foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--Trump vs. Biden Is ‘A Very Difficult Dilemma’ for Turkish Americans in Ohio

Trump vs. Biden Is ‘ A Very Difficult Dilemma ’ for Turkish Americans in Ohio With President Donald Trump and Joe Biden within a few percentage points of each other in Ohio according to recent polls , a few thousand votes could tip the balance on Election Day .
And in Montgomery County , ethnic Ahiska Turks who settled here under U.S. refugee protections two decades ago are split over who to pick .
Some want to repudiate Trump ’ s efforts to curb immigration and roll back refugee programs , while others are pushing back against Democratic support for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in what was , for many , their former homeland .
Most of Dayton , Ohio ’ s 2,000 Ahiska Turkish residents arrived between 2007 and 2012 , and 99 percent are now U.S. citizens , according to Islom Shakhbandarov , leader of the city ’ s Ahiska Turkish American Convention Center .
The choice between Biden and Trump this election year is “ a very difficult dilemma ” for the Turkish community , he said .
The Buckeye State is widely considered a must-win for Trump , who took nearly 52 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s 44 percent , after voters had largely backed Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 .
Dayton is the sixth-largest city in Ohio and the county seat of Montgomery County , where Trump had the tightest margin in the state in the 2016 presidential election .
At the time , the Dayton Daily News reported that Trump took the county by just under 1,900 votes .
Many Ahiska Turks who are unhappy with the way Trump has targeted immigrants—and gutted refugee programs—may end up voting for Biden , or rather against Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ that ] many of them will vote against ” Trump , as immigrant communities feel endangered under the current administration , said Shakhbandarov .
But , he said , a “ sizable minority ” are likely to support the president for his isolationist foreign-policy agenda and for his friendly relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan , he added .
“ It is appealing that he is not interfering with Turkish affairs , ” Shakhbandarov said .
For instance , the Trump administration has refused to impose mandatory sanctions on Turkey after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ free pass a Biden administration could reverse .
Likewise , the Trump administration actively intervened to protect a Turkish bank that facilitated Iran ’ s evasion of financial sanctions .
Community members are also closely watching the U.S. response to the military conflict along the de facto border between Armenia and Azerbaijan , Shakhbandarov said .
Tensions reemerged in September between the two nations concerning the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh , a highland region technically part of Azerbaijan , but largely populated and governed by ethnic Armenians .
A previous war over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least 20,000 dead , and despite periodic posturing in the years since , the fighting has greatly escalated over the past month .
A majority of the Ahiska Turks now residing in the United States lived in Azerbaijan for several years , and many were in the Nagorno-Karabakh region , Shakhbandarov said .
As the border conflict has kicked up , traumatic memories have resurfaced and are impacting their vote on Nov. 3 , as many find it “ unacceptable ” that a number of Democratic lawmakers have openly supported Armenia over Azerbaijan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Because of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict , the number [ of Trump voters ] is growing , and I ’ m afraid of that , ” he said .
Other members of the Ahiska Turkish community in Dayton said much the same .
One , who asked not to be identified , said he voted early for a write-in candidate to protest the way Democrats have taken Armenia ’ s side in the conflict .
Many in his social circle are planning to vote for Trump or for a write-in , specifically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Members of the wider Turkish American community are similarly divided on their plans to vote on Nov. 3 .
Ali Cinar , a foreign-policy analyst who immigrated to the United States from Turkey 22 years ago , said he sees a 50-50 split , with half supporting Biden ’ s domestic-policy approach , while the other half prefers Trump ’ s take on foreign-policy issues .
“ The Trump voters think that Biden is not good for the Turkey-U.S. relationship overall , ” Cinar said , noting that he has polled Turkish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ few months to learn who they plan to vote for .
Cinar , who is based in Washington , has also seen increased interest in this election over 2016 .
More and more community members are voting early and using mail-in ballots , he said .
“ Because of COVID , it ’ s more convenient , and they don ’ t need to wait in line .
So I see more turn out ; people are interested , ” he said .

With President Donald Trump and Joe Biden within a few percentage points of each other in Ohio according to recent polls, a few thousand votes could tip the balance on Election Day. And in Montgomery County, ethnic Ahiska Turks who settled here under U.S. refugee protections two decades ago are split over who to pick. Some want to repudiate Trump’s efforts to curb immigration and roll back refugee programs, while others are pushing back against Democratic support for the Armenian side of a centurylong conflict in what was, for many, their former homeland.
With President Donald Trump and Joe Biden within a few percentage points
of each other in Ohio according to recent polls, a few thousand votes could tip the balance on Election Day. And in Montgomery County, ethnic Ahiska Turks who settled here under U.S. refugee protections two decades ago are split over who to pick. Some want to repudiate Trump’s efforts to curb immigration and roll back refugee programs, while others are pushing back against Democratic support for the Armenian side of a centurylong conflict in what was, for many, their former homeland.
Most of Dayton, Ohio’s 2,000 Ahiska Turkish residents arrived between 2007 and 2012, and 99 percent are now U.S. citizens, according to Islom Shakhbandarov, leader of the city’s Ahiska Turkish American Convention Center. The choice between Biden and Trump this election year is “a very difficult dilemma” for the Turkish community, he said.
The Buckeye State is widely considered a must-win for Trump, who took nearly 52 percent of the vote there versus Hillary Clinton’s 44 percent, after voters had largely backed Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. Dayton is the sixth-largest city in Ohio and the county seat of Montgomery County, where Trump had the tightest margin in the state in the 2016 presidential election. At the time, the Dayton Daily News reported that Trump took the county by just under 1,900 votes.
Many Ahiska Turks who are unhappy with the way Trump has targeted immigrants—and gutted refugee programs—may end up voting for Biden, or rather against Trump.
“It’s most likely [that] many of them will vote against” Trump, as immigrant communities feel endangered under the current administration, said Shakhbandarov.
But, he said, a “sizable minority” are likely to support the president for his isolationist foreign-policy agenda and for his friendly relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he added.
“It is appealing that he is not interfering with Turkish affairs,” Shakhbandarov said. For instance, the Trump administration has refused to impose mandatory sanctions on Turkey after it bought a Russian air defense system—a free pass a Biden administration could reverse. Likewise, the Trump administration actively intervened to protect a Turkish bank that facilitated Iran’s evasion of financial sanctions.
Community members are also closely watching the U.S. response to the military conflict along the de facto border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Shakhbandarov said. Tensions reemerged in September between the two nations concerning the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, a highland region technically part of Azerbaijan, but largely populated and governed by ethnic Armenians. A previous war over the territory between 1992 and 1994 left at least 20,000 dead, and despite periodic posturing in the years since, the fighting has greatly escalated over the past month.
A majority of the Ahiska Turks now residing in the United States lived in Azerbaijan for several years, and many were in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Shakhbandarov said. As the border conflict has kicked up, traumatic memories have resurfaced and are impacting their vote on Nov. 3, as many find it “unacceptable” that a number of Democratic lawmakers have openly supported Armenia over Azerbaijan, said Shakhbandarov, a self-identified Democrat.
“Because of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, the number [of Trump voters] is growing, and I’m afraid of that,” he said.
Other members of the Ahiska Turkish community in Dayton said much the same. One, who asked not to be identified, said he voted early for a write-in candidate to protest the way Democrats have taken Armenia’s side in the conflict. Many in his social circle are planning to vote for Trump or for a write-in, specifically because of this issue, he said.
Members of the wider Turkish American community are similarly divided on their plans to vote on Nov. 3. Ali Cinar, a foreign-policy analyst who immigrated to the United States from Turkey 22 years ago, said he sees a 50-50 split, with half supporting Biden’s domestic-policy approach, while the other half prefers Trump’s take on foreign-policy issues.
“The Trump voters think that Biden is not good for the Turkey-U.S. relationship overall,” Cinar said, noting that he has polled Turkish Americans across the country over the past few months to learn who they plan to vote for.
Cinar, who is based in Washington, has also seen increased interest in this election over 2016. More and more community members are voting early and using mail-in ballots, he said. “Because of COVID, it’s more convenient, and they don’t need to wait in line. So I see more turn out; people are interested,” he said.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--Watching the United States From Israel, I Remember How Words Became Bullets

