foreignpolicy--2020-07-30--Lebanon as We Know It Is Dying

Lebanon as We Know It Is Dying

Lebanon as We Know It Is Dying What does it look like when a state collapses ?
It is a question that analysts ask ever more often about the Middle East , where five states are currently in some form of existential crisis .
Yet one of these states stands apart .
Yemen , Syria , Iraq , and Libya have recently gone through uprisings , civil war , external interventions , and regional proxy fights .
Lebanon ’ s crisis , by contrast , is self-inflected—and that makes it far more hopeless .
It ’ s true that Lebanon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an arena of Israeli-Iranian and Saudi-Iranian competition , but these problems are not the proximate cause of the country ’ s present troubles .
What ’ s happening in Lebanon is the death spiral of the country ’ s post-civil war order .
Nobody—least of all the Lebanese themselves—knows what comes next .
For those not paying attention , here is the story in brief : Years of dysfunction and corruption have finally caught up with Lebanon ’ s political class , which thrived on both , bankrupting the country in the process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in early 2019 when the Banque du Liban—Lebanon ’ s central bank—mandated that money transfers from abroad conducted through nonbanking institutions such as Western Union be denominated in lira even if the transfer indicated that the transaction was to be done in dollars .
In subsequent weeks and months , the demand for dollars increased , but to maintain the illusion of currency stability , Lebanese central bank authorities maintained the currency peg of 1,507 lira to the dollar .
Then the law of supply and demand took over , resulting in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deterioration in the value of the lira .
Fitch Rating then downgraded Lebanon ’ s credit from B- to CCC , which is an indication that—to Fitch , at least—Lebanon was at risk of default .
In September 2019 , Jammal Trust Bank liquidated after being hit with U.S. sanctions over its relationship with Hezbollah .
This bank was not a huge player , but its closure further eroded trust in the financial services sector .
A few weeks later , the government slapped a 20-cent daily tax on WhatsApp calls .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protests that continued throughout last fall and winter , to which the government had no response .
Since then , the full extent of Lebanon ’ s economic problems has come into view .
Lebanon does not produce much ; the country imports 80 percent of what it needs , including food and fuel .
Its economy is based on real estate , banking , and transfers from the Lebanese diaspora .
Banks have offered high interest rates to attract dollar deposits , which bankers then lent to the government .
This was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ financial system , but it functioned so long as the inflow of dollars continued .
Yet when the inflows fell and the government—bereft of revenue—could not pay the banks back , the system collapsed .
In March , Lebanon defaulted on its debt , proving Fitch correct .
The lira has lost 85 percent of its value , a significant hardship on people under any circumstances , but it is a situation that is made far worse by the coronavirus pandemic .
Like most of the rest of the world , Lebanon shut @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of infection and save people ’ s lives .
Yet the country does not have much in the way of a social safety net , and the growing ranks of unemployed are now confronting crushing inflation .
This is a situation in which no one is spared except for the wealthy .
Lebanon ’ s downward mobility has sped up since the October 2019 protests , with more than half the population now in poverty or destitute .
Not surprisingly , food insecurity is on the rise , bartering is becoming a way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little electricity , and those who can are leaving for Canada and Europe .
The desperation is such that there has been a spate of suicides on Lebanon ’ s streets this summer .
And what is the Lebanese government doing to manage the crisis ?
Fighting reform , bickering with parliament , resisting the International Monetary Fund , and flirting with China—all in what seems to be a vainglorious hope that small Lebanon is actually too big to fail .
It isn ’ t .
The professional staff at the IMF should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to help the Lebanese , especially because there is not a lot of international enthusiasm to help the government out of its mess .
The French foreign minister showed up in Beirut recently , but only to reinforce the message that reform is of the essence .
In Washington , those who don ’ t want to bail out a government and political class that are compromised by Hezbollah have thus far won the argument .
Neither the Saudis nor the Emiratis are inclined to help .
The Qataris have not stepped up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remaining possible patron , but once the Lebanese government signs up with Beijing that means there is no going back .
Given the current state of U.S.-Chinese relations and Washington ’ s influence at the IMF , officials in Beirut should not expect much from the fund if they take the Chinese deal .
The dysfunction and blame-shifting within the political class are hard to bear as the country collapses around them .
It is , however , what the political system has wrought , which is why the millions of Lebanese who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ want to tear it all down .
Lebanon has long featured a system that by convention divvied up power and state resources along religious lines .
Most famously , the president is always a Christian , the prime minister a Sunni , and speaker of the parliament a Shiite .
The Chamber of Deputies—the parliament—is , in accordance with Lebanon ’ s constitution , split evenly between Christians and Muslims and proportional to various sects .
The system is a legacy of French colonial rule , which sought to maintain social peace in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But over time this system became baked into Lebanon ’ s social and economic order .
Even after the 1975-1990 civil war , during which there was sectarian bloodletting , Lebanon went back to this formula .
But it is dubious that the system has maintained internal peace in recent times .
To the extent that the country has recently been stable , that has more likely been a function of the inclusion in government of the outright militarized sectarian Shiite group Hezbollah .
But even if to the extent that Lebanon ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ semblance of orderly and agreed-upon distribution of sectarian power worked , it has also bred remarkable amounts of corruption .
In the early 2000s , officials acknowledged the need to get beyond sectarian politics , but it was lip service .
Positions continue to be doled out based on religious affiliation , and are state resources , which are in turn cycled through networks of other officials , bureaucrats , and supportive business interests at the expense of the greater good .
It creates constituencies and groups of officials who are on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ powerful , and more voracious all at the expense of average Lebanese .
No one should be surprised by the country ’ s battered infrastructure and virtually nonexistent government services .
This is what an arrogant , wasteful political class looks like .
The protesters who turned out en masse last fall knew what Lebanon needs : a whole new system .
It must be one that does away with political and financial spoils based on sect in favor of a more equitable and just order .
It was hard not to admire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lebanese sought this change , but despite their best efforts , they remained saddled with a political class for which maintaining the current system is existential .
This is setting the country up for prolonged suffering as its leaders try desperately to outmaneuver their own moral and financial bankruptcy .
That is what collapse looks like .

What does it look like when a state collapses? It is a question that analysts ask ever more often about the Middle East, where five states are currently in some form of existential crisis. Yet one of these states stands apart. Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Libya have recently gone through uprisings, civil war, external interventions, and regional proxy fights. Lebanon’s crisis, by contrast, is self-inflected—and that makes it far more hopeless.
What does it look like when a state collapses? It is a question that analysts ask ever more often about the Middle East, where five states are currently in some form of existential crisis. Yet one of these states stands apart. Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Libya have recently gone through uprisings, civil war, external interventions, and regional proxy fights. Lebanon’s crisis, by contrast, is self-inflected—and that makes it far more hopeless.
It’s true that Lebanon does not have full sovereignty and is an arena of Israeli-Iranian and Saudi-Iranian competition, but these problems are not the proximate cause of the country’s present troubles. What’s happening in Lebanon is the death spiral of the country’s post-civil war order. Nobody—least of all the Lebanese themselves—knows what comes next.
For those not paying attention, here is the story in brief: Years of dysfunction and corruption have finally caught up with Lebanon’s political class, which thrived on both, bankrupting the country in the process. The first hints of this emerged in early 2019 when the Banque du Liban—Lebanon’s central bank—mandated that money transfers from abroad conducted through nonbanking institutions such as Western Union be denominated in lira even if the transfer indicated that the transaction was to be done in dollars. In subsequent weeks and months, the demand for dollars increased, but to maintain the illusion of currency stability, Lebanese central bank authorities maintained the currency peg of 1,507 lira to the dollar. Then the law of supply and demand took over, resulting in a black market in dollars and the further deterioration in the value of the lira. Fitch Rating then downgraded Lebanon’s credit from B- to CCC, which is an indication that—to Fitch, at least—Lebanon was at risk of default. In September 2019, Jammal Trust Bank liquidated after being hit with U.S. sanctions over its relationship with Hezbollah. This bank was not a huge player, but its closure further eroded trust in the financial services sector. A few weeks later, the government slapped a 20-cent daily tax on WhatsApp calls. This desperate attempt to raise revenue led to protests that continued throughout last fall and winter, to which the government had no response.
Since then, the full extent of Lebanon’s economic problems has come into view. Lebanon does not produce much; the country imports 80 percent of what it needs, including food and fuel. Its economy is based on real estate, banking, and transfers from the Lebanese diaspora. Banks have offered high interest rates to attract dollar deposits, which bankers then lent to the government. This was not a great way to run a financial system, but it functioned so long as the inflow of dollars continued. Yet when the inflows fell and the government—bereft of revenue—could not pay the banks back, the system collapsed. In March, Lebanon defaulted on its debt, proving Fitch correct.
