foreignpolicy--2020-10-12--Trumpworld’s Corruption Is as Globalized as the Ultra-Rich the President Mingles With

Trumpworld ’ s Corruption Is as Globalized as the Ultra-Rich the President Mingles With Elliott Broidy , the vice chairman for the 2016 Trump campaign ’ s joint fundraising committee with the Republican Party that raised over $ 108 million , is expected to plead guilty to violating foreign lobbying law , joining other prominent members of President Donald Trump ’ s inner circle , including , most infamously , Michael Flynn , Paul Manafort , and Rick Gates .
Broidy ’ s indictment emerged from a multibillion-dollar case of global fraud that has garnered remarkably little public attention—but that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international corruption in the Trump era .
Broidy ’ s fall was an unexpected consequence of the unraveling of the 1Malaysia Development Berhad ( 1MDB ) , a Malaysian state fund ostensibly set up to promote development through foreign investment but whose masterminds used it to leverage loans of $ 4.5 billion on the global financial markets , which they then siphoned off .
Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak , its chairman , has been arrested , as have his close associates .
Goldman Sachs , which brokered these loans and whose involvement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at its worst , ” has reached a $ 3.9 billion settlement with the Malaysian government , though it remains under the shadow of U.S. legal penalties .
Broidy ’ s own relatively modest role in the scandal was a result of his alleged lobbying to influence the U.S. Justice Department ’ s investigation into 1MDB on behalf of Jho Low , the accused mastermind of the fraud .
This included an unsuccessful attempt to arrange a golf game between Trump and Najib in 2017 .
( Malaysia didn ’ t just target @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under fire for engaging in what he called “ golf diplomacy ” with President Barack Obama while his country reeled from some of its worst flooding in years . )
In a week of political whiplash , with its own astonishing revelations about Trump ’ s taxes and his collapsing health , this story is unlikely to garner notice .
But ignoring Broidy ’ s connections to international corruption and to Trump ’ s world would be repeating old mistakes .
In 2016 , when 11.5 million documents from the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , were leaked , the web of global corruption implicated at least 140 politicians from more than 50 countries , as well as celebrities like Simon Cowell , Jackie Chan , Lionel Messi , and Amitabh Bachchan .
The list was impressively inclusive , with the rich of every color , creed , and nation well represented in the tranche of documents that came to be known as the Panama Papers .
Yet the ensuing fallout focused on the offshore nature of these tax havens , and politicians vowed to protect domestic interests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from national coffers .
Meanwhile , a wave of nationalist politicians tapped into an inchoate anger at a globalized world , whose promised riches had turned out to be fool ’ s gold for too many .
A retrenchment at home , through nationalism , was cast as a ritual purification of the excesses and corruptions of globalization .
Trump promised to “ drain the swamp ” and India ’ s Narendra Modi to bring home the black money stashed away abroad .
The weaponization of anti-corruption by nationalist leaders was more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to power in Brazil through the targeted prosecution of rival left-wing politicians as part of Operation Car Wash. Four years later , nationalist politicians have overseen the unbridled growth of corruption under their watch .
Far from repatriating black money , India is currently fighting a desultory battle to extradite two businessmen—Vijay Mallya and Nirav Modi—who alone have defrauded Indian banks of nearly $ 3 billion under Prime Minister Modi ’ s watch .
( More telling , the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has grown to become the richest by far among Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ donors . )
Bolsonaro has triumphantly announced the end of Operation Car Wash , “ because the government has no more corruption , ” despite pending criminal investigations of his immediate family and close associates for graft .
The breathtakingly brazen move follows revelations of Operation Car Wash ’ s politically motivated prosecutions , allowing Bolsonaro to lay the groundwork to scapegoat his former ally and justice minister , Sérgio Moro , after he resisted Bolsonaro ’ s blatant attempts to undermine the legal system to protect his inner circle .
And the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and prison has now become a banality .
It ’ s in this light that Trump ’ s own financial situation , as revealed through his taxes , must be read .
Trump ’ s wealth comes not through successful entrepreneurship but by exploiting the tax and credit systems—and through access to the interconnected world of the global elite .
The New York Times deemed the tax code ’ s provision allowing business owners to carry forward leftover losses to reduce taxes in future years “ the background music to Mr. Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the rich in the tax code can clearly be easily sidestepped .
Ultimately , what allowed the longevity of this shell game was endless access to global finance , facilitated by class connections rather than competence .
The Trump family lives , lavishly and with all the accoutrements of celebrity , on credit .
Trump ’ s personal debts , most of which are due in the next few years , totals at least $ 421 million .
Despite a proven track record of mismanaging businesses , which brought him to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him a lifeline ( ironically , by playing a successful businessman ) , banks have lined up to loan him nearly half a billion dollars .
He secured these loans in a way that ’ s familiar from the international circuit of corrupt businessmen , from Mallya to Low—not through proven competence but through massaging personal connections and cultivating the mystique of celebrity .
In an article on Low published before the 1MDB scandal exploded , the Times presented a two-faced portrait of a cosmopolitan jetsetter , indiscriminately buying Jean-Michel Basquiat ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hilton and rap stars , and a shady , faintly disreputable broker who leveraged boarding school and university contacts with scions of various ruling families into a global business .
Low himself explained his modus operandi as an investor as not merely about “ managing their money well ” but rather providing a kind of “ concierge service ” for the rich and powerful to facilitate their access to the lifestyle they feel entitled to .
Tabloid photographs of Mallya with Bollywood stars not only cemented his reputation as the “ King of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a nomination to the upper house of the Indian Parliament and eventually to secure the nearly $ 1 billion loan with which he absconded .
The Mallyas and Lows and Trumps of the world offer as collateral little more than their celebrity to secure unlimited access to global lines of credit .
The strong-arm leaders Trump assiduously cultivates , from India ’ s Modi to the Philippines ’ s Rodrigo Duterte and Turkey ’ s Recep Tayyip Erdogan , all head countries that house his most lucrative overseas businesses—and they know it .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in tax revenue from Trump than the United States itself , but their leaders have cannily used his business entanglements to diplomatic advantage .
Duterte chose the businessman behind the Trump Tower in Manila as his envoy , while Erdogan ’ s delegations and Turkish state businesses patronize Trump establishments in the United States selectively as a reward for U.S. diplomatic compromise with Turkey .
Among those nursing a hangover from the Cold War , these entanglements provoke predictable anxiety .
One genre of responses to the report on his taxes was to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Manchurian candidate .
( Or is it China ’ s Rasputin ? )
This perspective frames the Trump presidency as a matryoshka of power , in which some foreign adversary uses Trump as a useful idiot as he himself helms his own army of useful idiots , convinced he will make America great again despite all contrary evidence .
Yet this blinkered national security view misses the point .
The meticulous and prosaic reconstruction of Trump ’ s finances from his tax returns allowed the public to peek behind the wizard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In that moment of clarity , what we saw was a global elite , undifferentiated by ideology or creed or nation , that mingles in country clubs and bottle-service VIP rooms , whose children attend the same boarding schools and Ivy League universities and eventually marry each other , for whom social capital is capital .
The seemingly incongruous image of Dennis Rodman sitting beside a cherubic and murderous Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang becomes far more comprehensible if seen next to images of Low carting Busta Rhymes around George Town , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President-elect Trump in Trump Tower in New York .
Trump ’ s career is ultimately a product of this interconnected and profoundly corrupt world , in which celebrity , wealth , and power are interchangeable currency and which makes a mockery of the rule of law and of democracy .

Elliott Broidy, the vice chairman for the 2016 Trump campaign’s joint fundraising committee with the Republican Party that raised over $108 million, is expected to plead guilty to violating foreign lobbying law, joining other prominent members of President Donald Trump’s inner circle, including, most infamously, Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates. Broidy’s indictment emerged from a multibillion-dollar case of global fraud that has garnered remarkably little public attention—but that is deeply revealing about the nature of international corruption in the Trump era.
Elliott Broidy, the vice chairman for the 2016 Trump campaign’s joint fundraising committee with the Republican Party that raised over $108 million, is expected to plead guilty to violating foreign lobbying law, joining other prominent members of President Donald Trump’s inner circle, including, most infamously, Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates. Broidy’s indictment emerged from a multibillion-dollar case of global fraud that has garnered remarkably little public attention—but that is deeply revealing about the nature of international corruption in the Trump era.
Broidy’s fall was an unexpected consequence of the unraveling of the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a Malaysian state fund ostensibly set up to promote development through foreign investment but whose masterminds used it to leverage loans of $4.5 billion on the global financial markets, which they then siphoned off. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, its chairman, has been arrested, as have his close associates. Goldman Sachs, which brokered these loans and whose involvement then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions dubbed “kleptocracy at its worst,” has reached a $3.9 billion settlement with the Malaysian government, though it remains under the shadow of U.S. legal penalties. Broidy’s own relatively modest role in the scandal was a result of his alleged lobbying to influence the U.S. Justice Department’s investigation into 1MDB on behalf of Jho Low, the accused mastermind of the fraud. This included an unsuccessful attempt to arrange a golf game between Trump and Najib in 2017. (Malaysia didn’t just target Republicans. In 2014, Najib came under fire for engaging in what he called “golf diplomacy” with President Barack Obama while his country reeled from some of its worst flooding in years.)
