foreignpolicy--2020-09-11--How Far Should the U.S. Go to Counter China?

How Far Should the U.S. Go to Counter China ?
Emma Ashford : Hey , Matt , congrats on the start of the semester !
Have they quarantined your entire class yet , or just most of them ?
Matthew Kroenig : So far , so good .
But , despite the virtual classroom , many students have moved back to the Georgetown area to be with their friends .
We received an email from University officials indicating that some students are ignoring public health guidelines about large group gatherings and face masks , so we will see how long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ugh .
You know where they could send the students ?
Palau .
I hear the United States is getting a new military base on the tiny Pacific island .
Sounds like a nice boondoggle for the military .
MK : Yes .
Grab your sunscreen .
We should organize a think tank conference there immediately .
Palau has invited the Pentagon to place military installations on their islands .
I think this is a welcome development .
EA : Well .
you ’ ve answered my first question , which was that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. military can do from Palau that it couldn ’ t have done from Guam .
But it sounds like you ’ re just saying more bases are better ?
I ’ m pretty confident the Chinese can figure out how to target Palau as well .
MK : It helps solve two challenges to U.S. defense strategy in Asia .
First , the United States needs to bring more firepower to the region .
In war games , Americans run out of weapons pretty quickly if they are relying solely on air-based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would help , but Washington needs places to put them .
Second , U.S. military power in Asia is currently concentrated at a handful of bases , which makes them easy targets for the Chinese army .
Dispersing them makes China ’ s targeting challenge at least somewhat more difficult .
EA : I remember back when the Trump administration pulled out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—citing China as the reason—most of us policy wonks were perplexed about where the United States would base appropriately ranged missiles in the Pacific .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I guess Palau helps with that problem .
But I think any government should be very wary of taking steps that are primarily based on the outcomes of war games—in other words , steps that focus mostly on how we would win a war against China .
Sure , it would be helpful in a conflict .
But it also makes that conflict more likely .
That ’ s not a good trade-off .
Increasing and dispersing U.S. firepower in the Indo-Pacific region will help the United States to deter and defeat Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to invoke IR theory , but many debates about U.S. defense policy revolve around whether one believes the deterrence or spiral model .
Does strengthening our military capabilities deter war or provoke it ?
And when dealing with an aggressive adversary , like China , the deterrence model is a better guide .
After all , did you see what happened on the border with India this week ?
EA : If you believe China is implacably aggressive , then it ’ s possible that strengthening U.S. capabilities would deter them .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they ’ re driven by security concerns—which seems extremely plausible—then what you ’ re suggesting could cause a war .
It hardly matters why the United States is putting a base in Palau ; what matters is how China perceives it .
But I ’ m not sure anyone saw what actually happened on the China-India border .
You could not ask for a worse location from which to obtain intelligence .
It ’ s high up in the Himalayas , with poor visibility and bad roads .
Most of the information we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ governments .
And they ’ re both accusing each other of bringing a gun to a rock fight .
MK : The situation is certainly intensifying .
Shots were exchanged for the first time in decades , and Chinese forces are sitting across the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control .
China ’ s neighbors are getting nervous .
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun has said that he would like the “ Quad ” of major democracies in the Indo-Pacific ( the United States , Japan , India , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institution—with the unstated objective of defending against China .
EA : Washington should be trying to dial down these tensions , not add to them by confirming Chinese fears and boosting India .
Both sides are behaving badly .
The last thing the United States needs to do is take a side in a border dispute between two nuclear powers .
It hardly matters why the United States is putting a base in Palau ; what matters is how China perceives it .
Speaking of border disputes , it seems like new problems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Or rather , the same old problem : the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland .
What ’ s your take ?
MK : Yes .
As part of the Brexit negotiations , the U.K. had originally vowed to keep the border open , consistent with the Good Friday Agreement .
But now it appears that Boris Johnson is thinking about backtracking on that commitment , prompting the Joe Biden campaign and leading Democrats in Congress to threaten that a hard border would hurt U.S.-U.K. relations and could jeopardize progress toward a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t know what Johnson is thinking .
The Irish border is a seriously controversial issue .
A hard border would be extremely unpopular , and it could reignite separatist tensions in Northern Ireland .
As someone who grew up in the middle of the Troubles in Glasgow , Scotland—a city where hardcore Northern Irish unionists once bombed two pubs—I just can ’ t understand why he would risk it .
After all , he could have stuck with the so-called backstop instead .
That would have kept the whole of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ avoided the whole question of a customs border with Ireland .
That said , I also don ’ t believe Biden would necessarily retaliate if he wins the presidency in November .
Just like the Obama administration threatened that the U.S.-U.K. relationship would be less strong if Britain voted for Brexit , it ’ s a bit of an empty threat .
MK : The policy position is the right one ; the United States would prefer that the Northern Ireland protocol remain in place .
But it is puzzling that Democrats launched @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , especially given that a central plank of Biden ’ s foreign-policy platform is repairing relations with allies in Europe .
I don ’ t know what Johnson is thinking .
The Irish border is a seriously controversial issue .
A hard border would be extremely unpopular , and it could reignite separatist tensions in Northern Ireland .
EA : Sometimes it seems that the United States is so concerned with building new alliances that it rejects the old ones .
Even putting Donald Trump aside , Barack Obama and now Biden have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Kingdom while pushing for countries like Kosovo or Macedonia to become U.S. allies .
I know I ’ m biased , but it hardly seems like a good strategic choice to alienate one of the most militarily capable European countries just because you ’ re mad about Brexit .
But even the Trump administration seems to have the Balkans on its mind .
It announced a major new diplomatic initiative this week : economic normalization between Kosovo and Serbia .
Pity it wasn ’ t worth the paper it was written on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ m more optimistic .
The parties to the agreement were killing each other two decades ago , and now they have agreed to increase economic cooperation .
It does not solve all of the outstanding political issues ( including Serbia ’ s refusal to recognize Kosovo ’ s independence ) , but it is a step in the right direction and another late-term diplomatic achievement for the Trump administration .
Why do you say it is worthless ?
EA : It sounds great when you put it that way !
But it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Scratch the surface , and there ’ s nothing there .
Most of what the two parties agreed to had already been resolved in European Union-brokered agreements , for example .
They couldn ’ t even get the Serbian and Kosovar leaders to agree on a joint statement .
Instead , the signing ceremony was just the three leaders signing different bits of paper .
And there ’ s already been backpedaling on some of it .
Aleksandar Vucic , the Serbian leader , has already said that he won ’ t move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attempt to pander to his base—if the Israelis recognize Kosovo .
Doesn ’ t that sound a little less impressive ?
MK : I remain somewhat impressed .
But I was less stirred by another recent news item : Trump ’ s claim that military officers like starting wars to help the defense industry .
If anything , senior military officers are reluctant to recommend the use of force because they appreciate the life-and-death consequences better than anyone .
EA : I find it almost laughable that Trump has finally rediscovered his strong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wars .
I ’ m happy that he ’ s committing to bringing some troops home from the Middle East , and that he ’ s criticizing corruption in the military-industrial complex .
It ’ s a true about-face .
After all , Trump has done very little during his time in office to end the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan .
He kept troops in Syria to guard oil fields that don ’ t belong to us .
And his administration has repeatedly sought to increase the profits of defense contractors , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ welfare and tax cuts at home .
But it does prove one thing : Even Trump finally realizes that America ’ s wars overseas are unpopular and unproductive .
Has he persuaded you ?
MK : Unproductive ?
No .
There remains an important role for a contingent of U.S. forces in Iraq , Afghanistan , and Syria for the foreseeable future .
And the popularity of foreign-policy issues is hard to pin down .
Most Americans don ’ t have firm opinions on foreign policy any more than I have strong views @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is just not in my interest to devote time and attention to the issue , so I outsource it to specialists .
There is clearly a need for U.S. leaders to better make the case to the American people about the purpose of U.S. forces in those countries .
EA : Well , the president is certainly going to have trouble persuading the electorate he ’ s the peace candidate this time around .
But I look forward to seeing how he tries to persuade everyone that Joe Biden is simultaneously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Should be entertaining , at least .
I do want to one hit one final news story .
The only thing less surprising than Donald Trump ’ s itchy Twitter finger is the news that the Russians have been trying to hack into the Biden campaign .
Apparently , they were unsuccessful this time .
But I ’ m more concerned about the hacks that we don ’ t know about , and particularly about the return of the election meddling that we saw in 2016 .
