foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--Welcome to the Belt and Road Pandemic

Welcome to the Belt and Road Pandemic

Welcome to the Belt and Road Pandemic In an unfortunate turn of translation , China ’ s Xinhua News Agency described President Xi Jinping ’ s trip on Jan. 19 to Yunnan province with these words : “ The amiable image of the people ’ s leader moved through the crowd and through the screen , infecting everyone.
” It was a poor choice of words in a nation in the grips of an infectious respiratory disease epidemic .
But , in another way , the phrasing was entirely apt .
China ’ s president isn ’ t literally responsible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agenda may turn out to be a root cause of the epidemic .
By making the Belt and Road Initiative endeavor—a multitrillion-dollar program to expand Chinese trade and infrastructure around the world—the centerpiece of his foreign and economic policy , Xi has made it possible for a local disease to become a global menace .
The new virus , according to World Health Organization ( WHO ) scientists , has a reproductive rate of as high as 2.5 , meaning each infected individual on average infects as many as 2.5 more people .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ an epidemic of four people expands after a few days to 14 more cases , but when 500 cases swells to 1,750 , things get serious .
On Jan. 3 , China officially reported 44 cases of Wuhan pneumonia ; two weeks later the toll jumped to 198 cases ; on the morning of Jan. 21 the government said 444 patients in Wuhan ’ s surrounding province of Hubei were confirmed as infected by the virus .
By Jan. 23 , the situation was unfolding so rapidly that WHO said at midday in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of 575 cases were confirmed in mainland China , then the Chinese government issued a new total of 644 an hour later , and by the next day the tally hit 830 cases with 26 deaths .
In hopes of limiting spread of the new virus , Chinese authorities issued a travel ban and lockdown for the city Wuhan , population 11 million , on Jan. 23 .
But the virus had already spread far beyond the city , and cases are emerging now in most Chinese provinces .
The Chinese people awoke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ learn that the travel restrictions placed on the people of Wuhan had been expanded to eight other cities , for a total of more than 32 million people whose movements are restricted .
This , on the eve of China ’ s biggest holiday , the Lunar New Year .
As was the case with SARS , the new virus has spread from person to person through chains of at least four generations of transmission , infected entire families , and , according to WHO ’ s outbreak expert Mike Ryan , left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infected with severe illness requiring intensive care hospitalization .
Confirmed cases have turned up in Thailand , Singapore , Japan , South Korea , Vietnam , Taiwan , Hong Kong , Macao , and the United States .
At the time of this writing , additional pneumonia cases are awaiting laboratory confirmation ( or denial ) in Mexico , Russia , Northern Ireland , Scotland , and Rwanda .
Despite the similarities between SARS and the Wuhan pneumonia , and the new virus ’ s spread across much of China and to some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ declined this week to name the Wuhan pneumonia a Public Health Emergency of International Concern ( PHEIC ) .
“ I am not declaring a PHEIC today , ” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said in a press conference on Jan. 23 , after a contentious expert advisory panel debated the matter for two days , ending up , “ divided over whether the outbreak of novel coronavirus represents a PHEIC.
” But Tedros hastily added , “ Make no mistake .
This is an emergency in China , but it has not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WHO ’ s risk assessment is that the outbreak is a very high risk in China , and a high risk regionally and globally.
” Ryan , the WHO outbreak expert , repeatedly said in the same press conference that the Wuhan epidemic has met all the criteria for a PHEIC declaration .
It actually exceeds the issues of transmission and spread across national borders that led to last year ’ s designation of PHEIC status to the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo .
But , said Tedros , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shown “ cooperation and transparency ” in its handling of the epidemic and “ has taken measures it believes appropriate to contain the spread of coronavirus in Wuhan and other cities .
We hope that they will be both effective and short in their duration.
” China is also , however , a nation deeply connected to the rest of the world—far more so than was the case when SARS erupted in 2003 .
Since 2013 , the center of China ’ s foreign and trade policies is the Belt and Road Initiative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ land and maritime infrastructure , extending to northern Germany , across southern Russia and the Central Asian nations , and down the eastern coast of Africa .
In what is surely the largest infrastructure and investment project in history , covering 70 core countries , the Belt and Road will eventually reach two-thirds of the world population .
According to the Economic Times , China is spending hundreds of billions of dollars annually throughout this decade on the Belt and Road Initiative ; according to some estimates , the program could spend $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international highways and maritime ports are already completed , and China ’ s railway system is expanding , both inside the country and outward , across borders .
In 2003 , air travel was the only reasonable way to get from , for example , Wuhan to coastal Myanmar , but today a mix of high-speed trains and a superhighway makes the links .
Most crucial , in terms of the potential spread of the new virus , is China ’ s expanded interests and infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa , especially Eritrea , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Tanzania , Zimbabwe , and Angola .
The health care systems and capacities in these nations are grossly underprepared to tackle a SARS-like pandemic , and large percentages of the populations are especially vulnerable to severe reactions to infection due to malnutrition and chronic infection with other microbes such as tuberculosis , malaria , HIV , and various parasitic diseases .
Known as the “ thoroughfare of China , ” Wuhan is a key transport and trade hub .
Nationally , growth in China slowed in 2019 to its most sluggish level @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent .
On any given business day , nearly a million people ride trains in and out of the city .
The metropolis hosts factories and operations for more than half of the Fortune 500 corporations , with production for the likes of Microsoft and a host of top automakers .
Last year , 27 million passengers flew through Wuhan ’ s international airport , many of them business travelers .
The Economist Intelligence Unit this week predicted a prolonged epidemic in Wuhan and nearby cities could shave up to 1 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investors fear that further restrictions on Chinese travel , both domestically and internationally , could so radically reduce oil consumption that crude oil prices might fall by $ 3 a barrel .
If the Belt and Road Initiative and other Chinese connections with the rest of the world are in 2020 sufficiently robust that a prolonged Wuhan pneumonia epidemic might drive down the nation ’ s gross domestic product , cheapen world oil prices , and devastate the Shanghai stock market , that vast infrastructure is certainly adequate to provide a serious spread @ @ @ @ @ @ @ market from which the epidemic sprung is within walking distance of the Wuhan high-speed railway station , making it convenient for animal dealers to come and go between the city and wildlife hunting grounds in Southeast Asia , Himalayan nations , and Central Asia .
Before the government clamped down on movement out of the city , some 300,000 people fled Wuhan , hoping to reach relatives for the Lunar New Year or simply dodge a crackdown .
Wuhan ’ s political leaders have charged the city ’ s 11 million residents to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measures ” to stop the new virus .
But it ’ s impossible to fathom a scenario in which the new coronavirus does not become a global crisis .
The WHO expert panel was split 50-50 in its decision on whether or not to declare a public health emergency of international concern this week , according to sources present in the deliberations .
Yi Guan of the University of Hong Kong , a veteran virologist who worked on the SARS epidemic , told the Chinese news agency Caixin , “ I ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SARS , influenza A , swine fever , and the rest .
But the Wuhan pneumonia makes me feel extremely powerless .
Most of the past epidemics were controllable , but this time , I ’ m petrified.
” I , too , am anxious .
It ’ s hard to look at the new routes built with Chinese aid over Siberia and the Himalayas and as far as Africa without seeing potential routes for disease that could carry contagion to every corner of the world .

In an unfortunate turn of translation, China’s Xinhua News Agency described President Xi Jinping’s trip on Jan. 19 to Yunnan province with these words: “The amiable image of the people’s leader moved through the crowd and through the screen, infecting everyone.” It was a poor choice of words in a nation in the grips of an infectious respiratory disease epidemic.
In an unfortunate turn of translation, China’s Xinhua News Agency described President Xi Jinping’s trip on Jan. 19 to Yunnan province with these words: “The amiable image of the people’s leader moved through the crowd and through the screen, infecting everyone.” It was a poor choice of words in a nation in the grips of an infectious respiratory disease epidemic.
But, in another way, the phrasing was entirely apt. China’s president isn’t literally responsible for infecting anyone, but his political agenda may turn out to be a root cause of the epidemic. By making the Belt and Road Initiative endeavor—a multitrillion-dollar program to expand Chinese trade and infrastructure around the world—the centerpiece of his foreign and economic policy, Xi has made it possible for a local disease to become a global menace.
The new virus, according to World Health Organization (WHO) scientists, has a reproductive rate of as high as 2.5, meaning each infected individual on average infects as many as 2.5 more people. That might not seem so bad when an epidemic of four people expands after a few days to 14 more cases, but when 500 cases swells to 1,750, things get serious. On Jan. 3, China officially reported 44 cases of Wuhan pneumonia; two weeks later the toll jumped to 198 cases; on the morning of Jan. 21 the government said 444 patients in Wuhan’s surrounding province of Hubei were confirmed as infected by the virus. By Jan. 23, the situation was unfolding so rapidly that WHO said at midday in the eastern United States that a total of 575 cases were confirmed in mainland China, then the Chinese government issued a new total of 644 an hour later, and by the next day the tally hit 830 cases with 26 deaths.
In hopes of limiting spread of the new virus, Chinese authorities issued a travel ban and lockdown for the city Wuhan, population 11 million, on Jan. 23. But the virus had already spread far beyond the city, and cases are emerging now in most Chinese provinces. The Chinese people awoke on the morning of Jan. 24 to learn that the travel restrictions placed on the people of Wuhan had been expanded to eight other cities, for a total of more than 32 million people whose movements are restricted. This, on the eve of China’s biggest holiday, the Lunar New Year.
