foreignpolicy--2020-03-20--Death of a Whistleblower

Death of a Whistleblower

It ’ s almost not possible to overstate how large and complicated the United States Department of Defense is .
It is the largest U.S. government agency , serves as the country ’ s biggest employer , and wields an annual budget of $ 738 billion .
The task of detecting and deterring malfeasance within this labyrinth falls to the Pentagon ’ s Office of the Inspector General .
Each year , the watchdog ’ s hotline receives some 14,000 complaints from Department of Defense employees , many of whom make grave allegations of criminality , fraud , or waste @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were made against senior officials , they landed on the desk of Steven Luke , one of around 30 investigators tasked with handling probes into some of the highest-ranking officials in the Pentagon .
Having worked in the office for over a decade , Luke was well acquainted with the Washington swamp .
He enjoyed his job , and he was good at it .
But in January 2018 , Luke was handed a case that caused him to question the integrity of his office and the motives of his supervisors , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pentagon ’ s own watchdog office .
At first glance , the case should have been relatively straightforward .
Robert Cardillo , who was then the head of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency , had been accused of violating agency travel protocols .
Luke had handled plenty of similar cases over the years , and travel investigations often left a paper trail .
He reviewed the evidence and felt that it was too thin to substantiate the claims .
But in a series of emails obtained by Foreign Policy , Luke described how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to back up the allegations made against Cardillo .
“ From the outset , everyone in my leadership chain suggested or directed that I should substantiate the primary allegation , ” he wrote in an email to the office of Sen. Chuck Grassley , the Iowa Republican known as the “ patron saint of whistleblowers.
” “ I felt bullied , berated , and belittled unless I acquiesced to go along with everyone else and write the ROI [ Report of Investigation ] as a substantiation , ” Luke wrote .
The case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the experience left Luke rattled .
He felt sure that had he not stuck his neck out , the case would have been upheld , leaving an indelible stain on Cardillo ’ s decadeslong record of government service .
His wife , Amy Luke , said that it was the worst work-related stress she had ever seen him under .
He was frustrated , preoccupied , and beginning to look for other jobs .
After the case was closed , Luke wrote a two-page email outlining his concerns to Charles Murphy , an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They arranged to meet on Feb. 4 , 2019 .
But Luke never made it to the meeting .
On Jan. 8 , 2019 , he was found dead in the trunk of his red Volvo S60 in the parking garage of the Mark Center office building , home to the Pentagon ’ s Office of the Inspector General .
An Alexandria police department investigation concluded that Luke—a father of four who had been stalked by depression throughout his adult life—had killed himself .
He was 54 years old .
Each year , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forward to report misconduct .
They play a pivotal role in holding the government to account and have saved taxpayers billions of dollars .
Most whistleblowers do not imperil a presidency .
Few ever make the news .
The reality of whistleblowing is often different , and much darker , than the David and Goliath portrayal that has long captured imaginations in Hollywood .
Having stumbled upon nepotism , corruption , vested interests , or political agendas , many are simply crushed by the powerful interests they are trying to expose .
Whistleblowers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they often face retaliation , demotion , or the loss of their livelihoods , which can take a profound toll : “ There is a burgeoning field of research on whistleblower retaliation and a hostile work environment that causes stress-related disorders , such as PTSD , depression and suicide along with a host of physical disorders such as autoimmune diseases , musculoskeletal , and gastrointestinal , ” said Jacqueline Garrick , the founder of the nonprofit Whistleblowers of America , in an email to Foreign Policy .
In a poll of 100 whistleblowers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 50 percent of respondents said they had some thoughts of suicide during the whistleblowing process , Garrick said .
“ There is a burgeoning field of research on whistleblower retaliation and a hostile work environment that causes stress-related disorders , such as PTSD , depression and suicide.
” In writing to Grassley ’ s office , Luke was in the early stages of becoming a whistleblower himself .
Allegations he made in a series of emails exchanged with Grassley ’ s office raise serious questions about the Pentagon ’ s Office of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ previously been accused by lawmakers and independent watchdogs of exerting undue influence in investigations of senior officials and of presiding over a “ toxic ” environment for whistleblowers .
“ The tragic suicide of Steven Luke may be part of a long-standing pattern of alleged investigative misconduct , retaliation and bullying in the directorate where Luke worked .
This abusive culture has apparently been allowed to exist unchecked for far too long , ” Grassley said in a statement to Foreign Policy .
“ Those responsible must be held accountable.
” Grassley added @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needs to address this problem without further delay.
” Responding to Grassley ’ s statement , Dwrena Allen , a spokeswoman for the inspector general ’ s office , wrote , “ This statement raises inaccurate allegations and unfairly makes inferences that are simply not supported by facts.
” Allen referred Foreign Policy to the latest Federal Viewpoint survey of government employees , which showed significant improvements over recent years in the way employees of the Office of the Inspector General regard their workplace .
“ [ T ] he scores in Steven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consistently over 90 % ) are much higher than in the federal government and the Department of Defense as a whole , and they demonstrate that there is not an abusive culture , ” she said in a statement .
In 2015 , 56 percent of employees at the Office of the Inspector General felt that they could make a disclosure about suspected wrongdoing without fear of reprisal , below the government-wide average .
By 2019 , 73 percent of agency staff said that they felt they could blow the whistle without facing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government .
The Pentagon ’ s Office of the Inspector General is a “ shop that ’ s had a lot of problems for a long time , ” said Mandy Smithberger of the Project on Government Oversight , a good governance watchdog .
As far back as 2002 , a review by an external independent contractor found that “ The culture of the OIG DoD has been , and continues to be , hostile to internal whistleblowers .
All too often , OIG employees who have endeavored to identify mismanagement or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their chain of command.
” This was echoed 14 years later in a letter from the Project on Government Oversight to Fine , the acting inspector general , that described the office as having a “ cultural aversion ” to whistleblowers .
“ There is a lot of pressure there not to even open cases , ” said Garrick of Whistleblowers of America .
“ I ’ ve not seen anybody that I can think of off the top of my head who has gone to the DoD OIG and even had a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spokeswoman for the inspector general ’ s office , described these comments as inaccurate , saying , “ There is no pressure to reach any particular outcome on a case—other than to take the facts and evidence wherever they lead and to ensure the investigations and reports are well supported , well explained , and factually correct .
That is what happened in the case discussed in the article , and what happens in our other cases as well.
” “ There is no pressure to reach any particular outcome on a case—other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wherever they lead.
” A spokesman for Grassley estimated that the senator ’ s office had been contacted by dozens of whistleblowers from within the Pentagon ’ s inspector general office over the last decade .
“ There have been concerns for a long time about the treatment of whistleblowers , certainly hostility toward internal and external whistleblowers , ” Smithberger said .
She added that it wasn ’ t necessarily unusual to see so many whistleblowers come forward from a watchdog office , as they are likely more aware of what their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Allen declined to comment on past concerns raised about the inspector general ’ s office , describing the allegations as “ not fully accurate ” and “ dated.
” She said that the Administrative Investigations division where Luke worked had made numerous improvements since 2016 , stepping up the timeliness of investigations , reallocating significant resources to the office , and increasing staff numbers .
She pointed to a 2018 report from the Project on Government Oversight recommending that the inspector general ’ s alternative dispute resolution initiative , which uses mediation as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lengthy investigations , be considered for implementation at other large offices of inspectors general .
In a 2017 speech , Grassley raised concerns that senior managers in the Pentagon inspector general ’ s office had , “ allegedly been tampering with investigative reports and then retaliating against supervisory investigators who call them to account.
” In the same speech , he took the office to task for its backlog in processing whistleblower tips that come in through the agency ’ s hotline .
One of the sharpest critics of the inspector general ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for reducing the backlog in a 2019 speech , describing it as “ a glimmer of hope in an otherwise swamp of secrecy.
” Previous whistleblowers who have come forward from the Office of the Inspector General have alleged that there had been pressure in politically sensitive cases not to stand up allegations made against senior officials .
What is different about the claims made by Steven Luke is that he instead seemed to feel pressure to substantiate a case in which he didn ’ t feel the evidence held up .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials at the Pentagon ’ s inspector general office sought to influence Luke ’ s investigation into Cardillo or why .
Nor is it apparent from his emails who he allegedly felt under pressure from to substantiate the investigation .
Allen denied that there had been any improper influence on the outcome of the case .
In emails to Grassley ’ s office , Luke said that the then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis had taken a personal interest in Cardillo ’ s case and speculated that Mattis may have been planning to move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Honestly , it really bothers me—as a human being—that this gentleman ’ s long and distinguished career would have ended based on a group think ROI [ Report of Investigation ] had it not been for my willingness to say to my supervisors , ‘ No , this isn ’ t right , ’ ” he wrote .
