foreignpolicy--2020-07-16--Twitter Got Lucky With the Great Bitcoin Heist

Twitter Got Lucky With the Great Bitcoin Heist There is no such thing as getting rich quick .
But times are tough , and people are desperate .
Tell the powerless that there ’ s a magic trick to winning that the big guys aren ’ t telling you about , and you ’ ll get them in—or enough of them to be worth trying .
And that ’ s particularly easy on a platform like Twitter , which mixes worryingly weak security with massive reach .
It ’ s even easier when you throw in Bitcoin ; its pool @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , scamming , and a near-magical belief in the cryptocurrency ’ s policies ; and Twitter ’ s long-standing tolerance for those scams .
On Wednesday afternoon , multiple accounts on Twitter began posting the same message : Send bitcoins to the address in the tweet , and you ’ ll get back double the bitcoins !
Initial tweets claimed to be linked to a fake charity , Crypto for Health .
The first wave of scam tweets went out from small Twitter accounts and then cryptocurrency CEOs .
A second wave went @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accounts that had been verified as authentic—including Elon Musk , Kanye West , Jeff Bezos , Bill Gates , Joe Biden , and Barack Obama .
Donald Trump wasn ’ t hit , as his account has extra protections after previous attacks .
Twitter seemed powerless to stop the tweets ; for a short time , the platform even disabled all verified accounts .
Eventually , the perpetrator was found to be working via compromised Twitter employee accounts , using an internal administrative console that was widely accessible inside the company .
Twitter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the tool in question .
All scams are old scams .
The words “ double your money ” are perfectly designed to catch the eye of the gullible .
These days , money moves at the speed of light .
So the scams work as a widely spammed numbers game : If you come up with something that looks like an obvious scam , only the gullible respond .
Bitcoin was designed to be unstoppable electronic money , with no central controller .
Nobody can stop you sending your bitcoins anywhere you want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ design—a feature that was argued to be one of Bitcoin ’ s advantages .
Bitcoin doublers have been around since bitcoins could first be exchanged for real money—and earlier versions of the doubling scam ran in online games , such as “ ISK doublers ” in Eve Online or “ coin doublers ” in RuneScape .
Send in a small amount of bitcoins , and you ’ ll get double the coins back !
Send a larger amount straight after , and you won ’ t .
No reason is given for why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ You ’ d think people would catch on , but , years later , this scam keeps popping up and finding suckers .
After the scam runs for the first time , there ’ s often a second layer : The doubler never sends back coins .
But the doubling site is publicized with a “ warning ” about the scam .
Others think : “ If I only send coins once , the site will never see me as a repeat user !
” They send in a small amount of coins—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Like all the best scams , it ’ s a scam that relies on the sucker thinking they ’ re the scammer .
Fraud , crime , and ransomware make up a significant part of all Bitcoin usage .
A payment channel having substantial—and , worse yet , famous—criminal usage is a serious problem .
Many banks are reluctant even to let Bitcoin users bank with them because dirty money is pervasive in the crypto-trading system , with no easy way to sort out what ’ s clean .
E-Gold , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did not verify account holders ’ identities—and became famous for criminal use , eBay auction fraud , and internet-based Ponzi schemes .
E-Gold was shut down in 2007 , and the founder pleaded guilty to unlicensed money transmission and conspiracy to engage in money laundering .
But more worrying than Bitcoin ’ s problems are Twitter ’ s .
The social media platform has let coin doubling scams for Ethereum , another prominent cryptocurrency , run rampant for the past few years .
Tweet with an avatar and a display name imitating some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ double people ’ s ether .
Add some replies thanking the famous person for the money .
These could pull in up to $ 5,000 a day in ether .
Ethereum ’ s creator , Vitalik Buterin , eventually added “ Not giving away ETH ” to his Twitter display name for a time .
Elon Musk has long been another favorite target—to the point where Twitter would stop users from changing their display name to “ Elon Musk.
” One 2018 Musk scam pulled in $ 180,000 in bitcoins .
Twitter has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the past .
But arguably it got lucky this time around because this Bitcoin hacker was so startlingly unimaginative .
The hacker took control of an administrative panel giving full control over almost every account on Twitter ’ s service .
They could post anything they liked to hugely popular verified Twitter accounts , for important and powerful people .
The hacker could have influenced markets and politics with carefully applied tweets—and the first thing they did with this power was to run a Bitcoin scam .
In 2013 , an attacker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and posted that the White House had been bombed and Barack Obama injured and Wall Street flash-crashed .
The present attacker could have hit just Musk ’ s account and crashed and short-sold Tesla stock , obscured among all the other Tesla short-sellers .
The present Twitter scammer used this amazing power to make approximately $ 110,000 worth of bitcoins—as visible on the public Bitcoin blockchain , which shows all transactions .
This is assuming that the scammer didn ’ t recirculate bitcoins into the scam , to make it look as though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coins were then sent out .
Even a fake charity tweet asking for wire transfers would have netted more than the hacker managed .
Some speculated that the attack was the hacker marketing themselves , by demonstrating what they could do .
But burning their own attack mechanism in a way that makes international news—and that hit the sort of people who have a Secret Service detail , thus attracting the utmost attention of the authorities—suggests instead that the hacker was just not very bright .
Throw in the possibility of law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to help trace the thieves , as happened in the Silk Road case , and the chance that this is somebody who got lucky , rather than an unknown genius , is high .
Scams are a natural byproduct of Bitcoin .
The real issue is Twitter ’ s responsibility .
Twitter has been asked previously to block cryptocurrency addresses from being tweeted , which would have nipped the scam in the bud .
Twitter has acknowledged it allowed far too many employees full access to an all-powerful administrative console .
This was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s personal data requires controls as strong as the controls on other people ’ s money .
Twitter now has to earn back the trust of the verified celebrity posters it relies on to lure mundane users to the platform—and of politicians , who are already asking pointed questions .
Twitter must review its internal controls and release a full root cause analysis .
Government services that use Twitter , which in the United States now span from the presidency on down to local police forces and fire departments , need to rethink @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doesn ’ t show massive improvement .
Wednesday ’ s shenanigans , for instance , locked down a local National Weather Service account—in the middle of a tornado warning .
The Bitcoin subculture is as certain as ever that any publicity is good publicity .
Tyler Winklevoss , of The Social Network fame , and his brother run the cryptocurrency exchange Gemini , whose Twitter account was one of those compromised .
Winklevoss tweeted : “ Bitcoin is trending.
” Never mind that it was trending because of massive fraud .
Twitter can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This disaster could have ended the company .
It was lucky to have such an attacker so unimaginatively committed to a deeply fraudulent currency this time .
It can ’ t expect to be so lucky next time .

There is no such thing as getting rich quick. But times are tough, and people are desperate. Tell the powerless that there’s a magic trick to winning that the big guys aren’t telling you about, and you’ll get them in—or enough of them to be worth trying. And that’s particularly easy on a platform like Twitter, which mixes worryingly weak security with massive reach. It’s even easier when you throw in Bitcoin; its pool of adherents who have long mixed credulity, scamming, and a near-magical belief in the cryptocurrency’s policies; and Twitter’s long-standing tolerance for those scams.
There is no such thing as getting rich quick. But times are tough, and people are desperate. Tell the powerless that there’s a magic trick to winning that the big guys aren’t telling you about, and you’ll get them in—or enough of them to be worth trying. And that’s particularly easy on a platform like Twitter, which mixes worryingly weak security with massive reach. It’s even easier when you throw in Bitcoin; its pool of adherents who have long mixed credulity, scamming, and a near-magical belief in the cryptocurrency’s policies; and Twitter’s long-standing tolerance for those scams.
On Wednesday afternoon, multiple accounts on Twitter began posting the same message: Send bitcoins to the address in the tweet, and you’ll get back double the bitcoins! Initial tweets claimed to be linked to a fake charity, Crypto for Health.
The first wave of scam tweets went out from small Twitter accounts and then cryptocurrency CEOs. A second wave went out from celebrities and politicians with Twitter accounts that had been verified as authentic—including Elon Musk, Kanye West, Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, Joe Biden, and Barack Obama. Donald Trump wasn’t hit, as his account has extra protections after previous attacks.
Twitter seemed powerless to stop the tweets; for a short time, the platform even disabled all verified accounts. Eventually, the perpetrator was found to be working via compromised Twitter employee accounts, using an internal administrative console that was widely accessible inside the company. Twitter said it would be restricting access to the tool in question.
All scams are old scams. The words “double your money” are perfectly designed to catch the eye of the gullible. These days, money moves at the speed of light. So the scams work as a widely spammed numbers game: If you come up with something that looks like an obvious scam, only the gullible respond.
