foreignpolicy--2020-09-22--How Pompeo Blurs the Line Between Diplomacy and Politics

How Pompeo Blurs the Line Between Diplomacy and Politics Colin Powell was the most popular figure in the Republican Party in 2004 , when he served as secretary of state for U.S. President George W. Bush .
But when the party held its national convention in August of that year , he refused to attend , citing his role as the country ’ s top diplomat .
“ As secretary of state , I am obliged not to participate in any way , shape , fashion , or form in parochial , political debates , ” Powell said at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no sides in the matter.
” This election season , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has chosen a different path , giving a televised address to the Republican National Convention from Jerusalem and making public appearances in several potential battleground states during official State Department travel .
He made one such appearance at a Baptist church in Plano , Texas , on Sunday evening , following a trip to Latin America .
On Wednesday , he is scheduled to travel to Wisconsin—a key battleground state that could decide the 2020 election results—to deliver @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threats from China .
The trips have drawn criticism from lawmakers and even some veteran diplomats , who say Pompeo is using the taxpayers ’ dime to try to rally the president ’ s base to influence the election even if he is not explicitly campaigning for Trump .
“ It ’ s disappointing that Secretary of State Pompeo doesn ’ t respect the intelligence of the American people .
Everyone understands that campaigning using government resources is unlawful , but Secretary Pompeo is doing it anyways , ” said Texas Rep. Joaquin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House Foreign Affairs Committee who is competing to take the helm of the committee in the next Congress .
Pompeo ’ s supporters say that such speeches are a sorely needed course-correction to connect American citizens outside the Washington beltway to what U.S. foreign policy is and why it matters to them .
During his speeches , the secretary has not explicitly encouraged voters to back President Donald Trump—or vote against his Democratic rival , former Vice President Joe Biden .
A State Department spokesperson dismissed criticisms of Pompeo ’ s speeches as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the media are unfamiliar with the domestic aspect of the Department of State ’ s mission , as evidenced by their complaints every time the Secretary meets with Americans in different parts of the country—unless it ’ s visits to Silicon Valley or somewhere along the Acela corridor , ” the spokesperson said .
“ The Secretary ’ s job is to lead the State Department in executing on the foreign policy priorities President Trump has established to serve the American people .
Communicating our mission directly to the American people is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strengthening it.
” Some current and former diplomats expressed concern that if the tradition of secretaries of state steering clear of domestic politics has been broken , there ’ s no going back—and , in the process , American diplomacy could become further mired in Washington ’ s dysfunctional partisan politics .
“ How does this further the work of the department ?
How does the institution benefit from this ?
” said one State Department official of Pompeo ’ s planned speech in Wisconsin , speaking on condition of anonymity .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other than … it doesn ’ t .
It ’ s never been about the department—it ’ s about Pompeo and Trump and 2020 and 2024.
” In August , Pompeo carved out time during an official State Department visit to Israel to address the Republican National Convention from Jerusalem .
Trump moved the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv in 2018 , fulfilling a long-held campaign promise to his political base and pro-Israel Republican party leaders .
The State Department has insisted that Pompeo adhered to strict rules barring federal employees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in official capacities .
Nonetheless , on the very day that Pompeo gave his televised address to the Republican convention , Castro announced he was launching a congressional investigation into the matter to determine whether it violated federal regulations .
A Congressional aide said the investigation is ongoing .
On at least two State Department trips , Pompeo quietly held meetings with Republican political donors between his official engagements , and he has courted deep-pocketed conservative campaign funders alongside other officials in exclusive taxpayer-funded dinners hosted at the State Department .
Some State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about this mixing of official diplomatic work with domestic politics—including events aimed at furthering Pompeo ’ s own long-term political ambitions .
Pompeo himself signed off on a State Department memo earlier this year that urged political appointees to avoid participating in partisan events ahead of the election .
Trump in May fired the State Department watchdog , who was looking into allegations of impropriety by Pompeo , at the secretary ’ s request .
Pompeo and his aides have denied any wrongdoing and said the watchdog was fired for poor performance and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , Sen. Bob Menendez , called for a special counsel to investigate whether Pompeo violated the Hatch Act—a law that limits partisan political activity for federal employees—by using State Department resources for an “ unusual amount of visits ” to Kansas , his adopted home state where he was reportedly flirting with a Senate run .
An independent federal investigative agency cleared him of the charge , after he affirmed in January that he would not be running for the Senate seat .
Meanwhile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pompeo made a secretive trip to a Florida community with major Republican donors in January , on the tail end of a State Department trip .
In the past year , Pompeo has also met with Republican donors during official visits to London and Kansas .
And an NBC investigation found that since 2018 , Pompeo has held about two dozen “ Madison dinners , ” lavish affairs that were left off Pompeo ’ s public schedule .
The dinners raised internal concerns about his use of taxpayer funds to build a base @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , other former diplomats said it ’ s hard for secretaries of state to maintain the tradition of staying out of domestic politics in an era when nearly everything has become politicized .
In that sense , Pompeo may simply be adapting to a new reality , however unpalatable it is to seasoned foreign-policy experts .
“ The older tradition of keeping foreign policy out of domestic debates , I believe , was a sound one .
But it ’ s also true to say that tradition has been slipping , that more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of partisan divide now , ” said Ronald Neumann , the president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and a former senior career diplomat .
“ And so in a way there ’ s a phoniness to saying the secretary should stay out when so many people on both sides of the aisle are mixing domestic politics and foreign policy.
” Pompeo ’ s address in Madison , Wisconsin will be delivered to state senators and focus on “ why state legislators across our country must be vigilant against the Chinese Communist Party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ level , ” the State Department spokesperson said .
In his speech on Sunday at Prestonwood Baptist Church in Plano , Texas—a potential swing state , according to some polls—Pompeo was careful not to explicitly endorse Trump , but he invoked talking points that play to the president ’ s evangelical conservative base .
“ I meet with people of many , many faiths .
How America leads in the world is being watched .
And there is an absolute responsibility to make sure that they understand our founding as a Judeo-Christian nation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not only powerful but required by the American tradition .
And especially—especially in these challenging times , keeping faith in the public square is not simply acceptable , but it ’ s an imperative .
Our president believes that , and the senior leaders of America believe that.
” During his remarks , Pompeo was asked about the upcoming elections .
“ We should pray that the elections that we ’ ll have in 40-some days now will be safe and secure and that everyone ’ s vote will be counted precisely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ added : “ As the secretary of state , I ’ m not allowed to do politics .
”

Colin Powell was the most popular figure in the Republican Party in 2004, when he served as secretary of state for U.S. President George W. Bush. But when the party held its national convention in August of that year, he refused to attend, citing his role as the country’s top diplomat. “As secretary of state, I am obliged not to participate in any way, shape, fashion, or form in parochial, political debates,” Powell said at the time. “I have to take no sides in the matter.”
Colin Powell was the most popular figure in the Republican Party in 2004, when he served as secretary of state for U.S. President George W. Bush. But when the party held its national convention in August of that year, he refused to attend, citing his role as the country’s top diplomat. “As secretary of state, I am obliged not to participate in any way, shape, fashion, or form in parochial, political debates,” Powell said at the time. “I have to take no sides in the matter.”
This election season, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has chosen a different path, giving a televised address to the Republican National Convention from Jerusalem and making public appearances in several potential battleground states during official State Department travel. He made one such appearance at a Baptist church in Plano, Texas, on Sunday evening, following a trip to Latin America. On Wednesday, he is scheduled to travel to Wisconsin—a key battleground state that could decide the 2020 election results—to deliver another speech, this one focused on threats from China.
The trips have drawn criticism from lawmakers and even some veteran diplomats, who say Pompeo is using the taxpayers’ dime to try to rally the president’s base to influence the election even if he is not explicitly campaigning for Trump. “It’s disappointing that Secretary of State Pompeo doesn’t respect the intelligence of the American people. Everyone understands that campaigning using government resources is unlawful, but Secretary Pompeo is doing it anyways,” said Texas Rep. Joaquin Castro, a Democratic member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who is competing to take the helm of the committee in the next Congress.
Pompeo’s supporters say that such speeches are a sorely needed course-correction to connect American citizens outside the Washington beltway to what U.S. foreign policy is and why it matters to them. During his speeches, the secretary has not explicitly encouraged voters to back President Donald Trump—or vote against his Democratic rival, former Vice President Joe Biden.
