foreignpolicy--2020-03-26--Senate Passes Stimulus as U.S. Death Toll Reaches 1,000

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Senate passes massive stimulus bill , U.S. hostage dies in Iran , and Spain ’ s coronavirus death toll is now the world ’ s second highest .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Late Wednesday night the U.S. Senate passed the largest economic relief bill in U.S. history , almost tripling the $ 800 billion stimulus package passed in reaction the 2008 financial crisis .
The bill now goes to the House of Representatives .
U.S. President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that he would sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ includes $ 1,200 for individuals earning up to $ 75,000 , $ 100 billion for health care providers , and $ 58 billion for the U.S. airline industry .
It would also include $ 2,400 per month for up to four months to the unemployed .
By far the largest portion of the bill , $ 500 billion , goes to industry loans that corporations , cities , and states can apply for .
Democrats had initially fought this portion , but agreed when provisions for more independent oversight of the fund were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back ?
It ’ s too early to know for the United States , but the health of China ’ s economy could point the way , as it appears to be over the worst of its coronavirus outbreak .
The so-called “ V-shaped ” recovery isn ’ t a sure thing , but reports of life ticking back to normal in China show that a quick return isn ’ t impossible .
Foreign Policy ’ s Keith Johnson has more from economic analysts on whether China holds the key to predicting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe .
How much worse can the coronavirus epidemic get in the U.S. ?
If the sharp uptick in cases continues , the United States is on track to become the number one most-infected country worldwide .
At the time of writing , there were 1,032 deaths .
In New York , the virus epicenter in the United States with over 30,000 cases and 366 deaths , projections for hospitalizations doubling have changed from every two days to every 4.7 days , signaling that severe cases may be slowing .
G-20 leaders meet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a videoconference summit to discuss measures to address the coronavirus pandemic .
According to White House staffers , a key U.S. goal will be to convince Saudi Arabia to halt the overproduction of oil that has hurt U.S. producers .
A meeting with G-7 foreign ministers yesterday ended without a joint statement after other leaders would not agree on U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s designation of COVID-19 as the “ Wuhan virus.
” U.S. hostage dies in Iran .
The former FBI agent Robert Levinson , who disappeared in Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian custody , according to his family .
The family said that his death appeared to have occurred before the coronavirus pandemic .
They claimed they had recently received information from U.S. officials that led them to conclude he had died .
Levinson , the longest-held hostage in U.S. history , disappeared in 2007 on the Iranian island of Kish .
Islamic State claim Sikh compound attack .
The Islamic State claimed responsibility for killing 25 people in an attack on a Sikh temple compound in Kabul yesterday .
Afghan security forces responded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intruders , according to the Afghan government .
Boko Haram attacks in Chad .
Nearly 100 Chadian soldiers were killed yesterday in an ambush staged by Boko Haram militants in the village of Boma in the country ’ s west .
“ I have taken part in many operations … but never in our history have we lost so many men at one time , ” President Idriss Deby said on a visit to the attack site .
It ’ s the second Islamist attack in the region this week after militants killed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Charles infected .
Prince Charles , the heir to the British throne , has tested positive for the coronavirus .
His wife , Camilla , has tested negative .
Charles is now self-isolating and working from “ home ” at Balmoral Castle in Scotland , according to royal sources .
He is the latest in a string of high profile figures and world leaders to contract the virus , and Foreign Policy is keeping a track of them all here .
Israeli Knesset speaker quits .
The speaker of Israel ’ s parliament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a battle with the country ’ s Supreme Court .
The court on Monday set a deadline for Wednesday at midnight for Edelstein to convene a vote on a new speaker .
As his resignation takes 48 hours to apply , he has effectively defied the court ’ s ruling already .
In a statement , Edelstein said , “ I have no desire to be in contempt of court but my conscience does not allow me to respect the court ’ s order.
” Edelstein ’ s departure now makes it easier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s bloc , which appears to hold a tenuous majority , to pursue its legislative agenda .
Bolsonaro condemns local officials .
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro continues to rail against coronavirus measures being taken in his country , as local officials take preparedeness into their own hands .
“ Other viruses have killed many more than this one and there wasn ’ t all this commotion , ” Bolsonaro told journalists , “ What a few mayors and governors are doing is a crime .
They ’ re destroying Brazil.
” Augusto Heleno @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who tested positive for COVID-19 , has broken his 14-day quarantine after just one week and returned to work .
Turkey indicts 20 on Khashoggi killing .
Turkey has charged 20 Saudi nationals in connection with the “ deliberate and monstrous killing ” killing of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 .
The list of those indicted includes former Saudi Deputy Head of Intelligence Ahmad Asiri .
Agnes Callamard , the United Nations rapporteur on extrajudicial killings , welcomed the news , calling it a “ counter balance to the travesty of justice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Spain ’ s death toll surpasses China ’ s .
Spain is now the second country , after Italy , to surpass China in the number of deaths related to the coronavirus .
Spain has recorded just under 50,000 cases , 27,000 of which are undergoing hospital care .
Spain has now recorded 3,647 deaths from COVID-19 , Italy has the highest death toll at 7,503 .
Coral bleaching continues .
The Great Barrier Reef off the coast of Australia has suffered its third mass bleaching event in the past five years , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hughes of James Cook Univeristy .
Experts blame global warming .
Corals bleach when they sit in waters that are unusually hot for too long .
Further surveys in the coming days will determine whether the bleaching matches the extent of record events in 2016 and 2017 , when about half the shallow water corals were killed off .
Malaysia gloves in short supply .
Malaysia produces three out of every five pairs of medical gloves worldwide , and manufacturers there are struggling to meet coronavirus-related demand .
A combination of factors : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requirements , and supply chain shutdowns mean medical practitioners could soon find themselves short of equipment .
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration said earlier this month that certain gloves could be reused beyond their shelf life .
Putin delays .
Citing coronavirus concerns , Russian President Vladimir Putin has postponed a constitutional referendum that , if passed , would keep Putin in power until 2036 .
“ The absolute priority for us is the health , life and safety of people .
Therefore I believe that the vote should be postponed until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The new date has not yet been announced .
Russia has so far recorded 658 coronavirus cases .
A surge in applications from homebound New Yorkers has led to a shortage in dogs to adopt and foster .
A similar trend has emerged in Los Angeles , where the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals noted a 70 percent increase in animals entering foster care .
“ For the moment we definitely don ’ t have any dogs left to match ” with foster homes , said Anna Lai @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Which is a great problem to have.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Senate passes a massive stimulus bill , a U.S. hostage has died in Iran , and Spain’s coronavirus death toll is now the world’s second highest.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Senate passes a massive stimulus bill, a U.S. hostage has died in Iran, and Spain’s coronavirus death toll is now the world’s second highest.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Senate Passes $2.2 Trillion Coronavirus Bill
Late Wednesday night the U.S. Senate passed the largest economic relief bill in U.S. history, almost tripling the $800 billion stimulus package passed in reaction the 2008 financial crisis. The bill now goes to the House of Representatives. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that he would sign the bill “immediately.”
The bill includes $1,200 for individuals earning up to $75,000, $100 billion for health care providers, and $58 billion for the U.S. airline industry. It would also include $2,400 per month for up to four months to the unemployed.
By far the largest portion of the bill, $500 billion, goes to industry loans that corporations, cities, and states can apply for. Democrats had initially fought this portion, but agreed when provisions for more independent oversight of the fund were added.
Can the U.S. economy bounce back? It’s too early to know for the United States, but the health of China’s economy could point the way, as it appears to be over the worst of its coronavirus outbreak. The so-called “V-shaped” recovery isn’t a sure thing, but reports of life ticking back to normal in China show that a quick return isn’t impossible. Foreign Policy’s Keith Johnson has more from economic analysts on whether China holds the key to predicting the economic future of the United States and Europe.
How much worse can the coronavirus epidemic get in the U.S.? If the sharp uptick in cases continues, the United States is on track to become the number one most-infected country worldwide. At the time of writing, there were 1,032 deaths. In New York, the virus epicenter in the United States with over 30,000 cases and 366 deaths, projections for hospitalizations doubling have changed from every two days to every 4.7 days, signaling that severe cases may be slowing.
What We’re Following Today
G-20 leaders meet. G-20 leaders will meet today for a videoconference summit to discuss measures to address the coronavirus pandemic. According to White House staffers, a key U.S. goal will be to convince Saudi Arabia to halt the overproduction of oil that has hurt U.S. producers. A meeting with G-7 foreign ministers yesterday ended without a joint statement after other leaders would not agree on U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s designation of COVID-19 as the “Wuhan virus.”
