foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--It’s Not Too Late to Stop the Ethiopian Civil War From Becoming a Broader Ethnic Conflict

It ’ s Not Too Late to Stop the Ethiopian Civil War From Becoming a Broader Ethnic Conflict Over the past two years , Ethiopia seemed like Africa ’ s greatest success story .
After Abiy Ahmed became prime minister , the country opened up to the opposition , allowed exiled politicians to return , and ended the long-standing war with Eritrea .
The rapid transformation earned Abiy a Nobel Peace Prize .
However , this image has become tarnished in recent weeks by the escalating conflict with the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front ( TPLF ) , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the erstwhile ruling coalition , the Ethiopian People ’ s Revolutionary Democratic Front—and has a reputation for iron-fisted rule and fomenting interethnic violence as its principal source of power .
The current military confrontation also threatens to undo the progress made in recent years .
Many commentators have noted that there is a long history of violent repression of ethnic groups and regions in Ethiopia .
It might thus not be surprising to many that Abiy is also resorting to violence to confront the rebellious TPLF—a party that , due to its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , has many enemies .
However , it would be simple to reduce the brewing conflict to a simple desire to assert centralized power .
As we argued last year in Foreign Policy , Yugoslavia holds some important lessons for Ethiopia .
The combination of an ethnic federation and democratization , coupled with dormant or unresolved ethnic grievances , provides for a volatile mix .
Already during the early phase of Ethiopia ’ s transformation , there were some ominous signs , such as ethnic cleansing in parts of the country and fragmentation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Because Ethiopia has a longer tradition of statehood than Yugoslavia did at the time of its breakup—and with ethnically defined regions seeking greater autonomy , rather than independence—the preconditions were better in Ethiopia than in Yugoslavia for managing the shift toward a multiparty system .
The violent confrontation between the federal government and the TPLF bodes ill for the country , however .
Once violence becomes a means to address disputes , it is hard to stop , and demands for autonomy quickly escalate toward claims for independence .
In Yugoslavia , only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ However , once violence escalated and others feared being stuck in a much-reduced state with a changing balance of power , other republics also opted to leave the federation .
With some 110 million inhabitants and potential conflicts that could draw in several of its neighbors , the dangers in Ethiopia are too great to ignore .
With the exception of the TPLF—which appears to have lost hope of retaining power at the federal level—almost all political parties ( apart from a few radical groups ) have been supportive of the transition and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Abiy and his administration were widely popular , and the government ’ s early steps were encouraging , such as the inclusion of women in government and the opening up toward critical public debates .
All signs were that a successful transformation might be possible .
Today , the picture is much less encouraging .
A mixture of greed and incompetence at the local and regional levels , coupled with increasing tensions and belligerence , has thrown doubt on the successful transformation .
To understand those design flaws , some historical background @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different rebel armies led by Meles Zenawi and the TPLF overthrew the communist Derg government in 1991 , the rebels established a federal state , with its units corresponding to the largest ethnic groups in the country and governed by a coalition of ethnic-based parties .
The TPLF dominated the state , despite the Tigrayans accounting for only around 6 percent of Ethiopia ’ s population .
The ethnic federal system was largely modeled on the communist design of ethnic federalism , similar to Yugoslavia .
By imperfectly aligning ethnicity to territory , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interests but also controlled them through an authoritarian system .
Once authoritarian rule lost its grip , the main units and actors emerging into a liberalized political arena were based along ethnic lines , and there was little space for political competition over ideas rather than ethnicity .
In Yugoslavia , the nationalist politicians became vessels for extremist nationalist messaging , mutually reinforcing each other .
The rise of Croatian nationalist President Franjo Tudjman was a direct response to Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic ’ s claims to greater Serb dominance .
As each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ middle ground , as well as parties that focused on economic and social problems , were increasingly pushed aside .
The danger is similar in Ethiopia , where regional structures are defined along ethnic lines ; all political competition will therefore be ethnic .
There are four primary risks to a federalist Ethiopian state at the moment : ethnic identity as the sole political agenda ; ethnically motivated attacks ( and silence and inaction by regional and local authorities , which should take the leading role in containing them ) ; the issue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has caused tension in the country ’ s south ) ; and the conflict between the TPLF and the federal government .
While the latter has gathered the most international attention in recent weeks , it is not the only challenge Ethiopia is facing .
The greatest damage to the Ethiopian state that the TPLF did during its years in power was to entrench the dominance of ethnicity in almost all public and private affairs .
Facts depend on ethnicity ; prosecutions depend on ethnicity ; ethnicity has become the greatest unwritten defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public offices are sought and granted on the basis of ethnicity .
This has not just undermined meritocracy but also rendered the emergence of meaningful cross-ethnic political competition difficult .
Worst of all , the ethnic political parties dominating the political space , with few exceptions , appear to stake their potential gain of political power on ethnicity , invoking past and present ethnic resentments , with little effort to explain the economic and sociopolitical benefits that they would bring if they rose to power .
Ethnically motivated attacks and atrocities have increased @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demonizing and accusing others of all sorts of past and present atrocities .
Recent ethnically motivated attacks in the South , western Oromia , and Benishangul-Gumuz—resulting in civilian deaths , destruction of their belongings , displacement , and insecurity—have made this clear .
Most worrying , there are few constitutional and neutral means to prevent and prosecute such attacks by the federal government ; sometimes , citizens are hopelessly relying on those local authorities that are complicit in most of the criminal activities .
One of the daunting challenges facing Abiy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requests for regional statehood , which the Ethiopian Constitution allows with no regard to socioeconomic , political , or any other benefits .
The claims by more than a dozen zonal administrations ( which operate at a lower level than regional statehood ) in the South to become regional states are worrying , because there are no efforts to show that statehood would meaningfully benefit ordinary citizens .
Indeed , those groups are exercising self-administration at zonal level ; a change in status giving them statehood would have few tangible benefits .
Local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this risk of fragmentation or the multiple territorial conflicts that might arise from claims of territorial self-administration in this precarious time of transition .
For them , due to the perceived weakness of the federal government , this is an opportune time to make claims for new regional statehood .
A very generous offer of self-determination enshrined in the constitution used to be held in check through the cartel of dominant parties , controlled by the TPLF .
What was once a tool to accommodate competing demands and empower marginalized groups has ballooned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often posing a threat to regional minorities .
