foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--South Korea’s COVID-19 Church Scapegoat Is Fighting Back

South Korea faced a crisis early in the pandemic , when a 61-year-old woman with a fever attended several Shincheonji Church of Jesus events in the city of Daegu .
The area subsequently became the largest epicenter of the coronavirus outside China .
South Korea successfully flattened the curve and became a world leader for its pandemic response .
Shincheonji , meanwhile , became infamous as the Christian cult supposedly responsible for the country ’ s outbreak .
But the way the group has been treated brings up tough questions of religious freedom , pandemic responsibility , and media scapegoating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been blamed for the spread of the virus is the testimony of former members who say that even when they were sick , they were expected to attend services where they were “ packed together like sardines.
” There have also been reports that say church members believe their faith protects them from illness , or that illness is a sin .
This , South Koreans will tell you , is why Shincheonji members gathered in groups of more than 1,000 even as a pandemic was underway .
This is why South Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day in its first month—then jumped from 31 cases to 6,767 over the next two and a half weeks , with 63.5 percent of those cases tied to the church .
Shincheonji has also been blamed for the difficulty authorities faced in obtaining the secretive church ’ s membership records , which made it hard for health officials to track the spread of the virus in the crucial early days of the outbreak .
Initially , Shincheonji said it was difficult to provide a complete list because some individuals were not yet full @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Oh Keo-don , threatened to sue if Shincheonji was found to have provided a false list , while Daegu ’ s mayor , Kwon Young-jin , said he planned to press criminal charges for the church ’ s repeated refusal to hand in a list of trainees living in the city .
The church ’ s founder , Lee Man-hee , was questioned by prosecutors on charges that he deliberately misled authorities about the number of worshippers and places of worship .
On Aug. 1 , he was arrested for allegedly giving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 4.7 million .
But when the late mayor of Seoul , Park Won-soon , who recently committed suicide following accusations of sexual abuse , ordered the a raid of Shincheonji headquarters in the nearby city of Gwacheon to obtain a complete list of members , forensic analysis ultimately found that the church had not lied .
Moreover , in the days leading up to the Daegu outbreak , the Korean government had recommended against canceling large-scale events because of the coronavirus , saying it was time to return to daily life , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jae-in himself assured the public the epidemic would soon end , but that quarantine efforts would continue .
The church had done little more than follow the government ’ s lead .
Shincheonji has also been blamed for the difficulty authorities faced in obtaining the secretive church ’ s membership records , which made it hard for health officials to track the spread of the virus in the crucial early days of the outbreak .
The backlash against the group has nevertheless been severe .
An online petition filed with the presidential office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thousands of signatures within days .
When a Shincheonji representative posted a YouTube video asking viewers to end their hatred of its members , the video sparked mostly anger .
( The representative also argued that because most cases in Korea were church members , the church was therefore the biggest victim . )
One person wrote in the comments section , “ We should call it ‘ Shincheonji-19 , ’ instead of ‘ COVID-19.
’ ” In another case , a man wrote a Facebook post after he , his mother , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contracted the virus , asking people to show his family mercy .
“ I didn ’ t know my mother was a follower of Shincheonji , ” he wrote , explaining that his wife , who had been heavily criticized for visiting several places during her incubation period , was a nurse whose job was to accompany people with physical disabilities to clinics .
“ It is true my wife moved around a lot , ” he added , “ but please stop cursing her .
Her only fault is marrying someone like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take care of the children.
” Roughly 56 percent of Koreans are nonreligious , while 28 percent are Christian and about 16 percent are Buddhist .
Heterodox groups are therefore not the norm any more than in the United States , and even among the devoutly religious , they are viewed askance : 20 percent of Koreans are Protestant ( mostly Prebyterian ) , about 8 percent are Catholic , and most Korean Buddhists belong either to the Jogye or Taego order , which are both types of Seon , or Korean Zen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outside mainstream Korean society , which may partly explain why they were vilified .
Park Won-soon repeatedly claimed the group was responsible for the coronavirus outbreak in South Korea and sued 12 of its leaders for murder .
Daegu city officials sued the group for $ 82.3 million , or more than two-thirds of the city ’ s pandemic-related spending .
In early July , prosecutors arrested three Shincheonji officials for allegedly giving health authorities false information about its followers .
Efforts at redemption have fallen on deaf ears .
In July , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus promised to donate blood plasma to help develop treatments or possibly a vaccine , but the event looked too much like an engineered photo-op .
Shortly after the outbreak in Daegu , Lee held a press conference , got down on his knees , and offered up an apology .
But few were moved .
In fact , several reporters focused instead on his wristwatch , a gift from imprisoned former President Park Geun-hye—who fell from power in part because of her involvement with the leader of a shamanistic cult .
Lee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ man who had recently claimed the pandemic was the devil ’ s attempt to stop the church ’ s growth , and that victims of the pandemic were “ saints in Shincheonji.
” Efforts at redemption have fallen on deaf ears .
The church says it has been unfairly singled out for persecution .
At one point , for example , the Seoul city government banned all Shincheonji gatherings—but not other religious services .
Church services have been vectors for the coronavirus worldwide , including in the United States , chiefly thanks to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Weeks later , in fact , in mid-March , 46 churchgoers became infected after attending the River of Grace Community Church outside of Seoul .
Also in mid-March , officials in Gyeonggi province threatened to shut down some 140 churches that had failed to implement preventive measures , following news that Manmin Central Church in Seoul had infected 22 people during a meeting to prepare worship materials for lockdown .
South Korea continues to report upticks in coronavirus cases , mostly tied to churches .
Shincheonji members themselves say one reason they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Christians , in particular the Christian Council of Korea , revile the group .
This is interesting , because the group is not actually the crazy Korean cult one might expect .
It ’ s certainly no Christian Gospel Mission , also known as Providence or Jesus Morning Star , the Korean movement that allegedly teaches followers to worship Adolf Hitler alongside Jesus , and whose founder is an anti-Semitic serial rapist who tells young women the only way to salvation is through having sex with him .
( He served 10 years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ released in 2018 . )
Yes , Shincheonji followers believe Lee is a messianic prophet inspired by God , or even that he is an immortal savior himself .
Yes , in his book The Creation of Heaven and Earth , Lee writes , “ anyone who opposes Shincheonji is evil.
” But such beliefs are not so strange when set beside the basic tenets of Korea ’ s largest Christian denomination : Presbyterianism .
Or its second-largest , for that matter : Roman Catholicism .
Presented straightforwardly , the beliefs of most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be fair , not many claim to have a living Messiah , much less one who in his youth was himself a member of another cultlike Christian group , Olive Tree ) .
Rather , what offends the mainstream Christian community is the group ’ s secrecy and dishonesty .
According to Tark Ji-il , a professor of religion at Busan Presbyterian University and an expert on heretical Christian groups , the problem is not just that the group lied to the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , but that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their doctrine that religiously justifies the lies.
” This , he said , is why the church is “ isolated by not only the church but also Korean society.
” One thing Shincheonji members are honest about is their propensity for lying .
Members are known to infiltrate other congregations to convert their followers , in a practice known as “ sheep-stealing ” or “ harvesting , ” and they openly admit they are dishonest about their affiliation when they do so .
They even instruct members to lie to friends and family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of an internal Shincheonji lecture , one instructor reportedly explained that traditional evangelism “ is too expensive , takes too much manpower and is too time-consuming ” and that it is therefore “ better to swallow existing churches.
” Shincheonji justifies its dishonesty by pointing out that its members are persecuted , citing cases of brutal deprogramming and forced conversions back to mainline Protestant groups .
In December 2017 , for example , a 27-year-old woman suffocated to death when her own parents bound and gagged her to keep her from escaping .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a secluded lodge in the southern county of Hwasun , trying to forcibly convert her from the Shincheonji faith .
Commenting on Shincheonji ’ s persecution after the Daegu outbreak in a March report , the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom cited forced conversion of Shincheonji members , saying South Korea provides a “ vivid example of how public health emergencies can increase the risk to marginalized religious groups.
” “ Parents , family members , and husbands pay thousands of dollars to Protestant pastors to unconvert Shincheonji members , ” Abby @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington and asked to use only her first name , told Foreign Policy .
“ That ’ s something that we ’ ve brought up as a violation of human rights , but Korea has not recognized this as a problem.
” This is how the secretive Christian sect ended up making common cause with the LGBTQ community , through its support of South Korea ’ s anti-discrimination bill .
Mainstream Korean Christian groups vehemently oppose the bill and have compared LGBTQ members to Nazis , warning that if the bill is passed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dictatorship.
” As Ji Young-jun , a lawyer at the law firm Justice , put it , “ Shincheonji is responsible for indiscriminately spreading the coronavirus with their lies .
