foreignpolicy--2020-02-18--How Russia Is Prodding Scotland Toward Independence

How Russia Is Prodding Scotland Toward Independence A little over two years ago , Alex Salmond , the former first minister of Scotland , announced he was being hired to host a show on RT , the Kremlin-funded network once known as Russia Today .
The response from his colleagues in the pro-independence Scottish National Party ( SNP ) was unmistakable : “ What the fuck is he thinking ?
” Alyn Smith , then a member of the European Parliament and now foreign affairs spokesman for the SNP , told the Herald newspaper .
The F-word , Smith added @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not just cursing ; it was cursing for the record .
Smith ’ s barb aimed to puncture any potential opposition narrative that the SNP somehow approved of Salmond ’ s actions or , worse , of Vladimir Putin ’ s government .
But it also set the tone for what has become a small but intriguing front in Europe ’ s information wars : mainstream Scottish nationalists versus the Kremlin and its propaganda machine , which has taken a keen interest in the future prospects for Scottish independence from the United Kingdom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SNP and independence movements elsewhere , including Catalonia in Spain , as it seeks to equate them with the breakaway statelets of eastern Ukraine .
In Moscow , a Kremlin-friendly group convened what were dubbed separatist summits—including inviting representatives of the statelets in Donetsk and Luhansk .
( No Scot attended . )
And Putinist politicians sought to compare the 2014 referendum designed to legitimize Russia ’ s military annexation of Crimea to Scotland ’ s vote of the same year , when 55 percent of Scottish voters came out in favor of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signing of Salmond came after its sister outlet Sputnik opened its U.K. headquarters in Edinburgh , not London .
Some staffers and many contributors at both outlets have been vocal supporters of Scottish independence—but not the SNP .
Quite the opposite .
One Sputnik editor recently called Nicola Sturgeon , Salmond ’ s successor as SNP leader and first minister , a “ traitor knave.
” The insult comes from Scotland ’ s national bard , Robert Burns .
It refers to those too cowardly to defend their country from medieval English invasion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this skirmish says about any long-term Russian objectives for this strategic corner of the North Atlantic .
But they are increasingly certain about what it signals about where members of the SNP see an independent Scotland go—and that is nowhere near Putin ’ s Russia .
The SNP , after all , has a story to tell of an independent state that is internationalist , committed to both Atlantic defense and the European project .
As the U.K. leaves the European Union , the SNP pitch is getting easier to make , easier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a Brexit retreat to “ Little England ” isolationism .
Domestically , their message has helped nudge support for independence to 50 percent—and just beyond , at least according to the most recent opinion polls .
But for some opponents of independence , Kremlin media interest in Scotland conjures up another view of the SNP : that it fractures a key Western ally , the U.K. ; that it weakens the Western alliance ; and that the party wants the kind of thing Putin would like .
Most agree that The Alex @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diet of domestic and international magazine features , is a weekly dose of bad publicity for the SNP .
RT is still running the program , even as its eponymous host prepares to face in court a series of sexual assault charges he denies .
It is , however , also a spur for the party to define itself against the Kremlin , against what it regards as toxic propaganda , while making clear its beef is with Russia ’ s government , not its people .
“ Would I go so far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a blessing in disguise ?
” said Stewart McDonald , an SNP member of the U.K. Parliament .
“ No.
” But McDonald , who speaks for his party on defense , conceded that attempts from Russian state media to woo Scottish independence supporters has focused minds .
“ At first I was nervous that the RT show would hurt us , ” he said .
“ But I now think its effect can be overstated.
” RT ’ s Salmond coup sparked a damage limitation exercise by the SNP .
McDonald , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukrainian ambassador to London as soon as Salmond ’ s RT move was announced .
Scotland ’ s quasi-diplomats , ministers in Edinburgh , and SNP politicians in London and Brussels were quickly mobilized to set out their message on defense and foreign affairs .
“ Much of it chimes with what every other European and NATO nation thinks , ” McDonald said .
“ Not on everything , but certainly when it comes to Russia , which we know would be no friend of the Scottish independence movement .
We want an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and NATO and all the other bodies you would expect a country like Scotland to be in.
” “ And those are bodies Russia does not like .
We would be another , albeit small , independent country championing human rights , rules , laws , and aligning with other small states who agree with us , some of which have fallen victim to Russia.
” And RT ?
“ We have also tried to make it as toxic as possible , ” he added .
“ Bar a handful , nobody in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ What kind of ally could you sell yourself as if you elect to make your case for independence on a platform which has been used to stifle independence elsewhere ?
” There are two reasons why the SNP would be hostile to Putinism .
The first is an instinctive solidarity with small nations or nationalities bullied by bigger ones .
The second is more practical .
Support for independence is rising as European voices , once hostile to the SNP project , make welcoming noises .
This month , former EU Council President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ felt “ very Scottish , ” suggesting a trouble-free reentry into the bloc if Scotland becomes independent .
This contrasts with remarks made before the 2014 plebiscite by the then-president of the European Commission , José Manuel Barroso , who said it would be “ extremely difficult , if not impossible ” for Scotland to get back in the EU .
The SNP needs to promote this new mood on the continent , and looking cozy with Putin is a surefire way to spoil the vibe .
However , the party ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ After McDonald criticized Russian actions in eastern Ukraine , Sputnik mocked the SNP politician , quoting the Moscow-based editor of RT as suggesting McDonald was “ haunted ” by the ghost of the Loch Ness Monster .
The SNP has also accused Kremlin internet trolls of attacking Sturgeon after she supported her U.K. counterparts over the attempted murder of double agent Sergei Skripal in 2018 .
Is there a grand Kremlin campaign against Scotland or the SNP , with social media actions backing talking points on news outlets ?
Joanna Szostek , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Glasgow , is not so sure .
“ Their media in the U.K. has had a Scottish flavor , ” she said .
“ But I have not seen convincing evidence that there is Russian state-sponsored social media activity happening in Scotland on a big scale.
” For Szostek , Kremlin messaging for or about Scotland—and elsewhere—tends to amount to whataboutism , to tit-for-tat retaliations for criticism of Putin .
“ It would be a mistake to think Russia is strategically clever in what it does in international media , ” she said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ joined up , and they don ’ t always get what they want from it.
” True , Russia can be highly hostile to so-called separatists abroad amid concerns of a domino effect of independence movements across the European continent .
But the prospect of Scotland breaking off from Britain also offers plenty of “ what about ?
” opportunities , usually about Ukraine .
Ukrainian and Western protests over the Crimean plebiscite were followed by news stories—in an agency that was later folded into Sputnik—suggesting irregularities in the Scottish referendum .
These @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There are those who wonder if , in the end , Putin ’ s meddling will be healthy for Scotland .
David Clark , an international affairs analyst who was an advisor to former U.K. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook , thinks Putin has galvanized thinking in the SNP—which shifted to formally supporting NATO membership in 2012—on what kind of independent country Scotland should be .
“ Putin , by bullying the countries around him , has brought home to the Scottish nationalists exactly what the interests of a small independent state would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ access to markets on rules-based terms , ” Clark said .
Even in 2014 , Clark suggested , Putin might have seen Scottish independence as an opportunity , a chance to chip away at NATO and the EU .
Brexit changes that calculation .
Scottish independence , he said , no longer weakens the West ; it strengthens it .
“ Now it is not clear Scottish independence would be good for them at all , ” Clark said .
“ The SNP regards Putin and Russian imperialism as a threat.
” He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.K. to contribute to European integration and to become a member state of NATO .
It is quite clear to me—given the statements they have made—that the Russians regard the current SNP leadership as a threat.
” So is the Kremlin amplifying internal critics of the SNP to stave off that threat ?
“ I don ’ t know , ” McDonald said .
“ I think Russia ’ s level of sophistication can be overstated.
” His main takeaway : Scotland ’ s debate—with what he calls a “ bin fire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actors , whoever they may be .
“ We have what is needed for a disinformation battlefield , which is any kind of hot issue that can polarize opinions , ” McDonald said .
“ Well , let ’ s be honest , we have that in bucketloads .
“ The more interesting question is who is the battle between ?
Is Russia an actor in that ?
Yes .
Do I think it is at the fringes ?
Kind of , yes .