The TPLF ’ s attempt to go to war at this moment might be a grand miscalculation .
The TPLF has been administering the region with no rivals , before or since the elections .
While it withdrew from the federal government , it remains fully in control in its region while losing little at the federal level since the ascent of Abiy had already shifted the balance of power in Addis Ababa away from the TPLF .
Indeed , considering the ethnic system of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know it will never again be able to hold a dominant position at the federal level in a democratic environment .
Increasing its power at the federal level has not been an option , as it lacks the resources and circumstances that brought it to power nearly three decades ago .
Secession is also not a realistic option , being squeezed between Ethiopia and hostile Eritrea and with no prospects of recognition .
The escalation in recent months and weeks appears to have been aimed at achieving de facto independence , namely securing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ federal government .
It is difficult to predict what comes next .
As many observers had argued , the risks of an all out war are great for both the TPLF and the government .
The TPLF might be militarily well equipped and motivated to defend its base , but the small size of Tigray and considerable resentment toward the party elsewhere in the country make it vulnerable .
The government risks becoming bogged down in a protracted conflict it can not win easily .
A military escalation has revealed less democratic and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the war risks undoing much of the opening up the country experienced in recent years .
Arguably , a constitutional revision will be necessary to find a new balance between the federal government and regions , including removing the right to secession , introducing reasonable grounds for territorial autonomy , and ensuring the enforcement of constitutional rights of ordinary citizens in all regions and places , including through the use of federal law enforcement organs , but pushing through such amendments are difficult in the current context .
No less important is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is encountering owing to human rights violations with impunity all across the country .
Serious violations , including ethnically motivated killings and displacement , are going unchecked and unpunished .
The Abiy administration appears to place all the blame on the TPLF and its accomplices , but this does not address the full scope of Ethiopia ’ s problems .
Regional , zonal , and local authorities—often far from Tigray—in some cases have shown utter incompetence and complicity , and the central government must take responsibility and address these problems by listening to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accomplish this , building institutional trust will be crucial—trust in governmental institutions , trust in the media , and trust among communities—instead of relying on extremely vocal groups that currently appear to be living in alternative realities .
There has been little help from the outside in de-escalating the current conflict and ensuring that Ethiopia remains a success story rather than following in the bloody footsteps of Yugoslavia .
There are limited options for the international community .
It is weaker and more divided than in the 1990s , when it failed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intervening .
Sending a clear message that reported massacres and war crimes against civilians will not be ignored and should be investigated would be a start .
And while the military response of the Ethiopian federal government is understandable and necessary to keep the country from falling apart , foreign powers must pressure Abiy to act with restraint to avoid transforming the confrontation with the TPLF into a wider and more drawn-out ethnic conflict .

Florian Bieber and Wondemagegn Tadesse Goshu

Over the past two years, Ethiopia seemed like Africa’s greatest success story. After Abiy Ahmed became prime minister, the country opened up to the opposition, allowed exiled politicians to return, and ended the long-standing war with Eritrea. The rapid transformation earned Abiy a Nobel Peace Prize. However, this image has become tarnished in recent weeks by the escalating conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which had long disproportionately dominated the federal government and the erstwhile ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front—and has a reputation for iron-fisted rule and fomenting interethnic violence as its principal source of power. The current military confrontation also threatens to undo the progress made in recent years.
Over the past two years, Ethiopia seemed like Africa’s greatest success story. After Abiy Ahmed became prime minister, the country opened up to the opposition, allowed exiled politicians to return, and ended the long-standing war with Eritrea. The rapid transformation earned Abiy a Nobel Peace Prize. However, this image has become tarnished in recent weeks by the escalating conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which had long disproportionately dominated the federal government and the erstwhile ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front—and has a reputation for iron-fisted rule and fomenting interethnic violence as its principal source of power. The current military confrontation also threatens to undo the progress made in recent years.
Many commentators have noted that there is a long history of violent repression of ethnic groups and regions in Ethiopia. It might thus not be surprising to many that Abiy is also resorting to violence to confront the rebellious TPLF—a party that, due to its decades of domination of the federal government, has many enemies. However, it would be simple to reduce the brewing conflict to a simple desire to assert centralized power. As we argued last year in Foreign Policy, Yugoslavia holds some important lessons for Ethiopia.
The combination of an ethnic federation and democratization, coupled with dormant or unresolved ethnic grievances, provides for a volatile mix. Already during the early phase of Ethiopia’s transformation, there were some ominous signs, such as ethnic cleansing in parts of the country and fragmentation of political competition along ethnic lines. Because Ethiopia has a longer tradition of statehood than Yugoslavia did at the time of its breakup—and with ethnically defined regions seeking greater autonomy, rather than independence—the preconditions were better in Ethiopia than in Yugoslavia for managing the shift toward a multiparty system. The violent confrontation between the federal government and the TPLF bodes ill for the country, however.
Once violence becomes a means to address disputes, it is hard to stop, and demands for autonomy quickly escalate toward claims for independence. In Yugoslavia, only Slovenia and Croatia initially sought independence. However, once violence escalated and others feared being stuck in a much-reduced state with a changing balance of power, other republics also opted to leave the federation. With some 110 million inhabitants and potential conflicts that could draw in several of its neighbors, the dangers in Ethiopia are too great to ignore.
With the exception of the TPLF—which appears to have lost hope of retaining power at the federal level—almost all political parties (apart from a few radical groups) have been supportive of the transition and its principal architect, the prime minister. Abiy and his administration were widely popular, and the government’s early steps were encouraging, such as the inclusion of women in government and the opening up toward critical public debates. All signs were that a successful transformation might be possible. Today, the picture is much less encouraging. A mixture of greed and incompetence at the local and regional levels, coupled with increasing tensions and belligerence, has thrown doubt on the successful transformation.
There are several challenges Abiy’s government has encountered, all associated with difficulties of the country’s ethnic federalism, both in terms of its design and its reality.
To understand those design flaws, some historical background is necessary. When a coalition of different rebel armies led by Meles Zenawi and the TPLF overthrew the communist Derg government in 1991, the rebels established a federal state, with its units corresponding to the largest ethnic groups in the country and governed by a coalition of ethnic-based parties. The TPLF dominated the state, despite the Tigrayans accounting for only around 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population.
