foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--As Wuhan Virus Spreads, Taiwan Has No Say at WHO

As Wuhan Virus Spreads , Taiwan Has No Say at WHO On Wednesday , the World Health Organization ( WHO ) is convening an emergency committee of experts to assess whether the coronavirus outbreak that originated in Wuhan , China , constitutes an international crisis .
But one of the countries affected , Taiwan , will not be represented .
Taiwan confirmed its first case of the pneumonia on Jan. 21 , a potentially fatal illness similar to the deadly SARS outbreak of 2002-2003 .
The United States confirmed its first case the same day .
Although official statements before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confined to Wuhan and only a few dozen cases , the number of reported human infections has grown dramatically , to more than 500 in China , and cases have also now been confirmed in Australia , Japan , Thailand , and South Korea .
The seventeen people who have been confirmed to have died from the illness were in Wuhan , and many of the others infected had lived in or traveled there .
All of this comes just days ahead of Lunar New Year , celebrated across Asia , when China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take 3 billion trips to celebrate the festival with their families , in the largest annual human migration in the world .
Many of the 1 million Taiwanese living in China will return to Taiwan during this period .
But Taiwan is no longer able to attend the World Health Assembly , WHO ’ s annual policy meeting .
China has prevented Taiwan from attending since 2016 , after President Tsai Ing-wen was elected for the first time .
Since her election , Beijing has stepped up its existing military and economic pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-sovereignty status as a veil for Taiwanese independence .
Under what other circumstances would 24 million people be excluded from representation in such an important organization ?
Beijing—and the WHO authorities that bend to its will—is allowing political and diplomatic sensitivities to interfere with the administration of global health and safety .
Beijing relies on a United Nations resolution passed on Oct. 25 , 1971 , recognizing the People ’ s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the U.N. China ’ s Taiwan Affairs Office has openly thanked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inaccurate representation of Tsai ’ s views on Taiwan ’ s independence .
These efforts border on petty , with Beijing at times refusing Taiwan ’ s right to host sporting events .
While Taiwan is able to participate in the Olympic Games under the name “ Chinese Taipei , ” there are questions as to whether Beijing will even tolerate this when China hosts the Winter Olympics in 2022 .
The East Asian Olympic Committee bowed to Beijing ’ s pressure and canceled Taiwan ’ s planned hosting of the East Asian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similarly been excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organization ( ICAO ) , despite Taiwan ’ s largest airport receiving 46.5 million passengers in 2018 .
While Taiwan was able to attend the 38th ICAO Assembly in 2013 as a special guest , it was refused entry for the triennial assemblies in 2016 and 2019 .
Beijing ’ s successful attempts to exclude Taiwan from international organizations have serious consequences .
While Taiwanese officials receive information on unfolding health crises such as coronavirus from counterparts in China or elsewhere , no formal mechanism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a timely manner .
Taiwan has a history of managing previous outbreaks in the region , from SARS to swine flu , well .
It shouldn ’ t simply be a passive recipient of thirdhand information ; it should have a seat at the table in the planning and preparatory meetings of WHO .
Tsai herself said at a press conference on Jan. 22 that WHO should not exclude Taiwan for political reasons and find space to allow Taiwan ’ s attendance .
By her side was Vice President Chen Chien-jen , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SARS in 2003 as health minister .
China was widely criticized for its opaque handling of the SARS outbreak , which claimed nearly 800 lives .
It was only after two SARS-related fatalities that WHO agreed to send specialists to Taiwan .
But Taiwan ’ s experiences of late are limited to managing disease .
As Tsai took to the stage on Jan. 11 , reelected with a record number of 8.17 million votes , she had a message for the world : “ All countries should consider Taiwan a partner , not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Not only does Taiwan deserve to be a normal country , but there is much to learn from Taiwan .
Delegations of observers from all over the world , from Australia to Japan , the Czech Republic to the Philippines , traveled to Taiwan to witness the Jan. 11 elections .
Tsai in her acceptance speech noted the election had received “ unprecedented international attention ” and she hoped in turn that “ Taiwan will be given a fair opportunity to participate in international affairs.
” Taiwan has a long history of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that many other countries are slowly waking up to .
The solutions it has been forced to find to questions such as how to balance the demands of an increasingly authoritarian Beijing against the attractions of its lucrative market , how to manage relations with Washington when the United States seems to be retreating from the region , and how to defend its democratic system in the face of actors apparently intent on undermining it are ones that others badly need .
As a result , Taiwan has weathered the U.S.-China trade war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite the economic interdependence between Taiwan and China ’ s economies—without conceding ground to Beijing .
While many other third-wave democracies have backslid , Taiwan is one of the freest societies on Earth , according to Freedom House .
Taiwan has been on the front lines of these debates for decades .
China ’ s efforts to airbrush Taiwan ’ s existence and control the international narrative about the inevitability of unification are in part to convince the international community that Taiwan isn ’ t worth a war .
International observers may hope @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy toward Taiwan over the next four years .
But the internal logic in Xi Jinping ’ s China makes this unlikely .
Instead , the next four years will likely see more pressure on Taiwan ’ s remaining diplomatic partners and less space for its international participation .
But Taiwan can flip that strategy .
By encouraging more international support in areas like health that are clearly in the national interest of the United States or Australia , it can hope that China will continue to see that the costs of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the costs of patience .
In some areas , it will be difficult for other countries to navigate Beijing ’ s sensitivities about Taiwan .
Negotiating trade agreements or conducting joint military exercises may be a step too far—but issues such as health and aviation have direct national interest consequences for many other players .
Only international support can resist China ’ s efforts to erase Taiwan .
The coronavirus outbreak is deeply worrying but also a timely reminder that Taiwan needs to be readmitted to WHO and other international bodies .
Rather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be resolved , it should be a partner in the challenges that liberal democracies will face over the decades to come .

On Wednesday, the World Health Organization (WHO) is convening an emergency committee of experts to assess whether the coronavirus outbreak that originated in Wuhan, China, constitutes an international crisis. But one of the countries affected, Taiwan, will not be represented.
On Wednesday, the World Health Organization (WHO) is convening an emergency committee of experts to assess whether the coronavirus outbreak that originated in Wuhan, China, constitutes an international crisis. But one of the countries affected, Taiwan, will not be represented.
Taiwan confirmed its first case of the pneumonia on Jan. 21, a potentially fatal illness similar to the deadly SARS outbreak of 2002-2003. The United States confirmed its first case the same day.
Although official statements before last weekend claimed the infection was still confined to Wuhan and only a few dozen cases, the number of reported human infections has grown dramatically, to more than 500 in China, and cases have also now been confirmed in Australia, Japan, Thailand, and South Korea. The seventeen people who have been confirmed to have died from the illness were in Wuhan, and many of the others infected had lived in or traveled there.
All of this comes just days ahead of Lunar New Year, celebrated across Asia, when China’s government estimates that people will take 3 billion trips to celebrate the festival with their families, in the largest annual human migration in the world. Many of the 1 million Taiwanese living in China will return to Taiwan during this period.
But Taiwan is no longer able to attend the World Health Assembly, WHO’s annual policy meeting. China has prevented Taiwan from attending since 2016, after President Tsai Ing-wen was elected for the first time. Since her election, Beijing has stepped up its existing military and economic pressure on Taiwan, viewing Tsai’s pro-sovereignty status as a veil for Taiwanese independence.
Under what other circumstances would 24 million people be excluded from representation in such an important organization? Beijing—and the WHO authorities that bend to its will—is allowing political and diplomatic sensitivities to interfere with the administration of global health and safety.
Beijing relies on a United Nations resolution passed on Oct. 25, 1971, recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the U.N. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office has openly thanked WHO for excluding Taiwan, blaming an inaccurate representation of Tsai’s views on Taiwan’s independence.
These efforts border on petty, with Beijing at times refusing Taiwan’s right to host sporting events. While Taiwan is able to participate in the Olympic Games under the name “Chinese Taipei,” there are questions as to whether Beijing will even tolerate this when China hosts the Winter Olympics in 2022. The East Asian Olympic Committee bowed to Beijing’s pressure and canceled Taiwan’s planned hosting of the East Asian Youth Games in 2018.
Taiwan has similarly been excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite Taiwan’s largest airport receiving 46.5 million passengers in 2018. While Taiwan was able to attend the 38th ICAO Assembly in 2013 as a special guest, it was refused entry for the triennial assemblies in 2016 and 2019.
