foreignpolicy--2020-03-07--What Does Super Tuesday Mean for U.S. Foreign Policy?

What Does Super Tuesday Mean for U.S. Foreign Policy ?
Emma Ashford : Hey Matt , welcome to the first of our ( hopefully many ! )
debates .
The Super Tuesday results surprised a lot of people , but the narrowing of the 2020 race also brings some things into focus when it comes to what the U.S. government ’ s policies might look like a year from now .
Let ’ s kick things off today with a discussion of the Democratic primary and where it ’ s going on foreign policy .
It ’ s increasingly looking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fight , which means a competition between two candidates with some pretty different foreign-policy views .
What ’ s your take post-Super Tuesday ?
Matthew Kroenig : Hi Emma , it is great to be doing this column with you .
We ’ ve had the opportunity to debate onstage at events around town .
In October , for example , I released a report arguing that now is the time for Washington to double down on , not retrench from , U.S. global leadership .
You countered that the United States was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role and its interventions often made things worse , not better .
Other than finding my recommendations impossible and misguided , I think you were a big fan of the report .
EA : Putting aside the content , I thought the copy-editing and printing of the report were great !
But , more seriously , I think you and I disagree on most of the fundamentals of U.S. foreign policy .
I ’ m a millennial , and like most of my generation , I want to see an American foreign policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world but is less focused on military primacy and more in tune with the balance of power as it is today , rather than it was in 1991 .
Arguing about all of this here will really let us drill down on the big disagreements in U.S. foreign policy today .
Do the Democratic candidates even have foreign-policy views ?
You wouldn ’ t know it from watching the debates .
MK : Definitely .
Turning to the substantive issues , do the Democratic candidates even have foreign-policy views ?
You wouldn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
EA : That ’ s true .
You really have to go read their websites , watch their speeches , or try to read the tea leaves in profiles of their foreign-policy advisors ( like this one ) to get a picture of what the candidates are actually thinking on foreign policy , since the debate moderators just aren ’ t asking those questions .
But the upside is that at this point we ’ re left with two candidates—Biden and Sanders—who have about 100 years of public life between them to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bit easier to understand the pros and cons of their views than I did for , say , Pete Buttigieg .
MK : Yes .
In all seriousness , I think they are offering very different foreign-policy visions .
Biden is trying to promise a return to a kind of pre-Trump style of American international engagement .
While Sanders really is more preoccupied with domestic policy and does seem to show a worrying level of admiration for communist and socialist regimes abroad .
EA : I tend to think of Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Great Again.
” And that ’ s even if we ignore his many gaffes on foreign policy , like his bizarre fixation on partitioning Iraq .
The pieces that he ’ s published on foreign policy all make the same big point : U.S. foreign policy was great once ( before Donald Trump became president ) , and it will be again if we just embrace the United States ’ role as a global leader .
Sanders—putting aside the issue of his praise for Cuba—seems to be more of the view that U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that we should acknowledge the bad while continuing the good .
It ’ s a view I share .
MK : I think most people could agree that we should continue the good and discontinue the bad , the question is what goes in each category , and I ’ m afraid that Sanders would throw out the baby with the bathwater .
I ’ ve heard too little praise from him about the remarkable role the United States has played in bringing about unprecedented levels of global peace , prosperity , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And I ’ m afraid that Biden thinks he can turn back the clock to 1995 ( or 2008 ) and hasn ’ t quite come to grips with how much has changed—like the return of great-power competition , especially with China ; new technologies like AI ; and rising nationalist and populist sentiments across the West .
EA : I think it ’ s interesting , though , that the two of them do agree on some things , and it ’ s mostly on the “ bad ” of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the war on terror , that we should distance ourselves from bad allies like Saudi Arabia and Turkey , and the challenges posed by rising authoritarian states that U.S. foreign policy hasn ’ t adequately dealt with .
It ’ s just that Biden thinks it can be fixed by simply returning to the status quo ante-Trump , while Bernie wants more radical change .
MK : Yes .
Avoiding dumb wars in the Middle East has become as popular as motherhood and apple pie on both sides of the aisle .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is important to draw a distinction between those like China , Russia , and Iran that are actively seeking to challenge a U.S.-led system , and those like Saudi Arabia , that—while they undoubtedly have poor human rights records—work with the United States to advance other important interests , such as countering Iran ’ s destabilizing activities in the Middle East .
EA : Well that ’ s another place where you and I disagree .
America does sometimes have to work with autocrats , but Mohammed bin Salman isn ’ t just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has increased tensions with Iran , effectively destroyed Yemen , and helped to destabilize other regional states .
It would be far better for U.S. national security to distance the United States from the Saudis and pursue a more balanced approach to the region .
The Democratic candidates are pretty much agreed on that , too .
In fact , policy toward Saudi Arabia and Iran is one of the big shifts in the Democratic Party in the last few years , mostly thanks to the Saudi-ordered killing of Jamal Khashoggi and Mohammed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on regional foreign policy .
Even Biden , who has a long history of support for Saudi Arabia , is now supportive of a much looser relationship with the kingdom .
And both candidates have clearly stated that they ’ ll rejoin the Iran nuclear deal without new preconditions .
MK : You ’ re right ( and it ’ s unfortunate , in my view ) that Middle East policy has become so highly politicized in recent years .
I ’ d also add Israel to the list .
But , do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ return to the Iran deal if elected ?
Like Trump ’ s approach or not , he has created real pressure on Tehran and given the U.S. government new leverage , and it would be foolish in my view not to exploit that for a better deal .
EA : Trump has certainly created new pressure and economic pain in Tehran .
I ’ m not convinced we ’ re any closer to new concessions on the nuclear issue though—or on anything else .
Iran is no longer abiding by many of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many critics ’ main argument was that the nuclear deal was bad because its provisions—like those on uranium enrichment thresholds—eventually expired , then all Trump has succeeded in doing by withdrawing is hastening the arrival of that reality .
I think for Democratic candidates , the problem is going to be one of timing .
The deal is on life support at the moment , leaving a new administration very little time to get back in and resolve existing issues .
But either way , I doubt Sanders or Biden would continue Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
MK : I just don ’ t think they could return to the exact terms of the nuclear deal .
As you point out , the clock has been ticking , and some of the most important provisions are already about to expire .
So , at a minimum , I would think a new president would want to renegotiate longer timelines .
And there are signs that even the Europeans are coming around to a tougher approach , with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson expressing interest in a Trump deal .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I think the question for a Democratic president may end up being how to salvage something on Iran policy out of the wreckage of the Trump administration .
That ’ s unfortunate , because the deal with Iran was actually a substantive achievement of the Obama administration .
In three years , Trump has taken Washington from its best relations with Tehran since 1979 to some of the highest hostility levels in the last four decades .
It ’ s not clear if a new Democratic administration could fix the mess even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the AIPAC conference would have been practically obligatory for a Democratic candidate a decade ago .
Now we ’ re in a situation where the first potential Jewish president has called the Israeli prime minister a racist .
But what about Israel ?
You mentioned the growing partisan divide on it , and it ’ s been fascinating to watch this week , just as everyone was distracted by Super Tuesday , the Democratic field almost all rejecting the idea of attending the annual AIPAC conference in Washington .
Showing up would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a Democratic candidate a decade ago .
Now we ’ re in a situation where the first potential Jewish president has called the Israeli prime minister a racist , and AIPAC a platform for bigotry .
MK : I think that ’ s a tragedy .
U.S. foreign policy in Asia and Europe is easy because our allies for the most part share our values and interests .
Japan and Norway , for example , are both democracies , and they share our concerns about the threats posed by China and Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
There are countries we need to work with to advance important interests , but they don ’ t share our values .
Israel is the lone exception .
It should be easy for Republicans and Democrats to support a country with a vibrant democracy and innovative economy that shares many of our most important priorities in the region , including countering Iran and the Islamic State .
But I ’ m guessing you see it differently ?
EA : I ’ m sympathetic to the arguments that the United States has a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even perhaps a moral obligation to do so .
But I think what we ’ ve seen in the last few years is an Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu that has done its best to create a partisan split within the United States when it comes to Israel .
His government has also pursued an approach to the peace process that is completely uncompromising , backing Jared Kushner ’ s absurd peace plan that allows for the annexation of much of the West Bank and includes land swaps that could disenfranchise much of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I ’ m also strongly sympathetic to the arguments coming out of the Democratic Party that Israel under Netanyahu is moving away from those shared values and undermining any prospect for peace .
MK : I don ’ t know that Netanyahu is trying to drive a wedge ; I think he knows he needs American support regardless of who is in office .
I see it more as Democratic candidates reacting to Trump ’ s visible efforts to improve U.S.-Israeli relations after they soured in the Obama years .
I agree that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unlikely to work .
But neither has any other approach we ’ ve tried over the decades .
And honestly I ’ m surprised how much attention this issue still receives .
