foreignpolicy--2020-06-01--Canada May Host the World’s First Incel Show Trial

Canada May Host the World ’ s First Incel Show Trial A young man who hates women and can ’ t get laid goes to an erotic massage parlor in search of sexual relief .
He turns violent and stabs a female masseuse to death with a machete , injuring her co-worker in the process .
Is this act of murderous violence terrorism ?
This isn ’ t just an academic question : On May 19 , the Toronto Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police held a news conference announcing that a 17-year-old who is alleged to have fatally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Toronto massage parlor in February is to be charged with terrorism .
It is the first time that terrorism charges have been brought in a case connected to the so-called “ incel ” ideology .
In theory , treating violent incels as potential terrorists might be reasonable .
In practice , there ’ s plenty of reason to think this particular incel murderer isn ’ t a terrorist—and the government ’ s own motives in treating him as one may be less salutary than it admits .
“ Incel ” refers to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just as for the radical feminists they loathe , the personal is the political .
And the personal is a pandemonium of misery , self-hatred , and shame : Incels have come to believe that they are systematically deprived of sex .
This deficit is experienced not just as a deep psychological wound but as an all-embracing political status in a wider ideological worldview that rationalizes their deficit and excuses or even justifies violent retaliation against those who are perceived to be responsible for it .
( Conveniently , incels blame coveted women— @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Chads ” —for their miseries . )
What is the political cause or content of inceldom ?
What is it that incels want ?
To enshrine a law that creates a reserve army of sex slaves for all men who can ’ t get laid ?
To impose higher taxes on men and women who are sexually active ?
To grant incels free access to sex workers ?
No doubt incels are themselves divided on the finer points , but their vision of the world , however infantile and fantastical , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear and coherent political agenda .
It is to do with justice and ( perceived ) rights and wrongs .
The Canadian authorities have disclosed little about the case involving the 17-year-old ( who , as a minor , can not be named under Canada ’ s Youth Criminal Justice Act ) .
He is alleged to have killed Ashley Noell Arzaga with a machete , in addition to injuring the owner of the parlor as she tried to subdue him .
Police initially charged the minor with first-degree and attempted murder , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he is linked to the incel subculture , the authorities have now upgraded those charges to include “ terrorist activity.
” We don ’ t yet know the nature of the suspect ’ s link to the incel movement .
Was he an active member , or was he on the periphery ?
Did he advocate for murderous violence in his online communications ?
And did he , like other notable right-wing terrorists before him , announce and justify his murder mission before carrying it out in the form of a manifesto ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ indeed written just such a manifesto , then the case for upgrading his murder charge to one of terrorism would be an unassailable one : Terrorism is violence against civilians for political purposes .
It doesn ’ t matter how stupid or cruel the political goals are ( a utopia cleansed of infidels or a utopia cleansed of Stacys and Chads ) .
It doesn ’ t matter how durably effective the violence is .
( Most terrorism isn ’ t . )
It just matters that violence is used against civilians in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But what if the minor in the Toronto case had written no manifesto or announced no impending atrocity to inspire and thrill his fellow incels and draw publicity to their cause ?
What if he was just a disgruntled loner who happened to “ shitpost ” his bile against women on an incel forum ?
It is eminently possible for incels to murder women ( or anyone else for that matter ) for reasons that are wholly unrelated to the incel ideology .
And why choose a massage parlor to stage a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would think that such places offer incels a lifeline : a temporary relief from the oppressiveness of a sex-depleted life .
So what would be the political capital in killing sex workers in their place of work ?
Perhaps incels resent these women because they see them as profiteers from their sexual miseries .
As one incel tersely put it in an online forum , “ paying for sex is cucked [ cuckolded ] .
” Or perhaps there are more personal motives at work , motives to do with sexual shame : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can ’ t have sex ; they ’ re also ashamed by this failure and correspondingly resent all those who effortlessly can or do have sex .
It isn ’ t difficult to imagine the shame a 17-year-old might feel in a darkened room receiving impersonal sex from a stranger hired for pay .
All the miseries of their sexual deprivation , desperation , and abject dependency on women would be vividly crystalized in that moment .
One self-described “ escortcel ” ( an incel who hires sex workers ) confessed in an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with those he paid for sex : “ [ I ] t doesn ’ t make sense for an incel who ’ s a subhuman ugly fuck to go after a girl who would otherwise never even lay eyes on you if she saw you in the street.
” More likely this incel was disgusted at himself but projected that emotion outward at the source of his shame .
There is a wider political context that must be considered , too : The authorities in Canada have never before laid terrorism charges against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another way : It is the first time in Canadian prosecutorial history that a person who isn ’ t a jihadi has been charged under terrorism offenses .
For the authorities in Canada , this isn ’ t a good look : It makes them vulnerable to the charge that they ’ re selectively targeting Muslims and sleeping on other potential threats from the far-right and the incel subculture .
The Canadian authorities are also acutely alive to the criticism that they blundered for their mishandling of the Alek Minassian case .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , rammed his truck into a crowd of pedestrians on a sidewalk in Toronto , killing 10 .
Just before carrying out the attack , he wrote a post on Facebook in which he proclaimed the arrival of an “ incel rebellion.
” “ I was thinking that I would inspire future masses to join me in my uprising , ” he told his interrogators .
Seen in this context , the laying of terrorism charges by Canadian authorities is a form of symbolic work : They are signaling that they are not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ learned the appropriate lessons from the Minassian case and take misogynist violence very seriously indeed .
This sort of rhetorical messaging may yet backfire , especially if it turns out that the 17-year-old in question murdered for primarily personal rather than political reasons .
As the terrorism expert Phil Gurski has pointed out , the standards for prosecuting a terrorism charge are much stricter than those for prosecuting a murder charge .
The prosecution had better have the requisite evidence of political intent .
Moreover , by publicly announcing the charges , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a tremendous coup , giving it a coherence , relevance , and menace way beyond what this fringe subculture can realistically claim to possess .
Incels themselves are not insensitive to this implication .
As one sarcastically commented , “ Yeah I ’ m isis bro yeah yeah yeah I ’ m isis sure bro yep.
” Or , as another acidly put it , referring to the “ mainstream media ” : “ They really think we ’ ve got a clergy or something where we plot mass destruction.
” This is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when it is terrorism , but we should be on guard against the temptation to hunt for political motives in acts of public violence when it is politically expedient to do so .
Terrorism is a tactic , not a signifier of all that we loathe , still less a conduit for signaling our virtuous fidelity to righteous causes .

A young man who hates women and can’t get laid goes to an erotic massage parlor in search of sexual relief. He turns violent and stabs a female masseuse to death with a machete, injuring her co-worker in the process. Is this act of murderous violence terrorism?
A young man who hates women and can’t get laid goes to an erotic massage parlor in search of sexual relief. He turns violent and stabs a female masseuse to death with a machete, injuring her co-worker in the process. Is this act of murderous violence terrorism?
This isn’t just an academic question: On May 19, the Toronto Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police held a news conference announcing that a 17-year-old who is alleged to have fatally stabbed a woman and injured another in a Toronto massage parlor in February is to be charged with terrorism. It is the first time that terrorism charges have been brought in a case connected to the so-called “incel” ideology.
In theory, treating violent incels as potential terrorists might be reasonable. In practice, there’s plenty of reason to think this particular incel murderer isn’t a terrorist—and the government’s own motives in treating him as one may be less salutary than it admits.
“Incel” refers to “involuntarily celibate.” For incels, just as for the radical feminists they loathe, the personal is the political. And the personal is a pandemonium of misery, self-hatred, and shame: Incels have come to believe that they are systematically deprived of sex. This deficit is experienced not just as a deep psychological wound but as an all-embracing political status in a wider ideological worldview that rationalizes their deficit and excuses or even justifies violent retaliation against those who are perceived to be responsible for it. (Conveniently, incels blame coveted women—“Stacys”—and sexually successful men—“Chads”—for their miseries.)
What is the political cause or content of inceldom? What is it that incels want? To enshrine a law that creates a reserve army of sex slaves for all men who can’t get laid? To impose higher taxes on men and women who are sexually active? To grant incels free access to sex workers?
No doubt incels are themselves divided on the finer points, but their vision of the world, however infantile and fantastical, has a political character, if not a clear and coherent political agenda. It is to do with justice and (perceived) rights and wrongs.
The Canadian authorities have disclosed little about the case involving the 17-year-old (who, as a minor, cannot be named under Canada’s Youth Criminal Justice Act). He is alleged to have killed Ashley Noell Arzaga with a machete, in addition to injuring the owner of the parlor as she tried to subdue him. Police initially charged the minor with first-degree and attempted murder, but, based on police evidence that he is linked to the incel subculture, the authorities have now upgraded those charges to include “terrorist activity.”
