foreignpolicy--2020-12-07--Report Sheds Light on How Biden’s Future NSC Chief Wants to Reshape U.S. Foreign Policy

Report Sheds Light on How Biden ’ s Future NSC Chief Wants to Reshape U.S. Foreign Policy For those wishing simply to reset U.S. foreign policy to the era before Donald Trump took the presidency , President-elect Joe Biden seemed to offer a glimmer of hope last week .
“ America is back , ” he tweeted , adding in another tweet that his new foreign-policy team “ is ready to lead the world , not retreat from it.
” The subtext : Trump was but a blip in the story of the United States ’ global leadership .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most important members of his team tells a different story .
Incoming National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has spent the past several years as part of a group working on a humbler , less ambitious approach to U.S. foreign policy—one that offers an honest , realistic assessment of how Americans ’ own views on the their place in the world have changed over the past four years under Trump .
Beginning in 2017 , Sullivan and a dozen others , mostly former officials in the administration of former U.S. President Barack Obama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administrations , did something unusual for the Washington elite—they listened to what Americans outside the Washington bubble had to say .
In a project organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and led by Salman Ahmed , a former Obama administration National Security Council official , the group conducted hundreds of interviews with small business owners , farmers , educators , state and local government officials , and others in Ohio , Nebraska , and Colorado , asking them what they wanted from U.S. foreign policy .
The final result , published @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Making U.S. Foreign Policy Work Better for the Middle Class .
The report deserves far more attention than it received in the run-up to the November elections .
It embraces Trump ’ s most important insight—that the purpose of U.S. foreign policy is to make life better for Americans—even as it rejects Trump ’ s divisive nationalism on international trade and U.S. alliances .
Americans want their country engaged in the world , the report argues , but not at any cost .
Most Americans face massive economic uncertainty , not just from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but from decades of globalization and technological change that have lifted the well-educated and well-connected while leaving many struggling to stay afloat and provide opportunities for their children .
If U.S. foreign policy fails to reflect that existential challenge , Americans will not support it .
The report takes a slap at the interventionist liberal internationalism still championed by parts of the Democratic elite .
The group presents its approach as something distinctly new and better-suited for a United States that has limited resources ; faces debilitating regional , class , and racial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act in a world with much wealthier competitors than during either the Cold War or the brief so-called unipolar moment after the collapse of the Soviet Union .
If the report is modest and calls for a less ambitious foreign policy , that is precisely the point : “ The United States can not renew America ’ s middle class unless it corrects for the overextension that too often has defined U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era , ” the authors wrote .
That is a slap at the interventionist liberal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic elite , but also at some of Trump ’ s potential heirs in the Republican Party .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sens .
Marco Rubio , Tom Cotton , and Josh Hawley are all stoking the fire for a new global confrontation with China .
The Carnegie report suggests they won ’ t find much support across the country , not even in Republican states such as Nebraska and Ohio .
“ There is no evidence America ’ s middle class will rally behind efforts aimed at restoring U.S. primacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new Cold War with China , or waging a cosmic struggle between the world ’ s democracies and authoritarian governments , ” the report states .
Most Americans , it continues , “ are more concerned with proximate threats to their physical and economic security.
” The road map for what the authors call “ a foreign policy that supports the aspirations of a middle class in crisis ” is not an especially straightforward one .
Those interviewed wanted the government “ to better promote [ their ] interests … by fostering stability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a more open and integrated world , ” the authors wrote .
The traditional liberal agenda of free trade and the rules-based global order may have provided stability , but it has not delivered sustained growth in employment earnings and viability for their local communities .
The traditional arguments of economists about the aggregate gains of trade fall flat across much of the United States today .
But Trump ’ s policy of economic nationalism has produced an equally dismal result .
His global trade war not only upended international rules and thereby @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hurt manufacturers with new tariffs on imports and harmed farmers when China and other countries retaliated with their own levies .
A new , post-Trump agenda would prioritize issues such as pandemic preparedness and prevention ; cybersecurity ; the protection of critical supply chains ; support for research , development , and innovation ; workforce development ; and ways to bring better opportunities to struggling communities .
High-speed broadband , which is vital for access to education , business , and opportunity , should be rolled out across the country with the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rolled out the national highway system at the height of the Cold War .
Strengthening economic adjustment programs for communities hit by economic disruption would no longer be the responsibility of low-level officials ; it would be a White House concern .
This new approach would require breaking down the silos that have long constrained the making of foreign policy .
Until now , strategists and diplomats have focused on security and geopolitical competition while issues of domestic growth and economic equality were left to others .
The future will require “ better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some policy imagination , ” the report said .
Critical issues that meld domestic and foreign policy include curbing tax avoidance , reining in anti-competitive practices by large corporations , and boosting labor and environmental standards around the world in order to discourage companies from moving industry offshore .
The task force calls for a national competitiveness strategy that would more closely link U.S. foreign and domestic priorities .
Climate change will be another likely area of conflict within the new administration .
The report offers some glimpses into the internal struggles that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden ’ s “ Build Back Better ” plan , for example , still champions the old and increasingly irrelevant notion of manufacturing jobs as the best path to middle-class prosperity ; Biden is promising to create 5 million of them through “ Buy American ” procurement and building domestic supply chains .
But the Carnegie report rightly notes that manufacturing now employs just 9 percent of the nation ’ s workforce , and new labor-saving technologies mean “ this percentage will steadily decline over the longer term.
” At the same time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the digital economy .
Finding ways to spread these opportunities across the country deserves much higher priority .
Climate change will be another likely area of conflict .
The report recognizes the job-creating possibilities of transitioning to a low-carbon economy .
But in language that will frustrate progressive Democrats , it points out that most of the coal , oil , and gas jobs threatened by the climate agenda are in rural counties , some of which are poorly located for green energy projects .
In places such as Weld County , Colorado @ @ @ @ @ @ @ traditional energy industries provide the bulk of well-paying jobs for workers without a college education .
The same holds for defense spending .
While the report favors redeploying some military spending to research and development and workforce training , it warns that large cuts to the defense budget would be economically devastating for communities with few other short-term options .
The largest employer at a single site in Ohio , for example , is the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton .
Most of these communities that are dependent on resource extraction and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that slashed employment in these places would only cement the partisan divide .
One smaller but critical recommendation made by the report is to open up the U.S. government ’ s advisory committees on international economic policy .
The advisory panels for the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce , for example , are dominated by corporate interests .
There should be far more scope for input from state and local governments , labor and consumer groups , and ordinary citizens .
The government needs to institutionalize what the report ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more of the country when making foreign policy .
The report offers encouragement that Americans do not want to walk away from the world—they want to embrace it in ways that make their lives better .
That the incoming national security advisor ’ s name is on that report is a good sign that the Biden administration may be ready to take on that task .

For those wishing simply to reset U.S. foreign policy to the era before Donald Trump took the presidency, President-elect Joe Biden seemed to offer a glimmer of hope last week. “ America is back ,” he tweeted, adding in another tweet that his new foreign-policy team “is ready to lead the world, not retreat from it.” The subtext: Trump was but a blip in the story of the United States’ global leadership. But Biden’s choice for one of the most important members of his team tells a different story. Incoming National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has spent the past several years as part of a group working on a humbler, less ambitious approach to U.S. foreign policy—one that offers an honest, realistic assessment of how Americans’ own views on the their place in the world have changed over the past four years under Trump.
For those wishing simply to reset U.S. foreign policy to the era before Donald Trump took the presidency, President-elect Joe Biden seemed to offer a glimmer of hope last week. “America is back,” he tweeted, adding in another tweet that his new foreign-policy team “is ready to lead the world, not retreat from it.” The subtext: Trump was but a blip in the story of the United States’ global leadership. But Biden’s choice for one of the most important members of his team tells a different story. Incoming National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has spent the past several years as part of a group working on a humbler, less ambitious approach to U.S. foreign policy—one that offers an honest, realistic assessment of how Americans’ own views on the their place in the world have changed over the past four years under Trump.
Beginning in 2017, Sullivan and a dozen others, mostly former officials in the administration of former U.S. President Barack Obama, but also some veterans of Republican administrations, did something unusual for the Washington elite: They listened to what Americans outside the Washington bubble had to say. In a project organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and led by Salman Ahmed, a former Obama administration National Security Council official, the group conducted hundreds of interviews with small business owners, farmers, educators, state and local government officials, and others in Ohio, Nebraska, and Colorado, asking them what they wanted from U.S. foreign policy. The final result, published in September, was a report entitled Making U.S. Foreign Policy Work Better for the Middle Class.
The report deserves far more attention than it received in the run-up to the November elections. It embraces Trump’s most important insight—that the purpose of U.S. foreign policy is to make life better for Americans—even as it rejects Trump’s divisive nationalism on international trade and U.S. alliances. Americans want their country engaged in the world, the report argues, but not at any cost. Most Americans face massive economic uncertainty, not just from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, but from decades of globalization and technological change that have lifted the well-educated and well-connected while leaving many struggling to stay afloat and provide opportunities for their children. If U.S. foreign policy fails to reflect that existential challenge, Americans will not support it.
