foreignpolicy--2020-02-21--The Death of Truth to Power

The Death of Truth to Power

The Death of Truth to Power Conventional wisdom holds that President Donald Trump this week named the U.S. ambassador to Germany , Richard Grenell , to the post of acting director of national intelligence .
In this case , the conventional wisdom happens to be accurate—at least technically .
The White House confirmed the designation in a formal statement on Thursday .
What that phrasing fails to capture , however , is that Trump does not actually want Grenell , who must vacate the role by mid-next month unless Trump nominates a permanent replacement , to serve as a traditional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he want that out of Grenell ’ s successor .
In fact , Trump has made clear what has long been apparent : He has no desire for a conventional director of national intelligence .
Instead , he wants a loyalist prepared to protect and prize the president ’ s own interests , even when they are inconsistent with America ’ s broader national security interests .
That is precisely why he turned to Grenell , an unorthodox and , more to the point , dangerous interim choice to helm the 17 departments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community .
Even more disturbingly , we should not expect Trump ’ s ultimate nominee for the role to be any more conventional—or any less dangerous .
In fairness , and as background , there is not exactly a traditional director of national intelligence mold ; after all , only five individuals , all men , have assumed that position in a Senate-confirmed capacity .
And each has adopted a different approach to the job , owing , at least in part , to the fact that the 2004 legislation creating the post @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in rather broad terms .
According to that statute , the director of national intelligence should serve as the head of the intelligence community , act as the president ’ s principal intelligence advisor , and “ oversee and direct the implementation ” of intelligence activities across the community ’ s civilian components .
This official , therefore , enjoys a high degree of latitude in carrying out the role .
When it comes to the most effective directors of national intelligence , intelligence veterans often look to the example of President Barack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retired Lt. Gen. James Clapper , who rejected the idea of an intelligence figurehead—or “ hood ornament ” as he derisively referred to a purely ceremonial approach to the role—while also resisting the urge to take operational control of the individual departments and agencies under him .
( His predecessor , Dennis Blair , was dismissed after repeatedly clashing with—and losing to—CIA Director Leon Panetta . )
Clapper routinely briefed the president and his senior team on strategic and tactical intelligence , including at the start of most senior policy discussions , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ targets and allocate scarce resources between and among the intelligence agencies .
The intelligence arena is one of trade-offs , and Clapper won plaudits from policymakers and from much of his own workforce for effectively leading the effort to determine the threats and potential opportunities that merited intelligence collection—whether through overhead surveillance , technical monitoring , or other means .
Trump ’ s first director of national intelligence , former Sen. Dan Coats , largely hewed to this model , but he endured criticism for swerving more in the direction of the figurehead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any permanent nominee to the role , however , the playing field will be entirely different ; their success or failure in the role , at least in Trump ’ s eyes , will no longer be a question of too tactical versus too titular .
In this administration , that binary has become all too quaint .
Rather , Trump seems to have a fundamentally different notion of what he wants out of the director of national intelligence .
Indeed , if Trump had wanted a traditional director , he had one—Sue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Coats last year .
Gordon at the time was a nearly 40-year intelligence veteran serving as Coats ’ s principal deputy .
Not only did Trump not nominate her to succeed her former boss , he also pointedly refused to appoint her as acting director of national intelligence , swerving instead to select Joseph Maguire , the then-director of the National Counterterrorism Center .
( Gordon got the hint and promptly submitted her resignation . )
Trump previewed his new paradigm for a director of national intelligence last year when he announced his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the post .
The Ratcliffe pick was decidedly unconventional in that the congressman was new to the world of intelligence and was better known as a fierce and partisan Trump defender .
But so , too , was Trump ’ s justification for selecting Ratcliffe .
He told reporters : “ We need somebody strong that can rein it in .
Because , as I think you ’ ve all learned , the intelligence agencies have run amok .
They have run amok.
” Ratcliffe , who was found to have embellished his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the running , but Trump ’ s conception of what would make an effective director of national intelligence took hold .
Any hope that the Ratcliffe nod was an aberration died when an intelligence community whistleblower spawned what culminated in Trump ’ s impeachment .
Trump had long complained that his intelligence chiefs were not sufficiently loyal to him on matters of foreign policy ; he chastised them both publicly and privately early last year after they effectively conceded in public congressional testimony that Trump ’ s approaches to key challenges , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not grounded in sound intelligence .
The emergence of the whistleblower complaint on Trump ’ s withholding of aid to Ukraine , however , almost certainly underscored his belief that the perceived insubordination—what intelligence officials would call “ speaking truth to power ” —extended to Trump ’ s own actions .
If Trump was inclined to install a fierce loyalist before the Ukraine scandal exploded onto the front pages , his impeachment surely only reinforced that determination .
A final data point may help to explain what Trump wants out of Grenell and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Times reported on Thursday that Trump was infuriated to learn that intelligence officials briefed congressional overseers this month on Russian efforts to advance Trump ’ s reelection prospects .
Trump reportedly berated Maguire , the acting director of national intelligence , in an episode that some speculated led to Maguire ’ s dismissal and Grenell ’ s appointment .
If the report is accurate , there is little question regarding the propriety of the decision to brief lawmakers on the intelligence .
In fact , the intelligence community has for nearly four decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ fully and currently informed ” of matters relevant to its oversight .
That Trump took umbrage at the decision underscores that he seeks a director of national intelligence who will protect his personal interests , even when those collide with the law .
Enter Grenell .
What he lacks in intelligence experience—he effectively has none—Grenell makes up for in fierce partisanship and devotion to Trump .
On issue after issue , even those well beyond his purview as U.S. ambassador to Germany , he has proved himself to be an ardent proponent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equally aggressive antagonist to those standing in the way .
Much to the chagrin of his German hosts , he has berated them , including over Twitter , for their continued support of the Iran deal , lagging defense spending , and immigration policies , just as he has cheered on Europe ’ s broader conservative movement .
Just prior to the 2016 election , moreover , Grenell wrote an op-ed downplaying reports of Russian interference , calling them “ unproven.
” He did so notwithstanding an intelligence community statement , released just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high confidence assessment of Russia ’ s culpability .
In short , he has proved himself to be just the sort of fighter Trump has always wanted in his corner .
Trump ’ s narrow interests may be sated by this pick and presumably by whomever he taps to succeed Grenell , but what does that mean for Americans more broadly ?
Nothing good , and that is especially true given the timing .
First , the director of national intelligence is positioned to play a key role in coordinating many U.S. election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , while also ensuring that the executive and legislative branches remain apprised of U.S. adversaries ’ efforts and government countermeasures .
According to the New York Times report , it was precisely that function that engendered Trump ’ s ire and culminated in the apparent termination of Maguire as the acting director of national intelligence , suggesting that a Trump loyalist like Grenell might neglect his statutory obligations to keep Congress informed of threats to the United States ’ democracy .
Similarly , if precedent holds , the director of national intelligence also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic nominee with access to intelligence briefings .
These briefings have tended to be strategic overviews , with a focus on global hot spots , so that both party nominees vying for the role of commander in chief have a sense of the challenges that await .
By installing a pugilistic partisan to this role , however , Trump has , at the very least , corrupted the appearance of fairness and in all likelihood has ensured that the eventual Democratic nominee will be kept at a disadvantage—both during the campaign and , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the next president prepares to take office .
While the former politicizes intelligence in a way that corrupts the supposed apolitical nature of the U.S. intelligence community , the latter could hold profound national security implications if the incoming president is not prepared to take on what awaits on Jan. 20 , 2021 .
Finally , there is little reason for optimism that Grenell or a successor of his ilk would feel any compunction to keep the American people apprised of foreign threats to their democracy .
Election security measures can help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as social media networks can remain vigilant in detecting and removing content associated with a foreign government ’ s covert influence operation .
Ultimately , however , there is no broader and more effective antidote to this type of interference than public attribution , or naming and shaming , of those engaged in these attacks .
That is precisely why the director of national intelligence in 2016 drafted and released a statement pinning the hacking and leaking of emails on Moscow .
In 2020 , nevertheless , there is little reason for optimism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a similar approach .
Grenell ’ s naked partisanship and fierce loyalty to the president suggest he might follow in his predecessor ’ s footsteps only if exposing a foreign influence campaign held perceived political benefits for Trump—if , for instance , Beijing threw its weight behind the Democratic nominee .
The CIA ’ s headquarters carries an inscription that captures the ethos of the broader intelligence community : “ And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.
” Indeed , the notion of “ truth to power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workforce , just as it has been for previous directors of national intelligence who have sat atop it .
In fact , it often has fallen to the director of national intelligence—as the intelligence official with regular access to the highest echelons of government—to deliver those tough messages .