A State Department spokesperson dismissed criticisms of Pompeo’s speeches as unfounded. “Clearly, House Democrats and the media are unfamiliar with the domestic aspect of the Department of State’s mission, as evidenced by their complaints every time the Secretary meets with Americans in different parts of the country—unless it’s visits to Silicon Valley or somewhere along the Acela corridor,” the spokesperson said. “The Secretary’s job is to lead the State Department in executing on the foreign policy priorities President Trump has established to serve the American people. Communicating our mission directly to the American people is one of the most important ways of strengthening it.”
Some current and former diplomats expressed concern that if the tradition of secretaries of state steering clear of domestic politics has been broken, there’s no going back—and, in the process, American diplomacy could become further mired in Washington’s dysfunctional partisan politics.
“How does this further the work of the department? How does the institution benefit from this?” said one State Department official of Pompeo’s planned speech in Wisconsin, speaking on condition of anonymity. “I struggle to find any rational answer other than … it doesn’t. It’s never been about the department—it’s about Pompeo and Trump and 2020 and 2024.”
In August, Pompeo carved out time during an official State Department visit to Israel to address the Republican National Convention from Jerusalem. Trump moved the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv in 2018, fulfilling a long-held campaign promise to his political base and pro-Israel Republican party leaders. The State Department has insisted that Pompeo adhered to strict rules barring federal employees from engaging in political activities while working in official capacities. Nonetheless, on the very day that Pompeo gave his televised address to the Republican convention, Castro announced he was launching a congressional investigation into the matter to determine whether it violated federal regulations. A Congressional aide said the investigation is ongoing.
On at least two State Department trips, Pompeo quietly held meetings with Republican political donors between his official engagements, and he has courted deep-pocketed conservative campaign funders alongside other officials in exclusive taxpayer-funded dinners hosted at the State Department.
Some State Department officials have raised internal alarm bells about this mixing of official diplomatic work with domestic politics—including events aimed at furthering Pompeo’s own long-term political ambitions. Pompeo himself signed off on a State Department memo earlier this year that urged political appointees to avoid participating in partisan events ahead of the election. Trump in May fired the State Department watchdog, who was looking into allegations of impropriety by Pompeo, at the secretary’s request. Pompeo and his aides have denied any wrongdoing and said the watchdog was fired for poor performance and management issues.
In October 2019, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Bob Menendez, called for a special counsel to investigate whether Pompeo violated the Hatch Act—a law that limits partisan political activity for federal employees—by using State Department resources for an “unusual amount of visits” to Kansas, his adopted home state where he was reportedly flirting with a Senate run. An independent federal investigative agency cleared him of the charge, after he affirmed in January that he would not be running for the Senate seat.
Meanwhile, the Tampa Bay Times reported that Pompeo made a secretive trip to a Florida community with major Republican donors in January, on the tail end of a State Department trip. In the past year, Pompeo has also met with Republican donors during official visits to London and Kansas. And an NBC investigation found that since 2018, Pompeo has held about two dozen “Madison dinners,” lavish affairs that were left off Pompeo’s public schedule. The dinners raised internal concerns about his use of taxpayer funds to build a base for his own political ambitions.
Still, other former diplomats said it’s hard for secretaries of state to maintain the tradition of staying out of domestic politics in an era when nearly everything has become politicized. In that sense, Pompeo may simply be adapting to a new reality, however unpalatable it is to seasoned foreign-policy experts.
“The older tradition of keeping foreign policy out of domestic debates, I believe, was a sound one. But it’s also true to say that tradition has been slipping, that more and more foreign -olicy issues are issues of partisan divide now,” said Ronald Neumann, the president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and a former senior career diplomat. “And so in a way there’s a phoniness to saying the secretary should stay out when so many people on both sides of the aisle are mixing domestic politics and foreign policy.”
Pompeo’s address in Madison, Wisconsin will be delivered to state senators and focus on “why state legislators across our country must be vigilant against the Chinese Communist Party’s malign influence at the subnational level,” the State Department spokesperson said.
In his speech on Sunday at Prestonwood Baptist Church in Plano, Texas—a potential swing state, according to some polls—Pompeo was careful not to explicitly endorse Trump, but he invoked talking points that play to the president’s evangelical conservative base. “I meet with people of many, many faiths. How America leads in the world is being watched. And there is an absolute responsibility to make sure that they understand our founding as a Judeo-Christian nation,” Pompeo said. “Faith is not only powerful but required by the American tradition. And especially—especially in these challenging times, keeping faith in the public square is not simply acceptable, but it’s an imperative. Our president believes that, and the senior leaders of America believe that.”
During his remarks, Pompeo was asked about the upcoming elections. “We should pray that the elections that we’ll have in 40-some days now will be safe and secure and that everyone’s vote will be counted precisely once,” he said. He added: “As the secretary of state, I’m not allowed to do politics.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-22--‘This Is Personal’: Minnesota’s Somali Americans Fear Reckoning in Second Trump Term

‘ This Is Personal ’ : Minnesota ’ s Somali Americans Fear Reckoning in Second Trump Term It took U.S. President Donald Trump only seven minutes into his campaign rally in Bemidji , Minnesota , last Friday to launch a slew of attacks against the state ’ s Somali American community .
Trump warned that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden would “ flood [ Minnesota ] with an influx of refugees from Somalia , ” transforming the state into a “ refugee camp.
” The president called Somali Americans “ radical Islamic terrorists ” and labeled many in the community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assault , and murder .
Somali Americans—who identify as Black , Muslim , and immigrant for the most part—have felt targeted since the first days of the Trump administration , when the freshly minted commander in chief signed a travel ban against seven predominantly Muslim countries and effectively shut down the U.S. refugee program .
Since then , he has poured a steady stream of invective at the 60,000-strong Somali American community in the state—especially at Minnesota ’ s Somali-born Democratic representative , Ilhan Omar—and this month announced the deportation of Somali refugees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As Trump enters the final stretch of his reelection campaign in a state that Republicans desperately want to flip in November , Somali Americans in the Twin Cities—ground zero for nationwide protests against racial injustice this summer—fear another Trump term could be a point of no return .
A state that voted Democratic in 11 straight presidential elections is suddenly a battleground—making the politically engaged Somali American community a vital bloc four years after Trump won a basket of Midwestern states by razor-thin margins .
“ For many of us , this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rep. Hodan Hassan , a therapist and social worker who has represented South Minneapolis in the Minnesota House of Representatives since 2019 .
“ This is our livelihood being attacked , our existence being attacked—this is a really important election.
” Omar echoed Hassan ’ s comments in a tweet on Tuesday , stating that “ what happens in the next few weeks could impact us for the rest of our lives , and our children ’ s lives.
” Since 2016 , and especially since Omar ’ s election in 2018 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focus point for the hate movement in America , ” said Jaylani Hussein , the executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Minnesota .
Omar ’ s election victory—and her quick rise to national prominence as part of the “ squad ” of left-wing Democratic legislators—has allowed Trump to use Somali Americans “ as a lightning rod issue to build on his base around issues of Islamophobia , ” Hussein said .
During Trump ’ s previous stop in the state , an October 2019 rally in Minneapolis , he called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ America-hating socialist ” before launching into a broadside against Minnesota ’ s Somali community .
( The president had previously told Omar to “ go back ” to Somalia . )
More recently , after news broke of the administration ’ s plan to deport Somali refugees—many of whom are suspected to have COVID-19—Trump tweeted that he was “ helping Minnesota greatly.
” Advocacy groups say the deportations—which came on the heels of a recent court ruling giving the Trump administration the authority to overturn immigrants ’ Temporary Protected Status—were unprecedented .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ community after the 2017 travel ban halted the reunification of many families split between the United States and Somalia .
Democrats should be able to court Somali votes with ease , even without accounting for Trump ’ s attacks on the community .
Long a progressive bastion in a state that has gone from deep blue to a possible purple this year , Somali Americans generally favor left-of-center positions , such as state-funded education and health care .
And the coronavirus pandemic and ensuing economic carnage have highlighted disparities in health , education @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communities , further adding to Biden ’ s appeal among Somali American voters .
“ The pandemic has shown us the structural flaws in our system , ” said Hassan , the state representative .
But that doesn ’ t mean Biden is entirely without baggage , particularly when it comes to his role in extending post-9/11 counterterrorism policies broadly seen as targeting Muslim communities .