U.S. hostage dies in Iran. The former FBI agent Robert Levinson, who disappeared in Iran 13 years ago, has died in Iranian custody, according to his family. The family said that his death appeared to have occurred before the coronavirus pandemic. They claimed they had recently received information from U.S. officials that led them to conclude he had died. Levinson, the longest-held hostage in U.S. history, disappeared in 2007 on the Iranian island of Kish.
Islamic State claim Sikh compound attack. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for killing 25 people in an attack on a Sikh temple compound in Kabul yesterday. Afghan security forces responded to the attack and killed all the intruders, according to the Afghan government.
Boko Haram attacks in Chad. Nearly 100 Chadian soldiers were killed yesterday in an ambush staged by Boko Haram militants in the village of Boma in the country’s west. “I have taken part in many operations … but never in our history have we lost so many men at one time,” President Idriss Deby said on a visit to the attack site. It’s the second Islamist attack in the region this week after militants killed 70 Nigerian soldiers on Tuesday.
Prince Charles infected. Prince Charles, the heir to the British throne, has tested positive for the coronavirus. His wife, Camilla, has tested negative. Charles is now self-isolating and working from “home” at Balmoral Castle in Scotland, according to royal sources. He is the latest in a string of high profile figures and world leaders to contract the virus, and Foreign Policy is keeping a track of them all here.
Israeli Knesset speaker quits. The speaker of Israel’s parliament Yuli Edelstein has resigned his post amid a battle with the country’s Supreme Court. The court on Monday set a deadline for Wednesday at midnight for Edelstein to convene a vote on a new speaker. As his resignation takes 48 hours to apply, he has effectively defied the court’s ruling already. In a statement, Edelstein said, “I have no desire to be in contempt of court but my conscience does not allow me to respect the court’s order.” Edelstein’s departure now makes it easier for the Blue and White party’s bloc, which appears to hold a tenuous majority, to pursue its legislative agenda.
Keep an Eye On
Bolsonaro condemns local officials. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro continues to rail against coronavirus measures being taken in his country, as local officials take preparedeness into their own hands. “Other viruses have killed many more than this one and there wasn’t all this commotion,” Bolsonaro told journalists, “What a few mayors and governors are doing is a crime. They’re destroying Brazil.” Augusto Heleno, Brazil’s national security adviser, who tested positive for COVID-19, has broken his 14-day quarantine after just one week and returned to work.
Turkey indicts 20 on Khashoggi killing. Turkey has charged 20 Saudi nationals in connection with the “deliberate and monstrous killing” killing of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018. The list of those indicted includes former Saudi Deputy Head of Intelligence Ahmad Asiri. Agnes Callamard , the United Nations rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, welcomed the news, calling it a “counter balance to the travesty of justice at the hands of Saudi Arabia.”
Spain’s death toll surpasses China’s. Spain is now the second country, after Italy, to surpass China in the number of deaths related to the coronavirus. Spain has recorded just under 50,000 cases, 27,000 of which are undergoing hospital care. Spain has now recorded 3,647 deaths from COVID-19, Italy has the highest death toll at 7,503.
Coral bleaching continues. The Great Barrier Reef off the coast of Australia has suffered its third mass bleaching event in the past five years, according to an aerial survey by Terry Hughes of James Cook Univeristy. Experts blame global warming. Corals bleach when they sit in waters that are unusually hot for too long. Further surveys in the coming days will determine whether the bleaching matches the extent of record events in 2016 and 2017, when about half the shallow water corals were killed off.
Malaysia gloves in short supply. Malaysia produces three out of every five pairs of medical gloves worldwide, and manufacturers there are struggling to meet coronavirus-related demand. A combination of factors: a debilitated workforce, stringent new health requirements, and supply chain shutdowns mean medical practitioners could soon find themselves short of equipment. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration said earlier this month that certain gloves could be reused beyond their shelf life.
Putin delays. Citing coronavirus concerns, Russian President Vladimir Putin has postponed a constitutional referendum that, if passed, would keep Putin in power until 2036. “The absolute priority for us is the health, life and safety of people. Therefore I believe that the vote should be postponed until a later date,” Putin said. The new date has not yet been announced. Russia has so far recorded 658 coronavirus cases.
Odds and Ends
A surge in applications from homebound New Yorkers has led to a shortage in dogs to adopt and foster. A similar trend has emerged in Los Angeles, where the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals noted a 70 percent increase in animals entering foster care. “For the moment we definitely don’t have any dogs left to match” with foster homes, said Anna Lai, of Muddy Paws Rescue, “Which is a great problem to have.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-26--The Coronavirus War Economy Will Change the World

Is the world at war with the coronavirus ?
Last month , Xi Jinping called the Chinese suppression effort a “ people ’ s war ” ; in the past week , Donald Trump labeled himself a “ wartime president , ” while Emmanuel Macron declared that France is “ at war ” with COVID-19 .
As the global response to the pandemic gathers steam , the rhetoric of wartime mobilization is everywhere .
In Italy , the worst-affected country in Europe , the government ’ s anti-virus czar has called for the country to “ equip itself with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
During the 2008 global financial crisis , policymakers became fond of using warlike language to describe their stabilization efforts , invoking “ big bazookas ” and “ shock and awe.
” But the total nature of the global response to the coronavirus makes the metaphor of wartime economics even more relevant today .
Governments currently have to manage a public health emergency at the same time as central banks act to calm financial markets , armed forces are deployed to build hospitals , and citizens ’ movements are restricted by social distancing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war economy a useful way to understand the fight against the coronavirus ?
The idea has been invoked to mean a variety of things : productivity , sacrifice , reform , solidarity , and resourcefulness .
In some of these areas , war isn ’ t an appropriate way to think about the global pandemic .
In other respects , however , it ’ s time for Western governments to go beyond merely using wartime rhetoric .
The history of 20th-century war economies offers important lessons that policymakers should already be drawing on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points out , the DPA is not the only model for such resource mobilization , or even the most effective one .
There are models less reliant on the private sector than the DPA ; one important peacetime predecessor is the New Deal-era Works Progress Administration .
This sort of public scheme would be able to put to work the large numbers of workers who are facing unemployment in the coming weeks and months .
Besides having positive economic side effects , such public employment expands state capacity and removes the need to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as New York State ’ s use of prison labor to mass-produce hand sanitizer .
War-economic production is often conceived of as a national enterprise .
But most war economies in the 20th century were deeply international in their supply lines .
The medical mobilization against COVID-19 will have to be similarly global .
There are currently about 173,000 ventilators in the United States .
In the short term , the increase in American needs alone will probably exceed the entire global annual production of 40,000 to 50,000 machines .
Given the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ventilator assembly , even the DPA will only allow a small conversion of manufacturing plants for medical machine production .
The shortage can not be solved within national borders .
East Asia , where the virus is under relative control , is where ventilators can be produced on a serious scale .
Just as Lend-Lease and the Berlin airlift provided U.S.-produced war material for the rest of the world in the 1940s , so the realities of the global manufacturing base in 2020 suggest that mass airlifts of ventilators and machine parts from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western emergency care .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
Beyond the immediate treatment of those infected with coronavirus , however , Western governments have almost universally shut down rather than ramped up production .
As one financial analyst pointed out , “ lockdown economics ” is in many ways the exact opposite of the wartime economics of total mobilization .
During both world wars , economic mobilization enrolled unprecedentedly large groups of male @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The coronavirus ’ s disruption of supply chains and the social distancing measures of today , however , are currently putting millions of employees in the manufacturing and service sectors out of work .
Despite the atomized nature of life under quarantine , it ’ s clear that the coronavirus resembles war in one crucial aspect : As a highly infectious virus with a significant mortality rate , it has the potential to cause mass death on a scale unseen in European societies since the 1940s .
Facing up to this reality is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Giuseppe Conte has asked his compatriots for “ 60 million small great sacrifices ” as they weather the pandemic .
Even those who would rightly avoid the language of war , such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel , acknowledge that the coronavirus demands a level of collective action unseen since World War II .
Beyond the sick , wounded , and dead , war economies are based on other sacrifices , too .
Under capitalist conditions , war economics raises the question of how many resources society is willing to set aside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Both military power and health care fall into the category of expenditures that are essentially protective rather than productive in nature .
But beyond this , the analogy falters .
Emergencies often present economies with real resource constraints .
In early-20th-century war economics , the key dilemma was usually a choice between prioritizing defense or civilian production—guns or butter .
The coronavirus forces us to think hard about how public health measures can be reconciled with economic production .
But this is not a problem of prioritizing expenditures or limited resources .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short run , the demands of disease prevention ( quarantine measures ) and care ( hospitalization ) will put the livelihood of those dependent on other forms of capitalist production at risk .