Cardillo confirmed to Foreign Policy that he had been the subject of an inspector general investigation into two alleged violations of travel standards , and he confirmed that he ’ d met with Luke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aware whether or not he was being considered for a more senior appointment by Mattis .
Through a spokesperson , Mattis declined to comment on this story .
Seventy-four offices of inspectors general operate across the U.S. government , and they are often the first port of call for federal employees looking to report allegations of wrongdoing .
Luke ’ s claims of alleged misconduct within the Pentagon ’ s watchdog office cut to the heart of an age-old dilemma of who watches the watchmen .
Luke ’ s claims of alleged misconduct @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cut to the heart of an age-old dilemma of who watches the watchmen .
“ I often say that IGs , the overseers of agencies , need to be as pure as driven snow , because if they are not , all of their work is tainted , ” said Rep. Gerry Connolly during a hearing of the House Oversight Committee in September 2019 .
Luke ’ s emails to Grassley ’ s office raise significant questions about conduct within the inspector general ’ s office , questions that went unanswered after his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first time .
Did Steven Luke face any undue pressure regarding Cardillo ’ s case ?
Was he “ bullied ” by his supervisors to substantiate the claims ?
Was someone looking to use the case to smear Cardillo , as Luke feared ?
A Freedom of Information Act request by Foreign Policy revealed that the watchdog did not conduct an internal investigation into Luke ’ s death .
Grassley ’ s office halted its investigation of the claims upon the advice of counsel as Luke ’ s death was investigated by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pinpoint a single cause in cases of suicide .
“ Suicide is complex , and there are many factors that contribute—it ’ s never just one single factor , ” said Jill Harkavy-Friedman , a clinical psychologist and the vice president of research at the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention .
“ What happens is when somebody has a stress or multiple stresses it can look like that was the cause , but we don ’ t know what the person brings to it in terms of any risk factors and vulnerability.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people who die by suicide are known to have depression at the time of their death .
Luke ’ s wife said that his supervisor was aware of her husband ’ s mental health history and had been very supportive over the years .
Allen , the spokeswoman for the inspector general ’ s office , said , “ Mr .
Luke was a part of a close office that supported him over the years with personal and caring help when he needed it , both in and outside the workplace .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ leadership alike—were heartbroken when we learned that Mr. Luke succumbed to his illness.
” Luke had previously attempted to take his own life , and his wife , Amy , worried that it was only a matter of time before he would reach that point again .
But she does fear that it was hastened by stress he faced at work .
“ If they would have just let him do what he ’ s supposed to do in the job , he would have not been in that darkest place that he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he eventually would have , ” she said .
The weekend before his death , Luke had seemed overwhelmed .
“ He just was dissolving .
His mind was just not functioning right , ” Amy Luke said .
Luke joined the inspector general ’ s office in 2008 after retiring from a 20-year career in Air Force intelligence .
With a staff of more than 1,500 members , the office is responsible for detecting and deterring unscrupulous behavior that can gather in the corners of the Department of Defense .
It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it one of the highest-stakes watchdog offices in the federal government , according to Irvin McCullough of the whistleblower advocacy group the Government Accountability Project .
“ The DoD OIG is also conducting many , many sensitive investigations , some of which are still properly classified , on extraordinarily sensitive programs , ” McCullough said .
Luke worked in the Investigations of Senior Officials directorate , a subcomponent of the inspector general ’ s office that investigates allegations leveled against some of the most senior figures , both military and civilian , within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the office was tasked with investigating then-acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan himself .
The allegations were not substantiated .
Working hard had become a form of self-medication for Luke , a way to stave off the depression that weighed heavily on him—Amy Luke , his wife of 33 years , recalled him saying , “ I work so hard so people don ’ t think there ’ s something wrong with me.
” Amy said her husband had long been motivated by a strong sense of justice .
In his email @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the German writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe , “ You can easily judge the character of a man by how he treats those who can do nothing for him.
” At work he had a reputation among colleagues for being diligent , uncompromising .
He had a “ high level of attention to detail , very committed to sticking with an investigative plan , ” said Daniel Meyer , who previously served as director for whistleblowing and transparency at the Pentagon inspector general ’ s office .
“ He really didn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wanted .
He just presented his work as he found it , ” Meyer said .
These were useful characteristics to have in an investigator , but it made it all the more difficult when Luke came up against what he felt was wrongdoing by his own supervisors .
Meyer , who went on to serve as the executive director of intelligence community whistleblowing and source protection , said that whistleblowers or investigators who have an unyielding approach to wrongdoing can be challenged most when they ’ re confronted with it in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have the hardest time are the whistleblowers or investigators who see a rule , and they see it violated , and they expect there to be a response to that.
” “ The folks who have the hardest time , ” Meyer said , “ are the whistleblowers or investigators who see a rule , and they see it violated , and they expect there to be a response to that.
” He added that there was often an issue of “ emotional intelligence ” and “ resilience ” among whistleblowers : “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and watch those two qualities carefully in the IG , when I worked with Steve and the other investigators.
” Meyer himself had blown the whistle on the inspector general ’ s office in 2016 , alleging that they had watered down an investigation into whether former CIA Director Leon Panetta had revealed classified information about the raid on Osama bin Laden ’ s compound to the screenwriter who wrote the script for Zero Dark Thirty , a film about the raid .
In late January 2018 , Luke was handed the case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from watchdog to whistleblower and approach the office of Grassley , whose staff have handled a number of whistleblower complaints about the Pentagon ’ s Office of the Inspector General .
It wasn ’ t the first time Luke had contacted the office .
In 2013 , he reached out to report concerns about the length of time it took for investigative reports to be reviewed by senior leaders in his office and by the agency ’ s general counsel , but he never followed up .
In a two-page email sent on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how he felt bullied and increasingly isolated as he sought to resist efforts by his supervisors to substantiate the claims made against Robert Cardillo , who stepped down as director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in February 2019 as part of a scheduled departure .
In the email , Luke dispassionately recounts how , after examining the evidence , he advised his bosses that he did not see a “ slam dunk ” violation of the agency ’ s rules regarding travel .
His supervisors , according to Luke , felt differently .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I was pressured and bullied to write the ROI [ Report of Investigation ] in such a fashion that it would conclude as a ‘ substantiation.
’ ” Luke describes how he found himself excluded from meetings about the case even though he was the lead investigator .
When he complained , he received his first ever letter of counseling , a letter from his supervisors detailing what they saw as unacceptable behavior .
“ I began to believe that my exclusion from internal meetings was because I was the lone voice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ non-substantiation , ” he wrote .
In a subsequent email , Luke alleged that a few months into the probe , Marguerite Garrison , the head of his division , told him she was briefing acting Inspector General Fine that they planned to substantiate the claims against Cardillo .
In response to questions from Foreign Policy , Allen , the spokeswoman for the Office of the Inspector General , said that it was not uncommon for senior officials to advise the inspector general about the status of an investigation .
She added Luke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ initial draft report and , at the time , it looked as if the case was set to be substantiated .
Garrison ’ s handling of cases has previously drawn scrutiny from Grassley .
In speeches on the Senate floor in 2016 and 2017 , Grassley singled her out when he accused the department ’ s leaders of having “ doctored ” an investigation in favor of a rear admiral accused of retaliating against subordinates he suspected of being whistleblowers .
He said Garrison allegedly wrote a letter to the rear admiral , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigation had been finalized .
“ To conform with the Garrison letter , the findings in the draft report had to be allegedly changed from substantiated to not substantiated .
The investigators dug in their heels and stood their ground , ” Grassley said in the 2016 speech .
Allen described these allegations as inaccurate , adding , “ Rear Admiral Losey had five separate reprisal investigations opened against him , three of which were found to be substantiated by the OIG .
In the first of the other two cases , Rear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reprisal , and in the second case , to which Senator Grassley referred , Rear Admiral Losey was removed as the subject of that case because the evidence developed in the investigation showed that the prohibited personnel action was taken by the other alleged subject.
” By August 2018 , after months of feeling “ pressured and bullied , ” Luke acquiesced and told his supervisors that he would write a report substantiating the claims , but only if all of the exculpatory evidence could be included in the final report .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Congress .
It was at this point that the pressure began to ease .
Luke started to feel like his leadership had begun to take his draft report seriously .
According to his email to Grassley ’ s office , he shared it with four colleagues , senior investigators who were not involved in the case , for a cold read .
All reached the same conclusion that the primary allegation against Cardillo did not stand up .