The lira has lost 85 percent of its value, a significant hardship on people under any circumstances, but it is a situation that is made far worse by the coronavirus pandemic. Like most of the rest of the world, Lebanon shut down to try to break the chain of infection and save people’s lives. Yet the country does not have much in the way of a social safety net, and the growing ranks of unemployed are now confronting crushing inflation. This is a situation in which no one is spared except for the wealthy. Lebanon’s downward mobility has sped up since the October 2019 protests, with more than half the population now in poverty or destitute. Not surprisingly, food insecurity is on the rise, bartering is becoming a way of life for some, there is little electricity, and those who can are leaving for Canada and Europe. The desperation is such that there has been a spate of suicides on Lebanon’s streets this summer.
And what is the Lebanese government doing to manage the crisis? Fighting reform, bickering with parliament, resisting the International Monetary Fund, and flirting with China—all in what seems to be a vainglorious hope that small Lebanon is actually too big to fail. It isn’t. The professional staff at the IMF should get credit for their tenacity in trying to help the Lebanese, especially because there is not a lot of international enthusiasm to help the government out of its mess. The French foreign minister showed up in Beirut recently, but only to reinforce the message that reform is of the essence. In Washington, those who don’t want to bail out a government and political class that are compromised by Hezbollah have thus far won the argument. Neither the Saudis nor the Emiratis are inclined to help. The Qataris have not stepped up. That leaves the Chinese as the remaining possible patron, but once the Lebanese government signs up with Beijing that means there is no going back. Given the current state of U.S.-Chinese relations and Washington’s influence at the IMF, officials in Beirut should not expect much from the fund if they take the Chinese deal.
The dysfunction and blame-shifting within the political class are hard to bear as the country collapses around them. It is, however, what the political system has wrought, which is why the millions of Lebanese who turned out in the streets last fall want to tear it all down. Lebanon has long featured a system that by convention divvied up power and state resources along religious lines. Most famously, the president is always a Christian, the prime minister a Sunni, and speaker of the parliament a Shiite. The Chamber of Deputies—the parliament—is, in accordance with Lebanon’s constitution, split evenly between Christians and Muslims and proportional to various sects. The system is a legacy of French colonial rule, which sought to maintain social peace in a country with multiple sectarian divisions. But over time this system became baked into Lebanon’s social and economic order. Even after the 1975-1990 civil war, during which there was sectarian bloodletting, Lebanon went back to this formula.
But it is dubious that the system has maintained internal peace in recent times. To the extent that the country has recently been stable, that has more likely been a function of the inclusion in government of the outright militarized sectarian Shiite group Hezbollah. But even if to the extent that Lebanon’s efforts to create stability through some semblance of orderly and agreed-upon distribution of sectarian power worked, it has also bred remarkable amounts of corruption. In the early 2000s, officials acknowledged the need to get beyond sectarian politics, but it was lip service. Positions continue to be doled out based on religious affiliation, and are state resources, which are in turn cycled through networks of other officials, bureaucrats, and supportive business interests at the expense of the greater good. It creates constituencies and groups of officials who are on the take and who grew richer, more powerful, and more voracious all at the expense of average Lebanese. No one should be surprised by the country’s battered infrastructure and virtually nonexistent government services. This is what an arrogant, wasteful political class looks like.
The protesters who turned out en masse last fall knew what Lebanon needs: a whole new system. It must be one that does away with political and financial spoils based on sect in favor of a more equitable and just order. It was hard not to admire the determination and creativity with which the Lebanese sought this change, but despite their best efforts, they remained saddled with a political class for which maintaining the current system is existential. This is setting the country up for prolonged suffering as its leaders try desperately to outmaneuver their own moral and financial bankruptcy. That is what collapse looks like.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-30--After Lockdown, Femicide Rises in South Africa

JOHANNESBURG—On June 11 , masked mourners gathered around the brown casket of Tshegofatso Pule , a 28-year-old woman who was murdered in early June .
Pule was eight months pregnant when she was found hanging from a tree with stab wounds to her chest in a Johannesburg suburb .
The police charged a 31-year-old man with premeditated murder and said the suspect did not act alone .
Pula is just one victim among many .
Femicide—the killing of women by intimate partners or as the result of gender-based practices—and other gender-based violence is on the rise in South Africa , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ restrictions which began on June 1 .
Pule ’ s murder and other recent killings have sparked outrage across the country .
South Africans are simmering with anger over the ugly trend of violence against women—an old story in the country , which has been struggling with femicide for decades .
However , the rash of post-coronavirus violence has revitalized the movement .
The hashtag # StopKillingWomen trended on social media , with thousands of users condemning the increasing rates of violence against women and calling for justice .
Twenty-one women and children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said President Cyril Ramaphosa while responding to the issue in a televised presidential address .
That figure is likely to be an underestimate , counting only prominent victims .
Ramaphosa described the gender-based violence in the country as a second pandemic .
“ It is with the heaviest of hearts that I stand before the women and girls of South Africa this evening to talk about another pandemic that is raging in our country—the killing of women and children by the men of our country , ” he said .
South Africa has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against women in the world , with reports indicating that a woman is murdered every three hours .
Between 2018 and 2019 , the police recorded nearly 178,000 crimes against women , according to the country ’ s most recent crime statistics .
Of these , 82,728 cases were assault while 54,142 were assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm .
In addition , 2,771 women were murdered , with a further 3,445 attempted murders .
In 2019 alone , the police crimes department received 87,000 cases of gender-based violence complaints .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ about women , seeing them as inferior .
In a country with dramatic crime rates , women fear not only a lack of social equality but also for their safety .
The high rate of unemployment and economic inequality , especially in the post-pandemic era , have created a tinderbox for domestic violence .
Police say the end of the nine-week ban on alcohol sales contributed to a spike in crime and gender-related violence directed at women and children .
The opposition party Economic Freedom Fighters ( EFF ) has criticized the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the country .
“ We say : Let there be justice for Tshegofatso Pule , ” Mbuyiseni Ndlozi , an EFF MP , said at the funeral .
“ The police are in their numbers .
They have come to make sure that we stay one meter away from one another .
But where were they [ when she was killed ] ?
They are here with their guns .
They are more than 50 of them.
” Ndlozi added : “ We don ’ t need them when we mourn ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” In Nigeria , protesters have defied the lockdown restrictions to voice their anger over the recent wave of rape and murder of women and young girls in the country .
President Muhammadu Buhari reacted by condemning the increasing cases of rape and other gender-based violence in the country .
“ I would like to offer my deepest condolences to the family and friends of Uwaila Omozuwa , ” Buhari tweeted .
“ I expect the Nigeria Police Force to speedily and diligently investigate this case and ensure that all the culprits responsible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ justice.
” Omozuwa , 22 , was raped and killed inside a church where she had gone to study on May 27 .
A suspect has been arrested in connection to the murder .
A week later , another student was raped and killed by gunmen in Ibadan , southwest Nigeria .
In May , 11 men raped a 12-year-old girl in northern Nigeria .
After public outcry , the police announced the arrest of the men involved in the act and that they would soon face prosecution .
The Nigerian governors ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a state of emergency on violence against women and promised to set up sex offenders register in the wake of the protests and movements .
Activists and protesters described these as mere political statements and called for more action to protect women and girls .
A federal law , the Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act which was signed in 2015 , remains poorly implemented .
Of Nigeria ’ s 36 states , only 13 have domesticated and signed the law .
The remaining 23 states has no state law that protects women and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ African government says it is taking actions to combat the growing gender-based violence in the country .
The Gender-Based Violence National Command Centre , a government program committed to intensify and accelerate efforts in combating gender-based violence , is helping victims by providing support , counseling , and making referrals .
But solutions still seem a long way off .
In 2018 , the National Gender-Based Violence and Femicide Summit , which aims to highlight the plight of women and girls in the country , was hosted by the government , NGOs , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to find a solution to femicide and gender-based violence in the country .
Ramphosa signed and launched Gender-Based Violence and Femicide Declaration last year and will develop a multisectoral structure and national strategy to respond to violence toward women in the country .
Activists say the declaration is a step in the right direction , but much more needs to be done .
Strengthening the judicial systems to offer stiffer penalties for offenders would help prevent perpetrators from carrying out the act , activists believe .
But they add that men should start @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and with their sons , in order to educate the next generation about standing up for women to end rape .