The report takes a slap at the interventionist liberal internationalism still championed by parts of the Democratic elite.
The group presents its approach as something distinctly new and better-suited for a United States that has limited resources; faces debilitating regional, class, and racial divides at home; and has to act in a world with much wealthier competitors than during either the Cold War or the brief so-called unipolar moment after the collapse of the Soviet Union. If the report is modest and calls for a less ambitious foreign policy, that is precisely the point: “The United States cannot renew America’s middle class unless it corrects for the overextension that too often has defined U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era,” the authors wrote.
That is a slap at the interventionist liberal internationalism still championed by parts of the Democratic elite, but also at some of Trump’s potential heirs in the Republican Party. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sens. Marco Rubio, Tom Cotton, and Josh Hawley are all stoking the fire for a new global confrontation with China. The Carnegie report suggests they won’t find much support across the country, not even in Republican states such as Nebraska and Ohio. “There is no evidence America’s middle class will rally behind efforts aimed at restoring U.S. primacy in a unipolar world, escalating a new Cold War with China, or waging a cosmic struggle between the world’s democracies and authoritarian governments,” the report states. Most Americans, it continues, “are more concerned with proximate threats to their physical and economic security.”
The road map for what the authors call “a foreign policy that supports the aspirations of a middle class in crisis” is not an especially straightforward one. Those interviewed wanted the government “to better promote [their] interests … by fostering stability and lowering the risks of living in a more open and integrated world,” the authors wrote. The traditional liberal agenda of free trade and the rules-based global order may have provided stability, but it has not delivered sustained growth in employment earnings and viability for their local communities. The traditional arguments of economists about the aggregate gains of trade fall flat across much of the United States today. But Trump’s policy of economic nationalism has produced an equally dismal result. His global trade war not only upended international rules and thereby increased uncertainty and risk, but also hurt manufacturers with new tariffs on imports and harmed farmers when China and other countries retaliated with their own levies.
A new, post-Trump agenda would prioritize issues such as pandemic preparedness and prevention; cybersecurity; the protection of critical supply chains; support for research, development, and innovation; workforce development; and ways to bring better opportunities to struggling communities. High-speed broadband, which is vital for access to education, business, and opportunity, should be rolled out across the country with the same urgency as former President Dwight D. Eisenhower rolled out the national highway system at the height of the Cold War. Strengthening economic adjustment programs for communities hit by economic disruption would no longer be the responsibility of low-level officials; it would be a White House concern.
This new approach would require breaking down the silos that have long constrained the making of foreign policy. Until now, strategists and diplomats have focused on security and geopolitical competition while issues of domestic growth and economic equality were left to others. The future will require “better interagency coordination, interdisciplinary expertise, and some policy imagination,” the report said. Critical issues that meld domestic and foreign policy include curbing tax avoidance, reining in anti-competitive practices by large corporations, and boosting labor and environmental standards around the world in order to discourage companies from moving industry offshore. The task force calls for a national competitiveness strategy that would more closely link U.S. foreign and domestic priorities.
Climate change will be another likely area of conflict within the new administration.
The report offers some glimpses into the internal struggles that will play out in new administration. Biden’s “Build Back Better” plan, for example, still champions the old and increasingly irrelevant notion of manufacturing jobs as the best path to middle-class prosperity; Biden is promising to create 5 million of them through “Buy American” procurement and building domestic supply chains. But the Carnegie report rightly notes that manufacturing now employs just 9 percent of the nation’s workforce, and new labor-saving technologies mean “this percentage will steadily decline over the longer term.” At the same time, middle-income jobs are growing rapidly in the digital economy. Finding ways to spread these opportunities across the country deserves much higher priority.
Climate change will be another likely area of conflict. The report recognizes the job-creating possibilities of transitioning to a low-carbon economy. But in language that will frustrate progressive Democrats, it points out that most of the coal, oil, and gas jobs threatened by the climate agenda are in rural counties, some of which are poorly located for green energy projects. In places such as Weld County, Colorado, or North Platte, Nebraska, traditional energy industries provide the bulk of well-paying jobs for workers without a college education.
The same holds for defense spending. While the report favors redeploying some military spending to research and development and workforce training, it warns that large cuts to the defense budget would be economically devastating for communities with few other short-term options. The largest employer at a single site in Ohio, for example, is the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton. Most of these communities that are dependent on resource extraction and defense vote Republican, and Democratic initiatives that slashed employment in these places would only cement the partisan divide.
One smaller but critical recommendation made by the report is to open up the U.S. government’s advisory committees on international economic policy. The advisory panels for the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce, for example, are dominated by corporate interests. There should be far more scope for input from state and local governments, labor and consumer groups, and ordinary citizens. The government needs to institutionalize what the report’s authors set out to do—listen to more of the country when making foreign policy.
The report offers encouragement that Americans do not want to walk away from the world—they want to embrace it in ways that make their lives better. That the incoming national security advisor’s name is on that report is a good sign that the Biden administration may be ready to take on that task.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-07--Ignoring Criticism, Bangladesh Begins Resettling Rohingya

Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly update on emerging global stories .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : Concerns grow over an artificial island for refugees in Bangladesh , India ’ s farmers get militant in the face of crisis , and Japan and Russia quarrel over wartime legacies .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox on Mondays , please sign up here .
Authorities in Bangladesh have begun transporting thousands of Rohingya refugees from camps to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bay of Bengal .
Rights groups are concerned that many are being moved against their will .
Some 1,600 people were taken to the island of Bhasan Char on Friday .
The island , whose name means “ floating island , ” first emerged from silt in the estuary over 20 years ago .
The government of Bangladesh hopes to resettle 100,000 people there to ease pressure on mainland refugee camps .
Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya , a largely Muslim ethnic group , fled Myanmar beginning in 2017 following a brutal military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ described as having “ genocidal intent.
” Bangladesh took in around 1 million Rohingya , hundreds of thousands of whom live what is thought to be the largest refugee camp in the world , near the small city of Cox ’ s Bazar .
Bangladesh suffers from a critical shortage of land and has one of the highest population densities in the world .
The Bangladeshi authorities said that the Rohingya participating in the move had given their consent , but some refugees have previously told human rights groups that they had been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the refugees would have access to “ all modern amenities , year-round fresh water , beautiful lake and proper infrastructure ” —which would be an improvement on the flimsy and overcrowded camp accommodation .
But refugee advocates have questioned the island ’ s ability to withstand the cyclones and seasonal flooding .
A request by rights groups to allow a U.N. technical team to assess the safety and sustainability of the island has gone unanswered .
Approximately 300 refugees currently living on the island have no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been prevented from returning to their families in refugee camps .
Refugees and health care workers have also raised serious concerns about a lack of comprehensive health care on the island .
“ The relocation of so many # Rohingya refugees to a remote island , which is still off limits to everyone including rights groups and journalists without prior permission , poses grave concerns about independent human rights monitoring , ” Saad Hammadi , Amnesty International ’ s campaigner for South Asia , wrote on Twitter .
India ’ s farming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a nationwide strike starting Tuesday , vowing to intensify protests against controversial new agriculture laws .
The government argues that the new laws passed in September would allow farmers to sell produce directly to corporations , but farmers—the majority of whom are smallholders—fear that it will remove safeguards from exploitation .
Protesting farmers blocked roads and railways in India ’ s north before converging on New Delhi last month .
With some 60 percent of the Indian population dependent on agriculture , the backlash poses a real test for Prime Minister Narendra Modi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resolving the standoff failed on Saturday , as protest leaders have rejected the government ’ s offer to amend the laws , calling instead for a complete repeal of the legislation .
Havana syndrome .
Strange health problems including dizziness , vertigo , and memory loss experienced by U.S. diplomats and CIA officers working in Cuba , China , and Russia were likely caused by directed , pulsed radio frequency energy , according to a study conducted by the National Academies of Sciences , Engineering , and Medicine .
The study , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ released Saturday , is the most comprehensive account to date of the likely cause of the debilitating health issues .
U.S. officials have previously said they suspect Russian attacks may be responsible .
Hondurans seek aid .
Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández traveled to Washington last week to lobby for assistance from the U.S. government and international institutions after Hurricanes Eta and Iota devastated part of the country , displacing some 100,000 Hondurans .
On Friday Honduras , following a similar move by Guatemala last month , filed a request to extend Temporary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offered to almost 80,000 Hondurans within the United States .
TPS offers temporary protection from deportation and the ability to work legally to people from countries reeling from armed conflicts or natural disasters .
The Trump administration has sought to end the policy , but in an interview with the Washington Post , Hernández said that ending TPS now would deprive Honduras of much-needed remittances as the country ’ s economy suffers the effect of the hurricanes .
Venezuela elections hit opposition .
Pro-Nicolás Maduro candidates swept Sunday ’ s legislative elections in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s opposition leaders .
The results will enable Maduro to further consolidate his power , as the National Assembly was the last major lever of power in the country not dominated by his party and allies .
The results will come as a blow to the Venezuelan opposition , whose leader Juan Guaidó had been recognized by over 50 countries including the United States as the country ’ s rightful leader .
Guaidó ’ s recognition hinged on his role as president of the National Assembly , whom the constitution states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the president dies or has their mandate revoked .
