foreignpolicy--2020-08-08--Trump Has Pushed Iran Into China’s Arms

Trump Has Pushed Iran Into China’s Arms

When Hassan Rouhani announced in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elections that it would be better and easier to negotiate with the United States as the “ headman of the village , ” it was hard to imagine at the time that seven years into his presidency , ties with the United States would have been virtually cut off and he would be negotiating a 25-year accord with China .
Rouhani is considered a moderate in Iran , and he won the 2013 race promising to de-escalate tensions with the West , standing in sharp contrast to his predecessor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran toward China .
This shift brings to public view a rivalry inside the country between Western-minded reformists and pro-China hard-liners , a clash that has been ongoing since the 1979 revolution .
The ascendance of one faction over the other at various points has had a significant impact on the direction of Iranian politics .
Reformist President Mohammad Khatami ’ s government ( from 1997 to 2005 ) improved its ties with European countries within the framework of his “ constructive interaction ” doctrine , but Ahmadinejad ( who was president from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ successor , chose to focus his foreign policy on building closer ties with Russia and China .
At the end of Ahmadinejad ’ s term , as international sanctions were bringing the Iranian economy to its knees , the public wanted again to pivot back toward the West.The ascendance of one faction over the other at various points has had a significant impact on the direction of Iranian politics .
Rouhani tapped into this feeling and won the presidency by promising to solve the issues surrounding international sanctions and Iran ’ s nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capital into negotiating with the West over the nuclear program , which eventually produced the landmark 2015 deal that put strict limits on Iran ’ s nuclear capabilities in return for lifting sanctions and revoking all anti-Iran U.N. Security Council resolutions .
But Rouhani ’ s hard-line opponents harshly criticized him for what they called his “ pivot to the West , ” saying that he had unnecessarily ignored the East .
Pro-Eastern sentiment in Iran is rooted in two major modes of thinking .
On the one hand , hard-line groups prefer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that of China and Russia , and they have little interest in the West ’ s democratic ways .
On the other , many groups in Iran have extensive trade relations with China and were concerned that those ties could be disrupted if Iran began to cultivate economic ties with European and U.S. companies .
These were the forces Rouhani had to balance as he negotiated with the West , and while former U.S. President Barack Obama was in office , they mostly worked in his favor .
But the hard-line approach taken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the hopes of the Rouhani administration .
When Trump announced in May 2018 that the United States would withdraw from the nuclear deal , he effectively scuppered the gains made by Rouhani and his allies and gave renewed relevancy to the country ’ s hard-liners .
Now , after more than two years of crippling economic pressure , Rouhani seems to have resolved that the only way to save Iran is to follow the hard-liners ’ demands and pivot to the East .
On June 21 , a draft 25-year agreement between Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cabinet .
Details about the agreement have not been made public , and there has been much speculation about its contents .
But growing public concern over the deal has forced senior officials to comment on the deal .
While it is officially billed as an economic partnership , there is speculation that there will be a military component .
Any defense agreements would deepen a growing security partnership between Tehran and Beijing in the years since Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal .
Iran conducted joint military exercises with China and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Oman in December , and there have been some unconfirmed reports of Chinese troops in Iran .
It was also rumored that the recent agreement could grant China access to the island of Kish in the Persian Gulf .
According to one widely cited report during the negotiations in September , China has agreed to invest $ 280 billion to develop Iran ’ s oil , gas , and petrochemicals sectors .
There will also be another $ 120 billion investment in upgrading Iran ’ s transport and manufacturing infrastructure .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extraordinary influence over companies in these sectors , and Chinese security personnel will be permitted to protect Beijing ’ s economic interests in Iran .
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif dismissed those reports on July 16 , saying , “ We have not given and will not give away even an inch of Iranian soil .
We will not grant China or any other country the exclusive right to use a single meter of Iranian territory.
” Although the agreement has not yet been ratified by the two governments , it is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lost the initiative in Tehran .
Zarif dismissed most of the other reported stipulations .
He rejected the notion of a handover of Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf , a monopoly on the sale of oil at low prices to China , and the deployment of Chinese armed forces to Iran .
Although the agreement has not yet been ratified by the two governments , it is a major signal that reformists like Rouhani have lost the initiative in Tehran , and their previously successful attempt to align Iran more closely with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard-liners have used the occasion of Trump ’ s withdrawal from the nuclear deal to cultivate closer security , economic , and political ties with China .
The future does not bode well for the reformist camp .
The end of Washington ’ s involvement in the nuclear deal , coupled with the recent agreement with China , is largely a vindication of the hard-liners ’ pro-Eastern tilt , and reformists such as Rouhani will pay the price politically in future elections , especially if the relationship with China saves the Iranian economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War , when Iran was still considered an integral part of the Western bloc , Tehran still maintained good economic relations with the Soviet Union as a way of balancing great-power competition in the region .
Even after the 1979 revolution and the outburst of anti-U.S. sentiment that followed , the government in Tehran always tried to maintain a balance between East and West , to the long-term benefit of the regime .
The Trump administration ’ s hard-line approach to Iran has now forced the regime to pick a side , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the only viable option left .

When Hassan Rouhani announced in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elections that it would be better and easier to negotiate with the United States as the “ headman of the village,” it was hard to imagine at the time that seven years into his presidency, ties with the United States would have been virtually cut off and he would be negotiating a 25-year accord with China.
When Hassan Rouhani announced in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elections that it would be better and easier to negotiate with the United States as the “headman of the village,” it was hard to imagine at the time that seven years into his presidency, ties with the United States would have been virtually cut off and he would be negotiating a 25-year accord with China.
Rouhani is considered a moderate in Iran, and he won the 2013 race promising to de-escalate tensions with the West, standing in sharp contrast to his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who favored shifting Iran toward China.
This shift brings to public view a rivalry inside the country between Western-minded reformists and pro-China hard-liners, a clash that has been ongoing since the 1979 revolution.
The ascendance of one faction over the other at various points has had a significant impact on the direction of Iranian politics. Reformist President Mohammad Khatami’s government (from 1997 to 2005) improved its ties with European countries within the framework of his “constructive interaction” doctrine, but Ahmadinejad (who was president from 2005 to 2013), his immediate successor, chose to focus his foreign policy on building closer ties with Russia and China. At the end of Ahmadinejad’s term, as international sanctions were bringing the Iranian economy to its knees, the public wanted again to pivot back toward the West.The ascendance of one faction over the other at various points has had a significant impact on the direction of Iranian politics.
Rouhani tapped into this feeling and won the presidency by promising to solve the issues surrounding international sanctions and Iran’s nuclear program. He put all his political capital into negotiating with the West over the nuclear program, which eventually produced the landmark 2015 deal that put strict limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities in return for lifting sanctions and revoking all anti-Iran U.N. Security Council resolutions.
But Rouhani’s hard-line opponents harshly criticized him for what they called his “pivot to the West,” saying that he had unnecessarily ignored the East. Pro-Eastern sentiment in Iran is rooted in two major modes of thinking. On the one hand, hard-line groups prefer an authoritarian style of government similar to that of China and Russia, and they have little interest in the West’s democratic ways. On the other, many groups in Iran have extensive trade relations with China and were concerned that those ties could be disrupted if Iran began to cultivate economic ties with European and U.S. companies.
These were the forces Rouhani had to balance as he negotiated with the West, and while former U.S. President Barack Obama was in office, they mostly worked in his favor.
