foreignpolicy--2020-10-30--China’s Hunger for Seafood Is Now Latin America’s Problem

China ’ s Hunger for Seafood Is Now Latin America ’ s Problem China ’ s economic predation is back , this time in some of the most ecologically sensitive waters in the world—in the Galápagos Islands off the coast of Ecuador , in Peru , and soon , the waters off Chile .
In just one month , according to a report by Oceana , a marine conservation group , an armada of nearly 300 vessels spent an eye-popping 73,000 hours fishing off Galápagos .
Far from a Chinese voyage of the HMS Beagle , the fleet is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and sustainable fishing ( and sometimes sovereignty ) and an attempt to plunder resources to meet growing Chinese demand .
Chinese fishing could potentially wipe out vulnerable local communities that depend on the sea as a source of sustenance and livelihood .
In turn , Latin American countries , along with the United States , must increase the menu of options available to monitor and deter this behavior .
It should surprise nobody that China ’ s distant-water fleet is now ambling about off the Pacific coast of South America .
China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presence in the South China Sea and are also frequently found off the west coast of Africa .
Visits to South American waters have likewise increased in recent years .
The area is rich in fish populations because it benefits from the famous Humboldt Current , which carries nutrient-rich water from Chile all the way to the shores of southern Ecuador .
Even as China ’ s waters suffer from depleted stockpiles , the Chinese public ’ s growing appetite for seafood has forced the Chinese Communist Party to search for solutions to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there represents one-third of the world total .
In turn , the country has had to look for fish stocks further afield—with devastating environmental consequences .
China ’ s vast operations have been overfishing the world ’ s oceans for years .
In 2019 , the country had the worst score in the world on the Illegal , Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Index .
Encouraged by multibillion-dollar subsidies , China ’ s distant-water fleet , including fishing , supply , and transport boats , may number some 17,000 vessels .
( By contrast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 300 vessels . )
In the past , Latin American countries have been wary of criticizing China ’ s violations , either because they fear Chinese retaliation in the form of reducing imports of raw materials or because they owe billions to the Chinese government .
Recent violations , however , have brought a renewed focus on the challenge and a noteworthy change in the posture of many Latin American countries .
In order to fish in both international waters and , worryingly , sometimes within a country ’ s exclusive economic zone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turn off their automatic identification systems to hide their locations when they drift into waters they don ’ t have rights to .
Elsewhere , in the Philippines , for instance , China has negotiated bilateral fisheries access agreements that include fishing rights in EEZs ( although a court ruled that concession unconstitutional ) .
Chinese ships also engage in a musical-chairs game of name-swapping , employ so-called flags of convenience , and utilize ship-to-ship transfers at high sea to further curtail surveillance of their activities .
These practices facilitate illegal and unregulated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human rights abuses aboard vessels .
Meanwhile , by trawling waters , a practice whereby a fishing boat slowly drags a net along the ocean bed , scooping up or killing most things in its path , coral reefs and other ocean habitats are increasingly at risk .
Unused fish parts ( “ bycatch ” ) are discarded back into the water , and the amount of plastic waste entering the ocean from China ’ s fishing fleets is unfathomable .
This is to say nothing of the gruesome practice of shark-finning .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , meanwhile , Chinese fishing fleets have occasionally served as the vanguard of an aggressive geopolitical strategy in disputed waters , especially in the South China Sea .
Although it may be many years before China could engage in a similarly assertive campaign off the Pacific coast of South America , the year-round presence of its fleet should drive the urgency to find a regional solution .
Particularly because of the potential for geopolitical strife , the United States should more actively support diplomatic initiatives currently underway to seal off sensitive areas from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the South Pacific , a regional organization under the auspices of the United Nations , currently manages maritime policy there , which makes it an obvious candidate for carrying out such initiatives .
The first priority for any initiatives would be to build a regional consensus around monitoring and deterring Chinese fishing vessels .
But strengthening international institutions is also critical to solving this problem .
Although China signed an agreement on fish stocks with the United Nations in 1995 , it never ratified it , and its distant-water fleet operates well outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it has signed with its neighbors .
Meanwhile , the Agreement on Port State Measures , which entered into force in 2016 , is one of the first internationally binding accords that attempts to reduce illegal and unregulated fishing by preventing those suspected of engaging in the activity from landing catches at ports .
China is not a signatory , but the agreement aims to bolster the capacity of developing countries to inspect offloaded cargo and identify signs of illegal fishing .
Increasing the capacity of its partner countries to monitor , detect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States with greater strategic depth and will free up resources to direct elsewhere .
Tightening the security of international supply chains through greater traceability would also be attractive : The United States , Japan , and the European Union constitute a large share of the global seafood market , and they could be more proactive about establishing standards and monitoring to prevent illegal Chinese products from entering supply chains .
Because China cares deeply about its international reputation , high-level officials such as the U.S. secretary of state should continue to name and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and adverse impact on local economies .
And as in other areas of the Chinese economy , the United States must assemble a robust coalition to loudly denounce and take action against Chinese subsidies , which represent more than 20 percent of global fisheries subsidies and have driven the expansion of its fleet .
In this effort , U.S. diplomats must become conversant in the highly technocratic dealings of regional fisheries management organizations .
The United States still maintains unparalleled convening power and could bring these organizations together in a new forum to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tightening quotas , for instance , would be a logical place to start .
Meanwhile , the efforts of nongovernmental organizations and think tanks , especially those using the latest mapping , predictive , and ship-tracking technologies , will remain essential to documenting the full scope of the problem as it evolves .
And finally , there is the military option .
To combat China ’ s recent activity off the Galápagos , on Aug. 7 , the Ecuadorian Navy sent a vessel to scout the area , in coordination with the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sea , Indonesia has sent F-16s and naval vessels to ward off predatory Chinese fishing fleets .
At the moment , Latin American navies are too underfunded to engage in similar deterrence operations .
( Chinese trawlers outnumber the total fleet maintained by the navies of Ecuador , Peru , and Chile combined . )
They are unable to fully patrol their coastal waters , they lack the air power required to engage in robust aerial monitoring , and the capabilities they do possess are usually reserved for combating maritime drug trafficking .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Coast Guard ’ s new initiative , announced in September , to mitigate illegal , unreported , and unregulated fishing with partner countries such as Ecuador .
The Coast Guard ’ s equipment , experience , and capabilities can guide intelligence-driven enforcement operations based on the latest aerial and satellite imagery .
Training exercises should also hone the ability of partner countries to perform midsea boarding and inspection tasks to catch illegal fishing in the act .
Illegal , unreported , and unregulated fishing by China ’ s massive fleet should be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States and its partners in the Western Hemisphere .
Healthy fish stocks underpin the food security and livelihoods of communities all over Latin America .
The disregard for norms and the flouting of sovereignty by Chinese fishing vessels threatens the stability of Latin American countries that rely on the ocean ’ s resources for food and economic development .
Chinese behavior is also a direct violation of the international , rules-based order .
With a concerted effort , the United States can assist with a range of tools to help Latin American countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international laws and norms , and keep local communities vibrant .

China’s economic predation is back , this time in some of the most ecologically sensitive waters in the world—in the Galápagos Islands off the coast of Ecuador, in Peru, and soon, the waters off Chile. In just one month, according to a report by Oceana, a marine conservation group, an armada of nearly 300 vessels spent an eye-popping 73,000 hours fishing off Galápagos. Far from a Chinese voyage of the HMS Beagle, the fleet is a brazen violation of norms around environmental protection and sustainable fishing (and sometimes sovereignty) and an attempt to plunder resources to meet growing Chinese demand. Chinese fishing could potentially wipe out vulnerable local communities that depend on the sea as a source of sustenance and livelihood. In turn, Latin American countries, along with the United States, must increase the menu of options available to monitor and deter this behavior.
