foreignpolicy--2020-07-15--The World’s Most Technologically Sophisticated Genocide Is Happening in Xinjiang

The World ’ s Most Technologically Sophisticated Genocide Is Happening in Xinjiang Two recent disturbing events may finally awaken the world to the scale and horror of the atrocities being committed against the Uighurs , a mostly secular Muslim ethnic minority , in Xinjiang , China .
One is an authoritative report documenting the systematic sterilization of Uighur women .
The other was the seizure by U.S. Customs and Border Protection of 13 tons of products made from human hair suspected of being forcibly removed from Uighurs imprisoned in concentration camps .
Both events evoke chilling parallels to past atrocities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disabled , and Indigenous people , and the image of the glass display of mountains of hair preserved at Auschwitz .
The Genocide Convention , to which China is a signatory , defines genocide as specific acts against members of a group with the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part .
These acts include ( a ) killing ; ( b ) causing serious bodily or mental harm ; ( c ) deliberately inflicting conditions of life to bring about the group ’ s physical destruction ; ( d @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within the group ; and ( e ) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group .
Any one of these categories constitutes genocide .
The overwhelming evidence of the Chinese government ’ s deliberate and systematic campaign to destroy the Uighur people clearly meets each of these categories .
Over a million Turkic Uighurs are detained in concentration camps , prisons , and forced labor factories in China .
Detainees are subject to military-style discipline , thought transformation , and forced confessions .
They are abused , tortured , raped , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subjected to electrocution , waterboarding , repeated beatings , stress positions , and injections of unknown substances .
These mass detention camps are designed to cause serious physical , psychological harm and mentally break the Uighur people .
The repeated government orders to “ break their lineage , break their roots , break their connections , and break their origins ” ; “ round up everyone who should be rounded up ” ; and systematically prevent Uighur births demonstrate a clear intent to eradicate the Uighur people as a whole .
Ekpar Asat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authors ) is an emblematic example of how Uighurs are targeted regardless of their recognition as model Chinese citizens by the Communist Party .
Asat was praised by the government for his community leadership as a “ bridge builder ” and “ positive force ” between ethnic minorities and the Xinjiang local government .
But Asat still suffered the same fate as over a million other Uighurs and disappeared into the shadows of the concentration camps in 2016 .
He is held incommunicado and is reported to be serving a 15-year sentence on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hatred.
” Not a single court document is available about his case .
In 2017 , Xinjiang waged a brutal “ Special Campaign to Control Birth Control Violations , ” along with specific local directives .
By 2019 , the government planned to subject over 80 percent of women of childbearing age in southern Xinjiang to forced intrauterine devices ( IUDs ) and sterilization .
The goal is to achieve “ zero birth control violation incidents.
” Government documents reveal a campaign of mass female sterilization supported by state funding to carry out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 2020 .
This goes far beyond the scale , per capita , of forced sterilization inflicted on women throughout China under the past one-child policy .
To implement these policies , the Xinjiang government employed “ dragnet-style ” investigations to hunt down women of childbearing age .
Once apprehended , these women have no choice but to undergo forced sterilization to avoid being sent to an internment camp .
Once detained , women face forced injections , abortions , and unknown drugs .
And statistics show that the government is meeting its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2018 , population growth rates in the Uighur heartland plummeted by 84 percent .
Conversely , official documents show that sterilization rates skyrocketed in Xinjiang while plunging throughout the rest of China , and the funding for these programs is only increasing .
Between 2017 and 2018 , in one district , the percentage of women who were infertile or widowed increased by 124 percent and 117 percent , respectively .
In 2018 , 80 percent of all IUD placements in China were performed in Xinjiang despite accounting for a mere 1.8 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IUDs can be removed only by state-approved surgery—or else prison terms will follow .
In Kashgar , only about 3 percent of married women of childbearing age gave birth in 2019 .
The latest annual reports from some of these regions have begun omitting birth rate information altogether to conceal the scale of destruction .
The government has shut down its entire online platform after these revelations .
The scale and scope of these measures are clearly designed to halt Uighur births .
With Uighur men detained and women sterilized , the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ destruction of the Uighur people .
At least half a million of the remaining Uighur children have been separated from their families and are being raised by the state at so-called “ children shelters.
” What makes this genocide so uniquely dangerous is its technological sophistication , allowing for efficiency in its destruction and concealment from global attention .
The Uighurs have been suffering under the most advanced police state , with extensive controls and restrictions on every aspect of life—religious , familial , cultural , and social .
To facilitate surveillance , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Cities and villages are split into squares of about 500 people .
Each square has a police station that closely monitors inhabitants by regularly scanning their identification cards , faces , DNA samples , fingerprints , and cell phones .
These methods are supplemented by a machine-operated system known as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform .
The system uses machine learning to collect personal data from video surveillance , smartphones , and other private records to generate lists for detention .
Over a million Han Chinese watchers have been installed in Uighur @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the government ’ s eye .
The Chinese government operates the most intrusive mass surveillance system in the world and repeatedly denies the international community meaningful access to it .
It is therefore incumbent on us to appreciate the nature , depth , and speed of the genocide and act now before it ’ s too late .
Recognizing or refusing to name this a genocide will be a matter of life or death .
In 1994 , by the time U.S. officials were done debating the applicability of the term to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million Tutsis had already been slaughtered .
A document dated May 1 , 1994 , at the height of the genocide , by an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense stated : “ Genocide finding could commit [ the U.S. government ] to actually ‘ do something.
’ ” Four years later , President Bill Clinton stood before Rwandan survivors and reflected on his administration ’ s historic failure and vowed : “ Never again must we be shy in the face of the evidence.
” With the passing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. government has begun to take steps in the right direction to avoid another human catastrophe .
Seventy-eight members of Congress have followed up with a call for the administration to impose Magnitsky sanctions on the responsible Chinese officials and issue a formal declaration of the atrocity crimes , including genocide .
So far , the administration has officially imposed Magnitsky sanctions on four Chinese officials and an entity in charge of the Orwellian surveillance system and responsible for the expansion of the internment camps in Xinjiang .
The U.S. government must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This will not be difficult , as U.S. State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus has already asserted that “ what has happened to the Uighur people … is potentially the worst crime that we have seen since the Holocaust.
” A formal declaration of genocide is not simply symbolic .
It will catalyze other countries to join in a concerted effort to end the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang .
It will also prompt consumers to reject the over 80 international brands that profit off genocide .
Furthermore , the determination will strengthen legal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modern slavery in their supply chains sourced in China and compel business entities to refrain from profiting from genocide and commit to ethical sourcing .
In our interconnected world , we are not only bystanders if we fail to recognize the genocide as we see it .
We are complicit .

Two recent disturbing events may finally awaken the world to the scale and horror of the atrocities being committed against the Uighurs, a mostly secular Muslim ethnic minority, in Xinjiang, China. One is an authoritative report documenting the systematic sterilization of Uighur women. The other was the seizure by U.S. Customs and Border Protection of 13 tons of products made from human hair suspected of being forcibly removed from Uighurs imprisoned in concentration camps. Both events evoke chilling parallels to past atrocities elsewhere, forced sterilization of minorities, disabled, and Indigenous people, and the image of the glass display of mountains of hair preserved at Auschwitz.
Two recent disturbing events may finally awaken the world to the scale and horror of the atrocities being committed against the Uighurs, a mostly secular Muslim ethnic minority, in Xinjiang, China. One is an authoritative report documenting the systematic sterilization of Uighur women. The other was the seizure by U.S. Customs and Border Protection of 13 tons of products made from human hair suspected of being forcibly removed from Uighurs imprisoned in concentration camps. Both events evoke chilling parallels to past atrocities elsewhere, forced sterilization of minorities, disabled, and Indigenous people, and the image of the glass display of mountains of hair preserved at Auschwitz.
The Genocide Convention, to which China is a signatory, defines genocide as specific acts against members of a group with the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part. These acts include (a) killing; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm; (c) deliberately inflicting conditions of life to bring about the group’s physical destruction; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Any one of these categories constitutes genocide. The overwhelming evidence of the Chinese government’s deliberate and systematic campaign to destroy the Uighur people clearly meets each of these categories.
Over a million Turkic Uighurs are detained in concentration camps, prisons, and forced labor factories in China. Detainees are subject to military-style discipline, thought transformation, and forced confessions. They are abused, tortured, raped, and even killed. Survivors report being subjected to electrocution, waterboarding, repeated beatings, stress positions, and injections of unknown substances. These mass detention camps are designed to cause serious physical, psychological harm and mentally break the Uighur people. The repeated government orders to “break their lineage, break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins”; “round up everyone who should be rounded up”; and systematically prevent Uighur births demonstrate a clear intent to eradicate the Uighur people as a whole.
Ekpar Asat (brother of one of the present authors) is an emblematic example of how Uighurs are targeted regardless of their recognition as model Chinese citizens by the Communist Party. Asat was praised by the government for his community leadership as a “bridge builder” and “positive force” between ethnic minorities and the Xinjiang local government. But Asat still suffered the same fate as over a million other Uighurs and disappeared into the shadows of the concentration camps in 2016. He is held incommunicado and is reported to be serving a 15-year sentence on the trumped-up charge of “inciting ethnic hatred.” Not a single court document is available about his case.
