foreignpolicy--2020-10-07--Macron Wants to Start an Islamic Revolution

Macron Wants to Start an Islamic Revolution On Friday , French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled his plan to tackle what he termed Islamist separatism , with the dual objectives of healing social divisions and fighting violent extremism .
He is not the first French president to promise a new French Islam ; successive governments have done so since the 1980s .
But Macron , who took office in 2017 following two years of bloody terror attacks in France and is now heading into a 2022 election campaign , wants to succeed where his predecessors have failed .
In a country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or laïcité , at the heart of its national identity , and where controversies over Islam are a fixture of daily life—from interminable controversies over the hijab to a recent fixation on alleged polygamy—top-down attempts to manage religion are a tough sell .
Critics say Macron ’ s proposed law , which French parliament will begin debating in December , will alienate some of France ’ s estimated 6 million Muslims ; others point to thorny legal issues that will complicate its implementation .
Macron ’ s plan focuses on limiting foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of French imams , with a certification process based in France .
Because laïcité bars the state from interfering with religious affairs , France has relied on what ’ s known as “ consular Islam ” to manage Muslim institutions .
Algeria finances the Grand Mosque of Paris , for example , which distributes funds to affiliated mosques across the country .
Turkey , Algeria , and Morocco have exported imams to France ; in 2015 , then-President François Hollande signed a deal with the Moroccan monarchy to train French imams at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particular , has invested in religious and cultural organizations across France , particularly under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan .
These foreign entanglements have created a crisis of both representation and legitimacy .
France ’ s Islamic institutions do not reflect its diverse Muslim communities , which make up nearly 9 percent of the population .
And Macron ’ s government argues that external influence has opened the doors to radical ideas that have led to repeated terror attacks .
The president ’ s vision , then , is largely ideological : His project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Islam of the Enlightenment ” that is “ compatible with the values of the Republic ” —without exactly defining what that would entail .
Although Macron stressed that his focus was on “ radical Islamism , ” not the faith in general , he went on to call Islam “ a religion that is in crisis all over the world , ” angering some French Muslims .
“ The governments change , but the obsessions remain , ” read a statement signed by 100 Muslim academics , activists , and others in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ More than the necessity to fight terrorism as a criminal phenomenon , President Macron is today participating , with his speech , in constructing a Muslim problem , targeting all believers and their faith.
” “ Macron was supposed to talk about separatisms , plural , but he only focused on Islam , ” said Rim-Sarah Alouane , a PhD candidate focusing on religious freedom and civil liberties in France and North Africa .
The very idea of “ separatist behavior , ” she added , risks to “ open up a Pandora @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particularly in a society that is often divided over what constitutes a display of radicalism .
“ My question is , where do we draw the line ?
” Alouane asked .
“ If a Muslim woman wears a hijab , is it a form of separatism ?
For some , it is.
” But Tareq Oubrou , the Grand Imam of Bordeaux , whom the president has consulted in recent years , disagreed that Macron used stigmatizing rhetoric .
“ He avoided any amalgam between radical Islamism and the Muslim population , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the notion of radicalism is “ not very well defined ” and can be difficult to distinguish from “ orthodox practices of the religion.
” The centerpiece of Macron ’ s proposal is to certify and train imams in France .
The proposed measures also included offering Arabic instruction in public schools , tightening control on private religious education , limiting home schooling , and cracking down on speech or activities that contradict so-called Republican values such as gender-segregated hours at municipal swimming pools .
Taken together , Macron ’ s ideas raised @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comprehensive institutional framework to control and regulate Islam , with a clear repressive drive , ” said Marwan Muhammad , a prominent Muslim activist and the former president of an anti-discrimination group called the Collective Against Islamophobia in France .
Alouane echoed that sentiment .
“ The vast majority of Muslims here live their lives and pay their taxes , and where is their say in this ?
It ’ s very funny for a country that isn ’ t supposed to interfere with religion to find so many different ways to control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , seemed like an attempt to distract the public .
“ Macron was letting us know he wants the presidential election to be about security , immigration , and Islam , when it should be about the economy , the dismantlement of public services , and the poor management of the COVID-19 crisis.
” Indeed , France saw a record number of Covid-19 cases last week , and this week imposed new lockdown measures across the country .
“ That ’ s the paradox : to defend secularism with a plan based on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Olivier Roy , a scholar of religion and a professor at the European University Institute in Florence .
“ That ’ s why , for so many years , nothing has been done.
” Because the state itself can ’ t certify imams , for example , Macron would likely empower the French Council of the Muslim Faith ( CFCM ) —created by then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy in 2003—to do so .
But empowering the CFCM would go against Macron ’ s stated objective of creating a French Islam in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Only a third of French Muslims have even heard of the CFCM , according to a 2016 survey ; those who have criticize its opaque leadership structure and close ties to foreign powers .
“ The CFCM was a forced institution that created a foreign Islam in France—a Turkish-Maghrebi Islam , ” Oubrou said last year .
For Muhammad , the problem runs deeper : “ The main criticism isn ’ t that the CFCM represents foreign countries , it ’ s that they ’ ve failed French Muslims altogether , ” notably @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he says discriminate against Islam .
“ The state can ’ t create the ‘ good ’ Islam , so the CFCM will have to do it , ” Roy explained .
“ The CFCM will be perceived as an extension of the state—even more than it has always been.
” “ What ’ s absent from this project , ” he added , “ is the basic Muslim citizen , who goes to mosque , and we ’ re not giving them the choice—we ’ re not letting them choose their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impose a certain rabbi on Jews , or a certain pastor on Christians.
” On top of the credibility issue comes an implementation problem : The state can not force Muslims to exclusively attend sermons by “ certified ” imams .
“ That would be anti-constitutional , and it ’ d be shut down immediately at the European Court of Human Rights , ” said Roy .
Although Macron ’ s entire plan focuses on Islam exclusively , any eventual legislation would need to apply to all religions ; the 1905 law stipulates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the law .
“ The law needs to address all forms of separatism , and be rational and universal , not against one community , ” Oubrou said , even if , in application , “ its primary focus is on radical Islamism.
” But if French Muslims find that , in practice , the law is used to disproportionately target Muslims , that could also lead to court battles .
When it comes to monitoring private religious education , for example , any scrutiny applied to Muslim schools—on gender segregation , respect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speech—would have to apply to Catholic and Jewish schools , too , in order to be consistent with the text and spirit of the 1905 law .
That Macron ’ s law would restrict all religions , and not just Islam , hasn ’ t been lost on his political rivals .
In a communiqué released after his speech , the far-right National Rally called it “ regrettable that in the name of the fight against radical Islamism , the French will be obligated to curb their freedoms , notably those of parents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home schooling and private religious instruction .
The center-right Republicans , praising some of the plan , argued it didn ’ t go far enough , and called for a crackdown on immigration .
The left , in contrast , attacked Macron ’ s focus on Islam as the only form of “ separatism ” plaguing French society .
“ For 20 years , presidents have tried to take votes from the Front National , ” said Roy , referring to the far-right party that in 2018 changed its name to the National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been 20 years that they ’ ve failed.
” In the past few months , Macron has doubled down on security and identity issues , hoping to attract right-leaning voters ahead of the 2022 vote , where he is expected to face far-right leader Marine Le Pen .
( The two are neck-to-neck in a recent survey ) .
“ The problem is , Macron ’ s attempts at centrism are rejected by all sides , ” Roy said .
That dynamic was on display in Macron ’ s nod to France ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ branch to progressives .
( In turn , Macron ’ s past recognitions of France ’ s colonial legacy , first on the campaign trail in 2017 , and repeatedly throughout his presidency , have generated outcry from the right ) .
“ We have built this separatism ourselves , it ’ s in our communities and their ghettoization , ” he said on Friday , highlighting enduring tensions around France ’ s colonial past .
“ We have built concentrations of poverty and problems , ” and “ created areas where the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fulfilled.
” Few dispute the massive disparities in wealth and opportunity that plague French immigrant communities—and nowhere are they more present than in the banlieues , the suburbs of major cities , where unemployment is often double the national average , and social services are sparse .
But in attempting to win over progressives , Macron unintentionally drew attention to what many on the left say is a primary failing of his presidency : social policy .
Early on , Macron earned the moniker “ president of the rich ” thanks to his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wealth tax .
For the banlieues in particular , he has done little to reduce residential segregation or improve economic prospects .
“ Words don ’ t cost much , as Macron has consistently given up on the banlieues , ” Muhammad said .
“ He never acknowledged police violence ” and “ constantly opted for corporate interests , at the expense of social initiatives , whether it be education , health and housing plans .
His policies contradict his words.
” But Macron is far more concerned with attracting voters on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead-up to 2022 .
In a Cabinet reshuffle in July , he appointed a conservative , tough-on-crime interior minister ; in recent months his government has continued to denounce rising insecurity , even as crime rates remain stable , or even in decline , across the country .
Macron also gave his speech against the backdrop of the ongoing trial over the 2015 attack at Charlie Hebdo , a satirical magazine where extremists opened fire in retaliation for cartoonists ’ depiction of the Prophet Muhammad .
And it followed an attack late last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stabbed passersby near the magazine ’ s offices , purportedly for the same reason .
