foreignpolicy--2020-05-22--Trump Inherited the Drone War but Ditched Accountability

On March 10 , a U.S. drone fired a missile , turning a passenger vehicle outside Janaale , Somalia , into a heap of burnt and broken metal with fresh corpses inside .
Whether the people killed that day were “ terrorists ” or ordinary Somalis is actively disputed .
It is also a reminder that the United States ’ targeted killing program persists to this day , another legacy of the forever war that has now lasted for three presidential administrations and shows no signs of stopping in the next one .
Under U.S. President Donald Trump , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of rules has become even more widely applied , and ever less accountable .
The elastic nature of the September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force ( AUMF ) has stretched so far as to cover strikes in Yemen , Libya , and Somalia .
The first modern drone attack , a Hellfire missile fired from a CIA-piloted Predator drone in October 2001 , was covered by the AUMF , as was the airstrike in Janaale , conducted by U.S. Africa Command ( Africom ) , itself born in the dying years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration as part of the “ war on terror.
” In a press release also published March 10 , Africom claimed that its attack in Jaanale killed five terrorists .
Shortly after , images of the wrecked vehicle began to circulate online , some linked to al–Shabab , the terror group actively targeted by the strike , claiming that instead it had left only civilians dead .
Subsequent investigations by journalists found relatives of the deceased , who attested to the innocence of their family members .
As of April 27 , Africom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under investigation .
The investigations are a voluntary move towards transparency , though one that reflects the limitations of self-reported accountability .
Of the 20 possible civilian casualty incidents investigated and closed by March 31 , Africom found only one claim substantiated .
The Janaale airstrike is the drone war in microcosm .
To the extent that there is transparency , it is voluntary , not mandated .
Tracking civilian harm is done—at least at first—by people outside government .
And , as with all news save the most dramatic or scandalous in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ absent from public awareness , a boring holdover of past consensus politics that leaves a trail of corpses and mangled limbs behind it worldwide .
As of May 18 , the Trump administration had launched 40 airstrikes in Somalia in 2020 alone .
That figure is made all the more staggering by the fact that , from 2007 through 2016 , the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama conducted 41 airstrikes in Somalia total , according to reporting from Airwars .
The CIA was the first part of the national-security state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as scouts under the administration of President Bill Clinton during the Balkan wars , unarmed Predators offered a new feature for intelligence analysts : persistent battlefield surveillance .
The drones outlasted fragile flesh , able to fly for 24 hours with a change of their yawning remote piloting crews mid-flight , letting commanders see more of the battlefield , for longer , than ever before .
The Predator was originally limited to a spotting role for other weapons , its laser designator to paint targets for the cruise missiles and bombs launched by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missile on Predators was designed as a way to cut out that intermediate process .
All that was needed to find and kill a target was a single drone , for just $ 3 million apiece—by battlefield standards , a bargain .
Operating with Air Force pilots but a CIA mandate meant the drone war was already destined for obscurity .
While the Pentagon would get and operate its own armed Predators ( and , later , the Reapers that replaced them ) , those drones would primarily operate as in-theater battlefield support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or marines on patrol .
The specific targeting of individuals linked to terrorist groups would remain in CIA hands , and under CIA rules , until 2013 , when Obama nominally moved most of the drone program under the auspices of the Pentagon .
Yet this was an incomplete transfer , one that still left some strikes in CIA hands , and it was not paired with the requisite political choices that would diminish and constrain the scope of the forever war .
Changing what set of internal rules govern what kind of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ providing oversight .
And for that oversight to be a meaningful constraint , Congress has to be skeptical of the drone war itself , which is a political calculus , not a technical one .
Obama ’ s second turn towards drone war transparency would not come until July 2016 .
That month , the administration released Executive Order 13732 .
Titled “ United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force , ” the order required the administration to investigate reports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , offer condolences and payment to the families of those killed , and publish an annual report on strikes and those killed or injured in those strikes .
The executive order also required that independent reporting , as well as government information , be factored into the internal reviews over whether or not a strike had , in fact , killed or harmed civilians .
As with many policies enacted by executive order under the Obama administration , the rule held the weight of law for only so long as an administration decided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passing the accountability into law through the legislative branch , the order did nothing to meaningfully constrain the actions of the next president .
Soon after the presidential election in November 2016 , a version of the Pentagon ’ s internal manual for determining the legality of targets leaked online .
Possibly written to explain the U.S. process to close military allies , the unclassified but “ for official use only ” document outlines how the joint chiefs of staff see their actions , and their process , falling within the bounds of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an official transparency measure , the release of the manual provided a baseline understanding of how , at the end of its second term , the Obama administration saw its own actions as within the constraints of the law .
But there was never a consistent trajectory toward more transparency in the drone program .
By keeping internal policies within the executive branch and releasing them to the public either at will or under the pressure of Freedom of Information Act requests , the administration had broad freedom to shape perception of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama administration , that meant putting out messages about the difficult choices present in a long-running war against an expansive threat .
It meant , in particular , following transparency announcements with airstrikes , and then explanations of how those airstrikes fell within the existing purview of the war the administration inherited .
In 2013 , just six days after Obama unveiled new rules on drone strike authorities , White House spokesman Jay Carney quoted Obama ’ s remarks to explain how , exactly , a strike on militants in Pakistan fell into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when the Obama administration pursued drone transparency , it was voluntary self-reporting .
While it acknowledged reports of deaths and injuries from strikes beyond military intelligence itself , the administration held them only as one factor among many to take into consideration when clarifying what , exactly , happened in a given airstrike .
As part of the presidential transition in December 2016 , the Obama White House also released a lengthy memo about its understanding of the laws of war and how they applied to everything from the fighting in Afghanistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the 2001 AUMF .
It outlines the tools and rules of Obama ’ s opt-in transparency regime , itself just six months old at that point .
But the failure to produce actual legal restraints , rather than a code of good conduct , would give the Trump administration free rein .
As a candidate , Trump campaigned on a promise that the United States would not shy away from killing civilians in its wars abroad .
In 2015 , when asked what he would do if elected to defeat the Islamic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to take out their families , ” and he further promised that his administration would no longer be fighting what he perceived as Obama ’ s “ politically correct war.
” While not all campaign-trail utterances end up as formalized policy , by 2017 , the Trump administration was already working on rolling back its predecessor ’ s rules about airstrike transparency .
Obama ’ s 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance ( PPG ) designated looser targeting restrictions for battlefields and tighter ones for nonbattlefields .
The intent was to allow Pentagon drones @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in firefights in places such as Afghanistan , while holding tighter restrictions for targeted killing flights in places where the United States did not actively deploy troops on the ground , such as Yemen or Somalia .
While keeping within the letter of the rule , the Trump administration simply expanded battlefield designation to areas of Yemen and Somalia , rendering the whole of the distinction all but meaningless .
“ Another change is the at least tacit effort to absolve the Trump presidency of the responsibility that comes with using lethal force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” wrote Rachel Stohl , vice president of the Stimson Center , to Foreign Policy .
“ Part of reported changes to PPG were to reduce the White House ’ s involvement in strike decisions , a marked change from the Obama administration.
” A report by the Stimson Center in February found that , in addition to changing how it used battlefield designations , the Trump administration rolled back a host of Obama-era drone policies .
That meant relaxed restrictions on exports of drones and laser designators , relaxed oversight on military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both military commanders and the CIA in choosing to attack targets , and removing the reporting requirement for casualties outside of designated battlefields .
Further , wr Stohl and Shannon Dick , “ Each of these changes occurred under a veil of secrecy , as the administration has not publicly released the policies , principles and procedures guiding the U.S. drone program.
” The rollback of transparency measures itself was opaque and barely covered , a pattern that would continue in the way the Trump administration handled the killings .
A single formal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killings .
While Congress has long handed broad discretion on war power authorities to the executive , the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( NDAA ) for the first time mandated that the Pentagon submit annual reports on confirmed or suspected civilian casualties caused by U.S. military operations .
Signed into law in December 2017 , the requirement mandated that the Pentagon report , by May 1 the next year .
It marked a tentative step towards drone transparency , but the first execution in May 2018 had major limitations .
The public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ injuries across all areas where the United States was actively fighting , instead of parsing it out by month , country , location , age , or sex .
A classified annex delivered to Congress offered that information in disaggregated form , but reporting in such a way introduces a layer of opacity between the report and the public .
Congress strengthened the reporting requirements in the 2019 NDAA , and as a result the report features some disaggregated data .