Only massive government intervention to protect the channels of economic circulation can resolve this tension in a way that does not sacrifice the former for the latter .
We might call this the “ ventilation or butter ” dilemma .
The inescapable need for state involvement helps explain why the war economy is a favorite metaphor of the technocratic imagination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ powers to bypass legislative gridlock and entrenched interests .
The coronavirus crisis is already allowing the implementation of ideas that would have been considered very radical just months ago .
The speed with which U.S. legislators have embraced interventionist ideas such as direct cash transfers , freezes on mortgage foreclosures , and government nationalization of distressed firms is a major intellectual vindication of the left .
For a long time , the progressive left has highlighted the very problems that the virus has now exposed so starkly : precarious employment ; galloping income @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of health care , housing and education for many ; and the peril of personal indebtedness .
In the case of the European welfare state , the real fruits of wartime crisis management were only reaped after the end of conflict .
Policies meant to deal with the damage of the Great Depression and the world wars created new constituencies .
Despite being framed as exceptional wartime or postwar measures , many provisions rapidly became entrenched .
In interwar Britain , France , and Germany , it was financial support for “ war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , orphaned , and disabled by the war—that created the foundations for later universal pensions and child care .
If the emergency response measures to COVID-19 grow to encompass a large enough group—for example , the millions of service workers being laid off—this , too , may coagulate into a new semi-organized group with a future political role .
Precisely because of their reliance on state action , war economies are deeply political systems .
War economies do not suspend politics ; they raise the stakes .
As opportunities for empowerment and enrichment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ burdens arise in which some groups acquire power and resources not just in excess but at the expense of others .
Short-lived emergencies can temporarily bracket distributional questions from political debate , for instance over wages .
But the longer warlike exceptions last , the greater the opportunities for subordinate groups to leverage their power .
In the early 20th century , war production made labor unions more powerful in Britain , France , Germany , Italy , Japan , the United States , and elsewhere .
Even when organized labor negotiated pacts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interests , it put its power on display in the immediate postwar periods of 1918-1921 and 1945-1948 , which witnessed the largest strike waves of the 20th century .
In this respect , the coronavirus lockdowns present a deeply lopsided situation .
After decades of falling unionization , Western economies are confining much of their workforce to their homes while enormously increasing their reliance on a vital set of workers in the care , logistics , and retail sectors .
Doctors , nurses , delivery people , postal and transport workers , grocery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workers and janitors , mechanics and tech employees , and farm hands are now , very clearly , the indispensable foundation of a functioning society .
There is no precedent for the asymmetric mix of mobilization and demobilization of labor that we are witnessing right now .
And as anyone currently working from home with children knows , the realms of office work , child care , and other forms of domestic labor are colliding as never before .
Invoking warlike sacrifice heightens the need for governments to balance rewards across boundaries of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ age .
The history of war economies offers lessons in the management of solidarity under such circumstances .
Beyond pioneering forms of economic planning , resource mobilization , and industrial policy , war economies spearheaded many initiatives that directly promoted solidarity in the face of sacrifice .
As millions volunteered to fight while civilians on “ the homefront ” manned factories , schools , and hospitals , states were able to create a new moral economy .
Its central object of contempt was the figure of the war profiteer .
Every society at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ special hatred for individuals who reaped massive profits while others risked their lives and offered their labor .
The first tool against war-induced rent-seeking was excess profits taxation .
Between 1915 and 1918 , every major belligerent in World War I taxed the profits of private individuals and corporations .
Wisconsin Sen. Robert La Follette denounced war profiteers as “ the enemies of democracy in the homeland.
” Excess profits taxation was even higher in the next war ; by 1943 , U.S. firms were taxed at a rate of 95 percent for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent rate of return on capital .
President Franklin D. Roosevelt put it simply : “ I don ’ t want to see a single war millionaire created in the United States as a result of this world disaster.
” Wartime economics didn ’ t only recast what counted as legitimately earned income .
As historian Mark Wilson has emphasized , one legal innovation created by wartime arms spending was the U.S. government ’ s development of the power of “ statutory renegotiation.
” This allowed the government to revisit fulfilled private contracts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it had been overcharged by private suppliers .
Although these “ clawbacks ” were widely despised by industrialists , they allowed the government to avoid wasting public money because of price-gouging by contractors .
In urban planning and city politics , landlords came under scrutiny as possible residential war profiteers .
World War I did more than anything in the 20th century to make rent control a widespread practice in capitalist democracies .
As growing numbers of people worked and lived in cities , the cost of living had to be kept within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ income .
Minimum-wage laws served the same function , ensuring workers got their fair share of the gains of the wartime boon .
These war-economic mechanisms of solidarity offer valuable ideas about how to address the current pandemic “ world disaster.
” Pharmaceutical corporations and health care middlemen can have their excess profits taxed to ensure they do not reap the exclusive benefit of the common fight against the virus .
The Economist estimates that U.S. health care providers make excess profits of $ 65 billion a year .
This is enough to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 50,000 a piece or to fund the hospital stays of millions of people who will require urgent treatment for COVID-19 .
Congress should also investigate reinstating the Renegotiation Act of 1951 to revisit medical supply contracts resulting in excessive profits for the private sector .
Rent caps and minimum-wage floors should be instituted to ease pressures on the balance sheets of households .
Economic and financial measures alone are not enough , and major interventions in housing and utilities are also needed .
The initiatives of states like California and New York and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Orlando , and Seattle to freeze evictions and postpone utility shut-offs should be expanded nationwide .
( Detroit has even restored water access to those previously cut off . )
The U.S. government can use eminent domain law to take over empty private residences , hotels , parks , and other spaces needed to expand the capacity of emergency health care .
As James Galbraith has suggested , large logistical corporations such as Amazon , Walmart , and FedEx can be employed as public utilities , with underemployed Uber drivers filling in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was pressing , since wars are by their very nature open-ended clashes whose duration can not be predicted .
Early war economists such as Polish businessman Ivan Bloch and Austrian scientist Otto Neurath examined how large and small states—Germany and Russia as well as Japan and Serbia—would fare if they had to wage war for extended periods of time .
Bloch predicted that the overburdening of markets would result in major “ convulsions in the social order.
” Neurath argued that the proper organization of material supply would be a stronger foundation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both of them agreed on was that the most resilient war economies were those that did the most with limited resources .
Rationing was one way of doing this , but so was technological invention .
Being isolated from the rest of the world economy—either by economic crisis or by enemy armies or blockades—was a powerful stimulus to such invention , which brought about the development of synthetic forms of polymer , fabrics , fuel , and fertilizer during the world wars .
Such resourcefulness holds an important lesson for the present .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ financial means of the United States and the European Union to overcome the virus and the social and economic dislocation caused by it .
Moreover , although the death toll will likely be high , we know that the pandemic will eventually end .
But beyond the resolution of the COVID-19 crisis looms another problem : climate change .
Will an emergency response to the disease send us out of the frying pan of the virus , into the fire of climate breakdown ?
The challenge we currently face is to mobilize unused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protecting lives in the rest of the economy—including future lives that depend on winding down the fossil fuel industry .
Here the global effects of the virus , which has lowered carbon emissions , saved lives by reducing air pollution , and paused much of our ordinary carbon-intensive lifestyles , create opportunities for a turn to green policy across the board .
The resourcefulness of wartime economies offers a useful template for thinking about the broader context of the coronavirus crisis .
Mounting a serious campaign to mitigate climate change demands a response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response measures are just a start .
Despite calls for a return to normality , it is difficult to imagine the post-pandemic world economy , whatever it looks like , as a restoration of any sort .
Even if the virus subsides in several months or years from now , the larger state of exception in policymaking and collective action to which it already belongs is unlikely to end .
Twentieth-century war economies played an important role in allowing the peacetime economies that followed them to flourish .
The key now will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and inventiveness as the coronavirus confronts the 21st-century world economy with a new kind of warlike hazard .

Is the world at war with the coronavirus? Last month, Xi Jinping called the Chinese suppression effort a “people’s war”; in the past week, Donald Trump labeled himself a “wartime president,” while Emmanuel Macron declared that France is “at war” with COVID-19. As the global response to the pandemic gathers steam, the rhetoric of wartime mobilization is everywhere. In Italy, the worst-affected country in Europe, the government’s anti-virus czar has called for the country to “equip itself with a war economy” to confront the disease.
Is the world at war with the coronavirus? Last month, Xi Jinping called the Chinese suppression effort a “people’s war”; in the past week, Donald Trump labeled himself a “wartime president,” while Emmanuel Macron declared that France is “at war” with COVID-19. As the global response to the pandemic gathers steam, the rhetoric of wartime mobilization is everywhere. In Italy, the worst-affected country in Europe, the government’s anti-virus czar has called for the country to “equip itself with a war economy” to confront the disease.