In 2017, Xinjiang waged a brutal “Special Campaign to Control Birth Control Violations,” along with specific local directives. By 2019, the government planned to subject over 80 percent of women of childbearing age in southern Xinjiang to forced intrauterine devices (IUDs) and sterilization. The goal is to achieve “zero birth control violation incidents.” Government documents reveal a campaign of mass female sterilization supported by state funding to carry out hundreds of thousands of sterilizations in 2019 and 2020. This goes far beyond the scale, per capita, of forced sterilization inflicted on women throughout China under the past one-child policy.
To implement these policies, the Xinjiang government employed “dragnet-style” investigations to hunt down women of childbearing age. Once apprehended, these women have no choice but to undergo forced sterilization to avoid being sent to an internment camp. Once detained, women face forced injections, abortions, and unknown drugs.
And statistics show that the government is meeting its birth prevention goals.
Between 2015 and 2018, population growth rates in the Uighur heartland plummeted by 84 percent. Conversely, official documents show that sterilization rates skyrocketed in Xinjiang while plunging throughout the rest of China, and the funding for these programs is only increasing. Between 2017 and 2018, in one district, the percentage of women who were infertile or widowed increased by 124 percent and 117 percent, respectively. In 2018, 80 percent of all IUD placements in China were performed in Xinjiang despite accounting for a mere 1.8 percent of China’s population. These IUDs can be removed only by state-approved surgery—or else prison terms will follow. In Kashgar, only about 3 percent of married women of childbearing age gave birth in 2019. The latest annual reports from some of these regions have begun omitting birth rate information altogether to conceal the scale of destruction. The government has shut down its entire online platform after these revelations. The scale and scope of these measures are clearly designed to halt Uighur births.
With Uighur men detained and women sterilized, the government has laid the groundwork for the physical destruction of the Uighur people. At least half a million of the remaining Uighur children have been separated from their families and are being raised by the state at so-called “children shelters.”
What makes this genocide so uniquely dangerous is its technological sophistication, allowing for efficiency in its destruction and concealment from global attention. The Uighurs have been suffering under the most advanced police state, with extensive controls and restrictions on every aspect of life—religious, familial, cultural, and social. To facilitate surveillance, Xinjiang operates under a grid management system. Cities and villages are split into squares of about 500 people. Each square has a police station that closely monitors inhabitants by regularly scanning their identification cards, faces, DNA samples, fingerprints, and cell phones. These methods are supplemented by a machine-operated system known as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform. The system uses machine learning to collect personal data from video surveillance, smartphones, and other private records to generate lists for detention. Over a million Han Chinese watchers have been installed in Uighur households, rendering even intimate spaces subject to the government’s eye.
The Chinese government operates the most intrusive mass surveillance system in the world and repeatedly denies the international community meaningful access to it. It is therefore incumbent on us to appreciate the nature, depth, and speed of the genocide and act now before it’s too late.
Recognizing or refusing to name this a genocide will be a matter of life or death. In 1994, by the time U.S. officials were done debating the applicability of the term to the situation in Rwanda, nearly a million Tutsis had already been slaughtered. A document dated May 1, 1994, at the height of the genocide, by an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense stated: “Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something.’” Four years later, President Bill Clinton stood before Rwandan survivors and reflected on his administration’s historic failure and vowed: “Never again must we be shy in the face of the evidence.”
With the passing of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, the U.S. government has begun to take steps in the right direction to avoid another human catastrophe. Seventy-eight members of Congress have followed up with a call for the administration to impose Magnitsky sanctions on the responsible Chinese officials and issue a formal declaration of the atrocity crimes, including genocide. So far, the administration has officially imposed Magnitsky sanctions on four Chinese officials and an entity in charge of the Orwellian surveillance system and responsible for the expansion of the internment camps in Xinjiang. The U.S. government must now make an official determination of genocide. This will not be difficult, as U.S. State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus has already asserted that “what has happened to the Uighur people … is potentially the worst crime that we have seen since the Holocaust.”
A formal declaration of genocide is not simply symbolic. It will catalyze other countries to join in a concerted effort to end the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang. It will also prompt consumers to reject the over 80 international brands that profit off genocide. Furthermore, the determination will strengthen legal remedies for sanctioning companies that profit from modern slavery in their supply chains sourced in China and compel business entities to refrain from profiting from genocide and commit to ethical sourcing.
In our interconnected world, we are not only bystanders if we fail to recognize the genocide as we see it. We are complicit.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-15--Former U.S. Officials Urge Refugee Status for Hong Kongers

Former U.S. Officials Urge Refugee Status for Hong Kongers More than 20 former senior U.S. diplomats and defense officials are urging Congress in a letter to pass legislation that would give Hong Kong residents asylum in the United States after China passed a sweeping national security law that tightens its grip over the formerly semi-autonomous territory .
The letter , obtained by Foreign Policy , reflects growing alarm in the West over the fate of Hong Kong and many of its pro-democracy activists who have organized monthslong protests against Beijing ’ s suppression of the city ’ s political freedom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has already offered asylum for 3 million residents of its former colony , and both senior Australian and Canadian lawmakers have signaled that they want their countries to do the same .
“ Beijing ’ s latest move to impose a new national security law on Hong Kong , even as it circumvented the city ’ s elected legislature , has undermined the rights of the people of Hong Kong and signaled a fundamental breaking of China ’ s promises , ” the letter reads .
“ The United States must work closely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support the people of Hong Kong who are threatened by this new law.
” The Trump administration has so far responded to China ’ s imposition of the national security law by preparing mostly punitive measures : revoking the special economic relationship Hong Kong enjoyed with the United States that allowed it to sidestep the U.S.-China trade war , toying with shutting down Hong Kong ’ s access to U.S. dollars , and sanctioning Chinese officials who participated in crackdowns there .
Legislation pending in Congress , in contrast , would offer Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bullwhip .
“ The situation in Hong Kong is urgent .
This is about providing tangible support to the people of Hong Kong when they need it most , ” said Michael Fuchs , a former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs during the Obama administration , who helped organize the letter .
“ It is also an attempt to show Beijing that a Hong Kong under [ Chinese Communist Party ] control may not be the same vibrant economic hub that it has been.
” The letter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including nine former U.S. consul generals to Hong Kong , the top U.S. diplomats posted there , urged lawmakers to pass a series of bills that would give Hong Kong residents legal avenues to flee the embattled territory for the United States .
The Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act—co-sponsored in the Senate by Marco Rubio , a Florida Republican , and Bob Menendez , a New Jersey Democrat—would offer asylum to Hong Kong residents and their family members deemed most at risk of persecution by Chinese authorities , including protesters and activists .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration ’ s current cap on the number of refugees admitted into the United States .
The Hong Kong People ’ s Freedom and Choice Act—introduced in the House by Tom Malinowski , a New Jersey Democrat , and Adam Kinzinger , an Illinois Republican—would expedite immigration for highly skilled Hong Kong residents looking to move to the United States .
It would also fast-track residency status for Hong Kongers who have already fled to the United States—mirroring a law that the George H.W .
Bush administration used to help protect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 .
“ By passing both these bills , Congress would show that America is prepared to open its doors not just to brave activists and peaceful protestors but also other Hongkongers that Beijing fears will leave , ” the letter ’ s signatories wrote .
“ The situation in Hong Kong is urgent and requires a strong U.S. response rooted firmly in our values and long history of providing safe harbor to those fleeing tyranny.
” The bills have bipartisan support , but it ’ s not certain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chambers .
It ’ s also unclear if U.S. President Donald Trump , who has made restricting legal and illegal immigration the centerpiece of his administration , would support the bills .
Trump on Tuesday said he signed a bipartisan bill that would sanction Chinese officials over the crackdown on Hong Kong , in the latest diplomatic escalation between the two countries .
The president also signed an executive order that will roll back decades-old U.S. policies that favored Hong Kong over China , including suspending the U.S. extradition treaty with Hong Kong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on its response to Hong Kong to fill a void left by Trump ’ s inaction .
While railing against Beijing publicly , Trump has privately signaled wants to scale back the confrontation with China , opting against new sanctions on top Chinese officials and rejecting a plan to undermine the Hong Kong dollar ’ s peg to the U.S. dollar , as Bloomberg reported .
This leaves Congress in the driver ’ s seat for any new measures on the Hong Kong .
“ Trump has no credibility on Hong Kong , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take action , ” he said .
“ Meanwhile , in Congress , Hong Kong is a mostly bipartisan issue , and so there has been overwhelming support for standing up for the people of Hong Kong and U.S. interests there—especially since Trump hasn ’ t. ” Update , July 15 , 2020 : This article was updated with new reports of Trump ’ s Hong Kong policies .

More than 20 former senior U.S. diplomats and defense officials are urging Congress in a letter to pass legislation that would give Hong Kong residents asylum in the United States after China passed a sweeping national security law that tightens its grip over the formerly semi-autonomous territory.
More than 20 former senior U.S. diplomats and defense officials are urging Congress in a letter to pass legislation that would give Hong Kong residents asylum in the United States after China passed a sweeping national security law that tightens its grip over the formerly semi-autonomous territory.
