Across these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not police , are enforcing lockdown orders in informal settlements and slums .
Criminal factions , militias , and mafia groups are also conveniently reinforcing their soft power in the process .
Some are providing basic services and delivering toilet paper , canned goods , and perishable food items to the poor , infirm , and older adults .
Others are posting warnings online and off about abiding by curfews and social isolation .
Their appeal may be growing at a time when government leadership is lacking .
The surge in drug-related violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global markets .
The slowdown in international trade means that cartels and gangs have fewer opportunities to move their illegal merchandise through global supply chains , whether by land , air , or sea .
Meanwhile , drug producers in Bolivia , Colombia , Peru , and Mexico are struggling to source precursor chemicals to make methamphetamines , fentanyl , and even cocaine .
The lockdown of Chinese factories is not only impacting the export and sale of iPhones but also of counterfeit goods .
The global economic crunch is triggering supply and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a whole .
Anticipating a slowdown in international trade due to the pandemic , some Latin American traffickers ramped up shipments in recent months .
European law enforcement officials reported a surge in cocaine imports in March and April with sizable seizures in Antwerp , Belgium , one of the continent ’ s busiest ports .
And despite the shuttering of many international airports , satellites have tracked a steady stream of planes landing and taking off from Guinea-Bissau , suggesting that its role as a known transit hub for cocaine persists .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ substituting in alternatives once their drug of choice becomes harder to source .
Growing numbers of Europeans are reportedly shifting from foreign-manufactured cocaine to homegrown marijuana .
Others are hoarding drugs , which means increased prices .
As a result , some heroin users are shifting to more potent and dangerous opiates such as fentanyl .
Across the region , COVID-19 is also accelerating the purchase of drugs online , including via the so-called dark web .
The disruptions to global drug markets may be temporary , but they could have longer-term effects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up , gangs will increasingly target banks , shops , and residences to generate revenue .
In Latin America and other parts of the world , crime groups will resort to old-fashioned kidnapping , extortion , and protection rackets to keep the cash flowing .
People-smuggling will suffer a downturn due to the tightening of borders , putting trafficked victims at greater risk .
Meanwhile , many crime syndicates will branch into more lucrative businesses—especially cybercrime such as ransomware , phishing , and identity theft , which has seen a sharp rise as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ struggling to source precursor chemicals to make methamphetamines , fentanyl , and even cocaine .
The COVID-19 pandemic is also shaking up other forms of organized crime .
The trade of endangered wildlife is one example .
China banned the trade in wildlife early into the pandemic .
But this may mean such activity moves elsewhere , with reports emerging of Vietnamese traders in Hanoi marketing tiger bone glue and rhino horn as cures for COVID-19 .
Meanwhile , Mexico ’ s Jalisco New Generation cartel is reportedly already one of the top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They are part of a thriving global black market for counterfeit or stolen medicine and personal protective equipment .
Far from view , COVID-19 has given rise to a transformation in organized crime .
In addition to fueling rising violence , the pandemic could enhance the social , economic , and political clout of some criminal organizations in the same way that the Italian mafia and Japanese yakuza emerged stronger after the great dislocations of World War II .
Crime bosses know full well that law enforcement and criminal justice systems are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the seams in Latin America and elsewhere .
They also know great scarcity is coming , which may increase the risk of violence .
The question is whether we are even remotely ready .

To say that COVID-19 changes everything is already a cliché. But it’s also true. The pandemic is deepening tension between China and the United States, accelerating the digitalization of commerce, and shining a bright light on the inequalities that divide our societies. It is also triggering dramatic knock-on effects in the criminal underworld. After a temporary lull in homicidal violence in some countries, there are signs that it is rising once more. Meanwhile, crime groups are migrating online to where the action is. If left to their own devices, they could make the world a more dangerous place.
To say that COVID-19 changes everything is already a cliché. But it’s also true. The pandemic is deepening tension between China and the United States, accelerating the digitalization of commerce, and shining a bright light on the inequalities that divide our societies. It is also triggering dramatic knock-on effects in the criminal underworld. After a temporary lull in homicidal violence in some countries, there are signs that it is rising once more. Meanwhile, crime groups are migrating online to where the action is. If left to their own devices, they could make the world a more dangerous place.
