foreignpolicy--2020-07-29--The Risks of Susan Rice

The Risks of Susan Rice

Susan Rice , former national security advisor under President Barack Obama , is back in the news as a leading prospect to be named Joe Biden ’ s running mate against Donald Trump in November , following the presumptive Democratic nominee ’ s announcement that he will choose a woman , perhaps as early as this weekend .
Rice , 55 , possesses enormous advantages : A former U.N. ambassador as well as senior advisor to Obama , the Stanford University-educated former Rhodes scholar is by all accounts brilliant and deeply experienced in foreign policy to a degree few other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at a moment when the Black Lives Matter movement and calls for social justice have gripped the nation in the aftermath of George Floyd ’ s killing in May , Rice may rank high on Biden ’ s list of possibilities because she is one of the most accomplished and prominent African Americans in the Democratic Party .
Rice also has had a long and close relationship with Biden , who values loyalty .
This stands in stark contrast to California Sen. Kamala Harris , another leading candidate , who fiercely attacked the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the issue of racial segregation ; on Tuesday Biden was photographed holding a handwritten series of talking points about Harris that began with : “ Do not hold grudges.
” But Rice also brings a lot of potential baggage , from her role in the 2012 Benghazi tragedy to a personality described by many as abrasive , a lack of political experience , and a shaky track record while helming the National Security Council ( NSC ) .
Republicans are already threatening to revisit the ghosts of Benghazi , the Libyan city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and three other Americans were killed on Sept. 11 , 2012 , leading to one of Rice ’ s worst moments in public life and years of Republican attacks .
But Rice ’ s performance in public office has occasionally raised other issues about her suitability to be vice president that have nothing to do with Benghazi .
During her time as both U.N. ambassador and national security advisor , her judgment , political experience , and temperament were sometimes called into question—even by some within her own party .
Rice easily beats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deaths brought her to national attention in the worst possible way and at a critical point in her career .
Obama , to whom Rice had been a close advisor since his earliest days as a presidential candidate , had wanted her to be his second-term secretary of state , succeeding Hillary Clinton .
But that all ended when , in the days immediately after the Benghazi attacks , Rice gave interviews on the Sunday talk shows .
Speaking from “ talking points ” supplied by the U.S. intelligence community , she suggested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ spontaneous ” protests against an internet video , not an organized Islamist attack .
Right-wing conspiracists pounced , saying Rice and the administration were covering up policy failures to protect Obama and Clinton—whom Rice was sent out to take the heat for .
The allegations of a cover-up were mostly nonsense .
It was later determined that , despite the revelation of a controversial White House memo that sought to shape the official administration line that the Americans ’ deaths weren ’ t due to a “ broader failure of policy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to express the genuinely confused intelligence assessment at the time .
Republicans ultimately turned up so little evidence on Benghazi to use as ammunition against Clinton—their real target all along—that they dropped the issue in 2016 , focusing instead on her private email servers .
Meanwhile , in 2013 the much-maligned Rice was named Obama ’ s national security advisor , rather than getting the top cabinet post , which went to John Kerry .
In her 2019 memoir , Tough Love , Rice wrote that the controversy caused enormous pain for her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ daughter , who experienced hallucinations .
Rice was still traumatized by it years later .
“ Why me ?
” she wrote .
“ Why was I the one the GOP went after when I was a comparatively bit player in the actual Benghazi drama ?
” She had a point .
But the other knocks against Rice ’ s suitability might be harder to shake off .
As Obama ’ s closest foreign-policy aide , she was sometimes accused of running an insular NSC that didn ’ t consult well with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agencies , especially then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel .
“ There is a sense that the NSC is run a little like beehive ball soccer , where everyone storms to wherever the ball is moving around the field , ” one former senior administration official told me at the time .
“ They are managing by crisis rather than strategy .
… It ’ s Syria one day , Iraq the next , North Korea the next , and so on .
The NSC is finding multitasking very hard these days.
” Other critics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ popular with colleagues and subordinates .
Nor did she handle disagreement well , according to one longtime foreign-policy expert who worked for Democratic administrations and dealt with Rice personally .
She also encountered difficulties in her dealings with Capitol Hill that could raise questions about how well Rice would handle a tough national campaign against a media master like Trump .
Some senior officials reject this criticism as unfair , saying the NSC in those years was beset with an extraordinary barrage of crises .
“ I ’ ve worked with Susan for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of State James Steinberg said in an interview .
“ We ’ ve had policy disputes over the years , but she ’ s a very decent person .
She is one of the smartest foreign-policy professionals I ’ ve known .
She ’ s tough-minded but fair , has a deep sense of principles which serve as a lodestar in guiding her in handling complex problems , has a great sense of humor , and is a thoughtful person and good and trustworthy friend in a professional world where that is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rice sought to preserve her candidacy for secretary of state with a series of unpersuasive meetings on Capitol Hill in which she failed to sway even moderate Republicans such as Sen. Susan Collins of Maine ( whom she later considered running against—Rice ’ s family has deep ties to the state ) .
Rice also has never run for public office—an extreme rarity for someone bidding to be vice president ; the last major-party candidate to do so was Sargent Shriver , who lost in a landslide alongside George McGovern in 1972 to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is planning to attack Rice over an email she sent on the day of his inauguration raising questions about discussions her incoming successor , Michael Flynn , had with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak , and the role she might have played in prompting the FBI ’ s Russia investigation .
“ She ’ s not a glad-hander , that is true , ” said a former senior Obama administration official who worked closely with Rice .
“ She ’ s very straightforward .
She ’ s not gon na just make nice for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s honest with people where there are differences , but that ’ s what makes her effective too .
People know where she stands .
Rather than sweet talk and paper things over , she engages.
” A spokesperson for the Biden campaign did not immediately respond to a request for comment .
Some of Rice ’ s defenders say criticism of her no-nonsense manner smacks of sexism .
Indeed , in her book , Rice writes about the challenges of pushing her way upward in what remains largely a man ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The combination—being a confident black woman who is not seeking permission or affirmation from others—I now suspect accounts for why I inadvertently intimidate some people , especially certain men , and perhaps also why I have long inspired motivated detractors who simply can ’ t deal with me.
” But many critics , including even at one point her former Obama administration colleague Samantha Power—who succeeded Rice as U.N. ambassador—have also questioned her judgment and performance in critical policy areas , especially in Africa .
This goes back to the very beginning of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when , during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda , Rice was the NSC director for international organizations and peacekeeping under National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in the Bill Clinton administration .
Both Lake and Rice later expressed regret about failing to advocate U.S. intervention , and Clinton himself called it one of the biggest mistakes of his presidency .
“ Everyone who lived through that feels profoundly remorseful and bothered by it , ” Rice told me in an interview in 2008 , though she said she was too “ junior ” at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much .
Even so , Rice later came under criticism for her relationship with Rwandan President Paul Kagame , who was supplying and financing a brutal Congolese rebel force known as the March 23 ( M23 ) Movement .
While Rice did criticize M23 , she avoided linking the group to Rwanda and Kagame , and in 2012 critics said she held up publication of a U.N. report that accused the Rwandan government of protecting M23 leader Bosco Ntaganda , who was wanted by the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) for committing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human rights sources .
( Her spokesperson at the time , Payton Knopf , denied this . )
In 2019 , the ICC convicted Ntaganda of 18 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity .
During a meeting at the U.N. mission of France , after the French ambassador told Rice that the United Nations needed to do more to intervene in the Democratic Republic of the Congo , Rice replied : “ It ’ s the eastern DRC .
If it ’ s not M23 , it ’ s going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to an account given by a human rights worker who spoke with several people in the room .
The comment was confirmed in other contemporaneous accounts .
“ Looking back , it seems cruel to judge someone for what are practically errors of youth , but I think her work on Africa for the Clinton administration demonstrated elements of her character that give reason for pause , ” said Peter Rosenblum , a Bard College scholar who criticized Rice and the Clinton administration for backing an invasion of the troubled Congo by Rwanda @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brilliant professional who relies more on expertise and the judgment of a chosen group of elites than on the messy work of grassroots activism , constituency building , and democracy .
In Africa , that led her to rely on a group of military leaders who could project themselves as technocrats at the expense of human rights activists and democracy , ” Rosenblum said .
“ I think she was terribly wrong , but I still admire her and want to see her in government .
I just wish she had run for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ school board.
” Rice , however , is said to be very close to Biden in outlook .
She shares with the former vice president—as she did previously with Obama—a stringent , pared-down view of U.S. national interests that stands apart from Hillary Clinton ’ s more hawkish view of intervention , describing herself in her memoir as a “ realist.