You have to admit , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevent or deter such meddling .
There ’ s even a whistleblower who says that he was ordered to stop providing intelligence on Russian hacking to Congress !
MK : Unsurprising , indeed .
The United States is an open society and is the target of constant cybersurveillance and attacks from malicious state-backed actors .
And you are right that the administration has not done enough .
The solution is to stop treating cyberspace as virtual .
What if Russian commandos had tried to physically break into the office of Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were the hack ’ s targets ?
What would the U.S. response have been in terms of arrest warrants , expelling diplomats , targeted sanctions , etc.
?
That should be the response in this case .
Most Americans don ’ t have firm opinions on foreign policy any more than I have strong views on how to repair my air conditioning .
People prefer to outsource some things to specialists .
EA : For once , we agree .
But it ’ s hard to see a second Trump administration cracking down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when his first term was enabled by interference from a wide range of state and nonstate actors .
MK : And don ’ t forget the latest Washington controversy—the claim in Bob Woodward ’ s new book that Trump knowingly downplayed the threat of the coronavirus in his early public statements .
There is a necessary balance to be struck between alerting the public to dangers and shouting “ Fire !
” in a crowded theater .
In hindsight , Trump may not have gotten it exactly right , but I don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to punish him for a less than perfect response to a once-in-a-century pandemic .
EA : I ’ m not so sure about that , but I guess it ’ s time to watch the polls closely .
Now I just need to figure out if the fivethirtyeight.com election forecast model includes Russian interference as a variable or not .
MK : After 2016 , I ’ m not putting much credibility in the poll numbers this time around .
I think it is still anyone ’ s race .

Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt, congrats on the start of the semester! Have they quarantined your entire class yet, or just most of them?
Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt, congrats on the start of the semester! Have they quarantined your entire class yet, or just most of them?
Matthew Kroenig: So far, so good. But, despite the virtual classroom, many students have moved back to the Georgetown area to be with their friends. We received an email from University officials indicating that some students are ignoring public health guidelines about large group gatherings and face masks, so we will see how long the positive news lasts.
EA: Ugh. You know where they could send the students? Palau. I hear the United States is getting a new military base on the tiny Pacific island. Sounds like a nice boondoggle for the military.
Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
MK: Yes. Grab your sunscreen. We should organize a think tank conference there immediately. Palau has invited the Pentagon to place military installations on their islands. I think this is a welcome development.
EA: Well. you’ve answered my first question, which was that I don’t see what the U.S. military can do from Palau that it couldn’t have done from Guam. But it sounds like you’re just saying more bases are better? I’m pretty confident the Chinese can figure out how to target Palau as well.
MK: It helps solve two challenges to U.S. defense strategy in Asia. First, the United States needs to bring more firepower to the region. In war games, Americans run out of weapons pretty quickly if they are relying solely on air-based and sea-based platforms. More ground-launched capabilities would help, but Washington needs places to put them.
Second, U.S. military power in Asia is currently concentrated at a handful of bases, which makes them easy targets for the Chinese army. Dispersing them makes China’s targeting challenge at least somewhat more difficult.
EA: I remember back when the Trump administration pulled out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—citing China as the reason—most of us policy wonks were perplexed about where the United States would base appropriately ranged missiles in the Pacific. There’s barely any land! So I guess Palau helps with that problem.
But I think any government should be very wary of taking steps that are primarily based on the outcomes of war games—in other words, steps that focus mostly on how we would win a war against China. Sure, it would be helpful in a conflict. But it also makes that conflict more likely. That’s not a good trade-off.
Increasing and dispersing U.S. firepower in the Indo-Pacific region will help the United States to deter and defeat Chinese military aggression.
MK: I hate to invoke IR theory, but many debates about U.S. defense policy revolve around whether one believes the deterrence or spiral model. Does strengthening our military capabilities deter war or provoke it? And when dealing with an aggressive adversary, like China, the deterrence model is a better guide. After all, did you see what happened on the border with India this week?
EA: If you believe China is implacably aggressive, then it’s possible that strengthening U.S. capabilities would deter them. But if I’m right, and they’re driven by security concerns—which seems extremely plausible—then what you’re suggesting could cause a war. It hardly matters why the United States is putting a base in Palau; what matters is how China perceives it.
But I’m not sure anyone saw what actually happened on the China-India border. You could not ask for a worse location from which to obtain intelligence. It’s high up in the Himalayas, with poor visibility and bad roads. Most of the information we get comes from the Chinese and Indian governments. And they’re both accusing each other of bringing a gun to a rock fight.
MK: The situation is certainly intensifying. Shots were exchanged for the first time in decades, and Chinese forces are sitting across the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control. China’s neighbors are getting nervous. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun has said that he would like the “Quad” of major democracies in the Indo-Pacific (the United States, Japan, India, and Australia) to become a formalized institution—with the unstated objective of defending against China.
EA: Washington should be trying to dial down these tensions, not add to them by confirming Chinese fears and boosting India. Both sides are behaving badly. The last thing the United States needs to do is take a side in a border dispute between two nuclear powers.
It hardly matters why the United States is putting a base in Palau; what matters is how China perceives it.
Speaking of border disputes, it seems like new problems have come up during the Brexit process. Or rather, the same old problem: the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. What’s your take?
MK: Yes. As part of the Brexit negotiations, the U.K. had originally vowed to keep the border open, consistent with the Good Friday Agreement. But now it appears that Boris Johnson is thinking about backtracking on that commitment, prompting the Joe Biden campaign and leading Democrats in Congress to threaten that a hard border would hurt U.S.-U.K. relations and could jeopardize progress toward a bilateral trade deal.
EA: I don’t know what Johnson is thinking. The Irish border is a seriously controversial issue. A hard border would be extremely unpopular, and it could reignite separatist tensions in Northern Ireland. As someone who grew up in the middle of the Troubles in Glasgow, Scotland—a city where hardcore Northern Irish unionists once bombed two pubs—I just can’t understand why he would risk it. After all, he could have stuck with the so-called backstop instead. That would have kept the whole of the U.K. in regulatory compliance with Europe and avoided the whole question of a customs border with Ireland.
That said, I also don’t believe Biden would necessarily retaliate if he wins the presidency in November. Just like the Obama administration threatened that the U.S.-U.K. relationship would be less strong if Britain voted for Brexit, it’s a bit of an empty threat.
MK: The policy position is the right one; the United States would prefer that the Northern Ireland protocol remain in place. But it is puzzling that Democrats launched this shot across the bow to London, especially given that a central plank of Biden’s foreign-policy platform is repairing relations with allies in Europe.
I don’t know what Johnson is thinking. The Irish border is a seriously controversial issue. A hard border would be extremely unpopular, and it could reignite separatist tensions in Northern Ireland.
EA: Sometimes it seems that the United States is so concerned with building new alliances that it rejects the old ones. Even putting Donald Trump aside, Barack Obama and now Biden have both been quick to repeatedly criticize the United Kingdom while pushing for countries like Kosovo or Macedonia to become U.S. allies. I know I’m biased, but it hardly seems like a good strategic choice to alienate one of the most militarily capable European countries just because you’re mad about Brexit.
But even the Trump administration seems to have the Balkans on its mind. It announced a major new diplomatic initiative this week: economic normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. Pity it wasn’t worth the paper it was written on.
MK: I guess I’m more optimistic. The parties to the agreement were killing each other two decades ago, and now they have agreed to increase economic cooperation. It does not solve all of the outstanding political issues (including Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence), but it is a step in the right direction and another late-term diplomatic achievement for the Trump administration.
Why do you say it is worthless?
EA: It sounds great when you put it that way! But it’s a classic Trump diplomatic achievement: Scratch the surface, and there’s nothing there. Most of what the two parties agreed to had already been resolved in European Union-brokered agreements, for example. They couldn’t even get the Serbian and Kosovar leaders to agree on a joint statement. Instead, the signing ceremony was just the three leaders signing different bits of paper.
And there’s already been backpedaling on some of it. Aleksandar Vucic, the Serbian leader, has already said that he won’t move the Serbian Embassy to Jerusalem—Trump’s attempt to pander to his base—if the Israelis recognize Kosovo.
Doesn’t that sound a little less impressive?
MK: I remain somewhat impressed. But I was less stirred by another recent news item: Trump’s claim that military officers like starting wars to help the defense industry. If anything, senior military officers are reluctant to recommend the use of force because they appreciate the life-and-death consequences better than anyone.
