foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Corruption Is a Job Qualification in Today’s Iran

In the minds of many Iranians , Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf , Iran ’ s new speaker of parliament , is identified less with his political and military credentials than with corruption .
A 58-year-old trained pilot from Iran ’ s northeastern province of Khorasan , Qalibaf has an arguably unrivaled track record of illicit public self-dealing .
His tenures as mayor of Tehran , national police chief , and head of the national anti-trafficking headquarters were marked by some of the most high-profile corruption and embezzlement cases in the nation ’ s post-revolutionary history .
One instance involved Qalibaf as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 500 million worth of estates and buildings in Tehran ’ s affluent north at cut-rate prices .
An investigation motion was tabled in the parliament but ultimately shelved after 132 lawmakers voted against it under intense lobbying pressure .
Even by the warped meritocracy standards of the Islamic Republic , Qalibaf ’ s ascent to the top of Iran ’ s legislature , given the risk it poses to the government ’ s legitimacy , seems to require an explanation .
It becomes more understandable when one realizes that Qalibaf ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t a hurdle to his rapid promotion but part of the very reason for it .
Amid the Trump administration ’ s “ maximum pressure ” campaign against Iran , the Iranian establishment has found the virtue of having its own crook in power .
Whatever his faults , nobody has ever doubted Qalibaf ’ s loyalty to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) .
Like many other top Iranian power holders today , Qalibaf earned his early political credentials in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s , when he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 5th Nasr Division , two military units consisting mostly of combatants from his home province—which happens to be where current supreme leader Ali Khamenei hails from .
After the war , with Khamenei ’ s backing , Qalibaf was appointed deputy chief of the Basij ( mobilization ) militia force before being promoted to chief of IRGC ’ s Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters in 1994 and commander of the IRGC air force in 1997 .
Qalibaf has now been embraced by the Iranian leadership in the hope that he will play a central @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harmonious and homogeneous political system dominated by hard-line insiders and loyalists .
Given the increasing strangulation of the Iranian economy—on June 13 , Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri admitted that Iran ’ s total oil revenue plummeted to $ 8 billion in 2019 from an average of $ 100 billion a year—and the likelihood of another four years of crippling sanctions or even war if U.S. President Donald Trump is reelected in November , Tehran seems to believe that it can weather the storm safely only if it acts in concert and harmony .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government and the economy by hard-liners loyal to the country ’ s top military and clerical leadership .
Under these circumstances , it is not surprising that Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh declared on June 9 , in a ceremony featuring senior officials from the Iranian Ministry of Industry , Mine , and Trade , that the IRGC would be entering into the auto industry—a reportedly $ 15 billion market traditionally controlled by moderates and their pragmatic conservative allies in Iran ’ s business community .
With the judiciary— led by Chief Justice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role in the 1988 mass executions of political prisoners—and the legislature now in hard-liner hands , the next goal will be to control the executive branch .
Qalibaf will probably face his first major political test in the 2021 presidential vote as he will likely be expected to help facilitate the election of a like-minded politician .
In his first address as Majlis speaker , he accused the “ moderate ” administration of President Hassan Rouhani , his rival in the 2017 presidential elections , of “ managerial disarray and inefficacy ” and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hossein Allahkaram , a famed hard-line rabble-rouser , even went as far in a June 7 interview as to encourage efforts to deny anyone from the “ reformist camp ” the “ right ” to run for president in 2021 .
In contrast to his predecessor , Ali Larijani , whose measured support for Rouhani ’ s foreign policy of engagement with the West had proven pivotal in sustaining the 2015 nuclear deal , Qalibaf has described negotiations with the United States as “ pointless and pernicious , ” insisting instead on “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ Qassem ] Soleimani ’ s blood ” and “ augmenting the power of ‘ axis of resistance.
’ ” In a clear sign of shifting attitudes toward foreign and security policy matters , he appointed Mahdi Mohammadi , a hard-line member of Iran ’ s former nuclear negotiation team under Saeed Jalili—secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 2007 to 2013 and currently Khamenei ’ s representative on it—as his advisor on strategic affairs .
A few days earlier on June 1 , Jalili , who has set his sights on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new parliament in a letter to Qalibaf to monitor the state affairs like a “ shadow ” and thus act as a “ shadow administration ” in “ confirming , completing and correcting ” policies of the executive branch .
Meanwhile , the widely publicized large-scale corruption trial of Akbar Tabari—executive deputy to former Chief Justice Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani—along with vehement calls for Larijani ’ s own prosecution by hard-line ideologues close to the Revolutionary Guard suggest a likely fall from grace for the powerful Larijani family , who were , until recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the legislature .
These calls , coupled with growing ties between Qalibaf and Jalili , could be symptomatic of efforts behind the scenes to undermine former Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani ’ s chances of success if he decides to run for president in 2021 .
A more conformist , centralized , and streamlined system of decision-making is also deemed necessary to guarantee a smooth leadership succession and transition of power to the next supreme leader upon Khamenei ’ s death .
At the moment , Chief Justice Raisi stands as the prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his former boss and rival , Sadeq Larijani .
If Raisi ultimately wins the leadership succession contest , Iran will be led by a member of the “ death commission ” tasked by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to carry out the mass execution of political inmates in 1988 .
The state-led exclusionary homogenization is , however , not limited to politics and political decision-making .
Backed by hard-liners in power , it is swiftly extended to social and media spheres , too .
On June 21 , Iranian security forces stormed the offices of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and arrested its directors .
A widely popular nongovernmental charity with more than 10,000 members , the society was established in 1999 and has since earned a good reputation , especially over the past few years , for its effective poverty and disaster relief initiatives—in sharp contrast to the often-corrupt and inefficient interventions of the government , including the Revolutionary Guard .
Unsurprisingly , Tasnim News Agency , which is close to the IRGC , has accused the society and its founders of “ network-building in the guise of charitable measures ” to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ various levels.
” It is also notable that the roundup came shortly after Gen. Hossein Nejat , a well-connected hard-line IRGC veteran , was appointed as deputy commander of Sarallah Corps , which is tasked with security in Tehran and protection of state bodies based in the capital .
A former commander of Vali-e Amr ( Supreme Leader ) Corps—in charge of Khamenei and his household ’ s security—Nejat excoriated the West after the November 2019 protests for striving to subvert the Islamic Republic by provoking the poor and “ low ” classes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stressed , have been “ contaminated in the virtual sphere.
” Quite relevantly , the new parliament is now systematically pushing for greater state control over the “ unfettered ” online environment and the filtering of Instagram in particular , with Qalibaf himself warning of families ’ “ exposure to a contaminated space.
” But the incremental hard-liner takeover is generating both popular discontent—which a more uniform system of governance would be better positioned to tackle—and , far less commonly , increased dissatisfaction among sidelined insiders within the establishment .
Nowhere can this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the high ranks of Iran ’ s regular army ( Artesh ) , a professional military force that has traditionally been treated as a junior partner to the Revolutionary Guard .
In a rare interview , deleted an hour after its publication May 24 , Rear Adm. Habibollah Sayyari , a highly venerable veteran of the Iran-Iraq War and coordinating deputy chief of the army , implicitly criticized the Guard ’ s interventions in economy and politics , as well as attempts , mostly by IRGC-affiliated politicians and filmmakers , to portray the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force still beholden to the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi government .
“ Is the army some sort of fridge , construction , or camera factory whose every move should be publicized in the media ?
” Sayyari pointedly asked , suggesting that such achievements are a matter of “ national security ” and should not be hyped up .
His obvious dissatisfaction with “ lack of kindness to the army ” —particularly apparent in pro-IRGC narratives of the Iran-Iraq War—and the need for armed forces to steer clear of “ politicization ” and public spectacle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Ministry of Intelligence about the security consequences of the celebrity status built around slain Quds Force commander Soleimani .
High-level objections to state discrimination against Artesh are not unprecedented , however .
In June 2000 , then-commander-in-chief of the army Gen. Ali Shahbazi resigned reportedly in protest against the top leadership ’ s unfair favoring of the IRGC air force during a legal dispute with the army over possession of a military base in the southern city of Shiraz that originally belonged to the latter .
Interestingly , Qalibaf was chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force at the time .
Qalibaf ’ s rise to power is part of a grander scheme to ensure the long-term survival of the Islamic Republic “ as is ” at its most precarious juncture , marked on the one hand by a methodology of governance whose unsustainability has never been laid bare more clearly and on the other by foreign threats whose gravity have rarely been more formidable since the 1979 revolution .
This does not mean , however , that the Islamic Republic is anywhere near collapse , as Iran hawks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seem to hope .
As the Iranian nuclear dossier gradually returns to the international security agenda , thanks to Trump ’ s “ maximum pressure ” campaign and Iran ’ s retaliatory nuclear escalation , the incremental hard-liner takeover in Tehran just means that the Islamic Republic will do whatever it takes to stay in power , and this does not bode well for the future of democracy and prosperity in Iran , nor for the prospects of peace and stability in the Middle East .

