foreignpolicy--2020-11-17--Trump Is in Denial—and America Is Unsafe

Trump Is in Denial—and America Is Unsafe U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s refusal to concede that he lost the election—a stance that has received support from officials such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and senior Republican leaders such as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Sen. Lindsey Graham—reveals a blithe disregard for its foreign-policy and national security implications .
Continuing to challenge President-elect Joe Biden ’ s decisive victory ( based , I emphasize , on counting the same ballots that elected lots of Republican senators and representatives ) does further damage to democratic institutions and will weaken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Those who continue to pursue this course are acting as if the United States has no vital interests to defend , faces no serious challenges to those interests , and doesn ’ t have to worry about a goddamned thing occurring beyond its borders .
If the United States were the only country on earth , then Trump ’ s head-in-the-sand delusions , lame legal challenges , refusal to help Biden ’ s transition team prepare for the transfer of power , and petulant 11th-hour purge of top national security officials might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tantrums of a tragically flawed human being .
Americans could just ride out the last two months of Trump ’ s Lear-like ravings and then move on .
But that ’ s not the world we live in , and the GOP ’ s willingness to indulge Trump ’ s dangerous fantasies is , if anything , more alarming .
The GOP used to portray itself ( rightly or wrongly ) as better at foreign policy and national security than the Democrats ; today it is acting as if competing effectively with others @ @ @ @ @ @ @ check : We still live a world of anarchy , where no central authority exists to protect states from each other ( or from their own follies ) .
It is still a self-help world where each state must rely primarily on its own capabilities and strategies ( including , when appropriate , cooperating with others ) to preserve the security and well-being of its citizens .
Anything that makes it harder for the United States to perform those tasks—such as refusing to let a president-elect get intelligence briefings or appointing comically unqualified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undermine its global position .
It is the sort of thing Americans like to see happen to their adversaries , but not to themselves .
This matters greatly because we are no longer living in the “ unipolar moment.
” When the United States stood unchallenged at the pinnacle of power , it could afford a certain carelessness ( not to mention hubris ) in the conduct of foreign policy .
A cavalier and unrealistic approach to foreign policy wasn ’ t desirable , mind you , but the consequences for the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it already enjoyed .
Today , however , an increasingly powerful and ambitious China is seeking to challenge the comfortable position of power and influence that the United States has enjoyed for decades .
It will be a far more formidable rival than the Soviet Union ever was .
China ’ s population is more than four times larger , its economy is roughly the same size and growing at a faster rate , and its model of state capitalism is vastly more efficient than either the old Soviet model of central planning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese leader Mao Zedong .
China weathered the 2008 financial crisis better than most other states , and while its mishandling of the initial coronavirus outbreak helped spread the pandemic worldwide , its response since then has been far more effective than the United States ’ .
Unlike the Soviet Union , which consistently lagged the West in most areas of science and technology , China has a fair shot of competing with the United States in artificial intelligence , quantum computing , and other areas of advanced technology on which future power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic and geopolitical rivalry with China is serious business , yet Americans are spending their time and political energies arguing about whether to wear masks in the midst of a pandemic .
Who do they think they are kidding ?
One can argue , as Michael Beckley does , that China ’ s strengths are exaggerated and that the United States still enjoys a sizable lead over its Asian rival .
The trend lines are still running against it , however , and even Beckley acknowledges that U.S. primacy will not last if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to marshal the nation ’ s advantages effectively .
Alternatively , one can assume—as some progressives and libertarians do—that China ’ s ascendance does not matter very much , because the United States is still an ocean away , still has thousands of nuclear weapons to deter a direct attack , and would still be pretty well-off even if Beijing has more influence over the shape of the emerging global order than Washington does .
But they should at least consider whether ceding influence in this way would be wholly benign : If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and heavy-handed as the United States was over the past 50 years or more , Americans might find adapting to a Chinese-centric world decidedly uncomfortable .
One need not replace the failed strategy of liberal hegemony with passive acquiescence to China ’ s rise .
To be clear : Acknowledging that Sino-American rivalry will be intense and prolonged does not reduce the United States ’ need to cooperate with Beijing when their interests align .
Climate change may be a more serious threat to U.S. interests than a shifting balance of power , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Beijing must address this problem together even as they compete in other areas .
Developing arrangements that preserve the gains from trade while safeguarding other interests is highly desirable as well .
Americans also need to recognize that they can not prevent a wealthier and more powerful China from exerting more global influence than it did when it was vastly weaker .
The question is how the United States can make sure that the balance of power does not tilt too far in China ’ s direction , while avoiding major war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but not an impossible one .
So if U.S. officials were taking this competition seriously , what would they do ?
First , both parties , instead of just one , would be stressing the need for national unity , and Republicans would have been quick to acknowledge the results of the election .
Biden has made it clear that he wants to heal the partisan divisions that are weakening the country , because he understands that the country can not compete if Americans see their fellow citizens as a greater threat than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mask-wearing into a matter of a partisan contention , leading politicians from both parties would be encouraging everyone to make this exceedingly modest sacrifice for the good of the nation as a whole .
In particular , healing the United States ’ current divisions would require calling out leaders and other public figures who are actively and intentionally reinforcing them , and making it clear to all that their efforts are inherently unpatriotic .
This is a tricky task , of course , because those who level such accusations can themselves be accused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and U.S. leaders should still welcome dissent and encourage lively but respectful debate on important political issues .
But there is a crucial difference between principled disagreements about concrete policy issues ( e.g.
, the size of a stimulus or whether the country should remain in Afghanistan ) and the scorched-earth obstructionism , norm-breaking , and factually challenged discourse that began in the 1990s and has reached new heights under Trump .
Second , if U.S. leaders were serious , they would be working to reinforce all the sinews of national power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their infrastructure , and their relations with the rest of the world .
Instead of attacking the Affordable Care Act , they ’ d be trying to strengthen it , because a healthier population will be a more productive one .
They ’ d be increasing spending on scientific research , instead of cutting it , and politicians would not cast doubt on scientific expertise of all kinds .
Instead of making it harder for talented foreigners to work in the United States—especially in high-tech fields—they ’ d go back to encouraging a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in a United States that took global competition seriously , the Trump administration would be following the example set by every one of its predecessors and be working to ensure a smooth handoff to Biden and his team .
Nobody likes losing , but public officials are responsible to more than their own egos .
How does it help the United States to make the next president less able to fight a pandemic , confront adversaries , work with allies , and avoid costly errors or delays ?
Should Americans have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ available because the Trump administration refused to help Biden prepare for its distribution ?
Lastly , if as a country Americans recognized that interstate competition will not end in their lifetimes , they would take a hard look at the global balance of power and set realistic priorities .
Gone are the days when the United States could aspire to play the dominant role in Europe , Asia , and the Middle East simultaneously , and to use its economic and military power to try to spread liberal ideals around the globe .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which means striking a new division of labor with its European allies and strengthening ties with partners in Asia .
The United States should also pursue business-like relations with all states in the Middle East , instead of special relationships with a few and unremittingly hostile relations with others .
China and Russia talk to everyone in the region , and this approach gives them greater influence with all of them .
Washington should do the same .
I do not know if the United States can summon the sense of common @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a safe and prosperous future for Americans .
The divisions between Americans may be too deep , and their current crop of politicians ( or their financial backers ) may be too selfish and unprincipled to rise above party and personal ambition and recommit themselves to the greater good .
As I said 14 years ago : “ Although geography , history , and good fortune have combined to give the United States a remarkable array of advantages , it would still be possible to squander them.
” And if it does , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only ourselves to blame .