China’s economic predation is back, this time in some of the most ecologically sensitive waters in the world—in the Galápagos Islands off the coast of Ecuador, in Peru, and soon, the waters off Chile. In just one month, according to a report by Oceana, a marine conservation group, an armada of nearly 300 vessels spent an eye-popping 73,000 hours fishing off Galápagos. Far from a Chinese voyage of the HMS Beagle, the fleet is a brazen violation of norms around environmental protection and sustainable fishing (and sometimes sovereignty) and an attempt to plunder resources to meet growing Chinese demand. Chinese fishing could potentially wipe out vulnerable local communities that depend on the sea as a source of sustenance and livelihood. In turn, Latin American countries, along with the United States, must increase the menu of options available to monitor and deter this behavior.
It should surprise nobody that China’s distant-water fleet is now ambling about off the Pacific coast of South America. China’s fishing fleets form a nearly ubiquitous presence in the South China Sea and are also frequently found off the west coast of Africa. Visits to South American waters have likewise increased in recent years. The area is rich in fish populations because it benefits from the famous Humboldt Current, which carries nutrient-rich water from Chile all the way to the shores of southern Ecuador. Even as China’s waters suffer from depleted stockpiles, the Chinese public’s growing appetite for seafood has forced the Chinese Communist Party to search for solutions to secure its supply. Today, consumption there represents one-third of the world total. In turn, the country has had to look for fish stocks further afield—with devastating environmental consequences.
China’s vast operations have been overfishing the world’s oceans for years. In 2019, the country had the worst score in the world on the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Index. Encouraged by multibillion-dollar subsidies, China’s distant-water fleet, including fishing, supply, and transport boats, may number some 17,000 vessels. (By contrast, the U.S. distant-water fleet comprises around 300 vessels.) In the past, Latin American countries have been wary of criticizing China’s violations, either because they fear Chinese retaliation in the form of reducing imports of raw materials or because they owe billions to the Chinese government. Recent violations, however, have brought a renewed focus on the challenge and a noteworthy change in the posture of many Latin American countries.
In order to fish in both international waters and, worryingly, sometimes within a country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), Chinese vessels reportedly turn off their automatic identification systems to hide their locations when they drift into waters they don’t have rights to. Elsewhere, in the Philippines, for instance, China has negotiated bilateral fisheries access agreements that include fishing rights in EEZs (although a court ruled that concession unconstitutional). Chinese ships also engage in a musical-chairs game of name-swapping, employ so-called flags of convenience, and utilize ship-to-ship transfers at high sea to further curtail surveillance of their activities.
These practices facilitate illegal and unregulated fishing, and even contribute to ugly human rights abuses aboard vessels. Meanwhile, by trawling waters, a practice whereby a fishing boat slowly drags a net along the ocean bed, scooping up or killing most things in its path, coral reefs and other ocean habitats are increasingly at risk. Unused fish parts (“bycatch”) are discarded back into the water, and the amount of plastic waste entering the ocean from China’s fishing fleets is unfathomable. This is to say nothing of the gruesome practice of shark-finning.
Perhaps most ominously for South American countries, meanwhile, Chinese fishing fleets have occasionally served as the vanguard of an aggressive geopolitical strategy in disputed waters, especially in the South China Sea. Although it may be many years before China could engage in a similarly assertive campaign off the Pacific coast of South America, the year-round presence of its fleet should drive the urgency to find a regional solution.
Particularly because of the potential for geopolitical strife, the United States should more actively support diplomatic initiatives currently underway to seal off sensitive areas from commercial overfishing. The Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, a regional organization under the auspices of the United Nations, currently manages maritime policy there, which makes it an obvious candidate for carrying out such initiatives.
The first priority for any initiatives would be to build a regional consensus around monitoring and deterring Chinese fishing vessels. But strengthening international institutions is also critical to solving this problem. Although China signed an agreement on fish stocks with the United Nations in 1995, it never ratified it, and its distant-water fleet operates well outside of the various frameworks for fishery management it has signed with its neighbors.
Meanwhile, the Agreement on Port State Measures, which entered into force in 2016, is one of the first internationally binding accords that attempts to reduce illegal and unregulated fishing by preventing those suspected of engaging in the activity from landing catches at ports. China is not a signatory, but the agreement aims to bolster the capacity of developing countries to inspect offloaded cargo and identify signs of illegal fishing. Increasing the capacity of its partner countries to monitor, detect, and deter will provide the United States with greater strategic depth and will free up resources to direct elsewhere.
Tightening the security of international supply chains through greater traceability would also be attractive: The United States, Japan, and the European Union constitute a large share of the global seafood market, and they could be more proactive about establishing standards and monitoring to prevent illegal Chinese products from entering supply chains. Because China cares deeply about its international reputation, high-level officials such as the U.S. secretary of state should continue to name and shame Chinese fleets for their environmental devastation and adverse impact on local economies.
And as in other areas of the Chinese economy, the United States must assemble a robust coalition to loudly denounce and take action against Chinese subsidies, which represent more than 20 percent of global fisheries subsidies and have driven the expansion of its fleet. In this effort, U.S. diplomats must become conversant in the highly technocratic dealings of regional fisheries management organizations. The United States still maintains unparalleled convening power and could bring these organizations together in a new forum to challenge China’s fishing practices. Tightening quotas, for instance, would be a logical place to start. Meanwhile, the efforts of nongovernmental organizations and think tanks, especially those using the latest mapping, predictive, and ship-tracking technologies, will remain essential to documenting the full scope of the problem as it evolves.
And finally, there is the military option. To combat China’s recent activity off the Galápagos, on Aug. 7, the Ecuadorian Navy sent a vessel to scout the area, in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard. In the South China Sea, Indonesia has sent F-16s and naval vessels to ward off predatory Chinese fishing fleets. At the moment, Latin American navies are too underfunded to engage in similar deterrence operations. (Chinese trawlers outnumber the total fleet maintained by the navies of Ecuador, Peru, and Chile combined.) They are unable to fully patrol their coastal waters, they lack the air power required to engage in robust aerial monitoring, and the capabilities they do possess are usually reserved for combating maritime drug trafficking.
These facts highlight the importance of the U.S. Coast Guard’s new initiative, announced in September, to mitigate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing with partner countries such as Ecuador. The Coast Guard’s equipment, experience, and capabilities can guide intelligence-driven enforcement operations based on the latest aerial and satellite imagery. Training exercises should also hone the ability of partner countries to perform midsea boarding and inspection tasks to catch illegal fishing in the act.
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by China’s massive fleet should be an ongoing focal point between the United States and its partners in the Western Hemisphere. Healthy fish stocks underpin the food security and livelihoods of communities all over Latin America. The disregard for norms and the flouting of sovereignty by Chinese fishing vessels threatens the stability of Latin American countries that rely on the ocean’s resources for food and economic development. Chinese behavior is also a direct violation of the international, rules-based order. With a concerted effort, the United States can assist with a range of tools to help Latin American countries monitor and confront Chinese fleets, uphold international laws and norms, and keep local communities vibrant.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-30--5 Questions About the Antitrust Case Against Google That You Should Not Be Afraid to Ask

5 Questions About the Antitrust Case Against Google That You Should Not Be Afraid to Ask With so much ink spilled on the subject of reining in Big Tech , so many Silicon Valley executives summoned to Washington , so many government bodies with so many complaints , it was a fair question whether someone would eventually do something—and if so , what .
But now , they have .
The antitrust lawsuit filed this month by the U.S. Justice Department and 11 state attorneys general against Google marks a milestone : a specific plaintiff , with a specific complaint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lawsuits are notoriously hard to win .
Whatever the outcome , though , they can reshape industry structures , markets , and even technologies that emerge on the other side .
This is why it is essential to raise five key questions now .
Do we agree on what we mean by “ antitrust ” ?
Not really .
Gone are the days of Standard Oil , the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission acts of the early 1900s , and the 1940-1970 golden era of antitrust lawsuits , when competition was viewed as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is caught between two schools .
The first , dominant since the 1960s , considers impact on consumer welfare as the litmus test to determine a monopoly .
The other , a newer interpretation , goes further , arguing that the underlying structure of the market matters and even the potential for powerful players to exploit is a violation of antitrust objectives broadly defined .
