foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--Biden Camp Tries to Walk Fine Line on China

Biden Camp Tries to Walk Fine Line on China In May , representatives of progressive Asian American organizations held a virtual meeting with Joe Biden ’ s camp to raise concern about the Democratic candidate ’ s China policy , in particular his efforts to demonstrate he was tougher on Beijing than President Donald Trump , which risked exposing Chinese Americans to backlash .
The meeting , which was described by three people familiar with it , followed the airing in April of a political ad by the Biden campaign titled “ Unprepared , ” denouncing Trump as weak on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ having “ rolled over for the Chinese ” and letting 40,000 travelers from China into the country after he imposed a flight ban in response to the coronavirus—provoked anger and dismay among progressive Democrats and Asian American advocates , who felt it risked fomenting anti-Chinese sentiment .
“ We made our concerns clear and communicated very strongly that we wanted to see the campaign stop using this xenophobic and anti-China rhetoric , ” said one person present at the meeting with Amit Jani , who serves as the Asian American Pacific Islander outreach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ It was clear we were not the first group to raise this concern.
” The Biden campaign offered no guarantees .
But it did respond to the appeal—which followed the publication of a letter by Asian American groups criticizing Biden ’ s ad—by slightly softening its approach in subsequent ads .
Instead of highlighting Trump ’ s apparent acquiescence to China , the new ads criticized his weakness in challenging the Chinese Communist Party and President Xi Jinping .
They also stopped promoting the claim that Trump allowed tens of thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
But some Asian American advocates say Biden hasn ’ t gone far enough .
“ The Biden campaign has responded to concerns we and others have raised and dialed down the tone of the most inflammatory rhetoric in the original ad , ” said Tobita Chow , the director of Justice Is Global , a Chicago-based advocacy group .
“ Even so , the whole messaging strategy of trying to compete to prove who is tougher is going to continue to feed into this rise of anti-Asian racism .
And it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S.-China relationship.
” “ It is clear that Biden ’ s choice is to double down on this [ anti-China ] messaging , ” added Grace Pai , the director of movement politics for Asian American Midwest Progressives , who helped organize the letter-writing effort .
“ The strategy of going to war with the Trump camp over China is still consistent.
” An informal advisor to the Biden campaign told Foreign Policy that the former vice president is clear-eyed about the need to coexist with China and to work together to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effort to curb greenhouse gas emissions that fuel global warming to containing the coronavirus and convincing North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program .
But the advisor said Biden will continue to call out China on a number of issues , including its mass incarceration of Muslim Uighurs , its suppression of information about the coronavirus , and its promotion of unfair trade practices .
“ I don ’ t think anyone wants a knife fight , ” the advisor said .
“ I don ’ t get the sense that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bottom on who can be tougher on China .
But Trump has been very much standing with Xi , and so this is something that of course the vice president would be focused on.
” The Biden camp is trying to walk a fine line between accommodating an important , growing constituency and mounting a forceful campaign against a president who portrays the former vice president as weak and ineffectual in the face of a rising China that poses a threat to U.S. national security , according to sources close to the campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Democratic and Republican parties have been rethinking the wisdom of a long-standing bipartisan policy of engagement with China that dates back to President Richard Nixon ’ s 1972 visit to the country .
China hawks in the Trump administration , including U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer , have advocated a broader decoupling of the U.S. economy from China ’ s , arguing that decades of economic integration have resulted in the loss of U.S. jobs and intellectual property .
That effort—which includes a reduction in U.S. imports through tariffs—has accelerated as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dependence the United States has on Chinese supply chains .
Influential foreign-policy experts in the Democratic camp—including Ely Ratner , Kurt Campbell , and Jake Sullivan , a senior advisor to Biden—have also advocated a tougher line on China , arguing in a series of essays and public statements that U.S. engagement policy has failed to shape China ’ s rise as a responsible global partner .
“ Although Washington remains bitterly divided on most issues , there is a growing consensus that the era of engagement with China has come to an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrote last fall in Foreign Affairs .
“ The debate now is over what comes next.
” “ China has managed to secure some tactical gains , ” Sullivan told Foreign Policy , citing the U.S. withdrawal from key international agencies , including the World Health Organization .
“ That vacuum that Washington leaves gets filled by Beijing.
” “ I think China is positioning itself to take advantage of fiscal and debt crises around the world to continue to expand their economic influence , ” he added .
But “ an authoritarian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extreme set of policies to keep its own people in line is not going to be very attractive to the rest of the world.
” In a separate interview with Reuters , Sullivan said Biden will continue to draw attention to what he views as Trump ’ s weak approach to China , citing the president ’ s unjustified praise of Xi ’ s initial response to the coronavirus outbreak and his alienation of key allies who will be critical partners in checking China ’ s global dominance .
“ The vice president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump accountable for a catastrophic set of failures in his approach to China , and a colossal gap between tough talk and weak action , ” Sullivan said .
Still , the Biden campaign has been sensitive to the criticism that some of its past statements might cause problems for Asian Americans .
On May 27 , Biden and Sen. Tammy Duckworth wrote an op-ed for NBC News underscoring the threat to Asian Americans under Trump , saying the group have been “ needlessly , cruelly scapegoated by the most powerful man on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who has racialized the pandemic and stoked xenophobia every time he ’ s uttered the term ‘ Chinese virus.
’ “ No insult , no insinuation — even when it comes from the president in the middle of the Rose Garden telling an Asian American reporter to ‘ ask China ’ — can change the fact that Asian Americans are just as American as anyone else lucky enough to be a daughter or a son of the United States , ” wrote Biden and Duckworth , who is Thai American and a U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Biden has highlighted his long experience negotiating with China ’ s leadership and portrayed the country as an untrustworthy powerhouse that needs to be contained by a coalition of democratic governments .
He claimed that Beijing has unfairly subsidized state-owned enterprises , giving them a “ leg up on dominating the technologies and industries of the future.
” “ The United States does need to get tough with China , ” Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs earlier this year .
“ If China has its way , it will keep robbing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technology and intellectual property.
” But he has also made clear that the United States will work with China and other countries on a number of issues , from the international effort to dismantle North Korea ’ s nuclear weapons program to the negotiation of “ enforceable commitments ” to reduce emissions in global shipping and aviation .
“ The most effective way to meet that challenge is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China ’ s abusive behaviors and human rights violations , even as we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where our interests converge , such as climate change , nonproliferation , and global health security , ” Biden wrote .
For Chow , such talk underscored the degree to which both parties have taken “ a sharply negative and hawkish turn against China , ” a reflection , he said , of the enduring power of the idea of American exceptionalism .
There is “ a belief that the United States must remain the world ’ s sole superpower , that the U.S. needs to retain the ability to dominate every other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ added .
Chow contends that the majority of U.S. voters would rather see the United States and China cooperate on global issues , including climate change and the pandemic , rather than seeking confrontation .
“ We need U.S.-China cooperation to meet the urgent needs of Americans and humanity in general , ” he added .
“ Instead , what we still have is both parties trying to compete for the title of who is going to be tougher on China .
I think that is counterproductive.
” The debate coincides with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two months after March 19 , 1,843 reports of anti-Asian discrimination were documented by Stop AAPI Hate , a reporting center created by San Francisco State University and two advocacy groups , including verbal harassment , workplace discrimination , and physical assault .
One respondent recalled being called “ Chinese coronavirus ” while waiting in line for fast food .
“ The young man spit and pretended to cough .
I was with my sister , an RN [ registered nurse ] who was getting a [ health ] hero meal , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a dilemma for Biden , and his campaign team appears to be struggling to find the right balance to strike .
Does he continue to call out Trump—who has portrayed him as weak on China—for hypocrisy , drawing attention to the president ’ s frequent , and ultimately false , public pronouncements back in January that China had been transparent in informing the world about the risk of the virus spreading beyond its borders ?
Or should he spend most of the campaign taking the high road and concentrate on highlighting the importance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global challenges , from fighting the pandemic to stalling the pace of climate change ?
“ There is a legitimate and powerful way to attack Trump on China without attacking Chinese Americans or Asian Americans , ” said Chris Lu , who served as an advisor to President Barack Obama .
Lu , who is not an official member of the Biden campaign , spoke to Foreign Policy at the request of campaign officials .
“ If you ask people in the Asian American and Chinese American community , the greater concern is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ and the troubling increase in racially motivated attacks , ” Lu added .
There appears to be little risk that Asian Americans—the fastest-growing racial or ethnic group in the U.S. electorate—will vote in large numbers for Trump , who has demonized American immigrant groups in general and has potentially fostered a rise in attacks against Chinese Americans and other Asian Americans by seeking to classify the coronavirus as the “ Chinese virus.
” But some Asian American supporters of Biden have expressed concern that an anti-China political campaign could inspire hate crimes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Many Asian American organizations that are working to turn out our Asian American voters are deeply concerned about how this rhetoric will depress turnout , ” Pai said .
“ We are working to defeat Trump , and Biden ’ s campaign is not helping us achieve that goal.
