foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--In First Debate, Biden and Trump Get Personal

In First Debate , Biden and Trump Get Personal In a debate that amounted to little more than an hour-and-half-long harangue from both sides , President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden savaged each other in the most personal terms Tuesday , with Trump questioning Biden ’ s intelligence and Biden calling Trump a “ clown.
” In a typical exchange , Biden told Trump : “ You ’ re the worst president America has ever had.
” Trump responded : “ I ’ ve done more in 47 months than you ’ ve done in 47 years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who is well behind in the polls , was plainly more rattled than Biden during the entire night .
He appeared to interrupt the moderator , Chris Wallace of Fox News , as much as he did Biden , earning constant rebukes from Wallace .
Early reactions from pundits and polls suggested that the sometimes gaffe-prone Biden won the debate by merely standing up to the president and sounding coherent while a heavily sweating Trump seemed to unravel several times .
An early CNN poll of debate watchers found that 60 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent believed Trump did , though the survey was skewed toward Democratic voters .
Foreign policy per se took up almost no time in the debate , and when it did Biden generally got in more zingers than Trump and with more aplomb , barely looking at the president as Trump glared at him and cut into almost every answer .
Regarding Trump ’ s largely unsuccessful attempt to correct trade deficits with China , Biden said : “ He talks about the art of the deal .
China has perfected the art @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. has suffered a higher trade deficit with China during Trump ’ s time in office , though that was only true in 2018 .
In a final exchange , Biden committed to accepting the results of the election , while Trump did not , continuing to rant about largely unsubstantiated voting fraud charges even as Wallace was calling an end to the debate .
Trump also refrained from condemning white supremacists when asked to do so , saying the radical left group Antifa was causing almost all the violence in American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the contrary .
Trump merely suggested that a neo-fascist group that supports him , the Proud Boys , should “ stand back and stand by.
” The six topics chosen by Wallace were the Trump and Biden records , the Supreme Court , COVID-19 , the economy , urban race and violence , and electoral integrity .
The two candidates stuck mostly to those topics , with a great deal of angry cross talk .
But Trump several times sought to attack Biden ’ s son Hunter for his business involvement in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s hackles .
” My son did nothing wrong .
… Everyone has discredited it , ” Biden said .
As Trump continued to interrupt , Biden said , “ It ’ s hard to get any word in with this clown.
” Trump ’ s corruption charges against Hunter Biden have been largely debunked , even by members of his own party .
Earlier this month two Republican-led Senate committees concluded that while Hunter Biden ’ s position on the board of a Ukrainian energy company was “ awkward ” and “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Joe Biden , was serving as vice president , there was no clear evidence of wrongdoing .
The 87-page report concluded that “ the extent to which ” his role “ affected U.S. policy toward Ukraine is not clear.
” Tuesday ’ s debate was not expected to affect the outcome of the presidential race in a serious way , especially since 86 percent of voters say their minds are made up about who they will vote for , and only 14 percent say they are still persuadable , according to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maintained a consistent lead in the polls .
Only rarely in past elections has a presidential debate substantially tipped the race one way or another—for example in the first televised debate in 1960 , when the less experienced John F. Kennedy showed he could stand up to Vice President Richard Nixon ; and in the 1976 race between President Gerald Ford and then-little-known Democrat Jimmy Carter , when Ford flubbed a question on Soviet domination .
Still , the restrictions that COVID-19 has placed on normal campaigning—at least for Biden , while Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three presidential debates this cycle more important than usual .
Above all , Biden may have gotten the upper hand by putting down Trump in the sort of derisive terms that Trump has used successfully against his previous rivals .
When Biden declared that Trump has no healthcare plan to replace Obamacare , and Trump interrupted yet again , the former vice president retorted : “ Will you shut up , man .
… This is so unpresidential.
” At another point Biden said : “ Donald , would you just be quiet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most surprising , perhaps , was how small a part new and potentially damaging questions about Trump ’ s business dealings revealed in the New York Times played in the debate .
The newspaper reported Tuesday that Trump “ has huge balances on loans , soon to come due ” from Deutsche Bank , which has been implicated in money laundering abroad and has worked closely with Russian state institutions .
The biggest part of those include $ 160 million on his Washington hotel in the Old Post Office building and $ 148 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which is profitable .
The newspaper previously reported that Trump had avoided paying taxes for years and his businesses were chronic money losers .
When Biden briefly challenged Trump during the debate , “ Show us your tax returns , ” the president did not respond , saying only that he had “ paid millions of dollars of income taxes.
” Former National Security Advisor Susan Rice , a close Biden ally and potential secretary of state , on Monday called Trump ’ s huge debt “ very much a national security concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t know who has leverage over him.
” The Times reported that Trump is personally responsible for loans and other debts of $ 421 million , a substantial portion of which comes due in the next four years .
David Kris , a former assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department ’ s National Security Division , also said that debt was worrisome when carried by the president .
“ It is well understood that a U.S. government official in extreme debt creates leverage in the debt-holder , ” said Kris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consulting firm .
“ The leverage , and hence the national security risk , rise with both the likelihood of non-repayment.
” Trump is already accused of multiple conflicts of interest in mixing his business interests with those of his office .
Analysts believe that with the debt he needs to pay down , he could be motivated to carry those practices further in a second term .
Last week a report released by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington ( CREW ) , a watchdog group , said Trump has earned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ businesses during his presidency , including making more than 500 visits with large entourages to the properties he owns and profits from .
The president ’ s frequent travel to and from his properties has cost American taxpayers well over $ 100 million .
The debate was clearly haunted by tensions that have lingered since Trump was impeached by the House and ultimately acquitted by the Senate earlier this year for trying to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelensky into investigating the Biden family ’ s dealings in Ukraine .
Congressional investigations continue to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abroad , so it was no surprise that some of the sharpest exchanges occurred over both candidates ’ s overseas connections .

In a debate that amounted to little more than an hour-and-half-long harangue from both sides, U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden savaged each other in the most personal terms Tuesday, with Trump questioning Biden’s intelligence and Biden calling Trump a “clown.”
In a debate that amounted to little more than an hour-and-half-long harangue from both sides, U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden savaged each other in the most personal terms Tuesday, with Trump questioning Biden’s intelligence and Biden calling Trump a “clown.”
In a typical exchange, Biden told Trump: “You’re the worst president America has ever had.” Trump responded: “I’ve done more in 47 months than you’ve done in 47 years, Joe.”
On the whole, Trump, who is well behind in the polls, was plainly more rattled than Biden during the entire night. He appeared to interrupt the moderator, Chris Wallace of Fox News, as much as he did Biden, earning constant rebukes from Wallace.
Early reactions from pundits and polls suggested that the sometimes gaffe-prone Biden won the debate by merely standing up to the president and sounding coherent while a heavily sweating Trump seemed to unravel several times. An early CNN poll of debate watchers found that 60 percent thought Biden won, while only 28 percent believed Trump did, though the survey was skewed toward Democratic voters.
Foreign policy per se took up almost no time in the debate, and when it did Biden generally got in more zingers than Trump and with more aplomb, barely looking at the president as Trump glared at him and cut into almost every answer. Regarding Trump’s largely unsuccessful attempt to correct trade deficits with China, Biden said: “He talks about the art of the deal. China has perfected the art of the steal.” He charged that the United States has suffered a higher trade deficit with China during Trump’s time in office, though that was only true in 2018.
In a final exchange, Biden committed to accepting the results of the election, while Trump did not, continuing to rant about largely unsubstantiated voting fraud charges even as Wallace was calling an end to the debate. Trump also refrained from condemning white supremacists when asked to do so, saying the radical left antifa movement was causing almost all the violence in American cities despite the FBI’s conclusion to the contrary. Trump merely suggested that a neofascist group that supports him, the Proud Boys, should “stand back and stand by.”
The six topics chosen by Wallace were the Trump and Biden records, the Supreme Court, COVID-19, the economy, race and violence in cities, and electoral integrity. The two candidates stuck mostly to those topics, with a great deal of angry cross=talk.
But Trump several times sought to attack Biden’s son Hunter for his business involvement in Russia and Ukraine, raising the former vice president’s hackles. “My son did nothing wrong. … Everyone has discredited it,” Biden said. As Trump continued to interrupt, Biden said, “It’s hard to get any word in with this clown.”
Trump’s corruption allegations against Hunter Biden have been largely debunked, even by members of his own party. Earlier this month two Republican-led Senate committees concluded that while Hunter Biden’s position on the board of a Ukrainian energy company was “awkward” and “problematic” at the time his father, Joe Biden, was serving as vice president, there was no clear evidence of wrongdoing. The 87-page report concluded that “the extent to which” his role “affected U.S. policy toward Ukraine is not clear.”
Tuesday’s debate was not expected to affect the outcome of the presidential race in a serious way, especially since 86 percent of voters say their minds are made up about who they will vote for, and only 14 percent say they are still persuadable, according to a new Politico/Morning Consult poll. Biden has maintained a consistent lead in the polls.