In the minds of many Iranians, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, Iran’s new speaker of parliament, is identified less with his political and military credentials than with corruption. A 58-year-old trained pilot from Iran’s northeastern province of Khorasan, Qalibaf has an arguably unrivaled track record of illicit public self-dealing. His tenures as mayor of Tehran, national police chief, and head of the national anti-trafficking headquarters were marked by some of the most high-profile corruption and embezzlement cases in the nation’s post-revolutionary history. One instance involved Qalibaf as mayor granting several close associates more than $500 million worth of estates and buildings in Tehran’s affluent north at cut-rate prices. An investigation motion was tabled in the parliament but ultimately shelved after 132 lawmakers voted against it under intense lobbying pressure.
In the minds of many Iranians, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, Iran’s new speaker of parliament, is identified less with his political and military credentials than with corruption. A 58-year-old trained pilot from Iran’s northeastern province of Khorasan, Qalibaf has an arguably unrivaled track record of illicit public self-dealing. His tenures as mayor of Tehran, national police chief, and head of the national anti-trafficking headquarters were marked by some of the most high-profile corruption and embezzlement cases in the nation’s post-revolutionary history. One instance involved Qalibaf as mayor granting several close associates more than $500 million worth of estates and buildings in Tehran’s affluent north at cut-rate prices. An investigation motion was tabled in the parliament but ultimately shelved after 132 lawmakers voted against it under intense lobbying pressure.
Even by the warped meritocracy standards of the Islamic Republic, Qalibaf’s ascent to the top of Iran’s legislature, given the risk it poses to the government’s legitimacy, seems to require an explanation. It becomes more understandable when one realizes that Qalibaf’s politically calculated and ultimately state-serving corruption wasn’t a hurdle to his rapid promotion but part of the very reason for it. Amid the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, the Iranian establishment has found the virtue of having its own crook in power.
Whatever his faults, nobody has ever doubted Qalibaf’s loyalty to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Like many other top Iranian power holders today, Qalibaf earned his early political credentials in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, when he served as commander of Imam Reza-21 Brigade and 5th Nasr Division, two military units consisting mostly of combatants from his home province—which happens to be where current supreme leader Ali Khamenei hails from. After the war, with Khamenei’s backing, Qalibaf was appointed deputy chief of the Basij (mobilization) militia force before being promoted to chief of IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters in 1994 and commander of the IRGC air force in 1997.
Qalibaf has now been embraced by the Iranian leadership in the hope that he will play a central role in the creation of a more harmonious and homogeneous political system dominated by hard-line insiders and loyalists. Given the increasing strangulation of the Iranian economy—on June 13, Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri admitted that Iran’s total oil revenue plummeted to $8 billion in 2019 from an average of $100 billion a year—and the likelihood of another four years of crippling sanctions or even war if U.S. President Donald Trump is reelected in November, Tehran seems to believe that it can weather the storm safely only if it acts in concert and harmony. And that means an incremental takeover of the government and the economy by hard-liners loyal to the country’s top military and clerical leadership. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh declared on June 9, in a ceremony featuring senior officials from the Iranian Ministry of Industry, Mine, and Trade, that the IRGC would be entering into the auto industry—a reportedly $15 billion market traditionally controlled by moderates and their pragmatic conservative allies in Iran’s business community.
With the judiciary— led by Chief Justice Ebrahim Raisi, known for his direct role in the 1988 mass executions of political prisoners—and the legislature now in hard-liner hands, the next goal will be to control the executive branch. Qalibaf will probably face his first major political test in the 2021 presidential vote as he will likely be expected to help facilitate the election of a like-minded politician. In his first address as Majlis speaker, he accused the “moderate” administration of President Hassan Rouhani, his rival in the 2017 presidential elections, of “managerial disarray and inefficacy” and railed against its “outward look.” Hossein Allahkaram, a famed hard-line rabble-rouser, even went as far in a June 7 interview as to encourage efforts to deny anyone from the “reformist camp” the “right” to run for president in 2021.
In contrast to his predecessor, Ali Larijani, whose measured support for Rouhani’s foreign policy of engagement with the West had proven pivotal in sustaining the 2015 nuclear deal, Qalibaf has described negotiations with the United States as “pointless and pernicious,” insisting instead on “completing the chain of revenge for martyr [Qassem] Soleimani’s blood” and “augmenting the power of ‘axis of resistance.’” In a clear sign of shifting attitudes toward foreign and security policy matters, he appointed Mahdi Mohammadi, a hard-line member of Iran’s former nuclear negotiation team under Saeed Jalili—secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 2007 to 2013 and currently Khamenei’s representative on it—as his advisor on strategic affairs. A few days earlier on June 1, Jalili, who has set his sights on the 2021 presidential elections, urged the new parliament in a letter to Qalibaf to monitor the state affairs like a “shadow” and thus act as a “shadow administration” in “confirming, completing and correcting” policies of the executive branch.
Meanwhile, the widely publicized large-scale corruption trial of Akbar Tabari—executive deputy to former Chief Justice Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani—along with vehement calls for Larijani’s own prosecution by hard-line ideologues close to the Revolutionary Guard suggest a likely fall from grace for the powerful Larijani family, who were, until recently, in control of both the judiciary and the legislature. These calls, coupled with growing ties between Qalibaf and Jalili, could be symptomatic of efforts behind the scenes to undermine former Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani’s chances of success if he decides to run for president in 2021.
A more conformist, centralized, and streamlined system of decision-making is also deemed necessary to guarantee a smooth leadership succession and transition of power to the next supreme leader upon Khamenei’s death. At the moment, Chief Justice Raisi stands as the prime candidate, having so far successfully marginalized his former boss and rival, Sadeq Larijani. If Raisi ultimately wins the leadership succession contest, Iran will be led by a member of the “death commission” tasked by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to carry out the mass execution of political inmates in 1988.
The state-led exclusionary homogenization is, however, not limited to politics and political decision-making. Backed by hard-liners in power, it is swiftly extended to social and media spheres, too. On June 21, Iranian security forces stormed the offices of the Imam Ali Popular Students Relief Society and arrested its directors. A widely popular nongovernmental charity with more than 10,000 members, the society was established in 1999 and has since earned a good reputation, especially over the past few years, for its effective poverty and disaster relief initiatives—in sharp contrast to the often-corrupt and inefficient interventions of the government, including the Revolutionary Guard. Unsurprisingly, Tasnim News Agency, which is close to the IRGC, has accused the society and its founders of “network-building in the guise of charitable measures” to infiltrate and “influence public opinion on various levels.” It is also notable that the roundup came shortly after Gen. Hossein Nejat, a well-connected hard-line IRGC veteran, was appointed as deputy commander of Sarallah Corps, which is tasked with security in Tehran and protection of state bodies based in the capital. A former commander of Vali-e Amr (Supreme Leader) Corps—in charge of Khamenei and his household’s security—Nejat excoriated the West after the November 2019 protests for striving to subvert the Islamic Republic by provoking the poor and “low” classes of the society, whom, he stressed, have been “contaminated in the virtual sphere.” Quite relevantly, the new parliament is now systematically pushing for greater state control over the “unfettered” online environment and the filtering of Instagram in particular, with Qalibaf himself warning of families’ “exposure to a contaminated space.”
But the incremental hard-liner takeover is generating both popular discontent—which a more uniform system of governance would be better positioned to tackle—and, far less commonly, increased dissatisfaction among sidelined insiders within the establishment. Nowhere can this be seen more ostensibly today than in the high ranks of Iran’s regular army (Artesh), a professional military force that has traditionally been treated as a junior partner to the Revolutionary Guard. In a rare interview, deleted an hour after its publication May 24, Rear Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, a highly venerable veteran of the Iran-Iraq War and coordinating deputy chief of the army, implicitly criticized the Guard’s interventions in economy and politics, as well as attempts, mostly by IRGC-affiliated politicians and filmmakers, to portray the regular army as an unreliable and spineless force still beholden to the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi government.
“Is the army some sort of fridge, construction, or camera factory whose every move should be publicized in the media?” Sayyari pointedly asked, suggesting that such achievements are a matter of “national security” and should not be hyped up. His obvious dissatisfaction with “lack of kindness to the army”—particularly apparent in pro-IRGC narratives of the Iran-Iraq War—and the need for armed forces to steer clear of “politicization” and public spectacle echoed clear warnings by members of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence about the security consequences of the celebrity status built around slain Quds Force commander Soleimani.
High-level objections to state discrimination against Artesh are not unprecedented, however. In June 2000, then-commander-in-chief of the army Gen. Ali Shahbazi resigned reportedly in protest against the top leadership’s unfair favoring of the IRGC air force during a legal dispute with the army over possession of a military base in the southern city of Shiraz that originally belonged to the latter. Interestingly, Qalibaf was chief commander of the Guard’s air force at the time.
Qalibaf’s rise to power is part of a grander scheme to ensure the long-term survival of the Islamic Republic “as is” at its most precarious juncture, marked on the one hand by a methodology of governance whose unsustainability has never been laid bare more clearly and on the other by foreign threats whose gravity have rarely been more formidable since the 1979 revolution.
This does not mean, however, that the Islamic Republic is anywhere near collapse, as Iran hawks inside and outside of the Trump administration seem to hope. As the Iranian nuclear dossier gradually returns to the international security agenda, thanks to Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign and Iran’s retaliatory nuclear escalation, the incremental hard-liner takeover in Tehran just means that the Islamic Republic will do whatever it takes to stay in power, and this does not bode well for the future of democracy and prosperity in Iran, nor for the prospects of peace and stability in the Middle East.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Kenya’s Road to Dictatorship Runs Through Nairobi County

On June 3 , Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta signed his first executive order of the year .