But the hard-line approach taken by U.S. President Donald Trump has dashed the hopes of the Rouhani administration. When Trump announced in May 2018 that the United States would withdraw from the nuclear deal, he effectively scuppered the gains made by Rouhani and his allies and gave renewed relevancy to the country’s hard-liners. Now, after more than two years of crippling economic pressure, Rouhani seems to have resolved that the only way to save Iran is to follow the hard-liners’ demands and pivot to the East.
On June 21, a draft 25-year agreement between Iran and China was approved by the Iranian cabinet. Details about the agreement have not been made public, and there has been much speculation about its contents. But growing public concern over the deal has forced senior officials to comment on the deal. While it is officially billed as an economic partnership, there is speculation that there will be a military component.
Any defense agreements would deepen a growing security partnership between Tehran and Beijing in the years since Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal. Iran conducted joint military exercises with China and Russia in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman in December, and there have been some unconfirmed reports of Chinese troops in Iran. It was also rumored that the recent agreement could grant China access to the island of Kish in the Persian Gulf.
According to one widely cited report during the negotiations in September, China has agreed to invest $280 billion to develop Iran’s oil, gas, and petrochemicals sectors. There will also be another $120 billion investment in upgrading Iran’s transport and manufacturing infrastructure. According to the report, China will retain extraordinary influence over companies in these sectors, and Chinese security personnel will be permitted to protect Beijing’s economic interests in Iran.
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif dismissed those reports on July 16, saying, “We have not given and will not give away even an inch of Iranian soil. We will not grant China or any other country the exclusive right to use a single meter of Iranian territory.”Although the agreement has not yet been ratified by the two governments, it is a major signal that reformists like Rouhani have lost the initiative in Tehran.
Zarif dismissed most of the other reported stipulations. He rejected the notion of a handover of Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, a monopoly on the sale of oil at low prices to China, and the deployment of Chinese armed forces to Iran.
Although the agreement has not yet been ratified by the two governments, it is a major signal that reformists like Rouhani have lost the initiative in Tehran, and their previously successful attempt to align Iran more closely with the West is now dead. The hard-liners have used the occasion of Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal to cultivate closer security, economic, and political ties with China.
The future does not bode well for the reformist camp. The end of Washington’s involvement in the nuclear deal, coupled with the recent agreement with China, is largely a vindication of the hard-liners’ pro-Eastern tilt, and reformists such as Rouhani will pay the price politically in future elections, especially if the relationship with China saves the Iranian economy.
At the apex of the Cold War, when Iran was still considered an integral part of the Western bloc, Tehran still maintained good economic relations with the Soviet Union as a way of balancing great-power competition in the region. Even after the 1979 revolution and the outburst of anti-U.S. sentiment that followed, the government in Tehran always tried to maintain a balance between East and West, to the long-term benefit of the regime. The Trump administration’s hard-line approach to Iran has now forced the regime to pick a side, and Iranian leaders have determined that choosing China is the only viable option left.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-08--John Hume Left Behind a Peaceful—but Divided—Ireland

John Hume , a Nobel Peace laureate and giant of Irish politics , died on Monday , leaving behind a towering legacy .
The longtime leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party ( SDLP ) , Northern Ireland ’ s largest nationalist party for most of the second half of the 20th century , Hume will best be remembered for his most enduring contribution : peace in Ireland .
Hume was part of a generation of emergent middle-class Catholics who were the first of the country ’ s pro-Irish nationalist community to enjoy the social benefits that came with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ II welfare state .
This gave them the material and intellectual resources needed to challenge systemic anti-Catholic discrimination by the governing pro-British unionist administration .
Hume cut his political teeth in the mid-1960s as an early leader of the Northern Ireland civil rights movement , a grassroots campaign dedicated to ending housing , employment , and voter discrimination against Catholics .
His home city of Derry was considered the epicenter of unionist misrule .
Unemployment was rampant , gerrymandering locked the city ’ s large Catholic majority completely out of power , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1965 to build a new university in the Protestant-majority town of Coleraine rather than in Derry—Northern Ireland ’ s second largest city—was for many , including Hume , the spark that lit the fuse.Hume will best be remembered for his most enduring contribution : peace in Ireland .
The Northern Ireland civil rights movement took its inspiration from the African-American civil rights movement taking place in the United States , and like its U.S. counterpart it was committed to advancing its aims through nonviolent civil disobedience .
The movement was viciously opposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the breakdown of public order and the arrival of British troops at the end of the 1960s , Hume and some of his colleagues resolved to enter electoral politics .
The fatal shooting of 14 unarmed protesters by British troops on the streets of Derry in 1972 led directly to the rapid intensification of the paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army ’ s ( IRA ) armed campaign , forcing Hume to switch focus from social justice to peacebuilding .
Sinn Fein , widely considered the political wing of the IRA , gave public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrast to the SDLP ’ s commitment to nonviolence .
Though far smaller than the SDLP throughout the conflict , Sinn Fein enjoyed a substantial degree of support among nationalists .
As a peacemaker , there were few boundaries Hume would not cross , and he was willing to engage his opponents despite the enormous political—and often personal—risks involved .
He sat down with the IRA leadership as early as 1986—this , only a few years after it had reportedly considered assassinating him .
Those talks proved fruitless , but a short time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communication to Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams in what is now considered one of the first significant steps toward peace .
Hume was instrumental in moving the IRA away from its uncompromising view of the conflict and closer to his own , helping to create the political will in both London and Dublin to negotiate with Sinn Fein .
He successfully lobbied the British government to state explicitly that the Irish people had a right to national self-determination , a fundamental shift in the British position that helped convince the IRA there was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the provisions contained in the final version of the Good Friday peace agreement originated from Hume ’ s thinking .
The role he played in bringing an end to the violence is unquestionably his greatest achievement , but the next phase of the peace process—reconciling the two communities—has been left mostly unfulfilled .
In many ways , Northern Ireland is more divided now than it was during the conflict .
According to recently published data , 93 percent of students attend schools that are self-segregated along religious lines , and in a recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ described their local residential area as either “ mostly Protestant ” or “ mostly Catholic.
” In 2016 , the Northern Ireland Housing Executive found that more than 90 percent of social housing was still segregated , a figure that rose to 93 percent in Belfast .
Even more worrying , there are still sharp disagreements over how best to remember the past .
Nationalists in particular have called for the establishment of a truth commission to investigate crimes committed during the conflict , modeled on a similar body created in South Africa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unionists have pushed back , warning that a truth commission would simply be used by nationalists to place all of the blame for the conflict on the British government and its supporters .
Some nationalists have pushed for criminal prosecutions of former British soldiers , though many also argue that prosecuting former IRA members could damage the peace process .
This apparent double standard has rankled unionists , who say that if former IRA members are off-limits , former British soldiers should be , too .
The debate over who—if anyone—should be prosecuted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emotive issue.The next phase of the peace process—reconciling the two communities—has been left mostly unfulfilled .
The most visible displays of the continued division in Northern Ireland are the country ’ s famous peace walls .
Initially built as temporary structures in the 1970s to quell rioting near the dividing lines of nationalist and unionist enclaves , the peace walls were enlarged over the years and became permanent barriers , isolating whole communities from one another .
More than half of the peace walls in Northern Ireland today were built after the end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the end of large-scale violence has given way to a paralyzing degree of political polarization .
After the end of the conflict , the hardline Sinn Fein and Democratic Unionist Party ( DUP ) overtook their more moderate counterparts , including Hume ’ s SDLP , and are now the leading public faces of nationalism and unionism respectively .