”

U.S. President Donald Trump’s refusal to concede that he lost the election—a stance that has received support from officials such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and senior Republican leaders such as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Sen. Lindsey Graham—reveals a blithe disregard for its foreign-policy and national security implications . Continuing to challenge President-elect Joe Biden’s decisive victory (based, I emphasize, on counting the same ballots that elected lots of Republican senators and representatives) does further damage to democratic institutions and will weaken the United States relative to other countries. Those who continue to pursue this course are acting as if the United States has no vital interests to defend, faces no serious challenges to those interests, and doesn’t have to worry about a goddamned thing occurring beyond its borders.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s refusal to concede that he lost the election—a stance that has received support from officials such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and senior Republican leaders such as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Sen. Lindsey Graham—reveals a blithe disregard for its foreign-policy and national security implications. Continuing to challenge President-elect Joe Biden’s decisive victory (based, I emphasize, on counting the same ballots that elected lots of Republican senators and representatives) does further damage to democratic institutions and will weaken the United States relative to other countries. Those who continue to pursue this course are acting as if the United States has no vital interests to defend, faces no serious challenges to those interests, and doesn’t have to worry about a goddamned thing occurring beyond its borders.
If the United States were the only country on earth, then Trump’s head-in-the-sand delusions, lame legal challenges, refusal to help Biden’s transition team prepare for the transfer of power, and petulant 11th-hour purge of top national security officials might be written off as the final childish tantrums of a tragically flawed human being. Americans could just ride out the last two months of Trump’s Lear-like ravings and then move on.
But that’s not the world we live in, and the GOP’s willingness to indulge Trump’s dangerous fantasies is, if anything, more alarming. The GOP used to portray itself (rightly or wrongly) as better at foreign policy and national security than the Democrats; today it is acting as if competing effectively with others no longer matters at all.
Reality check: We still live a world of anarchy, where no central authority exists to protect states from each other (or from their own follies). It is still a self-help world where each state must rely primarily on its own capabilities and strategies (including, when appropriate, cooperating with others) to preserve the security and well-being of its citizens. Anything that makes it harder for the United States to perform those tasks—such as refusing to let a president-elect get intelligence briefings or appointing comically unqualified people to positions of grave responsibility—can only undermine its global position. It is the sort of thing Americans like to see happen to their adversaries, but not to themselves.
This matters greatly because we are no longer living in the “unipolar moment.” When the United States stood unchallenged at the pinnacle of power, it could afford a certain carelessness (not to mention hubris) in the conduct of foreign policy. A cavalier and unrealistic approach to foreign policy wasn’t desirable, mind you, but the consequences for the United States were bearable given the enormous advantages it already enjoyed.
Today, however, an increasingly powerful and ambitious China is seeking to challenge the comfortable position of power and influence that the United States has enjoyed for decades. It will be a far more formidable rival than the Soviet Union ever was. China’s population is more than four times larger, its economy is roughly the same size and growing at a faster rate, and its model of state capitalism is vastly more efficient than either the old Soviet model of central planning or the disastrous development policies of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong. China weathered the 2008 financial crisis better than most other states, and while its mishandling of the initial coronavirus outbreak helped spread the pandemic worldwide, its response since then has been far more effective than the United States’. Unlike the Soviet Union, which consistently lagged the West in most areas of science and technology, China has a fair shot of competing with the United States in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other areas of advanced technology on which future power and wealth will likely depend. An economic and geopolitical rivalry with China is serious business, yet Americans are spending their time and political energies arguing about whether to wear masks in the midst of a pandemic. Who do they think they are kidding?
One can argue, as Michael Beckley does, that China’s strengths are exaggerated and that the United States still enjoys a sizable lead over its Asian rival. The trend lines are still running against it, however, and even Beckley acknowledges that U.S. primacy will not last if U.S. leaders keep making mistakes and fail to marshal the nation’s advantages effectively. Alternatively, one can assume—as some progressives and libertarians do—that China’s ascendance does not matter very much, because the United States is still an ocean away, still has thousands of nuclear weapons to deter a direct attack, and would still be pretty well-off even if Beijing has more influence over the shape of the emerging global order than Washington does. But they should at least consider whether ceding influence in this way would be wholly benign: If China turns out to be as ambitious and heavy-handed as the United States was over the past 50 years or more, Americans might find adapting to a Chinese-centric world decidedly uncomfortable. One need not replace the failed strategy of liberal hegemony with passive acquiescence to China’s rise.
To be clear: Acknowledging that Sino-American rivalry will be intense and prolonged does not reduce the United States’ need to cooperate with Beijing when their interests align. Climate change may be a more serious threat to U.S. interests than a shifting balance of power, for example, which is why Washington and Beijing must address this problem together even as they compete in other areas. Developing arrangements that preserve the gains from trade while safeguarding other interests is highly desirable as well. Americans also need to recognize that they cannot prevent a wealthier and more powerful China from exerting more global influence than it did when it was vastly weaker. The question is how the United States can make sure that the balance of power does not tilt too far in China’s direction, while avoiding major war. A tall order, perhaps, but not an impossible one.
So if U.S. officials were taking this competition seriously, what would they do?
First, both parties, instead of just one, would be stressing the need for national unity, and Republicans would have been quick to acknowledge the results of the election. Biden has made it clear that he wants to heal the partisan divisions that are weakening the country, because he understands that the country cannot compete if Americans see their fellow citizens as a greater threat than any foreign rival. Instead of turning mask-wearing into a matter of a partisan contention, leading politicians from both parties would be encouraging everyone to make this exceedingly modest sacrifice for the good of the nation as a whole.
In particular, healing the United States’ current divisions would require calling out leaders and other public figures who are actively and intentionally reinforcing them, and making it clear to all that their efforts are inherently unpatriotic. This is a tricky task, of course, because those who level such accusations can themselves be accused of trying to divide the country further, and U.S. leaders should still welcome dissent and encourage lively but respectful debate on important political issues. But there is a crucial difference between principled disagreements about concrete policy issues (e.g., the size of a stimulus or whether the country should remain in Afghanistan) and the scorched-earth obstructionism, norm-breaking, and factually challenged discourse that began in the 1990s and has reached new heights under Trump.
Second, if U.S. leaders were serious, they would be working to reinforce all the sinews of national power: their people, their economy, their infrastructure, and their relations with the rest of the world. Instead of attacking the Affordable Care Act, they’d be trying to strengthen it, because a healthier population will be a more productive one. They’d be increasing spending on scientific research, instead of cutting it, and politicians would not cast doubt on scientific expertise of all kinds. Instead of making it harder for talented foreigners to work in the United States—especially in high-tech fields—they’d go back to encouraging a brain drain in their favor.
Third, in a United States that took global competition seriously, the Trump administration would be following the example set by every one of its predecessors and be working to ensure a smooth handoff to Biden and his team. Nobody likes losing, but public officials are responsible to more than their own egos. How does it help the United States to make the next president less able to fight a pandemic, confront adversaries, work with allies, and avoid costly errors or delays? Should Americans have to wait longer for a vaccine to be available because the Trump administration refused to help Biden prepare for its distribution?
Lastly, if as a country Americans recognized that interstate competition will not end in their lifetimes, they would take a hard look at the global balance of power and set realistic priorities. Gone are the days when the United States could aspire to play the dominant role in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East simultaneously, and to use its economic and military power to try to spread liberal ideals around the globe. Counterbalancing China should be its top priority, which means striking a new division of labor with its European allies and strengthening ties with partners in Asia. The United States should also pursue business-like relations with all states in the Middle East, instead of special relationships with a few and unremittingly hostile relations with others. China and Russia talk to everyone in the region, and this approach gives them greater influence with all of them. Washington should do the same.
I do not know if the United States can summon the sense of common purpose and shared identity required to secure a safe and prosperous future for Americans. The divisions between Americans may be too deep, and their current crop of politicians (or their financial backers) may be too selfish and unprincipled to rise above party and personal ambition and recommit themselves to the greater good. As I said 14 years ago: “Although geography, history, and good fortune have combined to give the United States a remarkable array of advantages, it would still be possible to squander them.” And if it does, I warned, “we will have only ourselves to blame.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-17--Russia Wants to Trade Syrian Refugees for Money

Russia Wants to Trade Syrian Refugees for Money Russia ’ s goals in Syria were never altruistic .
It wanted to preserve a military base in the Middle East to guard its regional interests , and it sought postwar reconstruction projects for its companies as a payoff for backing Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad .
Moscow has achieved the first goal , but the second is proving much more difficult .