Although Macron sees his Islam of the Enlightenment , divorced from foreign influence , as a bulwark against Islamic extremism , France ’ s recent experiences with terrorism challenge that assumption .
The perpetrators of the vast majority of attacks weren ’ t foreign infiltrators but French nationals , and more often had a history of petty crime than religious zealotry .
Many would-be terrorists are radicalized online or outside of religious settings ; experts have consistently pointed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ France ’ s borders to foreign imams will do little to solve .
“ Often the most radical imams are born in France , ” Oubrou said , describing a phenomenon of “ self-proclaimed imams who , in perfect French , diffuse fanatical ideas.
” Roy , who has long argued that social policy—not theological battles—are needed to fight extremism , argued that Macron ’ s plan stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of religion .
“ We ’ re acting as if religion is a passive receptacle , and all we have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the religion , and to change the believer , ” he said .
“ But that ’ s not how it works .
”

On Friday, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled his plan to tackle what he termed Islamist separatism, with the dual objectives of healing social divisions and fighting violent extremism. He is not the first French president to promise a new French Islam; successive governments have done so since the 1980s. But Macron, who took office in 2017 following two years of bloody terror attacks in France and is now heading into a 2022 election campaign, wants to succeed where his predecessors have failed.
On Friday, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled his plan to tackle what he termed Islamist separatism, with the dual objectives of healing social divisions and fighting violent extremism. He is not the first French president to promise a new French Islam; successive governments have done so since the 1980s. But Macron, who took office in 2017 following two years of bloody terror attacks in France and is now heading into a 2022 election campaign, wants to succeed where his predecessors have failed.
In a country that holds a strict vision of secularism, or laïcité, at the heart of its national identity, and where controversies over Islam are a fixture of daily life—from interminable controversies over the hijab to a recent fixation on alleged polygamy—top-down attempts to manage religion are a tough sell. Critics say Macron’s proposed law, which French parliament will begin debating in December, will alienate some of France’s estimated 6 million Muslims; others point to thorny legal issues that will complicate its implementation.
Macron’s plan focuses on limiting foreign influence and investing in a new generation of French imams, with a certification process based in France. Because laïcité bars the state from interfering with religious affairs, France has relied on what’s known as “consular Islam” to manage Muslim institutions. Algeria finances the Grand Mosque of Paris, for example, which distributes funds to affiliated mosques across the country. Turkey, Algeria, and Morocco have exported imams to France; in 2015, then-President François Hollande signed a deal with the Moroccan monarchy to train French imams at a center in Rabat. Turkey, in particular, has invested in religious and cultural organizations across France, particularly under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
These foreign entanglements have created a crisis of both representation and legitimacy. France’s Islamic institutions do not reflect its diverse Muslim communities, which make up nearly 9 percent of the population. And Macron’s government argues that external influence has opened the doors to radical ideas that have led to repeated terror attacks. The president’s vision, then, is largely ideological: His project, he said, would foster an “Islam of the Enlightenment” that is “compatible with the values of the Republic”—without exactly defining what that would entail.
Although Macron stressed that his focus was on “radical Islamism,” not the faith in general, he went on to call Islam “a religion that is in crisis all over the world,” angering some French Muslims. “The governments change, but the obsessions remain,” read a statement signed by 100 Muslim academics, activists, and others in the left-leaning news site Médiapart. “More than the necessity to fight terrorism as a criminal phenomenon, President Macron is today participating, with his speech, in constructing a Muslim problem, targeting all believers and their faith.”
“Macron was supposed to talk about separatisms, plural, but he only focused on Islam,” said Rim-Sarah Alouane, a PhD candidate focusing on religious freedom and civil liberties in France and North Africa. The very idea of “separatist behavior,” she added, risks to “open up a Pandora’s box of bigotry,” particularly in a society that is often divided over what constitutes a display of radicalism. “My question is, where do we draw the line?” Alouane asked. “If a Muslim woman wears a hijab, is it a form of separatism? For some, it is.”
But Tareq Oubrou, the Grand Imam of Bordeaux, whom the president has consulted in recent years, disagreed that Macron used stigmatizing rhetoric. “He avoided any amalgam between radical Islamism and the Muslim population,” Oubrou said, though noted that the notion of radicalism is “not very well defined” and can be difficult to distinguish from “orthodox practices of the religion.”
The centerpiece of Macron’s proposal is to certify and train imams in France. The proposed measures also included offering Arabic instruction in public schools, tightening control on private religious education, limiting home schooling, and cracking down on speech or activities that contradict so-called Republican values such as gender-segregated hours at municipal swimming pools. Taken together, Macron’s ideas raised eyebrows. “It’s a comprehensive institutional framework to control and regulate Islam, with a clear repressive drive,” said Marwan Muhammad, a prominent Muslim activist and the former president of an anti-discrimination group called the Collective Against Islamophobia in France.
Alouane echoed that sentiment. “The vast majority of Muslims here live their lives and pay their taxes, and where is their say in this? It’s very funny for a country that isn’t supposed to interfere with religion to find so many different ways to control it.”
The speech, she added, seemed like an attempt to distract the public. “Macron was letting us know he wants the presidential election to be about security, immigration, and Islam, when it should be about the economy, the dismantlement of public services, and the poor management of the COVID-19 crisis.” Indeed, France saw a record number of Covid-19 cases last week, and this week imposed new lockdown measures across the country.
Beyond the rhetorical implications of Macron’s plan, much of what he envisions will be difficult to implement, precisely because of the secular values he repeatedly defended throughout his speech. The 1905 Separation of Church and State law that underpins laïcité explicitly bars the state from interfering with private religious affairs.
“That’s the paradox: to defend secularism with a plan based on the state’s intervention in religion,” said Olivier Roy, a scholar of religion and a professor at the European University Institute in Florence. “That’s why, for so many years, nothing has been done.”
Because the state itself can’t certify imams, for example, Macron would likely empower the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM)—created by then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy in 2003—to do so.
But empowering the CFCM would go against Macron’s stated objective of creating a French Islam in the place of a foreign-influenced one. Only a third of French Muslims have even heard of the CFCM, according to a 2016 survey; those who have criticize its opaque leadership structure and close ties to foreign powers. “The CFCM was a forced institution that created a foreign Islam in France—a Turkish-Maghrebi Islam,” Oubrou said last year. For Muhammad, the problem runs deeper: “The main criticism isn’t that the CFCM represents foreign countries, it’s that they’ve failed French Muslims altogether,” notably in failing to criticize laws and policies that he says discriminate against Islam.
“The state can’t create the ‘good’ Islam, so the CFCM will have to do it,” Roy explained. “The CFCM will be perceived as an extension of the state—even more than it has always been.”
“What’s absent from this project,” he added, “is the basic Muslim citizen, who goes to mosque, and we’re not giving them the choice—we’re not letting them choose their own imam. We don’t impose a certain rabbi on Jews, or a certain pastor on Christians.”
On top of the credibility issue comes an implementation problem: The state cannot force Muslims to exclusively attend sermons by “certified” imams. “That would be anti-constitutional, and it’d be shut down immediately at the European Court of Human Rights,” said Roy.
Although Macron’s entire plan focuses on Islam exclusively, any eventual legislation would need to apply to all religions; the 1905 law stipulates that all religions have equal footing before the law.
“The law needs to address all forms of separatism, and be rational and universal, not against one community,” Oubrou said, even if, in application, “its primary focus is on radical Islamism.”
But if French Muslims find that, in practice, the law is used to disproportionately target Muslims, that could also lead to court battles. When it comes to monitoring private religious education, for example, any scrutiny applied to Muslim schools—on gender segregation, respect of the national curriculum, or hate speech—would have to apply to Catholic and Jewish schools, too, in order to be consistent with the text and spirit of the 1905 law.
That Macron’s law would restrict all religions, and not just Islam, hasn’t been lost on his political rivals. In a communiqué released after his speech, the far-right National Rally called it “regrettable that in the name of the fight against radical Islamism, the French will be obligated to curb their freedoms, notably those of parents,” referring to the measures on home schooling and private religious instruction. The center-right Republicans, praising some of the plan, argued it didn’t go far enough, and called for a crackdown on immigration. The left, in contrast, attacked Macron’s focus on Islam as the only form of “separatism” plaguing French society.
The political reactions to Macron’s plans are another example that his touted radical centrism—marked by a habit of making divergent promises “en même temps,” or at the same time—has failed to expand his electoral reach.
“For 20 years, presidents have tried to take votes from the Front National,” said Roy, referring to the far-right party that in 2018 changed its name to the National Rally. “And it’s been 20 years that they’ve failed.” In the past few months, Macron has doubled down on security and identity issues, hoping to attract right-leaning voters ahead of the 2022 vote, where he is expected to face far-right leader Marine Le Pen. (The two are neck-to-neck in a recent survey).
“The problem is, Macron’s attempts at centrism are rejected by all sides,” Roy said.
That dynamic was on display in Macron’s nod to France’s own role in contemporary divisions—an olive branch to progressives. (In turn, Macron’s past recognitions of France’s colonial legacy, first on the campaign trail in 2017, and repeatedly throughout his presidency, have generated outcry from the right). “We have built this separatism ourselves, it’s in our communities and their ghettoization,” he said on Friday, highlighting enduring tensions around France’s colonial past. “We have built concentrations of poverty and problems,” and “created areas where the promises of the Republic have not been fulfilled.”
