foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--The United States Needs to Reshape Global Supply Chains

The coronavirus crisis has brought home the dangers of losing sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity to meet the needs of a mass medical emergency—especially when the foreign supply comes from a potentially hostile power like China .
Efforts by U.S. companies to expand production of ventilators have been complicated by difficulties in obtaining essential parts from Chinese and other sources .
Thanks to export restrictions imposed by Beijing , health care staff around the world face a severe shortage of masks and respirators , the majority of which are made in China .
The fact that some of these desperately needed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by comparatively low-wage Chinese workers , is a painful reminder of globalization ’ s potential downsides .
As bad as things are , they could still get worse .
The capacity to manufacture drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients has moved from the United States and Europe to developing countries in Asia where costs are lower and environmental regulations more relaxed .
According to some widely cited estimates , the United States now imports virtually all of certain common antibiotics and over-the-counter pain medications from China , along with a high percentage of generic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Alzheimer ’ s , and other ailments , and many of the active pharmaceutical ingredients used to make other medicines .
Constriction of supply chains due to coronavirus-related shutdowns in China , further disruptions in global transportation networks , and a spike in worldwide demand for essential drugs could endanger the health of American citizens .
And there is always the possibility of cutoffs imposed for political reasons—a tactic not yet used but increasingly threatened of late by China .
An article on the website of China ’ s official Xinhua news @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China were to retaliate for U.S. statements blaming it for the spread of the coronavirus by cutting pharmaceutical exports , “ the United States would sink into the hell of a novel coronavirus epidemic.
” According to some widely cited estimates , the United States now imports virtually all of certain common antibiotics and over-the-counter pain medications from China , along with a high percentage of generic drugs .
These potential geopolitical as opposed to market or logistical factors point to a larger problem that extends well beyond medical supply chains .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certain industries in the United States and the accompanying increase in dependence on Chinese imports could greatly complicate any future attempt at defense mobilization .
If trade were suspended due to a tense confrontation or an actual armed conflict , the United States might find it difficult , and perhaps impossible , to ramp up and sustain production of arms , munitions , weapons platforms , communications equipment , and other military systems .
In addition to a direct loss of Chinese exports , an actual shooting war in the Western Pacific could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of supply from other regional trading partners , including Japan , South Korea , and Taiwan .
Although such concerns have started to receive more attention from defense planners in recent years , the last several months have cast them into sharp relief .
Even before the current crisis , many companies had begun to diversify production away from China , shifting a portion of their manufacturing capacity to other countries .
This movement was driven by the need to avoid U.S. tariffs , but also by longer-term trends , including rising Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it both desirable and cost-effective to shorten some supply chains , bringing producers closer to final consumers .
Once the coronavirus pandemic begins to recede , greater awareness of the potential impact of natural as well as man-made shocks will accelerate tendencies not toward deglobalization but rather toward reglobalization : a reshuffling of supply chains and at least a partial reduction in the concentration of capacity inside China .
In the words of one recent survey of global manufacturing trends : “ While the trade war triggered some notable tinkering , the massive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will compel companies to fundamentally rethink their sourcing strategies .
At minimum … they will be increasingly inclined to spread their risks rather than put all their eggs in the lowest cost basket , as many long did in China.
” As was true during its early stages , so too will the next phase of globalization be driven by thousands of discrete corporate decisions about profit and loss .
But , as in the past , those calculations will also be shaped by government policies .
The disruption caused by the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reassess and recalibrate their generally laissez-faire approach to globalization .
There are four distinct but overlapping reasons why U.S. strategists should seek to encourage at least a partial restructuring of global supply chains .
Under normal conditions , there may be no obvious problem in depending on imports rather than domestic suppliers for medicines or materials used in arms production .
Planners need to consider a range of plausible scenarios , and pinpoint instances in which the United States might find itself excessively dependent on imports from China .
In a crisis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are insufficient or unavailable , the absence of adequate domestic capacity could prove disastrous .
In order to identify potential gaps and shortfalls , planners would need to consider a range of plausible scenarios , estimating emergency requirements , comparing them to readily available resources , and pinpointing instances in which the United States might find itself excessively dependent on imports from China .
In such cases , the federal government would then have to contemplate ways of inducing U.S. or foreign companies to build or expand production facilities on American soil , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and perhaps to do both simultaneously .
The prominent role of Chinese-based companies in IT manufacturing , including everything from parts to finished products such as phones , drones , and network switching equipment , and the ability of the Communist Party to exert control over even nominally private Chinese entities create numerous potential vulnerabilities for their foreign customers .
This is why the U.S. federal government has banned Huawei and ZTE from the American telecommunications system .
The Defense Department and other agencies are also developing techniques for peering more deeply into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parts and subassemblies that go into the equipment they procure .
To mitigate risk , when links to potential “ threat actors ” are identified , alternative , trustworthy suppliers must also be found .
Another reason for attempting to shift existing supply chains and , in particular , for trying to preserve and expand domestic manufacturing capacity is that doing so could help boost the overall productivity , international competitiveness , and long-term growth prospects of the U.S. economy .
That , in turn , would generate more of the aggregate resources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with China , while at the same time enhancing the well-being of many American workers .
A revitalization of U.S. manufacturing industries could help to reverse this by creating more higher-wage jobs , especially for workers who lack college degrees .
The loss of manufacturing jobs that followed , and was in part caused by , China ’ s entry into the World Trade Organization appears to have contributed to rising income inequality , hurting the middle class and damaging the fabric of American society .
A revitalization of U.S. manufacturing industries could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ higher-wage jobs , especially for workers who lack college degrees .
The United States needs at least a portion of the manufacturing capacity in existing industries that it would need to meet the requirements of a near-term crisis .
In the longer run it must also have vibrant , home-based companies to develop and produce the next generation of advanced materials , semiconductors , and automated systems that will provide the basis for both new weapons systems and novel consumer products .
Just as it could provide benefits to the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on China .
As economist Derek Scissors has pointed out , earnings from the final assembly and export of consumer electronics to the United States are a major source of hard currency for Beijing .
In Scissors ’ s words , “ pushing supply chains out of China ” would constrict its export earnings while helping other countries “ considerably friendlier to American interests.
” Even if the value-added from the final assembly of consumer goods is relatively small , from a strategic standpoint it would be preferable if the resulting gains accrued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies rather than to China .
The physical relocation of some portion of existing supply chains could also help slow China ’ s efforts to extract sensitive technology through industrial espionage or coerced joint ventures .
U.S. policymakers have an array of instruments with which to further encourage the partial exodus of productivity capacity from China .
U.S. policymakers have an array of instruments with which to further encourage the partial exodus of productivity capacity from China .
Especially if it becomes clear that they will not be lifted anytime soon , tariffs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2018 and 2019 will continue to help drive this process .
If the purpose of U.S. policy is to enhance its own security and prosperity rather than simply to impose economic pain on China , import taxes on many consumer products could be lifted while those on a narrower list of intermediate goods ( including some electronic components and chemicals ) are retained .
These targeted tariffs , many of which were initially levied in retaliation for China ’ s alleged theft of intellectual property , could be supplemented by a set @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have engaged in IP theft and other unfair trading practices .
As Scissors suggests , “ it makes no sense to inhibit market access for China-based exporters at the end of supply chains while simultaneously providing them American funding.
” Even a largely market-driven dispersion of supply chains and a lesser degree of concentration in China should help to reduce risks and increase resilience .
While Washington lacks sufficient leverage to orchestrate or fine-tune this process , it can enhance the appeal of some locations over others .
As analyst Robert Atkinson has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade deal , eventual U.S. entry into some version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership “ would make it clear to global companies that if they move production out of China to one of these partner nations , they will not be subject to punitive tariffs in the future.
” Free trade agreements with Taiwan , the Philippines , and perhaps eventually Indonesia and India could have similar strategic as well as economic benefits .
There may be other attractive alternative sites in Eastern Europe and possibly Turkey .
To the extent feasible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ source imports of critical goods from a trusted production network of facilities in friendly or allied countries , at least some of them located far from China .
Washington also has a variety of tools with which to encourage the location , or promote the expansion , of industrial capacity on American soil .
During World War II and the opening stages of the Cold War , the federal government used the tax code in a focused fashion , extending the so-called rapid tax amortization privilege to promote expansion in sectors where resource @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense mobilization .
In the 1950s , federal agencies also used procurement guarantees to encourage the maintenance of capacity above anticipated market demand for certain minerals and machine tools by promising to buy a portion of the resulting output .