Maduro ’ s reelection in 2018 was widely regarded as rigged .
The mandate of opposition lawmakers currently elected will expire on Jan. 5 .
Reuters reported last week that the interim opposition government led by Guaidó was discussing scaling back its operations .
The UAE in Libya .
The United Arab Emirates , one of the United States ’ closest military allies in the Middle East , may be helping to fund the Russian mercenary group Wagner in Libya , according to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pentagon ’ s inspector general for counterterrorism operations in Africa .
The assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency comes as congressional Democrats have voiced concern about the Trump administration ’ s plan to sell $ 23 billion of F-35 fighter jets to Abu Dhabi .
Emirati Ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba categorically denied the allegations made in the Pentagon report .
Japan , Russia dispute WW2 island seizure .
Last Tuesday , Russia announced that it had deployed a number of its new S-300V4 missile defense systems to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ declaring war on Japan just before the end of World War II , the Soviet Union seized control of the islands and deported some 17,000 Japanese residents .
As a result of the territorial dispute , Russia and Japan never formally signed a peace treaty to end the war .
Russia has a military presence on the islands , but the deployment of the missile defense systems , reportedly for combat duty , is likely to ruffle feathers in Tokyo .
Denmark plans fossil fuel end .
On Friday , Denmark began the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it would end oil and gas exploration in its waters by 2050 , as it seeks to meet European Union obligations to become carbon neutral by the same year .
Since Britain left the EU , Denmark is currently the bloc ’ s top oil producer .
The move is expected to cost the country $ 2.1 billion in revenue .
That ’ s it for this week .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly update on emerging global stories.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: Concerns grow over an artificial island for refugees in Bangladesh, India’s farmers get militant in the face of crisis, and Japan and Russia quarrel over wartime legacies.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox on Mondays, please sign up here.
Rights Groups Voice Concerns About Rohingya Resettlement
Authorities in Bangladesh have begun transporting thousands of Rohingya refugees from camps to a previously uninhabited and flood-prone island in the Bay of Bengal. Rights groups are concerned that many are being moved against their will. Some 1,600 people were taken to the island of Bhasan Char on Friday. The island, whose name means “floating island,” first emerged from silt in the estuary over 20 years ago. The government of Bangladesh hopes to resettle 100,000 people there to ease pressure on mainland refugee camps.
Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a largely Muslim ethnic group, fled Myanmar beginning in 2017 following a brutal military campaign, which the United Nations has described as having “genocidal intent.” Bangladesh took in around 1 million Rohingya, hundreds of thousands of whom live what is thought to be the largest refugee camp in the world, near the small city of Cox’s Bazar.
Bangladesh suffers from a critical shortage of land and has one of the highest population densities in the world. The Bangladeshi authorities said that the Rohingya participating in the move had given their consent, but some refugees have previously told human rights groups that they had been compelled to participate in the plan.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the refugees would have access to “all modern amenities, year-round fresh water, beautiful lake and proper infrastructure”—which would be an improvement on the flimsy and overcrowded camp accommodation. But refugee advocates have questioned the island’s ability to withstand the cyclones and seasonal flooding. A request by rights groups to allow a U.N. technical team to assess the safety and sustainability of the island has gone unanswered.
Approximately 300 refugees currently living on the island have no access to sustainable livelihoods or education and have been prevented from returning to their families in refugee camps. Refugees and health care workers have also raised serious concerns about a lack of comprehensive health care on the island.
“The relocation of so many #Rohingya refugees to a remote island, which is still off limits to everyone including rights groups and journalists without prior permission, poses grave concerns about independent human rights monitoring,” Saad Hammadi, Amnesty International’s campaigner for South Asia, wrote on Twitter.
What We’re Following
India’s farming strike. Farmers in India called for a nationwide strike starting Tuesday, vowing to intensify protests against controversial new agriculture laws. The government argues that the new laws passed in September would allow farmers to sell produce directly to corporations, but farmers—the majority of whom are smallholders—fear that it will remove safeguards from exploitation.
Protesting farmers blocked roads and railways in India’s north before converging on New Delhi last month. With some 60 percent of the Indian population dependent on agriculture, the backlash poses a real test for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government. Talks aimed at resolving the standoff failed on Saturday, as protest leaders have rejected the government’s offer to amend the laws, calling instead for a complete repeal of the legislation.
Havana syndrome. Strange health problems including dizziness, vertigo, and memory loss experienced by U.S. diplomats and CIA officers working in Cuba, China, and Russia were likely caused by directed, pulsed radio frequency energy, according to a study conducted by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. The study, which was commissioned by the State Department and released Saturday, is the most comprehensive account to date of the likely cause of the debilitating health issues. U.S. officials have previously said they suspect Russian attacks may be responsible.
Hondurans seek aid. Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández traveled to Washington last week to lobby for assistance from the U.S. government and international institutions after Hurricanes Eta and Iota devastated part of the country, displacing some 100,000 Hondurans. On Friday Honduras, following a similar move by Guatemala last month, filed a request to extend Temporary Protected Status (TPS) protections currently offered to almost 80,000 Hondurans within the United States.
TPS offers temporary protection from deportation and the ability to work legally to people from countries reeling from armed conflicts or natural disasters. The Trump administration has sought to end the policy, but in an interview with the Washington Post, Hernández said that ending TPS now would deprive Honduras of much-needed remittances as the country’s economy suffers the effect of the hurricanes.
Venezuela elections hit opposition. Pro-Nicolás Maduro candidates swept Sunday’s legislative elections in Venezuela, which were boycotted by the country’s opposition leaders. The results will enable Maduro to further consolidate his power, as the National Assembly was the last major lever of power in the country not dominated by his party and allies. The results will come as a blow to the Venezuelan opposition, whose leader Juan Guaidó had been recognized by over 50 countries including the United States as the country’s rightful leader.
Guaidó’s recognition hinged on his role as president of the National Assembly, whom the constitution states serves as interim leader in the event that the president dies or has their mandate revoked. Maduro’s reelection in 2018 was widely regarded as rigged. The mandate of opposition lawmakers currently elected will expire on Jan. 5. Reuters reported last week that the interim opposition government led by Guaidó was discussing scaling back its operations.
Keep an Eye On
The UAE in Libya. The United Arab Emirates, one of the United States’ closest military allies in the Middle East, may be helping to fund the Russian mercenary group Wagner in Libya, according to a report issued late last month by the Pentagon’s inspector general for counterterrorism operations in Africa. The assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency comes as congressional Democrats have voiced concern about the Trump administration’s plan to sell $23 billion of F-35 fighter jets to Abu Dhabi. Emirati Ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba categorically denied the allegations made in the Pentagon report.
Japan, Russia dispute WW2 island seizure. Last Tuesday, Russia announced that it had deployed a number of its new S-300V4 missile defense systems to the disputed Kuril Islands near Japan. After declaring war on Japan just before the end of World War II, the Soviet Union seized control of the islands and deported some 17,000 Japanese residents. As a result of the territorial dispute, Russia and Japan never formally signed a peace treaty to end the war. Russia has a military presence on the islands, but the deployment of the missile defense systems, reportedly for combat duty, is likely to ruffle feathers in Tokyo.
Denmark plans fossil fuel end. On Friday, Denmark began the first major oil-producing nation to announce that it would end oil and gas exploration in its waters by 2050, as it seeks to meet European Union obligations to become carbon neutral by the same year. Since Britain left the EU, Denmark is currently the bloc’s top oil producer. The move is expected to cost the country $2.1 billion in revenue.
That’s it for this week.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to newsletters@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-07--How to Buy Time on the Korean Peninsula After Trump’s Theatrics

How to Buy Time on the Korean Peninsula After Trump ’ s Theatrics The answers you get in foreign policy , as in life , often depend on the questions you ask .
The North Korea question on everyone ’ s lips in Washington seems to be whether leader Kim Jong Un is about to test an intercontinental ballistic missile .
Here in Seoul , everyone wants to know whether President-elect Joe Biden will hold a summit with Kim .
Are we barking up the right tree ?
Both questions reflect the degree to which our expectations have been conditioned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ few years .
Kim ’ s extraordinary upgrade of his nuclear deterrent started in the Obama years and culminated on President Donald Trump ’ s watch with the successful test launch of a nuclear-capable ICBM in November 2017 , bringing the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war .
Six months later , Trump ’ s penchant for political theater led to a string of summits in Singapore , Hanoi , and Panmunjom , generating a solid framework for improving relations but no tangible progress on the details .
After the last U.S.-North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year ago , observers spent months on edge for an October surprise of a long-range missile test or a fourth Trump-Kim summit .
Neither arrived .
Since Nov. 3 , Trump has faced far more pressing concerns than North Korea , as he fights desperately to overturn the results of the election and deny the reality of defeat .
Trump ’ s intransigence is wreaking havoc on the transition process , making it even harder for Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris ’ s team to prepare for taking the reins come January @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rate as a top priority , but nor can it simply be ignored .
In that context , what is needed are practical ideas for defusing a crisis before it develops , buying time for responsible diplomacy , and finding a way to move on to a course of steady progress .