Bitcoin was designed to be unstoppable electronic money, with no central controller. Nobody can stop you sending your bitcoins anywhere you want to, and transactions are irreversible by design—a feature that was argued to be one of Bitcoin’s advantages.
Bitcoin doublers have been around since bitcoins could first be exchanged for real money—and earlier versions of the doubling scam ran in online games, such as “ISK doublers” in Eve Online or “coin doublers” in RuneScape. Send in a small amount of bitcoins, and you’ll get double the coins back! Send a larger amount straight after, and you won’t.
No reason is given for why anyone would just double your money. You’d think people would catch on, but, years later, this scam keeps popping up and finding suckers.
After the scam runs for the first time, there’s often a second layer: The doubler never sends back coins. But the doubling site is publicized with a “warning” about the scam. Others think: “If I only send coins once, the site will never see me as a repeat user!” They send in a small amount of coins—and never get anything back, even once. Like all the best scams, it’s a scam that relies on the sucker thinking they’re the scammer.
Fraud, crime, and ransomware make up a significant part of all Bitcoin usage. A payment channel having substantial—and, worse yet, famous—criminal usage is a serious problem. Many banks are reluctant even to let Bitcoin users bank with them because dirty money is pervasive in the crypto-trading system, with no easy way to sort out what’s clean. E-Gold, which let you quickly send dollars online, did not verify account holders’ identities—and became famous for criminal use, eBay auction fraud, and internet-based Ponzi schemes. E-Gold was shut down in 2007, and the founder pleaded guilty to unlicensed money transmission and conspiracy to engage in money laundering.
But more worrying than Bitcoin’s problems are Twitter’s. The social media platform has let coin doubling scams for Ethereum, another prominent cryptocurrency, run rampant for the past few years. Tweet with an avatar and a display name imitating some famous person, saying you’ll double people’s ether. Add some replies thanking the famous person for the money. These could pull in up to $5,000 a day in ether. Ethereum’s creator, Vitalik Buterin, eventually added “Not giving away ETH” to his Twitter display name for a time.
Elon Musk has long been another favorite target—to the point where Twitter would stop users from changing their display name to “Elon Musk.” One 2018 Musk scam pulled in $180,000 in bitcoins.
Twitter has been slow to move on these scams in the past. But arguably it got lucky this time around because this Bitcoin hacker was so startlingly unimaginative. The hacker took control of an administrative panel giving full control over almost every account on Twitter’s service. They could post anything they liked to hugely popular verified Twitter accounts, for important and powerful people. The hacker could have influenced markets and politics with carefully applied tweets—and the first thing they did with this power was to run a Bitcoin scam.
In 2013, an attacker took over the Associated Press Twitter account and posted that the White House had been bombed and Barack Obama injured and Wall Street flash-crashed. The present attacker could have hit just Musk’s account and crashed and short-sold Tesla stock, obscured among all the other Tesla short-sellers.
The present Twitter scammer used this amazing power to make approximately $110,000 worth of bitcoins—as visible on the public Bitcoin blockchain, which shows all transactions. This is assuming that the scammer didn’t recirculate bitcoins into the scam, to make it look as though coins were being sent in and double the coins were then sent out. Even a fake charity tweet asking for wire transfers would have netted more than the hacker managed.
Some speculated that the attack was the hacker marketing themselves, by demonstrating what they could do. But burning their own attack mechanism in a way that makes international news—and that hit the sort of people who have a Secret Service detail, thus attracting the utmost attention of the authorities—suggests instead that the hacker was just not very bright. Throw in the possibility of law enforcement using Bitcoin’s open transactions to help trace the thieves, as happened in the Silk Road case, and the chance that this is somebody who got lucky, rather than an unknown genius, is high.
Scams are a natural byproduct of Bitcoin. The real issue is Twitter’s responsibility. Twitter has been asked previously to block cryptocurrency addresses from being tweeted, which would have nipped the scam in the bud. Twitter has acknowledged it allowed far too many employees full access to an all-powerful administrative console. This was a systemic failure.
Other people’s personal data requires controls as strong as the controls on other people’s money. Twitter now has to earn back the trust of the verified celebrity posters it relies on to lure mundane users to the platform—and of politicians, who are already asking pointed questions. Twitter must review its internal controls and release a full root cause analysis. Government services that use Twitter, which in the United States now span from the presidency on down to local police forces and fire departments, need to rethink how they approach the platform if it doesn’t show massive improvement. Wednesday’s shenanigans, for instance, locked down a local National Weather Service account—in the middle of a tornado warning.
The Bitcoin subculture is as certain as ever that any publicity is good publicity. Tyler Winklevoss, of The Social Network fame, and his brother run the cryptocurrency exchange Gemini, whose Twitter account was one of those compromised. Winklevoss tweeted: “Bitcoin is trending.” Never mind that it was trending because of massive fraud.
Twitter can’t afford to be as delusional. This disaster could have ended the company. It was lucky to have such an attacker so unimaginatively committed to a deeply fraudulent currency this time. It can’t expect to be so lucky next time.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-16--Park Won-soon’s Suicide Might Destabilize Moon’s Foreign-Policy Agenda

The death of the South Korean human rights lawyer and potential presidential contender Park Won-soon by suicide last week has rocked the country , especially after it emerged that he was facing serious accusations of sexual abuse .
Park was serving his third term as mayor of South Korea ’ s capital , Seoul , and , as a close ally of President Moon Jae-in , he was the face of South Korea ’ s technocratic competence in the global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic .
Park had become a prominent figure in coverage of national success in curbing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has accused him of four years of sexual abuse and harassment .
Her claim is likely to go uninvestigated due to a South Korean law that prohibits the indictment against a deceased suspect .
But the allegations raise serious questions about his legacy as a “ people ’ s champion ” and a women ’ s rights advocate .
Furthermore , the allegations of sexual misconduct by Park could jeopardize his ally Moon ’ s foreign-policy agenda that prioritizes diplomacy with North Korea and strives toward a more equal relationship with the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Park ’ s death , Western media has largely focused on his presidential potential rather than how his passing could affect South Korea ’ s foreign policy , even though the consequences there may be very real .
Moon ’ s pursuit of peace on the Korean Peninsula and his desire to strengthen South Korea ’ s autonomy align with the United States ’ long-term strategic interests in the region .
It benefits the United States to have strong , democratic nations such as South Korea handle their own security .
April legislative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pursue a progressive domestic agenda and foreign policy .
As the president enters the final two years of his term , attention has naturally shifted to his potential successors .
Among potential 2022 presidential candidates , Park Won-soon ’ s political profile was among the strongest .
There are several reasons for this .
First , he was the longest-serving mayor of Seoul .
He came to office in 2011 and won a third and last term in 2018 , the first in Seoul ’ s history .
Secondly , Park enjoyed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long before he was mayor of South Korea ’ s largest city .
During the 1980s , Park helped win the conviction of a police officer who assaulted a female student activist during an interrogation .
In 1998 , Park won South Korea ’ s first sexual harassment case .
Finally—and perhaps most significantly—Park became synonymous with administrative competence and innovation during the handling of the coronavirus .
It started in March when Park sued leaders of the secretive religious group Shincheonji Church of Jesus that was the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak @ @ @ @ @ @ @ praise for the Seoul Metropolitan Government ’ s efforts , which slowed the spread of the disease through contact-tracing and emergency text alerts .
Park attributed the low infection and death rate to these techniques and offered help in “ supporting the international community in overcoming this pandemic.
” To be sure , Park ’ s candidacy for presidency in 2022 was something of a long shot .
Indeed , Seoul mayorship is not traditionally a stepping stone to the Blue House .
Out of 12 former presidents of South Korea , only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ taking office : Yun Bo-seon ( 1960-1962 ) and Lee Myung-bak ( 2008-2013 ) .
Presidential polls can be tricky to interpret this far in advance , but recent surveys showed Park trailing behind other potential candidates .
According to the monthly polls conducted by Realmeter , former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon has been polling at the top for the past six months , not Park .
The mayor ’ s hometown , which plays an important part in South Korean politics , would also have been unusual for the Democratic Party .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ home to South Korea ’ s conservative base , whereas Lee is from the Honam region , home to the liberal Jeolla provinces and the party ’ s stronghold .
Park ’ s alleged sexual abuse against his former secretary—particularly in light of two other equally disturbing sexual assault scandals involving the mayor of Busan and governor of South Chungcheong—is extremely damaging to the mayor ’ s legacy as a public servant .
Indirectly , it could also spell trouble for Moon Jae-in ’ s administration in the remaining two years of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have traditionally divided South Koreans regardless of which political party is in power .
Progress in this area has been slow , despite the # MeToo movement that reached South Korea in 2018 .