” Even some Asian American commentators , however , suggest Biden would be foolish to sit back and allow Trump to define him as soft on America ’ s biggest strategic competitor .
“ Campaigns are tough ; they are messy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ points in a campaign , ” Lu said .
“ Trying to refute Donald Trump with subtlety is probably not a winning strategy.
” More broadly , the Biden campaign is focused on promoting human rights , pushing back against authoritarianism , and underscoring the importance of rebuilding relations with U.S. allies , many of whom have been subject to economic , diplomatic , and military bullying by China , the informal advisor to Biden ’ s campaign added .
“ Those issues have to be addressed and called out , ” the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spoke on condition of anonymity , said Trump has attacked and alienated key allies , in Europe and beyond , whose backing is essential to preserving America ’ s influence and to pushing back on Chinese efforts to dominate the global market on future technologies—from 5G to artificial intelligence—and to flex its muscles in Hong Kong , Taiwan , and the South China Sea .
“ This campaign is not about China-bashing .
It is about how to [ recover ] the leverage that we have lost , how to rebuild those relationships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make the U.S. stronger , more credible , and more influential .
”

In May, representatives of progressive Asian American organizations held a virtual meeting with Joe Biden’s camp to raise concern about the Democratic candidate’s China policy, in particular his efforts to demonstrate he was tougher on Beijing than President Donald Trump, which risked exposing Chinese Americans to backlash.
In May, representatives of progressive Asian American organizations held a virtual meeting with Joe Biden’s camp to raise concern about the Democratic candidate’s China policy, in particular his efforts to demonstrate he was tougher on Beijing than President Donald Trump, which risked exposing Chinese Americans to backlash.
The meeting, which was described by three people familiar with it, followed the airing in April of a political ad by the Biden campaign titled “Unprepared,” denouncing Trump as weak on China. The ad—which faulted Trump for having “rolled over for the Chinese” and letting 40,000 travelers from China into the country after he imposed a flight ban in response to the coronavirus—provoked anger and dismay among progressive Democrats and Asian American advocates, who felt it risked fomenting anti-Chinese sentiment.
“We made our concerns clear and communicated very strongly that we wanted to see the campaign stop using this xenophobic and anti-China rhetoric,” said one person present at the meeting with Amit Jani, who serves as the Asian American Pacific Islander outreach director on Biden’s campaign. “It was clear we were not the first group to raise this concern.”
The Biden campaign offered no guarantees. But it did respond to the appeal—which followed the publication of a letter by Asian American groups criticizing Biden’s ad—by slightly softening its approach in subsequent ads. Instead of highlighting Trump’s apparent acquiescence to China, the new ads criticized his weakness in challenging the Chinese Communist Party and President Xi Jinping. They also stopped promoting the claim that Trump allowed tens of thousands of potentially infected travelers from China into the country.
But some Asian American advocates say Biden hasn’t gone far enough.
“The Biden campaign has responded to concerns we and others have raised and dialed down the tone of the most inflammatory rhetoric in the original ad,” said Tobita Chow, the director of Justice Is Global, a Chicago-based advocacy group. “Even so, the whole messaging strategy of trying to compete to prove who is tougher is going to continue to feed into this rise of anti-Asian racism. And it’s going to continue to poison the U.S.-China relationship.”
“It is clear that Biden’s choice is to double down on this [anti-China] messaging,” added Grace Pai, the director of movement politics for Asian American Midwest Progressives, who helped organize the letter-writing effort. “The strategy of going to war with the Trump camp over China is still consistent.”
An informal advisor to the Biden campaign told Foreign Policy that the former vice president is clear-eyed about the need to coexist with China and to work together to resolve pressing global challenges, from the effort to curb greenhouse gas emissions that fuel global warming to containing the coronavirus and convincing North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. But the advisor said Biden will continue to call out China on a number of issues, including its mass incarceration of Muslim Uighurs, its suppression of information about the coronavirus, and its promotion of unfair trade practices.
“I don’t think anyone wants a knife fight,” the advisor said. “I don’t get the sense that the vice president wants a race to the bottom on who can be tougher on China. But Trump has been very much standing with Xi, and so this is something that of course the vice president would be focused on.”
Biden and then-Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping talk during an expanded bilateral meeting with other U.S. and Chinese officials at the White House in Washington on Feb. 14, 2012.
The Biden camp is trying to walk a fine line between accommodating an important, growing constituency and mounting a forceful campaign against a president who portrays the former vice president as weak and ineffectual in the face of a rising China that poses a threat to U.S. national security, according to sources close to the campaign.
The controversy comes as key strategists in the Democratic and Republican parties have been rethinking the wisdom of a long-standing bipartisan policy of engagement with China that dates back to President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to the country.
China hawks in the Trump administration, including U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, have advocated a broader decoupling of the U.S. economy from China’s, arguing that decades of economic integration have resulted in the loss of U.S. jobs and intellectual property. That effort—which includes a reduction in U.S. imports through tariffs—has accelerated as the pandemic has exposed the degree of dependence the United States has on Chinese supply chains.
Influential foreign-policy experts in the Democratic camp—including Ely Ratner, Kurt Campbell, and Jake Sullivan, a senior advisor to Biden—have also advocated a tougher line on China, arguing in a series of essays and public statements that U.S. engagement policy has failed to shape China’s rise as a responsible global partner.
“Although Washington remains bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close,” Campbell and Sullivan wrote last fall in Foreign Affairs. “The debate now is over what comes next.”
“China has managed to secure some tactical gains,” Sullivan told Foreign Policy, citing the U.S. withdrawal from key international agencies, including the World Health Organization. “That vacuum that Washington leaves gets filled by Beijing.”
“I think China is positioning itself to take advantage of fiscal and debt crises around the world to continue to expand their economic influence,” he added. But “an authoritarian regime that relies on repression and an extreme set of policies to keep its own people in line is not going to be very attractive to the rest of the world.”
In a separate interview with Reuters, Sullivan said Biden will continue to draw attention to what he views as Trump’s weak approach to China, citing the president’s unjustified praise of Xi’s initial response to the coronavirus outbreak and his alienation of key allies who will be critical partners in checking China’s global dominance.
“The vice president intends to do two things: hold Trump accountable for a catastrophic set of failures in his approach to China, and a colossal gap between tough talk and weak action,” Sullivan said.
Still, the Biden campaign has been sensitive to the criticism that some of its past statements might cause problems for Asian Americans. On May 27, Biden and Sen. Tammy Duckworth wrote an op-ed for NBC News underscoring the threat to Asian Americans under Trump, saying the group have been “needlessly, cruelly scapegoated by the most powerful man on the planet, President Donald Trump, who has racialized the pandemic and stoked xenophobia every time he’s uttered the term ‘Chinese virus.’
“No insult, no insinuation — even when it comes from the president in the middle of the Rose Garden telling an Asian American reporter to ‘ask China’ — can change the fact that Asian Americans are just as American as anyone else lucky enough to be a daughter or a son of the United States,” wrote Biden and Duckworth, who is Thai American and a U.S. Army veteran.
In his public writings, Biden has highlighted his long experience negotiating with China’s leadership and portrayed the country as an untrustworthy powerhouse that needs to be contained by a coalition of democratic governments. He claimed that Beijing has unfairly subsidized state-owned enterprises, giving them a “leg up on dominating the technologies and industries of the future.”
“The United States does need to get tough with China,” Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs earlier this year. “If China has its way, it will keep robbing the United States and American companies of their technology and intellectual property.”
But he has also made clear that the United States will work with China and other countries on a number of issues, from the international effort to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program to the negotiation of “enforceable commitments” to reduce emissions in global shipping and aviation.
“The most effective way to meet that challenge is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviors and human rights violations, even as we seek to cooperate with Beijing on issues where our interests converge, such as climate change, nonproliferation, and global health security,” Biden wrote.
For Chow, such talk underscored the degree to which both parties have taken “a sharply negative and hawkish turn against China,” a reflection, he said, of the enduring power of the idea of American exceptionalism. There is “a belief that the United States must remain the world’s sole superpower, that the U.S. needs to retain the ability to dominate every other part of the planet,” he added.
Chow contends that the majority of U.S. voters would rather see the United States and China cooperate on global issues, including climate change and the pandemic, rather than seeking confrontation. “We need U.S.-China cooperation to meet the urgent needs of Americans and humanity in general,” he added. “Instead, what we still have is both parties trying to compete for the title of who is going to be tougher on China. I think that is counterproductive.”
The debate coincides with a flurry of anti-Asian attacks. In the two months after March 19, 1,843 reports of anti-Asian discrimination were documented by Stop AAPI Hate, a reporting center created by San Francisco State University and two advocacy groups, including verbal harassment, workplace discrimination, and physical assault.
One respondent recalled being called “Chinese coronavirus” while waiting in line for fast food. “The young man spit and pretended to cough. I was with my sister, an RN [registered nurse] who was getting a [health] hero meal, and my 6-year-old son.”