The letter, obtained by Foreign Policy, reflects growing alarm in the West over the fate of Hong Kong and many of its pro-democracy activists who have organized monthslong protests against Beijing’s suppression of the city’s political freedom and civil liberties. The United Kingdom has already offered asylum for 3 million residents of its former colony, and both senior Australian and Canadian lawmakers have signaled that they want their countries to do the same.
“Beijing’s latest move to impose a new national security law on Hong Kong, even as it circumvented the city’s elected legislature, has undermined the rights of the people of Hong Kong and signaled a fundamental breaking of China’s promises,” the letter reads. “The United States must work closely together with countries around the world to support the people of Hong Kong who are threatened by this new law.”
The Trump administration has so far responded to China’s imposition of the national security law by preparing mostly punitive measures: revoking the special economic relationship Hong Kong enjoyed with the United States that allowed it to sidestep the U.S.-China trade war, toying with shutting down Hong Kong’s access to U.S. dollars, and sanctioning Chinese officials who participated in crackdowns there. Legislation pending in Congress, in contrast, would offer Hong Kong residents a lifeline, not a bullwhip.
“The situation in Hong Kong is urgent. This is about providing tangible support to the people of Hong Kong when they need it most,” said Michael Fuchs, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs during the Obama administration, who helped organize the letter. “It is also an attempt to show Beijing that a Hong Kong under [Chinese Communist Party] control may not be the same vibrant economic hub that it has been.”
The letter, signed by a host of luminaries including nine former U.S. consul generals to Hong Kong, the top U.S. diplomats posted there, urged lawmakers to pass a series of bills that would give Hong Kong residents legal avenues to flee the embattled territory for the United States.
The Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act—co-sponsored in the Senate by Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican, and Bob Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat—would offer asylum to Hong Kong residents and their family members deemed most at risk of persecution by Chinese authorities, including protesters and activists. Their numbers would not be restricted by the Trump administration’s current cap on the number of refugees admitted into the United States.
The Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act—introduced in the House by Tom Malinowski, a New Jersey Democrat, and Adam Kinzinger, an Illinois Republican—would expedite immigration for highly skilled Hong Kong residents looking to move to the United States. It would also fast-track residency status for Hong Kongers who have already fled to the United States—mirroring a law that the George H.W. Bush administration used to help protect Chinese students in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.
“By passing both these bills, Congress would show that America is prepared to open its doors not just to brave activists and peaceful protestors but also other Hongkongers that Beijing fears will leave,” the letter’s signatories wrote. “The situation in Hong Kong is urgent and requires a strong U.S. response rooted firmly in our values and long history of providing safe harbor to those fleeing tyranny.”
The bills have bipartisan support, but it’s not certain they have enough votes to pass both chambers. It’s also unclear if U.S. President Donald Trump, who has made restricting legal and illegal immigration the centerpiece of his administration, would support the bills.
Trump on Tuesday said he signed a bipartisan bill that would sanction Chinese officials over the crackdown on Hong Kong, in the latest diplomatic escalation between the two countries. The president also signed an executive order that will roll back decades-old U.S. policies that favored Hong Kong over China, including suspending the U.S. extradition treaty with Hong Kong.
Fuchs said Congress was stepping up on its response to Hong Kong to fill a void left by Trump’s inaction. While railing against Beijing publicly, Trump has privately signaled wants to scale back the confrontation with China, opting against new sanctions on top Chinese officials and rejecting a plan to undermine the Hong Kong dollar’s peg to the U.S. dollar, as Bloomberg reported. This leaves Congress in the driver’s seat for any new measures on the Hong Kong.
“Trump has no credibility on Hong Kong, and has been forced by Congress to take action,” he said. “Meanwhile, in Congress, Hong Kong is a mostly bipartisan issue, and so there has been overwhelming support for standing up for the people of Hong Kong and U.S. interests there—especially since Trump hasn’t.”
Update, July 15, 2020: This article was updated with new reports of Trump’s Hong Kong policies.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-15--Pompeo Draws a Line Against Beijing in the South China Sea

Pompeo Draws a Line Against Beijing in the South China Sea In a surprise move , the Trump administration has issued a statement on the South China Sea that is consistent with international law , grounded in historical evidence , and completely in line with the expectations of the United States ’ allies and partners .
It places the United States squarely behind the interests of Vietnam , Malaysia , Indonesia , Brunei , and the Philippines , all of which have serious disputes with Beijing .
It ’ s a strong move—but the big question is how Washington will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statement on Monday , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said he was aligning the U.S. position on China ’ s maritime claims in the South China Sea with the 2016 ruling of an international arbitral tribunal in The Hague .
That ruling , in a case brought by the Philippines , comprehensively demolished China ’ s decades-old claims to maritime resources that go beyond those allowed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ) .
China refused to even attend the tribunal , despite being a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ result .
In an alternate universe , one in which Rodrigo Duterte lost the Philippine presidential election in 2016 and Hillary Clinton won the White House , this statement would have been issued long ago .
Duterte ’ s taking power , just 12 days before the arbitration ruling was announced , killed the chances of such an approach at the time even under then-U.S. President Barack Obama .
It is easy to imagine it lying buried in a file for four years until some patient State Department officials felt able to revive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the twilight months of Trump .
But with the statement now nailed to the mast of U.S. policymaking in Asia , what should happen next ?
China ’ s claims in the South China Sea fall into two types : “ territorial claims ” to the disputed rocks and reefs and “ maritime claims ” to the resources in the sea around those rocks and reefs .
The United States , quite sensibly , has never taken a position on which country is the rightful owner of these territories .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by asserting that China has “ no lawful territorial or maritime claim to ( or derived from ) James Shoal.
” This will be music to the ears of Malaysia because James Shoal ( Beting Serupai in Malay , Zengmu Ansha in Chinese ) is an entirely submerged piece of seabed about 50 miles from the coast of Borneo and more than 600 miles from China .
China claims James Shoal as its “ southernmost territory ” because of a translation error by a Republic of China government committee in 1934 .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” as a translation of “ shoal.
” Tan means “ sandbank , ” and this bureaucratic mistake led to a piece of seabed becoming defined as land .
In 1947 , the translation was changed to ansha , which means “ hidden sand , ” but the territorial claim remained .
The other key parts of Pompeo ’ s statement followed the 2016 arbitration ruling in asserting that neither Scarborough Shoal ( off the Philippine coast ) nor any of the so-called Spratly Islands are actually islands in the full sense .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough to justify an exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ) around them .
An EEZ can stretch for up to 200 nautical miles around an island , incorporating a far larger area than the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea that a mere “ rock ” can generate .
This is exactly what the Philippines would want Washington to say and backs up the findings of the arbitral tribunal .
But Pompeo went even further by rejecting any Chinese “ maritime claim in the waters surrounding Vanguard Bank ( off Vietnam ) , Luconia Shoals ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s EEZ , and Natuna Besar ( off Indonesia ) .
” Vanguard Bank is another underwater feature , like James Shoal .
Luconia Shoals are a series of reefs where sandbanks occasionally form , and Natuna Besar , where the statement deliberately used the Indonesian name , is a reference to problems that Indonesia has been suffering from incursions of Chinese fishing vessels into its EEZ around the Natuna Islands .
This statement thus positions the United States not as an outside interloper in the South China Sea only interested in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ competition with China but as a supporter of the legitimate rights of Southeast Asian countries , backed up by well-established international law under UNCLOS .
It is exactly what the governments of those countries want to hear .
It is their fishers whose boats get sunk by Chinese vessels and their offshore energy industries that are blocked from developing new resources .
It is their people ’ s livelihoods and national economies that suffer as a result of China ’ s efforts to undermine the UNCLOS treaty that it negotiated , signed , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this statement was coming .
American diplomats circulated a nonpaper version to them last week .
They broadly welcome its fine words , but that rhetoric means little by itself .
What Southeast Asian governments seek is protection in their EEZs , far out at sea .
They want to know that they can go fishing and prospect for hydrocarbons in line with UNCLOS without triggering intimidation from China ’ s growing navy , coast guard fleet , and maritime militia .
At the same time , they are apprehensive .
As Shahriman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ watcher at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia , said : “ The U.S. presence is seen as a double-edged sword .
It has the effect of both deterring but also potentially escalating matters with China .
… The worst-case scenario is for things to escalate , and then the U.S. gets distracted by something in the Middle East , and we get saddled with more Chinese ships in our waters.
” The Chinese embassy in Washington responded to Pompeo ’ s statement with boilerplate text about how the US @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law.
” There has already been a noticeable increase in military activity in the South China Sea this year , with two U.S. aircraft carrier groups exercising there just this month , at the same time as the Chinese navy conducted maneuvers .
Even before Monday ’ s statement , the two militaries seemed to be steering a course that was taking them closer to actual confrontation .
China has dozens of paramilitary vessels—coast guard and militia—that are intended to loiter and seek an opportunity to seize the advantage .
The U.S. Navy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In a dispute over resource rights , the advantage lies with the force with staying power .
What then could Washington actually do ?
The United States , along with its allies and friends , could provide a picket line in the South China Sea , observing , publicizing , and protesting infringements of UNCLOS .
It could also position its ships behind Southeast Asian government vessels attempting to enforce UNCLOS .
It would be a tough balance to maintain .