Yet there is still room for obscurity .
The 2018 civilian casualties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. strikes at one-tenth the level of independent assessments .
The 2018 report also treated all strikes as occurring within the designated battlefields , seeing no need to parse the difference between strikes in and out of combat zones .
With the release this month of the Pentagon ’ s report on civilian casualties in 2019 , the modest level of transparency promised in the 2016 executive order is still a very long way off .
And the discrepancies with outside reporting persist , to a sometimes extreme degree .
The Pentagon ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killed in Syria , for example , diverges from independent assessments by between a factor of 20 and a factor of 50 .
The targeted killing program has been folded into the status quo of U.S. foreign policy .
It is routine , normalized tragedy : the intelligence apparatus of a superpower thousands of miles away deciding precisely whose bodies are shattered on the ground .
Congressional moves on transparency have created a starting point for accountability .
Yet with the targeted killing program , and the wars abroad generally , enjoying bipartisan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so far is that the administration be slightly more public about what it is doing , so long as it doesn ’ t threaten national security .
The assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in Iraq by a U.S. airstrike brought a momentary disruption in the order of secrecy .
From across the then-vibrant Democratic primary , candidates condemned the act primarily as destabilizing , as did military strategists .
Laws and conduct of targeted killing aside , what stood out was the possibility that the existing infrastructure of airstrikes had bent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the capacity to strike back .
When polled afterward , Americans ’ support for drone strikes against terrorists increased , although more Americans than not were convinced that the specific strike against Suleimani made the United States less safe .
Drone warfare thrives in the abstract : missiles crashing into bodies rendered unrecognizable and unknowable , into faceless targets with no identity more specific than “ enemy.
” So long as the White House , any White House , can sustain the public ’ s mental distance from the tangible , human consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ machinery will continue to wage war in relative obscurity .

On March 10, a U.S. drone fired a missile, turning a passenger vehicle outside Janaale, Somalia, into a heap of burnt and broken metal with fresh corpses inside. Whether the people killed that day were “terrorists” or ordinary Somalis is actively disputed. It is also a reminder that the United States’ targeted killing program persists to this day, another legacy of the forever war that has now lasted for three presidential administrations and shows no signs of stopping in the next one. Under U.S. President Donald Trump, however, an already opaque and murderous set of rules has become even more widely applied, and ever less accountable.
On March 10, a U.S. drone fired a missile, turning a passenger vehicle outside Janaale, Somalia, into a heap of burnt and broken metal with fresh corpses inside. Whether the people killed that day were “terrorists” or ordinary Somalis is actively disputed. It is also a reminder that the United States’ targeted killing program persists to this day, another legacy of the forever war that has now lasted for three presidential administrations and shows no signs of stopping in the next one. Under U.S. President Donald Trump, however, an already opaque and murderous set of rules has become even more widely applied, and ever less accountable.
The elastic nature of the September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) has stretched so far as to cover strikes in Yemen, Libya, and Somalia. The first modern drone attack, a Hellfire missile fired from a CIA-piloted Predator drone in October 2001, was covered by the AUMF, as was the airstrike in Janaale, conducted by U.S. Africa Command (Africom), itself born in the dying years of President George W. Bush ‘s administration as part of the “war on terror.”
In a press release also published March 10, Africom claimed that its attack in Jaanale killed five terrorists. Shortly after, images of the wrecked vehicle began to circulate online, some linked to al–Shabab, the terror group actively targeted by the strike, claiming that instead it had left only civilians dead. Subsequent investigations by journalists found relatives of the deceased, who attested to the innocence of their family members.
As of April 27, Africom records the incident as still open and under investigation. The investigations are a voluntary move towards transparency, though one that reflects the limitations of self-reported accountability. Of the 20 possible civilian casualty incidents investigated and closed by March 31, Africom found only one claim substantiated.
The Janaale airstrike is the drone war in microcosm. To the extent that there is transparency, it is voluntary, not mandated. Tracking civilian harm is done—at least at first—by people outside government. And, as with all news save the most dramatic or scandalous in the Trump administration, it is largely absent from public awareness, a boring holdover of past consensus politics that leaves a trail of corpses and mangled limbs behind it worldwide.
As of May 18, the Trump administration had launched 40 airstrikes in Somalia in 2020 alone. That figure is made all the more staggering by the fact that, from 2007 through 2016, the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama conducted 41 airstrikes in Somalia total, according to reporting from Airwars.
The CIA was the first part of the national-security state to operate Predator drones. Purchased first as scouts under the administration of President Bill Clinton during the Balkan wars, unarmed Predators offered a new feature for intelligence analysts: persistent battlefield surveillance. The drones outlasted fragile flesh, able to fly for 24 hours with a change of their yawning remote piloting crews mid-flight, letting commanders see more of the battlefield, for longer, than ever before.
The Predator was originally limited to a spotting role for other weapons, its laser designator to paint targets for the cruise missiles and bombs launched by other vehicles. Putting the anti-tank Hellfire missile on Predators was designed as a way to cut out that intermediate process. All that was needed to find and kill a target was a single drone, for just $3 million apiece—by battlefield standards, a bargain.
Operating with Air Force pilots but a CIA mandate meant the drone war was already destined for obscurity. While the Pentagon would get and operate its own armed Predators (and, later, the Reapers that replaced them), those drones would primarily operate as in-theater battlefield support, offering scouting and firepower to soldiers or marines on patrol.
The specific targeting of individuals linked to terrorist groups would remain in CIA hands, and under CIA rules, until 2013, when Obama nominally moved most of the drone program under the auspices of the Pentagon. Yet this was an incomplete transfer, one that still left some strikes in CIA hands, and it was not paired with the requisite political choices that would diminish and constrain the scope of the forever war. Changing what set of internal rules govern what kind of strikes does very little without Congress actively providing oversight. And for that oversight to be a meaningful constraint, Congress has to be skeptical of the drone war itself, which is a political calculus, not a technical one.
Obama’s second turn towards drone war transparency would not come until July 2016. That month, the administration released Executive Order 13732. Titled “United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force,” the order required the administration to investigate reports of civilian casualties killed by U.S. action, offer condolences and payment to the families of those killed, and publish an annual report on strikes and those killed or injured in those strikes. The executive order also required that independent reporting, as well as government information, be factored into the internal reviews over whether or not a strike had, in fact, killed or harmed civilians.
As with many policies enacted by executive order under the Obama administration, the rule held the weight of law for only so long as an administration decided it wanted to follow it. Without passing the accountability into law through the legislative branch, the order did nothing to meaningfully constrain the actions of the next president.
Soon after the presidential election in November 2016, a version of the Pentagon’s internal manual for determining the legality of targets leaked online. Possibly written to explain the U.S. process to close military allies, the unclassified but “for official use only” document outlines how the joint chiefs of staff see their actions, and their process, falling within the bounds of the laws of war. While not an official transparency measure, the release of the manual provided a baseline understanding of how, at the end of its second term, the Obama administration saw its own actions as within the constraints of the law.
But there was never a consistent trajectory toward more transparency in the drone program. By keeping internal policies within the executive branch and releasing them to the public either at will or under the pressure of Freedom of Information Act requests, the administration had broad freedom to shape perception of its use of airstrikes abroad.
For the Obama administration, that meant putting out messages about the difficult choices present in a long-running war against an expansive threat. It meant, in particular, following transparency announcements with airstrikes, and then explanations of how those airstrikes fell within the existing purview of the war the administration inherited.
In 2013, just six days after Obama unveiled new rules on drone strike authorities, White House spokesman Jay Carney quoted Obama’s remarks to explain how, exactly, a strike on militants in Pakistan fell into that new policy.
In late 2016, when the Obama administration pursued drone transparency, it was voluntary self-reporting. While it acknowledged reports of deaths and injuries from strikes beyond military intelligence itself, the administration held them only as one factor among many to take into consideration when clarifying what, exactly, happened in a given airstrike.
As part of the presidential transition in December 2016, the Obama White House also released a lengthy memo about its understanding of the laws of war and how they applied to everything from the fighting in Afghanistan to the extensive targeted killing campaigns covered by the 2001 AUMF. It outlines the tools and rules of Obama’s opt-in transparency regime, itself just six months old at that point. But the failure to produce actual legal restraints, rather than a code of good conduct, would give the Trump administration free rein.
