foreignpolicy--2020-08-15--How 9/11 and the Coronavirus Pushed the UAE and Israel Together

How 9/11 and the Coronavirus Pushed the UAE and Israel Together The normalization pact between the United Arab Emirates and Israel that surprised the world on Thursday is the fruit of almost 20 years of covert ties between the two tiny Middle Eastern powers , and can ultimately be traced to the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington .
Because the Saudi hijackers used Dubai as a key point to transfer funds , the Emiratis quickly latched onto the Israelis to develop the cybersecurity software that would help the UAE rescue and rebuild its credibility as the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 9/11 was the big wake-up call that made it clear the UAE needed to have the best technology , and that presented an opportunity for the Israelis , ” said Ghanem Nuseibeh , founder of London-based Cornerstone Global Associates and a veteran advisor to companies in the region .
Dubai will further consolidate its position as a global center of commerce that now includes greater ties with Israeli companies and banks .
Born of necessity , the two countries ’ first dealings blossomed into an unusually broad relationship .
Over the past two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Israel have spread from computer surveillance and airport security into shipping , desalination , agricultural technology , real estate , and tourism .
Most prominent in recent months has been the UAE ’ s interest in supporting and gaining access to Israeli research into a vaccine and treatment for COVID-19 .
While the common threat from Iran , the Emiratis ’ aspirations to a bigger regional role , the Palestinian issue , and pressure from Washington all played a role in the peace deal , it is these business and financial relations—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and intelligence technology—that ultimately laid the groundwork for any deal .
This is also where the UAE has the most to gain .
From the first tweet , it was clear what U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hope to get from open UAE-Israel ties .
Both the U.S. and Israeli leaders framed the deal as historic as they fight for their political lives .
In one of his trademark tweets , Trump called it “ HUGE.
” Netanyahu , perhaps hoping to deflect from multiple indictments on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Jerusalem press conference as cementing his legacy , placing it beside former Prime Minister Menachem Begin ’ s ground-breaking 1979 peace agreement with Egypt and former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin ’ s 1994 peace deal with Jordan .
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed , the UAE ’ s de facto ruler , was considerably cooler—at least in his public statements , where he focused on Netanyahu ’ s commitment to drop his West Bank annexation plans in exchange for a “ roadmap towards establishing a bilateral relationship , ” as he put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Mahmoud Abbas called the pact “ disgraceful ” and a betrayal of the UAE ’ s historic commitment to the Palestinian people .
But the benefits for Mohammed bin Zayed are gradually coming into focus .
Bringing the UAE ’ s ties with Israel into the open has broad benefits in both the political and business spheres , Nuseibeh told Foreign Policy .
“ This agreement significantly strengthens the UAE ’ s position as a regional power broker , perhaps even as the leading one , ” he said , pointing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advance its soft power by promoting cultural ties and religious tolerance .
( Among other signs , a new synagogue is scheduled to open in 2022 in Abu Dhabi as part of an interfaith complex . )
Nusibeh predicts that Dubai will further consolidate its position as a global center of commerce that now includes greater ties with Israeli companies and banks .
The UAE is keen to develop its start-up culture and infrastructure , which could be attractive to Israeli companies , too .
“ Israeli start-ups operating out of Dubai will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Nuseibeh said .
Well before this week ’ s normalization agreement , the UAE had invited Israel to build a pavilion to promote its companies at Expo 2020 ( now postponed until 2021 ) in Dubai .
In early July , the UAE and Israel announced that Group 42 , an Abu Dhabi-based technology company , would work on COVID-19 research with Israeli companies connected to Israel ’ s state-owned Rafael Advanced Defense Systems .
In early July , the UAE and Israel announced that Abu Dhabi-based Group 42 would work on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rafael Advanced Defense Systems .
For several months , the burgeoning business ties appeared to be in peril because of Netanyahu ’ s commitment to declare Israeli sovereignty over nearly 30 percent of the West Bank , stoking Palestinian anger and condemnations from around the world .
The UAE ’ s ambassador to Washington , Yousef al-Otaiba , took the unprecedented step of appealing to Israelis in their nation ’ s top-selling newspaper to call off the annexation .
In a Hebrew-language column , Otaiba reeled off one example after another of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Israel , warning that all of this would cease if the territories were annexed .
Now that Netanyahu has agreed to suspend the move , the two countries and the United States suggested that the possibilities for further ties are endless .
In a joint statement released by the White House , the UAE and Israel said they would “ meet in the coming weeks to sign bilateral agreements regarding investment , tourism , direct flights , security , telecommunications , technology , energy , healthcare , culture , the environment , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other areas of mutual benefit.
” Direct ties between the two countries “ will transform the region by spurring economic growth , enhancing technological innovation , and forging closer people-to-people relations , ” the statement said .
Among the most prominent Emiratis who have engaged significantly with Israeli or Jewish investors are Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem , chairman of international ports operator DP World , and Mohamed Alabbar , founder of Emaar Properties , which built the 163-story Burj Khalifa in Dubai , the world ’ s biggest skyscraper .
Mubadala Investment Co. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fund , was one of the principal backers of WeWork , pouring billions into the office-sharing business started by Israeli-American entrepreneur Adam Neumann before it ran aground .
Israelis who have led the way in building business connections and increasingly cordial personal ties with the Emiratis include Idan Ofer , controlling shareholder of Zim Integrated Shipping Services , and diamond merchant Lev Leviev .
The strength of the relationship was underscored in 2006 when Ofer , a billionaire from one of Israel ’ s wealthiest families , lobbied on behalf of DP World @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operations in the United States .
In a letter to Hillary Clinton , who was a U.S. senator at the time , Ofer vouched for the rigorous security measures that made his own company ’ s ships “ very comfortable ” at ports managed by the Dubai company , “ especially in Arab countries , ” according to a text published by CNN .
In making its Israeli ties official , the UAE may be blazing a trail for its Gulf neighbors to follow.All these connections have now paid off .
“ Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Kalman Sporn , managing director of Marylebone LLC , a boutique investment firm with Middle Eastern clients .
“ The three powers that have been most concerned with Middle Eastern stability … finally told the world that they ’ re officially working together.
” In making its Israeli ties official , the UAE may be blazing a trail for its Gulf neighbors to follow .
“ Most business people [ in the Gulf countries ] understand that the days of not doing business with Israeli companies will be over soon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s former Middle East envoy , who now represents Israeli and U.S. companies .
“ They recognize not doing business with Israel was counterproductive to everyone.
” Saudis , Omanis , and Bahrainis may soon come to a similar realization .

The normalization pact between the United Arab Emirates and Israel that surprised the world on Thursday is the fruit of almost 20 years of covert ties between the two tiny Middle Eastern powers, and can ultimately be traced to the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Because the Saudi hijackers used Dubai as a key point to transfer funds, the Emiratis quickly latched onto the Israelis to develop the cybersecurity software that would help the UAE rescue and rebuild its credibility as the Middle East’s premier financial center. "9/11 was the big wake-up call that made it clear the UAE needed to have the best technology, and that presented an opportunity for the Israelis," said Ghanem Nuseibeh, founder of London-based Cornerstone Global Associates and a veteran advisor to companies in the region. Dubai will further consolidate its position as a global center of commerce that now includes greater ties with Israeli companies and banks.
The normalization pact between the United Arab Emirates and Israel that surprised the world on Thursday is the fruit of almost 20 years of covert ties between the two tiny Middle Eastern powers, and can ultimately be traced to the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Because the Saudi hijackers used Dubai as a key point to transfer funds, the Emiratis quickly latched onto the Israelis to develop the cybersecurity software that would help the UAE rescue and rebuild its credibility as the Middle East’s premier financial center. “9/11 was the big wake-up call that made it clear the UAE needed to have the best technology, and that presented an opportunity for the Israelis,” said Ghanem Nuseibeh, founder of London-based Cornerstone Global Associates and a veteran advisor to companies in the region.
Dubai will further consolidate its position as a global center of commerce that now includes greater ties with Israeli companies and banks.
Born of necessity, the two countries’ first dealings blossomed into an unusually broad relationship. Over the past two decades, business relations between the UAE and Israel have spread from computer surveillance and airport security into shipping, desalination, agricultural technology, real estate, and tourism. Most prominent in recent months has been the UAE’s interest in supporting and gaining access to Israeli research into a vaccine and treatment for COVID-19. While the common threat from Iran, the Emiratis’ aspirations to a bigger regional role, the Palestinian issue, and pressure from Washington all played a role in the peace deal, it is these business and financial relations—and the predominance of Israeli civilian, defense, and intelligence technology—that ultimately laid the groundwork for any deal. This is also where the UAE has the most to gain.
From the first tweet, it was clear what U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hope to get from open UAE-Israel ties. Both the U.S. and Israeli leaders framed the deal as historic as they fight for their political lives. In one of his trademark tweets, Trump called it “HUGE.” Netanyahu, perhaps hoping to deflect from multiple indictments on corruption charges, presented the accord at a Jerusalem press conference as cementing his legacy, placing it beside former Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s ground-breaking 1979 peace agreement with Egypt and former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s 1994 peace deal with Jordan.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE’s de facto ruler, was considerably cooler—at least in his public statements, where he focused on Netanyahu’s commitment to drop his West Bank annexation plans in exchange for a “roadmap towards establishing a bilateral relationship,” as he put it in a tweet. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas called the pact “disgraceful” and a betrayal of the UAE’s historic commitment to the Palestinian people.