The criticism presents a dilemma for Biden, and his campaign team appears to be struggling to find the right balance to strike. Does he continue to call out Trump—who has portrayed him as weak on China—for hypocrisy, drawing attention to the president’s frequent, and ultimately false, public pronouncements back in January that China had been transparent in informing the world about the risk of the virus spreading beyond its borders? Or should he spend most of the campaign taking the high road and concentrate on highlighting the importance of U.S.-Chinese cooperation on a number of global challenges, from fighting the pandemic to stalling the pace of climate change?
“There is a legitimate and powerful way to attack Trump on China without attacking Chinese Americans or Asian Americans,” said Chris Lu, who served as an advisor to President Barack Obama. Lu, who is not an official member of the Biden campaign, spoke to Foreign Policy at the request of campaign officials. “If you ask people in the Asian American and Chinese American community, the greater concern is Trump talking about the ‘Chinese virus’ and the troubling increase in racially motivated attacks,” Lu added.
There appears to be little risk that Asian Americans—the fastest-growing racial or ethnic group in the U.S. electorate—will vote in large numbers for Trump, who has demonized American immigrant groups in general and has potentially fostered a rise in attacks against Chinese Americans and other Asian Americans by seeking to classify the coronavirus as the “Chinese virus.”
But some Asian American supporters of Biden have expressed concern that an anti-China political campaign could inspire hate crimes and affect Asian American voting in November. “Many Asian American organizations that are working to turn out our Asian American voters are deeply concerned about how this rhetoric will depress turnout,” Pai said. “We are working to defeat Trump, and Biden’s campaign is not helping us achieve that goal.”
Even some Asian American commentators, however, suggest Biden would be foolish to sit back and allow Trump to define him as soft on America’s biggest strategic competitor.
“Campaigns are tough; they are messy. Subtlety doesn’t win you any points in a campaign,” Lu said. “Trying to refute Donald Trump with subtlety is probably not a winning strategy.”
More broadly, the Biden campaign is focused on promoting human rights, pushing back against authoritarianism, and underscoring the importance of rebuilding relations with U.S. allies, many of whom have been subject to economic, diplomatic, and military bullying by China, the informal advisor to Biden’s campaign added. “Those issues have to be addressed and called out,” the advisor said.
The advisor, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Trump has attacked and alienated key allies, in Europe and beyond, whose backing is essential to preserving America’s influence and to pushing back on Chinese efforts to dominate the global market on future technologies—from 5G to artificial intelligence—and to flex its muscles in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.
“This campaign is not about China-bashing. It is about how to [recover] the leverage that we have lost, how to rebuild those relationships with allies and do those things that make the U.S. stronger, more credible, and more influential.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--Coronavirus Cases Are Rising Globally—and Poor Countries Are Worst Off

Coronavirus Cases Are Rising Globally—and Poor Countries Are Worst Off The coronavirus pandemic has brutally exposed existing inequalities in the world ’ s wealthiest nations .
In the United States , black people—whose household wealth is a 10th that of their white counterparts—are dying at more than double the rate of white Americans .
In England , the COVID-19 death rate was more than twice as high in the poorest parts of the country than in its wealthiest areas .
But inequality is also playing out on a global scale .
As wealthier countries cautiously reopen their economies after having @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the developing world are recording progressively higher numbers of new daily cases .
In Suriname and Nepal , for example , total cases are doubling every week .
And as countries such as Germany and South Korea have shown , a high rate of testing—along with contact tracing and a well-resourced public health system—is the key to a robust coronavirus response .
Foreign Policy ’ s analysis of global testing data shows a strong correlation between a country ’ s wealth and its ability to test its population for the coronavirus .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ income bands commonly used by the World Bank helps make the gulf in testing clear .
Countries classified as “ high income , ” such as Germany and Japan , have a gross national income ( GNI ) per capita of $ 12,376 or higher .
Citizens of “ upper-middle-income ” countries , such as Turkey and China , have average incomes between $ 3,996 and $ 12,375 ; average salaries in “ lower-middle-income ” countries range between $ 1,026 and $ 3,995 ; and “ low-income ” countries have a GNI per @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Poorer countries have conducted far fewer coronavirus tests than rich countries , as the chart below shows .
China is not included in these figures as its decentralized health system does not report national testing numbers .
( Publicly reported numbers from provinces show at least 27 million people have been tested in Hubei and Guangdong . )
Even if China ’ s relatively high testing figures were included , it wouldn ’ t change the stark reality : The world ’ s richest countries have tested a far higher proportion of their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ income levels have barely scratched the surface .
As the chart below shows , the richest countries have a testing rate 40 times higher than the world ’ s poorest .
Countries at the very bottom of these charts have real cause to worry .
In Yemen , where the country ’ s health infrastructure was already largely destroyed by an going war , the medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières ( MSF ) has attempted to draw attention to the high number of coronavirus cases going under the radar .
“ What we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of the number of people infected and dying in Aden , ” Caroline Seguin , MSF ’ s operations manager for Yemen , said in a May 21 press release .
“ People are coming to us too late to save , and we know that many more people are not coming at all : they are just dying at home .
It is a heartbreaking situation.
” One question , then , is why international organizations haven ’ t been able to bridge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New York Times in April revealed a shady world of backroom dealing as rich countries attempted to strong-arm their way to the front of the line for testing equipment .
Those early moves mean that poorer countries now face order backlogs lasting months .
The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention has attempted to address this gap with a promise of 10 million new tests , but even that would cover less than 1 percent of the continent ’ s population .
The World Health Organization ( WHO ) is also working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Global Humanitarian Response Plan released by WHO calls for $ 6.7 billion in funding to “ stave off the most debilitating effects of the pandemic in 63 low and middle-income countries , ” including by providing testing equipment .

The coronavirus pandemic has brutally exposed existing inequalities in the world’s wealthiest nations. In the United States, black people—whose household wealth is a 10th that of their white counterparts—are dying at more than double the rate of white Americans. In England, the COVID-19 death rate was more than twice as high in the poorest parts of the country than in its wealthiest areas.
The coronavirus pandemic has brutally exposed existing inequalities in the world’s wealthiest nations. In the United States, black people—whose household wealth is a 10th that of their white counterparts—are dying at more than double the rate of white Americans. In England, the COVID-19 death rate was more than twice as high in the poorest parts of the country than in its wealthiest areas.
But inequality is also playing out on a global scale. As wealthier countries cautiously reopen their economies after having slowed their rates of infection, countries in the developing world are recording progressively higher numbers of new daily cases. In Suriname and Nepal, for example, total cases are doubling every week. And as countries such as Germany and South Korea have shown, a high rate of testing—along with contact tracing and a well-resourced public health system—is the key to a robust coronavirus response. Foreign Policy’s analysis of global testing data shows a strong correlation between a country’s wealth and its ability to test its population for the coronavirus.
Breaking up the world into the four income bands commonly used by the World Bank helps make the gulf in testing clear. Countries classified as “high income,” such as Germany and Japan, have a gross national income (GNI) per capita of $12,376 or higher. Citizens of “upper-middle-income” countries, such as Turkey and China, have average incomes between $3,996 and $12,375; average salaries in “lower-middle-income” countries range between $1,026 and $3,995; and “low-income” countries have a GNI per capita of $1,025 or less.
Poorer countries have conducted far fewer coronavirus tests than rich countries, as the chart below shows.
China is not included in these figures as its decentralized health system does not report national testing numbers. (Publicly reported numbers from provinces show at least 27 million people have been tested in Hubei and Guangdong.) Even if China’s relatively high testing figures were included, it wouldn’t change the stark reality: The world’s richest countries have tested a far higher proportion of their populations, while those at lower average income levels have barely scratched the surface. As the chart below shows, the richest countries have a testing rate 40 times higher than the world’s poorest.
Countries at the very bottom of these charts have real cause to worry. In Yemen, where the country’s health infrastructure was already largely destroyed by an going war, the medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has attempted to draw attention to the high number of coronavirus cases going under the radar. “What we are seeing in our COVID-19 treatment center is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of the number of people infected and dying in Aden,” Caroline Seguin, MSF’s operations manager for Yemen, said in a May 21 press release. “People are coming to us too late to save, and we know that many more people are not coming at all: they are just dying at home. It is a heartbreaking situation.”
One question, then, is why international organizations haven’t been able to bridge these disparities. An investigation by the New York Times in April revealed a shady world of backroom dealing as rich countries attempted to strong-arm their way to the front of the line for testing equipment. Those early moves mean that poorer countries now face order backlogs lasting months.
The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention has attempted to address this gap with a promise of 10 million new tests, but even that would cover less than 1 percent of the continent’s population.
The World Health Organization (WHO) is also working to tackle the imbalance among countries. The Global Humanitarian Response Plan released by WHO calls for $6.7 billion in funding to “stave off the most debilitating effects of the pandemic in 63 low and middle-income countries,” including by providing testing equipment.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--U.S. Begins Iraq Talks With One Eye on Graft

U.S. Begins Iraq Talks With One Eye on Graft The Trump administration is worried that Iraq is falling short on human rights obligations to detainees and is hampered by widespread corruption , according to a State Department assessment obtained by Foreign Policy , as the United States kicks off talks on Thursday that will help determine the future of the U.S. presence in the war-torn country .