” A Biden-Rice administration would likely take a similar view .
According to a former Obama administration official who had backed her bid for secretary of state , Rice and Obama at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the same page on all foreign-policy issues and … she represents Obama foreign policy in a way that Kerry doesn ’ t. ” Indeed , Kerry later found himself at odds with Obama over intervention in Syria and his generally activist approach to foreign policy ( which in the end produced one of the administration ’ s signal triumphs , the nuclear pact with Iran that Trump has since cashiered ) .
Though Rice ultimately backed the bombing of Libya in 2011 along with Clinton and Power—a policy that later gave rise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raging—she was against military involvement in Syria at about the same time .
Rice also initially resisted British and French efforts on the U.N. Security Council to create a no-fly zone against Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi , reportedly telling France ’ s U.N. ambassador , Gérard Araud , “ You ’ re not going to drag us into your shitty war , ” according to a 2012 account by Foreign Policy ’ s Colum Lynch .
Ultimately , however , faced with additional demands from the Arab League for intervention , Rice mounted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ airstrikes against Libyan forces to prevent the slaughter of civilians .
She also presided over a state of confusion within the administration over its strategy of fighting the Islamic State in Iraq while simultaneously trying to pull U.S. troops out of the country .
At one point , Rice sent a letter to then-House Speaker John Boehner requesting a withdrawal of the Authorization for Use of Military Force ( AUMF ) , additional legislation that was passed in 2002 to enable U.S. military action in Iraq .
But the AUMF that Rice wanted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the administration invoked to defeat the Islamic State .
“ Susan was somewhere between Obama and Samantha ” when it came to advocating U.S. intervention abroad , the former Obama administration official said .
“ She was more activist on Libya and some things than Obama wanted to be , but she also learned from her own experience it isn ’ t enough to have good intentions .
It was principle as seen through the light of experience , so she adopted a certain degree of realism.
” The biggest issue with Rice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is that she and Biden are both seen as “ foreign-policy people , ” the former Obama official added .
“ The only downside I see is that , because their strengths are comparable , you don ’ t get the division of labor .
”

Susan Rice, former national security advisor under President Barack Obama, is back in the news as a leading prospect to be named Joe Biden’s running mate against Donald Trump in November, following the presumptive Democratic nominee’s announcement that he will choose a woman, perhaps as early as this weekend.
Susan Rice, former national security advisor under President Barack Obama, is back in the news as a leading prospect to be named Joe Biden’s running mate against Donald Trump in November, following the presumptive Democratic nominee’s announcement that he will choose a woman, perhaps as early as this weekend.
Rice, 55, possesses enormous advantages: A former U.N. ambassador as well as senior advisor to Obama, the Stanford University-educated former Rhodes scholar is by all accounts brilliant and deeply experienced in foreign policy to a degree few other candidates for the job are. And at a moment when the Black Lives Matter movement and calls for social justice have gripped the nation in the aftermath of George Floyd’s killing in May, Rice may rank high on Biden’s list of possibilities because she is one of the most accomplished and prominent African Americans in the Democratic Party. Rice also has had a long and close relationship with Biden, who values loyalty. This stands in stark contrast to California Sen. Kamala Harris, another leading candidate, who fiercely attacked the former vice president during the Democratic primaries on the issue of racial segregation; on Tuesday Biden was photographed holding a handwritten series of talking points about Harris that began with: “Do not hold grudges.”
But Rice also brings a lot of potential baggage, from her role in the 2012 Benghazi tragedy to a personality described by many as abrasive, a lack of political experience, and a shaky track record while helming the National Security Council (NSC).
Republicans are already threatening to revisit the ghosts of Benghazi, the Libyan city where U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were killed on Sept. 11, 2012, leading to one of Rice’s worst moments in public life and years of Republican attacks. But Rice’s performance in public office has occasionally raised other issues about her suitability to be vice president that have nothing to do with Benghazi. During her time as both U.N. ambassador and national security advisor, her judgment, political experience, and temperament were sometimes called into question—even by some within her own party.
Rice easily beats the Benghazi rap, though the tragic deaths brought her to national attention in the worst possible way and at a critical point in her career. Obama, to whom Rice had been a close advisor since his earliest days as a presidential candidate, had wanted her to be his second-term secretary of state, succeeding Hillary Clinton. But that all ended when, in the days immediately after the Benghazi attacks, Rice gave interviews on the Sunday talk shows. Speaking from “talking points” supplied by the U.S. intelligence community, she suggested that Stevens’s death resulted from “spontaneous” protests against an internet video, not an organized Islamist attack. Right-wing conspiracists pounced, saying Rice and the administration were covering up policy failures to protect Obama and Clinton—whom Rice was sent out to take the heat for.
The allegations of a cover-up were mostly nonsense. It was later determined that, despite the revelation of a controversial White House memo that sought to shape the official administration line that the Americans’ deaths weren’t due to a “broader failure of policy,” Rice was basically doing her best to express the genuinely confused intelligence assessment at the time. Republicans ultimately turned up so little evidence on Benghazi to use as ammunition against Clinton—their real target all along—that they dropped the issue in 2016, focusing instead on her private email servers. Meanwhile, in 2013 the much-maligned Rice was named Obama’s national security advisor, rather than getting the top cabinet post, which went to John Kerry. In her 2019 memoir, Tough Love, Rice wrote that the controversy caused enormous pain for her and her family, including her young daughter, who experienced hallucinations. Rice was still traumatized by it years later. “Why me?” she wrote. “Why was I the one the GOP went after when I was a comparatively bit player in the actual Benghazi drama?”
She had a point. But the other knocks against Rice’s suitability might be harder to shake off. As Obama’s closest foreign-policy aide, she was sometimes accused of running an insular NSC that didn’t consult well with the administration’s own cabinet secretaries and agencies, especially then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel.
“There is a sense that the NSC is run a little like beehive ball soccer, where everyone storms to wherever the ball is moving around the field,” one former senior administration official told me at the time. “They are managing by crisis rather than strategy. … It’s Syria one day, Iraq the next, North Korea the next, and so on. The NSC is finding multitasking very hard these days.” Other critics say the outspoken Rice was not always popular with colleagues and subordinates. Nor did she handle disagreement well, according to one longtime foreign-policy expert who worked for Democratic administrations and dealt with Rice personally. She also encountered difficulties in her dealings with Capitol Hill that could raise questions about how well Rice would handle a tough national campaign against a media master like Trump.
Some senior officials reject this criticism as unfair, saying the NSC in those years was beset with an extraordinary barrage of crises. “I’ve worked with Susan for 32 years,” former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said in an interview. “We’ve had policy disputes over the years, but she’s a very decent person. She is one of the smartest foreign-policy professionals I’ve known. She’s tough-minded but fair, has a deep sense of principles which serve as a lodestar in guiding her in handling complex problems, has a great sense of humor, and is a thoughtful person and good and trustworthy friend in a professional world where that is not always the norm.”
After Benghazi, Rice sought to preserve her candidacy for secretary of state with a series of unpersuasive meetings on Capitol Hill in which she failed to sway even moderate Republicans such as Sen. Susan Collins of Maine (whom she later considered running against—Rice’s family has deep ties to the state). Rice also has never run for public office—an extreme rarity for someone bidding to be vice president; the last major-party candidate to do so was Sargent Shriver, who lost in a landslide alongside George McGovern in 1972 to Richard Nixon. Already the Trump camp is planning to attack Rice over an email she sent on the day of his inauguration raising questions about discussions her incoming successor, Michael Flynn, had with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak, and the role she might have played in prompting the FBI’s Russia investigation.
“She’s not a glad-hander, that is true,” said a former senior Obama administration official who worked closely with Rice. “She’s very straightforward. She’s not gonna just make nice for the sake of making nice. She’s honest with people where there are differences, but that’s what makes her effective too. People know where she stands. Rather than sweet talk and paper things over, she engages.”
A spokesperson for the Biden campaign did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Some of Rice’s defenders say criticism of her no-nonsense manner smacks of sexism. Indeed, in her book, Rice writes about the challenges of pushing her way upward in what remains largely a man’s world of high-level policymaking: “The combination—being a confident black woman who is not seeking permission or affirmation from others—I now suspect accounts for why I inadvertently intimidate some people, especially certain men, and perhaps also why I have long inspired motivated detractors who simply can’t deal with me.”