As a candidate, Trump campaigned on a promise that the United States would not shy away from killing civilians in its wars abroad. In 2015, when asked what he would do if elected to defeat the Islamic State, then-candidate Trump said “you have to take out their families,” and he further promised that his administration would no longer be fighting what he perceived as Obama’s “politically correct war.”
While not all campaign-trail utterances end up as formalized policy, by 2017, the Trump administration was already working on rolling back its predecessor’s rules about airstrike transparency. Obama’s 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) designated looser targeting restrictions for battlefields and tighter ones for nonbattlefields. The intent was to allow Pentagon drones more freedom providing support fire for soldiers in firefights in places such as Afghanistan, while holding tighter restrictions for targeted killing flights in places where the United States did not actively deploy troops on the ground, such as Yemen or Somalia.
While keeping within the letter of the rule, the Trump administration simply expanded battlefield designation to areas of Yemen and Somalia, rendering the whole of the distinction all but meaningless.
“Another change is the at least tacit effort to absolve the Trump presidency of the responsibility that comes with using lethal force in the name of national security,” wrote Rachel Stohl, vice president of the Stimson Center, to Foreign Policy. “Part of reported changes to PPG were to reduce the White House’s involvement in strike decisions, a marked change from the Obama administration.”
A report by the Stimson Center in February found that, in addition to changing how it used battlefield designations, the Trump administration rolled back a host of Obama-era drone policies. That meant relaxed restrictions on exports of drones and laser designators, relaxed oversight on military drones sold abroad, greater authority for both military commanders and the CIA in choosing to attack targets, and removing the reporting requirement for casualties outside of designated battlefields.
Further, wr ot e Stohl and Shannon Dick, “Each of these changes occurred under a veil of secrecy, as the administration has not publicly released the policies, principles and procedures guiding the U.S. drone program.”
The rollback of transparency measures itself was opaque and barely covered, a pattern that would continue in the way the Trump administration handled the killings.
A single formal check remains on the secrecy surrounding drone killings. While Congress has long handed broad discretion on war power authorities to the executive, the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the first time mandated that the Pentagon submit annual reports on confirmed or suspected civilian casualties caused by U.S. military operations.
Signed into law in December 2017, the requirement mandated that the Pentagon report, by May 1 the next year. It marked a tentative step towards drone transparency, but the first execution in May 2018 had major limitations.
The public 2017 civilian casualties report aggregated deaths and injuries across all areas where the United States was actively fighting, instead of parsing it out by month, country, location, age, or sex. A classified annex delivered to Congress offered that information in disaggregated form, but reporting in such a way introduces a layer of opacity between the report and the public.
Congress strengthened the reporting requirements in the 2019 NDAA, and as a result the report features some disaggregated data. Yet there is still room for obscurity. The 2018 civilian casualties report estimates civilian injuries and deaths from U.S. strikes at one-tenth the level of independent assessments. The 2018 report also treated all strikes as occurring within the designated battlefields, seeing no need to parse the difference between strikes in and out of combat zones.
With the release this month of the Pentagon’s report on civilian casualties in 2019, the modest level of transparency promised in the 2016 executive order is still a very long way off. And the discrepancies with outside reporting persist, to a sometimes extreme degree. The Pentagon’s estimate for how many civilians it killed in Syria, for example, diverges from independent assessments by between a factor of 20 and a factor of 50.
The targeted killing program has been folded into the status quo of U.S. foreign policy. It is routine, normalized tragedy: the intelligence apparatus of a superpower thousands of miles away deciding precisely whose bodies are shattered on the ground.
Congressional moves on transparency have created a starting point for accountability. Yet with the targeted killing program, and the wars abroad generally, enjoying bipartisan support across administrations, the most demanded so far is that the administration be slightly more public about what it is doing, so long as it doesn’t threaten national security.
The assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in Iraq by a U.S. airstrike brought a momentary disruption in the order of secrecy. From across the then-vibrant Democratic primary, candidates condemned the act primarily as destabilizing, as did military strategists. Laws and conduct of targeted killing aside, what stood out was the possibility that the existing infrastructure of airstrikes had bent toward an agent of a nation with the capacity to strike back.
When polled afterward, Americans’ support for drone strikes against terrorists increased, although more Americans than not were convinced that the specific strike against Suleimani made the United States less safe.
Drone warfare thrives in the abstract: missiles crashing into bodies rendered unrecognizable and unknowable, into faceless targets with no identity more specific than “enemy.” So long as the White House, any White House, can sustain the public’s mental distance from the tangible, human consequences of the drone war, an unaccountable machinery will continue to wage war in relative obscurity.
Forever.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-22--Goodbye, Government. Hello, Mafia.

Goodbye, Government. Hello, Mafia.

The coronavirus pandemic has exposed deficiencies among governments around in the world .
In the United States and Britain , inadequate testing and mixed messaging from leaders have led to declining public confidence in decisions made by lawmakers .
In the developing world , many governments lack the capacity to track and isolate coronavirus cases—much less to provide significant economic stimulus as businesses suffer from the effects of lockdowns and restrictions .
And multilateral institutions have struggled to take swift and decisive action , particularly as they become battlegrounds for rivalry between countries such as the United States and China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to criminal gangs , are filling the gap .
We ’ ve rounded up some of our best articles on the groups that have seized the opportunity and stepped in where central governments have faltered—sometimes in their own self-interest .
Since 30 percent of Pakistan ’ s population lives in poverty , Prime Minister Imran Khan worried early on that the nationwide lockdown—which ended on May 9—would have especially devastating consequences .
“ When the lockdown came , implementation was delayed or piecemeal , exposing the government ’ s lack of swift decision-making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 11 .
Likewise , while the government launched its own cash assistance program and relief fund , ordinary citizens stepped in to address remaining needs through acts of charity .
Local nonprofit organizations and even Pakistanis living abroad have used WhatsApp and social media platforms to appeal for donations of cash , food , soap , and personal protective equipment for people and hospitals in need .
But such community efforts provide only temporary relief , particularly as the economic effects of the lockdown extend past its end date .
“ Pakistan does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tackle the devastation caused by the lockdown , ” Maqsood writes .
“ For now , the country is surviving purely on its citizens ’ willingness to give.
” In neighboring Afghanistan , the government faced criticism during the pandemic for inadequate screening of those crossing its borders—including with Iran , which had an early and significant coronavirus outbreak .
But the Taliban claim that they enforced isolation measures for people returning from Iran and even established their own quarantine centers .
This messaging is part of a larger propaganda strategy , Ashley @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insurgent group released videos and announcements to suggest that it is containing the coronavirus in the areas that it controls , from conducting temperature checks to establishing health information teams .
Jackson argues that civilians living under Taliban control are still likely to suffer disproportionately as long as increasing violence disrupts health care access and supply chains .
“ Aid donors and agencies would do well to openly acknowledge that the insurgency has an essential role to play and call on it to take concrete , specific actions to halt the virus ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” she writes .
“ In the absence of such an effort , the Taliban will likely continue to exploit the pandemic for their own ends.
” Countries such as Mexico , Brazil , and El Salvador have also witnessed an increase in deadly violence at the hands of drug cartels and criminal gangs , which are using the opportunity of the pandemic to build soft power by providing essential goods and services to vulnerable groups , Robert Muggah wrote on May 8 .
In many slums , crime groups rather than the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Their appeal may be growing at a time when government leadership is lacking , ” he writes .
“ In addition to fueling rising violence , the pandemic could enhance the social , economic , and political clout of some criminal organizations in the same way that the Italian mafia and Japanese yakuza emerged stronger after the great dislocations of World War II.
” Italy ’ s sputtering economy has created a new vacuum for the mafia .
While the country ’ s southern regions largely avoided the worst of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensuing lockdown led to the loss of daily work for tens of thousands of informal laborers , Stefania D ’ Ignoti reported on May 4 .
Municipalities are taking longer than expected to distribute relief funds from the central government , leaving room for organized crime to step in .
“ In Naples , the mafia has stepped in as a provider of food parcels and loans .
In Palermo , the brother of a mafia boss was reportedly seen distributing food packages in the city ’ s poorest neighborhood , ” she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are offering their own food and cash assistance programs in an attempt to stop mafia networks from exploiting those who are desperate and unemployed to ask for some form of repayment later .
“ The fact that Palermo has fought against the mafia for decades , I see it as an advantage because we already know how to fight back .
We just need to be as quick as possible , and we ’ ll get through this , too , ” the mayor of Palermo told D ’ Ignoti .
In fact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system to confront the coronavirus crisis head on has created an opportunity for city and state governments around the world to take more decisive action , Nina Hachigian and Anthony F. Pipa argued on May 5 .