Many countries actually witnessed declines in some types of crime and increases in others shortly after the imposition of social distancing and lockdowns to slow the virus. In much of North America and Western Europe, for example, murder and violent assault plummeted as people stayed at home. On the other hand, reported domestic abuse and sexual violence exploded. Predictably, the confinement of people to their homes increased exposure to abusive partners.
Some of the world’s most violent nations recorded dramatic drops in violent crime. U.S. cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York experienced stunning declines in robbery and rape. El Salvador, routinely ranked among the most dangerous countries, saw homicides drop from 114 in February to 65 in March. South Africa, the continent’s crime capital, registered just 94 homicides in the first few weeks of lockdown, compared with 326 during the same period the year before.
Although welcome, these improvements in safety could be fleeting. Physical distancing, curfews, and shelter-in-place orders are not deterring drug cartels, gangs, and militias. To the contrary, a combination of police shortages and supply and demand shocks in the drug market are triggering fresh waves of violence, especially in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, where criminal groups are fighting over a diminishing pie. The deterioration in security also appears to be compounded by the early release of inmates from the region’s notoriously violent prisons—some of whom are already settling old scores.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Brazil’s three-year decline in homicide has come to screeching halt. In São Paulo, home to one of Latin America’s most powerful drug trafficking organizations, murders were up 10 percent between March 2019 and March 2020. And in the northern state of Ceará, violent crimes (including homicide) spiked by 98 percent in just 10 days in March. Levels of reported domestic violence have also surged in most states, including by more than 50 percent in Rio de Janeiro alone.
Mexico also witnessed a dramatic escalation in lethal violence, especially in states like Chihuahua, Michoacán, and especially Guanajuato, which are dominated by drug cartels. The authorities registered more than 2,500 homicides nationwide in March, the highest monthly toll since records started being kept in 1997. With the armed forces and police distracted with pandemic control measures, Mexico’s more than 200 criminal groups are fighting over control of drug routes and industrial-scale syphoning of gasoline.
Even El Salvador’s remarkable crime decline was shattered by a sharp increase in gang violence over the past weeks. After dozens of people were slaughtered over a single weekend in late April, the president ramped up arrests and authorized lethal force to stem the bloodshed. These iron-fisted measures could make a bad situation worse: Gangs already control the country’s jails, and the mixing of rival factions is a recipe for disaster.
Across these and other countries, crime groups, not police, are enforcing lockdown orders in informal settlements and slums. Criminal factions, militias, and mafia groups are also conveniently reinforcing their soft power in the process. Some are providing basic services and delivering toilet paper, canned goods, and perishable food items to the poor, infirm, and older adults. Others are posting warnings online and off about abiding by curfews and social isolation. Their appeal may be growing at a time when government leadership is lacking.
The surge in drug-related violence partly comes down to changes underway in global markets. The slowdown in international trade means that cartels and gangs have fewer opportunities to move their illegal merchandise through global supply chains, whether by land, air, or sea. Meanwhile, drug producers in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico are struggling to source precursor chemicals to make methamphetamines, fentanyl, and even cocaine. The lockdown of Chinese factories is not only impacting the export and sale of iPhones but also of counterfeit goods.
The global economic crunch is triggering supply and demand shocks for the narcotics business as a whole. Anticipating a slowdown in international trade due to the pandemic, some Latin American traffickers ramped up shipments in recent months. European law enforcement officials reported a surge in cocaine imports in March and April with sizable seizures in Antwerp, Belgium, one of the continent’s busiest ports. And despite the shuttering of many international airports, satellites have tracked a steady stream of planes landing and taking off from Guinea-Bissau, suggesting that its role as a known transit hub for cocaine persists.
There are signs that users themselves are substituting in alternatives once their drug of choice becomes harder to source. Growing numbers of Europeans are reportedly shifting from foreign-manufactured cocaine to homegrown marijuana. Others are hoarding drugs, which means increased prices. As a result, some heroin users are shifting to more potent and dangerous opiates such as fentanyl. Across the region, COVID-19 is also accelerating the purchase of drugs online, including via the so-called dark web.
