foreignpolicy--2020-06-02--Trump Pledges Military Response to Protests, Provoking Outrage

In a speech from the Rose Garden on Monday night as the sound of police firing tear gas on protesters outside the White House gates boomed in the background , U.S. President Donald Trump said he would deploy the military to quell anti-police protests if state governors are unable to do so , repeating warnings made to state officials earlier in the day .
“ As we speak , I am dispatching thousands and thousands of heavily armed soldiers , military personnel , and law enforcement officers to stop the rioting , looting , vandalism , assaults , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said in the short speech .
“ If a city or state refuses to take the actions that are necessary to defend the life and property of their residents , then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them.
” Trump followed the speech by walking to St. John ’ s Episcopal Church , a block away from the White House , for a photo-op in which he held up a bible for the cameras , after crossing a barren Lafayette Park that had been forcibly cleared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Standing with him were Defense Secretary Mark Esper , Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley , and Attorney General Bill Barr .
The basement of St. John ’ s , a historic church attended by previous presidents , was set on fire during protests on Sunday night before firefighters put out the blaze .
Trump ’ s remarks , coming just after additional National Guard troops drove through the streets of Washington , D.C. , in clips that went viral on social media , hinted at the use of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorities during the 1992 Los Angeles riots that followed the police beating of Rodney King .
The 1807 U.S. law allows active-duty units to be sent in to relieve the National Guard or local police to stop riots .
But such a move could aggravate an already raging national debate over the role of U.S. troops in the response to protests that followed the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis last week .
A white police officer has been charged with murder in the death of the African-American victim .
The president ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely exacerbate an already intense dispute between Trump , who is pushing for a wider U.S. military response to anti-police disturbances across the country , and Democrats and libertarians in Congress who worry that U.S. police departments have already become too militarized and are only aggravating the protesters , making the demonstrations more violent .
After images of New York City police ramming vehicles into barricades and Minneapolis officers firing rubber bullets and tear gas on bystanders went viral on Twitter last weekend , progressive Democrats and libertarian-leaning Republicans in the Senate pounced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to curtail a program that gives the Department of Defense leeway to send military weapons and equipment to local authorities .
But Trump , speaking to U.S. state governors amid rioting that has swept the nation in the wake of the videotaped death of an African American man in Minneapolis police custody , made the case for the White House and the Pentagon to play a much stronger hand in the response .
The president ’ s push came even after the National Guard announced it had activated 66,700 troops to respond to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a larger number of reservists than responded to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 .
“ You ’ ve got to arrest people , you have to track people , you have to put them in jail for 10 years , and you ’ ll never see this stuff again , ” Trump told the governors , whom he also described as “ weak ” in the leaked audio conference .
Trump also said that he was putting the U.S. military ’ s top officer , Milley , in charge of the response to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t immediately clear what role the chairman of the Joint Chiefs would have , since he is not in the operational chain of chain under law .
A senior defense official told Foreign Policy that the Justice Department would be leading the effort , and that Milley ’ s role as a military advisor to President Trump had not changed .
White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany later said that Milley , Esper , and Barr would be part of a command center alongside state and local governments to put a stop to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since Floyd was asphyxiated after a Minneapolis police officer knelt on his neck last week .
A senior defense official told Foreign Policy that the Justice Department would be leading the effort—not Milley—and that Joint Chiefs chairman ’ s role as a military advisor to Trump had not changed .
Trump also said “ federal assets ” would help respond , but he did not clarify what units or assets would deploy .
Chief Pentagon spokesman Jonathan Hoffman said in a statement on Saturday that U.S. Northern Command had been directed to increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but that Minnesota Gov .
Tim Walz had not asked for the military to respond .
The senior defense official told Foreign Policy that 500 National Guard troops from five states are in Washington or on their way , supplementing 1,200 members of the D.C. National Guard .
The official added that a mix of active-duty U.S. military police and engineers are already in the greater Washington area on a “ shortened alert status ” and can be activated by Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy .
Beyond that , Trump would have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hoops to deploy active-duty U.S. troops , as the White House is limited from using the military to conduct most law enforcement operations under the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act .
The Insurrection Act would potentially provide the White House with legal wiggle room .
Such a move could prove controversial , even as states have struggled to quell the destruction in the aftermath of Floyd ’ s killing .
While the National Guard ’ s efforts to protect infrastructure and emergency workers during the protests have been applauded by law enforcement officials , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the demonstrations .
Ronal Serpas , the former police superintendent in New Orleans , suggested the massing of law enforcement personnel may be aimed at keeping the protests from escalating , experts told Foreign Policy .
“ The bigger the other side is the quicker you ’ re going to run out of your energy , ” he said .
“ If the Minneapolis Police Department has 400 people and they ’ ve exhausted themselves , and then you bring in 1,000 state troopers and that ’ s been exhausted , and now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eventually the other side is going to run out of energy.
” Trump ’ s allies in Congress appeared to back his call to send the U.S. military to major cities overrun by protests and looting in the wake of Floyd ’ s killing last week , including Arkansas Republican Sen. Tom Cotton , who called for the Pentagon to send the elite 82nd Airborne Division to control demonstrators .
“ I think the sooner that you mass and dominate the battlespace , the quicker this dissipates and we can get back to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the leaked call on Monday .
“ Deploying them in more of an active or operational role is something that gives us concern , ” said Jim Burch , the president of the National Police Foundation and a former acting assistant director at the Justice Department ’ s Bureau of Alcohol , Tobacco , Firearms , and Explosives .
“ The concern that most of us have from the law enforcement community is what training does the military have.
” Hawaii Democratic Sen. Brian Schatz tweeted on Sunday night that he would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s annual authorizing bill that would discontinue the 1033 program , which the Defense Department uses to transfer everything from filing cabinets and night-vision goggles to rifles and armored personnel carriers to state and local authorities .
An aide to Schatz clarified that the provision is likely to be similar to a stalled 2015 bill he sponsored with Sen. Rand Paul , a Kentucky Republican , that limits the Pentagon from sending armored vehicles and drones to police , but it would not limit the provision of defense equipment , such as body @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bill was introduced , police accountability advocates have expressed concern that oversight of Pentagon assistance to local law enforcement has fallen by the wayside .
At the beginning of his administration , Trump stripped away an Obama-era executive order signed after the 2014 Ferguson , Missouri , protests that increased training standards for equipment passed from the Pentagon to local authorities and stopped transfers of riot gear , battering rams , explosives , and armored vehicles .
“ The tendency is to continually expand , especially in terms of the amount and type @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agencies , ” said Casey Delehanty , an assistant professor of global studies at Gardner-Webb University .
“ If we want to put a dent in police militarization , 1033 should go.
” The Government Accountability Office launched an investigation of the program in 2017 , determining that the Pentagon ’ s in-house logistics agency had done little to prevent fraudulent transfers after the watchdog acquired $ 1.2 million in potentially lethal items under a phony name .
Burch , the former Justice Department official , said that many local law enforcement agencies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agencies , such as the Department of Homeland Security .
Police departments have begun to buy greater quantities of high-powered military equipment and armor in recent years as they ’ ve been outgunned in certain criminal cases , dating back to a 1997 Los Angeles bank shootout that wounded 12 officers as the assailants were protected by heavily plated homemade body armor .
In 2016 , Dallas Police deployed a so-called bomb robot to kill a suspect accused of killing five police officers , raising eyebrows about a trend toward military action in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is really hard for anyone to say there hasn ’ t been a trend toward militarization , ” Burch said .
“ All you have to do is turn on the news right now and you see it , militarization , it ’ s out there .
”

In a speech from the Rose Garden on Monday night as the sound of police firing tear gas on protesters outside the White House gates boomed in the background, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would deploy the military to quell anti-police protests if state governors are unable to do so, repeating warnings made to state officials earlier in the day.
In a speech from the Rose Garden on Monday night as the sound of police firing tear gas on protesters outside the White House gates boomed in the background, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would deploy the military to quell anti-police protests if state governors are unable to do so, repeating warnings made to state officials earlier in the day.
“As we speak, I am dispatching thousands and thousands of heavily armed soldiers, military personnel, and law enforcement officers to stop the rioting, looting, vandalism, assaults, and the wanton destruction of property,” Trump said in the short speech. “If a city or state refuses to take the actions that are necessary to defend the life and property of their residents, then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them.”
Trump followed the speech by walking to St. John’s Episcopal Church, a block away from the White House, for a photo-op in which he held up a bible for the cameras, after crossing a barren Lafayette Park that had been forcibly cleared of peaceful demonstrators with tear gas. Standing with him were Defense Secretary Mark Esper, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, and Attorney General Bill Barr. The basement of St. John’s, a historic church attended by previous presidents, was set on fire during protests on Sunday night before firefighters put out the blaze.
