foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--How Will Biden’s Team Handle China?

How Will Biden’s Team Handle China?

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : Why the incoming Biden administration should prioritize China , Beijing threatens to put together a Taiwanese watchlist , and Alibaba performs a public apology for the Chinese government .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s new diplomatic and national security team is a far more professional and experienced group than President Donald Trump ever put together .
But there is one concerning thing about them : Their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the regional policy priorities of the past .
The group has considerable Washington knowhow and a lot of Middle Eastern expertise , but it has limited experience with China .
That presents a problem at a time when China is the biggest and trickiest challenge the United States has faced since the Soviet Union .
Meanwhile , Beijing has hinted at a possible reset through a New York Times op-ed by former Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying .
The piece takes familiar approach : Any problems in the relationship are the result of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the United States needs to be “ respectful ” by not “ meddling ” in Taiwan or in the South China Sea .
Fu also frames people-to-people exchanges as an area that needs rebuilding and holds out the carrot of climate change cooperation .
But China ’ s idea of these people-to-people exchanges is starkly different from America ’ s .
While the United States envisions them as led by individuals , China sees them as a vehicle for a state-organized complement to official diplomacy—with a well-established bureaucratic structure behind it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and they ’ re pushed with an agenda from above .
Biden ’ s team won ’ t fall for the idea that giving China everything it wants by retreating from East Asia will cause it to become a good international citizen—especially given the pressure from Republicans desperate to paint Biden as soft on China .
But the temptation to make China second or third priority will be there as the administration attempts to rebuild Washington ’ s reputation with allies and perhaps salvage the Iran nuclear deal .
Deprioritizing China—or , worse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grand bargain—would be a dangerous mistake .
The course of Chinese ambitions isn ’ t set by Fu ’ s banal op-ed but rather by the approach taken toward Australia for daring to take on China over foreign influence , the coronavirus pandemic , and threats at sea .
China has demanded that Australia cease funding so-called anti-China research , stop protecting Australians ( including Chinese-born citizens ) from Beijing ’ s coercion , and put pressure on its own open society not to talk about Chinese human rights abuses .
Those would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal between China and the United States , too—not just an end to U.S. power in East Asia , but that the United States actively abandon democracy promotion abroad .
Other small- or medium-sized countries have faced similar aggression .
As the Chinese ambassador to Sweden put it : “ For our enemies , we have shotguns.
” China ’ s belief that the United States is the main obstacle to its creation of a new illiberal global order on its terms won ’ t go away , and it should be the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwanese targeted .
China is threatening to put together a watchlist of what it terms Taiwanese separatists .
It doesn ’ t specify the consequences , but they could involve harassment through the Hong Kong national security law , which claims jurisdiction over the speech of everyone globally .
Beijing ’ s ability to enforce the list is limited outside of its own territory , but it could call on countries with extradition treaties to arrest individuals on the list .
As it has done in the past , China could even attempt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its clout in Interpol is waning after it disappeared and purged the former chief of Interpol while he was still in office .
Propaganda push .
Beijing is doubling down on its big lie of 2020 : the claim that the new coronavirus didn ’ t originate in China but was instead imported from the West .
The idea was floated in the spring but is now being pushed by top-level media such as the People ’ s Daily and embraced by Chinese ambassadors and scientists .
The Italian scientists quoted in one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ position say it misrepresents their paper .
But expect to see this as one of the shibboleths Beijing demands other states voice in order to receive Chinese backing—it ’ s very likely to be echoed by Pakistan , for example .
India bans more apps .
The seasons turn , leaves fall , and , in the glorious cycle of nature , the Indian government issues another list of banned Chinese apps .
The idea that Happy Fish or Isoland 2 : Ashes of Time are a dire threat to the sovereignty of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is dubious , but app bans have become a relatively low-cost way for New Delhi to appease nationalists and express continued anger at Beijing over the border killings earlier this year .
Alibaba fallout .
Following the dramatic government slap-down of Ant Finance—the fintech spin-off of Alibaba—after co-founder Jack Ma criticized regulators , Alibaba itself has performed the usual humiliating public obsequy .
Chairman Zhang Yong said Alibaba was “ filled with gratitude ” toward the government , grateful for regulation , and would work harder to “ learn and respond ” to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is normal for Chinese firms after facing action from the party-state .
Western firms have done the same , though normally framed as apologies to China rather than to the government .
Given Alibaba ’ s size and power , this is another reminder that the power of private enterprise to push back against the Chinese government is incredibly limited : Businesses have clout with local government or officials but essentially no ability to resist the central state .
Facial recognition worries .
Private companies are increasingly using ( link in Chinese ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and track potential clients , leading to concerns about abuse .
Many firms have no plans to delete the data and are selling it on to others .
The software companies boast that their product can “ track customers ’ movement , select the path they must take , deploy cameras to take pictures , and choose the most optimal pictures for each person.
” Real estate firms , for example , are using it to produce price discrimination .
Chinese authorities don ’ t want to restrict their own ability to invade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move sharply against private firms to assuage public fears .
Beidou ’ s success .
China ’ s satellite navigation system , Beidou , is still the minority choice worldwide compared to the U.S.-owned Global Positioning System ( GPS ) .
But in most countries it now outperforms GPS in accuracy for ordinary users , capturing cities more frequently than GPS in 85 percent of cases , according to a new report .
There are commercial projects—mostly run by U.S. corporation John Deere—that allow this increased accuracy for GPS users , but only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it comes with the basic package .
Ironically , Beidou is often at its least accurate inside China because of military demands to reduce accuracy near military bases or airspace .
An older Chinese classic film for the Thanksgiving holiday , this 2003 noir depicts a pair of con artists who lure and murder victims at illegal mines , making the killings look like accidents in order to blackmail the mining companies into giving them money to cover up the death .
Followed by Blind Mountain , it is part of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yang .
A brilliantly tense film , Blind Shaft captures the risk of Chinese migrant life and conveys the huge scale of the illegal mining industry , which fuels corruption and environmental damage .
China ’ s coal-mining accident rate reached a catastrophic peak in the 2000s , until it was brought down by a combination of regulatory action and diminished demand for coal .
( All figures probably undercount the deaths , but the trend line is real . )
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback @ @ @ @ @ @ @ find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: Why the incoming Biden administration should prioritize China, Beijing threatens to put together a Taiwanese watchlist , and Alibaba performs a public apology for the Chinese government.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: Why the incoming Biden administration should prioritize China, Beijing threatens to put together a Taiwanese watchlist, and Alibaba performs a public apology for the Chinese government.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
‘For Our Enemies, We Have Shotguns’
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s new diplomatic and national security team is a far more professional and experienced group than President Donald Trump ever put together. But there is one concerning thing about them: Their experience—and to some degree, their interests—reflects the regional policy priorities of the past.
The group has considerable Washington knowhow and a lot of Middle Eastern expertise, but it has limited experience with China. That presents a problem at a time when China is the biggest and trickiest challenge the United States has faced since the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, Beijing has hinted at a possible reset through a New York Times op-ed by former Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying. The piece takes familiar approach: Any problems in the relationship are the result of others simply not understanding what China wants, and the United States needs to be “respectful” by not “meddling” in Taiwan or in the South China Sea. Fu also frames people-to-people exchanges as an area that needs rebuilding and holds out the carrot of climate change cooperation.
But China’s idea of these people-to-people exchanges is starkly different from America’s. While the United States envisions them as led by individuals, China sees them as a vehicle for a state-organized complement to official diplomacy—with a well-established bureaucratic structure behind it. These ties are extremely politicized, and they’re pushed with an agenda from above.
Biden’s team won’t fall for the idea that giving China everything it wants by retreating from East Asia will cause it to become a good international citizen—especially given the pressure from Republicans desperate to paint Biden as soft on China. But the temptation to make China second or third priority will be there as the administration attempts to rebuild Washington’s reputation with allies and perhaps salvage the Iran nuclear deal.