Some of these were then placed in stockpiles for possible future use .
The U.S. government could use similar tools today if , for example , it wanted to expand the nation ’ s ability to manufacture personal protective equipment and ventilators , items that might be needed to combat the next pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American ” provisions in government procurement regulations has been proposed as a way of providing an additional incentive for domestic manufacturing .
Finally , in order to cultivate domestic capacity in some key sectors , the government may have to offer subsidies , loans , or loan guarantees .
This is especially likely to be the case in industries such as semiconductors , rare earth minerals , and pharmaceuticals where the costs of building , enlarging , or reopening facilities on U.S. soil might otherwise be prohibitively high .
Globalization is not an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technological progress and autonomous market forces ; instead it is a man-made phenomenon with contours shaped by the choices of states as well as firms .
China ’ s emergence as an irresistibly attractive manufacturing platform was partly due to the sheer size of its working-age population and the falling costs of communication and transportation , but also due to deliberate government policies designed to aid in the acquisition of foreign intellectual property while keeping the cost of land , labor , and capital low and exchange rates favorable .
Conversely , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ industrial countries reflected not only the profit and loss calculations of individual companies but also the permissive policies of Western governments that concluded in effect ( in the U.S. case ) that what was good for Apple or 3M was good for the United States .
Firms and now states have begun to recognize that , if it results in excessive dependence , an addiction to low costs can create serious commercial and strategic risks .
Even as some of China ’ s earlier advantages have started to wane , firms and now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if it results in excessive dependence , an addiction to low costs can create serious commercial and strategic risks .
In responding to this reality , corporate executives can be expected to do what is best for their companies and their shareholders .
Governments , meanwhile , will have to make judgments about what is in the best interests of their countries and their citizens .
In keeping with long-standing American traditions , rather than dictate to the private sector or attempt to do its job directly , the U.S. government should create @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national interest more closely into alignment .
There are obvious dangers here .
Sharpened tools of trade and industrial policy can be abused by irresponsible leaders seeking to pander to voters and pay off supporters , or they may be captured and exploited by special interests .
An effective strategy for reforging supply chains and strengthening domestic manufacturing will have costs and it will require mechanisms for assessing requirements , making decisions , and implementing policies that are at least partially insulated from day-to-day political pressures .
All of this would be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Still , the experience of finding themselves dependent in a dire emergency on an irresponsible , opportunistic , and potentially hostile power has clearly left an impression on democratic publics and politicians that will not soon fade .
There will never be a better time for the United States and its partners to reconsider , and begin to reshape , their economic relations with China .
The current crisis is a terrible thing , but it would also be a terrible thing to waste .

The coronavirus crisis has brought home the dangers of losing sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity to meet the needs of a mass medical emergency—especially when the foreign supply comes from a potentially hostile power like China. Efforts by U.S. companies to expand production of ventilators have been complicated by difficulties in obtaining essential parts from Chinese and other sources. Thanks to export restrictions imposed by Beijing, health care staff around the world face a severe shortage of masks and respirators, the majority of which are made in China. The fact that some of these desperately needed items are manufactured at American-owned plants, by comparatively low-wage Chinese workers, is a painful reminder of globalization’s potential downsides.
The coronavirus crisis has brought home the dangers of losing sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity to meet the needs of a mass medical emergency—especially when the foreign supply comes from a potentially hostile power like China. Efforts by U.S. companies to expand production of ventilators have been complicated by difficulties in obtaining essential parts from Chinese and other sources. Thanks to export restrictions imposed by Beijing, health care staff around the world face a severe shortage of masks and respirators, the majority of which are made in China. The fact that some of these desperately needed items are manufactured at American-owned plants, by comparatively low-wage Chinese workers, is a painful reminder of globalization’s potential downsides.
As bad as things are, they could still get worse. The capacity to manufacture drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients has moved from the United States and Europe to developing countries in Asia where costs are lower and environmental regulations more relaxed. According to some widely cited estimates, the United States now imports virtually all of certain common antibiotics and over-the-counter pain medications from China, along with a high percentage of generic drugs used to treat HIV, depression, Alzheimer’s, and other ailments, and many of the active pharmaceutical ingredients used to make other medicines. Constriction of supply chains due to coronavirus-related shutdowns in China, further disruptions in global transportation networks, and a spike in worldwide demand for essential drugs could endanger the health of American citizens. And there is always the possibility of cutoffs imposed for political reasons—a tactic not yet used but increasingly threatened of late by China. An article on the website of China’s official Xinhua news agency provides a not-so-friendly reminder: If China were to retaliate for U.S. statements blaming it for the spread of the coronavirus by cutting pharmaceutical exports, “the United States would sink into the hell of a novel coronavirus epidemic.”
According to some widely cited estimates, the United States now imports virtually all of certain common antibiotics and over-the-counter pain medications from China, along with a high percentage of generic drugs.
These potential geopolitical as opposed to market or logistical factors point to a larger problem that extends well beyond medical supply chains. The ongoing erosion of domestic manufacturing capacity in certain industries in the United States and the accompanying increase in dependence on Chinese imports could greatly complicate any future attempt at defense mobilization. If trade were suspended due to a tense confrontation or an actual armed conflict, the United States might find it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to ramp up and sustain production of arms, munitions, weapons platforms, communications equipment, and other military systems. In addition to a direct loss of Chinese exports, an actual shooting war in the Western Pacific could also disrupt U.S. access to alternative sources of supply from other regional trading partners, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Although such concerns have started to receive more attention from defense planners in recent years, the last several months have cast them into sharp relief.
A man in a facemask works at a production facility of the pharmaceutical company Escom, which manufactures saline solution, glucose solution, and other infusion and injection solutions in Stavropol, Russia, on May 6. The factory has moved to round-the-clock production during the pandemic. Alexander PogozhevTASS via Getty Images
Even before the current crisis, many companies had begun to diversify production away from China, shifting a portion of their manufacturing capacity to other countries. This movement was driven by the need to avoid U.S. tariffs, but also by longer-term trends, including rising Chinese wages and technological developments that are making it both desirable and cost-effective to shorten some supply chains, bringing producers closer to final consumers.
Once the coronavirus pandemic begins to recede, greater awareness of the potential impact of natural as well as man-made shocks will accelerate tendencies not toward deglobalization but rather toward reglobalization: a reshuffling of supply chains and at least a partial reduction in the concentration of capacity inside China. In the words of one recent survey of global manufacturing trends: “While the trade war triggered some notable tinkering, the massive operational disruption wrought by the coronavirus pandemic will compel companies to fundamentally rethink their sourcing strategies. At minimum … they will be increasingly inclined to spread their risks rather than put all their eggs in the lowest cost basket, as many long did in China.”
As was true during its early stages, so too will the next phase of globalization be driven by thousands of discrete corporate decisions about profit and loss. But, as in the past, those calculations will also be shaped by government policies. The disruption caused by the pandemic creates an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to reassess and recalibrate their generally laissez-faire approach to globalization.
There are four distinct but overlapping reasons why U.S. strategists should seek to encourage at least a partial restructuring of global supply chains.
1. Reducing vulnerability to disruption or coercion
Under normal conditions, there may be no obvious problem in depending on imports rather than domestic suppliers for medicines or materials used in arms production.
Planners need to consider a range of plausible scenarios, and pinpoint instances in which the United States might find itself excessively dependent on imports from China.
In a crisis, however, as demand rises and imports are insufficient or unavailable, the absence of adequate domestic capacity could prove disastrous. In order to identify potential gaps and shortfalls, planners would need to consider a range of plausible scenarios, estimating emergency requirements, comparing them to readily available resources, and pinpointing instances in which the United States might find itself excessively dependent on imports from China. In such cases, the federal government would then have to contemplate ways of inducing U.S. or foreign companies to build or expand production facilities on American soil, to diversify foreign sources of supply, and perhaps to do both simultaneously.
2. Reducing vulnerability to sabotage or surveillance
The prominent role of Chinese-based companies in IT manufacturing, including everything from parts to finished products such as phones, drones, and network switching equipment, and the ability of the Communist Party to exert control over even nominally private Chinese entities create numerous potential vulnerabilities for their foreign customers.
This is why the U.S. federal government has banned Huawei and ZTE from the American telecommunications system. The Defense Department and other agencies are also developing techniques for peering more deeply into supply chains, tracing the sources of parts and subassemblies that go into the equipment they procure. To mitigate risk, when links to potential “threat actors” are identified, alternative, trustworthy suppliers must also be found.