In a week of political whiplash, with its own astonishing revelations about Trump’s taxes and his collapsing health, this story is unlikely to garner notice. But ignoring Broidy’s connections to international corruption and to Trump’s world would be repeating old mistakes.
In 2016, when 11.5 million documents from the world’s fourth largest offshore provider, Mossack Fonseca, were leaked, the web of global corruption implicated at least 140 politicians from more than 50 countries, as well as celebrities like Simon Cowell, Jackie Chan, Lionel Messi, and Amitabh Bachchan. The list was impressively inclusive, with the rich of every color, creed, and nation well represented in the tranche of documents that came to be known as the Panama Papers. Yet the ensuing fallout focused on the offshore nature of these tax havens, and politicians vowed to protect domestic interests by preventing the fugitive escape of capital from national coffers. Meanwhile, a wave of nationalist politicians tapped into an inchoate anger at a globalized world, whose promised riches had turned out to be fool’s gold for too many. A retrenchment at home, through nationalism, was cast as a ritual purification of the excesses and corruptions of globalization. Trump promised to “drain the swamp” and India’s Narendra Modi to bring home the black money stashed away abroad. The weaponization of anti-corruption by nationalist leaders was more than mere rhetoric: Jair Bolsonaro arguably came to power in Brazil through the targeted prosecution of rival left-wing politicians as part of Operation Car Wash.
Four years later, nationalist politicians have overseen the unbridled growth of corruption under their watch. Far from repatriating black money, India is currently fighting a desultory battle to extradite two businessmen—Vijay Mallya and Nirav Modi—who alone have defrauded Indian banks of nearly $3 billion under Prime Minister Modi’s watch. (More telling, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has grown to become the richest by far among Indian political parties, mostly funded through unidentifiable donors.) Bolsonaro has triumphantly announced the end of Operation Car Wash, “because the government has no more corruption,” despite pending criminal investigations of his immediate family and close associates for graft. The breathtakingly brazen move follows revelations of Operation Car Wash’s politically motivated prosecutions, allowing Bolsonaro to lay the groundwork to scapegoat his former ally and justice minister, Sérgio Moro, after he resisted Bolsonaro’s blatant attempts to undermine the legal system to protect his inner circle. And the revolving door between the Trump political world and prison has now become a banality.
It’s in this light that Trump’s own financial situation, as revealed through his taxes, must be read. Trump’s wealth comes not through successful entrepreneurship but by exploiting the tax and credit systems—and through access to the interconnected world of the global elite. The New York Times deemed the tax code’s provision allowing business owners to carry forward leftover losses to reduce taxes in future years “the background music to Mr. Trump’s life.” Even the few tripwires for the rich in the tax code can clearly be easily sidestepped.
Ultimately, what allowed the longevity of this shell game was endless access to global finance, facilitated by class connections rather than competence. The Trump family lives, lavishly and with all the accoutrements of celebrity, on credit. Trump’s personal debts, most of which are due in the next few years, totals at least $421 million. Despite a proven track record of mismanaging businesses, which brought him to the brink of bankruptcy before The Apprentice threw him a lifeline (ironically, by playing a successful businessman), banks have lined up to loan him nearly half a billion dollars. He secured these loans in a way that’s familiar from the international circuit of corrupt businessmen, from Mallya to Low—not through proven competence but through massaging personal connections and cultivating the mystique of celebrity.
In an article on Low published before the 1MDB scandal exploded, the Times presented a two-faced portrait of a cosmopolitan jetsetter, indiscriminately buying Jean-Michel Basquiat’s paintings and penthouses, hobnobbing with Paris Hilton and rap stars, and a shady, faintly disreputable broker who leveraged boarding school and university contacts with scions of various ruling families into a global business. Low himself explained his modus operandi as an investor as not merely about “managing their money well” but rather providing a kind of “concierge service” for the rich and powerful to facilitate their access to the lifestyle they feel entitled to. Tabloid photographs of Mallya with Bollywood stars not only cemented his reputation as the “King of Good Times”—it helped him acquire a nomination to the upper house of the Indian Parliament and eventually to secure the nearly $1 billion loan with which he absconded. The Mallyas and Lows and Trumps of the world offer as collateral little more than their celebrity to secure unlimited access to global lines of credit.
The strong-arm leaders Trump assiduously cultivates, from India’s Modi to the Philippines’s Rodrigo Duterte and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, all head countries that house his most lucrative overseas businesses—and they know it. Not only do these countries extract more in tax revenue from Trump than the United States itself, but their leaders have cannily used his business entanglements to diplomatic advantage. Duterte chose the businessman behind the Trump Tower in Manila as his envoy, while Erdogan’s delegations and Turkish state businesses patronize Trump establishments in the United States selectively as a reward for U.S. diplomatic compromise with Turkey.
Among those nursing a hangover from the Cold War, these entanglements provoke predictable anxiety. One genre of responses to the report on his taxes was to revive the idea of Trump as Russia’s Manchurian candidate. (Or is it China’s Rasputin?) This perspective frames the Trump presidency as a matryoshka of power, in which some foreign adversary uses Trump as a useful idiot as he himself helms his own army of useful idiots, convinced he will make America great again despite all contrary evidence. Yet this blinkered national security view misses the point.
The meticulous and prosaic reconstruction of Trump’s finances from his tax returns allowed the public to peek behind the wizard’s curtain of lies and manipulation. In that moment of clarity, what we saw was a global elite, undifferentiated by ideology or creed or nation, that mingles in country clubs and bottle-service VIP rooms, whose children attend the same boarding schools and Ivy League universities and eventually marry each other, for whom social capital is capital.
The seemingly incongruous image of Dennis Rodman sitting beside a cherubic and murderous Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang becomes far more comprehensible if seen next to images of Low carting Busta Rhymes around George Town, Malaysia, or Kanye West standing beside President-elect Trump in Trump Tower in New York. Trump’s career is ultimately a product of this interconnected and profoundly corrupt world, in which celebrity, wealth, and power are interchangeable currency and which makes a mockery of the rule of law and of democracy.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-12--America’s Iraqi Embassy Is a Monstrosity Out of Time

America ’ s Iraqi Embassy Is a Monstrosity Out of Time Two weeks ago , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo threatened to close the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad .
He was responding to ongoing attacks against the building and the Iraqi government ’ s apparent inability to do much about it .
It ’ s hard to judge whether there are other ways for the United States to protect the embassy—or whether Pompeo ’ s threat is designed to achieve some other diplomatic end .
But the embassy should be shut down regardless .
Whatever the motivations for Pompeo ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good one on the merits .
To the extent that any Americans think about Iraq or the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad these days , they likely envision a building , but it is much more than that .
The compound , which is only slightly smaller than Disneyland , features 20 office buildings , six apartment blocks , and various amenities for the staff , which at one time numbered 16,000 .
The tab for the complex ’ s completion was $ 750 million .
It is the physical manifestation of American hubris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , no dreams came true there .
The next administration should shut down the compound and hand it over to the Iraqis .
The grounds would make a fine addition to the University of Baghdad .
Getting rid of the current embassy complex in Baghdad does not mean that the United States should abandon the city altogether .
The State Department floated the idea of moving the U.S. ambassador to Erbil , the capital of the Kurdish region , but that won ’ t do : It would seem too odd for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a unified Iraq if they sit in the capital of the Kurdish region .
Instead , Washington should buy a building in Baghdad that is commensurate with its actual mission , role , and influence in Iraq .
If the existing complex speaks to the arrogance of the past two decades , a new home for the embassy would symbolize American humility after a misbegotten invasion and occupation .
( It is too bad that the old embassy that Josep Lluís Sert designed in the 1950s was seized by the Iraqi government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Affairs .
It was appropriately modest and a midcentury gem . )
It is true that there is not much left for the United States to do in Iraq .
American officials made Iraqi political and economic reform part of the recently convened strategic dialogue between the two countries , but it is hard to take these goals seriously .
It has been more than 17 years since the invasion of Iraq , and there is no reason to believe that the United States will be met with any greater success now than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going to have chart their own way if they want decent politics and a prosperous economy .
There is , however , an important mission that the United States should sustain in Iraq : security , specifically the related efforts to keep extremists at bay and ensure Iraqi sovereignty .
These goals are intertwined with each other , and they require significant American attention .
It is true that Mosul was liberated in July 2017 and Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in Syria in October 2019 , but there was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Kirkuk this week , and the group is active in Diyala and Salahuddin governorates .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s repeated declarations concerning the defeat of the Islamic State are simply .
The Iraqi security forces are better than they were when their personnel cut and ran in 2014 , but they still have a fight on their hands .
One can understand the desire to finally pull up stakes in Iraq , but not only does the United States have some responsibility to Iraqis , but also no one will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leave .
