foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--Trump’s Candidate Would Be a Disaster for Latin America’s Bank

Trump ’ s Candidate Would Be a Disaster for Latin America ’ s Bank Latin America and the Caribbean have always mistrusted the United States , usually with good reason .
But they ’ ve had particular cause in recent weeks , after Mauricio Claver-Carone , a hard-right attorney from Florida and U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s candidate for the Inter-American Development Bank ( IDB ) presidency , intensified his campaign by attacking governments that oppose his candidacy .
If he is elected this weekend , as seems likely , regional multilateralism will suffer an unprecedented setback .
Latin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ epicenter of COVID-19 , reporting 43 percent of daily deaths , was already the most unequal region in the world before the pandemic .
That drama has been accentuated in recent months .
Economies there are expected to shrink by 9.3 percent this year , according to the IMF .
The United Nations predicted that as a result of the economic fallout from the pandemic and quarantine measures , 45 million people will fall into poverty .
The impact of the crisis on vulnerable populations , mainly women and children , will bring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Amid these calamities , the White House is alienating several of its regional partners , including Argentina , Chile , and Costa Rica .
Thanks to its hard-line candidate , who publicly and harshly criticizes governments opposing him , Washington once again reinforces the image that for decades has dominated the political , economic , and cultural elites of Latin America : the United States a powerful neighbor that exercises ruthless power over others , and not with others .
The U.S.-led coalition has a clear majority—54 percent—of the votes at the IDB @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and rule , ” the White House built a majority coalition , with the support of Brazil , Colombia , and 15 other governments .
If a session is held as scheduled on Sept. 12 and 13 , Claver-Carone , the senior director of Western Hemisphere affairs at the National Security Council , would be elected .
But for that to happen , the United States needs the participation of an absolute majority , that is , three-quarters of the voting power of the institution .
The quorum , originally designed so that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the participation and acquiescence of the United States , which has 30 percent of the votes , could prevent Washington from fracturing the IDB .
But that strategy might fail if other countries , such as Canada , Peru , and Mexico , which were hesitant about either supporting Claver-Carone or postponing the election , participate in the meeting this weekend .
The attempt to force Claver-Carone ’ s election is breaking an unwritten tradition established by former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower 60 years ago and respected by all his successors—until Trump—that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Latin American citizen .
The liberal international order created by the United States after World War II , made up of multilateral organizations such as the IDB , is based on rules .
Those rules allow the United States to hold leadership through consensus and a certain amount of legitimacy .
Trump is breaching these agreements , spurring distrust and anti-Americanism in the region , and thus undermining U.S. interests .
Controlling wallets seems to be more important than winning hearts and minds .
The United States is also attacking countries that try @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where there are none .
Claver-Carone mentioned Argentina in harsh terms six times in the last conference call organized by the State Department .
“ We are seeing a minority effort , led by the government of Argentina , to be able to block the election because they have not been able to present , or have not wanted to present , a competitive vision , ” he said .
The Argentine government denied that not providing a quorum was an illegal tactic , as the U.S. candidate claimed .
“ We are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IDB regulations , ” Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lisandro Sabanés told me .
Chile , governed by conservative President Sebastián Piñera , also repudiated the statements of Claver-Carone , who had called Chilean Foreign Minister Andrés Allamand “ old-fashioned.
” “ The aggressive statements confirm that his election would be very inadequate , ” the Chilean minister declared to the press .
The IDB has worked well with a Latin American president and a U.S. vice president .
Why change things now ?
The Argentine government and the Brazilian opposition believe that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapon to condition financial assistance on extreme loyalty to Washington , at a time when Beijing is becoming the main trading partner and investor in infrastructure for many countries in the region .
Moreover , it opens a Pandora ’ s box for other multilateral institutions : If the United States takes the IDB presidency today , tomorrow it could try to do the same at the IMF , which is traditionally led by a European .
The U.S. image under Trump is also at a record low in the region .
Although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region , as some of his predecessors did , most of his policies are hated and rejected .
Promising to build a wall on the border with Mexico , which would be paid for by the Mexicans , whom he accused of “ bringing drugs ” and “ crime ” and being “ rapists ” ; claiming that Haiti and El Salvador are “ shithole countries ” ; imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum from Argentina and Brazil ; and invoking the Monroe Doctrine have done nothing to strengthen inter-American ties .
Taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Latin American public opinion has of the United States and of Trump himself .
And why is there such a rush to elect a bank president just over 50 days before the U.S. presidential election ?
Will Claver-Carone be able to work in harmony with a potential Joe Biden administration , whose presidential campaign has let its opposition to that candidacy leak ?
Everything seems to indicate that he will not .
Claver-Carone himself would be a bad choice even if he wasn ’ t American .
He lacks expertise in areas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ever , such as cooperation to revive the economy , rebuilding its health infrastructure , and lifting millions of its people out of poverty .
“ I think it would increase the divisions within Latin America .
Divisions that have more to do with the ideology of the governments in power than with the long-term interests of the states , ” said Francisco de Santibañes , the director-general at the Argentine Council for International Relations .
“ Center-left governments , such as Argentina , would see this as an imposition and a dangerous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the appointment succeeds , the Latin American left will become a little more anti-American .
But I wouldn ’ t exaggerate its importance , ” he added .
All of this benefits China .
Beijing watches with a big smile as a large part of the region fights with the White House .
As China intensifies its mask diplomacy , Trump sends a diametrically opposed signal : The IDB is mine .
Nothing could be more auspicious for the interests of China , the main trading partner of Argentina , Brazil , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Peru .
If the U.S.-led coalition does not achieve a quorum for the meeting , but at the same time does not agree to postpone the elections until March 2021 , as Argentina , Chile , Mexico , and Costa Rica have requested , there will be a catastrophic tie that would plunge the IDB into paralysis .
But one of those countries could break the deadlock at the IDB board .
Although Mexican officials have spoken against Claver-Carone ’ s candidacy , Mexico could provide a quorum this weekend in order to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then , would be about who will be the vice president .
If Trump takes over the IDB , the international liberal order in the Western Hemisphere would be damaged beyond repair .
To find a way out of this maze , it is useful to listen to the former statesman who created the IDB .
“ If we , the United States , have been at fault we stand ready to be corrected , ” Eisenhower said in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in August 1958 , when he proposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Latin America is just honoring his words .
Unfortunately , it may not be enough .

Latin America and the Caribbean have always mistrusted the United States, usually with good reason. But they’ve had particular cause in recent weeks, after Mauricio Claver-Carone, a hard-right attorney from Florida and U.S. President Donald Trump's candidate for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) presidency, intensified his campaign by attacking governments that oppose his candidacy. If he is elected this weekend, as seems likely, regional multilateralism will suffer an unprecedented setback.
Latin America and the Caribbean have always mistrusted the United States, usually with good reason. But they’ve had particular cause in recent weeks, after Mauricio Claver-Carone, a hard-right attorney from Florida and U.S. President Donald Trump’s candidate for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) presidency, intensified his campaign by attacking governments that oppose his candidacy. If he is elected this weekend, as seems likely, regional multilateralism will suffer an unprecedented setback.
Latin America, which is now the global epicenter of COVID-19, reporting 43 percent of daily deaths, was already the most unequal region in the world before the pandemic. That drama has been accentuated in recent months. Economies there are expected to shrink by 9.3 percent this year, according to the IMF. The United Nations predicted that as a result of the economic fallout from the pandemic and quarantine measures, 45 million people will fall into poverty. The impact of the crisis on vulnerable populations, mainly women and children, will bring consequences that will survive for decades.
Amid these calamities, the White House is alienating several of its regional partners, including Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica. Thanks to its hard-line candidate, who publicly and harshly criticizes governments opposing him, Washington once again reinforces the image that for decades has dominated the political, economic, and cultural elites of Latin America: the United States a powerful neighbor that exercises ruthless power over others, and not with others.