“ [ C ] ities are banding together to fill the gap in global cooperation , ” they write , organizing digital forums and conference calls for mayors to discuss health responses , as well as how to reopen and support small businesses .
Local leaders are developing their own strategies with the global community in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faces extreme pressure .
But cities remain secondary players in global policymaking—something that may need to change in the post-pandemic world .
“ As governments begin to address the economic slump that the virus response has wrought , it will be these very cities that will fight hardest to ensure that a green and equitable recovery becomes the norm , ” Hachigian and Pipa write .

The coronavirus pandemic has exposed deficiencies among governments around in the world. In the United States and Britain, inadequate testing and mixed messaging from leaders have led to declining public confidence in decisions made by lawmakers. In the developing world, many governments lack the capacity to track and isolate coronavirus cases—much less to provide significant economic stimulus as businesses suffer from the effects of lockdowns and restrictions. And multilateral institutions have struggled to take swift and decisive action, particularly as they become battlegrounds for rivalry between countries such as the United States and China.
The coronavirus pandemic has exposed deficiencies among governments around in the world. In the United States and Britain, inadequate testing and mixed messaging from leaders have led to declining public confidence in decisions made by lawmakers. In the developing world, many governments lack the capacity to track and isolate coronavirus cases—much less to provide significant economic stimulus as businesses suffer from the effects of lockdowns and restrictions. And multilateral institutions have struggled to take swift and decisive action, particularly as they become battlegrounds for rivalry between countries such as the United States and China.
Other actors, from charitable organizations to criminal gangs, are filling the gap. We’ve rounded up some of our best articles on the groups that have seized the opportunity and stepped in where central governments have faltered—sometimes in their own self-interest.
Since 30 percent of Pakistan’s population lives in poverty, Prime Minister Imran Khan worried early on that the nationwide lockdown—which ended on May 9—would have especially devastating consequences. “When the lockdown came, implementation was delayed or piecemeal, exposing the government’s lack of swift decision-making,” Neha Maqsood wrote on May 11. Likewise, while the government launched its own cash assistance program and relief fund, ordinary citizens stepped in to address remaining needs through acts of charity. Local nonprofit organizations and even Pakistanis living abroad have used WhatsApp and social media platforms to appeal for donations of cash, food, soap, and personal protective equipment for people and hospitals in need.
But such community efforts provide only temporary relief, particularly as the economic effects of the lockdown extend past its end date. “Pakistan does not have sufficient resources and funding to tackle the devastation caused by the lockdown,” Maqsood writes. “For now, the country is surviving purely on its citizens’ willingness to give.”
In neighboring Afghanistan, the government faced criticism during the pandemic for inadequate screening of those crossing its borders—including with Iran, which had an early and significant coronavirus outbreak. But the Taliban claim that they enforced isolation measures for people returning from Iran and even established their own quarantine centers. This messaging is part of a larger propaganda strategy, Ashley Jackson wrote on May 6. The insurgent group released videos and announcements to suggest that it is containing the coronavirus in the areas that it controls, from conducting temperature checks to establishing health information teams.
Jackson argues that civilians living under Taliban control are still likely to suffer disproportionately as long as increasing violence disrupts health care access and supply chains. “Aid donors and agencies would do well to openly acknowledge that the insurgency has an essential role to play and call on it to take concrete, specific actions to halt the virus’s spread and facilitate health work,” she writes. “In the absence of such an effort, the Taliban will likely continue to exploit the pandemic for their own ends.”
Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and El Salvador have also witnessed an increase in deadly violence at the hands of drug cartels and criminal gangs, which are using the opportunity of the pandemic to build soft power by providing essential goods and services to vulnerable groups, Robert Muggah wrote on May 8. In many slums, crime groups rather than the police are enforcing lockdown orders and curfews. “Their appeal may be growing at a time when government leadership is lacking,” he writes. “In addition to fueling rising violence, the pandemic could enhance the social, economic, and political clout of some criminal organizations in the same way that the Italian mafia and Japanese yakuza emerged stronger after the great dislocations of World War II.”
Italy’s sputtering economy has created a new vacuum for the mafia. While the country’s southern regions largely avoided the worst of the pandemic’s health effects, the ensuing lockdown led to the loss of daily work for tens of thousands of informal laborers, Stefania D’Ignoti reported on May 4. Municipalities are taking longer than expected to distribute relief funds from the central government, leaving room for organized crime to step in. “In Naples, the mafia has stepped in as a provider of food parcels and loans. In Palermo, the brother of a mafia boss was reportedly seen distributing food packages in the city’s poorest neighborhood,” she writes.
Some cities such as Palermo are offering their own food and cash assistance programs in an attempt to stop mafia networks from exploiting those who are desperate and unemployed to ask for some form of repayment later. “The fact that Palermo has fought against the mafia for decades, I see it as an advantage because we already know how to fight back. We just need to be as quick as possible, and we’ll get through this, too,” the mayor of Palermo told D’Ignoti.
In fact, the failure of the global multilateral system to confront the coronavirus crisis head on has created an opportunity for city and state governments around the world to take more decisive action, Nina Hachigian and Anthony F. Pipa argued on May 5. “[C]ities are banding together to fill the gap in global cooperation,” they write, organizing digital forums and conference calls for mayors to discuss health responses, as well as how to reopen and support small businesses. Local leaders are developing their own strategies with the global community in mind, just as the multilateral system faces extreme pressure.
But cities remain secondary players in global policymaking—something that may need to change in the post-pandemic world. “As governments begin to address the economic slump that the virus response has wrought, it will be these very cities that will fight hardest to ensure that a green and equitable recovery becomes the norm,” Hachigian and Pipa write.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-22--One Year On, Zelensky Survives Impeachment (Trump’s, That Is) and Blunted Hopes

One Year On , Zelensky Survives Impeachment ( Trump ’ s , That Is ) and Blunted Hopes When Ukrainians went to the polls in April 2019 to elect Volodymyr Zelensky as president , it was a collective shot in the dark .
His previous political experience amounted to playing the role of the president in the popular Ukrainian TV series , Servant of the People .
But in a country where politics as usual had failed to address endemic corruption or bring an end to the war in eastern Ukraine , people were hungry for change , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wednesday , Zelensky celebrated the first anniversary of his inauguration : Perhaps one of the strangest presidential debuts anywhere in the world , as the new and untried Ukrainian leader found himself unexpectedly at center stage in the impeachment drama over in Washington , with questions being raised about his relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump .
Ironically , although the impeachment imbroglio by itself did little to affect Zelensky ’ s ambitious if faltering reform agenda , it may have raised his stature among Ukrainians in the past year .
Kyiv ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to stay away from U.S. partisan turf wars , have rallied around the political neophyte , and he remains hugely popular based on recent polls .
“ Even the enemies of Zelensky looked at him with sympathy , because he turned out to be in the center of the storm , ” Mikhail Minakov , a senior advisor at the Woodrow Wilson Center ’ s Kennan Institute , told Foreign Policy .
Domestically , Zelensky got off to a promising start , appointing a “ dream team ” of respected reformers to key @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Russia , and passing a flurry of new legislation in the fall .
But the dream team was disbanded in a government reshuffle in March , leaving many to wonder which course he could chart as he begins his second year in office .
Zelensky was elected with “ great expectations , great ambitions , great intentions , ” said former U.S .
Ambassador Bill Taylor , who led the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv in an acting capacity until January of this year .
Zelensky had promised to stamp out corruption , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Donbass , so it was almost inevitable that his shine would wear off , as he was unable to deliver on these pledges overnight .
“ The popularity factor wears off over time , it ’ s almost inevitable , ” said Kurt Volker , a former U.S. special envoy for Ukraine peace negotiations , adding that Zelensky was still Ukraine ’ s best hope for change since the country gained its independence in 1991 .
Even so , 68 percent of Ukrainians approve of the former actor ’ s first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percentage points below his margin of victory in 2019 , when he swept into power with nearly three-quarters of the vote .
While his campaign promises were bold , they were light on detail , which may help to explain the public has cut Zelensky some slack .
“ Zelensky created such a program during this presidential campaign where presidential promises were very vaguely phrased , ” Minakov told Foreign Policy .
“ So you can not catch him.
” U.S.-Ukraine relations remain somewhat strained in the aftermath of resistance by the Zelensky @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to investigate the family of former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden , Trump ’ s 2020 presidential election challenger .
