foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Data Governance – Part 2

Data Governance – Part 2

The Coronavirus Pandemic Is Accelerating the Adoption of AI use for Government Data Collection The outbreak and continued spread of COVID-19 is accelerating governments ’ adoption of data collection and surveillance measures , highlighting how such technology can be leveraged in the public ’ s interest .
Those with infrastructure already in place have deployed it to mitigate the spread of the virus .
China has used drones to monitor the quarantined , while countries such as Taiwan , Israel , South Korea , and Singapore have slowed the spread of the virus by using a combination of location data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ card information to track infected citizens .
AI-based technologies are enhancing contact-tracing and location-tracking capabilities and enabling the collection of biometric information on citizens .
The technology has proven to be a powerful tool for containing the virus ’ s spread , but , due to the current public health emergency , many of these technologies are being adopted at a faster pace and without public input , regulatory oversight , or implementation of legal safeguards , such as sunset clauses or data-anonymization measures .
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 , at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increased surveillance measures , with the most common measures being state access to cellphone data ( used in twenty-eight countries ) , or downloadable contact-tracing apps ( used in thirty countries ) .
Current data on COVID-19 is inconclusive as to whether surveillance measures have been the most fruitful method to combat the spread of the disease .
Some of the best-performing countries , in terms of containing the spread of the disease and limiting the death toll , have used extensive tracking and surveillance measures , such as South Korea and Taiwan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New Zealand - did not use extensive surveillance , instead relying on early action , strict lockdown policies , and expansive testing .
Most notably , the country with the most success combating the coronavirus and the least reported deaths as of this publishing , Vietnam relied mostly on human intelligence-gathering networks and extensive police enforcement of lockdowns .
Despite the mixed success of surveillance measures , without adequate safeguards there is real potential for the coronavirus outbreak to permanently increase data collection and surveillance infrastructure long after the virus is contained .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ measures after the pandemic ( however , without explicit legal guarantees ) , such as South Korea , or anonymizing the data they collect , such as Austria .
Other countries have written explicit sunset clauses into the COVID-19 legislation they have passed , such as the UK and France .
However , many countries have implemented extensive surveillance measures without any safeguards in place , such as Russia and India .
Additionally , a number of governments have outsourced varying degrees of their COVID-19 response to the private sector , particularly for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raises additional privacy concerns , as private companies are now collecting and holding citizens ’ sensitive health information , which under other circumstances users would likely be more reticent to share .
Brazil , for example , collaborates extensively with private start-up firms to track citizens ’ movements , and Apple and Google have developed contact-tracing technology that is currently being released in twenty-three countries .
While sunset clauses can serve as safeguards against current surveillance measures becoming permanent , they are far from a guarantee .
The USA Patriot Act , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capabilities of the federal government , has a sunset clause originally for February 2006 , but as of today the law is still in effect .
The urgency of COVID-19 containment may help to normalize the adoption of data collection and monitoring technologies .
South Korea ’ s coronavirus contact-tracing app was the sixth most downloaded app in the country .
Sentiment in Germany , which has some of the strictest data privacy laws in the world , seems to be changing ; by April of 2020 over half the population was in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the spread of COVID-19 , despite public outcry when the idea was originally pitched a month earlier .
The longer the pandemic persists , the more likely it is that increased government data collection and monitoring will be accepted .
While these practices provide a valuable resource to help fight the pandemic , the current environment risks accelerating the most troublesome surveillance trends .

The range of legal and regulatory measures pertaining to data access, protection, and transfer within the country and beyond its borders create the contours of a country’s data governance regime. For individuals and organizations to protect their data and effectively navigate the global data governance landscape, understanding the measures governing both private company and government data collection is critical. Governments’ collection of citizens’ data is certainly nothing new, but technological developments over the last few decades have dramatically increased the scope and scale of this collection. Growing reservoirs of data are strengthening governments’ ability to make more informed, efficient, and strategic decisions across the board. However, the extent of data collection remains largely unknown and inaccessible to the public, and the proliferation of novel technologies enabling governments to collect an array of data raises questions regarding which applications are, in fact, in the public’s interest. Notably, mass-scale data collection is enabling the development of widespread surveillance technology and the corresponding investment of foundational infrastructure to operate the technology by governments throughout the world. Many governments now deploy highly effective surveillance infrastructure, with attempts to access private company data growing, through either formal requests or legal pressure. Increasingly, national governments are establishing the legal authority that exempts their government data collection practices from general data privacy laws.
In the first half of 2020 alone, the U.S., along with other governments around the world, made 103,822 requests for user data from Google—an increase of over 20 percent from the first half of 2019. Over the same time period, Facebook had a total of 173,592 requests to access user data. And Twitter had 12,657, both representing the largest increases in requests between reporting periods since the data started being tracked. These increases mirror the overall trend of governments pushing to increase access to data held by private companies. Such access is enabled by legislation, notably China’s Cybersecurity Law. Early drafts of the law would have required companies to disclose source code for Chinese government review. However, after protests from the U.S. and other nations, this language was removed. The final version of the law contains modified, vague language granting the Chinese government the authority to access data held within its borders that it considers ‘relevant to national security.’ Further, the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act Act includes measures that weaken and circumvent the data protection practice of encryption, with other governments also pursuing means to access private company data held inside and outside its borders. If the country a company operates in weakens encryption standards through legislation, then operating within that country’s borders also puts the company’s data at heightened risk from outside attacks. When a government weakens encryption, companies that are conducting sensitive research, or holding valuable intellectual property, cannot guarantee that their data is secure from foreign governments while operating overseas. It also limits everyone’s ability to communicate privately.
Technological advancements, such as real-time location tracking, voice analysis, and facial recognition, significantly enhance governments’ capacity to monitor the communications of entire groups, companies, and nations on a mass scale, posing new challenges for operating within certain countries and given data governance regimes. Reforms to government data collection laws over the past two decades are granting increased government access to data, and they often circumvent new or existing privacy legislation. This trend is occurring in democratic countries with relatively strong checks and balances, as well as non-democratic and authoritarian systems, thus increasing risks of doing business and potentially having a corrosive impact on civil liberties in both. The proliferation of data localization laws chronicled in Part I of this series has contributed to these concerns over government access to private citizens’ data—particularly in autocratic states where free speech is routinely limited. Critics worry that restrictions on data flows will grant government officials access to massive datasets on their citizens, which can be combed through to target dissidents and religious or ethnic minorities. The correlated rise between governments’ drive and enhanced ability to access citizens’ data, and the increasing regulation of data flows, Internet speech, and big tech companies is amplifying both privacy and human rights concerns.
Technological advancements, such as real-time location tracking, voice analysis, and facial recognition, significantly enhance governments’ capacity to monitor the communications of entire groups, companies, and nations on a mass scale, posing new challenges for operating within certain countries and given data governance regimes. Reforms to government data collection laws over the past two decades are granting increased government access to data, and they often circumvent new or existing privacy legislation. This trend is occurring in democratic countries with relatively strong checks and balances, as well as non-democratic and authoritarian systems, thus increasing risks of doing business and potentially having a corrosive impact on civil liberties in both. The proliferation of data localization laws chronicled in Part I of this series has contributed to these concerns over government access to private citizens’ data—particularly in autocratic states where free speech is routinely limited. Critics worry that restrictions on data flows will grant government officials access to massive datasets on their citizens, which can be combed through to target dissidents and religious or ethnic minorities. The correlated rise between governments’ drive and enhanced ability to access citizens’ data, and the increasing regulation of data flows, Internet speech, and big tech companies is amplifying both privacy and human rights concerns.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-27--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

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Close security , economic , and cultural cooperation between Israel and the Persian Gulf States will blunt the backlash against Israel if it annexes the West Bank .
Meanwhile , the United Kingdom must be the principal upholder of Hong Kong ’ s autonomous status in the face of Chinese overreach .
And as governments begin to ease lockdown restrictions , disability activists worry that many vulnerable people have been left out of the conversation .
The deepening ties between Israel and several Persian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sign that , even if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proceeds with his plans to annex parts of the West Bank , those relationships will last , Jonathan H. Ferziger writes .
2 .
Britain Must Step Up to the Global Stage to Protect Hong Kong In the geopolitical impasse surrounding Hong Kong , the British government must continue to play a principal role in ensuring “ one country , two systems ” is upheld , David Owen writes .
Iran ’ s new speaker of parliament is identified less with his political and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Behravesh writes .
4 .
Politicians Are Writing Off Disabled Lives Amid the Pandemic Negative attitudes against those with disabilities have activists worried that the pandemic is entrenching old attitudes toward whose survival matters and who gets to participate in outside life , Harriet Williamson writes .
Municipal duties in Nairobi are being transferred from elected public officials into the hands of military men in an obvious power grab by President Uhuru Kenyatta , Carey Baraka writes .

Close security, economic, and cultural cooperation between Israel and the Persian Gulf States will blunt the backlash against Israel if it annexes the West Bank.
Close security, economic, and cultural cooperation between Israel and the Persian Gulf States will blunt the backlash against Israel if it annexes the West Bank.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom must be the principal upholder of Hong Kong’s autonomous status in the face of Chinese overreach.
And as governments begin to ease lockdown restrictions, disability activists worry that many vulnerable people have been left out of the conversation.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu meets with Sultan of Oman Sayyid Qaboos bin Said Al Said in Muscat, on Oct. 26, 2018.
The deepening ties between Israel and several Persian Gulf States in recent years are a sign that, even if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proceeds with his plans to annex parts of the West Bank, those relationships will last, Jonathan H. Ferziger writes.
A protester in Hong Kong waves a Union Jack flag
In the geopolitical impasse surrounding Hong Kong, the British government must continue to play a principal role in ensuring “one country, two systems” is upheld, David Owen writes.