Both parties hold radical visions for the future , and they seem to regard the power-sharing executive in Belfast—one of the institutions established by the Good Friday Agreement—as an occasionally useful stepping-stone to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years since the ascendance of Sinn Fein and the DUP , the executive has been out of commission for seven of them .
Brexit has only exacerbated these issues .
During the June 2016 referendum , Northern Ireland voted by a slim majority to remain in the European Union , and Sinn Fein used the result to push for unification with the Irish Republic as the only way to guarantee the democratically expressed will of the Northern Irish people .
Calls for unity have snowballed since then , in part due to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus pandemic , sharpening Sinn Fein ’ s political focus while at the same time causing the DUP to dig in and channel its historic “ no surrender ” mentality .
The uncompromising nature of Northern Ireland ’ s politics is unlikely to subside while the current conditions exist .
These are the problems that have dogged Northern Ireland since the end of the conflict .
Hume helped build the framework that gave meaningful expression to all of Northern Ireland ’ s communities , but the ultimate reconciliation of nationalists and unionists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left to a future generation of peacemakers .

John Hume, a Nobel Peace laureate and giant of Irish politics, died on Monday, leaving behind a towering legacy. The longtime leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), Northern Ireland’s largest nationalist party for most of the second half of the 20th century, Hume will best be remembered for his most enduring contribution: peace in Ireland.
John Hume, a Nobel Peace laureate and giant of Irish politics, died on Monday, leaving behind a towering legacy. The longtime leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), Northern Ireland’s largest nationalist party for most of the second half of the 20th century, Hume will best be remembered for his most enduring contribution: peace in Ireland.
Hume was part of a generation of emergent middle-class Catholics who were the first of the country’s pro-Irish nationalist community to enjoy the social benefits that came with the United Kingdom’s post-World War II welfare state. This gave them the material and intellectual resources needed to challenge systemic anti-Catholic discrimination by the governing pro-British unionist administration.
Hume cut his political teeth in the mid-1960s as an early leader of the Northern Ireland civil rights movement, a grassroots campaign dedicated to ending housing, employment, and voter discrimination against Catholics. His home city of Derry was considered the epicenter of unionist misrule. Unemployment was rampant, gerrymandering locked the city’s large Catholic majority completely out of power, and a decision by the Northern Ireland government in 1965 to build a new university in the Protestant-majority town of Coleraine rather than in Derry—Northern Ireland’s second largest city—was for many, including Hume, the spark that lit the fuse.Hume will best be remembered for his most enduring contribution: peace in Ireland.
The Northern Ireland civil rights movement took its inspiration from the African-American civil rights movement taking place in the United States, and like its U.S. counterpart it was committed to advancing its aims through nonviolent civil disobedience. The movement was viciously opposed by Protestant unionist reactionaries, and after the breakdown of public order and the arrival of British troops at the end of the 1960s, Hume and some of his colleagues resolved to enter electoral politics.
The fatal shooting of 14 unarmed protesters by British troops on the streets of Derry in 1972 led directly to the rapid intensification of the paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) armed campaign, forcing Hume to switch focus from social justice to peacebuilding. Sinn Fein, widely considered the political wing of the IRA, gave public support to the armed campaign in sharp contrast to the SDLP’s commitment to nonviolence. Though far smaller than the SDLP throughout the conflict, Sinn Fein enjoyed a substantial degree of support among nationalists.
As a peacemaker, there were few boundaries Hume would not cross, and he was willing to engage his opponents despite the enormous political—and often personal—risks involved. He sat down with the IRA leadership as early as 1986—this, only a few years after it had reportedly considered assassinating him. Those talks proved fruitless, but a short time later he opened a top-secret line of communication to Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams in what is now considered one of the first significant steps toward peace.
Hume was instrumental in moving the IRA away from its uncompromising view of the conflict and closer to his own, helping to create the political will in both London and Dublin to negotiate with Sinn Fein. He successfully lobbied the British government to state explicitly that the Irish people had a right to national self-determination, a fundamental shift in the British position that helped convince the IRA there was a nonviolent path forward. Most of the provisions contained in the final version of the Good Friday peace agreement originated from Hume’s thinking.
The role he played in bringing an end to the violence is unquestionably his greatest achievement, but the next phase of the peace process—reconciling the two communities—has been left mostly unfulfilled. In many ways, Northern Ireland is more divided now than it was during the conflict.
According to recently published data, 93 percent of students attend schools that are self-segregated along religious lines, and in a recent survey, more than half of respondents described their local residential area as either “mostly Protestant” or “mostly Catholic.” In 2016, the Northern Ireland Housing Executive found that more than 90 percent of social housing was still segregated, a figure that rose to 93 percent in Belfast.
Even more worrying, there are still sharp disagreements over how best to remember the past. Nationalists in particular have called for the establishment of a truth commission to investigate crimes committed during the conflict, modeled on a similar body created in South Africa after the end of apartheid. Some unionists have pushed back, warning that a truth commission would simply be used by nationalists to place all of the blame for the conflict on the British government and its supporters.
Some nationalists have pushed for criminal prosecutions of former British soldiers, though many also argue that prosecuting former IRA members could damage the peace process. This apparent double standard has rankled unionists, who say that if former IRA members are off-limits, former British soldiers should be, too. The debate over who—if anyone—should be prosecuted for conflict-related crimes is still a highly emotive issue.The next phase of the peace process—reconciling the two communities—has been left mostly unfulfilled.
The most visible displays of the continued division in Northern Ireland are the country’s famous peace walls. Initially built as temporary structures in the 1970s to quell rioting near the dividing lines of nationalist and unionist enclaves, the peace walls were enlarged over the years and became permanent barriers, isolating whole communities from one another. More than half of the peace walls in Northern Ireland today were built after the end of the conflict.
Perhaps most consequentially, the end of large-scale violence has given way to a paralyzing degree of political polarization. After the end of the conflict, the hardline Sinn Fein and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) overtook their more moderate counterparts, including Hume’s SDLP, and are now the leading public faces of nationalism and unionism respectively. Both parties hold radical visions for the future, and they seem to regard the power-sharing executive in Belfast—one of the institutions established by the Good Friday Agreement—as an occasionally useful stepping-stone to their real objectives. In the 17 years since the ascendance of Sinn Fein and the DUP, the executive has been out of commission for seven of them.
Brexit has only exacerbated these issues. During the June 2016 referendum, Northern Ireland voted by a slim majority to remain in the European Union, and Sinn Fein used the result to push for unification with the Irish Republic as the only way to guarantee the democratically expressed will of the Northern Irish people. Calls for unity have snowballed since then, in part due to the U.K. government’s underwhelming response to the coronavirus pandemic, sharpening Sinn Fein’s political focus while at the same time causing the DUP to dig in and channel its historic “no surrender” mentality. The uncompromising nature of Northern Ireland’s politics is unlikely to subside while the current conditions exist.
These are the problems that have dogged Northern Ireland since the end of the conflict. Hume helped build the framework that gave meaningful expression to all of Northern Ireland’s communities, but the ultimate reconciliation of nationalists and unionists remains elusive. That task will be left to a future generation of peacemakers.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-09--Iran’s Pact With China Is Bad News for the West

Iran ’ s Pact With China Is Bad News for the West A recently leaked document suggests that China and Iran are entering a 25-year strategic partnership in trade , politics , culture , and security .
Cooperation between China and Middle Eastern countries is neither new nor recent .
Yet what distinguishes this development from others is that both China and Iran have global and regional ambitions , both have confrontational relationships with the United States , and there is a security component to the agreement .
The military aspect of the agreement concerns the United States , just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman spooked Washington .