Trump’s remarks, coming just after additional National Guard troops drove through the streets of Washington, D.C., in clips that went viral on social media, hinted at the use of the Insurrection Act, last invoked by California authorities during the 1992 Los Angeles riots that followed the police beating of Rodney King. The 1807 U.S. law allows active-duty units to be sent in to relieve the National Guard or local police to stop riots. But such a move could aggravate an already raging national debate over the role of U.S. troops in the response to protests that followed the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis last week. A white police officer has been charged with murder in the death of the African-American victim.
The president’s Monday night’s address will likely exacerbate an already intense dispute between Trump, who is pushing for a wider U.S. military response to anti-police disturbances across the country, and Democrats and libertarians in Congress who worry that U.S. police departments have already become too militarized and are only aggravating the protesters, making the demonstrations more violent.
After images of New York City police ramming vehicles into barricades and Minneapolis officers firing rubber bullets and tear gas on bystanders went viral on Twitter last weekend, progressive Democrats and libertarian-leaning Republicans in the Senate pounced on the Trump administration, urging it to curtail a program that gives the Department of Defense leeway to send military weapons and equipment to local authorities.
But Trump, speaking to U.S. state governors amid rioting that has swept the nation in the wake of the videotaped death of an African American man in Minneapolis police custody, made the case for the White House and the Pentagon to play a much stronger hand in the response. The president’s push came even after the National Guard announced it had activated 66,700 troops to respond to both the protests and the coronavirus pandemic, a larger number of reservists than responded to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
“You’ve got to arrest people, you have to track people, you have to put them in jail for 10 years, and you’ll never see this stuff again,” Trump told the governors, whom he also described as “weak” in the leaked audio conference.
Trump also said that he was putting the U.S. military’s top officer, Milley, in charge of the response to the protests, though it wasn’t immediately clear what role the chairman of the Joint Chiefs would have, since he is not in the operational chain of chain under law. A senior defense official told Foreign Policy that the Justice Department would be leading the effort, and that Milley’s role as a military advisor to President Trump had not changed.
White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany later said that Milley, Esper, and Barr would be part of a command center alongside state and local governments to put a stop to looting and vandalism that accompanied peaceful protests since Floyd was asphyxiated after a Minneapolis police officer knelt on his neck last week. A senior defense official told Foreign Policy that the Justice Department would be leading the effort—not Milley—and that Joint Chiefs chairman’s role as a military advisor to Trump had not changed.
Trump also said “federal assets” would help respond, but he did not clarify what units or assets would deploy. Chief Pentagon spokesman Jonathan Hoffman said in a statement on Saturday that U.S. Northern Command had been directed to increase the alert status for several units, but that Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz had not asked for the military to respond. The senior defense official told Foreign Policy that 500 National Guard troops from five states are in Washington or on their way, supplementing 1,200 members of the D.C. National Guard. The official added that a mix of active-duty U.S. military police and engineers are already in the greater Washington area on a “shortened alert status” and can be activated by Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy.
Beyond that, Trump would have to jump through a number of legal hoops to deploy active-duty U.S. troops, as the White House is limited from using the military to conduct most law enforcement operations under the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act. The Insurrection Act would potentially provide the White House with legal wiggle room.
Such a move could prove controversial, even as states have struggled to quell the destruction in the aftermath of Floyd’s killing. While the National Guard’s efforts to protect infrastructure and emergency workers during the protests have been applauded by law enforcement officials, some are urging a local response to the demonstrations.
Ronal Serpas, the former police superintendent in New Orleans, suggested the massing of law enforcement personnel may be aimed at keeping the protests from escalating, experts told Foreign Policy.
“The bigger the other side is the quicker you’re going to run out of your energy,” he said. “If the Minneapolis Police Department has 400 people and they’ve exhausted themselves, and then you bring in 1,000 state troopers and that’s been exhausted, and now you bring in 5,000 National Guardspeople, eventually the other side is going to run out of energy.”
Trump’s allies in Congress appeared to back his call to send the U.S. military to major cities overrun by protests and looting in the wake of Floyd’s killing last week, including Arkansas Republican Sen. Tom Cotton, who called for the Pentagon to send the elite 82nd Airborne Division to control demonstrators.
“I think the sooner that you mass and dominate the battlespace, the quicker this dissipates and we can get back to the right normal,” Esper said on the leaked call on Monday.
But Esper’s comments were criticized on Twitter by the U.S. military’s former top officer, retired Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, and the former chief of U.S. Special Operations Command. And there is concern that a large U.S troop deployment that may not be trained in peacekeeping or maintaining order among large crowds could be disruptive and help escalate peaceful protests into violent clashes.
“Deploying them in more of an active or operational role is something that gives us concern,” said Jim Burch, the president of the National Police Foundation and a former acting assistant director at the Justice Department’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. “The concern that most of us have from the law enforcement community is what training does the military have.”
Hawaii Democratic Sen. Brian Schatz tweeted on Sunday night that he would introduce a provision in the Pentagon’s annual authorizing bill that would discontinue the 1033 program, which the Defense Department uses to transfer everything from filing cabinets and night-vision goggles to rifles and armored personnel carriers to state and local authorities.
An aide to Schatz clarified that the provision is likely to be similar to a stalled 2015 bill he sponsored with Sen. Rand Paul, a Kentucky Republican, that limits the Pentagon from sending armored vehicles and drones to police, but it would not limit the provision of defense equipment, such as body armor.
Since the first time that bill was introduced, police accountability advocates have expressed concern that oversight of Pentagon assistance to local law enforcement has fallen by the wayside.
At the beginning of his administration, Trump stripped away an Obama-era executive order signed after the 2014 Ferguson, Missouri, protests that increased training standards for equipment passed from the Pentagon to local authorities and stopped transfers of riot gear, battering rams, explosives, and armored vehicles.
“The tendency is to continually expand, especially in terms of the amount and type of gear it sends to law enforcement agencies,” said Casey Delehanty, an assistant professor of global studies at Gardner-Webb University. “If we want to put a dent in police militarization, 1033 should go.”
The Government Accountability Office launched an investigation of the program in 2017, determining that the Pentagon’s in-house logistics agency had done little to prevent fraudulent transfers after the watchdog acquired $1.2 million in potentially lethal items under a phony name. Burch, the former Justice Department official, said that many local law enforcement agencies are being equipped by other programs and agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security.
Police departments have begun to buy greater quantities of high-powered military equipment and armor in recent years as they’ve been outgunned in certain criminal cases, dating back to a 1997 Los Angeles bank shootout that wounded 12 officers as the assailants were protected by heavily plated homemade body armor. In 2016, Dallas Police deployed a so-called bomb robot to kill a suspect accused of killing five police officers, raising eyebrows about a trend toward military action in the law enforcement community.
“It is really hard for anyone to say there hasn’t been a trend toward militarization,” Burch said. “All you have to do is turn on the news right now and you see it, militarization, it’s out there.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-01--Iran Is Working Hard to Revive Anti-U.S. Operations in Latin America

Iran Is Working Hard to Revive Anti-U.S. Operations in Latin America Just as Iran ’ s adventures in the Western Hemisphere were beginning to fade from memory , Iranian passenger jets began landing in Venezuela again in late April .
Industry sources reported that the Iranians were providing parts and catalysts to restart dilapidated refineries as well as military trainers and drones to help the government tighten control over its own security forces and increasingly desperate population .
According to a Bloomberg report , Iran even flew out some $ 500 million in gold bullion as payment for services rendered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with gasoline left Iranian ports for Venezuela .
While these actions appear to be a response to a distress call from a once close ally , they are also a reminder of Iran ’ s unfinished business in the Americas—and the pivotal role Teheran hopes that Caracas can still play in reviving Iranian influence in the region.There was growing disappointment among Iran ’ s senior leaders over costly investments in Venezueala that never paid off .
To be sure , Iran has significant history in the Americas .
Its relationship with Venezuela goes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both countries were founding members of OPEC .
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution that deposed the U.S.-supported Shah , Iran developed close ties to Cuba and Nicaragua , aligning itself with those communist regimes in thwarting U.S. influence .
With the election of the strongman Hugo Chávez in 1998 , Venezuela opened its doors to Iranian cooperation on a broad range of internal projects and helped it navigate difficult cultural waters to broker alliances with Bolivia ’ s populist president Evo Morales and Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa .
Key to Iranian-Venezuelan collaboration was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , who made frequent visits and signed as many as 300 agreements .
However , the two countries ’ relationship lapsed in 2013 when Chávez died and Ahmadinejad left office .
By some accounts , there was growing disappointment among Iran ’ s senior leaders over years of costly investments that never paid off .
A joint “ anti-imperialist ” auto factory in Venezuela never met production goals and produced poor-quality cars that didn ’ t sell well .
A Caracas-Tehran airline route , established in 2007 despite low @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2010 .
Oil ventures soured with contracts that Iran saw as disadvantageous , while potential mining deals failed to go beyond exploration .
In fact , many of the highly touted mineral resources fell into the hands of Colombian guerrillas and criminal gangs .
In the end , current Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro ’ s incompetent financial management and practice of recycling corrupt cronies through top leadership positions probably made further cooperation unpalatable .
Relationships withered elsewhere in Latin America , too .
In Bolivia , joint exploitation of vast lithium deposits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ German and Chinese partners .
After a flawed reelection bid led to Morales ’ s resignation , the interim government repurposed the joint military training school that Iran had built north of Bolivia ’ s largest city , Santa Cruz .
In Ecuador , banking partnerships , a power plant project , military cooperation , and joint mining ventures ground to a halt in part because of U.S. sanctions on Iran and because Correa ’ s hand-picked successor opted to improve relations with the United States instead .
Despite solidarity with Nicaraguan President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Nicaragua ’ s old debts have gotten in the way of major new support from Tehran .
Finally , the smattering of cultural and religious centers that Iran established in the region have so far failed to inspire significant conversions to Shiite Islam or a groundswell of support for Iran.Hezbollah may have gained a new advantage in South America when hundreds of Lebanese and Syrians , allegedly including Hezbollah operatives , gained Venezuelan residency documents .
That doesn ’ t mean that Iran has no more irons in the fire in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long-standing bilateral commission on economic , scientific , and technical cooperation .
Ties to Bolivia ’ s political left are still warm .
Presidential candidate Luis Arce of Morales ’ s Movement Toward Socialism party has turned to Iran ’ s Spanish-language HispanTV to criticize the interim government against which he is campaigning .
HispanTV has broad reach in Latin America with internet sites and a presence on satellite and cable TV systems disseminating propaganda primarily denigrating the United States .
In the 1990s , Iran ’ s Lebanese proxy , Hezbollah , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s lawless tri-border region , where Argentina , Brazil , and Paraguay meet .
International security cooperation helped curtail these activities , but Hezbollah operatives in South America may have gained a new advantage when hundreds of Lebanese and Syrians , allegedly including Hezbollah operatives , received Venezuelan residency documents that allowed them to travel freely throughout Latin America .
This was facilitated by Tareck El Aissami , Venezuela ’ s minister of petroleum who was the deputy head of the national identification office at the time .
Aissami has been indicted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States and sanctioned for his alleged dealings with drug lords ; the New York Times has reported on an intelligence dossier linking him and his father to Hezbollah ’ s recruiting and fundraising efforts , in which the issuance of residency permits was alleged to have played a role .
These ties might not seem as substantial as the joint military , financial , and industrial relations that once characterized Iran ’ s influence—but they would still be enough to turn up the heat on the United States and its democratic allies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pendulum swings back to the radical left .
The trouble is , it would be much harder for Tehran ’ s plans to succeed if the Maduro regime collapsed .
Hence the Iranian focus on assisting Venezuela ’ s oil industry , which supplies 90 percent of the country ’ s income to fund social programs and maintain a large army .
Having forgone investment and maintenance , Venezuela can barely pump a third of the oil it once produced and refine none of it into gasoline or other usable products .
Lacking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is failing , food distribution is faltering , people are starving , and the health system is a wreck .
Low on gold and cash to pay bills , Venezuela will soon no longer be able to buy food and medicine , most of which it currently imports .
In Iran ’ s eyes , the mothership supporting its regional hopes is falling apart.Russia and China may be willing to share some of the burden with Iran to safeguard their geopolitical footprint in Latin America .
If the dictatorship in Venezuela fails , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ taking out Iran ’ s remaining Western Hemisphere partners in thwarting U.S. influence .
So helping the Maduro regime reactivate its refining operations to supply the country with gasoline and generate revenue is clearly worth Iran ’ s trouble .
How much more it can do , considering its own shrinking economy , is an open question .
Russia and China—both of which have seen their investments go sour in Venezuela—may be willing to share some of the burden with Iran to safeguard their geopolitical footprint in the region .
Beyond that , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an opportunity to recoup prior losses by requiring payment in what ’ s left of Venezuela ’ s $ 6.3 billion in gold reserves in exchange for technocrats and security personnel from Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to put Venezuela ’ s house in order—Persian style .
What the United States and Latin America ’ s democracies would do in response to a resurgent Iranian presence in the Americas is hard to imagine during the current COVID-19 pandemic .
What ’ s certain is that meddling of that magnitude would be @ @ @ @

Just as Iran’s adventures in the Western Hemisphere were beginning to fade from memory, Iranian passenger jets began landing in Venezuela again in late April. Industry sources reported that the Iranians were providing parts and catalysts to restart dilapidated refineries as well as military trainers and drones to help the government tighten control over its own security forces and increasingly desperate population. According to a Bloomberg report, Iran even flew out some $500 million in gold bullion as payment for services rendered. In May, five tankers loaded with gasoline left Iranian ports for Venezuela. While these actions appear to be a response to a distress call from a once close ally, they are also a reminder of Iran’s unfinished business in the Americas—and the pivotal role Teheran hopes that Caracas can still play in reviving Iranian influence in the region.There was growing disappointment among Iran’s senior leaders over costly investments in Venezueala that never paid off.
Just as Iran’s adventures in the Western Hemisphere were beginning to fade from memory, Iranian passenger jets began landing in Venezuela again in late April. Industry sources reported that the Iranians were providing parts and catalysts to restart dilapidated refineries as well as military trainers and drones to help the government tighten control over its own security forces and increasingly desperate population. According to a Bloomberg report, Iran even flew out some $500 million in gold bullion as payment for services rendered. In May, five tankers loaded with gasoline left Iranian ports for Venezuela. While these actions appear to be a response to a distress call from a once close ally, they are also a reminder of Iran’s unfinished business in the Americas—and the pivotal role Teheran hopes that Caracas can still play in reviving Iranian influence in the region.There was growing disappointment among Iran’s senior leaders over costly investments in Venezueala that never paid off.
To be sure, Iran has significant history in the Americas. Its relationship with Venezuela goes back at least to 1960, when both countries were founding members of OPEC. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution that deposed the U.S.-supported Shah, Iran developed close ties to Cuba and Nicaragua, aligning itself with those communist regimes in thwarting U.S. influence. With the election of the strongman Hugo Chávez in 1998, Venezuela opened its doors to Iranian cooperation on a broad range of internal projects and helped it navigate difficult cultural waters to broker alliances with Bolivia’s populist president Evo Morales and Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa. Key to Iranian-Venezuelan collaboration was a personal relationship that developed between Chávez and then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who made frequent visits and signed as many as 300 agreements. However, the two countries’ relationship lapsed in 2013 when Chávez died and Ahmadinejad left office.
By some accounts, there was growing disappointment among Iran’s senior leaders over years of costly investments that never paid off. A joint “anti-imperialist” auto factory in Venezuela never met production goals and produced poor-quality cars that didn’t sell well. A Caracas-Tehran airline route, established in 2007 despite low traffic, hemorrhaged money and ceased operations in 2010. Oil ventures soured with contracts that Iran saw as disadvantageous, while potential mining deals failed to go beyond exploration. In fact, many of the highly touted mineral resources fell into the hands of Colombian guerrillas and criminal gangs. In the end, current Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro’s incompetent financial management and practice of recycling corrupt cronies through top leadership positions probably made further cooperation unpalatable.
Relationships withered elsewhere in Latin America, too. In Bolivia, joint exploitation of vast lithium deposits evaporated as Morales eventually chose more practical German and Chinese partners. After a flawed reelection bid led to Morales’s resignation, the interim government repurposed the joint military training school that Iran had built north of Bolivia’s largest city, Santa Cruz. In Ecuador, banking partnerships, a power plant project, military cooperation, and joint mining ventures ground to a halt in part because of U.S. sanctions on Iran and because Correa’s hand-picked successor opted to improve relations with the United States instead. Despite solidarity with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in foiling the United States, Nicaragua’s old debts have gotten in the way of major new support from Tehran. Finally, the smattering of cultural and religious centers that Iran established in the region have so far failed to inspire significant conversions to Shiite Islam or a groundswell of support for Iran.Hezbollah may have gained a new advantage in South America when hundreds of Lebanese and Syrians, allegedly including Hezbollah operatives, gained Venezuelan residency documents.