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf is pictured during an interview with AFP in Tehran on Jan. 9, 2012.
Iran’s new speaker of parliament is identified less with his political and military credentials than with corruption, Maysam Behravesh writes.
Dawn, a carer, tends to her client, Tina, who has multiple sclerosis and is considered in the high-risk category during the COVID-19 pandemic, during a home visit in Scunthorpe, northern England, on May 8.
Negative attitudes against those with disabilities have activists worried that the pandemic is entrenching old attitudes toward whose survival matters and who gets to participate in outside life, Harriet Williamson writes.
Nairobi, Kenya, which has seen rapid economic expansion in recent years, is seen through a crisscross of electrical lines on May 16, 2019.
Municipal duties in Nairobi are being transferred from elected public officials into the hands of military men in an obvious power grab by President Uhuru Kenyatta, Carey Baraka writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-27--How Putin and the KGB Took Control of Russia—and Duped the West

How Putin and the KGB Took Control of Russia—and Duped the West The best one-line insight into Vladimir Putin I ever heard was from my friend ’ s father , a former Soviet dissident .
A beatnik in 1960s Leningrad , he experienced at first hand the operating practices of the KGB , the Soviet Union ’ s feared security service .
It was in the same organization that Putin spent the defining years of his youth , before he entered politics and embarked on his dizzying rise to the presidency .
The Russian leader ’ s KGB past means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a spy , my friend ’ s father explained one evening .
“ Putin can not be bent , ” he said , “ but he can be broken.
” Few people have told the story of how the KGB shaped Putin and modern Russia as well as journalist Catherine Belton in her new book , Putin ’ s People : How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On the West .
Belton argues that Putin has never been “ bent ” from his mission to restore the power of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been consigned to history alongside the Soviet Union .
And she traces the careers of Putin and his associates from mid-level spies in the 1980s , through the upheaval of the 1990s , to the very top of Russian politics and business .
They have forged a system , Belton argues , that uses the KGB playbook to keep a tight grip on power , manipulate hundreds of billions of dollars in money flows , and spread Russian influence deep into the West .
The coronavirus outbreak is an apt moment at which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Economic hardship and uncertainty have pushed Putin ’ s approval ratings to their lowest level in two decades , creating one of the biggest crises of his presidency and raising questions about his political future .
As the Russian leader struggles to ride out the storm , Belton ’ s analysis is a fascinating window into the group of men ( they are almost all men ) who wield power in the Kremlin .
Compellingly written and meticulously researched , Putin ’ s People looks set to become the definitive work on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spies .
To understand Putin ’ s modus operandi , Belton suggests you have to go to the East German city of Dresden , where Putin was posted as a foreign intelligence officer in 1985 .
Although most accounts of this period of Putin ’ s life state he did little more than learn German and drink beer , Belton paints a very different picture .
Putin , she says , was involved in running agents , recruitment , technology theft , and even the management of left-wing terror groups that carried out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iron Curtain .
At the same time , Putin was privy to measures taken by the KGB to preserve its influence in case of the collapse of the Soviet empire , which was anticipated by some far-seeing officers .
In the main , this meant setting up slush funds with “ trusted custodians ” and “ friendly firms ” and establishing complex smuggling schemes and networks of agents abroad .
What Putin and the KGB were up to in the 1980s , Belton argues , is “ a blueprint for everything that was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been there for decades , but the KGB ’ s continuing influence only came to the attention of most in the West in 2016 with evidence that Moscow had intervened on behalf of Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential elections .
Belton dives deeply into the world of the post-Soviet hucksters who surrounded Trump long before his White House bid , identifying their ties to Russian intelligence and how they used KGB tactics to entangle the future president in a web of financial obligation .
“ In the beginning , Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a convenient vehicle through which to funnel funds into the U.S. , ” writes Belton , as she traces his contacts with figures like construction tycoon Agas Agalarov , antique smuggler Shalva Tchigirinsky , and oil-trader Tamir Sapir , who all “ operated in the half-light between the Russian security services and the mob.
” Gradually , these relationships deepened , and Belton suggests that “ at some point Trump became a political opportunity.
” This is not , however , a book solely about Russia ’ s espionage operations abroad .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Putin ’ s People is the cast of powerful businessmen and officials at the heart of the Kremlin—and what they do with their money and influence .
Unsurprisingly , almost all of Belton ’ s characters have KGB backgrounds .
There is Igor Sechin , a former KGB agent in East Africa who worked as Putin ’ s secretary in the 1990s ( Belton recounts an anecdote in which he solicits a $ 10,000 bribe for his boss ) and is now the head of state-owned oil giant Rosneft .
There is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Putin in KGB training school before moving into oil trading and amassing a $ 14 billion fortune .
And there is Andrei Akimov , a one-time Soviet intelligence operative in Vienna who became a key player in the state ’ s seizure of private oil company Yukos and the labyrinthine financial schemes used to skim off billions of dollars from gas export deals .
But Belton goes further , showing how even those billionaires who are often seen as more independent are inextricably tied to the Kremlin .
She recounts how the owners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fridman and Pyotr Aven , employed the relatives of East German spy acquaintances of Putin and how Putin told billionaire Roman Abramovich to buy London soccer club Chelsea in 2003 .
The subservience of Russian business has even been on display during the coronavirus outbreak as the authorities lean on the superrich to provide tens of millions of dollars to boost the capacity of the health care system .
If Belton overreaches in her portrayal of Putin ’ s Russia , it is perhaps to attribute too much influence to the KGB and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ She explains the collapse of the Soviet Union as an “ inside job ” by KGB men and Putin ’ s rise to the presidency as a carefully planned KGB operation .
In both cases , these were complex political processes involving far more than just the machinations of a cabal of spymasters .
Belton also uses anonymous sources and circumstantial evidence to give new credence to some of post-Soviet Russia ’ s darkest rumors : that Putin was implicated in the murder of his 1990s boss Anatoly Sobchak , and that his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ siege of a Moscow theater , in which at least 170 people were killed , to cover Putin in blood and “ tie him to the presidency.
” There is no reason to doubt the ruthlessness of one-time KGB officers , but Russia ’ s security services are far from omnipotent .
Corruption , incompetence , and coincidence are also aspects of Russian politics .
Far more compelling is Belton ’ s exposure of how the Putin regime manipulates the economic system to amass personal fortunes for his inner circle , create secret @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finance influence operations abroad .
Through numerous conversations with bankers , Kremlin sources , and former spies , Putin ’ s People shows how the Russian leader ’ s associates gradually took over the Russian economy by stripping assets from state-owned gas monopoly Gazprom , creaming off money from energy exports , and creating financial giants , like insurance company Sogaz and Bank Rossiya , tightly controlled by Kremlin insiders .
Belton argues convincingly that this process was abetted by many in the West , who believed that integrating Russia into global financial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fold after the end of Communism .
Instead , the foreign listing of Russian companies and the kowtowing by Western lawyers , financiers , and officials simply enriched those close to Putin , entrenched a version of state capitalism , and , ultimately , held back the country ’ s economic development .
Bankers in the U.S. and Europe were “ blinded by the flood of cash , ” Belton writes .
“ Putin ’ s men had accurately calculated that , for the West , money would outweigh all other concerns.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the West collapsed in the wake of Moscow ’ s 2014 annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea , Putin ’ s grip on the Russian economy was almost total—the West had lost its chance to shape the Putin system .
“ It ’ s all Putin ’ s money , ” Belton quotes one banker as saying .
“ When he came to power , he started out saying he was no more than the hired manager .
But then he became the controlling shareholder of all of Russia.
” Some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of luxury for Putin and his closest allies , but according to Belton , much of it was also funneled abroad , hidden from democratic oversight , to undermine institutions in the West—from U.S. elections to the United Kingdom ’ s Brexit vote in 2016 and fringe political parties in Europe .
Putin ’ s KGB men have $ 800 billion “ stashed away in offshore bank accounts , ” according to Belton .
Earlier this year , Putin announced a series of constitutional changes that will allow him to remain president until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modern-day tsar .
But what will be the fate of Russia ’ s KGB regime ?
Will it endure beyond Putin ’ s death , or is its end much nearer at hand ?
Could , as my friend ’ s father once put it , Putin be “ broken ” ?
There are few signs of any imminent political collapse or that Putin is close to being “ broken ” by either domestic rivals or a foreign plot .
But the coronavirus crisis has made Putin appear more vulnerable than many observers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continue to drop .
The Kremlin ’ s political plans have been upended : A constitutional referendum was postponed and landmark events to mark the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union ’ s victory over Nazi Germany partially canceled .
Belton offers a few tentative predictions about the longevity of the regime in Putin ’ s People , suggesting that Putin is doomed to repeat the mistakes of his KGB predecessors .
The rule of Putin ’ s KGB men is “ calcifying , ” she warns , and faces the real risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day .
”

The best one-line insight into Vladimir Putin I ever heard was from my friend’s father, a former Soviet dissident. A beatnik in 1960s Leningrad, he experienced at first hand the operating practices of the KGB, the Soviet Union’s feared security service. It was in the same organization that Putin spent the defining years of his youth, before he entered politics and embarked on his dizzying rise to the presidency. The Russian leader’s KGB past means he will always have the mindset of a spy, my friend’s father explained one evening. “Putin cannot be bent,” he said, “but he can be broken.”
The best one-line insight into Vladimir Putin I ever heard was from my friend’s father, a former Soviet dissident. A beatnik in 1960s Leningrad, he experienced at first hand the operating practices of the KGB, the Soviet Union’s feared security service. It was in the same organization that Putin spent the defining years of his youth, before he entered politics and embarked on his dizzying rise to the presidency. The Russian leader’s KGB past means he will always have the mindset of a spy, my friend’s father explained one evening. “Putin cannot be bent,” he said, “but he can be broken.”
