foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Thai Monuments Are Disappearing in the Dead of Night

Thai Monuments Are Disappearing in the Dead of Night Late one night in April 2017 , a small brass plaque disappeared from the Royal Plaza in central Bangkok .
Embedded in the asphalt close to an equestrian statue of a 19th-century king , it had been easy to overlook : just 12 inches across , with a ring of ornamental Thai script worn smooth by time .
The plaque marked the spot where , 85 years earlier , a small band of revolutionaries proclaimed the end of Thailand ’ s absolute monarchy , creating a constitutional political system modeled on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ king to figurehead status .
The disappearance of the plaque bore all the signs of official involvement .
CCTV cameras in the plaza were turned off at the time , and police warned journalists not to investigate its removal .
The government later forced the Foreign Correspondents ’ Club of Thailand to cancel a panel discussion about the vanished plaque and charged an opposition politician who demanded its return with sedition .
The medallion was one of a number of monuments to the 1932 revolution that have been quietly removed by Thailand ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a systematic campaign to efface the country ’ s constitutional legacy and permanently cement the power of its military-royalist rulers .
Over the past few years , monuments to the revolution have disappeared , statues of its leaders have been taken down , and buildings and military institutes whose names honored the revolution have been renamed .
Critics call it a systematic campaign to efface the country ’ s constitutional legacy and permanently cement the power of its military-royalist rulers .
Just as Western nations are debating the toppling of statues to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ removal of the Thai monuments has sparked a public discussion about the legacy of the 1932 revolution , a pivotal event in Thailand ’ s modern history .
At the forefront is a young generation of political activists who have mobilized the legacy of 1932 in order to assail the legitimacy of the government led by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha , a former army officer who came to power in a military coup in 2014 and subsequently headed the military junta that ruled Thailand until March 2019 , when he prevailed in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ June 24 , the 88th anniversary of the revolution , around 100 political activists , some dressed in replica period military uniforms , took part in a pre-dawn demonstration close to Bangkok ’ s Democracy Monument , the largest surviving monument to the 1932 revolution .
There , a speaker read out the historic declaration of the revolution ’ s leaders .
During this and other commemorations , the missing Bangkok plaque figured prominently .
A mock-up of the medallion was paraded during gatherings , and activists emblazoned its image on T-shirts , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
One Thai netizen even created an Instagram filter that superimposes the plaque on photos of the ground .
The anniversary commemoration has since flowed into larger nationwide protests calling for Prayuth ’ s resignation , a new constitution , curbs on the power of the monarchy , and the end to the routine harassment ( and worse ) of political dissidents .
On Monday , up to 4,000 protesters gathered at Bangkok ’ s Thammasat University , a longtime locus of student activism .
Chanting “ long live democracy ” to calls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also issued a startlingly frank list of 10 demands for reducing the powers of the monarchy , explicitly referencing the 1932 revolution .
Pravit Rojanaphruk , a journalist for the newspaper Khaosod English who has covered the removal of revolutionary monuments , said the event 88 years ago has become more prominent in public discourse than at any time he could remember .
“ This year ’ s June 24 commemoration piqued the interest of young Thais in wanting to learn more about the past like never before , ” he told Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discovering a past that some people don ’ t want them to know.
” The bloodless revolt of June 24 , 1932 , was a watershed in modern Thai history , abruptly curtailing nearly 700 years of absolute rule .
The bloodless revolt of June 24 , 1932 , was a watershed in modern Thai history .
Led by an elite group of French-educated civil servants and soldiers known as the People ’ s Party ( Khana Ratsadon ) , the revolution overthrew King Prajadhipok and abruptly curtailed nearly 700 years of absolute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ revered as a godlike figure who emanated supernatural power , was shackled by a constitution for the first time .
By the end of World War II , as Paul Handley relates in his sweeping biography of the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej , who took the throne in 1946 , the “ king ’ s powers and prerogatives were gone , and much of the throne ’ s prestige had withered .
The ranks of celestial princes were dangerously thin , and the crown ’ s magnificent wealth had been stripped away.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights activist who took part in several events marking the anniversary , described 1932 as a milestone in the progress of a democratic tradition in Thailand .
“ It is part of our democratic roots that show us how Thais fought to establish democratic values , ” she told Foreign Policy .
But the years following World War II saw a royalist counterattack , including the establishment of the elite nexus that is now reasserting itself against demands for democratic reform .
A military coup in 1947 led to the writing of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many of the powers taken from it in 1932 .
Through the dizzying rotation of governments , coups , and constitutions that marked the subsequent decades , the monarchy and military established a firm alliance , rooted in the common threat of communism and reinforced from without by strong American support during the Cold War .
Equating the integrity of the monarchy with the security of the nation , palace and barracks joined in a mutual survival pact that guaranteed the preservation of each other ’ s powers and prerogatives .
Even as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Party were publicly feted in stone and marble , their legacy was hollowed out from within .
Over the decades , Thailand ’ s military-monarchy nexus legitimated itself via an ideology that Thongchai Winichakul , a former student activist in Thailand who is now a history professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison , has described as “ hyper-royalism.
” The monarchy was reinfused with godly power and positioned as the guardian of “ true ” democracy .
Courtly practices like ritual prostration , banned by Siam ’ s modernizing King Chulalongkorn in 1873 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day , even the prime minister is required to prostrate himself at the feet of the king . )
The events of 1932 were presented negatively to schoolchildren , if they were taught at all , while the state fashioned a cult of personality around the king , characterized by songs , flattering documentaries , and public images .
While Bhumibol was a genuinely popular monarch during his 70-year reign , traveling his kingdom and spearheading extensive charity works , his reputation was ring-fenced by a harsh lèse-majesté law that criminalized any criticism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a professor of art history at Silpakorn University in Bangkok , said the removal of monuments to the 1932 revolution represents the logical culmination of this decades-long attempt to delegitimize and erase reminders of Thailand ’ s constitutional past .
“ I see it as a reclaiming of the royal territory , both physically and ideologically , ” she said .
“ It demonstrates an exercise of the monarchy ’ s power.
” To this day , even the prime minister is required to prostrate himself at the feet of the king @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the monuments , symbols , and architectural styles of the post-1932 period as a “ painful physical reminder of a time when royal prestige was at its lowest , ” said James Buchanan , a doctoral researcher at the City University of Hong Kong who specializes in Thai politics .
But it was only relatively recently that the 1932 revolution reentered the Thai political consciousness .
It was even more recently that monuments started to disappear .
One key factor , observers say , is the accession of King Maha Vajiralongkorn , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his father , Bhumibol , in October 2016 .
Since then , the government has sped up its efforts to remove 1932 from Thai history .
This has been paralleled by Vajiralongkorn and his allies ’ consolidation of power , which has involved the appointment of loyalists to the upper echelons of the military , the purging of perceived rivals , and the rehabilitation of traditions from the days of absolute monarchy .
In 2017 , Vajiralongkorn assumed full ownership of the mammoth Crown Property Bureau , which manages the monarchy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ landholdings .
Two months after his coronation in 2019 , he took an official royal consort , the first king to do so since Chulalongkorn .
In a broader sense , the dispute over the legacy of 1932 has also grown out of the intense and protracted political crisis that has gripped Thai politics since 2005 .
This pitted the country ’ s military-royalist elite against supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra , a billionaire telecommunications tycoon who was elected by a landslide in 2001 on promises of universal health care and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marginalized parts of rural Thailand .
Thaksin ’ s political successes soon came to threaten the wealth and power of Thailand ’ s urban , royalist elites , who resorted to increasingly undemocratic methods to curb his influence .
When a military coup in 2006 removed Thaksin from office , his supporters , known as Red Shirts , massed in the streets and helped his proxies win elections in 2008 and 2011 .
Red Shirt leaders actively claimed the legacy of the 1932 revolution , marking the June 24 anniversary with protests and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Defense Monument in Bangkok , which commemorates the quashing of a royalist countercoup in 1933 .
( The monument was demolished without notice in December 2018 . )
As the 1932 revolution was conscripted into Thailand ’ s political battle , it spurred further calls by royalists—led by their own supporters , the Yellow Shirts—to scrub away all traces of this assault on monarchical privilege .
According to Thongchai , the dispute over the legacy of 1932 traces a deeper division between those who believe that political authority ought to derive from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think it should be vested in a traditional elite claiming a moral right to rule .
At the core of this , he said , “ is the place and the extent of the power of the monarchy in Thailand ’ s democracy.
” Remarkably , this sensitive question is now being aired openly for the first time in many decades .
At recent rallies , young demonstrators have waved signs calling to “ abolish 112 , ” the section in the Thai criminal code that punishes any criticism of the royal family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ openly that the palace ’ s powers be curbed , displaying a candor that was virtually unknown during Bhumibol ’ s reign .
The effort to remove the last remaining symbols of Thailand ’ s democratic revolution may have simply drawn further attention to its legacy .
Online , criticisms have been just as explicit .