”

A little over two years ago, Alex Salmond, the former first minister of Scotland, announced he was being hired to host a show on RT, the Kremlin-funded network once known as Russia Today.
A little over two years ago, Alex Salmond, the former first minister of Scotland, announced he was being hired to host a show on RT, the Kremlin-funded network once known as Russia Today.
The response from his colleagues in the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP) was unmistakable: “What the fuck is he thinking?” Alyn Smith, then a member of the European Parliament and now foreign affairs spokesman for the SNP, told the Herald newspaper. The F-word, Smith added, was for quoting. This was not just cursing; it was cursing for the record.
Smith’s barb aimed to puncture any potential opposition narrative that the SNP somehow approved of Salmond’s actions or, worse, of Vladimir Putin’s government.
But it also set the tone for what has become a small but intriguing front in Europe’s information wars: mainstream Scottish nationalists versus the Kremlin and its propaganda machine, which has taken a keen interest in the future prospects for Scottish independence from the United Kingdom.
Russia has made overtures to the SNP and independence movements elsewhere, including Catalonia in Spain, as it seeks to equate them with the breakaway statelets of eastern Ukraine. In Moscow, a Kremlin-friendly group convened what were dubbed separatist summits—including inviting representatives of the statelets in Donetsk and Luhansk. (No Scot attended.) And Putinist politicians sought to compare the 2014 referendum designed to legitimize Russia’s military annexation of Crimea to Scotland’s vote of the same year, when 55 percent of Scottish voters came out in favor of remaining in the U.K.
RT’s signing of Salmond came after its sister outlet Sputnik opened its U.K. headquarters in Edinburgh, not London. Some staffers and many contributors at both outlets have been vocal supporters of Scottish independence—but not the SNP. Quite the opposite. One Sputnik editor recently called Nicola Sturgeon, Salmond’s successor as SNP leader and first minister, a “traitor knave.” The insult comes from Scotland’s national bard, Robert Burns. It refers to those too cowardly to defend their country from medieval English invasion.
Scottish analysts are not sure what this skirmish says about any long-term Russian objectives for this strategic corner of the North Atlantic. But they are increasingly certain about what it signals about where members of the SNP see an independent Scotland go—and that is nowhere near Putin’s Russia. The SNP, after all, has a story to tell of an independent state that is internationalist, committed to both Atlantic defense and the European project.
As the U.K. leaves the European Union, the SNP pitch is getting easier to make, easier to contrast with what Scottish nationalists portray as a Brexit retreat to “Little England” isolationism. Domestically, their message has helped nudge support for independence to 50 percent—and just beyond, at least according to the most recent opinion polls.
But for some opponents of independence, Kremlin media interest in Scotland conjures up another view of the SNP: that it fractures a key Western ally, the U.K.; that it weakens the Western alliance; and that the party wants the kind of thing Putin would like.
Most agree that The Alex Salmond Show, despite its usually innocuous diet of domestic and international magazine features, is a weekly dose of bad publicity for the SNP. RT is still running the program, even as its eponymous host prepares to face in court a series of sexual assault charges he denies.
It is, however, also a spur for the party to define itself against the Kremlin, against what it regards as toxic propaganda, while making clear its beef is with Russia’s government, not its people. “Would I go so far to say The Alex Salmond Show was a blessing in disguise?” said Stewart McDonald, an SNP member of the U.K. Parliament. “No.”
But McDonald, who speaks for his party on defense, conceded that attempts from Russian state media to woo Scottish independence supporters has focused minds. “At first I was nervous that the RT show would hurt us,” he said. “But I now think its effect can be overstated.”
RT’s Salmond coup sparked a damage limitation exercise by the SNP. McDonald, for example, was photographed with the Ukrainian ambassador to London as soon as Salmond’s RT move was announced. Scotland’s quasi-diplomats, ministers in Edinburgh, and SNP politicians in London and Brussels were quickly mobilized to set out their message on defense and foreign affairs.
“Much of it chimes with what every other European and NATO nation thinks,” McDonald said. “Not on everything, but certainly when it comes to Russia, which we know would be no friend of the Scottish independence movement. We want an independent Scotland to be in the EU and NATO and all the other bodies you would expect a country like Scotland to be in.”
“And those are bodies Russia does not like. We would be another, albeit small, independent country championing human rights, rules, laws, and aligning with other small states who agree with us, some of which have fallen victim to Russia.” And RT? “We have also tried to make it as toxic as possible,” he added. “Bar a handful, nobody in the SNP goes near it.
“What kind of ally could you sell yourself as if you elect to make your case for independence on a platform which has been used to stifle independence elsewhere?”
There are two reasons why the SNP would be hostile to Putinism. The first is an instinctive solidarity with small nations or nationalities bullied by bigger ones. The second is more practical. Support for independence is rising as European voices, once hostile to the SNP project, make welcoming noises.
This month, former EU Council President Donald Tusk told the BBC that he felt “very Scottish,” suggesting a trouble-free reentry into the bloc if Scotland becomes independent. This contrasts with remarks made before the 2014 plebiscite by the then-president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, who said it would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible” for Scotland to get back in the EU.
The SNP needs to promote this new mood on the continent, and looking cozy with Putin is a surefire way to spoil the vibe. However, the party’s anti-Putin stance has also provoked pushback. After McDonald criticized Russian actions in eastern Ukraine, Sputnik mocked the SNP politician, quoting the Moscow-based editor of RT as suggesting McDonald was “haunted” by the ghost of the Loch Ness Monster. The SNP has also accused Kremlin internet trolls of attacking Sturgeon after she supported her U.K. counterparts over the attempted murder of double agent Sergei Skripal in 2018.
Is there a grand Kremlin campaign against Scotland or the SNP, with social media actions backing talking points on news outlets? Joanna Szostek, who teaches political communication at the University of Glasgow, is not so sure. “Their media in the U.K. has had a Scottish flavor,” she said. “But I have not seen convincing evidence that there is Russian state-sponsored social media activity happening in Scotland on a big scale.”
For Szostek, Kremlin messaging for or about Scotland—and elsewhere—tends to amount to whataboutism, to tit-for-tat retaliations for criticism of Putin. “It would be a mistake to think Russia is strategically clever in what it does in international media,” she said. “It’s not all joined up, and they don’t always get what they want from it.”
True, Russia can be highly hostile to so-called separatists abroad amid concerns of a domino effect of independence movements across the European continent. But the prospect of Scotland breaking off from Britain also offers plenty of “what about?” opportunities, usually about Ukraine. Ukrainian and Western protests over the Crimean plebiscite were followed by news stories—in an agency that was later folded into Sputnik—suggesting irregularities in the Scottish referendum. These claims took off on social media.
There are those who wonder if, in the end, Putin’s meddling will be healthy for Scotland. David Clark, an international affairs analyst who was an advisor to former U.K. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, thinks Putin has galvanized thinking in the SNP—which shifted to formally supporting NATO membership in 2012—on what kind of independent country Scotland should be.
“Putin, by bullying the countries around him, has brought home to the Scottish nationalists exactly what the interests of a small independent state would be: collective defense, international law, access to markets on rules-based terms,” Clark said.
Even in 2014, Clark suggested, Putin might have seen Scottish independence as an opportunity, a chance to chip away at NATO and the EU. Brexit changes that calculation. Scottish independence, he said, no longer weakens the West; it strengthens it. “Now it is not clear Scottish independence would be good for them at all,” Clark said. “The SNP regards Putin and Russian imperialism as a threat.”
He added: “Scotland would be leaving the U.K. to contribute to European integration and to become a member state of NATO. It is quite clear to me—given the statements they have made—that the Russians regard the current SNP leadership as a threat.”
So is the Kremlin amplifying internal critics of the SNP to stave off that threat? “I don’t know,” McDonald said. “I think Russia’s level of sophistication can be overstated.”
His main takeaway: Scotland’s debate—with what he calls a “bin fire” on social media—is vulnerable to malign actors, whoever they may be.
“We have what is needed for a disinformation battlefield, which is any kind of hot issue that can polarize opinions,” McDonald said. “Well, let’s be honest, we have that in bucketloads.