In the upside-down logic of America ’ s encounter with Iraq , the best way to get out of the country and stay out is to stay longer .
To some that might sound like a recipe for a slippery slope to endless occupation , but that is not the case .
The United States only has about 3,000 military personnel in the country .
The United States couldn ’ t effectively occupy the country with 50 times that number during the height of President George W. Bush ’ s surge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq is an occupation only if one is politically disposed to seeing one .
The far more challenging aspect of the security mission is helping to put the Iraqi military and other security forces in a position to protect Iraq ’ s sovereignty .
Currently , the Turkish armed forces , the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) through various militias , the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party , as well as American forces all operate in Iraq .
There is very little the Iraqis can do about any of them , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran .
It is entirely rational for the Iranians to want to influence Iraqi politics , but a consequence of that is the vassalization of Iraq .
Among the instruments the Iranians use to further their agenda are militias that are affiliated with the IRGC .
They played an important role in parallel to Iraqi security forces and Americans in the biggest battles against the Islamic State , but they have not been integrated into Iraq ’ s chain of command and have not laid down their arms .
Instead , groups like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plus a dozen more , remain instruments of Iranian power .
They are the ones for attacks on the American embassy , using snipers against protesters , advancing the IRGC ’ s economic interests , and intimidating the Iraqi government .
Not only is this a security threat , but it also contributes to Iraq ’ s perverse politics .
The Iraqis will remain vulnerable to the Iranians as long as Iraq ’ s security forces do not have the capability and confidence to assert their authority .
It is also a question @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now have a prime minister , Mustafa al-Kadhimi , who seems willing to try to rein in Iran ’ s agents .
In June he oversaw the arrest of nearly a dozen members of the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah for planning attacks around Baghdad .
In response , the militia detained family members of military officers involved in the raid and detention of their comrades and , in a show of force , rolled through the Green Zone in armored vehicles .
The militiamen were quickly released .
In late July , one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , was assassinated in a hit widely believed to be the work of Iran ’ s agents in Iraq .
Clearly , the effort to bring militias to heel has not worked .
In many ways , the security situation has deteriorated , and the routine targeting of American forces in the country has remained a significant challenge for U.S. commanders .
As a result , the Trump administration has consolidated the American presence in Iraq and withdrawn troops .
Trump clearly wants to get out of Iraq and the Middle East more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troop levels where they are .
Although a military withdrawal fulfills a promise the president made during the 2016 election , it is ultimately counterproductive .
Leaving Iraqis to the dangers of the Islamic State and the will of the Iranians would only perpetuate Iraq ’ s weakness and instability , handing Tehran a strategic victory .
The United States a little more patience in Iraq .
But that ’ s not a mission that an obnoxiously enormous embassy will much help with .

Two weeks ago, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo threatened to close the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. He was responding to ongoing attacks against the building and the Iraqi government’s apparent inability to do much about it.
Two weeks ago, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo threatened to close the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. He was responding to ongoing attacks against the building and the Iraqi government’s apparent inability to do much about it.
It’s hard to judge whether there are other ways for the United States to protect the embassy—or whether Pompeo’s threat is designed to achieve some other diplomatic end. But the embassy should be shut down regardless. Whatever the motivations for Pompeo’s idea, it’s a good one on the merits.
To the extent that any Americans think about Iraq or the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad these days, they likely envision a building, but it is much more than that. The compound, which is only slightly smaller than Disneyland, features 20 office buildings, six apartment blocks, and various amenities for the staff, which at one time numbered 16,000. The tab for the complex’s completion was $750 million. It is the physical manifestation of American hubris in Iraq. And, unlike Disneyland, no dreams came true there.
The next administration should shut down the compound and hand it over to the Iraqis. The grounds would make a fine addition to the University of Baghdad.
Getting rid of the current embassy complex in Baghdad does not mean that the United States should abandon the city altogether. The State Department floated the idea of moving the U.S. ambassador to Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish region, but that won’t do: It would seem too odd for the U.S. ambassador to continue making the case for a unified Iraq if they sit in the capital of the Kurdish region. Instead, Washington should buy a building in Baghdad that is commensurate with its actual mission, role, and influence in Iraq. If the existing complex speaks to the arrogance of the past two decades, a new home for the embassy would symbolize American humility after a misbegotten invasion and occupation. (It is too bad that the old embassy that Josep Lluís Sert designed in the 1950s was seized by the Iraqi government and turned into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was appropriately modest and a midcentury gem.)
It is true that there is not much left for the United States to do in Iraq. American officials made Iraqi political and economic reform part of the recently convened strategic dialogue between the two countries, but it is hard to take these goals seriously. It has been more than 17 years since the invasion of Iraq, and there is no reason to believe that the United States will be met with any greater success now than it was before. The Iraqis are going to have chart their own way if they want decent politics and a prosperous economy.
There is, however, an important mission that the United States should sustain in Iraq: security, specifically the related efforts to keep extremists at bay and ensure Iraqi sovereignty. These goals are intertwined with each other, and they require significant American attention. It is true that Mosul was liberated in July 2017 and Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in Syria in October 2019, but there was an Islamic State attack on police forces in Kirkuk this week, and the group is active in Diyala and Salahuddin governorates. U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated declarations concerning the defeat of the Islamic State are simply not accurate .
The Iraqi security forces are better than they were when their personnel cut and ran in 2014, but they still have a fight on their hands. One can understand the desire to finally pull up stakes in Iraq, but not only does the United States have some responsibility to Iraqis, but also no one will want to go back once U.S. forces leave. In the upside-down logic of America’s encounter with Iraq, the best way to get out of the country and stay out is to stay longer. To some that might sound like a recipe for a slippery slope to endless occupation, but that is not the case. The United States only has about 3,000 military personnel in the country. The United States couldn’t effectively occupy the country with 50 times that number during the height of President George W. Bush’s surge. A relatively modest training mission in Iraq is an occupation only if one is politically disposed to seeing one.
The far more challenging aspect of the security mission is helping to put the Iraqi military and other security forces in a position to protect Iraq’s sovereignty. Currently, the Turkish armed forces, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) through various militias, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, as well as American forces all operate in Iraq. There is very little the Iraqis can do about any of them, but the most egregious of these is Iran. It is entirely rational for the Iranians to want to influence Iraqi politics, but a consequence of that is the vassalization of Iraq.
Among the instruments the Iranians use to further their agenda are militias that are affiliated with the IRGC. They played an important role in parallel to Iraqi security forces and Americans in the biggest battles against the Islamic State, but they have not been integrated into Iraq’s chain of command and have not laid down their arms. Instead, groups like Kataib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization, plus a dozen more, remain instruments of Iranian power. They are the ones responsible for attacks on the American embassy, using snipers against protesters, advancing the IRGC’s economic interests, and intimidating the Iraqi government. Not only is this a security threat, but it also contributes to Iraq’s perverse politics.
The Iraqis will remain vulnerable to the Iranians as long as Iraq’s security forces do not have the capability and confidence to assert their authority. It is also a question of political will, but the Iraqis now have a prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who seems willing to try to rein in Iran’s agents. In June he oversaw the arrest of nearly a dozen members of the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah for planning attacks around Baghdad. In response, the militia detained family members of military officers involved in the raid and detention of their comrades and, in a show of force, rolled through the Green Zone in armored vehicles. The militiamen were quickly released. In late July, one of Kadhimi’s advisors, Hisham al-Hashimi, was assassinated in a hit widely believed to be the work of Iran’s agents in Iraq. Clearly, the effort to bring militias to heel has not worked. In many ways, the security situation has deteriorated, and the routine targeting of American forces in the country has remained a significant challenge for U.S. commanders. As a result, the Trump administration has consolidated the American presence in Iraq and withdrawn troops.
Trump clearly wants to get out of Iraq and the Middle East more broadly, but he should leave U.S. troop levels where they are. Although a military withdrawal fulfills a promise the president made during the 2016 election, it is ultimately counterproductive. Leaving Iraqis to the dangers of the Islamic State and the will of the Iranians would only perpetuate Iraq’s weakness and instability, handing Tehran a strategic victory. The United States a little more patience in Iraq. But that’s not a mission that an obnoxiously enormous embassy will much help with.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--U.S. Democracy Promotion Sure Looks Like a Double Standard

U.S. Democracy Promotion Sure Looks Like a Double Standard On Sept. 23 , the U.S. State Department announced that the United States would no longer recognize Aleksandr Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus after he refused to hand over power to his opponent following a fraudulent election .
That same day , the United States ’ own president , Donald Trump , refused to commit to a peaceful transition after the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election .
The timing was more than awkward , as was the seeming double standard .
In a world already riven by competition among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wind at their backs .
A dysfunctional U.S. democracy at home makes it less credible to support liberalism abroad—at a time when freedom continues a more than decade-long retreat around the world .
When the world needs the United States to lead in the support of democracy , the country is deeply divided about the strength of its own .
Absent a quick correction , this portends trouble for what has long been a core element of U.S. foreign policy .