Israel-Palestine is not in the top 10 U.S. foreign-policy priorities in my view .
EA : That ’ s certainly true .
It sucks up so much time and attention that could be devoted to other matters .
What about Afghanistan and the Trump administration ’ s new peace deal ?
It seems to me that there are some subtle differences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but they might not be obvious to the casual observer .
MK : Well , first on the deal itself .
It seems to me like the United States had three options : 1 ) cut and run ; 2 ) continue a small war indefinitely ; 3 ) work for a political settlement .
They ’ re going for option three , with option two as the backup .
It seems like a sensible approach to a hard problem .
What do you see as the differences between Biden and Sanders ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to slightly more studied observers .
EA : I ’ m pretty confident that a Sanders administration would pursue option three—as you put it—with option one as a backup .
Biden would probably do the same as Trump : maintain a small counterterrorism force indefinitely , and not necessarily withdraw in the absence of a political settlement .
I have to say—unless you believe the sunk cost fallacy is , well , a fallacy—Bernie ’ s approach seems to make a lot more sense to me .
MK : America has shown that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Afghanistan with military force alone , but it can also avoid losing at an acceptable cost , and to me that is the better fallback .
EA : I think you have more in common with Joe Biden than you might think !
And for me , it ’ s this hedging that ’ s the key distinction between Bernie and Biden .
On many issues , Sanders has taken a strong stance that he ’ d probably follow through on : distance from Saudi Arabia ; withdraw from Afghanistan ; avoid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has made statements that sound similar , if you look closely , he ’ s also got a backup option for taking a more moderate stance .
MK : I do tend to side with Biden over Sanders on most of these issues .
I ’ m not sure Bernie would be able to follow through on his promises , though .
He might be mugged by reality when in the Oval Office .
Remember , Barack Obama was going to close Guantánamo .
EA : The White House is pretty uniquely powerful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I agree with you that it ’ s not all-powerful .
Obama faced a lot of pushback , and he was far more moderate than Sanders .
But a lot has changed over the last four years , and I think even the center of the Democratic Party has moved closer to where Sanders is on foreign policy .
Which just makes it even more depressing that the remaining nominees are all septuagenarians whose formative foreign-policy experiences came in an era when the Soviet Union still existed .
MK : Speaking of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the candidates have openly disagreed is on Sanders ’ s past support for socialist and communist regimes .
Do you think this is a legitimate criticism , or was Stephen Walt correct when he wrote on this site a few days ago that Americans need to grow up , stop moralizing , and learn that the United States will sometimes need to deal with unsavory characters ?
EA : I think it ’ s a fair criticism of Sanders .
There are two parts to it , though .
Walt is correct that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But there ’ s also the politics of it .
Bernie ’ s insistence that he was right on these issues and no one should question him is just stupid politics .
How hard is it to say , “ Dictators are bad , and I probably shouldn ’ t have said that ” ?
MK : Yes .
I ’ d disagree with Walt , however , in that U.S. support for democracy is not just pie-in-the-sky idealism , it ’ s also a tool of hard power .
As I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is one of the best instruments the United States has to mobilize democratic allies and partners to counter threats from revisionist , autocratic powers , like China .
I hope we can take up the China issue in our next debate .
EA : True .
We didn ’ t even talk about China .
But I do think on this , and on many other things , that Biden is advocating for something like what you just outlined : America leading the world and spreading democracy .
It ’ s like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While Sanders—despite being of the same generation—is a lot more circumspect about what the United States can achieve in the world , and much clearer that the goal is not to spread democracy , but to protect it here at home .
MK : The unipolar moment has ended ?
America shouldn ’ t spread democracy ?
Clearly , we have a lot more to argue about .
Can we try this again ?
Same time , same place , two weeks from now ?

Emma Ashford: Hey Matt, welcome to the first of our (hopefully many!) debates. The Super Tuesday results surprised a lot of people, but the narrowing of the 2020 race also brings some things into focus when it comes to what the U.S. government’s policies might look like a year from now.
Emma Ashford: Hey Matt, welcome to the first of our (hopefully many!) debates. The Super Tuesday results surprised a lot of people, but the narrowing of the 2020 race also brings some things into focus when it comes to what the U.S. government’s policies might look like a year from now.
Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
Let’s kick things off today with a discussion of the Democratic primary and where it’s going on foreign policy. It’s increasingly looking like a Joe Biden vs. Bernie Sanders fight, which means a competition between two candidates with some pretty different foreign-policy views. What’s your take post-Super Tuesday?
Matthew Kroenig: Hi Emma, it is great to be doing this column with you. We’ve had the opportunity to debate onstage at events around town. In October, for example, I released a report arguing that now is the time for Washington to double down on, not retrench from, U.S. global leadership. You countered that the United States was not powerful enough to continue its post-1945 role and its interventions often made things worse, not better. Other than finding my recommendations impossible and misguided, I think you were a big fan of the report.
EA: Putting aside the content, I thought the copy-editing and printing of the report were great! But, more seriously, I think you and I disagree on most of the fundamentals of U.S. foreign policy. I’m a millennial, and like most of my generation, I want to see an American foreign policy that’s fully engaged with the world but is less focused on military primacy and more in tune with the balance of power as it is today, rather than it was in 1991. Arguing about all of this here will really let us drill down on the big disagreements in U.S. foreign policy today.
Do the Democratic candidates even have foreign-policy views? You wouldn’t know it from watching the debates.
MK: Definitely. Turning to the substantive issues, do the Democratic candidates even have foreign-policy views? You wouldn’t know it from watching the debates.
EA: That’s true. You really have to go read their websites, watch their speeches, or try to read the tea leaves in profiles of their foreign-policy advisors (like this one) to get a picture of what the candidates are actually thinking on foreign policy, since the debate moderators just aren’t asking those questions.
But the upside is that at this point we’re left with two candidates—Biden and Sanders—who have about 100 years of public life between them to analyze. So I find it a bit easier to understand the pros and cons of their views than I did for, say, Pete Buttigieg.
MK: Yes. In all seriousness, I think they are offering very different foreign-policy visions. Biden is trying to promise a return to a kind of pre-Trump style of American international engagement. While Sanders really is more preoccupied with domestic policy and does seem to show a worrying level of admiration for communist and socialist regimes abroad.
EA: I tend to think of Biden’s foreign policy as “Make American Exceptionalism Great Again.” And that’s even if we ignore his many gaffes on foreign policy, like his bizarre fixation on partitioning Iraq. The pieces that he’s published on foreign policy all make the same big point: U.S. foreign policy was great once (before Donald Trump became president), and it will be again if we just embrace the United States’ role as a global leader. Sanders—putting aside the issue of his praise for Cuba—seems to be more of the view that U.S. foreign policy has a mixed track record, that we should acknowledge the bad while continuing the good. It’s a view I share.
MK: I think most people could agree that we should continue the good and discontinue the bad, the question is what goes in each category, and I’m afraid that Sanders would throw out the baby with the bathwater. I’ve heard too little praise from him about the remarkable role the United States has played in bringing about unprecedented levels of global peace, prosperity, and freedom over the past 75 years.
And I’m afraid that Biden thinks he can turn back the clock to 1995 (or 2008) and hasn’t quite come to grips with how much has changed—like the return of great-power competition, especially with China; new technologies like AI; and rising nationalist and populist sentiments across the West.
EA: I think it’s interesting, though, that the two of them do agree on some things, and it’s mostly on the “bad” of U.S. foreign policy in recent years: excesses during the war on terror, that we should distance ourselves from bad allies like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and the challenges posed by rising authoritarian states that U.S. foreign policy hasn’t adequately dealt with. It’s just that Biden thinks it can be fixed by simply returning to the status quo ante-Trump, while Bernie wants more radical change.
MK: Yes. Avoiding dumb wars in the Middle East has become as popular as motherhood and apple pie on both sides of the aisle. On relations with autocratic regimes, it is important to draw a distinction between those like China, Russia, and Iran that are actively seeking to challenge a U.S.-led system, and those like Saudi Arabia, that—while they undoubtedly have poor human rights records—work with the United States to advance other important interests, such as countering Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East.
EA: Well that’s another place where you and I disagree. America does sometimes have to work with autocrats, but Mohammed bin Salman isn’t just a butcher. His regional foreign policy has increased tensions with Iran, effectively destroyed Yemen, and helped to destabilize other regional states. It would be far better for U.S. national security to distance the United States from the Saudis and pursue a more balanced approach to the region. The Democratic candidates are pretty much agreed on that, too.
In fact, policy toward Saudi Arabia and Iran is one of the big shifts in the Democratic Party in the last few years, mostly thanks to the Saudi-ordered killing of Jamal Khashoggi and Mohammed bin Salman’s truly awful record on regional foreign policy. Even Biden, who has a long history of support for Saudi Arabia, is now supportive of a much looser relationship with the kingdom. And both candidates have clearly stated that they’ll rejoin the Iran nuclear deal without new preconditions.