The ethnic federal system was largely modeled on the communist design of ethnic federalism, similar to Yugoslavia. By imperfectly aligning ethnicity to territory, it sought to address competing ethnic group interests but also controlled them through an authoritarian system. Once authoritarian rule lost its grip, the main units and actors emerging into a liberalized political arena were based along ethnic lines, and there was little space for political competition over ideas rather than ethnicity.
In Yugoslavia, the nationalist politicians became vessels for extremist nationalist messaging, mutually reinforcing each other. The rise of Croatian nationalist President Franjo Tudjman was a direct response to Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic’s claims to greater Serb dominance. As each side made more nationalist claims, the middle ground, as well as parties that focused on economic and social problems, were increasingly pushed aside. The danger is similar in Ethiopia, where regional structures are defined along ethnic lines; all political competition will therefore be ethnic.
There are four primary risks to a federalist Ethiopian state at the moment: ethnic identity as the sole political agenda; ethnically motivated attacks (and silence and inaction by regional and local authorities, which should take the leading role in containing them); the issue of self-determination to regional statehood (which has caused tension in the country’s south); and the conflict between the TPLF and the federal government. While the latter has gathered the most international attention in recent weeks, it is not the only challenge Ethiopia is facing.
The greatest damage to the Ethiopian state that the TPLF did during its years in power was to entrench the dominance of ethnicity in almost all public and private affairs. Facts depend on ethnicity; prosecutions depend on ethnicity; ethnicity has become the greatest unwritten defense of criminal prosecutions; and political and public offices are sought and granted on the basis of ethnicity. This has not just undermined meritocracy but also rendered the emergence of meaningful cross-ethnic political competition difficult. Worst of all, the ethnic political parties dominating the political space, with few exceptions, appear to stake their potential gain of political power on ethnicity, invoking past and present ethnic resentments, with little effort to explain the economic and sociopolitical benefits that they would bring if they rose to power.
Ethnically motivated attacks and atrocities have increased, with the attackers claiming innocence while demonizing and accusing others of all sorts of past and present atrocities. Recent ethnically motivated attacks in the South, western Oromia, and Benishangul-Gumuz—resulting in civilian deaths, destruction of their belongings, displacement, and insecurity—have made this clear. Most worrying, there are few constitutional and neutral means to prevent and prosecute such attacks by the federal government; sometimes, citizens are hopelessly relying on those local authorities that are complicit in most of the criminal activities.
One of the daunting challenges facing Abiy’s administration has been the increasing number of requests for regional statehood, which the Ethiopian Constitution allows with no regard to socioeconomic, political, or any other benefits. The claims by more than a dozen zonal administrations (which operate at a lower level than regional statehood) in the South to become regional states are worrying, because there are no efforts to show that statehood would meaningfully benefit ordinary citizens. Indeed, those groups are exercising self-administration at zonal level; a change in status giving them statehood would have few tangible benefits.
Local administrators do not seem to care about this risk of fragmentation or the multiple territorial conflicts that might arise from claims of territorial self-administration in this precarious time of transition. For them, due to the perceived weakness of the federal government, this is an opportune time to make claims for new regional statehood. A very generous offer of self-determination enshrined in the constitution used to be held in check through the cartel of dominant parties, controlled by the TPLF. What was once a tool to accommodate competing demands and empower marginalized groups has ballooned out of control with demands for self-rule often posing a threat to regional minorities.
The Tigray regional administrators’ hostility to the central government is a unique case and has different drivers. Since the TPLF lost power, it has literally retreated to the regional state of Tigray, refusing federal law enforcement, issuing incessant condemnation of Abiy and his administration, and totally rejecting his government as illegal. It was the only party in the ruling coalition of ethnic parties that refused to join Abiy’s newly created Prosperity Party. Instead, it organized regional elections despite objections by the federal government and in breach of Ethiopian laws. If governmental reports are accurate, the TPLF has brazenly sought a military confrontation with the federal government, which the TPLF claims to be a preemptive strike.
The TPLF’s attempt to go to war at this moment might be a grand miscalculation. The TPLF has been administering the region with no rivals, before or since the elections. While it withdrew from the federal government, it remains fully in control in its region while losing little at the federal level since the ascent of Abiy had already shifted the balance of power in Addis Ababa away from the TPLF. Indeed, considering the ethnic system of governance it established, the TPLF must know it will never again be able to hold a dominant position at the federal level in a democratic environment.
Increasing its power at the federal level has not been an option, as it lacks the resources and circumstances that brought it to power nearly three decades ago. Secession is also not a realistic option, being squeezed between Ethiopia and hostile Eritrea and with no prospects of recognition. The escalation in recent months and weeks appears to have been aimed at achieving de facto independence, namely securing undisturbed self-rule in Tigray and ignoring the federal government.
It is difficult to predict what comes next. As many observers had argued, the risks of an all out war are great for both the TPLF and the government. The TPLF might be militarily well equipped and motivated to defend its base, but the small size of Tigray and considerable resentment toward the party elsewhere in the country make it vulnerable. The government risks becoming bogged down in a protracted conflict it cannot win easily.
A military escalation has revealed less democratic and more military instincts on both sides, and the war risks undoing much of the opening up the country experienced in recent years.
Arguably, a constitutional revision will be necessary to find a new balance between the federal government and regions, including removing the right to secession, introducing reasonable grounds for territorial autonomy, and ensuring the enforcement of constitutional rights of ordinary citizens in all regions and places, including through the use of federal law enforcement organs, but pushing through such amendments are difficult in the current context.
No less important is addressing the legitimacy crisis the federal government is encountering owing to human rights violations with impunity all across the country. Serious violations, including ethnically motivated killings and displacement, are going unchecked and unpunished. The Abiy administration appears to place all the blame on the TPLF and its accomplices, but this does not address the full scope of Ethiopia’s problems. Regional, zonal, and local authorities—often far from Tigray—in some cases have shown utter incompetence and complicity, and the central government must take responsibility and address these problems by listening to the grievances of victimized groups.
To accomplish this, building institutional trust will be crucial—trust in governmental institutions, trust in the media, and trust among communities—instead of relying on extremely vocal groups that currently appear to be living in alternative realities. There has been little help from the outside in de-escalating the current conflict and ensuring that Ethiopia remains a success story rather than following in the bloody footsteps of Yugoslavia.