Watching the United States From Israel , I Remember How Words Became Bullets The photo made me suddenly anxious , the way a sight or noise does when it reminds you of an old danger even before your mind remembers what the danger was .
The photo was from Texas , very far from my Jerusalem home .
It showed a white hearse .
“ Collecting Democrat Voters , One Dead Stiff at a Time , ” was written on the side .
Behind it was a Biden-Harris campaign bus .
The hearse , I learned , was part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tried to force the bus off the road last Friday .
Afterward , the Biden campaign canceled two events out of security concerns .
President Trump applauded his supporters , tweeting , “ I LOVE TEXAS.
” After a deep breath and a moment ’ s thought , I recalled an older photo .
It appeared in blurry black and white in the Israeli press in 1994 .
It showed Benjamin Netanyahu , then the leader of the right-wing opposition in Israel , leading a protest against Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marchers were carrying a coffin .
A man holding a long pole with a noose hanging from it briefly appeared in video footage of the scene .
The slogan on the coffin said , “ Rabin is killing Zionism.
” A literalist might claim that it didn ’ t intentionally call for the prime minister ’ s death .
But the photo was a harbinger .
I remember it best not from when it first appeared but from stories published after Nov. 4 , 1995—the night a right-wing extremist murdered Rabin .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fact—the night my country broke .
Yes , by comparing Israel in 1995 with the United States today , I ’ m showing symptoms of political post-traumatic stress .
There are vast differences between the two crises .
But what happened in Israel does offer lessons .
One is that rhetoric really can ignite violence , and that even a brief , isolated outbreak can leave a country forever changed .
Another is that you shouldn ’ t reassure yourself that your country is uniquely immune .
The Israeli crisis began with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first Oslo Accord , announced late in the summer of 1993 .
“ The people rise up against the treason of the Rabin government , ” said a newspaper ad placed by the opposition parties .
Treason was the operative word .
From the first major demonstration against the accord , protesters chanted , “ Rabin is a traitor.
” Treason was the operative word .
For Netanyahu ’ s Likud party and its allies , the agreement was not just mistaken policy .
Negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization and agreeing in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the so-called Whole Land of Israel were betrayals of the nation .
From the first major demonstration against the accord , even before the White House signing ceremony , protesters chanted , “ Rabin is a traitor.
” Moreover , the Rabin government was the first in Israeli history ( and so far , the last ) that depended on the support of parties representing the Arab minority in the Israeli parliament .
Seen through the lens of the right ’ s identity politics , the real Israel was only the Jews @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could only be legitimate if they rested on a majority of legislators representing Jews .
The angry protests that shook the country for the next two years were the work of a partnership of mainstream secular right-wingers and an intensely motivated religious minority made up of the Orthodox settler movement and its supporters .
For that movement , keeping the Whole Land had become more than politics ; it was a core religious obligation .
Settler groups did the organizing .
Likud politicians—most prominently , Netanyahu—addressed the crowds with blistering rhetoric , occasionally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” and showed up the next time to bathe in the anger .
The violence that we saw and suffered was on the old Palestinian-Israeli front .
Palestinian rejectionists carried out terror attacks aimed at scuttling the accords .
In February 1994 , a Jewish settler , Baruch Goldstein , opened fire in a contested Jewish-Muslim holy place in the West Bank city of Hebron and murdered 29 worshippers during Ramadan prayers before he was killed .
He , too , sought to end the peace process .
Rabin described him as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestic right-wing terror .
Social media did not exist yet .
Extreme rhetoric spread easily enough on paper and was less visible to the wider public .
Extremists on the religious right published a hagiography of the perpetrator of the Hebron massacre .
One person who acquired the book was a law student , Yigal Amir , who also managed to get a hard-to-obtain handgun license under false pretenses .
By the summer of 1995 , though , reading a mainstream newspaper was enough to provoke anxiety .
In Haaretz , the journalist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assessment that “ the hostile environment on the right … could create the conditions for an assassin.
” The head of the Shin Bet security service asked Rabin to wear a bulletproof vest ; the prime minister refused .
He was confident that a political assassination couldn ’ t happen here .
In early October , tens of thousands of people demonstrated in Jerusalem as the Knesset debated the second Oslo accord .
In the crowd , handbills appeared showing Rabin in the uniform of a Nazi SS .
On Nov. 5 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-peace rally in Tel Aviv , Yigal Amir shot and killed him .
Words and images had turned into bullets .
The country convulsed .
Shimon Peres , Rabin ’ s less popular partner and rival in the Labor Party , became prime minister .
The following May , he lost a national election by a hair ’ s breadth—to Netanyahu .
The United States ’ current situation is very different .
But from afar , the differences are not reassuring .
It ’ s the nation ’ s leader , automatically granted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reasons to delegitimize a democratic process unless it leads to the result he wants .
It ’ s President Donald Trump whose identity politics of the right implies a so-called real America that ’ s far less than the whole of the country .
It ’ s the president who has told the violent far-right Proud Boys to “ stand by.
” In the United States , unlike Israel , citizens can easily buy guns , and sales are soaring .
Despite Trump ’ s incitement against Muslims and immigrants , the Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assessment says that “ white supremacist extremists … remain the most persistent and lethal ” terrorist threat .
One thing the Trump era has taught the world is that the United States is not uniquely immune to diseases that beset democracy .
The International Crisis Group has just published a report on the risk of violence after the election , as it might for any country .
It points at the potential triggering effect of a candidate declaring victory before the votes are counted .
The report urges “ traditional and social media… @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign leaders to “ to refrain from offering their congratulations ” too quickly even if the Trump administration presses them to do so .
I am not making predictions .
I am anxious .
I am , as I said , suffering from political PTSD .
I hope that , across the sea , words do not transmogrify into bullets .
I pray that the photo of a hearse on a Texas road is not remembered as a harbinger of what would come .

The photo made me suddenly anxious, the way a sight or noise does when it reminds you of an old danger even before your mind remembers what the danger was.
The photo made me suddenly anxious, the way a sight or noise does when it reminds you of an old danger even before your mind remembers what the danger was.
The photo was from Texas, very far from my Jerusalem home. It showed a white hearse. “Collecting Democrat Voters, One Dead Stiff at a Time,” was written on the side. Behind it was a Biden-Harris campaign bus. The hearse, I learned, was part of a caravan of Trump supporters—many reportedly armed—that tried to force the bus off the road last Friday. Afterward, the Biden campaign canceled two events out of security concerns. President Trump applauded his supporters, tweeting, “I LOVE TEXAS.”
After a deep breath and a moment’s thought, I recalled an older photo. It appeared in blurry black and white in the Israeli press in 1994. It showed Benjamin Netanyahu, then the leader of the right-wing opposition in Israel, leading a protest against Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Oslo peace process. Behind him, marchers were carrying a coffin. A man holding a long pole with a noose hanging from it briefly appeared in video footage of the scene.
The slogan on the coffin said, “Rabin is killing Zionism.” A literalist might claim that it didn’t intentionally call for the prime minister’s death.
But the photo was a harbinger. I remember it best not from when it first appeared but from stories published after Nov. 4, 1995—the night a right-wing extremist murdered Rabin. That was the night uncertain fear turned into fact—the night my country broke.
These memories are more immediate than usual: The 25th anniversary of Rabin’s assassination nearly coincides with a U.S. election suffused with anxiety, not just about the results but also about the potential for violence.
Yes, by comparing Israel in 1995 with the United States today, I’m showing symptoms of political post-traumatic stress. There are vast differences between the two crises. But what happened in Israel does offer lessons. One is that rhetoric really can ignite violence, and that even a brief, isolated outbreak can leave a country forever changed. Another is that you shouldn’t reassure yourself that your country is uniquely immune.
The Israeli crisis began with the political right’s response to the first Oslo Accord, announced late in the summer of 1993. “The people rise up against the treason of the Rabin government,” said a newspaper ad placed by the opposition parties.
Treason was the operative word. From the first major demonstration against the accord, protesters chanted, “Rabin is a traitor.”
Treason was the operative word. For Netanyahu’s Likud party and its allies, the agreement was not just mistaken policy. Negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization and agreeing in principle to give up control of part of the so-called Whole Land of Israel were betrayals of the nation. From the first major demonstration against the accord, even before the White House signing ceremony, protesters chanted, “Rabin is a traitor.”
Moreover, the Rabin government was the first in Israeli history (and so far, the last) that depended on the support of parties representing the Arab minority in the Israeli parliament. Seen through the lens of the right’s identity politics, the real Israel was only the Jews. So the government and its decisions could only be legitimate if they rested on a majority of legislators representing Jews.
The angry protests that shook the country for the next two years were the work of a partnership of mainstream secular right-wingers and an intensely motivated religious minority made up of the Orthodox settler movement and its supporters. For that movement, keeping the Whole Land had become more than politics; it was a core religious obligation.
Settler groups did the organizing. Likud politicians—most prominently, Netanyahu—addressed the crowds with blistering rhetoric, occasionally objected to the chants of “traitor,” and showed up the next time to bathe in the anger.
The violence that we saw and suffered was on the old Palestinian-Israeli front. Palestinian rejectionists carried out terror attacks aimed at scuttling the accords. In February 1994, a Jewish settler, Baruch Goldstein, opened fire in a contested Jewish-Muslim holy place in the West Bank city of Hebron and murdered 29 worshippers during Ramadan prayers before he was killed. He, too, sought to end the peace process. Rabin described him as mentally ill. Israeli authorities were unprepared for domestic right-wing terror.
Social media did not exist yet. Extreme rhetoric spread easily enough on paper and was less visible to the wider public. Extremists on the religious right published a hagiography of the perpetrator of the Hebron massacre. One person who acquired the book was a law student, Yigal Amir, who also managed to get a hard-to-obtain handgun license under false pretenses.
By the summer of 1995, though, reading a mainstream newspaper was enough to provoke anxiety. In Haaretz, the journalist Yossi Melman quoted former security officials’ assessment that “the hostile environment on the right … could create the conditions for an assassin.” The head of the Shin Bet security service asked Rabin to wear a bulletproof vest; the prime minister refused. He was confident that a political assassination couldn’t happen here. In early October, tens of thousands of people demonstrated in Jerusalem as the Knesset debated the second Oslo accord. In the crowd, handbills appeared showing Rabin in the uniform of a Nazi SS.
On Nov. 5, 1995, as Rabin left a huge pro-peace rally in Tel Aviv, Yigal Amir shot and killed him. Words and images had turned into bullets.
The country convulsed. Shimon Peres, Rabin’s less popular partner and rival in the Labor Party, became prime minister. The following May, he lost a national election by a hair’s breadth—to Netanyahu.
I can’t say what would have happened if Rabin had lived. But my best estimation is that the assassination effectively ended the Oslo process and set Israel on a different and darker course. It was one act of violence by one person. It was also the outcome of two years of reckless speech.
The United States’ current situation is very different. But from afar, the differences are not reassuring. It’s the nation’s leader, automatically granted perpetual media attention, who finds specious reasons to delegitimize a democratic process unless it leads to the result he wants. It’s President Donald Trump whose identity politics of the right implies a so-called real America that’s far less than the whole of the country.
It’s the president who has told the violent far-right Proud Boys to “stand by.” In the United States, unlike Israel, citizens can easily buy guns, and sales are soaring. Despite Trump’s incitement against Muslims and immigrants, the Department of Homeland Security’s own recent assessment says that “white supremacist extremists … remain the most persistent and lethal” terrorist threat.
One thing the Trump era has taught the world is that the United States is not uniquely immune to diseases that beset democracy. The International Crisis Group has just published a report on the risk of violence after the election, as it might for any country. It points at the potential triggering effect of a candidate declaring victory before the votes are counted.
The report urges “traditional and social media… not to pronounce winners prematurely” and foreign leaders to “to refrain from offering their congratulations” too quickly even if the Trump administration presses them to do so.
I am not making predictions. I am anxious. I am, as I said, suffering from political PTSD. I hope that, across the sea, words do not transmogrify into bullets. I pray that the photo of a hearse on a Texas road is not remembered as a harbinger of what would come.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--Misinformation Season Is Over

