foreignpolicy--2020-03-05--Erdogan and Putin Meet Over Syria

Erdogan and Putin Meet Over Syria

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Erdogan and Putin try to resolve their differences over Syria at a Moscow meeting , Italy imposes emergency measures to contain its coronavirus outbreak , and political deadlock looks likely once again in Israel .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin are meeting today in Moscow in an attempt to resolve differences over the conflict in Syria—this time , with very high stakes .
Tensions have risen between Turkey , which backs some rebel groups , and Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The leaders haven ’ t met face-to-face since Syrian forces launched an offensive in rebel-held Idlib , drawing in thousands of Turkish troops and displacing nearly 1 million people who Erdogan fears could end up crossing the border into Turkey .
Last week , an airstrike killed 36 Turkish soldiers at an outpost in Idlib , leading Turkey to retaliate against Syrian military targets—though it chose not to blame Russia for the attack .
In Moscow , the two leaders have conflicting objectives .
Erdogan will push for Putin to agree to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkish border in Idlib to resettle millions of refugees .
Putin , meanwhile , has insisted that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s forces regain all lost territory .
Posturing .
The tensions have increased the risk of direct confrontation between Russia and Turkey , and Erdogan will also push for a cease-fire .
Meanwhile , he continues to announce that vast numbers of migrants are heading to the Greek border—numbers that appear inflated .
Ahead of the Moscow talks , Russia sent reinforcements to its troops in Syria by air and by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bosphorus strait in Istanbul .
Europe on the sidelines .
Amid the offensive in Idlib , Turkey announced it would allow refugees to cross into the European Union—an effort to force Europe to come to Turkey ’ s aid that created a crisis at its borders , as Tessa Fox has reported for Foreign Policy .
The border crisis has alarmed EU leaders , who will be watching the Erdogan-Putin meeting closely .
But Turkey ’ s move has given the West another opportunity to take action in Idlib itself , Muhammad Idrees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s moral and political failure .
Instead , the EU is using force against migrants at the Greek border and attempting to push back dinghies at sea .
But today ’ s crisis was entirely foreseeable and European leaders have not done much to prevent it since signing an agreement with Turkey in 2016 to keep Syrian refugees there .
“ In the years since the deal ’ s signing , the EU has failed completely to devise a common migration policy for the bloc to manage the expected long-term uptick in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sudden influx of refugees of the sort we ’ re seeing now , ” Paul Hockenos argues in FP .
Italy imposes harsh restrictions to contain virus .
Italy has introduced emergency measures to try to contain the coronavirus , ordering all schools and universities shut nationwide from today through at least March 15 .
The number of confirmed cases in the country rose to 3,089 on Wednesday , and 107 people have died—the worst outbreak in Europe so far .
The new strategy also calls for cinemas and theaters to close @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emergency meeting between EU health ministers on Friday .
An EU Council staff member was confirmed to have the virus on Wednesday .
Will Netanyahu form a government ?
Israel appears headed for political deadlock yet again after near-final results showed that Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s Likud party and his usual allies had failed to win a clear majority in Monday ’ s elections .
Netanyahu ’ s coalition is likely to have 58 seats in parliament—three short of the 61 needed to form a government .
His rival Benny Gantz , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also fell short of a solid coalition—meaning that a stalemate looks likely , after the third inconclusive election in under a year .
If that is the case , yet another snap election will be called .
Netanyahu , who faces a corruption trial on March 17 , has so far refused to step aside .
First round of EU-U.K. negotiations concludes .
The first round of talks between the European Union and Britain on their post-Brexit trade relationship finish today , with EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier holding a press conference .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ahead of the negotiations , with some EU diplomats concerned that the political relationship could get in the way of technical decision making .
Both sides are aiming for zero tariffs but they disagree over the conditions .
They need to reach a deal by the end of the year .
A French ruling on Uber .
France ’ s top appeals court decided on Wednesday that a former rideshare driver for Uber should be recognized as an employee rather than a contractor .
The ruling appears to be the first from a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s insistence that its drivers aren ’ t company employees , limiting their benefits .
The company faces similar cases in the United States and Britain .
U.S. airstrikes against the Taliban .
The Pentagon announced its first airstrike against the Taliban since the United States struck a deal with the militant group on Wednesday .
The move comes as internal divisions and disagreements between the Afghan government and the Taliban threaten to derail the agreement—leaving the country holding its breath , Stefanie Glinski reports for FP .
A State Department appointment .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a senior position at the State Department , overseeing U.S. relations with the United Nations and the World Health Organization among other international organizations .
Sean Doocey ’ s appointment—not yet announced—is likely to deal a blow to the morale of State Department veterans , FP ’ s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report .
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro sent an impersonator to greet a crowd gathered outside his residence in Rio de Janeiro on Wednesday .
Mimicking the president ’ s recognizable accent , the comedian spoke to the crowd , played @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surreal scene .
Bolsonaro later emerged , dodging media questions about Brazil ’ s slowing economy by directing them to the impersonator .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Erdogan and Putin try to resolve their differences over Syria at a Moscow meeting, Italy imposes emergency measures to contain its coronavirus outbreak, and political deadlock looks likely once again in Israel .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Erdogan and Putin try to resolve their differences over Syria at a Moscow meeting, Italy imposes emergency measures to contain its coronavirus outbreak, and political deadlock looks likely once again in Israel.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Erdogan, Putin Seek Syria Solution
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin are meeting today in Moscow in an attempt to resolve differences over the conflict in Syria—this time, with very high stakes. Tensions have risen between Turkey, which backs some rebel groups, and Russia, which backs the Syrian regime. The leaders haven’t met face-to-face since Syrian forces launched an offensive in rebel-held Idlib, drawing in thousands of Turkish troops and displacing nearly 1 million people who Erdogan fears could end up crossing the border into Turkey.
Last week, an airstrike killed 36 Turkish soldiers at an outpost in Idlib, leading Turkey to retaliate against Syrian military targets—though it chose not to blame Russia for the attack. In Moscow, the two leaders have conflicting objectives. Erdogan will push for Putin to agree to a plan for a safe zone along the Turkish border in Idlib to resettle millions of refugees. Putin, meanwhile, has insisted that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces regain all lost territory.
Posturing. The tensions have increased the risk of direct confrontation between Russia and Turkey, and Erdogan will also push for a cease-fire. Meanwhile, he continues to announce that vast numbers of migrants are heading to the Greek border—numbers that appear inflated. Ahead of the Moscow talks, Russia sent reinforcements to its troops in Syria by air and by sea, with warships passing through the Bosphorus strait in Istanbul.
Europe on the sidelines. Amid the offensive in Idlib, Turkey announced it would allow refugees to cross into the European Union—an effort to force Europe to come to Turkey’s aid that created a crisis at its borders, as Tessa Fox has reported for Foreign Policy. The border crisis has alarmed EU leaders, who will be watching the Erdogan-Putin meeting closely. But Turkey’s move has given the West another opportunity to take action in Idlib itself, Muhammad Idrees Ahmad argues in FP.
The EU’s moral and political failure. Instead, the EU is using force against migrants at the Greek border and attempting to push back dinghies at sea. But today’s crisis was entirely foreseeable and European leaders have not done much to prevent it since signing an agreement with Turkey in 2016 to keep Syrian refugees there. “In the years since the deal’s signing, the EU has failed completely to devise a common migration policy for the bloc to manage the expected long-term uptick in migration—or even emergency plans should there be a sudden influx of refugees of the sort we’re seeing now,” Paul Hockenos argues in FP.
What We’re Following Today
Italy imposes harsh restrictions to contain virus. Italy has introduced emergency measures to try to contain the coronavirus, ordering all schools and universities shut nationwide from today through at least March 15. The number of confirmed cases in the country rose to 3,089 on Wednesday, and 107 people have died—the worst outbreak in Europe so far. The new strategy also calls for cinemas and theaters to close. It comes just ahead of an emergency meeting between EU health ministers on Friday. An EU Council staff member was confirmed to have the virus on Wednesday.