MK: You’re right (and it’s unfortunate, in my view) that Middle East policy has become so highly politicized in recent years. I’d also add Israel to the list. But, do you really think the Democrats will simply return to the Iran deal if elected? Like Trump’s approach or not, he has created real pressure on Tehran and given the U.S. government new leverage, and it would be foolish in my view not to exploit that for a better deal.
EA: Trump has certainly created new pressure and economic pain in Tehran. I’m not convinced we’re any closer to new concessions on the nuclear issue though—or on anything else. Iran is no longer abiding by many of the deal’s key requirements. If many critics’ main argument was that the nuclear deal was bad because its provisions—like those on uranium enrichment thresholds—eventually expired, then all Trump has succeeded in doing by withdrawing is hastening the arrival of that reality.
I think for Democratic candidates, the problem is going to be one of timing. The deal is on life support at the moment, leaving a new administration very little time to get back in and resolve existing issues. But either way, I doubt Sanders or Biden would continue Trump’s maximum pressure approach on Iran.
MK: I just don’t think they could return to the exact terms of the nuclear deal. As you point out, the clock has been ticking, and some of the most important provisions are already about to expire. So, at a minimum, I would think a new president would want to renegotiate longer timelines. And there are signs that even the Europeans are coming around to a tougher approach, with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson expressing interest in a Trump deal.
EA: I’m still skeptical. I think the question for a Democratic president may end up being how to salvage something on Iran policy out of the wreckage of the Trump administration. That’s unfortunate, because the deal with Iran was actually a substantive achievement of the Obama administration. In three years, Trump has taken Washington from its best relations with Tehran since 1979 to some of the highest hostility levels in the last four decades. It’s not clear if a new Democratic administration could fix the mess even if they wanted to.
Showing up at the AIPAC conference would have been practically obligatory for a Democratic candidate a decade ago. Now we’re in a situation where the first potential Jewish president has called the Israeli prime minister a racist.
But what about Israel? You mentioned the growing partisan divide on it, and it’s been fascinating to watch this week, just as everyone was distracted by Super Tuesday, the Democratic field almost all rejecting the idea of attending the annual AIPAC conference in Washington. Showing up would have been a no-brainer and practically obligatory for a Democratic candidate a decade ago. Now we’re in a situation where the first potential Jewish president has called the Israeli prime minister a racist, and AIPAC a platform for bigotry.
MK: I think that’s a tragedy. U.S. foreign policy in Asia and Europe is easy because our allies for the most part share our values and interests. Japan and Norway, for example, are both democracies, and they share our concerns about the threats posed by China and Russia. But the Middle East is tough.
There are countries we need to work with to advance important interests, but they don’t share our values. Israel is the lone exception. It should be easy for Republicans and Democrats to support a country with a vibrant democracy and innovative economy that shares many of our most important priorities in the region, including countering Iran and the Islamic State. But I’m guessing you see it differently?
EA: I’m sympathetic to the arguments that the United States has a long history of protecting Israel, and even perhaps a moral obligation to do so. But I think what we’ve seen in the last few years is an Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu that has done its best to create a partisan split within the United States when it comes to Israel.
His government has also pursued an approach to the peace process that is completely uncompromising, backing Jared Kushner’s absurd peace plan that allows for the annexation of much of the West Bank and includes land swaps that could disenfranchise much of Israel’s Arab population. So I’m also strongly sympathetic to the arguments coming out of the Democratic Party that Israel under Netanyahu is moving away from those shared values and undermining any prospect for peace.
MK: I don’t know that Netanyahu is trying to drive a wedge; I think he knows he needs American support regardless of who is in office. I see it more as Democratic candidates reacting to Trump’s visible efforts to improve U.S.-Israeli relations after they soured in the Obama years. I agree that Trump’s proposed peace plan is unlikely to work. But neither has any other approach we’ve tried over the decades. And honestly I’m surprised how much attention this issue still receives. Israel-Palestine is not in the top 10 U.S. foreign-policy priorities in my view.
EA: That’s certainly true. It sucks up so much time and attention that could be devoted to other matters. What about Afghanistan and the Trump administration’s new peace deal? It seems to me that there are some subtle differences between Biden and Sanders on Afghanistan, but they might not be obvious to the casual observer.
MK: Well, first on the deal itself. It seems to me like the United States had three options: 1) cut and run; 2) continue a small war indefinitely; 3) work for a political settlement. They’re going for option three, with option two as the backup. It seems like a sensible approach to a hard problem. What do you see as the differences between Biden and Sanders? Perhaps they’re not obvious even to slightly more studied observers.
EA: I’m pretty confident that a Sanders administration would pursue option three—as you put it—with option one as a backup. Biden would probably do the same as Trump: maintain a small counterterrorism force indefinitely, and not necessarily withdraw in the absence of a political settlement. I have to say—unless you believe the sunk cost fallacy is, well, a fallacy—Bernie’s approach seems to make a lot more sense to me.
MK: America has shown that it can’t win the war in Afghanistan with military force alone, but it can also avoid losing at an acceptable cost, and to me that is the better fallback.
EA: I think you have more in common with Joe Biden than you might think! And for me, it’s this hedging that’s the key distinction between Bernie and Biden. On many issues, Sanders has taken a strong stance that he’d probably follow through on: distance from Saudi Arabia; withdraw from Afghanistan; avoid major military interventions. But while Biden has made statements that sound similar, if you look closely, he’s also got a backup option for taking a more moderate stance.
MK: I do tend to side with Biden over Sanders on most of these issues. I’m not sure Bernie would be able to follow through on his promises, though. He might be mugged by reality when in the Oval Office. Remember, Barack Obama was going to close Guantánamo.
EA: The White House is pretty uniquely powerful on much of this stuff, though I agree with you that it’s not all-powerful. Obama faced a lot of pushback, and he was far more moderate than Sanders. But a lot has changed over the last four years, and I think even the center of the Democratic Party has moved closer to where Sanders is on foreign policy. Which just makes it even more depressing that the remaining nominees are all septuagenarians whose formative foreign-policy experiences came in an era when the Soviet Union still existed.
MK: Speaking of the Soviet Union, the other place where the candidates have openly disagreed is on Sanders’s past support for socialist and communist regimes. Do you think this is a legitimate criticism, or was Stephen Walt correct when he wrote on this site a few days ago that Americans need to grow up, stop moralizing, and learn that the United States will sometimes need to deal with unsavory characters?
EA: I think it’s a fair criticism of Sanders. There are two parts to it, though. Walt is correct that U.S. foreign policy requires compromise with dictators. But there’s also the politics of it. Bernie’s insistence that he was right on these issues and no one should question him is just stupid politics. How hard is it to say, “Dictators are bad, and I probably shouldn’t have said that”?
MK: Yes. I’d disagree with Walt, however, in that U.S. support for democracy is not just pie-in-the-sky idealism, it’s also a tool of hard power. As I’ve argued at length elsewhere, it is one of the best instruments the United States has to mobilize democratic allies and partners to counter threats from revisionist, autocratic powers, like China. I hope we can take up the China issue in our next debate.
EA: True. We didn’t even talk about China. But I do think on this, and on many other things, that Biden is advocating for something like what you just outlined: America leading the world and spreading democracy. It’s like the unipolar moment never ended for him. While Sanders—despite being of the same generation—is a lot more circumspect about what the United States can achieve in the world, and much clearer that the goal is not to spread democracy, but to protect it here at home.
MK: The unipolar moment has ended? America shouldn’t spread democracy? Clearly, we have a lot more to argue about. Can we try this again? Same time, same place, two weeks from now?
EA: Agreed. For once.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-09--Italy Quarantines Millions as Global Markets Plummet

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Italy puts the north on lockdown , Saudi Arabia sparks an oil price plunge , Lebanon defaults on debt , and what to watch in the world this week .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
In an attempt to tackle its growing coronavirus outbreak , Italy has taken the unprecedented step of placing over a quarter of its citizens on lockdown for a month , limiting movement for those living in the country ’ s north .
In a news conference after signing the quarantine decree , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ called the crisis a “ a national emergency.
” The move comes as the number of coronavirus cases in Italy exceeded 7,300 and the number of deaths increased from 233 to 366 .
Economic fallout .
Italy ’ s stock market plummeted by 11 percent on Monday morning as stock markets around Europe opened sharply lower , with opening drops of more than 8 percent on London ’ s FTSE and over 6 percent on the German DAX .
Southern Italian leaders , meanwhile , have urged northerners to obey the quarantine restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s south , which has so far remained largely unaffected .
“ I speak to you as if you were my children , my brothers , my nephews and nieces : Stop and go back , ” Michele Emiliano , the president of the southern province of Puglia wrote on Facebook Saturday .
Is it spreading in Europe ?
Elsewhere , Germany ’ s health minister Jens Spahn has urged the German public to consider staying at home and for large events to be canceled as the country deals with almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sporting events including Bundesliga soccer matches .