That doesn’t mean that Iran has no more irons in the fire in the Americas. Iran and Cuba share a long-standing bilateral commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. Ties to Bolivia’s political left are still warm. Presidential candidate Luis Arce of Morales’s Movement Toward Socialism party has turned to Iran’s Spanish-language HispanTV to criticize the interim government against which he is campaigning. HispanTV has broad reach in Latin America with internet sites and a presence on satellite and cable TV systems disseminating propaganda primarily denigrating the United States. In the 1990s, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, financed global terrorism operations from South America’s lawless tri-border region, where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet. International security cooperation helped curtail these activities, but Hezbollah operatives in South America may have gained a new advantage when hundreds of Lebanese and Syrians, allegedly including Hezbollah operatives, received Venezuelan residency documents that allowed them to travel freely throughout Latin America. This was facilitated by Tareck El Aissami, Venezuela’s minister of petroleum who was the deputy head of the national identification office at the time. Aissami has been indicted on drug trafficking charges in the United States and sanctioned for his alleged dealings with drug lords; the New York Times has reported on an intelligence dossier linking him and his father to Hezbollah’s recruiting and fundraising efforts, in which the issuance of residency permits was alleged to have played a role.
These ties might not seem as substantial as the joint military, financial, and industrial relations that once characterized Iran’s influence—but they would still be enough to turn up the heat on the United States and its democratic allies, especially if Latin America’s political pendulum swings back to the radical left. The trouble is, it would be much harder for Tehran’s plans to succeed if the Maduro regime collapsed. Hence the Iranian focus on assisting Venezuela’s oil industry, which supplies 90 percent of the country’s income to fund social programs and maintain a large army. Having forgone investment and maintenance, Venezuela can barely pump a third of the oil it once produced and refine none of it into gasoline or other usable products. Lacking investment as well, the electrical grid is failing, food distribution is faltering, people are starving, and the health system is a wreck. Low on gold and cash to pay bills, Venezuela will soon no longer be able to buy food and medicine, most of which it currently imports. In Iran’s eyes, the mothership supporting its regional hopes is falling apart.Russia and China may be willing to share some of the burden with Iran to safeguard their geopolitical footprint in Latin America.
If the dictatorship in Venezuela fails, Cuba and Nicaragua could be next, taking out Iran’s remaining Western Hemisphere partners in thwarting U.S. influence. So helping the Maduro regime reactivate its refining operations to supply the country with gasoline and generate revenue is clearly worth Iran’s trouble. How much more it can do, considering its own shrinking economy, is an open question. Russia and China—both of which have seen their investments go sour in Venezuela—may be willing to share some of the burden with Iran to safeguard their geopolitical footprint in the region. Beyond that, Iran’s leaders may be eyeing an opportunity to recoup prior losses by requiring payment in what’s left of Venezuela’s $6.3 billion in gold reserves in exchange for technocrats and security personnel from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to put Venezuela’s house in order—Persian style.
What the United States and Latin America’s democracies would do in response to a resurgent Iranian presence in the Americas is hard to imagine during the current COVID-19 pandemic. What’s certain is that meddling of that magnitude would be difficult to ignore.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-01--Welcome to a World of Bubbles

Welcome to a World of Bubbles

Welcome to a World of Bubbles Britain and France recently hinted at the bitter politics that may come with new coronavirus-related travel regulations , as the two nations traded tit-for-tat rulings ahead of a planned border reopening .
The United Kingdom announced it would require all foreign visitors to self-isolate for two weeks—backtracking on a deal to exempt the French .
France , in turn , responded by promising to impose reciprocal quarantine requirements .
Amid the retaliatory edicts , global airlines begged that national policies follow science , not politics .
It is unlikely the current standoff will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bridges and travel bubbles—agreements between countries allowing citizens to cross borders without needing to quarantine—provide hope for a resumption of travel , allowing international commerce and tourism to return .
But rather than reuniting a fractured world , the reopening of travel based on separate international circles of trust risks introducing new divisions .
In particular it will highlight the clout of three major powers—China , the European Union , and the United States—while also dividing the world into countries that have handled the pandemic well from those who have struggled .
With @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , temporary—geopolitical order divided along epidemiological lines , with complex implications for trade , tourism , and investment patterns .
The collapse of global travel is unprecedented .
About half of the world ’ s flights have been grounded , and passenger travel has declined by 95 percent .
Before the pandemic , more than 2 million air passengers flew in the United States each day ; that number is now closer to 100,000 .
Singapore ’ s Changi Airport , one of the world ’ s busiest , saw roughly 5 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ per day .
Last month , its daily count plummeted to below 1,000 .
One estimate suggested the business travel industry is expected to lose $ 820 billion in revenue this year .
Against this backdrop of severe economic losses , the idea of travel bubbles sounds particularly attractive .
Lithuania , Latvia , and Estonia launched the first such arrangement in May , allowing free movement for citizens of the three EU member states , at a time when travel within the larger bloc remains restricted .
A similar bubble is being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and also perhaps among France , Germany , and Austria .
Over time , a plethora of smaller bubbles are likely to emerge .
In turn , these could connect to one another , creating larger free zones allowing unrestricted travel .
This sounds hopeful , but there are obvious difficulties .
For starters , few such bubbles can be created instantly .
Australia has yet to resume interstate flights and says international travel is unlikely before October .
Now that they have a sense of the costs that coronavirus outbreaks bring , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cautious .
China recently announced that a business passenger on a rare charter flight from Germany had tested positive for the coronavirus , despite showing no symptoms .
Despite its enviable coronavirus record—or , perhaps , because of it—Taiwan says it won ’ t reopen its borders at all for the foreseeable future .
Even within bubbles there will have to be restrictions .
South Korea and China opened a mini bubble in early May for business travelers , but they required visas and multiple disease tests .
Other bilateral schemes could come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or mandatory monitoring apps .
Full travel bubbles will require more complex arrangements .
Countries hoping to form one are likely to have to start with similar epidemic conditions .
They will then have to agree to common rules and extensive data-sharing , as well as potentially working out how to make different national contact-tracing apps work and share information with one another without unduly risking the privacy of their citizens .
Bubble partners then must also have enough faith in one another ’ s health systems to believe that an outbreak in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spread back to others .
Finally , bubbles are fragile .
There is the tricky issue of what happens when a new outbreak occurs , and what rules govern when borders can be shut once again .
Making these plans work will be hard enough for countries such as Australia and New Zealand , which have managed to control their outbreaks so far ; for countries with starkly different levels of infections , such as Australia and Indonesia , it looks almost impossible .
Beyond the practicalities , new travel zones will underline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being the rules-setting clout of superpowers such as China , the EU , and the United States .
China ’ s position will be especially powerful .
With its economy recovering , access to China ’ s vast market is a prize for other countries around Asia , which are keen to tap Chinese investment and welcome back its tourists .
Bilateral travel agreements will cut across existing geopolitical alliances .
China has reopened some travel ties with South Korea .
It is likely to do so soon with Japan .
The enticement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strengthen Beijing ’ s already close ties across Southeast Asia , a region that in any case shows little of the post-pandemic anti-Chinese backlash common in Europe and North America .
The result will see the emergence of a new Sinosphere , with China at the heart of a web of reciprocal travel corridors , beginning with countries like Singapore before moving on to emerging economies with low coronavirus infection rates like Thailand and Malaysia , and also to economies further afield like Germany , with which China has already allowed a limited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s centrality will provide diplomatic leverage in other areas , too .
Over recent weeks Beijing has used trade rules to punish Canberra for pushing an investigation into China ’ s handling of the coronavirus outbreak .
Had a Sino-Australian air bridge been in operation , Beijing might well have restricted travel as well .
The EU will wield similar powers in its own neighborhood as it moves forward with plans to reopen internal travel .
Decisions on borders lie with individual European nations , such as Greece ’ s plan to reopen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tourist season—but to keep British travelers out .
But the EU has created guidelines for a phased lifting of restrictions , beginning with nations with low infection rates .
Eventually the EU is also likely to work with its member states to shape the rules by which countries outside its common borders resume access and on what terms—underlining the value that membership of a large bloc brings .
Nations outside , such as the U.K. , will find themselves in a weak position to resist these rules , given the importance of access @ @ @ @ @ @ @ market .
Something similar may also occur with neighbors of the United States , which shut borders to much of the world in March .