And a core element it remains , in spite of Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look at nearly any week of U.S. diplomatic activity , and you will see the thread of democracy promotion running through it .
On Oct. 6 , for example , State Department officials held a human rights dialogue with Vietnam , in which they emphasized the rule of law , freedom of expression and association , and religious freedom .
Two days later , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a statement on upcoming elections in several African countries , observing that “ [ r ] epression and intimidation have no place in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States sanctioned Nicaragua ’ s chief prosecutor for fabricating cases against political prisoners , while the State Department committed to “ [ p ] reserve and build upon the gains in democratization and human rights ” in Afghanistan “ as a necessary condition for sustainable peace.
” Foreign observers might ask Americans to extract the plank in their own eye before seeking to remove the speck in another ’ s .
These diplomatic efforts—and many others like them—run parallel to similar efforts by democracy promotion organizations such as the International Republican Institute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Institute , and the National Endowment for Democracy .
With budgets well-financed by a supportive U.S. Congress , these organizations ’ on-the-ground efforts to monitor elections , conduct polling , help build political parties , and strengthen the process of democracy remain vital .
Even in a Trump administration , support for democracy abroad remains a distinguishing feature of U.S. foreign policy .
Not a few foreign observers , however , might ask Americans to extract the plank in their own eye before seeking to remove the speck in another ’ s .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a peaceful transfer of power but has repeatedly said the election itself will be fraudulent .
He has begun insisting that the attorney general indict Trump ’ s political opponents , tweeted that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden “ shouldn ’ t be allowed to run , ” and argued that former Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton “ should be in jail.
” This is not exactly a firm embrace of the democratic process .
It ’ s also not new and follows years of undemocratic statements and behavior .
Trump has denounced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the people , ” claimed that the U.S. Constitution gives him “ the right to do whatever I want as president , ” and made many other statements that show a disdain for democratic norms .
The chinks in the United States ’ democratic armor go well beyond presidential rhetoric : The government has shut down twice in the past three years ; politicians now disagree not only about Supreme Court nominees but even the proper number of justices on the court .
With the nation roiled by the coronavirus pandemic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protection against death threats .
A militia was caught plotting to kidnap the governor of Michigan , and this year ’ s Black Lives Matter protests demonstrate once again that the country has fallen far short of its founding ideals .
In light of all this , one might ask by what rights the United States demands democracy and freedom in other countries .
Yet a sense of perspective is in order .
For all its flaws , the U.S. system of government remains vastly different from that of the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. president may denounce the press , but the press gives back as good as it gets .
Millions of Americans are freely voting already .
Protests against police violence could not have taken place in China , Iran , or Venezuela .
With any luck , there will be a peaceful post-election transition of power .
There are always inconsistencies in American democracy—yet it always remains far better than nondemocratic alternatives .
The key is to fix the flaws , not to lose faith in the project .
Some are indeed losing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House recently observed that the global pandemic has fueled what it calls a “ crisis for democracy , ” noting that the conditions for democracy and human rights have grown worse in 80 countries .
COVID-19 has inspired abuses of power , given governments an excuse to silence critics , weakened institutions , and undermined systems of accountability .
After 14 years of consecutive decline in global freedom as measured by Freedom House , democracy today is in need of strengthening .
According to Freedom House , the global pandemic has fueled a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration ’ s own national defense strategy rightly observes that China and Russia are working to shape the world in accordance with their authoritarian model .
By undermining democratic alliances and interfering in the domestic politics of key democracies , Beijing and Moscow not only aim to defend their political systems but seek to gain strategic advantage in their rivalry with the United States .
Resisting these efforts requires that the United States protect its own democracy and support it abroad—in places such as Belarus , Ethiopia , and Hong Kong .
Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to influence the domestic affairs of other countries .
As secretary of state 200 years ago , John Quincy Adams famously held that the United States should not offer active support for liberal causes but lead with “ the benignant sympathy of her example.
” At the other extreme , former President George W. Bush committed the United States to aid the growth of democratic movements “ in every nation and culture.
” For all their differences , both approaches—the United States as exemplar of democracy or as handmaiden to it—rely on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the balance today .
Political dysfunction sows doubt over Washington ’ s ability to lead the free world , undermines U.S. credibility in supporting liberal institutions abroad , and diminishes the attractiveness of the democratic model .
It also lends ammunition to those who tout autocratic alternatives , such as Moscow and Beijing .
Today , U.S. policymakers and foreign-policy experts increasingly hear from their international counterparts that instead of trying to teach the world about democracy , the United States would do well to learn from others : from Estonia about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; from Taiwan about handling a public health crisis without resorting to totalitarian controls ; or from South Korea about holding elections during the pandemic .
It is good to absorb these lessons—but U.S. foreign policy is strongest when the nation ’ s democracy functions well enough to convey its own set of positive lessons .
U.S. support has demonstrably made a difference in the past and will do so in the future , especially once the credibility of U.S. democracy is restored .
Even if the United States experiences a drama-free election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even if Trump gives way to the more democratically minded Biden , the country will still have a lot of work to do to firm up its political , economic , and social foundations .
Yet the world won ’ t wait for the United States to perfect itself .
It requires Washington to reembrace the cause of defending liberalism and freedom now .
Of course , as IRI President Daniel Twining puts it , activists striving for rights and freedoms in places like Hong Kong and Belarus do so for their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ fortunes .
Nonetheless , U.S. support has demonstrably made a difference in the past and will continue to make a difference in the future , especially once the credibility of U.S. democracy is restored .
If 2020 has not marked the high point of U.S. democratic practice , that ’ s no reason to lose faith in democracy promotion as a core element of U.S. foreign policy .
On the contrary , recent experience should be a spur : For both its own sake and the world ’ s , the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shaking its foundations at home .

On Sept. 23, the U.S. State Department announced that the United States would no longer recognize Aleksandr Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus after he refused to hand over power to his opponent following a fraudulent election. That same day, the United States’ own president, Donald Trump, refused to commit to a peaceful transition after the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election.
On Sept. 23, the U.S. State Department announced that the United States would no longer recognize Aleksandr Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus after he refused to hand over power to his opponent following a fraudulent election. That same day, the United States’ own president, Donald Trump, refused to commit to a peaceful transition after the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election.
The timing was more than awkward, as was the seeming double standard. In a world already riven by competition among political models, dictators and autocrats sense wind at their backs. A dysfunctional U.S. democracy at home makes it less credible to support liberalism abroad—at a time when freedom continues a more than decade-long retreat around the world. When the world needs the United States to lead in the support of democracy, the country is deeply divided about the strength of its own. Absent a quick correction, this portends trouble for what has long been a core element of U.S. foreign policy.
And a core element it remains, in spite of Trump’s statements and behavior. Take a look at nearly any week of U.S. diplomatic activity, and you will see the thread of democracy promotion running through it. On Oct. 6, for example, State Department officials held a human rights dialogue with Vietnam, in which they emphasized the rule of law, freedom of expression and association, and religious freedom. Two days later, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a statement on upcoming elections in several African countries, observing that “[r]epression and intimidation have no place in democracies.” On Oct. 9, the United States sanctioned Nicaragua’s chief prosecutor for fabricating cases against political prisoners, while the State Department committed to “[p]reserve and build upon the gains in democratization and human rights” in Afghanistan “as a necessary condition for sustainable peace.”
Foreign observers might ask Americans to extract the plank in their own eye before seeking to remove the speck in another’s.
These diplomatic efforts—and many others like them—run parallel to similar efforts by democracy promotion organizations such as the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy. With budgets well-financed by a supportive U.S. Congress, these organizations’ on-the-ground efforts to monitor elections, conduct polling, help build political parties, and strengthen the process of democracy remain vital. Even in a Trump administration, support for democracy abroad remains a distinguishing feature of U.S. foreign policy.
Not a few foreign observers, however, might ask Americans to extract the plank in their own eye before seeking to remove the speck in another’s. Trump has not only refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power but has repeatedly said the election itself will be fraudulent. He has begun insisting that the attorney general indict Trump’s political opponents, tweeted that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden “shouldn’t be allowed to run,” and argued that former Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton “should be in jail.” This is not exactly a firm embrace of the democratic process.
It’s also not new and follows years of undemocratic statements and behavior. Trump has denounced the free press as “the enemy of the people,” claimed that the U.S. Constitution gives him “the right to do whatever I want as president,” and made many other statements that show a disdain for democratic norms. The chinks in the United States’ democratic armor go well beyond presidential rhetoric: The government has shut down twice in the past three years; politicians now disagree not only about Supreme Court nominees but even the proper number of justices on the court. With the nation roiled by the coronavirus pandemic, its chief infectious disease expert is under protection against death threats. A militia was caught plotting to kidnap the governor of Michigan, and this year’s Black Lives Matter protests demonstrate once again that the country has fallen far short of its founding ideals. In light of all this, one might ask by what rights the United States demands democracy and freedom in other countries.