There are limited options for the international community. It is weaker and more divided than in the 1990s, when it failed to end the Yugoslav wars for years before intervening. Sending a clear message that reported massacres and war crimes against civilians will not be ignored and should be investigated would be a start. And while the military response of the Ethiopian federal government is understandable and necessary to keep the country from falling apart, foreign powers must pressure Abiy to act with restraint to avoid transforming the confrontation with the TPLF into a wider and more drawn-out ethnic conflict.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--Xi Jinping Doubles Down on Korean War Propaganda

As Napoleon is supposed to have said , don ’ t interfere when your adversaries are destroying themselves .
The United States should remember that when dealing with China , where President Xi Jinping ’ s latest act of PR self-immolation was his celebration of China ’ s intervention in the Korean War .
“ Imperialist invaders brought the flames of war burning to the doorway of the new China , ” he claimed .
“ The victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea was a victory of justice , a victory of peace and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , no one expects any Chinese regime , especially one populated by the nationalistic and authoritarian party cadres under Xi , to apologize for the PRC ’ s actions seven decades ago .
Although the conflict is officially named , in inimitable Maoist fashion , “ The War to Resist U.S .
Aggression and Aid Korea , ” Xi could simply have claimed credit for an admirable feat of warding off a potentially serious military threat American hawks , including American general and Southwest Pacific commander Douglas MacArthur , wanted to “ unleash @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his campaign to reconquer the mainland .
In Korea , Beijing fought the U.S. to a standstill barely a year after defeating Chiang .
Back in the early 2010s , there were even tentative signs of a more realistic historiography coming out of China , with historians hinting at accepting some blame for the North and films depicting the personal costs of the war .
Instead of moving in this direction , though , Xi marked the anniversary of China ’ s intervention by falsely blaming the West for the war .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of North .
Soviet archives confirmed back in the early 1990s what already was generally known : that North Korea funder Kim Il-sung was the avid aggressor .
While there is much to criticize about the behavior of ever-belligerent and irresponsible South Korean President Syngman Rhee , he was the one surprised on June 25 , 1950—and would have been ousted if it weren ’ t for the swift American intervention , leaving the whole country trapped under the Kim family regime today .
The Chinese president compounded that offense by crediting North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : “ After strenuous battles , the Chinese and DPRK armed forces defeated an opponent that was armed to the teeth , and broke the myth that the U.S. military is invincible.
” In fact , Beijing intervened because the North Korean military had broken and was fleeing north , allowing the capture of Pyongyang and march toward the Yalu River , the border with China .
Only the immediate and largescale dispatch of PRC “ volunteers ” prevented destruction of Kim ’ s regime , which had been created by the Soviet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people .
In contrast , Kim downplayed Beijing ’ s role after the fighting ended , when he reconstituted his regime .
As he consolidated power , he wiped out several opposing factions , including one friendly toward the PRC .
When I visited the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum in Pyongyang three years ago , I saw no mention of China ’ s contribution .
Kim ’ s dedication to “ Juche , ” or self-reliance , left little room for crediting assistance from the DPRK ’ s large , potentially overbearing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ specifically at Chinese tourists , but Chinese diplomats and journalists complain in private about North Korean ingratitude .
Presumably Xi believed he was sending an important message with his speech .
But to whom ?
Most obviously , his comments were meant for domestic consumption ; in fact , he packed members of the Politburo Standing Committee off to ostentatiously visit a museum exhibit on the conflict .
It seems there is never a bad time in China to inflame popular patriotic passions .
Although Xi did not mention the United States by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ target .
He warned : “ The Chinese people mean that we should speak to the invaders in a language they understand.
” Moreover , “ Arrogance , always doing as one pleases , acts of hegemony , overbearance , or bullying will lead nowhere.
” Indeed , he threatened , “ Once provoked , things will get ugly … The Korean War shows that the Chinese people must not be provoked .
If you make trouble , be prepared to bear the consequences.
” The clear meaning : We defeated you once @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As John DeLury of Yonsei University observed in the New York Times , Xi is “ hitting the stand-up-to-America theme pretty hard now .
It ’ s getting intense.
” Given the cost of the so-called victory—historian Bruce Cumings believes the PRC lost as many as 900,000 men , compared to the official estimate of 200,000—this warning might not be as persuasive as Beijing hoped .
Moreover , dissembling on the cause of the war will win the PRC no friends in the United States .
Xi ’ s outburst likely will reinforce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the North is but a Chinese puppet .
And Xi ’ s hostile tone will strengthen claims that Beijing poses a military threat to Northeast Asia and America .
Xi was also likely speaking to the North Korean regime , since the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty is up for renewal next year .
Few believe Beijing is willing to go to war again on the DPRK ’ s behalf—talk of a “ blood-forged alliance ” and relationship “ as close as lips and teeth ” long ago grew stale @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brotherhood of arms should reassure North Korea leader Kim Jong-un of at least political and economic support .
Indeed , there is talk of a Xi-Kim summit , at which Beijing might announce extension of the treaty and agree to additional economic support , while attempting to dissuade Pyongyang from taking provocative action over the winter , or to test a new American president in the spring .
Kim also is currying favor , last week visiting the Chinese Martyrs ’ Cemetery , and laying a wreath on the grave of Mao Anying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was killed by an American airstrike .
Kim ’ s action was well-covered in the PRC .
Mutual antagonism toward Washington helped bring the two communist states , big and small , back together .
With his speech Xi also might have been laying the necessary groundwork for justifying a treaty extension to his own people .
Kim has long been unpopular outside of military and party circles , denounced on social media as “ Fatty Kim ” and worse .
One professor otherwise faithful to Beijing ’ s line even suggested to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strike against the North .
Highlighting the two nations ’ past partnership against America might strengthen support for a pro-Pyongyang policy The one country Xi probably wasn ’ t directly addressing was the Republic of Korea , but its government reacted sharply .
Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha retorted : “ The international debate on this has already been terminated.
” The North ’ s culpability was “ recognized by the U.N. Security Council.
” Moreover , she added : “ We are taking necessary communication measures with the Chinese regarding this matter.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s remarks a simultaneous move to improve ties with the North and devalue relations with the South .
Sino-suspicion already is rampant .
The Pew Research Center recently found that 83 percent of South Koreans do not believe Xi would do the “ right thing in world affairs.
