foreignpolicy--2020-11-26--The Beautiful, Dumb Dream of McDonald’s Peace Theory

As tanks exploded and refugees fled in the latest round of Armenia and Azerbaijian ’ s war over Nagorno-Karabakh , social media became another battlefield—with some surprising participants .
That included the local branch of McDonald ’ s , which posted some ardently ( and brief-lived ) pro-Azeri sentiments on Twitter .
For Americans who remember the lazily optimistic foreign-policy analysis their country produced in the 1990s , it was a poignant moment .
A company once held up as a disincentive to war had become a participant in one .
It ’ s another blow to the idea that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less likely—and instead , how the legacies left behind by imperial decline will give birth to a new wave of conflict .
I happen to be one of those Americans .
Back when Bill Clinton was still president , President Donald Trump a punchline , and the Twin Towers standing , I was a college freshman taking a course on American foreign policy .
Our textbook was The Lexus and the Olive Tree , a 1999 bestseller by the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman .
Friedman ’ s claim was simple : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy choices open to governments , making war—which disrupts that integration—so unattractive as to be practically unthinkable .
If that sounds like the theory of the capitalist peace as understood by Montesquieu , Adam Smith , and Richard Cobden , well , it pretty much was .
The book formed part of the glut of glib globalization cheerleading that defined the true unipolar moment—that period between the mid-1990s and the terror attacks of September 11 , 2001 .
That optimism reflected a hard turn from the anxieties those same classes had embraced in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In 1990 , John Mearsheimer mused in The Atlantic that Americans would soon miss the Cold War as the world collapsed into anarchy .
Samuel Huntington ’ s 1993 essay in Foreign Affairs , “ The Clash of Civilizations ?
” , suggested that the future would feature civilizational bloodbaths .
Both Michael Crichton and Tom Clancy wrote thrillers in which the United States was threatened with humiliation by the rising Asian economic power , Japan .
For a while , a new era of great-power competition beckoned .
By the mid-1990s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The U.S.-led coalition ’ s war against President Saddam Hussein was a shockingly successful exercise .
It turned out that the Japanese didn ’ t want to embark on a war of aggression just because their grandparents had ( and their economy had tanked anyhow ) .
European integration was proceeding peacefully .
Ex-Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev did a Pizza Hut commercial .
The most pressing problem for American foreign policy thought leaders seemed to be explaining why this happy period had come about—and why it could never end .
There wasn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lot about the rest of the world : The combination of America ’ s irresistible power , both hard and soft , meant the world would become more like us anyhow .
In Friedman ’ s hands , the sophisticated flavors of Cobden and Smith were homogenized into a quick-serve dish , which he called the “ Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention.
” His thesis , originally expounded in a 1996 column , proposed to explain the decline in war as a result of the expansion of global capitalism : “ No @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s have ever fought a war against each other.
” Friedman admitted that the pacific correlation between McDonald ’ s and peaceful relations wasn ’ t causal .
He even interviewed a McDonald ’ s executive ( breathlessly identified as “ its de facto secretary of state ” ) , who told him that McDonald ’ s didn ’ t open in markets until they were already rich and developed enough to sustain a middle class that could afford luxuries like Western fast foods .
In other words , the presence of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t exert magical conflict-reducing properties .
Instead , McDonald ’ s strategically placed its restaurants in countries that were unlikely to go to war in the first place .
And this makes sense .
McDonald ’ s has a high bar for opening a franchise because the reliability of its supply chain is both a bragging point and the core to its business model .
A Big Mac is a Big Mac the world over , even if a quarter-pounder might not have the same name in the metric system .
( Experienced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and reliability of the toilets . )
In the whole of Africa , for instance , even today McDonald ’ s operates in only four countries : Morocco , Egypt , South Africa , and the tourist island of Mauritius .
Back in the 1990s , when Africa was the center of global conflict , with the Second Congo War claiming 5.4 million lives , the illusion of peace went with burgers and fries .
The actual cause of Friedman ’ s observation was how the expansion of global capital was making newly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Friedman ’ s conjecture was less a Golden Arches Theory and more a Golden Arches Correlation .
Correlation may not be causation , as any political scientist could have told Friedman , but snappy sloganeering is profitable .
Of course , if academics don ’ t sell as well as Friedman , they also are rarely proven wrong as quickly or as decisively as Friedman .
Soon after the book hit retailers ’ shelves , the U.S.-led NATO bombing campaign against Serbia started .
Belgrade had boasted a McDonald ’ s since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arches theory .
Like many cultural artifacts of that period , Friedman ’ s book was almost entirely forgotten after the terrorist attacks of September 11 swept away America ’ s heady Clintonian optimism .
( To be honest , I forgot about it pretty soon after I finished reading it , not least because I was distracted by the other big story of that semester : Bush v .
Gore . )
Yet Friedman himself never let go .
In a revised , and somewhat annoyed , edition of The Lexus and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ critics had gotten him all wrong .
Friedman ’ s updated presentation tried to refine his theory to preserve it .
“ My first reaction … was to defensively point out that NATO isn ’ t a country , that the Kosovo war wasn ’ t even a real war , and to the extent that it was a real war it was an intervention by NATO into a civil war between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians , ” he wrote .
There ’ s actually something to this defense .
The scholarly Correlates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as dispute # 4137 , which is coded as a 4 ( “ use of force ” ) rather than a 5 ( “ war ” ) .
And , as Friedman suggests , the larger dispute could also be coded as a civil war—although internationalized civil wars represent a distinct and increasingly common form of military conflict .
Friedman ’ s real defense , however , hangs on the idea that McDonald ’ s was irrelevant to the Golden Arches theory .
“ Kosovo proves just how much pressure … nationalist regimes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their adventures , and wars of choice , are brought home to their people in the age of globalization , ” Friedman wrote .
Contemporary globalization “ makes for a much stronger web of constraints on the foreign policy behavior of those nations which are plugged into the system.
” To be clear , the subsequent years have been no more kind to his theory , even in its post-McDonald ’ s form .
Since Friedman wrote those passages , Wikipedia drolly notes , three additional militarized disputes have broken out between countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lebanon War ; the 2008 Georgian-Russian War ; and the 2014 Crimean crisis .
Friedman may not have moved on , but the rest of us have .
In the years since he wrote the first version , I ’ ve earned a Ph.D. in international relations .
Now , I teach my own course on American foreign policy .
I don ’ t teach The Lexus and the Olive Tree .
If I were to teach a version of the capitalist peace hypothesis , I would probably use the one described by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development diminishes the prospects of war between two countries but doesn ’ t rule it out .
Or there ’ s Dale Copeland ’ s argument that expectations of gains from trade—not the gains themselves—reduce the likelihood of wars between states .
These fine distinctions matter .
And even those two versions of the capitalist peace lead to different conclusions .
If trade and economic integration between countries really does tamp down bellicosity , then the United States and China are unlikely to go to war .
But if those countries ’ leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chances of war would correspondingly increase .
Of course , I would explain to my students , war could also proceed from other causes .
Economic integration may be no panacea to interstate war after all .
John Vasquez writes : “ War among equals has followed the failure of power politics to settle certain highly salient issues ” —none , he writes , more than “ issues involving territory , especially territorial contiguity.
” In the former Soviet Union , the wars over Chechnya , Georgia , Ukraine , and now Nagorno-Karabakh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ element , a story much closer to what Vasquez ’ s theory would predict than to Friedman ’ s .
Globalization may have increased the costs of these wars , but they have obviously not prevented them .