But the benefits for Mohammed bin Zayed are gradually coming into focus. Bringing the UAE’s ties with Israel into the open has broad benefits in both the political and business spheres, Nuseibeh told Foreign Policy. “This agreement significantly strengthens the UAE’s position as a regional power broker, perhaps even as the leading one,” he said, pointing to the UAE’s wide-ranging efforts to advance its soft power by promoting cultural ties and religious tolerance. (Among other signs, a new synagogue is scheduled to open in 2022 in Abu Dhabi as part of an interfaith complex.) Nuseibeh predicts that Dubai will further consolidate its position as a global center of commerce that now includes greater ties with Israeli companies and banks. The UAE is keen to develop its start-up culture and infrastructure, which could be attractive to Israeli companies, too. “Israeli start-ups operating out of Dubai will open so much opportunity for both,” Nuseibeh said.
Well before this week’s normalization agreement, the UAE had invited Israel to build a pavilion to promote its companies at Expo 2020 (now postponed until 2021) in Dubai. In early July, the UAE and Israel announced that Group 42, an Abu Dhabi-based technology company, would work on COVID-19 research with Israeli companies connected to Israel’s state-owned Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.
In early July, the UAE and Israel announced that Abu Dhabi-based Group 42 would work on COVID-19 research with Israeli companies connected to Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.
For several months, the burgeoning business ties appeared to be in peril because of Netanyahu’s commitment to declare Israeli sovereignty over nearly 30 percent of the West Bank, stoking Palestinian anger and condemnations from around the world. The UAE’s ambassador to Washington, Yousef al-Otaiba, took the unprecedented step of appealing to Israelis in their nation’s top-selling newspaper to call off the annexation. In a Hebrew-language column, Otaiba reeled off one example after another of the UAE’s efforts to normalize relations with Israel, warning that all of this would cease if the territories were annexed.
Now that Netanyahu has agreed to suspend the move, the two countries and the United States suggested that the possibilities for further ties are endless. In a joint statement released by the White House, the UAE and Israel said they would “meet in the coming weeks to sign bilateral agreements regarding investment, tourism, direct flights, security, telecommunications, technology, energy, healthcare, culture, the environment, the establishment of reciprocal embassies, and other areas of mutual benefit.” Direct ties between the two countries “will transform the region by spurring economic growth, enhancing technological innovation, and forging closer people-to-people relations,” the statement said.
Among the most prominent Emiratis who have engaged significantly with Israeli or Jewish investors are Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, chairman of international ports operator DP World, and Mohamed Alabbar, founder of Emaar Properties, which built the 163-story Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the world’s biggest skyscraper. Mubadala Investment Co., Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund, was one of the principal backers of WeWork, pouring billions into the office-sharing business started by Israeli-American entrepreneur Adam Neumann before it ran aground. Israelis who have led the way in building business connections and increasingly cordial personal ties with the Emiratis include Idan Ofer, controlling shareholder of Zim Integrated Shipping Services, and diamond merchant Lev Leviev.
The strength of the relationship was underscored in 2006 when Ofer, a billionaire from one of Israel’s wealthiest families, lobbied on behalf of DP World during its unsuccessful attempt to buy terminal operations in the United States. In a letter to Hillary Clinton, who was a U.S. senator at the time, Ofer vouched for the rigorous security measures that made his own company’s ships “very comfortable” at ports managed by the Dubai company, “especially in Arab countries,” according to a text published by CNN.
In making its Israeli ties official, the UAE may be blazing a trail for its Gulf neighbors to follow.All these connections have now paid off. “Trump’s announcement normalized 20-year-old back-channel relationships,” said Kalman Sporn, managing director of Marylebone LLC, a boutique investment firm with Middle Eastern clients. “The three powers that have been most concerned with Middle Eastern stability … finally told the world that they’re officially working together.”
In making its Israeli ties official, the UAE may be blazing a trail for its Gulf neighbors to follow. “Most business people [in the Gulf countries] understand that the days of not doing business with Israeli companies will be over soon,” said Jason Greenblatt, Trump’s former Middle East envoy, who now represents Israeli and U.S. companies. “They recognize not doing business with Israel was counterproductive to everyone.” Saudis, Omanis, and Bahrainis may soon come to a similar realization.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-15--Don’t Let Iran Blow Up the U.N. Security Council

Don ’ t Let Iran Blow Up the U.N. Security Council The U.N. Security Council rejected on Aug. 14 a resolution that would have indefinitely extended the United Nations ’ conventional arms embargo on Iran .
That sets up one of the most consequential diplomatic decisions of the 21st century for the United Kingdom and France : whether to preserve the unique powers of the Security Council ’ s permanent members or upend 75 years of multilateralism to save a nuclear deal with Iran that begins to expire in less than 75 days .
The coming controversy surrounds U.N. Security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , perhaps the most flawed , convoluted , and yet ingenious resolution ever passed by the Security Council .
Ostensibly , the resolution merely endorsed the Iran nuclear deal , formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) .
In practice , it established a series of incentives for Iran to abide by its nuclear commitments , including the termination , or sunset , of the U.N. arms embargo and its restrictions on Tehran ’ s ballistic missile program .
The ingenuity of UNSCR 2231 lies in its creation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any one of the council ’ s five permanent members ( P5 ) to cancel the sunsets and reimpose multilateral sanctions , effectively killing the JCPOA .
Whereas the reversal of Security Council actions typically requires unanimity among the P5 , because of the snapback process , the preservation of UNSCR 2231 requires unanimity among the P5 .
Since the council failed to extend the arms embargo on Iran , the United States is preparing to trigger a snapback .
The United Kingdom and France remain deeply committed to the JCPOA , so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that would enable them to strip the United States of its prerogative .
London and Paris believe they have discovered precisely such a lacuna , yet if they invoke it even once , others will use it again and again to rob the P5 of their veto power .
To protect a single multilateral agreement , the French and British will have to destroy the foundation of the multilateral system they claim to cherish .
The first sunset mandated by UNSCR 2231 is scheduled for October , when the U.N. prohibition on transfers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will expire .
In 2023 , another sunset will end the U.N. ban on international support to Iran ’ s missile program .
Additional sunsets on Iran ’ s nuclear program quickly follow .
Fortunately , these sunset incentives came with one condition : Iran could not breach the JCPOA ’ s limits on its nuclear program .
UNSCR 2231 created the snapback process as a means of enforcing this condition .
The process , however , is convoluted .
UNSCR 2231 defines several countries , including the United States , as “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right to file a complaint with the Security Council if Iran ever breaches its nuclear commitments .
Any member of the council can then introduce a resolution to ignore the complaint and keep Iran ’ s sunsets intact .
If no member comes forward , the presiding member of the council is compelled to offer such a resolution after 10 days .
The resolution must be put to a vote and passed within 30 days of the complaint being filed—otherwise , snapback occurs .
Of course , any one of the permanent members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 30-day clock .
This is how the snapback process flips on its head the usual requirement for unanimity among the P5 .
But here comes the wrinkle .
UNSCR 2231 provided no contingency for what to do should one of the original “ JCPOA participants ” leave the nuclear deal .
Can a party leave the deal but maintain its right to exercise the snapback mechanism ?
More specifically , since the United States left the JCPOA in 2018 , can it still trigger the snapback as a “ JCPOA participant ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no .
Among them : Iran , which wants to keep its sunsets ; Russia and China , which both want to sell arms to Iran ; and some Western Europeans who are looking for any way to save the nuclear deal .
But the resolution simply was not drafted that way .
The United States is defined forever as a “ JCPOA participant ” in a binding Security Council resolution for the purpose of snapback .
Whether the resolution was drafted this way intentionally or not makes no difference .
Whether the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negotiated the wording of UNSCR 2231 to protect a U.S. snapback right in perpetuity , or the Trump administration took advantage of a glaring oversight , the outcome is the same .
The resolution , a document legally independent of the Iran deal itself , gives the United States the right to trigger the snapback if Iran breaches its commitments .
As it turns out , Iran has done exactly that .
The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran has enriched uranium to a purity greater than 3.67 percent ; increased its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kilograms ; stored excess amounts of heavy water ; tested advanced centrifuges ; and restarted enrichment at the Fordow enrichment plant .
At the same time , the agency reports that Iran is refusing to allow international inspectors into suspected nuclear sites and may be concealing undeclared nuclear materials and activities .
Neither British Prime Minister Boris Johnson nor French President Emmanuel Macron can dispute that Iran is in significant noncompliance with its JCPOA commitments , which is the legal basis for a snapback complaint .
While both nations , along with Germany @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resolution mechanism in January and warned Iran to halt its nuclear advances , neither leader has had the courage to take the next step and file a complaint with the Security Council—even though snapback would not only hold Iran accountable for its nuclear activities , but also automatically extend the arms embargo on Iran and prevent Russia and China from further destabilizing the Middle East with sales of tanks , fighter jets , naval platforms , and more .
Enter Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , who vowed months ago to extend the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ahead of a bipartisan request by nearly the entire U.S. House of Representatives .
As Pompeo foreshadowed , the United States introduced a new resolution to extend the arms embargo this week but Russia and China blocked it .
In response , the United States is expected to send a letter to the Security Council next week to trigger the snapback mechanism .
What comes next could determine whether the Security Council survives the next decade .
Russia , China and pro-JCPOA Europeans are reportedly preparing to contest the validity of the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while UNSCR 2231 does not contemplate a situation where a JCPOA “ participant ” no longer participates in the JCPOA , “ common sense ” should triumph over the legal text of the resolution ( as if that argument has ever worked in a contract dispute for anyone in the real world ) .
More significantly , these opponents of snapback may then propose a procedural motion to either declare the United States no longer a “ JCPOA participant ” or block the presiding member of the Security Council from scheduling a vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States complaint ( since scheduling that vote would de facto legitimize the U.S. complaint ) .
Still following ?
Good , because it gets a little bit more complicated .
