foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--Russia Fires Shot in Space Arms Race

Russia Fires Shot in Space Arms Race

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Russia launches an anti-satellite missile , the coronavirus strikes another U.S. aircraft carrier , and U.S. tensions with Iran heat up in the Persian Gulf .
A bit of self-promotion : The World Affairs Council of Dallas-Ft. Worth is hosting a webinar with FP ’ s Robbie Gramer on U.S. and international diplomacy in the age of the pandemic today at 5:00 p.m. EST .
Tune in here .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a missile on Wednesday that is capable of destroying satellites in low-earth orbit , U.S. Space Command said in a statement , as the Pentagon faced military challenges from Russia , China , and Iran over the course of a busy day .
The move could be a significant challenge to U.S. efforts to invest in communications satellites and sensor layers to track missiles in-flight—as the Space Force did during Iran ’ s ballistic missile attack on Iraq ’ s Al Asad air base in January , which left more than 100 U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This test is further proof of Russia ’ s hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control proposals designed to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting their counter-space weapons programs , ” said Gen. Jay Raymond , Space Command ’ s chief .
Growing challenge .
The missile test is another example of Russian forces challenging the United States in outer space in recent months , as the Trump administration has sought to get the nascent U.S. Space Force off the ground .
Time reported in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shadowing a U.S. satellite in outer space , a move that Raymond said had the potential to “ create a dangerous situation.
” Other rivals joining in .
It won ’ t just be Russia keeping the nascent Space Force busy : The Secure World Foundation said in its annual report last month that China , Iran , and North Korea are also looking at counter-space technologies .
An update on the Roosevelt .
U.S. Navy officials now believe the coronavirus outbreak on the U.S.S .
Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier spread from flight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday .
Pentagon officials previously suspected that a March port visit to Vietnam may have been the cause .
More than 600 sailors on board the ship , which is now docked in Guam , have tested positive for COVID-19 .
The news comes as the New York Times reports that the Navy is considering reinstating Capt .
Brett Crozier—who called for the ship ’ s crew to rapidly evacuate–as skipper of the Roosevelt .
Crozier ’ s firing prompted then-Acting U.S. Navy Secretary Thomas Modly to travel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crew , an action that eventually forced his resignation .
And if that wasn ’ t enough .
Nearly 700 sailors aboard the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle have tested positive for coronavirus , as have two U.S. sailors aboard the ship , with two more in quarantine .
While Cdr .
Kyle Raines , a spokesperson for the U.S. Navy ’ s 6th Fleet , said the infected sailors are receiving “ excellent ” care , the outbreak could be devastating for European military operations .
The de Gaulle is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Navy .
A new British carrier , the H.M.S .
Prince of Wales , does not have catapults to launch jets and is designed only for vertical or short takeoffs .
Military travel ban extension .
U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced on Tuesday that a travel ban applying to most U.S. military personnel would be extended , with details released later in the week .
The travel ban was ordered on March 12 and scheduled to last 60 days , until May 12 .
The measures put a halt on all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Afghanistan , Iraq , and Syria , though it was not expected to impact the United States ’ withdrawal from Afghanistan .
The Pentagon had reported 4,769 confirmed cases of coronavirus as of Tuesday .
U.S.-Iran tensions .
It wouldn ’ t be a regular weekday without new developments in not-so-friendly relations between Washington and Tehran .
This week , the U.S. Navy reported that 11 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps vessels were spotted harassing U.S. warships at close range and high speeds while they were conducting exercises in the north Persian Gulf @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Mark Green , U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s well-regarded U.S. Agency for International Development chief , has left the job—a long-planned departure that came in the middle of a global pandemic .
Who ’ s on tap to replace him ?
Three names are being floated , insiders tell Foreign Policy : Rep. Ted Yoho of Florida ; former Rep. Ed Royce ; and Jim Richardson , a State Department appointee who was Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s chief of staff during his stint in Congress .
Army appointment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his intent to nominate Michele A. Pearce to serve as the next General Counsel of the Department of the Army .
Pearce has held several senior roles in the federal government and currently serves as the Principal Deputy General Counsel of the U.S. Army .
Rising star on the left .
His supporters at home say he ’ s on a path to the White House .
His allies in Washington say he ’ s a top contender for a senior post in a next Democratic administration.Vox ’ s Alex Ward profiles Connecticut @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a leading progressive foreign policy voice on Capitol Hill .
The U.N. Security Council meets today to discuss the ongoing security situation in Yemen .
Fighting between the Houthi rebels and the government is reported to have increased , despite a recent cease-fire announced by Saudi Arabia .
U.S. diplomacy heavyweight joins Twitter .
Daniel Fried is the epitome of old-school U.S. diplomacy .
Until his retirement in 2017 , he was the longest-serving diplomat at the State Department .
Now at the Atlantic Council , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic .
He explained his reasoning to Foreign Policy : “ Long sequestration at home overcomes prior curmudgeonly vows .
And maybe tempted by new ways to fight the dark forces in the name of higher values.
” Keep an eye out for his insights , in 280 characters or less .
Exploring UFOs .
The U.S. Air Force takes its UFO videos very seriously .
A document recently acquired by Vice News revealed that the Air Force ’ s Office of Special Investigations opened an investigation into the use of allegedly classified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ DeLonge ’ s To the Stars Academy .
The investigation ended when it was determined that the videos were indeed unclassified , but it did spark a wave of curiosity into the Air Force ’ s apparent UFO interest .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Russia launches an anti-satellite missile , the coronavirus strikes another U.S. aircraft carrier, and U.S. tensions with Iran heat up in the Persian Gulf.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Russia launches an anti-satellite missile, the coronavirus strikes another U.S. aircraft carrier, and U.S. tensions with Iran heat up in the Persian Gulf.
A bit of self-promotion: The World Affairs Council of Dallas-Ft. Worth is hosting a webinar with FP’s Robbie Gramer on U.S. and international diplomacy in the age of the pandemic today at 5:00 p.m. EST. Tune in here.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Russian Missile Test Draws Criticism From the Pentagon
Russia tested a missile on Wednesday that is capable of destroying satellites in low-earth orbit, U.S. Space Command said in a statement, as the Pentagon faced military challenges from Russia, China, and Iran over the course of a busy day. The move could be a significant challenge to U.S. efforts to invest in communications satellites and sensor layers to track missiles in-flight—as the Space Force did during Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Iraq’s Al Asad air base in January, which left more than 100 U.S. troops with traumatic brain injuries.
“This test is further proof of Russia’s hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control proposals designed to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting their counter-space weapons programs,” said Gen. Jay Raymond, Space Command’s chief.
Growing challenge. The missile test is another example of Russian forces challenging the United States in outer space in recent months, as the Trump administration has sought to get the nascent U.S. Space Force off the ground. Time reported in February that two Russian satellites had begun shadowing a U.S. satellite in outer space, a move that Raymond said had the potential to “create a dangerous situation.”
Other rivals joining in. It won’t just be Russia keeping the nascent Space Force busy: The Secure World Foundation said in its annual report last month that China, Iran, and North Korea are also looking at counter-space technologies.
What We’re Watching
An update on the Roosevelt. U.S. Navy officials now believe the coronavirus outbreak on the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier spread from flight crews coming aboard the ship, the Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday. Pentagon officials previously suspected that a March port visit to Vietnam may have been the cause. More than 600 sailors on board the ship, which is now docked in Guam, have tested positive for COVID-19.
The news comes as the New York Times reports that the Navy is considering reinstating Capt. Brett Crozier—who called for the ship’s crew to rapidly evacuate–as skipper of the Roosevelt. Crozier’s firing prompted then-Acting U.S. Navy Secretary Thomas Modly to travel to Guam to criticize the captain and crew, an action that eventually forced his resignation.
And if that wasn’t enough. Nearly 700 sailors aboard the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle have tested positive for coronavirus, as have two U.S. sailors aboard the ship, with two more in quarantine. While Cdr. Kyle Raines, a spokesperson for the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet, said the infected sailors are receiving “excellent” care, the outbreak could be devastating for European military operations. The de Gaulle is the only nuclear-powered carrier outside of the U.S. Navy. A new British carrier, the H.M.S. Prince of Wales, does not have catapults to launch jets and is designed only for vertical or short takeoffs.
Military travel ban extension. U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced on Tuesday that a travel ban applying to most U.S. military personnel would be extended, with details released later in the week. The travel ban was ordered on March 12 and scheduled to last 60 days, until May 12. The measures put a halt on all military travel, including deployments to and from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, though it was not expected to impact the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Pentagon had reported 4,769 confirmed cases of coronavirus as of Tuesday.
U.S.-Iran tensions. It wouldn’t be a regular weekday without new developments in not-so-friendly relations between Washington and Tehran. This week, the U.S. Navy reported that 11 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps vessels were spotted harassing U.S. warships at close range and high speeds while they were conducting exercises in the north Persian Gulf near Iran.