Yet a sense of perspective is in order. For all its flaws, the U.S. system of government remains vastly different from that of the world’s autocracies and other illiberal regimes. The U.S. president may denounce the press, but the press gives back as good as it gets. Millions of Americans are freely voting already. Protests against police violence could not have taken place in China, Iran, or Venezuela. With any luck, there will be a peaceful post-election transition of power. There are always inconsistencies in American democracy—yet it always remains far better than nondemocratic alternatives. The key is to fix the flaws, not to lose faith in the project.
Some are indeed losing faith in the democratic project. Freedom House recently observed that the global pandemic has fueled what it calls a “crisis for democracy,” noting that the conditions for democracy and human rights have grown worse in 80 countries. COVID-19 has inspired abuses of power, given governments an excuse to silence critics, weakened institutions, and undermined systems of accountability. After 14 years of consecutive decline in global freedom as measured by Freedom House, democracy today is in need of strengthening.
According to Freedom House, the global pandemic has fueled a “crisis for democracy.”
The Trump administration’s own national defense strategy rightly observes that China and Russia are working to shape the world in accordance with their authoritarian model. By undermining democratic alliances and interfering in the domestic politics of key democracies, Beijing and Moscow not only aim to defend their political systems but seek to gain strategic advantage in their rivalry with the United States. Resisting these efforts requires that the United States protect its own democracy and support it abroad—in places such as Belarus, Ethiopia, and Hong Kong.
Americans have long debated whether they should seek to influence the domestic affairs of other countries. As secretary of state 200 years ago, John Quincy Adams famously held that the United States should not offer active support for liberal causes but lead with “the benignant sympathy of her example.” At the other extreme, former President George W. Bush committed the United States to aid the growth of democratic movements “in every nation and culture.”
For all their differences, both approaches—the United States as exemplar of democracy or as handmaiden to it—rely on a healthy democracy at home, which stands in the balance today. Political dysfunction sows doubt over Washington’s ability to lead the free world, undermines U.S. credibility in supporting liberal institutions abroad, and diminishes the attractiveness of the democratic model. It also lends ammunition to those who tout autocratic alternatives, such as Moscow and Beijing.
Today, U.S. policymakers and foreign-policy experts increasingly hear from their international counterparts that instead of trying to teach the world about democracy, the United States would do well to learn from others: from Estonia about protecting its democracy; from Russian disinformation; from Taiwan about handling a public health crisis without resorting to totalitarian controls; or from South Korea about holding elections during the pandemic. It is good to absorb these lessons—but U.S. foreign policy is strongest when the nation’s democracy functions well enough to convey its own set of positive lessons.
U.S. support has demonstrably made a difference in the past and will do so in the future, especially once the credibility of U.S. democracy is restored.
Even if the United States experiences a drama-free election and smooth transition of power, and even if Trump gives way to the more democratically minded Biden, the country will still have a lot of work to do to firm up its political, economic, and social foundations. Yet the world won’t wait for the United States to perfect itself. It requires Washington to reembrace the cause of defending liberalism and freedom now.
Of course, as IRI President Daniel Twining puts it, activists striving for rights and freedoms in places like Hong Kong and Belarus do so for their own reasons—not everything revolves around the United States’ fortunes. Nonetheless, U.S. support has demonstrably made a difference in the past and will continue to make a difference in the future, especially once the credibility of U.S. democracy is restored.
If 2020 has not marked the high point of U.S. democratic practice, that’s no reason to lose faith in democracy promotion as a core element of U.S. foreign policy. On the contrary, recent experience should be a spur: For both its own sake and the world’s, the United States should prefer supporting democracy abroad to shaking its foundations at home.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--Democrats Can’t Reverse the Damage of the Trump Era Overnight

Democrats Can ’ t Reverse the Damage of the Trump Era Overnight The recent death of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg aggravated deep problems in American democracy .
No sooner had Ginsburg ’ s death been announced than President Donald Trump and Senate Republicans made clear that they would immediately move to replace her just six weeks before an election , despite blocking even a hearing on former President Barack Obama ’ s Supreme Court nominee when Justice Antonin Scalia died nine months before the 2016 election .
This move was hypocritical as well as deeply damaging to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the game for partisan advantage and made the court appear a political pawn of the party in power .
Moreover , should Trump ’ s nominee , Amy Coney Barrett , be confirmed , the Supreme Court would have a 6-3 conservative majority—one that would likely endure for years to come .
Democrats have responded to this possibility with rage , arguing that the time for playing by the rules is over .
Calls for things such as “ packing ” the court by adding justices to neuter the conservative majority have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for destroying whatever remains of the court ’ s independence , and thus its ability to act as a check on other branches of government .
Supporters of ideas like court packing rarely grapple with the question of how Republicans got to be in a position to dominate the Supreme Court in the first place .
Aaron Belkin , for example , co-founder of the group Take Back the Court—a group opposed to conservative Supreme Court majorities and an open advocate of packing—has argued that since the Republicans have “ stolen ” the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are “ illegitimately appointed , ” and that because the Supreme Court is “ working to destroy democracy , ” Democrats are justified in doing whatever is necessary to gain control over it .
Ryan Cooper , a columnist at the Week , has similarly argued that the “ easiest way to get around potentially tyrannical right-wing justices ” is simply to “ ignore them.
” There is no way , after all , that the Supreme Court can force the president “ to obey ” it .
There are obvious problems with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be effective—court-packing , for example , seems likely to set off a tit-for-tat expansion of the court that would benefit no one—as well as likely to further weaken democracy by deepening polarization and the delegitimization of the courts .
Former President Franklin D. Roosevelt ’ s attempt to pack the court after it opposed some of his New Deal legislation was shut down and may have deepened opposition to him , although conservatives were opposed to his policies more generally .
Supporters of such suggestions rarely grapple with the question of how Republicans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dominate the Supreme Court in the first place .
To the degree this question is considered , answers generally focus on Republicans ’ use of dirty tricks and willingness to play constitutional hardball ( that is , to exploit any technically legal right to get one ’ s way ) .
While Republicans are surely guilty of these things , the real story is more complicated , and grappling with it is necessary in order to understand as well as design responses to the problems facing U.S. democracy today .
The Supreme Court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1953 to 1969 , was the most liberal in history , issuing decisions that reshaped U.S. society and revolutionized constitutional interpretation .
The Warren court dramatically expanded civil and voting rights with decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education , Gomillion v. Lightfoot , and Loving v. Virginia ; remade the relationship between church and state and between state and federal governments ; transformed criminal law ; affirmed a constitutionally protected right of privacy , laying the groundwork for the Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion , and more .
Many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the “ strong and bitter objections of a majority of the American people.
” From the perspective of conservatives , the larger political context only made things worse .
Despite conservative hopes that the New Deal would be rolled back after the war and Roosevelt ’ s death , much of it remained intact .
Even President Dwight D. Eisenhower , a Republican , did not attack it head on , leading conservatives to charge him with being “ a quisling in thrall to the Democrats ” and a “ socialist.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ controlled the presidency—enabling them to enact further transformative liberal reforms including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , the Voting Rights Act of 1965 , and the Great Society—as well as dominating state-level governments , holding governorships and legislative majorities in 40 percent of them , while the Republicans controlled fewer than 20 percent .
In was in this context that the modern conservative movement emerged .
Conservatives recognized that countering the changes wrought by the Warren court and liberal domination of political life would require capturing political power .
But given the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would require a long-term and multifaceted strategy .
Conservatives accordingly established a wide range of institutions , including the Heritage Foundation , the Cato Institute , and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research , to spread conservative ideas and shape public debate .
( Scholars have found these institutions to be less policy-focused and more openly ideological than their liberal counterparts . )
Conservatives also established organizations to help win elections and shape policymaking .
Groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council ( ALEC ) and the State Policy Network created networks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and conservative activists ; prepared op-eds and other media campaigns in favor of conservative policies ; recruited and supported conservative candidates ; and prepared “ model ” bills for conservative legislators .
Many of these organizations focused on the state and local level , reflecting a recognition that policymaking on many issues conservatives cared about—including voting access , redistricting , unionization , reproductive rights , education , health care , and more—happened there , not in Washington .
By any measure , these organizations have been remarkably successful .
Following the 1976 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control a single state ’ s legislative and executive branches .
Today , the party has unified control of 20 state legislatures and governorships ; the Democrats completely control just 15 states ( an improvement from 2016 , when they had full control of only 6 ) .
These organizations have also played a critical role in advancing a unified conservative policy agenda .
As Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and other scholars have shown , during the past decades hundreds of bills dealing with industry deregulation , the privatization of state services , labor-market protections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were “ drafted by ALEC task forces were passed by nearly every state legislature.
” Conservatives also understood that shifting political dynamics over the long term required undermining the power of their opponents .
Thus organizations such as Americans for Prosperity ( AFP ) , the political advocacy group funded by the Koch brothers , diligently and deliberately supported anti-union bills and politicians , particularly in states such as Michigan , Ohio , and Wisconsin , where unions were politically influential and crucial allies of the Democratic Party .
For example , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gov .