The gender earnings gap is the highest in South Korea of all OECD countries .
According to the World Economic Forum ’ s Global Gender Gap Report 2020 , South Korea ranks 79th in political empowerment , behind the United Arab Emirates and Romania .
The fact that progress has been so incremental hurts the Democratic Party , because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conservatives .
Moon had campaigned on the promise of being a “ feminist president ” who would make South Korean society safer for women .
He pledged to fill at least 30 percent of his cabinet with women , a promise that he fulfilled .
Moon ’ s positions on gender drew strong support from female voters while alienating some young male voters .
So the fact that officials from Moon ’ s party are involved in sexual abuse against women makes a mockery of the president ’ s efforts .
An immediate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be more public awareness about sexual harassment and resolve toward preventing future abuse .
As a member of the conservative United Future Party recently said , “ I believe the DP , having been more proactive than anyone in the past ‘ # MeToo ’ wave , would doubtlessly join the efforts to find the truth ” of Park ’ s case .
It could also spur calls for more female leaders at the highest levels of South Korean society .
So far , among the top 10 lik in 2022 , only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consequence could be a gradual decline in support for Moon and , by extension , his foreign-policy agenda .
According to the Realmeter poll from July 7 ( taken before Park ’ s suicide ) , Moon ’ s approval rating is 50 percent .
If the president ’ s party loses the mayoral seats in Seoul and Busan next year , it could be seen as a referendum against the Democratic Party given the size of the voting bloc ; voters in the two cities combined represent nearly a fourth of South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defeat could embolden the opposition party to challenge Moon ’ s policies , especially in areas that affect the U.S.-South Korea alliance .
A greater focus on women ’ s issues could also raise uncomfortable questions about U.S. troop presence in South Korea and their impact on women ’ s safety .
As Katharine Moon revealed in her book Sex Among Allies , for decades U.S. and South Korean governments not only tolerated prostitution near U.S. bases but also coordinated efforts to maintain it .
Women who are involved with such work are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this issue difficult .
Yet there is clearly a connection between South Korean women ’ s rights and the U.S. military presence in South Korea and other allied countries , and how the latter makes it difficult to address the former .
As the scholar Moon noted , the “ compromised sovereignty of their own governments in relationship with the more powerful U.S. government and military ” has resulted in “ the compromised rights and dignity of the Korean , Okinawan , Filipina and other women who ‘ serviced ’ American military ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is in the United States ’ long-term interest for allies to manage their own affairs rather than be subject to the whims of Washington policymakers .
This need is even more pronounced in the era of a global pandemic , where America ’ s inability to control the coronavirus has cast serious doubts about the United States ’ global leadership .
The question is whether Park ’ s suicide will inadvertently empower an ideological shift away from a South Korea-first foreign policy toward a U.S.-dominant , militarized foreign policy of the past .

The death of the South Korean human rights lawyer and potential presidential contender Park Won-soon by suicide last week has rocked the country, especially after it emerged that he was facing serious accusations of sexual abuse. Park was serving his third term as mayor of South Korea’s capital, Seoul, and, as a close ally of President Moon Jae-in, he was the face of South Korea’s technocratic competence in the global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Park had become a prominent figure in coverage of national success in curbing the disease.
The death of the South Korean human rights lawyer and potential presidential contender Park Won-soon by suicide last week has rocked the country, especially after it emerged that he was facing serious accusations of sexual abuse. Park was serving his third term as mayor of South Korea’s capital, Seoul, and, as a close ally of President Moon Jae-in, he was the face of South Korea’s technocratic competence in the global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Park had become a prominent figure in coverage of national success in curbing the disease.
Park’s former secretary has accused him of four years of sexual abuse and harassment. Her claim is likely to go uninvestigated due to a South Korean law that prohibits the indictment against a deceased suspect. But the allegations raise serious questions about his legacy as a “people’s champion” and a women’s rights advocate. Furthermore, the allegations of sexual misconduct by Park could jeopardize his ally Moon’s foreign-policy agenda that prioritizes diplomacy with North Korea and strives toward a more equal relationship with the United States in the long run.
Since Park’s death, Western media has largely focused on his presidential potential rather than how his passing could affect South Korea’s foreign policy, even though the consequences there may be very real. Moon’s pursuit of peace on the Korean Peninsula and his desire to strengthen South Korea’s autonomy align with the United States’ long-term strategic interests in the region. It benefits the United States to have strong, democratic nations such as South Korea handle their own security. April legislative election results showed strong support for Moon to pursue a progressive domestic agenda and foreign policy. As the president enters the final two years of his term, attention has naturally shifted to his potential successors.
Among potential 2022 presidential candidates, Park Won-soon’s political profile was among the strongest. There are several reasons for this. First, he was the longest-serving mayor of Seoul. He came to office in 2011 and won a third and last term in 2018, the first in Seoul’s history. Secondly, Park enjoyed national prominence as a human rights lawyer long before he was mayor of South Korea’s largest city. During the 1980s, Park helped win the conviction of a police officer who assaulted a female student activist during an interrogation. In 1998, Park won South Korea’s first sexual harassment case.
Finally—and perhaps most significantly—Park became synonymous with administrative competence and innovation during the handling of the coronavirus. It started in March when Park sued leaders of the secretive religious group Shincheonji Church of Jesus that was the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak in South Korea. Park received international praise for the Seoul Metropolitan Government’s efforts, which slowed the spread of the disease through contact-tracing and emergency text alerts. Park attributed the low infection and death rate to these techniques and offered help in “supporting the international community in overcoming this pandemic.”
To be sure, Park’s candidacy for presidency in 2022 was something of a long shot. Indeed, Seoul mayorship is not traditionally a stepping stone to the Blue House. Out of 12 former presidents of South Korea, only two were previously mayors of Seoul before taking office: Yun Bo-seon (1960-1962) and Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013).
Presidential polls can be tricky to interpret this far in advance, but recent surveys showed Park trailing behind other potential candidates. According to the monthly polls conducted by Realmeter, former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon has been polling at the top for the past six months, not Park. The mayor’s hometown, which plays an important part in South Korean politics, would also have been unusual for the Democratic Party. He is from southern Gyeongsang province, home to South Korea’s conservative base, whereas Lee is from the Honam region, home to the liberal Jeolla provinces and the party’s stronghold.
Park’s alleged sexual abuse against his former secretary—particularly in light of two other equally disturbing sexual assault scandals involving the mayor of Busan and governor of South Chungcheong—is extremely damaging to the mayor’s legacy as a public servant. Indirectly, it could also spell trouble for Moon Jae-in’s administration in the remaining two years of his term.
Issues related to gender equality have traditionally divided South Koreans regardless of which political party is in power. Progress in this area has been slow, despite the #MeToo movement that reached South Korea in 2018. The gender earnings gap is the highest in South Korea of all OECD countries. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2020, South Korea ranks 79th in political empowerment, behind the United Arab Emirates and Romania.
The fact that progress has been so incremental hurts the Democratic Party, because it had pledged to do better than conservatives. Moon had campaigned on the promise of being a “feminist president” who would make South Korean society safer for women. He pledged to fill at least 30 percent of his cabinet with women, a promise that he fulfilled. Moon’s positions on gender drew strong support from female voters while alienating some young male voters. So the fact that officials from Moon’s party are involved in sexual abuse against women makes a mockery of the president’s efforts.
An immediate consequence of Park’s suicide could be more public awareness about sexual harassment and resolve toward preventing future abuse. As a member of the conservative United Future Party recently said, “I believe the DP, having been more proactive than anyone in the past ‘#MeToo’ wave, would doubtlessly join the efforts to find the truth” of Park’s case. It could also spur calls for more female leaders at the highest levels of South Korean society. So far, among the top 10 lik ely Democratic Party presidential candidates in 2022, only one is a woman.
A longer-term consequence could be a gradual decline in support for Moon and, by extension, his foreign-policy agenda. According to the Realmeter poll from July 7 (taken before Park’s suicide), Moon’s approval rating is 50 percent. If the president’s party loses the mayoral seats in Seoul and Busan next year, it could be seen as a referendum against the Democratic Party given the size of the voting bloc; voters in the two cities combined represent nearly a fourth of South Korea’s population. A crushing defeat could embolden the opposition party to challenge Moon’s policies, especially in areas that affect the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
A greater focus on women’s issues could also raise uncomfortable questions about U.S. troop presence in South Korea and their impact on women’s safety. As Katharine Moon revealed in her book Sex Among Allies, for decades U.S. and South Korean governments not only tolerated prostitution near U.S. bases but also coordinated efforts to maintain it. Women who are involved with such work are often rendered invisible, making activism around this issue difficult. Yet there is clearly a connection between South Korean women’s rights and the U.S. military presence in South Korea and other allied countries, and how the latter makes it difficult to address the former. As the scholar Moon noted, the “compromised sovereignty of their own governments in relationship with the more powerful U.S. government and military” has resulted in “the compromised rights and dignity of the Korean, Okinawan, Filipina and other women who ‘serviced’ American military (male) personnel.”