Few dispute the massive disparities in wealth and opportunity that plague French immigrant communities—and nowhere are they more present than in the banlieues, the suburbs of major cities, where unemployment is often double the national average, and social services are sparse. But in attempting to win over progressives, Macron unintentionally drew attention to what many on the left say is a primary failing of his presidency: social policy. Early on, Macron earned the moniker “president of the rich” thanks to his pro-business agenda and decision to scrap a wealth tax. For the banlieues in particular, he has done little to reduce residential segregation or improve economic prospects.
“Words don’t cost much, as Macron has consistently given up on the banlieues,” Muhammad said. “He never acknowledged police violence” and “constantly opted for corporate interests, at the expense of social initiatives, whether it be education, health and housing plans. His policies contradict his words.”
But Macron is far more concerned with attracting voters on the right than on the left in the lead-up to 2022. In a Cabinet reshuffle in July, he appointed a conservative, tough-on-crime interior minister; in recent months his government has continued to denounce rising insecurity, even as crime rates remain stable, or even in decline, across the country.
Macron also gave his speech against the backdrop of the ongoing trial over the 2015 attack at Charlie Hebdo, a satirical magazine where extremists opened fire in retaliation for cartoonists’ depiction of the Prophet Muhammad. And it followed an attack late last month, when a young Pakistani migrant stabbed passersby near the magazine’s offices, purportedly for the same reason.
Although Macron sees his Islam of the Enlightenment, divorced from foreign influence, as a bulwark against Islamic extremism, France’s recent experiences with terrorism challenge that assumption. The perpetrators of the vast majority of attacks weren’t foreign infiltrators but French nationals, and more often had a history of petty crime than religious zealotry. Many would-be terrorists are radicalized online or outside of religious settings; experts have consistently pointed to a home-grown violent Salafism that shutting France’s borders to foreign imams will do little to solve. “Often the most radical imams are born in France,” Oubrou said, describing a phenomenon of “self-proclaimed imams who, in perfect French, diffuse fanatical ideas.”
Roy, who has long argued that social policy—not theological battles—are needed to fight extremism, argued that Macron’s plan stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of religion.
“We’re acting as if religion is a passive receptacle, and all we have to do is change the preacher to change the religion, and to change the believer,” he said. “But that’s not how it works.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-08--Trump, COVID-19, and the Future of International Order

Trump , COVID-19 , and the Future of International Order The COVID-19 pandemic , U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s diagnosis , and the upcoming U.S. election add uncertainty to an already troubled international system .
Rising populism , a potential great-power conflict between the United States and China , climate change , large numbers of refugees fleeing violence and poverty , and increasing pressures on globalization are just some of the many challenges facing the world in 2021 and beyond .
Given that background , how do experts see international relations evolving over the next five years ?
To @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and International Policy project at the College of William & Mary , in collaboration with the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University , surveyed international relations scholars at U.S. and European universities this August .
The experts are generally pessimistic about global trends over the next five years , predicting declines in the number of democracies and opportunities for trade and investment , and dramatic increases in civil wars , human rights abuses , and collapsing state institutions .
At the same time , the gloominess of their predictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is that Trump will be reelected as president in November .
Experts who predict a Trump reelection also believe that war with China is more realistic , that the United States is considerably more likely to withdraw from the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) , and that it will be much more difficult for immigrants to enter the United States .
By contrast , beliefs about when the COVID-19 pandemic will end barely affect how scholars think the system will evolve over the next five years .
Coronavirus optimists and coronavirus pessimists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war , globalization , democracy , and immigration .
Overall , the survey results suggest , the experts believe that shocks to the international system may come and go , but a stable global order will be the product of political choices .
And if the American people choose Trump again , these experts believe that he will make choices that threaten the existing order , increase the prospects for mass violence , and increase the cost of international commerce .
Overall , IR scholars are gloomy about global outcomes in the next @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by issue , with civil and political liberties , democracy , and state failure cause for more concern than trends in the number of civil wars and terrorist incidents .
In other words , the experts are very pessimistic about the future of liberalism and political stability but not as pessimistic about the prospects for increasing mass violence .
Another set of questions asked scholars to predict the likelihood of a series of events happening over the next five years .
Given the upcoming U.S. election , opinions about future U.S. foreign-policy behavior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pursued an aggressive policy toward China on trade and other issues , including the COVID-19 pandemic .
In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly , for example , he called the coronavirus “ the China virus ” and stated , “ The United Nations must hold China accountable for their actions.
” Scholars have long worried that Beijing ’ s rising power might result in a war between the United States and China , and those who give Trump the highest chance of winning next month ’ s presidential election are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China in the coming years .
All respondents were asked how likely ( on a scale of 0-100 ) Trump is to be reelected as president .
About half of scholars gave him a 20-40 percent chance , which is close to several forecasts based on public opinion data .
Yet almost 30 percent of scholars think his election prospects are between 40 and 60 percent .
A small group ( less than 10 percent ) believe that his chances are greater than 60 percent , while a similar size group think that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 20 percent .
The experts were then asked how likely war between the United States and China is in the next five years .
The results are striking .
The group that puts Trump ’ s reelection chances highest believes war is about twice as likely as the group that puts his chances lowest .
There were similar effects for predictions about future wars between the United States and unspecified other countries .
Moreover , the higher they rate Trump ’ s election prospects , the higher scholars think U.S. military expenditures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But scholars who think it is more likely that Trump will win reelection do not , on average , forecast more civil wars , fragile states , or terrorism .
So , they are not gloomier overall .
Instead , they reserve their fears for those outcomes that Trump is most likely to influence directly .
Similarly , scholars who were more pessimistic about the duration of the pandemic were no more or less likely to be pessimistic about war and peace in the coming years .
The Trump administration has had an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China but also with organizations like the WTO , which is the anchor of the global trading system .
It is perhaps not surprising , then , that experts believe that the United States is much more likely to leave the WTO over the next five years if they also believe that Trump will win the upcoming election .
The differences are large and significant .
Scholars who believe that Trump has a 40 percent or better chance of winning reelection also think that there is a 1-in-3 chance the United States will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 1 in 5 scholars who think Trump ’ s chances of winning are smaller than 40 percent believe the United States will leave the WTO .
Scholars who think Trump is more likely to win also thought it a bit more likely that an OECD country will default on its debt in the next five years , that reliance on global supply chains will be reduced , and that the dollar would lose some stature as a global reserve currency .
There was no difference , however , in perceptions of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IMF ( two international organizations that have not received as much ire from the Trump administration as many others have during the previous four years ) .
As on security issues , COVID-19 optimism or pessimism does not seem to affect predictions about globalization or economic governance over the next five years .
Another election issue is immigration , and here there are large differences in how U.S. scholars see the future of immigration depending on their beliefs about Trump ’ s electoral prospects .
These large differences persist across opinions about high-skill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visas , although , overall , scholars are more optimistic about high-skill immigration .
In short , who will be president after November matters to the future of the global order , according to the experts , even if the current pandemic does not .
Individual leaders make choices that shape the international system , but these international relations experts don ’ t believe that Trump will make decisions that help build a stable order .

Helen V. Milner, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, Michael J. Tierney and Erik Voeten

The COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. President Donald Trump’s diagnosis, and the upcoming U.S. election add uncertainty to an already troubled international system. Rising populism, a potential great-power conflict between the United States and China, climate change, large numbers of refugees fleeing violence and poverty, and increasing pressures on globalization are just some of the many challenges facing the world in 2021 and beyond.
The COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. President Donald Trump’s diagnosis, and the upcoming U.S. election add uncertainty to an already troubled international system. Rising populism, a potential great-power conflict between the United States and China, climate change, large numbers of refugees fleeing violence and poverty, and increasing pressures on globalization are just some of the many challenges facing the world in 2021 and beyond.
Given that background, how do experts see international relations evolving over the next five years? To find out, the Teaching, Research, and International Policy project at the College of William & Mary, in collaboration with the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University, surveyed international relations scholars at U.S. and European universities this August.
The experts are generally pessimistic about global trends over the next five years, predicting declines in the number of democracies and opportunities for trade and investment, and dramatic increases in civil wars, human rights abuses, and collapsing state institutions.
At the same time, the gloominess of their predictions depends on how likely scholars think it is that Trump will be reelected as president in November. Experts who predict a Trump reelection also believe that war with China is more realistic, that the United States is considerably more likely to withdraw from the World Trade Organization (WTO), and that it will be much more difficult for immigrants to enter the United States.
By contrast, beliefs about when the COVID-19 pandemic will end barely affect how scholars think the system will evolve over the next five years. Coronavirus optimists and coronavirus pessimists make similar predictions about the future of war, globalization, democracy, and immigration.
Overall, the survey results suggest, the experts believe that shocks to the international system may come and go, but a stable global order will be the product of political choices. And if the American people choose Trump again, these experts believe that he will make choices that threaten the existing order, increase the prospects for mass violence, and increase the cost of international commerce.