Beijing’s successful attempts to exclude Taiwan from international organizations have serious consequences. While Taiwanese officials receive information on unfolding health crises such as coronavirus from counterparts in China or elsewhere, no formal mechanism exists to ensure that it is received in a timely manner.
Taiwan has a history of managing previous outbreaks in the region, from SARS to swine flu, well. It shouldn’t simply be a passive recipient of thirdhand information; it should have a seat at the table in the planning and preparatory meetings of WHO. Tsai herself said at a press conference on Jan. 22 that WHO should not exclude Taiwan for political reasons and find space to allow Taiwan’s attendance. By her side was Vice President Chen Chien-jen, who managed Taiwan’s response to SARS in 2003 as health minister. China was widely criticized for its opaque handling of the SARS outbreak, which claimed nearly 800 lives. It was only after two SARS-related fatalities that WHO agreed to send specialists to Taiwan.
But Taiwan’s experiences of late are limited to managing disease. As Tsai took to the stage on Jan. 11, reelected with a record number of 8.17 million votes, she had a message for the world: “All countries should consider Taiwan a partner, not an issue.” She’s right. Not only does Taiwan deserve to be a normal country, but there is much to learn from Taiwan.
Delegations of observers from all over the world, from Australia to Japan, the Czech Republic to the Philippines, traveled to Taiwan to witness the Jan. 11 elections. Tsai in her acceptance speech noted the election had received “unprecedented international attention” and she hoped in turn that “Taiwan will be given a fair opportunity to participate in international affairs.”
Taiwan has a long history of being bullied by China, a situation that many other countries are slowly waking up to. The solutions it has been forced to find to questions such as how to balance the demands of an increasingly authoritarian Beijing against the attractions of its lucrative market, how to manage relations with Washington when the United States seems to be retreating from the region, and how to defend its democratic system in the face of actors apparently intent on undermining it are ones that others badly need. As a result, Taiwan has weathered the U.S.-China trade war better than any other Asian tiger, despite the economic interdependence between Taiwan and China’s economies—without conceding ground to Beijing. While many other third-wave democracies have backslid, Taiwan is one of the freest societies on Earth, according to Freedom House. Taiwan has been on the front lines of these debates for decades.
China’s efforts to airbrush Taiwan’s existence and control the international narrative about the inevitability of unification are in part to convince the international community that Taiwan isn’t worth a war. International observers may hope that China may adopt a more flexible policy toward Taiwan over the next four years. But the internal logic in Xi Jinping’s China makes this unlikely. Instead, the next four years will likely see more pressure on Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners and less space for its international participation.
But Taiwan can flip that strategy. By encouraging more international support in areas like health that are clearly in the national interest of the United States or Australia, it can hope that China will continue to see that the costs of a messy, high-risk, protracted war outweigh the costs of patience.
In some areas, it will be difficult for other countries to navigate Beijing’s sensitivities about Taiwan. Negotiating trade agreements or conducting joint military exercises may be a step too far—but issues such as health and aviation have direct national interest consequences for many other players.
Only international support can resist China’s efforts to erase Taiwan. The coronavirus outbreak is deeply worrying but also a timely reminder that Taiwan needs to be readmitted to WHO and other international bodies. Rather than treat Taiwan as a problem to be resolved, it should be a partner in the challenges that liberal democracies will face over the decades to come.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--The Future of Development Is Local

The Future of Development Is Local

The Future of Development Is Local In 2010 , the rate of people around the world living in extreme poverty—that is , surviving on less that $ 1.25 a day—was officially cut in half since 1990 .
It was the crowning achievement of the Millennium Development Goals , the global framework developed by the United Nations and others in 2000 to catalyze transformative economic development .
This progress , however , was built on the edifice of the post-World War II economic order : the capital markets , trade and migration networks , digital infrastructure , and institutions that were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and thereby encourage cooperation and peace among them .
Practically every driver that facilitated this dramatic reduction in global extreme poverty—the global exchange of goods , services , and capital through transnational markets ; the regional movement of production and manufacturing hubs that created global value chains ; and the flow of ideas , innovation , and data that undergirded the digital economy—stemmed from an order designed to serve and support nation-states .
But the post-World War II architecture is reaching its structural limits .
In particular , it is incompatible with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the successor to the Millennium Development Goals , which are 17 objectives designed to bring sustainable development to every part of the world—notably the world ’ s developing nations and , in particular , the world ’ s least-developed countries .
The new goals include completely eliminating global extreme poverty , managing sustainable production and consumption cycles , ending all forms of discrimination against women and girls , and strengthening resilience and adaptivity to hazards tied to climate change .
These challenges mostly reside in the cities and communities in developing countries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the poorest and most underserved markets in the world .
But the current global financial architecture centers on sovereign states , with international credit and the benefits of such credit—notably the ability to raise capital in order to fund projects , including infrastructure—tending to flow to countries rather than to the neediest local communities themselves .
The problem with this nation-centric approach is that financing is not going to those most incentivized or equipped to support the projects that advance sustainable development .
At a macro level , the problem with this nation-centric @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going to those most incentivized or equipped to support the projects that advance sustainable development .
Cities and local governments have the proximity necessary to better provide social and public services that meet their community ’ s needs , including those that define sustainable development—ending hunger ; providing quality education , clean water , and sanitation ; and making sure residents have access to affordable clean energy , decent work , and economic growth , to name a few .
When local governments have to make funding decisions , they will typically prioritize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or rather than , another .
But when funding flows to the national government , the opportunity cost calculations are different .
And even if international donors and investors encourage better national governance , and they should , funding for local projects still competes , often unfavorably , with national government priorities—such as national defense , foreign affairs operations , government salaries , and national budget deficits .
In the era of the Sustainable Development Goals , local communities are almost always the lead development actor .
In fact , a deeper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shows that almost 65 percent of them are supposed to be implemented by local governments .
And yet the global financial architecture does not operate on that basis .
These shifts in financial and demographic power have implications for accessing the international credit that can fund the projects supporting sustainable development , which can be seen in the context of individual development challenges .
Relative to national governments , local governments are singularly positioned to advance projects to address climate change , including infrastructure projects for climate adaptation and resilience : They have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are able to convene local stakeholders to democratize the creation of a climate action plan , for example , and they can pass appropriate policies in much easier fashion than central governments .
Yet , a nation-state-centric system can prevent climate finance from reaching those who can best enact the necessary projects .
Look to the sinking of Jakarta , Indonesia , the flooding of Venice , Italy , or New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina and consider how much worse the challenge is for the developing and least-developed countries .
The same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in response to climate change apply when it comes to sustainable development , too .
Take access to funding for development , for example .
First , cities in poorer countries often suffer a lack of domestic financing .
Savings pools in most of the least-developed nations are low and hardly adequate to finance the infrastructure needed to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals .
Many developing countries also lack the regulatory and policy frameworks that give cities the legal authority to collect taxes , issue bonds , or be sued for their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are stuck between hoping that more money trickles down from the central government or accessing international credit .
But in a nation-centric system , the second is often impossible .
Municipalities in poorer , developing nations are effectively frozen out of credit markets because they are subject to the debt limits of their national governments .
Under this nation-centric architecture , national debt determines whether cities can access international credit almost regardless of that city ’ s own debt profile .
By contrast , cities in wealthier nations can easily attract investment through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on their own financial health .
Additionally , in various developing countries and least-developed countries , municipalities looking to borrow in local currency , as opposed to hard currencies , require permission from central governments before they can access this credit .
As for the central governments in developing countries that deny their municipalities the authority to tax or issue debt , they become the borrowers of choice for international creditors , because they monopolize the power of taxation .
Consider that international capital will easily flow to Los Angeles , a city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issues debt to fund an infrastructure project , while such capital could easily avoid the city of Nairobi , a city of nearly 4.5 million people that is the largest GDP contributor to Kenya—one of the fastest-growing economies in the world over the past decade despite being a developing country .
The country of Benin will have an easier time accessing capital than the city of Cotonou , which holds the lion ’ s share of Benin ’ s national GDP .
To be clear , there are legitimate structural reasons for why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country markets .
For starters , according to the World Bank , less than 20 percent of the 500 largest cities in developing countries are considered investment grade by an international or local rating agency—though the inability to access credit is a contributing factor in the case of many municipalities .
Separate from the fact that these markets are not as mature as those in other geographies , the businesses within these markets may not have access to the advisory services that would make them investable .
And these markets are more likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make them palatable to investors—such as rule of law and physical and digital infrastructure .
But there are also many municipalities that should be able to attract investment yet have not been able to do so due to the structure of the financial architecture .