The U.S.-led coalition has a clear majority—54 percent—of the votes at the IDB. Applying the logic of “divide and rule,” the White House built a majority coalition, with the support of Brazil, Colombia, and 15 other governments. If a session is held as scheduled on Sept. 12 and 13, Claver-Carone, the senior director of Western Hemisphere affairs at the National Security Council, would be elected. But for that to happen, the United States needs the participation of an absolute majority, that is, three-quarters of the voting power of the institution. The quorum, originally designed so that countries could not elect a president without the participation and acquiescence of the United States, which has 30 percent of the votes, could prevent Washington from fracturing the IDB. But that strategy might fail if other countries, such as Canada, Peru, and Mexico, which were hesitant about either supporting Claver-Carone or postponing the election, participate in the meeting this weekend.
The attempt to force Claver-Carone’s election is breaking an unwritten tradition established by former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower 60 years ago and respected by all his successors—until Trump—that the presidency should be held by a Latin American citizen. The liberal international order created by the United States after World War II, made up of multilateral organizations such as the IDB, is based on rules. Those rules allow the United States to hold leadership through consensus and a certain amount of legitimacy. Trump is breaching these agreements, spurring distrust and anti-Americanism in the region, and thus undermining U.S. interests. Controlling wallets seems to be more important than winning hearts and minds.
The United States is also attacking countries that try to defend those rules, creating rivalries where there are none. Claver-Carone mentioned Argentina in harsh terms six times in the last conference call organized by the State Department. “We are seeing a minority effort, led by the government of Argentina, to be able to block the election because they have not been able to present, or have not wanted to present, a competitive vision,” he said.
The Argentine government denied that not providing a quorum was an illegal tactic, as the U.S. candidate claimed. “We are filibustering, which is something allowed by IDB regulations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lisandro Sabanés told me. Chile, governed by conservative President Sebastián Piñera, also repudiated the statements of Claver-Carone, who had called Chilean Foreign Minister Andrés Allamand “old-fashioned.” “The aggressive statements confirm that his election would be very inadequate,” the Chilean minister declared to the press.
The IDB has worked well with a Latin American president and a U.S. vice president. Why change things now? The Argentine government and the Brazilian opposition believe that Trump will use the bank as a weapon to condition financial assistance on extreme loyalty to Washington, at a time when Beijing is becoming the main trading partner and investor in infrastructure for many countries in the region. Moreover, it opens a Pandora’s box for other multilateral institutions: If the United States takes the IDB presidency today, tomorrow it could try to do the same at the IMF, which is traditionally led by a European.
The U.S. image under Trump is also at a record low in the region. Although Trump did not invade countries in the region, as some of his predecessors did, most of his policies are hated and rejected. Promising to build a wall on the border with Mexico, which would be paid for by the Mexicans, whom he accused of “bringing drugs” and “crime” and being “rapists”; claiming that Haiti and El Salvador are “shithole countries”; imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum from Argentina and Brazil; and invoking the Monroe Doctrine have done nothing to strengthen inter-American ties. Taking the IDB presidency would aggravate the perception that Latin American public opinion has of the United States and of Trump himself.
And why is there such a rush to elect a bank president just over 50 days before the U.S. presidential election? Will Claver-Carone be able to work in harmony with a potential Joe Biden administration, whose presidential campaign has let its opposition to that candidacy leak? Everything seems to indicate that he will not.
Claver-Carone himself would be a bad choice even if he wasn’t American. He lacks expertise in areas the region needs to improve more than ever, such as cooperation to revive the economy, rebuilding its health infrastructure, and lifting millions of its people out of poverty. “I think it would increase the divisions within Latin America. Divisions that have more to do with the ideology of the governments in power than with the long-term interests of the states,” said Francisco de Santibañes, the director-general at the Argentine Council for International Relations. “Center-left governments, such as Argentina, would see this as an imposition and a dangerous precedent. It is possible that, if the appointment succeeds, the Latin American left will become a little more anti-American. But I wouldn’t exaggerate its importance,” he added.
All of this benefits China. Beijing watches with a big smile as a large part of the region fights with the White House. As China intensifies its mask diplomacy, Trump sends a diametrically opposed signal: The IDB is mine. Nothing could be more auspicious for the interests of China, the main trading partner of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru.
If the U.S.-led coalition does not achieve a quorum for the meeting, but at the same time does not agree to postpone the elections until March 2021, as Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Costa Rica have requested, there will be a catastrophic tie that would plunge the IDB into paralysis. But one of those countries could break the deadlock at the IDB board. Although Mexican officials have spoken against Claver-Carone’s candidacy, Mexico could provide a quorum this weekend in order to facilitate his election. The discussion, then, would be about who will be the vice president.
If Trump takes over the IDB, the international liberal order in the Western Hemisphere would be damaged beyond repair. To find a way out of this maze, it is useful to listen to the former statesman who created the IDB. “If we, the United States, have been at fault we stand ready to be corrected,” Eisenhower said in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in August 1958, when he proposed the creation of the bank. Perhaps Latin America is just honoring his words. Unfortunately, it may not be enough.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--Artists of the World, Unite

Artists of the World, Unite

Heard about the new James Bond movie , soon going into production , which features a Chinese hacker who manages to penetrate the northeastern United States ’ electric grid ?
Thought so .
It is not actually in production , nor is it ever going to be .
From now on , entertainment may feature American villains , Russian villains , evil Iranians , Germans , and cops , but there won ’ t be a new Dr. No .
Chinese censors wouldn ’ t like it , so why bother trying ?
Attempts to stay on China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in its new live-action version of the movie Mulan , Disney even credits the Turpan Public Security Bureau , an institution that helps operate Uighur internment camps .
Such behavior is not just demeaning to the artists involved , it ’ s harmful to democracy .
And although the Chinese censors are mighty , they can be defeated through collective action .
Artists of the world , unite !
Two years ago , Disney , the powerful studio now humbly thanking an arm of the Chinese government , was seemingly unaware of Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Christopher Robin , a live-action version of the beloved Winnie the Pooh stories , it found the film mysteriously blocked from the 1.4 billion viewers in the Chinese market .
Christopher Robin featured no subtle mention of Tibet , no Chinese villain in the Hundred Acre Wood .
The likely problem ?
Winnie the Pooh happens to look a lot like Chinese President Xi Jinping , which caused merriment after enterprising Chinese Internet users posted images of the two .
Tinseltown has learned to be more circumspect , as the nonprofit PEN America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hollywood studios increasingly see access to China as a prerequisite for their movies ’ financial success , ” PEN noted .
Given that China ’ s movie market overtook the United States for a quarter in 2018 , that ’ s entirely logical .
But Hollywood can ’ t bring movies to China the way it does to , say , Switzerland or India .
If it wants movies released in China , it needs to please the country ’ s censors .
Failing to do that can be the difference between a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In turn , “ Beijing bureaucrats can demand changes to Hollywood movies—or expect Hollywood insiders to anticipate and make these changes , unprompted , ” according to PEN America .
As a result , the censors usually don ’ t even need to ply their trade .
The moviemakers try their hardest to anticipate what may encounter disapproval—and that means a lot of sanitizing just in case .
The trailer for a forthcoming Top Gun sequel , for example , shows Tom Cruise wearing his familiar bomber jacket , but with the flags @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gere—a public supporter of Tibet—has said he ’ s losing movie roles .
And when the director of Seven Years in Tibet , Jean-Jacques Annaud , was recently given a new movie to direct , he published a Chinese-language penitential blog post so obsequious that it could have been written during a show trial .
“ I have always respected the rules of international conventions that acknowledge that Tibet is a part of Chinese territory , ” Annaud swore .
The artistic harm is not limited to movies .
When the Swedish pop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that she had ended her sponsorship deal with Huawei because “ China is not a nice government , ” her songs swiftly disappeared from Apple in China .
But none of Larsson ’ s fellow pop stars came to her rescue .
Why should they ?
They ’ ve got their own income to protect .
Too bad for those other artists who are either so naive or so foolhardy that they dare criticize the country that can fill their bank accounts .
But invisible censorship leads to a life led in fear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Partial paralysis has already set in , thanks to the United States ’ own outsized role in cultural production .
Last year , the majority of the 20 top-grossing movies were American .
Stars of music and film alike are adopting American themes , expressions , and language .
Wang Ju , known as “ China ’ s Beyoncé , ” raps in Chinese and English .