Ultimately , the case was closed as unsubstantiated and , according to Luke ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the then-secretary of defense , on Nov. 30 , 2018 .
“ I take no joy in doing this .
I like my co-workers .
However , our ISO [ Investigations of Senior Officials ] process is broken and no one here is willing or able to change it , ” he wrote in a later email .
Allen declined to comment on the facts and circumstances surrounding the case , or on Luke ’ s perceptions of how it was handled .
“ Mr .
Luke was involved in professional discussions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirm that there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. Luke ’ s proposed outcome in the case , ” she said .
“ Mr .
Luke ’ s supervisors ultimately reviewed the evidence collected by Mr. Luke , found the information in Mr. Luke ’ s files to support the conclusions in the report , and the report was issued with all relevant evidence , in accord with Mr. Luke ’ s initial conclusion about the case.
” In the days before Luke died , internal Office of the Inspector General emails obtained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his bosses of his plans to meet with Murphy , the investigator in Grassley ’ s office , regarding their handling of the Cardillo investigation , which by that point had been closed .
Emails also show his supervisor informed him that he could use official time for the meeting .
On Monday , Jan. 7 , Fine , the acting inspector general of the Department of Defense , wrote to Luke and offered to meet with him to talk through his concerns .
Luke replied the next day to say he would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is unclear whether the meeting ever took place .
Later that day , when Luke failed to return home at the usual time , his wife raised the alarm .
His body was found later that evening .
Only a tiny number of security clearances are denied or revoked because of mental health , according to the Department of Defense .
Between 2006 and 2012 , only one in every 35,000 people either applying for the first time or looking to maintain their security clearance was denied because they disclosed a history @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military leaders have tried to drive home .
But Elspeth Cameron Ritchie , a former Army psychiatrist , said that the stakes of losing a security clearance have long held service members back from seeking help .
“ Say you ’ ve been in the military for 10 to 15 years .
Losing your clearance means losing your job—that means losing your health care .
It also means losing your housing and losing your retirement , ” said Ritchie , who at the time of her retirement from the military in 2010 served @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health in the Office of the Army Surgeon General .
Added to that is the stigma attached to seeking help , “ It ’ s a concern about what your buddies will think , concern that you won ’ t be found fit for duty , ” Ritchie said .
“ I don ’ t think Steven ’ s death can be attributed directly to this case or to the atmosphere at work or from anyone ’ s actions or inactions.
” The one thing that offered Luke a temporary release from his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
After graduating high school , Luke spent 18 months in the Dominican Republic as a missionary .
He went on to complete a degree in Spanish at the University of North Texas .
“ It ’ s like he could compartmentalize the depressed Steven from the Spanish-speaking Steven , ” Amy said .
He tried to instill his love of the language in their four children , buying them books and Disney films in Spanish .
Five months after her husband died , Amy Luke wrote to his former colleagues , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There was not anything that could have been said or done to have changed the outcome .
I know , I tried to save him from his suicidal thoughts for thirty-three years , ” she wrote in the letter .
It was signed off with a red heart .
In response to questions from Foreign Policy , the Office of the Inspector General reached out to Steven Luke ’ s wife for comment , which Allen included in the agency ’ s response .
Amy Luke said , “ I know that Steven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thoughtful , professional , and caring when it came to the depression he experienced .
He suffered from a pervasive and profound depression that he lived with for most of his life .
Unfortunately , the suicidal ideation that often accompanies this kind of depression can be deadly , as was the case with Steven .
I don ’ t think Steven ’ s death can be attributed directly to this case or to the atmosphere at work or from anyone ’ s actions or inactions.
” On Jan. 15 , 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rows of granite headstones in Quantico National Cemetery in Virginia .
On a recent Saturday afternoon , the only sound to disturb the silent repose of the cemetery was a light breeze that whispered through a nearby thicket of trees and rippled the miniature American flags planted in the earth .

It’s almost not possible to overstate how large and complicated the United States Department of Defense is. It is the largest U.S. government agency, serves as the country’s biggest employer, and wields an annual budget of $738 billion. The task of detecting and deterring malfeasance within this labyrinth falls to the Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General. Each year, the watchdog’s hotline receives some 14,000 complaints from Department of Defense employees, many of whom make grave allegations of criminality, fraud, or waste of government resources.
It’s almost not possible to overstate how large and complicated the United States Department of Defense is. It is the largest U.S. government agency, serves as the country’s biggest employer, and wields an annual budget of $738 billion. The task of detecting and deterring malfeasance within this labyrinth falls to the Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General. Each year, the watchdog’s hotline receives some 14,000 complaints from Department of Defense employees, many of whom make grave allegations of criminality, fraud, or waste of government resources.
When credible allegations were made against senior officials, they landed on the desk of Steven Luke, one of around 30 investigators tasked with handling probes into some of the highest-ranking officials in the Pentagon. Having worked in the office for over a decade, Luke was well acquainted with the Washington swamp. He enjoyed his job, and he was good at it. But in January 2018, Luke was handed a case that caused him to question the integrity of his office and the motives of his supervisors, and led him to blow the whistle on the Pentagon’s own watchdog office.
At first glance, the case should have been relatively straightforward. Robert Cardillo, who was then the head of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, had been accused of violating agency travel protocols. Luke had handled plenty of similar cases over the years, and travel investigations often left a paper trail.
He reviewed the evidence and felt that it was too thin to substantiate the claims. But in a series of emails obtained by Foreign Policy, Luke described how he felt under pressure from his supervisors to back up the allegations made against Cardillo. “From the outset, everyone in my leadership chain suggested or directed that I should substantiate the primary allegation,” he wrote in an email to the office of Sen. Chuck Grassley, the Iowa Republican known as the “patron saint of whistleblowers.” “I felt bullied, berated, and belittled unless I acquiesced to go along with everyone else and write the ROI [Report of Investigation] as a substantiation,” Luke wrote.
The case was ultimately closed as unsubstantiated, but the experience left Luke rattled.
If you are in crisis or are worried about a friend or loved one, the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline network is available 24/7 across the United States. Call 1-800-273-8255, or visit www.suicidepreventionlifeline.org for options in Spanish and for those who are deaf or hard of hearing.
He felt sure that had he not stuck his neck out, the case would have been upheld, leaving an indelible stain on Cardillo’s decadeslong record of government service. His wife, Amy Luke, said that it was the worst work-related stress she had ever seen him under. He was frustrated, preoccupied, and beginning to look for other jobs.
After the case was closed, Luke wrote a two-page email outlining his concerns to Charles Murphy, an investigator in Grassley’s office. They arranged to meet on Feb. 4, 2019.
But Luke never made it to the meeting.
On Jan. 8, 2019, he was found dead in the trunk of his red Volvo S60 in the parking garage of the Mark Center office building, home to the Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General. An Alexandria police department investigation concluded that Luke—a father of four who had been stalked by depression throughout his adult life—had killed himself. He was 54 years old.
Last year, a whistleblower complaint by an anonymous CIA official set off a chain of events that culminated in the impeachment of U.S. President Donald Trump. It underscored the remarkable power of whistleblowing, as well as the enormous pressure that can come to bear on those who speak out, as the president and his allies doubled down in their efforts to expose the complaint’s author.
Each year, tens of thousands of government employees come forward to report misconduct. They play a pivotal role in holding the government to account and have saved taxpayers billions of dollars. Most whistleblowers do not imperil a presidency. Few ever make the news. The reality of whistleblowing is often different, and much darker, than the David and Goliath portrayal that has long captured imaginations in Hollywood. Having stumbled upon nepotism, corruption, vested interests, or political agendas, many are simply crushed by the powerful interests they are trying to expose. Whistleblowers are protected under the law, but they often face retaliation, demotion, or the loss of their livelihoods, which can take a profound toll: “There is a burgeoning field of research on whistleblower retaliation and a hostile work environment that causes stress-related disorders, such as PTSD, depression and suicide along with a host of physical disorders such as autoimmune diseases, musculoskeletal, and gastrointestinal,” said Jacqueline Garrick, the founder of the nonprofit Whistleblowers of America, in an email to Foreign Policy. In a poll of 100 whistleblowers run on the organization’s website, 50 percent of respondents said they had some thoughts of suicide during the whistleblowing process, Garrick said.
“There is a burgeoning field of research on whistleblower retaliation and a hostile work environment that causes stress-related disorders, such as PTSD, depression and suicide.”