Since the founding of the United Nations , there has been a debate over what constitutes a procedural vote versus a substantive vote inside the Security Council .
The distinction is important : The latter is subject to a P5 veto , while the former is not .
Russia and China would likely insist that a motion to rule the United States is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is purely procedural .
The United States would contend the issue is clearly substantive , since the question would reinterpret the plain text of a binding Security Council resolution .
Who wins ?
The precedent governing the Security Council dictates that the United States wins , because a preliminary vote must be held to decide whether a matter is procedural or substantive .
That preliminary vote is subject to the permanent member veto , meaning the United States could veto a motion by Russia and China to rule their question procedural .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it too is subject to a U.S. veto .
This is known as the “ double veto ” power of a permanent member .
It is the ace in the hole for each of the P5—and though it has not been employed for decades , this is a paradigm case for its proper use .
Refusing to hold the preliminary vote , or denying the United States ’ right to use its veto in that vote , would not only violate 75 years of Security Council precedent , it would forever change the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ permanent member ’ s veto be absolute ; instead , it would be subject to consensus opinion .
The United States might be the victim of such a coup in 2020 , but Russia , China , the United Kingdom , and France would all find their vetoes up for debate in the months and years to come .
With such a new reality , U.S. leaders might rethink the utility of the Security Council .
Skepticism of the U.N. system is already at an all-time high within the Republican Party , yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way , Democrats , too , may come to see the council as a liability , not an asset .
Calls for the United States ’ withdrawal from the United Nations might become mainstream .
Withdrawal is not likely to be a priority if former Vice President Joe Biden is elected president .
But what about four years later if former Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , Sen. Tom Cotton , or Sen. Ted Cruz is elected ?
So now it is time for London @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and evaluate the magnitude of the diplomatic decision before them .
Johnson and Macron can still avoid a diplomatic showdown at the Turtle Bay Corral .
They could opt to trigger the snapback themselves , a logical step seven months after initiating the JCPOA ’ s dispute resolution process with nothing to show for it .
If they ’ d rather oppose snapback and maintain support for the JCPOA until the very end , UNSCR 2231 gives them the tools to do that , too .
Either country could introduce the resolution to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ JCPOA alive .
While the United States could veto the resolution , France and the United Kingdom would get to save face by voting to keep the nuclear deal and condemning the Americans for killing it—all without shredding the permanent member veto and risking the collapse of the United Nations .
But if either leader sides with Russia and China against the United States ’ “ double veto ” right , they will not only shoulder the blame for the arms embargo on Iran expiring , but will also bear the responsibility for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multilateralism .

The U.N. Security Council rejected on Aug. 14 a resolution that would have indefinitely extended the United Nations’ conventional arms embargo on Iran. That sets up one of the most consequential diplomatic decisions of the 21st century for the United Kingdom and France: whether to preserve the unique powers of the Security Council’s permanent members or upend 75 years of multilateralism to save a nuclear deal with Iran that begins to expire in less than 75 days.
The U.N. Security Council rejected on Aug. 14 a resolution that would have indefinitely extended the United Nations’ conventional arms embargo on Iran. That sets up one of the most consequential diplomatic decisions of the 21st century for the United Kingdom and France: whether to preserve the unique powers of the Security Council’s permanent members or upend 75 years of multilateralism to save a nuclear deal with Iran that begins to expire in less than 75 days.
The coming controversy surrounds U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (UNSCR 2231), perhaps the most flawed, convoluted, and yet ingenious resolution ever passed by the Security Council. Ostensibly, the resolution merely endorsed the Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In practice, it established a series of incentives for Iran to abide by its nuclear commitments, including the termination, or sunset, of the U.N. arms embargo and its restrictions on Tehran’s ballistic missile program.
The ingenuity of UNSCR 2231 lies in its creation of the snapback process, which enables any one of the council’s five permanent members (P5) to cancel the sunsets and reimpose multilateral sanctions, effectively killing the JCPOA. Whereas the reversal of Security Council actions typically requires unanimity among the P5, because of the snapback process, the preservation of UNSCR 2231 requires unanimity among the P5.
Since the council failed to extend the arms embargo on Iran, the United States is preparing to trigger a snapback. The United Kingdom and France remain deeply committed to the JCPOA, so they are searching for any procedural loophole that would enable them to strip the United States of its prerogative. London and Paris believe they have discovered precisely such a lacuna, yet if they invoke it even once, others will use it again and again to rob the P5 of their veto power. To protect a single multilateral agreement, the French and British will have to destroy the foundation of the multilateral system they claim to cherish.
The first sunset mandated by UNSCR 2231 is scheduled for October, when the U.N. prohibition on transfers of conventional arms to and from Iran will expire. In 2023, another sunset will end the U.N. ban on international support to Iran’s missile program. Additional sunsets on Iran’s nuclear program quickly follow. Fortunately, these sunset incentives came with one condition: Iran could not breach the JCPOA’s limits on its nuclear program. UNSCR 2231 created the snapback process as a means of enforcing this condition.
The process, however, is convoluted. UNSCR 2231 defines several countries, including the United States, as “JCPOA participants” and gives each the right to file a complaint with the Security Council if Iran ever breaches its nuclear commitments. Any member of the council can then introduce a resolution to ignore the complaint and keep Iran’s sunsets intact. If no member comes forward, the presiding member of the council is compelled to offer such a resolution after 10 days. The resolution must be put to a vote and passed within 30 days of the complaint being filed—otherwise, snapback occurs. Of course, any one of the permanent members can use its veto to run out the 30-day clock. This is how the snapback process flips on its head the usual requirement for unanimity among the P5.
But here comes the wrinkle. UNSCR 2231 provided no contingency for what to do should one of the original “JCPOA participants” leave the nuclear deal. Can a party leave the deal but maintain its right to exercise the snapback mechanism? More specifically, since the United States left the JCPOA in 2018, can it still trigger the snapback as a “JCPOA participant”?
Many parties wish the answer were no. Among them: Iran, which wants to keep its sunsets; Russia and China, which both want to sell arms to Iran; and some Western Europeans who are looking for any way to save the nuclear deal. But the resolution simply was not drafted that way.
The United States is defined forever as a “JCPOA participant” in a binding Security Council resolution for the purpose of snapback. Whether the resolution was drafted this way intentionally or not makes no difference. Whether the administration of former President Barack Obama carefully negotiated the wording of UNSCR 2231 to protect a U.S. snapback right in perpetuity, or the Trump administration took advantage of a glaring oversight, the outcome is the same. The resolution, a document legally independent of the Iran deal itself, gives the United States the right to trigger the snapback if Iran breaches its commitments.
As it turns out, Iran has done exactly that. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran has enriched uranium to a purity greater than 3.67 percent; increased its low-enriched uranium stockpile to more than 300 kilograms; stored excess amounts of heavy water; tested advanced centrifuges; and restarted enrichment at the Fordow enrichment plant. At the same time, the agency reports that Iran is refusing to allow international inspectors into suspected nuclear sites and may be concealing undeclared nuclear materials and activities.
Neither British Prime Minister Boris Johnson nor French President Emmanuel Macron can dispute that Iran is in significant noncompliance with its JCPOA commitments, which is the legal basis for a snapback complaint. While both nations, along with Germany, initiated the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism in January and warned Iran to halt its nuclear advances, neither leader has had the courage to take the next step and file a complaint with the Security Council—even though snapback would not only hold Iran accountable for its nuclear activities, but also automatically extend the arms embargo on Iran and prevent Russia and China from further destabilizing the Middle East with sales of tanks, fighter jets, naval platforms, and more.
Enter Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who vowed months ago to extend the arms embargo using all diplomatic means necessary ahead of a bipartisan request by nearly the entire U.S. House of Representatives. As Pompeo foreshadowed, the United States introduced a new resolution to extend the arms embargo this week but Russia and China blocked it. In response, the United States is expected to send a letter to the Security Council next week to trigger the snapback mechanism.
What comes next could determine whether the Security Council survives the next decade. Russia, China and pro-JCPOA Europeans are reportedly preparing to contest the validity of the U.S. snapback complaint. They may claim that while UNSCR 2231 does not contemplate a situation where a JCPOA “participant” no longer participates in the JCPOA, “common sense” should triumph over the legal text of the resolution (as if that argument has ever worked in a contract dispute for anyone in the real world). More significantly, these opponents of snapback may then propose a procedural motion to either declare the United States no longer a “JCPOA participant” or block the presiding member of the Security Council from scheduling a vote on a resolution to ignore the United States complaint (since scheduling that vote would de facto legitimize the U.S. complaint).
Still following? Good, because it gets a little bit more complicated. Since the founding of the United Nations, there has been a debate over what constitutes a procedural vote versus a substantive vote inside the Security Council. The distinction is important: The latter is subject to a P5 veto, while the former is not. Russia and China would likely insist that a motion to rule the United States is no longer a “JCPOA participant” is purely procedural. The United States would contend the issue is clearly substantive, since the question would reinterpret the plain text of a binding Security Council resolution. Who wins?
The precedent governing the Security Council dictates that the United States wins, because a preliminary vote must be held to decide whether a matter is procedural or substantive. That preliminary vote is subject to the permanent member veto, meaning the United States could veto a motion by Russia and China to rule their question procedural. The underlying motion then becomes substantive, meaning it too is subject to a U.S. veto. This is known as the “double veto” power of a permanent member. It is the ace in the hole for each of the P5—and though it has not been employed for decades, this is a paradigm case for its proper use.
Refusing to hold the preliminary vote, or denying the United States’ right to use its veto in that vote, would not only violate 75 years of Security Council precedent, it would forever change the Security Council. No longer would a permanent member’s veto be absolute; instead, it would be subject to consensus opinion. The United States might be the victim of such a coup in 2020, but Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France would all find their vetoes up for debate in the months and years to come.
