foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--Why Has China Detained a CGTN Journalist?

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : A Chinese-Australian journalist has been detained in Beijing , ethnic Mongolians hold rare protests over language instruction in Inner Mongolia , and China blocks the sale of TikTok to Microsoft .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
China ’ s foreign ministry has confirmed that the Chinese-Australian journalist Cheng Lei has been detained in Beijing on unspecified charges .
Cheng is a prominent face on China ’ s English-language TV channel CGTN , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
She disappeared on Aug.14 , prompting fear among friends and colleagues .
CGTN has deleted any reference to her existence in its materials .
Cheng , who was born in mainland China , became a naturalized Australian citizen after emigrating at the age of 10 .
That is a dangerous position , especially since China has claimed in the past that dual citizens have renounced their foreign citizenship in detention .
China is already holding another Chinese-born Australian , Yang Hengjun , on espionage charges .
China allows detainees to be held @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s unclear what prompted Cheng ’ s detention .
It ’ s unlikely to be her journalism : Although she worked for CNBC before taking the job at CGTN in 2012 , Cheng ’ s CGTN work has stayed within the limits of state media .
But Australian-Chinese relations are at a nadir , following Australian investigations into Chinese influence , a stream of insulting rhetoric and threats from Chinese media , and China ’ s worsening human rights .
That has prompted fears that Cheng might have been taken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in December 2018 .
Cheng played an active role in the Australian expatriate society in China , and her former partner was the head of the Australian Chamber of Commerce .
CGTN anchors have previously been caught up in political intrigue , though never foreign citizens .
The most prominent case is that of Rui Chenggang , once a rising star , who disappeared in 2014 and is said to be in prison .
There are rumors about two other CCTV presenters detained as part of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Sun Lijun .
But as a foreigner , Cheng is unlikely to have been given the kind of access to the powerful that creates those dangers .
She may instead simply be the victim of a state that increasingly sees foreigners as inherently suspicious .
Mongolian protests .
Inner Mongolia , which was absorbed into the Chinese state after 1949 , has seen vigorous protests by ethnic Mongolians after attempts to change elementary and high school classes from Mongolian into Mandarin .
China has gradually eradicated or reduced minority language education as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multicultural ideals the state once imperfectly espoused .
The targeting of Chinese languages such as Cantonese has also been a point of contention , especially in Hong Kong .
The protests may be a critical test for minority policy in the Xi era .
Over the last four decades , Inner Mongolia has been more peaceful than Tibet or Xinjiang .
That is in part because Mongolians have a state of their own next door , along with a relatively porous border .
Under past leaders , protests on this scale would have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If the government instead cracks down , it will create yet another long-term problem in its borderlands .
Diplomat crackdowns .
The U.S.-China diplomatic tit-for-tat fight continues , with the United States imposing new restrictions on Chinese embassy staff—singling out meetings with local government officials and visits to campuses , which now require an application for permission first .
The measures come as U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo threatens possible bans on Chinese students .
But as Lucas Tcheyan and Sam Bresnick recently argued in Foreign Policy , reciprocity isn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in this case , since the network of influence China maintains on U.S. campuses rarely operates through direct visits by embassy staff .
Taiwan switches passports .
Taiwan has announced its new passport designs , keeping the name Republic of China in Chinese but referring only to Taiwan in English .
The move follows other shifts away from using the term China , such as the renaming of China Airlines—Taiwan ’ s flagship carrier .
Sadly , proposals to use distinctly Taiwanese images such as bubble tea were rejected .
The symbolic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ feel entitled to ownership of Taiwan , which remains one of the most hot-button topics in censorship .
Nationalistic Chinese websites have blurred images of the new passports in their stories .
TikTok sale likely blocked .
China signaled over the weekend that the sale of the social media app TikTok to Microsoft by parent company Bytedance would likely be blocked under hastily rewritten export rules .
Bytedance , like all other Chinese firms , depends on state sufferance , but the announcement is a harsh blow to the firm , which may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in India and the United States—two of its biggest markets—without any chance of recouping losses through a sale .
The move also reinforces perceptions that TikTok serves Chinese state purposes and raises questions about the security of its underlying code and the nature of TikTok ’ s algorithms , which the firm denies favor pro-China viewpoints .
India puts 118 more apps on the blacklist .
Amid renewed tensions over the disputed China-India border , the Indian government blocked another swath of Chinese apps , mostly targeting games .
Although the government says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that seems doubtful : Many of the games , such as the popular PUBG , weren ’ t even developed in China but happen to be owned by the gaming giant Tencent .
Such bans have become the go-to way for the Indian government to play to nationalistic sentiments and inflict economic damage on China , but it costs India ’ s own tech sector investment from China .
Chinese firms may be increasingly unhappy about having to bear the economic burden of Beijing ’ s jingoism , but there is little they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cables threatened .
Global internet traffic largely depends upon high-speed undersea cables , especially between continents .
The U.S. Clean Network Initiative , launched by Pompeo , includes a Clean Cables section , amid fears that Chinese ownership or investment in those cables could be used for sabotage or espionage .
The move has caused Google and Facebook to abandon major Asia-North America cable projects due to the involvement of Chinese investors .
In keeping with this edition ’ s focus on petty squabbles : Geremie Barmé , a doyen of China studies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the New Yorker ’ s Peter Hessler , who recently returned to China .
Hessler ’ s articles are very popular inside China , not least because he tends to avoid political commentary in favor of localized stories .
Barmé accuses him of practicing self-censorship in order to avoid tackling human rights issues , thus effectively acting as a Chinese propagandist .
The criticisms aren ’ t particularly fair , but they speak to the real problems of trying to give a humane account of a country with an inhumane government .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China of the 2000s may not work in the China of 2020 .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: A Chinese-Australian journalist has been detained in Beijing, ethnic Mongolians hold rare protests over language instruction in Inner Mongolia , and China blocks the sale of TikTok to Microsoft.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: A Chinese-Australian journalist has been detained in Beijing, ethnic Mongolians hold rare protests over language instruction in Inner Mongolia, and China blocks the sale of TikTok to Microsoft.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Detained Journalist Prompts Fears of Hostage Diplomacy
China’s foreign ministry has confirmed that the Chinese-Australian journalist Cheng Lei has been detained in Beijing on unspecified charges. Cheng is a prominent face on China’s English-language TV channel CGTN, where she hosted a daily business show. She disappeared on Aug.14, prompting fear among friends and colleagues. CGTN has deleted any reference to her existence in its materials.
Cheng, who was born in mainland China, became a naturalized Australian citizen after emigrating at the age of 10. That is a dangerous position, especially since China has claimed in the past that dual citizens have renounced their foreign citizenship in detention. China is already holding another Chinese-born Australian, Yang Hengjun, on espionage charges. China allows detainees to be held without charge for up to six months.
It’s unclear what prompted Cheng’s detention. It’s unlikely to be her journalism: Although she worked for CNBC before taking the job at CGTN in 2012, Cheng’s CGTN work has stayed within the limits of state media. But Australian-Chinese relations are at a nadir, following Australian investigations into Chinese influence, a stream of insulting rhetoric and threats from Chinese media, and China’s worsening human rights.
That has prompted fears that Cheng might have been taken as a hostage, as with Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in December 2018. Cheng played an active role in the Australian expatriate society in China, and her former partner was the head of the Australian Chamber of Commerce.
CGTN anchors have previously been caught up in political intrigue, though never foreign citizens. The most prominent case is that of Rui Chenggang, once a rising star, who disappeared in 2014 and is said to be in prison. There are rumors about two other CCTV presenters detained as part of the investigation into the fallen public security minister, Sun Lijun.
But as a foreigner, Cheng is unlikely to have been given the kind of access to the powerful that creates those dangers. She may instead simply be the victim of a state that increasingly sees foreigners as inherently suspicious.
What We’re Following
Mongolian protests. Inner Mongolia, which was absorbed into the Chinese state after 1949, has seen vigorous protests by ethnic Mongolians after attempts to change elementary and high school classes from Mongolian into Mandarin. China has gradually eradicated or reduced minority language education as part of its shift away from the multicultural ideals the state once imperfectly espoused. The targeting of Chinese languages such as Cantonese has also been a point of contention, especially in Hong Kong.