Now , however , intelligence professionals who wish to carry out that tradition appear to have another obstacle in their way : the acting director of national intelligence himself .

Conventional wisdom holds that President Donald Trump this week named the U.S. ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, to the post of acting director of national intelligence. In this case, the conventional wisdom happens to be accurate—at least technically. The White House confirmed the designation in a formal statement on Thursday.
Conventional wisdom holds that President Donald Trump this week named the U.S. ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, to the post of acting director of national intelligence. In this case, the conventional wisdom happens to be accurate—at least technically. The White House confirmed the designation in a formal statement on Thursday.
What that phrasing fails to capture, however, is that Trump does not actually want Grenell, who must vacate the role by mid-next month unless Trump nominates a permanent replacement, to serve as a traditional director of national intelligence. Neither does he want that out of Grenell’s successor. In fact, Trump has made clear what has long been apparent: He has no desire for a conventional director of national intelligence. Instead, he wants a loyalist prepared to protect and prize the president’s own interests, even when they are inconsistent with America’s broader national security interests.
That is precisely why he turned to Grenell, an unorthodox and, more to the point, dangerous interim choice to helm the 17 departments and agencies that make up the intelligence community. Even more disturbingly, we should not expect Trump’s ultimate nominee for the role to be any more conventional—or any less dangerous.
In fairness, and as background, there is not exactly a traditional director of national intelligence mold; after all, only five individuals, all men, have assumed that position in a Senate-confirmed capacity. And each has adopted a different approach to the job, owing, at least in part, to the fact that the 2004 legislation creating the post laid out the director’s responsibilities in rather broad terms. According to that statute, the director of national intelligence should serve as the head of the intelligence community, act as the president’s principal intelligence advisor, and “oversee and direct the implementation” of intelligence activities across the community’s civilian components. This official, therefore, enjoys a high degree of latitude in carrying out the role.
When it comes to the most effective directors of national intelligence, intelligence veterans often look to the example of President Barack Obama’s second intelligence chief, retired Lt. Gen. James Clapper, who rejected the idea of an intelligence figurehead—or “hood ornament” as he derisively referred to a purely ceremonial approach to the role—while also resisting the urge to take operational control of the individual departments and agencies under him. (His predecessor, Dennis Blair, was dismissed after repeatedly clashing with—and losing to—CIA Director Leon Panetta.) Clapper routinely briefed the president and his senior team on strategic and tactical intelligence, including at the start of most senior policy discussions, while also leading the effort to prioritize intelligence targets and allocate scarce resources between and among the intelligence agencies. The intelligence arena is one of trade-offs, and Clapper won plaudits from policymakers and from much of his own workforce for effectively leading the effort to determine the threats and potential opportunities that merited intelligence collection—whether through overhead surveillance, technical monitoring, or other means. Trump’s first director of national intelligence, former Sen. Dan Coats, largely hewed to this model, but he endured criticism for swerving more in the direction of the figurehead that Clapper eschewed.
With Grenell and any permanent nominee to the role, however, the playing field will be entirely different; their success or failure in the role, at least in Trump’s eyes, will no longer be a question of too tactical versus too titular. In this administration, that binary has become all too quaint. Rather, Trump seems to have a fundamentally different notion of what he wants out of the director of national intelligence. Indeed, if Trump had wanted a traditional director, he had one—Sue Gordon—waiting in the wings when he dismissed Coats last year. Gordon at the time was a nearly 40-year intelligence veteran serving as Coats’s principal deputy. Not only did Trump not nominate her to succeed her former boss, he also pointedly refused to appoint her as acting director of national intelligence, swerving instead to select Joseph Maguire, the then-director of the National Counterterrorism Center. (Gordon got the hint and promptly submitted her resignation.)
Trump previewed his new paradigm for a director of national intelligence last year when he announced his intent to nominate Rep. John Ratcliffe to the post. The Ratcliffe pick was decidedly unconventional in that the congressman was new to the world of intelligence and was better known as a fierce and partisan Trump defender. But so, too, was Trump’s justification for selecting Ratcliffe. He told reporters: “We need somebody strong that can rein it in. Because, as I think you’ve all learned, the intelligence agencies have run amok. They have run amok.” Ratcliffe, who was found to have embellished his national security credentials, was soon out of the running, but Trump’s conception of what would make an effective director of national intelligence took hold.
Any hope that the Ratcliffe nod was an aberration died when an intelligence community whistleblower spawned what culminated in Trump’s impeachment. Trump had long complained that his intelligence chiefs were not sufficiently loyal to him on matters of foreign policy; he chastised them both publicly and privately early last year after they effectively conceded in public congressional testimony that Trump’s approaches to key challenges, including North Korea and Iran, were not grounded in sound intelligence. The emergence of the whistleblower complaint on Trump’s withholding of aid to Ukraine, however, almost certainly underscored his belief that the perceived insubordination—what intelligence officials would call “speaking truth to power”—extended to Trump’s own actions. If Trump was inclined to install a fierce loyalist before the Ukraine scandal exploded onto the front pages, his impeachment surely only reinforced that determination.
A final data point may help to explain what Trump wants out of Grenell and any permanent successor. The New York Times reported on Thursday that Trump was infuriated to learn that intelligence officials briefed congressional overseers this month on Russian efforts to advance Trump’s reelection prospects. Trump reportedly berated Maguire, the acting director of national intelligence, in an episode that some speculated led to Maguire’s dismissal and Grenell’s appointment. If the report is accurate, there is little question regarding the propriety of the decision to brief lawmakers on the intelligence. In fact, the intelligence community has for nearly four decades been required by law to keep Congress “fully and currently informed” of matters relevant to its oversight. That Trump took umbrage at the decision underscores that he seeks a director of national intelligence who will protect his personal interests, even when those collide with the law.
Enter Grenell. What he lacks in intelligence experience—he effectively has none—Grenell makes up for in fierce partisanship and devotion to Trump. On issue after issue, even those well beyond his purview as U.S. ambassador to Germany, he has proved himself to be an ardent proponent of Trump’s interests and an equally aggressive antagonist to those standing in the way. Much to the chagrin of his German hosts, he has berated them, including over Twitter, for their continued support of the Iran deal, lagging defense spending, and immigration policies, just as he has cheered on Europe’s broader conservative movement. Just prior to the 2016 election, moreover, Grenell wrote an op-ed downplaying reports of Russian interference, calling them “unproven.” He did so notwithstanding an intelligence community statement, released just days before his op-ed, describing a high confidence assessment of Russia’s culpability. In short, he has proved himself to be just the sort of fighter Trump has always wanted in his corner.
Trump’s narrow interests may be sated by this pick and presumably by whomever he taps to succeed Grenell, but what does that mean for Americans more broadly? Nothing good, and that is especially true given the timing.
First, the director of national intelligence is positioned to play a key role in coordinating many U.S. election security efforts, both offensive and defensive, while also ensuring that the executive and legislative branches remain apprised of U.S. adversaries’ efforts and government countermeasures. According to the New York Times report, it was precisely that function that engendered Trump’s ire and culminated in the apparent termination of Maguire as the acting director of national intelligence, suggesting that a Trump loyalist like Grenell might neglect his statutory obligations to keep Congress informed of threats to the United States’ democracy.
Similarly, if precedent holds, the director of national intelligence also will be responsible for providing the eventual Democratic nominee with access to intelligence briefings. These briefings have tended to be strategic overviews, with a focus on global hot spots, so that both party nominees vying for the role of commander in chief have a sense of the challenges that await. By installing a pugilistic partisan to this role, however, Trump has, at the very least, corrupted the appearance of fairness and in all likelihood has ensured that the eventual Democratic nominee will be kept at a disadvantage—both during the campaign and, should Trump lose reelection in November, as the next president prepares to take office. While the former politicizes intelligence in a way that corrupts the supposed apolitical nature of the U.S. intelligence community, the latter could hold profound national security implications if the incoming president is not prepared to take on what awaits on Jan. 20, 2021.
Finally, there is little reason for optimism that Grenell or a successor of his ilk would feel any compunction to keep the American people apprised of foreign threats to their democracy. Election security measures can help to harden a voting system, just as social media networks can remain vigilant in detecting and removing content associated with a foreign government’s covert influence operation. Ultimately, however, there is no broader and more effective antidote to this type of interference than public attribution, or naming and shaming, of those engaged in these attacks. That is precisely why the director of national intelligence in 2016 drafted and released a statement pinning the hacking and leaking of emails on Moscow. In 2020, nevertheless, there is little reason for optimism that Grenell or his successor will take a similar approach. Grenell’s naked partisanship and fierce loyalty to the president suggest he might follow in his predecessor’s footsteps only if exposing a foreign influence campaign held perceived political benefits for Trump—if, for instance, Beijing threw its weight behind the Democratic nominee.