As was the case with SARS, the new virus has spread from person to person through chains of at least four generations of transmission, infected entire families, and, according to WHO’s outbreak expert Mike Ryan, left 25 percent of those known to be infected with severe illness requiring intensive care hospitalization. Confirmed cases have turned up in Thailand, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and the United States. At the time of this writing, additional pneumonia cases are awaiting laboratory confirmation (or denial) in Mexico, Russia, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Rwanda.
Despite the similarities between SARS and the Wuhan pneumonia, and the new virus’s spread across much of China and to some 14 nations, the World Health Organization declined this week to name the Wuhan pneumonia a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).
“I am not declaring a PHEIC today,” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said in a press conference on Jan. 23, after a contentious expert advisory panel debated the matter for two days, ending up, “divided over whether the outbreak of novel coronavirus represents a PHEIC.” But Tedros hastily added, “Make no mistake. This is an emergency in China, but it has not yet become a global health emergency. WHO’s risk assessment is that the outbreak is a very high risk in China, and a high risk regionally and globally.”
Ryan, the WHO outbreak expert, repeatedly said in the same press conference that the Wuhan epidemic has met all the criteria for a PHEIC declaration. It actually exceeds the issues of transmission and spread across national borders that led to last year’s designation of PHEIC status to the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But, said Tedros, China is a sovereign nation that has shown “cooperation and transparency” in its handling of the epidemic and “has taken measures it believes appropriate to contain the spread of coronavirus in Wuhan and other cities. We hope that they will be both effective and short in their duration.”
China is also, however, a nation deeply connected to the rest of the world—far more so than was the case when SARS erupted in 2003. Since 2013, the center of China’s foreign and trade policies is the Belt and Road Initiative, a massive loan project that includes land and maritime infrastructure, extending to northern Germany, across southern Russia and the Central Asian nations, and down the eastern coast of Africa. In what is surely the largest infrastructure and investment project in history, covering 70 core countries, the Belt and Road will eventually reach two-thirds of the world population.
According to the Economic Times, China is spending hundreds of billions of dollars annually throughout this decade on the Belt and Road Initiative; according to some estimates, the program could spend $8 trillion by 2030. Several major international highways and maritime ports are already completed, and China’s railway system is expanding, both inside the country and outward, across borders. In 2003, air travel was the only reasonable way to get from, for example, Wuhan to coastal Myanmar, but today a mix of high-speed trains and a superhighway makes the links.
Most crucial, in terms of the potential spread of the new virus, is China’s expanded interests and infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa, especially Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Angola. The health care systems and capacities in these nations are grossly underprepared to tackle a SARS-like pandemic, and large percentages of the populations are especially vulnerable to severe reactions to infection due to malnutrition and chronic infection with other microbes such as tuberculosis, malaria, HIV, and various parasitic diseases.
Known as the “thoroughfare of China,” Wuhan is a key transport and trade hub. Nationally, growth in China slowed in 2019 to its most sluggish level in years, but Wuhan expanded 7.8 percent. On any given business day, nearly a million people ride trains in and out of the city. The metropolis hosts factories and operations for more than half of the Fortune 500 corporations, with production for the likes of Microsoft and a host of top automakers. Last year, 27 million passengers flew through Wuhan’s international airport, many of them business travelers.
The Economist Intelligence Unit this week predicted a prolonged epidemic in Wuhan and nearby cities could shave up to 1 percent of China’s 2020 GDP. Commodities investors fear that further restrictions on Chinese travel, both domestically and internationally, could so radically reduce oil consumption that crude oil prices might fall by $3 a barrel.
If the Belt and Road Initiative and other Chinese connections with the rest of the world are in 2020 sufficiently robust that a prolonged Wuhan pneumonia epidemic might drive down the nation’s gross domestic product, cheapen world oil prices, and devastate the Shanghai stock market, that vast infrastructure is certainly adequate to provide a serious spread of the virus. The live animal market from which the epidemic sprung is within walking distance of the Wuhan high-speed railway station, making it convenient for animal dealers to come and go between the city and wildlife hunting grounds in Southeast Asia, Himalayan nations, and Central Asia. Before the government clamped down on movement out of the city, some 300,000 people fled Wuhan, hoping to reach relatives for the Lunar New Year or simply dodge a crackdown.
Wuhan’s political leaders have charged the city’s 11 million residents to “enter wartime status and implement wartime measures” to stop the new virus. But it’s impossible to fathom a scenario in which the new coronavirus does not become a global crisis. The WHO expert panel was split 50-50 in its decision on whether or not to declare a public health emergency of international concern this week, according to sources present in the deliberations.
Yi Guan of the University of Hong Kong, a veteran virologist who worked on the SARS epidemic, told the Chinese news agency Caixin, “I’ve seen it all: bird flu, SARS, influenza A, swine fever, and the rest. But the Wuhan pneumonia makes me feel extremely powerless. Most of the past epidemics were controllable, but this time, I’m petrified.” I, too, am anxious. It’s hard to look at the new routes built with Chinese aid over Siberia and the Himalayas and as far as Africa without seeing potential routes for disease that could carry contagion to every corner of the world.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-23--Oman’s Smooth Transition Doesn’t Mean Its Neighbors Won’t Stir Up Trouble

Oman ’ s Smooth Transition Doesn ’ t Mean Its Neighbors Won ’ t Stir Up Trouble Many observers have commended the smooth and transparent process by which Haitham bin Tariq was designated sultan of Oman , following the death of Sultan Qaboos , which was announced on Jan. 10 .
Because Qaboos had not publicly named a successor , the ruling family opted to open a sealed envelope containing the name of the individual Qaboos preferred , rather than selecting the new sultan themselves .
Qaboos ’ s selection of his cousin Haitham , with his background in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minister of heritage and culture , over Haitham ’ s brothers Asad and Shihab—both military men—appears to signal his desire to perpetuate Oman ’ s role as a facilitator of regional diplomacy .
Yet Oman remains vulnerable to both foreign and domestic sources of instability as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates seek to expand their regional influence .
Potential causes of domestic unrest—including high unemployment , budget deficits , and dwindling oil reserves—lack clear-cut solutions .
Sultan Haitham faces multiple challenges even without the threat of foreign meddling , yet Oman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Qaboos as a unique opportunity to advance their own expansionist agendas .
For decades , Sultan Qaboos positioned Oman as a neutral arbiter , allowing it to serve as a mediator for regional conflicts .
This stance was challenged as the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia intensified in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 , which eliminated Iraq as a regional counterbalance to Iran and inflamed a combustible mixture of geopolitical and sectarian rivalry .
From the Saudi perspective , facilitating cooperation with Iran challenged the interests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closeness to Iran contributed to the Saudi and Emirati decision to blockade Qatar in 2017 .
( Oman has defied the blockade by allowing Qatari-bound flights and shipping to transit in and out of Muscat as well as Omani ports . )
Oman resisted Saudi Arabia ’ s attempts to use the Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) as a tool to serve the Saudis ’ foreign-policy agenda , most visibly when Oman ’ s minister of state for foreign affairs publicly rejected King Abdullah ’ s plan to deepen the GCC into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was the only GCC state to not participate in the Saudi-led military incursion against Yemen that began in 2015 .
Oman ’ s reputation for neutrality and history of facilitating negotiations caused the Obama administration to seek Qaboos ’ s assistance in arranging secret meetings with Iran in 2012-2013 that eventually led to the Iran nuclear deal .
In contrast , Sultan Haitham comes to power at a time when the Trump administration has repeatedly signaled its support for Saudi Arabia and antipathy toward Iran .
The belated naming of low-ranking U.S. officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Qaboos was widely interpreted as a slight against the Omanis ; the U.K. , in contrast , sent both Prince Charles and Prime Minister Boris Johnson to pay their respects .
Saudi leaders likely hope that Sultan Haitham will be more amenable to a Saudi-led Gulf , and without U.S. support , Oman may feel pressure to acquiesce or face potential repercussions .
Omani officials have privately expressed concerns that Oman could be the next target of a Saudi- and Emirati-led blockade .
Unlike Qatar , Oman lacks the financial resources to survive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already exhibited its willingness to pursue its geostrategic objectives , regardless of the implications .
Despite precipitating the world ’ s most urgent humanitarian crisis in Yemen , Saudi Arabia has used its military presence there to declare its intention to build a pipeline through the Mahra region and construct an oil port on the Yemeni coast .
Saudi Arabia currently ships oil through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb strait , whereas the proposed pipeline would allow direct access to the Indian Ocean .
Mahra has close links to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has long viewed the province as an informal buffer from the instability in other parts of Yemen .
Sultan Qaboos offered aid as well as dual citizenship to residents of Mahra as a means of eliminating the potential for another conflict resembling the Dhofar War of 1963-1976 , which drew cross-border support from the People ’ s Democratic Republic of Yemen operating from Mahra into Dhofar .
Qaboos came to power in the middle of that war and , after defeating the rebels with Iranian and British assistance , emphasized economic development as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ earning the loyalty of former adversaries .
Although Saudi Arabia established a presence in Mahra in 2017 , the UAE had arrived in 2015 , soon after initiating military hostilities against Yemen .
Inhabitants of Mahra have expressed frustration with the presence of both the Saudis and Emiratis , given that these kingdoms ’ alleged foes—the Houthis as well as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—are not present in Mahra .
Yahya al-Sewari , the Yemeni author of a report on Saudi and Emirati activities in the region , was detained in July @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Saudi Arabia maintains that the Houthis present a significant threat and therefore it can not end hostilities against Yemen until they are pacified .
In contrast , the UAE ’ s actions in Yemen constitute a war of choice and a means of expanding regional strongholds .
The UAE has taken control of the Yemeni island of Socotra , building a military base in a unique ecosystem nominally protected by UNESCO .