As thousands of Islamic State prisoners sit in lengthy and sometimes undocumented pretrial detention that may pose constitutional questions , the Iraqi legal system is bogged down by an insufficient number of judges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of bribes , a snapshot of Iraq ’ s corruption challenges that kicked off widespread anti-government protests last year .
Iraq ’ s “ security situation and political history have left the judiciary weak and dependent on other parts of the government , ” said the State Department report sent to Congress in April .
“ Iraq ’ s judiciary suffers from the same endemic corruption that affects the rest of the Iraqi government.
” Former U.S. officials also say there is increasing pressure on Iraq ahead of the dialogue to better protect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that killed the Iranian military leader Qassem Suleimani in January led to a spate of Iran-backed mortar and rocket attacks on American troops .
The threat of attacks led U.S. troops to pull out of three outlying Iraqi bases in March .
But former officials say President Donald Trump ’ s administration may be forced to temper its expectations for reforms as it moves forward from the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue on Thursday .
At the beginning of the year , the now-digital gathering might have been front-page news in the United States .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ international headlines , tit-for-tat attacks broke out between the United States and Iran inside Iraq over the death of an American contractor in a suspected Iran-backed rocket attack that culminated in a Pentagon drone strike that killed Suleimani .
Thursday ’ s function was not staffed at the highest levels .
Iraq ’ s Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi , who only took office a month ago , did not attend the talks , and on Wednesday he traveled to Mosul to mark the Islamic State ’ s sacking of the city that became @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The discussions are being led by the agency ’ s No .
3 official , David Hale .
The virus-induced venue will make it difficult for the United States to make progress on Iraq ’ s imports of Iranian natural gas , for which the Trump administration has reluctantly granted sanctions waivers , and the future role of 5,200 American troops who are in the country only at the invitation of the prime minister .
“ My fear is that the expectation is set that we ’ re going to walk away @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a firm agreement on a residual presence and major deals on flaring gas , ” said one former U.S. official , referring to the burn-off of natural gas that costs the Iraqi government billions of dollars in lost revenue each year .
“ That ’ s just not going to happen.
” Even as a U.S.-led coalition drove the Islamic State from Mosul three years ago and winnowed the militant group ’ s territorial holdings to near-zero , Islamic State attacks have scaled up in recent months as Iraq has become a primary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ James Jeffrey , the Trump administration ’ s special envoy to the anti-Islamic State coalition , cautioned that attacks often spike regardless during the holy month of Ramadan , which ended in late May .
But Iraq ’ s justice system also bears the scars of the Islamic State ’ s reign , according to the State Department assessment .
Baghdad is beset by a lack of capable judges and is accused of holding Islamic State-linked suspects in pretrial isolation for months at a time without contact with the outside world .
Human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraqi authorities are holding 20,000 prisoners with suspected ties to the Islamic State .
Nongovernmental organizations cited in the assessment , mandated by Congress in last year ’ s appropriations bill , have said that detainees are constrained in their ability to challenge their arrests and are often forced to pay bribes to get charges dropped .
Though the State Department is concerned about the status of Iraqi reforms , some in Congress see the dialogue as a chance for getting back on solid footing with Baghdad as tensions with Iran appear to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States should use the Strategic Dialogue as a fresh start to engage with Iraq ’ s new government to create long-term stability in the country , ” Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy , a member of the foreign relations committee , told Foreign Policy in a statement .
“ The Trump administration too often treats Iraqi policy as a blunt appendage of their counter-Iran strategy.
” Murphy , who has pushed back strongly against the State Department ’ s drawdown of diplomatic personnel , said that the talks represented an opportunity to hold Prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fire on tackling corruption and bringing prosperity to a nation wracked by years of war .
“ These are lofty goals that will require sustained diplomatic attention and U.S. dollars , but they are critical to long-term U.S. national security and regional stability , ” he said .
But as rockets landed in Baghdad ’ s Green Zone for the first time in months ahead of the talks overnight on Thursday , the United States appears to be no closer to restoring its eroding diplomatic presence .
Foreign Policy reported in December 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to reduce the number of diplomats on the ground in Iraq by 28 percent , including cuts to the Baghdad embassy .
According to a State Department report sent to Congress in February and obtained by Foreign Policy , the agency does not plan to resume activities at the U.S. consulate in Basra , Iraq ’ s second-largest city and main port , that was shuttered in September 2018 amid Iran-backed rocket fire .
“ We do not foresee the security situation in southern Iraq improving in a way that would permit resumption @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 , ” the report said .
“ Maintaining a diplomatic presence in Basrah at this time would involve an unacceptable level of risk to our personnel.
” David Schenker , the State Department ’ s top Middle East official , said Thursday that the Iraqi government renewed its commitment to protect U.S. and international troops during the talks , even as the Trump administration looks at troop cuts .
“ We are looking at possible force reductions , ” Schenker told reporters on Thursday .
Furthering American frustrations , Iraq ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Popular Mobilization Forces in check , despite U.S. requests .
“ Iran-aligned PMF militias frequently ignore government orders , including court orders , further complicating efforts to provide judicial oversight of their activities , ” the State Department reported to Congress in April , using an acronym for the group .
Corruption fears prompted widespread anti-government street protests last year that took a violent turn when authorities began firing on demonstrators .
But the movement has not produced meaningful reforms .
The Iraqi government has not yet enacted draft legislation to bar illegal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holding office .
U.S. Embassy contacts “ have reported threat of prosecution for corruption or other crimes ” is being used by Iran-aligned parties to extort politicians , according to the State Department report .
Former U.S. officials say the ability of the United States and Europe to help fight corruption is limited , despite years of technical assistance from the West .
“ So many of these issues are things that the Iraqis have got to do themselves .
You have a ghost army and a ghost civil service that ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources , ” said Barbara Leaf , who served as U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates during the Obama and Trump administrations .
“ Corruption is just a cancer on the state at this point.
” Yet the Trump administration could risk putting too much pressure on Kadhimi over the presence of Iran-backed militias and importing natural gas from Tehran , as the fledgling prime minister faces a financial crunch and lacks the political capital to take on more entrenched political groups .
“ They don ’ t have money to pay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two , ” the former U.S. official told Foreign Policy .
“ The idea that he can take on the … [ PMF ] and the Fatah party and he can take on the Kurds and the Sadrists , that ’ s just delusional right now.
” The U.S. drone strike that killed Suleimani at Baghdad Airport led then-Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi to back a nonbinding vote in the Iraqi parliament to eject the 5,200 American troops who are in the country to fight the remnants of the Islamic State .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have cooled in the ensuing months as the coronavirus pandemic has ravaged the nation ’ s health care system and Saudi Arabia ’ s oil price war with Russia has put downward pressure on Baghdad ’ s biggest source of export revenue .
“ The political parties realize that without [ the ] U.S. , they can not get any financial and economic benefits from the West , ” said Sarkawt Shams , a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament .
The virus also may have limited the advance of Iran-backed militias that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past several months .
Speaking at an event organized by the Middle East Institute think tank on Wednesday , U.S. Central Command chief Kenneth McKenzie said that the coronavirus “ may have slowed the tempo ” of Kataib Hezbollah , the Iran-backed group that the Trump administration has mostly blamed for rocket and missile attacks against U.S. troops .
Yet even as the State Department and the Pentagon insist that the United States will stay in Iraq until the Islamic State is permanently defeated , former officials aren ’ t convinced that Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bigger role in Iraq , is on board with the plan .
“ I don ’ t think you ever go into a negotiation saying we must stay , ” said a former State Department official , who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity .
“ What will this POTUS do if the Iraqis insult him on Twitter based on the strategic dialogue ?
He ’ ll pull out .
”

The Trump administration is worried that Iraq is falling short on human rights obligations to detainees and is hampered by widespread corruption, according to a State Department assessment obtained by Foreign Policy , as the United States kicks off talks on Thursday that will help determine the future of the U.S. presence in the war-torn country.
The Trump administration is worried that Iraq is falling short on human rights obligations to detainees and is hampered by widespread corruption, according to a State Department assessment obtained by Foreign Policy, as the United States kicks off talks on Thursday that will help determine the future of the U.S. presence in the war-torn country.
As thousands of Islamic State prisoners sit in lengthy and sometimes undocumented pretrial detention that may pose constitutional questions, the Iraqi legal system is bogged down by an insufficient number of judges, overflowing facilities, and the use of bribes, a snapshot of Iraq’s corruption challenges that kicked off widespread anti-government protests last year.
Iraq’s “security situation and political history have left the judiciary weak and dependent on other parts of the government,” said the State Department report sent to Congress in April. “Iraq’s judiciary suffers from the same endemic corruption that affects the rest of the Iraqi government.”
Former U.S. officials also say there is increasing pressure on Iraq ahead of the dialogue to better protect American forces after the Pentagon drone strike that killed the Iranian military leader Qassem Suleimani in January led to a spate of Iran-backed mortar and rocket attacks on American troops. The threat of attacks led U.S. troops to pull out of three outlying Iraqi bases in March.