Misinformation Season Is Over

This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
A Russian hacker group known as CyberBerkut knows what to do during elections .
If needed , it can falsify electronic voting records , for example , to make it appear that a candidate who received 1 percent of the vote in fact won the election .
The group was almost able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidential elections six years ago .
The hack was discovered in time , but U.S. voters should keep it mind and prepare for confusion on Nov. 3—and Nov. 4 , and possibly beyond .
The purpose of CyberBerkut ’ s attack was “ to discredit the election process , ” as a Ukrainian official later told Wired reporter Andy Greenberg .
Although many Americans assume that China , Iran , and Russia engage in election interference because they support either President Donald Trump or his Democratic rival , Joe Biden , the reality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interfere with U.S. elections to sow confusion .
A United States whose citizens can ’ t even agree on what constitutes a fact is a dream scenario for anyone trying to outflank it .
It is far less risky than betting on a particular candidate , after all , who will have their own constituencies to serve .
As Konstantin Sonin , a professor at the University of Chicago , pointed out last week , Russian leader Vladimir Putin sees all American leaders as adversaries .
In that way , the puny amounts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election ( the Facebook ads were around $ 46,000 ) were a spectacular investment .
Much of the electorate mistrusts the validity of the result .
Meanwhile , election interference remains a dominant theme in the U.S. coverage of this cycle , with a staggering three-quarters of Americans convinced that foreign governments are likely to interfere in this election too .
Whether they will ( the FBI says they already are ) or won ’ t , the public will always have doubt about the credibility of the result .
Given the bang @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elections , it is worth watching to see whether Russia , China , and Iran get creative .
It would be a good investment for them to spend more than they did on the 2016 election , but these countries may already consider Americans sufficiently confused and disunited , making 2016-style misinformation campaigns not worth it .
They could instead bank on something that would require a distracted United States to swiftly take action , and where it would be unclear what the right response would be .
An armed attack on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of cyberattacks on hospitals in a swing state ?
Disruption of COVID-19 vaccine research ?
But such stunts would just be icing on the cake .
As things stand , neither Russia nor any other country really needs to try any old tricks or even new ones to sow disarray : The United States is so busy confusing itself that its adversaries can just sit back and watch as what is sure to be a hectic few days unfold .

A Russian hacker group known as CyberBerkut knows what to do during elections. If needed, it can falsify electronic voting records, for example, to make it appear that a candidate who received 1 percent of the vote in fact won the election. The group was almost able to pull that off in Ukraine’s presidential elections six years ago. The hack was discovered in time, but U.S. voters should keep it mind and prepare for confusion on Nov. 3—and Nov. 4, and possibly beyond.
A Russian hacker group known as CyberBerkut knows what to do during elections. If needed, it can falsify electronic voting records, for example, to make it appear that a candidate who received 1 percent of the vote in fact won the election. The group was almost able to pull that off in Ukraine’s presidential elections six years ago. The hack was discovered in time, but U.S. voters should keep it mind and prepare for confusion on Nov. 3—and Nov. 4, and possibly beyond.
The purpose of CyberBerkut’s attack was “to discredit the election process,” as a Ukrainian official later told Wired reporter Andy Greenberg. Although many Americans assume that China, Iran, and Russia engage in election interference because they support either President Donald Trump or his Democratic rival, Joe Biden, the reality is much more straightforward: These countries interfere with U.S. elections to sow confusion. A United States whose citizens can’t even agree on what constitutes a fact is a dream scenario for anyone trying to outflank it. It is far less risky than betting on a particular candidate, after all, who will have their own constituencies to serve. As Konstantin Sonin, a professor at the University of Chicago, pointed out last week, Russian leader Vladimir Putin sees all American leaders as adversaries.
In that way, the puny amounts Russia spent interfering with the last U.S. election (the Facebook ads were around $46,000) were a spectacular investment. Much of the electorate mistrusts the validity of the result. Meanwhile, election interference remains a dominant theme in the U.S. coverage of this cycle, with a staggering three-quarters of Americans convinced that foreign governments are likely to interfere in this election too. Whether they will (the FBI says they already are) or won’t, the public will always have doubt about the credibility of the result.
Given the bang for the buck in interfering with U.S. elections, it is worth watching to see whether Russia, China, and Iran get creative. It would be a good investment for them to spend more than they did on the 2016 election, but these countries may already consider Americans sufficiently confused and disunited, making 2016-style misinformation campaigns not worth it. They could instead bank on something that would require a distracted United States to swiftly take action, and where it would be unclear what the right response would be. An armed attack on a neighboring country, perhaps? A string of cyberattacks on hospitals in a swing state? Disruption of COVID-19 vaccine research?
But such stunts would just be icing on the cake. As things stand, neither Russia nor any other country really needs to try any old tricks or even new ones to sow disarray: The United States is so busy confusing itself that its adversaries can just sit back and watch as what is sure to be a hectic few days unfold.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--Will the Next Administration Take a New Track on Venezuela Policy?

Will the Next Administration Take a New Track on Venezuela Policy ?
As U.S. President Donald Trump and the Democratic nominee , former Vice President Joe Biden , enter the final stretch in their campaigns for the White House , both have been openly courting the votes and support of Venezuelan Americans , particularly in Florida .
But while talking points on socialism and dictatorships may mobilize voters in the short term , simplistic rhetoric about Venezuela will quickly run up against its limits .
Indeed , few foreign-policy issues will be knottier in the immediate aftermath of the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ road map on how to lead an international coalition in restoring Venezuelan democracy , or even exacting any meaningful concessions from the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro .
As it stands , the U.S. stance is that Maduro should step down , but his power remains firmly entrenched in Caracas while the country continues on a disastrous socioeconomic decline .
Venezuela is in dire straits .
Despite boasting the largest proven oil reserves on the planet , lines at gas stations across the country snake for miles .
Protests broke out , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in September as people grew desperate for fuel , and they only let up when Iran sent tankers loaded with gasoline to Venezuelan shores .
The episode was yet more evidence of the South American country ’ s fall from a powerful petrostate to a country increasingly reliant on other unsavory regimes .
Meanwhile , hyperinflation continues to wrack the economy , rendering the local bolívar banknotes even more worthless .
Shortages in everything from basic foodstuffs to medical supplies are widespread .
Power and water outages are most easily counted by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t occur .
A country that , during its oil-fueled heyday , attracted immigrant workers is now seeing people go the other way .
Over 4 million have left the country , whose population peaked in 2015 at over 30 million , often for neighboring countries such as Colombia and Brazil , which are ill-equipped to receive them .
Yet solutions from Washington and its allies have hardly been forthcoming .
A moment in early 2019 brought a flicker of hope , with the arrival on the national stage of opposition leader Juan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s democratically elected National Assembly .
He , with the backing of the United States and over 50 allies , enacted a clause of the constitution granting him the presidency on an interim basis , until free and fair elections could be held .
Those elections have not yet happened—and Guaidó ’ s constitutional mandate could end with December ’ s parliamentary elections , which most observers have already deemed susceptible to fraud .
Guaidó was a guest at this year ’ s State of the Union address , but the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ indictments has done little to dislodge Maduro or any of his cronies , largely due to the unwavering support of the military for Maduro , despite Guaidó ’ s multiple attempts to recruit military leaders onto its side .
Neither candidate will inherit a clear road map on how to lead an international coalition in restoring Venezuelan democracy , or even exacting any meaningful concessions from the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro .
Despite the stalling of Venezuela policy , the issue has resurged during the U.S. election .
“ Joe Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump tweeted earlier this month in reference to Cuba ’ s Fidel Castro and Venezuela ’ s Hugo Chávez—both the late and combative architects of their countries ’ current left-wing status quo .
This rhetoric is likely to play well with Venezuelan , Cuban , and Colombian immigrants who are wary of socialism , particularly in Florida , a state Trump sees as key to any Electoral College victory .
But still , should he win reelection , regional analysts are unsure of what a second-term set of Venezuela policies would look like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ towards Venezuela can only be understood through the prism of Florida politics and his reelection strategy , ” Michael Shifter , the president of the Inter-American Dialogue , said .
“ There ’ s been a lot of tough talk , threats , and saber-rattling , along with harsh economic sanctions , but nothing to show for it .
By any measure , the country is in worse shape than ever.
” If Trump manages to win reelection , Shifter suggests his stance could quickly shift , perhaps even mimicking his solicitous policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Un .
In June of this year , Trump said he would be open to meeting with Maduro , before walking the comments back .
“ Most likely , he would just be indifferent , and Venezuela could become a second-tier issue , ” Shifter said .
“ None of these possibilities augurs well for a more successful and productive U.S. Venezuela policy than what we have seen over the last four years.
” Trump , freed from the campaign trail , may also change tack on his strict sanctions regime , according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Control Risks , a consulting firm , in the Andean region .
“ Trump is likely to maintain a confrontational stance with the Maduro regime .
But faced with the need to revive the U.S. economy and support the profitable forays of U.S. companies weakened by COVID-19 , he is likely to take an easier approach against Venezuela , ” Gallegos said , predicting that in the event of a Trump victory , many companies will double down on their lobbying for sanctions relief .
Some companies in the oil sphere would stand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration will likely cease protecting Citgo assets from the seizure of creditors if and when he gets reelected , ” the analyst said , in reference to Venezuela ’ s U.S. refining subsidiary .
Biden , on the other hand , while never hesitant to call Maduro a “ dictator ” and recognize Guaidó ’ s legitimacy in February last year , has not given many specifics , beyond focusing on international diplomacy and the plight of refugees from the regime .
In an 2019 statement in response to questions from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was still campaigning for the nomination , Biden said that “ the overriding goal in Venezuela must be to hold free and fair elections so that the Venezuelan people may recover their democracy and rebuild their country.
” Biden said that the United States should push for stronger multilateral sanctions—rather than the unilateral ones announced by the incumbent—and should grant Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans who have fled their home country .
Answering the same set of questions from the Council on Foreign Relations , Biden ’ s now-running mate Kamala Harris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aid to humanitarian organizations supporting Venezuelan refugees and extend Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans in the United States .
“ Finally , we should take U.S. military intervention off the table , ” Harris said , in reference to the Trump administration ’ s repeated and thinly veiled threat that “ all options are on the table.
” One thing likely to continue no matter who wins in November would be the ongoing attempt at coalition-building in Latin America .
Biden would continue to coordinate , as the Trump administration has , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries in the Americas working to resolve the crisis in Venezuela .
But on regional cooperation , he may face new difficulties from countries including Colombia and Brazil , and continued difficulty with Mexico and Argentina .
He may butt heads with leaders from Colombia and Brazil , where ruling politicians are supportive of Trump and issues including corruption and the environment may lead to conflict with a Biden administration .
“ Unlike Trump , Biden would also coordinate with European powers , whose obvious dislike and mistrust of Trump has complicated U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Benjamin Gedan , the deputy director of the Latin America program at the Wilson Center .
“ And though he would be far more admired than Trump in Latin America , he would not succeed in persuading Mexico or Argentina to return to their hardline positions on Venezuela under their previous governments.
” The leaders in Venezuela , both the opposition and Maduro himself , will also be paying keen attention to the results of the election in November .
While the assumption may be that a Trump victory would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case that a Biden foreign policy based “ first and foremost on democracy , ” as Amanda Mattingly— a former foreign affairs officer at the State Department—wrote last month in a series of recommendations for U.S. policy on Venezuela , would be equally if not more unsettling for the strongman .
“ I actually think Maduro would prefer Trump , who is easy to demonize , and a lightning rod for other maligned forces , ” Ray Walser , a historian and former foreign service officer , said , adding that the Guaidó-led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Washington .
“ After 2 years under Trump , the opposition might just be open to some fresh thinking and a new diplomatic team on the playing field.
” But regardless of who takes office in January , obstacles continue to develop as the situation on the ground in Venezuela continues to change .
When Leopoldo López , a prominent and combative opposition leader and mentor to Guaidó , fled the country in late October , it was yet another sign that political space continues to shrink .
Either a Trump or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Venezuela policy .