“The more interesting question is who is the battle between? Is Russia an actor in that? Yes. Do I think it is at the fringes? Kind of, yes.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-18--If Iowa Were in Africa, International Observers Would Be Crying Foul

If Iowa Were in Africa , International Observers Would Be Crying Foul It ’ s not a good sign when an election trends on Twitter with the hashtag # disaster .
But that ’ s what happened with the Iowa caucuses this month .
Pretty much every stage of the process , from voting to counting to the announcement of the results , did not meet the basic democratic standards that professional election observers expect to see around the world .
There is no evidence to suggest foul play , but there is quite a lot of evidence of sheer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bernie Sanders have claimed victory , neither has gone to court to make his case .
The same is true of the other candidates who left Iowa disappointed , such as Elizabeth Warren and Joe Biden , whose reputations and presidential ambitions were dented by their poor showing .
Instead , the state ’ s Democratic Party has started conducting a limited recanvassing exercise after being asked to “ reexamine its tallies ” by the Buttigieg and Sanders campaigns .
Definitive details have yet to be provided about what this process will entail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Although the United States likes to think of itself as the world ’ s greatest democracy , its electoral system suffers from problems that have not been adequately addressed despite being apparent for generations .
Moreover , the process will only take place if Buttigieg and Sanders are willing to foot the bill .
Both have moved on , preparing to fight the looming battles of Nevada , South Carolina , and the many states that vote on March 3 , known as Super Tuesday .
The failings in Iowa—and the lack of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reflect a deeper democratic malaise within U.S. politics .
Although the United States likes to think of itself as the world ’ s greatest democracy , its electoral system suffers from problems that have not been adequately addressed despite being apparent for generations .
In addition to the gerrymandering of electoral districts and the gross inequalities created by the lack of effective limits on campaign contributions , newer problems have also gone unaddressed , including the lack of security around digital technology and in some cases even electronic voting machines themselves .
Failing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ question the quality of American democracy .
In the worst-case scenario , those flaws could threaten the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election itself .
The 2020 Iowa caucuses were organized a bit like an election for class president at a failing high school—late and with homemade technology .
State party officials introduced the IowaRecorder app to collate and transfer results late and with insufficient training for those who needed to use it—and without proper testing in advance .
It was also not fit for purpose .
Some experts have described the app @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a professor might use with students who are learning how to code .
According to a team at Stanford University , it also contained major errors , including faulty coding that led to mistakes in the calculation of results .
It was vulnerable to hacking due to a lack of effective security protocol—a flaw that beggars belief given the Democratic Party ’ s experience in 2016 .
The great irony is that an app that was supposed to speed up the results and create transparency ended up producing an opaque count , widespread @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bagniewski , the Democratic Party chair for Polk County , reported that only 20 percent of precinct chairs were able to use it .
Consequently , results had to be phoned or emailed in , which opened the system up to human error in the rush to manually fill in worksheets while journalists were already clamoring for the final figures .
More than 100 precincts reported tallies that were clearly faulty because they did not include the right number of delegates or did not match the figures later released by the Iowa Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was so complete that it led to a number of conspiracy theories emerging on social media , including that Hillary Clinton ’ s 2016 campaign manager was somehow involved ( he wasn ’ t ) or that , because of apparent connections between the app ’ s developer and Buttigieg ’ s campaign , Mayor Pete had paid for the app so that his team could influence the results in his favor ( he hadn ’ t ) .
But the situation surrounding the Iowa voting and reporting systems was nevertheless murky and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ murkiness that leads to conspiracy theories .
Although these allegations were quickly debunked , weak oversight of the elections meant that clear errors were allowed to stand .
The most glaring example of this are photographs , reproduced in the New York Times , that capture basic mathematical errors on the worksheets that were used to add up results and calculate the number of delegates each candidate is awarded for the national convention .
The circulation of these images on social media drew comparisons to Malawi , where the constitutional court recently nullified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were amended under dubious circumstances in what became known as the “ Tipp-Ex election , ” referring to the brand of whiteout .
But in contrast to Malawi , the faulty worksheets in Iowa were allowed to stand because , according to the bizarre self-justifying reasoning of the Iowa Democratic Party , the worksheets represented unalterable legal records and so could not be amended .
Faced with an election that seemed more fit for a banana republic than for the world ’ s most powerful democracy , Buttigieg and Sanders responded by acting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ custom in countries where election tampering is commonplace , both candidates immediately declared themselves the winners before there was a complete or reliable set of results .
Later , having criticized each other ’ s conduct , they asked the Iowa Democratic Party to check the figures again .
However , their focus was on the results .
It should have been on reform .
When election-monitoring organizations deploy trained observers , a key feature they look for is any evidence that the secret ballot has been compromised .
The Iowa caucuses deliberately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a prerequisite for elections to be considered free and fair in most of the world .
What passes for democracy in Iowa is called “ queue voting ” in Kenya and is associated with the authoritarian one-party state presided over by Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s .
Instead , people who do not have to work or care for their children in the evening turn up to their precincts and express their preference by physically moving into a certain part of the room .
In Kenya , this is called queue voting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state presided over by Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s .
It is generally thought to discriminate against minority candidates , as voters fear being ostracized for not voting with the crowd .
Indeed , it ’ s voting by peer pressure .
And in Iowa , it is used to determine how many delegates each candidate should be awarded in a process that has an outsized impact on the race to be the Democratic presidential nominee .
Iowa also has a particularly confusing process for translating votes into delegates for the candidates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reflects a peculiarity of the U.S. primary system more generally .
Instead of the vote tallies for each primary being added into an overall total , candidates secure delegates on a state-by-state basis .
The winning candidate is then the one who can mobilize the greatest number of delegates at the convention .
This introduces a number of distortions into the system , not least that the candidate with the most votes does not necessarily win .
For instance , although Sanders won a couple thousand more votes than Buttigieg according to Iowa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the primary into a number of caucuses enabled Buttigieg to secure more delegates than Sanders .
The mess in Iowa undermined both the ability of any of the leading candidates to credibly claim a mandate moving forward and the credibility of the Democratic Party more broadly .
U.S. President Donald Trump took to Twitter with glee to brand it an “ unmitigated disaster.
” Even leading Democrats used similar language .
It is therefore striking that Nevada , which holds its caucuses this week , was also intending to use a recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ iPads—to collate and transmit results .
For Douglas Jones , a computer scientist at the University of Iowa , this sounds like a dangerous way to organize an election , as if “ people are still improvising and making up the rules as they go.
” The chaos in Iowa ultimately forced a rethink , and officials in Nevada recently confirmed that they had dropped plans to use the app , but this leaves them with another problem : how to ensure a high quality poll when you are making last-minute decisions about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This raises a much bigger question : Why are key elements of the election protocol , which should be known and tested months if not years in advance , being decided at the last minute ?
Iowa and Nevada are not isolated examples but part of a broader trend .
The belief that the United States is one of the world ’ s oldest and strongest democracies appears to have led to the belief that the country does not need to worry about its elections being undermined or subverted .
That assumption is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the University of Michigan hacked into electronic voting machines in order to demonstrate the need for critical gaps in election infrastructure and security to be addressed .
To prove their point , they made machines play the University of Michigan ’ s fight song every time a vote was cast .
As explained in my 2018 book , How to Rig an Election , co-written with Brian Klaas , a worrying number of those voting machines were still running badly outdated Windows software that had not had essential security updates installed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian hackers probed voting databases in at least 21 U.S. states around the 2016 general elections , the 2020 contest is still a hacker ’ s dream .
The U.S. government did take an important step forward in January 2017 , when Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson classified election-related machinery and databases as “ critical infrastructure ” that was essential to national security .
But the Trump administration then failed to make good on this decision by not putting the weaknesses of the country ’ s electoral framework at the top of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he would consider using hacked materials provided from foreign governments for electoral gain .
It ’ s now only a question of who will attack the U.S. elections—and when they will strike .
If international election observers descended on the United States in the way they do on many African countries , their reports would be overflowing with demands for far-reaching changes to protect the electoral system against hacking , manipulation , and malpractice .
At a time when U.S. democracy is under intense scrutiny around the world , flawed caucuses and primaries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could do significant harm to the country ’ s reputation .
Yet American leaders—including those who lecture the world about the importance of free and fair elections—are doing next to nothing to ensure that their own democratic contests meet that standard .