” Almost as many have a negative view of the PRC .
These numbers could worsen after hearing Xi—Chinese intervention prolonged the Korean War by more than two years , multiplied casualties and destruction , left the peninsula divided , and nearly overran the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be older citizens , given their personal experience with the conflict or its lengthy aftermath .
Indeed , South Korea recently rebuffed nationalistic Chinese netizens who attacked the boy band BTS for lauding wartime sacrifices made by U.S. and South Korean military personnel without mentioning PRC soldiers—who , of course , had been attempting to conquer the South .
Chinese social media erupted in anger , but critics soon retreated .
After a couple days , even the semi-official Global Times took down articles it had run on the controversy .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Korean War .
However , Beijing ’ s willingness to twist history about what it was defending—North Korean aggression—reinforces the dangerous trajectory of China ’ s relations with the United States , ROK , and other Western states .
Xi may have scored domestic points , but international tensions will rise , which could further reduce the possibility of a “ honeymoon ” with the incoming administration and consequent opportunity for a policy reset .
No one should doubt China ’ s resolution under fire .
But the United States proved its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against successive threatening powers .
Both governments should avoid putting the other to the test .
As Xi warned , “ Once provoked , things will get ugly.
” Which unfortunately is true for both sides .

As Napoleon is supposed to have said, don’t interfere when your adversaries are destroying themselves. The United States should remember that when dealing with China, where President Xi Jinping’s latest act of PR self-immolation was his celebration of China’s intervention in the Korean War.
As Napoleon is supposed to have said, don’t interfere when your adversaries are destroying themselves. The United States should remember that when dealing with China, where President Xi Jinping’s latest act of PR self-immolation was his celebration of China’s intervention in the Korean War.
“Imperialist invaders brought the flames of war burning to the doorway of the new China,” he claimed. “The victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea was a victory of justice, a victory of peace and a victory of the people.”
Of course, no one expects any Chinese regime, especially one populated by the nationalistic and authoritarian party cadres under Xi, to apologize for the PRC’s actions seven decades ago. Although the conflict is officially named, in inimitable Maoist fashion, “The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,” Xi could simply have claimed credit for an admirable feat of warding off a potentially serious military threat American hawks, including American general and Southwest Pacific commander Douglas MacArthur, wanted to “unleash” the defeated Chiang Kai-shek and back his campaign to reconquer the mainland. In Korea, Beijing fought the U.S. to a standstill barely a year after defeating Chiang. Back in the early 2010s, there were even tentative signs of a more realistic historiography coming out of China, with historians hinting at accepting some blame for the North and films depicting the personal costs of the war.
Instead of moving in this direction, though, Xi marked the anniversary of China’s intervention by falsely blaming the West for the war. In doing so, he whitewashed the role of North. Soviet archives confirmed back in the early 1990s what already was generally known: that North Korea funder Kim Il-sung was the avid aggressor. While there is much to criticize about the behavior of ever-belligerent and irresponsible South Korean President Syngman Rhee, he was the one surprised on June 25, 1950—and would have been ousted if it weren’t for the swift American intervention, leaving the whole country trapped under the Kim family regime today.
The Chinese president compounded that offense by crediting North Korea with defending against the allied force: “After strenuous battles, the Chinese and DPRK armed forces defeated an opponent that was armed to the teeth, and broke the myth that the U.S. military is invincible.” In fact, Beijing intervened because the North Korean military had broken and was fleeing north, allowing the capture of Pyongyang and march toward the Yalu River, the border with China. Only the immediate and largescale dispatch of PRC “volunteers” prevented destruction of Kim’s regime, which had been created by the Soviet occupation authority, not the North Korean people.
In contrast, Kim downplayed Beijing’s role after the fighting ended, when he reconstituted his regime. As he consolidated power, he wiped out several opposing factions, including one friendly toward the PRC. When I visited the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum in Pyongyang three years ago, I saw no mention of China’s contribution. Kim’s dedication to “Juche,” or self-reliance, left little room for crediting assistance from the DPRK’s large, potentially overbearing neighbor. A separate museum exists directed specifically at Chinese tourists, but Chinese diplomats and journalists complain in private about North Korean ingratitude.
Presumably Xi believed he was sending an important message with his speech. But to whom? Most obviously, his comments were meant for domestic consumption; in fact, he packed members of the Politburo Standing Committee off to ostentatiously visit a museum exhibit on the conflict. It seems there is never a bad time in China to inflame popular patriotic passions.
Although Xi did not mention the United States by name, it was his other unmistakable target. He warned: “The Chinese people mean that we should speak to the invaders in a language they understand.” Moreover, “Arrogance, always doing as one pleases, acts of hegemony, overbearance, or bullying will lead nowhere.” Indeed, he threatened, “Once provoked, things will get ugly … The Korean War shows that the Chinese people must not be provoked. If you make trouble, be prepared to bear the consequences.”
The clear meaning: We defeated you once and we can do so again. As John DeLury of Yonsei University observed in the New York Times, Xi is “hitting the stand-up-to-America theme pretty hard now. It’s getting intense.”
Given the cost of the so-called victory—historian Bruce Cumings believes the PRC lost as many as 900,000 men, compared to the official estimate of 200,000—this warning might not be as persuasive as Beijing hoped. Moreover, dissembling on the cause of the war will win the PRC no friends in the United States. Xi’s outburst likely will reinforce the view of those who believe that the North is but a Chinese puppet. And Xi’s hostile tone will strengthen claims that Beijing poses a military threat to Northeast Asia and America.
Xi was also likely speaking to the North Korean regime, since the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty is up for renewal next year. Few believe Beijing is willing to go to war again on the DPRK’s behalf—talk of a “blood-forged alliance” and relationship “as close as lips and teeth” long ago grew stale. However, renewed celebration of their brotherhood of arms should reassure North Korea leader Kim Jong-un of at least political and economic support.
Indeed, there is talk of a Xi-Kim summit, at which Beijing might announce extension of the treaty and agree to additional economic support, while attempting to dissuade Pyongyang from taking provocative action over the winter, or to test a new American president in the spring. Kim also is currying favor, last week visiting the Chinese Martyrs’ Cemetery, and laying a wreath on the grave of Mao Anying, Mao Zedong’s son who was killed by an American airstrike. Kim’s action was well-covered in the PRC. Mutual antagonism toward Washington helped bring the two communist states, big and small, back together.