Two diplomatic visions of Syrian reconstructions continue to clash .
The West insists on linking reconstruction funds to a domestic political process deemed widely legitimate , the release of thousands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for all Syrians .
Russia , for its part , wants to make reconstruction a precondition for the return of Syrian refugees .
It has tried to sell the idea that the country ’ s 6 million-plus refugees will only be able to go back home if the West is willing to pay to rebuild Syria .
Last week , Russia tried to realize its vision for postwar Syria by helping organize the first international refugee return conference in Damascus .
It failed miserably .
Around 20 countries including China , India , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But it quickly became apparent that they were only there either because they wished to gain from the reconstruction boom in Syria , not pay for it , or simply to display political support for Assad .
Except for Lebanon , none of the countries hosting a sizable chunk of refugees was willing to accept Russia ’ s terms for dialogue .
The European Union refused to attend , releasing a statement describing the conference as “ premature.
” EU foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell added that even though everybody wanted the refugees to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must be safe , voluntary , and dignified , in line with the parameters defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
” The United Nations was present at the conference but only as an observer .
The conference ’ s thin participation enraged the Russians .
Russia ’ s special envoy to Syria , Alexander Lavrentiev , was livid as reporters inquired why the attendance was far below expectations .
“ Pressure , pressure , ” from the United States , he said to a Russian journalist at the event .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ days before to reconsider its decision , but his efforts had not paid off .
Jordan , which hosts 650,000 Syrians who are often blamed for the country ’ s deteriorating economy , would be all too pleased to see them go home .
Moreover , Amman desperately needs Moscow ’ s support to keep the Iranian militias present in southern Syria away from its borders .
But Jordan is allied with the West and can not be seen to be forcing the refugees to leave .
Russia understands Jordan ’ s predicament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to assuage its concerns .
Lavrentiev went along with Ahmad al-Oudeh , a former rebel leader who is now the leading security provider to anti-regime Syrians in eastern Daraa near the Syria-Jordan border .
Oudeh is a familiar figure in the chaotic civil war with myriad local rebel groups and militias .
He received assistance from the West and the United Arab Emirates at the Amman-based Military Operations Center during many years of the Syrian war .
But in 2018 , defeat seemed imminent and he agreed to a reconciliation deal mediated by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was rewarded when he was appointed commander of the 8th Brigade of the Moscow-backed 5th Corps in the Syrian Arab Army .
His loyalty , however , is not to Assad but to anti-regime Syrians .
Two sources in Jordan confirmed to Foreign Policy that one of the reasons for Oudeh ’ s visit to Jordan was to pacify that country ’ s anxieties over the security threat the refugees might face if they returned .
“ Ahmad al-Oudeh went to Jordan to discuss the return of refugees , ” said Abou Maher @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among those who signed the Daraa reconciliation agreement .
Russia is portraying the former rebel leaders who joined the 5th Corps as a safeguard for the safety of refugees upon return .
But the idea is fraught with challenges .
Since the reconciliation deal in Daraa promised peace for all sides in the war , the regime and the opposition have been relentlessly attacking each other , and the region has witnessed many assassinations .
There is too much bad blood between Russia-backed former rebels and the Syrian army to reach any compromise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they might escape random arrests , forced disappearances , and torture if they decided to return .
“ Russians are trying to get the regime and our leaders to discuss refugee security , ” added Abou Maher , the former rebel .
“ But no one must trust the regime ’ s intentions .
They want to kill everyone.
” In 2019 , a report by the Human Rights Watch said that Syrian intelligence branches had continued to arbitrary detain , disappear , and harass people .
Abou Salem ’ s brother was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
Soon after his return , as he made way for the city center , he was allegedly stopped by regime soldiers at a checkpoint , detained , and tortured in the local military intelligence branch .
“ They beat him so bad that there was no skin on parts of his body , ” Abou Salem said .
“ He could not move for 10 days , I swear.
” These stories dent Russia ’ s image as a reliable policeman in Syria and deepen the Syrians ’ fear of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war crimes , now including the apprehension of those who thought it safe and returned .
Neither Russia ’ s presumed sway over Assad nor its parallel army division made up of former rebels has managed to change the way the regime functions .
Jordan and its allies in the West have been made aware of the situation on the ground by intrepid human rights activists in Syria , Jordan , and Lebanon , often at personal risk .
Darwish , one such Syrian activist , said he received death threats for being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were arrested and disappeared .
He paid a smuggler $ 1,500 and fled to Lebanon just two years ago , then succeeded in bringing his family last month .
Darwish said that even though the economic situation in Lebanon is worsening , and poverty among refugees has risen by 90 percent in recent months , it is better than being in Syria .
“ Here at least the army won ’ t threaten and disappear me , ” he told us from a Beirut suburb .
“ I stayed in Syria throughout the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into my house to look for me , I knew what was coming.
” Lebanon participated in the conference .
Its ruling elite has turned a deaf ear to refugees ’ anxiety over random arrests , mandatory conscription in the army , and other privations inflicted by war .
It has long held the view that the U.N. ’ s aid to Syrian refugees is slowing the return .
Lebanon hosts 1.5 million Syrian refugees and , despite the government ’ s direct and indirect campaign to push them out , only 65,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s President Michel Aoun said the presence of refugees cost his country $ 40 billion , citing the International Monetary Fund , and suggested that international aid be provided to Syrians inside Syria , as that would “ encourage them to return.
” Like Russia , Lebanon too expects to benefit from Syria ’ s impending reconstruction , which is expected to cost around $ 200 billion .
It has been marketing its port in Tripoli in the north , just 20 miles from Syria , as the logistics hub for Syria ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Russia has no sympathizers in the region .
Marianna Belenkaya , a Russian journalist who covered the conference , curiously noted Lavrentiev ’ s Turkey stopover right after the conference .
“ Russia had asked Damascus to invite Turkey , ” she told me on the phone from the Syrian capital .
“ But Moscow understood why it couldn ’ t .
Lavrentiev flew to Turkey to make sure they were not offended and to discuss refugee return.
” In Syria , Russian President Vladimir Putin is unable to seek any concessions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to back an international conference for refugee return , such as repealing mandatory conscription , releasing prisoners , and giving unhindered access to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees .
But the other very important reason that many Syrians do not wish to return is the economic crisis in Syria .
People don ’ t have enough to eat , their cities have been pulverized , and their homes are mere rubble in a vast wasteland .
Most countries have made it clear that they don ’ t want to legitimate Russia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for its own diplomatic and economic gain .
But that ’ s not to suggest they have any plausible ideas of their own for reducing the suffering either of Syrians inside the country or those scattered elsewhere .

Russia’s goals in Syria were never altruistic. It wanted to preserve a military base in the Middle East to guard its regional interests, and it sought postwar reconstruction projects for its companies as a payoff for backing Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Moscow has achieved the first goal, but the second is proving much more difficult.
Russia’s goals in Syria were never altruistic. It wanted to preserve a military base in the Middle East to guard its regional interests, and it sought postwar reconstruction projects for its companies as a payoff for backing Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Moscow has achieved the first goal, but the second is proving much more difficult.
Two diplomatic visions of Syrian reconstructions continue to clash. The West insists on linking reconstruction funds to a domestic political process deemed widely legitimate, the release of thousands of political prisoners, and guaranteed safety for all Syrians. Russia, for its part, wants to make reconstruction a precondition for the return of Syrian refugees. It has tried to sell the idea that the country’s 6 million-plus refugees will only be able to go back home if the West is willing to pay to rebuild Syria.
Last week, Russia tried to realize its vision for postwar Syria by helping organize the first international refugee return conference in Damascus. It failed miserably.
Around 20 countries including China, India, and the United Arab Emirates participated. But it quickly became apparent that they were only there either because they wished to gain from the reconstruction boom in Syria, not pay for it, or simply to display political support for Assad. Except for Lebanon, none of the countries hosting a sizable chunk of refugees was willing to accept Russia’s terms for dialogue.
The European Union refused to attend, releasing a statement describing the conference as “premature.” EU foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell added that even though everybody wanted the refugees to go back home, “these returns must be safe, voluntary, and dignified, in line with the parameters defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.” The United Nations was present at the conference but only as an observer.
