Say No, Joe

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden assembles a foreign-policy team of experts drawn from previous Democratic administrations—including former Secretary of State John Kerry and former Deputy National Security Advisor Antony Blinken—some of its members may be tempted to turn back the clock and return the United States to its course of four years ago , before Donald Trump ever set foot in the Oval @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for sure—and one to which Biden gestured in his campaign pledge to “ restore ” U.S. global leadership from its alleged Trumpian aberration .
During his campaign , however , Biden struck different notes as well , indicating a desire not just to restore but also to change .
Biden promised to end the “ forever wars ” in Afghanistan and the Middle East launched and sustained by Trump ’ s predecessors .
He vowed to terminate U.S. assistance for the Saudi-led war in Yemen and stand against Saudi Arabia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he had opposed sending more troops to Afghanistan in the hopes of building up the Afghan state under the Obama administration , proposing instead a narrower approach of targeting terrorists .
In taking these positions , Biden practiced good politics .
He recognized the unpopularity of military entanglements and made it difficult for Trump to cast him as a warmonger .
Now , Biden and his team have the opportunity to implement good policy as well by actually restraining U.S. military power from the White House .
The Biden administration can draw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Four years ago , as he left office , President Barack Obama criticized what he called “ the Washington playbook ” for reflexively prescribing “ militarized responses ” to world events .
Obama was right then and is only more so today , after four years of President Trump—who has bragged about U.S. weaponry and casually eaten chocolate cake while launching missile strikes .
Overextended abroad , the United States has urgent needs at home , starting with recovery from the coronavirus pandemic .
But the old playbook will invariably reappear , given @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more fundamentally , the temptation U.S. power creates to meddle and boss others around .
When this happens , the Biden administration will need to be ready to say no—no to unnecessary wars and no to further U.S. military overstretch .
In five areas in particular , the administration ought to vow restraint from the get-go .
First , the Biden administration should not pursue global military dominance .
The unipolar moment of the 1990s turned out to be just that—a moment that has long passed .
In the meantime , countries like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military capabilities to defend their borders and surroundings .
The United States , for its part , has found that chasing global dominance brings endless wars and enormous defense costs .
Military spending absorbs over half of the federal government ’ s entire discretionary budget , meaning that more money is spent on the Pentagon than on education , infrastructure , the environment , scientific research , diplomacy , and foreign aid combined .
Pursuing dominance served the American public poorly even when no major competitor existed .
It carries even bigger risks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Biden must work alongside U.S. allies to create a stable balance of power .
With its nuclear deterrents , strong defenses , and geographical separation from many threats , the United States will be remarkably secure even if it opts not to police the world .
Accepting multipolarity hardly means giving up on the exercise of military power ; it means limiting power to that which has strategic purpose so as to obtain security at the least cost to Americans .
Where U.S. adversaries improve their capabilities , the Biden administration should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than put the United States on the front line of every potential conflict .
Second , the Biden administration must deliver on its promise to end what are often referred to as the United States ’ “ forever wars.
” This could prove difficult : The last two presidents opposed “ endless wars ” rhetorically while extending them all the same .
To avoid the same fate , Biden should take decisive action .
He should create a robust timeline that ensures that the United States ’ ground troops in Afghanistan , Iraq @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the end of his first term .
He should end the “ war on terror ” as a rhetorical and policy framework , and subject drone strikes to strict scrutiny so that they become far rarer .
Biden has promised to bring “ the vast majority of our troops home ” from Afghanistan and the Middle East , a stance that suggests he might leave behind contingents to combat terrorists .
That would be a mistake .
In Afghanistan , the United States long ago achieved its key post-9/11 counterterrorism aims of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Ending “ forever wars ” means that all U.S. forces should come home , even if peace talks among the Afghan parties prove unsuccessful .
The United States should then assess the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan just as it does elsewhere , freed from the sunk-cost logic of overemphasizing Afghanistan in U.S. policymaking simply because the United States has already expended so much effort there .
If there are indeed terrorists who threaten the United States , they can be attacked by local forces or long-range U.S. striking power , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deploys combat troops preventatively—for the purpose of keeping terrorists from resurging— the country ’ s wars will never end .
U.S. troops should likewise depart from Iraq and Syria .
They achieved their mission of destroying the Islamic State , and local forces can now handle its remnants .
If the United States deploys combat troops preventatively—for the purpose of keeping terrorists from resurging— the country ’ s wars will never end ; it can never be verified with 100 percent certainty that terrorists won ’ t come back in the future .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in peril , canceling out any speculative American lives saved through their deployment .
Third , the U.S. military can not police the Middle East , and Biden should not ask it to try .
In fact , once the United States ’ current wars are brought to a close , U.S. interests in the region will scarcely warrant any troop presence at all besides what is needed to protect naval and perhaps intelligence-gathering facilities .
Because the Middle East is experiencing a competition for influence among multiple midsized powers—Iran , Turkey , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one state credibly threatens to dominate the region and its oil supply .
The United States will obtain more security by doing less .
Biden has already committed himself to taking steps to disentangle the United States from Middle Eastern politics .
He wants to end the failed “ maximum pressure ” campaign toward Iran and resurrect the Iran nuclear deal .
He has also called Saudi Arabia a “ pariah , ” suggesting he will downgrade the United States ’ partnership with the kingdom .
The Biden administration should build on these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overidentification with one-half of the region and its excessive enmity with the other .
Through evenhanded diplomacy—and avoiding any large U.S. troop presence—Biden can fulfill Obama ’ s goal of encouraging Middle Eastern powers to “ share the neighborhood.
” Fourth , Biden must resist NATO expansion .
For all his rebukes of European allies , Trump only increased U.S. security commitments to the continent .
On his watch , the United States sent lethal weapons to Ukraine , intensified revolving military deployments in the Baltic States , and welcomed Montenegro and North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to stop , not least because the accession of the next candidates in line for NATO—Ukraine and Georgia—could provoke a dangerous response from Russia .
The Biden administration should welcome initiatives from France and other European states to assume the primary responsibility for dealing with security challenges in their own region .
By doing so , the United States would not only cut down on costs but also diminish the risk of being pulled into a World War III .
The next administration must temper U.S. militarism toward China .
Finally , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China .
In this year ’ s Democratic platform , the party sensibly rejected a “ cold war ” posture toward Beijing .
Despite the country ’ s deepening repression and belligerence , China remains an essential U.S. partner in combating pandemic disease and climate change—far more direct threats to the American people than the specter of an armed attack .
The Biden administration should therefore preserve room for dialogue and cooperation with Beijing and keep military competition from defining the bilateral relationship .
For now , the People ’ s Liberation Army @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disputes around China ’ s coasts .
U.S. allies , such as Japan , South Korea , and the Philippines , have the resources to defend themselves and do not wish to see their region descend into a Sino-U.S. standoff .
In particular , the Biden administration should give a resounding no to growing calls to break from the U.S. policy of “ strategic ambiguity ” by committing to wage war against China on behalf of Taiwan .
It would be far better to help Taiwan bolster its own defenses and pursue a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through both deterrence and reassurance .
By saying no to reckless interventions and commitments , the Biden administration would only be rejecting the false comforts of post-Cold War enthusiasms .
For three decades , the United States ’ pursuit of armed dominance produced all the pathologies that Trump took further—indefensible wars , strategic overstretch , runaway spending , and a culture fearful of endless threat .
Trump unmasked these realities more than he created them .
Biden should chart his own course .

Benjamin H. Friedman and Stephen Wertheim

As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden assembles a foreign-policy team of experts drawn from previous Democratic administrations—including former Secretary of State John Kerry and former Deputy National Security Advisor Antony Blinken—some of its members may be tempted to turn back the clock and return the United States to its course of four years ago, before Donald Trump ever set foot in the Oval Office. It is an appealing fantasy, for sure—and one to which Biden gestured in his campaign pledge to “restore” U.S. global leadership from its alleged Trumpian aberration.
As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden assembles a foreign-policy team of experts drawn from previous Democratic administrations—including former Secretary of State John Kerry and former Deputy National Security Advisor Antony Blinken—some of its members may be tempted to turn back the clock and return the United States to its course of four years ago, before Donald Trump ever set foot in the Oval Office. It is an appealing fantasy, for sure—and one to which Biden gestured in his campaign pledge to “restore” U.S. global leadership from its alleged Trumpian aberration.
During his campaign, however, Biden struck different notes as well, indicating a desire not just to restore but also to change. Biden promised to end the “forever wars” in Afghanistan and the Middle East launched and sustained by Trump’s predecessors. He vowed to terminate U.S. assistance for the Saudi-led war in Yemen and stand against Saudi Arabia’s broader misdeeds. And he repeatedly emphasized that he had opposed sending more troops to Afghanistan in the hopes of building up the Afghan state under the Obama administration, proposing instead a narrower approach of targeting terrorists.