In Bangladesh , when cities were graded for credit at the local level , over a third of them attained a rating that was above investment grade .
Yet those ratings make no difference , because Bangladeshi capital markets are not accessible by municipalities .
The same is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least-developed countries , such as Kenya , Morocco , Botswana , and Indonesia .
To fully understand the implications , consider that between now and 2050 , the urban population in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to more than triple , reaching approximately 1.3 billion people .
Yet , barring fundamental changes , the region will likely lack the levels of capital investment necessary to finance development to support this population growth—including investment in infrastructure and urban planning , as well as commercial and residential real estate .
If financing is not able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practically assure that the rise in urbanization in this part of the world , as well as others , will coincide with a rise in poverty—especially urban poverty and the growth of slums and unplanned communities—and its attendant consequences .
Such efforts have to be complemented with the right policy and regulatory environment at the central government level .
National governments should enable the legal framework that allow cities and municipalities to borrow in capital markets , notably through the authority to issue bonds and other forms of financing , and to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , South Africa , and Indonesia have taken the lead in such efforts .
After a lot of hard work of reforms , India has also started to enable cities to access capital markets .
And these policies do not have to leave behind rural areas when it comes to sustainable development .
Urban areas can leverage their new capability and financial strength to help rural areas access international credit , whether by creating a pooled fund where urban and rural areas can issue a single bond or by collectively accessing thematic funds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change , women ’ s economic empowerment , or financial inclusion .
The right policy and regulatory environment would have to minimize the role of central governments as gatekeepers to international capital for municipalities .
One way to achieve this is by enabling municipalities to access international credit in local currency as opposed to U.S. dollars , euros , and other hard currencies .
Borrowing in local currency would insulate them from foreign exchange risks and allow investors to include the cost of risk management of such investments at the time of buying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also be able to focus more on their traditional roles of managing monetary and fiscal policies at the macro level .
These kind of innovative financial tools are starting to emerge in different global capital markets .
The London Stock Exchange ’ s issuance of Masala bonds for local Indian infrastructure financing is one good example .
Finally , the world needs financial tools and products that can drive international investments to local infrastructure projects .
Luckily , the area of innovative finance continues to produce tools and products focused on such investments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Among those is an independent municipal investment fund that will exclusively focus on delivering investment to local projects , notably in developing countries and particularly in the least-developed countries—the creation of which was supported by the United Nations Capital Development Fund , United Cities and Local Governments ( an umbrella organization for local and regional governments around the world ) , and the Global Fund for Cities Development ( their technical partner ) .
The hope is that the successful investments will create demonstration effects that will incentivize public and private lenders to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is impossible to avoid the truth that our 20th-century global financial architecture does not fully serve a 21st-century global economy and its development aspirations .
Reforming the global financial system to focus more on cities can help mitigate the problems .
Getting this wrong means more than missing the goal of eliminating extreme poverty .
It means failing on the signal promise of the Sustainable Development Goals : to leave no one behind .

In 2010, the rate of people around the world living in extreme poverty—that is, surviving on less that $1.25 a day—was officially cut in half since 1990. It was the crowning achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, the global framework developed by the United Nations and others in 2000 to catalyze transformative economic development.
In 2010, the rate of people around the world living in extreme poverty—that is, surviving on less that $1.25 a day—was officially cut in half since 1990. It was the crowning achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, the global framework developed by the United Nations and others in 2000 to catalyze transformative economic development.
This progress, however, was built on the edifice of the post-World War II economic order: the capital markets, trade and migration networks, digital infrastructure, and institutions that were designed to enable global commerce between nations and thereby encourage cooperation and peace among them. Practically every driver that facilitated this dramatic reduction in global extreme poverty—the global exchange of goods, services, and capital through transnational markets; the regional movement of production and manufacturing hubs that created global value chains; and the flow of ideas, innovation, and data that undergirded the digital economy—stemmed from an order designed to serve and support nation-states.
But the post-World War II architecture is reaching its structural limits. In particular, it is incompatible with the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, the successor to the Millennium Development Goals, which are 17 objectives designed to bring sustainable development to every part of the world—notably the world’s developing nations and, in particular, the world’s least-developed countries. The new goals include completely eliminating global extreme poverty, managing sustainable production and consumption cycles, ending all forms of discrimination against women and girls, and strengthening resilience and adaptivity to hazards tied to climate change.
These challenges mostly reside in the cities and communities in developing countries, including the least-developed countries, which comprise the poorest and most underserved markets in the world. But the current global financial architecture centers on sovereign states, with international credit and the benefits of such credit—notably the ability to raise capital in order to fund projects, including infrastructure—tending to flow to countries rather than to the neediest local communities themselves.
The problem with this nation-centric approach is that financing is not going to those most incentivized or equipped to support the projects that advance sustainable development.
At a macro level, the problem with this nation-centric approach is that such financing is not going to those most incentivized or equipped to support the projects that advance sustainable development. Cities and local governments have the proximity necessary to better provide social and public services that meet their community’s needs, including those that define sustainable development—ending hunger; providing quality education, clean water, and sanitation; and making sure residents have access to affordable clean energy, decent work, and economic growth, to name a few.
When local governments have to make funding decisions, they will typically prioritize funding one service or project more than, or rather than, another. But when funding flows to the national government, the opportunity cost calculations are different. And even if international donors and investors encourage better national governance, and they should, funding for local projects still competes, often unfavorably, with national government priorities—such as national defense, foreign affairs operations, government salaries, and national budget deficits.
In the era of the Sustainable Development Goals, local communities are almost always the lead development actor. In fact, a deeper examination of the goals’ underlying targets shows that almost 65 percent of them are supposed to be implemented by local governments. And yet the global financial architecture does not operate on that basis.
A nation-centric architecture made sense when nations were the only geographic center of economic development and financial power. But that view needs to be expanded to include municipalities, local governments, and cities as emerging centers of economic power all over the world. Around 80 percent of global GDP is already being generated in cities, while 68 percent of the total global population will be made up of urban residents by 2050, according to World Bank data. A 2013 joint report by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank stated that of the 1.4 billion-person increase in population projected to occur within developing countries by 2030, 96 percent are expected to live in urban areas. And 30 of the world’s 35 most rapidly growing cities are in the least-developed countries.
These shifts in financial and demographic power have implications for accessing the international credit that can fund the projects supporting sustainable development, which can be seen in the context of individual development challenges. Relative to national governments, local governments are singularly positioned to advance projects to address climate change, including infrastructure projects for climate adaptation and resilience: They have the clearest understanding of local needs, they are able to convene local stakeholders to democratize the creation of a climate action plan, for example, and they can pass appropriate policies in much easier fashion than central governments.
Yet, a nation-state-centric system can prevent climate finance from reaching those who can best enact the necessary projects. Look to the sinking of Jakarta, Indonesia, the flooding of Venice, Italy, or New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina and consider how much worse the challenge is for the developing and least-developed countries. The same capabilities that make local governments irreplaceable actors in response to climate change apply when it comes to sustainable development, too.
Take access to funding for development, for example. First, cities in poorer countries often suffer a lack of domestic financing. Savings pools in most of the least-developed nations are low and hardly adequate to finance the infrastructure needed to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals. Many developing countries also lack the regulatory and policy frameworks that give cities the legal authority to collect taxes, issue bonds, or be sued for their debts. In such cases, cities are stuck between hoping that more money trickles down from the central government or accessing international credit. But in a nation-centric system, the second is often impossible.
Municipalities in poorer, developing nations are effectively frozen out of credit markets because they are subject to the debt limits of their national governments. Under this nation-centric architecture, national debt determines whether cities can access international credit almost regardless of that city’s own debt profile. By contrast, cities in wealthier nations can easily attract investment through the issuance of their own bonds based on their own financial health. Additionally, in various developing countries and least-developed countries, municipalities looking to borrow in local currency, as opposed to hard currencies, require permission from central governments before they can access this credit. As for the central governments in developing countries that deny their municipalities the authority to tax or issue debt, they become the borrowers of choice for international creditors, because they monopolize the power of taxation. Consider that international capital will easily flow to Los Angeles, a city of 4 million people, if it issues debt to fund an infrastructure project, while such capital could easily avoid the city of Nairobi, a city of nearly 4.5 million people that is the largest GDP contributor to Kenya—one of the fastest-growing economies in the world over the past decade despite being a developing country. The country of Benin will have an easier time accessing capital than the city of Cotonou, which holds the lion’s share of Benin’s national GDP.