The protests may be a critical test for minority policy in the Xi era. Over the last four decades, Inner Mongolia has been more peaceful than Tibet or Xinjiang. That is in part because Mongolians have a state of their own next door, along with a relatively porous border. Under past leaders, protests on this scale would have likely produced a policy retraction or revision. If the government instead cracks down, it will create yet another long-term problem in its borderlands.
Diplomat crackdowns. The U.S.-China diplomatic tit-for-tat fight continues, with the United States imposing new restrictions on Chinese embassy staff—singling out meetings with local government officials and visits to campuses, which now require an application for permission first. The measures come as U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo threatens possible bans on Chinese students.
But as Lucas Tcheyan and Sam Bresnick recently argued in Foreign Policy, reciprocity isn’t much of a policy by itself—especially, in this case, since the network of influence China maintains on U.S. campuses rarely operates through direct visits by embassy staff.
Taiwan switches passports. Taiwan has announced its new passport designs, keeping the name Republic of China in Chinese but referring only to Taiwan in English. The move follows other shifts away from using the term China, such as the renaming of China Airlines—Taiwan’s flagship carrier. Sadly, proposals to use distinctly Taiwanese images such as bubble tea were rejected.
The symbolic moves could prompt anger among Chinese who feel entitled to ownership of Taiwan, which remains one of the most hot-button topics in censorship. Nationalistic Chinese websites have blurred images of the new passports in their stories.
Tech and Business
TikTok sale likely blocked. China signaled over the weekend that the sale of the social media app TikTok to Microsoft by parent company Bytedance would likely be blocked under hastily rewritten export rules. Bytedance, like all other Chinese firms, depends on state sufferance, but the announcement is a harsh blow to the firm, which may now have to eat bans on TikTok in India and the United States—two of its biggest markets—without any chance of recouping losses through a sale.
The move also reinforces perceptions that TikTok serves Chinese state purposes and raises questions about the security of its underlying code and the nature of TikTok’s algorithms, which the firm denies favor pro-China viewpoints.
India puts 118 more apps on the blacklist. Amid renewed tensions over the disputed China-India border, the Indian government blocked another swath of Chinese apps, mostly targeting games. Although the government says the move is for security purposes, that seems doubtful: Many of the games, such as the popular PUBG, weren’t even developed in China but happen to be owned by the gaming giant Tencent.
Such bans have become the go-to way for the Indian government to play to nationalistic sentiments and inflict economic damage on China, but it costs India’s own tech sector investment from China. Chinese firms may be increasingly unhappy about having to bear the economic burden of Beijing’s jingoism, but there is little they can do about it.
Global internet cables threatened. Global internet traffic largely depends upon high-speed undersea cables, especially between continents. The U.S. Clean Network Initiative, launched by Pompeo, includes a Clean Cables section, amid fears that Chinese ownership or investment in those cables could be used for sabotage or espionage. The move has caused Google and Facebook to abandon major Asia-North America cable projects due to the involvement of Chinese investors.
What We’re Reading
“The Good Caucasian of Sichuan”
In keeping with this edition’s focus on petty squabbles: Geremie Barmé, a doyen of China studies, has launched a dramatic broadside against the New Yorker’s Peter Hessler, who recently returned to China. Hessler’s articles are very popular inside China, not least because he tends to avoid political commentary in favor of localized stories. Barmé accuses him of practicing self-censorship in order to avoid tackling human rights issues, thus effectively acting as a Chinese propagandist.
The criticisms aren’t particularly fair, but they speak to the real problems of trying to give a humane account of a country with an inhumane government. The approach that worked for Hessler in the China of the 2000s may not work in the China of 2020.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--The Russian Election Hack That Wasn’t (This Time)

The Russian Election Hack That Wasn ’ t ( This Time ) A report published Tuesday in a Russian newspaper claiming Russian hackers had seized personal details of millions of U.S. voters sparked panic about a repeat of Russian efforts to sway the U.S. presidential election .
The story was shared online by a number of high-profile journalists , political commentators , and national security experts , playing on widespread concerns about Moscow ’ s plans to repeat its successful cyber-meddling in the 2016 election .
The only problem : The story was almost entirely false .
Four years after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a disinformation campaign in the United States , the incident underscores how vulnerable many Americans still are to fake news , especially with much of the populace primed for a repeat of Russia ’ s use of hacks , online ads , and outright lies to sway U.S. voters to advance its own agenda .
“ I was pretty frustrated seeing the number of people who do have political and national security expertise that instantly posted the story on their social media , painting it as true , ” said Cindy Otis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s very much a cautionary tale of whether you ’ ve got two followers or a million , you ’ ve got to do your due diligence.
” With almost all eyes peeled for another round of foreign interference in the upcoming election—a top U.S. intelligence official warned last month that “ foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures in their attempts to sway U.S. voters ’ preferences ” —the incident highlights how the very notion of interference , whether true or not , can be used to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters .
“ There is certainly an appetite for this sort of story , and everyone is looking for where the Russian interference will come into the election , ” said Nina Jankowicz , the disinformation fellow at the Wilson Center .
“ Because of the lack of information we ’ ve gotten from the federal government so far , people are trying to fill in the gaps.
” Cybersecurity experts were quick to debunk the most explosive claim in the Kommersant report : that the information had to come from a hack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the leak is either publicly available in much of the United States or can be accessed via Freedom of Information requests .
In some states , such as Florida , voter registration and voting history are by law public record .
The Michigan Department of State denied that its systems had been hacked .
“ We encourage all Michigan voters to be wary of attempts to ‘ hack ’ their minds , however , by questioning the sources of information and advertisements they encounter and seeking out trusted sources , including their local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Tracy Wimmer , a spokesperson for the Michigan Department of State .
The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued a joint statement confirming that they had not seen any cyberattacks on voter registration databases or any systems that involve voting .
“ Early , unverified claims should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism , ” they said .
Longtime Russia watchers were unsurprised that publicly available data would be traded in Russian online forums , where there is a thriving trade in both hacked and legally obtained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , you have a lot of people who have access to information like the migration service , police records , loan information , etc.
, and a real willingness for these people to make some cash on the side by selling access to this data , ” said Aric Toler , who spearheads East European and Eurasian research for the open-source investigative site Bellingcat .
The original Kommersant report alleged that Russian internet users were looking to leverage the voter database to claim rewards from the State Department ’ s Rewards for Justice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 10 million reward for information on the identification or location of people working on behalf of a foreign government to interfere in U.S. elections using illegal cyberactivities .
The article said that one user on the hacker forum had claimed to have received $ 4,000 from the State Department for sharing a link to a leaked voter database from Connecticut .
That , too , appears to be false .
A State Department spokesperson told Foreign Policy that no awards had been paid out under the expanded election interference program , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rewards for Justice program was established in 1984 by the State Department to collect information on acts of terrorism or terrorists looking to target American citizens .
Last month , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expanded the program to offer rewards for information on foreign election interference .
While the contents of the article have been widely debunked , it remains unclear whether it was slapdash journalism , or the result of something more nefarious .
After the Rewards for Justice program was announced , the Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman joked on Facebook @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would crash with people looking to denounce their neighbors for a financial reward .
The Russian political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya described the article as “ strange , ” adding that it seemed to accuse the State Department of provoking leaks of U.S. citizen data by offering the rewards .
“ The Kremlin appears to be preparing for allegations of [ election ] meddling , ” she wrote on her public channel on the messaging app Telegram .
Otis , the author of True or False : A CIA Analyst ’ s Guide to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highly charged nature of social media fuels the spread of disinformation .
“ It ’ s never really the ‘ let ’ s step back and pause ’ kind of takes that go viral .
It ’ s the emotionally charged , pithily worded hot takes that go viral , ” she said .
More U.S. government transparency about foreign interference efforts , as well as more detailed debunking of false stories , could be an antidote by increasing trust in the government and raising awareness about the kinds of threats the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ How to Lose the Information War .
Yet the Trump administration is moving in the opposite direction .
Over the weekend , the director of national intelligence said that his office would stop briefing Congress in person about foreign election interference , claiming that lawmakers had leaked classified information .
