foreignpolicy--2020-04-27--The Future of Korean Politics Might Be This Defector From Pyongyang

Few men possess Thae Yong-ho ’ s sartorial elegance .
The newly elected South Korean politician will regularly appear in a dark fedora hat , a gray suit with a white shirt , tortoiseshell sunglasses—which he keeps on indoors—and a luxury Salvatore Ferragamo or Hermès tie checkered with an African menagerie print of giraffes , zebras , and spotted panthers .
Thae dresses with the pride of a man who knows he has arrived .
The cosmopolitan speaks fluent English and Chinese in addition to his native Korean .
For a regular South Korean official , all this wouldn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ man raised in one of the most closed dictatorships on Earth , and who spent more than three decades as a senior diplomat for Pyongyang before becoming one of the highest-ranking defectors in 2016 , it is extraordinary .
Now , he has made history as the first North Korean directly elected to South Korea ’ s legislature—just four years after he fled .
And if North Korea ever reconciles with its neighbor—whether through collapse or diplomacy—it may be trailblazers like Thae who play a key role in any rapprochement .
“ In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ caliber has defected.
” “ In half a century , nobody of his caliber has defected , ” said Andrei Lankov , the director of Korea Risk Group , a research firm .
“ We have probably the first North Korean who can be described as a politician independent from the North Korean state.
” After encountering many communist apparatchiks in the course of my reporting , from China to Cuba , I was cautious when I met Thae .
People who ’ ve succeeded in that kind of system tend to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lip service for what they think you want to hear .
You don ’ t know what they really believe in .
They carry the coldness of survivors who ’ ve worked their way up an unforgiving system .
Thae was none of the above , and well before his time in the South , he impressed and charmed many of the people he met .
In North Korea , he came from a family with good revolutionary credentials , though not particularly elite .
He did well after college and served as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Denmark during the awful famine years , with the unenviable task of procuring luxury European goods for the Kim family while appealing for help to the World Food Program to feed the rest of his country .
In London , he bargain-hunted for real estate to set up the embassy at its new location on a quiet suburban street .
In his free time , he made foreign friends and took up tennis and golf .
Unusually , he ’ d gained the trust of his superiors back home so much that they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his wife and sons along during his tour .
That would prove critical for Thae and his decision to escape .
Other defectors have served and will serve in the National Assembly : Cho Myeong-cheol in 2012 and Ji Seong-ho this term .
But both were nominated by their parties rather than running directly for a seat—the South Korean system mixes proportional representation with directly elected representatives .
Neither had to campaign and appeal to South Koreans as Thae did .
Prejudice in the country against former North Koreans runs deep , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For most North Koreans , liberation has its share of trauma , with many finding it hard to adjust to South Korea ’ s fierce job market and intense democracy .
Most defectors flee for economic reasons .
After a lifetime of ideological indoctrination , they actually care little for politics .
They are predominantly middle-aged women with limited education , often from one of the border towns near China .
Once free , they struggle to adjust , living in poverty and working for low wages .
Shunted to the periphery of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not had a voice .
On the surface , Thae shares little in common with them , but “ I consider myself North Korean , ” he told me—he means his sensibility , even if he has successfully adapted to being a citizen of South Korea .
“ My way of thinking is mostly in the North Korean way , ” he admitted .
Thae knows the world the refugee community left and understands the bewildering feeling they have in their new home .
But Thae in his dapper ensembles—or sporting his United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part the modern South Korean man .
He won in Gangnam , the affluent Seoul district made famous by the K-pop star Psy ’ s hit song .
He had become a household name by the time he launched his campaign this year—a celebrity with a bestselling memoir and a North Korea expert , frequently quoted in media .
As he celebrated his win and supporters sang the national anthem , Thae broke down into tears .
“ I can ’ t believe that it is real , ” he said .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he added , “ I ’ m sure that North Korean people will adopt the same method of an election process.
” He had officially run as Thae Ku-min , a pseudonym he first used in the early days of his defection .
It was symbolic .
It translates to “ saving the people , ” and he had North Koreans in mind .
He has pledged that he will advocate for their needs , particularly for more funding for vocational job training and other forms of social assistance .
He does not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Just raising the issue and talking about it , raising public awareness , is the key thing that he can do , ” said Sue Mi Terry , a senior fellow for Korea at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former CIA analyst .
Last November , Thae attacked the government for its repatriation of two North Korean defectors .
They were accused of murdering their fishing crew , and the public had little sympathy for them .
Thae deplored their handover back to the North to certain death @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face trial in South Korea .
He points to that incident as his wake-up call to jump into politics .
He didn ’ t have to do this .
Thae has said his primary motivation for escaping was for the sake of his children , so he could have melted away into safe anonymity after he defected with his family .
His enemy was a regime fond of dramatic assassinations of those it views as traitors or threats , including the murder of Kim Jong Un ’ s half-brother , Kim Jong Nam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a nerve agent .
“ He is probably number one on their assassination list , ” Lankov said .
Not tall , he walks into a room in an unassuming manner , but you notice him because of the big men in suits circling around to guard him .
At the Oslo Freedom Forum last year , an attacker managed to get past his protective ring to toss a milkshake at him outside a hotel .
For a few moments , people panicked , assuming it was poison .
It turned out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and it was really just a milkshake .
The incident , however , demonstrated how easy an assassination would be .
It did not scare him into silence .
Thae clearly wants to matter and in a very public way .
What makes his hawkish position on North Korea different is his humanity of having been North Korean .
“ Maybe I would appear every night on TV , ” he told me last year , fantasizing about a day when the two countries might unify .
He would explain South Korean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may play a kind of role bridging the North and South.
” For him , reconciliation is not a question of if but when .
South Korean politicians speak about unification in lofty but abstract terms .
Thae thinks Seoul needs far more concrete plans—from handling the North ’ s military to education to health care—for that eventuality .
“ There is no preparation at all , ” he said .
However system collapse plays out , decades of militant propaganda against the South will mean that someone like Thae may be one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trust and simultaneously one of the authorities South Korean leadership would turn to for policy advice .
As long as he manages to avoid assassination , Thae is in a valuable , possibly indispensable spot .
What makes his hawkish position on North Korea different is his humanity of having been North Korean .
His criticism of President Moon Jae-in ’ s détente was one reason why the United Future Party ( UFP ) , the conservative opposition , supported his candidacy .
Among parties , Thae had few viable options except to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been Moon ’ s Democratic Party , and Thae views its policy on North Korea as appeasement .
The UFP welcomed the name recognition Thae brought , along with his anti-Kim credentials .
Yet he is more nuanced than most other members of the right when it comes to Pyongyang .
Many conservatives insist on zero engagement until a total collapse of the regime .
“ The question is to which extent he will be able to express his opinions , which will seriously differ from what is the politically correct group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Lankov said .
Where the conservatives see an enemy , Thae sees millions of oppressed fellow citizens .
Thae ’ s normalization into South Korean politics also conveys a powerful message to possible future defectors that refugee integration is possible .
His victory not only has the potential to benefit current defectors or reinvigorate the South ’ s political conversation on the North .
Thae ’ s normalization into South Korean politics also conveys a powerful message to his former colleagues—possible future defectors—that refugee integration is possible .
“ One of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its pillars of stability—is elite support , ” Terry explained .
His victory proves that there is “ an alternative pathway for them that can safeguard their survival .
Thae ’ s election shows that North Korean defectors are not only welcome in South Korea , but they are now part of South Korea ’ s leadership.
” Until this month , North Korean elites may have hated Kim ’ s brutal rule , but they tolerated it out of self-preservation because they believed they had no better options .
Thae has said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his progress , to “ watch and understand how democracy works.
” His success dangerously challenges the North ’ s prevailing narrative , even if the reality is that his triumph is unlikely to be easily replicated by other defectors .
Thae ’ s victory may spur Kim to make an example of him .
“ Frankly if they are determined , they can do it , ” Lankov said .
Meanwhile , Thae begins his new political life in South Korea and continues to win friends and allies with his energy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up a front , it ’ s been quite a show .