Only rarely in past elections has a presidential debate substantially tipped the race one way or another—for example in the first televised presidential debate in 1960, when the less experienced John F. Kennedy showed he could stand up to Vice President Richard Nixon, and in the 1976 race between President Gerald Ford and then-little-known Democrat Jimmy Carter, when Ford flubbed a question on Soviet domination.
Still, the restrictions that COVID-19 has placed on normal campaigning—at least for Biden, while Trump has continued to hold rallies—could make the three presidential debates this cycle more important than usual.
Above all, Biden may have gotten the upper hand by putting down Trump in the sort of derisive terms that Trump has used successfully against his previous rivals. When Biden declared that Trump has no health care plan to replace Obamacare, and Trump interrupted yet again, the former vice president retorted: “Will you shut up, man? … This is so unpresidential.” At another point Biden said: “Donald, would you just be quiet for a minute?”
What was most surprising, perhaps, was how small a part new and potentially damaging questions about Trump’s business dealings revealed in the New York Times played in the debate. The newspaper reported Tuesday that Trump “has huge balances on loans, soon to come due” from Deutsche Bank, which has been implicated in money laundering abroad and has worked closely with Russian state institutions. The biggest part of those include $160 million on his Washington hotel in the Old Post Office building and $148 million on the Doral golf resort—neither of which is profitable. The newspaper previously reported that Trump had avoided paying taxes for years and his businesses were chronic money-losers.
When Biden briefly challenged Trump during the debate, saying, “Show us your tax returns,” the president did not respond, saying only that he had “paid millions of dollars of income taxes.”
Former National Security Advisor Susan Rice, a close Biden ally and potential secretary of state, on Monday called Trump’s huge debt “very much a national security concern,” saying “we don’t know who has leverage over him.” The Times reported that Trump is personally responsible for loans and other debts of $421 million, a substantial portion of which comes due in the next four years.
David Kris, a former assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, also said that debt was worrisome when carried by the president. “It is well understood that a U.S. government official in extreme debt creates leverage in the debt-holder,” said Kris, now a principal at Culper Partners consulting firm. “The leverage, and hence the national security risk, rise with both the likelihood of non-repayment.”
Trump is already accused of multiple conflicts of interest in mixing his business interests with those of his office. Analysts believe that with the debt he needs to pay down, he could be motivated to carry those practices further in a second term. Last week a report released by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, a watchdog group, said Trump has earned many millions of dollars for his personal businesses during his presidency, including making more than 500 visits with large entourages to the properties he owns and profits from. The president’s frequent travel to and from his properties has cost American taxpayers well over $100 million.
The debate was clearly haunted by tensions that have lingered since Trump was impeached by the House and ultimately acquitted by the Senate earlier this year for trying to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into investigating the Biden family’s dealings in Ukraine. Congressional investigations continue to look at Trump’s business ties abroad, so it was no surprise that some of the sharpest exchanges occurred over both candidates’ overseas connections.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-29--Trump’s Pick to Replace Ginsburg Could Make the Supreme Court ‘America First’

Trump ’ s Pick to Replace Ginsburg Could Make the Supreme Court ‘ America First ’ You can ’ t accuse him of dithering .
It took just eight days for U.S. President Donald Trump to nominate Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett to take the still-warm seat of the late justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the Supreme Court .
If the spectacle of a nomination battle being fought out during an election season proves one thing , it ’ s that the court is political .
In American legal politics , one issue trumps all others : abortion .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s likely position on the 1973 case of Roe v Wade that established a woman ’ s right to an abortion was being analyzed even before she was nominated .
But abortion is only one of many pressing issues that ultimately end up before the court .
Another perennial controversy is the status of “ customary ” international law in U.S. jurisprudence .
For the people around the world who often find themselves subject to U.S. law while having no say in its formulation , the way the Supreme Court treats international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , death , and billions of dollars .
When most people think of international law , they have in mind the international treaties that countries sign with other nations .
But in the United States , international treaties ratified by Congress have the force of domestic law , meaning that statutory international law becomes U.S. law .
Up for grabs , however , is the unwritten common law of nations—the legal norms and standards widely practiced around the world but not laid down in binding treaties .
Often called “ customary international law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ courts to interpret—or ignore .
Ginsburg was a champion of customary international law and a proponent of citing international precedents in U.S. legal judgments .
Ginsburg was a champion of customary international law and a proponent of citing international precedents in U.S. legal judgments .
That made her , along with fellow justices Sonia Sotomayor and Stephen Breyer , one of the court ’ s three so-called transnationalists .
Opposing them were the four strict constructionists , Clarence Thomas , Samuel Alito , Neil Gorsuch , and Brett Kavanaugh , who tend to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The remaining two justices , Elena Kagan and Chief Justice John Roberts , are widely viewed as case-by-case pragmatists .
At the beginning of her career , Barrett clerked for former Justice Antonin Scalia , who strictly rejected any relevance of foreign law or opinion to U.S. jurisprudence .
Although clerks do not necessarily adopt the views of their mentors , Barrett ’ s views seem to be broadly aligned with Scalia ’ s judicial thinking .
Serving for less than three years as an appeals court judge in Chicago , she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on international law .
But she has touched on the relevance of international law for U.S. jurisprudence in her academic writing as a law professor at the University of Notre Dame .
In at least one of those law review articles , she argues that for a judge to consider customary international law is at best superfluous , and at worst a dereliction of duty , since if international law accords with the will of Congress it is unnecessary to take it into account , while if it contradicts the will of Congress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that must prevail .
Ginsburg , by contrast , thought that the Supreme Court should actively engage with international legal opinion and international thought about the scope of the common law of nations , and that the United States had as much to learn as it had to teach when it came to understanding the law .
In a 2010 speech to the International Academy of Comparative Law , she reasoned that if “ U.S .
experience and decisions may be instructive to systems that have more recently instituted or invigorated judicial review @ @ @ @ @ @ @ learn from others now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and executive actions against fundamental instruments of government and charters securing basic rights.
” One area where Ginsburg thought it particularly important to take account of the views of what she termed “ humankind ” was capital punishment .
She was a staunch opponent of the death penalty , and although she never argued that it was unconstitutional , she did refer to international opinion in arguing that it violated international norms .
While her views on capital punishment were deeply humane , her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ After all , there is hardly a global consensus on the death penalty .
The majority of countries don ’ t use it , but most of the world ’ s population live in countries that do .
The world ’ s five most populous countries all have the death penalty : China , India , the United States , Indonesia , and Pakistan .
A quick look at the death penalty map shows that the United States is not so much an outlier among democratic countries or even an outlier among rich @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but an outlier among European-heritage countries .
Ginsburg urged that the “ U.S .
judicial system will be the poorer … if we do not both share our experience with , and learn from , legal systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own , ” citing Canada , South Africa , Germany , and the European Court of Human Rights .
But arguably it is either cherry-picking or plain Eurocentrism not to seek to learn from Japan , Taiwan , and India as well .
International law takes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of any one country , no matter how powerful .
The weakness of Ginsburg ’ s approach to international opinion—and the strength of Barrett ’ s—arises from the fact that the world is a diverse place , and what was once the law of nations was really only ever the law of Europe .
Whereas Ginsburg stressed the commitment of America ’ s founding generation to European legal norms , Barrett stresses the fact that they only did so until the United States ’ own statute laws began to accumulate .
For Barrett @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unwritten common law practices , but it is irrelevant to the interpretation of express statute and constitutional law .
America ’ s engagement with customary international law isn ’ t all about respect for the world ’ s opinions ; it cuts both ways .
For example , the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act , also known as Alien Tort Statute , has in recent decades become an invaluable tool for human rights activists seeking restitution in U.S. courts for atrocities committed by foreigners in foreign countries .
The Supreme Court also decides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. government surveillance and the power of the president to order targeted killings .
And of course we just witnessed how a U.S. federal judge could intervene in foreign policy by halting the ban on TikTok .
All of these potentially violate customary international law , which most interpreters believe takes a dim view of the extraterritorial reach of the laws of any one country , no matter how powerful .
And in all these examples , it is unclear whether ( and which ) international actors would prefer a transnationalist jurist like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The only certain thing is that it ’ s complicated , and no one can be sure how any Supreme Court justice will vote on any particular case .
Barrett is no exception .
Her appeals court tenure has been short , and ( notwithstanding White House claims to the contrary ) her 15-year academic career was unremarkable .
Court watchers who want to understand her legal reasoning will just have to watch—and wait .
And when it comes to the Supreme Court ’ s treatment of customary international law , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Correction , Sept. 30 , 2020 : This article originally stated that Amy Coney Barrett clerked for Samuel Alito .
She clerked for Antonin Scalia .