But many critics, including even at one point her former Obama administration colleague Samantha Power—who succeeded Rice as U.N. ambassador—have also questioned her judgment and performance in critical policy areas, especially in Africa. This goes back to the very beginning of Rice’s career in government, when, during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Rice was the NSC director for international organizations and peacekeeping under National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in the Bill Clinton administration. Both Lake and Rice later expressed regret about failing to advocate U.S. intervention, and Clinton himself called it one of the biggest mistakes of his presidency.
“Everyone who lived through that feels profoundly remorseful and bothered by it,” Rice told me in an interview in 2008, though she said she was too “junior” at the time to have affected decision-making very much.
Even so, Rice later came under criticism for her relationship with Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who was supplying and financing a brutal Congolese rebel force known as the March 23 (M23) Movement. While Rice did criticize M23, she avoided linking the group to Rwanda and Kagame, and in 2012 critics said she held up publication of a U.N. report that accused the Rwandan government of protecting M23 leader Bosco Ntaganda, who was wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for committing atrocities, according to several U.N. and human rights sources. (Her spokesperson at the time, Payton Knopf, denied this.) In 2019, the ICC convicted Ntaganda of 18 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
During a meeting at the U.N. mission of France, after the French ambassador told Rice that the United Nations needed to do more to intervene in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rice replied: “It’s the eastern DRC. If it’s not M23, it’s going to be some other group,” according to an account given by a human rights worker who spoke with several people in the room. The comment was confirmed in other contemporaneous accounts.
“Looking back, it seems cruel to judge someone for what are practically errors of youth, but I think her work on Africa for the Clinton administration demonstrated elements of her character that give reason for pause,” said Peter Rosenblum, a Bard College scholar who criticized Rice and the Clinton administration for backing an invasion of the troubled Congo by Rwanda and Uganda.
“She is a brilliant professional who relies more on expertise and the judgment of a chosen group of elites than on the messy work of grassroots activism, constituency building, and democracy. In Africa, that led her to rely on a group of military leaders who could project themselves as technocrats at the expense of human rights activists and democracy,” Rosenblum said. “I think she was terribly wrong, but I still admire her and want to see her in government. I just wish she had run for senator of Maine or at least the school board.”
Rice, however, is said to be very close to Biden in outlook. She shares with the former vice president—as she did previously with Obama—a stringent, pared-down view of U.S. national interests that stands apart from Hillary Clinton’s more hawkish view of intervention, describing herself in her memoir as a “realist.” A Biden-Rice administration would likely take a similar view. According to a former Obama administration official who had backed her bid for secretary of state, Rice and Obama at the time were “very much exactly on the same page on all foreign-policy issues and … she represents Obama foreign policy in a way that Kerry doesn’t.”
Indeed, Kerry later found himself at odds with Obama over intervention in Syria and his generally activist approach to foreign policy (which in the end produced one of the administration’s signal triumphs, the nuclear pact with Iran that Trump has since cashiered). Though Rice ultimately backed the bombing of Libya in 2011 along with Clinton and Power—a policy that later gave rise to a civil war that is still raging—she was against military involvement in Syria at about the same time. Rice also initially resisted British and French efforts on the U.N. Security Council to create a no-fly zone against Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi, reportedly telling France’s U.N. ambassador, Gérard Araud, “You’re not going to drag us into your shitty war,” according to a 2012 account by Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch. Ultimately, however, faced with additional demands from the Arab League for intervention, Rice mounted an aggressive campaign for a resolution authorizing airstrikes against Libyan forces to prevent the slaughter of civilians.
She also presided over a state of confusion within the administration over its strategy of fighting the Islamic State in Iraq while simultaneously trying to pull U.S. troops out of the country. At one point, Rice sent a letter to then-House Speaker John Boehner requesting a withdrawal of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), additional legislation that was passed in 2002 to enable U.S. military action in Iraq. But the AUMF that Rice wanted withdrawn later became part of the authority the administration invoked to defeat the Islamic State.
“Susan was somewhere between Obama and Samantha” when it came to advocating U.S. intervention abroad, the former Obama administration official said. “She was more activist on Libya and some things than Obama wanted to be, but she also learned from her own experience it isn’t enough to have good intentions. It was principle as seen through the light of experience, so she adopted a certain degree of realism.”
The biggest issue with Rice’s possible selection as vice president is that she and Biden are both seen as “foreign-policy people,” the former Obama official added. “The only downside I see is that, because their strengths are comparable, you don’t get the division of labor.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-29--The Pandemic Is the Perfect Time to Rethink Travel Visas

The Pandemic Is the Perfect Time to Rethink Travel Visas If the Trump administration ’ s goal from day one was to restrict legal immigration and travel for work , study , or tourism , it could not have found a better partner than COVID-19 , which has led to a near-total shutdown of global travel and visa processing .
Once the worst of the pandemic has passed , it may be tempting for any potential new administration elected in November to focus on returning things to the status quo , undoing the most contested of the Trump administration ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visa processing along traditional lines .
Doing so , however , would be a missed opportunity .
The current U.S. visa system , which dates back to 1965 , is a patchwork of policies and practices out of step with the times and with the United States ’ global standing .
The Trump administration has been so successful at denying foreign citizens opportunities to travel to the United States because , for decades , the visa process had already suffered from benign neglect at the hands of the White House .
But now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States an unprecedented chance to correct that problem .
That ’ s why , if President Donald Trump loses in November , the next administration would do well to look beyond the technical tasks of reopening travel to the United States and unwinding specific visa policies to the larger goal of creating a modernized and equitable visa process .
Several steps will be key .
The Trump administration demonstrated that visa issues are symbolic , visceral , and have real impact .
Recognizing the political importance of visa policy , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a political appointee as assistant secretary of state for consular affairs .
It also empowered a senior advisor in the White House to take lead on all visa issues .
The next administration should maintain the political focus on visas , perhaps elevating the head of the visa function to the assistant secretary level and putting an undersecretary in charge of the Bureau of Consular Affairs .
The next administration will also have to craft a broader vision for U.S. visa policy and how it ’ s implemented .
Visa regulations have no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and it is up to each administration to create its own framework—whether that is “ Secure Borders , Open Doors , ” as under President George W. Bush , or “ America First , ” as under Trump .
Any vision for the visa system will need to think closely about how to balance public health concerns and economic recovery , but if the next administration fails to articulate a clear vision , then the bureaucracy will revert to its default : enforcing laws for the sake of enforcing laws and charting a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is also the question of culture .
If U.S. immigration law was originally written to facilitate travel while keeping out ne ’ er-do-wells , its focus has flipped in the implementation .
Consular managers and trainers put a heavy focus on Section 214 ( b ) of the Immigration and Nationality Act—a small but powerful snippet of U.S. visa law that instructs visa adjudicators to assume that the vast majority of applicants are ineligible and should be denied a visa until proved otherwise .
While Section 214 ( b ) is not inherently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Visa adjudicators performs upwards of 100 face-to-face interviews a day in a setting that demands that they rely on unconscious and conscious biases in order to keep up with the pace of work .
The Trump administration ’ s focus on driving down overstay rates has accelerated the trend .
The next administration should promote a culture that recognizes routinely refusing visas to qualified individuals can be as problematic to the fair application of immigration law as the opposite and that it has serious costs to the United States ’ reputational security .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ create an environment that puts government efficiency over the needs of applicants .
Over the years , there have been pushes to emphasize customer service at visa sections overseas , but , even today , applicants use a buggy and poorly designed website to schedule an appointment weeks in advance , line up outdoors in the hot sun , and hand over their cellphone in order to be grilled about their travel plans through bulletproof glass .
The adjudicator makes a decision on the spot , and applicants are often refused a visa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dozens of curious onlookers .
The next administration should focus on improving the applicant experience by addressing the root cause : a visa system that tries to process too many applicants with too few resources .
As a first step , the next administration should find ways to better fund the Bureau of Consular Affairs—made even more urgent by the drop in visa fees collected since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic .
The next administration will also have to create a security infrastructure that works .
Since 9/11 , the visa system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on an overly complicated and ever growing security screening process .
The system results in situations where visa applications languish for years without a decision while individuals who should merit further scrutiny pass through undetected .
Rather than pushing through more policy changes for enhanced security from the top and expecting the internal processes to keep up , the next administration should take time to ask security experts what policies truly make sense and what resources they need to create a streamlined vetting process that handles cases quickly , correctly , and in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with that goal will be modernizing decision-making .
In 2020 , the same year that entire schools , workplaces , and even governments have moved operations online , the U.S. visa system still requires a U.S. citizen sitting in a U.S. embassy overseas personally interviewing almost every individual who wants to travel to the United States .
