foreignpolicy--2020-05-22--China Has Two Paths to Global Domination

Xi Jinping ’ s China is displaying a superpower ’ s ambition .
Only a few years ago , many American observers still hoped that China would reconcile itself to a supporting role in the liberal international order or would pose—at most—a challenge to U.S. influence in the Western Pacific .
The conventional wisdom was that China would seek an expanded regional role—and a reduced U.S. role—but would defer to the distant future any global ambitions .
Now , however , the signs that China is gearing up to contest America ’ s global leadership are unmistakable , and they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at Johns Hopkins University ’ s School of Advanced International Studies .
Jake Sullivan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .
He was a deputy assistant to President Barack Obama and national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden from 2013 to 2014 , as well as director of policy planning at the U.S. State Department from 2011 to 2013 .
There is the naval shipbuilding program , which put more vessels to sea between 2014 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ships in the German , Indian , Spanish , and British navies combined .
There is Beijing ’ s bid to dominate high-tech industries that will determine the future distribution of economic and military power .
There is the campaign to control the crucial waterways off China ’ s coast , as well as reported plans to create a chain of bases and logistical facilities farther afield .
There are the systematic efforts to refine methods of converting economic influence into economic coercion throughout the Asia-Pacific and beyond .
Not least , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ formerly disguised its ambitions now asserts them openly .
China has entered a “ new era , ” Xi announced in 2017 , and must “ take center stage in the world.
” Two years later , Xi used the idea of a “ new Long March ” to describe China ’ s worsening relationship with Washington .
Even strategic shocks that originated within China have become showcases for Beijing ’ s geopolitical aspirations : Witness how Xi ’ s government has sought to turn a coronavirus crisis made worse by its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ influence and market China ’ s model overseas .
The precise intentions of opaque , authoritarian regimes are difficult to discern .
And there is danger in definitive declarations of hostile intent because they can lead to fatalism and self-fulfilling prophecies .
The two of us have different priors about whether stable , constructive U.S.-China relations are still possible .
But it requires a degree of willful ignorance not to ask whether China is in fact seeking ( or will inevitably seek ) to establish itself as the world ’ s leading power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that goal .
The architects of America ’ s China strategy , no matter how instinctively accommodating or confrontational they might be , must face this issue squarely .
If true superpower status is China ’ s desired destination , there are two roads it might take to try to get there .
The first is the one American strategists have until now emphasized ( to the extent they acknowledged China ’ s global ambitions ) .
This road runs through China ’ s home region , specifically the Western Pacific .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ springboard to global power , and it looks quite familiar to the road the United States itself once traveled .
The second road is very different because it seems to defy the historical laws of strategy and geopolitics .
This approach focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China ’ s economic , diplomatic , and political influence on a global scale .
The question of which of these roads China should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s strategists , who will face tough decisions about what to invest in—and what fights to avoid—in the coming years .
And the question of what road China will take has profound implications for American strategists—and , ultimately , the rest of the world .
The emerging conventional wisdom holds that China will try to establish global influence by first establishing regional hegemony .
This does not mean physically occupying neighboring countries ( with the potential exception of Taiwan ) , as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself the dominant player in the Western Pacific , out to the first island chain ( which runs from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines ) and beyond ; it must gain an effective veto over the security and economic choices of its neighbors ; it must rupture America ’ s alliances in the region and push U.S. military forces farther and farther away from China ’ s shores .
If China can not do this , it will never have a secure regional base from which to project power globally .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along its vulnerable maritime periphery ; it will have to focus its energies and military assets on defense rather than offense .
And so long as Washington retains a strong military position along the first island chain , regional powers—from Vietnam to Taiwan to Japan—will try to resist China ’ s rise rather than accommodate it .
Put simply , China can not be a true global power if it remains surrounded by U.S. allies and security partners , military bases , and other outposts of a hostile superpower .
One reason this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it so closely resembles their own path to primacy .
From the early days of the Republic , U.S. officials understood that Washington could hardly conceive of playing a major role in global affairs until it had developed a degree of strategic invulnerability within North America and the larger Western Hemisphere .
This was the strategic logic that connected the many components of a decades-long campaign to evict European rivals from the hemisphere , from the Monroe Doctrine in the 1820s through the breaking of Spanish power in the Caribbean during the War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a century ’ s worth of efforts—some of them morally ambiguous and even deeply problematic—to keep Europeans from reestablishing a foothold in the region , from the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904 through the Reagan administration ’ s semi-covert war against Sandinista Nicaragua , which was aligned with Cuba and the Soviet Union , in the 1980s .
A bipartisan commission made clear during the Cold War that America ’ s global power was intimately connected to its dominant regional position .
“ The ability of the United States to sustain a tolerable balance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a manageable cost depends on the inherent security of its land borders , ” the commission stated .
If America had to “ defend against security threats near its borders , ” it would “ have to assume a permanently increased defense burden ... and as a result have to reduce important commitments elsewhere in the world.
” There are certainly signs that China has imbibed this same logic because many of its policies seem calculated to establish regional primacy .
Beijing has invested heavily in advanced air defenses , quiet submarines , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capabilities necessary to keep U.S. ships and planes away from its shores so that it can have a freer hand in dealing with its neighbors .
Beijing has focused on turning the South China Sea and East China Sea into Chinese lakes—for many of the same underlying reasons , one imagines , that the United States was so determined to kick its rivals out of the Caribbean .
Similarly , China has used a mixture of inducement , coercion , and political manipulation in an effort to weaken America ’ s relationships with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese officials have promoted the idea of “ Asia for Asians ” —a not-so-veiled reference to the idea that the region should settle its affairs without the meddling of the United States .
When Xi and his advisors unveiled the concept of a “ New Model of Major-Country Relations , ” the core proposition was that the United States and China could get along if each country stayed on its side of the Pacific .
Finally , the People ’ s Liberation Army has made no secret of the fact that it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to subjugate Taiwan , a development that would upend the regional balance of power overnight and call the rest of America ’ s commitments in the Western Pacific into question .
Some analysts believe that a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait would be—either now or within a few years—essentially a toss-up .
All of these policies bespeak a basic insecurity with America ’ s strategic proximity to China .
And , of course , all are consistent with the narrower goal of regional dominance .
But they are also consistent with what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to mimic America ’ s path to global power .
Yet there are reasons to wonder whether this is indeed the path that China will take , if in fact it seeks global superpower status .
In international affairs , there is always great peril in mirror-imaging—in assuming that an adversary sees the world the same way that we do , or will try to replicate our own experience .
This is particularly the case here because it must be apparent to Beijing by now that it will be far harder for China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was for the United States .
The United States never faced a Japan—a significant regional power allied to an even greater power—in its own hemisphere , and getting beyond the first island chain means getting beyond Japan .
It never had to deal with the number of rivals—India , Vietnam , Indonesia , and many others—that confront China along its territorial and maritime peripheries .
It never had to face a superpower that viewed the United States as its greatest challenge , as opposed to simply viewing it as an annoyance or a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensure its support against more pressing threats .
Making a bid for regional dominance risks focusing the strategic competition on a challenge at which the United States typically excels—winning high-end , high-tech military competitions—and simply driving China ’ s neighbors further into Washington ’ s arms .
So far , in fact , Beijing ’ s efforts at seduction and coercion have been partially successful in shifting the geopolitical orientation of the Philippines and Thailand , but they have backfired in dealing with Australia and Japan .
In short , it is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regional path to global power—which raises the question of whether there may be a second road to Chinese global leadership .
What if , instead of focusing on regional hegemony before turning to consider global hegemony , China approaches things the other way around ?
This second road would lead China more to its west than to its east , in service of building a new Chinese-led security and economic order across the Eurasian land mass and Indian Ocean , while establishing Chinese centrality in global institutions .
In this approach , China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ displace the United States from Asia or push the U.S. Navy beyond the Western Pacific ’ s first island chain , at least for the foreseeable future .
It would instead put increasing emphasis on shaping the world ’ s economic rules , technology standards , and political institutions to its advantage and in its image .
The central premises of this alternative approach would be that economic and technological power is fundamentally more important than traditional military power in establishing global leadership , and that a physical sphere of influence in East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sustaining such leadership .
By this logic , China could simply keep managing a military balance in the Western Pacific—attending to its immediate periphery and especially its territorial claims through its anti-access/area -denial doctrine , and slowly shifting the correlation of forces in its favor—while pursuing global dominance through these other forms of power .
Here , Beijing would consider a different variation of the U.S. analogy .
U.S. leadership of the international order that emerged after World War II and was consolidated after the end of the Cold War rested on at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ability to convert economic might into political influence .
Second , the maintenance of an innovation advantage over the rest of the world .
And third , the capacity to shape the key international institutions and set the key rules of global conduct .
In traveling this second road , China would seek to replicate these factors .
This would start with the widening ambition of the Belt Road Initiative across Eurasia and Africa .