The announcement came amid concerns—and some evidence—that the Trump administration is seeking to downplay election threats from foreign actors .
On Wednesday , ABC News , citing internal emails and documents , reported that senior Department of Homeland Security officials squashed the circulation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enforcement agencies that determined with “ high confidence ” that Russian operatives sought to sow doubt about the mental fitness of Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden .

A report published Tuesday in a Russian newspaper claiming Russian hackers had seized personal details of millions of U.S. voters sparked panic about a repeat of Russian efforts to sway the U.S. presidential election. The story was shared online by a number of high-profile journalists, political commentators, and national security experts, playing on widespread concerns about Moscow’s plans to repeat its successful cyber-meddling in the 2016 election.
A report published Tuesday in a Russian newspaper claiming Russian hackers had seized personal details of millions of U.S. voters sparked panic about a repeat of Russian efforts to sway the U.S. presidential election. The story was shared online by a number of high-profile journalists, political commentators, and national security experts, playing on widespread concerns about Moscow’s plans to repeat its successful cyber-meddling in the 2016 election.
The only problem: The story was almost entirely false.
Four years after Russia’s infamous troll factory unleashed a disinformation campaign in the United States, the incident underscores how vulnerable many Americans still are to fake news, especially with much of the populace primed for a repeat of Russia’s use of hacks, online ads, and outright lies to sway U.S. voters to advance its own agenda.
“I was pretty frustrated seeing the number of people who do have political and national security expertise that instantly posted the story on their social media, painting it as true,” said Cindy Otis, a former CIA analyst. “It’s very much a cautionary tale of whether you’ve got two followers or a million, you’ve got to do your due diligence.”
With almost all eyes peeled for another round of foreign interference in the upcoming election—a top U.S. intelligence official warned last month that “foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures in their attempts to sway U.S. voters’ preferences”—the incident highlights how the very notion of interference, whether true or not, can be used to muddy the waters and further confuse potential voters.
“There is certainly an appetite for this sort of story, and everyone is looking for where the Russian interference will come into the election,” said Nina Jankowicz, the disinformation fellow at the Wilson Center. “Because of the lack of information we’ve gotten from the federal government so far, people are trying to fill in the gaps.”
Cybersecurity experts were quick to debunk the most explosive claim in the Kommersant report: that the information had to come from a hack. The kind of data included in the leak is either publicly available in much of the United States or can be accessed via Freedom of Information requests. In some states, such as Florida, voter registration and voting history are by law public record.
The Michigan Department of State denied that its systems had been hacked. “We encourage all Michigan voters to be wary of attempts to ‘hack’ their minds, however, by questioning the sources of information and advertisements they encounter and seeking out trusted sources, including their local election clerk and our office,” said Tracy Wimmer, a spokesperson for the Michigan Department of State.
The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued a joint statement confirming that they had not seen any cyberattacks on voter registration databases or any systems that involve voting. “Early, unverified claims should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism,” they said.
Longtime Russia watchers were unsurprised that publicly available data would be traded in Russian online forums, where there is a thriving trade in both hacked and legally obtained databases of information.
“In Russia, you have a lot of people who have access to information like the migration service, police records, loan information, etc., and a real willingness for these people to make some cash on the side by selling access to this data,” said Aric Toler, who spearheads East European and Eurasian research for the open-source investigative site Bellingcat.
The original Kommersant report alleged that Russian internet users were looking to leverage the voter database to claim rewards from the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program, which offers up to a $10 million reward for information on the identification or location of people working on behalf of a foreign government to interfere in U.S. elections using illegal cyberactivities. The article said that one user on the hacker forum had claimed to have received $4,000 from the State Department for sharing a link to a leaked voter database from Connecticut.
That, too, appears to be false. A State Department spokesperson told Foreign Policy that no awards had been paid out under the expanded election interference program, which was launched in early August.
The Rewards for Justice program was established in 1984 by the State Department to collect information on acts of terrorism or terrorists looking to target American citizens. Last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expanded the program to offer rewards for information on foreign election interference.
While the contents of the article have been widely debunked, it remains unclear whether it was slapdash journalism, or the result of something more nefarious. After the Rewards for Justice program was announced, the Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman joked on Facebook that the State Department’s website would crash with people looking to denounce their neighbors for a financial reward.
The Russian political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya described the article as “strange,” adding that it seemed to accuse the State Department of provoking leaks of U.S. citizen data by offering the rewards.
“The Kremlin appears to be preparing for allegations of [election] meddling,” she wrote on her public channel on the messaging app Telegram.
Otis, the author of True or False: A CIA Analyst’s Guide to Spotting Fake News, said that the highly charged nature of social media fuels the spread of disinformation. “It’s never really the ‘let’s step back and pause’ kind of takes that go viral. It’s the emotionally charged, pithily worded hot takes that go viral,” she said.
More U.S. government transparency about foreign interference efforts, as well as more detailed debunking of false stories, could be an antidote by increasing trust in the government and raising awareness about the kinds of threats the country faces, said Jankowicz, who wrote How to Lose the Information War.
Yet the Trump administration is moving in the opposite direction. Over the weekend, the director of national intelligence said that his office would stop briefing Congress in person about foreign election interference, claiming that lawmakers had leaked classified information. The announcement came amid concerns—and some evidence—that the Trump administration is seeking to downplay election threats from foreign actors.
On Wednesday, ABC News, citing internal emails and documents, reported that senior Department of Homeland Security officials squashed the circulation of an intelligence bulletin meant for law enforcement agencies that determined with “high confidence” that Russian operatives sought to sow doubt about the mental fitness of Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--The Developing World Could Come Out of the Pandemic Ahead

The Developing World Could Come Out of the Pandemic Ahead The coronavirus could be the great global leveler for this generation .
Although the virus has spread through the entire world , its effects—both on physical and economic health—have been better managed in some developing countries than in their richer counterparts .
In the United Kingdom , the official death toll at the beginning of September is 40,000 , whereas Bangladesh ’ s official count stands around 4,000 , despite having over twice the U.K. ’ s population .
And while the British economy is expected to contract by around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s GDP may fall by around 2 percent .
At the same time , developing countries may also find the post-pandemic world more hospitable to their continued rise , as the global economy becomes more digitized , more multipolar , and more fluid .
The better performance in parts of the developing world throughout the pandemic comes down mainly to two factors .
First , major virus outbreaks hit Europe and the United States relatively early in the spread of the pandemic , which means they had less time to prepare .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the face of the virus , perhaps because it saw virus outbreaks as a third-world problem .
In 2016 , an exercise to test Britain ’ s ability to cope with a pandemic found gaping holes—including a lack of personal protective equipment and insufficient health care infrastructure—in preparedness .
Those holes were never filled , perhaps because Zika , SARS , MERS , and swine flu were all health emergencies that affected poorer countries and spared richer ones .
But such complacency means that in the ranking of coronavirus-related deaths per capita around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States account for six out of the top 10 .
Even given the possibility that cases in some developing countries are undercounted , the difference is so large that observers can reliably say that many of those nations must be doing something right that some of their richer counterparts are not .
Steven Friedman at the University of Johannesburg , for example , made such an argument in May under the headline “ COVID-19 has blown away the myth about ‘ First ’ and ‘ Third ’ world competence.
” And there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Consider the case of Vietnam , which quickly enforced public health measures such as increased health checks , travel restrictions , and extensive quarantines that took European countries months to put in place .
Nigeria shut down when there were only 100 reported cases of the virus .
Meanwhile , Turkey ’ s track and trace system for viral spread was already in place and robust , built on decades of experience in tracking measles and other outbreaks .
This has allowed Turkey , a country of 85 million people , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over 6,000 .
And many African countries had experience containing an outbreak from the Ebola epidemic of 2014 , which surely helped when COVID-19 came knocking .
On paper , meanwhile , Bangladesh , the most crowded large country in the world , should have been among the worst affected by COVID-19 .
But at time of writing , the country ’ s official death toll is less than a third that of Texas .
It is worth asking whether the official count is low , but even if it is , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the worst-case projections made early in the pandemic .