The Eurovision Song Contest ’ s top songs are now sung in English even though the United Kingdom is a minimal ( and rather embarrassing ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ cultures deserves more attention in pop culture .
But China ’ s censors are not going to liberate the world from Hollywood creep .
On the contrary , they ’ re a foe mightier even than Hollywood .
It is high time for artists to openly publish their views on censorship and offer a manifesto of artistic freedom .
That means : Artists of the world , unite !
Unite even though income from China is alluring , especially with the global entertainment market expected to shrink by 6 percent this year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simply because he happens to look like Xi .
Make a movie about Tibet , Hong Kong booksellers , or Uighur “ reeducation camp ” inmates if you like , not to demean Beijing but because it ’ s compelling cinematic material .
Hire Gere if he ’ s right for the role .
Speak up for Larsson , who dares to say what everyone should have said .
By all means , be apolitical as well when it suits .
But kowtowing is no guarantee against eventually finding oneself frozen out .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s biggest entertainment markets , but artists in the West are among the biggest creators .
If they were to stop showing their movies in Chinese cinemas , performing at Chinese arenas , and selling their songs to smartphone users in China—if the NBA were to stop playing in China to point out that Beijing has no right to censor NBA managers ’ views on Hong Kong—it would be Beijing that would have to contend with a very large number of unhappy people .
For the past few years , Beijing has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ victim , with the country ’ s ambassador to Sweden comparing his host country ’ s media to a lightweight boxer versus China , the heavyweight , and threatening consequences over a literary reward given to a Hong Kong bookseller with Swedish nationality .
But when it comes to pop music , Sweden is the heavyweight boxer .
Its many producers—think of Max Martin and Shellback—are the best in the world .
Only Paul McCartney and John Lennon have written more Billboard No .
1 hits than Martin .
Taylor Swift , Ed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his collaborators .
His protégé , Shellback , boasts a similarly impressive résumé that includes Katy Perry and the Jonas Brothers .
The West shouldn ’ t lecture other countries or demand that they conform to its way of life .
But if the governments of those countries want access to Western societies , the deal includes accepting mentions of free Tibet and images of Winnie the Pooh .
Every German leader has to put up with Hitler mustaches drawn onto pictures of them .
Even Russian President Vladimir Putin permits Russian translations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It would be wrong for Western leaders to read Xi the Riot Act on freedom of expression , but if artists unite rather than trying to maximize their individual advantage , they have a chance of succeeding .
If it were Martin versus Xi , it ’ s clear who people would root for .

Heard about the new James Bond movie, soon going into production, which features a Chinese hacker who manages to penetrate the northeastern United States’ electric grid?
Thought so. It is not actually in production, nor is it ever going to be. From now on, entertainment may feature American villains, Russian villains, evil Iranians, Germans, and cops, but there won’t be a new Dr. No. Chinese censors wouldn’t like it, so why bother trying? Attempts to stay on China’s good side have gone so far that in its new live-action version of the movie Mulan, Disney even credits the Turpan Public Security Bureau, an institution that helps operate Uighur internment camps.
Such behavior is not just demeaning to the artists involved, it’s harmful to democracy. And although the Chinese censors are mighty, they can be defeated through collective action. Artists of the world, unite!
For the past several years, a specter has been haunting Europe, North America, Japan, South Korea, and many other democratically ruled lands: censorship. Beijing has done its best to strengthen that ghost through its various weapons for controlling the media: its State Film Administration, State Administration of Radio and Television, and State Administration of Press and Publication; the China Film Group Corporation; the China Film Co-Production Corporation; and the Central Committee Publicity Department.
Two years ago, Disney, the powerful studio now humbly thanking an arm of the Chinese government, was seemingly unaware of Beijing’s reach. When Disney released Christopher Robin, a live-action version of the beloved Winnie the Pooh stories, it found the film mysteriously blocked from the 1.4 billion viewers in the Chinese market. Christopher Robin featured no subtle mention of Tibet, no Chinese villain in the Hundred Acre Wood. The likely problem? Winnie the Pooh happens to look a lot like Chinese President Xi Jinping, which caused merriment after enterprising Chinese Internet users posted images of the two.
Tinseltown has learned to be more circumspect, as the nonprofit PEN America detailed in a recent report. “Hollywood studios increasingly see access to China as a prerequisite for their movies’ financial success,” PEN noted. Given that China’s movie market overtook the United States for a quarter in 2018, that’s entirely logical. But Hollywood can’t bring movies to China the way it does to, say, Switzerland or India. If it wants movies released in China, it needs to please the country’s censors. Failing to do that can be the difference between a black and a red bottom line. In turn, “Beijing bureaucrats can demand changes to Hollywood movies—or expect Hollywood insiders to anticipate and make these changes, unprompted,” according to PEN America.
As a result, the censors usually don’t even need to ply their trade. The moviemakers try their hardest to anticipate what may encounter disapproval—and that means a lot of sanitizing just in case. The trailer for a forthcoming Top Gun sequel, for example, shows Tom Cruise wearing his familiar bomber jacket, but with the flags of Taiwan and Japan altered. Richard Gere—a public supporter of Tibet—has said he’s losing movie roles. And when the director of Seven Years in Tibet, Jean-Jacques Annaud, was recently given a new movie to direct, he published a Chinese-language penitential blog post so obsequious that it could have been written during a show trial. “I have always respected the rules of international conventions that acknowledge that Tibet is a part of Chinese territory,” Annaud swore.
The artistic harm is not limited to movies. When the Swedish pop star Zara Larsson announced earlier this summer that she had ended her sponsorship deal with Huawei because “China is not a nice government,” her songs swiftly disappeared from Apple in China. But none of Larsson’s fellow pop stars came to her rescue. Why should they? They’ve got their own income to protect. Too bad for those other artists who are either so naive or so foolhardy that they dare criticize the country that can fill their bank accounts.
But invisible censorship leads to a life led in fear, not to mention creative paralysis. Partial paralysis has already set in, thanks to the United States’ own outsized role in cultural production. Last year, the majority of the 20 top-grossing movies were American. Stars of music and film alike are adopting American themes, expressions, and language. Wang Ju, known as “China’s Beyoncé,” raps in Chinese and English. The Eurovision Song Contest’s top songs are now sung in English even though the United Kingdom is a minimal (and rather embarrassing) presence. The breadth of other countries’ cultures deserves more attention in pop culture. But China’s censors are not going to liberate the world from Hollywood creep. On the contrary, they’re a foe mightier even than Hollywood. It is high time for artists to openly publish their views on censorship and offer a manifesto of artistic freedom.
That means: Artists of the world, unite! Unite even though income from China is alluring, especially with the global entertainment market expected to shrink by 6 percent this year. Don’t abandon Pooh Bear simply because he happens to look like Xi. Make a movie about Tibet, Hong Kong booksellers, or Uighur “reeducation camp” inmates if you like, not to demean Beijing but because it’s compelling cinematic material. Hire Gere if he’s right for the role. Speak up for Larsson, who dares to say what everyone should have said. By all means, be apolitical as well when it suits. But kowtowing is no guarantee against eventually finding oneself frozen out.
China may be one of the world’s biggest entertainment markets, but artists in the West are among the biggest creators. If they were to stop showing their movies in Chinese cinemas, performing at Chinese arenas, and selling their songs to smartphone users in China—if the NBA were to stop playing in China to point out that Beijing has no right to censor NBA managers’ views on Hong Kong—it would be Beijing that would have to contend with a very large number of unhappy people.
For the past few years, Beijing has singled out Sweden as its favorite bullying victim, with the country’s ambassador to Sweden comparing his host country’s media to a lightweight boxer versus China, the heavyweight, and threatening consequences over a literary reward given to a Hong Kong bookseller with Swedish nationality. But when it comes to pop music, Sweden is the heavyweight boxer. Its many producers—think of Max Martin and Shellback—are the best in the world. Only Paul McCartney and John Lennon have written more Billboard No. 1 hits than Martin. Taylor Swift, Ed Sheeran, and Ariana Grande are all his collaborators. His protégé, Shellback, boasts a similarly impressive résumé that includes Katy Perry and the Jonas Brothers.