Building and financing physical infrastructure puts China at the center of a web of trade and economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ digital component of the effort , the Digital Silk Road , advances China ’ s stated goal from the 2017 Party Congress of becoming a “ cyber-superpower , ” by deploying Chinese foundational technologies , driving standard-setting in international bodies , and securing long-term commercial advantages for Chinese firms .
( There are indications that China is even using its head-start in recovering from the coronavirus to advance this agenda by claiming additional market share in key industries where competitors are temporarily laid low . )
Combining an aggressive foreign economic policy with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China could emerge as the leading player in foundational technologies from artificial intelligence to quantum computing to biotechnology .
As China builds economic power through these efforts , it will sharpen its capacity to convert that power into geopolitical influence .
Carnegie ’ s Evan Feigenbaum has identified multiple types of leverage China can use to “ lock in its political and economic preferences , ” ranging from latent-and-passive to active-and-coercive .
He assesses that Beijing will keep refining a “ mix and match ” strategy that deploys the full range of these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of countries , from South Korea to Mongolia to Norway .
Eventually , China may well adapt a more systematic ladder of escalation to produce preferred outcomes .
And just as the United States built the key postwar institutions in its political image , this second road would lead China toward reshaping the central political norms of the international order .
A number of studies have documented Beijing ’ s full-court press across the U.N. system to both protect narrow Chinese equities ( denying Taiwan status in the United Nations , blocking criticism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hierarchy of values in which national sovereignty trumps human rights .
And the phrase “ sharp power ” has now become commonplace to describe China ’ s intrusive efforts to influence the political discourse in democratic countries including Australia , Hungary , and Zambia .
Beijing is also rapidly enhancing its diplomatic throw-weight , passing the United States in the number of diplomatic posts around the world and persistently expanding its influence in multilateral finance , global climate and trade institutions , and other key rule-setting bodies .
The Brookings Institution ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s approach to ideology may be flexible , but its cumulative effect is to expand the space for authoritarianism and constrain the space for transparency and democratic accountability .
Another key driver of U.S. leadership in the postwar and post-Cold War era , of course , was a robust and resilient alliance system .
This is less available as an asset to Beijing .
Nonetheless , Chinese leaders have begun establishing a potential network of military bases beyond China ’ s shores , starting in Djibouti .
And to compensate for its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a strategy to weaken and divide the Western alliance structure , cultivating the countries of Eastern Europe and fraying the bonds between the United States and its Asian allies .
All of these efforts come at a time when the United States has stepped back from its traditional role as guarantor of the order .
And that may be the most critical ingredient of all .
U.S. President Donald Trump has continued to emphasize traditional military and security investments , which give the United States the ability to sustain its role as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has shown far less interest in meeting the global challenge posed by China—at least in a coherent way .
The U.S. response to the coronavirus has been sadly emblematic so far , combining clumsy efforts to remind the world that the virus originated in China with an inept domestic response and a relative absence of the principled international leadership that has traditionally been the best advertisement for U.S. primacy .
In the past , one might have expected to see the United States spearheading international efforts to coordinate economic stimulus and global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not have expected the federal government to fail so badly in crafting a national response and disseminating accurate information .
For all of the talk of great- power competition , a plausible scenario is that China gradually fills a vacuum left by the United States , with the rest of the world accommodating to a world of growing Chinese power , in the absence of any viable alternative .
It seems unlikely , of course , that a globally preeminent China would forever accept the United States as the dominant power on its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that reaching for global leadership is simply a way of outflanking the U.S. position in the Western Pacific—of rendering it untenable through the accumulation of economic and diplomatic influence rather than through political-military pressure or confrontation .
To be sure , this path also has its problems .
China may well be less capable of providing global public goods than the United States , both because it is less powerful and because its authoritarian political system makes it harder to exercise the comparatively enlightened , positive-sum leadership that has distinguished U.S. primacy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ this regard .
The slack U.S. response has surely compounded global concerns about American competence and reliability , yet it has also shown how irresponsibly and offensively China can behave—from covering up the initial outbreak in a way that encouraged its global spread to concocting an absurd story about how the virus originated in the United States to selling defective tests to countries in grave need .
Governments in key European countries such as Germany were already getting tired of Beijing ’ s predatory trade practices , efforts to dominate key industries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the democratic world by silencing criticism of its human rights practices .
In demonstrating the darker sides of the Chinese model , the coronavirus crisis may also encourage greater resistance to Beijing ’ s global ambitions .
These investments and innovations are indeed critical .
Yet our analysis raises the possibility that the United States could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific .
It reminds us that the softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge .
It indicates that it will be just as important to defend U.S. alliances and partnerships from internal decay—hastened by Chinese influence-buying and information operations—as to shelter them from external military pressures .
And it offers a warning that investing heavily in the U.S. military while shortchanging diplomacy and foreign aid , hollowing out America ’ s global network of relationships , and weakening or retreating from international institutions could prove to be just as dangerous as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Washington ’ s presence abroad .
Finally , thinking about China ’ s two roads to hegemony clarifies how the U.S.-China competition will be both similar to and different from the Cold War .
Then , as now , there was a central military theater in which the contenders confronted each other most directly : Central Europe .
And during the Cold War , the difficulties and dangers of trying to dislodge the United States from that theater led the Soviets to conduct a flanking maneuver .
Moscow probed for advantage in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic aid , subversion , and ideological solidarity with revolutionary movements ; it sought to hollow out U.S. alliance relationships in Europe and beyond through implicit military pressure and political meddling .
Yet the Soviet Union was never a serious rival for global economic leadership ; it never had the ability , or the sophistication , to shape global norms and institutions in the way that Beijing may be able to do .
Soviet power was ultimately quite narrowly based , which limited the strategic options Moscow possessed .
And whereas the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict in Manichean terms—good versus evil , victory versus defeat , survival versus collapse—today there is greater nuance in a relationship that combines increasingly sharp competition with a still-significant interdependence .
The United States still has the ability to more than hold its own in that competition , so long as it doesn ’ t continue along the current trajectory of self-sabotage .
But the fact that China has two plausible paths to preeminence means that the contest will be more complex , and potentially more challenging , than it was during America @ @ @ @ @ @

And a lot is riding on whether Washington can figure out which strategy Beijing has chosen. By Hal Brands and Jake Sullivan |
Xi Jinping’s China is displaying a superpower’s ambition. Only a few years ago, many American observers still hoped that China would reconcile itself to a supporting role in the liberal international order or would pose—at most—a challenge to U.S. influence in the Western Pacific. The conventional wisdom was that China would seek an expanded regional role—and a reduced U.S. role—but would defer to the distant future any global ambitions. Now, however, the signs that China is gearing up to contest America’s global leadership are unmistakable, and they are ubiquitous. ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
Jake Sullivan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was a deputy assistant to President Barack Obama and national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden from 2013 to 2014, as well as director of policy planning at the U.S. State Department from 2011 to 2013. There is the naval shipbuilding program, which put more vessels to sea between 2014 and 2018 than the total number of ships in the German, Indian, Spanish, and British navies combined. There is Beijing’s bid to dominate high-tech industries that will determine the future distribution of economic and military power. There is the campaign to control the crucial waterways off China’s coast, as well as reported plans to create a chain of bases and logistical facilities farther afield. There are the systematic efforts to refine methods of converting economic influence into economic coercion throughout the Asia-Pacific and beyond. Not least, there is the fact that a country that formerly disguised its ambitions now asserts them openly. China has entered a “new era,” Xi announced in 2017, and must “take center stage in the world.” Two years later, Xi used the idea of a “new Long March” to describe China’s worsening relationship with Washington. Even strategic shocks that originated within China have become showcases for Beijing’s geopolitical aspirations: Witness how Xi’s government has sought to turn a coronavirus crisis made worse by its own authoritarianism into an opportunity to project Chinese influence and market China’s model overseas. The precise intentions of opaque, authoritarian regimes are difficult to discern. And there is danger in definitive declarations of hostile intent because they can lead to fatalism and self-fulfilling prophecies. The two of us have different priors about whether stable, constructive U.S.-China relations are still possible. But it requires a degree of willful ignorance not to ask whether China is in fact seeking (or will inevitably seek) to establish itself as the world’s leading power and how it might go about achieving that goal. The architects of America’s China strategy, no matter how instinctively accommodating or confrontational they might be, must face this issue squarely.
If true superpower status is China’s desired destination, there are two roads it might take to try to get there.
If true superpower status is China’s desired destination, there are two roads it might take to try to get there. The first is the one American strategists have until now emphasized (to the extent they acknowledged China’s global ambitions). This road runs through China’s home region, specifically the Western Pacific. It focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power, and it looks quite familiar to the road the United States itself once traveled. The second road is very different because it seems to defy the historical laws of strategy and geopolitics. This approach focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale. The question of which of these roads China should take is a pressing one for Beijing’s strategists, who will face tough decisions about what to invest in—and what fights to avoid—in the coming years. And the question of what road China will take has profound implications for American strategists—and, ultimately, the rest of the world.