As others who ’ ve met him in person also note , he exudes charisma .
He engages in questions with enthusiasm and care .
Once he sets his sunglasses aside , you catch his curious eyes .
At the same conference where he thought he might have been milkshake-murdered , he spent his free time attending the other panels and workshops , at one point peering into the session on LGBTQ rights , later listening attentively to an evangelist about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a smart man making up for lost time .
He might dress the part , but he can still feel out of place in South Korea .
( “ I ’ m not good at using these smartphones , ” he confessed to me at one point .
“ You have to remember a lot of passwords.
” ) Neither does he idolize his new country .
When it comes to defectors ’ struggles , he observes that “ North Korean people are freed from North Korea ’ s slavery system but they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” He may represent a district of fiscal conservatives who demand lower taxes , but it doesn ’ t preclude him from seeing things with eyes wide open .
In many ways , his positive disposition jars you .
It doesn ’ t reflect the strange , creepy life he led—of Juche ( “ self-reliance ” ) ideology in years of horrendous famine or of colleagues who would occasionally disappear , presumably to some prison camp , no questions asked .
He can seem too good to be true : a realist who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a dreamer to have defected the way he did and taken the brave path to run for office .
“ I have to believe that he ’ s committed to his cause , ” Terry said , when I asked about his authenticity .
Thae , once an eloquent spokesman for the Kim dynasty , now speaks with equal passion about freedom : “ I want North Koreans to understand and see the democratic process through me .
That is my main purpose .
”

Few men possess Thae Yong-ho’s sartorial elegance. The newly elected South Korean politician will regularly appear in a dark fedora hat, a gray suit with a white shirt, tortoiseshell sunglasses—which he keeps on indoors—and a luxury Salvatore Ferragamo or Hermès tie checkered with an African menagerie print of giraffes, zebras, and spotted panthers. Thae dresses with the pride of a man who knows he has arrived. The cosmopolitan speaks fluent English and Chinese in addition to his native Korean.
Few men possess Thae Yong-ho’s sartorial elegance. The newly elected South Korean politician will regularly appear in a dark fedora hat, a gray suit with a white shirt, tortoiseshell sunglasses—which he keeps on indoors—and a luxury Salvatore Ferragamo or Hermès tie checkered with an African menagerie print of giraffes, zebras, and spotted panthers. Thae dresses with the pride of a man who knows he has arrived. The cosmopolitan speaks fluent English and Chinese in addition to his native Korean.
For a regular South Korean official, all this wouldn’t be so unusual. For a man raised in one of the most closed dictatorships on Earth, and who spent more than three decades as a senior diplomat for Pyongyang before becoming one of the highest-ranking defectors in 2016, it is extraordinary. Now, he has made history as the first North Korean directly elected to South Korea’s legislature—just four years after he fled. And if North Korea ever reconciles with its neighbor—whether through collapse or diplomacy—it may be trailblazers like Thae who play a key role in any rapprochement.
“In half a century, nobody of his caliber has defected.”
“In half a century, nobody of his caliber has defected,” said Andrei Lankov, the director of Korea Risk Group, a research firm. “We have probably the first North Korean who can be described as a politician independent from the North Korean state.”
After encountering many communist apparatchiks in the course of my reporting, from China to Cuba, I was cautious when I met Thae. People who’ve succeeded in that kind of system tend to be ruthless, inscrutable, and pay you lip service for what they think you want to hear. You don’t know what they really believe in. They carry the coldness of survivors who’ve worked their way up an unforgiving system.
Thae speaks to the media after securing a majority vote in his Gangnam constituency on behalf of the conservative United Future Party during South Korea's parliamentary elections, at his campaign headquarters in the Gangnam district of Seoul on April 16.
Thae was none of the above, and well before his time in the South, he impressed and charmed many of the people he met. In North Korea, he came from a family with good revolutionary credentials, though not particularly elite. He did well after college and served as a diplomat overseas. He worked in Denmark during the awful famine years, with the unenviable task of procuring luxury European goods for the Kim family while appealing for help to the World Food Program to feed the rest of his country. In London, he bargain-hunted for real estate to set up the embassy at its new location on a quiet suburban street. In his free time, he made foreign friends and took up tennis and golf. Unusually, he’d gained the trust of his superiors back home so much that they granted him the rare exception of bringing his wife and sons along during his tour. That would prove critical for Thae and his decision to escape.
Other defectors have served and will serve in the National Assembly: Cho Myeong-cheol in 2012 and Ji Seong-ho this term. But both were nominated by their parties rather than running directly for a seat—the South Korean system mixes proportional representation with directly elected representatives. Neither had to campaign and appeal to South Koreans as Thae did.
Prejudice in the country against former North Koreans runs deep, with defectors often accused of being spies. For most North Koreans, liberation has its share of trauma, with many finding it hard to adjust to South Korea’s fierce job market and intense democracy.
Most defectors flee for economic reasons. After a lifetime of ideological indoctrination, they actually care little for politics. They are predominantly middle-aged women with limited education, often from one of the border towns near China. Once free, they struggle to adjust, living in poverty and working for low wages. Shunted to the periphery of South Korean society, this group has not had a voice.
On the surface, Thae shares little in common with them, but “I consider myself North Korean,” he told me—he means his sensibility, even if he has successfully adapted to being a citizen of South Korea. “My way of thinking is mostly in the North Korean way,” he admitted. Thae knows the world the refugee community left and understands the bewildering feeling they have in their new home.
An aide records a live video as Thae, seen reflected in a mirror, speaks at his campaign headquarters in the Gangnam district of Seoul on March 28.
But Thae in his dapper ensembles—or sporting his United Future Party’s pink jackets—looks every part the modern South Korean man. He won in Gangnam, the affluent Seoul district made famous by the K-pop star Psy’s hit song. He had become a household name by the time he launched his campaign this year—a celebrity with a bestselling memoir and a North Korea expert, frequently quoted in media. As he celebrated his win and supporters sang the national anthem, Thae broke down into tears. “I can’t believe that it is real,” he said. “One day in the future,” he added, “I’m sure that North Korean people will adopt the same method of an election process.” He had officially run as Thae Ku-min, a pseudonym he first used in the early days of his defection. It was symbolic. It translates to “saving the people,” and he had North Koreans in mind. He has pledged that he will advocate for their needs, particularly for more funding for vocational job training and other forms of social assistance. He does not want them treated like second-class citizens.
“Just raising the issue and talking about it, raising public awareness, is the key thing that he can do,” said Sue Mi Terry, a senior fellow for Korea at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former CIA analyst. Last November, Thae attacked the government for its repatriation of two North Korean defectors. They were accused of murdering their fishing crew, and the public had little sympathy for them. Thae deplored their handover back to the North to certain death, arguing that they should at least face trial in South Korea. He points to that incident as his wake-up call to jump into politics.
He didn’t have to do this. Thae has said his primary motivation for escaping was for the sake of his children, so he could have melted away into safe anonymity after he defected with his family. His enemy was a regime fond of dramatic assassinations of those it views as traitors or threats, including the murder of Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, at the airport in Kuala Lumpur with a nerve agent. “He is probably number one on their assassination list,” Lankov said.
Not tall, he walks into a room in an unassuming manner, but you notice him because of the big men in suits circling around to guard him. At the Oslo Freedom Forum last year, an attacker managed to get past his protective ring to toss a milkshake at him outside a hotel. For a few moments, people panicked, assuming it was poison. It turned out the protester was a local leftist activist, and it was really just a milkshake. The incident, however, demonstrated how easy an assassination would be. It did not scare him into silence. Thae clearly wants to matter and in a very public way.
What makes his hawkish position on North Korea different is his humanity of having been North Korean.
“Maybe I would appear every night on TV,” he told me last year, fantasizing about a day when the two countries might unify. He would explain South Korean life to his compatriots. “I may play a kind of role bridging the North and South.” For him, reconciliation is not a question of if but when. South Korean politicians speak about unification in lofty but abstract terms. Thae thinks Seoul needs far more concrete plans—from handling the North’s military to education to health care—for that eventuality. “There is no preparation at all,” he said. However system collapse plays out, decades of militant propaganda against the South will mean that someone like Thae may be one of the few figures North Koreans would trust and simultaneously one of the authorities South Korean leadership would turn to for policy advice. As long as he manages to avoid assassination, Thae is in a valuable, possibly indispensable spot.