In taking these positions, Biden practiced good politics. He recognized the unpopularity of military entanglements and made it difficult for Trump to cast him as a warmonger. Now, Biden and his team have the opportunity to implement good policy as well by actually restraining U.S. military power from the White House.
The Biden administration can draw on familiar insights to do so. Four years ago, as he left office, President Barack Obama criticized what he called “the Washington playbook” for reflexively prescribing “militarized responses” to world events. Obama was right then and is only more so today, after four years of President Trump—who has bragged about U.S. weaponry and casually eaten chocolate cake while launching missile strikes. Overextended abroad, the United States has urgent needs at home, starting with recovery from the coronavirus pandemic. But the old playbook will invariably reappear, given its popularity among foreign-policy hands and, more fundamentally, the temptation U.S. power creates to meddle and boss others around. When this happens, the Biden administration will need to be ready to say no—no to unnecessary wars and no to further U.S. military overstretch. In five areas in particular, the administration ought to vow restraint from the get-go.
Chasing global dominance brings endless wars and enormous defense costs.
First, the Biden administration should not pursue global military dominance. The unipolar moment of the 1990s turned out to be just that—a moment that has long passed. In the meantime, countries like China have grown their economies and attained military capabilities to defend their borders and surroundings. The United States, for its part, has found that chasing global dominance brings endless wars and enormous defense costs. Military spending absorbs over half of the federal government’s entire discretionary budget, meaning that more money is spent on the Pentagon than on education, infrastructure, the environment, scientific research, diplomacy, and foreign aid combined. Pursuing dominance served the American public poorly even when no major competitor existed. It carries even bigger risks now.
Instead of pursuing dominance everywhere, Biden must work alongside U.S. allies to create a stable balance of power. With its nuclear deterrents, strong defenses, and geographical separation from many threats, the United States will be remarkably secure even if it opts not to police the world. Accepting multipolarity hardly means giving up on the exercise of military power; it means limiting power to that which has strategic purpose so as to obtain security at the least cost to Americans. Where U.S. adversaries improve their capabilities, the Biden administration should ask U.S. allies to similarly scale up—rather than put the United States on the front line of every potential conflict.
Second, the Biden administration must deliver on its promise to end what are often referred to as the United States’ “forever wars.” This could prove difficult: The last two presidents opposed “endless wars” rhetorically while extending them all the same. To avoid the same fate, Biden should take decisive action. He should create a robust timeline that ensures that the United States’ ground troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Somalia come home by the end of his first term. He should end the “war on terror” as a rhetorical and policy framework, and subject drone strikes to strict scrutiny so that they become far rarer.
Biden has promised to bring “the vast majority of our troops home” from Afghanistan and the Middle East, a stance that suggests he might leave behind contingents to combat terrorists. That would be a mistake. In Afghanistan, the United States long ago achieved its key post-9/11 counterterrorism aims of decimating al Qaeda and punishing the Taliban. Ending “forever wars” means that all U.S. forces should come home, even if peace talks among the Afghan parties prove unsuccessful. The United States should then assess the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan just as it does elsewhere, freed from the sunk-cost logic of overemphasizing Afghanistan in U.S. policymaking simply because the United States has already expended so much effort there. If there are indeed terrorists who threaten the United States, they can be attacked by local forces or long-range U.S. striking power, if necessary.
If the United States deploys combat troops preventatively—for the purpose of keeping terrorists from resurging— the country’s wars will never end.
U.S. troops should likewise depart from Iraq and Syria. They achieved their mission of destroying the Islamic State, and local forces can now handle its remnants. If the United States deploys combat troops preventatively—for the purpose of keeping terrorists from resurging— the country’s wars will never end; it can never be verified with 100 percent certainty that terrorists won’t come back in the future. Meanwhile, such missions place U.S. troops in peril, canceling out any speculative American lives saved through their deployment.
Third, the U.S. military cannot police the Middle East, and Biden should not ask it to try. In fact, once the United States’ current wars are brought to a close, U.S. interests in the region will scarcely warrant any troop presence at all besides what is needed to protect naval and perhaps intelligence-gathering facilities. Because the Middle East is experiencing a competition for influence among multiple midsized powers—Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel—no one state credibly threatens to dominate the region and its oil supply. The United States will obtain more security by doing less.
Biden has already committed himself to taking steps to disentangle the United States from Middle Eastern politics. He wants to end the failed “maximum pressure” campaign toward Iran and resurrect the Iran nuclear deal. He has also called Saudi Arabia a “pariah,” suggesting he will downgrade the United States’ partnership with the kingdom. The Biden administration should build on these policies to systematically reduce America’s overidentification with one-half of the region and its excessive enmity with the other. Through evenhanded diplomacy—and avoiding any large U.S. troop presence—Biden can fulfill Obama’s goal of encouraging Middle Eastern powers to “share the neighborhood.”
Fourth, Biden must resist NATO expansion. For all his rebukes of European allies, Trump only increased U.S. security commitments to the continent. On his watch, the United States sent lethal weapons to Ukraine, intensified revolving military deployments in the Baltic States, and welcomed Montenegro and North Macedonia into NATO. That trend needs to stop, not least because the accession of the next candidates in line for NATO—Ukraine and Georgia—could provoke a dangerous response from Russia. The Biden administration should welcome initiatives from France and other European states to assume the primary responsibility for dealing with security challenges in their own region. By doing so, the United States would not only cut down on costs but also diminish the risk of being pulled into a World War III.
The next administration must temper U.S. militarism toward China.
Finally, the next administration must temper U.S. militarism toward China. In this year’s Democratic platform, the party sensibly rejected a “cold war” posture toward Beijing. Despite the country’s deepening repression and belligerence, China remains an essential U.S. partner in combating pandemic disease and climate change—far more direct threats to the American people than the specter of an armed attack. The Biden administration should therefore preserve room for dialogue and cooperation with Beijing and keep military competition from defining the bilateral relationship.
For now, the People’s Liberation Army has focused its capabilities on winning local disputes around China’s coasts. U.S. allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, have the resources to defend themselves and do not wish to see their region descend into a Sino-U.S. standoff. In particular, the Biden administration should give a resounding no to growing calls to break from the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” by committing to wage war against China on behalf of Taiwan. It would be far better to help Taiwan bolster its own defenses and pursue a diplomatic course that keeps China at bay through both deterrence and reassurance.
By saying no to reckless interventions and commitments, the Biden administration would only be rejecting the false comforts of post-Cold War enthusiasms. For three decades, the United States’ pursuit of armed dominance produced all the pathologies that Trump took further—indefensible wars, strategic overstretch, runaway spending, and a culture fearful of endless threat. Trump unmasked these realities more than he created them. Biden should chart his own course.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--Biden Likely to Lift Sanctions on ICC Chief Prosecutor

Biden Likely to Lift Sanctions on ICC Chief Prosecutor This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
President-elect Joe Biden is facing increasing pressure from foreign allies , international justice advocates , and some of his own advisors to lift U.S. sanctions on Fatou Bensouda , the Gambian lawyer who leads the International Criminal Court , and a chief ICC aide .
Once he ’ s inaugurated , Biden has vowed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Paris climate accord and reversing the current administration ’ s decision to withdraw from the World Health Organization—aimed at assuring key allies that the new American leader is committed to multilateralism and cooperating on a range of vexing global challenges .
He has largely remained silent on his plans for the international tribunal , but sources familiar with the deliberations say that Biden is likely to lift sanctions on the court ’ s personnel early in his term .
“ The first priority has to be on day one to rescind the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials and those who cooperate with it , ” said James Goldston , a former trial attorney with the international tribunal who serves as the executive director of the Open Society Justice Initiative , a New York-based nonprofit that promotes accountability for serious crimes around the world .
“ The administration should be working toward a more comprehensive and robust policy toward the prosecution of grave crimes , and one aspect of that should be reengaging with the ICC.
” In June , U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order granting authority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to impose an asset freeze and travel ban on foreign nationals who have participated in ICC investigations into alleged crimes by U.S. personnel or American allies .
The move infuriated America ’ s Western allies , which have long supported the court—and they have been pressing the Biden camp to reverse course .
The Hague-based court has long had a complicated relationship with both Democratic and Republican administrations , which have worried that it might pursue criminal charges against American service members engaged in international military or peacekeeping operations .
Those fears were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pursue an investigation into alleged atrocities by U.S. troops in Afghanistan .
In the wake of the U.S. sanctions , signatories to the criminal tribunal have denounced the measures and urged the Biden administration to support the court .