“ We don ’ t need the military when we mourn , ” the mourners sang .

JOHANNESBURG—On June 11, masked mourners gathered around the brown casket of Tshegofatso Pule, a 28-year-old woman who was murdered in early June . Pule was eight months pregnant when she was found hanging from a tree with stab wounds to her chest in a Johannesburg suburb.
JOHANNESBURG—On June 11, masked mourners gathered around the brown casket of Tshegofatso Pule, a 28-year-old woman who was murdered in early June. Pule was eight months pregnant when she was found hanging from a tree with stab wounds to her chest in a Johannesburg suburb.
The police charged a 31-year-old man with premeditated murder and said the suspect did not act alone.
Pula is just one victim among many. Femicide—the killing of women by intimate partners or as the result of gender-based practices—and other gender-based violence is on the rise in South Africa, following the gradual easing of the lockdown restrictions which began on June 1.
Pule’s murder and other recent killings have sparked outrage across the country. South Africans are simmering with anger over the ugly trend of violence against women—an old story in the country, which has been struggling with femicide for decades. However, the rash of post-coronavirus violence has revitalized the movement. The hashtag #StopKillingWomen trended on social media, with thousands of users condemning the increasing rates of violence against women and calling for justice.
Twenty-one women and children have been killed in recent weeks, said President Cyril Ramaphosa while responding to the issue in a televised presidential address. That figure is likely to be an underestimate, counting only prominent victims.
Ramaphosa described the gender-based violence in the country as a second pandemic.
“It is with the heaviest of hearts that I stand before the women and girls of South Africa this evening to talk about another pandemic that is raging in our country—the killing of women and children by the men of our country,” he said.
South Africa has one of the highest rates of violence against women in the world, with reports indicating that a woman is murdered every three hours.
Between 2018 and 2019, the police recorded nearly 178,000 crimes against women, according to the country’s most recent crime statistics. Of these, 82,728 cases were assault while 54,142 were assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. In addition, 2,771 women were murdered, with a further 3,445 attempted murders. In 2019 alone, the police crimes department received 87,000 cases of gender-based violence complaints.
South African men often hold patriarchal views about women, seeing them as inferior. In a country with dramatic crime rates, women fear not only a lack of social equality but also for their safety. The high rate of unemployment and economic inequality, especially in the post-pandemic era, have created a tinderbox for domestic violence. Police say the end of the nine-week ban on alcohol sales contributed to a spike in crime and gender-related violence directed at women and children.
The opposition party Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has criticized the government for failing to protect women and girls in the country.
“We say: Let there be justice for Tshegofatso Pule,” Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, an EFF MP, said at the funeral. “The police are in their numbers. They have come to make sure that we stay one meter away from one another. But where were they [when she was killed]? They are here with their guns. They are more than 50 of them.”
Ndlozi added: “We don’t need them when we mourn; we need them to stop the mourning.”
In Nigeria, protesters have defied the lockdown restrictions to voice their anger over the recent wave of rape and murder of women and girls in the country.
President Muhammadu Buhari reacted by condemning the increasing cases of rape and other gender-based violence in the country.
“I would like to offer my deepest condolences to the family and friends of Uwaila Omozuwa,” Buhari tweeted. “I expect the Nigeria Police Force to speedily and diligently investigate this case and ensure that all the culprits responsible for this barbaric act are brought to justice.”
Omozuwa, 22, was raped and killed inside a church where she had gone to study on May 27. A suspect has been arrested in connection to the murder. A week later, another student was raped and killed by gunmen in Ibadan, southwest Nigeria.
In May, 11 men raped a 12-year-old girl in northern Nigeria. After public outcry, the police announced the arrest of the men involved in the act and that they would soon face prosecution.
The Nigerian governors’ forum said it has resolved to declare a state of emergency on violence against women and promised to set up sex offenders register in the wake of the protests and movements.
Activists and protesters described these as mere political statements and called for more action to protect women and girls. A federal law, the Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act which was signed in 2015, remains poorly implemented. Of Nigeria’s 36 states, only 13 have domesticated and signed the law. The remaining 23 states has no state law that protects women and girls from gender-based violence.
The South African government says it is taking actions to combat the growing gender-based violence in the country. The Gender-Based Violence National Command Centre, a government program committed to intensify and accelerate efforts in combating gender-based violence, is helping victims by providing support, counseling, and making referrals.
But solutions still seem a long way off. In 2018, the National Gender-Based Violence and Femicide Summit, which aims to highlight the plight of women and girls in the country, was hosted by the government, NGOs, and civil society groups in an effort to find a solution to femicide and gender-based violence in the country. Ramphosa signed and launched Gender-Based Violence and Femicide Declaration last year and will develop a multisectoral structure and national strategy to respond to violence toward women in the country. Activists say the declaration is a step in the right direction, but much more needs to be done.
Strengthening the judicial systems to offer stiffer penalties for offenders would help prevent perpetrators from carrying out the act, activists believe. But they add that men should start having conversations about rape with each other and with their sons, in order to educate the next generation about standing up for women to end rape.
“We don’t need the military when we mourn,” the mourners sang.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-30--Here’s How Biden’s Possible VP Picks Stack Up on Foreign Policy

Here ’ s How Biden ’ s Possible VP Picks Stack Up on Foreign Policy As Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden mulls his choice of running mate , his own history as then-Sen. Barack Obama ’ s pick for vice president looms large .
Then , the choice stemmed in part from Biden ’ s years of experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , filling a foreign-affairs gap in Obama ’ s resume .
Biden as U.S. vice president was in many ways the culmination of decades of growing foreign-policy influence for what had previously been largely a figurehead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ branch of a vice president who can help shape America ’ s relations with the world .
Other vice presidents who played an outsized foreign-policy role were Richard Nixon ( under Dwight D. Eisenhower ) , George H.W .
Bush ( under Ronald Reagan ) , and Dick Cheney ( under George W. Bush ) .
But with Biden heading the ticket , there isn ’ t quite the same need for the No .
2 to be strong on foreign policy .
This time , his position as an older , white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his promise to choose a woman as his running mate to address that shortcoming .
But since U.S. foreign policy has largely been defined by men , it ’ s unlikely any potential vice presidential candidate would have anything like Biden ’ s foreign-policy resume when he was chosen .
Only three women—Madeleine Albright , Condoleezza Rice , and Hillary Clinton—have ever been secretary of state .
No woman has headed the Pentagon .
No woman has ever chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , and only one—former Republican Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen—has chaired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that in mind , here ’ s where each potential vice presidential pick stands on foreign policy .
Of all the possible Biden picks , Rice can comfortably claim the most foreign-policy experience in a career that includes stints as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and as U.S. national security advisor , both under Obama .
Unlike the other candidates under consideration , Rice has never held elected office .
Her track record has both positive and negative implications for her vice presidential chances .
Her work in the Obama administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whom she appears to have a warm relationship—she describes him as her “ favorite unannounced visitor ” during her time in the White House—and the two would likely forge a foreign-policy consensus .
But she faced plenty of criticism earlier in her career for her handling of the Rwanda genocide during the Clinton administration , and there was plenty of griping later over her management of the National Security Council under Obama .
One other potential vulnerability looms for Rice : Benghazi .
Republicans have already threatened to resuscitate their criticisms over Rice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the administration in responding to the deadly 2012 attacks in Libya that killed a U.S. ambassador and three others .
Still in her first term as the junior U.S. senator from California , Harris has mainly focused on domestic law enforcement—most prominently as the California attorney general .
Like many congressional Democrats , Harris sees Russia as one of the biggest foreign-policy issues , and she has repeatedly highlighted Kremlin-backed interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and warned of more to come in 2020 .
Considered one of the most likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she faces growing pushback from some Biden allies ) , Harris doesn ’ t diverge from Biden on any major Democratic foreign-policy priorities .
She wants a U.S. return to the Iran nuclear deal , is unequivocal in her support for Israel , and is broadly supportive of U.S. alliances , including NATO .
In her second term as the senior U.S. senator from Massachusetts , Warren , too , has mostly focused on domestic issues , namely consumer protection and banking regulation .
Outspoken in her distaste for the cozy relationship between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her stance could be at odds with Biden , who tends to steer clear of the structural underpinnings of U.S. foreign-policy .
She has called for an audit of the Pentagon , calling its budget “ too large for too long.
” She has also been more direct in her criticism of China , outlining the corruption inherent in the Chinese Communist Party ’ s power structure and calling for U.S. leadership on Hong Kong in October 2019 , before the recent escalation in Beijing ’ s dominance of the city .