During the 2008 global financial crisis, policymakers became fond of using warlike language to describe their stabilization efforts, invoking “big bazookas” and “shock and awe.” But the total nature of the global response to the coronavirus makes the metaphor of wartime economics even more relevant today. Governments currently have to manage a public health emergency at the same time as central banks act to calm financial markets, armed forces are deployed to build hospitals, and citizens’ movements are restricted by social distancing.
But in what ways is the war economy a useful way to understand the fight against the coronavirus? The idea has been invoked to mean a variety of things: productivity, sacrifice, reform, solidarity, and resourcefulness. In some of these areas, war isn’t an appropriate way to think about the global pandemic. In other respects, however, it’s time for Western governments to go beyond merely using wartime rhetoric. The history of 20th-century war economies offers important lessons that policymakers should already be drawing on today.
A World War II poster urges women to find a job to aid in the war effort.
Our campaign against the disease most clearly recalls wartime emergencies in the urgent need to expand production and care. As COVID-19 cases overwhelm intensive care units around the world, we need more test kits, hospital beds, ventilator machines, masks, and protective clothing—lots of them, fast. Expanded emergency care capacity is encountering supply bottlenecks, for instance of the chemical reagents used in testing, and the looming shortage of trained medical personnel. The U.S. government’s invocation last week of the Defense Production Act (DPA), a Cold War law allowing it to prioritize and allocate resources to help expand private industries in strategic sectors, is a step on this road to constructing a larger medical mass-production base.
But as historian Tim Barker points out, the DPA is not the only model for such resource mobilization, or even the most effective one. There are models less reliant on the private sector than the DPA; one important peacetime predecessor is the New Deal-era Works Progress Administration. This sort of public scheme would be able to put to work the large numbers of workers who are facing unemployment in the coming weeks and months. Besides having positive economic side effects, such public employment expands state capacity and removes the need to rely on improvised exploitative labor practices, such as New York State’s use of prison labor to mass-produce hand sanitizer.
War-economic production is often conceived of as a national enterprise. But most war economies in the 20th century were deeply international in their supply lines. The medical mobilization against COVID-19 will have to be similarly global. There are currently about 173,000 ventilators in the United States. In the short term, the increase in American needs alone will probably exceed the entire global annual production of 40,000 to 50,000 machines. Given the complex nature and high sanitary requirements of ventilator assembly, even the DPA will only allow a small conversion of manufacturing plants for medical machine production. The shortage cannot be solved within national borders. East Asia, where the virus is under relative control, is where ventilators can be produced on a serious scale. Just as Lend-Lease and the Berlin airlift provided U.S.-produced war material for the rest of the world in the 1940s, so the realities of the global manufacturing base in 2020 suggest that mass airlifts of ventilators and machine parts from China will be needed to support adequate Western emergency care.
Beyond the immediate treatment of those infected with coronavirus, however, Western governments have almost universally shut down rather than ramped up production. As one financial analyst pointed out, “lockdown economics” is in many ways the exact opposite of the wartime economics of total mobilization. During both world wars, economic mobilization enrolled unprecedentedly large groups of male and female workers in mass production. The coronavirus’s disruption of supply chains and the social distancing measures of today, however, are currently putting millions of employees in the manufacturing and service sectors out of work.
Despite the atomized nature of life under quarantine, it’s clear that the coronavirus resembles war in one crucial aspect: As a highly infectious virus with a significant mortality rate, it has the potential to cause mass death on a scale unseen in European societies since the 1940s. Facing up to this reality is politically difficult but unavoidable. Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte has asked his compatriots for “60 million small great sacrifices” as they weather the pandemic. Even those who would rightly avoid the language of war, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, acknowledge that the coronavirus demands a level of collective action unseen since World War II.
Beyond the sick, wounded, and dead, war economies are based on other sacrifices, too. Under capitalist conditions, war economics raises the question of how many resources society is willing to set aside from profit-seeking ventures to protect itself. Both military power and health care fall into the category of expenditures that are essentially protective rather than productive in nature.
But beyond this, the analogy falters. Emergencies often present economies with real resource constraints. In early-20th-century war economics, the key dilemma was usually a choice between prioritizing defense or civilian production—guns or butter. The coronavirus forces us to think hard about how public health measures can be reconciled with economic production. But this is not a problem of prioritizing expenditures or limited resources. The issue is sustaining circulation. In the short run, the demands of disease prevention (quarantine measures) and care (hospitalization) will put the livelihood of those dependent on other forms of capitalist production at risk. Only massive government intervention to protect the channels of economic circulation can resolve this tension in a way that does not sacrifice the former for the latter. We might call this the “ventilation or butter” dilemma.
The inescapable need for state involvement helps explain why the war economy is a favorite metaphor of the technocratic imagination. Crises have always granted reformist policymakers powers to bypass legislative gridlock and entrenched interests. The coronavirus crisis is already allowing the implementation of ideas that would have been considered very radical just months ago. The speed with which U.S. legislators have embraced interventionist ideas such as direct cash transfers, freezes on mortgage foreclosures, and government nationalization of distressed firms is a major intellectual vindication of the left. For a long time, the progressive left has highlighted the very problems that the virus has now exposed so starkly: precarious employment; galloping income and wealth inequality; the unaffordable cost of health care, housing and education for many; and the peril of personal indebtedness.
But successful crisis management is no guarantee of durable reform. War economies can be powerful incubators of political change. But technocracy cannot make its offspring survive through its own power alone. What renders these innovations durable is the emergence of political and electoral alliances.
In the case of the European welfare state, the real fruits of wartime crisis management were only reaped after the end of conflict. Policies meant to deal with the damage of the Great Depression and the world wars created new constituencies. Despite being framed as exceptional wartime or postwar measures, many provisions rapidly became entrenched. In interwar Britain, France, and Germany, it was financial support for “war victims”—veterans and those left widowed, orphaned, and disabled by the war—that created the foundations for later universal pensions and child care. If the emergency response measures to COVID-19 grow to encompass a large enough group—for example, the millions of service workers being laid off—this, too, may coagulate into a new semi-organized group with a future political role.
Precisely because of their reliance on state action, war economies are deeply political systems. War economies do not suspend politics; they raise the stakes. As opportunities for empowerment and enrichment abound, novel distributions of benefits and burdens arise in which some groups acquire power and resources not just in excess but at the expense of others. Short-lived emergencies can temporarily bracket distributional questions from political debate, for instance over wages. But the longer warlike exceptions last, the greater the opportunities for subordinate groups to leverage their power. In the early 20th century, war production made labor unions more powerful in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, and elsewhere. Even when organized labor negotiated pacts of national unity with government and business interests, it put its power on display in the immediate postwar periods of 1918-1921 and 1945-1948, which witnessed the largest strike waves of the 20th century.
In this respect, the coronavirus lockdowns present a deeply lopsided situation. After decades of falling unionization, Western economies are confining much of their workforce to their homes while enormously increasing their reliance on a vital set of workers in the care, logistics, and retail sectors. Doctors, nurses, delivery people, postal and transport workers, grocery store employees, shelf stockers, sanitation workers and janitors, mechanics and tech employees, and farm hands are now, very clearly, the indispensable foundation of a functioning society. There is no precedent for the asymmetric mix of mobilization and demobilization of labor that we are witnessing right now. And as anyone currently working from home with children knows, the realms of office work, child care, and other forms of domestic labor are colliding as never before.
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Invoking warlike sacrifice heightens the need for governments to balance rewards across boundaries of class, race, region, and age. The history of war economies offers lessons in the management of solidarity under such circumstances. Beyond pioneering forms of economic planning, resource mobilization, and industrial policy, war economies spearheaded many initiatives that directly promoted solidarity in the face of sacrifice. As millions volunteered to fight while civilians on “the homefront” manned factories, schools, and hospitals, states were able to create a new moral economy. Its central object of contempt was the figure of the war profiteer. Every society at war between 1914 and 1945 reserved a special hatred for individuals who reaped massive profits while others risked their lives and offered their labor.
The first tool against war-induced rent-seeking was excess profits taxation. Between 1915 and 1918, every major belligerent in World War I taxed the profits of private individuals and corporations. Wisconsin Sen. Robert La Follette denounced war profiteers as “the enemies of democracy in the homeland.” Excess profits taxation was even higher in the next war; by 1943, U.S. firms were taxed at a rate of 95 percent for every dollar they earned above an 8 percent rate of return on capital. President Franklin D. Roosevelt put it simply: “I don’t want to see a single war millionaire created in the United States as a result of this world disaster.”