This is primarily the Southeast Asian governments ’ fight : There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States shedding blood to protect someone else ’ s oil nor much Southeast Asian support for the country using the region to fight a kinetic battle with China .
And these moves would come at a time when the Chinese leadership has elevated questions of national territory to a near-sacred level .
Whether in Hong Kong , the Himalayas , or over Taiwan , Xi Jinping ’ s government appears to regard the protection of China ’ s territorial claims ( however poorly founded they may be ) as a matter of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ else that is going on in the U.S.-China relationship , the risk of escalation is real .
In his 1924 speech on pan-Asianism , Sun Yat-sen , one of the founding fathers of modern China , drew a distinction between a “ European civilization [ that ] is nothing but the rule of might ” and a superior civilization in the East based on “ the rule of right.
” These days , Vietnamese fishermen are discovering that in the South China Sea , the “ right ” agreed in UNCLOS is somewhat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the China Coast Guard ship ramming and sinking their wooden boats .
On Monday , Pompeo positioned the United States behind “ right , ” quoting Sun as he did so .
But , as Sun knew well , right is useless without the power of might behind it .
It would also be politically useful for the United States to demonstrate its own commitment to “ right ” by mustering the 66 senators required to formally ratify UNCLOS .
Using power to protect legitimate rights without crossing the line into war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and its friends , partners , and allies in Southeast Asia .

In a surprise move, the Trump administration has issued a statement on the South China Sea that is consistent with international law, grounded in historical evidence, and completely in line with the expectations of the United States’ allies and partners. It places the United States squarely behind the interests of Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines, all of which have serious disputes with Beijing. It’s a strong move—but the big question is how Washington will follow up on it.
In a surprise move, the Trump administration has issued a statement on the South China Sea that is consistent with international law, grounded in historical evidence, and completely in line with the expectations of the United States’ allies and partners. It places the United States squarely behind the interests of Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines, all of which have serious disputes with Beijing. It’s a strong move—but the big question is how Washington will follow up on it.
In his statement on Monday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said he was aligning the U.S. position on China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea with the 2016 ruling of an international arbitral tribunal in The Hague. That ruling, in a case brought by the Philippines, comprehensively demolished China’s decades-old claims to maritime resources that go beyond those allowed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China refused to even attend the tribunal, despite being a UNCLOS signatory, and fiercely denies the result.
In an alternate universe, one in which Rodrigo Duterte lost the Philippine presidential election in 2016 and Hillary Clinton won the White House, this statement would have been issued long ago. Duterte’s taking power, just 12 days before the arbitration ruling was announced, killed the chances of such an approach at the time even under then-U.S. President Barack Obama. It is easy to imagine it lying buried in a file for four years until some patient State Department officials felt able to revive the practice of diplomacy and working partnerships in the twilight months of Trump. But with the statement now nailed to the mast of U.S. policymaking in Asia, what should happen next?
China’s claims in the South China Sea fall into two types: “territorial claims” to the disputed rocks and reefs and “maritime claims” to the resources in the sea around those rocks and reefs. The United States, quite sensibly, has never taken a position on which country is the rightful owner of these territories. However, Pompeo’s statement breaks new ground by asserting that China has “no lawful territorial or maritime claim to (or derived from) James Shoal.”
This will be music to the ears of Malaysia because James Shoal (Beting Serupai in Malay, Zengmu Ansha in Chinese) is an entirely submerged piece of seabed about 50 miles from the coast of Borneo and more than 600 miles from China. China claims James Shoal as its “southernmost territory” because of a translation error by a Republic of China government committee in 1934. The committee used the Chinese word “tan” as a translation of “shoal.” Tan means “sandbank,” and this bureaucratic mistake led to a piece of seabed becoming defined as land. In 1947, the translation was changed to ansha, which means “hidden sand,” but the territorial claim remained.
The other key parts of Pompeo’s statement followed the 2016 arbitration ruling in asserting that neither Scarborough Shoal (off the Philippine coast) nor any of the so-called Spratly Islands are actually islands in the full sense. That is, they are not large enough to justify an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around them. An EEZ can stretch for up to 200 nautical miles around an island, incorporating a far larger area than the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea that a mere “rock” can generate. This is exactly what the Philippines would want Washington to say and backs up the findings of the arbitral tribunal.
But Pompeo went even further by rejecting any Chinese “maritime claim in the waters surrounding Vanguard Bank (off Vietnam), Luconia Shoals (off Malaysia), waters in Brunei’s EEZ, and Natuna Besar (off Indonesia).” Vanguard Bank is another underwater feature, like James Shoal. Luconia Shoals are a series of reefs where sandbanks occasionally form, and Natuna Besar, where the statement deliberately used the Indonesian name, is a reference to problems that Indonesia has been suffering from incursions of Chinese fishing vessels into its EEZ around the Natuna Islands.
This statement thus positions the United States not as an outside interloper in the South China Sea only interested in questions of freedom of navigation or great-power competition with China but as a supporter of the legitimate rights of Southeast Asian countries, backed up by well-established international law under UNCLOS. It is exactly what the governments of those countries want to hear. It is their fishers whose boats get sunk by Chinese vessels and their offshore energy industries that are blocked from developing new resources. It is their people’s livelihoods and national economies that suffer as a result of China’s efforts to undermine the UNCLOS treaty that it negotiated, signed, and ratified.
Southeast Asian governments knew this statement was coming. American diplomats circulated a nonpaper version to them last week. They broadly welcome its fine words, but that rhetoric means little by itself. What Southeast Asian governments seek is protection in their EEZs, far out at sea. They want to know that they can go fishing and prospect for hydrocarbons in line with UNCLOS without triggering intimidation from China’s growing navy, coast guard fleet, and maritime militia.
At the same time, they are apprehensive. As Shahriman Lockman, a veteran South China Sea watcher at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia, said: “The U.S. presence is seen as a double-edged sword. It has the effect of both deterring but also potentially escalating matters with China. … The worst-case scenario is for things to escalate, and then the U.S. gets distracted by something in the Middle East, and we get saddled with more Chinese ships in our waters.”
The Chinese embassy in Washington responded to Pompeo’s statement with boilerplate text about how the US “deliberately distorts the facts and international law.” There has already been a noticeable increase in military activity in the South China Sea this year, with two U.S. aircraft carrier groups exercising there just this month, at the same time as the Chinese navy conducted maneuvers. Even before Monday’s statement, the two militaries seemed to be steering a course that was taking them closer to actual confrontation. China has dozens of paramilitary vessels—coast guard and militia—that are intended to loiter and seek an opportunity to seize the advantage. The U.S. Navy is built for the opposite—quick in-and-out operations. In a dispute over resource rights, the advantage lies with the force with staying power.
What then could Washington actually do? The United States, along with its allies and friends, could provide a picket line in the South China Sea, observing, publicizing, and protesting infringements of UNCLOS. It could also position its ships behind Southeast Asian government vessels attempting to enforce UNCLOS. It would be a tough balance to maintain. This is primarily the Southeast Asian governments’ fight: There would be little domestic support for the United States shedding blood to protect someone else’s oil nor much Southeast Asian support for the country using the region to fight a kinetic battle with China.
And these moves would come at a time when the Chinese leadership has elevated questions of national territory to a near-sacred level. Whether in Hong Kong, the Himalayas, or over Taiwan, Xi Jinping’s government appears to regard the protection of China’s territorial claims (however poorly founded they may be) as a matter of national life and death. Given everything else that is going on in the U.S.-China relationship, the risk of escalation is real.
In his 1924 speech on pan-Asianism, Sun Yat-sen, one of the founding fathers of modern China, drew a distinction between a “European civilization [that] is nothing but the rule of might” and a superior civilization in the East based on “the rule of right.” These days, Vietnamese fishermen are discovering that in the South China Sea, the “right” agreed in UNCLOS is somewhat flimsy compared with the “might” of the China Coast Guard ship ramming and sinking their wooden boats.
On Monday, Pompeo positioned the United States behind “right,” quoting Sun as he did so. But, as Sun knew well, right is useless without the power of might behind it. It would also be politically useful for the United States to demonstrate its own commitment to “right” by mustering the 66 senators required to formally ratify UNCLOS. Using power to protect legitimate rights without crossing the line into war will be a tough challenge for the United States and its friends, partners, and allies in Southeast Asia.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-15--QAnon Goes to Iran

QAnon Goes to Iran

QAnon entered the mainstream U.S. political lingo in 2017 , when its followers propagated the conspiracy theory that the “ deep state ” was plotting against U.S. President Donald Trump .
Since then , ideas put forth by QAnon have gained traction , thanks in part to U.S. President Donald Trump giving a platform to its followers on a number of occasions , including by retweeting messages from accounts linked to the group .
Most recently , a number of individuals with apparent ties to QAnon have become Republican candidates for Congress .
Although QAnon ’ s raison d ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it has capitalized mainly on anxieties prevalent in U.S. society—the conspiracy theory has recently developed an unlikely group of adherents : an Iranian dissident group that calls itself Restart .
Despite remaining a minor political force for now , Restart is a fascinating example of a broader trend : conspiracist thinking going global .
The Restarters are a fringe association in a larger web of Iranian opposition and conspiracy groups that wish to overthrow Iran ’ s current power brokers .