The West shouldn’t lecture other countries or demand that they conform to its way of life. But if the governments of those countries want access to Western societies, the deal includes accepting mentions of free Tibet and images of Winnie the Pooh. Every German leader has to put up with Hitler mustaches drawn onto pictures of them. Even Russian President Vladimir Putin permits Russian translations of books critical of his country. It would be wrong for Western leaders to read Xi the Riot Act on freedom of expression, but if artists unite rather than trying to maximize their individual advantage, they have a chance of succeeding. If it were Martin versus Xi, it’s clear who people would root for.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--A North Korea Strategy for the Next Administration

A North Korea Strategy for the Next Administration During an election year , it is natural to think about all the ways that U.S. foreign policy might change .
One arena that seems particularly ripe for rethinking is its approach to North Korea .
Democratic nominee Joe Biden has talked of a reset , particularly with allies and China , while President Donald Trump has said he ’ d seek to make a deal “ very quickly ” if reelected on Nov. 3 .
Engagement is a real possibility but achieving meaningful dialogue that leads to a more sustainable arrangement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But before engaging Pyongyang again , the next administration needs to understand how North Koreans view the United States , and how they would interpret new policies .
Over the decades , both Republican and Democratic administrations have tried to engage Pyongyang to improve relations and change its objectionable behavior .
Some have made progress toward an agreement , but all have ultimately ended in failure .
And in recent years , things have gotten worse .
Unlike his grandfather and father , Kim Jong Un is less risk averse , having conducted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ submarine-launched ballistic missile ejection tests , one of which was successful .
Kim ’ s father , Kim Jong Il , tested only 16 ; his grandfather , Kim Il Sung , 15 .
After North Korea ’ s last nuclear test in 2017 , Pyongyang announced that it had detonated a hydrogen bomb that could be loaded onto an intercontinental ballistic missile .
A North Korea with 300 nuclear weapons is very different from a North Korea with 30 nuclear weapons .
As Pyongyang advances its delivery systems and technological capabilities , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should change the U.S. calculus .
Active measures to counter North Korean cybercrime must be likewise prioritized , given how lucrative it has become .
Firms trading in commodities such as petroleum , coal , sand , and luxury goods should be put on notice , but countries involved in such trade with North Korea should be given a chance to take action against such trade if they are unwittingly involved .
Suppliers and distributors that fail in their due diligence must be penalized .
Meanwhile , banks wittingly processing North Korean transactions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be named , shamed , and penalized .
Shipping activity needs to be closely monitored , as does Pyongyang ’ s desire to develop its chemical and biological programs .
Disruption of North Korea ’ s arms trade and military cooperation with Iran and Syria should rank high on the agenda , as should seeking to sever military trade with countries in Africa and Southeast Asia .
At the same time , Washington should reenergize work with its allies in Seoul , Tokyo , Canberra , the EU , and the United Kingdom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ones , and coordinate diplomatic pressure to stop illicit North Korean activities abroad .
Seoul and Tokyo are instrumental to this approach and both need to be committed to this effort .
Time and time again , Pyongyang has tried to divide the alliance .
Such activities can not go unaddressed .
Nor can military provocations .
Since the last U.N. Security Council resolution imposed on North Korea in 2017 , Pyongyang has launched more than 20 missiles , including successfully test firing a submarine-based missile in October 2019 .
But Washington has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Nations .
The failure to do so sends the wrong message to Kim .
Instead , the Security Council should adopt the recommendations from the latest annual report of the U.N. DPRK Panel of Experts .
All nations agreed to the report when it went public , so there should be no hesitation on implementing its recommendations .
Washington should also have a draft resolution ready to go for the next provocation .
It is a matter of “ when , ” not “ if.
” Meanwhile , a focus on Pyongyang @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowed to obscure its atrocious human rights practices nor to block any effort to mitigate them .
In fact , improving human rights conditions in North Korea should be an integral policy objective .
Pyongyang ’ s sensitivity to criticism of its human rights record , particularly from South Korea , should be leveraged toward positive change and no matter the temptation , should not be seen as a potential concession in negotiations .
Increased political and economic isolation will significantly increase North Korea ’ s dependence on China and Russia , particularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s largest trading partner .
But for Pyongyang , Beijing isn ’ t the be all and end all .
It still seeks security assurances , sanctions relief , and diplomatic recognition from Washington , and while Beijing may be able to offer the country some support , only Washington can offer some of the things Pyongyang wants .
Washington and Beijing will never be in lock step , but Beijing does share Washington ’ s desire for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula—even if it does not believe it is achievable in the short @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official should lead an effort to meet regularly with Chinese counterparts , and working-level interagency experts should provide support on both sides for constructive engagement .
The goal should be making steps toward developing a regularized U.S.-Chinese working group on North Korea to discuss isolating North Korea and to identify where North Koreans are violating U.N. Security resolutions on Chinese soil , which is an embarrassment to Beijing .
If Beijing fails to enforce the United Nations ’ resolutions after sustained engagement or coordination , Washington should be prepared to pursue unilateral action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing should not be led to believe that cooperation is a tradeoff for other U.S. policy concessions .
For 30 years , Pyongyang has used talks for short-term tactical concessions .
That can ’ t be allowed anymore .
Instead , a constant , evolving phase-by-phase engagement needs to include measures to buttress sanctions and other pressure tools in order to probe , test , and assess intent .
Before coming to the negotiating table , both sides will need to agree to the ultimate goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ballistic missile program .
Achieving this goal will be constructed in a phase-by-phase approach .
When Pyongyang agrees to freeze its weapons programs , the introduction of new sanctions should also freeze , beginning engagement .
Washington will need to identify goals for each phase and to determine how to ensure the implementation of the agreed phases as they go forward .
Both sides will need to recognize that each subsequent phase may evolve , with some making more progress than others .
These phases might include freezes , verification of sites , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Given the threat from North Korea ’ s ballistic missile launches to the region , ballistic missiles need to be part of any arrangement made on the nuclear program .
Washington will need to anticipate Pyongyang ’ s “ asks ” and identify redlines .
Pyongyang will no doubt cheat , but that does not mean Washington should withdraw from talks .
Cheating should be built into the equation as a beginning and not an end .
In the meantime , any sanctions relief should start with vertically integrated industries , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ integrated service-oriented industries such as the foreign workers program and textiles require foreign supply chains or partners .
Sanctions on weapons-related programs and illicit cyber activities must remain in effect .
When Pyongyang began its nuclear program in the early 1950s , the country ’ s survival seemed much less certain .
Steps toward meaningful dialogue will require resources , commitment , and patience over years—if not decades .
This process may very well outlast any U.S. administration .
If nothing is done , not only will there be renewed danger , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outside of Pyongyang , will suffer the most as Kim reallocates scarce resources to prioritize his weapons programs .
And that makes it all the more important for the next administration to have an effective , calibrated strategy to pressure the regime , even if it only contains Pyongyang ’ s weapons programs until that opportune time for dialogue comes again .

During an election year, it is natural to think about all the ways that U.S. foreign policy might change. One arena that seems particularly ripe for rethinking is its approach to North Korea. Democratic nominee Joe Biden has talked of a reset, particularly with allies and China, while President Donald Trump has said he’d seek to make a deal “very quickly” if reelected on Nov. 3. Engagement is a real possibility but achieving meaningful dialogue that leads to a more sustainable arrangement would require a phase-by-phase deal-making approach.
During an election year, it is natural to think about all the ways that U.S. foreign policy might change. One arena that seems particularly ripe for rethinking is its approach to North Korea. Democratic nominee Joe Biden has talked of a reset, particularly with allies and China, while President Donald Trump has said he’d seek to make a deal “very quickly” if reelected on Nov. 3. Engagement is a real possibility but achieving meaningful dialogue that leads to a more sustainable arrangement would require a phase-by-phase deal-making approach.
But before engaging Pyongyang again, the next administration needs to understand how North Koreans view the United States, and how they would interpret new policies.