To be sure , Armenia has no McDonald ’ s , an issue grave enough to have been raised in the parliament at Yerevan earlier this year .
The Azerbaijan franchise ’ s cheerleading was also slapped down by the Home Office .
Regardless , Friedman ’ s logic suggests the conflict shouldn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been so bloody once it did .
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan score highly ( and almost identically ) on the ETH Zurich KOF Globalisation Index .
The pace of deaths suggests that the conflict could qualify as a so-called real war by the traditional 1,000 battle-related-deaths criterion .
( Indeed , some reports say the death toll blew past that level quickly . )
And if the conflict has knocked the final support from the Golden Arches theory , it has also finally toppled whatever confidence remained in the 1990s belief in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The resurgent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict provides yet another reason to worry that the world is entering a new phase of more violent conflict—including major wars—and globalization will no more prevent them than burgeoning trade before Archduke Ferdinand ’ s assassination prevented the First World War .
After all , wars keep emerging that challenge the optimistic assessment that war is a relic of the past .
The specific ways these conflicts emerge , moreover , point to the possibility that new wars could break out that make even bloody conflicts like those in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Driven by processes of imperial dysfunction and internal breakdown , today ’ s wars have causes that are enormously difficult to heal .
The conflicts in the former Soviet Union , from Chechnya in the 1990s to Nagorno-Karabakh today , represent a set of wars in the post-Soviet succession .
Russia has attempted to maintain its central role against real and perceived rivals throughout that vast region including transnational Islam , the European Union , the United States , China , and now arguably Turkey .
In the Middle East , revisionist regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for power as the United States continues to loudly proclaim that it is unwilling to continue playing its imperial stabilizing role ( even if Washington never actually seems to find the exit ) .
And China , which once preferred to keep its border disputes quiet , seems increasingly willing to saber-rattle from the Taiwan Straits to the Himalayas .
Any given conflict may have a particular set of causes .
But one thing Friedman got right was in looking to changes in the broad international system rather than just focusing on those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the common factors are uncertainty about the intentions of the United States and the role of new global challengers .
Much of that uncertainty stems from how the Trump administration and deeper domestic dysfunctions have hobbled U.S. foreign policy .
Ironically , even though the doomsayers of the immediate post-Cold War era had predicted that U.S. leadership would collapse because of a challenge from without , the gravest blow came from within .
If the catalyst hadn ’ t been Trump , then it ’ s likely that some other political entrepreneur would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the polarized U.S. political system to bring about similar results .
Were the Golden Arches theory right , the rise of other countries should not have posed a challenge to U.S. order .
Friedman assumed that every country would be bound by globalization to choose from the same limited number of options .
In this , he wasn ’ t alone .
Many observers , from policymakers to international relations scholars , made the same bet .
And , like him , they also assumed that the United States itself would do whatever @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a benevolent hegemon upholding the international system .
But it turns out that countries are willing to pay an economic price to pursue other values .
We can no longer take for granted the idea that the United States—or any other country—will be bound to be a responsible stakeholder .
It ’ s time to begin thinking about what the next era of world politics will look like .
As I teach my students , I ’ m haunted by the idea that my assessment of what they need to know will prove @ @ @ @ @ @ @ professor ’ s choice of Friedman as a textbook ended up being .
At the very least , I can try to avoid errors as catastrophic and hubristic as the lazy confidence in American power that defined my youth .
That means forgoing simple stories and teaching real debates between complex theories .
It means taking other countries ’ cultures and interests seriously , rather than assuming everyone just wants to be American .
Most of all , it means being open about how the only way to make a better world is @ @ @ @ @ @ @

As tanks exploded and refugees fled in the latest round of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s war over Nagorno-Karabakh, social media became another battlefield—with some surprising participants. That included the local branch of McDonald’s, which posted some ardently (and brief-lived) pro-Azeri sentiments on Twitter.
As tanks exploded and refugees fled in the latest round of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s war over Nagorno-Karabakh, social media became another battlefield—with some surprising participants. That included the local branch of McDonald’s, which posted some ardently (and brief-lived) pro-Azeri sentiments on Twitter.
For Americans who remember the lazily optimistic foreign-policy analysis their country produced in the 1990s, it was a poignant moment. A company once held up as a disincentive to war had become a participant in one. It’s another blow to the idea that economic globalization by itself can make war less likely—and instead, how the legacies left behind by imperial decline will give birth to a new wave of conflict.
I happen to be one of those Americans. Back when Bill Clinton was still president, President Donald Trump a punchline, and the Twin Towers standing, I was a college freshman taking a course on American foreign policy. Our textbook was The Lexus and the Olive Tree, a 1999 bestseller by the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman.
Friedman’s claim was simple: The benefits of economic integration reduce the policy choices open to governments, making war—which disrupts that integration—so unattractive as to be practically unthinkable. If that sounds like the theory of the capitalist peace as understood by Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Richard Cobden, well, it pretty much was.
The book formed part of the glut of glib globalization cheerleading that defined the true unipolar moment—that period between the mid-1990s and the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. That optimism reflected a hard turn from the anxieties those same classes had embraced in the unsettled, immediate post-Cold War world. In 1990, John Mearsheimer mused in The Atlantic that Americans would soon miss the Cold War as the world collapsed into anarchy. Samuel Huntington’s 1993 essay in Foreign Affairs, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, suggested that the future would feature civilizational bloodbaths. Both Michael Crichton and Tom Clancy wrote thrillers in which the United States was threatened with humiliation by the rising Asian economic power, Japan. For a while, a new era of great-power competition beckoned.
By the mid-1990s, though, Americans had chilled out. The U.S.-led coalition’s war against President Saddam Hussein was a shockingly successful exercise. It turned out that the Japanese didn’t want to embark on a war of aggression just because their grandparents had (and their economy had tanked anyhow). European integration was proceeding peacefully. Ex-Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev did a Pizza Hut commercial. The most pressing problem for American foreign policy thought leaders seemed to be explaining why this happy period had come about—and why it could never end. There wasn’t much need to learn a lot about the rest of the world: The combination of America’s irresistible power, both hard and soft, meant the world would become more like us anyhow.
In Friedman’s hands, the sophisticated flavors of Cobden and Smith were homogenized into a quick-serve dish, which he called the “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention.” His thesis, originally expounded in a 1996 column, proposed to explain the decline in war as a result of the expansion of global capitalism: “No two countries that both have a McDonald’s have ever fought a war against each other.”
Friedman admitted that the pacific correlation between McDonald’s and peaceful relations wasn’t causal. He even interviewed a McDonald’s executive (breathlessly identified as “its de facto secretary of state”), who told him that McDonald’s didn’t open in markets until they were already rich and developed enough to sustain a middle class that could afford luxuries like Western fast foods.
In other words, the presence of a McDonald’s restaurant didn’t exert magical conflict-reducing properties. Instead, McDonald’s strategically placed its restaurants in countries that were unlikely to go to war in the first place.
And this makes sense. McDonald’s has a high bar for opening a franchise because the reliability of its supply chain is both a bragging point and the core to its business model. A Big Mac is a Big Mac the world over, even if a quarter-pounder might not have the same name in the metric system. (Experienced travelers can also speak to the cleanliness and reliability of the toilets.) In the whole of Africa, for instance, even today McDonald’s operates in only four countries: Morocco, Egypt, South Africa, and the tourist island of Mauritius. Back in the 1990s, when Africa was the center of global conflict, with the Second Congo War claiming 5.4 million lives, the illusion of peace went with burgers and fries.