EA: I find it almost laughable that Trump has finally rediscovered his strong support for ending America’s endless wars. I’m happy that he’s committing to bringing some troops home from the Middle East, and that he’s criticizing corruption in the military-industrial complex. It’s a true about-face.
After all, Trump has done very little during his time in office to end the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He kept troops in Syria to guard oil fields that don’t belong to us. And his administration has repeatedly sought to increase the profits of defense contractors, whether from weapons sales abroad or corporate welfare and tax cuts at home.
But it does prove one thing: Even Trump finally realizes that America’s wars overseas are unpopular and unproductive. Has he persuaded you?
MK: Unproductive? No. There remains an important role for a contingent of U.S. forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria for the foreseeable future.
And the popularity of foreign-policy issues is hard to pin down. Most Americans don’t have firm opinions on foreign policy any more than I have strong views on how to repair my air conditioning. It is just not in my interest to devote time and attention to the issue, so I outsource it to specialists.
There is clearly a need for U.S. leaders to better make the case to the American people about the purpose of U.S. forces in those countries.
EA: Well, the president is certainly going to have trouble persuading the electorate he’s the peace candidate this time around. But I look forward to seeing how he tries to persuade everyone that Joe Biden is simultaneously soft on defense and a warmonger. Should be entertaining, at least.
I do want to one hit one final news story. The only thing less surprising than Donald Trump’s itchy Twitter finger is the news that the Russians have been trying to hack into the Biden campaign. Apparently, they were unsuccessful this time. But I’m more concerned about the hacks that we don’t know about, and particularly about the return of the election meddling that we saw in 2016. You have to admit, the Trump administration has done very little to prevent or deter such meddling. There’s even a whistleblower who says that he was ordered to stop providing intelligence on Russian hacking to Congress!
MK: Unsurprising, indeed. The United States is an open society and is the target of constant cybersurveillance and attacks from malicious state-backed actors.
And you are right that the administration has not done enough. The solution is to stop treating cyberspace as virtual. What if Russian commandos had tried to physically break into the office of Biden’s consultants at the firm SKDKnickerbocker, who were the hack’s targets? What would the U.S. response have been in terms of arrest warrants, expelling diplomats, targeted sanctions, etc.? That should be the response in this case.
Most Americans don’t have firm opinions on foreign policy any more than I have strong views on how to repair my air conditioning. People prefer to outsource some things to specialists.
EA: For once, we agree. But it’s hard to see a second Trump administration cracking down on this kind of interference, particularly when his first term was enabled by interference from a wide range of state and nonstate actors.
MK: And don’t forget the latest Washington controversy—the claim in Bob Woodward’s new book that Trump knowingly downplayed the threat of the coronavirus in his early public statements. There is a necessary balance to be struck between alerting the public to dangers and shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. In hindsight, Trump may not have gotten it exactly right, but I don’t think the average voter is going to punish him for a less than perfect response to a once-in-a-century pandemic.
EA: I’m not so sure about that, but I guess it’s time to watch the polls closely. Now I just need to figure out if the fivethirtyeight.com election forecast model includes Russian interference as a variable or not.
MK: After 2016, I’m not putting much credibility in the poll numbers this time around. I think it is still anyone’s race.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-11--Russian Interference Intensifies as U.S. Election Heats Up

Russian Interference Intensifies as U.S. Election Heats Up Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Russian-linked hackers tried to gain access to the Biden campaign ’ s networks , violent protests grip Colombia , and the Algerian parliament adopts constitutional reforms .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. tech giant Microsoft recently informed the campaign of Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden that it may have been the target of a suspected hacking attempt by Russian state-backed actors , demonstrating Moscow ’ s continued efforts to interfere in and influence U.S. elections .
Hackers reportedly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and communications firm SKDKnickerbocker , which has worked on the campaigns of several past Democratic presidential candidates and is currently taking a lead role in supporting Biden ’ s run .
Sources told Reuters that they had been trying to break into the firm ’ s networks for the past two months , but they appear to have failed to breach SKDK ’ s security .
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the claim “ nonsense.
” On Thursday , the U.S. Treasury Department also sanctioned four people accused of trying to interfere in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ One is a member of the Ukrainian parliament , while the other three are Russian nationals employed by Russia ’ s Internet Research Agency , which was heavily involved in Moscow ’ s influence campaign during the 2016 presidential election .
Here for more .
Thursday ’ s revelations are further evidence that Russia is actively working to interfere in the election in an effort to support President Donald Trump over Biden .
Last month , U.S. intelligence officials said that Russia is employing a range of methods to hurt Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mirroring its efforts in 2016 to push Trump past former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton .
Although that assessment also concluded that China is considering its own influence campaign and preferred to see Trump lose , Russia is still considered a far greater threat .
Can ’ t escape the past .
The issue of Russian interference has relentlessly followed Trump since the investigation led by Special Counsel Robert Mueller into alleged collusion in 2016 between his campaign and Moscow , and it won ’ t go away .
On Thursday , an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said that Chad Wolf , the department ’ s acting secretary , told him to stop intelligence assessments of Russian attempts to influence the 2016 election because it “ made the President look bad.
” He told him to focus instead on similar efforts by China and Iran—an order that apparently came directly from the White House .
China bars coverage of Mulan .
The Chinese government has barred major media outlets from covering the release of the film “ Mulan ” in response to international backlash over the revelation that the movie @ @ @ @ @ @ @ province , where the government is accused of brutally repressing the local Uighur Muslim community in a campaign widely considered a cultural genocide .
Disney came under heavy criticism after the filming location was revealed .
The film ’ s credits explicitly thanked eight different government entities in Xinjiang , as well as the publicity department of the CPC Xinjiang Uighur Autonomy Region Committee .
Protests sweep Colombia .
Deadly protests have erupted across Colombia after the death of a man in Bogotá , who was tasered by police despite telling them he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turned into open street clashes with police , and at least seven people have been killed .
Bogotá mayor Claudia López said an additional 248 people have been injured , of whom 58 were shot by police .
Although she said that there was no order to fire on protesters , it appeared police did fire indiscriminately in some areas .
The current unrest is the latest expression of public anger over police brutality in the country .
In November , tens of thousands of people took to the streets after a student @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an anti-government protest .
Leaders meet with Mali junta .
Leaders of Mali ’ s newly-formed military junta met with political figures and civil society leaders to discuss how to return the country to civilian rule after ousting President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and imposing military rule in a coup last month .
Leaders from the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) set a deadline for the appointment of a new prime minister and president for Sep. 15 , warning the junta that it could face a new round of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadline .
The coup leaders reportedly considered a three-year transition period during which it would continue to rule the country , but it came under heavy criticism from ECOWAS and other international actors , who have pressed the junta to restore civilian government as soon as possible .
Fires in Beirut .
Massive fires engulfed parts of the Lebanese capital of Beirut on Thursday , weeks after a pair of explosions rocked the city and caused severe damage , killing almost 200 people and injuring around 6,000 .
The cause of the fires @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Aoun said in a meeting with security officials that it could have been the result of sabotage , technical error , or negligence .
The fires will likely further anger Beirut ’ s residents , who were already outraged after it was revealed that government negligence was partly to blame for last month ’ s explosions .
Protesters took to the streets en masse following the disaster , eventually forcing the resignation of the entire Lebanese government .
Constitutional reform in Algeria .
Algeria ’ s parliament voted to adopt a series of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Hirak protest movement , which is rallying against entrenched government corruption and calling for democratic reforms .
President Abdelmadjid Tebboune , who has pushed for the changes , said the reforms will create a separation of powers , prevent corruption , and prioritize social justice .
“ The proposal is fully in line with the requirements of modern state building and responds to the demands of the popular movement [ Hirak ] , ” he said over the weekend before the parliamentary vote .
The public will now vote on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1 , the anniversary of the start of the country ’ s war of independence .
He loves me , he loves me not .
Journalist Bob Woodward ’ s new book Rage has , by now , made the rounds on social media , but some of its juicy tidbits are the new details it has unearthed on the 27 letters passed between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un , which the president once glowingly characterized as “ love letters.
” “ Even now I can not forget that moment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Excellency ’ s hand at the beautiful and sacred location as the whole world watched with great interest and hope to relive the honor of that day , ” Kim wrote to Trump in one letter on Dec. 25 , 2018 , following their historic first meeting in Singapore .