U.S. President Donald Trump participates in a tour of a Honeywell International plant that manufactures personal protective equipment in Phoenix, Arizona, on May 5.
3. Preserving/expanding domestic manufacturing capacity
Another reason for attempting to shift existing supply chains and, in particular, for trying to preserve and expand domestic manufacturing capacity is that doing so could help boost the overall productivity, international competitiveness, and long-term growth prospects of the U.S. economy. That, in turn, would generate more of the aggregate resources necessary to sustain a protracted strategic competition with China, while at the same time enhancing the well-being of many American workers.
A revitalization of U.S. manufacturing industries could help to reverse this by creating more higher-wage jobs, especially for workers who lack college degrees.
The loss of manufacturing jobs that followed, and was in part caused by, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization appears to have contributed to rising income inequality, hurting the middle class and damaging the fabric of American society. A revitalization of U.S. manufacturing industries could help to reverse this by creating more higher-wage jobs, especially for workers who lack college degrees. The United States needs at least a portion of the manufacturing capacity in existing industries that it would need to meet the requirements of a near-term crisis. In the longer run it must also have vibrant, home-based companies to develop and produce the next generation of advanced materials, semiconductors, and automated systems that will provide the basis for both new weapons systems and novel consumer products.
4. Imposing costs on China
Just as it could provide benefits to the United States, shifting supply chains would also impose costs on China. As economist Derek Scissors has pointed out, earnings from the final assembly and export of consumer electronics to the United States are a major source of hard currency for Beijing. In Scissors’s words, “pushing supply chains out of China” would constrict its export earnings while helping other countries “considerably friendlier to American interests.” Even if the value-added from the final assembly of consumer goods is relatively small, from a strategic standpoint it would be preferable if the resulting gains accrued to the economies of U.S. friends and allies rather than to China. The physical relocation of some portion of existing supply chains could also help slow China’s efforts to extract sensitive technology through industrial espionage or coerced joint ventures.
U.S. policymakers have an array of instruments with which to further encourage the partial exodus of productivity capacity from China.
U.S. policymakers have an array of instruments with which to further encourage the partial exodus of productivity capacity from China. Especially if it becomes clear that they will not be lifted anytime soon, tariffs such as those the Trump administration imposed in 2018 and 2019 will continue to help drive this process.
If the purpose of U.S. policy is to enhance its own security and prosperity rather than simply to impose economic pain on China, import taxes on many consumer products could be lifted while those on a narrower list of intermediate goods (including some electronic components and chemicals) are retained. These targeted tariffs, many of which were initially levied in retaliation for China’s alleged theft of intellectual property, could be supplemented by a set of financial sanctions against specific companies that have engaged in IP theft and other unfair trading practices. As Scissors suggests, “it makes no sense to inhibit market access for China-based exporters at the end of supply chains while simultaneously providing them American funding.”
Even a largely market-driven dispersion of supply chains and a lesser degree of concentration in China should help to reduce risks and increase resilience. While Washington lacks sufficient leverage to orchestrate or fine-tune this process, it can enhance the appeal of some locations over others. As analyst Robert Atkinson has pointed out, in combination with the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade deal, eventual U.S. entry into some version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership “would make it clear to global companies that if they move production out of China to one of these partner nations, they will not be subject to punitive tariffs in the future.” Free trade agreements with Taiwan, the Philippines, and perhaps eventually Indonesia and India could have similar strategic as well as economic benefits. There may be other attractive alternative sites in Eastern Europe and possibly Turkey. To the extent feasible, the United States should seek to source imports of critical goods from a trusted production network of facilities in friendly or allied countries, at least some of them located far from China.
Washington also has a variety of tools with which to encourage the location, or promote the expansion, of industrial capacity on American soil. During World War II and the opening stages of the Cold War, the federal government used the tax code in a focused fashion, extending the so-called rapid tax amortization privilege to promote expansion in sectors where resource requirement calculations revealed gaps that could stall defense mobilization. In the 1950s, federal agencies also used procurement guarantees to encourage the maintenance of capacity above anticipated market demand for certain minerals and machine tools by promising to buy a portion of the resulting output. Some of these were then placed in stockpiles for possible future use.
The U.S. government could use similar tools today if, for example, it wanted to expand the nation’s ability to manufacture personal protective equipment and ventilators, items that might be needed to combat the next pandemic. Tightening the interpretation of “buy American” provisions in government procurement regulations has been proposed as a way of providing an additional incentive for domestic manufacturing. Finally, in order to cultivate domestic capacity in some key sectors, the government may have to offer subsidies, loans, or loan guarantees. This is especially likely to be the case in industries such as semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and pharmaceuticals where the costs of building, enlarging, or reopening facilities on U.S. soil might otherwise be prohibitively high.
Globalization is not an unstoppable natural force, propelled solely by technological progress and autonomous market forces; instead it is a man-made phenomenon with contours shaped by the choices of states as well as firms. China’s emergence as an irresistibly attractive manufacturing platform was partly due to the sheer size of its working-age population and the falling costs of communication and transportation, but also due to deliberate government policies designed to aid in the acquisition of foreign intellectual property while keeping the cost of land, labor, and capital low and exchange rates favorable. Conversely, the migration of manufacturing capacity from the advanced industrial countries reflected not only the profit and loss calculations of individual companies but also the permissive policies of Western governments that concluded in effect (in the U.S. case) that what was good for Apple or 3M was good for the United States.
Firms and now states have begun to recognize that, if it results in excessive dependence, an addiction to low costs can create serious commercial and strategic risks.
Even as some of China’s earlier advantages have started to wane, firms and now states have begun to recognize that, if it results in excessive dependence, an addiction to low costs can create serious commercial and strategic risks. In responding to this reality, corporate executives can be expected to do what is best for their companies and their shareholders. Governments, meanwhile, will have to make judgments about what is in the best interests of their countries and their citizens. In keeping with long-standing American traditions, rather than dictate to the private sector or attempt to do its job directly, the U.S. government should create incentives that bring corporate interests and the national interest more closely into alignment.
There are obvious dangers here. Sharpened tools of trade and industrial policy can be abused by irresponsible leaders seeking to pander to voters and pay off supporters, or they may be captured and exploited by special interests. An effective strategy for reforging supply chains and strengthening domestic manufacturing will have costs and it will require mechanisms for assessing requirements, making decisions, and implementing policies that are at least partially insulated from day-to-day political pressures.
All of this would be a tall order under the best of circumstances. Still, the experience of finding themselves dependent in a dire emergency on an irresponsible, opportunistic, and potentially hostile power has clearly left an impression on democratic publics and politicians that will not soon fade. There will never be a better time for the United States and its partners to reconsider, and begin to reshape, their economic relations with China. The current crisis is a terrible thing, but it would also be a terrible thing to waste.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--Botched Venezuela Operation Is a Boon for Maduro

Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : What to make of a bizarre plot to overthrow the embattled Venezuelan president , Iraq ’ s parliament anoints a prime minister after months of deadlock , and a regional party makes a possible power grab in Ethiopia .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox on Fridays , please sign up here .
Two former U.S. special forces soldiers were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week and accused of trying to topple the country ’ s embattled president , Nicolás Maduro .
A Florida-based private security contractor allegedly orchestrated the murky operation and live-tweeted the incursion .
“ A daring amphibious raid was launched from the border of Colombia deep into the heart of Caracas , ” said Jordan Goudreau , the founder of the security contractor Silvercorp , in a video on Sunday .
By the time the video was posted online , eight operatives had been killed after being intercepted by the Venezuelan military .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Monday .
The plot appears to have been infiltrated by Venezuelan intelligence .
It was also picked up the Associated Press , which published a detailed account of Goudreau ’ s plans three days before the attack .
One former U.S. diplomat has described the story as a “ Keystone Cops Bay of Pigs.
” If Maduro was looking for a propaganda coup , he could not have scripted one better himself .
What ’ s good for Maduro is bad for opposition leader Juan Guaidó , whose lieutenants were reportedly involved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recognized by nearly 60 countries , including the United States , as the rightful leader of Venezuela .
Florida man .
Goudreau , a U.S. special forces veteran , took responsibility for the bungled operation .
“ The main mission was to liberate Venezuela , to capture Maduro , but the mission in Caracas failed , ” he told Bloomberg .
Founded in 2018 , Silvercorp says on its website that it provides crisis planning and risk management services to governments and companies in over 50 countries .
The company has also provided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump .
Trump has denied that the U.S. government had played a role in the attempted coup .