On Nov. 2 , Germany issued a statement on behalf of 74 countries saying that “ sanctions are a tool to be used against those responsible for the most serious crimes , not against those seeking justice .
Any attempt to undermine the independence of the Court should not be tolerated.
” “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the very beginning , ” France ’ s Ambassador to the United Nations Nicolas de Rivière said .
“ We are very strong supporters of international justice .
We will certainly encourage the U.S. not only to drop sanctions or sanctions threats against the ICC , but we will also encourage them to support international justice and not undermine it.
” Observers say it is all but inevitable that Biden will lift the sanctions on Bensouda and Phakiso Mochochoko , a top aide , but that they are not convinced that Biden administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ level of cooperation as during the Obama administration , citing the political complications posed by an ongoing investigation into U.S. service members in Afghanistan and the potential for a possible investigation into alleged crimes by Israelis .
“ It ’ s very unlikely they will go back to where they were in 2015 or 2016 , ” said Todd Buchwald , who served as special coordinator in the State Department ’ s Office of Global Criminal Justice during the Obama administration .
Buchwald is preparing a report for the American Society of International @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” recommendations aimed at furthering the cause of international justice .
The ICC—which has issued only eight convictions since it began operating nearly 20 years ago and which has faced criticism even from its own supporters—represents only one piece of a broader international justice strategy .
And Buchwald believes the Biden administration will “ reemphasize working with friends and allies ” and promoting the idea that “ those responsible for atrocities should be held accountable.
” “ It is imperative that they act very quickly to repeal that executive order as part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rule of law—and I say that cognizant of the possible ICC investigation in Afghanistan that could implicate U.S. personnel , as well as a possible investigation in Palestinian territories , ” said Richard Dicker , an expert on the International Criminal Court at Human Rights Watch .
“ Obviously the relationship between the court and incoming Biden administration will have points of tension , but what is new ?
” Dicker added .
“ But that tension should not preclude , as prior administrations managed , a constructive engagement with the court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the court ’ s investigative and prosecutorial work facilitate U.S. foreign policy objectives.
” Ned Price , a spokesperson for the Biden transition , declined to comment on Biden ’ s plans for the ICC .
But he said : “ The President-elect firmly believes in the principle that there must be only one president at a time guiding our country ’ s foreign policy and national security as he is focused on preparing to govern.
” The International Criminal Court was established by treaty in Rome in 1998 , becoming operational four @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mass atrocities , including genocide ; crimes against humanity ; and war crimes .
From the beginning , the United States has had an ambivalent relationship with the court , which it encouraged to prosecute some of the world ’ s most bloodstained leaders , from the former Sudanese strongman Omar al-Bashir to the late Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi , while working to secure immunity for American nationals operating in military missions overseas .
U.S. President Bill Clinton overcame his own misgivings about the court and ultimately signed the Rome Statute that established @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President George W. Bush , withdrew the presidential signature , citing concern that the tribunal would be used to conduct politically motivated prosecutions of U.S. service members engaged in overseas operations .
Even before the court came into existence , the Bush administration threatened to shutter vital U.N. peacekeeping missions to compel the U.N. Security Council to carve out an immunity provision for countries , like the United States , that had not joined the treaty .
The effort failed .
Despite early opposition to the court , Bush ultimately found it could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adversaries .
In 2005 , the Bush administration abstained on a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing a criminal investigation by the ICC prosecutor into alleged war crimes committed by Bashir ’ s regime in Darfur .
President Barack Obama went further , voting in favor of a 2011 U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing an investigation by the court into mass atrocities in Libya .
The Obama administration also stepped up cooperation with the court , aiding in the arrest and transfer of a Congolese militia leader , Bosco Ntaganda , to The Hague @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crimes .
But the Trump administration has pursued an openly hostile approach to the court .
The ICC ’ s prosecutor infuriated the Trump administration during its first year in office , seeking permission from the court ’ s judges to pursue a formal investigation into alleged crimes committed by the United States and other combatants during the Afghan War , and in previously secret CIA detention centers outside of Afghanistan .
And in December 2019 , Bensouda sought permission from the court ’ s judges to pursue an investigation into alleged war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2014 conflict in the Gaza Strip .
In response , the Trump administration took a number of punitive steps against the prosecutor , initially revoking her visa to travel to the United States .
This June , the White House issued an executive order paving the way for sanctions on the court on the grounds that the Afghan investigation constituted an infringement of U.S. sovereignty that threatened the national security of the United States .
In September , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced sanctions on Bensouda and a top aide , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ thoroughly broken and corrupted institution ” and vowing that the United States “ will not tolerate its illegitimate attempts to subject Americans to its jurisdiction .
”

President-elect Joe Biden is facing increasing pressure from foreign allies, international justice advocates, and some of his own advisors to lift U.S. sanctions on Fatou Bensouda, the Gambian lawyer who leads the International Criminal Court, and a chief ICC aide.
President-elect Joe Biden is facing increasing pressure from foreign allies, international justice advocates, and some of his own advisors to lift U.S. sanctions on Fatou Bensouda, the Gambian lawyer who leads the International Criminal Court, and a chief ICC aide.
Once he’s inaugurated, Biden has vowed to take a number of steps—including rejoining the Paris climate accord and reversing the current administration’s decision to withdraw from the World Health Organization—aimed at assuring key allies that the new American leader is committed to multilateralism and cooperating on a range of vexing global challenges. He has largely remained silent on his plans for the international tribunal, but sources familiar with the deliberations say that Biden is likely to lift sanctions on the court’s personnel early in his term.
“The first priority has to be on day one to rescind the executive order that authorized sanctions against court officials and those who cooperate with it,” said James Goldston, a former trial attorney with the international tribunal who serves as the executive director of the Open Society Justice Initiative, a New York-based nonprofit that promotes accountability for serious crimes around the world. “The administration should be working toward a more comprehensive and robust policy toward the prosecution of grave crimes, and one aspect of that should be reengaging with the ICC.”
In June, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order granting authority to the secretaries of state and treasury to impose an asset freeze and travel ban on foreign nationals who have participated in ICC investigations into alleged crimes by U.S. personnel or American allies. The move infuriated America’s Western allies, which have long supported the court—and they have been pressing the Biden camp to reverse course.
The Hague-based court has long had a complicated relationship with both Democratic and Republican administrations, which have worried that it might pursue criminal charges against American service members engaged in international military or peacekeeping operations. Those fears were heightened by the prosecution’s decision to pursue an investigation into alleged atrocities by U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
In the wake of the U.S. sanctions, signatories to the criminal tribunal have denounced the measures and urged the Biden administration to support the court. On Nov. 2, Germany issued a statement on behalf of 74 countries saying that “sanctions are a tool to be used against those responsible for the most serious crimes, not against those seeking justice. Any attempt to undermine the independence of the Court should not be tolerated.”
“France has been supporting the ICC from the very beginning,” France’s Ambassador to the United Nations Nicolas de Rivière said. “We are very strong supporters of international justice. We will certainly encourage the U.S. not only to drop sanctions or sanctions threats against the ICC, but we will also encourage them to support international justice and not undermine it.”
Observers say it is all but inevitable that Biden will lift the sanctions on Bensouda and Phakiso Mochochoko, a top aide, but that they are not convinced that Biden administration will be able to resume the same level of cooperation as during the Obama administration, citing the political complications posed by an ongoing investigation into U.S. service members in Afghanistan and the potential for a possible investigation into alleged crimes by Israelis.
“It’s very unlikely they will go back to where they were in 2015 or 2016,” said Todd Buchwald, who served as special coordinator in the State Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice during the Obama administration.
Buchwald is preparing a report for the American Society of International Law with a series of “pragmatic” recommendations aimed at furthering the cause of international justice. The ICC—which has issued only eight convictions since it began operating nearly 20 years ago and which has faced criticism even from its own supporters—represents only one piece of a broader international justice strategy. And Buchwald believes the Biden administration will “reemphasize working with friends and allies” and promoting the idea that “those responsible for atrocities should be held accountable.”
“It is imperative that they act very quickly to repeal that executive order as part of rejoining the community of states that support the rule of law—and I say that cognizant of the possible ICC investigation in Afghanistan that could implicate U.S. personnel, as well as a possible investigation in Palestinian territories,” said Richard Dicker, an expert on the International Criminal Court at Human Rights Watch.
“Obviously the relationship between the court and incoming Biden administration will have points of tension, but what is new?” Dicker added. “But that tension should not preclude, as prior administrations managed, a constructive engagement with the court, particularly in those country situations where the court’s investigative and prosecutorial work facilitate U.S. foreign policy objectives.”