The actual cause of Friedman’s observation was how the expansion of global capital was making newly emerging markets increasingly attractive to multinational corporations. Friedman’s conjecture was less a Golden Arches Theory and more a Golden Arches Correlation. Correlation may not be causation, as any political scientist could have told Friedman, but snappy sloganeering is profitable.
Of course, if academics don’t sell as well as Friedman, they also are rarely proven wrong as quickly or as decisively as Friedman. Soon after the book hit retailers’ shelves, the U.S.-led NATO bombing campaign against Serbia started.
Belgrade had boasted a McDonald’s since 1988. So much for the Golden Arches theory.
A pedestrian walks by a burned car in front of McDonald's restaurant after unrest in downtown Belgrade on Feb. 22, 2008.
Like many cultural artifacts of that period, Friedman’s book was almost entirely forgotten after the terrorist attacks of September 11 swept away America’s heady Clintonian optimism. (To be honest, I forgot about it pretty soon after I finished reading it, not least because I was distracted by the other big story of that semester: Bush v. Gore.)
Yet Friedman himself never let go. In a revised, and somewhat annoyed, edition of The Lexus and the Olive Tree, he complained that critics had gotten him all wrong.
Friedman’s updated presentation tried to refine his theory to preserve it. “My first reaction … was to defensively point out that NATO isn’t a country, that the Kosovo war wasn’t even a real war, and to the extent that it was a real war it was an intervention by NATO into a civil war between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians,” he wrote.
There’s actually something to this defense. The scholarly Correlates of War dataset records the NATO-Serbia conflict as dispute #4137, which is coded as a 4 (“use of force”) rather than a 5 (“war”). And, as Friedman suggests, the larger dispute could also be coded as a civil war—although internationalized civil wars represent a distinct and increasingly common form of military conflict.
Friedman’s real defense, however, hangs on the idea that McDonald’s was irrelevant to the Golden Arches theory. “Kosovo proves just how much pressure … nationalist regimes can come under when the costs of their adventures, and wars of choice, are brought home to their people in the age of globalization,” Friedman wrote. Contemporary globalization “makes for a much stronger web of constraints on the foreign policy behavior of those nations which are plugged into the system.”
To be clear, the subsequent years have been no more kind to his theory, even in its post-McDonald’s form. Since Friedman wrote those passages, Wikipedia drolly notes, three additional militarized disputes have broken out between countries with McDonald’s: the 2006 Lebanon War; the 2008 Georgian-Russian War; and the 2014 Crimean crisis.
Friedman may not have moved on, but the rest of us have. In the years since he wrote the first version, I’ve earned a Ph.D. in international relations. Now, I teach my own course on American foreign policy.
I don’t teach The Lexus and the Olive Tree. If I were to teach a version of the capitalist peace hypothesis, I would probably use the one described by scholar Erik Gartzke, in which market development diminishes the prospects of war between two countries but doesn’t rule it out. Or there’s Dale Copeland’s argument that expectations of gains from trade—not the gains themselves—reduce the likelihood of wars between states.
These fine distinctions matter. And even those two versions of the capitalist peace lead to different conclusions. If trade and economic integration between countries really does tamp down bellicosity, then the United States and China are unlikely to go to war. But if those countries’ leaders decide to decouple their economy, the chances of war would correspondingly increase.
Of course, I would explain to my students, war could also proceed from other causes. Economic integration may be no panacea to interstate war after all. John Vasquez writes: “War among equals has followed the failure of power politics to settle certain highly salient issues”—none, he writes, more than “issues involving territory, especially territorial contiguity.”
In the former Soviet Union, the wars over Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and now Nagorno-Karabakh have all involved territory as a crucial element, a story much closer to what Vasquez’s theory would predict than to Friedman’s.
Globalization may have increased the costs of these wars, but they have obviously not prevented them. To be sure, Armenia has no McDonald’s, an issue grave enough to have been raised in the parliament at Yerevan earlier this year. The Azerbaijan franchise’s cheerleading was also slapped down by the Home Office.
Regardless, Friedman’s logic suggests the conflict shouldn’t have begun, or shouldn’t have been so bloody once it did. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan score highly (and almost identically) on the ETH Zurich KOF Globalisation Index. The pace of deaths suggests that the conflict could qualify as a so-called real war by the traditional 1,000 battle-related-deaths criterion. (Indeed, some reports say the death toll blew past that level quickly.)
And if the conflict has knocked the final support from the Golden Arches theory, it has also finally toppled whatever confidence remained in the 1990s belief in the eternal sunshine of the American order.
The resurgent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict provides yet another reason to worry that the world is entering a new phase of more violent conflict—including major wars—and globalization will no more prevent them than burgeoning trade before Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination prevented World War I.
After all, wars keep emerging that challenge the optimistic assessment that war is a relic of the past. The specific ways these conflicts emerge, moreover, point to the possibility that new wars could break out that make even bloody conflicts like those in Syria and Yemen seem relatively minor.
Driven by processes of imperial dysfunction and internal breakdown, today’s wars have causes that are enormously difficult to heal.
The conflicts in the former Soviet Union, from Chechnya in the 1990s to Nagorno-Karabakh today, represent a set of wars in the post-Soviet succession. Russia has attempted to maintain its central role against real and perceived rivals throughout that vast region including transnational Islam, the European Union, the United States, China, and now arguably Turkey.
A segregation board separates men and women at a McDonald’s in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on July 11, 2004.
In the Middle East, revisionist regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran contend for power as the United States continues to loudly proclaim that it is unwilling to continue playing its imperial stabilizing role (even if Washington never actually seems to find the exit).
And China, which once preferred to keep its border disputes quiet, seems increasingly willing to saber-rattle from the Taiwan Straits to the Himalayas.
Any given conflict may have a particular set of causes. But one thing Friedman got right was in looking to changes in the broad international system rather than just focusing on those particularities. And in this case, the common factors are uncertainty about the intentions of the United States and the role of new global challengers.
Much of that uncertainty stems from how the Trump administration and deeper domestic dysfunctions have hobbled U.S. foreign policy. Ironically, even though the doomsayers of the immediate post-Cold War era had predicted that U.S. leadership would collapse because of a challenge from without, the gravest blow came from within. If the catalyst hadn’t been Trump, then it’s likely that some other political entrepreneur would have seized on the opportunities afforded by the polarized U.S. political system to bring about similar results.
Were the Golden Arches theory right, the rise of other countries should not have posed a challenge to U.S. order. Friedman assumed that every country would be bound by globalization to choose from the same limited number of options. In this, he wasn’t alone. Many observers, from policymakers to international relations scholars, made the same bet. And, like him, they also assumed that the United States itself would do whatever it took to maintain a position as a benevolent hegemon upholding the international system. But it turns out that countries are willing to pay an economic price to pursue other values.
We can no longer take for granted the idea that the United States—or any other country—will be bound to be a responsible stakeholder. It’s time to begin thinking about what the next era of world politics will look like.
As I teach my students, I’m haunted by the idea that my assessment of what they need to know will prove as dated and as limited as my professor’s choice of Friedman as a textbook ended up being. At the very least, I can try to avoid errors as catastrophic and hubristic as the lazy confidence in American power that defined my youth.
That means forgoing simple stories and teaching real debates between complex theories. It means taking other countries’ cultures and interests seriously, rather than assuming everyone just wants to be American. Most of all, it means being open about how the only way to make a better world is to work for it, hard.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-26--Why Does Belgium Have the World’s Highest COVID-19 Death Rate?

Why Does Belgium Have the World ’ s Highest COVID-19 Death Rate ?