Another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Israel aid .
Last October , she told a conference hosted by J Street , a progressive Israel policy group , “ If Israel ’ s government continues with steps to formally annex the West Bank , the U.S. should make clear that none of our aid should be used to support annexation.
” Biden addressed the same conference and never raised the issue of conditionality on the $ 3.8 billion in annual military aid to Israel .
Choosing Warren would be seen as an olive branch if not to a younger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overwhelmingly chose Sen. Bernie Sanders over Warren in the presidential primary ) then at least to one branch of the Democratic Party ’ s progressive wing .
A former U.S. combat veteran who fought in the Iraq War , Duckworth can lay claim to the most direct experience of any of the elected officials under consideration by Biden .
She also has more personal experience of the world outside the United States than any other possible pick : Duckworth was born in Bangkok and spent seven years of her childhood in Indonesia .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Duckworth serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee and is known as a fierce supporter of U.S. veterans .
In contrast to Warren , she recently voted against an amendment to the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that would cut the Pentagon budget by 10 percent .
Most recently , Duckworth has become one of the leading critics of the Trump administration ’ s tepid response to reports of Russian bounties on U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan , pushing the Pentagon to fully investigate what U.S. President Donald Trump dismisses as “ fake news.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2017 , Demings has done little to highlight any foreign-policy positions that would diverge from the Democratic Party orthodoxy .
She serves on the House Committee on Homeland Security and is the vice chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime , Terrorism , Homeland Security , and Investigations .
Demings was absent from the Homeland Security Committee ’ s most overtly foreign-policy-focused hearing , on U.S. tensions with Iran following the killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani , although it ’ s possible her role as a manager in the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ best known for leading the Orlando Police Department from 2007 to 2011 , a position she earned after working her way up from her initial role as a beat cop .

As Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden mulls his choice of running mate, his own history as then-Sen. Barack Obama’s pick for vice president looms large. Then, the choice stemmed in part from Biden’s years of experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, filling a foreign-affairs gap in Obama’s resume.
As Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden mulls his choice of running mate, his own history as then-Sen. Barack Obama’s pick for vice president looms large. Then, the choice stemmed in part from Biden’s years of experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, filling a foreign-affairs gap in Obama’s resume.
Biden as U.S. vice president was in many ways the culmination of decades of growing foreign-policy influence for what had previously been largely a figurehead role—underscoring the importance in the modern executive branch of a vice president who can help shape America’s relations with the world. Other vice presidents who played an outsized foreign-policy role were Richard Nixon (under Dwight D. Eisenhower), George H.W. Bush (under Ronald Reagan), and Dick Cheney (under George W. Bush).
But with Biden heading the ticket, there isn’t quite the same need for the No. 2 to be strong on foreign policy. This time, his position as an older, white establishment man could be his biggest weakness—thus his promise to choose a woman as his running mate to address that shortcoming.
But since U.S. foreign policy has largely been defined by men, it’s unlikely any potential vice presidential candidate would have anything like Biden’s foreign-policy resume when he was chosen. Only three women—Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton—have ever been secretary of state. No woman has headed the Pentagon. No woman has ever chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and only one—former Republican Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen—has chaired the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
With that in mind, here’s where each potential vice presidential pick stands on foreign policy.
Former National Security Advisor Susan Rice at the J Street 2018 National Conference in Washington on April 16, 2018.
Susan Rice
Of all the possible Biden picks, Rice can comfortably claim the most foreign-policy experience in a career that includes stints as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and as U.S. national security advisor, both under Obama. Unlike the other candidates under consideration, Rice has never held elected office.
Her track record has both positive and negative implications for her vice presidential chances. Her work in the Obama administration brought her close to Biden, with whom she appears to have a warm relationship—she describes him as her “favorite unannounced visitor” during her time in the White House—and the two would likely forge a foreign-policy consensus. But she faced plenty of criticism earlier in her career for her handling of the Rwanda genocide during the Clinton administration, and there was plenty of griping later over her management of the National Security Council under Obama.
One other potential vulnerability looms for Rice: Benghazi. Republicans have already threatened to resuscitate their criticisms over Rice’s role as the early face of the administration in responding to the deadly 2012 attacks in Libya that killed a U.S. ambassador and three others.
U.S. Sen. Kamala Harris speaks to reporters after announcing her candidacy for president at Howard University in Washington on Jan. 21, 2019.
Kamala Harris
Still in her first term as the junior U.S. senator from California, Harris has mainly focused on domestic law enforcement—most prominently as the California attorney general.
Like many congressional Democrats, Harris sees Russia as one of the biggest foreign-policy issues, and she has repeatedly highlighted Kremlin-backed interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and warned of more to come in 2020.
Considered one of the most likely choices in a tight field (though she faces growing pushback from some Biden allies), Harris doesn’t diverge from Biden on any major Democratic foreign-policy priorities. She wants a U.S. return to the Iran nuclear deal, is unequivocal in her support for Israel, and is broadly supportive of U.S. alliances, including NATO.
Sen. Elizabeth Warren questions Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director Richard Cordray on Capitol Hill in Washington on June 10, 2014.
Elizabeth Warren
In her second term as the senior U.S. senator from Massachusetts, Warren, too, has mostly focused on domestic issues, namely consumer protection and banking regulation.
Outspoken in her distaste for the cozy relationship between U.S. defense contractors and the Pentagon, her stance could be at odds with Biden, who tends to steer clear of the structural underpinnings of U.S. foreign-policy. She has called for an audit of the Pentagon, calling its budget “too large for too long.”
She has also been more direct in her criticism of China, outlining the corruption inherent in the Chinese Communist Party’s power structure and calling for U.S. leadership on Hong Kong in October 2019, before the recent escalation in Beijing’s dominance of the city.
Another clear difference between herself and Biden is on Israel aid. Last October, she told a conference hosted by J Street, a progressive Israel policy group, “If Israel’s government continues with steps to formally annex the West Bank, the U.S. should make clear that none of our aid should be used to support annexation.” Biden addressed the same conference and never raised the issue of conditionality on the $3.8 billion in annual military aid to Israel.
Choosing Warren would be seen as an olive branch if not to a younger base (voters under 40 years old overwhelmingly chose Sen. Bernie Sanders over Warren in the presidential primary) then at least to one branch of the Democratic Party’s progressive wing.
U.S. Sen. Tammy Duckworth during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on Capitol Hill in Washington on May 6.
Tammy Duckworth
A former U.S. combat veteran who fought in the Iraq War, Duckworth can lay claim to the most direct experience of any of the elected officials under consideration by Biden. She also has more personal experience of the world outside the United States than any other possible pick: Duckworth was born in Bangkok and spent seven years of her childhood in Indonesia.
As a U.S. senator from Illinois, Duckworth serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee and is known as a fierce supporter of U.S. veterans. In contrast to Warren, she recently voted against an amendment to the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that would cut the Pentagon budget by 10 percent.
Most recently, Duckworth has become one of the leading critics of the Trump administration’s tepid response to reports of Russian bounties on U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, pushing the Pentagon to fully investigate what U.S. President Donald Trump dismisses as “fake news.”
U.S. Congresswoman Val Demings questions Kurt Volker, former State Department special envoy to Ukraine, during testimony before the House Intelligence Committee on Capitol Hill in Washington on Nov. 19, 2019.
Val Demings
Elected to the House of Representatives in 2017, Demings has done little to highlight any foreign-policy positions that would diverge from the Democratic Party orthodoxy. She serves on the House Committee on Homeland Security and is the vice chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations.
Demings was absent from the Homeland Security Committee’s most overtly foreign-policy-focused hearing, on U.S. tensions with Iran following the killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani, although it’s possible her role as a manager in the Trump impeachment trial took priority.
She is best known for leading the Orlando Police Department from 2007 to 2011, a position she earned after working her way up from her initial role as a beat cop.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-30--Trans-Atlantic Ties Should Put Finance, Not Security, First

Trans-Atlantic Ties Should Put Finance , Not Security , First As presidential candidate Joe Biden ’ s team begins cautiously sizing up furniture for the White House , they will have a lot of damaged relationships to repair should U.S. President Donald Trump lose in November .
Europe may not top the agenda , but the need to find a new approach to trans-Atlantic relations is an urgent one , especially after Trump ’ s abrupt withdrawal of troops from Germany .
Democrats should not mistake worn rhetoric about “ special or inviolable ” defense organizations for a forward-looking strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ foreign policy for the middle class ” if he is elected , Biden must embrace a progressive Europe policy .