Ned Price, a spokesperson for the Biden transition, declined to comment on Biden’s plans for the ICC. But he said: “The President-elect firmly believes in the principle that there must be only one president at a time guiding our country’s foreign policy and national security as he is focused on preparing to govern.”
The International Criminal Court was established by treaty in Rome in 1998, becoming operational four years later, to prosecute perpetrators of mass atrocities, including genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes.
From the beginning, the United States has had an ambivalent relationship with the court, which it encouraged to prosecute some of the world’s most bloodstained leaders, from the former Sudanese strongman Omar al-Bashir to the late Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, while working to secure immunity for American nationals operating in military missions overseas.
U.S. President Bill Clinton overcame his own misgivings about the court and ultimately signed the Rome Statute that established the tribunal. But his successor, President George W. Bush, withdrew the presidential signature, citing concern that the tribunal would be used to conduct politically motivated prosecutions of U.S. service members engaged in overseas operations. Even before the court came into existence, the Bush administration threatened to shutter vital U.N. peacekeeping missions to compel the U.N. Security Council to carve out an immunity provision for countries, like the United States, that had not joined the treaty. The effort failed.
Despite early opposition to the court, Bush ultimately found it could be used to pressure America’s adversaries. In 2005, the Bush administration abstained on a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing a criminal investigation by the ICC prosecutor into alleged war crimes committed by Bashir’s regime in Darfur.
President Barack Obama went further, voting in favor of a 2011 U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing an investigation by the court into mass atrocities in Libya. The Obama administration also stepped up cooperation with the court, aiding in the arrest and transfer of a Congolese militia leader, Bosco Ntaganda, to The Hague, where he was convicted of war crimes.
But the Trump administration has pursued an openly hostile approach to the court.
The ICC’s prosecutor infuriated the Trump administration during its first year in office, seeking permission from the court’s judges to pursue a formal investigation into alleged crimes committed by the United States and other combatants during the Afghan War, and in previously secret CIA detention centers outside of Afghanistan. And in December 2019, Bensouda sought permission from the court’s judges to pursue an investigation into alleged war crimes committed by Israeli forces during the 2014 conflict in the Gaza Strip.
In response, the Trump administration took a number of punitive steps against the prosecutor, initially revoking her visa to travel to the United States. This June, the White House issued an executive order paving the way for sanctions on the court on the grounds that the Afghan investigation constituted an infringement of U.S. sovereignty that threatened the national security of the United States. In September, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced sanctions on Bensouda and a top aide, Mochochoko, dismissing the court as a “thoroughly broken and corrupted institution” and vowing that the United States “will not tolerate its illegitimate attempts to subject Americans to its jurisdiction.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--How Israel Should Prepare for Biden’s New Approach to Iran

How Israel Should Prepare for Biden ’ s New Approach to Iran This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
The Iranian threat—both conventional and nuclear—has a major impact on Israel ’ s policy calculations .
While Jerusalem ’ s concerns regarding the dangers of a potential military conflict with the Palestinians or Hezbollah are real , they are limited in scope , as those confrontations would not put Israel ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrast , the prospect of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon is viewed as a potentially existential threat by the Israeli security establishment ; this explains why the government has allocated a large proportion of its attention and resources to slowing advances within the Iranian nuclear program and preventing its weaponization , both independently and together with allies .
Changes and fluctuations in the U.S. approach toward Iran and its nuclear program impact key Israeli national security calculations on how it ought to advance its goals of maximizing the time it takes Iran to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eruption of a war .
The incoming Biden administration is expected to take a different approach to Iran—and Israel will need to prepare accordingly .
In recent years , during the tenure of President Donald Trump , Israel and the United States were in lockstep regarding the U.S. policy of withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal and imposing a so-called maximum pressure sanctions campaign on the Iranian economy .
The U.S. government has proved that its economic power gives it the ability to exert enormous economic pressure—even when acting primarily alone and targeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into the international economic system .
The dismal economic situation in Iran following the reimposition of sanctions was significantly worsened by the health and economic crises caused by the COVID-19 pandemic .
Yet despite the U.S. success in garnering a great deal of economic leverage from its maximum pressure campaign , it is now all but a foregone conclusion that maximum pressure will not force Iran to renegotiate the nuclear deal with Trump before his term expires .
Iran proved more defiant than was anticipated by the White House and Israel , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ maximum resistance , ” which included attacks on the oil infrastructure of U.S. allies , advancing its nuclear program in violation of the deal , and a refusal to negotiate .
When Trump leaves office on Jan. 20 , 2021 , the regime ’ s nuclear program will be closer to the threshold than it would have been under the terms of the agreement .
When sizing up the incoming Biden administration , based on President-elect Joe Biden ’ s own statements as well as those of expected appointees Antony Blinken and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be faced with some of the policy issues that led to bad blood between the two governments during Barack Obama ’ s presidency .
If the Biden administration rejoins the nuclear deal in accordance with its stated intentions , the bitter controversy over the agreement from 2015 may end up being relitigated between Israel and the United States .
The key question will be whether this time around the two governments can more successfully bridge the policy gaps and mitigate any personal vendettas .
Despite Israeli concerns , Biden does not appear poised @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four years to return to the final days of the Obama administration in a manner that will seek to reverse all of Trump ’ s policies and ignore the ways in which the strategic environment has changed since January 2017 .
From the Israeli perspective , it is important that Biden avoid quickly forfeiting the economic leverage over Tehran that the United States has derived from its maximum pressure campaign .
From the perspective of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani , Biden ’ s inauguration will present the regime with the opportunity , difficult @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , of striking a more favorable balance between Tehran ’ s mistrust of Washington and its desperate need to alleviate the economic distress , which has posed numerous challenges including consistent but sporadic unrest .
That window to reach an agreement may close if the hard-line candidate wins in the Iranian presidential election set for June 2021 , but not necessarily , as Iran ’ s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is also capable , if less inclined , to take a pragmatic approach to improving Iran ’ s economic situation through sanctions relief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision-making , it seems that the regime ’ s dilemma will only intensify over time if the Biden administration avoids rushing into reversing the maximum pressure policy .
The fact that Iran is seeking to improve its dismal economic state should inform a restrained U.S. approach to incentivizing an Iranian return to the negotiating table .
It is possible that small confidence-building measures , such as the approval of a loan to Iran by the International Monetary Fund or European countries extending limited lines of credit , will be necessary in order to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a context to present these gestures as humanitarian in nature rather than long-term concessions that reduce Washington ’ s negotiating leverage .
As soon as it is possible , Israel should begin coordinating positions on Iran and discussing the respective countries ’ core interests with the incoming Biden administration .
In addition , the Israeli government should avoid seeking to take advantage of symbolic last-minute favors from the Trump administration , which would nurture hostility and suspicion from the Democratic Party .
Despite the delay in doing so , acknowledging Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu so as to avoid preemptively poisoning Israel ’ s relationship with the new White House—but Netanyahu ’ s subsequent and very public challenge to Biden ’ s planned return to the 2015 deal sets the stage for a tense relationship between the two .
Discretion in its collaboration with both incoming and outgoing administrations is the name of the game for Israel .
It will be important , in Israel ’ s view , for the U.S. government to clarify to Iran that it will not lift all of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and improved agreement that includes additional concessions from Iran .
Israel will ask the Biden administration to focus the bulk of its efforts on the nuclear issue : extending limitations on quality and quantity of centrifuges and stockpiled fissile material so that they do not begin to expire in five years ’ time , restricting research and development on advanced centrifuges , and implementing a more intrusive inspections regime .
Certainly Israel would also seek an agreement that includes restrictions on Iran ’ s missile program and destabilizing activity in the region , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2015 agreement is the main priority , and the possibility of doing so should not be dependent on reaching an understanding on nonnuclear matters ( which might be handled on parallel tracks , as Sullivan has suggested ) .
The phrase “ all options are on the table ” should also return to the discourse on Iran ’ s nuclear program .
That approach was used during the Obama era to intensify Iran ’ s perception of risk for failing to reach an agreement , and Biden would benefit greatly from adopting that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prove that such talk is more than just rhetoric .
Past experience indicates that despite the Iranian supreme leader ’ s disdain for and distrust of the United States , he is also aware of the risks accompanied by overly provocative steps that could push the relationship between the two countries to combustible new lows .
Even if the Iranian negotiators drive a hard bargain , they will ultimately seek to avoid a scenario in which their domestic situation continues to deteriorate , and they would undoubtedly take the necessary steps to avoid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict with the United States .
Should the new U.S. administration fail to take Israel ’ s concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear program into account , we can expect a return of the paradigm of tension that characterized Obama-Netanyahu relations as well as greater Israeli appetite to act independently in order to prevent Iran from reaching the nuclear threshold .