The cost to the U.S. government and applicants for this extremely labor-intensive process is immense , and it is increasingly difficult to justify in a digital age .
The personal interview has taken on almost mythic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but many competitors for global travelers—including Australia , Canada , the United Kingdom , and the Schengen states—have moved to less resource-intensive systems that do not rely on face-to-face interviews .
The next administration should look closely at the relationship between in-person interviews and quality of decision-making ; it will likely find that the correlation is weaker than expected .
Further , the technical infrastructure underlying U.S. visa processing should have been replaced decades ago but has been patched up enough to keep it lumbering along—for the most part .
The system has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ few times , including during a series of system crashes in 2014 that shut down visa processing across the globe .
Visa adjudicators have been waiting for a long-promised IT system upgrade since at least 2008—over a decade ago—and there is no question that the current technology impairs productivity and lets serious security lapses pass unnoticed .
The next administration should explore how technological advances in automation , machine learning , and artificial intelligence could help make better and safer decisions .
Beyond the technological systems , the next administration will also have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are the primary face of the U.S. government to populations overseas , but that face comes from a State Department corps that is still primarily white and male .
It is important that visa applicants interact with a bureaucracy that reflects the full breadth of the American experience .
The administration and Bureau of Consular Affairs leadership will also have to listen to a wide range of stakeholders—including people who feel that they ’ ve been wronged by the system—to craft a new and more positive culture and vision .
Visa law , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward the technical , and it is easy to get lost in the weeds .
Parts of the current visa function are held together with duct tape and wire , and change is scary , because it risks upsetting a dozen delicate balances .
It is trivially easy for a new administration to arrive , take a brief look around the Visa Office , and decide to slowly back away .
What is more difficult is for the new administration to take the time to truly understand the visa function of today and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does the visa system look like in 2050 ?
Who is traveling to the United States , how , and why ?
What does a consular section look like , and what does it do ?
By asking questions like these , the next administration can begin to shape a legacy that will last beyond just the next four years .

If the Trump administration’s goal from day one was to restrict legal immigration and travel for work, study, or tourism, it could not have found a better partner than COVID-19, which has led to a near-total shutdown of global travel and visa processing. Once the worst of the pandemic has passed, it may be tempting for any potential new administration elected in November to focus on returning things to the status quo, undoing the most contested of the Trump administration’s immigration policies and ramping back up visa processing along traditional lines. Doing so, however, would be a missed opportunity.
If the Trump administration’s goal from day one was to restrict legal immigration and travel for work, study, or tourism, it could not have found a better partner than COVID-19, which has led to a near-total shutdown of global travel and visa processing. Once the worst of the pandemic has passed, it may be tempting for any potential new administration elected in November to focus on returning things to the status quo, undoing the most contested of the Trump administration’s immigration policies and ramping back up visa processing along traditional lines. Doing so, however, would be a missed opportunity.
The current U.S. visa system, which dates back to 1965, is a patchwork of policies and practices out of step with the times and with the United States’ global standing. The Trump administration has been so successful at denying foreign citizens opportunities to travel to the United States because, for decades, the visa process had already suffered from benign neglect at the hands of the White House. But now the ongoing pause in global travel gives the United States an unprecedented chance to correct that problem.
The United States’ antiquated visa system has struggled to support U.S. interests since long before 2017. Each year, the country loses tens of thousands of potential tourists, workers, and students due to delays and perceived difficulties in obtaining a visa—costing the U.S. economy millions, if not billions, of dollars. Meanwhile, the United States’ image abroad is hurt when, for many individuals, their first and only face-to-face encounter with the U.S. government falls somewhere between mildly inconvenient and deeply humiliating. The system fails to live up to U.S. ideals when applicants are issued or refused a visa based on their race, religion, nationality, or language skills and disproportionate to their actual qualifications. And internally, the system struggles to provide security by hunting for the rare applicant who signals their ties to terrorism in the visa application process rather than focusing on the risk posed by individuals already able to enter—or currently residing in—the United States.
That’s why, if President Donald Trump loses in November, the next administration would do well to look beyond the technical tasks of reopening travel to the United States and unwinding specific visa policies to the larger goal of creating a modernized and equitable visa process.
Several steps will be key. The Trump administration demonstrated that visa issues are symbolic, visceral, and have real impact. Recognizing the political importance of visa policy, the administration broke with recent tradition and named a political appointee as assistant secretary of state for consular affairs. It also empowered a senior advisor in the White House to take lead on all visa issues. The next administration should maintain the political focus on visas, perhaps elevating the head of the visa function to the assistant secretary level and putting an undersecretary in charge of the Bureau of Consular Affairs.
The next administration will also have to craft a broader vision for U.S. visa policy and how it’s implemented. Visa regulations have no purpose other than enforcing immigration laws, and it is up to each administration to create its own framework—whether that is “Secure Borders, Open Doors,” as under President George W. Bush, or “America First,” as under Trump. Any vision for the visa system will need to think closely about how to balance public health concerns and economic recovery, but if the next administration fails to articulate a clear vision, then the bureaucracy will revert to its default: enforcing laws for the sake of enforcing laws and charting a path based on bureaucratic momentum.
There is also the question of culture. If U.S. immigration law was originally written to facilitate travel while keeping out ne’er-do-wells, its focus has flipped in the implementation. Consular managers and trainers put a heavy focus on Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act—a small but powerful snippet of U.S. visa law that instructs visa adjudicators to assume that the vast majority of applicants are ineligible and should be denied a visa until proved otherwise. While Section 214(b) is not inherently problematic, its application can be. Visa adjudicators performs upwards of 100 face-to-face interviews a day in a setting that demands that they rely on unconscious and conscious biases in order to keep up with the pace of work. The Trump administration’s focus on driving down overstay rates has accelerated the trend. The next administration should promote a culture that recognizes routinely refusing visas to qualified individuals can be as problematic to the fair application of immigration law as the opposite and that it has serious costs to the United States’ reputational security.
This culture has made it easy to create an environment that puts government efficiency over the needs of applicants. Over the years, there have been pushes to emphasize customer service at visa sections overseas, but, even today, applicants use a buggy and poorly designed website to schedule an appointment weeks in advance, line up outdoors in the hot sun, and hand over their cellphone in order to be grilled about their travel plans through bulletproof glass. The adjudicator makes a decision on the spot, and applicants are often refused a visa through a crackly microphone in front of dozens of curious onlookers. The next administration should focus on improving the applicant experience by addressing the root cause: a visa system that tries to process too many applicants with too few resources. As a first step, the next administration should find ways to better fund the Bureau of Consular Affairs—made even more urgent by the drop in visa fees collected since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The next administration will also have to create a security infrastructure that works. Since 9/11, the visa system has paired extreme risk adverseness with reliance on an overly complicated and ever growing security screening process. The system results in situations where visa applications languish for years without a decision while individuals who should merit further scrutiny pass through undetected. Rather than pushing through more policy changes for enhanced security from the top and expecting the internal processes to keep up, the next administration should take time to ask security experts what policies truly make sense and what resources they need to create a streamlined vetting process that handles cases quickly, correctly, and in accordance with current threats.
In line with that goal will be modernizing decision-making. In 2020, the same year that entire schools, workplaces, and even governments have moved operations online, the U.S. visa system still requires a U.S. citizen sitting in a U.S. embassy overseas personally interviewing almost every individual who wants to travel to the United States. The cost to the U.S. government and applicants for this extremely labor-intensive process is immense, and it is increasingly difficult to justify in a digital age. The personal interview has taken on almost mythic status in the U.S. visa process, but many competitors for global travelers—including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Schengen states—have moved to less resource-intensive systems that do not rely on face-to-face interviews. The next administration should look closely at the relationship between in-person interviews and quality of decision-making; it will likely find that the correlation is weaker than expected.
Further, the technical infrastructure underlying U.S. visa processing should have been replaced decades ago but has been patched up enough to keep it lumbering along—for the most part. The system has, in fact, fallen apart a few times, including during a series of system crashes in 2014 that shut down visa processing across the globe. Visa adjudicators have been waiting for a long-promised IT system upgrade since at least 2008—over a decade ago—and there is no question that the current technology impairs productivity and lets serious security lapses pass unnoticed. The next administration should explore how technological advances in automation, machine learning, and artificial intelligence could help make better and safer decisions.
Beyond the technological systems, the next administration will also have to focus on staffing. Visa adjudicators are the primary face of the U.S. government to populations overseas, but that face comes from a State Department corps that is still primarily white and male. It is important that visa applicants interact with a bureaucracy that reflects the full breadth of the American experience. The administration and Bureau of Consular Affairs leadership will also have to listen to a wide range of stakeholders—including people who feel that they’ve been wronged by the system—to craft a new and more positive culture and vision.