Today , an oversecuritized worldview still sees ties with Britain and the European Union primarily as military matters or tools for superpower rivalry .
But the factors binding Europe and the United States together are far different from those present in 1949 , when NATO was founded .
At that point economies were mostly national , capital flows were controlled , and the Cold War looked capable of going hot at any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ priority .
Today , a new approach to Europe needs to focus on what really ties the two continents together : the power and threat of global money .
What best captures the staggering potential of U.S.-Europe cooperation is not NATO ’ s European Deterrence Initiative to forestall Russian aggression , but the 2008 financial crisis , when the U.S. Federal Reserve lent more than $ 8 trillion to the European Central Bank and more than $ 900 billion to the Bank of England to keep the globalized economy , and with it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ afloat .
Though foundational , this awesome financial nexus has not yet shaped the U.S.—and Democratic—foreign-policy outlook toward Europe .
A look at the Democratic-majority House Foreign Affairs Committee reveals where the party ’ s Europe thinking is right now .
Since June , the outgoing chairman , Rep. Eliot Engel , has commented on important issues such as Russian politics , U.S. troop withdrawals from Germany , electoral reform in Albania , and Polish President Andrzej Duda ’ s White House visit , but he has ignored the existential economic fights roiling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Italy over the future of the European project .
In the race to replace Engel , the most senior candidate , Rep. Brad Sherman highlights crises in Russia , China , and the Middle East , and calls for more focus on Africa and Latin America .
Even candidates with more expansive and self-consciously progressive foreign-policy visions , such as Reps. Gregory Meeks and Joaquin Castro , do not connect their focuses on such transnational challenges as “ financial crisis ” and “ inequality ” with Europe , the indispensable partner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to such fights .
Indeed , Castro and Sherman do not even mention Europe in their statements , with Meeks simply noting past meetings with “ national leaders in Brussels and Beijing.
” Either by ignoring Europe or viewing the trans-Atlantic partnership as an overwhelmingly security-based alliance against Russia or China , Democrats are missing the real Europe questions and the real European opportunities .
These will come from greater engagement with Brussels and London as economic and financial partners .
Unlocking this will require Democrats to have a clearer idea of what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be more involved .
Breaking with precedent , Trump has shown just how much a U.S. president can involve himself in European politics .
His administration has inaugurated an interventionist , even more securitized relationship .
In the past weeks , the United States escalated sanctions against Russia ’ s Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Germany and celebrated the U.K. decision to exclude the Chinese company Huawei from its 5G network after American pressure .
These measures come on top of the ongoing disputes over NATO funding and U.S. troop levels on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a partner against threats like Russia and China has meant too little attention on what Europe and the United States can offer each other directly .
This goes beyond traditional national security assurances and instead requires rethinking the purpose of foreign policy for the United States in the 2020s .
The Democrats have already begun this process .
Biden , a former vice president , is running on “ a foreign policy for the middle class.
” This approach brings together traditional Democratic themes—Biden has proposed a “ Summit for Democracy ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shared purpose of the nations of the free world ” —with an acknowledgment of the changed economic and geopolitical landscape .
Earlier this month , Biden previewed what this new policy looks like : a fusion of industrial policy and foreign policy .
He announced his plan to rebuild supply chains to protect national security and create U.S. jobs , suggesting how Democrats can combine foreign policy toward China and Russia with ambitious domestic economic goals .
This rethink should extend to Europe .
Here , a “ foreign policy for the middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ targeted at American opponents .
Washington , Brussels , and London are the control centers of the global financial system , so moving further beyond industry and trade , this would fuse foreign policy and financial policy .
To fulfill a progressive foreign policy , trans-Atlantic leaders can not allow the financial infrastructure they control to be neutral before the issues they most care about , whether it is European banks in Hong Kong cutting off pro-democracy activists or U.S. states enabling anonymity , kleptocracy , and inequality .
Only trans-Atlantic partners at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put an end to these problems .
Making this happen will require a progressive Europe policy to be more , not less , engaged in European politics than the United States was under former President Barack Obama .
Take the fight in Brussels over post-pandemic reconstruction .
Even as the Federal Reserve propped up global finance and the U.S. military provided security guarantees to all of Europe , Washington sat on the sidelines as the “ Frugal Four ” —the Netherlands , Denmark , Austria , and Sweden—scuttled full coronavirus crisis debt mutualization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ step toward European integration , and then constrained the much-needed 750 billion euro ( $ 880 billion ) assistance to member states .
Though European leaders ultimately agreed on a final package that included EU-wide common debt and other steps toward a more united Europe , Washington still wasted an opportunity to serve as a countervailing force , breaking these political stalemates and ending European politics ’ doom-loop of economic sluggishness and political upheaval .
Washington should be more involved in such negotiations , because key U.S. interests are at stake in this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Michael Pettis argue in their recent book , Trade Wars Are Class Wars : How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace , insufficient European spending has harmed both U.S. and European middle classes .
Weak European demand driven by austerity economics has hit U.S. manufacturing and harmed American workers .
U.S. intervention in the Brussels stalemate is a unique opportunity to bolster the middle class on both continents .
A more generous recovery package , one with more generous grants and fewer strings attached , could have kick-started the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on both sides of the Atlantic .
U.S. aloofness on the trans-Atlantic economic question has meant that other Democratic priorities became bargaining chips as well .
In an effort to reach a deal , EU leaders sacrificed long-term investments in fighting climate change .
They reduced the Just Transition Fund , which incentivizes countries to increase carbon-cutting measures , from 40 billion euros to 17.5 billion ( $ 47 billion to $ 21 billion ) .
European leaders also abandoned the “ rule of law ” conditions that would have made recovery funding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like Poland and Hungary .
Here , phone calls from a President Biden to those in Brussels involved in the negotiations signaling U.S. priorities could have made a significant difference .
Even the most traditional national security-focused portfolios of Europe policy would have benefited from U.S. involvement in the negotiations .
Successful economic cooperation will forge the strong trans-Atlantic ties necessary if Washington chooses to pursue strategic competition .
It will also undo past blunders .
Clashes over austerity have fueled Euroskepticism , and weakened traditionally pro-U.S. governments like Italy .
Meanwhile , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from abroad , particularly China , especially appealing , further complicating Washington ’ s efforts to protect allies ’ critical economic sectors from competitors ’ reach .
Recognizing the economic and financial foundation of the trans-Atlantic relationship should bring about a new era of U.S. engagement and cooperation with Europe over progressive priorities .
Bolstering the EU ’ s nascent plans to tackle its tax haven problem , the United States should enlist Brussels and London in a Global Offshore Initiative to tax corporations where they earn their revenue , rather than where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Global Kleptocracy Initiative to make the global financial system unsafe for dark money , building on the incremental , but patchy , improvements that Britain and the EU have made to clamp down on kleptocracy .
And by aligning Biden ’ s recently announced $ 2 trillion climate change plan with European Green Deal efforts , a new administration can push the world ’ s leading central banks in Washington , London , and Frankfurt to make a global energy transition a reality .
Biden can integrate these major trans-Atlantic initiatives into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to his Summit for Democracy : There is no better way to make clear that global democracy can not flourish without a strong internationalist economic policy .
The lines between domestic and foreign policy have broken down at home and abroad .
Biden ’ s “ foreign policy for the middle class ” has made clear that the solutions to U.S. domestic problems run through U.S. foreign policy .
By extension , a successful U.S. administration will need to be deeply engaged in EU and British domestic politics .
Therefore the Democrats should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approach on Europe nor like Trump treat it solely as a tool to compete with Russia and China .
When it comes to achieving key Democratic objectives in the United States—whether curbing corruption , taming financial flows , reviving the world economy , or tackling climate breakdown—all roads lead to Europe .

As presidential candidate Joe Biden’s team begins cautiously sizing up furniture for the White House, they will have a lot of damaged relationships to repair should U.S. President Donald Trump lose in November. Europe may not top the agenda, but the need to find a new approach to trans-Atlantic relations is an urgent one, especially after Trump's abrupt withdrawal of troops from Germany. Democrats should not mistake worn rhetoric about “special or inviolable” defense organizations for a forward-looking strategy. To actualize his vision of a “foreign policy for the middle class” if he is elected, Biden must embrace a progressive Europe policy.