We don’t yet know the nature of the suspect’s link to the incel movement. Was he an active member, or was he on the periphery? Did he advocate for murderous violence in his online communications? And did he, like other notable right-wing terrorists before him, announce and justify his murder mission before carrying it out in the form of a manifesto? Time will tell.
If he had indeed written just such a manifesto, then the case for upgrading his murder charge to one of terrorism would be an unassailable one: Terrorism is violence against civilians for political purposes. It doesn’t matter how stupid or cruel the political goals are (a utopia cleansed of infidels or a utopia cleansed of Stacys and Chads). It doesn’t matter how durably effective the violence is. (Most terrorism isn’t.) It just matters that violence is used against civilians in service to a political or ideological worldview.
But what if the minor in the Toronto case had written no manifesto or announced no impending atrocity to inspire and thrill his fellow incels and draw publicity to their cause? What if he was just a disgruntled loner who happened to “shitpost” his bile against women on an incel forum? It is eminently possible for incels to murder women (or anyone else for that matter) for reasons that are wholly unrelated to the incel ideology.
And why choose a massage parlor to stage a politically motivated attack against women? You would think that such places offer incels a lifeline: a temporary relief from the oppressiveness of a sex-depleted life. So what would be the political capital in killing sex workers in their place of work? Perhaps incels resent these women because they see them as profiteers from their sexual miseries. As one incel tersely put it in an online forum, “paying for sex is cucked [cuckolded].”
Or perhaps there are more personal motives at work, motives to do with sexual shame: Incels are not just aggrieved that they can’t have sex; they’re also ashamed by this failure and correspondingly resent all those who effortlessly can or do have sex. It isn’t difficult to imagine the shame a 17-year-old might feel in a darkened room receiving impersonal sex from a stranger hired for pay. All the miseries of their sexual deprivation, desperation, and abject dependency on women would be vividly crystalized in that moment. One self-described “escortcel” (an incel who hires sex workers) confessed in an online post how he had become disgusted with those he paid for sex: “[I]t doesn’t make sense for an incel who’s a subhuman ugly fuck to go after a girl who would otherwise never even lay eyes on you if she saw you in the street.” More likely this incel was disgusted at himself but projected that emotion outward at the source of his shame.
There is a wider political context that must be considered, too: The authorities in Canada have never before laid terrorism charges against a non-Muslim. Or to put it another way: It is the first time in Canadian prosecutorial history that a person who isn’t a jihadi has been charged under terrorism offenses. For the authorities in Canada, this isn’t a good look: It makes them vulnerable to the charge that they’re selectively targeting Muslims and sleeping on other potential threats from the far-right and the incel subculture.
The Canadian authorities are also acutely alive to the criticism that they blundered for their mishandling of the Alek Minassian case. In 2018, Minassian, a self-described incel, rammed his truck into a crowd of pedestrians on a sidewalk in Toronto, killing 10. Just before carrying out the attack, he wrote a post on Facebook in which he proclaimed the arrival of an “incel rebellion.” “I was thinking that I would inspire future masses to join me in my uprising,” he told his interrogators.
Seen in this context, the laying of terrorism charges by Canadian authorities is a form of symbolic work: They are signaling that they are not selectively targeting Muslims and that they have learned the appropriate lessons from the Minassian case and take misogynist violence very seriously indeed.
This sort of rhetorical messaging may yet backfire, especially if it turns out that the 17-year-old in question murdered for primarily personal rather than political reasons. As the terrorism expert Phil Gurski has pointed out, the standards for prosecuting a terrorism charge are much stricter than those for prosecuting a murder charge. The prosecution had better have the requisite evidence of political intent.
Moreover, by publicly announcing the charges, the authorities have just given the incel movement a tremendous coup, giving it a coherence, relevance, and menace way beyond what this fringe subculture can realistically claim to possess. Incels themselves are not insensitive to this implication. As one sarcastically commented, “Yeah I’m isis bro yeah yeah yeah I’m isis sure bro yep.” Or, as another acidly put it, referring to the “mainstream media”: “They really think we’ve got a clergy or something where we plot mass destruction.”
This is not an argument for not prosecuting terrorism when it is terrorism, but we should be on guard against the temptation to hunt for political motives in acts of public violence when it is politically expedient to do so. Terrorism is a tactic, not a signifier of all that we loathe, still less a conduit for signaling our virtuous fidelity to righteous causes.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-01--With Scenes of Police Brutality, America’s Beacon to the World Winks Out

With Scenes of Police Brutality , America ’ s Beacon to the World Winks Out A world that once looked to the United States to champion democracy and human rights watched with dismay and alarm as police departments across the nation unleashed violent crackdowns on anti-police protesters , targeting looters , demonstrators , and journalists alike , even as President Donald Trump on Monday criticized state governors for their “ weak ” response .
Meanwhile , from Canada to New Zealand , tens of thousands of people gathered around the world to protest the killing of an African American man @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on May 25 in Minneapolis by a white police officer who kneeled on his neck .
The officer has since been charged with murder .
Floyd ’ s death a week ago touched off U.S. demonstrations that swiftly turned into riots in more than 100 American cities .
But memorials also sprouted up in cities around the globe , from a candlelight vigil in Mashhad , Iran , to a mural painted on the Berlin Wall bearing Floyd ’ s likeness along with his dying plea : “ I can ’ t breathe.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than anything was the often brutal response of police , some of whom were videotaped ramming demonstrators with SUVs and tasing college students in their car .
One heavily armed Minneapolis police officer fired paint rounds Saturday night at a resident watching the events unfold from her porch while another officer called out , “ Light ’ em up.
” Trump only appeared to encourage official violence , telling U.S. governors in a video conference call on Monday : “ You have to dominate , if you don ’ t dominate you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re going to run over you .
You ’ re going to look like a bunch of jerks .
You have to dominate.
” The overwhelmingly negative international reaction to the crackdown showed how far the United States ’ reputation has fallen in the eyes of the world under the Trump presidency , evoking the international opprobrium directed at previous U.S. governments during the Vietnam War and civil rights era , when police in Southern states turned attack dogs on black freedom marchers .
“ The erosion of U.S. global leadership has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senior European diplomat told Foreign Policy .
“ Military supremacy and financial leverage is still there .
However , reserves of political and ‘ soft ’ power are being depleted rapidly.
” “ This is placing traditional allies in a difficult position—trying to cling to a traditional value-based connection [ with the United States ] which is diminishing fast , ” the diplomat said .
“ Europe is hoping for a turning point , although everyone is realizing that there is no absolute return to 2016.
” The protests have also laid bare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the United States , undercutting America ’ s standing as a standard-bearer of modern liberal values , including the promotion of human rights , democracy , and free-market capitalism .
“ I ’ m very concerned about how this will impact our leadership and our voice overseas , ” said Linda Thomas-Greenfield , a former career diplomat who was the seniormost-ranking African American woman in the U.S. foreign service when she retired in 2017 .
“ People look to the United States for leadership , they look to us for support .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ losing ground.
” In his call with the governors , Trump urged them to increase law enforcement efforts and noted that foreign countries were watching—and judging .
“ You know , when other countries watch this , they ’ re watching this , the next day wow , they ’ re really a pushover .
And we can ’ t be a pushover .
And we have all the resources—it ’ s not like we don ’ t have the resources .
So , I don ’ t know what you ’ re @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Trump ’ s national security advisor , Robert O ’ Brien , said that U.S. rivals were trying to exploit the situation and rebuked their criticisms as hypocritical .
“ I want to tell our foreign adversaries , whether it ’ s Zimbabwe or China , that the difference between us and you is that that officer who killed George Floyd … he ’ ll be investigated and he ’ ll be prosecuted , and he ’ s going to receive a fair trial , ” O ’ Brien told ABC ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people that want to go out and protest peacefully , they ’ re going to be allowed to seek redress from their government .
They ’ re not going to be thrown in jail for peaceful protesting.
” ( Peaceful protesters and journalists were among some 4,000 arrested across the United States over the weekend . )
Some senior U.S. diplomats have weighed in from afar , explaining how they defend American values abroad even as they condemn Floyd ’ s killing and struggle to grapple with the reality of racial injustice at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for as long as I can remember I have known that my rights and my body were not fully my own .
I have also always known that America , conceived in liberty , has always aspired to be better—a shining city on a hill—and that is why I have dedicated my life to her service , ” Brian Nichols , a senior U.S. diplomat and the ambassador to Zimbabwe , wrote in a letter the embassy published .
Nichols ’ s letter reflects how U.S. diplomatic outposts abroad are now being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chorus of outcry from foreign countries on systemic racial injustices and police violence in the United States .
In his letter , Nichols tied the struggle of protesters in the United States to civil society activists detained and abused by the Zimbabwean government , noting that a police officer has been charged with murder in Floyd ’ s death , while Zimbabwean authorities abducted and assaulted democracy activists without consequence .