Two letters had already been made public previously , but Woodward was given exclusive access to the other 25 for use in his book .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russian-linked hackers tried to gain access to the Biden campaign's networks, violent protests grip Colombia, and the Algerian parliament adopts constitutional reforms.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russian-linked hackers tried to gain access to the Biden campaign’s networks, violent protests grip Colombia, and the Algerian parliament adopts constitutional reforms.
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Russia Gears Up to Back Trump Again
U.S. tech giant Microsoft recently informed the campaign of Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden that it may have been the target of a suspected hacking attempt by Russian state-backed actors, demonstrating Moscow’s continued efforts to interfere in and influence U.S. elections.
Hackers reportedly targeted staffers at the prominent campaign strategy and communications firm SKDKnickerbocker, which has worked on the campaigns of several past Democratic presidential candidates and is currently taking a lead role in supporting Biden’s run. Sources told Reuters that they had been trying to break into the firm’s networks for the past two months, but they appear to have failed to breach SKDK’s security. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the claim “nonsense.”
On Thursday, the U.S. Treasury Department also sanctioned four people accused of trying to interfere in the election on behalf of Russia. One is a member of the Ukrainian parliament, while the other three are Russian nationals employed by Russia’s Internet Research Agency, which was heavily involved in Moscow’s influence campaign during the 2016 presidential election.
Here for more. Thursday’s revelations are further evidence that Russia is actively working to interfere in the election in an effort to support President Donald Trump over Biden. Last month, U.S. intelligence officials said that Russia is employing a range of methods to hurt Biden’s campaign to help get Trump reelected, mirroring its efforts in 2016 to push Trump past former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. Although that assessment also concluded that China is considering its own influence campaign and preferred to see Trump lose, Russia is still considered a far greater threat.
Can’t escape the past. The issue of Russian interference has relentlessly followed Trump since the investigation led by Special Counsel Robert Mueller into alleged collusion in 2016 between his campaign and Moscow, and it won’t go away.
On Thursday, an official in the Department of Homeland Security said that Chad Wolf, the department’s acting secretary, told him to stop intelligence assessments of Russian attempts to influence the 2016 election because it “made the President look bad.” He told him to focus instead on similar efforts by China and Iran—an order that apparently came directly from the White House.
What We’re Following Today
China bars coverage of Mulan. The Chinese government has barred major media outlets from covering the release of the film “Mulan” in response to international backlash over the revelation that the movie was filmed in China’s Xinjiang province, where the government is accused of brutally repressing the local Uighur Muslim community in a campaign widely considered a cultural genocide.
Disney came under heavy criticism after the filming location was revealed. The film’s credits explicitly thanked eight different government entities in Xinjiang, as well as the publicity department of the CPC Xinjiang Uighur Autonomy Region Committee.
Protests sweep Colombia. Deadly protests have erupted across Colombia after the death of a man in Bogotá, who was tasered by police despite telling them he was choking. The protests have quickly turned into open street clashes with police, and at least seven people have been killed. Bogotá mayor Claudia López said an additional 248 people have been injured, of whom 58 were shot by police. Although she said that there was no order to fire on protesters, it appeared police did fire indiscriminately in some areas.
The current unrest is the latest expression of public anger over police brutality in the country. In November, tens of thousands of people took to the streets after a student was shot and killed by police during an anti-government protest.
Leaders meet with Mali junta. Leaders of Mali’s newly-formed military junta met with political figures and civil society leaders to discuss how to return the country to civilian rule after ousting President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and imposing military rule in a coup last month. Leaders from the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) set a deadline for the appointment of a new prime minister and president for Sep. 15, warning the junta that it could face a new round of sanctions if it did not meet the deadline.
The coup leaders reportedly considered a three-year transition period during which it would continue to rule the country, but it came under heavy criticism from ECOWAS and other international actors, who have pressed the junta to restore civilian government as soon as possible.
Keep an Eye On
Fires in Beirut. Massive fires engulfed parts of the Lebanese capital of Beirut on Thursday, weeks after a pair of explosions rocked the city and caused severe damage, killing almost 200 people and injuring around 6,000. The cause of the fires is still unknown, but President Michel Aoun said in a meeting with security officials that it could have been the result of sabotage, technical error, or negligence.
The fires will likely further anger Beirut’s residents, who were already outraged after it was revealed that government negligence was partly to blame for last month’s explosions. Protesters took to the streets en masse following the disaster, eventually forcing the resignation of the entire Lebanese government.
Constitutional reform in Algeria. Algeria’s parliament voted to adopt a series of constitutional reforms aimed at assuaging the grievances of the Hirak protest movement, which is rallying against entrenched government corruption and calling for democratic reforms.
President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who has pushed for the changes, said the reforms will create a separation of powers, prevent corruption, and prioritize social justice. “The proposal is fully in line with the requirements of modern state building and responds to the demands of the popular movement [Hirak],” he said over the weekend before the parliamentary vote. The public will now vote on the reforms in a referendum set for Nov. 1, the anniversary of the start of the country’s war of independence.
Odds and Ends
He loves me, he loves me not. Journalist Bob Woodward’s new book Rage has, by now, made the rounds on social media, but some of its juicy tidbits are the new details it has unearthed on the 27 letters passed between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, which the president once glowingly characterized as “love letters.”
“Even now I cannot forget that moment of history when I firmly held Your Excellency’s hand at the beautiful and sacred location as the whole world watched with great interest and hope to relive the honor of that day,” Kim wrote to Trump in one letter on Dec. 25, 2018, following their historic first meeting in Singapore.
Two letters had already been made public previously, but Woodward was given exclusive access to the other 25 for use in his book.
That’s it for today.
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Photo credit: Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images


foreignpolicy--2020-09-11--What the West Needs From Modi

What the West Needs From Modi

What the West Needs From Modi When nuclear-armed neighbors start fighting , the whole world gets nervous .
Security analysts ’ biggest worry has long been the unstable rivalry between India and Pakistan , but the most dangerous powder keg in the world today may be the Line of Actual Control dividing India and China .
For decades , a tacit no-shooting rule has maintained a precarious peace , even as dozens of troops have been killed in vicious hand-to-hand fighting using clubs and stones .
Now , guns have finally been fired ( if only in the air ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blame the other for firing first , both sides are moving troops into the region , not out .
In the lopsided struggle in Ladakh in the western Himalayas , India must confront a nascent superpower while simultaneously keeping an eye on its traditional adversary , Pakistan .
China spends more than three times as much as India on defense and has a massive technological advantage to boot .
It also has relations with Pakistan that are as close as “ lips and teeth , ” as their leaders like to say .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ sheet , India has greater experience with high-altitude conflict , shorter supply lines , and increasingly friendly ties with three fellow democracies : the United States , Japan , and Australia .
The growing role of India in U.S. strategic thinking is reflected in the 2018 rebranding of the venerable U.S. Pacific Command into Indo-Pacific Command , which is increasingly focused on containing Beijing ’ s newfound expansionism in the era of Chinese President Xi Jinping .
India is looking to the United States to play a key role in modernizing India ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Seahawk helicopters for its Army and Navy , respectively .
India has conducted joint exercises with Japan ’ s Maritime Self-Defense Force , and persistent rumors suggest that Australia may join India , the United States , and Japan in the annual naval exercises off India ’ s Malabar coast—if they aren ’ t canceled due to COVID-19 .
If Modi wants to see unequivocal Western support for India ’ s stand against China , he ’ ll have to clean up his act .
That ’ s all very cozy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ real military alliance .
The democratic Quad ( the name comes from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue , set up between Australia , India , the United States , and Japan in 2007 as an informal consultation mechanism ) is still more an aspiration than a reality .
The United States is leading a push for more cooperation , which will likely be on the table when the four meet later this month .
But obstacles remain .
One of the most serious is that supporters of the Quad as an alignment of democracies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ charismatic but controversial prime minister , Narendra Modi .
From an international relations standpoint , it makes perfect sense for democracies to work together to balance and contain China .
But democracies , by definition , have their own internal politics .
And in the internal politics of the West , many see Modi as an anathema .
With a 78 percent approval rating in a country of 1.35 billion people , Modi may just be the most popular man in the world .
Despite gratuitously repressive coronavirus shutdowns , an economy that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and a thoroughly mismanaged demonetization campaign , Modi ’ s popularity has not suffered during his six years in office .
Though he and the Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) he leads are widely perceived as being Hindu nationalist and even anti-Muslim , only 5 percent of those polled in India Today ’ s annual Mood of the Nation survey rated his performance as “ poor ” —in a country that is roughly 15 percent Muslim .