With its pandemic battle ongoing , the United States has mostly kept its borders open , although it did ban flights from Europe in March , and from a handful of other countries , including most recently Brazil .
Given the ongoing severity of the U.S. outbreak and associated policy failures , President Donald Trump ’ s position in negotiating future travel arrangements will be weaker than a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close to suppressing the pandemic .
But the size of the U.S. economy and the importance of its citizens in such areas as tourism will still carry considerable weight , especially among nearby countries in Latin America .
Trump is also likely to demand reciprocal reopening for any country seeking access to the United States , potentially laying the groundwork for further diplomatic spats in the vein of that between the U.K. and France .
Some emerging nations such as Thailand and Vietnam have dealt with the pandemic far more effectively than the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States , and they will be rightly cautious about letting in visitors from those countries—despite their reliance on tourism .
But in general , richer nations are more likely to be able to reduce and manage infection levels over the coming months .
By contrast , poorer nations without large-scale testing regimes that are struggling to reduce infection rates will find it far harder to reopen borders with those that have succeeded at keeping the coronavirus at bay .
This will be true even of those with the right geopolitical connections .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies of Beijing .
Both declined to close off travel to China during the pandemic ’ s early stages in Wuhan .
Yet so far , at least , China has shown no signs of being willing to reopen travel in return , presumably given its lack of trust in the countries ’ official outbreak figures and fear that doing so will risk renewed infection .
All this will add up to a world roughly divided into red , orange , and green zones .
Travel bubbles will work best between green nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have well-functioning institutions capable of managing future outbreaks .
Orange zones will include some advanced economies that have been unable to suppress the virus , such as the United Kingdom , as well as better-performing emerging nations such as Thailand .
But until a vaccine is found—and widely disseminated—red zones will cover much of the globe , especially poorer countries with weaker responses such as India , Nigeria , and Ecuador .
Countries unable to bring the coronavirus under control will require strict quarantine measures and other restrictions to reopen , likely dissuading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ zones will reopen with other red partners , potentially complicating the task of managing future outbreaks .
Others will be forced to accept nonreciprocal terms , in which red-zone citizens can only travel to green zones if they accept onerous self-funded quarantine , potentially creating a domestic political backlash from citizens who feel they are being treated unfairly .
Even within green zones , the odds are that travel patterns in a world of bubbles will resume only gradually as businesses adjust to remote work and tourists stay at home .
But it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , stuck in a kind of perpetual national lockdown , that the true impact of an epidemiologically fractured world will be felt .

Britain and France recently hinted at the bitter politics that may come with new coronavirus-related travel regulations, as the two nations traded tit-for-tat rulings ahead of a planned border reopening. The United Kingdom announced it would require all foreign visitors to self-isolate for two weeks— backtracking on a deal to exempt the French. France, in turn, responded by promising to impose reciprocal quarantine requirements. Amid the retaliatory edicts, global airlines begged that national policies follow science, not politics. It is unlikely the current standoff will be the last.
Britain and France recently hinted at the bitter politics that may come with new coronavirus-related travel regulations, as the two nations traded tit-for-tat rulings ahead of a planned border reopening. The United Kingdom announced it would require all foreign visitors to self-isolate for two weeks—backtracking on a deal to exempt the French. France, in turn, responded by promising to impose reciprocal quarantine requirements. Amid the retaliatory edicts, global airlines begged that national policies follow science, not politics. It is unlikely the current standoff will be the last.
Plans for so-called air bridges and travel bubbles—agreements between countries allowing citizens to cross borders without needing to quarantine—provide hope for a resumption of travel, allowing international commerce and tourism to return. But rather than reuniting a fractured world, the reopening of travel based on separate international circles of trust risks introducing new divisions. In particular it will highlight the clout of three major powers—China, the European Union, and the United States—while also dividing the world into countries that have handled the pandemic well from those who have struggled. With the bubbles come a new—if, hopefully, temporary—geopolitical order divided along epidemiological lines, with complex implications for trade, tourism, and investment patterns.
The collapse of global travel is unprecedented. About half of the world’s flights have been grounded, and passenger travel has declined by 95 percent. Before the pandemic, more than 2 million air passengers flew in the United States each day; that number is now closer to 100,000. Singapore’s Changi Airport, one of the world’s busiest, saw roughly 5 million passengers in April 2019, over 150,000 per day. Last month, its daily count plummeted to below 1,000. One estimate suggested the business travel industry is expected to lose $820 billion in revenue this year.
Against this backdrop of severe economic losses, the idea of travel bubbles sounds particularly attractive. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia launched the first such arrangement in May, allowing free movement for citizens of the three EU member states, at a time when travel within the larger bloc remains restricted. A similar bubble is being discussed between Australia and New Zealand, and also perhaps among France, Germany, and Austria. Over time, a plethora of smaller bubbles are likely to emerge. In turn, these could connect to one another, creating larger free zones allowing unrestricted travel.
This sounds hopeful, but there are obvious difficulties. For starters, few such bubbles can be created instantly. Australia has yet to resume interstate flights and says international travel is unlikely before October. Now that they have a sense of the costs that coronavirus outbreaks bring, other countries are likely to be similarly cautious. China recently announced that a business passenger on a rare charter flight from Germany had tested positive for the coronavirus, despite showing no symptoms. Despite its enviable coronavirus record—or, perhaps, because of it—Taiwan says it won’t reopen its borders at all for the foreseeable future.
Even within bubbles there will have to be restrictions. South Korea and China opened a mini bubble in early May for business travelers, but they required visas and multiple disease tests. Other bilateral schemes could come with quarantine periods, pre-submitted itineraries, or mandatory monitoring apps.
Full travel bubbles will require more complex arrangements. Countries hoping to form one are likely to have to start with similar epidemic conditions. They will then have to agree to common rules and extensive data-sharing, as well as potentially working out how to make different national contact-tracing apps work and share information with one another without unduly risking the privacy of their citizens.
Bubble partners then must also have enough faith in one another’s health systems to believe that an outbreak in one country would be contained before it spread back to others. Finally, bubbles are fragile. There is the tricky issue of what happens when a new outbreak occurs, and what rules govern when borders can be shut once again. Making these plans work will be hard enough for countries such as Australia and New Zealand, which have managed to control their outbreaks so far; for countries with starkly different levels of infections, such as Australia and Indonesia, it looks almost impossible.
Beyond the practicalities, new travel zones will underline larger geopolitical realities, the most obvious being the rules-setting clout of superpowers such as China, the EU, and the United States.
China’s position will be especially powerful. With its economy recovering, access to China’s vast market is a prize for other countries around Asia, which are keen to tap Chinese investment and welcome back its tourists. Bilateral travel agreements will cut across existing geopolitical alliances. China has reopened some travel ties with South Korea. It is likely to do so soon with Japan. The enticement of partnering in a travel bubble will strengthen Beijing’s already close ties across Southeast Asia, a region that in any case shows little of the post-pandemic anti-Chinese backlash common in Europe and North America.
The result will see the emergence of a new Sinosphere, with China at the heart of a web of reciprocal travel corridors, beginning with countries like Singapore before moving on to emerging economies with low coronavirus infection rates like Thailand and Malaysia, and also to economies further afield like Germany, with which China has already allowed a limited resumption of business flights.
China’s centrality will provide diplomatic leverage in other areas, too. Over recent weeks Beijing has used trade rules to punish Canberra for pushing an investigation into China’s handling of the coronavirus outbreak. Had a Sino-Australian air bridge been in operation, Beijing might well have restricted travel as well.
The EU will wield similar powers in its own neighborhood as it moves forward with plans to reopen internal travel. Decisions on borders lie with individual European nations, such as Greece’s plan to reopen in time for this summer’s tourist season—but to keep British travelers out. But the EU has created guidelines for a phased lifting of restrictions, beginning with nations with low infection rates.
Eventually the EU is also likely to work with its member states to shape the rules by which countries outside its common borders resume access and on what terms—underlining the value that membership of a large bloc brings. Nations outside, such as the U.K., will find themselves in a weak position to resist these rules, given the importance of access to the EU’s vast internal market.
Something similar may also occur with neighbors of the United States, which shut borders to much of the world in March. With its pandemic battle ongoing, the United States has mostly kept its borders open, although it did ban flights from Europe in March, and from a handful of other countries, including most recently Brazil. Given the ongoing severity of the U.S. outbreak and associated policy failures, President Donald Trump’s position in negotiating future travel arrangements will be weaker than a country like China, which has come close to suppressing the pandemic. But the size of the U.S. economy and the importance of its citizens in such areas as tourism will still carry considerable weight, especially among nearby countries in Latin America.