They try to avoid responsibility by using the term ‘ hate tactics , ’ which is very similar to the strategy used by male homosexuals who indiscriminately spread AIDS , which is deadlier than COVID-19.
” When I asked Abby about Shincheonji ’ s position on the bill , she said , “ We fully support it , ” but later added that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ When I asked about the group ’ s position on the LGBTQ community , she said that as Christians , their position is “ conservative , ” but that they oppose discrimination against any and all groups .
Like the LGBTQ community , Shincheonji members have been stigmatized because a virus spread among their ranks .
Also like the LGBTQ community , Shincheonji members fear persecution , feel the need to lie about their identity , are broadly hated by mainstream Christians , and hope to see protective legislation passed .
But there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identity itself has become pejorative .
On July 30 , Justice Minister Choo Mi-ae was deflecting criticism from conservatives over the Democrats ’ push for prosecutorial reform .
Choo suggested that the opposition ’ s tireless attacks and Shincheonji ’ s own opposition to her reforms could be related .
In other words , all she had to do to attack her conservative opponents was associate them , however loosely , with an almost universally hated religious minority .

South Korea faced a crisis early in the pandemic, when a 61-year-old woman with a fever attended several Shincheonji Church of Jesus events in the city of Daegu. The area subsequently became the largest epicenter of the coronavirus outside China. South Korea successfully flattened the curve and became a world leader for its pandemic response. Shincheonji, meanwhile, became infamous as the Christian cult supposedly responsible for the country’s outbreak. But the way the group has been treated brings up tough questions of religious freedom, pandemic responsibility, and media scapegoating.
South Korea faced a crisis early in the pandemic, when a 61-year-old woman with a fever attended several Shincheonji Church of Jesus events in the city of Daegu. The area subsequently became the largest epicenter of the coronavirus outside China. South Korea successfully flattened the curve and became a world leader for its pandemic response. Shincheonji, meanwhile, became infamous as the Christian cult supposedly responsible for the country’s outbreak. But the way the group has been treated brings up tough questions of religious freedom, pandemic responsibility, and media scapegoating.
One of the reasons Shincheonji has been blamed for the spread of the virus is the testimony of former members who say that even when they were sick, they were expected to attend services where they were “packed together like sardines.” There have also been reports that say church members believe their faith protects them from illness, or that illness is a sin. This, South Koreans will tell you, is why Shincheonji members gathered in groups of more than 1,000 even as a pandemic was underway. This is why South Korea only recorded about one new case per day in its first month—then jumped from 31 cases to 6,767 over the next two and a half weeks, with 63.5 percent of those cases tied to the church.
Shincheonji has also been blamed for the difficulty authorities faced in obtaining the secretive church’s membership records, which made it hard for health officials to track the spread of the virus in the crucial early days of the outbreak. Initially, Shincheonji said it was difficult to provide a complete list because some individuals were not yet full members. Busan’s then mayor, Oh Keo-don, threatened to sue if Shincheonji was found to have provided a false list, while Daegu’s mayor, Kwon Young-jin, said he planned to press criminal charges for the church’s repeated refusal to hand in a list of trainees living in the city. The church’s founder, Lee Man-hee, was questioned by prosecutors on charges that he deliberately misled authorities about the number of worshippers and places of worship. On Aug. 1, he was arrested for allegedly giving health officials false information and embezzling about $4.7 million.
But when the late mayor of Seoul, Park Won-soon, who recently committed suicide following accusations of sexual abuse, ordered the a raid of Shincheonji headquarters in the nearby city of Gwacheon to obtain a complete list of members, forensic analysis ultimately found that the church had not lied. Moreover, in the days leading up to the Daegu outbreak, the Korean government had recommended against canceling large-scale events because of the coronavirus, saying it was time to return to daily life, albeit with safety protocols. President Moon Jae-in himself assured the public the epidemic would soon end, but that quarantine efforts would continue. The church had done little more than follow the government’s lead.
Shincheonji has also been blamed for the difficulty authorities faced in obtaining the secretive church’s membership records, which made it hard for health officials to track the spread of the virus in the crucial early days of the outbreak.
The backlash against the group has nevertheless been severe. An online petition filed with the presidential office to disband the church collected hundreds of thousands of signatures within days. When a Shincheonji representative posted a YouTube video asking viewers to end their hatred of its members, the video sparked mostly anger. (The representative also argued that because most cases in Korea were church members, the church was therefore the biggest victim.) One person wrote in the comments section, “We should call it ‘Shincheonji-19,’ instead of ‘COVID-19.’”
In another case, a man wrote a Facebook post after he, his mother, his wife, and his two children contracted the virus, asking people to show his family mercy. “I didn’t know my mother was a follower of Shincheonji,” he wrote, explaining that his wife, who had been heavily criticized for visiting several places during her incubation period, was a nurse whose job was to accompany people with physical disabilities to clinics. “It is true my wife moved around a lot,” he added, “but please stop cursing her. Her only fault is marrying someone like me, and having to work and take care of the children.”
Roughly 56 percent of Koreans are nonreligious, while 28 percent are Christian and about 16 percent are Buddhist. Heterodox groups are therefore not the norm any more than in the United States, and even among the devoutly religious, they are viewed askance: 20 percent of Koreans are Protestant (mostly Prebyterian), about 8 percent are Catholic, and most Korean Buddhists belong either to the Jogye or Taego order, which are both types of Seon, or Korean Zen. This puts groups like Shincheonji far outside mainstream Korean society, which may partly explain why they were vilified.
Park Won-soon repeatedly claimed the group was responsible for the coronavirus outbreak in South Korea and sued 12 of its leaders for murder. Daegu city officials sued the group for $82.3 million, or more than two-thirds of the city’s pandemic-related spending. In early July, prosecutors arrested three Shincheonji officials for allegedly giving health authorities false information about its followers.
Efforts at redemption have fallen on deaf ears. In July, 4,000 members who have recovered from the coronavirus promised to donate blood plasma to help develop treatments or possibly a vaccine, but the event looked too much like an engineered photo-op. Shortly after the outbreak in Daegu, Lee held a press conference, got down on his knees, and offered up an apology. But few were moved. In fact, several reporters focused instead on his wristwatch, a gift from imprisoned former President Park Geun-hye—who fell from power in part because of her involvement with the leader of a shamanistic cult. Lee was, after all, the same man who had recently claimed the pandemic was the devil’s attempt to stop the church’s growth, and that victims of the pandemic were “saints in Shincheonji.”
Efforts at redemption have fallen on deaf ears.
The church says it has been unfairly singled out for persecution. At one point, for example, the Seoul city government banned all Shincheonji gatherings—but not other religious services. Church services have been vectors for the coronavirus worldwide, including in the United States, chiefly thanks to singing, which projects the virus strongly.
Weeks later, in fact, in mid-March, 46 churchgoers became infected after attending the River of Grace Community Church outside of Seoul. Also in mid-March, officials in Gyeonggi province threatened to shut down some 140 churches that had failed to implement preventive measures, following news that Manmin Central Church in Seoul had infected 22 people during a meeting to prepare worship materials for lockdown. South Korea continues to report upticks in coronavirus cases, mostly tied to churches.
Shincheonji members themselves say one reason they have been singled out is because mainstream Christians, in particular the Christian Council of Korea, revile the group. This is interesting, because the group is not actually the crazy Korean cult one might expect. It’s certainly no Christian Gospel Mission, also known as Providence or Jesus Morning Star, the Korean movement that allegedly teaches followers to worship Adolf Hitler alongside Jesus, and whose founder is an anti-Semitic serial rapist who tells young women the only way to salvation is through having sex with him. (He served 10 years in prison for sexual assault and was released in 2018.)
Yes, Shincheonji followers believe Lee is a messianic prophet inspired by God, or even that he is an immortal savior himself. Yes, in his book The Creation of Heaven and Earth, Lee writes, “anyone who opposes Shincheonji is evil.” But such beliefs are not so strange when set beside the basic tenets of Korea’s largest Christian denomination: Presbyterianism. Or its second-largest, for that matter: Roman Catholicism. Presented straightforwardly, the beliefs of most religions can seem startlingly odd (though to be fair, not many claim to have a living Messiah, much less one who in his youth was himself a member of another cultlike Christian group, Olive Tree). Rather, what offends the mainstream Christian community is the group’s secrecy and dishonesty. According to Tark Ji-il, a professor of religion at Busan Presbyterian University and an expert on heretical Christian groups, the problem is not just that the group lied to the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, but that “their lies are deeply connected with their doctrine that religiously justifies the lies.” This, he said, is why the church is “isolated by not only the church but also Korean society.”