The UAE is also building bases in Eritrea and Somaliland as part of a plan to develop a “ string @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to project power and escape possible pressure from Iran in the Persian Gulf.Emirati ambitions toward the peninsula are reflected in a map at the Louvre Abu Dhabi , which depicts Musandam as part of the UAE .
Other Emirati ambitions include the Musandam Peninsula , an Omani enclave that forms the narrowest point in the Strait of Hormuz .
The inhabitants of the peninsula have close ties to the UAE , as Musandam connects geographically to the emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah , rather than Oman .
Oman ’ s control of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s history as an empire whose territory once stretched from southern Pakistan to Zanzibar .
The UAE ’ s designs on the enclave are no secret .
Indeed , Emirati ambitions toward the peninsula are reflected in a map at the Louvre Abu Dhabi , which depicts Musandam as part of the UAE .
The border between Oman and the UAE was only formally demarcated in 2008 , but Omanis see a circle of potential threats arising from Emirati activity in or possible designs on Musandam , Mahra , and Socotra .
Omani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2011 by the arrest of a senior member of Oman ’ s Internal Security Service , as part of a spy ring employed by Abu Dhabi .
The arrest of another spy ring in November 2018 further heightened the Omanis ’ sense of alarm .
That same month , Sultan Qaboos issued a royal decree to bar non-Omani citizens from owning land in strategic border areas in Oman , including Musandam as well as Dhofar , in response to land purchases by Emirati nationals .
In December 2019 , while Qaboos sought medical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the UAE ’ s de facto ruler , Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed , made a surprise visit to Muscat ; Qaboos returned soon after .
With Qaboos gone , the UAE may feel that Oman ’ s new sultan may be more receptive to alignment with Emirati objectives than his predecessor .
On Twitter , Emiratis celebrated the crowning of Sultan Haitham , featuring pictures of Haitham in the UAE .
Haitham ’ s work as a businessman involved partnership with the Emirates , distinguishing him from the reclusive Qaboos .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ been limited compared with those of its wealthier neighbors , and Oman has failed to significantly diversify its economy .
Obtaining Oman ’ s remaining oil already requires advanced and expensive means of extraction .
As in many oil-dependent economies , unemployment is high , especially among young people .
Throughout his rule , Sultan Qaboos used Oman ’ s oil reserves to provide infrastructure and social services to a once desperately impoverished population , but the years of prosperity also fostered corruption and waste .
During the popular uprising of 2011 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ street for the first time , the government used its nest egg to pay for a massive expansion of the government payroll .
In a 2015 interview , an Omani government official in Muscat told me that some government offices had three employees to a desk to satisfy the protesters ’ demands for employment .
The official explained that if another massive popular uprising occurred , the government would have no money left to address citizens ’ needs , as it was already running a massive deficit .
Indeed , there are no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transition away from oil , and the low price of oil has further impeded the government ’ s efforts to meet its obligations .
Sultan Haitham inherits a problematic domestic scenario , further complicated by the ambitions of Oman ’ s neighbors .
Although the Trump administration has exhibited minimal interest in the sultanate , a clear signal of support for Oman would reduce the potential for destabilization posed by the UAE and Saudi Arabia .
A territorial incursion or a domestic uprising would bring additional upheaval to a restive region , potentially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to extricate itself from the Middle East .
For an administration that claims to seek an end to endless war in the region , this is a scenario Washington should seek to avoid .

Many observers have commended the smooth and transparent process by which Haitham bin Tariq was designated sultan of Oman, following the death of Sultan Qaboos, which was announced on Jan. 10. Because Qaboos had not publicly named a successor, the ruling family opted to open a sealed envelope containing the name of the individual Qaboos preferred, rather than selecting the new sultan themselves.
Many observers have commended the smooth and transparent process by which Haitham bin Tariq was designated sultan of Oman, following the death of Sultan Qaboos, which was announced on Jan. 10. Because Qaboos had not publicly named a successor, the ruling family opted to open a sealed envelope containing the name of the individual Qaboos preferred, rather than selecting the new sultan themselves.
Qaboos’s selection of his cousin Haitham, with his background in the foreign ministry and most recently as the minister of heritage and culture, over Haitham’s brothers Asad and Shihab—both military men—appears to signal his desire to perpetuate Oman’s role as a facilitator of regional diplomacy.
Yet Oman remains vulnerable to both foreign and domestic sources of instability as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates seek to expand their regional influence. Potential causes of domestic unrest—including high unemployment, budget deficits, and dwindling oil reserves—lack clear-cut solutions. Sultan Haitham faces multiple challenges even without the threat of foreign meddling, yet Oman’s neighbors may view the death of Qaboos as a unique opportunity to advance their own expansionist agendas.
For decades, Sultan Qaboos positioned Oman as a neutral arbiter, allowing it to serve as a mediator for regional conflicts. This stance was challenged as the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia intensified in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which eliminated Iraq as a regional counterbalance to Iran and inflamed a combustible mixture of geopolitical and sectarian rivalry.
From the Saudi perspective, facilitating cooperation with Iran challenged the interests of the Arab Gulf states: Perceived closeness to Iran contributed to the Saudi and Emirati decision to blockade Qatar in 2017. (Oman has defied the blockade by allowing Qatari-bound flights and shipping to transit in and out of Muscat as well as Omani ports.) Oman resisted Saudi Arabia’s attempts to use the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a tool to serve the Saudis’ foreign-policy agenda, most visibly when Oman’s minister of state for foreign affairs publicly rejected King Abdullah’s plan to deepen the GCC into a Gulf Union in 2013, and was the only GCC state to not participate in the Saudi-led military incursion against Yemen that began in 2015.
Oman’s reputation for neutrality and history of facilitating negotiations caused the Obama administration to seek Qaboos’s assistance in arranging secret meetings with Iran in 2012-2013 that eventually led to the Iran nuclear deal. In contrast, Sultan Haitham comes to power at a time when the Trump administration has repeatedly signaled its support for Saudi Arabia and antipathy toward Iran. The belated naming of low-ranking U.S. officials to attend the official ceremony honoring Sultan Qaboos was widely interpreted as a slight against the Omanis; the U.K., in contrast, sent both Prince Charles and Prime Minister Boris Johnson to pay their respects.
Saudi leaders likely hope that Sultan Haitham will be more amenable to a Saudi-led Gulf, and without U.S. support, Oman may feel pressure to acquiesce or face potential repercussions. Omani officials have privately expressed concerns that Oman could be the next target of a Saudi- and Emirati-led blockade. Unlike Qatar, Oman lacks the financial resources to survive such a blockade.
Saudi Arabia has already exhibited its willingness to pursue its geostrategic objectives, regardless of the implications. Despite precipitating the world’s most urgent humanitarian crisis in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has used its military presence there to declare its intention to build a pipeline through the Mahra region and construct an oil port on the Yemeni coast. Saudi Arabia currently ships oil through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb strait, whereas the proposed pipeline would allow direct access to the Indian Ocean.
Mahra has close links to the adjacent Dhofar region of Oman, which has long viewed the province as an informal buffer from the instability in other parts of Yemen. Sultan Qaboos offered aid as well as dual citizenship to residents of Mahra as a means of eliminating the potential for another conflict resembling the Dhofar War of 1963-1976, which drew cross-border support from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen operating from Mahra into Dhofar. Qaboos came to power in the middle of that war and, after defeating the rebels with Iranian and British assistance, emphasized economic development as a means of preventing future conflict and earning the loyalty of former adversaries.
Although Saudi Arabia established a presence in Mahra in 2017, the UAE had arrived in 2015, soon after initiating military hostilities against Yemen. Inhabitants of Mahra have expressed frustration with the presence of both the Saudis and Emiratis, given that these kingdoms’ alleged foes—the Houthis as well as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—are not present in Mahra. Yahya al-Sewari, the Yemeni author of a report on Saudi and Emirati activities in the region, was detained in July 2019, and his whereabouts remain unknown.
Saudi Arabia maintains that the Houthis present a significant threat and therefore it cannot end hostilities against Yemen until they are pacified. In contrast, the UAE’s actions in Yemen constitute a war of choice and a means of expanding regional strongholds. The UAE has taken control of the Yemeni island of Socotra, building a military base in a unique ecosystem nominally protected by UNESCO. The UAE is also building bases in Eritrea and Somaliland as part of a plan to develop a “string of ports” that will allow it to project power and escape possible pressure from Iran in the Persian Gulf.Emirati ambitions toward the peninsula are reflected in a map at the Louvre Abu Dhabi, which depicts Musandam as part of the UAE.
Other Emirati ambitions include the Musandam Peninsula, an Omani enclave that forms the narrowest point in the Strait of Hormuz. The inhabitants of the peninsula have close ties to the UAE, as Musandam connects geographically to the emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah, rather than Oman. Oman’s control of the strategic chokepoint reflects the sultanate’s history as an empire whose territory once stretched from southern Pakistan to Zanzibar.
The UAE’s designs on the enclave are no secret. Indeed, Emirati ambitions toward the peninsula are reflected in a map at the Louvre Abu Dhabi, which depicts Musandam as part of the UAE. The border between Oman and the UAE was only formally demarcated in 2008, but Omanis see a circle of potential threats arising from Emirati activity in or possible designs on Musandam, Mahra, and Socotra.
Omani concerns about Emirati intentions were solidified in 2011 by the arrest of a senior member of Oman’s Internal Security Service, as part of a spy ring employed by Abu Dhabi. The arrest of another spy ring in November 2018 further heightened the Omanis’ sense of alarm. That same month, Sultan Qaboos issued a royal decree to bar non-Omani citizens from owning land in strategic border areas in Oman, including Musandam as well as Dhofar, in response to land purchases by Emirati nationals. In December 2019, while Qaboos sought medical treatment in Belgium soon before his death, the UAE’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, made a surprise visit to Muscat; Qaboos returned soon after.