You can’t accuse him of dithering. It took just eight days for U.S. President Donald Trump to nominate Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett to take the still-warm seat of the late justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the Supreme Court. If the spectacle of a nomination battle being fought out during an election season proves one thing, it’s that the court is political.
You can’t accuse him of dithering. It took just eight days for U.S. President Donald Trump to nominate Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett to take the still-warm seat of the late justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the Supreme Court. If the spectacle of a nomination battle being fought out during an election season proves one thing, it’s that the court is political.
In American legal politics, one issue trumps all others: abortion. Little surprise, then, that Barrett’s likely position on the 1973 case of Roe v Wade that established a woman’s right to an abortion was being analyzed even before she was nominated. But abortion is only one of many pressing issues that ultimately end up before the court. Another perennial controversy is the status of “customary” international law in U.S. jurisprudence. For the people around the world who often find themselves subject to U.S. law while having no say in its formulation, the way the Supreme Court treats international law can be a matter of life, death, and billions of dollars.
When most people think of international law, they have in mind the international treaties that countries sign with other nations. But in the United States, international treaties ratified by Congress have the force of domestic law, meaning that statutory international law becomes U.S. law. Up for grabs, however, is the unwritten common law of nations—the legal norms and standards widely practiced around the world but not laid down in binding treaties. Often called “customary international law,” its meaning is for the courts to interpret—or ignore.
Ginsburg was a champion of customary international law and a proponent of citing international precedents in U.S. legal judgments.
Ginsburg was a champion of customary international law and a proponent of citing international precedents in U.S. legal judgments. That made her, along with fellow justices Sonia Sotomayor and Stephen Breyer, one of the court’s three so-called transnationalists. Opposing them were the four strict constructionists, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh, who tend to consider U.S. law impervious to global opinion. The remaining two justices, Elena Kagan and Chief Justice John Roberts, are widely viewed as case-by-case pragmatists.
At the beginning of her career, Barrett clerked for former Justice Antonin Scalia, who strictly rejected any relevance of foreign law or opinion to U.S. jurisprudence. Although clerks do not necessarily adopt the views of their mentors, Barrett’s views seem to be broadly aligned with Scalia’s judicial thinking. Serving for less than three years as an appeals court judge in Chicago, she has had little opportunity to issue judgments on international law. But she has touched on the relevance of international law for U.S. jurisprudence in her academic writing as a law professor at the University of Notre Dame. In at least one of those law review articles, she argues that for a judge to consider customary international law is at best superfluous, and at worst a dereliction of duty, since if international law accords with the will of Congress it is unnecessary to take it into account, while if it contradicts the will of Congress, it is the will of Congress that must prevail.
Ginsburg, by contrast, thought that the Supreme Court should actively engage with international legal opinion and international thought about the scope of the common law of nations, and that the United States had as much to learn as it had to teach when it came to understanding the law. In a 2010 speech to the International Academy of Comparative Law, she reasoned that if “U.S. experience and decisions may be instructive to systems that have more recently instituted or invigorated judicial review for constitutionality, so too can we learn from others now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and executive actions against fundamental instruments of government and charters securing basic rights.”
One area where Ginsburg thought it particularly important to take account of the views of what she termed “humankind” was capital punishment. She was a staunch opponent of the death penalty, and although she never argued that it was unconstitutional, she did refer to international opinion in arguing that it violated international norms. While her views on capital punishment were deeply humane, her references to humankind were inevitably selective. After all, there is hardly a global consensus on the death penalty. The majority of countries don’t use it, but most of the world’s population live in countries that do. The world’s five most populous countries all have the death penalty: China, India, the United States, Indonesia, and Pakistan.
A quick look at the death penalty map shows that the United States is not so much an outlier among democratic countries or even an outlier among rich countries in maintaining the death penalty, but an outlier among European-heritage countries. Ginsburg urged that the “U.S. judicial system will be the poorer … if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own,” citing Canada, South Africa, Germany, and the European Court of Human Rights. But arguably it is either cherry-picking or plain Eurocentrism not to seek to learn from Japan, Taiwan, and India as well.
International law takes a dim view of the extraterritorial reach of any one country, no matter how powerful.
The weakness of Ginsburg’s approach to international opinion—and the strength of Barrett’s—arises from the fact that the world is a diverse place, and what was once the law of nations was really only ever the law of Europe. Whereas Ginsburg stressed the commitment of America’s founding generation to European legal norms, Barrett stresses the fact that they only did so until the United States’ own statute laws began to accumulate. For Barrett, international opinion is useful for understanding unwritten common law practices, but it is irrelevant to the interpretation of express statute and constitutional law.
America’s engagement with customary international law isn’t all about respect for the world’s opinions; it cuts both ways. For example, the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act, also known as Alien Tort Statute, has in recent decades become an invaluable tool for human rights activists seeking restitution in U.S. courts for atrocities committed by foreigners in foreign countries. The Supreme Court also decides cases relating to the global scope of U.S. government surveillance and the power of the president to order targeted killings. And of course we just witnessed how a U.S. federal judge could intervene in foreign policy by halting the ban on TikTok. All of these potentially violate customary international law, which most interpreters believe takes a dim view of the extraterritorial reach of the laws of any one country, no matter how powerful.
And in all these examples, it is unclear whether (and which) international actors would prefer a transnationalist jurist like Ginsburg or a strict constructionist like Barrett. The only certain thing is that it’s complicated, and no one can be sure how any Supreme Court justice will vote on any particular case. Barrett is no exception. Her appeals court tenure has been short, and (notwithstanding White House claims to the contrary) her 15-year academic career was unremarkable. Court watchers who want to understand her legal reasoning will just have to watch—and wait. And when it comes to the Supreme Court’s treatment of customary international law, the world will have to wait with them.
Correction, Sept. 30, 2020: This article originally stated that Amy Coney Barrett clerked for Samuel Alito. She clerked for Antonin Scalia.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--Trump Officials Seek to Push Social Conservative Values in International Agreements

Amy Coney Barrett ’ s Supreme Court nomination marks a potential turning point in the decadeslong conservative crusade to roll back abortion rights inside the United States .
But Republican social conservatives have for decades been steadily chipping away at abortion rights on the global stage , stacking key foreign-policy agencies with anti-abortion advocates and paring back U.S. assistance if recipients provide abortion advice or services .
In the past four years , the Trump administration has taken this battle to international organizations on an unprecedented scale , going further than past Republican administrations to try to stamp out references @ @ @ @ @ @ @ planning , and other phrases that they argue condone abortion—as well as new norms on gender identity and sexual orientation .
The administration ’ s offensives are playing out now in a battle at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development , where Trump administration officials have worked to redraft chunks of a strategy document on combating gender-based violence , stripping out such phrases as “ sexual orientation , ” “ gender identities , ” and “ health services ” —referring to them as red lines for the administration .
An internal draft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. side highlights the extent to which the Trump administration is trying to export its socially conservative stances to international organizations .
The push , according to people familiar with the matter , will likely put the United States on a yet another collision course with European countries advocating for international efforts to combat gender-based violence .
The battle at the OECD isn ’ t the only one .
The United States is currently seeking governments to co-sign a declaration to be read by foreign ministers on the sidelines of the World @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asserting that “ there is no international right to abortion ” and that “ in no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.
” The draft declaration also excludes any reference to rights for transgender people .
It has the backing of Brazil , Hungary , Egypt , Indonesia , and Uganda .
The effort to curtail abortion services that are legally protected in the United States in part dates back to President Ronald Reagan ’ s Mexico City policy , often called the “ global gag rule ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have implemented .
The rule bars U.S. foreign aid from being used to fund foreign health groups or nongovernmental organizations that provide abortion counseling or referrals .
Recent studies indicate that the rule has led to a rise in unwanted pregnancies , unsafe abortions , and curtailed access to sexual health services in developing countries .
A spokesperson for the U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) reaffirmed the Trump administration ’ s commitment to advancing anti-abortion policies in international organizations while saying the United States remains “ committed to helping improve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , especially for women and children.
” “ The Trump Administration unapologetically defends human life and dignity around the world , including at international organizations , ” the spokesperson said .
Republican presidents , including George W. Bush , have long granted Christian conservatives a visible role in shaping U.S. policy on abortion at the United Nations .
But President Donald Trump , encouraged by his important evangelical Christian base of supporters , has taken it further , some experts say , placing conservative Christian advocates and activists in critical federal jobs , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Pam Pryor , the acting assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs , served as Trump ’ s principal liaison with the evangelical community during his 2016 presidential run .
The administration has hired a number of Christian advocates to critical positions in USAID , including Bethany Kozma , USAID ’ s deputy chief of staff , who has advocated the closure of gender-neutral bathrooms in Virginia ’ s public schools , claiming they provided an opportunity for predators to attack girls .
Anti-abortion conservatives have had “ free rein on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary of State Mike ] Pompeo , ” said Jennifer Vanyur , associate director of global advocacy at Planned Parenthood .
