foreignpolicy--2020-02-07--Poland Is Becoming a Global Capital of Chutzpah

Von Seltmann is one of a small number of artists and designers , both Jewish and not , who currently live in Poland and are actively engaged with the legacy of the Holocaust and the lost world of Polish Jewry .
“ It ’ s a topic I always try to address , ” said von Seltmann , who has collaborated on similarly themed film projects with her German-born husband .
Growing up outside Krakow , Poland , von Seltmann said there was a “ silence ” surrounding anything to do with her community ’ s missing Jews .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Poland , uncovering the country ’ s hidden Jewish heritage is a crucial act of remembrance , an effort to “ bring back the past , ” as von Seltmann puts it .
That kind of artistic time-traveling seems especially relevant in today ’ s Poland .
2020 marks the 75th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi death camps , the largest of which ( Auschwitz-Birkenau , Treblinka , and Belzec , if reckoning by numbers killed ) were all located on Polish soil .
At the same time , under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Justice ( PiS ) party , the Polish national government has passed restrictive legislation that threatens serious penalties for anyone , artist or otherwise , who suggests Polish complicity in the slaughter .
Roundly condemned by the international media , the 2018 Act on the Institute of National Remembrance continues to be zealously executed , albeit with mixed success .
This past November , the government finally dropped a case against the esteemed U.S.-based academic Jan Tomasz Gross , who was threatened with jail time for purportedly “ insulting the Polish nation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Poles .
“ There is a space for Jewish art now , ” Czernek said ; the country ’ s politics , she added , “ don ’ t feel connected with our practice , ” at least not in a way that inhibits their creativity or their sales .
How to make art in such a repressive environment ?
Yael Wisnicki Levi is one artist whose multipronged practice confronts the problem of Jewish identity in modern-day Poland .
“ I ’ m in a privileged position , ” she said—born in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she was able to claim Polish citizenship thanks to her family ’ s roots in the country , from which her grandfather escaped just prior to the Holocaust .
Since emigrating , Levi has staged assorted exhibitions and performance pieces with various international collaborators ; one of them , a 2015 theatre work called Six Verbs Movement , was an abstract exploration of collective memory and civic action as part of a six-day festival in the heartland town of Lublin .
As something of a novelty for Polish audiences , Levi said that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kind of Jewish ornament ” ; yet while she is alarmed by what she calls PiS ’ s “ whitewashing ” of Polish history , Levi described Poland as “ a really comfortable place ” for an artist of her stripe .
“ That the government is nationalist , right-wing—everyone knows this , ” she said .
“ But in fact it ’ s much harder to be a woman than a Jew.
” A surprising bullishness seems common among Polish artists engaged with Jewish issues .
“ Every city in Poland wishes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Aleksander Prugar .
A designer based in Warsaw , Prugar and his partner Helena Czernek are the founders of Mi Polin , a design collaborative specializing in contemporary Judaica .
The business , which bills itself as the first of its kind in postwar Poland , began five years ago with a photography project documenting the traces of long-removed mezuzahs—the markers traditionally placed on the doorposts of Jewish homes—often found in older buildings throughout Poland .
From merely observing the outline of the vanished objects , the pair moved on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a full line of menorahs , candles , and assorted jewelry , largely sold online .
And while the buyers for much of their work come from abroad , and especially from the United States , clients have sprung up at home as well .
“ There is a space for Jewish art now , ” Czernek said ; the country ’ s politics , she added , “ don ’ t feel connected with our practice , ” at least not in a way that inhibits their creativity or their sales .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the stifling political atmosphere grows only deeper when one recalls that , in Poland , art and government are deeply intertwined .
Many if not most artists are subsidized through generous grants , and financing for work on Jewish themes has been robust : Levi has benefited from such funding , while von Seltmann ’ s most recent projection was financed by the city of Warsaw .
The government has continued to bankroll museums , such as the Polin Museum of the History of Polish Jews , whose exhibitions on prewar Jewish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marketplace—at the major auction houses Agra Art and Desa Unicum , pieces by 19th- and early 20th-century Jewish painters such as Chaim Goldberg and Maurycy Trebacz fetch substantial sums , and at least one prewar Jewish artist , Moshe Rynecki , has even become a popular subject for forgers .
His great grand-daughter Elizabeth Rynecki , who released a documentary in 2018 about her search for her forebear ’ s work , has made multiple journeys to Poland , trolling flea markets awash in what purported to be Jewish art .
“ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all legit or not , ” Rynecki said .
Much of what she saw , locals assured her , was of very recent vintage , neo-Jewish kitsch catering to nostalgic Poles .
That these same Poles returned PiS to power in October 2019 with the largest majority since the fall of the communist regime may seem hard to fathom .
On the other hand , the nation ’ s philo-Semitic populace and its anti-Semitic policies may be not be so unrelated .
“ It ’ s all about preserving the myth of Polish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Polish-born professor of history at the University of Ottawa .
Grabowski discerns a distinct pattern in attitudes toward artistic remembrance of the Holocaust .
At the planned Warsaw Ghetto Museum , for example , the government has proposed what Grabowski calls “ monuments to Polish virtue ” —statues of Poles credited with saving Jewish lives—nearly surrounding the building .
“ The idea is to stress the bravery of the Aryan population , ” said the historian , with Poles embracing Jewish misery in order to further a narrative of national victimhood .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Americans ; in the United States , the anti-racist Black Lives Matter movement has been met with chants of “ All Lives Matter , ” an analogous attempt to appropriate minority suffering and efface majority guilt .
“ The situation is more or less the same ” for all cultural actors in Poland , said Monika Krajewska .
The artist , a specialist in Hebrew calligraphy and gravestone inscriptions , feels that the general impact of the PiS has been “ negative , ” though she cautions that any broad assessment risks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thrived—yet he institutional sphere in which they operate has been in constant tumult .
The Polin Museum , Warsaw ’ s Center for Contemporary Art , and the National Museum have all been caught in leadership struggles , all instigated to some degree by political interference .
The pervasive government presence may be one reason that , despite the evident appeal of Jewish-oriented art , official recognition of this year ’ s anniversary of the liberation of the country ’ s concentration camps in 1945 appears to be fairly minimal .
The very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ considered , by Polish authorities , to constitute a form of slander .
Among the few bona fide artistic commemorations of the anniversary year , open through Oct. 31 , is an installation on the grounds of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum , now the single most highly trafficked historical site in Poland .
A collaboration between the architect Daniel Libeskind and the photographer Caryl Englander , the piece consists of a long ramp faced on either side by portraits of Holocaust survivors , the images laser-cut into aluminum panels alongside brief testimonials from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Faith , the project examines the religious life of those who escaped the camps .
“ Spirituality as an aspect of survival hasn ’ t really been explored , ” said Henri Lustiger-Thaler , a Brooklyn-based curator and historian who helped organize the exhibition .
Intriguingly , the proportion of Jews to non-Jews in the show is almost exactly commensurate with the population murdered at Auschwitz : 18 to three , or roughly 85 percent Jewish .
At the debut of the exhibition in June , despite suggestions that government officials would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evidence .
Polish leaders did see the show months later , on Jan. 27 , when they appeared at Auschwitz alongside survivors and foreign dignitaries there to mark the date of the camp ’ s liberation .
Not present on that occasion : the nation that did the liberating—Russia , whose representatives were excluded from the ceremony after President Vladimir Putin made disparaging remarks about Poland ’ s Nazi collaborators .
Notably , Through the Lens of Faith is the product almost exclusively of artists and designers based outside Poland .
( Libeskind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country when he was 11 . )
For artists based in Poland , the prevailing political winds may be only one factor in avoiding the Holocaust as a subject this year : There was a swell of artistic output last year in remembrance of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising , including the second of the two synagogue projections at the Blue Skyscraper .
For the artist who created that project , however , 2020 is no less crucial—von Seltmann said she ’ s planning another projection for this spring .
“ I worry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” she said .
“ You have to try and do something .