“ In a long , unbroken line of black men and women , George Floyd gave the last full measure of devotion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in freedom , ” he wrote .
“ Americans will continue to speak out for justice whether at home or abroad .
We can meet the ideals of our founding , we will change this world for the better.
” Thomas-Greenfield , however , said that while the messages coming from U.S. diplomatic outposts abroad are important , they don ’ t make up for the void in Washington .
“ It has to be extraordinarily hard for ambassadors to try to explain what is happening in the United States in the context @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we had been the voice that people have looked to , ” she said .
“ They ’ re doing the best with what they have.
” The scenes of protesters over the weekend pressing in on the White House , where the president was reported to be holed up in a secure bunker , served to highlight the isolation for a president who has found little solidarity from allies .
Indeed , Trump ’ s apparent failure to demonstrate leadership over the issue of police abuse and nationwide street protests was only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was already in tatters around the world , following his fumbling , “ America first ” approach to the global coronavirus pandemic and his repeated insults to U.S. allies as well as his withdrawals from one major agreement after another—from the Paris climate pact to , most recently , the Open Skies Treaty .
Last month , Trump abruptly announced that he would also seek to withdraw from the World Health Organization , a move that has virtually no support from key allies .
Trump was also forced to reschedule a June Camp @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after Germany ’ s Chancellor Angela Merkel declined to participate , citing the health risks of the ongoing pandemic—but the U.S. president indicated he would invite non-member nations to the rescheduled meeting , including Russia .
Trump ’ s closest European ally , British Prime Minister Boris Johnson , on Monday appeared to break with his U.S. counterpart , threatening to block any move by the White House to restore Russia ’ s membership in the big-power club .
Asked about Trump ’ s call for expanding the G-7 membership and inviting Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group following its annexation of Crimea , Johnson ’ s chief spokesman said , “ We are yet to see evidence of [ Russia ’ s ] changed behavior which would justify readmittance.
” The latest string of police violence and protests are “ a piece of a larger puzzle , ” said Thomas-Greenfield .
“ I think our face in the world had already diminished … because of our lack of leadership in the world and on this issue it ’ s just an added reason for countries to question our leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to have the worst human rights records in the world—piled onto the protests , relishing the sight of a rival power engulfed in the pandemic lockdown and social unrest that exposed enduring racism and inequality .
“ Some don ’ t think # BlackLivesMatter , ” tweeted Mohammad Javad Zarif , Iran ’ s foreign minister , sharing a marked-up version of a statement from the U.S. State Department on protests in Iran .
“ To those of us who do : it is long overdue for the entire world to wage war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WorldAgainstRacism.
” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , a longtime critic of same-sex marriage who once described homosexuality as a “ perversion , ” then countered : “ You hang homosexuals , stone women and exterminate Jews.
” Beijing , still reeling from the fallout of racist attacks against African migrants in China in April , seized on the U.S. protests to detract attention from its own crackdown on pro-democratic demonstrators in Hong Kong .
When State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus chided Beijing on Twitter for reneging on its commitment to grant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , her Chinese counterpart , Hua Chunying , retweeted the message with the line “ I can ’ t breathe.
” “ All lives matter , ” she added in a subsequent tweet .
“ We stand firmly with our African friends .
We strongly oppose all forms of racial discrimination and inflammatory expressions of racism and hatred.
” The official social media accounts of the Russian Embassy in Washington condemned police violence toward members of the media after a correspondent from the Russian state-owned news agency Ria Novosti was hit with pepper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the increased number of police violence cases and unjustified detentions of journalists during their coverage of protests in the United States that broke out after the murder of George Floyd , ” the embassy posted on Facebook .
The post came just days after several prominent Russian reporters were detained and later released for holding one-person pickets in support of the arrested Russian journalist Ilya Azar .
Azar was arrested and sentenced to 15 days ’ imprisonment earlier last week for holding a single-person demonstration against the imprisonment of activist Vladimir Vorontsov , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to expose abuses of power within Russian law enforcement .
For many traditional allies , the events in the United States underscore the degree to which the rest of the world is being forced to align themselves with two increasingly problematic superpowers .
“ The choice is between an unreliable and increasingly transactional and autocratic democracy ( U.S. ) and a reliably transactional and unforgiving autocratic rising power ( China ) , ” one senior Asian diplomat told Foreign Policy .
“ The United States is and appears to the world divided , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Haass , the president of the Council on Foreign Relations , tweeted on Monday .
“ Hard to believe we will not be challenged somewhere somehow by someone wanting to take advantage of these circumstances .
To add a 4th ‘ D , ’ these are truly dangerous times .
”

A world that once looked to the United States to champion democracy and human rights watched with dismay and alarm as police departments across the nation unleashed violent crackdowns on anti-police protesters, targeting looters, demonstrators, and journalists alike, even as President Donald Trump on Monday criticized state governors for their “weak” response.
A world that once looked to the United States to champion democracy and human rights watched with dismay and alarm as police departments across the nation unleashed violent crackdowns on anti-police protesters, targeting looters, demonstrators, and journalists alike, even as President Donald Trump on Monday criticized state governors for their “weak” response.
Meanwhile, from Canada to New Zealand, tens of thousands of people gathered around the world to protest the killing of an African American man, George Floyd, who was suffocated on May 25 in Minneapolis by a white police officer who kneeled on his neck. The officer has since been charged with murder. Floyd’s death a week ago touched off U.S. demonstrations that swiftly turned into riots in more than 100 American cities. But memorials also sprouted up in cities around the globe, from a candlelight vigil in Mashhad, Iran, to a mural painted on the Berlin Wall bearing Floyd’s likeness along with his dying plea: “I can’t breathe.”
What shocked observers around the world more than anything was the often brutal response of police, some of whom were videotaped ramming demonstrators with SUVs and tasing college students in their car. One heavily armed Minneapolis police officer fired paint rounds Saturday night at a resident watching the events unfold from her porch while another officer called out, “Light ’em up.”
Trump only appeared to encourage official violence, telling U.S. governors in a video conference call on Monday: “You have to dominate, if you don’t dominate you’re wasting your time. They’re going to run over you. You’re going to look like a bunch of jerks. You have to dominate.”
The overwhelmingly negative international reaction to the crackdown showed how far the United States’ reputation has fallen in the eyes of the world under the Trump presidency, evoking the international opprobrium directed at previous U.S. governments during the Vietnam War and civil rights era, when police in Southern states turned attack dogs on black freedom marchers.
“The erosion of U.S. global leadership has been faster than expected,” a senior European diplomat told Foreign Policy. “Military supremacy and financial leverage is still there. However, reserves of political and ‘soft’ power are being depleted rapidly.”
“This is placing traditional allies in a difficult position—trying to cling to a traditional value-based connection [with the United States] which is diminishing fast,” the diplomat said. “Europe is hoping for a turning point, although everyone is realizing that there is no absolute return to 2016.”
The protests have also laid bare to the world deeply rooted societal problems in the United States, undercutting America’s standing as a standard-bearer of modern liberal values, including the promotion of human rights, democracy, and free-market capitalism.
“I’m very concerned about how this will impact our leadership and our voice overseas,” said Linda Thomas-Greenfield, a former career diplomat who was the seniormost-ranking African American woman in the U.S. foreign service when she retired in 2017. “People look to the United States for leadership, they look to us for support. They are worried that we’re losing ground.”
In his call with the governors, Trump urged them to increase law enforcement efforts and noted that foreign countries were watching—and judging. “You know, when other countries watch this, they’re watching this, the next day wow, they’re really a pushover. And we can’t be a pushover. And we have all the resources—it’s not like we don’t have the resources. So, I don’t know what you’re doing,” he told the governors.
Trump’s national security advisor, Robert O’Brien, said that U.S. rivals were trying to exploit the situation and rebuked their criticisms as hypocritical. “I want to tell our foreign adversaries, whether it’s Zimbabwe or China, that the difference between us and you is that that officer who killed George Floyd … he’ll be investigated and he’ll be prosecuted, and he’s going to receive a fair trial,” O’Brien told ABC’s on Sunday. “The American people that want to go out and protest peacefully, they’re going to be allowed to seek redress from their government. They’re not going to be thrown in jail for peaceful protesting.” (Peaceful protesters and journalists were among some 4,000 arrested across the United States over the weekend.)
Some senior U.S. diplomats have weighed in from afar, explaining how they defend American values abroad even as they condemn Floyd’s killing and struggle to grapple with the reality of racial injustice at home.
“As an African American, for as long as I can remember I have known that my rights and my body were not fully my own. I have also always known that America, conceived in liberty, has always aspired to be better—a shining city on a hill—and that is why I have dedicated my life to her service,” Brian Nichols, a senior U.S. diplomat and the ambassador to Zimbabwe, wrote in a letter the embassy published.