Whatever India ’ s own Muslims—who did rate Modi significantly lower in the India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many Western liberals loathe him .
So , too , do many secular , English-speaking Indian intellectuals .
These critics loom large in Western policy debates .
Whether Modi likes it or not , he has to mollify them—or at least give his supporters in the West some firm ground to stand on in pushing back against his critics .
If Modi wants to see unequivocal Western support for India ’ s stand against China , he ’ ll have to clean up his act .
No matter how strong his democratic mandate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberal ” back into India ’ s liberal democracy .
India is , of course , the world ’ s most populous democracy .
It is also the world ’ s 22nd-oldest democracy and the longest-standing democracy in the developing world .
Freedom House rates it as one of only three fully free countries between South Korea and Israel ( the others are Mongolia and Taiwan ) .
The Economist Intelligence Unit considers it a “ flawed democracy , ” but it says the same of the United States and Japan .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a GDP per capita of only around $ 2,000 , which makes India one of the world ’ s poorest democracy as well .
Yet many mainstream Western media believe that Indian democracy is imperiled or dying , that India is at best a 40 percent democracy , or that it is a fascistic democracy going down the road of Nazi Germany .
Some even argue that Modi is more dangerous than Adolf Hitler .
Others claim that India ’ s “ current situation is already worse than Indira Gandhi ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” when for nearly two years in that period the staunchly secular , supposedly liberal Indian National Congress party ruled by decree , outlawed opposition , imprisoned opponents , censored the press , and implemented a program of forced sterilization of the poor .
Those are powerful criticisms , and they pose serious problems for an India that is increasingly looking for friends in Washington and other Western capitals .
U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration seem very comfortable with Modi ’ s India , but presidential challenger Joe Biden and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much tougher line , demanding the restoration of full civil rights in Kashmir and criticizing the Citizenship Amendment Act that sparked riots and lynchings in Delhi and elsewhere late last year and earlier this year .
Across the Atlantic , the European Parliament nearly voted on a resolution condemning India over the controversial law before ultimately deciding to shelve it .
India ’ s Supreme Court has repeatedly turned down requests to stay the Citizenship Amendment Act , which has been labeled anti-Muslim by its critics .
The law offers a pathway to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan , Bangladesh , and Pakistan—as long as they are not Muslim .
On its face , that ’ s almost reasonable : Why should Muslims need asylum from religious persecution in these Muslim-majority countries ?
Dig a little deeper , and the law can be seen as an effort to cast doubt on the citizenship status of members of India ’ s own Muslim minority population , many of whom may legitimately fear deportation .
The problem isn ’ t the religious sentiment of the law—the problem is its illiberal execution .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ dilemma facing Modi and the BJP .
India is a democracy , and the BJP was elected ( resoundingly ) on a platform that explicitly promised citizenship to “ Hindus , Jains , Buddhists , Sikhs and Christians escaping persecution from India ’ s neighbouring countries.
” Polling suggests that more than a third of India ’ s own Muslims actually support the law , though a wide majority see the law as broadly anti-Muslim .
And the United States has similar policies , for example offering asylum specifically to Christians and Yazidis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decried the Trump administration ’ s decision to scale back these religion-based programs that effectively exclude Muslims coming from this Muslim-majority country .
So what ’ s the problem ?
The problem isn ’ t the religious sentiment of the law .
The problem is its illiberal execution .
Instead of being presented as a plan to protect refugees who qualify , the Citizenship Amendment Act has been wielded as a weapon against Muslims who do not qualify .
It has been rolled out in conjunction with an update to the citizenship registry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newly identified as stateless in northeast India ’ s Assam province .
When protests broke out , they were repressed under anti-terrorism laws , yet police reportedly turned a blind eye to violent Hindu nationalist counterprotests that killed dozens of Muslims .
None of this makes Modi look good in the West .
Along similar lines , Modi ’ s government was simply fulfilling a popular election promise when it passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act last year , ending 70 years of uncertainty over the status of Muslim-majority Kashmir and converting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ central government supervision .
Pakistan regularized its rule over the portion of Kashmir it administers as long ago as 1948—some might say that it is about time India did the same .
But when the Modi government supposedly regularized the status of Indian-administered Kashmir , it cut the region off from the world , shutting off phone and internet service and imposing a supposedly two-day curfew that has lasted more than a year .
As with the Citizenship Amendment Act , the revocation of Kashmir ’ s special status is not in itself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a positive development for Indian democracy .
But the clumsy , heavy-handed , profoundly illiberal approach taken by the Modi government in each of these cases has made it difficult for his erstwhile international boosters to support him .
Part of the problem is probably poor execution : In a country as decentralized and underdeveloped as India , it can be difficult to find enough talented , qualified people to implement the government ’ s policies in a responsible way .
But part of the problem is also Modi himself .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ BJP could make India much more successful on the world stage .
Modi and his senior BJP colleagues often seem to delight in provoking their opponents and inciting their supporters , even if it brings the opprobrium of the Western media down upon them too .
They may believe that thumbing their noses at Western finger-waggers can only win them more votes at home .
That may be true , but it won ’ t win them the support they will need in their standoff with China .
A slightly less confrontational , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much more successful on the world stage .
Given all the other challenges Modi faces , an embarrassing defeat at the hands of China high in the Himalayas might be the straw that finally breaks his hold on Indian politics .
To ensure Western political support against China , Modi has to moderate his exercise of power in India .
The BJP will never be a secular party , but it can become a more liberal party , and for most Western governments , that would be enough .
For most Indians , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opportunities for political participation while securing freedom of expression .
The BJP prides itself on being a reformist party .
The most difficult reform—and possibly the most important—is for the party to reform itself .

When nuclear-armed neighbors start fighting, the whole world gets nervous. Security analysts’ biggest worry has long been the unstable rivalry between India and Pakistan, but the most dangerous powder keg in the world today may be the Line of Actual Control dividing India and China. For decades, a tacit no-shooting rule has maintained a precarious peace, even as dozens of troops have been killed in vicious hand-to-hand fighting using clubs and stones. Now, guns have finally been fired (if only in the air), and although India and China each blame the other for firing first , both sides are moving troops into the region, not out.
When nuclear-armed neighbors start fighting, the whole world gets nervous. Security analysts’ biggest worry has long been the unstable rivalry between India and Pakistan, but the most dangerous powder keg in the world today may be the Line of Actual Control dividing India and China. For decades, a tacit no-shooting rule has maintained a precarious peace, even as dozens of troops have been killed in vicious hand-to-hand fighting using clubs and stones. Now, guns have finally been fired (if only in the air), and although India and China each blame the other for firing first, both sides are moving troops into the region, not out.
In the lopsided struggle in Ladakh in the western Himalayas, India must confront a nascent superpower while simultaneously keeping an eye on its traditional adversary, Pakistan. China spends more than three times as much as India on defense and has a massive technological advantage to boot. It also has relations with Pakistan that are as close as “lips and teeth,” as their leaders like to say. On the other side of the balance sheet, India has greater experience with high-altitude conflict, shorter supply lines, and increasingly friendly ties with three fellow democracies: the United States, Japan, and Australia.
The growing role of India in U.S. strategic thinking is reflected in the 2018 rebranding of the venerable U.S. Pacific Command into Indo-Pacific Command, which is increasingly focused on containing Beijing’s newfound expansionism in the era of Chinese President Xi Jinping. India is looking to the United States to play a key role in modernizing India’s armed forces, recently purchasing Apache and Seahawk helicopters for its Army and Navy, respectively. India has conducted joint exercises with Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, and persistent rumors suggest that Australia may join India, the United States, and Japan in the annual naval exercises off India’s Malabar coast—if they aren’t canceled due to COVID-19.
If Modi wants to see unequivocal Western support for India’s stand against China, he’ll have to clean up his act.
That’s all very cozy, but it is far short of a real military alliance. The democratic Quad (the name comes from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, set up between Australia, India, the United States, and Japan in 2007 as an informal consultation mechanism) is still more an aspiration than a reality. The United States is leading a push for more cooperation, which will likely be on the table when the four meet later this month.
But obstacles remain. One of the most serious is that supporters of the Quad as an alignment of democracies do not necessarily admire India’s charismatic but controversial prime minister, Narendra Modi. From an international relations standpoint, it makes perfect sense for democracies to work together to balance and contain China. But democracies, by definition, have their own internal politics. And in the internal politics of the West, many see Modi as an anathema.