”

In Poland, on the former site of the Great Synagogue of Warsaw—the largest house of worship for what was, until World War II, the largest Jewish population in the world—there now rises a tall azure skyscraper. Known simply as Blekitny Wiezowiec (“Blue Skyscraper”), the building with its all-glass facade has lately served as a kind of screen for a unique public art project. Twice in the last two years, most recently in April 2019, the artist Gabi von Seltmann has projected an image of the synagogue, long ago destroyed by the Nazis, onto the contemporary skyscraper: a grayish translucent ghost, hovering all night over the Warsaw streetscape.
In Poland, on the former site of the Great Synagogue of Warsaw—the largest house of worship for what was, until World War II, the largest Jewish population in the world—there now rises a tall azure skyscraper. Known simply as Blekitny Wiezowiec (“Blue Skyscraper”), the building with its all-glass facade has lately served as a kind of screen for a unique public art project. Twice in the last two years, most recently in April 2019, the artist Gabi von Seltmann has projected an image of the synagogue, long ago destroyed by the Nazis, onto the contemporary skyscraper: a grayish translucent ghost, hovering all night over the Warsaw streetscape.
Von Seltmann is one of a small number of artists and designers, both Jewish and not, who currently live in Poland and are actively engaged with the legacy of the Holocaust and the lost world of Polish Jewry. “It’s a topic I always try to address,” said von Seltmann, who has collaborated on similarly themed film projects with her German-born husband. Growing up outside Krakow, Poland, von Seltmann said there was a “silence” surrounding anything to do with her community’s missing Jews. For her, and for other like-minded artists in Poland, uncovering the country’s hidden Jewish heritage is a crucial act of remembrance, an effort to “bring back the past,” as von Seltmann puts it.
That kind of artistic time-traveling seems especially relevant in today’s Poland. 2020 marks the 75th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi death camps, the largest of which (Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, and Belzec, if reckoning by numbers killed) were all located on Polish soil. At the same time, under the leadership of the populist right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, the Polish national government has passed restrictive legislation that threatens serious penalties for anyone, artist or otherwise, who suggests Polish complicity in the slaughter. Roundly condemned by the international media, the 2018 Act on the Institute of National Remembrance continues to be zealously executed, albeit with mixed success. This past November, the government finally dropped a case against the esteemed U.S.-based academic Jan Tomasz Gross, who was threatened with jail time for purportedly “insulting the Polish nation” after documenting violence against Jews perpetrated by Poles.
“There is a space for Jewish art now,” Czernek said; the country’s politics, she added, “don’t feel connected with our practice,” at least not in a way that inhibits their creativity or their sales.
How to make art in such a repressive environment? Yael Wisnicki Levi is one artist whose multipronged practice confronts the problem of Jewish identity in modern-day Poland. “I’m in a privileged position,” she said—born in New York, educated in Israel, she was able to claim Polish citizenship thanks to her family’s roots in the country, from which her grandfather escaped just prior to the Holocaust. Since emigrating, Levi has staged assorted exhibitions and performance pieces with various international collaborators; one of them, a 2015 theatre work called Six Verbs Movement, was an abstract exploration of collective memory and civic action as part of a six-day festival in the heartland town of Lublin. As something of a novelty for Polish audiences, Levi said that she feels at times “like a kind of Jewish ornament”; yet while she is alarmed by what she calls PiS’s “whitewashing” of Polish history, Levi described Poland as “a really comfortable place” for an artist of her stripe. “That the government is nationalist, right-wing—everyone knows this,” she said. “But in fact it’s much harder to be a woman than a Jew.”
A surprising bullishness seems common among Polish artists engaged with Jewish issues. “Every city in Poland wishes it could a host Jewish cultural festival,” said Aleksander Prugar. A designer based in Warsaw, Prugar and his partner Helena Czernek are the founders of Mi Polin, a design collaborative specializing in contemporary Judaica. The business, which bills itself as the first of its kind in postwar Poland, began five years ago with a photography project documenting the traces of long-removed mezuzahs—the markers traditionally placed on the doorposts of Jewish homes—often found in older buildings throughout Poland. From merely observing the outline of the vanished objects, the pair moved on to making their own and now produce a full line of menorahs, candles, and assorted jewelry, largely sold online. And while the buyers for much of their work come from abroad, and especially from the United States, clients have sprung up at home as well. “There is a space for Jewish art now,” Czernek said; the country’s politics, she added, “don’t feel connected with our practice,” at least not in a way that inhibits their creativity or their sales.
The contradiction between this lively artistic subculture and the stifling political atmosphere grows only deeper when one recalls that, in Poland, art and government are deeply intertwined. Many if not most artists are subsidized through generous grants, and financing for work on Jewish themes has been robust: Levi has benefited from such funding, while von Seltmann’s most recent projection was financed by the city of Warsaw. The government has continued to bankroll museums, such as the Polin Museum of the History of Polish Jews, whose exhibitions on prewar Jewish artists have helped feed a brisk private marketplace—at the major auction houses Agra Art and Desa Unicum, pieces by 19th- and early 20th-century Jewish painters such as Chaim Goldberg and Maurycy Trebacz fetch substantial sums, and at least one prewar Jewish artist, Moshe Rynecki, has even become a popular subject for forgers. His great grand-daughter Elizabeth Rynecki, who released a documentary in 2018 about her search for her forebear’s work, has made multiple journeys to Poland, trolling flea markets awash in what purported to be Jewish art. “I couldn’t tell if it was all legit or not,” Rynecki said. Much of what she saw, locals assured her, was of very recent vintage, neo-Jewish kitsch catering to nostalgic Poles.
That these same Poles returned PiS to power in October 2019 with the largest majority since the fall of the communist regime may seem hard to fathom. On the other hand, the nation’s philo-Semitic populace and its anti-Semitic policies may be not be so unrelated. “It’s all about preserving the myth of Polish innocence,” said Jan Grabowski, a Polish-born professor of history at the University of Ottawa. Grabowski discerns a distinct pattern in attitudes toward artistic remembrance of the Holocaust. At the planned Warsaw Ghetto Museum, for example, the government has proposed what Grabowski calls “monuments to Polish virtue”—statues of Poles credited with saving Jewish lives—nearly surrounding the building. “The idea is to stress the bravery of the Aryan population,” said the historian, with Poles embracing Jewish misery in order to further a narrative of national victimhood. It is a logic not entirely unfamiliar to Americans; in the United States, the anti-racist Black Lives Matter movement has been met with chants of “All Lives Matter,” an analogous attempt to appropriate minority suffering and efface majority guilt.
“The situation is more or less the same” for all cultural actors in Poland, said Monika Krajewska. The artist, a specialist in Hebrew calligraphy and gravestone inscriptions, feels that the general impact of the PiS has been “negative,” though she cautions that any broad assessment risks “oversimplification.” Individual artists have indeed thrived—yet he institutional sphere in which they operate has been in constant tumult. The Polin Museum, Warsaw’s Center for Contemporary Art, and the National Museum have all been caught in leadership struggles, all instigated to some degree by political interference. The pervasive government presence may be one reason that, despite the evident appeal of Jewish-oriented art, official recognition of this year’s anniversary of the liberation of the country’s concentration camps in 1945 appears to be fairly minimal. The very phrase “Polish death camp” is considered, by Polish authorities, to constitute a form of slander.
Among the few bona fide artistic commemorations of the anniversary year, open through Oct. 31, is an installation on the grounds of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, now the single most highly trafficked historical site in Poland. A collaboration between the architect Daniel Libeskind and the photographer Caryl Englander, the piece consists of a long ramp faced on either side by portraits of Holocaust survivors, the images laser-cut into aluminum panels alongside brief testimonials from each subject. Titled Through the Lens of Faith, the project examines the religious life of those who escaped the camps. “Spirituality as an aspect of survival hasn’t really been explored,” said Henri Lustiger-Thaler, a Brooklyn-based curator and historian who helped organize the exhibition. Intriguingly, the proportion of Jews to non-Jews in the show is almost exactly commensurate with the population murdered at Auschwitz: 18 to three, or roughly 85 percent Jewish. At the debut of the exhibition in June, despite suggestions that government officials would be in attendance, none were in evidence.