Former U.S. officials and Ukraine experts told Foreign Policy that while the impeachment controversy did not change longstanding bipartisan support for Ukraine—even as weapons shipments got snagged last year amid Trump ’ s push for an investigation of Biden and his family—it has prompted some in Kyiv to question the reliability and sincerity of the United States , the biggest backer of Ukraine ’ s sovereignty .
“ I have to admit that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s reliable ally has deteriorated because of this story , ” said Alyona Getmanchuk , the director of the New Europe think tank in Kyiv .
Since Volker stepped down early in the impeachment investigation after getting caught up in efforts by Trump ’ s allies to pressure Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials to open corruption investigations that could aid Trump ’ s reelection , the State Department has not appointed another special envoy to Ukraine .
That has left Kyiv without a dedicated point person for the peace process as Zelensky seeks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They ’ re looking for a stronger U.S. voice , and they feel the absence of that , ” Volker said .
And if Zelensky ’ s reform agenda wasn ’ t ambitious enough for a novice politician who was caught in a pressure vise by a superpower that was also Ukraine ’ s No .
1 aid donor , he has faced other challenges this year , including the downing of a Ukrainian passenger jet in Iran and a global pandemic .
The government ordered a strict lockdown on March 12 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of confirmed cases of the coronavirus .
That decision appears to have spared Ukraine from the mass outbreaks seen in Western Europe and the United States .
At the time of publication , Ukraine has reported close to 20,000 known cases , compared to 280,000 in similarly sized Spain .
But there is one issue where Zelensky is likely to face increasing scrutiny from critics and the public : Ending the war in eastern Ukraine , where fighting between the Ukrainian military and Kremlin-backed forces has killed over 13,000 people , is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was sworn in , Zelensky has overseen three prisoner exchanges with Russia .
Among those released were 24 Ukrainian sailors captured by Russia in November 2018 and the film director Oleg Sentsov , who had been held for over five years .
The decision didn ’ t come without a cost for Kyiv , though—in return it released a key witness to the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 and five former members of the Ukrainian Berkut riot police charged with killing unarmed protesters during the 2014 Ukrainian revolution .
Explaining what he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Zelensky said , “ I respect parents and relatives of those killed at the Maidan [ epicenter of the 2014 uprisings ] .
Unfortunately , we can not return those who passed away .
… But we could return those alive.
” In the fall , Zelensky reached an agreement with separatist forces to a mutual withdrawal of forces along the front line , a move that was seen as a precondition to restarting peace talks .
The Normandy contact group , which included the leaders of Ukraine , Russia , France @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 for the first time in three years .
“ Zelensky and his team don ’ t want to see a frozen conflict , ” said Taylor , the former U.S. ambassador .
“ They don ’ t want to cede part of their sovereign territory to Russia without doing everything they can to avoid it , and they ’ ve made some progress.
” Yet Ukraine may be gaining leverage with Russia at the negotiating table even as the country remains in lockdown .
Taylor said Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the costly Donbass war , now in its seventh year .
“ I know that there are people around [ Putin ] in the Kremlin who have been saying , ‘ Donbass is a loser , we should get out of Donbass , ’ ” he said .
The pressure on the long-serving Russian president to pull up sticks in Donbass comes as Russia has been beset by the coronavirus pandemic , with the second-highest caseload in the world behind the United States .
Putin ’ s spokesman Dmitry Peskov and Prime Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s 325,000 reported cases .
Still , while Zelensky has made efforts to end the stalemate with Russia and its proxies , his push for peace can only go so far .
“ Zelensky showed clear political will to end the war , Putin unfortunately [ did ] not , ” said Getmanchuk of the New Europe think tank .
Ukraine has relied heavily on support from Western allies in the war against Russia , including U.S. military aid , which Trump ’ s allies used as leverage as they sought to pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ business activities of Biden ’ s son , which could have aided the U.S. president ’ s reelection campaign .
The U.S. Department of Defense has provided a range of nonlethal aid and defensive weapons to the tune of $ 1.1 billion over the past four fiscal years , such as body armor , night-vision goggles , sniper rifles , and grenade launchers , as well as selling Javelin anti-tank missiles meant to halt a Russian advance from separatist-controlled territory in the east .
While the impeachment probe into Trump may have entrenched @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kyiv on Capitol Hill and among U.S. policymakers remains strong .
The United States has long been a vocal advocate for reform in Ukraine , but some now fear that its standing may have been diminished by the impeachment investigation .
“ It undermined the leverage that the U.S. has over Ukraine , especially on rule of law and in the justice sectors , ” said Daria Kaleniuk , the head of the Anti-Corruption Action Center .
Zelensky opted to keep a low profile during the impeachment investigation and at every turn sought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war with Russia .
In an op-ed in the New York Times on Wednesday , he said the investigation “ took American and international attention away from the issues that mattered most to Ukraine and turned our country into a story about President Trump.
” On Tuesday it became clear that Ukraine would continue to be a battleground for those looking to take swipes at presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden .
Andriy Derkach , a Ukrainian lawmaker with past links to Russian intelligence services , released recordings of a private phone conversation between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that linked fresh U.S. loans for Ukraine with the firing of the country ’ s prosecutor general .
The recordings don ’ t reveal anything new about Biden ’ s activities in Ukraine , but they have been seized upon by Trump ’ s defenders .
“ Yikes !
!
!
!
This is not a ‘ perfect conversation , ’ ” his son Donald Trump Jr. tweeted on Tuesday .
But the bulk of public criticism of Zelensky has focused on his challenges pushing reforms through Ukraine ’ s corruption-laden bureaucracy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into power .
A number of Ukrainian political observers told Foreign Policy that they saw two distinct periods during Zelensky ’ s first year in office .
“ It was a great start in autumn 2019 , a lot of good laws were adopted ensuring the independence of institutions , ” said Andrii Borovyk , the executive director of Transparency International Ukraine .
In July 2019 , Zelensky ’ s Servant of the People party , named after the television show that made him famous , won a commanding majority in the parliament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no political experience whatsoever—a deliberate effort designed to sweep out the old guard—and had to be sent on remedial courses to teach them the fundamentals of economic policy , ideology , and communication , with some classes taught in spartan settings in western Ukraine .
After the new parliament was sworn in this past August , they passed a number of significant bills in the fall that criminalized illicit enrichment by state officials , stripped lawmakers of their parliamentary immunity , and improved protections for anti-corruption whistleblowers .
By 2020 , this legislative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Kaleniuk of the Anti-Corruption Action Center pointed to the government reshuffle in March as the moment things began to veer off course .
Among the reform-minded ministers and agency heads who were removed from their posts was Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka , who was well respected by anti-corruption activists for his efforts to reform and streamline the country ’ s unwieldy court system .
He was replaced by Irina Venediktova , a member of Zelensky ’ s party who previously served as acting head of the State Bureau of Investigations .
Kaleniuk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ loyal to the authorities.
” While the pace of legislative reforms may have slowed , it has not stopped altogether , with the parliament passing two landmark pieces of legislation that would reform the banking sector and sale of farmland .
The parliament ’ s actions were praised by the International Monetary Fund and could see Ukraine unlock access to $ 5 billion in loans .
The banking bill , which prevents nationalized banks from being returned to their previous owners , took direct aim at the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky , once @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and another former owner of Privatbank have been accused of pushing Ukraine ’ s largest bank to the brink of collapse , siphoning off $ 5.5 billion , and forcing the Ukrainian government to step in with a bailout .
A reform-minded leader who falls from grace is an all-too-familiar story in Ukraine .
Having not yet fully shown his hand as to what type of president he will be , Zelensky will likely be as closely scrutinized in his second year in office as in his first .
But despite the freshman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crossfire of the historic U.S. impeachment proceedings , former administration officials still think Washington should keep faith in the young leader if he keeps up pursuing his anti-corruption agenda .
“ I do think he wants to succeed , I do think he wants to make Ukraine a better place and make Ukraine a normal European country , ” Taylor said .
“ As long as he stays on that course , we should help him .
”

Amy Mackinnon, Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch

When Ukrainians went to the polls in April 2019 to elect Volodymyr Zelensky as president, it was a collective shot in the dark. His previous political experience amounted to playing the role of the president in the popular Ukrainian TV series, Servant of the People. But in a country where politics as usual had failed to address endemic corruption or bring an end to the war in eastern Ukraine, people were hungry for change, and the comedian won by a landslide.