Few people have told the story of how the KGB shaped Putin and modern Russia as well as journalist Catherine Belton in her new book, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On the West. Belton argues that Putin has never been “bent” from his mission to restore the power of the KGB, which once seemed to have been consigned to history alongside the Soviet Union. And she traces the careers of Putin and his associates from mid-level spies in the 1980s, through the upheaval of the 1990s, to the very top of Russian politics and business. They have forged a system, Belton argues, that uses the KGB playbook to keep a tight grip on power, manipulate hundreds of billions of dollars in money flows, and spread Russian influence deep into the West.
The coronavirus outbreak is an apt moment at which to look at Putin and his regime. Economic hardship and uncertainty have pushed Putin’s approval ratings to their lowest level in two decades, creating one of the biggest crises of his presidency and raising questions about his political future. As the Russian leader struggles to ride out the storm, Belton’s analysis is a fascinating window into the group of men (they are almost all men) who wield power in the Kremlin. Compellingly written and meticulously researched, Putin’s People looks set to become the definitive work on the enduring influence of Russia’s spies.
To understand Putin’s modus operandi, Belton suggests you have to go to the East German city of Dresden, where Putin was posted as a foreign intelligence officer in 1985. Although most accounts of this period of Putin’s life state he did little more than learn German and drink beer, Belton paints a very different picture. Putin, she says, was involved in running agents, recruitment, technology theft, and even the management of left-wing terror groups that carried out assassinations on the other side of the Iron Curtain. At the same time, Putin was privy to measures taken by the KGB to preserve its influence in case of the collapse of the Soviet empire, which was anticipated by some far-seeing officers. In the main, this meant setting up slush funds with “trusted custodians” and “friendly firms” and establishing complex smuggling schemes and networks of agents abroad. What Putin and the KGB were up to in the 1980s, Belton argues, is “a blueprint for everything that was to come later.”
The signs may have been there for decades, but the KGB’s continuing influence only came to the attention of most in the West in 2016 with evidence that Moscow had intervened on behalf of Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential elections. Belton dives deeply into the world of the post-Soviet hucksters who surrounded Trump long before his White House bid, identifying their ties to Russian intelligence and how they used KGB tactics to entangle the future president in a web of financial obligation. “In the beginning, Trump’s business was probably no more than a convenient vehicle through which to funnel funds into the U.S.,” writes Belton, as she traces his contacts with figures like construction tycoon Agas Agalarov, antique smuggler Shalva Tchigirinsky, and oil-trader Tamir Sapir, who all “operated in the half-light between the Russian security services and the mob.” Gradually, these relationships deepened, and Belton suggests that “at some point Trump became a political opportunity.”
This is not, however, a book solely about Russia’s espionage operations abroad. As the title suggests, the main focus of Putin’s People is the cast of powerful businessmen and officials at the heart of the Kremlin—and what they do with their money and influence. Unsurprisingly, almost all of Belton’s characters have KGB backgrounds. There is Igor Sechin, a former KGB agent in East Africa who worked as Putin’s secretary in the 1990s (Belton recounts an anecdote in which he solicits a $10,000 bribe for his boss) and is now the head of state-owned oil giant Rosneft. There is Gennady Timchenko, who studied German with Putin in KGB training school before moving into oil trading and amassing a $14 billion fortune. And there is Andrei Akimov, a one-time Soviet intelligence operative in Vienna who became a key player in the state’s seizure of private oil company Yukos and the labyrinthine financial schemes used to skim off billions of dollars from gas export deals.
But Belton goes further, showing how even those billionaires who are often seen as more independent are inextricably tied to the Kremlin. She recounts how the owners of privately held Alfa Bank, Mikhail Fridman and Pyotr Aven, employed the relatives of East German spy acquaintances of Putin and how Putin told billionaire Roman Abramovich to buy London soccer club Chelsea in 2003. The subservience of Russian business has even been on display during the coronavirus outbreak as the authorities lean on the superrich to provide tens of millions of dollars to boost the capacity of the health care system.
If Belton overreaches in her portrayal of Putin’s Russia, it is perhaps to attribute too much influence to the KGB and Russia’s post-Soviet spy agencies. She explains the collapse of the Soviet Union as an “inside job” by KGB men and Putin’s rise to the presidency as a carefully planned KGB operation. In both cases, these were complex political processes involving far more than just the machinations of a cabal of spymasters. Belton also uses anonymous sources and circumstantial evidence to give new credence to some of post-Soviet Russia’s darkest rumors: that Putin was implicated in the murder of his 1990s boss Anatoly Sobchak, and that his ally Nikolai Patrushev organized the 2002 terrorist siege of a Moscow theater, in which at least 170 people were killed, to cover Putin in blood and “tie him to the presidency.” There is no reason to doubt the ruthlessness of one-time KGB officers, but Russia’s security services are far from omnipotent. Corruption, incompetence, and coincidence are also aspects of Russian politics.
Far more compelling is Belton’s exposure of how the Putin regime manipulates the economic system to amass personal fortunes for his inner circle, create secret funding “war chests,” and finance influence operations abroad. Through numerous conversations with bankers, Kremlin sources, and former spies, Putin’s People shows how the Russian leader’s associates gradually took over the Russian economy by stripping assets from state-owned gas monopoly Gazprom, creaming off money from energy exports, and creating financial giants, like insurance company Sogaz and Bank Rossiya, tightly controlled by Kremlin insiders. Belton argues convincingly that this process was abetted by many in the West, who believed that integrating Russia into global financial markets would bring the country into the fold after the end of Communism. Instead, the foreign listing of Russian companies and the kowtowing by Western lawyers, financiers, and officials simply enriched those close to Putin, entrenched a version of state capitalism, and, ultimately, held back the country’s economic development. Bankers in the U.S. and Europe were “blinded by the flood of cash,” Belton writes. “Putin’s men had accurately calculated that, for the West, money would outweigh all other concerns.”
By the time Russia’s relations with the West collapsed in the wake of Moscow’s 2014 annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea, Putin’s grip on the Russian economy was almost total—the West had lost its chance to shape the Putin system. “It’s all Putin’s money,” Belton quotes one banker as saying. “When he came to power, he started out saying he was no more than the hired manager. But then he became the controlling shareholder of all of Russia.” Some of this money has financed a life of luxury for Putin and his closest allies, but according to Belton, much of it was also funneled abroad, hidden from democratic oversight, to undermine institutions in the West—from U.S. elections to the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote in 2016 and fringe political parties in Europe. Putin’s KGB men have $800 billion “stashed away in offshore bank accounts,” according to Belton.
Earlier this year, Putin announced a series of constitutional changes that will allow him to remain president until 2036, effectively transforming him into a modern-day tsar. But what will be the fate of Russia’s KGB regime? Will it endure beyond Putin’s death, or is its end much nearer at hand? Could, as my friend’s father once put it, Putin be “broken”?
There are few signs of any imminent political collapse or that Putin is close to being “broken” by either domestic rivals or a foreign plot. But the coronavirus crisis has made Putin appear more vulnerable than many observers can remember, and his approval ratings continue to drop. The Kremlin’s political plans have been upended: A constitutional referendum was postponed and landmark events to mark the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany partially canceled. Belton offers a few tentative predictions about the longevity of the regime in Putin’s People, suggesting that Putin is doomed to repeat the mistakes of his KGB predecessors. The rule of Putin’s KGB men is “calcifying,” she warns, and faces the real risk of “becoming more brittle by the day.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-27--Will Poland’s Presidential Race Deal a Blow to Nationalist Conservatives?

WARSAW , Poland—Last October , Poland ’ s President Andrzej Duda and Rafal Trzaskowski , the mayor of Warsaw , took part in the unveiling ceremony of the memorial of one of the fathers of Polish independence .
Standing almost shoulder to shoulder in chilly weather , they paid tribute to a national hero .
But later the same day , a striking thing occurred : Duda disappeared from the photos released by the mayor , while Trzaskowski was visibly missing in the photos issued by the president ’ s office .
Eight months later , Duda and Trzaskowski , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics—the ruling right-wing Law and Justice ( PiS ) party and more liberal Civic Platform ( PO ) are most likely to emerge from this weekend ’ s first-round presidential election and proceed to the second round to compete for a post that , although largely ceremonial , allows the holder of the office to veto laws .
Originally , the election was scheduled for May 10 , but it was postponed to June 28 due to the COVID-19 pandemic .
Last fall ’ s photo-editing was , it now seems , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be a brutal election campaign .
In just a few weeks , Trzaskowski appears to have gained ground on a popular incumbent .
Duda reacted to his falling poll numbers by declaring LGBT “ ideology ” worse than Soviet-era communist indoctrination and PO worse than the coronavirus .
Duda reacted to his falling poll numbers by declaring LGBT “ ideology ” worse than Soviet-era communist indoctrination and PO worse than the coronavirus .
Trzaskowski , a PO candidate who in Warsaw unveiled a series of commitments to uphold LGBT rights , seemingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has now avoided discussing LGBT topics and cut himself off from some of PO ’ s most controversial decisions .
According to those who know the president , his anti-LGBT turn is new .
“ I didn ’ t know this side of the president , ” Jolanta Turczynowicz-Kieryllo , Duda ’ s former campaign manager who worked with him briefly in February and March , admitted .
For her , his harsh language is “ an ineffective remedy for dipping polls , ” a strategy “ imposed on the president by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s current staff .