Among them are the followers of Reza Pahlavi , who is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Mujahideen–e–Khalq ( MEK ) , a crypto-Shiite cultlike dissident group , to name a few .
Such groups have enjoyed strong tailwinds in recent years .
As BBC Monitoring reported in 2019 , Iranian opposition factions have been able to increase their social-media reach and following since Trump took office—likely because of the perception that the Trump administration ’ s Iran policy favors them .
At the same time , Tehran has also grown its online influence operations—with concerted efforts to launch disinformation campaigns against the United States .
These state and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; they differ in their ideologies and the traction they have received both within and outside Iran .
However , they are aligned in at least one important respect : They are all vying for influence not in their native Iran , but in the United States , where they try to shift U.S. policy to their liking .
And they do so by leveraging partisanship and other divisions within the United States .
Like QAnon , which doesn ’ t “ possess a physical location , but … has an infrastructure , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adherents , and a great deal of merchandising , ” as writer Adrienne LaFrance recently wrote in the Atlantic , Restart exists in the Internet more than the real world .
But unlike QAnon , which has more of a presence in mainstream U.S. politics ( with some candidates for office even espousing their ideas ) , Restart remains small .
Its leader has certainly encouraged violent dissent , but more than leading to an actual rise in protests , Restart ’ s activities illustrate how fringe movements and media outlets can push @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to dominate more mainstream political discussions in the United States and around the globe .
In an example of how easy such manipulation has become , in April , Trump retweeted an account posing as an Iranian activist , “ Heshmat Alavi.
” In his tweet , Alavi had weighed in on U.S.-Iranian tensions in the Persian Gulf , writing , “ Thank you , President Trump , for reminding this regime that the Obama years are gone.
” In what appeared on the surface to be an unremarkable response , Trump fired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic nominee , former Vice President Joe Biden , implying that Iranian activities in the region were a direct result of former President Barack Obama ’ s policies .
What made the exchange troubling , though , was that “ Heshmat Alavi is a persona run by a team of people from the political wing of the MEK , ” as an MEK defector the Intercept in 2019 .
“ This is not and has never been a real person.
” More disconcerting yet , the MEK ( which Restart opposes ) was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and is responsible for some of the first terrorist attacks targeting Americans and U.S. interests in Iran prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution .
Even more so than the MeK , Restart ’ s reach within Iran is limited .
But the movement has gained some traction in fringe media outlets in the United States promoted by the president of the United States .
Foreign policy has never been fully divorced from domestic politics , but the information age has given a new meaning to the adage , “ Everything is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and military power , the United States remains one of the only countries in the world whose politics reverberate around the globe .
Groups from smaller nations bargain for power in Washington as much as they do in their own respective capitals .
Iran is no exception to this rule .
For years , various Iranian groups have lobbied in Washington .
Pahlavi has made the rounds in well-respected Beltway think tanks aligned with both sides of the aisle , including the Center for American Progress , the Washington Institute for Near @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , while the MEK ’ s operatives have met with key lawmakers .
Regime leaders likewise make a point of meeting influential Americans and members of the Iranian diaspora when they travel to the United States for U.N. events .
All seek to present their own narratives and cultivate support for their positions .
Although they appeal to different groups in the United States , they all benefit from the country ’ s divisions , which they can manipulate to their advantage .
Tehran ’ s information operations are well documented .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and activists in the United States , especially those whose ideology is grounded in criticizing the what they consider to be an interventionist foreign policy .
Iran-linked accounts push pro-Iran policies , including criticism of the United States in general and U.S. sanctions in particular , as well as anti-Israeli and anti-Saudi positions .
For example , official and inauthentic outlets and accounts linked to the Iranian government denounce U.S. sanctions , which they characterize as # EconomicTerrorism , and promote content about the fate of Palestinians and Yemenis in line with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which Iran has a hand .
Regime-linked accounts often try to engage the progressive wing of the Democratic Party , amplifying content critical of U.S. foreign policy .
For their part , regime opponents appeal more to the right , arguing for a more muscular approach to Iran—including more political pressure and economic sanctions , some going as far as advocating for military intervention .
For example , in a video message addressed to U.S. lawmakers from both parties , the MEK ’ s leader , Maryam Rajavi , called for “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , overthrow.
” All these dissident groups also share a deep suspicion of the Obama administration ’ s diplomatic efforts aimed at restricting Iranian nuclear activities .
For all three , the Obama administration simply extended the Islamic Republic ’ s life instead of crushing it , as they believe the Trump administration is doing .
The Restarters take this idea to a new level .
Accounts linked with the group have pushed for war with Iran and have proffered offers to fight alongside Americans should the United States decide to stage a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And to further appeal to the Trump administration , they have adopted the slogan # MIGA ( for “ Make Iran Great Again , ” a play on Trump ’ s # MAGA , or “ Make America Great Again ” ) .
Restart frequently replies to the president ’ s tweets with this hashtag .
The group seems to be getting through .
Responding to reporters ’ questions about U.S.-Iranian relations in June 2019 , Trump noted , “ Let ’ s make Iran great again .
Does that make sense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if this was a coincidence , it raised the group ’ s profile among some parts of the president ’ s base .
In 2018 , the group ’ s leader even appeared on Infowars , which has spent some time covering its origins and objectives .
A fringe group such as this one would have been unlikely to gain any prominence in the absence of two factors : First , a U.S. political landscape characterized by deep partisanship and a distrust of traditional authorities ; and second , the proliferation of social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies and foes , the United States ’ political ecosystem is a boxing ring .
By competing for influence and asserting themselves in the United States , these players believe they can ultimately attain some form of power in their own country .
The Iranian regime sees its influence operations in the United States as key to securing its interests , perhaps its very survival .
Influence in U.S. politics is thus a means rather than an end in itself .
But in the process of increasing their power on the U.S. political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. political system through their influence operations—in the end both using and accelerating U.S. political polarization .
In turn , if the United States fails to address polarization—as immense a challenge as that is—it not only opens the door to interference by authoritarian state actors such as Iran , but also paves the way for those states and their opponents to manipulate democratic processes for their own gain .

QAnon entered the mainstream U.S. political lingo in 2017, when its followers propagated the conspiracy theory that the “deep state” was plotting against U.S. President Donald Trump. Since then, ideas put forth by QAnon have gained traction, thanks in part to U.S. President Donald Trump giving a platform to its followers on a number of occasions, including by retweeting messages from accounts linked to the group. Most recently, a number of individuals with apparent ties to QAnon have become Republican candidates for Congress .
QAnon entered the mainstream U.S. political lingo in 2017, when its followers propagated the conspiracy theory that the “deep state” was plotting against U.S. President Donald Trump. Since then, ideas put forth by QAnon have gained traction, thanks in part to U.S. President Donald Trump giving a platform to its followers on a number of occasions, including by retweeting messages from accounts linked to the group. Most recently, a number of individuals with apparent ties to QAnon have become Republican candidates for Congress.
Although QAnon’s raison d’être is largely rooted in domestic politics—and it has capitalized mainly on anxieties prevalent in U.S. society—the conspiracy theory has recently developed an unlikely group of adherents: an Iranian dissident group that calls itself Restart. Despite remaining a minor political force for now, Restart is a fascinating example of a broader trend: conspiracist thinking going global.
The Restarters are a fringe association in a larger web of Iranian opposition and conspiracy groups that wish to overthrow Iran’s current power brokers. Among them are the followers of Reza Pahlavi, who is the son of the deposed shah, and the Mujahideen–e–Khalq (MEK), a crypto-Shiite cultlike dissident group, to name a few. Such groups have enjoyed strong tailwinds in recent years. As BBC Monitoring reported in 2019, Iranian opposition factions have been able to increase their social-media reach and following since Trump took office—likely because of the perception that the Trump administration’s Iran policy favors them. At the same time, Tehran has also grown its online influence operations—with concerted efforts to launch disinformation campaigns against the United States.
These state and nonstate actors have very little in common; they differ in their ideologies and the traction they have received both within and outside Iran. However, they are aligned in at least one important respect: They are all vying for influence not in their native Iran, but in the United States, where they try to shift U.S. policy to their liking. And they do so by leveraging partisanship and other divisions within the United States.
Like QAnon, which doesn’t “possess a physical location, but … has an infrastructure, a literature, a growing body of adherents, and a great deal of merchandising,” as writer Adrienne LaFrance recently wrote in the Atlantic, Restart exists in the Internet more than the real world. But unlike QAnon, which has more of a presence in mainstream U.S. politics (with some candidates for office even espousing their ideas), Restart remains small. Its leader has certainly encouraged violent dissent, but more than leading to an actual rise in protests, Restart’s activities illustrate how fringe movements and media outlets can push narratives and amplify messages that can come to dominate more mainstream political discussions in the United States and around the globe.
In an example of how easy such manipulation has become, in April, Trump retweeted an account posing as an Iranian activist, “Heshmat Alavi.” In his tweet, Alavi had weighed in on U.S.-Iranian tensions in the Persian Gulf, writing, “Thank you, President Trump, for reminding this regime that the Obama years are gone.” In what appeared on the surface to be an unremarkable response, Trump fired off a tweet aimed at the presumptive Democratic nominee, former Vice President Joe Biden, implying that Iranian activities in the region were a direct result of former President Barack Obama’s policies.