The emerging conventional wisdom holds that China will try to establish global influence by first establishing regional hegemony. This does not mean physically occupying neighboring countries (with the potential exception of Taiwan), as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. But it does mean that Beijing must make itself the dominant player in the Western Pacific, out to the first island chain (which runs from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines) and beyond; it must gain an effective veto over the security and economic choices of its neighbors; it must rupture America’s alliances in the region and push U.S. military forces farther and farther away from China’s shores. If China cannot do this, it will never have a secure regional base from which to project power globally. It will be confronted by persistent security challenges along its vulnerable maritime periphery; it will have to focus its energies and military assets on defense rather than offense. And so long as Washington retains a strong military position along the first island chain, regional powers—from Vietnam to Taiwan to Japan—will try to resist China’s rise rather than accommodate it. Put simply, China cannot be a true global power if it remains surrounded by U.S. allies and security partners, military bases, and other outposts of a hostile superpower. One reason this scenario seems plausible to Americans is that it so closely resembles their own path to primacy. From the early days of the Republic, U.S. officials understood that Washington could hardly conceive of playing a major role in global affairs until it had developed a degree of strategic invulnerability within North America and the larger Western Hemisphere. This was the strategic logic that connected the many components of a decades-long campaign to evict European rivals from the hemisphere, from the Monroe Doctrine in the 1820s through the breaking of Spanish power in the Caribbean during the War of 1898. The same idea underpinned a century’s worth of efforts—some of them morally ambiguous and even deeply problematic—to keep Europeans from reestablishing a foothold in the region, from the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904 through the Reagan administration’s semi-covert war against Sandinista Nicaragua, which was aligned with Cuba and the Soviet Union, in the 1980s. A bipartisan commission made clear during the Cold War that America’s global power was intimately connected to its dominant regional position. “The ability of the United States to sustain a tolerable balance of power on the global scene at a manageable cost depends on the inherent security of its land borders,” the commission stated. If America had to “defend against security threats near its borders,” it would “have to assume a permanently increased defense burden ... and as a result have to reduce important commitments elsewhere in the world.” There are certainly signs that China has imbibed this same logic because many of its policies seem calculated to establish regional primacy. Beijing has invested heavily in advanced air defenses, quiet submarines, anti-ship missiles, and other anti-access/area -denial capabilities necessary to keep U.S. ships and planes away from its shores so that it can have a freer hand in dealing with its neighbors. Beijing has focused on turning the South China Sea and East China Sea into Chinese lakes—for many of the same underlying reasons, one imagines, that the United States was so determined to kick its rivals out of the Caribbean.
One reason this scenario seems plausible to Americans is that it so closely resembles their own path to primacy.
Similarly, China has used a mixture of inducement, coercion, and political manipulation in an effort to weaken America’s relationships with its military partners and treaty allies. Chinese officials have promoted the idea of “Asia for Asians”—a not-so-veiled reference to the idea that the region should settle its affairs without the meddling of the United States. When Xi and his advisors unveiled the concept of a “New Model of Major-Country Relations,” the core proposition was that the United States and China could get along if each country stayed on its side of the Pacific. Finally, the People’s Liberation Army has made no secret of the fact that it is building the military power -projection capabilities necessary to subjugate Taiwan, a development that would upend the regional balance of power overnight and call the rest of America’s commitments in the Western Pacific into question. Some analysts believe that a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait would be—either now or within a few years—essentially a toss-up. All of these policies bespeak a basic insecurity with America’s strategic proximity to China. And, of course, all are consistent with the narrower goal of regional dominance. But they are also consistent with what one would expect if Beijing were trying to mimic America’s path to global power. Yet there are reasons to wonder whether this is indeed the path that China will take, if in fact it seeks global superpower status. In international affairs, there is always great peril in mirror-imaging—in assuming that an adversary sees the world the same way that we do, or will try to replicate our own experience. This is particularly the case here because it must be apparent to Beijing by now that it will be far harder for China to subdue its regional periphery than it was for the United States. The United States never faced a Japan—a significant regional power allied to an even greater power—in its own hemisphere, and getting beyond the first island chain means getting beyond Japan. It never had to deal with the number of rivals—India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and many others—that confront China along its territorial and maritime peripheries. It never had to face a superpower that viewed the United States as its greatest challenge, as opposed to simply viewing it as an annoyance or a lesser rival that should be appeased to ensure its support against more pressing threats. Making a bid for regional dominance risks focusing the strategic competition on a challenge at which the United States typically excels—winning high-end, high-tech military competitions—and simply driving China’s neighbors further into Washington’s arms. So far, in fact, Beijing’s efforts at seduction and coercion have been partially successful in shifting the geopolitical orientation of the Philippines and Thailand, but they have backfired in dealing with Australia and Japan. In short, it is not clear that Beijing can successfully take a regional path to global power—which raises the question of whether there may be a second road to Chinese global leadership.
What if, instead of focusing on regional hegemony before turning to consider global hegemony, China approaches things the other way around? This second road would lead China more to its west than to its east, in service of building a new Chinese-led security and economic order across the Eurasian land mass and Indian Ocean, while establishing Chinese centrality in global institutions. In this approach, China would grudgingly accept that it could not displace the United States from Asia or push the U.S. Navy beyond the Western Pacific’s first island chain, at least for the foreseeable future. It would instead put increasing emphasis on shaping the world’s economic rules, technology standards, and political institutions to its advantage and in its image. The central premises of this alternative approach would be that economic and technological power is fundamentally more important than traditional military power in establishing global leadership, and that a physical sphere of influence in East Asia is not a necessary precondition for sustaining such leadership. By this logic, China could simply keep managing a military balance in the Western Pacific—attending to its immediate periphery and especially its territorial claims through its anti-access/area -denial doctrine, and slowly shifting the correlation of forces in its favor—while pursuing global dominance through these other forms of power.
China could simply keep managing a military balance in the Western Pacific while pursuing global dominance through these other forms of power.
Here, Beijing would consider a different variation of the U.S. analogy. U.S. leadership of the international order that emerged after World War II and was consolidated after the end of the Cold War rested on at least three critical factors. First, the ability to convert economic might into political influence. Second, the maintenance of an innovation advantage over the rest of the world. And third, the capacity to shape the key international institutions and set the key rules of global conduct. In traveling this second road, China would seek to replicate these factors. This would start with the widening ambition of the Belt Road Initiative across Eurasia and Africa. Building and financing physical infrastructure puts China at the center of a web of trade and economic links spanning multiple continents. And the digital component of the effort, the Digital Silk Road, advances China’s stated goal from the 2017 Party Congress of becoming a “cyber-superpower,” by deploying Chinese foundational technologies, driving standard-setting in international bodies, and securing long-term commercial advantages for Chinese firms. (There are indications that China is even using its head-start in recovering from the coronavirus to advance this agenda by claiming additional market share in key industries where competitors are temporarily laid low.) Combining an aggressive foreign economic policy with massive state-directed domestic investments in innovation, China could emerge as the leading player in foundational technologies from artificial intelligence to quantum computing to biotechnology. As China builds economic power through these efforts, it will sharpen its capacity to convert that power into geopolitical influence. Carnegie’s Evan Feigenbaum has identified multiple types of leverage China can use to “lock in its political and economic preferences,” ranging from latent-and-passive to active-and-coercive. He assesses that Beijing will keep refining a “mix and match” strategy that deploys the full range of these tools in dust-ups with a diverse array of countries, from South Korea to Mongolia to Norway. Eventually, China may well adapt a more systematic ladder of escalation to produce preferred outcomes. And just as the United States built the key postwar institutions in its political image, this second road would lead China toward reshaping the central political norms of the international order. A number of studies have documented Beijing’s full-court press across the U.N. system to both protect narrow Chinese equities (denying Taiwan status in the United Nations, blocking criticism of China) and to reinforce a hierarchy of values in which national sovereignty trumps human rights. And the phrase “sharp power” has now become commonplace to describe China’s intrusive efforts to influence the political discourse in democratic countries including Australia, Hungary, and Zambia. Beijing is also rapidly enhancing its diplomatic throw-weight, passing the United States in the number of diplomatic posts around the world and persistently expanding its influence in multilateral finance, global climate and trade institutions, and other key rule-setting bodies. The Brookings Institution’s Tarun Chhabra aptly observes that Beijing’s approach to ideology may be flexible, but its cumulative effect is to expand the space for authoritarianism and constrain the space for transparency and democratic accountability.
Beijing’s approach to ideology may be flexible, but its cumulative effect is to expand the space for authoritarianism.