We asked international relations scholars to look into the future and forecast what the world will look like in 2025 compared to 2019 on a range of important outcomes. For example, one question asked: “According to V-Dem, there were 87 democracies in the world at the end of 2019. Do you expect this number will increase or decrease by 2025?” Fifty-seven percent of respondents expected the number of democracies in the world to decrease over the next five years.
Overall, IR scholars are gloomy about global outcomes in the next few years, although their pessimism varies by issue, with civil and political liberties, democracy, and state failure cause for more concern than trends in the number of civil wars and terrorist incidents. In other words, the experts are very pessimistic about the future of liberalism and political stability but not as pessimistic about the prospects for increasing mass violence.
Another set of questions asked scholars to predict the likelihood of a series of events happening over the next five years. Given the upcoming U.S. election, opinions about future U.S. foreign-policy behavior were of particular interest.
Trump has pursued an aggressive policy toward China on trade and other issues, including the COVID-19 pandemic. In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, for example, he called the coronavirus “the China virus” and stated, “The United Nations must hold China accountable for their actions.” Scholars have long worried that Beijing’s rising power might result in a war between the United States and China, and those who give Trump the highest chance of winning next month’s presidential election are also most likely to expect war with China in the coming years.
All respondents were asked how likely (on a scale of 0-100) Trump is to be reelected as president. About half of scholars gave him a 20-40 percent chance, which is close to several forecasts based on public opinion data. Yet almost 30 percent of scholars think his election prospects are between 40 and 60 percent. A small group (less than 10 percent) believe that his chances are greater than 60 percent, while a similar size group think that Trump’s reelection chances are less than 20 percent.
The experts were then asked how likely war between the United States and China is in the next five years. The results are striking. The group that puts Trump’s reelection chances highest believes war is about twice as likely as the group that puts his chances lowest.
There were similar effects for predictions about future wars between the United States and unspecified other countries. Moreover, the higher they rate Trump’s election prospects, the higher scholars think U.S. military expenditures will be five years from now.
But scholars who think it is more likely that Trump will win reelection do not, on average, forecast more civil wars, fragile states, or terrorism. So, they are not gloomier overall. Instead, they reserve their fears for those outcomes that Trump is most likely to influence directly. Similarly, scholars who were more pessimistic about the duration of the pandemic were no more or less likely to be pessimistic about war and peace in the coming years.
The Trump administration has had an antagonistic relationship not only with countries like China but also with organizations like the WTO, which is the anchor of the global trading system. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that experts believe that the United States is much more likely to leave the WTO over the next five years if they also believe that Trump will win the upcoming election. The differences are large and significant. Scholars who believe that Trump has a 40 percent or better chance of winning reelection also think that there is a 1-in-3 chance the United States will leave the WTO. Meanwhile, less than 1 in 5 scholars who think Trump’s chances of winning are smaller than 40 percent believe the United States will leave the WTO.
Scholars who think Trump is more likely to win also thought it a bit more likely that an OECD country will default on its debt in the next five years, that reliance on global supply chains will be reduced, and that the dollar would lose some stature as a global reserve currency. There was no difference, however, in perceptions of the future importance of the World Bank and IMF (two international organizations that have not received as much ire from the Trump administration as many others have during the previous four years). As on security issues, COVID-19 optimism or pessimism does not seem to affect predictions about globalization or economic governance over the next five years.
Another election issue is immigration, and here there are large differences in how U.S. scholars see the future of immigration depending on their beliefs about Trump’s electoral prospects. These large differences persist across opinions about high-skill immigration, low-skill immigration, and student visas, although, overall, scholars are more optimistic about high-skill immigration.
International relations scholars are sometimes hesitant to put too much emphasis on individual leadership as an explanation for outcomes in international affairs, but our findings suggest that their predictions about what the world will look like depend considerably on who they think will emerge victorious in the November election. This does not seem to reflect an underlying propensity for gloom and doom; rather, scholars clearly differentiate issues where the Trump administration has signaled its intent (the WTO, immigration, China) from those that are less directly associated with Trump, like the IMF, democratization, and civil wars.
In short, who will be president after November matters to the future of the global order, according to the experts, even if the current pandemic does not. Individual leaders make choices that shape the international system, but these international relations experts don’t believe that Trump will make decisions that help build a stable order.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-08--Indians and Central Asians Are the New Face of the Islamic State

Indians and Central Asians Are the New Face of the Islamic State As white nationalists across the world have gained prominence through racist , Islamophobic and anti-Semitic acts , the world ’ s focus on terrorism seems to have shifted .
Many experts on extremism now focus heavily on the far-right in its many incarnations as an important driver of terrorist threat .
But this myopic approach ignores the dynamism that the Islamic State injected into the international jihadist movement , and the long-term repercussions of the networks it built .
In particular , the Indian and Central Asian linkages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ repercussions beyond the region .
This threat emerged most recently with the attack by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province ( ISKP ) on Jalalabad prison in early August .
The attack showed a level of ambition that distinguished the group from many of the Islamic State ’ s other regional affiliates .
Part of a bigger global push to do something about colleagues rotting in prisons , it was also a way of signaling how the group ’ s approach to freeing its prisoners differed from the Taliban ’ s .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are in essence surrendering in their peace negotiations with the U.S. government .
But the most interesting aspect of the attack was the roster of fighters involved—a multinational group that included Afghans , Indians , Tajiks , and Pakistanis .
While at first glance this seems unsurprising , the presence of Central Asians and Indians in transnational attacks is a relatively new phenomenon that reflects a shifting pattern in jihadism linked to the Islamic State .
Some of the group ’ s most dramatic attacks—like the Easter 2019 Sri Lanka bombings , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Year ’ s Eve 2017 , or the 2017 truck attacks in New York City and Stockholm—revealed jihadism ’ s persistent appeal to a global audience .
Indeed , the rise of Central and South Asian cohorts to the front rank of attack planning is a development with potentially worrying consequences .
Jihadist ideas are not new to Central Asia or India .
The civil war in 1990s Tajikistan that broke out in the wake of the country ’ s emancipation from the Soviet Union was an early post-Cold War battlefield which included @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a base from which to fight in Tajikistan .
While most of the support for the fighting in Tajikistan emerged from communities in northern Afghanistan who went on to fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban , some disillusioned fighters in the conflict ended up fighting alongside al Qaeda .
And for a while , assessments of where al Qaeda would go after its ejection from Afghanistan post-9/11 focused on the Fergana Valley , a region spanning Uzbekistan , Tajikistan , and Kyrgyzstan that is home to conservative communities who have clashed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan , Jund al Khilafah , the Islamic Jihad Union or various Tajikistani groups provided networks that helped Central Asians get involved in fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan .
But these networks were relatively limited in their impact .
India was the birthplace of the Deobandi movement , a sect that was a source of ideas for the Taliban , and the conflict in Kashmir has for years been a rallying cry for extremist groups India ’ s history of jihadism goes back even further .
The country was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sect that was a source of ideas for the Taliban among others .
And the conflict in Kashmir has long been held up by extremist groups as one of the world ’ s most long-standing unresolved jihadi conflicts .
While most Kashmiris are nationalists furious at New Delhi , their conflict is one that is regularly adopted as a rallying cry by extremists who point to it as one of the many places where Muslims are being abused .
Yet notwithstanding this heritage , neither India nor Central Asia has historically produced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , launching attacks far from their borders .
Indians have stayed involved in networks in India , or occasionally Pakistan .
Central Asians have shown up in Afghanistan and Pakistan , but rarely farther afield .
That is changing .
A major turning point in Indian and Central Asian involvement in the global jihadist movement was Syria .
A cauldron that continues to draw people in , it is a clear and significant marker in the international jihadist story .
The battlefield was one that drew in Muslims from almost 100 different countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indians and Central Asians , though their experiences were markedly different .
The Central Asians integrated well into the conflict , serving alongside both Islamic State and al Qaeda-affiliated groups .
For example , Tajikistani former Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov rose to be a senior Islamic State commander .
Large groups of Central Asians fought on the battlefield .
In contrast , the few Indians who made it to the Levant had a different experience .
Many received bad treatment at the hands of their Arab hosts , who tended to look down on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poor laborers in much of the Arab world .
This racism did not stop a significant number of Indians being drawn to the group , however .
A more thriving community of Indian fighters made it to the conflict in Afghanistan to fight alongside ISKP there .
Since the Islamic State ’ s emergence , Central Asians have been involved in repeated attacks in Turkey , including the assault on Istanbul ’ s Ataturk Airport in June 2016 and the high-profile massacre at the city ’ s Reina nightclub on New Year ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacks using vehicles that were driven into crowds in 2017 in Stockholm in April , and New York City on Halloween that year , as well as an underground bombing in St. Petersburg .
For Indians , the international role has been more limited , with Indians for the most part appearing in attacks in Afghanistan and in limited numbers on the battlefield in Syria .
The attack on the prison in Jalalabad follows the earlier decision by ISKP to use an Indian fighter to attack a Sikh gurdwara—a place of worship—in Kabul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sikhs are regarded as an acceptable target by the Islamic State like many other religious groups , though the decision to use an Indian attacker likely reflected a desire by the group to highlight their connection to India in particular .
While the absolute numbers are small , this is an entirely new trend .
Indians involved in external jihadist attacks have until now been the exception .