What makes his hawkish position on North Korea different is his humanity of having been North Korean. His criticism of President Moon Jae-in’s détente was one reason why the United Future Party (UFP), the conservative opposition, supported his candidacy. Among parties, Thae had few viable options except to join the UFP. The alternative would have been Moon’s Democratic Party, and Thae views its policy on North Korea as appeasement. The UFP welcomed the name recognition Thae brought, along with his anti-Kim credentials. Yet he is more nuanced than most other members of the right when it comes to Pyongyang. Many conservatives insist on zero engagement until a total collapse of the regime.
Photos of Thae are displayed at his campaign headquarters in Seoul on March 28.
“The question is to which extent he will be able to express his opinions, which will seriously differ from what is the politically correct group think of the South Korean right,” Lankov said. Where the conservatives see an enemy, Thae sees millions of oppressed fellow citizens.
Thae’s normalization into South Korean politics also conveys a powerful message to possible future defectors that refugee integration is possible.
His victory not only has the potential to benefit current defectors or reinvigorate the South’s political conversation on the North. Thae’s normalization into South Korean politics also conveys a powerful message to his former colleagues—possible future defectors—that refugee integration is possible.
“One of the reasons the North Korean regime survives—one of its pillars of stability—is elite support,” Terry explained. His victory proves that there is “an alternative pathway for them that can safeguard their survival. Thae’s election shows that North Korean defectors are not only welcome in South Korea, but they are now part of South Korea’s leadership.”
Until this month, North Korean elites may have hated Kim’s brutal rule, but they tolerated it out of self-preservation because they believed they had no better options. Thae has said he hopes they’ve been tracking his progress, to “watch and understand how democracy works.” His success dangerously challenges the North’s prevailing narrative, even if the reality is that his triumph is unlikely to be easily replicated by other defectors. Thae’s victory may spur Kim to make an example of him. “Frankly if they are determined, they can do it,” Lankov said.
Thae testifies during a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., on Nov. 1, 2017.
Meanwhile, Thae begins his new political life in South Korea and continues to win friends and allies with his energy and forthrightness. If he’s putting up a front, it’s been quite a show. As others who’ve met him in person also note, he exudes charisma. He engages in questions with enthusiasm and care. Once he sets his sunglasses aside, you catch his curious eyes. At the same conference where he thought he might have been milkshake-murdered, he spent his free time attending the other panels and workshops, at one point peering into the session on LGBTQ rights, later listening attentively to an evangelist about the power of bitcoin. He is a smart man making up for lost time.
He might dress the part, but he can still feel out of place in South Korea. (“I’m not good at using these smartphones,” he confessed to me at one point. “You have to remember a lot of passwords.”) Neither does he idolize his new country. When it comes to defectors’ struggles, he observes that “North Korean people are freed from North Korea’s slavery system but they become another slave of South Korean capitalism.” He may represent a district of fiscal conservatives who demand lower taxes, but it doesn’t preclude him from seeing things with eyes wide open.
In many ways, his positive disposition jars you. It doesn’t reflect the strange, creepy life he led—of Juche (“self-reliance”) ideology in years of horrendous famine or of colleagues who would occasionally disappear, presumably to some prison camp, no questions asked. He can seem too good to be true: a realist who worked his way up North Korean bureaucracy, a dreamer to have defected the way he did and taken the brave path to run for office.
“I have to believe that he’s committed to his cause,” Terry said, when I asked about his authenticity. Thae, once an eloquent spokesman for the Kim dynasty, now speaks with equal passion about freedom: “I want North Koreans to understand and see the democratic process through me. That is my main purpose.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-27--5 Things to Know If Kim Jong Un Dies

5 Things to Know If Kim Jong Un Dies

5 Things to Know If Kim Jong Un Dies North Korea ’ s dictator , Kim Jong Un , was reported to have had a cardiovascular procedure on April 12 , treating a health condition allegedly stemming from “ excessive smoking , obesity , and overwork , ” according to one South Korean publication .
Since then , Kim has not made any public appearances ; he was absent from April 15 celebrations of North Korea ’ s most important holiday , the birthday of his grandfather and founder of the regime , Kim Il Sung .
On Saturday , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ annual parade celebrating the founding of the armed forces .
Panic has reportedly broken out in North Korea ’ s capital of Pyongyang , where residents are buying up necessities in preparation for the worst .
As a result , there is much speculation that the North Korean leader is gravely ill. U.S. officials and the intelligence community have received reports about Kim ’ s troubled health , but , given the closed nature of North Korea , it is impossible to accurately assess the severity of Kim ’ s condition .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it poses a serious threat to the regime .
The hereditary nature of North Korea ’ s government means that internal stability is heavily reliant on the smooth succession to a new leader—which likely means one of Kim ’ s family members .
But , as I found in my recent study of all hereditary autocracies since World War II , passing power is particularly difficult in family dictatorships , where the ability to find an individual who is both competent and enjoys elites ’ support is relatively low , due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in medieval monarchies , succession crises become the norm , and obscure figures or new dynasties rise as a result : Since World War II , no family dictatorship has ever managed to pass power for a third time .
The situation is dire in North Korea , where there is no clear successor to Kim .
Instability in North Korea would have immediate and long-term implications for the region and U.S.-China competition .
Here are five things you need to know as speculation about Kim ’ s health continues .
1 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ happen quickly .
A common characteristic of family dictatorships is rapid and often unexpected collapse .
Most failed regimes disintegrate completely in less than a year from the first signs of crisis : Experts have speculated about the potential collapse of the North Korean regime for decades , for example , during Kim ’ s monthlong absence from the public eye in 2014 .
The rumors about Kim ’ s health are of great interest , because the expectation of a power transition can be enough to spark such a crisis .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ historical anomaly .
Twelve out of 18 family dictatorships in place since World War II have collapsed , with the average lasting 32 years .
In contrast , the North Korean regime has endured for over seven decades , despite famine , economic crisis , international sanctions , and restrictions on foreign trade , as well as two transitions of power .
There is currently no formidable outside challenge to the Kim dynasty , neither by the military nor by the North Korean people .
However , this past resiliency tells us little @ @ @ @ @ @ @ characteristic of family dictatorships is rapid and often unexpected collapse .
It doesn ’ t help that Kim hasn ’ t designated a successor , and the most likely candidate is a woman—Kim ’ s sister Kim Yo Jong—which would be unprecedented for authoritarian hereditary regimes .
2 .
The United States is prepared , kind of .
The U.S. military plans for two main scenarios : a North Korean attack on South Korea and the collapse of North Korea .
The United States conducts a number of annual joint exercises with South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in these contingencies .
The alliance is strong , with both countries continually improving their joint operational effectiveness .
For example , the Combined Forces Command , established in 1978 , comprises equal numbers of U.S. and South Korean officers .
The command ’ s structures and processes have allowed the two countries to build strong operational integration , enabling military decision-making that is faster and more efficient than if the United States and South Korea had two separate commands .
But transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are still in the process of making such a command change a viable option , although it will be years before South Korea meets the agreed-upon conditions for that transfer .
Also , the best response to instability in North Korea would depend on an unpredictable variable , the cause of the instability , and there are many possible triggers : refugee problems caused by food shortages , political instability due to fighting factions , a civil war caused by regime change , or a coup .
Another big unknown is the dynamics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does not help readiness that the United States has put off or scaled back major joint exercises with South Korea since 2018 , and both its aircraft carriers dedicated to the region are battling the coronavirus .
3 .
North Korean nukes would need to be secured quickly .
The United States would face many challenges , alongside South Korea , in the event of collapse in the North .
But securing and destroying nuclear weapons and associated facilities would be the top priority .