Another key driver of U.S. leadership in the postwar and post-Cold War era, of course, was a robust and resilient alliance system. This is less available as an asset to Beijing. Nonetheless, Chinese leaders have begun establishing a potential network of military bases beyond China’s shores, starting in Djibouti. And to compensate for its own alliance deficit, China has embarked on a strategy to weaken and divide the Western alliance structure, cultivating the countries of Eastern Europe and fraying the bonds between the United States and its Asian allies. All of these efforts come at a time when the United States has stepped back from its traditional role as guarantor of the order. And that may be the most critical ingredient of all. U.S. President Donald Trump has continued to emphasize traditional military and security investments, which give the United States the ability to sustain its role as a resident physical power in Asia. But he has shown far less interest in meeting the global challenge posed by China—at least in a coherent way. The U.S. response to the coronavirus has been sadly emblematic so far, combining clumsy efforts to remind the world that the virus originated in China with an inept domestic response and a relative absence of the principled international leadership that has traditionally been the best advertisement for U.S. primacy. In the past, one might have expected to see the United States spearheading international efforts to coordinate economic stimulus and global public health measures; one certainly would not have expected the federal government to fail so badly in crafting a national response and disseminating accurate information. For all of the talk of great- power competition, a plausible scenario is that China gradually fills a vacuum left by the United States, with the rest of the world accommodating to a world of growing Chinese power, in the absence of any viable alternative. It seems unlikely, of course, that a globally preeminent China would forever accept the United States as the dominant power on its maritime periphery. But it could be that reaching for global leadership is simply a way of outflanking the U.S. position in the Western Pacific—of rendering it untenable through the accumulation of economic and diplomatic influence rather than through political-military pressure or confrontation. To be sure, this path also has its problems. China may well be less capable of providing global public goods than the United States, both because it is less powerful and because its authoritarian political system makes it harder to exercise the comparatively enlightened, positive-sum leadership that has distinguished U.S. primacy. The coronavirus crisis cuts both ways in this regard. The slack U.S. response has surely compounded global concerns about American competence and reliability, yet it has also shown how irresponsibly and offensively China can behave—from covering up the initial outbreak in a way that encouraged its global spread to concocting an absurd story about how the virus originated in the United States to selling defective tests to countries in grave need. Governments in key European countries such as Germany were already getting tired of Beijing’s predatory trade practices, efforts to dominate key industries, and desire to suppress free speech in the democratic world by silencing criticism of its human rights practices. In demonstrating the darker sides of the Chinese model, the coronavirus crisis may also encourage greater resistance to Beijing’s global ambitions.
The tensions surrounding China’s rise do not simply result from clashing economic and geopolitical interests. They also reflect a deeper, more inherent distrust.
Finally, there is an ideological barrier to Chinese leadership. The tensions surrounding China’s rise do not simply result from clashing economic and geopolitical interests. They also reflect a deeper, more inherent distrust that often afflicts relationships between democratic governments and powerful authoritarian regimes. This gulf between Beijing’s political values and those of the world’s democracies means that many countries in Europe and beyond start from a position of unease about China’s growing role in global affairs. But none of this means that Beijing won’t still try to follow this path—which seems to grow wider and more inviting as the United States sunders its relationships and depletes its prestige.
Any “two roads” analysis has to confront the obvious question: What if it’s both—or neither? In practice, China’s strategy currently appears to combine elements of both approaches. So far, Beijing has been amassing the means and seeking the geopolitical influence to confront the United States in the Western Pacific as well as positioning itself for a broader global challenge. It is also entirely possible that Beijing won’t ultimately travel either path successfully, if its economy or political system falters or its competitors respond effectively. Yet, either way, laying out Beijing’s options is still a useful exercise for three reasons. First, it helps frame the strategic choices and trade-offs China will face in the coming years. China’s resources often appear vast, but they are nonetheless finite: A dollar spent on a carrier-killer missile or a quiet attack submarine cannot be spent on an infrastructure project in Pakistan or Europe. The attention and political capital of top Chinese leaders are also limited. A rising country that faces formidable rivals, and that still confronts daunting internal difficulties, can only take on so many geopolitical and geo-economic challenges without overtaxing its resources or diluting the impact of its efforts. It stands to reason, then, that figuring out which road to hegemony is more promising will be a consistent preoccupation of Chinese planners—and no less of the U.S. officials who must determine Washington’s response. Second, this exercise helps clarify the strategic challenge the United States confronts. Some leading U.S. defense analysts have argued that if Beijing does not win the military competition along its maritime periphery, it cannot rival the United States globally. This analysis places a high premium on the United States making the military investments and pursuing the technological and operational innovations needed to shore up a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and other regional hot-spots that is already starting to tip.
The United States could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific.
These investments and innovations are indeed critical. Yet our analysis raises the possibility that the United States could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific. It reminds us that the softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge. It indicates that it will be just as important to defend U.S. alliances and partnerships from internal decay—hastened by Chinese influence-buying and information operations—as to shelter them from external military pressures. And it offers a warning that investing heavily in the U.S. military while shortchanging diplomacy and foreign aid, hollowing out America’s global network of relationships, and weakening or retreating from international institutions could prove to be just as dangerous as failing to strengthen the hard-power military backbone of Washington’s presence abroad. Finally, thinking about China’s two roads to hegemony clarifies how the U.S.-China competition will be both similar to and different from the Cold War. Then, as now, there was a central military theater in which the contenders confronted each other most directly: Central Europe. And during the Cold War, the difficulties and dangers of trying to dislodge the United States from that theater led the Soviets to conduct a flanking maneuver. Moscow probed for advantage in the developing world through the use of economic aid, subversion, and ideological solidarity with revolutionary movements; it sought to hollow out U.S. alliance relationships in Europe and beyond through implicit military pressure and political meddling.
The U.S.-China competition will be both similar to and different from the Cold War.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-22--Is This the End of Hong Kong As We Know It?

Is This the End of Hong Kong As We Know It ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : China announces new national security laws for Hong Kong , the United States is leaving the Open Skies Treaty , and Brazil ’ s coronavirus crisis worsens .
Morning Brief will be taking a brief hiatus for the U.S. Memorial Day holiday and will return in your inbox on Tuesday , May 26 .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
China is set to bypass Hong Kong ’ s legislature to enact new national security laws @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s autonomous status and a signal that 23 years of Beijing ’ s “ one country , two systems ” approach to the financial hub may be coming to an end .
Speaking to the annual gathering of the National People ’ s Congress in Beijing on Friday , Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said China would establish a “ sound ” legal system to safeguard national security for both Hong Kong and Macau .
The new law would ban “ secessionist and subversive activity as well as foreign interference and terrorism ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South China Morning Post .
“ This move affirms that Hong Kong as we knew it is gone and rule of law is now rule by law , ” China expert Bill Bishop wrote in his Sinocism newsletter .
Will the move spark more protests ?
“ I think the provocation of last year ’ s protests has proved too much and Beijing wants to reassert its authority in Hong Kong forcefully and decisively , ” Antony Dapiran , a writer and lawyer based in Hong Kong told Foreign Policy .
( On @ @ @ @ @ @ @ FP , warned that China may use the “ global distraction ” of the coronavirus to crack down on Hong Kong . )
Hong Kongers have fiercely opposed national security laws in the past , viewing them as an attack on civil liberties .
In 2003 , half a million people protested against proposed national security legislation until the issue was dropped .
As the demonstrations over the past year show , the citizenry has not become any more compliant than they were 17 years ago .
The move is likely to spur @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have already been taking place in recent weeks in shopping malls across the city , leading to hundreds of arrests .
U.S. reacts with sanctions threat .
The Wall Street Journal reports that U.S .
Senators Chris Van Hollen and Pat Toomey will introduce a bill that would sanction Chinese officials involved in enforcing the new laws in Hong Kong .
It would also sanction banks and businesses that work with entities involved in carrying out the law .
U.S. President Donald Trump was less specific on what action , if any , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If it happens , we ’ ll address that issue very strongly , ” he told reporters on Thursday .
Earlier this week in Foreign Policy , Ore Koren and W. Kindred Winecoff , researchers at Indiana University warned that the quantitative easing the U.S. Federal Reserve is pursuing to stabilize the U.S. economy may have an unintended consequence : Driving up commodity prices—including food prices—and setting the stage for further global unrest .
The chart below highlights the relationship between food riots and food prices—with spikes around the last financial crisis .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s effect on food , read Koren and Kindred Winecoff ’ s full analysis .
U.S. to leave Open Skies Treaty .
President Trump will withdraw the United States from the Open Skies Treaty , an agreement that allows countries to fly surveillance aircraft over each other ’ s territory as a confidence-building measure .
U.S. officials cited Russia ’ s apparent noncompliance with the treaty as a reason to pull out .
Russia has blocked surveillance flights over some of its territory , including during military exercises .
Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. formally leaves the treaty , and a reversal is still possible .
“ There ’ s a chance we may make a new agreement or do something to put that agreement back together , ” Trump said .
“ I think what ’ s going to happen is we ’ re going to pull out and they ’ re going to come back and want to make a deal.
” Even if the United States leaves Open Skies , other countries won ’ t be completely blocked from viewing U.S. territory from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Satellites are not included in the treaty .
Chechen leader in hospital with possible coronavirus case .
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has been admitted to hospital in Moscow with a suspected case of COVID-19 .
If his case is confirmed , he would join the many high-profile Russians to contract the disease : Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov was hospitalized last week due to the virus , and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin returned to work on Tuesday after he recovered from the virus .
Russia has the second highest number of coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 317,000 cases Cyclone Amphan death toll climbs .
