foreignpolicy--2020-08-31--Time Is Running Out in Belarus

Time Is Running Out in Belarus

Time Is Running Out in Belarus The authoritarian government of Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has escalated its crackdowns against the opposition as protests continue to flare across the country in the wake of a falsified presidential election .
Foreign journalists have been expelled en masse , and the embattled strongman president looks increasingly to be looking to Russia—where President Vladimir Putin is signaling stronger support for his fellow autocrat , emboldening Lukashenko to harsher actions even as tens of thousands of protests chant “ Tribunal !
Tribunal !
” outside his residence .
But Lukashenko may be misreading how far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ message was aimed at .
For the third Sunday in a row , Minsk was overflowing with protesters hoisting the red and white national flag .
Their sheer weight of numbers deterred the deployment of wide-scale violence against them and sent a message that Lukashenko could not simply wait them out .
But likewise , for the second week in a row , Lukashenko could be seen cavorting in a special forces uniform with a machine gun in hand .
When they have the numbers , the security forces have been confident in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when a hundred protesters sought sanctuary from the arrests in the iconic red-bricked neo-Romanesque Catholic Church of Saints Simon and Helena , security forces promptly barricaded the doors and trapped them inside .
Earlier Monday , immediately after the weekend protests , Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz , the archbishop of Minsk , was banned from reentering the nation after a trip to neighboring Poland .
The banning of the leader of the Catholic Church in Belarus ( also a Belarusian citizen , making his expulsion patently unconstitutional ) summons memories of the organized repression of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inevitably dashes all hopes of the Belarusian churches , one of precious few existing forces independent of the state , acting as potential intermediaries between the government and the opposition .
Earlier in the week , leaders from the opposition Transition Council , such as factory strike leader Sergei Dylevsky and opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya ’ s campaign aide Olga Kovalkova , were detained .
2015 Nobel Prize in Literature winner Svetlana Alexievich , the moral conscience of the council , was demonstratively called into the Investigative Committee for a deposition that lasted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Belarus , which has fully open borders and residency with Russia , is a core interest for Moscow .
How far the Kremlin would be willing to go to intervene on behalf of Lukashenko , with whom Putin has an acrimonious personal relationship , was an open question during the first two weeks of the political crisis .
But Putin ’ s announcement of the creation of a reserve police force that would be on call if authorities in Minsk ever requested assistance was a decisive , if also somewhat ambiguous , declaration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ underlined that it was not yet time for such assistance to be sent and that it would only be done if “ extremist elements ” —an unmistakable nod to the Ukrainian Maidan protests of 2014—began to disrupt order .
Moscow has already demonstrated its public willingness to lend assistance by sending media specialists to take over the running of Belarusian propaganda channels after some workers defected to the opposition and walked out of their studios .
Perhaps the statement was meant to publicly telegraph that Lukashenko had acquiesced to the totality of Moscow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be more pliable in the future .
Yet the relative ambiguity of Putin ’ s comments left Russia watchers divided on what his actual intentions were—which may have been the point .
The Lukashenko regime ’ s deep unpopularity makes the prospect of propping it up against the will of a recalcitrant majority a potentially risk-laden and expensive venture—I have observed affection for Russia dissipate by the day among protesters in Minsk—with the Kremlin perhaps settling on the calculation that Lukashenko needs it far more than it needs him .
Was this an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to shore up Lukashenko , or was it an implicit guarantee to the Belarusian protesters that intervention would not take place if the protests remained peaceful and manageable ?
The Russian population , which might not be thrilled with their children being ordered to shoot fellow Russian-speaking Orthodox Slavs in Belarus , would need to be adequately prepared by the Kremlin for an incursion that consisted of more than a few battalions of anti-riot police and OMON paramilitary specialized forces .
The European Union and the United States have taken a low-key approach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the exception of the vigorous efforts of neighboring Lithuania ) , and the paucity of pro-European slogans and EU flags in the streets of Minsk indicate a low risk of any successor to Lukashenko pivoting the country toward a clear anti-Moscow position .
The mass of the Belarusian population is more exhausted by the indignities of 26 years ’ worth of autocracy and , implicitly , a lack of progress in developing the nation in whatever direction than they are concerned with geopolitical positioning .
The general Russian population will be even less @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Belarus than it has been in Ukraine , where the long war has worn the public down despite the enthusiasm for the seizure of Crimea , and the Kremlin may have been gauging the predisposition of the Russian population with Putin ’ s comments .
Moscow ’ s resources have also been stretched thin in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic , which , coupled with a catastrophic drop in international gas and oil prices , along with the latest round of European sanctions and the uncertainty of the U.S. presidential elections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Squandering resources on the unpopular Lukashenko and incurring the reputational costs of doing so is definitely not a first-order priority for Russia .
Enforcing an orderly managed transition in Minsk toward a pragmatic and acceptable opposition figure who would not radically alter existing arrangements would be the best possible outcome for Moscow .
As the Belarusian economy has begun to unravel , with the Belarusian ruble in an inexorable decline on currency markets and tech companies announcing their imminent departure from Minsk , the Russian and Belarusian prime ministers announced late last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minsk ’ s debt .
The disciplined nonviolence of the Belarusian protesters represents their widely held understanding that these tactics are necessary for assuaging the Kremlin ’ s worries .
The workers will come to their side any day now , they insist , and the regime will quickly collapse .
In any case , it is becoming increasingly obvious that time is clearly not on the side of the Belarusian protesters .
Time-saving measures are Lukashenko ’ s main argument .
The longer the standoff continues between Lukashenko and the opposition who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and towns of Belarus , the more likely it is that the nation ’ s future will be decided in Moscow rather than in Minsk .

The authoritarian government of Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has escalated its crackdowns against the opposition as protests continue to flare across the country in the wake of a falsified presidential election. Foreign journalists have been expelled en masse, and the embattled strongman president looks increasingly to be looking to Russia—where President Vladimir Putin is signaling stronger support for his fellow autocrat, emboldening Lukashenko to harsher actions even as tens of thousands of protests chant “Tribunal! Tribunal!” outside his residence. But Lukashenko may be misreading how far Putin is willing to go—and who his message was aimed at.
The authoritarian government of Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has escalated its crackdowns against the opposition as protests continue to flare across the country in the wake of a falsified presidential election. Foreign journalists have been expelled en masse, and the embattled strongman president looks increasingly to be looking to Russia—where President Vladimir Putin is signaling stronger support for his fellow autocrat, emboldening Lukashenko to harsher actions even as tens of thousands of protests chant “Tribunal! Tribunal!” outside his residence. But Lukashenko may be misreading how far Putin is willing to go—and who his message was aimed at.
For the third Sunday in a row, Minsk was overflowing with protesters hoisting the red and white national flag. Their sheer weight of numbers deterred the deployment of wide-scale violence against them and sent a message that Lukashenko could not simply wait them out. But likewise, for the second week in a row, Lukashenko could be seen cavorting in a special forces uniform with a machine gun in hand.
When they have the numbers, the security forces have been confident in using force. On Wednesday night, when a hundred protesters sought sanctuary from the arrests in the iconic red-bricked neo-Romanesque Catholic Church of Saints Simon and Helena, security forces promptly barricaded the doors and trapped them inside. Earlier Monday, immediately after the weekend protests, Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, the archbishop of Minsk, was banned from reentering the nation after a trip to neighboring Poland. The banning of the leader of the Catholic Church in Belarus (also a Belarusian citizen, making his expulsion patently unconstitutional) summons memories of the organized repression of religion by communist authorities. It also inevitably dashes all hopes of the Belarusian churches, one of precious few existing forces independent of the state, acting as potential intermediaries between the government and the opposition.
Earlier in the week, leaders from the opposition Transition Council, such as factory strike leader Sergei Dylevsky and opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s campaign aide Olga Kovalkova, were detained. 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature winner Svetlana Alexievich, the moral conscience of the council, was demonstratively called into the Investigative Committee for a deposition that lasted only 15 minutes.
The fate of Belarus, which has fully open borders and residency with Russia, is a core interest for Moscow. How far the Kremlin would be willing to go to intervene on behalf of Lukashenko, with whom Putin has an acrimonious personal relationship, was an open question during the first two weeks of the political crisis.
But Putin’s announcement of the creation of a reserve police force that would be on call if authorities in Minsk ever requested assistance was a decisive, if also somewhat ambiguous, declaration of Moscow’s position. Putin underlined that it was not yet time for such assistance to be sent and that it would only be done if “extremist elements”—an unmistakable nod to the Ukrainian Maidan protests of 2014—began to disrupt order. Moscow has already demonstrated its public willingness to lend assistance by sending media specialists to take over the running of Belarusian propaganda channels after some workers defected to the opposition and walked out of their studios. Perhaps the statement was meant to publicly telegraph that Lukashenko had acquiesced to the totality of Moscow’s demands and had agreed to be more pliable in the future.
Yet the relative ambiguity of Putin’s comments left Russia watchers divided on what his actual intentions were—which may have been the point. The Lukashenko regime’s deep unpopularity makes the prospect of propping it up against the will of a recalcitrant majority a potentially risk-laden and expensive venture—I have observed affection for Russia dissipate by the day among protesters in Minsk—with the Kremlin perhaps settling on the calculation that Lukashenko needs it far more than it needs him.