Among other things , it listed a newly created Nairobi Metropolitan Services ( NMS ) —including functions such as health care , transportation , and public works—as part of the president ’ s office rather than an independent office in the county government system .
The decision goes against the spirit of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution , which established county governments to promote democratic accountability by devolving some powers to the local level .
In March , Mike Sonko , the governor of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transfer with the national government .
Under the terms of the deal , county functions would be administered by the national government through the new NMS .
Air Force Maj. Gen. Mohamed Abdalla Badi was appointed the director-general by Kenyatta , and seven more senior military officers were added to the leadership ranks of the NMS two months later .
As Kenya reels from the coronavirus pandemic , a shift in power is underway in Nairobi , with municipal duties being transferred from elected public officials into the hands of military men .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ global attention for including bottles of Hennessy in coronavirus care packages for the public , has spoken out against the militarization .
He says he was hoodwinked into signing documents he didn ’ t understand and has now taken the national government to court on the grounds that the deal is unconstitutional .
The militarization of Nairobi and the subsequent transfer of the county ’ s administration into the president ’ s office is a brazen power grab by Kenyatta .
The militarization of Nairobi and the subsequent transfer of the county ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ office is a brazen power grab by Kenyatta ; even more worrying is the fact that the moves have gone unchecked by Kenya ’ s parliament .
With presidential elections due in 2022 and Kenyatta ’ s two-term limit up , the shift also raises questions about succession and whether he intends to attempt to remain in presidential office .
Kenyatta ’ s allies are already clamoring to remove the term limits , and Kenyatta ’ s move to seize control of Nairobi raises questions about whether he will flout the norms again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nairobi County to the office of the president has drawn angry reactions from critics , who view the move as an assault on Kenya ’ s democratic institutions .
“ To put it plainly , Uhuru Kenyatta is out of order , ” Brenda Wambui , a Kenyan writer and public policy scholar , wrote in an email .
The constitution “ vests sovereignty in the Kenyan people , and Uhuru ’ s Executive Order is a direct attack on that sovereignty.
” Economic control of the city is key to the Kenyatta @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kenyatta has already successfully pursued , or attempted to pursue , changes elsewhere that tie in with his family ’ s business interests .
For example , two Kenyatta family-owned construction firms figure heavily in deals to build affordable housing in the country , a hallmark project of the president ’ s administration .
However , Northlands City is the biggest ongoing Kenyatta family project .
Once completed , the urban development is projected to have 250,000 people working and living within it .
The plans have influenced key government decisions , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million interchange in Nairobi .
The development is rumored to be the reason for a series of demolitions that rendered thousands homeless amid the coronavirus pandemic .
“ We know that much of how Uhuru Kenyatta has strategized has to do with consolidating business interests and , as many have noted , I think the grabbing of Nairobi has to do with consolidating Northlands , ” wrote Mumbi Kanyogo , a Kenyan activist , in a text message .
“ And if Nairobi is supposed to become an expat city , then we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of poor Nairobians in ways that remind me of Nairobi ’ s colonial history , as well as the continued pushing out of middle-class renters to the outskirts of the city , possibly into Northlands.
” It is noteworthy that Kenyatta has chosen to use military officers to consolidate his power .
Nairobi was never completely demilitarized after British rule ended in 1963 , and it is still replete with strategic military installations that were intended to prevent a revolt or takeover by natives ; since independence , the barracks have continued to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government relies on them to dispatch the military to quell dissent .
While military involvement in Kenya ’ s political institutions is not often overt , with Badi ’ s appointment to the NMS leadership , Kenyatta has made clear how he wishes power to be wielded in Nairobi—and the Kenyan military is key .
The militarization of the capital is just one of several unconstitutional moves by Kenyatta .
The composition of several branches of his government violates constitutional mandates , including a rule that “ not more than two-thirds of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be of the same gender.
” The president has also blatantly refused to appoint new judges to the country ’ s courts , leading to backlogs in the judicial system .
Kenya ’ s constitution does not provide for an all-powerful president , but it seems to be what Kenyatta is trying to make himself .
Kenyatta ’ s recent executive order also brought other independent offices under his authority , including the deputy president ’ s office and the judiciary .
The action , which is illegal under the constitution , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to achieve .
Kenya ’ s chief justice , David Maraga , has pointed out that the president doesn ’ t have the power to transfer the judiciary or other state organs to his office ’ s control .
Kenya ’ s constitution does not provide for an all-powerful president , but it seems to be what Kenyatta is trying to make himself , rolling back democratic gains in the process .
“ We have separation of powers in our Constitution for a good reason , ” Wambui wrote .
“ The separation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be fairly represented and to seek legal redress , whilst stopping executive overreach , which is what Uhuru Kenyatta is attempting to do.
” Kenya ’ s history is replete with unilateral declarations from the president ’ s office .
It is to this past that Kenyatta seeks to return .
Kenyatta ’ s recent move in Nairobi is a brazen attempt to undermine democracy in the country , leading Kenya back to the type of imperial dictatorship imposed by his father , Jomo Kenyatta , and his successor , Daniel arap Moi @

On June 3, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta signed his first executive order of the year. Among other things, it listed a newly created Nairobi Metropolitan Services (NMS)—including functions such as health care, transportation, and public works—as part of the president’s office rather than an independent office in the county government system. The decision goes against the spirit of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, which established county governments to promote democratic accountability by devolving some powers to the local level.
On June 3, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta signed his first executive order of the year. Among other things, it listed a newly created Nairobi Metropolitan Services (NMS)—including functions such as health care, transportation, and public works—as part of the president’s office rather than an independent office in the county government system. The decision goes against the spirit of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, which established county governments to promote democratic accountability by devolving some powers to the local level.
In March, Mike Sonko, the governor of Nairobi County, signed a deed of transfer with the national government. Under the terms of the deal, county functions would be administered by the national government through the new NMS. Air Force Maj. Gen. Mohamed Abdalla Badi was appointed the director-general by Kenyatta, and seven more senior military officers were added to the leadership ranks of the NMS two months later.
As Kenya reels from the coronavirus pandemic, a shift in power is underway in Nairobi, with municipal duties being transferred from elected public officials into the hands of military men. Even Sonko, who in April captured global attention for including bottles of Hennessy in coronavirus care packages for the public, has spoken out against the militarization. He says he was hoodwinked into signing documents he didn’t understand and has now taken the national government to court on the grounds that the deal is unconstitutional.
The militarization of Nairobi and the subsequent transfer of the county’s administration into the president’s office is a brazen power grab by Kenyatta.
The militarization of Nairobi and the subsequent transfer of the county’s administration into the president’s office is a brazen power grab by Kenyatta; even more worrying is the fact that the moves have gone unchecked by Kenya’s parliament. With presidential elections due in 2022 and Kenyatta’s two-term limit up, the shift also raises questions about succession and whether he intends to attempt to remain in presidential office. Kenyatta’s allies are already clamoring to remove the term limits, and Kenyatta’s move to seize control of Nairobi raises questions about whether he will flout the norms again in two years.
The handover of Nairobi County to the office of the president has drawn angry reactions from critics, who view the move as an assault on Kenya’s democratic institutions. “To put it plainly, Uhuru Kenyatta is out of order,” Brenda Wambui, a Kenyan writer and public policy scholar, wrote in an email. The constitution “vests sovereignty in the Kenyan people, and Uhuru’s Executive Order is a direct attack on that sovereignty.”
Nairobi County is Kenya’s political and economic hub, controlling 21.7 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. And the Kenyatta family is one of Nairobi’s biggest landowners. It recently unveiled a plan to build a $5 billion urban development in Nairobi dubbed Northlands City. To some, the project is at the heart of the president’s power grab.
Economic control of the city is key to the Kenyatta family’s manufacturing dynasty, and Kenyatta has already successfully pursued, or attempted to pursue, changes elsewhere that tie in with his family’s business interests. For example, two Kenyatta family-owned construction firms figure heavily in deals to build affordable housing in the country, a hallmark project of the president’s administration.
However, Northlands City is the biggest ongoing Kenyatta family project. Once completed, the urban development is projected to have 250,000 people working and living within it. The plans have influenced key government decisions, such as the building of a $376 million interchange in Nairobi. The development is rumored to be the reason for a series of demolitions that rendered thousands homeless amid the coronavirus pandemic.
“We know that much of how Uhuru Kenyatta has strategized has to do with consolidating business interests and, as many have noted, I think the grabbing of Nairobi has to do with consolidating Northlands,” wrote Mumbi Kanyogo, a Kenyan activist, in a text message. “And if Nairobi is supposed to become an expat city, then we’re going to see mass displacement of poor Nairobians in ways that remind me of Nairobi’s colonial history, as well as the continued pushing out of middle-class renters to the outskirts of the city, possibly into Northlands.”
It is noteworthy that Kenyatta has chosen to use military officers to consolidate his power. Nairobi was never completely demilitarized after British rule ended in 1963, and it is still replete with strategic military installations that were intended to prevent a revolt or takeover by natives; since independence, the barracks have continued to serve a similar function. The Kenyan government relies on them to dispatch the military to quell dissent.
While military involvement in Kenya’s political institutions is not often overt, with Badi’s appointment to the NMS leadership, Kenyatta has made clear how he wishes power to be wielded in Nairobi—and the Kenyan military is key.