With Qaboos gone, the UAE may feel that Oman’s new sultan may be more receptive to alignment with Emirati objectives than his predecessor. On Twitter, Emiratis celebrated the crowning of Sultan Haitham, featuring pictures of Haitham in the UAE. Haitham’s work as a businessman involved partnership with the Emirates, distinguishing him from the reclusive Qaboos.
Oman’s oil reserves have always been limited compared with those of its wealthier neighbors, and Oman has failed to significantly diversify its economy. Obtaining Oman’s remaining oil already requires advanced and expensive means of extraction. As in many oil-dependent economies, unemployment is high, especially among young people. Throughout his rule, Sultan Qaboos used Oman’s oil reserves to provide infrastructure and social services to a once desperately impoverished population, but the years of prosperity also fostered corruption and waste.
During the popular uprising of 2011, which brought thousands of Omanis to the street for the first time, the government used its nest egg to pay for a massive expansion of the government payroll. In a 2015 interview, an Omani government official in Muscat told me that some government offices had three employees to a desk to satisfy the protesters’ demands for employment. The official explained that if another massive popular uprising occurred, the government would have no money left to address citizens’ needs, as it was already running a massive deficit. Indeed, there are no available resources to try to finance a transition away from oil, and the low price of oil has further impeded the government’s efforts to meet its obligations.
Sultan Haitham inherits a problematic domestic scenario, further complicated by the ambitions of Oman’s neighbors. Although the Trump administration has exhibited minimal interest in the sultanate, a clear signal of support for Oman would reduce the potential for destabilization posed by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. A territorial incursion or a domestic uprising would bring additional upheaval to a restive region, potentially pulling in Iran and complicating U.S. efforts to extricate itself from the Middle East. For an administration that claims to seek an end to endless war in the region, this is a scenario Washington should seek to avoid.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-25--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

As the coronavirus spreads out of Wuhan in China ’ s Hubei province , the city ’ s population is facing mass quarantine as officials try to curb the spread of the virus .
Meanwhile , world powers are working to forge a lasting political settlement in Libya , but Russia is playing the country ’ s warring factions off each other in attempt to secure concessions from the European Union .
And a prominent conspiracy theory asserting that Ukraine was responsible for interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election has found its way into the White House .
An @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chinese city of Wuhan is spreading with frightening speed , alarming health officials across the world , Foreign Policy ’ s James Palmer writes .
2 .
Imran Khan on Trump , Modi , and Why He Won ’ t Criticize China In an exclusive Q & A with Foreign Policy editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman at the World Economic Forum in Davos , Switzerland , Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said his country won ’ t publicly challenge China on the systematic repression of Muslims in Xinjiang because of the economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia ’ s Role in the Libyan Civil War Gives It Leverage Over Europe Russia is actively exploiting divisions in the Libyan civil war in an apparent attempt to prolong the conflict and win maximum concessions from the EU , Anas El Gomati writes .
A prominent right-wing conspiracy theory asserts that Ukraine , not Russia , was behind the large-scale interference campaign that occurred during the 2016 U.S. presidential election .
It has been picked up by President Donald Trump and other senior Republicans , Foreign Policy ’ s Robbie Gramer and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Could Spark a Return to Violence in Northern Ireland Republican and loyalist paramilitaries have competing versions of what Brexit means for them , and some of them are preparing to reignite campaigns of violence as a way of advancing their longer-term aspirations , Jason Blazakis and Colin P. Clarke write .

As the coronavirus spreads out of Wuhan in China’s Hubei province, the city’s population is facing mass quarantine as officials try to curb the spread of the virus.
As the coronavirus spreads out of Wuhan in China’s Hubei province, the city’s population is facing mass quarantine as officials try to curb the spread of the virus.
Meanwhile, world powers are working to forge a lasting political settlement in Libya, but Russia is playing the country’s warring factions off each other in attempt to secure concessions from the European Union.
And a prominent conspiracy theory asserting that Ukraine was responsible for interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election has found its way into the White House.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Medical staff transfer patients to hospital in Wuhan, China, on Jan. 17.
An outbreak of the previously unknown coronavirus in the Chinese city of Wuhan is spreading with frightening speed, alarming health officials across the world, Foreign Policy’s James Palmer writes.
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan delivers a speech at the World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland.
In an exclusive Q&A with Foreign Policy editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said his country won’t publicly challenge China on the systematic repression of Muslims in Xinjiang because of the economic assistance Beijing has provided.
Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias (right) meets with Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar (left) in Athens, Greece, on Jan. 17, 2020, ahead of a peace conference in Berlin aimed at ending the civil war in Libya.
Russia is actively exploiting divisions in the Libyan civil war in an apparent attempt to prolong the conflict and win maximum concessions from the EU, Anas El Gomati writes.
A prominent right-wing conspiracy theory asserts that Ukraine, not Russia, was behind the large-scale interference campaign that occurred during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. It has been picked up by President Donald Trump and other senior Republicans, Foreign Policy’s Robbie Gramer and Amy Mackinnon report.
An Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) mural in North Belfast, Northern Ireland.
Republican and loyalist paramilitaries have competing versions of what Brexit means for them, and some of them are preparing to reignite campaigns of violence as a way of advancing their longer-term aspirations, Jason Blazakis and Colin P. Clarke write.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--Peru’s Vote for a New Congress Could Shape the President’s Legacy

Peru ’ s Vote for a New Congress Could Shape the President ’ s Legacy LIMA , Peru—Peru spent the last few months of 2019 facing a constitutional crisis , but some in the Andean nation remain optimistic that the turbulence in the halls of power could ultimately provide a shot in the arm for the president ’ s anti-corruption efforts .
Following months of steadfast opposition from the unicameral Congress and an effort to unseat him , President Martín Vizcarra dissolved the legislative body altogether at the end of September , which then turned around and suspended him .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ backing remained the country ’ s de facto leader , called legislative elections , to be held on Jan. 26 , to solve the impasse .
Meanwhile , Peru ’ s top court ruled last week that Vizcarra ’ s closure of Congress was legal .
At the time , much of the public applauded Vizcarra ’ s move , and Peruvians have been consistently in favor of the president ’ s anti-corruption efforts .
Unlike a number of protests that emerged in other Latin American countries late last year , including Chile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ended quickly .
Since he assumed office in 2018 , many of Vizcarra ’ s popular reforms have been blocked by the hard-line Popular Force party , which held a majority in Congress until its dissolution .
“ What happened in Congress underscores the shamelessness to which the legislative majority has fallen , ” Vizcarra said at the time , taking particular umbrage at the opposition ’ s attempts to install judges to the court that would ultimately decide how the impasse is settled .
“ Peruvian people , we have done all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress was dissolved last fall , and the outcome of the upcoming election is anything but certain .
Twenty-one parties are running in the election , and all are polling badly .
However , much has changed since Congress was dissolved last fall , and the outcome of the upcoming election is anything but certain .
Twenty-one parties are running in the election , and all are polling badly .
Furthermore , a significant number of voters have signaled their intent to submit blank ballots .
Yet the consensus of observers is that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and if enough legislators continue to support Vizcarra ’ s anti-corruption drive , the president could make a significant impact before the next election in 2021 .
The political crisis briefly impacted markets , though the Peruvian sol , the stock market , and bonds swiftly recovered .
While police blocked roads and demonstrators took to the streets following the declaration that Congress would be dissolved , Lima quickly returned to relative calm , despite the continuing political disarray .
“ There ’ s always one crisis or another , ” one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ center said just a few weeks after the dissolution of Congress .
“ But we just get on with our lives.
” The consensus is that January ’ s legislative elections should resolve the impasse , though the resolution will only last as long as the newly elected legislature resists the same battle stance against the executive that caused the current crisis .
“ Both powers must be aware that their collaborative work is what will take the country out of the lethargy in which it seems to have sunk , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ science at the University of Lima .
The crisis has galvanized political movements fed up with the constitutional hardball played by opposition legislators and renewed calls to end cronyism and corruption in Peruvian politics , most recently during the Odebrecht scandal .
Vizcarra ’ s anti-corruption drives are what initially earned him support , and his decision to shut down Congress is also popular .
Peru has been no stranger in recent years to political intrigue .
The Odebrecht scandal , implicating leaders past and present across the continent , continues to haunt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Peru ’ s president—killed himself in April 2019 as police officers were preparing to arrest him as part of the sprawling international investigation .
Vizcarra himself was unelected , getting the job after serving as vice president to Pedro Pablo Kuczynski , who was also embroiled in the Odebrecht scandal and survived an impeachment vote in December 2017 only to resign three months later after videos surfaced showing alleged attempts at vote buying by allies .
With such sustained turbulence , faith in institutions is weak .
Transparency International ranked Peru 101st @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corruption index .
Vizcarra , who assumed the presidency as a relative outsider , remains popular .
He swiftly pursued an anti-graft drive that won him widespread support , with polls suggesting he is one of Peru ’ s most popular recent leaders .
“ But such support is volatile and is limited by a state that has proved ineffective in facing the country ’ s social agenda , ” said Ivan Lanegra , a professor of political science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and the University of the Pacific .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens about the opportunities for improvement that have opened up with the crisis.
” Much of the blame for the current crisis has been laid at the feet of Fujimorismo , a movement led by ex-President Alberto Fujimori—whose tenure from 1990 to 2000 is considered authoritarian even by some of his supporters—and his daughter Keiko Fujimori , a controversial and recurrent presidential candidate and politician .