It used to be , in a not so distant past , that countries were judged on their economic performance , the inclusiveness of their institutions , and their ability to hold democratic elections .
Flash forward to today , and a nation ’ s standing on the international stage hinges less on abstract notions of good governance , and more on something very concrete : its capacity to contain the coronavirus .
Take Belgium , for example .
The country of 11.5 million people sits at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the continent ’ s most powerful institutions .
But that hasn ’ t stopped it from rising to the top of a list no nation wants to be on : It now has the highest coronavirus death rate in the world—1,385 per 1 million residents , according to Worldometer .
In the past two weeks , on average , Belgium registered 3,926 new coronavirus cases and 173 deaths per day .
Belgium ’ s public hospitals , among the best in Europe , have been overwhelmed , admitting almost 700 coronavirus patients @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told to close on Nov. 2 and will stay shuttered for at least another week .
With 180 nationalities , 100 languages spoken , and two out of three residents born abroad , Brussels is one of the world ’ s most cosmopolitan cities .
On one hand , this cultural diversity is what makes Brussels an attractive place to live .
On the other , this hugely mobile population might have inadvertently contributed to the spread of the virus .
“ Belgium is a small beehive in the heart of Europe , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both the introduction and the further spread of the virus , ” said virologist and interfederal COVID-19 spokesperson , Steven Van Gucht .
“ The people working and living in the so-called ‘ Eurobubble ’ travel a great deal , often going back and forth between Belgium and their home country.
” There ’ s also something else : Belgium is a deeply divided country .
A new government was formed in September , with Alexander De Croo named as the prime minister .
But before De Croo ’ s election the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since December 2018 , when its dysfunctional four-party coalition disintegrated .
The two largest parties , the French-speaking Socialists and Flemish separatist N-VA , can ’ t find a way to get along .
The solution was a seven-party coalition across four political groups , nicknamed Vivaldi , after the colors of the four seasons : the Greens , orange for the Flemish Christian-Democrats , blue for the liberals , and red for the socialists .
Decisions regarding foreign affairs , defense , justice , finance , social security , home affairs , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the federal level .
Flanders , Wallonia , and Brussels , defined along linguistic and cultural lines , handle education , culture , youth welfare , and other aspects of health policy as three sovereign entities .
Each region also has its own legislative and executive powers .
On a map , Belgium looks like one country .
But on the ground , it is at least two , arguably three .
During the first wave of infections back in spring , the wealthier Flanders region was the hardest hit of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particularly high .
Now , in this second wave , it is Francophone Wallonia and Brussels that are suffering the most .
As the virus continues to rage , the authorities ’ response has been shaped by regional priorities and political objectives .
When De Croo took his oath a few weeks ago , contrary to the advice of health experts and perhaps as an attempt to unite the country under one single vision , he pointedly said he wanted to avoid a new lockdown : “ Let me be very clear : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ businesses can ’ t handle a new general lockdown.
” The situation described above might seem akin to a failed state , where corruption is endemic and citizens have no rights .
But Belgium is in fact a relatively wealthy nation , with an economy guided by science and technological development .
People from all over the world flock here to work and study .
It is a far cry from Brazil , where I was born , and which is among the three countries with the largest number of confirmed coronavirus cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wear a mask most of the time , keeps on shaking people ’ s hands , disregards social distancing rules , while encouraging his supporters to go out onto the streets to protest against lockdown measures imposed by state governors .
Even after contracting the virus back in July , Bolsonaro continued to play down its seriousness .
The Brazilian federal government ’ s denial of science has led to a failure to coordinate , promote , and finance internationally sanctioned public health measures .
The health ministry has not developed a national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has any other federal government agency .
Against the federal government ’ s inertia , it has been down to state and local officials , as well as civil society groups , to try to put measures in place to mitigate the effects of the virus .
Culture matters .
Both Belgium and Brazil , although different in almost every other way , are federalist nations where general consensus is hard to come by .
People in such countries are encouraged to have different views , speak their minds , and question the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In both nations , the pandemic has helped to expand—not shrink—historical , regional , and societal rifts .
In Belgium , industry-rich Flanders fears it will be the one doing the heavy lifting to get the economy back on its feet .
In Brazil , much like in the United States , mask-wearing has become political , with Bolsonaro supporters dismissing the preventive measures to contain the virus , while the rest of the population does its best to stay safe .
In theory , neither country needed to be in this position @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asked of citizens to avoid the spread of the disease was the bare minimum : stay home , wash your hands , avoid crowds—hardly an effort requiring much in the form of money or technology .
What it did need was something lacking in most Western capitalist societies but found in abundance in other more remote parts of the world : a collective spirit .
Places we tend to hear about only when there ’ s a natural disaster or some kind of political unrest—Mozambique , Senegal , Rwanda , Malaysia , Vietnam—have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on how to act during a global pandemic .
The lesson : Communitarian societies have the social capital and mutual support to allow curfews , self-isolation , quarantining , and social distancing to work , even among the poorest .
The West , on the other hand , addicted to consumption and competition , is currently suffering as much from the pandemic as from the effects of the preventive measures put in place .
A day after the end of the first lockdown in Brussels back in spring , there were queues forming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the city center .
Ultimately , this isn ’ t much about good governments or bad governments as it is about values .
Some of the most successful countries in fighting the pandemic are also some of the most corrupt and repressive .
As awful as Bolsonaro is as president , or dysfunctional Belgium is as a government , the high COVID-19 death toll in both countries could have been avoided if only there was a bit more empathy and solidarity .
Years ago , in London , a Chinese lady told me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wasn ’ t because she was afraid she would catch something from others ; she wore a mask because she didn ’ t want to pass on her germs .
As populations all over the world face lockdown fatigue , people long for a return to normal .
But “ normal ” is what got us here in the first place .
The transmission of this virus is determined by one factor only : people ’ s behavior .
No country , no government—rich or poor , democratic or otherwise—will prevail against this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team players rather than rugged individualists .

It used to be, in a not so distant past, that countries were judged on their economic performance, the inclusiveness of their institutions, and their ability to hold democratic elections.
It used to be, in a not so distant past, that countries were judged on their economic performance, the inclusiveness of their institutions, and their ability to hold democratic elections.
Flash forward to today, and a nation’s standing on the international stage hinges less on abstract notions of good governance, and more on something very concrete: its capacity to contain the coronavirus. Take Belgium, for example.
The country of 11.5 million people sits at the heart of Europe and is home to the continent’s most powerful institutions. But that hasn’t stopped it from rising to the top of a list no nation wants to be on: It now has the highest coronavirus death rate in the world—1,385 per 1 million residents, according to Worldometer.
In the past two weeks, on average, Belgium registered 3,926 new coronavirus cases and 173 deaths per day. Belgium’s public hospitals, among the best in Europe, have been overwhelmed, admitting almost 700 coronavirus patients daily. Non-essential shops and businesses were told to close on Nov. 2 and will stay shuttered for at least another week.
With 180 nationalities, 100 languages spoken, and two out of three residents born abroad, Brussels is one of the world’s most cosmopolitan cities. On one hand, this cultural diversity is what makes Brussels an attractive place to live. On the other, this hugely mobile population might have inadvertently contributed to the spread of the virus.
“Belgium is a small beehive in the heart of Europe, which makes the country very vulnerable to both the introduction and the further spread of the virus,” said virologist and interfederal COVID-19 spokesperson, Steven Van Gucht. “The people working and living in the so-called ‘Eurobubble’ travel a great deal, often going back and forth between Belgium and their home country.”