Will Netanyahu form a government? Israel appears headed for political deadlock yet again after near-final results showed that Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and his usual allies had failed to win a clear majority in Monday’s elections. Netanyahu’s coalition is likely to have 58 seats in parliament—three short of the 61 needed to form a government. His rival Benny Gantz, who leads the Blue and White party, also fell short of a solid coalition—meaning that a stalemate looks likely, after the third inconclusive election in under a year. If that is the case, yet another snap election will be called. Netanyahu, who faces a corruption trial on March 17, has so far refused to step aside.
First round of EU-U.K. negotiations concludes. The first round of talks between the European Union and Britain on their post-Brexit trade relationship finish today, with EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier holding a press conference. Rhetoric between the two sides was tense ahead of the negotiations, with some EU diplomats concerned that the political relationship could get in the way of technical decision making. Both sides are aiming for zero tariffs but they disagree over the conditions. They need to reach a deal by the end of the year.
Keep an Eye On
A French ruling on Uber. France’s top appeals court decided on Wednesday that a former rideshare driver for Uber should be recognized as an employee rather than a contractor. The ruling appears to be the first from a top court to directly contradict Uber’s insistence that its drivers aren’t company employees, limiting their benefits. The company faces similar cases in the United States and Britain.
U.S. airstrikes against the Taliban. The Pentagon announced its first airstrike against the Taliban since the United States struck a deal with the militant group on Wednesday. The move comes as internal divisions and disagreements between the Afghan government and the Taliban threaten to derail the agreement—leaving the country holding its breath, Stefanie Glinski reports for FP.
A State Department appointment. A Trump loyalist has been appointed to a senior position at the State Department, overseeing U.S. relations with the United Nations and the World Health Organization among other international organizations. Sean Doocey’s appointment—not yet announced—is likely to deal a blow to the morale of State Department veterans, FP’s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report.
Odds and Ends
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro sent an impersonator to greet a crowd gathered outside his residence in Rio de Janeiro on Wednesday. Mimicking the president’s recognizable accent, the comedian spoke to the crowd, played the trumpet, and threw bananas—creating a surreal scene. Bolsonaro later emerged, dodging media questions about Brazil’s slowing economy by directing them to the impersonator.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-05--Europe’s Morality Is Dying at the Greek Border

Europe ’ s Morality Is Dying at the Greek Border This week , Greece ’ s northern border with Turkey and the Bulgarian-Turkish borderlands , too , have witnessed brutal , violent scenes reminiscent of war zones .
Thousands of desperate migrants fleeing war zones—including mothers with babies in their arms—are storming barbed-wire fences to get into European Union territory to apply for political asylum , while Greek security forces in anti-riot gear beat them back and shoot rubber bullets and billowing clouds of tear gas at them .
On the easternmost Greek islands , such as Lesbos , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turning away dinghies of half-frozen , frightened refugees .
More than 32,000 migrants have been arrested at the Greek land border .
Greece has suspended asylum applications for a month and is deporting all migrants attempting to enter Greece “ illegally , ” although The United Nations refugee agency has said there is no legal basis for suspending asylum decisions .
Two people have reportedly died so far , including a child in a capsized boat .
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is making no apologies for such treatment : “ We stopped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also the EU ’ s borders , ” a government spokesperson said on March 1 .
EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen , who visited Greece yesterday to show solidarity with the Athens government , praised Greece ’ s role as “ Europe ’ s shield ” and promised Greece 700 million euros ( $ 780 million ) more in support to bolster border security .
“ The events of 2015 must not be repeated , ” said David McAllister , head of the European Parliament ’ s Committee on Foreign Affairs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million asylum applicants into the European Union that year .
The EU is correct to intuit that the legacy of the events of 2015 are in play at the Greek border .
In the earlier crisis , the continent managed , not without difficulty , to earn a reputation for humanitarianism in the eyes of the world , while buying time to address the root causes of mass migration from the Middle East and to prepare better for its consequences .
Europe did neither .
To be sure , there is no excuse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s brute attempts to blackmail the EU .
He has made good on his cynical threat to open Turkey ’ s borders to refugees fleeing westward to Europe should Turkey not receive military support from NATO for his army ’ s operations in Syria .
He also demanded more money for the refugee camps Turkey agreed to host as part of the 2016 deal he struck with Europe to stem migrant flows from the Middle East .
NATO is understandably loath to bend to Erdogan ’ s attempts at geopolitical coercion .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU , for its part , was so unprepared for a renewed migrant crisis and now finds itself resorting to martial coercion of its own at its borders .
From the inception of the 2016 agreement with Turkey , it was obvious that it was not a long-term solution but a maneuver to buy time to design a common EU refugee policy .
Crafted largely by the German government under Chancellor Angela Merkel , the 2016 deal promised Turkey 6 billion euros ( $ 6.7 billion ) in aid to Turkey for taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU membership , visa-free travel for Turks to the EU ( upon fulfilling various conditions ) , and continued progress on an EU-Turkey customs union .
As for Greece , it would return to Turkey those refugees that attempted to cross the Aegean and make an “ illegal ” entry ; for every such “ irregular migrant ” sent back to Turkey , the EU in turn would resettle one refugee from the Turkish camps .
These people would be distributed across Europe according to a quota system .
The accord , signed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refugee numbers applying for asylum in the EU to a trickle .
More than 1 million refugees arrived in Europe in 2015 , but by 2017 the total dropped to around 200,000 , and further to 150,000 in 2018 .
In the first half of 2019 , about 40,000 arrivals were recorded—just 37 percent of those during the same period in 2018 .
The number crossing—and dying in—the Aegean Sea fell off dramatically , from a high of 10,000 arrivals a day in 2015 to fewer than 100 .
( Since 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been creeping higher . )
But Europe never came close to upholding its end of the bargain .
On several counts , Merkel should have known she was overpromising .
The EU never loosened visa regulations for Turks ; Greece , as a result of chaotic public administration , managed to send fewer than 2,000 migrants back to Turkey , instead leaving most of them to dwell for months and even years in thrown-together camps on islands such as Lesbos .
Meanwhile , the volume of the financial aid for the refugee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claimed it had transferred the two installments of 3 billion euros to Turkey , but Ankara insisted that it had received about half that amount .
( The camps set up by Turkey didn ’ t live up to international standards , although there the EU was happy to look the other way . )
The EU ’ s most egregious failure , however , was that it never accepted a significant number of refugees from Turkey .
In total , since 2016 , the EU has taken around 26,500 Syrians living in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Germany , the Netherlands , France , and Finland .
This , however , was far less than the 72,000 “ cap ” mentioned in the deal—itself a paltry number compared with the enormous burden shouldered by Turkey .
Nevertheless , in the years since the deal ’ s signing , the EU has failed completely to devise a common migration policy for the bloc to manage the expected long-term uptick in migration—or even emergency plans should there be a sudden influx of refugees of the sort we ’ re seeing now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Plan A is now in the garbage can and there is no Plan B. EU leaders may blame the lack of policy on the Central Europeans , who indeed have objected to a quota distribution plan , but they weren ’ t the only ones plotting against it .
Meanwhile , even proponents of the quota plan are now refusing to admit the number of asylum seekers they claim to have been prepared to accept under a common strategy .
In Germany , conservatives in Merkel ’ s own Christian Democratic Union party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard cap of refugees of 200,000 per year .
And how many did Germany actually take ?
In 2018 , the country processed 185,853 applicants , of which just over 50 percent received “ protected status , ” namely political asylum or temporary refugee status .
Last year , just 146,619 applied for political protection .
“ The EU is now paying the price for not having a functioning European migration policy even after years of negotiations , ” claimed German newsweekly Der Spiegel .
“ The EU countries left Greece alone with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their number was enough to bring the Greek reception system to the brink of collapse in July [ 2019 ] .
” What we ’ re experiencing now is the collapse , long predicted .
Amnesty International , Germany ’ s churches , and Germany ’ s left-wing parties , including the Social Democrats who are part of the governing coalition , have strongly condemned the Greek authorities ’ suspension of the right of refugees to apply for asylum at all EU borders .
But it is time to take more much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s nonborder countries must finally step in to assist Greece , as well as Spain , Italy , and Bulgaria , by helping process the refugees , rather than turning them away at border fortifications .