Hussein said Biden was integral in establishing the Countering Violent Extremism ( CVE ) program first piloted in the Twin Cities that recruits community leaders to identify @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activity .
Many allege that CVE unfairly stereotypes Muslims as uniquely dangerous and violent ; the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University called the program a “ surveillance and intelligence ” effort “ masquerading as community outreach.
” While Democrats have since distanced themselves from the program , which under the Trump administration has increasingly targeted Muslim , Black , LGBTQ , and immigrant communities , Somali Americans haven ’ t forgotten who started it .
“ We don ’ t turn a blind eye to the Obama administration , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration ’ s stepped-up use of drone strikes against al-Shabab militants in Somalia , which many view as only contributing to discord and civilian suffering in the country .
But even though many Somali Americans are critical of U.S. counterterrorism policies and tend to regard U.S. foreign policy unfavorably—some decrying it as “ imperialist ” —it ’ s not nearly as make-or-break an issue as what they see as growing domestic Islamophobia .
“ They ’ re all going to bomb us anyway , ” said Abdi Mohamed , a 26-year-old first-generation Somali @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might as well vote for the one who ’ s not going to be mean to us here.
” Somali refugees who immigrated to the United States in the early 1990s after the outbreak of the country ’ s civil war zeroed in on Minneapolis and St. Paul , where a combination of job opportunities and activist culture promised a hospitable new home .
In the past quarter century , Somalis have left a marked imprint on the Twin Cities through their activism and culture .
“ The Twin Cities allowed the Somali @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to which they ’ re not able to in other parts ” of the country , Mohamed said .
But even as many have achieved political and economic mobility—holding seats in the state senate , city councils , and agency boards for years—Mohamed worries that some members of his community are feeling increasingly dejected with the political landscape .
While he ’ s confident his fellow millennials will turn out for Biden , he fears that older Somali Americans feel more marginalized than ever , while disillusioned younger voters are at risk of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
“ When you ’ re constantly snapping the same people … there ’ s going to be a time when they ’ re not going to care anymore.
” And Trump ’ s rally in Bemidji—which claims to be the home of Paul Bunyan—was for some , like Hussein , a sign of a Minnesota that is changing .
Beltrami County , where the city is located , in January became the first jurisdiction in the state to vote to prohibit refugee resettlement .
Local officials and advocates worry that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to growing Islamophobia .
“ I don ’ t want to turn on the TV and [ have ] my kids listening to a president insulting my ethnic group when we have done nothing except integrate into the American way of life , ” Hassan said .
“ This [ election ] is do or die .
”

It took U.S. President Donald Trump only seven minutes into his campaign rally in Bemidji, Minnesota, last Friday to launch a slew of attacks against the state’s Somali American community. Trump warned that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden would “flood [Minnesota] with an influx of refugees from Somalia,” transforming the state into a “refugee camp.” The president called Somali Americans “radical Islamic terrorists” and labeled many in the community “criminals” guilty of rape, assault, and murder.
It took U.S. President Donald Trump only seven minutes into his campaign rally in Bemidji, Minnesota, last Friday to launch a slew of attacks against the state’s Somali American community. Trump warned that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden would “flood [Minnesota] with an influx of refugees from Somalia,” transforming the state into a “refugee camp.” The president called Somali Americans “radical Islamic terrorists” and labeled many in the community “criminals” guilty of rape, assault, and murder.
Somali Americans—who identify as Black, Muslim, and immigrant for the most part—have felt targeted since the first days of the Trump administration, when the freshly minted commander in chief signed a travel ban against seven predominantly Muslim countries and effectively shut down the U.S. refugee program. Since then, he has poured a steady stream of invective at the 60,000-strong Somali American community in the state—especially at Minnesota’s Somali-born Democratic representative, Ilhan Omar—and this month announced the deportation of Somali refugees detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
As Trump enters the final stretch of his reelection campaign in a state that Republicans desperately want to flip in November, Somali Americans in the Twin Cities—ground zero for nationwide protests against racial injustice this summer—fear another Trump term could be a point of no return. A state that voted Democratic in 11 straight presidential elections is suddenly a battleground—making the politically engaged Somali American community a vital bloc four years after Trump won a basket of Midwestern states by razor-thin margins.
“For many of us, this is personal,” said Democratic State Rep. Hodan Hassan, a therapist and social worker who has represented South Minneapolis in the Minnesota House of Representatives since 2019. “This is our livelihood being attacked, our existence being attacked—this is a really important election.”
Omar echoed Hassan’s comments in a tweet on Tuesday, stating that “what happens in the next few weeks could impact us for the rest of our lives, and our children’s lives.”
Since 2016, and especially since Omar’s election in 2018, “Somali Americans have … become a focus point for the hate movement in America,” said Jaylani Hussein, the executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Minnesota. Omar’s election victory—and her quick rise to national prominence as part of the “squad” of left-wing Democratic legislators—has allowed Trump to use Somali Americans “as a lightning rod issue to build on his base around issues of Islamophobia,” Hussein said.
During Trump’s previous stop in the state, an October 2019 rally in Minneapolis, he called Omar a “disgrace” and an “America-hating socialist” before launching into a broadside against Minnesota’s Somali community. (The president had previously told Omar to “go back” to Somalia.) More recently, after news broke of the administration’s plan to deport Somali refugees—many of whom are suspected to have COVID-19—Trump tweeted that he was “helping Minnesota greatly.”
Advocacy groups say the deportations—which came on the heels of a recent court ruling giving the Trump administration the authority to overturn immigrants’ Temporary Protected Status—were unprecedented. It was another unwelcome shock to the community after the 2017 travel ban halted the reunification of many families split between the United States and Somalia.
Democrats should be able to court Somali votes with ease, even without accounting for Trump’s attacks on the community. Long a progressive bastion in a state that has gone from deep blue to a possible purple this year, Somali Americans generally favor left-of-center positions, such as state-funded education and health care. And the coronavirus pandemic and ensuing economic carnage have highlighted disparities in health, education, and economic opportunities that affect marginalized communities, further adding to Biden’s appeal among Somali American voters.
“The pandemic has shown us the structural flaws in our system,” said Hassan, the state representative.
But that doesn’t mean Biden is entirely without baggage, particularly when it comes to his role in extending post-9/11 counterterrorism policies broadly seen as targeting Muslim communities.
Hussein said Biden was integral in establishing the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program first piloted in the Twin Cities that recruits community leaders to identify those who may be susceptible to extremist activity. Many allege that CVE unfairly stereotypes Muslims as uniquely dangerous and violent; the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University called the program a “surveillance and intelligence” effort “masquerading as community outreach.”
While Democrats have since distanced themselves from the program, which under the Trump administration has increasingly targeted Muslim, Black, LGBTQ, and immigrant communities, Somali Americans haven’t forgotten who started it.
“We don’t turn a blind eye to the Obama administration,” Hussein said. That includes the Obama administration’s stepped-up use of drone strikes against al-Shabab militants in Somalia, which many view as only contributing to discord and civilian suffering in the country. But even though many Somali Americans are critical of U.S. counterterrorism policies and tend to regard U.S. foreign policy unfavorably—some decrying it as “imperialist”—it’s not nearly as make-or-break an issue as what they see as growing domestic Islamophobia.
“They’re all going to bomb us anyway,” said Abdi Mohamed, a 26-year-old first-generation Somali American in St. Paul. “We might as well vote for the one who’s not going to be mean to us here.”
Somali refugees who immigrated to the United States in the early 1990s after the outbreak of the country’s civil war zeroed in on Minneapolis and St. Paul, where a combination of job opportunities and activist culture promised a hospitable new home. In the past quarter century, Somalis have left a marked imprint on the Twin Cities through their activism and culture.
“The Twin Cities allowed the Somali community … to thrive to a degree to which they’re not able to in other parts” of the country, Mohamed said.
But even as many have achieved political and economic mobility—holding seats in the state senate, city councils, and agency boards for years—Mohamed worries that some members of his community are feeling increasingly dejected with the political landscape. While he’s confident his fellow millennials will turn out for Biden, he fears that older Somali Americans feel more marginalized than ever, while disillusioned younger voters are at risk of turning away from partisan politics, he said. “When you’re constantly snapping the same people … there’s going to be a time when they’re not going to care anymore.”