It’s not a good sign when an election trends on Twitter with the hashtag #disaster. But that’s what happened with the Iowa caucuses this month. Pretty much every stage of the process, from voting to counting to the announcement of the results, did not meet the basic democratic standards that professional election observers expect to see around the world. There is no evidence to suggest foul play, but there is quite a lot of evidence of sheer incompetence.
It’s not a good sign when an election trends on Twitter with the hashtag #disaster. But that’s what happened with the Iowa caucuses this month. Pretty much every stage of the process, from voting to counting to the announcement of the results, did not meet the basic democratic standards that professional election observers expect to see around the world. There is no evidence to suggest foul play, but there is quite a lot of evidence of sheer incompetence.
Although both Pete Buttigieg and Bernie Sanders have claimed victory, neither has gone to court to make his case. The same is true of the other candidates who left Iowa disappointed, such as Elizabeth Warren and Joe Biden, whose reputations and presidential ambitions were dented by their poor showing.
Instead, the state’s Democratic Party has started conducting a limited recanvassing exercise after being asked to “reexamine its tallies” by the Buttigieg and Sanders campaigns. Definitive details have yet to be provided about what this process will entail or whether it will be credible.
Although the United States likes to think of itself as the world’s greatest democracy, its electoral system suffers from problems that have not been adequately addressed despite being apparent for generations.
Moreover, the process will only take place if Buttigieg and Sanders are willing to foot the bill. Both have moved on, preparing to fight the looming battles of Nevada, South Carolina, and the many states that vote on March 3, known as Super Tuesday.
The failings in Iowa—and the lack of an effective response—are particularly significant because they reflect a deeper democratic malaise within U.S. politics. Although the United States likes to think of itself as the world’s greatest democracy, its electoral system suffers from problems that have not been adequately addressed despite being apparent for generations.
In addition to the gerrymandering of electoral districts and the gross inequalities created by the lack of effective limits on campaign contributions, newer problems have also gone unaddressed, including the lack of security around digital technology and in some cases even electronic voting machines themselves. Failing to take these issues seriously calls into question the quality of American democracy. In the worst-case scenario, those flaws could threaten the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election itself.
The 2020 Iowa caucuses were organized a bit like an election for class president at a failing high school—late and with homemade technology. State party officials introduced the IowaRecorder app to collate and transfer results late and with insufficient training for those who needed to use it—and without proper testing in advance. It was also not fit for purpose. Some experts have described the app as incredibly basic—the kind of thing that a professor might use with students who are learning how to code. According to a team at Stanford University, it also contained major errors, including faulty coding that led to mistakes in the calculation of results. It was vulnerable to hacking due to a lack of effective security protocol—a flaw that beggars belief given the Democratic Party’s experience in 2016.
The great irony is that an app that was supposed to speed up the results and create transparency ended up producing an opaque count, widespread delays, and glaring inaccuracies. Sean Bagniewski, the Democratic Party chair for Polk County, reported that only 20 percent of precinct chairs were able to use it. Consequently, results had to be phoned or emailed in, which opened the system up to human error in the rush to manually fill in worksheets while journalists were already clamoring for the final figures.
More than 100 precincts reported tallies that were clearly faulty because they did not include the right number of delegates or did not match the figures later released by the Iowa Democratic Party. The breakdown of the system was so complete that it led to a number of conspiracy theories emerging on social media, including that Hillary Clinton’s 2016 campaign manager was somehow involved (he wasn’t) or that, because of apparent connections between the app’s developer and Buttigieg’s campaign, Mayor Pete had paid for the app so that his team could influence the results in his favor (he hadn’t). But the situation surrounding the Iowa voting and reporting systems was nevertheless murky and confusing—and it is precisely this kind of murkiness that leads to conspiracy theories.
Although these allegations were quickly debunked, weak oversight of the elections meant that clear errors were allowed to stand. The most glaring example of this are photographs, reproduced in the New York Times, that capture basic mathematical errors on the worksheets that were used to add up results and calculate the number of delegates each candidate is awarded for the national convention.
The circulation of these images on social media drew comparisons to Malawi, where the constitutional court recently nullified the presidential election after many results sheets were amended under dubious circumstances in what became known as the “Tipp-Ex election,” referring to the brand of whiteout. But in contrast to Malawi, the faulty worksheets in Iowa were allowed to stand because, according to the bizarre self-justifying reasoning of the Iowa Democratic Party, the worksheets represented unalterable legal records and so could not be amended.
Faced with an election that seemed more fit for a banana republic than for the world’s most powerful democracy, Buttigieg and Sanders responded by acting like tin-pot dictators. As is the custom in countries where election tampering is commonplace, both candidates immediately declared themselves the winners before there was a complete or reliable set of results. Later, having criticized each other’s conduct, they asked the Iowa Democratic Party to check the figures again. However, their focus was on the results. It should have been on reform.
When election-monitoring organizations deploy trained observers, a key feature they look for is any evidence that the secret ballot has been compromised. The Iowa caucuses deliberately compromise the secret ballot—even though it is a prerequisite for elections to be considered free and fair in most of the world.
What passes for democracy in Iowa is called “queue voting” in Kenya and is associated with the authoritarian one-party state presided over by Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s.
Instead, people who do not have to work or care for their children in the evening turn up to their precincts and express their preference by physically moving into a certain part of the room. In Kenya, this is called queue voting and is associated with the authoritarian one-party state presided over by Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s. It is generally thought to discriminate against minority candidates, as voters fear being ostracized for not voting with the crowd. Indeed, it’s voting by peer pressure. And in Iowa, it is used to determine how many delegates each candidate should be awarded in a process that has an outsized impact on the race to be the Democratic presidential nominee.
Iowa also has a particularly confusing process for translating votes into delegates for the candidates for the Democratic National Convention. This reflects a peculiarity of the U.S. primary system more generally. Instead of the vote tallies for each primary being added into an overall total, candidates secure delegates on a state-by-state basis. The winning candidate is then the one who can mobilize the greatest number of delegates at the convention. This introduces a number of distortions into the system, not least that the candidate with the most votes does not necessarily win. For instance, although Sanders won a couple thousand more votes than Buttigieg according to Iowa’s published numbers, the subdivision of the primary into a number of caucuses enabled Buttigieg to secure more delegates than Sanders.
The mess in Iowa undermined both the ability of any of the leading candidates to credibly claim a mandate moving forward and the credibility of the Democratic Party more broadly. U.S. President Donald Trump took to Twitter with glee to brand it an “unmitigated disaster.” Even leading Democrats used similar language. It is therefore striking that Nevada, which holds its caucuses this week, was also intending to use a recently developed app—this time designed for use on iPads—to collate and transmit results.
For Douglas Jones, a computer scientist at the University of Iowa, this sounds like a dangerous way to organize an election, as if “people are still improvising and making up the rules as they go.” The chaos in Iowa ultimately forced a rethink, and officials in Nevada recently confirmed that they had dropped plans to use the app, but this leaves them with another problem: how to ensure a high quality poll when you are making last-minute decisions about key elements of the electoral process. This raises a much bigger question: Why are key elements of the election protocol, which should be known and tested months if not years in advance, being decided at the last minute?
Iowa and Nevada are not isolated examples but part of a broader trend. The belief that the United States is one of the world’s oldest and strongest democracies appears to have led to the belief that the country does not need to worry about its elections being undermined or subverted. That assumption is dangerously wrong. In 2010, researchers from the University of Michigan hacked into electronic voting machines in order to demonstrate the need for critical gaps in election infrastructure and security to be addressed. To prove their point, they made machines play the University of Michigan’s fight song every time a vote was cast.
As explained in my 2018 book, How to Rig an Election, co-written with Brian Klaas, a worrying number of those voting machines were still running badly outdated Windows software that had not had essential security updates installed. Despite the fact that we know that Russian hackers probed voting databases in at least 21 U.S. states around the 2016 general elections, the 2020 contest is still a hacker’s dream.
The U.S. government did take an important step forward in January 2017, when Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson classified election-related machinery and databases as “critical infrastructure” that was essential to national security. But the Trump administration then failed to make good on this decision by not putting the weaknesses of the country’s electoral framework at the top of the priority list—and by Trump openly saying he would consider using hacked materials provided from foreign governments for electoral gain. It’s now only a question of who will attack the U.S. elections—and when they will strike.