Over the decades, both Republican and Democratic administrations have tried to engage Pyongyang to improve relations and change its objectionable behavior. Some have made progress toward an agreement, but all have ultimately ended in failure. And in recent years, things have gotten worse. Unlike his grandfather and father, Kim Jong Un is less risk averse, having conducted nearly 120 missile launches, including two submarine-launched ballistic missile ejection tests, one of which was successful. Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, tested only 16; his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, 15. After North Korea’s last nuclear test in 2017, Pyongyang announced that it had detonated a hydrogen bomb that could be loaded onto an intercontinental ballistic missile. A North Korea with 300 nuclear weapons is very different from a North Korea with 30 nuclear weapons. As Pyongyang advances its delivery systems and technological capabilities, the threat grows. All of this should change the U.S. calculus.
Any new administration would have to apply pressure using economic, diplomatic, and liaison channels in countries in Africa and Southeast Asia where North Korea continues to operate, selling weapons and conducting illicit trade. The goal would be to squeeze North Korea out and cut it off from earnings through criminal activities. The message must be clear to those who turn a blind eye: They, too, will increasingly face serious sanctions.
Active measures to counter North Korean cybercrime must be likewise prioritized, given how lucrative it has become. Firms trading in commodities such as petroleum, coal, sand, and luxury goods should be put on notice, but countries involved in such trade with North Korea should be given a chance to take action against such trade if they are unwittingly involved. Suppliers and distributors that fail in their due diligence must be penalized. Meanwhile, banks wittingly processing North Korean transactions and holding accounts for front companies should be named, shamed, and penalized. Shipping activity needs to be closely monitored, as does Pyongyang’s desire to develop its chemical and biological programs. Disruption of North Korea’s arms trade and military cooperation with Iran and Syria should rank high on the agenda, as should seeking to sever military trade with countries in Africa and Southeast Asia.
At the same time, Washington should reenergize work with its allies in Seoul, Tokyo, Canberra, the EU, and the United Kingdom to harmonize existing sanctions, introduce new ones, and coordinate diplomatic pressure to stop illicit North Korean activities abroad. Seoul and Tokyo are instrumental to this approach and both need to be committed to this effort. Time and time again, Pyongyang has tried to divide the alliance. Such activities cannot go unaddressed.
Nor can military provocations. Since the last U.N. Security Council resolution imposed on North Korea in 2017, Pyongyang has launched more than 20 missiles, including successfully test firing a submarine-based missile in October 2019. But Washington has not pressed for any action from the United Nations. The failure to do so sends the wrong message to Kim. Instead, the Security Council should adopt the recommendations from the latest annual report of the U.N. DPRK Panel of Experts. All nations agreed to the report when it went public, so there should be no hesitation on implementing its recommendations. Washington should also have a draft resolution ready to go for the next provocation. It is a matter of “when,” not “if.”
Meanwhile, a focus on Pyongyang’s weapons program must not be allowed to obscure its atrocious human rights practices nor to block any effort to mitigate them. In fact, improving human rights conditions in North Korea should be an integral policy objective. Pyongyang’s sensitivity to criticism of its human rights record, particularly from South Korea, should be leveraged toward positive change and no matter the temptation, should not be seen as a potential concession in negotiations.
Increased political and economic isolation will significantly increase North Korea’s dependence on China and Russia, particularly China, by far North Korea’s largest trading partner. But for Pyongyang, Beijing isn’t the be all and end all. It still seeks security assurances, sanctions relief, and diplomatic recognition from Washington, and while Beijing may be able to offer the country some support, only Washington can offer some of the things Pyongyang wants. Washington and Beijing will never be in lock step, but Beijing does share Washington’s desire for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula—even if it does not believe it is achievable in the short term.
A senior U.S. State Department official should lead an effort to meet regularly with Chinese counterparts, and working-level interagency experts should provide support on both sides for constructive engagement. The goal should be making steps toward developing a regularized U.S.-Chinese working group on North Korea to discuss isolating North Korea and to identify where North Koreans are violating U.N. Security resolutions on Chinese soil, which is an embarrassment to Beijing. If Beijing fails to enforce the United Nations’ resolutions after sustained engagement or coordination, Washington should be prepared to pursue unilateral action, ideally coordinated with allies. And Beijing should not be led to believe that cooperation is a tradeoff for other U.S. policy concessions.
For Washington, the challenge will be striking the balance between pressure and dialogue. How does Washington remain open to dialogue but not be so desirous of talks that it would significantly alleviate pressure on Pyongyang as an incentive to negotiate? Once pressure begins to work, relieving that pressure too prematurely or indiscriminately removes the motivating force that was moving Pyongyang in the right direction.
For 30 years, Pyongyang has used talks for short-term tactical concessions. That can’t be allowed anymore. Instead, a constant, evolving phase-by-phase engagement needs to include measures to buttress sanctions and other pressure tools in order to probe, test, and assess intent.
Before coming to the negotiating table, both sides will need to agree to the ultimate goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a dismantlement of North Korea’s ballistic missile program. Achieving this goal will be constructed in a phase-by-phase approach. When Pyongyang agrees to freeze its weapons programs, the introduction of new sanctions should also freeze, beginning engagement. Washington will need to identify goals for each phase and to determine how to ensure the implementation of the agreed phases as they go forward. Both sides will need to recognize that each subsequent phase may evolve, with some making more progress than others.
These phases might include freezes, verification of sites, dismantlement, reductions, and more verifications. Given the threat from North Korea’s ballistic missile launches to the region, ballistic missiles need to be part of any arrangement made on the nuclear program. Washington will need to anticipate Pyongyang’s “asks” and identify redlines. Pyongyang will no doubt cheat, but that does not mean Washington should withdraw from talks. Cheating should be built into the equation as a beginning and not an end.
In the meantime, any sanctions relief should start with vertically integrated industries, such as the commodities trade, because horizontally integrated service-oriented industries such as the foreign workers program and textiles require foreign supply chains or partners. Sanctions on weapons-related programs and illicit cyber activities must remain in effect.
When Pyongyang began its nuclear program in the early 1950s, the country’s survival seemed much less certain. Steps toward meaningful dialogue will require resources, commitment, and patience over years—if not decades. This process may very well outlast any U.S. administration. If nothing is done, not only will there be renewed danger, but the North Korean people, particularly those outside of Pyongyang, will suffer the most as Kim reallocates scarce resources to prioritize his weapons programs. And that makes it all the more important for the next administration to have an effective, calibrated strategy to pressure the regime, even if it only contains Pyongyang’s weapons programs until that opportune time for dialogue comes again.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--Biden Has a Serious Credibility Problem in Asia

Biden Has a Serious Credibility Problem in Asia Bilahari Kausikan , a former high-ranking Singaporean diplomat , is known to be outspoken .
But his recent comments about Susan Rice , a U.S. national security advisor during the Obama administration , were even blunter than usual .
“ Rice would be a disaster , ” he wrote on Facebook in August , when Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden was reportedly considering Rice as a running mate .
Kausikan described her as weak-willed on Beijing : “ She was amongst those who thought the United States should get China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of international relations.
” His prediction in case of a Biden victory : “ We will look back on Trump with nostalgia.
” If Kausikan ’ s sharp views have often made him an intellectual outlier in Asia , this case is different .
To a degree that will surprise many in Washington , the United States ’ friends in the region are quietly anxious about a Biden victory , and that counts even more for vital partners such as Japan and India .
In the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both the left and right find him offensive and despair of his politics—and assume that any right-minded foreigner would , too .
That may be the case in much of Europe , but not so in much of Asia : Officials in Tokyo , Taipei , New Delhi , Singapore , and other capitals have grown relatively comfortable with Trump and his tough approach on China .
The prospect of a Biden presidency , by contrast , brings back uncomfortable memories of an Obama era that many Asian movers and shakers recall as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or not that memory is correct is beside the point .
Biden has an Asian credibility problem—and one that may prove tricky to solve .
In his speech at the Democratic convention , Biden described four priorities for his administration , including tackling COVID-19 and promoting racial justice .
Managing China , a vital concern among Asian foreign policy elites , did not make the list .