At least 82 people have died as a result of Cyclone Amphan , according to officials in India and Bangladesh .
That number could grow , given that damage to electricity lines has hampered communications with hard-hit areas .
As FP Managing Editor Ravi Agrawal highlighted in yesterday ’ s South Asia Brief , storms like Amphan—and the destruction associated with it—could become a more frequent part of life in the region as climate change warms waters and pollution and construction erode natural defenses .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ like this , sign up for South Asia Brief , delivered on Tuesdays .
Who gets a vaccine first ?
The United States has reportedly secured 300 million out of the first billion doses of a potential coronavirus vaccine being developed by University of Oxford scientists and drug firm AstraZeneca .
The United States committed $ 1.2 billion toward speeding up the vaccine ’ s development , putting it in pole position , along with the United Kingdom , to receive the vaccine should trials prove successful .
As a result of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involving 30,000 people in the United States will now be able to move forward .
Since the vaccine candidate is still in early-stage human trials it may yet prove ineffective , a fact the manufacturer is aware of .
“ AstraZeneca recognises that the vaccine may not work but is committed to progressing the clinical program with speed and scaling up manufacturing at risk , ” the company said .
Brazil ’ s worsening coronavirus epidemic .
Brazil recorded its highest daily coronavirus death toll for the second time this week , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comes as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro mulls an aid package worth $ 10 billion to help cities and states deal with the fallout from the coronavirus .
Bolsonaro has yet to sign off on the package as he pushes governors to support a public sector pay freeze in return for the aid .
A court in the Netherlands has ruled that a woman must delete pictures of her grandchildren from social media in a landmark case .
The case was brought after a dispute between the children ’ s mother and grandmother .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s General Data Protection Regulation ( GDPR ) laws , the grandmother ’ s posts did not qualify as “ purely personal ” or “ household ” data since the content was displayed on Facebook and Pinterest .
The grandmother must now remove the posts or be fined 50 euros ( $ 55 ) per day that the posts remain up .
If she posts any more photos , she will be fined a further 50 euros per day .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: China announces new national security laws for Hong Kong , the United States is leaving the Open Skies Treaty , and Brazil’s coronavirus crisis worsens.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: China announces new national security laws for Hong Kong, the United States is leaving the Open Skies Treaty, and Brazil’s coronavirus crisis worsens.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
China Moves to Enact Major Hong Kong Security Law
China is set to bypass Hong Kong’s legislature to enact new national security laws in the latest blow to the city’s autonomous status and a signal that 23 years of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” approach to the financial hub may be coming to an end.
Speaking to the annual gathering of the National People’s Congress in Beijing on Friday, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said China would establish a “sound” legal system to safeguard national security for both Hong Kong and Macau. The new law would ban “secessionist and subversive activity as well as foreign interference and terrorism” in Hong Kong, according to the South China Morning Post.
“This move affirms that Hong Kong as we knew it is gone and rule of law is now rule by law,” China expert Bill Bishop wrote in his Sinocism newsletter.
Will the move spark more protests? “I think the provocation of last year’s protests has proved too much and Beijing wants to reassert its authority in Hong Kong forcefully and decisively,” Antony Dapiran, a writer and lawyer based in Hong Kong told Foreign Policy. (On April 22, Dapiran, writing in FP, warned that China may use the “global distraction” of the coronavirus to crack down on Hong Kong.)
Hong Kongers have fiercely opposed national security laws in the past, viewing them as an attack on civil liberties. In 2003, half a million people protested against proposed national security legislation until the issue was dropped. As the demonstrations over the past year show, the citizenry has not become any more compliant than they were 17 years ago.
The move is likely to spur fresh protests in Hong Kong. Demonstrations have already been taking place in recent weeks in shopping malls across the city, leading to hundreds of arrests.
U.S. reacts with sanctions threat. The Wall Street Journal reports that U.S. Senators Chris Van Hollen and Pat Toomey will introduce a bill that would sanction Chinese officials involved in enforcing the new laws in Hong Kong. It would also sanction banks and businesses that work with entities involved in carrying out the law.
U.S. President Donald Trump was less specific on what action, if any, the White House would take. “If it happens, we’ll address that issue very strongly,” he told reporters on Thursday.
Will QE Cause More Food Volatility?
Earlier this week in Foreign Policy, Ore Koren and W. Kindred Winecoff, researchers at Indiana University warned that the quantitative easing the U.S. Federal Reserve is pursuing to stabilize the U.S. economy may have an unintended consequence: Driving up commodity prices—including food prices—and setting the stage for further global unrest. The chart below highlights the relationship between food riots and food prices—with spikes around the last financial crisis. For a deeper look at the Fed’s effect on food, read Koren and Kindred Winecoff’s full analysis.
What We’re Following Today
U.S. to leave Open Skies Treaty. President Trump will withdraw the United States from the Open Skies Treaty, an agreement that allows countries to fly surveillance aircraft over each other’s territory as a confidence-building measure. U.S. officials cited Russia’s apparent noncompliance with the treaty as a reason to pull out. Russia has blocked surveillance flights over some of its territory, including during military exercises.
Trump’s announcement sets a six-month clock until the U.S. formally leaves the treaty, and a reversal is still possible. “There’s a chance we may make a new agreement or do something to put that agreement back together,” Trump said. “I think what’s going to happen is we’re going to pull out and they’re going to come back and want to make a deal.”
Even if the United States leaves Open Skies, other countries won’t be completely blocked from viewing U.S. territory from above if they have the requisite technology: Satellites are not included in the treaty.
Chechen leader in hospital with possible coronavirus case. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has been admitted to hospital in Moscow with a suspected case of COVID-19. If his case is confirmed, he would join the many high-profile Russians to contract the disease: Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov was hospitalized last week due to the virus, and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin returned to work on Tuesday after he recovered from the virus. Russia has the second highest number of coronavirus cases in the world, with roughly 317,000 cases
Cyclone Amphan death toll climbs. At least 82 people have died as a result of Cyclone Amphan, according to officials in India and Bangladesh. That number could grow, given that damage to electricity lines has hampered communications with hard-hit areas.
As FP Managing Editor Ravi Agrawal highlighted in yesterday’s South Asia Brief, storms like Amphan—and the destruction associated with it—could become a more frequent part of life in the region as climate change warms waters and pollution and construction erode natural defenses.
For more news and analysis on stories like this, sign up for South Asia Brief, delivered on Tuesdays.
Keep an Eye On
Who gets a vaccine first? The United States has reportedly secured 300 million out of the first billion doses of a potential coronavirus vaccine being developed by University of Oxford scientists and drug firm AstraZeneca. The United States committed $1.2 billion toward speeding up the vaccine’s development, putting it in pole position, along with the United Kingdom, to receive the vaccine should trials prove successful. As a result of the investment, a large scale human trial involving 30,000 people in the United States will now be able to move forward.
Since the vaccine candidate is still in early-stage human trials it may yet prove ineffective, a fact the manufacturer is aware of. “AstraZeneca recognises that the vaccine may not work but is committed to progressing the clinical program with speed and scaling up manufacturing at risk,” the company said.
Brazil’s worsening coronavirus epidemic. Brazil recorded its highest daily coronavirus death toll for the second time this week, with 1,188 new deaths reported. The news comes as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro mulls an aid package worth $10 billion to help cities and states deal with the fallout from the coronavirus. Bolsonaro has yet to sign off on the package as he pushes governors to support a public sector pay freeze in return for the aid.
Odds and Ends
A court in the Netherlands has ruled that a woman must delete pictures of her grandchildren from social media in a landmark case. The case was brought after a dispute between the children’s mother and grandmother. The judge ruled that under Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) laws, the grandmother’s posts did not qualify as “purely personal” or “household” data since the content was displayed on Facebook and Pinterest. The grandmother must now remove the posts or be fined 50 euros ($55) per day that the posts remain up. If she posts any more photos, she will be fined a further 50 euros per day.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-22--Congress Has Been AWOL on U.S. Coronavirus Diplomacy

Congress Has Been AWOL on U.S. Coronavirus Diplomacy Countless columns have been written about the Trump administration ’ s abdication of U.S. leadership during the global coronavirus crisis , a vacuum that China has used to launch a massive influence campaign around the world .
Far less has been said about the failures of the U.S. Congress during the crisis .
While the executive branch has a greater ability and more tools to conduct U.S. foreign policy , this doesn ’ t excuse Congress ’ s nearly total absence from global coronavirus coordination and diplomacy , which could help ensure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outmaneuvered by its global rivals during the coronavirus crisis .
The invisibility of U.S .
Senators and Representatives around the world stands in stark contrast to Congress ’ s role in the past .
For many decades , legislators and their staffs have been among the most important players in U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy—representing the United States abroad , exchanging views , building trust , and helping coordinate policy during crises .
Whatever survives of once-deep U.S. relationships with allies and partners abroad is in many cases unthinkable without the work done @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The contrast to Congress ’ s current invisibility and silence is striking .