If international election observers descended on the United States in the way they do on many African countries, their reports would be overflowing with demands for far-reaching changes to protect the electoral system against hacking, manipulation, and malpractice.
At a time when U.S. democracy is under intense scrutiny around the world, flawed caucuses and primaries leading up to a divisive presidential election could do significant harm to the country’s reputation. Yet American leaders—including those who lecture the world about the importance of free and fair elections—are doing next to nothing to ensure that their own democratic contests meet that standard.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-18--The Oslo Accords Are Dead. Should the Palestinian Authority Live On?

The Oslo Accords Are Dead .
Should the Palestinian Authority Live On ?
The Palestinians “ never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
” The statement , first uttered by the Israeli politician and diplomat Abba Eban nearly 50 years ago , has become a trope that collectively paints the Palestinian people as rejectionists who are unwilling to make compromises for peace .
On Jan. 28 , in an interview on CNN , Jared Kushner , U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s son-in-law and Middle East advisor , stated that the Palestinians “ have a perfect track record of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their past .
But perhaps maybe their leadership will read the details of [ the Trump plan ] , stop posturing , and do what ’ s best to try to make the Palestinians ’ lives better.
” Some Palestinians might heed Kushner ’ s advice , just not in the way he hopes .
The Trump plan , titled “ Peace to Prosperity : A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People , ” does indeed offer the Palestinian leadership an opportunity to stop posturing and begin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Now that the current U.S. administration and successive Israeli governments have explicitly discarded the Oslo Accords , should the Palestinian leadership also abandon that agreement ?
The most obvious is whether , now that the current U.S. administration and successive Israeli governments have explicitly discarded the Oslo Accords , the Palestinian leadership should also abandon that agreement , rather than risk becoming the midwife for further Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories .
Many Palestinians would answer in the affirmative and quickly explain why : A consequence of the Oslo Accords is that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the internationally recognized sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people , has been subsumed into the Palestinian Authority ( PA ) , effectively subordinating the PLO ’ s liberation agenda to the PA ’ s governance responsibilities .
Established in 1994 , following the signing of the Oslo Accords , the PA was envisioned , at least by some Palestinians , to be their state-in-waiting , even though the Oslo Accords made no mention of Palestinian statehood .
The PA ’ s state-building agenda established sprawling public institutions that employ more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Muqata have altered Ramallah ’ s cityscape and made the once-tranquil city the urban center of the West Bank .
As of 2013 , the words “ State of Palestine ” adorn all official insignia .
Alongside such performances of statehood , a neoliberal economic agenda enhanced the quality of life for a certain subset of Palestinians , even while burdening them with mortgage debts and car loans .
Most importantly , the PA monopolized the use of arms in the West Bank and , under the Basic Law , declared that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be “ limited to defending the country , serving the people.
” Yet at the same time , the PA entered into expansive security coordination agreements with Israel .
Those were premised on the notion that if the PA could safeguard the security of Israeli civilians and stabilize the territories , Israel would withdraw from territories that , under an agreed two-state solution , would form part of the Palestinian state .
Trump ’ s “ realistic two-state solution ” offers a vision of statehood that deviates substantially from that premise .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation have criticized Trump ’ s plan for breaking with the U.N. resolutions and international legal principles that have underpinned the two-state solution .
Yet , as with past peace initiatives , there is little indication that sufficient political will can be rallied , locally or internationally , to stop , let alone reverse , the slow erosion of Palestinian sovereignty enshrined in each subsequent peace proposal .
For many Palestinians , the Trump plan has already been implemented on the ground and is merely being formalized on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan either with a sense of apprehension , understanding it as the blueprint that future Israeli governments will implicitly or explicitly follow , or with resignation , seeing it as the description of present reality—a plan that has already been implemented on the ground and is merely being formalized on paper .
Presented with this Swiss cheese map of how the present U.S. and Israeli governments imagine Palestinian statehood , as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas referred to it at the United Nations , his PA will be hard-pressed to show how its state-building @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set the foundation for the state Palestinians desire rather than creating a set of nonsovereign , territorially disconnected Bantustans .
Instead of buying into the facade of statehood , many Palestinians see the PA simply as an extension of Israel ’ s occupation , like the Indian viceroy—a governing authority that pacifies indigenous populations on behalf of colonial regimes .
Security coordination sits at the heart of this grievance .
Consuming a disproportionate amount of the PA ’ s public expenditure , security coordination has repeatedly been hailed by Abbas as “ sacred.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as underpinning both the occupation and the PA ’ s unpopular rule , rather than protecting them or paving the way for Israeli withdrawal .
A common refrain heard in Ramallah is that when the PA police scurry into their hideouts , that ’ s when one knows the Israeli army is about to come into Palestinian cities .
The PA uses security coordination to outsource its repressive tactics to Israeli security agents or to crack down on opponents of its rule , whether from Hamas or local activists .
A Human Rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the PA relies on extensive torture and imprisonment tactics in the West Bank .
I recall a sobering conversation with a young Palestinian teenager in a refugee camp in the West Bank .
Sweating heavily and seemingly unable to control his nerves , he explained to me that he would choose an Israeli prison over a PA one anytime , given the brutality of the torture under Palestinian security officers .
While employment opportunities and public security may have once been rationalized as precursors to statehood , they increasingly are viewed as straitjackets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military regime and sustain the PA as a corrupt police pseudo-state .
Little surprise then , that , according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research , 84 percent of Palestinians favor withdrawing Palestinian recognition of Israel , 77 percent call for ending security coordination with Israel , and 69 percent call for ending the implementation of the Oslo Accords .
It ’ s therefore clear that many Palestinians view the PA ’ s dismantlement as a prerequisite for Palestinians to secure their freedom and rights , whether in one state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ view the PA as a state-in-the-making , including many PLO leaders , reject this view , however .
They argue that the PA , and the institutions of state it has built , must be reformed to resist the occupation rather than continue to operate within it .
Their rationale is shaped , among other concerns , by a fear of what a void where the PA once stood might mean , in terms of soaring unemployment and crippled public services , including schools and hospitals .
These are not idle concerns , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must come up with adequate answers .
At the same time , it seems unrealistic to assume the PA can reform itself to resist further Israeli settlement and annexation of the West Bank or to reclaim sovereignty .
The PA ’ s very structures have been designed and have evolved to stabilize , rather than disrupt , Palestinian lives under occupation .
And its ability to govern is premised precisely on its acquiescence to Israeli constraints .
In recent months , for instance , Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh has been attempting to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel and seeking other trade partners , such as Jordan and Egypt .
Most recently , Shtayyeh limited the import of cattle from Israel into the West Bank .
These policies have demonstrated their power : Israeli ranchers mobilized against their government , demanding retribution .
However , in retaliation , Israeli Defense Minister Naftali Bennett made clear that the PA lacked any economic autonomy , preventing Palestinian agricultural exports to Israel or elsewhere , effectively initiating an economic siege on the West Bank .
Such policies on the part of the PA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are unlikely to yield substantive results .
Shtayyeh ’ s trajectory , while well intentioned , was hastily implemented , without the requisite infrastructure that would allow for its success .
Israeli reprisals were to be expected .
As a Palestinian economist asked during an interview with me , what were the measures taken by the PA to protect Palestinian farmers from the backlash ?
The First Intifada , when Palestinians refused to cooperate with the occupation , offers useful lessons , including in its shift toward localized economies , whether in agriculture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israeli punitive measures .
Most Palestinians agree that the PA in its current format is not conducive to securing Palestinians ’ rights .
With the Trump plan , there is an opportunity again for the Palestinian leadership to embrace an alternative path .
Whether Palestinians are calling for a dismantlement of the PA or its reform into a body that can challenge the occupation , most agree that the PA in its current format is not conducive to securing Palestinians ’ rights .
As a senior PLO member told me recently , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , allowing for an occupation without a cost.
” So far , PA leaders have doubled down on old strategies in response to Trump ’ s pro-annexation plan and reacted in a haphazard manner : Abbas called for the suspension of the Oslo Accords , for a halt to security coordination , and for the PA ’ s disengagement from the occupation .
Yet these statements were not accompanied by any indication that they were seriously considered , let alone about to be implemented .