This kind of omission gets noticed in Tokyo , for instance , where Japan ’ s views on Trump were nicely encapsulated in an April article @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ The Virtues of a Confrontational China Strategy ” , was written by an anonymous Japanese foreign ministry official and was scathing about an Obama-era China policy , whose “ priority mission was always to engage China , ” not compete with it .
Trump ’ s policies were imperfect , the author argued , but his more robust approach to Beijing was welcome .
“ Do we want , if possible , to go back to the world before Trump ?
” the Japanese official asked .
“ For many decision-makers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no , because having a poorly implemented but fundamentally correct strategy [ under Trump ] is better than having a well-implemented but ambiguous strategy [ under Obama ] .
” As it grapples with rapidly deteriorating Sino-Indian ties , New Delhi is increasingly likely to value Trump ’ s anti-Chinese policies .
To be fair , the anonymous article represents just one strain of thinking in Tokyo .
But its publication almost certainly required formal foreign ministry approval , which suggests that it reflects the views of many senior officials .
And it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own most recent visit to Japan in late 2019 , during which senior officials and foreign affairs analysts seemed remarkably sanguine about what another Trump term would mean .
Biden ’ s election , by contrast , would risk the return of an approach many characterized as lacking the political will to manage and contain Chinese power .
A similar line of thinking lurks beneath the surface in New Delhi .
Speaking last year , Subrahmanyam Jaishankar , India ’ s cerebral External Affairs Minister , pushed back against those who thought Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ What I have seen with Trump in the last two or three years was not at all the traditional American system , ” he said .
“ You actually got big bold decisive steps in a range of areas.
” As it grapples with rapidly deteriorating Sino-Indian ties , New Delhi is increasingly likely to value Trump ’ s chaotic but forceful anti-Chinese policies .
At the very least , Biden ’ s arrival could complicate India ’ s strategic position , as foreign affairs commentator Raja Mohan argued recently when he predicted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China while ending Trump ’ s lenient approach to Russia .
“ New strains in the US-Russia relations and a Sino-US rapprochement under Biden will certainly complicate India ’ s great power relations , ” he wrote .
Similar worries are found in Taiwan , where foreign affairs officials are understandably sensitive to changes in U.S. China policy , and where the recent visit of U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar underlined deepening ties with Washington .
“ Taiwan has benefited during Trump ’ s first term , ” said Chieh-Ting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan Institute , a Washington-based policy group .
Speaking for many in Taiwan , he backed “ the current course over untested campaign promises.
” Biden ’ s campaign would disagree with those in Asia who seem relaxed about Trump ’ s return , and in many ways they would be right to do so .
A second Trump administration is likely to cause considerable damage to the region , from his dismissive and transactional approach to existing U.S. alliances to the small but rising risk of a destabilizing military conflict with China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doubts about Biden are far from universal .
Many in the region would welcome a less pugnacious period of U.S. diplomacy , and hope for a new period of accommodation .
“ The two powers must work out a modus vivendi that will be competitive in some areas without allowing rivalry to poison cooperation in others , ” as Singapore ’ s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote recently—a prospect more likely under Biden than Trump .
What ’ s more , Biden has by now articulated a far tougher China policy than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Xi Jinping a “ thug ” in one Democratic presidential debate earlier this year .
In another , he painted China as “ an authoritarian dictatorship.
” Like most U.S. political leaders , he has long given up on the idea that China can be reformed , arguing instead that the United States must out-compete its Asian rival .
His campaign has sent more subtle signals to Asian audiences too , not least by reaching out to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) and hinting that Biden would make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump so often skipped .
“ ASEAN is essential to tackling major challenges like climate change and global health , ” Anthony Blinken , one of Biden ’ s senior advisors , recently wrote on Twitter .
“ President Biden will show up and engage ASEAN on critical issues.
” Biden ’ s emphasis on values might appeal to U.S. progressives , but in Asia it comes with less fortunate Obama-era overtones .
Yet even as Biden and his team push this more hawkish China tone , they face dilemmas .
The first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this a centerpiece of a tougher approach to Beijing , often highlighting the plight of millions of ethnic Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang .
“ I ’ ll put values back at the center of American foreign policy , ” he said in a toughly worded statement this month that also focused on Tibet .
This might appeal to U.S. progressives , but in Asia it comes with less fortunate Obama-era overtones of Washington lecturing its friends and pushing for democratic reforms .
Then there is a second problem of conflicting priorities , most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States does need to get tough with China , ” Biden wrote recently .
“ The most effective way to meet that challenge is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China ’ s abusive behaviors and human rights violations , even as we seek to cooperate with Beijing on issues where our interests converge , such as climate change.
” Given his alarming lack of interest in climate issues , this tension never troubled Trump .
Biden can not wish it away , and is under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his own party .
Any hope of doing so , however , requires engagement with China as the world ’ s largest carbon emitter .
For critics like Kausikan , it is precisely this rebalancing of issues that suggests Biden could return to what they view as Obama ’ s mushy mix of priorities .
Ultimately , Asian nations will adapt to whichever candidate ends up in the White House .
Were Biden to prevail , he may be able to assuage his doubters quickly , leaving little nostalgia for Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , Asia ’ s doubts about him are real .
Biden ’ s true priority is to win over American voters .
But given that he has put working with U.S. partners in Asia at the heart of any future foreign policy , a little more reassurance would not go amiss .

Bilahari Kausikan, a former high-ranking Singaporean diplomat, is known to be outspoken. But his recent comments about Susan Rice, a U.S. national security advisor during the Obama administration, were even blunter than usual. “ Rice would be a disaster ,” he wrote on Facebook in August, when Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden was reportedly considering Rice as a running mate. Kausikan described Rice—a possible candidate for secretary of state or defense in a Biden adminstration—as weak-willed on Beijing: “She was amongst those who thought the United States should deemphasise competition to get China’s cooperation on climate change, which is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of international relations.” His prediction in case of a Biden victory: “We will look back on Trump with nostalgia.”
Bilahari Kausikan, a former high-ranking Singaporean diplomat, is known to be outspoken. But his recent comments about Susan Rice, a U.S. national security advisor during the Obama administration, were even blunter than usual. “Rice would be a disaster,” he wrote on Facebook in August, when Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden was reportedly considering Rice as a running mate. Kausikan described Rice—a possible candidate for secretary of state or defense in a Biden adminstration—as weak-willed on Beijing: “She was amongst those who thought the United States should deemphasise competition to get China’s cooperation on climate change, which is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of international relations.” His prediction in case of a Biden victory: “We will look back on Trump with nostalgia.”
If Kausikan’s sharp views have often made him an intellectual outlier in Asia, this case is different. To a degree that will surprise many in Washington, the United States’ friends in the region are quietly anxious about a Biden victory, and that counts even more for vital partners such as Japan and India. In the United States, Trump’s critics on both the left and right find him offensive and despair of his politics—and assume that any right-minded foreigner would, too. That may be the case in much of Europe, but not so in much of Asia: Officials in Tokyo, Taipei, New Delhi, Singapore, and other capitals have grown relatively comfortable with Trump and his tough approach on China. The prospect of a Biden presidency, by contrast, brings back uncomfortable memories of an Obama era that many Asian movers and shakers recall as unfocused and soft toward Beijing. Whether or not that memory is correct is beside the point. Biden has an Asian credibility problem—and one that may prove tricky to solve.
In his speech at the Democratic convention, Biden described four priorities for his administration, including tackling COVID-19 and promoting racial justice. Managing China, a vital concern among Asian foreign policy elites, did not make the list. This kind of omission gets noticed in Tokyo, for instance, where Japan’s views on Trump were nicely encapsulated in an April article in the American Interest. The essay, “The Virtues of a Confrontational China Strategy”, was written by an anonymous Japanese foreign ministry official and was scathing about an Obama-era China policy, whose “priority mission was always to engage China,” not compete with it. Trump’s policies were imperfect, the author argued, but his more robust approach to Beijing was welcome. “Do we want, if possible, to go back to the world before Trump?” the Japanese official asked. “For many decision-makers in Tokyo, the answer is probably no, because having a poorly implemented but fundamentally correct strategy [under Trump] is better than having a well-implemented but ambiguous strategy [under Obama].”