A key part of the strategy to counter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to prevent the proliferation of material , weapons , and know-how beyond the peninsula to new actors .
In a North Korea collapse scenario , the United States would likely seek to establish a cordon sanitaire around the country to prevent nuclear materials from getting out and into the hands of other rogue actors , or even terrorist organizations .
North Korea is currently estimated to have between 20 and 60 nuclear weapons , a stockpile of 75 to 320 kilograms of highly enriched uranium , 39 relevant nuclear sites , and 49 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missile technology , North Korea can hit South Korea , Japan , and even potentially the United States with nuclear weapons and has threatened to do so on multiple occasions .
Kim or a successor may use nuclear weapons as a last-ditch effort to deter outside intervention that could ensure and accelerate the collapse of the regime .
4 .
China would take the lead militarily , whether the United States likes it or not .
One big problem is that U.S. contingency planning does not adequately account for the role of Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conventional wisdom is that Chinese intervention would largely be limited to dealing with refugees along its border , and any actions taken would be in support of North Korea .
But changes in Chinese military capabilities , heightened concerns about nuclear security , and prioritization of geopolitical competition with the United States have encouraged China to broaden its thinking in recent years .
Specifically , China would likely undertake an extensive military intervention with an eye on expanding regional influence if a major conflict broke out on the Korean Peninsula .
Recent Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to heightened preparations for intervention .
Moreover , it is likely that the Chinese military would reach North Korean nuclear facilities sooner than U.S. or South Korean troops , thanks to China ’ s geographical proximity to North Korea , the vicinity of its troops , and the possibility that North Korean troops would exhibit relatively low resistance to Chinese forces .
China might also enjoy early warning , allowing for advanced preparation , because the shared border provides China with unique opportunities to collect intelligence .
All of this points to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its planning assumptions to account for the presence of Chinese troops on the peninsula following any credible signs of instability in Pyongyang .
5 .
The collapse of the Kim regime would likely set back America ’ s position in Asia .
It is not an exaggeration to say that the future of the U.S. role in Asia , and thus the status of its competition with China for power and influence , rides on how the United States responds to instability on the Korean Peninsula .
Unlike China , the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it relies on a network of alliance relationships for military access .
The unpredictability of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s stance on North Korea , vacillating between “ fire and fury ” and dramatic praise for Kim , may create uncertainty among U.S. allies as to how the country would behave in a confrontation .
Similarly , if the United States does not follow through completely on its alliance commitments to South Korea , this could encourage allies to pursue alternative arrangements and seek greater accommodation of China , weakening the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Kim regime would most certainly lead to a civil war that would involve the United States as South Korea ’ s ally .
Hundreds of thousands of troops would be needed for stability and WMD elimination operations in North Korea .
Such a war would then likely involve deaths in the order of tens of thousands of people , even millions , and the choice to detonate any U.S. nuclear weapons within North Korea would bring “ hellish results , ” as the security studies expert Barry Posen has argued .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Korean Peninsula would be cataclysmic for U.S. resourcing of the great-power competition with China in other areas and arenas .
In short , while many may cheer at the sign of political troubles in North Korea , the situation is complicated .
U.S. policymakers would almost certainly face a deck stacked against them if regime instability hits Pyongyang .
It would take once-in-a-generation leadership to create the U.S. statecraft that would navigate the United States safely through a potential crisis .

North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong Un, was reported to have had a cardiovascular procedure on April 12, treating a health condition allegedly stemming from “excessive smoking, obesity, and overwork,” according to one South Korean publication. Since then, Kim has not made any public appearances; he was absent from April 15 celebrations of North Korea’s most important holiday, the birthday of his grandfather and founder of the regime, Kim Il Sung. On Saturday, April 25, he even missed the annual parade celebrating the founding of the armed forces. Panic has reportedly broken out in North Korea’s capital of Pyongyang, where residents are buying up necessities in preparation for the worst.
North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong Un, was reported to have had a cardiovascular procedure on April 12, treating a health condition allegedly stemming from “excessive smoking, obesity, and overwork,” according to one South Korean publication. Since then, Kim has not made any public appearances; he was absent from April 15 celebrations of North Korea’s most important holiday, the birthday of his grandfather and founder of the regime, Kim Il Sung. On Saturday, April 25, he even missed the annual parade celebrating the founding of the armed forces. Panic has reportedly broken out in North Korea’s capital of Pyongyang, where residents are buying up necessities in preparation for the worst.
As a result, there is much speculation that the North Korean leader is gravely ill. U.S. officials and the intelligence community have received reports about Kim’s troubled health, but, given the closed nature of North Korea, it is impossible to accurately assess the severity of Kim’s condition.
If Kim dies, or is even incapacitated, it poses a serious threat to the regime. The hereditary nature of North Korea’s government means that internal stability is heavily reliant on the smooth succession to a new leader—which likely means one of Kim’s family members. But, as I found in my recent study of all hereditary autocracies since World War II, passing power is particularly difficult in family dictatorships, where the ability to find an individual who is both competent and enjoys elites’ support is relatively low, due to the small pool of candidates. As in medieval monarchies, succession crises become the norm, and obscure figures or new dynasties rise as a result: Since World War II, no family dictatorship has ever managed to pass power for a third time.
The situation is dire in North Korea, where there is no clear successor to Kim. Instability in North Korea would have immediate and long-term implications for the region and U.S.-China competition. Here are five things you need to know as speculation about Kim’s health continues.
1. If the regime collapses, it will happen quickly.
A common characteristic of family dictatorships is rapid and often unexpected collapse. Most failed regimes disintegrate completely in less than a year from the first signs of crisis: Experts have speculated about the potential collapse of the North Korean regime for decades, for example, during Kim’s monthlong absence from the public eye in 2014. The rumors about Kim’s health are of great interest, because the expectation of a power transition can be enough to spark such a crisis.
The durability of the Kim regime is a historical anomaly. Twelve out of 18 family dictatorships in place since World War II have collapsed, with the average lasting 32 years. In contrast, the North Korean regime has endured for over seven decades, despite famine, economic crisis, international sanctions, and restrictions on foreign trade, as well as two transitions of power. There is currently no formidable outside challenge to the Kim dynasty, neither by the military nor by the North Korean people.
However, this past resiliency tells us little about the future, because a common characteristic of family dictatorships is rapid and often unexpected collapse. It doesn’t help that Kim hasn’t designated a successor, and the most likely candidate is a woman—Kim’s sister Kim Yo Jong—which would be unprecedented for authoritarian hereditary regimes.
2. The United States is prepared, kind of.
The U.S. military plans for two main scenarios: a North Korean attack on South Korea and the collapse of North Korea. The United States conducts a number of annual joint exercises with South Korea to test and hone their preparedness in these contingencies. The alliance is strong, with both countries continually improving their joint operational effectiveness. For example, the Combined Forces Command, established in 1978, comprises equal numbers of U.S. and South Korean officers. The command’s structures and processes have allowed the two countries to build strong operational integration, enabling military decision-making that is faster and more efficient than if the United States and South Korea had two separate commands.
But transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea remains unresolved. The two sides are still in the process of making such a command change a viable option, although it will be years before South Korea meets the agreed-upon conditions for that transfer.
Also, the best response to instability in North Korea would depend on an unpredictable variable, the cause of the instability, and there are many possible triggers: refugee problems caused by food shortages, political instability due to fighting factions, a civil war caused by regime change, or a coup. Another big unknown is the dynamics an incapacitated Kim would spark.
It does not help readiness that the United States has put off or scaled back major joint exercises with South Korea since 2018, and both its aircraft carriers dedicated to the region are battling the coronavirus.
3. North Korean nukes would need to be secured quickly.
The United States would face many challenges, alongside South Korea, in the event of collapse in the North. But securing and destroying nuclear weapons and associated facilities would be the top priority. A key part of the strategy to counter North Korean weapons of mass destruction is to prevent the proliferation of material, weapons, and know-how beyond the peninsula to new actors. In a North Korea collapse scenario, the United States would likely seek to establish a cordon sanitaire around the country to prevent nuclear materials from getting out and into the hands of other rogue actors, or even terrorist organizations.