The conference’s thin participation enraged the Russians. Russia’s special envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, was livid as reporters inquired why the attendance was far below expectations. “Pressure, pressure,” from the United States, he said to a Russian journalist at the event. Lavrentiev had courted Jordan just a few days before to reconsider its decision, but his efforts had not paid off.
Jordan, which hosts 650,000 Syrians who are often blamed for the country’s deteriorating economy, would be all too pleased to see them go home. Moreover, Amman desperately needs Moscow’s support to keep the Iranian militias present in southern Syria away from its borders. But Jordan is allied with the West and cannot be seen to be forcing the refugees to leave.
Russia understands Jordan’s predicament and sent Lavrentiev there on Oct. 27 to assuage its concerns. Lavrentiev went along with Ahmad al-Oudeh, a former rebel leader who is now the leading security provider to anti-regime Syrians in eastern Daraa near the Syria-Jordan border.
Oudeh is a familiar figure in the chaotic civil war with myriad local rebel groups and militias. He received assistance from the West and the United Arab Emirates at the Amman-based Military Operations Center during many years of the Syrian war. But in 2018, defeat seemed imminent and he agreed to a reconciliation deal mediated by the Russians. Oudeh’s pragmatism was rewarded when he was appointed commander of the 8th Brigade of the Moscow-backed 5th Corps in the Syrian Arab Army. His loyalty, however, is not to Assad but to anti-regime Syrians.
Two sources in Jordan confirmed to Foreign Policy that one of the reasons for Oudeh’s visit to Jordan was to pacify that country’s anxieties over the security threat the refugees might face if they returned. “Ahmad al-Oudeh went to Jordan to discuss the return of refugees,” said Abou Maher, a former rebel himself who was among those who signed the Daraa reconciliation agreement.
Russia is portraying the former rebel leaders who joined the 5th Corps as a safeguard for the safety of refugees upon return. But the idea is fraught with challenges. Since the reconciliation deal in Daraa promised peace for all sides in the war, the regime and the opposition have been relentlessly attacking each other, and the region has witnessed many assassinations. There is too much bad blood between Russia-backed former rebels and the Syrian army to reach any compromise that could possibly assure the refugees that they might escape random arrests, forced disappearances, and torture if they decided to return.
“Russians are trying to get the regime and our leaders to discuss refugee security,” added Abou Maher, the former rebel. “But no one must trust the regime’s intentions. They want to kill everyone.”
In 2019, a report by the Human Rights Watch said that Syrian intelligence branches had continued to arbitrary detain, disappear, and harass people. Abou Salem’s brother was among those who returned to Daraa that year. Soon after his return, as he made way for the city center, he was allegedly stopped by regime soldiers at a checkpoint, detained, and tortured in the local military intelligence branch. “They beat him so bad that there was no skin on parts of his body,” Abou Salem said. “He could not move for 10 days, I swear.”
These stories dent Russia’s image as a reliable policeman in Syria and deepen the Syrians’ fear of the regime that they accuse of committing systematic war crimes, now including the apprehension of those who thought it safe and returned. Neither Russia’s presumed sway over Assad nor its parallel army division made up of former rebels has managed to change the way the regime functions.
Jordan and its allies in the West have been made aware of the situation on the ground by intrepid human rights activists in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, often at personal risk. Darwish, one such Syrian activist, said he received death threats for being pro-West, while two of his colleagues were arrested and disappeared. He paid a smuggler $1,500 and fled to Lebanon just two years ago, then succeeded in bringing his family last month.
Darwish said that even though the economic situation in Lebanon is worsening, and poverty among refugees has risen by 90 percent in recent months, it is better than being in Syria. “Here at least the army won’t threaten and disappear me,” he told us from a Beirut suburb. “I stayed in Syria throughout the war, but when the army broke into my house to look for me, I knew what was coming.”
Lebanon participated in the conference. Its ruling elite has turned a deaf ear to refugees’ anxiety over random arrests, mandatory conscription in the army, and other privations inflicted by war. It has long held the view that the U.N.’s aid to Syrian refugees is slowing the return. Lebanon hosts 1.5 million Syrian refugees and, despite the government’s direct and indirect campaign to push them out, only 65,000 have so far returned.
Lebanon’s President Michel Aoun said the presence of refugees cost his country $40 billion, citing the International Monetary Fund, and suggested that international aid be provided to Syrians inside Syria, as that would “encourage them to return.”
Like Russia, Lebanon too expects to benefit from Syria’s impending reconstruction, which is expected to cost around $200 billion. It has been marketing its port in Tripoli in the north, just 20 miles from Syria, as the logistics hub for Syria’s reconstruction. But other than Lebanon, Russia has no sympathizers in the region.
Marianna Belenkaya, a Russian journalist who covered the conference, curiously noted Lavrentiev’s Turkey stopover right after the conference. “Russia had asked Damascus to invite Turkey,” she told me on the phone from the Syrian capital. “But Moscow understood why it couldn’t. Lavrentiev flew to Turkey to make sure they were not offended and to discuss refugee return.”
In Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unable to seek any concessions from Assad that could persuade the West to back an international conference for refugee return, such as repealing mandatory conscription, releasing prisoners, and giving unhindered access to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. But the other very important reason that many Syrians do not wish to return is the economic crisis in Syria. People don’t have enough to eat, their cities have been pulverized, and their homes are mere rubble in a vast wasteland.
Most countries have made it clear that they don’t want to legitimate Russia’s attempt to exploit the refugee issue for its own diplomatic and economic gain. But that’s not to suggest they have any plausible ideas of their own for reducing the suffering either of Syrians inside the country or those scattered elsewhere.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--Pompeo Heads to Israel as Netanyahu Calls Biden ‘President-elect’

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visits Israel , Ethiopian troops to march on Tigray capital , and Bulgaria blocks North Macedonia EU accession talks .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is in Israel today as he continues his whistle-stop tour of U.S. allies .
Before he heads to the United Arab Emirates , Bahrain , and Saudi Arabia , he is planning on making history .
Pompeo will visit two Israeli settlements both considered in violation of international law , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the West Bank .
By doing so , he becomes the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit either site .
His de facto endorsement of the Israeli occupation stands in contrast to the outgoing Obama administration ’ s moves in 2016 , allowing passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution declaring Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory illegal by abstaining from ( rather than vetoing ) the vote .
Anger at home and abroad .
Palestinian Authority ( PA ) Prime Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh condemned the move , arguing that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are some bright spots in the Israel-PA relationship , however , as the PA announced on Tuesday it would resume its civil and security cooperation with Israel after a six-month freeze—a security relationship that many ordinary Palestinians resent .
There has also been criticism of Pompeo at home ; 40 Democratic lawmakers have sent a letter to Pompeo calling on him to condemn the destruction of a Palestinian village by Israel on Nov. 3 and asking whether U.S. equipment was used in the process .
His visit also comes as Israel plans to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite outcry from the United Nations and European Union .
Nickolay Mladenov , U.N. envoy to the Middle East peace process , said the expansion would “ further consolidate a ring of settlements between Jerusalem and Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank ” and therefore “ significantly damage prospects for a future contiguous Palestinian State.
” Goodbye , Donald .
Hello , Joe .
Pompeo ’ s farewell tour occurs as U.S. President Donald Trump continues to rail against his defeat in the U.S. presidential election .
Although Netanyahu has enjoyed close ties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be no awkward declarations with Pompeo ; the Israeli prime minister spoke with Biden on Tuesday , addressing him as president-elect .
Biden—who reminded Netanyahu that he was his “ best fucking friend here ” on a 2010 White House visit—is considered a moderate voice on Israel : He doesn ’ t believe U.S. aid should come with conditions , nor does he plan to reverse the Trump administration ’ s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel ’ s capital .
Iran disagreements .
Nonetheless , he and Netanyahu are likely to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has repeatedly called for a U.S. return to the Iran nuclear agreement .