Visa law, policies, systems, and staffing tend toward the technical, and it is easy to get lost in the weeds. Parts of the current visa function are held together with duct tape and wire, and change is scary, because it risks upsetting a dozen delicate balances. It is trivially easy for a new administration to arrive, take a brief look around the Visa Office, and decide to slowly back away. What is more difficult is for the new administration to take the time to truly understand the visa function of today and to envision one for tomorrow. What does the visa system look like in 2050? Who is traveling to the United States, how, and why? What does a consular section look like, and what does it do? By asking questions like these, the next administration can begin to shape a legacy that will last beyond just the next four years.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-29--What Were Russian Mercenaries Doing in Belarus?

What Were Russian Mercenaries Doing in Belarus ?
Authorities in Belarus announced on Wednesday that they had arrested 33 fighters from Russia ’ s quasi-private military contractor the Wagner Group just as President Aleksandr Lukashenko faces an unprecedented opposition challenge ahead of elections next month .
The arrests were first reported in the Belarusian state news agency Belta , which alleged that over 200 Russian-backed militants have been dispatched to the country to destabilize it ahead of the Aug. 9 vote .
But many experts suspect the mercenaries were simply using Belarus as a convenient transit point on their way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries where they have been operating lately .
The publicized arrest appears to have been an attempt on the part of Lukashenko , who has ruled the country for over 25 years , to stoke fears of a Russian intervention in a bid to shore up support ahead of the election .
The 65-year-old president faces a rare challenger on the campaign trail ( after arresting and barring prior opposition candidates from running ) : Svetlana Tikhanovskaya , the wife of a popular blogger who was arrested after announcing his own candidacy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ smaller cities and towns long thought to be Lukashenko bastions .
She has little chance of winning what will be highly stage-managed elections meant to deliver Lukashenko—often described as Europe ’ s last dictator—his sixth consecutive term in office .
But the groundswell of support for her campaign has underscored the precariousness of Lukashenko ’ s position as Belarusians are increasingly fed up with economic stagnation and the president ’ s apparent disregard for the coronavirus pandemic .
On Tuesday , Lukashenko announced that he had contracted and survived the virus himself .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign interference—from both Russia and the West—to portray himself as the person best positioned to defend the country ’ s sovereignty , and invoking the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries inside the country would send an ominous signal to voters that the country could go the way of Ukraine if it repudiates him .
While the arrests may have offered Lukashenko the chance of a preelection stunt , it ’ s unclear where he can go from here without painting himself into a corner .
Releasing the fighters without trial would undermine his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face to both Ukraine and the United States , which has sanctioned several Wagner entities for their foreign interference efforts .
Charging them risks provoking Russia ’ s ire .
Lukashenko called a meeting of the country ’ s security council on Wednesday , describing the situation as an “ emergency.
” “ I am looking at how the Russians are reacting .
They are already trying to justify themselves , saying that we practically brought them here ourselves .
It ’ s clear that they have to somehow justify their dirty intentions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little doubt that the men arrested are from the Wagner Group , a nebulous collection of Russian firms that offer military contractors for combat and destabilization activities in countries around the world .
Sixteen of the 33 men were identified by the controversial Ukrainian website Myrotvorets .
And Zakhar Prilepin , a Russian writer who served as deputy commander of a unit that fought on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine , confirmed on social media that some of the men arrested in Minsk had served in his battalion .
“ Based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian private military contractors I have no doubt that the guys they caught were Russian private military contractors , ” said Rob Lee , an expert on the Russian military and a Ph.D. student at King ’ s College London , noting that the men wore distinctive patches and checkered keffiyeh scarves that are consistent with the appearance of Wagner operatives .
But that doesn ’ t necessarily mean , contrary to the assertions of Belarusian state media , that Belarus was their ultimate destination .
Another scenario , put forward by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is that Wagner fighters were using Belarus as a transit hub to other countries where they are known to operate , given the country ’ s open border with Russia and Moscow ’ s coronavirus-related travel restrictions .
“ It does make quite a lot of sense , ” said Kirill Mikhailov , a researcher with the Conflict Intelligence Team , which tracks Russian military involvement in Ukraine and Syria .
The Russian-language services of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty noted that in footage of the items seized from the men was a Sudanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ phone card featuring an image of a Sudanese mosque .
Wagner operatives are known to operate in Sudan , and earlier this month the U.S. Treasury announced sanctions on affiliates of the group for their role in collaborating with the ousted Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir to quash pro-democracy protests that broke out in late 2018 .
Further dousing the idea that they were in Belarus on an operational assignment , the militants seem to have made little effort to blend in .
According to Belarusian state media , the men arrived in Minsk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hotel before transferring to a health spa outside of the capital .
“ They weren ’ t inconspicuous based off their clothing and equipment , they were rolling around in a large group , there wasn ’ t much operational security , and they didn ’ t appear to be armed or equipped to do anything in Belarus , ” Lee said .
If Wagner operatives were routinely transiting through Belarus , it ’ s unlikely that the country ’ s security services would have been unaware .
Belarus has long been a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidized Russian energy in a relationship that came to be known as “ oil for kisses.
” But ties between Minsk and Moscow cooled following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 , which prompted Lukashenko to rethink his dependence on Moscow and to pursue a thaw in relations with the West .
In 2015 , he freed the country ’ s remaining political prisoners , prompting the European Union and the United States to lift sanctions .
Washington and Minsk have struck a number of diplomatic breakthroughs over the past 18 months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the first time in over a decade .
While Russia has proved willing to intervene militarily in neighboring states suspected of getting too cozy with the West , first in Georgia in 2008 and later in Ukraine , analysts are skeptical that Moscow would seek to overthrow Lukashenko , particularly in the absence of a viable alternative who is palatable to the Kremlin .
Belarus serves as an important buffer state between Russia ’ s western borders and NATO member states .
“ If Lukashenko is cornered , with a broken society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shape , then he ’ s going to be quite an easy catch for [ Vladimir ] Putin .
But I also don ’ t think they want to change him for exactly this reason , ” said Yauheni Preiherman , the founder and director of the Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations .
Meanwhile , the Kremlin has watched Lukashenko throw warming diplomatic ties with the West into question by brutally cracking down on the opposition ahead of the elections .
“ Lukashenko is digging his diplomatic grave now with his own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Belarusian political analyst , told Foreign Policy last week .

Authorities in Belarus announced on Wednesday that they had arrested 33 fighters from Russia’s quasi-private military contractor the Wagner Group just as President Aleksandr Lukashenko faces an unprecedented opposition challenge ahead of elections next month.
Authorities in Belarus announced on Wednesday that they had arrested 33 fighters from Russia’s quasi-private military contractor the Wagner Group just as President Aleksandr Lukashenko faces an unprecedented opposition challenge ahead of elections next month.
The arrests were first reported in the Belarusian state news agency Belta, which alleged that over 200 Russian-backed militants have been dispatched to the country to destabilize it ahead of the Aug. 9 vote. But many experts suspect the mercenaries were simply using Belarus as a convenient transit point on their way to Sudan, Syria, or Libya—all countries where they have been operating lately.
The publicized arrest appears to have been an attempt on the part of Lukashenko, who has ruled the country for over 25 years, to stoke fears of a Russian intervention in a bid to shore up support ahead of the election. The 65-year-old president faces a rare challenger on the campaign trail (after arresting and barring prior opposition candidates from running): Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, the wife of a popular blogger who was arrested after announcing his own candidacy. Tikhanovskaya has been drawing significant crowds in smaller cities and towns long thought to be Lukashenko bastions.
She has little chance of winning what will be highly stage-managed elections meant to deliver Lukashenko—often described as Europe’s last dictator—his sixth consecutive term in office. But the groundswell of support for her campaign has underscored the precariousness of Lukashenko’s position as Belarusians are increasingly fed up with economic stagnation and the president’s apparent disregard for the coronavirus pandemic. On Tuesday, Lukashenko announced that he had contracted and survived the virus himself.
Lukashenko has routinely used the specter of foreign interference—from both Russia and the West—to portray himself as the person best positioned to defend the country’s sovereignty, and invoking the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries inside the country would send an ominous signal to voters that the country could go the way of Ukraine if it repudiates him.
While the arrests may have offered Lukashenko the chance of a preelection stunt, it’s unclear where he can go from here without painting himself into a corner. Releasing the fighters without trial would undermine his claims and be a slap in the face to both Ukraine and the United States, which has sanctioned several Wagner entities for their foreign interference efforts. Charging them risks provoking Russia’s ire.