But former officials say President Donald Trump’s administration may be forced to temper its expectations for reforms as it moves forward from the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue on Thursday.
At the beginning of the year, the now-digital gathering might have been front-page news in the United States. In a dizzying 10-day spell that grabbed international headlines, tit-for-tat attacks broke out between the United States and Iran inside Iraq over the death of an American contractor in a suspected Iran-backed rocket attack that culminated in a Pentagon drone strike that killed Suleimani.
Thursday’s function was not staffed at the highest levels. Iraq’s Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who only took office a month ago, did not attend the talks, and on Wednesday he traveled to Mosul to mark the Islamic State’s sacking of the city that became the Iraqi capital of the self-declared caliphate. The discussions are being led by the agency’s No. 3 official, David Hale.
The virus-induced venue will make it difficult for the United States to make progress on Iraq’s imports of Iranian natural gas, for which the Trump administration has reluctantly granted sanctions waivers, and the future role of 5,200 American troops who are in the country only at the invitation of the prime minister.
“My fear is that the expectation is set that we’re going to walk away with this two day Zoom conference with a firm agreement on a residual presence and major deals on flaring gas,” said one former U.S. official, referring to the burn-off of natural gas that costs the Iraqi government billions of dollars in lost revenue each year. “That’s just not going to happen.”
Even as a U.S.-led coalition drove the Islamic State from Mosul three years ago and winnowed the militant group’s territorial holdings to near-zero, Islamic State attacks have scaled up in recent months as Iraq has become a primary battlefield for ongoing American tensions with Iran—though James Jeffrey, the Trump administration’s special envoy to the anti-Islamic State coalition, cautioned that attacks often spike regardless during the holy month of Ramadan, which ended in late May.
But Iraq’s justice system also bears the scars of the Islamic State’s reign, according to the State Department assessment. Baghdad is beset by a lack of capable judges and is accused of holding Islamic State-linked suspects in pretrial isolation for months at a time without contact with the outside world.
Human Rights Watch estimated in December 2017 that Iraqi authorities are holding 20,000 prisoners with suspected ties to the Islamic State. Nongovernmental organizations cited in the assessment, mandated by Congress in last year’s appropriations bill, have said that detainees are constrained in their ability to challenge their arrests and are often forced to pay bribes to get charges dropped.
Though the State Department is concerned about the status of Iraqi reforms, some in Congress see the dialogue as a chance for getting back on solid footing with Baghdad as tensions with Iran appear to have simmered down.
“The United States should use the Strategic Dialogue as a fresh start to engage with Iraq’s new government to create long-term stability in the country,” Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy, a member of the foreign relations committee, told Foreign Policy in a statement. “The Trump administration too often treats Iraqi policy as a blunt appendage of their counter-Iran strategy.”
Murphy, who has pushed back strongly against the State Department’s drawdown of diplomatic personnel, said that the talks represented an opportunity to hold Prime Minister Kadhimi’s feet to the fire on tackling corruption and bringing prosperity to a nation wracked by years of war. “These are lofty goals that will require sustained diplomatic attention and U.S. dollars, but they are critical to long-term U.S. national security and regional stability,” he said.
But as rockets landed in Baghdad’s Green Zone for the first time in months ahead of the talks overnight on Thursday, the United States appears to be no closer to restoring its eroding diplomatic presence. Foreign Policy reported in December 2019 that the United States was on track to reduce the number of diplomats on the ground in Iraq by 28 percent, including cuts to the Baghdad embassy.
According to a State Department report sent to Congress in February and obtained by Foreign Policy, the agency does not plan to resume activities at the U.S. consulate in Basra, Iraq’s second-largest city and main port, that was shuttered in September 2018 amid Iran-backed rocket fire.
“We do not foresee the security situation in southern Iraq improving in a way that would permit resumption of operations at the Consulate General in 2020,” the report said. “Maintaining a diplomatic presence in Basrah at this time would involve an unacceptable level of risk to our personnel.” David Schenker, the State Department’s top Middle East official, said Thursday that the Iraqi government renewed its commitment to protect U.S. and international troops during the talks, even as the Trump administration looks at troop cuts. “We are looking at possible force reductions,” Schenker told reporters on Thursday.
Furthering American frustrations, Iraq’s government has often failed to keep Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces in check, despite U.S. requests. “Iran-aligned PMF militias frequently ignore government orders, including court orders, further complicating efforts to provide judicial oversight of their activities,” the State Department reported to Congress in April, using an acronym for the group.
Corruption fears prompted widespread anti-government street protests last year that took a violent turn when authorities began firing on demonstrators. But the movement has not produced meaningful reforms. The Iraqi government has not yet enacted draft legislation to bar illegal enrichment in government or corrupt lawmakers from holding office. U.S. Embassy contacts “have reported threat of prosecution for corruption or other crimes” is being used by Iran-aligned parties to extort politicians, according to the State Department report.
Former U.S. officials say the ability of the United States and Europe to help fight corruption is limited, despite years of technical assistance from the West.
“So many of these issues are things that the Iraqis have got to do themselves. You have a ghost army and a ghost civil service that’s eating up an enormous amount of public resources,” said Barbara Leaf, who served as U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates during the Obama and Trump administrations. “Corruption is just a cancer on the state at this point.”
Yet the Trump administration could risk putting too much pressure on Kadhimi over the presence of Iran-backed militias and importing natural gas from Tehran, as the fledgling prime minister faces a financial crunch and lacks the political capital to take on more entrenched political groups.
“They don’t have money to pay their salaries, by a factor of two,” the former U.S. official told Foreign Policy. “The idea that he can take on the … [PMF] and the Fatah party and he can take on the Kurds and the Sadrists, that’s just delusional right now.”
The U.S. drone strike that killed Suleimani at Baghdad Airport led then-Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi to back a nonbinding vote in the Iraqi parliament to eject the 5,200 American troops who are in the country to fight the remnants of the Islamic State.
But Iraqi lawmakers told Foreign Policy that tensions have cooled in the ensuing months as the coronavirus pandemic has ravaged the nation’s health care system and Saudi Arabia’s oil price war with Russia has put downward pressure on Baghdad’s biggest source of export revenue.
“The political parties realize that without [the] U.S., they cannot get any financial and economic benefits from the West,” said Sarkawt Shams, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament.
The virus also may have limited the advance of Iran-backed militias that have caused the Pentagon headaches over the past several months. Speaking at an event organized by the Middle East Institute think tank on Wednesday, U.S. Central Command chief Kenneth McKenzie said that the coronavirus “may have slowed the tempo” of Kataib Hezbollah, the Iran-backed group that the Trump administration has mostly blamed for rocket and missile attacks against U.S. troops.
Yet even as the State Department and the Pentagon insist that the United States will stay in Iraq until the Islamic State is permanently defeated, former officials aren’t convinced that Trump, who has requested that NATO play a bigger role in Iraq, is on board with the plan.
“I don’t think you ever go into a negotiation saying we must stay,” said a former State Department official, who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity. “What will this POTUS do if the Iraqis insult him on Twitter based on the strategic dialogue? He’ll pull out.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--I Abolished and Rebuilt the Police. The United States Can Do the Same.

I Abolished and Rebuilt the Police .
The United States Can Do the Same .
After Georgia ’ s Rose Revolution in 2004 , I became president of a failed state .
Law enforcement agencies functioned like criminal gangs .
Officers demanded bribes , trafficked narcotics and weapons , and worked for political and business elites as a mercenary security force .
Georgia was a textbook example of “ predatory policing ” : Police did not perform the basic responsibilities of ensuring public safety , instead enriching themselves and their patrons by extorting citizens .
A 2003 survey found that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ positive view of police .
In just a few years , we transformed this—offering a model for other countries , such as the United States , struggling with police reform .
The corruption of law enforcement empowered organized criminals , known in the former Soviet Union as vory v zakone , literally “ thieves in law , ” to fill the void .
Gang leaders served not only as de facto police but also as judge , jury , and executioner .
The police themselves were notorious for collaborating with organized crime .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Georgian society : A survey of schoolchildren in 1993 found that a quarter of them wanted to be thieves in law when they grew up .
Those youth had witnessed police systematically exploiting their communities .
Of course , they held gangsters in higher regard than law enforcement .
Given that reality , police reform was not only a matter of restructuring institutions or implementing better policies .
We had to change the mentality of a broken , cynical , and fearful society .
Before people could begin to trust the police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their trust .
Challenging the status quo was not enough .
We had to destroy it and build something better .
And we had to do it quickly .
After the Rose Revolution , Georgian society united to demand reform .
Reforms mean nothing without results that people can see .
The first priority was to seize back control of state security functions from organized crime .
Vano Merabishvili , then-interior minister , announced : “ We will confiscate from all thieves in law the palaces they built with their dirty money and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And we did .
Over a billion dollars ’ worth of stolen property was recovered from thieves and returned to the state budget .
New police stations were built all over Georgia , with floor-to-ceiling glass .
This wasn ’ t just an aesthetic choice—building trust in law enforcement requires transparency .