A Thai-language hashtag that translates to # WhyDoWeNeedAKing ?
has trended on Twitter , as has one calling for a boycott on graduation ceremonies , traditionally presided over by members of the royal family .
Netizens have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ king , who spends most of his time in southern Germany , particularly his self-centered passivity during the coronavirus pandemic .
While open criticism of the monarchy is a risky business—on July 9 , one Facebook user who posted a picture of himself wearing a T-shirt printed with the words “ I lost faith in the monarchy ” was forcibly admitted to a psychiatric institution—the authorities may find this genie hard to put back in the bottle .
Prayuth told reporters he was “ concerned ” by Monday ’ s protests , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government will react .
Indeed , the effort to remove the last remaining symbols of Thailand ’ s democratic revolution may have simply drawn further attention to its legacy , restaging once again the social and political struggles that have dominated Thai politics for the past century .
“ Suddenly it ’ s like we ’ re back in 1932 again , ” Buchanan said , “ with some sections of the population preferring the monarchy be kept in check by the constitution , while royal-nationalists seek to defend its sanctity.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be coming to a head once more .

Late one night in April 2017, a small brass plaque disappeared from the Royal Plaza in central Bangkok. Embedded in the asphalt close to an equestrian statue of a 19th-century king, it had been easy to overlook: just 12 inches across, with a ring of ornamental Thai script worn smooth by time. The plaque marked the spot where, 85 years earlier, a small band of revolutionaries proclaimed the end of Thailand’s absolute monarchy, creating a constitutional political system modeled on Britain’s and relegating the Thai king to figurehead status.
Late one night in April 2017, a small brass plaque disappeared from the Royal Plaza in central Bangkok. Embedded in the asphalt close to an equestrian statue of a 19th-century king, it had been easy to overlook: just 12 inches across, with a ring of ornamental Thai script worn smooth by time. The plaque marked the spot where, 85 years earlier, a small band of revolutionaries proclaimed the end of Thailand’s absolute monarchy, creating a constitutional political system modeled on Britain’s and relegating the Thai king to figurehead status.
The disappearance of the plaque bore all the signs of official involvement. CCTV cameras in the plaza were turned off at the time, and police warned journalists not to investigate its removal. The government later forced the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand to cancel a panel discussion about the vanished plaque and charged an opposition politician who demanded its return with sedition.
The medallion was one of a number of monuments to the 1932 revolution that have been quietly removed by Thailand’s government, in what critics describe as a systematic campaign to efface the country’s constitutional legacy and permanently cement the power of its military-royalist rulers. Over the past few years, monuments to the revolution have disappeared, statues of its leaders have been taken down, and buildings and military institutes whose names honored the revolution have been renamed.
Critics call it a systematic campaign to efface the country’s constitutional legacy and permanently cement the power of its military-royalist rulers.
Just as Western nations are debating the toppling of statues to slave owners and colonial plunderers, the removal of the Thai monuments has sparked a public discussion about the legacy of the 1932 revolution, a pivotal event in Thailand’s modern history. At the forefront is a young generation of political activists who have mobilized the legacy of 1932 in order to assail the legitimacy of the government led by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, a former army officer who came to power in a military coup in 2014 and subsequently headed the military junta that ruled Thailand until March 2019, when he prevailed in a controversial and deeply flawed election.
On June 24, the 88th anniversary of the revolution, around 100 political activists, some dressed in replica period military uniforms, took part in a pre-dawn demonstration close to Bangkok’s Democracy Monument, the largest surviving monument to the 1932 revolution. There, a speaker read out the historic declaration of the revolution’s leaders. During this and other commemorations, the missing Bangkok plaque figured prominently. A mock-up of the medallion was paraded during gatherings, and activists emblazoned its image on T-shirts, playing cards, pancakes, and cookies. One Thai netizen even created an Instagram filter that superimposes the plaque on photos of the ground.
The anniversary commemoration has since flowed into larger nationwide protests calling for Prayuth’s resignation, a new constitution, curbs on the power of the monarchy, and the end to the routine harassment (and worse) of political dissidents. On Monday, up to 4,000 protesters gathered at Bangkok’s Thammasat University, a longtime locus of student activism. Chanting “long live democracy” to calls for Prayuth to step down, they also issued a startlingly frank list of 10 demands for reducing the powers of the monarchy, explicitly referencing the 1932 revolution.
Pravit Rojanaphruk, a journalist for the newspaper Khaosod English who has covered the removal of revolutionary monuments, said the event 88 years ago has become more prominent in public discourse than at any time he could remember. “This year’s June 24 commemoration piqued the interest of young Thais in wanting to learn more about the past like never before,” he told Foreign Policy. “A new generation is discovering a past that some people don’t want them to know.”
The bloodless revolt of June 24, 1932, was a watershed in modern Thai history, abruptly curtailing nearly 700 years of absolute rule.
The bloodless revolt of June 24, 1932, was a watershed in modern Thai history. Led by an elite group of French-educated civil servants and soldiers known as the People’s Party (Khana Ratsadon), the revolution overthrew King Prajadhipok and abruptly curtailed nearly 700 years of absolute rule. The Thai king, once revered as a godlike figure who emanated supernatural power, was shackled by a constitution for the first time. By the end of World War II, as Paul Handley relates in his sweeping biography of the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who took the throne in 1946, the “king’s powers and prerogatives were gone, and much of the throne’s prestige had withered. The ranks of celestial princes were dangerously thin, and the crown’s magnificent wealth had been stripped away.”
Chonthicha Jangrew, a pro-democracy and human rights activist who took part in several events marking the anniversary, described 1932 as a milestone in the progress of a democratic tradition in Thailand. “It is part of our democratic roots that show us how Thais fought to establish democratic values,” she told Foreign Policy.
But the years following World War II saw a royalist counterattack, including the establishment of the elite nexus that is now reasserting itself against demands for democratic reform. A military coup in 1947 led to the writing of a new constitution that restored to the monarchy many of the powers taken from it in 1932. Through the dizzying rotation of governments, coups, and constitutions that marked the subsequent decades, the monarchy and military established a firm alliance, rooted in the common threat of communism and reinforced from without by strong American support during the Cold War. Equating the integrity of the monarchy with the security of the nation, palace and barracks joined in a mutual survival pact that guaranteed the preservation of each other’s powers and prerogatives. Even as the leaders of the People’s Party were publicly feted in stone and marble, their legacy was hollowed out from within.
Over the decades, Thailand’s military-monarchy nexus legitimated itself via an ideology that Thongchai Winichakul, a former student activist in Thailand who is now a history professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, has described as “hyper-royalism.” The monarchy was reinfused with godly power and positioned as the guardian of “true” democracy. Courtly practices like ritual prostration, banned by Siam’s modernizing King Chulalongkorn in 1873, were revived. (To this day, even the prime minister is required to prostrate himself at the feet of the king.) The events of 1932 were presented negatively to schoolchildren, if they were taught at all, while the state fashioned a cult of personality around the king, characterized by songs, flattering documentaries, and public images. While Bhumibol was a genuinely popular monarch during his 70-year reign, traveling his kingdom and spearheading extensive charity works, his reputation was ring-fenced by a harsh lèse-majesté law that criminalized any criticism of the royal family.
Thanavi Chotpradit, a professor of art history at Silpakorn University in Bangkok, said the removal of monuments to the 1932 revolution represents the logical culmination of this decades-long attempt to delegitimize and erase reminders of Thailand’s constitutional past. “I see it as a reclaiming of the royal territory, both physically and ideologically,” she said. “It demonstrates an exercise of the monarchy’s power.”
To this day, even the prime minister is required to prostrate himself at the feet of the king.
Many royalist-minded Thais have long seen the monuments, symbols, and architectural styles of the post-1932 period as a “painful physical reminder of a time when royal prestige was at its lowest,” said James Buchanan, a doctoral researcher at the City University of Hong Kong who specializes in Thai politics. But it was only relatively recently that the 1932 revolution reentered the Thai political consciousness. It was even more recently that monuments started to disappear.
One key factor, observers say, is the accession of King Maha Vajiralongkorn, who took the throne following the death of his father, Bhumibol, in October 2016. Since then, the government has sped up its efforts to remove 1932 from Thai history. This has been paralleled by Vajiralongkorn and his allies’ consolidation of power, which has involved the appointment of loyalists to the upper echelons of the military, the purging of perceived rivals, and the rehabilitation of traditions from the days of absolute monarchy. In 2017, Vajiralongkorn assumed full ownership of the mammoth Crown Property Bureau, which manages the monarchy’s estimated $30 billion in assets and landholdings. Two months after his coronation in 2019, he took an official royal consort, the first king to do so since Chulalongkorn.
In a broader sense, the dispute over the legacy of 1932 has also grown out of the intense and protracted political crisis that has gripped Thai politics since 2005. This pitted the country’s military-royalist elite against supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a billionaire telecommunications tycoon who was elected by a landslide in 2001 on promises of universal health care and microloans, which garnered overwhelming support in marginalized parts of rural Thailand. Thaksin’s political successes soon came to threaten the wealth and power of Thailand’s urban, royalist elites, who resorted to increasingly undemocratic methods to curb his influence.