Nichols’s letter reflects how U.S. diplomatic outposts abroad are now being compelled to address domestic strife amid a chorus of outcry from foreign countries on systemic racial injustices and police violence in the United States.
In his letter, Nichols tied the struggle of protesters in the United States to civil society activists detained and abused by the Zimbabwean government, noting that a police officer has been charged with murder in Floyd’s death, while Zimbabwean authorities abducted and assaulted democracy activists without consequence.
“In a long, unbroken line of black men and women, George Floyd gave the last full measure of devotion to point us toward a new birth in freedom,” he wrote. “Americans will continue to speak out for justice whether at home or abroad. We can meet the ideals of our founding, we will change this world for the better.”
Thomas-Greenfield, however, said that while the messages coming from U.S. diplomatic outposts abroad are important, they don’t make up for the void in Washington.
“It has to be extraordinarily hard for ambassadors to try to explain what is happening in the United States in the context of human rights and justice, where we had been the voice that people have looked to,” she said. “They’re doing the best with what they have.”
The scenes of protesters over the weekend pressing in on the White House, where the president was reported to be holed up in a secure bunker, served to highlight the isolation for a president who has found little solidarity from allies.
Indeed, Trump’s apparent failure to demonstrate leadership over the issue of police abuse and nationwide street protests was only the latest blow to a reputation that was already in tatters around the world, following his fumbling, “America first” approach to the global coronavirus pandemic and his repeated insults to U.S. allies as well as his withdrawals from one major agreement after another—from the Paris climate pact to, most recently, the Open Skies Treaty. Last month, Trump abruptly announced that he would also seek to withdraw from the World Health Organization, a move that has virtually no support from key allies. Trump was also forced to reschedule a June Camp David summit of the G-7 industrial powers after Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel declined to participate, citing the health risks of the ongoing pandemic—but the U.S. president indicated he would invite non-member nations to the rescheduled meeting, including Russia.
Trump’s closest European ally, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, on Monday appeared to break with his U.S. counterpart, threatening to block any move by the White House to restore Russia’s membership in the big-power club. Asked about Trump’s call for expanding the G-7 membership and inviting Russia, which was forced out of the group following its annexation of Crimea, Johnson’s chief spokesman said, “We are yet to see evidence of [Russia’s] changed behavior which would justify readmittance.”
The latest string of police violence and protests are “a piece of a larger puzzle,” said Thomas-Greenfield. “I think our face in the world had already diminished … because of our lack of leadership in the world and on this issue it’s just an added reason for countries to question our leadership”
U.S. adversaries—many of which are regarded to have the worst human rights records in the world—piled onto the protests, relishing the sight of a rival power engulfed in the pandemic lockdown and social unrest that exposed enduring racism and inequality.
“Some don’t think #BlackLivesMatter,” tweeted Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, sharing a marked-up version of a statement from the U.S. State Department on protests in Iran. “To those of us who do: it is long overdue for the entire world to wage war against racism. Time for a #WorldAgainstRacism.”
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, a longtime critic of same-sex marriage who once described homosexuality as a “perversion,” then countered: “You hang homosexuals, stone women and exterminate Jews.”
Beijing, still reeling from the fallout of racist attacks against African migrants in China in April, seized on the U.S. protests to detract attention from its own crackdown on pro-democratic demonstrators in Hong Kong. When State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus chided Beijing on Twitter for reneging on its commitment to grant political freedom to the former British colony, her Chinese counterpart, Hua Chunying, retweeted the message with the line “I can’t breathe.”
“All lives matter,” she added in a subsequent tweet. “We stand firmly with our African friends. We strongly oppose all forms of racial discrimination and inflammatory expressions of racism and hatred.”
The official social media accounts of the Russian Embassy in Washington condemned police violence toward members of the media after a correspondent from the Russian state-owned news agency Ria Novosti was hit with pepper spray. “We are concerned about the increased number of police violence cases and unjustified detentions of journalists during their coverage of protests in the United States that broke out after the murder of George Floyd,” the embassy posted on Facebook.
The post came just days after several prominent Russian reporters were detained and later released for holding one-person pickets in support of the arrested Russian journalist Ilya Azar. Azar was arrested and sentenced to 15 days’ imprisonment earlier last week for holding a single-person demonstration against the imprisonment of activist Vladimir Vorontsov, who runs an online community that seeks to expose abuses of power within Russian law enforcement.
For many traditional allies, the events in the United States underscore the degree to which the rest of the world is being forced to align themselves with two increasingly problematic superpowers. “The choice is between an unreliable and increasingly transactional and autocratic democracy (U.S.) and a reliably transactional and unforgiving autocratic rising power (China),” one senior Asian diplomat told Foreign Policy.
“The United States is and appears to the world divided, diminished, & distracted,” Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, tweeted on Monday. “Hard to believe we will not be challenged somewhere somehow by someone wanting to take advantage of these circumstances. To add a 4th ‘D,’ these are truly dangerous times.”
Staff reporter Amy Mackinnon contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-01--Leader of Afghan Taliban Said to Be Gravely Ill With the Coronavirus

Leader of Afghan Taliban Said to Be Gravely Ill With the Coronavirus The supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban has contracted COVID-19 and has possibly died while receiving treatment , according to Taliban officials .
Confirmation that Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada had contracted the virus , which has stricken a number of senior Taliban leaders , came Monday from a senior military official of the Islamist movement , Moulawi Muhammad Ali Jan Ahmed .
“ Our leader is sick , but he is recovering , ” Ahmed told Foreign Policy in an interview .
However , three other Taliban figures in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spoke on condition of anonymity , said they believed Akhunzada had died of the illness .
No official confirmation appeared to be forthcoming Monday .
A senior official in the Afghan government said other Taliban leaders , including many in the movement ’ s office in Doha , Qatar , who negotiated a bilateral deal with the United States that was signed in February , were also ill with COVID-19 .
Speaking on the condition that he not be identified , the official said : “ Nearly all the Taliban leadership in Doha @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant because if talks [ between the Afghan government and the Taliban ] are likely not to start within the next few weeks if they ’ re sick , how long will they keep up the cease-fire ?
” the official added .
The Taliban officials who would not be named said Akhunzada , the supreme leader , had not been seen for the past three months and had not made any voice recordings , including an Eid al-Fitr message released as a statement ahead of the holiday last month .
Ahmed , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been hospitalized but he would not confirm where .
Asked if the Taliban ’ s leader had received treatment in Pakistan , he responded : “ Why do you people think that Pakistan is the only country [ where he would be hospitalized ] ?
There are other countries that are stronger than Pakistan , that support us , and the world knows that .
I will not name the country , but it is a powerful country that is one of our allies.
” Afghan government and Western official sources have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time ago .
Antonio Giustozzi , a Taliban expert with the Royal United Services Institute in London , said his Taliban sources confirmed Akhunzada had contracted the coronavirus .
“ Haibatullah is seriously sick and in hospital in Pakistan , ” Giustozzi said .
Some Taliban sources in Quetta have said Akhunzada went to Russia for treatment .
The Taliban offered a three-day cease-fire to coincide with the Eid holiday .
Afghan media quoted an unnamed Kabul government source saying the cease-fire would continue unofficially as neither side had yet announced its end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Taliban leadership , infecting negotiators and commanders , the peace process has been hit by the uncertainty of how the pandemic will impact the uppermost echelons of the group .
Foreign Policy reported on May 29 that many of the Taliban ’ s senior leaders in Quetta had caught COVID-19 , including Akhunzada ’ s deputy , Sirajuddin Haqqani , the leader of the jihadi Haqqani network , which has been behind many brutal attacks on Afghan and international forces and civilians in Afghanistan and has close ties to al Qaeda .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ action , the Taliban movement is now being run by the son of its founder , Mullah Mohammed Omar , whose death was revealed in mid-2015 , more than two years after he had died .
Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob has taken over administrative , operational , and military command of the movement , according to Taliban officials , including Ahmed , and Western intelligence sources .
COVID-19 appears to have helped Yaqoob on the way to realizing his long-held ambition of taking his late father ’ s mantle as Taliban leader .
He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as chief of operations and is consolidating his hold on the group ’ s military operations , expected to soon extend his reach from 28 of Afghanistan ’ s 34 provinces to the whole country .
Commanders have said they support his leadership .
What this could mean for the peace process , the nature of the war , and the vast money-making ventures that the Taliban use to fund their almost 20-year insurgency remains unclear .
But the questions being raised in Kabul by the recent changes are causing consternation among the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support peace in Afghanistan , sources in Quetta said this may depend on what support he receives in his bid for a formal takeover of the Taliban .
“ The prince is trying to claim his crown , ” said one source close to the Taliban leadership .