But , although Duda and Trzaskowski have sought throughout the campaign to showcase their stark differences , they are in fact not as totally opposed as their hometowns : Duda ’ s Krakow and Trzaskowski ’ s Warsaw—the two eternal rival cities , Poland ’ s former and current capitals .
Both born in 1972 to intellectual families , they first tasted politics in the late 1980s , as the implosion of global communism was rapidly gathering speed .
As teenagers , they both volunteered in the 1989 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who were getting ready to trounce communists in the first partly free legislative elections .
Years later , after obtaining doctoral degrees in administrative law and political science , respectively , Duda and Trzaskowski even ascended a similar political ladder , which included posts of deputy ministers , and members of both the Polish parliament and the European Parliament .
Neither man was their party ’ s first choice for presidential nominee .
In 2015 , Duda was picked by Jaroslaw Kaczynski , the heavy-handed leader of the PiS , who himself was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And Trzaskowski in mid-May quietly replaced Malgorzata Kidawa-Blonska , a PO deputy head of the Sejm , the lower house of Poland ’ s parliament .
After an uninspiring campaign and many gaffes , Kidawa-Blonska ’ s support has dipped dramatically to a mere 4 percent .
The current rivalry between the PiS and PO backup candidates mirrors a long , destructive battle sparked by both political and personal resentments between the two leading conservative parties—the nationalist PiS and more economically liberal PO—both with roots in the anti-communist Solidarity movement .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ taken turns in power or serving as the main opposition force .
What over the years has become Poland ’ s key political conflict reflects the country ’ s historical divisions and a contest of economic and cultural interests .
The PO party has mostly targeted the wealthier and more economically developed cities , promoting itself as pro-European force linked with economic neoliberalism and the rule of law to appeal to richer , liberal urban elites .
Meanwhile , Poland ’ s strongly Catholic and poorer countryside , notably in Poland ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ PiS rule .
The party has successfully married the Catholic Church , in which some leaders have openly backed PiS , with flagship social programs .
Although costly , they became immensely popular and helped PiS to offer itself as the protector of ordinary families .
PiS has also mastered a more top-down form of rule personified by Kaczynski , the party ’ s leader , who is an ordinary member of parliament but is widely believed to be the mastermind behind everything currently taking place in Poland .
Unsurprisingly , Duda , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turned into hard-line propaganda mouthpieces , built an image of a president close to people ’ s hearts and a guardian of PiS social programs .
“ He ’ s been a frequent visitor in small cities and villages , usually bypassed by presidents , ” said Piotr Trudnowski , the head of the Krakow-based Jagiellonian Club , a conservative think tank .
“ He was able to recognize and give a credit to a less wealthy , more traditionally oriented part of the country , which politicians do not see often from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of public media outlets turned into hard-line propaganda mouthpieces , built an image of a president close to people ’ s hearts and a guardian of PiS social programs .
Trzaskowski , meanwhile , has cultivated the image of the consummate European .
A diplomat who knew Trzaskowski when he was deputy foreign minister confirmed that the Warsaw mayor has an expert knowledge of the European Union and a reputation for professionalism among those who worked with him .
Some perceived him as narcissistic , however , given that he reportedly liked to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ languages .
“ His professional distance sometimes came off as lack of emotional intelligence , ” the diplomat said .
Kaczynski has long accused Tusk of being indirectly responsible for the 2010 Smolensk air crash that killed Lech Kaczynski , Jaroslaw ’ s twin brother and Poland ’ s then-president , along with 95 other people .
Despite landing jobs in the EU , Tusk remains a mentor to many in PO , including Trzaskowski , who briefly served as minister of administration and digitization in his government from 2013 to 2014 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ society at large , often dividing families .
“ The task of people on one side is to find reasons to praise their leader and attack the opposite leader , whatever one has done , ” Jan Rokita , one of PO ’ s founding fathers , who now supports Duda over Trzaskowski due to Duda ’ s social conservatism , told me .
“ On the other hand , tribal divisions became a universal trend that has affected politics in the entire Western world .
They destroy public debate but effectively mobilize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involved.
” In many ways , Trzaskowski is now who Duda was five years ago : a youthful enigma challenging a strong incumbent while promising to unite the nation—and he is proving to be a surprisingly effective campaigner , despite the fact he was chosen for lack of a better candidate .
He has also become the great hope for transforming the electoral misfortunes of his party .
It worked with Duda ; after all , his stunning victory in May 2015 opened the door for PiS to win an overall majority in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first PiS parliamentary triumph after eight years of PO ruling in the country .
According to Pawel Kowal , a former deputy foreign minister in Jaroslaw Kaczynski ’ s government and now a PO member of the Sejm , Trzaskowski has patiently waited a long time for his chance .
“ He certainly showed an appetite , ” Kowal said .
“ But , he was careful enough not to express it very much .
Now , I see different Trzaskowski : determined and pragmatic .
He is being formed into a mature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way from the days when he was an energetic , yet relatively unknown , member of the European Parliament selected by Kaczynski to attract more centrist voters .
But he has never fulfilled the hopes of those who thought he , as a young and a fresh face with no burdens , would end the devastating war between PiS and PO .
On the contrary , with a chaotic team around him and still lacking influence within the party , he cemented his image as the PiS rubber stamp , who signs almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including controversial judiciary bills , which provoked clashes with the EU over the rule of law .
PiS hard-liners see Trzaskowski as a devilish phantom influenced by gays , Jews , and George Soros—an image spread by state-run media .
As part of PiS , which is much more centered around its leader than PO , Duda has constantly been reminded he ’ s just one of many cogs in Kaczynski ’ s machine , even if he occasionally vetoed PiS laws , including some that would have cemented the party ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ judiciary—though in the latter case he proposed an alternative law of his own that further increased his and the government ’ s power over the courts .
“ The key of this presidency is that he genuinely shares many views with Kaczynski , ” said Arkadiusz Mularczyk , a member of the ruling coalition and Duda ’ s friend .
“ I really don ’ t see room for major conflicts.
” In Warsaw , the presidential palace is located only a 15-minute walk away from City Hall .
Traveling between the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gap between supporters of the president and the mayor—especially the PiS hard-liners who see Trzaskowski as a devilish phantom influenced by gays , Jews , and George Soros—an image spread by state-run media .
But sometimes even his recent opponents look at him favorably .
“ I haven ’ t decided yet ” , said Turczynowicz-Kieryllo , Duda ’ s former campaign manager , when asked if she would vote for Trzaskowski .
“ But , I admit , I like his vision of a president who builds alliances , not walls .
@

WARSAW, Poland—Last October, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda and Rafal Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw, took part in the unveiling ceremony of the memorial of one of the fathers of Polish independence. Standing almost shoulder to shoulder in chilly weather, they paid tribute to a national hero. But later the same day, a striking thing occurred: Duda disappeared from the photos released by the mayor, while Trzaskowski was visibly missing in the photos issued by the president’s office.
WARSAW, Poland—Last October, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda and Rafal Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw, took part in the unveiling ceremony of the memorial of one of the fathers of Polish independence. Standing almost shoulder to shoulder in chilly weather, they paid tribute to a national hero. But later the same day, a striking thing occurred: Duda disappeared from the photos released by the mayor, while Trzaskowski was visibly missing in the photos issued by the president’s office.
Eight months later, Duda and Trzaskowski, backed by the two arch-enemies of Polish politics—the ruling right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party and more liberal Civic Platform (PO) are most likely to emerge from this weekend’s first-round presidential election and proceed to the second round to compete for a post that, although largely ceremonial, allows the holder of the office to veto laws. Originally, the election was scheduled for May 10, but it was postponed to June 28 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Last fall’s photo-editing was, it now seems, the first salvo in what has turned out to be a brutal election campaign. In just a few weeks, Trzaskowski appears to have gained ground on a popular incumbent. Duda reacted to his falling poll numbers by declaring LGBT “ideology” worse than Soviet-era communist indoctrination and PO worse than the coronavirus.
Duda reacted to his falling poll numbers by declaring LGBT “ideology” worse than Soviet-era communist indoctrination and PO worse than the coronavirus.
Trzaskowski, a PO candidate who in Warsaw unveiled a series of commitments to uphold LGBT rights, seemingly personifies these alleged evils, even though he has now avoided discussing LGBT topics and cut himself off from some of PO’s most controversial decisions.
According to those who know the president, his anti-LGBT turn is new. “I didn’t know this side of the president,” Jolanta Turczynowicz-Kieryllo, Duda’s former campaign manager who worked with him briefly in February and March, admitted. For her, his harsh language is “an ineffective remedy for dipping polls,” a strategy “imposed on the president by PiS,” whose members dominate Duda’s current staff.
But, although Duda and Trzaskowski have sought throughout the campaign to showcase their stark differences, they are in fact not as totally opposed as their hometowns: Duda’s Krakow and Trzaskowski’s Warsaw—the two eternal rival cities, Poland’s former and current capitals.
Both born in 1972 to intellectual families, they first tasted politics in the late 1980s, as the implosion of global communism was rapidly gathering speed. As teenagers, they both volunteered in the 1989 campaign of the Solidarity movement candidates, who were getting ready to trounce communists in the first partly free legislative elections.
Years later, after obtaining doctoral degrees in administrative law and political science, respectively, Duda and Trzaskowski even ascended a similar political ladder, which included posts of deputy ministers, and members of both the Polish parliament and the European Parliament.
Neither man was their party’s first choice for presidential nominee. In 2015, Duda was picked by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the heavy-handed leader of the PiS, who himself was much too controversial and divisive to run. And Trzaskowski in mid-May quietly replaced Malgorzata Kidawa-Blonska, a PO deputy head of the Sejm, the lower house of Poland’s parliament. After an uninspiring campaign and many gaffes, Kidawa-Blonska’s support has dipped dramatically to a mere 4 percent.