Armin Laschet , the head of the North Rhine Westphalia state—and a leading contender to replace Angela Merkel as head of the governing CDU party—said he would heed Spahn ’ s advice meaning that Saturday ’ s major soccer match between Dortmund and Schalke could be played in an empty stadium .
Meanwhile , in Britain , Prime Minister Boris Johnson is chairing an emergency meeting to consider more stringent measures to slow the spread of the virus as cases in the U.K. jumped from 209 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on gatherings in pubs , at religious services , and other mass-attendance events .
What ’ s the U.S. response ?
Anthony Fauci , the head of the infectious diseases unit at the National Institutes of Health , told NBC on Sunday that 400,000 more coronavirus tests would be available by Monday , increasing to 4 million by the end of the week .
He added that large-scale quarantines , as seen in Italy and China , were unlikely to be put in place .
Washington , D.C. reported its first case of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 34 states with confirmed cases , while Sen. Ted Cruz and Rep. Paul Gosar self-quarantined after a man they shook hands with at the recent Conservative Political Action Conference tested positive for COVID-19 .
Oil plummets and market panic .
Oil prices dropped nearly 30 percent to their lowest levels since 2016 as a price war develops between Russia and OPEC countries .
Saudi Arabia ’ s announcement of dramatic price cuts on its oil as well as an increase in production levels above 10 million barrels per day sent shock waves through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a retaliation after Russia ’ s refusal to agree to production cuts during meetings with OPEC in Vienna last week .
A drop in oil price won ’ t just hurt Russia , but will likely affect U.S. producers , too .
As Foreign Policy ‘ s Keith Johnson reported last week , $ 30 dollars a barrel is well short of the $ 50 limit U.S. shale oil producers usually need to make a good return on investment .
The collapse in oil prices led a broader , global rout across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more carnage expected in New York trading later in the day .
With Saudi Arabia and Russia throwing open the taps on oil production—even as the impact of the coronavirus has hammered the world ’ s thirst for oil—crude prices are now in free fall .
That combination of shrinking demand and massive oversupply creates a situation with “ no equal in market history , ” said Fatih Birol , the head of the International Energy Agency .
Saudi Palace intrigue .
In addition to market shocks , there was also palace drama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prince Mohammad bin Salman , the kingdom ’ s de facto leader , accused senior royals of a coup plot and arrested Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz al Saud , a brother of Saudi King Salman , and Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al Saud , the king ’ s nephew .
Bin Nayef ’ s younger brother was also detained along with as many as 20 others .
The move was seen as a warning to anyone within the royal family who dares to criticize MBS ’ s rule .
Lebanon defaults @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history , Lebanon is to default on a foreign debt payment .
Lebanon had been due to pay a $ 1.2 billion bond today , but amid a financial crisis the country now faces the prospect of International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) intervention .
In a televised address , Prime Minister Hassan Diab said the country ’ s debt had “ become bigger than Lebanon can bear.
” Erdogan to Brussels .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is in Brussels today for discussions with EU leaders , including European Council President Charles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ der Leyen , with Syria and migration expected to top the list of priorities .
In a speech in Istanbul on Sunday he called on Greece to “ open your gates ” to the thousands of refugees seeking to enter the European Union from Turkey .
On Tuesday , March 10 , six more states have their say on who should be the Democratic nominee for the 2020 presidential election .
The race is now effectively down to two candidates , former Vice President Joe Biden and Sen. Bernie Sanders ( Rep. Tulsi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far behind ) .
Biden heads into Tuesday ’ s vote with a 90 delegate lead as both candidates eye up the main prize : the state of Michigan and its 125 delegates .
The chiefs of both U.S. Africa Command ( Africom ) and U.S. Central Command ( Centcom ) will brief the House Armed Services Committee on Tuesday to discuss U.S. military activities in Africa and the Middle East .
Two members of that committee introduced a bill last week that would curtail the Pentagon ’ s ability to reduce troop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy ’ s Robbie Gramer reported on March 4 .
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro continues his visit to the United States .
Following meetings with President Trump and a visit to U.S. Southern Command over the weekend , Bolsonaro will meet with U.S. senators today before visiting a facility belonging to the Brazilian aerospace company Embraer on Tuesday .
Afghan talks .
After the recent agreement signed between the United and States and the Taliban , its unclear whether the next step—talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government—will proceed as scheduled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set for March 10 in Oslo , remains in limbo .
A source in Norway ’ s foreign ministry speaking to Norwegian media about the prospect of talks this week said “ We know nothing at present.
” MH17 trial .
The criminal trial of those accused of downing Malaysian Airlines flight 17 over Ukraine in 2014 begins today in the Netherlands .
The four defendants , three Russians and a Ukrainian , were senior commanders in the Donetsk People ’ s Republic militia , the group alleged to be responsible for firing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aircraft mid-flight .
None are expected to attend in person and will instead be tried in absentia .
Amid falling consumer demand due to the coronavirus outbreak , warehouse retailer Costco has been one of the few businesses benefiting from the epidemic .
Sales for this quarter are up 9.1 percent on the previous year , with 3 percent of that growth an “ uptick in consumer demand ” the company attributes to coronavirus panic-buying .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Italy puts the north on lockdown, Saudi Arabia sparks an oil price plunge, Lebanon defaults on debt, and what to watch in the world this week .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Italy puts the north on lockdown, Saudi Arabia sparks an oil price plunge, Lebanon defaults on debt, and what to watch in the world this week.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Italy Quarantines Millions
In an attempt to tackle its growing coronavirus outbreak, Italy has taken the unprecedented step of placing over a quarter of its citizens on lockdown for a month, limiting movement for those living in the country’s north. In a news conference after signing the quarantine decree, Italy’s Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte called the crisis a “a national emergency.” The move comes as the number of coronavirus cases in Italy exceeded 7,300 and the number of deaths increased from 233 to 366.
Economic fallout. Italy’s stock market plummeted by 11 percent on Monday morning as stock markets around Europe opened sharply lower, with opening drops of more than 8 percent on London’s FTSE and over 6 percent on the German DAX. Southern Italian leaders, meanwhile, have urged northerners to obey the quarantine restrictions and not bring the coronavirus to the country’s south, which has so far remained largely unaffected. “I speak to you as if you were my children, my brothers, my nephews and nieces: Stop and go back,” Michele Emiliano, the president of the southern province of Puglia wrote on Facebook Saturday.
Is it spreading in Europe? Elsewhere, Germany’s health minister Jens Spahn has urged the German public to consider staying at home and for large events to be canceled as the country deals with almost 1,000 confirmed cases—a move that could affect sporting events including Bundesliga soccer matches. Armin Laschet, the head of the North Rhine Westphalia state—and a leading contender to replace Angela Merkel as head of the governing CDU party—said he would heed Spahn’s advice meaning that Saturday’s major soccer match between Dortmund and Schalke could be played in an empty stadium.
Meanwhile, in Britain, Prime Minister Boris Johnson is chairing an emergency meeting to consider more stringent measures to slow the spread of the virus as cases in the U.K. jumped from 209 to 278. Restrictions could include bans on gatherings in pubs, at religious services, and other mass-attendance events.
What’s the U.S. response? Anthony Fauci, the head of the infectious diseases unit at the National Institutes of Health, told NBC on Sunday that 400,000 more coronavirus tests would be available by Monday, increasing to 4 million by the end of the week. He added that large-scale quarantines, as seen in Italy and China, were unlikely to be put in place. Washington, D.C. reported its first case of the virus over the weekend, joining 34 states with confirmed cases, while Sen. Ted Cruz and Rep. Paul Gosar self-quarantined after a man they shook hands with at the recent Conservative Political Action Conference tested positive for COVID-19.
What We’re Following Today
Oil plummets and market panic. Oil prices dropped nearly 30 percent to their lowest levels since 2016 as a price war develops between Russia and OPEC countries. Saudi Arabia’s announcement of dramatic price cuts on its oil as well as an increase in production levels above 10 million barrels per day sent shock waves through global markets.
The moves appear to be a retaliation after Russia’s refusal to agree to production cuts during meetings with OPEC in Vienna last week. A drop in oil price won’t just hurt Russia, but will likely affect U.S. producers, too. As Foreign Policy‘s Keith Johnson reported last week, $30 dollars a barrel is well short of the $50 limit U.S. shale oil producers usually need to make a good return on investment.
The collapse in oil prices led a broader, global rout across stock and bond markets Monday, with more carnage expected in New York trading later in the day. With Saudi Arabia and Russia throwing open the taps on oil production—even as the impact of the coronavirus has hammered the world’s thirst for oil—crude prices are now in free fall. That combination of shrinking demand and massive oversupply creates a situation with “no equal in market history,” said Fatih Birol, the head of the International Energy Agency.