The success depended on intelligent local lockdowns that focused on particular areas at particular times and a swift world-class telemedicine strategy , led from the very top of government .
Beyond the capacity for quick government action , another advantage for some developing countries has been their young populations , since the vast majority of serious cases , and an even vaster majority of deaths , are among the elderly .
The median age of the population in Africa is only 19 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Just as much of the global south has been able to deal with COVID-19 ’ s health effects more effectively , the same is true of the economic fallout .
The United Kingdom recorded a 20 percent contraction in its GDP in the second quarter of this year .
Emerging markets and developing economies are predicted to fare far better .
This is almost inevitable , as many of them had stronger growth in the period immediately preceding the pandemic to begin with .
For example , last year , Bangladesh was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a growth rate of 7.9 percent .
The U.K. , by contrast , grew by just 1.4 percent , meaning it was already closer to recession .
Developing economies like Bangladesh are used to big challenges .
Workers and industrial sectors may be more adaptive .
Laid-off garment workers and shuttered factories quickly pivoted to manufacture of personal protective equipment such as masks and face shields .
That was coupled with Bangladesh ’ s ongoing digitization of its economy through an ambitious program , predating the pandemic , for all government services and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conducted entirely online .
Thanks to such initiatives , the government had tools already in place for nationwide telemedicine systems and to deliver aid to citizens efficiently .
This same infrastructure has allowed a large portion of economic activity—especially education , financial services , and international trade—to continue throughout the pandemic .
Bangladesh is not alone in such initiatives , and the rise of developing countries like it will be hastened by greater acceptance of working from home .
If a company is headquartered in London or New York and its employees are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ difference whether that home is 10 miles from the office or 1,000 .
In turn , the flow of talent and labor , long controlled by the supply of work visas , could change .
The line between outsourcing to freelancers and in-house work is becoming blurred and may eventually disappear .
This bodes well for developing countries , which may see their ambitious plans to become developed countries coming to fruition sooner than expected .

The coronavirus could be the great global leveler for this generation.
Although the virus has spread through the entire world, its effects—both on physical and economic health—have been better managed in some developing countries than in their richer counterparts. In the United Kingdom, the official death toll at the beginning of September is 40,000, whereas Bangladesh’s official count stands around 4,000, despite having over twice the U.K.’s population. And while the British economy is expected to contract by around 9 percent in 2020, Bangladesh’s GDP may fall by around 2 percent. At the same time, developing countries may also find the post-pandemic world more hospitable to their continued rise, as the global economy becomes more digitized, more multipolar, and more fluid.
The better performance in parts of the developing world throughout the pandemic comes down mainly to two factors. First, major virus outbreaks hit Europe and the United States relatively early in the spread of the pandemic, which means they had less time to prepare. But the developed world was also complacent in the face of the virus, perhaps because it saw virus outbreaks as a third-world problem.
In 2016, an exercise to test Britain’s ability to cope with a pandemic found gaping holes—including a lack of personal protective equipment and insufficient health care infrastructure—in preparedness. Those holes were never filled, perhaps because Zika, SARS, MERS, and swine flu were all health emergencies that affected poorer countries and spared richer ones. But such complacency means that in the ranking of coronavirus-related deaths per capita around the world, European countries and the United States account for six out of the top 10. Even given the possibility that cases in some developing countries are undercounted, the difference is so large that observers can reliably say that many of those nations must be doing something right that some of their richer counterparts are not. Steven Friedman at the University of Johannesburg, for example, made such an argument in May under the headline “COVID-19 has blown away the myth about ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world competence.” And there is ample evidence that he is right.
Consider the case of Vietnam, which quickly enforced public health measures such as increased health checks, travel restrictions, and extensive quarantines that took European countries months to put in place. Nigeria shut down when there were only 100 reported cases of the virus. Meanwhile, Turkey’s track and trace system for viral spread was already in place and robust, built on decades of experience in tracking measles and other outbreaks. This has allowed Turkey, a country of 85 million people, to limit the official death count to just over 6,000. And many African countries had experience containing an outbreak from the Ebola epidemic of 2014, which surely helped when COVID-19 came knocking.
On paper, meanwhile, Bangladesh, the most crowded large country in the world, should have been among the worst affected by COVID-19. But at time of writing, the country’s official death toll is less than a third that of Texas. It is worth asking whether the official count is low, but even if it is, the real number is still surely below many of the worst-case projections made early in the pandemic. The success depended on intelligent local lockdowns that focused on particular areas at particular times and a swift world-class telemedicine strategy, led from the very top of government.
Beyond the capacity for quick government action, another advantage for some developing countries has been their young populations, since the vast majority of serious cases, and an even vaster majority of deaths, are among the elderly. The median age of the population in Africa is only 19, whereas in Europe it’s 43.
Just as much of the global south has been able to deal with COVID-19’s health effects more effectively, the same is true of the economic fallout.
The United Kingdom recorded a 20 percent contraction in its GDP in the second quarter of this year. Emerging markets and developing economies are predicted to fare far better. This is almost inevitable, as many of them had stronger growth in the period immediately preceding the pandemic to begin with. For example, last year, Bangladesh was the sixth-fastest-growing economy in the world with a growth rate of 7.9 percent. The U.K., by contrast, grew by just 1.4 percent, meaning it was already closer to recession.
Developing economies like Bangladesh are used to big challenges. Workers and industrial sectors may be more adaptive. Laid-off garment workers and shuttered factories quickly pivoted to manufacture of personal protective equipment such as masks and face shields. That was coupled with Bangladesh’s ongoing digitization of its economy through an ambitious program, predating the pandemic, for all government services and significant swaths of economic activity to be conducted entirely online. Thanks to such initiatives, the government had tools already in place for nationwide telemedicine systems and to deliver aid to citizens efficiently. This same infrastructure has allowed a large portion of economic activity—especially education, financial services, and international trade—to continue throughout the pandemic.
Bangladesh is not alone in such initiatives, and the rise of developing countries like it will be hastened by greater acceptance of working from home. If a company is headquartered in London or New York and its employees are working from home, it makes less difference whether that home is 10 miles from the office or 1,000. In turn, the flow of talent and labor, long controlled by the supply of work visas, could change. The line between outsourcing to freelancers and in-house work is becoming blurred and may eventually disappear.
This bodes well for developing countries, which may see their ambitious plans to become developed countries coming to fruition sooner than expected.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--Kenya’s 2022 Elections Have Already Begun

Days before Kenya ’ s general elections in July 2017 , the bodies of Chris Msando , the official in charge of the country ’ s computerized voting system , and his companion Carol Ngumbu were found on the outskirts of Nairobi two days after they went missing .
They had been strangled to death .
“ There was no doubt he was tortured and murdered , ” said Wafula Chebukati , chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission ( IEBC ) , at the time .
The Kenyan police arrested three people while tracing Msando ’ s last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ court .
Raila Odinga , one of the leading presidential candidates , alleged that Msando had been killed because he refused to hand over a password that was later used to rig the elections .
Odinga said that the IEBC ’ s IT system had been hacked and the results altered .
While the commission acknowledged that there had been a hacking attempt , it said the attempt had failed .
The vote went ahead as scheduled , but the results were cancelled after Odinga filed a petition with the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Court nullified the results and called for fresh elections .
In the court ’ s view , the IEBC had failed to provide requested information on its IT system ’ s firewall configuration , leaving them with no choice but to accept Odinga ’ s claim that the system and the data were compromised .
The electoral commission ’ s credibility was dealt another blow just days ahead of the new elections , when the commissioner Roselyn Akombe resigned and fled to the United States .
Together with Chebukati and the commission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was the face of the vote .
But she said that political interference had rendered IEBC so dysfunctional that it could not carry out credible elections as scheduled .
Akombe said that she and other commissioners had been threatened by political actors and protestors frustrated with the IEBC ’ s failure to effect the reforms ordered by the court .
Akombe , still in the United States , is now calling for an inquest into Msando ’ s death , for which no one has been found guilty .
That she is bringing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among Kenya ’ s political set .
Kenya holds general elections every five years , with the next vote scheduled for August 2022 .
Akombe ’ s statements about the IEBC ensure that its credibility—and its ability to conduct free and fair elections—remain in question .