Rather than ask , will Kim test and will Biden talk , the question is how to navigate the space between provocation and negotiation .
So here ’ s a modest suggestion .
As swiftly as possible , the president-elect should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ review .
That sounds deadly dull , I know , and it ’ s no guarantee of progress .
But it ’ s a critical necessity for framing exactly what the United States wants out of the process .
Let ’ s do a quick review of North Korea policy reviews : The George W. Bush administration completed its review in June 2001 , by which point the White House was already looking for an exit from the Agreed Framework negotiated by former President Bill Clinton with leader Kim Jong Il .
Leaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a mistake , and Bush reversed course in his second term as North Korea staged a nuclear breakout .
Bush turned his hopes to the Beijing-brokered Six Party Talks to get the horse back in the barn , with mixed results .
Former President Barack Obama never carried out a policy review , symptomatic of the low priority placed on the North Korea issue .
That too turned out to be a mistake , so much so that by the end of his second term , in the one sit-down with incoming President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Un at the top of the national security inbox .
Trump ’ s National Security Council wasted no time in carrying out a policy review , released in April 2017 ( just before Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago ) , that promised “ maximum pressure and engagement.
” That shows that just doing a deliberate review is no guarantee of success .
Yet it ’ s better than just keeping things on autopilot .
Everyone wants to know how the Biden administration will handle North Korea .
Hopefully , Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ answer .
They shouldn ’ t , yet—they need trusted advisors to study the options and consult with the players first .
A formal policy review does that , while also signaling to Pyongyang ( and Seoul ) that the new administration does , in fact , care .
Moreover , they can add a twist by looking at a slightly older model : the “ Perry Process ” policy review carried out in Clinton ’ s second term by former Secretary of Defense William Perry .
Consulting extensively across agencies as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ added an essential ingredient by talking to key stakeholders in the region as part of his review .
Most importantly , those discussions included talking to North Korean officials in Pyongyang as Clinton ’ s special envoy .
There happens to be a perfect candidate out there to carry out this policy review process , assuming he is willing to answer if called back to public service : recently retired U.S. Army Gen. Vincent Brooks .
Ask just about anyone who was paying attention to the Korean Peninsula amid the “ fire and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ peace and denuclearization ” diplomacy of 2018 about Brooks , then serving as U.S .
Forces Korea Commander , and you are likely to hear only praise .
After graduating West Point at the top of his class ( the first African American cadet to make First Captain ) in 1980 , Brooks ’ rise to four star afforded him an experience not just of fighting in war , but also—more germane to Korea—of keeping the peace .
In 2013 , Obama tapped Brooks to command Army forces across the Pacific @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bigger picture in the region .
Brooks combines the acquired wisdom of a distinguished military career , fresh knowledge of Korean Peninsula dynamics , and intuitive good sense of a problem-solver .
So , it ’ s a small step , but start by entrusting Brooks with a title like special envoy to the Korean Peninsula , empower him to make the interagency rounds starting with the talented team led by the unflappable Stephen Biegun , and then dispatch him to Seoul with a calling card for Pyongyang .
Kim Jong Un would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pass up the chance to probe the possibilities of negotiating with a new government in Washington .
By meeting North Korean interlocutors ( in a third country if necessary , given Kim ’ s extreme measures to fight off the pandemic ) , the Brooks Process could prevent the Biden administration from falling into the ditch of refusing “ talks for talks ’ sake ” —a talking point that hobbled North Korea diplomacy in the Obama years .
En route home , Brooks could drop by Beijing for input and confer closely with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does not ensure success , but it might at least help keep the possibility of progress open , buying time without wasting bandwidth .

The answers you get in foreign policy, as in life, often depend on the questions you ask. The North Korea question on everyone’s lips in Washington seems to be whether leader Kim Jong Un is about to test an intercontinental ballistic missile. Here in Seoul, everyone wants to know whether President-elect Joe Biden will hold a summit with Kim. Are we barking up the right tree?
The answers you get in foreign policy, as in life, often depend on the questions you ask. The North Korea question on everyone’s lips in Washington seems to be whether leader Kim Jong Un is about to test an intercontinental ballistic missile. Here in Seoul, everyone wants to know whether President-elect Joe Biden will hold a summit with Kim. Are we barking up the right tree?
Both questions reflect the degree to which our expectations have been conditioned by the events—traumatic and dramatic—of the last few years. Kim’s extraordinary upgrade of his nuclear deterrent started in the Obama years and culminated on President Donald Trump’s watch with the successful test launch of a nuclear-capable ICBM in November 2017, bringing the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war. Six months later, Trump’s penchant for political theater led to a string of summits in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom, generating a solid framework for improving relations but no tangible progress on the details. After the last U.S.-North Korean talks broke off in Stockholm a year ago, observers spent months on edge for an October surprise of a long-range missile test or a fourth Trump-Kim summit. Neither arrived.
Since Nov. 3, Trump has faced far more pressing concerns than North Korea, as he fights desperately to overturn the results of the election and deny the reality of defeat. Trump’s intransigence is wreaking havoc on the transition process, making it even harder for Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris’s team to prepare for taking the reins come January. No one expects North Korea to rate as a top priority, but nor can it simply be ignored. In that context, what is needed are practical ideas for defusing a crisis before it develops, buying time for responsible diplomacy, and finding a way to move on to a course of steady progress. Rather than ask, will Kim test and will Biden talk, the question is how to navigate the space between provocation and negotiation.
So here’s a modest suggestion. As swiftly as possible, the president-elect should announce plans for a Korean Peninsula policy review. That sounds deadly dull, I know, and it’s no guarantee of progress. But it’s a critical necessity for framing exactly what the United States wants out of the process. Let’s do a quick review of North Korea policy reviews: The George W. Bush administration completed its review in June 2001, by which point the White House was already looking for an exit from the Agreed Framework negotiated by former President Bill Clinton with leader Kim Jong Il. Leaving the Agreed Framework turned out to be a mistake, and Bush reversed course in his second term as North Korea staged a nuclear breakout. Bush turned his hopes to the Beijing-brokered Six Party Talks to get the horse back in the barn, with mixed results. Former President Barack Obama never carried out a policy review, symptomatic of the low priority placed on the North Korea issue. That too turned out to be a mistake, so much so that by the end of his second term, in the one sit-down with incoming President Donald Trump, Obama put Kim Jong Un at the top of the national security inbox. Trump’s National Security Council wasted no time in carrying out a policy review, released in April 2017 (just before Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago), that promised “maximum pressure and engagement.” That shows that just doing a deliberate review is no guarantee of success. Yet it’s better than just keeping things on autopilot.
Everyone wants to know how the Biden administration will handle North Korea. Hopefully, Biden and Harris don’t know the answer. They shouldn’t, yet—they need trusted advisors to study the options and consult with the players first. A formal policy review does that, while also signaling to Pyongyang (and Seoul) that the new administration does, in fact, care. Moreover, they can add a twist by looking at a slightly older model: the “Perry Process” policy review carried out in Clinton’s second term by former Secretary of Defense William Perry. Consulting extensively across agencies as well as with members of Congress, Perry added an essential ingredient by talking to key stakeholders in the region as part of his review. Most importantly, those discussions included talking to North Korean officials in Pyongyang as Clinton’s special envoy.
There happens to be a perfect candidate out there to carry out this policy review process, assuming he is willing to answer if called back to public service: recently retired U.S. Army Gen. Vincent Brooks. Ask just about anyone who was paying attention to the Korean Peninsula amid the “fire and fury” of 2017 as well as the “peace and denuclearization” diplomacy of 2018 about Brooks, then serving as U.S. Forces Korea Commander, and you are likely to hear only praise. After graduating West Point at the top of his class (the first African American cadet to make First Captain) in 1980, Brooks’ rise to four star afforded him an experience not just of fighting in war, but also—more germane to Korea—of keeping the peace. In 2013, Obama tapped Brooks to command Army forces across the Pacific, giving him a feel for the bigger picture in the region. Brooks combines the acquired wisdom of a distinguished military career, fresh knowledge of Korean Peninsula dynamics, and intuitive good sense of a problem-solver.
So, it’s a small step, but start by entrusting Brooks with a title like special envoy to the Korean Peninsula, empower him to make the interagency rounds starting with the talented team led by the unflappable Stephen Biegun, and then dispatch him to Seoul with a calling card for Pyongyang. Kim Jong Un would be unlikely, and unwise, to pass up the chance to probe the possibilities of negotiating with a new government in Washington.
By meeting North Korean interlocutors (in a third country if necessary, given Kim’s extreme measures to fight off the pandemic), the Brooks Process could prevent the Biden administration from falling into the ditch of refusing “talks for talks’ sake”—a talking point that hobbled North Korea diplomacy in the Obama years. En route home, Brooks could drop by Beijing for input and confer closely with allies in Tokyo. A policy review does not ensure success, but it might at least help keep the possibility of progress open, buying time without wasting bandwidth.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-07--Document of the Week: Aid Donors Blast UNDP for Resisting Appeals to Fight Corruption

Document of the Week : Aid Donors Blast UNDP for Resisting Appeals to Fight Corruption The United Nations ’ premier development agency has resisted appeals from its wealthiest donors to conduct an independent investigation into alleged corruption and mismanagement by U.N. personnel and consultants working on a controversial environmental project in Russia aimed at mitigating the impact of global warming , according to internal U.N. documents .