Movers and Shakers
The next USAID chief. Mark Green, U.S. President Donald Trump’s well-regarded U.S. Agency for International Development chief, has left the job—a long-planned departure that came in the middle of a global pandemic. Who’s on tap to replace him? Three names are being floated, insiders tell Foreign Policy: Rep. Ted Yoho of Florida; former Rep. Ed Royce; and Jim Richardson, a State Department appointee who was Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s chief of staff during his stint in Congress.
Army appointment. On April 9, Trump announced his intent to nominate Michele A. Pearce to serve as the next General Counsel of the Department of the Army. Pearce has held several senior roles in the federal government and currently serves as the Principal Deputy General Counsel of the U.S. Army.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Rising star on the left. His supporters at home say he’s on a path to the White House. His allies in Washington say he’s a top contender for a senior post in a next Democratic administration.Vox’s Alex Ward profiles Connecticut Sen. Chris Murphy, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a leading progressive foreign policy voice on Capitol Hill.
The Week Ahead
The U.N. Security Council meets today to discuss the ongoing security situation in Yemen. Fighting between the Houthi rebels and the government is reported to have increased, despite a recent cease-fire announced by Saudi Arabia.
Odds and Ends
U.S. diplomacy heavyweight joins Twitter. Daniel Fried is the epitome of old-school U.S. diplomacy. Until his retirement in 2017, he was the longest-serving diplomat at the State Department. Now at the Atlantic Council, he has at last joined Twitter amid the pandemic. He explained his reasoning to Foreign Policy: “Long sequestration at home overcomes prior curmudgeonly vows. And maybe tempted by new ways to fight the dark forces in the name of higher values.” Keep an eye out for his insights, in 280 characters or less.
Exploring UFOs. The U.S. Air Force takes its UFO videos very seriously. A document recently acquired by Vice News revealed that the Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations opened an investigation into the use of allegedly classified UFO videos by former Blink-182 singer Tom DeLonge’s To the Stars Academy. The investigation ended when it was determined that the videos were indeed unclassified, but it did spark a wave of curiosity into the Air Force’s apparent UFO interest.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--Congress Seeks to Confront China With $6 Billion in New Defense Spending

Congress Seeks to Confront China With $ 6 Billion in New Defense Spending Amid rising U.S.-China tensions over the coronavirus pandemic , a bill introduced in Congress on Thursday would seek to create for the first time a dedicated defense fund to boost deterrence against China in the Pacific , allocating more than $ 6 billion for air and missile defense systems and new military construction in partner countries .
The proposal from the House Armed Services Committee ’ s top Republican , Rep. Mac Thornberry , reflects a growing bipartisan call for a more immediate and conventional solution to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s multiyear European Deterrence Initiative , another dedicated funding program .
Since Russia invaded Ukraine and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014 , the initiative has consumed $ 22 billion to increase military training , infrastructure , and rotational deployments on NATO ’ s eastern flank .
“ If it worked so well there , why don ’ t we do it in what we are calling our ‘ priority theater , ’ ” Thornberry , of Texas , said in an interview Wednesday .
“ We just haven ’ t , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where our mouth is.
” The concept of an Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative has support not only from Republican China hawks such as Sen. Josh Hawley and arch-conservatives such as the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee , Sen. Jim Inhofe , but also the Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee , Rep. Adam Smith .
While the coronavirus pandemic response is expected to put pressure on defense spending this year , the initiative is likely to become law in some form .
Though the Trump and Obama administrations have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , this fund would be the first of its kind for the region—and it comes amid deepening tensions between the rival superpowers over the spread of the novel coronavirus , beyond festering disputes on Taiwan , trade , cybertheft , and geopolitical influence .
Tensions over the contested South China Sea , where China has built several islands to house military equipment , saw a flash point this month when the U.S. State Department condemned China for allegedly ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat near the islands .
( Beijing says the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Absent such a dedicated defense fund , the Trump administration ’ s strategy has emphasized Russia and China but taken a more diffuse approach to spending .
The Pentagon has continued Middle East deployments amid Iran tensions and made marquee investments to counter Beijing in such technologies as hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence , which are still more than a decade away .
In recent weeks , tensions that were already high over U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s trade war with China have escalated over the pandemic .
Officials from the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the White House accusing Beijing of withholding information about how badly China was struck by the virus .
Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have at times controversially called it the “ China virus ” or “ Wuhan virus , ” while Chinese officials have denied the virus originated in China even as most evidence indicates that it did , possibly even emerging from a poorly regulated research lab in Wuhan .
Thornberry ’ s bill would overlap with recommendations from a landmark report to Congress from Indo-Pacific Command , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spending between 2021 and 2026 .
After Congress authorized a special Indo-Pacific account two years ago and the Pentagon didn ’ t fund it , frustrated lawmakers used the annual defense policy law to require the military ’ s regional war-fighting command , Indopacom , report on what military assets were missing in the struggle to deter China in the Pacific .
Pointedly , the report circumvents the Pentagon ’ s top leaders , though observers expect Defense Secretary Mark Esper to respond eventually with his own set of recommendations to Capitol Hill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new Indopacom report as a jumping-off point , Thornberry ’ s bill would authorize big-ticket items such as a land-based integrated air and missile defense system on Guam to defend it as a power-projection hub , restart a postponed homeland defense radar in Hawaii , and fund new long-range precision missiles throughout the region .
( All of the above would still have to be reconciled within the House and Senate , and included in spending legislation , to become reality . )
Less flashy , Indopacom is seeking billions of dollars for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ preposition munitions , fuel , and maintenance equipment in Southeast Asia , Oceania , and Pacific island countries such as Palau and the Northern Marianas .
During a hypothetical fight with China , having dispersed assets—far from big U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea—is meant to both protect U.S. forces and compel Chinese forces to defend themselves in multiple places .
“ It is not strategically prudent , nor operationally viable to physically concentrate on large , close-in bases that are highly vulnerable to a potential adversary ’ s strike capability , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Philip Davidson , wrote in his report .
“ Distributed operations increase mobility and agility to ensure our ability to ‘ Fight and Win.
’ ” Under the multiyear Indopacom proposal , $ 5.8 billion would be for offensive missiles and multiple radars , including a space-based radar ; another $ 5.8 billion would be used to distribute forces around the region ; and $ 5.1 billion would be for “ logistics and security enablers ” —a broad array that includes counterpropaganda operations , fuel storage , battle-damage repair facilities , as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Malaysia , the Philippines , Thailand , and Vietnam .
“ Every chairman of the Joint Chiefs says our greatest advantage is our partnerships , and we do nurture them , ” Thornberry said .
“ We have exercises and so forth , but taking the template that has worked so well in Europe , putting some money toward enhancing [ Pacific ] infrastructure , those partnerships , and those exercises , I think that ’ s a step up , and we need to do that.
” Esper has warned that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ influence , and he ’ s called China his “ No .
1 priority , ” traveling to Asia last August to shore up U.S. alliances .
But critics charge the Defense Department ’ s budget process is better organized to address the procurement priorities of the armed services than regional war-fighting priorities—except when it comes to Europe and the European Deterrence Initiative .
“ If you tried to ask the department right now what ’ s going on in the Indo-Pacific in the FY21 budget , let alone what ’ s been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it has no way of doing it , ” said one congressional staffer .
“ We kind of know ‘ no , we ’ re not.
’ The force posture in the region hasn ’ t changed much.
” A Democratic spokesperson for the House Armed Services Committee said Wednesday that the chairman , Smith , has been working on the issue since last fall and plans to include some variation of the fund in his draft of the massive annual defense policy bill , due out next month .
Smith faced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy bill and has been reaching across the aisle for months to avoid a repeat .
The Indo-Pacific Reassurance Initiative will “ responsibly fund activities that are fully supported by DoD , avoid budgetary gimmicks , and require DoD to provide additional information to ensure DoD is strategically aligning resources toward the challenges and objectives in the Indo-Pacific , ” the spokesperson said .
“ Chairman Smith is proud of our Committee ’ s long-standing tradition of meaningful bipartisanship , and the IPRI is an example of this tradition .
”

Amid rising U.S.-China tensions over the coronavirus pandemic, a bill introduced in Congress on Thursday would seek to create for the first time a dedicated defense fund to boost deterrence against China in the Pacific, allocating more than $6 billion for air and missile defense systems and new military construction in partner countries.
Amid rising U.S.-China tensions over the coronavirus pandemic, a bill introduced in Congress on Thursday would seek to create for the first time a dedicated defense fund to boost deterrence against China in the Pacific, allocating more than $6 billion for air and missile defense systems and new military construction in partner countries.
The proposal from the House Armed Services Committee’s top Republican, Rep. Mac Thornberry, reflects a growing bipartisan call for a more immediate and conventional solution to the threat from China by replicating Washington’s multiyear European Deterrence Initiative, another dedicated funding program. Since Russia invaded Ukraine and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, the initiative has consumed $22 billion to increase military training, infrastructure, and rotational deployments on NATO’s eastern flank.
“If it worked so well there, why don’t we do it in what we are calling our ‘priority theater,’” Thornberry, of Texas, said in an interview Wednesday. “We just haven’t, in my view, fully put our money where our mouth is.”