The plot thickens .
The Venezuelan opposition led by Guaidó has denied any connection to Silvercorp .
But the Venezuelan political strategist J.J. Rendón told the Washington Post that he was asked by Guaidó to explore all options to oust Maduro .
In October 2019 , the Venezuelan opposition signed a $ 219 million agreement with Silvercorp .
Guaidó ’ s signature appears on the contract , but the opposition disputes its authenticity .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Guaidó ’ s representatives not only signed the contract with Goudreau with his knowledge , but that they met with several private security contractors who wanted as much as $ 500 million .
They shopped around , and Goudreau was the budget option , ” said Geoff Ramsey , the assistant director for Venezuela at the Washington Office on Latin America , a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization .
After the deal was inked , Goudreau started to behave erratically , and members of the opposition began to doubt he had the money or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he asked for a $ 1.5 million retainer .
Rendón and his colleagues considered the deal to be over , but Goudreau went ahead with it anyway .
Asked why he had done it without payment , he said that he was a “ freedom fighter.
” What ’ s next ?
The bungled operation has enabled Maduro to take aim at his most despised adversaries : the Venezuelan opposition , the United States , and Colombia—where the fighters were reportedly trained .
“ Obviously the Maduro regime knew about it in advance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Were they somehow egging it along ?
” Eric Farnsworth , the vice president of the Council of the Americas , told Foreign Policy .
The attack has also raised serious questions for the Guaidó-led opposition , whose credibility has been undermined by the plot .
“ [ Guaidó ’ s ] biggest risk lies in explaining his connections to this contract and laying out a credible plan to actually advance a peaceful democratic transition , ” said Ramsey of the Washington Office on Latin America .
Iraq gets a prime minister .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq ’ s parliament voted on Wednesday to appoint the former intelligence chief Mustafa al-Kadhimi as the country ’ s new prime minister .
His predecessor , Adil Abdul-Mahdi , stepped down in November amid anti-government protests .
Seen as pragmatic and secular , Kadhimi secured the backing of both the United States and Iran .
But he has promised to maintain Iraq ’ s muhasasa system , which divvies up public offices and resources along ethno-sectarian lines—the same arrangement that protesters have blamed for entrenching corruption and sectarian divides .
Kadhimi , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has a daunting to-do list ahead of him : dealing with a pandemic , calming simmering tensions between the United States and Iran , and managing a huge loss in government revenues due to the collapse of oil and gas prices .
Nord Stream 2 nears completion .
A Russian pipe-laying vessel arrived in the Baltic Sea on Sunday , which Russia says will be used to complete the remaining 100 miles of the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline running from Siberia to Germany .
Last year , U.S. sanctions took aim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ energy projects , prompting European vessels to back out of the project .
“ Whether Moscow is able to pull-off the project on its own using the Akademik Cherskiy remains to be seen , ” said Benjamin L. Schmitt , a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and former European energy security advisor to the U.S. Department of State , echoing concerns of other experts that the vessel lacks the technical capacities needed .
Supporters of the Nord Stream 2 project argue that it will increase Europe ’ s energy security , but opponents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will leave the continent reliant on Russia and deprive Ukraine of gas transit revenues .
The sanctions haven ’ t dented the confidence of Russian officials , who are optimistic that the pipeline could be functional by the end of the year .
Sudan ’ s man in Washington .
Sudan has appointed its first ambassador to the United States in over 20 years , the latest sign of deepening ties between the countries since former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was ousted last year .
The Sudanese foreign ministry announced on Monday that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Satti as its envoy .
In 1993 , the United States added Sudan to its list of state sponsors of terrorism , making it ineligible for debt relief and financing from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank , and getting his country removed from the list is a top priority for the new ambassador .
The United States has not yet named its envoy to Sudan .
Power grabs in Ethiopia .
In March , Ethiopia postponed parliamentary and regional elections scheduled for August due to the coronavirus .
A new date @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set , but the Tigrayan People ’ s Liberation Front ( TPLF ) , which governs the northern region of Tigray , announced on Monday that it would hold the vote as scheduled in that region , putting fragmented Ethiopia ’ s unity to the test .
The TPLF had a stranglehold on power in Ethiopia for decades .
When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed entered office in 2018 , he sought to dismantle the group ’ s influence over public life as part of a wider push to do away with ethnically based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ onetime power brokers are unlikely to go quietly .
As the group once again throws down the gauntlet , Abiy has warned that “ those pushing for unconstitutional ways to grab power… will be punished by law.
” The temperature gauge .
In just 50 years , more than 3 billion people could find themselves living in places with inhospitable temperatures caused by climate change , according to a new report published Monday in the proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences .
“ There will be more change in the next 50 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” one of the study ’ s authors told the Guardian .
Taking into account population growth and rising greenhouse gas emissions , the authors expect India to be one of the countries hit hardest , and some 1.2 billion people in the country could find themselves living in areas as hot as the Sahara .
That ’ s it for this week .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or @ @ @ @ @ @

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: What to make of a bizarre plot to overthrow the embattled Venezuelan president, Iraq’s parliament anoints a prime minister after months of deadlock, and a regional party makes a possible power grab in Ethiopia.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox on Fridays, please sign up here.
U.S. Mercenaries Arrested in Botched Attempt to Overthrow Maduro
Two former U.S. special forces soldiers were among 17 people arrested in Venezuela this week and accused of trying to topple the country’s embattled president, Nicolás Maduro. A Florida-based private security contractor allegedly orchestrated the murky operation and live-tweeted the incursion. “A daring amphibious raid was launched from the border of Colombia deep into the heart of Caracas,” said Jordan Goudreau, the founder of the security contractor Silvercorp, in a video on Sunday.
By the time the video was posted online, eight operatives had been killed after being intercepted by the Venezuelan military. A second boat of would-be invaders was captured on Monday. The plot appears to have been infiltrated by Venezuelan intelligence. It was also picked up the Associated Press, which published a detailed account of Goudreau’s plans three days before the attack. One former U.S. diplomat has described the story as a “Keystone Cops Bay of Pigs.”
If Maduro was looking for a propaganda coup, he could not have scripted one better himself. What’s good for Maduro is bad for opposition leader Juan Guaidó, whose lieutenants were reportedly involved in planning the boondoggle. Guaidó is recognized by nearly 60 countries, including the United States, as the rightful leader of Venezuela.
Florida man. Goudreau, a U.S. special forces veteran, took responsibility for the bungled operation. “The main mission was to liberate Venezuela, to capture Maduro, but the mission in Caracas failed,” he told Bloomberg. Founded in 2018, Silvercorp says on its website that it provides crisis planning and risk management services to governments and companies in over 50 countries. The company has also provided security at rallies for U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump has denied that the U.S. government had played a role in the attempted coup.
The plot thickens. The Venezuelan opposition led by Guaidó has denied any connection to Silvercorp. But the Venezuelan political strategist J.J. Rendón told the Washington Post that he was asked by Guaidó to explore all options to oust Maduro. In October 2019, the Venezuelan opposition signed a $219 million agreement with Silvercorp. Guaidó’s signature appears on the contract, but the opposition disputes its authenticity. “What is more outrageous to me is that Guaidó’s representatives not only signed the contract with Goudreau with his knowledge, but that they met with several private security contractors who wanted as much as $500 million. They shopped around, and Goudreau was the budget option,” said Geoff Ramsey, the assistant director for Venezuela at the Washington Office on Latin America, a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization.
After the deal was inked, Goudreau started to behave erratically, and members of the opposition began to doubt he had the money or manpower to pull off the operation when he asked for a $1.5 million retainer. Rendón and his colleagues considered the deal to be over, but Goudreau went ahead with it anyway. Asked why he had done it without payment, he said that he was a “freedom fighter.”
What’s next? The bungled operation has enabled Maduro to take aim at his most despised adversaries: the Venezuelan opposition, the United States, and Colombia—where the fighters were reportedly trained. “Obviously the Maduro regime knew about it in advance, but you have to wonder: Were they somehow egging it along?” Eric Farnsworth, the vice president of the Council of the Americas, told Foreign Policy.
The attack has also raised serious questions for the Guaidó-led opposition, whose credibility has been undermined by the plot. “[Guaidó’s] biggest risk lies in explaining his connections to this contract and laying out a credible plan to actually advance a peaceful democratic transition,” said Ramsey of the Washington Office on Latin America.