The militarization of the capital is just one of several unconstitutional moves by Kenyatta. The composition of several branches of his government violates constitutional mandates, including a rule that “not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender.” The president has also blatantly refused to appoint new judges to the country’s courts, leading to backlogs in the judicial system.
Kenya’s constitution does not provide for an all-powerful president, but it seems to be what Kenyatta is trying to make himself.
Kenyatta’s recent executive order also brought other independent offices under his authority, including the deputy president’s office and the judiciary. The action, which is illegal under the constitution, has raised questions about what Kenyatta is trying to achieve. Kenya’s chief justice, David Maraga, has pointed out that the president doesn’t have the power to transfer the judiciary or other state organs to his office’s control. Kenya’s constitution does not provide for an all-powerful president, but it seems to be what Kenyatta is trying to make himself, rolling back democratic gains in the process.
“We have separation of powers in our Constitution for a good reason,” Wambui wrote. “The separation of powers protects Kenyans’ right to be fairly represented and to seek legal redress, whilst stopping executive overreach, which is what Uhuru Kenyatta is attempting to do.”
Kenya’s history is replete with unilateral declarations from the president’s office. It is to this past that Kenyatta seeks to return. Kenyatta’s recent move in Nairobi is a brazen attempt to undermine democracy in the country, leading Kenya back to the type of imperial dictatorship imposed by his father, Jomo Kenyatta, and his successor, Daniel arap Moi.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Why Israel’s Warming Gulf Ties Will Survive Annexation

In the shadow of the world ’ s tallest skyscraper in Dubai , a new kosher caterer makes delicious tsimmes .
The sweet carrot stew is an iconic Jewish dish featured on the menu of Elli ’ s Kosher Kitchen , alongside matzo ball soup and brisket .
For the United Arab Emirates , the new kosher cuisine has become a point of pride as the royal court of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan tries to rebrand the country as modern and multicultural .
Along with creating a Ministry of Tolerance and declaring battle on “ extremism and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two synagogues and a growing Jewish community of about 200.Along with creating a Ministry of Tolerance , the UAE now boasts two synagogues and a growing Jewish community of about 200 .
In a stunning turnaround from decades of animosity and—in more recent years—secret contacts , the UAE has also been cultivating public ties with Israel .
That ’ s why it ’ s perplexing to watch Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu veer from his script of courting moderate Gulf states and proceed with plans to annex parts of the West Bank .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ forward , which rests on getting a green light from the White House , has drawn outrage from Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas , King Abdullah of Jordan , the 22-member Arab League , and most European nations .
Joe Biden , the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee , says he won ’ t recognize Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank if he wins the election in November .
As Netanyahu ’ s July 1 target date for formal annexation approaches , a diplomatic fog has settled in .
Conflicting signals emerge every day over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he promised during the campaign , when he desperately needed right-wing votes to secure his March reelection .
So far , his own remarks and those of his aides indicate Netanyahu will buck the criticism and extend the full embrace of Israeli law to at least some of the 132 Jewish settlements that most of the world considers occupied territory .
As for the likelihood that Israel ’ s new friends in the Gulf will tell him to get lost , Netanyahu has ample evidence to suspect they ’ re bluffing .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is dissipating .
So far , the most compelling argument that Israel would be spiting itself by formally asserting ownership in the West Bank was made by the UAE ’ s ambassador to Washington , Yousef al-Otaiba , in a remarkable Hebrew-language newspaper column .
Annexation will “ upend Israeli aspirations for improved security , economic and cultural ties with the Arab world , ” Otaiba wrote on June 12 in Israel ’ s Yedioth Ahronoth , adding that “ it will ignite violence and rouse extremists.
” Then he zeroed in on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tiny Muslim-majority country .
“ We have promoted engagement and conflict reduction , helped to create incentives—carrots rather than sticks , ” he wrote .
“ This is what normal could be.
” In truth , the growing UAE-Israeli relationship is anything but normal .
Like its Gulf neighbors , the UAE is a monarchical police state , and the cultural shift toward tolerance is part of a set of highly strategic responses to geopolitical threats .
First is countering their common adversary , Iran .
Second is access to Israeli technology , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ start-ups in desert agriculture , desalination , and cyber-spying.Now under construction in Dubai is an Israeli pavilion for next year ’ s World Expo , a project that would have been unimaginable five years ago .
A third and suddenly new area of strategic cooperation—one that has already proved resistant to criticism from anti-Israel forces in the UAE—is medical research to fight COVID-19 .
Gulf investors have their eyes on Israel ’ s Migal Galilee Research Institute near the Lebanese border and the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness Ziona , where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus vaccine and treatments for the disease .
This week , Netanyahu announced an agreement between the Israeli and UAE health ministries to work together on battling COVID-19 .
The Emirati response was more muted , saying only that two of its companies would collaborate on research .
It ’ s a familiar pattern from the past—Israel has gone public with Arab-Israeli cooperation before , only for its partners to flinch at admitting to the extent of that cooperation in public .
This time , nervousness over annexation may also have played a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to speak another language .
Now under construction in Dubai is an Israeli pavilion for next year ’ s World Expo , a project that would have been unimaginable five years ago when most ties with the Jewish state were under the radar out of concern it would undermine the Palestinians .
That concern has diminished amid friction with Abbas and impatience with his refusal to negotiate on U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s peace proposal .
For the first time , Israeli visitors to the Dubai exposition will be able to enter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a courtesy that Qatar also plans to offer in 2022 when it hosts soccer ’ s FIFA World Cup .
To prepare for that event , the petroleum-rich peninsula has engaged New York ’ s Rabbi Marc Schneier—who often takes congregants from his synagogue in the Hamptons on interfaith jaunts through the Muslim world—as an advisor to ensure kosher food is available for Jewish fans .
And while the UAE entertained a series of Israeli cabinet ministers over the past two years , Oman ’ s Sultan Qaboos bin Said shocked the Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ himself , along with his wife , Sara Netanyahu , at the late sultan ’ s opulent palace in Muscat .
A clip from the meeting was aired on the evening news once the Netanyahus were safely back in Jerusalem .
The UAE , as well as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain , is highly invested in Trump ’ s “ Peace to Prosperity ” plan , which the Palestinians summarily rejected .
Otaiba himself was present at the White House in January when Trump released the proposal , which includes both establishing a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s annexation of the Jordan Valley and other territory where its settlements sit .
The Emirati tycoon Mohamed Ali Alabbar , who has long and deep ties to the UAE ’ s Jewish community , attended an earlier Bahraini summit where Trump son-in-law and peace team chief Jared Kushner unveiled a $ 50 billion plan to rebuild the Palestinian economy , which Abbas also dismissed.The UAE dealt Abbas an embarrassing slap by sending the aid on two Etihad Airways flights to Tel Aviv ’ s Ben Gurion International Airport , the first noncovert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
To be sure , as Otaiba said , the Gulf ’ s carrots can be substituted with sticks if Israel goes rogue in the West Bank .
Gone would be the presence of Israeli diplomats in Abu Dhabi or military ventures such as Emirati participation in air force exercises with Israel .
Forget the possibility of a formal nonbelligerency pact with the UAE and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council that Netanyahu aides have frequently floated .
Gulf states could prick harder at Israel in the United Nations or boost support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Sanctions movement that has gained strength in Europe and the United States .
They could join Qatar in financing Hamas in the Gaza Strip and other militant groups hostile to Israel .
But Netanyahu , shielded by Trump , is betting they won ’ t .
Just days after Otaiba published his Hebrew op-ed , the Emirati state minister for foreign affairs , Anwar Gargash , participated in a Zoom interview with the American Jewish Committee ’ s international troubleshooter Jason Isaacson and offered a more conciliatory approach .
While restating his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ UAE believes in “ decoupling the political from the nonpolitical.
” His government , the foreign minister suggested , may look at Israel ’ s designs on the West Bank and say , “ We don ’ t think it ’ s a good idea , but at the same time there are areas , such a COVID , technology , and other things , where we can actually work together.
” Even as the UAE raps the West Bank plans in public and presented itself as a champion of the Palestinians by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ help control the coronavirus in the Palestinian-inhabited parts of the West Bank , it dealt Abbas an embarrassing slap by sending the aid on two Etihad Airways flights to Tel Aviv ’ s Ben Gurion International Airport , the first noncovert flights by a Gulf airline to Israel .
The mortified leader rejected the shipments , even though they displayed the Emirati flag and were brightly labeled as aid to fight the pandemic in Palestine .
Such an insult would never have happened in the past when Yasser Arafat was in charge and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arab political unity .
In part , the support has ebbed through diplomatic fatigue as the Palestinians have rejected one peace initiative after another since the 1993 Oslo accords .
Ebbing support for the Palestinians is also generational , as Arab millennials who chat online with young Israelis about gaming and software apps find their parents ’ dogmas boring.It ’ s also generational , as Arab millennials who chat online with young Israelis about gaming and software apps find their parents ’ dogmas boring .
A final factor is intra-Palestinian intrigue .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fingerprints of Mohammed Dahlan , a political rival whom Abbas drove into exile .
Dahlan now lives in Abu Dhabi , where he is a close friend of the crown prince , advising him on real estate purchases in Eastern Europe , handling the Palestinian leadership , and more .