In August 2019 , Foreign Policy published a lengthy investigation into alleged corruption in an environmental program managed by the U.N. Development Program ( UNDP ) in Russia , triggering a major push @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into potential mismanagement and corruption at the agency .
The following month , the UNDP interim associate administrator , Mourad Wahba , sought to assure key Western donors , including the Netherlands , New Zealand , and Sweden , that the agency took the allegations of corruption seriously , and he proposed having the U.N. ’ s internal watchdog , the Office of Internal Oversight Services , conduct an investigation .
But the donors expressed concern that the U.N. had reneged on the pledge .
“ This offer appears to have been subsequently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ letter prepared in January by those three countries .
“ Given the seriousness of our concerns , we hope that UNDP will reconsider its position and formally request OIOS investigate its handling ” of the Russia project , according to the draft letter , which was obtained by Foreign Policy .
UNDP never did .
In a written response , a UNDP spokesperson said that the development agency never retracted the offer .
The spokesperson , who requested anonymity , confirmed that the development agency had proposed the Office of Internal Oversight Services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unacceptable to the donors , the spokesperson added , UNDP suggested that another U.N. investigative unit conduct the review .
It remains unclear why the U.N. didn ’ t conduct the review itself .
In the end , UNDP decided to press ahead with an independent review of its handling of the Russia program .
If the review finds cause for further investigation , UNDP will “ pursue that route with a U.N.-mandated body.
” Tensions between UNDP and its wealthiest contributors peaked in March , when a dozen donor states , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the United States , signed a confidential letter to UNDP ’ s administrator , Achim Steiner , that underscored the exasperation they had faced in prodding the development agency to dig deeper into the allegations .
The March 5 letter—which we are publishing as our Document of the Week—voiced frustration that the donors ’ request for reinvestigating the case “ has not materialized.
” “ We consider that a reinvestigation by an independent body is essential to address our concerns , to satisfy requirements of some of our national auditors , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problems will not occur in future UNDP programs , ” according to the letter , which was cited in a recent story by the Financial Times .
“ Allegations of potential misconduct within the United Nations Development System will inevitably endanger the faith in its entities and the system overall.
” The U.N. ’ s handling of the $ 7.8 million Russia project has raised broader concerns about the U.N. development agency ’ s ability to assure donor countries that it can reliably distribute hundreds of millions of dollars in international funding for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ designed to curb greenhouse gas emissions in Russia by encouraging energy efficiency , had been plagued by allegations of corruption and mismanagement since shortly after its inception in 2010 .
An internal 2017 audit found “ strong indicators of deliberate misappropriation ” of millions of dollars in funds .
UNDP has acknowledged that its handling of the Russian project “ fell short of its required standards.
” But a UNDP investigation into the allegations , carried out by its internal corruption watchdog , the Office of Audit and Investigation , found no evidence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agency informed donors at the time that it “ does not believe that a technical review … would produce evidence or indication of misconduct.
” Donor nations were dissatisfied with UNDP ’ s own investigation and demanded an independent review of its handling of the Russia program .
Such a review , they wrote in the March letter , “ will provide answers to many of the questions and concerns we have raised which , after UNDP ’ s reviews and investigations , are still outstanding .
This review will determine whether wrongdoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , if so , identify the persons or entities responsible.
” In response , the U.N. hired an outside consultant , Amitav Rath , to conduct a review of the U.N. ’ s management of the program , which is almost complete .
The purpose of the review , however , was not to hold potential perpetrators accountable for a crime , but to help UNDP “ further refine controls , risk management and governance arrangements.
” Only the UNDP ’ s internal watchdog , which has already concluded that no wrongdoing occurred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigate alleged individual misconduct , ” the organization wrote .
“ We have established an independent Office of Audit and Investigations and rely on that office to conduct the required audit , ” a UNDP spokesperson said .
“ We would be breaching the independence of the office if we requested external parties to re-investigate their work .
”

The United Nations’ premier development agency has resisted appeals from its wealthiest donors to conduct an independent investigation into alleged corruption and mismanagement by U.N. personnel and consultants working on a controversial environmental project in Russia aimed at mitigating the impact of global warming, according to internal U.N. documents.
The United Nations’ premier development agency has resisted appeals from its wealthiest donors to conduct an independent investigation into alleged corruption and mismanagement by U.N. personnel and consultants working on a controversial environmental project in Russia aimed at mitigating the impact of global warming, according to internal U.N. documents.
In August 2019, Foreign Policy published a lengthy investigation into alleged corruption in an environmental program managed by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) in Russia, triggering a major push by donor states for an independent investigation into potential mismanagement and corruption at the agency.
The following month, the UNDP interim associate administrator, Mourad Wahba, sought to assure key Western donors, including the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden, that the agency took the allegations of corruption seriously, and he proposed having the U.N.’s internal watchdog, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, conduct an investigation.
But the donors expressed concern that the U.N. had reneged on the pledge. “This offer appears to have been subsequently retracted,” according to a draft letter prepared in January by those three countries. “Given the seriousness of our concerns, we hope that UNDP will reconsider its position and formally request OIOS investigate its handling” of the Russia project, according to the draft letter, which was obtained by Foreign Policy. UNDP never did.
In a written response, a UNDP spokesperson said that the development agency never retracted the offer. The spokesperson, who requested anonymity, confirmed that the development agency had proposed the Office of Internal Oversight Services investigate the project. If that was unacceptable to the donors, the spokesperson added, UNDP suggested that another U.N. investigative unit conduct the review. It remains unclear why the U.N. didn’t conduct the review itself.
In the end, UNDP decided to press ahead with an independent review of its handling of the Russia program. If the review finds cause for further investigation, UNDP will “pursue that route with a U.N.-mandated body.”
Tensions between UNDP and its wealthiest contributors peaked in March, when a dozen donor states, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and the United States, signed a confidential letter to UNDP’s administrator, Achim Steiner, that underscored the exasperation they had faced in prodding the development agency to dig deeper into the allegations.
The March 5 letter—which we are publishing as our Document of the Week—voiced frustration that the donors’ request for reinvestigating the case “has not materialized.”
“We consider that a reinvestigation by an independent body is essential to address our concerns, to satisfy requirements of some of our national auditors, and to sustain our confidence that similar problems will not occur in future UNDP programs,” according to the letter, which was cited in a recent story by the Financial Times. “Allegations of potential misconduct within the United Nations Development System will inevitably endanger the faith in its entities and the system overall.”
The U.N.’s handling of the $7.8 million Russia project has raised broader concerns about the U.N. development agency’s ability to assure donor countries that it can reliably distribute hundreds of millions of dollars in international funding for environmental projects.
The UNDP program, designed to curb greenhouse gas emissions in Russia by encouraging energy efficiency, had been plagued by allegations of corruption and mismanagement since shortly after its inception in 2010. An internal 2017 audit found “strong indicators of deliberate misappropriation” of millions of dollars in funds.
UNDP has acknowledged that its handling of the Russian project “fell short of its required standards.” But a UNDP investigation into the allegations, carried out by its internal corruption watchdog, the Office of Audit and Investigation, found no evidence that funds had been misappropriated. The agency informed donors at the time that it “does not believe that a technical review … would produce evidence or indication of misconduct.”
Donor nations were dissatisfied with UNDP’s own investigation and demanded an independent review of its handling of the Russia program. Such a review, they wrote in the March letter, “will provide answers to many of the questions and concerns we have raised which, after UNDP’s reviews and investigations, are still outstanding. This review will determine whether wrongdoing, including misappropriation of funds occurred and, if so, identify the persons or entities responsible.”
In response, the U.N. hired an outside consultant, Amitav Rath, to conduct a review of the U.N.’s management of the program, which is almost complete. The purpose of the review, however, was not to hold potential perpetrators accountable for a crime, but to help UNDP “further refine controls, risk management and governance arrangements.” Only the UNDP’s internal watchdog, which has already concluded that no wrongdoing occurred, “has the sole responsibility to investigate alleged individual misconduct,” the organization wrote.
“We have established an independent Office of Audit and Investigations and rely on that office to conduct the required audit,” a UNDP spokesperson said. “We would be breaching the independence of the office if we requested external parties to re-investigate their work.”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-07--China Is Both Weak and Dangerous

China Is Both Weak and Dangerous

China Is Both Weak and Dangerous In a timely and insightful new book , The China Nightmare : The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State , the American Enterprise Institute ’ s Dan Blumenthal takes a close look at China , examining its capacity and strategic objectives .
In so doing , he sheds light on the paradox of modern China : It is an assertive , ambitious power , but also one with underlying weaknesses that could upend its rise , or , as the title contends , hasten its decay .
In his words , “ The main @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( or perhaps because of ) China ’ s growing internal weaknesses , it is pushing forward grand strategic ambitions.
” Blumenthal ’ s study of China began years ago on the Pentagon ’ s China desk , and he brings a deep understanding of the developments that have transformed the country since .