“ There is no veil of diplomacy , ” she added , recalling the U.S. threat to veto a German draft Security Council resolution targeting rape as a weapon of war if Berlin didn ’ t delete the phrase “ sexual and reproductive health.
” The Germans yielded .
“ They are not afraid to be isolated and tank negotiations , ” Vanyur said .
The back-and-forth over the OECD strategy document @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the American culture wars .
U.S. negotiators took issue with the document ’ s contention that “ gender-based violence stems from societal norms ” and “ internalized notions of masculinity and femininity ” among other factors .
In response , Sarah Gesiriech , a Trump advisor on children ’ s issues at USAID , deleted the phrase , with the comment : “ They ’ re categorizing this as bad when it is not always the case .
i.e .
young girls wanting to grow up to be mothers , men wanting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wanting to be ballerinas and boys construction workers .
It ’ s not all negative.
” U.S. officials also repeatedly struck phrases such as “ sexual orientation ” and “ toxic masculinity ” from the document , at one point adding a comment next to the deletion : “ This is a redline for USAID.
” The gender campaign dovetails with the anti-abortion fight .
In another section , Meghan Hanson , a Trump appointee at USAID , pushed back against the phrase “ addressing all forms of GBV against all women and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gender-based violence .
The official deleted the words “ all forms of ” with the comment : “ This is very problematic as the [ World Health Organization ] has indicated that not providing abortions is a form of GBV.
” She linked to a WHO document that says that “ denial of abortion and forced continuation of pregnancy ” have been identified as forms of gender-based violence .
Some U.S. officials familiar with internal deliberations have expressed concerns , believing Trump appointees are defanging important language in the document .
But even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ say the administration has offered some helpful suggestions and criticism .
One example they point to : The USAID appointees noted that the document made “ almost no mention of GBV in the military ” and encouraged it to do so .
But some experts fear the Trump administration ’ s battles with the U.N. and other international organizations will derail future efforts to fight gender-based violence .
“ Removing the terms ‘ sexual orientation , ’ ‘ gender identity , ’ and ‘ reproductive health services ’ is an extreme measure taken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ addressing gender-based violence , and will make other multilateral spaces hesitant to take on once uncontroversial topics , ” said Beirne Roose-Snyder , the director of public policy at the Center for Health and Gender Equity , an advocacy organization .
The USAID spokesperson declined to comment specifically on the OECD draft document but said that the U.S. government “ reviews the language in multilateral documents extremely carefully , as a number of terms are open to interpretation , and have been misused to promote agendas that are contrary to administration policy.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure governments to change their laws on health care and social issues , which is an affront to the autonomy of each society to determine its own national policies , ” the spokesperson said .
The spokesperson also noted that the United States remains the largest bilateral donor on global health programs in the world .
“ The U.S. Government agrees with the crucial goal of addressing violence against women , where clearly defined , ” the spokesperson said .
Yet it is precisely that status as the biggest health donor in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , said Nina Besser Doorley , the associate director for advocacy and policy with the International Women ’ s Health Coalition .
In May 2017 , the Trump administration expanded the so-called global gag rule , barring foreign NGOs from receiving U.S. funds unless they certify that they do not engage in abortion-related counseling or services .
“ The U.S. is the biggest bilateral global health funder , and so what the U.S. does has an immense impact on the ground , ” she said .
“ What we have seen over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.S. policy doesn ’ t change the need for these services , it doesn ’ t change the need for abortion or access to contraceptives .
All it is doing is making that stuff harder and riskier to access .
”

Amy Coney Barrett’s Supreme Court nomination marks a potential turning point in the decadeslong conservative crusade to roll back abortion rights inside the United States. But Republican social conservatives have for decades been steadily chipping away at abortion rights on the global stage, stacking key foreign-policy agencies with anti-abortion advocates and paring back U.S. assistance if recipients provide abortion advice or services.
Amy Coney Barrett’s Supreme Court nomination marks a potential turning point in the decadeslong conservative crusade to roll back abortion rights inside the United States. But Republican social conservatives have for decades been steadily chipping away at abortion rights on the global stage, stacking key foreign-policy agencies with anti-abortion advocates and paring back U.S. assistance if recipients provide abortion advice or services.
In the past four years, the Trump administration has taken this battle to international organizations on an unprecedented scale, going further than past Republican administrations to try to stamp out references to sexual and reproductive health, family planning, and other phrases that they argue condone abortion—as well as new norms on gender identity and sexual orientation.
The administration’s offensives are playing out now in a battle at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, where Trump administration officials have worked to redraft chunks of a strategy document on combating gender-based violence, stripping out such phrases as “sexual orientation,” “gender identities,” and “health services”—referring to them as red lines for the administration.
An internal draft of the document with proposed edits by the U.S. side highlights the extent to which the Trump administration is trying to export its socially conservative stances to international organizations. The push, according to people familiar with the matter, will likely put the United States on a yet another collision course with European countries advocating for international efforts to combat gender-based violence.
The battle at the OECD isn’t the only one. The United States is currently seeking governments to co-sign a declaration to be read by foreign ministers on the sidelines of the World Health Assembly session in Geneva in November asserting that “there is no international right to abortion” and that “in no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.” The draft declaration also excludes any reference to rights for transgender people. It has the backing of Brazil, Hungary, Egypt, Indonesia, and Uganda.
The effort to curtail abortion services that are legally protected in the United States in part dates back to President Ronald Reagan’s Mexico City policy, often called the “global gag rule” by critics, that successive Republican administrations have implemented. The rule bars U.S. foreign aid from being used to fund foreign health groups or nongovernmental organizations that provide abortion counseling or referrals. Recent studies indicate that the rule has led to a rise in unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, and curtailed access to sexual health services in developing countries.
A spokesperson for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reaffirmed the Trump administration’s commitment to advancing anti-abortion policies in international organizations while saying the United States remains “committed to helping improve health for all, across the lifespan, especially for women and children.”
“The Trump Administration unapologetically defends human life and dignity around the world, including at international organizations,” the spokesperson said.
Republican presidents, including George W. Bush, have long granted Christian conservatives a visible role in shaping U.S. policy on abortion at the United Nations. But President Donald Trump, encouraged by his important evangelical Christian base of supporters, has taken it further, some experts say, placing conservative Christian advocates and activists in critical federal jobs, particularly in the State Department and USAID.
Pam Pryor, the acting assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, served as Trump’s principal liaison with the evangelical community during his 2016 presidential run. The administration has hired a number of Christian advocates to critical positions in USAID, including Bethany Kozma, USAID’s deputy chief of staff, who has advocated the closure of gender-neutral bathrooms in Virginia’s public schools, claiming they provided an opportunity for predators to attack girls.
Anti-abortion conservatives have had “free rein on the foreign-policy side, especially under [Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo,” said Jennifer Vanyur, associate director of global advocacy at Planned Parenthood Action Fund. “There is no veil of diplomacy,” she added, recalling the U.S. threat to veto a German draft Security Council resolution targeting rape as a weapon of war if Berlin didn’t delete the phrase “sexual and reproductive health.” The Germans yielded.
“They are not afraid to be isolated and tank negotiations,” Vanyur said.
The back-and-forth over the OECD strategy document on gender-based violence highlights the international element of the American culture wars. U.S. negotiators took issue with the document’s contention that “gender-based violence stems from societal norms” and “internalized notions of masculinity and femininity” among other factors. In response, Meghan Hanson, a Trump appointee at USAID, deleted the phrase, with the comment: “They’re categorizing this as bad when it is not always the case. i.e. young girls wanting to grow up to be mothers, men wanting to be providers, etc. Girls wanting to be ballerinas and boys construction workers. It’s not all negative.”
U.S. officials also repeatedly struck phrases such as “sexual orientation” and “toxic masculinity” from the document, at one point adding a comment next to the deletion: “This is a redline for USAID.”
The gender campaign dovetails with the anti-abortion fight. In another section, Meghan Hanson, a Trump appointee at USAID, pushed back against the phrase “addressing all forms of GBV against all women and girls”—GBV is an acronym for gender-based violence. The official deleted the words “all forms of” with the comment: “This is very problematic as the [World Health Organization] has indicated that not providing abortions is a form of GBV.” She linked to a WHO document that says that “denial of abortion and forced continuation of pregnancy” have been identified as forms of gender-based violence.
Some U.S. officials familiar with internal deliberations have expressed concerns, believing Trump appointees are defanging important language in the document. But even sharp critics who have viewed the document say the administration has offered some helpful suggestions and criticism. One example they point to: The USAID appointees noted that the document made “almost no mention of GBV in the military” and encouraged it to do so.
But some experts fear the Trump administration’s battles with the U.N. and other international organizations will derail future efforts to fight gender-based violence.