Given the close relations between the two countries and the tremendous amount of overlap between their views on the Iranian nuclear issue , that is a scenario both parties have an interest and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s apparent willingness to rejoin the nuclear deal , Israel should not and likely will not shy away from presenting its concerns regarding the loopholes of the 2015 agreement .
While the deal was certainly flawed , it bought time that could have been used by the U.S. and Israeli governments to prepare solutions for the deal ’ s sunset clauses and loopholes—preparations that have thus far been neglected despite the fact that Iran ’ s nuclear program has now advanced well beyond what the 2015 pact allowed .
The Trump administration has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but it did open the door to correcting the agreement ’ s flaws—simply closing that door rather than making the most of U.S. leverage would hardly resolve the issue .

The Iranian threat—both conventional and nuclear—has a major impact on Israel’s policy calculations. While Jerusalem’s concerns regarding the dangers of a potential military conflict with the Palestinians or Hezbollah are real, they are limited in scope, as those confrontations would not put Israel’s very existence in jeopardy. In contrast, the prospect of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon is viewed as a potentially existential threat by the Israeli security establishment; this explains why the government has allocated a large proportion of its attention and resources to slowing advances within the Iranian nuclear program and preventing its weaponization, both independently and together with allies.
The Iranian threat—both conventional and nuclear—has a major impact on Israel’s policy calculations. While Jerusalem’s concerns regarding the dangers of a potential military conflict with the Palestinians or Hezbollah are real, they are limited in scope, as those confrontations would not put Israel’s very existence in jeopardy. In contrast, the prospect of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon is viewed as a potentially existential threat by the Israeli security establishment; this explains why the government has allocated a large proportion of its attention and resources to slowing advances within the Iranian nuclear program and preventing its weaponization, both independently and together with allies.
Changes and fluctuations in the U.S. approach toward Iran and its nuclear program impact key Israeli national security calculations on how it ought to advance its goals of maximizing the time it takes Iran to develop a nuclear weapon while preventing the eruption of a war. The incoming Biden administration is expected to take a different approach to Iran—and Israel will need to prepare accordingly.
In recent years, during the tenure of President Donald Trump, Israel and the United States were in lockstep regarding the U.S. policy of withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal and imposing a so-called maximum pressure sanctions campaign on the Iranian economy. The U.S. government has proved that its economic power gives it the ability to exert enormous economic pressure—even when acting primarily alone and targeting countries that are not very deeply tied into the international economic system. The dismal economic situation in Iran following the reimposition of sanctions was significantly worsened by the health and economic crises caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Yet despite the U.S. success in garnering a great deal of economic leverage from its maximum pressure campaign, it is now all but a foregone conclusion that maximum pressure will not force Iran to renegotiate the nuclear deal with Trump before his term expires. Iran proved more defiant than was anticipated by the White House and Israel, and Tehran responded with its own campaign of “maximum resistance,” which included attacks on the oil infrastructure of U.S. allies, advancing its nuclear program in violation of the deal, and a refusal to negotiate. When Trump leaves office on Jan. 20, 2021, the regime’s nuclear program will be closer to the threshold than it would have been under the terms of the agreement.
When sizing up the incoming Biden administration, based on President-elect Joe Biden’s own statements as well as those of expected appointees Antony Blinken and Jake Sullivan, Israel could once again be faced with some of the policy issues that led to bad blood between the two governments during Barack Obama’s presidency. If the Biden administration rejoins the nuclear deal in accordance with its stated intentions, the bitter controversy over the agreement from 2015 may end up being relitigated between Israel and the United States. The key question will be whether this time around the two governments can more successfully bridge the policy gaps and mitigate any personal vendettas.
Despite Israeli concerns, Biden does not appear poised to try to turn back the clock four years to return to the final days of the Obama administration in a manner that will seek to reverse all of Trump’s policies and ignore the ways in which the strategic environment has changed since January 2017. From the Israeli perspective, it is important that Biden avoid quickly forfeiting the economic leverage over Tehran that the United States has derived from its maximum pressure campaign.
From the perspective of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Biden’s inauguration will present the regime with the opportunity, difficult as it may be to capitalize on, of striking a more favorable balance between Tehran’s mistrust of Washington and its desperate need to alleviate the economic distress, which has posed numerous challenges including consistent but sporadic unrest. That window to reach an agreement may close if the hard-line candidate wins in the Iranian presidential election set for June 2021, but not necessarily, as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is also capable, if less inclined, to take a pragmatic approach to improving Iran’s economic situation through sanctions relief.
When considering the factors impacting Iranian decision-making, it seems that the regime’s dilemma will only intensify over time if the Biden administration avoids rushing into reversing the maximum pressure policy. The fact that Iran is seeking to improve its dismal economic state should inform a restrained U.S. approach to incentivizing an Iranian return to the negotiating table. It is possible that small confidence-building measures, such as the approval of a loan to Iran by the International Monetary Fund or European countries extending limited lines of credit, will be necessary in order to resume talks; the COVID-19 pandemic provides a context to present these gestures as humanitarian in nature rather than long-term concessions that reduce Washington’s negotiating leverage.
As soon as it is possible, Israel should begin coordinating positions on Iran and discussing the respective countries’ core interests with the incoming Biden administration. In addition, the Israeli government should avoid seeking to take advantage of symbolic last-minute favors from the Trump administration, which would nurture hostility and suspicion from the Democratic Party. Despite the delay in doing so, acknowledging Biden’s electoral victory was an important step by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu so as to avoid preemptively poisoning Israel’s relationship with the new White House—but Netanyahu’s subsequent and very public challenge to Biden’s planned return to the 2015 deal sets the stage for a tense relationship between the two. Discretion in its collaboration with both incoming and outgoing administrations is the name of the game for Israel.
It will be important, in Israel’s view, for the U.S. government to clarify to Iran that it will not lift all of the reimposed sanctions before striking a new and improved agreement that includes additional concessions from Iran. Israel will ask the Biden administration to focus the bulk of its efforts on the nuclear issue: extending limitations on quality and quantity of centrifuges and stockpiled fissile material so that they do not begin to expire in five years’ time, restricting research and development on advanced centrifuges, and implementing a more intrusive inspections regime.
Certainly Israel would also seek an agreement that includes restrictions on Iran’s missile program and destabilizing activity in the region, but closing the nuclear loopholes of the 2015 agreement is the main priority, and the possibility of doing so should not be dependent on reaching an understanding on nonnuclear matters (which might be handled on parallel tracks, as Sullivan has suggested).
The phrase “all options are on the table” should also return to the discourse on Iran’s nuclear program. That approach was used during the Obama era to intensify Iran’s perception of risk for failing to reach an agreement, and Biden would benefit greatly from adopting that approach as president while taking steps to prove that such talk is more than just rhetoric.
Past experience indicates that despite the Iranian supreme leader’s disdain for and distrust of the United States, he is also aware of the risks accompanied by overly provocative steps that could push the relationship between the two countries to combustible new lows. Even if the Iranian negotiators drive a hard bargain, they will ultimately seek to avoid a scenario in which their domestic situation continues to deteriorate, and they would undoubtedly take the necessary steps to avoid the existential risk posed by a military conflict with the United States.
Should the new U.S. administration fail to take Israel’s concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear program into account, we can expect a return of the paradigm of tension that characterized Obama-Netanyahu relations as well as greater Israeli appetite to act independently in order to prevent Iran from reaching the nuclear threshold. Given the close relations between the two countries and the tremendous amount of overlap between their views on the Iranian nuclear issue, that is a scenario both parties have an interest and responsibility to prevent.
Despite Biden’s apparent willingness to rejoin the nuclear deal, Israel should not and likely will not shy away from presenting its concerns regarding the loopholes of the 2015 agreement. While the deal was certainly flawed, it bought time that could have been used by the U.S. and Israeli governments to prepare solutions for the deal’s sunset clauses and loopholes—preparations that have thus far been neglected despite the fact that Iran’s nuclear program has now advanced well beyond what the 2015 pact allowed.
The Trump administration has not achieved the better deal it promised, but it did open the door to correcting the agreement’s flaws—simply closing that door rather than making the most of U.S. leverage would hardly resolve the issue.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--When Great-Power Politics Isn’t Great Enough

Armenia and Azerbaijan have , for the time being , agreed to a tenuous cease-fire after six weeks of fighting over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh .
But it ’ s unlikely to be a long-term fix .
While Baku is jubilant over its territorial gains , many Armenians reacted to the news with outrage , storming parliament and other government buildings to demand answers about a deal they feel amounts to betrayal .
A peace settlement that satisfies both sides does not yet seem in sight .