With such a new reality, U.S. leaders might rethink the utility of the Security Council. Skepticism of the U.N. system is already at an all-time high within the Republican Party, yet if Russia and China increasingly get their way, Democrats, too, may come to see the council as a liability, not an asset. Calls for the United States’ withdrawal from the United Nations might become mainstream. Withdrawal is not likely to be a priority if former Vice President Joe Biden is elected president. But what about four years later if former Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Sen. Tom Cotton, or Sen. Ted Cruz is elected?
So now it is time for London and Paris to take a deep breath and evaluate the magnitude of the diplomatic decision before them. Johnson and Macron can still avoid a diplomatic showdown at the Turtle Bay Corral. They could opt to trigger the snapback themselves, a logical step seven months after initiating the JCPOA’s dispute resolution process with nothing to show for it. If they’d rather oppose snapback and maintain support for the JCPOA until the very end, UNSCR 2231 gives them the tools to do that, too. Either country could introduce the resolution to ignore the U.S. complaint and keep the JCPOA alive. While the United States could veto the resolution, France and the United Kingdom would get to save face by voting to keep the nuclear deal and condemning the Americans for killing it—all without shredding the permanent member veto and risking the collapse of the United Nations.
But if either leader sides with Russia and China against the United States’ “double veto” right, they will not only shoulder the blame for the arms embargo on Iran expiring, but will also bear the responsibility for the beginning of the end of modern multilateralism.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-15--There’s No Cold War With China

There’s No Cold War With China

For the past 20 years , the most important , consequential international relationship has been between a rising China and a powerful United States .
That remains true today , and it will likely be the case for many years to come , even as the nature of that relationship changes over time .
Never static , ties in the past few years have shifted from engagement with an undercurrent of wariness to wariness with an undercurrent of engagement .
Yet talk of a new Cold War—and the idea that Chinese-U.S. relations are at their worst since the two countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ form of frenzy .
And that way of thinking is forcing a 20th-century template of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union onto a U.S.-Chinese relationship that could not be more different .
If ever there was a case of taking of simplistic view of the past and transposing it on the present , the Cold War framework applied to U.S.-Chinese relations is it .
And it is not just a case of the misuse of history , although it is that .
It also betrays a deep misunderstanding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States and China , one that appears to the shared even by U.S. officials .
The two countries ’ war of words is indeed hot .
The technology competition is real , ranging from U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s administration ’ s intent to ban Chinese social media company TikTok from the United States and the long U.S. campaign against Huawei to the Chinese attempt to build its own internal telecommunications and Internet infrastructure .
But the economic intertwinement between the two countries remains deep , complicated , and largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and bad words .
The United States and China are not in a cold war .
They are in a bad marriage , with no current option for divorce .
That will remain the case for many years to come .
Of late , the bickering between the United States and China has certainly gotten much worse .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has assailed Chinese President Xi Jinping as a “ true believer in a bankrupt totalitarian ideology.
” And the two countries have imposed an escalating series of tit-for-tat measures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions on U.S. senators to U.S. orders to close the Chinese consulate in Houston .
That , in turn , has led policy experts and China watchers to speak of “ a drift toward Cold War , ” with potential for all the familiar hallmarks of last century ’ s Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union : starkly opposed ideologies ; proxy confrontations that then become proxy wars in other countries ; mutually exclusive spheres of influence in which each attempts to freeze out the other ; and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offensive to line up allies and cut off the economic oxygen of the other side .
What these analogies completely miss , however , is the nature of the Chinese-U.S. economic relationship , which is so much more connected and intertwined than the U.S.-Soviet one ever was .
That alone renders the Cold War template almost completely irrelevant as a guide to our present and future .
In 1950 , the point of no return for conflict between the United States and Soviet Union , the United States represented about half of all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was funneling billions of dollars to Western Europe to reconstruct the war-ravaged economies there .
But none of that money was flowing to the Soviet Union or the Eastern Bloc .
During the following decades , the amount of trade between the two countries was so negligible as to be all but nonexistent .
The only real constraint on hot war at the time was nuclear weapons .
Instead , war was waged ideologically , economically via those exclusive spheres , and militarily only in peripheral countries such as Vietnam , Angola , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , has evolved in the context of extraordinary economic interdependence .
Even with two years of Trump administration tariffs on Chinese imports and mass disruptions on global commerce and movement of people due to the pandemic , bilateral trade in goods between the two countries is likely to be around $ 450- $ 500 billion this year , with close to another $ 100 billion in services .
That is down from highs over the past few years , but about where it was in 2011 .
Not captured in those official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that China holds in U.S. Treasury securities and the hundreds of billions of dollars of capital stock and factories in China either owned , constructed , or maintained by U.S. companies .
These companies not only manufacture goods such as the iPhone for export to the United States , but also sell goods to consumers in China .
The interlocking economies of the two countries , which the historian Niall Ferguson and economist Moritz Schularick once dubbed “ Chimerica ” and which I have called an economic “ superfusion , ” both enriched @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The opening of Chinese domestic markets after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 was a boon for U.S. companies , such as Yum !
Brands , Ralph Lauren , and microchip and hardware companies that sold to a China that was not yet able to make the high-tech products itself .
U.S. manufacturing took a hit , just as it had taken a hit from Taiwan and Japan in the 1970s and 1980s and from Mexico in the 1990s , but U.S. consumers benefited from a slew of cheaper products that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and after the financial crisis of 2008 , the United States was bolstered by Chinese investment in the United States in the form of bond and hard assets .
But even with tech tensions , the sheer scale of the countries ’ economic interdependence remains largely intact .
Over time , the frostiness may well lead to less and less economic commingling , but that will be measured in years , not months .
Unless either China or the United States finds a spare $ 5 trillion to $ 10 trillion to rebuild @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of trade and manufacturing and mutual engagement is with us for a long haul .
Or perhaps the United States just needs a great enemy , as it used to have in the form of the Soviet Union .
And it ’ s true that China is better cast than , say , al Qaeda or that amorphous nonstate thing called “ Islamic fundamentalism ” or “ terrorism.
” The U.S. national security establishment was set up in the late 1940s in order to contain and confront a unitary state power with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China is a worthy successor to the Soviet Union .
And what is faintly similar is that the two are locked in a great-power contest , in which China has moved to dominate the South China Sea as the United States did and still does in the Caribbean .
The two countries do have ideological differences as well , but those are much less acute for the simple reason that China does not seem to seek to export any particular ideology other than state sovereignty .
In short , there is nothing comparable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and China to the 20th-century rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union .
With that in mind , the best course for the United States is to focus on itself .
If there are fears of China stealing the intellectual property of U.S. companies or the data of U.S. citizens , then the U.S. government and relevant companies should invest heavily in innovation , cybersecurity , and data security .
If the United States is concerned about a particular entity such as Huawei , then it needs to develop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Huawei or other Chinese companies now supply .
None of that can happen with an executive order or a dramatic speech .
It will take time , money , patience , and strategy .
Stinging accusations and predictions of cold war catch attention , but they are like paper arrows .
The U.S.-Chinese relationship is unlike any other between two grand nations in history in the degree of economic intimacy juxtaposed with genuine rivalry and distrust .
Navigating tensions is hard work , and the history of other great powers in the past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it could do a great deal of harm if used simplistically .
Best to let the Cold War be , and learn new tactics to manage a new rivalry for a different century .

For the past 20 years, the most important, consequential international relationship has been between a rising China and a powerful United States. That remains true today, and it will likely be the case for many years to come, even as the nature of that relationship changes over time. Never static, ties in the past few years have shifted from engagement with an undercurrent of wariness to wariness with an undercurrent of engagement. Yet talk of a new Cold War—and the idea that Chinese-U.S. relations are at their worst since the two countries normalized diplomatic ties in 1979—is its own form of frenzy. And that way of thinking is forcing a 20th-century template of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union onto a U.S.-Chinese relationship that could not be more different.
For the past 20 years, the most important, consequential international relationship has been between a rising China and a powerful United States. That remains true today, and it will likely be the case for many years to come, even as the nature of that relationship changes over time. Never static, ties in the past few years have shifted from engagement with an undercurrent of wariness to wariness with an undercurrent of engagement. Yet talk of a new Cold War—and the idea that Chinese-U.S. relations are at their worst since the two countries normalized diplomatic ties in 1979—is its own form of frenzy. And that way of thinking is forcing a 20th-century template of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union onto a U.S.-Chinese relationship that could not be more different.
If ever there was a case of taking of simplistic view of the past and transposing it on the present, the Cold War framework applied to U.S.-Chinese relations is it. And it is not just a case of the misuse of history, although it is that. It also betrays a deep misunderstanding about what the actual dynamic is between the United States and China, one that appears to the shared even by U.S. officials. The two countries’ war of words is indeed hot. The technology competition is real, ranging from U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration’s intent to ban Chinese social media company TikTok from the United States and the long U.S. campaign against Huawei to the Chinese attempt to build its own internal telecommunications and Internet infrastructure. But the economic intertwinement between the two countries remains deep, complicated, and largely untouched by years of sanctions, tariffs, and bad words. The United States and China are not in a cold war. They are in a bad marriage, with no current option for divorce. That will remain the case for many years to come.