The CIA’s headquarters carries an inscription that captures the ethos of the broader intelligence community: “And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.” Indeed, the notion of “truth to power” is an animating principle for the workforce, just as it has been for previous directors of national intelligence who have sat atop it. In fact, it often has fallen to the director of national intelligence—as the intelligence official with regular access to the highest echelons of government—to deliver those tough messages. Now, however, intelligence professionals who wish to carry out that tradition appear to have another obstacle in their way: the acting director of national intelligence himself.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-21--Hun Sen Is More Worried About Beijing Than the Coronavirus

Hun Sen Is More Worried About Beijing Than the Coronavirus As governments across the region scrambled to respond to initial news of the coronavirus outbreak last month , Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen , Asia ’ s longest-serving dictator , didn ’ t flinch .
He saw an opportunity .
While other countries enforced restrictions on Chinese travelers , Hun Sen sought to reassure not his citizens but Beijing , which he depends on for political and financial support .
“ Please continue our cooperation with China .
Do not ban flights from China .
Do not ban China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ban Chinese tourists , ” he said at a press conference on Jan. 30 .
Days earlier , Cambodia had recorded its first and only confirmed case to date : a 60-year-old Chinese man who had flown from Wuhan , where the outbreak began , to Sihanoukville , a casino town booming with Chinese investment .
Hun Sen has held power in Cambodia for 35 years , and he is turning it into a client state of China as he tightens his grip .
While the European Union and the United States have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poor human rights record , especially as Hun Sen moved to crush the remaining opposition in 2017 , China has remained its largest source of foreign direct investment , providing nearly $ 3.6 billion in 2018—much of it in construction .
Hun Sen knows that he can ’ t afford to offend Beijing .
Last week , the Cambodian leader saw another opportunity to assert his loyalty to China—this time , risking global contagion .
Hun Sen personally welcomed the Westerdam , a cruise ship that left Hong Kong on Feb. 1 and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was allowed to disembark in Sihanoukville last Friday .
Though Cambodian officials conducted a temperature screening and determined none of the 2,257 passengers and crew had the coronavirus , one later tested positive in Malaysia after being stopped at the airport .
The Westerdam incident has raised concerns among health experts that other asymptomatic cases may have gone undetected—especially given the incubation period of the virus , which can last 14 days or longer .
While the ship docked in Sihanoukville didn ’ t produce a virus cluster the size of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risks are similar .
“ The risk is that you have a closed community .
You ’ ve got the incubation period .
You ’ ve got diagnostic tests that aren ’ t reliable .
You ’ ve got the potential for spread that is undetected , ” said Richard Coker , a Bangkok-based emeritus professor at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine .
After the Westerdam case was confirmed in Malaysia , Cambodia began laboratory testing for the passengers that remained in the country .
By then , hundreds had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , their return trips are now increasingly limited : Thailand , Singapore , Malaysia , and Taiwan have refused to allow in passengers from the ship , making it difficult to reach Europe or the United States .
On Thursday , a chartered flight with 283 Westerdam passengers was diverted to Pakistan after the Turkish government refused to allow the plane to land .
If Hun Sen has created an international incident , it was in his own service .
By allowing the cruise ship to dock , the prime minister cast himself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passengers , many of them European or U.S. citizens .
The timing allowed Hun Sen to distract from the bad news of the week : that the European Union had rescinded some of its trade preferences for Cambodia on the basis of human-rights violations .
The move also follows Hun Sen ’ s government ’ s general approach to the coronavirus outbreak , which has been to play down the risk to court China ’ s favor .
The prime minister has chided reporters for wearing surgical masks .
The health ministry has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the virus to spread , although around 3,000 Chinese citizens traveled to Cambodia from Wuhan during the Lunar New Year holiday .
Hun Sen has refused to organize evacuations of Cambodian citizens from China , including some students in Wuhan—a decision that has not been received well at home .
Hun Sen flew to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping on Feb. 5 in an expression of solidarity , making him the first foreign leader to visit China since the coronavirus outbreak began .
“ He is trying to basically go all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is no real danger , ” said Ou Virak , a Phnom Penh-based human-rights activist and the founder of the Future Forum think tank .
“ In some ways , he is sending a message to China that Hun Sen and Cambodia are standing with China.
” China , meanwhile , is courting this loyalty : Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a meeting this week in Vientiane , Laos , with his counterparts at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) about the outbreak .
The gathering , called at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a demand for support than a call to action : The ministers were recorded joining hands and expressing solidarity with China .
“ Fear is more threatening than the virus and confidence is more precious than gold , ” Wang said at a press conference afterward .
Still , other ASEAN countries , including Malaysia , the Philippines , Singapore , and Thailand , have imposed travel restrictions or advisories in response to the virus .
It is the countries that are highly dependent on and indebted to China , such as Cambodia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have adopted loose attitudes .
But these nations are also poorer and lack the health services to handle even a handful of severe virus cases , much less an outbreak .
A 2012 study using models based on the 2009 H1N1 pandemic found that in the case of another influenza pandemic , Cambodia and Laos would have high avoidable death rates based on gaps in critically needed resources such as ventilators and hospital beds .
“ Their capacity to respond to a significant pandemic is going to be extremely challenging , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s co-authors .
Though Cambodia ’ s National Social Security Fund covers health care for some workers , many Cambodians end up paying out of pocket at private hospitals or clinics when they get sick .
If the private clinics are not routinely communicating with public agencies , that can lead to a delay in reporting , said Mishal Khan , an associate professor at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine .
“ There can be major challenges with early diagnosis of infectious diseases such as COVID-19 in countries where private @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people , ” she wrote in an email .
While Hun Sen panders to China , some in Cambodia are growing frustrated about the government ’ s inconsistent communication about the virus , particularly after the Westerdam incident .
Cambodia ’ s Ministry of Health has instructed experts at at least one organization working with the government on the public health response not to speak directly with journalists .
The situation is compounded by the fact that Hun Sen ’ s regime has gutted the country ’ s independent media , shutting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ organizing the sale of another to an investor with government ties .
If there were more coronavirus cases detected from the Westerdam inside Cambodia , would they be confirmed ?
“ Whatever narratives they ’ re trying to put out , people think they must be the opposite , ” said Ou Virak , the human-rights activist .
“ Because the Cambodian government must have some agenda .
The truth must be the opposite .
”

As governments across the region scrambled to respond to initial news of the coronavirus outbreak last month, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Asia’s longest-serving dictator, didn’t flinch. He saw an opportunity. While other countries enforced restrictions on Chinese travelers, Hun Sen sought to reassure not his citizens but Beijing, which he depends on for political and financial support. “Please continue our cooperation with China. Do not ban flights from China. Do not ban China’s sea transportation, and do not ban Chinese tourists,” he said at a press conference on Jan. 30.
As governments across the region scrambled to respond to initial news of the coronavirus outbreak last month, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Asia’s longest-serving dictator, didn’t flinch. He saw an opportunity. While other countries enforced restrictions on Chinese travelers, Hun Sen sought to reassure not his citizens but Beijing, which he depends on for political and financial support. “Please continue our cooperation with China. Do not ban flights from China. Do not ban China’s sea transportation, and do not ban Chinese tourists,” he said at a press conference on Jan. 30.
Days earlier, Cambodia had recorded its first and only confirmed case to date: a 60-year-old Chinese man who had flown from Wuhan, where the outbreak began, to Sihanoukville, a casino town booming with Chinese investment.
Hun Sen has held power in Cambodia for 35 years, and he is turning it into a client state of China as he tightens his grip. While the European Union and the United States have recently punished or sanctioned Cambodia over its poor human rights record, especially as Hun Sen moved to crush the remaining opposition in 2017, China has remained its largest source of foreign direct investment, providing nearly $3.6 billion in 2018—much of it in construction. Hun Sen knows that he can’t afford to offend Beijing.
Last week, the Cambodian leader saw another opportunity to assert his loyalty to China—this time, risking global contagion. Hun Sen personally welcomed the Westerdam, a cruise ship that left Hong Kong on Feb. 1 and was turned away by five countries before it was allowed to disembark in Sihanoukville last Friday. Though Cambodian officials conducted a temperature screening and determined none of the 2,257 passengers and crew had the coronavirus, one later tested positive in Malaysia after being stopped at the airport.