To be clear, there are legitimate structural reasons for why international capital routinely avoids developing and least-developed country markets. For starters, according to the World Bank, less than 20 percent of the 500 largest cities in developing countries are considered investment grade by an international or local rating agency—though the inability to access credit is a contributing factor in the case of many municipalities. Separate from the fact that these markets are not as mature as those in other geographies, the businesses within these markets may not have access to the advisory services that would make them investable. And these markets are more likely to lack the institutional resources that would make them palatable to investors—such as rule of law and physical and digital infrastructure.
But there are also many municipalities that should be able to attract investment yet have not been able to do so due to the structure of the financial architecture. In Bangladesh, when cities were graded for credit at the local level, over a third of them attained a rating that was above investment grade. Yet those ratings make no difference, because Bangladeshi capital markets are not accessible by municipalities. The same is true for many cities in developing and least-developed countries, such as Kenya, Morocco, Botswana, and Indonesia.
To fully understand the implications, consider that between now and 2050, the urban population in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to more than triple, reaching approximately 1.3 billion people. Yet, barring fundamental changes, the region will likely lack the levels of capital investment necessary to finance development to support this population growth—including investment in infrastructure and urban planning, as well as commercial and residential real estate. If financing is not able to reach the local level, this will practically assure that the rise in urbanization in this part of the world, as well as others, will coincide with a rise in poverty—especially urban poverty and the growth of slums and unplanned communities—and its attendant consequences.
Realistically speaking, the nation will always be the main public actor in the global financial architecture. But that does not mean that this architecture cannot be more flexible. A flexible architecture that enables access for municipalities in developing and least-developed nations is the best way to ensure that sustainable development reaches the world’s poorest and most underserved people. One solution involves disaggregating national from subnational debt. It is far past time for municipalities to be able to borrow on their own terms, based on their own capabilities. Los Angeles is able to borrow in capital markets on the basis of its own creditworthiness. Nairobi should be able to do the same.
Such efforts have to be complemented with the right policy and regulatory environment at the central government level. National governments should enable the legal framework that allow cities and municipalities to borrow in capital markets, notably through the authority to issue bonds and other forms of financing, and to be subject to liability for debts. Ghana, South Africa, and Indonesia have taken the lead in such efforts. After a lot of hard work of reforms, India has also started to enable cities to access capital markets. And these policies do not have to leave behind rural areas when it comes to sustainable development. Urban areas can leverage their new capability and financial strength to help rural areas access international credit, whether by creating a pooled fund where urban and rural areas can issue a single bond or by collectively accessing thematic funds that focus on specific interests like climate change, women’s economic empowerment, or financial inclusion.
The right policy and regulatory environment would have to minimize the role of central governments as gatekeepers to international capital for municipalities. One way to achieve this is by enabling municipalities to access international credit in local currency as opposed to U.S. dollars, euros, and other hard currencies. Borrowing in local currency would insulate them from foreign exchange risks and allow investors to include the cost of risk management of such investments at the time of buying. Central banks and national governments would also be able to focus more on their traditional roles of managing monetary and fiscal policies at the macro level. These kind of innovative financial tools are starting to emerge in different global capital markets. The London Stock Exchange’s issuance of Masala bonds for local Indian infrastructure financing is one good example.
Finally, the world needs financial tools and products that can drive international investments to local infrastructure projects. Luckily, the area of innovative finance continues to produce tools and products focused on such investments, including those in poorer countries. Among those is an independent municipal investment fund that will exclusively focus on delivering investment to local projects, notably in developing countries and particularly in the least-developed countries—the creation of which was supported by the United Nations Capital Development Fund, United Cities and Local Governments (an umbrella organization for local and regional governments around the world), and the Global Fund for Cities Development (their technical partner). The hope is that the successful investments will create demonstration effects that will incentivize public and private lenders to expand financing of the municipal finance space.
It is impossible to avoid the truth that our 20th-century global financial architecture does not fully serve a 21st-century global economy and its development aspirations. Reforming the global financial system to focus more on cities can help mitigate the problems. Getting this wrong means more than missing the goal of eliminating extreme poverty. It means failing on the signal promise of the Sustainable Development Goals: to leave no one behind.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--The Rise and Fall of Another African Donor Darling

The Rise and Fall of Another African Donor Darling Arresting and expelling opposition politicians and seeking an unconstitutional third term in office are moves typically associated with the types of authoritarian leaders who have little regard for the rule of law , freedom of speech , or human rights and who often come under fire by Western democracies and international aid agencies .
But the case of Ivory Coast is different .
In late 2019 , President Alassane Ouattara announced that he would stand for an unconstitutional third term in office in the October 2020 election should the leaders of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also political veterans , do the same .
The announcement brought the Ivoirian leader , who is held in high regard in many Western countries and among aid organizations , a step closer to overturning his country ’ s legal foundations .
Yet in a similar fashion to East Africa ’ s donor darling , Rwandan President Paul Kagame , who in 2015 amended his country ’ s constitution to allow himself to remain in power for another three terms , Ouattara ’ s statement was met with little condemnation from the international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undertake another campaign for the presidency because constitutional amendments introduced in 2016 effectively reset the countdown clock for his terms ( an unpopular argument ) .
Should he go through with his plans and stand in the election , there is likely to be significant unrest in both Abidjan and other large cities like Yamoussoukro , Bouaké , and Duékoué .
Either way , the 2020 presidential election is bound to be contentious .
It will be the second since the end of a nine-year , on-again-off-again civil war in 2011 and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowed to stand .
If he does not , it will force a change of power , which has not been seen since 2010 .
That year Ouattara was declared the victor , although incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to stand down , triggering violence that killed more than 3,000 people .
Ivoirians are hoping the next transfer of power will not spark such serious unrest .
If Ouattara does run , that will present problems of its own .
His latest announcement regarding his candidacy was one in a long line of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ freedom of speech , angering the opposition and pushing it closer to insurrection .
Previous moves include constitutional amendments passed in a 2016 referendum , for example , that drove a wedge between the government and much of the population .
The referendum saw only 42 percent participation , yet the government ploughed ahead with considerable reforms anyway , including the creation of a senate .
Senatorial elections were subsequently held with little notice , providing minimal time for campaigning .
Meanwhile , the government said 33 of the 99 senators would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a similar vein , in 2019 , the president reformed the electoral commission—which was long deemed to be biased in favor of the president—but the opposition lamented that it was barely consulted in the process and that the commission remains partisan .
Perhaps the president ’ s most controversial moves have been repeated crackdowns on the opposition .
Perhaps the president ’ s most controversial moves have been repeated crackdowns on the opposition , epitomized by the decision to issue a warrant for the arrest of opposition leader and the former head of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in December .
Soro , once an ally of the president , had declared his plans to stand as a candidate in the October election while on a European tour .
He was forced to divert his flight back to Abidjan to avoid being taken to prison .
The government claimed it had evidence that Soro was plotting a coup and arrested several of Soro ’ s key allies , who were alleged to be behind the subversive campaign .
The opposition candidate declared he only intended to unseat the government politically and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The specific allegations against Soro are dubious , although he is the former head of the Forces Nouvelles rebel group , which controlled the north of Ivory Coast during the 2002-2011 conflict and retains close ties with hundreds of former combatants , some of whom have since been reinserted into the government and armed forces and remain extremely powerful .
These ties have been increasingly scrutinized in recent years as thousands of reintegrated former fighters participated in a series of mutinies in 2014 and 2017 , raising valid questions over Soro ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ His marginalization now though , amid his presidential candidacy announcement and after years of close cooperation with Ouattara , reeks of political motivations .
Indeed , the attempt to arrest Soro was merely the culmination of a series of attempts to stigmatize and undermine the opposition that have become increasingly commonplace during Ouattara ’ s presidency .
In January 2019 , Alain Lobognon , a parliamentarian close to Soro , was arrested and sentenced to a year in jail and fined about $ 520 for posting a “ fake news tweet.
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the arrest of a fellow member of parliament .
The government argued that the post was intended to incite violence , although Lobognon denied the accusations and claimed his arrest was politically motivated .
Lobognon has not been the only one to make such claims .
In October 2019 , Jacques Mangoua , a leading figure in the opposition Democratic Party of Cote d ’ Ivoire-African Democratic Rally ( PDCI-RDA ) , was arrested for having munitions and weaponry at his home in N ’ Guessanrko , a little under 40 miles west @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Subsequently , he was sentenced to five years in prison , although the PDCI claimed that the weapons found at his house had been planted there and that Mangoua had not lived at that home in recent months .