As presidential candidate Joe Biden’s team begins cautiously sizing up furniture for the White House, they will have a lot of damaged relationships to repair should U.S. President Donald Trump lose in November. Europe may not top the agenda, but the need to find a new approach to trans-Atlantic relations is an urgent one, especially after Trump’s abrupt withdrawal of troops from Germany. Democrats should not mistake worn rhetoric about “special or inviolable” defense organizations for a forward-looking strategy. To actualize his vision of a “foreign policy for the middle class” if he is elected, Biden must embrace a progressive Europe policy.
Today, an oversecuritized worldview still sees ties with Britain and the European Union primarily as military matters or tools for superpower rivalry. But the factors binding Europe and the United States together are far different from those present in 1949, when NATO was founded. At that point economies were mostly national, capital flows were controlled, and the Cold War looked capable of going hot at any moment, making military cooperation an imminent priority. Today, a new approach to Europe needs to focus on what really ties the two continents together: the power and threat of global money.
What best captures the staggering potential of U.S.-Europe cooperation is not NATO’s European Deterrence Initiative to forestall Russian aggression, but the 2008 financial crisis, when the U.S. Federal Reserve lent more than $8 trillion to the European Central Bank and more than $900 billion to the Bank of England to keep the globalized economy, and with it the dream of a united Europe, afloat. Though foundational, this awesome financial nexus has not yet shaped the U.S.—and Democratic—foreign-policy outlook toward Europe.
A look at the Democratic-majority House Foreign Affairs Committee reveals where the party’s Europe thinking is right now. Since June, the outgoing chairman, Rep. Eliot Engel, has commented on important issues such as Russian politics, U.S. troop withdrawals from Germany, electoral reform in Albania, and Polish President Andrzej Duda’s White House visit, but he has ignored the existential economic fights roiling the U.S. allies in Germany, France, and Italy over the future of the European project. In the race to replace Engel, the most senior candidate, Rep. Brad Sherman , highlights crises in Russia, China, and the Middle East, and calls for more focus on Africa and Latin America. Even candidates with more expansive and self-consciously progressive foreign-policy visions, such as Reps. Gregory Meeks and Joaquin Castro, do not connect their focuses on such transnational challenges as “financial crisis” and “inequality” with Europe, the indispensable partner to implementing any solutions when it comes to such fights. Indeed, Castro and Sherman do not even mention Europe in their statements, with Meeks simply noting past meetings with “national leaders in Brussels and Beijing.”
Either by ignoring Europe or viewing the trans-Atlantic partnership as an overwhelmingly security-based alliance against Russia or China, Democrats are missing the real Europe questions and the real European opportunities. These will come from greater engagement with Brussels and London as economic and financial partners. Unlocking this will require Democrats to have a clearer idea of what they want from Europe and the desire to be more involved.
Breaking with precedent, Trump has shown just how much a U.S. president can involve himself in European politics. His administration has inaugurated an interventionist, even more securitized relationship. In the past weeks, the United States escalated sanctions against Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Germany and celebrated the U.K. decision to exclude the Chinese company Huawei from its 5G network after American pressure. These measures come on top of the ongoing disputes over NATO funding and U.S. troop levels on the continent. An overfocus on Europe as a partner against threats like Russia and China has meant too little attention on what Europe and the United States can offer each other directly. This goes beyond traditional national security assurances and instead requires rethinking the purpose of foreign policy for the United States in the 2020s.
The Democrats have already begun this process. Biden, a former vice president, is running on “a foreign policy for the middle class.” This approach brings together traditional Democratic themes—Biden has proposed a “Summit for Democracy” aiming to “renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world”—with an acknowledgment of the changed economic and geopolitical landscape. Earlier this month, Biden previewed what this new policy looks like: a fusion of industrial policy and foreign policy. He announced his plan to rebuild supply chains to protect national security and create U.S. jobs, suggesting how Democrats can combine foreign policy toward China and Russia with ambitious domestic economic goals.
This rethink should extend to Europe. Here, a “foreign policy for the middle class” requires different tools than one targeted at American opponents. Washington, Brussels, and London are the control centers of the global financial system, so moving further beyond industry and trade, this would fuse foreign policy and financial policy. To fulfill a progressive foreign policy, trans-Atlantic leaders cannot allow the financial infrastructure they control to be neutral before the issues they most care about, whether it is European banks in Hong Kong cutting off pro-democracy activists or U.S. states enabling anonymity, kleptocracy, and inequality. Only trans-Atlantic partners at the heart of the financial system can put an end to these problems.
Making this happen will require a progressive Europe policy to be more, not less, engaged in European politics than the United States was under former President Barack Obama. Take the fight in Brussels over post-pandemic reconstruction. Even as the Federal Reserve propped up global finance and the U.S. military provided security guarantees to all of Europe, Washington sat on the sidelines as the “Frugal Four”—the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, and Sweden—scuttled full coronavirus crisis debt mutualization, which would have marked a major step toward European integration, and then constrained the much-needed 750 billion euro ($880 billion) assistance to member states. Though European leaders ultimately agreed on a final package that included EU-wide common debt and other steps toward a more united Europe, Washington still wasted an opportunity to serve as a countervailing force, breaking these political stalemates and ending European politics’ doom-loop of economic sluggishness and political upheaval.
Washington should be more involved in such negotiations, because key U.S. interests are at stake in this European clash. As Matthew Klein and Michael Pettis argue in their recent book, Trade Wars Are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace, insufficient European spending has harmed both U.S. and European middle classes. Weak European demand driven by austerity economics has hit U.S. manufacturing and harmed American workers. U.S. intervention in the Brussels stalemate is a unique opportunity to bolster the middle class on both continents. A more generous recovery package, one with more generous grants and fewer strings attached, could have kick-started the European recovery and spending, boosting growth on both sides of the Atlantic.
U.S. aloofness on the trans-Atlantic economic question has meant that other Democratic priorities became bargaining chips as well. In an effort to reach a deal, EU leaders sacrificed long-term investments in fighting climate change. They reduced the Just Transition Fund, which incentivizes countries to increase carbon-cutting measures, from 40 billion euros to 17.5 billion ($47 billion to $21 billion). European leaders also abandoned the “rule of law” conditions that would have made recovery funding dependent on good governance in backsliding countries like Poland and Hungary. Here, phone calls from a President Biden to those in Brussels involved in the negotiations signaling U.S. priorities could have made a significant difference.
Even the most traditional national security-focused portfolios of Europe policy would have benefited from U.S. involvement in the negotiations. Successful economic cooperation will forge the strong trans-Atlantic ties necessary if Washington chooses to pursue strategic competition. It will also undo past blunders. Clashes over austerity have fueled Euroskepticism, and weakened traditionally pro-U.S. governments like Italy. Meanwhile, European domestic spending restrictions have made investments from abroad, particularly China, especially appealing, further complicating Washington’s efforts to protect allies’ critical economic sectors from competitors’ reach.
Recognizing the economic and financial foundation of the trans-Atlantic relationship should bring about a new era of U.S. engagement and cooperation with Europe over progressive priorities. Bolstering the EU’s nascent plans to tackle its tax haven problem, the United States should enlist Brussels and London in a Global Offshore Initiative to tax corporations where they earn their revenue, rather than where they hide it. Washington should start a Global Kleptocracy Initiative to make the global financial system unsafe for dark money, building on the incremental, but patchy, improvements that Britain and the EU have made to clamp down on kleptocracy. And by aligning Biden’s recently announced $2 trillion climate change plan with European Green Deal efforts, a new administration can push the world’s leading central banks in Washington, London, and Frankfurt to make a global energy transition a reality. Biden can integrate these major trans-Atlantic initiatives into his broader agenda by making them central to his Summit for Democracy: There is no better way to make clear that global democracy cannot flourish without a strong internationalist economic policy.
The lines between domestic and foreign policy have broken down at home and abroad. Biden’s “foreign policy for the middle class” has made clear that the solutions to U.S. domestic problems run through U.S. foreign policy. By extension, a successful U.S. administration will need to be deeply engaged in EU and British domestic politics. Therefore the Democrats should neither revert to Obama’s hands-off approach on Europe nor like Trump treat it solely as a tool to compete with Russia and China. When it comes to achieving key Democratic objectives in the United States—whether curbing corruption, taming financial flows, reviving the world economy, or tackling climate breakdown—all roads lead to Europe.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-30--Trump Isn’t the Only President Who May Have Explored Postponing the Vote

Trump Isn ’ t the Only President Who May Have Explored Postponing the Vote On July 30 , U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted a condemnation of mail-in voting as “ INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT ” —a claim that has little evidence to support it—and to raise the idea of postponing the November presidential elections “ until people can properly , securely and safely vote.