One thing Shincheonji members are honest about is their propensity for lying. Members are known to infiltrate other congregations to convert their followers, in a practice known as “sheep-stealing” or “harvesting,” and they openly admit they are dishonest about their affiliation when they do so. They even instruct members to lie to friends and family members about it. In video footage of an internal Shincheonji lecture, one instructor reportedly explained that traditional evangelism “is too expensive, takes too much manpower and is too time-consuming” and that it is therefore “better to swallow existing churches.”
Shincheonji justifies its dishonesty by pointing out that its members are persecuted, citing cases of brutal deprogramming and forced conversions back to mainline Protestant groups. In December 2017, for example, a 27-year-old woman suffocated to death when her own parents bound and gagged her to keep her from escaping. They had been holding her captive at a secluded lodge in the southern county of Hwasun, trying to forcibly convert her from the Shincheonji faith. Commenting on Shincheonji’s persecution after the Daegu outbreak in a March report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom cited forced conversion of Shincheonji members, saying South Korea provides a “vivid example of how public health emergencies can increase the risk to marginalized religious groups.”
“Parents, family members, and husbands pay thousands of dollars to Protestant pastors to unconvert Shincheonji members,” Abby, a Shincheonji member who lives in Washington and asked to use only her first name, told Foreign Policy. “That’s something that we’ve brought up as a violation of human rights, but Korea has not recognized this as a problem.”
This is how the secretive Christian sect ended up making common cause with the LGBTQ community, through its support of South Korea’s anti-discrimination bill. Mainstream Korean Christian groups vehemently oppose the bill and have compared LGBTQ members to Nazis, warning that if the bill is passed, Korea will become a “gay dictatorship.” As Ji Young-jun, a lawyer at the law firm Justice, put it, “Shincheonji is responsible for indiscriminately spreading the coronavirus with their lies. They try to avoid responsibility by using the term ‘hate tactics,’ which is very similar to the strategy used by male homosexuals who indiscriminately spread AIDS, which is deadlier than COVID-19.”
When I asked Abby about Shincheonji’s position on the bill, she said, “We fully support it,” but later added that the church has no official position. When I asked about the group’s position on the LGBTQ community, she said that as Christians, their position is “conservative,” but that they oppose discrimination against any and all groups. Like the LGBTQ community, Shincheonji members have been stigmatized because a virus spread among their ranks. Also like the LGBTQ community, Shincheonji members fear persecution, feel the need to lie about their identity, are broadly hated by mainstream Christians, and hope to see protective legislation passed. But there’s one more similarity: Their identity itself has become pejorative.
On July 30, Justice Minister Choo Mi-ae was deflecting criticism from conservatives over the Democrats’ push for prosecutorial reform. Choo suggested that the opposition’s tireless attacks and Shincheonji’s own opposition to her reforms could be related. In other words, all she had to do to attack her conservative opponents was associate them, however loosely, with an almost universally hated religious minority.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--State Department Pushes Back on Claims that Officials Lied to Congress over Emergency Arms Deals

State Department Pushes Back on Claims that Officials Lied to Congress over Emergency Arms Deals The U.S. State Department ’ s top official overseeing arms sales has pushed back against claims that he misled Congress concerning emergency multibillion-dollar weapons transactions to Middle Eastern countries , after two Democratic lawmakers accused him of lying while testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee last year .
In letters sent to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Eliot Engel and Rep. Andy Levin , both Democrats , and obtained by Foreign Policy , Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper insisted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ justified in invoking an emergency declaration to expedite arms sales to the region based on months of increasing threats from Iran .
Cooper refuted claims he attempted to mislead lawmakers on the subject .
In letters to both Engel and Levin , Cooper also indicated that Congress has held up additional weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates , and he urged lawmakers to expedite their review of the proposed sales .
“ It is bewildering you continue to call into question the basis for such an emergency with such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) record , ” Cooper wrote to Engel and Levin on Monday .
He cited two months of security incidents both before and after President Donald Trump ’ s May 2019 declaration that allowed more than $ 8 billion in sales to move forward , including precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE that had long been blocked by Congress .
The letter marks the first time Cooper has addressed claims he misled Congress .
It represents the latest turn in spiraling tensions between Pompeo ’ s State Department and the Democratic-led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Engel accused the State Department of throwing a “ temper tantrum ” with its decision to halt staff-level briefings with U.S. diplomats on counterterrorism and China issues because of an escalating dispute over the committee ’ s investigation into the abrupt firing of the State Department ’ s top watchdog , Steve Linick , in May .
A State Department spokesperson defended the decision to cancel briefings with congressional overseers on issues unrelated to the Saudi arms sales , saying it was based on the committee ’ s treatment of State Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least one has been accused of lying before Congress without being given the opportunity to clear his name in an open hearing , ” the spokesperson said , claiming the State Department officials were being unfairly treated across a range of issues—which is why all briefings were halted .
But a Democratic committee aide said in response that the State Department doesn ’ t get to dictate how Congress conducts oversight .
“ Their half-truths and falsehoods are a distraction .
The record is clear that they ’ ve tried to thwart this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ every turn , ” said the aide , who spoke on condition of anonymity .
The “ briefings they canceled have nothing to do with the committee ’ s oversight efforts .
They ’ re playing games with issues that bear on our national security , ” the aide added .
In a letter to the State Department earlier this month , Engel and Levin suggested Cooper offered false testimony on the emergency weapons sales during a June 2019 hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee .
Pompeo gave a classified briefing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 , in which he made no reference to an emergency that would necessitate expediting arms sales .
Three days later , on May 24 , Pompeo declared the emergency .
“ Within three days , an emergency was created that required that declaration ?
” Levin asked Cooper .
“ Congressman , yes .
Yes , ” Cooper responded .
Levin replied : “ So , your testimony here is that in those two or three intervening days , an emergency arose that required a declaration ?
” “ I would—yes .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ imposition of sanctions , ” Cooper responded , before Levin cut him off and said , “ Sir , with all due respect , I just do not think that is credible.
” A State Department Office of the Inspector General report released earlier this month determined that Pompeo acted within his legal authority to declare an emergency and expedite the arms sales , but the department did not adequately take into account the humanitarian impact of those arms sales , given the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen ’ s devastating civil war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obtained by Politico found that Pompeo ’ s team began laying the groundwork for declaring an emergency beginning in April 2019 , more than a month before the emergency declaration was made—not in the three-day period Levin questioned Cooper about .
“ In short : Mr. Cooper lied .
Secretary Pompeo directed the invention of an emergency more than two weeks before he briefed Congress .
One did not arise over the course of three days , as Mr. Cooper told me , ” Levin said in a statement on Aug. 11 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ committed a federal crime if he lied to Congress .
Cooper , in his letter , outlined a dozen examples of the Trump administration raising alarm bells over Iranian aggression in the months leading up to the emergency certification , including what the Defense Department characterized as “ a credible threat ” from Iranian forces to U.S. forces in the Middle East .
Cooper also referred to “ compelling ” classified information the administration relayed to Congress .
“ Your letter alleges I testified the emergency only arose between May 21-24 , 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that was the case , ” Cooper wrote .
“ If you view my exchange with Representative Levin , during which he interrupted me several times , as inconsistent in any way with the facts as described in the Secretary ’ s certification , my full testimony including my opening statement , or this letter , please rest assured there was no intent to obfuscate the necessity to address the threat , ” Cooper wrote .
“ In sum , it is time for this matter to be closed.
” Notably , Cooper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other arms sales to the UAE and Saudi Arabia that are being held up by congressional review , including the transfer of small arms and M230 chain guns to the UAE , and Paveway IV laser-guided bombs and a command and control system to Saudi Arabia .
“ Although the deadline for informal review of these cases ended between two and eight months ago , the Department and our Gulf partners would welcome your support at the earliest opportunity , ” Clarke wrote .
He commended lawmakers for recently supporting another $ 154 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a separate deal .
“ Mr .
Cooper ’ s letter contains many words , but none of them explain why his actual testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee—that an emergency arose between May 21 and May 24 of 2019—was not false , ” a Foreign Affairs Committee aide told Foreign Policy in response to questions about the letter .
“ We ’ ve given him an opportunity to clear this up on the record .
We hope he takes it.
” The aide added that the committee has “ outstanding questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Congress will be used by Saudi Arabia and the UAE .
“ We look forward to the department clarifying those questions , hopefully with a focus on American values as well as interests , ” the aide said .
Foreign Policy reported in June that the Trump administration is in discussions to end the informal process through which Congress reviews arms sales , a practice that dates back decades .
An unusual coalition of conservative Republican and progressive Democratic lawmakers have banded together in recent years to curtail the president ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without prior congressional approval , including U.S. military support for the Saudi-led fight in Yemen against Iran-backed Houthi rebels .
Human rights groups have accused the Saudi military of indiscriminately bombing civilians with U.S.-made munitions .