Of late, the bickering between the United States and China has certainly gotten much worse. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has assailed Chinese President Xi Jinping as a “true believer in a bankrupt totalitarian ideology.” And the two countries have imposed an escalating series of tit-for-tat measures against each other, ranging from Chinese sanctions on U.S. senators to U.S. orders to close the Chinese consulate in Houston. That, in turn, has led policy experts and China watchers to speak of “a drift toward Cold War,” with potential for all the familiar hallmarks of last century’s Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union: starkly opposed ideologies; proxy confrontations that then become proxy wars in other countries; mutually exclusive spheres of influence in which each attempts to freeze out the other; and a global diplomatic, propaganda, and economic offensive to line up allies and cut off the economic oxygen of the other side.
What these analogies completely miss, however, is the nature of the Chinese-U.S. economic relationship, which is so much more connected and intertwined than the U.S.-Soviet one ever was. That alone renders the Cold War template almost completely irrelevant as a guide to our present and future.
In 1950, the point of no return for conflict between the United States and Soviet Union, the United States represented about half of all global industrial production. Its Marshall Plan was funneling billions of dollars to Western Europe to reconstruct the war-ravaged economies there. But none of that money was flowing to the Soviet Union or the Eastern Bloc. During the following decades, the amount of trade between the two countries was so negligible as to be all but nonexistent. The only real constraint on hot war at the time was nuclear weapons. Instead, war was waged ideologically, economically via those exclusive spheres, and militarily only in peripheral countries such as Vietnam, Angola, and Nicaragua.
The U.S.-Chinese relationship, however, has evolved in the context of extraordinary economic interdependence. Even with two years of Trump administration tariffs on Chinese imports and mass disruptions on global commerce and movement of people due to the pandemic, bilateral trade in goods between the two countries is likely to be around $450-$500 billion this year, with close to another $100 billion in services. That is down from highs over the past few years, but about where it was in 2011. Not captured in those official statistics are the additional $1.1 trillion that China holds in U.S. Treasury securities and the hundreds of billions of dollars of capital stock and factories in China either owned, constructed, or maintained by U.S. companies. These companies not only manufacture goods such as the iPhone for export to the United States, but also sell goods to consumers in China.
The interlocking economies of the two countries, which the historian Niall Ferguson and economist Moritz Schularick once dubbed “Chimerica” and which I have called an economic “superfusion,” both enriched and imperiled U.S. companies and consumers. The opening of Chinese domestic markets after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 was a boon for U.S. companies, such as Yum! Brands, Ralph Lauren, and microchip and hardware companies that sold to a China that was not yet able to make the high-tech products itself. U.S. manufacturing took a hit, just as it had taken a hit from Taiwan and Japan in the 1970s and 1980s and from Mexico in the 1990s, but U.S. consumers benefited from a slew of cheaper products that made middle-class life more affordable. During and after the financial crisis of 2008, the United States was bolstered by Chinese investment in the United States in the form of bond and hard assets.
So why does the language of the Cold War persist? Many observers point to the technological competition between the two, with each distrusting the technology of the other. China has already walled itself off from the social media companies of the United States, and now both are attempting a tech decoupling that the pandemic is hastening, especially as China manages its health crisis through a deeply intrusive use of personal data to monitor and control the movement of its 1.4 billion people.
But even with tech tensions, the sheer scale of the countries’ economic interdependence remains largely intact. Over time, the frostiness may well lead to less and less economic commingling, but that will be measured in years, not months. Unless either China or the United States finds a spare $5 trillion to $10 trillion to rebuild completely independent supply chains, that structure of trade and manufacturing and mutual engagement is with us for a long haul.
Or perhaps the United States just needs a great enemy, as it used to have in the form of the Soviet Union. And it’s true that China is better cast than, say, al Qaeda or that amorphous nonstate thing called “Islamic fundamentalism” or “terrorism.” The U.S. national security establishment was set up in the late 1940s in order to contain and confront a unitary state power with a potent military. In that sense, China is a worthy successor to the Soviet Union. And what is faintly similar is that the two are locked in a great-power contest, in which China has moved to dominate the South China Sea as the United States did and still does in the Caribbean. The two countries do have ideological differences as well, but those are much less acute for the simple reason that China does not seem to seek to export any particular ideology other than state sovereignty.
In short, there is nothing comparable in today’s relationship between the United States and China to the 20th-century rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. With that in mind, the best course for the United States is to focus on itself. If there are fears of China stealing the intellectual property of U.S. companies or the data of U.S. citizens, then the U.S. government and relevant companies should invest heavily in innovation, cybersecurity, and data security. If the United States is concerned about a particular entity such as Huawei, then it needs to develop companies and technologies that can supplant what Huawei or other Chinese companies now supply.
None of that can happen with an executive order or a dramatic speech. It will take time, money, patience, and strategy. Stinging accusations and predictions of cold war catch attention, but they are like paper arrows. The U.S.-Chinese relationship is unlike any other between two grand nations in history in the degree of economic intimacy juxtaposed with genuine rivalry and distrust. Navigating tensions is hard work, and the history of other great powers in the past is of little help. In fact, it could do a great deal of harm if used simplistically. Best to let the Cold War be, and learn new tactics to manage a new rivalry for a different century.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-15--Nonviolence as War by Other Means

Nonviolence as War by Other Means

Nonviolence as War by Other Means Protests in the streets .
Police firing tear gas at demonstrators .
A country at times so aflame that some demand the military intervene .
America in 2020 ?
No , India in 1947 .
The images of protesters in the United States confronting heavily armed police and National Guard troops recall the turmoil of 75 years ago , when India sought independence from the British Empire .
True , one was a campaign to break the chains of colonialism , while the other is a fight for civil rights and economic equality .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ dilemma : violence or nonviolence ?
To proponents of nonviolent protest , resorting to violence against the power of the state—whether British soldiers or the Minneapolis police—isn ’ t just morally wrong .
It is suicidal against a foe with vastly superior firepower .
However , to more radical activists , nonviolence is futile .
To them , it ’ s an invitation to be killed , beaten , or ignored by an entrenched power structure that won ’ t respond to pleas but just might respond to force .
But is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1947 , the answer was yes .
That was the year that British soldiers and administrators—who had ruled some or all of India for nearly two centuries—peacefully climbed aboard ships to return home to Britain .
There were numerous reasons for Britain ’ s withdrawal , including financial exhaustion from fighting two world wars and a post-World War II revulsion toward imperialism .
But perhaps the biggest reason was the struggle by Mahatma Gandhi and his nonviolent protest movement .
“ 100,000 Englishmen simply can not control 350 million Indians , if those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ warned .
He was right .
An empire that had defeated Napoleon and Hitler succumbed to marches and hunger strikes by unarmed people wearing homespun clothes .
Are there lessons for today ’ s America ?
The board game “ Gandhi , ” from the publisher GMT Games , posits some answers—or at least offers a unique framing of the question .
“ Gandhi ” is a wargame , but a strange one .
It inverts Clausewitz ’ s famous dictum : Instead of war as politics by other means , nonviolence becomes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control one of four competing factions : the British Raj ; the Indian National Congress ; the Muslim League ; or the Revolutionaries ( reflecting an amorphous collection of groups that favored the violent overthrow of British rule ) .
Congress and the Muslim League are restricted to nonviolent protest , while the Raj and the Revolutionaries can employ force .
For their part , the Revolutionaries can attack both the British and the nonviolent opposition factions .
All four factions have different capabilities , weaknesses , and—most importantly—goals .
The British want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population .
Congress wants to turn public opinion against the Raj enough to make India ungovernable .
The Muslim League desires the same , except that it ’ s also trying to form a separate Muslim nation .
As for the Revolutionaries , their goal is to create guerrilla cadres to foment mass armed rebellion .
Briefly described , the “ Gandhi ” gameboard depicts a series of rural provinces and major cities , linked by the railways that were the connective arteries of British India .
These cities and provinces contain the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ key to victory : They can be pro-Raj , neutral , or anti-Raj .
Railways enable troops and activists to move around the map , as well as providing the economic resources that sustain British rule .
Each turn , players draw cards and then move tokens reflecting troops , activists , and guerrillas as they perform various missions such as arresting activists or staging anti-government demonstrations .
In a game of “ Gandhi ” against three friends , I stepped into the role of the Raj between 1930 and 1947 .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , notably Bombay ( now Mumbai ) , the Punjab , and East Bengal , rife with opposition activists .
Scattered across India are British and sepoy ( native Indian troops ) regiments , with concentrations in Calcutta ( Kolkata ) and Delhi .
At first glance , the Empire appears all-powerful .
To win the loyalty of the population , the Raj can wield the traditional carrots and sticks with which empires maintain their rule .
It can spend resources to gain political support of cities and provinces .
And if that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regiments of soldiers and sepoys who can be dispatched to quell unrest .
At first , the correct strategy seems clear : Spend down the scarce pool of resource points to buy public support , while sending in the troops to arrest activists and wipe out guerrillas .
Do it quickly before the opposition grows , and the Raj might yet keep the jewel in the Empire ’ s crown .
But there ’ s quickly a rude awakening : Choosing between violence and nonviolence is as much a dilemma for the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ features a Restraint Level that reflects the willingness of the British to use force .
Each time the troops break up protests or arrest activists , the Restraint Level goes down .
As the level decreases , the sepoys—who make up the bulk of the Raj ’ s forces—balk at shooting their fellow countrymen .
Of course , the government can declare martial law to break up protests , but only at the cost of sparking unrest among the populace it ’ s trying to win over .
Indeed , when real-life Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sign that Britain was losing control over its security forces .
Just as police in Minneapolis can attest , the more violence the government employs in “ Gandhi , ” the more costly it is to resort to violence in the future .
By the game ’ s end , the Raj was tottering .
Opposition tokens had spread across the map like measles , the railways had ceased to function , and the security forces had been overwhelmed .
As more provinces and cities became restive , the Raj ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vicious cycle in which each wave of repression became feebler .