What We’re Following
Iraq gets a prime minister. After five months of political deadlock, Iraq’s parliament voted on Wednesday to appoint the former intelligence chief Mustafa al-Kadhimi as the country’s new prime minister. His predecessor, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, stepped down in November amid anti-government protests. Seen as pragmatic and secular, Kadhimi secured the backing of both the United States and Iran. But he has promised to maintain Iraq’s muhasasa system, which divvies up public offices and resources along ethno-sectarian lines—the same arrangement that protesters have blamed for entrenching corruption and sectarian divides.
Kadhimi, who was sworn in on Thursday, has a daunting to-do list ahead of him: dealing with a pandemic, calming simmering tensions between the United States and Iran, and managing a huge loss in government revenues due to the collapse of oil and gas prices.
Nord Stream 2 nears completion. A Russian pipe-laying vessel arrived in the Baltic Sea on Sunday, which Russia says will be used to complete the remaining 100 miles of the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline running from Siberia to Germany. Last year, U.S. sanctions took aim at companies laying deep-sea pipelines for Russian energy projects, prompting European vessels to back out of the project. “Whether Moscow is able to pull-off the project on its own using the Akademik Cherskiy remains to be seen,” said Benjamin L. Schmitt, a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and former European energy security advisor to the U.S. Department of State, echoing concerns of other experts that the vessel lacks the technical capacities needed.
Supporters of the Nord Stream 2 project argue that it will increase Europe’s energy security, but opponents including the United States fear that it will leave the continent reliant on Russia and deprive Ukraine of gas transit revenues. The sanctions haven’t dented the confidence of Russian officials, who are optimistic that the pipeline could be functional by the end of the year.
Sudan’s man in Washington. Sudan has appointed its first ambassador to the United States in over 20 years, the latest sign of deepening ties between the countries since former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was ousted last year. The Sudanese foreign ministry announced on Monday that it had chosen the seasoned diplomat Nureldin Satti as its envoy. In 1993, the United States added Sudan to its list of state sponsors of terrorism, making it ineligible for debt relief and financing from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank, and getting his country removed from the list is a top priority for the new ambassador. The United States has not yet named its envoy to Sudan.
Keep an Eye On
Power grabs in Ethiopia. In March, Ethiopia postponed parliamentary and regional elections scheduled for August due to the coronavirus. A new date for the vote hasn’t been set, but the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which governs the northern region of Tigray, announced on Monday that it would hold the vote as scheduled in that region, putting fragmented Ethiopia’s unity to the test. The TPLF had a stranglehold on power in Ethiopia for decades.
When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed entered office in 2018, he sought to dismantle the group’s influence over public life as part of a wider push to do away with ethnically based politics. But the country’s onetime power brokers are unlikely to go quietly. As the group once again throws down the gauntlet, Abiy has warned that “those pushing for unconstitutional ways to grab power… will be punished by law.”
The temperature gauge. In just 50 years, more than 3 billion people could find themselves living in places with inhospitable temperatures caused by climate change, according to a new report published Monday in the proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. “There will be more change in the next 50 years than in the past 6,000 years,” one of the study’s authors told the Guardian. Taking into account population growth and rising greenhouse gas emissions, the authors expect India to be one of the countries hit hardest, and some 1.2 billion people in the country could find themselves living in areas as hot as the Sahara.
That’s it for this week.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to newsletters@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--Despite U.S. Sanctions, Iran Expands Its Nuclear Stockpile

Two years after President Donald Trump announced the U.S withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal , Tehran has resumed its enrichment of uranium , restarted research and development on advanced centrifuges , and expanded its stockpile of nuclear fuel , cutting in half the time it would need to produce enough weapons-grade fuel to build a nuclear bomb .
“ Iran is manifestly closer to being able to produce a nuclear weapon than they were two years ago , ” said Richard Nephew , who participated in negotiations on the landmark nuclear deal in 2015 .
While there is no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a nuclear weapon , the Iranian advances raise questions about the success of the White House ’ s so-called “ maximum pressure ” campaign , which is aimed at forcing Iran through the imposition of ever more stringent sanctions to accept greater constraints on its political and military support for regional militias and the development of its ballistic missile program .
The effort—which has severely damaged Iran ’ s economy—has yet to temper Iran ’ s nuclear ambitions , instead prompting Tehran to resume nuclear activities prohibited by the nuclear pact , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Plan of Action , or JCPOA .
It has also eroded Washington ’ s credibility even among many of its traditional allies and placed increasing strains on America ’ s diplomatic partnerships .
This month , the U.S. State Department publicly unveiled a diplomatic effort to secure a tangible result from its pressure campaign in the run-up to the U.S. presidential election—an agreement by the U.N. Security Council to extend a conventional arms embargo that is scheduled to expire on Oct. 18 , just weeks before the election .
Back in February , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a draft Security Council resolution extending the arms embargo to Britain , France , and Germany , hoping to rally support for the initiative .
The United States received a chilly response from the Europeans , who argued that the resolution was all but certain to be vetoed by China and Russia , which plan to sell arms to Iran once the embargo expires .
The Europeans say they share Washington ’ s concerns about Iran ’ s ballistic missile programs and its support for proxies , including Hezbollah and other militias spread @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fault Washington with undermining a landmark nuclear pact that enjoyed broad international support and which they believed had succeeded in constraining Tehran ’ s nuclear program , until the United States ditched it .
Last week , Brian Hook , the U.S. special envoy for Iran , warned that if the council failed to agree to extend the embargo , Washington could deliver a potentially lethal blow to the nuclear agreement by triggering a provision that would allow any of the initial seven signatories to reimpose—or snap back—all Iran sanctions , including the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force before the nuclear pact was concluded .
Iran has warned that if the sanctions are reimposed , it will likely pull out of the nuclear pact , end international inspections of its nuclear energy program , and withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty .
Such a move by Washington would raise complex political , diplomatic , and legal questions about whether the United States , which withdrew its participation in the nuclear deal on May 8 , 2018 , has the legal right or the moral authority to trigger the snapback provision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council Resolution 2231 , which endorsed the nuclear deal , any participant in the nuclear pact has the right to single-handedly snap back the previous sanctions .
Trump administration officials contend that while the United States is no longer a participant in the nuclear deal , it still retains all the rights of a participant under the resolution , which has never been overturned .
And they intend to exercise that right if they don ’ t get their way .
“ There is no qualification in 2231 where ‘ participant ’ is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the JCPOA .
And if the drafters wanted to make the qualification , they could have , but they did not , ” Hook told reporters on April 30 .
“ This is the plain reading of the text.
” “ The arms embargo must be renewed , and we will exercise all diplomatic options to accomplish that , ” Hook said .
“ We have a policy goal of renewing the arms embargo , and that ’ s where our focus is .
We ’ re hopeful that we ’ ll @ @ @ @ @ @ @ served as the principal legal advisor to the National Security Council and the State Department during the George W. Bush administration , said the United States can make a credible legal case for reimposing sanctions but that the outcome could prove self-defeating .
“ The U.S. has the right to trigger snapback , but they may ultimately not be effective in achieving what they want to achieve , ” he said , warning that states may be disinclined to observe such sanctions .
“ There is a real risk it could backfire if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along .
If you try to lead but no one will follow , you have not been successful , and the U.S. will have fractured the Security Council.
” “ If you try to lead but no one will follow , you have not been successful , and the U.S. will have fractured the Security Council.
” “ I suspect , at the end of the day , the Security Council will be forced on a purely legal basis to conclude we have the right to submit the resolution [ triggering snapback ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ debate will split the council as a point of fact because you will have the French , Brits , and Germans screaming that we are not doing this in good faith and the Russians and the Chinese will lose their minds on this.
” The practical outcome of this approach , he said , is that the Chinese and Russians will cry foul and declare the action illegitimate .
“ I have no doubt they will sell arms and will do so immediately .
Those tanks that [ U.S. Secretary of State Mike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be put on the next boat.
” European officials have fumed in private over the latest U.S. threat , which they suspect is designed to kill off the nuclear pact .
They view Washington ’ s legalistic approach as inconsistent and hypocritical , noting that the very resolution being invoked by the United States to reimpose sanctions also calls on states to support the implementation of the nuclear pact .
One senior European official also pointed out that a key provision in the U.N. Charter , Article 25 , states that “ the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter ” —a provision that the United States has ignored .
The U.S. strategy is “ legally and politically obscene , ” a U.N.-based diplomat privately told the International Crisis Group .
Russia has said publicly what some of its European partners are saying privately .