The disruptions to global drug markets may be temporary, but they could have longer-term effects on crime. With their liquidity drying up, gangs will increasingly target banks, shops, and residences to generate revenue. In Latin America and other parts of the world, crime groups will resort to old-fashioned kidnapping, extortion, and protection rackets to keep the cash flowing. People-smuggling will suffer a downturn due to the tightening of borders, putting trafficked victims at greater risk. Meanwhile, many crime syndicates will branch into more lucrative businesses—especially cybercrime such as ransomware, phishing, and identity theft, which has seen a sharp rise as the world goes increasingly digital.
The COVID-19 pandemic is also shaking up other forms of organized crime. The trade of endangered wildlife is one example. China banned the trade in wildlife early into the pandemic. But this may mean such activity moves elsewhere, with reports emerging of Vietnamese traders in Hanoi marketing tiger bone glue and rhino horn as cures for COVID-19. Meanwhile, Mexico’s Jalisco New Generation cartel is reportedly already one of the top vendors of stolen and pirated pharmaceutical products. They are part of a thriving global black market for counterfeit or stolen medicine and personal protective equipment.
Far from view, COVID-19 has given rise to a transformation in organized crime. In addition to fueling rising violence, the pandemic could enhance the social, economic, and political clout of some criminal organizations in the same way that the Italian mafia and Japanese yakuza emerged stronger after the great dislocations of World War II. Crime bosses know full well that law enforcement and criminal justice systems are overstretched and that prisons are bursting at the seams in Latin America and elsewhere. They also know great scarcity is coming, which may increase the risk of violence. The question is whether we are even remotely ready.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-09--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

It ’ s been two years since the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal .
Now , Iran is even closer to producing a nuclear weapon .
Meanwhile , both sides of the Libyan civil war are relying on disaffected Syrians to boost their war efforts .
And the pandemic has opened space for the Taliban to continue to erode the legitimacy of the Afghan government .
1 .
Despite U.S. Sanctions , Iran Expands Its Nuclear Stockpile Two years after U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Foreign Policy ’ s Colum Lynch reports .
2 .
U.S .
Naval Standoff With China Fails to Reassure Regional Allies A recent naval standoff with China in the South China Sea shows that if South Asian countries want to continue to rely on the U.S. Navy , they need to collectively come up with ways to rotate the burden of hosting it , Euan Graham writes .
Turkey and Russia are increasingly turning to proxies composed of exiled Syrians to advance their geopolitical interests in Libya , Anchal Vohra writes .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pandemic Is a Ladder The Taliban are using the coronavirus as an opportunity to build legitimacy and further entrench themselves in Afghan society , Ashley Jackson writes .
5 .
How Are Countries Reopening ?
Firsthand Reports From Around the World The world is reacting to coronavirus lockdowns in myriad different ways .
Amanda Sloat emailed friends , colleagues , and acquaintances across the world to learn how their societies were preparing to reopen .

It’s been two years since the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. Now, Iran is even closer to producing a nuclear weapon.
It’s been two years since the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. Now, Iran is even closer to producing a nuclear weapon.
Meanwhile, both sides of the Libyan civil war are relying on disaffected Syrians to boost their war efforts.
And the pandemic has opened space for the Taliban to continue to erode the legitimacy of the Afghan government.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
An International Atomic Energy Agency inspector visits the Natanz enrichment facility, south of Tehran, on Jan. 20, 2014.
Two years after U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran has resumed its enrichment of uranium, Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch reports.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy aircraft carrier Liaoning participates in a naval parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of China's PLA Navy in the sea near Qingdao in eastern China's Shandong province, on April 23, 2019.
A recent naval standoff with China in the South China Sea shows that if South Asian countries want to continue to rely on the U.S. Navy, they need to collectively come up with ways to rotate the burden of hosting it, Euan Graham writes.
Pro-Turkish Syrian fighters
Turkey and Russia are increasingly turning to proxies composed of exiled Syrians to advance their geopolitical interests in Libya, Anchal Vohra writes.
Taliban militants and villagers attend a gathering as they celebrate the U.S.-Afghan peace deal in Laghman province, Afghanistan, on March 2.
The Taliban are using the coronavirus as an opportunity to build legitimacy and further entrench themselves in Afghan society, Ashley Jackson writes.
A stylist washes a customer’s hair at a salon in Burgos, Spain, on May 4. It was the first time the salon was open since the country’s lockdown began.
The world is reacting to coronavirus lockdowns in myriad different ways. Amanda Sloat emailed friends, colleagues, and acquaintances across the world to learn how their societies were preparing to reopen.