Now , more than ever , a lasting peace settlement is of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because great powers ’ involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh has raised the stakes of resolution : Russia and Turkey may have both helped broker the existing cease-fire , but it is uncertain whether their interests in Nagorno-Karabakh—and beyond—will continue to align .
An unfinished peace in Nagorno-Karabakh arguably makes the current situation more , not less , dangerous ; having been dragged into the hostilities , Russia and Turkey may sooner or later be pushed to face off against one another .
Fortunately , a more peaceful future is possible—it just requires reaching deeper into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh has been treated as a bilateral zero-sum game .
In reality , it ’ s part of a crescent of deadlocked , simmering , and occasionally white-hot conflict zones running east from Ukraine across the Caucasus and Caspian Sea and south to Syria , any of which could take over headlines in the months and years to come .
Each of these conflicts involves a cast of outside actors—from Russia to various NATO members—in a complicated tangle .
The conflicts in this arc—Transnistria , Crimea , the Donbass , Abkhazia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey ’ s southern rim—are all unique .
But they share the feature that they are structurally hard to solve , and thus illustrate how hard it is to achieve peace when irreconcilable claims collide .
In all of these disputes , there are few win-win scenarios for long-term resolution .
Moreover , several of these conflicts , like Karabakh , threaten stability far afield .
With multiple standoffs imperiling long-term regional security , it might be time to coalesce all central Eurasian conflicts into negotiations over one grand bargain , where all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get a little for mutual , overarching net benefit .
Far from lofty idealism , there is a historical model for such an unlikely peace : In Europe , the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815 settled the many interlocking challenges that arose from the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars—for major and minor European powers alike .
The Congress of Vienna came on the heels of the high-intensity Napoleonic wars , which had upended the geopolitical arrangements that predated the French Revolution of 1789 .
It included extensive exchanges of territory reaching @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , secured freedom of navigation for the major transport routes of its time—the Rhine and Danube— and provides a strong historical precedent for overcoming multiple violent standoffs through complicated cross-swaps .
Precisely because various players needed a face-saving way out of deadlock , these multilateral swaps offered a viable approach to transcend a zero-sum game .
In such arrangements , governments have an opportunity to secure a prize that otherwise will not ever become available .
Some irredentists might be lured by historical opportunity .
Moreover , a grander settlement can help explain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s still a tough sell , but easier than defending a direct concession .
In the two centuries since , the Congress of Vienna has been the subject of historical intrigue and veneration .
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger authored his doctoral dissertation on the event , and it informed many of his own realist persuasions .
Today , though there are key differences between 19th-century Europe and modern Eurasia , there are still enough core parallels to render the Congress of Vienna relevant .
The current impasse from Crimea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cumulatively over the 30 years following the end of the Soviet Union which , as the historian Ronald Grigor Suny put it , “ is still unraveling ” ; the Congress of Vienna , by contrast , followed decades of hard-fought war .
Modern parties to Eurasian conflict zones are either democratic or various shades of authoritarian , while the Congress of Vienna was attended mostly by unabashed monarchs .
Today , people are emboldened by the idea of self-determination , which had yet to make its debut in 1814 .
And there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who—like the United States and China—can complicate matters by exerting their own influence .
But besides contextual particularities , the overarching challenge underpinning Europe ’ s 1814 territorial disputes and Eurasia ’ s 2020 conflicts remains the same .
Then and now , leaders grappled with how to integrate various de facto territorial gains into a de jure system , and hoped to reestablish a workable , stable , and ideally prosperous order .
As Kissinger noted , the key question of the Congress of Vienna was how to recreate legitimacy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and costly ; it is risky in that unresolved conflicts can spark more wars , and costly in human lives , poverty , uncertainty , and military spending .
Without a larger settlement , the threat of destabilization remains .
If Armenians are brought closer to Mount Ararat , they may be more flexible in Karabakh .
In a “ Congress of Istanbul , ” as we ’ ll call it , grievances over Karabakh could be balanced out with leeway on Mount Ararat ; if Armenians are brought closer to Mount Ararat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Karabakh .
In one version of this ambitious thought experiment , Turkey could create a multilateral peace park on the sparsely populated Eastern slopes of Mount Ararat .
This park could allow Armenians access to the mountain that is so central to their historical imagination—yet blocked by a closed border , and the peak inaccessible without a hard-to-get permit .
Ani , the abandoned capital of the ancient Armenian kingdom , is also just across on the Turkish side of the border and inaccessible from Armenia .
An Armenian government that can deliver @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of access—to Ararat and Ani could muster more support for painful concessions on Karabakh .
Turkey and Armenia may struggle to develop friendly relations , but it ’ s not outlandish to suggest that Ankara might be tempted by a swap of some sort .
After all , following Talleyrand ’ s principle , Turkey would also gain something for making a resolution on its eastern border .
The country appears to have a vested interest in half a dozen territorial disputes—from the Aegean to interests in Northern Syria .
In a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these disputes could be tweaked in Turkey ’ s favor .
But the swaps needn ’ t stop with Turkey .
Across the Black Sea sits Russia which , under Tsar Alexander I , was a key player in the Congress of Vienna .
Today , Russia remains the strategic protector of Armenia proper ( and the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad ) , and could facilitate a final settlement over Karabakh .
Russia may be motivated by the prospect of international recognition of its claim to Crimea , Ukrainian territory that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country has resisted such a recognition , there is no plausible scenario under which external pressure will move Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine—even if a liberal government came to power in Moscow .
Rather , it may make more sense to seek Russian concessions in return for recognizing Russian control over Crimea .
Three concessions could contribute to settlements elsewhere .
Next to nudging Armenia and potentially Syria to join a multilateral peace , Russia could contribute to settling conflicts in Ukraine and in Georgia .
In Ukraine—in return for the crown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government in Kyiv regains control over the Donbass , an area currently administered by vassals of the Russian government .
( Kissinger is often associated with suggesting such a swap himself . )
Russia could also cancel Ukraine ’ s debts and offer favorable terms on energy supplies .
Such measures wouldn ’ t make up for a bitter loss , but they would boost the country ’ s long-term development and standard of living .
Georgia , too , could benefit from Russian concessions in South Ossetia .
The Russian protectorate in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a wedge against Georgian statehood .
Opening a vital North-South transport route through South Ossetia would benefit Armenia and Russia , too .
Moreover , the tiny Ossetian statelet—which has fewer residents than New York has homeless people—has few realistic prospects of providing for its own citizens .
Returning South Ossetia to Georgia would lead to more economic development , participation in the Georgian mountain tourism boom , and reverse its ongoing depopulation .
Georgia should also regain control of Gali , an area in breakaway Abkhazia settled mostly by Georgians .
( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practical statehood . )
While many Georgians would be unhappy not to get all of Abkhazia back , such a settlement—and peaceful relations including trade , access , and tourism—would probably be the best possible outcome for Georgia .
The democratic deficits of Russia ( and , to a lesser extent Turkey ) may be an advantage for an ambitious peace .
The democratic deficits of Russia ( and , to a lesser extent Turkey ) may be an advantage for an ambitious peace .
Autocratic leaders do not face a vibrant internal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may find a “ Congress of Istanbul ” attractive : It would put them in the historical spotlight and allow them to upstage established Western diplomacy , yet again .
Still , popular referenda , say , ten years down the line , could ensure that the people have the final say and democratic will prevails .
Another referendum in Crimea , for example , could be an incentive for genuine reform in Ukraine .
Imperfect as such referenda are , East Timor ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against repression if the desire for change is overwhelming .
Kissinger wrote that , after the Congress of Vienna , “ Europe experienced the longest period of peace it had ever known.
” Following decades of violence , Europe ’ s middle class began to emerge and prosper .
And yet , the established Western diplomacy of our day has mostly rejected the idea of tinkering with borders ; the worry is that it will open a Pandora ’ s box .
But the war in Karabakh is evidence that that perilous box @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Congress of Istanbul ” could close it and address challenges that established diplomacy has not been able to tackle for decades—with positive aftereffects for generations to come .

Armenia and Azerbaijan have, for the time being, agreed to a tenuous cease-fire after six weeks of fighting over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. But it’s unlikely to be a long-term fix. While Baku is jubilant over its territorial gains, many Armenians reacted to the news with outrage, storming parliament and other government buildings to demand answers about a deal they feel amounts to betrayal. A peace settlement that satisfies both sides does not yet seem in sight.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have, for the time being, agreed to a tenuous cease-fire after six weeks of fighting over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. But it’s unlikely to be a long-term fix. While Baku is jubilant over its territorial gains, many Armenians reacted to the news with outrage, storming parliament and other government buildings to demand answers about a deal they feel amounts to betrayal. A peace settlement that satisfies both sides does not yet seem in sight.