Polish leaders did see the show months later, on Jan. 27, when they appeared at Auschwitz alongside survivors and foreign dignitaries there to mark the date of the camp’s liberation. Not present on that occasion: the nation that did the liberating—Russia, whose representatives were excluded from the ceremony after President Vladimir Putin made disparaging remarks about Poland’s Nazi collaborators.
Notably, Through the Lens of Faith is the product almost exclusively of artists and designers based outside Poland. (Libeskind, though born in Poland, left the country when he was 11.) For artists based in Poland, the prevailing political winds may be only one factor in avoiding the Holocaust as a subject this year: There was a swell of artistic output last year in remembrance of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, including the second of the two synagogue projections at the Blue Skyscraper. For the artist who created that project, however, 2020 is no less crucial—von Seltmann said she’s planning another projection for this spring. “I worry that the darkness is coming again,” she said. “You have to try and do something.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-07--Will Irish Elections Lead to Unification?

The United Kingdom has officially withdrawn from the European Union , and this weekend voters in Ireland will go to the polls in what could turn out to be one of the country ’ s most transformative elections in a century .
The ruling Fine Gael party ’ s positive record on Brexit matters little to voters , increasing the chances that the leading opposition party , Fianna Fail , will return to power for the first time in a decade .
By the time the dust settles , however , Fianna Fail will likely find itself well short of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pull together support from a collection of smaller parties to form a government .
One of those parties could be the staunchly nationalist , pro-Irish unity Sinn Fein .
Brexit has reopened the debate over Irish unification , and if Sinn Fein wins enough seats to join a coalition with one of the larger parties , it could reshape the conversation by putting the party in the governments of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for the first time in history .
What is the political situation ?
Fine Gael @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on its positive record in government .
The Irish economy saw the highest growth rate of any EU country in 2019 , and its unemployment rate is the lowest it ’ s been in 13 years .
On Brexit , Taoiseach ( Prime Minister ) Leo Varadkar and his team secured a withdrawal agreement from the United Kingdom that met Dublin ’ s main condition—namely , that the border with Northern Ireland would remain open .
Despite these successes , an ongoing housing crisis and inadequate health services have leveled a blow against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been unable to overcome .
Health and housing are the campaign issues that have been at the forefront of voters ’ minds , and although Fianna Fail is best positioned to capitalize on Fine Gael ’ s misfortune , Sinn Fein seems to have been the biggest beneficiary .
A recent Irish Times opinion poll put its support at 25 percent , first among all parties .
Sinn Fein has a peculiar place in Irish politics .
It is the former political wing of the paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army ( IRA ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1970s and 1980s as a pariah , the party developed a comprehensive social and economic program in the 1990s and 2000s that included a commitment to nonviolent methods and progressive politics .
It took time for its left-wing populist message to gain traction with voters , but after the financial crisis devastated the Irish economy in 2008 , a large section of the electorate was ready for radical change , and Sinn Fein was propelled into the political mainstream .
The party has focused this campaign on health and housing .
“ We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how to invest in good-quality public service provision in areas of health , housing , and child care , particularly targeted at giving workers and families a break , ” said Eoin O Broin , Sinn Fein ’ s housing spokesman who is fighting for reelection in the Dublin Mid-West constituency .
The party ’ s commitment to the issues closest to voter concerns has helped boost its fortunes .
Sinn Fein ’ s paramilitary past has given it a black mark in the Irish political landscape , and both Fine Gael and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arm ’ s length .
But for voters , several changes have occurred in the past 10 years that have made Sinn Fein more palatable , including Brexit .
“ I suspect what Brexit has done is it ’ s made Irish nationalism—a really aggressive Irish nationalism , or anti-British Irish nationalism—more mainstream and more acceptable , ” said Eoin O ’ Malley , a professor at Dublin City University and an expert on Irish politics , “ which makes Sinn Fein ’ s position more mainstream and acceptable.
” What is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s impressive poll numbers , the next government will most likely be led by Fianna Fail .
But none of the largest parties can realistically hope to win a majority of seats , meaning the real question will be whom Fianna Fail can form a government with .
None of the possible outcomes is particularly likely .
A potential grand coalition with Fine Gael would be politically impossible , and Fianna Fail ’ s preferred outcome of leading a so-called rainbow coalition consisting of the constellation of smaller left-wing parties that dot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unstable to last .
The more intriguing question is whether Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein will shed past animosities and go into government together .
The histories of both parties are rooted in militant republicanism .
Fianna Fail emerged out of a 1926 split within Sinn Fein and drew much of its early membership from the IRA after its failure to overthrow the newly established Irish Free State during the 1922-1923 Civil War .
Although Fianna Fail abandoned violence and entered constitutional politics in 1927 , more than seven decades before Sinn Fein @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a center-right social democratic identity vastly different from Sinn Fein ’ s far-left nationalist project ) , elements within the party continued to sympathize with militant republicanism .
As late as the early 1970s , senior members of Fianna Fail were expelled from the frontbenches of the Irish legislature after they illegally organized an internal scheme to funnel weapons to the nascent Provisional IRA .
For some , those broad historical and ideological similarities make a Fianna Fail-Sinn Fein coalition feel almost natural .
Could Sinn Fein end up in government ?
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Fianna Fail leader Micheal Martin is a fierce critic of Sinn Fein , and he has ruled out the possibility of going into government with the party on several occasions .
Grassroots members of Fianna Fail told Foreign Policy that it ’ s unlikely the wider party membership would support such an arrangement .
But below the surface , the picture is more complicated .
Fianna Fail ’ s brand is inextricably linked to state power , and after 10 years on the opposition benches , the desire to return to government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fail has insisted that it won ’ t do so , and I think Micheal Martin is sincere in believing that he doesn ’ t want to do so , ” said O ’ Malley , “ I do think it ’ s his last chance to become taoiseach … and I suspect that it will be very difficult for him to just walk away from that.
” In some quarters of Fianna Fail , a quiet openness toward Sinn Fein has sometimes bubbled to the surface .
In August 2017 , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frontbench members of the Irish parliament were open to a coalition with Sinn Fein , and , more recently , Pat Gallagher , a Fianna Fail lawmaker from Donegal , said he would personally prefer that outcome .
“ The numbers look like that will be the only realistic option , ” O ’ Malley added .
Of course , even if Fianna Fail did choose to engage with Sinn Fein , the offer would have to be sweet enough for it to accept .
“ We ’ ve said very clearly that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all parties after the election , ” said O Broin .
“ But the kind of deal we would be insisting on would be dramatically different from anything that ’ s gone before.
” For Sinn Fein , the price for going into government would be a commitment to comprehensive investment in public services and serious preparations for a referendum on Irish unification .
What would it mean for Irish unity ?
The unity question will be paramount during the government formation process .
Although Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein both support unification @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they have publicly clashed over the timing of a referendum .
Sinn Fein has repeatedly called for one within the lifetime of the next government , whereas Fianna Fail has taken a much more cautious approach , saying a referendum should only happen when the “ conditions are right.
” Dublin , however , is very limited in what it can do to push for a unity referendum .
“ An Irish government can ’ t unilaterally say , ‘ Yes , we ’ re going to give you a border poll [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s the U.K. secretary of state for Northern Ireland who makes that decision , ” O ’ Malley said .
“ So all you can do is say , ‘ Yes , we ’ re going to ask very strenuously for one , ’ but you can ’ t do anything about it.
” Still , for unification to take effect , a referendum would have to pass in both Northern Ireland and the republic , so the southern side is not insignificant .
Further , unionists in Northern Ireland—those who want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Kingdom—are primarily concerned about what their future would look like inside a united Ireland , so the outcome of a border poll there would be partly dependent on how welcoming and conciliatory the Dublin government can show itself to be .