Ultimately, it is in the United States’ long-term interest for allies to manage their own affairs rather than be subject to the whims of Washington policymakers. This need is even more pronounced in the era of a global pandemic, where America’s inability to control the coronavirus has cast serious doubts about the United States’ global leadership. The question is whether Park’s suicide will inadvertently empower an ideological shift away from a South Korea-first foreign policy toward a U.S.-dominant, militarized foreign policy of the past .


foreignpolicy--2020-07-16--To Fight China, India Needs to Forget Russia

To Fight China , India Needs to Forget Russia In late June , just days after a deadly border skirmish between Indian and Chinese troops , Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh traveled to Moscow to attend the 75th Victory Day Parade that commemorated the defeat of Nazi Germany .
During his visit , Singh concluded a deal to purchase fighter jets and other arms worth $ 2.4 billion .
The accord followed an agreement reached last year for India to acquire Russia ’ s S-400 air defense missile system despite explicit objections from the United States .
What explains India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at a time when it has no dearth of other suppliers , including the United States ?
The answer to this question is complex .
However , one of the principal reasons for India ’ s fondness for Russians arms stems from what institutional economists refer to as path dependence .
Put simply , path dependence means that in any given arena policymakers are constrained by decisions made in the past .
Even though India has sought to diversify its sources of supply , as much as 60 percent of its military arsenal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Not surprisingly , India remains reliant on Russia for spare parts and upgrades for a disproportionate segment of its armory .
This , however , is not the sole reason that explains India ’ s habit of turning to Russia to replenish its military capabilities .
New Delhi also looks to Moscow because unlike other suppliers—most notably Washington—few political considerations come into play when acquiring weaponry .
The Russians , who are acutely cash-strapped and have few , if any , domestic institutional constraints , are only too happy to provide India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , while often more sophisticated , have in the past been subject to congressional oversight and vagaries.India remains reliant on Russia for spare parts and upgrades for a disproportionate segment of its armory .
There is at least one other factor that explains India ’ s reluctance to rely too heavily on the United States .
This hesitation stems in considerable part from U.S. sales of sophisticated weaponry to Pakistan during much of the Cold War and even , on occasion , thereafter .
Even though U.S.-Pakistan relations have noticeably cooled over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past remain alive and well .
While most of these issues are understandable , it may now be time for India to recalculate its weapons acquisition strategies .
During the Cold War , when India had a strategic partnership with the former Soviet Union , it made much sense to acquire military technology mostly from the Kremlin .
The Soviet Union was willing to supply advanced weaponry at bargain-basement prices , it accepted Indian rupees in payment , and it shared deep misgivings about the rise of China .
Most importantly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reliable supplier .
Practically every one of those considerations do not hold today .
Moscow today has an ambivalent relationship with Beijing .
India , on the other hand , sees China as its principal , long-term security threat .
More than two decades ago , Mikhail Gorbachev made it amply clear that Russia no longer intended to act as a strategic bulwark against China .
Subsequent leaders , including President Vladimir Putin , have hardly disavowed Gorbachev ’ s stance .
Russia has also made it clear that it would only supply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard currency .
Worse still , its dependability as a supplier is now also in question : After India contracted to acquire a refurbished Soviet-era aircraft carrier , the Admiral Gorshkov , Russia not only failed to deliver it on time but dramatically raised the eventual cost of the ship .
Put together , these factors underscore the fundamentally altered terms of the two countries ’ arms transfer relationship .
Despite Moscow ’ s seeming willingness to keep supplying weaponry at short notice—as demonstrated during Singh ’ s recent visit—New Delhi needs to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at multiple levels .
The old Indo-Russian arms transfer nexus is a relic of the past .
And despite U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s mercurial tendencies , the American defense establishment squarely shares India ’ s concerns and fears about a revanchist China .
To that end , China signaled its misgivings when , in 2018 , U.S. Pacific Command was renamed U.S. Indo-Pacific Command .
The decision was not just a cosmetic change in nomenclature but signaled the growing significance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. grand strategy .
In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States designated India as a “ major defense partner , ” making it eligible to acquire a range of advanced and sensitive U.S. weapons technologies .
For all its unpredictability , the Trump administration has not made any moves to alter this status.India is left with one real option : To stand up to China , it needs to firm up its relationship with the United States .
It is evident that U.S. and Indian security interests are steadily converging—a phenomenon that comes at a most critical moment for the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an increasingly aggressive China and a yawning gap in economic capabilities , India can ill afford a military strategy of going it alone .
Under these circumstances , it is faced with two possible choices .
It can continue appeasing China in the elusive hope that its periodic incursions along the vast Himalayan border will cease .
Given that there is little or no evidence that such a strategy has proved fruitful , India is left with one real option : To stand up to China , it needs to firm up its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the surest means to bolster the U.S.-India partnership involves slowly but surely walking away from its dependence on Russian weaponry .
There are several reasons why doing so may be desirable .
Continued reliance on high-tech Russian weaponry raises legitimate U.S. fears about hacking .
As senior U.S. officials have made clear in congressional testimony , such purchases could also limit interoperability , thereby jeopardizing future arms sales to India .
And India is no doubt aware that Russia has already sold the S-400 system to China , India ’ s principal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make a clear case to end Indian reliance on Russia for advanced weaponry .
The United States , for nearly two decades , has sought to forge a working military-to-military relationship with India as it seeks to counter China ’ s growing assertiveness .
To that end , a number of administrations have sought to court New Delhi , starting with the landmark U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement of 2008 .
And Washington has since made a series of other overtures , most notably the creation of Indo-Pacific Command .
An increased willingness to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States would be most welcome in Washington .
Instead of dwelling on the history of past disagreements with the United States , relying on a questionable arms transfer relationship with Russia , and hoping for an end to Chinese aggressiveness , India needs to firm up the budding strategic partnership with the United States .
This will not only ensure access to vital U.S. weapons technology but also secure its support in protecting India ’ s national security interests .

In late June, just days after a deadly border skirmish between Indian and Chinese troops, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh traveled to Moscow to attend the 75th Victory Day Parade that commemorated the defeat of Nazi Germany. During his visit, Singh concluded a deal to purchase fighter jets and other arms worth $2.4 billion. The accord followed an agreement reached last year for India to acquire Russia’s S-400 air defense missile system despite explicit objections from the United States.
In late June, just days after a deadly border skirmish between Indian and Chinese troops, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh traveled to Moscow to attend the 75th Victory Day Parade that commemorated the defeat of Nazi Germany. During his visit, Singh concluded a deal to purchase fighter jets and other arms worth $2.4 billion. The accord followed an agreement reached last year for India to acquire Russia’s S-400 air defense missile system despite explicit objections from the United States.
What explains India’s continued reliance on Russian weaponry at a time when it has no dearth of other suppliers, including the United States? The answer to this question is complex. However, one of the principal reasons for India’s fondness for Russians arms stems from what institutional economists refer to as path dependence. Put simply, path dependence means that in any given arena policymakers are constrained by decisions made in the past. Even though India has sought to diversify its sources of supply, as much as 60 percent of its military arsenal is either of Soviet or Russian origin. Not surprisingly, India remains reliant on Russia for spare parts and upgrades for a disproportionate segment of its armory.
This, however, is not the sole reason that explains India’s habit of turning to Russia to replenish its military capabilities. New Delhi also looks to Moscow because unlike other suppliers—most notably Washington—few political considerations come into play when acquiring weaponry. The Russians, who are acutely cash-strapped and have few, if any, domestic institutional constraints, are only too happy to provide India with top-grade weaponry. U.S. weapons systems, while often more sophisticated, have in the past been subject to congressional oversight and vagaries.India remains reliant on Russia for spare parts and upgrades for a disproportionate segment of its armory.
There is at least one other factor that explains India’s reluctance to rely too heavily on the United States. This hesitation stems in considerable part from U.S. sales of sophisticated weaponry to Pakistan during much of the Cold War and even, on occasion, thereafter. Even though U.S.-Pakistan relations have noticeably cooled over the last several years, Indian misgivings about the past remain alive and well.