Scott Walker ’ s anti-union crusade in Wisconsin , one AFP leader noted that this victory required a diligent , multifaceted strategy that included town halls , a media campaign , and the recruitment “ of more grassroots activists … than the Wisconsin teacher ’ s union [ had ] members .
That ’ s how you change a state , ” he bragged .
Another clear example of a sustained , strategic effort by conservative organizations to undermine opponents and shift political dynamics occurred , of course , with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other courts could not be changed overnight , conservatives engaged in a decades-long effort to counter progressive ideologies within law schools and groom lawyers and judges who could slowly march through legal institutions .
The Federalist Society is the well-known face of these efforts : At least four of the five conservative Supreme Court justices have been members , and it has provided Trump and his Republican predecessors with lists of nominees for the Supreme Court and lower-level courts .
As the conservative magazine National Review—an organ of the conservative political movement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the “ rise and nomination of Amy Coney Barrett is a testament to the work of generations of people tending to conservative institutions.
” Rather than focusing on efforts such as court-packing that are likely to be ineffective and other changes that are likely to weaken the courts ’ independence further and thus undermine democracy , Democrats should grapple with the question of how Republicans achieved this dominance in the first place .
Those advocating short-term measures that could delegitimize the Supreme Court are missing the bigger picture .
Many liberals seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tricks or unrepresentative institutions such as the Senate and the Electoral College that Republicans win .
While these things surely help Republicans , they fail to fully explain Republicans ’ success , especially state-level victories where the Senate and Electoral College play no role .
Facing a similar situation to what liberals face today , conservatives undertook a different and more difficult strategy in response—they embarked on a long-term effort to spread conservative ideas , win elections , and gradually reshape U.S. society and political institutions from the ground up .
These efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1960s , and paid clear dividends by 1980 with the election of President Ronald Reagan .
The dirty tricks and constitutional hardball so successfully employed by Republicans were a consequence of the power gained by this strategy rather than the entire strategy itself .
With the Supreme Court in conservative hands and Democrats facing significant structural disadvantages at the national level—including an Electoral College and Senate that provide disproportionate power to states controlled by Republicans—Democrats will need to embark on a multipronged , long-term effort of their own if they want to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reshape political dynamics in this country not just after this election , but for years into the future .
Democrats might also learn from conservatives the value of focusing on the state and local level—not only because Democrats are so clearly at a disadvantage there , but also because a critical consequence of a conservative Supreme Court is that many of its decisions would simply return even more crucial policymaking power to the states .
And it is at this level that Republicans have excelled , using their control of state governments in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including voting rights , redistricting , health care , and , of course , abortion rights .
It is worth remembering that should a conservative Supreme Court majority overturn Roe v. Wade , access to abortion won ’ t end ; it will instead depend on which state you live in .
But as Joan Williams recently noted , thanks to Republican efforts at the state level over the past years , access to reproductive services “ already depends on where you live.
” Even with Roe v. Wade in place , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of American counties.
” The fight over abortion has been going on at the state level for quite a while , but one party has been much more successful in waging this battle than the other .
Democrats need to refocus their attention on the political fight necessary to protect abortion—a fight , by the way , that Ginsburg understood the need for .
In 1992 , Ginsburg gave a lecture arguing that proponents of abortion would have been better off if the Supreme Court had issued a narrower decision , leaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were at the time trending toward liberalizing abortion laws anyway .
However , once Roe v. Wade was decided , a “ political process that was moving in a reform direction ” was halted , delaying the “ stable settlement of the issue ” that would have come from having to convince a majority of citizens of the desirability of abortion rights .
This leads to another important lesson Democrats might learn from the decades-long conservative effort that brought the United States to where it is today .
As Rick Perlstein recounts in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the formation of modern conservatism , the right understood that a conservative electorate would not simply emerge ; it had to be “ created.
” Many observers and scholars have noted that on many of the most crucial issues facing this country—health care , inequality , gun rights , abortion , and more—a majority of voters ( including significant numbers of current Republicans ) actually hold left-of-center views .
There is , accordingly , a potential center-left majority in the United States , but in order for that potential to become a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would need to be organized and focused on electing people to office .
Democrats may indeed be involved—as Sen. Elizabeth Warren and others have argued—in “ the fight of our lives , ” but a prerequisite for winning a fight is clearly understanding what kind of fight it is .
Over the past years conservatives have managed to achieve a remarkable amount of what they set out to do decades before .
That they have been able to do so is testament to an impressive movement and decades of determination .
If Democrats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump and the Republicans and reinforce U.S. democracy , they will need to do more than win the next election and rail against the conservative Supreme Court .
They will need a similar long-term strategy capable of building a Democratic electorate and winning elections not merely at the national , but also at the state and local levels , for many years to come .

The recent death of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg aggravated deep problems in American democracy.
No sooner had Ginsburg’s death been announced than President Donald Trump and Senate Republicans made clear that they would immediately move to replace her just six weeks before an election, despite blocking even a hearing on former President Barack Obama’s Supreme Court nominee when Justice Antonin Scalia died nine months before the 2016 election. This move was hypocritical as well as deeply damaging to democracy, since it manipulated the rules of the game for partisan advantage and made the court appear a political pawn of the party in power. Moreover, should Trump’s nominee, Amy Coney Barrett, be confirmed, the Supreme Court would have a 6-3 conservative majority—one that would likely endure for years to come.
Democrats have responded to this possibility with rage, arguing that the time for playing by the rules is over. Calls for things such as “packing” the court by adding justices to neuter the conservative majority have exploded. Some go further, arguing for destroying whatever remains of the court’s independence, and thus its ability to act as a check on other branches of government.
Supporters of ideas like court packing rarely grapple with the question of how Republicans got to be in a position to dominate the Supreme Court in the first place.
Aaron Belkin, for example, co-founder of the group Take Back the Court—a group opposed to conservative Supreme Court majorities and an open advocate of packing—has argued that since the Republicans have “stolen” the courts, the judges they have appointed are “illegitimately appointed,” and that because the Supreme Court is “working to destroy democracy,” Democrats are justified in doing whatever is necessary to gain control over it. Ryan Cooper, a columnist at the Week, has similarly argued that the “easiest way to get around potentially tyrannical right-wing justices” is simply to “ignore them.” There is no way, after all, that the Supreme Court can force the president “to obey” it.
There are obvious problems with these suggestions. They are unlikely to be effective—court-packing, for example, seems likely to set off a tit-for-tat expansion of the court that would benefit no one—as well as likely to further weaken democracy by deepening polarization and the delegitimization of the courts. Former President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s attempt to pack the court after it opposed some of his New Deal legislation was shut down and may have deepened opposition to him, although conservatives were opposed to his policies more generally.
Supporters of such suggestions rarely grapple with the question of how Republicans got to be in a position to dominate the Supreme Court in the first place. To the degree this question is considered, answers generally focus on Republicans’ use of dirty tricks and willingness to play constitutional hardball (that is, to exploit any technically legal right to get one’s way). While Republicans are surely guilty of these things, the real story is more complicated, and grappling with it is necessary in order to understand as well as design responses to the problems facing U.S. democracy today.
Conservative domination of the courts is the culmination of a multipronged political strategy that began decades ago, when conservatives were in a situation similar to that facing liberals today.
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren, from 1953 to 1969, was the most liberal in history, issuing decisions that reshaped U.S. society and revolutionized constitutional interpretation. The Warren court dramatically expanded civil and voting rights with decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, and Loving v. Virginia; remade the relationship between church and state and between state and federal governments; transformed criminal law; affirmed a constitutionally protected right of privacy, laying the groundwork for the Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion, and more. Many of these decisions were taken, moreover, over the “strong and bitter objections of a majority of the American people.”
From the perspective of conservatives, the larger political context only made things worse. Despite conservative hopes that the New Deal would be rolled back after the war and Roosevelt’s death, much of it remained intact. Even President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Republican, did not attack it head on, leading conservatives to charge him with being “a quisling in thrall to the Democrats” and a “socialist.” And during much of the 1960s Democrats controlled the presidency—enabling them to enact further transformative liberal reforms including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Great Society—as well as dominating state-level governments, holding governorships and legislative majorities in 40 percent of them, while the Republicans controlled fewer than 20 percent.
In was in this context that the modern conservative movement emerged. Conservatives recognized that countering the changes wrought by the Warren court and liberal domination of political life would require capturing political power. But given the disadvantages they faced, capturing this power would require a long-term and multifaceted strategy.
Conservatives accordingly established a wide range of institutions, including the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, to spread conservative ideas and shape public debate. (Scholars have found these institutions to be less policy-focused and more openly ideological than their liberal counterparts.) Conservatives also established organizations to help win elections and shape policymaking.
Groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the State Policy Network created networks among local business interests, Republican politicians, and conservative activists; prepared op-eds and other media campaigns in favor of conservative policies; recruited and supported conservative candidates; and prepared “model” bills for conservative legislators. Many of these organizations focused on the state and local level, reflecting a recognition that policymaking on many issues conservatives cared about—including voting access, redistricting, unionization, reproductive rights, education, health care, and more—happened there, not in Washington.