Simultaneously , we dismantled the Soviet legacy of politicized policing and replaced it with equitable law enforcement .
We eliminated redundant agencies and those beyond hope of rehabilitation .
The Ministry of State Security , a KGB relic , was dissolved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firing every one of the thousands of officers who had acted as state-sanctioned highway robbers .
We replaced them with an entirely new force of Patrol Police , who had no background in law enforcement and thus no ties to old , corrupted elites .
Recruits had to pass a competitive examination and complete a course in criminal procedure code .
They were trained in persuasion , negotiation , and mediation skills to minimize the use of force .
In restaffing the streamlined law enforcement agencies , we chose quality over quantity .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Affairs employees decreased from around 56,000 to 33,000 .
Violent crime fell by 66 percent after reforms were implemented .
Carjackings and auto thefts , once commonplace , nearly disappeared .
The overall crime rate dropped by over 50 percent , making Georgia one of the world ’ s safest countries in the world .
We hadn ’ t needed so many police .
We only needed good police .
Before my government ’ s reforms , talented people who wanted to serve their communities would never have considered careers in law enforcement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Without the right people , even the best policies would be doomed to fail .
Besides revamping the hiring process , we established a Police Academy , issued modern uniforms , and imported new squad cars and equipment .
These investments improved morale and professionalism of personnel .
At last , professional police earned professional salaries .
Before my presidency , police officers were paid just $ 44 per month—with the unspoken expectation that they would supplement their meager incomes with bribes .
By reducing the size of the force , jettisoning agencies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates , we increased salaries of police officers nearly tenfold .
Now that officers were fairly compensated , we enforced zero tolerance for corruption .
Public employees did not enjoy any special treatment from the criminal justice system .
The Ministry of Internal Affairs created a reality TV show to broadcast raids at the homes of corrupt officers .
With these tactics , some time-tested and some unconventional , we managed to break the backbone of the post-Soviet patronage system .
Police no longer exploited the people whom they took an oath to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they gained the public ’ s trust .
At the end of my presidency in 2013 , law enforcement ranked among the most respected institutions in the country , with an 87 percent approval rating .
This figure was one of the highest in the world .
If leading Georgia from a failed state to , in the World Bank ’ s estimation , the “ world ’ s best reformer ” taught me one thing , it ’ s that half-measures don ’ t work .
Those who benefit from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And vested interests tend to fight incremental measures with the same ferocity as they resist dramatic overhauls .
So when the moment is ripe , why accept incremental progress when you can seize the opportunity for real transformation ?
The push in some American cities to “ defund the police ” constitutes a dramatic overhaul , at least as bold as firing an entire small country ’ s police force .
But , unlike post-revolutionary Georgia , most Americans do not support such a drastic measure .
Cutting funds for police departments could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the wealthy hiring personal guards while the poor bear the brunt of increased crime .
These risks deserve serious consideration—take it from someone who once lived in a country where mercenary forces owned by oligarchs and gangsters ruled the streets .
Creative destruction requires a better replacement for the current system .
Perhaps in certain cities , alternatives to traditional policing could be tested .
Innovative policies can be piloted in localities and , if successful , may be replicated and scaled across the United States .
Georgia ’ s population is about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ metro area .
But size alone does not explain Georgia ’ s success .
When I was elected , the people of Georgia gave me a mandate to destroy a system that no longer worked for them .
The top-down transformation of law enforcement was possible because citizens and government united to achieve it .
The United States today is much more fragmented than Georgia was in 2004 .
But as the massive ongoing protests demonstrate , Americans are dissatisfied with the status quo .
According to recent polls , two-thirds of Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrong direction .
Change seems urgent and necessary .
But what kind of change will work for America ?
First , transparency is key .
Police departments nationwide must operate under clear , succinct , uniform guidelines .
A set of national standards should be developed for training officers on crisis management and conflict resolution ; federal funding should be contingent on local departments meeting these standards .
Technology can enhance transparency and rebuild trust .
Civilians are now driving the police accountability movement by livestreaming videos of misconduct from their smartphones .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ internal accountability .
Police could be required to wear body cameras that continually upload footage to the cloud for monitoring by law enforcement agencies and independent experts .
Second , those who enforce the law can not be above the law .
The doctrine of “ qualified immunity , ” which has drawn criticism for protecting officers accused of misconduct from legal repercussions , can undermine public trust in police .
While acknowledging that officers must sometimes make split-second , life-or-death decisions , and that human error is inevitable , the legal system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a solid public relations strategy is essential .
In Georgia , we rehabilitated the sullied image of law enforcement with modern uniforms , new cars , and glass police stations .
This rebrand was not merely cosmetic but part of a broader effort to raise public awareness of the structural and policy changes in law enforcement .
U.S. police departments could use constructive approaches to connect with their communities .
Events and education , in partnership with community leaders , close the gap between police and the people they are expected to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human resources management should be revamped .
Supporters of the status quo maintain that police are generally good , but “ a few bad apples ” —like Derek Chauvin , the Minneapolis officer who has been charged with second-degree murder in the killing of George Floyd—cause undue damage to the reputation of the institution .
I would caution those who agree with this statement to recall the rest of it : A few bad apples spoil the barrel .
In Georgia , we had more than a few bad apples .
To transform @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remove all of them .
Watchdog groups and policy researchers could develop new standards for law enforcement personnel .
Police must represent the diverse communities they serve .
Law enforcement agencies should also consider steps to improve working conditions to mitigate risks for police and civilians alike .
Long shifts and unpredictable hours can devastate officers ’ mental and physical health .
Departments may increase resources for employee wellness , including counseling .
Procedures for advancement , punishment , and termination of staff should be reviewed to ensure that incentives for police are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of police is symptomatic of a widespread sentiment : The system is built to protect the interests of elites .
If we could solve this problem in Georgia , so can Americans .
With that said , reform in any society is a continuous process because backsliding is always a danger .
In the seven years since I left Georgia , the current ruling party has done nothing but erode the institutions that my government built .
Approval of police dropped precipitously from 87 percent to 59 percent following the violent dispersal of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Law enforcement institutions must evolve to meet the needs of the people they serve .
This can only happen if civil society is vigilant in holding the authorities accountable .
Americans and Georgians take this responsibility seriously , and that is one reason for optimism .

After Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2004, I became president of a failed state. Law enforcement agencies functioned like criminal gangs. Officers demanded bribes, trafficked narcotics and weapons, and worked for political and business elites as a mercenary security force. Georgia was a textbook example of “predatory policing”: Police did not perform the basic responsibilities of ensuring public safety, instead enriching themselves and their patrons by extorting citizens. A 2003 survey found that just 2.3 percent of Georgians held a positive view of police. In just a few years, we transformed this—offering a model for other countries, such as the United States, struggling with police reform.
After Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2004, I became president of a failed state. Law enforcement agencies functioned like criminal gangs. Officers demanded bribes, trafficked narcotics and weapons, and worked for political and business elites as a mercenary security force. Georgia was a textbook example of “predatory policing”: Police did not perform the basic responsibilities of ensuring public safety, instead enriching themselves and their patrons by extorting citizens. A 2003 survey found that just 2.3 percent of Georgians held a positive view of police. In just a few years, we transformed this—offering a model for other countries, such as the United States, struggling with police reform.
The corruption of law enforcement empowered organized criminals, known in the former Soviet Union as vory v zakone, literally “thieves in law,” to fill the void. Gang leaders served not only as de facto police but also as judge, jury, and executioner. The police themselves were notorious for collaborating with organized crime. Suspicion of state institutions was deeply rooted in Georgian society: A survey of schoolchildren in 1993 found that a quarter of them wanted to be thieves in law when they grew up. Those youth had witnessed police systematically exploiting their communities. Of course, they held gangsters in higher regard than law enforcement.
Given that reality, police reform was not only a matter of restructuring institutions or implementing better policies. We had to change the mentality of a broken, cynical, and fearful society. Before people could begin to trust the police, we—the new political elites—had to earn their trust. Challenging the status quo was not enough. We had to destroy it and build something better. And we had to do it quickly. After the Rose Revolution, Georgian society united to demand reform. Reforms mean nothing without results that people can see.
The first priority was to seize back control of state security functions from organized crime. Vano Merabishvili, then-interior minister, announced: “We will confiscate from all thieves in law the palaces they built with their dirty money and put police stations in their place.” And we did. Over a billion dollars’ worth of stolen property was recovered from thieves and returned to the state budget. New police stations were built all over Georgia, with floor-to-ceiling glass. This wasn’t just an aesthetic choice—building trust in law enforcement requires transparency.
Simultaneously, we dismantled the Soviet legacy of politicized policing and replaced it with equitable law enforcement. We eliminated redundant agencies and those beyond hope of rehabilitation. The Ministry of State Security, a KGB relic, was dissolved. We disbanded the Traffic Police, firing every one of the thousands of officers who had acted as state-sanctioned highway robbers. We replaced them with an entirely new force of Patrol Police, who had no background in law enforcement and thus no ties to old, corrupted elites. Recruits had to pass a competitive examination and complete a course in criminal procedure code. They were trained in persuasion, negotiation, and mediation skills to minimize the use of force.