While most of these issues are understandable, it may now be time for India to recalculate its weapons acquisition strategies. During the Cold War, when India had a strategic partnership with the former Soviet Union, it made much sense to acquire military technology mostly from the Kremlin. The Soviet Union was willing to supply advanced weaponry at bargain-basement prices, it accepted Indian rupees in payment, and it shared deep misgivings about the rise of China. Most importantly, at that time, Moscow was a reliable supplier.
Practically every one of those considerations do not hold today. Moscow today has an ambivalent relationship with Beijing. India, on the other hand, sees China as its principal, long-term security threat. More than two decades ago, Mikhail Gorbachev made it amply clear that Russia no longer intended to act as a strategic bulwark against China. Subsequent leaders, including President Vladimir Putin, have hardly disavowed Gorbachev’s stance. Russia has also made it clear that it would only supply weaponry to India at commercial rates—and for hard currency. Worse still, its dependability as a supplier is now also in question: After India contracted to acquire a refurbished Soviet-era aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, Russia not only failed to deliver it on time but dramatically raised the eventual cost of the ship. Put together, these factors underscore the fundamentally altered terms of the two countries’ arms transfer relationship.
Despite Moscow’s seeming willingness to keep supplying weaponry at short notice—as demonstrated during Singh’s recent visit—New Delhi needs to come to terms with changed global realities at multiple levels. The old Indo-Russian arms transfer nexus is a relic of the past. And despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s mercurial tendencies, the American defense establishment squarely shares India’s concerns and fears about a revanchist China. To that end, China signaled its misgivings when, in 2018, U.S. Pacific Command was renamed U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The decision was not just a cosmetic change in nomenclature but signaled the growing significance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. grand strategy.
In the waning days of the Obama administration, the United States designated India as a “major defense partner,” making it eligible to acquire a range of advanced and sensitive U.S. weapons technologies. For all its unpredictability, the Trump administration has not made any moves to alter this status.India is left with one real option: To stand up to China, it needs to firm up its relationship with the United States.
It is evident that U.S. and Indian security interests are steadily converging—a phenomenon that comes at a most critical moment for the world’s largest democracy. Faced with an increasingly aggressive China and a yawning gap in economic capabilities, India can ill afford a military strategy of going it alone. Under these circumstances, it is faced with two possible choices. It can continue appeasing China in the elusive hope that its periodic incursions along the vast Himalayan border will cease. Given that there is little or no evidence that such a strategy has proved fruitful, India is left with one real option: To stand up to China, it needs to firm up its relationship with the United States.
One of the surest means to bolster the U.S.-India partnership involves slowly but surely walking away from its dependence on Russian weaponry. There are several reasons why doing so may be desirable. Continued reliance on high-tech Russian weaponry raises legitimate U.S. fears about hacking. As senior U.S. officials have made clear in congressional testimony, such purchases could also limit interoperability, thereby jeopardizing future arms sales to India. And India is no doubt aware that Russia has already sold the S-400 system to China, India’s principal adversary. Put together, these considerations make a clear case to end Indian reliance on Russia for advanced weaponry.
The United States, for nearly two decades, has sought to forge a working military-to-military relationship with India as it seeks to counter China’s growing assertiveness. To that end, a number of administrations have sought to court New Delhi, starting with the landmark U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement of 2008. And Washington has since made a series of other overtures, most notably the creation of Indo-Pacific Command. An increased willingness to boost Indian military acquisitions from the United States would be most welcome in Washington.
Instead of dwelling on the history of past disagreements with the United States, relying on a questionable arms transfer relationship with Russia, and hoping for an end to Chinese aggressiveness, India needs to firm up the budding strategic partnership with the United States. This will not only ensure access to vital U.S. weapons technology but also secure its support in protecting India’s national security interests.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--Countries Should Mind Their Own Business

Countries Should Mind Their Own Business What ’ s the dumbest idea affecting the foreign policy of major powers ?
There are plenty of candidates—the domino theory ; the myth of the short , cheap war ; the belief that a particular deity is “ on the side ” of one nation and will guarantee its success ; etc .
But right up there with those worthy contenders is a country ’ s belief that it has found the magic formula for political , economic , social , and international success and that it has the right , the responsibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gospel far and wide .
In some cases , this impulse arises from ( mostly ) benevolent aims : The leaders of some country genuinely believe that spreading ( through force , if necessary ) their ideals and institutions to others will genuinely benefit the recipients .
Defensive motives may also be operating : A state may believe that it can not be reliably secure unless other countries have similar if not identical institutions .
U.S. leaders once worried that America could not survive alone in a world dominated by fascism , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ friendly ” countries on its borders , by which he meant countries governed by Leninist parties patterned after the Soviet model .
Of course , such claims may simply be a reassuring story that ruling elites propagate to justify aggressive actions undertaken for more selfish reasons .
Whatever the motivation , if their efforts were successful the world would gradually converge on a single model for political , economic , and social life .
Individual national variations would be modest and declining in importance , limited to purely local concerns ( such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ musical styles , etc. )
.
In theory , even some of these features might begin to lose their individual features over time .
This hasn ’ t happened , however , due to an intriguing paradox .
Thus far , the only political form that has commanded nearly universal global acceptance is the territorial state itself , along with the closely related idea of nationalism .
As Hendrik Spruyt , Stephen Krasner , Dan Nexon , and others have explored , the territorial state was only one of several political forms coexisting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eventual emergence as the dominant political form was a contentious process that might have turned out differently .
Many factors contributed to its ultimate success , and one of them was the idea of sovereignty : the principle that every government got to run its own affairs as its rulers ( or , eventually , its citizens ) saw fit .
And once that principle took firm hold , individual local variations were reinforced and entrenched .
Add to this notion the emerging idea of nationalism—the belief that different groups of people have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , shared history , etc .
and that such self-aware groups are entitled to govern themselves—and you have a couple of powerful and mutually reinforcing ideals .
As John Mearsheimer argues in The Great Delusion , nations want their own state so that they can protect themselves in an insecure world , and states often encourage nationalism in order to unify the population and enhance state power .
The gradual spread of these twin ideas—nationalism and sovereignty—has had far-reaching if uneven effects .
Nationalism undermined and eventually destroyed the Spanish , Portugeuse , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Austro-Hungarian , and Soviet empires , and decolonization eventually swelled the United Nations from its original 50-odd members to nearly 200 states today .
In this way , the territorial state became the dominant political form in the contemporary world , but the specific content within each state still varied enormously .
Democracies , monarchies , oligarchies , one-party authoritarians , military dictators , religious regimes , etc .
all coexisted within the basic framework of the sovereign state , along with a number of different economic systems .
Throughout this process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one time or another seen themselves as models for the rest , and they have tried in various ways to convince others to adopt their formula .
The leaders of revolutionary France sought to topple foreign monarchs and spread liberty to Europe and beyond , and Napoleon subsequently tried to impose his own order on the countries he had conquered .
Soviet Russia was explicitly committed to spreading its particular form of socialism , and pan-Arabists , Nasserites , and assorted Islamic fundamentalists have sought to convince or coerce others into adopting their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world .
Although Americans were initially ambivalent about whether their newfangled republic could be a model for others , confidence that other states would benefit if they become more like the United States grew as the country rose to great-power status and became the world ’ s strongest power .
The impulse to remake the world in America ’ s image kicked into overdrive when the so-called unipolar moment arrived : The tides of history seemed to be running America ’ s way , liberal democratic capitalism was said to be the inevitable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and there were no rival great powers who could prevent the United States from wielding its vast economic and military power in the service of liberal ideals .
Not surprisingly , in the unipolar era the United States increasingly favored a one-size-fits-all approach to other countries .
Foreign countries may still have been regarded as formally sovereign , but the United States increasingly sought to influence ( if not dictate ) some of their national policy decisions .
In the military realm , states that sought weapons of mass destruction were sanctioned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even as U.S. leaders declared that America ’ s own nuclear arsenal was still essential for its security .
Rising powers such as China were advised to forgo “ advanced military capabilities ” on the grounds that this was “ an outdated path ” that would “ hamper its own pursuit of national greatness.
” ( For some strange reason , Beijing chose to ignore this friendly advice . )
Where possible , the United States sought to recruit new states into security institutions that it already led , thereby obtaining more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In politics , Washington sought to promote democracy where and when it could , whether by providing money and advice to nascent civil society groups , supporting human rights more generally , or acting to topple regimes that were unlucky or unwise enough to attract Washington ’ s particular ire .
The goal , as President George W. Bush put it , was “ a generation of democratic peace , ” and U.S. power could be used to speed up the timetable and get the globe there as quickly as possible .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ argues convincingly , U.S. efforts to promote what he calls “ hyperglobalization ” led other states to alter their domestic arrangements in ways that would attract foreign capital , expand trade opportunities , and bring them into greater conformity with U.S. preferences .