“Removing the terms ‘sexual orientation,’ ‘gender identity,’ and ‘reproductive health services’ is an extreme measure taken by the U.S. to deter progress on addressing gender-based violence, and will make other multilateral spaces hesitant to take on once uncontroversial topics,” said Beirne Roose-Snyder, the director of public policy at the Center for Health and Gender Equity, an advocacy organization.
The USAID spokesperson declined to comment specifically on the OECD draft document but said that the U.S. government “reviews the language in multilateral documents extremely carefully, as a number of terms are open to interpretation, and have been misused to promote agendas that are contrary to administration policy.”
“Advocates often use multilateral documents to pressure governments to change their laws on health care and social issues, which is an affront to the autonomy of each society to determine its own national policies,” the spokesperson said.
The spokesperson also noted that the United States remains the largest bilateral donor on global health programs in the world. “The U.S. Government agrees with the crucial goal of addressing violence against women, where clearly defined,” the spokesperson said.
Yet it is precisely that status as the biggest health donor in the world that makes U.S. policies so important, said Nina Besser Doorley, the associate director for advocacy and policy with the International Women’s Health Coalition. In May 2017, the Trump administration expanded the so-called global gag rule, barring foreign NGOs from receiving U.S. funds unless they certify that they do not engage in abortion-related counseling or services.
“The U.S. is the biggest bilateral global health funder, and so what the U.S. does has an immense impact on the ground,” she said. “What we have seen over the last three years is that the change of U.S. policy doesn’t change the need for these services, it doesn’t change the need for abortion or access to contraceptives. All it is doing is making that stuff harder and riskier to access.”
Correction, Oct. 7, 2020: In response to a draft strategy document that mentioned “internalized notions of masculinity and femininity,” USAID official Meghan Hanson wrote, “They’re categorizing this as bad when it is not always the case.” A previous version of this article misattributed this comment to another USAID staff member


foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--The World’s Sustainable Development Goals Aren’t Sustainable

In 2015 , the world ’ s governments signed on to the U.N .
Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs ) with a commitment to bring the global economy back into balance with the living world .
Now , five years later , as the UN General Assembly convenes online to discuss the global ecological crisis , everyone wants to know how countries are performing .
To answer this question , delegates and policymakers have referred to a metric called the SDG Index , which was developed by Jeffrey Sachs “ to assess where each country stands with regard to achieving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tells a very clear story .
Sweden , Denmark , Finland , France , and Germany—along with most other rich Western nations—rise to the top of the rankings , giving casual observers the impression that these countries are real leaders in achieving sustainable development .
There ’ s only one problem .
Despite its name , the SDG Index has very little to do with sustainable development all .
In fact , oddly enough , the countries with the highest scores on this index are some of the most environmentally unsustainable countries in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example .
Sweden scores an impressive 84.7 on the index , topping the pack .
But ecologists have long pointed out that Sweden ’ s “ material footprint ” —the quantity of natural resources that the country consumes each year—is one of the biggest in the world , right up there with the United States , at 32 metric tons per person .
To put this in perspective , the global average is about 12 tons per person , and the sustainable level is about 7 tons per person .
In other words @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the boundary .
There is nothing sustainable about this kind of consumption .
If everyone on the planet were to consume as Sweden does , global resource use would exceed 230 billion tons of stuff per year .
To get a sense for what this would look like , consider all the resources that we presently extract , produce , transport , and consume around the world each year—and all of the ecological damage that this causes—and triple it .
Or take Finland , for example , which is No .
3 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s carbon footprint is about 13 metric tons of carbon dioxide per person per year , similar to that of Saudi Arabia .
This makes it one of the most polluting countries in the world , in per capita terms , and a major contributor to climate breakdown .
For comparison , China ’ s carbon footprint is about 7 tons per person .
India ’ s is less than 2 .
If the whole world were to consume as much fossil fuels as Finland does , the planet would be literally uninhabitable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ matter of a few odd results .
Data published by scientists at the University of Leeds shows that all of the top-ranked countries in the SDG Index have significantly overshot their fair share of planetary boundaries , in consumption-based terms—not only when it comes to resource use and emissions but also in terms of land use and chemical flows like nitrogen and phosphorous .
It is physically impossible for all nations to consume and pollute at the level of the SDG top performers without destroying our planet ’ s biosphere .
In other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the perspective of ecology , incoherent .
It creates the illusion that rich countries have high levels of sustainability when in fact they do not .
So what ’ s going on here ?
Well , the SDG Index is directly linked to the Sustainable Development Goals .
There are 17 goals , each of which include a number of targets .
The SDG Index takes indicators for each of these targets ( where data is available ) , indexes them , and then averages them together to arrive at a score @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goals are averaged together in turn to come up with the final figure .
All of this seems reasonable enough , on the face of it .
But taking this approach means introducing a number of analytical problems .
First , there is a weighting problem .
The SDGs include three different kinds of indicators : Some focus on ecological impact ( like deforestation and biodiversity loss ) , some focus on social development ( like education and hunger ) , and some focus on infrastructure development ( like transportation and electricity ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mix of these , but the ecological indicators are almost always swamped , as it were , by the development indicators .
For example , the SDG Index has four indicators for Goal 11 ( on “ sustainable cities and communities ” ) ; three of them are development indicators , while only one of them has to do with ecological impact .
This means that if a country performs well on the development indicators , its score for that goal will look good even if it fails in terms of sustainability .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ problem , namely , that only four of the 17 SDGs deal mostly or wholly with ecological sustainability ( Goals 12 through 15 ) .
The other 13 are mostly focused on development .
Once again , this means that good performance on the development goals outweighs poor performance on the sustainability goals , so countries like Sweden , Germany , and Finland can rise to the top of the index ( with the United States ranking in the top 20 percent ) even though they have highly unsustainable levels of ecological impact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vast majority of the ecological indicators are territorial metrics that do not account for impacts related to international trade .
For instance , take the air pollution indicator in Goal 11 .
Rich countries come out looking clean—but this is largely because they have offshored most of their polluting industries to countries in the global south since the 1980s , thus shifting the problem abroad .
So too with the indicators on deforestation , overfishing , and so on : most of this damage happens in poorer countries , but it is disproportionately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and quite often perpetrated by corporations or investors headquartered there .
As a result , poorer countries get punished in the SDG Index for being harmed and polluted by richer countries .
Of course , in many cases territorial metrics are appropriate ; but there are a number of indicators in the SDG Index that should be reckoned as well in consumption-based terms and yet are not .
In effect , the SDG Index celebrates rich countries while turning a blind eye to the damage they are causing .
Ecological economists have long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the principle of “ strong sustainability , ” which holds that good performance on development indicators can not legitimately substitute for destructive levels of ecological impact .
The SDG Index team are aware of this problem .
It ’ s even mentioned ( briefly ) in their methodological notes—but then it ’ s swept under the rug in favor of a final metric that has little grounding in ecological principles .
Ultimately , metrics of sustainable development need to be universalizable .
In other words , the top performers on the index should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aspire to achieve without this leading to a collapse of global ecosystems .
That ’ s not the case with the SDG Index , where rich countries are held up as models when in reality , as the Leeds research shows , they are a big part of the problem .
The United Nations needs to redesign the index to correct these issues .
This can be done by rendering the ecological indicators in consumption-based terms wherever relevant and possible , to take account of international trade , and by indexing the ecological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that we can see clearly what ’ s happening on each front .
This way we can celebrate what countries like Denmark and Germany have achieved in terms of development while also recognizing that they are major drivers of ecological breakdown and need urgently to change course , with rapid reductions in emissions and resource use .
Until then , we should avoid using the SDG Index as a metric of progress in sustainable development , because it ’ s not .
Given the stakes of the crisis we face , we need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about what ’ s happening to our planet and who is responsible for it .

In 2015, the world’s governments signed on to the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with a commitment to bring the global economy back into balance with the living world. Now, five years later, as the U.N. General Assembly convenes online to discuss the global ecological crisis, everyone wants to know how countries are performing.
In 2015, the world’s governments signed on to the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with a commitment to bring the global economy back into balance with the living world. Now, five years later, as the U.N. General Assembly convenes online to discuss the global ecological crisis, everyone wants to know how countries are performing.
To answer this question, delegates and policymakers have referred to a metric called the SDG Index, which was developed by Jeffrey Sachs “to assess where each country stands with regard to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.” The metric tells a very clear story. Sweden, Denmark, Finland, France, and Germany—along with most other rich Western nations—rise to the top of the rankings, giving casual observers the impression that these countries are real leaders in achieving sustainable development.
There’s only one problem. Despite its name, the SDG Index has very little to do with sustainable development all. In fact, oddly enough, the countries with the highest scores on this index are some of the most environmentally unsustainable countries in the world.
Take Sweden, for example. Sweden scores an impressive 84.7 on the index, topping the pack. But ecologists have long pointed out that Sweden’s “material footprint”—the quantity of natural resources that the country consumes each year—is one of the biggest in the world, right up there with the United States, at 32 metric tons per person. To put this in perspective, the global average is about 12 tons per person, and the sustainable level is about 7 tons per person. In other words, Sweden is consuming nearly five times over the boundary.