The current rivalry between the PiS and PO backup candidates mirrors a long, destructive battle sparked by both political and personal resentments between the two leading conservative parties—the nationalist PiS and more economically liberal PO—both with roots in the anti-communist Solidarity movement. For the past 15 years, they have taken turns in power or serving as the main opposition force.
What over the years has become Poland’s key political conflict reflects the country’s historical divisions and a contest of economic and cultural interests. The PO party has mostly targeted the wealthier and more economically developed cities, promoting itself as pro-European force linked with economic neoliberalism and the rule of law to appeal to richer, liberal urban elites.
Meanwhile, Poland’s strongly Catholic and poorer countryside, notably in Poland’s east, has become a pillar for PiS rule. The party has successfully married the Catholic Church, in which some leaders have openly backed PiS, with flagship social programs. Although costly, they became immensely popular and helped PiS to offer itself as the protector of ordinary families. PiS has also mastered a more top-down form of rule personified by Kaczynski, the party’s leader, who is an ordinary member of parliament but is widely believed to be the mastermind behind everything currently taking place in Poland.
Unsurprisingly, Duda, with the help of public media outlets turned into hard-line propaganda mouthpieces, built an image of a president close to people’s hearts and a guardian of PiS social programs. “He’s been a frequent visitor in small cities and villages, usually bypassed by presidents,” said Piotr Trudnowski, the head of the Krakow-based Jagiellonian Club, a conservative think tank. “He was able to recognize and give a credit to a less wealthy, more traditionally oriented part of the country, which politicians do not see often from Warsaw.”
Duda, with the help of public media outlets turned into hard-line propaganda mouthpieces, built an image of a president close to people’s hearts and a guardian of PiS social programs.
Trzaskowski, meanwhile, has cultivated the image of the consummate European. A diplomat who knew Trzaskowski when he was deputy foreign minister confirmed that the Warsaw mayor has an expert knowledge of the European Union and a reputation for professionalism among those who worked with him. Some perceived him as narcissistic, however, given that he reportedly liked to show off his knowledge of five foreign languages. “His professional distance sometimes came off as lack of emotional intelligence,” the diplomat said.
The vicious Polish campaign is not merely the result of clashes between internationalist and nationalist worldviews or between austerity and redistributive economic policies; it has become an emotional battle characterized at times by extreme hostility. That escalation is deeply rooted in a genuine hatred between Kaczynski and Donald Tusk, PO’s co-founder and later long-term prime minister and European Council president.
Kaczynski has long accused Tusk of being indirectly responsible for the 2010 Smolensk air crash that killed Lech Kaczynski, Jaroslaw’s twin brother and Poland’s then-president, along with 95 other people. Despite landing jobs in the EU, Tusk remains a mentor to many in PO, including Trzaskowski, who briefly served as minister of administration and digitization in his government from 2013 to 2014.
This hostility has spilled over into Polish society at large, often dividing families. “The task of people on one side is to find reasons to praise their leader and attack the opposite leader, whatever one has done,” Jan Rokita, one of PO’s founding fathers, who now supports Duda over Trzaskowski due to Duda’s social conservatism, told me. “On the other hand, tribal divisions became a universal trend that has affected politics in the entire Western world. They destroy public debate but effectively mobilize voters. People are genuinely concerned and involved.”
In many ways, Trzaskowski is now who Duda was five years ago: a youthful enigma challenging a strong incumbent while promising to unite the nation—and he is proving to be a surprisingly effective campaigner, despite the fact he was chosen for lack of a better candidate. He has also become the great hope for transforming the electoral misfortunes of his party. It worked with Duda; after all, his stunning victory in May 2015 opened the door for PiS to win an overall majority in the legislative election five months later—the very first PiS parliamentary triumph after eight years of PO ruling in the country.
According to Pawel Kowal, a former deputy foreign minister in Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government and now a PO member of the Sejm, Trzaskowski has patiently waited a long time for his chance. “He certainly showed an appetite,” Kowal said. “But, he was careful enough not to express it very much. Now, I see different Trzaskowski: determined and pragmatic. He is being formed into a mature politician.”
Duda has come a long way from the days when he was an energetic, yet relatively unknown, member of the European Parliament selected by Kaczynski to attract more centrist voters. But he has never fulfilled the hopes of those who thought he, as a young and a fresh face with no burdens, would end the devastating war between PiS and PO. On the contrary, with a chaotic team around him and still lacking influence within the party, he cemented his image as the PiS rubber stamp, who signs almost everything that PiS-dominated parliament sends his way, including controversial judiciary bills, which provoked clashes with the EU over the rule of law.
PiS hard-liners see Trzaskowski as a devilish phantom influenced by gays, Jews, and George Soros—an image spread by state-run media.
As part of PiS, which is much more centered around its leader than PO, Duda has constantly been reminded he’s just one of many cogs in Kaczynski’s machine, even if he occasionally vetoed PiS laws, including some that would have cemented the party’s power over local governments and the judiciary—though in the latter case he proposed an alternative law of his own that further increased his and the government’s power over the courts. “The key of this presidency is that he genuinely shares many views with Kaczynski,” said Arkadiusz Mularczyk, a member of the ruling coalition and Duda’s friend. “I really don’t see room for major conflicts.”
In Warsaw, the presidential palace is located only a 15-minute walk away from City Hall. Traveling between the two buildings is much easier than bridging the gap between supporters of the president and the mayor—especially the PiS hard-liners who see Trzaskowski as a devilish phantom influenced by gays, Jews, and George Soros—an image spread by state-run media. But sometimes even his recent opponents look at him favorably.
“I haven’t decided yet”, said Turczynowicz-Kieryllo, Duda’s former campaign manager, when asked if she would vote for Trzaskowski. “But, I admit, I like his vision of a president who builds alliances, not walls.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-27--A Portrait of India on Fire

A Portrait of India on Fire

So asks Jivan , the young protagonist of Megha Majumdar ’ s powerful debut novel , A Burning , after she is falsely accused of collaborating with a terrorist on social media .
More than a hundred people have been killed in an attack at a train station near her slum in Kolkata , and tensions are running high .
Given what befalls her , Jivan could have put her question another way : Is it a crime to be born into a poor family in India ?
To be a Muslim ?
To be a woman ?
To imagine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meager salary as a retail clerk and animated by her new smartphone ?
Of course , Jivan ’ s Facebook post , which starts the novel , was ill-advised—especially given the realities of today ’ s India , with its surge of nationalism and growing suppression of free speech .
“ If the police didn ’ t help ordinary people like you and me , if the police watched them die , doesn ’ t that mean that the government is also a terrorist ?
” she writes .
Whatever the police and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a good scapegoat when they see one .
They arrest Jivan , charge her with sedition , and lock her up as the Indian public and a jingoistic media bay for the death penalty .
( It ’ s surely no accident that Majumdar , who grew up in Kolkata , gave her character a name that means “ life ” in Bengali . )
And so begins Majumdar ’ s takedown of the notion of the Indian Dream—the promise of social mobility , if not riches , in one of the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the current government under Narendra Modi and parroted by most Indian TV news channels .
Take Jivan , an impoverished Muslim slum-dweller .
Even before she was locked up , she had little chance of rising .
( She once sees a man in a clean shirt and shined shoes and wishes she could be rich like him .
But she realizes : “ He wasn ’ t rich , of course .
Later I learned that what he was , was called middle class.
” ) As Jivan recounts her life @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in jail , Majumdar ’ s prose comes alive , taking us inside the mind of a woman who thinks she has agency but whose life was doomed from the start .
Every aspect of the Indian system betrays her : the police , social services , real estate agents , doctors , and more .
Jivan naively details her innocence to the press in the hope that she will get a fair hearing .
Fat chance .
The only good thing that has ever happened to Jivan is that an NGO sponsored @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Education was supposed to grant her a passport to a better life—the ability to speak English .
But life intervened : After passing her 10th grade examinations , Jivan dropped out to support her parents .
Jivan ’ s mother forages for fish and vegetables at an illegal night market and runs a tenuous business selling bread and curries outside the family shack .
Her father , suffering permanent injuries from an act of police brutality , mostly lies supine at home .
Majumdar ’ s novel takes us inside the mind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agency but whose life was doomed from the start .
For someone with so little , Jivan has much to give .
Before being jailed , she spent her spare time giving free English lessons to an aspiring actress named Lovely .
Lovely is a hijra—part of a community of mostly eunuchs but also intersex and transgender people who are both revered and reviled in Indian society for their supposed ability to bless or curse babies and newlyweds .
They are often paid for their services , but it is common to see @ @ @ @ @ @ @ streets .
Hijras dress in colorful saris and are known to belt out bawdy songs .
Majumdar masterfully translates Lovely ’ s voice—and her Bollywood dreams—by writing her dialogue in the present continuous tense and maintaining the singsong rhythms of Bengali : I am going to a room and standing nervously in front of not a theoretical camera but a real camera .
It is balanced on top of a tripod , and there is a blinking red light on it .
The man with sleepy eyes is standing behind it , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and he is not liking me , I am feeling like a real actress .
I am looking at the lens and knowing—through this lens , someday I am reaching a thousand people , a million people .
PT Sir , Jivan ’ s onetime gym teacher , completes a triptych of primary characters .
The daily grind of school life , and the taunts and giggles of schoolgirls who are clearly richer than he is , wears him down .
But soon PT Sir—his sobriquet comes from his job teaching physical training—begins @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ranks of a regional right-wing political party .
Majumdar transports us into his mind : He lies with his head on his thin pillow and wonders why his wife can not tolerate something exciting that is happening in his life .