Adding to the volatility , incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta is legally barred from seeking another term .
Succession politics have started playing out , with numerous figures around him jostling for the chance to occupy the presidential office in 2022 .
On July 29 , the third @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Akombe announced her willingness to testify in the inquest about the killing , which she described as an inside job .
“ Painful that instead , on this day three years ago , your own colleagues led you to the slaughter house , ” she tweeted .
“ We will find justice for you , no matter how long it takes.
” Chiloba allegedly responded to the comments with an email , which Akombe shared on Twitter , that many interpreted as a threat .
“ Do not attempt to rewrite history .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” it read .
Akombe ’ s call for an inquest should be considered in the context of Kenya ’ s electoral history .
Independent Kenya ’ s first multiparty democratic election was held in 1992 , and cycles of violence have surrounded each subsequent election , with no one ever held accountable .
In 1992 , 1,500 people were killed in waves of violence along ethnic lines , and an estimated 300,000 were displaced .
It later emerged that members of the ruling party , the Kenya African National Union ( KANU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violence .
Five years later , the KANU again backed attacks in the Coast Province that displaced up to 10,000 people and killed 104 .
While the 2002 and 2013 elections saw fewer clashes , the period after the 2007 election was characterized by significant violence .
In December 2007 , incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was sworn in under the cover of darkness and amid allegations of vote rigging that many alleged the electoral commission ignored .
Violence broke out across the country , and as many as 1,400 people were killed over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involvement of mediators led by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan prevented the country from slipping into civil war .
The 2007 election marked the first attempt to prosecute the instigators of any of Kenya ’ s electoral violence .
In 2010 , International Criminal Court prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo named six high-profile Kenyans suspected of being behind the violence—with charges including murder , incitement , deportation , persecutions and torture , and mass rape .
Among them were Kenyatta , then the minister of finance , and William Ruto , a Rift Valley @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Ruto came together in a coalition for the presidential ticket in 2013 , casting themselves as the victims of an imperialist ICC plot .
They won the election , and their government frustrated the ICC investigation by blocking the court from accessing the suspects ’ wealth declarations , government officers , and security agents accused of involvement in the violence .
Msando was killed in the lead-up to their successful bid for reelection in 2017 .
On the day his body was found , Kenya ’ s director of public prosecutions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three prosecutors to look into the case .
The country ’ s secretary of the interior , himself accused of facilitating the killings of unarmed civilians by the police after the Supreme Court nullified the elections , said the country ’ s best detectives were on the case .
Three years later , there is little indication the Kenyatta-Ruto government is interested in solving Msando ’ s alleged murder .
The Msando affair is now part of a pattern in which electoral violence in Kenya often goes unsolved and unpunished .
Akombe is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it go , but the threats against her and members of her family show that those willing to speak out against state capture and violence often have to leave the country to do so .
As Paul Muite , one of Kenya ’ s leading lawyers , said , “ Once the government knows you ’ re a witness , you have literally signed your death warrant.
” John Githongo , a Kenyan whistleblower who went into exile in 2005 after reporting on one of Kenya ’ s biggest corruption scandals as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the office of the president , is sceptical about the chances of an inquest .
It is “ highly unlikely unless there is a tremendous political disruption in Kenya , ” he said in a text message .
“ Our justice system is very much a work in progress , and [ it is ] currently frozen in a hostile posture between the Judiciary and the Executive.
” In addition to the tensions between the judiciary and the executive branches , the Kenyatta-Ruto alliance is crumbling .
Recently , there was a purge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the overriding feeling among political commentators is that Kenyatta won ’ t support Ruto as his successor , contrary to the expectations of their 2013 coalition agreement .
In fact , the 2013 coalition was cobbled together from the shared ignominy of being ICC indictees , with Ruto accused of organizing attacks against members of Kenyatta ’ s Kikuyu community and Kenyatta accused of funding and organizing reprisal attacks against members of Ruto ’ s Kalenjin community .
Should the two of them fall out , then waves of violence could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2022 elections .
With less than two years to the next election , there is a growing fear that Kenya will be sucked into another cycle of violence—a cycle in which the perpetrators will again face no punishment .

Days before Kenya’s general elections in July 2017, the bodies of Chris Msando, the official in charge of the country’s computerized voting system, and his companion Carol Ngumbu were found on the outskirts of Nairobi two days after they went missing. They had been strangled to death. “There was no doubt he was tortured and murdered,” said Wafula Chebukati, chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), at the time.
Days before Kenya’s general elections in July 2017, the bodies of Chris Msando, the official in charge of the country’s computerized voting system, and his companion Carol Ngumbu were found on the outskirts of Nairobi two days after they went missing. They had been strangled to death. “There was no doubt he was tortured and murdered,” said Wafula Chebukati, chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), at the time.
The Kenyan police arrested three people while tracing Msando’s last movements, but none ever appeared in court. Raila Odinga, one of the leading presidential candidates, alleged that Msando had been killed because he refused to hand over a password that was later used to rig the elections. Odinga said that the IEBC’s IT system had been hacked and the results altered. While the commission acknowledged that there had been a hacking attempt, it said the attempt had failed.
The vote went ahead as scheduled, but the results were cancelled after Odinga filed a petition with the country’s Supreme Court. On Sept. 1, the Court nullified the results and called for fresh elections. In the court’s view, the IEBC had failed to provide requested information on its IT system’s firewall configuration, leaving them with no choice but to accept Odinga’s claim that the system and the data were compromised.
The electoral commission’s credibility was dealt another blow just days ahead of the new elections, when the commissioner Roselyn Akombe resigned and fled to the United States. Together with Chebukati and the commission’s CEO Ezra Chiloba, Akombe was the face of the vote. But she said that political interference had rendered IEBC so dysfunctional that it could not carry out credible elections as scheduled. Akombe said that she and other commissioners had been threatened by political actors and protestors frustrated with the IEBC’s failure to effect the reforms ordered by the court.
Akombe, still in the United States, is now calling for an inquest into Msando’s death, for which no one has been found guilty. That she is bringing up the case now has caused jitters among Kenya’s political set. Kenya holds general elections every five years, with the next vote scheduled for August 2022. Akombe’s statements about the IEBC ensure that its credibility—and its ability to conduct free and fair elections—remain in question.
Adding to the volatility, incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta is legally barred from seeking another term. Succession politics have started playing out, with numerous figures around him jostling for the chance to occupy the presidential office in 2022.
On July 29, the third anniversary of Msando’s death, Akombe announced her willingness to testify in the inquest about the killing, which she described as an inside job. “Painful that instead, on this day three years ago, your own colleagues led you to the slaughter house,” she tweeted. “We will find justice for you, no matter how long it takes.”
Chiloba allegedly responded to the comments with an email, which Akombe shared on Twitter, that many interpreted as a threat. “Do not attempt to rewrite history. Our silence is not your license,” it read.
Akombe’s call for an inquest should be considered in the context of Kenya’s electoral history. Independent Kenya’s first multiparty democratic election was held in 1992, and cycles of violence have surrounded each subsequent election, with no one ever held accountable. In 1992, 1,500 people were killed in waves of violence along ethnic lines, and an estimated 300,000 were displaced. It later emerged that members of the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), had funded and supported the violence. Five years later, the KANU again backed attacks in the Coast Province that displaced up to 10,000 people and killed 104.
While the 2002 and 2013 elections saw fewer clashes, the period after the 2007 election was characterized by significant violence. In December 2007, incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was sworn in under the cover of darkness and amid allegations of vote rigging that many alleged the electoral commission ignored. Violence broke out across the country, and as many as 1,400 people were killed over the next few weeks. Only the involvement of mediators led by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan prevented the country from slipping into civil war.
The 2007 election marked the first attempt to prosecute the instigators of any of Kenya’s electoral violence. In 2010, International Criminal Court prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo named six high-profile Kenyans suspected of being behind the violence—with charges including murder, incitement, deportation, persecutions and torture, and mass rape. Among them were Kenyatta, then the minister of finance, and William Ruto, a Rift Valley politician.