China ’ s growing influence in East Asia and Africa has challenged U.S. interests , and the Middle East is the next battlefield on which Beijing can challenge U.S. hegemony—this time through Iran .
This is particularly important since the agreement and its implications go beyond the economic sphere and bilateral relations : It operates at the internal , regional , and global level .
Internally , the agreement can be an economic lifeline for Iran , saving its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sale of its oil and gas to China .
In addition , Iran will be able to use its strategic ties with China as a bargaining chip in any possible future negotiations with the West by taking advantage of its ability to expand China ’ s footprint in the Persian Gulf .
While there are only three months left before the 2020 U.S. presidential election , closer scrutiny of the new Iran-China strategic partnership could jeopardize the possibility of a Republican victory .
That ’ s because the China-Iran strategic partnership proves that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy has been a failure ; not only did it fail to restrain Iran and change its regional behavior , but it pushed Tehran into the arms of Beijing .
In the long term , Iran ’ s strategic proximity to China implies that Tehran is adapting the so-called “ Look East ” policy in order to boost its regional and military power and to defy and undermine U.S. power in the Persian Gulf region .
For China , the pact can help guarantee its energy security .
The Persian Gulf supplies more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needs .
Thus , securing freedom of navigation through the Persian Gulf is of great importance for China .
Saudi Arabia , a close U.S. ally , has now become the top supplier of crude oil to China , as Chinese imports from the kingdom in May set a new record of 2.16 million barrels per day .
This dependence is at odds with China ’ s general policy of diversifying its energy sources and not being reliant on one supplier .
( China ’ s other Arab oil suppliers in the Persian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States . )
China fears that as the trade war between the two countries intensifies , the United States may put pressure on those countries not to supply Beijing with the energy it needs .
A comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran is both a hedge and an insurance policy ; it can provide China with a guaranteed and discounted source of energy .
Chinese-Iranian ties will inevitably reshape the political landscape of the region in favor of Iran and China , further undermining U.S. influence .
Indeed , the agreement allows @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one of the most important regions in the world .
The strategic landscape has shifted since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq .
In the new regional order , transnational identities based on religious and sectarian divisions spread and changed the essence of power dynamics .
These changes , as well as U.S. troop withdrawals and the unrest of the Arab Spring , provided an opportunity for middle powers like Iran to fill the gaps and to boost their regional power .
Simultaneously , since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012 , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make China a world power and to play a more active role in other regions .
This ambition manifested itself in introducing the Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) , which highlighted the strategic importance of the Middle East .
China ’ s apolitical approach to the region aims to utilize Iran ’ s regional power to expand economic ties with nearby countries and establish security in the region through what it calls developmental peace .
China grasps Iran ’ s position and importance as a regional power in the new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years have consolidated Iran ’ s influence .
Unlike the United States , China has adopted an apolitical development-oriented approach to the region , utilizing Iran ’ s regional power to expand economic relations with nearby countries and establish security in the region through what it calls developmental peace—rather than the Western notion of democratic peace .
It ’ s an approach that authoritarian states in the Middle East tend to welcome .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018 , and the subsequent introduction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the last effort by the U.S. government to halt Iran ’ s growing influence in the region .
Although this policy has hit Iran ’ s economy hard , it has not been able to change the country ’ s ambitious regional and military policies yet .
As such , the newfound strategic cooperation between China and Iran will further undermine U.S. leverage , paving the way for China to play a more active role in the Middle East .
The Chinese-Iranian strategic partnership will also impact neighboring regions , including South Asia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signed an agreement to invest in Iran ’ s strategic Chabahar Port and to construct the railway connecting the southeastern port city of Chabahar to the eastern city of Zahedan and to link India to landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asia .
Iran now accuses India of delaying its investments under U.S. pressure and has dismissed India from the project .
While Iranian officials have refused to link India ’ s removal from Chabahar-Zahedan project to the new 25-year deal with China , it seems that India ’ s close ties to Washington led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China in such a strategic project will alter the balance of power in South Asia to the detriment of New Delhi .
China now has the chance to connect Chabahar Port to Gwadar in Pakistan , which is a critical hub in the BRI program .
Regardless of what Washington thinks , the new China-Iran relationship will ultimately undermine India ’ s interests in the region , particularly if Pakistan gets on board .
The implementation of Iran ’ s proposal to expand the existing China-Pakistan Economic Corridor along northern , western , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Pakistan to Chabahar and then to Europe and to Central Asia through Iran by a rail network is now more probable .
If that plan proceeds , the golden ring consisting of China , Pakistan , Iran , Russia , and Turkey will turn into the centerpiece of BRI , linking China to Iran and onward to Central Asia , the Caspian Sea , and to the Mediterranean Sea through Iraq and Syria .
On July 16 , Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced that Jask Port would become the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a greater focus on the development of the two strategic ports of Jask and Chabahar , Iran is attempting to shift its geostrategic focus from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman .
This would allow Tehran to avoid the tense Persian Gulf region , reduces the journey distance for oil tankers shipping Iranian oil , and also enables Tehran to close the Strait of Hormuz when needed .
The bilateral agreement provides China with an extraordinary opportunity to participate in the development of this port .
China will be able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hubs in the region .
According to this plan , regional industrial parks developed by Chinese companies in some Persian Gulf countries will link up to ports where China has a strong presence .
This interconnected network of industrial parks and ports can further challenge the United States ’ dominant position in the region surrounding the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz .
A strategic partnership between Iran and China will also affect the great-power rivalry between the United States and China .
While China remains the largest trading partner of the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the two global powers , their competition has intensified in various fields to the point that many observers argue the world is entering a new cold war .
Given the geopolitical and economic importance of the Middle East , the deal with Iran gives China yet another perch from which it can challenge U.S. power .
Meanwhile , in addition to ensuring its survival , Tehran is going to take advantage of ties with Beijing to consolidate its regional position .
Last but not least , while the United States has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region , Chinese-Iranian partnership could eventually reshape the region ’ s security landscape by promoting stability through the Chinese approach of developmental peace .

A recently leaked document suggests that China and Iran are entering a 25-year strategic partnership in trade, politics, culture, and security.
Cooperation between China and Middle Eastern countries is neither new nor recent. Yet what distinguishes this development from others is that both China and Iran have global and regional ambitions, both have confrontational relationships with the United States, and there is a security component to the agreement. The military aspect of the agreement concerns the United States, just as last year’s unprecedented Iran-China-Russia joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman spooked Washington.
China’s growing influence in East Asia and Africa has challenged U.S. interests, and the Middle East is the next battlefield on which Beijing can challenge U.S. hegemony—this time through Iran. This is particularly important since the agreement and its implications go beyond the economic sphere and bilateral relations: It operates at the internal, regional, and global level.
Internally, the agreement can be an economic lifeline for Iran, saving its sanctions-hit, cash-strapped economy by ensuring the sale of its oil and gas to China. In addition, Iran will be able to use its strategic ties with China as a bargaining chip in any possible future negotiations with the West by taking advantage of its ability to expand China’s footprint in the Persian Gulf.
While there are only three months left before the 2020 U.S. presidential election, closer scrutiny of the new Iran-China strategic partnership could jeopardize the possibility of a Republican victory. That’s because the China-Iran strategic partnership proves that the Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy has been a failure; not only did it fail to restrain Iran and change its regional behavior, but it pushed Tehran into the arms of Beijing.
In the long term, Iran’s strategic proximity to China implies that Tehran is adapting the so-called “Look East” policy in order to boost its regional and military power and to defy and undermine U.S. power in the Persian Gulf region.