The U.S. strategy is “ legally and politically obscene , ” a U.N.-based diplomat privately told the International Crisis Group .
“ Their reasoning is ludicrous , of course , ” Mikhail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.N. in Vienna , said in an interview with the Russian newspaper Kommersant published on April 28 .
“ It is common knowledge that Washington officially announced its withdrawal from the nuclear deal on May 8 , 2018.
” “ Theoretically , an attempt of this sort is possible , but it will make the U.S. appear in an extremely unattractive light , ” he added .
“ I don ’ t think that the U.N. Security Council members would be ready to support the U.S. bid to remain a JCPOA participant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this is preposterous .
… The attempt to implement this plan will cause a lot of harm and lead to stormy debates in the U.N. Security Council.
” Democratic lawmakers who supported the JCPOA chided the administration for withdrawing from it in the first place and then later trying to use the deal to advance its goals .
“ They ’ re trying to have it both ways , ” one Democratic congressional aide said .
Nevertheless , a bipartisan majority in Congress—including some of Trump ’ s most stalwart critics on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hundreds of House lawmakers from both sides signed on to a letter to Pompeo last month urging an extension of the ban .
“ [ W ] e are concerned that the ban ’ s expiration will lead to more states buying and selling weapons to and from Iran .
… This could have disastrous consequences for U.S. national security and our regional allies , ” read the letter , which was organized by Reps. Eliot Engel and Michael McCaul , the chairman and the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now just several months out where China , Russia , other countries from around the world can all sell significant conventional weapons systems to the Iranians in October of this year , ” Pompeo told reporters in a briefing last week .
“ This isn ’ t far off .
This isn ’ t some fantasy by conservatives .
This is a reality.
” The 2015 Iran nuclear pact—the culmination of more than a decade of diplomatic efforts to contain Iran ’ s nuclear program—offered Tehran an end to crippling economic sanctions in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undertaking a set of verifiable commitments to assure the world it was not building nuclear weapons .
It was signed by representatives of Britain , China , the European Union , Iran , France , Germany , Russia , and the United States .
Trump derided the nuclear pact—a signature foreign-policy achievement for President Barack Obama—as a flawed agreement that gave Iran access to billions of dollars that have since been used to fund Iranian-backed militias and to advance a ballistic missile program that could improve Iran ’ s ability in the future @ @ @ @ @ @ @ May 8 , 2018 , Trump formally withdrew from the agreement and began a process of imposing a range of U.S. sanctions on Iran .
Despite European government efforts to circumvent those sanctions , European businesses have largely observed the U.S. measures , fearing their companies could be penalized and denied access to U.S. consumer financial markets .
Iran has insisted for years that it has never had any desire to build nuclear weapons , but U.S. and other intelligence agencies have long contended that Tehran had been secretly developing nuclear weapons for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( IAEA ) concluded that it had been working on a nuclear weapon design until at least 2009 .
But the IAEA also claimed that Iran had stopped its design work and was in compliance with its obligations under the nuclear pact until the United States reneged on the deal .
Iran subsequently stepped up activities at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities , increasing stores of a more purified grade of uranium that could bring it close to producing weapons-grade fuel .
A year after the United States withdrew from the pact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its own commitments under the pact , announcing on May 8 , 2019 , that it would no longer be bound by limits on the size of its stockpiles of enriched uranium .
Iran subsequently stepped up activities at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities , increasing stores of a more purified grade of uranium that could bring it close to producing weapons-grade fuel .
Iran also restarted prohibited research and development work on advanced centrifuges , which would enable the country to purify its uranium at a greater speed .
Under the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is permitted to stockpile up to 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium , far short of the estimated 1,050 kilograms required to produce enough weapons-grade fuel for a single bomb .
But in March , the IAEA reported that Iran had produced 1,021 kilograms of low-enriched uranium , making it all but certain it has enough raw uranium to build a bomb .
If Iran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon , according to Nephew , the larger stockpile would cut down its so-called breakout time—the time it would take to convert the low-enriched @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about six months .
But some arms control experts cautioned that Iran would still need to overcome considerable technical hurdles to weaponize and deploy a nuclear weapon .
They suspect that Iran ’ s violations have been carefully calibrated to apply pressure on the other signatories of the nuclear pact to ease sanctions on Iran .
The Iranians ’ “ actions and statements indicate they are not racing to build a nuclear weapon or amass material for a nuclear weapon , ” said Daryl Kimball , the executive director of the Arms Control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a measured way to the U.S. reimposition of sanctions , and they have threatened to go further if the situation continues indefinitely.
” “ They are retaliating in a measured way to the U.S. reimposition of sanctions , and they have threatened to go further if the situation continues indefinitely.
” In January , after Iran rejected any constraints on its enrichment of uranium , the foreign ministers of Britain , France , and Germany called out Iran for violating the terms of the nuclear pact and jointly triggered a so-called dispute settlement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into compliance or face the prospect of the Europeans declaring it in breach of its obligations—an action that would lead to the reimposition of sanctions .
But the Europeans also faulted the United States for withdrawing from the nuclear accord and expressed their hopes that the initiative would compel Iran to reverse course .
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said at the time that the Europeans “ could no longer leave the growing Iranian violations of the nuclear agreement unanswered.
” “ Our goal is clear , ” he said .
“ We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a diplomatic solution within the agreement.
” Richard Gowan , the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group , said Washington ’ s threat to trigger the snapback may be designed to “ scare the Europeans into backing alternative ways to keep the arms embargo alive.
” Gowan said European diplomats had suspected that the United States might try to convince Britain to break with its European partners , declare Tehran in breach of its obligations , and trigger the snapback provision .
“ The fact the U.S. is making the case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ implies that the British option may not be available.
” “ I am not sure there is a compromise available , ” he added , noting that the Europeans may be paying as much attention as Trump to the U.S. election calendar .
“ The higher the chances of [ Joe ] Biden victory in November , the less likely the E3 [ the three European signatories to the nuclear pact ] will be to buy a U.S. snapback drive .
”

Two years after President Donald Trump announced the U.S withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran has resumed its enrichment of uranium, restarted research and development on advanced centrifuges, and expanded its stockpile of nuclear fuel, cutting in half the time it would need to produce enough weapons-grade fuel to build a nuclear bomb.
Two years after President Donald Trump announced the U.S withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran has resumed its enrichment of uranium, restarted research and development on advanced centrifuges, and expanded its stockpile of nuclear fuel, cutting in half the time it would need to produce enough weapons-grade fuel to build a nuclear bomb.
“Iran is manifestly closer to being able to produce a nuclear weapon than they were two years ago,” said Richard Nephew, who participated in negotiations on the landmark nuclear deal in 2015.
While there is no evidence Tehran is preparing a dash for a nuclear weapon, the Iranian advances raise questions about the success of the White House’s so-called “maximum pressure” campaign, which is aimed at forcing Iran through the imposition of ever more stringent sanctions to accept greater constraints on its political and military support for regional militias and the development of its ballistic missile program.
The effort—which has severely damaged Iran’s economy—has yet to temper Iran’s nuclear ambitions, instead prompting Tehran to resume nuclear activities prohibited by the nuclear pact, which is formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. It has also eroded Washington’s credibility even among many of its traditional allies and placed increasing strains on America’s diplomatic partnerships.
This month, the U.S. State Department publicly unveiled a diplomatic effort to secure a tangible result from its pressure campaign in the run-up to the U.S. presidential election—an agreement by the U.N. Security Council to extend a conventional arms embargo that is scheduled to expire on Oct. 18, just weeks before the election. Back in February, the United States privately circulated elements of a draft Security Council resolution extending the arms embargo to Britain, France, and Germany, hoping to rally support for the initiative.
The United States received a chilly response from the Europeans, who argued that the resolution was all but certain to be vetoed by China and Russia, which plan to sell arms to Iran once the embargo expires. The Europeans say they share Washington’s concerns about Iran’s ballistic missile programs and its support for proxies, including Hezbollah and other militias spread across the Middle East. But they fault Washington with undermining a landmark nuclear pact that enjoyed broad international support and which they believed had succeeded in constraining Tehran’s nuclear program, until the United States ditched it.
Last week, Brian Hook, the U.S. special envoy for Iran, warned that if the council failed to agree to extend the embargo, Washington could deliver a potentially lethal blow to the nuclear agreement by triggering a provision that would allow any of the initial seven signatories to reimpose—or snap back—all Iran sanctions, including the conventional arms embargo, that were in force before the nuclear pact was concluded. Iran has warned that if the sanctions are reimposed, it will likely pull out of the nuclear pact, end international inspections of its nuclear energy program, and withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
U.S. President Donald Trump holds up a memorandum at the White House in Washington that reinstates sanctions on Iran after he announced his decision to withdraw the United States from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal on May 8, 2018.