The concept of an Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative has support not only from Republican China hawks such as Sen. Josh Hawley and arch-conservatives such as the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Jim Inhofe, but also the Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Adam Smith. While the coronavirus pandemic response is expected to put pressure on defense spending this year, the initiative is likely to become law in some form.
Though the Trump and Obama administrations have emphasized a military focus on the Pacific, this fund would be the first of its kind for the region—and it comes amid deepening tensions between the rival superpowers over the spread of the novel coronavirus, beyond festering disputes on Taiwan, trade, cybertheft, and geopolitical influence. Tensions over the contested South China Sea, where China has built several islands to house military equipment, saw a flash point this month when the U.S. State Department condemned China for allegedly ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat near the islands. (Beijing says the fishing boat did the ramming.)
Absent such a dedicated defense fund, the Trump administration’s strategy has emphasized Russia and China but taken a more diffuse approach to spending. The Pentagon has continued Middle East deployments amid Iran tensions and made marquee investments to counter Beijing in such technologies as hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence, which are still more than a decade away.
In recent weeks, tensions that were already high over U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war with China have escalated over the pandemic. Officials from the two countries have traded jabs over COVID-19, with the White House accusing Beijing of withholding information about how badly China was struck by the virus. Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have at times controversially called it the “China virus” or “Wuhan virus,” while Chinese officials have denied the virus originated in China even as most evidence indicates that it did, possibly even emerging from a poorly regulated research lab in Wuhan.
Thornberry’s bill would overlap with recommendations from a landmark report to Congress from Indo-Pacific Command, which called for $20.1 billion in added spending between 2021 and 2026. After Congress authorized a special Indo-Pacific account two years ago and the Pentagon didn’t fund it, frustrated lawmakers used the annual defense policy law to require the military’s regional war-fighting command, Indopacom, report on what military assets were missing in the struggle to deter China in the Pacific.
Pointedly, the report circumvents the Pentagon’s top leaders, though observers expect Defense Secretary Mark Esper to respond eventually with his own set of recommendations to Capitol Hill for 2022 and beyond.
Using the new Indopacom report as a jumping-off point, Thornberry’s bill would authorize big-ticket items such as a land-based integrated air and missile defense system on Guam to defend it as a power-projection hub, restart a postponed homeland defense radar in Hawaii, and fund new long-range precision missiles throughout the region. (All of the above would still have to be reconciled within the House and Senate, and included in spending legislation, to become reality.)
Less flashy, Indopacom is seeking billions of dollars for new facilities for joint training and to preposition munitions, fuel, and maintenance equipment in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Pacific island countries such as Palau and the Northern Marianas. During a hypothetical fight with China, having dispersed assets—far from big U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea—is meant to both protect U.S. forces and compel Chinese forces to defend themselves in multiple places.
“It is not strategically prudent, nor operationally viable to physically concentrate on large, close-in bases that are highly vulnerable to a potential adversary’s strike capability,” Indopacom’s commander, Adm. Philip Davidson, wrote in his report. “Distributed operations increase mobility and agility to ensure our ability to ‘Fight and Win.’”
Under the multiyear Indopacom proposal, $5.8 billion would be for offensive missiles and multiple radars, including a space-based radar; another $5.8 billion would be used to distribute forces around the region; and $5.1 billion would be for “logistics and security enablers”—a broad array that includes counterpropaganda operations, fuel storage, battle-damage repair facilities, as well as military aid for forces in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
“Every chairman of the Joint Chiefs says our greatest advantage is our partnerships, and we do nurture them,” Thornberry said. “We have exercises and so forth, but taking the template that has worked so well in Europe, putting some money toward enhancing [Pacific] infrastructure, those partnerships, and those exercises, I think that’s a step up, and we need to do that.”
Esper has warned that Beijing’s expanding military threatens U.S. influence, and he’s called China his “No. 1 priority,” traveling to Asia last August to shore up U.S. alliances. But critics charge the Defense Department’s budget process is better organized to address the procurement priorities of the armed services than regional war-fighting priorities—except when it comes to Europe and the European Deterrence Initiative.
“If you tried to ask the department right now what’s going on in the Indo-Pacific in the FY21 budget, let alone what’s been happening in the region over many budgets, it has no way of doing it,” said one congressional staffer. “We kind of know ‘no, we’re not.’ The force posture in the region hasn’t changed much.”
A Democratic spokesperson for the House Armed Services Committee said Wednesday that the chairman, Smith, has been working on the issue since last fall and plans to include some variation of the fund in his draft of the massive annual defense policy bill, due out next month. Smith faced a Republican revolt against the last defense policy bill and has been reaching across the aisle for months to avoid a repeat.
The Indo-Pacific Reassurance Initiative will “responsibly fund activities that are fully supported by DoD, avoid budgetary gimmicks, and require DoD to provide additional information to ensure DoD is strategically aligning resources toward the challenges and objectives in the Indo-Pacific,” the spokesperson said. “Chairman Smith is proud of our Committee’s long-standing tradition of meaningful bipartisanship, and the IPRI is an example of this tradition.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--Trump Is Stirring Chaos in Kosovo at the Worst Possible Time

Trump Is Stirring Chaos in Kosovo at the Worst Possible Time The Trump administration has sown political turmoil in Kosovo at exactly the moment when stable governance is needed to face the COVID-19 threat .
The challenge of responding to the outbreak in Kosovo has been compounded by the fallout of a U.S.-backed no-confidence vote that toppled Prime Minister Albin Kurti ’ s government at the end of March , after less than two months in power .
The ongoing political battle pits Kurti , who remains the caretaker prime minister and favors new elections , against President Hashim Thaci @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who want to form a government of national unity that would sideline Kurti and his Vetevendosje ( “ self-determination ” ) party , which campaigned on an anti-corruption platform and has balked at Washington ’ s outsized influence in Kosovo ’ s affairs .
Thaci long led the Democratic Party of Kosovo , which emerged from the Kosovo Liberation Army ( KLA ) —in which Thaci was a former top guerrilla—after the 1998-1999 war .
Thus , a constitutional crisis has emerged over who has the right to govern the country .
Angry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pristina , have taken to banging pots and pans to protest the machinations that brought down the Kurti government during the coronavirus crisis .
The Trump administration ’ s political intervention in Kosovo has been driven by what is now a familiar approach to a foreign policy characterized by the shunning of allies , decision-making led by operatives close to the White House who sideline career diplomats , blatantly political motives , and a disregard for human rights .
The United States has framed Kurti ’ s removal as a step toward an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
To Washington ’ s chagrin , Kurti insisted on keeping 100 percent tariffs on Serbian trade in place , which both the Trump administration and Thaci viewed as an impediment to advancing negotiations with Belgrade .
In addition , Kurti had opposed the highly controversial idea of land swaps between Kosovo and Serbia to win breakthroughs at the negotiating table .
The Trump administration has expressed openness to the land swaps , as have Thaci and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic .
The merits of pushing for a settlement at this juncture and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swap aside , the U.S. role in backing Thaci ’ s bid to oust Kurti has been criticized not only for jeopardizing Kosovo ’ s sovereignty but for disrupting governance during the pandemic .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s policy has also been faulted for undermining Washington ’ s relationship with key European allies that had advocated for the need for stable leadership and warned against such heavy-handed interference during the pandemic .
At home , the Trump administration has been sharply criticized by Eliot Engel , the chairman of the House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newly elected democratic leader just when the government needs to be focused on developing an effective policy to address the ongoing health emergency .
The U.S. backing for the no-confidence vote to remove Kurti and elevate Thaci is troubling for yet another reason .
It raises the possibility that the Trump administration may seek to come to Thaci ’ s defense by interfering with the work of a special tribunal investigating KLA crimes committed in the aftermath of the war two decades ago .
In 2011 , Thaci and a number of other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council of Europe report detailing KLA involvement in the postwar abduction of Serb prisoners and their torture in secret detention camps in Albania .
A small number of these prisoners , according to the report , were allegedly killed for their vital organs .
These explosive accusations led Brussels , with strong backing from Washington , to establish the European Union-run Kosovo Specialist Chambers .
Thaci and other high-level former KLA commanders could face indictment at the new tribunal , which has long enjoyed American backing .
In working to engineer Kurti ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thaci , the United States has signaled its renewed backing of Kosovo ’ s old-guard political elite , many of whom are tainted by alleged participation in human rights abuses and organized crime .
During NATO ’ s 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 , Washington worked closely with Thaci , who then ran the KLA ’ s political arm .
The United States and its Western allies—along with the United Nations administration that governed Kosovo for the first postwar decade—continued to support Thaci and other former KLA commanders-turned-politicians despite their suspected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Albanian rivals and ethnic Serbs .
The United States has used its substantial influence in Kosovo ever since it led the NATO intervention against Serbia ’ s ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians , subsequently championing Kosovo ’ s independence .
Since that time , the United States worked closely with its EU partners to support the young country .