Whether in the form of the 1990s Washington Consensus or trade agreements like the stillborn Trans-Pacific Partnership , a world with fewer barriers to the movement of goods , people , or capital left national governments less able to chart their own course or insulate their populations from global market @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states either had to put on what Tom Friedman dubbed “ the Golden Straightjacket ” or fall by the wayside .
The past 15 years has not been kind to this ambitious vision of a world increasingly united by shared values and similar institutions .
Efforts to prevent adversaries from acquiring WMD were only partly successful ( and at considerable cost ) .
Key states such as China did not liberalize as expected yet continued to prosper .
The spread of democracy slowed , stalled , and then went into reverse , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy become deeply troubling .
Even before the coronavirus pandemic , a broad backlash against globalization was underway , whether in the form of Brexit , Trumpism , the growing segmentation of the internet , and the partial decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies .
As I ’ ve written elsewhere , the pandemic has accelerated and deepened these tendencies , and raised the walls that the United States and others had been trying to lower before the arrival of Donald Trump .
The common taproot to these various trends is simple @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or peoples in different states to have a greater say in how they live , even if it means somewhat less material prosperity .
The leaders of the Brexit campaign may have been supremely cynical in the many false claims they made to sell their scheme , but the supporters who voted to “ take back control ” were utterly sincere .
They wanted to defend a particular way of life against changes they saw as disruptive and as threats to a cherished “ way of life.
” Much the same instinct lies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries , or the every-state-for-itself impulse that is leading many nations to seek a COVID-19 vaccine for themselves first and others later .
What we are seeing , in short , is a reassertion of sovereign independence on the part of great and small powers alike .
The Westphalian model of sovereignty has never been absolute or uncontested , but the idea that individual nations should be ( mostly ) free to chart their own course at home remains deeply embedded in the present world order .
The territorial state remains the basic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with some exceptions , states today are doing more to reinforce that idea than to dilute it .
Although there are clearly areas where our future depends on states agreeing to limit their own freedom of action and conform to global norms and institutions , greater respect for sovereignty and national autonomy has some obvious benefits .
First , states that interfere in foreign countries rarely understand what they are doing , and even well-intentioned efforts often fail due to ignorance , unintended consequences , or local resentment and resistance .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protracted conflicts less likely or prolonged .
Second , trying to impose a single model on other countries inevitably raises threat perceptions and increases the risk of serious great-power conflict .
The Westphalian idea of sovereignty was created in part to address this problem : Instead of continuing to fight over which version of Christianity would hold sway in different countries ( one of the key drivers of the wars that preceded the Westphalian peace ) , European states agreed to let each ruler determine the religious orientation of their realm .
Similarly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to shape the domestic arrangements of another country will inevitably be seen as threatening by the target : Just look at how Americans now react to the possibility of Russian interference in our political system .
Third , creating a more stable international economic order while preserving most of the benefits of trade and comparative advantage will require fashioning trade and economic arrangements that permit great national autonomy , even at the price of slightly lower global growth rates .
Not only might this reduce the risk of global financial panics , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the terms of their international economic engagement could also reduce the anti-free trade backlash that is currently fueling costly trade wars .
Finally , a world in which a single political and economic model prevails is probably impossible anyway , at least for the foreseeable future .
To believe that one size could fit all ignores the enormous diversity that still exists in the world and the powerful tendency for ideas and institutions to morph and evolve as they travel from their point of origins .
Take pop music : Elvis Presley creates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , gospel , and rockabilly ( with a jolt of testosterone ) , his influence arrives in England and helps inspire the Beatles , who lead the “ British invasion ” of America in the 1960s , which then combines with Bob Dylan and the folk music movement to create the sound of groups like The Byrds .
Or look at how Lin-Manuel Miranda combined hip-hop with his deep appreciation of traditional Broadway styles to create something new like Hamilton .
These examples just scratch the surface of how music changes when different @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could just as easily have cited examples from Africa , Latin America , the Middle East , or the Silk Road .
Because humans are boundlessly creative social beings who resist conformity , and because no social or political arrangements are ever perfect , dissidents will always arise and contending visions will emerge no matter how fiercely they are repressed .
Institutions created in one place may travel to other locations , but they will mutate and evolve in the process and exhibit different forms wherever they take root .
And that ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cheers for the ( partly ) sovereign state .
A world made up of contending nationalisms is hardly a utopia , with the ever-present possibility of conflict and war and many obstacles to mutual cooperation .
But trying to fit a diverse humanity into a uniform box is doomed to fail—and no small source of trouble as well .
Even if we hold certain values to be sacred and are tempted to act when other states violate them , continued respect for boundaries and sovereignty is also a norm that can keep simmering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have multiple powers interfering in it today had Britain , France , and the United States not decided to meddle there back in 2011 .
As A.J.P .
Taylor once archly observed , leaders in the 19th century “ fought ‘ necessary ’ wars and killed thousands ; the idealists of the 20th century fought ‘ just ’ wars and killed millions.
” Looking ahead , greater respect for national sovereignty and fewer efforts to force the whole world into one way of living will help emerging rivalries stay within bounds and help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those critical issues where their interests overlap .

What’s the dumbest idea affecting the foreign policy of major powers? There are plenty of candidates—the domino theory; the myth of the short, cheap war; the belief that a particular deity is “on the side” of one nation and will guarantee its success; etc. But right up there with those worthy contenders is a country’s belief that it has found the magic formula for political, economic, social, and international success and that it has the right, the responsibility, and the ability to spread this gospel far and wide.
What’s the dumbest idea affecting the foreign policy of major powers? There are plenty of candidates—the domino theory; the myth of the short, cheap war; the belief that a particular deity is “on the side” of one nation and will guarantee its success; etc. But right up there with those worthy contenders is a country’s belief that it has found the magic formula for political, economic, social, and international success and that it has the right, the responsibility, and the ability to spread this gospel far and wide.
In some cases, this impulse arises from (mostly) benevolent aims: The leaders of some country genuinely believe that spreading (through force, if necessary) their ideals and institutions to others will genuinely benefit the recipients. Defensive motives may also be operating: A state may believe that it cannot be reliably secure unless other countries have similar if not identical institutions. U.S. leaders once worried that America could not survive alone in a world dominated by fascism, and Joseph Stalin believed the Soviet Union needed “friendly” countries on its borders, by which he meant countries governed by Leninist parties patterned after the Soviet model.
Of course, such claims may simply be a reassuring story that ruling elites propagate to justify aggressive actions undertaken for more selfish reasons. Whatever the motivation, if their efforts were successful the world would gradually converge on a single model for political, economic, and social life. Individual national variations would be modest and declining in importance, limited to purely local concerns (such as national holidays, cuisine, preferred musical styles, etc.). In theory, even some of these features might begin to lose their individual features over time.
This hasn’t happened, however, due to an intriguing paradox. Thus far, the only political form that has commanded nearly universal global acceptance is the territorial state itself, along with the closely related idea of nationalism. As Hendrik Spruyt, Stephen Krasner, Dan Nexon, and others have explored, the territorial state was only one of several political forms coexisting in early modern Europe, and its eventual emergence as the dominant political form was a contentious process that might have turned out differently. Many factors contributed to its ultimate success, and one of them was the idea of sovereignty: the principle that every government got to run its own affairs as its rulers (or, eventually, its citizens) saw fit. And once that principle took firm hold, individual local variations were reinforced and entrenched.
Add to this notion the emerging idea of nationalism—the belief that different groups of people have distinct identities based on language, culture, shared history, etc. and that such self-aware groups are entitled to govern themselves—and you have a couple of powerful and mutually reinforcing ideals. As John Mearsheimer argues in The Great Delusion, nations want their own state so that they can protect themselves in an insecure world, and states often encourage nationalism in order to unify the population and enhance state power.
The gradual spread of these twin ideas—nationalism and sovereignty—has had far-reaching if uneven effects. Nationalism undermined and eventually destroyed the Spanish, Portugeuse, British, French, Belgian, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Soviet empires, and decolonization eventually swelled the United Nations from its original 50-odd members to nearly 200 states today. In this way, the territorial state became the dominant political form in the contemporary world, but the specific content within each state still varied enormously. Democracies, monarchies, oligarchies, one-party authoritarians, military dictators, religious regimes, etc. all coexisted within the basic framework of the sovereign state, along with a number of different economic systems.
Throughout this process, a number of countries have at one time or another seen themselves as models for the rest, and they have tried in various ways to convince others to adopt their formula. The leaders of revolutionary France sought to topple foreign monarchs and spread liberty to Europe and beyond, and Napoleon subsequently tried to impose his own order on the countries he had conquered. Soviet Russia was explicitly committed to spreading its particular form of socialism, and pan-Arabists, Nasserites, and assorted Islamic fundamentalists have sought to convince or coerce others into adopting their preferred model within the Arab and Islamic world.