In writing to Grassley’s office, Luke was in the early stages of becoming a whistleblower himself. Allegations he made in a series of emails exchanged with Grassley’s office raise serious questions about the Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General, where officials have previously been accused by lawmakers and independent watchdogs of exerting undue influence in investigations of senior officials and of presiding over a “toxic” environment for whistleblowers. “The tragic suicide of Steven Luke may be part of a long-standing pattern of alleged investigative misconduct, retaliation and bullying in the directorate where Luke worked. This abusive culture has apparently been allowed to exist unchecked for far too long,” Grassley said in a statement to Foreign Policy. “Those responsible must be held accountable.” Grassley added that acting Inspector General Glenn Fine “needs to address this problem without further delay.”
Responding to Grassley’s statement, Dwrena Allen, a spokeswoman for the inspector general’s office, wrote, “This statement raises inaccurate allegations and unfairly makes inferences that are simply not supported by facts.” Allen referred Foreign Policy to the latest Federal Viewpoint survey of government employees, which showed significant improvements over recent years in the way employees of the Office of the Inspector General regard their workplace. “[T]he scores in Steven’s office on this survey (consistently over 90%) are much higher than in the federal government and the Department of Defense as a whole, and they demonstrate that there is not an abusive culture,” she said in a statement.
In 2015, 56 percent of employees at the Office of the Inspector General felt that they could make a disclosure about suspected wrongdoing without fear of reprisal, below the government-wide average. By 2019, 73 percent of agency staff said that they felt they could blow the whistle without facing retaliation, higher than the average across the government.
The Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General is a “shop that’s had a lot of problems for a long time,” said Mandy Smithberger of the Project on Government Oversight, a good governance watchdog. As far back as 2002, a review by an external independent contractor found that “The culture of the OIG DoD has been, and continues to be, hostile to internal whistleblowers. All too often, OIG employees who have endeavored to identify mismanagement or violations of law have been punished by their chain of command.” This was echoed 14 years later in a letter from the Project on Government Oversight to Fine, the acting inspector general, that described the office as having a “cultural aversion” to whistleblowers.
“There is a lot of pressure there not to even open cases,” said Garrick of Whistleblowers of America. “I’ve not seen anybody that I can think of off the top of my head who has gone to the DoD OIG and even had a case get opened.”
Allen, the spokeswoman for the inspector general’s office, described these comments as inaccurate, saying, “There is no pressure to reach any particular outcome on a case—other than to take the facts and evidence wherever they lead and to ensure the investigations and reports are well supported, well explained, and factually correct. That is what happened in the case discussed in the article, and what happens in our other cases as well.”
“There is no pressure to reach any particular outcome on a case—other than to take the facts and evidence wherever they lead.”
A spokesman for Grassley estimated that the senator’s office had been contacted by dozens of whistleblowers from within the Pentagon’s inspector general office over the last decade. “There have been concerns for a long time about the treatment of whistleblowers, certainly hostility toward internal and external whistleblowers,” Smithberger said. She added that it wasn’t necessarily unusual to see so many whistleblowers come forward from a watchdog office, as they are likely more aware of what their rights are than other government employees.
Allen declined to comment on past concerns raised about the inspector general’s office, describing the allegations as “not fully accurate” and “dated.” She said that the Administrative Investigations division where Luke worked had made numerous improvements since 2016, stepping up the timeliness of investigations, reallocating significant resources to the office, and increasing staff numbers. She pointed to a 2018 report from the Project on Government Oversight recommending that the inspector general’s alternative dispute resolution initiative, which uses mediation as a means of resolving complaints instead of lengthy investigations, be considered for implementation at other large offices of inspectors general.
In a 2017 speech, Grassley raised concerns that senior managers in the Pentagon inspector general’s office had, “allegedly been tampering with investigative reports and then retaliating against supervisory investigators who call them to account.” In the same speech, he took the office to task for its backlog in processing whistleblower tips that come in through the agency’s hotline. One of the sharpest critics of the inspector general’s office, Grassley later commended it for reducing the backlog in a 2019 speech, describing it as “a glimmer of hope in an otherwise swamp of secrecy.”
Previous whistleblowers who have come forward from the Office of the Inspector General have alleged that there had been pressure in politically sensitive cases not to stand up allegations made against senior officials. What is different about the claims made by Steven Luke is that he instead seemed to feel pressure to substantiate a case in which he didn’t feel the evidence held up.
It’s not clear whether any senior officials at the Pentagon’s inspector general office sought to influence Luke’s investigation into Cardillo or why. Nor is it apparent from his emails who he allegedly felt under pressure from to substantiate the investigation. Allen denied that there had been any improper influence on the outcome of the case.
In emails to Grassley’s office, Luke said that the then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis had taken a personal interest in Cardillo’s case and speculated that Mattis may have been planning to move or promote the geospatial intelligence chief. “Honestly, it really bothers me—as a human being—that this gentleman’s long and distinguished career would have ended based on a group think ROI [Report of Investigation] had it not been for my willingness to say to my supervisors, ‘No, this isn’t right,’” he wrote.
Cardillo confirmed to Foreign Policy that he had been the subject of an inspector general investigation into two alleged violations of travel standards, and he confirmed that he’d met with Luke during his investigation. He was not aware whether or not he was being considered for a more senior appointment by Mattis. Through a spokesperson, Mattis declined to comment on this story.
Seventy-four offices of inspectors general operate across the U.S. government, and they are often the first port of call for federal employees looking to report allegations of wrongdoing. Luke’s claims of alleged misconduct within the Pentagon’s watchdog office cut to the heart of an age-old dilemma of who watches the watchmen.
Luke’s claims of alleged misconduct within the Pentagon’s watchdog office cut to the heart of an age-old dilemma of who watches the watchmen.
“I often say that IGs, the overseers of agencies, need to be as pure as driven snow, because if they are not, all of their work is tainted,” said Rep. Gerry Connolly during a hearing of the House Oversight Committee in September 2019. Luke’s emails to Grassley’s office raise significant questions about conduct within the inspector general’s office, questions that went unanswered after his death, which is reported here for the first time. Did Steven Luke face any undue pressure regarding Cardillo’s case? Was he “bullied” by his supervisors to substantiate the claims? Was someone looking to use the case to smear Cardillo, as Luke feared?
A Freedom of Information Act request by Foreign Policy revealed that the watchdog did not conduct an internal investigation into Luke’s death. Grassley’s office halted its investigation of the claims upon the advice of counsel as Luke’s death was investigated by law enforcement.
Experts caution against trying to pinpoint a single cause in cases of suicide. “Suicide is complex, and there are many factors that contribute—it’s never just one single factor,” said Jill Harkavy-Friedman, a clinical psychologist and the vice president of research at the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention. “What happens is when somebody has a stress or multiple stresses it can look like that was the cause, but we don’t know what the person brings to it in terms of any risk factors and vulnerability.” Harkavy-Friedman noted that around 60 percent of people who die by suicide are known to have depression at the time of their death.
Luke’s wife said that his supervisor was aware of her husband’s mental health history and had been very supportive over the years. Allen, the spokeswoman for the inspector general’s office, said, “Mr. Luke was a part of a close office that supported him over the years with personal and caring help when he needed it, both in and outside the workplace. His OIG colleagues—employees, supervisors, and leadership alike—were heartbroken when we learned that Mr. Luke succumbed to his illness.”
Luke had previously attempted to take his own life, and his wife, Amy, worried that it was only a matter of time before he would reach that point again. But she does fear that it was hastened by stress he faced at work. “If they would have just let him do what he’s supposed to do in the job, he would have not been in that darkest place that he ended up being. But I think he eventually would have,” she said. The weekend before his death, Luke had seemed overwhelmed. “He just was dissolving. His mind was just not functioning right,” Amy Luke said.
Steven Luke, a former investigator with the Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General.
The living room of the Luke family home in Stafford, Virginia, is adorned with photographs and mementos of all that the Lukes held dear: Texas roots, family, and their Mormon faith. Beneath a photo of the Lukes with their four children, the youngest of whom is now 16 years old, is a long drop-leaf table that has been turned into a memorial to Steven Luke’s life: A graying plush Snoopy from his childhood in Lubbock, Texas. An award he received in 2015 for “Investigation of the Year” in his department of the Office of the Inspector General. The bullet casings from the three-volley salute fired at his funeral.
Luke joined the inspector general’s office in 2008 after retiring from a 20-year career in Air Force intelligence. With a staff of more than 1,500 members, the office is responsible for detecting and deterring unscrupulous behavior that can gather in the corners of the Department of Defense. It’s this kind of work that makes it one of the highest-stakes watchdog offices in the federal government, according to Irvin McCullough of the whistleblower advocacy group the Government Accountability Project. “The DoD OIG is also conducting many, many sensitive investigations, some of which are still properly classified, on extraordinarily sensitive programs,” McCullough said. Luke worked in the Investigations of Senior Officials directorate, a subcomponent of the inspector general’s office that investigates allegations leveled against some of the most senior figures, both military and civilian, within the Department of Defense. In 2019, the office was tasked with investigating then-acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan himself. The allegations were not substantiated.