Another opposition figure , Nathalie Yamb of the Lider party , was expelled from Ivory Coast in December after she made comments regarding France ’ s influence over the Ouattara government .
Considerable government spending on infrastructure , supported by the private sector , has helped the country regain its reputation as the financial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ roads , banks , and upmarket restaurants appear almost daily .
Ouattara , who was a deputy managing director at the International Monetary Fund before becoming president , has in some ways vindicated Western nations ’ trust in him .
He has rebuilt the economy—in 2018 , GDP growth stood at 7.4 percent , marking seven consecutive years of growth above 7 percent—and brought much of the country back together after a rending civil war .
The north-south divide that characterized the 2002-2011 conflict has been eased .
Residents now travel freely around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk of day-to-day violence .
But the president ’ s increasing tendency toward policies that contravene human rights , due process , and freedom of speech has gotten far less attention than his country ’ s growth and progress .
Yet these very policies might spark further violence in 2020 .
The situation in Ivory Coast is reminiscent of that in Rwanda , where Kagame has presided over strong economic growth rates and impressive development and equality programs .
Meanwhile , his restrictions on freedom of speech and brutal attacks on outspoken critics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the international community .
The message to leaders around the world seems increasingly to be that if countries can ensure development , the protection of human rights and freedom of speech are inconsequential .
How far Western leaders are willing to go with such an approach will be made apparent in the coming months as Ouattara makes his final decision on his candidacy .
If the Ivoirian president , who has brought about his country ’ s economic rebirth , does choose to stand for a third term , it will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Unlike in Rwanda , there is likely to be significant unrest and opposition to such a move , making it harder for Western leaders to turn a blind eye .

Arresting and expelling opposition politicians and seeking an unconstitutional third term in office are moves typically associated with the types of authoritarian leaders who have little regard for the rule of law, freedom of speech, or human rights and who often come under fire by Western democracies and international aid agencies.
Arresting and expelling opposition politicians and seeking an unconstitutional third term in office are moves typically associated with the types of authoritarian leaders who have little regard for the rule of law, freedom of speech, or human rights and who often come under fire by Western democracies and international aid agencies.
But the case of Ivory Coast is different. In late 2019, President Alassane Ouattara announced that he would stand for an unconstitutional third term in office in the October 2020 election should the leaders of the other main parties, who are also political veterans, do the same.
The announcement brought the Ivoirian leader, who is held in high regard in many Western countries and among aid organizations, a step closer to overturning his country’s legal foundations. Yet in a similar fashion to East Africa’s donor darling, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who in 2015 amended his country’s constitution to allow himself to remain in power for another three terms, Ouattara’s statement was met with little condemnation from the international community.
Ouattara maintains that he can undertake another campaign for the presidency because constitutional amendments introduced in 2016 effectively reset the countdown clock for his terms (an unpopular argument). Should he go through with his plans and stand in the election, there is likely to be significant unrest in both Abidjan and other large cities like Yamoussoukro, Bouaké, and Duékoué.
Either way, the 2020 presidential election is bound to be contentious. It will be the second since the end of a nine-year, on-again-off-again civil war in 2011 and the first in which Ouattara is not legally allowed to stand. If he does not, it will force a change of power, which has not been seen since 2010. That year Ouattara was declared the victor, although incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to stand down, triggering violence that killed more than 3,000 people. Ivoirians are hoping the next transfer of power will not spark such serious unrest.
If Ouattara does run, that will present problems of its own. His latest announcement regarding his candidacy was one in a long line of efforts to tighten the political space and freedom of speech, angering the opposition and pushing it closer to insurrection. Previous moves include constitutional amendments passed in a 2016 referendum, for example, that drove a wedge between the government and much of the population.
The referendum saw only 42 percent participation, yet the government ploughed ahead with considerable reforms anyway, including the creation of a senate. Senatorial elections were subsequently held with little notice, providing minimal time for campaigning. Meanwhile, the government said 33 of the 99 senators would be appointed unilaterally by the president. In a similar vein, in 2019, the president reformed the electoral commission—which was long deemed to be biased in favor of the president—but the opposition lamented that it was barely consulted in the process and that the commission remains partisan.
Perhaps the president’s most controversial moves have been repeated crackdowns on the opposition.
Perhaps the president’s most controversial moves have been repeated crackdowns on the opposition, epitomized by the decision to issue a warrant for the arrest of opposition leader and the former head of the National Assembly, Guillaume Soro, in December. Soro, once an ally of the president, had declared his plans to stand as a candidate in the October election while on a European tour. He was forced to divert his flight back to Abidjan to avoid being taken to prison.
The government claimed it had evidence that Soro was plotting a coup and arrested several of Soro’s key allies, who were alleged to be behind the subversive campaign. The opposition candidate declared he only intended to unseat the government politically and was not involved in fomenting violent unrest.
The specific allegations against Soro are dubious, although he is the former head of the Forces Nouvelles rebel group, which controlled the north of Ivory Coast during the 2002-2011 conflict and retains close ties with hundreds of former combatants, some of whom have since been reinserted into the government and armed forces and remain extremely powerful. These ties have been increasingly scrutinized in recent years as thousands of reintegrated former fighters participated in a series of mutinies in 2014 and 2017, raising valid questions over Soro’s involvement in the military unrest.
His marginalization now though, amid his presidential candidacy announcement and after years of close cooperation with Ouattara, reeks of political motivations. Indeed, the attempt to arrest Soro was merely the culmination of a series of attempts to stigmatize and undermine the opposition that have become increasingly commonplace during Ouattara’s presidency.
In January 2019, Alain Lobognon, a parliamentarian close to Soro, was arrested and sentenced to a year in jail and fined about $520 for posting a “fake news tweet.” The message that Lobognon had posted related to the arrest of a fellow member of parliament. The government argued that the post was intended to incite violence, although Lobognon denied the accusations and claimed his arrest was politically motivated.
Lobognon has not been the only one to make such claims. In October 2019, Jacques Mangoua, a leading figure in the opposition Democratic Party of Cote d’Ivoire-African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA), was arrested for having munitions and weaponry at his home in N’Guessanrko, a little under 40 miles west of the central town of Bouaké. Subsequently, he was sentenced to five years in prison, although the PDCI claimed that the weapons found at his house had been planted there and that Mangoua had not lived at that home in recent months. Another opposition figure, Nathalie Yamb of the Lider party, was expelled from Ivory Coast in December after she made comments regarding France’s influence over the Ouattara government.
These moves appear to mark a steady drift toward authoritarianism from a leader who has been renowned for his Western-friendly economic and development policies. Ouattara’s Ivory Coast has been a donor and investor darling, repeatedly in the top three fastest-growing economies in Africa since he took power. In 2014 and 2015, the World Bank placed the postwar nation among the top 10 most improved places to do business in the world.
Considerable government spending on infrastructure, supported by the private sector, has helped the country regain its reputation as the financial hub of Francophone West Africa. New roads, banks, and upmarket restaurants appear almost daily.
Ouattara, who was a deputy managing director at the International Monetary Fund before becoming president, has in some ways vindicated Western nations’ trust in him. He has rebuilt the economy—in 2018, GDP growth stood at 7.4 percent, marking seven consecutive years of growth above 7 percent—and brought much of the country back together after a rending civil war. The north-south divide that characterized the 2002-2011 conflict has been eased. Residents now travel freely around Ivory Coast and face a much lower risk of day-to-day violence.
But the president’s increasing tendency toward policies that contravene human rights, due process, and freedom of speech has gotten far less attention than his country’s growth and progress. Yet these very policies might spark further violence in 2020.
The situation in Ivory Coast is reminiscent of that in Rwanda, where Kagame has presided over strong economic growth rates and impressive development and equality programs. Meanwhile, his restrictions on freedom of speech and brutal attacks on outspoken critics of the regime have been virtually ignored by the international community.
The message to leaders around the world seems increasingly to be that if countries can ensure development, the protection of human rights and freedom of speech are inconsequential. How far Western leaders are willing to go with such an approach will be made apparent in the coming months as Ouattara makes his final decision on his candidacy. If the Ivoirian president, who has brought about his country’s economic rebirth, does choose to stand for a third term, it will be up to the West to respond. Unlike in Rwanda, there is likely to be significant unrest and opposition to such a move, making it harder for Western leaders to turn a blind eye.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--More U.S. Troops Treated for Concussion Symptoms as Trump Downplays ‘Headaches’

More U.S .