Israel is already making its stance clear with a number of airstrikes early this morning on Iranian targets in Syria following the discovery of explosives on the Israeli-controlled side of the Golan Heights .
As Joshua Mitnick writes in Foreign Policy , there are as many reasons for why Biden ’ s presidency could help Netanyahu as hurt him .
Ethiopian military marching on Mekelle .
Ethiopia ’ s military is marching on the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle , according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he declared “ the final critical act of law enforcement will be done in the coming days.
” The ground campaign comes after Mekelle was bombarded by the Ethiopian air force on Monday .
The two-week long conflict has already led to a “ full-scale humanitarian crisis , ” according to the United Nations , with at least 27,000 Ethiopians fleeing into neighboring Sudan .
Trump fires election security head .
U.S. President Donald Trump has fired the head of a government agency designed to protect U.S. voting systems in an escalation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his loss to U.S. President-elect Joe Biden .
Chris Krebs , the now-fired director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ( CISA ) had recently contradicted Trump ’ s desperate claims of a rigged vote by sharing a link to a report showing no evidence of computer fraud in the U.S. election .
Zepeda off the hook .
Former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda ’ s court hearing in New York will not go ahead this morning after the United States agreed to drop the case and return Zepeda to Mexico @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Angeles in October on charges of money laundering and facilitating drug trafficking but U.S. attorneys on Tuesday said that “ sensitive and important foreign policy considerations ” outweighed the government ’ s desire to prosecute the case .
It ’ s unclear whether Zepeda will face charges in Mexico , as President Andrés Manuel López Obrador had come to his defense when he was initially arrested .
Bulgaria blocks North Macedonia .
European Union member Bulgaria has blocked its neighbor , North Macedonia , from beginning accession talks with the bloc over a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including the nationality of a shared historical hero .
Bulgaria wants guarantees that North Macedonia will make good on a friendship treaty signed in 2017 between the two countries—a joint commission on controversial historical issues has stalled since its creation in 2018 .
Bulgaria also objects to the mention of the “ Macedonian language ” in EU documents as it believes the language spoken in North Macedonia to be a form of Bulgarian .
A similar dispute between North Macedonia and Greece concluded in 2018 with the Greeks recognizing Macedonian as a language @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who also recognize it .
As Bojan Stojkovski argued in FP last year , “ While there are many reasons for the Balkan countries to cooperate and help each other into the EU , some can ’ t resist bickering instead … rather than squabbling over shared heroes , they should be working together toward integrating the region into the EU and paving the way for the others to follow.
” If the new Moderna vaccine ends up helping to end the coronavirus pandemic , among those in line to receive the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Parton .
The singer and activist emerged as an early backer of vaccine research after donating $ 1 million in April to the Vanderbilt University Medical Center in Nashville , a site of Moderna ’ s vaccine trials .
Early data showed the vaccine to be nearly 95 percent effective in preventing the contraction of COVID-19 .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visits Israel , Ethiopian troops to march on Tigray capital, and Bulgaria blocks North Macedonia EU accession talks.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visits Israel, Ethiopian troops to march on Tigray capital, and Bulgaria blocks North Macedonia EU accession talks.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pompeo To Visit Israeli West Bank Settlements During Farewell Tour
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is in Israel today as he continues his whistle-stop tour of U.S. allies. Before he heads to the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, he is planning on making history.
Pompeo will visit two Israeli settlements both considered in violation of international law, one in the Golan Heights and one in the West Bank. By doing so, he becomes the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit either site. His de facto endorsement of the Israeli occupation stands in contrast to the outgoing Obama administration’s moves in 2016, allowing passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution declaring Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory illegal by abstaining from (rather than vetoing) the vote.
Anger at home and abroad. Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh condemned the move, arguing that it will set a dangerous precedent. There are some bright spots in the Israel-PA relationship, however, as the PA announced on Tuesday it would resume its civil and security cooperation with Israel after a six-month freeze—a security relationship that many ordinary Palestinians resent.
There has also been criticism of Pompeo at home; 40 Democratic lawmakers have sent a letter to Pompeo calling on him to condemn the destruction of a Palestinian village by Israel on Nov. 3 and asking whether U.S. equipment was used in the process.
His visit also comes as Israel plans to expand a settlement in East Jerusalem, despite outcry from the United Nations and European Union. Nickolay Mladenov, U.N. envoy to the Middle East peace process, said the expansion would “further consolidate a ring of settlements between Jerusalem and Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank” and therefore “significantly damage prospects for a future contiguous Palestinian State.”
Goodbye, Donald. Hello, Joe. Pompeo’s farewell tour occurs as U.S. President Donald Trump continues to rail against his defeat in the U.S. presidential election. Although Netanyahu has enjoyed close ties with the Trump administration, there will be no awkward declarations with Pompeo; the Israeli prime minister spoke with Biden on Tuesday, addressing him as president-elect.
Biden—who reminded Netanyahu that he was his “best fucking friend here” on a 2010 White House visit—is considered a moderate voice on Israel: He doesn’t believe U.S. aid should come with conditions, nor does he plan to reverse the Trump administration’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.
Iran disagreements. Nonetheless, he and Netanyahu are likely to be at odds over Iran, as Biden has repeatedly called for a U.S. return to the Iran nuclear agreement. Israel is already making its stance clear with a number of airstrikes early this morning on Iranian targets in Syria following the discovery of explosives on the Israeli-controlled side of the Golan Heights. As Joshua Mitnick writes in Foreign Policy, there are as many reasons for why Biden’s presidency could help Netanyahu as hurt him.
What We’re Following Today
Ethiopian military marching on Mekelle. Ethiopia’s military is marching on the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle, according to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, as he declared “the final critical act of law enforcement will be done in the coming days.” The ground campaign comes after Mekelle was bombarded by the Ethiopian air force on Monday. The two-week long conflict has already led to a “full-scale humanitarian crisis,” according to the United Nations, with at least 27,000 Ethiopians fleeing into neighboring Sudan.
Trump fires election security head. U.S. President Donald Trump has fired the head of a government agency designed to protect U.S. voting systems in an escalation of his Twitter crusade against election officials following his loss to U.S. President-elect Joe Biden. Chris Krebs, the now-fired director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) had recently contradicted Trump’s desperate claims of a rigged vote by sharing a link to a report showing no evidence of computer fraud in the U.S. election.
Zepeda off the hook. Former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda’s court hearing in New York will not go ahead this morning after the United States agreed to drop the case and return Zepeda to Mexico. Zepeda had been arrested in Los Angeles in October on charges of money laundering and facilitating drug trafficking but U.S. attorneys on Tuesday said that “sensitive and important foreign policy considerations” outweighed the government’s desire to prosecute the case. It’s unclear whether Zepeda will face charges in Mexico, as President Andrés Manuel López Obrador had come to his defense when he was initially arrested.
Keep an Eye On Turkey to join Russia in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkish troops will soon join their Russian counterparts in Nagorno-Karabakh after Turkey’s parliament approved their deployment. Turkish forces will man a joint Russian-Turkish observation post in the region for one year, in line with the agreement signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan to end the six-week conflict. In a letter to parliament urging their approval, Turkish Presidnet Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggested that Turkish civilian personnel could soon be needed as part of the operation.
Bulgaria blocks North Macedonia. European Union member Bulgaria has blocked its neighbor, North Macedonia, from beginning accession talks with the bloc over a dispute over language and historical issues, including the nationality of a shared historical hero. Bulgaria wants guarantees that North Macedonia will make good on a friendship treaty signed in 2017 between the two countries—a joint commission on controversial historical issues has stalled since its creation in 2018. Bulgaria also objects to the mention of the “Macedonian language” in EU documents as it believes the language spoken in North Macedonia to be a form of Bulgarian. A similar dispute between North Macedonia and Greece concluded in 2018 with the Greeks recognizing Macedonian as a language, joining the vast majority of nations who also recognize it.
As Bojan Stojkovski argued in FP last year, “While there are many reasons for the Balkan countries to cooperate and help each other into the EU, some can’t resist bickering instead … rather than squabbling over shared heroes, they should be working together toward integrating the region into the EU and paving the way for the others to follow.”