Rhetoric notwithstanding , the timing of a border poll may prove to be a secondary concern .
Neither Fianna Fail ’ s nor Sinn Fein ’ s election manifesto mentions timing , both focusing instead on the details of the consultative process required to lay the groundwork for a referendum .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ does choose to engage Sinn Fein in coalition talks , the timing of a border poll won ’ t be a red line for either party , meaning unity could still be a top priority for the next government .
The result could be historic : The decision to hold a border poll would remain the prerogative of the British government , but the combined force of a resurgent Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland ( where Sinn Fein forms part of the devolved administration ) and a staunchly pro-unity Irish government could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is unclear how a border poll would ultimately turn out ( and especially what the longer-term consequences could be ) , but Saturday ’ s elections could be part of a broader trend leading to Irish unification .

The United Kingdom has officially withdrawn from the European Union, and this weekend voters in Ireland will go to the polls in what could turn out to be one of the country’s most transformative elections in a century. The ruling Fine Gael party’s positive record on Brexit matters little to voters, increasing the chances that the leading opposition party, Fianna Fail, will return to power for the first time in a decade. By the time the dust settles, however, Fianna Fail will likely find itself well short of a majority, meaning it will have to pull together support from a collection of smaller parties to form a government.
The United Kingdom has officially withdrawn from the European Union, and this weekend voters in Ireland will go to the polls in what could turn out to be one of the country’s most transformative elections in a century. The ruling Fine Gael party’s positive record on Brexit matters little to voters, increasing the chances that the leading opposition party, Fianna Fail, will return to power for the first time in a decade. By the time the dust settles, however, Fianna Fail will likely find itself well short of a majority, meaning it will have to pull together support from a collection of smaller parties to form a government.
One of those parties could be the staunchly nationalist, pro-Irish unity Sinn Fein. Brexit has reopened the debate over Irish unification, and if Sinn Fein wins enough seats to join a coalition with one of the larger parties, it could reshape the conversation by putting the party in the governments of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for the first time in history.
What is the political situation?
Fine Gael initially hoped to stake its reelection campaign on its positive record in government. The Irish economy saw the highest growth rate of any EU country in 2019, and its unemployment rate is the lowest it’s been in 13 years. On Brexit, Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Leo Varadkar and his team secured a withdrawal agreement from the United Kingdom that met Dublin’s main condition—namely, that the border with Northern Ireland would remain open. Despite these successes, an ongoing housing crisis and inadequate health services have leveled a blow against the government that it so far has been unable to overcome.
Health and housing are the campaign issues that have been at the forefront of voters’ minds, and although Fianna Fail is best positioned to capitalize on Fine Gael’s misfortune, Sinn Fein seems to have been the biggest beneficiary. A recent Irish Times opinion poll put its support at 25 percent, first among all parties.
Sinn Fein has a peculiar place in Irish politics. It is the former political wing of the paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), and after spending much of the 1970s and 1980s as a pariah, the party developed a comprehensive social and economic program in the 1990s and 2000s that included a commitment to nonviolent methods and progressive politics. It took time for its left-wing populist message to gain traction with voters, but after the financial crisis devastated the Irish economy in 2008, a large section of the electorate was ready for radical change, and Sinn Fein was propelled into the political mainstream.
The party has focused this campaign on health and housing. “We’ve made very significant commitments to how to invest in good-quality public service provision in areas of health, housing, and child care, particularly targeted at giving workers and families a break,” said Eoin O Broin, Sinn Fein’s housing spokesman who is fighting for reelection in the Dublin Mid-West constituency. The party’s commitment to the issues closest to voter concerns has helped boost its fortunes.
Sinn Fein’s paramilitary past has given it a black mark in the Irish political landscape, and both Fine Gael and Fianna Fail have always kept it at arm’s length. But for voters, several changes have occurred in the past 10 years that have made Sinn Fein more palatable, including Brexit.
“I suspect what Brexit has done is it’s made Irish nationalism—a really aggressive Irish nationalism, or anti-British Irish nationalism—more mainstream and more acceptable,” said Eoin O’Malley, a professor at Dublin City University and an expert on Irish politics, “which makes Sinn Fein’s position more mainstream and acceptable.”
What is the most likely outcome?
Despite Sinn Fein’s impressive poll numbers, the next government will most likely be led by Fianna Fail. But none of the largest parties can realistically hope to win a majority of seats, meaning the real question will be whom Fianna Fail can form a government with.
None of the possible outcomes is particularly likely. A potential grand coalition with Fine Gael would be politically impossible, and Fianna Fail’s preferred outcome of leading a so-called rainbow coalition consisting of the constellation of smaller left-wing parties that dot the political landscape would probably be too unstable to last. The more intriguing question is whether Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein will shed past animosities and go into government together.
The histories of both parties are rooted in militant republicanism. Fianna Fail emerged out of a 1926 split within Sinn Fein and drew much of its early membership from the IRA after its failure to overthrow the newly established Irish Free State during the 1922-1923 Civil War. Although Fianna Fail abandoned violence and entered constitutional politics in 1927, more than seven decades before Sinn Fein did (giving it time to adopt a center-right social democratic identity vastly different from Sinn Fein’s far-left nationalist project), elements within the party continued to sympathize with militant republicanism. As late as the early 1970s, senior members of Fianna Fail were expelled from the frontbenches of the Irish legislature after they illegally organized an internal scheme to funnel weapons to the nascent Provisional IRA. For some, those broad historical and ideological similarities make a Fianna Fail-Sinn Fein coalition feel almost natural.
Could Sinn Fein end up in government?
It won’t be an easy sell. Fianna Fail leader Micheal Martin is a fierce critic of Sinn Fein, and he has ruled out the possibility of going into government with the party on several occasions. Grassroots members of Fianna Fail told Foreign Policy that it’s unlikely the wider party membership would support such an arrangement.
But below the surface, the picture is more complicated. Fianna Fail’s brand is inextricably linked to state power, and after 10 years on the opposition benches, the desire to return to government is palpable.
“Even though Fianna Fail has insisted that it won’t do so, and I think Micheal Martin is sincere in believing that he doesn’t want to do so,” said O’Malley, “I do think it’s his last chance to become taoiseach … and I suspect that it will be very difficult for him to just walk away from that.”
In some quarters of Fianna Fail, a quiet openness toward Sinn Fein has sometimes bubbled to the surface. In August 2017, the Irish Times reported that several Fianna Fail frontbench members of the Irish parliament were open to a coalition with Sinn Fein, and, more recently, Pat Gallagher, a Fianna Fail lawmaker from Donegal, said he would personally prefer that outcome. “The numbers look like that will be the only realistic option,” O’Malley added.
Of course, even if Fianna Fail did choose to engage with Sinn Fein, the offer would have to be sweet enough for it to accept.
“We’ve said very clearly that we will talk to any parties and all parties after the election,” said O Broin. “But the kind of deal we would be insisting on would be dramatically different from anything that’s gone before.” For Sinn Fein, the price for going into government would be a commitment to comprehensive investment in public services and serious preparations for a referendum on Irish unification.
What would it mean for Irish unity?
The unity question will be paramount during the government formation process. Although Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein both support unification of Northern Ireland and the republic, they have publicly clashed over the timing of a referendum. Sinn Fein has repeatedly called for one within the lifetime of the next government, whereas Fianna Fail has taken a much more cautious approach, saying a referendum should only happen when the “conditions are right.”
Dublin, however, is very limited in what it can do to push for a unity referendum. “An Irish government can’t unilaterally say, ‘Yes, we’re going to give you a border poll [unity referendum],’ because it’s the U.K. secretary of state for Northern Ireland who makes that decision,” O’Malley said. “So all you can do is say, ‘Yes, we’re going to ask very strenuously for one,’ but you can’t do anything about it.”
Still, for unification to take effect, a referendum would have to pass in both Northern Ireland and the republic, so the southern side is not insignificant. Further, unionists in Northern Ireland—those who want the country to remain part of the United Kingdom—are primarily concerned about what their future would look like inside a united Ireland, so the outcome of a border poll there would be partly dependent on how welcoming and conciliatory the Dublin government can show itself to be.