Now, more than ever, a lasting peace settlement is of paramount importance. That’s largely because great powers’ involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh has raised the stakes of resolution: Russia and Turkey may have both helped broker the existing cease-fire, but it is uncertain whether their interests in Nagorno-Karabakh—and beyond—will continue to align. An unfinished peace in Nagorno-Karabakh arguably makes the current situation more, not less, dangerous; having been dragged into the hostilities, Russia and Turkey may sooner or later be pushed to face off against one another.
Fortunately, a more peaceful future is possible—it just requires reaching deeper into the past.
For decades, the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh has been treated as a bilateral zero-sum game. In reality, it’s part of a crescent of deadlocked, simmering, and occasionally white-hot conflict zones running east from Ukraine across the Caucasus and Caspian Sea and south to Syria, any of which could take over headlines in the months and years to come. Each of these conflicts involves a cast of outside actors—from Russia to various NATO members—in a complicated tangle.
The conflicts in this arc—Transnistria, Crimea, the Donbass, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabakh, and Turkey’s southern rim—are all unique. But they share the feature that they are structurally hard to solve, and thus illustrate how hard it is to achieve peace when irreconcilable claims collide. In all of these disputes, there are few win-win scenarios for long-term resolution. Moreover, several of these conflicts, like Karabakh, threaten stability far afield.
With multiple standoffs imperiling long-term regional security, it might be time to coalesce all central Eurasian conflicts into negotiations over one grand bargain, where all actors—great powers included—are forced to give and get a little for mutual, overarching net benefit. Far from lofty idealism, there is a historical model for such an unlikely peace: In Europe, the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815 settled the many interlocking challenges that arose from the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars—for major and minor European powers alike.
Prince Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, France’s foreign minister and chief negotiator during the Congress of Vienna, summed up its core principle succinctly. For a settlement to work, he is reported to have said, “Everyone needs to leave unhappy, and having had to make sacrifices. It is from these partial sacrifices that must come to life the agreement of all, the greater good.”
The Congress of Vienna came on the heels of the high-intensity Napoleonic wars, which had upended the geopolitical arrangements that predated the French Revolution of 1789. It included extensive exchanges of territory reaching from Netherlands to what today is Ukraine, secured freedom of navigation for the major transport routes of its time—the Rhine and Danube— and provides a strong historical precedent for overcoming multiple violent standoffs through complicated cross-swaps.
Precisely because various players needed a face-saving way out of deadlock, these multilateral swaps offered a viable approach to transcend a zero-sum game. In such arrangements, governments have an opportunity to secure a prize that otherwise will not ever become available. Some irredentists might be lured by historical opportunity. Moreover, a grander settlement can help explain sacrifices to a leery populace; it’s still a tough sell, but easier than defending a direct concession.
Multilateral swaps offered a viable approach to transcend a zero-sum game.
In the two centuries since, the Congress of Vienna has been the subject of historical intrigue and veneration. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger authored his doctoral dissertation on the event, and it informed many of his own realist persuasions. Today, though there are key differences between 19th-century Europe and modern Eurasia, there are still enough core parallels to render the Congress of Vienna relevant.
The current impasse from Crimea to Karabakh is structural and has developed cumulatively over the 30 years following the end of the Soviet Union which, as the historian Ronald Grigor Suny put it, “is still unraveling”; the Congress of Vienna, by contrast, followed decades of hard-fought war. Modern parties to Eurasian conflict zones are either democratic or various shades of authoritarian, while the Congress of Vienna was attended mostly by unabashed monarchs. Today, people are emboldened by the idea of self-determination, which had yet to make its debut in 1814. And there are new actors on the global stage, who—like the United States and China—can complicate matters by exerting their own influence.
But besides contextual particularities, the overarching challenge underpinning Europe’s 1814 territorial disputes and Eurasia’s 2020 conflicts remains the same. Then and now, leaders grappled with how to integrate various de facto territorial gains into a de jure system, and hoped to reestablish a workable, stable, and ideally prosperous order. As Kissinger noted, the key question of the Congress of Vienna was how to recreate legitimacy. Not establishing such an order is risky and costly; it is risky in that unresolved conflicts can spark more wars, and costly in human lives, poverty, uncertainty, and military spending. Without a larger settlement, the threat of destabilization remains.
In Karabakh today, a Talleyrand model could transcend the current zero-sum game between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenians find it inconceivable to give up the core of Karabakh; too much of Armenian identity is invested in the region. But it’s also important to understand why Karabakh has taken up unprecedented significance in the Armenian imaginary: Armenians’ pre-eminent national symbol—Mount Ararat—remains out of reach in Turkey. Ararat was the geographical center of several Armenian kingdoms and is seen as the people’s holy mountain; in 1921, the Treaty of Kars assigned Ararat to Turkey. On clear days, the dormant volcano looms over Yerevan, the Armenian capital—a constant reminder of national loss. Karabakh was a symbolic salve of sorts, and now it’s at risk, too.
If Armenians are brought closer to Mount Ararat, they may be more flexible in Karabakh.
In a “Congress of Istanbul,” as we’ll call it, grievances over Karabakh could be balanced out with leeway on Mount Ararat; if Armenians are brought closer to Mount Ararat, they may be more flexible in Karabakh. In one version of this ambitious thought experiment, Turkey could create a multilateral peace park on the sparsely populated Eastern slopes of Mount Ararat. This park could allow Armenians access to the mountain that is so central to their historical imagination—yet blocked by a closed border, and the peak inaccessible without a hard-to-get permit. Ani, the abandoned capital of the ancient Armenian kingdom, is also just across on the Turkish side of the border and inaccessible from Armenia. An Armenian government that can deliver a symbolic return—or at least a return of access—to Ararat and Ani could muster more support for painful concessions on Karabakh.
Turkey and Armenia may struggle to develop friendly relations, but it’s not outlandish to suggest that Ankara might be tempted by a swap of some sort. After all, following Talleyrand’s principle, Turkey would also gain something for making a resolution on its eastern border. The country appears to have a vested interest in half a dozen territorial disputes—from the Aegean to interests in Northern Syria. In a “Congress of Istanbul,” some of these disputes could be tweaked in Turkey’s favor.
But the swaps needn’t stop with Turkey. Across the Black Sea sits Russia which, under Tsar Alexander I, was a key player in the Congress of Vienna. Today, Russia remains the strategic protector of Armenia proper (and the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad), and could facilitate a final settlement over Karabakh. Russia may be motivated by the prospect of international recognition of its claim to Crimea, Ukrainian territory that it invaded in 2014. While nearly every country has resisted such a recognition, there is no plausible scenario under which external pressure will move Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine—even if a liberal government came to power in Moscow.
Rather, it may make more sense to seek Russian concessions in return for recognizing Russian control over Crimea. Three concessions could contribute to settlements elsewhere. Next to nudging Armenia and potentially Syria to join a multilateral peace, Russia could contribute to settling conflicts in Ukraine and in Georgia.
In Ukraine—in return for the crown jewel of Crimea—Russia could ensure that the government in Kyiv regains control over the Donbass, an area currently administered by vassals of the Russian government. (Kissinger is often associated with suggesting such a swap himself.) Russia could also cancel Ukraine’s debts and offer favorable terms on energy supplies. Such measures wouldn’t make up for a bitter loss, but they would boost the country’s long-term development and standard of living.
Georgia, too, could benefit from Russian concessions in South Ossetia. The Russian protectorate in the heart of the country seems like a wedge against Georgian statehood. Opening a vital North-South transport route through South Ossetia would benefit Armenia and Russia, too. Moreover, the tiny Ossetian statelet—which has fewer residents than New York has homeless people—has few realistic prospects of providing for its own citizens. Returning South Ossetia to Georgia would lead to more economic development, participation in the Georgian mountain tourism boom, and reverse its ongoing depopulation.
Georgia should also regain control of Gali, an area in breakaway Abkhazia settled mostly by Georgians. (Abkhazia otherwise has achieved a degree of practical statehood.) While many Georgians would be unhappy not to get all of Abkhazia back, such a settlement—and peaceful relations including trade, access, and tourism—would probably be the best possible outcome for Georgia.
The democratic deficits of Russia (and, to a lesser extent Turkey) may be an advantage for an ambitious peace.
The democratic deficits of Russia (and, to a lesser extent Turkey) may be an advantage for an ambitious peace. Autocratic leaders do not face a vibrant internal opposition when they settle. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may find a “Congress of Istanbul” attractive: It would put them in the historical spotlight and allow them to upstage established Western diplomacy, yet again.