In effect , the litmus test for this second school is the impact not just on consumers but on all stakeholders : employees , suppliers , potential competitors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appears to be gaining ground .
A little over a year ago , 181 CEOs , all members of the Business Roundtable , declared their commitment to all stakeholders .
The declaration hasn ’ t amounted to much so far , and neither Google nor its parent company , Alphabet , is a signatory .
But it does show that the American public ’ s expectations of its most prominent corporations are changing .
Now , the Google case—which maintains that the company has unfairly locked in its search engine as the default @ @ @ @ @ @ @ creates disadvantages for competitors , new market entrants , and others affected by Google ’ s ranking of search results—could become another landmark en route to domination of the more expansive view of antitrust .
Is Google the new Microsoft , and was Microsoft the new… ?
No , and while we are at it , neither of them is Standard Oil , the century-old analogy that is wheeled out with every antitrust case .
To drive the point home , Standard Oil has even been described as the “ Google of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ almost a carbon copy ” of the 1998 Microsoft one—all by those who should know better .
Analogies are useful to make arcane issues more accessible to a general public , but it is dangerous to point to them as legal precedent or guide to policymaking .
Such analogies can be misleading for many reasons .
Breaking up Standard Oil was different from breaking up Google ; at the turn of the last century , the oil industry was technologically stable .
By the time one acts on today ’ s tech @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In other words , a slow antitrust effort could be solving a problem caused by a technology or application that has become obsolete .
The Microsoft analogy fails as well .
That case centered on the bundling of Microsoft ’ s Internet Explorer with its operating system .
Whereas that technology did not have powerful independencies with Microsoft ’ s operating system , Google ’ s search engine is made more effective by Google ’ s other properties , and the web of deals that Google has made with Apple and others @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In turn , it is hard to draw lessons from these historical analogies to interpret today ’ s problem or devise solutions that are appropriate to the present and future of the industry .
Is the proverbial pig flying over Washington ?
Is there bipartisan consensus , finally , on at least one topic : reining in Silicon Valley ?
One of the breakthroughs associated with anti-tech sentiment is its apparent bipartisan nature in a time of polarization .
Genuine consensus would indeed be welcome , since there is a real possibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Communications Commission or the Food and Drug Administration—will have to be created to appropriately regulate Big Tech .
Creating an effective one would require lawmakers reaching across the aisle .
But the reality of partisan cooperation is more nuanced .
The House has taken an expansive view on antitrust with a 450-page report laying out the case for restraining the monopoly of Big Tech broadly writ .
That effort is exclusively Democrat-led .
In parallel , the Senate inquiries into Big Tech ’ s power are an exclusively Republican-led operation .
Far from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tackling the issues , the political parties are following separate paths with separate motivations .
The Republicans seem more focused on social media platforms using their power to throttle conservative voices .
Democrats speak of a “ Glass-Steagall for the internet , ” referencing the laws that forced banks to separate their commercial and investment banking activities to ensure the combinations did not dampen competition .
In the context of tech , that could mean forcing social media companies to run their platforms separately from applications and businesses that profit from user data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among many Republicans of government overreach .
A case in point on the continued distance between the parties is the lawsuit against Google itself , which has been exclusively Republican-led thus far .
Some critics claim that it was rushed out in advance of the U.S. elections to ensure that some action has been launched even in the event of a Republican loss .
Bottom line : If you are hoping for wise , forward-looking bipartisan agreement on a regulatory regime down the road , keep your expectations in check , and keep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ together .
Will this lawsuit lead to the holy grail : giving consumers rights to their data ?
Ultimately , the only way to truly check the power of Google or any other tech company is to grant consumers agency over their own data ; digital agency , therefore , is the holy grail of antitrust .
That could mean consumers owning rights to their personal data , managing access to this data , and , potentially , being compensated for such access .
With this power , consumers are in a better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ matter how large these giants are .
But the case filed against Google is remarkably narrow : Its sole claim is that the company ’ s contracts with device-makers to prioritize Google ’ s search engine are exclusionary and give Google an unfair competitive advantage .
Given the numerous and deeper worries about Big Tech , this seems almost petty .
The narrow focus makes sense as legal strategy : a specific charge now with bigger issues and additional charges building leverage for negotiations down the road .
From a societal perspective , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is an endgame strategy for giving users that digital agency .
Digital agency would make data similar to other forms of personal property : a home , a bank account , or even a mobile phone number .
Getting there will be hard for three reasons : Consumers don ’ t seem to care enough to take action on their own ; there are many competing proposals for solutions , without a clear winner ; and , ultimately , it is difficult to even define what constitutes personal data belonging solely to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stop declaring the Google suit as a pivot point until we see work being done on an endgame strategy .
Wait .
Did we forget there is a pandemic on the loose ?
It is ironic that the first significant antitrust action against tech comes after years of inaction and even looking the other way in a year when consumers have huddled in their homes and must rely on tech products for remote work , schooling , health care , and personal connections .
The experience of the last several months has laid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inequalities in reliable access to the internet .
The Google lawsuit only focuses on the inequities between Google and its competitors .
But surely we can agree that inequities in schooling , health care , and remote working are far more consequential .
Among the many lessons of the pandemic , we should acknowledge that internet access has been proved a necessity—not a luxury .
Any action against Google or others should focus on that fact en route to any settlement .
Today , about half of the U.S. population is without adequate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ considered a national crisis .
It helps that Google is in the internet access business .
Viewed in pure business terms , that business—its Google Fiber project—may be a failed experiment .
However , Google Fiber ’ s launch did galvanize action by incumbent internet access providers , former phone and cable companies , and even new low-Earth orbit satellites and “ fixed wireless ” outfits to serve outlying areas .
A major lawsuit can be leveraged to convince Google to help with narrowing the access gaps , through its own investments and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Americans should care less that Google ’ s reviews reach us before those from Yelp ; a responsible policymaker ought to first see to it that everyone in the United States can get access to online reviews in the first place .
Or forget about reviews , every child in the United States should be able to attend online school or be seen by a doctor using telemedicine , if the need arises .
It is all too easy to google “ Google antitrust ” and find a running jeremiad about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government should do something .
It is too easy to come up with a narrow legal strategy to rush through a lawsuit just before an election .
It is too easy to haul tech CEOs before Congress and grandstand before cameras .
Now is the time to raise more difficult questions .
We can ’ t be afraid to ask them just because the answers aren ’ t straightforward .
The lawsuit has already been billed as “ huge and historic , ” “ the biggest antitrust case in a generation , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the battle against Big Tech .
Let ’ s make sure the opening salvo closes with efforts to begin the hard work of making the Google economy work for everyone .

With so much ink spilled on the subject of reining in Big Tech, so many Silicon Valley executives summoned to Washington, so many government bodies with so many complaints, it was a fair question whether someone would eventually do something—and if so, what. But now, they have. The antitrust lawsuit filed this month by the U.S. Justice Department and 11 state attorneys general against Google marks a milestone: a specific plaintiff, with a specific complaint, against a specific company.
With so much ink spilled on the subject of reining in Big Tech, so many Silicon Valley executives summoned to Washington, so many government bodies with so many complaints, it was a fair question whether someone would eventually do something—and if so, what. But now, they have. The antitrust lawsuit filed this month by the U.S. Justice Department and 11 state attorneys general against Google marks a milestone: a specific plaintiff, with a specific complaint, against a specific company.
Antitrust lawsuits are notoriously hard to win. Whatever the outcome, though, they can reshape industry structures, markets, and even technologies that emerge on the other side. This is why it is essential to raise five key questions now.
Do we agree on what we mean by “antitrust”?
Not really. Gone are the days of Standard Oil, the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission acts of the early 1900s, and the 1940-1970 golden era of antitrust lawsuits, when competition was viewed as an antidote to fascism.
Present-day antitrust is caught between two schools. The first, dominant since the 1960s, considers impact on consumer welfare as the litmus test to determine a monopoly. The other, a newer interpretation, goes further, arguing that the underlying structure of the market matters and even the potential for powerful players to exploit is a violation of antitrust objectives broadly defined. In effect, the litmus test for this second school is the impact not just on consumers but on all stakeholders: employees, suppliers, potential competitors, and more.