In Washington , Otaiba keeps a ritual Jewish shofar on display in his spacious embassy office .
The son of a former OPEC president , he has developed an unusually warm relationship with the Israeli ambassador to the United States , Ron Dermer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comfortable talking about the mutual benefits of closer ties with Israel , as well as the UAE ’ s impatience with the Palestinians .
If Otaiba ’ s boss , the UAE ’ s foreign minister , was speaking in candor , then even Israel ’ s ambitions to annex up to 29 percent of the West Bank , including the strategic Jordan Valley border area , can be decoupled as a political disagreement from strategic cooperation , business and technology deals , and the growing comfort with Israelis and Jews .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic carrots are just too enticing .
Netanyahu is confident that the UAE and its Gulf neighbors will keep the tsimmes simmering , that sticks amount to mere twigs , and that they represent little long-term threat to Israel .

In the shadow of the world’s tallest skyscraper in Dubai, a new kosher caterer makes delicious tsimmes. The sweet carrot stew is an iconic Jewish dish featured on the menu of Elli’s Kosher Kitchen , alongside matzo ball soup and brisket. For the United Arab Emirates, the new kosher cuisine has become a point of pride as the royal court of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan tries to rebrand the country as modern and multicultural. Along with creating a Ministry of Tolerance and declaring battle on “extremism and fanaticism,” the UAE now boasts two synagogues and a growing Jewish community of about 200.Along with creating a Ministry of Tolerance, the UAE now boasts two synagogues and a growing Jewish community of about 200. In a stunning turnaround from decades of animosity and—in more recent years—secret contacts, the UAE has also been cultivating public ties with Israel.
In the shadow of the world’s tallest skyscraper in Dubai, a new kosher caterer makes delicious tsimmes. The sweet carrot stew is an iconic Jewish dish featured on the menu of Elli’s Kosher Kitchen, alongside matzo ball soup and brisket. For the United Arab Emirates, the new kosher cuisine has become a point of pride as the royal court of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan tries to rebrand the country as modern and multicultural. Along with creating a Ministry of Tolerance and declaring battle on “extremism and fanaticism,” the UAE now boasts two synagogues and a growing Jewish community of about 200.Along with creating a Ministry of Tolerance, the UAE now boasts two synagogues and a growing Jewish community of about 200. In a stunning turnaround from decades of animosity and—in more recent years—secret contacts, the UAE has also been cultivating public ties with Israel.
That’s why it’s perplexing to watch Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu veer from his script of courting moderate Gulf states and proceed with plans to annex parts of the West Bank. The prospect of Israel’s moving forward, which rests on getting a green light from the White House, has drawn outrage from Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, King Abdullah of Jordan, the 22-member Arab League, and most European nations. Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, says he won’t recognize Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank if he wins the election in November.
As Netanyahu’s July 1 target date for formal annexation approaches, a diplomatic fog has settled in. Conflicting signals emerge every day over whether Netanyahu will go through with what he promised during the campaign, when he desperately needed right-wing votes to secure his March reelection. So far, his own remarks and those of his aides indicate Netanyahu will buck the criticism and extend the full embrace of Israeli law to at least some of the 132 Jewish settlements that most of the world considers occupied territory. As for the likelihood that Israel’s new friends in the Gulf will tell him to get lost, Netanyahu has ample evidence to suspect they’re bluffing. It’s clear their empathy for Abbas is dissipating.
So far, the most compelling argument that Israel would be spiting itself by formally asserting ownership in the West Bank was made by the UAE’s ambassador to Washington, Yousef al-Otaiba, in a remarkable Hebrew-language newspaper column. Annexation will “upend Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world,” Otaiba wrote on June 12 in Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth, adding that “it will ignite violence and rouse extremists.”
Then he zeroed in on the new tolerance for Jews in his tiny Muslim-majority country. “We have promoted engagement and conflict reduction, helped to create incentives—carrots rather than sticks,” he wrote. “This is what normal could be.”
In truth, the growing UAE-Israeli relationship is anything but normal. Like its Gulf neighbors, the UAE is a monarchical police state, and the cultural shift toward tolerance is part of a set of highly strategic responses to geopolitical threats. First is countering their common adversary, Iran. Second is access to Israeli technology, particularly the pioneering methods developed by Israeli start-ups in desert agriculture, desalination, and cyber-spying.Now under construction in Dubai is an Israeli pavilion for next year’s World Expo, a project that would have been unimaginable five years ago.
A third and suddenly new area of strategic cooperation—one that has already proved resistant to criticism from anti-Israel forces in the UAE—is medical research to fight COVID-19. Gulf investors have their eyes on Israel’s Migal Galilee Research Institute near the Lebanese border and the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness Ziona, where scientists are making progress in developing a coronavirus vaccine and treatments for the disease. This week, Netanyahu announced an agreement between the Israeli and UAE health ministries to work together on battling COVID-19. The Emirati response was more muted, saying only that two of its companies would collaborate on research. It’s a familiar pattern from the past—Israel has gone public with Arab-Israeli cooperation before, only for its partners to flinch at admitting to the extent of that cooperation in public. This time, nervousness over annexation may also have played a role.
Developments in the Gulf continue to speak another language. Now under construction in Dubai is an Israeli pavilion for next year’s World Expo, a project that would have been unimaginable five years ago when most ties with the Jewish state were under the radar out of concern it would undermine the Palestinians. That concern has diminished amid friction with Abbas and impatience with his refusal to negotiate on U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace proposal.
For the first time, Israeli visitors to the Dubai exposition will be able to enter the UAE on their Israeli passports, a courtesy that Qatar also plans to offer in 2022 when it hosts soccer’s FIFA World Cup. To prepare for that event, the petroleum-rich peninsula has engaged New York’s Rabbi Marc Schneier—who often takes congregants from his synagogue in the Hamptons on interfaith jaunts through the Muslim world—as an advisor to ensure kosher food is available for Jewish fans. And while the UAE entertained a series of Israeli cabinet ministers over the past two years, Oman’s Sultan Qaboos bin Said shocked the Middle East in October 2018 by hosting Netanyahu himself, along with his wife, Sara Netanyahu, at the late sultan’s opulent palace in Muscat. A clip from the meeting was aired on the evening news once the Netanyahus were safely back in Jerusalem.
The UAE, as well as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, is highly invested in Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan, which the Palestinians summarily rejected. Otaiba himself was present at the White House in January when Trump released the proposal, which includes both establishing a demilitarized Palestinian state and allowing Israel’s annexation of the Jordan Valley and other territory where its settlements sit. The Emirati tycoon Mohamed Ali Alabbar, who has long and deep ties to the UAE’s Jewish community, attended an earlier Bahraini summit where Trump son-in-law and peace team chief Jared Kushner unveiled a $50 billion plan to rebuild the Palestinian economy, which Abbas also dismissed.
To be sure, as Otaiba said, the Gulf’s carrots can be substituted with sticks if Israel goes rogue in the West Bank. Gone would be the presence of Israeli diplomats in Abu Dhabi or military ventures such as Emirati participation in air force exercises with Israel. Forget the possibility of a formal nonbelligerency pact with the UAE and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council that Netanyahu aides have frequently floated. Gulf states could prick harder at Israel in the United Nations or boost support to the Palestinian-led Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement that has gained strength in Europe and the United States. They could join Qatar in financing Hamas in the Gaza Strip and other militant groups hostile to Israel.
But Netanyahu, shielded by Trump, is betting they won’t. Just days after Otaiba published his Hebrew op-ed, the Emirati state minister for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, participated in a Zoom interview with the American Jewish Committee’s international troubleshooter Jason Isaacson and offered a more conciliatory approach. While restating his opposition to annexation, Gargash said the UAE believes in “decoupling the political from the nonpolitical.” His government, the foreign minister suggested, may look at Israel’s designs on the West Bank and say, “We don’t think it’s a good idea, but at the same time there are areas, such a COVID, technology, and other things, where we can actually work together.”
Even as the UAE raps the West Bank plans in public and presented itself as a champion of the Palestinians by delivering two planeloads of protective gear to help control the coronavirus in the Palestinian-inhabited parts of the West Bank, it dealt Abbas an embarrassing slap by sending the aid on two Etihad Airways flights to Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport, the first noncovert flights by a Gulf airline to Israel. The mortified leader rejected the shipments, even though they displayed the Emirati flag and were brightly labeled as aid to fight the pandemic in Palestine.
Such an insult would never have happened in the past when Yasser Arafat was in charge and support for the Palestinians against Israel defined Arab political unity. In part, the support has ebbed through diplomatic fatigue as the Palestinians have rejected one peace initiative after another since the 1993 Oslo accords. Ebbing support for the Palestinians is also generational, as Arab millennials who chat online with young Israelis about gaming and software apps find their parents’ dogmas boring.It’s also generational, as Arab millennials who chat online with young Israelis about gaming and software apps find their parents’ dogmas boring. A final factor is intra-Palestinian intrigue. The COVID-19 airport episode seems to bear the fingerprints of Mohammed Dahlan, a political rival whom Abbas drove into exile. Dahlan now lives in Abu Dhabi, where he is a close friend of the crown prince, advising him on real estate purchases in Eastern Europe, handling the Palestinian leadership, and more.