Working hard had become a form of self-medication for Luke, a way to stave off the depression that weighed heavily on him—Amy Luke, his wife of 33 years, recalled him saying, “I work so hard so people don’t think there’s something wrong with me.” Amy said her husband had long been motivated by a strong sense of justice. In his email signature he included a quote sometimes attributed to the German writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “You can easily judge the character of a man by how he treats those who can do nothing for him.”
At work he had a reputation among colleagues for being diligent, uncompromising. He had a “high level of attention to detail, very committed to sticking with an investigative plan,” said Daniel Meyer, who previously served as director for whistleblowing and transparency at the Pentagon inspector general’s office. “He really didn’t try to read what his boss wanted. He just presented his work as he found it,” Meyer said. These were useful characteristics to have in an investigator, but it made it all the more difficult when Luke came up against what he felt was wrongdoing by his own supervisors. Meyer, who went on to serve as the executive director of intelligence community whistleblowing and source protection, said that whistleblowers or investigators who have an unyielding approach to wrongdoing can be challenged most when they’re confronted with it in their own office.
“The folks who have the hardest time are the whistleblowers or investigators who see a rule, and they see it violated, and they expect there to be a response to that.”
“The folks who have the hardest time,” Meyer said, “are the whistleblowers or investigators who see a rule, and they see it violated, and they expect there to be a response to that.” He added that there was often an issue of “emotional intelligence” and “resilience” among whistleblowers: “[W]e used to study and watch those two qualities carefully in the IG, when I worked with Steve and the other investigators.”
Meyer himself had blown the whistle on the inspector general’s office in 2016, alleging that they had watered down an investigation into whether former CIA Director Leon Panetta had revealed classified information about the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound to the screenwriter who wrote the script for Zero Dark Thirty, a film about the raid.
In late January 2018, Luke was handed the case that would ultimately prompt him to go from watchdog to whistleblower and approach the office of Grassley, whose staff have handled a number of whistleblower complaints about the Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General. It wasn’t the first time Luke had contacted the office. In 2013, he reached out to report concerns about the length of time it took for investigative reports to be reviewed by senior leaders in his office and by the agency’s general counsel, but he never followed up.
In a two-page email sent on Dec. 17, 2018, Luke detailed how he felt bullied and increasingly isolated as he sought to resist efforts by his supervisors to substantiate the claims made against Robert Cardillo, who stepped down as director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in February 2019 as part of a scheduled departure. In the email, Luke dispassionately recounts how, after examining the evidence, he advised his bosses that he did not see a “slam dunk” violation of the agency’s rules regarding travel. His supervisors, according to Luke, felt differently. “Over a period of several months, I was pressured and bullied to write the ROI [Report of Investigation] in such a fashion that it would conclude as a ‘substantiation.’”
Luke describes how he found himself excluded from meetings about the case even though he was the lead investigator. When he complained, he received his first ever letter of counseling, a letter from his supervisors detailing what they saw as unacceptable behavior. “I began to believe that my exclusion from internal meetings was because I was the lone voice that insisted the evidence led to a non-substantiation,” he wrote.
In a subsequent email, Luke alleged that a few months into the probe, Marguerite Garrison, the head of his division, told him she was briefing acting Inspector General Fine that they planned to substantiate the claims against Cardillo. In response to questions from Foreign Policy, Allen, the spokeswoman for the Office of the Inspector General, said that it was not uncommon for senior officials to advise the inspector general about the status of an investigation. She added Luke had not included exculpatory evidence in his initial draft report and, at the time, it looked as if the case was set to be substantiated.
Garrison’s handling of cases has previously drawn scrutiny from Grassley. In speeches on the Senate floor in 2016 and 2017, Grassley singled her out when he accused the department’s leaders of having “doctored” an investigation in favor of a rear admiral accused of retaliating against subordinates he suspected of being whistleblowers. He said Garrison allegedly wrote a letter to the rear admiral, clearing him of any wrongdoing before the investigation had been finalized. “To conform with the Garrison letter, the findings in the draft report had to be allegedly changed from substantiated to not substantiated. The investigators dug in their heels and stood their ground,” Grassley said in the 2016 speech.
Allen described these allegations as inaccurate, adding, “Rear Admiral Losey had five separate reprisal investigations opened against him, three of which were found to be substantiated by the OIG. In the first of the other two cases, Rear Admiral Losey was not substantiated against for reprisal, and in the second case, to which Senator Grassley referred, Rear Admiral Losey was removed as the subject of that case because the evidence developed in the investigation showed that the prohibited personnel action was taken by the other alleged subject.”
By August 2018, after months of feeling “pressured and bullied,” Luke acquiesced and told his supervisors that he would write a report substantiating the claims, but only if all of the exculpatory evidence could be included in the final report. If it were deleted, he would complain to Congress.
It was at this point that the pressure began to ease. Luke started to feel like his leadership had begun to take his draft report seriously. According to his email to Grassley’s office, he shared it with four colleagues, senior investigators who were not involved in the case, for a cold read. All reached the same conclusion that the primary allegation against Cardillo did not stand up. Ultimately, the case was closed as unsubstantiated and, according to Luke’s email, was hand-delivered to Mattis, the then-secretary of defense, on Nov. 30, 2018.
“I take no joy in doing this. I like my co-workers. However, our ISO [Investigations of Senior Officials] process is broken and no one here is willing or able to change it,” he wrote in a later email.
Allen declined to comment on the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, or on Luke’s perceptions of how it was handled. “Mr. Luke was involved in professional discussions with his supervisors where they sought to confirm that there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. Luke’s proposed outcome in the case,” she said. “Mr. Luke’s supervisors ultimately reviewed the evidence collected by Mr. Luke, found the information in Mr. Luke’s files to support the conclusions in the report, and the report was issued with all relevant evidence, in accord with Mr. Luke’s initial conclusion about the case.”
In the days before Luke died, internal Office of the Inspector General emails obtained by Foreign Policy show that he informed his bosses of his plans to meet with Murphy, the investigator in Grassley’s office, regarding their handling of the Cardillo investigation, which by that point had been closed. Emails also show his supervisor informed him that he could use official time for the meeting.
On Monday, Jan. 7, Fine, the acting inspector general of the Department of Defense, wrote to Luke and offered to meet with him to talk through his concerns. Luke replied the next day to say he would be happy to meet that morning. It is unclear whether the meeting ever took place. Later that day, when Luke failed to return home at the usual time, his wife raised the alarm. His body was found later that evening.
Following in the footsteps of his father, Luke joined the U.S. Air Force in 1988, drawn by a desire to serve his country and a love of travel. His work in Air Force intelligence took the family around the world, from South Korea to Panama to Spain and Germany, but wherever they went, Luke’s depression followed. For years he resisted seeking help for his mental health, fearing that it could put his security clearance and by extension his job at risk. It was only some 15 years into his Air Force career that he was placed on medication that helped to alleviate some of his symptoms. But years of missed treatment had already taken a toll, further entrenching his depression, Amy Luke said.
Only a tiny number of security clearances are denied or revoked because of mental health, according to the Department of Defense. Between 2006 and 2012, only one in every 35,000 people either applying for the first time or looking to maintain their security clearance was denied because they disclosed a history of mental health issues, a message military leaders have tried to drive home. But Elspeth Cameron Ritchie, a former Army psychiatrist, said that the stakes of losing a security clearance have long held service members back from seeking help. “Say you’ve been in the military for 10 to 15 years. Losing your clearance means losing your job—that means losing your health care. It also means losing your housing and losing your retirement,” said Ritchie, who at the time of her retirement from the military in 2010 served as the director of proponency of behavioral health in the Office of the Army Surgeon General. Added to that is the stigma attached to seeking help, “It’s a concern about what your buddies will think, concern that you won’t be found fit for duty,” Ritchie said.
“I don’t think Steven’s death can be attributed directly to this case or to the atmosphere at work or from anyone’s actions or inactions.”
The one thing that offered Luke a temporary release from his depression was speaking Spanish, Amy Luke said. After graduating high school, Luke spent 18 months in the Dominican Republic as a missionary. He went on to complete a degree in Spanish at the University of North Texas. “It’s like he could compartmentalize the depressed Steven from the Spanish-speaking Steven,” Amy said. He tried to instill his love of the language in their four children, buying them books and Disney films in Spanish.