What made the exchange troubling, though, was that “Heshmat Alavi is a persona run by a team of people from the political wing of the MEK,” as an MEK defector told the Intercept in 2019. “This is not and has never been a real person.” More disconcerting yet, the MEK (which Restart opposes) was formerly designated a terrorist group by the United States and is responsible for some of the first terrorist attacks targeting Americans and U.S. interests in Iran prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Even more so than the MeK, Restart’s reach within Iran is limited. But the movement has gained some traction in fringe media outlets in the United States promoted by the president of the United States.
Foreign policy has never been fully divorced from domestic politics, but the information age has given a new meaning to the adage, “Everything is political.” Given its economic, technological, and military power, the United States remains one of the only countries in the world whose politics reverberate around the globe. Groups from smaller nations bargain for power in Washington as much as they do in their own respective capitals.
Iran is no exception to this rule. For years, various Iranian groups have lobbied in Washington. Pahlavi has made the rounds in well-respected Beltway think tanks aligned with both sides of the aisle, including the Center for American Progress, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and the Hudson Institute, while the MEK’s operatives have met with key lawmakers. Regime leaders likewise make a point of meeting influential Americans and members of the Iranian diaspora when they travel to the United States for U.N. events. All seek to present their own narratives and cultivate support for their positions. Although they appeal to different groups in the United States, they all benefit from the country’s divisions, which they can manipulate to their advantage.
Tehran’s information operations are well documented. The regime has tried to embrace leftist politicians and activists in the United States, especially those whose ideology is grounded in criticizing the what they consider to be an interventionist foreign policy. Iran-linked accounts push pro-Iran policies, including criticism of the United States in general and U.S. sanctions in particular, as well as anti-Israeli and anti-Saudi positions. For example, official and inauthentic outlets and accounts linked to the Iranian government denounce U.S. sanctions, which they characterize as #EconomicTerrorism, and promote content about the fate of Palestinians and Yemenis in line with the regime’s positions on the conflicts—conflicts in which Iran has a hand. Regime-linked accounts often try to engage the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, amplifying content critical of U.S. foreign policy.
For their part, regime opponents appeal more to the right, arguing for a more muscular approach to Iran—including more political pressure and economic sanctions, some going as far as advocating for military intervention. For example, in a video message addressed to U.S. lawmakers from both parties, the MEK’s leader, Maryam Rajavi, called for “the regime’s overthrow, overthrow, overthrow.” All these dissident groups also share a deep suspicion of the Obama administration’s diplomatic efforts aimed at restricting Iranian nuclear activities. For all three, the Obama administration simply extended the Islamic Republic’s life instead of crushing it, as they believe the Trump administration is doing.
The Restarters take this idea to a new level. Accounts linked with the group have pushed for war with Iran and have proffered offers to fight alongside Americans should the United States decide to stage a military intervention to topple the Iranian regime. And to further appeal to the Trump administration, they have adopted the slogan #MIGA (for “Make Iran Great Again,” a play on Trump’s #MAGA, or “Make America Great Again”). Restart frequently replies to the president’s tweets with this hashtag.
The group seems to be getting through. Responding to reporters’ questions about U.S.-Iranian relations in June 2019, Trump noted, “Let’s make Iran great again. Does that make sense? Make Iran great again.” Even if this was a coincidence, it raised the group’s profile among some parts of the president’s base. In 2018, the group’s leader even appeared on Infowars, which has spent some time covering its origins and objectives. A fringe group such as this one would have been unlikely to gain any prominence in the absence of two factors: First, a U.S. political landscape characterized by deep partisanship and a distrust of traditional authorities; and second, the proliferation of social media platforms.
For Restart and its allies and foes, the United States’ political ecosystem is a boxing ring. By competing for influence and asserting themselves in the United States, these players believe they can ultimately attain some form of power in their own country. The Iranian regime sees its influence operations in the United States as key to securing its interests, perhaps its very survival. Influence in U.S. politics is thus a means rather than an end in itself. But in the process of increasing their power on the U.S. political scene, the groups also manipulate the U.S. political system through their influence operations—in the end both using and accelerating U.S. political polarization.
In turn, if the United States fails to address polarization—as immense a challenge as that is—it not only opens the door to interference by authoritarian state actors such as Iran, but also paves the way for those states and their opponents to manipulate democratic processes for their own gain.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-15--The Misogynist Violence of Iceland’s Feminist Paradise

For the past 11 years Iceland has led the World Economic Forum ’ s Gender Gap Index , earning the country the label of “ the best place in the world to be a woman.
” Iceland has some of the world ’ s strongest laws on workplace equality and equal pay , as well as high outcomes for women in issues of health , education , economic opportunity , and political representation .
Yet these positive realities mask several insidious problems in Icelandic society , including persistently high rates of domestic violence and sexual abuse , as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the victims of these abuses .
Scholars have termed this phenomenon the “ Nordic paradox ” Iceland and its fellow Nordic countries have been able to achieve significant structural equality for women in some areas , yet maintain disproportionate instances of violence against them .
The brutality of life for many Icelandic women has been highlighted by a recent study for the Scandinavian Journal of Public Health .
The authors traced admissions to the emergency department of Reykjavik ’ s main hospital , documenting not just the prevalence of intimate-partner violence ( IPV @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used to inflict injury , from punching to strangulation and the use of weaponry .
Detailing IPV in this way provides a blunt and confronting illustration of the home environments for many Icelandic women , something a reliance on broad statistics can often obscure .
During the COVID-19 pandemic—reflecting trends globally—reports of domestic violence in Iceland have risen ; two women were allegedly murdered by family members in the first weeks of the country ’ s partial lockdown , a significant spike for a country of just 360,000 people .
While globally 38 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by a male partner , according to the Commissioner of National Police this figure is 50 percent for Iceland .
Of course , not all instances of domestic violence result in death or visits to the hospital , and like in other countries , a large percentage of cases of domestic abuse go unreported for a variety of reasons , including fear of retribution .
Sexual assault in Iceland is also widespread .
A national survey conducted by the University of Iceland in 2018 revealed that 1 in 4 Icelandic women has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In Europe overall the reported figure is 1 in 10 .
Yet , according to Stigamot—Iceland ’ s center for survivors of sexual abuse and violence—only around 12 percent of these victims actually press charges .
Many have no confidence in the justice system and fear shame , guilt , and condemnation .
Those who do press charges find their cases dismissed close to three-quarters of the time .
These realities would seem to contradict Iceland ’ s reputation as a country where being a woman is particularly advantageous .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s prevalent violence against women may have been exacerbated by the very structural advances achieved by Icelandic women .
One theory to explain the Nordic paradox is that increased gender equality fuels male resentment , creating frustrations that are channeled into physical violence—a mode of action where men can easily still dominate .
Violent outbursts of this sort , fueled by feelings of injured masculine status , are so deeply psychologically motivated that they can be difficult for governments to counteract .
Yet , in Iceland , such violence is also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that tolerates and excuses these behaviours—or indeed shares in the perspectives of the male perpetrators .
Of particular concern is the way Icelandic courts have a tendency to ignore—and often even punish—mothers who report the abuse of their children by fathers .
The justice system strictly adheres to the concept of equal shared parental responsibility , which frequently overlooks or downplays violence against children in order to consistently allow unsupervised access to children for physically or sexually abusive fathers .
Icelandic courts also maintain a habitual usage of a discredited theory known as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actively seeks to break the bond between mother and child .
PAS works on the assumption that almost all allegations of child abuse will be false , and the more a mother insists that abuse has occurred the more evidence that this “ syndrome ” is at work .
PAS has been dismissed by all authoritative psychiatric , psychological , and medical bodies throughout the West , and its usage has been demonstrated in the United States to increase the chances of children being placed in the full custody of an abusive father @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Iceland produced this very outcome The Icelandic # MeToo movement ’ s call for its justice system to “ believe women ” is not a demand for preferential treatment before the law , but an attempt to reform the implicit biases against women within courts which have enabled abusive men to use the courts as a weapon and routinely allowed victimhood to be reassigned to them , rather than vulnerable women and children .
The Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women stresses the need for judicial proceedings to respect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the secondary victimization of women by the courts themselves .
Iceland ratified the convention in April 2018 , and it supposedly came into force in August of the same year .
However , in our inquiries to the Ministry of Justice , the Judicial Administration , and the Judges ’ Association , we received no confirmation that Iceland ’ s judges had been educated in the convention ’ s provisions .
This failure will allow judges ’ suspicion of women who have endured abuse—or sought to protect their children from it—to persist .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ motivation for the Icelandic judicial system ’ s failures—a fear that acknowledging the prevalence of male violence would inundate the system with reports , drain the country ’ s energy , and limit its overall capabilities .
Given Iceland ’ s small population , this instinct might be especially pronounced .
Instead the country places the burden of carrying this violence on its women , and often also on its children .
Yet Icelandic women should not accept such injustices complacently .
All of their previous advancements have been hard-fought .
In 1975 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which 90 percent of the country ’ s women ceased both their professional jobs and domestic duties , causing the entire country to grind to a halt .
This should have been a definitive indication to all national institutions that women are the country ’ s backbone , that they are essential workers in every sphere , and that undermining their welfare is actually what inhibits Iceland ’ s capabilities .