For China, the pact can help guarantee its energy security. The Persian Gulf supplies more than half of China’s energy needs. Thus, securing freedom of navigation through the Persian Gulf is of great importance for China. Saudi Arabia, a close U.S. ally, has now become the top supplier of crude oil to China, as Chinese imports from the kingdom in May set a new record of 2.16 million barrels per day. This dependence is at odds with China’s general policy of diversifying its energy sources and not being reliant on one supplier. (China’s other Arab oil suppliers in the Persian Gulf region have close security ties with the United States.)
China fears that as the trade war between the two countries intensifies, the United States may put pressure on those countries not to supply Beijing with the energy it needs. A comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran is both a hedge and an insurance policy; it can provide China with a guaranteed and discounted source of energy.
Chinese-Iranian ties will inevitably reshape the political landscape of the region in favor of Iran and China, further undermining U.S. influence. Indeed, the agreement allows China to play a greater role in one of the most important regions in the world. The strategic landscape has shifted since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In the new regional order, transnational identities based on religious and sectarian divisions spread and changed the essence of power dynamics.
These changes, as well as U.S. troop withdrawals and the unrest of the Arab Spring, provided an opportunity for middle powers like Iran to fill the gaps and to boost their regional power. Simultaneously, since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, the Chinese government has expressed a stronger desire to make China a world power and to play a more active role in other regions. This ambition manifested itself in introducing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which highlighted the strategic importance of the Middle East.
China’s apolitical approach to the region aims to utilize Iran’s regional power to expand economic ties with nearby countries and establish security in the region through what it calls developmental peace.
China grasps Iran’s position and importance as a regional power in the new Middle East. Regional developments in recent years have consolidated Iran’s influence. Unlike the United States, China has adopted an apolitical development-oriented approach to the region, utilizing Iran’s regional power to expand economic relations with nearby countries and establish security in the region through what it calls developmental peace—rather than the Western notion of democratic peace. It’s an approach that authoritarian states in the Middle East tend to welcome.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018, and the subsequent introduction of the maximum pressure policy, was the last effort by the U.S. government to halt Iran’s growing influence in the region. Although this policy has hit Iran’s economy hard, it has not been able to change the country’s ambitious regional and military policies yet. As such, the newfound strategic cooperation between China and Iran will further undermine U.S. leverage, paving the way for China to play a more active role in the Middle East.
The Chinese-Iranian strategic partnership will also impact neighboring regions, including South Asia. In 2016, India and Iran signed an agreement to invest in Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port and to construct the railway connecting the southeastern port city of Chabahar to the eastern city of Zahedan and to link India to landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran now accuses India of delaying its investments under U.S. pressure and has dismissed India from the project.
While Iranian officials have refused to link India’s removal from Chabahar-Zahedan project to the new 25-year deal with China, it seems that India’s close ties to Washington led to this decision. Replacing India with China in such a strategic project will alter the balance of power in South Asia to the detriment of New Delhi. China now has the chance to connect Chabahar Port to Gwadar in Pakistan, which is a critical hub in the BRI program.
Regardless of what Washington thinks, the new China-Iran relationship will ultimately undermine India’s interests in the region, particularly if Pakistan gets on board. The implementation of Iran’s proposal to expand the existing China-Pakistan Economic Corridor along northern, western, and southern axes and link Gwadar Port in Pakistan to Chabahar and then to Europe and to Central Asia through Iran by a rail network is now more probable. If that plan proceeds, the golden ring consisting of China, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and Turkey will turn into the centerpiece of BRI, linking China to Iran and onward to Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and to the Mediterranean Sea through Iraq and Syria.
On July 16, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced that Jask Port would become the country’s main oil loading point. By placing a greater focus on the development of the two strategic ports of Jask and Chabahar, Iran is attempting to shift its geostrategic focus from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. This would allow Tehran to avoid the tense Persian Gulf region, reduces the journey distance for oil tankers shipping Iranian oil, and also enables Tehran to close the Strait of Hormuz when needed.
The bilateral agreement provides China with an extraordinary opportunity to participate in the development of this port. China will be able to add Jask to its network of strategic hubs in the region. According to this plan, regional industrial parks developed by Chinese companies in some Persian Gulf countries will link up to ports where China has a strong presence. This interconnected network of industrial parks and ports can further challenge the United States’ dominant position in the region surrounding the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.
A strategic partnership between Iran and China will also affect the great-power rivalry between the United States and China. While China remains the largest trading partner of the United States and there are still extensive bilateral relations between the two global powers, their competition has intensified in various fields to the point that many observers argue the world is entering a new cold war. Given the geopolitical and economic importance of the Middle East, the deal with Iran gives China yet another perch from which it can challenge U.S. power.
Meanwhile, in addition to ensuring its survival, Tehran is going to take advantage of ties with Beijing to consolidate its regional position. Last but not least, while the United States has been benefiting from rivalry and division in the region, Chinese-Iranian partnership could eventually reshape the region’s security landscape by promoting stability through the Chinese approach of developmental peace.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-10--The U.N. Secretary-General Is Letting Powerful Countries Get Away With Killing Kids

The U.N. Secretary-General Is Letting Powerful Countries Get Away With Killing Kids The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres is undermining one of the U.N. ’ s most effective tools for holding wartime abusers to account : He has repeatedly omitted powerful governments from his annual list of shame for grave violations against children in armed conflict , ignoring the U.N. ’ s own evidence of abuse .
When the Security Council first requested the list in 2001 , it was limited to governments recruiting and using child soldiers , but over the years the Security Council has expanded it to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kill and maim children , commit acts of sexual violence , attack schools and hospitals , abduct children , and deny them humanitarian access .
Many of the state and nonstate actors named—including the governments of Somalia , South Sudan , and Syria—are on the list for multiple violations .
Not surprisingly , most parties to armed conflict—particularly governments—do not want to be included on the list .
To be listed means keeping company with pariah groups like the Islamic State , Al Qaeda , or the Taliban—and facing possible Security Council sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and travel bans .
The first major successful attack on the credibility of the list was in 2015 , when the secretary-general ’ s special representative on children and armed conflict recommended adding Israel for violations during a major military offensive in the Gaza Strip the year before .
The U.N. reported that at least 557 Palestinian children were killed and at least 4,249 , most under the age of 12 , were injured .
According to diplomatic sources , both Israeli officials and the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. lobbied Guterres @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to keep Israel off the list .
Ban succumbed to the pressure and omitted Israel .
The following year , Ban included the Saudi-led coalition of countries fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen .
He based his decision on U.N. documentation that the coalition was responsible for at least 1,100 child casualties in Yemen , as well as about 50 attacks on schools and hospitals .
But after Saudi Arabia threatened to withdraw hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance to the U.N. , Ban announced that he was removing the coalition from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ later accused Saudi Arabia of exerting “ unacceptable pressure ” and said that the decision to remove the coalition from the list was one of the most difficult and painful of his tenure .
A pattern had been established .
Powerful governments that were willing to throw their weight around were able to avoid the stigma of the list , no matter their crimes .
Guterres inherited the politicized list when he took office in 2017 .
During his tenure , the list ’ s credibility has deteriorated even further .
To his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the “ list of shame ” in 2017 , after the U.N. verified that the coalition was responsible for at least 683 child casualties and 38 attacks on schools and hospitals in Yemen .
But he attempted to appease Saudi Arabia by dividing the list into two sections , one for parties that had put in place “ measures aimed at improving the protection of children , ” and a second for parties that had taken no action .