Not that the choices were easier for the pro-independence groups .
Nonviolence spared Congress and the Muslim League from bloody battles against soldiers and tanks .
The price was accepting that the British could use force at will without fear of violent retaliation .
Even for the Revolutionaries , a sort of Viet Cong on the Ganges , violence was not a guaranteed solution .
They could conduct pinprick attacks , but the Raj was too strong to be driven out at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end of the game , the government ’ s near-monopoly of force proved unable to defeat a nonviolent struggle that slowly garnered popular support—province by province and city by city—until India became ungovernable .
It was death by a thousand cuts that left the Raj in a state of creeping paralysis .
Ironically , while “ Gandhi ” depicts a largely nonviolent independence movement , it really is a wargame at heart .
Staging protests and strikes—or smashing them—involves as much strategy and tactics as any military campaign .
Proper allocation of resources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resilience when the enemy interrupts your plans : Whether Napoleon ’ s army at Waterloo or Mahatma Gandhi ’ s followers in Delhi , the same principles apply .
Could Gandhi ’ s strategy work in today ’ s world ?
The game suggests that the answer is yes , though it would require a long , patient effort .
It also assumes that there are political and moral limits on the government .
Britain in 1947 could not employ its fading but still potent military might against unarmed protesters .
China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , might not be as reluctant .
But ominously for the current protest movement in the United States , the game also highlights another problem : What happens when the anti-government opposition is itself split into competing factions ?
In “ Gandhi , ” Congress , Muslim League , and Revolutionaries are competing against each other as well as the government .
They snatch each other ’ s supporters and undermine each other ’ s campaigns .
In that sense , “ Gandhi ” is zero-sum : There can be only one winner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cooperate tactically , but must ultimately turn on each other .
One can argue that winner-take-all is baked into “ Gandhi ” because it is a game , and games require a victor .
But looking at the spectrum of protesters in American cities , it ’ s easy to wonder whether the opposition can hold itself together .
What happens if white liberals , Black activists , anti-fascists , feminists , and anarchists decide that the old system must go , but can ’ t agree on what the new system should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Britain , and mostly through nonviolent means .
But independence was quickly followed by ethnic and religious strife that killed up to 2 million people , displaced millions more , and left the subcontinent divided into hostile Hindu and Muslim states .
In the United States , violence on that scale seems unlikely , but it ’ s not clear whether proposed reforms will satisfy demands for justice .
Even today ’ s India has been plagued by anti-Muslim riots that could be a harbinger of greater civil strife .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ life of Gandhi the man—offers a glimpse of how nonviolence might triumph .

Protests in the streets. Police firing tear gas at demonstrators. A country at times so aflame that some demand the military intervene.
America in 2020? No, India in 1947.
The images of protesters in the United States confronting heavily armed police and National Guard troops recall the turmoil of 75 years ago, when India sought independence from the British Empire. True, one was a campaign to break the chains of colonialism, while the other is a fight for civil rights and economic equality. Yet the current struggle faces a similar dilemma: violence or nonviolence?
To proponents of nonviolent protest, resorting to violence against the power of the state—whether British soldiers or the Minneapolis police—isn’t just morally wrong. It is suicidal against a foe with vastly superior firepower.
However, to more radical activists, nonviolence is futile. To them, it’s an invitation to be killed, beaten, or ignored by an entrenched power structure that won’t respond to pleas but just might respond to force.
But is the sit-in mightier than the sword? In 1947, the answer was yes. That was the year that British soldiers and administrators—who had ruled some or all of India for nearly two centuries—peacefully climbed aboard ships to return home to Britain.
There were numerous reasons for Britain’s withdrawal, including financial exhaustion from fighting two world wars and a post-World War II revulsion toward imperialism. But perhaps the biggest reason was the struggle by Mahatma Gandhi and his nonviolent protest movement.
“100,000 Englishmen simply cannot control 350 million Indians, if those Indians refuse to cooperate,” Gandhi warned. He was right. An empire that had defeated Napoleon and Hitler succumbed to marches and hunger strikes by unarmed people wearing homespun clothes.
Are there lessons for today’s America? The board game “Gandhi,” from the publisher GMT Games, posits some answers—or at least offers a unique framing of the question.
“Gandhi” is a wargame, but a strange one. It inverts Clausewitz’s famous dictum: Instead of war as politics by other means, nonviolence becomes war waged by other means. Players control one of four competing factions: the British Raj; the Indian National Congress; the Muslim League; or the Revolutionaries (reflecting an amorphous collection of groups that favored the violent overthrow of British rule). Congress and the Muslim League are restricted to nonviolent protest, while the Raj and the Revolutionaries can employ force. For their part, the Revolutionaries can attack both the British and the nonviolent opposition factions.
All four factions have different capabilities, weaknesses, and—most importantly—goals. The British want the support of the majority of the population. Congress wants to turn public opinion against the Raj enough to make India ungovernable. The Muslim League desires the same, except that it’s also trying to form a separate Muslim nation. As for the Revolutionaries, their goal is to create guerrilla cadres to foment mass armed rebellion.
Briefly described, the “Gandhi” gameboard depicts a series of rural provinces and major cities, linked by the railways that were the connective arteries of British India. These cities and provinces contain the population whose hearts and minds are the key to victory: They can be pro-Raj, neutral, or anti-Raj. Railways enable troops and activists to move around the map, as well as providing the economic resources that sustain British rule. Each turn, players draw cards and then move tokens reflecting troops, activists, and guerrillas as they perform various missions such as arresting activists or staging anti-government demonstrations.
In a game of “Gandhi” against three friends, I stepped into the role of the Raj between 1930 and 1947. The game starts with large parts of India, notably Bombay (now Mumbai), the Punjab, and East Bengal, rife with opposition activists. Scattered across India are British and sepoy (native Indian troops) regiments, with concentrations in Calcutta (Kolkata) and Delhi.
At first glance, the Empire appears all-powerful. To win the loyalty of the population, the Raj can wield the traditional carrots and sticks with which empires maintain their rule. It can spend resources to gain political support of cities and provinces. And if that doesn’t work, it has regiments of soldiers and sepoys who can be dispatched to quell unrest. At first, the correct strategy seems clear: Spend down the scarce pool of resource points to buy public support, while sending in the troops to arrest activists and wipe out guerrillas. Do it quickly before the opposition grows, and the Raj might yet keep the jewel in the Empire’s crown.
But there’s quickly a rude awakening: Choosing between violence and nonviolence is as much a dilemma for the government as the protesters. “Gandhi” features a Restraint Level that reflects the willingness of the British to use force. Each time the troops break up protests or arrest activists, the Restraint Level goes down. As the level decreases, the sepoys—who make up the bulk of the Raj’s forces—balk at shooting their fellow countrymen. Of course, the government can declare martial law to break up protests, but only at the cost of sparking unrest among the populace it’s trying to win over.
Indeed, when real-life Indian sailors mutinied in 1946, it was a sign that Britain was losing control over its security forces. Just as police in Minneapolis can attest, the more violence the government employs in “Gandhi,” the more costly it is to resort to violence in the future. By the game’s end, the Raj was tottering. Opposition tokens had spread across the map like measles, the railways had ceased to function, and the security forces had been overwhelmed. As more provinces and cities became restive, the Raj’s finances became more depleted, creating a vicious cycle in which each wave of repression became feebler.
Not that the choices were easier for the pro-independence groups. Nonviolence spared Congress and the Muslim League from bloody battles against soldiers and tanks. The price was accepting that the British could use force at will without fear of violent retaliation. Even for the Revolutionaries, a sort of Viet Cong on the Ganges, violence was not a guaranteed solution. They could conduct pinprick attacks, but the Raj was too strong to be driven out at the point of bayonets.
By the end of the game, the government’s near-monopoly of force proved unable to defeat a nonviolent struggle that slowly garnered popular support—province by province and city by city—until India became ungovernable. It was death by a thousand cuts that left the Raj in a state of creeping paralysis.
Ironically, while “Gandhi” depicts a largely nonviolent independence movement, it really is a wargame at heart. Staging protests and strikes—or smashing them—involves as much strategy and tactics as any military campaign. Proper allocation of resources, exquisite timing, flexibility, and resilience when the enemy interrupts your plans: Whether Napoleon’s army at Waterloo or Mahatma Gandhi’s followers in Delhi, the same principles apply.
Could Gandhi’s strategy work in today’s world? The game suggests that the answer is yes, though it would require a long, patient effort. It also assumes that there are political and moral limits on the government. Britain in 1947 could not employ its fading but still potent military might against unarmed protesters. China, another place where protest could break out, might not be as reluctant.
But ominously for the current protest movement in the United States, the game also highlights another problem: What happens when the anti-government opposition is itself split into competing factions? In “Gandhi,” Congress, Muslim League, and Revolutionaries are competing against each other as well as the government. They snatch each other’s supporters and undermine each other’s campaigns.
In that sense, “Gandhi” is zero-sum: There can be only one winner, which means the opposition factions can cooperate tactically, but must ultimately turn on each other. One can argue that winner-take-all is baked into “Gandhi” because it is a game, and games require a victor.
But looking at the spectrum of protesters in American cities, it’s easy to wonder whether the opposition can hold itself together. What happens if white liberals, Black activists, anti-fascists, feminists, and anarchists decide that the old system must go, but can’t agree on what the new system should look like?
India did achieve independence from Britain, and mostly through nonviolent means. But independence was quickly followed by ethnic and religious strife that killed up to 2 million people, displaced millions more, and left the subcontinent divided into hostile Hindu and Muslim states. In the United States, violence on that scale seems unlikely, but it’s not clear whether proposed reforms will satisfy demands for justice. Even today’s India has been plagued by anti-Muslim riots that could be a harbinger of greater civil strife.