Troops Treated for Concussion Symptoms as Trump Downplays ‘ Headaches ’ A top U.S. general confirmed that additional service members are being treated for concussion-like symptoms after Iran ’ s missile strike on a military base in Iraq earlier this month , even as President Donald Trump downplayed the injuries as “ headaches.
” Trump on Wednesday seemed to brush off injuries sustained by U.S. troops after Iran ’ s Jan. 8 attack , saying at a news conference in Davos , Switzerland , that he did not consider them to be “ very serious.
” “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And a couple of other things , ” Trump said .
“ But I would say , and I can report it is not very serious.
” Trump ’ s comments immediately drew fire from veterans advocates , who noted that traumatic brain injuries ( TBIs ) are often considered to be the signature wounds of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars due to blasts from roadside bombs and other incidents .
Between 2000 and early 2019 , the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center reported more than 408,000 TBIs among U.S. service members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Veterans Affairs .
Paul Rieckhoff , the founder of Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America , tweeted : “ The @ DeptVetAffairs and hundreds of thousands of post-9/11 veterans disagree … Don ’ t just be outraged by # PresidentMayhem ’ s latest asinine comments .
Take action to help vets facing TBIs.
” The news that at least a dozen service members stationed in Iraq are being evaluated for possible traumatic brain injuries emerges two weeks after the attack , prompting speculation that the White House directed a cover-up .
Washington and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said in the hours after the attack , which came as retaliation for the U.S. killing of Iran ’ s Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani , that no U.S. troops were killed or injured .
Maj. Gen. Alex Grynkewich , the deputy commander of the coalition to defeat the Islamic State terrorist group , said Wednesday that the number of service members being treated for possible TBIs is now “ in the teens ” —up from 11 who the Defense Department acknowledged last week had been transported out of the country to Landstuhl , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The facility in Iraq does not have MRI equipment .
Grynkewich denied that the White House or any other outside party directed the military to delay talking about the injuries , saying that “ TBIs are very difficult to assess ” and that commanders were not immediately aware that service members were showing such symptoms .
“ In the wake of an attack you are looking for people with cuts and bruises , those sorts of things , ” Grynkewich said .
After conducting “ follow-on assessments , ” commanders decided “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to apply concussion protocol , he said .
“ Really it just takes some time for the commanders on the ground to get through their assessment period and then some time for that to percolate to us , ” Grynkewich said .
The general ’ s comments echo those made by a Pentagon spokesperson last week .
Alyssa Farah , the Pentagon press secretary , told reporters Jan. 17 that following the attack , a number of service members were given “ routine examinations ” for concussions .
The vast majority needed no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ display concussion-like symptoms days after the attack and reported them to their commanders , she said .
Pentagon leadership was only notified of the 11 initial service members who were transported out of the country for evaluation the day prior—Jan .
16—and “ made it public within hours , ” Farah said .
“ We fully expect these service members to return to their duty when deemed medically able , ” Farah said .
Unlike incidents threatening “ life , limb , or eyesight , ” TBIs don ’ t normally rise to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pentagon , said chief Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Hoffman .
He added that the injured service members got onto transport aircraft “ under their own power ” rather than being rolled out on stretchers .
Hoffman also downplayed speculation that the White House directed the military to cover up the injuries after the president ’ s initial comments .
“ Every administration official that ’ s gone on the record on what the intentions of the Iranians were is—including the vice president , the secretary and the chairman—is that their intention was to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
“ So this idea that there was an effort to de-emphasize injuries for some sort of amorphous political agenda doesn ’ t hold water to what the administration has said on the record .
”

A top U.S. general confirmed that additional service members are being treated for concussion-like symptoms after Iran’s missile strike on a military base in Iraq earlier this month, even as President Donald Trump downplayed the injuries as “headaches.”
A top U.S. general confirmed that additional service members are being treated for concussion-like symptoms after Iran’s missile strike on a military base in Iraq earlier this month, even as President Donald Trump downplayed the injuries as “headaches.”
Trump on Wednesday seemed to brush off injuries sustained by U.S. troops after Iran’s Jan. 8 attack, saying at a news conference in Davos, Switzerland, that he did not consider them to be “very serious.”
“I heard that they had headaches. And a couple of other things,” Trump said. “But I would say, and I can report it is not very serious.”
Trump’s comments immediately drew fire from veterans advocates, who noted that traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) are often considered to be the signature wounds of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars due to blasts from roadside bombs and other incidents. Between 2000 and early 2019, the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center reported more than 408,000 TBIs among U.S. service members worldwide, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Paul Rieckhoff, the founder of Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, tweeted: “The @DeptVetAffairs and hundreds of thousands of post-9/11 veterans disagree … Don’t just be outraged by #PresidentMayhem’s latest asinine comments. Take action to help vets facing TBIs.”
The news that at least a dozen service members stationed in Iraq are being evaluated for possible traumatic brain injuries emerges two weeks after the attack, prompting speculation that the White House directed a cover-up. Washington and Tehran have ratcheted down tensions after Trump said in the hours after the attack, which came as retaliation for the U.S. killing of Iran’s Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, that no U.S. troops were killed or injured.
Maj. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, the deputy commander of the coalition to defeat the Islamic State terrorist group, said Wednesday that the number of service members being treated for possible TBIs is now “in the teens”—up from 11 who the Defense Department acknowledged last week had been transported out of the country to Landstuhl, Germany, and Kuwait for further evaluation. The facility in Iraq does not have MRI equipment.
Grynkewich denied that the White House or any other outside party directed the military to delay talking about the injuries, saying that “TBIs are very difficult to assess” and that commanders were not immediately aware that service members were showing such symptoms.
“In the wake of an attack you are looking for people with cuts and bruises, those sorts of things,” Grynkewich said. After conducting “follow-on assessments,” commanders decided “out of an abundance of caution” to apply concussion protocol, he said.
“Really it just takes some time for the commanders on the ground to get through their assessment period and then some time for that to percolate to us,” Grynkewich said.
The general’s comments echo those made by a Pentagon spokesperson last week. Alyssa Farah, the Pentagon press secretary, told reporters Jan. 17 that following the attack, a number of service members were given “routine examinations” for concussions. The vast majority needed no follow-on exams, but some continued to display concussion-like symptoms days after the attack and reported them to their commanders, she said.
Pentagon leadership was only notified of the 11 initial service members who were transported out of the country for evaluation the day prior—Jan. 16—and “made it public within hours,” Farah said.
“We fully expect these service members to return to their duty when deemed medically able,” Farah said.
Unlike incidents threatening “life, limb, or eyesight,” TBIs don’t normally rise to the threshold for immediate reporting up to the Pentagon, said chief Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Hoffman. He added that the injured service members got onto transport aircraft “under their own power” rather than being rolled out on stretchers.
Hoffman also downplayed speculation that the White House directed the military to cover up the injuries after the president’s initial comments.
“Every administration official that’s gone on the record on what the intentions of the Iranians were is—including the vice president, the secretary and the chairman—is that their intention was to injure or kill Americans,” Hoffman said. “So this idea that there was an effort to de-emphasize injuries for some sort of amorphous political agenda doesn’t hold water to what the administration has said on the record.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--5G Explained – Part One

5G Explained – Part One

Huawei is by far the current market leader in 5G infrastructure network equipment .
With 29 percent of the telecom equipment market , it controls nearly as much market share as its two closest competitors—Nokia and Ericsson—combined .
Concerned about the security implications of allowing a Chinese company to build out this critical infrastructure , President Trump signed an executive order banning Huawei and ZTE—China ’ s other telecom equipment manufacturer—from accessing U.S. supply chains in May of 2019 .
With significant , long-running concerns over Huawei and intellectual property theft , U.S. lawmakers released a 52-page report as far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exclude Huawei equipment from their networks .
However , the U.S. does not have a direct domestic competitor to Huawei , and for nearly the last decade , many smaller wireless providers in the U.S. have installed and relied on Huawei equipment to operate their existing networks , thus embedding Huawei equipment across the U.S. Amid heightened concern under the Trump administration , bipartisan legislation was drafted in September of 2019 that would authorize $ 1 billion for small wireless carriers to replace Huawei equipment .
While this cost covers replacing Huawei equipment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in lost revenue while services are down .
Colorado telecom provider Viaero estimated that it would lose an additional $ 50 million in revenues , which the current cost estimates do not take into account .
Small and rural wireless providers rely extensively on low-cost equipment from Huawei , and even with subsidies , the costs of ripping out Huawei equipment may be too high for some of these carriers to continue to be profitable .