Although a U.N. panel of experts found that any precautionary measures taken by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its air campaign were “ largely inadequate and ineffective , “ Guterres placed the coalition on the not-so-bad list .
Then , in 2018 , Guterres removed the coalition from the list with regard to schools and hospitals citing a “ significant decrease ” in the number of attacks compared to the year before , and “ preventative measures ” taken by the coalition .
He made this move despite verified attacks on at least 19 schools and five hospitals—even though the Houthis remained on the list for that violation , despite a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same year , Guterres continued to omit Israel from his list , despite U.N. documentation that 15 Palestinian children were killed and 1,160 injured , as well Iraqi government forces responsible for at least 109 child casualties , and U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan , responsible for at least 96 child casualties .
This year , Guterres went further , delisting the Saudi-led coalition entirely , even though his accompanying report stated that the coalition had killed or maimed 222 children in Yemen in 2019 .
Similarly , he delisted the Myanmar armed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ straight years on the list for using children in conflict , despite more than 200 new cases of child recruitment and use in 2019 .
In doing so , he ignored criteria established in 2010 stipulating that a party would only be delisted based on full implementation of a U.N. action plan to end the violations , and U.N. verification that the party had ceased all violations for a period of at least once year .
Neither the Saudi-led coalition nor the Tatmadaw met those conditions .
Guterres ’ s most recent list @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Defense and Security Forces , Russian forces in Syria , and U.S. forces in Afghanistan—despite hundreds of child casualties attributed to each .
In an open letter , a group of 24 nongovernmental organizations said that the secretary-general appeared to continually move the goalposts with regard to listing and delisting in order “ to accommodate a predetermined outcome : not upsetting powerful U.N .
Member States.
” Power politics at the U.N. is nothing new .
But in the past , this list of shame has been remarkably effective at pressuring governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 years , it has contributed to the release of more than 155,000 child soldiers , including an estimated 13,200 in 2019 alone , and has prompted 32 governments and non-state armed groups to sign U.N. action plans to end grave violations against children .
At least a dozen of these have successfully ended their violations , while others are working to implement their plans .
One of its successes is the Democratic Republic of Congo , where warring parties , including the government , recruited tens of thousands of children as soldiers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict ’ s height in the 1990s , UNICEF estimates that 30,000 children were fighting on all sides .
After appearing on the U.N. list of shame , the Congolese government issued new command orders prohibiting child recruitment , initiated age verification procedures for new recruits , and arrested and prosecuted officers for recruiting children .
By 2015 , government recruitment and use of children had virtually stopped .
Similarly , the governments of Uganda , Chad , Côte d ’ Ivoire , and non-state armed groups from Nepal , the Philippines , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ removed from the list after successfully implementing their action plans and proving that they had reformed their treatment of children .
But now , the list has become almost meaningless .
When powerful countries escape scrutiny year after year , other listed parties can claim a double standard .
To restore the list ’ s credibility , Guterres needs to list all parties based on the evidence , not political pressure or influence .
Guterres is not the first secretary-general to allow powerful states to escape accountability for their offenses .
But his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own evidence and coddle powerful countries may fatally damage one of the U.N. ’ s proven and most effective weapons for protecting the world ’ s children .

The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres is undermining one of the U.N.’s most effective tools for holding wartime abusers to account: He has repeatedly omitted powerful governments from his annual list of shame for grave violations against children in armed conflict, ignoring the U.N.’s own evidence of abuse.
The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres is undermining one of the U.N.’s most effective tools for holding wartime abusers to account: He has repeatedly omitted powerful governments from his annual list of shame for grave violations against children in armed conflict, ignoring the U.N.’s own evidence of abuse.
When the Security Council first requested the list in 2001, it was limited to governments recruiting and using child soldiers, but over the years the Security Council has expanded it to include military forces and armed groups that kill and maim children, commit acts of sexual violence, attack schools and hospitals, abduct children, and deny them humanitarian access. Many of the state and nonstate actors named—including the governments of Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria—are on the list for multiple violations.
Not surprisingly, most parties to armed conflict—particularly governments—do not want to be included on the list. To be listed means keeping company with pariah groups like the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, or the Taliban—and facing possible Security Council sanctions, including arms embargoes, asset freezes, and travel bans.
The first major successful attack on the credibility of the list was in 2015, when the secretary-general’s special representative on children and armed conflict recommended adding Israel for violations during a major military offensive in the Gaza Strip the year before. The U.N. reported that at least 557 Palestinian children were killed and at least 4,249, most under the age of 12, were injured. According to diplomatic sources, both Israeli officials and the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. lobbied Guterres’s predecessor, Ban Ki-moon, to keep Israel off the list. Ban succumbed to the pressure and omitted Israel.
The following year, Ban included the Saudi-led coalition of countries fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen. He based his decision on U.N. documentation that the coalition was responsible for at least 1,100 child casualties in Yemen, as well as about 50 attacks on schools and hospitals. But after Saudi Arabia threatened to withdraw hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance to the U.N., Ban announced that he was removing the coalition from the list, “pending review.” Ban later accused Saudi Arabia of exerting “unacceptable pressure” and said that the decision to remove the coalition from the list was one of the most difficult and painful of his tenure.
A pattern had been established. Powerful governments that were willing to throw their weight around were able to avoid the stigma of the list, no matter their crimes.
Guterres inherited the politicized list when he took office in 2017. During his tenure, the list’s credibility has deteriorated even further. To his credit, he restored the Saudi-led coalition to the “list of shame” in 2017, after the U.N. verified that the coalition was responsible for at least 683 child casualties and 38 attacks on schools and hospitals in Yemen.
But he attempted to appease Saudi Arabia by dividing the list into two sections, one for parties that had put in place “measures aimed at improving the protection of children,” and a second for parties that had taken no action. Although a U.N. panel of experts found that any precautionary measures taken by the Saudi-led coalition to protect civilians during its air campaign were “largely inadequate and ineffective,“ Guterres placed the coalition on the not-so-bad list.
Then, in 2018, Guterres removed the coalition from the list with regard to schools and hospitals citing a “significant decrease” in the number of attacks compared to the year before, and “preventative measures” taken by the coalition. He made this move despite verified attacks on at least 19 schools and five hospitals—even though the Houthis remained on the list for that violation, despite a far smaller number of attacks.
That same year, Guterres continued to omit Israel from his list, despite U.N. documentation that 15 Palestinian children were killed and 1,160 injured, as well Iraqi government forces responsible for at least 109 child casualties, and U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan, responsible for at least 96 child casualties.
This year, Guterres went further, delisting the Saudi-led coalition entirely, even though his accompanying report stated that the coalition had killed or maimed 222 children in Yemen in 2019. Similarly, he delisted the Myanmar armed forces, the Tatmadaw, after 17 straight years on the list for using children in conflict, despite more than 200 new cases of child recruitment and use in 2019.
In doing so, he ignored criteria established in 2010 stipulating that a party would only be delisted based on full implementation of a U.N. action plan to end the violations, and U.N. verification that the party had ceased all violations for a period of at least once year. Neither the Saudi-led coalition nor the Tatmadaw met those conditions.
Guterres’s most recent list also omitted Israeli security forces, Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, Russian forces in Syria, and U.S. forces in Afghanistan—despite hundreds of child casualties attributed to each. In an open letter, a group of 24 nongovernmental organizations said that the secretary-general appeared to continually move the goalposts with regard to listing and delisting in order “to accommodate a predetermined outcome: not upsetting powerful U.N. Member States.”