With a 78 percent approval rating in a country of 1.35 billion people, Modi may just be the most popular man in the world. Despite gratuitously repressive coronavirus shutdowns, an economy that was already slowing before the virus hit, and a thoroughly mismanaged demonetization campaign, Modi’s popularity has not suffered during his six years in office. Though he and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) he leads are widely perceived as being Hindu nationalist and even anti-Muslim, only 5 percent of those polled in India Today’s annual Mood of the Nation survey rated his performance as “poor”—in a country that is roughly 15 percent Muslim.
Whatever India’s own Muslims—who did rate Modi significantly lower in the India Today poll—think of the prime minister, many Western liberals loathe him. So, too, do many secular, English-speaking Indian intellectuals. These critics loom large in Western policy debates. Whether Modi likes it or not, he has to mollify them—or at least give his supporters in the West some firm ground to stand on in pushing back against his critics. If Modi wants to see unequivocal Western support for India’s stand against China, he’ll have to clean up his act. No matter how strong his democratic mandate, Modi has to put the “liberal” back into India’s liberal democracy.
India is, of course, the world’s most populous democracy. It is also the world’s 22nd-oldest democracy and the longest-standing democracy in the developing world. Freedom House rates it as one of only three fully free countries between South Korea and Israel (the others are Mongolia and Taiwan). The Economist Intelligence Unit considers it a “flawed democracy,” but it says the same of the United States and Japan. That’s not bad for a country with a GDP per capita of only around $2,000, which makes India one of the world’s poorest democracy as well.
Yet many mainstream Western media believe that Indian democracy is imperiled or dying, that India is at best a 40 percent democracy, or that it is a fascistic democracy going down the road of Nazi Germany. Some even argue that Modi is more dangerous than Adolf Hitler. Others claim that India’s “current situation is already worse than Indira Gandhi’s state of emergency in the mid-1970s,” when for nearly two years in that period the staunchly secular, supposedly liberal Indian National Congress party ruled by decree, outlawed opposition, imprisoned opponents, censored the press, and implemented a program of forced sterilization of the poor.
Those are powerful criticisms, and they pose serious problems for an India that is increasingly looking for friends in Washington and other Western capitals. U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration seem very comfortable with Modi’s India, but presidential challenger Joe Biden and his running mate Kamala Harris have taken a much tougher line, demanding the restoration of full civil rights in Kashmir and criticizing the Citizenship Amendment Act that sparked riots and lynchings in Delhi and elsewhere late last year and earlier this year. Across the Atlantic, the European Parliament nearly voted on a resolution condemning India over the controversial law before ultimately deciding to shelve it.
India’s Supreme Court has repeatedly turned down requests to stay the Citizenship Amendment Act, which has been labeled anti-Muslim by its critics. The law offers a pathway to citizenship for refugees fleeing religious persecution in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan—as long as they are not Muslim. On its face, that’s almost reasonable: Why should Muslims need asylum from religious persecution in these Muslim-majority countries? Dig a little deeper, and the law can be seen as an effort to cast doubt on the citizenship status of members of India’s own Muslim minority population, many of whom may legitimately fear deportation.
The problem isn’t the religious sentiment of the law—the problem is its illiberal execution.
The Citizenship Amendment Act well illustrates the dilemma facing Modi and the BJP. India is a democracy, and the BJP was elected (resoundingly) on a platform that explicitly promised citizenship to “Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, Sikhs and Christians escaping persecution from India’s neighbouring countries.” Polling suggests that more than a third of India’s own Muslims actually support the law, though a wide majority see the law as broadly anti-Muslim. And the United States has similar policies, for example offering asylum specifically to Christians and Yazidis from Iraq. Refugee advocates have even decried the Trump administration’s decision to scale back these religion-based programs that effectively exclude Muslims coming from this Muslim-majority country. So what’s the problem?
The problem isn’t the religious sentiment of the law. The problem is its illiberal execution. Instead of being presented as a plan to protect refugees who qualify, the Citizenship Amendment Act has been wielded as a weapon against Muslims who do not qualify. It has been rolled out in conjunction with an update to the citizenship registry that has seen nearly 2 million people newly identified as stateless in northeast India’s Assam province. When protests broke out, they were repressed under anti-terrorism laws, yet police reportedly turned a blind eye to violent Hindu nationalist counterprotests that killed dozens of Muslims. None of this makes Modi look good in the West.
Along similar lines, Modi’s government was simply fulfilling a popular election promise when it passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act last year, ending 70 years of uncertainty over the status of Muslim-majority Kashmir and converting it into two union territories under direct central government supervision. Pakistan regularized its rule over the portion of Kashmir it administers as long ago as 1948—some might say that it is about time India did the same. But when the Modi government supposedly regularized the status of Indian-administered Kashmir, it cut the region off from the world, shutting off phone and internet service and imposing a supposedly two-day curfew that has lasted more than a year.
As with the Citizenship Amendment Act, the revocation of Kashmir’s special status is not in itself indefensible. It might even be portrayed as a positive development for Indian democracy. But the clumsy, heavy-handed, profoundly illiberal approach taken by the Modi government in each of these cases has made it difficult for his erstwhile international boosters to support him. Part of the problem is probably poor execution: In a country as decentralized and underdeveloped as India, it can be difficult to find enough talented, qualified people to implement the government’s policies in a responsible way. But part of the problem is also Modi himself.
A slightly less confrontational, slightly more liberal BJP could make India much more successful on the world stage.
Modi and his senior BJP colleagues often seem to delight in provoking their opponents and inciting their supporters, even if it brings the opprobrium of the Western media down upon them too. They may believe that thumbing their noses at Western finger-waggers can only win them more votes at home. That may be true, but it won’t win them the support they will need in their standoff with China. A slightly less confrontational, slightly more liberal BJP could make India much more successful on the world stage.
Given all the other challenges Modi faces, an embarrassing defeat at the hands of China high in the Himalayas might be the straw that finally breaks his hold on Indian politics. To ensure Western political support against China, Modi has to moderate his exercise of power in India. The BJP will never be a secular party, but it can become a more liberal party, and for most Western governments, that would be enough. For most Indians, that would be a boon, expanding opportunities for political participation while securing freedom of expression. The BJP prides itself on being a reformist party. The most difficult reform—and possibly the most important—is for the party to reform itself.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-11--Document of the Week: U.S. Plan for World Health Organization Has Few Followers

Document of the Week : U.S. Plan for World Health Organization Has Few Followers The Trump administration still wants to tell the World Health Organization and its members how to run their affairs , even after it announced plans to withdraw from the agency in the midst of a pandemic , cutting hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. funding .
Earlier this month , senior U.S. officials distributed a plan to reform the United Nations health agency to WHO ’ s Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and members of the G-7 industrial powers .
We are posting a copy of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Document of the Week .
The draft—which provides a “ roadmap ” of proposed short- , medium- , and long-term reforms—includes an array of sensible proposals , such as establishing an additional early warning system to detect emerging threats and granting the WHO greater authority to conduct on-the-ground investigations into outbreaks .
“ This roadmap sets out areas where we believe there is an opportunity to strengthen the WHO by increasing accountability and its ability to be impartial and objective , improve transparency and its overall effectiveness … to address new and emerging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump has left the door open to a possible U.S. return to the WHO if it changes its ways , including by demonstrating greater honesty in assessing China ’ s role in failing to halt the initial spread of the coronavirus .
But the United States has given no indication that it would reverse the decision to withdraw from the global health agency next July if the recommendations are accepted .
For his part , Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden has pledged that if he defeats Trump he will rejoin the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president ” and “ restore our leadership on the world stage.
” But American diplomats are struggling to get even U.S. allies to sign on .
Germany and France , for instance , have told the Americans they support some of the reforms , particularly those that would strengthen the World Health Organization .
But they have decided to pursue their own initiative at the health agency .
The United States , meanwhile , is committed to pursuing its enterprise and plans to seek support for the initiative at a special session of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Executive Board meeting from Oct. 5-6 .
The U.S. plan urged the U.N. health agency to enhance reporting by governments on the emergence of deadly viruses , set specific deadlines for states where an outbreak has been detected to share samples of pathogens , and establish a universal review of states ’ pandemic preparedness policies .
The plan welcomes the WHO ’ s July 9 announcement to conduct an “ impartial , independent and comprehensive evaluation ” into the global response to the coronavirus pandemic—an inquiry the United States hopes will shine a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ initial response to the virus , which originated in Wuhan , China .
But some delegates are not confident that the United States can muster sufficient support for the plan .