The few Indians who pursued jihad tended to do it at home in a limited fashion , often with links across the border to Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like Dhiren Barot , a British-raised Hindu convert who was close to 9/11 organizer Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and was ultimately jailed for a plot to detonate a bomb in the U.K. in 2005 .
This is surprising , considering that India is home to the world ’ s third-largest Muslim community .
However , today ’ s new generation of jihadists , is driven by a range of economic , political , and ideological factors .
Both Central Asia and India are home to large communities of young men who go and work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a crucial pillar of local economies .
It is often among these diaspora communities where radicalization takes place—for the Indians in the Gulf , for the Central Asians in Russia .
In the COVID-blighted world , this workflow has slowed down , hurting economies , but also creating a pool of underemployed young men at home and abroad .
In the COVID-blighted world , opportunities to work abroad have dried up—hurting economies and creating a pool of underemployed young men at home and abroad .
This comes in the context of a tense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Narendra Modi has advanced a series of policies promoting a Hindu nationalist narrative openly hostile toward Muslims .
There has since been a notable uptick in jihadist propaganda toward India .
In Central Asia , governments may not be stoking the same fires , but there has been an active pursuit of political opponents across the region .
While there are numerous programs in place seeking to counter violent extremism , it is not always clear how effective they are , nor is it clear they are able to deal with problems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is the continuing question of what will happen to the fighters from these countries who went to Syria and Iraq .
Some may try to come home , but others may end up fostering new networks which create problems elsewhere .
The danger is that there may be an increasing number of Indian and Central Asian links to plots outside their regions .
Earlier this year , German authorities disrupted a network of Tajiks linked to cells in Albania and in contact with the Islamic State in both Afghanistan and Syria .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ an attack in Europe .
Other Central Asian cells have been reportedly disrupted across Europe , and authorities in Ukraine have made numerous arrests of fighters fleeing the collapsing battlefield in Syria .
India has seen less such activity , though there were Indian links to the 2019 Sri Lanka Easter attacks .
Like many violent Islamist extremists , a Southern Indian cell involved appears to have followed the sermons of Indian prominent extremist preacher Zakir Naik , whose speeches have helped radicalize numerous different jihadists around the world .
Most of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the extreme right—something that is understandable given the deeply polarized political environment in the western world .
But violent Islamist threats have not gone away , and are transforming .
The story of Central Asian and Indian jihadism is one that has historically received too little attention .
Emerging from domestic environments that are creating more opportunities for disenfranchisement and radicalization to take place , they are exactly the sort of threats which may slip under the radar until it is too late .

As white nationalists across the world have gained prominence through racist, Islamophobic and anti-Semitic acts, the world’s focus on terrorism seems to have shifted. Many experts on extremism now focus heavily on the far-right in its many incarnations as an important driver of terrorist threat. But this myopic approach ignores the dynamism that the Islamic State injected into the international jihadist movement, and the long-term repercussions of the networks it built. In particular, the Indian and Central Asian linkages that the group fostered are already having repercussions beyond the region.
As white nationalists across the world have gained prominence through racist, Islamophobic and anti-Semitic acts, the world’s focus on terrorism seems to have shifted. Many experts on extremism now focus heavily on the far-right in its many incarnations as an important driver of terrorist threat. But this myopic approach ignores the dynamism that the Islamic State injected into the international jihadist movement, and the long-term repercussions of the networks it built. In particular, the Indian and Central Asian linkages that the group fostered are already having repercussions beyond the region.
This threat emerged most recently with the attack by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) on Jalalabad prison in early August. The attack showed a level of ambition that distinguished the group from many of the Islamic State’s other regional affiliates. Part of a bigger global push to do something about colleagues rotting in prisons, it was also a way of signaling how the group’s approach to freeing its prisoners differed from the Taliban’s. In ISKP’s eyes, the Taliban are in essence surrendering in their peace negotiations with the U.S. government. But the most interesting aspect of the attack was the roster of fighters involved—a multinational group that included Afghans, Indians, Tajiks, and Pakistanis.
While at first glance this seems unsurprising, the presence of Central Asians and Indians in transnational attacks is a relatively new phenomenon that reflects a shifting pattern in jihadism linked to the Islamic State. Some of the group’s most dramatic attacks—like the Easter 2019 Sri Lanka bombings, the attack on a Turkish nightclub on New Year’s Eve 2017, or the 2017 truck attacks in New York City and Stockholm—revealed jihadism’s persistent appeal to a global audience. Indeed, the rise of Central and South Asian cohorts to the front rank of attack planning is a development with potentially worrying consequences.
Jihadist ideas are not new to Central Asia or India. The civil war in 1990s Tajikistan that broke out in the wake of the country’s emancipation from the Soviet Union was an early post-Cold War battlefield which included jihadist elements. Fighters used northern Afghanistan as a base from which to fight in Tajikistan.
While most of the support for the fighting in Tajikistan emerged from communities in northern Afghanistan who went on to fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban, some disillusioned fighters in the conflict ended up fighting alongside al Qaeda. And for a while, assessments of where al Qaeda would go after its ejection from Afghanistan post-9/11 focused on the Fergana Valley, a region spanning Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan that is home to conservative communities who have clashed with their respective capitals. Groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jund al Khilafah, the Islamic Jihad Union or various Tajikistani groups provided networks that helped Central Asians get involved in fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But these networks were relatively limited in their impact.
India was the birthplace of the Deobandi movement, a sect that was a source of ideas for the Taliban, and the conflict in Kashmir has for years been a rallying cry for extremist groups
India’s history of jihadism goes back even further. The country was the birthplace of the Deobandi movement, a sect that was a source of ideas for the Taliban among others. And the conflict in Kashmir has long been held up by extremist groups as one of the world’s most long-standing unresolved jihadi conflicts. While most Kashmiris are nationalists furious at New Delhi, their conflict is one that is regularly adopted as a rallying cry by extremists who point to it as one of the many places where Muslims are being abused.
Yet notwithstanding this heritage, neither India nor Central Asia has historically produced many figures in the international jihadist movement, launching attacks far from their borders. Indians have stayed involved in networks in India, or occasionally Pakistan. Central Asians have shown up in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but rarely farther afield. That is changing.
A major attraction drawing young men and women to jihadism has always been the idea of participating in a transnational religious movement and an epic global struggle. To focus only on a parochial local level misses the larger canvas of their narratives. This appears to be a gap that the Islamic State identified and filled.
A major turning point in Indian and Central Asian involvement in the global jihadist movement was Syria. A cauldron that continues to draw people in, it is a clear and significant marker in the international jihadist story. The battlefield was one that drew in Muslims from almost 100 different countries and from every continent. This included Indians and Central Asians, though their experiences were markedly different.
The Central Asians integrated well into the conflict, serving alongside both Islamic State and al Qaeda-affiliated groups. For example, Tajikistani former Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov rose to be a senior Islamic State commander. Large groups of Central Asians fought on the battlefield. In contrast, the few Indians who made it to the Levant had a different experience. Many received bad treatment at the hands of their Arab hosts, who tended to look down on them—reflecting the status of South Asians as poor laborers in much of the Arab world. This racism did not stop a significant number of Indians being drawn to the group, however. A more thriving community of Indian fighters made it to the conflict in Afghanistan to fight alongside ISKP there.
Since the Islamic State’s emergence, Central Asians have been involved in repeated attacks in Turkey, including the assault on Istanbul’s Ataturk Airport in June 2016 and the high-profile massacre at the city’s Reina nightclub on New Year’s Eve 2017, as well as attacks using vehicles that were driven into crowds in 2017 in Stockholm in April, and New York City on Halloween that year, as well as an underground bombing in St. Petersburg.
For Indians, the international role has been more limited, with Indians for the most part appearing in attacks in Afghanistan and in limited numbers on the battlefield in Syria. The attack on the prison in Jalalabad follows the earlier decision by ISKP to use an Indian fighter to attack a Sikh gurdwara—a place of worship—in Kabul. Seen as “polytheists,” Sikhs are regarded as an acceptable target by the Islamic State like many other religious groups, though the decision to use an Indian attacker likely reflected a desire by the group to highlight their connection to India in particular.
The Islamic State officially announced the creation of an affiliate in India last year but has been hinting about involvement in Kashmir for years. The group was likely in part rejected by local Kashmiris who have long seen foreign Islamists as complicating factors in their struggles against the Indian state. However, it now seems as though the group is quite openly talking about its involvement. Al Naba, the Islamic State’s regular publication, recently listed the martyrdom notices of three Kashmiris who had reportedly fallen fighting for the group. These individuals join the growing numbers of Keralans and other Indians who are now reported to have died or fought alongside the Islamic State.
While the absolute numbers are small, this is an entirely new trend. Indians involved in external jihadist attacks have until now been the exception. The few Indians who pursued jihad tended to do it at home in a limited fashion, often with links across the border to Pakistan. Only a few ventured beyond, like Dhiren Barot, a British-raised Hindu convert who was close to 9/11 organizer Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and was ultimately jailed for a plot to detonate a bomb in the U.K. in 2005.
This is surprising, considering that India is home to the world’s third-largest Muslim community. However, today’s new generation of jihadists, is driven by a range of economic, political, and ideological factors.