Rhetoric notwithstanding, the timing of a border poll may prove to be a secondary concern. Neither Fianna Fail’s nor Sinn Fein’s election manifesto mentions timing, both focusing instead on the details of the consultative process required to lay the groundwork for a referendum. This suggests that, if Fianna Fail does choose to engage Sinn Fein in coalition talks, the timing of a border poll won’t be a red line for either party, meaning unity could still be a top priority for the next government.
The result could be historic: The decision to hold a border poll would remain the prerogative of the British government, but the combined force of a resurgent Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland (where Sinn Fein forms part of the devolved administration) and a staunchly pro-unity Irish government could be enough to move London in that direction. It is unclear how a border poll would ultimately turn out (and especially what the longer-term consequences could be), but Saturday’s elections could be part of a broader trend leading to Irish unification.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-08--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

The outbreak of the coronavirus in China continues to capture world headlines , but the longer-term consequences are just starting to be realized .
Meanwhile , Irish voters go to the polls in what could turn out to be one of the country ’ s most transformative elections in a century .
And now that the United Kingdom has left the European Union , Brussels must address serious questions about its future role in world politics .
1 .
Knock-On Effects of China ’ s Coronavirus May Be Worse Than Thought The effects of the virus and China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , from disrupted air travel to rattled supply chains and plummeting commodity prices that are hurting growth prospects abroad , Foreign Policy ’ s Keith Johnson and James Palmer report .
2 .
At Embassies Abroad , Trump Envoys Are Quietly Pushing Out Career Diplomats Several of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s political allies-turned-ambassadors have sacked their deputies amid a culture of mistrust between politically appointed and career State Department officials , Foreign Policy ’ s Robbie Gramer reports .
Ireland ’ s populist Sinn Fein party could join a governing coalition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possibly making Irish unification a priority for the new government , Foreign Policy ’ s Dan Haverty writes .
Turkey recently signed a deal with Libya demarcating new maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean in a humiliating disregard of Greece ’ s territorial claims .
But the Greek prime minister has done little to impede the process , Yiannis Baboulias writes .
The problems the EU is facing go far beyond Britain ’ s decision to leave and raise serious questions about Europe ’ s future role in world politics , Foreign Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @

The outbreak of the coronavirus in China continues to capture world headlines, but the longer-term consequences are just starting to be realized.
The outbreak of the coronavirus in China continues to capture world headlines, but the longer-term consequences are just starting to be realized.
Meanwhile, Irish voters go to the polls in what could turn out to be one of the country’s most transformative elections in a century.
And now that the United Kingdom has left the European Union, Brussels must address serious questions about its future role in world politics.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Investors look at a screen showing stock market movements at a securities company in Hangzhou in China's eastern Zhejiang province on Feb. 3.
The effects of the virus and China’s dramatic response are making themselves felt daily, from disrupted air travel to rattled supply chains and plummeting commodity prices that are hurting growth prospects abroad, Foreign Policy’s Keith Johnson and James Palmer report.
Several of U.S. President Donald Trump’s political allies-turned-ambassadors have sacked their deputies amid a culture of mistrust between politically appointed and career State Department officials, Foreign Policy’s Robbie Gramer reports.
Fianna Fail leader Micheal Martin (left), Taoiseach and Fine Gael leader Leo Varadkar (center), and Sinn Fein leader Mary Lou McDonald take part in the final TV leaders' debate at the RTE studios.
Ireland’s populist Sinn Fein party could join a governing coalition after this weekend’s elections, possibly making Irish unification a priority for the new government, Foreign Policy’s Dan Haverty writes.
Kyriakos Mitsotakis
Turkey recently signed a deal with Libya demarcating new maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean in a humiliating disregard of Greece’s territorial claims. But the Greek prime minister has done little to impede the process, Yiannis Baboulias writes.
The European Union flag is seen through a windshield covered with raindrops in Sofia, Bulgaria on May 15, 2006.
The problems the EU is facing go far beyond Britain’s decision to leave and raise serious questions about Europe’s future role in world politics, Foreign Policy’s Stephen M. Walt writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-07--America Needs a New Economic Philosophy. Foreign Policy Experts Can Help.

America Needs a New Economic Philosophy .
Foreign Policy Experts Can Help .
U.S. foreign-policy makers now face a world in which power is increasingly measured and exercised in economic terms .
Authoritarian capitalism is challenging market democracy as the prevailing model—and technological disruption , climate change , and inequality are straining the compact between governments and their people .
In such a world , economics , at least as much as anything else , will determine the United States ’ success or failure in geopolitics .
This is especially true when it comes to dealing with China , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strength and influence the Soviet Union never enjoyed .
While military power will still matter , the emerging great-power competition between the United States and China will ultimately turn on how effectively each country stewards its national economy and shapes the global economy .
Looking to U.S. history , from the early years of the republic to the era following World War II , shifts in grand strategy have from time to time necessitated a change in economic philosophy—from mercantilism to laissez-faire absolutism to Keynesianism to neoliberalism—and national security arguments have proved critical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is true today as the United States enters a new era of great-power competition and grapples with powerful forces like inequality , technology , and climate change .
Today , moderate domestic policy experts are experiencing a genuine reckoning as they accept that economists got a number of things wrong and significant correctives are overdue .
As in the past , the United States needs to move beyond the prevailing economic ideology of the past few decades ( sometimes imperfectly termed neoliberalism ) and rethink how the economy operates , the goals it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be restructured to serve those goals—and this is a geopolitical imperative as well as an economic one .
And as in the past , the national security and foreign-policy community should play a proactive role in this domestic economic policy debate , advocating for and helping to deliver the needed reforms .
Today , moderate domestic policy experts are experiencing a genuine reckoning as they accept that economists got a number of things wrong and significant correctives are overdue .
This has produced a marked shift in the debate on issues including worker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anti-monopoly policy , and the scope of public investment .
While foreign-policy hands have started to focus more on what it will take to enhance U.S. competitiveness , they haven ’ t had the same kind of basic reckoning .
The time has come for foreign-policy professionals to develop a sharper and more systematic sense of what needs to change in their own economic assumptions , both domestic and international .
Over the past three years , in an effort to deal with the national emergency that is Donald Trump , Democrats and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have come together to defend a core set of important propositions on alliances , values , and institutions .
In doing so , they have tended to elide differences on hard economic questions or to avoid answering them .
And over the past 30 years , foreign-policy professionals have largely deferred questions of economics to a small community of experts who run international economic affairs .
Partly , this deference has come from a view that economics and foreign policy ought to be kept distinct , as if mixing the two would taint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ science , with the self-interested influences of geopolitics .
And partly , it is because the foreign-policy elite , like much of the rest of U.S. society , internalized this economic orthodoxy and came to believe it to such an extent that delegation was a matter of mere convenience .
This explains , for example , why the Barack Obama and George W. Bush administrations had such different approaches to domestic economic policy but nearly identical approaches to foreign economic policy , from the Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) to the International Monetary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , indeed they should not , stay on the sidelines in emerging economic policy debates .
In the past , U.S. grand strategy has been built around economic theories matched to the moment—and strategists were central to the conversation .
For example , in the country ’ s earliest days , the United States was fending off empires built on mercantilism .
Well aware that it couldn ’ t beat established players like France and the United Kingdom at this game , the country rejected mercantilism and instead adopted—and then helped spread—a free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States ’ early love affair with Adam Smith and David Ricardo was in part about geopolitical survival .
Foreign-policy experts need not and should not stay on the sidelines in emerging economic policy debates .
The Cold War yielded a similar story .
The U.S. government used a recipe advocated by the British economist John Maynard Keynes to grow its economy in the decades following World War II at a pace that the Soviet economy could not match .
This involved a formula of stimulating consumer demand and industrial production through public investment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And while history tends to condense the rise of Keynesianism in those years into an obvious , inevitable response to the Great Depression and a world war , it was hardly clear in the earliest days of the Cold War that this approach would consolidate itself into orthodoxy .