And Trump’s rally in Bemidji—which claims to be the home of Paul Bunyan—was for some, like Hussein, a sign of a Minnesota that is changing. Beltrami County, where the city is located, in January became the first jurisdiction in the state to vote to prohibit refugee resettlement. Local officials and advocates worry that the Trump rally was a nod of affirmation to growing Islamophobia.
“I don’t want to turn on the TV and [have] my kids listening to a president insulting my ethnic group when we have done nothing except integrate into the American way of life,” Hassan said. “This [election] is do or die.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-22--The Republican and Democratic Parties Are Heading for Collapse

The Republican and Democratic Parties Are Heading for Collapse In a year that has already seen impeachment , plague , and fire , and with total warfare battle over filling Ruth Bader Ginsburg ’ s Supreme Court seat and an even higher-stakes and equally uncertain election still to come , it ’ s easy to feel as if U.S. democracy is crumbling before our eyes .
Yet here ’ s some potentially good news in a year without much of it : The United States has been through moments of political and economic crisis before , and out of each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s politics and economy .
There ’ s reason to expect the 2020s to be a decade of major political evolution , as well .
And none too soon : The United States is overdue for both an overhaul of its party system and a major renewal of its ever evolving democracy .
Overlaid on this pattern of party system and collapse are four major periods of bottom-up democratic transformation in the United States .
These are the Revolutionary War ( from monarchy to self-governance ) , the 1830s ( major @ @ @ @ @ @ @ males ) , the Progressive Era ( major expansions of participatory democracy and expansion of the franchise to women ) , and the 1960s ( voting rights and enfranchisement of Black people , plus some governance reforms ) .
Again , there ’ s a regular pattern , with some kind of transformation coming about every 60 years or so .
Here , too , the United States is due for a wave of bottom-up democratic transformation .
It may seem unlikely that such a complex political system really transforms with semiregularity .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is unique , given the unusual confluence of factors the United States is facing , most notably the hyperpartisanship of its politics and sharp racial and cultural differences that seem to power the divide between the parties .
Certainly , past performance is no guarantee of future returns .
And no doubt , there are elements of current U.S. politics that make the chances of another transformation and renewal deeply uncertain .
But the lessons of history have value .
They can tell us what looks like charted territory , what looks like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needed to keep the United States ’ creaky old system of self-governance working .
Over time , the principles that unite a coalition together in one moment fray—and the governing ideologies that solved a previous problem create their own future problems , demanding a new ideology .
Demographics change , too , altering the relative balances of power , both between and within parties .
But voting loyalties are sticky .
And especially in a two-party system , breaking from a coalition comes at a high cost if the opposing coalition can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is why it typically takes a major event , like an economic depression or a major conflict over race , to break a coalition apart .
For example , the party system of 1832-1856 was based on a relatively balanced competition between the populist frontier-oriented Democratic Party founded by Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren and the more cosmopolitan industry-friendly Whig Party formed in opposition to “ King Andrew.
” The parties argued between themselves over canals and tariffs .
Internally , they argued over slavery , since both had Northern and Southern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slavery question unavoidable , both parties split , and a civil war and new alignment emerged .
Almost a century later , the party system of 1932-1968 came together in response to the shock of the Great Depression .
Democrats dominated , held together by a New Deal coalition of Northern and Southern Democrats , who were relatively united in their support for a social welfare state but were divided on how much it should just be for white people .
The coalition held as long as civil rights remained a local issue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in poverty .
But the civil rights revolution of the 1960s jettisoned Southern conservatives from the Democratic Party , and the success of the New Deal in expanding the middle class shifted the politics of redistribution .
The United States ’ current party system cohered around 1980 , with the Republican Party uniting a coalition of market libertarians , evangelical values voters , and foreign-policy hawks .
Democrats comprised a coalition of cosmopolitan liberals , lower-income people of color , and backers of a laundry list of social causes .
For both parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic ideology , a fuzzy term that defined markets and privatization as the primary tools of both domestic public policy and international relations .
With a relative consensus around neoliberalism , cultural and racial issues became the dominant cleavage in the system along with an increasingly polarized urban-rural “ density divide.
” That party system seemed on its last legs as early as four years ago .
At the time , the 2016 presidential election appeared to augur the coming of a new party system , with newly elected President Donald Trump as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican Party .
Yet whereas candidate Trump may have signaled as much with his pledged commitments to the social welfare state and domestic manufacturing , as president Trump lacked both the policy infrastructure and the internal party consensus to carry it through .
Instead , his presidency has been defined by a remarkable maintenance of the existing Republican coalition .
Thanks to his own flexibility , his lack of policy knowledge , his astounding cult of personality , and his singular ability to blame “ radical Democrats , ” Trump has held together @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it publicly stands for pretty much nothing—only against the fevered threat of a violent Marxist revolution by a racially militant Democratic Party .
Democrats have been able to a cobble together a policy platform ahead of this year ’ s election , but even they have elided their divisions by shifting focus to the existential risk of a second Trump term—an obvious strategy given both Trump ’ s clear failures and the lack of internal policy unity .
That both parties are fractured does not necessarily herald a realignment .
Internal division @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What does signal a potential shuffle is the lack of any substantive arguments about the big questions that have defined partisan conflict throughout U.S. history : the role of government , the regulation of the economy , or the United States ’ role in the world .
Instead , this election is about why the other party would destroy democracy and the country , in narratives suffused with race .
In past times of ideological vacuum , U.S. political parties were more easily able to adopt new ideas because the party coalitions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups less closely attached to the national organization .
Although this structure had its obvious problems , it was also more flexible with more potential for recombination .
Today ’ s two parties are far more nationalized , and in a hyperpartisan 24/7 media environment , every issue quickly becomes a pants-on-fire crisis .
That makes it much more difficult to imagine the kinds of cross-cutting issues that generated realignments in the past .
And now , as if the country ’ s hyperpartisan politics couldn ’ t get any more bitterly hyperpartisan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again by taking Ginsburg just six weeks before an election .
Further , whereas today ’ s parties may be divided internally , at the elite level they are divided along a single partisan dimension , in which the threat of the other party itself serves as a unifying force .
In theory , a major national crisis could force one party to adopt a new governing ideology out of necessity and then solidify a new coalition around it .
COVID-19 is probably not such a crisis because too many people see it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , could fit the bill , as could a major economic depression .
But given the country ’ s hyperpolarized politics , the greater risk is that the crisis itself instead becomes a partisan issue , in the way that COVID-19 and the environment have .
In that case , the United States is screwed .
Most of the time , Americans accept , ignore , or deny the gap between the ideal and the reality .
But periodically , this gap widens into such an overwhelming chasm that the spirit of reform @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demand widespread changes to remedy the shortfalls by making U.S. democracy more inclusive and responsive .
The reforms work , sort of—at least well enough to restore some lost legitimacy to the political system and quell interest in reform for a while .
Eventually , though , problems arise , and demand for reform builds again .
The current political moment , with its widespread discontent , grievance , and restlessness , bears many of the familiar hallmarks of previous eras leading to democratic reform .
In a recent Pew Research Center poll @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreed that “ significant changes are needed in the fundamental design and structure of American government.
” In each previous era , the challenge was different .
But in each era , when reform came , it wasn ’ t from Washington .
It was from the bottom up , with political elites eventually getting on board .
For reformers today , given the existential democracy-undermining risk of hyperpartisan two-party politics in which neither side acknowledges the legitimacy of the other , the first priority must be breaking the two-party “ doom loop.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ how Americans vote by adopting ranked-choice voting with multimember districts , a proportional system used in Ireland and Australia .
Such a system would support more parties , breaking the binary partisan dynamics driving gridlock , extremism , and breakdown .
Most importantly , it would allow new , more flexible coalitions—not reliant for support on questioning the legitimacy of the other—to form .
U.S. politics desperately needs a political realignment to respond to the economic and climate crises bearing down on it .
Instead , the country will spend the next several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the Supreme Court , whose growing centrality is testament to Congress ’ s inability to resolve conflicts legislatively , and then likely an even more contentious fight over the legitimacy of the November election .
The only way to break the democracy-destroying doom loop is by making it easier for more parties to compete .
The future of U.S. democracy depends on it .

In a year that has already seen impeachment, plague, and fire, and with total warfare battle over filling Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Supreme Court seat and an even higher-stakes and equally uncertain election still to come, it’s easy to feel as if U.S. democracy is crumbling before our eyes.