Scholars debate whether China desires limited regional hegemony or dominance of the global system .
Blumenthal ’ s answer is clear : China ’ s ambitions are worldwide .
He points to the 19th Chinese Communist Party ( CCP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2017 .
The report predicts that by mid-century , China will be a “ prosperous , modern , and strong socialist country with a world-class military.
” According to Blumenthal , Beijing ’ s “ struggle for geopolitical mastery will not be limited to Asia , ” because “ China wants to lead a new world order centered around Chinese power and governed by Chinese-made rules.
” Even if the CCP is primarily concerned with regime survival , he argues , it views a Sinocentric international order as essential .
A perception @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world has always served as an important source of domestic legitimacy .
But China ’ s global ambitions belie underlying weaknesses .
Blumenthal observes that the CCP itself “ has assessed that its own internal and external security situation is in fact overwhelmingly challenging.
” Blumenthal cites a litany of economic , social , and political challenges facing Beijing , including a burgeoning demographic crisis , slowing GDP growth due to the party ’ s reassertion of state control of the economy , capital flight with wealthy Chinese moving hundreds of billions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is stunting Chinese agricultural production and the health of its people , the prospect of a middle-income trap due to China ’ s struggle to unleash innovation , and fears of separatism and domestic unrest .
As Xi tries to rally China behind a vision of national renewal and achieve the country ’ s grand ambitions on the world stage , he is hamstrung by the reality of China ’ s flaws .
Blumenthal is correct that China is weaker than many understand .
His analysis accords well with that of one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his new book , Kroenig argues that China ’ s autocratic system of governance is a fundamental handicap in its great-power rivalry with the United States .
Historically , from the ancient world to the Cold War , autocratic powers have performed poorly in long-term , great-power competitions against democratic rivals .
Autocratic-governance systems stifle economic growth and innovation by emphasizing cultures of conformity and limiting free enterprise .
In the diplomatic realm , dictators struggle to build deep and lasting international alliances and partnerships .
When it comes to military matters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own people than to defending against external threats .
China is afflicted with each of these challenges : a slowing economy ; few true friends abroad ; and domestic insecurity .
Going further , Blumenthal shrewdly delves into the CCP ’ s struggle to reconstitute new sources of domestic legitimacy .
Former China leader Deng Xiaoping ’ s transition toward a market economy undercut the Marxist-Leninist roots of the ruling party .
As Blumenthal writes , “ China today is making up for the absence of attractive political principles or ideologies by creating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lieu of Marxism-Leninism , it “ offers increasingly strident appeals to an imperialist nationalism.
” It is for these reasons that , even as a much more fragile power than it appears , China poses a serious threat to the United States and its allies .
Blumenthal notes that “ declining powers are no less dangerous than rising ones , ” pointing to Russia ’ s invasion of Ukraine as an example of a weak power aggressively lashing out against its neighbors .
Blumenthal , therefore , carves out an important third way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington see China as ten feet tall and great-power competition as the foremost priority of the United States .
Others describe a China with serious internal problems , which does not pose much of a threat , and with which Washington can continue to cooperate .
In contrast , Blumenthal ’ s China is both weak and dangerous .
Toward the end of the book , Blumenthal asks , “ ‘ What kind of world do we want to live in ?
’ The CCP has a clear answer , if not the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yet the CCP may have a clear answer , but Washington does not .
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy of the United States of America correctly diagnosed the problem of great-power competition with China , but it did not articulate the desired end state of this rivalry .
Blumenthal sketches the outlines of a theory of victory for the United States : “ This will mean convincing China that such a competition is too costly and could come at the expense of Beijing ’ s crucial goal of regime survival.
” This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one than other China watchers have provided .
We have previously argued that the United States should seek to revitalize , adapt , and defend the U.S.-led , rules-based international system .
In the long term , the United States would like China to be a cooperative member of that system .
But that will not be possible any time soon , perhaps not as long as the CCP reigns in Beijing .
In the short term , therefore , the United States and its allies must defend that system from economic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poses , and impose serious costs on the CCP when it violates widely held international standards .
This strategy will be successful when it changes the minds of China ’ s leaders and , as Blumenthal also argues , convinces them that challenging the U.S.-led system is too difficult and costly .
Successfully executing such a strategy will require a deep understanding of China ’ s strengths and weaknesses as well as its hopes and fears .
This is exactly what Blumenthal ’ s important book provides .
It should be required reading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ understand China , and , most of all , for the government officials who are responsible from protecting us from this weak and dangerous nation .

Three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States finds itself engaged in a new great-power competition with China. Since assuming office, Chinese President Xi Jinping has launched his country on a more assertive path, and the COVID-19 pandemic has intensified the rivalry. On the surface, China appears confident, with a recovering economy, a modernizing military, accelerating technological development, and expanding diplomatic influence around the world.
Three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States finds itself engaged in a new great-power competition with China. Since assuming office, Chinese President Xi Jinping has launched his country on a more assertive path, and the COVID-19 pandemic has intensified the rivalry. On the surface, China appears confident, with a recovering economy, a modernizing military, accelerating technological development, and expanding diplomatic influence around the world.
In a timely and insightful new book, The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State, the American Enterprise Institute’s Dan Blumenthal takes a close look at China, examining its capacity and strategic objectives. In so doing, he sheds light on the paradox of modern China: It is an assertive, ambitious power, but also one with underlying weaknesses that could upend its rise, or, as the title contends, hasten its decay. In his words, “The main argument of this book is that despite (or perhaps because of) China’s growing internal weaknesses, it is pushing forward grand strategic ambitions.”
The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State, Dan Blumenthal, AEI Press, 176 pp., , October 2020
Blumenthal’s study of China began years ago on the Pentagon’s China desk, and he brings a deep understanding of the developments that have transformed the country since. Scholars debate whether China desires limited regional hegemony or dominance of the global system. Blumenthal’s answer is clear: China’s ambitions are worldwide. He points to the 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress work report delivered by Xi in 2017. The report predicts that by mid-century, China will be a “prosperous, modern, and strong socialist country with a world-class military.” According to Blumenthal, Beijing’s “struggle for geopolitical mastery will not be limited to Asia,” because “China wants to lead a new world order centered around Chinese power and governed by Chinese-made rules.”
Even if the CCP is primarily concerned with regime survival, he argues, it views a Sinocentric international order as essential. A perception of China as the natural center of the world has always served as an important source of domestic legitimacy.
But China’s global ambitions belie underlying weaknesses. Blumenthal observes that the CCP itself “has assessed that its own internal and external security situation is in fact overwhelmingly challenging.” Blumenthal cites a litany of economic, social, and political challenges facing Beijing, including a burgeoning demographic crisis, slowing GDP growth due to the party’s reassertion of state control of the economy, capital flight with wealthy Chinese moving hundreds of billions of dollars offshore, environmental degradation that is stunting Chinese agricultural production and the health of its people, the prospect of a middle-income trap due to China’s struggle to unleash innovation, and fears of separatism and domestic unrest. As Xi tries to rally China behind a vision of national renewal and achieve the country’s grand ambitions on the world stage, he is hamstrung by the reality of China’s flaws.
Blumenthal is correct that China is weaker than many understand. His analysis accords well with that of one of the authors of this review. In his new book, Kroenig argues that China’s autocratic system of governance is a fundamental handicap in its great-power rivalry with the United States. Historically, from the ancient world to the Cold War, autocratic powers have performed poorly in long-term, great-power competitions against democratic rivals. Autocratic-governance systems stifle economic growth and innovation by emphasizing cultures of conformity and limiting free enterprise. In the diplomatic realm, dictators struggle to build deep and lasting international alliances and partnerships. When it comes to military matters, they devote more resources to repressing their own people than to defending against external threats. China is afflicted with each of these challenges: a slowing economy; few true friends abroad; and domestic insecurity.
Going further, Blumenthal shrewdly delves into the CCP’s struggle to reconstitute new sources of domestic legitimacy. Former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s transition toward a market economy undercut the Marxist-Leninist roots of the ruling party. As Blumenthal writes, “China today is making up for the absence of attractive political principles or ideologies by creating a new empire of fear.” In lieu of Marxism-Leninism, it “offers increasingly strident appeals to an imperialist nationalism.”
It is for these reasons that, even as a much more fragile power than it appears, China poses a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Blumenthal notes that “declining powers are no less dangerous than rising ones,” pointing to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an example of a weak power aggressively lashing out against its neighbors.
Blumenthal, therefore, carves out an important third way of thinking about China. Many in Washington see China as ten feet tall and great-power competition as the foremost priority of the United States. Others describe a China with serious internal problems, which does not pose much of a threat, and with which Washington can continue to cooperate. In contrast, Blumenthal’s China is both weak and dangerous.
Toward the end of the book, Blumenthal asks, “‘What kind of world do we want to live in?’ The CCP has a clear answer, if not the long-term means to achieve its vision.” Yet the CCP may have a clear answer, but Washington does not. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy of the United States of America correctly diagnosed the problem of great-power competition with China, but it did not articulate the desired end state of this rivalry.
Blumenthal sketches the outlines of a theory of victory for the United States: “This will mean convincing China that such a competition is too costly and could come at the expense of Beijing’s crucial goal of regime survival.”