With his speech Xi also might have been laying the necessary groundwork for justifying a treaty extension to his own people. Kim has long been unpopular outside of military and party circles, denounced on social media as “Fatty Kim” and worse. One professor otherwise faithful to Beijing’s line even suggested to me that Washington should stage a preventive strike against the North. Highlighting the two nations’ past partnership against America might strengthen support for a pro-Pyongyang policy
The one country Xi probably wasn’t directly addressing was the Republic of Korea, but its government reacted sharply. Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha retorted: “The international debate on this has already been terminated.” The North’s culpability was “recognized by the U.N. Security Council.” Moreover, she added: “We are taking necessary communication measures with the Chinese regarding this matter.”
South Koreans are likely to interpret Xi’s remarks a simultaneous move to improve ties with the North and devalue relations with the South. Sino-suspicion already is rampant. The Pew Research Center recently found that 83 percent of South Koreans do not believe Xi would do the “right thing in world affairs.” Almost as many have a negative view of the PRC.
These numbers could worsen after hearing Xi—Chinese intervention prolonged the Korean War by more than two years, multiplied casualties and destruction, left the peninsula divided, and nearly overran the South. Especially negative are likely to be older citizens, given their personal experience with the conflict or its lengthy aftermath.
Indeed, South Korea recently rebuffed nationalistic Chinese netizens who attacked the boy band BTS for lauding wartime sacrifices made by U.S. and South Korean military personnel without mentioning PRC soldiers—who, of course, had been attempting to conquer the South. Chinese social media erupted in anger, but critics soon retreated. After a couple days, even the semi-official Global Times took down articles it had run on the controversy.
It is difficult to imagine anyone wanting to refight the Korean War. However, Beijing’s willingness to twist history about what it was defending—North Korean aggression—reinforces the dangerous trajectory of China’s relations with the United States, ROK, and other Western states. Xi may have scored domestic points, but international tensions will rise, which could further reduce the possibility of a “honeymoon” with the incoming administration and consequent opportunity for a policy reset.
No one should doubt China’s resolution under fire. But the United States proved its determination when it carried a global alliance against successive threatening powers. Both governments should avoid putting the other to the test. As Xi warned, “Once provoked, things will get ugly.” Which unfortunately is true for both sides.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--In Memoir, Obama Calls Putin a ‘Ward Boss, Except With Nukes’

In Memoir , Obama Calls Putin a ‘ Ward Boss , Except With Nukes ’ In A Promised Land , the first volume of a planned two-part memoir , former U.S. President Barack Obama comes across as fairly dismissive about many world leaders he met , likening Russian President Vladimir Putin to a Tammany Hall hack , deriding former French President Nicolas Sarkozy as full of “ overblown rhetoric , ” and saying the Chinese “ were in no hurry to seize the reins of the international world order.
” Obama is also frank about his initial insecurities emerging on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Was I prepared to be a world leader ?
Did I have the diplomatic skills , the knowledge and stamina , the authority to command ?
” he writes .
He describes a trip to the Middle East during the 2008 presidential campaign , when he pushed a private prayer into the Western Wall that read in part , “ Lord , protect my family and me .
Forgive me my sins , and help me guard against pride and despair.
” He adds that someone then dug out the paper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was world news .
“ I had assumed those words were between me and God .
But the next day they showed up in an Israeli newspaper before achieving eternal life on the internet .
… The line between my private and public lives was dissolving ; each thought and gesture was now a matter of global interest.
” Few passages are as revealing as when Obama realizes that his early hopes for a “ reset ” of U.S.-Russia relations with then-President Dmitry Medvedev were doomed the moment he met with the Kremlin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who was only biding his time before he took over from Medvedev again .
Obama had been previously warned by Bill Burns , one of the State Department ’ s senior Russia specialists , that Putin had to “ get a few things off his chest , ” and the former president writes : “ Burns hadn ’ t been kidding .
… Putin launched into an animated and seemingly endless monologue chronicling every perceived injustice , betrayal , and slight that he and the Russian people had suffered at the hands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ d offered President George W. Bush all sorts of help in sharing intelligence against al Qaeda and handling Iraq ’ s Saddam Hussein , “ and where had it gotten him ?
” Obama recounts .
“ Rather than heed his warnings , he said , Bush had gone ahead and invaded Iraq , destabilizing the entire Middle East.
” Then the Russian leader continued his harangue about how NATO had steadily encroached on Russia ’ s sphere of influence and promoted democracy recklessly—all issues that continue to bedevil U.S.-Russia relations a decade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perhaps could have only come from someone who began as a city organizer , as Obama had , the president writes that when his aide David Axelrod asked him his impression of Putin , he responded that he “ found him strangely familiar , ‘ like a ward boss , except with nukes and a U.N. Security Council veto.
’ This prompted a laugh , but I hadn ’ t meant it as a joke .
Putin did , in fact , remind me of the sorts of men who had once run @ @ @ @ @ @ @ street smart , unsentimental characters who knew what they knew , who never moved outside their narrow experiences , and who viewed patronage , bribery , shakedowns , fraud , and occasional violence as legitimate tools of the trade.
” And in the end , he writes , “ you couldn ’ t trust them.
” Obama makes similar observations about Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and some Eastern Europe leaders such as then-Czech President Vaclav Klaus , divining that their commitment to democracy was flimsy as right-wing forces congealed in the face @ @ @ @ @ @ @ found Erdogan to be “ cordial and generally responsive to my requests .
But whenever I listened to him speak , his tall frame slightly stooped , his voice a forceful staccato that rose an octave in response to various grievances or perceived slights , I got the strong impression that his commitment to democracy and the rule of law might last only as long as it preserved his own power.
” As for Klaus , Obama writes , he came to fear that the Czech leader was a harbinger of the rise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ how the economic crisis [ of 2008-9 ] was causing an uptick in nationalism , anti-immigrant sentiment , and skepticism about [ European ] integration.
” Again drawing from his earliest experiences in the divisive city politics of Chicago , Obama writes that he perceived that “ the hopeful tide of democratization , liberalization , and integration that had swept the globe after the end of the Cold War was beginning to recede.
” “ In fact , what was striking was how easily Klaus would have fit in with the Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I could readily picture Erdogan as a local power broker on the Chicago City Council , ” the former president writes .