When Ukrainians went to the polls in April 2019 to elect Volodymyr Zelensky as president, it was a collective shot in the dark. His previous political experience amounted to playing the role of the president in the popular Ukrainian TV series, Servant of the People. But in a country where politics as usual had failed to address endemic corruption or bring an end to the war in eastern Ukraine, people were hungry for change, and the comedian won by a landslide.
On Wednesday, Zelensky celebrated the first anniversary of his inauguration: Perhaps one of the strangest presidential debuts anywhere in the world, as the new and untried Ukrainian leader found himself unexpectedly at center stage in the impeachment drama over in Washington, with questions being raised about his relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump.
Ironically, although the impeachment imbroglio by itself did little to affect Zelensky’s ambitious if faltering reform agenda, it may have raised his stature among Ukrainians in the past year. Kyiv’s elites, who have long tried to stay away from U.S. partisan turf wars, have rallied around the political neophyte, and he remains hugely popular based on recent polls.
“Even the enemies of Zelensky looked at him with sympathy, because he turned out to be in the center of the storm,” Mikhail Minakov, a senior advisor at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, told Foreign Policy.
Domestically, Zelensky got off to a promising start, appointing a “dream team” of respected reformers to key positions in government, restarting peace talks with Russia, and passing a flurry of new legislation in the fall. But the dream team was disbanded in a government reshuffle in March, leaving many to wonder which course he could chart as he begins his second year in office.
Zelensky was elected with “great expectations, great ambitions, great intentions,” said former U.S. Ambassador Bill Taylor, who led the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv in an acting capacity until January of this year. Zelensky had promised to stamp out corruption, reform the economy, and bring peace to the Donbass, so it was almost inevitable that his shine would wear off, as he was unable to deliver on these pledges overnight.
“The popularity factor wears off over time, it’s almost inevitable,” said Kurt Volker, a former U.S. special envoy for Ukraine peace negotiations, adding that Zelensky was still Ukraine’s best hope for change since the country gained its independence in 1991.
Even so, 68 percent of Ukrainians approve of the former actor’s first year in office, just a few percentage points below his margin of victory in 2019, when he swept into power with nearly three-quarters of the vote. While his campaign promises were bold, they were light on detail, which may help to explain the public has cut Zelensky some slack. “Zelensky created such a program during this presidential campaign where presidential promises were very vaguely phrased,” Minakov told Foreign Policy. “So you cannot catch him.”
U.S.-Ukraine relations remain somewhat strained in the aftermath of resistance by the Zelensky government to pressure from the Trump administration to investigate the family of former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, Trump’s 2020 presidential election challenger. Former U.S. officials and Ukraine experts told Foreign Policy that while the impeachment controversy did not change longstanding bipartisan support for Ukraine—even as weapons shipments got snagged last year amid Trump’s push for an investigation of Biden and his family—it has prompted some in Kyiv to question the reliability and sincerity of the United States, the biggest backer of Ukraine’s sovereignty. “I have to admit that perception of the U.S. as Ukraine’s reliable ally has deteriorated because of this story,” said Alyona Getmanchuk, the director of the New Europe think tank in Kyiv.
Since Volker stepped down early in the impeachment investigation after getting caught up in efforts by Trump’s allies to pressure Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials to open corruption investigations that could aid Trump’s reelection, the State Department has not appointed another special envoy to Ukraine. That has left Kyiv without a dedicated point person for the peace process as Zelensky seeks to reinvigorate talks with Russia.
“They’re looking for a stronger U.S. voice, and they feel the absence of that,” Volker said.
And if Zelensky’s reform agenda wasn’t ambitious enough for a novice politician who was caught in a pressure vise by a superpower that was also Ukraine’s No. 1 aid donor, he has faced other challenges this year, including the downing of a Ukrainian passenger jet in Iran and a global pandemic. The government ordered a strict lockdown on March 12, when the country had just a handful of confirmed cases of the coronavirus. That decision appears to have spared Ukraine from the mass outbreaks seen in Western Europe and the United States. At the time of publication, Ukraine has reported close to 20,000 known cases, compared to 280,000 in similarly sized Spain.
But there is one issue where Zelensky is likely to face increasing scrutiny from critics and the public: Ending the war in eastern Ukraine, where fighting between the Ukrainian military and Kremlin-backed forces has killed over 13,000 people, is a top priority for voters. Since he was sworn in, Zelensky has overseen three prisoner exchanges with Russia. Among those released were 24 Ukrainian sailors captured by Russia in November 2018 and the film director Oleg Sentsov, who had been held for over five years. The decision didn’t come without a cost for Kyiv, though—in return it released a key witness to the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 and five former members of the Ukrainian Berkut riot police charged with killing unarmed protesters during the 2014 Ukrainian revolution.
Explaining what he described as a “hard decision,” Zelensky said, “I respect parents and relatives of those killed at the Maidan [epicenter of the 2014 uprisings]. Unfortunately, we cannot return those who passed away. … But we could return those alive.”
In the fall, Zelensky reached an agreement with separatist forces to a mutual withdrawal of forces along the front line, a move that was seen as a precondition to restarting peace talks. The Normandy contact group, which included the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, met in December 2019 for the first time in three years.
“Zelensky and his team don’t want to see a frozen conflict,” said Taylor, the former U.S. ambassador. “They don’t want to cede part of their sovereign territory to Russia without doing everything they can to avoid it, and they’ve made some progress.”
Yet Ukraine may be gaining leverage with Russia at the negotiating table even as the country remains in lockdown. Taylor said Russian President Vladimir Putin’s resolve might be crumbling to keep bankrolling the costly Donbass war, now in its seventh year. “I know that there are people around [Putin] in the Kremlin who have been saying, ‘Donbass is a loser, we should get out of Donbass,’” he said.
The pressure on the long-serving Russian president to pull up sticks in Donbass comes as Russia has been beset by the coronavirus pandemic, with the second-highest caseload in the world behind the United States. Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin are among the country’s 325,000 reported cases.
Still, while Zelensky has made efforts to end the stalemate with Russia and its proxies, his push for peace can only go so far. “Zelensky showed clear political will to end the war, Putin unfortunately [did] not,” said Getmanchuk of the New Europe think tank.
Ukraine has relied heavily on support from Western allies in the war against Russia, including U.S. military aid, which Trump’s allies used as leverage as they sought to pressure Ukrainian officials to open investigations into the business activities of Biden’s son, which could have aided the U.S. president’s reelection campaign. The U.S. Department of Defense has provided a range of nonlethal aid and defensive weapons to the tune of $1.1 billion over the past four fiscal years, such as body armor, night-vision goggles, sniper rifles, and grenade launchers, as well as selling Javelin anti-tank missiles meant to halt a Russian advance from separatist-controlled territory in the east.
While the impeachment probe into Trump may have entrenched divides among U.S. lawmakers, support for Kyiv on Capitol Hill and among U.S. policymakers remains strong. The United States has long been a vocal advocate for reform in Ukraine, but some now fear that its standing may have been diminished by the impeachment investigation. “It undermined the leverage that the U.S. has over Ukraine, especially on rule of law and in the justice sectors,” said Daria Kaleniuk, the head of the Anti-Corruption Action Center.
Zelensky opted to keep a low profile during the impeachment investigation and at every turn sought to refocus attention to Ukraine’s war with Russia. In an op-ed in the New York Times on Wednesday, he said the investigation “took American and international attention away from the issues that mattered most to Ukraine and turned our country into a story about President Trump.”
On Tuesday it became clear that Ukraine would continue to be a battleground for those looking to take swipes at presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden. Andriy Derkach, a Ukrainian lawmaker with past links to Russian intelligence services, released recordings of a private phone conversation between Biden and former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that linked fresh U.S. loans for Ukraine with the firing of the country’s prosecutor general. The recordings don’t reveal anything new about Biden’s activities in Ukraine, but they have been seized upon by Trump’s defenders. “Yikes!!!! This is not a ‘perfect conversation,’” his son Donald Trump Jr. tweeted on Tuesday.
But the bulk of public criticism of Zelensky has focused on his challenges pushing reforms through Ukraine’s corruption-laden bureaucracy and bringing a new generation of inexperienced politicians into power. A number of Ukrainian political observers told Foreign Policy that they saw two distinct periods during Zelensky’s first year in office. “It was a great start in autumn 2019, a lot of good laws were adopted ensuring the independence of institutions,” said Andrii Borovyk, the executive director of Transparency International Ukraine. In July 2019, Zelensky’s Servant of the People party, named after the television show that made him famous, won a commanding majority in the parliament. Most of the new lawmakers had no political experience whatsoever—a deliberate effort designed to sweep out the old guard—and had to be sent on remedial courses to teach them the fundamentals of economic policy, ideology, and communication, with some classes taught in spartan settings in western Ukraine.