In Washington, Otaiba keeps a ritual Jewish shofar on display in his spacious embassy office. The son of a former OPEC president, he has developed an unusually warm relationship with the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer. In conversation, Otaiba is disarmingly comfortable talking about the mutual benefits of closer ties with Israel, as well as the UAE’s impatience with the Palestinians.
If Otaiba’s boss, the UAE’s foreign minister, was speaking in candor, then even Israel’s ambitions to annex up to 29 percent of the West Bank, including the strategic Jordan Valley border area, can be decoupled as a political disagreement from strategic cooperation, business and technology deals, and the growing comfort with Israelis and Jews. For both sides, it appears, the diplomatic carrots are just too enticing. Netanyahu is confident that the UAE and its Gulf neighbors will keep the tsimmes simmering, that sticks amount to mere twigs, and that they represent little long-term threat to Israel.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--China Ridicules U.S. Protests Out of Fear of Its Own People

China Ridicules U.S .
Protests Out of Fear of Its Own People Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying on May 30 tweeted “ I can ’ t breathe ” in response to the U.S. State Department ’ s criticism of a proposed national security law for Hong Kong .
This clapback neatly captures the recent eagerness of Chinese state media and officials to amplify the George Floyd marches and criticize the U.S. government for police brutality and racism .
At first glance , the Chinese party-state has been handed a rhetorical gift .
As the United States explodes in nationwide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Chinese officials are using the unrest to deflect condemnation for abuses against their own citizens .
They can readily accuse the United States of “ hypocritical double standards ” for failing to live up to its venerated principles .
There ’ s certainly some truth to the accusation of violent or illiberal responses to the protests .
Widespread curfews denied many Americans their fundamental right to assembly and free expression .
Thousands of protesters have been arrested , most for violating curfews .
Police have widely employed tear gas , rubber bullets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The U.S. Press Freedom Tracker , as of June 15 , had documented at least 325 attacks and more than 59 arrests of journalists .
President Donald Trump and some of his political allies threatened to deploy the military against citizens .
But on deeper examination , these mass demonstrations are fraught territory for the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) .
While it wants to frame the unrest as an indictment of American democracy , the reality is that nationwide collective action for government accountability is democracy in action .
When the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials or lawmakers to effect justice , they take to the streets to shift narratives and demand resolution .
The George Floyd protests , composed of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in more than 2,000 locations in the United States , can already claim some notable achievements , such as repurposing police funding for social services .
The House and Senate have both proposed laws to counter impunity for police violence .
We ’ ll set aside for now that , as Ho-fung Hung pointed out recently in Foreign Policy , the CCP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights .
We ’ ll also bookmark that Hua bafflingly tweeted “ All lives matter ” two days after “ I can ’ t breathe ” and the history of racism toward ethnic minorities and Africans in China itself .
What ’ s more important is that the CCP ’ s rush to paint the George Floyd protests as a sign of failure is indicative of its anxiety toward social movements .
Indeed , widespread demonstrations are conspicuously absent in China .
This is not to say Chinese citizens don ’ t protest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent state-released data on so-called “ mass incidents ” —party-speak for unauthorized gatherings and other social unrest—indicates there were about 180,000 such events in 2010 .
That information used to be released regularly , until the CCP decided the number was too risky to publicize .
In 2016 , the researchers Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu were arrested for collecting and publishing data about the frequency , size , and nature of Chinese protests .
Before losing their freedom , the research duo managed to record nearly 30,000 events in 2015 alone .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ identified some 136,000 collective action events between 2010 and 2017 by applying a deep-learning algorithm to analyze Weibo posts .
Lu and Li ’ s research found that approximately half of demonstrations were led by workers and peasants—a ratio mirroring analysis of mass incidents by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences—protesting labor rights abuses , forced evictions , and corrupt local officials .
These rural residents and migrant workers , a population of some 560 million , disproportionally hold low-wage jobs and are denied some entitlements or rights granted to urban residents .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ led by urban residents cheated by developers or protesting environmental degradation .
Some end up petitioning the government ’ s Bureau of Letters and Visits , joining the ranks of millions who subject themselves to years of waiting and police abuse for an unlikely chance of a successful appeal .
While China does not lack for grievances or dissent , the party-state has long honed a security apparatus specifically designed to prevent localized activism from developing into a movement .
It averts mobilization by employing surveillance , heavily censoring online speech , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emerges , police use a combination of repression and negotiation to contain and squelch the unrest as early as possible .
The scholars Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang call this system “ bargained authoritarianism.
” The CCP euphemistically refers to it as “ stability maintenance , ” and it was allocated nearly $ 200 billion in 2018 , exceeding or equal to its defense budget .
The consequence is , as intended , the curbing of cross-geographical and sustained mobilizations that could create leverage for political concessions .
With some exception for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even encouraged in limited , atomized groups—social movements are barely able to get off the ground before the state extinguishes them .
This is especially true since Xi Jinping took over as CCP leader in 2012 , instituting more restrictions on independent civil society , consolidating the party ’ s monopoly on political discourse , and emphasizing the nonnegotiability of stability maintenance .
In the context of a party-state that takes such great pains to crush collective action , the CCP ’ s keenness to comment on the George Floyd protests presents an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that never were .
In early 2013 , activists began organizing protests in multiple cities to demand officials publicly disclose their financial assets .
They posted event photos online to spread the word .
The demonstrations were inspired by the New Citizens Movement , founded by the legal scholar Xu Zhiyong , which advocates civic participation in political life .
By March , police started arresting the protesters , and dozens were ultimately sentenced to years in prison .
This occurred just months after Xi pledged to fight corruption .
The crackdown on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not intend for the public to play a major role in anti-graft efforts .
Had the movement been allowed to evolve , perhaps attention would have turned to the immense wealth accumulated by top leaders ’ families , including Xi ’ s own .
Some of the anti-corruption demonstrators , having been released from jail , convened a small meeting in December 2019 to discuss politics .
Within weeks , police rounded up several people on the charge of “ inciting subversion ” for attending the meeting , including Xu .
That the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a private discussion reflects the greater intolerance for dissent since their 2013 campaign .
Chinese feminists have also faced obstacles in recent efforts to build a movement .
Up to five years ago , a network of activists was able to conduct performance protests across the country to raise awareness about sexual harassment and gender inequality .
But in 2015 , ahead of International Women ’ s Day , five leading feminists were detained for 37 days because of a plan to hand out stickers about sexual harassment on public transport in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a more restrictive environment for street demonstrations by taking the movement online .
A # MeToo campaign expanded quickly on Weibo and WeChat in January 2018 through a “ networked guerrilla movement ” that relied on decentralized posting and creative use of coded language to circumvent censors .
It culminated in a petition signed by 8,000 people demanding that universities address sexual harassment on campus .
In a tentative victory , the government has since introduced anti-sexual harassment provisions in a draft civil code .
But the state has extracted a substantial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ terms related to the # MeToo campaign and , on International Women ’ s Day in 2018 , by shutting down the social media accounts of Feminist Voices and Anti-Sexual Harassment ( ATSH ) , two important feminist platforms that between them had hundreds of thousands of followers .
Authorities shut down a feminist NGO in December 2018 and detained ATSH founder Huang Xueqin in October 2019 .
A feminist activist involved in the # MeToo campaign , Yue Xin , was also detained in August 2018 .
But the pretext was linked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a labor rights movement .
In July 2018 , workers at the Jasic Technology factory in Shenzhen demonstrated against the arrests of fellow workers who wanted to form a grassroots union at the company .
Dozens of self-professed Marxist students , including Yue , traveled to Shenzhen from around the country to join the workers in protest .
Other university students demonstrated in solidarity on their campuses .
As the Jasic protests garnered attention inside and outside China , the government responded harshly , detaining over 130 workers , students , and labor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Staff of at least 10 labor NGOs were impacted .
As noted above , labor grievances are a common driver of protests in China .
What made the Jasic movement unique was that workers demanded power in the workplace through a functioning union , and it quickly attracted cross-geographical , cross-class solidarity .
By international standards , it was a nascent , small-scale labor action .
But it contained enough ingredients of a social movement to merit the state ’ s widespread and thorough suppression .
The CCP has surely not forgotten that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alliance of workers and students .
Understanding the party ’ s memory of Tiananmen , Yue published an open letter to Xi just days before she was detained , reassuring that : “ We [ student activists ] are not foreign forces or a student movement , and we don ’ t have any political demands .
We just want justice for Jasic workers.
” But even those modest demands were a bridge too far .
Chinese people believing they can drive social change from the bottom through organization and dissent is an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anxiety , since the start of the George Floyd protests , has motivated the party-state in domestically oriented media to emphasize incidents of looting and violence , downplaying the larger social movement .
Such framing has contributed to Weibo posts with the hashtag “ U.S .
riots ” accumulating 5 billion views .
The CCP must portray the protests as a chaotic political failure , for fear that China ’ s own economically or socially marginalized groups may appreciate the potential power of collective action .

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying on May 30 tweeted “I can’t breathe” in response to the U.S. State Department’s criticism of a proposed national security law for Hong Kong. This clapback neatly captures the recent eagerness of Chinese state media and officials to amplify the George Floyd marches and criticize the U.S. government for police brutality and racism.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying on May 30 tweeted “I can’t breathe” in response to the U.S. State Department’s criticism of a proposed national security law for Hong Kong. This clapback neatly captures the recent eagerness of Chinese state media and officials to amplify the George Floyd marches and criticize the U.S. government for police brutality and racism.