Additionally , the U.S. government has not convinced most rural providers that removing Huawei equipment will make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there are upward of 290 U.S. firms that rely on Huawei for large parts of their revenue streams , and the Huawei ban blocked them from doing business with the company .
The Trump administration has since partially capitulated to these suppliers ’ requests to continue contracting with Huawei .
In November of 2019 , the U.S. government sent approval and denial letters to companies wishing to continue to do business with Huawei .
So far , roughly half of the processed requests for special licenses to sell equipment to Huawei have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The U.S. is now pivoting toward relying on European and South Korean companies as alternative equipment providers and is urging other countries to follow suit , but it may be too little , too late .
While the U.S. government pushes to decrease Huawei ’ s global influence , other countries have broadly accepted Huawei .
In late 2018 , Australia , Japan , Taiwan , and New Zealand banned Huawei equipment from their telecom networks .
However , they were the only countries outside the U.S. to do so .
Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s presence , with another 48 likely to do so in the coming months .

The Chinese company Huawei is by far the current market leader in 5G infrastructure network equipment in terms of market share. With 30 percent of the telecom equipment market, it controls a larger market share than its two closest competitors—Nokia and Ericsson—combined. However, Huawei’s position is becoming increasingly fragile as both Nokia and Ericsson have now signed over thirty more 5G contracts, despite selling equipment generally at higher price points. This deterioration in Huawei’s 5G market dominance stems primarily from the fallout of ex-President Trump’s May 2019 executive order banning Huawei and ZTE—China’s other telecom equipment manufacturer—from accessing U.S. supply chains. Concerned about the security implications of allowing a Chinese company to build out this critical infrastructure, due to long-running suspicions over Huawei and intellectual property theft, US lawmakers released a fifty-two-page report as far back as 2012, urging U.S. companies to exclude Huawei equipment from their networks. However, the U.S. does not have a direct domestic competitor to Huawei and for the last near-decade, many smaller wireless providers in the U.S. have installed and relied on Huawei equipment to operate their existing networks – embedding Huawei equipment across the U.S.
Amid heightened concern under the Trump administration, bipartisan legislation was drafted in September of 2019 that would authorize $1 billion for small wireless carriers to replace Huawei equipment. While this cost covers replacing Huawei equipment, it does not include the costs in lost revenue while services are down. Colorado telecom provider Viaero estimated that it would lose an additional $50 million in revenues, which the current cost estimates do not take into account. Small and rural wireless providers rely extensively on low-cost equipment from Huawei, and even with subsidies, the costs of ripping out Huawei equipment may be too high for some of these carriers to continue to be profitable. Additionally, the U.S. government has not convinced most rural providers that removing Huawei equipment will make their networks more secure.
Further, there are almost 300 U.S. firms that rely on Huawei for large parts of their revenue streams, and the ban blocked them from doing business with Huawei. The Trump administration has since partially capitulated to these suppliers’ requests to continue doing business with Huawei. In November of 2019, the U.S. government sent approval and denial letters to companies wishing to continue doing business with Huawei. As of February of 2020, roughly half of the processed requests for special licenses to sell equipment to Huawei have been approved by the U.S. Department of Commerce, and in June of 2020, the Department decided to allow U.S. companies to work with Huawei on setting 5G standards. However, subsequent measures have further restricted U.S. companies’ commercial interactions with Huawei. In March of 2020, President Trump restricted U.S. companies from selling to any international suppliers that sold to Huawei. The U.S. is now pivoting toward relying on European and South Korean companies as alternative equipment providers and is urging other countries to follow suit. So far, the U.S. has proposed financing a domestic Huawei competitor through government funds, subsidizing foreign competitors, or outright buying a stake in Nokia and Ericsson. As of early February, of 2021, none of these proposals had yet been enacted.
Meanwhile, the international landscape continues to evolve. An increasing number of countries are joining the U.S. effort to remove Huawei from their 5G networks. Following the U.K.’s decision to ban Huawei, at least twenty-three additional European companies have taken some form of action against Huawei. Sweden enacted an outright ban on Huawei technology in October of 2020, while eleven Eastern European countries, including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania, signed onto the U.S. Clean Network initiative. Spearheaded by former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Clean Network signees pledge not to work with Chinese vendors the US considers a national security risk (i.e., Huawei and ZTE), amounting to a de-facto ban on their technology sales in these markets. Huawei is currently challenging the legality of these bans but has yet to achieve any significant victories in court. In November of 2020, the US announced that nearly fifty countries and a total of 170 telecom operators had joined the Clean Network agreement, including individual telecoms and national governments in twenty-six of the twenty-seven EU countries.
A number of EU countries, such as France, have not made a formal declaration of joining the initiative, instead opting to exclude Huawei through regulatory requirements that will effectively phase out Huawei technology in the coming years. Others, such as Denmark and Norway, have excluded Huawei by opting for alternative carriers in their networks. Market exclusions have not impacted Huawei’s sales yet, as they actually increased their infrastructure equipment market share from 28 percent in 2019 to 30 percent through Q3 2020. However, there is evidence that Huawei’s 5G sales have been impacted, as Huawei had been the commercial leader in 5G contracts since early 2018 but has now been surpassed by both Nokia and Ericsson, who each announced over 100 signed 5G deals in late 2020. Huawei announced that it had reached ninety-one signed commercial contracts in March 2020, but as of January of 2021, it has made no further announcements and still only lists fifty commercial 5G deals on its official website—raising the possibility that a significant number of planned contracts were cancelled.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-22--U.S. State Department Appoints Envoy to Counter Chinese Influence at the U.N.

U.S. State Department Appoints Envoy to Counter Chinese Influence at the U.N .
The U.S. State Department has appointed a new special envoy with a mandate to stall China ’ s growing influence at the United Nations and other international organizations that the Trump administration has , until now , largely snubbed or ignored .
The new envoy , Mark Lambert—whose appointment has not been publicly announced—served until recently as the U.S. special envoy for North Korea .
His departure comes as U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s effort to close a deal with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons program has stalled , and as Trump ’ s top negotiator for North Korea , Stephen Biegun , has transitioned to a new role as deputy secretary of state .
The United States has grown increasingly alarmed at China ’ s success at rallying the United Nations behind key foreign-policy initiatives—including the Belt and Road Initiative and efforts led by Russia and backed by Beijing to establish a new cybersecurity treaty—and securing top positions of influence in international organizations .
Critics say that the United States has inadvertently helped pave the way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United Nations and other world bodies by retreating from its leadership position in multilateral organizations and by promoting poor candidates for top jobs at international agencies .
The decision to confront China directly over its rising role , rather than competing directly for influence , may alienate some potential allies , which may be anxious about picking a fight with Beijing .
“ The Trump administration ’ s failure to lead at the U.N. has created a vacuum that China has been happy to fill , ” said Richard Gowan , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Rather than crudely try to counter China , the U.S. should get back to showing some leadership and regaining credibility in New York.
” “ This decision will make a lot of U.S. allies very uncomfortable , ” he added .
“ The Europeans in particular are very nervous about Chinese influence at the U.N. but don ’ t want a headlong collision with Beijing.
” But others think it makes sense to concentrate U.S. efforts in one office .
“ The administration is right to focus on China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it is an issue that extends beyond New York , to Geneva and the specialized agencies and funds and programs , ” said Brett Schaeffer , a U.N. expert at the Heritage Foundation .
“ Having somebody take a look at the issue across the entire U.N. system might provide an opportunity to weigh how best to advance U.S. interests and counter Chinese influence where the U.S. views it to be detrimental.
” This past December , the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Chinese- and Russian-backed U.N. General Assembly cybersecurity resolution , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new cyber-treaty .
The United States and its Western allies opposed the move , voicing fears that China , Russia , and other autocratic government would use the measure to strengthen their grips on internet use .
In June 2019 , China ’ s then-vice minister for agriculture , Qu Dongyu , routed the U.S.-backed candidate , Davit Kirvalidze of Georgia , in the race to lead the Food and Agriculture Organization , gaining 108 votes to Kirvalidze ’ s 12 .
“ We ’ ve got some lessons to learn from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ applying to some other battles coming up , ” David Hale , the U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs , told State Department staffers at a town hall meeting late last year .
An account of the confidential briefing was reviewed by Foreign Policy .
Lambert ’ s first major challenge in the new special envoy role will be to prevent a Beijing-backed Chinese candidate , Wang Binying , from winning the March 5-6 election for a new director-general of the World Intellectual Property Organization , which is currently headed by an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ step down in September .