Lawmakers objected to the administration ’ s emergency declaration , but did not muster enough of the two-thirds vote required in each chamber to override Trump ’ s decision .
The emergency waiver reportedly provoked internal dissension within the ranks of the administration .
The exchange of letters marks a new low in the relationship between the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Engel and the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , Robert Menendez , have accused Pompeo of stifling lawmakers ’ requests for testimony and transparency .
Pompeo , for his part , has said that Congress had rejected State Department offers for testimony after Linick ’ s surprise firing .
Linick was looking into the administration ’ s deliberations concerning the emergency declaration and Pompeo ’ s alleged misuse of staff resources for private errands when he was fired .

The U.S. State Department’s top official overseeing arms sales has pushed back against claims that he misled Congress concerning emergency multibillion-dollar weapons transactions to Middle Eastern countries, after two Democratic lawmakers accused him of lying while testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee last year.
The U.S. State Department’s top official overseeing arms sales has pushed back against claims that he misled Congress concerning emergency multibillion-dollar weapons transactions to Middle Eastern countries, after two Democratic lawmakers accused him of lying while testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee last year.
In letters sent to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Eliot Engel and Rep. Andy Levin, both Democrats, and obtained by Foreign Policy, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper insisted that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was justified in invoking an emergency declaration to expedite arms sales to the region based on months of increasing threats from Iran. Cooper refuted claims he attempted to mislead lawmakers on the subject.
In letters to both Engel and Levin, Cooper also indicated that Congress has held up additional weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and he urged lawmakers to expedite their review of the proposed sales.
“It is bewildering you continue to call into question the basis for such an emergency with such a compelling public (and substantive classified) record,” Cooper wrote to Engel and Levin on Monday. He cited two months of security incidents both before and after President Donald Trump’s May 2019 declaration that allowed more than $8 billion in sales to move forward, including precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE that had long been blocked by Congress.
The letter marks the first time Cooper has addressed claims he misled Congress. It represents the latest turn in spiraling tensions between Pompeo’s State Department and the Democratic-led House Foreign Affairs Committee.
On Tuesday, Engel accused the State Department of throwing a “temper tantrum” with its decision to halt staff-level briefings with U.S. diplomats on counterterrorism and China issues because of an escalating dispute over the committee’s investigation into the abrupt firing of the State Department’s top watchdog, Steve Linick, in May.
A State Department spokesperson defended the decision to cancel briefings with congressional overseers on issues unrelated to the Saudi arms sales, saying it was based on the committee’s treatment of State Department officials, including Cooper. “At least one has been accused of lying before Congress without being given the opportunity to clear his name in an open hearing,” the spokesperson said, claiming the State Department officials were being unfairly treated across a range of issues—which is why all briefings were halted.
But a Democratic committee aide said in response that the State Department doesn’t get to dictate how Congress conducts oversight.
“Their half-truths and falsehoods are a distraction. The record is clear that they’ve tried to thwart this committee’s oversight efforts at nearly every turn,” said the aide, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The “briefings they canceled have nothing to do with the committee’s oversight efforts. They’re playing games with issues that bear on our national security,” the aide added.
In a letter to the State Department earlier this month, Engel and Levin suggested Cooper offered false testimony on the emergency weapons sales during a June 2019 hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Pompeo gave a classified briefing to members of Congress on May 21, 2019, in which he made no reference to an emergency that would necessitate expediting arms sales. Three days later, on May 24, Pompeo declared the emergency.
“Within three days, an emergency was created that required that declaration?” Levin asked Cooper. “Congressman, yes. Yes,” Cooper responded. Levin replied: “So, your testimony here is that in those two or three intervening days, an emergency arose that required a declaration?”
“I would—yes. And I would parallel this to also imposition of sanctions,” Cooper responded, before Levin cut him off and said, “Sir, with all due respect, I just do not think that is credible.”
A State Department Office of the Inspector General report released earlier this month determined that Pompeo acted within his legal authority to declare an emergency and expedite the arms sales, but the department did not adequately take into account the humanitarian impact of those arms sales, given the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen’s devastating civil war. An unredacted version of the report obtained by Politico found that Pompeo’s team began laying the groundwork for declaring an emergency beginning in April 2019, more than a month before the emergency declaration was made—not in the three-day period Levin questioned Cooper about.
“In short: Mr. Cooper lied. Secretary Pompeo directed the invention of an emergency more than two weeks before he briefed Congress. One did not arise over the course of three days, as Mr. Cooper told me,” Levin said in a statement on Aug. 11. Engel and Levin suggested that Cooper potentially committed a federal crime if he lied to Congress.
Cooper, in his letter, outlined a dozen examples of the Trump administration raising alarm bells over Iranian aggression in the months leading up to the emergency certification, including what the Defense Department characterized as “a credible threat” from Iranian forces to U.S. forces in the Middle East. Cooper also referred to “compelling” classified information the administration relayed to Congress.
“Your letter alleges I testified the emergency only arose between May 21-24, 2019. I did not intend to suggest that was the case,” Cooper wrote. “If you view my exchange with Representative Levin, during which he interrupted me several times, as inconsistent in any way with the facts as described in the Secretary’s certification, my full testimony including my opening statement, or this letter, please rest assured there was no intent to obfuscate the necessity to address the threat,” Cooper wrote. “In sum, it is time for this matter to be closed.”
Notably, Cooper’s letter also makes reference to other arms sales to the UAE and Saudi Arabia that are being held up by congressional review, including the transfer of small arms and M230 chain guns to the UAE, and Paveway IV laser-guided bombs and a command and control system to Saudi Arabia. “Although the deadline for informal review of these cases ended between two and eight months ago, the Department and our Gulf partners would welcome your support at the earliest opportunity,” Clarke wrote. He commended lawmakers for recently supporting another $154 million in new sales to the UAE in a separate deal.
“Mr. Cooper’s letter contains many words, but none of them explain why his actual testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee—that an emergency arose between May 21 and May 24 of 2019—was not false,” a Foreign Affairs Committee aide told Foreign Policy in response to questions about the letter. “We’ve given him an opportunity to clear this up on the record. We hope he takes it.”
The aide added that the committee has “outstanding questions” about how the weapons on hold from Congress will be used by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. “We look forward to the department clarifying those questions, hopefully with a focus on American values as well as interests,” the aide said. Foreign Policy reported in June that the Trump administration is in discussions to end the informal process through which Congress reviews arms sales, a practice that dates back decades.
An unusual coalition of conservative Republican and progressive Democratic lawmakers have banded together in recent years to curtail the president’s ability to engage in military actions abroad without prior congressional approval, including U.S. military support for the Saudi-led fight in Yemen against Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Human rights groups have accused the Saudi military of indiscriminately bombing civilians with U.S.-made munitions.
Lawmakers objected to the administration’s emergency declaration, but did not muster enough of the two-thirds vote required in each chamber to override Trump’s decision. The emergency waiver reportedly provoked internal dissension within the ranks of the administration.
The exchange of letters marks a new low in the relationship between the State Department and congressional Democrats. Both Engel and the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Menendez, have accused Pompeo of stifling lawmakers’ requests for testimony and transparency.
Pompeo, for his part, has said that Congress had rejected State Department offers for testimony after Linick’s surprise firing. Linick was looking into the administration’s deliberations concerning the emergency declaration and Pompeo’s alleged misuse of staff resources for private errands when he was fired.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--Belarus’s Protests Aren’t Particularly Anti-Putin

The mass uprising sparked by the viciousness of Belarus ’ s security services toward protests against an apparently fraudulent presidential election this month caught everyone by surprise .
Although the vote , which incumbent President Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed to have won by more than 80 percent , was clearly rigged , the expectation inside Belarus and in the world beyond was that contemporary Europe ’ s longest-ruling dictator , having dominated Belarus for 26 years , would continue doing so .
Well , not this time .
Lukashenko now lives on borrowed time .
The ridiculously huge margin of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with claiming to have won , say , 60 percent of the votes in elections they steal ?
—and more so the arrest of some 7,000 nonviolent demonstrators , many of whom were badly beaten on the streets and while in detention , created a tsunami of anger .
Indeed , far from cowing the protesters , the regime ’ s show of force brought even more of them on to the streets .
From Minsk , the capital , to smaller cities across the country , even workers at state-owned factories—whom the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strike , booed Lukashenko , and demanded that he depart .
Hundreds of employees at the state-run television station Belarus 1 also refused to work until new elections were held and censorship ended .
Riot police ditched their crowd control paraphernalia in a gesture of camaraderie with the protesters .
Within days , the seemingly invincible Lukashenko was on political life support .
Not surprisingly , commentators in the West turned their attention to the Kremlin , and speculation began about what Russian President Vladimir Putin might do .