The second school appears to be gaining ground. A little over a year ago, 181 CEOs, all members of the Business Roundtable, declared their commitment to all stakeholders. The declaration hasn’t amounted to much so far, and neither Google nor its parent company, Alphabet, is a signatory. But it does show that the American public’s expectations of its most prominent corporations are changing. Now, the Google case—which maintains that the company has unfairly locked in its search engine as the default option in smartphones and browsers, which creates disadvantages for competitors, new market entrants, and others affected by Google’s ranking of search results—could become another landmark en route to domination of the more expansive view of antitrust.
Is Google the new Microsoft, and was Microsoft the new…?
No, and while we are at it, neither of them is Standard Oil, the century-old analogy that is wheeled out with every antitrust case. To drive the point home, Standard Oil has even been described as the “Google of its day” and the Google case as “almost a carbon copy” of the 1998 Microsoft one—all by those who should know better. Analogies are useful to make arcane issues more accessible to a general public, but it is dangerous to point to them as legal precedent or guide to policymaking.
Such analogies can be misleading for many reasons. Breaking up Standard Oil was different from breaking up Google; at the turn of the last century, the oil industry was technologically stable. By the time one acts on today’s tech giants, the technology has moved on. In other words, a slow antitrust effort could be solving a problem caused by a technology or application that has become obsolete.
The Microsoft analogy fails as well. That case centered on the bundling of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer with its operating system. Whereas that technology did not have powerful interdependencies with Microsoft’s operating system, Google’s search engine is made more effective by Google’s other properties, and the web of deals that Google has made with Apple and others helps it suck more data from users.
In turn, it is hard to draw lessons from these historical analogies to interpret today’s problem or devise solutions that are appropriate to the present and future of the industry.
Is the proverbial pig flying over Washington? Is there bipartisan consensus, finally, on at least one topic: reining in Silicon Valley?
One of the breakthroughs associated with anti-tech sentiment is its apparent bipartisan nature in a time of polarization. Genuine consensus would indeed be welcome, since there is a real possibility that a new agency—modeled on the Federal Communications Commission or the Food and Drug Administration—will have to be created to appropriately regulate Big Tech. Creating an effective one would require lawmakers reaching across the aisle.
But the reality of partisan cooperation is more nuanced. The House has taken an expansive view on antitrust with a 450-page report laying out the case for restraining the monopoly of Big Tech broadly writ. That effort is exclusively Democrat-led. In parallel, the Senate inquiries into Big Tech’s power are an exclusively Republican-led operation.
Far from working together on a cohesive approach to tackling the issues, the political parties are following separate paths with separate motivations. The Republicans seem more focused on social media platforms using their power to throttle conservative voices. Democrats speak of a “Glass-Steagall for the internet,” referencing the laws that forced banks to separate their commercial and investment banking activities to ensure the combinations did not dampen competition. In the context of tech, that could mean forcing social media companies to run their platforms separately from applications and businesses that profit from user data. Such extreme measures may raise fears among many Republicans of government overreach.
A case in point on the continued distance between the parties is the lawsuit against Google itself, which has been exclusively Republican-led thus far. Some critics claim that it was rushed out in advance of the U.S. elections to ensure that some action has been launched even in the event of a Republican loss.
Bottom line: If you are hoping for wise, forward-looking bipartisan agreement on a regulatory regime down the road, keep your expectations in check, and keep up the pressure on lawmakers to work together.
Will this lawsuit lead to the holy grail: giving consumers rights to their data?
Ultimately, the only way to truly check the power of Google or any other tech company is to grant consumers agency over their own data; digital agency, therefore, is the holy grail of antitrust. That could mean consumers owning rights to their personal data, managing access to this data, and, potentially, being compensated for such access. With this power, consumers are in a better bargaining position with the tech giants no matter how large these giants are.
But the case filed against Google is remarkably narrow: Its sole claim is that the company’s contracts with device-makers to prioritize Google’s search engine are exclusionary and give Google an unfair competitive advantage. Given the numerous and deeper worries about Big Tech, this seems almost petty.
The narrow focus makes sense as legal strategy: a specific charge now with bigger issues and additional charges building leverage for negotiations down the road. From a societal perspective, though, we should not rest until there is an endgame strategy for giving users that digital agency.
Digital agency would make data similar to other forms of personal property: a home, a bank account, or even a mobile phone number. Getting there will be hard for three reasons: Consumers don’t seem to care enough to take action on their own; there are many competing proposals for solutions, without a clear winner; and, ultimately, it is difficult to even define what constitutes personal data belonging solely to an individual. It is time to stop declaring the Google suit as a pivot point until we see work being done on an endgame strategy.
Wait. Did we forget there is a pandemic on the loose?
It is ironic that the first significant antitrust action against tech comes after years of inaction and even looking the other way in a year when consumers have huddled in their homes and must rely on tech products for remote work, schooling, health care, and personal connections. The experience of the last several months has laid bare the many problems that stem from inequalities in reliable access to the internet. The Google lawsuit only focuses on the inequities between Google and its competitors. But surely we can agree that inequities in schooling, health care, and remote working are far more consequential.
Among the many lessons of the pandemic, we should acknowledge that internet access has been proved a necessity—not a luxury. Any action against Google or others should focus on that fact en route to any settlement. Today, about half of the U.S. population is without adequate internet access, which ought to be considered a national crisis. It helps that Google is in the internet access business. Viewed in pure business terms, that business—its Google Fiber project—may be a failed experiment. However, Google Fiber’s launch did galvanize action by incumbent internet access providers, former phone and cable companies, and even new low-Earth orbit satellites and “fixed wireless” outfits to serve outlying areas.
A major lawsuit can be leveraged to convince Google to help with narrowing the access gaps, through its own investments and by encouraging those of others. Ultimately, Americans should care less that Google’s reviews reach us before those from Yelp; a responsible policymaker ought to first see to it that everyone in the United States can get access to online reviews in the first place. Or forget about reviews, every child in the United States should be able to attend online school or be seen by a doctor using telemedicine, if the need arises.
It is all too easy to google “Google antitrust” and find a running jeremiad about the evils of Big Tech and how the government should do something. It is too easy to come up with a narrow legal strategy to rush through a lawsuit just before an election. It is too easy to haul tech CEOs before Congress and grandstand before cameras. Now is the time to raise more difficult questions. We can’t be afraid to ask them just because the answers aren’t straightforward. The lawsuit has already been billed as “huge and historic,” “the biggest antitrust case in a generation,” and an “opening salvo” in the battle against Big Tech. Let’s make sure the opening salvo closes with efforts to begin the hard work of making the Google economy work for everyone.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-30--Changing Tides in Divided Cyprus

Changing Tides in Divided Cyprus

For decades , the Turkish army had kept the beach town of Varosha in Northern Cyprus fenced off and closed to the public—a symbol of the stalemate between the Turkish and Greek sides of the divided island .
Greek Cypriots who fled the Turkish invasion of the northern part of the island in 1974 have never been allowed back to reclaim their property at the once-thriving resort .
But as long as the area remained sealed off , they could dream of returning one day .
But earlier this month , hard-line Prime Minister Ersin Tatar of the National Unity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Erdogan—that parts of the shoreline would be reopened .
The following week , in a presidential election clouded by the Varosha decision , Tatar defeated the moderate incumbent , Mustafa Akinci .
Elections in Northern Cyprus are not recognized internationally—Turkey is the only country in the world that accepted the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence in 1983 .
Still , previous votes have been deemed relatively fair , and this one carries particular weight .
According to analysts , the results deal a significant blow to the prospects of the island ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is throwing his weight around in the region .
Elections in Northern Cyprus are not recognized internationally—Turkey is the only country in the world that accepted the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence in 1983 .
“ When you look at the overall foreign policy of Erdogan—with each step he is getting more hawkish , ” said Sertac Sonan , a Turkish Cypriot who teaches political science at Cyprus International University in the north .