“ The crisis was generated by the attitude of the Fujimoristas who don ’ t know how to fulfill their roles as legislators when they are more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Eliana Carlin , a prominent anti-Fujimori activist in Lima .
Keiko Fujimori now dominates the movement .
She remains the public face and founder of the Popular Force party , despite her preventative arrest in 2018 pending an investigation into corruption within the party and her alleged role in the Odebrecht scandal , having previously come close to winning the presidency in 2011 and 2016 .
In November 2019 , she was released after more than a year in pretrial detention .
Yet while Fujimorismo may be on the ropes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out .
Although the Popular Force party is expected to lose seats in Congress , it will remain influential .
A major risk , analysts warn , is that a lack of political leadership after this election could lead to the emergence of another populist president .
Beyond Vizcarra , who is limited to serving only one term , few politicians appear ready to galvanize broad support .
“ And that ’ s dangerous , ” said Jo-Marie Burt , an analyst at the Washington Office on Latin America .
“ The left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the center , but after that where is the leadership ?
”

LIMA, Peru—Peru spent the last few months of 2019 facing a constitutional crisis, but some in the Andean nation remain optimistic that the turbulence in the halls of power could ultimately provide a shot in the arm for the president’s anti-corruption efforts. Following months of steadfast opposition from the unicameral Congress and an effort to unseat him, President Martín Vizcarra dissolved the legislative body altogether at the end of September, which then turned around and suspended him. Vizcarra, who with public and military backing remained the country’s de facto leader, called legislative elections, to be held on Jan. 26, to solve the impasse. Meanwhile, Peru’s top court ruled last week that Vizcarra’s closure of Congress was legal.
LIMA, Peru—Peru spent the last few months of 2019 facing a constitutional crisis, but some in the Andean nation remain optimistic that the turbulence in the halls of power could ultimately provide a shot in the arm for the president’s anti-corruption efforts. Following months of steadfast opposition from the unicameral Congress and an effort to unseat him, President Martín Vizcarra dissolved the legislative body altogether at the end of September, which then turned around and suspended him. Vizcarra, who with public and military backing remained the country’s de facto leader, called legislative elections, to be held on Jan. 26, to solve the impasse. Meanwhile, Peru’s top court ruled last week that Vizcarra’s closure of Congress was legal.
At the time, much of the public applauded Vizcarra’s move, and Peruvians have been consistently in favor of the president’s anti-corruption efforts. Unlike a number of protests that emerged in other Latin American countries late last year, including Chile and Colombia, protests after the closure ended quickly.
Since he assumed office in 2018, many of Vizcarra’s popular reforms have been blocked by the hard-line Popular Force party, which held a majority in Congress until its dissolution. “What happened in Congress underscores the shamelessness to which the legislative majority has fallen,” Vizcarra said at the time, taking particular umbrage at the opposition’s attempts to install judges to the court that would ultimately decide how the impasse is settled. “Peruvian people, we have done all we could.”
Much has changed since Congress was dissolved last fall, and the outcome of the upcoming election is anything but certain. Twenty-one parties are running in the election, and all are polling badly.
However, much has changed since Congress was dissolved last fall, and the outcome of the upcoming election is anything but certain. Twenty-one parties are running in the election, and all are polling badly. Furthermore, a significant number of voters have signaled their intent to submit blank ballots. Yet the consensus of observers is that centrists seem likely to come out best, and if enough legislators continue to support Vizcarra’s anti-corruption drive, the president could make a significant impact before the next election in 2021.
The political crisis briefly impacted markets, though the Peruvian sol, the stock market, and bonds swiftly recovered. While police blocked roads and demonstrators took to the streets following the declaration that Congress would be dissolved, Lima quickly returned to relative calm, despite the continuing political disarray. “There’s always one crisis or another,” one news agent in Lima’s historic center said just a few weeks after the dissolution of Congress. “But we just get on with our lives.”
The consensus is that January’s legislative elections should resolve the impasse, though the resolution will only last as long as the newly elected legislature resists the same battle stance against the executive that caused the current crisis. “Both powers must be aware that their collaborative work is what will take the country out of the lethargy in which it seems to have sunk,” said Josef Zielinski, a professor of political science at the University of Lima.
The crisis has galvanized political movements fed up with the constitutional hardball played by opposition legislators and renewed calls to end cronyism and corruption in Peruvian politics, most recently during the Odebrecht scandal. Vizcarra’s anti-corruption drives are what initially earned him support, and his decision to shut down Congress is also popular.
Peru has been no stranger in recent years to political intrigue. The Odebrecht scandal, implicating leaders past and present across the continent, continues to haunt the country. Alan García—who twice served as Peru’s president—killed himself in April 2019 as police officers were preparing to arrest him as part of the sprawling international investigation.
Vizcarra himself was unelected, getting the job after serving as vice president to Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who was also embroiled in the Odebrecht scandal and survived an impeachment vote in December 2017 only to resign three months later after videos surfaced showing alleged attempts at vote buying by allies.
With such sustained turbulence, faith in institutions is weak. Transparency International ranked Peru 101st out of 180 countries in its 2019 corruption index. Vizcarra, who assumed the presidency as a relative outsider, remains popular. He swiftly pursued an anti-graft drive that won him widespread support, with polls suggesting he is one of Peru’s most popular recent leaders.
“But such support is volatile and is limited by a state that has proved ineffective in facing the country’s social agenda,” said Ivan Lanegra, a professor of political science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and the University of the Pacific. “There is some optimism in the citizens about the opportunities for improvement that have opened up with the crisis.”
Much of the blame for the current crisis has been laid at the feet of Fujimorismo, a movement led by ex-President Alberto Fujimori—whose tenure from 1990 to 2000 is considered authoritarian even by some of his supporters—and his daughter Keiko Fujimori, a controversial and recurrent presidential candidate and politician. “The crisis was generated by the attitude of the Fujimoristas who don’t know how to fulfill their roles as legislators when they are more used to being in the executive branch,” said Eliana Carlin, a prominent anti-Fujimori activist in Lima.
Keiko Fujimori now dominates the movement. She remains the public face and founder of the Popular Force party, despite her preventative arrest in 2018 pending an investigation into corruption within the party and her alleged role in the Odebrecht scandal, having previously come close to winning the presidency in 2011 and 2016.
In November 2019, she was released after more than a year in pretrial detention. Yet while Fujimorismo may be on the ropes, it is far from down and out. Although the Popular Force party is expected to lose seats in Congress, it will remain influential.
A major risk, analysts warn, is that a lack of political leadership after this election could lead to the emergence of another populist president. Beyond Vizcarra, who is limited to serving only one term, few politicians appear ready to galvanize broad support. “And that’s dangerous,” said Jo-Marie Burt, an analyst at the Washington Office on Latin America. “The left is weak, Vizcarra occupies a space in the center, but after that where is the leadership?”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-25--How To Tell What’s Really Happening With the Wuhan Virus

How To Tell What ’ s Really Happening With the Wuhan Virus It ’ s Lunar New Year , usually a time of celebration in China , but instead of heading into the streets to let off fireworks , people are staying at home out of fear of contracting a fast-spreading coronavirus .
The quarantine in China has now extended to nearly 50 million people , as sweeping restrictions on travel are expanding daily out from the epicenter of the outbreak in the city of Wuhan .
These include bans on tour groups across the country , on long-distance travel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transport in the center of Wuhan itself .
The number of officially confirmed cases has reached 1,756 , and continues to rise fast , with at least 54 dead , mostly elderly .
China is struggling to cope with its worst health crisis since SARS in 2003 , amid fears that Lunar New Year travel has already spread the infection far and wide .
Every province and region in China , barring Tibet and Qinghai , both of which are geographically and politically isolated , has had cases of the virus .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evacuate its approximately 1,000 citizens and consular staff from the quarantine zone .
It ’ s too soon to tell , but quite probably not .
The confirmed numbers may be just a fraction of the real total of infected victims , with many not yet diagnosed or even showing symptoms .
But the biggest problem is that the long incubation period means hundreds of thousands of people left Wuhan long before the virus was seen as a major problem —especially as the Lunar New Year , when hundreds of millions of people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was coming up .
A lot now depends on where they ended up .
The constant expansion of the quarantine zone , which now covers a huge chunk of the central Chinese province of Hubei , suggests that local transmission may have been fierce and fast , outrunning the authorities .
Modeling by foreign scientists is producing disturbing results—250,000 or more infected inside Wuhan and large outbreaks elsewhere , with 60 percent or more of possible transmissions needing to be blocked to contain the outbreak .
The quarantine creates its own problems .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ with regular logistical links severed , is a huge , though not impossible , task .
China has exceptional logistics companies such as Alibaba , and they may be brought in , along with the military , to make sure shops stay supplied and people fed ; long lines of trucks are heading into Wuhan to supply the population .
That ’ s good , since Price gouging and shortages have already started .
So are we all going to die ?
Probably not .
The coronavirus is highly worrying , but so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ influenza and has a relatively low—experts believe— mortality rate .
The deaths so far have been mostly , but not exclusively , confined to older people , most of whom had preexisting conditions .
The World Health Organization has declined to declare a global emergency , pointing to the relatively small number of cases outside China , although that could well change .
That said , many people remain in serious condition , and the virus has already mutated to pass from human to human—and could evolve further .
At least one super-spreader—someone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high number of other victims—has already emerged in a Wuhan hospital .
And while cases of infection appear to have been largely caught in foreign countries , thanks mostly to the victims being relatively well-off people who had access to health care resources , they ’ ve been popping up all over the place from Washington state to Malaysia .