There is nothing sustainable about this kind of consumption. If everyone on the planet were to consume as Sweden does, global resource use would exceed 230 billion tons of stuff per year. To get a sense for what this would look like, consider all the resources that we presently extract, produce, transport, and consume around the world each year—and all of the ecological damage that this causes—and triple it.
Or take Finland, for example, which is No. 3 on the SDG Index. Finland’s carbon footprint is about 13 metric tons of carbon dioxide per person per year, similar to that of Saudi Arabia. This makes it one of the most polluting countries in the world, in per capita terms, and a major contributor to climate breakdown. For comparison, China’s carbon footprint is about 7 tons per person. India’s is less than 2. If the whole world were to consume as much fossil fuels as Finland does, the planet would be literally uninhabitable.
This isn’t just a matter of a few odd results. Data published by scientists at the University of Leeds shows that all of the top-ranked countries in the SDG Index have significantly overshot their fair share of planetary boundaries, in consumption-based terms—not only when it comes to resource use and emissions but also in terms of land use and chemical flows like nitrogen and phosphorous. It is physically impossible for all nations to consume and pollute at the level of the SDG top performers without destroying our planet’s biosphere.
In other words, the SDG Index is, from the perspective of ecology, incoherent. It creates the illusion that rich countries have high levels of sustainability when in fact they do not.
So what’s going on here? Well, the SDG Index is directly linked to the Sustainable Development Goals. There are 17 goals, each of which include a number of targets. The SDG Index takes indicators for each of these targets (where data is available), indexes them, and then averages them together to arrive at a score for each goal. Then the 17 goals are averaged together in turn to come up with the final figure. All of this seems reasonable enough, on the face of it. But taking this approach means introducing a number of analytical problems.
First, there is a weighting problem. The SDGs include three different kinds of indicators: Some focus on ecological impact (like deforestation and biodiversity loss), some focus on social development (like education and hunger), and some focus on infrastructure development (like transportation and electricity). Most of the SDGs contain a mix of these, but the ecological indicators are almost always swamped, as it were, by the development indicators. For example, the SDG Index has four indicators for Goal 11 (on “sustainable cities and communities”); three of them are development indicators, while only one of them has to do with ecological impact. This means that if a country performs well on the development indicators, its score for that goal will look good even if it fails in terms of sustainability.
This issue is compounded by a second problem, namely, that only four of the 17 SDGs deal mostly or wholly with ecological sustainability (Goals 12 through 15). The other 13 are mostly focused on development. Once again, this means that good performance on the development goals outweighs poor performance on the sustainability goals, so countries like Sweden, Germany, and Finland can rise to the top of the index (with the United States ranking in the top 20 percent) even though they have highly unsustainable levels of ecological impact.
The final problem is that the vast majority of the ecological indicators are territorial metrics that do not account for impacts related to international trade. For instance, take the air pollution indicator in Goal 11. Rich countries come out looking clean—but this is largely because they have offshored most of their polluting industries to countries in the global south since the 1980s, thus shifting the problem abroad.
So too with the indicators on deforestation, overfishing, and so on: most of this damage happens in poorer countries, but it is disproportionately caused by overconsumption in richer countries, and quite often perpetrated by corporations or investors headquartered there. As a result, poorer countries get punished in the SDG Index for being harmed and polluted by richer countries. Of course, in many cases territorial metrics are appropriate; but there are a number of indicators in the SDG Index that should be reckoned as well in consumption-based terms and yet are not.
In effect, the SDG Index celebrates rich countries while turning a blind eye to the damage they are causing. Ecological economists have long warned against this approach. It violates the principle of “strong sustainability,” which holds that good performance on development indicators cannot legitimately substitute for destructive levels of ecological impact. The SDG Index team are aware of this problem. It’s even mentioned (briefly) in their methodological notes—but then it’s swept under the rug in favor of a final metric that has little grounding in ecological principles.
Ultimately, metrics of sustainable development need to be universalizable. In other words, the top performers on the index should represent a standard that all nations could aspire to achieve without this leading to a collapse of global ecosystems. That’s not the case with the SDG Index, where rich countries are held up as models when in reality, as the Leeds research shows, they are a big part of the problem.
The United Nations needs to redesign the index to correct these issues. This can be done by rendering the ecological indicators in consumption-based terms wherever relevant and possible, to take account of international trade, and by indexing the ecological indicators separately from the development indicators so that we can see clearly what’s happening on each front. This way we can celebrate what countries like Denmark and Germany have achieved in terms of development while also recognizing that they are major drivers of ecological breakdown and need urgently to change course, with rapid reductions in emissions and resource use.
Until then, we should avoid using the SDG Index as a metric of progress in sustainable development, because it’s not. Given the stakes of the crisis we face, we need to tell more honest, accurate stories about what’s happening to our planet and who is responsible for it.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--Why Is China Sabotaging Its Own Athletes?

Why Is China Sabotaging Its Own Athletes ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : Beijing introduces a new set of athletic qualifications that could eliminate half of national-level competitors , Chinese students successfully protest against university campus lockdowns , and new research reveals the extent of forced labor in Xinjiang .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
China is sabotaging its own Olympics efforts , imposing arbitrary physical tests on athletes in qualifying events for international competitions .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Oct. 2 in Shandong , many top competitors have already been eliminated—for reasons that have nothing to do with their swimming ability .
The swimmers are the latest victims of a bizarre new set of rules for qualification imposed in February that could eliminate as many as half of all athletes based on a set of arbitrary physical challenges that have nothing to do with their individual sports , such as pushups , endurance running , and bench presses .
Several of China ’ s best skiers were blocked from traveling to Norway @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the tests , while champion snowboarders were kicked off the team for underperforming at long-distance running .
One of the measures involved in the new rules is body mass index ( BMI ) , a dubious but commonly used measure of body composition that is especially unreliable for athletes .
The BMI standards set by authorities are unhealthy : Only men with a BMI of 18 or less achieve a perfect score under the new rules , which for most people is dangerously underweight .
Female standards are set slightly higher , at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Chinese athletes have adopted forced diets to lose weight and make their BMI targets , dropping some of them into lower weight classes .
The standards are even being applied to sports that have no physical component at all , such as chess .
Why the new rules ?
China ’ s sports system is known for its brutal treatment of competitors .
But traditionally it has focused on channeling young athletes into medal-rich sports such as Olympic shooting .
The result : Beijing hasn ’ t built up a team sports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ haul of Olympic gold .
The new tests , however , seem like a product of a familiar preoccupation in business and government with arbitrary rankings as a sign of success .
The preoccupation is worsened by the lack of professional sports science in China .
Rather than working directly with teams , sports scientists hold quasi-academic jobs and , when given an official role , tend toward arbitrary pseudoscience .
National strength .
The official announcement about the new qualification rules reveals the Chinese leadership ’ s long-standing obsession with physical strength @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That dates back to the 1930s , but it manifests today as part of the belief in a so-called boys ’ crisis—that young Chinese men are too effeminate , soft , and lazy .
Exercise is part of reasserting supposedly traditional gender roles .
The focus on overall strength rather than particular skill may end up hampering China at both the delayed 2021 Tokyo Summer Olympics and the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics .
The outcry against the ridiculous new system could lead to its abandonment , but as with much else in Xi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also lead officials to double down out of stubbornness .
Student unrest .
In a rare victory for protesters in China , students across the country secured a relaxation of hard lockdown conditions on university campuses .
Despite China ’ s successes against COVID-19 , tight restrictions continued after the summer holidays , effectively locking students on campus .
The model follows that used after SARS , when universities controlled entry and exit to campuses even a year after the epidemic ended .
Chinese university campuses are relatively self-contained , with their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have exploded into protest , picking up substantial online comment .
One of the major complaints was price gouging , with on-campus shops taking advantage of the lack of other options to charge students extra for essential goods .
Forced labor in Xinjiang .
Major new research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute ( ASPI ) shows the extent of the mass destruction of religious and cultural sites across Xinjiang—more than two-thirds of all mosques have been damaged or destroyed—and the growth of prison sites .
It also reveals the effective sale of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China .
Western firms are facing growing questions about their supply chains in China , too , as the use of forced labor from detained Uighur Muslims grows .
Meanwhile , China ’ s counterattacks on researchers and journalists working on Xinjiang have also increased as condemnation of the atrocities spreads : Individual researchers at ASPI and elsewhere have faced online threats .
The vaccine race .
Chinese firms are conducting testing of experimental COVID-19 vaccines in numerous countries , possibly giving the country an edge in the frantic race to be the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promised early access to any successful vaccine to countries that allow clinical trials , including Pakistan , Mexico , Egypt , and Indonesia .
The official pressure for success , however , has raised concerns about shortcuts and experimental standards .