In the current situation , the fact that key EU member states , including France and Germany , opposed the toppling of Kurti ’ s government over concern about destabilizing Kosovo as the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration to go against its European partners in order to sideline a democratically elected government during an unprecedented health crisis further damages an already strained trans-Atlantic partnership .
The Trump administration ’ s determination to see Kurti removed may lead to declining Kosovar support for the United States .
Ordinary Kosovars , who have until now been reliably pro-American owing to the NATO military intervention and avid U.S. backing for their independence , may reconsider their support for the country in light of the strong-arm diplomacy that featured Washington ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ funding of a Millennium Challenge Corporation grant .
In an unprecedented move , Trump-allied members of Congress even threatened to pull U.S. peacekeepers out of the country .
Many Kosovars have also grown weary of continued U.S. support for the corrupt political clique of former fighters led by Thaci , who have dominated Kosovo ’ s politics since the war but have delivered little in the way of effective governance .
The Trump administration risks losing the deep reservoir of goodwill the United States has enjoyed in Kosovo for over two decades .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ seen from this administration ’ s foreign policy , its recent political meddling in Kosovo has been driven by a Trump confidant carrying out an ad hoc foreign policy that marginalizes other government stakeholders and experts and does so largely outside the formal policy process .
In the latest instance , that individual is Richard Grenell , whose experience in the region is minimal but who , like many in the Trump administration , is keen to please a capricious and self-obsessed boss .
Before recently becoming the acting director of national intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s ambassador to Germany and special envoy to the Balkans .
In that capacity , he worked closely with Thaci and Vucic to push a peace deal forward , leveraging it with the promise of renewed transportation links between Belgrade and Pristina .
In early March , Grenell hosted Thaci and Vucic at the White House , with top officials in attendance .
U.S. foreign-policy insiders and prominent observers say Grenell ’ s objective is to carry out another “ domestic political errand ” ( as was done in the Ukraine scandal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sidelining the democratically elected Kurti in order to hasten the long-shot possibility of Thaci and Vucic shaking hands in the White House Rose Garden and to deliver a major foreign-policy win for Trump ahead of the November presidential election .
In normal times , this would stand out as merely a nakedly political act .
But the effort to reach for a quixotic peace deal at any cost during a pandemic imperils the public and political health of a country that Washington worked so hard to create .

Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski and Victor Peskin

The Trump administration has sown political turmoil in Kosovo at exactly the moment when stable governance is needed to face the COVID-19 threat. The challenge of responding to the outbreak in Kosovo has been compounded by the fallout of a U.S.-backed no-confidence vote that toppled Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s government at the end of March, after less than two months in power.
The Trump administration has sown political turmoil in Kosovo at exactly the moment when stable governance is needed to face the COVID-19 threat. The challenge of responding to the outbreak in Kosovo has been compounded by the fallout of a U.S.-backed no-confidence vote that toppled Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s government at the end of March, after less than two months in power.
The ongoing political battle pits Kurti, who remains the caretaker prime minister and favors new elections, against President Hashim Thaci and some of his parliamentary allies, who want to form a government of national unity that would sideline Kurti and his Vetevendosje (“self-determination”) party, which campaigned on an anti-corruption platform and has balked at Washington’s outsized influence in Kosovo’s affairs. Thaci long led the Democratic Party of Kosovo, which emerged from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—in which Thaci was a former top guerrilla—after the 1998-1999 war. Thus, a constitutional crisis has emerged over who has the right to govern the country. Angry residents on lockdown in the capital, Pristina, have taken to banging pots and pans to protest the machinations that brought down the Kurti government during the coronavirus crisis.
The Trump administration’s political intervention in Kosovo has been driven by what is now a familiar approach to a foreign policy characterized by the shunning of allies, decision-making led by operatives close to the White House who sideline career diplomats, blatantly political motives, and a disregard for human rights.
The United States has framed Kurti’s removal as a step toward an elusive final settlement between Kosovo and Serbia. To Washington’s chagrin, Kurti insisted on keeping 100 percent tariffs on Serbian trade in place, which both the Trump administration and Thaci viewed as an impediment to advancing negotiations with Belgrade. In addition, Kurti had opposed the highly controversial idea of land swaps between Kosovo and Serbia to win breakthroughs at the negotiating table. The Trump administration has expressed openness to the land swaps, as have Thaci and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic.
The merits of pushing for a settlement at this juncture and the broader regional implications of a land swap aside, the U.S. role in backing Thaci’s bid to oust Kurti has been criticized not only for jeopardizing Kosovo’s sovereignty but for disrupting governance during the pandemic. U.S. President Donald Trump’s policy has also been faulted for undermining Washington’s relationship with key European allies that had advocated for the need for stable leadership and warned against such heavy-handed interference during the pandemic. At home, the Trump administration has been sharply criticized by Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, for undermining a newly elected democratic leader just when the government needs to be focused on developing an effective policy to address the ongoing health emergency.
The U.S. backing for the no-confidence vote to remove Kurti and elevate Thaci is troubling for yet another reason. It raises the possibility that the Trump administration may seek to come to Thaci’s defense by interfering with the work of a special tribunal investigating KLA crimes committed in the aftermath of the war two decades ago.
In 2011, Thaci and a number of other high-level former rebels were named in a Council of Europe report detailing KLA involvement in the postwar abduction of Serb prisoners and their torture in secret detention camps in Albania. A small number of these prisoners, according to the report, were allegedly killed for their vital organs. These explosive accusations led Brussels, with strong backing from Washington, to establish the European Union-run Kosovo Specialist Chambers. Thaci and other high-level former KLA commanders could face indictment at the new tribunal, which has long enjoyed American backing.
In working to engineer Kurti’s removal and throwing its support behind Thaci, the United States has signaled its renewed backing of Kosovo’s old-guard political elite, many of whom are tainted by alleged participation in human rights abuses and organized crime. During NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999, Washington worked closely with Thaci, who then ran the KLA’s political arm. The United States and its Western allies—along with the United Nations administration that governed Kosovo for the first postwar decade—continued to support Thaci and other former KLA commanders-turned-politicians despite their suspected role in postwar crimes against their Kosovar Albanian rivals and ethnic Serbs.
The United States has used its substantial influence in Kosovo ever since it led the NATO intervention against Serbia’s ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, subsequently championing Kosovo’s independence. Since that time, the United States worked closely with its EU partners to support the young country. In the current situation, the fact that key EU member states, including France and Germany, opposed the toppling of Kurti’s government over concern about destabilizing Kosovo as the coronavirus spreads is troubling. The willingness of the Trump administration to go against its European partners in order to sideline a democratically elected government during an unprecedented health crisis further damages an already strained trans-Atlantic partnership.
The Trump administration’s determination to see Kurti removed may lead to declining Kosovar support for the United States. Ordinary Kosovars, who have until now been reliably pro-American owing to the NATO military intervention and avid U.S. backing for their independence, may reconsider their support for the country in light of the strong-arm diplomacy that featured Washington’s threat to end its $49 million funding of a Millennium Challenge Corporation grant. In an unprecedented move, Trump-allied members of Congress even threatened to pull U.S. peacekeepers out of the country.
Many Kosovars have also grown weary of continued U.S. support for the corrupt political clique of former fighters led by Thaci, who have dominated Kosovo’s politics since the war but have delivered little in the way of effective governance. The Trump administration risks losing the deep reservoir of goodwill the United States has enjoyed in Kosovo for over two decades.
Like much of what we’ve seen from this administration’s foreign policy, its recent political meddling in Kosovo has been driven by a Trump confidant carrying out an ad hoc foreign policy that marginalizes other government stakeholders and experts and does so largely outside the formal policy process. In the latest instance, that individual is Richard Grenell, whose experience in the region is minimal but who, like many in the Trump administration, is keen to please a capricious and self-obsessed boss. Before recently becoming the acting director of national intelligence, Grenell had been serving as Trump’s ambassador to Germany and special envoy to the Balkans. In that capacity, he worked closely with Thaci and Vucic to push a peace deal forward, leveraging it with the promise of renewed transportation links between Belgrade and Pristina. In early March, Grenell hosted Thaci and Vucic at the White House, with top officials in attendance.
U.S. foreign-policy insiders and prominent observers say Grenell’s objective is to carry out another “domestic political errand” (as was done in the Ukraine scandal for which Trump was impeached): sidelining the democratically elected Kurti in order to hasten the long-shot possibility of Thaci and Vucic shaking hands in the White House Rose Garden and to deliver a major foreign-policy win for Trump ahead of the November presidential election. In normal times, this would stand out as merely a nakedly political act. But the effort to reach for a quixotic peace deal at any cost during a pandemic imperils the public and political health of a country that Washington worked so hard to create.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--Duterte’s Response to the Coronavirus: ‘Shoot Them Dead’

MANILA , Philippines—Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte is bringing his uniquely brutal brand of leadership to combating the coronavirus .
On March 24 , police in San Isidro forced alleged curfew violators to sit under the sun , and the local government ’ s Facebook page posted a photo of them , saying , “ Everyone violating the curfew will be placed here.