” Unfortunately for Trump , U.S. presidents have no authority to tamper with the date of presidential elections—something this country ’ s last Republican president may have had to learn as well .
In the runup to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incumbent President George W. Bush against Democratic nominee John Kerry , a debate about delaying the vote briefly bubbled to the top of the national conversation after Newsweek reported that , fearing possible terrorist attacks , the Department of Homeland Security had “ asked the Justice Department ’ s Office of Legal Counsel to analyze what legal steps would be needed to permit the postponement of the election were an attack to take place.
” Quickly , Bush ’ s national security advisor , Condoleezza Rice , appeared on CNN to deny that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote .
“ We ’ ve had elections in this country when we were at war , even when we were in civil war , ” she said in her interview with host Wolf Blitzer .
“ And we should have the elections on time .
That ’ s the view of the president , that ’ s the view of the administration.
” ( A longer transcript of those remarks is below . )
Denials aside , commentators around the web , including on Foreign Policy , pointed out that delaying the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ terrorists win , that it would represent bad politics , and , similar to today , that it would undermine democracy .
Even more than that , as July and October 2004 reports to Congress from the Congressional Research Service make abundantly clear , it would not even be up to the president to decide when the election would happen .
That ’ s a lesson experts are reminding yet another administration of again today .
Wolf Blitzer : Welcome back .
I ’ m Wolf Blitzer reporting today from New York .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the event of a terrorist attack ?
The idea has been discussed within the Bush administration , I ’ ll ask the national security advisor , Condoleezza Rice .
… Dr. Rice , thanks very much for joining us .
Before we get to the intelligence report , homeland security .
How serious is this threat of an al Qaeda attack on the homeland before the election , a threat apparently serious enough that the Department of Homeland Security is asking the Justice Department about contingency plans , if necessary , to postpone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Well , we are concerned about threats prior to the election .
There have been such threats , and we are concerned about them .
But let me just be very clear .
I don ’ t know where the idea that there might be some postponement of elections comes from .
But this administration believes that the elections will go forward on schedule , that there is no reason to think about anything else .
We ’ ve had elections in this country when we were at war , even when we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should have the elections on time .
That ’ s the view of the president , that ’ s the view of the administration .
WB : So even if there ’ s a major terrorist attack along the lines of 9/11 you don ’ t envisage the need of postponing the election ?
CR : No one is thinking of postponing the elections , Wolf .
WB : Alright .
Well , I just asked the question because there is this formal request for these contingency plans which has generated some concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t know where that comes from .
The Department of Homeland Security and our Justice Department are not certain where this has come from and exactly what people are talking about .
The important point is we believe elections will go on as planned .
We ’ ve done it before in this country .
There is no reason to think anything else .
This transcript is taken from the website of CNN .

On July 30, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted a condemnation of mail-in voting as “INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT”—a claim that has little evidence to support it—and to raise the idea of postponing the November presidential elections “until people can properly, securely and safely vote.” Unfortunately for Trump, U.S. presidents have no authority to tamper with the date of presidential elections—something this country’s last Republican president may have had to learn as well.
On July 30, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted a condemnation of mail-in voting as “INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT”—a claim that has little evidence to support it—and to raise the idea of postponing the November presidential elections “until people can properly, securely and safely vote.” Unfortunately for Trump, U.S. presidents have no authority to tamper with the date of presidential elections—something this country’s last Republican president may have had to learn as well.
In the runup to the 2004 election, which would pit incumbent President George W. Bush against Democratic nominee John Kerry, a debate about delaying the vote briefly bubbled to the top of the national conversation after Newsweek reported that, fearing possible terrorist attacks, the Department of Homeland Security had “asked the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel to analyze what legal steps would be needed to permit the postponement of the election were an attack to take place.”
Quickly, Bush’s national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, appeared on CNN to deny that the administration had plans to postpone the vote. “We’ve had elections in this country when we were at war, even when we were in civil war,” she said in her interview with host Wolf Blitzer. “And we should have the elections on time. That’s the view of the president, that’s the view of the administration.” (A longer transcript of those remarks is below.)
Denials aside, commentators around the web, including on Foreign Policy, pointed out that delaying the election would be tantamount to letting the terrorists win, that it would represent bad politics, and, similar to today, that it would undermine democracy. Even more than that, as July and October 2004 reports to Congress from the Congressional Research Service make abundantly clear, it would not even be up to the president to decide when the election would happen. That’s a lesson experts are reminding yet another administration of again today.
***
Wolf Blitzer: Welcome back. I’m Wolf Blitzer reporting today from New York.
Could the presidential election be postponed in the event of a terrorist attack?
The idea has been discussed within the Bush administration, I’ll ask the national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice. …
Dr. Rice, thanks very much for joining us. Before we get to the intelligence report, homeland security. How serious is this threat of an al Qaeda attack on the homeland before the election, a threat apparently serious enough that the Department of Homeland Security is asking the Justice Department about contingency plans, if necessary, to postpone the presidential election.
Condoleezza Rice: Well, we are concerned about threats prior to the election. There have been such threats, and we are concerned about them. But let me just be very clear. I don’t know where the idea that there might be some postponement of elections comes from. But this administration believes that the elections will go forward on schedule, that there is no reason to think about anything else. We’ve had elections in this country when we were at war, even when we were in civil war. And we should have the elections on time. That’s the view of the president, that’s the view of the administration.
WB: So even if there’s a major terrorist attack along the lines of 9/11 you don’t envisage the need of postponing the election?
CR: No one is thinking of postponing the elections, Wolf.
WB: Alright. Well, I just asked the question because there is this formal request for these contingency plans which has generated some concern.
CR: Wolf, I don’t know where that comes from. The Department of Homeland Security and our Justice Department are not certain where this has come from and exactly what people are talking about. The important point is we believe elections will go on as planned. We’ve done it before in this country. There is no reason to think anything else.
This transcript is taken from the website of CNN.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-30--Trump’s Germany Troop Withdrawal Could Take Years to Execute

Trump ’ s Germany Troop Withdrawal Could Take Years to Execute Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Confusion follows U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s order to withdraw some U.S. troops from Germany , a Republican ally of Trump holds up a controversial Pentagon nomination , and the Afghanistan peace talks stumble forward .
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While the Pentagon has rushed to begin plans to draw down troops from Germany at the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members stationed there are being told that these moves will take years to carry out , according to documents obtained by Foreign Policy and interviews with U.S. officials .
Some units that are moving back to the United States , including the 2nd Cavalry Regiment , based in Vilseck , Germany , have been told that the move will “ likely take months to plan and years to execute.
” Slow out of the gate ?
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said yesterday that some moves would begin “ within weeks , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But the development could be another sign that the planning for the drawdown in Germany is more disorderly than previously thought .
During a press briefing announcing the move yesterday , Esper said the moves would cost in the “ single-digit billions ” of dollars , but Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Hyten quickly countered that the figure was a “ rough estimate.
” “ Nobody really has any idea how this will play out , ” another U.S. official told Foreign Policy , speaking on condition of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to clear significant hurdles in Congress , where troop withdrawals face opposition from both Democrats and Republicans .
It is also unclear whether the withdrawal would move forward if Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden wins in November : All signals so far indicate he opposes the move .
Impact beyond German borders .
U.S. military installations in Germany are an important hub and launchpad for U.S. operations across Europe , the Middle East , and Africa .
U.S. Africa Command is currently based in Stuttgart .
On NATO ’ s vulnerable eastern flank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Baltic region would come from Germany .
So any disruption would have ripple effects well beyond German borders .
U.S. officials said what has rattled Berlin and other European allies is not the withdrawal of troops itself—past presidents have also ordered a drawdown in U.S. troops from Germany—but the chaotic process through which it was done .
Allies were kept in the dark , the White House and the Pentagon are sending conflicting signals , and there is confusion over why which forces are being moved where .
Ta-ta to Tata ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a confirmation hearing for Trump ’ s controversial pick to lead the Pentagon ’ s policy shop today , just an hour before the panel was set to consider the nomination .
In a statement , Armed Services Chairman and Trump ally Sen. Jim Inhofe said that many Democrats and Republicans “ didn ’ t know enough ” about Anthony Tata and that the powerful panel did not receive required documents for the hearing until Wednesday .
Inhofe said he told Trump that the committee was “ out of time ” with August @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t serve any useful purpose to have a hearing at this point , and he agreed.
” The postponement leaves further confusion about the nomination ; Democrats on the panel oppose the pick , sending a letter urging Tata to step aside after his tweets surfaced falsely labelling former President Barack Obama as a “ terrorist leader ” and hinting—without evidence—that former CIA director John Brennan ordered Trump ’ s assassination .