Would he come to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so , how ?
By sending the so-called little green men who popped up in Ukraine in 2014 ?
Dispatching troops to quell the demonstrations ?
Arming irregulars ?
Rattling sabers ?
The speculation was not entirely unwarranted .
Putin had congratulated Lukashenko on his electoral victory , and once the uprising began , he pledged to defend Belarus against “ external pressure.
” There ’ s also the historical precedent ; like Ukraine , Belarus adjoins Russia and is a fellow Slavic nation .
The Russian military doubtless sees it as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of how it served as a passageway for Napoleon and Hitler .
More importantly , Putin has been obsessed with Western-inspired color revolutions for the better part of two decades , and he is currently also dealing with huge protests in Khabarovsk , in Russia ’ s Far East .
There ’ s good reason for him to worry that the Belarusian protesters would , by sheer force of example , inspire—perhaps even mobilize—Russia ’ s fragmented political opposition .
In short , Putin and his government have a lot at stake in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have wondered ( reasonably ) whether Belarus in 2020 would beget a crisis akin to Ukraine in 2014 .
But this is very unlikely .
The circumstances underlying the two uprisings are utterly different .
For starters , the Belarus protesters aren ’ t driven by a desire to break free of Russian control , which , in any event , the wily Lukashenko proved pretty adept at avoiding .
Lukashenko is reviled , no doubt , but not because he is regarded in the country as Moscow ’ s man , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Nor are the intrepid protesters who have taken to the streets in Belarus animated primarily by dreams of joining the European Union and NATO , and the anti-Russian sentiments evident among some of the groups that were part of the protests on Kyiv ’ s Maidan have been notably absent on the streets of Minsk .
Moreover , because Russian is far more widely used in Belarus than Belarusian—like Russian , Belarusian has the status of an official language , but less than a quarter of the population speaks it day to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and parts of Ukraine , particularly its western regions , aren ’ t present either .
In short , Putin need not really fear the installation of an anti-Russian regime .
Still , Moscow does have good reason to worry that the ripple effects of the protests in Belarus could reach into Russia .
But not only would an intervention not solve that particular problem , it would actually make it worse .
The protests in Belarus are so massive and encompass so many different segments of society that quashing them would require @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force .
Hundreds , perhaps thousands , of demonstrators would be killed .
A movement that did not originate out of antipathy to Russia would then inevitably acquire an anti-Russian character .
And even if Russian forces were to prevail , Belarusian sentiments toward Russia would be forever altered .
Future protests wouldn ’ t be directed against Lukashenko alone but against his imperial benefactor as well .
As it has in Ukraine , Moscow ’ s military intervention would ensure that Belarusian nationalism will come to be defined in no small measure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a tactical victory would become a strategic defeat .
There ’ s also the question of what would follow an intervention .
Lukashenko has become unsalvageable .
Even if Russia ’ s use of force were to quell the protests , lasting peace would require his exit , even if after a decent interval .
But there ’ s no ready replacement , because Lukashenko has exercised near total control for 26 years ; he hasn ’ t been one to look kindly upon , let alone cultivate , rising stars or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were to be trotted out , anyone closely identified with the old regime could never gain even the minimal support needed to calm the political waters .
Russia would be required to serve as the guardian of a leader with reed-thin political support—but without the dictatorial instincts or capacity to rule by intimidation a la Lukashenko .
One could argue that such an outcome could suit Putin perfectly and indeed would pave the way for a union between Belarus and Russia , which he has long wanted .
But that assumes that Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of peaceful demonstrators would actually work , rather than provoke greater resistance .
The unlikeliness of success explains why even the official and regime-aligned media in Russia have not parroted Lukashenko ’ s line that it ’ s either him or anarchy or a Western takeover .
To the contrary , the demonstrations have received wide coverage , as has the viciousness of the government ’ s response .
As the Carnegie Endowment ’ s Eugene Rumer has pointed out , the Kremlin has even allowed small demonstrations outside Belarus ’ s embassy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agency , reported on the gatherings , noting that they were held for several successive days .
In short , Putin ’ s is not all-in for Lukashenko—and he hasn ’ t been for a long while .
Witness , for example , his refusal to continue selling Belarus oil at subsidized prices .
Lukashenko ’ s entreaties for Russian intervention haven ’ t elicited a sympathetic response from the Kremlin , which the Belarusian leader accused ( in June and July ) of plotting to disrupt the upcoming elections through the use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates .
He even had 33 Russians , allegedly members of the Wagner Group , a paramilitary outfit with official ties , arrested on charges of planning a terrorist attack on the eve of the election .
If Belarus isn ’ t Ukraine in 2014 , what is it ?
As Harvard University ’ s Mark Kramer has observed , the 2018 protests in Armenia , which forced the resignation of the Russia-aligned government of Serzh Sargsyan and the emergence of a successor led by the opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan , might be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ popular movement sparked by a stolen 2017 election—intended to permit Sargsyan , who served as president from 2008 to 2018 , to retain power by becoming prime minister ( with additional authorities ) in 2018—led to another vote .
Pashinyan ’ s coalition won resoundingly .
Not only has Russia retained its close military ties with Armenia since then , it has also deployed newer weapons to its bases at Gyumri and Erebuni .
In Belarus today , as in Armenia in 2017 , the uprising isn ’ t powered by a desire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the West through eventual membership in NATO and the EU .
It was produced by outrage over electoral fraud perpetrated , yet again , by a leader who had outstayed his welcome and was willing to beat his people into submission to retain all-encompassing power .
Although some Western experts have warned about a Russian military intervention in Belarus , Russia is much more to hew to the playbook in Armenia two years ago—sitting largely on the sidelines in hopes that whatever government follows , it will be pro-Russian .
None of this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t dicey and couldn ’ t become more so .
One way to prevent a national crisis from spiraling into an international one , however , is to maintain communication between Russia on the one hand and NATO and the EU on the other .
Eschewing misplaced historical analogies and doomsday scenarios might help , too .

The mass uprising sparked by the viciousness of Belarus’s security services toward protests against an apparently fraudulent presidential election this month caught everyone by surprise. Although the vote, which incumbent President Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed to have won by more than 80 percent, was clearly rigged, the expectation inside Belarus and in the world beyond was that contemporary Europe’s longest-ruling dictator, having dominated Belarus for 26 years, would continue doing so.
The mass uprising sparked by the viciousness of Belarus’s security services toward protests against an apparently fraudulent presidential election this month caught everyone by surprise. Although the vote, which incumbent President Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed to have won by more than 80 percent, was clearly rigged, the expectation inside Belarus and in the world beyond was that contemporary Europe’s longest-ruling dictator, having dominated Belarus for 26 years, would continue doing so.
Well, not this time. Lukashenko now lives on borrowed time.
The ridiculously huge margin of his victory—can’t despots ever be satisfied with claiming to have won, say, 60 percent of the votes in elections they steal?—and more so the arrest of some 7,000 nonviolent demonstrators, many of whom were badly beaten on the streets and while in detention, created a tsunami of anger.
Indeed, far from cowing the protesters, the regime’s show of force brought even more of them on to the streets. From Minsk, the capital, to smaller cities across the country, even workers at state-owned factories—whom the government had long regarded as loyal—went on strike, booed Lukashenko, and demanded that he depart. Hundreds of employees at the state-run television station Belarus 1 also refused to work until new elections were held and censorship ended. Riot police ditched their crowd control paraphernalia in a gesture of camaraderie with the protesters.
Within days, the seemingly invincible Lukashenko was on political life support.
Not surprisingly, commentators in the West turned their attention to the Kremlin, and speculation began about what Russian President Vladimir Putin might do. Would he come to Lukashenko’s rescue, and if so, how? By sending the so-called little green men who popped up in Ukraine in 2014? Dispatching troops to quell the demonstrations? Arming irregulars? Rattling sabers?
The speculation was not entirely unwarranted. Putin had congratulated Lukashenko on his electoral victory, and once the uprising began, he pledged to defend Belarus against “external pressure.” There’s also the historical precedent; like Ukraine, Belarus adjoins Russia and is a fellow Slavic nation. The Russian military doubtless sees it as a strategic buffer with the West, mindful of how it served as a passageway for Napoleon and Hitler.
More importantly, Putin has been obsessed with Western-inspired color revolutions for the better part of two decades, and he is currently also dealing with huge protests in Khabarovsk, in Russia’s Far East. There’s good reason for him to worry that the Belarusian protesters would, by sheer force of example, inspire—perhaps even mobilize—Russia’s fragmented political opposition.
In short, Putin and his government have a lot at stake in Belarus, which is why some experts have wondered (reasonably) whether Belarus in 2020 would beget a crisis akin to Ukraine in 2014. But this is very unlikely. The circumstances underlying the two uprisings are utterly different.