Power politics at the U.N. is nothing new. But in the past, this list of shame has been remarkably effective at pressuring governments and armed groups. Over the past 20 years, it has contributed to the release of more than 155,000 child soldiers, including an estimated 13,200 in 2019 alone, and has prompted 32 governments and non-state armed groups to sign U.N. action plans to end grave violations against children. At least a dozen of these have successfully ended their violations, while others are working to implement their plans.
One of its successes is the Democratic Republic of Congo, where warring parties, including the government, recruited tens of thousands of children as soldiers over decades of conflict. At the conflict’s height in the 1990s, UNICEF estimates that 30,000 children were fighting on all sides.
After appearing on the U.N. list of shame, the Congolese government issued new command orders prohibiting child recruitment, initiated age verification procedures for new recruits, and arrested and prosecuted officers for recruiting children. By 2015, government recruitment and use of children had virtually stopped.
Similarly, the governments of Uganda, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and non-state armed groups from Nepal, the Philippines, and Côte d’Ivoire, were removed from the list after successfully implementing their action plans and proving that they had reformed their treatment of children.
But now, the list has become almost meaningless. When powerful countries escape scrutiny year after year, other listed parties can claim a double standard. To restore the list’s credibility, Guterres needs to list all parties based on the evidence, not political pressure or influence.
Guterres is not the first secretary-general to allow powerful states to escape accountability for their offenses. But his willingness to ignore the U.N.’s own evidence and coddle powerful countries may fatally damage one of the U.N.’s proven and most effective weapons for protecting the world’s children.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-10--Thousands Protest Controversial Belarus Election Results

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Protests erupt in Belarus after Aleksandr Lukashenko claims a landslide victory , the Afghan government agrees to release Taliban prisoners , and a shooting in Niger leaves eight dead .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Five-term Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed victory in the country ’ s presidential elections on Sunday after facing one of his toughest electoral challenges since taking over the presidency in 1994 .
An official exit poll showed that he won 79.7 percent of the vote , a result wholly inconsistent with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent weeks .
Mass protests broke out in the capital of Minsk and other cities after the exit poll was published .
The situation quickly turned violent as protesters clashed with police .
Police responded using water cannons , tear gas , and stun grenades to disperse the crowds .
Lukashenko ’ s main challenger , Svetlana Tikhanovskaya , secured only 6.8 percent of the vote according to the exit poll ; she rejected the official figures , declaring that “ the majority is with us.
” Mounting a challenge .
This was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in years , due in large part to the country ’ s declining economic fortunes and the government ’ s underwhelming response to the coronavirus pandemic , as Foreign Policy ’ s Amy Mackinnon reported .
Promising to free political prisoners and to hold new elections , Tikhanovskaya drew massive crowds to her rallies , reportedly drawing tens of thousands of supporters to one in Minsk in July .
Feeling the pressure , the government cracked down on the opposition in the weeks leading up to the election .
Human rights groups said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the final weeks of the campaign , including election observers and members of Tikhanovskaya ’ s campaign team .
Tikhanovskaya herself went into hiding the night before the vote after two senior staffers were arrested .
Russia ’ s watchful eye .
Russia loomed large over the election campaign .
Once considered a staunch Russian ally , relations between Lukashenko and Moscow have deteriorated in recent months as he has resisted attempts by Russian President Vladimir Putin to strengthen ties between the two countries .
Lukashenko notably had 33 Russian mercenaries in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lying in wait and preparing to instigate a revolution .
Although Russia probably prefers Lukashenko to stay at the helm , the recent upsurge of unrest along its border may cause it to consider intervening the way it did after the events of the Euromaidan in Ukraine in 2014 .
August 10-14 .
U.S. Democratic nominee Joe Biden is expected to name a running mate this week .
Former National Security Advisor Susan Rice and former presidential candidate Sen. Kamala Harris are considered the frontrunners for the job .
Foreign Policy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s potential picks stand on foreign policy .
August 10-14 .
The U.N. Security Council is expected to vote on a resolution this week extending sanctions on Iran .
Although U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would table a resolution to extend the sanctions , a date has not yet been set .
August 12 .
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen will join the Hudson Institute for an online discussion on the diplomatic , security , and economic challenges facing Taiwan .
August 12 .
Bougainville , an autonomous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elect a president and 39 members of its House of Representatives , which will be responsible for negotiating independence from Papua New Guinea .
The autonomous region voted to split from Papua New Guinea in a referendum last year .
August 13 .
A reprieve from sanctions against U.S. companies doing business with the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei is set to expire today .
Some companies had been permitted to continue doing business with Huawei to mitigate the strain on communications in rural parts of the country .
August 15 .
U.S. Trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese Vice Premier Liu He to review the February trade deal between the two countries .
The meeting has not been confirmed by either country .
Protests in Beirut .
Political and social unrest has gripped Lebanon since last week ’ s deadly explosions in Beirut .
Thousands of protesters took to the streets on Sunday , attacking a parliamentary precinct in the city with rubble from the blast and demanding the resignation of the government .
The demonstrations turned increasingly violent as protesters attempted to gain entry into the legislature , causing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The government has been widely blamed for the accident after it was revealed that ammonium nitrate—a highly explosive chemical which helped intensify the blast—had been stored in the city with official knowledge , despite warnings from inspectors about the danger it posed .
Several high-ranking government officials have already resigned since the accident .
Information Minister Manal Abdel Samad resigned her post on Sunday , followed shortly after by Environment Minister Damianos Kattar .
An additional three members of parliament resigned on Sunday , bringing the total number of parliamentary resignations to nine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On Sunday , the Afghan legislative assembly passed a resolution authorizing the release of 400 “ hard-core ” Taliban prisoners , considered the Taliban ’ s last condition before entering talks with the Afghan government .
Shortly after the resolution passed , President Ashraf Ghani confirmed that he would “ sign the release order of these 400 prisoners , ” setting the stage for talks between the two sides to begin this week .
Prisoner releases had been one of the main sticking points since the peace deal signed between the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s decision will bring the total number of Taliban prisoners released up to 5,000 , meeting one of the key stipulations of February ’ s deal .
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Saturday that the U.S. troop presence in the country would drop to less than 5,000 by the end of November .
U.S. officials arrive in Taiwan .
U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar touched down in Taiwan on Sunday for the highest-level meeting between U.S. and Taiwanese officials in decades and quickly praised Taiwan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Officials will discuss ongoing pandemic relief efforts , as well as the broader U.S.-Taiwanese relationship in the face of growing assertiveness from China .
Chinese officials were not pleased and have threatened “ strong countermeasures in response to the U.S. behavior , ” though what action they might take remains unclear .
Shooting in Niger .
On Sunday , a team of gunmen killed eight people in an ambush in Niger ’ s southern region of Koure .
The dead included two Nigérien nationals and six French tourists .
Neither Nigérien President Mahamadou @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the attackers , and no group has claimed responsibility for the killings .
Niger has become a hotspot for militant activity in recent years .
Groups such as Boko Haram and affiliates of the Islamic State operate in large parts of the country , and their attacks have increased as U.S. and French counterterrorism operations in the local Sahel region have intensified .
Sri Lankan power stays in the family .
Mahinda Rajapaksa was sworn in as Sri Lanka ’ s new prime minister on Sunday after his Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in last week ’ s parliamentary elections , cementing the Rajapaksa family ’ s hold on power in the country .
Rajapaksa , whose brother Gotabaya is the current Sri Lankan president , made it known during the campaign that he wanted to win at least two-thirds of seats in order to have enough support to change the constitution and restore sweeping powers to the presidency .