Trump is also likely to demand reciprocal reopening for any country seeking access to the United States, potentially laying the groundwork for further diplomatic spats in the vein of that between the U.K. and France.
Some emerging nations such as Thailand and Vietnam have dealt with the pandemic far more effectively than the U.K., Spain, and the United States, and they will be rightly cautious about letting in visitors from those countries—despite their reliance on tourism. But in general, richer nations are more likely to be able to reduce and manage infection levels over the coming months. By contrast, poorer nations without large-scale testing regimes that are struggling to reduce infection rates will find it far harder to reopen borders with those that have succeeded at keeping the coronavirus at bay.
This will be true even of those with the right geopolitical connections. In Asia, Cambodia and Laos are both allies of Beijing. Both declined to close off travel to China during the pandemic’s early stages in Wuhan. Yet so far, at least, China has shown no signs of being willing to reopen travel in return, presumably given its lack of trust in the countries’ official outbreak figures and fear that doing so will risk renewed infection.
All this will add up to a world roughly divided into red, orange, and green zones. Travel bubbles will work best between green nations that have largely suppressed the coronavirus and have well-functioning institutions capable of managing future outbreaks. Orange zones will include some advanced economies that have been unable to suppress the virus, such as the United Kingdom, as well as better-performing emerging nations such as Thailand.
But until a vaccine is found—and widely disseminated—red zones will cover much of the globe, especially poorer countries with weaker responses such as India, Nigeria, and Ecuador. Countries unable to bring the coronavirus under control will require strict quarantine measures and other restrictions to reopen, likely dissuading much-needed tourism. Some countries in red zones will reopen with other red partners, potentially complicating the task of managing future outbreaks. Others will be forced to accept nonreciprocal terms, in which red-zone citizens can only travel to green zones if they accept onerous self-funded quarantine, potentially creating a domestic political backlash from citizens who feel they are being treated unfairly.
Even within green zones, the odds are that travel patterns in a world of bubbles will resume only gradually as businesses adjust to remote work and tourists stay at home. But it is in these new involuntary red zones, stuck in a kind of perpetual national lockdown, that the true impact of an epidemiologically fractured world will be felt.


Mourning in Mexico

MEXICO CITY—The coronavirus section of the public cemetery in Iztapalapa consists of rows of wreaths .
The municipality in Mexico City has the highest number of confirmed infections in the country , and most of the graves are too fresh for headstones .
Workers , who dig for families ’ tips , unzip their blue hazmat suits to make it through the heat , then close them up again to carry plastic-wrapped caskets .
Only two mourners are allowed per funeral ; the remainder gather at the cemetery ’ s gate .
Confused about the pandemic ’ s spread , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cemetery are skeptical that the virus ended their relatives ’ lives .
But because the coronavirus is listed as a possibility in the death records , friends and relatives are suddenly absent .
People say they have lost their ability to grieve as the dead deserve .
The uncertainty , at burial time , about what happened to their loved ones has left many unmoored .
Mexico has recorded more than 90,000 coronavirus cases and 9,000 deaths , but the actual rate is likely far higher .
Critics have said the government is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the country has one of the lowest testing rates in all of Latin America .
The top epidemiologist has said that a committee will eventually review cases in which COVID-19 is suspected but not confirmed , but by then the funerals , cremations , and last rites will already be over .
“ We usually do a Bible reading , but in this situation we couldn ’ t , because of all the restrictions , ” said Alvaro Pérez , 40 .
He started to weep as diggers shoveled dirt over his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ death was listed as of “ suspected ” coronavirus in the certificate .
The workers move quickly , sending dirt flying for new graves even as vans unload the next caskets .
Mexicans are exceptionally close to their dead , a tradition that predates the arrival of Christianity .
They hold overnight wakes at home , where sleepless family members dole out coffee and sweet bread .
They flock to the cemetery with marigolds for an annual celebration , to spend the whole day with those who have passed .
Catholics pray for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s soul to heaven , as members of the community , sometimes hundreds , come to offer condolences .
None of that is possible now .
Priests livestream last rites from funeral homes .
To make up for the absence of a live band to serenade the dead with their most beloved songs , one man held his phone over a plastic cup to amplify a mariachi ballad .
Two brothers filmed their mother ’ s burial with a cell phone as the diggers move across to the grave , a plastic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made an exception , allowing one of the men to touch the glass covering her head .
“ Row 6 , Grave 48 , ” they told the brothers after it was all over , in less than 15 minutes .
The government has instructed hospitals , funeral homes , and gravediggers to follow sanitary protocols for bodies suspected of being infected .
Most are cremated , and in the few cemeteries that allow burials , the services are brief .
Teresa Zapatero Ramírez , 42 , said she was so rushed at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plucked flowers from the ground of a cemetery in Nezahualcóyotl , a municipality adjacent to Iztapalapa , after she had forgotten a bouquet .
Sometimes people worry that members of their own community will call them carriers of the sickness .
Zapatero said her grandfather had died earlier this year , and she remembered how other mourners had helped her by telling her the words to pray .
Now , relatives watched from behind their doors as she left for her mother ’ s funeral , and only one got close enough to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the costs .
“ My father was a clown , one of those people who puts on clown shows , and so many people knew him .
But not as many people arrived as I expected , ” said Rosa Isela Rangel Buendía , 22 , whose father was also marked as a suspected COVID-19 case .
“ Many people started to judge us and said , ‘ Don ’ t go out if you were with him.
’ The doctor basically told us to burn his clothes.
” The issue of undercounting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and officials have doubted the data in countries across Europe and in the United States .
But in Mexico , which hesitated to have a lockdown as strict as those in other countries in Latin America , the debate has become fiercer as the number of cases has risen .
Regionally , only Brazil has more confirmed deaths .
This grim outlook comes along with widespread distrust of authorities and underfunded public hospitals .
Many people at first did not believe that the virus existed , then did not believe that they had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a dispute has unfolded over Mexico ’ s management of the crisis , families are asking not for answers about how many overall deaths there might be , but for closure in their specific cases .
Mexicans have high rates of preexisting conditions that put them at greater risk .
For people whose relatives enter the hospital with all kinds of ailments—diabetes , kidney failure , cancer , hypertension—and leave within days in body bags , cataloged as the virus ’ s possible but not certain victims , it ’ s especially hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ few tests , the final word on a loved one ’ s cause of death can add to suspicion after the initial shock .
The pandemic caught Mexico in the middle of one of its biggest health reforms in years , one that sought to expand health coverage to millions of uninsured people and to restore trust in its health system .
But when the coronavirus came , people still headed to private doctors , neighborhood clinics , and pharmacies , to avoid long waits and crowds .
When dying patients are admitted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know on what basis doctors decided that they have the virus .
Following a series of news stories about a coronavirus undercount , the nonprofit Mexicanos Contra La Corrupción y La Impunidad reported that more than 3,000 death certificates in Mexico City listed people at the time of their deaths as “ suspected , ” “ possible , ” or “ probable ” COVID-19 victims .
Claudia Sheinbaum , Mexico City ’ s mayor , said the government has been transparent , but an independent committee has to finish reviewing medical records and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ count .
A string of funeral homes stands across the street from the Iztapalapa cemetery and next to the hospital gate where people wait for their dead .
The funeral home doorbells ring at all hours of the night , and sleepy staff arrive to show people the caskets crammed into their showrooms .
“ [ Hospital staff ] check our vans when we take someone out of the hospital , and they ask us for protective equipment , but you see the pathologists dressed like this , normally , “ said Javier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home employee who transports bodies , pointing at his long-sleeve button-up shirt and jeans , “ and you ask yourself , ‘ Does it exist or not exist ?
’ ” Those who are certain the virus swept through their families say they hope bending tradition will help stop its spread .
But they still struggle with doubts about the protocols meant to protect them .
Outside a crematorium , Rosita de Lima Navarro Pérez , 58 , banned from going inside and seeing her son ’ s body , asked a funeral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a photograph as proof , out of fears they might have the wrong body .
“ In normal circumstances , we ’ d spend the night with our family .
There are flowers , hugs , a family ’ s affection .
But this situation doesn ’ t allow for any of that , ” she said .
She was running a fever and struggled to stand .
Before she got a taxi home , she told the staffer : “ Just make sure he ’ s my son .