Deprioritizing China—or, worse, trying to strike some kind of grand bargain—would be a dangerous mistake. The course of Chinese ambitions isn’t set by Fu’s banal op-ed but rather by the approach taken toward Australia for daring to take on China over foreign influence, the coronavirus pandemic, and threats at sea. China has demanded that Australia cease funding so-called anti-China research, stop protecting Australians (including Chinese-born citizens) from Beijing’s coercion, and put pressure on its own open society not to talk about Chinese human rights abuses.
Those would be the actual terms of any long-term deal between China and the United States, too—not just an end to U.S. power in East Asia, but that the United States actively abandon democracy promotion abroad. Other small- or medium-sized countries have faced similar aggression. As the Chinese ambassador to Sweden put it: “For our enemies, we have shotguns.”
China’s belief that the United States is the main obstacle to its creation of a new illiberal global order on its terms won’t go away, and it should be the first item on any U.S. agenda.
What We’re Following
Taiwanese targeted. China is threatening to put together a watchlist of what it terms Taiwanese separatists. It doesn’t specify the consequences, but they could involve harassment through the Hong Kong national security law, which claims jurisdiction over the speech of everyone globally. Beijing’s ability to enforce the list is limited outside of its own territory, but it could call on countries with extradition treaties to arrest individuals on the list.
As it has done in the past, China could even attempt to issue Interpol Red Notices against dissidents—though its clout in Interpol is waning after it disappeared and purged the former chief of Interpol while he was still in office.
Propaganda push. Beijing is doubling down on its big lie of 2020: the claim that the new coronavirus didn’t originate in China but was instead imported from the West. The idea was floated in the spring but is now being pushed by top-level media such as the People’s Daily and embraced by Chinese ambassadors and scientists.
The Italian scientists quoted in one of the studies used to justify the position say it misrepresents their paper. But expect to see this as one of the shibboleths Beijing demands other states voice in order to receive Chinese backing—it’s very likely to be echoed by Pakistan, for example.
India bans more apps. The seasons turn, leaves fall, and, in the glorious cycle of nature, the Indian government issues another list of banned Chinese apps. The idea that Happy Fish or Isoland 2: Ashes of Time are a dire threat to the sovereignty of India or the privacy of Indian citizens is dubious, but app bans have become a relatively low-cost way for New Delhi to appease nationalists and express continued anger at Beijing over the border killings earlier this year.
Tech and Business
Alibaba fallout. Following the dramatic government slap-down of Ant Finance—the fintech spin-off of Alibaba—after co-founder Jack Ma criticized regulators, Alibaba itself has performed the usual humiliating public obsequy. Chairman Zhang Yong said Alibaba was “filled with gratitude” toward the government, grateful for regulation, and would work harder to “learn and respond” to government policies.
This kind of performance is normal for Chinese firms after facing action from the party-state. Western firms have done the same, though normally framed as apologies to China rather than to the government. Given Alibaba’s size and power, this is another reminder that the power of private enterprise to push back against the Chinese government is incredibly limited: Businesses have clout with local government or officials but essentially no ability to resist the central state.
Facial recognition worries. Private companies are increasingly using (link in Chinese) facial recognition software in China to identify and track potential clients, leading to concerns about abuse. Many firms have no plans to delete the data and are selling it on to others. The software companies boast that their product can “track customers’ movement, select the path they must take, deploy cameras to take pictures, and choose the most optimal pictures for each person.” Real estate firms, for example, are using it to produce price discrimination.
Chinese authorities don’t want to restrict their own ability to invade citizens’ privacy, but regulators may move sharply against private firms to assuage public fears.
Beidou’s success. China’s satellite navigation system, Beidou, is still the minority choice worldwide compared to the U.S.-owned Global Positioning System (GPS). But in most countries it now outperforms GPS in accuracy for ordinary users, capturing cities more frequently than GPS in 85 percent of cases, according to a new report.
There are commercial projects—mostly run by U.S. corporation John Deere—that allow this increased accuracy for GPS users, but only at an extra cost. With Beidou, it comes with the basic package. Ironically, Beidou is often at its least accurate inside China because of military demands to reduce accuracy near military bases or airspace.
What We’re Watching
Blind Shaft
An older Chinese classic film for the Thanksgiving holiday, this 2003 noir depicts a pair of con artists who lure and murder victims at illegal mines, making the killings look like accidents in order to blackmail the mining companies into giving them money to cover up the death. Followed by Blind Mountain, it is part of a loose and unfinished trilogy by director Li Yang. A brilliantly tense film, Blind Shaft captures the risk of Chinese migrant life and conveys the huge scale of the illegal mining industry, which fuels corruption and environmental damage.
China’s coal-mining accident rate reached a catastrophic peak in the 2000s, until it was brought down by a combination of regulatory action and diminished demand for coal. (All figures probably undercount the deaths, but the trend line is real.)
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--Pentagon Purges Leading Advisors From Defense Policy Board

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Several members of the top federal advisory committee to the U.S. Department of Defense have been suddenly pushed out , multiple U.S. officials told Foreign Policy , in what appears to be the outgoing Trump administration ’ s parting shot at scions of the foreign-policy establishment .
The directive , which the Pentagon ’ s White House liaison Joshua Whitehouse sent on Wednesday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Defense Policy Board , including former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright ; retired Adm. Gary Roughead , who served as chief of naval operations ; and a onetime ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee , Jane Harman .
Rudy De Leon , a former chief operating officer at the Pentagon once considered by then-Defense Secretary James Mattis for a high-level policy role , will also be ousted .
Also booted in today ’ s sweep of the board , which is effective immediately , were former House Majority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a former Treasury Department undersecretary during the George W. Bush administration .
Both had been added to the board by Mattis in 2017 .
Jamie Gorelick , a Clinton administration deputy attorney general ; Robert Joseph , a chief U.S. nuclear negotiator who convinced Libya to give up weapons of mass destruction ; former Bush Deputy National Security Advisor J.D .
Crouch II ; and Franklin Miller , a former top defense official , have also been removed .
This story is based on interviews with three current and former officials .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ request for comment .
The board , overseen by the Pentagon ’ s top policy official , the undersecretary of defense for policy , serves as a kind of in-house think tank on retainer for top military leaders , providing independent counsel and advice on defense policy .
The Defense Policy Board includes former top military brass , secretaries of state , members of Congress , and other senior diplomats and foreign-policy experts .
The status of two other members of the panel—or who would replace the ousted members—was not immediately clear .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ long tried to remake the board with figures seen as loyal to the president—and outside of the Washington establishment—but had received pushback from recently ousted Defense Secretary Mark Esper and acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Anderson , who sought to keep the board in place to allow for policy continuity .
Both Esper and Anderson were removed earlier this month in a purge of Pentagon officials .
The White House had sought to add Scott O ’ Grady , a former Air Force fighter pilot shot down over Bosnia , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nominated for a top Pentagon position , as well as former House Speaker Newt Gingrich , a close ally of President Donald Trump .
The administration had also vetoed adding retired Adm. Eric Olson , a former U.S. Special Operations Command chief , and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice , as well as Gordon England , a former deputy secretary of defense during the Bush administration , over perceived anti-Trump ties .
“ If they get treated like that , then who is going to want to volunteer ?
” a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ condition of anonymity , told Foreign Policy .
While the board has no tangible role inside the Pentagon in the policymaking process , it routinely advises senior military leadership on some of the top strategic national security threats facing the United States .
The board convened in October for classified discussions on formulating a long-term strategy toward China and deterrence in space , according to a notice from the Federal Register .
The meeting included briefings from the CIA , the Pentagon ’ s Office of Net Assessment , and other senior Pentagon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ board has faced scrutiny from some Republican foreign-policy analysts , who say the current members do not accurately reflect the views of the administration , including its hard-line views toward China , as the Washington Times reported in October .