It happened because a range of voices—including U.S. national security voices like Cordell Hull , who was secretary of state from 1933 to 1944 , and the veteran diplomat George Kennan—made the case that out-competing the Soviets called for discarding the laissez-faire economic philosophies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Great Depression .
In pressing his case for a more expansionary economics during the early years of the Cold War , Kennan pointed to a generation earlier , arguing that the foreign-policy horrors of the 1930s could be traced to the “ lost opportunities ” of the 1920s .
History is again knocking .
The growing competition with China and shifts in the international political and economic order should provoke a similar instinct within the contemporary foreign-policy establishment .
Today ’ s national security experts need to move beyond the prevailing neoliberal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This philosophy can be summarized as reflexive confidence in competitive markets as the surest route to maximizing both individual liberty and economic growth and a corresponding belief that the role of government is best confined to securing those competitive markets through enforcing property rights , only intervening in the supposedly rare instance of market failure .
The foreign-policy establishment need not come up with the next economic philosophy ; the task is more limited—to contribute a geopolitical perspective to the unfolding debate on what should follow neoliberalism and then to make the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as it emerges .
Toward this end , the foreign-policy community needs to shed a number of old assumptions .
Whereas the most damaging elements of the previous approach are being discarded from mainstream economics , certain tropes still linger in the foreign-policy conversation .
First , policymakers should recognize that underinvestment is a bigger threat to national security than the U.S. national debt .
At annual gatherings both inside and beyond Washington , senior national security experts still inveigh against the debt as a top national security threat .
Generals and admirals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress on a regular basis .
But by now it should be beyond argument that secular stagnation ( whereby satisfactory growth can only be achieved through unstable financial conditions ) , not debt , is far and away the more pressing national security concern .
After all , the world has now had a 10-year live experiment showing how austerity and lack of investment in the face of low growth produce destabilizing autocrats in the mold of Hungary ’ s Viktor Orban and Brazil ’ s Jair Bolsonaro .
This is not to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rather , it is to emphasize the distinction between good debt and bad debt—a point now widely embraced in economic circles .
The U.S. national security community is rightly beginning to insist on the investments in infrastructure , technology , innovation , and education that will determine the United States ’ long-term competitiveness vis-à-vis China .
With growth , inflation , and interest rates all lagging , policymakers should not be intimidated by arguments going back to the Simpson-Bowles commission ( and likely to return if a Democrat takes office in 2021 ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these investments .
Bad debt , though , does create risk without enhancing medium- and longer-term growth potential .
The Trump administration ’ s 2018 tax legislation , with a price tag of between $ 1.5 trillion and $ 2.3 trillion ( two or three times what the 2009 stimulus cost ) , serves as an expensive lesson .
There are now too many nails in the coffin of trickle-down tax cuts for corporations and the wealthiest Americans to view it as anything but a zombie ideology that is redistributing trillions of dollars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wealthiest—and the foreign-policy community should likewise dismiss it .
The idea of trickle-down tax cuts for corporations and the wealthiest Americans is discredited .
It simply redistributes trillions of dollars from lower- and middle-income Americans to the wealthiest—and the foreign-policy community should dismiss it .
Second , advocating industrial policy ( broadly speaking , government actions aimed at reshaping the economy ) was once considered embarrassing—now it should be considered something close to obvious .
Despite a 40-odd-year hiatus , industrial policy is deeply American .
Alexander Hamilton ’ s vision for U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a tradition carried forward throughout U.S. history—from Henry Clay ’ s American System to Dwight D. Eisenhower ’ s interstate highway network and Lyndon Johnson ’ s Great Society—until it lost favor in the 1980s .
A return to industrial policy shouldn ’ t simply pick up where the country left off a few decades ago .
Rather than focusing on picking winners in specific sectors , there is an emerging consensus that suggests governments should focus instead on investing in large-scale missions—like putting a man on the moon or achieving net-zero @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The biggest geopolitical reason to get back to industrial policy is climate change .
It can not be addressed by taxing carbon alone .
It will take a surge of deliberate and directed public investment that underwrites a shift to a post-carbon U.S. economy through research and development , deployment of new technologies , and development of climate-friendly infrastructure .
Another good reason is that others are doing it , especially the United States ’ competitors .
President Xi Jinping ’ s Made in China 2025 strategy is a 10-year blueprint aimed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advanced manufacturing leader in both the commercial and military domains .
Good estimates are elusive , but China ’ s subsidies alone reach into the hundreds of billions of dollars .
And these investments have already paid off handsomely in several areas , like artificial intelligence , solar energy , and 5G , where many experts believe China is on par with or already outstripping the United States .
U.S. firms will continue to lose ground in the competition with Chinese companies if Washington continues to rely so heavily on private sector research @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short-term profit-making applications rather than long-term , transformative breakthroughs .
And the United States will be more insecure if it lacks the manufacturing base necessary to produce essential goods—from military technologies to vaccines—in a crisis .
Third , policymakers must move beyond the received wisdom that every trade deal is a good trade deal and that more trade is always the answer .
The details matter .
Whatever one thinks of the TPP , the national security community backed it unquestioningly without probing its actual contents .
U.S. trade policy has suffered too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-deal arguments at face value .
The Nobel laureate and economist Paul Krugman has recently issued something of a mea culpa on this issue , noting that he “ missed a crucial part of the story ” when it came to the impact of China ’ s entry into the World Trade Organization on communities in the United States .
He was partly responding to work by David Autor , David Dorn , and Gordon Hanson , which documented a dramatic loss of U.S. jobs to China—an outcome that had been dismissed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ late 1990s .
Policymakers must move beyond the received wisdom that every trade deal is a good trade deal and that more trade is always the answer .
New thinkers are also looking beyond individual agreements to challenge some of the basic premises of trade theory as applied to today ’ s economy .
For example , the idea that trade will necessarily make both parties better off so long as any losers could in principle be compensated is coming under well-deserved pressure within the field of economics .
This is especially true @ @ @ @ @ @ @ record of harnessing those gains by collecting corporate taxes in the first place , let alone distributing them broadly .
A better approach to trade , then , should involve more aggressively targeting the tax havens and loopholes that undermine many of the theoretical gains from trade .
It should also involve a laser focus on what improves wages and creates high-paying jobs in the United States , rather than making the world safe for corporate investment .
( Why , for example , should it be a U.S. negotiating priority to open @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sachs ? )
And it should connect foreign trade policy to domestic investments in workers and communities so that trade adjustment is not a hollow promise .
Done well , a different course should yield strategic as well as economic dividends .
To take just one example , provisions against currency manipulation—absent in TPP—would not only help the American middle class but also the United States ’ strategic position by constraining China ’ s capacity to fund efforts like its Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) , a connected set of infrastructure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multiple continents .
( China has funded much of the BRI through its stockpile of foreign exchange reserves—a stockpile it amassed through years of intervening heavily in foreign exchange markets to depress the value of its currency in order to make its exports more competitive . )
Fourth , foreign-policy experts must dispense with the notion that what ’ s good for U.S.-based multinational corporations is necessarily good for the United States .
U.S. diplomats travel the world on the taxpayers ’ dime , advocating for U.S. companies to win contracts and deals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often , the jobs created by these contracts and deals are created overseas , not in the United States , and all or most of the benefit goes to investors , not to U.S. workers or communities .
Take the pharmaceutical industry—the United States is the undisputed leader in drug development , and most U.S. negotiators have regarded pharmaceuticals as a source of export strength ( hence all of the generous terms for Big Pharma in U.S. trade deals ) .
The reality , however , is starkly different—the United States owns the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are mostly manufactured abroad .
This might sound like an unsurprising fact of globalization .
Yet the largest sources of U.S. drug imports aren ’ t low-wage countries but Ireland and Switzerland .
This isn ’ t a case of global capital migrating to low-wage countries ; it ’ s happening because of tax sheltering .