Wartime economics didn’t only recast what counted as legitimately earned income. As historian Mark Wilson has emphasized, one legal innovation created by wartime arms spending was the U.S. government’s development of the power of “statutory renegotiation.” This allowed the government to revisit fulfilled private contracts, demanding lower prices in cases where it had been overcharged by private suppliers. Although these “clawbacks” were widely despised by industrialists, they allowed the government to avoid wasting public money because of price-gouging by contractors. In urban planning and city politics, landlords came under scrutiny as possible residential war profiteers. World War I did more than anything in the 20th century to make rent control a widespread practice in capitalist democracies. As growing numbers of people worked and lived in cities, the cost of living had to be kept within reach of the average worker’s income. Minimum-wage laws served the same function, ensuring workers got their fair share of the gains of the wartime boon.
These war-economic mechanisms of solidarity offer valuable ideas about how to address the current pandemic “world disaster.” Pharmaceutical corporations and health care middlemen can have their excess profits taxed to ensure they do not reap the exclusive benefit of the common fight against the virus. The Economist estimates that U.S. health care providers make excess profits of $65 billion a year. This is enough to produce 1.3 million ICU ventilators at $50,000 a piece or to fund the hospital stays of millions of people who will require urgent treatment for COVID-19. Congress should also investigate reinstating the Renegotiation Act of 1951 to revisit medical supply contracts resulting in excessive profits for the private sector. Rent caps and minimum-wage floors should be instituted to ease pressures on the balance sheets of households.
Economic and financial measures alone are not enough, and major interventions in housing and utilities are also needed. The initiatives of states like California and New York and such cities as Los Angeles, Miami, Orlando, and Seattle to freeze evictions and postpone utility shut-offs should be expanded nationwide. (Detroit has even restored water access to those previously cut off.) The U.S. government can use eminent domain law to take over empty private residences, hotels, parks, and other spaces needed to expand the capacity of emergency health care. As James Galbraith has suggested, large logistical corporations such as Amazon, Walmart, and FedEx can be employed as public utilities, with underemployed Uber drivers filling in as additional delivery staff.
A propaganda poster from World War II shows Americans of different national origins assembling a Sherman tank with a quotation against discrimination by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
War economics emerged around the turn of the 20th century as a field that mixed careful analysis with fearful speculation. Could mass societies based on industrial production and globalized supply routes survive modern wars?
The question was pressing, since wars are by their very nature open-ended clashes whose duration cannot be predicted. Early war economists such as Polish businessman Ivan Bloch and Austrian scientist Otto Neurath examined how large and small states—Germany and Russia as well as Japan and Serbia—would fare if they had to wage war for extended periods of time. Bloch predicted that the overburdening of markets would result in major “convulsions in the social order.” Neurath argued that the proper organization of material supply would be a stronger foundation of national survival than financial wealth.
What both of them agreed on was that the most resilient war economies were those that did the most with limited resources. Rationing was one way of doing this, but so was technological invention. Being isolated from the rest of the world economy—either by economic crisis or by enemy armies or blockades—was a powerful stimulus to such invention, which brought about the development of synthetic forms of polymer, fabrics, fuel, and fertilizer during the world wars.
Such resourcefulness holds an important lesson for the present. It is certainly within the material and financial means of the United States and the European Union to overcome the virus and the social and economic dislocation caused by it. Moreover, although the death toll will likely be high, we know that the pandemic will eventually end. But beyond the resolution of the COVID-19 crisis looms another problem: climate change. Will an emergency response to the disease send us out of the frying pan of the virus, into the fire of climate breakdown? The challenge we currently face is to mobilize unused labor and resources in certain sectors while protecting lives in the rest of the economy—including future lives that depend on winding down the fossil fuel industry. Here the global effects of the virus, which has lowered carbon emissions, saved lives by reducing air pollution, and paused much of our ordinary carbon-intensive lifestyles, create opportunities for a turn to green policy across the board.
The resourcefulness of wartime economies offers a useful template for thinking about the broader context of the coronavirus crisis. Mounting a serious campaign to mitigate climate change demands a response so large that many of the virus response measures are just a start. Despite calls for a return to normality, it is difficult to imagine the post-pandemic world economy, whatever it looks like, as a restoration of any sort. Even if the virus subsides in several months or years from now, the larger state of exception in policymaking and collective action to which it already belongs is unlikely to end.
Twentieth-century war economies played an important role in allowing the peacetime economies that followed them to flourish. The key now will be to draw on their lessons of solidarity and inventiveness as the coronavirus confronts the 21st-century world economy with a new kind of warlike hazard.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--South Korea Is a Liberal Country Now

South Korea Is a Liberal Country Now

South Korea ’ s Democratic Party had a good start in its election night on Wednesday , as the exit polls for the National Assembly—South Korea ’ s unicameral legislature—predicted a solid win for the liberals .
Then , as has frequently been the case with politics around the world , the exit polls were wrong .
By the end of the night , President Moon Jae-in ’ s Democrats did not have a solid victory ; instead , they had an overwhelming , history-making one , of the scale of Ronald Reagan versus Walter Mondale in the 1984 U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Moon ’ s party is projected to win 180 out of the 300 seats in the National Assembly , after the exit polls predicted a range of 155 to 173 .
To be sure , the Democrats , the main liberal party , were expecting a good result .
They comfortably led the conservative United Future Party in the polls by around a 10-15 percent margin leading up to the elections , while the implosion of the center-right Bareun Mirae Party meant the Democratic Party was slated to pick up many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The administration ’ s successful containment of the coronavirus outbreak has pushed Moon ’ s approval rating to a 17-month high .
Nonetheless , few expected the Democrats to win in a walk .
South Korea ’ s conservatives seemed to be putting behind them the damage they sustained from previous President Park Geun-hye ’ s impeachment , which split Park ’ s Saenuri Party into several different camps .
Under the new banner of the United Future Party , South Korea ’ s conservatives were promising a good fight , hoping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s presidency in the third year of his five-year term .
Instead , the result was an unprecedented landslide .
An outright majority of 150-plus for a single party is rare enough , as minor parties and independents usually win between 20 and 30 seats , requiring the two major parties to battle over the remaining 270-280 seats .
Since South Korea became a democracy in 1987 , the largest legislative election victory for the main conservative party was 153 seats in 2008 , while the largest one for the main liberal party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seats in 2004 .
To find a comparable legislative win , one has to trace back to South Korea ’ s pre-democracy era : The opposition Democratic Party won 175 seats in 1960 , in a chaotic election after the fall of the dictator Syngman Rhee that was rapidly superseded by Park Chung-hee ’ s military coup in 1961 .
One hundred and eighty seats , or three-fifths of the legislature , is a procedurally significant benchmark .
Under South Korea ’ s legislative rules , a three-fifths supermajority can fast-track bills , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the legislative committee deliberations and be presented for a final vote before the whole National Assembly , where the bill ’ s passage is all but guaranteed .
Before this election , the Democratic Party held 129 seats , making it a plurality but not the majority .
Although Moon did manage to cobble together a coalition with the minor parties to pass a handful of significant laws , such as establishing an independent investigative bureau for crimes committed by public officials , the lack of an outright majority hampered the Democrats from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ With this win , Moon and his party are likely to pursue their long-standing legislative goals , such as judicial reform and anti-discrimination laws .
But discussing this election solely in terms of near-term policy implications diminishes its significance .
Until recently , it was fair to say that South Korea was fundamentally a conservative country .
The noted liberal commentator Yu Si-min lamented that being a liberal in South Korea meant “ playing soccer on a tilted pitch.
” When the liberals did win , it was either because they entered into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because the conservatives fell into a civil war .
Kim Dae-jung won the presidency in 1997 because he allied with Kim Jong-pil , the former right-hand man of military dictator Park Chung-hee and because the independent candidate Lee In-je siphoned off the conservative vote .
Roh Moo-hyun won his presidency in 2002 in a similar manner , by allying with the centrist Hyundai scion Chung Mong-joon .
This time , however , the conservatives presented a single front , with their new party name “ United Future ” indicating the aspiration that they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former president ’ s impeachment in order to defeat the Democrats .
The turnout for this election was 66.2 percent , the highest turnout for a National Assembly election since 1992 .
In other words , this was an electoral version of a total war—each side bringing out its maximal capacity , pitting full strength against full strength .
Yet the result was an unprecedented victory for the Democrats and a crushing defeat for United Future .
Moon , as the face of the Democratic Party , has led a political transformation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ four national elections in a row : the 2016 legislative elections , 2017 presidential election , the 2018 local elections , and the 2020 legislative elections .
In the history of South Korea ’ s democracy , no other party has won four national elections in a row .
These victories were not a result of short-term tactical moves but a fundamental realignment .