To compete with China ’ s extremely cynical but effective coronavirus diplomacy , the United States must be more active , visible , and creative in helping other countries manage the pandemic and its consequences .
At the moment , the United States can ’ t respond to China in kind , since Beijing ’ s coronavirus diplomacy revolves around the provision of medical supplies and staff to countries in dire need .
Unlike China , where the pandemic has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the United States doesn ’ t have excess ventilators , protective equipment , or doctors to match Beijing ’ s global aid .
But that doesn ’ t mean the United States has nothing to offer other countries in their battle with coronavirus—if Washington can find the will to leverage substantial U.S. comparative advantages over its adversaries .
Congress can and must contribute to this effort in the coming weeks and months .
Here is what Congress needs to do to help ensure that China can ’ t exploit the pandemic to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the United States : Provide more funding for coronavirus aid .
The $ 2.2 trillion stimulus bill passed by Congress in March included a minuscule 0.05 percent for foreign assistance , which has traditionally made up around 1 percent of the federal budget .
By comparison , the European Union and its member states are allocating $ 22 billion in grants and loans to countries around the world to help them deal with both the pandemic itself and its economic fallout .
The United States can ’ t compete with China on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Washington must provide far greater assistance to other countries—resources that must be appropriated by Congress .
As a start , the next stimulus bill should include a foreign coronavirus assistance package in the range of $ 20 billion .
This isn ’ t charity , but a cost-effective and absolutely essential investment in the preservation of U.S. influence around the world .
Conduct virtual delegations to engage with foreign countries ’ policymakers and publics .
The foreign travel that congressional delegations regularly do is one of the most underappreciated tools of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic force-multiplier , demonstrating that the United States is committed to the success of its friends and partners , while building stronger lines of communication with countries that have a less intimate relationship with the United States .
While it ’ s understandable that members of Congress are currently focused on the plight of their constituents , ignoring the rest of the world fails their constituents in other ways .
This can be easily corrected by creating virtual congressional delegations , where members of Congress reach out to foreign leaders , officials , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actual delegations would .
With this engagement , they should draw attention to the coronavirus assistance that the United States has already provided and emphasize that U.S. support will continue to flow until this common enemy is defeated .
A few members of Congress are engaging with foreign audiences individually , but they are the exception that proves the rule .
Mobilize the U.S. private sector to engage abroad .
With the U.S. economy stalled , companies are reaching out to Congress for assistance .
This dialogue should go both ways , especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Members of Congress should urge U.S. companies—including those in their constituencies—to assist countries and communities where they operate .
U.S. coronavirus diplomacy must leverage the global footprint and good corporate citizenship of American companies .
The U.S. image abroad is substantially defined by the actions—and inactions—of its private sector .
To be effective , U.S. coronavirus diplomacy must be a public-private partnership that leverages the global footprint and good corporate citizenship of the U.S. private sector .
Engage foreign media .
While members of Congress are understandably focused on domestic media to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats on Capitol Hill must put in much greater time and effort to connect with foreign media , as many of their predecessors have done in the past .
Their message should be threefold .
First , the United States is actively helping countries around the world manage the health , economic , and other challenges of coronavirus , including the relevant U.S. assistance to the media outlet ’ s country .
Second , despite unquestionable difficulties , the United States is not the unmitigated disaster zone many are making it out to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to counter the disease without crushing individual liberties or harming its democracy .
And third , China ’ s monthslong coverup of the coronavirus outbreak prevented each and every other country in the world from starting preparations on time at the cost of tens of thousands of lives ; any aid from Beijing should therefore be seen as a form of compensation rather than Chinese generosity .
That most foreign media rarely reach out to congressional offices doesn ’ t make the task any less urgent .
Media in Ukraine , for example @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 80 million in what most Ukrainians see as coronavirus assistance from China as a state , is unlikely to seek comments from Capitol Hill .
Yet dozens of members of Congress have traveled to Ukraine in recent years , have immense credibility with Ukrainians , and could effectively convey the messages just outlined .
Congressional communications staff must therefore be proactive in pushing members of Congress to issue frequent statements about U.S. efforts abroad and reach out to foreign media themselves .
Demonstrate a bipartisan consensus on holding China accountable .
Numerous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s coronavirus cover-up .
They include legislation that would allow the administration to impose sanctions on foreign officials who deliberately conceal or distort information about a global public health emergency ; other bills would amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to create an exception for damages caused by China ’ s handling of the outbreak , provide for an evaluation of supply chain risk and dependence on China in pharmaceuticals , and call for other measures aimed at Beijing .
So far , however , most of these bills are Republican-only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and much-needed measures to hold Beijing accountable and reduce U.S. overdependence on China , many Democrats view as efforts to deflect attention from President Donald Trump ’ s and his administration ’ s alleged mishandling of the coronavirus crisis at home .
Republicans and Democrats in Congress must set these differences aside .
If there is any area where bipartisan consensus has a long and highly effective tradition , it ’ s in representing essential U.S. values and interests abroad .
A good first step would be a joint resolution that unequivocally condemns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s coronavirus cover-up and its consequences for the world .
Second , Republicans and Democrats should agree to launch mechanisms to further investigate the cover-up and lay out options for a U.S. response .
House Republicans have assembled a China task force to develop legislative measures , but Democrats opted not to participate .
This inability to come together on such a critical matter of U.S. interest demonstrates disunity to the world and severely undermines U.S. coronavirus diplomacy .
Even if Congress is late to the game , it doesn ’ t mean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ play a decisive role—as it has so often in the past—in safeguarding U.S. global interests .
Much like the administration ’ s coronavirus diplomacy , Congress can make up for its sluggish start with an aggressive and disciplined course-correction , starting with the next stimulus bill .
As leaders on Capitol Hill draft this piece of legislation , it ’ s absolutely vital that they finally allocate the resources needed to support the United States ’ friends and partners around the world .
If they fail to do this and continue to abandon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomacy , Congress will bear a substantial share of the blame for letting China and other adversaries take advantage of the crisis to expand their global influence at the United States ’ expense .

Countless columns have been written about the Trump administration’s abdication of U.S. leadership during the global coronavirus crisis, a vacuum that China has used to launch a massive influence campaign around the world. Far less has been said about the failures of the U.S. Congress during the crisis. While the executive branch has a greater ability and more tools to conduct U.S. foreign policy, this doesn’t excuse Congress’s nearly total absence from global coronavirus coordination and diplomacy, which could help ensure that the United States isn’t outmaneuvered by its global rivals during the coronavirus crisis.
Countless columns have been written about the Trump administration’s abdication of U.S. leadership during the global coronavirus crisis, a vacuum that China has used to launch a massive influence campaign around the world. Far less has been said about the failures of the U.S. Congress during the crisis. While the executive branch has a greater ability and more tools to conduct U.S. foreign policy, this doesn’t excuse Congress’s nearly total absence from global coronavirus coordination and diplomacy, which could help ensure that the United States isn’t outmaneuvered by its global rivals during the coronavirus crisis.
The invisibility of U.S. Senators and Representatives around the world stands in stark contrast to Congress’s role in the past. For many decades, legislators and their staffs have been among the most important players in U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy—representing the United States abroad, exchanging views, building trust, and helping coordinate policy during crises. Whatever survives of once-deep U.S. relationships with allies and partners abroad is in many cases unthinkable without the work done by generations of members of Congress. The contrast to Congress’s current invisibility and silence is striking.
To compete with China’s extremely cynical but effective coronavirus diplomacy, the United States must be more active, visible, and creative in helping other countries manage the pandemic and its consequences. At the moment, the United States can’t respond to China in kind, since Beijing’s coronavirus diplomacy revolves around the provision of medical supplies and staff to countries in dire need. Unlike China, where the pandemic has abated and these supplies are now surplus, the United States doesn’t have excess ventilators, protective equipment, or doctors to match Beijing’s global aid.
But that doesn’t mean the United States has nothing to offer other countries in their battle with coronavirus—if Washington can find the will to leverage substantial U.S. comparative advantages over its adversaries. Congress can and must contribute to this effort in the coming weeks and months. Here is what Congress needs to do to help ensure that China can’t exploit the pandemic to boost its global influence at the expense of the United States:
Provide more funding for coronavirus aid. The $2.2 trillion stimulus bill passed by Congress in March included a minuscule 0.05 percent for foreign assistance, which has traditionally made up around 1 percent of the federal budget. By comparison, the European Union and its member states are allocating $22 billion in grants and loans to countries around the world to help them deal with both the pandemic itself and its economic fallout.
The United States can’t compete with China on the cheap. To maintain global leadership, Washington must provide far greater assistance to other countries—resources that must be appropriated by Congress. As a start, the next stimulus bill should include a foreign coronavirus assistance package in the range of $20 billion. This isn’t charity, but a cost-effective and absolutely essential investment in the preservation of U.S. influence around the world.
Conduct virtual delegations to engage with foreign countries’ policymakers and publics. The foreign travel that congressional delegations regularly do is one of the most underappreciated tools of U.S. global engagement. These visits are a diplomatic force-multiplier, demonstrating that the United States is committed to the success of its friends and partners, while building stronger lines of communication with countries that have a less intimate relationship with the United States.