Given the criticism , it is unclear why the White House waited until the final months of Trump ’ s tenure in the Oval Office to make changes to the Defense Policy Board .
Some members of the board , including Roughead , Albright , and Harman , were added to the board @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The move follows a recent decision by Whitehouse , the liaison officer , to begin political-style vetting of nonpolitical experts and employees on loan from think tanks , an effort that had only extended to political appointees in the past .

Several members of the top federal advisory committee to the U.S. Department of Defense have been suddenly pushed out, multiple U.S. officials told Foreign Policy , in what appears to be the outgoing Trump administration’s parting shot at scions of the foreign-policy establishment.
Several members of the top federal advisory committee to the U.S. Department of Defense have been suddenly pushed out, multiple U.S. officials told Foreign Policy, in what appears to be the outgoing Trump administration’s parting shot at scions of the foreign-policy establishment.
The directive, which the Pentagon’s White House liaison Joshua Whitehouse sent on Wednesday afternoon, removes 11 high-profile advisors from the Defense Policy Board, including former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright; retired Adm. Gary Roughead, who served as chief of naval operations; and a onetime ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, Jane Harman. Rudy De Leon, a former chief operating officer at the Pentagon once considered by then-Defense Secretary James Mattis for a high-level policy role, will also be ousted.
Also booted in today’s sweep of the board, which is effective immediately, were former House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and David McCormick, a former Treasury Department undersecretary during the George W. Bush administration. Both had been added to the board by Mattis in 2017. Jamie Gorelick, a Clinton administration deputy attorney general; Robert Joseph, a chief U.S. nuclear negotiator who convinced Libya to give up weapons of mass destruction; former Bush Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. Crouch II; and Franklin Miller, a former top defense official, have also been removed.
This story is based on interviews with three current and former officials. In a statement late Wednesday, the Department of Defense confirmed the decision. “As part of long-considered changes, we can confirm that several members of the Department’s Defense Policy Board have been removed,” a defense official said. “We are extremely grateful for their dedicated service, commitment, and contributions to our national security. Future announcements for new members of the board will be made soon.”
The board, overseen by the Pentagon’s top policy official, the undersecretary of defense for policy, serves as a kind of in-house think tank on retainer for top military leaders, providing independent counsel and advice on defense policy. The Defense Policy Board includes former top military brass, secretaries of state, members of Congress, and other senior diplomats and foreign-policy experts. The status of two other members of the panel—or who would replace the ousted members—was not immediately clear.
Officials said that the Trump administration had long tried to remake the board with figures seen as loyal to the president—and outside of the Washington establishment—but had received pushback from recently ousted Defense Secretary Mark Esper and acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Anderson, who sought to keep the board in place to allow for policy continuity. Both Esper and Anderson were removed earlier this month in a purge of Pentagon officials.
The White House had sought to add Scott O’Grady, a former Air Force fighter pilot shot down over Bosnia, to the board to prepare him to be nominated for a top Pentagon position, as well as former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, a close ally of President Donald Trump. The administration had also vetoed adding retired Adm. Eric Olson, a former U.S. Special Operations Command chief, and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, as well as Gordon England, a former deputy secretary of defense during the Bush administration, over perceived anti-Trump ties.
“If they get treated like that, then who is going to want to volunteer?” a former senior Trump administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Foreign Policy.
While the board has no tangible role inside the Pentagon in the policymaking process, it routinely advises senior military leadership on some of the top strategic national security threats facing the United States. The board convened in October for classified discussions on formulating a long-term strategy toward China and deterrence in space, according to a notice from the Federal Register. The meeting included briefings from the CIA, the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, and other senior Pentagon policy officials.
The composition of the board has faced scrutiny from some Republican foreign-policy analysts, who say the current members do not accurately reflect the views of the administration, including its hard-line views toward China, as the Washington Times reported in October. Given the criticism, it is unclear why the White House waited until the final months of Trump’s tenure in the Oval Office to make changes to the Defense Policy Board.
Some members of the board, including Roughead, Albright, and Harman, were added to the board during the Obama administration in 2011.
The move follows a recent decision by Whitehouse, the liaison officer, to begin political-style vetting of nonpolitical experts and employees on loan from think tanks, an effort that had only extended to political appointees in the past.
Update, Nov. 26, 2020: This article was updated to provide comment from a Department of Defense official.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--Mohammed bin Salman’s Human Rights Mirage

Abdullah could never have taken his girlfriend to a cafe when they started dating .
Attending music concerts featuring American pop stars was also in the realm of the impossible .
But in the “ New Saudi , ” as he puts it , many such freedoms have been bestowed upon the public .
There are more avenues for entertainment , mingling between the sexes has become easier among the relatively liberal , and women are allowed to drive .
These small mercies have been sold as major reforms to both Saudis and the West .
The Saudi government ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabia ’ s youth—two-thirds of Saudi Arabia ’ s population is under the age of 35—and discourage them from challenging the monarchy .
It has the additional goal of luring foreign investment to help diversify the economy .
Last week , Saudi Arabia became the first Arab nation to host the G-20 , the yearly summit of the world ’ s top leaders to discuss shared economic , political , and health challenges .
King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and his son and crown prince , Mohammed bin Salman , had hoped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their relationship with the global elite since the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi , allegedly on the orders of the crown prince .
That had caused huge embarrassment and made it harder , at least for Europeans , to justify “ business as usual ” with the kingdom .
The COVID-19 pandemic , however , denied the opportunity for photo opportunities , and the gathering was instead held online .
Among Saudis in exile , like Abdullah , the coveted summit generated mixed feelings .
They felt proud that their country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most of the 9/11 hijackers hailed , might be becoming more accepted as an influential global power .
But there was also palpable anguish that the G-20 leaders merely paid lip service to the cause of their human and political rights .
Arrests and even executions of critics have sharply risen in the last few years , creating an atmosphere of fear among many Saudis .
Hundreds have been thrown behind bars , including the prince ’ s cousin Mohammed bin Nayef , the man who coordinated with the Western intelligence agencies in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seen as the West ’ s bulwark in the country ’ s establishment .
At least four prominent women activists who fought for women ’ s right to drive , and won , as well as scholars who demanded political reforms have been languishing in prisons for years .
Despite the outrage caused by Khashoggi ’ s killing , 13 writers and activists were imprisoned in April 2019 alone , just six months after his death , according to a report by Human Rights Watch .
Saudis in exile , as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while with one hand the monarchy has been handing out a few social liberties , with the other it crushed political dissent like never before .
Abdullah said in the new Saudi Arabia a tweet could land an activist , a writer , or anyone who seemed mildly critical of the government behind bars .
He fled the country last month and spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of anonymity .
“ They don ’ t like what I say , ” he told me on the phone from Europe , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ living in Riyadh outweighed the desire to speak up.
” Saudi Arabia has always been criticized for its human rights record , but two developments over the last decade have caused a steeper slide into authoritarianism : the Arab Spring and the rise of Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince .
Until the beginning of the Arab Spring , Saudi scholars and activists were tolerated to a certain degree when they discussed institutional reforms , including mention of some form of democracy .
That came to a swift halt as demonstrators took to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tripoli , and Damascus .
Lawyers and bloggers were among the first to be rounded up .
As the Arab Spring progressed , the Muslim Brotherhood , the pan-Arab organization propagating political Islam , gained influence and even won elections in Egypt .
Local leaders of the Sahwa , the Saudi arm of the Muslim Brotherhood , also spoke up to seek political reforms .
This was seen as a threat by the royals , who feared that a similar combination of cosmopolitan liberals and political Islamists might also lead the masses in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Among the leading Saudi scholars to back the uprisings was Salman al-Awdah , who wrote a letter to the government in 2013 and warned of a “ sociopolitical explosion ” if political reforms were not enacted .