While Yaqoob is believed to support the peace process , “ it will depend on whether he gets support as leader , ” the source said .
The Taliban and Afghan government are in the process of a prisoner swap that was negotiated as part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and Taliban officials in Doha .
The agreement calls for the release by the Kabul government of some 5,000 Taliban prisoners .
The release process has been proceeding haltingly and could be adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic that has sickened the Taliban leadership .
The Kabul official said the head of the Taliban ’ s prisoners commission , Mullah Nooruddin Turabi , remains ill with COVID-19 , despite some media reports that he has recovered .
The official said Turabi “ remains bedridden ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supposed to come to Kabul for the current rounds of talks ” on the status of the prisoner swap , the official said .
Turabi was the minister of vice and virtue in the Taliban ’ s 1996-2001 administration , which ruled Afghanistan until a U.S.-led military invasion drove it from power in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks on the United States .
Osama bin Laden , as the head of al Qaeda , planned and carried out the attacks while based in Afghanistan with the blessing of Mullah Omar .
The Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well the Islamic State and other violent insurgent groups with a presence in Afghanistan .
A Western intelligence source described the Haqqani network as “ essentially an opportunistic business operation ” close to al Qaeda .
Haqqani became Akhunzada ’ s deputy when he took over as the Taliban ’ s leader in 2016—following the killing by U.S. drone strike of Mullah Akhtar Mansour , who succeeded Mullah Omar .
Haqqani ’ s elevation formalized the relationship between the extremist groups and ensured a flow of funding from the wealthy Haqqani into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that with Haqqani sidelined by illness and Yaqoob ’ s elevation to chief of operations , the Haqqani network “ will probably just go its own way and operate in its own way.
” The Kabul official also confirmed that another Doha-based Taliban figure , Mohammad Nabi Omari , who was directly involved in negotiating the deal with the United States , had been ill with COVID-19 and was now recovered .
“ He has been leading the Taliban delegation during video teleconferences with the government that set the stage for prisoner releases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was held in U.S. custody at Guantánamo Bay for nearly 12 years—one of the so-called Taliban Five who were prominent in the group ’ s pre-9/11 administration .
They were released in 2014 in a prisoner swap for U.S. Army Sgt .
Bowe Bergdahl , who had been held by the Taliban for five years .
“ Omari was out of commission for several weeks , ” the official said , and unable to maintain contact with Kabul in making progress in ending the war .
The Afghan government would not make any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ illness of Taliban leaders could have on direct talks with the group—the next stage of the process that had been expected to begin within weeks .
With the United States proceeding with a troop drawdown as part of the Feb. 29 agreement with the Taliban , the Kabul government appears vulnerable as the Afghan military is not seen as ready to stand alone against the insurgents .
Long War Journal , a project of the Washington-based think tank the Foundation for Defense Of Democracies , says the Taliban have been “ unquestionably ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troop presence drew down from its peak .
The NATO mission switched from military support to a “ train , advise , assist ” role at the end of 2014 .
Under the U.S.-Taliban agreement , the United States will draw down to zero by next year ; NATO partners are largely expected to follow suit .
Long War Journal describes nearly half of Afghanistan ’ s districts as “ contested.
” Of a total of 398 districts , 189 are contested , 133 are believed to be under government control , and @ @ @ @ @ @

The supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban has contracted COVID-19 and has possibly died while receiving treatment, according to Taliban officials. Confirmation that Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada had contracted the virus, which has stricken a number of senior Taliban leaders, came Monday from a senior military official of the Islamist movement, Moulawi Muhammad Ali Jan Ahmed.
The supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban has contracted COVID-19 and has possibly died while receiving treatment, according to Taliban officials. Confirmation that Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada had contracted the virus, which has stricken a number of senior Taliban leaders, came Monday from a senior military official of the Islamist movement, Moulawi Muhammad Ali Jan Ahmed.
“Our leader is sick, but he is recovering,” Ahmed told Foreign Policy in an interview. However, three other Taliban figures in the Pakistani city of Quetta, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said they believed Akhunzada had died of the illness. No official confirmation appeared to be forthcoming Monday.
A senior official in the Afghan government said other Taliban leaders, including many in the movement’s office in Doha, Qatar, who negotiated a bilateral deal with the United States that was signed in February, were also ill with COVID-19. Speaking on the condition that he not be identified, the official said: “Nearly all the Taliban leadership in Doha has the bug.”
“This is significant because if talks [between the Afghan government and the Taliban] are likely not to start within the next few weeks if they’re sick, how long will they keep up the cease-fire?” the official added.
The Taliban officials who would not be named said Akhunzada, the supreme leader, had not been seen for the past three months and had not made any voice recordings, including an Eid al-Fitr message released as a statement ahead of the holiday last month.
Ahmed, the senior Taliban official, said Akhunzada had been hospitalized but he would not confirm where. Asked if the Taliban’s leader had received treatment in Pakistan, he responded: “Why do you people think that Pakistan is the only country [where he would be hospitalized]? There are other countries that are stronger than Pakistan, that support us, and the world knows that. I will not name the country, but it is a powerful country that is one of our allies.”
Afghan government and Western official sources have suspected that Akhunzada contracted the virus some time ago. Antonio Giustozzi, a Taliban expert with the Royal United Services Institute in London, said his Taliban sources confirmed Akhunzada had contracted the coronavirus. “Haibatullah is seriously sick and in hospital in Pakistan,” Giustozzi said. Some Taliban sources in Quetta have said Akhunzada went to Russia for treatment.
The Taliban offered a three-day cease-fire to coincide with the Eid holiday. Afghan media quoted an unnamed Kabul government source saying the cease-fire would continue unofficially as neither side had yet announced its end.
However, as COVID-19 sweeps through the Taliban leadership, infecting negotiators and commanders, the peace process has been hit by the uncertainty of how the pandemic will impact the uppermost echelons of the group. Foreign Policy reported on May 29 that many of the Taliban’s senior leaders in Quetta had caught COVID-19, including Akhunzada’s deputy, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the jihadi Haqqani network, which has been behind many brutal attacks on Afghan and international forces and civilians in Afghanistan and has close ties to al Qaeda.
With the top two leaders out of action, the Taliban movement is now being run by the son of its founder, Mullah Mohammed Omar, whose death was revealed in mid-2015, more than two years after he had died.
Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob has taken over administrative, operational, and military command of the movement, according to Taliban officials, including Ahmed, and Western intelligence sources. COVID-19 appears to have helped Yaqoob on the way to realizing his long-held ambition of taking his late father’s mantle as Taliban leader.
He has stepped into Haqqani’s role as chief of operations and is consolidating his hold on the group’s military operations, expected to soon extend his reach from 28 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces to the whole country. Commanders have said they support his leadership.
What this could mean for the peace process, the nature of the war, and the vast money-making ventures that the Taliban use to fund their almost 20-year insurgency remains unclear. But the questions being raised in Kabul by the recent changes are causing consternation among the government.
While Yaqoob is believed to support peace in Afghanistan, sources in Quetta said this may depend on what support he receives in his bid for a formal takeover of the Taliban. “The prince is trying to claim his crown,” said one source close to the Taliban leadership. While Yaqoob is believed to support the peace process, “it will depend on whether he gets support as leader,” the source said.
The Taliban and Afghan government are in the process of a prisoner swap that was negotiated as part of the deal signed on Feb. 29 between the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and Taliban officials in Doha.
The agreement calls for the release by the Kabul government of some 5,000 Taliban prisoners. The release process has been proceeding haltingly and could be adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic that has sickened the Taliban leadership.
The Kabul official said the head of the Taliban’s prisoners commission, Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, remains ill with COVID-19, despite some media reports that he has recovered. The official said Turabi “remains bedridden” with the virus.
“He was supposed to come to Kabul for the current rounds of talks” on the status of the prisoner swap, the official said. Turabi was the minister of vice and virtue in the Taliban’s 1996-2001 administration, which ruled Afghanistan until a U.S.-led military invasion drove it from power in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks on the United States.
Osama bin Laden, as the head of al Qaeda, planned and carried out the attacks while based in Afghanistan with the blessing of Mullah Omar. The Taliban leadership remains linked to al Qaeda, as well the Islamic State and other violent insurgent groups with a presence in Afghanistan.
A Western intelligence source described the Haqqani network as “essentially an opportunistic business operation” close to al Qaeda. Haqqani became Akhunzada’s deputy when he took over as the Taliban’s leader in 2016—following the killing by U.S. drone strike of Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who succeeded Mullah Omar.
Haqqani’s elevation formalized the relationship between the extremist groups and ensured a flow of funding from the wealthy Haqqani into Taliban coffers. A Western diplomat said that with Haqqani sidelined by illness and Yaqoob’s elevation to chief of operations, the Haqqani network “will probably just go its own way and operate in its own way.”