For starters, the Belarus protesters aren’t driven by a desire to break free of Russian control, which, in any event, the wily Lukashenko proved pretty adept at avoiding. Lukashenko is reviled, no doubt, but not because he is regarded in the country as Moscow’s man, as Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was in 2014.
Nor are the intrepid protesters who have taken to the streets in Belarus animated primarily by dreams of joining the European Union and NATO, and the anti-Russian sentiments evident among some of the groups that were part of the protests on Kyiv’s Maidan have been notably absent on the streets of Minsk. Moreover, because Russian is far more widely used in Belarus than Belarusian—like Russian, Belarusian has the status of an official language, but less than a quarter of the population speaks it day to day—the linguistic and cultural divide between Russia and parts of Ukraine, particularly its western regions, aren’t present either. In short, Putin need not really fear the installation of an anti-Russian regime.
Still, Moscow does have good reason to worry that the ripple effects of the protests in Belarus could reach into Russia. But not only would an intervention not solve that particular problem, it would actually make it worse.
The protests in Belarus are so massive and encompass so many different segments of society that quashing them would require Russia to deploy a substantial amount of force. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of demonstrators would be killed. A movement that did not originate out of antipathy to Russia would then inevitably acquire an anti-Russian character. And even if Russian forces were to prevail, Belarusian sentiments toward Russia would be forever altered. Future protests wouldn’t be directed against Lukashenko alone but against his imperial benefactor as well. As it has in Ukraine, Moscow’s military intervention would ensure that Belarusian nationalism will come to be defined in no small measure by animus toward Russia. In short, a tactical victory would become a strategic defeat.
There’s also the question of what would follow an intervention. Lukashenko has become unsalvageable. Even if Russia’s use of force were to quell the protests, lasting peace would require his exit, even if after a decent interval. But there’s no ready replacement, because Lukashenko has exercised near total control for 26 years; he hasn’t been one to look kindly upon, let alone cultivate, rising stars or putative successors. Even if a successor were to be trotted out, anyone closely identified with the old regime could never gain even the minimal support needed to calm the political waters. Russia would be required to serve as the guardian of a leader with reed-thin political support—but without the dictatorial instincts or capacity to rule by intimidation a la Lukashenko.
One could argue that such an outcome could suit Putin perfectly and indeed would pave the way for a union between Belarus and Russia, which he has long wanted. But that assumes that Russia’s use of force and slaughter of peaceful demonstrators would actually work, rather than provoke greater resistance.
The unlikeliness of success explains why even the official and regime-aligned media in Russia have not parroted Lukashenko’s line that it’s either him or anarchy or a Western takeover. To the contrary, the demonstrations have received wide coverage, as has the viciousness of the government’s response. As the Carnegie Endowment’s Eugene Rumer has pointed out, the Kremlin has even allowed small demonstrations outside Belarus’s embassy in Moscow—and TASS, the state news agency, reported on the gatherings, noting that they were held for several successive days.
In short, Putin’s is not all-in for Lukashenko—and he hasn’t been for a long while. Witness, for example, his refusal to continue selling Belarus oil at subsidized prices. Lukashenko’s entreaties for Russian intervention haven’t elicited a sympathetic response from the Kremlin, which the Belarusian leader accused (in June and July) of plotting to disrupt the upcoming elections through the use of mercenaries and by conspiring with opposition candidates. He even had 33 Russians, allegedly members of the Wagner Group, a paramilitary outfit with official ties, arrested on charges of planning a terrorist attack on the eve of the election.
If Belarus isn’t Ukraine in 2014, what is it? As Harvard University’s Mark Kramer has observed, the 2018 protests in Armenia, which forced the resignation of the Russia-aligned government of Serzh Sargsyan and the emergence of a successor led by the opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan, might be a better comparison. There, a popular movement sparked by a stolen 2017 election—intended to permit Sargsyan, who served as president from 2008 to 2018, to retain power by becoming prime minister (with additional authorities) in 2018—led to another vote. Pashinyan’s coalition won resoundingly. Not only has Russia retained its close military ties with Armenia since then, it has also deployed newer weapons to its bases at Gyumri and Erebuni.
In Belarus today, as in Armenia in 2017, the uprising isn’t powered by a desire to break with Moscow and align with the West through eventual membership in NATO and the EU. It was produced by outrage over electoral fraud perpetrated, yet again, by a leader who had outstayed his welcome and was willing to beat his people into submission to retain all-encompassing power.
Although some Western experts have warned about a Russian military intervention in Belarus, Russia is much more to hew to the playbook in Armenia two years ago—sitting largely on the sidelines in hopes that whatever government follows, it will be pro-Russian. None of this means that the situation in Belarus isn’t dicey and couldn’t become more so. One way to prevent a national crisis from spiraling into an international one, however, is to maintain communication between Russia on the one hand and NATO and the EU on the other. Eschewing misplaced historical analogies and doomsday scenarios might help, too.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--Xi’s Latest Purge Reflects Climate of Fear

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s latest purge targets the police and judicial sectors , Beijing ’ s Workers ’ Stadium is demolished , and U.S. President Donald Trump hints at restrictions against Alibaba .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s latest round of purges targets the police and judicial sectors , with dozens of officials already arrested , including at least one major police chief .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ crackdowns a key feature of his rule , beginning with the elimination of his chief political rivals after he took power and continuing with key institutions , such as state-owned enterprises and the military .
Xi ’ s defenders say the purges are part of anti-corruption work , and it ’ s likely that some of the cases involve unusually corrupt officials .
But anti-corruption crackdowns carried out under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party auspices tend to follow a familiar pattern .
The price of luxuries—a useful proxy for corruption , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goods—fell during Xi ’ s first rounds of purges and then hit record highs before the coronavirus pandemic .
Eight years in , rule by fear still seems to be Xi ’ s watchword both inside and outside the party .
Reformist expelled .
Prominent reformist CCP intellectual Cai Xia , meanwhile , was formally expelled from the party and stripped of her retirement benefits this week .
Cai , who now lives in the United States , is a fierce critic of Xi ’ s leadership—views she says are shared by many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Guardian that China under Xi is trapped in a cycle of sycophancy and fear .
“ But those below are too afraid to tell him and wrong decisions continue to be made until the situation is out of control , ” she said .
“ In this vicious cycle , there is no way to stop the country from sliding towards disaster.
” No exit .
Even if resentment toward Xi ’ s leadership is growing , nobody in the party has the ability to act .
Short of a full-blown coup @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the entire system is locked in to ideological paranoia , yes-man thinking , and an increasing personality cult .
Xi himself may be aware of these problems—but like dictators before him , he ’ s learning that it ’ s hard to order people who are terrified of you to speak their minds .
Workers ’ Stadium demolished .
One of Beijing ’ s key sites , the Workers ’ Stadium , was ripped down in just four days this week , ahead of a planned reconstruction for the 2022 Winter Olympics .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ last few years have painfully reshaped the city .
But while the 66,000-seat Workers ’ Stadium carries strong memories for anyone who attended an event there , it ’ s not exactly an architectural loss .
Like many other demolitions , it comes with a commercial cost : The stadium had a penumbra of clubs and stores surrounding it that are now closed .
The peculiar juxtaposition of night life and a communist monument was the result of the People ’ s Liberation Army ’ s direct ownership of the stadium and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ club owners only had to bribe a single PLA representative .
Wetting the Buddha ’ s toes .
The record-setting rains and flooding in southern China continues , with the waters now reaching the toes of a famous statue of the Buddha in Leshan that normally sits well above the confluence of the Min and Dadu rivers , for the first time since 1949 .
The Three Gorges Dam is facing the largest inflow since it was completed in 2006 , although claims that the dam is in imminent danger of collapse are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a complicated battle against the waters , diverting as much as possible onto farmland while evacuating other areas and issuing warnings across entire provinces .
Hong Kong ’ s nadir .
The Public Opinion Programme , which has conducted research on Hong Kong since 1997 , found opinions of its five key indicators—prosperity , stability , rule of law , freedom , and democracy—reached a record low in the city this week .
The most significant drop was in prosperity : Hong Kong ’ s economy has faced a straight year of recession @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The other ratings already saw sharp declines following last year ’ s police brutality and government intransigence and the passage of Beijing ’ s draconian national security law in June .
Is Alibaba next ?
U.S. President Donald Trump issued yet another sweeping set of security restrictions this week , this time aimed at perpetual bugbear Huawei .
The new move targets chip sellers , potentially crippling Huawei ’ s production chain .
China has attempted to speed up its own semiconductor development , including espionage attempts directed at Taiwanese and U.S. firms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behind even its initial goal of 40 percent domestic production .
The response from the Chinese state and media was strong , but it ’ s unlikely to change anything .