With each victory , Moon nudged South Korea toward being a center-left country in which the liberals are the new mainstream and the pitch is finally tilted toward their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the assumptions underlying South Korean politics .
Especially in the eyes of international observers who do not follow day-to-day South Korean politics , the caricature of the liberals is stuck in the 1990s : North Korea-admiring student activists who had just put down their Molotov cocktails to enter politics , long on rhetorical incitement and short on stable governance .
On the eve of this year ’ s National Assembly elections , it was not difficult to find English-language analysis about South Korean politics that claimed liberal constituents were ideologically aligned with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already outdated several years ago ; after this election , it is completely indefensible .
True , the center-left politics of South Korea originate from its democratization movement , and many of its prominent politicians—including Lee Hae-chan , the Democratic Party chair whose strategic mind led his party to victory—were student activists before they entered politics .
It is also true that in the early stages of their careers as politicians , they struck an incorrect balance between idealism and pragmatism .
But that stage of South Korean politics ended long ago .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ party of the middle class , with an overwhelming level of support from urban voters in their 30s and 40s .
As can be seen from the Moon administration ’ s strong response to the coronavirus pandemic , the Democratic Party is also the party of professionalism and competence .
In contrast , the conservatives are increasingly trapped in their regional stronghold in the southeast and marginalized as the party of the old and the bigoted .
The international acclaim that the Moon administration is earning for its COVID-19 response serves a daily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conservative Park Geun-hye administration was at handling the MERS ( Middle East respiratory syndrome ) epidemic less than five years ago .
Simply put , Korean conservatives are increasingly becoming too big of an embarrassment for ordinary Koreans to support , which in turn pushes the conservatives further into being extreme and outlandish .
Nothing is final in politics and especially in the famously dynamic South Korean politics .
But it will be a long time before South Korea ’ s conservatives can dig themselves out of this hole .
All of United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hwang Kyo-ahn , minority leader Na Kyung-won , and former Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon—lost their elections , leaving the party rudderless .
Nor does it seem likely that the conservatives can find in the near term a positive political message that does not center on the stale red scare that accuses every opponent of being a communist sympathizer .
With the latest victory , we may be witnessing South Korea ’ s version of the Reagan Revolution : an electoral victory that may well set the course of politics for the next generation @ @ @ @ @ @

South Korea’s Democratic Party had a good start in its election night on Wednesday, as the exit polls for the National Assembly—South Korea’s unicameral legislature—predicted a solid win for the liberals. Then, as has frequently been the case with politics around the world, the exit polls were wrong. By the end of the night, President Moon Jae-in’s Democrats did not have a solid victory; instead, they had an overwhelming, history-making one, of the scale of Ronald Reagan versus Walter Mondale in the 1984 U.S. presidential election. As of this writing, Moon’s party is projected to win 180 out of the 300 seats in the National Assembly, after the exit polls predicted a range of 155 to 173.
South Korea’s Democratic Party had a good start in its election night on Wednesday, as the exit polls for the National Assembly—South Korea’s unicameral legislature—predicted a solid win for the liberals. Then, as has frequently been the case with politics around the world, the exit polls were wrong. By the end of the night, President Moon Jae-in’s Democrats did not have a solid victory; instead, they had an overwhelming, history-making one, of the scale of Ronald Reagan versus Walter Mondale in the 1984 U.S. presidential election. As of this writing, Moon’s party is projected to win 180 out of the 300 seats in the National Assembly, after the exit polls predicted a range of 155 to 173.
To be sure, the Democrats, the main liberal party, were expecting a good result. They comfortably led the conservative United Future Party in the polls by around a 10-15 percent margin leading up to the elections, while the implosion of the center-right Bareun Mirae Party meant the Democratic Party was slated to pick up many of the former party’s 30-odd seats. The administration’s successful containment of the coronavirus outbreak has pushed Moon’s approval rating to a 17-month high. Nonetheless, few expected the Democrats to win in a walk. South Korea’s conservatives seemed to be putting behind them the damage they sustained from previous President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, which split Park’s Saenuri Party into several different camps. Under the new banner of the United Future Party, South Korea’s conservatives were promising a good fight, hoping the shine had come off Moon’s presidency in the third year of his five-year term.
Instead, the result was an unprecedented landslide. An outright majority of 150-plus for a single party is rare enough, as minor parties and independents usually win between 20 and 30 seats, requiring the two major parties to battle over the remaining 270-280 seats. Since South Korea became a democracy in 1987, the largest legislative election victory for the main conservative party was 153 seats in 2008, while the largest one for the main liberal party (until this election) was 152 seats in 2004. To find a comparable legislative win, one has to trace back to South Korea’s pre-democracy era: The opposition Democratic Party won 175 seats in 1960, in a chaotic election after the fall of the dictator Syngman Rhee that was rapidly superseded by Park Chung-hee’s military coup in 1961.
One hundred and eighty seats, or three-fifths of the legislature, is a procedurally significant benchmark. Under South Korea’s legislative rules, a three-fifths supermajority can fast-track bills, essentially allowing the bill to cut short the legislative committee deliberations and be presented for a final vote before the whole National Assembly, where the bill’s passage is all but guaranteed. Before this election, the Democratic Party held 129 seats, making it a plurality but not the majority. Although Moon did manage to cobble together a coalition with the minor parties to pass a handful of significant laws, such as establishing an independent investigative bureau for crimes committed by public officials, the lack of an outright majority hampered the Democrats from pursuing a more ambitious legislative agenda. With this win, Moon and his party are likely to pursue their long-standing legislative goals, such as judicial reform and anti-discrimination laws.
But discussing this election solely in terms of near-term policy implications diminishes its significance. Until recently, it was fair to say that South Korea was fundamentally a conservative country. The noted liberal commentator Yu Si-min lamented that being a liberal in South Korea meant “playing soccer on a tilted pitch.” When the liberals did win, it was either because they entered into a strategic alliance with moderate conservatives or because the conservatives fell into a civil war. Kim Dae-jung won the presidency in 1997 because he allied with Kim Jong-pil, the former right-hand man of military dictator Park Chung-hee and because the independent candidate Lee In-je siphoned off the conservative vote. Roh Moo-hyun won his presidency in 2002 in a similar manner, by allying with the centrist Hyundai scion Chung Mong-joon.
This time, however, the conservatives presented a single front, with their new party name “United Future” indicating the aspiration that they would set aside their differences regarding the former president’s impeachment in order to defeat the Democrats. The turnout for this election was 66.2 percent, the highest turnout for a National Assembly election since 1992. In other words, this was an electoral version of a total war—each side bringing out its maximal capacity, pitting full strength against full strength. Yet the result was an unprecedented victory for the Democrats and a crushing defeat for United Future.
Moon, as the face of the Democratic Party, has led a political transformation. From 2016, the Democrats decisively won four national elections in a row: the 2016 legislative elections, 2017 presidential election, the 2018 local elections, and the 2020 legislative elections. In the history of South Korea’s democracy, no other party has won four national elections in a row. These victories were not a result of short-term tactical moves but a fundamental realignment. With each victory, Moon nudged South Korea toward being a center-left country in which the liberals are the new mainstream and the pitch is finally tilted toward their advantage.
This transformation requires a reassessment of the assumptions underlying South Korean politics. Especially in the eyes of international observers who do not follow day-to-day South Korean politics, the caricature of the liberals is stuck in the 1990s: North Korea-admiring student activists who had just put down their Molotov cocktails to enter politics, long on rhetorical incitement and short on stable governance. On the eve of this year’s National Assembly elections, it was not difficult to find English-language analysis about South Korean politics that claimed liberal constituents were ideologically aligned with North Korea.
Such a view was already outdated several years ago; after this election, it is completely indefensible. True, the center-left politics of South Korea originate from its democratization movement, and many of its prominent politicians—including Lee Hae-chan, the Democratic Party chair whose strategic mind led his party to victory—were student activists before they entered politics. It is also true that in the early stages of their careers as politicians, they struck an incorrect balance between idealism and pragmatism. But that stage of South Korean politics ended long ago. Today, the Democratic Party is the party of the middle class, with an overwhelming level of support from urban voters in their 30s and 40s. As can be seen from the Moon administration’s strong response to the coronavirus pandemic, the Democratic Party is also the party of professionalism and competence.
In contrast, the conservatives are increasingly trapped in their regional stronghold in the southeast and marginalized as the party of the old and the bigoted. The international acclaim that the Moon administration is earning for its COVID-19 response serves a daily reminder of how bumbling and ineffective the conservative Park Geun-hye administration was at handling the MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) epidemic less than five years ago. Simply put, Korean conservatives are increasingly becoming too big of an embarrassment for ordinary Koreans to support, which in turn pushes the conservatives further into being extreme and outlandish.