” ( Such treatment is legally classified as torture under the Anti-Torture Act of 2009 . )
A few days earlier , officials in Santa Cruz , Laguna province , locked five youths inside a dog cage for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of police beatings and shootings around the country .
“ Anyone out at the wrong time will be shot , you sons of bitches , ” said a police officer on a radio report on March 26 .
And on April 1 , Duterte delivered an impromptu national address with a short and clear message : “ My orders to the police and military … if there is trouble or the situation arises where your life is on the line , shoot them dead , ” he announced .
“ Understand ?
Dead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the grave .
… Don ’ t test the government.
” In his warning , Duterte called out the human rights group Kadamay , which he accused of instigating a protest against the government ’ s lockdown .
The speech followed weeks of criticism of the government ’ s handling of the coronavirus pandemic .
Two days later , a 63-year-old farmer was shot dead in Mindanao after reportedly refusing to wear a face mask .
The police reported that the man had been drunk and attacked the health workers and the police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ met with public outcry , with some Filipino citizens calling for Duterte to be ousted .
Even his traditional base of supporters criticized the move .
“ When you have a government that prioritizes the mobilization of military and police force to respond to a health crisis , you can ’ t help but see the lack of sight in their priorities , ” said Matthew Jzac Kintanar , a student active in online protests against the Duterte government from his home in Mindanao in the southern Philippines .
“ The government should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , protection of front-liners , and economic support for all individuals , but instead we get threats.
” Duterte ’ s shoot-to-kill order is just one escalation in his increasing assertion of authority that is all too reminiscent of the president ’ s crackdown on illegal narcotics , which has seen more than 20,000 suspected drug offenders killed in three years , according to human rights organizations .
The government has put the number of dead at about 6,000 .
The United Nations has called for an investigation into that crackdown .
Carlos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Watch Philippines , said that beyond mistreatment at the hands of the authorities , the arrests have been counterproductive in reducing the spread of the coronavirus .
“ The most worrisome aspect of tens of thousands of arrests is that they are thrown into crowded jails and holding areas , which completely eliminates the possibility of social distancing , ” he said .
“ The most worrisome aspect of tens of thousands of arrests is that they are thrown into crowded jails and holding areas , which completely eliminates the possibility of social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Philippines has evoked new concerns about rising authoritarianism during the coronavirus pandemic .
On April 1 , in a statement , a group of 13 European Union member states said they are “ deeply concerned ” about the use of emergency measures to tackle the coronavirus outbreak , fearing that some powers could threaten “ democracy and fundamental rights.
” This came after Hungary ’ s parliament granted Prime Minister Viktor Orban sweeping new powers , and other states are considering similar measures .
But Duterte has been particularly blunt and brutal in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Community Quarantine , which placed Manila and the entire island of Luzon on lockdown on March 16 , suspending domestic and international travel .
Businesses were shuttered , with the exception of supermarkets and pharmacies , and police , military , and local government officials enforced a strict 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. curfew .
On March 21 , the president ’ s office asked Congress to grant special powers to Duterte allowing him to take over privately owned utilities and businesses to address the effects of COVID-19 .
After having his request @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Heal as One Act on March 25 , granting him 30 powers including the ability to take over private medical facilities and public transportation , and giving him greater control of the executive branch , including government-owned and controlled corporations .
Lawyers have criticized the measure , insisting existing laws already offer the president such powers and emphasizing that it did not address the root cause of the health crisis due to Duterte ’ s lack of a comprehensive plan against the outbreak .
Meanwhile , the law punishes those violating restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or fines up to 1 million Philippine pesos , about $ 20,000 .
These punishments extend to individuals or groups found to be creating or spreading false information regarding the coronavirus crisis .
The National Union of Journalists , a local press group , said that the provision makes the government the “ arbiter of what is true or false ” and will “ end up criminalizing free speech.
” Politicians in the Philippines are equally defiant .
Filipino Sen. Leila de Lima , who has been in prison since 2017 for allegedly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no stranger to arbitrary authoritarianism .
The National Union of Journalists , a local press group , said that the provision makes the government the “ arbiter of what is true or false ” and will “ end up criminalizing free speech.
” “ I personally experienced being the victim of the weaponization of the law to silence democratic dissent , a useful tool in the Tyrant ’ s Toolbox , ” she said in a prison interview with Foreign Policy .
De Lima said that there have been more arrests of curfew @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) than mass testings ( 3,000 ) .
“ People are dying because governments are more concerned about retaining control and power , rather than protecting and serving and we are now one hungry mob away from a dictatorship , ” she said .
Nor does Duterte ’ s approach appear to be working well .
The Department of Health has recorded 5,660 confirmed cases of the novel coronavirus in the Philippines as of April 16 , a leap from just three reported cases on March 2 .
The Philippines has the highest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia as of April 15 , according to the World Health Organization , followed by Indonesia and Malaysia .
In the region , the Philippines has the second-highest number of deaths , 362 , and the second-lowest recovery rate , just 435 .
The Philippines also has among the highest percentage of total COVID-19 fatalities among health care professionals in the world .
The country has conducted the fewer tests than most other nations , 38,103 for a population of 109 million , according to data compiled by Johns Hopkins University , Another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forced to sign bail papers with sweat , while being threatened with paddling .
As a result of such brutality , the tide of public sentiment is beginning to turn .
Perhaps the most notorious incident to date concerns a protest by residents in Sitio San Roque , Quezon City , who were asking for food aid on April 1 .
Twenty-one people were arrested with bail set at 15,000 pesos ( almost $ 300 ) each .
With 80 percent of San Roque earning minimum wage around 500 pesos a day and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lockdown , such a fee is impossible for many .
Human rights organizations and labor groups have expressed outrage and indignation at the violent arrests .
The Asia Pacific Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines called for the release of the 21 protesters , who , as of April 6 were still in police custody .
“ The Philippine authorities should urgently investigate reports of barangay ( village ) officials committing abuses , ” said Amnesty International Philippines on April 8 .
And the labor group Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino said , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a new low for this administration.
” As a result of such brutality , the tide of public sentiment is beginning to turn .
Over the past two weeks , the hashtags # StopTheAttacks , # BasicSocialServicesforthePoor and # MassTestingNowPH circulated on social media .
A growing sentiment among the Philippine public is that the more the Duterte administration focuses on heavy-handed , militaristic responses , the less attention is directed toward health solutions .
People are waiting for the government to deliver on its promises of assistance for health workers and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ families of which more than 1.5 million have lost all sources of income .
The International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines said the crisis will increasingly take a heavy toll on the poor .
“ We support the efforts of empowered people ’ s movement in the Philippines ’ to make the Duterte government accountable for : every poor person ’ s life lost due to denial of health care services and protection from Covid-19 ; every front-liners who died and are at risk due to the massive shortage of adequate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrote in a statement .
Eliza Romero is the coordinator at the Malaya Movement , a U.S.-based alliance to advance democracy and human rights in the Philippines .
She said that her organization supports the increasing protests demanding the release of the San Roque residents and condemning the government ’ s response to the coronavirus .
“ The shoot-to-kill order will just encourage more extrajudicial killings and vigilantism , ” Romero said .
“ It will give private citizens and barangay captains impunity to commit more human rights violations with the protection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The shoot to kill order will just encourage more extrajudicial killings and vigilantism.
” The forum Kalusugan , Hindi Diktadura !
( Health , Not Dictatorship ! )
organized an online rally with speakers from advocacy organizations on April 1 .
They pushed a social media rally spreading the hashtags # DUTERTERESIGN and # OUSTDUTERTENOW , and the message “ Solusyong medical , hindi militar ” ( Medical solutions , not military ) , which began trending on Twitter .
Amid the government ’ s militarist approach , Filipinos have taken the situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operations , information campaigns , and donation drives are providing hundreds of community-driven solutions to a faltering government response .
They call it the Citizens ’ Urgent Response to End Covid-19 ( CURE COVID ) , an initiative made up of various organizations and sectors such as the National Union of Students of the Philippines that were active in calling for the release of the 21 San Roque residents .
“ Duterte ’ s order is made more dangerous by the culture of impunity created by his administration .
State forces will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know that they have the support of the president , ” said Jandeil Roperos , the deputy secretary-general of the student group .
Filipinos are wary of dictator-like actions , which hark back to the notorious Marcos years before the 1986 People Power Revolution .
“ The fact that the Philippines was already under a state of de facto martial law long before the enhanced community quarantine is testament to Duterte ’ s Marcosian tactics , ” Roperos said .
“ His war on drugs , the extrajudicial killings , the political persecutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are a few examples of these tactics and proof that democracy is endangered .
The whole country held its breath when he asked for more powers precisely because of him being hell-bent on recreating Marcos ’ s dictatorship .
“ Filipinos have been pushing back against the system that oppresses them for a long time .
The recent dissent against Duterte ’ s incompetence has contributed to the growing social unrest .
Duterte ’ s fall from power , if he fails to change trajectories , is inevitable.
” “ This pandemic gives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ endanger democracy , ” Conde , the Human Rights Watch researcher , added .