In Germany , the opposition Greens have sensibly called for Germany to immediately take in 5,000 women , children , and elderly stranded on the Greek islands .
That seems the least that can be done .
A broader coalition of willing European states should be formed to relieve the current crisis .
There is ample evidence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new influx of refugees , even if their own national government is hesitant .
The German organization Seebrücke , which seeks to protect refugees , says that it has been in contact with 140 municipalities and cities that are together willing to take in about 10,000 to 20,000 refugees .
According to Liza Pflaum of Seebrücke , the organization has been fighting in German courts for a year and a half for these towns to receive refugees , even as the federal interior ministry , run by conservative Horst Seehofer , refuses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The political asylum process is a prerogative of the federal government . )
Merkel has not put Seehofer under any pressure to acquiesce .
“ We have empty beds that were used in 2015 and 2016 when German communities voluntarily found places for refugees , ” said Pflaum .
The EU has prevaricated and shamed on migration , and now a crisis has arrived at its shores that was foreseeable in every way .
Merkel ’ s only response has been to offer Erdogan more money , in hopes of buying more time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with her attempts to salvage what ’ s left of her legacy on migration .
But the EU has the responsibility of facing the crisis squarely : The choice now is whether Europe wants to earn its reputation for humanitarianism , or forfeit it entirely .

This week, Greece’s northern border with Turkey and the Bulgarian-Turkish borderlands, too, have witnessed brutal, violent scenes reminiscent of war zones. Thousands of desperate migrants fleeing war zones—including mothers with babies in their arms—are storming barbed-wire fences to get into European Union territory to apply for political asylum, while Greek security forces in anti-riot gear beat them back and shoot rubber bullets and billowing clouds of tear gas at them. On the easternmost Greek islands, such as Lesbos, the Greek coast guard and navy have been turning away dinghies of half-frozen, frightened refugees. More than 32,000 migrants have been arrested at the Greek land border.
This week, Greece’s northern border with Turkey and the Bulgarian-Turkish borderlands, too, have witnessed brutal, violent scenes reminiscent of war zones. Thousands of desperate migrants fleeing war zones—including mothers with babies in their arms—are storming barbed-wire fences to get into European Union territory to apply for political asylum, while Greek security forces in anti-riot gear beat them back and shoot rubber bullets and billowing clouds of tear gas at them. On the easternmost Greek islands, such as Lesbos, the Greek coast guard and navy have been turning away dinghies of half-frozen, frightened refugees. More than 32,000 migrants have been arrested at the Greek land border.
Greece has suspended asylum applications for a month and is deporting all migrants attempting to enter Greece “illegally,” although The United Nations refugee agency has said there is no legal basis for suspending asylum decisions. Two people have reportedly died so far, including a child in a capsized boat. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is making no apologies for such treatment: “We stopped and protected our borders, which are also the EU’s borders,” a government spokesperson said on March 1. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who visited Greece yesterday to show solidarity with the Athens government, praised Greece’s role as “Europe’s shield” and promised Greece 700 million euros ($780 million) more in support to bolster border security. “The events of 2015 must not be repeated,” said David McAllister, head of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, referring to the influx of 1.3 million asylum applicants into the European Union that year.
The EU is correct to intuit that the legacy of the events of 2015 are in play at the Greek border. In the earlier crisis, the continent managed, not without difficulty, to earn a reputation for humanitarianism in the eyes of the world, while buying time to address the root causes of mass migration from the Middle East and to prepare better for its consequences. Europe did neither.
To be sure, there is no excuse for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s brute attempts to blackmail the EU. He has made good on his cynical threat to open Turkey’s borders to refugees fleeing westward to Europe should Turkey not receive military support from NATO for his army’s operations in Syria. He also demanded more money for the refugee camps Turkey agreed to host as part of the 2016 deal he struck with Europe to stem migrant flows from the Middle East.
NATO is understandably loath to bend to Erdogan’s attempts at geopolitical coercion. It is baffling, however, that the EU, for its part, was so unprepared for a renewed migrant crisis and now finds itself resorting to martial coercion of its own at its borders. From the inception of the 2016 agreement with Turkey, it was obvious that it was not a long-term solution but a maneuver to buy time to design a common EU refugee policy.
Crafted largely by the German government under Chancellor Angela Merkel, the 2016 deal promised Turkey 6 billion euros ($6.7 billion) in aid to Turkey for taking in refugees and accelerated negotiations on Turkish EU membership, visa-free travel for Turks to the EU (upon fulfilling various conditions), and continued progress on an EU-Turkey customs union. As for Greece, it would return to Turkey those refugees that attempted to cross the Aegean and make an “illegal” entry; for every such “irregular migrant” sent back to Turkey, the EU in turn would resettle one refugee from the Turkish camps. These people would be distributed across Europe according to a quota system.
The accord, signed in March 2016, succeeded at slashing refugee numbers applying for asylum in the EU to a trickle. More than 1 million refugees arrived in Europe in 2015, but by 2017 the total dropped to around 200,000, and further to 150,000 in 2018. In the first half of 2019, about 40,000 arrivals were recorded—just 37 percent of those during the same period in 2018. The number crossing—and dying in—the Aegean Sea fell off dramatically, from a high of 10,000 arrivals a day in 2015 to fewer than 100. (Since 2019, the numbers coming from Turkey to Greece had been creeping higher.)
But Europe never came close to upholding its end of the bargain. On several counts, Merkel should have known she was overpromising. The EU never loosened visa regulations for Turks; Greece, as a result of chaotic public administration, managed to send fewer than 2,000 migrants back to Turkey, instead leaving most of them to dwell for months and even years in thrown-together camps on islands such as Lesbos. Meanwhile, the volume of the financial aid for the refugee camps was always disputed: The EU claimed it had transferred the two installments of 3 billion euros to Turkey, but Ankara insisted that it had received about half that amount. (The camps set up by Turkey didn’t live up to international standards, although there the EU was happy to look the other way.)
The EU’s most egregious failure, however, was that it never accepted a significant number of refugees from Turkey. In total, since 2016, the EU has taken around 26,500 Syrians living in Turkey, almost all of them landing in Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Finland. This, however, was far less than the 72,000 “cap” mentioned in the deal—itself a paltry number compared with the enormous burden shouldered by Turkey.
Nevertheless, in the years since the deal’s signing, the EU has failed completely to devise a common migration policy for the bloc to manage the expected long-term uptick in migration—or even emergency plans should there be a sudden influx of refugees of the sort we’re seeing now.
What’s clear is that Plan A is now in the garbage can and there is no Plan B. EU leaders may blame the lack of policy on the Central Europeans, who indeed have objected to a quota distribution plan, but they weren’t the only ones plotting against it. Meanwhile, even proponents of the quota plan are now refusing to admit the number of asylum seekers they claim to have been prepared to accept under a common strategy. In Germany, conservatives in Merkel’s own Christian Democratic Union party never ceased agitating since 2017 for a hard cap of refugees of 200,000 per year. And how many did Germany actually take? In 2018, the country processed 185,853 applicants, of which just over 50 percent received “protected status,” namely political asylum or temporary refugee status. Last year, just 146,619 applied for political protection.
“The EU is now paying the price for not having a functioning European migration policy even after years of negotiations,” claimed German newsweekly Der Spiegel. “The EU countries left Greece alone with the arriving refugees. A moderate increase in their number was enough to bring the Greek reception system to the brink of collapse in July [2019].” What we’re experiencing now is the collapse, long predicted.
Amnesty International, Germany’s churches, and Germany’s left-wing parties, including the Social Democrats who are part of the governing coalition, have strongly condemned the Greek authorities’ suspension of the right of refugees to apply for asylum at all EU borders. But it is time to take more much more decisive action: The EU’s nonborder countries must finally step in to assist Greece, as well as Spain, Italy, and Bulgaria, by helping process the refugees, rather than turning them away at border fortifications. In Germany, the opposition Greens have sensibly called for Germany to immediately take in 5,000 women, children, and elderly stranded on the Greek islands. That seems the least that can be done.