As it grapples with rapidly deteriorating Sino-Indian ties, New Delhi is increasingly likely to value Trump’s anti-Chinese policies.
To be fair, the anonymous article represents just one strain of thinking in Tokyo. But its publication almost certainly required formal foreign ministry approval, which suggests that it reflects the views of many senior officials. And it chimes with what I heard on my own most recent visit to Japan in late 2019, during which senior officials and foreign affairs analysts seemed remarkably sanguine about what another Trump term would mean. Biden’s election, by contrast, would risk the return of an approach many characterized as lacking the political will to manage and contain Chinese power.
A similar line of thinking lurks beneath the surface in New Delhi. Speaking last year, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s cerebral External Affairs Minister, pushed back against those who thought Trump had damaged ties with India. “What I have seen with Trump in the last two or three years was not at all the traditional American system,” he said. “You actually got big bold decisive steps in a range of areas.” As it grapples with rapidly deteriorating Sino-Indian ties, New Delhi is increasingly likely to value Trump’s chaotic but forceful anti-Chinese policies. At the very least, Biden’s arrival could complicate India’s strategic position, as foreign affairs commentator Raja Mohan argued recently when he predicted that Biden would be less confrontational with China while ending Trump’s lenient approach to Russia. “New strains in the US-Russia relations and a Sino-US rapprochement under Biden will certainly complicate India’s great power relations,” he wrote.
Similar worries are found in Taiwan, where foreign affairs officials are understandably sensitive to changes in U.S. China policy, and where the recent visit of U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar underlined deepening ties with Washington. “Taiwan has benefited during Trump’s first term,” said Chieh-Ting Yeh, vice chairman of the Global Taiwan Institute, a Washington-based policy group. He said many in Taiwan would back “the current course over untested campaign promises.”
Biden’s campaign would disagree with those in Asia who seem relaxed about Trump’s return, and in many ways they would be right to do so. A second Trump administration is likely to cause considerable damage to the region, from his dismissive and transactional approach to existing U.S. alliances to the small but rising risk of a destabilizing military conflict with China itself. It is also true that doubts about Biden are far from universal. Many in the region would welcome a less pugnacious period of U.S. diplomacy, and hope for a new period of accommodation. “The two powers must work out a modus vivendi that will be competitive in some areas without allowing rivalry to poison cooperation in others,” as Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote recently—a prospect more likely under Biden than Trump.
What’s more, Biden has by now articulated a far tougher China policy than Obama ever did. He called Chinese President Xi Jinping a “thug” in one Democratic presidential debate earlier this year. In another, he painted China as “an authoritarian dictatorship.” Like most U.S. political leaders, he has long given up on the idea that China can be reformed, arguing instead that the United States must out-compete its Asian rival. His campaign has sent more subtle signals to Asian audiences too, not least by reaching out to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and hinting that Biden would make a point of attending regional meetings that Trump so often skipped. “ASEAN is essential to tackling major challenges like climate change and global health,” Anthony Blinken, one of Biden’s senior advisors, recently wrote on Twitter. “President Biden will show up and engage ASEAN on critical issues.”
Biden’s emphasis on values might appeal to U.S. progressives, but in Asia it comes with less fortunate Obama-era overtones.
Yet even as Biden and his team push this more hawkish China tone, they face dilemmas. The first involves human rights. Biden has made this a centerpiece of a tougher approach to Beijing, often highlighting the plight of millions of ethnic Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. “I’ll put values back at the center of American foreign policy,” he said in a toughly worded statement this month that also focused on Tibet. This might appeal to U.S. progressives, but in Asia it comes with less fortunate Obama-era overtones of Washington lecturing its friends and pushing for democratic reforms.
Then there is a second problem of conflicting priorities, most obviously over climate change. “The United States does need to get tough with China,” Biden wrote recently. “The most effective way to meet that challenge is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviors and human rights violations, even as we seek to cooperate with Beijing on issues where our interests converge, such as climate change.” Given his alarming lack of interest in climate issues, this tension never troubled Trump. Biden cannot wish it away, and is under immense pressure to make progress from within his own party. Any hope of doing so, however, requires engagement with China as the world’s largest carbon emitter. For critics like Kausikan, it is precisely this rebalancing of issues that suggests Biden could return to what they view as Obama’s mushy mix of priorities.
Ultimately, Asian nations will adapt to whichever candidate ends up in the White House. Were Biden to prevail, he may be able to assuage his doubters quickly, leaving little nostalgia for Trump’s era of unpredictability. For now, however, Asia’s doubts about him are real. Biden’s true priority is to win over American voters. But given that he has put working with U.S. partners in Asia at the heart of any future foreign policy, a little more reassurance would not go amiss.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--Macron Hosts Eastern Med Summit as Russian Involvement Deepens

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : France chairs a meeting with Mediterranean leaders on the Greece-Turkey standoff , the British government faces a barrage of criticism over its efforts to override the Brexit deal , and the Afghan vice president narrowly survives an assassination attempt as intra-Afghan talks await .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
French President Emmanuel Macron will host a summit of the European Union ’ s informal Med7 group—consisting of the bloc ’ s seven Mediterranean countries—to try to form a consensus on several regional challenges , including Libya and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , will be the ongoing standoff between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean .
In addition to Macron , the leaders of Greece , Spain , Portugal , Italy , Cyprus , and Malta are expected to attend the summit on the French island of Corsica .
Greece and Turkey , both NATO members but longtime regional rivals , have overlapping maritime claims in the region , where a large deposit of oil and gas was recently discovered .
The dispute boiled into a crisis last month after both countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flex their military muscle .
Writing for Foreign Policy recently , Michaël Tanchum explained the origins of the crisis .
Interest from abroad .
International actors are now playing a growing role in the dispute .
On Aug. 14 , EU foreign ministers held an emergency meeting to discuss the crisis , and although they did not hammer out a long-term resolution , EU leaders are expected to announce more comprehensive action against Turkey after the EU summit later this month .
Measures against Turkey could include sanctions and suspending its application to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , France is working to support Greece militarily .
French troops have participated in military exercises with Greece in recent weeks , and in the days leading up to today ’ s summit , it was reported that Greece is in talks with France over purchasing fighter jets to boost its defense capabilities .
Russia taking on a greater role .
Russia has also shown an interest in the dispute .
Last week , Turkey announced that Russian troops would be participating in several live-fire military exercises this month , and in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow was prepared to step in and help “ resolve differences through dialogue and within a legal framework ” if the main actors requested its direct involvement .
Where is the United States ?
Although the U.S. State Department has expressed deep concern “ about Turkey ’ s continued activities in the region ” and supports dialogue between Ankara and Athens , Washington has been notably absent as a mediator in the dispute , largely leaving it to EU and other regional policymakers .
More @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The U.S. military announced on Wednesday that it is reducing its troop presence in Iraq from 5,200 personnel to 3,000 , formalizing a larger withdrawal process that has been underway for several months now .
“ We are continuing to expand on our partner capacity programs that enable Iraqi forces and allow us to reduce our footprint in Iraq , ” said General Frank McKenzie , the head of U.S. Central Command .
The United States and Iraq both affirmed their commitment to the reduction of U.S. troops in June , and this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country handed over to Iraqi forces .
Britain under heavy criticism .
On Wednesday , the British government published its controversial internal market bill , which aims to override key parts of last year ’ s Brexit withdrawal agreement , including the highly contentious Northern Ireland protocol .
Prime Minister Boris Johnson told Parliament that the bill would “ ensure the integrity of the UK internal market , ” a nod to Northern Ireland ’ s fiercely pro-Britain unionist parties .
The bill has brought a torrent of criticism on the government .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ said that the bill “ would break international law and [ undermine ] trust , ” echoing a widely-held belief among critics of the bill .
But as Garvan Walshe wrote in Foreign Policy yesterday , the move shouldn ’ t necessarily come as a surprise .
London ’ s attempt to renege on its commitments “ is entirely in line with the transactional diplomacy and imperial-era sovereignty spirit of the Brexiteers.
” Violence continues in Afghanistan .