Was this an open declaration of Moscow’s willingness to shore up Lukashenko, or was it an implicit guarantee to the Belarusian protesters that intervention would not take place if the protests remained peaceful and manageable? The Russian population, which might not be thrilled with their children being ordered to shoot fellow Russian-speaking Orthodox Slavs in Belarus, would need to be adequately prepared by the Kremlin for an incursion that consisted of more than a few battalions of anti-riot police and OMON paramilitary specialized forces.
The European Union and the United States have taken a low-key approach to the Belarusian political crisis (with the exception of the vigorous efforts of neighboring Lithuania), and the paucity of pro-European slogans and EU flags in the streets of Minsk indicate a low risk of any successor to Lukashenko pivoting the country toward a clear anti-Moscow position. The mass of the Belarusian population is more exhausted by the indignities of 26 years’ worth of autocracy and, implicitly, a lack of progress in developing the nation in whatever direction than they are concerned with geopolitical positioning. The general Russian population will be even less enthused at the prospect of direct intervention in Belarus than it has been in Ukraine, where the long war has worn the public down despite the enthusiasm for the seizure of Crimea, and the Kremlin may have been gauging the predisposition of the Russian population with Putin’s comments.
Moscow’s resources have also been stretched thin in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, which, coupled with a catastrophic drop in international gas and oil prices, along with the latest round of European sanctions and the uncertainty of the U.S. presidential elections, does not make this ideal timing. Squandering resources on the unpopular Lukashenko and incurring the reputational costs of doing so is definitely not a first-order priority for Russia.
Enforcing an orderly managed transition in Minsk toward a pragmatic and acceptable opposition figure who would not radically alter existing arrangements would be the best possible outcome for Moscow. As the Belarusian economy has begun to unravel, with the Belarusian ruble in an inexorable decline on currency markets and tech companies announcing their imminent departure from Minsk, the Russian and Belarusian prime ministers announced late last week the opening of talks to refinance Minsk’s debt. The disciplined nonviolence of the Belarusian protesters represents their widely held understanding that these tactics are necessary for assuaging the Kremlin’s worries. The workers will come to their side any day now, they insist, and the regime will quickly collapse.
In any case, it is becoming increasingly obvious that time is clearly not on the side of the Belarusian protesters. Time-saving measures are Lukashenko’s main argument. The longer the standoff continues between Lukashenko and the opposition who hold the streets all across the cities and towns of Belarus, the more likely it is that the nation’s future will be decided in Moscow rather than in Minsk.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-31--Lukashenko Unleashed Changes in Belarus That Are Out of His Control

Lukashenko Unleashed Changes in Belarus That Are Out of His Control The waves of protests that have swept Belarus since its disputed Aug. 9 election that pitted longtime ruler Alexander Lukashenko against Svetlana Tikhanovskaya , took many by surprise—even in Belarus .
But the seeds of the uprising were planted years ago .
Over the past decade , Belarusian society has changed immeasurably .
Although the country ’ s economy has generally stagnated , a middle class based on information-technology specialists and minor entrepreneurs emerged , more people had the money to travel all around Europe , and social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Belarus looks pretty different from the picture presented by the official state propaganda .
For a time , according to Zmicier Mickiewicz , a journalist at independent Belsat TV , Lukashenko was able to navigate those changes , building “ up his support amongst broad masses of Belarusians on the two main pillars : economic stability and the sense of social security , ” he said .
But more recently , those foundations had started to crumble .
“ The first was erased by the developing economic crisis and the second by neglecting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Going into this summer ’ s election , Belarusians were already increasingly skeptical of Lukashenko ’ s stewardship .
So when the official results handed him 80 percent of vote , few believed him .
They sided with Tikhanovskaya , who announced that , according to independent estimates , she had won .
Ever since , Belarusians have been out in protest .
On a recent Sunday in Independence Square in Minsk , it seemed that they wouldn ’ t stop until real change had come .
As many as 250,000 people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to resign immediately .
One young girl lifted a handmade drawing of the president depicting him as a vampire with razor-sharp teeth and a caption in English announcing : “ We are not your slaves.
” Whatever the outcome of the protests , the structural changes in society that started years ago have been sped up , and that is something no future leader will be able to undo .
“ Mom found my ponytail in my trousers ’ pocket .
I must have compulsively hid it before I partially passed out .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and firstly ordered [ me ] to eat it , but finally , they concentrated on beating me.
” Aleksei had been detained by a special paramilitary police squad , OMON , on the night of Aug. 12 to 13 .
The policeman who beat him had asked many times who his commander was and how much he was paid for participating in the demonstrations .
He was thrown back out on the street at some point after losing consciousness .
According to Anaïs Marin , the U.N. special rapporteur on the situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 7,000 people were arrested in the first four days of protests .
Most of them were beaten and tortured in police trucks and in a few prisons , particularly the Okrestina jail , which served as a central detention center .
Some detainees were forced to kneel with their heads on the ground and hands behind their backs for hours .
Others were kept in extremely crowded cells where they had to take turns to sit down .
“ I saw men kneeling on the floor covered with blood .
The woman that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but she was denied any food or medical help .
We were beaten by the female staff in the spine if we did not bow low enough , and I was punched a few times in the stomach .
Thirty of us was put into the cell with only four beds , ” said Belsat TV journalist Alyona Shcherbinskaya , who spent three days in Okrestina and another week in the hospital .
According to Nascia Maschava and Artur Finkevich , volunteers working with the detainees , many of them had not even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were seen dragging drivers from passing cars or detaining people coming back from cafes or heading to supermarkets .
“ The aim of this action was not to quell the protests but to intimidate society .
To show that no one is safe , ” said Vitalii Tsyhankou , a political analyst and journalist for Radio Free Europe .
Tyshankou was threatened with a handgun and pulled from his car with his wife before being detained and battered .
But as an intimidation tactic , such abuse is not working .
“ We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women standing in a chain stretching out for hundreds of meters outside Minsk ’ s largest marketplace , Kamarouski Rynak .
According to the World Bank , Belarusian gross domestic product per capita amounts to about $ 6,700 .
In Europe , only North Macedonia , Bosnia and Herzegovina , Albania , Georgia , Armenia , Moldova , Kosovo , Azerbaijan , and Ukraine are poorer .
At the same time , since 2015 , those other countries have mostly grown faster than Belarus .
That has made it clearer than ever that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and change is needed .
That shift in perspective has spread beyond the protestors in the big cities .
Pedestrians , drivers , and shopkeepers repeat that the spirit of solidarity is uniting them as a nation .
But notably , workers who traditionally support Lukashenko at huge industrial plants such as Minsk Automobile Plant , salt mines in the city of Soligorsk , and some collective farms have also decided to speak against him .
At the start of the protests , the economic conditions and pandemic may have been key , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government ’ s harsh repression of the protesters .
Meanwhile , news feeds on the popular messaging program Telegram have been providing a steady flow of independent information .
That is part of the reason , opponents say , Lukashenko could not understand at the beginning how to cope with demonstrations .
He was on the lookout for one leader to decapitate him , but he was confronted with a million-headed hydra instead .
“ Since August 9 , Lukashenko has been struggling for survival , ” argued Piotr Rudkouski , director of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ He has been fighting not only for keeping the power but for his freedom because if revolution prevailed , he would be prosecuted.
” But Rudkouski believes that the chances that the current protests will force him to resign are scant , especially since the so-called siloviki , higher-ups in the armed forces , are still backing his regime .
In his opinion , he said , the process of transition of power has already commenced , but it will presumably take not days or weeks , but instead months or even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , given the changes in society in recent years , the Belarusian population is no longer governable by Lukashenko ’ s political apparatus .
The only way for him to keep the control is to restore order using the police , the secret services , and potentially also the army .
Russian President Vladimir Putin has even warned that Russian is ready to back Lukashenko in the even of a crisis .
Both Minsk and Moscow have realized , in other words , that only force can keep Lukashenko in office .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it isn ’ t a long-term recipe for success .
“ We have already surprised ourselves that we are ready to unite against the regime , ” one of the protesters told me .
“ However , maybe it our last chance to overthrow it , and so we must persevere in our resistance.
” On that Sunday , a crowd of many thousands of protesters set off from Independence Square , marched across the streets of Minsk , and reached the monument dedicated to the Great Patriotic War , a term @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states to describe World War II .
The mighty spire was surrounded by metal barriers , barbed wire entanglements , and hundreds of soldiers .
Young men stood in a row with Kalashnikovs on their backs and their faces hidden under balaclavas .
A protester stopped in front of them , raised his hands , and spread the flag of a free Belarus over his head , shouting : “ We are Belarusians !
Join us.
” None of the soldiers moved , but some of their eyes flickered with uncertainty .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ separated by barbed wire .

The waves of protests that have swept Belarus since its disputed Aug. 9 election that pitted longtime ruler Alexander Lukashenko against Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, took many by surprise—even in Belarus. But the seeds of the uprising were planted years ago.