He became a victim of a second purge , under Mohammed bin Salman , in 2017 .
Lina al-Hathloul , the sister of one of the country ’ s most prominent women ’ s rights activists , Loujain al-Hathloul , told Foreign Policy that soon after Mohammed bin Salman was anointed crown prince , old red @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unknown .
“ Earlier we knew not to challenge the royal family and religion , but now we don ’ t know what the red lines are , ” she said from Berlin .
Her sister Loujain had been fighting for the right to drive .
Her family remains perplexed that the government saw it as necessary to incarcerate someone for the crime of having advocated a reform it had decided to grant .
Loujain al-Hathloul has been on a hunger strike since Oct. 26 .
Before the G-20 , many activists had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the summit unless Riyadh released political prisoners .
But their calls fell on deaf ears , even though one of the themes of the G-20 was women ’ s empowerment .
Lynn Maalouf , Amnesty International ’ s deputy regional director for the Middle East and North Africa , said instead of buying the Saudi government ’ s “ whitewashed narrative , ” G-20 leaders should have used the summit to stand up for people like Hathloul .
“ For Saudi authorities , the G-20 summit is critical—it is a moment for them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world and show their country is open for business , ” she said .
“ Meanwhile , Saudi Arabia ’ s real reformers are behind bars.
” Michael Page , the deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch , added : “ Instead of signaling its concern for Saudi Arabia ’ s serious abuses , the G-20 is bolstering the Saudi government ’ s well-funded publicity efforts to portray the country as ‘ reforming ’ despite a significant increase in repression.
” Some changes are real , and Saudi society is clearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a mix of modern and traditional lifestyles .
However , the West should not be afraid of using its considerable leverage as a catalyst for the good in this difficult and often brutal process .

Abdullah could never have taken his girlfriend to a cafe when they started dating. Attending music concerts featuring American pop stars was also in the realm of the impossible. But in the “New Saudi,” as he puts it, many such freedoms have been bestowed upon the public. There are more avenues for entertainment, mingling between the sexes has become easier among the relatively liberal, and women are allowed to drive.
Abdullah could never have taken his girlfriend to a cafe when they started dating. Attending music concerts featuring American pop stars was also in the realm of the impossible. But in the “New Saudi,” as he puts it, many such freedoms have been bestowed upon the public. There are more avenues for entertainment, mingling between the sexes has become easier among the relatively liberal, and women are allowed to drive.
These small mercies have been sold as major reforms to both Saudis and the West. The Saudi government’s aim is to win over Saudi Arabia’s youth—two-thirds of Saudi Arabia’s population is under the age of 35—and discourage them from challenging the monarchy. It has the additional goal of luring foreign investment to help diversify the economy.
Last week, Saudi Arabia became the first Arab nation to host the G-20, the yearly summit of the world’s top leaders to discuss shared economic, political, and health challenges. King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and his son and crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, had hoped it would usher in a new chapter in their relationship with the global elite since the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, allegedly on the orders of the crown prince. That had caused huge embarrassment and made it harder, at least for Europeans, to justify “business as usual” with the kingdom. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, denied the opportunity for photo opportunities, and the gathering was instead held online.
Among Saudis in exile, like Abdullah, the coveted summit generated mixed feelings. They felt proud that their country, derided as the nation from where most of the 9/11 hijackers hailed, might be becoming more accepted as an influential global power. But there was also palpable anguish that the G-20 leaders merely paid lip service to the cause of their human and political rights.
Arrests and even executions of critics have sharply risen in the last few years, creating an atmosphere of fear among many Saudis. Hundreds have been thrown behind bars, including the prince’s cousin Mohammed bin Nayef, the man who coordinated with the Western intelligence agencies in the battle against al Qaeda and was seen as the West’s bulwark in the country’s establishment. At least four prominent women activists who fought for women’s right to drive, and won, as well as scholars who demanded political reforms have been languishing in prisons for years. Despite the outrage caused by Khashoggi’s killing, 13 writers and activists were imprisoned in April 2019 alone, just six months after his death, according to a report by Human Rights Watch.
Saudis in exile, as well as humanitarian organizations, told Foreign Policy that while with one hand the monarchy has been handing out a few social liberties, with the other it crushed political dissent like never before.
Abdullah said in the new Saudi Arabia a tweet could land an activist, a writer, or anyone who seemed mildly critical of the government behind bars. He fled the country last month and spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of anonymity. “They don’t like what I say,” he told me on the phone from Europe, “and frankly the risk and stress of living in Riyadh outweighed the desire to speak up.”
Saudi Arabia has always been criticized for its human rights record, but two developments over the last decade have caused a steeper slide into authoritarianism: the Arab Spring and the rise of Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince.
Until the beginning of the Arab Spring, Saudi scholars and activists were tolerated to a certain degree when they discussed institutional reforms, including mention of some form of democracy. That came to a swift halt as demonstrators took to the streets of Cairo, Manama, Tripoli, and Damascus. Lawyers and bloggers were among the first to be rounded up.
As the Arab Spring progressed, the Muslim Brotherhood, the pan-Arab organization propagating political Islam, gained influence and even won elections in Egypt. Local leaders of the Sahwa, the Saudi arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, also spoke up to seek political reforms. This was seen as a threat by the royals, who feared that a similar combination of cosmopolitan liberals and political Islamists might also lead the masses in Saudi Arabia to challenge the monarchy.
Among the leading Saudi scholars to back the uprisings was Salman al-Awdah, who wrote a letter to the government in 2013 and warned of a “sociopolitical explosion” if political reforms were not enacted. He became a victim of a second purge, under Mohammed bin Salman, in 2017.
Lina al-Hathloul, the sister of one of the country’s most prominent women’s rights activists, Loujain al-Hathloul, told Foreign Policy that soon after Mohammed bin Salman was anointed crown prince, old red lines were obliterated while new ones remained unknown. “Earlier we knew not to challenge the royal family and religion, but now we don’t know what the red lines are,” she said from Berlin. Her sister Loujain had been fighting for the right to drive. Her family remains perplexed that the government saw it as necessary to incarcerate someone for the crime of having advocated a reform it had decided to grant.
Loujain al-Hathloul has been on a hunger strike since Oct. 26. Before the G-20, many activists had appealed to the international community to boycott the summit unless Riyadh released political prisoners. But their calls fell on deaf ears, even though one of the themes of the G-20 was women’s empowerment.
Lynn Maalouf, Amnesty International’s deputy regional director for the Middle East and North Africa, said instead of buying the Saudi government’s “whitewashed narrative,” G-20 leaders should have used the summit to stand up for people like Hathloul. “For Saudi authorities, the G-20 summit is critical—it is a moment for them to promote their reform agenda to the world and show their country is open for business,” she said. “Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s real reformers are behind bars.” Michael Page, the deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, added: “Instead of signaling its concern for Saudi Arabia’s serious abuses, the G-20 is bolstering the Saudi government’s well-funded publicity efforts to portray the country as ‘reforming’ despite a significant increase in repression.”
Some changes are real, and Saudi society is clearly struggling to create a new identity, a mix of modern and traditional lifestyles. However, the West should not be afraid of using its considerable leverage as a catalyst for the good in this difficult and often brutal process.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--The Top Five Reasons to Still Feel Thankful About the World

The Top Five Reasons to Still Feel Thankful About the World This is a hard year in which to feel thankful .
As disasters go , 2020 may not rank with 1914 or 1939 , to pick just two famously bad years , but it is still likely to be remembered as one of the more lamentable periods in modern history , and few people will be sorry to see it end .
It is easily the worst year I ’ ve ever lived through , and I count myself as luckier than most .
Yet as Americans prepare to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be grateful for those aspects of life that give me hope .