When a military coup in 2006 removed Thaksin from office, his supporters, known as Red Shirts, massed in the streets and helped his proxies win elections in 2008 and 2011. Red Shirt leaders actively claimed the legacy of the 1932 revolution, marking the June 24 anniversary with protests and holding rallies at monuments including the Constitution Defense Monument in Bangkok, which commemorates the quashing of a royalist countercoup in 1933. (The monument was demolished without notice in December 2018.) As the 1932 revolution was conscripted into Thailand’s political battle, it spurred further calls by royalists—led by their own supporters, the Yellow Shirts—to scrub away all traces of this assault on monarchical privilege.
According to Thongchai, the dispute over the legacy of 1932 traces a deeper division between those who believe that political authority ought to derive from the will of the people and those who think it should be vested in a traditional elite claiming a moral right to rule. At the core of this, he said, “is the place and the extent of the power of the monarchy in Thailand’s democracy.”
Remarkably, this sensitive question is now being aired openly for the first time in many decades. At recent rallies, young demonstrators have waved signs calling to “abolish 112,” the section in the Thai criminal code that punishes any criticism of the royal family. Others have risked prison by demanding openly that the palace’s powers be curbed, displaying a candor that was virtually unknown during Bhumibol’s reign.
The effort to remove the last remaining symbols of Thailand’s democratic revolution may have simply drawn further attention to its legacy.
Online, criticisms have been just as explicit. A Thai-language hashtag that translates to #WhyDoWeNeedAKing? has trended on Twitter, as has one calling for a boycott on graduation ceremonies, traditionally presided over by members of the royal family. Netizens have actively assailed the behavior of the 68-year-old king, who spends most of his time in southern Germany, particularly his self-centered passivity during the coronavirus pandemic.
While open criticism of the monarchy is a risky business—on July 9, one Facebook user who posted a picture of himself wearing a T-shirt printed with the words “I lost faith in the monarchy” was forcibly admitted to a psychiatric institution—the authorities may find this genie hard to put back in the bottle. Prayuth told reporters he was “concerned” by Monday’s protests, but has given no clue as to how the government will react.
Indeed, the effort to remove the last remaining symbols of Thailand’s democratic revolution may have simply drawn further attention to its legacy, restaging once again the social and political struggles that have dominated Thai politics for the past century. “Suddenly it’s like we’re back in 1932 again,” Buchanan said, “with some sections of the population preferring the monarchy be kept in check by the constitution, while royal-nationalists seek to defend its sanctity.” It is a question that seems to be coming to a head once more.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Pompeo’s Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia Were Legal—but Heightened Risks of Civilian Casualties in Yemen

Pompeo ’ s Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia Were Legal—but Heightened Risks of Civilian Casualties in Yemen A keenly awaited report from the U.S. State Department ’ s internal watchdog found that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used proper procedures to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates last year over congressional attempts to block the move .
But the report also found that the State Department did not properly assess the humanitarian impacts of shipping more weapons to Riyadh in the midst of the Saudi-led coalition ’ s involvement in Yemen ’ s ongoing civil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of civilians with U.S. munitions and by devastating humanitarian impacts .
The report , and the Office of Inspector General ( OIG ) itself , has become a key battleground between the Trump administration ’ s foreign-policy team and U.S. lawmakers ever since Pompeo overrode congressional opposition and approved the arms sales using an emergency declaration last year .
The Trump administration , greenlighted by Pompeo , invoked a national security emergency in May 2019 to force 22 arms sales worth $ 8.1 billion to Saudi Arabia , the United Arab Emirates , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition and eventually the inspector general ’ s probe .
Pompeo invoked the emergency sale by citing vague threats to U.S. interests from Iran in the region .
In May of this year , U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly fired the State Department inspector general , Steve Linick , amid his office ’ s probe into the arms sales and other investigations into allegations of impropriety by Pompeo .
Linick later told members of Congress in an interview that senior members of Pompeo ’ s team attempted to “ bully ” him into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requested by Congress .
His acting replacement , Stephen Akard—a political appointee and associate of Vice President Mike Pence with no prior investigative experience—abruptly stepped down from his post this month after less than three months on the job .
Akard recused himself from the arms sales investigation following pressure from Capitol Hill .
The OIG report found that the secretary ’ s emergency certification of the arms sale was properly executed under the Arms Export Control Act , which gives the president and secretary of state wide-ranging authorities to determine what constitutes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ didn ’ t weigh the merits of Pompeo ’ s Iran-related emergency .
The report found that the State Department “ did not fully assess risks and implement mitigation measures to reduce civilian casualties and legal concerns associated with the transfer of [ precision-guided munitions ] included in the May 2019 emergency certification.
” The watchdog clarified that its investigation was narrowly focused on that aspect of the controversial measure .
OIG “ did not evaluate whether the Iranian malign threats cited in the Secretary ’ s May 2019 certification and associated memorandum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did OIG make any assessment of the policy decisions underlying the arms transfers and the associated emergency , ” the report noted .
The report also includes a classified section , which will be made available to lawmakers .
The administration ’ s move allowed the United States to sell billions of dollars ’ worth of precision-guided munitions to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen despite mounting civilian casualties from air raids in that conflict , after Trump vetoed three bills that Congress used to attempt to block the transfer , which had been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
A rare coalition of conservative Republicans and progressive Democrats banded together to try to curtail presidential authority to engage in military actions abroad without prior congressional approval .
In response to the OIG report , Clarke Cooper , the State Department ’ s assistant secretary for political-military affairs who oversees weapons transfers , said Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the first two countries to sign up for a Pentagon-led initiative to reduce innocent deaths by improving bomb targeting .
The fight is part of an ongoing tit for tat between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sales .
The State Department ’ s inspector general said State officials had reported that the review process in Congress had been hindering arms exports , a key foreign-policy priority of the Trump administration .
The inspector general reported that the State Department had since 2017 sent another $ 11.2 billion in arms transfers to Saudi Arabia and the UAE that flew below the threshold of congressional notification , including components for precision-guided bombs and munitions .
In the wake of the congressional uproar , Foreign Policy reported in June that the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons sales to Congress , a move that could provoke further ire from Capitol Hill .
Before the report ’ s release , a senior State Department official told reporters in a phone briefing on Monday that “ the big takeaway ” from the report was that OIG determined that Pompeo used his authorities “ in accordance with the law.
” The State Department organized the briefing before the public or Congress had access to the OIG report and declined to make it available .
The senior official declined to speak on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ press were the subjects of the [ inspector general ’ s ] probe , not the report ’ s authors .
This obvious pre-spin of the findings reeks of an attempt to distract and mislead .
Mike Pompeo is pulling directly from the Bill Barr playbook , ” Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel , the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , said in a statement on Monday , referring to the U.S. attorney general ’ s similar whitewashing of an earlier investigation into Trump administration wrongdoing .

A keenly awaited report from the U.S. State Department’s internal watchdog found that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used proper procedures to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates last year over congressional attempts to block the move.
A keenly awaited report from the U.S. State Department’s internal watchdog found that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used proper procedures to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates last year over congressional attempts to block the move.
But the report also found that the State Department did not properly assess the humanitarian impacts of shipping more weapons to Riyadh in the midst of the Saudi-led coalition’s involvement in Yemen’s ongoing civil war, marked by the indiscriminate bombing of civilians with U.S. munitions and by devastating humanitarian impacts.
The report, and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) itself, has become a key battleground between the Trump administration’s foreign-policy team and U.S. lawmakers ever since Pompeo overrode congressional opposition and approved the arms sales using an emergency declaration last year.
The Trump administration, greenlighted by Pompeo, invoked a national security emergency in May 2019 to force 22 arms sales worth $8.1 billion to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan that led to widespread congressional opposition and eventually the inspector general’s probe. Pompeo invoked the emergency sale by citing vague threats to U.S. interests from Iran in the region.
In May of this year, U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly fired the State Department inspector general, Steve Linick, amid his office’s probe into the arms sales and other investigations into allegations of impropriety by Pompeo. Linick later told members of Congress in an interview that senior members of Pompeo’s team attempted to “bully” him into dropping the investigation, though it was requested by Congress. His acting replacement, Stephen Akard—a political appointee and associate of Vice President Mike Pence with no prior investigative experience—abruptly stepped down from his post this month after less than three months on the job. Akard recused himself from the arms sales investigation following pressure from Capitol Hill.
The OIG report found that the secretary’s emergency certification of the arms sale was properly executed under the Arms Export Control Act, which gives the president and secretary of state wide-ranging authorities to determine what constitutes an emergency, even if the OIG didn’t weigh the merits of Pompeo’s Iran-related emergency.
The report found that the State Department “did not fully assess risks and implement mitigation measures to reduce civilian casualties and legal concerns associated with the transfer of [precision-guided munitions] included in the May 2019 emergency certification.”