This is a good answer and a clearer one than other China watchers have provided. We have previously argued that the United States should seek to revitalize, adapt, and defend the U.S.-led, rules-based international system. In the long term, the United States would like China to be a cooperative member of that system. But that will not be possible any time soon, perhaps not as long as the CCP reigns in Beijing.
In the short term, therefore, the United States and its allies must defend that system from economic, governance, and military threats that China poses, and impose serious costs on the CCP when it violates widely held international standards. This strategy will be successful when it changes the minds of China’s leaders and, as Blumenthal also argues, convinces them that challenging the U.S.-led system is too difficult and costly.
Successfully executing such a strategy will require a deep understanding of China’s strengths and weaknesses as well as its hopes and fears. This is exactly what Blumenthal’s important book provides. It should be required reading for all those who seek to better understand China, and, most of all, for the government officials who are responsible for protecting us from this weak and dangerous nation.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-07--Forget Greenland, There’s a New Strategic Gateway to the Arctic

Forget Greenland , There ’ s a New Strategic Gateway to the Arctic Jenis av Rana , foreign minister of the Faroe Islands , was excited on the morning of July 22 .
In his 25-year-long career as a member of the Faroese Parliament for the Christian Conservative party , he occasionally met with colleagues from Iceland or Greenland or even different Scandinavian countries .
But he hadn ’ t even been foreign minister for a year , when on that Wednesday morning he was preparing to meet U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
Pompeo was in Copenhagen , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ invite the foreign ministers of the self-governing parts of the Danish Kingdom—Greenland and the Faroes—to join him and the Danish foreign minister for a meeting .
For the tiny Faroese department of foreign relations , it was the culmination of many years of work that such a high-profile U.S. official was willing to talk directly to the Faroese government .
But more than anything , the invitation was a sign of the growing strategic importance the Faroe Islands , as an Arctic nation , are beginning to have .
Four months later , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group—which sells a quarter of its fish to Russia and was about to commit to a 5G agreement with the controversial Chinese telecom firm Huawei—signed a partnership declaration with the United States .
The Faroes consist of 18 small islands , inhabited by 52,000 people .
The archipelago lies in the middle of the North Atlantic Ocean , at the center of the so-called GIUK-gap—a North Atlantic transit route between Greenland , Iceland , and the northern United Kingdom—which has regained the strategic importance it enjoyed during the Cold War .
As stated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region , which was released in a report to Congress in 2019 , the gap has become a “ strategic corridor for naval operations between the Arctic and the North Atlantic.
” And with both Russia and China as competitors , the region is increasingly important for U.S. national security interests .
With the Arctic ice melting , and the shipping traffic growing , the Faroe Islands are hoping to become a maritime service base for U.S. and NATO ships .
Like Greenland , which outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump announced he wanted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Faroe Islands are a self-governing part of the Danish Kingdom .
The economy is primarily based on fishing and salmon farming .
An increasing U.S. diplomatic presence in the Faroes has been noted by local politicians and media in recent years .
The U.S. ambassador to Denmark , Carla Sands , has been visiting the islands frequently .
While it is normal for the politically appointed U.S. ambassadors in Denmark to visit the Faroese as part of their duties , the feeling in the Faroes is that Sands has had a more substantive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state-owned telecommunications company , Føroya Tele , was in negotiations with Huawei to make the Chinese company its 5G-provider , the ambassador addressed the issue directly in the Faroese newspaper , Sosialurin , urging the company to “ choose an American or European firm ” to make sure that it was the Faroese people , “ not the Chinese government ” that was in charge of deciding how the technology would influence Faroese values and society .
Sands has been vocal in her worries about the potential surveillance Huawei can do for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she went further , and tried to spread fear that countries that let Huawei control their tele-infrastructure would be working by “ communist rules.
” If those rules were broken , for example by “ supporting human rights demonstrations in Hong Kong , ” the country could be subject to “ threats , reprisals and economic sanctions.
” Sands told me that she found her role as ambassador to naturally include engagement in the Faroes to ensure trade and “ people-to-people relations.
” She also noted the importance of the islands to NATO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only American suitor to visit the islands lately .
In October , U.S. Admiral Robert Burke , Commander of U.S .
Naval Forces Europe , visited and met with the Faroese foreign minister to discuss security in the Arctic and the possibility of cooperation with the Faroes providing services to U.S. navy ships .
But when Denmark joined what later would become the European Union in 1972 , the Faroese Parliament decided not to follow—mainly because it would mean giving up fishing rights .
And the EU ’ s ever-growing importance for Danish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the self-governing parts of the kingdom , which sometimes , like when it comes to fishing rights , have opposing interests .
As the Faroe Islands aren ’ t part of the European single market , the islands have developed important business relations outside the union .
The archipelago ’ s government was one of the first in the West to reach a fishery agreement with the Soviet Union in the 1970s , and later discussed a free-trade agreement with Russia for years .
Even though no agreement was reached , Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
After the Ukraine crisis in 2014 , tensions between the West and Russia reached a boiling point .
At the peak of the disagreements , the United States and Europe implemented sanctions on Russian minerals , which led to Russia imposing boycotts on European food imports .
The Faroe Islands had just faced European boycotts themselves following a fishery dispute with Norway and the European Union and had increased their export to the Russian market .
Luckily for the Faroese economy , Russia did not include the islands in the boycotts , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Eastern giant increased .
In 2015 , the Faroe Islands opened a diplomatic mission in Moscow , and in 2018 , the Faroes signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union , formalizing cooperation with Russia and its neighbors .
In 2018 , 27 percent of Faroese exports went to the Russian market—making the Faroes the largest fish exporter to the country—and Russia was the largest single importer of Faroese fish ( European countries combined imported more Faroese fishery products ) and therefore essential to the Faroese economy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ over Faroese trade with Russia while Denmark and the EU are being partially boycotted , Denmark does not have the power to decide who the Faroes trade with .
As the Faroe Islands have become increasingly independent over the last decades , the nature of the relationship with Denmark has changed .
When it comes to trade , the Faroes deal with anyone they choose , and the Danish government knows that any interference with trade or fishing rights could lead to major conflicts within the kingdom .
Washington probably won ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia , but will be aiming at gaining equally economic and cultural ties to the islands ’ inhabitants .
The Faroe Islands have embassies in Moscow and Beijing , and the Faroese foreign minister told me that Pompeo had asked , in the meeting with the foreign ministers of the Danish Kingdom , why the Faroes don ’ t have any diplomatic representation in the United States .
In recent years , China has also become a more important market for the Faroes than ever before .
The Faroese salmon-farming giant , Bakkafrost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ salmon to China because of the COVID-19 pandemic , but the islands are exporting more than 20 times more salmon to China than in 2010 .
A free-trade agreement with the most populous country on earth is therefore something politicians and businessmen in the Faroes dream about .
And when the Faroese telecom company was working on a 5G agreement with Huawei , the Chinese ambassador to Denmark apparently raised the issue with Faroese ministers .
The promise of an easier path to free trade was of course meant to be secret , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minister of commerce was about to give an interview to Faroese media on another topic , but was approached by a state official from his ministry .
The minister had forgotten to turn off his microphone , and his private conversation with the official , who told him that the Chinese ambassador had said in a meeting that it would be easier to achieve free trade between the countries if the telecom company signed an agreement with Huawei , was recorded .
The revelation made international news and put pressure on Faroese authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 5G provider .
It has since become clear that an agreement with Huawei , even though not officially ruled out , is unlikely .
The Faroese tightrope act is likely to continue as great powers show a greater interest in the islands .
A recent Danish Institute for International Relations report , commissioned by the Danish Foreign Ministry , outlines the effects of the Arctic change from a “ low-tension ” toward a “ high-tension ” region .
In addition to discussing the challenges that growing tensions between the superpowers in the Arctic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it discusses the challenges the new political reality will have on the Arctic parts of the Danish Kingdom—Greenland and the Faroe Islands .
“ Great power tension in the Arctic has two effects on the Faroe Islands , ” Mikkel Runge Olesen , one of the authors of the report said .
“ The first one is that they are back on the map , ” he explained , “ but there is a negative side as well .
The more interested the US becomes , the harder it will be to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ everyone , and not pick a side.
” For the United States , this will perhaps be seen as a victory in establishing its presence and maybe for the immediate future ruling out Chinese influence in a place that trades with everyone .
The agreement has not received a lot of attention in the Danish media , but one can imagine that Danish politicians are happy as well .
While the agreement was signed by Faroese and U.S. officials , American diplomats must have informed the Danes of what was going on .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Economic Union does not align with Danish foreign policy , Faroese partnership with the U.S. government does .
Faroese politicians are aware of the increased relevance the tiny island group is beginning to have .
When I talked to the Faroese foreign minister in August , he expressed happiness over the superpower suitors .
“ We have often been told that we have been insignificant in recent years after our geographical location lost importance when tensions in the region disappeared , ” Rana explained .
“ We have had problems reaching out to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation is welcomed … Some nations have natural resources , but our location is a resource for us .