Being thankful for small mercies , appreciating there were bad things that might have occurred but didn ’ t , and highlighting the positive developments that have helped us get through this annus horribilis is a way of reminding ourselves that the present crisis will not last forever and that it is within our power to make things better .
In that spirit , here are my top five reasons I ’ m still thankful this year .
It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worldwide , almost 1.5 million dead , and societies disrupted in countless ways .
Economies everywhere are in recession , poorer countries have taken a huge hit , and the careers of many people—and especially women—have been set back years .
Schooling has been disrupted in ways that will affect future productivity , and mental health problems will be more severe and cast a long shadow over the future .
Yet all of these depressing features pale in comparison to the harm a great-power war would have inflicted , even if we assume @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used .
We lament the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia or India and China , not to mention the continued bloodlettings in Syria , Sudan , Afghanistan , Yemen , and elsewhere , and we should .
But an all-out war between any of the major powers would wreak even greater destruction and suffering , and its non-occurrence should never be taken for granted .
Any year when major war does not occur is something to be thankful for .
You knew I ’ d mention this , didn ’ t you ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ different outcome , but millions more Americans are thankful that Joe Biden will replace President Donald Trump .
There ’ s more good news here : Preelection fear that violence would disrupt voting proved unfounded , foreign powers did not interfere in any significant way , and the votes were counted accurately and fairly .
Biden won decisively .
Predictably , the only dissonant note in what might otherwise have been seen as an affirmation of America ’ s democratic ideals came from soon-to-be-ex-president Trump ( and his increasingly goofy band of conspiracist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenge the outcome have undermined citizens ’ faith in core American institutions , further tarnished the U.S. image abroad , and , by making a seamless transition impossible , put the well-being of millions of Americans at risk .
But seriously : What did we expect from a misogynistic , venal , litigious , racist , adulterous , tax-evading , draft-dodging , science-denying , and irredeemably dishonest con man ?
There ’ s no shortage of corrupt and dangerous politicians in America ’ s past , but to have expected this grievously flawed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ignoring not just the past four years but his actions throughout his entire adult life .
Fortunately , a clear majority of Americans saw through the con and told him , “ You ’ re fired.
” He has a few weeks to do more damage—and no doubt he ’ ll try—and his antics may continue to pollute U.S. politics for some time to come .
But his ejection from power at the hands of the voters creates the possibility of ending the downward spiral the United States has been riding for some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The orator Edmund Burke famously warned that “ the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.
” We can be thankful this year for the good people in both political parties who acted with integrity in the face of temptation and political pressure .
At our Thanksgiving table , my wife and I will raise a glass to Brad Raffensperger ( the Republican secretary of state of Georgia ) , who affirmed that the election results there were valid .
We ’ ll be thankful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who worked successfully to prevent illegal interference in the U.S. electoral process and got fired for it by that most petty of presidents .
We ’ ll sing the praises of Mike Shirkey , the Republican head of the Michigan Senate , who reacted to Trump ’ s efforts to thwart the people ’ s will by saying , “ That ’ s not going to happen .
We are going to follow the law and follow the process.
” We ’ ll be grateful to the growing but still small handful of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and have acknowledged Biden ’ s victory , and to Democrats like Stacey Abrams , who shrugged off her own past disappointments and got busy overcoming voter suppression .
And we ’ ll continue to wonder what the hell happened to Sen. Lindsey Graham and the other invertebrates who now represent a once-respectable political party .
The universe doesn ’ t care if you know how it works—the laws of physics , chemistry , biology , etc .
will operate whether we understand and accept them or not .
You are free to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ causing climate change , for example , but the atmosphere isn ’ t interested in your opinion , and the Earth will keep getting warmer if atmospheric carbon dioxide keeps rising , no matter how many op-eds and Facebook posts climate denialists write .
Understanding the basic forces that govern the real world is essential to operating in that world , and for that we thank science .
You can also thank science for longer life expectancy , the electricity that lights your room , the ability to travel to distant lands , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ water , and an endless series of other enhancements to human existence .
Without science , I wouldn ’ t be typing this on a laptop , and you wouldn ’ t be reading it online .
And in the modern world , a sophisticated scientific and technological community is a prerequisite for being a great power .
Ironically , in a year when millions of people decided to ignore scientific advice and rely on false nostrums peddled by ignorant and self-interested politicians—sometimes with fatal results—and when the refusal to wear masks , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bars has undermined efforts to control a destructive disease , it is science that is riding to our rescue .
Effective vaccines against the coronavirus are expected to be available soon , heralding a return to normal life sometime next year .
If you are protected by a vaccine and celebrating a more traditional Thanksgiving with family and friends next year , thank a scientist .
My classes went online in mid-March and remained there this fall .
It hasn ’ t been easy , but I ’ m not going to complain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and in less-than-ideal circumstances .
Instead , I want to highlight the resilience , seriousness of purpose , adaptability , and sheer good humor that my students have displayed throughout this ordeal .
They ’ ve been deprived of the informal connections , extracurricular activities , and random social interactions that provide much of the joy of university life , and I know that some of them also faced serious personal challenges even as they sought to continue their education .
Despite it all , they have mastered new material , shown an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Zoom could not erase , done some remarkably impressive work on their own and in teams , and helped support each other ( and me ) .
The pre- and postdoctoral fellows with whom I work have been fully engaged online and are producing innovative research despite unfamiliar and unexpected challenges .
It hasn ’ t been a cakewalk for anyone , but my students made my job easier , and I hope my own efforts to adjust were at least partly successful .
I ’ m grateful to all of you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thanksgiving .
Maybe Trump will have come to his senses by then and bowed to the inevitable .
I wouldn ’ t bet on it , but if he does , that will be one more thing to be thankful for .
Happy Thanksgiving , and for everyone ’ s sake—please celebrate safely .

This is a hard year in which to feel thankful. As disasters go, 2020 may not rank with 1914 or 1939, to pick just two famously bad years, but it is still likely to be remembered as one of the more lamentable periods in modern history, and few people will be sorry to see it end. It is easily the worst year I’ve ever lived through, and I count myself as luckier than most.
This is a hard year in which to feel thankful. As disasters go, 2020 may not rank with 1914 or 1939, to pick just two famously bad years, but it is still likely to be remembered as one of the more lamentable periods in modern history, and few people will be sorry to see it end. It is easily the worst year I’ve ever lived through, and I count myself as luckier than most.
Yet as Americans prepare to celebrate Thanksgiving, I am striving to be grateful for those aspects of life that give me hope. Being thankful for small mercies, appreciating there were bad things that might have occurred but didn’t, and highlighting the positive developments that have helped us get through this annus horribilis is a way of reminding ourselves that the present crisis will not last forever and that it is within our power to make things better.
In that spirit, here are my top five reasons I’m still thankful this year.
No great-power wars.
It’s been awful—more than 60 million people sickened worldwide, almost 1.5 million dead, and societies disrupted in countless ways. Economies everywhere are in recession, poorer countries have taken a huge hit, and the careers of many people—and especially women—have been set back years. Schooling has been disrupted in ways that will affect future productivity, and mental health problems will be more severe and cast a long shadow over the future.
Yet all of these depressing features pale in comparison to the harm a great-power war would have inflicted, even if we assume that weapons of mass destruction were not used. We lament the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia or India and China, not to mention the continued bloodlettings in Syria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere, and we should. But an all-out war between any of the major powers would wreak even greater destruction and suffering, and its non-occurrence should never be taken for granted. Any year when major war does not occur is something to be thankful for.
The U.S. election.