Odds and Ends
If the new Moderna vaccine ends up helping to end the coronavirus pandemic, among those in line to receive the world’s gratitude is music legend Dolly Parton. The singer and activist emerged as an early backer of vaccine research after donating $1 million in April to the Vanderbilt University Medical Center in Nashville, a site of Moderna’s vaccine trials. Early data showed the vaccine to be nearly 95 percent effective in preventing the contraction of COVID-19.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--America’s Messiness Is Its Strength

America’s Messiness Is Its Strength

In the run-up to the U.S. presidential election , the Week news magazine published an opinion by Ryan Cooper arguing not only that the United States is “ the Holy Roman Empire of the 21st century ” but that this is a bad thing .
It ’ s not a new or an uncommon comparison .
In the book The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire , A. Wess Mitchell argues that the United States occupies an analogous geopolitical position to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and could learn from its successes and failures .
As an analogy , though , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and the Holy Roman Empire .
The desire for centralization and control misses exactly what made both powers survive and thrive .
Cooper is more dismissive than Mitchell .
He calls the original empire ’ s legal institutions “ complicated and illogical.
” He claims the empire was “ [ s ] urpassed by history ” and “ doomed.
” Similarly , America ’ s basic mechanisms of government are “ malfunctioning kludges.
” He writes : “ Countries that fail to maintain themselves to this degree often do not survive.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ collection of political entities that occupied Central Europe in the early modern period , the United States is “ ripe for the picking by an opportunistic tyrant.
” In the empire ’ s case , this tyrant was Napoleon Bonaparte , commander in chief of the first modern national army and author of a legal code that influenced Germany ’ s current modern legal system—after he “ swept away all the feudal cruft ” of Germany ’ s earlier legal heritage , of course .
Cooper admits this narrative is somewhat stretched , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ takeaway point : “ Political systems require maintenance and regular updating to stay on top of the developments of history.
” Cooper is arguing that the U.S. electoral system is as out of touch with reality as he believes the Holy Roman Empire was in its later years .
He judges the empire for not being a cohesive nation-state and marks the United States down likewise .
Ironically for a narrative that calls for reform , this picture of the empire is old .
It draws on 19th-century nationalist Prussian historiography , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to prevail over this immense and haphazard congeries of electorates , kingdoms , counties , duchies , margraviates and landgraviates , imperial free cities , imperial free abbeys , imperial free nunneries , imperial knights , and at least one county , Sayn-Wittgenstein-Hachenburg , that descended through the female line alone .
The implication is there is a timeline of development for states : progress , that vaporware idea .
Cooper ’ s article opens with the statement that the Holy Roman Empire was an “ anachronistic political fossil.
” States that update @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the right time succeed .
States that retain archaic elements—like the U.S. Constitution ( one of the oldest still operating ) and the Electoral College—are doomed and will be surpassed by history .
But history has no goal .
There is no historical end point for states such that Napoleon ’ s France was further along its development toward it and the empire was less advanced .
There are logical arguments to be made that a centralized state or a legal code like Napoleon ’ s or modern Germany ’ s should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ centers of power like the Holy Roman Empire or legal systems based on precedent like in the United States or United Kingdom .
That they are newer isn ’ t one of them .
I ’ m not sure why Cooper assumes that “ federal cruft ” should be done away with in favor of a centralized and efficient system given who ’ s currently at the head of the U.S. executive .
In an influential reimagining of the Holy Roman Empire , Mack Walker argues that its highly decentralized structure protected Germany @ @ @ @ @ @ @ empire was an “ incubator ” for local communities : “ German Home Towns.
” America ’ s governors , mayors , senators , and representatives have been foci of resistance to U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s off-brand autocracy , like “ sanctuary ” jurisdictions .
Since National Guard units are under the dual control of state and federal government , it has been difficult for Trump to control them to counter protests .
The armed forces hate him , and U.S. Capitol Police answers to Congress .
Trump used border patrol @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was forced to by U.S. decentralization .
Regional officials like New York Gov .
Andrew Cuomo have also provided necessary leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic—or , like Florida Gov .
Ron DeSantis , they have failed .
Different responses by state governors have had profoundly different effects .
Back in April , when U.S. states were coordinating their hypothetical COVID-19 reopening schedules in several overlapping groups , at least one joker on Twitter looked at the map and said : “ Congrats , everyone .
We invented the Holy Roman Empire.
” Cooper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instituted .
He calls the U.S. system lacking because it is “ not designed to enable efficient , humane government.
” But what a system is designed to do is not necessarily what it ends up capable of .
To a great extent , the U.S. system—like the Holy Roman Empire ’ s before it—was not designed at all but grew .
The empire had a constitution , but except for texts like the Golden Bull of 1356 , this was unwritten : a mixed body of local laws , territorial statutes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a medieval combination of canon law and Roman law .
Yes , this is a kludge .
Complex systems are full of them .
The Holy Roman Empire lasted a long time , but it was not changeless .
Its laws and its governance developed throughout its existence .
The historical interpretation of the empire has recently undergone a renaissance : Historians now point out that the maintenance and regular updating Cooper wants actually happened repeatedly .
The Reformation prompted the development of a system where people of different religions could live together @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Peace of Westphalia .
The empire did not collapse because of a failure to update ; it was invaded by a global superpower .
But Napoleon ’ s modern national army eventually lost , up to date legal codes or no .
He was beaten by the unregenerate armies of the United Kingdom and Russia , as well as a collection of German states , including some of Napoleon ’ s former subjects or allies .
( The kingdom that gave us the Prussian historiography that informed Cooper ’ s opinion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ . )
In Cooper ’ s analogy , Napoleon plays the part of Trump .
But this isn ’ t quite right .
Napoleon was a foreign head of state and the commander of an invading army .
Instead I propose that the United States might look like the Holy Roman Empire 200 years before Napoleon , right before the Thirty Years ’ War .
Like the empire in the early 17th century , we may soon be facing a constitutional crisis .
Like the empire , plenty of people are sniffing about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation , and these people are weaker and more out of their depth than they believe .
On the other hand , it ’ s difficult to find a German Habsburg who can be compared to the malevolent vacuum at the top of the U.S. government .
Rudolf II may have been going insane , but there the comparison ends .
Ferdinand II ’ s choices , like the 1629 Edict of Restitution , aggravated the situation—but Ferdinand was also principled and God-fearing , and he did his duty as he understood it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the deaths of up to one-third of the population of Central Europe .
But the Holy Roman Empire not only survived this crisis ; it lasted for another 158 years .
After the war , the empire developed legal institutions that helped prevent something like it from happening again .
Benjamin Franklin traveled to Germany in 1766 and met a leading German constitutional scholar because he was interested in the empire ’ s federal structure as a model for a political entity made up of several states , a political set of sets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ British Empire and the eventual American state .
If the United States is like the Holy Roman Empire , we could do worse than consider some of its characteristics : a sense of common identity juxtaposed with manifold diversity , an appreciation of resistance from below , and the participation of ordinary people in the political process .
Those qualities have helped the United States last for over two centuries .
They might let it equal the empire yet .

In the run-up to the U.S. presidential election, the Week news magazine published an opinion by Ryan Cooper arguing not only that the United States is “the Holy Roman Empire of the 21st century” but that this is a bad thing. It’s not a new or an uncommon comparison . In the book The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire, A. Wess Mitchell argues that the United States occupies an analogous geopolitical position to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and could learn from its successes and failures. As an analogy, though, it manages to be unfair to both the United States and the Holy Roman Empire. The desire for centralization and control misses exactly what made both powers survive and thrive.
In the run-up to the U.S. presidential election, the Week news magazine published an opinion by Ryan Cooper arguing not only that the United States is “the Holy Roman Empire of the 21st century” but that this is a bad thing. It’s not a new or an uncommon comparison. In the book The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire, A. Wess Mitchell argues that the United States occupies an analogous geopolitical position to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and could learn from its successes and failures. As an analogy, though, it manages to be unfair to both the United States and the Holy Roman Empire. The desire for centralization and control misses exactly what made both powers survive and thrive.