Saudi Palace intrigue. In addition to market shocks, there was also palace drama in Riyadh over the weekend. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, the kingdom’s de facto leader, accused senior royals of a coup plot and arrested Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz al Saud, a brother of Saudi King Salman, and Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al Saud, the king’s nephew. Bin Nayef’s younger brother was also detained along with as many as 20 others. The move was seen as a warning to anyone within the royal family who dares to criticize MBS’s rule.
Lebanon defaults. For the first time in its history, Lebanon is to default on a foreign debt payment. Lebanon had been due to pay a $1.2 billion bond today, but amid a financial crisis the country now faces the prospect of International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervention. In a televised address, Prime Minister Hassan Diab said the country’s debt had “become bigger than Lebanon can bear.”
Erdogan to Brussels. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is in Brussels today for discussions with EU leaders, including European Council President Charles Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, with Syria and migration expected to top the list of priorities. In a speech in Istanbul on Sunday he called on Greece to “open your gates” to the thousands of refugees seeking to enter the European Union from Turkey.
The World This Week
On Tuesday, March 10, six more states have their say on who should be the Democratic nominee for the 2020 presidential election. The race is now effectively down to two candidates, former Vice President Joe Biden and Sen. Bernie Sanders (Rep. Tulsi Gabbard remains in the race but is far behind). Biden heads into Tuesday’s vote with a 90 delegate lead as both candidates eye up the main prize: the state of Michigan and its 125 delegates.
The chiefs of both U.S. Africa Command (Africom) and U.S. Central Command (Centcom) will brief the House Armed Services Committee on Tuesday to discuss U.S. military activities in Africa and the Middle East. Two members of that committee introduced a bill last week that would curtail the Pentagon’s ability to reduce troop numbers in the Africom theater, as Foreign Policy’s Robbie Gramer reported on March 4.
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro continues his visit to the United States. Following meetings with President Trump and a visit to U.S. Southern Command over the weekend, Bolsonaro will meet with U.S. senators today before visiting a facility belonging to the Brazilian aerospace company Embraer on Tuesday.
Keep an Eye On
Afghan talks. After the recent agreement signed between the United and States and the Taliban, its unclear whether the next step—talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government—will proceed as scheduled. The dialogue, believed to be set for March 10 in Oslo, remains in limbo. A source in Norway’s foreign ministry speaking to Norwegian media about the prospect of talks this week said “We know nothing at present.”
MH17 trial. The criminal trial of those accused of downing Malaysian Airlines flight 17 over Ukraine in 2014 begins today in the Netherlands. The four defendants, three Russians and a Ukrainian, were senior commanders in the Donetsk People’s Republic militia, the group alleged to be responsible for firing the Buk missile that destroyed the passenger aircraft mid-flight. None are expected to attend in person and will instead be tried in absentia.
Odds and Ends
Amid falling consumer demand due to the coronavirus outbreak, warehouse retailer Costco has been one of the few businesses benefiting from the epidemic. Sales for this quarter are up 9.1 percent on the previous year, with 3 percent of that growth an “uptick in consumer demand” the company attributes to coronavirus panic-buying.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-09--El Salvador’s Justice System Takes on a Historic Case

Virginia Flores has been on edge since February 2019 , when she learned her best friend , Camila Díaz Córdova , a transgender woman , was dead in an apparent homicide .
She has reason to be worried .
Flores , a 37-year-old trans woman from El Salvador , knows she has beaten the odds just by being alive today .
In El Salvador , trans women have a life expectancy of only 35 years due to extreme violence .
Across the entire Latin America and Caribbean region , the figure ranges from 30 to 35 years , compared to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 81 .
The killing was a turning point for Flores : She said she realized she would never live in peace in her home country .
In the week Díaz Córdova died , another trans woman was killed in El Salvador , and at least five more have been killed since then .
In 2011 , one of Flores and Díaz Córdova ’ s best friends , a trans woman named Monica , was killed .
There was no arrest or conviction .
“ It ’ s alarming , ” Flores said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ people say , ‘ I don ’ t want to be here.
’ Because I could be next.
” Three police officers currently stand trial for Díaz Córdova ’ s killing , which is being prosecuted as a hate crime in a historic case for the country .
If the trial ends in conviction , it would be the first homicide conviction classified as a hate crime in El Salvador .
It wasn ’ t until the country modified its penal code in 2015 that prosecutors could even categorize a homicide as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Of 27 killings that El Salvador ’ s ombudsman has identified as LGBTQ hate crimes since then , prosecutors have tried to classify just two as hate crimes , not including the case of Díaz Córdova .
In both cases , judges decided not to accept the charges , which would carry a higher sentence .
Trans rights organizations hope that the case will send a signal to Salvadoran society that hate crimes against lesbian , gay , bisexual , transgender , and queer citizens are unacceptable and will be punished accordingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only a small step forward for trans rights in a country where LGBTQ citizens face systematic abuse and discrimination in nearly every aspect of life .
“ That ’ s why so many people say , ‘ I don ’ t want to be here.
’ Because I could be next.
” Trans women report constant harassment from employers , law enforcement , and other government institutions .
In a 2019 study , trans women in El Salvador reported experiencing systemic intimidation , robbery , sexual assault , and harassment from police .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ so sex work is often their only option .
A 2014 report from the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS found that nearly 50 percent of trans women in El Salvador made a living through sex work .
This work exposes them to even more violence and discrimination , from their clients , gangs , and authorities .
Díaz Córdova and Flores both had been sex workers in the past .
Flores is now considering seeking asylum in the United States .
But she has heard horror stories about the journey and potential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Córdova herself when she was alive—that are making her think twice .
Díaz Córdova attempted to seek asylum in late 2017 before being deported .
Flores also knows that seeking asylum in the United States is now becoming harder than ever .
In fiscal year 2019 , a record 69 percent of asylum cases were rejected , according to Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse , a nonprofit data research center at Syracuse University .
Díaz Córdova was one of the tens of thousands of people who pursued asylum in the United States in 2017 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that year , citing horrible detention center conditions to her friends , and returned to El Salvador .
Opting to return home instead of waiting years for cases to be resolved has become more common under President Donald Trump ’ s administration .
“ She came back disillusioned , ” Flores said .
Now , Flores is one of many Central Americans weighing whether it still makes sense to pursue an asylum claim .
In July 2019 , the United States entered into a controversial safe third country agreement with Guatemala that requires @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enter the country en route to the United States , as most Salvadorans and Hondurans do .
But civil society groups question how the country will care for the migrants when hundreds of thousands of its own citizens are leaving .
In September 2019 , the governments of El Salvador and Honduras entered into similar agreements with the United States that have been met with equal criticism .
Last July , the Trump administration announced a new rule that disqualifies any migrant from receiving asylum in the United States if they have not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had passed through .
This makes many Central Americans ineligible , because most travel through Mexico before reaching the U.S. border .
Lawyers are still waiting to see exactly how these new restrictions will play out , given ongoing legal challenges .
Flores has heard about policy changes to restrict asylum for people from her country but said it doesn ’ t change the reality of her situation .
She doubts that her country has gotten any safer for trans women like her and is scared the people responsible for Díaz Córdova ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out .
“ With the way things are in my country , I would say that any attempt to leave is worth it , ” she said in September 2019 .
Despite her fear , she has decided that speaking out is worth the risk .
Living in El Salvador seemed like certain death for Díaz Córdova , so that month she left for Mexico , where she gained legal residence .
She then returned to El Salvador and convinced Flores to come to Mexico with her in March 2016 , but there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as at home .
Flores was violently robbed while with another friend , so she returned to El Salvador after two months .
Díaz Córdova returned to El Salvador at the end of 2016 before leaving her home country in February 2017 for the last time .
Back in Mexico , she met and formed a strong friendship with Julia , another trans woman from El Salvador whose name has been changed for her safety .
As legal residents , they tried to establish new lives in various parts of Mexico .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ factory in what Julia believes was a case of workplace discrimination , leading Díaz Córdova to urge Julia to come with her to seek asylum in the United States in August 2017 .
Julia said that U.S. officials at the port of entry in Tijuana , Mexico , tried to turn them away , but Díaz Córdova remained adamant that they needed to enter the United States because they feared for their lives .
A Spanish-speaking immigration official later came to process their cases .
They had passed a major hurdle , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Córdova and Julia were then transferred to a detention facility in San Diego .
Trans women are particularly vulnerable in immigrant detention .
“ Conditions are so bad in detention that our main goal is to get women out as soon as possible , ” said Allegra Love , director and lawyer for Santa Fe Dreamers Project , a New-Mexico based immigrant legal aid organization .
An average client spends four months in detention , Love said , but she has worked with at least one woman who was detained for two years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become less common for all asylum-seekers , including trans women .
“ They feel alone and like they are never going to win , and they roll the dice and they say , ‘ I can ’ t take this .
I ’ m going home.
’ That ’ s how horrific detention is , ” Love said .