Still, popular referenda, say, ten years down the line, could ensure that the people have the final say and democratic will prevails. Another referendum in Crimea, for example, could be an incentive for genuine reform in Ukraine. Imperfect as such referenda are, East Timor’s independence illustrates that they can also prevail against repression if the desire for change is overwhelming.
Kissinger wrote that, after the Congress of Vienna, “Europe experienced the longest period of peace it had ever known.” Following decades of violence, Europe’s middle class began to emerge and prosper. And yet, the established Western diplomacy of our day has mostly rejected the idea of tinkering with borders; the worry is that it will open a Pandora’s box. But the war in Karabakh is evidence that that perilous box is already wide open. A modern “Congress of Istanbul” could close it and address challenges that established diplomacy has not been able to tackle for decades—with positive aftereffects for generations to come.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--What to Do About the Children of the Islamic State

What to Do About the Children of the Islamic State In October , a 16-year-old boy in Russia was fatally shot after he wounded a policeman while trying to set several police cars on fire .
It wasn ’ t his family ’ s first brush with the law .
In 2001 , his stepfather had was convicted to 14 years in prison for terrorism after he attempted to explode a gas pipeline , likely as part of an Islamist organization .
The incident added new urgency to the question of what to do with the tens of thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ camps and prisons in Iraq and Syria .
Almost everyone involved in repatriation issues , though , is busy using the children—already victims of violence and instability—to advance their own agendas .
In October , several Western governments , including Sweden and Germany , sent delegations to camps in Syria to speak to incarcerated nationals about whether they wanted to repatriate their children .
None the women they spoke to agreed .
On their social media accounts and in Telegram channels , many of them said that they made their decisions for their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be close to their mothers .
But in private , they added their concern that allowing the children to be repatriated meant their government would forget about the mothers themselves and leave them in the camps Western government officials noted that their main goal is to repatriate kids , and they are much less concerned about what would happen to the women afterwards .
And they are not wrong .
In interviews , several Western government officials noted that their main goal is to repatriate kids—they believe it is safe to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favor of such initiatives—and they are much less concerned about what would happen to the women afterwards .
Even if any of the women the delegations spoke to had agreed to their children ’ s repatriation , it is still not certain that it would have happened .
The official policy of the Syrian Democratic Forces , which oversee many of the Islamic State detention camps , is that only orphans and medical cases ( sick children with their mothers ) are eligible to be sent home .
Mothers admit to trying to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but at least some have been caught out .
In an interview , one woman said that the women were notified that if they try to do it again , their children would be taken to orphanages in Syria instead .
For the Syrian Democratic Forces , having control of many foreigners , and children in particular , in camps would potentially give them a stronger position in in the negotiations with women ’ s home governments .
Even true orphans are not easily repatriated .
Women have used orphans to blackmail grandparents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grandparents would pay a ransom , their grandchild could be repatriated .
One case that several women in the camp mentioned involved a 56-year-old Chechen Islamic State affiliate known as Kadidja jailed in al-Hol camp .
For several months , she hid four Russian orphans so they would not be sent back home .
Publicly , she said she did not want the children to grow up in a non-Muslim country with grandparents she considers non-Muslim .
At the same time , however , she is reported to have told each orphan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if they will pay for her to be smuggled to Turkey .
She let the children go after Islamic State fighters asked her to do so and group supporters abroad threatened to stop sending her money that they had been giving for her care .
According to other family members and camp officials , that case was not unique Even in rare cases when a child is repatriated together with an Islamic State-affiliated mother , the child may still be used .
In one case in Central Asia , a mother repatriated with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s father was a man from a wealthy family who had died in Syria .
The country ’ s intelligence service knew she was lying ; the man was fighting in a different area nine months before the child was born .
For almost a year , an official said in an interview , they have debated whether to tell the truth to the child ’ s alleged grandfather , though .
What to do with the children of Islamic State fighters is a crucial question not only from a humanitarian perspective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ view .
In countries with a long history of an insurgency , cases of children joining their fathers in combat are not rare .
And while majority of countries are still trying to keep children with their radicalized parents , some countries do the opposite , hoping to stave off children ’ s inheritance of radical beliefs .
For example , in Tajikistan , which recently experienced a bloody civil war , Islamic State-affiliated children returned from Iraq and Syria are placed in orphanages .
At the same time , these are children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them up for gone .
They are already at risk of becoming the new face of the Islamic State or whatever group follows , and the more the world abandons them , the more likely they are to feel they have no other option .
That is why repatriation , with careful attention toward deradicalization and reintegration , is key .

In October, a 16-year-old boy in Russia was fatally shot after he wounded a policeman while trying to set several police cars on fire. It wasn’t his family’s first brush with the law. In 2001, his stepfather had was convicted to 14 years in prison for terrorism after he attempted to explode a gas pipeline, likely as part of an Islamist organization. The incident added new urgency to the question of what to do with the tens of thousands of children of Islamic State affiliates still in camps and prisons in Iraq and Syria. Almost everyone involved in repatriation issues, though, is busy using the children—already victims of violence and instability—to advance their own agendas.
In October, a 16-year-old boy in Russia was fatally shot after he wounded a policeman while trying to set several police cars on fire. It wasn’t his family’s first brush with the law. In 2001, his stepfather had was convicted to 14 years in prison for terrorism after he attempted to explode a gas pipeline, likely as part of an Islamist organization. The incident added new urgency to the question of what to do with the tens of thousands of children of Islamic State affiliates still in camps and prisons in Iraq and Syria. Almost everyone involved in repatriation issues, though, is busy using the children—already victims of violence and instability—to advance their own agendas.
In October, several Western governments, including Sweden and Germany, sent delegations to camps in Syria to speak to incarcerated nationals about whether they wanted to repatriate their children. None the women they spoke to agreed. On their social media accounts and in Telegram channels, many of them said that they made their decisions for their children’s own well-being—the kids needed to be close to their mothers. But in private, they added their concern that allowing the children to be repatriated meant their government would forget about the mothers themselves and leave them in the camps
Western government officials noted that their main goal is to repatriate kids, and they are much less concerned about what would happen to the women afterwards.
And they are not wrong. In interviews, several Western government officials noted that their main goal is to repatriate kids—they believe it is safe to do so, and public opinion is in favor of such initiatives—and they are much less concerned about what would happen to the women afterwards.
Even if any of the women the delegations spoke to had agreed to their children’s repatriation, it is still not certain that it would have happened. The official policy of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which oversee many of the Islamic State detention camps, is that only orphans and medical cases (sick children with their mothers) are eligible to be sent home. Mothers admit to trying to pass their children off as orphans, but at least some have been caught out. In an interview, one woman said that the women were notified that if they try to do it again, their children would be taken to orphanages in Syria instead. For the Syrian Democratic Forces, having control of many foreigners, and children in particular, in camps would potentially give them a stronger position in in the negotiations with women’s home governments.
Even true orphans are not easily repatriated. Women have used orphans to blackmail grandparents back home, saying that if the grandparents would pay a ransom, their grandchild could be repatriated. One case that several women in the camp mentioned involved a 56-year-old Chechen Islamic State affiliate known as Kadidja jailed in al-Hol camp. For several months, she hid four Russian orphans so they would not be sent back home. Publicly, she said she did not want the children to grow up in a non-Muslim country with grandparents she considers non-Muslim. At the same time, however, she is reported to have told each orphan’s relatives she would return the children if they will pay for her to be smuggled to Turkey. She let the children go after Islamic State fighters asked her to do so and group supporters abroad threatened to stop sending her money that they had been giving for her care. According to other family members and camp officials, that case was not unique
Even in rare cases when a child is repatriated together with an Islamic State-affiliated mother, the child may still be used. In one case in Central Asia, a mother repatriated with her child falsely claimed that the child’s father was a man from a wealthy family who had died in Syria. The country’s intelligence service knew she was lying; the man was fighting in a different area nine months before the child was born. For almost a year, an official said in an interview, they have debated whether to tell the truth to the child’s alleged grandfather, though.
What to do with the children of Islamic State fighters is a crucial question not only from a humanitarian perspective but also from a security point of view. In countries with a long history of an insurgency, cases of children joining their fathers in combat are not rare. And while majority of countries are still trying to keep children with their radicalized parents, some countries do the opposite, hoping to stave off children’s inheritance of radical beliefs. For example, in Tajikistan, which recently experienced a bloody civil war, Islamic State-affiliated children returned from Iraq and Syria are placed in orphanages.
At the same time, these are children, and the world should not give them up for gone. They are already at risk of becoming the new face of the Islamic State or whatever group follows, and the more the world abandons them, the more likely they are to feel they have no other option. That is why repatriation, with careful attention toward deradicalization and reintegration, is key.