The waves of protests that have swept Belarus since its disputed Aug. 9 election that pitted longtime ruler Alexander Lukashenko against Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, took many by surprise—even in Belarus. But the seeds of the uprising were planted years ago.
Over the past decade, Belarusian society has changed immeasurably. Although the country’s economy has generally stagnated, a middle class based on information-technology specialists and minor entrepreneurs emerged, more people had the money to travel all around Europe, and social media revealed beyond dispute that the world outside Belarus looks pretty different from the picture presented by the official state propaganda.
For a time, according to Zmicier Mickiewicz, a journalist at independent Belsat TV, Lukashenko was able to navigate those changes, building “up his support amongst broad masses of Belarusians on the two main pillars: economic stability and the sense of social security,” he said. But more recently, those foundations had started to crumble. “The first was erased by the developing economic crisis and the second by neglecting the COVID pandemic,” he said. Going into this summer’s election, Belarusians were already increasingly skeptical of Lukashenko’s stewardship. So when the official results handed him 80 percent of vote, few believed him. They sided with Tikhanovskaya, who announced that, according to independent estimates, she had won.
Ever since, Belarusians have been out in protest. On a recent Sunday in Independence Square in Minsk, it seemed that they wouldn’t stop until real change had come. As many as 250,000 people gathered that day, calling on Lukashenko to resign immediately. One young girl lifted a handmade drawing of the president depicting him as a vampire with razor-sharp teeth and a caption in English announcing: “We are not your slaves.”
Whatever the outcome of the protests, the structural changes in society that started years ago have been sped up, and that is something no future leader will be able to undo.
Aleksei, who asked to be identified only by his first name, is more bookworm than battle-hardened street fighter ready to confront the police forces on the barricades. This year marks his second year of university. His girlfriend, Maria, is studying in the United States, but she returned home for a summer break. In the past few weeks, bruises and swelling have slowly taken over Aleksei’s legs, back, arms, and head. The young man sat on an armchair holding Maria’s hand with his good one. The other was in a cast and hung in a sling. Aleksei had spent the previous several days in the hospital, returning home only the day before we met. His head was marked with one patch of short tufts of hair.
“Mom found my ponytail in my trousers’ pocket. I must have compulsively hid it before I partially passed out. They cut it off with a knife and firstly ordered [me] to eat it, but finally, they concentrated on beating me.” Aleksei had been detained by a special paramilitary police squad, OMON, on the night of Aug. 12 to 13. The policeman who beat him had asked many times who his commander was and how much he was paid for participating in the demonstrations. He was thrown back out on the street at some point after losing consciousness.
According to Anaïs Marin, the U.N. special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, around 7,000 people were arrested in the first four days of protests. Most of them were beaten and tortured in police trucks and in a few prisons, particularly the Okrestina jail, which served as a central detention center. Some detainees were forced to kneel with their heads on the ground and hands behind their backs for hours. Others were kept in extremely crowded cells where they had to take turns to sit down. “I saw men kneeling on the floor covered with blood. The woman that was detained with me suffered from diabetes but she was denied any food or medical help. We were beaten by the female staff in the spine if we did not bow low enough, and I was punched a few times in the stomach. Thirty of us was put into the cell with only four beds,” said Belsat TV journalist Alyona Shcherbinskaya, who spent three days in Okrestina and another week in the hospital.
According to Nascia Maschava and Artur Finkevich, volunteers working with the detainees, many of them had not even participated in the protests. OMON officers were seen dragging drivers from passing cars or detaining people coming back from cafes or heading to supermarkets. “The aim of this action was not to quell the protests but to intimidate society. To show that no one is safe,” said Vitalii Tsyhankou, a political analyst and journalist for Radio Free Europe. Tyshankou was threatened with a handgun and pulled from his car with his wife before being detained and battered.
But as an intimidation tactic, such abuse is not working. “We are not afraid anymore,” chanted women standing in a chain stretching out for hundreds of meters outside Minsk’s largest marketplace, Kamarouski Rynak.
According to the World Bank, Belarusian gross domestic product per capita amounts to about $6,700. In Europe, only North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine are poorer. At the same time, since 2015, those other countries have mostly grown faster than Belarus. That has made it clearer than ever that the governing regime is doing something wrong and change is needed.
That shift in perspective has spread beyond the protestors in the big cities. Pedestrians, drivers, and shopkeepers repeat that the spirit of solidarity is uniting them as a nation. But notably, workers who traditionally support Lukashenko at huge industrial plants such as Minsk Automobile Plant, salt mines in the city of Soligorsk, and some collective farms have also decided to speak against him. At the start of the protests, the economic conditions and pandemic may have been key, but the real breaking point was the government’s harsh repression of the protesters.
Meanwhile, news feeds on the popular messaging program Telegram have been providing a steady flow of independent information. That is part of the reason, opponents say, Lukashenko could not understand at the beginning how to cope with demonstrations. He was on the lookout for one leader to decapitate him, but he was confronted with a million-headed hydra instead.
Still, what had been a major factor in the opposition’s success in the first stage of the protest might also be its biggest flaw. The lack of charismatic political leadership or a clear strategy for further protests might result in the gradual withering away of today’s revolutionary fervor. For now, Tikhanovskaya serves as a symbol of change, but it is doubtful that she is experienced enough or has the political allies to confront Lukashenko. Until recently, she was working as English teacher and interpreter and had not been engaged in politics. Moreover, after the recent election she was forced to flee Belarus and is currently in exile in Lithuania.
“Since August 9, Lukashenko has been struggling for survival,” argued Piotr Rudkouski, director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies. “He has been fighting not only for keeping the power but for his freedom because if revolution prevailed, he would be prosecuted.” But Rudkouski believes that the chances that the current protests will force him to resign are scant, especially since the so-called siloviki, higher-ups in the armed forces, are still backing his regime. In his opinion, he said, the process of transition of power has already commenced, but it will presumably take not days or weeks, but instead months or even years.
The bottom line is that, given the changes in society in recent years, the Belarusian population is no longer governable by Lukashenko’s political apparatus. The only way for him to keep the control is to restore order using the police, the secret services, and potentially also the army. Russian President Vladimir Putin has even warned that Russian is ready to back Lukashenko in the even of a crisis. Both Minsk and Moscow have realized, in other words, that only force can keep Lukashenko in office. That may work in the short term, but it isn’t a long-term recipe for success.
“For the first time in the post-Soviet history of Belarus,” Pit Paulau, a rock musician from the legendary anti-establishment band Niezaleznaja Respublika Mroja told me on Aug. 23. “I am no longer an outsider, but a completely ordinary person like millions of my fellow countrymen,” he continued, hinting at the way in which Belarusian society has swung toward his point of view. He pulled out his guitar, and as he plucked the strings, those gathered immediately picked chimed in with the words of the protest-song “Three Turtles,” the chorus of which goes: “Don’t wait, there will be no other surprises!”
“We have already surprised ourselves that we are ready to unite against the regime,” one of the protesters told me. “However, maybe it our last chance to overthrow it, and so we must persevere in our resistance.” On that Sunday, a crowd of many thousands of protesters set off from Independence Square, marched across the streets of Minsk, and reached the monument dedicated to the Great Patriotic War, a term used in Russia and some other post-Soviet states to describe World War II. The mighty spire was surrounded by metal barriers, barbed wire entanglements, and hundreds of soldiers.
Young men stood in a row with Kalashnikovs on their backs and their faces hidden under balaclavas. A protester stopped in front of them, raised his hands, and spread the flag of a free Belarus over his head, shouting: “We are Belarusians! Join us.” None of the soldiers moved, but some of their eyes flickered with uncertainty. The stalemate continues, and two Belaruses remain separated by barbed wire.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-31--Tibet Was China’s First Laboratory of Repression

Tibet Was China ’ s First Laboratory of Repression In the early 2000s , the Free Tibet movement galvanized the world .
From celebrity endorsements to Simpsons cameos , the media launched the plight of Tibet into the Western imagination ; the suffering of Tibetans under a foreign regime became well known .
But today , with atrocities in Xinjiang and Hong Kong dominating the narrative and Tibet now more sealed off than ever , news about the Himalayan region has been reduced to stray sentences in coverage on Chinese aggression .
Yet oppression in Tibet has only gotten worse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Xi Jinping announced plans to “ strengthen unity and socialism ” in Tibet by building an “ impregnable fortress ” to ward off splittism .
The Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) views Tibetan disobedience , violent or nonviolent , as separatism , which , in Beijing ’ s eyes , threatens national security and expansionism .
So when the 2008 Tibet protests erupted , fomented by discontent with decades-long repression , the CCP ruthlessly responded by killing and arbitrarily arresting protesters .
But these immediate measures were not enough .
The CCP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forced assimilation .
Chen Quanguo , then a rising star in the CCP , arrived in Tibet as the new party secretary in 2011 and rapidly transformed Tibet into one of the most pervasive police states in the world , a model that would soon be adopted in Xinjiang against the Muslim Uighurs .