“ It will never fly , ” cautioned one senior diplomat familiar with the plan .

The Trump administration still wants to tell the World Health Organization and its members how to run their affairs, even after it announced plans to withdraw from the agency in the midst of a pandemic, cutting hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. funding.
The Trump administration still wants to tell the World Health Organization and its members how to run their affairs, even after it announced plans to withdraw from the agency in the midst of a pandemic, cutting hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. funding.
Earlier this month, senior U.S. officials distributed a plan to reform the United Nations health agency to WHO’s Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and members of the G-7 industrial powers. We are posting a copy of the draft here as FP’s Document of the Week.
The draft—which provides a “roadmap” of proposed short-, medium-, and long-term reforms—includes an array of sensible proposals, such as establishing an additional early warning system to detect emerging threats and granting the WHO greater authority to conduct on-the-ground investigations into outbreaks.
“This roadmap sets out areas where we believe there is an opportunity to strengthen the WHO by increasing accountability and its ability to be impartial and objective, improve transparency and its overall effectiveness … to address new and emerging threats,” the document reads. President Donald Trump has left the door open to a possible U.S. return to the WHO if it changes its ways, including by demonstrating greater honesty in assessing China’s role in failing to halt the initial spread of the coronavirus. But the United States has given no indication that it would reverse the decision to withdraw from the global health agency next July if the recommendations are accepted.
For his part, Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden has pledged that if he defeats Trump he will rejoin the WHO “on my first day as president” and “restore our leadership on the world stage.”
But American diplomats are struggling to get even U.S. allies to sign on.
Germany and France, for instance, have told the Americans they support some of the reforms, particularly those that would strengthen the World Health Organization. But they have decided to pursue their own initiative at the health agency. The United States, meanwhile, is committed to pursuing its enterprise and plans to seek support for the initiative at a special session of the health agency’s 34-member state Executive Board meeting from Oct. 5-6.
The U.S. plan urged the U.N. health agency to enhance reporting by governments on the emergence of deadly viruses, set specific deadlines for states where an outbreak has been detected to share samples of pathogens, and establish a universal review of states’ pandemic preparedness policies. The plan welcomes the WHO’s July 9 announcement to conduct an “impartial, independent and comprehensive evaluation” into the global response to the coronavirus pandemic—an inquiry the United States hopes will shine a brighter spotlight on China’s sluggish initial response to the virus, which originated in Wuhan, China.
But some delegates are not confident that the United States can muster sufficient support for the plan. “It will never fly,” cautioned one senior diplomat familiar with the plan.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-11--In Afghanistan, Social Media Is the Only Way to Talk Back to the Taliban

In Afghanistan , Social Media Is the Only Way to Talk Back to the Taliban KABUL , Afghanistan—In July , after an Iranian social media campaign— # Don ’ t_Execute , calling for the regime to overturn the death sentences of three political prisoners—received support in neighboring Afghanistan , an Afghan Twitter user suggested replicating the hashtag in the Afghan political context .
He said that Afghans should use # DoNotRedeemtheTaliban in Dari , referring to the government ’ s potential peace talks with the militant group .
Within hours , # Don ’ t_Execute became a global trend on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Can we also tell the government and the international community to not redeem the Taliban ?
” The tweet—from an account that has since been deactivated—went viral , and more than 100,000 tweets with the hashtag were posted over the following week .
Some Afghans tweeted graphic images of Taliban attacks—mainly car bombs in the capital Kabul .
People demanded that the government not compromise in the upcoming negotiations with the Taliban , in particular demanding protections of freedom of speech , gender equality , and democracy .
“ When we talk of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for expertise , analysis , and reasoning , ” one person tweeted .
“ Our memories , pains , sobs , angers , and tears that have never been wiped off can explain , instead of dozens of books and articles , that they are murderers , criminals , and enemies and should never be returned to power.
” “ Insecurity in Kabul robbed people of access to the streets , ” said Ali Yawar Adili , a researcher at the Kabul-based think tank Afghanistan Analysts Network .
“ Instead of being on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their concerns on social media.
” The U.S.-Taliban agreement is the latest chapter in a long history of deal-making to serve the interests of stakeholders rather than considering public opinion in Afghanistan .
So people retreated to social media pages .
A recent survey showed that almost 90 percent of households in Afghanistan have at least one mobile phone , and about 40 percent have access to the Internet .
And while traditional protests attempted only to hold the Afghan government accountable to its people , social media campaigns aim to voice concerns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community .
The slow-motion peace process came to a halt over the prisoner swap between the Afghan government and the Taliban for months .
In early September , the government , after holding a consultative council , decided to release the remaining Taliban prisoners in a bid to kick off direct talks with the Taliban .
As peace talks loom , concerns are now growing over a deal with the Taliban that undermines the liberal values that the United States and Afghans fought for during the past 20 years .
In Afghanistan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for ordinary Afghans to voice their concerns about the peace process .
The U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in February , setting up the intra-Afghan peace talks , is the latest chapter in a long history of deal-making to serve the interests of stakeholders rather than considering public opinion in Afghanistan .
The # DoNotRedeemtheTaliban campaign shows that the peace process has failed to address concerns such as prioritizing human rights or a lasting cease-fire with the Taliban .
“ People feel they are left out of the process , ” Hakimi said .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a place where people can talk , connect with each other , and feel that someone else is listening to them .
Social media makes people powerful.
” Adili , the researcher , said that the Afghan government was more accountable to the international community that pays as much as 75 percent of government ’ s expenses .
“ These Afghan carpetbaggers are accountable to donors , ” Adili said .
“ When only social media campaigns influenced the donors , government officials would act and respond to the social media campaigns.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s administration ’ s direct negotiations with the Taliban progressed in 2019 , many Afghans—including students , teachers , and government employees—joined the “ My Red Line ” campaign .
Laila Haidari , a social activist in Kabul , said that she often has her tweets translated from Dari into English , which can make campaigns more effective .
“ I do the extra work because I want to reach to human rights and democracy defenders , ” Haidari said .
A social media campaign in November 2019 protested the arrest of two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exploitation of schoolboys in Afghanistan ’ s Logar province .
Afghanistan ’ s intelligence agency had detained the activists and forced them to apologize .
After the then U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan , John Bass called it a “ Soviet-style ” arrest , President Ashraf Ghani ordered the activists ’ release .
Social media campaigns have also influenced Afghanistan ’ s political discourse .
As U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s administration ’ s direct negotiations with the Taliban progressed in 2019 , many Afghans—including students , teachers , and government employees—joined the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sharing video clips stating common values they stood for in the talks with the Taliban .
Tamana , a student from Kandahar province , said in a video clip that she did not want to lose her right to education if the Taliban returned to power .
“ Because I want progress more and become a person in the future that can bring peace to my homeland , myself , ” she said .
As a result of the campaign , the phrase “ my red line ” entered Afghan politics .
Protection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our red lines , ” said Ghani in a gathering with Afghan youths in February 2020 .
In an interview with local media outlets , the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan , Zalmay Khalilzad , said that return of the Islamic Emirate was “ the red line of the international community.
” The most recent agreement Khalilzad struck failed to focus on values , however , and instead prioritized the interests of the United States and the Taliban : the U.S. troop withdrawal and the Taliban ’ s breakup with al Qaeda .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ limitations of social media ’ s ability to effect change .
“ People can begin a campaign and protest a policy , ” Hakimi said .
“ But it is more like a painkiller .
It has little effect.
” In Afghanistan , “ there is no other mechanism ” for people to participate in politics and decision-making , he added .
Many activists fear that the Afghan government and the Taliban will negotiate over fundamental human rights in the process .
The administration in Kabul was formed through a power-sharing deal , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prospect of such deal-making frightens Afghans about their future .
“ When a political deal replaces votes , the election is meaningless , ” Adili said .
Many activists fear that the Afghan government and the Taliban will negotiate over fundamental human rights .
So Afghans are trying to influence the negotiations through the only independent and available means : social media .
Omar Sadr , a lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan , said that social media pages enable people to create a collective voice .
“ The collective voice creates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ At least , negotiators understand the concerns of people .
They can not ignore it.
” In one recent campaign , a group of Afghan activists created a social media campaign named Feminine Perspectives in a bid to raise demands of women in peace talks .
Every week , the campaign focuses on one right .
“ We start this week with # WomenRightstoEducation , ” read the campaign ’ s first tweet .
“ We request that you join us.