Cooper is more dismissive than Mitchell. He calls the original empire’s legal institutions “complicated and illogical.” He claims the empire was “[s]urpassed by history” and “doomed.” Similarly, America’s basic mechanisms of government are “malfunctioning kludges.” He writes: “Countries that fail to maintain themselves to this degree often do not survive.” Cooper believes that like the vast collection of political entities that occupied Central Europe in the early modern period, the United States is “ripe for the picking by an opportunistic tyrant.”
In the empire’s case, this tyrant was Napoleon Bonaparte, commander in chief of the first modern national army and author of a legal code that influenced Germany’s current modern legal system—after he “swept away all the feudal cruft” of Germany’s earlier legal heritage, of course. Cooper admits this narrative is somewhat stretched, but he’s serious about his takeaway point: “Political systems require maintenance and regular updating to stay on top of the developments of history.”
Cooper is arguing that the U.S. electoral system is as out of touch with reality as he believes the Holy Roman Empire was in its later years. He judges the empire for not being a cohesive nation-state and marks the United States down likewise.
Ironically for a narrative that calls for reform, this picture of the empire is old. It draws on 19th-century nationalist Prussian historiography, which identified centralized nation-states like Prussia as destined to prevail over this immense and haphazard congeries of electorates, kingdoms, counties, duchies, margraviates and landgraviates, imperial free cities, imperial free abbeys, imperial free nunneries, imperial knights, and at least one county, Sayn-Wittgenstein-Hachenburg, that descended through the female line alone.
The implication is there is a timeline of development for states: progress, that vaporware idea. Cooper’s article opens with the statement that the Holy Roman Empire was an “anachronistic political fossil.” States that update (their laws, their armies) at the right time succeed. States that retain archaic elements—like the U.S. Constitution (one of the oldest still operating) and the Electoral College—are doomed and will be surpassed by history.
But history has no goal. There is no historical end point for states such that Napoleon’s France was further along its development toward it and the empire was less advanced. There are logical arguments to be made that a centralized state or a legal code like Napoleon’s or modern Germany’s should be preferable to a polity with multiple centers of power like the Holy Roman Empire or legal systems based on precedent like in the United States or United Kingdom. That they are newer isn’t one of them.
I’m not sure why Cooper assumes that “federal cruft” should be done away with in favor of a centralized and efficient system given who’s currently at the head of the U.S. executive. In an influential reimagining of the Holy Roman Empire, Mack Walker argues that its highly decentralized structure protected Germany’s smaller political entities. The empire was an “incubator” for local communities: “German Home Towns.”
America’s governors, mayors, senators, and representatives have been foci of resistance to U.S. President Donald Trump’s off-brand autocracy, like “sanctuary” jurisdictions. Since National Guard units are under the dual control of state and federal government, it has been difficult for Trump to control them to counter protests. The armed forces hate him, and U.S. Capitol Police answers to Congress. Trump used border patrol as riot police this summer because he was forced to by U.S. decentralization.
Regional officials like New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo have also provided necessary leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic—or, like Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, they have failed. Different responses by state governors have had profoundly different effects. Back in April, when U.S. states were coordinating their hypothetical COVID-19 reopening schedules in several overlapping groups, at least one joker on Twitter looked at the map and said: “Congrats, everyone. We invented the Holy Roman Empire.”
Cooper praises “efficient” governance, deliberately instituted. He calls the U.S. system lacking because it is “not designed to enable efficient, humane government.” But what a system is designed to do is not necessarily what it ends up capable of. To a great extent, the U.S. system—like the Holy Roman Empire’s before it—was not designed at all but grew. The empire had a constitution, but except for texts like the Golden Bull of 1356, this was unwritten: a mixed body of local laws, territorial statutes, and the ancient European ius commune, a medieval combination of canon law and Roman law. Yes, this is a kludge. Complex systems are full of them.
The Holy Roman Empire lasted a long time, but it was not changeless. Its laws and its governance developed throughout its existence. The historical interpretation of the empire has recently undergone a renaissance: Historians now point out that the maintenance and regular updating Cooper wants actually happened repeatedly. The Reformation prompted the development of a system where people of different religions could live together. The Thirty Years’ War resulted in the Peace of Westphalia.
The empire did not collapse because of a failure to update; it was invaded by a global superpower. But Napoleon’s modern national army eventually lost, up to date legal codes or no. He was beaten by the unregenerate armies of the United Kingdom and Russia, as well as a collection of German states, including some of Napoleon’s former subjects or allies. (The kingdom that gave us the Prussian historiography that informed Cooper’s opinion hasn’t done so well either.)
In Cooper’s analogy, Napoleon plays the part of Trump. But this isn’t quite right. Napoleon was a foreign head of state and the commander of an invading army. Instead I propose that the United States might look like the Holy Roman Empire 200 years before Napoleon, right before the Thirty Years’ War. Like the empire in the early 17th century, we may soon be facing a constitutional crisis. Like the empire, plenty of people are sniffing about U.S. politics hoping to benefit from this situation, and these people are weaker and more out of their depth than they believe.
On the other hand, it’s difficult to find a German Habsburg who can be compared to the malevolent vacuum at the top of the U.S. government. Rudolf II may have been going insane, but there the comparison ends. Ferdinand II’s choices, like the 1629 Edict of Restitution, aggravated the situation—but Ferdinand was also principled and God-fearing, and he did his duty as he understood it.
The Thirty Years’ War caused the deaths of up to one-third of the population of Central Europe. But the Holy Roman Empire not only survived this crisis; it lasted for another 158 years. After the war, the empire developed legal institutions that helped prevent something like it from happening again. Benjamin Franklin traveled to Germany in 1766 and met a leading German constitutional scholar because he was interested in the empire’s federal structure as a model for a political entity made up of several states, a political set of sets. This was how he saw the British Empire and the eventual American state.
If the United States is like the Holy Roman Empire, we could do worse than consider some of its characteristics: a sense of common identity juxtaposed with manifold diversity, an appreciation of resistance from below, and the participation of ordinary people in the political process. Those qualities have helped the United States last for over two centuries. They might let it equal the empire yet.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--Will the Trump Administration Sabotage U.S.-China Relations?

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : What U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has planned for China in the Trump administration ’ s final days , a British diplomat carries out a surprising rescue in Chongqing , and why the artist Ai Weiwei backs U.S. President Donald Trump .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
Chinese President Xi Jinping called U.S. President-elect Joe Biden last Friday , nearly a week after he was declared winner of the Nov. 3 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contact , as I explained last week , was understandable .
But while China may aspire to slightly better relations with the incoming Biden administration—encouraged by figures such as Henry Kissinger calling for a “ reset ” —the outgoing Trump administration is trying to set a course for permanent hostility .
Some officials , such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , are still participating in President Donald Trump ’ s delusions of victory , at least in public .
But in private , they are trying to push through measures designed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a confrontational course .
Those efforts include doubling down on the intelligence community ’ s new focus on China , taking steps against China ’ s fishing policies , and likely introducing new limits on imports of Chinese products , especially technology .
This week , Trump banned U.S. firms from “ Chinese military investment.
” But Trump ’ s electoral loss has left ongoing cases such as the TikTok ban in limbo , possibly making it harder for Biden administration hawks to follow up .
One significant step not yet taken : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang genocide , following the lead of the Canadian Parliament .
That would set a precedent for the Biden administration and spark a massive reaction from Beijing .
But it ’ s unlikely to happen , given the continued strength of the pro-business lobby inside the Trump administration .
( It would also require a sign-off from a distracted president with no interest in human rights . )
Another possibility , and one more in line with the Trump administration , is further visa restrictions for Chinese visitors , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immigration policies would be relatively easy for Biden to undo , but it would send another message to the Chinese leadership and ordinary Chinese people .
While travel to the United States isn ’ t that attractive at present , Chinese students are still attempting to enroll at U.S. universities .
It won ’ t be a surprise if the United States , in the final days of the Trump administration , tells them again that they ’ re not wanted .
Diplomatic lifesaver .