He described the election outcome as the “ end of an era.
” ( Sonan has publicly supported the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ established by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to advance bi-communal relations . )
Umut Bozkurt , an assistant professor at Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta on the northeast coast of the island , said the Varosha gambit may have contributed to Tatar ’ s victory and called it a “ card for the nationalists.
” She noted that some Turkish Cypriots visited the beach after the opening carrying Turkish flags .
Tatar has advocated scrapping proposals to unify the island as a federated but unitary state , favoring instead a political partition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solution ” —meaning total independence for the north .
Many analysts are concerned that his actual role will be to advance whatever Turkey wants .
Long before the vote , decades of negotiations on the terms of reunification had foundered , giving Cyprus the unfortunate reputation as a “ graveyard for diplomats.
” The “ bizonal , bi-communal federation ” formula that Tatar opposes has long been the orthodoxy in talks between the two sides .
It was negotiated by the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in the late 1970s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council Resolution 649 three decades ago .
That U.N. decision and subsequent ones preclude any resolution in Cyprus via partition , secession , or unification to join another country .
In 2004 , a U.N.-brokered federation plan was put to a referendum on both sides ; a majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor , but three-quarters of Greek Cypriots voted against it .
Cyprus entered the European Union that year as an unresolved conflict .
The next serious summit took place in 2017 in Crans-Montana , Switzerland , but again failed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a federation , the Greek Cypriot side has balked at proposals that afford too much power to Turkish Cypriots—a minority on the island—and don ’ t adequately address their property claims in the north .
The Greek Cypriot side also insists that Turkey remove itself altogether—both its lingering troop presence in the north and its influence as a “ guarantor ” power .
( Its guarantor status dates back to Cypriot independence in 1960 , via a treaty permitting Greece , Turkey , or the United Kingdom to intervene in Cyprus should one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The treaty provided the legal vehicle for Turkey ’ s initial intervention in July 1974 in response to the Greek-backed coup in the Republic of Cyprus . )
Given the Greek Cypriot opposition to elements of even carefully negotiated plans under U.N. auspices in 2004 and 2017 , it ’ s hard to imagine Greek Cypriots tolerating negotiations for partition through a two-state approach .
In the past , Turkish Cypriot leaders have put forward the idea of a loose confederation as a less rough-edged version of a two-state solution ; in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the term has resurfaced .
Still , a confederation doesn ’ t look any more amenable to the Greek Cypriot side than two states .
“ We [ would ] lose the umbrella of Cyprus as a federal state , ” said Andreas Bimbishis , the political editor of Phileleftheros , the highest-circulation Greek newspaper in the Republic of Cyprus .
If none of these , then what ?
In September , U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres proposed informal talks with the two leaders and the three guarantor powers , but no date has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for unification , Sonan , the Turkish Cypriot academic , said “ even the status-quo , hanging on to what we have now , looks good to me.
” But judging from Turkey ’ s recent actions , including its role in reopening parts Varosha , the status quo could be fading fast .
Judging from Turkey ’ s recent actions , including its role in reopening parts Varosha , the status quo could be fading fast .
Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike agree that Turkey is likely to tighten its existing military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cyprus .
Bozkurt said Tatar owes his narrow victory to Turkish interference , largely through mobilization of so-called settlers—mainland Turks who migrated over the years and attained citizenship in Northern Cyprus .
The point is backed by the research of the political and demographic analyst Mete Hatay , a Turkish Cypriot .
Though Turkey ’ s regional policies have clearly taken a more aggressive turn—from gunboat diplomacy in Eastern Mediterranean natural gas explorations to bolstering Azerbaijan ’ s position in Nagorno-Karabakh escalation—most local analysts do not expect Cyprus to turn violent .
Still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Varosha ’ s reopening sparked demonstrations by Greek Cypriots at a checkpoint between north and south .
The Greek Cypriots arrested were too young to remember the 1974 invasion , but emotions in Cyprus , as in other conflict areas , can deepen with each passing generation .
Divining what Turkey will do next prompts the question of what Erdogan actually wants .
Leverage in hydrocarbon exploration is just one answer .
“ Erdogan wants to be the great power of the East Med , the Middle East , the Arab world , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bimbishis , the Greek Cypriot editor .
Hubert Faustmann , a professor at the University of Nicosia in the south , sees deeper threats to the international system .
He described Turkey ’ s attitude as , “ screw international law , ignore the U.N. ” “ Turkey has an understanding that it ’ s too big to fail , ” Faustmann said .
“ He ’ s losing popularity , but nationalism is always popular.
” But Bimbishis believes Turkey may also prefer to resolve rather than aggravate the festering Cyprus problem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a major power broker in the region .
This may hold for Europe as well .
The EU prefers to de-escalate conflicts at its doorstep and work cautiously with Turkey , which maintains the threat of flooding Europe with Middle East refugees .
As Turkey ’ s main export market , the EU has leverage .
Yiorgos Kakouris , a Greek Cypriot journalist living in Brussels , points out that infrastructure for a cooperative Eastern Mediterranean relationship exists ; perhaps the recently inaugurated multilateral gas exploration forum could seek to cooperate with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the right circumstances .
Varosha and the upset victory of Turkey ’ s candidate provided the latest fuse between north and south .
Resolving the Cyprus problem will be harder now , but it ’ s also more urgent .

For decades, the Turkish army had kept the beach town of Varosha in Northern Cyprus fenced off and closed to the public—a symbol of the stalemate between the Turkish and Greek sides of the divided island. Greek Cypriots who fled the Turkish invasion of the northern part of the island in 1974 have never been allowed back to reclaim their property at the once-thriving resort. But as long as the area remained sealed off, they could dream of returning one day.
For decades, the Turkish army had kept the beach town of Varosha in Northern Cyprus fenced off and closed to the public—a symbol of the stalemate between the Turkish and Greek sides of the divided island. Greek Cypriots who fled the Turkish invasion of the northern part of the island in 1974 have never been allowed back to reclaim their property at the once-thriving resort. But as long as the area remained sealed off, they could dream of returning one day.
But earlier this month, hard-line Prime Minister Ersin Tatar of the National Unity Party announced—together with Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan—that parts of the shoreline would be reopened. The following week, in a presidential election clouded by the Varosha decision, Tatar defeated the moderate incumbent, Mustafa Akinci.
Elections in Northern Cyprus are not recognized internationally—Turkey is the only country in the world that accepted the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence in 1983. Still, previous votes have been deemed relatively fair, and this one carries particular weight. According to analysts, the results deal a significant blow to the prospects of the island’s reunification and signal one more way Erdogan is throwing his weight around in the region.
Elections in Northern Cyprus are not recognized internationally—Turkey is the only country in the world that accepted the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence in 1983.
“When you look at the overall foreign policy of Erdogan—with each step he is getting more hawkish,” said Sertac Sonan, a Turkish Cypriot who teaches political science at Cyprus International University in the north. He described the election outcome as the “end of an era.” (Sonan has publicly supported the outgoing Akinci and participated in joint committees established by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to advance bi-communal relations.)
Umut Bozkurt, an assistant professor at Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta on the northeast coast of the island, said the Varosha gambit may have contributed to Tatar’s victory and called it a “card for the nationalists.” She noted that some Turkish Cypriots visited the beach after the opening carrying Turkish flags.
Tatar has advocated scrapping proposals to unify the island as a federated but unitary state, favoring instead a political partition in the form of a “two-state solution”—meaning total independence for the north. Many analysts are concerned that his actual role will be to advance whatever Turkey wants. Long before the vote, decades of negotiations on the terms of reunification had foundered, giving Cyprus the unfortunate reputation as a “graveyard for diplomats.”
The “bizonal, bi-communal federation” formula that Tatar opposes has long been the orthodoxy in talks between the two sides. It was negotiated by the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in the late 1970s and affirmed explicitly by United Nations Security Council Resolution 649 three decades ago. That U.N. decision and subsequent ones preclude any resolution in Cyprus via partition, secession, or unification to join another country.