“ The martial-law like atmosphere , the clampdown on criticism , coupled with past actions against the media and critics , all make a democratic slide possible.
” More than three decades ago , it was the much-acclaimed People Power that ultimately toppled the Marcos dictatorship in February 1986 as hundreds of thousands of Filipinos rose up to challenge the president .
And if Duterte is not careful , history may repeat itself , said the student protester Kintanar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the absolute worst of this government .
People are tired , angry , and fed up at how we are being treated .
Filipinos have shown the world people ’ s power .
We have ousted two presidents before .
I ’ m sure that if the need arises , we will not hesitate to do it again .
”

MANILA, Philippines—Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte is bringing his uniquely brutal brand of leadership to combating the coronavirus.
On March 24, police in San Isidro forced alleged curfew violators to sit under the sun, and the local government’s Facebook page posted a photo of them, saying, “Everyone violating the curfew will be placed here.” (Such treatment is legally classified as torture under the Anti-Torture Act of 2009.) A few days earlier, officials in Santa Cruz, Laguna province, locked five youths inside a dog cage for the same violation. Further reports emerged of police beatings and shootings around the country. “Anyone out at the wrong time will be shot, you sons of bitches,” said a police officer on a radio report on March 26.
And on April 1, Duterte delivered an impromptu national address with a short and clear message: “My orders to the police and military … if there is trouble or the situation arises where your life is on the line, shoot them dead,” he announced. “Understand? Dead. I’ll send you to the grave. … Don’t test the government.” In his warning, Duterte called out the human rights group Kadamay, which he accused of instigating a protest against the government’s lockdown.
The speech followed weeks of criticism of the government’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic. Two days later, a 63-year-old farmer was shot dead in Mindanao after reportedly refusing to wear a face mask. The police reported that the man had been drunk and attacked the health workers and the police with a scythe.
The incident was met with public outcry, with some Filipino citizens calling for Duterte to be ousted. Even his traditional base of supporters criticized the move. “When you have a government that prioritizes the mobilization of military and police force to respond to a health crisis, you can’t help but see the lack of sight in their priorities,” said Matthew Jzac Kintanar, a student active in online protests against the Duterte government from his home in Mindanao in the southern Philippines. “The government should prioritize mass testing, aggressive contact tracing, protection of front-liners, and economic support for all individuals, but instead we get threats.”
A police officer wearing a protective suit removes a resident suspected of having COVID-19 from his home in a slum area to be taken to an isolation facility in Manila on April 15.
Duterte’s shoot-to-kill order is just one escalation in his increasing assertion of authority that is all too reminiscent of the president’s crackdown on illegal narcotics, which has seen more than 20,000 suspected drug offenders killed in three years, according to human rights organizations. The government has put the number of dead at about 6,000. The United Nations has called for an investigation into that crackdown.
Carlos Conde, a researcher at Human Rights Watch Philippines, said that beyond mistreatment at the hands of the authorities, the arrests have been counterproductive in reducing the spread of the coronavirus. “The most worrisome aspect of tens of thousands of arrests is that they are thrown into crowded jails and holding areas, which completely eliminates the possibility of social distancing,” he said.
“The most worrisome aspect of tens of thousands of arrests is that they are thrown into crowded jails and holding areas, which completely eliminates the possibility of social distancing.”
What is happening in the Philippines has evoked new concerns about rising authoritarianism during the coronavirus pandemic. On April 1, in a statement, a group of 13 European Union member states said they are “deeply concerned” about the use of emergency measures to tackle the coronavirus outbreak, fearing that some powers could threaten “democracy and fundamental rights.” This came after Hungary’s parliament granted Prime Minister Viktor Orban sweeping new powers, and other states are considering similar measures.
But Duterte has been particularly blunt and brutal in his response. First came the Enhanced Community Quarantine, which placed Manila and the entire island of Luzon on lockdown on March 16, suspending domestic and international travel. Businesses were shuttered, with the exception of supermarkets and pharmacies, and police, military, and local government officials enforced a strict 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. curfew.
On March 21, the president’s office asked Congress to grant special powers to Duterte allowing him to take over privately owned utilities and businesses to address the effects of COVID-19.
After having his request refused, Duterte signed the three-month-long Bayanihan to Heal as One Act on March 25, granting him 30 powers including the ability to take over private medical facilities and public transportation, and giving him greater control of the executive branch, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
Lawyers have criticized the measure, insisting existing laws already offer the president such powers and emphasizing that it did not address the root cause of the health crisis due to Duterte’s lack of a comprehensive plan against the outbreak.
Filipino policemen wearing face masks and gloves staff a checkpoint as authorities begin implementing lockdown measures in Las Pinas, Philippines, on March 16.
Meanwhile, the law punishes those violating restrictions with up to two months’ imprisonment or fines up to 1 million Philippine pesos, about $20,000. These punishments extend to individuals or groups found to be creating or spreading false information regarding the coronavirus crisis. The National Union of Journalists, a local press group, said that the provision makes the government the “arbiter of what is true or false” and will “end up criminalizing free speech.”
Politicians in the Philippines are equally defiant. Filipino Sen. Leila de Lima, who has been in prison since 2017 for allegedly violating the drug trafficking law, is no stranger to arbitrary authoritarianism.
The National Union of Journalists, a local press group, said that the provision makes the government the “arbiter of what is true or false” and will “end up criminalizing free speech.”
“I personally experienced being the victim of the weaponization of the law to silence democratic dissent, a useful tool in the Tyrant’s Toolbox,” she said in a prison interview with Foreign Policy. De Lima said that there have been more arrests of curfew and quarantine violators (at least 17,000) than mass testings (3,000). “People are dying because governments are more concerned about retaining control and power, rather than protecting and serving and we are now one hungry mob away from a dictatorship,” she said.
Nor does Duterte’s approach appear to be working well. The Department of Health has recorded 5,660 confirmed cases of the novel coronavirus in the Philippines as of April 16, a leap from just three reported cases on March 2. The Philippines has the highest number of cumulative coronavirus cases in Southeast Asia as of April 15, according to the World Health Organization, followed by Indonesia and Malaysia. In the region, the Philippines has the second-highest number of deaths, 362, and the second-lowest recovery rate, just 435. The Philippines also has among the highest percentage of total COVID-19 fatalities among health care professionals in the world. The country has conducted the fewer tests than most other nations, 38,103 for a population of 109 million, according to data compiled by Johns Hopkins University,
Filipino protesters take to the streets to oppose President Duterte’s dicatorship in Manila on Feb. 25. The date marks the 34th year anniversary of the People Power uprising in the country that ended the two-decade rule of Ferdinand Marcos.
Other types of punishments are also highly demeaning. On April 5, three members of the LGBTQI+ community in Pandacaqui, Pampanga, were “ordered to kiss each other and do a sexy dance in front of a minor,” Rappler reported, as punishment for violating the curfew, and the incident was streamed live on Facebook by the barangay captain, the highest elected official in the village. An anti-discrimination bill that would have penalized this type of behavior has languished in Congress for nearly four years.
Another Facebook live post shows detainees in Pandacaqui forced to sign bail papers with sweat, while being threatened with paddling.
As a result of such brutality, the tide of public sentiment is beginning to turn.
Perhaps the most notorious incident to date concerns a protest by residents in Sitio San Roque, Quezon City, who were asking for food aid on April 1. Twenty-one people were arrested with bail set at 15,000 pesos (almost $300) each. With 80 percent of San Roque earning minimum wage around 500 pesos a day and most residents unable to work during the lockdown, such a fee is impossible for many.
Human rights organizations and labor groups have expressed outrage and indignation at the violent arrests. The Asia Pacific Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines called for the release of the 21 protesters, who, as of April 6 were still in police custody. “The Philippine authorities should urgently investigate reports of barangay (village) officials committing abuses,” said Amnesty International Philippines on April 8. And the labor group Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino said, “to arrest hungry and desperate people is a new low for this administration.”
As a result of such brutality, the tide of public sentiment is beginning to turn. Over the past two weeks, the hashtags #StopTheAttacks, #BasicSocialServicesforthePoor and #MassTestingNowPH circulated on social media. A growing sentiment among the Philippine public is that the more the Duterte administration focuses on heavy-handed, militaristic responses, the less attention is directed toward health solutions. People are waiting for the government to deliver on its promises of assistance for health workers and emergency cash aid for 18 million low-income families of which more than 1.5 million have lost all sources of income.
The International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines said the crisis will increasingly take a heavy toll on the poor. “We support the efforts of empowered people’s movement in the Philippines’ to make the Duterte government accountable for: every poor person’s life lost due to denial of health care services and protection from Covid-19; every front-liners who died and are at risk due to the massive shortage of adequate facilities and equipment,” the coalition wrote in a statement.
Protesters hold up pictures of victims of extrajudicial killings during Human Rights Day protests in Manila on Dec. 10, 2017.
Eliza Romero is the coordinator at the Malaya Movement, a U.S.-based alliance to advance democracy and human rights in the Philippines. She said that her organization supports the increasing protests demanding the release of the San Roque residents and condemning the government’s response to the coronavirus.