In a year that has already seen impeachment, plague, and fire, and with total warfare battle over filling Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Supreme Court seat and an even higher-stakes and equally uncertain election still to come, it’s easy to feel as if U.S. democracy is crumbling before our eyes.
Yet here’s some potentially good news in a year without much of it: The United States has been through moments of political and economic crisis before, and out of each crisis emerged a much-needed transformation of the country’s politics and economy. There’s reason to expect the 2020s to be a decade of major political evolution, as well. And none too soon: The United States is overdue for both an overhaul of its party system and a major renewal of its ever evolving democracy.
Broadly speaking, U.S. politics has had six party systems—that is, distinct eras in which party competition was somewhat stable, both in the relative balance of power between the parties and in the types of issues that the parties fought over, such as the role of government in the economy. These eras roughly covered 1796-1820, 1832-1856, 1868-1892, 1896-1928, 1932-1968, and 1980 until now. The transitions between each system were generally led from the top down, through rifts and realignments in elite coalitions and ideologies, typically catalyzed by societal crises. The first five party systems lasted, by this count, 24, 24, 24, 32, and 36 years—a certain regularity, with the length expanding as people lived longer. By this pattern, the current party system should probably be collapsing about now.
Overlaid on this pattern of party system and collapse are four major periods of bottom-up democratic transformation in the United States. These are the Revolutionary War (from monarchy to self-governance), the 1830s (major expansion of the franchise to nonpropertied white males), the Progressive Era (major expansions of participatory democracy and expansion of the franchise to women), and the 1960s (voting rights and enfranchisement of Black people, plus some governance reforms). Again, there’s a regular pattern, with some kind of transformation coming about every 60 years or so. Here, too, the United States is due for a wave of bottom-up democratic transformation.
It may seem unlikely that such a complex political system really transforms with semiregularity. And it may seem that this moment is unique, given the unusual confluence of factors the United States is facing, most notably the hyperpartisanship of its politics and sharp racial and cultural differences that seem to power the divide between the parties.
Certainly, past performance is no guarantee of future returns. And no doubt, there are elements of current U.S. politics that make the chances of another transformation and renewal deeply uncertain. But the lessons of history have value. They can tell us what looks like charted territory, what looks like uncharted territory, and what updates are needed to keep the United States’ creaky old system of self-governance working.
Because of the country’s unique electoral system—first-past-the-post plurality elections and a one-round, winner-take-all Electoral College—U.S. politics has always had two dominant national parties to structure political competition. In turn, the two parties have had to be big-tent coalitions, since any party attempting to build a governing majority will by necessity need to include lots of disparate interests across broad geographies. But coalitions are hard to maintain over long periods of times, as allies on certain issues are bound to be enemies on others.
Over time, the principles that unite a coalition together in one moment fray—and the governing ideologies that solved a previous problem create their own future problems, demanding a new ideology. Demographics change, too, altering the relative balances of power, both between and within parties. But voting loyalties are sticky. And especially in a two-party system, breaking from a coalition comes at a high cost if the opposing coalition can’t accommodate your demands either. That is why it typically takes a major event, like an economic depression or a major conflict over race, to break a coalition apart.
For example, the party system of 1832-1856 was based on a relatively balanced competition between the populist frontier-oriented Democratic Party founded by Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren and the more cosmopolitan industry-friendly Whig Party formed in opposition to “King Andrew.” The parties argued between themselves over canals and tariffs. Internally, they argued over slavery, since both had Northern and Southern wings. When westward expansion made the slavery question unavoidable, both parties split, and a civil war and new alignment emerged.
Almost a century later, the party system of 1932-1968 came together in response to the shock of the Great Depression. Democrats dominated, held together by a New Deal coalition of Northern and Southern Democrats, who were relatively united in their support for a social welfare state but were divided on how much it should just be for white people. The coalition held as long as civil rights remained a local issue and as long as many Americans remained in poverty. But the civil rights revolution of the 1960s jettisoned Southern conservatives from the Democratic Party, and the success of the New Deal in expanding the middle class shifted the politics of redistribution.
The United States’ current party system cohered around 1980, with the Republican Party uniting a coalition of market libertarians, evangelical values voters, and foreign-policy hawks. Democrats comprised a coalition of cosmopolitan liberals, lower-income people of color, and backers of a laundry list of social causes. For both parties, “neoliberalism” became the dominant economic ideology, a fuzzy term that defined markets and privatization as the primary tools of both domestic public policy and international relations. With a relative consensus around neoliberalism, cultural and racial issues became the dominant cleavage in the system along with an increasingly polarized urban-rural “density divide.”
That party system seemed on its last legs as early as four years ago. At the time, the 2016 presidential election appeared to augur the coming of a new party system, with newly elected President Donald Trump as the vanguard of a now economically populist Republican Party. Yet whereas candidate Trump may have signaled as much with his pledged commitments to the social welfare state and domestic manufacturing, as president Trump lacked both the policy infrastructure and the internal party consensus to carry it through. Instead, his presidency has been defined by a remarkable maintenance of the existing Republican coalition. Thanks to his own flexibility, his lack of policy knowledge, his astounding cult of personality, and his singular ability to blame “radical Democrats,” Trump has held together a party so beset by internal disagreement that it publicly stands for pretty much nothing—only against the fevered threat of a violent Marxist revolution by a racially militant Democratic Party. Democrats have been able to a cobble together a policy platform ahead of this year’s election, but even they have elided their divisions by shifting focus to the existential risk of a second Trump term—an obvious strategy given both Trump’s clear failures and the lack of internal policy unity.
That both parties are fractured does not necessarily herald a realignment. Internal division is a constant of U.S. party politics. What does signal a potential shuffle is the lack of any substantive arguments about the big questions that have defined partisan conflict throughout U.S. history: the role of government, the regulation of the economy, or the United States’ role in the world. Instead, this election is about why the other party would destroy democracy and the country, in narratives suffused with race.
In past times of ideological vacuum, U.S. political parties were more easily able to adopt new ideas because the party coalitions were looser affiliations of state and local groups less closely attached to the national organization. Although this structure had its obvious problems, it was also more flexible with more potential for recombination.
Today’s two parties are far more nationalized, and in a hyperpartisan 24/7 media environment, every issue quickly becomes a pants-on-fire crisis. That makes it much more difficult to imagine the kinds of cross-cutting issues that generated realignments in the past. And now, as if the country’s hyperpartisan politics couldn’t get any more bitterly hyperpartisan, the gods have laughed at us again by taking Ginsburg just six weeks before an election. Further, whereas today’s parties may be divided internally, at the elite level they are divided along a single partisan dimension, in which the threat of the other party itself serves as a unifying force.
In theory, a major national crisis could force one party to adopt a new governing ideology out of necessity and then solidify a new coalition around it. COVID-19 is probably not such a crisis because too many people see it as temporary. Climate change, however, could fit the bill, as could a major economic depression. But given the country’s hyperpolarized politics, the greater risk is that the crisis itself instead becomes a partisan issue, in the way that COVID-19 and the environment have. In that case, the United States is screwed.
It’s a good thing, then, that the country may be due for a bottom-up democratic transformation because it is sure going to need one to fix its broken politics. Like party realignments, transformations of democracy have a certain cyclical logic, which the political scientist Samuel Huntington laid out in his classic book American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. U.S. democracy is founded on ideals, but they are ideals it never quite lives up to—that government should be “egalitarian, participatory, open, noncoercive, and responsive to the demands of individuals and groups” (per Huntington’s formulation). But since no functional government can be all these things simultaneously, disappointment perpetually defines the American political imagination.
Most of the time, Americans accept, ignore, or deny the gap between the ideal and the reality. But periodically, this gap widens into such an overwhelming chasm that the spirit of reform and innovation takes over and social movements demand widespread changes to remedy the shortfalls by making U.S. democracy more inclusive and responsive. The reforms work, sort of—at least well enough to restore some lost legitimacy to the political system and quell interest in reform for a while. Eventually, though, problems arise, and demand for reform builds again.
The current political moment, with its widespread discontent, grievance, and restlessness, bears many of the familiar hallmarks of previous eras leading to democratic reform. In a recent Pew Research Center poll, more than 6 in 10 Americans agreed that “significant changes are needed in the fundamental design and structure of American government.” In each previous era, the challenge was different. But in each era, when reform came, it wasn’t from Washington. It was from the bottom up, with political elites eventually getting on board.