The cases collapsed. Kenyatta and Ruto came together in a coalition for the presidential ticket in 2013, casting themselves as the victims of an imperialist ICC plot. They won the election, and their government frustrated the ICC investigation by blocking the court from accessing the suspects’ wealth declarations, government officers, and security agents accused of involvement in the violence.
Msando was killed in the lead-up to their successful bid for reelection in 2017. On the day his body was found, Kenya’s director of public prosecutions, Keriako Tobiko, said he had appointed three prosecutors to look into the case. The country’s secretary of the interior, himself accused of facilitating the killings of unarmed civilians by the police after the Supreme Court nullified the elections, said the country’s best detectives were on the case. Three years later, there is little indication the Kenyatta-Ruto government is interested in solving Msando’s alleged murder.
The Msando affair is now part of a pattern in which electoral violence in Kenya often goes unsolved and unpunished. Akombe is on a one-woman mission not to let it go, but the threats against her and members of her family show that those willing to speak out against state capture and violence often have to leave the country to do so. As Paul Muite, one of Kenya’s leading lawyers, said, “Once the government knows you’re a witness, you have literally signed your death warrant.”
John Githongo, a Kenyan whistleblower who went into exile in 2005 after reporting on one of Kenya’s biggest corruption scandals as the permanent secretary for governance and ethics in the office of the president, is sceptical about the chances of an inquest. It is “highly unlikely unless there is a tremendous political disruption in Kenya,” he said in a text message. “Our justice system is very much a work in progress, and [it is] currently frozen in a hostile posture between the Judiciary and the Executive.”
In addition to the tensions between the judiciary and the executive branches, the Kenyatta-Ruto alliance is crumbling. Recently, there was a purge of Ruto allies from key parliamentary positions, and the overriding feeling among political commentators is that Kenyatta won’t support Ruto as his successor, contrary to the expectations of their 2013 coalition agreement.
In fact, the 2013 coalition was cobbled together from the shared ignominy of being ICC indictees, with Ruto accused of organizing attacks against members of Kenyatta’s Kikuyu community and Kenyatta accused of funding and organizing reprisal attacks against members of Ruto’s Kalenjin community. Should the two of them fall out, then waves of violence could break out between the two communities during the 2022 elections.
With less than two years to the next election, there is a growing fear that Kenya will be sucked into another cycle of violence—a cycle in which the perpetrators will again face no punishment.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--Big Brother Turns Its Eye on Refugees

Big Brother Turns Its Eye on Refugees

Perhaps without us realizing it , biometrics have crept into many corners of our lives .
The prevalence of biometrics—the use of physical characteristics to determine and verify identity—facilitates our access to the world .
Be it fingerprinting , iris scans , or facial recognition , biometrics has streamlined identification , making it easier and easier to add ID processes to interactions where they were missing before .
Biometric usage has even become standard practice in the humanitarian aid industry .
By adopting biometric registration systems , aid agencies efficiently provide refugees with an official identity , prevent fraud , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aid process .
Yet despite those benefits , biometrics also threaten the security of refugees , especially women , in three ways : through greater risk for false matches ; by increasing the potential for discrimination ; and by threatening exploitation .
The first step in correcting these problems is recognizing them .
Biometrics have successfully provided a universal identity to refugees , many of whom lost or destroyed identifying documents during their flight , or never possessed any to begin with .
Approximately 1 billion people globally lack identification ; women are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greater access to aid services , employment , and personal empowerment .
Through fingerprinting and iris scans , many aid agencies now register refugees as they come through camps , allowing them to confirm their information without need for prior documentation .
Such a system can help prevent benefit fraud , whether from double-receipt of aid or by organizers who take aid away from the populations in need .
Biometric systems thus offer important oversight in the refugee aid industry .
Nevertheless , the history and implementation of biometrics raises some concerns .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for donor states rather than the aid agencies themselves .
As the researcher Katja Jacobsen explained in The Politics of Humanitarian Technology , large donors , like the United States , make their funding dependent on the implementation of biometrics in the refugee registration process .
However , the interests of these donors are driven by security rather than aid , and governance of refugees ’ biometric data remains ambiguous : Which states own the data—those which host the refugees , or those who provide the funds ?
Who is in charge of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ biometric systems to aid agencies and what is their level of control over the data ?
Beyond those questions , there is the risk of false matches .
Biometric technology occasionally incorrectly registers a refugee as already in the system .
According to Jacobsen , previous testing of biometric systems was small-scale , operating on “ a few hundred entries to a database ” with relative precision .
Yet it is unclear how well it works when the databases include millions of registered individuals .
This concern is doubled if the biometric technology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the type of information requested by donor states emphasizes security concerns rather than an accurate distribution of humanitarian aid .
Although false matching could harm all refugees , women in particular could suffer .
They are often already marginalized in their communities , and face issues in securing aid .
If falsely matched , they could face yet more hurdles to securing cash transfers , owning property , and accessing employment opportunities in a dignified way .
A test of American faces conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology shows that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by facial recognition systems than men .
This is doubly true for women of color , as shown by the same test in which “ the highest false positives are in American Indians , with elevated rates in African American and Asian populations.
” Further , as Lindsey Kingston explains in the 2018 book , Digital Lifeline , women , especially single mothers , may serve as heads of households and primary caregivers , duties which may prevent them from claiming aid in person .
Beyond that , Kingston explains , women are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cooking burns , which could disrupt fingerprint identification required to receive assistance .
Another problem is data usage .
As more humanitarian aid agencies adopt biometric technology , a “ dictatorship of no alternatives , ” a phrase coined by Shoshana Zuboff in her 2018 book , The Age of Surveillance Capitalism , is emerging .
Refugees have little say in the usage of their personal data .
It is hard to say that refugees have provided real consent when they turn over biometric data because there aren ’ t other good choices @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women , who may face norms preventing them from speaking out .
In fact , systems of biometric registration continue to be discriminatory even when women do speak against its usage , as seen in the case of veiled Muslim women in Bangladesh .
Women and girls reported that they were not consulted on biometric identification systems and said that they felt disrespected and violated when their headwear was adjusted during the registration process .
Exploitation of the collected data is another concern .
Although significant data breaches of biometric management systems have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and exposure of sensitive biometric information would be catastrophic for refugee populations .
First , unlike PIN codes and passwords , personal physical identifiers can not be changed .
Should data be stolen , fingerprints and iris scans would remain exposed .
Given that many biometrics programs are accessible to state governments , it is unclear who has control over and access to refugees ’ biometric information .
A recent article by Dave Nyczepir outlines the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ’ s decision to move its cache of biometric data from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Web Services GovCloud .
Since UNHCR sends refugee information to DHS , that means refugees ’ data will be on the cloud as well .
For women who are fleeing persecution or gender-based violence , breaches of this information can be deadly .
In short , although biometrics have improved the efficacy of refugee registration and identification , there are still several risks , especially for refugee women .
Recognizing those problems would be a good first start to improving the systems in question .
Beyond that , using two or more methods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ false matches .
Stronger security systems are also critical .
Should a data breach occur , establishing long-term protection policies in advance would likewise help to ensure the safety and security of refugee populations .
The 1951 United Nations Convention regarding the Status of Refugees specifies that states should provide identifying documents to all refugees within their territory , and builds on the UDHR to ensure the rights of refugees .
Yet the threats to refugees ’ human rights are different today compared to almost 70 years ago .
The emergence of new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights of refugees outlined in the convention , in particular , to ensure refugees ’ security and privacy—both in their person and their digital identities .
Such reforms could be a good jumping-off point for aid agencies to responsibly address the risks of false matching , discriminatory algorithms , and data breaches themselves .

Perhaps without us realizing it, biometrics have crept into many corners of our lives. The prevalence of biometrics—the use of physical characteristics to determine and verify identity—facilitates our access to the world. Be it fingerprinting, iris scans, or facial recognition, biometrics has streamlined identification, making it easier and easier to add ID processes to interactions where they were missing before. Biometric usage has even become standard practice in the humanitarian aid industry.
Perhaps without us realizing it, biometrics have crept into many corners of our lives. The prevalence of biometrics—the use of physical characteristics to determine and verify identity—facilitates our access to the world. Be it fingerprinting, iris scans, or facial recognition, biometrics has streamlined identification, making it easier and easier to add ID processes to interactions where they were missing before. Biometric usage has even become standard practice in the humanitarian aid industry.