The Kabul official also confirmed that another Doha-based Taliban figure, Mohammad Nabi Omari, who was directly involved in negotiating the deal with the United States, had been ill with COVID-19 and was now recovered. “He has been leading the Taliban delegation during video teleconferences with the government that set the stage for prisoner releases,” the official said.
Omari was held in U.S. custody at Guantánamo Bay for nearly 12 years—one of the so-called Taliban Five who were prominent in the group’s pre-9/11 administration. They were released in 2014 in a prisoner swap for U.S. Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, who had been held by the Taliban for five years.
“Omari was out of commission for several weeks,” the official said, and unable to maintain contact with Kabul in making progress in ending the war.
The Afghan government would not make any official comment on the impact that the illness of Taliban leaders could have on direct talks with the group—the next stage of the process that had been expected to begin within weeks. With the United States proceeding with a troop drawdown as part of the Feb. 29 agreement with the Taliban, the Kabul government appears vulnerable as the Afghan military is not seen as ready to stand alone against the insurgents.
Long War Journal, a project of the Washington-based think tank the Foundation for Defense Of Democracies, says the Taliban have been “unquestionably” resurgent since 2011, when the U.S. troop presence drew down from its peak. The NATO mission switched from military support to a “train, advise, assist” role at the end of 2014. Under the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the United States will draw down to zero by next year; NATO partners are largely expected to follow suit.
Long War Journal describes nearly half of Afghanistan’s districts as “contested.” Of a total of 398 districts, 189 are contested, 133 are believed to be under government control, and 75 are under Taliban control.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-01--Why Erdogan Won’t Ask the IMF for Help

Why Erdogan Won’t Ask the IMF for Help

Why Erdogan Won ’ t Ask the IMF for Help Turkey ’ s economy is a dam waiting to break .
The lira has lost 90 percent of its value against the dollar over the last three years , while Ankara , as of last month , depleted its net international reserves ( excluding swap lines ) in an ineffective defense of the currency .
Turkey ’ s overleveraged nonfinancial companies , already drowning in foreign exchange liabilities totaling some $ 300 billion , continue to pay the price .
Yet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still unlikely to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Monetary Fund ( IMF ) , despite the country ’ s need for it .
That ’ s because Erdogan prefers quick fixes .
One example of this is his recent expansion of the lira-riyal swap line with Qatar—a temporary arrangement that boosts Turkey ’ s Central Bank reserves on paper—from $ 5 billion to $ 15 billion rather than negotiating what Turkey ’ s ailing economy desperately needs : a Stand-By Arrangement or an Extended Fund Facility with the IMF , which would provide the country with a medium-term low-interest loan in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The obstacle for Turkey ’ s strongman president isn ’ t ideology ; it ’ s IMF conditionality and its potential to undermine his hypercentralized style of governance .
Many pundits in Turkey and abroad argue the main impediment to an IMF program is Erdogan ’ s ideology coupled with his fear of voter backlash to such a program .
They ’ re wrong .
Rather , the obstacle for Turkey ’ s strongman president is IMF conditionality and its potential to undermine his hypercentralized style of governance .
Within the last decade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ platform built on unorthodox economic policies .
Investors used to view the president ’ s bizarre beliefs—interest rates leading to higher inflation or an “ interest-rate lobby ” led by Jews aiming to tank Turkey ’ s economy—as embarrassing and annoying .
Those days are long gone .
After the Central Bank lost its last semblance of independence in 2019 , those beliefs have become mainstream .
To a large extent , they now dictate Turkey ’ s monetary policy , which has led to an exodus from the country ’ s bond @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worse , the pointless defense of the Turkish currency ’ s exchange rate , first at 6 and then 7 liras to the dollar , have proved catastrophic to Central Bank reserves .
Erdogan is particularly vulnerable here because those efforts were mounted by his underqualified son-in-law , Finance and Treasury Minister Berat Albayrak , who should never have held the position in the first place .
It is true that Erdogan has proved himself to be pragmatic before , particularly in the face of crisis .
Interest rate hikes have occurred , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ After the escalation of the crisis with Russia , he swallowed his pride and reset ties .
But these decisions did not entail a devolution of power .
In fact , given his near-total control over the media , Erdogan can make U-turns far more easily than in a true democracy , as long as they do not require him to reverse his 18 years of power consolidation .
The real reason Erdogan can not go to the IMF is that any Stand-By Arrangement or Extended Fund Facility requires structural reform and , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The rule of Erdogan ’ s Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party ( AKP ) has benefited from a lack of transparency and accountability .
Turkey ’ s sovereign wealth fund , which acts as the Turkish president ’ s parallel budget , is not audited by parliament or the Court of Final Accounts .
One private auditor even said there is not enough data to conduct a proper assessment .
Economic data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute is also suspect .
A 2017 report by Germany ’ s second-largest lender , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ growth figures was titled , “ Turkey – Are you kidding me ?
” Erdogan ’ s economy thrives on off-balance-sheet arrangements for friends of the AKP .
One example : the Zafer Airport inaugurated in 2012 in western Turkey ’ s Kutahya province and run by a construction magnate close to Erdogan who has helped him acquire government media outlets .
The government forecasted 7.6 million passengers during the first seven years of the airport ’ s operation ; the airport has had just 300,000 passengers so far .
Under a government-guaranteed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ company is estimated to receive 205 million euros ( $ 228 million ) from the public purse for serving nonexistent flights at an airport it built for over $ 55 million .
An IMF program , with its accompanying reforms , would likely eliminate such outrageous revenue guarantees and countless other off-balance-sheet arrangements .
It would also demand competent technocrats , transparency , accountability , independent regulatory agencies , and a Central Bank free from political pressure .
But with such reforms , Erdogan would effectively be asked to forfeit control over all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have brokered over time .
In other words , an IMF deal is a direct threat to his rule and accompanying patronage network .
Turkey ’ s previous IMF program , which started in 1999 and came to head in the 2001 crisis , brought greater transparency and accountability to the country .
That package came in response to unsustainable levels of government debt and Turkish banks ’ exposure to it .
The IMF called for structural reforms to strengthen public finances and fiscal transparency , and new management as a requirement for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , attaining an average of 7 percent growth for the next six years .
And while an IMF program could yield similar benefits for Turkey today , Erdogan is loath to submit to its conditions .
The last time around , the IMF ’ s painful austerity measures did deliver results , but not before Devlet Bahceli , the ultranationalist partner of Turkey ’ s three-way coalition , forced early elections in 2002 , ousting all political parties represented in parliament , ruling and opposition alike , and vaulting Erdogan , the former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The same Bahceli , as unpredictable now as he was back then , is Erdogan ’ s key coalition partner today .
Erdogan , who was the beneficiary of Bahceli ’ s fickleness in 2002 , would hate to become his latest victim ahead of the upcoming 2023 presidential elections , especially since the current Istanbul mayor , Ekrem Imamoglu—an increasingly popular figure who succeeded in uniting Turkey ’ s fractured opposition—has emerged to be his biggest rival .
Yet elections are in three years—a lifetime in Turkish politics—and Erdogan needs to keep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ AKP ’ s patronage network but also to Bahceli and his clients today .
It is for these reasons that the IMF will be the Turkish government ’ s absolute last stop .
If Turkey ’ s economic woes and its suffering citizens somehow force Erdogan to the table , the IMF should not give him a free pass .
The IMF must demand fiscal transparency , an end to off-balance-sheet arrangements , hiring of able technocrats instead of family members , and the imposition of stringent anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering measures .
Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dynamic population can be a driver of economic growth for both Europe and the Middle East .
They deserve to be given that chance .

Turkey’s economy is a dam waiting to break. The lira has lost 90 percent of its value against the dollar over the last three years, while Ankara, as of last month, depleted its net international reserves (excluding swap lines) in an ineffective defense of the currency. Turkey’s overleveraged nonfinancial companies, already drowning in foreign exchange liabilities totaling some $300 billion , continue to pay the price. Yet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still unlikely to sign a bailout deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), despite the country’s need for it.
Turkey’s economy is a dam waiting to break. The lira has lost 90 percent of its value against the dollar over the last three years, while Ankara, as of last month, depleted its net international reserves (excluding swap lines) in an ineffective defense of the currency. Turkey’s overleveraged nonfinancial companies, already drowning in foreign exchange liabilities totaling some $300 billion, continue to pay the price. Yet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still unlikely to sign a bailout deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), despite the country’s need for it.
That’s because Erdogan prefers quick fixes. One example of this is his recent expansion of the lira-riyal swap line with Qatar—a temporary arrangement that boosts Turkey’s Central Bank reserves on paper—from $5 billion to $15 billion rather than negotiating what Turkey’s ailing economy desperately needs: a Stand-By Arrangement or an Extended Fund Facility with the IMF, which would provide the country with a medium-term low-interest loan in exchange for committing to structural reforms.