CNN reported on Thursday that the White House had requested the Senate pull the nomination .
New MI6 Chief .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Younger as the chief of MI6 , Britain ’ s premiere foreign intelligence agency .
Moore , a former intelligence official and diplomat , served as the U.K. ambassador to Turkey from 2014 to 2017 .
New Arctic envoy .
The State Department this week appointed James DeHart as the new U.S. envoy for the Arctic .
DeHart , a career foreign service officer , takes the post at a time when the United States is increasingly concerned about China ’ s and Russia ’ s designs in the Arctic .
White House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sent three nominations for senior national security posts to the Senate this week : Craig Duehring to be deputy under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness ; Douglas MacGregor to be ambassador to Germany ; and Eric Ueland to be under secretary of state for civilian security , democracy , and human rights .
Pompeo heads to the hill .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday , with Russia and China the top focus of the hearing .
Pompeo faces criticism from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just released a report on the administration ’ s “ decimation ” of the State Department .
Pompeo , testifying before the committee for the first time since April 2019 , defended the administration ’ s policies on Russia but did not say whether he had addressed the Russians on specific allegations Moscow was paying bounties to Afghan militants to target U.S. troops .
During the hearing , Pompeo also reiterated his hardline stance on China , calling the Chinese Communist Party “ the central threat of our times.
” Not going anywhere @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Libya to bolster the capabilities of the Wagner group , a constellation of private military contractors helping Moscow carve out a stake in the North African country , according to U.S. Africa Command .
Overhead imagery captured a wide range of Russian military equipment near the coastal city of Sirte , where Libyan National Army Gen. Khalifa Haftar is making what could be his last stand .
These reports come as authorities in Minsk have accused Russia of sending in Wagner operatives to Belarus ahead of the country ’ s presidential election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia is only using Belarus as a transit point on the way to other hotspots like Libya , as FP ’ s Amy Mackinnon reports .
Afghanistan cease-fires .
On July 28 , the Taliban announced it would observe a three-day ceasefire during the Muslim festival of Eid al-Adha , beginning Friday .
The annual move could ease tensions between the two sides amid fraught peace negotiations .
The cease-fire comes after Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced that his government would soon complete the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners , paving the way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The color of diplomacy .
Kip Whittington , a currently-serving foreign service officer , writes a must-read personal essay in War on the Rocks about the State Department ’ s shortcomings on racism and diversity .
On Friday , July 31 , the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the International Security Program are hosting an online discussion with General James C. McConville , Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army , about the Indo-Pacific .
The Belarusian presidential election takes place on August 9 .
Incumbent President Aleksandr Lukashenko is running @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what many international observers expect will be an unfair and rigged election ( despite facing a surprising opposition challenge ) .
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Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Confusion follows U.S. President Donald Trump’s order to withdraw some U.S. troops from Germany , a Republican ally of Trump holds up a controversial Pentagon nomination , and the Afghanistan peace talks stumble forward.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Confusion follows U.S. President Donald Trump’s order to withdraw some U.S. troops from Germany, a Republican ally of Trump holds up a controversial Pentagon nomination, and the Afghanistan peace talks stumble forward.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Germany Troop Withdrawal Could Take Years
While the Pentagon has rushed to begin plans to draw down troops from Germany at the president’s request, some U.S. service members stationed there are being told that these moves will take years to carry out, according to documents obtained by Foreign Policy and interviews with U.S. officials.
Some units that are moving back to the United States, including the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, based in Vilseck, Germany, have been told that the move will “likely take months to plan and years to execute.”
Slow out of the gate? U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said yesterday that some moves would begin “within weeks,” while other troop movements would take longer. But the development could be another sign that the planning for the drawdown in Germany is more disorderly than previously thought. During a press briefing announcing the move yesterday, Esper said the moves would cost in the “single-digit billions” of dollars, but Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Hyten quickly countered that the figure was a “rough estimate.”
“Nobody really has any idea how this will play out,” another U.S. official told Foreign Policy, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Any such plan will have to clear significant hurdles in Congress, where troop withdrawals face opposition from both Democrats and Republicans. It is also unclear whether the withdrawal would move forward if Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden wins in November: All signals so far indicate he opposes the move.
Impact beyond German borders. U.S. military installations in Germany are an important hub and launchpad for U.S. operations across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. U.S. Africa Command is currently based in Stuttgart. On NATO’s vulnerable eastern flank, any reinforcement of U.S. troops to the Baltic region would come from Germany. So any disruption would have ripple effects well beyond German borders.
U.S. officials said what has rattled Berlin and other European allies is not the withdrawal of troops itself—past presidents have also ordered a drawdown in U.S. troops from Germany—but the chaotic process through which it was done. Allies were kept in the dark, the White House and the Pentagon are sending conflicting signals, and there is confusion over why which forces are being moved where.
Movers and Shakers
Ta-ta to Tata? The Senate Armed Services Committee abruptly cancelled a confirmation hearing for Trump’s controversial pick to lead the Pentagon’s policy shop today, just an hour before the panel was set to consider the nomination. In a statement, Armed Services Chairman and Trump ally Sen. Jim Inhofe said that many Democrats and Republicans “didn’t know enough” about Anthony Tata and that the powerful panel did not receive required documents for the hearing until Wednesday.
Inhofe said he told Trump that the committee was “out of time” with August recess coming, “so it wouldn’t serve any useful purpose to have a hearing at this point, and he agreed.”
The postponement leaves further confusion about the nomination; Democrats on the panel oppose the pick, sending a letter urging Tata to step aside after his tweets surfaced falsely labelling former President Barack Obama as a “terrorist leader” and hinting—without evidence—that former CIA director John Brennan ordered Trump’s assassination. CNN reported on Thursday that the White House had requested the Senate pull the nomination.
New MI6 Chief. Richard Moore is slated to replace Alex Younger as the chief of MI6, Britain’s premiere foreign intelligence agency. Moore, a former intelligence official and diplomat, served as the U.K. ambassador to Turkey from 2014 to 2017.
New Arctic envoy. The State Department this week appointed James DeHart as the new U.S. envoy for the Arctic. DeHart, a career foreign service officer, takes the post at a time when the United States is increasingly concerned about China’s and Russia’s designs in the Arctic.
White House nominations. The White House this week sent three nominations for senior national security posts to the Senate this week: Craig Duehring to be deputy under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness; Douglas MacGregor to be ambassador to Germany; and Eric Ueland to be under secretary of state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights.
What We’re Watching
Pompeo heads to the hill. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday, with Russia and China the top focus of the hearing. Pompeo faces criticism from top Democrats on the committee, which just released a report on the administration’s “decimation” of the State Department. Pompeo, testifying before the committee for the first time since April 2019, defended the administration’s policies on Russia but did not say whether he had addressed the Russians on specific allegations Moscow was paying bounties to Afghan militants to target U.S. troops.
During the hearing, Pompeo also reiterated his hardline stance on China, calling the Chinese Communist Party “the central threat of our times.”
Not going anywhere. Russia is continuing to send supplies to Libya to bolster the capabilities of the Wagner group, a constellation of private military contractors helping Moscow carve out a stake in the North African country, according to U.S. Africa Command. Overhead imagery captured a wide range of Russian military equipment near the coastal city of Sirte, where Libyan National Army Gen. Khalifa Haftar is making what could be his last stand.
These reports come as authorities in Minsk have accused Russia of sending in Wagner operatives to Belarus ahead of the country’s presidential election this month, though many experts believe Russia is only using Belarus as a transit point on the way to other hotspots like Libya, as FP’s Amy Mackinnon reports.
Afghanistan cease-fires. On July 28, the Taliban announced it would observe a three-day ceasefire during the Muslim festival of Eid al-Adha, beginning Friday. The annual move could ease tensions between the two sides amid fraught peace negotiations. The cease-fire comes after Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced that his government would soon complete the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners, paving the way for the opening of inter-Afghan talks.
Foreign Policy Recommends
The color of diplomacy. Kip Whittington, a currently-serving foreign service officer, writes a must-read personal essay in War on the Rocks about the State Department’s shortcomings on racism and diversity.
The Week Ahead
On Friday, July 31, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the International Security Program are hosting an online discussion with General James C. McConville, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, about the Indo-Pacific.
The Belarusian presidential election takes place on August 9. Incumbent President Aleksandr Lukashenko is running for a sixth term in office in what many international observers expect will be an unfair and rigged election (despite facing a surprising opposition challenge).
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.