At first glance, the Chinese party-state has been handed a rhetorical gift. As the United States explodes in nationwide demonstrations over police violence against Black Americans, Chinese officials are using the unrest to deflect condemnation for abuses against their own citizens. They can readily accuse the United States of “hypocritical double standards” for failing to live up to its venerated principles.
There’s certainly some truth to the accusation of violent or illiberal responses to the protests. Widespread curfews denied many Americans their fundamental right to assembly and free expression. Thousands of protesters have been arrested, most for violating curfews. Police have widely employed tear gas, rubber bullets, and other violent dispersal tactics. The U.S. Press Freedom Tracker, as of June 15, had documented at least 325 attacks and more than 59 arrests of journalists. President Donald Trump and some of his political allies threatened to deploy the military against citizens.
But on deeper examination, these mass demonstrations are fraught territory for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While it wants to frame the unrest as an indictment of American democracy, the reality is that nationwide collective action for government accountability is democracy in action. When the politically marginalized can no longer wait for officials or lawmakers to effect justice, they take to the streets to shift narratives and demand resolution. The George Floyd protests, composed of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in more than 2,000 locations in the United States, can already claim some notable achievements, such as repurposing police funding for social services. The House and Senate have both proposed laws to counter impunity for police violence.
We’ll set aside for now that, as Ho-fung Hung pointed out recently in Foreign Policy, the CCP is not a credible ally for human rights. We’ll also bookmark that Hua bafflingly tweeted “All lives matter” two days after “I can’t breathe” and the history of racism toward ethnic minorities and Africans in China itself.
What’s more important is that the CCP’s rush to paint the George Floyd protests as a sign of failure is indicative of its anxiety toward social movements. Indeed, widespread demonstrations are conspicuously absent in China.
This is not to say Chinese citizens don’t protest. Far from it. The most recent state-released data on so-called “mass incidents”—party-speak for unauthorized gatherings and other social unrest—indicates there were about 180,000 such events in 2010. That information used to be released regularly, until the CCP decided the number was too risky to publicize. In 2016, the researchers Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu were arrested for collecting and publishing data about the frequency, size, and nature of Chinese protests. Before losing their freedom, the research duo managed to record nearly 30,000 events in 2015 alone. The academics Han Zhang and Jennifer Pan identified some 136,000 collective action events between 2010 and 2017 by applying a deep-learning algorithm to analyze Weibo posts.
Lu and Li’s research found that approximately half of demonstrations were led by workers and peasants—a ratio mirroring analysis of mass incidents by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences—protesting labor rights abuses, forced evictions, and corrupt local officials. These rural residents and migrant workers, a population of some 560 million, disproportionally hold low-wage jobs and are denied some entitlements or rights granted to urban residents. At least a fifth of demonstrations were led by urban residents cheated by developers or protesting environmental degradation. Some end up petitioning the government’s Bureau of Letters and Visits, joining the ranks of millions who subject themselves to years of waiting and police abuse for an unlikely chance of a successful appeal.
While China does not lack for grievances or dissent, the party-state has long honed a security apparatus specifically designed to prevent localized activism from developing into a movement. It averts mobilization by employing surveillance, heavily censoring online speech, and dismantling activist networks. When a protest emerges, police use a combination of repression and negotiation to contain and squelch the unrest as early as possible. The scholars Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang call this system “bargained authoritarianism.” The CCP euphemistically refers to it as “stability maintenance,” and it was allocated nearly $200 billion in 2018, exceeding or equal to its defense budget.
The consequence is, as intended, the curbing of cross-geographical and sustained mobilizations that could create leverage for political concessions. With some exception for nationalist protests—which the CCP has permitted and even encouraged in limited, atomized groups—social movements are barely able to get off the ground before the state extinguishes them. This is especially true since Xi Jinping took over as CCP leader in 2012, instituting more restrictions on independent civil society, consolidating the party’s monopoly on political discourse, and emphasizing the nonnegotiability of stability maintenance.
In the context of a party-state that takes such great pains to crush collective action, the CCP’s keenness to comment on the George Floyd protests presents an occasion to consider some recent Chinese movements that never were.
In early 2013, activists began organizing protests in multiple cities to demand officials publicly disclose their financial assets. They posted event photos online to spread the word. The demonstrations were inspired by the New Citizens Movement, founded by the legal scholar Xu Zhiyong, which advocates civic participation in political life. By March, police started arresting the protesters, and dozens were ultimately sentenced to years in prison. This occurred just months after Xi pledged to fight corruption. The crackdown on these activists made clear that he did not intend for the public to play a major role in anti-graft efforts. Had the movement been allowed to evolve, perhaps attention would have turned to the immense wealth accumulated by top leaders’ families, including Xi’s own.
Some of the anti-corruption demonstrators, having been released from jail, convened a small meeting in December 2019 to discuss politics. Within weeks, police rounded up several people on the charge of “inciting subversion” for attending the meeting, including Xu. That the activists could face years of incarceration just for a private discussion reflects the greater intolerance for dissent since their 2013 campaign.
Chinese feminists have also faced obstacles in recent efforts to build a movement. Up to five years ago, a network of activists was able to conduct performance protests across the country to raise awareness about sexual harassment and gender inequality. But in 2015, ahead of International Women’s Day, five leading feminists were detained for 37 days because of a plan to hand out stickers about sexual harassment on public transport in multiple cities.
Feminists have since adapted to a more restrictive environment for street demonstrations by taking the movement online. A #MeToo campaign expanded quickly on Weibo and WeChat in January 2018 through a “networked guerrilla movement” that relied on decentralized posting and creative use of coded language to circumvent censors. It culminated in a petition signed by 8,000 people demanding that universities address sexual harassment on campus. In a tentative victory, the government has since introduced anti-sexual harassment provisions in a draft civil code.
But the state has extracted a substantial cost. It retaliated by heavily censoring terms related to the #MeToo campaign and, on International Women’s Day in 2018, by shutting down the social media accounts of Feminist Voices and Anti-Sexual Harassment (ATSH), two important feminist platforms that between them had hundreds of thousands of followers. Authorities shut down a feminist NGO in December 2018 and detained ATSH founder Huang Xueqin in October 2019.
A feminist activist involved in the #MeToo campaign, Yue Xin, was also detained in August 2018. But the pretext was linked to a separate effort to snuff out a labor rights movement. In July 2018, workers at the Jasic Technology factory in Shenzhen demonstrated against the arrests of fellow workers who wanted to form a grassroots union at the company. Dozens of self-professed Marxist students, including Yue, traveled to Shenzhen from around the country to join the workers in protest. Other university students demonstrated in solidarity on their campuses. As the Jasic protests garnered attention inside and outside China, the government responded harshly, detaining over 130 workers, students, and labor activists over the subsequent 11 months. Staff of at least 10 labor NGOs were impacted.
As noted above, labor grievances are a common driver of protests in China. What made the Jasic movement unique was that workers demanded power in the workplace through a functioning union, and it quickly attracted cross-geographical, cross-class solidarity. By international standards, it was a nascent, small-scale labor action. But it contained enough ingredients of a social movement to merit the state’s widespread and thorough suppression. The CCP has surely not forgotten that the 1989 pro-democracy movement was a powerful alliance of workers and students.
Understanding the party’s memory of Tiananmen, Yue published an open letter to Xi just days before she was detained, reassuring that: “We [student activists] are not foreign forces or a student movement, and we don’t have any political demands. We just want justice for Jasic workers.” But even those modest demands were a bridge too far. Chinese people believing they can drive social change from the bottom through organization and dissent is an idea that terrifies the CCP.
This anxiety, since the start of the George Floyd protests, has motivated the party-state in domestically oriented media to emphasize incidents of looting and violence, downplaying the larger social movement. Such framing has contributed to Weibo posts with the hashtag “U.S. riots” accumulating 5 billion views. The CCP must portray the protests as a chaotic political failure, for fear that China’s own economically or socially marginalized groups may appreciate the potential power of collective action.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Israel’s Annexation of the West Bank Would be a Gift to Iran

Israel ’ s Annexation of the West Bank Would be a Gift to Iran Starting July 1 , Israel may take the first step toward annexing territory in the West Bank , in line with U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s peace plan for the region .
Discussions about the potential annexation have mostly focused on its implications for the two-state solution and renewed violence .
But it would also have significant effects on Israel ’ s rivalry with Iran and on U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran .
Although many Israelis view annexation as a strategic gain , the move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Annexation is not yet a done deal .
According to the Israeli government ’ s coalition agreement , Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may hold a cabinet or parliamentary vote on unilaterally annexing West Bank settlements and the Jordan Valley starting July 1 , so long as the Israelis act in concert with Washington .
But Benny Gantz , the alternate prime minister and defense minister , has expressed serious reservations , and Washington wants both leaders to be in agreement before it greenlights any decision .
As July approaches , some Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experts have warned that annexation would bring about the end of the two-state solution and potentially trigger another Palestinian intifada .
And , for its part , Iran would likely welcome the chance to reassert its anti-Israel credentials .
Iran ’ s opposition to Israel , and its effort to disrupt any Arab-Israeli normalization , dates back to the country ’ s founding .
The first supreme leader , Ruhollah Khomeini , made opposition to Israel a core pillar of the regime ’ s identity and approach to foreign affairs .