North Korea is currently estimated to have between 20 and 60 nuclear weapons, a stockpile of 75 to 320 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, 39 relevant nuclear sites, and 49 missile sites. Given advancements in its missile technology, North Korea can hit South Korea, Japan, and even potentially the United States with nuclear weapons and has threatened to do so on multiple occasions. Kim or a successor may use nuclear weapons as a last-ditch effort to deter outside intervention that could ensure and accelerate the collapse of the regime.
4. China would take the lead militarily, whether the United States likes it or not.
One big problem is that U.S. contingency planning does not adequately account for the role of Chinese forces in a collapse contingency. The conventional wisdom is that Chinese intervention would largely be limited to dealing with refugees along its border, and any actions taken would be in support of North Korea.
But changes in Chinese military capabilities, heightened concerns about nuclear security, and prioritization of geopolitical competition with the United States have encouraged China to broaden its thinking in recent years. Specifically, China would likely undertake an extensive military intervention with an eye on expanding regional influence if a major conflict broke out on the Korean Peninsula. Recent Chinese statements and military training exercises also point to heightened preparations for intervention.
Moreover, it is likely that the Chinese military would reach North Korean nuclear facilities sooner than U.S. or South Korean troops, thanks to China’s geographical proximity to North Korea, the vicinity of its troops, and the possibility that North Korean troops would exhibit relatively low resistance to Chinese forces. China might also enjoy early warning, allowing for advanced preparation, because the shared border provides China with unique opportunities to collect intelligence. All of this points to the need for the United States to change its planning assumptions to account for the presence of Chinese troops on the peninsula following any credible signs of instability in Pyongyang.
5. The collapse of the Kim regime would likely set back America’s position in Asia.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the future of the U.S. role in Asia, and thus the status of its competition with China for power and influence, rides on how the United States responds to instability on the Korean Peninsula. Unlike China, the United States is not a resident Asian power; it relies on a network of alliance relationships for military access. The unpredictability of U.S. President Donald Trump’s stance on North Korea, vacillating between “fire and fury” and dramatic praise for Kim, may create uncertainty among U.S. allies as to how the country would behave in a confrontation. Similarly, if the United States does not follow through completely on its alliance commitments to South Korea, this could encourage allies to pursue alternative arrangements and seek greater accommodation of China, weakening the U.S. position.
Instability caused by the collapse of the Kim regime would most certainly lead to a civil war that would involve the United States as South Korea’s ally. Hundreds of thousands of troops would be needed for stability and WMD elimination operations in North Korea. Such a war would then likely involve deaths in the order of tens of thousands of people, even millions, and the choice to detonate any U.S. nuclear weapons within North Korea would bring “hellish results,” as the security studies expert Barry Posen has argued. The drain of a major war on the Korean Peninsula would be cataclysmic for U.S. resourcing of the great-power competition with China in other areas and arenas.
In short, while many may cheer at the sign of political troubles in North Korea, the situation is complicated. U.S. policymakers would almost certainly face a deck stacked against them if regime instability hits Pyongyang. It would take once-in-a-generation leadership to create the U.S. statecraft that would navigate the United States safely through a potential crisis.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-27--The Last Great Race

The Last Great Race

ANCHORAGE , Alaska—On a windy morning in early March , Sean Underwood was leading his team of sled dogs out of a race checkpoint in White Mountain , Alaska , when he sensed something was wrong .
The winter weather was unforgiving .
But Underwood knew the risks he would take as he competed in the Iditarod , an annual sled dog race from Anchorage to Nome , Alaska , with competitors hailing from the countries speckled around the Arctic Circle .
He was one among 56 other mushers that year , and one of the 12 first-timers racing across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than two weeks to complete .
But that morning—just six hours after a team of trailbreakers cleared the path of any potential dangers—a spell of warm temperatures and winds at 40 miles per hour caused a six-foot surge of sea water to wallop over the ice shelf rimming the Norton Bay .
It then flooded the veinlike valley outside of White Mountain , creating lakes of near-freezing slush as far as the eye could see .
“ You could have gone and done laps in it , ” Underwood said .
“ Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it was hovering above my knee at certain points … [ they were ] extremely rare conditions.
” Underwood and the veteran mushers Tom Knolmayer and Matthew Failor found themselves stranded .
They struggled for hours through the quicksand-like slush caused by unseasonably warm temperatures .
After losing feeling in their legs and feet , they decided the safest thing to do was to call for rescue .
Soon , a team of snow machines and a National Guard helicopter arrived to pluck them from the competition—and re-mark a trail for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behind .
“ This all started with us having mushed through a biblical-level storm from Elim to White Mountain , ” Underwood said .
“ The typical temperature around there is zero degrees.
” But that morning , it reached 36 degrees Fahrenheit—well above freezing levels—which triggered the dangerous alchemy of conditions they experienced that day .
This year , 22 Iditarod mushers ended their races preemptively—the second-highest scratch rate in the competition ’ s 47-year history .
Nearly all of them quit due to tumultuous environmental conditions .
In 2007 , some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same reasons .
Scratch rates will likely climb in the coming years .
Studies by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ( NOAA ) have shown cataclysmic decreases in sea ice and snow cover across the Arctic since the 1980s , which could lead to further climate anomalies and a suspension of the sensitive ecosystem ’ s fine balance .
But these changes happening in Alaska—and in the Arctic Circle overall—aren ’ t only a musher ’ s problem .
Because of where and when they travel , mushers are among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eventually stretch across the globe .
A recent Arctic Report Card from NOAA found that the region is warming at a rate twice as fast as the global average , with the race ’ s starting line in Anchorage recording the second-highest winter temperatures in Alaska ’ s history .
In winter 2019 alone , monthly temperatures were about 7.2 degrees Fahrenheit higher than normal , and the north Bering Sea where Underwood experienced his emergency was as much as 28.8 degrees Fahrenheit .
Data sets that describe what are known as “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three-decade average across the United States by NOAA every 10 years , the most recent of which was captured in 2010 .
The global temperature , meanwhile , also spiked last year , recording temperatures 1.6 degrees Fahrenheit above average—making it the third-warmest year on record .
“ Alaska last year was at the epicenter of warmth for the entire globe , ” said Brian Brettschneider , a University of Alaska Fairbanks researcher who works for the International Arctic Research Center .
For years , the Arctic region has posed as a canary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ climate change .
Summers have elongated and winters have compressed , transforming the Arctic : Permafrost has rapidly begun to melt , with many perennially frozen locations reaching record-high temperatures .
At best , these fluctuations can destroy the structural integrity of homes , airport runways , and city infrastructure .
At worst , the region has transitioned from becoming a carbon sink , which absorbs excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere , to one that expels more harmful amounts of carbon into the atmosphere .
Based on studies by NOAA , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rather than slowing , climate change.
” This year , the state had its first traditionally cold winter in nearly a decade , with several consecutive days below zero degrees ( some days get as low as negative 50 degrees Fahrenheit ) and persistent high-elevation snow .
But in the lead-up to winter , Alaska experienced the warmest summer and fall temperatures on record .
Even as Alaskans celebrate the most ample snow in quite some time , the phenomenon is still part of a global climate anomaly .
“ The issue is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some of the places with the most rapid change in terms of these temperatures , ” said Ken Tape , an associate professor at the University of Alaska Fairbanks .
The entirety of the Iditarod race takes place in the region Tape describes .
“ In the case of the Iditarod trail , a lot of these places aren ’ t even getting what you would describe as permanent snowfall.
” Snowfall is crucial to the safety of mushers , their athletic dogs , and the sensitive ecology of the land .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brought rainfall instead of snow—an aberration in a region known for its constant snowfall from October to April .
Over the past several years , snow cover has disappeared increasingly earlier in the season from the landscape , and its geographical extent has shriveled , some of which is due to rapidly dwindling sea ice , which acts as a natural barricade to protect against weather extremes.A warming climate is something mushers have had to contend with for years—sometimes at great risk .