As U.S. President Donald Trump and the Democratic nominee, former Vice President Joe Biden, enter the final stretch in their campaigns for the White House, both have been openly courting the votes and support of Venezuelan Americans, particularly in Florida. But while talking points on socialism and dictatorships may mobilize voters in the short term, simplistic rhetoric about Venezuela will quickly run up against its limits. Indeed, few foreign-policy issues will be knottier in the immediate aftermath of the election.
As U.S. President Donald Trump and the Democratic nominee, former Vice President Joe Biden, enter the final stretch in their campaigns for the White House, both have been openly courting the votes and support of Venezuelan Americans, particularly in Florida. But while talking points on socialism and dictatorships may mobilize voters in the short term, simplistic rhetoric about Venezuela will quickly run up against its limits. Indeed, few foreign-policy issues will be knottier in the immediate aftermath of the election.
Neither candidate will inherit a clear road map on how to lead an international coalition in restoring Venezuelan democracy, or even exacting any meaningful concessions from the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. As it stands, the U.S. stance is that Maduro should step down, but his power remains firmly entrenched in Caracas while the country continues on a disastrous socioeconomic decline.
Venezuela is in dire straits. Despite boasting the largest proven oil reserves on the planet, lines at gas stations across the country snake for miles. Protests broke out, primarily in the country’s interior, in September as people grew desperate for fuel, and they only let up when Iran sent tankers loaded with gasoline to Venezuelan shores. The episode was yet more evidence of the South American country’s fall from a powerful petrostate to a country increasingly reliant on other unsavory regimes. Meanwhile, hyperinflation continues to wrack the economy, rendering the local bolívar banknotes even more worthless. Shortages in everything from basic foodstuffs to medical supplies are widespread. Power and water outages are most easily counted by the days in which they don’t occur. A country that, during its oil-fueled heyday, attracted immigrant workers is now seeing people go the other way. Over 4 million have left the country, whose population peaked in 2015 at over 30 million, often for neighboring countries such as Colombia and Brazil, which are ill-equipped to receive them.
Yet solutions from Washington and its allies have hardly been forthcoming. A moment in early 2019 brought a flicker of hope, with the arrival on the national stage of opposition leader Juan Guaidó, the president of Venezuela’s democratically elected National Assembly. He, with the backing of the United States and over 50 allies, enacted a clause of the constitution granting him the presidency on an interim basis, until free and fair elections could be held. Those elections have not yet happened—and Guaidó’s constitutional mandate could end with December’s parliamentary elections, which most observers have already deemed susceptible to fraud. Guaidó was a guest at this year’s State of the Union address, but the United States’ strategy of unilateral sanctions and criminal indictments has done little to dislodge Maduro or any of his cronies, largely due to the unwavering support of the military for Maduro, despite Guaidó’s multiple attempts to recruit military leaders onto its side.
Neither candidate will inherit a clear road map on how to lead an international coalition in restoring Venezuelan democracy, or even exacting any meaningful concessions from the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.
Despite the stalling of Venezuela policy, the issue has resurged during the U.S. election. “Joe Biden is a PUPPET of CASTRO-CHAVISTAS,” Trump tweeted earlier this month in reference to Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez—both the late and combative architects of their countries’ current left-wing status quo. This rhetoric is likely to play well with Venezuelan, Cuban, and Colombian immigrants who are wary of socialism, particularly in Florida, a state Trump sees as key to any Electoral College victory. But still, should he win reelection, regional analysts are unsure of what a second-term set of Venezuela policies would look like.
“President Trump’s policy towards Venezuela can only be understood through the prism of Florida politics and his reelection strategy,” Michael Shifter, the president of the Inter-American Dialogue, said. “There’s been a lot of tough talk, threats, and saber-rattling, along with harsh economic sanctions, but nothing to show for it. By any measure, the country is in worse shape than ever.”
If Trump manages to win reelection, Shifter suggests his stance could quickly shift, perhaps even mimicking his solicitous policy toward North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. In June of this year, Trump said he would be open to meeting with Maduro, before walking the comments back. “Most likely, he would just be indifferent, and Venezuela could become a second-tier issue,” Shifter said. “None of these possibilities augurs well for a more successful and productive U.S. Venezuela policy than what we have seen over the last four years.”
Trump, freed from the campaign trail, may also change tack on his strict sanctions regime, according to Raúl Gallegos, a director for Control Risks, a consulting firm, in the Andean region. “Trump is likely to maintain a confrontational stance with the Maduro regime. But faced with the need to revive the U.S. economy and support the profitable forays of U.S. companies weakened by COVID-19, he is likely to take an easier approach against Venezuela,” Gallegos said, predicting that in the event of a Trump victory, many companies will double down on their lobbying for sanctions relief. Some companies in the oil sphere would stand to benefit. “This also means the Trump administration will likely cease protecting Citgo assets from the seizure of creditors if and when he gets reelected,” the analyst said, in reference to Venezuela’s U.S. refining subsidiary.
Biden, on the other hand, while never hesitant to call Maduro a “dictator” and recognize Guaidó’s legitimacy in February last year, has not given many specifics, beyond focusing on international diplomacy and the plight of refugees from the regime. In an 2019 statement in response to questions from the Council on Foreign Relations, while he was still campaigning for the nomination, Biden said that “the overriding goal in Venezuela must be to hold free and fair elections so that the Venezuelan people may recover their democracy and rebuild their country.” Biden said that the United States should push for stronger multilateral sanctions—rather than the unilateral ones announced by the incumbent—and should grant Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans who have fled their home country.
Answering the same set of questions from the Council on Foreign Relations, Biden’s now-running mate Kamala Harris said the United States should provide additional aid to humanitarian organizations supporting Venezuelan refugees and extend Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans in the United States. “Finally, we should take U.S. military intervention off the table,” Harris said, in reference to the Trump administration’s repeated and thinly veiled threat that “all options are on the table.”
One thing likely to continue no matter who wins in November would be the ongoing attempt at coalition-building in Latin America. Biden would continue to coordinate, as the Trump administration has, with the Lima Group—the intergovernmental organization of 14 countries in the Americas working to resolve the crisis in Venezuela. But on regional cooperation, he may face new difficulties from countries including Colombia and Brazil, and continued difficulty with Mexico and Argentina. He may butt heads with leaders from Colombia and Brazil, where ruling politicians are supportive of Trump and issues including corruption and the environment may lead to conflict with a Biden administration.
“Unlike Trump, Biden would also coordinate with European powers, whose obvious dislike and mistrust of Trump has complicated U.S. efforts to synchronize sanctions and diplomatic tactics,” said Benjamin Gedan, the deputy director of the Latin America program at the Wilson Center. “And though he would be far more admired than Trump in Latin America, he would not succeed in persuading Mexico or Argentina to return to their hardline positions on Venezuela under their previous governments.”
The leaders in Venezuela, both the opposition and Maduro himself, will also be paying keen attention to the results of the election in November. While the assumption may be that a Trump victory would upset Maduro, it could be the case that a Biden foreign policy based “first and foremost on democracy,” as Amanda Mattingly— a former foreign affairs officer at the State Department—wrote last month in a series of recommendations for U.S. policy on Venezuela, would be equally if not more unsettling for the strongman.
“I actually think Maduro would prefer Trump, who is easy to demonize, and a lightning rod for other maligned forces,” Ray Walser, a historian and former foreign service officer, said, adding that the Guaidó-led opposition too may enjoy a new tack from Washington. “After 2 years under Trump, the opposition might just be open to some fresh thinking and a new diplomatic team on the playing field.”
But regardless of who takes office in January, obstacles continue to develop as the situation on the ground in Venezuela continues to change. When Leopoldo López, a prominent and combative opposition leader and mentor to Guaidó, fled the country in late October, it was yet another sign that political space continues to shrink. Either a Trump or a Biden administration would face continuing challenges on Venezuela policy.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--An Election Everyone Is Too Scared to Call