Although Americans were initially ambivalent about whether their newfangled republic could be a model for others, confidence that other states would benefit if they become more like the United States grew as the country rose to great-power status and became the world’s strongest power. The impulse to remake the world in America’s image kicked into overdrive when the so-called unipolar moment arrived: The tides of history seemed to be running America’s way, liberal democratic capitalism was said to be the inevitable end point of political and social development, and there were no rival great powers who could prevent the United States from wielding its vast economic and military power in the service of liberal ideals.
Not surprisingly, in the unipolar era the United States increasingly favored a one-size-fits-all approach to other countries. Foreign countries may still have been regarded as formally sovereign, but the United States increasingly sought to influence (if not dictate) some of their national policy decisions. In the military realm, states that sought weapons of mass destruction were sanctioned, ostracized, attacked, or overthrown, even as U.S. leaders declared that America’s own nuclear arsenal was still essential for its security. Rising powers such as China were advised to forgo “advanced military capabilities” on the grounds that this was “an outdated path” that would “hamper its own pursuit of national greatness.” (For some strange reason, Beijing chose to ignore this friendly advice.) Where possible, the United States sought to recruit new states into security institutions that it already led, thereby obtaining more influence over other states’ security policies.
In politics, Washington sought to promote democracy where and when it could, whether by providing money and advice to nascent civil society groups, supporting human rights more generally, or acting to topple regimes that were unlucky or unwise enough to attract Washington’s particular ire. The goal, as President George W. Bush put it, was “a generation of democratic peace,” and U.S. power could be used to speed up the timetable and get the globe there as quickly as possible.
Lastly, as my colleague Dani Rodrik argues convincingly, U.S. efforts to promote what he calls “hyperglobalization” led other states to alter their domestic arrangements in ways that would attract foreign capital, expand trade opportunities, and bring them into greater conformity with U.S. preferences. Whether in the form of the 1990s Washington Consensus or trade agreements like the stillborn Trans-Pacific Partnership, a world with fewer barriers to the movement of goods, people, or capital left national governments less able to chart their own course or insulate their populations from global market forces. As practiced, globalization meant states either had to put on what Tom Friedman dubbed “the Golden Straightjacket” or fall by the wayside.
The past 15 years has not been kind to this ambitious vision of a world increasingly united by shared values and similar institutions. Efforts to prevent adversaries from acquiring WMD were only partly successful (and at considerable cost). Key states such as China did not liberalize as expected yet continued to prosper. The spread of democracy slowed, stalled, and then went into reverse, and the state of America’s own democracy become deeply troubling.
Even before the coronavirus pandemic, a broad backlash against globalization was underway, whether in the form of Brexit, Trumpism, the growing segmentation of the internet, and the partial decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies. As I’ve written elsewhere, the pandemic has accelerated and deepened these tendencies, and raised the walls that the United States and others had been trying to lower before the arrival of Donald Trump.
The common taproot to these various trends is simple. It is the desire of leaders or peoples in different states to have a greater say in how they live, even if it means somewhat less material prosperity. The leaders of the Brexit campaign may have been supremely cynical in the many false claims they made to sell their scheme, but the supporters who voted to “take back control” were utterly sincere. They wanted to defend a particular way of life against changes they saw as disruptive and as threats to a cherished “way of life.” Much the same instinct lies behind efforts to curb immigration in many countries, or the every-state-for-itself impulse that is leading many nations to seek a COVID-19 vaccine for themselves first and others later.
What we are seeing, in short, is a reassertion of sovereign independence on the part of great and small powers alike. The Westphalian model of sovereignty has never been absolute or uncontested, but the idea that individual nations should be (mostly) free to chart their own course at home remains deeply embedded in the present world order. The territorial state remains the basic building block of world politics, and, with some exceptions, states today are doing more to reinforce that idea than to dilute it.
Although there are clearly areas where our future depends on states agreeing to limit their own freedom of action and conform to global norms and institutions, greater respect for sovereignty and national autonomy has some obvious benefits. First, states that interfere in foreign countries rarely understand what they are doing, and even well-intentioned efforts often fail due to ignorance, unintended consequences, or local resentment and resistance. A stronger norm of noninterference could make some protracted conflicts less likely or prolonged.
Second, trying to impose a single model on other countries inevitably raises threat perceptions and increases the risk of serious great-power conflict. The Westphalian idea of sovereignty was created in part to address this problem: Instead of continuing to fight over which version of Christianity would hold sway in different countries (one of the key drivers of the wars that preceded the Westphalian peace), European states agreed to let each ruler determine the religious orientation of their realm. Similarly, a powerful state’s efforts to shape the domestic arrangements of another country will inevitably be seen as threatening by the target: Just look at how Americans now react to the possibility of Russian interference in our political system.
Third, creating a more stable international economic order while preserving most of the benefits of trade and comparative advantage will require fashioning trade and economic arrangements that permit great national autonomy, even at the price of slightly lower global growth rates. Not only might this reduce the risk of global financial panics, but allowing individual states greater freedom to set the terms of their international economic engagement could also reduce the anti-free trade backlash that is currently fueling costly trade wars.
Finally, a world in which a single political and economic model prevails is probably impossible anyway, at least for the foreseeable future. To believe that one size could fit all ignores the enormous diversity that still exists in the world and the powerful tendency for ideas and institutions to morph and evolve as they travel from their point of origins. Take pop music: Elvis Presley creates a new amalgam of rhythm and blues, gospel, and rockabilly (with a jolt of testosterone), his influence arrives in England and helps inspire the Beatles, who lead the “British invasion” of America in the 1960s, which then combines with Bob Dylan and the folk music movement to create the sound of groups like The Byrds. Or look at how Lin-Manuel Miranda combined hip-hop with his deep appreciation of traditional Broadway styles to create something new like Hamilton. These examples just scratch the surface of how music changes when different cultural streams begin to interact; I could just as easily have cited examples from Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, or the Silk Road.
Because humans are boundlessly creative social beings who resist conformity, and because no social or political arrangements are ever perfect, dissidents will always arise and contending visions will emerge no matter how fiercely they are repressed. Institutions created in one place may travel to other locations, but they will mutate and evolve in the process and exhibit different forms wherever they take root.
And that’s why I’ll raise two cheers for the (partly) sovereign state. A world made up of contending nationalisms is hardly a utopia, with the ever-present possibility of conflict and war and many obstacles to mutual cooperation. But trying to fit a diverse humanity into a uniform box is doomed to fail—and no small source of trouble as well. Even if we hold certain values to be sacred and are tempted to act when other states violate them, continued respect for boundaries and sovereignty is also a norm that can keep simmering rivalries in check. Libya would not have multiple powers interfering in it today had Britain, France, and the United States not decided to meddle there back in 2011.
As A.J.P. Taylor once archly observed, leaders in the 19th century “fought ‘necessary’ wars and killed thousands; the idealists of the 20th century fought ‘just’ wars and killed millions.” Looking ahead, greater respect for national sovereignty and fewer efforts to force the whole world into one way of living will help emerging rivalries stay within bounds and help countries with very different values cooperate on those critical issues where their interests overlap.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--European Council Meets For First In-Person Summit of Pandemic Era

European Council Meets For First In-Person Summit of Pandemic Era Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The European Council meets today in Brussels to discuss an EU budget and rescue package , Britain accuses Russia of hacking coronavirus research data , and Azerbaijan ’ s foreign minister is fired after 16 years in his post .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
European heads of government meet in Brussels today for a two-day summit to decide on the fate of the European Union ’ s seven-year budget alongside an economic rescue package for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council will be the first in-person summit since Feb. 21 .
Since then , member states have seen around 135,000 deaths from COVID-19 , with 1.3 million people infected .
The pandemic has caused economic havoc , too : The EU economy is projected to contract by 8.3 percent this year .
The fact that leaders can meet face to face is a victory of sorts .
Compared to their transatlantic rival , the coronavirus is relatively vanquished in Europe .
The European Union reported fewer than 4,000 new cases on Wednesday , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the United States was more than 17 times higher .
Should I pay or should I loan ?
There will be no celebratory mood , however , as leaders remain divided on how to administer an $ 840 billion recovery fund and must reach a unanimous decision for it to go forward .
Sweden , Denmark , Austria , and the Netherlands—the so-called frugal four—want any funds to be distributed as loans , not as grants , and want veto power on how the money is used .
This approach has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been particularly hard hit by the coronavirus pandemic and also stand to receive the most from the fund .
Diplomacy in the time of COVID .