The Westerdam incident has raised concerns among health experts that other asymptomatic cases may have gone undetected—especially given the incubation period of the virus, which can last 14 days or longer. While the ship docked in Sihanoukville didn’t produce a virus cluster the size of the Diamond Princess quarantined off Japan, the risks are similar. “The risk is that you have a closed community. You’ve got the incubation period. You’ve got diagnostic tests that aren’t reliable. You’ve got the potential for spread that is undetected,” said Richard Coker, a Bangkok-based emeritus professor at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
After the Westerdam case was confirmed in Malaysia, Cambodia began laboratory testing for the passengers that remained in the country. By then, hundreds had already left. For those that remain, their return trips are now increasingly limited: Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Taiwan have refused to allow in passengers from the ship, making it difficult to reach Europe or the United States. On Thursday, a chartered flight with 283 Westerdam passengers was diverted to Pakistan after the Turkish government refused to allow the plane to land.
If Hun Sen has created an international incident, it was in his own service. By allowing the cruise ship to dock, the prime minister cast himself as a humanitarian—offering refuge to the stranded passengers, many of them European or U.S. citizens. The timing allowed Hun Sen to distract from the bad news of the week: that the European Union had rescinded some of its trade preferences for Cambodia on the basis of human-rights violations.
The move also follows Hun Sen’s government’s general approach to the coronavirus outbreak, which has been to play down the risk to court China’s favor. The prime minister has chided reporters for wearing surgical masks. The health ministry has insisted that Cambodia is too hot for the virus to spread, although around 3,000 Chinese citizens traveled to Cambodia from Wuhan during the Lunar New Year holiday. Hun Sen has refused to organize evacuations of Cambodian citizens from China, including some students in Wuhan—a decision that has not been received well at home.
Hun Sen flew to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping on Feb. 5 in an expression of solidarity, making him the first foreign leader to visit China since the coronavirus outbreak began. “He is trying to basically go all in and continue with the narrative that there is no real danger,” said Ou Virak, a Phnom Penh-based human-rights activist and the founder of the Future Forum think tank. “In some ways, he is sending a message to China that Hun Sen and Cambodia are standing with China.”
China, meanwhile, is courting this loyalty. Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a meeting this week in Vientiane, Laos, with his counterparts at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) about the outbreak. The gathering, called at the last minute, seemed more like a demand for support than a call to action: The ministers were recorded joining hands and expressing solidarity with China. “Fear is more threatening than the virus and confidence is more precious than gold,” Wang said at a press conference afterward.
Still, other ASEAN countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, have imposed travel restrictions or advisories in response to the virus. It is the countries that are highly dependent on and indebted to China, such as Cambodia and Laos—which has reported no coronavirus cases—that have adopted loose attitudes.
But these nations are also poorer and lack the health services to handle even a handful of severe virus cases, much less an outbreak. A 2012 study using models based on the 2009 H1N1 pandemic found that in the case of another influenza pandemic, Cambodia and Laos would have high avoidable death rates based on gaps in critically needed resources such as ventilators and hospital beds. “Their capacity to respond to a significant pandemic is going to be extremely challenging,” said Coker, one of the study’s co-authors.
Though Cambodia’s National Social Security Fund covers health care for some workers, many Cambodians end up paying out of pocket at private hospitals or clinics when they get sick. If the private clinics are not routinely communicating with public agencies, that can lead to a delay in reporting, said Mishal Khan, an associate professor at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. “There can be major challenges with early diagnosis of infectious diseases such as COVID-19 in countries where private healthcare providers are used by the majority of people,” she wrote in an email.
While Hun Sen panders to China, some in Cambodia are growing frustrated about the government’s inconsistent communication about the virus, particularly after the Westerdam incident. Cambodia’s Ministry of Health has instructed experts at at least one organization working with the government on the public health response not to speak directly with journalists. The situation is compounded by the fact that Hun Sen’s regime has gutted the country’s independent media, shutting down one critical English-language newspaper and allegedly organizing the sale of another to an investor with government ties.
If there were more coronavirus cases detected from the Westerdam inside Cambodia, would they be confirmed? “Whatever narratives they’re trying to put out, people think they must be the opposite,” said Ou Virak, the human-rights activist. “Because the Cambodian government must have some agenda. The truth must be the opposite.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-21--Richard Grenell: Pundit, Envoy, Spokesman. Spy?

Richard Grenell , the U.S. ambassador to Germany , has earned President Donald Trump ’ s favor through fierce partisanship , scolding the German government for its positions on everything from Iran to trade , denouncing Democratic rivals on Fox News , and trolling the press on Twitter .
Now his elevation by Trump to serve as the frontman for the world ’ s most powerful intelligence network is sending tremors through U.S. diplomatic and intelligence communities , which fear he will spin the facts to suit the president ’ s political needs .
White House press secretary Stephanie Grisham @ @ @ @ @ @ @ non-political , non-partisan approach as head of the Intelligence Community.
” But several of Grenell ’ s former colleagues see him as a poor fit for the role , saying he ’ d make a better propaganda minister than an impartial sounding board for the president on intelligence matters or a steward of the nation ’ s most sensitive secrets .
“ Everyone knows he has no qualifications for this job , ” said Mark Groombridge , a former aide to John Bolton who worked closely with Grenell at the U.S. Mission to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many talents and a considerable skill set , ” added Groombridge , a vocal Trump critic .
But the demands of impartiality required by the president ’ s principal intelligence coordinator “ don ’ t comport with that skill set at all , ” he said .
Neither the State Department nor Grenell responded to request for comment .
Grenell ’ s appointment as acting director of national intelligence—he announced on Twitter that he will not get the full-time job—follows the abrupt ouster of Joseph Maguire , until Thursday the acting director of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an aide warned House lawmakers that Russia is interfering in the 2020 presidential campaign with an eye toward favoring Trump ’ s reelection .
It also coincides with the appointment to a senior post at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence of former top National Security Council official Kash Patel , who sought to discredit a previous probe into Russian interference in the 2016 election .
The developments have fueled speculation among intelligence specialists that Trump is seeking to kill off any scrutiny of Russia ’ s role in the 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ informed Senator Bernie Sanders that Russia is also seeking to aid his campaign in the Democratic primaries , the Washington Post reported .
“ The thought that immediately pops to mind is that this appointment is being made more for political reasons than for professional reasons , ” a former director of national intelligence , speaking on condition of anonymity , told Foreign Policy .
“ I think it ’ s hard to argue that he is qualified to serve as the president ’ s principal intelligence advisor.
” Grenell ’ s ascension @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s cabinet , even in an acting position , also reveals the sea change of attitudes about LGBT rights in the U.S. in the past decade .
Grenell is the first openly gay person to be appointed to a cabinet-level position , even in an acting capacity .
“ Fifty years ago a gay man or woman couldn ’ t work in the intelligence community .
Today President Trump is appointing an openly gay man to serve as Acting Director of National Intelligence , ” Republican Rep. Matt Gaetz , a prominent Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Grenell was forced out of his job as a top campaign advisor to then-presidential hopeful Mitt Romney amid a groundswell of pressure from anti-gay conservative circles in the Republican Party .
( At the time , Grenell also faced scrutiny over fiery social media posts seen as misogynistic and sexist .
He later apologized for the posts . )
“ It ’ s not that the campaign cared whether Ric Grenell was gay , ” one Republican advisor told the New York Times at the time .
“ They believed this was a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ want to confront the religious right.
” The acting director of national intelligence appointment was received warmly by Britain ’ s incoming ambassador to Washington , Karen Pierce , who recalled meeting Grenell when he served as Bolton ’ s spokesman at the United Nations : “ I like him a lot.
” “ I think that makes him the administration ’ s most senior LGBT appointment , ” added Pierce , who is wrapping up her term as Britain ’ s U.N. ambassador .
“ And that ’ s terrific.
” But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration has left some of his detractors in the government scratching their heads .
“ Grenell ’ s meteoric rise is the clearest evidence in the universe that there is no God or no justice , ” said one former U.S. official who worked closely with him .
Once in Berlin , Grenell quickly established himself as one of Trump ’ s highest-profile and most outspoken envoys .
It quickly won him plaudits in the White House and inner circle of Trump supporters , but it also alienated him from power brokers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Grenell railed against a Washington Post article reporting that Trump threatened auto tariffs on Europe if it didn ’ t crack down on Iran .
One day after Grenell slammed the story as “ fake news , ” saying he had no knowledge of this happening and demanding a retraction of the story , the German defense minister confirmed it was accurate .
To several current and former State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy , the incident showcased how German policymakers , bristling at Grenell ’ s leadership style , have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of their key internal policy deliberations .
“ There is real value to having an ambassador who can connect directly with the inner circle of the president and not just go through layers of State Department bureaucracy , ” said one former U.S. diplomat .
“ But that is only valuable if that channel is used … to get things done .
I find it hard to identify specific accomplishments that you can chalk up to [ Grenell ’ s ] close relationship with the White House that has made the German-American relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ took on two additional portfolios that reflected his growing clout in the Trump administration .
He positioned himself as the architect of a new administration-wide effort to decriminalize homosexuality worldwide—though some human rights groups say they haven ’ t yet seen any practical effects of the campaign .