” Afghan men and women joined the campaign , demanding the protection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the event of the Taliban ’ s return .
Mina Rezaee , a women ’ s rights activist in Kabul , posted a photo of an old man who lived in a rural area with a poster that promoted education .
“ These men are tired of the war , ” she tweeted .
“ They were victims , but they want education for their children.
” But with a Taliban leadership that has yet to show willingness to compromise in talks with the government , Afghans fear that such free expression @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible under a future government .
“ Through social media pages , people connect with the government and the Taliban , ” Hakimi , the twitter user , said .
“ Can you imagine a Taliban that will allow people to criticize it on social media pages ?
”

KABUL, Afghanistan—In July, after an Iranian social media campaign —#Don’t_Execute, calling for the regime to overturn the death sentences of three political prisoners— received support in neighboring Afghanistan, an Afghan Twitter user suggested replicating the hashtag in the Afghan political context. He said that Afghans should use #DoNotRedeemtheTaliban in Dari, referring to the government’s potential peace talks with the militant group.
KABUL, Afghanistan—In July, after an Iranian social media campaign—#Don’t_Execute, calling for the regime to overturn the death sentences of three political prisoners—received support in neighboring Afghanistan, an Afghan Twitter user suggested replicating the hashtag in the Afghan political context. He said that Afghans should use #DoNotRedeemtheTaliban in Dari, referring to the government’s potential peace talks with the militant group.
Within hours, #Don’t_Execute became a global trend on Twitter after Aziz Hakimi tweeted, “Can we also tell the government and the international community to not redeem the Taliban?” The tweet—from an account that has since been deactivated—went viral, and more than 100,000 tweets with the hashtag were posted over the following week.
Some Afghans tweeted graphic images of Taliban attacks—mainly car bombs in the capital Kabul. People demanded that the government not compromise in the upcoming negotiations with the Taliban, in particular demanding protections of freedom of speech, gender equality, and democracy. “When we talk of the Taliban, there is no need for expertise, analysis, and reasoning,” one person tweeted. “Our memories, pains, sobs, angers, and tears that have never been wiped off can explain, instead of dozens of books and articles, that they are murderers, criminals, and enemies and should never be returned to power.”
After nearly two decades of war, a new generation of Afghans has grown up with a strong sense of social and political responsibility. But as peaceful public protest remains dangerous, they increasingly use social media to participate in political activities. In July 2016, two suicide bombers attacked a protest in Kabul, killing 83 civilians and wounding more than 230 others. In June 2017, another protest in the capital ended in when Afghan security forces allegedly shot and killed seven demonstrators. A triple bombing during the funeral for the protesters killed 20 civilians.
“Insecurity in Kabul robbed people of access to the streets,” said Ali Yawar Adili, a researcher at the Kabul-based think tank Afghanistan Analysts Network. “Instead of being on the streets, people can only express their concerns on social media.”
The U.S.-Taliban agreement is the latest chapter in a long history of deal-making to serve the interests of stakeholders rather than considering public opinion in Afghanistan.
So people retreated to social media pages. A recent survey showed that almost 90 percent of households in Afghanistan have at least one mobile phone, and about 40 percent have access to the Internet. And while traditional protests attempted only to hold the Afghan government accountable to its people, social media campaigns aim to voice concerns for a larger audience: the international community.
The slow-motion peace process came to a halt over the prisoner swap between the Afghan government and the Taliban for months. In early September, the government, after holding a consultative council, decided to release the remaining Taliban prisoners in a bid to kick off direct talks with the Taliban. As peace talks loom, concerns are now growing over a deal with the Taliban that undermines the liberal values that the United States and Afghans fought for during the past 20 years.
In Afghanistan, social media has become the primary means for ordinary Afghans to voice their concerns about the peace process. The U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in February, setting up the intra-Afghan peace talks, is the latest chapter in a long history of deal-making to serve the interests of stakeholders rather than considering public opinion in Afghanistan.
The #DoNotRedeemtheTaliban campaign shows that the peace process has failed to address concerns such as prioritizing human rights or a lasting cease-fire with the Taliban. “People feel they are left out of the process,” Hakimi said. “Social media is a refuge for people, a place where people can talk, connect with each other, and feel that someone else is listening to them. Social media makes people powerful.”
Adili, the researcher, said that the Afghan government was more accountable to the international community that pays as much as 75 percent of government’s expenses. “These Afghan carpetbaggers are accountable to donors,” Adili said. “When only social media campaigns influenced the donors, government officials would act and respond to the social media campaigns.”
As U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration’s direct negotiations with the Taliban progressed in 2019, many Afghans—including students, teachers, and government employees—joined the “My Red Line” campaign.
Laila Haidari, a social activist in Kabul, said that she often has her tweets translated from Dari into English, which can make campaigns more effective. “I do the extra work because I want to reach to human rights and democracy defenders,” Haidari said.
A social media campaign in November 2019 protested the arrest of two activists who had documented the systematic sexual exploitation of schoolboys in Afghanistan’s Logar province. Afghanistan’s intelligence agency had detained the activists and forced them to apologize. After the then U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, John Bass called it a “Soviet-style” arrest, President Ashraf Ghani ordered the activists’ release.
Social media campaigns have also influenced Afghanistan’s political discourse. As U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration’s direct negotiations with the Taliban progressed in 2019, many Afghans—including students, teachers, and government employees—joined the “My Red Line” campaign, sharing video clips stating common values they stood for in the talks with the Taliban.
Tamana, a student from Kandahar province, said in a video clip that she did not want to lose her right to education if the Taliban returned to power. “Because I want progress more and become a person in the future that can bring peace to my homeland, myself,” she said.
For nearly five decades, the people of Afghanistan have been sacrificing in various ways to bring peace, but which peace? Tamana is one of the girls who wants to define the peace herself.#خط‌ـسرخ‌ـمن
#زماـسره‌ـکرښه
#MyRedLine#Kandahar#Afghanistan #Peace pic.twitter.com/X6RCStQbkK — MyRedLine – خط سرخ من (@myredline_afg) July 7, 2020
As a result of the campaign, the phrase “my red line” entered Afghan politics.
Protection of the republic and citizenship rights are our red lines,” said Ghani in a gathering with Afghan youths in February 2020. In an interview with local media outlets, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, said that return of the Islamic Emirate was “the red line of the international community.”
The most recent agreement Khalilzad struck failed to focus on values, however, and instead prioritized the interests of the United States and the Taliban: the U.S. troop withdrawal and the Taliban’s breakup with al Qaeda. Activists say the U.S.-Taliban deal shows the limitations of social media’s ability to effect change. “People can begin a campaign and protest a policy,” Hakimi said. “But it is more like a painkiller. It has little effect.” In Afghanistan, “there is no other mechanism” for people to participate in politics and decision-making, he added.
But as the United States gradually draws down its troops from Afghanistan, the peace process is moving to the next phase—the negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. As much as the process raised hopes for the end of the nearly 19-year war in Afghanistan, fears over the Taliban’s return to power remain.
Many activists fear that the Afghan government and the Taliban will negotiate over fundamental human rights in the process. The administration in Kabul was formed through a power-sharing deal, rather than a democratic election. The prospect of such deal-making frightens Afghans about their future. “When a political deal replaces votes, the election is meaningless,” Adili said.
Many activists fear that the Afghan government and the Taliban will negotiate over fundamental human rights.
So Afghans are trying to influence the negotiations through the only independent and available means: social media. Omar Sadr, a lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan, said that social media pages enable people to create a collective voice. “The collective voice creates pressure,” Sadr said. “At least, negotiators understand the concerns of people. They cannot ignore it.”
In one recent campaign, a group of Afghan activists created a social media campaign named Feminine Perspectives in a bid to raise demands of women in peace talks. Every week, the campaign focuses on one right. “We start this week with #WomenRightstoEducation,” read the campaign’s first tweet. “We request that you join us.” Afghan men and women joined the campaign, demanding the protection of women’s rights for education in the event of the Taliban’s return.
Mina Rezaee, a women’s rights activist in Kabul, posted a photo of an old man who lived in a rural area with a poster that promoted education. “These men are tired of the war,” she tweeted. “They were victims, but they want education for their children.”
But with a Taliban leadership that has yet to show willingness to compromise in talks with the government, Afghans fear that such free expression on social media pages will not be possible under a future government.
“Through social media pages, people connect with the government and the Taliban,” Hakimi, the twitter user, said. “Can you imagine a Taliban that will allow people to criticize it on social media pages?”