Both Central Asia and India are home to large communities of young men who go and work abroad, sending home remittances that are a crucial pillar of local economies. It is often among these diaspora communities where radicalization takes place—for the Indians in the Gulf, for the Central Asians in Russia. In the COVID-blighted world, this workflow has slowed down, hurting economies, but also creating a pool of underemployed young men at home and abroad.
In the COVID-blighted world, opportunities to work abroad have dried up—hurting economies and creating a pool of underemployed young men at home and abroad.
This comes in the context of a tense political environment. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has advanced a series of policies promoting a Hindu nationalist narrative openly hostile toward Muslims. There has since been a notable uptick in jihadist propaganda toward India. In Central Asia, governments may not be stoking the same fires, but there has been an active pursuit of political opponents across the region. While there are numerous programs in place seeking to counter violent extremism, it is not always clear how effective they are, nor is it clear they are able to deal with problems of radicalization amongst diaspora communities.
And there is the continuing question of what will happen to the fighters from these countries who went to Syria and Iraq. Some may try to come home, but others may end up fostering new networks which create problems elsewhere.
The danger is that there may be an increasing number of Indian and Central Asian links to plots outside their regions. Earlier this year, German authorities disrupted a network of Tajiks linked to cells in Albania and in contact with the Islamic State in both Afghanistan and Syria. They were reportedly under orders to launch an attack in Europe. Other Central Asian cells have been reportedly disrupted across Europe, and authorities in Ukraine have made numerous arrests of fighters fleeing the collapsing battlefield in Syria.
India has seen less such activity, though there were Indian links to the 2019 Sri Lanka Easter attacks. Like many violent Islamist extremists, a Southern Indian cell involved appears to have followed the sermons of Indian prominent extremist preacher Zakir Naik, whose speeches have helped radicalize numerous different jihadists around the world.
Most of the current attention on new terrorist groups focuses on the extreme right—something that is understandable given the deeply polarized political environment in the western world. But violent Islamist threats have not gone away, and are transforming. The story of Central Asian and Indian jihadism is one that has historically received too little attention. Emerging from domestic environments that are creating more opportunities for disenfranchisement and radicalization to take place, they are exactly the sort of threats which may slip under the radar until it is too late.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-08--Greece’s Golden Dawn Ruled a Criminal Organization

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Golden Dawn ’ s leadership is convicted of operating the party as a criminal organization , Mike Pence and Kamala Harris spar over foreign policy , and Kuwait ’ s new leader appoints a new heir apparent .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The leaders of Greece ’ s Golden Dawn political party were found guilty on Wednesday of a range of criminal activity , including using the party as cover to run a criminal organization .
A court in Athens ruled that acts of violence committed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and left-wing activists were consciously planned and executed by the party leadership as a way of eliminating perceived threats .
The ruling followed a trial that lasted five-and-a-half years .
Several dozen party members and associates , including 18 former lawmakers and party leader Nikos Michaloliakos , were found guilty on a variety of charges , including murder , attempted murder , assault , and possession of weapons .
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said in response to the ruling that “ as prime minister , I consciously refrain from commenting on court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , I share the universal satisfaction for the recognition of its criminal character.
” National celebration .
Tens of thousands of people gathered outside the courthouse to await the verdict .
When the news came , the crowds erupted in applause and cheers .
“ The mood here today is resonant of the celebrations we saw with the liberation of Athens from the Nazis .
It ’ s a great day , ” said Petros Constantinou , a leading anti-racism activist .
Victory over the far-right .
For proponents of liberal democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over what was once considered one of Europe ’ s most prominent far-right forces .
Golden Dawn was formed as an ultranationalist neo-Nazi organization in the 1980s , but rose to national prominence in the early 2010s in the aftermath of the Great Recession .
It won 21 seats in the country ’ s parliament after the 2012 elections and largely maintained that support until getting swept at the polls in elections last year .
New beginning .
Wednesday ’ s ruling combined with the victory of the center-right New Democracy party over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s elections reflects the remarkable stabilization of Greece ’ s political system just a few years after it appeared to be on the verge of total collapse .
Although most other far-right parties in Europe distanced themselves from Golden Dawn , Greece ’ s experience could offer important lessons to other European leaders battling neo-fascists within their own borders .
VP candidates talk foreign policy .
In a presidential campaign that has been dominated by domestic issues , U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and Democratic VP candidate Kamala Harris broke the mold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ night ’ s vice presidential debate discussing foreign policy .
Harris reiterated Democratic nominee Joe Biden ’ s commitment to restoring the United States ’ relationships with its most trusted allies abroad .
“ Foreign policy is about relationships , ” she said .
“ You got ta keep your word to your friends .
You got ta be loyal to your friends … But what we have seen with [ President Donald ] Trump is that he has betrayed our friends and embraced dictators around the world.
” Pence , for his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s notable foreign-policy achievements , including the assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani , the killing of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi , and the supposed defeat of the Islamic State itself .
But when the question of China came up , neither Pence nor Harris were willing to clarify their views on Beijing .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Michael Hirsh wrote , “ both of them gingerly avoided [ debate moderator Susan ] Page ’ s question about whether Beijing was an adversary or competitor.
” The debate left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pence deflected questions about Trump ’ s record on the coronavirus pandemic , blaming China for causing the outbreak and promising a vaccine in the near future ; Harris refused to answer a question from Pence about whether Biden would appoint additional justices to the Supreme Court if Trump nominee Amy Coney Barrett is confirmed by the Senate .
New Kuwaiti crown prince .
Kuwait ’ s Emir Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah has named Sheikh Meshal al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah crown prince , ending speculation over who the country ’ s new leader would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the deputy head of the country ’ s National Guard and was the oldest candidate under consideration for the post .
The decision is a sign that Kuwait ’ s new leadership ’ s approach to foreign and domestic policy will change little from that of Nawaf ’ s half-brother and predecessor , Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah , who died last week .
Although Nawaf has spent several decades in leadership positions , he is known for his low public profile , leading many observers to speculate that his crown prince @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestic and international politics .
Disarray in Kyrgyzstan .
The opposition in Kyrgyzstan can ’ t agree on a way forward after toppling the government of Prime Minister Kubatbek Boronov on Tuesday .
Under immense pressure to resign , President Sooronbay Jeenbekov called for all-party talks to hammer out a resolution .
He met with the representatives of eight opposition parties on Wednesday , though several important parties were left out of the mix .
Two rival candidates for the premiership emerged during the talks , emphasizing the differences that still remain .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to crises in other post-Soviet republics , but as Colleen Wood argues in Foreign Policy , the situation in Kyrgyzstan is driven by internal factors and focusing on the wider international dimension is misplaced .
Unrest in Indonesia over new labor law .
Hundreds of people were arrested in Indonesia during protests against a controversial new labor law passed by the government on Monday .
Demonstrations were reported in at least 12 locations on Wednesday , and police resorted to tear gas and water cannons to disperse protesters .
The legislation has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it is key to deregulating the country ’ s economy and opening it to foreign investment .
Labor unions were angered by the passage of the law , however , arguing that it favors business and negatively impacts both workers and the environment .
EU to consider sanctions on Russia .
Germany and France will propose to the European Union a new round of sanctions on Russian individuals who are known to be involved in developing nerve agents like Novichok in response to the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been provided by Russia so far .
In this context , we consider that there is no other plausible explanation for Mr Navalny ’ s poisoning than a Russian involvement and responsibility , ” Foreign Ministers Jean-Yves Le Drian and Heiko Maas said in a joint statement .
Since leaving the German hospital where he was being treated last month , Navalny has struck out against the Russian government and , in particular , President Vladimir Putin for the attack .
“ I assert that Putin is behind this act , I don @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he said in an interview last week .
QAnon online crackdown .
Facebook has banned groups , pages , and accounts propagating the QAnon conspiracy theory on its platforms on Wednesday , representing one of the strongest efforts by the tech giant to crack down on individuals and groups linked to the conspiracy theory .
“ Starting today , we will remove any Facebook Pages , Groups and Instagram accounts representing QAnon , even if they contain no violent content , ” it said in a statement .
QAnon believers insist that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an ultra elite consisting of child sex traffickers , and that only Trump can uncover and defeat it .
As Justin Ling wrote in Foreign Policy , QAnon is a powerful cult-like conspiracy theory rooted in decades of right-wing ideas about power , government , and society .
Renewed clashes in Yemen port city .
Violent clashes between the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels continued in the port city of Hodeida for the fifth straight day on Wednesday , representing the city ’ s worst round of violence between the two sides in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dead and 70 more wounded , including dozens of civilian casualties .
Violence has taken place in Hodeida and the surrounding area as Houthi rebels attempt to break a siege on the town of Durayhimi .
On Monday , the United Nations urged both sides to “ immediately stop the fighting and return to the joint mechanisms established over the last two years so as not to put the population at further risk and jeopardize the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
” Mark Ruffalo , Sarah Silverman , and several other celebrities made the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a video urging U.S. citizens to check the rules around mail-in voting in their states .
The twist—they were all naked .
The video was mocked as crude and indecent by right-wing commentators , but it created a buzz among left-wing social media users who considered it a creative way to draw attention to serious issues around mail-in voting .