Lukashenko called a meeting of the country’s security council on Wednesday, describing the situation as an “emergency.” “I am looking at how the Russians are reacting. They are already trying to justify themselves, saying that we practically brought them here ourselves. It’s clear that they have to somehow justify their dirty intentions,” he said.
There seems little doubt that the men arrested are from the Wagner Group, a nebulous collection of Russian firms that offer military contractors for combat and destabilization activities in countries around the world. Sixteen of the 33 men were identified by the controversial Ukrainian website Myrotvorets. And Zakhar Prilepin, a Russian writer who served as deputy commander of a unit that fought on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine, confirmed on social media that some of the men arrested in Minsk had served in his battalion.
“Based off their equipment and statements from other Russian private military contractors I have no doubt that the guys they caught were Russian private military contractors,” said Rob Lee, an expert on the Russian military and a Ph.D. student at King’s College London, noting that the men wore distinctive patches and checkered keffiyeh scarves that are consistent with the appearance of Wagner operatives.
But that doesn’t necessarily mean, contrary to the assertions of Belarusian state media, that Belarus was their ultimate destination. Another scenario, put forward by the popular Russian Telegram channel War Gonzo, is that Wagner fighters were using Belarus as a transit hub to other countries where they are known to operate, given the country’s open border with Russia and Moscow’s coronavirus-related travel restrictions.
“It does make quite a lot of sense,” said Kirill Mikhailov, a researcher with the Conflict Intelligence Team, which tracks Russian military involvement in Ukraine and Syria.
The Russian-language services of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty noted that in footage of the items seized from the men was a Sudanese banknote and what appears to be a phone card featuring an image of a Sudanese mosque. Wagner operatives are known to operate in Sudan, and earlier this month the U.S. Treasury announced sanctions on affiliates of the group for their role in collaborating with the ousted Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir to quash pro-democracy protests that broke out in late 2018.
Further dousing the idea that they were in Belarus on an operational assignment, the militants seem to have made little effort to blend in. According to Belarusian state media, the men arrived in Minsk on July 25 and checked into a hotel before transferring to a health spa outside of the capital.
“They weren’t inconspicuous based off their clothing and equipment, they were rolling around in a large group, there wasn’t much operational security, and they didn’t appear to be armed or equipped to do anything in Belarus,” Lee said.
If Wagner operatives were routinely transiting through Belarus, it’s unlikely that the country’s security services would have been unaware.
Belarus has long been a loyal vassal of Moscow, dependent on subsidized Russian energy in a relationship that came to be known as “oil for kisses.” But ties between Minsk and Moscow cooled following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, which prompted Lukashenko to rethink his dependence on Moscow and to pursue a thaw in relations with the West. In 2015, he freed the country’s remaining political prisoners, prompting the European Union and the United States to lift sanctions. Washington and Minsk have struck a number of diplomatic breakthroughs over the past 18 months, including an agreement to exchange ambassadors for the first time in over a decade.
While Russia has proved willing to intervene militarily in neighboring states suspected of getting too cozy with the West, first in Georgia in 2008 and later in Ukraine, analysts are skeptical that Moscow would seek to overthrow Lukashenko, particularly in the absence of a viable alternative who is palatable to the Kremlin. Belarus serves as an important buffer state between Russia’s western borders and NATO member states.
“If Lukashenko is cornered, with a broken society internally and the economy in such horrible shape, then he’s going to be quite an easy catch for [Vladimir] Putin. But I also don’t think they want to change him for exactly this reason,” said Yauheni Preiherman, the founder and director of the Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin has watched Lukashenko throw warming diplomatic ties with the West into question by brutally cracking down on the opposition ahead of the elections.
“Lukashenko is digging his diplomatic grave now with his own hands,” Artyom Shraibman, a Belarusian political analyst, told Foreign Policy last week.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-29--Why a Quiet Hajj Is Hurting Somalia

Why a Quiet Hajj Is Hurting Somalia

The annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca was slated to begin this week .
In normal times , pilgrims from around the world would be flocking to Islam ’ s holiest site , where they would take part in days of rituals central to their faith .
But these are not normal times .
As a result of the coronavirus pandemic , Saudi Arabian airports are quiet and the Kaaba may welcome thousands of worshipers rather than millions .
And as strange as the scene may seem in Saudi Arabia , the economic shockwaves around the world will be even more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far as rural Somalia , where they have raised troubling questions about livelihoods and stability around the region .
To feed the 2.5 million pilgrims who visit Saudi Arabia during a typical hajj , the country imports more than 3 million animals , which also includes livestock for sacrifice .
Many come from Somalia , which typically sends about 40 percent of its sheep and goats , to its Arabian trade partner .
Overall , livestock makes up nearly 75 percent of Somalia ’ s total exports and provides income to 60 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around the hajj would be a good one , economically speaking , when Somali farmers could meet their own food needs and pay back debts accrued in the dry season .
But this year , not only has COVID-19 put the hajj on hold for many , but it has also led to border closures with other countries—including Kenya—that also import Somali animals .
In turn , Somalia ’ s livestock exports have plummeted by roughly 50 percent , thinning out already meager livelihoods .
It isn ’ t just those who raise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ With as many as 20 families involved in the sale of each animal—producers , local traders , transporters , feedlot owners , brokers , and exporters—a breakdown in the supply chain could throw the fragile nation into crisis .
Animals are being sold locally at prices so depressed that farmers can barely cover their basic necessities , which are becoming more expensive as trade slowdowns raise the prices of imported staple goods .
“ We are experiencing a difficult time .
We have products ready for sale and no ready market , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ El Barde , a town in southwestern Somalia , said in July .
“ The local market does not have capacity to accommodate more livestock.
” Farmers like Omar may be tempted to allow their animals to graze until prices rise .
Yet , there are a couple of problems with that plan .
First , historic plagues of locusts have devastated pastures .
With more animals and less feed , herders are forced to migrate to new rangeland .
There , many of them encounter intertribal hostilities or conflict between the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confiscate cherished herds that represent an entire family ’ s wealth .
Second , increasingly poor grazing conditions caused by flooding are raising the specter of disease , including worms , Rift Valley fever , and even hide porter ’ s anthrax , which can cause sudden death of animals .
Efforts to improve livestock health , like that by Action Against Hunger , where I work , are facing new hurdles .
A consortium to train and certify 120 community-based workers on basic diagnostic and treatment techniques , with private-sector loans to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that supported 30,000 households , or 210,000 people , before the pandemic .
But that system quickly falls apart when farmers don ’ t have money to pay for the services .
Without functioning markets to sell the animals , local incomes have dropped alarmingly .
Third , after moving tens of thousands of animals even farther from urban areas in search of pasture , and with scant refrigeration or means to produce shelf-safe products , producers are having trouble getting their milk to market .
That poses another significant health challenge .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ among the urban poor , as well as 2.6 million internally displaced people .
It ’ s particularly key to preventing malnutrition in children and pregnant women , but milk is becoming a rare commodity in cities , and prices have increased by 30-50 percent in all regions .
These cumulative challenges are expected to leave 50 percent more people , 3.5 million Somalis , needing urgent food assistance by September .
The avenues for support are narrowing .
Somalis may normally turn to the diaspora for help , but COVID-19 lockdowns and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decline in recent history .
And emergency international humanitarian relief is slow to come .
From previous work , we know that $ 60,000 can cover medicines , staff stipends , and logistics to treat 6,600 head of livestock .
But international donors are struggling to meet existing obligations , and they appear unlikely to provide more money .
If people aren ’ t reached in their villages , the world should brace for a massive displacement of people in search of help and jobs in urban areas .
There must be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and one route may be to rely on the networks that groups like Action Against Hunger have spent so long fostering .
Today , in the areas we work in , inclusive village-level development committees of young people and faith-based leaders select new people to join their livelihood programs , which help villagers start farms , connect with markets , and develop long-term adaptive capacity to withstand future shocks .
The committees prioritize people in greatest need , and 60 to 70 percent of program participants are women or households with malnourished @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the El Barde Livestock Marketing Association , which works with traders to gather local livestock works and connect them to exporters , creating value-chain efficiencies .
We must stabilize these groups .
Existing loans could be redirected toward reinvestment , transportation , sales , and exports once borders open up .
Until then , the animals need to graze , and with harvests cut in half by locusts , families were not able to retain seeds for next year ’ s plantings .
Targeted loans could help replenish those stocks .