She is annoyed , he feels , because he didn ’ t have much of an appetite for the yogurt fish she cooked .
She is annoyed because he filled his belly with store-bought biryani .
But he is a man !
He is a man with bigger capacities than eating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get a fair trial in the Indian legal system ?
Spoiler alert : Of course not .
The stories of the three main characters and the buildup to the moment when we learn Jivan ’ s fate make for a real page turner—even when the outcome seems obvious all along .
PT Sir , given the chance for some redemption , spurns the opportunity to say anything good about his former student when he is called to the witness stand .
While Lovely at least tries to defend Jivan , the judge dismisses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Later , on the cusp of video stardom , even Lovely agrees to appease her studio and drop her politically damaging support for Jivan .
In Majumdar ’ s India , everyone has a price .
Press freedom is dying as Modi ’ s government punishes prominent journalists for their work .
Publishers rein in criticism of the authorities for fear of losing advertising , on which most of the media relies .
Mainstream news outlets have become largely pliant , accepting the fact that Modi has reigned for six years without holding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , India has dropped 37 places in Reporters Without Borders ’ annual press freedom rankings .
But it ’ s not just professional writers who have suffered .
A growing number of citizens—like the fictional Jivan—have been arrested or jailed for posting comments critical of their elected leaders .
The police , especially in states controlled by Modi ’ s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party , feel emboldened to defend their government and act accordingly .
Sometimes that means looking the other way .
In March , as protests grew in New Delhi over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Muslims , the city ’ s police stood by as mobs of Hindus demolished Muslim homes and businesses .
For several years , and increasingly under Modi , the police have also turned a blind eye to vigilante groups that roam suburbs and villages looking to punish , sometimes by lynching , Muslims who are suspected of killing cows.Majumdar cleverly places the smartphone at the center of some of the novel ’ s key themes .
In today ’ s India , cruelty has become banal .
Consider that in March , when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to prevent the spread of the coronavirus , the government seemingly gave no thought to the roughly 140 million migrant and daily wage laborers who would be stuck in India ’ s cities .
Desperate and unable to make ends meet , most set off on foot for their villages .
( Many also carried the coronavirus with them , accelerating the spread of the pandemic . )
Majumdar ’ s characters narrate several such crimes against the country ’ s poor and voiceless , many based on real events .
At one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political figure , is giving a campaign speech in a village when a rumor erupts that a Muslim man is keeping beef in his fridge—a story that mirrors a real incident in a village near New Delhi in 2015 .
A Hindu mob breaks into his house , rapes his wife , and kills him .
Majumdar cleverly places the smartphone at the center of some of the novel ’ s key themes .
After all , it is only with the proliferation of cheap smartphones that nearly half of the country ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most Indians , the smartphone is not only their first internet device but also their first computer and their first camera , a democratizing force that allows them to be digital citizens even if they are not English speakers .
The smartphone is the embodiment of the new Indian Dream : It is a potential tool of empowerment , and even employment , for a rising and entrepreneurial generation .
This fact is what makes Majumdar ’ s takedown more devastating .
Jivan ’ s first major purchase is a smartphone , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to read people ’ s comments on Facebook .
As she does , she marvels to herself that their carefree speech seems the very definition of freedom .
Facebook ’ s algorithm , and her desire for a few extra likes , is what pushes her to type in the words she admits “ nobody like me should ever think , let alone write.
” When rumors and so-called fake news spread in India , they proliferate on WhatsApp—a messaging app owned by Facebook and used by more than 400 million Indians .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Facebook is the largest and most powerful purveyor of misinformation in the world ’ s largest democracy .
A Burning is not just a critique of modern Indian society but a universal parable on inequality .
The very things that are supposed to propel and then gird Jivan ’ s success according to India ’ s boosters—cheap technology , democracy , the justice system , and the police—help spell her downfall .
The mirage of hope makes her eventual disappointment even more acute .
Majumdar ’ s timing is either extremely lucky or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up the global bestseller lists thanks in part to its resonance with this summer of discontent and despair , a time when public trust in leadership and Big Tech is dwindling .
One reason why A Burning should appeal to readers unfamiliar with India is that the novel is not just a critique of modern Indian society but a universal parable on inequality .
Systems promise much but turn out to be broken .
Social mobility is exposed as a myth .
Hope is an illusion .
Rage is only natural .
Jivan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country of her birth could resonate to some extent for Black Americans , as protests over the killing of George Floyd have lighted up the world ’ s cities .
A Burning will attract critics , especially in India , who will say its portrayal of the country is too bleak .
And they will have a point .
For all its flaws , India has more resilient checks and balances—and at least some redeeming features—than the novel lets on .
The country ’ s legal system , for example , would almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a higher court for greater scrutiny .
And its civil society , which has displayed a heartening resistance to government overreach and social injustice in recent years , doesn ’ t get a mention .
In that sense , Jivan ’ s story can seem a bit contrived .
But the role of the novelist is to take artistic license , to not just describe how things are but warn how they could be .
That ’ s what makes A Burning such essential reading .
If Majumdar has tapped into the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s because her novel brilliantly explores some of the sources of the helplessness so many people currently feel .
And we must listen to those people , because for many of them , the only way forward seems to be to burn it all down .

“Is it a crime to write some words on Facebook?”
So asks Jivan, the young protagonist of Megha Majumdar’s powerful debut novel, A Burning, after she is falsely accused of collaborating with a terrorist on social media. More than a hundred people have been killed in an attack at a train station near her slum in Kolkata, and tensions are running high. Given what befalls her, Jivan could have put her question another way: Is it a crime to be born into a poor family in India? To be a Muslim? To be a woman? To imagine a better life, powered by her meager salary as a retail clerk and animated by her new smartphone?
A Burning, Megha Majumdar, Knopf, 304 pp., .95, June 2020
Of course, Jivan’s Facebook post, which starts the novel, was ill-advised—especially given the realities of today’s India, with its surge of nationalism and growing suppression of free speech. “If the police didn’t help ordinary people like you and me, if the police watched them die, doesn’t that mean that the government is also a terrorist?” she writes. Whatever the police and the government actually are, they know a good scapegoat when they see one. They arrest Jivan, charge her with sedition, and lock her up as the Indian public and a jingoistic media bay for the death penalty. (It’s surely no accident that Majumdar, who grew up in Kolkata, gave her character a name that means “life” in Bengali.)
And so begins Majumdar’s takedown of the notion of the Indian Dream—the promise of social mobility, if not riches, in one of the world’s most class- and caste-bound societies—peddled by the current government under Narendra Modi and parroted by most Indian TV news channels.
Take Jivan, an impoverished Muslim slum-dweller. Even before she was locked up, she had little chance of rising. (She once sees a man in a clean shirt and shined shoes and wishes she could be rich like him. But she realizes: “He wasn’t rich, of course. Later I learned that what he was, was called middle class.”) As Jivan recounts her life story to a corrupt reporter while sitting in jail, Majumdar’s prose comes alive, taking us inside the mind of a woman who thinks she has agency but whose life was doomed from the start. Every aspect of the Indian system betrays her: the police, social services, real estate agents, doctors, and more. Jivan naively details her innocence to the press in the hope that she will get a fair hearing.
Fat chance. The only good thing that has ever happened to Jivan is that an NGO sponsored her education at an all-girls private school. Education was supposed to grant her a passport to a better life—the ability to speak English. But life intervened: After passing her 10th grade examinations, Jivan dropped out to support her parents. Jivan’s mother forages for fish and vegetables at an illegal night market and runs a tenuous business selling bread and curries outside the family shack. Her father, suffering permanent injuries from an act of police brutality, mostly lies supine at home.
Majumdar’s novel takes us inside the mind of a woman who thinks she has agency but whose life was doomed from the start.
For someone with so little, Jivan has much to give. Before being jailed, she spent her spare time giving free English lessons to an aspiring actress named Lovely. Lovely is a hijra—part of a community of mostly eunuchs but also intersex and transgender people who are both revered and reviled in Indian society for their supposed ability to bless or curse babies and newlyweds. They are often paid for their services, but it is common to see them begging at markets and on the streets. Hijras dress in colorful saris and are known to belt out bawdy songs. Majumdar masterfully translates Lovely’s voice—and her Bollywood dreams—by writing her dialogue in the present continuous tense and maintaining the singsong rhythms of Bengali:
I am going to a room and standing nervously in front of not a theoretical camera but a real camera. It is balanced on top of a tripod, and there is a blinking red light on it. The man with sleepy eyes is standing behind it, and even though I am not liking him and he is not liking me, I am feeling like a real actress. I am looking at the lens and knowing—through this lens, someday I am reaching a thousand people, a million people.
PT Sir, Jivan’s onetime gym teacher, completes a triptych of primary characters. The daily grind of school life, and the taunts and giggles of schoolgirls who are clearly richer than he is, wears him down. But soon PT Sir—his sobriquet comes from his job teaching physical training—begins to muster some character and starts climbing the ranks of a regional right-wing political party. Majumdar transports us into his mind:
He lies with his head on his thin pillow and wonders why his wife cannot tolerate something exciting that is happening in his life. She is annoyed, he feels, because he didn’t have much of an appetite for the yogurt fish she cooked. She is annoyed because he filled his belly with store-bought biryani. But he is a man! He is a man with bigger capacities than eating the dinner she cooks.
Will Jivan get a fair trial in the Indian legal system? Spoiler alert: Of course not. The stories of the three main characters and the buildup to the moment when we learn Jivan’s fate make for a real page turner—even when the outcome seems obvious all along. PT Sir, given the chance for some redemption, spurns the opportunity to say anything good about his former student when he is called to the witness stand. While Lovely at least tries to defend Jivan, the judge dismisses “the word of a hijra.” Later, on the cusp of video stardom, even Lovely agrees to appease her studio and drop her politically damaging support for Jivan. In Majumdar’s India, everyone has a price.