“ Whether this was a source of comfort or concern , I couldn ’ t decide.
” Obama comes to mistrust the European allies as well , especially after the Greek debt crisis snowballed in 2011 .
“ We couldn ’ t afford to be passive observers in all this , ” he writes .
After pushing European countries such as Germany and France with stronger balance sheets to initiate stimulus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ got exactly nowhere , ” he writes .
He liked and admired German Chancellor Angela Merkel , finding her “ steady , honest , intellectually rigorous , and instinctually kind , ” but he came to realize she was too conservative to escape the constraints of German politics .
As for the president of the second most powerful European country , Sarkozy—another center-right leader—Obama writes that the French president proved to be duplicitous and thoroughly unreliable .
“ ‘ Don ’ t worry , Barack … I ’ m working on Angela , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama recounts him saying .
But “ as far as I could tell , he wasn ’ t organized enough to come up with a clear plan for his own country , much less for all of Europe.
” Obama also delves deeply into his manifold problems in forcing the Chinese to stop cheating on trade and revalue their currency—and his dismissive views of their readiness for world leadership .
“ If any country was likely to challenge U.S. preeminence on the world stage , it was China , ” Obama writes .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ operate at the G20 , I was convinced that any such challenge was still decades away—and that if and when it came , it would most likely happen as a result of America ’ s strategic mistakes.
” Obama concludes : “ That was the thing that would strike me … at every international forum I attended while president : Even those who complained about America ’ s role in the world still relied on us to keep the system afloat.
” Many countries were willing to pitch in to varying degrees , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ few nations felt obliged to act beyond narrow self-interest ; and those that shared America ’ s basic commitment to the principles upon which a liberal , market-based system depended—individual freedom , the rule of law , strong enforcement of property rights and neutral arbitration of disputes , plus baseline levels of governmental accountability and competence—lacked the economic and political heft , not to mention the army of diplomats and policy experts , to promote those principles on a global scale .
”

In A Promised Land , the first volume of a planned two-part memoir, former U.S. President Barack Obama comes across as fairly dismissive about many world leaders he met, likening Russian President Vladimir Putin to a Tammany Hall hack, deriding former French President Nicolas Sarkozy as full of “overblown rhetoric,” and saying the Chinese “were in no hurry to seize the reins of the international world order.”
In A Promised Land, the first volume of a planned two-part memoir, former U.S. President Barack Obama comes across as fairly dismissive about many world leaders he met, likening Russian President Vladimir Putin to a Tammany Hall hack, deriding former French President Nicolas Sarkozy as full of “overblown rhetoric,” and saying the Chinese “were in no hurry to seize the reins of the international world order.”
Obama is also frank about his initial insecurities emerging on the world stage for the first time. “Was I prepared to be a world leader? Did I have the diplomatic skills, the knowledge and stamina, the authority to command?” he writes. He describes a trip to the Middle East during the 2008 presidential campaign, when he pushed a private prayer into the Western Wall that read in part, “Lord, protect my family and me. Forgive me my sins, and help me guard against pride and despair.”
A Promised Land, Barack Obama, Crown Publishing Group, 768 pp., , Nov. 17, 2020
He adds that someone then dug out the paper, and next thing he knew it was world news. “I had assumed those words were between me and God. But the next day they showed up in an Israeli newspaper before achieving eternal life on the internet. … The line between my private and public lives was dissolving; each thought and gesture was now a matter of global interest.”
Few passages are as revealing as when Obama realizes that his early hopes for a “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations with then-President Dmitry Medvedev were doomed the moment he met with the Kremlin’s real power, Putin, who was only biding his time before he took over from Medvedev again.
Obama had been previously warned by Bill Burns, one of the State Department’s senior Russia specialists, that Putin had to “get a few things off his chest,” and the former president writes: “Burns hadn’t been kidding. … Putin launched into an animated and seemingly endless monologue chronicling every perceived injustice, betrayal, and slight that he and the Russian people had suffered at the hands of the Americans.” Putin said he’d offered President George W. Bush all sorts of help in sharing intelligence against al Qaeda and handling Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, “and where had it gotten him?” Obama recounts. “Rather than heed his warnings, he said, Bush had gone ahead and invaded Iraq, destabilizing the entire Middle East.” Then the Russian leader continued his harangue about how NATO had steadily encroached on Russia’s sphere of influence and promoted democracy recklessly—all issues that continue to bedevil U.S.-Russia relations a decade later.
In an acute observation that perhaps could have only come from someone who began as a city organizer, as Obama had, the president writes that when his aide David Axelrod asked him his impression of Putin, he responded that he “found him strangely familiar, ‘like a ward boss, except with nukes and a U.N. Security Council veto.’ This prompted a laugh, but I hadn’t meant it as a joke. Putin did, in fact, remind me of the sorts of men who had once run the Chicago machine or Tammany Hall—tough, street smart, unsentimental characters who knew what they knew, who never moved outside their narrow experiences, and who viewed patronage, bribery, shakedowns, fraud, and occasional violence as legitimate tools of the trade.” And in the end, he writes, “you couldn’t trust them.”
Obama makes similar observations about Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and some Eastern Europe leaders such as then-Czech President Vaclav Klaus, divining that their commitment to democracy was flimsy as right-wing forces congealed in the face of economic upheaval. He said he found Erdogan to be “cordial and generally responsive to my requests. But whenever I listened to him speak, his tall frame slightly stooped, his voice a forceful staccato that rose an octave in response to various grievances or perceived slights, I got the strong impression that his commitment to democracy and the rule of law might last only as long as it preserved his own power.”
As for Klaus, Obama writes, he came to fear that the Czech leader was a harbinger of the rise of the far-right across Europe and embodied “how the economic crisis [of 2008-9] was causing an uptick in nationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and skepticism about [European] integration.”
Again drawing from his earliest experiences in the divisive city politics of Chicago, Obama writes that he perceived that “the hopeful tide of democratization, liberalization, and integration that had swept the globe after the end of the Cold War was beginning to recede.”
“In fact, what was striking was how easily Klaus would have fit in with the Republican Senate caucus back home, just as I could readily picture Erdogan as a local power broker on the Chicago City Council,” the former president writes. “Whether this was a source of comfort or concern, I couldn’t decide.”