Given what seems to be a relatively long incubation period of seven to 12 days , during which victims can spread the virus without showing symptoms , it ’ s hard to tell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reached .
On top of that , the range of symptoms is long , and some victims haven ’ t shown the most characteristic signs—and the ones being tested for—such as fever .
The world could well see multiple outbreaks , especially if it reaches poorer and more vulnerable countries .
Reports so far have been confined to developed nations like South Korea , France , and the United States , but it ’ s entirely possible that cases elsewhere have simply gone undetected .
Can we trust the government figures right now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reasons .
The first is that China has a record of concealing the numbers around disaster events for political reasons , from the initial cover-up around SARS to the regular underreporting of the number of dead from floods , landslides , industrial explosions , and other relatively routine disasters .
In Wuhan ’ s case , it seems very likely that the leap to human-to-human transmission , and the sudden explosion in numbers , was concealed by local authorities keen not to risk the local economy or to disturb the smooth progress of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mid-January political meetings .
The number of cases stayed at 41 for weeks and then suddenly jumped to more than 200 after the virus reached other countries a week ago .
Meanwhile , Wuhan officials were scheduling large-scale public events right up until the quarantine was imposed .
There ’ s less reason for the central government to squash the numbers , and the enormous leap from 41 to more than 1300 cases this week may be the result of the sudden interest by Beijing in the epidemic .
But government officials are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ information from the public , especially negative information .
Huge amounts of resources are put into controlling and suppressing information in China , and doctors , reporters , and ordinary people have already been threatened or arrested for posting independently about the outbreak .
A sudden flood of online posts today praised the government and criticized people for posting unauthorized information .
Chinese media is enjoying a short burst of relative freedom , with Caixin and other outlets producing some excellent and critical reporting .
But that ’ s common in the aftermath @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impetus of the news creates several days of comparative openness before the propaganda authorities decide and enforce new lines .
( I saw it happen after the Sichuan earthquake and again after the Tianjin explosions when I worked in Chinese newsrooms. )
.
Papers are already being forced to issue apologies if their reporters speak out of line .
The internet might well be cut at some point , as happened in Xinjiang in 2009 after the riots there .
Even if the government doesn ’ t want to distort data , its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Diagnostic test kits are in short supply , the population potentially affected is huge , and many poorer Chinese—those most affected—are out of reach for the state .
The scientific community in China is genuinely extremely concerned and attempting to share information as rapidly and transparently as it can with foreign counterparts .
But it is also working within an environment where everything , even scientific research , is politicized .
Since the ascent of Chinese President Xi Jinping to dictatorial status , many scientific papers begin with routine encomiums to Xi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ keep seeing all these videos of dead bodies and people flooding Wuhan hospitals .
What ’ s up with that ?
Several videos have emerged from Wuhan showing disturbing scenes at hospitals , such as bodies abandoned in corridors .
But this doesn ’ t mean they ’ re victims of the virus—except indirectly .
Wuhan has 11 million people : Using the average mortality rate for China , that means approximately 213 people die there daily , as in any large city .
Add in that it ’ s winter , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the conventional rate of death is even higher .
Some of the videos are also mislabeled , or fakes ; there ’ s a useful list being maintained here .
Now remember that Wuhan ’ s health care system is completely flooded right now .
Everyone with a cold is heading to the hospital to get checked , and medical staff are exhausted and overwhelmed .
150 army medical staff have been sent to help , and two emergency field hospital using prefabricated materials are being erected , but that ’ s unlikely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very likely people who died of regular causes but who simply haven ’ t been processed as they would in calmer times .
As anyone who has been through Chinese health care knows , hospitals there are often chaotic places where patients regularly find themselves sitting with IVs in corridors , on the floor , or even in the parking lot ; add in epidemic and quarantine , and everything falls apart .
The regular medical number—120—is producing no response most of the time .
There ’ s one scary possibility here , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vectors for the virus .
They ’ re already known to have infected at least 14 health care workers , and there are reports of widespread infection among medical staff who are running out of masks and gloves .
Add to that patients crowding to get help , and even those whose symptoms are the result of ordinary colds rather than the virus might end up walking away infected .
Inside the quarantine zone , perhaps .
A tremendous amount of fear is emerging in the patchy picture we get through social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ riots or disturbances or of clashes with police or attempts to escape the quarantine zone .
That ’ s hopefully a good sign .
Outside of Wuhan , people seem worried but calm .
This is where some of China ’ s advantages , such as extensive networks of block workers and community centers , can come into play in keeping people informed without panic .
There are runs on masks and hand sanitizer , which you ’ d expect .
The most disturbing aspect may be the measures taken by some villages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own blockades to keep travelers out .
That could get quite nasty , as anyone who has passed through a village gate late at night—where locals sometimes set up informal tollbooths , enforced by thugs—knows .
The control on information is probably helping to reduce potential panic and unjustified rumor , even as it may also be concealing vital facts .
Chinese-language chat groups and forums in the United States , which lack those controls , seem far more panicked than those inside China itself , with extreme concern being shown over , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wuhan and people warning others to stockpile medical supplies from CVS .
There are also widespread rumors among the Uighur diaspora—the Turkic minority persecuted by China in the Western region of Xinjiang ; they ’ re expressing both fears that the original virus might have been a byproduct of Chinese bio-experimentation on Uighurs and more grounded worries that if the virus reaches the detention camps in which over a million Uighurs are held , the results could be a devastating infection .
What about the political fallout ?
It ’ s still very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certainly roll over the initial delay or cover-up .
The central government has already made ominous noises .
Given the usual pattern , this may well involve suddenly discovering that the Wuhan mayor , or local party leaders , was corrupt all along .
If the outbreak can be controlled , then this may be spun as a success for the system and a justification of authoritarian powers .
If it isn ’ t , it ’ s a genuinely serious threat—not to Communist Party rule itself but to Xi .
He ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the political-economic elite who believe he has mishandled national affairs .
The disruption of a full-scale epidemic would be a perfect opportunity for his opponents to reveal themselves and move against him .
The top levels of the propaganda media—People ’ s Daily and the Xinwen Lianbo news broadcast—were still heavily downplaying the story until late in the week .
People ’ s Daily hasn ’ t yet mentioned it on the front pages , which have been devoted entirely to praise of Xi and national prosperity ; the story was buried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it took the nightly news 22 minutes to reach the story .
On Saturday , however , the broadcast led with a seven-minute meeting of the Central Committee , showing Xi in a leadership role .
That ’ s a contrast with previous disasters under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao , where the media led with images of national leadership and personal appearances .
Wen , in particular , became sardonically nicknamed “ the best actor ” for his kind but stern appearances in disaster zones , ordering local officials around and representing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Neither Xi nor premier Li Keqiang has visited Wuhan or announced plans to do so .
That might be simply because it ’ s far more difficult to protect a leader from a virus than from fire or flood .
But it might also be a real fear that the epidemic will run out of control—and thus a desire to disassociate themselves from it as much as possible .

It’s Lunar New Year, usually a time of celebration in China, but instead of heading into the streets to let off fireworks, people are staying at home out of fear of contracting a fast-spreading coronavirus. The quarantine in China has now extended to nearly 50 million people, as sweeping restrictions on travel are expanding daily out from the epicenter of the outbreak in the city of Wuhan.
It’s Lunar New Year, usually a time of celebration in China, but instead of heading into the streets to let off fireworks, people are staying at home out of fear of contracting a fast-spreading coronavirus. The quarantine in China has now extended to nearly 50 million people, as sweeping restrictions on travel are expanding daily out from the epicenter of the outbreak in the city of Wuhan. These include bans on tour groups across the country, on long-distance travel in some cities, and on private transport in the center of Wuhan itself. The number of officially confirmed cases has reached 2,018, and continues to rise fast, with at least 56 dead, mostly elderly. China is struggling to cope with its worst health crisis since SARS in 2003, amid fears that Lunar New Year travel has already spread the infection far and wide. Every province and region in China, barring Tibet which is geographically and politically isolated, has had cases of the virus. The United States has sent charter planes to evacuate its approximately 1,000 citizens and consular staff from the quarantine zone.
Is the quarantine working?
It’s too soon to tell, but quite probably not. The confirmed numbers may be just a fraction of the real total of infected victims, with many not yet diagnosed or even showing symptoms. But the biggest problem is that the long incubation period means hundreds of thousands of people left Wuhan long before the virus was seen as a major problem—especially as the Lunar New Year, when hundreds of millions of people return to their families across China, was coming up. A lot now depends on where they ended up. The constant expansion of the quarantine zone, which now covers a huge chunk of the central Chinese province of Hubei, suggests that local transmission may have been fierce and fast, outrunning the authorities. Modeling by foreign scientists is producing disturbing results—250,000 or more infected inside Wuhan and large outbreaks elsewhere, with 60 percent or more of possible transmissions needing to be blocked to contain the outbreak. [The authors of the original paper have since revised their estimations of the transmission rate down, though have not yet produced new figures for likely infections.]
The quarantine creates its own problems. Feeding and supplying the population inside, with regular logistical links severed, is a huge, though not impossible, task. China has exceptional logistics companies such as Alibaba, and they may be brought in, along with the military, to make sure shops stay supplied and people fed; long lines of trucks are heading into Wuhan to supply the population. That’s good, since price gouging and shortages have already started.
So are we all going to die?
Probably not. The coronavirus is highly worrying, but so far it lacks the pandemic properties of influenza and has a relatively low—experts believe—mortality rate. The deaths so far have been mostly, but not exclusively, confined to older people, most of whom had preexisting conditions. The World Health Organization has declined to declare a global emergency, pointing to the relatively small number of cases outside China, although that could well change.