Polls have indicated that more than 70 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The PLO ’ s efforts to circulate drafts opposing Trump ’ s plan to the U.N. Security Council are viewed by the leadership as an important way of rallying international opposition to Israel ’ s future annexation of Palestinian lands and reaffirming international commitments to the two-state solution .
They believe that the international community can act as a bulwark against current Israeli-American efforts to undermine future prospects for Palestinian statehood .
Yet despite heavy diplomatic lobbying , the Palestinians were unable to gather the support they deemed necessary at the U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rules of the game have changed .
So far there is no indication from the Palestinian leadership—beyond rhetoric—that additional measures are being considered .
But assuming that their current efforts are sufficient is a mistake , as is defining a future red line .
Regardless of whether the Israeli government annexes Palestinian lands before the March 2 elections or after , at what pace , or at all , the Palestinian leadership must act with the facts on the ground : The historical trajectory points to the entrenchment of a one-state reality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ indication that local or international players will actively intervene to reverse this trajectory .
Therefore , the PA leadership should develop a comprehensive political strategy to address the fact that the Oslo Accords have been emptied of all content .
They could still indicate a preference and readiness for negotiations along internationally agreed parameters .
But that does not absolve them of the need or responsibility to develop a serious and calculated response to the reality in which they now find themselves .
This initiative could have two parts .
The first would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the PLO through carrying out elections for the Palestinian National Council .
This is more pressing than pursuing Palestinian legislative elections , which would essentially legitimize the PA and reinforce the present reality .
The second is to seriously consider , rather than hastily repeat , what disengagement might look like , whether this entails suspending recognition of Israel , ending security coordination , or dismantling the PA—all of which are demands made by a majority of Palestinians .
The leadership ought to assess whether , and if so how , the PA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Palestinians from the current reality of state-building under occupation and allow them to reclaim sovereignty and resist further Israeli encroachment .
The PA leadership ought to assess whether , and if so how , the PA might be dismantled or restructured to allow Palestinians to reclaim sovereignty and resist further Israeli encroachment .
Almost every Palestinian leader to whom I ’ ve spoken in the past few years has stressed the need to build Palestinian resilience in the face of the existential threats they are facing .
Such rhetoric has more often than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inaction .
But to effectively build resilience , the PA leadership must now answer difficult questions instead of merely repeating the threat of disengagement .
How would they provide for the 150,000 employees who now depend on PA salaries ?
How will public hospitals and schools in the West Bank run without the PA ?
What kinds of social and economic plans can be put in place to mitigate financial reprisals from Israel ?
How can Palestinians be protected when the Israeli army redeploys into the territories ?
What kind of local agricultural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sustain people ’ s lives in the absence of their ability to import and export ?
And can the PA adopt progressive taxation to redistribute wealth and reduce dependency on foreign aid and Israeli withholding of collected taxes ?
Palestinians on the ground will bear the brunt of any policy shift , and they deserve more than empty rhetoric and reactive gestures .
It might be fanciful to think that the PA leadership will disrupt a system that has furthered its own self-interest .
But the PA ’ s collapse is now a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israeli initiatives .
This is an opportunity for the PA leadership to reclaim its agency , assume responsibility , and explore what strategically disentangling itself from the Oslo Accords might look like beyond empty threats .
They should seize the moment .

The Palestinians “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.”
The statement, first uttered by the Israeli politician and diplomat Abba Eban nearly 50 years ago, has become a trope that collectively paints the Palestinian people as rejectionists who are unwilling to make compromises for peace.
On Jan. 28, in an interview on CNN, Jared Kushner, U.S. President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and Middle East advisor, stated that the Palestinians “have a perfect track record of blowing every opportunity they’ve had in their past. But perhaps maybe their leadership will read the details of [the Trump plan], stop posturing, and do what’s best to try to make the Palestinians’ lives better.”
Some Palestinians might heed Kushner’s advice, just not in the way he hopes.
The Trump plan, titled “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People,” does indeed offer the Palestinian leadership an opportunity to stop posturing and begin asking, and answering, difficult questions.
Now that the current U.S. administration and successive Israeli governments have explicitly discarded the Oslo Accords, should the Palestinian leadership also abandon that agreement?
The most obvious is whether, now that the current U.S. administration and successive Israeli governments have explicitly discarded the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian leadership should also abandon that agreement, rather than risk becoming the midwife for further Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories.
Many Palestinians would answer in the affirmative and quickly explain why: A consequence of the Oslo Accords is that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the internationally recognized sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, has been subsumed into the Palestinian Authority (PA), effectively subordinating the PLO’s liberation agenda to the PA’s governance responsibilities.
Established in 1994, following the signing of the Oslo Accords, the PA was envisioned, at least by some Palestinians, to be their state-in-waiting, even though the Oslo Accords made no mention of Palestinian statehood.
The PA’s state-building agenda established sprawling public institutions that employ more than 150,000 Palestinians. Grand buildings like the Muqata have altered Ramallah’s cityscape and made the once-tranquil city the urban center of the West Bank. As of 2013, the words “State of Palestine” adorn all official insignia. Alongside such performances of statehood, a neoliberal economic agenda enhanced the quality of life for a certain subset of Palestinians, even while burdening them with mortgage debts and car loans.
Most importantly, the PA monopolized the use of arms in the West Bank and, under the Basic Law, declared that the function of the Palestinian security forces would be “limited to defending the country, serving the people.” Yet at the same time, the PA entered into expansive security coordination agreements with Israel. Those were premised on the notion that if the PA could safeguard the security of Israeli civilians and stabilize the territories, Israel would withdraw from territories that, under an agreed two-state solution, would form part of the Palestinian state.
Trump’s “realistic two-state solution” offers a vision of statehood that deviates substantially from that premise. The European Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation have criticized Trump’s plan for breaking with the U.N. resolutions and international legal principles that have underpinned the two-state solution. Yet, as with past peace initiatives, there is little indication that sufficient political will can be rallied, locally or internationally, to stop, let alone reverse, the slow erosion of Palestinian sovereignty enshrined in each subsequent peace proposal.
For many Palestinians, the Trump plan has already been implemented on the ground and is merely being formalized on paper.
Palestinians have reacted to the plan either with a sense of apprehension, understanding it as the blueprint that future Israeli governments will implicitly or explicitly follow, or with resignation, seeing it as the description of present reality—a plan that has already been implemented on the ground and is merely being formalized on paper.
Presented with this Swiss cheese map of how the present U.S. and Israeli governments imagine Palestinian statehood, as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas referred to it at the United Nations, his PA will be hard-pressed to show how its state-building agenda of the past 26 years has set the foundation for the state Palestinians desire rather than creating a set of nonsovereign, territorially disconnected Bantustans.
Instead of buying into the facade of statehood, many Palestinians see the PA simply as an extension of Israel’s occupation, like the Indian viceroy—a governing authority that pacifies indigenous populations on behalf of colonial regimes.
Security coordination sits at the heart of this grievance. Consuming a disproportionate amount of the PA’s public expenditure, security coordination has repeatedly been hailed by Abbas as “sacred.” But many Palestinians see security coordination as underpinning both the occupation and the PA’s unpopular rule, rather than protecting them or paving the way for Israeli withdrawal.
A common refrain heard in Ramallah is that when the PA police scurry into their hideouts, that’s when one knows the Israeli army is about to come into Palestinian cities. The PA uses security coordination to outsource its repressive tactics to Israeli security agents or to crack down on opponents of its rule, whether from Hamas or local activists.
A Human Rights Watch report published in 2018 detailed how the PA relies on extensive torture and imprisonment tactics in the West Bank. I recall a sobering conversation with a young Palestinian teenager in a refugee camp in the West Bank. Sweating heavily and seemingly unable to control his nerves, he explained to me that he would choose an Israeli prison over a PA one anytime, given the brutality of the torture under Palestinian security officers.
While employment opportunities and public security may have once been rationalized as precursors to statehood, they increasingly are viewed as straitjackets to stabilize and subsidize Israel’s military regime and sustain the PA as a corrupt police pseudo-state.
Little surprise then, that, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 84 percent of Palestinians favor withdrawing Palestinian recognition of Israel, 77 percent call for ending security coordination with Israel, and 69 percent call for ending the implementation of the Oslo Accords.