The U.K. consul general in Chongqing , Stephen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rescue a young woman who slipped on rocks , hit her head , and fell into the river .
Video of the event has gone viral in China , giving Britain a much-needed image boost : Relations between the two countries are at a nadir thanks to the situation in Hong Kong .
But Chinese also raised the usual questions : Why did no one else in the crowd help before the 61-year-old foreign diplomat jumped in ?
Bystander apathy is a common source of public angst in China , although state media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of help .
But there may be a simpler explanation for the failure to act in this case : While swimming lessons are universal in Britain , only 1 in 5 people in China can swim—that ’ s why Mao Zedong ’ s feats of aquatic endurance were so powerful .
Ai Weiwei backs Trump .
A number of prominent Chinese dissidents have embraced far-right disinformation about the U.S. elections , retweeting Trump ’ s conspiracy theories about irregularities .
Among them is the prominent artist Ai Weiwei .
Trump has also been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by anti-Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) intellectuals .
While Asian Americans vote overwhelmingly for Democrats , exit polling did show a slight bump toward Trump in the election .
Long telegram ?
The U.S. State Department released a 70-page document this week laying out “ The China Challenge , ” a clear imitation of the famous 1946 “ Long Telegram ” in which U.S. diplomat George Kennan predicted the postwar Soviet threat .
But unlike Kennan ’ s dispatch , this document is committee-produced .
It also places a strange emphasis on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ socialist international order ” —reflecting Pompeo ’ s own language .
The document isn ’ t poorly written , but it doesn ’ t say anything particularly new or interesting , either .
It is more a reflection of the moment than an attempt to shape it .
Tech firms targeted .
Following the block of Ant Financial ’ s initial public offering , Chinese regulators have rolled out a whole set of measures directed at technology firms , especially in the online finance sector .
Some of the regulations reflect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an increasingly potent issue in China .
But there also seems to be a feeling within the CCP that tech companies have become too powerful and are in danger of forgetting who is in charge .
Australia trade war .
A deliberately leaked document shows what Beijing wants from Canberra in order to end the unofficial but comprehensive restraints on Australian trade in recent weeks : an end to efforts to combat Chinese interference in Australia ; silence on Hong Kong , Taiwan , and Xinjiang ; and the embrace of Huawei products @ @ @ @ @ @ @ News by the Chinese Embassy in Australia , accuses Australia of “ poisoning bilateral relations.
” As usual with Chinese diplomacy in the “ wolf warrior ” era , this aggression has prompted immediate backlash in Australia .
Australian politicians may find themselves caught between a desire to solve trade issues and increasing anti-Chinese feelings among the public , stirred by China ’ s threats .
Vaccine hopes .
Chinese coronavirus vaccine efforts , which originally seemed to have a head start , have fallen somewhat behind the recent Western successes .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Chinese companies may have been hampered by the country ’ s own success at containing the virus : While Pfizer and Moderna were able to run trials among the American public , China now has almost no active cases and a much smaller pool of information to draw on .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters @

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: What U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has planned for China in the Trump administration’s final days, a British diplomat carries out a surprising rescue in Chongqing, and why the artist Ai Weiwei backs U.S. President Donald Trump.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: What U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has planned for China in the Trump administration’s final days, a British diplomat carries out a surprising rescue in Chongqing, and why the artist Ai Weiwei backs U.S. President Donald Trump.
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The Last Weeks of Trump’s China Chaos
Chinese President Xi Jinping called U.S. President-elect Joe Biden last Friday, nearly a week after he was declared winner of the Nov. 3 election. The delay in making formal contact, as I explained last week, was understandable. But while China may aspire to slightly better relations with the incoming Biden administration—encouraged by figures such as Henry Kissinger calling for a “reset”—the outgoing Trump administration is trying to set a course for permanent hostility.
Some officials, such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, are still participating in President Donald Trump’s delusions of victory, at least in public. But in private, they are trying to push through measures designed to keep the United States and China on a confrontational course.
Those efforts include doubling down on the intelligence community’s new focus on China, taking steps against China’s fishing policies, and likely introducing new limits on imports of Chinese products, especially technology. This week, Trump banned U.S. firms from “Chinese military investment.” But Trump’s electoral loss has left ongoing cases such as the TikTok ban in limbo, possibly making it harder for Biden administration hawks to follow up.
One significant step not yet taken: to officially declare China’s actions against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang genocide, following the lead of the Canadian Parliament. That would set a precedent for the Biden administration and spark a massive reaction from Beijing. But it’s unlikely to happen, given the continued strength of the pro-business lobby inside the Trump administration. (It would also require a sign-off from a distracted president with no interest in human rights.)
Another possibility, and one more in line with the Trump administration, is further visa restrictions for Chinese visitors, immigrants, and especially students.
Tightening immigration policies would be relatively easy for Biden to undo, but it would send another message to the Chinese leadership and ordinary Chinese people. While travel to the United States isn’t that attractive at present, Chinese students are still attempting to enroll at U.S. universities. It won’t be a surprise if the United States, in the final days of the Trump administration, tells them again that they’re not wanted.
What We’re Following
Diplomatic lifesaver. The U.K. consul general in Chongqing, Stephen Ellison, dove into freezing waters to rescue a young woman who slipped on rocks, hit her head, and fell into the river. Video of the event has gone viral in China, giving Britain a much-needed image boost: Relations between the two countries are at a nadir thanks to the situation in Hong Kong.
But Chinese also raised the usual questions: Why did no one else in the crowd help before the 61-year-old foreign diplomat jumped in? Bystander apathy is a common source of public angst in China, although state media under Xi has focused on propagandizing instances of help.
But there may be a simpler explanation for the failure to act in this case: While swimming lessons are universal in Britain, only 1 in 5 people in China can swim—that’s why Mao Zedong’s feats of aquatic endurance were so powerful.
Ai Weiwei backs Trump. A number of prominent Chinese dissidents have embraced far-right disinformation about the U.S. elections, retweeting Trump’s conspiracy theories about irregularities. Among them is the prominent artist Ai Weiwei. Trump has also been increasingly embraced as a potential savior figure by anti-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intellectuals. While Asian Americans vote overwhelmingly for Democrats, exit polling did show a slight bump toward Trump in the election.
Long telegram? The U.S. State Department released a 70-page document this week laying out “The China Challenge,” a clear imitation of the famous 1946 “Long Telegram” in which U.S. diplomat George Kennan predicted the postwar Soviet threat. But unlike Kennan’s dispatch, this document is committee-produced. It also places a strange emphasis on China’s supposed attempt to impose a “socialist international order”—reflecting Pompeo’s own language.
The document isn’t poorly written, but it doesn’t say anything particularly new or interesting, either. It is more a reflection of the moment than an attempt to shape it.
Tech and Business
Tech firms targeted. Following the block of Ant Financial’s initial public offering, Chinese regulators have rolled out a whole set of measures directed at technology firms, especially in the online finance sector. Some of the regulations reflect legitimate anti-monopoly and data privacy concerns, an increasingly potent issue in China. But there also seems to be a feeling within the CCP that tech companies have become too powerful and are in danger of forgetting who is in charge.
Australia trade war. A deliberately leaked document shows what Beijing wants from Canberra in order to end the unofficial but comprehensive restraints on Australian trade in recent weeks: an end to efforts to combat Chinese interference in Australia; silence on Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xinjiang; and the embrace of Huawei products. The report, given to Nine News by the Chinese Embassy in Australia, accuses Australia of “poisoning bilateral relations.”
As usual with Chinese diplomacy in the “wolf warrior” era, this aggression has prompted immediate backlash in Australia. Australian politicians may find themselves caught between a desire to solve trade issues and increasing anti-Chinese feelings among the public, stirred by China’s threats.
Vaccine hopes. Chinese coronavirus vaccine efforts, which originally seemed to have a head start, have fallen somewhat behind the recent Western successes. But first- and second-phase trials show promising results. Chinese companies may have been hampered by the country’s own success at containing the virus: While Pfizer and Moderna were able to run trials among the American public, China now has almost no active cases and a much smaller pool of information to draw on.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.