Nothing is final in politics and especially in the famously dynamic South Korean politics. But it will be a long time before South Korea’s conservatives can dig themselves out of this hole. All of United Future’s senior leadership—including party chair Hwang Kyo-ahn, minority leader Na Kyung-won, and former Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon—lost their elections, leaving the party rudderless. Nor does it seem likely that the conservatives can find in the near term a positive political message that does not center on the stale red scare that accuses every opponent of being a communist sympathizer. With the latest victory, we may be witnessing South Korea’s version of the Reagan Revolution: an electoral victory that may well set the course of politics for the next generation toward an entirely new direction.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--Germany Found a Strongman for Its Coronavirus Crisis

Chancellor Angela Merkel and Health Minister Jens Spahn have been leading Germany ’ s national response to the coronavirus pandemic .
But Germans would be forgiven for thinking that they were taking direction from a provincial governor : Bavaria ’ s imposing , straight-talking premier , Markus Söder .
Since the pandemic broke out , Söder ’ s decisive crisis management in his home state—especially his imperious pronouncements on lockdowns , testing , and other public health measures—has captured national attention .
It ’ s not just that Söder ’ s moves have generally anticipated the steps taken by other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national government—nor just that he has been rewarded with historically unprecedented 94 percent approval ratings in his home state .
It ’ s also that his distinctively paternalistic style of leadership may offer clues about the post-Merkel direction of German politics .
For those outside of Germany , Söder ’ s name might for good reason be completely unfamiliar : Until the crisis , the 53-year-old native of Nuremberg was an irascible regional strongman who came to office two years ago in a muscular takeover of his party , the Christian Social Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party of Merkel ’ s Christian Democrats ( CDU ) .
But the pandemic has suddenly catapulted Söder into the mix to become Merkel ’ s successor in the autumn 2021 general election as chancellor candidate for the Christian Democrats .
In barely a month ’ s time , Söder has become the nation ’ s favorite politician , soaring past even Merkel , Germany ’ s most popular politico for years , which has recast all calculations about the contest within conservative ranks .
( Merkel has said she will not run @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s take-charge style , which combines rhetorical displays of empathy with a willingness to resolutely impose hard-line public-safety measures , have appealed to many Germans consumed with angst about the virus .
Söder was the first German executive to issue stay-at-home orders and to close schools .
When the first coronavirus cases began popping up in Bavaria as infected vacationers returned from ski trips in Austria ’ s Tirol region , he made it clear from the onset that he , not the federal government , would decide what was best for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once .
This go-it-alone strategy incurred rancor from some of the other state premiers , as it pushed the boundaries of Germany ’ s federalism .
But Söder didn ’ t back down .
The lockdown he has imposed in Bavaria has also been notably stricter than in other German states : State police have been instructed to strictly enforce the official reasons for leaving one ’ s home , whereas other states have policed more liberally .
He has also warned Bavarians that face masks will likely be obligatory in the state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to issue public recommendations about mask-wearing .
( Söder was also the first government official to himself don a face mask in public . )
At the same time , Söder has offered the most vigorous assurances to private businesses and workers that the government can compensate for the shutting down of the free market : He was the first to offer small businesses cash grants to compensate for the shutting down of the free market , and to approve bonuses for health care personnel .
Söder has also come to represent one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy , insisting that Bavarian restrictions ( including the closure of schools ) could extend beyond guidelines set by the national government , thus placing a greater emphasis on paternalistic government control rather than on the free market .
By contrast , Armin Laschet , North Rhine-Westphalia ’ s soft-spoken premier and a close Merkel ally , has insisted on the importance of quickly finding a way to reopen businesses across the country .
“ With a lot of patience and clever strategy we ’ ve actually created a different situation here in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parts of Europe , ” Söder said on national television on April 14 , referring to the fewer coronavirus cases and deaths per 100,000 people .
“ We shouldn ’ t risk anything .
We shouldn ’ t be too impatient ” and take “ hectic and hasty risks , ” he said .
Perhaps most notable have been Söder ’ s everywhere-at-once media appearances : He has visited hospitals and clinics , embattled Bavarian companies , and manufacturers that have converted their facilities to make face masks .
He comes off as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
By contrast , Merkel ’ s intermittent addresses to the public—admittedly , she was quarantined for two weeks—have been dry and technical , devoid of real-world engagement .
The crisis is exactly the kind of situation that Söder can shine in , longtime observers say .
“ Söder ’ s strength is communication , ” noted the Munich-based Süddeutsche Zeitung ’ s commentator Roman Deininger , the author of a biography of Söder .
“ He hits just the right note : self-assured and energetic but not panicky.
” This unexpected turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fray of the wide-open contest for Merkel ’ s successor .
One reader ’ s comment in the conservative daily Die Welt obviously reflects the thoughts of some : “ I think he ’ s great , can he be chancellor ?
” Söder has repeatedly denied that he will throw his hat in the ring for the national election .
But few doubt that he has his eye on the chancellorship , perhaps sooner rather than later , even despite the full field of candidates already vying to become the next @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Although the CDU chairperson is usually the chancellor candidate , the CDU and the Bavarian CSU vote together for the frontperson in the campaign , who has twice in the past been a CSU figure . )
Out in front has been Laschet , who has teamed up with Spahn , an arch conservative , to run against the right-wing Friedrich Merz and the foreign affairs specialist Norbert Röttgen .
A political veteran , Söder likely wouldn ’ t feel intimidated by whomever wins the CDU race .
His rise in the CSU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years old , has been always been marked by tenacity and ambition ( and occasionally ham-fistedness ) .
He became the youngest member of Bavaria ’ s state legislature at the age of 27 in 1994 , before becoming the state ’ s powerful finance minister from 2011 to 2018 .
Söder ’ s most prominent intervention as finance minister offers a telling indication of his party ’ s political philosophy—and the challenges he may face as he attempts to translate it to the national stage .
He repeatedly weighed in forcefully against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an effort to relieve Bavaria , Germany ’ s second wealthiest state , from its burden of helping pay for the country ’ s less prosperous states .
It was an indication of what might be called the CSU ’ s Bavarianism , its populist regionalism that seeks to protect the state , its citizens , and its distinctive culture from encroachments from the outside world—including from other German states .
“ Söder ’ s all about Bavaria , what ’ s best for Bavaria , ” Deininger told Foreign Policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ traditionalism , full of Bavarian folklore , with the kind of high-tech modern economics that has been so successful for Bavaria.
” Bavarianism has typically had a conservative-populist tinge .
Bavarian premiers have opposed liberal migration policies , and Söder has been no exception ; he thundered against the Merkel government ’ s decision in 2015-2016 to allow nearly 900,000 refugees to enter the country .
Although the government had managed to bring the flow to a trickle by 2017 , Söder did not let up , harshly criticizing Merkel in public and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany ’ s refugee intake .
And as premier , Söder oversaw the passage of the controversial Kreuzpflicht in predominantly Catholic Bavaria , an obligation to post crosses on public buildings .
Söder , a Protestant himself , claimed that the crosses aren ’ t necessarily Christian symbols , but rather emblems of Bavaria ’ s cultural identity .
The move was an overture to conservative voters who had strayed from the CSU to the far-right Alternative for Germany , or AfD .
But Söder is reaching out to middle-of-the road voters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relative drubbing in the 2018 Bavarian elections , in which the Greens and the AfD made inroads into the CSU ’ s base constituency , he began searching for ways to win credibility with his party ’ s folksy base on environmental issues and the climate crisis .
He eliminated the party ’ s give-away plastic pens and balloons , ordered several electric cars for the Bavarian fleet , and committed to make the regional government climate neutral by 2030 .
These token measures might not win many voters back , but Söder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open to governing together with the Greens—a valuable attribute looking forward to potential coalition negotiations after the 2021 national election .
Still , it ’ s no accident that a CSU figure has never served as chancellor ; rising to the top of the party requires strictly identifying with Bavaria , whereas winning a national campaign requires appealing to a broader base of voters .
Söder ’ s future may hinge on his ability to use the coronavirus crisis to convert Bavarian regionalism into an idiom of German nationalism .
That , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bavarians out of the crisis as well as he has guided them through it thus far .
This entails another kind of crisis management , argues Deininger : “ The talents of the can-do Söder will no longer be quite as relevant .
Now it ’ s all about moderating impatience and balancing interests.
” This burst of popularity , he said , “ like the crisis itself , is a state of emergency.
” This may just be Söder ’ s 15 minutes of fame .
But his strategy regarding the chancellorship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is to avoid appearing that he ’ s exploiting the crisis for political gain and to wait until the pandemic is past—and then , if his numbers remain high , explicitly enter the contest .
The leadership of Germany ’ s Christian Democrats is certainly up for grabs .