As a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the neediest households in a cash transfer program .
It provided them with $ 60- $ 70 a month , enough to purchase grains and cooking oil , which also keeps local markets open .
After three months , though , the funding has run out .
Before the pandemic and before the hajj was canceled , livestock markets were strengthening the Somali economy .
Animals are the country ’ s gold mine and a source of pride , but this year both the money and morale have run out .
That is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 has proved once again , the world is deeply interconnected , from glittering Saudi airports to dusty Somali fields .
We ignore those connections at our own risk , as none of us will be safe unless all of us are .

The annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca was slated to begin this week. In normal times, pilgrims from around the world would be flocking to Islam’s holiest site, where they would take part in days of rituals central to their faith. But these are not normal times. As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, Saudi Arabian airports are quiet and the Kaaba may welcome thousands of worshipers rather than millions. And as strange as the scene may seem in Saudi Arabia, the economic shockwaves around the world will be even more disquieting. The effects have reached as far as rural Somalia, where they have raised troubling questions about livelihoods and stability around the region.
The annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca was slated to begin this week. In normal times, pilgrims from around the world would be flocking to Islam’s holiest site, where they would take part in days of rituals central to their faith. But these are not normal times. As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, Saudi Arabian airports are quiet and the Kaaba may welcome thousands of worshipers rather than millions. And as strange as the scene may seem in Saudi Arabia, the economic shockwaves around the world will be even more disquieting. The effects have reached as far as rural Somalia, where they have raised troubling questions about livelihoods and stability around the region.
To feed the 2.5 million pilgrims who visit Saudi Arabia during a typical hajj, the country imports more than 3 million animals, which also includes livestock for sacrifice. Many come from Somalia, which typically sends about 40 percent of its sheep and goats, to its Arabian trade partner. Overall, livestock makes up nearly 75 percent of Somalia’s total exports and provides income to 60 percent of the population.
Usually the month around the hajj would be a good one, economically speaking, when Somali farmers could meet their own food needs and pay back debts accrued in the dry season. But this year, not only has COVID-19 put the hajj on hold for many, but it has also led to border closures with other countries—including Kenya—that also import Somali animals. In turn, Somalia’s livestock exports have plummeted by roughly 50 percent, thinning out already meager livelihoods.
It isn’t just those who raise the animals who are in trouble. With as many as 20 families involved in the sale of each animal—producers, local traders, transporters, feedlot owners, brokers, and exporters—a breakdown in the supply chain could throw the fragile nation into crisis. Animals are being sold locally at prices so depressed that farmers can barely cover their basic necessities, which are becoming more expensive as trade slowdowns raise the prices of imported staple goods.
“We are experiencing a difficult time. We have products ready for sale and no ready market,” Abdi Omar, a livestock trader in El Barde, a town in southwestern Somalia, said in July. “The local market does not have capacity to accommodate more livestock.” Farmers like Omar may be tempted to allow their animals to graze until prices rise. Yet, there are a couple of problems with that plan.
First, historic plagues of locusts have devastated pastures. With more animals and less feed, herders are forced to migrate to new rangeland. There, many of them encounter intertribal hostilities or conflict between the government and other armed groups, which may confiscate cherished herds that represent an entire family’s wealth.
Second, increasingly poor grazing conditions caused by flooding are raising the specter of disease, including worms, Rift Valley fever, and even hide porter’s anthrax, which can cause sudden death of animals. Efforts to improve livestock health, like that by Action Against Hunger, where I work, are facing new hurdles. A consortium to train and certify 120 community-based workers on basic diagnostic and treatment techniques, with private-sector loans to start veterinary businesses, had treated livestock that supported 30,000 households, or 210,000 people, before the pandemic. But that system quickly falls apart when farmers don’t have money to pay for the services. Without functioning markets to sell the animals, local incomes have dropped alarmingly.
Third, after moving tens of thousands of animals even farther from urban areas in search of pasture, and with scant refrigeration or means to produce shelf-safe products, producers are having trouble getting their milk to market. That poses another significant health challenge. In Somalia, milk is a staple among the urban poor, as well as 2.6 million internally displaced people. It’s particularly key to preventing malnutrition in children and pregnant women, but milk is becoming a rare commodity in cities, and prices have increased by 30-50 percent in all regions. These cumulative challenges are expected to leave 50 percent more people, 3.5 million Somalis, needing urgent food assistance by September.
The avenues for support are narrowing. Somalis may normally turn to the diaspora for help, but COVID-19 lockdowns and economic woes are causing the sharpest remittances decline in recent history. And emergency international humanitarian relief is slow to come. From previous work, we know that $60,000 can cover medicines, staff stipends, and logistics to treat 6,600 head of livestock. But international donors are struggling to meet existing obligations, and they appear unlikely to provide more money. If people aren’t reached in their villages, the world should brace for a massive displacement of people in search of help and jobs in urban areas.
There must be a path back from the brink of catastrophe, and one route may be to rely on the networks that groups like Action Against Hunger have spent so long fostering. Today, in the areas we work in, inclusive village-level development committees of young people and faith-based leaders select new people to join their livelihood programs, which help villagers start farms, connect with markets, and develop long-term adaptive capacity to withstand future shocks. The committees prioritize people in greatest need, and 60 to 70 percent of program participants are women or households with malnourished children. Multiple village groups together form the El Barde Livestock Marketing Association, which works with traders to gather local livestock works and connect them to exporters, creating value-chain efficiencies.
We must stabilize these groups. Existing loans could be redirected toward reinvestment, transportation, sales, and exports once borders open up. Until then, the animals need to graze, and with harvests cut in half by locusts, families were not able to retain seeds for next year’s plantings. Targeted loans could help replenish those stocks. As a stopgap, Action Hunger enrolled 7,500 of the neediest households in a cash transfer program. It provided them with $60-$70 a month, enough to purchase grains and cooking oil, which also keeps local markets open. After three months, though, the funding has run out.
Before the pandemic and before the hajj was canceled, livestock markets were strengthening the Somali economy. Animals are the country’s gold mine and a source of pride, but this year both the money and morale have run out. That is true all over the world. As COVID-19 has proved once again, the world is deeply interconnected, from glittering Saudi airports to dusty Somali fields. We ignore those connections at our own risk, as none of us will be safe unless all of us are.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-29--Trump Undercuts Pentagon Over Germany Troop Withdrawal

Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Wednesday that the United States would pull nearly 12,000 troops out of Germany , starting in the coming weeks , ostensibly to beef up U.S. deterrence against Russia .
Immediately after , Esper was undercut by U.S. President Donald Trump , who described the troop withdrawal as a reprisal against Germany for not meeting its defense-spending targets .
Pentagon and military officials insisted the redeployments , which came after Germany rebuked an invitation to an upcoming G-7 conference over a possible Russian invite from Trump , were part of a strategic plan to give @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rotational forces forward into the Black Sea and Baltic regions to counter Russian aggression , and they said the move has nothing to do with German defense spending .
Trump himself undercut that message minutes later .
“ Germany ’ s delinquent , they haven ’ t paid their NATO fees , ” Trump said , repeating a factually incorrect talking point used frequently in his administration .
Berlin has long failed to meet the alliance ’ s target for defense spending—2 percent of GDP—but is not behind on any payments , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states .
Yet Pentagon officials admitted that Trump ’ s persistent calls to thin out American forces in Europe had caused the issue to jump to the top of the queue as the Defense Department has been reviewing U.S. troop numbers in regions around the world , particularly in Africa .
But even as Esper briefed reporters about the plan on Wednesday , it appeared that the Pentagon was still doing back-of-the-envelope math to figure out how much the drawdown would cost .
Esper said the moves , which also cap the number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would cost U.S. taxpayers in the “ single-digit billions ” of dollars , though Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Hyten quickly cautioned that was a “ rough estimate.
” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Esper ’ s decision “ underlines the continued commitment by the United States to NATO and to European security ” in a statement .
He also said the United States “ consulted closely with all NATO allies ahead of today ’ s announcement.
” Behind the scenes , however , the decision has frustrated some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move as harmful to U.S. interests in Europe and fear it will undercut NATO ’ s activities aimed at deterring Russia from the alliance ’ s eastern flank .
They also said the decision was made in haste , without a proper interagency review , and without sufficient consultations with European allies .
U.S. military installations in Germany serve as a major hub for U.S. and NATO military exercises across Europe aimed at deterring Russia—particularly for the Baltic states that are NATO members .
“ Many focus on Germany and see it as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there are also Baltic states whose defense is dependent on reinforcement of U.S. troops from Germany , ” said one European official .