The watchdog clarified that its investigation was narrowly focused on that aspect of the controversial measure. OIG “did not evaluate whether the Iranian malign threats cited in the Secretary’s May 2019 certification and associated memorandum of justification constituted an emergency, nor did OIG make any assessment of the policy decisions underlying the arms transfers and the associated emergency,” the report noted. The report also includes a classified section, which will be made available to lawmakers.
The administration’s move allowed the United States to sell billions of dollars’ worth of precision-guided munitions to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen despite mounting civilian casualties from air raids in that conflict, after Trump vetoed three bills that Congress used to attempt to block the transfer, which had been in the works for more than a year. A rare coalition of conservative Republicans and progressive Democrats banded together to try to curtail presidential authority to engage in military actions abroad without prior congressional approval.
In response to the OIG report, Clarke Cooper, the State Department’s assistant secretary for political-military affairs who oversees weapons transfers, said Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the first two countries to sign up for a Pentagon-led initiative to reduce innocent deaths by improving bomb targeting.
The fight is part of an ongoing tit for tat between the Trump administration and Congress over arms sales. The State Department’s inspector general said State officials had reported that the review process in Congress had been hindering arms exports, a key foreign-policy priority of the Trump administration. The inspector general reported that the State Department had since 2017 sent another $11.2 billion in arms transfers to Saudi Arabia and the UAE that flew below the threshold of congressional notification, including components for precision-guided bombs and munitions.
In the wake of the congressional uproar, Foreign Policy reported in June that the Trump administration was mulling ending informal notifications of weapons sales to Congress, a move that could provoke further ire from Capitol Hill.
Before the report’s release, a senior State Department official told reporters in a phone briefing on Monday that “the big takeaway” from the report was that OIG determined that Pompeo used his authorities “in accordance with the law.” The State Department organized the briefing before the public or Congress had access to the OIG report and declined to make it available. The senior official declined to speak on the record.
“The people briefing the press were the subjects of the [inspector general’s] probe, not the report’s authors. This obvious pre-spin of the findings reeks of an attempt to distract and mislead. Mike Pompeo is pulling directly from the Bill Barr playbook,” Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a statement on Monday, referring to the U.S. attorney general’s similar whitewashing of an earlier investigation into Trump administration wrongdoing.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Trump’s Pick to Run Latin America’s Development Bank Is the Last Thing It Needed

Trump ’ s Pick to Run Latin America ’ s Development Bank Is the Last Thing It Needed When the Trump administration nominated a White House official to run the Inter-American Development Bank ( IDB ) this summer , it didn ’ t just tear up a 60-year old unwritten agreement that a Latin American would head the bank .
It has also kicked off a clash among Latin American countries , and between several of them and Washington , over the bank ’ s future—at a time when financing of the kind the region ’ s most important development @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Latin America out of its post-pandemic economic collapse .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s nomination of Mauricio Claver-Carone , the senior director of Western Hemisphere affairs at the National Security Council , flies in the face of the bank ’ s 1959 foundational agreement , when then-U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower laid down that a Latin American should run the region ’ s marquee development bank .
Other multilateral financial institutions , such as the World Bank , traditionally headed by an American , and the International Monetary Fund , helmed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for leadership .
Always with the blessing of the United States , the IDB has in its history had just four leaders—a Chilean , a Mexican , an Uruguayan , and , most recently , a Colombian , Luis Alberto Moreno , who is set to depart after a 15-year tenure later this year .
Claver-Carone has plenty of credentials for the job .
He was previously a senior U.S. representative to the International Monetary Fund , had international roles at the Treasury Department , and helped rejuvenate America ’ s own development @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lawyer is also viewed by critics , especially on Capitol Hill , as a hard-liner on Latin America , vocally lobbying while at the White House for tougher action against Cuba , Venezuela , and Nicaragua .
Some see his nomination for a five-year term as IDB head as yet another effort by the Trump administration to sow ideologically like-minded officials in international posts where they can maintain influence even after the end of the administration .
In 2017 , Trump nominated another conservative Cuban American to serve as the U.S. ambassador to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Claver-Carone , since the beginning of his tenure in April 2018 , Carlos Trujillo has strongly advocated for regime change in Latin America ’ s “ troika of tyranny.
” “ The strategy is to clearly embed Trump officials within the U.S. international development institutions , ” a former staff member at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee told Foreign Policy .
The U.S. pick has split Latin American countries , which earlier this year were mulling a choice between the Argentine economist Gustavo Béliz and the Brazilian banker Rodrigo Xavier .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Paraguayan Finance Minister Benigno López were also expected to put their names in the hat .
Colombia , a staunch U.S. ally , was the first country to issue a statement in favor of the U.S. nominee .
Brazil , whose bid had originally been endorsed by the Trump administration , then ditched its own candidate to follow Washington ’ s beckon .
So far , at least 15 of the IDB ’ s 48 member countries have publicly supported him , with Claver-Carone saying he has “ overwhelming support.
” But Argentina @ @ @ @ @ @ @ indicated that “ for the reconstruction of our economies it is key to have a Latin American perspective at the IDB , given that we are the ones worst-hit economically , ” has continued to back its own candidate , enjoying the support of Mexico .
Even the European Union has weighed in , suggesting postponing the election—scheduled for Sept. 12 and 13—until next year .
“ This postponement is more advisable if we consider the submission , without precedent , of a candidacy to preside the Bank by the United States Government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Borrell wrote to Spanish Foreign Minister Arancha González Laya on July 30 in a letter obtained by Reuters .
Even some U.S. allies have backed the call for delayed elections in light of the U.S. maneuver .
The conservative government of Chilean President Sebastián Piñera has supported Argentina , Mexico , and Costa Rica in urging that the elections be postponed until 2021 .
In June , former Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso , whose governments had close ties with Washington , joined an array of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ letter against the U.S. candidacy .
The spat over who will run the Inter-American Development Bank is even making waves among U.S. policymakers and lawmakers .
Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden ’ s campaign has also reportedly indicated that Claver-Carone is “ overly ideological ” and “ under qualified ” to lead the bank .
Roberta Jacobson , formerly a top Western Hemisphere official in President Barack Obama ’ s State Department and most recently ambassador to Mexico between 2016 and 2018 , and Dan Restrepo , a former Obama advisor on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent article that choosing an American would “ undermine [ the bank ’ s ] fundamental mission in a new Inter-American system.
” But the way the bank is set up points toward a victory for Washington—if the elections go ahead as planned .
The United States , with 30 percent of the voting shares , and Brazil , with just over 11 percent , have the two biggest individual votes alongside Argentina , which holds the same vote share as Brazil .
If all countries that have come forward in support of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is unlikely that Argentina still stands a chance .
The fight has important implications for the future of the bank at a time when development aid is desperately needed in coronavirus-hammered Latin America , and the bank needs recapitalization to be able to meet all the development goals in the region .
After announcing a nearly $ 2 billion package to help fund anti-coronavirus measures in the region in March , the bank , which continues to be the largest source of multilateral financing to Latin America and the Caribbean , is desperate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ justified its support for the unprecedented nomination by arguing that U.S. leadership could help recapitalize the bank .
Colombian President Iván Duque , who worked at the IDB for a decade , later added that Claver-Carone ’ s candidacy was “ clear proof that the main stockholder at this time wants to help create a positive transformation in the bank.
” Brazil struck a similar tone in its own note backing Trump ’ s candidate .
In Washington , things look entirely different—and could look even worse for the bank ’ s recapitalization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House and Democrats flip the Senate in the November elections .
“ A priority for a lot of member states at the IDB would be to get a capital increase for the bank , ” said Mark Feierstein , a former Obama official for the Western Hemisphere .
“ But if you have a leader who is opposed by the Senate Appropriations chair , who ’ s opposed by the House Appropriations Committee , it will be a lot more difficult for the bank to get the resources it wants to get.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Democrat who is currently the vice chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and stands to take the gavel early next year if Democrats win , has already made that clear .
“ Electing Mr. Claver-Carone to a five-year term just weeks before the U.S. presidential election , coupled with his unpopularity with some Members of Congress , ” Leahy said in a statement , “ would not bode well for United States support for the bank in the coming years.
” That could be a problem , as Latin American and Caribbean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fallout from the coronavirus pandemic .
The IMF projects a 9.3 percent GDP drop this year , which could result in another 45 million Latin Americans falling into poverty by the end of 2020 .
Governments are relying on a stable—and fully capitalized—IDB to help them at a time when other global organizations have their hands full .
“ The region is facing these enormous economic and health crises , and many countries are not in the fiscal position to be able to respond , and they will need the IDB , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president of the Center for Global Development and formerly staff at the IDB .
“ At the World Bank , there ’ s a ton of competition for these very scarce resources from the rest of the world , ” Glassman told Foreign Policy .
“ Latin America is a small portion of the world for them , whereas for the IDB it ’ s their whole world .
”

When the Trump administration nominated a White House official to run the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) this summer, it didn’t just tear up a 60-year old unwritten agreement that a Latin American would head the bank. It has also kicked off a clash among Latin American countries, and between several of them and Washington, over the bank’s future—at a time when financing of the kind the region’s most important development institution can provide is critical to pulling Latin America out of its post-pandemic economic collapse.