Chen implemented an urban design—a panopticon-like system that is euphemistically referred to as “ grid-style social management ” —that enables CCP police officers to easily surveil Tibetans .
Also in the name of counterterrorism , Chen oversaw the formation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Orwellian social system in which family members are encouraged to report one another to the authorities at any hint of transgression .
In 2016 , Chen became Xinjiang ’ s Communist Party secretary and nationalized these policies , bringing the techniques practiced on Tibetans to Xinjiang .
China has additionally seized the opportunity presented by a saturated news cycle to facilitate sinister policies against Tibetans .
While the Hong Kong protests have absorbed fervent worldwide attention since last summer over an alarming extradition bill , Nepal and China signed a contentious extradition treaty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to negotiate diplomatic proposals between the two countries .
One proposal was a treaty that would extradite newly arrived Tibetan refugees from Nepal .
After initial reports that Nepali officials would not authorize the treaty , Xi met secretly with Nepal ’ s foreign minister , Pradeep Gyawali , to sign it .
This agreement condemns captured Tibetan refugees in Nepal to the rarely merciful penal system of mainland China .
The Hong Kong bill and protests may draw attention , but an independent government shifting its policies to appease Beijing is just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ honed in Xinjiang may be returning to their birthplace in Tibet .
The CCP passed a bill titled “ Regulations on the Establishment of a Model Area for Ethnic Unity and Progress in the Tibet Autonomous Region ” this spring , which aims to Sinicize Tibetans .
While the bill ’ s title seems innocuous , similar ethnic unity regulations in Xinjiang preceded the detention camps for Uighurs and other ethnic minorities .
The CCP strives to promote an “ All ethnic groups in China are one family ” narrative , since CCP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrary is considered a threat to CCP legitimacy .
It has become clear what this means in Xinjiang .
Ethnic unity means incarcerating millions of Uighurs in political reeducation camps , where detainees are forced to renounce Islam and profess devotion to communism .
Ethnic unity means that children can be forcefully separated from their parents at a CCP official ’ s whim .
Ethnic unity means that the Uighur identity must be beaten out of the individual .
Although attention has been understandably focused on Xinjiang ’ s vast network of prison @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human rights should cause equal alarm .
The new ethnic unity bill in Tibet is likely to presage a new round of cruel ethnonationalist policies under the guise of reeducation in Tibet .
This June , the CCP ordered the destruction of Tibetan Buddhist prayer flags , justifying it as “ behavioral reform , ” and Tibetan Buddhist monasteries are steadily restricted by CCP-appointed officials .
The CCP is fixated on “ fostering ethnic unity ” by dismantling Tibetans ’ and Uighurs ’ faith ; after all , according to Karl Marx , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Though state-ordered family separation is not as common in Tibet , enforced political reeducation has been integral to Tibetan prisons .
Other than the erasure of religion , increased language Sinicization will almost surely occur given that the CCP considers the Tibetan language as a vessel for separatism .
The ethnic unity dilemma may not be reserved for Tibetans and Uighurs either .
Recently , the CCP widened its language Sinicization ; teachers in Inner Mongolia will be forced to replace Mongolian-medium education with Chinese-medium education beginning in September .
The upcoming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tibet coverage .
In a rare move , five independent mandate holders at the United Nations , including two working groups and three special rapporteurs , recently demanded that the CCP provide more information regarding the whereabouts of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima—Tibet ’ s 11th Panchen Lama .
The Panchen Lama , second only to the Dalai Lama ’ s lama rank in Tibetan Buddhism , was kidnapped by the CCP in 1995 as a 6-year-old and was replaced by a Chinese-chosen figure .
The U.S. Congress is on the brink of passing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 , which passed the House of Representatives with a bipartisan supermajority vote and now awaits approval in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee .
The new Tibetan Policy and Support Act would update a 2002 U.S.-Tibet policy to account for a robust U.S. stance on Tibetan religious freedom in addition to the support of environmental protection of the Tibetan Plateau .
Understanding the future fate of Uighurs and Hong Kongers can be strengthened by studying the historical and ongoing repression of Tibetans .
The Associated Press first reported in June on the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Uighurs—a genocidal policy that was diabolically imposed on Tibetans decades ago .
Now , more than ever , journalists and foreign-policy makers must focus on Tibet to contextualize current events across the Asia-Pacific and to bear witness to the splintering human rights of Tibetans ; the lack of human rights has become so unbearable that 156 Tibetans have self-immolated since 2009 .
Based on the history of repression of Tibetans and Uighurs , which seems to work in tandem , the new ethnic unity bill in Tibet is a menacing harbinger for what @ @ @ @

In the early 2000s, the Free Tibet movement galvanized the world. From celebrity endorsements to Simpsons cameos , the media launched the plight of Tibet into the Western imagination; the suffering of Tibetans under a foreign regime became well known. But today, with atrocities in Xinjiang and Hong Kong dominating the narrative and Tibet now more sealed off than ever, news about the Himalayan region has been reduced to stray sentences in coverage on Chinese aggression.
In the early 2000s, the Free Tibet movement galvanized the world. From celebrity endorsements to Simpsons cameos, the media launched the plight of Tibet into the Western imagination; the suffering of Tibetans under a foreign regime became well known. But today, with atrocities in Xinjiang and Hong Kong dominating the narrative and Tibet now more sealed off than ever, news about the Himalayan region has been reduced to stray sentences in coverage on Chinese aggression.
Yet oppression in Tibet has only gotten worse. On Aug. 29, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced plans to “strengthen unity and socialism” in Tibet by building an “impregnable fortress” to ward off splittism. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views Tibetan disobedience, violent or nonviolent, as separatism, which, in Beijing’s eyes, threatens national security and expansionism. So when the 2008 Tibet protests erupted, fomented by discontent with decades-long repression, the CCP ruthlessly responded by killing and arbitrarily arresting protesters. But these immediate measures were not enough. The CCP began to plan a long-term policy of forced assimilation.
Chen Quanguo, then a rising star in the CCP, arrived in Tibet as the new party secretary in 2011 and rapidly transformed Tibet into one of the most pervasive police states in the world, a model that would soon be adopted in Xinjiang against the Muslim Uighurs. Chen implemented an urban design—a panopticon-like system that is euphemistically referred to as “grid-style social management”—that enables CCP police officers to easily surveil Tibetans. Also in the name of counterterrorism, Chen oversaw the formation of “double-linked households,” an Orwellian social system in which family members are encouraged to report one another to the authorities at any hint of transgression. In 2016, Chen became Xinjiang’s Communist Party secretary and nationalized these policies, bringing the techniques practiced on Tibetans to Xinjiang.
China has additionally seized the opportunity presented by a saturated news cycle to facilitate sinister policies against Tibetans. While the Hong Kong protests have absorbed fervent worldwide attention since last summer over an alarming extradition bill, Nepal and China signed a contentious extradition treaty in January. Xi arrived in Nepal to negotiate diplomatic proposals between the two countries. One proposal was a treaty that would extradite newly arrived Tibetan refugees from Nepal. After initial reports that Nepali officials would not authorize the treaty, Xi met secretly with Nepal’s foreign minister, Pradeep Gyawali, to sign it. This agreement condemns captured Tibetan refugees in Nepal to the rarely merciful penal system of mainland China. The Hong Kong bill and protests may draw attention, but an independent government shifting its policies to appease Beijing is just as worrying.
Meanwhile, the techniques honed in Xinjiang may be returning to their birthplace in Tibet. The CCP passed a bill titled “Regulations on the Establishment of a Model Area for Ethnic Unity and Progress in the Tibet Autonomous Region” this spring, which aims to Sinicize Tibetans. While the bill’s title seems innocuous, similar ethnic unity regulations in Xinjiang preceded the detention camps for Uighurs and other ethnic minorities. The CCP strives to promote an “All ethnic groups in China are one family” narrative, since CCP totalitarianism necessitates conformity and obedience—anything to the contrary is considered a threat to CCP legitimacy. It has become clear what this means in Xinjiang. Ethnic unity means incarcerating millions of Uighurs in political reeducation camps, where detainees are forced to renounce Islam and profess devotion to communism. Ethnic unity means that children can be forcefully separated from their parents at a CCP official’s whim. Ethnic unity means that the Uighur identity must be beaten out of the individual.
Although attention has been understandably focused on Xinjiang’s vast network of prison camps, the increasing oppression of Tibetan human rights should cause equal alarm. The new ethnic unity bill in Tibet is likely to presage a new round of cruel ethnonationalist policies under the guise of reeducation in Tibet. This June, the CCP ordered the destruction of Tibetan Buddhist prayer flags, justifying it as “behavioral reform,” and Tibetan Buddhist monasteries are steadily restricted by CCP-appointed officials. The CCP is fixated on “fostering ethnic unity” by dismantling Tibetans’ and Uighurs’ faith; after all, according to Karl Marx, religion is the opium of the masses. Though state-ordered family separation is not as common in Tibet, enforced political reeducation has been integral to Tibetan prisons. Other than the erasure of religion, increased language Sinicization will almost surely occur given that the CCP considers the Tibetan language as a vessel for separatism. The ethnic unity dilemma may not be reserved for Tibetans and Uighurs either. Recently, the CCP widened its language Sinicization; teachers in Inner Mongolia will be forced to replace Mongolian-medium education with Chinese-medium education beginning in September.