Although the SLPP fell just short of that threshold , it is believed the Rajapaksas will corral enough support from some of the smaller parties to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tunnel stretching from Mexico to Arizona discovered last week is believed to be the most sophisticated of its kind in U.S. history .
Complete with a ventilation system , water lines , electrical wiring , and a rail system , the tunnel impressed U.S. authorities in part because it ran beneath ground considered highly unconducive to tunnel-building .
Though extensive in its design , the tunnel was incomplete , so it remains unclear what its purpose was .
Authorities speculate that it would have been used for smuggling once completed .
For more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Protests erupt in Belarus after Aleksandr Lukashenko claims a landslide victory, the Afghan government agrees to release Taliban prisoners , and a shooting in Niger leaves eight dead.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Protests erupt in Belarus after Aleksandr Lukashenko claims a landslide victory, the Afghan government agrees to release Taliban prisoners, and a shooting in Niger leaves eight dead.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Lukashenko Claims Victory as Protests Engulf Belarus
Five-term Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed victory in the country’s presidential elections on Sunday after facing one of his toughest electoral challenges since taking over the presidency in 1994. An official exit poll showed that he won 79.7 percent of the vote, a result wholly inconsistent with the level of opposition he has faced in recent weeks.
Mass protests broke out in the capital of Minsk and other cities after the exit poll was published. The situation quickly turned violent as protesters clashed with police. Police responded using water cannons, tear gas, and stun grenades to disperse the crowds. Lukashenko’s main challenger, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, secured only 6.8 percent of the vote according to the exit poll; she rejected the official figures, declaring that “the majority is with us.”
Mounting a challenge. This was the most significant challenge Lukashenko has faced in years, due in large part to the country’s declining economic fortunes and the government’s underwhelming response to the coronavirus pandemic, as Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon reported. Promising to free political prisoners and to hold new elections, Tikhanovskaya drew massive crowds to her rallies, reportedly drawing tens of thousands of supporters to one in Minsk in July.
Feeling the pressure, the government cracked down on the opposition in the weeks leading up to the election. Human rights groups said that more than 1,300 people were detained in the final weeks of the campaign, including election observers and members of Tikhanovskaya’s campaign team. Tikhanovskaya herself went into hiding the night before the vote after two senior staffers were arrested.
Russia’s watchful eye. Russia loomed large over the election campaign. Once considered a staunch Russian ally, relations between Lukashenko and Moscow have deteriorated in recent months as he has resisted attempts by Russian President Vladimir Putin to strengthen ties between the two countries. Lukashenko notably had 33 Russian mercenaries in the country arrested, claiming they were lying in wait and preparing to instigate a revolution.
Although Russia probably prefers Lukashenko to stay at the helm, the recent upsurge of unrest along its border may cause it to consider intervening the way it did after the events of the Euromaidan in Ukraine in 2014.
The World This Week
August 10-14. U.S. Democratic nominee Joe Biden is expected to name a running mate this week. Former National Security Advisor Susan Rice and former presidential candidate Sen. Kamala Harris are considered the frontrunners for the job. Foreign Policy’s Colm Quinn recently explained where Biden’s potential picks stand on foreign policy.
August 10-14. The U.N. Security Council is expected to vote on a resolution this week extending sanctions on Iran. Although U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would table a resolution to extend the sanctions, a date has not yet been set.
August 12. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen will join the Hudson Institute for an online discussion on the diplomatic, security, and economic challenges facing Taiwan.
August 12. Bougainville, an autonomous region of Papua New Guinea, will elect a president and 39 members of its House of Representatives, which will be responsible for negotiating independence from Papua New Guinea. The autonomous region voted to split from Papua New Guinea in a referendum last year.
August 13. A reprieve from sanctions against U.S. companies doing business with the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei is set to expire today. Some companies had been permitted to continue doing business with Huawei to mitigate the strain on communications in rural parts of the country.
August 15. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer will reportedly meet with Chinese Vice Premier Liu He to review the February trade deal between the two countries. The meeting has not been confirmed by either country.
What We’re Following Today
Protests in Beirut. Political and social unrest has gripped Lebanon since last week’s deadly explosions in Beirut. Thousands of protesters took to the streets on Sunday, attacking a parliamentary precinct in the city with rubble from the blast and demanding the resignation of the government. The demonstrations turned increasingly violent as protesters attempted to gain entry into the legislature, causing security personnel to respond with force.
The government has been widely blamed for the accident after it was revealed that ammonium nitrate—a highly explosive chemical which helped intensify the blast—had been stored in the city with official knowledge, despite warnings from inspectors about the danger it posed.
Several high-ranking government officials have already resigned since the accident. Information Minister Manal Abdel Samad resigned her post on Sunday, followed shortly after by Environment Minister Damianos Kattar. An additional three members of parliament resigned on Sunday, bringing the total number of parliamentary resignations to nine.
Afghanistan releases more Taliban prisoners. On Sunday, the Afghan legislative assembly passed a resolution authorizing the release of 400 “hard-core” Taliban prisoners, considered the Taliban’s last condition before entering talks with the Afghan government. Shortly after the resolution passed, President Ashraf Ghani confirmed that he would “sign the release order of these 400 prisoners,” setting the stage for talks between the two sides to begin this week.
Prisoner releases had been one of the main sticking points since the peace deal signed between the United States and the Taliban in February. Sunday’s decision will bring the total number of Taliban prisoners released up to 5,000, meeting one of the key stipulations of February’s deal. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Saturday that the U.S. troop presence in the country would drop to less than 5,000 by the end of November.
U.S. officials arrive in Taiwan. U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar touched down in Taiwan on Sunday for the highest-level meeting between U.S. and Taiwanese officials in decades and quickly praised Taiwan’s handling of the coronavirus outbreak. Officials will discuss ongoing pandemic relief efforts, as well as the broader U.S.-Taiwanese relationship in the face of growing assertiveness from China. Chinese officials were not pleased and have threatened “strong countermeasures in response to the U.S. behavior,” though what action they might take remains unclear.
Keep an Eye On
Shooting in Niger. On Sunday, a team of gunmen killed eight people in an ambush in Niger’s southern region of Koure. The dead included two Nigérien nationals and six French tourists. Neither Nigérien President Mahamadou Issoufou nor French President Emmanuel Macron identified the attackers, and no group has claimed responsibility for the killings.
Niger has become a hotspot for militant activity in recent years. Groups such as Boko Haram and affiliates of the Islamic State operate in large parts of the country, and their attacks have increased as U.S. and French counterterrorism operations in the local Sahel region have intensified.
Sri Lankan power stays in the family. Mahinda Rajapaksa was sworn in as Sri Lanka’s new prime minister on Sunday after his Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) party secured a landslide victory in last week’s parliamentary elections, cementing the Rajapaksa family’s hold on power in the country.
Rajapaksa, whose brother Gotabaya is the current Sri Lankan president, made it known during the campaign that he wanted to win at least two-thirds of seats in order to have enough support to change the constitution and restore sweeping powers to the presidency. Although the SLPP fell just short of that threshold, it is believed the Rajapaksas will corral enough support from some of the smaller parties to push through their agenda.
Odds and Ends
An underground tunnel stretching from Mexico to Arizona discovered last week is believed to be the most sophisticated of its kind in U.S. history. Complete with a ventilation system, water lines, electrical wiring, and a rail system, the tunnel impressed U.S. authorities in part because it ran beneath ground considered highly unconducive to tunnel-building. Though extensive in its design, the tunnel was incomplete, so it remains unclear what its purpose was. Authorities speculate that it would have been used for smuggling once completed.
That’s it for today.
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