Afghan First Vice President Amrullah Saleh , a prominent Taliban critic , survived an assassination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kabul , underscoring a growing body of dissent toward the ongoing Afghan peace process .
The interior ministry confirmed that 10 people were killed in the attack and at least 15 were wounded .
The Taliban , whose negotiating team is currently in Doha , Qatar , awaiting the start of peace talks with the Afghan government , has denied all responsibility .
The attack is part of a wave of violence that has hit Afghanistan in recent weeks .
Last week , the United Nations ’ top official in Afghanistan warned that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was threatening to derail the entire peace process .
Dissent in Ethiopia grows .
Ethiopia ’ s northern Tigray region held local elections on Wednesday , defying the national government as pressure on Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed continues to mount .
Elections were originally scheduled to take place in August , but Abiy ’ s government postponed the vote due to coronavirus concerns .
Tigrayan officials warned that a government intervention to prevent the vote would be tantamount a “ declaration of war.
” Although the upper house of the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has so far ruled out military intervention .
The Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front , the region ’ s ruling party and the country ’ s dominant party before the realignment of Ethiopian politics in 2019 after Abiy ’ s takeover , is expected to top the poll .
Saudi Arabia doubles down on Palestine .
In a statement following a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers on Wednesday , Saudi Arabia said that it supports all efforts to achieve a lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , and that it continues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state based on the pre-1967 borders .
Members of the Arab League met on Wednesday to discuss a range of social , economic , and political issues , but paid special attention to Palestinian statehood in the wake of the UAE-Israel deal , which has rankled Palestinians and caused some strain in the Arab world over the issue of Palestinian statehood .
The Saudi statement did not comment on the deal .
No more President Xi ?
U.S. lawmakers have proposed a bill that would strip Chinese President Xi Jinping of the title @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic circles .
Republican Rep. Scott Perry introduced the bill last month , which would prohibit the federal government from using any term other than General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Community Party ( or simply General Secretary ) to refer to Xi , in order to remove the notion that Xi commands the same legitimacy as democratically-elected presidents in Western democracies .
Although “ president ” isn ’ t used to refer to Xi in China ( where the confluence of his many titles is notoriously complicated ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government , media , and business .
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Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: France chairs a meeting with Mediterranean leaders on the Greece-Turkey standoff , the British government faces a barrage of criticism over its efforts to override the Brexit deal , and the Afghan vice president narrowly survives an assassination attempt as intra-Afghan talks await.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: France chairs a meeting with Mediterranean leaders on the Greece-Turkey standoff, the British government faces a barrage of criticism over its efforts to override the Brexit deal, and the Afghan vice president narrowly survives an assassination attempt as intra-Afghan talks await.
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Eastern Mediterranean Crisis Looms Over Med7 Summit
French President Emmanuel Macron will host a summit of the European Union’s informal Med7 group—consisting of the bloc’s seven Mediterranean countries—to try to form a consensus on several regional challenges, including Libya and Syria. The main item of discussion, however, will be the ongoing standoff between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition to Macron, the leaders of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Cyprus, and Malta are expected to attend the summit on the French island of Corsica.
Greece and Turkey, both NATO members but longtime regional rivals, have overlapping maritime claims in the region, where a large deposit of oil and gas was recently discovered. The dispute boiled into a crisis last month after both countries sent naval vessels to the area to flex their military muscle. Writing for Foreign Policy recently, Michaël Tanchum explained the origins of the crisis.
Interest from abroad. International actors are now playing a growing role in the dispute. On Aug. 14, EU foreign ministers held an emergency meeting to discuss the crisis, and although they did not hammer out a long-term resolution, EU leaders are expected to announce more comprehensive action against Turkey after the EU summit later this month. Measures against Turkey could include sanctions and suspending its application to join the bloc.
In the meantime, France is working to support Greece militarily. French troops have participated in military exercises with Greece in recent weeks, and in the days leading up to today’s summit, it was reported that Greece is in talks with France over purchasing fighter jets to boost its defense capabilities.
Russia taking on a greater role. Russia has also shown an interest in the dispute. Last week, Turkey announced that Russian troops would be participating in several live-fire military exercises this month, and in a meeting with his Cypriot counterpart on Tuesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow was prepared to step in and help “resolve differences through dialogue and within a legal framework” if the main actors requested its direct involvement.
Where is the United States? Although the U.S. State Department has expressed deep concern “about Turkey’s continued activities in the region” and supports dialogue between Ankara and Athens, Washington has been notably absent as a mediator in the dispute, largely leaving it to EU and other regional policymakers.
What We’re Following Today
More U.S. troops pulling out of Iraq. The U.S. military announced on Wednesday that it is reducing its troop presence in Iraq from 5,200 personnel to 3,000, formalizing a larger withdrawal process that has been underway for several months now. “We are continuing to expand on our partner capacity programs that enable Iraqi forces and allow us to reduce our footprint in Iraq,” said General Frank McKenzie, the head of U.S. Central Command.
The United States and Iraq both affirmed their commitment to the reduction of U.S. troops in June, and this year saw several U.S.-controlled bases in the country handed over to Iraqi forces.
Britain under heavy criticism. On Wednesday, the British government published its controversial internal market bill, which aims to override key parts of last year’s Brexit withdrawal agreement, including the highly contentious Northern Ireland protocol. Prime Minister Boris Johnson told Parliament that the bill would “ensure the integrity of the UK internal market,” a nod to Northern Ireland’s fiercely pro-Britain unionist parties.
The bill has brought a torrent of criticism on the government. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that the bill “would break international law and [undermine] trust,” echoing a widely-held belief among critics of the bill. But as Garvan Walshe wrote in Foreign Policy yesterday, the move shouldn’t necessarily come as a surprise. London’s attempt to renege on its commitments “is entirely in line with the transactional diplomacy and imperial-era sovereignty spirit of the Brexiteers.”
Violence continues in Afghanistan. Afghan First Vice President Amrullah Saleh, a prominent Taliban critic, survived an assassination attempt on Wednesday in the capital of Kabul, underscoring a growing body of dissent toward the ongoing Afghan peace process. The interior ministry confirmed that 10 people were killed in the attack and at least 15 were wounded. The Taliban, whose negotiating team is currently in Doha, Qatar, awaiting the start of peace talks with the Afghan government, has denied all responsibility.
The attack is part of a wave of violence that has hit Afghanistan in recent weeks. Last week, the United Nations’ top official in Afghanistan warned that a “near-record” level of violence was threatening to derail the entire peace process.
Keep an Eye On
Dissent in Ethiopia grows. Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region held local elections on Wednesday, defying the national government as pressure on Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed continues to mount. Elections were originally scheduled to take place in August, but Abiy’s government postponed the vote due to coronavirus concerns. Tigrayan officials warned that a government intervention to prevent the vote would be tantamount a “declaration of war.” Although the upper house of the country’s parliament called the elections unconstitutional, Abiy has so far ruled out military intervention.
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the region’s ruling party and the country’s dominant party before the realignment of Ethiopian politics in 2019 after Abiy’s takeover, is expected to top the poll.
Saudi Arabia doubles down on Palestine. In a statement following a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers on Wednesday, Saudi Arabia said that it supports all efforts to achieve a lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that it continues to support the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the pre-1967 borders.
Members of the Arab League met on Wednesday to discuss a range of social, economic, and political issues, but paid special attention to Palestinian statehood in the wake of the UAE-Israel deal, which has rankled Palestinians and caused some strain in the Arab world over the issue of Palestinian statehood. The Saudi statement did not comment on the deal.
Odds and Ends
No more President Xi? U.S. lawmakers have proposed a bill that would strip Chinese President Xi Jinping of the title of president—at least in U.S. government and diplomatic circles. Republican Rep. Scott Perry introduced the bill last month, which would prohibit the federal government from using any term other than General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Community Party (or simply General Secretary) to refer to Xi, in order to remove the notion that Xi commands the same legitimacy as democratically-elected presidents in Western democracies.
Although “president” isn’t used to refer to Xi in China (where the confluence of his many titles is notoriously complicated), it is the preferred honorific across U.S. government, media, and business.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Photo credit: Ian Langsdon/Pool/AFP via Getty Images