In restaffing the streamlined law enforcement agencies, we chose quality over quantity. The total number of Ministry of Internal Affairs employees decreased from around 56,000 to 33,000. Violent crime fell by 66 percent after reforms were implemented. Carjackings and auto thefts, once commonplace, nearly disappeared. The overall crime rate dropped by over 50 percent, making Georgia one of the world’s safest countries in the world. We hadn’t needed so many police. We only needed good police.
Before my government’s reforms, talented people who wanted to serve their communities would never have considered careers in law enforcement. We had to change that. Without the right people, even the best policies would be doomed to fail. Besides revamping the hiring process, we established a Police Academy, issued modern uniforms, and imported new squad cars and equipment. These investments improved morale and professionalism of personnel.
At last, professional police earned professional salaries. Before my presidency, police officers were paid just $44 per month—with the unspoken expectation that they would supplement their meager incomes with bribes. By reducing the size of the force, jettisoning agencies and ministries, and hiring only qualified candidates, we increased salaries of police officers nearly tenfold. Now that officers were fairly compensated, we enforced zero tolerance for corruption. Public employees did not enjoy any special treatment from the criminal justice system. The Ministry of Internal Affairs created a reality TV show to broadcast raids at the homes of corrupt officers.
With these tactics, some time-tested and some unconventional, we managed to break the backbone of the post-Soviet patronage system. Police no longer exploited the people whom they took an oath to protect. In place of cash bribes, they gained the public’s trust. At the end of my presidency in 2013, law enforcement ranked among the most respected institutions in the country, with an 87 percent approval rating. This figure was one of the highest in the world.
If leading Georgia from a failed state to, in the World Bank’s estimation, the “world’s best reformer” taught me one thing, it’s that half-measures don’t work. Those who benefit from the status quo will always abhor change. And vested interests tend to fight incremental measures with the same ferocity as they resist dramatic overhauls. So when the moment is ripe, why accept incremental progress when you can seize the opportunity for real transformation?
The push in some American cities to “defund the police” constitutes a dramatic overhaul, at least as bold as firing an entire small country’s police force. But, unlike post-revolutionary Georgia, most Americans do not support such a drastic measure. Cutting funds for police departments could result in privatization of security, with the wealthy hiring personal guards while the poor bear the brunt of increased crime. These risks deserve serious consideration—take it from someone who once lived in a country where mercenary forces owned by oligarchs and gangsters ruled the streets.
Creative destruction requires a better replacement for the current system. Perhaps in certain cities, alternatives to traditional policing could be tested. Innovative policies can be piloted in localities and, if successful, may be replicated and scaled across the United States. Georgia’s population is about 3.7 million—not much more than the Minneapolis metro area. But size alone does not explain Georgia’s success. When I was elected, the people of Georgia gave me a mandate to destroy a system that no longer worked for them. The top-down transformation of law enforcement was possible because citizens and government united to achieve it.
The United States today is much more fragmented than Georgia was in 2004. But as the massive ongoing protests demonstrate, Americans are dissatisfied with the status quo. According to recent polls, two-thirds of Americans think their country is headed in the wrong direction. Change seems urgent and necessary. But what kind of change will work for America?
First, transparency is key. Police departments nationwide must operate under clear, succinct, uniform guidelines. A set of national standards should be developed for training officers on crisis management and conflict resolution; federal funding should be contingent on local departments meeting these standards. Technology can enhance transparency and rebuild trust. Civilians are now driving the police accountability movement by livestreaming videos of misconduct from their smartphones. Departments could use the same technology for internal accountability. Police could be required to wear body cameras that continually upload footage to the cloud for monitoring by law enforcement agencies and independent experts.
Second, those who enforce the law cannot be above the law. The doctrine of “qualified immunity,” which has drawn criticism for protecting officers accused of misconduct from legal repercussions, can undermine public trust in police. While acknowledging that officers must sometimes make split-second, life-or-death decisions, and that human error is inevitable, the legal system should not enshrine double standards.
Third, a solid public relations strategy is essential. In Georgia, we rehabilitated the sullied image of law enforcement with modern uniforms, new cars, and glass police stations. This rebrand was not merely cosmetic but part of a broader effort to raise public awareness of the structural and policy changes in law enforcement. U.S. police departments could use constructive approaches to connect with their communities. Events and education, in partnership with community leaders, close the gap between police and the people they are expected to protect.
Last but not least, human resources management should be revamped. Supporters of the status quo maintain that police are generally good, but “a few bad apples”—like Derek Chauvin, the Minneapolis officer who has been charged with second-degree murder in the killing of George Floyd—cause undue damage to the reputation of the institution. I would caution those who agree with this statement to recall the rest of it: A few bad apples spoil the barrel. In Georgia, we had more than a few bad apples. To transform a rotten system, we had to remove all of them.
Watchdog groups and policy researchers could develop new standards for law enforcement personnel. Police must represent the diverse communities they serve. Law enforcement agencies should also consider steps to improve working conditions to mitigate risks for police and civilians alike. Long shifts and unpredictable hours can devastate officers’ mental and physical health. Departments may increase resources for employee wellness, including counseling. Procedures for advancement, punishment, and termination of staff should be reviewed to ensure that incentives for police are aligned with the public interest.
Distrust of police is symptomatic of a widespread sentiment: The system is built to protect the interests of elites. If we could solve this problem in Georgia, so can Americans. With that said, reform in any society is a continuous process because backsliding is always a danger. In the seven years since I left Georgia, the current ruling party has done nothing but erode the institutions that my government built. Approval of police dropped precipitously from 87 percent to 59 percent following the violent dispersal of peaceful protests in Tbilisi last summer.
Law enforcement institutions must evolve to meet the needs of the people they serve. This can only happen if civil society is vigilant in holding the authorities accountable. Americans and Georgians take this responsibility seriously, and that is one reason for optimism.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--50 Years On, Biafra’s Pain Is Still Fresh

50 Years On , Biafra ’ s Pain Is Still Fresh JOHANNESBURG—On Jan. 15 , 1970 , Nigeria ’ s civil war with the breakaway nation of Biafra officially came to an end .
The war came after coups and countercoups around the central government , followed by a pogrom in which an estimated 30,000 Igbo people were massacred in the north , causing over a million people to flee into the east .
The failed Aburi Accord—a conference convened to address rising tensions between the central government and the Eastern Region in 1967—was the final straw .
Nigeria ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surprisingly successful , despite the horrors of the war .
About 2-3 million people—mostly women and children in Biafra itself—died in nearly three years of conflict .
But 50 years later , Biafran independence is once again a powerful cause .
On May 30 , pro-Biafra groups and their supporters celebrated the anniversary of the declaration of the Biafran Republic on May 30 , 1967 , by Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu—a 33-year-old Oxford University-educated historian-turned-military officer .
With public events canceled , private memories shared with others online became key this year .
Prayers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ victims and survivors dominated , as well as posts and images on social media , sparking more support for the Indigenous People of Biafra ( IPOB ) , a group that has long been agitating for an independent state of Biafra .
For more than five years now , IPOB and other pro-Biafra groups have been organizing peaceful protests across the country and demanding self-determination .
Led by Nnamdi Kanu , a British Nigerian activist , IPOB blames the central government for leaving the region marginalized and is seeking a peaceful referendum to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ separate state .
That doesn ’ t sit well with the fragile central government , which has frequently used force to try to crush the movement .
In October 2015 , political tensions ratcheted up when Kanu was arrested by Nigeria ’ s security forces on treason and secession charges on his return to the country from the United Kingdom , where he is based .
Kanu runs Radio Biafra—an online radio station that broadcasts from London , where he agitates for a referendum and communicates with his followers .
Kanu ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Each day , thousands of pro-Biafra agitators and supporters , hoisting flags and chanting Biafra songs , moved across the country , demanding his unconditional release .
The protests often turned bloody with brutality and extrajudicial killings by security forces .
In 2016 , Amnesty International accused Nigeria ’ s security forces of embarking on a “ chilling campaign of extrajudicial executions and violence resulting in the deaths of at least 150 peaceful pro-Biafra protesters in the south east of the country.
” Abroad , Kanu ’ s supporters staged protests at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , United Kingdom , and Europe .
After spending more than 18 months in jail without trial , Kanu was released in April 2017 with stringent bail conditions that restricted his movements , but the agitation grew even louder with more peaceful protests and rallies .
The federal government run by President Muhammadu Buhari , a Muslim from the Fulani north , has strongly rejected any call for a referendum and stated that his administration would not bow down to demands for separatism , saying the country ’ s unity is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the trajectory of the pro-Biafra movements and agitations changed again .
The government launched Operation Python Dance to quell the agitation in the region , a military operation that led to the deaths of several pro-Biafra activists .
Kanu ’ s home in Umuahia , in the country ’ s southeast , was invaded and raided by security forces , which IPOB said was a “ calculated attempt to assassinate him.