In 2004, a U.N.-brokered federation plan was put to a referendum on both sides; a majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor, but three-quarters of Greek Cypriots voted against it. Cyprus entered the European Union that year as an unresolved conflict. The next serious summit took place in 2017 in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, but again failed to produce a deal.
In negotiations over a federation, the Greek Cypriot side has balked at proposals that afford too much power to Turkish Cypriots—a minority on the island—and don’t adequately address their property claims in the north. The Greek Cypriot side also insists that Turkey remove itself altogether—both its lingering troop presence in the north and its influence as a “guarantor” power. (Its guarantor status dates back to Cypriot independence in 1960, via a treaty permitting Greece, Turkey, or the United Kingdom to intervene in Cyprus should one of the others make a grab. The treaty provided the legal vehicle for Turkey’s initial intervention in July 1974 in response to the Greek-backed coup in the Republic of Cyprus.) Given the Greek Cypriot opposition to elements of even carefully negotiated plans under U.N. auspices in 2004 and 2017, it’s hard to imagine Greek Cypriots tolerating negotiations for partition through a two-state approach.
In the past, Turkish Cypriot leaders have put forward the idea of a loose confederation as a less rough-edged version of a two-state solution; in the wake of Tatar’s election, the term has resurfaced. Still, a confederation doesn’t look any more amenable to the Greek Cypriot side than two states. “We [would] lose the umbrella of Cyprus as a federal state,” said Andreas Bimbishis, the political editor of Phileleftheros, the highest-circulation Greek newspaper in the Republic of Cyprus.
If none of these, then what? In September, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres proposed informal talks with the two leaders and the three guarantor powers, but no date has been set. Given the inauspicious prospects for unification, Sonan, the Turkish Cypriot academic, said “even the status-quo, hanging on to what we have now, looks good to me.” But judging from Turkey’s recent actions, including its role in reopening parts Varosha, the status quo could be fading fast.
Judging from Turkey’s recent actions, including its role in reopening parts Varosha, the status quo could be fading fast.
Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike agree that Turkey is likely to tighten its existing military, economic, and political grip on Cyprus. Bozkurt said Tatar owes his narrow victory to Turkish interference, largely through mobilization of so-called settlers—mainland Turks who migrated over the years and attained citizenship in Northern Cyprus. The point is backed by the research of the political and demographic analyst Mete Hatay, a Turkish Cypriot.
Though Turkey’s regional policies have clearly taken a more aggressive turn—from gunboat diplomacy in Eastern Mediterranean natural gas explorations to bolstering Azerbaijan’s position in Nagorno-Karabakh escalation—most local analysts do not expect Cyprus to turn violent. Still, no one can be sure. Varosha’s reopening sparked demonstrations by Greek Cypriots at a checkpoint between north and south. The Greek Cypriots arrested were too young to remember the 1974 invasion, but emotions in Cyprus, as in other conflict areas, can deepen with each passing generation.
Divining what Turkey will do next prompts the question of what Erdogan actually wants. Leverage in hydrocarbon exploration is just one answer.
“Erdogan wants to be the great power of the East Med, the Middle East, the Arab world, and the Muslim world,” said Bimbishis, the Greek Cypriot editor.
Hubert Faustmann, a professor at the University of Nicosia in the south, sees deeper threats to the international system. He described Turkey’s attitude as, “screw international law, ignore the U.N.”
“Turkey has an understanding that it’s too big to fail,” Faustmann said. “He’s losing popularity, but nationalism is always popular.”
But Bimbishis believes Turkey may also prefer to resolve rather than aggravate the festering Cyprus problem in order to advance its ambition to be a major power broker in the region. This may hold for Europe as well. The EU prefers to de-escalate conflicts at its doorstep and work cautiously with Turkey, which maintains the threat of flooding Europe with Middle East refugees. As Turkey’s main export market, the EU has leverage.
Yiorgos Kakouris, a Greek Cypriot journalist living in Brussels, points out that infrastructure for a cooperative Eastern Mediterranean relationship exists; perhaps the recently inaugurated multilateral gas exploration forum could seek to cooperate with Turkey rather than confront it, in the right circumstances.
Varosha and the upset victory of Turkey’s candidate provided the latest fuse between north and south. Resolving the Cyprus problem will be harder now, but it’s also more urgent.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-30--Montana’s Most Pressing Electoral Issue Is Suddenly China

In a typical election , the most grating political posturing in Montana is white men bragging about guns , hunting , fishing , and other macho pursuits .
But this year a new obsession is generating political noise in the state : China .
In one of the most closely watched U.S. Senate races in the country , where Democratic Gov .
Steve Bullock is running to unseat Republican Sen. Steve Daines , China has become a boogeyman deployed by both parties—but particularly by outside Democratic groups pushing for Bullock ’ s election .
It ’ s a surprising partisan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Republicans , notably President Donald Trump .
And its lasting impact may be demonizing Asians in a state that ’ s 88.9 white and frequently far removed from the machinations of geopolitics .
Outside groups have made this one of the most expensive U.S. Senate races in American history , with over $ 118 million spent so far , and the noise is overpowering in a state with only a million people and fewer than 750,000 registered voters .
With a rolling barrage of mail , broadcast , and online ads , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacked Daines for his ties to China .
The senator spent six years in Hong Kong and China in the 1990s , where he worked for Procter & Gamble , helping the American company establish factories and its consumer business in China .
Daines has positioned himself in the race as tough on China , but the ads relentlessly portray him as outsourcing American jobs and cozying up to the Chinese regime .
“ No wonder the communist Chinese government called Sen. Daines China ’ s ambassador in Congress , ” says one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( For the record , the “ China ’ s ambassador ” descriptor was in reference to his work as a senator , not his work for P & G . )
In truth , as Montana political correspondent Mike Dennison reported in reviewing the crush of ads , Daines ’ s work in China was unrelated to the company ’ s U.S. operations .
The other line of attack , a Montana beef deal with China heavily touted by Daines that failed to pan out , is more accurate .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promised to buy $ 200 million in Montana beef and fund a $ 100 million meat plant in the state , but the deal hasn ’ t materialized .
The truth is more banal than the picture of a senator in the pocket of a dangerous regime .
Contracts and trade deals with China—which Montana politicians including former Democratic U.S. senator and ambassador to China Max Baucus have sought out for ages—frequently flop .
And Daines himself has pivoted to attacking China , with one ad saying , “ Communist China lied about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American jobs.
” The anti-China messaging throughout the campaign is not subtle .
Stacks of glossy mailers show photos of Daines transposed onto a Chinese flag background , shaking hands with unnamed Chinese officials , and harkening back to the Red Scare era of anti-communist propaganda in the 1950s .
This week , the Lincoln Project , the big-money project funded by a number of former Republicans to unseat Trump , joined the fray with an ad proclaiming Daines “ too damn cozy with China.
” And in 2020 , anti-China messaging could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus pandemic that originated in Wuhan .
In a state with relatively few Asian Americans , flirting with this kind of messaging might seem like a safe way for Democrats to push independent and Republican-leaning voters away from Daines .
That message might be fresh to Montana , but it ’ s an old and dangerous one in wider American politics .
Russell Jeung , an Asian American studies professor at San Francisco State University who helped start a group to document the uptick in anti-Asian racism this year , says sustained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2020 harkens back to earlier American eras when Asian people and countries were painted as an “ other.
” “ I think it ’ s perpetuating a long-standing yellow peril fear , it ’ s a fear that Asia will dominate American jobs , infect people with diseases , and overtake the West , ” Jeung said .
“ That ’ s why you see the invoking of redbaiting.
” Montana is not the whitest state in the country ; the state includes seven reservations , and Native Americans account for nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it does have among the smallest number of residents who identify as Asian American—just over 1 percent , according to census data .
In a culture where identity politics usually involves bragging about how long a candidate ’ s family has been in the state , anti-China posturing might seem safe .
“ We know that one of the ways in which people campaign is based upon othering , making someone else an ‘ other ’ we can demonize .
In Montana , the other is not fifth-generation Montanan , but someone from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said David Parker , a political scientist at Montana State University .