After the new parliament was sworn in this past August, they passed a number of significant bills in the fall that criminalized illicit enrichment by state officials, stripped lawmakers of their parliamentary immunity, and improved protections for anti-corruption whistleblowers. By 2020, this legislative zeal began to falter, Borovyk said.
Kaleniuk of the Anti-Corruption Action Center pointed to the government reshuffle in March as the moment things began to veer off course.
Among the reform-minded ministers and agency heads who were removed from their posts was Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka, who was well respected by anti-corruption activists for his efforts to reform and streamline the country’s unwieldy court system. He was replaced by Irina Venediktova, a member of Zelensky’s party who previously served as acting head of the State Bureau of Investigations. Kaleniuk described her as “incompetent” and “loyal to the authorities.”
While the pace of legislative reforms may have slowed, it has not stopped altogether, with the parliament passing two landmark pieces of legislation that would reform the banking sector and sale of farmland. The parliament’s actions were praised by the International Monetary Fund and could see Ukraine unlock access to $5 billion in loans.
The banking bill, which prevents nationalized banks from being returned to their previous owners, took direct aim at the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, once a close ally of Zelensky. Kolomoisky and another former owner of Privatbank have been accused of pushing Ukraine’s largest bank to the brink of collapse, siphoning off $5.5 billion, and forcing the Ukrainian government to step in with a bailout.
A reform-minded leader who falls from grace is an all-too-familiar story in Ukraine. Having not yet fully shown his hand as to what type of president he will be, Zelensky will likely be as closely scrutinized in his second year in office as in his first. But despite the freshman hiccups and getting caught in the political crossfire of the historic U.S. impeachment proceedings, former administration officials still think Washington should keep faith in the young leader if he keeps up pursuing his anti-corruption agenda.
“I do think he wants to succeed, I do think he wants to make Ukraine a better place and make Ukraine a normal European country,” Taylor said. “As long as he stays on that course, we should help him.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-22--Coronavirus ‘Fake News’ Arrests Are Quieting Critics

A 14-year-old in Kampot , Cambodia , was detained and forced by police to publicly apologize after expressing fear about the coronavirus in a Facebook message .
A Siem Reap man was arrested after posting social media videos criticizing Cambodia ’ s lackluster coronavirus testing .
Altogether , dozens of Cambodians have been arrested in recent weeks after being accused of spreading fake news about COVID-19 , released only after signing apology documents .
Among those still in jail are four members of the banned opposition party .
Lumping together criticism with misinformation , Prime Minister Hun Sen has branded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as “ terrorists.
” ‘ The Cambodian cases are part of a broader trend of Southeast Asian governments using the pandemic as an excuse to crack down on free speech .
As the coronavirus continues to spread across the region , governments have adopted new measures , including emergency decrees , to slow the rate of infections .
These efforts—while crucial to protect public health—have been accompanied by sweeping free speech restrictions under the pretext of combating the spread of false information and maintaining public order .
Many of these new regulations have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or question hundreds of people for criticizing government handling of the crisis , or merely for sharing coronavirus-related information .
Authorities have also resorted to strict measures against the press to censor and stifle independent media , confirming fears that authoritarian governments are exploiting the pandemic to advance their political interests .
In my home country , Cambodia , 12 supporters or members of my former party , the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party , have been arrested since the outbreak began , under spurious charges including inciting military personnel to disobedience and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was dissolved under politically motivated charges in 2017 , and many of its former members , including myself , are now in exile .
This worrying trend looks set to continue .
Last month , Cambodia ’ s National Assembly passed the state of emergency law , which grants the government broad powers to “ monitor , observe , and gather information from all telecommunication mediums ” and control the “ distribution of information that could scare the public , [ cause ] unrest , or that can negatively impact national security.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights violations and use of any means necessary to retain power , this new law is likely to become yet another tool in his playbook to silence dissent .
Neighboring countries under strongman rule , including Thailand and the Philippines , have employed similar emergency powers to restrict information related to the virus .
Just two days after the emergency law was passed in the Philippines , police filed criminal complaints against a mayor and two journalists for allegedly sharing false information that a patient with the virus had died at a hospital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Governments are increasingly targeting reporters and news providers as part of efforts to curb so-called fake news , or they are using laws that grant authorities vague powers under the guise of national security .
In Malaysia , the South China Morning Post journalist Tashny Sukumaran was questioned by the police for her reporting on the raids and arrests of hundreds of migrant workers and refugees as part of government efforts to tackle the pandemic .
She is being investigated for provoking a breach of peace and misusing network facilities .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Transport blocked more than 200 websites , which they claimed spread fake news , under a provision that allows the government to suspend the use of telecommunication services for the “ benefit of the people.
” Such laws are problematic , as they confer extensive powers to states to determine what is true or false , as well as the type of information that can be published and accessed by the public .
Wider efforts in the region to tackle misinformation about the virus also saw Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha warn that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that is “ untrue , ” and Malaysian authorities have instructed the police and the Communications and Multimedia Commission to take “ stern action ” against online media that supposedly misreport the news .
There is no doubt that misinformation surrounding the coronavirus can be dangerous—leading , for instance , to false treatments or the scapegoating of vulnerable populations .
But governments in Southeast Asia are resorting to disproportionate methods to fight misinformation by censoring both legitimate information and valid criticisms that are vital to the promotion of transparency and accountability .
Journalists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hostile environments , and governments ’ heavy-handed approach will make reporting more difficult and exacerbate the decline of free speech and independent media .
Beyond reporters , anyone who dares to speak on social media about COVID-19 is increasingly at risk of arrest—as the Cambodian cases demonstrate .
In Thailand , a street artist was arrested and charged with causing damage to Bangkok ’ s main airport after posting on Facebook about the absence of coronavirus screenings there .
Meanwhile , an Indonesian man who criticized President Joko Widodo on social media for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with charges relating to defamation and inciting racial hatred .
Reportedly , more than 600 Facebook users in Vietnam have been hauled in by the police for questioning , while hundreds more in Malaysia are being investigated for disseminating supposed fake news .
A Malaysian lawmaker , Fuziah Salleh , has also been charged for allegedly causing “ fear or alarm to the public ” for a video posted on her Facebook page that appeared to show crowded scenes at a border crossing—which the police said was an old video .
While governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they should never resort to criminal prosecution or heavy censorship .
This could stifle open communication and heavily restrict the right to freedom of expression , important to curbing the spread of the coronavirus .
Instead , authorities should adopt less intrusive methods , such as supporting digital literacy and proactively disclosing information relating to COVID-19 .
Now more than ever , citizens must remain vigilant and continue to urge their governments to uphold human rights during this pandemic .
Even where parliaments are in recess , or where there is no longer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can use their influence to call out rights violations and support civil society and the media—which also play crucial roles in the fight against COVID-19 .
While freedom of expression is not absolute and restrictions are warranted during crises , our leaders should be reminded that measures taken must remain necessary and proportionate to containing the virus .
They should also not quash dissent or serve other aims .
Although the spread of misinformation can undermine health efforts , ensuring an enabling environment for freedom of expression—including an independent media—will safeguard the free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tackling the pandemic , and which can effectively address misinformation .
Any curtailment of rights that can be implemented for an indefinite period must be closely monitored to prevent the deepening of human rights violations beyond COVID-19 .

A 14-year-old in Kampot, Cambodia, was detained and forced by police to publicly apologize after expressing fear about the coronavirus in a Facebook message. A Siem Reap man was arrested after posting social media videos criticizing Cambodia’s lackluster coronavirus testing. Altogether, dozens of Cambodians have been arrested in recent weeks after being accused of spreading fake news about COVID-19, released only after signing apology documents. Among those still in jail are four members of the banned opposition party. Lumping together criticism with misinformation, Prime Minister Hun Sen has branded those “who spread fake news” as “ terrorists .”‘
A 14-year-old in Kampot, Cambodia, was detained and forced by police to publicly apologize after expressing fear about the coronavirus in a Facebook message. A Siem Reap man was arrested after posting social media videos criticizing Cambodia’s lackluster coronavirus testing. Altogether, dozens of Cambodians have been arrested in recent weeks after being accused of spreading fake news about COVID-19, released only after signing apology documents. Among those still in jail are four members of the banned opposition party. Lumping together criticism with misinformation, Prime Minister Hun Sen has branded those “who spread fake news” as “terrorists.”‘
The Cambodian cases are part of a broader trend of Southeast Asian governments using the pandemic as an excuse to crack down on free speech. As the coronavirus continues to spread across the region, governments have adopted new measures, including emergency decrees, to slow the rate of infections. These efforts—while crucial to protect public health—have been accompanied by sweeping free speech restrictions under the pretext of combating the spread of false information and maintaining public order.