An Election Everyone Is Too Scared to Call This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
It takes an awful lot to unseat an elected incumbent president , even an unpopular one .
It has happened only three times in U.S. politics in the last century—1932 , 1980 , and 1992—and despite Democratic challenger Joe Biden ’ s substantial , steady @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and pundits alike are doubly reluctant to call this one .
That ’ s not just because Trump has been openly suggesting he might not accept the results—even declaring the first night of the Republican convention that the only way he could lose “ is if this is a rigged election ” —but also because the media and pollsters have still not recovered from their embarrassment over the titanic miscalls of 2016 .
There was a lot of crow eaten the week of that year ’ s election , and the bitter taste @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the damage to reputations .
Though some respected polling outfits such as FiveThirtyEight are now giving Biden almost as high a chance of winning as that 2016 prediction , TV networks and major news organizations such as the Associated Press are pledging to be restrained in their predictions and open up their data to the public .
Because of the massive number of mail-in and absentee ballots this time , in part due to COVID-19 measures—and because of Republicans ’ many legal challenges to them—some networks are suggesting they may not call the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happens .
“ CNN is deploying resources to keep viewers apprised of updates on vote counts and reports , which may extend beyond November 3 , ” the network said in a press release .
But the odds are clearly stacked against Trump .
On Saturday , FiveThirtyEight ’ s Nate Silver wrote on his website that Trump has just a 10 percent chance of winning and “ things aren ’ t likely to change all that much in our forecast between now and just after midnight on Tuesday , when we ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other major advantage may be that not only is he well ahead of polling in the national vote , but that he is also ahead of where Clinton was against Trump in most battleground states at this juncture .
Even so , Biden is still thought to be vulnerable in some of the same states that Democrats in 2016 described overconfidently as their “ blue wall , ” including Pennsylvania , Michigan , and Wisconsin .
To leave FP ’ s live election blog and read the rest of this article , click @ @

It takes an awful lot to unseat an elected incumbent president, even an unpopular one. It has happened only three times in U.S. politics in the last century—1932, 1980, and 1992—and despite Democratic challenger Joe Biden’s substantial, steady lead over President Donald Trump, pollsters and pundits alike are doubly reluctant to call this one.
It takes an awful lot to unseat an elected incumbent president, even an unpopular one. It has happened only three times in U.S. politics in the last century—1932, 1980, and 1992—and despite Democratic challenger Joe Biden’s substantial, steady lead over President Donald Trump, pollsters and pundits alike are doubly reluctant to call this one.
That’s not just because Trump has been openly suggesting he might not accept the results—even declaring the first night of the Republican convention that the only way he could lose “is if this is a rigged election”—but also because the media and pollsters have still not recovered from their embarrassment over the titanic miscalls of 2016. There was a lot of crow eaten the week of that year’s election, and the bitter taste still lingers, as does concern over the damage to reputations.
Though some respected polling outfits such as FiveThirtyEight are now giving Biden almost as high a chance of winning as that 2016 prediction, TV networks and major news organizations such as the Associated Press are pledging to be restrained in their predictions and open up their data to the public. Because of the massive number of mail-in and absentee ballots this time, in part due to COVID-19 measures—and because of Republicans’ many legal challenges to them—some networks are suggesting they may not call the race by Tuesday night, as typically happens. “CNN is deploying resources to keep viewers apprised of updates on vote counts and reports, which may extend beyond November 3,” the network said in a press release.
But the odds are clearly stacked against Trump. On Saturday, FiveThirtyEight’s Nate Silver wrote on his website that Trump has just a 10 percent chance of winning and “things aren’t likely to change all that much in our forecast between now and just after midnight on Tuesday, when we’ll freeze it.”
Biden’s other major advantage may be that not only is he well ahead of polling in the national vote, but that he is also ahead of where Clinton was against Trump in most battleground states at this juncture. Even so, Biden is still thought to be vulnerable in some of the same states that Democrats in 2016 described overconfidently as their “blue wall,” including Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
To leave FP’s live election blog and read the rest of this article, click here.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--Trump’s Plan to Withdraw From Somalia Couldn’t Come at a Worse Time

Trump ’ s Plan to Withdraw From Somalia Couldn ’ t Come at a Worse Time Earlier this month , reports emerged that U.S. President Donald Trump had asked his senior advisors to devise a plan for the withdrawal of the 650 to 800 U.S. forces stationed in Somalia .
This directive cast a striking contrast with Trump ’ s prior track record of supporting the expansion of U.S. military involvement in Somalia .
For example , in March 2017 , Trump approved a Pentagon proposal to expand the scope of U.S. airstrikes against al-Shabab in central and southern Somalia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carried out 63 airstrikes on al-Shabab targets .
Between January and May this year , it conducted 40 .
That ’ s a drastic increase from the 14 strikes that U.S. President Barack Obama authorized in 2016 .
Trump ’ s about-face might well be electoral theater , not an indication of real policy shift .
After all , the president announced the drawdown of 2,200 U.S. troops from Iraq in September and recently pledged to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan by Christmas .
Nevertheless , senior Somali and Kenyan officials immediately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to even entertain the idea of U.S. withdrawal .
Shortly after the directive was made public , Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed emphasized the central role the U.S.-Somalia partnership plays in stabilizing the Horn of Africa .
On Oct. 18 , Kamau Macharia , Kenya ’ s former ambassador to the United Nations and current foreign-affairs principal secretary , opined that a U.S. exit “ will worsen the already fragile situation in the country.
” These expressions of concern are well founded .
A U.S. withdrawal from Somalia could strengthen al-Shabab and leave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ external partner on counterterrorism .
The abdication of U.S. leadership could also create opportunities for China and Russia , and increase Somalia ’ s vulnerability to the destabilizing ambitions of regional powers in the Middle East .
An abrupt U.S. withdrawal from Somalia could help al-Shabab achieve its goals of territorial expansion in Somalia and spreading its reach across borders .
So far , the U.S. military presence has prevented al-Shabab from capitalizing on Somalia ’ s intraregional divisions , which cause the Somali Armed Forces to divert scarce resources towards fighting regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Somali special forces achieve notable military successes against al-Shabab , such as the liberation of towns in the Lower Shabelle region over the past month .
Meanwhile , there is the rest of the region to consider .
On Jan. 5 , al-Shabab attacked a U.S. base in Manda Bay , Kenya , killing three Americans .
The severity of al-Shabab ’ s threat to Kenya ’ s security reportedly motivated the U.S. Department of Defense to consider carrying out drone strikes in there , but the idea was rebuffed by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Al-Shabab also poses a long-term risk to the security of Uganda and Tanzania , and it has even deployed mercenaries to train Ansar al-Sunna militants in northern Mozambique .
Given al-Shabab ’ s transnational reach , a U.S. withdrawal from Somalia could precipitate a broader collective security crisis in eastern Africa .
The risks of al-Shabab ’ s expansion are compounded further by the probability that the Somali Armed Forces could find themselves without an external partner that can fill the shoes of the United States .
Although France backed Kenya ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2011 , it remains overwhelmingly focused on stemming the rising tide of political violence in the Sahel .
Britain trains Somali National Army personnel in the southwestern Somali city of Baidoa .
However , Britain lacks experience carrying out U.S.-style drone strikes against al-Shabab .
As France and the United Kingdom are unlikely to fill the void , the Somali National Army could appeal for increased support from the African Union ( AU ) , which has 21,000 troops in Somalia .
However , the AU ’ s commitment to military intervention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the union has called for the handover of counterterrorism responsibilities to the military , and in October , the AU reiterated its plan to withdraw militarily from Somalia in 2021 .
That means Somalia could face a double shock of a U.S. and AU military drawdown at a time when al-Shabab is ascendant .
Chinese state-aligned private security companies are exploring commercial opportunities in Ethiopia and Djibouti , and Beijing could deploy private security contractors to defend its infrastructure investments from al-Shabab .
Via its naval base in Djibouti , China could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. partners , such as Saudi Arabia , who are concerned about al-Shabab ’ s threat to Red Sea commercial activity .
These actions could give China an advantage in its competition with the U.S. for hegemony over the Red Sea .
Unlike the United States , China has not devised a counterterrorism strategy for Somalia and has focused exclusively on protecting its own commercial interests .
China ’ s narrow interests could force the Somali Armed Forces to fight alone in tracts of central and southern Somalia where the Belt and Road @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also see its influence expand in the event of a U.S. withdrawal from Somalia .
Since 2016 , Somalia has asked Russia for counterterrorism assistance against al-Shabab , and would likely renew these requests if the United States departs .
Although Russia does not wish to send its military there , it could view a U.S. exit as a window of opportunity to establish a naval base in the Horn of Africa .
In January , U.S. Department of Defense officials stated that Russia had designated the port of Berbera in Somaliland , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ideal location for such a base .
The United States previously thwarted Moscow ’ s ambitions of establishing one in Djibouti , so Russian officials could view a U.S. withdrawal from Somalia as an opportunity to enter the international competition for Red Sea facilities .
A U.S. withdrawal from Somalia would also remove a vital check on the destabilizing conduct of the United Arab Emirates , Qatar , and Iran in Africa .
The UAE has backed separatist movements in Somaliland and Puntland , as it seeks to expand its leverage over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey ’ s rising influence in Somalia .
Iran has allegedly provided assistance to al-Shabab , while Qatar ’ s interference in Somalia ’ s internal politics has exacerbated corruption and poor governance in the country .
Given a U.S. departure , Somalia could become , like Yemen or Libya , a battleground for influence between all four countries .
The recent improvement in U.S.-Kenyan relations , which resulted in the announcement of free trade negotiations in early July , should facilitate Nairobi ’ s expanded participation in U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cooperation with Tanzania seen during the Obama and George W. Bush administrations , and endorse ad hoc regional security initiatives , such as the Somalia-Ethiopia-Eritrea trilateral summits on counterterrorism which began in January .
If African countries are better equipped to fight al-Shabab , the United States will be able to orchestrate a phased withdrawal from Somalia at the appropriate time and avoid the security crises that would accompany Trump ’ s plan .
Although it is uncertain whether Trump will follow through on his plans to end U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. withdrawal doing so unwise .
As Somalia prepares for presidential elections in 2021 , the U.S. needs to devise a new strategy to counter al-Shabab which extends beyond the binary of forever war or immediate withdrawal that polarizes Washington .
Regardless of whether Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails on Nov. 3 , terrorism and instability in Somalia will present major challenges for U.S. officials in the months ahead .