For reformers today, given the existential democracy-undermining risk of hyperpartisan two-party politics in which neither side acknowledges the legitimacy of the other, the first priority must be breaking the two-party “doom loop.” My recommendation would be to change how Americans vote by adopting ranked-choice voting with multimember districts, a proportional system used in Ireland and Australia. Such a system would support more parties, breaking the binary partisan dynamics driving gridlock, extremism, and breakdown. Most importantly, it would allow new, more flexible coalitions—not reliant for support on questioning the legitimacy of the other—to form.
U.S. politics desperately needs a political realignment to respond to the economic and climate crises bearing down on it. Instead, the country will spend the next several months consumed with another knock-down partisan fight over the Supreme Court, whose growing centrality is testament to Congress’s inability to resolve conflicts legislatively, and then likely an even more contentious fight over the legitimacy of the November election. The only way to break the democracy-destroying doom loop is by making it easier for more parties to compete. The future of U.S. democracy depends on it.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-22--The United States Needs a New Strategic Mindset

The United States Needs a New Strategic Mindset The United States hasn ’ t had a coherent strategic vision for a generation , and it shows .
The absence of an overarching strategic concept has produced little but short-sighted moves that have left the country less secure , less prosperous , and less relevant .
President Donald Trump has made a string of abrupt decisions—banning TikTok , withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization , and cutting American forces in Germany , are only the most recent examples .
The Trump administration is by no means uniquely guilty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American leaders have failed the marshmallow test of great-power competition for decades .
To regain strategic coherence and set a better course for the future , the United States needs leaders who can break free from short-term thinking habits and provide a renewed sense of purpose to guide American policies .
In short , the country needs leaders with an infinite mindset .
When the Cold War came to its unexpected end in 1991 , the strategy of containment that had broadly guided American policy for almost a half-century did too , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to replace it .
The United States spent the 1990s tilting at windmills in a period now almost derisively called the “ unipolar moment.
” After 2001 , it reflexively—and then monomaniacally—fixated on the threat of terrorism to the exclusion of all else , squandering its wealth , sacrificing its soldiers ’ lives , and tarnishing its reputation , all for nothing .
More recently , it has spent exorbitant sums on what it construes as “ great-power competition , ” but is really just the defense industrial complex ’ s same old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public institutions rot .
Meanwhile , its competitors have been investing in the future by laying the foundations of global integration .
They are building the physical and digital infrastructure that ’ s connecting continents—all while America ’ s own infrastructure has either lagged or crumbled .
China specifically understands that in the information age , great-power competition is about these global infrastructures .
China ’ s need for infrastructure at home has been fortuitously—for Beijing—matched with global demand abroad .
It has woven an impressive system of dependence and influence by buying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fiber-optic cables , connecting fifth-generation telecommunications networks , and financing the development of modernizing states—in much the same way the United States itself once did .
China has crowned its foreign investments with a far-flung constellation of diplomatic posts , the most now of any country on earth—all while the United States has cut its own foreign service to the very bone .
China has built the planet ’ s greatest capacity for solar energy generation , even as the United States has foolishly wasted its own resources doubling down on the fossil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s passed for U.S. strategy for the past 30 years or more has been about reaching conclusions—end states , in the strategist ’ s parlance .
But this sequential , linear conception misses the essential point that that nothing ever ends .
Strategy isn ’ t about reaching an end state , or even about winning .
Strategy isn ’ t about reaching an end state , or even about winning for that matter .
These militarized concepts of strategy are an inheritance from the 19th century only later imperfectly adapted to fit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the relatively straightforward language of war—with its campaigns , objectives , and engagements—might still suit the battlefield , it is far too reductive to be of much use describing the societal rivalries of the digital era .
Strategy is better described as what James Carse called an infinite game , a competition in which the point is not to win or lose but simply to keep playing .
Finite games , like chess , have straightforward rules .
They are about tactics—limiting an opponent ’ s options until the only choice left is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrast , are about expanding a player ’ s options and ensuring the competition continues even when other options are removed .
The classic example of an infinite game is Nomic , in which players have the option to change the rules in play , and can win by tying their opponents up in a knot of contradictions—an outcome more reminiscent of international competition .
As Carse wrote , “ Finite players play within boundaries .
Infinite players play with boundaries.
” Everett Carl Dolman , a professor of military studies at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Staff College , wrote that strategy seeks not the culmination of events but “ a favorable continuation of events.
” Strategists aim to increase their options by manipulating the structure of the competition itself , dictating the terms by which the game is played .
Unlike tactics , strategy is never about the next move .
It is instead about defining the range of moves that are even possible .
A good strategy , in other words , aims to make the outcome of tactical events irrelevant .
America ’ s adversaries seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own leaders do .
While the United States has been playing the game under a certain set of assumptions , its enemies have been changing them .
As former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia John Culver writes , China perceives that “ the side that best marshals superior domestic stability , economic performance and relevance to international conditions will prevail.
” For more than two decades now , Chinese leaders have worked assiduously to change the structure of great-power competition .
They have manipulated the boundaries of play both by growing Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new ones more suitable to Chinese preferences .
Today , President Xi Jinping is building China ’ s state capacity while the United States dismantles its own ; he ’ s expanding Chinese influence beyond East Asia while America stains itself with transactional diplomacy and foreign policy by pique .
This isn ’ t some master strategy or stroke of brilliance .
China makes plenty of mistakes , from its obsession with domestic control contravening attempts to build soft power to the needless picking of border fights that have alienated almost all of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ having some sense of vision that , for better or worse , goes beyond the obsession with the next six months or the next poll .
Today , for good or ill , the decisions of great powers reverberate through a global competitive network .
The states that build solid foundations will be well positioned to ride out the inevitable shocks of an age of disruption .
Those that don ’ t—those that fixate on the immediate or the expedient while letting others manipulate the infinite—will decline , and perhaps even fall .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ wind up in the latter category , the United States needs to start thinking in infinite terms .
U.S. leaders need to decide what the country stands for in the 21st century .
Vociferous daily condemnations of China aren ’ t nearly enough .
Everyone knows what the United States is against ; they must also know what it is for .
An infinite-minded America would argue big , bold ideas that safeguard individual liberty and accelerate human progress—for everyone , everywhere .
An infinite-minded America would argue big , bold ideas that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Next , it must choose the role it seeks to play in a world where it is no longer a virtually unquestioned hegemon .
Those days are gone , and they aren ’ t coming back .
Because the United States remains a hemispheric power with a large market and global reach , it will always exert a powerful influence on world affairs .
But it can no longer expect other nations—even allies—to follow its lead by default , something it should have learned from the paltry character of its willing coalition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and its aspirational role defined , U.S. leaders could begin to craft a compelling story to illuminate every subordinate decision about where the United States stands , where it wants to go , and how it intends to get there .
They could envision new mechanisms to buttress the liberal order America built after World War II , changing the structure of the game once again—to benefit not only Americans , but also everyone around the world who believes in freedom and the rule of law .
An infinite strategy would finance the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans themselves .
It would prioritize the rebuilding of public infrastructure over profligate spending on antiquated military platforms , recognizing that the health , welfare , and education of a nation ’ s citizens is the foundation of all political power .
It would modernize the national security bureaucracy , both by reforming existing institutions to make them more responsive and representative and by designing new ones better able to seize opportunities and mitigate risks .
It would reassure friends by being transparent with its motivations and deter enemies by making it clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not accept .
The world needs a vigorous and united United States to offset the growing power of an authoritarian , avaricious China .
But Americans must understand that no nation is inherently great , or even good , and that past pedigree counts for little today .
Nations are made great only by the actions and choices of their people over time .
Every generation of Americans must choose reform over stagnation , and hope over fear , if they are to navigate the disruptions of the 21st century and show a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ follow .

The United States hasn’t had a coherent strategic vision for a generation, and it shows. The absence of an overarching strategic concept has produced little but short-sighted moves that have left the country less secure, less prosperous, and less relevant.
The United States hasn’t had a coherent strategic vision for a generation, and it shows. The absence of an overarching strategic concept has produced little but short-sighted moves that have left the country less secure, less prosperous, and less relevant.