”

Jenis av Rana, foreign minister of the Faroe Islands, was excited on the morning of July 22. In his 25-year-long career as a member of the Faroese Parliament for the Christian Conservative party, he occasionally met with colleagues from Iceland or Greenland or even different Scandinavian countries. But he hadn’t even been foreign minister for a year, when on that Wednesday morning he was preparing to meet U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Jenis av Rana, foreign minister of the Faroe Islands, was excited on the morning of July 22. In his 25-year-long career as a member of the Faroese Parliament for the Christian Conservative party, he occasionally met with colleagues from Iceland or Greenland or even different Scandinavian countries. But he hadn’t even been foreign minister for a year, when on that Wednesday morning he was preparing to meet U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Pompeo was in Copenhagen, and quite untraditionally, had decided to invite the foreign ministers of the self-governing parts of the Danish Kingdom—Greenland and the Faroes—to join him and the Danish foreign minister for a meeting. For the tiny Faroese department of foreign relations, it was the culmination of many years of work that such a high-profile U.S. official was willing to talk directly to the Faroese government.
But more than anything, the invitation was a sign of the growing strategic importance the Faroe Islands, as an Arctic nation, are beginning to have. Four months later, on Nov. 28, the tiny island group—which sells a quarter of its fish to Russia and was about to commit to a 5G agreement with the controversial Chinese telecom firm Huawei—signed a partnership declaration with the United States.
The Faroes consist of 18 small islands, inhabited by 52,000 people. The archipelago lies in the middle of the North Atlantic Ocean, at the center of the so-called GIUK-gap—a North Atlantic transit route between Greenland, Iceland, and the northern United Kingdom—which has regained the strategic importance it enjoyed during the Cold War.
As stated in the U.S. defense strategy for the region, which was released in a report to Congress in 2019, the gap has become a “strategic corridor for naval operations between the Arctic and the North Atlantic.” And with both Russia and China as competitors, the region is increasingly important for U.S. national security interests. With the Arctic ice melting, and the shipping traffic growing, the Faroe Islands are hoping to become a maritime service base for U.S. and NATO ships.
Like Greenland, which outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump announced he wanted to buy a year ago, the Faroe Islands are a self-governing part of the Danish Kingdom. The economy is primarily based on fishing and salmon farming.
An increasing U.S. diplomatic presence in the Faroes has been noted by local politicians and media in recent years. The U.S. ambassador to Denmark, Carla Sands, has been visiting the islands frequently. While it is normal for the politically appointed U.S. ambassadors in Denmark to visit the Faroese as part of their duties, the feeling in the Faroes is that Sands has had a more substantive agenda than her predecessors.
When the state-owned telecommunications company, Føroya Tele, was in negotiations with Huawei to make the Chinese company its 5G-provider, the ambassador addressed the issue directly in the Faroese newspaper, Sosialurin, urging the company to “choose an American or European firm” to make sure that it was the Faroese people, “not the Chinese government” that was in charge of deciding how the technology would influence Faroese values and society.
Sands has been vocal in her worries about the potential surveillance Huawei can do for the Chinese state, but in this op-ed she went further, and tried to spread fear that countries that let Huawei control their tele-infrastructure would be working by “communist rules.” If those rules were broken, for example by “supporting human rights demonstrations in Hong Kong,” the country could be subject to “threats, reprisals and economic sanctions.”
Sands told me that she found her role as ambassador to naturally include engagement in the Faroes to ensure trade and “people-to-people relations.” She also noted the importance of the islands to NATO security. Sands isn’t the only American suitor to visit the islands lately. In October, U.S. Admiral Robert Burke, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, visited and met with the Faroese foreign minister to discuss security in the Arctic and the possibility of cooperation with the Faroes providing services to U.S. navy ships.
Faroese foreign relations have always been synonymous with business relations. As foreign and security policies on the islands are still, legally speaking, under the Danish government’s control, Faroese leaders were historically somewhat limited to making trade and fishery agreements.
But when Denmark joined what later would become the European Union in 1972, the Faroese Parliament decided not to follow—mainly because it would mean giving up fishing rights. And the EU’s ever-growing importance for Danish politics has complicated the relationship between Denmark and the self-governing parts of the kingdom, which sometimes, like when it comes to fishing rights, have opposing interests. As the Faroe Islands aren’t part of the European single market, the islands have developed important business relations outside the union.
The archipelago’s government was one of the first in the West to reach a fishery agreement with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, and later discussed a free-trade agreement with Russia for years. Even though no agreement was reached, Russia remained a vital market for Faroese exports.
After the Ukraine crisis in 2014, tensions between the West and Russia reached a boiling point. At the peak of the disagreements, the United States and Europe implemented sanctions on Russian minerals, which led to Russia imposing boycotts on European food imports. The Faroe Islands had just faced European boycotts themselves following a fishery dispute with Norway and the European Union and had increased their export to the Russian market. Luckily for the Faroese economy, Russia did not include the islands in the boycotts, and in the coming years, exports to the Eastern giant increased.
In 2015, the Faroe Islands opened a diplomatic mission in Moscow, and in 2018, the Faroes signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union, formalizing cooperation with Russia and its neighbors. In 2018, 27 percent of Faroese exports went to the Russian market—making the Faroes the largest fish exporter to the country—and Russia was the largest single importer of Faroese fish (European countries combined imported more Faroese fishery products) and therefore essential to the Faroese economy.
While Danish politicians have sometimes expressed concern over Faroese trade with Russia while Denmark and the EU are being partially boycotted, Denmark does not have the power to decide who the Faroes trade with. As the Faroe Islands have become increasingly independent over the last decades, the nature of the relationship with Denmark has changed. When it comes to trade, the Faroes deal with anyone they choose, and the Danish government knows that any interference with trade or fishing rights could lead to major conflicts within the kingdom.
Washington probably won’t be worried about Faroese fish exports to Russia, but will be aiming at gaining equally economic and cultural ties to the islands’ inhabitants. The Faroe Islands have embassies in Moscow and Beijing, and the Faroese foreign minister told me that Pompeo had asked, in the meeting with the foreign ministers of the Danish Kingdom, why the Faroes don’t have any diplomatic representation in the United States.
In recent years, China has also become a more important market for the Faroes than ever before. The Faroese salmon-farming giant, Bakkafrost, is currently facing problems in exporting salmon to China because of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the islands are exporting more than 20 times more salmon to China than in 2010. A free-trade agreement with the most populous country on earth is therefore something politicians and businessmen in the Faroes dream about. And when the Faroese telecom company was working on a 5G agreement with Huawei, the Chinese ambassador to Denmark apparently raised the issue with Faroese ministers.
The promise of an easier path to free trade was of course meant to be secret, but it was revealed as the Faroese minister of commerce was about to give an interview to Faroese media on another topic, but was approached by a state official from his ministry. The minister had forgotten to turn off his microphone, and his private conversation with the official, who told him that the Chinese ambassador had said in a meeting that it would be easier to achieve free trade between the countries if the telecom company signed an agreement with Huawei, was recorded.
The revelation made international news and put pressure on Faroese authorities not to make Huawei it’s 5G provider. It has since become clear that an agreement with Huawei, even though not officially ruled out, is unlikely.
The Faroese tightrope act is likely to continue as great powers show a greater interest in the islands. A recent Danish Institute for International Relations report, commissioned by the Danish Foreign Ministry, outlines the effects of the Arctic change from a “low-tension” toward a “high-tension” region. In addition to discussing the challenges that growing tensions between the superpowers in the Arctic will have on the region in general, it discusses the challenges the new political reality will have on the Arctic parts of the Danish Kingdom—Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
“Great power tension in the Arctic has two effects on the Faroe Islands,” Mikkel Runge Olesen, one of the authors of the report said. “The first one is that they are back on the map,” he explained, “but there is a negative side as well. The more interested the US becomes, the harder it will be to fly under the radar, trade with everyone, and not pick a side.”
After the meeting with Pompeo, the Faroese foreign minister was satisfied. He had prepared to talk about formalizing trade and cooperation between the United States and the Faroe Islands and was positively surprised by the effectiveness of the meeting; officials from both countries had already started working on the agreement that was formalized last month. Apart from stating that the parties of the agreement want to strengthen cooperation in science, culture, and business, the agreement also acknowledges “common strategic and economic interests in the North Atlantic.”
For the United States, this will perhaps be seen as a victory in establishing its presence and maybe for the immediate future ruling out Chinese influence in a place that trades with everyone. The agreement has not received a lot of attention in the Danish media, but one can imagine that Danish politicians are happy as well. While the agreement was signed by Faroese and U.S. officials, American diplomats must have informed the Danes of what was going on. And while a memorandum with the Eurasian Economic Union does not align with Danish foreign policy, Faroese partnership with the U.S. government does.
Faroese politicians are aware of the increased relevance the tiny island group is beginning to have. When I talked to the Faroese foreign minister in August, he expressed happiness over the superpower suitors.
“We have often been told that we have been insignificant in recent years after our geographical location lost importance when tensions in the region disappeared,” Rana explained. “We have had problems reaching out to other nations, and therefore the current situation is welcomed … Some nations have natural resources, but our location is a resource for us.”