However, “Gandhi” the game—just like the life of Gandhi the man—offers a glimpse of how nonviolence might triumph.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-15--The Tragic Romance of the Middle-Aged Western Liberal

The Tragic Romance of the Middle-Aged Western Liberal “ Were some of our friends always closet authoritarians ?
” she wonders .
“ Or have the people with whom we clinked glasses in the first minutes of the new millennium somehow changed over the subsequent two decades ?
” The book is an admirable quest for answers and goes a long way toward providing them .
But it would have benefited from considering whether the questions Applebaum has posed are the right ones to begin with .
Applebaum ’ s new book is partly a brilliant political reportage , partly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political analysis , and partly a personal diary .
It is also a postscript to a distinct epoch .
The story Applebaum tells is that of the death of anti-communism as the public philosophy of the West .
During the Cold War , the Soviet Union wasn ’ t only America ’ s principal military adversary but also its ideological and moral “ other.
” Both left and right in America and Western Europe defended their competing visions of a liberal society in reaction to the Stalinist nightmare .
This was especially pronounced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Soviet communism guided how Americans thought about the core principles underlying their basic institutions .
For American liberalism was , or at least appeared to be , Soviet totalitarianism turned inside out .
Freedoms of speech and the press , as well as freedom of conscience , were idealized precisely because they were cruelly repressed under Moscow ’ s sway .
In the same spirit , Americans underscored the freedom of movement , the right to form private associations , the right to a fair trial , and the right to vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toppled from power .
Likewise emphasized was the latitude to accumulate private wealth , on the assumption that a decentralized and unplanned economy alone could provide the basis of both prosperity and political freedom .
What Applebaum ’ s book makes clear is that for people like the Hungarian historian Maria Schmidt or National Review editor-at-large John O ’ Sullivan or the vocal Trump supporter Laura Ingraham , liberal principles were valued only because they were an effective instrument for destroying communism .
When this goal was achieved , values like free media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be viewed as a threat to Western civilization and traditional Christian values .
The new prophets of illiberalism used all their talent to persuade their societies that the rights of others were a threat to their own rights and that the liberal system of checks and balances was not a way to preserve individuals ’ freedoms but an instrument for elites to abuse the will of the people .
Applebaum is a very good writer ; her style is lucid , and her arguments are bracing .
This has made her one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resistance .
But the strength of her new book is not so much in exposing the authoritarian nature of populists in power but in revealing the intellectual hollowness of the anti-communist consensus .
In his review of Jacob Heilbrunn ’ s history of neoconservatism They Knew They Were Right , the author and journalist Timothy Noah sharply observed : “ To be neoconservative is to bear almost daily witness to the resurrection of Adolf Hitler.
” In Applebaum ’ s much more liberal and optimistic version , to be neoconservative is to bear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Berlin Wall .
Applebaum ’ s political identity was made by her admiration for the moral courage of East European dissidents and her belief in the potential of the United States to make the world a better place .
On Nov. 10 , 1989 , Applebaum , then a young reporter , jumped in a car in the company of her soon-to-be husband—future Polish Foreign and Defense Minister Radek Sikorski—and drove from Warsaw to Berlin to see with her own eyes the collapse of the Berlin Wall .
1989 was the point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the following three decades .
Her much-praised history books about the Soviet Gulag and the establishment of the communist regimes in Central Europe were her historical introduction to the inevitability of 1989 .
For her , the end of the Cold War was not a geopolitical story ; it was a moral story , a verdict pronounced by history itself .
She tends to see the post-Cold War world as an epic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism , between freedom and oppression .
In this sense , Applebaum is a classic ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she was shaped by the Cold War without ever really experiencing it .
For the ’ 89ers , the Cold War was what the anti-fascist resistance was for the West ’ s student revolutionaries of the 1960s , the ’ 68ers—a time of inspiring heroism and moral clarity .
In her worldview , the marriage between democracy and capitalism was made in heaven , and most of the conflicts in the world were not about a clash of interests but about a clash of values .
It was this mindset that made many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coming from Vladimir Putin ’ s Russia but also the last to condemn George W. Bush ’ s ugly war in Iraq .
Applebaum ’ s book could be read in two different modes .
It could be seen as a story of betrayals , a version of Norman Podhoretz ’ s score-settling and acidly written Ex-Friends , or rather as a 21st-century version of Czeslaw Milosz ’ s 1953 classic , The Captive Mind—an attempt to explain the seductive power of communism through the personal choices of fellow intellectuals made in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ either way , it is the personal tone of the narrative that allows Applebaum to go beyond the usual liberal tirades against the new anti-liberals and to reveal some of the neglected sources of certain intellectuals ’ illiberalism .
But the book ’ s subtitle “ The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism ” is rather misleading .
Unlike communism , authoritarianism is not an ideology .
Populists , unlike communists or fascists , do not dream about a “ new man ” who will be born of their revolution .
What drives intellectual supporters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Orban is not some new vision of society but a pathological hate toward liberalism .
The central and most bitter insight of the book is that Applebaum ’ s ex-friends are not sorry for the breakup of their relationship with her—in fact , they feel liberated from partying with people like her in the first place .
For the nationalist populist , 1989 stands for a victory that was subsequently lost—and they blame people like Applebaum , and her liberal peers , for turning the victory into a defeat .
Populists ’ rejection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distinctive Polish , British , and American versions , but what is common for the new anti-liberals is the idea of a stolen victory .
In Poland , supporters of the Law and Justice party found it unbearable that ex-communists turned out to be among the winners of the fall of communism .
In the United Kingdom , the West ’ s victory in the Cold War revealed the decline of Britain ’ s influence .
In the United States , Trump ’ s supporters are convinced that not the West but communist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cold War .
Intellectuals who support anti-liberal counterrevolution feel deeply betrayed by history .
They swim in pessimism and despair even when they win elections .
The resentment of Applebaum ’ s ex-friends against people like her is their true ideology .
Resentment toward liberalism in places like Poland is a resentment toward cosmopolitan-minded local elites , those who speak foreign languages and joined the global elite and who see the post-communist transition as a success .
In a similar way , the new anti-Semitism in places like Poland is directed not so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so few of them left there , but against those Poles who are ashamed of Polish anti-Semitism .
Anti-liberal intellectuals have masked their resentment as ideology .
The story of the anti-liberalism of Applebaum ’ s ex-friends does not precisely explain the rise of Trump or Brexit , but it is of critical importance for understanding the dissolution of the pre-1989 democratic moral consensus .
It explains the transformation of democracy in places like Poland , the United States , Britain , and Spain into a civil war with words and ballots .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Louis Marie Bosredon in 1848 , the year France adopted universal male suffrage , depicts the ambivalence of early European democracy .
It shows a worker with a rifle in one hand and a ballot in the other : bullets for the nation ’ s enemies and ballots for the class enemies .
But for the new illiberals , the war against one ’ s political opponent is the real battle .
In this Schmidtean understanding of electoral politics , as civil war with ballots , any criticism toward one ’ s own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in countries like Poland and the United States is that a democracy of citizens has been replaced by a democracy of fans .
While for a liberal citizen the readiness to point out and correct the mistakes of your own party is a sign of the highest loyalty , the loyalty of fans is zealous , unthinking , and unswerving .
Enthralled fans , with their critical faculties switched off , are central to populists ’ understanding of politics as a loyalty game : Their cheers reflect their sense of belonging .
Trust-but-verify @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who refuse to applaud are traitors , and any statement of fact becomes a declaration of belonging .
When political participants become fans , their primary goal is to make sure their opponents will never come to power .
Populists encourage this mindset—and in their most romantic vein , the liberal ’ 89ers manage to replicate it .
In trying to make sense of the current “ illiberal moment , ” Applebaum frames the choices intellectuals face today as similar to the ones faced by the men of letters in France during the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authoritarians .
You can sense in this framing an ’ 89er ’ s nostalgia for the illusionary moral clarity of the Cold War .
But while this frame has mobilizing power and gives us a sense of purpose , it blurs the major challenge Western liberalism is facing today—how to uphold Western universalism while Western power is in decline .
Will the West remain devoted to free markets if non-Western economies become more competitive ?
Will the West remain devoted to free elections if they bring to power anti-Western regimes ?
Is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does it represent the dark side of democracy we are uncomfortable talking about ?
While Applebaum was finishing her book , COVID-19 infected the world with an ultimate uncertainty .
The distinction between democracies and authoritarian regimes has been blurred .
In the words of the political philosopher David Runciman , “ Under a lockdown , democracies reveal what they have in common with other political regimes : here too politics is ultimately about power and order.
” This new crisis did not bring polarized societies together .
Rather , it pushed them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a transformative moment—perhaps as transformative for the international system as the end of the Cold War .
But there is a difference : In 1989 , intellectuals had the illusion that they knew which direction the world was going .
Now that illusion is dead .
What the pandemic made clear is that the return to the ideals of 1989 can not be the point of departure when it comes to reforming the world .
In this sense , Applebaum ’ s passionate defense of liberalism is strongest when it recognizes that liberals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They should start by questioning some of the self-evident truths of 1989 .

Anne Applebaum opens her new book, Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism, with a scene on the long winter night of Dec. 31, 1999, in a newly restored family house somewhere in the deep Polish countryside, where a big party is set to celebrate the coming of the new millennium. The closing scene is in the same house 20 years later, where the author has been spending the coronavirus lockdown. In the two decades that stretch between, many of the guests of Applebaum’s new millennium party—a colorful mix of conservative intellectuals, diplomats, and politicians—have become her political enemies, passionate supporters of Donald Trump and Poland’s anti-liberal counterrevolution.