“The shoot-to-kill order will just encourage more extrajudicial killings and vigilantism,” Romero said. “It will give private citizens and barangay captains impunity to commit more human rights violations with the protection of the law while normalizing carnage.”
“The shoot to kill order will just encourage more extrajudicial killings and vigilantism.”
The forum Kalusugan, Hindi Diktadura! (Health, Not Dictatorship!) organized an online rally with speakers from advocacy organizations on April 1. They pushed a social media rally spreading the hashtags #DUTERTERESIGN and #OUSTDUTERTENOW, and the message “Solusyong medical, hindi militar” (Medical solutions, not military), which began trending on Twitter.
Amid the government’s militarist approach, Filipinos have taken the situation into their own hands; citizen-led relief operations, information campaigns, and donation drives are providing hundreds of community-driven solutions to a faltering government response. They call it the Citizens’ Urgent Response to End Covid-19 (CURE COVID), an initiative made up of various organizations and sectors such as the National Union of Students of the Philippines that were active in calling for the release of the 21 San Roque residents.
“Duterte’s order is made more dangerous by the culture of impunity created by his administration. State forces will not hesitate to pull the trigger because they know that they have the support of the president,” said Jandeil Roperos, the deputy secretary-general of the student group.
Protesters invade the grounds of the Malacanang Palace in Manila, home of President Ferdinand Marcos, shortly after the president fled the palace for exile in Hawaii following the People Power Revolution on Feb. 25, 1986.
Filipinos are wary of dictator-like actions, which hark back to the notorious Marcos years before the 1986 People Power Revolution. “The fact that the Philippines was already under a state of de facto martial law long before the enhanced community quarantine is testament to Duterte’s Marcosian tactics,” Roperos said. “His war on drugs, the extrajudicial killings, the political persecutions, and red-tagging of activists and critics are a few examples of these tactics and proof that democracy is endangered. The whole country held its breath when he asked for more powers precisely because of him being hell-bent on recreating Marcos’s dictatorship.
“Filipinos have been pushing back against the system that oppresses them for a long time. The recent dissent against Duterte’s incompetence has contributed to the growing social unrest. Duterte’s fall from power, if he fails to change trajectories, is inevitable.”
“This pandemic gives him more leeway to abuse rights and endanger democracy,” Conde, the Human Rights Watch researcher, added. “The martial-law like atmosphere, the clampdown on criticism, coupled with past actions against the media and critics, all make a democratic slide possible.”
More than three decades ago, it was the much-acclaimed People Power that ultimately toppled the Marcos dictatorship in February 1986 as hundreds of thousands of Filipinos rose up to challenge the president.
And if Duterte is not careful, history may repeat itself, said the student protester Kintanar: “This pandemic has brought out the absolute worst of this government. People are tired, angry, and fed up at how we are being treated. Filipinos have shown the world people’s power. We have ousted two presidents before. I’m sure that if the need arises, we will not hesitate to do it again.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-15--China Is Bargain Hunting—and Western Security Is at Risk

China Is Bargain Hunting—and Western Security Is at Risk On April 7 , a Chinese company suffered a surprising setback in the United Kingdom .
Following an uproar by British legislators , an arm of the Chinese state-owned investment firm China Reform had to abandon its bid to dominate Imagination , a leading British technology firm that makes smartphone chips .
Even if that effort failed , others are likely to succeed .
That ’ s because many Western manufacturers of popular products will face financial uncertainty as a result of the coronavirus pandemic , making them easy prey for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a corporate buying spree in the West .
Canyon Bridge , a Cayman Islands-based outfit that is majority-owned by China Reform , bought Imagination in 2017—but the U.K. government didn ’ t intervene .
This month , however , when China Reform attempted to put four directors on Imagination ’ s board and thus seize control of the company , British members of Parliament rebelled ; China Reform abandoned the attempt .
Imagination is well known , but across Europe , North America , and other advanced economies there are countless cutting-edge firms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ electronics that are neither as rich nor as well funded as Imagination .
And like most other companies , they ’ ve been hit by the standstill that coronavirus has imposed on the economy .
A recent survey of more than 10,000 Japanese firms , for example , showed that 63 percent predicted the coronavirus would have a negative impact on their business performance .
Many Western manufacturers of popular products will face financial uncertainty as a result of the coronavirus pandemic , making them easy prey for Chinese companies China Reform ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a major Chinese acquisition spree in Europe and North America over the past few years .
Last year , for example , Chinese entities invested 11.7 billion euros ( nearly $ 13 billion ) in European Union countries , the vast majority of it in mergers and acquisitions and only a minimal share going to forming new companies .
In 2018 , Chinese entities invested some $ 25 billion in the United States .
Government support makes it even easier for Chinese companies to buy foreign firms .
Chinese acquisitions have caused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2003 , Chinese mergers and acquisitions of foreign companies amounted to $ 1.6 billion .
By 2006 it had shot up to $ 18.2 billion , often involving takeovers of Western household names .
But many of those acquisitions , such as TCL ’ s takeover of France ’ s Thomson Electronics , ended in failure .
Then came the 2008-2009 financial crisis , which presented another opportunity for Chinese businesses .
In a manner similar to what the world may now be about to experience , they went on an acquisition spree @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , too , went south for many of them when the acquired companies ’ value continued to slump , as Wang Duanyong of Shanghai International Studies University pointed out in a 2011 paper .
China Has Its Eyes on Serbia Beijing is using the coronavirus pandemic to expand its influence into the EU ’ s backyard .
The populist Five Star Movement has become China ’ s chief enabler as Beijing spreads disinformation about the origins of the coronavirus while sending aid shipments to EU countries where it seeks influence .
But China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attention from Western legacy companies to , for example , state-of-the-art technologies and research and development facilities .
Today ’ s investments and takeovers continue in that mode and are often part of China ’ s Made in China 2025 strategy , through which China plans to become a superpower in technology , manufacturing , and cybertechnology .
As Max Zenglein and Anna Holzmann of the Mercator Institute , a German think tank , note in a new report on Made in China 2025 , “ in smart manufacturing , digitalization and emerging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leave foreign competitors behind.
” A key part of the strategy is to buy up Western firms .
In a 2019 report , the Swedish Defence Research Agency found that Chinese acquisitions of Swedish firms have accelerated since 2014 .
What ’ s more , half of the takeovers fall within focus areas of Made in China 2025 .
Today ’ s investments and takeovers continue in that mode and are often part of China ’ s Made in China 2025 strategy , through which China plans to become a superpower in technology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Chinese investments now target Made in China 2025 ’ s core sectors .
Northern Europe—home of many innovation-heavy smaller businesses—is currently China ’ s top investment target in Europe .
By contrast , the Chinese buy almost no firms in Central and Eastern Europe , apparently because those countries don ’ t have enough cutting-edge firms in China ’ s preferred sectors .
Another report by the Mercator Institute , the “ Chinese FDI in Europe : 2019 Update , ” points out that Chinese companies also engage in enormous quantities of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nature—with Western counterparts .
In the United States , the government has woken up to the national security implications of losing sensitive capabilities to China ; the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ( CFIUS ) now plays a very active role in screening potential takeovers on national security grounds .
( Last year , it famously forced a Chinese company to reverse its acquisition of the gay dating app Grindr . )
The EU has no CFIUS , only a largely toothless screening mechanism .
Some countries are stricter : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ introduced a new bill that allows regulators to scrutinize investments that are likely to affect the country ’ s security .
( Previous German legislation requires government approval for all investments over 10 percent that pose a direct threat to national security . )
The U.K. government screens acquisitions in the military , dual-use , computing hardware , and quantum technology sectors .
If a Chinese outfit offers a good price to an ailing Western maker of , say , advanced sewage technology , will the board turn it down as matter of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Here ’ s the thing : Lots of companies with cutting-edge technology are not active in national security , even when national security is defined broadly .
They simply make extremely good parts or products , or offer extremely good services , that are vital to their country ’ s economy .
Ventilators—primarily made by U.S. and European companies—are currently demonstrating their value to every country ’ s well-being , and there are countless other similarly vital and even more technologically advanced products .
But now businesses are suffering from the effects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies not active in the national security sector , they ’ re not bound by strict regulations .
Their boards ’ only objective is to balance the books .
If a Chinese outfit offers a good price to an ailing Western maker of , say , advanced sewage technology , will the board turn it down as matter of patriotic duty ?
It ’ s unlikely .
At the moment , nothing is more urgent than the medical care of coronavirus victims .
But the care of ailing companies shouldn ’ t be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demonstrated when sending medical supplies to Italy after EU member states had failed to do so , it rapidly spots and exploits Western vulnerabilities .
Bloomberg reports that China-based banks are already seeing a spike in requests from Chinese outfits interested in acquiring European companies .
Many Western governments have already passed business aid packages to make sure companies don ’ t go under .
But that ’ s not enough .
Margrethe Vestager , the European commissioner for competition , has just proposed that governments buy stakes in vital companies to prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to screen Chinese raiders taking advantage of the coronavirus .