And in October last year , Trump also named him to be special envoy for Serbia-Kosovo peace talks , a job he held concurrently with his post in Berlin .
It ’ s still unclear if he will retain his special envoy post in his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the acting director of national intelligence job for up to 210 days , provided Trump nominates a new director of national intelligence for Senate confirmation , according to U.S. law on federal vacancies .
Several officials who spoke to Foreign Policy suggested that Grenell ’ s day-to-day duties as ambassador will fall on the embassy ’ s second-in-command , deputy chief of mission Robin Quinville , even as Grenell retains his formal title .

Richard Grenell, the U.S. ambassador to Germany, has earned President Donald Trump’s favor through fierce partisanship, scolding the German government for its positions on everything from Iran to trade, denouncing Democratic rivals on Fox News, and trolling the press on Twitter.
Richard Grenell, the U.S. ambassador to Germany, has earned President Donald Trump’s favor through fierce partisanship, scolding the German government for its positions on everything from Iran to trade, denouncing Democratic rivals on Fox News, and trolling the press on Twitter.
Now his elevation by Trump to serve as the frontman for the world’s most powerful intelligence network is sending tremors through U.S. diplomatic and intelligence communities, which fear he will spin the facts to suit the president’s political needs.
White House press secretary Stephanie Grisham said Grenell “is committed to a non-political, non-partisan approach as head of the Intelligence Community.” But several of Grenell’s former colleagues see him as a poor fit for the role, saying he’d make a better propaganda minister than an impartial sounding board for the president on intelligence matters or a steward of the nation’s most sensitive secrets.
“Everyone knows he has no qualifications for this job,” said Mark Groombridge, a former aide to John Bolton who worked closely with Grenell at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. “Ric has many talents and a considerable skill set,” added Groombridge, a vocal Trump critic. But the demands of impartiality required by the president’s principal intelligence coordinator “don’t comport with that skill set at all,” he said.
Neither the State Department nor Grenell responded to request for comment.
Grenell’s appointment as acting director of national intelligence—he announced on Twitter that he will not get the full-time job—follows the abrupt ouster of Joseph Maguire, until Thursday the acting director of national intelligence. Trump fired Maguire after an aide warned House lawmakers that Russia is interfering in the 2020 presidential campaign with an eye toward favoring Trump’s reelection. It also coincides with the appointment to a senior post at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence of former top National Security Council official Kash Patel, who sought to discredit a previous probe into Russian interference in the 2016 election.
The developments have fueled speculation among intelligence specialists that Trump is seeking to kill off any scrutiny of Russia’s role in the 2020 election. U.S. officials, meanwhile, informed Senator Bernie Sanders that Russia is also seeking to aid his campaign in the Democratic primaries, the Washington Post reported.
“The thought that immediately pops to mind is that this appointment is being made more for political reasons than for professional reasons,” a former director of national intelligence, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Foreign Policy. “I think it’s hard to argue that he is qualified to serve as the president’s principal intelligence advisor.”
Grenell’s ascension to a powerful position in Trump’s cabinet, even in an acting position, also reveals the sea change of attitudes about LGBT rights in the U.S. in the past decade. Grenell is the first openly gay person to be appointed to a cabinet-level position, even in an acting capacity. “Fifty years ago a gay man or woman couldn’t work in the intelligence community. Today President Trump is appointing an openly gay man to serve as Acting Director of National Intelligence,” Republican Rep. Matt Gaetz, a prominent Trump ally, tweeted.
In 2012, Grenell was forced out of his job as a top campaign advisor to then-presidential hopeful Mitt Romney amid a groundswell of pressure from anti-gay conservative circles in the Republican Party. (At the time, Grenell also faced scrutiny over fiery social media posts seen as misogynistic and sexist. He later apologized for the posts.) “It’s not that the campaign cared whether Ric Grenell was gay,” one Republican advisor told the New York Times at the time. “They believed this was a nonissue. But they didn’t want to confront the religious right.”
The acting director of national intelligence appointment was received warmly by Britain’s incoming ambassador to Washington, Karen Pierce, who recalled meeting Grenell when he served as Bolton’s spokesman at the United Nations: “I like him a lot.”
“I think that makes him the administration’s most senior LGBT appointment,” added Pierce, who is wrapping up her term as Britain’s U.N. ambassador. “And that’s terrific.”
But Grenell’s fast ascent in the Trump administration has left some of his detractors in the government scratching their heads. “Grenell’s meteoric rise is the clearest evidence in the universe that there is no God or no justice,” said one former U.S. official who worked closely with him.
Once in Berlin, Grenell quickly established himself as one of Trump’s highest-profile and most outspoken envoys. It quickly won him plaudits in the White House and inner circle of Trump supporters, but it also alienated him from power brokers in Berlin.
On Jan. 15, Grenell railed against a Washington Post article reporting that Trump threatened auto tariffs on Europe if it didn’t crack down on Iran. One day after Grenell slammed the story as “fake news,” saying he had no knowledge of this happening and demanding a retraction of the story, the German defense minister confirmed it was accurate. To several current and former State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy, the incident showcased how German policymakers, bristling at Grenell’s leadership style, have shut out the U.S. ambassador from some of their key internal policy deliberations.
“There is real value to having an ambassador who can connect directly with the inner circle of the president and not just go through layers of State Department bureaucracy,” said one former U.S. diplomat. “But that is only valuable if that channel is used … to get things done. I find it hard to identify specific accomplishments that you can chalk up to [Grenell’s] close relationship with the White House that has made the German-American relationship more effective.”
As ambassador, Grenell took on two additional portfolios that reflected his growing clout in the Trump administration. He positioned himself as the architect of a new administration-wide effort to decriminalize homosexuality worldwide—though some human rights groups say they haven’t yet seen any practical effects of the campaign. And in October last year, Trump also named him to be special envoy for Serbia-Kosovo peace talks, a job he held concurrently with his post in Berlin. It’s still unclear if he will retain his special envoy post in his new role.
Grenell can remain in the acting director of national intelligence job for up to 210 days, provided Trump nominates a new director of national intelligence for Senate confirmation, according to U.S. law on federal vacancies. Several officials who spoke to Foreign Policy suggested that Grenell’s day-to-day duties as ambassador will fall on the embassy’s second-in-command, deputy chief of mission Robin Quinville, even as Grenell retains his formal title.
Foreign Policy’s Jacob Wallace contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-21--Why Afghanistan Is America’s Greatest Strategic Disaster

Way back in January 2002 , a few weeks after the Taliban fled terrified from Kabul , Kandahar , and other major cities , I went to Afghanistan to report on the aftermath .
In just seven weeks , the world ’ s lone superpower had pounded Afghanistan ’ s Islamist occupiers into the ground , literally , with B-52s dropping massive laser-targeted bombs that seemed , to the hapless Taliban , to come from nowhere .
It was the moment that “ the nineteenth century met the twenty-first century , ” an ebullient Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld later wrote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wasn ’ t a Taliban fighter in sight , and the country seemed to lay wide open , practically begging the Americans to occupy it .
What ’ s keeping the peace ?
I asked the warlords I met .
Pretty much the same answer came back over and over , often preceded by a gap-toothed grin : “ B-52 justice , ” said one man , pointing upward .
Eighteen bloody years later , the conventional wisdom in Washington is that Afghanistan was always destined to be a failure .
When Secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States had reached “ an understanding with the Taliban on a significant reduction in violence across # Afghanistan ” and announced that peace talks would soon begin in earnest , almost no one complained about the relegitimization of the Taliban , who will now have a powerful voice in ruling the country and may even take it over again .
After all , it was inevitable , wasn ’ t it ?
No , in fact , it wasn ’ t , and some very smart strategists will tell you so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hear that from the many columnists , pundits , and scholars who blindly supported the diversion into Iraq—the main reason for the disaster of Afghanistan— and to this day can ’ t admit that they became what President George W. Bush ’ s former spokesman Scott McClellan called “ complicit enablers ” in possibly the worst strategic misdirection in American history .
Yet some military historians and thinkers , including David Kilcullen , the author of a new book called The Dragons and the Snakes : How the Rest Learned to Fight the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never was going to be easy—was a winnable conflict .
At the very least , Washington could have stabilized the country with far less investment of time , money , and blood , had it simply paid attention .
“ People say we took our eye off the ball .
But we didn ’ t even realize there was a ball , ” Kilcullen , a career soldier who served in both Iraq and Afghanistan and was chief strategist for counterterrorism coordination at the State Department , said in an interview .
Around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ creep back down from their mountainous hiding places in the fall of 2003 to consolidate the Quetta Shura , the Taliban leaders ’ council across the border in Pakistan , the Bush administration was in panic mode some 1,400 miles away in Iraq .