You knew I’d mention this, didn’t you? More than 70 million Americans wanted a different outcome, but millions more Americans are thankful that Joe Biden will replace President Donald Trump. There’s more good news here: Preelection fear that violence would disrupt voting proved unfounded, foreign powers did not interfere in any significant way, and the votes were counted accurately and fairly. Biden won decisively. Predictably, the only dissonant note in what might otherwise have been seen as an affirmation of America’s democratic ideals came from soon-to-be-ex-president Trump (and his increasingly goofy band of conspiracist enablers), whose petulant attempts to challenge the outcome have undermined citizens’ faith in core American institutions, further tarnished the U.S. image abroad, and, by making a seamless transition impossible, put the well-being of millions of Americans at risk.
But seriously: What did we expect from a misogynistic, venal, litigious, racist, adulterous, tax-evading, draft-dodging, science-denying, and irredeemably dishonest con man? There’s no shortage of corrupt and dangerous politicians in America’s past, but to have expected this grievously flawed narcissist to act differently in defeat requires ignoring not just the past four years but his actions throughout his entire adult life. Fortunately, a clear majority of Americans saw through the con and told him, “You’re fired.”
He has a few weeks to do more damage—and no doubt he’ll try—and his antics may continue to pollute U.S. politics for some time to come. But his ejection from power at the hands of the voters creates the possibility of ending the downward spiral the United States has been riding for some time.
Let us give thanks.
People with integrity.
The orator Edmund Burke famously warned that “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” We can be thankful this year for the good people in both political parties who acted with integrity in the face of temptation and political pressure. At our Thanksgiving table, my wife and I will raise a glass to Brad Raffensperger (the Republican secretary of state of Georgia), who affirmed that the election results there were valid. We’ll be thankful for former cybersecurity chief Christopher Krebs, who worked successfully to prevent illegal interference in the U.S. electoral process and got fired for it by that most petty of presidents. We’ll sing the praises of Mike Shirkey, the Republican head of the Michigan Senate, who reacted to Trump’s efforts to thwart the people’s will by saying, “That’s not going to happen. We are going to follow the law and follow the process.” We’ll be grateful to the growing but still small handful of Republican leaders who respect the democratic process and have acknowledged Biden’s victory, and to Democrats like Stacey Abrams, who shrugged off her own past disappointments and got busy overcoming voter suppression. And we’ll continue to wonder what the hell happened to Sen. Lindsey Graham and the other invertebrates who now represent a once-respectable political party.
Science.
The universe doesn’t care if you know how it works—the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. will operate whether we understand and accept them or not. You are free to reject the evidence that human activity is causing climate change, for example, but the atmosphere isn’t interested in your opinion, and the Earth will keep getting warmer if atmospheric carbon dioxide keeps rising, no matter how many op-eds and Facebook posts climate denialists write. Understanding the basic forces that govern the real world is essential to operating in that world, and for that we thank science.
You can also thank science for longer life expectancy, the electricity that lights your room, the ability to travel to distant lands, the availability of safe food and potable water, and an endless series of other enhancements to human existence. Without science, I wouldn’t be typing this on a laptop, and you wouldn’t be reading it online. And in the modern world, a sophisticated scientific and technological community is a prerequisite for being a great power.
Ironically, in a year when millions of people decided to ignore scientific advice and rely on false nostrums peddled by ignorant and self-interested politicians—sometimes with fatal results—and when the refusal to wear masks, physically distance, and stay out of bars has undermined efforts to control a destructive disease, it is science that is riding to our rescue. Effective vaccines against the coronavirus are expected to be available soon, heralding a return to normal life sometime next year. If you are protected by a vaccine and celebrating a more traditional Thanksgiving with family and friends next year, thank a scientist.
My students.
My classes went online in mid-March and remained there this fall. It hasn’t been easy, but I’m not going to complain about learning to teach in new ways and in less-than-ideal circumstances. Instead, I want to highlight the resilience, seriousness of purpose, adaptability, and sheer good humor that my students have displayed throughout this ordeal. They’ve been deprived of the informal connections, extracurricular activities, and random social interactions that provide much of the joy of university life, and I know that some of them also faced serious personal challenges even as they sought to continue their education. Despite it all, they have mastered new material, shown an enthusiasm for ideas and knowledge that life on Zoom could not erase, done some remarkably impressive work on their own and in teams, and helped support each other (and me). The pre- and postdoctoral fellows with whom I work have been fully engaged online and are producing innovative research despite unfamiliar and unexpected challenges. It hasn’t been a cakewalk for anyone, but my students made my job easier, and I hope my own efforts to adjust were at least partly successful. I’m grateful to all of you.
I’ll be back after Thanksgiving. Maybe Trump will have come to his senses by then and bowed to the inevitable. I wouldn’t bet on it, but if he does, that will be one more thing to be thankful for. Happy Thanksgiving, and for everyone’s sake—please celebrate safely.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--Russian Troops in Nagorno-Karabakh ‘Clearly a Win for Moscow’

STEPANAKERT , Nagorno-Karabakh—The Russian soldiers were in no mood to talk .
At the bottom of a winding mountain road , where less than a week earlier Armenian and Azerbaijani forces had been locked in fierce combat , the squad had arrived earlier that morning to set up a new checkpoint on the outskirts of Nagorno-Karabakh ’ s regional capital , Stepanakert .
Any attempt at conversation was met with impassive shrugs ; attempts to take photos , with a sharp rebuke .
In the previous day or two , only brief flashes had emerged of this unprecedented peacekeeping force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ halt six weeks of fighting in this breakaway enclave .
One phone clip had shown the rear of a Russian armored personnel carrier crawling through the Lachin corridor , a mountain pass that connects the disputed territory with Armenia proper .
Another photo captured a tank rolling through rugged terrain , the Russian tricolor fluttering above its gun turret .
In this southern corner of the former Soviet Union—caught between Russia to the north , Turkey to the west , and Iran to the south—Russian boots on the ground deliver a major coup @ @ @ @ @ @ @ upper hand as great powers jostle .
However , for civilians and conscripts in the firing line , the dramatic deployment promises little resolution to this decades-old crisis .
Immense challenges remain in a battleground quieted by an uneasy truce , yet still bereft of a sustainable peace .
Moscow ’ s military intervention follows a six-week war that , for the most part , had favored its regional rival , Ankara , chief patron of Azerbaijan .
Turkish military support had fueled a powerful Azerbaijani assault against ethnic Armenian soldiers who have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1990s .
Earlier this month , as the conflict reached its brutal crescendo in the key town of Shushi , threatening next to overwhelm Stepanakert in the valley below , Russia stepped in with its peace deal .
As part of its nine-point plan , the agreement froze hostilities , returned certain districts to Azerbaijan ’ s control , and , significantly , authorized the deployment of nearly 2,000 Russian soldiers as a peacekeeping force , along with hundreds of military vehicles and pieces of vaguely termed “ special equipment.
” Both sides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Armenia and celebration in Azerbaijan .
“ Nagorno-Karabakh was the only conflict in the former Soviet Union without a Russian military presence , and that was a long-term irritant for Moscow , ” said Richard Giragosian , the director of the Regional Studies Center , an independent think tank in Yerevan , Armenia .
“ The deployment is clearly a win for Moscow.
” Operating in a region regarded by Russia as its “ near abroad , ” Turkey had given unprecedented support to Azerbaijan , directing the Azerbaijani offensive and bolstering it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat to Moscow ’ s sphere of influence .
Despite the moniker of peacekeepers , analysts regard the Russian troops as simply a tool to push back against Turkey ’ s postwar presence , with the added benefits of opening up trade routes and linking the administration of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to the Kremlin .
“ [ President Vladimir ] Putin ’ s Russia doesn ’ t really do humanitarian , ” said Thomas de Waal , a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe , specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get its footprint back in the southern Caucasus .
Russia is reinserting itself into that region , where it ’ s been in retreat.
” The deployment has relegated Ankara to a secondary , largely symbolic role following the Kremlin-enforced cease-fire , though that could change .
Turkey ’ s parliament last week approved a plan to send its own peacekeepers to Azerbaijan , which may yet allow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ’ s government to save face , if not tip the balance back in its favor .