Such a move by Washington would raise complex political, diplomatic, and legal questions about whether the United States, which withdrew its participation in the nuclear deal on May 8, 2018, has the legal right or the moral authority to trigger the snapback provision. Under the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the nuclear deal, any participant in the nuclear pact has the right to single-handedly snap back the previous sanctions. Trump administration officials contend that while the United States is no longer a participant in the nuclear deal, it still retains all the rights of a participant under the resolution, which has never been overturned. And they intend to exercise that right if they don’t get their way.
“There is no qualification in 2231 where ‘participant’ is defined in a way to require participation in the JCPOA. And if the drafters wanted to make the qualification, they could have, but they did not,” Hook told reporters on April 30. “This is the plain reading of the text.”
“The arms embargo must be renewed, and we will exercise all diplomatic options to accomplish that,” Hook said. “We have a policy goal of renewing the arms embargo, and that’s where our focus is. We’re hopeful that we’ll succeed.”
John Bellinger III, who served as the principal legal advisor to the National Security Council and the State Department during the George W. Bush administration, said the United States can make a credible legal case for reimposing sanctions but that the outcome could prove self-defeating.
“The U.S. has the right to trigger snapback, but they may ultimately not be effective in achieving what they want to achieve,” he said, warning that states may be disinclined to observe such sanctions. “There is a real risk it could backfire if the other countries are unwilling to go along. If you try to lead but no one will follow, you have not been successful, and the U.S. will have fractured the Security Council.”
“If you try to lead but no one will follow, you have not been successful, and the U.S. will have fractured the Security Council.”
“I suspect, at the end of the day, the Security Council will be forced on a purely legal basis to conclude we have the right to submit the resolution [triggering snapback],” Nephew said. “The debate will split the council as a point of fact because you will have the French, Brits, and Germans screaming that we are not doing this in good faith and the Russians and the Chinese will lose their minds on this.” The practical outcome of this approach, he said, is that the Chinese and Russians will cry foul and declare the action illegitimate. “I have no doubt they will sell arms and will do so immediately. Those tanks that [U.S. Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo is so concerned about could be put on the next boat.”
European officials have fumed in private over the latest U.S. threat, which they suspect is designed to kill off the nuclear pact. They view Washington’s legalistic approach as inconsistent and hypocritical, noting that the very resolution being invoked by the United States to reimpose sanctions also calls on states to support the implementation of the nuclear pact. One senior European official also pointed out that a key provision in the U.N. Charter, Article 25, states that “the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”—a provision that the United States has ignored.
The U.S. strategy is “legally and politically obscene,” a U.N.-based diplomat privately told the International Crisis Group.
Russia has said publicly what some of its European partners are saying privately.
The U.S. strategy is “legally and politically obscene,” a U.N.-based diplomat privately told the International Crisis Group.
“Their reasoning is ludicrous, of course,” Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s ambassador to the U.N. in Vienna, said in an interview with the Russian newspaper Kommersant published on April 28. “It is common knowledge that Washington officially announced its withdrawal from the nuclear deal on May 8, 2018.”
“Theoretically, an attempt of this sort is possible, but it will make the U.S. appear in an extremely unattractive light,” he added. “I don’t think that the U.N. Security Council members would be ready to support the U.S. bid to remain a JCPOA participant. It is clear to everybody that this is preposterous. … The attempt to implement this plan will cause a lot of harm and lead to stormy debates in the U.N. Security Council.”
Democratic lawmakers who supported the JCPOA chided the administration for withdrawing from it in the first place and then later trying to use the deal to advance its goals. “They’re trying to have it both ways,” one Democratic congressional aide said.
Nevertheless, a bipartisan majority in Congress—including some of Trump’s most stalwart critics on the left—supports extending the Iran arms embargo. Hundreds of House lawmakers from both sides signed on to a letter to Pompeo last month urging an extension of the ban. “[W]e are concerned that the ban’s expiration will lead to more states buying and selling weapons to and from Iran. … This could have disastrous consequences for U.S. national security and our regional allies,” read the letter, which was organized by Reps. Eliot Engel and Michael McCaul, the chairman and the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, respectively.
“It’s now just several months out where China, Russia, other countries from around the world can all sell significant conventional weapons systems to the Iranians in October of this year,” Pompeo told reporters in a briefing last week. “This isn’t far off. This isn’t some fantasy by conservatives. This is a reality.”
The 2015 Iran nuclear pact—the culmination of more than a decade of diplomatic efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear program—offered Tehran an end to crippling economic sanctions in exchange for limiting its nuclear activities and undertaking a set of verifiable commitments to assure the world it was not building nuclear weapons. It was signed by representatives of Britain, China, the European Union, Iran, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States.
Trump derided the nuclear pact—a signature foreign-policy achievement for President Barack Obama—as a flawed agreement that gave Iran access to billions of dollars that have since been used to fund Iranian-backed militias and to advance a ballistic missile program that could improve Iran’s ability in the future to deliver a nuclear payload. On May 8, 2018, Trump formally withdrew from the agreement and began a process of imposing a range of U.S. sanctions on Iran.
Despite European government efforts to circumvent those sanctions, European businesses have largely observed the U.S. measures, fearing their companies could be penalized and denied access to U.S. consumer financial markets.
Iran has insisted for years that it has never had any desire to build nuclear weapons, but U.S. and other intelligence agencies have long contended that Tehran had been secretly developing nuclear weapons for years. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that it had been working on a nuclear weapon design until at least 2009. But the IAEA also claimed that Iran had stopped its design work and was in compliance with its obligations under the nuclear pact until the United States reneged on the deal.
Iran subsequently stepped up activities at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, increasing stores of a more purified grade of uranium that could bring it close to producing weapons-grade fuel.
A year after the United States withdrew from the pact, Tehran began a process of violating its own commitments under the pact, announcing on May 8, 2019, that it would no longer be bound by limits on the size of its stockpiles of enriched uranium. Iran subsequently stepped up activities at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, increasing stores of a more purified grade of uranium that could bring it close to producing weapons-grade fuel. Iran also restarted prohibited research and development work on advanced centrifuges, which would enable the country to purify its uranium at a greater speed.
Under the terms of the nuclear pact, Iran is permitted to stockpile up to 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium, far short of the estimated 1,050 kilograms required to produce enough weapons-grade fuel for a single bomb. But in March, the IAEA reported that Iran had produced 1,021 kilograms of low-enriched uranium, making it all but certain it has enough raw uranium to build a bomb. If Iran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, according to Nephew, the larger stockpile would cut down its so-called breakout time—the time it would take to convert the low-enriched uranium into weapons-grade fuel—from 12 months to about six months.
But some arms control experts cautioned that Iran would still need to overcome considerable technical hurdles to weaponize and deploy a nuclear weapon. They suspect that Iran’s violations have been carefully calibrated to apply pressure on the other signatories of the nuclear pact to ease sanctions on Iran.
The Iranians’ “actions and statements indicate they are not racing to build a nuclear weapon or amass material for a nuclear weapon,” said Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association. “They are retaliating in a measured way to the U.S. reimposition of sanctions, and they have threatened to go further if the situation continues indefinitely.”
“They are retaliating in a measured way to the U.S. reimposition of sanctions, and they have threatened to go further if the situation continues indefinitely.”
In January, after Iran rejected any constraints on its enrichment of uranium, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany called out Iran for violating the terms of the nuclear pact and jointly triggered a so-called dispute settlement mechanism to press Tehran to come back into compliance or face the prospect of the Europeans declaring it in breach of its obligations—an action that would lead to the reimposition of sanctions. But the Europeans also faulted the United States for withdrawing from the nuclear accord and expressed their hopes that the initiative would compel Iran to reverse course.
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said at the time that the Europeans “could no longer leave the growing Iranian violations of the nuclear agreement unanswered.”
“Our goal is clear,” he said. “We want to preserve the accord and come to a diplomatic solution within the agreement.”
Richard Gowan, the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group, said Washington’s threat to trigger the snapback may be designed to “scare the Europeans into backing alternative ways to keep the arms embargo alive.”
Gowan said European diplomats had suspected that the United States might try to convince Britain to break with its European partners, declare Tehran in breach of its obligations, and trigger the snapback provision. “The fact the U.S. is making the case that it can still do snapback itself implies that the British option may not be available.”