These views @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials have stridently opposed any progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace , and Tehran has for decades provided assistance to Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad .
The country has likewise tried to derail previous U.S.-supported efforts to broker peace , including the 1991 Madrid conference and the 1993 Oslo Accords .
Iran will likely spearhead international opposition to annexation .
The regime would raise the mantle of its defense of Palestinian rights to distract from its own issues at home , including a botched response to the COVID-19 pandemic , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with regime incompetence and corruption .
Although the impact of such a propaganda campaign in changing public sentiment would likely be limited , it would lay the groundwork for the consolidation of a more hard-line agenda after the 2021 presidential elections .
The annexation would also provide the regime with a golden opportunity to justify its increase in defense spending and its controversial expenditures abroad .
Annexation would also provide Iran ’ s leaders with more ammunition to criticize Israel and escape , if only rhetorically , the U.S. campaign to isolate it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , annexation would also provide Iran ’ s leaders with more ammunition to criticize Israel and escape , if only rhetorically , the U.S. campaign to isolate it in the region .
Tehran can direct its ire toward those Muslim nations that have started to quietly normalize ties with Israel , such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates .
Iran ’ s regional policy has been a source of tension with its neighbors going back decades , but these concerns have intensified since the Arab Spring , after which Iran became @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Arab public perceptions of Iran have suffered as its regional presence has grown .
And given that Iran was an epicenter for the coronavirus in the Middle East , it is facing significant headwinds .
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a prime way for Iran to change the subject .
As annexation hands Iran an opportunity to improve its standing in the Middle East , it would also weaken Israel ’ s standing internationally and consume it domestically .
In its zero-sum competition , a distracted Israel is a strong plus for Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it clear that they oppose annexation and are preparing retaliatory measures .
European states have warned Israel against unilateral annexation and are working with the European Union to develop sanctions .
In the United States , Israel would weaken its relationship with key Democrats and further polarize American public support for Israel .
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee , a pro-Israel lobbying group , already gave U.S. legislators a green light to publicly raise concerns about the annexation move , a rare decision for the most prominent organization supporting U.S.-Israeli ties .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ president and presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden openly opposes annexation , Israel is setting itself up for a difficult four years ( at least ) if Trump isn ’ t reelected in November .
If annexation triggers a new wave of Palestinian violence , Israel ’ s military and security services will be forced to devote attention to the home front—giving Iran a chance to strengthen its hand on Israel ’ s frontiers , undermining U.S. efforts to keep Tehran under pressure across the region .
Meanwhile , Israel risks eroding years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regional states .
Over the past decade , Israel and Gulf Arab states have strengthened ties around a shared perception of the Iranian threat .
From the U.S. perspective , this is a strong positive for its anti-Iran campaign .
In practice , Arab states in the Persian Gulf may continue their security cooperation with Israel thanks to their wariness of Iran .
But as the two sides of the Gulf take steps to address their issues ( as modeled by the United Arab Emirates and Iran ) and Israel ’ s plan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public overtures toward Israel will be more difficult .
In an op-ed and video earlier this month , Emirati Ambassador to the United States Yousef al-Otaiba underscored this point ( although the UAE foreign minister last week tried to temper his statement ) .
For its part , Iran will make sure to present itself as the only regional power still standing with Palestinians even as Gulf monarchies fold .
In the long term , other Muslim states may be dissuaded from taking steps toward normalization with Israel .
Israel ’ s intention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Palestinian issue , handing Iran a fresh opportunity to play the role of disruptor .
Iran would be keen to exploit Israel ’ s isolation regionally and internationally .
A more distracted Israel gives Iran an opportunity to shore up its diplomatic and military position in the region , at precisely the time the Trump administration is trying to turn the screws tighter .
At the White House in January , Netanyahu praised the Trump proposal as a “ great plan ” and the “ opportunity of the century.
” As Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Iranian leaders probably agree .

Starting July 1, Israel may take the first step toward annexing territory in the West Bank, in line with U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace plan for the region. Discussions about the potential annexation have mostly focused on its implications for the two-state solution and renewed violence. But it would also have significant effects on Israel’s rivalry with Iran and on U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran. Although many Israelis view annexation as a strategic gain, the move would be a strategic gift for Tehran.
Starting July 1, Israel may take the first step toward annexing territory in the West Bank, in line with U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace plan for the region. Discussions about the potential annexation have mostly focused on its implications for the two-state solution and renewed violence. But it would also have significant effects on Israel’s rivalry with Iran and on U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran. Although many Israelis view annexation as a strategic gain, the move would be a strategic gift for Tehran.
Annexation is not yet a done deal. According to the Israeli government’s coalition agreement, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may hold a cabinet or parliamentary vote on unilaterally annexing West Bank settlements and the Jordan Valley starting July 1, so long as the Israelis act in concert with Washington. But Benny Gantz, the alternate prime minister and defense minister, has expressed serious reservations, and Washington wants both leaders to be in agreement before it greenlights any decision. As July approaches, some Israeli politicians, retired security officials, and experts have warned that annexation would bring about the end of the two-state solution and potentially trigger another Palestinian intifada. And, for its part, Iran would likely welcome the chance to reassert its anti-Israel credentials.
Iran’s opposition to Israel, and its effort to disrupt any Arab-Israeli normalization, dates back to the country’s founding. The first supreme leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, made opposition to Israel a core pillar of the regime’s identity and approach to foreign affairs. These views have endured largely without interruption. Iranian officials have stridently opposed any progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace, and Tehran has for decades provided assistance to Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The country has likewise tried to derail previous U.S.-supported efforts to broker peace, including the 1991 Madrid conference and the 1993 Oslo Accords.
Iran will likely spearhead international opposition to annexation. The regime would raise the mantle of its defense of Palestinian rights to distract from its own issues at home, including a botched response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a weak economy, and general popular exasperation with regime incompetence and corruption. Although the impact of such a propaganda campaign in changing public sentiment would likely be limited, it would lay the groundwork for the consolidation of a more hard-line agenda after the 2021 presidential elections. The annexation would also provide the regime with a golden opportunity to justify its increase in defense spending and its controversial expenditures abroad.
Annexation would also provide Iran’s leaders with more ammunition to criticize Israel and escape, if only rhetorically, the U.S. campaign to isolate it in the region.
Perhaps more significantly, annexation would also provide Iran’s leaders with more ammunition to criticize Israel and escape, if only rhetorically, the U.S. campaign to isolate it in the region. Tehran can direct its ire toward those Muslim nations that have started to quietly normalize ties with Israel, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran’s regional policy has been a source of tension with its neighbors going back decades, but these concerns have intensified since the Arab Spring, after which Iran became more interventionist in conflicts in neighboring countries. Arab public perceptions of Iran have suffered as its regional presence has grown. And given that Iran was an epicenter for the coronavirus in the Middle East, it is facing significant headwinds. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a prime way for Iran to change the subject.
As annexation hands Iran an opportunity to improve its standing in the Middle East, it would also weaken Israel’s standing internationally and consume it domestically. In its zero-sum competition, a distracted Israel is a strong plus for Iran. Key international players have already made it clear that they oppose annexation and are preparing retaliatory measures. European states have warned Israel against unilateral annexation and are working with the European Union to develop sanctions. In the United States, Israel would weaken its relationship with key Democrats and further polarize American public support for Israel. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a pro-Israel lobbying group, already gave U.S. legislators a green light to publicly raise concerns about the annexation move, a rare decision for the most prominent organization supporting U.S.-Israeli ties. Moreover, given that the former vice president and presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden openly opposes annexation, Israel is setting itself up for a difficult four years (at least) if Trump isn’t reelected in November. If annexation triggers a new wave of Palestinian violence, Israel’s military and security services will be forced to devote attention to the home front—giving Iran a chance to strengthen its hand on Israel’s frontiers, undermining U.S. efforts to keep Tehran under pressure across the region.
Meanwhile, Israel risks eroding years of work toward normalizing relations with key regional states. Over the past decade, Israel and Gulf Arab states have strengthened ties around a shared perception of the Iranian threat. From the U.S. perspective, this is a strong positive for its anti-Iran campaign. In practice, Arab states in the Persian Gulf may continue their security cooperation with Israel thanks to their wariness of Iran. But as the two sides of the Gulf take steps to address their issues (as modeled by the United Arab Emirates and Iran) and Israel’s plan raises the cost of Gulf acquiescence, public overtures toward Israel will be more difficult. In an op-ed and video earlier this month, Emirati Ambassador to the United States Yousef al-Otaiba underscored this point (although the UAE foreign minister last week tried to temper his statement). For its part, Iran will make sure to present itself as the only regional power still standing with Palestinians even as Gulf monarchies fold. In the long term, other Muslim states may be dissuaded from taking steps toward normalization with Israel.
Israel’s intention to pursue annexation has once again elevated the Palestinian issue, handing Iran a fresh opportunity to play the role of disruptor. Iran would be keen to exploit Israel’s isolation regionally and internationally. A more distracted Israel gives Iran an opportunity to shore up its diplomatic and military position in the region, at precisely the time the Trump administration is trying to turn the screws tighter. At the White House in January, Netanyahu praised the Trump proposal as a “great plan” and the “opportunity of the century.” As Israel gears up for the potential of annexation, Iranian leaders probably agree.