U.S. troops there were fighting an insurgency the Bush administration failed to anticipate , after no weapons of mass destruction or links to Osama bin Laden—that is , to 9/11—ever materialized .
Rumsfeld , who had blithely decided to keep what he called a “ small footprint ” in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the idea of nation-building ( his boss , Bush , had campaigned against it in 2000 ) was by then paying Afghanistan no mind at all .
The Afghans I met , meanwhile , were desperate for foreign intervention , knowing the consequences of U.S. withdrawal in the previous era , when Washington funded the mujahideen against the Soviets and then simply left ( and the Taliban moved in ) .
As Ismail Qasimyar , the head of the Loya Jirga commission , told me when I was there , Afghans saw that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opened for them ” and that Afghanistan was now “ a baby of the international community.
” “ Everybody knows who the real muscle is , ” Sayed Hamed Gailani , the son and spokesman for a powerful warlord in the south , Pir Gailani , said at the time .
“ I want the Americans here as much as possible to give me back my country.
” The moment was ripe , because just about every non-Taliban warlord was open for business to the CIA—happy to work with the Americans in exchange @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scattered .
Many of them went home , ” Kilcullen said .
“ Gradually they went to Pakistan and formed the Quetta Shura .
By 2004 the insurgency begins , and it starts to get really bad by 2005 .
If we hadn ’ t invaded Iraq when things started to go bad , and in the early phase had a much more engaged political stance in Afghanistan … but it was basically ignored until [ Barack ] Obama got elected.
” And by the time President Obama and his team debated what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ matters may have gone too far , especially after the Taliban took the city of Kunduz in 2015 , surging back to threaten the urban areas and the Kabul government itself .
Indeed , what gets lost in discussions of the now-infamous “ Afghanistan Papers ” —the not-so-secret Pentagon history of the 18-year Afghan war revealed by the Washington Post late last year—is that Afghanistan was never just one long continuous history .
Instead the conflict had at least two distinct phases : one in which the United States under Bush diverted most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sending even critical stabilizing U.S. forces like Pashto- and Dari-speaking special ops units to Iraq , and a second phase in which Washington abruptly awakened to the Taliban ’ s return and recklessly threw money and troops at a problem that had already metastasized out of control .
“ The Bush administration made three fundamental early errors in Afghanistan , ” said James Dobbins , who served as Bush ’ s first envoy to post-Taliban Afghanistan and later lamented to me that Washington had turned Afghanistan into “ the most under-resourced nation-building effort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that a devastated country with no national army or police could secure its territory and population unaided , ” Dobbins said in an email Friday .
“ Second was the failure to engage those elements of the Taliban , including its top leadership , that were prepared to lay down their arms .
“ Third was not understanding that while Pakistan had ceased supporting the Taliban government after 9/11 , it had not ceased to support the Taliban movement .
By the time these failings were rectified the Taliban had regrouped , rearmed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ haven , projected a large scale insurgency back into Afghanistan.
” Recalcitrance from neighboring Pakistan was critical to the Taliban ’ s return .
But much evidence suggests that the abrupt shift into Iraq also disillusioned the Pakistanis , who until then had been successfully strong-armed by Washington into containing the Taliban somewhat , as well as hunting al-Qaeda terrorists .
Pakistan helped , for instance , in the capture of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Rawalpindi in March 2003 .
But sensing that Washington was going to leave the region to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past practices , setting up the Taliban once again as an Islamist ally .
In an interview with me in the mid 2000s , Mahmud Ali Durrani , then Pakistan ’ s ambassador to the United States , said that just as Bush was about to invade Iraq , “ al-Qaeda was almost destroyed in an operational sense .
But then al-Qaeda got a vacuum in Afghanistan [ as U.S. focus wandered ] .
And they got a motivational area in Iraq .
Al-Qaeda rejuvenated.
” All of which suggests , Kilcullen said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that began with 9/11 may well have resulted in the worst strategic mistake made by any major world leader since Adolf Hitler decided , on the cusp of total victory over Europe and Great Britain , to turn and invade the Soviet Union—a decision that most historians agree cost the Nazi dictator World War II .
“ Hitler thinks England was just going to fall on its own , and then he launches into what he thinks is going to be a cakewalk ” against the Soviet Union , Kilcullen said .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Afghanistan and Iraq .
While the battle of Tora Bora [ the mountain redoubt where a fleeing bin Laden was said to be holed up ] was still going , on the Bush administration were already starting the planning process for Iraq.
” Worse , America ’ s worst enemies have used the nearly two decades since 9/11 and America ’ s initial invasion of Afghanistan—a moment when U.S. power , manifested as “ B-52 justice , ” still inspired awe—to learn innumerable asymmetric techniques , including IEDs and the use of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq , Kilcullen said .
“ In 1991 the Gulf War showed everyone how not to fight us , but the 2003 invasion of Iraq showed everybody how to fight us .
”

Way back in January 2002, a few weeks after the Taliban fled terrified from Kabul, Kandahar, and other major cities, I went to Afghanistan to report on the aftermath. In just seven weeks, the world’s lone superpower had pounded Afghanistan’s Islamist occupiers into the ground, literally, with B-52s dropping massive laser-targeted bombs that seemed, to the hapless Taliban, to come from nowhere. It was the moment that “the nineteenth century met the twenty-first century,” an ebullient Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld later wrote . As I drove around, there wasn’t a Taliban fighter in sight, and the country seemed to lay wide open, practically begging the Americans to occupy it.
Way back in January 2002, a few weeks after the Taliban fled terrified from Kabul, Kandahar, and other major cities, I went to Afghanistan to report on the aftermath. In just seven weeks, the world’s lone superpower had pounded Afghanistan’s Islamist occupiers into the ground, literally, with B-52s dropping massive laser-targeted bombs that seemed, to the hapless Taliban, to come from nowhere. It was the moment that “the nineteenth century met the twenty-first century,” an ebullient Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld later wrote. As I drove around, there wasn’t a Taliban fighter in sight, and the country seemed to lay wide open, practically begging the Americans to occupy it.
What’s keeping the peace? I asked the warlords I met. Pretty much the same answer came back over and over, often preceded by a gap-toothed grin: “B-52 justice,” said one man, pointing upward.
Eighteen bloody years later, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that Afghanistan was always destined to be a failure. When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted Friday that the United States had reached “an understanding with the Taliban on a significant reduction in violence across #Afghanistan” and announced that peace talks would soon begin in earnest, almost no one complained about the relegitimization of the Taliban, who will now have a powerful voice in ruling the country and may even take it over again.
After all, it was inevitable, wasn’t it? No, in fact, it wasn’t, and some very smart strategists will tell you so. But you certainly won’t hear that from the many columnists, pundits, and scholars who blindly supported the diversion into Iraq—the main reason for the disaster of Afghanistan— and to this day can’t admit that they became what President George W. Bush’s former spokesman Scott McClellan called “complicit enablers” in possibly the worst strategic misdirection in American history.
Yet some military historians and thinkers, including David Kilcullen, the author of a new book called The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, argue persuasively that Afghanistan—while it never was going to be easy—was a winnable conflict. At the very least, Washington could have stabilized the country with far less investment of time, money, and blood, had it simply paid attention.
“People say we took our eye off the ball. But we didn’t even realize there was a ball,” Kilcullen, a career soldier who served in both Iraq and Afghanistan and was chief strategist for counterterrorism coordination at the State Department, said in an interview. Around the time the Taliban were beginning to creep back down from their mountainous hiding places in the fall of 2003 to consolidate the Quetta Shura, the Taliban leaders’ council across the border in Pakistan, the Bush administration was in panic mode some 1,400 miles away in Iraq. U.S. troops there were fighting an insurgency the Bush administration failed to anticipate, after no weapons of mass destruction or links to Osama bin Laden—that is, to 9/11—ever materialized. Rumsfeld, who had blithely decided to keep what he called a “small footprint” in Afghanistan because he didn’t like the idea of nation-building (his boss, Bush, had campaigned against it in 2000) was by then paying Afghanistan no mind at all.
The Afghans I met, meanwhile, were desperate for foreign intervention, knowing the consequences of U.S. withdrawal in the previous era, when Washington funded the mujahideen against the Soviets and then simply left (and the Taliban moved in). As Ismail Qasimyar, the head of the Loya Jirga commission, told me when I was there, Afghans saw that “a window of opportunity had been opened for them” and that Afghanistan was now “a baby of the international community.”
“Everybody knows who the real muscle is,” Sayed Hamed Gailani, the son and spokesman for a powerful warlord in the south, Pir Gailani, said at the time. “I want the Americans here as much as possible to give me back my country.”