Earlier this month, reports emerged that U.S. President Donald Trump had asked his senior advisors to devise a plan for the withdrawal of the 650 to 800 U.S. forces stationed in Somalia. This directive cast a striking contrast with Trump’s prior track record of supporting the expansion of U.S. military involvement in Somalia. For example, in March 2017, Trump approved a Pentagon proposal to expand the scope of U.S. airstrikes against al-Shabab in central and southern Somalia. In 2019, the United States carried out 63 airstrikes on al-Shabab targets. Between January and May this year, it conducted 40. That’s a drastic increase from the 14 strikes that U.S. President Barack Obama authorized in 2016.
Earlier this month, reports emerged that U.S. President Donald Trump had asked his senior advisors to devise a plan for the withdrawal of the 650 to 800 U.S. forces stationed in Somalia. This directive cast a striking contrast with Trump’s prior track record of supporting the expansion of U.S. military involvement in Somalia. For example, in March 2017, Trump approved a Pentagon proposal to expand the scope of U.S. airstrikes against al-Shabab in central and southern Somalia. In 2019, the United States carried out 63 airstrikes on al-Shabab targets. Between January and May this year, it conducted 40. That’s a drastic increase from the 14 strikes that U.S. President Barack Obama authorized in 2016.
Trump’s about-face might well be electoral theater, not an indication of real policy shift. After all, the president announced the drawdown of 2,200 U.S. troops from Iraq in September and recently pledged to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan by Christmas. Nevertheless, senior Somali and Kenyan officials immediately expressed alarm at Trump’s willingness to even entertain the idea of U.S. withdrawal. Shortly after the directive was made public, Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed emphasized the central role the U.S.-Somalia partnership plays in stabilizing the Horn of Africa. On Oct. 18, Kamau Macharia, Kenya’s former ambassador to the United Nations and current foreign-affairs principal secretary, opined that a U.S. exit “will worsen the already fragile situation in the country.”
These expressions of concern are well founded. A U.S. withdrawal from Somalia could strengthen al-Shabab and leave the Somali Armed Forces without a reliable external partner on counterterrorism. The abdication of U.S. leadership could also create opportunities for China and Russia, and increase Somalia’s vulnerability to the destabilizing ambitions of regional powers in the Middle East.
In spite of frequent U.S. counterterrorism strikes in Somalia, al-Shabab’s capacity for destruction has steadily grown. The group’s terrorist activities have resulted in at least 4,000 civilian deaths in the country since 2010, and more than 3,000 of those deaths have come since 2015. As Somalia’s presidential elections, which are scheduled for early 2021, draw nearer, al-Shabab has carried out more frequent strikes on civilians. On Aug. 16, for example, it took control of the beachside Elite Hotel in Mogadishu, killing at least 10 civilians. In the week from Sept. 11 to Sept. 18, al-Shabab carried out more than a dozen attacks. The terrorist organization has also crowded out rival groups in Somalia, and it is aligned with al Qaeda.
An abrupt U.S. withdrawal from Somalia could help al-Shabab achieve its goals of territorial expansion in Somalia and spreading its reach across borders. So far, the U.S. military presence has prevented al-Shabab from capitalizing on Somalia’s intraregional divisions, which cause the Somali Armed Forces to divert scarce resources towards fighting regional militias. U.S. training has also helped the Somali special forces achieve notable military successes against al-Shabab, such as the liberation of towns in the Lower Shabelle region over the past month.
Meanwhile, there is the rest of the region to consider. On Jan. 5, al-Shabab attacked a U.S. base in Manda Bay, Kenya, killing three Americans. The severity of al-Shabab’s threat to Kenya’s security reportedly motivated the U.S. Department of Defense to consider carrying out drone strikes in there, but the idea was rebuffed by the country’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta. Al-Shabab also poses a long-term risk to the security of Uganda and Tanzania, and it has even deployed mercenaries to train Ansar al-Sunna militants in northern Mozambique. Given al-Shabab’s transnational reach, a U.S. withdrawal from Somalia could precipitate a broader collective security crisis in eastern Africa.
The risks of al-Shabab’s expansion are compounded further by the probability that the Somali Armed Forces could find themselves without an external partner that can fill the shoes of the United States. Although France backed Kenya’s efforts to combat al-Shabab in Somalia in 2011, it remains overwhelmingly focused on stemming the rising tide of political violence in the Sahel. Britain trains Somali National Army personnel in the southwestern Somali city of Baidoa. However, Britain lacks experience carrying out U.S.-style drone strikes against al-Shabab.
As France and the United Kingdom are unlikely to fill the void, the Somali National Army could appeal for increased support from the African Union (AU), which has 21,000 troops in Somalia. However, the AU’s commitment to military intervention in Somalia is uncertain. Since 2017, the union has called for the handover of counterterrorism responsibilities to the military, and in October, the AU reiterated its plan to withdraw militarily from Somalia in 2021. That means Somalia could face a double shock of a U.S. and AU military drawdown at a time when al-Shabab is ascendant.
A U.S. withdrawal from Somalia could also have far-reaching geopolitical implications. China, Russia, and Middle Eastern regional powers are likely beneficiaries from a U.S. departure. China has close relations with Somalia and is concerned about rising instability in the Horn of Africa. In February, al-Shabab attacked a Chinese construction crew on Kenya’s Lamu-Garsen road, and a U.S. withdrawal from Somalia could increase the frequency of these attacks.
Chinese state-aligned private security companies are exploring commercial opportunities in Ethiopia and Djibouti, and Beijing could deploy private security contractors to defend its infrastructure investments from al-Shabab. Via its naval base in Djibouti, China could also deepen its maritime security cooperation with U.S. partners, such as Saudi Arabia, who are concerned about al-Shabab’s threat to Red Sea commercial activity. These actions could give China an advantage in its competition with the U.S. for hegemony over the Red Sea. Unlike the United States, China has not devised a counterterrorism strategy for Somalia and has focused exclusively on protecting its own commercial interests. China’s narrow interests could force the Somali Armed Forces to fight alone in tracts of central and southern Somalia where the Belt and Road Initiative does not cross.
Russia could also see its influence expand in the event of a U.S. withdrawal from Somalia. Since 2016, Somalia has asked Russia for counterterrorism assistance against al-Shabab, and would likely renew these requests if the United States departs. Although Russia does not wish to send its military there, it could view a U.S. exit as a window of opportunity to establish a naval base in the Horn of Africa. In January, U.S. Department of Defense officials stated that Russia had designated the port of Berbera in Somaliland, a self-declared state within Somalia, as the ideal location for such a base. The United States previously thwarted Moscow’s ambitions of establishing one in Djibouti, so Russian officials could view a U.S. withdrawal from Somalia as an opportunity to enter the international competition for Red Sea facilities.
A U.S. withdrawal from Somalia would also remove a vital check on the destabilizing conduct of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iran in Africa. The UAE has backed separatist movements in Somaliland and Puntland, as it seeks to expand its leverage over critical ports in both regions and counter Turkey’s rising influence in Somalia. Iran has allegedly provided assistance to al-Shabab, while Qatar’s interference in Somalia’s internal politics has exacerbated corruption and poor governance in the country. Given a U.S. departure, Somalia could become, like Yemen or Libya, a battleground for influence between all four countries.
Although the many risks associated with an immediate U.S. withdrawal from Somalia make Trump’s proposal ill-advised, the alternative of a U.S. “forever war” in Somalia is equally problematic. Even though the United States was expected to hand over security responsibilities to the Somali National Army in 2021, Africom stated in March that U.S. training efforts for Somalia’s Danab (Lightning) Brigade would last until 2027. In order to eventually complete a safe withdrawal, the United States needs to strike a middle ground between Trump’s and the Pentagon’s preferred policies on Somalia by incrementally shifting burdens to the African countries that are most acutely threatened by al-Shabab.
The recent improvement in U.S.-Kenyan relations, which resulted in the announcement of free trade negotiations in early July, should facilitate Nairobi’s expanded participation in U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia. The United States should revive the cooperation with Tanzania seen during the Obama and George W. Bush administrations, and endorse ad hoc regional security initiatives, such as the Somalia-Ethiopia-Eritrea trilateral summits on counterterrorism which began in January. If African countries are better equipped to fight al-Shabab, the United States will be able to orchestrate a phased withdrawal from Somalia at the appropriate time and avoid the security crises that would accompany Trump’s plan.
Although it is uncertain whether Trump will follow through on his plans to end U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia, the risks associated with an abrupt U.S. withdrawal doing so unwise. As Somalia prepares for presidential elections in 2021, the U.S. needs to devise a new strategy to counter al-Shabab which extends beyond the binary of forever war or immediate withdrawal that polarizes Washington. Regardless of whether Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails on Nov. 3, terrorism and instability in Somalia will present major challenges for U.S. officials in the months ahead.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-03--France’s War on Islamism Isn’t Populism. It’s Reality.