The university ’ s polling indicates even more Montana voters now believe China covered up the pandemic at the start than in the spring .
That , Parker says , indicates the anti-China political messaging is working , and it might be enough to sway Montana ’ s storied independents—some of them Trump voters , many Republican-leaning—to vote for Bullock and give the state two Democratic senators .
Polls show a race likely to come down to the wire .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters , ” Parker said .
“ It makes Daines seem like someone not connected to Montana and connected to this foreign place.
” But the longer , more dangerous impact could lie in racism against Asian people and countries that , in normal times , are economic partners and allies .
“ China ’ s an easy target right now because of the coronavirus , ” Jeung said .
“ For Chinese Americans and Asian Americans , there is clear impact on our health and safety , as we see an increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violence , but in anti-immigration policies .
“ This rhetoric is pretty damaging for the Asian American community .
”

In a typical election, the most grating political posturing in Montana is white men bragging about guns, hunting, fishing, and other macho pursuits. But this year a new obsession is generating political noise in the state: China.
In a typical election, the most grating political posturing in Montana is white men bragging about guns, hunting, fishing, and other macho pursuits. But this year a new obsession is generating political noise in the state: China.
In one of the most closely watched U.S. Senate races in the country, where Democratic Gov. Steve Bullock is running to unseat Republican Sen. Steve Daines, China has become a boogeyman deployed by both parties—but particularly by outside Democratic groups pushing for Bullock’s election. It’s a surprising partisan flip of the anti-China script routinely deployed by Republicans, notably President Donald Trump. And its lasting impact may be demonizing Asians in a state that’s 88.9 white and frequently far removed from the machinations of geopolitics.
Outside groups have made this one of the most expensive U.S. Senate races in American history, with over $118 million spent so far, and the noise is overpowering in a state with only a million people and fewer than 750,000 registered voters.
With a rolling barrage of mail, broadcast, and online ads, Democratic groups from outside the state have attacked Daines for his ties to China. The senator spent six years in Hong Kong and China in the 1990s, where he worked for Procter & Gamble, helping the American company establish factories and its consumer business in China. Daines has positioned himself in the race as tough on China, but the ads relentlessly portray him as outsourcing American jobs and cozying up to the Chinese regime.
“No wonder the communist Chinese government called Sen. Daines China’s ambassador in Congress,” says one television ad from the Senate Majority PAC. (For the record, the “China’s ambassador” descriptor was in reference to his work as a senator, not his work for P&G.)
In truth, as Montana political correspondent Mike Dennison reported in reviewing the crush of ads, Daines’s work in China was unrelated to the company’s U.S. operations.
The other line of attack, a Montana beef deal with China heavily touted by Daines that failed to pan out, is more accurate. The Chinese e-commerce company JD.com three years ago promised to buy $200 million in Montana beef and fund a $100 million meat plant in the state, but the deal hasn’t materialized. The truth is more banal than the picture of a senator in the pocket of a dangerous regime. Contracts and trade deals with China—which Montana politicians including former Democratic U.S. senator and ambassador to China Max Baucus have sought out for ages—frequently flop.
And Daines himself has pivoted to attacking China, with one ad saying, “Communist China lied about the coronavirus, costing American lives and American jobs.”
The anti-China messaging throughout the campaign is not subtle. Stacks of glossy mailers show photos of Daines transposed onto a Chinese flag background, shaking hands with unnamed Chinese officials, and harkening back to the Red Scare era of anti-communist propaganda in the 1950s. This week, the Lincoln Project, the big-money project funded by a number of former Republicans to unseat Trump, joined the fray with an ad proclaiming Daines “too damn cozy with China.”
And in 2020, anti-China messaging could be particularly resonant with voters because of the coronavirus pandemic that originated in Wuhan. In a state with relatively few Asian Americans, flirting with this kind of messaging might seem like a safe way for Democrats to push independent and Republican-leaning voters away from Daines.
That message might be fresh to Montana, but it’s an old and dangerous one in wider American politics. Russell Jeung, an Asian American studies professor at San Francisco State University who helped start a group to document the uptick in anti-Asian racism this year, says sustained anti-China political messaging in the United States in 2020 harkens back to earlier American eras when Asian people and countries were painted as an “other.”
“I think it’s perpetuating a long-standing yellow peril fear, it’s a fear that Asia will dominate American jobs, infect people with diseases, and overtake the West,” Jeung said. “That’s why you see the invoking of redbaiting.”
Montana is not the whitest state in the country; the state includes seven reservations, and Native Americans account for nearly 7 percent of the population. But it does have among the smallest number of residents who identify as Asian American—just over 1 percent, according to census data. In a culture where identity politics usually involves bragging about how long a candidate’s family has been in the state, anti-China posturing might seem safe.
“We know that one of the ways in which people campaign is based upon othering, making someone else an ‘other’ we can demonize. In Montana, the other is not fifth-generation Montanan, but someone from far away or another state,” said David Parker, a political scientist at Montana State University.
The university’s polling indicates even more Montana voters now believe China covered up the pandemic at the start than in the spring. That, Parker says, indicates the anti-China political messaging is working, and it might be enough to sway Montana’s storied independents—some of them Trump voters, many Republican-leaning—to vote for Bullock and give the state two Democratic senators. Polls show a race likely to come down to the wire.
“Demonizing China works, especially among independent voters,” Parker said. “It makes Daines seem like someone not connected to Montana and connected to this foreign place.”
But the longer, more dangerous impact could lie in racism against Asian people and countries that, in normal times, are economic partners and allies.
“China’s an easy target right now because of the coronavirus,” Jeung said. “For Chinese Americans and Asian Americans, there is clear impact on our health and safety, as we see an increase in racism, not only in interpersonal violence, but in anti-immigration policies.
“This rhetoric is pretty damaging for the Asian American community.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-30--America’s Dysfunctional Russia Policy Is Unlikely to Improve Under Biden

America ’ s Dysfunctional Russia Policy Is Unlikely to Improve Under Biden The United States ’ Russia policy over the past four years has been profoundly dysfunctional .
President Donald Trump has relished his cozy relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin , denigrated NATO , scuttled arms control agreements , and allowed Moscow to become an influential player again in the Middle East , Africa , and Latin America .
He has refused to act on credible reports of Russia offering bounties for killing U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan .
A deeply alarmed U.S. Congress , meanwhile , has been ratcheting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections , and for fomenting the ongoing proxy war in Ukraine .
Three senators even wrote a nasty letter to the mayor of the German Baltic port town of Sassnitz , where the North Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia comes ashore , threatening him with reprisals .
The depth of the stalemate in Washington was illustrated this August , when two bipartisan groups of experienced Russia hands dueled it out in competing letters .
One called for a renewal of nuclear arms control and diplomacy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fewer ) sanctions ; the other countered that , on the contrary , there needed to be less “ pointless dialogue ” and more “ strong pushback.
” Emotions in Moscow regarding the most desirable outcome of the U.S. elections appear to be mixed .
Chances are slim that the election will make U.S. Russia policy more coherent .
A second term for Trump would presumably be an amplified version of the first ( hard to imagine as that might be ) .
He might bring back U.S. troops from Afghanistan , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attempt to make an ally of Russia against China .
It could well be the end of NATO .
Democratic candidate Joe Biden , in contrast , is known to be sharply critical of Putin : In a television interview last week , he referred to Russia as “ the biggest threat to America.
” Yet as much as Biden cherishes the United States ’ alliances , as president he would be bogged down by domestic concerns .
Abroad , he would be focused on China above all else .
Emotions in Moscow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. elections appear to be mixed .
A second dose of Trump would presumably tax the nerves of a Kremlin already wrongfooted by the pandemic , a tanking economy , and persistent protests in its regions .
Putin seemed to concede as much when he defended the challenger ’ s son Hunter against accusations of dodgy business ties with Ukraine .
Yet Biden ’ s remarks about Russia clearly rankled Putin ’ s speaker Dmitry Peskov , who accused the Democrat of spreading “ absolute hatred.