The upcoming months may see an international resurgence of Tibet coverage. In a rare move, five independent mandate holders at the United Nations, including two working groups and three special rapporteurs, recently demanded that the CCP provide more information regarding the whereabouts of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima—Tibet’s 11th Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama, second only to the Dalai Lama’s lama rank in Tibetan Buddhism, was kidnapped by the CCP in 1995 as a 6-year-old and was replaced by a Chinese-chosen figure. The U.S. Congress is on the brink of passing the new Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2019, which passed the House of Representatives with a bipartisan supermajority vote and now awaits approval in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The new Tibetan Policy and Support Act would update a 2002 U.S.-Tibet policy to account for a robust U.S. stance on Tibetan religious freedom in addition to the support of environmental protection of the Tibetan Plateau.
Understanding the future fate of Uighurs and Hong Kongers can be strengthened by studying the historical and ongoing repression of Tibetans. The Associated Press first reported in June on the Chinese government’s accelerated forced sterilization of Uighurs—a genocidal policy that was diabolically imposed on Tibetans decades ago. Now, more than ever, journalists and foreign-policy makers must focus on Tibet to contextualize current events across the Asia-Pacific and to bear witness to the splintering human rights of Tibetans; the lack of human rights has become so unbearable that 156 Tibetans have self-immolated since 2009. Based on the history of repression of Tibetans and Uighurs, which seems to work in tandem, the new ethnic unity bill in Tibet is a menacing harbinger for what may come next.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-31--How to Lose an Election on Foreign Policy

How to Lose an Election on Foreign Policy As the old adage goes , foreign policy doesn ’ t win you elections .
But sometimes it can lose them .
In the United Kingdom ’ s 2019 general election , which saw Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn thrashed by incumbent Boris Johnson , it may have been a key factor in Labour ’ s defeat .
A strong foreign-policy platform is unlikely to sway many undecided voters .
But in response to a national emergency , as Britain saw with Russia ’ s attempted nerve agent assassination of Sergei Skripal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public against you .
The Skripal case , where agents of Russia ’ s foreign military intelligence agency were caught on camera in Salisbury , England , attempting to murder a Russian former double agent with nerve agents that left him and his daughter Yulia paralyzed and killed a bystander , seized headlines in Britain .
But the response from the Labour leadership was to defend Russian President Vladimir Putin .
One of the more damning claims published last week in excerpts of Left Out : The Inside Story of Labour Under Corbyn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Maguire , is that Labour ’ s head of communications repeatedly attempted to steer Labour ’ s position away from holding the Russian government to account , including allegedly gutting a speech of “ any statements levelling blame at Russia , support for Nato , or anything else that Corbyn might regard as unduly imperialist in its tone.
” It was a fatal decision for Corbyn .
Despite some passionate yet misguided defenses of Corbyn ’ s skepticism , the evidence against Russia is overwhelming .
So are the signs that the decision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shaky Corbyn .
According to YouGov polling at the time , while 53 percent of the British electorate thought then Prime Minister Theresa May handled the Salisbury poisonings well , only 18 percent of the population thought the same of Corbyn ’ s reaction .
Up until that point in 2018 , Labour had been enjoying relative popularity in the polls , with Labour polling as high as 43 percent , but following Salisbury , those numbers began to fall .
While the Labour Party got a slight boost in the polling as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Brexit , Corbyn ’ s own personal popularity ratings never recovered .
As I explored in my podcast series Corbynism : The Post-Mortem , Corbyn ’ s Labour Party did not lose the 2019 general election because of the Salisbury poisonings alone—but they were a critical moment that embedded the image of Corbyn as weak and foolish .
This was driven almost entirely by Corbyn and his team , not by the Labour Party as a whole .
Throughout the affair , Corbyn seemed more determined to protect Putin ’ s reputation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moment for the Labour Party would come at Corbyn ’ s hands , as he stood in Parliament and demanded the prime minister explain whether she had complied with Moscow ’ s ludicrous request to be sent a sample of the Novichok nerve agent used to poison the Skripals , so that , as he later clarified , “ they can say categorically one way or the other ” whether the Russian state-manufactured nerve agent used in the attempted assassination of a Russian ex-spy belonged to them .
The response from Labour ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was so brutal that the deputy speaker was forced to intervene to ask them to stop shouting at their own leader .
It led to a wave of statements issued by Labour members of Parliament condemning Corbyn and supporting the government ’ s position on the attack , one of whom initiated an early-day motion identifying Russia as the culprit .
It was a disastrous public-relations debacle for the party , but the evidence that continued to emerge made it all the more damning .
Not only had Labour got it wrong , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ benefit of the doubt , he only added fuel to the disinformation war being waged by the Kremlin .
Labour ’ s approach to foreign policy had descended into farce long before the suspects were paraded on Russian state media as simple tourists longing to fly into the country to visit Salisbury Cathedral .
As the book reveals , Labour ’ s position on the Salisbury poisonings even provoked fury among members of the Labour leadership ’ s senior advisors .
James Mills , a former senior advisor to both Corbyn and then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to have said that position would cost them the election .
Speaking to Foreign Policy about the Salisbury fallout , Mills said while that he didn ’ t think the event on its own had an impact on the 2019 election , “ it was one of those cut through moments that many voters notice , which added more volume to the chorus of our detractors.
” “ At the time we were expecting a potential snap election , and we were targeting patriotic brexit/leave voters , so I doubt it helped us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tory attack lines permeate and crowd out our more positive messages , ” he said .
Media figures supportive of Corbyn , including Owen Jones and Paul Mason , have also pointed to the Skripal incident as a damaging moment for the Labour Party .
Corbyn ’ s former senior advisor Andrew Murray , someone who certainly can ’ t be described as a Russia hawk , said “ we were wrong.
” Speaking to Pogrund and Maguire , Murray also went further , by confirming what Labour ’ s fiercest critics had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s response : “ We just didn ’ t think the Russian state would be so stupid and brazen as to do something like that.
” This suggests that it wasn ’ t a fear of getting it wrong that drove Labour ’ s position , but a fundamentally flawed understanding of Putin ’ s a violent , oppressive mafia kleptocracy , which routinely murders its opponents in cruel and unusual ways .
But Labour ’ s foreign-policy positions under Corbyn weren ’ t an unfortunate accident .
Seumas Milne , the man @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have edited speeches to remove critical positions against Russia , has a long history of defending or downplaying Russian military aggression , and was even hosted by Putin at the Valdai Discussion Club .
Labour ’ s official foreign-policy positions routinely fell in line with Kremlin talking points , and the pro-Labour commentariat provided fertile ground for conspiracism .
While Labour ’ s indifference on Syria did not cut through to the British electorate , who have grown weary of conflicts in the Middle East since Iraq , Corbyn ’ s team fundamentally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the benefit of the doubt following a chemical-weapons atrocity that killed a British civilian on the streets of Salisbury .
Some 73 percent of the British electorate were convinced Russia was responsible for the Russian nerve agent attack on a Russian ex-spy , and only 5 percent of the population thought otherwise .
While Britons were watching the scenes of horror as chemical-hazard response teams were deployed to the streets of Salisbury , Milne was warning the press lobby about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction .
Milne was certainly using his considerable influence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense of the Kremlin , not the British people—and Corbyn went happily along with him .
Foreign policy was never going to win Labour ’ s anti-imperialist leader a general election .
But the electorate ’ s perception that Labour was eager to defend the culprits behind a war crime on British soil ensured that Labour could not escape its eventual defeat .
Ultimately , in the case of the Salisbury poisoning , by prioritizing Milne ’ s anti-imperialist approach to the Kremlin , Labour sent a message to voters that it put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and security of the British people .
After electing a new party leader , the lawyer Keir Starmer , who represented Marina Litvinenko , the widow of another Putin poisoning victim , it is hopefully a mistake it won t make again .

As the old adage goes, foreign policy doesn’t win you elections. But sometimes it can lose them. In the United Kingdom’s 2019 general election, which saw Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn thrashed by incumbent Boris Johnson, it may have been a key factor in Labour’s defeat.
As the old adage goes, foreign policy doesn’t win you elections. But sometimes it can lose them. In the United Kingdom’s 2019 general election, which saw Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn thrashed by incumbent Boris Johnson, it may have been a key factor in Labour’s defeat.
A strong foreign-policy platform is unlikely to sway many undecided voters. But in response to a national emergency, as Britain saw with Russia’s attempted nerve agent assassination of Sergei Skripal, a weak response clearly turns the public against you.
The Skripal case, where agents of Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency were caught on camera in Salisbury, England, attempting to murder a Russian former double agent with nerve agents that left him and his daughter Yulia paralyzed and killed a bystander, seized headlines in Britain. But the response from the Labour leadership was to defend Russian President Vladimir Putin. One of the more damning claims published last week in excerpts of Left Out: The Inside Story of Labour Under Corbyn, written by Gabriel Pogrund and Patrick Maguire, is that Labour’s head of communications repeatedly attempted to steer Labour’s position away from holding the Russian government to account, including allegedly gutting a speech of “any statements levelling blame at Russia, support for Nato, or anything else that Corbyn might regard as unduly imperialist in its tone.”