When the Trump administration nominated a White House official to run the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) this summer, it didn’t just tear up a 60-year old unwritten agreement that a Latin American would head the bank. It has also kicked off a clash among Latin American countries, and between several of them and Washington, over the bank’s future—at a time when financing of the kind the region’s most important development institution can provide is critical to pulling Latin America out of its post-pandemic economic collapse.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s nomination of Mauricio Claver-Carone, the senior director of Western Hemisphere affairs at the National Security Council, flies in the face of the bank’s 1959 foundational agreement, when then-U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower laid down that a Latin American should run the region’s marquee development bank. Other multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank, traditionally headed by an American, and the International Monetary Fund, helmed by a European, have similar national criteria for leadership. Always with the blessing of the United States, the IDB has in its history had just four leaders—a Chilean, a Mexican, an Uruguayan, and, most recently, a Colombian, Luis Alberto Moreno, who is set to depart after a 15-year tenure later this year.
Claver-Carone has plenty of credentials for the job. He was previously a senior U.S. representative to the International Monetary Fund, had international roles at the Treasury Department, and helped rejuvenate America’s own development finance arm. But the Cuban American lawyer is also viewed by critics, especially on Capitol Hill, as a hard-liner on Latin America, vocally lobbying while at the White House for tougher action against Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.
Some see his nomination for a five-year term as IDB head as yet another effort by the Trump administration to sow ideologically like-minded officials in international posts where they can maintain influence even after the end of the administration. In 2017, Trump nominated another conservative Cuban American to serve as the U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. Similarly to Claver-Carone, since the beginning of his tenure in April 2018, Carlos Trujillo has strongly advocated for regime change in Latin America’s “troika of tyranny.”
“The strategy is to clearly embed Trump officials within the U.S. international development institutions,” a former staff member at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee told Foreign Policy.
The U.S. pick has split Latin American countries, which earlier this year were mulling a choice between the Argentine economist Gustavo Béliz and the Brazilian banker Rodrigo Xavier. Former Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla and Paraguayan Finance Minister Benigno López were also expected to put their names in the hat.
Colombia, a staunch U.S. ally, was the first country to issue a statement in favor of the U.S. nominee. Brazil, whose bid had originally been endorsed by the Trump administration, then ditched its own candidate to follow Washington’s beckon. So far, at least 15 of the IDB’s 48 member countries have publicly supported him, with Claver-Carone saying he has “overwhelming support.”
But Argentina, whose Foreign Minister Felipe Solá has indicated that “for the reconstruction of our economies it is key to have a Latin American perspective at the IDB, given that we are the ones worst-hit economically,” has continued to back its own candidate, enjoying the support of Mexico. Even the European Union has weighed in, suggesting postponing the election—scheduled for Sept. 12 and 13—until next year.
“This postponement is more advisable if we consider the submission, without precedent, of a candidacy to preside the Bank by the United States Government,” EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell wrote to Spanish Foreign Minister Arancha González Laya on July 30 in a letter obtained by Reuters.
Even some U.S. allies have backed the call for delayed elections in light of the U.S. maneuver. The conservative government of Chilean President Sebastián Piñera has supported Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica in urging that the elections be postponed until 2021. In June, former Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, whose governments had close ties with Washington, joined an array of top Latin American officials in signing a letter against the U.S. candidacy.
The spat over who will run the Inter-American Development Bank is even making waves among U.S. policymakers and lawmakers. Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden’s campaign has also reportedly indicated that Claver-Carone is “overly ideological” and “under qualified” to lead the bank.
Roberta Jacobson, formerly a top Western Hemisphere official in President Barack Obama’s State Department and most recently ambassador to Mexico between 2016 and 2018, and Dan Restrepo, a former Obama advisor on the Western Hemisphere, argued in a recent article that choosing an American would “undermine [the bank’s] fundamental mission in a new Inter-American system.”
But the way the bank is set up points toward a victory for Washington—if the elections go ahead as planned. The United States, with 30 percent of the voting shares, and Brazil, with just over 11 percent, have the two biggest individual votes alongside Argentina, which holds the same vote share as Brazil. If all countries that have come forward in support of Claver-Carone stick to their claims, it is unlikely that Argentina still stands a chance.
The fight has important implications for the future of the bank at a time when development aid is desperately needed in coronavirus-hammered Latin America, and the bank needs recapitalization to be able to meet all the development goals in the region. After announcing a nearly $2 billion package to help fund anti-coronavirus measures in the region in March, the bank, which continues to be the largest source of multilateral financing to Latin America and the Caribbean, is desperate to increase its lending power.
Colombia justified its support for the unprecedented nomination by arguing that U.S. leadership could help recapitalize the bank. Colombian President Iván Duque, who worked at the IDB for a decade, later added that Claver-Carone’s candidacy was “clear proof that the main stockholder at this time wants to help create a positive transformation in the bank.” Brazil struck a similar tone in its own note backing Trump’s candidate.
In Washington, things look entirely different—and could look even worse for the bank’s recapitalization’s prospects if Biden wins the White House and Democrats flip the Senate in the November elections.
“A priority for a lot of member states at the IDB would be to get a capital increase for the bank,” said Mark Feierstein, a former Obama official for the Western Hemisphere. “But if you have a leader who is opposed by the Senate Appropriations chair, who’s opposed by the House Appropriations Committee, it will be a lot more difficult for the bank to get the resources it wants to get.”
Indeed, Sen. Patrick Leahy, a Democrat who is currently the vice chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and stands to take the gavel early next year if Democrats win, has already made that clear.
“Electing Mr. Claver-Carone to a five-year term just weeks before the U.S. presidential election, coupled with his unpopularity with some Members of Congress,” Leahy said in a statement, “would not bode well for United States support for the bank in the coming years.”
That could be a problem, as Latin American and Caribbean economies have been hit hard by the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic. The IMF projects a 9.3 percent GDP drop this year, which could result in another 45 million Latin Americans falling into poverty by the end of 2020. Governments are relying on a stable—and fully capitalized—IDB to help them at a time when other global organizations have their hands full.
“The region is facing these enormous economic and health crises, and many countries are not in the fiscal position to be able to respond, and they will need the IDB,” said Amanda Glassman, the executive vice president of the Center for Global Development and formerly staff at the IDB.
“At the World Bank, there’s a ton of competition for these very scarce resources from the rest of the world,” Glassman told Foreign Policy. “Latin America is a small portion of the world for them, whereas for the IDB it’s their whole world.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Rajapaksa, in a Landslide

Rajapaksa, in a Landslide

In 2016 , supporters of Mahinda Rajapaksa , who had been president of Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2015 , rechristened a minor political party and launched the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna ( SLPP ) .
At the time , no one none could have predicted the ways in which his move would upend the island nation ’ s politics .
Rajapaksa had recently lost a bid for a third presidential term , and he and his grasping family were facing charges over corruption and other crimes .
Determined to block a Rajapaksa political resurgence in the future , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a two-term limit on the presidency , bar duel citizens from contesting general elections ( thereby targeting two prominent Rajapaksa siblings ) , and weaken presidential powers while strengthening the prime minister and independent governing institutions .
Two years later , though , the SLPP , which Rajapaksa had joined , won a slate of local elections throughout the island by a landslide .
In November 2019 , SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa , Mahinda ’ s younger brother and former defense secretary , capitalized on government mismanagement of the response to terrorist attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and handily won the presidency after renouncing his U.S. citizenship .
On Aug. 5 this year , with Mahinda as prime minister and Gotabaya as president , the SLPP outdid even the most optimistic pre-poll predictions by winning close to a legislative supermajority .
The party obtained 145 seats in the 225-member legislature and will have no problem attracting crossovers to take it past the 150 mark .
It will now work toward setting up a new constitution with a strong executive president—and no doubt one that will ensure Rajapaksa rule well into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the forefront in working with the British to ensure a seamless transition to independence , and many of its leaders rank among the island ’ s most consequential political figures .
Ranil Wickremesinghe , who served three terms as prime minister , has led the party for the past 26 years .
Wickremasinghe ’ s monomaniacal craving to keep leading the party despite repeated failures in recent years caused a split in the party that saw the UNP garner just one seat in Parliament .
The breakaway party , called Samagi Jana Balavegaya @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ended up second with 54 seats and will now form a weak opposition .
Unless the UNP ’ s fissures are mended , its pathetic performance , coupled with the SLPP ’ s cooptation of the SLFP , could push Sri Lanka ’ s foremost two parties into irrelevance .
Besides the UNP split , the relatively effective way Sri Lanka has managed the COVID-19 pandemic under Gotabaya Rajapaksa also contributed to the SLPP ’ s electoral gains .
The official number of deaths from the coronavirus has stayed at 11 for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actual number is surely much higher—especially given how some government officials have doctored COVID-19 results and refused to conduct autopsies on those thought to have died from the illness—the island still ranks well , especially when compared to many Western states struggling with the pandemic .