President Donald Trump has made a string of abrupt decisions—banning TikTok, withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization, and cutting American forces in Germany, are only the most recent examples. The Trump administration is by no means uniquely guilty of fixating on the short term; American leaders have failed the marshmallow test of great-power competition for decades.
To regain strategic coherence and set a better course for the future, the United States needs leaders who can break free from short-term thinking habits and provide a renewed sense of purpose to guide American policies.
In short, the country needs leaders with an infinite mindset.
When the Cold War came to its unexpected end in 1991, the strategy of containment that had broadly guided American policy for almost a half-century did too, and no one had thought far enough ahead to replace it. The United States spent the 1990s tilting at windmills in a period now almost derisively called the “unipolar moment.” After 2001, it reflexively—and then monomaniacally—fixated on the threat of terrorism to the exclusion of all else, squandering its wealth, sacrificing its soldiers’ lives, and tarnishing its reputation, all for nothing.
More recently, it has spent exorbitant sums on what it construes as “great-power competition,” but is really just the defense industrial complex’s same old graft with a different guise—all while its public institutions rot.
Meanwhile, its competitors have been investing in the future by laying the foundations of global integration. They are building the physical and digital infrastructure that’s connecting continents—all while America’s own infrastructure has either lagged or crumbled.
China specifically understands that in the information age, great-power competition is about these global infrastructures. China’s need for infrastructure at home has been fortuitously—for Beijing—matched with global demand abroad. It has woven an impressive system of dependence and influence by buying up controlling interests in ports, laying fiber-optic cables, connecting fifth-generation telecommunications networks, and financing the development of modernizing states—in much the same way the United States itself once did.
China has crowned its foreign investments with a far-flung constellation of diplomatic posts, the most now of any country on earth—all while the United States has cut its own foreign service to the very bone. China has built the planet’s greatest capacity for solar energy generation, even as the United States has foolishly wasted its own resources doubling down on the fossil fuels of the past.
What’s passed for U.S. strategy for the past 30 years or more has been about reaching conclusions—end states, in the strategist’s parlance. But this sequential, linear conception misses the essential point that that nothing ever ends.
Strategy isn’t about reaching an end state, or even about winning.
Strategy isn’t about reaching an end state, or even about winning for that matter. These militarized concepts of strategy are an inheritance from the 19th century only later imperfectly adapted to fit large-scale competition between states. And while the relatively straightforward language of war—with its campaigns, objectives, and engagements—might still suit the battlefield, it is far too reductive to be of much use describing the societal rivalries of the digital era.
Strategy is better described as what James Carse called an infinite game, a competition in which the point is not to win or lose but simply to keep playing. Finite games, like chess, have straightforward rules. They are about tactics—limiting an opponent’s options until the only choice left is capitulation—the checkmate. Infinite games, in contrast, are about expanding a player’s options and ensuring the competition continues even when other options are removed. The classic example of an infinite game is Nomic, in which players have the option to change the rules in play, and can win by tying their opponents up in a knot of contradictions—an outcome more reminiscent of international competition. As Carse wrote, “Finite players play within boundaries. Infinite players play with boundaries.”
Everett Carl Dolman, a professor of military studies at the U.S. Air Force’s Command and Staff College, wrote that strategy seeks not the culmination of events but “a favorable continuation of events.” Strategists aim to increase their options by manipulating the structure of the competition itself, dictating the terms by which the game is played. Unlike tactics, strategy is never about the next move. It is instead about defining the range of moves that are even possible. A good strategy, in other words, aims to make the outcome of tactical events irrelevant.
America’s adversaries seem to grasp this more clearly than its own leaders do. While the United States has been playing the game under a certain set of assumptions, its enemies have been changing them. As former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia John Culver writes, China perceives that “the side that best marshals superior domestic stability, economic performance and relevance to international conditions will prevail.”
For more than two decades now, Chinese leaders have worked assiduously to change the structure of great-power competition. They have manipulated the boundaries of play both by growing Chinese influence in existing institutions and by founding new ones more suitable to Chinese preferences. Today, President Xi Jinping is building China’s state capacity while the United States dismantles its own; he’s expanding Chinese influence beyond East Asia while America stains itself with transactional diplomacy and foreign policy by pique.
This isn’t some master strategy or stroke of brilliance. China makes plenty of mistakes, from its obsession with domestic control contravening attempts to build soft power to the needless picking of border fights that have alienated almost all of its neighbors. It simply benefits from having some sense of vision that, for better or worse, goes beyond the obsession with the next six months or the next poll.
Today, for good or ill, the decisions of great powers reverberate through a global competitive network. The states that build solid foundations will be well positioned to ride out the inevitable shocks of an age of disruption. Those that don’t—those that fixate on the immediate or the expedient while letting others manipulate the infinite—will decline, and perhaps even fall. To make sure it doesn’t wind up in the latter category, the United States needs to start thinking in infinite terms.
U.S. leaders need to decide what the country stands for in the 21st century. Vociferous daily condemnations of China aren’t nearly enough. Everyone knows what the United States is against; they must also know what it is for. An infinite-minded America would argue big, bold ideas that safeguard individual liberty and accelerate human progress—for everyone, everywhere.
An infinite-minded America would argue big, bold ideas that safeguard individual liberty and accelerate human progress.
Next, it must choose the role it seeks to play in a world where it is no longer a virtually unquestioned hegemon. Those days are gone, and they aren’t coming back. Because the United States remains a hemispheric power with a large market and global reach, it will always exert a powerful influence on world affairs. But it can no longer expect other nations—even allies—to follow its lead by default, something it should have learned from the paltry character of its willing coalition in 2003.
With its values set and its aspirational role defined, U.S. leaders could begin to craft a compelling story to illuminate every subordinate decision about where the United States stands, where it wants to go, and how it intends to get there. They could envision new mechanisms to buttress the liberal order America built after World War II, changing the structure of the game once again—to benefit not only Americans, but also everyone around the world who believes in freedom and the rule of law.
An infinite strategy would finance the future by investing first and foremost in Americans themselves. It would prioritize the rebuilding of public infrastructure over profligate spending on antiquated military platforms, recognizing that the health, welfare, and education of a nation’s citizens is the foundation of all political power. It would modernize the national security bureaucracy, both by reforming existing institutions to make them more responsive and representative and by designing new ones better able to seize opportunities and mitigate risks. It would reassure friends by being transparent with its motivations and deter enemies by making it clear what the United States will and will not accept.
The world needs a vigorous and united United States to offset the growing power of an authoritarian, avaricious China. But Americans must understand that no nation is inherently great, or even good, and that past pedigree counts for little today. Nations are made great only by the actions and choices of their people over time. Every generation of Americans must choose reform over stagnation, and hope over fear, if they are to navigate the disruptions of the 21st century and show a path the rest of the world will follow.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-22--The Taliban, at Least, Are Striking Gold in Afghanistan

The Taliban , at Least , Are Striking Gold in Afghanistan For decades , Afghanistan ’ s untapped mineral wealth has been touted as the country ’ s trillion-dollar El Dorado .
But while the Afghan government has never been able to monetize mountains of copper , iron ore , gold , and gemstones , the Taliban have—and are ramping up their mining operations as just-started peace talks aim to shape the future of a postwar Afghanistan .
In recent years , the Taliban have deliberately moved to secure control over regions of Afghanistan rich in mineral deposits , from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gold , lead , and zinc in Helmand and vast talc and marble deposits in southern Nangarhar .
The Taliban , who already control most of the country ’ s mineral wealth , are banking on further developing the sector to make it the bedrock of the country ’ s postwar economy—or theirs , at least .
“ Mining is one of the leading factors in the economic development of Afghanistan , ” said Yaqoob Shah , the director of the leasing department of the Taliban ’ s shadow ministry of mines .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ about $ 400 million a year from mining—a figure confirmed by independent researchers and which dwarfs Afghan government income from mining .
“ Once the peace talks have been carried out , it will be of great value to the country ’ s welfare and development , ” Shah said .
In recent years , the Taliban have sought to maximize their earnings from the minerals under their control , said two senior Taliban figures , including a member of the insurgents ’ negotiating team .
The group issues mining licenses , arranges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mines and access to the roads , according to a new report from the U.N. Development Program ( UNDP ) .
One insurgent , a powerful commander , talked up the changes the group has made to increase production and “ achieve maximum profit ” in the sector .
He ’ s looking to the day when there are no more U.S. or international sanctions on Taliban economic activities .