In 2006 , the veteran musher DeeDee Jonrowe experienced a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ smaller race outside of the coastal village of Unalakleet , Alaska .
It had been an unusually mild winter , with less snowfall , and sea ice melting along the coast .
As Jonrowe neared a bend along the Norton Bay , the sea ice she was racing on—which normally stayed through June—vanished from sight .
The race markers kept disappearing into water , she recounted : “ The broken ice was so tall , you couldn ’ t always see what was going on [ ahead of you ] .
” Jonrowe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they were stranded on a massive , broken plate of ice with no safe return in sight .
That same plate had been marked safe by race trailbreakers just one week earlier .
“ They put an airplane in the air and found that … we were floating free , floating in the bay , and that whole plate of ice had broken away from the shore , ” Jonrowe said .
Pilots from nearby Koyuk would eventually lead the mushers safely back to land by pointing out a new trail 50 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ touched back onto the remote coastline .
For mushers caught in the tumult of a rapidly changing world , races are more than a chance to show off canine brawn or cling to bygone traditions .
The Iditarod in particular showcases Alaska ’ s history and resilience .
It ’ s a sport with heart and indigenous roots ; a horizontal Everest at the top of the world ( which recently became one of the only U.S.-based professional sports to continue as the coronavirus spread around the world ) .
“ I am @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Jonrowe , who has completed the Iditarod 32 times and holds the fastest finishing record of any woman who has competed .
“ You ’ re utilizing your own skill , your own ability to read dogs , to read the weather , to listen to the stories of the elders.
” Such indigenous elders—and their kin—continue to pass along the tradition of mushing , which dates back thousands of years .
Ryan Redington , a 14-time competitor with Inupiat Eskimo roots , said climate change is undeniably impacting how he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ difficult to get miles on the dogs , ” says Redington .
To aid with this , he bought property in northern Wisconsin to improve his chances of experiencing snow from October to February—his training months .
But such practices are cumbersome and costly—something that few competitors can afford .
For Redington , whose grandfather founded the race in 1973 , the sacrifice is personal .
It may well prove the best chance of keeping the race alive .
“ I ’ m honored to carry on the family tradition , ” he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it 19 times .
My father ran in it 14 times .
Now it ’ s me and my brother that race in it .
And , hopefully , one day our kids will race in it as well .
”

ANCHORAGE, Alaska—On a windy morning in early March, Sean Underwood was leading his team of sled dogs out of a race checkpoint in White Mountain, Alaska, when he sensed something was wrong.
ANCHORAGE, Alaska—On a windy morning in early March, Sean Underwood was leading his team of sled dogs out of a race checkpoint in White Mountain, Alaska, when he sensed something was wrong.
The winter weather was unforgiving. But Underwood knew the risks he would take as he competed in the Iditarod, an annual sled dog race from Anchorage to Nome, Alaska, with competitors hailing from the countries speckled around the Arctic Circle. He was one among 56 other mushers that year, and one of the 12 first-timers racing across the nearly 1,000-mile trail—which can take more than two weeks to complete.
But that morning—just six hours after a team of trailbreakers cleared the path of any potential dangers—a spell of warm temperatures and winds at 40 miles per hour caused a six-foot surge of sea water to wallop over the ice shelf rimming the Norton Bay. It then flooded the veinlike valley outside of White Mountain, creating lakes of near-freezing slush as far as the eye could see.
“You could have gone and done laps in it,” Underwood said. “Even as we trekked through the shallower parts, it was hovering above my knee at certain points … [they were] extremely rare conditions.”
The Elderberry Park Coastal Trail in Anchorage, Alaska, is dusted with snow and flanked by sea ice on March 4.
Underwood and the veteran mushers Tom Knolmayer and Matthew Failor found themselves stranded. They struggled for hours through the quicksand-like slush caused by unseasonably warm temperatures. After losing feeling in their legs and feet, they decided the safest thing to do was to call for rescue. Soon, a team of snow machines and a National Guard helicopter arrived to pluck them from the competition—and re-mark a trail for the remaining mushers who weren’t far behind.
“This all started with us having mushed through a biblical-level storm from Elim to White Mountain,” Underwood said. “The typical temperature around there is zero degrees.” But that morning, it reached 36 degrees Fahrenheit—well above freezing levels—which triggered the dangerous alchemy of conditions they experienced that day.
This year, 22 Iditarod mushers ended their races preemptively—the second-highest scratch rate in the competition’s 47-year history. Nearly all of them quit due to tumultuous environmental conditions. In 2007, some 24 mushers ended the race prematurely for the same reasons. Scratch rates will likely climb in the coming years. Studies by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have shown cataclysmic decreases in sea ice and snow cover across the Arctic since the 1980s, which could lead to further climate anomalies and a suspension of the sensitive ecosystem’s fine balance. But these changes happening in Alaska—and in the Arctic Circle overall—aren’t only a musher’s problem.
Two race dogs owned by competitive musher and Wisconsin native Kristy Berington peer out of a trailer on March 7.
Because of where and when they travel, mushers are among the first witnesses to climate transformations that eventually stretch across the globe. A recent Arctic Report Card from NOAA found that the region is warming at a rate twice as fast as the global average, with the race’s starting line in Anchorage recording the second-highest winter temperatures in Alaska’s history. In winter 2019 alone, monthly temperatures were about 7.2 degrees Fahrenheit higher than normal, and the north Bering Sea where Underwood experienced his emergency was as much as 28.8 degrees Fahrenheit. Data sets that describe what are known as “climate normals” are taken from a three-decade average across the United States by NOAA every 10 years, the most recent of which was captured in 2010. The global temperature, meanwhile, also spiked last year, recording temperatures 1.6 degrees Fahrenheit above average—making it the third-warmest year on record.
“Alaska last year was at the epicenter of warmth for the entire globe,” said Brian Brettschneider, a University of Alaska Fairbanks researcher who works for the International Arctic Research Center.
For years, the Arctic region has posed as a canary in a coal mine in regard to climate change. Summers have elongated and winters have compressed, transforming the Arctic: Permafrost has rapidly begun to melt, with many perennially frozen locations reaching record-high temperatures. At best, these fluctuations can destroy the structural integrity of homes, airport runways, and city infrastructure. At worst, the region has transitioned from becoming a carbon sink, which absorbs excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, to one that expels more harmful amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Based on studies by NOAA, the Arctic “is now contributing to, rather than slowing, climate change.”
This year, the state had its first traditionally cold winter in nearly a decade, with several consecutive days below zero degrees (some days get as low as negative 50 degrees Fahrenheit) and persistent high-elevation snow. But in the lead-up to winter, Alaska experienced the warmest summer and fall temperatures on record. Even as Alaskans celebrate the most ample snow in quite some time, the phenomenon is still part of a global climate anomaly.
Two mushing sleds are set beside a mushing trailer ahead of the race.
“The issue is that southwest Alaska and western Alaska are some of the places with the most rapid change in terms of these temperatures,” said Ken Tape, an associate professor at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. The entirety of the Iditarod race takes place in the region Tape describes. “In the case of the Iditarod trail, a lot of these places aren’t even getting what you would describe as permanent snowfall.”
Snowfall is crucial to the safety of mushers, their athletic dogs, and the sensitive ecology of the land. But in recent years, some winters have brought rainfall instead of snow—an aberration in a region known for its constant snowfall from October to April.
Over the past several years, snow cover has disappeared increasingly earlier in the season from the landscape, and its geographical extent has shriveled, some of which is due to rapidly dwindling sea ice, which acts as a natural barricade to protect against weather extremes.A warming climate is something mushers have had to contend with for years—sometimes at great risk. In 2006, the veteran musher DeeDee Jonrowe experienced a close call as she competed in a smaller race outside of the coastal village of Unalakleet, Alaska. It had been an unusually mild winter, with less snowfall, and sea ice melting along the coast. As Jonrowe neared a bend along the Norton Bay, the sea ice she was racing on—which normally stayed through June—vanished from sight.
The race markers kept disappearing into water, she recounted: “The broken ice was so tall, you couldn’t always see what was going on [ahead of you].”