What makes Majumdar’s novel so compelling, timely, and propulsive—the new word “doomsurfing” comes to mind—is that Jivan’s predicament, at least initially, is quite plausible in modern-day India. (Disclosure: I first met Majumdar in Kolkata, our shared hometown, some 14 years ago, and we have stayed loosely in touch ever since.)
Press freedom is dying as Modi’s government punishes prominent journalists for their work. Publishers rein in criticism of the authorities for fear of losing advertising, on which most of the media relies. Mainstream news outlets have become largely pliant, accepting the fact that Modi has reigned for six years without holding a single press conference. Since 2009, India has dropped 37 places in Reporters Without Borders’ annual press freedom rankings. But it’s not just professional writers who have suffered. A growing number of citizens—like the fictional Jivan—have been arrested or jailed for posting comments critical of their elected leaders. The police, especially in states controlled by Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, feel emboldened to defend their government and act accordingly.
Sometimes that means looking the other way. In March, as protests grew in New Delhi over a controversial citizenship law that discriminated against Muslims, the city’s police stood by as mobs of Hindus demolished Muslim homes and businesses. For several years, and increasingly under Modi, the police have also turned a blind eye to vigilante groups that roam suburbs and villages looking to punish, sometimes by lynching, Muslims who are suspected of killing cows.Majumdar cleverly places the smartphone at the center of some of the novel’s key themes.
In today’s India, cruelty has become banal. Consider that in March, when New Delhi suddenly announced a nationwide lockdown to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, the government seemingly gave no thought to the roughly 140 million migrant and daily wage laborers who would be stuck in India’s cities. Desperate and unable to make ends meet, most set off on foot for their villages. (Many also carried the coronavirus with them, accelerating the spread of the pandemic.)
Majumdar’s characters narrate several such crimes against the country’s poor and voiceless, many based on real events. At one point, PT Sir, now a political figure, is giving a campaign speech in a village when a rumor erupts that a Muslim man is keeping beef in his fridge—a story that mirrors a real incident in a village near New Delhi in 2015. A Hindu mob breaks into his house, rapes his wife, and kills him.
Majumdar cleverly places the smartphone at the center of some of the novel’s key themes. After all, it is only with the proliferation of cheap smartphones that nearly half of the country’s population has come online. For most Indians, the smartphone is not only their first internet device but also their first computer and their first camera, a democratizing force that allows them to be digital citizens even if they are not English speakers. The smartphone is the embodiment of the new Indian Dream: It is a potential tool of empowerment, and even employment, for a rising and entrepreneurial generation.
This fact is what makes Majumdar’s takedown more devastating. Jivan’s first major purchase is a smartphone, which she uses, among other things, to read people’s comments on Facebook. As she does, she marvels to herself that their carefree speech seems the very definition of freedom. Facebook’s algorithm, and her desire for a few extra likes, is what pushes her to type in the words she admits “nobody like me should ever think, let alone write.” When rumors and so-called fake news spread in India, they proliferate on WhatsApp—a messaging app owned by Facebook and used by more than 400 million Indians. It is no exaggeration to say that Facebook is the largest and most powerful purveyor of misinformation in the world’s largest democracy.
A Burning is not just a critique of modern Indian society but a universal parable on inequality.
The very things that are supposed to propel and then gird Jivan’s success according to India’s boosters—cheap technology, democracy, the justice system, and the police—help spell her downfall. The mirage of hope makes her eventual disappointment even more acute.
Majumdar’s timing is either extremely lucky or remarkably prescient. Her book is soaring up the global bestseller lists thanks in part to its resonance with this summer of discontent and despair, a time when public trust in leadership and Big Tech is dwindling.
One reason why A Burning should appeal to readers unfamiliar with India is that the novel is not just a critique of modern Indian society but a universal parable on inequality. Systems promise much but turn out to be broken. Social mobility is exposed as a myth. Hope is an illusion. Rage is only natural. Jivan’s story of betrayal by the country of her birth could resonate to some extent for Black Americans, as protests over the killing of George Floyd have lighted up the world’s cities.
A Burning will attract critics, especially in India, who will say its portrayal of the country is too bleak. And they will have a point. For all its flaws, India has more resilient checks and balances—and at least some redeeming features—than the novel lets on. The country’s legal system, for example, would almost certainly have moved Jivan’s case to a higher court for greater scrutiny. And its civil society, which has displayed a heartening resistance to government overreach and social injustice in recent years, doesn’t get a mention. In that sense, Jivan’s story can seem a bit contrived. But the role of the novelist is to take artistic license, to not just describe how things are but warn how they could be. That’s what makes A Burning such essential reading. If Majumdar has tapped into the fury of the moment, it’s because her novel brilliantly explores some of the sources of the helplessness so many people currently feel. And we must listen to those people, because for many of them, the only way forward seems to be to burn it all down.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-27--Bullied by Beijing, America’s Closest Allies Regret Saying ‘Yes’ to China

Bullied by Beijing , America ’ s Closest Allies Regret Saying ‘ Yes ’ to China On June 29 , Australia will probably overlook an anniversary it would rather forget .
Five years ago this month , Australia broke ranks with the United States to join one of China ’ s most important foreign-policy initiatives , the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ( AIIB ) .
It was the price Australia paid to get a free trade agreement with China , which had been stalled in endless negotiations for more than a decade .
The Australian government tried to get the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a comprehensive strategic partnership with China in 2014 , but even that wasn ’ t enough to satisfy Beijing .
Joining the AIIB in 2015 did the trick.The most trusted U.S. allies—the countries in the so-called Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network— have all agreed to such partnerships with China .
Australians may be surprised to discover that their country is one of China ’ s dozens of “ strategic partners , ” “ comprehensive strategic partners , ” and “ comprehensive strategic cooperative partners , ” terms Beijing uses to describe its formal relationships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. allies—the countries in the so-called Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network— have all agreed to such partnerships with China .
Australia ’ s neighbors across the Tasman Sea in New Zealand also enjoy a comprehensive strategic partnership with China , while Canada ’ s relationship with China , though of longer standing , is merely an ordinary strategic partnership .
The language around the U.K.-Chinese partnership may be the grandest of all : The two countries are locked together in a “ global comprehensive strategic partnership for the 21st century , ” per an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ era of cooperation with China may be over soon .
Australia , Britain , Canada , and New Zealand are beginning to regret saying “ yes ” to China ’ s strategic overtures .
The leaders , once eager to assert a little independence from their often-overbearing superpower ally , now find themselves aligning with the United States to oppose the use of Huawei equipment in 5G networks , universities accepting Chinese money to host Confucius Institutes , gross human rights violations in Xinjiang , government repression in Hong Kong , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They are wary of appearing to support a U.S. president who is anathema to many in their own countries , but they increasingly support Donald Trump ’ s actual policy stances with regard to China .
Each country has its own reasons for confronting China , but all of them are , in effect , falling in line with U.S. China policy .
In Canada , Huawei ’ s chief financial officer , Meng Wanzhou , has been detained in Vancouver since December 2018 , pending extradition to the United States on charges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Iran .
In a move it insists is unrelated , China has charged two Canadian businesspeople with espionage in apparent retaliation .
Huawei ’ s Meng is out on bail , but the two Canadians are being held under 24-hour surveillance in harsh conditions , largely incommunicado , and with limited food .
In Britain , the ruling Conservative Party , fresh from an internal crisis over allowing China ’ s Huawei to participate in building the country ’ s 5G wireless networks , has now united behind Prime Minister Boris Johnson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ full British citizenship for up to 3 million Hong Kong residents who hold or are eligible to apply for British National ( Overseas ) passports , which exclude work and residency rights .
The pledge is in response to China ’ s new national security law for Hong Kong .
The U.K. will also review the Huawei decision , made just four months ago .
And Britain ’ s Office of Communications has ruled China ’ s state broadcaster CGTN out of compliance with Britain ’ s broadcasting rules , to boot .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Five Eyes membership has a perpetually strained relationship with the United States , has recently faced the wrath of China .
Issues have included New Zealand ’ s support for Uighur rights and Taiwan ’ s membership of the World Health Organization .
But none of the United States ’ closest allies has come to regret its China ties quite as much as Australia .
When Australia led global calls for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic—a demand widely perceived as being targeted at China—China struck back with restrictions on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ safety reasons , and punitive tariffs on Australian barley .
China has also warned its students to avoid Australia , threatening another key export industry : international education .
China has split Australia not just politically , but also geographically .
In a bizarre assertion of local diplomatic independence , the Australian state of Victoria signed up to Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s trademark foreign-policy agenda , the Belt and Road Initiative .
The Victorian premier , Daniel Andrews , did so in defiance of the national government , which has refused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a member of the Australian Labor Party , which at the federal level opposes Prime Minister Scott Morrison ’ s Liberal-National Coalition .
But Andrews ’ s rebellion is not a mere matter of party politics : The federal Labor Party also opposes Australia ’ s membership in the Belt and Road Initiative .
It is a division stoked by China—and Chinese money .
Australia ’ s top universities , which until the coronavirus pandemic were dependent on Chinese student tuition for as much as a quarter of their revenues , have also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case that has garnered global media attention , the University of Queensland ( one of Australia ’ s elite Group of Eight universities ) suspended one of its students for demonstrating against Chinese influence in Hong Kong—and on campus .
As in the United States and other countries , Australian universities have faced protests over their acceptance of Chinese money to fund Confucius Institutes for the teaching of Chinese language and culture .