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Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Golden Dawn's leadership is convicted of operating the party as a criminal organization, Mike Pence and Kamala Harris spar over foreign policy, and Kuwait’s new leader appoints a new heir apparent.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Golden Dawn’s leadership is convicted of operating the party as a criminal organization, Mike Pence and Kamala Harris spar over foreign policy, and Kuwait’s new leader appoints a new heir apparent.
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Greek Neofascist Party’s Demise Is a Win for Liberal Democracy
The leaders of Greece’s Golden Dawn political party were found guilty on Wednesday of a range of criminal activity, including using the party as cover to run a criminal organization. A court in Athens ruled that acts of violence committed by members of Golden Dawn against migrants and left-wing activists were consciously planned and executed by the party leadership as a way of eliminating perceived threats.
The ruling followed a trial that lasted five-and-a-half years. Several dozen party members and associates, including 18 former lawmakers and party leader Nikos Michaloliakos, were found guilty on a variety of charges, including murder, attempted murder, assault, and possession of weapons.
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said in response to the ruling that “as prime minister, I consciously refrain from commenting on court decisions. As a Greek citizen, however, I share the universal satisfaction for the recognition of its criminal character.”
National celebration. Tens of thousands of people gathered outside the courthouse to await the verdict. When the news came, the crowds erupted in applause and cheers. “The mood here today is resonant of the celebrations we saw with the liberation of Athens from the Nazis. It’s a great day,” said Petros Constantinou, a leading anti-racism activist.
Victory over the far-right. For proponents of liberal democracy, the ruling represents a significant victory over what was once considered one of Europe’s most prominent far-right forces. Golden Dawn was formed as an ultranationalist neo-Nazi organization in the 1980s, but rose to national prominence in the early 2010s in the aftermath of the Great Recession. It won 21 seats in the country’s parliament after the 2012 elections and largely maintained that support until getting swept at the polls in elections last year.
New beginning. Wednesday’s ruling combined with the victory of the center-right New Democracy party over the left-wing populist Syriza in last year’s elections reflects the remarkable stabilization of Greece’s political system just a few years after it appeared to be on the verge of total collapse. Although most other far-right parties in Europe distanced themselves from Golden Dawn, Greece’s experience could offer important lessons to other European leaders battling neo-fascists within their own borders.
What We’re Following Today
VP candidates talk foreign policy. In a presidential campaign that has been dominated by domestic issues, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and Democratic VP candidate Kamala Harris broke the mold by spending an extensive portion of Wednesday night’s vice presidential debate discussing foreign policy. Harris reiterated Democratic nominee Joe Biden’s commitment to restoring the United States’ relationships with its most trusted allies abroad. “Foreign policy is about relationships,” she said. “You gotta keep your word to your friends. You gotta be loyal to your friends … But what we have seen with [President Donald] Trump is that he has betrayed our friends and embraced dictators around the world.”
Pence, for his part, touted some of Trump’s notable foreign-policy achievements, including the assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the killing of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the supposed defeat of the Islamic State itself. But when the question of China came up, neither Pence nor Harris were willing to clarify their views on Beijing. As Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh wrote, “both of them gingerly avoided [debate moderator Susan] Page’s question about whether Beijing was an adversary or competitor.”
The debate left other important questions unanswered as well. Pence deflected questions about Trump’s record on the coronavirus pandemic, blaming China for causing the outbreak and promising a vaccine in the near future; Harris refused to answer a question from Pence about whether Biden would appoint additional justices to the Supreme Court if Trump nominee Amy Coney Barrett is confirmed by the Senate.
New Kuwaiti crown prince. Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah has named Sheikh Meshal al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah crown prince, ending speculation over who the country’s new leader would appoint as his heir apparent. Meshal is the deputy head of the country’s National Guard and was the oldest candidate under consideration for the post. The decision is a sign that Kuwait’s new leadership’s approach to foreign and domestic policy will change little from that of Nawaf’s half-brother and predecessor, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, who died last week.
Although Nawaf has spent several decades in leadership positions, he is known for his low public profile, leading many observers to speculate that his crown prince would take on an outsized role in domestic and international politics.
Disarray in Kyrgyzstan. The opposition in Kyrgyzstan can’t agree on a way forward after toppling the government of Prime Minister Kubatbek Boronov on Tuesday. Under immense pressure to resign, President Sooronbay Jeenbekov called for all-party talks to hammer out a resolution. He met with the representatives of eight opposition parties on Wednesday, though several important parties were left out of the mix. Two rival candidates for the premiership emerged during the talks, emphasizing the differences that still remain.
The unrest gripping Kyrgyzstan has drawn comparisons to crises in other post-Soviet republics, but as Colleen Wood argues in Foreign Policy, the situation in Kyrgyzstan is driven by internal factors and focusing on the wider international dimension is misplaced.
Unrest in Indonesia over new labor law. Hundreds of people were arrested in Indonesia during protests against a controversial new labor law passed by the government on Monday. Demonstrations were reported in at least 12 locations on Wednesday, and police resorted to tear gas and water cannons to disperse protesters. The legislation has been championed by President Joko Widodo who argues that it is key to deregulating the country’s economy and opening it to foreign investment. Labor unions were angered by the passage of the law, however, arguing that it favors business and negatively impacts both workers and the environment.
Keep an Eye On
EU to consider sanctions on Russia. Germany and France will propose to the European Union a new round of sanctions on Russian individuals who are known to be involved in developing nerve agents like Novichok in response to the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny last month. “No credible explanation has been provided by Russia so far. In this context, we consider that there is no other plausible explanation for Mr Navalny’s poisoning than a Russian involvement and responsibility,” Foreign Ministers Jean-Yves Le Drian and Heiko Maas said in a joint statement.
Since leaving the German hospital where he was being treated last month, Navalny has struck out against the Russian government and, in particular, President Vladimir Putin for the attack. “I assert that Putin is behind this act, I don’t see any other explanation,” he said in an interview last week.
QAnon online crackdown. Facebook has banned groups, pages, and accounts propagating the QAnon conspiracy theory on its platforms on Wednesday, representing one of the strongest efforts by the tech giant to crack down on individuals and groups linked to the conspiracy theory. “Starting today, we will remove any Facebook Pages, Groups and Instagram accounts representing QAnon, even if they contain no violent content,” it said in a statement.
QAnon believers insist that the U.S. federal government is controlled by an ultra elite consisting of child sex traffickers, and that only Trump can uncover and defeat it. As Justin Ling wrote in Foreign Policy, QAnon is a powerful cult-like conspiracy theory rooted in decades of right-wing ideas about power, government, and society.
Renewed clashes in Yemen port city. Violent clashes between the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels continued in the port city of Hodeida for the fifth straight day on Wednesday, representing the city’s worst round of violence between the two sides in months. The fighting left 52 people dead and 70 more wounded, including dozens of civilian casualties. Violence has taken place in Hodeida and the surrounding area as Houthi rebels attempt to break a siege on the town of Durayhimi.
On Monday, the United Nations urged both sides to “immediately stop the fighting and return to the joint mechanisms established over the last two years so as not to put the population at further risk and jeopardize the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”
Odds and Ends
Mark Ruffalo, Sarah Silverman, and several other celebrities made the rounds on Twitter on Wednesday after appearing in a video urging U.S. citizens to check the rules around mail-in voting in their states. The twist—they were all naked. The video was mocked as crude and indecent by right-wing commentators, but it created a buzz among left-wing social media users who considered it a creative way to draw attention to serious issues around mail-in voting.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-08--Macron’s Not Worried About Islam. He’s Worried About Le Pen.

Macron ’ s Not Worried About Islam .
He ’ s Worried About Le Pen .
Last Friday , French President Emmanuel Macron warned that a minority of France ’ s estimated 6 million Muslims could form a “ counter-society , ” and that Islam was facing a “ crisis ” all around the world , before unveiling his plan to tackle what he considered to be a “ parallel society ” in France .
It ’ s not a new argument in the country , which has the largest Muslim population in Western Europe .
Macron has another , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ credentials in a populist political environment at the expense of an already embattled French Muslim minority .
Ironically , Macron has failed to recognize that the cardinal principle of separation between church and state in France ( laicité ) and the state ’ s neutrality toward organized religion actually prohibit him from engaging in what is essentially a community ’ s own private religious discourse .
But the situation is far more serious than that .
It was only last year that Guardian ran a piece titled , “ The myth of Eurabia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mainstream.
” But the idea has been around for two decades , coined by Gisèle Littman ( otherwise known as Bat Yeor ) , who has earned as much academic criticism debunking her concept , as she has invited fandom on the far-right , including from the Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik .
The idea feeds a very simple falsehood : Muslims are in Europe to engage in a culture war to overturn European values , and white Christians have to fight to save their civilization .
It ’ s a wild @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which is all about “ Muslim separatism , ” moved from the fringes to the mainstream a long time ago and has infected the left and the right in French politics and beyond .
It can be debated who is most responsible for beginning this discourse in France , but any list would have to include the likes of the commentator Éric Zemmour and the author Renaud Camus , who coined the theory of the “ Great Replacement , ” which has gone onto inspire many on the far-right worldwide .
Macron ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that mainstreaming far beyond the fringes .