As a country seen as a global exemplar in women ’ s rights , Iceland ’ s persistently high rates of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t share the values Iceland would like to project—should be a major embarrassment .
They should provide the country with clarity concerning the areas where it is failing its women and failing itself .
The true test of Iceland ’ s commitment to gender equality will be whether it intends to acknowledge and confront this violence against its women , and whether it has the will to reform its justice system to believe and respect women who suffer these abuses .

For the past 11 years Iceland has led the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index , earning the country the label of “the best place in the world to be a woman.” Iceland has some of the world’s strongest laws on workplace equality and equal pay, as well as high outcomes for women in issues of health, education, economic opportunity, and political representation.
For the past 11 years Iceland has led the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index, earning the country the label of “the best place in the world to be a woman.” Iceland has some of the world’s strongest laws on workplace equality and equal pay, as well as high outcomes for women in issues of health, education, economic opportunity, and political representation.
Yet these positive realities mask several insidious problems in Icelandic society, including persistently high rates of domestic violence and sexual abuse, as well as a justice system that remains suspicious toward the victims of these abuses. Scholars have termed this phenomenon the “Nordic paradox . ” Iceland and its fellow Nordic countries have been able to achieve significant structural equality for women in some areas, yet maintain disproportionate instances of violence against them.
The brutality of life for many Icelandic women has been highlighted by a recent study for the Scandinavian Journal of Public Health. The authors traced admissions to the emergency department of Reykjavik’s main hospital, documenting not just the prevalence of intimate-partner violence (IPV), but the methods that were used to inflict injury, from punching to strangulation and the use of weaponry. Detailing IPV in this way provides a blunt and confronting illustration of the home environments for many Icelandic women, something a reliance on broad statistics can often obscure.
During the COVID-19 pandemic—reflecting trends globally—reports of domestic violence in Iceland have risen; two women were allegedly murdered by family members in the first weeks of the country’s partial lockdown, a significant spike for a country of just 360,000 people. While globally 38 percent of murders of women are committed by a male partner, according to the Commissioner of National Police this figure is 50 percent for Iceland. Of course, not all instances of domestic violence result in death or visits to the hospital, and like in other countries, a large percentage of cases of domestic abuse go unreported for a variety of reasons, including fear of retribution.
Sexual assault in Iceland is also widespread. A national survey conducted by the University of Iceland in 2018 revealed that 1 in 4 Icelandic women has been raped or sexually assaulted during her life. In Europe overall the reported figure is 1 in 10. Yet, according to Stigamot—Iceland’s center for survivors of sexual abuse and violence—only around 12 percent of these victims actually press charges. Many have no confidence in the justice system and fear shame, guilt, and condemnation. Those who do press charges find their cases dismissed close to three-quarters of the time.
These realities would seem to contradict Iceland’s reputation as a country where being a woman is particularly advantageous. However, there’s reason to believe the country’s prevalent violence against women may have been exacerbated by the very structural advances achieved by Icelandic women. One theory to explain the Nordic paradox is that increased gender equality fuels male resentment, creating frustrations that are channeled into physical violence—a mode of action where men can easily still dominate. Violent outbursts of this sort, fueled by feelings of injured masculine status, are so deeply psychologically motivated that they can be difficult for governments to counteract.
Yet, in Iceland, such violence is also protected and reinforced by a justice system that tolerates and excuses these behaviours—or indeed shares in the perspectives of the male perpetrators.
Of particular concern is the way Icelandic courts have a tendency to ignore—and often even punish—mothers who report the abuse of their children by fathers. The justice system strictly adheres to the concept of equal shared parental responsibility, which frequently overlooks or downplays violence against children in order to consistently allow unsupervised access to children for physically or sexually abusive fathers.
Icelandic courts also maintain a habitual usage of a discredited theory known as parental alienation syndrome (PAS) that actively seeks to break the bond between mother and child. PAS works on the assumption that almost all allegations of child abuse will be false, and the more a mother insists that abuse has occurred the more evidence that this “syndrome” is at work. PAS has been dismissed by all authoritative psychiatric, psychological, and medical bodies throughout the West, and its usage has been demonstrated in the United States to increase the chances of children being placed in the full custody of an abusive father. A custody case in recent weeks in Iceland produced this very outcome
The Icelandic #MeToo movement’s call for its justice system to “believe women” is not a demand for preferential treatment before the law, but an attempt to reform the implicit biases against women within courts which have enabled abusive men to use the courts as a weapon and routinely allowed victimhood to be reassigned to them, rather than vulnerable women and children.
The Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women stresses the need for judicial proceedings to respect the rights of victims and to avoid the secondary victimization of women by the courts themselves. Iceland ratified the convention in April 2018, and it supposedly came into force in August of the same year. However, in our inquiries to the Ministry of Justice, the Judicial Administration, and the Judges’ Association, we received no confirmation that Iceland’s judges had been educated in the convention’s provisions. This failure will allow judges’ suspicion of women who have endured abuse—or sought to protect their children from it—to persist.
There may be another, more unconscious motivation for the Icelandic judicial system’s failures—a fear that acknowledging the prevalence of male violence would inundate the system with reports, drain the country’s energy, and limit its overall capabilities. Given Iceland’s small population, this instinct might be especially pronounced. Instead the country places the burden of carrying this violence on its women, and often also on its children.
Yet Icelandic women should not accept such injustices complacently. All of their previous advancements have been hard-fought. In 1975, Icelandic women famously called a strike in which 90 percent of the country’s women ceased both their professional jobs and domestic duties, causing the entire country to grind to a halt. This should have been a definitive indication to all national institutions that women are the country’s backbone, that they are essential workers in every sphere, and that undermining their welfare is actually what inhibits Iceland’s capabilities.
As a country seen as a global exemplar in women’s rights, Iceland’s persistently high rates of violence against women—and legal system that doesn’t share the values Iceland would like to project—should be a major embarrassment. They should provide the country with clarity concerning the areas where it is failing its women and failing itself. The true test of Iceland’s commitment to gender equality will be whether it intends to acknowledge and confront this violence against its women, and whether it has the will to reform its justice system to believe and respect women who suffer these abuses.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-16--Why Google and Facebook Are Racing to Invest in India

Why Google and Facebook Are Racing to Invest in India Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief , the newsletter that covers the region comprising Afghanistan , Bangladesh , Bhutan , India , the Maldives , Nepal , Pakistan , and Sri Lanka .
This week : Google invests $ 4.5 billion in India ’ s Jio Platforms , South Asia records 1.5 million coronavirus infections , mass flooding hits Bangladesh , and Nepal picks a new fight with India .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ announced it would invest $ 4.5 billion in India ’ s Jio Platforms , the unit of Reliance Industries overseeing music , movie , and telecommunications ventures .
The investment , which buys Google a 7.7 percent stake in Jio and a seat on its board , is the latest in a spree of Western investments into Reliance ’ s digital company .
Facebook bought a 9.99 percent stake worth $ 5.7 billion last month .
Since April , Jio has raised more than $ 20 billion from investors including General Atlantic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( For context , as TechCrunch reports , the entire Indian start-up world raised just $ 14.5 billion in 2019 . )
What Reliance gains .
Cash , of course .
As I describe in my 2018 book India Connected ( a new and updated paperback was released this month ) , Jio has transformed India ’ s digital market by pouring $ 30 billion into the country ’ s internet infrastructure , building a nationwide 4G network , and initially offering new customers unlimited data for free .
While India was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ data offers were the catalyst for tens of millions of Indians to discover all that the internet had to offer .
Even today , with Jio no longer offering free internet , India has among the lowest costs for data in the world .
Jio ’ s investments are paying off , with the company ’ s valuation soaring to around $ 60 billion .
But this is about more than just dollars .
Partnering with Google will enable Jio to draw on its expertise in smart homes , connected cars , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ smartphone could be powered by a bespoke version of Google ’ s Android system .
Similarly , Jio ’ s partnership with Facebook could enable synergies through WhatsApp , allowing Reliance to dominate the digital money and e-commerce markets through local corner stores .
( This would also hurt the Indian ambitions of Amazon and Walmart . )
What Google and Facebook gain .
Reliance is well-known for its government connections and expertise in navigating local regulations .
It is also expected to become the dominant national player in 5G , with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And as other global markets are tapped out , India ’ s appeal is that it still has as many as half a billion people who haven ’ t come online .
That ’ s 500 million potential new users of Google and Facebook ’ s products .
Many of them will discover the internet through Jio ’ s data and soon its smartphones .
The China factor .
The Indian national mood has shifted greatly in the last few months and in the wake of growing border tensions with China .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ self-reliance ” —code for shunning Chinese-made products , which currently dominate India ’ s smartphone ecosystem .
Reliance was always going to be the biggest domestic winner in this scenario , which in part explains why Western firms are hitching a ride .
One significant impact of the investments may be in India ’ s eventual turn to 5G .
Before recent India-China tensions , Huawei held ambitions of participating in India ’ s 5G trials and spectrum auctions .
That is now unlikely .
Instead , with its deep pockets , Jio @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the airwaves and be among the first to deploy 5G-ready products for hundreds of millions of Indians .