Last Thursday , three French citizens were brutally killed in a church in Nice , one of them a woman whose throat was slit .
This gruesome act , coming barely two weeks after the beheading of Samuel Paty , a history teacher who showed his class cartoons from the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo to illustrate the concept of freedom of speech , has reawakened France to the reality of Islamist terrorism .
Since 2012 , more than 260 people of all backgrounds have died in terrorist attacks : in a Jewish school , at the Charlie Hebdo headquarters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ streets of Nice , in churches , and in police street patrols .
Yet when looking at some of the coverage of the most recent attacks in the United States , and the reaction from leaders like Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan , the culprit is France itself .
French President Emmanuel Macron ’ s vow to fight “ Islamist separatism ” has been treated as its own act of barbarism .
But most French citizens , however , aware of the reality on the ground , recognize this fight as necessary and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ series of personal attacks against the French president , Erdogan claimed that “ Macron needed mental treatment ” for his response to the attack .
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan asserted on Twitter that Macron ’ s words encouraged “ Islamophobia , ” while Mahathir Mohamad , the former prime minister of Malaysia , upped the ante by commenting that Muslims have a right to “ kill millions of French people ” in reaction to the “ disrespect ” they suffered .
Some of the U.S. media coverage seems to take at face @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Erdogan .
One article spoke grandiloquently of a “ crackdown on Islam , ” and the initial headline on a New York Times piece about Paty ’ s killing was “ French Police Shoot and Kill Man After a Fatal Knife Attack on the Street.
” As France mourns its victims , its fight against terrorism and radicalism deserves more understanding and solidarity .
The coverage has puzzled if not angered French observers .
An op-ed in Le Monde denounced a “ disconcerting American blindness when it comes to jihadism in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frequently been analyzed through the prism of domestic electoral politics as allegedly trying to co-opt the far-right .
But this analysis represents a gross misunderstanding of the French political reality .
A recent poll on the upcoming French presidential election in 2022 shows a situation eerily similar to the one that prevailed in 2017 , when Macron roundly defeated Marine Le Pen in the second round .
The vast majority of French citizens feel deep concern over the situation .
According to a IFOP survey last month , 89 percent of respondents considered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” 87 percent that “ secularism is in danger , ” and 79 percent that “ Islamism has declared war on the nation and the Republic.
” Are these all National Rally voters ?
While pointing to a “ crisis ” within Islam , Macron was careful to distinguish the majority of French Muslims living and observing peacefully from the radical minority that poses a threat .
The comparisons with far-right rhetoric , which precisely refuses to make such distinctions , thus completely miss the point .
For many French liberals , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the one against the far-right—both are a defense of liberal democratic values against illiberal ideologies .
French Justice Minister Éric Dupond-Moretti thus dismissed calls for emergency measures coming from the National Rally , insisting that the rule of law was the only possible solution .
Outsiders also misunderstand the situation on the ground in France as it deals with radical Islamism .
After the recent attacks , the government chose to close a mosque and an NGO suspected of ties with radical groups .
But more consequential legislative action was initiated this fall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bill seeking to fight “ separatism.
” Building on months of dialogue with religious organizations like the French Council of the Muslim Faith , Macron suggested stemming foreign funding for mosques and the training of imams , aiming to instead privilege domestic training of religious scholars in accordance with democratic values .
The term “ separatism ” was chosen concertedly .
Scholars such as Gilles Kepel , who has been influential in Macron ’ s thinking , have documented that France faces a struggle with Islamism that extends beyond terrorism .
The deeper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ radical groups in certain neighborhoods that exist outside the state ’ s purview , a countersociety that operates at the expense of women , LGBT people , Jews , and many others .
Kepel ’ s book Terror in France recounts the trajectory of figures like Mohammed Merah , the terrorist who killed seven people , including three Jewish children , in Toulouse in 2012 .
At the time , Merah was seen as the ultimate “ lone wolf , ” a former petty criminal-turned-radical , acting on his own , without receiving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as al Qaeda or the Islamic State .
But years of investigations showed a different picture from the convenient lone-wolf narrative .
Merah was socialized in a radical ideology that was the norm in his direct environment .
From his family to his friends to his mosque ( that Islamic State leaders Fabien and Jean-Michel Clain also attended ) , Merah ’ s ideological surroundings laid the groundwork for his radicalism .
Rather than look at individual profiles and the psychological underpinnings of radicalism , the French government wants to tackle the ecosystems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All this adds to many reports over the years of growing pressure on teachers trying to teach about the Holocaust , sex education , or even basic biology .
In 2002 , a book written by a collective of high school professors , The Lost Territories of the Republic , warned of alarming sexism and anti-Semitism in the French banlieues .
A female professor interviewed by the Financial Times last month reported : “ I don ’ t feel safe .
If I have to show a film with a nude scene or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be shouting , and not just the normal teenage stuff , real aggression , kids saying , ‘ This is not OK.
It ’ s not allowed.
’ ” Male physicians have been put under pressure to avoid attending to female patients alone .
Mayors have come under criticism for acceding to demands from religious groups for separate hours for women in public swimming pools .
More recently , a group of Sorbonne scholars ( a university not known for its far-right activism to say the least ) led by Bernard Rougier published @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Conquered by Islamism , warning that “ Islamist networks have managed to build enclaves at the heart of popular neighborhoods.
” Jews , who represent 1 percent of the French population but are disproportionally targeted by hate crimes ( about 40 percent of attacks most years ) , have largely deserted these areas in the last decade .
According to the jihadism scholar Hugo Micheron , currently at Princeton University , about 2,000 French individuals are considered to represent a direct jihadi threat ; another 20,000 are monitored by French intelligence as potential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ larger group is influenced by Salafi ideals and is at threat of breaking away from French society .
This third group is the one targeted by the new policy on separatism .
Micheron quotes an influential 2016 study by Hakim El Karoui at the centrist think tank Institut Montaigne , estimating that 28 percent of self-declared French Muslims are seen as “ secessionist , ” according to which Islam becomes a means of self-assertion against French society .
Similarly , according to the respected pollster Jérôme Fourquet , the author of the bestselling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ show sympathy for radical ideology .
Could France do a better job at integrating its largest minority and dealing with issues of racism and discrimination ?
Yes , it certainly could .
Discrimination in the job and housing markets , as well as hate speech against Muslims , is a serious problem that French society must address .
And as Macron noted in his speech several weeks ago : “ We built a concentration of misery and difficulties .
We concentrated populations according to origin and social milieu .
…We created neighborhoods where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kept and where these most radical forms [ of Islamism ] became sources of hope.
” Some of the rhetoric from Macron ’ s own government hasn ’ t been helpful either .
Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin , himself of North African heritage , criticized large corporations for acceding to identity politics by having separate kosher and halal aisles .
But blaming the French state for the attacks and the rise of radicalism shows a dangerous moral confusion .
Nor is secularism to blame here .
While French secularism laws prohibit “ ostentatious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , kippas , or large crosses ) in schools and state buildings , Paty ’ s killing and the new wave of attacks are linked to the Charlie Hebdo cartoons and most recently to the trials of the accomplices of the 2015 attacks .
Whatever one thinks of the magazine—which regularly mocks all religions , the far-right , or any politician for that matter—its staff is entitled , in a liberal democracy , to draw cartoons without being murdered .
Besides , secularism or not , France is not alone in this fight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population in Europe , Belgium , Denmark , and Sweden , none of them harbingers of laïcité , have sent higher proportions of foreign fighters to Syria .
Terrorist attacks have struck Germany , the United Kingdom , Belgium , and others .
France is at the forefront of a deeper battle striking major European societies .
A key fact often overlooked in this context is the diversity of France ’ s 5 million Muslims , of their political opinions , and of their religious practice .
In public service , in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in politics , a new generation of French citizens of multiple religious , ethnic , and social backgrounds are making a name for themselves .
They often don ’ t want their public or political identities to be conferred by their religion .
Other French people carry their religious identity more visibly , and that ’ s their full right , even if it is not always well received in a deeply secular , even atheist society .
It is paradoxical that so many news outlets in the world claim to care for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the different opinions they have or even speaking with them .
It is up to them , not Erdogan or Khan , to speak for their identity .
Meanwhile , denouncing policies targeting Islamists as “ Islamophobia ” bundles all Muslims together with the radical minority that is precisely attempting to prevent their integration with society as a whole .
It ’ s a trap .
To name things wrongly is to add to the world ’ s misery , Albert Camus said .
In 2017 , after Brexit and the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of terrorist attacks and structural economic difficulties , the French electorate chose to resoundingly defeat the far-right and opt for a centrist , pro-European government .
Today France is the front line of another fight against illiberalism , and it is leading that fight with the same values .
It deserves better than denial and accusations from its friends .