By adopting biometric registration systems, aid agencies efficiently provide refugees with an official identity, prevent fraud, and improve the dignity of the refugee aid process. Yet despite those benefits, biometrics also threaten the security of refugees, especially women, in three ways: through greater risk for false matches; by increasing the potential for discrimination; and by threatening exploitation. The first step in correcting these problems is recognizing them.
Biometrics have successfully provided a universal identity to refugees, many of whom lost or destroyed identifying documents during their flight, or never possessed any to begin with. Approximately 1 billion people globally lack identification; women are disproportionately represented. Providing documentation results in greater access to aid services, employment, and personal empowerment. Through fingerprinting and iris scans, many aid agencies now register refugees as they come through camps, allowing them to confirm their information without need for prior documentation. Such a system can help prevent benefit fraud, whether from double-receipt of aid or by organizers who take aid away from the populations in need. Biometric systems thus offer important oversight in the refugee aid industry.
Nevertheless, the history and implementation of biometrics raises some concerns. Its usage has typically been an imperative for donor states rather than the aid agencies themselves. As the researcher Katja Jacobsen explained in The Politics of Humanitarian Technology, large donors, like the United States, make their funding dependent on the implementation of biometrics in the refugee registration process. However, the interests of these donors are driven by security rather than aid, and governance of refugees’ biometric data remains ambiguous: Which states own the data—those which host the refugees, or those who provide the funds? Who is in charge of data protection? Which companies provide the biometric systems to aid agencies and what is their level of control over the data?
Beyond those questions, there is the risk of false matches. Biometric technology occasionally incorrectly registers a refugee as already in the system. According to Jacobsen, previous testing of biometric systems was small-scale, operating on “a few hundred entries to a database” with relative precision. Yet it is unclear how well it works when the databases include millions of registered individuals. This concern is doubled if the biometric technology itself is of poor quality or if the type of information requested by donor states emphasizes security concerns rather than an accurate distribution of humanitarian aid.
Although false matching could harm all refugees, women in particular could suffer. They are often already marginalized in their communities, and face issues in securing aid. If falsely matched, they could face yet more hurdles to securing cash transfers, owning property, and accessing employment opportunities in a dignified way. A test of American faces conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology shows that women were less likely to be recognized by facial recognition systems than men. This is doubly true for women of color, as shown by the same test in which “the highest false positives are in American Indians, with elevated rates in African American and Asian populations.”
Further, as Lindsey Kingston explains in the 2018 book, Digital Lifeline, women, especially single mothers, may serve as heads of households and primary caregivers, duties which may prevent them from claiming aid in person. Beyond that, Kingston explains, women are most likely to face injuries such as cooking burns, which could disrupt fingerprint identification required to receive assistance.
Another problem is data usage. As more humanitarian aid agencies adopt biometric technology, a “dictatorship of no alternatives,” a phrase coined by Shoshana Zuboff in her 2018 book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, is emerging. Refugees have little say in the usage of their personal data. It is hard to say that refugees have provided real consent when they turn over biometric data because there aren’t other good choices. That’s especially true of women, who may face norms preventing them from speaking out. In fact, systems of biometric registration continue to be discriminatory even when women do speak against its usage, as seen in the case of veiled Muslim women in Bangladesh. Women and girls reported that they were not consulted on biometric identification systems and said that they felt disrespected and violated when their headwear was adjusted during the registration process.
Exploitation of the collected data is another concern. Although significant data breaches of biometric management systems have yet to occur, the threat remains, and exposure of sensitive biometric information would be catastrophic for refugee populations. First, unlike PIN codes and passwords, personal physical identifiers cannot be changed. Should data be stolen, fingerprints and iris scans would remain exposed. Given that many biometrics programs are accessible to state governments, it is unclear who has control over and access to refugees’ biometric information. A recent article by Dave Nyczepir outlines the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s decision to move its cache of biometric data from U.S. citizens and foreign nationals to Amazon Web Services GovCloud. Since UNHCR sends refugee information to DHS, that means refugees’ data will be on the cloud as well. For women who are fleeing persecution or gender-based violence, breaches of this information can be deadly.
In short, although biometrics have improved the efficacy of refugee registration and identification, there are still several risks, especially for refugee women. Recognizing those problems would be a good first start to improving the systems in question.
Beyond that, using two or more methods of biometric data collection would help mitigate false matches. Stronger security systems are also critical. Should a data breach occur, establishing long-term protection policies in advance would likewise help to ensure the safety and security of refugee populations.
The 1951 United Nations Convention regarding the Status of Refugees specifies that states should provide identifying documents to all refugees within their territory, and builds on the UDHR to ensure the rights of refugees. Yet the threats to refugees’ human rights are different today compared to almost 70 years ago. The emergence of new technologies may warrant an update to the rights of refugees outlined in the convention, in particular, to ensure refugees’ security and privacy—both in their person and their digital identities. Such reforms could be a good jumping-off point for aid agencies to responsibly address the risks of false matching, discriminatory algorithms, and data breaches themselves.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--European Leaders Pay Surprise Visit to Libya to Push for Peace

European Leaders Pay Surprise Visit to Libya to Push for Peace Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : European leaders met with Libyan officials to discuss a peaceful resolution to the country ’ s civil war , Saudi Arabia cracks down on more members of the royal family , and Chinese and Indian commanders hold talks over recent border tensions .
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday , please sign up here .
Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio and EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell paid a surprise visit to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efforts as the country ’ s warring factions continue to search for a way out of the war .
Di Maio and Borrell each met with Fayez Serraj , chief of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord ( GNA ) based in the capital of Tripoli , to discuss the current military situation .
Di Maio later met with Aguila Saleh , speaker of the House of Representatives based in eastern Libya ’ s Tobruk , who partially backs the Libyan National Army ’ s ( LNA ) Khalifa Haftar .
Calls for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the GNA ’ s military position has improved .
Its defeat of Haftar ’ s 14-month campaign to take Tripoli consolidated its hold on the capital , pushing the focus of the fighting out to the coastal city of Sirte .
Cautious hope .
But the fighting in Sirte has ground into a stalemate , and international actors have since lobbied Libya ’ s rival factions to enter into negotiations .
On Aug. 21 , both Serraj and Saleh declared ceasefires across all of Libya , raising hope for a longer-term solution but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actually be implemented .
Haftar rejected the ceasefire outright , calling it a “ deception ” whose sole purpose was for “ media marketing.
” He accused the GNA of continuing to build up its military presence in Sirte .
Splits all around .
Despite tentative efforts at a resolution , the future of Libya is murky .
The GNA has been beset by internal feuding in recent days , raising doubts about its viability as a legitimate national government .
Even if the GNA survives intact , it appears increasingly unlikely that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unitary state .
As Anas El Gomati wrote in Foreign Policy last month , Haftar ’ s international backers have largely given up on him , and the only option left for them if they want to retain their influence in the country is to push for partition .
Saudi royal family crackdown .
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sacked two princes and several military officials as part of a wider investigation into alleged corruption in the defense ministry .
“ Riyadh has sent a strong message in that accountability bodies will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of any considerations .
And that Saudi Arabia ’ s fierce war against corruption is not a luxury , but rather a necessity for development and protecting public money , ” a Saudi newspaper said in an editorial .
But the arrests appear to be part of a wider effort by Prince Mohammad to remove perceived threats to his power .
Shortly after becoming crown prince in 2017 , Mohammed detained more than 200 princes , officials , and businessmen on charges of corruption , but critics have argued it was an attempt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his rule .
U.S. presidential candidates spar over violence .
U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden traded blows over the recent violent protests in some American cities .
Speaking in Pennsylvania , Biden accused Trump of using the violence as a “ political lifeline ” and said that he “ can ’ t stop the violence because for years he has fomented it.
” Trump hit back in an interview with Fox News ’ s Laura Ingraham , pinning the blame for the unrest on Biden .
“ People that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people that are in the dark shadows ” are controlling Biden , he claimed .
Last week , a 17-year-old pro-Trump vigilante shot and killed two people during protests in Kenosha , Wisconsin , following the police shooting of Jacob Blake .