And Söder , a man fully convinced of his abilities , certainly envisioned running for chancellor one day .
That day could come sooner than he or anyone else thought possible .

Chancellor Angela Merkel and Health Minister Jens Spahn have been leading Germany’s national response to the coronavirus pandemic. But Germans would be forgiven for thinking that they were taking direction from a provincial governor: Bavaria’s imposing, straight-talking premier, Markus Söder. Since the pandemic broke out, Söder’s decisive crisis management in his home state—especially his imperious pronouncements on lockdowns, testing, and other public health measures—has captured national attention.
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Health Minister Jens Spahn have been leading Germany’s national response to the coronavirus pandemic. But Germans would be forgiven for thinking that they were taking direction from a provincial governor: Bavaria’s imposing, straight-talking premier, Markus Söder. Since the pandemic broke out, Söder’s decisive crisis management in his home state—especially his imperious pronouncements on lockdowns, testing, and other public health measures—has captured national attention.
It’s not just that Söder’s moves have generally anticipated the steps taken by other German states, under coordination by the national government—nor just that he has been rewarded with historically unprecedented 94 percent approval ratings in his home state. It’s also that his distinctively paternalistic style of leadership may offer clues about the post-Merkel direction of German politics.
For those outside of Germany, Söder’s name might for good reason be completely unfamiliar: Until the crisis, the 53-year-old native of Nuremberg was an irascible regional strongman who came to office two years ago in a muscular takeover of his party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU). But the pandemic has suddenly catapulted Söder into the mix to become Merkel’s successor in the autumn 2021 general election as chancellor candidate for the Christian Democrats.
In barely a month’s time, Söder has become the nation’s favorite politician, soaring past even Merkel, Germany’s most popular politico for years, which has recast all calculations about the contest within conservative ranks. (Merkel has said she will not run for a fifth term.) Söder’s take-charge style, which combines rhetorical displays of empathy with a willingness to resolutely impose hard-line public-safety measures, have appealed to many Germans consumed with angst about the virus.
Söder was the first German executive to issue stay-at-home orders and to close schools. When the first coronavirus cases began popping up in Bavaria as infected vacationers returned from ski trips in Austria’s Tirol region, he made it clear from the onset that he, not the federal government, would decide what was best for Bavaria, which meant shutting schools at once. This go-it-alone strategy incurred rancor from some of the other state premiers, as it pushed the boundaries of Germany’s federalism. But Söder didn’t back down.
The lockdown he has imposed in Bavaria has also been notably stricter than in other German states: State police have been instructed to strictly enforce the official reasons for leaving one’s home, whereas other states have policed more liberally. He has also warned Bavarians that face masks will likely be obligatory in the state, while other states have only agreed to issue public recommendations about mask-wearing. (Söder was also the first government official to himself don a face mask in public.) At the same time, Söder has offered the most vigorous assurances to private businesses and workers that the government can compensate for the shutting down of the free market: He was the first to offer small businesses cash grants to compensate for the shutting down of the free market, and to approve bonuses for health care personnel.
Söder has also come to represent one pole of the debate about reopening the economy, insisting that Bavarian restrictions (including the closure of schools) could extend beyond guidelines set by the national government, thus placing a greater emphasis on paternalistic government control rather than on the free market. By contrast, Armin Laschet, North Rhine-Westphalia’s soft-spoken premier and a close Merkel ally, has insisted on the importance of quickly finding a way to reopen businesses across the country. “With a lot of patience and clever strategy we’ve actually created a different situation here in the past few weeks than in other parts of Europe,” Söder said on national television on April 14, referring to the fewer coronavirus cases and deaths per 100,000 people. “We shouldn’t risk anything. We shouldn’t be too impatient” and take “hectic and hasty risks,” he said.
Perhaps most notable have been Söder’s everywhere-at-once media appearances: He has visited hospitals and clinics, embattled Bavarian companies, and manufacturers that have converted their facilities to make face masks. He comes off as concerned, in-charge, and even charismatic. By contrast, Merkel’s intermittent addresses to the public—admittedly, she was quarantined for two weeks—have been dry and technical, devoid of real-world engagement.
The crisis is exactly the kind of situation that Söder can shine in, longtime observers say. “Söder’s strength is communication,” noted the Munich-based Süddeutsche Zeitung’s commentator Roman Deininger, the author of a biography of Söder. “He hits just the right note: self-assured and energetic but not panicky.”
This unexpected turn of events has suddenly cast Söder into the fray of the wide-open contest for Merkel’s successor. One reader’s comment in the conservative daily Die Welt obviously reflects the thoughts of some : “I think he’s great, can he be chancellor?”
Söder has repeatedly denied that he will throw his hat in the ring for the national election. But few doubt that he has his eye on the chancellorship, perhaps sooner rather than later, even despite the full field of candidates already vying to become the next CDU chief later this year. (Although the CDU chairperson is usually the chancellor candidate, the CDU and the Bavarian CSU vote together for the frontperson in the campaign, who has twice in the past been a CSU figure.) Out in front has been Laschet, who has teamed up with Spahn, an arch conservative, to run against the right-wing Friedrich Merz and the foreign affairs specialist Norbert Röttgen.
A political veteran, Söder likely wouldn’t feel intimidated by whomever wins the CDU race. His rise in the CSU, which began when he was 16 years old, has been always been marked by tenacity and ambition (and occasionally ham-fistedness). He became the youngest member of Bavaria’s state legislature at the age of 27 in 1994, before becoming the state’s powerful finance minister from 2011 to 2018.
Söder’s most prominent intervention as finance minister offers a telling indication of his party’s political philosophy—and the challenges he may face as he attempts to translate it to the national stage. He repeatedly weighed in forcefully against the country’s federal distribution system in an effort to relieve Bavaria, Germany’s second wealthiest state, from its burden of helping pay for the country’s less prosperous states. It was an indication of what might be called the CSU’s Bavarianism, its populist regionalism that seeks to protect the state, its citizens, and its distinctive culture from encroachments from the outside world—including from other German states.
“Söder’s all about Bavaria, what’s best for Bavaria,” Deininger told Foreign Policy. “He combines the CSU’s traditionalism, full of Bavarian folklore, with the kind of high-tech modern economics that has been so successful for Bavaria.”
Bavarianism has typically had a conservative-populist tinge. Bavarian premiers have opposed liberal migration policies, and Söder has been no exception; he thundered against the Merkel government’s decision in 2015-2016 to allow nearly 900,000 refugees to enter the country. Although the government had managed to bring the flow to a trickle by 2017, Söder did not let up, harshly criticizing Merkel in public and insisting that a cap be put on Germany’s refugee intake. And as premier, Söder oversaw the passage of the controversial Kreuzpflicht in predominantly Catholic Bavaria, an obligation to post crosses on public buildings. Söder, a Protestant himself, claimed that the crosses aren’t necessarily Christian symbols, but rather emblems of Bavaria’s cultural identity. The move was an overture to conservative voters who had strayed from the CSU to the far-right Alternative for Germany, or AfD.
But Söder is reaching out to middle-of-the road voters, too. After the CSU experienced a relative drubbing in the 2018 Bavarian elections, in which the Greens and the AfD made inroads into the CSU’s base constituency, he began searching for ways to win credibility with his party’s folksy base on environmental issues and the climate crisis. He eliminated the party’s give-away plastic pens and balloons, ordered several electric cars for the Bavarian fleet, and committed to make the regional government climate neutral by 2030. These token measures might not win many voters back, but Söder has made it clear he’s open to governing together with the Greens—a valuable attribute looking forward to potential coalition negotiations after the 2021 national election.
Still, it’s no accident that a CSU figure has never served as chancellor; rising to the top of the party requires strictly identifying with Bavaria, whereas winning a national campaign requires appealing to a broader base of voters. Söder’s future may hinge on his ability to use the coronavirus crisis to convert Bavarian regionalism into an idiom of German nationalism. That, in turn, will require him to steer Bavarians out of the crisis as well as he has guided them through it thus far. This entails another kind of crisis management, argues Deininger: “The talents of the can-do Söder will no longer be quite as relevant. Now it’s all about moderating impatience and balancing interests.” This burst of popularity, he said, “like the crisis itself, is a state of emergency.”
This may just be Söder’s 15 minutes of fame. But his strategy regarding the chancellorship, Germany’s pundits surmise, is to avoid appearing that he’s exploiting the crisis for political gain and to wait until the pandemic is past—and then, if his numbers remain high, explicitly enter the contest. The leadership of Germany’s Christian Democrats is certainly up for grabs. And Söder, a man fully convinced of his abilities, certainly envisioned running for chancellor one day. That day could come sooner than he or anyone else thought possible.