Wang is one of 10 candidates vying for the top job .
On Dec. 16 , 2019 , four lawmakers , including Sens .
Chuck Schumer , a Democrat , and Tom Cotton , a Republican , wrote to Trump expressing “ concern ” about China ’ s bid to lead the intellectual property body .
“ Given China ’ s persistent violations of intellectual property protections , including through trade secret theft , corporate espionage , and forced transfer of technology , the United States and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move , ” they wrote .
“ We can not let a regime , which continues to blatantly undermine the rules-based system by failing to ensure open markets or respect for intellectual property rights , ascend as the leader of global intellectual property policy , ” they added .
The idea of appointing Lambert as “ special envoy for multilateral integrity ” was noted in passing last week by State Department officials during a briefing on Taiwan to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee .
Another U.S. official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ envoy for countering malign influences ” and said that it was focused on China ’ s role in international organizations .
The disclosure about Lambert ’ s appointment irked some lawmakers who say they have been pressing the administration for years to consult with Congress on the appointment of special envoys—or to at least explain why they are needed .
Lambert did not respond to an email request for comment .
A State Department spokesperson emailed Foreign Policy a statement saying : “ Multilateral institutions and their leadership need to reflect the principles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and democracy under which they were established .
Mr. Lambert , a career Foreign Service Officer , has been assigned to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs as a member of a diverse team of diplomatic professionals working to ensure the integrity of multilateral institutions .
This includes countering the malign influences of the PRC [ People ’ s Republic of China ] and others in the UN system.
” Former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sought to shrink the number of special envoys during his time in office , saying they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Tillerson ’ s effort to scrap multiple special envoy positions was one of the few proposals that had popular support among diplomats amid his controversial push to overhaul and reform the department .
But Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has reversed that trend , appointing a raft of senior envoys to run point on some of the administration ’ s top foreign-policy priorities : Iran , Afghanistan , Syria , and North Korea .
The State Department also has special envoys for Sudan and the Great Lakes region of Africa .
Lawmakers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the House and Senate share the State Department ’ s concerns about the rise of China .
But they have faulted the administration for turning away from international organizations and creating a political opportunity for countries like China and Russia to fill the gap .
“ This is not exactly what winning looks like , ” said one Democratic congressional aide .
“ This is all extraordinarily predictable .
You create a vacuum by threatening to cut funding or by actually cutting funding and then what do you expect is going to happen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; we are creating space for the Chinese and Russians and they are taking advantage.
” “ This administration has not exactly been in the forefront of fighting for international organizations ; just the opposite , ” said the congressional aide .
“ The Chinese and the Russians are cleaning our clocks on a regular basis.
” This story has been updated to include the State Department ’ s official response .

The U.S. State Department has appointed a new special envoy with a mandate to stall China’s growing influence at the United Nations and other international organizations that the Trump administration has, until now, largely snubbed or ignored.
The U.S. State Department has appointed a new special envoy with a mandate to stall China’s growing influence at the United Nations and other international organizations that the Trump administration has, until now, largely snubbed or ignored.
The new envoy, Mark Lambert—whose appointment has not been publicly announced—served until recently as the U.S. special envoy for North Korea. His departure comes as U.S. President Donald Trump’s effort to close a deal with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has stalled, and as Trump’s top negotiator for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, has transitioned to a new role as deputy secretary of state.
The United States has grown increasingly alarmed at China’s success at rallying the United Nations behind key foreign-policy initiatives—including the Belt and Road Initiative and efforts led by Russia and backed by Beijing to establish a new cybersecurity treaty—and securing top positions of influence in international organizations.
Critics say that the United States has inadvertently helped pave the way for China’s rapid ascent at the United Nations and other world bodies by retreating from its leadership position in multilateral organizations and by promoting poor candidates for top jobs at international agencies. The decision to confront China directly over its rising role, rather than competing directly for influence, may alienate some potential allies, which may be anxious about picking a fight with Beijing.
“The Trump administration’s failure to lead at the U.N. has created a vacuum that China has been happy to fill,” said Richard Gowan, the U.N. representative for the International Crisis Group. “Rather than crudely try to counter China, the U.S. should get back to showing some leadership and regaining credibility in New York.”
“This decision will make a lot of U.S. allies very uncomfortable,” he added. “The Europeans in particular are very nervous about Chinese influence at the U.N. but don’t want a headlong collision with Beijing.”
But others think it makes sense to concentrate U.S. efforts in one office.
“The administration is right to focus on China’s increasing influence at the United Nations, but it is an issue that extends beyond New York, to Geneva and the specialized agencies and funds and programs,” said Brett Schaeffer, a U.N. expert at the Heritage Foundation. “Having somebody take a look at the issue across the entire U.N. system might provide an opportunity to weigh how best to advance U.S. interests and counter Chinese influence where the U.S. views it to be detrimental.”
This past December, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Chinese- and Russian-backed U.N. General Assembly cybersecurity resolution, setting the stage for international negotiations on a new cyber-treaty. The United States and its Western allies opposed the move, voicing fears that China, Russia, and other autocratic government would use the measure to strengthen their grips on internet use.
In June 2019, China’s then-vice minister for agriculture, Qu Dongyu, routed the U.S.-backed candidate, Davit Kirvalidze of Georgia, in the race to lead the Food and Agriculture Organization, gaining 108 votes to Kirvalidze’s 12.
“We’ve got some lessons to learn from that experience that we’re now applying to some other battles coming up,” David Hale, the U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, told State Department staffers at a town hall meeting late last year. An account of the confidential briefing was reviewed by Foreign Policy.
Lambert’s first major challenge in the new special envoy role will be to prevent a Beijing-backed Chinese candidate, Wang Binying, from winning the March 5-6 election for a new director-general of the World Intellectual Property Organization, which is currently headed by an Australian, Francis Gurry, who will step down in September. Wang is one of 10 candidates vying for the top job.
On Dec. 16, 2019, four lawmakers, including Sens. Chuck Schumer, a Democrat, and Tom Cotton, a Republican, wrote to Trump expressing “concern” about China’s bid to lead the intellectual property body.
“Given China’s persistent violations of intellectual property protections, including through trade secret theft, corporate espionage, and forced transfer of technology, the United States and its allies must stand firmly against such a move,” they wrote.
“We cannot let a regime, which continues to blatantly undermine the rules-based system by failing to ensure open markets or respect for intellectual property rights, ascend as the leader of global intellectual property policy,” they added.
The idea of appointing Lambert as “special envoy for multilateral integrity” was noted in passing last week by State Department officials during a briefing on Taiwan to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Another U.S. official referred to it as the “special envoy for countering malign influences” and said that it was focused on China’s role in international organizations.
The disclosure about Lambert’s appointment irked some lawmakers who say they have been pressing the administration for years to consult with Congress on the appointment of special envoys—or to at least explain why they are needed. Lambert did not respond to an email request for comment. A State Department spokesperson emailed Foreign Policy a statement saying:
“Multilateral institutions and their leadership need to reflect the principles of transparency, rule of law, and democracy under which they were established. Mr. Lambert, a career Foreign Service Officer, has been assigned to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs as a member of a diverse team of diplomatic professionals working to ensure the integrity of multilateral institutions. This includes countering the malign influences of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] and others in the UN system.”
Former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sought to shrink the number of special envoys during his time in office, saying they duplicated the work of State Department officials. Tillerson’s effort to scrap multiple special envoy positions was one of the few proposals that had popular support among diplomats amid his controversial push to overhaul and reform the department.
But Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has reversed that trend, appointing a raft of senior envoys to run point on some of the administration’s top foreign-policy priorities: Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, and North Korea. The State Department also has special envoys for Sudan and the Great Lakes region of Africa.
Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle in the House and Senate share the State Department’s concerns about the rise of China. But they have faulted the administration for turning away from international organizations and creating a political opportunity for countries like China and Russia to fill the gap.
“This is not exactly what winning looks like,” said one Democratic congressional aide. “This is all extraordinarily predictable. You create a vacuum by threatening to cut funding or by actually cutting funding and then what do you expect is going to happen? These are unforced errors and turnovers; we are creating space for the Chinese and Russians and they are taking advantage.”
“This administration has not exactly been in the forefront of fighting for international organizations; just the opposite,” said the congressional aide. “The Chinese and the Russians are cleaning our clocks on a regular basis.”
Staff writer Robbie Gramer contributed to this story.
This story has been updated to include the State Department’s official response.