The obstacle for Turkey’s strongman president isn’t ideology; it’s IMF conditionality and its potential to undermine his hypercentralized style of governance.
Many pundits in Turkey and abroad argue the main impediment to an IMF program is Erdogan’s ideology coupled with his fear of voter backlash to such a program. They’re wrong. Rather, the obstacle for Turkey’s strongman president is IMF conditionality and its potential to undermine his hypercentralized style of governance.
Within the last decade, Erdogan consolidated power with a political platform built on unorthodox economic policies. Investors used to view the president’s bizarre beliefs—interest rates leading to higher inflation or an “interest-rate lobby” led by Jews aiming to tank Turkey’s economy—as embarrassing and annoying. Those days are long gone. After the Central Bank lost its last semblance of independence in 2019, those beliefs have become mainstream. To a large extent, they now dictate Turkey’s monetary policy, which has led to an exodus from the country’s bond and equity markets.
To make matters worse, the pointless defense of the Turkish currency’s exchange rate, first at 6 and then 7 liras to the dollar, have proved catastrophic to Central Bank reserves. Erdogan is particularly vulnerable here because those efforts were mounted by his underqualified son-in-law, Finance and Treasury Minister Berat Albayrak, who should never have held the position in the first place.
It is true that Erdogan has proved himself to be pragmatic before, particularly in the face of crisis. Interest rate hikes have occurred, even when he initially opposed them. After the escalation of the crisis with Russia, he swallowed his pride and reset ties. But these decisions did not entail a devolution of power. In fact, given his near-total control over the media, Erdogan can make U-turns far more easily than in a true democracy, as long as they do not require him to reverse his 18 years of power consolidation.
The real reason Erdogan cannot go to the IMF is that any Stand-By Arrangement or Extended Fund Facility requires structural reform and, therefore, power-sharing and good governance measures. The rule of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has benefited from a lack of transparency and accountability.
Turkey’s sovereign wealth fund, which acts as the Turkish president’s parallel budget, is not audited by parliament or the Court of Final Accounts. One private auditor even said there is not enough data to conduct a proper assessment. Economic data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute is also suspect. A 2017 report by Germany’s second-largest lender, Commerzbank, on Turkey’s dubious growth figures was titled, “Turkey – Are you kidding me?”
Erdogan’s economy thrives on off-balance-sheet arrangements for friends of the AKP. One example: the Zafer Airport inaugurated in 2012 in western Turkey’s Kutahya province and run by a construction magnate close to Erdogan who has helped him acquire government media outlets. The government forecasted 7.6 million passengers during the first seven years of the airport’s operation; the airport has had just 300,000 passengers so far. Under a government-guaranteed revenue deal expiring in 2044, the company is estimated to receive 205 million euros ($228 million) from the public purse for serving nonexistent flights at an airport it built for over $55 million.
An IMF program, with its accompanying reforms, would likely eliminate such outrageous revenue guarantees and countless other off-balance-sheet arrangements. It would also demand competent technocrats, transparency, accountability, independent regulatory agencies, and a Central Bank free from political pressure. But with such reforms, Erdogan would effectively be asked to forfeit control over all the shady deals he and his cronies have brokered over time. In other words, an IMF deal is a direct threat to his rule and accompanying patronage network.
Turkey’s previous IMF program, which started in 1999 and came to head in the 2001 crisis, brought greater transparency and accountability to the country. That package came in response to unsustainable levels of government debt and Turkish banks’ exposure to it. The IMF called for structural reforms to strengthen public finances and fiscal transparency, and new management as a requirement for lending. It worked. Turkey stabilized, attaining an average of 7 percent growth for the next six years.
And while an IMF program could yield similar benefits for Turkey today, Erdogan is loath to submit to its conditions. The last time around, the IMF’s painful austerity measures did deliver results, but not before Devlet Bahceli, the ultranationalist partner of Turkey’s three-way coalition, forced early elections in 2002, ousting all political parties represented in parliament, ruling and opposition alike, and vaulting Erdogan, the former mayor of Istanbul, to leadership. The same Bahceli, as unpredictable now as he was back then, is Erdogan’s key coalition partner today.
Erdogan, who was the beneficiary of Bahceli’s fickleness in 2002, would hate to become his latest victim ahead of the upcoming 2023 presidential elections, especially since the current Istanbul mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu—an increasingly popular figure who succeeded in uniting Turkey’s fractured opposition—has emerged to be his biggest rival. Yet elections are in three years—a lifetime in Turkish politics—and Erdogan needs to keep the spoils flowing not only to the AKP’s patronage network but also to Bahceli and his clients today.
It is for these reasons that the IMF will be the Turkish government’s absolute last stop. If Turkey’s economic woes and its suffering citizens somehow force Erdogan to the table, the IMF should not give him a free pass. The IMF must demand fiscal transparency, an end to off-balance-sheet arrangements, hiring of able technocrats instead of family members, and the imposition of stringent anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering measures. Turkey’s large, young, and dynamic population can be a driver of economic growth for both Europe and the Middle East. They deserve to be given that chance.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-01--How Taiwan Can Turn Coronavirus Victory Into Economic Success

How Taiwan Can Turn Coronavirus Victory Into Economic Success Taiwan has earned the world ’ s admiration for its fast and highly effective response to the coronavirus pandemic .
As of June 1 , Taiwan had only 443 confirmed infections and 7 deaths among a population of 24 million—and even has a functioning professional baseball league .
This comes despite early modeling that projected Taiwan to have one of the highest risks of importing cases from China .
Taiwan ’ s coronavirus success was based on efficient coordination across the public and private sectors coupled with innovative deployment of advanced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ success have been efficient coordination across the public and private sectors coupled with innovative deployment of advanced technology—the very same recipe that has delivered decades of steady economic growth .
Taiwan has also stood out for its ability to learn and apply the lessons from its bitter 2003 experience with the SARS outbreak in order to coordinate an effective governmental response .
But the most notable component of Taiwan ’ s success has been its successful use of artificial intelligence and big-data applications , helping it to integrate its national health insurance database @ @ @ @ @ @ @ classify infection risks among inbound travelers , and monitor cell phones to undertake contact tracing and enforce quarantines .
This unique ability to integrate data and creatively apply technology helped Taiwan to withstand the first wave of the pandemic .
The next question , however , is what Taiwan will do to use these advantages to assure a prosperous and competitive future on the other side of the crisis .
And this challenge will grow more serious in coming years as Beijing further undermines Taiwan ’ s international support and ratchets up the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s immediate opportunity is to capitalize on its momentum and double down on investments in technology to ensure future health security .
The pandemic has yielded a radical shift in the way governments and businesses view public health and define essential goods and services .
With smart investments and new economic policies , Taiwan could use the crisis to become a regional leader in areas of biomedicine and pharmaceuticals .
President Tsai Ing-wen ’ s administration had already made biomedicine a focal point of its “ five plus two ” plan , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sectors including intelligent machinery , green energy , and advanced agricultural technology .
As part of this plan , the government is also directing resources toward developing industry clusters for biomedical research and the production of high-value drugs .
As the information and communications technology market approaches maturity , Taiwan-based hardware giants Foxconn and Quanta Computer have identified the growth potential of health care technologies and expanded their businesses into this sector , particularly digital health and artificial-intelligence applications .
Taiwan should encourage these developments , cultivate start-ups , and steer resources toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example could be the use of artificial-intelligence technologies to dramatically raise the success rate of clinical trials—both by more effectively selecting participants and by improving the design of the trials themselves .
If Taiwan can build on its track record of strong governance and intellectual-property protection , and position itself as a trusted manager of sensitive , high-quality health care data , it could attract many clinical trials from global pharmaceutical companies as therapies currently in the pipeline are brought to market .
Health care is just one example of how Taiwan might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cybersecurity .
But to win that future , Taiwan needs a far broader effort to use technology than it has undertaken so far .
In semiconductors and other advanced hardware components , for example , Taiwan has a long-standing innovation advantage—but that legacy advantage , ironically , has led it to underinvest in new and emerging industries .
Beyond exploiting its traditional semiconductor advantage , Taiwan should pivot toward a vastly more extensive play for data , not just hardware .
Simply put : If companies decide that their data and research is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conditions in mainland China—then this would be a highly attractive basis for investment in Taiwan .
As new knowledge-based industries develop and mature , foreign investors may place a premium not just on data quantity , but also on quality and open access .
The moment could not be more opportune for Taiwan .
The trade war and escalating conflict between the United States and China , in addition to the coronavirus pandemic , have accelerated broad-based structural shifts in East Asian manufacturing supply chains .
All this could play to Taiwan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an innovation-based future .