Although the summit is in-person , it will not otherwise be business as usual : Delegations have been cut to a maximum of six people .
Fresh—not recycled—air will filter into the meeting room , translation headsets will be cleaned at every break , and a doctor will be on call should anyone feel ill. All these measures are designed as a counter to “ Zoomplomacy.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ concludes , we should know whether human connection can do that much better than an internet connection .
U.K. accuses Russia of hacking COVID-19 vaccine data .
The British National Cyber Security Centre claimed that Russian state-backed hackers are attempting to steal coronavirus vaccine data .
The United Kingdom , the United States , and Canada issued a joint statement on Sunday attributing the attacks to APT29 , also known as Cozy Bear—a group of hackers believed to be linked with Russian intelligence services .
The Kremlin has rejected the allegations , citing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ came the same day that British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Dominic Raab accused Russia of meddling in the 2019 U.K. general election by disseminating a draft of a free trade agreement between Britain and the United States .
Russia ’ s foreign ministry ridiculed the allegations “ The statement is so foggy and contradictory that it ’ s practically impossible to understand it , ” ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said .
European court rules in privacy case .
Europe ’ s top court has ruled that current regulations on data flows @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do not do enough to protect a citizen ’ s right to privacy following a case brought by activist Max Schrems .
In the short-term , the decision may mean U.S. tech companies will move some of their data processing into Europe , in theory keeping it away from U.S. surveillance programs .
U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said he was “ deeply disappointed ” with the court ’ s decision .
Azerbaijan ’ s foreign minister fired .
Azerbaijan ’ s President Ilham Aliyev has fired Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov over what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mamedyarov and Armenia over the latest increase in fighting between the two countries .
Mamedyarov had served as Azerbaijan ’ s foreign minister since 2004 .
The sacking comes after a dozen Azeris were killed along with four Armenians in the past week of fighting in the Tavush region in Armenia ’ s northeast .
White House mulls China travel ban .
The Trump administration is considering a U.S. travel ban on Chinese Communist Party members , according to reports in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times .
Discussions are reported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is not yet any clue on when such a policy would be implemented .
There are at least two potential roadblocks to implementing a ban : the sheer scale of membership—the party has more than 90 million members—and the fact that membership in the party is not public information .
Belarusian opposition rally behind Tikhanouskaya .
Two banned challengers to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko have thrown their support behind Svetlana Tikhanouskaya , a blogger who had entered the presidential race in place of her husband after his arrest on charges of threatening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supporters—Viktor Babariko and Valery Tsepkalo—had both been seen as strong rivals to the incumbent Lukashenko before they were both barred—Babariko because of corruption charges and Tsepkalo because the electoral commission rejected some of the signatures on his candidacy petition .
The election is scheduled for August 9 .
FBI probing Twitter hack .
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation is investigating Wednesday ’ s Twitter hack , which compromised high-profile accounts on the platform .
The news comes as cybersecurity researchers fear the attack could also have been a “ hack and dump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ message history was accessed in order to humiliate or otherwise influence public opinion , such as in the hack of Democratic National Committee staff in the run-up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election .
The global reckoning on racial justice has reached Greenland , where a municipality of roughly 23,000 will vote on whether to remove a statue of Hans Egede , a symbol of the island ’ s colonial past .
Egede established a colony on Greenland during the era of the united kingdom of Denmark-Norway in the early 18th century .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Danes on the island but found only the ethnic Inuit people living there—a group that remains in the majority in modern Greenland .
An online and postal vote currently shows 555 votes in favor of keeping the statue , and 324 votes to remove it .
Voting continues until July 21 .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The European Council meets today in Brussels to discuss an EU budget and rescue package, Britain accuses Russia of hacking coronavirus research data, and Azerbaijan’s foreign minister is fired after 16 years in his post.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The European Council meets today in Brussels to discuss an EU budget and rescue package, Britain accuses Russia of hacking coronavirus research data, and Azerbaijan’s foreign minister is fired after 16 years in his post.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
European Union Leaders Meet In Brussels For Showdown on Recovery Plan
European heads of government meet in Brussels today for a two-day summit to decide on the fate of the European Union’s seven-year budget alongside an economic rescue package for the bloc.
The meeting of the European Council will be the first in-person summit since Feb. 21. Since then, member states have seen around 135,000 deaths from COVID-19, with 1.3 million people infected. The pandemic has caused economic havoc, too: The EU economy is projected to contract by 8.3 percent this year.
The fact that leaders can meet face to face is a victory of sorts. Compared to their transatlantic rival, the coronavirus is relatively vanquished in Europe. The European Union reported fewer than 4,000 new cases on Wednesday, while the number of new cases reported in the United States was more than 17 times higher.
Should I pay or should I loan? There will be no celebratory mood, however, as leaders remain divided on how to administer an $840 billion recovery fund and must reach a unanimous decision for it to go forward. Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands—the so-called frugal four—want any funds to be distributed as loans, not as grants, and want veto power on how the money is used. This approach has been rejected by Spain and France, which have been particularly hard hit by the coronavirus pandemic and also stand to receive the most from the fund.
Diplomacy in the time of COVID. Although the summit is in-person, it will not otherwise be business as usual: Delegations have been cut to a maximum of six people. Fresh—not recycled—air will filter into the meeting room, translation headsets will be cleaned at every break, and a doctor will be on call should anyone feel ill. All these measures are designed as a counter to “Zoomplomacy.” By Saturday, when the summit concludes, we should know whether human connection can do that much better than an internet connection.
What We’re Following Today
U.K. accuses Russia of hacking COVID-19 vaccine data. The British National Cyber Security Centre claimed that Russian state-backed hackers are attempting to steal coronavirus vaccine data. The United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada issued a joint statement on Sunday attributing the attacks to APT29, also known as Cozy Bear—a group of hackers believed to be linked with Russian intelligence services. The Kremlin has rejected the allegations, citing a lack of evidence.
The allegations came the same day that British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Dominic Raab accused Russia of meddling in the 2019 U.K. general election by disseminating a draft of a free trade agreement between Britain and the United States. Russia’s foreign ministry ridiculed the allegations “The statement is so foggy and contradictory that it’s practically impossible to understand it,” ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said.
European court rules in privacy case. Europe’s top court has ruled that current regulations on data flows between the United States and the EU do not do enough to protect a citizen’s right to privacy following a case brought by activist Max Schrems. In the short-term, the decision may mean U.S. tech companies will move some of their data processing into Europe, in theory keeping it away from U.S. surveillance programs. U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said he was “deeply disappointed” with the court’s decision.
Azerbaijan’s foreign minister fired. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has fired Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov over what he called “meaningless negotiations” between Mamedyarov and Armenia over the latest increase in fighting between the two countries. Mamedyarov had served as Azerbaijan’s foreign minister since 2004. The sacking comes after a dozen Azeris were killed along with four Armenians in the past week of fighting in the Tavush region in Armenia’s northeast.
Keep an Eye On
White House mulls China travel ban. The Trump administration is considering a U.S. travel ban on Chinese Communist Party members, according to reports in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times. Discussions are reported to be in the early stages and there is not yet any clue on when such a policy would be implemented. There are at least two potential roadblocks to implementing a ban: the sheer scale of membership—the party has more than 90 million members—and the fact that membership in the party is not public information.
Belarusian opposition rally behind Tikhanouskaya. Two banned challengers to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko have thrown their support behind Svetlana Tikhanouskaya, a blogger who had entered the presidential race in place of her husband after his arrest on charges of threatening public order. Tikhanouskaya’s new supporters—Viktor Babariko and Valery Tsepkalo—had both been seen as strong rivals to the incumbent Lukashenko before they were both barred—Babariko because of corruption charges and Tsepkalo because the electoral commission rejected some of the signatures on his candidacy petition. The election is scheduled for August 9.
FBI probing Twitter hack. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation is investigating Wednesday’s Twitter hack, which compromised high-profile accounts on the platform. The news comes as cybersecurity researchers fear the attack could also have been a “hack and dump” operation, whereby users’ direct message history was accessed in order to humiliate or otherwise influence public opinion, such as in the hack of Democratic National Committee staff in the run-up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Odds and Ends
The global reckoning on racial justice has reached Greenland, where a municipality of roughly 23,000 will vote on whether to remove a statue of Hans Egede, a symbol of the island’s colonial past. Egede established a colony on Greenland during the era of the united kingdom of Denmark-Norway in the early 18th century. Egede had hoped to reconnect with long-lost Danes on the island but found only the ethnic Inuit people living there—a group that remains in the majority in modern Greenland. An online and postal vote currently shows 555 votes in favor of keeping the statue, and 324 votes to remove it. Voting continues until July 21.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.