”

MEXICO CITY—The coronavirus section of the public cemetery in Iztapalapa consists of rows of wreaths. The municipality in Mexico City has the highest number of confirmed infections in the country, and most of the graves are too fresh for headstones. Workers, who dig for families’ tips, unzip their blue hazmat suits to make it through the heat, then close them up again to carry plastic-wrapped caskets. Only two mourners are allowed per funeral; the remainder gather at the cemetery’s gate.
MEXICO CITY—The coronavirus section of the public cemetery in Iztapalapa consists of rows of wreaths. The municipality in Mexico City has the highest number of confirmed infections in the country, and most of the graves are too fresh for headstones. Workers, who dig for families’ tips, unzip their blue hazmat suits to make it through the heat, then close them up again to carry plastic-wrapped caskets. Only two mourners are allowed per funeral; the remainder gather at the cemetery’s gate.
Confused about the pandemic’s spread, many families who arrive at the Iztapalapa cemetery are skeptical that the virus ended their relatives’ lives. But because the coronavirus is listed as a possibility in the death records, friends and relatives are suddenly absent. People say they have lost their ability to grieve as the dead deserve. The uncertainty, at burial time, about what happened to their loved ones has left many unmoored.
Mexico has recorded more than 90,000 coronavirus cases and 9,000 deaths, but the actual rate is likely far higher. Critics have said the government is minimizing the virus’s effects, since the country has one of the lowest testing rates in all of Latin America. The top epidemiologist has said that a committee will eventually review cases in which COVID-19 is suspected but not confirmed, but by then the funerals, cremations, and last rites will already be over.
A hospital worker waits outside a COVID-19 triage unit at the General Hospital of Mexico in Mexico City on May 21.
A man identifies the body of his mother, who is suspected to have died from COVID-19, outside the morgue of a public hospital in Iztapalapa on May 9.
“We usually do a Bible reading, but in this situation we couldn’t, because of all the restrictions,” said Alvaro Pérez, 40. He started to weep as diggers shoveled dirt over his sister’s body, after her death was listed as of “suspected” coronavirus in the certificate. The workers move quickly, sending dirt flying for new graves even as vans unload the next caskets.
Mexicans are exceptionally close to their dead, a tradition that predates the arrival of Christianity. They hold overnight wakes at home, where sleepless family members dole out coffee and sweet bread. They flock to the cemetery with marigolds for an annual celebration, to spend the whole day with those who have passed. Catholics pray for nine days, to usher the deceased’s soul to heaven, as members of the community, sometimes hundreds, come to offer condolences.
None of that is possible now. Priests livestream last rites from funeral homes. To make up for the absence of a live band to serenade the dead with their most beloved songs, one man held his phone over a plastic cup to amplify a mariachi ballad. Two brothers filmed their mother’s burial with a cell phone as the diggers move across to the grave, a plastic Jesus bending his knees; the workers made an exception, allowing one of the men to touch the glass covering her head.
“Row 6, Grave 48,” they told the brothers after it was all over, in less than 15 minutes.
Adán Bello, 27, waits with his father for the cremated remains of his brother, who died from complications related to COVID-19, in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, outside Mexico City, on May 12.
Standing with family members, Rosita de Lima Navarro Pérez (center) waits for the remains of her son outside a crematorium in Texcoco, outside Mexico City, on May 12. The cost of her son’s treatment, along with the testing of family members for the coronavirus, has left them in debt.
The government has instructed hospitals, funeral homes, and gravediggers to follow sanitary protocols for bodies suspected of being infected. Most are cremated, and in the few cemeteries that allow burials, the services are brief. Teresa Zapatero Ramírez, 42, said she was so rushed at her mother’s funeral that she plucked flowers from the ground of a cemetery in Nezahualcóyotl, a municipality adjacent to Iztapalapa, after she had forgotten a bouquet.
Sometimes people worry that members of their own community will call them carriers of the sickness. Zapatero said her grandfather had died earlier this year, and she remembered how other mourners had helped her by telling her the words to pray. Now, relatives watched from behind their doors as she left for her mother’s funeral, and only one got close enough to slip money into her hand to defray the costs.
“My father was a clown, one of those people who puts on clown shows, and so many people knew him. But not as many people arrived as I expected,” said Rosa Isela Rangel Buendía, 22, whose father was also marked as a suspected COVID-19 case. “Many people started to judge us and said, ‘Don’t go out if you were with him.’ The doctor basically told us to burn his clothes.”
The issue of undercounting is not exclusive to Mexico. Analysts and officials have doubted the data in countries across Europe and in the United States. But in Mexico, which hesitated to have a lockdown as strict as those in other countries in Latin America, the debate has become fiercer as the number of cases has risen. Regionally, only Brazil has more confirmed deaths.
This grim outlook comes along with widespread distrust of authorities and underfunded public hospitals. Many people at first did not believe that the virus existed, then did not believe that they had the misfortune of facing it. As a dispute has unfolded over Mexico’s management of the crisis, families are asking not for answers about how many overall deaths there might be, but for closure in their specific cases.
Mexicans have high rates of preexisting conditions that put them at greater risk. For people whose relatives enter the hospital with all kinds of ailments—diabetes, kidney failure, cancer, hypertension—and leave within days in body bags, cataloged as the virus’s possible but not certain victims, it’s especially hard to accept the verdict. With so few tests, the final word on a loved one’s cause of death can add to suspicion after the initial shock.
The pandemic caught Mexico in the middle of one of its biggest health reforms in years, one that sought to expand health coverage to millions of uninsured people and to restore trust in its health system. But when the coronavirus came, people still headed to private doctors, neighborhood clinics, and pharmacies, to avoid long waits and crowds. When dying patients are admitted to hospitals, their families do not know on what basis doctors decided that they have the virus.
Following a series of news stories about a coronavirus undercount, the nonprofit Mexicanos Contra La Corrupción y La Impunidad reported that more than 3,000 death certificates in Mexico City listed people at the time of their deaths as “suspected,” “possible,” or “probable” COVID-19 victims. Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico City’s mayor, said the government has been transparent, but an independent committee has to finish reviewing medical records and death certificates before it can update the count.
A string of funeral homes stands across the street from the Iztapalapa cemetery and next to the hospital gate where people wait for their dead. The funeral home doorbells ring at all hours of the night, and sleepy staff arrive to show people the caskets crammed into their showrooms.
“[Hospital staff] check our vans when we take someone out of the hospital, and they ask us for protective equipment, but you see the pathologists dressed like this, normally, “ said Javier Verón López, 53, a funeral home employee who transports bodies, pointing at his long-sleeve button-up shirt and jeans, “and you ask yourself, ‘Does it exist or not exist?’”
Sixteen-year-old Flor Clara Magdalena García Rojas (right) hugs a friend after the funeral of her mother at a public cemetery in Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl on May 17. The mother, who had diabetes, worked as a janitor at a private hospital that treats COVID-19 patients and is suspected to have contracted the virus.
Those who are certain the virus swept through their families say they hope bending tradition will help stop its spread. But they still struggle with doubts about the protocols meant to protect them. Outside a crematorium, Rosita de Lima Navarro Pérez, 58, banned from going inside and seeing her son’s body, asked a funeral home employee to send his ashes and a photograph as proof, out of fears they might have the wrong body.
“In normal circumstances, we’d spend the night with our family. There are flowers, hugs, a family’s affection. But this situation doesn’t allow for any of that,” she said. She was running a fever and struggled to stand. Before she got a taxi home, she told the staffer: “Just make sure he’s my son.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-01--China Puts the Final Kibosh on Trump’s Trade Deal

U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s phase-one trade deal with China , one of the few glimmers of success to come out of three years of harmful trade wars , was already dying a slow death as the economic devastation of the coronavirus pandemic made his massively ambitious trade targets all but unreachable .
Now , the Chinese government appears to be reneging on the sputtering deal , reportedly telling state-owned agricultural firms to halt purchases of U.S. soybeans , one of the major U.S. agricultural exports to China and a pillar of the deal ’ s promised $ 200 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s move , first reported by Bloomberg News , followed Friday ’ s U.S. announcement that Washington will potentially take steps to revoke Hong Kong ’ s special status and possibly levy sanctions and other economic weapons against both China proper and the once-autonomous region .
The big question now , some say , is not whether the trade deal will survive but what form of trade confrontation will take its place at a time when U.S. economic policy toward China is dictated less by long-term national interest and more by short-term electoral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration has moved from , ‘ Should we drop the deal ?
’ to , ‘ And then do what ?
’ ” said Derek Scissors , a China trade expert at the American Enterprise Institute who sometimes consults with the White House .
“ Trump wants to make sure that [ prospective Democratic presidential nominee Joe ] Biden can ’ t outflank him on China .
But that dramatic action , if there is any , is going to have costs.