The moment was ripe, because just about every non-Taliban warlord was open for business to the CIA—happy to work with the Americans in exchange for payoffs. “The Taliban were scattered. Many of them went home,” Kilcullen said. “Gradually they went to Pakistan and formed the Quetta Shura. By 2004 the insurgency begins, and it starts to get really bad by 2005. If we hadn’t invaded Iraq when things started to go bad, and in the early phase had a much more engaged political stance in Afghanistan … but it was basically ignored until [Barack] Obama got elected.”
And by the time President Obama and his team debated what to do in the early 2010s, matters may have gone too far, especially after the Taliban took the city of Kunduz in 2015, surging back to threaten the urban areas and the Kabul government itself.
Indeed, what gets lost in discussions of the now-infamous “Afghanistan Papers”—the not-so-secret Pentagon history of the 18-year Afghan war revealed by the Washington Post late last year—is that Afghanistan was never just one long continuous history. Instead the conflict had at least two distinct phases: one in which the United States under Bush diverted most of its resources and energy elsewhere, sending even critical stabilizing U.S. forces like Pashto- and Dari-speaking special ops units to Iraq, and a second phase in which Washington abruptly awakened to the Taliban’s return and recklessly threw money and troops at a problem that had already metastasized out of control.
“The Bush administration made three fundamental early errors in Afghanistan,” said James Dobbins, who served as Bush’s first envoy to post-Taliban Afghanistan and later lamented to me that Washington had turned Afghanistan into “the most under-resourced nation-building effort in history.”
“First was believing that a devastated country with no national army or police could secure its territory and population unaided,” Dobbins said in an email Friday. “Second was the failure to engage those elements of the Taliban, including its top leadership, that were prepared to lay down their arms.
“Third was not understanding that while Pakistan had ceased supporting the Taliban government after 9/11, it had not ceased to support the Taliban movement. By the time these failings were rectified the Taliban had regrouped, rearmed and, operating from its Pakistan safe haven, projected a large scale insurgency back into Afghanistan.”
Recalcitrance from neighboring Pakistan was critical to the Taliban’s return. But much evidence suggests that the abrupt shift into Iraq also disillusioned the Pakistanis, who until then had been successfully strong-armed by Washington into containing the Taliban somewhat, as well as hunting al-Qaeda terrorists. Pakistan helped, for instance, in the capture of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Rawalpindi in March 2003.
But sensing that Washington was going to leave the region to its own devices, Islamabad reverted to past practices, setting up the Taliban once again as an Islamist ally. In an interview with me in the mid 2000s, Mahmud Ali Durrani, then Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, said that just as Bush was about to invade Iraq, “al-Qaeda was almost destroyed in an operational sense. But then al-Qaeda got a vacuum in Afghanistan [as U.S. focus wandered]. And they got a motivational area in Iraq. Al-Qaeda rejuvenated.”
All of which suggests, Kilcullen said, that the so-called war on terror that began with 9/11 may well have resulted in the worst strategic mistake made by any major world leader since Adolf Hitler decided, on the cusp of total victory over Europe and Great Britain, to turn and invade the Soviet Union—a decision that most historians agree cost the Nazi dictator World War II.
“Hitler thinks England was just going to fall on its own, and then he launches into what he thinks is going to be a cakewalk” against the Soviet Union, Kilcullen said. “That is literally what happened to us with Afghanistan and Iraq. While the battle of Tora Bora [the mountain redoubt where a fleeing bin Laden was said to be holed up] was still going on, the Bush administration was already starting the planning process for Iraq.”
Worse, America’s worst enemies have used the nearly two decades since 9/11 and America’s initial invasion of Afghanistan—a moment when U.S. power, manifested as “B-52 justice,” still inspired awe—to learn innumerable asymmetric techniques, including IEDs and the use of small, spread-out cells that began in Iraq, Kilcullen said.
“In 1991 the Gulf War showed everyone how not to fight us, but the 2003 invasion of Iraq showed everybody how to fight us.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-21--Putin Fires His Puppet Master

Putin Fires His Puppet Master

The gray cardinal .
Putin ’ s Rasputin .
The Kremlin puppet master .
Vladislav Surkov , a close advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin , has achieved near-mythical status over the years as the self-proclaimed author of the Putin system , which flirts with democratic principles to cloak its increasing authoritarianism .
But on Tuesday he was summarily sacked in the latest of a series of political shake-ups as the Kremlin prepares for what to do when Putin ’ s term limit expires in 2024 .
Rumors of Surkov ’ s departure had swirled in recent weeks after another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was tapped to take up his job overseeing Ukraine policy .
This speculation was finally confirmed by way of a curt two-line presidential decree issued by the Russian president on Tuesday .
Surkov was known to be increasingly at odds with Russia ’ s power brokers and in January was reported to have resigned over unspecified policy differences , according to Bloomberg , although this was denied at the time by the Kremlin .
“ He had very little room to achieve anything .
It ’ s surprising he didn ’ t leave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the founder of the political consultancy R.Politik and a scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center .
He leaves behind a complicated legacy for both Russia and Ukraine , where he carefully stage-managed separatist groups in the country ’ s east .
He was seen as a hard-liner in Kyiv , where his departure will likely be welcomed amid efforts to de-escalate the conflict in eastern Ukraine , but regional analysts and former U.S. officials cautioned that any progress will be incremental at best .
“ I think Putin feels quite comfortable with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moment , ” said Kurt Volker , who formerly served as U.S. special envoy for the Ukrainian peace process .
With a flair for theatrics , Surkov was uniquely suited to the role of micromanaging Russia ’ s hybrid war in Ukraine , where front groups , proxy fighters , and disinformation were used as a smoke screen to obscure the presence of Russian troops .
In 2016 , thousands of Surkov ’ s emails were released by Ukrainian hackers , revealing the degree to which he was involved in micromanaging separatist groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how in the earliest days of the conflict , Surkov received a shortlist of candidates to be “ elected ” to the government of the breakaway region Donetsk People ’ s Republic , and he was asked to edit a plea supposedly written by residents of the region calling on Kyiv to halt military operations .
The letter was later published by the magazine Russian Reporter and by RT ’ s Russian-language site .
While Surkov was a master of so-called black PR , his replacement , Kozak , has long been Putin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He is considered a hard-working technocrat who has overseen some of the most ambitious projects of Putin ’ s tenure , including the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the integration of Crimea after it was annexed in 2014 .
The substitution of Kozak for Surkov is indicative of the Kremlin ’ s growing appetite for steady hands as Putin approaches his term limit , said Andrea Kendall-Taylor , a former deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council .
“ It does seem that there ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to handle this uncertain period , ” she said .
Kendall-Taylor pointed to Putin ’ s recent appointment of Mikhail Mishustin , once the obscure but highly effective head of the country ’ s tax service , as prime minister as another key example .
Kozak also has a preexisting relationship with Andriy Yermak , the Ukrainian president ’ s recently appointed chief of staff , as they supervised a prisoner swap between the two countries last year .
Yermak told Ukrainian TV earlier this month that he saw Kozak as an improvement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two of them can talk , can meet , that ’ s a positive thing , ” Volker said .
Surkov ’ s flair for disinformation extended to his negotiating style .
“ He would go on these long monologues .
He would say these things that are absolutely crazy and false .
And he knows you know they ’ re crazy and false , but he ’ d say them anyway , ” said Volker , who met with Surkov four times in his role as special envoy .
The presidents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first time in December as part of a bid to restart peace talks , aiming to bring an end to the war in eastern Ukraine , which has killed over 13,000 people .
Alyona Getmanchuk , the director of the Kyiv-based think tank New Europe Center , was cautious about whether Kozak ’ s appointment represents a change in substance for the Kremlin ’ s Ukraine policy .
“ It ’ s still Putin directing strategy toward Ukraine , that ’ s why we shouldn ’ t exaggerate Kozak ’ s role , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will lead to a less toxic atmosphere for negotiations , but I wouldn ’ t expect much of a change in strategy , just a more sophisticated approach.
” Surkov ’ s firing signals the exit of one of the most impactful and colorful figures of the Putin era .
Serving as deputy chief of the presidential administration for Putin ’ s first two terms , Surkov was seen as an omnipresent figure in Russian domestic politics who served as the chief architect of Russia ’ s Potemkin “ managed democracy ” that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much of the 1990s working in PR and advertising , Surkov understood the power of brand and carefully cultivated his own , earning a reputation as a well-read and at times esoteric figure .
He became known for his love of beat poetry , his encyclopedic knowledge of American rock music , and for keeping a photo of the American rapper Tupac Shakur on his desk , next to one of Putin .
“ What was interesting about him was more the brand he created around himself and a mystique and the kind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pomerantsev , an expert on Russian propaganda with the London School of Economics .