There’s also something else: Belgium is a deeply divided country. A new government was formed in September, with Alexander De Croo named as the prime minister. But before De Croo’s election the country had been without a fully fledged government since December 2018, when its dysfunctional four-party coalition disintegrated. The two largest parties, the French-speaking Socialists and Flemish separatist N-VA, can’t find a way to get along. The solution was a seven-party coalition across four political groups, nicknamed Vivaldi, after the colors of the four seasons: the Greens, orange for the Flemish Christian-Democrats, blue for the liberals, and red for the socialists.
Since moving to Brussels in 2018, I have been often struck by the lack of national cohesion. The country consists of French-speaking Wallonia in the south and the Dutch-speaking Flanders region in the north. Brussels, the capital, is considered bilingual, but located in the north of the country, finds itself surrounded by a sea of Dutch-speaking towns and cities.
Decisions regarding foreign affairs, defense, justice, finance, social security, home affairs, and certain public health decisions are taken at the federal level. Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels, defined along linguistic and cultural lines, handle education, culture, youth welfare, and other aspects of health policy as three sovereign entities. Each region also has its own legislative and executive powers.
On a map, Belgium looks like one country. But on the ground, it is at least two, arguably three. During the first wave of infections back in spring, the wealthier Flanders region was the hardest hit of the three, with deaths in care homes particularly high. Now, in this second wave, it is Francophone Wallonia and Brussels that are suffering the most.
As the virus continues to rage, the authorities’ response has been shaped by regional priorities and political objectives. When De Croo took his oath a few weeks ago, contrary to the advice of health experts and perhaps as an attempt to unite the country under one single vision, he pointedly said he wanted to avoid a new lockdown: “Let me be very clear: Our country, our economy and our businesses can’t handle a new general lockdown.”
The situation described above might seem akin to a failed state, where corruption is endemic and citizens have no rights. But Belgium is in fact a relatively wealthy nation, with an economy guided by science and technological development. People from all over the world flock here to work and study.
It is a far cry from Brazil, where I was born, and which is among the three countries with the largest number of confirmed coronavirus cases. Right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro refuses to wear a mask most of the time, keeps on shaking people’s hands, disregards social distancing rules, while encouraging his supporters to go out onto the streets to protest against lockdown measures imposed by state governors. Even after contracting the virus back in July, Bolsonaro continued to play down its seriousness.
The Brazilian federal government’s denial of science has led to a failure to coordinate, promote, and finance internationally sanctioned public health measures. The health ministry has not developed a national plan to combat the pandemic, nor has any other federal government agency. Against the federal government’s inertia, it has been down to state and local officials, as well as civil society groups, to try to put measures in place to mitigate the effects of the virus.
Culture matters. Both Belgium and Brazil, although different in almost every other way, are federalist nations where general consensus is hard to come by. People in such countries are encouraged to have different views, speak their minds, and question the central government’s political decisions. In both nations, the pandemic has helped to expand—not shrink—historical, regional, and societal rifts. In Belgium, industry-rich Flanders fears it will be the one doing the heavy lifting to get the economy back on its feet. In Brazil, much like in the United States, mask-wearing has become political, with Bolsonaro supporters dismissing the preventive measures to contain the virus, while the rest of the population does its best to stay safe.
In theory, neither country needed to be in this position. For months, what was being asked of citizens to avoid the spread of the disease was the bare minimum: stay home, wash your hands, avoid crowds—hardly an effort requiring much in the form of money or technology. What it did need was something lacking in most Western capitalist societies but found in abundance in other more remote parts of the world: a collective spirit.
Places we tend to hear about only when there’s a natural disaster or some kind of political unrest—Mozambique, Senegal, Rwanda, Malaysia, Vietnam—have been giving other nations a master class on how to act during a global pandemic. The lesson: Communitarian societies have the social capital and mutual support to allow curfews, self-isolation, quarantining, and social distancing to work, even among the poorest.
The West, on the other hand, addicted to consumption and competition, is currently suffering as much from the pandemic as from the effects of the preventive measures put in place. A day after the end of the first lockdown in Brussels back in spring, there were queues forming outside the H&M store in the city center.
Ultimately, this isn’t much about good governments or bad governments as it is about values. Some of the most successful countries in fighting the pandemic are also some of the most corrupt and repressive. As awful as Bolsonaro is as president, or dysfunctional Belgium is as a government, the high COVID-19 death toll in both countries could have been avoided if only there was a bit more empathy and solidarity. Years ago, in London, a Chinese lady told me the reason why she wore a mask wasn’t because she was afraid she would catch something from others; she wore a mask because she didn’t want to pass on her germs.
As populations all over the world face lockdown fatigue, people long for a return to normal. But “normal” is what got us here in the first place. The transmission of this virus is determined by one factor only: people’s behavior. No country, no government—rich or poor, democratic or otherwise—will prevail against this invisible enemy, unless we all become team players rather than rugged individualists.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-27--The Radicalization of Bangladeshi Cyberspace

At 8:45 pm , five gunmen stormed the Holey Artisan Bakery , an upscale establishment in Dhaka , the capital of Bangladesh .
The siege lasted more than 12 hours .
By the time it was over , 22 people were dead , most of them foreigners .
While other terrorist attacks have occurred in Bangladesh since that fateful evening on July 1 , 2016 , the massacre at Holey Artisan is considered the deadliest terrorist attack in the country ’ s history .
It also triggered new thinking about how to counter violent extremism and gave rise to efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries tackling similar problems .
In the months and years following the incident , Bangladeshi intelligence and police agencies cracked down on sleeper cells and extremist networks .
Their primary focus was on capturing or killing high-profile targets associated with the Islamic State or a local Islamist terrorist network , Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh .
Dozens of suspects were rounded up and arrested ; 20 were eventually charged .
At least seven of them were sentenced to death in Nov. 2019 .
Another eight suspects were killed during counterterrorist operations in different parts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these heavy-handed operations appeared to be ruthlessly effective .
Unlike most of its neighbors , Bangladesh has avoided large-scale extremist violence over the past four years .
Yet beneath the surface , a different picture emerges .
Online radicalization is widespread and increasingly normalized .
A network of violent Islamist extremist groups are spreading hate speech and misinformation across the social media ecosystem .
Bangladeshi police say that more than 80 percent of the people arrested for terrorism in recent years were radicalized online and almost 60 percent were university-educated .
There are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reignite a wave of extremism across Bangladesh .
In fact , there are worrying signs that it is already starting .
In early November , houses belonging to Bangladeshi Hindus were vandalized and torched after one of their occupants was accused of supporting France and defaming Islam on social media .
The previous month , a librarian was lynched and killed after being accused of desecrating the Quran .
The Bangladesh Peace Observatory reported a disturbing increase in attacks , police raids , and arrests in the first nine months of 2020 compared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In recent years , there have been several incidents involving the targeted killing of liberal writers , digital influencers , and LGBTQ activists .
Worries about digital radicalization are hardly new .
Some of the young men involved in the Holey Artisan Bakery attack were lively social media users and actively spread extremist content before the raid .
They were also connected to other Bangladeshis living abroad , including one based in Canada , who helped plan and orchestrate the attack .
Another convicted felon involved in helping plan the strike was first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Awalki , a well-known Al Qaeda leader , as well as Jasimuddin Rhmani , a Bangladeshi preacher affiliated with al Qaeda who later aligned himself with the Islamic State .
But extremist content is growing in Bangladeshi cyberspace , much of it carefully packaged to evade detection by government and social media platforms .
Examples include Jasimuddin Rahmani ’ s sermons on YouTube , which continue accumulating views .