According to estimates by the University of California , Berkeley economist Gabriel Zucman , the U.S. government loses close to $ 70 billion a year in tax revenue thanks to U.S. companies shifting their profits to lax @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s almost 20 percent of the corporate tax revenue collected annually .
The result , as the economist Brad Setser has shown , is that the U.S. trade deficit in pharmaceuticals now exceeds the country ’ s surplus in civil aviation ; indeed , the United States imports more pharmaceuticals than smartphones .
It is far from obvious that the U.S. government should be expending so much political capital on an industry that has become so thoroughly divorced from U.S. interests .
Government advocacy for companies is a privilege , not a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take tax structures and revenues into account when deciding whether and how to expend diplomatic leverage on behalf of U.S.-based firms operating abroad .
Finally , there are some areas in which the help of foreign-policy professionals will be central to developing the answers themselves .
One good example is the lively debate now underway on reinvigorating antitrust policy .
Given the evidence linking economic concentration to low growth , stagnant wages , and growing inequality , a renewed form of antitrust law will be a necessary feature of whatever new economic consensus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States breaks up the large technology platforms , for example , some worry this may simply cede global market share to Chinese tech behemoths—unless Washington accompanies a domestic push with a new international antitrust strategy as well .
Especially given the array of strategic technologies that hang in the balance , the foreign-policy community should have something to say about where and how they are produced .
More broadly , arguments driven by national security concerns and the leaders who voice them are a potent source of validation , often determining which ideas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not .
A new common sense on how to manage and grow the economy will more easily take hold if the foreign-policy community helps make the case .
And , most of all , this matters because a new grand strategy for today ’ s world will only be as good as the economic philosophy behind it .
Past assumptions led , among other things , to domestic dislocation and to weaknesses and blind spots in the United States ’ approach to China .
It ’ s time to discard them .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new economic model .
America ’ s national security depends on it .

U.S. foreign-policy makers now face a world in which power is increasingly measured and exercised in economic terms. Authoritarian capitalism is challenging market democracy as the prevailing model—and technological disruption, climate change, and inequality are straining the compact between governments and their people. In such a world, economics, at least as much as anything else, will determine the United States’ success or failure in geopolitics.
U.S. foreign-policy makers now face a world in which power is increasingly measured and exercised in economic terms. Authoritarian capitalism is challenging market democracy as the prevailing model—and technological disruption, climate change, and inequality are straining the compact between governments and their people. In such a world, economics, at least as much as anything else, will determine the United States’ success or failure in geopolitics.
This is especially true when it comes to dealing with China, which has already reached a level of economic strength and influence the Soviet Union never enjoyed. While military power will still matter, the emerging great-power competition between the United States and China will ultimately turn on how effectively each country stewards its national economy and shapes the global economy.
Looking to U.S. history, from the early years of the republic to the era following World War II, shifts in grand strategy have from time to time necessitated a change in economic philosophy—from mercantilism to laissez-faire absolutism to Keynesianism to neoliberalism—and national security arguments have proved critical to securing that change. The same is true today as the United States enters a new era of great-power competition and grapples with powerful forces like inequality, technology, and climate change.
Today, moderate domestic policy experts are experiencing a genuine reckoning as they accept that economists got a number of things wrong and significant correctives are overdue.
As in the past, the United States needs to move beyond the prevailing economic ideology of the past few decades (sometimes imperfectly termed neoliberalism) and rethink how the economy operates, the goals it should serve, and how it should be restructured to serve those goals—and this is a geopolitical imperative as well as an economic one. And as in the past, the national security and foreign-policy community should play a proactive role in this domestic economic policy debate, advocating for and helping to deliver the needed reforms.
Today, moderate domestic policy experts are experiencing a genuine reckoning as they accept that economists got a number of things wrong and significant correctives are overdue. This has produced a marked shift in the debate on issues including worker power, the taxation of capital, anti-monopoly policy, and the scope of public investment. While foreign-policy hands have started to focus more on what it will take to enhance U.S. competitiveness, they haven’t had the same kind of basic reckoning. The time has come for foreign-policy professionals to develop a sharper and more systematic sense of what needs to change in their own economic assumptions, both domestic and international.
Over the past three years, in an effort to deal with the national emergency that is Donald Trump, Democrats and anti-Trump Republicans who work on foreign policy have come together to defend a core set of important propositions on alliances, values, and institutions. In doing so, they have tended to elide differences on hard economic questions or to avoid answering them. And over the past 30 years, foreign-policy professionals have largely deferred questions of economics to a small community of experts who run international economic affairs.
Partly, this deference has come from a view that economics and foreign policy ought to be kept distinct, as if mixing the two would taint economics, long cast as an objective science, with the self-interested influences of geopolitics. And partly, it is because the foreign-policy elite, like much of the rest of U.S. society, internalized this economic orthodoxy and came to believe it to such an extent that delegation was a matter of mere convenience. This explains, for example, why the Barack Obama and George W. Bush administrations had such different approaches to domestic economic policy but nearly identical approaches to foreign economic policy, from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to the International Monetary Fund.
But foreign-policy experts need not, indeed they should not, stay on the sidelines in emerging economic policy debates. In the past, U.S. grand strategy has been built around economic theories matched to the moment—and strategists were central to the conversation. For example, in the country’s earliest days, the United States was fending off empires built on mercantilism. Well aware that it couldn’t beat established players like France and the United Kingdom at this game, the country rejected mercantilism and instead adopted—and then helped spread—a free trade model. Indeed, the United States’ early love affair with Adam Smith and David Ricardo was in part about geopolitical survival.
Foreign-policy experts need not and should not stay on the sidelines in emerging economic policy debates.
The Cold War yielded a similar story. The U.S. government used a recipe advocated by the British economist John Maynard Keynes to grow its economy in the decades following World War II at a pace that the Soviet economy could not match. This involved a formula of stimulating consumer demand and industrial production through public investment and monetary policies favoring full employment. And while history tends to condense the rise of Keynesianism in those years into an obvious, inevitable response to the Great Depression and a world war, it was hardly clear in the earliest days of the Cold War that this approach would consolidate itself into orthodoxy.
It happened because a range of voices—including U.S. national security voices like Cordell Hull, who was secretary of state from 1933 to 1944, and the veteran diplomat George Kennan—made the case that out-competing the Soviets called for discarding the laissez-faire economic philosophies that had dominated in the decades preceding the Great Depression. In pressing his case for a more expansionary economics during the early years of the Cold War, Kennan pointed to a generation earlier, arguing that the foreign-policy horrors of the 1930s could be traced to the “lost opportunities” of the 1920s.
History is again knocking. The growing competition with China and shifts in the international political and economic order should provoke a similar instinct within the contemporary foreign-policy establishment. Today’s national security experts need to move beyond the prevailing neoliberal economic philosophy of the past 40 years. This philosophy can be summarized as reflexive confidence in competitive markets as the surest route to maximizing both individual liberty and economic growth and a corresponding belief that the role of government is best confined to securing those competitive markets through enforcing property rights, only intervening in the supposedly rare instance of market failure.
The foreign-policy establishment need not come up with the next economic philosophy; the task is more limited—to contribute a geopolitical perspective to the unfolding debate on what should follow neoliberalism and then to make the national security case for a new approach as it emerges.
Toward this end, the foreign-policy community needs to shed a number of old assumptions. Whereas the most damaging elements of the previous approach are being discarded from mainstream economics, certain tropes still linger in the foreign-policy conversation.
First, policymakers should recognize that underinvestment is a bigger threat to national security than the U.S. national debt. At annual gatherings both inside and beyond Washington, senior national security experts still inveigh against the debt as a top national security threat. Generals and admirals testify to this effect before the U.S. Congress on a regular basis. But by now it should be beyond argument that secular stagnation (whereby satisfactory growth can only be achieved through unstable financial conditions), not debt, is far and away the more pressing national security concern. After all, the world has now had a 10-year live experiment showing how austerity and lack of investment in the face of low growth produce destabilizing autocrats in the mold of Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro.