Díaz Córdova applied for parole in early November 2017 , which would have granted her release while her asylum case worked its way through an immigration court backlog .
The request was denied—on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she was not a flight risk—like many parole requests in recent years .
From February to September 2017 , only 4 percent of those who applied received parole from immigration detention , according to information presented in a lawsuit from the American Civil Liberties Union against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security .
With documentation of the threats and violence she fled , Díaz Córdova would have likely had a strong chance for protection back in 2017 .
New asylum rules would make her case harder to argue today .
After months of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to seek asylum and was deported in November 2017 .
Julia said that Díaz Córdova had lost hope and willingly waived her right to formally file for asylum , but Flores said Díaz Córdova told her that she was unaware of what she was signing .
Eventually , Julia and Díaz Córdova reconnected in El Salvador , but leaving still remained on their minds .
Julia suggested to Díaz Córdova that they return to Mexico , and Díaz Córdova said she would think about it , but she never had the chance to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ went missing on Jan. 30 , 2019 .
Earlier in the evening , she had told Flores she was having problems with a group of trans women who worked as sex workers whom she believed were receiving protection from a gang or police .
“ What I do is just listen and stay quiet , ” said Díaz Córdova in her last message to Flores .
When Flores awoke the next day , Díaz Córdova had not responded to her last text .
Once she realized something was wrong , Flores and friends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the morgue .
But they couldn ’ t find Díaz Córdova .
Days later , a hospital confirmed that she had been treated there for serious injuries .
She did not survive .
According to documents filed by the prosecutors , a witness said that he saw three police officers put Díaz Córdova in the back of their truck on the morning of Jan. 31 .
About an hour later , first responders reported finding Díaz Córdova seriously bruised and bleeding , in their assessment as a result of being thrown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allege that Díaz Córdova was critically wounded by the officers .
When asked for comment , the police officer handling the case said he would not confirm these details on the grounds that police can not comment on an ongoing investigation .
A hearing in March was postponed , as the judge has asked for more evidence from the prosecutors .
The judge could decide as early as this month whether to send the case to the third and final stage of the Salvadoran judicial process or suspend it indefinitely .
Flores and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continue to the third phase .
Advocates say bias across the justice system continues : Trans women are stigmatized by judges and lawyers for engaging in sex work and blamed for the violence they experience .
But the investigation of the case still represents a step forward in a country where just a few years ago the framework to prosecute as a hate crime did not even exist in its criminal code .
Whatever the outcome , the case has made it further in the judicial process than any other homicide classified as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Rodríguez .
“ When the news broke , I felt a little bit of happiness and satisfaction , but I know that it ’ s a long process and that I have to wait until it reaches the end , ” Flores said .
“ I ’ ve seen so much injustice in this country , so believing in the justice system is nearly impossible for me .
”

Virginia Flores has been on edge since February 2019, when she learned her best friend, Camila Díaz Córdova, a transgender woman, was dead in an apparent homicide. She has reason to be worried. Flores, a 37-year-old trans woman from El Salvador, knows she has beaten the odds just by being alive today. In El Salvador, trans women have a life expectancy of only 35 years due to extreme violence. Across the entire Latin America and Caribbean region , the figure ranges from 30 to 35 years, compared to average life expectancies ranging from 65 to 81.
Virginia Flores has been on edge since February 2019, when she learned her best friend, Camila Díaz Córdova, a transgender woman, was dead in an apparent homicide. She has reason to be worried. Flores, a 37-year-old trans woman from El Salvador, knows she has beaten the odds just by being alive today. In El Salvador, trans women have a life expectancy of only 35 years due to extreme violence. Across the entire Latin America and Caribbean region, the figure ranges from 30 to 35 years, compared to average life expectancies ranging from 65 to 81.
The killing was a turning point for Flores: She said she realized she would never live in peace in her home country. In the week Díaz Córdova died, another trans woman was killed in El Salvador, and at least five more have been killed since then. In 2011, one of Flores and Díaz Córdova’s best friends, a trans woman named Monica, was killed. There was no arrest or conviction. “It’s alarming,” Flores said. “That’s why so many people say, ‘I don’t want to be here.’ Because I could be next.”
(Update, March 12, 2020: This piece has been slightly updated to reflect that on March 11, a judge ruled that the homicide case will continue to the third phase of El Salvador’s justice process, but the charges of unlawful deprivation of liberty and the classification of the homicide as a hate crime will not proceed.) Prosecutors had classified the homicide as a hate crime in a historic case for the country. It wasn’t until the country modified its penal code in 2015 that prosecutors could even categorize a homicide as a hate crime and seek a harsher penalty. Of 27 killings that El Salvador’s ombudsman has identified as LGBTQ hate crimes since then, prosecutors have tried to classify just two as hate crimes, not including the case of Díaz Córdova. In both cases, judges decided not to accept the charges, which would carry a higher sentence.
Trans rights organizations hope that the case will send a signal to Salvadoran society that hate crimes against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer citizens are unacceptable and will be punished accordingly. But they say this would mark only a small step forward for trans rights in a country where LGBTQ citizens face systematic abuse and discrimination in nearly every aspect of life.
El Salvador has one of the highest rates of trans women who are killed relative to its small population, with 19 homicides reported in 2018. The exact number of trans women who have fled in recent years is difficult to track, because they often don’t tell anyone they are leaving and why, said Mónica Linares, the director of the trans rights organization Aspidh Arcoiris Trans. Another trans rights organization, Comcavis Trans, has documented 116 cases of trans women leaving the country since 2014, but the real number could be even higher. “The belief of the LGBT population has always been that the only way to ensure their rights is to leave the country,” said Johanna Ramírez, who provides legal aid through the San Salvador-based organization Passionist Social Service, in 2018.
“That’s why so many people say, ‘I don’t want to be here.’ Because I could be next.”
Trans women report constant harassment from employers, law enforcement, and other government institutions. In a 2019 study, trans women in El Salvador reported experiencing systemic intimidation, robbery, sexual assault, and harassment from police. Many employers refuse to hire them, so sex work is often their only option. A 2014 report from the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS found that nearly 50 percent of trans women in El Salvador made a living through sex work. This work exposes them to even more violence and discrimination, from their clients, gangs, and authorities. Díaz Córdova and Flores both had been sex workers in the past.
Flores is now considering seeking asylum in the United States. But she has heard horror stories about the journey and potential detention in the United States—some from Díaz Córdova herself when she was alive—that are making her think twice. Díaz Córdova attempted to seek asylum in late 2017 before being deported. Flores also knows that seeking asylum in the United States is now becoming harder than ever.
In fiscal year 2019, a record 69 percent of asylum cases were rejected, according to Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, a nonprofit data research center at Syracuse University. Díaz Córdova was one of the tens of thousands of people who pursued asylum in the United States in 2017, but she abandoned the attempt later that year, citing horrible detention center conditions to her friends, and returned to El Salvador. Opting to return home instead of waiting years for cases to be resolved has become more common under President Donald Trump’s administration. “She came back disillusioned,” Flores said.
Now, Flores is one of many Central Americans weighing whether it still makes sense to pursue an asylum claim. In July 2019, the United States entered into a controversial safe third country agreement with Guatemala that requires migrants to seek asylum there if they enter the country en route to the United States, as most Salvadorans and Hondurans do. But civil society groups question how the country will care for the migrants when hundreds of thousands of its own citizens are leaving.
In September 2019, the governments of El Salvador and Honduras entered into similar agreements with the United States that have been met with equal criticism. Last July, the Trump administration announced a new rule that disqualifies any migrant from receiving asylum in the United States if they have not been denied asylum in another country they had passed through. This makes many Central Americans ineligible, because most travel through Mexico before reaching the U.S. border. Lawyers are still waiting to see exactly how these new restrictions will play out, given ongoing legal challenges.
Flores has heard about policy changes to restrict asylum for people from her country but said it doesn’t change the reality of her situation. She doubts that her country has gotten any safer for trans women like her and is scared the people responsible for Díaz Córdova’s death will harm her for speaking out. “With the way things are in my country, I would say that any attempt to leave is worth it,” she said in September 2019. Despite her fear, she has decided that speaking out is worth the risk.
Díaz Córdova’s attempts to seek a safe haven spanned several years. On Aug. 3, 2015, three Barrio 18 gang members approached Díaz Córdova while she was working at a bar in downtown San Salvador. She told Flores she suspected they had been sent by a group of trans women who worked at a nearby bar who had a personal problem with her and had previously threatened her. The gang members told her that she had 15 days to leave. If she refused, they threatened to kill her. Díaz Córdova reported the threats to police, but no one was ever arrested in relation to her case, according to Carlos Rodríguez, deputy attorney for civil rights for El Salvador’s ombudsman, who has been following the case.