A broader coalition of willing European states should be formed to relieve the current crisis. There is ample evidence that ordinary Germans are prepared to accept a new influx of refugees, even if their own national government is hesitant. The German organization Seebrücke, which seeks to protect refugees, says that it has been in contact with 140 municipalities and cities that are together willing to take in about 10,000 to 20,000 refugees. According to Liza Pflaum of Seebrücke, the organization has been fighting in German courts for a year and a half for these towns to receive refugees, even as the federal interior ministry, run by conservative Horst Seehofer, refuses to give a green light. (The political asylum process is a prerogative of the federal government.) Merkel has not put Seehofer under any pressure to acquiesce. “We have empty beds that were used in 2015 and 2016 when German communities voluntarily found places for refugees,” said Pflaum.
The EU has prevaricated and shamed on migration, and now a crisis has arrived at its shores that was foreseeable in every way. Merkel’s only response has been to offer Erdogan more money, in hopes of buying more time to uncertain end. One might sympathize with her attempts to salvage what’s left of her legacy on migration. But the EU has the responsibility of facing the crisis squarely: The choice now is whether Europe wants to earn its reputation for humanitarianism, or forfeit it entirely.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-05--The Coronavirus Is Not Mother Nature’s Revenge

The Coronavirus Is Not Mother Nature ’ s Revenge If you gaze long into the abyss of a disease , your own ideology gazes back at you .
Authoritative expertise fades dangerously into the background , replaced by the conspiratorial whispers of those who know the truth—about coronavirus , they say , but primarily as a symptom of what ’ s wrong with everything else .
Anti-misinformation measures from tech companies may help mute these voices , but , as the anti-vaccine movement demonstrates , the task will be Sisyphean unless we understand and address the mechanism by which maladies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common to what otherwise look like disparate ideologies and contradictory theories : the belief that systems , whether biological or political , are naturally harmonious , and disorder is always the result of unnatural interference .
This belief is most explicit in the world of alternative health and diet , ground zero for coronavirus misinformation .
On the extremely popular wellness website Natural News— “ Defending Health , Life and Liberty ” —concerned citizens will be unsurprised to learn what the ever-present “ they ” don ’ t want you to know about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Prevention “ deliberately released [ an ] infected patient in San Antonio while positioning itself to financially benefit from an exploding epidemic.
” Thankfully the supplements and herbal remedies long touted by Natural News protect against COVID-19 , from colloidal silver ( “ silver nanoparticles kill HIV-1 and most kinds of viruses ” ) to intravenous vitamin C ( “ every virus seems to respond to this type of treatment ” ) .
At Mercola.com ( 6.5 million visits per month ) , natural-health enthusiasts are treated to a different sort of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ominously , that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation sponsored a novel coronavirus pandemic preparedness exercise on October 18 , 2019 , in New York called Event 201 .
“ The hysteria being drummed up follows a well-worn pattern , ” wrote Mercola , his words authorized by an official looking “ Fact Checked ” logo .
“ The population is kept in a state of fear about microbes so that drug companies can come to the rescue with yet another expensive ( and potentially mandatory ) drug or vaccine.
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mainstream movements , such as animal rights .
Supporters of the organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals ( PETA ) can purchase Go Vegan face masks emblazoned with their favored theory about the origin of coronavirus and how to prevent it : “ Meat markets breed killer diseases .
Go vegan.
” ( Coronavirus is , after all , an anagram of “ carnivorous.
” ) Understandably , advocates of an entirely carnivorous diet beg to differ .
Nor is transforming illness into ideology the exclusive practice of conspiracists and health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last month , Chinese state-sponsored media has , without evidence , been emphasizing the efficacy of traditional Chinese medicine ( TCM ) against COVID-19 .
“ TCM has never missed a single fight against epidemics throughout Chinese history , ” gushed one characteristic article .
“ TCM classics have provided sufficient evidence of how TCM cured epidemic diseases such as smallpox over the past several thousand years.
” Ideologically inflected responses to COVID-19 frequently transcend the realms of health and medicine , becoming primarily political and theological .
Far-right politicians across the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ borders ; religious zealots see it , of course , as punishment for our sins .
Although seemingly unrelated , these reactions share a key feature , just as COVID-19 infects its host using the same mechanism as other coronaviruses .
They all exploit the human desire for a simplistic binary that explains good and evil , traditionally articulated in terms of natural and unnatural systems .
Obey the laws of those systems and flourish .
Disobey and suffer .
As Susan Sontag wrote in Illness as Metaphor , “ Dying has come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a shameful , unnatural event , so that disease which is widely considered a synonym for death has come to seem shameful , something to deny.
” Panicked , we insist that deadly diseases must be unnatural—and , since origin determines essence , their cause must be unnatural as well .
Indeed , unnaturalness has long been used to explain all forms of dysfunction .
Throughout Shakespeare ’ s plays , for instance , the word serves as shorthand for moral deficiency : “ unnatural and unkind , ” “ unworthy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” “ inhuman and unnatural.
” In his time—and before it—an “ unnatural ” birth meant a baby born with some deformity ; an “ unnatural ” death meant , and still means , life cut short by murder or accident .
With regard to sexual activity , “ unnatural ” describes perversions of desire ; in government , perversions of justice .
Again , this foundational assumption is clearest in health and wellness conspiracy theories .
COVID-19 could not possibly be natural , so it must have been seeded by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cooked up in a secret Wuhan laboratory or as a CIA biological weapon for use against China .
The details differ , but , as Stephanie Lee wrote in Buzzfeed , the central theme is consistent : “ man-made , ” “ not natural , ” and “ prob .
not random.
” What about PETA ’ s assertion that eating meat was the ultimate cause of COVID-19 ?
A central plank of their case for vegetarianism is that eating animals is unnatural .
Our unnatural diet explains not only COVID-19 , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s the same argument made more than 200 years ago in “ A Vindication of Natural Diet ” by the vegetarian poet Percy Bysshe Shelley .
“ Man and the animals whom he has infected with his society , or depraved by his dominion , are alone diseased , ” wrote Shelley , who proceeds to argue that crime is madness , madness is disease , and therefore abstaining from meat-eating will end criminal activity .
Dietary habits are a crucial part of identity , which is why intuitions about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into nationalist rhetoric .
When Fox News host Jesse Watters blames Chinese people “ eating raw bats and snakes ” for COVID-19 , he is tapping into a primal sense that foreigners are unnatural , unethical ( they eat dogs , too ! )
, inferior , and contagious—foreign bodies that compromise us physically and ideologically .
From there it is a short step to tightening borders to protect a nation ’ s health .
“ Naturalizing ” foreigners is necessary , since otherwise they will endanger the body politic .
Open borders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that brings down divine wrath in the form of hurricanes and coronaviruses .
The antidote is a return to natural systems .
The “ oriental wisdom ” of TCM celebrated by Chinese state media—and embraced by Western proponents of alternative medicine like Mercola—is rooted in its supposed attention to natural systems .
“ TCM interprets a pandemic from the principle of how human beings adapt to the alternation of seasons and natural change , ” explained Cao Hongxin , the former head of science and technology at China ’ s National Administration of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some irony in the possibility that COVID-19 may have come from pangolins , trafficked for their use in TCM . )
Likewise , the natural political solution to COVID-19 and future outbreaks is to limit the body politic ’ s exposure to foreign agents , those who are not our natural kinfolk ( easily identified by their dietary habits ) .
Blood and soil .
Close up the borders to keep out the disease .
The persuasiveness of the natural/unnatural binary is not confined to those who endorse conspiracy theories , natural medicine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is underwritten by standard epidemiological discourse about the causes of COVID-19 .
In a typical turn of phrase , the disease ecologist Kevin Olival explained to National Geographic that “ when you bring animals together in these unnatural situations , you have the risk of human diseases emerging.
” Writing in the New York Times , David Quammen identifies unnatural human activity as the culprit for our current situation : “ We cut the trees ; we kill the animals or cage them and send them to markets .
We disrupt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from their natural hosts .
When that happens , they need a new host .
Often , we are it.
” The implications are clear .
Ecosystems in their natural state are balanced , harmonious , and safe .
Problems arise when we meddle with those systems .