Jonrowe and the other competitors would soon discover that they were stranded on a massive, broken plate of ice with no safe return in sight. That same plate had been marked safe by race trailbreakers just one week earlier.
“They put an airplane in the air and found that … we were floating free, floating in the bay, and that whole plate of ice had broken away from the shore,” Jonrowe said.
Pilots from nearby Koyuk would eventually lead the mushers safely back to land by pointing out a new trail 50 miles north, where the ice plate touched back onto the remote coastline.
Veteran musher Dee Dee Jonrowe (left), stands alongside rookie competitor and mentee Mille Porsild of Denmark on March 7.
For mushers caught in the tumult of a rapidly changing world, races are more than a chance to show off canine brawn or cling to bygone traditions. The Iditarod in particular showcases Alaska’s history and resilience. It’s a sport with heart and indigenous roots; a horizontal Everest at the top of the world (which recently became one of the only U.S.-based professional sports to continue as the coronavirus spread around the world).
“I am living the history of our state,” said Jonrowe, who has completed the Iditarod 32 times and holds the fastest finishing record of any woman who has competed. “You’re utilizing your own skill, your own ability to read dogs, to read the weather, to listen to the stories of the elders.”
Such indigenous elders—and their kin—continue to pass along the tradition of mushing, which dates back thousands of years. Ryan Redington, a 14-time competitor with Inupiat Eskimo roots, said climate change is undeniably impacting how he trains.
“It’s been difficult to get miles on the dogs,” says Redington. To aid with this, he bought property in northern Wisconsin to improve his chances of experiencing snow from October to February—his training months. But such practices are cumbersome and costly—something that few competitors can afford. For Redington, whose grandfather founded the race in 1973, the sacrifice is personal. It may well prove the best chance of keeping the race alive.
“I’m honored to carry on the family tradition,” he said. “My grandpa ran in it 19 times. My father ran in it 14 times. Now it’s me and my brother that race in it. And, hopefully, one day our kids will race in it as well.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--Where Is Kim Jong Un?

Where Is Kim Jong Un?

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : North Korea stalls for time as the world speculates about Kim Jong Un ’ s health , the White House announces a ramp-up in coronavirus testing , and Venezuela names a new oil minister .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
After weeks without an appearance , North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un has materialized—on paper at least .
In a sign that North Korea is feeling the pressure to provide some proof of life , North Korea ’ s Korean Central News Agency ( KCNA ) published @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jong Un to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa sending greetings for South Africa ’ s Freedom Day .
Although such letters are a common diplomatic nicety , it would be somewhat unusual for Kim to send such a letter to South Africa ’ s leader : For the past 16 years , North Korea ’ s No .
2 , the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People ’ s Assembly—currently Choe Ryong Hae—has traditionally sent greetings for South Africa ’ s Freedom Day .
South Korea has repeatedly held firm that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Unification Kim Yeon Chul said on Monday that South Korea has “ enough intelligence to confidently say that there are no unusual developments ” in North Korea .
During Monday ’ s White House briefing , U.S. President Donald Trump renewed his good wishes to Kim , adding that he may be more aware of Kim ’ s status than he let on , “ I hope he ’ s fine .
I do know how he ’ s doing relatively speaking .
We will see—you ’ ll probably be hearing in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump said .
What ’ s coming next ?
In Foreign Policy , Duyeon Kim and Leif-Eric Easley explore the different scenarios , from a full return to normal to a leadership vacuum .
Either way , the authors say this episode “ can serve as a wake-up call to the U.S.-South Korea alliance on the need for close and advance coordination on scenarios surrounding the health of the North Korean leader.
” It ’ s also a reality check on the frailty of North Korea ’ s political system , as Oriana @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Since World War II , no family dictatorship has ever managed to pass power for a third time.
” If things fall apart in the north , defectors could play a key role in the Korean Peninsula ’ s future .
Melissa Chan profiles the former North Korean diplomat Thae Yong-ho , who defected to South Korea after serving Pyongyang for decades and was recently elected to the legislature in Seoul .
“ If North Korea ever reconciles with its neighbor—whether through collapse or diplomacy—it may be trailblazers like Thae who play @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” she writes .
White House plans to partner with private companies to increase testing .
The White House released plans to expand coronavirus testing so that 2 percent of Americans across 50 states ( roughly 6.5 million people ) could receive a test .
To date , approximately 17,000 out of every 1 million inhabitants have been tested in the United States—just over half the rate in Spain and Italy .
According to the CDC , the daily number of tests in the United States in the past week has hovered around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Health Institute estimate that a testing rate of 500,000 per day would be the “ bare minimum ” in order to expect a return to normal economic activity .
It ’ s unclear whether the White House plan , which involves a partnership with major pharmaceutical retailers like CVS and Walgreens , will reach that figure .
CVS said it hoped to conduct 1.5 million tests per month , and Walgreens said it would aim for 800,000 tests per month .
In a further sign that the Trump administration wants to hand off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the private sector , it said that contact tracing methods should be developed by the states with the federal government offering “ technical assistance.
” U.S. Africa Command admits to killing civilians in Somalia .
On Monday , a U.S. Africa Command internal investigation found that a military airstrike it carried out in February of 2019 killed two civilians and injured three more .
It is only the second time Africom has admitted to killing civilians through one of its airstrikes .
The U.S. military is increasingly reliant on airstrikes in its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been launched in the past 4 months than in the entire 8 years of Barack Obama ’ s presidency .
In May 2019 , Amanda Sperber investigated the civilian casualties resulting from Africom strikes .
Writing in FP , she noted that three civilians had reportedly been killed and that Africom appeared “ to have done little to verify details about the three men , raising the possibility that others killed in U.S. strikes and labeled as terrorists might also have been innocent victims.
” Amnesty International has long been critical of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. airstrikes that it alleges led to civilian deaths .
“ We ’ ve documented case after case in the USA ’ s escalating air war on Somalia , where the Africom thinks it can simply smear its civilian victims as ‘ terrorists , ’ no questions asked , ” said Deprose Muchena of Amnesty International .
“ This is unconscionable ; the US military must change course and pursue truth and accountability in these cases , in line with its obligations under international humanitarian law.
” Prague mayor under police protection after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hrib has been given 24-hour police protection after a report in Czech magazine Respekt said the mayor was the subject of a Russian poisoning plot .
The mayor had recently spoken positively of the Prague council ’ s decision to rename the square in front of the Russian embassy after Boris Nemtsov , the murdered Russian dissident .
Czech authorities have not confirmed that the details reported in Respekt are the reason why Hrib is under increased protection .
Hrib himself has also remained quiet .
“ The police protection was simply given @ @ @ @ @ @ @ By their decision , I am not able to comment on the reasons , ” he said .
Venezuela appoints new oil minister .
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is shaking up the country ’ s oil leadership , as record-low prices cut deeper into an already crippled oil production network .
Tareck El Aissami , a former vice president who had most recently served as minister of industry and national production will take over as oil minister .
El Aissami replaces Gen. Manuel Quevedo who had simultaneously headed up the state oil company @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cousin of the deceased former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez , has been named interim president of PDVSA .
In March , El Aissami was included in a U.S. Justice Department indictment for violating U.S. sanctions and for facilitating drug trafficking .
Writing in Foreign Policy , Carlos Vecchio , the U.S.-recognized ambassador to the United States—representing Juan Guaido ’ s interim government—argues that the Maduro regime had forced the country into economic self-isolation long before the coronavirus hit .
“ By forcibly isolating Venezuelans , Maduro ’ s policies—which have led to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system—are designed to suppress Venezuelans ’ freedoms in order to allow his regime to hold onto power , ” he argues .
Oil prices slide again .
Oil could be heading for calamity again as one of the funds responsible for April ’ s rout on May oil futures said it would begin selling its June futures .
To head off another storage capacity panic , JPMorgan Chase warned that a suspension of U.S. production equivalent to 1 million barrels per day would have to be put in place in May .
Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Moscow commemorating Russia ’ s victory in World War II will open at the beginning of May featuring eye-catching mosaics celebrating the annexation of Crimea that includes Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials .
Another mosaic will feature a group of soldiers holding up a picture of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin during a 1945 victory parade—Stalin ’ s first appearance in a state building since the 1960s .
Putin himself has attempted to play down his inclusion in the cathedral art , and his spokesman said , “ When he was told @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : ‘ Someday our thankful descendants will appreciate our merits , but it ’ s too early to do so now.
’ ” Doctors without trousers .
A group of doctors in Germany have started a protest on social media to draw attention to shortages in personal protective equipment .
With mass protests ruled out due to lockdown measures , the doctors are grabbing attention by posing naked in their offices , with artful poses to circumvent anti-nudity algorithms .
“ The nudity is a symbol of how vulnerable we are without protection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the doctors participating in the protest , said .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: North Korea stalls for time as the world speculates about Kim Jong Un's health, the White House announces a ramp-up in coronavirus testing, and Venezuela names a new oil minister.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: North Korea stalls for time as the world speculates about Kim Jong Un’s health, the White House announces a ramp-up in coronavirus testing, and Venezuela names a new oil minister.
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N. Korea Publishes Letter, But No Public Appearance Yet
After weeks without an appearance, North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un has materialized—on paper at least.
In a sign that North Korea is feeling the pressure to provide some proof of life, North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published a letter dated April 27 from Kim Jong Un to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa sending greetings for South Africa’s Freedom Day.
Although such letters are a common diplomatic nicety, it would be somewhat unusual for Kim to send such a letter to South Africa’s leader: For the past 16 years, North Korea’s No. 2, the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly—currently Choe Ryong Hae—has traditionally sent greetings for South Africa’s Freedom Day.
South Korea has repeatedly held firm that Kim is in no danger. Minister for Unification Kim Yeon Chul said on Monday that South Korea has “enough intelligence to confidently say that there are no unusual developments” in North Korea.
During Monday’s White House briefing, U.S. President Donald Trump renewed his good wishes to Kim, adding that he may be more aware of Kim’s status than he let on, “I hope he’s fine. I do know how he’s doing relatively speaking. We will see—you’ll probably be hearing in the not too distant future,” Trump said.
What’s coming next? In Foreign Policy, Duyeon Kim and Leif-Eric Easley explore the different scenarios, from a full return to normal to a leadership vacuum. Either way, the authors say this episode “can serve as a wake-up call to the U.S.-South Korea alliance on the need for close and advance coordination on scenarios surrounding the health of the North Korean leader.”
It’s also a reality check on the frailty of North Korea’s political system, as Oriana Skylar Mastro points out in FP, “Since World War II, no family dictatorship has ever managed to pass power for a third time.”
If things fall apart in the north, defectors could play a key role in the Korean Peninsula’s future. Melissa Chan profiles the former North Korean diplomat Thae Yong-ho, who defected to South Korea after serving Pyongyang for decades and was recently elected to the legislature in Seoul. “If North Korea ever reconciles with its neighbor—whether through collapse or diplomacy—it may be trailblazers like Thae who play a key role in any rapprochement,” she writes.
What We’re Following Today
White House plans to partner with private companies to increase testing. The White House released plans to expand coronavirus testing so that 2 percent of Americans across 50 states (roughly 6.5 million people) could receive a test. To date, approximately 17,000 out of every 1 million inhabitants have been tested in the United States—just over half the rate in Spain and Italy.
According to the CDC, the daily number of tests in the United States in the past week has hovered around 15,000; researchers at the Harvard Global Health Institute estimate that a testing rate of 500,000 per day would be the “bare minimum” in order to expect a return to normal economic activity.
It’s unclear whether the White House plan, which involves a partnership with major pharmaceutical retailers like CVS and Walgreens, will reach that figure. CVS said it hoped to conduct 1.5 million tests per month, and Walgreens said it would aim for 800,000 tests per month. In a further sign that the Trump administration wants to hand off responsibility for the U.S. epidemic to states and the private sector, it said that contact tracing methods should be developed by the states with the federal government offering “technical assistance.”
U.S. Africa Command admits to killing civilians in Somalia. On Monday, a U.S. Africa Command internal investigation found that a military airstrike it carried out in February of 2019 killed two civilians and injured three more. It is only the second time Africom has admitted to killing civilians through one of its airstrikes. The U.S. military is increasingly reliant on airstrikes in its operations in Somalia; more attacks have been launched in the past 4 months than in the entire 8 years of Barack Obama’s presidency.
In May 2019, Amanda Sperber investigated the civilian casualties resulting from Africom strikes. Writing in FP, she noted that three civilians had reportedly been killed and that Africom appeared “to have done little to verify details about the three men, raising the possibility that others killed in U.S. strikes and labeled as terrorists might also have been innocent victims.”
Amnesty International has long been critical of U.S. operations in Somalia and has highlighted more U.S. airstrikes that it alleges led to civilian deaths. “We’ve documented case after case in the USA’s escalating air war on Somalia, where the Africom thinks it can simply smear its civilian victims as ‘terrorists,’ no questions asked,” said Deprose Muchena of Amnesty International. “This is unconscionable; the US military must change course and pursue truth and accountability in these cases, in line with its obligations under international humanitarian law.”
Prague mayor under police protection after suspected poisoning plot. Prague Mayor Zdenek Hrib has been given 24-hour police protection after a report in Czech magazine Respekt said the mayor was the subject of a Russian poisoning plot. The mayor had recently spoken positively of the Prague council’s decision to rename the square in front of the Russian embassy after Boris Nemtsov, the murdered Russian dissident. Czech authorities have not confirmed that the details reported in Respekt are the reason why Hrib is under increased protection. Hrib himself has also remained quiet. “The police protection was simply given to me by the Czech police. By their decision, I am not able to comment on the reasons,” he said.
Keep an Eye On
Venezuela appoints new oil minister. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is shaking up the country’s oil leadership, as record-low prices cut deeper into an already crippled oil production network. Tareck El Aissami, a former vice president who had most recently served as minister of industry and national production will take over as oil minister. El Aissami replaces Gen. Manuel Quevedo who had simultaneously headed up the state oil company, PDVSA. Asdrubal Chavez, a cousin of the deceased former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, has been named interim president of PDVSA. In March, El Aissami was included in a U.S. Justice Department indictment for violating U.S. sanctions and for facilitating drug trafficking.
Writing in Foreign Policy, Carlos Vecchio, the U.S.-recognized ambassador to the United States—representing Juan Guaido’s interim government—argues that the Maduro regime had forced the country into economic self-isolation long before the coronavirus hit. “By forcibly isolating Venezuelans, Maduro’s policies—which have led to a collapsed economy and a depleted health care system—are designed to suppress Venezuelans’ freedoms in order to allow his regime to hold onto power,” he argues.
Oil prices slide again. Oil could be heading for calamity again as one of the funds responsible for April’s rout on May oil futures said it would begin selling its June futures. To head off another storage capacity panic, JPMorgan Chase warned that a suspension of U.S. production equivalent to 1 million barrels per day would have to be put in place in May.
Odds and Ends
Russia celebrates Putin—and Stalin. A new church in Moscow commemorating Russia’s victory in World War II will open at the beginning of May featuring eye-catching mosaics celebrating the annexation of Crimea that includes Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials. Another mosaic will feature a group of soldiers holding up a picture of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin during a 1945 victory parade—Stalin’s first appearance in a state building since the 1960s. Putin himself has attempted to play down his inclusion in the cathedral art, and his spokesman said, “When he was told about this, he smiled and said: ‘Someday our thankful descendants will appreciate our merits, but it’s too early to do so now.’”
Doctors without trousers. A group of doctors in Germany have started a protest on social media to draw attention to shortages in personal protective equipment. With mass protests ruled out due to lockdown measures, the doctors are grabbing attention by posing naked in their offices, with artful poses to circumvent anti-nudity algorithms. “The nudity is a symbol of how vulnerable we are without protection,” Ruben Bernau, one of the doctors participating in the protest, said.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.