The Rajapaksas like projecting competent and decisive leadership , but the COVID-19 narrative that the pro-Rajapaksa media have mounted has helped mask the president ’ s illiberal tendencies .
Both Mahinda and Gotabaya are Sinhalese Buddhist supremacists .
While Mahinda Rajapaksa rose to prominence through Parliament , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military .
As defense secretary , from 2005 to 2015 , Gotabaya Rajapaksa strengthened the military and played a leading role in strategizing the defeat of Tamil separatists .
Family members branded him “ the Terminator ” for how he pursued detractors .
Many in the international community accuse him of war crimes given the atrocities perpetrated during the last stages of the Sri Lankan civil war .
The Rajapaksas used surveillance and militarization to rule in an autocratic fashion even following the civil war .
Those old strategies returned almost immediately after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ erected checkpoints in the predominantly Tamil Northern Province and began to monitor civil-society organizations .
It became routine for nongovernmental organizations to face questioning about personnel and funding sources , and to have surprise visits by intelligence officials , as the defense ministry took charge of registering NGOs .
Much of this transpired before COVID-19 got to Sri Lanka ’ s shores .
In many ways , the military crept into civilian politics even more during the pandemic .
Gotabaya Rajapaksa has appointed retired and serving military personnel to powerful government positions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a public health official ) put in charge of the task force dealing with COVID-19 .
Many of these officials also stand accused of committing war crimes during the civil war .
Additionally , in June the president set up a “ Presidential Task Force to build a Secure Country , Disciplined , Virtuous and Lawful Society ” whose members comprise of intelligence , military , and police officials .
Its authorities are so wide-ranging that this task force could easily usurp the functions of civilian officials .
That ’ s particularly scary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Under Mahinda Rajapaksa , radical Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists enjoyed free rein to inveigh against minorities , with Muslims especially targeted following the end of the civil war .
Last year ’ s Easter Sunday bombings have only increased hostility toward the group among all communities .
There have been numerous riots against Muslims—instigated by Buddhist monks and extremist allies who have operated with impunity .
Some among these Buddhist monks have promised to conduct campaigns after the election against Muslim businesses , women wearing the burqa , and madrassas .
Muslims ’ votes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for his defeat in 2015 .
They also voted against Gotabaya Rajapaksa in large numbers .
The very high Sinhalese Buddhist vote in his favor , however , neutralized the quest to defeat him .
In turn , Buddhist nationalists thus not only consider the Muslim community anti-Rajapaksa , they fear that Wahhabi-Salafi influence spreading within the community is transforming Sri Lanka ’ s identity .
Their shrill rhetoric during the election , combined with vile postings on social media , hint of forthcoming unrest .
The island ’ s Muslims could well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the international community bands together to protect them .
Consider that , in June , Gotabaya Rajapaksa created the Presidential Task Force for Archaeological Heritage Management in the Eastern Province , which does not include a single Tamil or Muslim despite both groups combining to form a majority in the region .
A retired general who is secretary to the ministry of defense and is accused of committing war crimes leads the task force , which includes Buddhist monks and individuals eager to promote Sinhalese colonization of Tamil and Muslim areas .
Many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Northern and Eastern Provinces become Buddhist-majority areas , and it appears the stage is set for a policy of ethnic flooding similar to what has taken place in China ’ s Tibet and Xinjiang regions .
Sri Lanka ’ s economy was in difficulty before COVID-19 surfaced .
The island owed lenders around $ 3 billion in 2020 and must cough up billions of dollars over the next few years to service nearly $ 55 billion in debt .
Drastically reduced revenue from textile exports , remittances , and tourism will exacerbate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seek a moratorium on loan payments , and this will likely further cement its ties to China , which can ( and is eager to ) help in this regard .
With regard to China , Mahinda Rajapaksa ’ s defeat in 2015 also represented a defeat for China , given the country ’ s support for the president and how the Rajapaksa family enabled Chinese influence in the region at India ’ s expense .
Indeed , India ’ s intelligence played a prominent role supporting Mahinda Rajapaksa ’ s ouster in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have since pursued friendly ties , it is striking that the Gotabaya Rajapaksa regime has avoided finalizing agreements its predecessor reached with India and Japan even as it has pursued cooperative relations with China .
In this context , untrammeled Rajapaksa rule in the offing represents a major victory for China .
This bonhomie , combined with the economic carnage stemming from COVID-19 , will allow China many opportunities to expand further its tentacles in the island .
When Sri Lanka celebrated Independence Day in February @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allow the national anthem sung in Tamil , a practice its predecessor reintroduced .
The following month , the president pardoned a former army sergeant who in 2000 slit the throats of eight Tamil civilians , including four children , despite the island ’ s Supreme Court unanimously upholding his death sentence .
The government tried to blame Muslims for spreading COVID-19 in the island , as a few from the community were among the first to contract the virus .
This took place even as Muslims thought to have died from COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goes against Islamic beliefs and World Health Organization recommendations .
These ominous events took place before this majoritarian government commanded a parliamentary supermajority .
All this suggest Sri Lanka and the region are bound to experience significant repercussions thanks to the results of this just-concluded election .

In 2016, supporters of Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had been president of Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2015, rechristened a minor political party and launched the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP). At the time, no one none could have predicted the ways in which his move would upend the island nation’s politics. Rajapaksa had recently lost a bid for a third presidential term, and he and his grasping family were facing charges over corruption and other crimes. Determined to block a Rajapaksa political resurgence in the future, the new government amended the constitution to reimpose a two-term limit on the presidency, bar duel citizens from contesting general elections (thereby targeting two prominent Rajapaksa siblings), and weaken presidential powers while strengthening the prime minister and independent governing institutions.
In 2016, supporters of Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had been president of Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2015, rechristened a minor political party and launched the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP). At the time, no one none could have predicted the ways in which his move would upend the island nation’s politics. Rajapaksa had recently lost a bid for a third presidential term, and he and his grasping family were facing charges over corruption and other crimes. Determined to block a Rajapaksa political resurgence in the future, the new government amended the constitution to reimpose a two-term limit on the presidency, bar duel citizens from contesting general elections (thereby targeting two prominent Rajapaksa siblings), and weaken presidential powers while strengthening the prime minister and independent governing institutions.
Two years later, though, the SLPP, which Rajapaksa had joined, won a slate of local elections throughout the island by a landslide. In November 2019, SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Mahinda’s younger brother and former defense secretary, capitalized on government mismanagement of the response to terrorist attacks that hit the nation on Easter Sunday and handily won the presidency after renouncing his U.S. citizenship. On Aug. 5 this year, with Mahinda as prime minister and Gotabaya as president, the SLPP outdid even the most optimistic pre-poll predictions by winning close to a legislative supermajority.
The party obtained 145 seats in the 225-member legislature and will have no problem attracting crossovers to take it past the 150 mark. It will now work toward setting up a new constitution with a strong executive president—and no doubt one that will ensure Rajapaksa rule well into the future.
For decades after Sri Lanka’s independence from British colonial rule in 1948, two parties dominated the island’s politics: the United National Party (UNP), which is relatively pro-Western and friendly to the island’s many minority groups; and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which attracted strong support among rural Buddhists and pioneered Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism. The Rajapaksa family was among the SLFP’s founders, and Mahinda launched the SLPP only after losing the presidency to fellow SLFP member Maithripala Sirisena. The success of Mahinda’s party, however, forced SLFP candidates to run in an alliance with the SLPP in this election, including Sirisena.
The UNP was at the forefront in working with the British to ensure a seamless transition to independence, and many of its leaders rank among the island’s most consequential political figures. Ranil Wickremesinghe, who served three terms as prime minister, has led the party for the past 26 years. Wickremasinghe’s monomaniacal craving to keep leading the party despite repeated failures in recent years caused a split in the party that saw the UNP garner just one seat in Parliament. The breakaway party, called Samagi Jana Balavegaya (United People’s Front), ended up second with 54 seats and will now form a weak opposition. Unless the UNP’s fissures are mended, its pathetic performance, coupled with the SLPP’s cooptation of the SLFP, could push Sri Lanka’s foremost two parties into irrelevance.
Besides the UNP split, the relatively effective way Sri Lanka has managed the COVID-19 pandemic under Gotabaya Rajapaksa also contributed to the SLPP’s electoral gains. The official number of deaths from the coronavirus has stayed at 11 for more than two months. Although the actual number is surely much higher—especially given how some government officials have doctored COVID-19 results and refused to conduct autopsies on those thought to have died from the illness—the island still ranks well, especially when compared to many Western states struggling with the pandemic.
The Rajapaksas like projecting competent and decisive leadership, but the COVID-19 narrative that the pro-Rajapaksa media have mounted has helped mask the president’s illiberal tendencies. Both Mahinda and Gotabaya are Sinhalese Buddhist supremacists. While Mahinda Rajapaksa rose to prominence through Parliament, Gotabaya Rajapaksa built a career through the military. As defense secretary, from 2005 to 2015, Gotabaya Rajapaksa strengthened the military and played a leading role in strategizing the defeat of Tamil separatists. Family members branded him “the Terminator” for how he pursued detractors. Many in the international community accuse him of war crimes given the atrocities perpetrated during the last stages of the Sri Lankan civil war.