Even China ’ s conventional vaccine production has seen numerous scandals , including a mass public health crisis in 2018 .
Party presence .
An aggressive new push to increase the already considerable role of the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) in private business has received surprisingly little attention .
Xi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unite around the party , ” a familiar refrain throughout China .
The very prevalence of such party-first messaging makes it unclear whether this will mean substantial changes to how private businesses operate—they are already required to set up CCP cells once they reach a certain size—or whether it ’ s simply a warning .
TikTok , WeChat get judicial reprieve .
The U.S. attempt to ban or force the sale of popular Chinese-run social media apps has hit an obstacle after U.S. courts issued two separate injunctions against it , arguing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat to override the companies ’ First Amendment rights .
The U.S. government argues that the national security threat is critical .
But its own handling of the TikTok-Oracle deal , which would effectively leave control in the hands of the app ’ s Chinese parent , ByteDance—undermines its case .
The recent revelation that TikTok stores a copy of all U.S. data on Singaporean servers run by Alibaba , however , does strengthen fears about data security .
Recovery boosts RMB .
China ’ s pandemic success and relative economic stability this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the yuan .
Despite spiraling U.S.-Chinese relations , Washington has held off from any further tariffs against China , while the lack of travel overseas and reduction in emigration has kept money in the country .
Today marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of Eileen Chang ( Zhang Ailing ) , one of China ’ s most brilliant modern authors .
Chang is most famous in the West for her novella Lust , Caution—a haunting tale of love , war , and assassination in wartime Shanghai adapted to film by the Taiwanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ achievements may be her short stories , some as brief and powerful as parables .
Read “ Sealed Off ” or the beautiful wisp of a story “ Love , ” translated by Qiaomei Tang .
That ’ s it for this week .
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Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: Beijing introduces a new set of athletic qualifications that could eliminate half of national-level competitors, Chinese students successfully protest against university campus lockdowns , and new research reveals the extent of forced labor in Xinjiang .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: Beijing introduces a new set of athletic qualifications that could eliminate half of national-level competitors, Chinese students successfully protest against university campus lockdowns, and new research reveals the extent of forced labor in Xinjiang.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Arbitrary Rules Frustrate Chinese Athletes
China is sabotaging its own Olympics efforts, imposing arbitrary physical tests on athletes in qualifying events for international competitions. In the national swimming championships, held through Oct. 2 in Shandong, many top competitors have already been eliminated—for reasons that have nothing to do with their swimming ability.
The swimmers are the latest victims of a bizarre new set of rules for qualification imposed in February that could eliminate as many as half of all athletes based on a set of arbitrary physical challenges that have nothing to do with their individual sports, such as pushups, endurance running, and bench presses. Several of China’s best skiers were blocked from traveling to Norway this summer for training due to failing the tests, while champion snowboarders were kicked off the team for underperforming at long-distance running.
One of the measures involved in the new rules is body mass index (BMI), a dubious but commonly used measure of body composition that is especially unreliable for athletes. The BMI standards set by authorities are unhealthy: Only men with a BMI of 18 or less achieve a perfect score under the new rules, which for most people is dangerously underweight. Female standards are set slightly higher, at a BMI of 20.
In judo, Chinese athletes have adopted forced diets to lose weight and make their BMI targets, dropping some of them into lower weight classes. The standards are even being applied to sports that have no physical component at all, such as chess.
Why the new rules? China’s sports system is known for its brutal treatment of competitors. But traditionally it has focused on channeling young athletes into medal-rich sports such as Olympic shooting. The result: Beijing hasn’t built up a team sports culture, but it has a rich haul of Olympic gold. The new tests, however, seem like a product of a familiar preoccupation in business and government with arbitrary rankings as a sign of success.
The preoccupation is worsened by the lack of professional sports science in China. Rather than working directly with teams, sports scientists hold quasi-academic jobs and, when given an official role, tend toward arbitrary pseudoscience.
National strength. The official announcement about the new qualification rules reveals the Chinese leadership’s long-standing obsession with physical strength as a sign of national greatness. That dates back to the 1930s, but it manifests today as part of the belief in a so-called boys’ crisis—that young Chinese men are too effeminate, soft, and lazy. Exercise is part of reasserting supposedly traditional gender roles.
The focus on overall strength rather than particular skill may end up hampering China at both the delayed 2021 Tokyo Summer Olympics and the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. The outcry against the ridiculous new system could lead to its abandonment, but as with much else in Xi Jinping’s China, it could also lead officials to double down out of stubbornness.
What We’re Following
Student unrest. In a rare victory for protesters in China, students across the country secured a relaxation of hard lockdown conditions on university campuses. Despite China’s successes against COVID-19, tight restrictions continued after the summer holidays, effectively locking students on campus. The model follows that used after SARS, when universities controlled entry and exit to campuses even a year after the epidemic ended.
Chinese university campuses are relatively self-contained, with their own supermarkets and restaurants, but student frustrations have exploded into protest, picking up substantial online comment. One of the major complaints was price gouging, with on-campus shops taking advantage of the lack of other options to charge students extra for essential goods.
Forced labor in Xinjiang. Major new research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) shows the extent of the mass destruction of religious and cultural sites across Xinjiang—more than two-thirds of all mosques have been damaged or destroyed—and the growth of prison sites. It also reveals the effective sale of coerced Uighur labor in the rest of China.
Western firms are facing growing questions about their supply chains in China, too, as the use of forced labor from detained Uighur Muslims grows. Meanwhile, China’s counterattacks on researchers and journalists working on Xinjiang have also increased as condemnation of the atrocities spreads: Individual researchers at ASPI and elsewhere have faced online threats.
The vaccine race. Chinese firms are conducting testing of experimental COVID-19 vaccines in numerous countries, possibly giving the country an edge in the frantic race to be the first to provide immunization. China has promised early access to any successful vaccine to countries that allow clinical trials, including Pakistan, Mexico, Egypt, and Indonesia. The official pressure for success, however, has raised concerns about shortcuts and experimental standards. Even China’s conventional vaccine production has seen numerous scandals, including a mass public health crisis in 2018.
Tech and Business
Party presence. An aggressive new push to increase the already considerable role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in private business has received surprisingly little attention. Xi has called on private business to “unite around the party,” a familiar refrain throughout China. The very prevalence of such party-first messaging makes it unclear whether this will mean substantial changes to how private businesses operate—they are already required to set up CCP cells once they reach a certain size—or whether it’s simply a warning.
TikTok, WeChat get judicial reprieve. The U.S. attempt to ban or force the sale of popular Chinese-run social media apps has hit an obstacle after U.S. courts issued two separate injunctions against it, arguing the Trump administration had failed to show sufficient threat to override the companies’ First Amendment rights. The U.S. government argues that the national security threat is critical. But its own handling of the TikTok-Oracle deal, which would effectively leave control in the hands of the app’s Chinese parent, ByteDance—undermines its case.
The recent revelation that TikTok stores a copy of all U.S. data on Singaporean servers run by Alibaba, however, does strengthen fears about data security.
Recovery boosts RMB. China’s pandemic success and relative economic stability this year have produced a record quarter for the yuan. Despite spiraling U.S.-Chinese relations, Washington has held off from any further tariffs against China, while the lack of travel overseas and reduction in emigration has kept money in the country.
What We’re Reading
Eileen Chang’s short stories
Today marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of Eileen Chang (Zhang Ailing), one of China’s most brilliant modern authors. Chang is most famous in the West for her novella Lust, Caution—a haunting tale of love, war, and assassination in wartime Shanghai adapted to film by the Taiwanese director Ang Lee. But her greatest achievements may be her short stories, some as brief and powerful as parables.
Read “Sealed Off” or the beautiful wisp of a story “Love,” translated by Qiaomei Tang.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--How to Trim the Defense Budget Without Harming U.S. Security

How to Trim the Defense Budget Without Harming U.S. Security As the COVID-19 pandemic drags on and its economic toll grows , politicians and observers on both sides of the U.S. political divide have called for cuts to the national security budget in order to free up funds for more pressing items .
According to this logic , the defense budget is bloated , the federal deficit continues to climb , and the Department of Defense could , and should , do more with less .
Although preparing for the next pandemic is crucial , there is no justification for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home when both are necessary .
Observers including independent Sen. Bernie Sanders have argued that domestic threats—such as pandemics—will become a greater security concern than foreign adversaries .
That ’ s wishful thinking .
A pandemic can ’ t make the United States ’ security problems go away—in fact , it may make them worse .
The country ’ s leaders can no longer evade or defer hard choices , and with a period of fiscal austerity on the horizon , there is no longer room for equivocating .
In these circumstances , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nation wants its military to achieve .
Without any guiding strategy , hard budget choices become shots in the dark .
Here , the 2018 National Defense Strategy , which identified great-power competition—above all with China—as the primary challenge to U.S. national security remains key to sustaining U.S. security , freedom , and prosperity .