Lectures by Anwar al-Awlaki are routinely translated into Bangla and spread on Telegram , as well as recommended by sympathizers on Facebook .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Islamic State are routinely taken down by social media companies , extremist propaganda in local dialects is available on specialized websites , discussion forums , social media channels , and even fact-checking sites where the curators add their own radical twist .
The spread of violent extremist ideology in cyberspace has real-world impacts .
In recent years , there have been several incidents involving the targeted killing of liberal writers , digital influencers , and LGBTQ activists .
Extremist groups affiliated with al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent ( AQIS ) are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islam .
AQIS has an active presence on social media , though its followers generally avoid perpetrating staged acts of violence and tangling with Bangladeshi security agencies .
Instead , they are stealthily targeting their enemies and normalizing hatred against “ atheists ” and “ blasphemers.
” AQIS is disseminating divisive and intolerant narratives in Bangladeshi cyberspace .
One of their goals is to persuade Muslims that “ real ” Islam does not support peace and tolerance .
Instead , they are urging what they call an “ intellectual jihad ” in order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They are waging a war of ideas , with hardline supporters exhorting followers to reject sanctions against polygamy , child marriage , and slavery .
They are staunchly opposed to equal rights for women and routinely urge their followers to target blasphemers and secular liberals .
AQIS is also working to discredit the government and international organizations , including their attempts to promote religious tolerance and moderate forms of Islam .
Owing to a combination of skillfully produced videos and viral content , AQIS is making impressive inroads among younger impressionable audiences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of armed jihad , glorification of terrorist groups , calls for attacks against liberal activists , and propaganda condemning minorities—is soaring .
According to SecDev research , the number of interactions per Facebook post on violent extremist channels has surged by 250 percent in only one year , from an average of 99 interactions per post between April and June 2019 to 347 per post during the same months in 2020 .
This is partly due to the simultaneous growth of Islamist bloggers expressing support for AQIS .
Paradoxically , the COVID-19 pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even wider audience .
Internet use exploded by over 50 percent across Bangladesh since the outbreak was first reported in early 2020 .
Violent extremists took advantage of increased connectivity to pull audiences into their webs of influence .
In May 2020 , just seven AQIS channels on YouTube featuring content related to COVID-19 registered a surge of over 100,000 new subscriptions .
With the government distracted by the crisis , online radicalization has soared .
Domestic and international authorities are not taking the weaponization of social media lightly .
Shortly after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bangladeshi authorities joined forces with the United Nations to tackle violent extremism , both online and off .
For example , they are working with a variety of entities such as the Bangladesh Peace Observatory and Cox ’ s Bazar Analysis and Research Unit to study the scope and scale of the challenge .
With support from international partners , they also launched targeted programs to engage youth , including a digital peace movement involving over 1.9 million people .
Their aim is to inspire younger Bangladeshis to express solidarity online , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups , especially minorities .
The promotion of tolerance , inclusion , and digital literacy is the key to changing attitudes and , ultimately , behavior .
Helping people of all ages to identify , question , and interpret what they read and share on social media is the first step in neutralizing divisive , exclusionary and ultimately hateful rhetoric designed to divide and polarize communities .
Mindful of the reputational risks , technology companies such as Facebook are stepping up their monitoring and strengthening content moderation policies .
There are hopeful signs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diminish extremist content in Bangladeshi cyberspace .
In recent months , the extent of disinformation related to COVID-19 has declined steadily .
Dozens of extremist channels have been removed , although AQIS ’ s YouTube account still has over 600,000 subscribers .
SecDev documented a 43 percent reduction of extremist content on roughly 400 social media channels between April and September 2020 .
Indeed , over 90 percent of Bangla channels affiliated with the Islamic State were removed between April and June 2020 .
That said , these kinds of channels are resilient @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after being shut down .
Mindful of the reputational risks , technology companies such as Facebook are stepping up their monitoring and strengthening content moderation policies .
Facebook recently said that it now has fact-checkers monitoring posts in Bangla and has added “ false information ” tags to fake news and misinformation .
Around 70 percent of the COVID-19-related disinformation posts identified by SecDev on Facebook have been removed or made inaccessible to the public .
Other technology firms also appear to be moving to bolster their ability to detect and neutralize extremist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worsen before they improve .
Social media use is expanding rapidly in Bangladesh and around the world .
Efforts to solve the challenges of radicalization , misinformation , and disinformation must necessarily move beyond the whack-a-mole approach that still defines content moderation and account takedowns .
Education , awareness-raising , and targeted investment in digital natives is ultimately the only way to fight violent extremism over the long term .
This must be accompanied by a sustained debate about how to balance legitimate freedom of expression with the need for building a safer @ @

At 8:45 pm, five gunmen stormed the Holey Artisan Bakery, an upscale establishment in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. The siege lasted more than 12 hours. By the time it was over, 22 people were dead, most of them foreigners. While other terrorist attacks have occurred in Bangladesh since that fateful evening on July 1, 2016, the massacre at Holey Artisan is considered the deadliest terrorist attack in the country's history. It also triggered new thinking about how to counter violent extremism and gave rise to efforts that can serve as a model for other countries tackling similar problems.
At 8:45 pm, five gunmen stormed the Holey Artisan Bakery, an upscale establishment in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. The siege lasted more than 12 hours. By the time it was over, 22 people were dead, most of them foreigners. While other terrorist attacks have occurred in Bangladesh since that fateful evening on July 1, 2016, the massacre at Holey Artisan is considered the deadliest terrorist attack in the country’s history. It also triggered new thinking about how to counter violent extremism and gave rise to efforts that can serve as a model for other countries tackling similar problems.
In the months and years following the incident, Bangladeshi intelligence and police agencies cracked down on sleeper cells and extremist networks. Their primary focus was on capturing or killing high-profile targets associated with the Islamic State or a local Islamist terrorist network, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. Dozens of suspects were rounded up and arrested; 20 were eventually charged. At least seven of them were sentenced to death in Nov. 2019. Another eight suspects were killed during counterterrorist operations in different parts of the country.
To some observers, these heavy-handed operations appeared to be ruthlessly effective. Unlike most of its neighbors, Bangladesh has avoided large-scale extremist violence over the past four years. Yet beneath the surface, a different picture emerges. Online radicalization is widespread and increasingly normalized. A network of violent Islamist extremist groups are spreading hate speech and misinformation across the social media ecosystem. Bangladeshi police say that more than 80 percent of the people arrested for terrorism in recent years were radicalized online and almost 60 percent were university-educated.
There are fears that online rumors and misinformation could reignite a wave of extremism across Bangladesh. In fact, there are worrying signs that it is already starting. In early November, houses belonging to Bangladeshi Hindus were vandalized and torched after one of their occupants was accused of supporting France and defaming Islam on social media. The previous month, a librarian was lynched and killed after being accused of desecrating the Quran. The Bangladesh Peace Observatory reported a disturbing increase in attacks, police raids, and arrests in the first nine months of 2020 compared with the same period in 2019.
In recent years, there have been several incidents involving the targeted killing of liberal writers, digital influencers, and LGBTQ activists.
Worries about digital radicalization are hardly new. Some of the young men involved in the Holey Artisan Bakery attack were lively social media users and actively spread extremist content before the raid. They were also connected to other Bangladeshis living abroad, including one based in Canada, who helped plan and orchestrate the attack. Another convicted felon involved in helping plan the strike was first radicalized after watching videos produced by Anwar al-Awalki, a well-known Al Qaeda leader, as well as Jasimuddin Rhmani, a Bangladeshi preacher affiliated with al Qaeda who later aligned himself with the Islamic State.