” Since Washington and Beijing signed the so-called phase-one deal earlier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crushed global ( and especially Chinese ) economic activity , the agreement has been in trouble .
Its highly ambitious goals—a huge , $ 200 billion increase in exports of U.S. energy , farm products , manufacturing , and other goods over this year and next—were always going to be hard to reach .
The pandemic only made it harder , for instance by sharply depressing Chinese demand for U.S. oil and natural gas , sales of which have come nowhere near initial targets .
But China ’ s about-face on purchases of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ isn ’ t suffering ; on the contrary , the rebuilding of China ’ s pig herds after a previous bout of swine fever means strong demand for products such as soybeans for animal feed that the United States hoped to deliver .
But even before tensions over Hong Kong and China ’ s restrictive new security law for the city , China was selling the United States short when it came to buying agricultural products .
While other big soy producers such as Brazil were posting record export numbers to China in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. sales fell off dramatically .
The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged in a recent report on soy and other oilseeds that “ export commitments to China continue to trail 2018 and 2017 levels ” —when they were meant to start soaring far beyond that baseline .
The department hoped that rising Chinese demand , coupled with maxed-out Brazilian production , would offer U.S. farmers some relief later this year .
But even that now might be off the table .
Since the phase-one deal delivered a truce to growing U.S.-China tensions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the narrow trade agreement reached earlier this year is only a small part of a much broader relationship between the two biggest economies in the world , hopes of its implementation helped take some of the steam out of what has become an open strategic confrontation .
“ The ‘ phase one ’ deal ’ s importance to the overall relationship is relatively small .
It ’ s not the anchor that some thought it could be , ” said Scott Kennedy , a China expert at the Center for Strategic and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the trade deal—if reports of Chinese orders to halt purchases are confirmed—as “ hanging by a thread.
” “ The deal itself can not stabilize the relationship , but if you remove the deal , then that is further evidence that both sides are throwing up their hands and see the relationship in purely competitive terms with nothing on the other side of the scale , ” Kennedy said .
If that is where things go this summer , there are a couple of different ways they could play out .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ November election—and Trump ’ s ability to position himself as tougher on China than Biden .
If the Democratic nominee talks of simply taking up China ’ s abuses with the United Nations , for instance , or offers vague ideas about working with allies to push back against China , then Trump could just go back to his preferred weapon of across-the-board tariffs on Chinese goods , Scissors said .
But if Biden starts to articulate a tougher response to China ’ s violation of Hong Kong ’ s autonomy , repeated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relentlessly aggressive foreign policy , then the Trump administration would likely be forced into a more muscular response .
“ If we are going to jettison the deal , Trump is absolutely going to have to come up with new actions—the president is not going to be outflanked by Biden , ” Scissors said .
Those tougher actions could include anything from more sweeping restrictions on U.S. technology exports to Chinese firms beyond current limits on U.S. sales to the telecom giant Huawei to more aggressive regulation of Chinese finance , including limiting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. stock markets .
Additionally , the administration could take other measures , including more restrictive visa policies or limiting U.S. investment in China-linked companies , that could ramp up the pressure and accelerate the decoupling between the two countries .
Others see Trump , who always hoped to run for reelection on the back of a strong economy and a buoyant stock market , as walking a tightrope .
“ Politically , he ’ s going to keep whipping China .
But at the same time , he has a fragile economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negative market reaction to a resumption of the trade war , so he ’ s likely to feel constrained , ” said Simon Lester , a trade expert at the Cato Institute .
“ There ’ s likely to be lots of talk , which will work politically , but less action , which could hurt economically .
”

U.S. President Donald Trump’s phase-one trade deal with China, one of the few glimmers of success to come out of three years of harmful trade wars, was already dying a slow death as the economic devastation of the coronavirus pandemic made his massively ambitious trade targets all but unreachable.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s phase-one trade deal with China, one of the few glimmers of success to come out of three years of harmful trade wars, was already dying a slow death as the economic devastation of the coronavirus pandemic made his massively ambitious trade targets all but unreachable.
Now, the Chinese government appears to be reneging on the sputtering deal, reportedly telling state-owned agricultural firms to halt purchases of U.S. soybeans, one of the major U.S. agricultural exports to China and a pillar of the deal’s promised $200 billion in extra exports. Beijing’s move, first reported by Bloomberg News, followed Friday’s U.S. announcement that Washington will potentially take steps to revoke Hong Kong’s special status and possibly levy sanctions and other economic weapons against both China proper and the once-autonomous region.
The big question now, some say, is not whether the trade deal will survive but what form of trade confrontation will take its place at a time when U.S. economic policy toward China is dictated less by long-term national interest and more by short-term electoral calculations.
“The locus inside the administration has moved from, ‘Should we drop the deal?’ to, ‘And then do what?’” said Derek Scissors, a China trade expert at the American Enterprise Institute who sometimes consults with the White House. “Trump wants to make sure that [prospective Democratic presidential nominee Joe] Biden can’t outflank him on China. But that dramatic action, if there is any, is going to have costs.”
Since Washington and Beijing signed the so-called phase-one deal earlier this year, just as the pandemic crushed global (and especially Chinese) economic activity, the agreement has been in trouble. Its highly ambitious goals—a huge, $200 billion increase in exports of U.S. energy, farm products, manufacturing, and other goods over this year and next—were always going to be hard to reach. The pandemic only made it harder, for instance by sharply depressing Chinese demand for U.S. oil and natural gas, sales of which have come nowhere near initial targets.
But China’s about-face on purchases of U.S. farm goods is different. Demand isn’t suffering; on the contrary, the rebuilding of China’s pig herds after a previous bout of swine fever means strong demand for products such as soybeans for animal feed that the United States hoped to deliver. But even before tensions over Hong Kong and China’s restrictive new security law for the city, China was selling the United States short when it came to buying agricultural products.
While other big soy producers such as Brazil were posting record export numbers to China in the first quarter of this year, U.S. sales fell off dramatically. The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged in a recent report on soy and other oilseeds that “export commitments to China continue to trail 2018 and 2017 levels”—when they were meant to start soaring far beyond that baseline. The department hoped that rising Chinese demand, coupled with maxed-out Brazilian production, would offer U.S. farmers some relief later this year. But even that now might be off the table.
Since the phase-one deal delivered a truce to growing U.S.-China tensions, what would its demise portend? Even if the narrow trade agreement reached earlier this year is only a small part of a much broader relationship between the two biggest economies in the world, hopes of its implementation helped take some of the steam out of what has become an open strategic confrontation.
“The ‘phase one’ deal’s importance to the overall relationship is relatively small. It’s not the anchor that some thought it could be,” said Scott Kennedy, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who described the status of the trade deal—if reports of Chinese orders to halt purchases are confirmed—as “hanging by a thread.”
“The deal itself cannot stabilize the relationship, but if you remove the deal, then that is further evidence that both sides are throwing up their hands and see the relationship in purely competitive terms with nothing on the other side of the scale,” Kennedy said.
If that is where things go this summer, there are a couple of different ways they could play out. For Scissors, the main factor is the November election—and Trump’s ability to position himself as tougher on China than Biden. If the Democratic nominee talks of simply taking up China’s abuses with the United Nations, for instance, or offers vague ideas about working with allies to push back against China, then Trump could just go back to his preferred weapon of across-the-board tariffs on Chinese goods, Scissors said. But if Biden starts to articulate a tougher response to China’s violation of Hong Kong’s autonomy, repeated trade and human rights abuses, and relentlessly aggressive foreign policy, then the Trump administration would likely be forced into a more muscular response.
“If we are going to jettison the deal, Trump is absolutely going to have to come up with new actions—the president is not going to be outflanked by Biden,” Scissors said.
Those tougher actions could include anything from more sweeping restrictions on U.S. technology exports to Chinese firms beyond current limits on U.S. sales to the telecom giant Huawei to more aggressive regulation of Chinese finance, including limiting Chinese firms’ ability to list on U.S. stock markets. Additionally, the administration could take other measures, including more restrictive visa policies or limiting U.S. investment in China-linked companies, that could ramp up the pressure and accelerate the decoupling between the two countries.
Others see Trump, who always hoped to run for reelection on the back of a strong economy and a buoyant stock market, as walking a tightrope.
“Politically, he’s going to keep whipping China. But at the same time, he has a fragile economic recovery, and is scared of a negative market reaction to a resumption of the trade war, so he’s likely to feel constrained,” said Simon Lester, a trade expert at the Cato Institute. “There’s likely to be lots of talk, which will work politically, but less action, which could hurt economically.”