And not just coronavirus : invasive species , climate change , habitat destruction , pandemics of any kind—these are all a function of our artificial hubris , our dense cities , our interconnected global community and the industries that support it .
In this light @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t seem so crazy .
Isn ’ t Big Pharma one of those unnatural industries ?
Surely alternative medicine and a natural diet is a safer bet than their tainted vaccines .
And if globalization facilitates unnatural pandemics , isn ’ t it just common sense to tighten borders and return nations to their natural , safer condition ?
We are so accustomed to the idea of unnatural evil that unnatural activity seems like the obvious root of all woes .
But unnaturalness is not an explanation of dysfunction .
Some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our artificially improved versions .
Highly technological forms of energy generation such as solar panels are better for the natural world than digging up coal and setting it on fire , natural though it may be .
“ Natural ” and “ unnatural ” are descriptions , yet we insist on using them as judgments .
Speaking about illness as a product of unnatural activity facilitates the projection of ideological causes and solutions .
Naturalness is an ambiguous metaphysics , an empty and powerful cipher which we can fill however we like .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is essential—to condemn dangerous activities that might lead to COVID-19 without invoking a broader criteria of natural goodness .
We would never say that vaccines are effective because they are unnatural—why , then , would we attribute protective properties to something in light of its naturalness ?
If and when a vaccine is developed for the latest coronavirus , there will be a small segment of the population that refuses it , endangering public health .
Maybe a government will refuse it , as the South African government once refused to treat HIV @ @ @ @ @ @ @ natural remedies that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths .
When another virus threatens the world , there will be populist politicians who use it to gin up hatred and xenophobia .
They will see in the specter of disease a justification of their own ideological tendencies .
Perhaps that is inevitable .
But if we do not take measures to change how we talk about the causes of our crises , starting with COVID-19 , part of the blame for their persuasiveness will lie with us .

If you gaze long into the abyss of a disease, your own ideology gazes back at you.
Authoritative expertise fades dangerously into the background, replaced by the conspiratorial whispers of those who know the truth—about coronavirus, they say, but primarily as a symptom of what’s wrong with everything else.
Anti-misinformation measures from tech companies may help mute these voices, but, as the anti-vaccine movement demonstrates, the task will be Sisyphean unless we understand and address the mechanism by which maladies become mirrors. It is a mechanism common to what otherwise look like disparate ideologies and contradictory theories: the belief that systems, whether biological or political, are naturally harmonious, and disorder is always the result of unnatural interference.
This belief is most explicit in the world of alternative health and diet, ground zero for coronavirus misinformation. On the extremely popular wellness website Natural News—“Defending Health, Life and Liberty”—concerned citizens will be unsurprised to learn what the ever-present “they” don’t want you to know about coronavirus: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention “deliberately released [an] infected patient in San Antonio while positioning itself to financially benefit from an exploding epidemic.”
Thankfully the supplements and herbal remedies long touted by Natural News protect against COVID-19, from colloidal silver (“silver nanoparticles kill HIV-1 and most kinds of viruses”) to intravenous vitamin C (“every virus seems to respond to this type of treatment”).
At Mercola.com (6.5 million visits per month), natural-health enthusiasts are treated to a different sort of conspiracy. The vaccine-skeptical Joseph Mercola observes, ominously, that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation sponsored a novel coronavirus pandemic preparedness exercise on October 18, 2019, in New York called Event 201. “The hysteria being drummed up follows a well-worn pattern,” wrote Mercola, his words authorized by an official looking “Fact Checked” logo. “The population is kept in a state of fear about microbes so that drug companies can come to the rescue with yet another expensive (and potentially mandatory) drug or vaccine.”
The same faith in natural systems underwrites more mainstream movements, such as animal rights. Supporters of the organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) can purchase Go Vegan face masks emblazoned with their favored theory about the origin of coronavirus and how to prevent it: “Meat markets breed killer diseases. Go vegan.” (Coronavirus is, after all, an anagram of “carnivorous.”) Understandably, advocates of an entirely carnivorous diet beg to differ.
Nor is transforming illness into ideology the exclusive practice of conspiracists and health nuts. As reported in Foreign Policy last month, Chinese state-sponsored media has, without evidence, been emphasizing the efficacy of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) against COVID-19. “TCM has never missed a single fight against epidemics throughout Chinese history,” gushed one characteristic article. “TCM classics have provided sufficient evidence of how TCM cured epidemic diseases such as smallpox over the past several thousand years.”
Ideologically inflected responses to COVID-19 frequently transcend the realms of health and medicine, becoming primarily political and theological. Far-right politicians across the world see the virus as punishment for open borders; religious zealots see it, of course, as punishment for our sins.
Although seemingly unrelated, these reactions share a key feature, just as COVID-19 infects its host using the same mechanism as other coronaviruses. They all exploit the human desire for a simplistic binary that explains good and evil, traditionally articulated in terms of natural and unnatural systems. Obey the laws of those systems and flourish. Disobey and suffer. As Susan Sontag wrote in Illness as Metaphor, “Dying has come to be regarded in advanced industrial societies as a shameful, unnatural event, so that disease which is widely considered a synonym for death has come to seem shameful, something to deny.” Panicked, we insist that deadly diseases must be unnatural—and, since origin determines essence, their cause must be unnatural as well.
Indeed, unnaturalness has long been used to explain all forms of dysfunction. Throughout Shakespeare’s plays, for instance, the word serves as shorthand for moral deficiency: “unnatural and unkind,” “unworthy and unnatural,” “savage and unnatural,” “inhuman and unnatural.” In his time—and before it—an “unnatural” birth meant a baby born with some deformity; an “unnatural” death meant, and still means, life cut short by murder or accident. With regard to sexual activity, “unnatural” describes perversions of desire; in government, perversions of justice.
Again, this foundational assumption is clearest in health and wellness conspiracy theories. COVID-19 could not possibly be natural, so it must have been seeded by the U.S. government or the Gates Foundation; cooked up in a secret Wuhan laboratory or as a CIA biological weapon for use against China. The details differ, but, as Stephanie Lee wrote in Buzzfeed, the central theme is consistent: “man-made,” “not natural,” and “prob. not random.”
What about PETA’s assertion that eating meat was the ultimate cause of COVID-19? A central plank of their case for vegetarianism is that eating animals is unnatural. Our unnatural diet explains not only COVID-19, but every modern affliction from racism to sexism. It’s the same argument made more than 200 years ago in “A Vindication of Natural Diet” by the vegetarian poet Percy Bysshe Shelley. “Man and the animals whom he has infected with his society, or depraved by his dominion, are alone diseased,” wrote Shelley, who proceeds to argue that crime is madness, madness is disease, and therefore abstaining from meat-eating will end criminal activity.
Dietary habits are a crucial part of identity, which is why intuitions about “unnatural diet” are easily conscripted into nationalist rhetoric. When Fox News host Jesse Watters blames Chinese people “eating raw bats and snakes” for COVID-19, he is tapping into a primal sense that foreigners are unnatural, unethical (they eat dogs, too!), inferior, and contagious—foreign bodies that compromise us physically and ideologically. From there it is a short step to tightening borders to protect a nation’s health. “Naturalizing” foreigners is necessary, since otherwise they will endanger the body politic. Open borders are as unnatural as the sexual activity that brings down divine wrath in the form of hurricanes and coronaviruses.
The antidote is a return to natural systems. The “oriental wisdom” of TCM celebrated by Chinese state media—and embraced by Western proponents of alternative medicine like Mercola—is rooted in its supposed attention to natural systems. “TCM interprets a pandemic from the principle of how human beings adapt to the alternation of seasons and natural change,” explained Cao Hongxin, the former head of science and technology at China’s National Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine. (There is some irony in the possibility that COVID-19 may have come from pangolins, trafficked for their use in TCM.)
Likewise, the natural political solution to COVID-19 and future outbreaks is to limit the body politic’s exposure to foreign agents, those who are not our natural kinfolk (easily identified by their dietary habits). Blood and soil. Close up the borders to keep out the disease.