While it’s understandable that members of Congress are currently focused on the plight of their constituents, ignoring the rest of the world fails their constituents in other ways. This can be easily corrected by creating virtual congressional delegations, where members of Congress reach out to foreign leaders, officials, businesspeople, and civil society representatives—just as actual delegations would. With this engagement, they should draw attention to the coronavirus assistance that the United States has already provided and emphasize that U.S. support will continue to flow until this common enemy is defeated. A few members of Congress are engaging with foreign audiences individually, but they are the exception that proves the rule.
Mobilize the U.S. private sector to engage abroad. With the U.S. economy stalled, companies are reaching out to Congress for assistance. This dialogue should go both ways, especially when that aid helps sustain overseas operations. Members of Congress should urge U.S. companies—including those in their constituencies—to assist countries and communities where they operate. U.S. coronavirus diplomacy must leverage the global footprint and good corporate citizenship of American companies.
The U.S. image abroad is substantially defined by the actions—and inactions—of its private sector. To be effective, U.S. coronavirus diplomacy must be a public-private partnership that leverages the global footprint and good corporate citizenship of the U.S. private sector.
Engage foreign media. While members of Congress are understandably focused on domestic media to communicate with their constituents, Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill must put in much greater time and effort to connect with foreign media, as many of their predecessors have done in the past.
Their message should be threefold. First, the United States is actively helping countries around the world manage the health, economic, and other challenges of coronavirus, including the relevant U.S. assistance to the media outlet’s country. Second, despite unquestionable difficulties, the United States is not the unmitigated disaster zone many are making it out to be and takes pride in its ability to counter the disease without crushing individual liberties or harming its democracy. And third, China’s monthslong coverup of the coronavirus outbreak prevented each and every other country in the world from starting preparations on time at the cost of tens of thousands of lives; any aid from Beijing should therefore be seen as a form of compensation rather than Chinese generosity.
That most foreign media rarely reach out to congressional offices doesn’t make the task any less urgent. Media in Ukraine, for example, where Alibaba founder Jack Ma donated $80 million in what most Ukrainians see as coronavirus assistance from China as a state, is unlikely to seek comments from Capitol Hill. Yet dozens of members of Congress have traveled to Ukraine in recent years, have immense credibility with Ukrainians, and could effectively convey the messages just outlined. Congressional communications staff must therefore be proactive in pushing members of Congress to issue frequent statements about U.S. efforts abroad and reach out to foreign media themselves.
Demonstrate a bipartisan consensus on holding China accountable. Numerous bills have been filed in response to China’s coronavirus cover-up. They include legislation that would allow the administration to impose sanctions on foreign officials who deliberately conceal or distort information about a global public health emergency; other bills would amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to create an exception for damages caused by China’s handling of the outbreak, provide for an evaluation of supply chain risk and dependence on China in pharmaceuticals, and call for other measures aimed at Beijing. So far, however, most of these bills are Republican-only initiatives. What Republicans view as legitimate and much-needed measures to hold Beijing accountable and reduce U.S. overdependence on China, many Democrats view as efforts to deflect attention from President Donald Trump’s and his administration’s alleged mishandling of the coronavirus crisis at home.
Republicans and Democrats in Congress must set these differences aside. If there is any area where bipartisan consensus has a long and highly effective tradition, it’s in representing essential U.S. values and interests abroad. A good first step would be a joint resolution that unequivocally condemns what is already known about Beijing’s coronavirus cover-up and its consequences for the world.
Second, Republicans and Democrats should agree to launch mechanisms to further investigate the cover-up and lay out options for a U.S. response. House Republicans have assembled a China task force to develop legislative measures, but Democrats opted not to participate. This inability to come together on such a critical matter of U.S. interest demonstrates disunity to the world and severely undermines U.S. coronavirus diplomacy.
Even if Congress is late to the game, it doesn’t mean it can’t start now and play a decisive role—as it has so often in the past—in safeguarding U.S. global interests. Much like the administration’s coronavirus diplomacy, Congress can make up for its sluggish start with an aggressive and disciplined course-correction, starting with the next stimulus bill. As leaders on Capitol Hill draft this piece of legislation, it’s absolutely vital that they finally allocate the resources needed to support the United States’ friends and partners around the world. If they fail to do this and continue to abandon their long-held role in global engagement and diplomacy, Congress will bear a substantial share of the blame for letting China and other adversaries take advantage of the crisis to expand their global influence at the United States’ expense.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-22--Trump’s China Trade Deal Is as Dead as Can Be

Trump ’ s China Trade Deal Is as Dead as Can Be When U.S. President Donald Trump is asked to point to the signature achievements of his first four years in power as he seeks reelection this fall , among those he trumpets will surely be his trade deal with Beijing .
The January pact committed China to buying vast quantities of U.S. products , leading to a lower trade deficit and jobs for American workers .
And a crucial component of Trump ’ s deal was massive Chinese purchases of U.S. oil and gas , which were supposed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process.When Trump is asked to point to his signature achievements as he seeks reelection this fall , he will surely trumpet his trade deal with Beijing .
Trump ’ s much-touted trade victory has crashed and burned with the coronavirus pandemic , and nothing more dramatically signals that than the energy part of the deal .
Amid the collapse in oil demand and prices unleashed by the pandemic , it is now all but certain that China will fail to meet its targets for energy purchases and expose the folly of Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right to address China ’ s problematic trade practices , the administration ’ s approach made little sense before the pandemic—and makes even less sense now .
To recap : The two countries ended more than 18 months of heated trade war , including Chinese tariffs on U.S. energy exports , when they signed the first phase of Trump ’ s deal .
The centerpiece was an agreement that China would buy goods and services from the United States in 2020 and 2021 worth a combined $ 200 billion above 2017 levels , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. exports to China by 2021 in four key sectors .
By far , energy was the sector with the largest promised growth , with the Chinese pledging to raise purchases of U.S. energy by $ 19 billion in 2020 and $ 34 billion in 2021—a staggering 240 percent and 440 percent increase , respectively , over 2017 levels .
The targets were unrealistic even before the ink was dry in January .
That may not have mattered to Trump and his advisors , because the deal was structured so that China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counted until after the November election .
COVID-19 , however , has brought forward the moment of reckoning : Trump ’ s deal is certifiably dead , because there is no way for China to come anywhere near reaching its commitments .
Let ’ s do the math .
For energy , the trade agreement targets Chinese imports at an average monthly rate of $ 2.2 billion during 2020 .
In reality , China imported almost nothing in January , again almost nothing in February , and a mere $ 320 million worth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Partners , a consultancy .
That ’ s a more than 90 percent shortfall from Beijing ’ s target for the first quarter .
This dramatic shortfall is not surprising , of course .
Chinese energy use collapsed in the first quarter of 2020 as a result of lockdown measures and the economic collapse resulting from COVID-19 .
Shrinking global demand has also meant a collapse in the price of oil , which would require an even bigger increase in the volume of energy China must buy to hit the spending target .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ take effect until Feb. 14 , and China did not remove its own tariffs on U.S. oil and gas until March 2.Trump ’ s deal is certifiably dead , because there is no way for China to come anywhere near reaching its commitments .
At the same time , the COVID-19 shutdown does not entirely explain China ’ s almost complete lack of progress on meeting its energy purchase commitments .
Despite the pandemic , imports of crude oil from Saudi Arabia and Russia actually rose during the first quarter as China took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its strategic stocks .
Moreover , even as China ’ s economy reopens and gasoline use rebounds—in part driven by commuters eschewing crowded mass transit—preliminary data from oil tanker movements suggests Chinese imports of U.S. crude oil will actually fall in April compared to March , not just in terms of value but total volume , too .
Even if China ’ s imports of U.S. energy rise in the months ahead , the trade deal commitments will be impossible to reach .
Again , it ’ s simple math : Fulfilling the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China to spend an average of $ 2.9 billion per month from April through December to buy U.S. energy—at $ 30 per barrel ( the U.S. government ’ s projected average price for 2020 ) , that ’ s equivalent to about 3 million barrels of oil per day , or the total of all U.S. daily crude exports in 2019 .
That China would buy every last drop of exported U.S. oil is unrealistic enough—but today , that oil is not even available , as U.S. oil exports are projected to fall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. shale output , which is projected to drop by roughly one-third over the next year .
Moreover , China could not take 3 million barrels per day of U.S. crude oil even if it were available .
Even if China were to replace all of its oil imports from Saudi Arabia , currently its largest supplier , with U.S. oil , that would only be 1.8 million barrels per day .
Beijing could meet its targets by buying other fuels as well , but other types of energy such as liquefied natural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coal represent only a fraction of the value of crude oil exports .
China would need to dramatically shift its entire energy import portfolio from its current suppliers to the United States .
Even then , the math does not add up .
The limits of the Trump administration ’ s trade strategy have been especially evident in recent weeks as it scoured for ways to provide relief to hard-hit U.S. oil producers and their workers .