It was a fatal decision for Corbyn. Despite some passionate yet misguided defenses of Corbyn’s skepticism, the evidence against Russia is overwhelming. So are the signs that the decision was a crippling one for an already shaky Corbyn.
According to YouGov polling at the time, while 53 percent of the British electorate thought then Prime Minister Theresa May handled the Salisbury poisonings well, only 18 percent of the population thought the same of Corbyn’s reaction. Up until that point in 2018, Labour had been enjoying relative popularity in the polls, with Labour polling as high as 43 percent, but following Salisbury, those numbers began to fall. While the Labour Party got a slight boost in the polling as May’s premiership ran into problems with Brexit, Corbyn’s own personal popularity ratings never recovered. As I explored in my podcast series Corbynism: The Post-Mortem, Corbyn’s Labour Party did not lose the 2019 general election because of the Salisbury poisonings alone—but they were a critical moment that embedded the image of Corbyn as weak and foolish.
This was driven almost entirely by Corbyn and his team, not by the Labour Party as a whole. Throughout the affair, Corbyn seemed more determined to protect Putin’s reputation than British citizens. The most humiliating moment for the Labour Party would come at Corbyn’s hands, as he stood in Parliament and demanded the prime minister explain whether she had complied with Moscow’s ludicrous request to be sent a sample of the Novichok nerve agent used to poison the Skripals, so that, as he later clarified, “they can say categorically one way or the other” whether the Russian state-manufactured nerve agent used in the attempted assassination of a Russian ex-spy belonged to them.
The response from Labour’s own backbenchers to this staggering naiveté was so brutal that the deputy speaker was forced to intervene to ask them to stop shouting at their own leader. It led to a wave of statements issued by Labour members of Parliament condemning Corbyn and supporting the government’s position on the attack, one of whom initiated an early-day motion identifying Russia as the culprit.
It was a disastrous public-relations debacle for the party, but the evidence that continued to emerge made it all the more damning. Not only had Labour got it wrong, but by attempting to give Putin the benefit of the doubt, he only added fuel to the disinformation war being waged by the Kremlin. Labour’s approach to foreign policy had descended into farce long before the suspects were paraded on Russian state media as simple tourists longing to fly into the country to visit Salisbury Cathedral.
As the book reveals, Labour’s position on the Salisbury poisonings even provoked fury among members of the Labour leadership’s senior advisors. James Mills, a former senior advisor to both Corbyn and then Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell, was reported to have said that position would cost them the election.
Speaking to Foreign Policy about the Salisbury fallout, Mills said while that he didn’t think the event on its own had an impact on the 2019 election, “it was one of those cut through moments that many voters notice, which added more volume to the chorus of our detractors.”
“At the time we were expecting a potential snap election, and we were targeting patriotic brexit/leave voters, so I doubt it helped us with those voters as it helped the Tory attack lines permeate and crowd out our more positive messages,” he said.
Media figures supportive of Corbyn, including Owen Jones and Paul Mason, have also pointed to the Skripal incident as a damaging moment for the Labour Party.
Corbyn’s former senior advisor Andrew Murray, someone who certainly can’t be described as a Russia hawk, said “we were wrong.” Speaking to Pogrund and Maguire, Murray also went further, by confirming what Labour’s fiercest critics had said all along about the party’s response: “We just didn’t think the Russian state would be so stupid and brazen as to do something like that.”
This suggests that it wasn’t a fear of getting it wrong that drove Labour’s position, but a fundamentally flawed understanding of Putin’s a violent, oppressive mafia kleptocracy, which routinely murders its opponents in cruel and unusual ways.
But Labour’s foreign-policy positions under Corbyn weren’t an unfortunate accident. Seumas Milne, the man who is alleged by former staffers to have edited speeches to remove critical positions against Russia, has a long history of defending or downplaying Russian military aggression, and was even hosted by Putin at the Valdai Discussion Club.
Labour’s official foreign-policy positions routinely fell in line with Kremlin talking points, and the pro-Labour commentariat provided fertile ground for conspiracism. While Labour’s indifference on Syria did not cut through to the British electorate, who have grown weary of conflicts in the Middle East since Iraq, Corbyn’s team fundamentally miscalculated when they attempted to give Putin the benefit of the doubt following a chemical-weapons atrocity that killed a British civilian on the streets of Salisbury.
Some 73 percent of the British electorate were convinced Russia was responsible for the Russian nerve agent attack on a Russian ex-spy, and only 5 percent of the population thought otherwise. While Britons were watching the scenes of horror as chemical-hazard response teams were deployed to the streets of Salisbury, Milne was warning the press lobby about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Milne was certainly using his considerable influence, but he was using it in defense of the Kremlin, not the British people—and Corbyn went happily along with him.
Foreign policy was never going to win Labour’s anti-imperialist leader a general election. But the electorate’s perception that Labour was eager to defend the culprits behind a war crime on British soil ensured that Labour could not escape its eventual defeat.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-31--Deadly Restraints Are a Stain on the EU

Deadly Restraints Are a Stain on the EU

Deadly Restraints Are a Stain on the EU Blurry security camera footage showed the guards carrying the teenager into a cramped room , with his hands bound behind his back .
Thirteen minutes later , he was dead .
Iliass Tahiri was just 18 years old when he was strapped face down to a bed by six security staff in a center for juvenile offenders in Andalusia , Spain .
Two of the men knelt on his back until he stopped breathing .
Tahiri ’ s death in July 2019 was declared accidental by a judge in January , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Spanish newspaper El País in June—has called that decision into question .
Tahiri ’ s family is now calling for homicide charges against the guards , and the use of straps will likely be used as a legal defense to argue that his death was not deliberate .
But more broadly , the physical restraints that contributed to his death remain widely used in law enforcement and mental health settings throughout the European Union .
Several EU countries present themselves as world leaders in human rights .
The EU reacted forcefully to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ knee of a Minneapolis police officer , and politicians are quick to condemn violence on the part of law enforcement often framed as uniquely American .
But the dangerous use of body weight and strap restraints remains common in Denmark , France , Spain , Sweden and the United Kingdom .
The recourse to involuntary restraint for minor infractions or disturbances is at odds with the EU ’ s long-standing positions on human rights , undermining its advocacy around the world .
The conversation around Tahiri ’ s death reflects a growing debate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against minorities—Tahiri was born in Morocco—and the continued use of deadly restraints against suspected criminals , ethnic minorities , and the mentally ill .
In too many EU countries , anyone considered an imminent danger to themselves or others can be targeted for violent restraint .
In France , debate about the use of deadly police chokeholds has raged since the death in January of Cédric Chouviat , a 42-year-old deliveryman who was pinned to the ground while still wearing a motorcycle helmet and went into cardiac arrest as a result .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , though Chouviat ’ s family is calling for murder charges .
Meanwhile , law enforcement officials succeeded in postponing a proposed ban following the incident .
“ Substitution techniques ” are due to be announced in September .
In the United Kingdom , 10 percent of deaths in police custody were attributed to the use of restraints between 2004 and 2015 , including straps .
The sister of Sheku Bayoh , a man who choked to death in 2015 in Scotland while being restrained by police , said that Floyd ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s—down to the men ’ s last words : “ I can ’ t breathe.
” Mechanical restraint is supposed to be a measure of last resort , but it was used at least 360 times in Andalusia ’ s youth detention centers in 2017 and 2018 .
In Spain , Tahiri was the third teenager to die while subjected to mechanical restraint , or restraint with a belt and straps , in the past decade .
Mechanical restraint is supposed to be a measure of last resort , but it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s youth detention centers in 2017 and 2018 , according to official data .
Spanish youth detention centers restrain juveniles to beds for hours for infractions such as jumping into a swimming pool without permission or declining to undress for religious reasons .
Tahiri ’ s detention center said he struggled violently with the guards , but the video footage shows him limp in their arms .
As young men move into adult prisons , the use of mechanical restraints becomes more common .
“ There are so many cases of [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people being beaten , ” said Christian Loda of the Council of Europe ’ s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ( CPT ) , recalling a visit to several Spanish prisons in 2016 .
Inmates reported being beaten on the soles of their feet while tied down .
“ This really falls into the category of what may amount to torture , because the [ mechanical restraint ] lasted in some cases up to a couple of weeks without interruption , ” Loda said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protocols play a role in the overuse of restraints against vulnerable offenders in Spain—sometimes with lethal results .
The Association for the Management of Social Integration ( Ginso ) , the private company that runs the juvenile detention center where Tahiri died , has received complaints of abuse for years .
When ex-employees released images of children strapped to beds , Ginso pursued them in court under right-to-privacy legislation .