By any measure, these organizations have been remarkably successful. Following the 1976 elections, the Republicans didn’t control a single state’s legislative and executive branches. Today, the party has unified control of 20 state legislatures and governorships; the Democrats completely control just 15 states (an improvement from 2016, when they had full control of only 6).
These organizations have also played a critical role in advancing a unified conservative policy agenda. As Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and other scholars have shown, during the past decades hundreds of bills dealing with industry deregulation, the privatization of state services, labor-market protections, the environment, and more that were “drafted by ALEC task forces were passed by nearly every state legislature.”
Conservatives also understood that shifting political dynamics over the long term required undermining the power of their opponents. Thus organizations such as Americans for Prosperity (AFP), the political advocacy group funded by the Koch brothers, diligently and deliberately supported anti-union bills and politicians, particularly in states such as Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin, where unions were politically influential and crucial allies of the Democratic Party.
For example, in discussing AFP’s role in former Gov. Scott Walker’s anti-union crusade in Wisconsin, one AFP leader noted that this victory required a diligent, multifaceted strategy that included town halls, a media campaign, and the recruitment “of more grassroots activists … than the Wisconsin teacher’s union [had] members. That’s how you change a state,” he bragged.
Another clear example of a sustained, strategic effort by conservative organizations to undermine opponents and shift political dynamics occurred, of course, with the courts.
Recognizing that the Supreme Court and other courts could not be changed overnight, conservatives engaged in a decades-long effort to counter progressive ideologies within law schools and groom lawyers and judges who could slowly march through legal institutions. The Federalist Society is the well-known face of these efforts: At least four of the five conservative Supreme Court justices have been members, and it has provided Trump and his Republican predecessors with lists of nominees for the Supreme Court and lower-level courts. As the conservative magazine National Review—an organ of the conservative political movement that began in the Eisenhower era—noted recently, the “rise and nomination of Amy Coney Barrett is a testament to the work of generations of people tending to conservative institutions.”
Rather than focusing on efforts such as court-packing that are likely to be ineffective and other changes that are likely to weaken the courts’ independence further and thus undermine democracy, Democrats should grapple with the question of how Republicans achieved this dominance in the first place. Those advocating short-term measures that could delegitimize the Supreme Court are missing the bigger picture. Many liberals seem to think it is only through dirty tricks or unrepresentative institutions such as the Senate and the Electoral College that Republicans win. While these things surely help Republicans, they fail to fully explain Republicans’ success, especially state-level victories where the Senate and Electoral College play no role.
Facing a similar situation to what liberals face today, conservatives undertook a different and more difficult strategy in response—they embarked on a long-term effort to spread conservative ideas, win elections, and gradually reshape U.S. society and political institutions from the ground up. These efforts began in the mid-1950s, continued through the 1960s, and paid clear dividends by 1980 with the election of President Ronald Reagan. The dirty tricks and constitutional hardball so successfully employed by Republicans were a consequence of the power gained by this strategy rather than the entire strategy itself.
With the Supreme Court in conservative hands and Democrats facing significant structural disadvantages at the national level—including an Electoral College and Senate that provide disproportionate power to states controlled by Republicans—Democrats will need to embark on a multipronged, long-term effort of their own if they want to recapture the power to appoint judges and reshape political dynamics in this country not just after this election, but for years into the future.
Democrats might also learn from conservatives the value of focusing on the state and local level—not only because Democrats are so clearly at a disadvantage there, but also because a critical consequence of a conservative Supreme Court is that many of its decisions would simply return even more crucial policymaking power to the states. And it is at this level that Republicans have excelled, using their control of state governments in recent years to undermine Democratic priorities, including voting rights, redistricting, health care, and, of course, abortion rights.
It is worth remembering that should a conservative Supreme Court majority overturn Roe v. Wade, access to abortion won’t end; it will instead depend on which state you live in. But as Joan Williams recently noted, thanks to Republican efforts at the state level over the past years, access to reproductive services “already depends on where you live.” Even with Roe v. Wade in place, there is “no abortion clinic in 90 percent of American counties.” The fight over abortion has been going on at the state level for quite a while, but one party has been much more successful in waging this battle than the other.
Democrats need to refocus their attention on the political fight necessary to protect abortion—a fight, by the way, that Ginsburg understood the need for. In 1992, Ginsburg gave a lecture arguing that proponents of abortion would have been better off if the Supreme Court had issued a narrower decision, leaving room for action by state legislatures which were at the time trending toward liberalizing abortion laws anyway. However, once Roe v. Wade was decided, a “political process that was moving in a reform direction” was halted, delaying the “stable settlement of the issue” that would have come from having to convince a majority of citizens of the desirability of abortion rights.
This leads to another important lesson Democrats might learn from the decades-long conservative effort that brought the United States to where it is today.
As Rick Perlstein recounts in Before the Storm, his seminal account of the formation of modern conservatism, the right understood that a conservative electorate would not simply emerge; it had to be “created.” Many observers and scholars have noted that on many of the most crucial issues facing this country—health care, inequality, gun rights, abortion, and more—a majority of voters (including significant numbers of current Republicans) actually hold left-of-center views. There is, accordingly, a potential center-left majority in the United States, but in order for that potential to become a reality and thus politically consequential, it would need to be organized and focused on electing people to office.
Democrats may indeed be involved—as Sen. Elizabeth Warren and others have argued—in “the fight of our lives,” but a prerequisite for winning a fight is clearly understanding what kind of fight it is.
Over the past years conservatives have managed to achieve a remarkable amount of what they set out to do decades before. That they have been able to do so is testament to an impressive movement and decades of determination. If Democrats hope to reverse the policies implemented by Trump and the Republicans and reinforce U.S. democracy, they will need to do more than win the next election and rail against the conservative Supreme Court. They will need a similar long-term strategy capable of building a Democratic electorate and winning elections not merely at the national, but also at the state and local levels, for many years to come.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--No Resolution After Top-Level Talks Between Indian and Chinese Military Commanders

No Resolution After Top-Level Talks Between Indian and Chinese Military Commanders Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Indian and Chinese military commanders meet for talks over the Line of Actual Control , the EU agrees to impose sanctions on Russia over the Alexei Navalny poisoning , and Tanzanian officials crack down on the opposition ahead of elections .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
China ’ s and India ’ s top military brass met for their seventh round of talks on Monday aimed at defusing tensions along their contested border , the Line @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where violence has erupted several times this year .
Intractable positions .
Officials did not immediately make details of the talks publicly available , but sources told the Times of India that the Indian delegation asked the Chinese for a “ complete de-escalation ” at troop interface areas , including the entire frontier in eastern Ladakh , where deadly clashes occurred in June ; Indian commanders insisted that China needed to make the first move and revert to the positions it held in April .
The Chinese delegation demanded that Indian forces vacate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in late August before a resolution could be reached .
No end in sight .
Similar to the first six rounds of negotiations , a breakthrough looks unlikely .
There are still major gaps between the two sides , and neither India nor China has shown any willingness to reduce their significant military presences along the LAC .
Although a resolution probably won ’ t be forthcoming , both sides have already agreed to refrain from needlessly escalating the standoff .
After the last round of talks in September , they agreed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frontline , refrain from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground , and avoid taking any actions that may complicate the situation.
” Skepticism in Washington .
But New Delhi is under some pressure from Washington .
U.S. officials are skeptical that dialogue can resolve the dispute and have blamed China ’ s activity in the region as the source of the issue .
“ The Chinese Communist Party ’ s territorial aggression is apparent on its Indian border where China has attempted to seize control of the line of actual control by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Robert O ’ Brien said on Sunday .
“ The time has come to accept that dialogue and agreements will not persuade or compel the People ’ s Republic of China to change.
” The enemy of my enemy .
But regardless of how the United States reacts to the latest round of talks , India ’ s tensions with China have brought Washington and New Delhi closer together .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Sumit Ganguly wrote in August , “ India has no choice but to turn to what scholars of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the support of a more powerful state to secure one ’ s national security interests.
” EU to sanction Russia .
The European Union has agreed to impose a new round of sanctions on Russian individuals over the poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny last month .
Germany and France proposed the measures at a meeting of EU foreign ministers on Monday , which the EU duly voted to back .
The sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans on several Russian military intelligence officials .
However , they will not take immediate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legal experts .
EU leaders have urged Moscow to provide transparency into the circumstances surrounding the attack .
While Navalny was being treated at a hospital in Berlin , German experts determined that he had been poisoned by the Soviet-era nerve agent Novichok , a substance that has been implicated in the poisonings of other Kremlin critics .
Since his release from hospital , Navalny has publicly pinned the blame for his attack on Russian President Vladimir Putin .
Tensions reignite in eastern Mediterranean .
Turkey has again dispatched the research vessel Oruc @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eastern Mediterranean , stoking tensions with Greece .
The Greek foreign ministry called the move a “ major escalation ” of the dispute and a “ direct threat to peace in the region.