That said, many people remain in serious condition, and the virus has already mutated to pass from human to human—and could evolve further. At least one super-spreader—someone who passes the virus to an unusually high number of other victims—has already emerged in a Wuhan hospital.
And while cases of infection appear to have been largely caught in foreign countries, thanks mostly to the victims being relatively well-off people who had access to health care resources, they’ve been popping up all over the place from Washington state to Malaysia. Given what seems to be a relatively long incubation period of seven to 12 days, during which victims can spread the virus without showing symptoms, it’s hard to tell just how far the virus has already reached.
On top of that, the range of symptoms is long, and some victims haven’t shown the most characteristic signs—and the ones being tested for—such as fever. The world could well see multiple outbreaks, especially if it reaches poorer and more vulnerable countries, as Laurie Garrett has highlighted. Reports so far have been confined to developed nations like South Korea, France, and the United States, but it’s entirely possible that cases elsewhere have simply gone undetected.
Can we trust the government figures right now?
No, for a variety of reasons. The first is that China has a record of concealing the numbers around disaster events for political reasons, from the initial cover-up around SARS to the regular underreporting of the number of dead from floods, landslides, industrial explosions, and other relatively routine disasters. In Wuhan’s case, it seems very likely that the leap to human-to-human transmission, and the sudden explosion in numbers, was concealed by local authorities keen not to risk the local economy or to disturb the smooth progress of the “two sessions,” important mid-January political meetings. The number of cases stayed at 41 for weeks and then suddenly jumped to more than 200 after the virus reached other countries a week ago. Meanwhile, Wuhan officials were scheduling large-scale public events right up until the quarantine was imposed.
There’s less reason for the central government to squash the numbers, and the enormous leap from 41 to nearly 2,000 cases this week may be the result of the sudden interest by Beijing in the epidemic. But government officials are also in the routine—and hard-to-break—habit of concealing information from the public, especially negative information. Huge amounts of resources are put into controlling and suppressing information in China, and doctors, reporters, and ordinary people have already been threatened or arrested for posting independently about the outbreak. A sudden flood of online posts today praised the government and criticized people for posting unauthorized information.
Chinese media is enjoying a short burst of relative freedom, with Caixin and other outlets producing some excellent and critical reporting. But that’s common in the aftermath of disaster in China; the sudden impetus of the news creates several days of comparative openness before the propaganda authorities decide and enforce new lines. (I saw it happen after the Sichuan earthquake and again after the Tianjin explosions when I worked in Chinese newsrooms.). Papers are already being forced to issue apologies if their reporters speak out of line. The internet might well be cut at some point, as happened in Xinjiang in 2009 after the riots there.
Even if the government doesn’t want to distort data, its ability to gather information is also limited. Diagnostic test kits are in short supply, the population potentially affected is huge, and many poorer Chinese—those most affected—are out of reach for the state.
The scientific community in China is genuinely extremely concerned and attempting to share information as rapidly and transparently as it can with foreign counterparts. But it is also working within an environment where everything, even scientific research, is politicized. Since the ascent of Chinese President Xi Jinping to dictatorial status, many scientific papers begin with routine encomiums to Xi Jinping Thought, for instance.
I keep seeing all these videos of dead bodies and people flooding Wuhan hospitals. What’s up with that?
Several videos have emerged from Wuhan showing disturbing scenes at hospitals, such as bodies abandoned in corridors. But this doesn’t mean they’re victims of the virus—except indirectly. Wuhan has 11 million people: Using the average mortality rate for China, that means approximately 213 people die there daily, as in any large city. Add in that it’s winter, and it’s flu season, and the conventional rate of death is even higher. Some of the videos are also mislabeled, or fakes; there’s a useful list being maintained here.
Now remember that Wuhan’s health care system is completely flooded right now. Everyone with a cold is heading to the hospital to get checked, and medical staff are exhausted and overwhelmed. 450 army medical staff have been sent to help, and two emergency field hospital using prefabricated materials are being erected, but that’s unlikely to be enough. Those corpses are very likely people who died of regular causes but who simply haven’t been processed as they would in calmer times. As anyone who has been through Chinese health care knows, hospitals there are often chaotic places where patients regularly find themselves sitting with IVs in corridors, on the floor, or even in the parking lot; add in epidemic and quarantine, and everything falls apart. The regular medical number—120—is producing no response most of the time.
There’s one scary possibility here, though. Hospitals themselves could be becoming vectors for the virus. They’re already known to have infected at least 14 health care workers, and there are reports of widespread infection among medical staff who are running out of masks and gloves. Add to that patients crowding to get help, and even those whose symptoms are the result of ordinary colds rather than the virus might end up walking away infected.
Are people panicking?
Inside the quarantine zone, perhaps. A tremendous amount of fear is emerging in the patchy picture we get through social media. But there are no accounts of riots or disturbances or of clashes with police or attempts to escape the quarantine zone. That’s hopefully a good sign.
Outside of Wuhan, people seem worried but calm. This is where some of China’s advantages, such as extensive networks of block workers and community centers, can come into play in keeping people informed without panic. There are runs on masks and hand sanitizer, which you’d expect. The most disturbing aspect may be the measures taken by some villages and townships, which are posting their own blockades to keep travelers out. That could get quite nasty, as anyone who has passed through a village gate late at night—where locals sometimes set up informal tollbooths, enforced by thugs—knows.
The control on information is probably helping to reduce potential panic and unjustified rumor, even as it may also be concealing vital facts. Chinese-language chat groups and forums in the United States, which lack those controls, seem far more panicked than those inside China itself, with extreme concern being shown over, for instance, visiting school groups from Wuhan and people warning others to stockpile medical supplies from CVS.
There are also widespread rumors among the Uighur diaspora—the Turkic minority persecuted by China in the Western region of Xinjiang; they’re expressing both fears that the original virus might have been a byproduct of Chinese bio-experimentation on Uighurs and more grounded worries that if the virus reaches the detention camps in which over a million Uighurs are held, the results could be a devastating infection.
What about the political fallout?
It’s still very early days, but heads will almost certainly roll over the initial delay or cover-up. The central government has already made ominous noises. Given the usual pattern, this may well involve suddenly discovering that the Wuhan mayor, or local party leaders, was corrupt all along.
If the outbreak can be controlled, then this may be spun as a success for the system and a justification of authoritarian powers. If it isn’t, it’s a genuinely serious threat—not to Communist Party rule itself but to Xi. He’s already facing private dissent from members of the political-economic elite who believe he has mishandled national affairs. The disruption of a full-scale epidemic would be a perfect opportunity for his opponents to reveal themselves and move against him.
The top levels of the propaganda media—People’s Daily and the Xinwen Lianbo news broadcast—were still heavily downplaying the story until late in the week. People’s Daily hasn’t yet mentioned it on the front pages, which have been devoted entirely to praise of Xi and national prosperity; the story was buried on Page 4 on Wednesday, while it took the nightly news 22 minutes to reach the story. On Saturday, however, the broadcast led with a seven-minute meeting of the Central Committee, showing Xi in a leadership role.
That’s a contrast with previous disasters under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, where the media led with images of national leadership and personal appearances. Wen, in particular, became sardonically nicknamed “the best actor” for his kind but stern appearances in disaster zones, ordering local officials around and representing the paternal control of the party. Neither Xi nor premier Li Keqiang has visited Wuhan or announced plans to do so.
That might be simply because it’s far more difficult to protect a leader from a virus than from fire or flood. But it might also be a real fear that the epidemic will run out of control—and thus a desire to disassociate themselves from it as much as possible.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-25--The Wuhan Virus: How to Stay Safe

The Wuhan Virus: How to Stay Safe

The Wuhan Virus : How to Stay Safe As the new Wuhan coronavirus has spread not only all over mainland China , but also worldwide , panic is rising .
Inside China there is a growing sense of helplessness , as the government is compelled to take drastic measures to stop the virus , including introducing some travel restrictions in Beijing .
I have received panicked queries from journalists and public health workers in China , asking , “ How can we protect ourselves and our families ?
” The epidemic could have been controlled fairly easily three weeks ago @ @ @ @ @ @ @ action , and no attempted cover-up .
But now it ’ s too late , and this virus is spreading globally .
Because there is no vaccine or treatment for nCoV2019—the Wuhan pneumonia—and infection has spread throughout China , the government is forced to turn to its 2003 SARS playbook .
And that means entire cities must be cut off , and the population of the nation must be restricted in its movements and potential disease-spreading behavior .
It is not surprising then that travel out of Beijing may be forbidden ; the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I know people are very frightened .
And I expect panic will rise in the coming days .
But very simple measures can protect you .
During the SARS epidemic , I traveled all over China and Hong Kong , interviewed people infected with the virus , doctors and nurses treating the disease , government officials , police—everybody .
I was never concerned that I would become infected , despite being in the room with sick individuals .
And that ’ s because I knew what precautions to take .
Here are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1 .
When you leave your home , wear gloves—winter mittens or outdoor gloves—and keep them on in subways , buses , and public spaces .
2 .
If you are in a social situation where you should remove your gloves , perhaps to shake hands or dine , do not touch your face or eyes , no matter how much something itches .
Keep your hands away from contact with your face .
And before you put your gloves back on , wash your hands thoroughly with soap and warm water , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on .
3 .
Change gloves daily , washing them thoroughly , and avoid wearing damp gloves .
4 .
Masks are useless when worn outdoors and may not be very helpful even indoors .
Most masks deteriorate after one or two wearings .
Using the same mask day after day is worse than useless—it ’ s disgusting , as the contents of your mouth and nose eventually coat the inside of the mask with a smelly veneer that is attractive to bacteria .
I rarely wear a face mask in an epidemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 30 outbreaks .