This is not to suggest debts and deficits never matter. Rather, it is to emphasize the distinction between good debt and bad debt—a point now widely embraced in economic circles. The U.S. national security community is rightly beginning to insist on the investments in infrastructure, technology, innovation, and education that will determine the United States’ long-term competitiveness vis-à-vis China. With growth, inflation, and interest rates all lagging, policymakers should not be intimidated by arguments going back to the Simpson-Bowles commission (and likely to return if a Democrat takes office in 2021) that the United States cannot afford these investments.
Bad debt, though, does create risk without enhancing medium- and longer-term growth potential. The Trump administration’s 2018 tax legislation, with a price tag of between $1.5 trillion and $2.3 trillion (two or three times what the 2009 stimulus cost), serves as an expensive lesson. There are now too many nails in the coffin of trickle-down tax cuts for corporations and the wealthiest Americans to view it as anything but a zombie ideology that is redistributing trillions of dollars from lower- and middle-income Americans to the wealthiest—and the foreign-policy community should likewise dismiss it.
The idea of trickle-down tax cuts for corporations and the wealthiest Americans is discredited. It simply redistributes trillions of dollars from lower- and middle-income Americans to the wealthiest—and the foreign-policy community should dismiss it.
Second, advocating industrial policy (broadly speaking, government actions aimed at reshaping the economy) was once considered embarrassing—now it should be considered something close to obvious. Despite a 40-odd-year hiatus, industrial policy is deeply American. Alexander Hamilton’s vision for U.S. manufacturing was the first American industrial policy, a tradition carried forward throughout U.S. history—from Henry Clay’s American System to Dwight D. Eisenhower’s interstate highway network and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society—until it lost favor in the 1980s.
A return to industrial policy shouldn’t simply pick up where the country left off a few decades ago. Rather than focusing on picking winners in specific sectors, there is an emerging consensus that suggests governments should focus instead on investing in large-scale missions—like putting a man on the moon or achieving net-zero emissions—that require innovations across many different sectors.
The biggest geopolitical reason to get back to industrial policy is climate change. It cannot be addressed by taxing carbon alone. It will take a surge of deliberate and directed public investment that underwrites a shift to a post-carbon U.S. economy through research and development, deployment of new technologies, and development of climate-friendly infrastructure.
Another good reason is that others are doing it, especially the United States’ competitors. President Xi Jinping’s Made in China 2025 strategy is a 10-year blueprint aimed at catapulting China into a technology and advanced manufacturing leader in both the commercial and military domains. Good estimates are elusive, but China’s subsidies alone reach into the hundreds of billions of dollars. And these investments have already paid off handsomely in several areas, like artificial intelligence, solar energy, and 5G, where many experts believe China is on par with or already outstripping the United States.
U.S. firms will continue to lose ground in the competition with Chinese companies if Washington continues to rely so heavily on private sector research and development, which is directed toward short-term profit-making applications rather than long-term, transformative breakthroughs. And the United States will be more insecure if it lacks the manufacturing base necessary to produce essential goods—from military technologies to vaccines—in a crisis.
Third, policymakers must move beyond the received wisdom that every trade deal is a good trade deal and that more trade is always the answer. The details matter. Whatever one thinks of the TPP, the national security community backed it unquestioningly without probing its actual contents. U.S. trade policy has suffered too many mistakes over the years to accept pro-deal arguments at face value.
The Nobel laureate and economist Paul Krugman has recently issued something of a mea culpa on this issue, noting that he “missed a crucial part of the story” when it came to the impact of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization on communities in the United States. He was partly responding to work by David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson, which documented a dramatic loss of U.S. jobs to China—an outcome that had been dismissed by traditional economists during the debates in the late 1990s.
Policymakers must move beyond the received wisdom that every trade deal is a good trade deal and that more trade is always the answer.
New thinkers are also looking beyond individual agreements to challenge some of the basic premises of trade theory as applied to today’s economy. For example, the idea that trade will necessarily make both parties better off so long as any losers could in principle be compensated is coming under well-deserved pressure within the field of economics. This is especially true given the United States’ terrible track record of harnessing those gains by collecting corporate taxes in the first place, let alone distributing them broadly.
A better approach to trade, then, should involve more aggressively targeting the tax havens and loopholes that undermine many of the theoretical gains from trade. It should also involve a laser focus on what improves wages and creates high-paying jobs in the United States, rather than making the world safe for corporate investment. (Why, for example, should it be a U.S. negotiating priority to open China’s financial system for Goldman Sachs?) And it should connect foreign trade policy to domestic investments in workers and communities so that trade adjustment is not a hollow promise.
Done well, a different course should yield strategic as well as economic dividends. To take just one example, provisions against currency manipulation—absent in TPP—would not only help the American middle class but also the United States’ strategic position by constraining China’s capacity to fund efforts like its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a connected set of infrastructure projects designed to enhance Chinese power across multiple continents. (China has funded much of the BRI through its stockpile of foreign exchange reserves—a stockpile it amassed through years of intervening heavily in foreign exchange markets to depress the value of its currency in order to make its exports more competitive.)
Fourth, foreign-policy experts must dispense with the notion that what’s good for U.S.-based multinational corporations is necessarily good for the United States. U.S. diplomats travel the world on the taxpayers’ dime, advocating for U.S. companies to win contracts and deals in foreign countries. But all too often, the jobs created by these contracts and deals are created overseas, not in the United States, and all or most of the benefit goes to investors, not to U.S. workers or communities.
Take the pharmaceutical industry—the United States is the undisputed leader in drug development, and most U.S. negotiators have regarded pharmaceuticals as a source of export strength (hence all of the generous terms for Big Pharma in U.S. trade deals). The reality, however, is starkly different—the United States owns the intellectual property, but the active ingredients are mostly manufactured abroad. This might sound like an unsurprising fact of globalization. Yet the largest sources of U.S. drug imports aren’t low-wage countries but Ireland and Switzerland.
This isn’t a case of global capital migrating to low-wage countries; it’s happening because of tax sheltering. According to estimates by the University of California, Berkeley economist Gabriel Zucman, the U.S. government loses close to $70 billion a year in tax revenue thanks to U.S. companies shifting their profits to lax jurisdictions like Ireland and Switzerland. That’s almost 20 percent of the corporate tax revenue collected annually.
The result, as the economist Brad Setser has shown, is that the U.S. trade deficit in pharmaceuticals now exceeds the country’s surplus in civil aviation; indeed, the United States imports more pharmaceuticals than smartphones. It is far from obvious that the U.S. government should be expending so much political capital on an industry that has become so thoroughly divorced from U.S. interests.
Government advocacy for companies is a privilege, not a right. And future U.S. administrations should take tax structures and revenues into account when deciding whether and how to expend diplomatic leverage on behalf of U.S.-based firms operating abroad.
Finally, there are some areas in which the help of foreign-policy professionals will be central to developing the answers themselves. One good example is the lively debate now underway on reinvigorating antitrust policy. Given the evidence linking economic concentration to low growth, stagnant wages, and growing inequality, a renewed form of antitrust law will be a necessary feature of whatever new economic consensus emerges.
Yet, if the United States breaks up the large technology platforms, for example, some worry this may simply cede global market share to Chinese tech behemoths—unless Washington accompanies a domestic push with a new international antitrust strategy as well. Especially given the array of strategic technologies that hang in the balance, the foreign-policy community should have something to say about where and how they are produced.
More broadly, arguments driven by national security concerns and the leaders who voice them are a potent source of validation, often determining which ideas are deemed worthy or serious and which are not. A new common sense on how to manage and grow the economy will more easily take hold if the foreign-policy community helps make the case.
And, most of all, this matters because a new grand strategy for today’s world will only be as good as the economic philosophy behind it. Past assumptions led, among other things, to domestic dislocation and to weaknesses and blind spots in the United States’ approach to China. It’s time to discard them. The foreign-policy community should actively reach for a new economic model. America’s national security depends on it.