The Rajapaksas used surveillance and militarization to rule in an autocratic fashion even following the civil war. Those old strategies returned almost immediately after Gotabaya Rajapaksa became president. The government erected checkpoints in the predominantly Tamil Northern Province and began to monitor civil-society organizations. It became routine for nongovernmental organizations to face questioning about personnel and funding sources, and to have surprise visits by intelligence officials, as the defense ministry took charge of registering NGOs. Much of this transpired before COVID-19 got to Sri Lanka’s shores.
In many ways, the military crept into civilian politics even more during the pandemic. Gotabaya Rajapaksa has appointed retired and serving military personnel to powerful government positions, with the army commander (and not a public health official) put in charge of the task force dealing with COVID-19. Many of these officials also stand accused of committing war crimes during the civil war. Additionally, in June the president set up a “Presidential Task Force to build a Secure Country, Disciplined, Virtuous and Lawful Society” whose members comprise of intelligence, military, and police officials. Its authorities are so wide-ranging that this task force could easily usurp the functions of civilian officials.
That’s particularly scary for the country’s Muslims. Under Mahinda Rajapaksa, radical Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists enjoyed free rein to inveigh against minorities, with Muslims especially targeted following the end of the civil war. Last year’s Easter Sunday bombings have only increased hostility toward the group among all communities.
There have been numerous riots against Muslims—instigated by Buddhist monks and extremist allies who have operated with impunity. Some among these Buddhist monks have promised to conduct campaigns after the election against Muslim businesses, women wearing the burqa, and madrassas. Muslims’ votes against Mahinda Rajapaksa were a big reason for his defeat in 2015. They also voted against Gotabaya Rajapaksa in large numbers. The very high Sinhalese Buddhist vote in his favor, however, neutralized the quest to defeat him. In turn, Buddhist nationalists thus not only consider the Muslim community anti-Rajapaksa, they fear that Wahhabi-Salafi influence spreading within the community is transforming Sri Lanka’s identity. Their shrill rhetoric during the election, combined with vile postings on social media, hint of forthcoming unrest. The island’s Muslims could well endure pogroms in the days ahead unless the international community bands together to protect them.
Consider that, in June, Gotabaya Rajapaksa created the Presidential Task Force for Archaeological Heritage Management in the Eastern Province, which does not include a single Tamil or Muslim despite both groups combining to form a majority in the region. A retired general who is secretary to the ministry of defense and is accused of committing war crimes leads the task force, which includes Buddhist monks and individuals eager to promote Sinhalese colonization of Tamil and Muslim areas. Many Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists want to eventually see the Northern and Eastern Provinces become Buddhist-majority areas, and it appears the stage is set for a policy of ethnic flooding similar to what has taken place in China’s Tibet and Xinjiang regions.
Sri Lanka’s economy was in difficulty before COVID-19 surfaced. The island owed lenders around $3 billion in 2020 and must cough up billions of dollars over the next few years to service nearly $55 billion in debt. Drastically reduced revenue from textile exports, remittances, and tourism will exacerbate the balance-of-payment crisis. The government will seek a moratorium on loan payments, and this will likely further cement its ties to China, which can (and is eager to) help in this regard.
With regard to China, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s defeat in 2015 also represented a defeat for China, given the country’s support for the president and how the Rajapaksa family enabled Chinese influence in the region at India’s expense. Indeed, India’s intelligence played a prominent role supporting Mahinda Rajapaksa’s ouster in 2015. While the Rajapaksas and the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have since pursued friendly ties, it is striking that the Gotabaya Rajapaksa regime has avoided finalizing agreements its predecessor reached with India and Japan even as it has pursued cooperative relations with China. In this context, untrammeled Rajapaksa rule in the offing represents a major victory for China. This bonhomie, combined with the economic carnage stemming from COVID-19, will allow China many opportunities to expand further its tentacles in the island.
When Sri Lanka celebrated Independence Day in February, the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government did not allow the national anthem sung in Tamil, a practice its predecessor reintroduced. The following month, the president pardoned a former army sergeant who in 2000 slit the throats of eight Tamil civilians, including four children, despite the island’s Supreme Court unanimously upholding his death sentence. The government tried to blame Muslims for spreading COVID-19 in the island, as a few from the community were among the first to contract the virus. This took place even as Muslims thought to have died from COVID-19 were forcibly cremated, a practice that goes against Islamic beliefs and World Health Organization recommendations. These ominous events took place before this majoritarian government commanded a parliamentary supermajority. All this suggest Sri Lanka and the region are bound to experience significant repercussions thanks to the results of this just-concluded election.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Will Lebanon Rise From the Ashes?

Will Lebanon Rise From the Ashes?

Will Lebanon Rise From the Ashes ?
Bad times have visited Lebanon before , but the Lebanese have never been as tested and humbled as they have been recently .
On Tuesday , the Lebanese caught a glimpse of the apocalypse , which came by way of decades of political dysfunction ; a diabolical culture of criminal negligence and corruption ; and economic plunder of resources and public assets by an entrenched , lawless coalition of feudal political families , former and current warlords , and new oligarchs .
This corruption culminated in the explosions that flattened Beirut ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within a 5-mile radius .
The port ’ s huge grain silo suffered the brunt of the blasts , leaving part of it standing like an ancient ruin signifying the hulk of a bygone civilization .
The dead will be in the hundreds , and the wounded already exceed 6,000 .
The reverberations from this man-made earthquake will continue to be felt for many years to come .
Lebanon is a remnant of its fading past .
By now , the country ’ s tale of woe , which brought it to this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ veneer of economic prosperity centered on a glitzy Beirut could not hide the rot that afflicted every facet of life in a country that imports more than 80 percent of its needs and produces very little worthy of foreign currency .
Years of economic mismanagement , endemic corruption , overspending , indebtedness , and outright plunder of financial resources by the dominant powers with the complicity of a compromised banking sector led to the collapse of the Lebanese lira , which has lost more than 80 percent of its value since last October @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explosions , Lebanon had become a Weimar Republic on the Mediterranean .
Last fall , Lebanese protesters took to the streets in peaceful demonstrations , many of them demanding serious structural change that would sweep the whole ruling class from power .
That sentiment was expressed by their catchy rebel yell , “ All means all.
” For the first time since Lebanon fell into a cycle of wars , invasions , and occupations in the 1970s , many Lebanese dared to hope that a nonsectarian , even progressive movement could arise in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activists who created the early burst of enthusiasm could not create and sustain a political wave capable of challenging the entrenched classes and participate in electoral politics , in part because of the stiff resistance led by the most reactionary force in Lebanon : Hezbollah .
The country that emerged from civil war in 1990 never had a serious chance to redeem itself .
There was no Truth and Reconciliation Commission to identify culprits and to console and compensate victims , no attempt at exorcising the demons of the conflict to prevent their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even a hint of introspection .
The Lebanese have always excelled at living in denial .
If everybody is innocent , then there are no villains .
Since 1975 , Lebanon ’ s two powerful neighbors , Syria and Israel , have invaded the country and even occupied its capital , Beirut ; their recurring rampages left an indelible scar on the collective memories of the Lebanese .
Foreign armies including those of the United States , France , and other European powers , with contingents from Gulf Arab states , were dispatched @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to restore stability .
All of them failed .
But every army that entered Lebanon , by invasion or invitation , found a Lebanese group or groups showering its soldiers with rice and flowers and pledges of support .
Wily Lebanese politicians thought they could exploit the outsiders to serve their parochial goals .
The decision by Iran , Syria , and their local allies to exclude Hezbollah from the demobilization that other militias were subjected to after 1990 put Lebanon on the road to perdition .
In subsequent years Hezbollah developed into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world .
Its intelligence and financial cells operate in five continents , generating illicit funds through smuggling and money laundering , particularly in Latin America and Africa .
Hezbollah fought Israel to a standstill for 33 days in 2006 .
Israel ’ s reaction went beyond fighting Hezbollah ’ s fighters to destroy Lebanon ’ s civilian infrastructure in a collective punishment designed to force the Lebanese people to rebel against Hezbollah .
The militia that Iran helped create , guide , and finance has evolved into a full-fledged Persian satrap in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tehran influence in the Eastern Mediterranean region ( for the first time since the Greco-Persian wars ) .
It became a rapid intervention force that would later support—and in fact save—the despotic regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria , as well as train pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Yemen .
No decision affecting Lebanon ’ s foreign policy or economy would be made without the consent of Hezbollah , which was allowed to build its own communication infrastructure and local economy .
Hezbollah has now penetrated every official Lebanese institution , including the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and it is entrenched at the Beirut port and airport .
Any serious , independent investigation of the port explosions would have to acknowledge Hezbollah ’ s unfettered access to the port , because the cache of confiscated ammonium nitrate that apparently accidentally leveled the port and large swaths of the capital can be used for commercial and noncommercial explosions .