” The Turkish defense minister said the vessel will be accompanied by a naval contingent “ as needed.
” The Oruc Reis was previously sent to the region in August to survey possible oil and gas reserves in the area , immediately sparking the standoff with Greece which resulted in both countries sending military personnel to the region .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over its activities , but at an emergency session of the bloc earlier this month , it warned Ankara that it could impose sanctions as early as December .
Belarus authorizes lethal force .
Belarusian authorities have threatened to use live ammunition on protesters in their most explicit threat of force since protests against President Aleksandr Lukashenko broke out in August .
“ Law enforcement officers and internal troops will not leave the streets and will use riot control equipment and lethal weapons if need be , ” the interior ministry said in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ninth consecutive Sunday of major demonstrations in the capital of Minsk .
Police used water cannons and stun grenades to disperse protesters , arresting 700 people across the country in the process .
Also on Sunday , Lukashenko met with opposition leaders in jail to discuss constitutional reform as a way of defusing the crisis .
Repression in Tanzania .
Amnesty International published a report on Monday concluding that Tanzanian authorities have taken steps to repress the opposition ahead of elections on Oct. 28 .
Most of these efforts have been directed at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government banned the Tanzania Daima newspaper , a major outlet headed by opposition leader Freeman Mbowe .
Authorities also passed laws severely limiting international coverage of the elections , and opposition figures have said that hundreds of candidates have been unfairly disqualified from standing in the elections .
President John Magufuli is seeking a second five-year term in office , but his presidency has been marred by a regressive slide toward authoritarianism .
Since first taking office in 2015 , Magufuli ’ s government has passed several laws increasing central control over Tanzania @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strikes Taliban targets .
U.S. forces conducted a series of airstrikes on Taliban targets in Afghanistan ’ s southern Helmand province as violence in the country continues despite ongoing peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government .
Col. Sonny Leggett , the spokesman for the U.S. military in Afghanistan , said the airstrikes did not violate February ’ s peace deal between the United States and the Taliban .
“ The Taliban need to immediately stop their offensive actions in Helmand Province and reduce their violence around the country .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and undermines the ongoing Afghan Peace Talks , ” he said in a tweet .
The airstrikes followed a fresh wave of violence in the region .
Taliban militants recently attacked several security checkpoints around the southern city of Lashkar Gah , part of a wider uptick in violence across much of the country .
Imagine going into a coma in January and waking up to the state of the world today ?
Although former Canadian diplomat Michael Kovrig wasn ’ t actually in a coma , he has been held arbitrarily by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along with fellow Canadian Michael Spavor .
Canada and other western countries regard their detention as retaliation for the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in Canada .
Kovrig had been held in extreme isolation in China beginning in January and made his first contact with the outside world on Saturday .
“ He was astonished to learn about the details of the Covid-19 pandemic and remarked that it all sounded like some ‘ zombie apocalypse movie , ’ ” his wife said in a statement .
For more from FP , visit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Indian and Chinese military commanders meet for talks over the Line of Actual Control , the EU agrees to impose sanctions on Russia over the Alexei Navalny poisoning, and Tanzanian officials crack down on the opposition ahead of elections.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Indian and Chinese military commanders meet for talks over the Line of Actual Control, the EU agrees to impose sanctions on Russia over the Alexei Navalny poisoning, and Tanzanian officials crack down on the opposition ahead of elections.
If you would like receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S. Officials Are Skeptical of India’s Talks With China
China’s and India’s top military brass met for their seventh round of talks on Monday aimed at defusing tensions along their contested border, the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where violence has erupted several times this year.
Intractable positions. Officials did not immediately make details of the talks publicly available, but sources told the Times of India that the Indian delegation asked the Chinese for a “complete de-escalation” at troop interface areas, including the entire frontier in eastern Ladakh, where deadly clashes occurred in June; Indian commanders insisted that China needed to make the first move and revert to the positions it held in April. The Chinese delegation demanded that Indian forces vacate a series of tactical heights they occupied in late August before a resolution could be reached.
No end in sight. Similar to the first six rounds of negotiations, a breakthrough looks unlikely. There are still major gaps between the two sides, and neither India nor China has shown any willingness to reduce their significant military presences along the LAC. Although a resolution probably won’t be forthcoming, both sides have already agreed to refrain from needlessly escalating the standoff. After the last round of talks in September, they agreed to “stop sending more troops to the frontline, refrain from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground, and avoid taking any actions that may complicate the situation.”
Skepticism in Washington. But New Delhi is under some pressure from Washington. U.S. officials are skeptical that dialogue can resolve the dispute and have blamed China’s activity in the region as the source of the issue. “The Chinese Communist Party’s territorial aggression is apparent on its Indian border where China has attempted to seize control of the line of actual control by force,” U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien said on Sunday. “The time has come to accept that dialogue and agreements will not persuade or compel the People’s Republic of China to change.”
The enemy of my enemy. But regardless of how the United States reacts to the latest round of talks, India’s tensions with China have brought Washington and New Delhi closer together. As Foreign Policy’s Sumit Ganguly wrote in August, “India has no choice but to turn to what scholars of international relations refer to as external balancing—seeking the support of a more powerful state to secure one’s national security interests.”
What We’re Following Today
EU to sanction Russia. The European Union has agreed to impose a new round of sanctions on Russian individuals over the poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny last month. Germany and France proposed the measures at a meeting of EU foreign ministers on Monday, which the EU duly voted to back. The sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans on several Russian military intelligence officials. However, they will not take immediate effect and must be further reviewed by legal experts.
EU leaders have urged Moscow to provide transparency into the circumstances surrounding the attack. While Navalny was being treated at a hospital in Berlin, German experts determined that he had been poisoned by the Soviet-era nerve agent Novichok, a substance that has been implicated in the poisonings of other Kremlin critics. Since his release from hospital, Navalny has publicly pinned the blame for his attack on Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Tensions reignite in eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has again dispatched the research vessel Oruc Reis to the contested waters of the eastern Mediterranean, stoking tensions with Greece. The Greek foreign ministry called the move a “major escalation” of the dispute and a “direct threat to peace in the region.” The Turkish defense minister said the vessel will be accompanied by a naval contingent “as needed.”
The Oruc Reis was previously sent to the region in August to survey possible oil and gas reserves in the area, immediately sparking the standoff with Greece which resulted in both countries sending military personnel to the region. The EU has been reluctant to sanction Turkey over its activities, but at an emergency session of the bloc earlier this month, it warned Ankara that it could impose sanctions as early as December.
Belarus authorizes lethal force. Belarusian authorities have threatened to use live ammunition on protesters in their most explicit threat of force since protests against President Aleksandr Lukashenko broke out in August. “Law enforcement officers and internal troops will not leave the streets and will use riot control equipment and lethal weapons if need be,” the interior ministry said in a statement.
The threat followed the ninth consecutive Sunday of major demonstrations in the capital of Minsk. Police used water cannons and stun grenades to disperse protesters, arresting 700 people across the country in the process. Also on Sunday, Lukashenko met with opposition leaders in jail to discuss constitutional reform as a way of defusing the crisis.
Keep an Eye On
Repression in Tanzania. Amnesty International published a report on Monday concluding that Tanzanian authorities have taken steps to repress the opposition ahead of elections on Oct. 28. Most of these efforts have been directed at the media. In June, the government banned the Tanzania Daima newspaper, a major outlet headed by opposition leader Freeman Mbowe. Authorities also passed laws severely limiting international coverage of the elections, and opposition figures have said that hundreds of candidates have been unfairly disqualified from standing in the elections.
President John Magufuli is seeking a second five-year term in office, but his presidency has been marred by a regressive slide toward authoritarianism. Since first taking office in 2015, Magufuli’s government has passed several laws increasing central control over Tanzania’s politics and society.
U.S. strikes Taliban targets. U.S. forces conducted a series of airstrikes on Taliban targets in Afghanistan’s southern Helmand province as violence in the country continues despite ongoing peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Col. Sonny Leggett, the spokesman for the U.S. military in Afghanistan, said the airstrikes did not violate February’s peace deal between the United States and the Taliban. “The Taliban need to immediately stop their offensive actions in Helmand Province and reduce their violence around the country. It is not consistent with the US-Taliban agreement and undermines the ongoing Afghan Peace Talks,” he said in a tweet.
The airstrikes followed a fresh wave of violence in the region. Taliban militants recently attacked several security checkpoints around the southern city of Lashkar Gah, part of a wider uptick in violence across much of the country.
Odds and Ends
Imagine going into a coma in January and waking up to the state of the world today? Although former Canadian diplomat Michael Kovrig wasn’t actually in a coma, he has been held arbitrarily by the Chinese government for nearly two years along with fellow Canadian Michael Spavor. Canada and other western countries regard their detention as retaliation for the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in Canada.
Kovrig had been held in extreme isolation in China beginning in January and made his first contact with the outside world on Saturday. “He was astonished to learn about the details of the Covid-19 pandemic and remarked that it all sounded like some ‘zombie apocalypse movie,’” his wife said in a statement.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.