” Kanu was whisked away by his supporters during the invasion and was hidden until he reappeared in Israel in October @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was proscribed and declared as a terrorist organization by an Abuja high court in September 2017 .
But the United States has said it does not see the movement as a terrorist organization , as its protests have been largely peaceful , although Washington has maintained that it is committed to a united Nigeria .
IPOB says the proscription and clampdown by security forces have emboldened and hardened its resolve and that it will keep agitating until an independent state is achieved .
The pain of Biafrans is understandable .
The government has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ address growing grievances and some of the fundamental issues that led to the war in the first place .
Many in the southeast say they have never received justice for the more than 2 million people killed during the war .
Analysts say conversation or dialogue about the war could be a way of healing old wounds and forging reconciliation , building trust and national alliances .
Nigeria is still deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines , and this has played into many national and regional engagements .
Marginalization , unequal political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are still brewing division .
Since Buhari came into power in 2015 , the south has criticized the president ’ s major political and military appointments , which have often favored individuals from the north , further deepening the divide .
“ There was sadness in the heart of every single Igbo family .
Nobody in the Eastern Region had not lost somebody , ” Christopher Ejiofor , who was a Biafran soldier and military advisor to Ojukwu during the war , told Foreign Policy .
“ The blood of the innocent children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war is still seeking vengeance.
” Ejiofor , who is the author of Biafra ’ s Struggle for Survival—a personal account of the war—said : “ The Nigerian-Biafra civil war should have never happened in my estimation.
” Unlike the memorials and national day of remembrance set up in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide that led to the deaths of some 800,000 people , Nigeria doesn ’ t officially commemorate the war .
There are private efforts—such as the Centre for Memories , located in the former Biafra capital city of Enugu , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the war—and there have been past gestures .
In January , during the 50th anniversary of the end of the war , Nigeria ’ s vice president , Yemi Osinbajo , became the first high-ranking government official to say that a national conversation about the war was necessary .
“ Without mincing words , the civil war was a defining national tragedy and a robust national conversation is necessary to aid the process of healing and reconciliation , ” Osinbajo tweeted after visiting the National War Museum , which showcases some of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last 50 years belonged to us , but the next 50 belong to our children and we must unshackle them from ghosts of ancient grudges & grievances .
“ By their conduct , our children show us that it is possible to forge friendships , let us give them a chance to do better than ourselves.
” Established in 1985 , the museum was aimed at putting aside the ugly past of the war and moving forward toward the process of national reconciliation and healing .
But that hasn ’ t happened—partially because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t been met with serious legal or governmental commitments .
The Biafra agitation , now led by mostly young people , is just getting started .
The present government , like most of those before it , has no interest in reconciliatory moves such as holding a roundtable dialogue with the agitators or in leading a national conversation to address the grievances that have left the country still divided five decades later .
Agitators believe a new breakaway is imminent—but the government ’ s answer may yet again be force .

JOHANNESBURG—On Jan. 15, 1970, Nigeria’s civil war with the breakaway nation of Biafra officially came to an end. The war came after coups and countercoups around the central government, followed by a pogrom in which an estimated 30,000 Igbo people were massacred in the north, causing over a million people to flee into the east. The failed Aburi Accord —a conference convened to address rising tensions between the central government and the Eastern Region in 1967—was the final straw.
JOHANNESBURG—On Jan. 15, 1970, Nigeria’s civil war with the breakaway nation of Biafra officially came to an end. The war came after coups and countercoups around the central government, followed by a pogrom in which an estimated 30,000 Igbo people were massacred in the north, causing over a million people to flee into the east. The failed Aburi Accord—a conference convened to address rising tensions between the central government and the Eastern Region in 1967—was the final straw.
Nigeria’s reintegration of the breakaway state was surprisingly successful, despite the horrors of the war. About 2-3 million people—mostly women and children in Biafra itself—died in nearly three years of conflict. But 50 years later, Biafran independence is once again a powerful cause.
On May 30, pro-Biafra groups and their supporters celebrated the anniversary of the declaration of the Biafran Republic on May 30, 1967, by Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu—a 33-year-old Oxford University-educated historian-turned-military officer. With public events canceled, private memories shared with others online became key this year. Prayers in remembrance of the war’s victims and survivors dominated, as well as posts and images on social media, sparking more support for the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a group that has long been agitating for an independent state of Biafra.
For more than five years now, IPOB and other pro-Biafra groups have been organizing peaceful protests across the country and demanding self-determination. Led by Nnamdi Kanu, a British Nigerian activist, IPOB blames the central government for leaving the region marginalized and is seeking a peaceful referendum to break away from Nigeria and create a separate state. That doesn’t sit well with the fragile central government, which has frequently used force to try to crush the movement.
In October 2015, political tensions ratcheted up when Kanu was arrested by Nigeria’s security forces on treason and secession charges on his return to the country from the United Kingdom, where he is based. Kanu runs Radio Biafra—an online radio station that broadcasts from London, where he agitates for a referendum and communicates with his followers.
Kanu’s arrest sparked nationwide protests among his followers. Each day, thousands of pro-Biafra agitators and supporters, hoisting flags and chanting Biafra songs, moved across the country, demanding his unconditional release. The protests often turned bloody with brutality and extrajudicial killings by security forces. In 2016, Amnesty International accused Nigeria’s security forces of embarking on a “chilling campaign of extrajudicial executions and violence resulting in the deaths of at least 150 peaceful pro-Biafra protesters in the south east of the country.” Abroad, Kanu’s supporters staged protests at Nigerian embassies and high commissions in the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe.
After spending more than 18 months in jail without trial, Kanu was released in April 2017 with stringent bail conditions that restricted his movements, but the agitation grew even louder with more peaceful protests and rallies.
The federal government run by President Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim from the Fulani north, has strongly rejected any call for a referendum and stated that his administration would not bow down to demands for separatism, saying the country’s unity is “not negotiable.”
In August 2017, the trajectory of the pro-Biafra movements and agitations changed again. The government launched Operation Python Dance to quell the agitation in the region, a military operation that led to the deaths of several pro-Biafra activists. Kanu’s home in Umuahia, in the country’s southeast, was invaded and raided by security forces, which IPOB said was a “calculated attempt to assassinate him.” Kanu was whisked away by his supporters during the invasion and was hidden until he reappeared in Israel in October 2018 before returning to the U.K.
IPOB was proscribed and declared as a terrorist organization by an Abuja high court in September 2017. But the United States has said it does not see the movement as a terrorist organization, as its protests have been largely peaceful, although Washington has maintained that it is committed to a united Nigeria.
IPOB says the proscription and clampdown by security forces have emboldened and hardened its resolve and that it will keep agitating until an independent state is achieved.
The pain of Biafrans is understandable. The government has yet to hold any serious conversation to address growing grievances and some of the fundamental issues that led to the war in the first place. Many in the southeast say they have never received justice for the more than 2 million people killed during the war. Analysts say conversation or dialogue about the war could be a way of healing old wounds and forging reconciliation, building trust and national alliances.
Nigeria is still deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines, and this has played into many national and regional engagements. Marginalization, unequal political appointments, and ethnic and religious tensions are still brewing division. Since Buhari came into power in 2015, the south has criticized the president’s major political and military appointments, which have often favored individuals from the north, further deepening the divide.
“There was sadness in the heart of every single Igbo family. Nobody in the Eastern Region had not lost somebody,” Christopher Ejiofor, who was a Biafran soldier and military advisor to Ojukwu during the war, told Foreign Policy. “The blood of the innocent children who died due to starvation during the war is still seeking vengeance.”
Ejiofor, who is the author of Biafra’s Struggle for Survival—a personal account of the war—said: “The Nigerian-Biafra civil war should have never happened in my estimation.”
Unlike the memorials and national day of remembrance set up in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide that led to the deaths of some 800,000 people, Nigeria doesn’t officially commemorate the war. There are private efforts—such as the Centre for Memories, located in the former Biafra capital city of Enugu, which holds exhibitions each year to commemorate the war—and there have been past gestures.
In January, during the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Nigeria’s vice president, Yemi Osinbajo, became the first high-ranking government official to say that a national conversation about the war was necessary.
“Without mincing words, the civil war was a defining national tragedy and a robust national conversation is necessary to aid the process of healing and reconciliation,” Osinbajo tweeted after visiting the National War Museum, which showcases some of the relics from the war. “The last 50 years belonged to us, but the next 50 belong to our children and we must unshackle them from ghosts of ancient grudges & grievances.
“By their conduct, our children show us that it is possible to forge friendships, let us give them a chance to do better than ourselves.”
Established in 1985, the museum was aimed at putting aside the ugly past of the war and moving forward toward the process of national reconciliation and healing. But that hasn’t happened—partially because the museum’s efforts haven’t been met with serious legal or governmental commitments.
The Biafra agitation, now led by mostly young people, is just getting started. The present government, like most of those before it, has no interest in reconciliatory moves such as holding a roundtable dialogue with the agitators or in leading a national conversation to address the grievances that have left the country still divided five decades later. Agitators believe a new breakaway is imminent—but the government’s answer may yet again be force.