Despite the realpolitik , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to those in the war zone—at least for now .
The conflict cost thousands of lives and displaced around 100,000 more , some of whom can now return home .
The horror of relentless bombardments was brought into sharp relief by Norayr Zakharyan , an Armenian orthopedic surgeon who treated the wounded while volunteering at the hospital in Stepanakert .
“ During the worst of the fighting , I was carrying out 10 or 11 amputations each day , ” Zakharyan recalled .
“ There was so much bombing , and we received @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It was tough , but there were too many people who needed our help .
You just have to be strong .
You can not think about yourself—you can only think of them .
For me , this peace deal is just some game between the big powers.
” Despite the return of their former imperial ruler , some Armenians welcome the appearance of Russian soldiers and even the cease-fire , regardless of its punitive terms against their country .
One afternoon , outside the Red Cross building in Stepanakert , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missing nephew .
“ As far as I ’ m concerned , the war is over and that ’ s no bad thing , ” said Misha Ayvazyan .
He was clad in military fatigues , his face etched with fatigue and worry .
“ It ’ s good that we are alive.
” Another soldier accompanied him .
“ I ’ m all for having the Russians here , ” said Boris Stepanyan .
“ Far better than being at the mercy of the Turks , anyway.
” For the hundreds of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the early 1990s , the truce promises the chance to return home .
Elsewhere , the peacekeeping force has coordinated the exchange of war dead between both sides , Russian combat engineers have been clearing unexploded munitions along the Lachin corridor , and other personnel have escorted buses carrying hundreds of refugees on their emotional return to Stepanakert .
Such scenes hand an initial PR victory to Moscow , in contrast to more ham-fisted interventions to the north in Georgia ’ s breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia .
“ There is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Kremlin from Abkhazia and South Ossetia where the local populations felt betrayed because of unfulfilled promises and expectations of Russian aid and investment , ” said Giragosian of the Regional Studies Center .
“ The Russian foreign and defense ministers have both come to Yerevan—it ’ s a tag-team effort , which shows a hell of a lot more sophistication than the Americans or Europeans.
” The scenes now unfolding in Nagorno-Karabakh correspond to what was known in recent years as the “ Lavrov Plan.
” That meant the entrance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s phased withdrawal from occupied territories .
For Paris and Washington , mere bystanders during the conflict , such unilateral action was always unacceptable .
Yet that ’ s just what Putin did in the war ’ s waning hours .
“ This was a strategic win by accident , ” Giragosian said .
“ This fell into his lap.
” Yet the dividends in public opinion , geopolitical gamesmanship , and even peace are not guaranteed to last .
Russia ’ s deal has been criticized for vague wording , especially around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of new infrastructure .
Azerbaijan retains the right to veto an extension of the mission ’ s five-year mandate , thereby eroding the leverage secured by the Kremlin—as well as laying kindling for a serious spat between Moscow and Baku .
Most importantly , it offers no political settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh , a crucial absence that will only perpetuate tensions .
“ This is a grand truce deal , not a peace deal , ” de Waal said .
“ The Russians could win a lot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this.
” With the hostilities paused , the fight now shifts from the battlefield to diplomatic negotiations .
Russia ’ s short-term goal will be to prevent the resurgence of military and intercommunal violence , not least as Armenian-held Stepanakert and Azerbaijani-held Shusha are so close to each other .
But the real test will lie in peace building .
By swinging this deal , Moscow has saddled itself with that responsibility , though it may call on other parties , from the OSCE to U.N. agencies , Western capitals , and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , peace building is critical to future stability .
The cease-fire at the end of the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1994 never became a sustainable peace—a failure tragically highlighted by the last few weeks of bloodshed and destruction .
“ The longer-term challenge is political , ” said Kenny Gluck , a professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University who previously held high-level roles in peace processes in Darfur , Yemen , and the Central African Republic .
“ The most important thing now is to start putting in place mechanisms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thinking about the creation of longer-term political legitimacy .
That ’ s going to be the difficult task—and it won ’ t be achieved quickly.
” One cloudy November afternoon , on the Armenia-bound northern road through Nagorno-Karabakh , a sizable detachment of Russian peacekeepers was spotted by the side of the road .
One armored personnel carrier was parked off the asphalt where two young soldiers surveyed the scene , one of them in a blue surgical mask .
Nearby , three more hulking combat vehicles were parked in a walled-off yard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insignia of the Mirotvorcheskiye Sily , or peacekeeping forces .
The dozen or so men there were less guarded than their fellow soldiers in Stepanakert , offering enthusiastic handshakes and welcoming grins .
“ We arrived in Yerevan two days ago , then came into Nagorno-Karabakh yesterday , ” said a private who spoke in English and gave his name as Slava .
“ We don ’ t know exactly where we ’ ll be deployed .
We don ’ t know what will be tomorrow.
” Despite the uncertainty , Slava seemed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian presence will help the situation , ” he asserted .
“ It will , of course .
We are going to do everything we can to help , because peace is our most important goal.
” Suddenly , in the ramshackle yard strewn with litter and packed with firepower , Slava grew cagey .
Whether his presence was the first hint of an embryonic Russian protectorate or the vanguard of Russia ’ s latest garrison state , Slava was far from home and realized he shouldn ’ t be talking .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forbids me from speaking with you , ” Slava said .
“ He is getting nervous .
If I keep talking , he will do push-ups on my eyebrows .
I can not say any more .
”

STEPANAKERT, Nagorno-Karabakh—The Russian soldiers were in no mood to talk. At the bottom of a winding mountain road, where less than a week earlier Armenian and Azerbaijani forces had been locked in fierce combat, the squad had arrived earlier that morning to set up a new checkpoint on the outskirts of Nagorno-Karabakh’s regional capital, Stepanakert. Any attempt at conversation was met with impassive shrugs; attempts to take photos, with a sharp rebuke.
STEPANAKERT, Nagorno-Karabakh—The Russian soldiers were in no mood to talk. At the bottom of a winding mountain road, where less than a week earlier Armenian and Azerbaijani forces had been locked in fierce combat, the squad had arrived earlier that morning to set up a new checkpoint on the outskirts of Nagorno-Karabakh’s regional capital, Stepanakert. Any attempt at conversation was met with impassive shrugs; attempts to take photos, with a sharp rebuke.
In the previous day or two, only brief flashes had emerged of this unprecedented peacekeeping force, deployed under a Russian-brokered cease-fire to halt six weeks of fighting in this breakaway enclave. One phone clip had shown the rear of a Russian armored personnel carrier crawling through the Lachin corridor, a mountain pass that connects the disputed territory with Armenia proper. Another photo captured a tank rolling through rugged terrain, the Russian tricolor fluttering above its gun turret.
In this southern corner of the former Soviet Union—caught between Russia to the north, Turkey to the west, and Iran to the south—Russian boots on the ground deliver a major coup for the Kremlin, granting Moscow an upper hand as great powers jostle. However, for civilians and conscripts in the firing line, the dramatic deployment promises little resolution to this decades-old crisis. Immense challenges remain in a battleground quieted by an uneasy truce, yet still bereft of a sustainable peace.
Moscow’s military intervention follows a six-week war that, for the most part, had favored its regional rival, Ankara, chief patron of Azerbaijan. Turkish military support had fueled a powerful Azerbaijani assault against ethnic Armenian soldiers who have held Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas since the 1990s. Earlier this month, as the conflict reached its brutal crescendo in the key town of Shushi, threatening next to overwhelm Stepanakert in the valley below, Russia stepped in with its peace deal.
Ethnic Armenian soldiers man a tank by the highway connecting Stepanakert and Shushi in Nagorno-Karabakh on Nov. 13.
Ethnic Armenian soldiers block the main northern highway in Nagorno-Karabakh on November 14, 2020, forcing traffic to take a smaller, rougher road through Kalbajar.