At least in India , the next decade looks to be Jio ’ s—and some of its biggest global competitors are now sitting on its board to help it out .
The coronavirus crisis .
South Asia now has more than 1.5 million known cases of the coronavirus , up by about 250,000 since last week .
The Indian tech hub of Bengaluru , which reopened last month , is shutting down again after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan , the Red Crescent Society said the country ’ s 35,000 recorded cases were likely underreported due to limited testing , particularly among women , who have difficulty accessing the country ’ s health system .
In Bangladesh , scams and profiteering are hampering efforts : A hospital owner allegedly issued thousands of fake COVID-19 tests worth a total of $ 350,000 .
[ FP Insiders : Join me for a conference call this Friday at 11 a.m .
ET with Ashish Jha , the faculty director of Harvard University ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how the pandemic will evolve over the coming months .
We ’ ll also offer a sneak preview of the new FP Analytics coronavirus index , which ranks how countries have handled the pandemic . ]
Flooding in Bangladesh .
As much as one-third of Bangladesh is now underwater after the country ’ s heaviest rainfall in a decade , according to Al Jazeera .
As we reported last week , the floods began in part because of the overflowing of the Brahmaputra River .
In the neighboring Indian state of Assam , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a result of the flooding .
China-India talks .
It looks like some progress is being made in talks between Indian and Chinese military commanders .
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying told reporters on Wednesday that “ the two sides have made positive progress on pushing forward the disengagement of the front-line troops … easing the border tension.
” Stretching the Quad .
Media reports suggest that Australia may join the key military exercises with India , the United States , and Japan .
Australia already enjoys informal cooperation with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and has long lobbied to join the regular military exercises , but it has so far been rebuked by India .
The latest tensions with China now seem to have changed India ’ s stance .
Kuwait ’ s government is considering a bill that would reduce the number of Indians allowed to work in the country .
What percentage of Kuwait ’ s population of 4 million is composed of foreign nationals ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Nepal pokes India .
Readers of this newsletter are already familiar with how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territory claimed by India .
Prime Minister K.P .
Sharma Oli has now attracted controversy by saying that the Hindu god Rama was born in Nepal—and not India .
Indian Hindus believe Rama was born in Ayodhya , in the central Indian state of Uttar Pradesh .
“ We have been oppressed a bit culturally , ” Oli reportedly said at an event on Monday .
“ Facts have been encroached.
” By Tuesday , Nepal ’ s foreign ministry was walking back Oli ’ s assertion : “ The prime minister was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and research , ” it said in a statement .
But Oli ’ s comments will no doubt rile up New Delhi .
For more about the context of Rama and his importance in modern day India , read Snigdha Poonam ’ s essay in FP , “ The 3 Most Polarizing Words in India.
” According to the BBC , there are nearly 3 million foreign workers in Kuwait , most of them Indians , making up 70 percent of the country ’ s population .
The bill under consideration would reduce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could force as many as 800,000 Indians to leave .
Speaking to local media , Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah called the country ’ s demographic makeup a “ big imbalance.
” That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the newsletter that covers the region comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This week: Google invests $4.5 billion in India’s Jio Platforms, South Asia records 1.5 million coronavirus infections , mass flooding hits Bangladesh , and Nepal picks a new fight with India.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the newsletter that covers the region comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This week: Google invests $4.5 billion in India’s Jio Platforms, South Asia records 1.5 million coronavirus infections, mass flooding hits Bangladesh, and Nepal picks a new fight with India.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Google Joins the Reliance Bandwagon
On Wednesday, Google announced it would invest $4.5 billion in India’s Jio Platforms, the unit of Reliance Industries overseeing music, movie, and telecommunications ventures. The investment, which buys Google a 7.7 percent stake in Jio and a seat on its board, is the latest in a spree of Western investments into Reliance’s digital company. Facebook bought a 9.99 percent stake worth $5.7 billion last month. Since April, Jio has raised more than $20 billion from investors including General Atlantic, Qualcomm, Intel, and Silver Lake. (For context, as TechCrunch reports, the entire Indian start-up world raised just $14.5 billion in 2019.)
What Reliance gains. Cash, of course. As I describe in my 2018 book India Connected (a new and updated paperback was released this month), Jio has transformed India’s digital market by pouring $30 billion into the country’s internet infrastructure, building a nationwide 4G network, and initially offering new customers unlimited data for free.
While India was already rapidly digitizing, Jio’s data offers were the catalyst for tens of millions of Indians to discover all that the internet had to offer. Even today, with Jio no longer offering free internet, India has among the lowest costs for data in the world. Jio’s investments are paying off, with the company’s valuation soaring to around $60 billion.
But this is about more than just dollars. Partnering with Google will enable Jio to draw on its expertise in smart homes, connected cars, and software. A potential low-cost 5G Jio smartphone could be powered by a bespoke version of Google’s Android system. Similarly, Jio’s partnership with Facebook could enable synergies through WhatsApp, allowing Reliance to dominate the digital money and e-commerce markets through local corner stores. (This would also hurt the Indian ambitions of Amazon and Walmart.)
What Google and Facebook gain. Reliance is well-known for its government connections and expertise in navigating local regulations. It is also expected to become the dominant national player in 5G, with a growing share of the total cellular market. And as other global markets are tapped out, India’s appeal is that it still has as many as half a billion people who haven’t come online. That’s 500 million potential new users of Google and Facebook’s products. Many of them will discover the internet through Jio’s data and soon its smartphones.
The China factor. The Indian national mood has shifted greatly in the last few months and in the wake of growing border tensions with China. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has urged “self-reliance”—code for shunning Chinese-made products, which currently dominate India’s smartphone ecosystem. Reliance was always going to be the biggest domestic winner in this scenario, which in part explains why Western firms are hitching a ride.
One significant impact of the investments may be in India’s eventual turn to 5G. Before recent India-China tensions, Huawei held ambitions of participating in India’s 5G trials and spectrum auctions. That is now unlikely. Instead, with its deep pockets, Jio looks set to buy a large portion of the airwaves and be among the first to deploy 5G-ready products for hundreds of millions of Indians.
At least in India, the next decade looks to be Jio’s—and some of its biggest global competitors are now sitting on its board to help it out.
What We’re Following
The coronavirus crisis. South Asia now has more than 1.5 million known cases of the coronavirus, up by about 250,000 since last week. The Indian tech hub of Bengaluru, which reopened last month, is shutting down again after a sudden rise in infections. In Afghanistan, the Red Crescent Society said the country’s 35,000 recorded cases were likely underreported due to limited testing, particularly among women, who have difficulty accessing the country’s health system. In Bangladesh, scams and profiteering are hampering efforts: A hospital owner allegedly issued thousands of fake COVID-19 tests worth a total of $350,000.
[FP Insiders: Join me for a conference call this Friday at 11 a.m. ET with Ashish Jha, the faculty director of Harvard University’s Global Health Institute, as we explore how the pandemic will evolve over the coming months. We’ll also offer a sneak preview of the new FP Analytics coronavirus index, which ranks how countries have handled the pandemic.]
Flooding in Bangladesh. As much as one-third of Bangladesh is now underwater after the country’s heaviest rainfall in a decade, according to Al Jazeera. As we reported last week, the floods began in part because of the overflowing of the Brahmaputra River. In the neighboring Indian state of Assam, at least 50 people have been killed as a result of the flooding.
China-India talks. It looks like some progress is being made in talks between Indian and Chinese military commanders. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying told reporters on Wednesday that “the two sides have made positive progress on pushing forward the disengagement of the front-line troops … easing the border tension.”
Stretching the Quad. Media reports suggest that Australia may join the key military exercises with India, the United States, and Japan. Australia already enjoys informal cooperation with the group through the so-called Quad security dialogue and has long lobbied to join the regular military exercises, but it has so far been rebuked by India. The latest tensions with China now seem to have changed India’s stance.
Question of the Week
Kuwait’s government is considering a bill that would reduce the number of Indians allowed to work in the country. What percentage of Kuwait’s population of 4 million is composed of foreign nationals?
A) 10 percent
B) 20 percent
C) 40 percent
D) 70 percent
Scroll down for the answer.
Keep an Eye On
Nepal pokes India. Readers of this newsletter are already familiar with how Nepal has redrawn its maps to include territory claimed by India. Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli has now attracted controversy by saying that the Hindu god Rama was born in Nepal—and not India. Indian Hindus believe Rama was born in Ayodhya, in the central Indian state of Uttar Pradesh.
“We have been oppressed a bit culturally,” Oli reportedly said at an event on Monday. “Facts have been encroached.” By Tuesday, Nepal’s foreign ministry was walking back Oli’s assertion: “The prime minister was simply highlighting the importance of further studies and research,” it said in a statement. But Oli’s comments will no doubt rile up New Delhi.
For more about the context of Rama and his importance in modern day India, read Snigdha Poonam’s essay in FP, “The 3 Most Polarizing Words in India.”
And the Answer Is…
D) 70 percent.
According to the BBC, there are nearly 3 million foreign workers in Kuwait, most of them Indians, making up 70 percent of the country’s population. The bill under consideration would reduce that ratio to 30 percent, which could force as many as 800,000 Indians to leave. Speaking to local media, Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah called the country’s demographic makeup a “big imbalance.”
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.