But extremist content is growing in Bangladeshi cyberspace, much of it carefully packaged to evade detection by government and social media platforms. Examples include Jasimuddin Rahmani’s sermons on YouTube, which continue accumulating views. Lectures by Anwar al-Awlaki are routinely translated into Bangla and spread on Telegram, as well as recommended by sympathizers on Facebook. While sites sponsored by notorious groups such as the Islamic State are routinely taken down by social media companies, extremist propaganda in local dialects is available on specialized websites, discussion forums, social media channels, and even fact-checking sites where the curators add their own radical twist.
The spread of violent extremist ideology in cyberspace has real-world impacts. In recent years, there have been several incidents involving the targeted killing of liberal writers, digital influencers, and LGBTQ activists. Extremist groups affiliated with al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) are increasingly regarded as champions of socially conservative Islam. AQIS has an active presence on social media, though its followers generally avoid perpetrating staged acts of violence and tangling with Bangladeshi security agencies. Instead, they are stealthily targeting their enemies and normalizing hatred against “atheists” and “blasphemers.”
AQIS is disseminating divisive and intolerant narratives in Bangladeshi cyberspace. One of their goals is to persuade Muslims that “real” Islam does not support peace and tolerance. Instead, they are urging what they call an “intellectual jihad” in order to overcome the corrosive influence of infidels. They are waging a war of ideas, with hardline supporters exhorting followers to reject sanctions against polygamy, child marriage, and slavery. They are staunchly opposed to equal rights for women and routinely urge their followers to target blasphemers and secular liberals. AQIS is also working to discredit the government and international organizations, including their attempts to promote religious tolerance and moderate forms of Islam.
Owing to a combination of skillfully produced videos and viral content, AQIS is making impressive inroads among younger impressionable audiences. The sharing of violent extremist content—endorsements of armed jihad, glorification of terrorist groups, calls for attacks against liberal activists, and propaganda condemning minorities—is soaring. According to SecDev research, the number of interactions per Facebook post on violent extremist channels has surged by 250 percent in only one year, from an average of 99 interactions per post between April and June 2019 to 347 per post during the same months in 2020. This is partly due to the simultaneous growth of Islamist bloggers expressing support for AQIS.
Paradoxically, the COVID-19 pandemic has helped opportunistic extremist groups reach an even wider audience. Internet use exploded by over 50 percent across Bangladesh since the outbreak was first reported in early 2020. Violent extremists took advantage of increased connectivity to pull audiences into their webs of influence. In May 2020, just seven AQIS channels on YouTube featuring content related to COVID-19 registered a surge of over 100,000 new subscriptions. With the government distracted by the crisis, online radicalization has soared.
Domestic and international authorities are not taking the weaponization of social media lightly. Shortly after the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attacks, the Bangladeshi authorities joined forces with the United Nations to tackle violent extremism, both online and off. For example, they are working with a variety of entities such as the Bangladesh Peace Observatory to study the scope and scale of the challenge. With support from international partners, they also launched targeted programs to engage youth, including a digital peace movement involving over 1.9 million people.
Their aim is to inspire younger Bangladeshis to express solidarity online, while also bolstering the resilience of more vulnerable groups, especially minorities. The promotion of tolerance, inclusion, and digital literacy is the key to changing attitudes and, ultimately, behavior. Helping people of all ages to identify, question, and interpret what they read and share on social media is the first step in neutralizing divisive, exclusionary and ultimately hateful rhetoric designed to divide and polarize communities.
Mindful of the reputational risks, technology companies such as Facebook are stepping up their monitoring and strengthening content moderation policies.
There are hopeful signs that these kinds of efforts will help diminish extremist content in Bangladeshi cyberspace. In recent months, the extent of disinformation related to COVID-19 has declined steadily. Dozens of extremist channels have been removed, although AQIS’s YouTube account still has over 600,000 subscribers. SecDev documented a 43 percent reduction of extremist content on roughly 400 social media channels between April and September 2020. Indeed, over 90 percent of Bangla channels affiliated with the Islamic State were removed between April and June 2020. That said, these kinds of channels are resilient and often reappear under new names soon after being shut down.
Mindful of the reputational risks, technology companies such as Facebook are stepping up their monitoring and strengthening content moderation policies. Facebook recently said that it now has fact-checkers monitoring posts in Bangla and has added “false information” tags to fake news and misinformation. Around 70 percent of the COVID-19-related disinformation posts identified by SecDev on Facebook have been removed or made inaccessible to the public. Other technology firms also appear to be moving to bolster their ability to detect and neutralize extremist material.
These challenges are likely to worsen before they improve. Social media use is expanding rapidly in Bangladesh and around the world. Efforts to solve the challenges of radicalization, misinformation, and disinformation must necessarily move beyond the whack-a-mole approach that still defines content moderation and account takedowns. Education, awareness-raising, and targeted investment in digital natives is ultimately the only way to fight violent extremism over the long term. This must be accompanied by a sustained debate about how to balance legitimate freedom of expression with the need for building a safer cyberspace.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-27--After the Travel Collapse, Build Tourism Back Better

After the Travel Collapse , Build Tourism Back Better U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s ambitious goals include strengthening the country ’ s middle class , making the environment a top priority across the government , and building the economy back better after so many livelihoods have been shattered by the coronavirus pandemic .
A revitalized national tourism policy could be a big part of the solution for all three issues .
To get an idea how that could work , take a look at Key West , an island off the southern tip of Florida .
On Nov. 3 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were fixed on the U.S. presidential election , the voters of Key West passed three landmark measures to dramatically reduce cruise ship traffic docking in their small , historic town .
A citizen-led movement successfully argued that years of unregulated big-cruise tourism had taken too great a toll on the environment , public health , local businesses , and the town ’ s very way of life .
By margins as large as 81 percent , the island city voted to reduce the number of ships allowed to dock , ban the largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ environmental records of the smaller vessels that will still be allowed to visit the island .
Voters were opting for an end to frenzied crowds and polluted water , and in favor of something closer to sustainable or ecotourism .
Both the locals and their visitors will be better off this way .
But this vote was about far more than one town ’ s battle against cruise ships .
It ’ s part of a backlash following many years of government neglect during a phase of relentless growth of tourism .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overtourism has not only overrun , disfigured , and polluted places such as Key West , Barcelona , and Venice , but also spoiled destinations and ruined vacations for many travelers as well .
In real time , Americans saw how travel and tourism is the $ 1.6-trillion glue holding much of the U.S. economy together .
In the era before the pandemic , the $ 8 trillion global tourism industry was celebrated for underpinning economies around the world , including that of the United States , where the money spent by foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ earnings .
( Because the money technically comes in from abroad , spending by visitors is booked as exports . )
Those numbers mask the furor at the unacknowledged damage tourism was doing to local life , the environment , and visitors ’ ability to appreciate the places they were visiting .
It took the pandemic to bring the issue to a head .
The tsunami-like spread of the coronavirus brought the global travel industry to an abrupt halt .
The world went from too much tourism to no tourism at all .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ neither across international borders nor even across town .
Overnight , we all discovered the contradictory powers of the travel and tourism industry .
In real time , Americans saw how travel and tourism is the $ 1.6-trillion glue holding much of the U.S. economy together .
Yet they also saw how it is a formidable environmental threat that pollutes their air and water and contributes to the climate crisis .
Without tourism , seemingly solid industries such as airlines , hotels , restaurants , and department stores tanked—the list is almost endless @ @ @ @ @ @ @ especially states like Hawaii and Nevada , where tourism represents more than 20 percent of the economy .