“ The U.K. government shouldn ’ t act on one-off cases because individual legislators start lobbying , ” suggested Ruth Smeeth , who was until last November a member of the British Parliament ’ s Defense Committee .
“ That only means that high-profile businesses are examined , not the smaller players who may be even more relevant.
” As for the EU , Sven-Christer Nilsson , a former CEO of the Swedish telecommunications giant Ericsson , told Foreign Policy that “ it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as do the individual member states .
We can ’ t wait , or we will see the Chinese giving offers companies can ’ t refuse.
” The American CFIUS , in turn , needs to rethink what constitutes national security—ventilators clearly do .
They must also ask if national security is the only criterion for rejection .
Indeed , takeovers should be screened too for the damage they could do to the economy .
“ If we have learned anything from the current crisis , it should be that the definition we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been insufficient , ” said Smeeth .
“ Our world has changed beyond recognition , and by default so have our core industries .
Our mergers and acquisitions policies need to reflect that .
”

On April 7, a Chinese company suffered a surprising setback in the United Kingdom. Following an uproar by British legislators, an arm of the Chinese state-owned investment firm China Reform had to abandon its bid to dominate Imagination, a leading British technology firm that makes smartphone chips. Even if that effort failed, others are likely to succeed.
On April 7, a Chinese company suffered a surprising setback in the United Kingdom. Following an uproar by British legislators, an arm of the Chinese state-owned investment firm China Reform had to abandon its bid to dominate Imagination, a leading British technology firm that makes smartphone chips. Even if that effort failed, others are likely to succeed.
That’s because many Western manufacturers of popular products will face financial uncertainty as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, making them easy prey for Chinese companies, which are already on a corporate buying spree in the West.
Canyon Bridge, a Cayman Islands-based outfit that is majority-owned by China Reform, bought Imagination in 2017—but the U.K. government didn’t intervene. This month, however, when China Reform attempted to put four directors on Imagination’s board and thus seize control of the company, British members of Parliament rebelled; China Reform abandoned the attempt.
Imagination is well known, but across Europe, North America, and other advanced economies there are countless cutting-edge firms in key sectors such as biotech and electronics that are neither as rich nor as well funded as Imagination. And like most other companies, they’ve been hit by the standstill that coronavirus has imposed on the economy. A recent survey of more than 10,000 Japanese firms, for example, showed that 63 percent predicted the coronavirus would have a negative impact on their business performance.
Many Western manufacturers of popular products will face financial uncertainty as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, making them easy prey for Chinese companies
China Reform’s majority stake in Imagination is part of a major Chinese acquisition spree in Europe and North America over the past few years. Last year, for example, Chinese entities invested 11.7 billion euros (nearly $13 billion) in European Union countries, the vast majority of it in mergers and acquisitions and only a minimal share going to forming new companies. In 2018, Chinese entities invested some $25 billion in the United States. Government support makes it even easier for Chinese companies to buy foreign firms.
Chinese acquisitions have caused headaches in Western capitals before. In 2003, Chinese mergers and acquisitions of foreign companies amounted to $1.6 billion. By 2006 it had shot up to $18.2 billion, often involving takeovers of Western household names. But many of those acquisitions, such as TCL’s takeover of France’s Thomson Electronics, ended in failure.
Then came the 2008-2009 financial crisis, which presented another opportunity for Chinese businesses. In a manner similar to what the world may now be about to experience, they went on an acquisition spree among weakened Western outfits. But that, too, went south for many of them when the acquired companies’ value continued to slump, as Wang Duanyong of Shanghai International Studies University pointed out in a 2011 paper.
Read More Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a meeting. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a meeting. China Has Its Eyes on Serbia Beijing is using the coronavirus pandemic to expand its influence into the EU’s backyard. Argument | Vuk Vuksanovic From left: Chinese President Xi Jinping; He Lifeng, the chairman of China's National Development and Reform Commission; Italian Labor and Industry Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Luigi Di Maio; and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte attend a signing ceremony following their meeting at Villa Madama in Rome on March 23, 2019. From left: Chinese President Xi Jinping; He Lifeng, the chairman of China's National Development and Reform Commission; Italian Labor and Industry Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Luigi Di Maio; and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte attend a signing ceremony following their meeting at Villa Madama in Rome on March 23, 2019. China Isn’t Helping Italy. It’s Waging Information Warfare. The populist Five Star Movement has become China’s chief enabler as Beijing spreads disinformation about the origins of the coronavirus while sending aid shipments to EU countries where it seeks influence. Argument | Mattia Ferraresi Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. India Is Pushing Back Against China in South Asia Beijing’s attempts to encircle New Delhi are being systematically reversed. Analysis | Derek Grossman
But China, Inc. persevered. It shifted its attention from Western legacy companies to, for example, state-of-the-art technologies and research and development facilities. Today’s investments and takeovers continue in that mode and are often part of China’s Made in China 2025 strategy, through which China plans to become a superpower in technology, manufacturing, and cybertechnology. As Max Zenglein and Anna Holzmann of the Mercator Institute, a German think tank, note in a new report on Made in China 2025, “in smart manufacturing, digitalization and emerging technologies, China wants to leapfrog and leave foreign competitors behind.” A key part of the strategy is to buy up Western firms. In a 2019 report, the Swedish Defence Research Agency found that Chinese acquisitions of Swedish firms have accelerated since 2014. What’s more, half of the takeovers fall within focus areas of Made in China 2025.
Today’s investments and takeovers continue in that mode and are often part of China’s Made in China 2025 strategy, through which China plans to become a superpower in technology, manufacturing, and cybertechnology.
Indeed, Chinese investments now target Made in China 2025’s core sectors. Northern Europe—home of many innovation-heavy smaller businesses—is currently China’s top investment target in Europe. By contrast, the Chinese buy almost no firms in Central and Eastern Europe, apparently because those countries don’t have enough cutting-edge firms in China’s preferred sectors. Another report by the Mercator Institute, the “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update,” points out that Chinese companies also engage in enormous quantities of research and development collaboration—often of a sensitive nature—with Western counterparts.
In the United States, the government has woken up to the national security implications of losing sensitive capabilities to China; the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) now plays a very active role in screening potential takeovers on national security grounds. (Last year, it famously forced a Chinese company to reverse its acquisition of the gay dating app Grindr.)
The EU has no CFIUS, only a largely toothless screening mechanism. Some countries are stricter: Earlier this month, the German government introduced a new bill that allows regulators to scrutinize investments that are likely to affect the country’s security. (Previous German legislation requires government approval for all investments over 10 percent that pose a direct threat to national security.) The U.K. government screens acquisitions in the military, dual-use, computing hardware, and quantum technology sectors.
If a Chinese outfit offers a good price to an ailing Western maker of, say, advanced sewage technology, will the board turn it down as matter of patriotic duty? It’s unlikely.
Here’s the thing: Lots of companies with cutting-edge technology are not active in national security, even when national security is defined broadly. They simply make extremely good parts or products, or offer extremely good services, that are vital to their country’s economy.
Ventilators—primarily made by U.S. and European companies—are currently demonstrating their value to every country’s well-being, and there are countless other similarly vital and even more technologically advanced products. But now businesses are suffering from the effects of the coronavirus. And as private companies not active in the national security sector, they’re not bound by strict regulations. Their boards’ only objective is to balance the books. If a Chinese outfit offers a good price to an ailing Western maker of, say, advanced sewage technology, will the board turn it down as matter of patriotic duty? It’s unlikely.
At the moment, nothing is more urgent than the medical care of coronavirus victims. But the care of ailing companies shouldn’t be far behind. As the Chinese government demonstrated when sending medical supplies to Italy after EU member states had failed to do so, it rapidly spots and exploits Western vulnerabilities. Bloomberg reports that China-based banks are already seeing a spike in requests from Chinese outfits interested in acquiring European companies.
Many Western governments have already passed business aid packages to make sure companies don’t go under. But that’s not enough. Margrethe Vestager, the European commissioner for competition, has just proposed that governments buy stakes in vital companies to prevent Chinese takeovers. They will also need to screen Chinese raiders taking advantage of the coronavirus. “The U.K. government shouldn’t act on one-off cases because individual legislators start lobbying,” suggested Ruth Smeeth, who was until last November a member of the British Parliament’s Defense Committee. “That only means that high-profile businesses are examined, not the smaller players who may be even more relevant.”
As for the EU, Sven-Christer Nilsson, a former CEO of the Swedish telecommunications giant Ericsson, told Foreign Policy that “it absolutely has to establish a CFIUS, as do the individual member states. We can’t wait, or we will see the Chinese giving offers companies can’t refuse.”
The American CFIUS, in turn, needs to rethink what constitutes national security—ventilators clearly do. They must also ask if national security is the only criterion for rejection. Indeed, takeovers should be screened too for the damage they could do to the economy.
“If we have learned anything from the current crisis, it should be that the definition we have been using of national security has been insufficient,” said Smeeth. “Our world has changed beyond recognition, and by default so have our core industries. Our mergers and acquisitions policies need to reflect that.”