Many of these new regulations have been used to arrest, detain, or question hundreds of people for criticizing government handling of the crisis, or merely for sharing coronavirus-related information. Authorities have also resorted to strict measures against the press to censor and stifle independent media, confirming fears that authoritarian governments are exploiting the pandemic to advance their political interests.
In my home country, Cambodia, 12 supporters or members of my former party, the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party, have been arrested since the outbreak began, under spurious charges including inciting military personnel to disobedience and provocation to commit offenses. The party was dissolved under politically motivated charges in 2017, and many of its former members, including myself, are now in exile.
This worrying trend looks set to continue. Last month, Cambodia’s National Assembly passed the state of emergency law, which grants the government broad powers to “monitor, observe, and gather information from all telecommunication mediums” and control the “distribution of information that could scare the public, [cause] unrest, or that can negatively impact national security.”
Given Hun Sen’s history of rights violations and use of any means necessary to retain power, this new law is likely to become yet another tool in his playbook to silence dissent.
Neighboring countries under strongman rule, including Thailand and the Philippines, have employed similar emergency powers to restrict information related to the virus. Just two days after the emergency law was passed in the Philippines, police filed criminal complaints against a mayor and two journalists for allegedly sharing false information that a patient with the virus had died at a hospital in Cavite City, close to Manila.
Governments are increasingly targeting reporters and news providers as part of efforts to curb so-called fake news, or they are using laws that grant authorities vague powers under the guise of national security. In Malaysia, the South China Morning Post journalist Tashny Sukumaran was questioned by the police for her reporting on the raids and arrests of hundreds of migrant workers and refugees as part of government efforts to tackle the pandemic. She is being investigated for provoking a breach of peace and misusing network facilities. In Myanmar, the Ministry of Communications and Transport blocked more than 200 websites, which they claimed spread fake news, under a provision that allows the government to suspend the use of telecommunication services for the “benefit of the people.” Such laws are problematic, as they confer extensive powers to states to determine what is true or false, as well as the type of information that can be published and accessed by the public.
Wider efforts in the region to tackle misinformation about the virus also saw Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha warn that the government could suspend or edit news that is “untrue,” and Malaysian authorities have instructed the police and the Communications and Multimedia Commission to take “stern action” against online media that supposedly misreport the news.
There is no doubt that misinformation surrounding the coronavirus can be dangerous—leading, for instance, to false treatments or the scapegoating of vulnerable populations. But governments in Southeast Asia are resorting to disproportionate methods to fight misinformation by censoring both legitimate information and valid criticisms that are vital to the promotion of transparency and accountability.
Journalists in the region are already operating in hostile environments, and governments’ heavy-handed approach will make reporting more difficult and exacerbate the decline of free speech and independent media.
Beyond reporters, anyone who dares to speak on social media about COVID-19 is increasingly at risk of arrest—as the Cambodian cases demonstrate. In Thailand, a street artist was arrested and charged with causing damage to Bangkok’s main airport after posting on Facebook about the absence of coronavirus screenings there. Meanwhile, an Indonesian man who criticized President Joko Widodo on social media for his response to the virus was slapped with charges relating to defamation and inciting racial hatred.
Reportedly, more than 600 Facebook users in Vietnam have been hauled in by the police for questioning, while hundreds more in Malaysia are being investigated for disseminating supposed fake news. A Malaysian lawmaker, Fuziah Salleh, has also been charged for allegedly causing “fear or alarm to the public” for a video posted on her Facebook page that appeared to show crowded scenes at a border crossing—which the police said was an old video. While governments have the responsibility to counter misinformation, they should never resort to criminal prosecution or heavy censorship. This could stifle open communication and heavily restrict the right to freedom of expression, important to curbing the spread of the coronavirus. Instead, authorities should adopt less intrusive methods, such as supporting digital literacy and proactively disclosing information relating to COVID-19.
Now more than ever, citizens must remain vigilant and continue to urge their governments to uphold human rights during this pandemic. Even where parliaments are in recess, or where there is no longer an opposition, lawmakers past and present can use their influence to call out rights violations and support civil society and the media—which also play crucial roles in the fight against COVID-19.
While freedom of expression is not absolute and restrictions are warranted during crises, our leaders should be reminded that measures taken must remain necessary and proportionate to containing the virus. They should also not quash dissent or serve other aims. Although the spread of misinformation can undermine health efforts, ensuring an enabling environment for freedom of expression—including an independent media—will safeguard the free flow of information that is vital in tackling the pandemic, and which can effectively address misinformation.
Any curtailment of rights that can be implemented for an indefinite period must be closely monitored to prevent the deepening of human rights violations beyond COVID-19.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-23--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

The coronavirus pandemic has killed U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s highly publicized trade deal with China .
Meanwhile , protesters in Iraq are demanding immediate change , but the country ’ s new prime minister is planning to move at an incremental pace .
And as Israeli politics settle into a new normal , the new coalition government should make healing the country ’ s deep divisions one of its top priorities .
1 .
Trump ’ s China Trade Deal Is as Dead as Can Be Trump ’ s much-touted trade victory over China has crashed and burned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more dramatically signals that than the almost certain failure of the energy part of the deal , Foreign Policy ’ s Jason Bordoff writes .
Mustafa al-Kadhimi is neither a revolutionary who will overhaul the system nor a strongman who will centralize power .
Instead , he is seeking incremental reform within the existing system , Renad Mansour writes .
3 .
One Year On , Zelensky Survives Impeachment ( Trump ’ s , That Is ) and Blunted Hopes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky celebrates the first anniversary of a roller-coaster presidency no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Amy Mackinnon , Robbie Gramer , and Jack Detsch report .
China ’ s lobbying efforts have proved effective in Hungary and other countries with illiberal governments that are receptive to its message , but it will still have a tougher time in the Czech Republic , Tim Gosling writes .
The new Israeli government is deeply flawed , but it can succeed in reminding Israelis that while they may have different visions for the future , the challenges of the present demand cooperation right now , Yohanan Plesner writes .

The coronavirus pandemic has killed U.S. President Donald Trump’s highly publicized trade deal with China.
The coronavirus pandemic has killed U.S. President Donald Trump’s highly publicized trade deal with China.
Meanwhile, protesters in Iraq are demanding immediate change, but the country’s new prime minister is planning to move at an incremental pace.
And as Israeli politics settle into a new normal, the new coalition government should make healing the country’s deep divisions one of its top priorities.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese Vice Premier Liu He at the signing ceremony for the U.S.-Chinese trade agreement at the White House in Washington, DC, on Jan. 15, 2020.
Trump’s much-touted trade victory over China has crashed and burned with the coronavirus pandemic, and nothing more dramatically signals that than the almost certain failure of the energy part of the deal, Foreign Policy’s Jason Bordoff writes.
Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Mustafa al-Kadhimi makes a speech before the Iraqi Parliament in Baghdad on May 6.
Mustafa al-Kadhimi is neither a revolutionary who will overhaul the system nor a strongman who will centralize power. Instead, he is seeking incremental reform within the existing system, Renad Mansour writes.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky celebrates the first anniversary of a roller-coaster presidency no one saw coming, Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon, Robbie Gramer, and Jack Detsch report.
Czech Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Jan Hamacek (third from left), speaks at the Prague Airport in the Czech Republic on March 20. A China Eastern Airlines plane carrying 1.1 million respirators purchased by the Czech Republic from China is behind him.
China’s lobbying efforts have proved effective in Hungary and other countries with illiberal governments that are receptive to its message, but it will still have a tougher time in the Czech Republic, Tim Gosling writes.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (left) greets Benny Gantz, the leader of Blue and White party, at a memorial ceremony for the late Israeli President Shimon Peres in Jerusalem on Sept. 19, 2019.
The new Israeli government is deeply flawed, but it can succeed in reminding Israelis that while they may have different visions for the future, the challenges of the present demand cooperation right now, Yohanan Plesner writes.