The security guards at Tierras de Oria received just 10 hours of training in surveillance before starting work in the juvenile center , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There is a lack of transparency and accountability in these centres , which is extremely problematic , and there is not sufficient human rights and conflict prevention training for guards and other workers , ” Sira Rego , a Spanish deputy in the European Parliament , wrote in an email to Foreign Policy .
In the EU , there is significant overlap between law enforcement and mental health interventions .
The use of restraints in clinical settings is also common throughout Europe , though it generally receives less criticism due to the perceived @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
One of the harshest places in Europe for the mentally ill is Denmark .
The CPT recently criticized a Danish mental hospital where one patient was kept strapped to a bed for 13 months .
In mental-health institutions in England , 2,875 people were held down by staff in a face-down position—considered to be dangerous—and 7,399 people were subjected to other physical restraint in 2018 and 2019 , according to figures shared with Foreign Policy by the British mental health charity Mind .
Black and multiracial people were subjected to these measures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people .
A small number of psychiatrists now question whether violent restraint is morally justified , including in law enforcement settings , but imagining a mental hospital where restraints are never used is difficult for most clinicians .
“ The culture and environment of wards can create the situations where restraint is used , ” said Alison Cobb , a specialist policy advisor at Mind .
Overcrowding , arbitrary rules , and closed wards increase the likelihood of agitation and the recourse to restraints .
“ Reducing the use of restraint starts with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Cobb said .
Roberto Mezzina , who recently retired from running the mental health department of the city of Trieste ’ s public health system , subscribes to a school of thought founded by the Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia .
Basaglia believed in a “ whole life ” intervention for the mentally ill , which led to the permanent closure of Italy ’ s mental hospitals by a 1978 law still associated with his name .
During his five-decade career , Mezzina never put a patient into a restraint , he said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refined Basaglia ’ s model of talking therapies , family involvement , and a focus on employment and social inclusion .
In the Friuli Venezia Giulia region , walk-in mental health centers are open 24 hours a day .
Italy has the lowest rate of involuntary treatment in Europe—and in Trieste , mental health centers never use restraints , according to Mezzina .
Mental health professionals are called to scenes of self-harm or violence , not police , and can spend hours negotiating with vulnerable citizens .
“ People are treated with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Mezzina said .
Mezzina said that the Basaglia approach should also be used by law enforcement in Italy and beyond , adding that those suspected of crimes , the mentally ill , and the disabled should not lose their rights when they come into contact with the authorities .
Mezzina is particularly critical of the U.K. ’ s risk assessment culture , which leaves little room for clinical judgment .
“ They just follow the procedures .
And that ’ s a terrible thing , especially because now it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is to protect staff in mental health and police staff , ” Mezzina said—rather than minimizing risk through speaking “ like two human beings.
” The Basaglia method has so far only been used to inform police forces studying de-escalation and negotiation rather than applied toward wholesale reform .
For mental health clinicians outside of Italy , it is considered quixotic and even idealistic .
But for the Tahiris and Chouviats of Europe , any reforms concerning the use of restraints will come too late .

Blurry security camera footage showed the guards carrying the teenager into a cramped room, with his hands bound behind his back. Thirteen minutes later, he was dead.
Blurry security camera footage showed the guards carrying the teenager into a cramped room, with his hands bound behind his back. Thirteen minutes later, he was dead.
Iliass Tahiri was just 18 years old when he was strapped face down to a bed by six security staff in a center for juvenile offenders in Andalusia, Spain. Two of the men knelt on his back until he stopped breathing. Tahiri’s death in July 2019 was declared accidental by a judge in January, but the footage of his last moments—released by the Spanish newspaper El País in June—has called that decision into question.
Tahiri’s family is now calling for homicide charges against the guards, and the use of straps will likely be used as a legal defense to argue that his death was not deliberate. But more broadly, the physical restraints that contributed to his death remain widely used in law enforcement and mental health settings throughout the European Union.
Several EU countries present themselves as world leaders in human rights. The EU reacted forcefully to the death of George Floyd under the knee of a Minneapolis police officer, and politicians are quick to condemn violence on the part of law enforcement often framed as uniquely American. But the dangerous use of body weight and strap restraints remains common in Denmark, France, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The recourse to involuntary restraint for minor infractions or disturbances is at odds with the EU’s long-standing positions on human rights, undermining its advocacy around the world.
The conversation around Tahiri’s death reflects a growing debate in the European Union about police brutality against minorities—Tahiri was born in Morocco—and the continued use of deadly restraints against suspected criminals, ethnic minorities, and the mentally ill. In too many EU countries, anyone considered an imminent danger to themselves or others can be targeted for violent restraint.
In France, debate about the use of deadly police chokeholds has raged since the death in January of Cédric Chouviat, a 42-year-old deliveryman who was pinned to the ground while still wearing a motorcycle helmet and went into cardiac arrest as a result. The officers involved have been charged with manslaughter, though Chouviat’s family is calling for murder charges. Meanwhile, law enforcement officials succeeded in postponing a proposed ban following the incident. “Substitution techniques” are due to be announced in September.
In the United Kingdom, 10 percent of deaths in police custody were attributed to the use of restraints between 2004 and 2015, including straps. The sister of Sheku Bayoh, a man who choked to death in 2015 in Scotland while being restrained by police, said that Floyd’s case had shocking similarities with her brother’s—down to the men’s last words: “I can’t breathe.”
Mechanical restraint is supposed to be a measure of last resort, but it was used at least 360 times in Andalusia’s youth detention centers in 2017 and 2018.
In Spain, Tahiri was the third teenager to die while subjected to mechanical restraint, or restraint with a belt and straps, in the past decade. Mechanical restraint is supposed to be a measure of last resort, but it was used at least 360 times in Andalusia’s youth detention centers in 2017 and 2018, according to official data. Spanish youth detention centers restrain juveniles to beds for hours for infractions such as jumping into a swimming pool without permission or declining to undress for religious reasons. Tahiri’s detention center said he struggled violently with the guards, but the video footage shows him limp in their arms.
As young men move into adult prisons, the use of mechanical restraints becomes more common. “There are so many cases of [mechanical restraint] combined with ill-treatment, of people being beaten,” said Christian Loda of the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), recalling a visit to several Spanish prisons in 2016.
Inmates reported being beaten on the soles of their feet while tied down. “This really falls into the category of what may amount to torture, because the [mechanical restraint] lasted in some cases up to a couple of weeks without interruption,” Loda said.
A lack of training and rigid protocols play a role in the overuse of restraints against vulnerable offenders in Spain—sometimes with lethal results. The Association for the Management of Social Integration (Ginso), the private company that runs the juvenile detention center where Tahiri died, has received complaints of abuse for years. When ex-employees released images of children strapped to beds, Ginso pursued them in court under right-to-privacy legislation. The security guards at Tierras de Oria received just 10 hours of training in surveillance before starting work in the juvenile center, according to a 2016 report.
“There is a lack of transparency and accountability in these centres, which is extremely problematic, and there is not sufficient human rights and conflict prevention training for guards and other workers,” Sira Rego, a Spanish deputy in the European Parliament, wrote in an email to Foreign Policy.
Holding or tying a person down against their will usually occurs in two contexts: law enforcement and psychiatric settings. In the EU, there is significant overlap between law enforcement and mental health interventions. Around 10 to 15 percent of Europe’s prison population suffers from severe mental illnesses such as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, or autistic disorders, compared with 1.3 percent of people across the whole EU population.
In the EU, there is significant overlap between law enforcement and mental health interventions.
The use of restraints in clinical settings is also common throughout Europe, though it generally receives less criticism due to the perceived risk of patients to themselves and others. One of the harshest places in Europe for the mentally ill is Denmark. The CPT recently criticized a Danish mental hospital where one patient was kept strapped to a bed for 13 months.
In mental-health institutions in England, 2,875 people were held down by staff in a face-down position—considered to be dangerous—and 7,399 people were subjected to other physical restraint in 2018 and 2019, according to figures shared with Foreign Policy by the British mental health charity Mind. Black and multiracial people were subjected to these measures at rates three times higher than white people.
A small number of psychiatrists now question whether violent restraint is morally justified, including in law enforcement settings, but imagining a mental hospital where restraints are never used is difficult for most clinicians. “The culture and environment of wards can create the situations where restraint is used,” said Alison Cobb, a specialist policy advisor at Mind.
Overcrowding, arbitrary rules, and closed wards increase the likelihood of agitation and the recourse to restraints. “Reducing the use of restraint starts with getting the quality of care right,” Cobb said.
In one corner of northeastern Italy, mental health institutions have not tied down a patient in decades, and clinicians there say the police should follow their example.
Roberto Mezzina, who recently retired from running the mental health department of the city of Trieste’s public health system, subscribes to a school of thought founded by the Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia. Basaglia believed in a “whole life” intervention for the mentally ill, which led to the permanent closure of Italy’s mental hospitals by a 1978 law still associated with his name. During his five-decade career, Mezzina never put a patient into a restraint, he said.