Critics worry that this kind of funding comes with strings attached : in particular , the demand that universities silence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As the revelations of complicity pour out , the political mood in Australia has turned decisively against China .
For years , the country ’ s establishment promoted stronger China ties as the key to economic success , with everyone from mining magnates to retired politicians seeming to cash in on the China boom .
Even Bob Hawke , the late prime minister who in 1989 tearfully offered asylum to Chinese students in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre , ultimately became a paid lobbyist for Chinese companies seeking to invest in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home to roost , as some Australian commentators complained of a reactionary China panic even before the coronavirus came to stoke additional China fears .
The new mantra among Australia ’ s political leaders is that the country needs an “ eyes wide open ” approach to China .
That ’ s a feeling echoed throughout the English-speaking world .
Politicians who are wary of being too closely identified with Trump ’ s China-bashing are nonetheless finding their own reasons to be wary of China.Politicians who are wary of being too closely identified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China-bashing are nonetheless finding their own reasons to be wary of China .
For New Zealand ’ s Jacinda Ardern , it ’ s human rights .
For Canada ’ s Justin Trudeau , it ’ s the fact that China ’ s favorability rating has fallen to a profound low of just 14 percent among Canadians .
For Britain ’ s Boris Johnson , it ’ s Hong Kong .
In a cross-party show of unity that would have been unimaginable one year ago , seven former British foreign secretaries have jointly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead in coordinating an international response to China ’ s new national security laws for Hong Kong .
Not long ago , both Ardern and Johnson were pushing for closer relations with Beijing .
Trudeau was so cozy with China that his own Parliament started an investigation .
Australia ’ s Morrison was equivocal but eager to emphasize that he would not pick sides in any dispute between the United States and China .
All four have now shifted decisively toward Trump ’ s position on China , even as they avoid association @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They have their own reasons for being suspicious of China , and those have little or nothing to do with pleasing Trump .
So although it would be inaccurate to say that Trump has won over the rest of the Five Eyes to his view of China , it is nonetheless clear that their policy positions have rapidly converged with his administration ’ s .
As China pushes forward on all fronts , global public opinion—not just in the English-speaking countries—has turned decisively against China .
As it becomes increasingly clear that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and control the coronavirus , those negative opinions will only harden .
For three years , Beijing has counted on Trump ’ s personal unpopularity to score easy points with the United States ’ closest allies .
Now that all eyes are open , China will find it much harder to get its way .

On June 29, Australia will probably overlook an anniversary it would rather forget. Five years ago this month, Australia broke ranks with the United States to join one of China’s most important foreign-policy initiatives, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It was the price Australia paid to get a free trade agreement with China, which had been stalled in endless negotiations for more than a decade. The Australian government tried to get the agreement over the line by entering into a comprehensive strategic partnership with China in 2014, but even that wasn’t enough to satisfy Beijing. Joining the AIIB in 2015 did the trick.The most trusted U.S. allies—the countries in the so-called Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network— have all agreed to such partnerships with China.
On June 29, Australia will probably overlook an anniversary it would rather forget. Five years ago this month, Australia broke ranks with the United States to join one of China’s most important foreign-policy initiatives, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It was the price Australia paid to get a free trade agreement with China, which had been stalled in endless negotiations for more than a decade. The Australian government tried to get the agreement over the line by entering into a comprehensive strategic partnership with China in 2014, but even that wasn’t enough to satisfy Beijing. Joining the AIIB in 2015 did the trick.The most trusted U.S. allies—the countries in the so-called Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network— have all agreed to such partnerships with China.
Australians may be surprised to discover that their country is one of China’s dozens of “strategic partners,” “comprehensive strategic partners,” and “comprehensive strategic cooperative partners,” terms Beijing uses to describe its formal relationships with other countries. The most trusted U.S. allies—the countries in the so-called Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network— have all agreed to such partnerships with China. Australia’s neighbors across the Tasman Sea in New Zealand also enjoy a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, while Canada’s relationship with China, though of longer standing, is merely an ordinary strategic partnership. The language around the U.K.-Chinese partnership may be the grandest of all: The two countries are locked together in a “global comprehensive strategic partnership for the 21st century,” per an agreement signed in October 2015.
The era of cooperation with China may be over soon. Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand are beginning to regret saying “yes” to China’s strategic overtures. The leaders, once eager to assert a little independence from their often-overbearing superpower ally, now find themselves aligning with the United States to oppose the use of Huawei equipment in 5G networks, universities accepting Chinese money to host Confucius Institutes, gross human rights violations in Xinjiang, government repression in Hong Kong, and the militarization of the South China Sea. They are wary of appearing to support a U.S. president who is anathema to many in their own countries, but they increasingly support Donald Trump’s actual policy stances with regard to China. Each country has its own reasons for confronting China, but all of them are, in effect, falling in line with U.S. China policy.
In Canada, Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, has been detained in Vancouver since December 2018, pending extradition to the United States on charges related to the evasion of U.S. sanctions on Iran. In a move it insists is unrelated, China has charged two Canadian businesspeople with espionage in apparent retaliation. Huawei’s Meng is out on bail, but the two Canadians are being held under 24-hour surveillance in harsh conditions, largely incommunicado, and with limited food.
In Britain, the ruling Conservative Party, fresh from an internal crisis over allowing China’s Huawei to participate in building the country’s 5G wireless networks, has now united behind Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s pledge of a path to full British citizenship for up to 3 million Hong Kong residents who hold or are eligible to apply for British National (Overseas) passports, which exclude work and residency rights. The pledge is in response to China’s new national security law for Hong Kong. The U.K. will also review the Huawei decision, made just four months ago. And Britain’s Office of Communications has ruled China’s state broadcaster CGTN out of compliance with Britain’s broadcasting rules, to boot.
Even New Zealand, which despite its Five Eyes membership has a perpetually strained relationship with the United States, has recently faced the wrath of China. Issues have included New Zealand’s support for Uighur rights and Taiwan’s membership of the World Health Organization.
But none of the United States’ closest allies has come to regret its China ties quite as much as Australia. When Australia led global calls for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic—a demand widely perceived as being targeted at China—China struck back with restrictions on Australian beef, ostensibly for health and safety reasons, and punitive tariffs on Australian barley. China has also warned its students to avoid Australia, threatening another key export industry: international education.
China has split Australia not just politically, but also geographically. In a bizarre assertion of local diplomatic independence, the Australian state of Victoria signed up to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trademark foreign-policy agenda, the Belt and Road Initiative. The Victorian premier, Daniel Andrews, did so in defiance of the national government, which has refused Chinese invitations to participate. Andrews is a member of the Australian Labor Party, which at the federal level opposes Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s Liberal-National Coalition. But Andrews’s rebellion is not a mere matter of party politics: The federal Labor Party also opposes Australia’s membership in the Belt and Road Initiative. It is a division stoked by China—and Chinese money.
Australia’s top universities, which until the coronavirus pandemic were dependent on Chinese student tuition for as much as a quarter of their revenues, have also gone all-out for China. In a case that has garnered global media attention, the University of Queensland (one of Australia’s elite Group of Eight universities) suspended one of its students for demonstrating against Chinese influence in Hong Kong—and on campus. As in the United States and other countries, Australian universities have faced protests over their acceptance of Chinese money to fund Confucius Institutes for the teaching of Chinese language and culture. Critics worry that this kind of funding comes with strings attached: in particular, the demand that universities silence student and staff criticism of China.
As the revelations of complicity pour out, the political mood in Australia has turned decisively against China. For years, the country’s establishment promoted stronger China ties as the key to economic success, with everyone from mining magnates to retired politicians seeming to cash in on the China boom. Even Bob Hawke, the late prime minister who in 1989 tearfully offered asylum to Chinese students in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, ultimately became a paid lobbyist for Chinese companies seeking to invest in Australia. Those chickens have now come home to roost, as some Australian commentators complained of a reactionary China panic even before the coronavirus came to stoke additional China fears.
The new mantra among Australia’s political leaders is that the country needs an “eyes wide open” approach to China. That’s a feeling echoed throughout the English-speaking world. Politicians who are wary of being too closely identified with Trump’s China-bashing are nonetheless finding their own reasons to be wary of China.Politicians who are wary of being too closely identified with U.S. President Donald Trump’s China-bashing are nonetheless finding their own reasons to be wary of China. For New Zealand’s Jacinda Ardern, it’s human rights. For Canada’s Justin Trudeau, it’s the fact that China’s favorability rating has fallen to a profound low of just 14 percent among Canadians. For Britain’s Boris Johnson, it’s Hong Kong. In a cross-party show of unity that would have been unimaginable one year ago, seven former British foreign secretaries have jointly urged the prime minister to take the lead in coordinating an international response to China’s new national security laws for Hong Kong.
Not long ago, both Ardern and Johnson were pushing for closer relations with Beijing. Trudeau was so cozy with China that his own Parliament started an investigation. Australia’s Morrison was equivocal but eager to emphasize that he would not pick sides in any dispute between the United States and China. All four have now shifted decisively toward Trump’s position on China, even as they avoid association with the U.S. president like the coronavirus. They have their own reasons for being suspicious of China, and those have little or nothing to do with pleasing Trump.
So although it would be inaccurate to say that Trump has won over the rest of the Five Eyes to his view of China, it is nonetheless clear that their policy positions have rapidly converged with his administration’s. As China pushes forward on all fronts, global public opinion—not just in the English-speaking countries—has turned decisively against China. As it becomes increasingly clear that China obstructed early international efforts to understand and control the coronavirus, those negative opinions will only harden. For three years, Beijing has counted on Trump’s personal unpopularity to score easy points with the United States’ closest allies. Now that all eyes are open, China will find it much harder to get its way.