The persuasiveness of the natural/unnatural binary is not confined to those who endorse conspiracy theories, natural medicine, and radical nationalism. In fact, it is underwritten by standard epidemiological discourse about the causes of COVID-19. In a typical turn of phrase, the disease ecologist Kevin Olival explained to National Geographic that “when you bring animals together in these unnatural situations, you have the risk of human diseases emerging.” Writing in the New York Times, David Quammen identifies unnatural human activity as the culprit for our current situation: “We cut the trees; we kill the animals or cage them and send them to markets. We disrupt ecosystems, and we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts. When that happens, they need a new host. Often, we are it.”
The implications are clear. Ecosystems in their natural state are balanced, harmonious, and safe. Problems arise when we meddle with those systems. And not just coronavirus: invasive species, climate change, habitat destruction, pandemics of any kind—these are all a function of our artificial hubris, our dense cities, our interconnected global community and the industries that support it.
In this light, the wild-eyed conspiracies and ardent nationalism don’t seem so crazy. Isn’t Big Pharma one of those unnatural industries? Surely alternative medicine and a natural diet is a safer bet than their tainted vaccines. And if globalization facilitates unnatural pandemics, isn’t it just common sense to tighten borders and return nations to their natural, safer condition?
We are so accustomed to the idea of unnatural evil that unnatural activity seems like the obvious root of all woes. But unnaturalness is not an explanation of dysfunction. Some natural systems—childbirth, say—are manifestly inferior to our artificially improved versions. Highly technological forms of energy generation such as solar panels are better for the natural world than digging up coal and setting it on fire, natural though it may be. “Natural” and “unnatural” are descriptions, yet we insist on using them as judgments.
Speaking about illness as a product of unnatural activity facilitates the projection of ideological causes and solutions. Naturalness is an ambiguous metaphysics, an empty and powerful cipher which we can fill however we like. It’s entirely possible—indeed, it is essential—to condemn dangerous activities that might lead to COVID-19 without invoking a broader criteria of natural goodness. We would never say that vaccines are effective because they are unnatural—why, then, would we attribute protective properties to something in light of its naturalness?
If and when a vaccine is developed for the latest coronavirus, there will be a small segment of the population that refuses it, endangering public health. Maybe a government will refuse it, as the South African government once refused to treat HIV with drugs, opting instead for traditional natural remedies that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths. When another virus threatens the world, there will be populist politicians who use it to gin up hatred and xenophobia. They will see in the specter of disease a justification of their own ideological tendencies. Perhaps that is inevitable. But if we do not take measures to change how we talk about the causes of our crises, starting with COVID-19, part of the blame for their persuasiveness will lie with us.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-05--Diplomats Fear a Collapse of South Sudan’s Latest Peace Deal

South Sudan ’ s latest peace deal will likely not stop the country ’ s bloody conflict , according to more than a dozen officials and experts , raising questions about the seriousness of the international community ’ s effort to end a brutal cycle of violence in the East African nation .
Many of these observers say the deal backs effectively the same power-sharing formula to end the country ’ s civil war that has repeatedly failed before , which they say highlights South Sudan ’ s tragic arc from an international success story to a chronic diplomatic catastrophe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” one senior European diplomat told Foreign Policy .
The Feb. 22 creation of a coalition government between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and former deputy-turned rebel leader Riek Machar was meant to end a deadly conflict that began in 2013 .
But even if the two men adhere to their pledges , their legacy will all but ensure continued violence and corruption , these officials and observers say .
Since civil war broke out , there have been dozens of cease-fires and peace deals between the two men that have successively collapsed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials and Western governments have publicly praised the latest peace deal with tones of cautious optimism .
The deal has “ moved the country further along the road to sustainable peace , ” top U.N. envoy David Shearer said .
“ We welcome the fact that the government and opposition parties have made the necessary compromises to allow this important step , ” the U.S. , British , and Norwegian governments said in a joint statement on Feb. 23 .
Privately , other American and Western officials cast doubt on the very foundations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States has no strategy to find another path to peace if this one fails .
But privately , other American and Western officials cast doubt on the very foundations of the peace deal and complain that the United States has no strategy to find another path to peace if this one fails .
“ There is no reason to suggest that the same power-sharing agreement that has failed so many times will work , ” said Payton Knopf , a former head of the U.N. Panel of Experts on South Sudan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Peace .
“ I am unable to describe what U.S. policy is in South Sudan , ” Knopf said .
U.S. officials have discussed a range of options if the deal falls through again , including sanctioning more senior South Sudanese government officials , downgrading diplomatic relations , and even de-recognizing the government of South Sudan as potential options .
Some experts in the region worry it ’ s not enough .
“ Before this , we didn ’ t seem to have a plan beyond , ‘ Let ’ s throw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said one U.S. official .
“ Now that the government has been formed , I also don ’ t think there ’ s a plan .
What are we pushing for , what are we focused on now ?
It ’ s still unclear.
” “ We hope that genuine leadership will be shown on all sides and that the peace process will continue moving forward , ” a State Department spokesman said when asked for comment .
“ If progress stalls , however , the United States will use all available @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accountability for those who deny peace and progress to the South Sudanese people , ” he added .
The latest coalition government between the two feuding leaders began last week when Machar returned to the capital of Juba and was appointed one of Kiir ’ s vice presidents .
That came after Pope Francis sponsored a mediation between Kiir and Machar in his private Vatican residence last April , and many analysts say the meeting drove the two leaders to continue talks .
When it first gained independence in 2011 , South Sudan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ achievement .
The East African nation was shepherded into existence by the administrations of President George W. Bush and Barack Obama , and backed by a coalition of high-profile activists and conservative Christian lawmakers in Congress .
( South Sudan ’ s decadeslong struggle for independence was often viewed from the outside as a fight by the primarily Christian south against a hard-line Islamist government in Khartoum . )
But if U.S. efforts to help South Sudan gain independence marked the high point of Washington ’ s diplomacy , then its subsequent disengagement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a superpower unable—or unwilling—to stop the monster it helped create .
Two years after independence , South Sudan fell into a bloody civil war largely along ethnic lines .
Some 400,000 people have died , and both government and rebel forces are accused by human rights groups of war crimes .
The conflict has also fueled famine-like conditions , making the impoverished East African country one of the largest focuses of humanitarian relief in the world .
The story of South Sudan ’ s latest unstable government begins with the collapse of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short-lived unity government between Machar and Kiir ended with an explosion of violence in July of that year .
Government soldiers rampaged through the streets of Juba .
Rebel forces were battered by tanks and helicopters .
Machar fled on foot to the Democratic Republic of the Congo .
Diplomatic missteps by the U.S. may have compounded the country ’ s crisis , some current and former State Department officials say .
Diplomatic missteps by the United States may have compounded the country ’ s crisis , some current and former State Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is from August 2016 .
During a press conference in Kenya that month , then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry sidelined Machar as the country ’ s recognized rebel leader and backed his former deputy , Taban Deng Gai , as the country ’ s official opposition leader .
It meant that Machar , who commanded the rebel army , was no longer part of the country ’ s peace deal .
The announcement “ was essentially the death knell of the transitional government and loudly reinforced our partiality to Kiir , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department official and author of a forthcoming book on South Sudan , The Dissent Channel .
“ There was nothing other players in the international community could do at that point to walk it back , and it was confirmation to Kiir he could continue a hard-line approach without consequence.
” The incident marked the last sustained diplomatic effort by the Obama administration on South Sudan .
Afterward , talks once again broke down , fueling another wave of violence .
One million people fled to neighboring Uganda by August 2017 amid U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and famine .
When U.S. President Donald Trump came into office , the administration continued supporting talks between Kiir and Machar , though Africa was largely on the foreign-policy back burner for an administration focused on Iran , North Korea , and China .
Most of the engagement on South Sudan was at lower levels—the administration ’ s top State Department post on Africa sat empty for over 16 months—with the exception of Nikki Haley , the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 2017 and 2018 .
Haley visited South Sudan in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she helped pushed through a U.N. arms embargo on the country .
“ She got tough on the government .
… She was willing to push forward the arms embargo , ” said one U.S. official .
But the embargo and diplomatic pressure weren ’ t enough to push Kiir and Machar toward a power-sharing deal at the time .
Peace talks floundered .
Fighting continued .