In Trieste, mental-health professionals have refined Basaglia’s model of talking therapies, family involvement, and a focus on employment and social inclusion. In the Friuli Venezia Giulia region, walk-in mental health centers are open 24 hours a day. Italy has the lowest rate of involuntary treatment in Europe—and in Trieste, mental health centers never use restraints, according to Mezzina. Mental health professionals are called to scenes of self-harm or violence, not police, and can spend hours negotiating with vulnerable citizens. “People are treated with the highest level of respect in a negotiation,” Mezzina said.
Mezzina said that the Basaglia approach should also be used by law enforcement in Italy and beyond, adding that those suspected of crimes, the mentally ill, and the disabled should not lose their rights when they come into contact with the authorities. Mezzina is particularly critical of the U.K.’s risk assessment culture, which leaves little room for clinical judgment.
“They just follow the procedures. And that’s a terrible thing, especially because now it’s supported by another defensive attitude, which is to protect staff in mental health and police staff,” Mezzina said—rather than minimizing risk through speaking “like two human beings.”
The Basaglia method has so far only been used to inform police forces studying de-escalation and negotiation rather than applied toward wholesale reform. For mental health clinicians outside of Italy, it is considered quixotic and even idealistic.
But for the Tahiris and Chouviats of Europe, any reforms concerning the use of restraints will come too late.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-31--America’s Elections Are Under Threat—and Congress Is Being Bypassed

America ’ s Elections Are Under Threat—and Congress Is Being Bypassed The decision by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence ( ODNI ) that it will no longer brief the House and Senate intelligence committees on matters of election security is an abdication of its duty to inform Congress .
The 2016 elections made clear that the United States is not immune to interference in its elections .
Special counsel Robert Mueller ’ s report noted the “ sweeping and systematic fashion ” in which Russia interfered in the 2016 election , highlighting the scope of the challenge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidential election around the corner and reports of Russian interference already underway , the urgency to get this right has never been so clear .
Ensuring that elections are secure should not be a partisan issue—and it ’ s just the baseline for what needs to be done .
The ODNI ’ s decision to shift to written briefings puts significant limits on the ability of lawmakers—on both sides of the aisle—to ask questions of intelligence officials and communicate to the American people important information about the upcoming election .
This decision threatens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ every American citizen .
President Donald Trump has in recent weeks launched attacks on mail-in voting and the U.S .
Postal Service , raising questions about the sanctity of the country ’ s political process .
By canceling all briefings on election security , the Trump administration now seeks to keep Congress in the dark too .
If the American people lose confidence in the election , democracy falls apart .
Every elected official in this country should prioritize ensuring election security ahead of November and beyond .
Ensuring that elections are secure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There are five steps the federal government should take to protect the election .
First , every congressional leader should step up to demand that the Trump administration reverse this decision and push the ODNI to immediately schedule briefings in front of the House and Senate intelligence committees to inform Congress about the security of U.S. elections .
While this issue may seem divided along party lines , such a move is in fact politically advantageous at an individual level : After all , every congressional leader has a vested interest in ensuring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration doesn ’ t reverse this decision , the House should move to subpoena intelligence officials to testify on election security before the November vote .
Second , the federal government must take decisive action to protect against attacks from foreign actors before Election Day .
The U.S. government needs to communicate to Russia and other adversaries that interference in its elections represents a dangerous attack on the United States and will be responded to with severe consequences .
Polling has indicated that a majority of Americans have concerns about election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in mitigating these concerns—a fact that lawmakers should publicly remind him of , especially given his recent focus on domestic law and order—by calling out Russia loudly and clearly and with warnings of severe repercussions if interference is detected .
Third , Congress should provide emergency funding to support election security .
With reports of interference underway , every elected representative should be invested in maintaining the trust of the American people and ensuring that they have faith in the electoral process .
Emergency funding would support state and local governments ahead of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources necessary to protect against cyberattacks .
The Mueller report highlighted that Russian hackers targeted election technology firms and county officials who are responsible for administering the vote .
These officials are vulnerable because , in many cases , they lack the resources to hire staff with expertise in cybersecurity .
In the coming weeks , states must hire additional information technology staff , update software , and work to secure election websites that provide information on mail-in ballots , early voting , polling locations and times , as well as registration status @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potential attacks on election night reporting systems and protect against attempts to take down websites providing critical election information .
Fourth , the federal government should work with industry partners to identify and counter imminent disinformation threats on the internet .
In the short term , the intelligence community and the consumer internet industry must work together to effectively tackle acute disinformation threats as they arise .
Internet platforms can benefit from the intelligence agencies ’ capacities in information sharing and analysis .
Congressional leaders in the House and Senate should lead the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work with technology companies to combat disinformation ahead of the election .
Finally , the American people should be made aware of all threats to their elections .
The Trump administration and members of Congress should communicate to the public what Americans should be concerned about and what efforts are being taken to secure the elections .
ODNI ’ s decision to cancel all election security briefings keeps the American people in the dark , leaving voters unsure of whether foreign actors may be attempting to interfere in the election .
Congress must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Trump administration needs to step up to protect the world ’ s biggest election in 2020—the stakes are simply too high .

The decision by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that it will no longer brief the House and Senate intelligence committees on matters of election security is an abdication of its duty to inform Congress. The 2016 elections made clear that the United States is not immune to interference in its elections. Special counsel Robert Mueller’s report noted the “sweeping and systematic fashion” in which Russia interfered in the 2016 election, highlighting the scope of the challenge to protect U.S. elections. With another presidential election around the corner and reports of Russian interference already underway, the urgency to get this right has never been so clear.
The decision by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that it will no longer brief the House and Senate intelligence committees on matters of election security is an abdication of its duty to inform Congress. The 2016 elections made clear that the United States is not immune to interference in its elections. Special counsel Robert Mueller’s report noted the “sweeping and systematic fashion” in which Russia interfered in the 2016 election, highlighting the scope of the challenge to protect U.S. elections. With another presidential election around the corner and reports of Russian interference already underway, the urgency to get this right has never been so clear.
Ensuring that elections are secure should not be a partisan issue—and it’s just the baseline for what needs to be done. The ODNI’s decision to shift to written briefings puts significant limits on the ability of lawmakers—on both sides of the aisle—to ask questions of intelligence officials and communicate to the American people important information about the upcoming election. This decision threatens to undermine the vote and voice of every American citizen.
President Donald Trump has in recent weeks launched attacks on mail-in voting and the U.S. Postal Service, raising questions about the sanctity of the country’s political process. By canceling all briefings on election security, the Trump administration now seeks to keep Congress in the dark too. If the American people lose confidence in the election, democracy falls apart. Every elected official in this country should prioritize ensuring election security ahead of November and beyond.
Ensuring that elections are secure should not be a partisan issue.
There are five steps the federal government should take to protect the election.
First, every congressional leader should step up to demand that the Trump administration reverse this decision and push the ODNI to immediately schedule briefings in front of the House and Senate intelligence committees to inform Congress about the security of U.S. elections. While this issue may seem divided along party lines, such a move is in fact politically advantageous at an individual level: After all, every congressional leader has a vested interest in ensuring the electoral process is secure. If the Trump administration doesn’t reverse this decision, the House should move to subpoena intelligence officials to testify on election security before the November vote.
Second, the federal government must take decisive action to protect against attacks from foreign actors before Election Day. The U.S. government needs to communicate to Russia and other adversaries that interference in its elections represents a dangerous attack on the United States and will be responded to with severe consequences. Polling has indicated that a majority of Americans have concerns about election security. Trump has a personal interest in mitigating these concerns—a fact that lawmakers should publicly remind him of, especially given his recent focus on domestic law and order—by calling out Russia loudly and clearly and with warnings of severe repercussions if interference is detected.
Third, Congress should provide emergency funding to support election security. With reports of interference underway, every elected representative should be invested in maintaining the trust of the American people and ensuring that they have faith in the electoral process. Emergency funding would support state and local governments ahead of Election Day to ensure they have the resources necessary to protect against cyberattacks. The Mueller report highlighted that Russian hackers targeted election technology firms and county officials who are responsible for administering the vote. These officials are vulnerable because, in many cases, they lack the resources to hire staff with expertise in cybersecurity. In the coming weeks, states must hire additional information technology staff, update software, and work to secure election websites that provide information on mail-in ballots, early voting, polling locations and times, as well as registration status. States should work to secure against potential attacks on election night reporting systems and protect against attempts to take down websites providing critical election information.
Fourth, the federal government should work with industry partners to identify and counter imminent disinformation threats on the internet. In the short term, the intelligence community and the consumer internet industry must work together to effectively tackle acute disinformation threats as they arise. Internet platforms can benefit from the intelligence agencies’ capacities in information sharing and analysis. Congressional leaders in the House and Senate should lead the effort to question ODNI about efforts to work with technology companies to combat disinformation ahead of the election.
Finally, the American people should be made aware of all threats to their elections. The Trump administration and members of Congress should communicate to the public what Americans should be concerned about and what efforts are being taken to secure the elections.
ODNI’s decision to cancel all election security briefings keeps the American people in the dark, leaving voters unsure of whether foreign actors may be attempting to interfere in the election. Congress must immediately be briefed on election security, and the Trump administration needs to step up to protect the world’s biggest election in 2020—the stakes are simply too high.