“I am not sure there is a compromise available,” he added, noting that the Europeans may be paying as much attention as Trump to the U.S. election calendar. “The higher the chances of [Joe] Biden victory in November, the less likely the E3 [the three European signatories to the nuclear pact] will be to buy a U.S. snapback drive.”
Foreign Policy staff writer Robbie Gramer contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--Snap Poll: What Foreign-Policy Experts Make of Trump’s Coronavirus Response

In the three months since the novel coronavirus first appeared in the United States , the White House and state governments have struggled to contain its spread .
How has the United States ’ troubled public health response impacted its place on the world stage ?
And how has it affected U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s reelection prospects ?
To find out , the Teaching , Research , and International Policy project at William & Mary , in collaboration with Foreign Policy and with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York , surveyed international relations scholars at U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
These results are based on answers from the 982 scholars who responded to our invitation to participate in the survey .
( Complete results of the snap poll can be found here . )
International relations scholars were almost uniformly negative when rating Washington ’ s role in coordinating a global response to the pandemic .
Far from seeing the United States as a leader , 97 percent of participants say the United States has played a role that was “ not very effective ” or “ not effective at all.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be “ very effective.
” Respondents predict that the poor response to the pandemic will have a negative impact on the United States ’ international reputation , leading to a loss of respect for the country and a decline in both foreign leaders ’ and foreign publics ’ faith in the willingness of the United States to provide global public goods and honor its commitments .
On April 14 , Trump announced a 60-day freeze on U.S. funding to the World Health Organization .
The move was met with loud and sustained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and from U.S. allies abroad .
Scholars echo the criticism—only 1.6 percent support Trump ’ s decision to eliminate financial support for WHO .
Two-thirds believe the United States should increase financial support to WHO relative to pre-coronavirus levels .
Even though respondents support increased funding for WHO , they are decidedly mixed on their assessment of that body ’ s response to COVID-19 .
Thirty-seven percent of scholars rated WHO ’ s response “ not very effective ” or “ not effective at all , ” while a majority responded that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ together , these results might suggest that scholars believe the ineffectiveness of the WHO response could be related to a lack of funding .
Respondents were mixed on the capability of international health institutions to manage pandemics more generally .
Fewer than half felt such institutions were capable of mitigating the spread of disease , and a third were simply undecided .
These results , however , are an improvement from 2014 , when we asked the same question at the height of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa .
Then , only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capable ” or “ very capable.
” Even so , scholars now rate the international response to the coronavirus far below the approach to the Ebola response , suggesting history will ultimately be the judge of this pandemic .
The international relations scholars surveyed overwhelmingly prefer former Vice President Joe Biden as the next president .
Across all the election questions we ask , Biden trounces Trump .
A resounding 90 percent of scholars respond that they would vote for Biden if the upcoming election were held today , compared to 4.9 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reminiscent of a survey we fielded ahead of the 2016 election , when respondents were similarly unenthusiastic about voting for Trump .
That year , we asked scholars which presidential candidate ’ s foreign-policy views best reflected their own .
Eighty-two percent said Hillary Clinton compared to 3.8 percent who preferred Trump .
We also asked scholars whether each of the candidates would exercise good judgment as military commander in chief .
Overall , 88 percent of respondents believed that Biden would exercise good judgment , with 42 percent opting to “ strongly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Trump would not exercise good judgment in this role .
Again , these results mirror scholars ’ opinions in the last presidential election .
In 2016 , 95 percent of scholars responded that Trump would not exercise good judgment as commander in chief , while 86 percent believed that Clinton would exercise good judgment in this role .
Four years later , scholars remain supportive of the Democratic candidate for president and strongly agree that Trump lacks the judgment required for his role .
As the coronavirus pandemic rages on in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Biden extends to their belief in his ability to effectively manage the aftermath of that crisis , with 93 percent of scholars picking Biden over Trump .
Finally , we asked scholars how the United States should respond to the pandemic in terms of spending on various forms of assistance to developing countries .
Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that the United States should grow spending on health aid , with 88 percent responding “ increase ” and only 2 percent saying “ decrease.
” A majority of scholars agreed that both economic assistance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well .
The only area where scholars do not think the United States should increase spending is on military assistance : More than half believe there should be a decrease .

Emily B. Jackson, Eric Parajon, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers and Michael J. Tierney

U.S. President Donald Trump takes questions from reporters during a news conference on the coronavirus in the Rose Garden of the White House on April 27. MANDEL NGAN/AFP via Getty Images
In the three months since the novel coronavirus first appeared in the United States, the White House and state governments have struggled to contain its spread. How has the United States’ troubled public health response impacted its place on the world stage? And how has it affected U.S. President Donald Trump’s reelection prospects? To find out, the Teaching, Research, and International Policy project at William & Mary, in collaboration with Foreign Policy and with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, surveyed international relations scholars at U.S. universities in the first week of May. These results are based on answers from the 982 scholars who responded to our invitation to participate in the survey. (Complete results of the snap poll can be found here.)
International Perceptions
International relations scholars were almost uniformly negative when rating Washington’s role in coordinating a global response to the pandemic. Far from seeing the United States as a leader, 97 percent of participants say the United States has played a role that was “not very effective” or “not effective at all.” Only 0.7 percent found the United States to be “very effective.”
Respondents predict that the poor response to the pandemic will have a negative impact on the United States’ international reputation, leading to a loss of respect for the country and a decline in both foreign leaders’ and foreign publics’ faith in the willingness of the United States to provide global public goods and honor its commitments.
The World Health Organization
On April 14, Trump announced a 60-day freeze on U.S. funding to the World Health Organization. The move was met with loud and sustained criticism from Democrats in the United States and from U.S. allies abroad. Scholars echo the criticism—only 1.6 percent support Trump’s decision to eliminate financial support for WHO. Two-thirds believe the United States should increase financial support to WHO relative to pre-coronavirus levels.
Even though respondents support increased funding for WHO, they are decidedly mixed on their assessment of that body’s response to COVID-19. Thirty-seven percent of scholars rated WHO’s response “not very effective” or “not effective at all,” while a majority responded that the organization was “somewhat effective.” Taken together, these results might suggest that scholars believe the ineffectiveness of the WHO response could be related to a lack of funding.
Global Cooperation
Respondents were mixed on the capability of international health institutions to manage pandemics more generally. Fewer than half felt such institutions were capable of mitigating the spread of disease, and a third were simply undecided.
These results, however, are an improvement from 2014, when we asked the same question at the height of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. Then, only 34 percent rated international institutions as “capable” or “very capable.” Even so, scholars now rate the international response to the coronavirus far below the approach to the Ebola response, suggesting history will ultimately be the judge of this pandemic.
2020 Election
The international relations scholars surveyed overwhelmingly prefer former Vice President Joe Biden as the next president. Across all the election questions we ask, Biden trounces Trump. A resounding 90 percent of scholars respond that they would vote for Biden if the upcoming election were held today, compared to 4.9 percent who pick Trump.
These results are reminiscent of a survey we fielded ahead of the 2016 election, when respondents were similarly unenthusiastic about voting for Trump. That year, we asked scholars which presidential candidate’s foreign-policy views best reflected their own. Eighty-two percent said Hillary Clinton compared to 3.8 percent who preferred Trump.
We also asked scholars whether each of the candidates would exercise good judgment as military commander in chief. Overall, 88 percent of respondents believed that Biden would exercise good judgment, with 42 percent opting to “strongly agree.” Ninety-two percent of scholars responded that Trump would not exercise good judgment in this role.
Again, these results mirror scholars’ opinions in the last presidential election. In 2016, 95 percent of scholars responded that Trump would not exercise good judgment as commander in chief, while 86 percent believed that Clinton would exercise good judgment in this role. Four years later, scholars remain supportive of the Democratic candidate for president and strongly agree that Trump lacks the judgment required for his role.
As the coronavirus pandemic rages on in the United States, the scholars’ preference for Biden extends to their belief in his ability to effectively manage the aftermath of that crisis, with 93 percent of scholars picking Biden over Trump.
Global Assistance
Finally, we asked scholars how the United States should respond to the pandemic in terms of spending on various forms of assistance to developing countries. Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that the United States should grow spending on health aid, with 88 percent responding “increase” and only 2 percent saying “decrease.” A majority of scholars agreed that both economic assistance and refugee assistance should be increased as well. The only area where scholars do not think the United States should increase spending is on military assistance: More than half believe there should be a decrease.