“ Now we are hopeful that peace talks will bear fruit , and after they are completed , we will be able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work in our own way to provide employment and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan , ” said the commander , who spoke on condition of anonymity .
The senior Taliban figure on the negotiating team called mining “ our most important sector.
” The senior Taliban figure on the negotiating team , who also spoke on condition of anonymity , called mining “ our most important sector ” and said the group would seek to “ boost this precious sector for the betterment and development of society.
” The Taliban ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as long-delayed peace talks with the Afghan government began this month .
For now , the talks are bogged down amid deep distrust on both sides—the Taliban do not recognize the legitimacy of the Kabul government—and dogged by a huge spike in violence .
The Taliban are widely believed to be responsible for a wave of attacks against Afghan government troops and installations this summer and have also apparently taken aim at departing U.S. forces .
A spokesperson for the U.S.-NATO Resolute Support mission said in a statement that a spate of recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bases in Kandahar , contravened the agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban in February and “ have the potential to put the peace process in jeopardy.
” Against that backdrop , with the Taliban hoping for some sort of power-sharing agreement in the future Afghanistan , the mineral riches offer a way for the militant group to almost match the government ’ s fiscal firepower .
The CIA estimates that the Afghan government took in just $ 2.2 billion in taxes and other revenue in 2017 , for instance .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ earn upwards of $ 1.5 billion a year , according to the U.N. Security Council ’ s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team , from “ narcotics , illicit mineral and other resource extraction , taxation , extortion , the sale of commercial and government services and property , and donations from abroad.
” After opium and other narcotics , mining does seem to be a gold mine for the Taliban .
The UNDP report estimates that extractive industries like mining are the Taliban ’ s “ second-largest revenue stream after narcotics.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Afghanistan—a magnet for conflict and a source of financing conflict .
Ordinary Afghans are heavily affected by the contestation over mineral resources between the government , the Taliban , the IS-K [ the local franchise of the Islamic State group ] , local insurgents and criminal networks , ” the report reads .
Meanwhile , even as insurgents successfully tap Afghanistan ’ s riches , the UNDP estimates that the Afghan government took in only $ 42 million on average between 2012 and 2018 from the country ’ s extractive industries .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that .
The Afghan government has never been able to ensure physical security in mining areas , which has discouraged most international investment , according to the UNDP report .
Chinese firms , for example , hold the rights to the big Mes Aynak copper deposit south of Kabul .
But work halted years ago after Taliban attacks on the site .
But the Afghan government isn ’ t much better at providing legal and financial security , either .
As feared and resented as the Taliban may be , they are seen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national government .
The UNDP report highlights how government corruption discourages international mining investment and greater exploitation of the country ’ s potential wealth .
“ Such corruption will deter many companies from seeking contracts since they never know whether their taxes go to the government or into the pocket of the official , or whether another official might not turn up at the next opportunity to charge a further tax or fine .
“ The Taliban do at least provide security in the areas they control and protect their ‘ taxpayers.
’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe that the Taliban are better able to provide security and ensure ‘ law and order ’ , albeit according to their own rules .
“ From the perspective of a mining company or a prospective taxpayer , the benefits of paying taxes to the government are limited , while the risks of not paying taxes to insurgents are enormous , ” the report reads .

For decades, Afghanistan’s untapped mineral wealth has been touted as the country’s trillion-dollar El Dorado. But while the Afghan government has never been able to monetize mountains of copper, iron ore, gold, and gemstones, the Taliban have—and are ramping up their mining operations as just-started peace talks aim to shape the future of a postwar Afghanistan.
For decades, Afghanistan’s untapped mineral wealth has been touted as the country’s trillion-dollar El Dorado. But while the Afghan government has never been able to monetize mountains of copper, iron ore, gold, and gemstones, the Taliban have—and are ramping up their mining operations as just-started peace talks aim to shape the future of a postwar Afghanistan.
In recent years, the Taliban have deliberately moved to secure control over regions of Afghanistan rich in mineral deposits, from lapis lazuli mines in northern Badakhshan to gold, lead, and zinc in Helmand and vast talc and marble deposits in southern Nangarhar. The Taliban, who already control most of the country’s mineral wealth, are banking on further developing the sector to make it the bedrock of the country’s postwar economy—or theirs, at least.
“Mining is one of the leading factors in the economic development of Afghanistan,” said Yaqoob Shah, the director of the leasing department of the Taliban’s shadow ministry of mines. He said the group is currently earning about $400 million a year from mining—a figure confirmed by independent researchers and which dwarfs Afghan government income from mining.
“Once the peace talks have been carried out, it will be of great value to the country’s welfare and development,” Shah said.
In recent years, the Taliban have sought to maximize their earnings from the minerals under their control, said two senior Taliban figures, including a member of the insurgents’ negotiating team. The group issues mining licenses, arranges labor, and controls haulage from the mines and access to the roads, according to a new report from the U.N. Development Program (UNDP).
One insurgent, a powerful commander, talked up the changes the group has made to increase production and “achieve maximum profit” in the sector. He’s looking to the day when there are no more U.S. or international sanctions on Taliban economic activities.
“Now we are hopeful that peace talks will bear fruit, and after they are completed, we will be able to represent ourselves in the international market and work in our own way to provide employment and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan,” said the commander, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The senior Taliban figure on the negotiating team called mining “our most important sector.”
The senior Taliban figure on the negotiating team, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, called mining “our most important sector” and said the group would seek to “boost this precious sector for the betterment and development of society.”
The Taliban’s push to maximize their economic leverage comes as long-delayed peace talks with the Afghan government began this month. For now, the talks are bogged down amid deep distrust on both sides—the Taliban do not recognize the legitimacy of the Kabul government—and dogged by a huge spike in violence.
The Taliban are widely believed to be responsible for a wave of attacks against Afghan government troops and installations this summer and have also apparently taken aim at departing U.S. forces. A spokesperson for the U.S.-NATO Resolute Support mission said in a statement that a spate of recent attacks, including rocket strikes on U.S. bases in Kandahar, contravened the agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban in February and “have the potential to put the peace process in jeopardy.”
Against that backdrop, with the Taliban hoping for some sort of power-sharing agreement in the future Afghanistan, the mineral riches offer a way for the militant group to almost match the government’s fiscal firepower.
The CIA estimates that the Afghan government took in just $2.2 billion in taxes and other revenue in 2017, for instance. The Taliban, for their part, earn upwards of $1.5 billion a year, according to the U.N. Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, from “narcotics, illicit mineral and other resource extraction, taxation, extortion, the sale of commercial and government services and property, and donations from abroad.”
After opium and other narcotics, mining does seem to be a gold mine for the Taliban. The UNDP report estimates that extractive industries like mining are the Taliban’s “second-largest revenue stream after narcotics.”
“Minerals have become integral to conflict in Afghanistan—a magnet for conflict and a source of financing conflict. Ordinary Afghans are heavily affected by the contestation over mineral resources between the government, the Taliban, the IS-K [the local franchise of the Islamic State group], local insurgents and criminal networks,” the report reads.
Meanwhile, even as insurgents successfully tap Afghanistan’s riches, the UNDP estimates that the Afghan government took in only $42 million on average between 2012 and 2018 from the country’s extractive industries.
There are a couple of reasons for that. The Afghan government has never been able to ensure physical security in mining areas, which has discouraged most international investment, according to the UNDP report. Chinese firms, for example, hold the rights to the big Mes Aynak copper deposit south of Kabul. But work halted years ago after Taliban attacks on the site.
But the Afghan government isn’t much better at providing legal and financial security, either. As feared and resented as the Taliban may be, they are seen as more capable than the largely corrupt national government. The UNDP report highlights how government corruption discourages international mining investment and greater exploitation of the country’s potential wealth.
“Such corruption will deter many companies from seeking contracts since they never know whether their taxes go to the government or into the pocket of the official, or whether another official might not turn up at the next opportunity to charge a further tax or fine.
“The Taliban do at least provide security in the areas they control and protect their ‘taxpayers.’ Indeed, ordinary Afghans and mining companies believe that the Taliban are better able to provide security and ensure ‘law and order’, albeit according to their own rules.
“From the perspective of a mining company or a prospective taxpayer, the benefits of paying taxes to the government are limited, while the risks of not paying taxes to insurgents are enormous,” the report reads.