Last Thursday, three French citizens were brutally killed in a church in Nice, one of them a woman whose throat was slit. This gruesome act, coming barely two weeks after the beheading of Samuel Paty, a history teacher who showed his class cartoons from the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo to illustrate the concept of freedom of speech, has reawakened France to the reality of Islamist terrorism. Since 2012, more than 260 people of all backgrounds have died in terrorist attacks: in a Jewish school, at the Charlie Hebdo headquarters, in a concert hall, in the streets of Nice, in churches, and in police street patrols.
Last Thursday, three French citizens were brutally killed in a church in Nice, one of them a woman whose throat was slit. This gruesome act, coming barely two weeks after the beheading of Samuel Paty, a history teacher who showed his class cartoons from the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo to illustrate the concept of freedom of speech, has reawakened France to the reality of Islamist terrorism. Since 2012, more than 260 people of all backgrounds have died in terrorist attacks: in a Jewish school, at the Charlie Hebdo headquarters, in a concert hall, in the streets of Nice, in churches, and in police street patrols.
Yet when looking at some of the coverage of the most recent attacks in the United States, and the reaction from leaders like Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the culprit is France itself. French President Emmanuel Macron’s vow to fight “Islamist separatism” has been treated as its own act of barbarism. Most French citizens, however, aware of the reality on the ground, recognize this fight as necessary and overdue.
In the latest of a series of personal attacks against the French president, Erdogan claimed that “Macron needed mental treatment” for his response to the attack. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan asserted on Twitter that Macron’s words encouraged “Islamophobia,” while Mahathir Mohamad, the former prime minister of Malaysia, upped the ante by commenting that Muslims have a right to “kill millions of French people” in reaction to the “disrespect” they suffered. Some of the U.S. media coverage seems to take at face value the opportunistic accusations of illiberal leaders such as Erdogan. One article spoke grandiloquently of a “crackdown on Islam,” and the initial headline on a New York Times piece about Paty’s killing was “French Police Shoot and Kill Man After a Fatal Knife Attack on the Street.”
As France mourns its victims, its fight against terrorism and radicalism deserves more understanding and solidarity.
The coverage has puzzled if not angered French observers. An op-ed in Le Monde denounced a “disconcerting American blindness when it comes to jihadism in France.” Macron’s measures have frequently been analyzed through the prism of domestic electoral politics as allegedly trying to co-opt the far-right. But this analysis represents a gross misunderstanding of the French political reality. A recent poll on the upcoming French presidential election in 2022 shows a situation eerily similar to the one that prevailed in 2017, when Macron roundly defeated Marine Le Pen in the second round. The vast majority of French citizens feel deep concern over the situation. According to a IFOP survey last month, 89 percent of respondents considered the terrorist threat to be “high,” 87 percent that “secularism is in danger,” and 79 percent that “Islamism has declared war on the nation and the Republic.” Are these all National Rally voters?
While pointing to a “crisis” within Islam, Macron was careful to distinguish the majority of French Muslims living and observing peacefully from the radical minority that poses a threat. The comparisons with far-right rhetoric, which precisely refuses to make such distinctions, thus completely miss the point. For many French liberals, this fight is not easily separable from the one against the far-right—both are a defense of liberal democratic values against illiberal ideologies. French Justice Minister Éric Dupond-Moretti thus dismissed calls for emergency measures coming from the National Rally, insisting that the rule of law was the only possible solution.
Outsiders also misunderstand the situation on the ground in France as it deals with radical Islamism. After the recent attacks, the government chose to close a mosque and an NGO suspected of ties with radical groups. But more consequential legislative action was initiated this fall, when the French government proposed a bill seeking to fight “separatism.” Building on months of dialogue with religious organizations like the French Council of the Muslim Faith, Macron suggested stemming foreign funding for mosques and the training of imams, aiming to instead privilege domestic training of religious scholars in accordance with democratic values.
The term “separatism” was chosen concertedly. Scholars such as Gilles Kepel, who has been influential in Macron’s thinking, have documented that France faces a struggle with Islamism that extends beyond terrorism. The deeper societal challenge involves the growing influence of radical groups in certain neighborhoods that exist outside the state’s purview, a countersociety that operates at the expense of women, LGBT people, Jews, and many others. Kepel’s book Terror in France recounts the trajectory of figures like Mohammed Merah, the terrorist who killed seven people, including three Jewish children, in Toulouse in 2012. At the time, Merah was seen as the ultimate “lone wolf,” a former petty criminal-turned-radical, acting on his own, without receiving orders from an organized terrorist network such as al Qaeda or the Islamic State. But years of investigations showed a different picture from the convenient lone-wolf narrative. Merah was socialized in a radical ideology that was the norm in his direct environment. From his family to his friends to his mosque (that Islamic State leaders Fabien and Jean-Michel Clain also attended), Merah’s ideological surroundings laid the groundwork for his radicalism. Rather than look at individual profiles and the psychological underpinnings of radicalism, the French government wants to tackle the ecosystems that have allowed them to prosper.
All this adds to many reports over the years of growing pressure on teachers trying to teach about the Holocaust, sex education, or even basic biology. In 2002, a book written by a collective of high school professors, The Lost Territories of the Republic, warned of alarming sexism and anti-Semitism in the French banlieues. A female professor interviewed by the Financial Times last month reported: “I don’t feel safe. If I have to show a film with a nude scene or a couple embracing, there’d be shouting, and not just the normal teenage stuff, real aggression, kids saying, ‘This is not OK. It’s not allowed.’” Male physicians have been put under pressure to avoid attending to female patients alone. Mayors have come under criticism for acceding to demands from religious groups for separate hours for women in public swimming pools. More recently, a group of Sorbonne scholars (a university not known for its far-right activism to say the least) led by Bernard Rougier published a series of empirical studies titled Territories Conquered by Islamism, warning that “Islamist networks have managed to build enclaves at the heart of popular neighborhoods.” Jews, who represent 1 percent of the French population but are disproportionally targeted by hate crimes (about 40 percent of attacks most years), have largely deserted these areas in the last decade.
According to the jihadism scholar Hugo Micheron, currently at Princeton University, about 2,000 French individuals are considered to represent a direct jihadi threat; another 20,000 are monitored by French intelligence as potential accomplices; and a third, much larger group is influenced by Salafi ideals and is at threat of breaking away from French society. This third group is the one targeted by the new policy on separatism. Micheron quotes an influential 2016 study by Hakim El Karoui at the centrist think tank Institut Montaigne, estimating that 28 percent of self-declared French Muslims are seen as “secessionist,” according to which Islam becomes a means of self-assertion against French society. Similarly, according to the respected pollster Jérôme Fourquet, the author of the bestselling book French Archipelago, around 750,000 individuals show sympathy for radical ideology.
Could France do a better job at integrating its largest minority and dealing with issues of racism and discrimination? Yes, it certainly could. Discrimination in the job and housing markets, as well as hate speech against Muslims, is a serious problem that French society must address. And as Macron noted in his speech several weeks ago: “We built a concentration of misery and difficulties. We concentrated populations according to origin and social milieu. …We created neighborhoods where the promise of the Republic was never kept and where these most radical forms [of Islamism] became sources of hope.” Some of the rhetoric from Macron’s own government hasn’t been helpful either. Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin, himself of North African heritage, criticized large corporations for acceding to identity politics by having separate kosher and halal aisles.
But blaming the French state for the attacks and the rise of radicalism shows a dangerous moral confusion. Nor is secularism to blame here. While French secularism laws prohibit “ostentatious” religious signs (such as hijabs, kippas, or large crosses) in schools and state buildings, Paty’s killing and the new wave of attacks are linked to the Charlie Hebdo cartoons and most recently to the trials of the accomplices of the 2015 attacks. Whatever one thinks of the magazine—which regularly mocks all religions, the far-right, or any politician for that matter—its staff is entitled, in a liberal democracy, to draw cartoons without being murdered. Besides, secularism or not, France is not alone in this fight. While France harbors the largest Muslim population in Europe, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden, none of them harbingers of laïcité, have sent higher proportions of foreign fighters to Syria. Terrorist attacks have struck Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and others. France is at the forefront of a deeper battle striking major European societies.
A key fact often overlooked in this context is the diversity of France’s 5 million Muslims, of their political opinions, and of their religious practice. In public service, in the business community, in journalism, and in politics, a new generation of French citizens of multiple religious, ethnic, and social backgrounds are making a name for themselves. They often don’t want their public or political identities to be conferred by their religion. Other French people carry their religious identity more visibly, and that’s their full right, even if it is not always well received in a deeply secular, even atheist society. It is paradoxical that so many news outlets in the world claim to care for Muslims in France without giving a voice to the different opinions they have or even speaking with them. It is up to them, not Erdogan or Khan, to speak for their identity. Meanwhile, denouncing policies targeting Islamists as “Islamophobia” bundles all Muslims together with the radical minority that is precisely attempting to prevent their integration with society as a whole. It’s a trap.
To name things wrongly is to add to the world’s misery, Albert Camus said. In 2017, after Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, after two years of terrorist attacks and structural economic difficulties, the French electorate chose to resoundingly defeat the far-right and opt for a centrist, pro-European government. Today France is the front line of another fight against illiberalism, and it is leading that fight with the same values. It deserves better than denial and accusations from its friends.