It’s therefore clear that many Palestinians view the PA’s dismantlement as a prerequisite for Palestinians to secure their freedom and rights, whether in one state or two. Those who continue to view the PA as a state-in-the-making, including many PLO leaders, reject this view, however. They argue that the PA, and the institutions of state it has built, must be reformed to resist the occupation rather than continue to operate within it. Their rationale is shaped, among other concerns, by a fear of what a void where the PA once stood might mean, in terms of soaring unemployment and crippled public services, including schools and hospitals.
These are not idle concerns, and any advocate of dismantling the PA must come up with adequate answers. At the same time, it seems unrealistic to assume the PA can reform itself to resist further Israeli settlement and annexation of the West Bank or to reclaim sovereignty. The PA’s very structures have been designed and have evolved to stabilize, rather than disrupt, Palestinian lives under occupation. And its ability to govern is premised precisely on its acquiescence to Israeli constraints.
In recent months, for instance, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh has been attempting to reclaim sovereignty by reducing economic dependence on Israel and seeking other trade partners, such as Jordan and Egypt. Most recently, Shtayyeh limited the import of cattle from Israel into the West Bank. These policies have demonstrated their power: Israeli ranchers mobilized against their government, demanding retribution. However, in retaliation, Israeli Defense Minister Naftali Bennett made clear that the PA lacked any economic autonomy, preventing Palestinian agricultural exports to Israel or elsewhere, effectively initiating an economic siege on the West Bank.
Such policies on the part of the PA, often reactive and ad hoc, are unlikely to yield substantive results. Shtayyeh’s trajectory, while well intentioned, was hastily implemented, without the requisite infrastructure that would allow for its success. Israeli reprisals were to be expected. As a Palestinian economist asked during an interview with me, what were the measures taken by the PA to protect Palestinian farmers from the backlash? The First Intifada, when Palestinians refused to cooperate with the occupation, offers useful lessons, including in its shift toward localized economies, whether in agriculture or manufacturing, that mitigated exposure to Israeli punitive measures.
Most Palestinians agree that the PA in its current format is not conducive to securing Palestinians’ rights.
With the Trump plan, there is an opportunity again for the Palestinian leadership to embrace an alternative path. Whether Palestinians are calling for a dismantlement of the PA or its reform into a body that can challenge the occupation, most agree that the PA in its current format is not conducive to securing Palestinians’ rights. As a senior PLO member told me recently, “Abbas now is an authority without authority, allowing for an occupation without a cost.”
So far, PA leaders have doubled down on old strategies in response to Trump’s pro-annexation plan and reacted in a haphazard manner: Abbas called for the suspension of the Oslo Accords, for a halt to security coordination, and for the PA’s disengagement from the occupation. Yet these statements were not accompanied by any indication that they were seriously considered, let alone about to be implemented. Polls have indicated that more than 70 percent of Palestinians no longer believe such promises.
The PLO’s efforts to circulate drafts opposing Trump’s plan to the U.N. Security Council are viewed by the leadership as an important way of rallying international opposition to Israel’s future annexation of Palestinian lands and reaffirming international commitments to the two-state solution. They believe that the international community can act as a bulwark against current Israeli-American efforts to undermine future prospects for Palestinian statehood. Yet despite heavy diplomatic lobbying, the Palestinians were unable to gather the support they deemed necessary at the U.N. Their failure is one more indication that the rules of the game have changed.
So far there is no indication from the Palestinian leadership—beyond rhetoric—that additional measures are being considered. But assuming that their current efforts are sufficient is a mistake, as is defining a future red line. Regardless of whether the Israeli government annexes Palestinian lands before the March 2 elections or after, at what pace, or at all, the Palestinian leadership must act with the facts on the ground: The historical trajectory points to the entrenchment of a one-state reality. And at present there is no indication that local or international players will actively intervene to reverse this trajectory.
Therefore, the PA leadership should develop a comprehensive political strategy to address the fact that the Oslo Accords have been emptied of all content. They could still indicate a preference and readiness for negotiations along internationally agreed parameters. But that does not absolve them of the need or responsibility to develop a serious and calculated response to the reality in which they now find themselves.
This initiative could have two parts.
The first would be the resuscitation of the institutions of the PLO through carrying out elections for the Palestinian National Council. This is more pressing than pursuing Palestinian legislative elections, which would essentially legitimize the PA and reinforce the present reality.
The second is to seriously consider, rather than hastily repeat, what disengagement might look like, whether this entails suspending recognition of Israel, ending security coordination, or dismantling the PA—all of which are demands made by a majority of Palestinians. The leadership ought to assess whether, and if so how, the PA might be dismantled or restructured to extricate Palestinians from the current reality of state-building under occupation and allow them to reclaim sovereignty and resist further Israeli encroachment.
The PA leadership ought to assess whether, and if so how, the PA might be dismantled or restructured to allow Palestinians to reclaim sovereignty and resist further Israeli encroachment.
Almost every Palestinian leader to whom I’ve spoken in the past few years has stressed the need to build Palestinian resilience in the face of the existential threats they are facing. Such rhetoric has more often than not been used as an excuse for inaction.
But to effectively build resilience, the PA leadership must now answer difficult questions instead of merely repeating the threat of disengagement. How would they provide for the 150,000 employees who now depend on PA salaries? How will public hospitals and schools in the West Bank run without the PA? What kinds of social and economic plans can be put in place to mitigate financial reprisals from Israel? How can Palestinians be protected when the Israeli army redeploys into the territories? What kind of local agricultural and production capacity can be developed to sustain people’s lives in the absence of their ability to import and export? And can the PA adopt progressive taxation to redistribute wealth and reduce dependency on foreign aid and Israeli withholding of collected taxes?
Palestinians on the ground will bear the brunt of any policy shift, and they deserve more than empty rhetoric and reactive gestures. It might be fanciful to think that the PA leadership will disrupt a system that has furthered its own self-interest. But the PA’s collapse is now a real possibility—whether caused by Palestinian revolts or Israeli initiatives. This is an opportunity for the PA leadership to reclaim its agency, assume responsibility, and explore what strategically disentangling itself from the Oslo Accords might look like beyond empty threats.
They should seize the moment.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-19--European Union Unveils Proposed Tech Rules

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : EU officials propose a new digital strategy , the U.N. says Syrian government airstrikes are targeting civilians , and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau faces pressure to bring an end to a protracted railway blockade .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Margrethe Vestager , the European Union ’ s digital and competition chief , today will release the first draft of an EU digital strategy likely to have major consequences for technology giants such as Apple , Facebook , and Google .
The strategy will focus on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support growth and innovation in the European tech industry .
Vestager is currently examining big tech ’ s data practices , including how companies use third-party data to compete .
The EU is taking on a global role in tech regulation , in contrast to the United States .
The new plans have prompted Silicon Valley executives to visit Brussels .
On Monday , Facebook chief executive Mark Zuckerberg met with Vestager and other officials at the EU headquarters .
Zuckerberg has emphasized the need for “ good regulation , ” while Facebook @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harming innovation .
Artificial intelligence .
The new digital policy includes rules on companies ’ use of artificial intelligence ( AI ) that could set a precedent for other countries .
The proposed regulation will likely focus on how governments should monitor the riskier aspects of AI , such as its use in health care or transportation .
Restricting facial recognition technology is also a key concern .
“ It is quite the European approach to say if things are risky , then we as a society want to regulate this , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ The main thing is for us to create societies where people feel that they can trust what is going on.
” Taxing tech .
Later this year , Spain will introduce a 3 percent digital services tax on the revenue of companies including Facebook and Google , Bloomberg reports .
It joins countries like France and Britain moving forward with similar regulations .
Digital tax plans have angered the United States , which threatened retaliatory tariffs on France late last year .
The OECD is working on a push for a global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also consider a bloc-wide tax .
U.N. says Syrian government is targeting civilians .
Government airstrikes in northwest Syria have hit hospitals and refugee camps , killing at least 300 civilians .
Nearly 1 million people have been displaced in recent weeks as Syrian forces accelerate their campaign in Idlib province .
The U.N. human rights chief has accused the Syrian government and Russia of deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure during the campaign to take back the country ’ s last rebel strongholds .
After a second day of talks in Moscow , Turkish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Ankara plans to deploy more troops to the region as it demands that Syria pull back .