Five months after her husband died, Amy Luke wrote to his former colleagues, explaining his history of depression. “There was not anything that could have been said or done to have changed the outcome. I know, I tried to save him from his suicidal thoughts for thirty-three years,” she wrote in the letter. It was signed off with a red heart.
In response to questions from Foreign Policy, the Office of the Inspector General reached out to Steven Luke’s wife for comment, which Allen included in the agency’s response. Amy Luke said, “I know that Steven’s peers and his leadership were thoughtful, professional, and caring when it came to the depression he experienced. He suffered from a pervasive and profound depression that he lived with for most of his life. Unfortunately, the suicidal ideation that often accompanies this kind of depression can be deadly, as was the case with Steven. I don’t think Steven’s death can be attributed directly to this case or to the atmosphere at work or from anyone’s actions or inactions.”
On Jan. 15, 2019, Steven Luke was buried amid the neat rows of granite headstones in Quantico National Cemetery in Virginia. On a recent Saturday afternoon, the only sound to disturb the silent repose of the cemetery was a light breeze that whispered through a nearby thicket of trees and rippled the miniature American flags planted in the earth.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-20--Central Asian States Can’t Hide the Coronavirus Any Longer

On March 10 , Kazakhstan ’ s chief doctor made a public announcement .
While there were still no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the country , he said , cases might appear over the next five days .
The source of his precision was not explained , and Kazakhs were understandably skeptical .
“ Everyone here is joking about this , ” said one Almaty resident , a Kazakh academic who asked not to be named .
“ People think we already have those cases but the authorities are hiding facts .
Otherwise , it is ridiculous that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has no cases.
” Watching from outside , experts on the region were just as incredulous .
“ Obviously this is impossible , ” said Luca Anceschi , senior lecturer in Central Asian Studies at the University of Glasgow .
Like China , he said , the tightly controlled flow of information in Central Asian states means “ we ’ re not getting any picture .
Not even the full picture—no picture at all.
” Three days later , the predictions began to be realized .
Over the course of 24 hours , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of announcements through Facebook , confirming what were supposedly the country ’ s first cases : four in Almaty , the country ’ s largest city and the closest major metropolis to China , plus two in Nur-Sultan .
All of these were citizens who had just returned from Germany , Italy , or the United States , plus one from Moscow .
Supposedly , not a single transmission from China .
Then , on March 15 , Uzbekistan declared its first case : a medical professional who had just flown back from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the outbreak hot spots of Iran and China , but on paper , COVID-19 has barely touched Kazakhstan , Kyrgyzstan , Uzbekistan , Tajikistan , and Turkmenistan .
That might seem like a miracle .
In reality , it ’ s cause for concern .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
“ As a legacy from the Soviet era , Central Asian governments are more prone to secrecy than transparency on matters of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the London think tank Chatham House .
“ It is unlikely that many of the governments have enough diagnosis kits .
… Corruption is endemic in the health care system in the region , and vast parts of the health care budgets are stolen by officials.
” Certainly , citizens show few signs of trusting the official line .
Even before the six cases were announced in Kazakhstan , Almaty ’ s supermarkets were mobbed , carts piled high with nonperishable food .
The cost of face masks shot up to eight times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , President Emomali Rahmon ’ s personal assurances that there was no need to panic-buy food did little to slow the stockpiling that has left shelves empty .
It doesn ’ t help that the behavior of these leaders has been at odds with their message that all is well .
Despite so few confirmed cases in Kazakhstan , the Health Ministry said its “ algorithms ” drove the decision to place an additional 1,500 people in quarantine , two-thirds of them in “ special hospitals.
” Tajikistan has asked people to avoid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is canceling sporting events and closing schools and universities for three weeks .
Immediately after announcing its one case , Uzbekistan imposed an international travel ban on citizens , the closure of schools and universities , and restrictions on public events .
These steps are all perfectly rational for any country bracing for an outbreak .
For one insisting it has zero cases—or even , in Kazakhstan ’ s case , what is now over a landmass larger than all of Western Europe—it suggests either the response is overblown or the spread has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is down to scheming , of course : Many nations simply don ’ t know what to do .
As Eurasia expert Filippo Costa Buranelli points out , Dushanbe ’ s back-and-forth over travel restrictions , where bans were issued and then revoked in succession , left many people “ questioning the degree of knowledge and preparation by the authorities in charge of dealing with this crisis.
” Meanwhile , in the highly secretive autocratic country of Turkmenistan , state media and government officials have denied anonymous reports that COVID-19 cases are being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ashgabat .
Authorities refuse to use the word “ coronavirus ” at all , even as they deploy what Mallinson of Chatham House described as the most aggressive response in the region .
The central bank , she said , even canceled the cards of Turkmen citizens stranded in the Beijing airport to make it harder for them to get home .
Turkmenistan has good reason to insulate itself : As Mallinson points out , its most competent doctors have moved to Turkey , and rumors abound that you can get out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health care system simply can ’ t handle a pandemic .
Rather than address the threat of COVID-19 directly , Ashgabat has stepped up public education initiatives about limiting the spread of infection , announcing that traditional herbal remedies can treat zoonotic diseases .
That ’ s not terribly reassuring coming from a government whose atrocious mismanagement of medical services leads to occasional outbreaks of plague .
The world has already seen how dangerous it can be to suppress information on the spread of COVID-19 .
In Wuhan , China , where authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than containing an outbreak , tens of thousands of party members and their families came together for mass banquets as part of the annual Two Sessions events in January , creating ideal conditions for the virus to be transmitted .
Meanwhile , statistical models suggest that Iran , keen to avoid panic ahead of its legislative elections in February , seriously underreported cases from the outset , claiming that the country had fewer than 100 cases at a time when the real number was probably closer to 23,000 .
Within days of Tehran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was already building mass graves so large they ’ re visible in zoomed-in satellite imagery .
Before neighboring Afghanistan had a chance to recognize the threat and close the border , COVID-19 cases were already appearing in Herat .
In regions where cross-border movement is often illicit , closing down formal ports of entry may matter little : Around 3,000 people are believed to cross between Iran and Afghanistan illegally every day , and the porous border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan , a long-standing drug and human trafficking route , is extremely hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t owned up to any cases , Mallinson points out that Iran ’ s delay left it “ heavy exposed.
” All in all , it ’ s a recipe for disaster .
“ The combination of years of underinvestment in health care , endemic corruption , significant numbers of migrant laborers , and low public trust in governance in Central Asia makes the region extremely vulnerable to mass infection of COVID-19 , ” Mallinson said .
Whatever the true scale of infections in Central Asia , the economic impacts are already starting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ struggled to translate a wealth of natural resources , including oil and gas , into resilient economies thanks to civil wars , instability , and ethnic tensions since gaining independence in 1991 .
While the poverty rate in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 70 percent in 2002 to 13 percent and 20 percent respectively , this progress is fragile .
Much of it is predicated on Chinese investment in infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative , which the pandemic now threatens to bring to a halt .
Closing borders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade .
In Kazakhstan , imports from China are down 11 percent from this time last year , leading to a 12 percent reduction in customs duties from Chinese imports .
And the pandemic has triggered a drop in the price of oil , Kazakhstan ’ s main export , which worries some Almaty residents more than the virus itself .
It doesn ’ t help that , in January , Nur-Sultan had to reduce exports to China when dangerous chemicals were detected in an oil pipeline .
The strongest economy in Central @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For its less affluent neighbors , the outlook is even worse .
Exporting natural gas to China accounts for 25 percent of Turkmenistan ’ s gross domestic product , but Beijing has significantly cut imports amid reduced demand—another casualty of COVID-19 .
“ Even in the absence of officially reported cases , the coronavirus pandemic is already having major economic consequences for Turkmenistan , ” warns Mallinson .
Autocratic Central Asian governments are used to being able to control the narrative in their respective countries , but COVID-19 isn ’ t something that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Now that they ’ re acknowledging confirmed cases , the secret is out—and the prognosis for this precarious region does not look good .

Nathan Paul Southern and Lindsey Kennedy

On March 10, Kazakhstan’s chief doctor made a public announcement. While there were still no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the country, he said, cases might appear over the next five days. The source of his precision was not explained, and Kazakhs were understandably skeptical. “Everyone here is joking about this,” said one Almaty resident, a Kazakh academic who asked not to be named. “People think we already have those cases but the authorities are hiding facts. Otherwise, it is ridiculous that the country with the longest border with China has no cases.”