There are , of course , plenty of crises facing Muslims worldwide , both as national populations and as a confessional community .
For example , huge swaths of Muslim populations live under authoritarian and autocratic regimes , which is a crisis of its own , though not an inevitable one .
( And it ’ s not clear that Macron ’ s foreign policy views such regimes as problematic ; indeed , it ’ s quite likely that he believes the contrary ) .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ governance for Muslim populations worldwide , it would have significant repercussions for French foreign policy ; his failure to prioritize it makes his talk of a crisis in Islam less convincing .
Muslim scholars regularly talk about the “ crisis of authority ” within religious education and the lack of sufficient investment into revitalizing different educational establishments as they try to recover from the legacy of colonial rule .
Incidentally , Macron has not , to my knowledge , brought up the history of French colonialism in that regard , which is definitely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Africa had a salient negative impact on different Muslim religious establishments , making those religious authorities less equipped to deal with the challenges of the modern world .
That legacy plays into the ideology of extremists , as do the authoritarian politics of the region .
But these aren ’ t the crises that Macron or other European politicians are complaining about .
Macron ’ s statements are simply an attempt to appeal to right-wing voters ahead of the 2022 presidential election , where he is currently polling neck and neck with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who is not afraid to blame Muslims for all of France ’ s ills .
Perhaps Macron genuinely believes his narrative about a crisis—but it doesn ’ t really matter .
What matters is that far too many prominent European Union politicians , including those committed to liberal democratic values , no longer pause before pinning the blame for social problems on Muslim minorities .
Doing so is likely to get politicians more , not less , votes .
Genuine political leadership would mean countering that trend—not riding it .
Far too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those committed to liberal democratic values , no longer pause before pinning the blame for social problems on Muslim minorities .
As Rim-Sarah Alouane , a French legal scholar at the Toulouse 1 Capitole University argued : “ Anti-Muslim bigotry is a business model in France : It boosts audiences on 24/7 news networks , and it allows politicians to be more visible .
The far-right might not be in power in France , but its spirit definitely is.
” And if the choice once again comes down to Macron and the far-right @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be asked to vote to save the republic when Le Pen reaches the second round of the election.
” Macron ’ s political party , En Marche , occupies the center ground of French politics—and that ’ s precisely why his discourse , and that of a number of lawmakers in his party , is so concerning .
A couple of decades ago , a politician insisting that “ Islam is a religion that is in crisis all over the world today , ” would have most definitely been from a far-right party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for someone declaring that the hijab was “ not in accordance with the civility of our country , ” but Macron said that two years ago .
It would have been astounding not so long ago for anyone but a supporter of the far-right to say , “ I can not accept that someone comes to participate in our work at the National Assembly wearing a hijab.
” But those are the words of another well-known member of the French Parliament who is in Macron ’ s centrist political party , Anne-Christine Lang @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack was aimed at an elected student leader , who was visiting her country ’ s Parliament and participating fully as a citizen .
For the supposed defenders of the secular republic , veils seem to matter more than civic values and individual freedoms .
For all the talk about separatism in France , more attention is given to Muslims in headscarves who are carrying out their civic duties than far-right populists who are actually committing crimes or violating the law—like the former member of Le Pen ’ s party who tried to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then proceeded to shoot two men who sought to stop him .
As Alouane put it : “ Not once has Macron mentioned the threat of white supremacy and the ultra-right , even though the racist so-called theory of the ‘ great replacement ’ has been developed in France and has been used by the terrorist who committed the horrific massacre in Christchurch.
” Depicting Muslims as a problem in the public sphere pays dividends at the polls in France and elsewhere in Europe—and it may win Macron a second term .
Unfortunately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minority , the French Muslim population , who will pay the price .

Last Friday, French President Emmanuel Macron warned that a minority of France’s estimated 6 million Muslims could form a “counter-society,” and that Islam was facing a “crisis” all around the world, before unveiling his plan to tackle what he considered to be a “parallel society” in France.
Last Friday, French President Emmanuel Macron warned that a minority of France’s estimated 6 million Muslims could form a “counter-society,” and that Islam was facing a “crisis” all around the world, before unveiling his plan to tackle what he considered to be a “parallel society” in France.
It’s not a new argument in the country, which has the largest Muslim population in Western Europe. Macron has another, singular purpose: to brandish his tough-on-Islam credentials in a populist political environment at the expense of an already embattled French Muslim minority.
Ironically, Macron has failed to recognize that the cardinal principle of separation between church and state in France (laicité) and the state’s neutrality toward organized religion actually prohibit him from engaging in what is essentially a community’s own private religious discourse. But the situation is far more serious than that.
It was only last year that Guardian ran a piece titled, “The myth of Eurabia: how a far-right conspiracy theory went mainstream.” But the idea has been around for two decades, coined by Gisèle Littman (otherwise known as Bat Yeor), who has earned as much academic criticism debunking her concept, as she has invited fandom on the far-right, including from the Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik.
The idea feeds a very simple falsehood: Muslims are in Europe to engage in a culture war to overturn European values, and white Christians have to fight to save their civilization. It’s a wild theory, but its respectable form, which is all about “Muslim separatism,” moved from the fringes to the mainstream a long time ago and has infected the left and the right in French politics and beyond.
It can be debated who is most responsible for beginning this discourse in France, but any list would have to include the likes of the commentator Éric Zemmour and the author Renaud Camus, who coined the theory of the “Great Replacement,” which has gone onto inspire many on the far-right worldwide. Macron’s statements are yet more evidence of that mainstreaming far beyond the fringes.
There are, of course, plenty of crises facing Muslims worldwide, both as national populations and as a confessional community. For example, huge swaths of Muslim populations live under authoritarian and autocratic regimes, which is a crisis of its own, though not an inevitable one. (And it’s not clear that Macron’s foreign policy views such regimes as problematic; indeed, it’s quite likely that he believes the contrary). If Macron took seriously the issue of good governance for Muslim populations worldwide, it would have significant repercussions for French foreign policy; his failure to prioritize it makes his talk of a crisis in Islam less convincing.
Muslim scholars regularly talk about the “crisis of authority” within religious education and the lack of sufficient investment into revitalizing different educational establishments as they try to recover from the legacy of colonial rule. Incidentally, Macron has not, to my knowledge, brought up the history of French colonialism in that regard, which is definitely pertinent, given that French rule in North Africa had a salient negative impact on different Muslim religious establishments, making those religious authorities less equipped to deal with the challenges of the modern world.
That legacy plays into the ideology of extremists, as do the authoritarian politics of the region.
But these aren’t the crises that Macron or other European politicians are complaining about. Macron’s statements are simply an attempt to appeal to right-wing voters ahead of the 2022 presidential election, where he is currently polling neck and neck with far-right National Rally leader Marine Le Pen, who is not afraid to blame Muslims for all of France’s ills.
Perhaps Macron genuinely believes his narrative about a crisis—but it doesn’t really matter. What matters is that far too many prominent European Union politicians, including those committed to liberal democratic values, no longer pause before pinning the blame for social problems on Muslim minorities. Doing so is likely to get politicians more, not less, votes. Genuine political leadership would mean countering that trend—not riding it.
Far too many prominent European Union politicians, including those committed to liberal democratic values, no longer pause before pinning the blame for social problems on Muslim minorities.
As Rim-Sarah Alouane, a French legal scholar at the Toulouse 1 Capitole University argued: “Anti-Muslim bigotry is a business model in France: It boosts audiences on 24/7 news networks, and it allows politicians to be more visible. The far-right might not be in power in France, but its spirit definitely is.” And if the choice once again comes down to Macron and the far-right, she added, “you will be asked to vote to save the republic when Le Pen reaches the second round of the election.”
Macron’s political party, En Marche, occupies the center ground of French politics—and that’s precisely why his discourse, and that of a number of lawmakers in his party, is so concerning. A couple of decades ago, a politician insisting that “Islam is a religion that is in crisis all over the world today,” would have most definitely been from a far-right party. The same would have been true for someone declaring that the hijab was “not in accordance with the civility of our country,” but Macron said that two years ago.
It would have been astounding not so long ago for anyone but a supporter of the far-right to say, “I cannot accept that someone comes to participate in our work at the National Assembly wearing a hijab.” But those are the words of another well-known member of the French Parliament who is in Macron’s centrist political party, Anne-Christine Lang.
Even worse, Lang’s attack was aimed at an elected student leader, who was visiting her country’s Parliament and participating fully as a citizen. For the supposed defenders of the secular republic, veils seem to matter more than civic values and individual freedoms.
For all the talk about separatism in France, more attention is given to Muslims in headscarves who are carrying out their civic duties than far-right populists who are actually committing crimes or violating the law—like the former member of Le Pen’s party who tried to set fire to a mosque, and then proceeded to shoot two men who sought to stop him.
As Alouane put it: “Not once has Macron mentioned the threat of white supremacy and the ultra-right, even though the racist so-called theory of the ‘great replacement’ has been developed in France and has been used by the terrorist who committed the horrific massacre in Christchurch.”
Depicting Muslims as a problem in the public sphere pays dividends at the polls in France and elsewhere in Europe—and it may win Macron a second term. Unfortunately, it will be an already embattled minority, the French Muslim population, who will pay the price.