New British immigration rules .
Boris Johnson ’ s government has announced new U.K. immigration rules which would drastically reduce the number of unskilled workers from non-English speaking countries .
The government claims that its overhaul of the immigration process along the lines of Australia ’ s points system will fulfill a key pledge of the Brexit campaign—to “ take back control ” of the nation ’ s borders and put an end to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , on farms , and in the service sector .
Business leaders branded the move “ an assault on the economy , ” according to the Guardian and warned of “ disastrous ” consequences , job losses , and shop and factory closures while union leaders said it could lead to chaos in the health care sector .
Trudeau under pressure to end rail blockade .
Indigenous protesters in Canada are blockading a railway for the 13th straight day , in solidarity with the Wet ’ suwet ’ en First Nation in British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a natural gas pipeline through their land .
The standoff has raised fears fuel shortages and layoffs , increasing the pressure on Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to resolve the situation .
Speaking in Parliament on Tuesday , he called for “ dialogue and mutual respect , ” but his government hasn ’ t provided details on its ongoing negotiations with the indigenous leaders .
China tightens Wuhan quarantine .
Chinese state media reported on Wednesday that Hubei province—the epicenter of the coronavirus—would adopt stricter containment measures , even as the provincial capital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ announced Tuesday that the director of a hospital in the city had died—one of many health workers to succumb to the virus .
The overall death toll in China passed 2,000 on Wednesday , but the number of new reported cases fell for the second day in a row .
Meanwhile , the impact of the coronavirus outbreak is becoming more apparent in global markets .
It strikes at a particularly bad time for Japan and Germany , FP ’ s Keith Johnson reports .
For more news and analysis on stories like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , delivered on Wednesdays .
U.S. rules on Chinese media .
The Trump administration announced Tuesday that it will now treat five Chinese state-run media companies with U.S. operations like foreign embassies , meaning they will have to register their employees and properties with the State Department .
The decision isn ’ t linked to any new developments , but an official described the entities , including Xinhua News Agency and China Daily , as part of China ’ s “ propaganda apparatus.
” Lebanon ’ s protest movement .
Last month , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but it has put protesters in an awkward position .
Most agree it ’ s just a shadow body representing the political elite , but the protest movement is still unable to articulate a long-term strategy for change—likely because it never developed one , Anchal Vohra writes for FP .
Turkey ’ s Gezi Park case .
On Tuesday , a Turkish court acquitted nine people of charges over the anti-government Gezi Park protests in 2013—surprising many who have questioned the independence of Turkey ’ s courts under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rearrest one of the defendants , Osman Kavala , who faced a life sentence .
U.S. President Donald Trump indicated on Tuesday that he ’ d like to attend the summer Olympic Games in Tokyo later this year , despite the events coinciding with his campaign for reelection .
The president is likely to have a limited travel schedule as election season gets fully underway .
“ We ’ ll make that determination , ” he said .
“ We ’ re going to try if we can.
” The Olympics begin on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: EU officials propose a new digital strategy , the U.N. says Syrian government airstrikes are targeting civilians, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau faces pressure to bring an end to a protracted railway blockade .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: EU officials propose a new digital strategy, the U.N. says Syrian government airstrikes are targeting civilians, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau faces pressure to bring an end to a protracted railway blockade.
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Brussels Pitches New Tech Rules
Margrethe Vestager, the European Union’s digital and competition chief, today will release the first draft of an EU digital strategy likely to have major consequences for technology giants such as Apple, Facebook, and Google. The strategy will focus on a so-called digital single market that will support growth and innovation in the European tech industry. Vestager is currently examining big tech’s data practices, including how companies use third-party data to compete.
The EU is taking on a global role in tech regulation, in contrast to the United States. The new plans have prompted Silicon Valley executives to visit Brussels. On Monday, Facebook chief executive Mark Zuckerberg met with Vestager and other officials at the EU headquarters. Zuckerberg has emphasized the need for “good regulation,” while Facebook itself has warned that potential rules risk harming innovation.
Artificial intelligence. The new digital policy includes rules on companies’ use of artificial intelligence (AI) that could set a precedent for other countries. The proposed regulation will likely focus on how governments should monitor the riskier aspects of AI, such as its use in health care or transportation. Restricting facial recognition technology is also a key concern.
“It is quite the European approach to say if things are risky, then we as a society want to regulate this,” Vestager told the New York Times. “The main thing is for us to create societies where people feel that they can trust what is going on.”
Taxing tech. Later this year, Spain will introduce a 3 percent digital services tax on the revenue of companies including Facebook and Google, Bloomberg reports. It joins countries like France and Britain moving forward with similar regulations. Digital tax plans have angered the United States, which threatened retaliatory tariffs on France late last year. The OECD is working on a push for a global digital tax, and the EU could also consider a bloc-wide tax.
What We’re Following Today
U.N. says Syrian government is targeting civilians. Government airstrikes in northwest Syria have hit hospitals and refugee camps, killing at least 300 civilians. Nearly 1 million people have been displaced in recent weeks as Syrian forces accelerate their campaign in Idlib province. The U.N. human rights chief has accused the Syrian government and Russia of deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure during the campaign to take back the country’s last rebel strongholds. After a second day of talks in Moscow, Turkish officials said no agreement had been reached, and Ankara plans to deploy more troops to the region as it demands that Syria pull back.
New British immigration rules. Boris Johnson’s government has announced new U.K. immigration rules which would drastically reduce the number of unskilled workers from non-English speaking countries. The government claims that its overhaul of the immigration process along the lines of Australia’s points system will fulfill a key pledge of the Brexit campaign—to “take back control” of the nation’s borders and put an end to cheap labor from EU citizens in factories, on farms, and in the service sector. Business leaders branded the move “an assault on the economy,” according to the Guardian and warned of “disastrous” consequences, job losses, and shop and factory closures while union leaders said it could lead to chaos in the health care sector.
Trudeau under pressure to end rail blockade. Indigenous protesters in Canada are blockading a railway for the 13th straight day, in solidarity with the Wet’suwet’en First Nation in British Columbia, which is fighting the construction of a natural gas pipeline through their land. The standoff has raised fears fuel shortages and layoffs, increasing the pressure on Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to resolve the situation. Speaking in Parliament on Tuesday, he called for “dialogue and mutual respect,” but his government hasn’t provided details on its ongoing negotiations with the indigenous leaders.
China tightens Wuhan quarantine. Chinese state media reported on Wednesday that Hubei province—the epicenter of the coronavirus—would adopt stricter containment measures, even as the provincial capital Wuhan remains under lockdown. It was announced Tuesday that the director of a hospital in the city had died—one of many health workers to succumb to the virus. The overall death toll in China passed 2,000 on Wednesday, but the number of new reported cases fell for the second day in a row.
Meanwhile, the impact of the coronavirus outbreak is becoming more apparent in global markets. It strikes at a particularly bad time for Japan and Germany, FP’s Keith Johnson reports.
For more news and analysis on stories like this, sign up for China Brief, delivered on Wednesdays.
Keep an Eye On
U.S. rules on Chinese media. The Trump administration announced Tuesday that it will now treat five Chinese state-run media companies with U.S. operations like foreign embassies, meaning they will have to register their employees and properties with the State Department. The decision isn’t linked to any new developments, but an official described the entities, including Xinhua News Agency and China Daily, as part of China’s “propaganda apparatus.”
Lebanon’s protest movement. Last month, a new government took power in Lebanon, but it has put protesters in an awkward position. Most agree it’s just a shadow body representing the political elite, but the protest movement is still unable to articulate a long-term strategy for change—likely because it never developed one, Anchal Vohra writes for FP.
Turkey’s Gezi Park case. On Tuesday, a Turkish court acquitted nine people of charges over the anti-government Gezi Park protests in 2013—surprising many who have questioned the independence of Turkey’s courts under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But prosecutors immediately demanded that police rearrest one of the defendants, Osman Kavala, who faced a life sentence.
Odds and Ends
U.S. President Donald Trump indicated on Tuesday that he’d like to attend the summer Olympic Games in Tokyo later this year, despite the events coinciding with his campaign for reelection. The president is likely to have a limited travel schedule as election season gets fully underway. “We’ll make that determination,” he said. “We’re going to try if we can.” The Olympics begin on July 24.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.