Anne Applebaum opens her new book, Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism, with a scene on the long winter night of Dec. 31, 1999, in a newly restored family house somewhere in the deep Polish countryside, where a big party is set to celebrate the coming of the new millennium. The closing scene is in the same house 20 years later, where the author has been spending the coronavirus lockdown. In the two decades that stretch between, many of the guests of Applebaum’s new millennium party—a colorful mix of conservative intellectuals, diplomats, and politicians—have become her political enemies, passionate supporters of Donald Trump and Poland’s anti-liberal counterrevolution.
“Were some of our friends always closet authoritarians?” she wonders. “Or have the people with whom we clinked glasses in the first minutes of the new millennium somehow changed over the subsequent two decades?” The book is an admirable quest for answers and goes a long way toward providing them. But it would have benefited from considering whether the questions Applebaum has posed are the right ones to begin with.
Applebaum’s new book is partly a brilliant political reportage, partly a Central European-style psychodrama, partly a political analysis, and partly a personal diary. It is also a postscript to a distinct epoch. The story Applebaum tells is that of the death of anti-communism as the public philosophy of the West. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union wasn’t only America’s principal military adversary but also its ideological and moral “other.” Both left and right in America and Western Europe defended their competing visions of a liberal society in reaction to the Stalinist nightmare.
This was especially pronounced in the United States. The contest with Soviet communism guided how Americans thought about the core principles underlying their basic institutions. For American liberalism was, or at least appeared to be, Soviet totalitarianism turned inside out. Freedoms of speech and the press, as well as freedom of conscience, were idealized precisely because they were cruelly repressed under Moscow’s sway. In the same spirit, Americans underscored the freedom of movement, the right to form private associations, the right to a fair trial, and the right to vote in competitive elections where incumbents might be toppled from power. Likewise emphasized was the latitude to accumulate private wealth, on the assumption that a decentralized and unplanned economy alone could provide the basis of both prosperity and political freedom.
What Applebaum’s book makes clear is that for people like the Hungarian historian Maria Schmidt or National Review editor-at-large John O’Sullivan or the vocal Trump supporter Laura Ingraham, liberal principles were valued only because they were an effective instrument for destroying communism. When this goal was achieved, values like free media and the division of powers started to be viewed as a threat to Western civilization and traditional Christian values. The new prophets of illiberalism used all their talent to persuade their societies that the rights of others were a threat to their own rights and that the liberal system of checks and balances was not a way to preserve individuals’ freedoms but an instrument for elites to abuse the will of the people.
Applebaum is a very good writer; her style is lucid, and her arguments are bracing. This has made her one of the most powerful voices of the anti-populist resistance. But the strength of her new book is not so much in exposing the authoritarian nature of populists in power but in revealing the intellectual hollowness of the anti-communist consensus.
In his review of Jacob Heilbrunn’s history of neoconservatism They Knew They Were Right, the author and journalist Timothy Noah sharply observed: “To be neoconservative is to bear almost daily witness to the resurrection of Adolf Hitler.” In Applebaum’s much more liberal and optimistic version, to be neoconservative is to bear almost daily witness to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Applebaum’s political identity was made by her admiration for the moral courage of East European dissidents and her belief in the potential of the United States to make the world a better place.
On Nov. 10, 1989, Applebaum, then a young reporter, jumped in a car in the company of her soon-to-be husband—future Polish Foreign and Defense Minister Radek Sikorski—and drove from Warsaw to Berlin to see with her own eyes the collapse of the Berlin Wall. 1989 was the point of departure of everything that Applebaum did in the following three decades. Her much-praised history books about the Soviet Gulag and the establishment of the communist regimes in Central Europe were her historical introduction to the inevitability of 1989. For her, the end of the Cold War was not a geopolitical story; it was a moral story, a verdict pronounced by history itself. She tends to see the post-Cold War world as an epic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, between freedom and oppression.
In this sense, Applebaum is a classic ’89er; like many of us, she was shaped by the Cold War without ever really experiencing it. For the ’89ers, the Cold War was what the anti-fascist resistance was for the West’s student revolutionaries of the 1960s, the ’68ers—a time of inspiring heroism and moral clarity. In her worldview, the marriage between democracy and capitalism was made in heaven, and most of the conflicts in the world were not about a clash of interests but about a clash of values. It was this mindset that made many ’89ers first to detect the danger coming from Vladimir Putin’s Russia but also the last to condemn George W. Bush’s ugly war in Iraq.
Applebaum’s book could be read in two different modes. It could be seen as a story of betrayals, a version of Norman Podhoretz’s score-settling and acidly written Ex-Friends, or rather as a 21st-century version of Czeslaw Milosz’s 1953 classic, The Captive Mind—an attempt to explain the seductive power of communism through the personal choices of fellow intellectuals made in the wake of World War II. But either way, it is the personal tone of the narrative that allows Applebaum to go beyond the usual liberal tirades against the new anti-liberals and to reveal some of the neglected sources of certain intellectuals’ illiberalism.
But the book’s subtitle “The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism” is rather misleading. Unlike communism, authoritarianism is not an ideology. Populists, unlike communists or fascists, do not dream about a “new man” who will be born of their revolution. What drives intellectual supporters of Trump and Hungary’s Viktor Orban is not some new vision of society but a pathological hate toward liberalism. The central and most bitter insight of the book is that Applebaum’s ex-friends are not sorry for the breakup of their relationship with her—in fact, they feel liberated from partying with people like her in the first place. For the nationalist populist, 1989 stands for a victory that was subsequently lost—and they blame people like Applebaum, and her liberal peers, for turning the victory into a defeat.
Populists’ rejection of the post-Cold War world has its distinctive Polish, British, and American versions, but what is common for the new anti-liberals is the idea of a stolen victory. In Poland, supporters of the Law and Justice party found it unbearable that ex-communists turned out to be among the winners of the fall of communism. In the United Kingdom, the West’s victory in the Cold War revealed the decline of Britain’s influence. In the United States, Trump’s supporters are convinced that not the West but communist China is the real winner of the Cold War. Intellectuals who support anti-liberal counterrevolution feel deeply betrayed by history. They swim in pessimism and despair even when they win elections.
The resentment of Applebaum’s ex-friends against people like her is their true ideology. Resentment toward liberalism in places like Poland is a resentment toward cosmopolitan-minded local elites, those who speak foreign languages and joined the global elite and who see the post-communist transition as a success. In a similar way, the new anti-Semitism in places like Poland is directed not so much against Jews, as there are so few of them left there, but against those Poles who are ashamed of Polish anti-Semitism. Anti-liberal intellectuals have masked their resentment as ideology.
The story of the anti-liberalism of Applebaum’s ex-friends does not precisely explain the rise of Trump or Brexit, but it is of critical importance for understanding the dissolution of the pre-1989 democratic moral consensus. It explains the transformation of democracy in places like Poland, the United States, Britain, and Spain into a civil war with words and ballots.
A well-known engraving by the French artist Louis Marie Bosredon in 1848, the year France adopted universal male suffrage, depicts the ambivalence of early European democracy. It shows a worker with a rifle in one hand and a ballot in the other: bullets for the nation’s enemies and ballots for the class enemies. But for the new illiberals, the war against one’s political opponent is the real battle. In this Schmidtean understanding of electoral politics, as civil war with ballots, any criticism toward one’s own side equals betrayal.
What we see in countries like Poland and the United States is that a democracy of citizens has been replaced by a democracy of fans. While for a liberal citizen the readiness to point out and correct the mistakes of your own party is a sign of the highest loyalty, the loyalty of fans is zealous, unthinking, and unswerving. Enthralled fans, with their critical faculties switched off, are central to populists’ understanding of politics as a loyalty game: Their cheers reflect their sense of belonging. Trust-but-verify is replaced by rowdy adoration. Those who refuse to applaud are traitors, and any statement of fact becomes a declaration of belonging.
When political participants become fans, their primary goal is to make sure their opponents will never come to power. Populists encourage this mindset—and in their most romantic vein, the liberal ’89ers manage to replicate it.
In trying to make sense of the current “illiberal moment,” Applebaum frames the choices intellectuals face today as similar to the ones faced by the men of letters in France during the Dreyfus Affair—nationalists versus cosmopolitans, democrats versus authoritarians. You can sense in this framing an ’89er’s nostalgia for the illusionary moral clarity of the Cold War. But while this frame has mobilizing power and gives us a sense of purpose, it blurs the major challenge Western liberalism is facing today—how to uphold Western universalism while Western power is in decline. Will the West remain devoted to free markets if non-Western economies become more competitive? Will the West remain devoted to free elections if they bring to power anti-Western regimes? Is the democratic majoritarianism of leaders like Orban anti-democratic—or does it represent the dark side of democracy we are uncomfortable talking about?
While Applebaum was finishing her book, COVID-19 infected the world with an ultimate uncertainty. The distinction between democracies and authoritarian regimes has been blurred. In the words of the political philosopher David Runciman, “Under a lockdown, democracies reveal what they have in common with other political regimes: here too politics is ultimately about power and order.” This new crisis did not bring polarized societies together. Rather, it pushed them even further apart. The pandemic is a transformative moment—perhaps as transformative for the international system as the end of the Cold War. But there is a difference: In 1989, intellectuals had the illusion that they knew which direction the world was going. Now that illusion is dead.
What the pandemic made clear is that the return to the ideals of 1989 cannot be the point of departure when it comes to reforming the world. In this sense, Applebaum’s passionate defense of liberalism is strongest when it recognizes that liberals must be ready to reinvent it. They should start by questioning some of the self-evident truths of 1989.