Instead , I stay away from crowds , and I keep my distance from individual people—a half meter , about 1.5 feet , is a good standard .
If someone is coughing or sneezing , I ask them to put on a mask—to protect me from their potentially contaminated fluids .
If they decline , I step a meter ( about 3 feet ) away from them , or I leave .
Don ’ t shake hands or hug people—politely beg off , saying it ’ s better for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close contact during an epidemic .
5 .
Inside your household , remove all of the towels from your bathrooms and kitchen immediately , and replace them with clean towels that have the names of each family member on them .
Instruct everybody in your home to only use their own towels and never touch another family member ’ s .
Wash all towels twice a week .
Damp towels provide terrific homes for viruses , like common colds , flus , and , yes , coronaviruses .
6 .
Be careful with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to open and close doors using your elbows or shoulders , do so .
Wear gloves to turn a doorknob—or wash your hands after touching it .
If anybody in your home takes sick , wash your doorknobs regularly .
Similarly , be cautious with stairway banisters , desktops , cell phones , toys , laptops—any objects that are hand-held .
As long as you handle only your own personal objects , you will be ok—but if you need to pick up someone else ’ s cell phone or cooking tools or use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be mindful of not touching your face and wash your hands immediately after touching the object .
7 .
If you share meals , do not use your personal chopsticks and utensils to remove food from a serving bowl or plate and , of course , tell your children to never drink out of anybody else ’ s cups or from a container of shared fluid .
It is customary in China to prepare several dishes for a meal and then allow everybody at the table to use their personal chopsticks to pull @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t do this until the epidemic is over .
Place serving spoons in each dish and instruct everybody at the table to scoop what they want from the serving dishes onto their personal plates or bowls , return the serving spoon to the main dish , and then use their personal chopsticks only to pick food from their personal plate or bowl into their mouth .
Wash all food and kitchenware thoroughly between meals and avoid restaurants that have poor hygiene practices .
8 .
Absolutely do not buy , slaughter , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until it is known what species was the source of the virus .
9 .
When the weather allows , open your windows at home or work , letting your space air out .
The virus can not linger in a well-ventilated space .
But of course , if it is cold or the weather is inclement , keep warm and close those windows .
10 .
Finally , if you are caring for a friend or family member who is running a fever , always wear a tight-fitting mask when you are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ailing person ( unless they are nauseated ) .
When you replace an old , dirty mask from the face of your friend or loved one be very , very careful—assume , for the sake of your protection , that it is covered in viruses , and handle it while wearing latex gloves , place it inside of a disposable container , seal it , and then put it in the trash .
While wearing those latex gloves , gently wash the patient ’ s face with warm soap and water , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swab , and seal it after use in a container or plastic bag before placing it in your household trash .
Wear long-sleeved shirts and clothing that covers your body when you are caring for your ailing friend or relative .
Clean everything your patient wears or touches very thoroughly in hot soapy water , including sheets , towels , and utensils .
If you have space , isolate the sick person in your household in a room , or a corner of a room , where they are comfortable , but separated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If the weather is tolerable , open a window that is on the opposite side of the room , so that air gently blows past the patient ’ s face and then outdoors .
Of course , don ’ t do this if it is very cold , as your friend or loved one will be made sicker if uncomfortably cold .
The Chinese government will take very drastic actions over the next few weeks , and this will be a time of hardship for the Chinese people .
As the virus spreads @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may be invoked to slow the epidemic .
But with these simple precautions , if taken by everybody in your household , building , office , and school , you will dramatically reduce the spread of the virus and bring the outbreak to its knees .
Be safe .
Do not panic .
Take commonsense precautions .
As frightening as this time is , you will get through it .

As the coronavirus has spread not only all over mainland China, but also worldwide, panic is rising. Inside China there is a growing sense of helplessness, as the government is compelled to take drastic measures to stop the virus, including introducing some travel restrictions in Beijing. I have received panicked queries from journalists and public health workers in China, asking, “How can we protect ourselves and our families?”
As the coronavirus has spread not only all over mainland China, but also worldwide, panic is rising. Inside China there is a growing sense of helplessness, as the government is compelled to take drastic measures to stop the virus, including introducing some travel restrictions in Beijing. I have received panicked queries from journalists and public health workers in China, asking, “How can we protect ourselves and our families?”
The epidemic could have been controlled fairly easily three weeks ago had there been more openness, swift action, and no attempted cover-up. But now it’s too late, and this virus is spreading globally. Because there is no vaccine or treatment for nCoV2019—the Wuhan pneumonia—and infection has spread throughout China, the government is forced to turn to its 2003 SARS playbook. And that means entire cities must be cut off, and the population of the nation must be restricted in its movements and potential disease-spreading behavior. It is not surprising then that travel out of Beijing may be forbidden; the entire mainland could go on lockdown soon.
I know people are very frightened. And I expect panic will rise in the coming days. But very simple measures can protect you.
During the SARS epidemic, I traveled all over China and Hong Kong, interviewed people infected with the virus, doctors and nurses treating the disease, government officials, police—everybody. I was never concerned that I would become infected, despite being in the room with sick individuals. And that’s because I knew what precautions to take. Here are the most important ones to know:
1. When you leave your home, wear gloves—winter mittens or outdoor gloves—and keep them on in subways, buses, and public spaces.
2. If you are in a social situation where you should remove your gloves, perhaps to shake hands or dine, do not touch your face or eyes, no matter how much something itches. Keep your hands away from contact with your face. And before you put your gloves back on, wash your hands thoroughly with soap and warm water, scrubbing the fingers. Put your gloves on.
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3. Change gloves daily, washing them thoroughly, and avoid wearing damp gloves.
4. Masks are useless when worn outdoors and may not be very helpful even indoors. Most masks deteriorate after one or two wearings. Using the same mask day after day is worse than useless—it’s disgusting, as the contents of your mouth and nose eventually coat the inside of the mask with a smelly veneer that is attractive to bacteria. I rarely wear a face mask in an epidemic, and I have been in more than 30 outbreaks. Instead, I stay away from crowds, and I keep my distance from individual people—a half meter, about 1.5 feet, is a good standard. If someone is coughing or sneezing, I ask them to put on a mask—to protect me from their potentially contaminated fluids. If they decline, I step a meter (about 3 feet) away from them, or I leave. Don’t shake hands or hug people—politely beg off, saying it’s better for both of you not to come in close contact during an epidemic.
5. Inside your household, remove all of the towels from your bathrooms and kitchen immediately, and replace them with clean towels that have the names of each family member on them. Instruct everybody in your home to only use their own towels and never touch another family member’s. Wash all towels twice a week. Damp towels provide terrific homes for viruses, like common colds, flus, and, yes, coronaviruses.
6. Be careful with doorknobs. If it’s possible to open and close doors using your elbows or shoulders, do so. Wear gloves to turn a doorknob—or wash your hands after touching it. If anybody in your home takes sick, wash your doorknobs regularly. Similarly, be cautious with stairway banisters, desktops, cell phones, toys, laptops—any objects that are hand-held. As long as you handle only your own personal objects, you will be ok—but if you need to pick up someone else’s cell phone or cooking tools or use someone else’s computer keyboard, be mindful of not touching your face and wash your hands immediately after touching the object.
7. If you share meals, do not use your personal chopsticks and utensils to remove food from a serving bowl or plate and, of course, tell your children to never drink out of anybody else’s cups or from a container of shared fluid. It is customary in China to prepare several dishes for a meal and then allow everybody at the table to use their personal chopsticks to pull food from the common dishes: Don’t do this until the epidemic is over. Place serving spoons in each dish and instruct everybody at the table to scoop what they want from the serving dishes onto their personal plates or bowls, return the serving spoon to the main dish, and then use their personal chopsticks only to pick food from their personal plate or bowl into their mouth. Wash all food and kitchenware thoroughly between meals and avoid restaurants that have poor hygiene practices.
8. Absolutely do not buy, slaughter, or consume any live animal or fish until it is known what species was the source of the virus.
9. When the weather allows, open your windows at home or work, letting your space air out. The virus cannot linger in a well-ventilated space. But of course, if it is cold or the weather is inclement, keep warm and close those windows.
10. Finally, if you are caring for a friend or family member who is running a fever, always wear a tight-fitting mask when you are near them, and place one on the ailing person (unless they are nauseated). When you replace an old, dirty mask from the face of your friend or loved one be very, very careful—assume, for the sake of your protection, that it is covered in viruses, and handle it while wearing latex gloves, place it inside of a disposable container, seal it, and then put it in the trash. While wearing those latex gloves, gently wash the patient’s face with warm soap and water, using a disposable paper towel or cotton swab, and seal it after use in a container or plastic bag before placing it in your household trash. Wear long-sleeved shirts and clothing that covers your body when you are caring for your ailing friend or relative. Clean everything your patient wears or touches very thoroughly in hot soapy water, including sheets, towels, and utensils. If you have space, isolate the sick person in your household in a room, or a corner of a room, where they are comfortable, but separated from the rest of the household. If the weather is tolerable, open a window that is on the opposite side of the room, so that air gently blows past the patient’s face and then outdoors. Of course, don’t do this if it is very cold, as your friend or loved one will be made sicker if uncomfortably cold.
The Chinese government will take very drastic actions over the next few weeks, and this will be a time of hardship for the Chinese people. As the virus spreads in other countries, similarly draconian measures may be invoked to slow the epidemic. But with these simple precautions, if taken by everybody in your household, building, office, and school, you will dramatically reduce the spread of the virus and bring the outbreak to its knees.
Be safe. Do not panic. Take commonsense precautions. As frightening as this time is, you will get through it.