“ People talk about Surkovian style in political technology in Russia in the way that people talk about Michelangelo ’ s style .
He was the Zeitgeist , he captured it , he cultivated it , ” said Pomerantsev , the author of This is Not Propaganda .
“ Theatrics is what he does , ” said Kendall-Taylor , now a senior fellow and the director of the trans-Atlantic security program at the Center for a New American Security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very important role in enabling Putin to create the system that he has , to help Putin personalize power in the way that he has .
To help Putin to marginalize any opposition .
In enabling Putin to create the perception that he is the only viable alternative , ” she said .
At the peak of his influence in the 2000s , Surkov controlled political parties in Russia ’ s parliament , engineered pro-Kremlin youth groups , directed electoral campaigns that delivered victories for Putin and his allies , and was believed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s political opposition .
But Surkov ’ s star was dimmed by street protests over the winter of 2012 against Putin ’ s return to the presidency .
With Surkov ’ s role as the Kremlin ’ s chief ideologist , the demonstrations were interpreted by some as a sign of the erosion of the system he had set up and perhaps even a sign of his own support for the Russians who had taken to the streets .
Such theories were bolstered after a late 2011 interview in which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then-President Dmitry Medvedev , said that those protesting against the government deserve respect and that the authorities should “ respond benevolently ” to them .
Surkov was then made a deputy prime minister , a move seen as a demotion to keep him out of domestic politics .
In May 2013 he resigned from the Kremlin amid speculation that he had been pushed aside .
But four months later he was back , appointed by Putin to oversee the Russian-backed breakaway regions in Georgia , which Moscow recognized as independent following a short @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Surkov is gone for now , he may not be gone for good .
“ He ’ s been pushed aside before—he very likely could come back , and if Putin ever needed him he ’ d be at the ready , ” Kendall-Taylor said .

The gray cardinal. Putin’s Rasputin. The Kremlin puppet master. Vladislav Surkov, a close advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin, has achieved near-mythical status over the years as the self-proclaimed author of the Putin system, which flirts with democratic principles to cloak its increasing authoritarianism. But on Tuesday he was summarily sacked in the latest of a series of political shake-ups as the Kremlin prepares for what to do when Putin’s term limit expires in 2024.
The gray cardinal. Putin’s Rasputin. The Kremlin puppet master. Vladislav Surkov, a close advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin, has achieved near-mythical status over the years as the self-proclaimed author of the Putin system, which flirts with democratic principles to cloak its increasing authoritarianism. But on Tuesday he was summarily sacked in the latest of a series of political shake-ups as the Kremlin prepares for what to do when Putin’s term limit expires in 2024.
Rumors of Surkov’s departure had swirled in recent weeks after another longtime Putin aide, Dmitry Kozak, was tapped to take up his job overseeing Ukraine policy. This speculation was finally confirmed by way of a curt two-line presidential decree issued by the Russian president on Tuesday. Surkov was known to be increasingly at odds with Russia’s power brokers and in January was reported to have resigned over unspecified policy differences, according to Bloomberg, although this was denied at the time by the Kremlin. “He had very little room to achieve anything. It’s surprising he didn’t leave earlier,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, the founder of the political consultancy R.Politik and a scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
He leaves behind a complicated legacy for both Russia and Ukraine, where he carefully stage-managed separatist groups in the country’s east. He was seen as a hard-liner in Kyiv, where his departure will likely be welcomed amid efforts to de-escalate the conflict in eastern Ukraine, but regional analysts and former U.S. officials cautioned that any progress will be incremental at best.
“I think Putin feels quite comfortable with the way things are in Ukraine at the moment,” said Kurt Volker, who formerly served as U.S. special envoy for the Ukrainian peace process.
With a flair for theatrics, Surkov was uniquely suited to the role of micromanaging Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine, where front groups, proxy fighters, and disinformation were used as a smoke screen to obscure the presence of Russian troops. In 2016, thousands of Surkov’s emails were released by Ukrainian hackers, revealing the degree to which he was involved in micromanaging separatist groups in eastern Ukraine.
The emails show how in the earliest days of the conflict, Surkov received a shortlist of candidates to be “elected” to the government of the breakaway region Donetsk People’s Republic, and he was asked to edit a plea supposedly written by residents of the region calling on Kyiv to halt military operations. The letter was later published by the magazine Russian Reporter and by RT’s Russian-language site.
While Surkov was a master of so-called black PR, his replacement, Kozak, has long been Putin’s project manager of choice. He is considered a hard-working technocrat who has overseen some of the most ambitious projects of Putin’s tenure, including the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the integration of Crimea after it was annexed in 2014.
The substitution of Kozak for Surkov is indicative of the Kremlin’s growing appetite for steady hands as Putin approaches his term limit, said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council. “It does seem that there’s a strong preference for technocrats and managers to handle this uncertain period,” she said. Kendall-Taylor pointed to Putin’s recent appointment of Mikhail Mishustin, once the obscure but highly effective head of the country’s tax service, as prime minister as another key example.
Kozak also has a preexisting relationship with Andriy Yermak, the Ukrainian president’s recently appointed chief of staff, as they supervised a prisoner swap between the two countries last year. Yermak told Ukrainian TV earlier this month that he saw Kozak as an improvement on Surkov. “The fact that the two of them can talk, can meet, that’s a positive thing,” Volker said.
Surkov’s flair for disinformation extended to his negotiating style. “He would go on these long monologues. He would say these things that are absolutely crazy and false. And he knows you know they’re crazy and false, but he’d say them anyway,” said Volker, who met with Surkov four times in his role as special envoy.
The presidents of Russia and Ukraine met for the first time in December as part of a bid to restart peace talks, aiming to bring an end to the war in eastern Ukraine, which has killed over 13,000 people.
Alyona Getmanchuk, the director of the Kyiv-based think tank New Europe Center, was cautious about whether Kozak’s appointment represents a change in substance for the Kremlin’s Ukraine policy. “It’s still Putin directing strategy toward Ukraine, that’s why we shouldn’t exaggerate Kozak’s role,” she said. “Maybe it will lead to a less toxic atmosphere for negotiations, but I wouldn’t expect much of a change in strategy, just a more sophisticated approach.”
Surkov’s firing signals the exit of one of the most impactful and colorful figures of the Putin era. Serving as deputy chief of the presidential administration for Putin’s first two terms, Surkov was seen as an omnipresent figure in Russian domestic politics who served as the chief architect of Russia’s Potemkin “managed democracy” that took shape under Putin.
Having spent much of the 1990s working in PR and advertising, Surkov understood the power of brand and carefully cultivated his own, earning a reputation as a well-read and at times esoteric figure. He became known for his love of beat poetry, his encyclopedic knowledge of American rock music, and for keeping a photo of the American rapper Tupac Shakur on his desk, next to one of Putin.
“What was interesting about him was more the brand he created around himself and a mystique and the kind of the style,” said Peter Pomerantsev, an expert on Russian propaganda with the London School of Economics. “People talk about Surkovian style in political technology in Russia in the way that people talk about Michelangelo’s style. He was the Zeitgeist, he captured it, he cultivated it,” said Pomerantsev, the author of This is Not Propaganda.
“Theatrics is what he does,” said Kendall-Taylor, now a senior fellow and the director of the trans-Atlantic security program at the Center for a New American Security. “That’s played a very important role in enabling Putin to create the system that he has, to help Putin personalize power in the way that he has. To help Putin to marginalize any opposition. In enabling Putin to create the perception that he is the only viable alternative,” she said.
At the peak of his influence in the 2000s, Surkov controlled political parties in Russia’s parliament, engineered pro-Kremlin youth groups, directed electoral campaigns that delivered victories for Putin and his allies, and was believed to also play a guiding role with the country’s political opposition.
But Surkov’s star was dimmed by street protests over the winter of 2012 against Putin’s return to the presidency. With Surkov’s role as the Kremlin’s chief ideologist, the demonstrations were interpreted by some as a sign of the erosion of the system he had set up and perhaps even a sign of his own support for the Russians who had taken to the streets. Such theories were bolstered after a late 2011 interview in which Surkov, at the time working for then-President Dmitry Medvedev, said that those protesting against the government deserve respect and that the authorities should “respond benevolently” to them.
Surkov was then made a deputy prime minister, a move seen as a demotion to keep him out of domestic politics. In May 2013 he resigned from the Kremlin amid speculation that he had been pushed aside. But four months later he was back, appointed by Putin to oversee the Russian-backed breakaway regions in Georgia, which Moscow recognized as independent following a short war with Georgia in 2008.
Although Surkov is gone for now, he may not be gone for good.
“He’s been pushed aside before—he very likely could come back, and if Putin ever needed him he’d be at the ready,” Kendall-Taylor said.