As supply chains reorganize and technology partnerships with Chinese companies fall out of favor , Taiwan can take concrete steps to become a preferred location for developing and testing , for example , 5G cellular network technologies and applications related to artificial intelligence .
For instance , Taiwan has already joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation system for privacy rules and data transfer .
It should also seek a determination by the European Union that it meets European data protection requirements , a position Taiwan could then use to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But Taiwan is not just a prospective beneficiary of supply chain realignment .
As an importer of some 98 percent of the energy that powers its economy , Taiwan depends on fossil fuel shipments from volatile regions of the world .
Here , too , technology investments hold the key .
Recognizing the challenge of decarbonization , Taipei has set ambitious targets that would see energy from renewable sources rise from just 6 percent of 2019 electricity production to 20 percent by 2025—an addition of some 27 gigawatts of generation capacity .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a pillar of its “ five plus two ” program .
In energy , Taiwan can not possibly meet its targets without bold technology-based investments .
The good news is that Taiwan ’ s potential to attract foreign investment in energy technology is clear .
Partnerships with European firms have already made Taiwan a regional leader in offshore wind power at a time when Asia is projected to become the world ’ s largest market for wind-generated energy .
In Taiwan alone , these projects are expected to generate $ 31.7 billion in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ energy , Google teamed up with several local partners in 2019 to develop an array of floating solar panels to help power its large data center in Changhua .
But ultimately , simply scaling up capacity and attracting new technologies will not be enough—Taiwan will also have to innovate next-generation technology domestically .
For Taiwan , the need to drive down costs and solve the electric grid and power storage issues associated with intermittent wind and solar power are particularly urgent given its land scarcity and high level of energy dependence .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in many nascent areas a dominant market player has yet to emerge and the race for industrial leadership is open—including energy storage batteries , smart meters that better track renewable energy consumption , renewable natural gas , solar and battery waste recycling , and carbon capture and storage .
Dramatic paradigm shifts are reshaping all industries .
But global public health and energy are two areas where strategic , technology-based investments would allow Taiwan to use its established strengths in technology and harness disruption to its advantage .
If Taiwan decisively pursues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technology , it has the chance to carve out fresh market niches , secure and expand its integration into the global economy , and set itself on a robust growth path for decades to come .
Taiwan has already been one of the few success stories in dealing with COVID-19 , and the crisis has only sharpened its potential advantage .
Taiwan should not let that go to waste .

Taiwan has earned the world’s admiration for its fast and highly effective response to the coronavirus pandemic. As of June 1, Taiwan had only 443 confirmed infections and 7 deaths among a population of 24 million—and even has a functioning professional baseball league . This comes despite early modeling that projected Taiwan to have one of the highest risks of importing cases from China.
Taiwan has earned the world’s admiration for its fast and highly effective response to the coronavirus pandemic. As of June 1, Taiwan had only 443 confirmed infections and 7 deaths among a population of 24 million—and even has a functioning professional baseball league. This comes despite early modeling that projected Taiwan to have one of the highest risks of importing cases from China.
Taiwan’s coronavirus success was based on efficient coordination across the public and private sectors coupled with innovative deployment of advanced technology.The central ingredients of Taiwan’s success have been efficient coordination across the public and private sectors coupled with innovative deployment of advanced technology—the very same recipe that has delivered decades of steady economic growth. Taiwan has also stood out for its ability to learn and apply the lessons from its bitter 2003 experience with the SARS outbreak in order to coordinate an effective governmental response. But the most notable component of Taiwan’s success has been its successful use of artificial intelligence and big-data applications, helping it to integrate its national health insurance database with its immigration and customs database, classify infection risks among inbound travelers, and monitor cell phones to undertake contact tracing and enforce quarantines.
This unique ability to integrate data and creatively apply technology helped Taiwan to withstand the first wave of the pandemic. The next question, however, is what Taiwan will do to use these advantages to assure a prosperous and competitive future on the other side of the crisis. And this challenge will grow more serious in coming years as Beijing further undermines Taiwan’s international support and ratchets up the pressure on its economy.
Taiwan’s immediate opportunity is to capitalize on its momentum and double down on investments in technology to ensure future health security. The pandemic has yielded a radical shift in the way governments and businesses view public health and define essential goods and services. With smart investments and new economic policies, Taiwan could use the crisis to become a regional leader in areas of biomedicine and pharmaceuticals.
President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration had already made biomedicine a focal point of its “five plus two” plan, a national economic development policy targeted at growth sectors including intelligent machinery, green energy, and advanced agricultural technology. As part of this plan, the government is also directing resources toward developing industry clusters for biomedical research and the production of high-value drugs. As the information and communications technology market approaches maturity, Taiwan-based hardware giants Foxconn and Quanta Computer have identified the growth potential of health care technologies and expanded their businesses into this sector, particularly digital health and artificial-intelligence applications.
Taiwan should encourage these developments, cultivate start-ups, and steer resources toward market opportunities beyond its shores. One example could be the use of artificial-intelligence technologies to dramatically raise the success rate of clinical trials—both by more effectively selecting participants and by improving the design of the trials themselves. If Taiwan can build on its track record of strong governance and intellectual-property protection, and position itself as a trusted manager of sensitive, high-quality health care data, it could attract many clinical trials from global pharmaceutical companies as therapies currently in the pipeline are brought to market.
Health care is just one example of how Taiwan might become a hub in data protection and cybersecurity. But to win that future, Taiwan needs a far broader effort to use technology than it has undertaken so far. In semiconductors and other advanced hardware components, for example, Taiwan has a long-standing innovation advantage—but that legacy advantage, ironically, has led it to underinvest in new and emerging industries.
Beyond exploiting its traditional semiconductor advantage, Taiwan should pivot toward a vastly more extensive play for data, not just hardware. Simply put: If companies decide that their data and research is safer in Taiwan than elsewhere—especially compared with conditions in mainland China—then this would be a highly attractive basis for investment in Taiwan. As new knowledge-based industries develop and mature, foreign investors may place a premium not just on data quantity, but also on quality and open access.
The moment could not be more opportune for Taiwan. The trade war and escalating conflict between the United States and China, in addition to the coronavirus pandemic, have accelerated broad-based structural shifts in East Asian manufacturing supply chains. All this could play to Taiwan’s advantage—if it is prepared to invest in an innovation-based future.
As supply chains reorganize and technology partnerships with Chinese companies fall out of favor, Taiwan can take concrete steps to become a preferred location for developing and testing, for example, 5G cellular network technologies and applications related to artificial intelligence. For instance, Taiwan has already joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation system for privacy rules and data transfer. It should also seek a determination by the European Union that it meets European data protection requirements, a position Taiwan could then use to become a regional and global cybersecurity powerhouse.
But Taiwan is not just a prospective beneficiary of supply chain realignment. As an importer of some 98 percent of the energy that powers its economy, Taiwan depends on fossil fuel shipments from volatile regions of the world. Here, too, technology investments hold the key. Recognizing the challenge of decarbonization, Taipei has set ambitious targets that would see energy from renewable sources rise from just 6 percent of 2019 electricity production to 20 percent by 2025—an addition of some 27 gigawatts of generation capacity. Indeed, Taiwan has made clean energy a pillar of its “five plus two” program.
In energy, Taiwan cannot possibly meet its targets without bold technology-based investments. The good news is that Taiwan’s potential to attract foreign investment in energy technology is clear. Partnerships with European firms have already made Taiwan a regional leader in offshore wind power at a time when Asia is projected to become the world’s largest market for wind-generated energy. In Taiwan alone, these projects are expected to generate $31.7 billion in new foreign investment. And in solar energy, Google teamed up with several local partners in 2019 to develop an array of floating solar panels to help power its large data center in Changhua.
But ultimately, simply scaling up capacity and attracting new technologies will not be enough—Taiwan will also have to innovate next-generation technology domestically. For Taiwan, the need to drive down costs and solve the electric grid and power storage issues associated with intermittent wind and solar power are particularly urgent given its land scarcity and high level of energy dependence. While much of the world faces similar imperatives, in many nascent areas a dominant market player has yet to emerge and the race for industrial leadership is open—including energy storage batteries, smart meters that better track renewable energy consumption, renewable natural gas, solar and battery waste recycling, and carbon capture and storage.
Dramatic paradigm shifts are reshaping all industries. But global public health and energy are two areas where strategic, technology-based investments would allow Taiwan to use its established strengths in technology and harness disruption to its advantage. If Taiwan decisively pursues smart specialization in these key areas of technology, it has the chance to carve out fresh market niches, secure and expand its integration into the global economy, and set itself on a robust growth path for decades to come. Taiwan has already been one of the few success stories in dealing with COVID-19, and the crisis has only sharpened its potential advantage. Taiwan should not let that go to waste.