U.S. officials privately grew more exasperated with South Sudan ’ s leaders , and the Trump administration began prodding other governments in the region to take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ East African nations began a slow and bumbling effort to solve South Sudan ’ s civil war in 2018 .
Sudan began to mediate a peace deal .
In September 2018 , another peace deal between Kiir and Machar was signed in Ethiopia , but setbacks continued .
For years , Machar had refused to return to South Sudan .
An opposition negotiator told Foreign Policy that , until the most recent deal was struck , Machar was worried about going to Juba because of the threat of assassination—he had already survived one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gerrymandering of the number and boundaries of states in South Sudan was another stumbling block .
Increasing the number of states the country was divided into was a way for him to exert power and give political allies posts as governors .
Yet the fledgling peace deal was boosted by an invitation for Kiir and Machar to visit the Vatican in April 2019 .
The warring leaders went to Pope Francis ’ s private chapel for mediation .
“ We all wrote down what the spirit ministered to us , ” recalled Bishop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict in sub-Saharan Africa for the archbishop of Canterbury .
On the last day , the Pope joined the group .
Cloaked in white , Francis kissed the feet of Kiir and Machar .
“ Resolve your problems , ” Francis told the men .
The holy retreat had an impact , several analysts and Western officials say .
In the following months , Kiir glowingly recalled the papal visit to Western diplomats .
Soon , Machar made more regular visits to Juba .
The peace deal was becoming more realistic despite missed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regional efforts to solve the country ’ s peace deal increased in November 2019 , particularly after South Africa ’ s Deputy President David Mabuza became more involved .
During those months , a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers pressed Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to do more to break the deadlock in South Sudan , frustrated by the impasse and seeming inaction from the United States .
In January , the State Department brought W. Stuart Symington , a seasoned career diplomat , out of retirement and named him special envoy on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States sanctioned Taban Deng Gai—the same official Kerry once touted in 2016 as the country ’ s rebel leader—accusing him of “ serious human rights abuses.
” Some saw the sanctions as an effective shot across the bow at Kiir and Machar , signaling that the United States would target them next if they didn ’ t form a unity government .
Diplomats believe that Kiir ’ s early February decision to reduce the number of states in South Sudan from 32 to 10 , plus three administrative areas , was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s justifications to avoid returning to South Sudan .
Machar returned to Juba and was officially sworn in as the country ’ s first vice president on Feb. 22 .
It was the start of a new coalition government—one with a similar power-sharing formula that had twice failed .
“ There are assertions by all parties that it ’ s different this time , assertions which have to be tested and watched very carefully , ” a senior U.S. official said last month .
A senior U.S. official expressed cautious optimism that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of working than previous ones , in a briefing to reporters late last month .
“ One of the signs that this is different than before , there are assertions by all parties that it ’ s different this time , assertions which have to be tested and watched very carefully , ” the official said .
The peace deal is “ more inclusive than the other one , ” the official said .
“ There ’ s five major parties to this peace agreement , and some of those are umbrellas that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experts question how inclusive the deal is , however .
The agreement does not include the rebel group in the Equatorian region led by Thomas Cirillo , for example . )
Amid the controversial peace deal , experts and diplomats predict the cycle of violence won ’ t end .
The root causes of conflict that include access to resources and land disputes are ongoing , and roughly 4 million people have been forced from their homes—either internally displaced or fleeing to neighboring countries—according to the U.N. An opposition negotiator told Foreign Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the government over how ministry positions will be divided , among other important issues .
Others are wary of whether the rival factions can successfully integrate militias that had been fighting for years under one unified command .
Millions of dollars in state revenue routinely vanish in what amounts to the systematic swindling of South Sudan ’ s public budget , according to the United Nations Human Rights Council .
Millions of dollars in state revenue routinely vanish in what amounts to the systematic swindling of South Sudan s public budget , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council , just one instance of what the body said was evidence of how the East African government has engaged in “ acts that amount to economic crimes.
” For October and November 2019 , 80 percent of the country ’ s non-oil income was diverted to the country ’ s National Revenue Authority , funds that “ do not reach the Government , ” according to a recent report from the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan .
The pilfering of public funds was not unique to those months and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , according to the report .
Some $ 10 billion has been spent on aid in South Sudan since 2011 , almost half of which has been provided by the U.S. government .
But a flurry of reports and statements from aid workers highlighted how urgent changes in the international approach to South Sudan are required .
An internal report from the Overseas Development Institute , a London-based think tank , said that South Sudan ’ s government gains a “ significant part ” of its international legitimacy because of the international humanitarian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Assistance disproportionately benefits the government in Juba , both financially and politically , ” according to the report , reviewed by Foreign Policy .
“ In contrast to Syria , for example , there is virtually no debate in policy and donors circles about the moral hazard of undertaking reconstruction and development in South Sudan where one side won militarily and is accused of war crimes and there is no real political settlement , ” Knopf , the former head of the U.N. Panel of Experts on South Sudan , said .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bracing for bad news to hit again .
“ Ultimately , the problem is this is yet another elite power-sharing deal , ” said another Western official .
“ It ’ s still too early to tell whether the same leaders back in the same room together will do anything differently .
”

South Sudan’s latest peace deal will likely not stop the country’s bloody conflict, according to more than a dozen officials and experts, raising questions about the seriousness of the international community’s effort to end a brutal cycle of violence in the East African nation.
South Sudan’s latest peace deal will likely not stop the country’s bloody conflict, according to more than a dozen officials and experts, raising questions about the seriousness of the international community’s effort to end a brutal cycle of violence in the East African nation.
Many of these observers say the deal backs effectively the same power-sharing formula to end the country’s civil war that has repeatedly failed before, which they say highlights South Sudan’s tragic arc from an international success story to a chronic diplomatic catastrophe.
“Nothing really has changed,” one senior European diplomat told Foreign Policy.
The Feb. 22 creation of a coalition government between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and former deputy-turned rebel leader Riek Machar was meant to end a deadly conflict that began in 2013. But even if the two men adhere to their pledges, their legacy will all but ensure continued violence and corruption, these officials and observers say.
Since civil war broke out, there have been dozens of cease-fires and peace deals between the two men that have successively collapsed. Despite this, top United Nations officials and Western governments have publicly praised the latest peace deal with tones of cautious optimism.
The deal has “moved the country further along the road to sustainable peace,” top U.N. envoy David Shearer said. “We welcome the fact that the government and opposition parties have made the necessary compromises to allow this important step,” the U.S., British, and Norwegian governments said in a joint statement on Feb. 23.
Privately, other American and Western officials cast doubt on the very foundations of the peace deal and complain that the United States has no strategy to find another path to peace if this one fails.
But privately, other American and Western officials cast doubt on the very foundations of the peace deal and complain that the United States has no strategy to find another path to peace if this one fails.
“There is no reason to suggest that the same power-sharing agreement that has failed so many times will work,” said Payton Knopf, a former head of the U.N. Panel of Experts on South Sudan who is now with the U.S. Institute of Peace. “I am unable to describe what U.S. policy is in South Sudan,” Knopf said.
U.S. officials have discussed a range of options if the deal falls through again, including sanctioning more senior South Sudanese government officials, downgrading diplomatic relations, and even de-recognizing the government of South Sudan as potential options. Some experts in the region worry it’s not enough.
“Before this, we didn’t seem to have a plan beyond, ‘Let’s throw more sanctions at these guys,’” said one U.S. official. “Now that the government has been formed, I also don’t think there’s a plan. What are we pushing for, what are we focused on now? It’s still unclear.”
“We hope that genuine leadership will be shown on all sides and that the peace process will continue moving forward,” a State Department spokesman said when asked for comment. “If progress stalls, however, the United States will use all available tools, including sanctions, to promote accountability for those who deny peace and progress to the South Sudanese people,” he added.
U.N. peace keepers patrol Malakal, South Sudan, on March 4, 2014..
The latest coalition government between the two feuding leaders began last week when Machar returned to the capital of Juba and was appointed one of Kiir’s vice presidents. That came after Pope Francis sponsored a mediation between Kiir and Machar in his private Vatican residence last April, and many analysts say the meeting drove the two leaders to continue talks.