Many livelihoods were lost , and that loss could be forever .
At the same time , with airplanes grounded and many factories shuttered , skies were suddenly blue for weeks and months .
People could see horizons ; deep into northern India , the Himalayas were visible again .
Without tourists crowding the seashores , turtles returned to hatch on sandy beaches from Florida to Brazil .
In Malaysia , otters were back in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boats moored , the Mediterranean was no longer as murky .
In Venice , swans were paddling in the suddenly quiet , clear-watered canals .
In Thailand , where all beaches and islands were closed off to tourists and tourist ships , fish and marine mammals multiplied .
California shores saw more whales than usual .
Without tourism , the environment recovered , at least temporarily .
This also raises a big red flag about the effect that the development of travel and tourism has had on climate change .
Government neglect began @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then the speaker of the House of Representatives , launched a successful effort to eliminate the U.S. Travel and Tourism Administration—with the acquiescence of the administration of then-President Bill Clinton .
Gingrich argued that the federal government had no business coordinating or regulating tourism , corresponding to the long-standing Republican philosophy that government is the problem , not the solution .
This couldn ’ t have been more inane .
Government , almost by definition , is at the heart of tourism .
The U.S. federal government issues tourist visas , oversees borders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parks and cultural institutions that draw tourists , and promotes tourism and cultural exchanges as one of the country ’ s soft-power assets .
Individual states depend on the federal government in all things tourism .
Gingrich ’ s timing came at the worst possible moment for U.S. tourism .
The 1990s marked the start of globalization , which turned travel and tourism into the global juggernaut it is today , capable of making or breaking countries and cultures .
With open borders , rising incomes , and technological advances , the number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million annual trips in 1996 to over 1 billion 20 years later .
Yet at this precise moment , the U.S. government no longer recognized tourism as a significant issue .
Clinton had already withdrawn the United States from the United Nations World Tourism Organization in 1995 .
In the following years , without a national policy , tourism became Balkanized , with no overall direction and only piecemeal regulation .
Local watchdogs and civic groups pushed for green , smart , or sustainable tourism , but with little success .
Things were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tourism industry had to implore the George W. Bush administration just to create a simple website promoting tourism to the United States .
The incoming Biden administration now has a rare window of opportunity to reverse this anti-government stance , bring tourism back into the policy mix , and make it a 21st-century soft-power , environmental , and economic asset .

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s ambitious goals include strengthening the country’s middle class, making the environment a top priority across the government, and building the economy back better after so many livelihoods have been shattered by the coronavirus pandemic.
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s ambitious goals include strengthening the country’s middle class, making the environment a top priority across the government, and building the economy back better after so many livelihoods have been shattered by the coronavirus pandemic.
A revitalized national tourism policy could be a big part of the solution for all three issues. To get an idea how that could work, take a look at Key West, an island off the southern tip of Florida.
On Nov. 3, when the world’s eyes were fixed on the U.S. presidential election, the voters of Key West passed three landmark measures to dramatically reduce cruise ship traffic docking in their small, historic town. A citizen-led movement successfully argued that years of unregulated big-cruise tourism had taken too great a toll on the environment, public health, local businesses, and the town’s very way of life. By margins as large as 81 percent, the island city voted to reduce the number of ships allowed to dock, ban the largest cruise ships outright, and require clean environmental records of the smaller vessels that will still be allowed to visit the island. Voters were opting for an end to frenzied crowds and polluted water, and in favor of something closer to sustainable or ecotourism. Both the locals and their visitors will be better off this way.
But this vote was about far more than one town’s battle against cruise ships. It’s part of a backlash following many years of government neglect during a phase of relentless growth of tourism. It’s become a truism that modern overtourism has not only overrun, disfigured, and polluted places such as Key West, Barcelona, and Venice, but also spoiled destinations and ruined vacations for many travelers as well.
In real time, Americans saw how travel and tourism is the $1.6-trillion glue holding much of the U.S. economy together.
In the era before the pandemic, the $8 trillion global tourism industry was celebrated for underpinning economies around the world, including that of the United States, where the money spent by foreign visitors accounts for 11 percent of export earnings. (Because the money technically comes in from abroad, spending by visitors is booked as exports.) Those numbers mask the furor at the unacknowledged damage tourism was doing to local life, the environment, and visitors’ ability to appreciate the places they were visiting.
It took the pandemic to bring the issue to a head. The tsunami-like spread of the coronavirus brought the global travel industry to an abrupt halt. The world went from too much tourism to no tourism at all. Lockdowns meant that no one moved, neither across international borders nor even across town. Overnight, we all discovered the contradictory powers of the travel and tourism industry.
In real time, Americans saw how travel and tourism is the $1.6-trillion glue holding much of the U.S. economy together. Yet they also saw how it is a formidable environmental threat that pollutes their air and water and contributes to the climate crisis.
Without tourism, seemingly solid industries such as airlines, hotels, restaurants, and department stores tanked—the list is almost endless. Every U.S. state suffered, but especially states like Hawaii and Nevada, where tourism represents more than 20 percent of the economy. Many livelihoods were lost, and that loss could be forever.
At the same time, with airplanes grounded and many factories shuttered, skies were suddenly blue for weeks and months. People could see horizons; deep into northern India, the Himalayas were visible again. Without tourists crowding the seashores, turtles returned to hatch on sandy beaches from Florida to Brazil. In Malaysia, otters were back in lakes. With cruise ships and pleasure boats moored, the Mediterranean was no longer as murky. In Venice, swans were paddling in the suddenly quiet, clear-watered canals. In Thailand, where all beaches and islands were closed off to tourists and tourist ships, fish and marine mammals multiplied. California shores saw more whales than usual. Without tourism, the environment recovered, at least temporarily. This also raises a big red flag about the effect that the development of travel and tourism has had on climate change.
Government neglect began in 1996, when Newt Gingrich, then the speaker of the House of Representatives, launched a successful effort to eliminate the U.S. Travel and Tourism Administration—with the acquiescence of the administration of then-President Bill Clinton. Gingrich argued that the federal government had no business coordinating or regulating tourism, corresponding to the long-standing Republican philosophy that government is the problem, not the solution.
This couldn’t have been more inane. Government, almost by definition, is at the heart of tourism. The U.S. federal government issues tourist visas, oversees borders, regulates environmental impacts, funds national parks and cultural institutions that draw tourists, and promotes tourism and cultural exchanges as one of the country’s soft-power assets. Individual states depend on the federal government in all things tourism.
Gingrich’s timing came at the worst possible moment for U.S. tourism. The 1990s marked the start of globalization, which turned travel and tourism into the global juggernaut it is today, capable of making or breaking countries and cultures. With open borders, rising incomes, and technological advances, the number of international trips exploded from some 500 million annual trips in 1996 to over 1 billion 20 years later.
Yet at this precise moment, the U.S. government no longer recognized tourism as a significant issue. Clinton had already withdrawn the United States from the United Nations World Tourism Organization in 1995. In the following years, without a national policy, tourism became Balkanized, with no overall direction and only piecemeal regulation. Local watchdogs and civic groups pushed for green, smart, or sustainable tourism, but with little success. Things were so disorganized that representatives of the U.S. tourism industry had to implore the George W. Bush administration just to create a simple website promoting tourism to the United States.
The incoming Biden administration now has a rare window of opportunity to reverse this anti-government stance, bring tourism back into the policy mix, and make it a 21st-century soft-power, environmental, and economic asset.