The new restrictions may mean that Huawei gets the funds it needs to survive directly from government-linked institutions .
In the meantime , Trump openly mused about imposing restrictions on Alibaba , China ’ s logistical giant .
It ’ s hard to see any national security justification for such a move , outside of Alibaba ’ s cloud services , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forcing U.S.-China decoupling .
A flood of Alibaba-sourced products have appeared on Amazon in recent years through third-party sellers .
Back to Xi ’ s future .
China is attempting to develop a science-fiction movie sector where the first priority is to “ thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought.
” The plans follow a familiar pattern of state criticism of domestic creative industries .
The supposed solution is always more top-down direction , government instruction , and ideological correctness .
But the emphasis on politically approved domestic blockbusters may make things trickier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ access the Chinese market .
It ’ s possible that U.S. studios will face demands to actively promote Xi-ist ideals , leaving them on a collision course with a U.S. government increasingly hostile toward accommodation of Chinese authoritarianism .
Trade talks delayed .
Trump has canceled follow-on trade talks for the supposed “ phase two ” of the U.S.-China trade agreement—at this point a zombie deal , staggering on under its own undead weight .
Asked by reporters , Trump said that he wasn ’ t even thinking about the deal and again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus—a recurrent theme in recent weeks .
This delightful animated young adult favorite , originally made between 2005 and 2009 , is now streaming on Netflix .
The U.S. series is notable for China watchers because it does something that China itself has never managed : It makes a fantasy world rooted in East Asian culture that reaches a global audience .
The Chinese influence on Avatar goes deep , depicting martial arts practice , recreating Japanese invasions and colonies in Manchuria , and referencing modern-day authoritarianism such as laogai ( labor camps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secret police heads .
As Jeannette Ng points out , that depth is arguably missing from the show ’ s own sequel .
That ’ s it for this week .
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Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s latest purge targets the police and judicial sectors, Beijing’s Workers’ Stadium is demolished, and U.S. President Donald Trump hints at restrictions against Alibaba .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s latest purge targets the police and judicial sectors, Beijing’s Workers’ Stadium is demolished, and U.S. President Donald Trump hints at restrictions against Alibaba.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Xi Jinping Still Rules by Fear
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s latest round of purges targets the police and judicial sectors, with dozens of officials already arrested, including at least one major police chief. Xi has made these kinds of sweeping crackdowns a key feature of his rule, beginning with the elimination of his chief political rivals after he took power and continuing with key institutions, such as state-owned enterprises and the military.
Xi’s defenders say the purges are part of anti-corruption work, and it’s likely that some of the cases involve unusually corrupt officials. But anti-corruption crackdowns carried out under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party auspices tend to follow a familiar pattern. The price of luxuries—a useful proxy for corruption, since bribes often involve exchanges of luxury goods—fell during Xi’s first rounds of purges and then hit record highs before the coronavirus pandemic.
Eight years in, rule by fear still seems to be Xi’s watchword both inside and outside the party.
Reformist expelled. Prominent reformist CCP intellectual Cai Xia, meanwhile, was formally expelled from the party and stripped of her retirement benefits this week. Cai, who now lives in the United States, is a fierce critic of Xi’s leadership—views she says are shared by many inside the party itself. Cai told the Guardian that China under Xi is trapped in a cycle of sycophancy and fear.
“But those below are too afraid to tell him and wrong decisions continue to be made until the situation is out of control,” she said. “In this vicious cycle, there is no way to stop the country from sliding towards disaster.”
No exit. Even if resentment toward Xi’s leadership is growing, nobody in the party has the ability to act. Short of a full-blown coup or a health crisis for Xi, the entire system is locked in to ideological paranoia, yes-man thinking, and an increasing personality cult. Xi himself may be aware of these problems—but like dictators before him, he’s learning that it’s hard to order people who are terrified of you to speak their minds.
What We’re Following
Workers’ Stadium demolished. One of Beijing’s key sites, the Workers’ Stadium, was ripped down in just four days this week, ahead of a planned reconstruction for the 2022 Winter Olympics. Beijing’s systematic demolitions over the last few years have painfully reshaped the city. But while the 66,000-seat Workers’ Stadium carries strong memories for anyone who attended an event there, it’s not exactly an architectural loss.
Like many other demolitions, it comes with a commercial cost: The stadium had a penumbra of clubs and stores surrounding it that are now closed. The peculiar juxtaposition of night life and a communist monument was the result of the People’s Liberation Army’s direct ownership of the stadium and the land around it, which meant that club owners only had to bribe a single PLA representative.
Wetting the Buddha’s toes. The record-setting rains and flooding in southern China continues, with the waters now reaching the toes of a famous statue of the Buddha in Leshan that normally sits well above the confluence of the Min and Dadu rivers, for the first time since 1949. The Three Gorges Dam is facing the largest inflow since it was completed in 2006, although claims that the dam is in imminent danger of collapse are exaggerated.
The Chinese government is waging a complicated battle against the waters, diverting as much as possible onto farmland while evacuating other areas and issuing warnings across entire provinces.
Hong Kong’s nadir. The Public Opinion Programme, which has conducted research on Hong Kong since 1997, found opinions of its five key indicators—prosperity, stability, rule of law, freedom, and democracy—reached a record low in the city this week. The most significant drop was in prosperity: Hong Kong’s economy has faced a straight year of recession and shows no signs of recovery.
The other ratings already saw sharp declines following last year’s police brutality and government intransigence and the passage of Beijing’s draconian national security law in June.
Tech and Business
Is Alibaba next? U.S. President Donald Trump issued yet another sweeping set of security restrictions this week, this time aimed at perpetual bugbear Huawei. The new move targets chip sellers, potentially crippling Huawei’s production chain. China has attempted to speed up its own semiconductor development, including espionage attempts directed at Taiwanese and U.S. firms, but is still a long way behind even its initial goal of 40 percent domestic production.
The response from the Chinese state and media was strong, but it’s unlikely to change anything. The new restrictions may mean that Huawei gets the funds it needs to survive directly from government-linked institutions.
In the meantime, Trump openly mused about imposing restrictions on Alibaba, China’s logistical giant. It’s hard to see any national security justification for such a move, outside of Alibaba’s cloud services, but it would be a key step in forcing U.S.-China decoupling. A flood of Alibaba-sourced products have appeared on Amazon in recent years through third-party sellers.
Back to Xi’s future. China is attempting to develop a science-fiction movie sector where the first priority is to “thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought.” The plans follow a familiar pattern of state criticism of domestic creative industries. The supposed solution is always more top-down direction, government instruction, and ideological correctness.
But the emphasis on politically approved domestic blockbusters may make things trickier for Hollywood, which already self-censors to access the Chinese market. It’s possible that U.S. studios will face demands to actively promote Xi-ist ideals, leaving them on a collision course with a U.S. government increasingly hostile toward accommodation of Chinese authoritarianism.
Trade talks delayed. Trump has canceled follow-on trade talks for the supposed “phase two” of the U.S.-China trade agreement—at this point a zombie deal, staggering on under its own undead weight. Asked by reporters, Trump said that he wasn’t even thinking about the deal and again blamed China for failing to stop the coronavirus—a recurrent theme in recent weeks.
What We’re Watching
Aang, the hero of Avatar: The Last Airbender.
Avatar: The Last Airbender
This delightful animated young adult favorite, originally made between 2005 and 2009, is now streaming on Netflix. The U.S. series is notable for China watchers because it does something that China itself has never managed: It makes a fantasy world rooted in East Asian culture that reaches a global audience.
The Chinese influence on Avatar goes deep, depicting martial arts practice, recreating Japanese invasions and colonies in Manchuria, and referencing modern-day authoritarianism such as laogai (labor camps) and sinister guards named after real-life secret police heads. As Jeannette Ng points out, that depth is arguably missing from the show’s own sequel.
That’s it for this week.
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foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--Mali Needs a Marshall Plan, Not a Military Regime

Mali ’ s military has staged a coup , taking President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and Prime Minister Boubou Cissé into custody near the capital , Bamako .
The situation is reminiscent of the 2013 French military intervention that was prompted by a coup , the flight of the then-president , and the success of an al Qaeda affiliate that nearly overran the country .
All those factors are at play once again , seven years later .
The president of France , the United Nations , and the United States have called for the restoration of the constitutionally-elected government .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the short term .
Keita announced on August 19 that he had resigned to stop further bloodshed .
Cissé , in a gesture of reconciliation , said that he understood the frustration of the protesters who have held massive demonstrations in the dusty streets of Mali ’ s capital .
For months , Malians fed up with a government unable to effectively rule a country beset by a brutal jihadist conflict , communal violence , and a shattered economy have demanded that the president resign .