On March 10, Kazakhstan’s chief doctor made a public announcement. While there were still no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the country, he said, cases might appear over the next five days. The source of his precision was not explained, and Kazakhs were understandably skeptical. “Everyone here is joking about this,” said one Almaty resident, a Kazakh academic who asked not to be named. “People think we already have those cases but the authorities are hiding facts. Otherwise, it is ridiculous that the country with the longest border with China has no cases.”
Watching from outside, experts on the region were just as incredulous. “Obviously this is impossible,” said Luca Anceschi, senior lecturer in Central Asian Studies at the University of Glasgow. Like China, he said, the tightly controlled flow of information in Central Asian states means “we’re not getting any picture. Not even the full picture—no picture at all.”
Three days later, the predictions began to be realized. Over the course of 24 hours, the Kazakhstan Health Ministry released a flurry of announcements through Facebook, confirming what were supposedly the country’s first cases: four in Almaty, the country’s largest city and the closest major metropolis to China, plus two in Nur-Sultan. All of these were citizens who had just returned from Germany, Italy, or the United States, plus one from Moscow. Supposedly, not a single transmission from China. Then, on March 15, Uzbekistan declared its first case: a medical professional who had just flown back from France.
Central Asian states are sandwiched between the outbreak hot spots of Iran and China, but on paper, COVID-19 has barely touched Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. That might seem like a miracle. In reality, it’s cause for concern.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
“As a legacy from the Soviet era, Central Asian governments are more prone to secrecy than transparency on matters of security,” said Kate Mallinson of the London think tank Chatham House. “It is unlikely that many of the governments have enough diagnosis kits. … Corruption is endemic in the health care system in the region, and vast parts of the health care budgets are stolen by officials.”
Certainly, citizens show few signs of trusting the official line. Even before the six cases were announced in Kazakhstan, Almaty’s supermarkets were mobbed, carts piled high with nonperishable food. The cost of face masks shot up to eight times the usual price. In nearby Tajikistan, President Emomali Rahmon’s personal assurances that there was no need to panic-buy food did little to slow the stockpiling that has left shelves empty.
It doesn’t help that the behavior of these leaders has been at odds with their message that all is well. Despite so few confirmed cases in Kazakhstan, the Health Ministry said its “algorithms” drove the decision to place an additional 1,500 people in quarantine, two-thirds of them in “special hospitals.” Tajikistan has asked people to avoid public gatherings and even mosques. Kyrgyzstan is canceling sporting events and closing schools and universities for three weeks. Immediately after announcing its one case, Uzbekistan imposed an international travel ban on citizens, the closure of schools and universities, and restrictions on public events.
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These steps are all perfectly rational for any country bracing for an outbreak. For one insisting it has zero cases—or even, in Kazakhstan’s case, what is now over a landmass larger than all of Western Europe—it suggests either the response is overblown or the spread has been downplayed.
Not all the confusion is down to scheming, of course: Many nations simply don’t know what to do. As Eurasia expert Filippo Costa Buranelli points out, Dushanbe’s back-and-forth over travel restrictions, where bans were issued and then revoked in succession, left many people “questioning the degree of knowledge and preparation by the authorities in charge of dealing with this crisis.”
Meanwhile, in the highly secretive autocratic country of Turkmenistan, state media and government officials have denied anonymous reports that COVID-19 cases are being treated in a Choganly hospital close to Ashgabat. Authorities refuse to use the word “coronavirus” at all, even as they deploy what Mallinson of Chatham House described as the most aggressive response in the region. The central bank, she said, even canceled the cards of Turkmen citizens stranded in the Beijing airport to make it harder for them to get home. Turkmenistan has good reason to insulate itself: As Mallinson points out, its most competent doctors have moved to Turkey, and rumors abound that you can get out of quarantine by bribing officials. Its depleted health care system simply can’t handle a pandemic.
Rather than address the threat of COVID-19 directly, Ashgabat has stepped up public education initiatives about limiting the spread of infection, announcing that traditional herbal remedies can treat zoonotic diseases. That’s not terribly reassuring coming from a government whose atrocious mismanagement of medical services leads to occasional outbreaks of plague.
The world has already seen how dangerous it can be to suppress information on the spread of COVID-19. In Wuhan, China, where authorities were initially more concerned with silencing whistleblowers than containing an outbreak, tens of thousands of party members and their families came together for mass banquets as part of the annual Two Sessions events in January, creating ideal conditions for the virus to be transmitted. Meanwhile, statistical models suggest that Iran, keen to avoid panic ahead of its legislative elections in February, seriously underreported cases from the outset, claiming that the country had fewer than 100 cases at a time when the real number was probably closer to 23,000. Within days of Tehran announcing its first official case, it was already building mass graves so large they’re visible in zoomed-in satellite imagery.
Before neighboring Afghanistan had a chance to recognize the threat and close the border, COVID-19 cases were already appearing in Herat. In regions where cross-border movement is often illicit, closing down formal ports of entry may matter little: Around 3,000 people are believed to cross between Iran and Afghanistan illegally every day, and the porous border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, a long-standing drug and human trafficking route, is extremely hard to monitor. While Turkmenistan hasn’t owned up to any cases, Mallinson points out that Iran’s delay left it “heavy exposed.”
All in all, it’s a recipe for disaster. “The combination of years of underinvestment in health care, endemic corruption, significant numbers of migrant laborers, and low public trust in governance in Central Asia makes the region extremely vulnerable to mass infection of COVID-19,” Mallinson said.
Whatever the true scale of infections in Central Asia, the economic impacts are already starting to show.
All five countries have struggled to translate a wealth of natural resources, including oil and gas, into resilient economies thanks to civil wars, instability, and ethnic tensions since gaining independence in 1991. While the poverty rate in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 70 percent in 2002 to 13 percent and 20 percent respectively, this progress is fragile. Much of it is predicated on Chinese investment in infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, which the pandemic now threatens to bring to a halt.
Closing borders also means a sharp drop in cross-border trade. In Kazakhstan, imports from China are down 11 percent from this time last year, leading to a 12 percent reduction in customs duties from Chinese imports. And the pandemic has triggered a drop in the price of oil, Kazakhstan’s main export, which worries some Almaty residents more than the virus itself. It doesn’t help that, in January, Nur-Sultan had to reduce exports to China when dangerous chemicals were detected in an oil pipeline. The strongest economy in Central Asia is now in crisis mode.
For its less affluent neighbors, the outlook is even worse. Exporting natural gas to China accounts for 25 percent of Turkmenistan’s gross domestic product, but Beijing has significantly cut imports amid reduced demand—another casualty of COVID-19. “Even in the absence of officially reported cases, the coronavirus pandemic is already having major economic consequences for Turkmenistan,” warns Mallinson.
Autocratic Central Asian governments are used to being able to control the narrative in their respective countries, but COVID-19 isn’t something that can be contained by a party line. Now that they’re acknowledging confirmed cases, the secret is out—and the prognosis for this precarious region does not look good.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-20--Virus Competition Is Wrecking China-U.S. Cooperation Hopes

As Washington shifted its worldview over the last several years to a sharp focus on China competition , even the most claw-bearing hawks generally left open the possibility of cooperation .
Key transnational issues , such as climate change and nonproliferation , challenge all nations and require collaborative responses even among adversaries .
While the United States and China compete fiercely , it previously seemed to most that enhanced rivalry should not preclude working together when interests dictated it .
But amid an unprecedented crisis as the new coronavirus spreads , cooperation is the last thing on either side ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which threatens every country , should be the paradigmatic example of a joint cause compelling U.S.-China cooperation .
Unfortunately , it has been anything but .
Where the need to fight the coronavirus might once have brought the United States and China closer together , today it is driving them further apart .
COVID-19 is becoming one more feature of great-power competition , rather than an exception to it .
To be sure , the wider international response has not exactly been a model of cooperation .
Governments have made decisions on borders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and population control measures largely on their own and with little consultation .
The G-7 leaders convened a virtual , emergency summit on Monday that produced a statement filled with abstract pledges of coordination but bereft of any specific commitments .
The G-20 leaders have not met at all .
The coronavirus crisis may be worldwide , but the responses have so far been almost exclusively national .
Beijing has gone beyond sins of omission , however , to include ones of commission as well .
It covered up the extent of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weeks and then rejected the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ’ s offer to send in an expert team .
The Chinese foreign ministry attempted to deflect any domestic disquiet at the government ’ s response by slamming the United States , criticizing it for spreading fear and not sending help .
Once infections dipped in China and rose outside it , Beijing began touting its response , emphasizing its top-down , we-can-build-a-hospital-in-a-few-days brand of autocracy , contrasting it with the slow response in large and fractious democracies such as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Zhao Lijian , have begun peddling the outrageous falsehood that the U.S. military brought the coronavirus to China , rather than the virus spreading outward from China .