“ It ’ s always a good thing to revisit how many troops the U.S. has deployed abroad , especially in Europe , ” said Rachel Rizzo , an expert on European security issues with the Truman Center for National Policy .
“ But this particular move is just clearly punishment for Germany .
It seems like it was done without any real analysis or strategy behind it.
” Under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Wall Street Journal , 6,400 troops in Germany will return to the United States and then begin doing rotational deployments to Europe .
Some 4,500 soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment , which employs eight-wheeled armored fighting vehicles , will also return stateside before starting rotations in the Black Sea .
Another 5,600 U.S troops will be redistributed throughout Europe : The 5th Corps headquarters will move to Poland , and an F-16 squadron will shift from Germany to Italy , officials said , leaving room for the possibility of moving other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Baltics .
Additionally , 2,000 American troops will also go to Belgium for headquarters work , and the U.S. European Command chief and supreme allied commander of NATO , Gen. Tod Wolters , said that U.S. Africa Command ’ s headquarters could also be moved from Stuttgart , Germany .
Neither Belgium nor Italy meets NATO ’ s target for defense spending .
Esper tried to make the case on Wednesday that utilizing rotational forces from the United States , instead of permanent troops based in Germany , would give the Pentagon a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the continent with more ready troops .
But former officials said that cutting U.S. troops permanently stationed in Germany , who primarily serve in logistical , air defense , and intelligence functions rather than combat roles , could actually hamper the NATO alliance ’ s ability to respond to a Russian attack .
“ The Russians will not line up on the border and come across with columns of tanks , ” said Ben Hodges , a retired lieutenant general who commanded U.S. Army Europe until 2017 .
“ It ’ s going @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that will delay the decision of the alliance.
” Moving U.S. troops to Italy could also cause logistical challenges , Hodges said , since the Army doesn ’ t have enough facilities to house and train an entire airborne brigade there .
While the Pentagon has long deliberated about adding rotational units on NATO ’ s so-called eastern flank , it is not allowed to keep permanent troops in Poland and the Baltic states under the Russia-NATO founding act .
In contrast , Germany ’ s large airports and seaports , including Bremerhaven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to stage for a contingency in Europe outside of Russian rocket and missile ranges , Hodges said .
The withdrawal has also become a flash point for congressional debate over the Pentagon ’ s annual funding bill , with lawmakers in both chambers floating provisions that would slow or stop the drawdown .
The final House bill would halt the removal of American forces unless the Pentagon can certify to Congress that the departure of U.S. troops would not impact national security .
“ It is a gift to Russia coming at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its support for the Taliban and reports of bounties on killing American troops , ” said Republican Sen. Mitt Romney , who tried to put a similar provision in the Senate defense bill , in a statement .
Trump in an interview with Axios dismissed reports of Russian bounties on U.S. troops as “ fake news , ” and he said he didn ’ t bring up the subject in a recent phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin .
“ The move may temporarily play well in domestic politics , but its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American interests , ” Romney said .

Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Wednesday that the United States would pull nearly 12,000 troops out of Germany, starting in the coming weeks, ostensibly to beef up U.S. deterrence against Russia. Immediately after, Esper was undercut by U.S. President Donald Trump, who described the troop withdrawal as a reprisal against Germany for not meeting its defense-spending targets.
Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Wednesday that the United States would pull nearly 12,000 troops out of Germany, starting in the coming weeks, ostensibly to beef up U.S. deterrence against Russia. Immediately after, Esper was undercut by U.S. President Donald Trump, who described the troop withdrawal as a reprisal against Germany for not meeting its defense-spending targets.
Pentagon and military officials insisted the redeployments, which came after Germany rebuked an invitation to an upcoming G-7 conference over a possible Russian invite from Trump, were part of a strategic plan to give the U.S. military more flexibility to move rotational forces forward into the Black Sea and Baltic regions to counter Russian aggression, and they said the move has nothing to do with German defense spending. Trump himself undercut that message minutes later.
“Germany’s delinquent, they haven’t paid their NATO fees,” Trump said, repeating a factually incorrect talking point used frequently in his administration. Berlin has long failed to meet the alliance’s target for defense spending—2 percent of GDP—but is not behind on any payments, such as headquarters fees, contributed by member states.
Yet Pentagon officials admitted that Trump’s persistent calls to thin out American forces in Europe had caused the issue to jump to the top of the queue as the Defense Department has been reviewing U.S. troop numbers in regions around the world, particularly in Africa. But even as Esper briefed reporters about the plan on Wednesday, it appeared that the Pentagon was still doing back-of-the-envelope math to figure out how much the drawdown would cost. Esper said the moves, which also cap the number of troops in Germany at 24,000, would cost U.S. taxpayers in the “single-digit billions” of dollars, though Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Hyten quickly cautioned that was a “rough estimate.”
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Esper’s decision “underlines the continued commitment by the United States to NATO and to European security” in a statement. He also said the United States “consulted closely with all NATO allies ahead of today’s announcement.”
Behind the scenes, however, the decision has frustrated some U.S. and European officials who see the move as harmful to U.S. interests in Europe and fear it will undercut NATO’s activities aimed at deterring Russia from the alliance’s eastern flank. They also said the decision was made in haste, without a proper interagency review, and without sufficient consultations with European allies.
U.S. military installations in Germany serve as a major hub for U.S. and NATO military exercises across Europe aimed at deterring Russia—particularly for the Baltic states that are NATO members.
“Many focus on Germany and see it as a German issue, but many forget there are also Baltic states whose defense is dependent on reinforcement of U.S. troops from Germany,” said one European official.
“It’s always a good thing to revisit how many troops the U.S. has deployed abroad, especially in Europe,” said Rachel Rizzo, an expert on European security issues with the Truman Center for National Policy. “But this particular move is just clearly punishment for Germany. It seems like it was done without any real analysis or strategy behind it.”
Under the current plan, first reported by the Wall Street Journal, 6,400 troops in Germany will return to the United States and then begin doing rotational deployments to Europe. Some 4,500 soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, which employs eight-wheeled armored fighting vehicles, will also return stateside before starting rotations in the Black Sea.
Another 5,600 U.S troops will be redistributed throughout Europe: The 5th Corps headquarters will move to Poland, and an F-16 squadron will shift from Germany to Italy, officials said, leaving room for the possibility of moving other American troops forward to Poland and the Baltics. Additionally, 2,000 American troops will also go to Belgium for headquarters work, and the U.S. European Command chief and supreme allied commander of NATO, Gen. Tod Wolters, said that U.S. Africa Command’s headquarters could also be moved from Stuttgart, Germany.
Neither Belgium nor Italy meets NATO’s target for defense spending.
Esper tried to make the case on Wednesday that utilizing rotational forces from the United States, instead of permanent troops based in Germany, would give the Pentagon a “much more enduring presence” on the continent with more ready troops.
But former officials said that cutting U.S. troops permanently stationed in Germany, who primarily serve in logistical, air defense, and intelligence functions rather than combat roles, could actually hamper the NATO alliance’s ability to respond to a Russian attack.
“The Russians will not line up on the border and come across with columns of tanks,” said Ben Hodges, a retired lieutenant general who commanded U.S. Army Europe until 2017. “It’s going to be disinformation [and] cyber that will delay the decision of the alliance.”
Moving U.S. troops to Italy could also cause logistical challenges, Hodges said, since the Army doesn’t have enough facilities to house and train an entire airborne brigade there.
While the Pentagon has long deliberated about adding rotational units on NATO’s so-called eastern flank, it is not allowed to keep permanent troops in Poland and the Baltic states under the Russia-NATO founding act. In contrast, Germany’s large airports and seaports, including Bremerhaven, give the United States wide latitude to stage for a contingency in Europe outside of Russian rocket and missile ranges, Hodges said.
The withdrawal has also become a flash point for congressional debate over the Pentagon’s annual funding bill, with lawmakers in both chambers floating provisions that would slow or stop the drawdown. The final House bill would halt the removal of American forces unless the Pentagon can certify to Congress that the departure of U.S. troops would not impact national security.
“It is a gift to Russia coming at a time when we just have learned of its support for the Taliban and reports of bounties on killing American troops,” said Republican Sen. Mitt Romney, who tried to put a similar provision in the Senate defense bill, in a statement. Trump in an interview with Axios dismissed reports of Russian bounties on U.S. troops as “fake news,” and he said he didn’t bring up the subject in a recent phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
“The move may temporarily play well in domestic politics, but its consequences will be lasting and harmful to American interests,” Romney said.