Living in El Salvador seemed like certain death for Díaz Córdova, so that month she left for Mexico, where she gained legal residence. She then returned to El Salvador and convinced Flores to come to Mexico with her in March 2016, but there, they found life nearly as difficult as at home. Flores was violently robbed while with another friend, so she returned to El Salvador after two months. Díaz Córdova returned to El Salvador at the end of 2016 before leaving her home country in February 2017 for the last time. Back in Mexico, she met and formed a strong friendship with Julia, another trans woman from El Salvador whose name has been changed for her safety. As legal residents, they tried to establish new lives in various parts of Mexico. But they were unexpectedly fired from a clothing factory in what Julia believes was a case of workplace discrimination, leading Díaz Córdova to urge Julia to come with her to seek asylum in the United States in August 2017.
Julia said that U.S. officials at the port of entry in Tijuana, Mexico, tried to turn them away, but Díaz Córdova remained adamant that they needed to enter the United States because they feared for their lives. A Spanish-speaking immigration official later came to process their cases. They had passed a major hurdle, but more were yet to come.
Díaz Córdova and Julia were then transferred to a detention facility in San Diego. Trans women are particularly vulnerable in immigrant detention. “Conditions are so bad in detention that our main goal is to get women out as soon as possible,” said Allegra Love, director and lawyer for Santa Fe Dreamers Project, a New-Mexico based immigrant legal aid organization. An average client spends four months in detention, Love said, but she has worked with at least one woman who was detained for two years. In recent years, parole has become less common for all asylum-seekers, including trans women. “They feel alone and like they are never going to win, and they roll the dice and they say, ‘I can’t take this. I’m going home.’ That’s how horrific detention is,” Love said.
Díaz Córdova applied for parole in early November 2017, which would have granted her release while her asylum case worked its way through an immigration court backlog. The request was denied—on the grounds that she had failed to prove she was not a flight risk—like many parole requests in recent years. From February to September 2017, only 4 percent of those who applied received parole from immigration detention, according to information presented in a lawsuit from the American Civil Liberties Union against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
With documentation of the threats and violence she fled, Díaz Córdova would have likely had a strong chance for protection back in 2017. New asylum rules would make her case harder to argue today.
After months of detention, Díaz Córdova waived her right to seek asylum and was deported in November 2017. Julia said that Díaz Córdova had lost hope and willingly waived her right to formally file for asylum, but Flores said Díaz Córdova told her that she was unaware of what she was signing.
Eventually, Julia and Díaz Córdova reconnected in El Salvador, but leaving still remained on their minds. Julia suggested to Díaz Córdova that they return to Mexico, and Díaz Córdova said she would think about it, but she never had the chance to give Julia her answer. Díaz Córdova went missing on Jan. 30, 2019. Earlier in the evening, she had told Flores she was having problems with a group of trans women who worked as sex workers whom she believed were receiving protection from a gang or police. “What I do is just listen and stay quiet,” said Díaz Córdova in her last message to Flores.
When Flores awoke the next day, Díaz Córdova had not responded to her last text. Once she realized something was wrong, Flores and friends began searching various police stations, hospitals, and the morgue. But they couldn’t find Díaz Córdova. Days later, a hospital confirmed that she had been treated there for serious injuries. She did not survive.
In July 2019, three police officers were arrested on suspicion of Díaz Córdova’s death. During a hearing that month, the judge accepted the charges, including a charge of aggravated homicide motivated by hate. As per Rodríguez, this was the first time a judge accepted this classification of a homicide as a hate crime, which carries a maximum sentence of 50 years compared to 30. The judge ordered that the police officers be held in prison while awaiting the rest of the trial. Lawyers for the accused said their clients are not guilty and repeatedly referred to Díaz Córdova using the pronoun “he” when addressing reporters outside the courtroom.
According to documents filed by the prosecutors, a witness said that he saw three police officers put Díaz Córdova in the back of their truck on the morning of Jan. 31. About an hour later, first responders reported finding Díaz Córdova seriously bruised and bleeding, in their assessment as a result of being thrown out of a moving vehicle. Prosecutors allege that Díaz Córdova was critically wounded by the officers. When asked for comment, the police officer handling the case said he would not confirm these details on the grounds that police cannot comment on an ongoing investigation.
A hearing in March was postponed, and the judge asked for more evidence from the prosecutors. The judge decided on March 11 that the case could continue to the third phase of El Salvador’s justice process, but the charges of unlawful deprivation of liberty and the classification of the homicide as a hate crime would not proceed, dashing the hopes of Flores and other activists.
Advocates say bias across the justice system continues: Trans women are stigmatized by judges and lawyers for engaging in sex work and blamed for the violence they experience. But the investigation of the case still represents a step forward in a country where just a few years ago the framework to prosecute as a hate crime did not even exist in its criminal code. Whatever the outcome, the case has made it further in the judicial process than any other homicide classified as a hate crime to date, according to Rodríguez.
“When the news broke, I felt a little bit of happiness and satisfaction, but I know that it’s a long process and that I have to wait until it reaches the end,” Flores said. “I’ve seen so much injustice in this country, so believing in the justice system is nearly impossible for me.”


foreignpolicy--2020-03-09--Bibi Is No Houdini

Bibi Is No Houdini

Fog still hangs over Israel ’ s political future in the wake of the country ’ s March 2 election .
The Likud party , under the leadership of incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu , won the number of seats in the next Knesset , but neither Netanyahu nor his chief rival , Benny Gantz , is a shoo-in to form a new government .
What administrative construct will emerge to run Israel after more exasperating horse-trading between various parties remains unknown .
One thing has been taken as a foregone conclusion amid the uncertainty .
Netanyahu , a consensus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He ’ s not .
That ’ s not to say he isn ’ t politically talented .
Netanyahu ’ s acumen for politics is undeniable .
After two previous ballots ended in deadlock and with little expectation of a different result this past time around , he managed—through a combination of skill , grit and dirty tricks—to bring out the vote and deliver Likud its best showing in 17 years .
He lined up his electoral ducks masterfully , prompting his right-wing allies to pledge , in writing , that they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cultivated U.S. President Donald Trump expertly , extracting from him a series of unprecedented concessions to Israel ’ s policy positions ; the so-called deal of the century is only the latest manifestation of this feat .
And then , last week , he pulled a rabbit out of a hat at the polls , maneuvering back into striking range of a renewed mandate as premier .
If Israel ’ s longest-serving prime minister does possess any superpowers , however , their scope has been greatly exaggerated .
His efforts contributed surely and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nation ’ s right , which now comprises 58 of the 120 representatives to the incoming Knesset .
( The other 62 representatives are a more disparate , heterogenous lot . )
But Jewish citizens of today ’ s State of Israel—where they comprise 74 percent of the population—are predominantly conservative , and thus were naturally predisposed to Netanyahu ’ s views .
This demographic has despaired largely of hopes for peace with the Palestinians since the failure of the Camp David negotiations in 2000 and the subsequent wave of terrorism that has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Orthodox Jews , a core component of this community , are the fastest-growing sector by far within Israeli society .
Netanyahu catered to the fears and passions of these hawkish and religiously observant voters , stoking their feelings of disenfranchisement from civil institutions , but he marched essentially through an open door that is not of his own particular making .
Another Likud leader could have cleaned up , rather than just winning a convincing plurality for the right .
Indeed , those who depict Netanyahu as some sort of Harry Houdini fail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have performed .
While Netanyahu bolstered the specific fortunes of his Likud faction , the capacity of the party and its satellites to field a new coalition would have been enhanced—and better positioned to close the deal—under alternative management .
Netanyahu wanted desperately for Likud to capture the most seats , demonstrating no qualms about pillaging supporters from his erstwhile partners .
Having succeeded in this mission , he has celebrated this achievement as a vindication of his controversial tenure .
( Netanyahu is slated to stand trial starting next week on charges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of trust . )
But in an election that amounted to a referendum on his personal performance , Netanyahu , it is becoming increasingly clear , got the short end of the stick .
Another steward of Likud could have better capitalized on widespread public sympathy for the party ’ s platform .
If Netanyahu had been replaced by a different , less selfish principal , two trend lines would have likely taken shape .
The first would reflect the return of disaffected Likud enthusiasts who couldn ’ t stomach Netanyahu ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ escaped to find shelter in Blue and White ; for this group , Likud remains the genuine article—and they ’ d be back home in a heartbeat if Netanyahu left the throne .
The second would be the flight of Likudniks uncomfortable with Netanyahu ’ s departure to other right-leaning parties .
In this scenario , Likud might have earned fewer Knesset seats , but its bloc would have sailed easily to victory—and a new Likud leader would become Israel ’ s next prime minister atop a large and stable right-wing coalition .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ will become more vivid once Netanyahu begins spending his days in court and being photographed daily in the dock .
His sheen of invincibility will lose some of its luster .
Circumstances may then provide an impetus for Likud to switch stallions and move toward some resolution of the current political confusion .
Once Netanyahu begins spending his days in court , his sheen of invincibility will lose some of its luster , providing an impetus for Likud to switch stallions .