Underneath that broad priority , there needs to be consensus regarding the roles and missions of the U.S. armed forces and how to pursue them .
And as new Air Force Chief of Staff Charles Brown explains , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adapt to the reality of great-power competition or lose : lose time , lose battles , lose capital assets , lose people , lose credibility , and lose wars .
Meanwhile , Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has already taken steps to implement a departmentwide review of programs to look for savings .
At risk are large surface combatants , Army vehicles , the size of Air Force squadrons , missile defense , and permanently forward-deployed forces .
But more trade-offs are required .
And there are a few areas where change can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. armed forces to prevail in a long-term great-power competition , preparing to win the big war must take precedence over the constant activities that keep hundreds of thousands of uniformed personnel navigating , driving , flying , training , and exercising around the world each day .
To that end , the Pentagon should reevaluate the utility of extended peacetime presence missions , even if the initial savings from doing so are modest .
For example , as the Navy focuses more on the Pacific , leaders should reconsider allocating precious assets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa .
Similarly , drug interdiction efforts should be left to the Coast Guard , U.S. Customs and Border Protection , and the Drug Enforcement Administration .
Closer to home , election security , however necessary , is not the job of the U.S. military , even though defense leaders recently volunteer for this duty when intelligence agencies take it on .
Where shedding missions is not feasible , cheaper methods of achieving them must be advanced .
For example , Security Force Assistance Brigades could sub @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In the Middle East , the military continues to use high-end fighters at great costs in low-end missions , even though a light attack aircraft could accomplish reconnaissance , close air support , and strike missions in relatively uncontested environments .
Meanwhile , the Pentagon must shift away from nonstop presence , assurance , and other similar “ nice to have ” missions .
This means redressing the fundamental tension between the ever-growing demands by combatant commanders , in particular on troops , and the challenges of keeping the force healthy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bottom line is that readiness for major war must trump day-to-day activities .
Furthermore , the services need mission clarity to minimize redundancies .
For instance , the Air Force and the Army should ensure their deep strike capabilities are complementary rather than duplicative .
Meanwhile , the services should consider whether they are all totally bought in on the Air Force ’ s version of a military Internet of Things , or will some hedge their bets and go it alone when there should be unity of funding and effort behind one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for rapid reform .
An overhaul of current platforms and systems is overdue—and early cancellation of unsustainable programs like some the Marine Corps commandant has suggested such as heavy and light attack helicopters will save time and money in the long run .
Shining light on where most of the United States ’ equipment dollars are spent—maintenance of existing equipment rather than production of new items—will also show where the United States could increase efficiency .
Experimental programs and prototypes should be moved into the next phase as soon as possible in order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ divestment of legacy systems once fielded .
Similarly , improving the accuracy of program cost estimates should be coupled with hard fielding schedules , throwing out two-decade timeframes for ones measured in months or years .
Currently , the budget does not reflect an intentional investment in weapons , posture , and capabilities that might give the United States an edge in the Indo-Pacific , such as unmanned systems for the Air Force and robot ships for the Navy .
Two years after the release of the National Defense Strategy , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fresh operational concepts that provide guidance for force development , posture , and training .
Other corners of the Pentagon appear entirely unaffected by the shift to great-power competition .
Nearly two decades since its inception , the Overseas Contingency Operations ( OCO ) account , often referred to as the “ war budget , ” has had no meaningful decline despite significantly lower troop levels in Syria , Iraq , and Afghanistan .
Accurately representing the true base budget of the Department of Defense , which currently spills over into the special @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the alignment of U.S. resources and strategy .
COVID-19 has increased pressure on the defense budget .
But it does not eliminate the importance of national security .
To the contrary , as the United States enters a time of budget pressure , it is vital that Congress , the White House , and the Pentagon truly—ruthlessly—implement the National Defense Strategy as a way to make the best use of the funds available .

Elbridge Colby, Mackenzie Eaglen and Roger Zakheim

As the COVID-19 pandemic drags on and its economic toll grows, politicians and observers on both sides of the U.S. political divide have called for cuts to the national security budget in order to free up funds for more pressing items. According to this logic, the defense budget is bloated, the federal deficit continues to climb, and the Department of Defense could, and should, do more with less.
As the COVID-19 pandemic drags on and its economic toll grows, politicians and observers on both sides of the U.S. political divide have called for cuts to the national security budget in order to free up funds for more pressing items. According to this logic, the defense budget is bloated, the federal deficit continues to climb, and the Department of Defense could, and should, do more with less.
Although preparing for the next pandemic is crucial, there is no justification for trading off security abroad for safety at home when both are necessary. Observers including independent Sen. Bernie Sanders have argued that domestic threats—such as pandemics—will become a greater security concern than foreign adversaries. That’s wishful thinking. A pandemic can’t make the United States’ security problems go away—in fact, it may make them worse. The country’s leaders can no longer evade or defer hard choices, and with a period of fiscal austerity on the horizon, there is no longer room for equivocating.
In these circumstances, step one is to reaffirm what the nation wants its military to achieve. Without any guiding strategy, hard budget choices become shots in the dark. Here, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which identified great-power competition—above all with China—as the primary challenge to U.S. national security remains key to sustaining U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity.
Underneath that broad priority, there needs to be consensus regarding the roles and missions of the U.S. armed forces and how to pursue them. And as new Air Force Chief of Staff Charles Brown explains, the U.S. military must act now to adapt to the reality of great-power competition or lose: lose time, lose battles, lose capital assets, lose people, lose credibility, and lose wars. Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has already taken steps to implement a departmentwide review of programs to look for savings. At risk are large surface combatants, Army vehicles, the size of Air Force squadrons, missile defense, and permanently forward-deployed forces.
But more trade-offs are required. And there are a few areas where change can’t come soon enough. For U.S. armed forces to prevail in a long-term great-power competition, preparing to win the big war must take precedence over the constant activities that keep hundreds of thousands of uniformed personnel navigating, driving, flying, training, and exercising around the world each day.
To that end, the Pentagon should reevaluate the utility of extended peacetime presence missions, even if the initial savings from doing so are modest. For example, as the Navy focuses more on the Pacific, leaders should reconsider allocating precious assets away from less important missions such as counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, drug interdiction efforts should be left to the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Closer to home, election security, however necessary, is not the job of the U.S. military, even though defense leaders recently volunteer for this duty when intelligence agencies take it on.
Where shedding missions is not feasible, cheaper methods of achieving them must be advanced. For example, Security Force Assistance Brigades could sub in for more expensive forces and methods. In the Middle East, the military continues to use high-end fighters at great costs in low-end missions, even though a light attack aircraft could accomplish reconnaissance, close air support, and strike missions in relatively uncontested environments.
Meanwhile, the Pentagon must shift away from nonstop presence, assurance, and other similar “nice to have” missions. This means redressing the fundamental tension between the ever-growing demands by combatant commanders, in particular on troops, and the challenges of keeping the force healthy and ready for a major conflict. The bottom line is that readiness for major war must trump day-to-day activities.
Furthermore, the services need mission clarity to minimize redundancies. For instance, the Air Force and the Army should ensure their deep strike capabilities are complementary rather than duplicative. Meanwhile, the services should consider whether they are all totally bought in on the Air Force’s version of a military Internet of Things, or will some hedge their bets and go it alone when there should be unity of funding and effort behind one plan.
There are still other opportunities for rapid reform. An overhaul of current platforms and systems is overdue—and early cancellation of unsustainable programs like some the Marine Corps commandant has suggested such as heavy and light attack helicopters will save time and money in the long run. Shining light on where most of the United States’ equipment dollars are spent—maintenance of existing equipment rather than production of new items—will also show where the United States could increase efficiency.
Experimental programs and prototypes should be moved into the next phase as soon as possible in order to increase oversight and allow for the divestment of legacy systems once fielded. Similarly, improving the accuracy of program cost estimates should be coupled with hard fielding schedules, throwing out two-decade timeframes for ones measured in months or years.
Currently, the budget does not reflect an intentional investment in weapons, posture, and capabilities that might give the United States an edge in the Indo-Pacific, such as unmanned systems for the Air Force and robot ships for the Navy. Two years after the release of the National Defense Strategy, it is critical that the Defense Department swiftly define fresh operational concepts that provide guidance for force development, posture, and training.
Other corners of the Pentagon appear entirely unaffected by the shift to great-power competition. Nearly two decades since its inception, the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account, often referred to as the “war budget,” has had no meaningful decline despite significantly lower troop levels in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Accurately representing the true base budget of the Department of Defense, which currently spills over into the special OCO budget, will improve transparency about the alignment of U.S. resources and strategy.
COVID-19 has increased pressure on the defense budget. But it does not eliminate the importance of national security. To the contrary, as the United States enters a time of budget pressure, it is vital that Congress, the White House, and the Pentagon truly—ruthlessly—implement the National Defense Strategy as a way to make the best use of the funds available.