When it first gained independence in 2011, South Sudan was heralded as a major U.S. diplomatic achievement. The East African nation was shepherded into existence by the administrations of President George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and backed by a coalition of high-profile activists and conservative Christian lawmakers in Congress. (South Sudan’s decadeslong struggle for independence was often viewed from the outside as a fight by the primarily Christian south against a hard-line Islamist government in Khartoum.)
But if U.S. efforts to help South Sudan gain independence marked the high point of Washington’s diplomacy, then its subsequent disengagement from South Sudan is the story of a superpower unable—or unwilling—to stop the monster it helped create.
Two years after independence, South Sudan fell into a bloody civil war largely along ethnic lines. Some 400,000 people have died, and both government and rebel forces are accused by human rights groups of war crimes. The conflict has also fueled famine-like conditions, making the impoverished East African country one of the largest focuses of humanitarian relief in the world.
The story of South Sudan’s latest unstable government begins with the collapse of the last peace deal in 2016. A short-lived unity government between Machar and Kiir ended with an explosion of violence in July of that year. Government soldiers rampaged through the streets of Juba. Rebel forces were battered by tanks and helicopters. Machar fled on foot to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Diplomatic missteps by the U.S. may have compounded the country’s crisis, some current and former State Department officials say.
Diplomatic missteps by the United States may have compounded the country’s crisis, some current and former State Department officials say. One example they cite is from August 2016. During a press conference in Kenya that month, then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry sidelined Machar as the country’s recognized rebel leader and backed his former deputy, Taban Deng Gai, as the country’s official opposition leader. It meant that Machar, who commanded the rebel army, was no longer part of the country’s peace deal.
The announcement “was essentially the death knell of the transitional government and loudly reinforced our partiality to Kiir,” said Elizabeth Shackelford, a former State Department official and author of a forthcoming book on South Sudan, The Dissent Channel. “There was nothing other players in the international community could do at that point to walk it back, and it was confirmation to Kiir he could continue a hard-line approach without consequence.”
The incident marked the last sustained diplomatic effort by the Obama administration on South Sudan. Afterward, talks once again broke down, fueling another wave of violence. One million people fled to neighboring Uganda by August 2017 amid U.N. warnings about the risk of ethnic cleansing and famine.
When U.S. President Donald Trump came into office, the administration continued supporting talks between Kiir and Machar, though Africa was largely on the foreign-policy back burner for an administration focused on Iran, North Korea, and China. Most of the engagement on South Sudan was at lower levels—the administration’s top State Department post on Africa sat empty for over 16 months—with the exception of Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 2017 and 2018.
Haley visited South Sudan in October 2017, and the following year she helped pushed through a U.N. arms embargo on the country. “She got tough on the government. … She was willing to push forward the arms embargo,” said one U.S. official.
But the embargo and diplomatic pressure weren’t enough to push Kiir and Machar toward a power-sharing deal at the time. Peace talks floundered. Fighting continued. U.S. officials privately grew more exasperated with South Sudan’s leaders, and the Trump administration began prodding other governments in the region to take a lead on brokering peace instead.
East African nations began a slow and bumbling effort to solve South Sudan’s civil war in 2018. Sudan began to mediate a peace deal. In September 2018, another peace deal between Kiir and Machar was signed in Ethiopia, but setbacks continued.
For years, Machar had refused to return to South Sudan. An opposition negotiator told Foreign Policy that, until the most recent deal was struck, Machar was worried about going to Juba because of the threat of assassination—he had already survived one attempt in 2016. Kiir’s gerrymandering of the number and boundaries of states in South Sudan was another stumbling block. Increasing the number of states the country was divided into was a way for him to exert power and give political allies posts as governors.
Yet the fledgling peace deal was boosted by an invitation for Kiir and Machar to visit the Vatican in April 2019. The warring leaders went to Pope Francis’s private chapel for mediation. “We all wrote down what the spirit ministered to us,” recalled Bishop Precious Omuku, the special representative on conflict in sub-Saharan Africa for the archbishop of Canterbury. On the last day, the Pope joined the group. Cloaked in white, Francis kissed the feet of Kiir and Machar. “Resolve your problems,” Francis told the men. The holy retreat had an impact, several analysts and Western officials say. In the following months, Kiir glowingly recalled the papal visit to Western diplomats.
Soon, Machar made more regular visits to Juba. The peace deal was becoming more realistic despite missed deadlines. A Western diplomat said that regional efforts to solve the country’s peace deal increased in November 2019, particularly after South Africa’s Deputy President David Mabuza became more involved.
During those months, a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers pressed Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to do more to break the deadlock in South Sudan, frustrated by the impasse and seeming inaction from the United States. In January, the State Department brought W. Stuart Symington, a seasoned career diplomat, out of retirement and named him special envoy on South Sudan.
That same month, the United States sanctioned Taban Deng Gai—the same official Kerry once touted in 2016 as the country’s rebel leader—accusing him of “serious human rights abuses.” Some saw the sanctions as an effective shot across the bow at Kiir and Machar, signaling that the United States would target them next if they didn’t form a unity government.
Diplomats believe that Kiir’s early February decision to reduce the number of states in South Sudan from 32 to 10, plus three administrative areas, was a significant concession that removed Machar’s justifications to avoid returning to South Sudan.
Machar returned to Juba and was officially sworn in as the country’s first vice president on Feb. 22. It was the start of a new coalition government—one with a similar power-sharing formula that had twice failed.
“There are assertions by all parties that it’s different this time, assertions which have to be tested and watched very carefully,” a senior U.S. official said last month.
A senior U.S. official expressed cautious optimism that the latest deal may have a better chance of working than previous ones, in a briefing to reporters late last month. “One of the signs that this is different than before, there are assertions by all parties that it’s different this time, assertions which have to be tested and watched very carefully,” the official said.
The peace deal is “more inclusive than the other one,” the official said. “There’s five major parties to this peace agreement, and some of those are umbrellas that include many more parties.” (Some experts question how inclusive the deal is, however. The agreement does not include the rebel group in the Equatorian region led by Thomas Cirillo, for example.)
Amid the controversial peace deal, experts and diplomats predict the cycle of violence won’t end. The root causes of conflict that include access to resources and land disputes are ongoing, and roughly 4 million people have been forced from their homes—either internally displaced or fleeing to neighboring countries—according to the U.N.
An opposition negotiator told Foreign Policy there has been no progress in talks with the government over how ministry positions will be divided, among other important issues. Others are wary of whether the rival factions can successfully integrate militias that had been fighting for years under one unified command.
Millions of dollars in state revenue routinely vanish in what amounts to the systematic swindling of South Sudan’s public budget, according to the United Nations Human Rights Council.
Millions of dollars in state revenue routinely vanish in what amounts to the systematic swindling of South Sudan s public budget, according to the United Nations Human Rights Council, just one instance of what the body said was evidence of how the East African government has engaged in “acts that amount to economic crimes.”
For October and November 2019, 80 percent of the country’s non-oil income was diverted to the country’s National Revenue Authority, funds that “do not reach the Government,” according to a recent report from the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan. The pilfering of public funds was not unique to those months and potentially amounted to some $36 million, according to the report.
Some $10 billion has been spent on aid in South Sudan since 2011, almost half of which has been provided by the U.S. government. But a flurry of reports and statements from aid workers highlighted how urgent changes in the international approach to South Sudan are required.
An internal report from the Overseas Development Institute, a London-based think tank, said that South Sudan’s government gains a “significant part” of its international legitimacy because of the international humanitarian operations propping up the government. “Assistance disproportionately benefits the government in Juba, both financially and politically,” according to the report, reviewed by Foreign Policy.
“In contrast to Syria, for example, there is virtually no debate in policy and donors circles about the moral hazard of undertaking reconstruction and development in South Sudan where one side won militarily and is accused of war crimes and there is no real political settlement,” Knopf, the former head of the U.N. Panel of Experts on South Sudan, said.
For now, diplomats watch and wait, bracing for bad news to hit again. “Ultimately, the problem is this is yet another elite power-sharing deal,” said another Western official. “It’s still too early to tell whether the same leaders back in the same room together will do anything differently.”