In the interim , chaos reigns .
Netanyahu ’ s Likud @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for final results not to be presented to Israel ’ s president , after which they will be rendered official .
And law enforcement officials are working overtime to sort through the mud that Israeli politicians are continuing to heave at each other .
Pending , among other complaints , are a Likud bid for Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit to open a probe into alleged corruption by Yisrael Beiteinu chief Avigdor Liberman—who has aligned himself with Gantz against Netanyahu—and a parallel accusation that Likud itself hired sleuths to dig up dirt surreptitiously on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Likud and its fellow travelers seemed closer to a 61-seat majority , talk had concentrated on “ incentivizing ” defectors to join a Netanyahu coalition .
That option disappeared when the right wing ’ s triumph proved underwhelming and has given way since to a consideration of a Gantz-led minority government—counting only 40 participants , and with outside support from Yisrael Beiteinu and the 15-member Joint List .
( Difficulties on this road include the resistance of some Blue and White deputies to relying upon the patronage of the mostly Arab Joint List @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possibility , has assailed Gantz for subverting the public will and attempting to “ steal the election.
” The threat to Netanyahu is compounded palpably by this group ’ s stated intent to pass two pieces of legislation whose effect would be to bar him from ever returning as prime minister—a measure that may be the only thing on which Gantz ’ s Blue and White party , Yisrael Beiteinu , and the Joint List can agree .
Once Blue and White ’ s raison d ’ être of toppling Netanyahu becomes superfluous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who sport differences of opinion on other issues—could disintegrate .
The post-Netanyahu future is unclear .
Once Blue and White ’ s raison d ’ être of toppling Netanyahu becomes superfluous , the party—a balancing act between members who sport differences of opinion on other issues—could disintegrate and disappear from the stage .
Absent the Netanyahu brand , Likud too could shrink significantly in size , buoying the prospects of parties who share its agenda .
But if Israel ’ s three elections of the past 12 months offer any clue , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wizardry is holding his right-wing camp back from asserting power and prolonging the country ’ s nightmare of instability .
After a period of consolidation during which splinter groups merged together in larger frameworks , Israelis could find themselves once again with a fragmented and even more unruly political landscape .
And with the possibility of a fourth election—dreaded , to be sure , but not impossible—around the corner , that reality may come to pass sooner than anyone had ever imagined .

Fog still hangs over Israel's political future in the wake of the country's March 2 election. The Likud party, under the leadership of incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, won the largest number of seats in the next Knesset, but neither Netanyahu nor his chief rival, Benny Gantz, is a shoo-in to form a new government. What administrative construct will emerge to run Israel after more exasperating horse-trading between various parties remains unknown.
Fog still hangs over Israel’s political future in the wake of the country’s March 2 election. The Likud party, under the leadership of incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, won the largest number of seats in the next Knesset, but neither Netanyahu nor his chief rival, Benny Gantz, is a shoo-in to form a new government. What administrative construct will emerge to run Israel after more exasperating horse-trading between various parties remains unknown.
One thing has been taken as a foregone conclusion amid the uncertainty. Netanyahu, a consensus of pundits proclaimed, is a magician. He’s not.
That’s not to say he isn’t politically talented. Netanyahu’s acumen for politics is undeniable. After two previous ballots ended in deadlock and with little expectation of a different result this past time around, he managed—through a combination of skill, grit and dirty tricks—to bring out the vote and deliver Likud its best showing in 17 years.
He lined up his electoral ducks masterfully, prompting his right-wing allies to pledge, in writing, that they would champion his candidacy exclusively. He cultivated U.S. President Donald Trump expertly, extracting from him a series of unprecedented concessions to Israel’s policy positions; the so-called deal of the century is only the latest manifestation of this feat. And then, last week, he pulled a rabbit out of a hat at the polls, maneuvering back into striking range of a renewed mandate as premier.
If Israel’s longest-serving prime minister does possess any superpowers, however, their scope has been greatly exaggerated.
His efforts contributed surely and significantly to the robust exploits of the nation’s right, which now comprises 58 of the 120 representatives to the incoming Knesset. (The other 62 representatives are a more disparate, heterogenous lot.)
But Jewish citizens of today’s State of Israel—where they comprise 74 percent of the population—are predominantly conservative, and thus were naturally predisposed to Netanyahu’s views. This demographic has despaired largely of hopes for peace with the Palestinians since the failure of the Camp David negotiations in 2000 and the subsequent wave of terrorism that has left more than 1,000 Israelis dead.
Orthodox Jews, a core component of this community, are the fastest-growing sector by far within Israeli society. Netanyahu catered to the fears and passions of these hawkish and religiously observant voters, stoking their feelings of disenfranchisement from civil institutions, but he marched essentially through an open door that is not of his own particular making. Another Likud leader could have cleaned up, rather than just winning a convincing plurality for the right.
Indeed, those who depict Netanyahu as some sort of Harry Houdini fail to grasp how much better Likud could have performed. While Netanyahu bolstered the specific fortunes of his Likud faction, the capacity of the party and its satellites to field a new coalition would have been enhanced—and better positioned to close the deal—under alternative management.
Netanyahu wanted desperately for Likud to capture the most seats, demonstrating no qualms about pillaging supporters from his erstwhile partners. Having succeeded in this mission, he has celebrated this achievement as a vindication of his controversial tenure. (Netanyahu is slated to stand trial starting next week on charges of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust.) But in an election that amounted to a referendum on his personal performance, Netanyahu, it is becoming increasingly clear, got the short end of the stick.
Another steward of Likud could have better capitalized on widespread public sympathy for the party’s platform. If Netanyahu had been replaced by a different, less selfish principal, two trend lines would have likely taken shape. The first would reflect the return of disaffected Likud enthusiasts who couldn’t stomach Netanyahu’s behavior and, in many cases, escaped to find shelter in Blue and White; for this group, Likud remains the genuine article—and they’d be back home in a heartbeat if Netanyahu left the throne.
The second would be the flight of Likudniks uncomfortable with Netanyahu’s departure to other right-leaning parties. In this scenario, Likud might have earned fewer Knesset seats, but its bloc would have sailed easily to victory—and a new Likud leader would become Israel’s next prime minister atop a large and stable right-wing coalition.
The contrast between these two alternate realities will become more vivid once Netanyahu begins spending his days in court and being photographed daily in the dock. His sheen of invincibility will lose some of its luster. Circumstances may then provide an impetus for Likud to switch stallions and move toward some resolution of the current political confusion.
Once Netanyahu begins spending his days in court, his sheen of invincibility will lose some of its luster, providing an impetus for Likud to switch stallions.
In the interim, chaos reigns. Netanyahu’s Likud is demanding a vote recount and petitioning for final results not to be presented to Israel’s president, after which they will be rendered official. And law enforcement officials are working overtime to sort through the mud that Israeli politicians are continuing to heave at each other. Pending, among other complaints, are a Likud bid for Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit to open a probe into alleged corruption by Yisrael Beiteinu chief Avigdor Liberman—who has aligned himself with Gantz against Netanyahu—and a parallel accusation that Likud itself hired sleuths to dig up dirt surreptitiously on Gantz.
On election night, when Likud and its fellow travelers seemed closer to a 61-seat majority, talk had concentrated on “incentivizing” defectors to join a Netanyahu coalition. That option disappeared when the right wing’s triumph proved underwhelming and has given way since to a consideration of a Gantz-led minority government—counting only 40 participants, and with outside support from Yisrael Beiteinu and the 15-member Joint List. (Difficulties on this road include the resistance of some Blue and White deputies to relying upon the patronage of the mostly Arab Joint List.)
Netanyahu, railing against this possibility, has assailed Gantz for subverting the public will and attempting to “steal the election.” The threat to Netanyahu is compounded palpably by this group’s stated intent to pass two pieces of legislation whose effect would be to bar him from ever returning as prime minister—a measure that may be the only thing on which Gantz’s Blue and White party, Yisrael Beiteinu, and the Joint List can agree.
Once Blue and White’s raison d’être of toppling Netanyahu becomes superfluous, the party—a balancing act between members who sport differences of opinion on other issues—could disintegrate.
The post-Netanyahu future is unclear. Once Blue and White’s raison d’être of toppling Netanyahu becomes superfluous, the party—a balancing act between members who sport differences of opinion on other issues—could disintegrate and disappear from the stage. Absent the Netanyahu brand, Likud too could shrink significantly in size, buoying the prospects of parties who share its agenda.
But if Israel’s three elections of the past 12 months offer any clue, it’s that Netanyahu’s dubious wizardry is holding his right-wing camp back from asserting power and prolonging the country’s nightmare of instability.
After a period of consolidation during which splinter groups merged together in larger frameworks, Israelis could find themselves once again with a fragmented and even more unruly political landscape. And with the possibility of a fourth election—dreaded, to be sure, but not impossible—around the corner, that reality may come to pass sooner than anyone had ever imagined.