In the meantime , Chinese aircraft filled with medical aid conspicuously landed in Italy and Spain .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
Washington ’ s response to the pandemic has also heightened the sense of competition , but for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump early on closed American borders to foreign nationals who had recently been to China , and officials in his administration privately expressed a total lack of trust in the Chinese government ’ s reported number of cases .
Now they watch with some trepidation as Beijing tries to turn its response—the claims of success at home , the offers of aid to others—into competitive advantage .
The backdrop of these responses has been the turn toward hard-edged competition between the United States and China .
Following the 2008 global financial crisis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China increasingly abandoned its prior strategy of building economic strength while biding its time internationally .
Beijing became far more assertive after Xi Jinping ’ s ascension to supreme power in 2012 and 2013 , militarizing the South China Sea , embarking on an illiberal Belt and Road infrastructure initiative , bullying governments throughout Asia , employing coercive economic tools , and seeking technological advantage over the United States and others .
The West ’ s best days , officials often said to their American counterparts , were in the past ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sensitive to these developments , and far less risk-adverse than its predecessors , the Trump administration has elevated China as the No .
1 long-term threat to U.S. national security .
It ’ s not hard to see why cooperation on the coronavirus is unlikely .
This jumbled state of affairs has two major implications for U.S. policy .
The first is that the notion of protecting islands of cooperation in a sea of U.S.-China competition will be profoundly difficult .
It may be easier to forge a whisper of collaboration in areas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as nonproliferation regimes or North Korea policy .
Yet in an area like coronavirus—where the Chinese government is keen to nip in the bud any hint of popular discontent—the temptation will be overwhelming for Beijing to portray the United States as a ruthless predator and itself as a benevolent savior .
It may simply be easier said than done to oppose Chinese designs in the South China Sea , its Belt and Road Initiative , or its Uighur repression in Xinjiang while working simultaneously with Beijing to address global warming , stabilize the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the impact of those crises intensifies and the party ’ s leadership looks for an external actor to blame .
The second implication is that China ’ s approach to the coronavirus crisis marks the global response itself as a new area of competition .
That ’ s not necessarily a bad thing ; two superpowers angling to better defeat a global threat and aid those suffering from it could produce a more decent outcome than if both tended merely to their own .
Yet right now Beijing is the only one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ failure to respond quickly and effectively at home—and its obvious struggles to make testing widespread—now focus the administration on protection at home rather than leading abroad .
The United States is not leading international efforts in any obvious way , not providing assistance to the most vulnerable , and not vigorously pushing back against the ridiculous claim that Americans first spread the coronavirus .
The U.S. response so far seems largely limited to Trump ’ s occasionally referring to “ the China virus.
” That won ’ t cut it .
Fighting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in its own right .
It is also quickly becoming a feature of geopolitical competition .
Beijing ’ s preferred master narrative portrays a decisive , efficient , generous China that triumphs over disease at home and helps those still at risk abroad .
It adds to that picture a plodding , declining United States that is flailing on the home front and inspiring little confidence elsewhere .
The already-burdened Trump administration needs to wake up to this reality and respond , before events and mindsets harden further .

As Washington shifted its worldview over the last several years to a sharp focus on China competition, even the most claw-bearing hawks generally left open the possibility of cooperation. Key transnational issues, such as climate change and nonproliferation, challenge all nations and require collaborative responses even among adversaries. While the United States and China compete fiercely, it previously seemed to most that enhanced rivalry should not preclude working together when interests dictated it.
As Washington shifted its worldview over the last several years to a sharp focus on China competition, even the most claw-bearing hawks generally left open the possibility of cooperation. Key transnational issues, such as climate change and nonproliferation, challenge all nations and require collaborative responses even among adversaries. While the United States and China compete fiercely, it previously seemed to most that enhanced rivalry should not preclude working together when interests dictated it.
But amid an unprecedented crisis as the new coronavirus spreads, cooperation is the last thing on either side’s mind. Fighting pandemic disease, which threatens every country, should be the paradigmatic example of a joint cause compelling U.S.-China cooperation. Unfortunately, it has been anything but. Where the need to fight the coronavirus might once have brought the United States and China closer together, today it is driving them further apart. COVID-19 is becoming one more feature of great-power competition, rather than an exception to it.
To be sure, the wider international response has not exactly been a model of cooperation. Governments have made decisions on borders, entry protocols, export bans, and population control measures largely on their own and with little consultation. The G-7 leaders convened a virtual, emergency summit on Monday that produced a statement filled with abstract pledges of coordination but bereft of any specific commitments. The G-20 leaders have not met at all. The coronavirus crisis may be worldwide, but the responses have so far been almost exclusively national.
Beijing has gone beyond sins of omission, however, to include ones of commission as well. It covered up the extent of the virus’ spread in Wuhan for critical weeks and then rejected the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s offer to send in an expert team. The Chinese foreign ministry attempted to deflect any domestic disquiet at the government’s response by slamming the United States, criticizing it for spreading fear and not sending help. Once infections dipped in China and rose outside it, Beijing began touting its response, emphasizing its top-down, we-can-build-a-hospital-in-a-few-days brand of autocracy, contrasting it with the slow response in large and fractious democracies such as the United States. Its officials, such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Zhao Lijian, have begun peddling the outrageous falsehood that the U.S. military brought the coronavirus to China, rather than the virus spreading outward from China. In the meantime, Chinese aircraft filled with medical aid conspicuously landed in Italy and Spain.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
Washington’s response to the pandemic has also heightened the sense of competition, but for very different reasons. U.S. President Donald Trump early on closed American borders to foreign nationals who had recently been to China, and officials in his administration privately expressed a total lack of trust in the Chinese government’s reported number of cases. Now they watch with some trepidation as Beijing tries to turn its response—the claims of success at home, the offers of aid to others—into competitive advantage.
The backdrop of these responses has been the turn toward hard-edged competition between the United States and China. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, and detecting weakness in the United States, China increasingly abandoned its prior strategy of building economic strength while biding its time internationally. Beijing became far more assertive after Xi Jinping’s ascension to supreme power in 2012 and 2013, militarizing the South China Sea, embarking on an illiberal Belt and Road infrastructure initiative, bullying governments throughout Asia, employing coercive economic tools, and seeking technological advantage over the United States and others. The West’s best days, officials often said to their American counterparts, were in the past; China’s time has arrived. Sensitive to these developments, and far less risk-adverse than its predecessors, the Trump administration has elevated China as the No. 1 long-term threat to U.S. national security. It’s not hard to see why cooperation on the coronavirus is unlikely.
This jumbled state of affairs has two major implications for U.S. policy.
The first is that the notion of protecting islands of cooperation in a sea of U.S.-China competition will be profoundly difficult. It may be easier to forge a whisper of collaboration in areas solely the province of experts, such as nonproliferation regimes or North Korea policy. Yet in an area like coronavirus—where the Chinese government is keen to nip in the bud any hint of popular discontent—the temptation will be overwhelming for Beijing to portray the United States as a ruthless predator and itself as a benevolent savior. It may simply be easier said than done to oppose Chinese designs in the South China Sea, its Belt and Road Initiative, or its Uighur repression in Xinjiang while working simultaneously with Beijing to address global warming, stabilize the global economy, and stop pandemic disease—especially as the impact of those crises intensifies and the party’s leadership looks for an external actor to blame.
The second implication is that China’s approach to the coronavirus crisis marks the global response itself as a new area of competition. That’s not necessarily a bad thing; two superpowers angling to better defeat a global threat and aid those suffering from it could produce a more decent outcome than if both tended merely to their own. Yet right now Beijing is the only one in the game. Washington’s failure to respond quickly and effectively at home—and its obvious struggles to make testing widespread—now focus the administration on protection at home rather than leading abroad. The United States is not leading international efforts in any obvious way, not providing assistance to the most vulnerable, and not vigorously pushing back against the ridiculous claim that Americans first spread the coronavirus. The U.S. response so far seems largely limited to Trump’s occasionally referring to “the China virus.” That won’t cut it.
Fighting the coronavirus is a mammoth, worthy undertaking in its own right. It is also quickly becoming a feature of geopolitical competition. Beijing’s preferred master narrative portrays a decisive, efficient, generous China that triumphs over disease at home and helps those still at risk abroad. It adds to that picture a plodding, declining United States that is flailing on the home front and inspiring little confidence elsewhere. The already-burdened Trump administration needs to wake up to this reality and respond, before events and mindsets harden further.