A man affiliated with a right-wing group was also shot and killed by an unidentified assailant during clashes between protesters and counterprotesters on Saturday in Portland , Oregon .
Turkey stays in the eastern Mediterranean .
Turkey has extended a research mission in the eastern Mediterranean , raising the heat again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has fast become one of the region ’ s tensest hotspots .
The extension of the mission , which had already drawn Greece ’ s ire , was announced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a speech in which he also accused the European Union of engaging in “ modern-day colonialism ” for its involvement in the dispute .
Turkey and Greece have overlapping maritime claims in the eastern Mediterranean , where large sources of oil and gas were recently discovered .
Both countries have clashed over who has the right to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both have held parallel military exercises as a show of force .
India and China in talks over border .
Indian and Chinese commanders met for the second day of talks on Tuesday to seek to resolve the latest burst of tensions along their disputed border .
Soldiers from both countries engaged in a verbal altercation over the weekend that local commanders deescalated before it turned physical , but it led to troop movements and accusations from both sides that the other was trying to illegally seize territory .
Tensions between the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In June , violent clashes along the border resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers .
But as Foreign Policy ’ s Salvatore Babones wrote , the border dispute is part of a wider conflict taking place in the region , and China is actively pushing for the construction of a canal in Thailand to help encircle India .
Oil spill deaths in Mauritius .
Two people were killed off the coast of Mauritius on Tuesday after their boat struck a barge in bad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a nearby oil spill .
The spill happened after the MV Wakashio ran aground on a coral reef in late July , dumping much of its oil cargo into the surrounding waters .
While early cleanup efforts did remove most of the spillage , locals are still working to remove the remaining oil .
The accident highlights the harmful impact of the oil spill on both people and the environment .
Last weekend , thousands of protesters gathered in the Mauritian capital of Port Louis to rally against the government ’ s mishandling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dolphins washed ashore .
The French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo republished its controversial cartoon images of the Prophet Muhammad—which led to the deadly 2015 shootings by Islamist militants in Paris—to mark the beginning of the trial of the shooters ’ alleged accomplices today .
The attacks , which left 12 dead , led to an outpouring of grief for the magazine and helped spark an international debate over free speech .
Depicting the Prophet Muhammad in images of any kind is strictly prohibited by Islamic law , but Charlie Hebdo had long drawn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A few weeks before the attack , it published a drawing of a smiling baby Jesus exploding out of the Virgin Mary .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: European leaders met with Libyan officials to discuss a peaceful resolution to the country’s civil war, Saudi Arabia cracks down on more members of the royal family, and Chinese and Indian commanders hold talks over recent border tensions.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: European leaders met with Libyan officials to discuss a peaceful resolution to the country’s civil war, Saudi Arabia cracks down on more members of the royal family, and Chinese and Indian commanders hold talks over recent border tensions.
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Peace in Libya Remains Elusive
Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio and EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell paid a surprise visit to Libya on Tuesday to help boost peace efforts as the country’s warring factions continue to search for a way out of the war. Di Maio and Borrell each met with Fayez Serraj, chief of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) based in the capital of Tripoli, to discuss the current military situation. Di Maio later met with Aguila Saleh, speaker of the House of Representatives based in eastern Libya’s Tobruk, who partially backs the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) Khalifa Haftar.
Calls for peace have grown in recent weeks as the GNA’s military position has improved. Its defeat of Haftar’s 14-month campaign to take Tripoli consolidated its hold on the capital, pushing the focus of the fighting out to the coastal city of Sirte.
Cautious hope. But the fighting in Sirte has ground into a stalemate, and international actors have since lobbied Libya’s rival factions to enter into negotiations. On Aug. 21, both Serraj and Saleh declared ceasefires across all of Libya, raising hope for a longer-term solution but leaving serious doubt over whether it could actually be implemented. Haftar rejected the ceasefire outright, calling it a “deception” whose sole purpose was for “media marketing.” He accused the GNA of continuing to build up its military presence in Sirte.
Splits all around. Despite tentative efforts at a resolution, the future of Libya is murky. The GNA has been beset by internal feuding in recent days, raising doubts about its viability as a legitimate national government. Even if the GNA survives intact, it appears increasingly unlikely that Libya will survive as a single, unitary state. As Anas El Gomati wrote in Foreign Policy last month, Haftar’s international backers have largely given up on him, and the only option left for them if they want to retain their influence in the country is to push for partition.
What We’re Following Today
Saudi royal family crackdown. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sacked two princes and several military officials as part of a wider investigation into alleged corruption in the defense ministry. “Riyadh has sent a strong message in that accountability bodies will not tolerate those who are corrupt regardless of any considerations. And that Saudi Arabia’s fierce war against corruption is not a luxury, but rather a necessity for development and protecting public money,” a Saudi newspaper said in an editorial.
But the arrests appear to be part of a wider effort by Prince Mohammad to remove perceived threats to his power. Shortly after becoming crown prince in 2017, Mohammed detained more than 200 princes, officials, and businessmen on charges of corruption, but critics have argued it was an attempt to root out any lingering threats to his rule.
U.S. presidential candidates spar over violence. U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden traded blows over the recent violent protests in some American cities. Speaking in Pennsylvania, Biden accused Trump of using the violence as a “political lifeline” and said that he “can’t stop the violence because for years he has fomented it.” Trump hit back in an interview with Fox News’s Laura Ingraham, pinning the blame for the unrest on Biden. “People that you’ve never heard of, people that are in the dark shadows” are controlling Biden, he claimed.
Last week, a 17-year-old pro-Trump vigilante shot and killed two people during protests in Kenosha, Wisconsin, following the police shooting of Jacob Blake. A man affiliated with a right-wing group was also shot and killed by an unidentified assailant during clashes between protesters and counterprotesters on Saturday in Portland, Oregon.
Turkey stays in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has extended a research mission in the eastern Mediterranean, raising the heat again in an ongoing dispute with Greece which has fast become one of the region’s tensest hotspots. The extension of the mission, which had already drawn Greece’s ire, was announced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a speech in which he also accused the European Union of engaging in “modern-day colonialism” for its involvement in the dispute.
Turkey and Greece have overlapping maritime claims in the eastern Mediterranean, where large sources of oil and gas were recently discovered. Both countries have clashed over who has the right to extract resources from the area, and both have held parallel military exercises as a show of force.
Keep an Eye On
India and China in talks over border. Indian and Chinese commanders met for the second day of talks on Tuesday to seek to resolve the latest burst of tensions along their disputed border. Soldiers from both countries engaged in a verbal altercation over the weekend that local commanders deescalated before it turned physical, but it led to troop movements and accusations from both sides that the other was trying to illegally seize territory.
Tensions between the two countries have risen sharply in recent months. In June, violent clashes along the border resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers. But as Foreign Policy’s Salvatore Babones wrote, the border dispute is part of a wider conflict taking place in the region, and China is actively pushing for the construction of a canal in Thailand to help encircle India.
Oil spill deaths in Mauritius. Two people were killed off the coast of Mauritius on Tuesday after their boat struck a barge in bad weather while assisting efforts to clean up a nearby oil spill. The spill happened after the MV Wakashio ran aground on a coral reef in late July, dumping much of its oil cargo into the surrounding waters. While early cleanup efforts did remove most of the spillage, locals are still working to remove the remaining oil.
The accident highlights the harmful impact of the oil spill on both people and the environment. Last weekend, thousands of protesters gathered in the Mauritian capital of Port Louis to rally against the government’s mishandling of the oil spill after 40 dead dolphins washed ashore.
Odds and Ends
The French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo republished its controversial cartoon images of the Prophet Muhammad—which led to the deadly 2015 shootings by Islamist militants in Paris—to mark the beginning of the trial of the shooters’ alleged accomplices today. The attacks, which left 12 dead, led to an outpouring of grief for the magazine and helped spark an international debate over free speech.
Depicting the Prophet Muhammad in images of any kind is strictly prohibited by Islamic law, but Charlie Hebdo had long drawn controversy for its portrayals of religious figures. A few weeks before the attack, it published a drawing of a smiling baby Jesus exploding out of the Virgin Mary.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.