In response to the oil price crash , U.S. output is down at least 1.5 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ February .
A survey by the Kansas City Federal Reserve projects 40 percent of U.S. oil firms will go bankrupt if prices remain at low levels .
Rystad , a human resources consultancy , projected 220,000 oil workers would lose their jobs .
In response to the carnage , the Trump administration suggested a vast array of possible measures to support oil and gas firms—including paying producers not to produce , expanding lending through the Federal Reserve , filling up the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve , and imposing tariffs on imported oil .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ only action available to the administration that made much difference was to coax Saudi Arabia and Russia to come back together and organize a historically large production cut by OPEC and other oil-producing nations .
Strangely—or perhaps revealingly—diplomatic pressure on China to live up to its trade obligations was never even mentioned by administration officials despite pleas from industry .
While the oil industry was divided on most proposals to raise oil prices and support companies , they could all agree that China buying more U.S. energy would be a good thing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to buy U.S. energy to be hollow , and Trump ’ s trade strategy to have failed.Had China actually made meaningful progress on its commitments to buy U.S. oil and gas in recent months , that would have provided some relief to U.S. producers at a time when they were running out of tanks to store their oil , which for a brief moment sent U.S. oil prices into negative territory for the first time in history .
If Trump either can ’ t or won ’ t push China on oil , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the administration at least boost liquefied natural gas export projects by allowing China to count new purchase agreements immediately instead of spread out over the duration of the project .
The oil price crash may explain part of China ’ s lack of progress toward meeting its energy targets .
But it also exposes the limits of Trump ’ s strategy of managed trade based on deals promising specific purchases , rather than doing the hard and systematic work of removing trade barriers , resolving concerns around Chinese industrial policy , and dealing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exchange rates , and subsidies .
China ’ s record on these issues has been problematic for years , and bullying China into buying more American stuff was never a coherent response to it .
COVID-19 has revealed China ’ s promises to buy U.S. energy to be hollow , and the Trump administration ’ s trade strategy to have failed .

When U.S. President Donald Trump is asked to point to the signature achievements of his first four years in power as he seeks reelection this fall, among those he trumpets will surely be his trade deal with Beijing. The January pact committed China to buying vast quantities of U.S. products, leading to a lower trade deficit and jobs for American workers. And a crucial component of Trump’s deal was massive Chinese purchases of U.S. oil and gas, which were supposed to boost the U.S. energy sector in the process.When Trump is asked to point to his signature achievements as he seeks reelection this fall, he will surely trumpet his trade deal with Beijing.
When U.S. President Donald Trump is asked to point to the signature achievements of his first four years in power as he seeks reelection this fall, among those he trumpets will surely be his trade deal with Beijing. The January pact committed China to buying vast quantities of U.S. products, leading to a lower trade deficit and jobs for American workers. And a crucial component of Trump’s deal was massive Chinese purchases of U.S. oil and gas, which were supposed to boost the U.S. energy sector in the process.When Trump is asked to point to his signature achievements as he seeks reelection this fall, he will surely trumpet his trade deal with Beijing.
Trump’s much-touted trade victory has crashed and burned with the coronavirus pandemic, and nothing more dramatically signals that than the energy part of the deal. Amid the collapse in oil demand and prices unleashed by the pandemic, it is now all but certain that China will fail to meet its targets for energy purchases and expose the folly of Trump’s trade strategy. While Trump was right to address China’s problematic trade practices, the administration’s approach made little sense before the pandemic—and makes even less sense now.
To recap: The two countries ended more than 18 months of heated trade war, including Chinese tariffs on U.S. energy exports, when they signed the first phase of Trump’s deal. The centerpiece was an agreement that China would buy goods and services from the United States in 2020 and 2021 worth a combined $200 billion above 2017 levels, a figure that would mean roughly doubling U.S. exports to China by 2021 in four key sectors. By far, energy was the sector with the largest promised growth, with the Chinese pledging to raise purchases of U.S. energy by $19 billion in 2020 and $34 billion in 2021—a staggering 240 percent and 440 percent increase, respectively, over 2017 levels.
The targets were unrealistic even before the ink was dry in January. That may not have mattered to Trump and his advisors, because the deal was structured so that China’s actual purchases would not have been counted until after the November election. COVID-19, however, has brought forward the moment of reckoning: Trump’s deal is certifiably dead, because there is no way for China to come anywhere near reaching its commitments.
Let’s do the math. For energy, the trade agreement targets Chinese imports at an average monthly rate of $2.2 billion during 2020. In reality, China imported almost nothing in January, again almost nothing in February, and a mere $320 million worth in March, according to ClearView Energy Partners, a consultancy. That’s a more than 90 percent shortfall from Beijing’s target for the first quarter.
This dramatic shortfall is not surprising, of course. Chinese energy use collapsed in the first quarter of 2020 as a result of lockdown measures and the economic collapse resulting from COVID-19. Shrinking global demand has also meant a collapse in the price of oil, which would require an even bigger increase in the volume of energy China must buy to hit the spending target. The trade deal also did not formally take effect until Feb. 14, and China did not remove its own tariffs on U.S. oil and gas until March 2.Trump’s deal is certifiably dead, because there is no way for China to come anywhere near reaching its commitments.
At the same time, the COVID-19 shutdown does not entirely explain China’s almost complete lack of progress on meeting its energy purchase commitments. Despite the pandemic, imports of crude oil from Saudi Arabia and Russia actually rose during the first quarter as China took advantage of cheap prices to fill up its strategic stocks. Moreover, even as China’s economy reopens and gasoline use rebounds—in part driven by commuters eschewing crowded mass transit—preliminary data from oil tanker movements suggests Chinese imports of U.S. crude oil will actually fall in April compared to March, not just in terms of value but total volume, too.
Even if China’s imports of U.S. energy rise in the months ahead, the trade deal commitments will be impossible to reach. Again, it’s simple math: Fulfilling the energy part of the deal would require China to spend an average of $2.9 billion per month from April through December to buy U.S. energy—at $30 per barrel (the U.S. government’s projected average price for 2020), that’s equivalent to about 3 million barrels of oil per day, or the total of all U.S. daily crude exports in 2019. That China would buy every last drop of exported U.S. oil is unrealistic enough—but today, that oil is not even available, as U.S. oil exports are projected to fall this year along with the collapse in U.S. shale output, which is projected to drop by roughly one-third over the next year.
Moreover, China could not take 3 million barrels per day of U.S. crude oil even if it were available. Even if China were to replace all of its oil imports from Saudi Arabia, currently its largest supplier, with U.S. oil, that would only be 1.8 million barrels per day. Beijing could meet its targets by buying other fuels as well, but other types of energy such as liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, and coal represent only a fraction of the value of crude oil exports. China would need to dramatically shift its entire energy import portfolio from its current suppliers to the United States. Even then, the math does not add up.
The limits of the Trump administration’s trade strategy have been especially evident in recent weeks as it scoured for ways to provide relief to hard-hit U.S. oil producers and their workers. In response to the oil price crash, U.S. output is down at least 1.5 million barrels per day since the end of February. A survey by the Kansas City Federal Reserve projects 40 percent of U.S. oil firms will go bankrupt if prices remain at low levels. Rystad, an energy consultancy, projected 220,000 oil workers would lose their jobs.
In response to the carnage, the Trump administration suggested a vast array of possible measures to support oil and gas firms—including paying producers not to produce, expanding lending through the Federal Reserve, filling up the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve, and imposing tariffs on imported oil. In the end, however, the only action available to the administration that made much difference was to coax Saudi Arabia and Russia to come back together and organize a historically large production cut by OPEC and other oil-producing nations.
Strangely—or perhaps revealingly—diplomatic pressure on China to live up to its trade obligations was never even mentioned by administration officials despite pleas from industry. While the oil industry was divided on most proposals to raise oil prices and support companies, they could all agree that China buying more U.S. energy would be a good thing. COVID-19 has revealed China’s promises to buy U.S. energy to be hollow, and Trump’s trade strategy to have failed.Had China actually made meaningful progress on its commitments to buy U.S. oil and gas in recent months, that would have provided some relief to U.S. producers at a time when they were running out of tanks to store their oil, which for a brief moment sent U.S. oil prices into negative territory for the first time in history. If Trump either can’t or won’t push China on oil, the energy industry is now proposing that the administration at least boost liquefied natural gas export projects by allowing China to count new purchase agreements immediately instead of spread out over the duration of the project.
The oil price crash may explain part of China’s lack of progress toward meeting its energy targets. But it also exposes the limits of Trump’s strategy of managed trade based on deals promising specific purchases, rather than doing the hard and systematic work of removing trade barriers, resolving concerns around Chinese industrial policy, and dealing with topics such as intellectual property, exchange rates, and subsidies. China’s record on these issues has been problematic for years, and bullying China into buying more American stuff was never a coherent response to it. COVID-19 has revealed China’s promises to buy U.S. energy to be hollow, and the Trump administration’s trade strategy to have failed.