Under the banner of the June 5 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parties , religious leaders , and civil society protested Keita ’ s 2018 re-election , claiming it was plagued by irregularities , and denounced the government ’ s effort to pack the Supreme Court with loyalists .
The situation further deteriorated when the military killed 11 protesters .
The Keita government was simply unacceptable to many Malians who were forced to flee their homes to escape jihadist and communal violence .
The government ’ s incapacity—as well as that of foreign military forces that were struggling to prevent the country ’ s disintegration—was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unwillingness , to secure the release of presidential candidate and opposition leader , Soumaila Cissé , who was kidnapped by jihadists last March .
Fearing state collapse , the heads of the West African states—ECOWAS—proposed a unity government and the resignation of the Supreme Court .
That wasn ’ t enough for the protesters or for the titular head of the June 5 Movement , Mahmoud Dicko , a conservative Muslim preacher .
They rejected the ECOWAS proposals and brought the protesters back into the streets to demand the president ’ s resignation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the military intervened in a manner reminiscent of the 2012 coup that opened the way for a near-takeover of the country by an al Qaeda affiliate .
The situation is especially perilous because Mali is central to African and international efforts to defeat al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates operating throughout the Sahel region .
The French military , acclaimed for having defeated al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ( AQIM ) and liberating Timbuktu in 2013 , is now disparaged because AQIM ’ s successor—Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin—is expanding attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel—the group that killed three U.S. army green berets in Niger in 2018—has increased its attacks , employing heavy machine gun fire , and suicide bombers in southern Mali and neighboring countries of Burkina Faso and Niger .
The United Nations mission there ( known as MINUSMA ) , the most dangerous in the world , is seen as powerless .
In a world convulsed by the coronavirus pandemic , a coup in Mali may seem like a distant distraction .
But if Mali implodes as it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Islamic State extremists could destabilize the entire West African region , creating a massive refugee crisis .
France , the United States , the African Union , and ECOWAS must act to force the military to stand down .
Once calm is restored and mediation efforts led by ECOWAS are resumed , negotiations must result in the selection of an interim president and prime minister that are acceptable to Keita ’ s party and the June 5 Movement .
The job of the interim government must be to end the endemic corruption @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confronting the severe poverty and a spreading pandemic .
The interim government will need support from countries in the region and internationally .
If Mali implodes as it did in 2012 , these al Qaeda and Islamic State extremists could destabilize the entire West African region , creating a massive refugee crisis .
Moreover , there should be no rush to elections until the country is sufficiently stable so that the majority of citizens can safely go to the polls .
To do so would only discredit the elections and condemn the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tragedy of Mali and stabilize the Sahel , the violent extremists must be defeated—otherwise they could destabilize all of West Africa .
Mali ’ s neighbors , Burkina Faso , and Niger , like Mali itself , have proven unable to defeat the jihadists , who are now threatening the more prosperous West African states of Ivory Coast , Senegal , and Nigeria .
This means that the United Nations peacekeeping force must be given a broader mandate , one that will allow it to actively pursue and defeat the violent extremists operating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force led by France and composed of European and African troops will also need to be fully engaged in this effort .
In addition , local militaries need support so they can effectively protect civilians from communal violence which has been stoked by the jihadists .
Finally , France and the United States should lead the international community in providing a comprehensive economic recovery plan similar to the Marshall Plan for postwar Europe that covers Mauritania , Niger , Mali , and Burkina Faso .
The plan would address underlying causes of poverty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ education , and a shrinking resource base that are made worse by rapid population growth and advancing desertification .
Without increased diplomatic , security , and donor engagement in partnership with regional leaders in West Africa , the Sahel ’ s security crisis will only intensify , encouraging jihadist forces globally while adding strains to a region that is struggling to address a humanitarian crisis , rein in endemic violence , and manage the coronavirus pandemic .

Vicki J. Huddleston and Witney Schneidman

Mali’s military has staged a coup, taking President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and Prime Minister Boubou Cissé into custody near the capital, Bamako. The situation is reminiscent of the 2013 French military intervention that was prompted by a coup, the flight of the then-president, and the success of an al Qaeda affiliate that nearly overran the country. All those factors are at play once again, seven years later.
Mali’s military has staged a coup, taking President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and Prime Minister Boubou Cissé into custody near the capital, Bamako. The situation is reminiscent of the 2013 French military intervention that was prompted by a coup, the flight of the then-president, and the success of an al Qaeda affiliate that nearly overran the country. All those factors are at play once again, seven years later.
The president of France, the United Nations, and the United States have called for the restoration of the constitutionally-elected government. But that is unlikely to occur in the short term. Keita announced on August 19 that he had resigned to stop further bloodshed. Cissé, in a gesture of reconciliation, said that he understood the frustration of the protesters who have held massive demonstrations in the dusty streets of Mali’s capital.
For months, Malians fed up with a government unable to effectively rule a country beset by a brutal jihadist conflict, communal violence, and a shattered economy have demanded that the president resign. Under the banner of the June 5 Movement, a broad coalition of opposition parties, religious leaders, and civil society protested Keita’s 2018 re-election, claiming it was plagued by irregularities, and denounced the government’s effort to pack the Supreme Court with loyalists. The situation further deteriorated when the military killed 11 protesters.
The Keita government was simply unacceptable to many Malians who were forced to flee their homes to escape jihadist and communal violence. The government’s incapacity—as well as that of foreign military forces that were struggling to prevent the country’s disintegration—was further illustrated by its inability, or unwillingness, to secure the release of presidential candidate and opposition leader, Soumaila Cissé, who was kidnapped by jihadists last March.
Fearing state collapse, the heads of the West African states—ECOWAS—proposed a unity government and the resignation of the Supreme Court. That wasn’t enough for the protesters or for the titular head of the June 5 Movement, Mahmoud Dicko, a conservative Muslim preacher.
They rejected the ECOWAS proposals and brought the protesters back into the streets to demand the president’s resignation. When that didn’t happen, the military intervened in a manner reminiscent of the 2012 coup that opened the way for a near-takeover of the country by an al Qaeda affiliate.
The situation is especially perilous because Mali is central to African and international efforts to defeat al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates operating throughout the Sahel region. The French military, acclaimed for having defeated al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and liberating Timbuktu in 2013, is now disparaged because AQIM’s successor—Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin—is expanding attacks across central Mali.
In addition, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel—the group that killed three U.S. army green berets in Niger in 2018—has increased its attacks, employing heavy machine gun fire, and suicide bombers in southern Mali and neighboring countries of Burkina Faso and Niger. The United Nations mission there (known as MINUSMA), the most dangerous in the world, is seen as powerless.
In a world convulsed by the coronavirus pandemic, a coup in Mali may seem like a distant distraction. But if Mali implodes as it did in 2012, these al Qaeda and Islamic State extremists could destabilize the entire West African region, creating a massive refugee crisis.
France, the United States, the African Union, and ECOWAS must act to force the military to stand down. Once calm is restored and mediation efforts led by ECOWAS are resumed, negotiations must result in the selection of an interim president and prime minister that are acceptable to Keita’s party and the June 5 Movement. The job of the interim government must be to end the endemic corruption which rendered the Keita government incapable of confronting the severe poverty and a spreading pandemic. The interim government will need support from countries in the region and internationally.
If Mali implodes as it did in 2012, these al Qaeda and Islamic State extremists could destabilize the entire West African region, creating a massive refugee crisis.
Moreover, there should be no rush to elections until the country is sufficiently stable so that the majority of citizens can safely go to the polls. To do so would only discredit the elections and condemn the country to continued unrest.
To resolve the tragedy of Mali and stabilize the Sahel, the violent extremists must be defeated—otherwise they could destabilize all of West Africa. Mali’s neighbors, Burkina Faso, and Niger, like Mali itself, have proven unable to defeat the jihadists, who are now threatening the more prosperous West African states of Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Nigeria. This means that the United Nations peacekeeping force must be given a broader mandate, one that will allow it to actively pursue and defeat the violent extremists operating throughout the Sahel.
The G-5 fighting force led by France and composed of European and African troops will also need to be fully engaged in this effort. In addition, local militaries need support so they can effectively protect civilians from communal violence which has been stoked by the jihadists.
Finally, France and the United States should lead the international community in providing a comprehensive economic recovery plan similar to the Marshall Plan for postwar Europe that covers Mauritania, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The plan would address underlying causes of poverty and communal violence: unemployment, inadequate education, and a shrinking resource base that are made worse by rapid population growth and advancing desertification.
Without increased diplomatic, security, and donor engagement in partnership with regional leaders in West Africa, the Sahel’s security crisis will only intensify, encouraging jihadist forces globally while adding strains to a region that is struggling to address a humanitarian crisis, rein in endemic violence, and manage the coronavirus pandemic.