” This is a moment of great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the Balkans to Belarus still seeking to chart a westward course .
Whatever the outcome of the Nov. 3 election , a much larger part ( if not all ) of the burden of regional security will fall to Europe , which urgently needs a common policy that addresses the risks and threats posed by Russia to the continent .
If there is a sympathetic administration in Washington that is willing to support and collaborate with it , so much the better .
If the administration is hostile , then the task @ @ @ @ @ @

The United States’ Russia policy over the past four years has been profoundly dysfunctional. President Donald Trump has relished his cozy relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, denigrated NATO, scuttled arms control agreements, and allowed Moscow to become an influential player again in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. He has refused to act on credible reports of Russia offering bounties for killing U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. A deeply alarmed U.S. Congress, meanwhile, has been ratcheting up ever tougher sanctions on Russia for meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections, and for fomenting the ongoing proxy war in Ukraine. Three senators even wrote a nasty letter to the mayor of the German Baltic port town of Sassnitz, where the North Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia comes ashore, threatening him with reprisals.
The United States’ Russia policy over the past four years has been profoundly dysfunctional. President Donald Trump has relished his cozy relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, denigrated NATO, scuttled arms control agreements, and allowed Moscow to become an influential player again in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. He has refused to act on credible reports of Russia offering bounties for killing U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. A deeply alarmed U.S. Congress, meanwhile, has been ratcheting up ever tougher sanctions on Russia for meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections, and for fomenting the ongoing proxy war in Ukraine. Three senators even wrote a nasty letter to the mayor of the German Baltic port town of Sassnitz, where the North Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia comes ashore, threatening him with reprisals.
The depth of the stalemate in Washington was illustrated this August, when two bipartisan groups of experienced Russia hands dueled it out in competing letters. One called for a renewal of nuclear arms control and diplomacy, combined with more flexible (read: fewer) sanctions; the other countered that, on the contrary, there needed to be less “pointless dialogue” and more “strong pushback.”
Emotions in Moscow regarding the most desirable outcome of the U.S. elections appear to be mixed.
Chances are slim that the election will make U.S. Russia policy more coherent. A second term for Trump would presumably be an amplified version of the first (hard to imagine as that might be). He might bring back U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Europe, and attempt to make an ally of Russia against China. It could well be the end of NATO. Democratic candidate Joe Biden, in contrast, is known to be sharply critical of Putin: In a television interview last week, he referred to Russia as “the biggest threat to America.” Yet as much as Biden cherishes the United States’ alliances, as president he would be bogged down by domestic concerns. Abroad, he would be focused on China above all else.
Emotions in Moscow regarding the most desirable outcome of the U.S. elections appear to be mixed. A second dose of Trump would presumably tax the nerves of a Kremlin already wrongfooted by the pandemic, a tanking economy, and persistent protests in its regions. Putin seemed to concede as much when he defended the challenger’s son Hunter against accusations of dodgy business ties with Ukraine. Yet Biden’s remarks about Russia clearly rankled Putin’s speaker Dmitry Peskov, who accused the Democrat of spreading “absolute hatred.”
This is a moment of great danger for Europe—especially for the civil societies from the Balkans to Belarus still seeking to chart a westward course. Whatever the outcome of the Nov. 3 election, a much larger part (if not all) of the burden of regional security will fall to Europe, which urgently needs a common policy that addresses the risks and threats posed by Russia to the continent. If there is a sympathetic administration in Washington that is willing to support and collaborate with it, so much the better. If the administration is hostile, then the task is all the more urgent.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-31--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

Late last year , as Sen. Bernie Sanders seemed to be edging toward the U.S. Democratic nomination and Jeremy Corbyn ’ s Labour Party started to climb in Britain ’ s polls , it looked like two interlinked leftist movements might come to power .
That didn ’ t happen , of course , but those movements have reshaped the political landscape on both sides of the Atlantic .
Meanwhile , a negotiated settlement seems far off in Nagorno-Karabakh , where a rising death toll isn ’ t pushing Armenian and Azerbaijani fighters away from the battlefield , despite repeated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Montana , a state that ’ s usually far removed from the machinations of geopolitics , China has emerged as a dominant electoral issue .
1 .
Democratic Socialists Lost , but Their Ideas Have Won The legacy of Sen. Bernie Sanders and former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn should not be underestimated , as left-wing politicians have a stronger base now within the U.S. Democratic Party and Britain ’ s Labour Party than they ’ ve had for decades , Darren Loucaides writes .
In his new role as confidant of Persian Gulf @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exiled Palestinian politician Mohammed Dahlan is helping to shape the Arab peace deals with Israel that are infuriating Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas , Jonathan H. Ferziger writes .
3 .
Ivory Coast ’ s Election Could Do Lasting Harm to Democratic Norms in West Africa Saturday ’ s presidential election in Ivory Coast is the culmination of a gradual trend toward authoritarian rule—one that is affecting other countries in West Africa , a region that once appeared to be almost entirely democratic , Jessica Moody writes .
4 .
‘ We Don @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ in Nagorno-Karabakh , Fighters Say The death toll is already high in Nagorno-Karabakh .
But three attempts at a humanitarian cease-fire have failed , and on the front lines , Armenian soldiers want victory , not compromise , Liz Cookman reports .
In Montana , where one of the most closely watched Senate races in the United States is taking place , China has become a boogeyman deployed by both parties—and Asian Americans stand to suffer , Kathleen E. McLaughlin reports .

Late last year, as Sen. Bernie Sanders seemed to be edging toward the U.S. Democratic nomination and Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party started to climb in Britain’s polls, it looked like two interlinked leftist movements might come to power. That didn’t happen, of course, but those movements have reshaped the political landscape on both sides of the Atlantic.
Late last year, as Sen. Bernie Sanders seemed to be edging toward the U.S. Democratic nomination and Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party started to climb in Britain’s polls, it looked like two interlinked leftist movements might come to power. That didn’t happen, of course, but those movements have reshaped the political landscape on both sides of the Atlantic.
Meanwhile, a negotiated settlement seems far off in Nagorno-Karabakh, where a rising death toll isn’t pushing Armenian and Azerbaijani fighters away from the battlefield, despite repeated international attempts at mediation.
And in Montana, a state that’s usually far removed from the machinations of geopolitics, China has emerged as a dominant electoral issue.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders greets supporters after speaking at a campaign rally in Denver on Feb. 16, during his run to be the Democratic nominee for president.
The legacy of Sen. Bernie Sanders and former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn should not be underestimated, as left-wing politicians have a stronger base now within the U.S. Democratic Party and Britain’s Labour Party than they’ve had for decades, Darren Loucaides writes.
Mohammed Dahlan, a former Fatah security chief, in his office in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on Oct. 18, 2016.
In his new role as confidant of Persian Gulf leaders and regional strategic mastermind, the exiled Palestinian politician Mohammed Dahlan is helping to shape the Arab peace deals with Israel that are infuriating Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Jonathan H. Ferziger writes.
A group supporting Ivory Coast's political opposition protest against a third term for President Alassane Ouattara in Abidjan on Oct. 15.
Saturday’s presidential election in Ivory Coast is the culmination of a gradual trend toward authoritarian rule—one that is affecting other countries in West Africa, a region that once appeared to be almost entirely democratic, Jessica Moody writes.
Artak Beglaryan, the elected human rights ombudsman for the Republic of Artsakh, stands in the wreckage of a Stepanakert school in Nagorno-Karabakh on Oct. 23. He was blinded by a land mine in 1995 and now works to document the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan.
The death toll is already high in Nagorno-Karabakh. But three attempts at a humanitarian cease-fire have failed, and on the front lines, Armenian soldiers want victory, not compromise, Liz Cookman reports.
Montana Gov. Steve Bullock speaks at the Wells Fargo Arena in Des Moines, Iowa, on Nov. 1, 2019.
In Montana, where one of the most closely watched Senate races in the United States is taking place, China has become a boogeyman deployed by both parties—and Asian Americans stand to suffer, Kathleen E. McLaughlin reports.