An armored vehicle on the highway connecting Stepanakert and Shushi on Nov. 13.
As part of its nine-point plan, the agreement froze hostilities, returned certain districts to Azerbaijan’s control, and, significantly, authorized the deployment of nearly 2,000 Russian soldiers as a peacekeeping force, along with hundreds of military vehicles and pieces of vaguely termed “special equipment.” Both sides signed the pact, prompting fury in Armenia and celebration in Azerbaijan.
“Nagorno-Karabakh was the only conflict in the former Soviet Union without a Russian military presence, and that was a long-term irritant for Moscow,” said Richard Giragosian, the director of the Regional Studies Center, an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia. “The deployment is clearly a win for Moscow.”
Operating in a region regarded by Russia as its “near abroad,” Turkey had given unprecedented support to Azerbaijan, directing the Azerbaijani offensive and bolstering it with combat drones and Syrian mercenaries—a clear threat to Moscow’s sphere of influence. Despite the moniker of peacekeepers, analysts regard the Russian troops as simply a tool to push back against Turkey’s postwar presence, with the added benefits of opening up trade routes and linking the administration of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to the Kremlin.
“[President Vladimir] Putin’s Russia doesn’t really do humanitarian,” said Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region. “Its agenda is to get its footprint back in the southern Caucasus. Russia is reinserting itself into that region, where it’s been in retreat.”
The deployment has relegated Ankara to a secondary, largely symbolic role following the Kremlin-enforced cease-fire, though that could change. Turkey’s parliament last week approved a plan to send its own peacekeepers to Azerbaijan, which may yet allow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to save face, if not tip the balance back in its favor.
Despite the realpolitik, the halt in fighting does bring relief to those in the war zone—at least for now. The conflict cost thousands of lives and displaced around 100,000 more, some of whom can now return home. The horror of relentless bombardments was brought into sharp relief by Norayr Zakharyan, an Armenian orthopedic surgeon who treated the wounded while volunteering at the hospital in Stepanakert.
Vehicles crowd the road in Kalbachar on Nov. 14 as thousands of civilians flee the contested area before it cedes to Azerbaijan's control.
An ethnic Armenian soldier back from the frontlines around Shushi returns to his house to pack up and escape Kalbajar on Nov. 12.
“During the worst of the fighting, I was carrying out 10 or 11 amputations each day,” Zakharyan recalled. “There was so much bombing, and we received so many people with injuries from artillery. It was tough, but there were too many people who needed our help. You just have to be strong. You cannot think about yourself—you can only think of them. For me, this peace deal is just some game between the big powers.”
Despite the return of their former imperial ruler, some Armenians welcome the appearance of Russian soldiers and even the cease-fire, regardless of its punitive terms against their country.
One afternoon, outside the Red Cross building in Stepanakert, a soldier showed up seeking information about his missing nephew. “As far as I’m concerned, the war is over and that’s no bad thing,” said Misha Ayvazyan. He was clad in military fatigues, his face etched with fatigue and worry. “It’s good that we are alive.”
Another soldier accompanied him. “I’m all for having the Russians here,” said Boris Stepanyan. “Far better than being at the mercy of the Turks, anyway.”
Bodies of soldiers killed fighting on behalf of Azerbaijan remain on the side of the highway connecting Stepanakert and Shushi on Nov. 13.
A Russian peacekeeper speaks with ethnic Armenian soldiers before the Azeri and Armenian sides exchange the bodies of fallen soldiers near Shushi on Nov. 13—a process coordinated by the Russian peacekeeping force, overseen by the International Committee of the Red Cross and stipulated by a term of the peace deal.
For the hundreds of thousands of Azeris displaced by war in the early 1990s, the truce promises the chance to return home. Elsewhere, the peacekeeping force has coordinated the exchange of war dead between both sides, Russian combat engineers have been clearing unexploded munitions along the Lachin corridor, and other personnel have escorted buses carrying hundreds of refugees on their emotional return to Stepanakert. Such scenes hand an initial PR victory to Moscow, in contrast to more ham-fisted interventions to the north in Georgia’s breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
“There is a degree of ‘lessons learned’ in the Kremlin from Abkhazia and South Ossetia where the local populations felt betrayed because of unfulfilled promises and expectations of Russian aid and investment,” said Giragosian of the Regional Studies Center. “The Russian foreign and defense ministers have both come to Yerevan—it’s a tag-team effort, which shows a hell of a lot more sophistication than the Americans or Europeans.”
The scenes now unfolding in Nagorno-Karabakh correspond to what was known in recent years as the “Lavrov Plan.” That meant the entrance of Russian peacekeepers in tandem with Armenia’s phased withdrawal from occupied territories. For Paris and Washington, mere bystanders during the conflict, such unilateral action was always unacceptable. Yet that’s just what Putin did in the war’s waning hours.
“This was a strategic win by accident,” Giragosian said. “This fell into his lap.”
Yet the dividends in public opinion, geopolitical gamesmanship, and even peace are not guaranteed to last.
Russia’s deal has been criticized for vague wording, especially around the resettlement of refugees and the construction of new infrastructure. Azerbaijan retains the right to veto an extension of the mission’s five-year mandate, thereby eroding the leverage secured by the Kremlin—as well as laying kindling for a serious spat between Moscow and Baku. Most importantly, it offers no political settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, a crucial absence that will only perpetuate tensions.
“This is a grand truce deal, not a peace deal,” de Waal said. “The Russians could win a lot, but they could also lose from this.”
With the hostilities paused, the fight now shifts from the battlefield to diplomatic negotiations. Russia’s short-term goal will be to prevent the resurgence of military and intercommunal violence, not least as Armenian-held Stepanakert and Azerbaijani-held Shusha are so close to each other. But the real test will lie in peace building. By swinging this deal, Moscow has saddled itself with that responsibility, though it may call on other parties, from the OSCE to U.N. agencies, Western capitals, and other international organizations.
Whatever option it chooses, peace building is critical to future stability. The cease-fire at the end of the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1994 never became a sustainable peace—a failure tragically highlighted by the last few weeks of bloodshed and destruction.
“The longer-term challenge is political,” said Kenny Gluck, a professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University who previously held high-level roles in peace processes in Darfur, Yemen, and the Central African Republic. “The most important thing now is to start putting in place mechanisms that move beyond the cease-fire and start thinking about the creation of longer-term political legitimacy. That’s going to be the difficult task—and it won’t be achieved quickly.”
One cloudy November afternoon, on the Armenia-bound northern road through Nagorno-Karabakh, a sizable detachment of Russian peacekeepers was spotted by the side of the road. One armored personnel carrier was parked off the asphalt where two young soldiers surveyed the scene, one of them in a blue surgical mask. Nearby, three more hulking combat vehicles were parked in a walled-off yard, flying Russian flags and bearing the insignia of the Mirotvorcheskiye Sily, or peacekeeping forces.
The dozen or so men there were less guarded than their fellow soldiers in Stepanakert, offering enthusiastic handshakes and welcoming grins.
“We arrived in Yerevan two days ago, then came into Nagorno-Karabakh yesterday,” said a private who spoke in English and gave his name as Slava. “We don’t know exactly where we’ll be deployed. We don’t know what will be tomorrow.”
Despite the uncertainty, Slava seemed sure of one thing. “The Russian presence will help the situation,” he asserted. “It will, of course. We are going to do everything we can to help, because peace is our most important goal.”
Suddenly, in the ramshackle yard strewn with litter and packed with firepower, Slava grew cagey. Whether his presence was the first hint of an embryonic Russian protectorate or the vanguard of Russia’s latest garrison state, Slava was far from home and realized he shouldn’t be talking.
“I am sorry, but my commander forbids me from speaking with you,” Slava said. “He is getting nervous. If I keep talking, he will do push-ups on my eyebrows. I cannot say any more.”