Lebanese President Michel Aoun ’ s rejection on Friday of any international investigation into the catastrophic port blasts says a lot about the collective mentality of Lebanese officialdom : to deny @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the truth , to reject responsibility—all of which led to colossal criminal negligence .
It is not difficult to see Hezbollah ’ s influence on the hapless Lebanese state .
There can be no salvation for Lebanon , let alone building a civil state and good governance , until Hezbollah ’ s malignant influence is sharply reduced or totally wiped out .
The Lebanese are still dazed from the immediate impact of their national catastrophe .
But there is much evidence , as seen in recent demonstrations , that a rising wave of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ class that built a shaky house of lies , delusions , fears , corruption , and inequities .
Against the background of hyperinflation , a worthless currency , hunger , and a lack of basic food and medicine , the anger will be spontaneous and unfocused , as it can not be translated into meaningful political action by organized opposition groups—which would lead to sporadic violence , rampant criminality , and vengeance .
There will be chaos , and , yes , there will be blood .
The Western democracies still interested in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an international , transparent probe into the Beirut blasts .
The United States should offer its considerable technical expertise to help the investigation .
Beyond providing immediate relief such as food , medical supplies , and temporary shelter to the injured and those made homeless , there should be no economic or financial aid going to any Lebanese official agency , because it will likely be stolen , squandered , or ill-used .
In the foreseeable future , international assistance should be provided through local and international nongovernmental organizations .
Before the explosions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were frustrated because the custodians of the decomposing political system kept refusing the necessary basic reforms demanded to secure transparency and accountability .
The custodians of the system are the brigands living off of its carcass .
After the blasts , the IMF should be more insistent on its conditions .
One would easily imagine Lebanese politicians rejecting serious reforms if their ill-gotten gains are exposed .
One would hope that Beirut ’ s latest calamity will be the final impetus for the Lebanese people to begin thinking and acting as one united @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them to shake the whole country once again with that rebel yell , “ all means all ” —and this time to act on it .

Bad times have visited Lebanon before, but the Lebanese have never been as tested and humbled as they have been recently. On Tuesday, the Lebanese caught a glimpse of the apocalypse, which came by way of decades of political dysfunction; a diabolical culture of criminal negligence and corruption; and economic plunder of resources and public assets by an entrenched, lawless coalition of feudal political families, former and current warlords, and new oligarchs. This corruption culminated in the explosions that flattened Beirut’s whole port area and caused severe damage within a 5-mile radius. The port’s huge grain silo suffered the brunt of the blasts, leaving part of it standing like an ancient ruin signifying the hulk of a bygone civilization. The dead will be in the hundreds, and the wounded already exceed 6,000. The reverberations from this man-made earthquake will continue to be felt for many years to come.
Bad times have visited Lebanon before, but the Lebanese have never been as tested and humbled as they have been recently. On Tuesday, the Lebanese caught a glimpse of the apocalypse, which came by way of decades of political dysfunction; a diabolical culture of criminal negligence and corruption; and economic plunder of resources and public assets by an entrenched, lawless coalition of feudal political families, former and current warlords, and new oligarchs. This corruption culminated in the explosions that flattened Beirut’s whole port area and caused severe damage within a 5-mile radius. The port’s huge grain silo suffered the brunt of the blasts, leaving part of it standing like an ancient ruin signifying the hulk of a bygone civilization. The dead will be in the hundreds, and the wounded already exceed 6,000. The reverberations from this man-made earthquake will continue to be felt for many years to come.
Lebanon is a remnant of its fading past. By now, the country’s tale of woe, which brought it to this nadir, is well known. The veneer of economic prosperity centered on a glitzy Beirut could not hide the rot that afflicted every facet of life in a country that imports more than 80 percent of its needs and produces very little worthy of foreign currency. Years of economic mismanagement, endemic corruption, overspending, indebtedness, and outright plunder of financial resources by the dominant powers with the complicity of a compromised banking sector led to the collapse of the Lebanese lira, which has lost more than 80 percent of its value since last October. By the time of the Beirut explosions, Lebanon had become a Weimar Republic on the Mediterranean.
Last fall, Lebanese protesters took to the streets in peaceful demonstrations, many of them demanding serious structural change that would sweep the whole ruling class from power. That sentiment was expressed by their catchy rebel yell, “All means all.” For the first time since Lebanon fell into a cycle of wars, invasions, and occupations in the 1970s, many Lebanese dared to hope that a nonsectarian, even progressive movement could arise in the divided country. But the liberal activists who created the early burst of enthusiasm could not create and sustain a political wave capable of challenging the entrenched classes and participate in electoral politics, in part because of the stiff resistance led by the most reactionary force in Lebanon: Hezbollah.
The country that emerged from civil war in 1990 never had a serious chance to redeem itself. There was no Truth and Reconciliation Commission to identify culprits and to console and compensate victims, no attempt at exorcising the demons of the conflict to prevent their return in the future, and not even a hint of introspection. The Lebanese have always excelled at living in denial. If everybody is innocent, then there are no villains.
Since 1975, Lebanon’s two powerful neighbors, Syria and Israel, have invaded the country and even occupied its capital, Beirut; their recurring rampages left an indelible scar on the collective memories of the Lebanese. Foreign armies including those of the United States, France, and other European powers, with contingents from Gulf Arab states, were dispatched to Beirut at one time or another to restore stability. All of them failed. But every army that entered Lebanon, by invasion or invitation, found a Lebanese group or groups showering its soldiers with rice and flowers and pledges of support. Wily Lebanese politicians thought they could exploit the outsiders to serve their parochial goals. The decision by Iran, Syria, and their local allies to exclude Hezbollah from the demobilization that other militias were subjected to after 1990 put Lebanon on the road to perdition.
In subsequent years Hezbollah developed into the most powerful sustained nonstate actor in the world. Its intelligence and financial cells operate in five continents, generating illicit funds through smuggling and money laundering, particularly in Latin America and Africa. Hezbollah fought Israel to a standstill for 33 days in 2006. Israel’s reaction went beyond fighting Hezbollah’s fighters to destroy Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure in a collective punishment designed to force the Lebanese people to rebel against Hezbollah. The militia that Iran helped create, guide, and finance has evolved into a full-fledged Persian satrap in Lebanon, giving the theocratic regime in Tehran influence in the Eastern Mediterranean region (for the first time since the Greco-Persian wars). It became a rapid intervention force that would later support—and in fact save—the despotic regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as well as train pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Yemen. No decision affecting Lebanon’s foreign policy or economy would be made without the consent of Hezbollah, which was allowed to build its own communication infrastructure and local economy.
Hezbollah has now penetrated every official Lebanese institution, including the armed forces and most internal security agencies, and it is entrenched at the Beirut port and airport. Any serious, independent investigation of the port explosions would have to acknowledge Hezbollah’s unfettered access to the port, because the cache of confiscated ammonium nitrate that apparently accidentally leveled the port and large swaths of the capital can be used for commercial and noncommercial explosions. Lebanese President Michel Aoun’s rejection on Friday of any international investigation into the catastrophic port blasts says a lot about the collective mentality of Lebanese officialdom: to deny, to obfuscate, to cover up the truth, to reject responsibility—all of which led to colossal criminal negligence. It is not difficult to see Hezbollah’s influence on the hapless Lebanese state. There can be no salvation for Lebanon, let alone building a civil state and good governance, until Hezbollah’s malignant influence is sharply reduced or totally wiped out.
The Lebanese are still dazed from the immediate impact of their national catastrophe. But there is much evidence, as seen in recent demonstrations, that a rising wave of rage is forming against a criminal political class that built a shaky house of lies, delusions, fears, corruption, and inequities. Against the background of hyperinflation, a worthless currency, hunger, and a lack of basic food and medicine, the anger will be spontaneous and unfocused, as it cannot be translated into meaningful political action by organized opposition groups—which would lead to sporadic violence, rampant criminality, and vengeance. There will be chaos, and, yes, there will be blood.
The Western democracies still interested in helping the Lebanese people should insist on an international, transparent probe into the Beirut blasts. The United States should offer its considerable technical expertise to help the investigation. Beyond providing immediate relief such as food, medical supplies, and temporary shelter to the injured and those made homeless, there should be no economic or financial aid going to any Lebanese official agency, because it will likely be stolen, squandered, or ill-used. In the foreseeable future, international assistance should be provided through local and international nongovernmental organizations. Before the explosions, officials at the International Monetary Fund were frustrated because the custodians of the decomposing political system kept refusing the necessary basic reforms demanded to secure transparency and accountability. The custodians of the system are the brigands living off of its carcass. After the blasts, the IMF should be more insistent on its conditions. One would easily imagine Lebanese politicians rejecting serious reforms if their ill-gotten gains are exposed.
One would hope that Beirut’s latest calamity will be the final impetus for the Lebanese people to begin thinking and acting as one united people. It’s time for them to shake the whole country once again with that rebel yell, “all means all”—and this time to act on it.