Obama comes to mistrust the European allies as well, especially after the Greek debt crisis snowballed in 2011.
“We couldn’t afford to be passive observers in all this,” he writes. After pushing European countries such as Germany and France with stronger balance sheets to initiate stimulus policies, “[W]e got exactly nowhere,” he writes. He liked and admired German Chancellor Angela Merkel, finding her “steady, honest, intellectually rigorous, and instinctually kind,” but he came to realize she was too conservative to escape the constraints of German politics.
As for the president of the second most powerful European country, Sarkozy—another center-right leader—Obama writes that the French president proved to be duplicitous and thoroughly unreliable. “‘Don’t worry, Barack … I’m working on Angela, you’ll see,’” Obama recounts him saying. But “as far as I could tell, he wasn’t organized enough to come up with a clear plan for his own country, much less for all of Europe.”
Obama also delves deeply into his manifold problems in forcing the Chinese to stop cheating on trade and revalue their currency—and his dismissive views of their readiness for world leadership.
“If any country was likely to challenge U.S. preeminence on the world stage, it was China,” Obama writes. “And yet watching the Chinese delegation operate at the G20, I was convinced that any such challenge was still decades away—and that if and when it came, it would most likely happen as a result of America’s strategic mistakes.”
Obama concludes: “That was the thing that would strike me … at every international forum I attended while president: Even those who complained about America’s role in the world still relied on us to keep the system afloat.”
Many countries were willing to pitch in to varying degrees, he writes, “But otherwise, few nations felt obliged to act beyond narrow self-interest; and those that shared America’s basic commitment to the principles upon which a liberal, market-based system depended—individual freedom, the rule of law, strong enforcement of property rights and neutral arbitration of disputes, plus baseline levels of governmental accountability and competence—lacked the economic and political heft, not to mention the army of diplomats and policy experts, to promote those principles on a global scale.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--Why the United States Can’t Defeat the Coronavirus

Why the United States Can ’ t Defeat the Coronavirus As Thanksgiving approaches , some conservatives in the United States are boasting online of the mass gatherings they plan to hold in defiance of social distancing measures .
This strange civil disobedience , even as the country ’ s coronavirus cases and deaths soar , has become a bizarre mark of status for them , as they plan public events that are likely to led to people ’ s deaths .
The denial of facts and science extends to the deathbed , as the South Dakota nurse Jodi Doering told @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for something else , and they want a magic answer , and they don ’ t want to believe that COVID is real .
… Their last dying words are , ‘ This can ’ t be happening .
It ’ s not real.
’ ” The outright denialists are only the crudest representative of an idea that has dominated American ( and to some degree , European ) responses since the start of the pandemic : This can ’ t really be happening .
As the second wave of the pandemic crashes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surrendered : The Republican Party is adamantly anti-lockdown , and the country ’ s coronavirus task force is advised by a crank the president saw on TV .
Usually , this kind of denial of reality is associated with authoritarian states and leaders who don ’ t need to answer to anyone .
But American denialism hasn ’ t been driven by dictatorship or control of the media—although Donald Trump and Fox News have played a critical part in worsening things .
Instead , the primary driver behind America ’ s current predicament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself—and the deep conviction that disaster is something that happens to other people .
The playbook for control of the coronavirus is , as countries across the Asia-Pacific have shown , simple—and painful .
It begins with sharp lockdowns , pioneered by China ’ s near-total closure of the country for 76 days but also carried out skillfully in New Zealand , Taiwan , Vietnam , and elsewhere .
In countries where the virus hasn ’ t taken a strong foothold , such as Japan and Australia , enforced social distancing , rather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
During that lockdown , economic support has to flow from the government to a frozen private sector , whether through wage subsidies , direct payments , or , as in China , targeted business aid combined with restrictions on layoffs .
The United States never really had a lockdown .
Even the stay-at-home orders issued in 43 states in March and April came nowhere close to the level of lockdown imposed in other countries—not least because of the lack of real penalties for violating the rules .
In a rare success , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and unemployment insurance kept the U.S. economy afloat .
But it ’ s the necessary follow-up stages where the United States has truly failed .
It ’ s not just the lack of a centralized test-and-trace program , a necessity for spotting and stamping out future possible outbreaks .
Key among these has been a centralized and mandatory system for quarantine and isolation , not just for patients themselves but for those exposed to them .
It was this step that crushed the spread of the virus in China and has helped contain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virus seriously , such as Taiwan , Australia , and Israel , entering from abroad means two weeks of monitored observance in a hotel ; in the United States , you can simply waltz in and say you intend to quarantine , with no checks or balances .
New York City now offers quarantine facilities for coronavirus sufferers in hotel rooms—on a purely volunteer basis .
Centralized isolation is nowhere to be seen , and instead the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issues suggestions about confining the infected to a single room—an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ small city apartments .
Internal travel rules are flimsy ; take Washington , D.C. , which has been relatively successful in coronavirus control .
Its attempt to impose rules to prevent reinfection by visitors features no enforcement and a myriad of bizarre loopholes : If you ’ re visiting for less than 24 hours , for instance , that ’ s fine .
Perhaps the virus likes to take a good look around first before it infects people .
At every stage , loopholes dominate , a belief that somehow the virus can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ll keep restaurants open until 10 p.m. but no later !
We ’ ll ban gatherings of more than 15 people !
Arbitrary lines are adjusted to avoid necessary realities .
At the heart of these systemic flaws lie two fatal American convictions : The government can ’ t help , and disasters are things that happen to other people .
That first idea is embedded so deep into American life that it becomes self-sustaining .
Government departments are underfunded , often deliberately , so the everyday experience of Americans with government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unpleasant .
Meanwhile , the parts of U.S. governance most frequently enforced are those that hit the most vulnerable—such as brutal policing .
From crumbling infrastructure to a tax system and a carceral state that target the poor , Americans have ample reason to not trust the government to do its job .
But another factor contributing to national denialism may be the sheer prosperity and safety of modern American life .
Americans are simply not used to the idea that what ’ s happening on the news might change their daily life @ @ @ @ @ @ @ natural disaster radically altered life within living memory , such as China or Vietnam , people were psychologically prepared for the impact of the coronavirus—for the idea that today ’ s headlines might mean your life will be different tomorrow .
But in the United States , the news has very rarely had that kind of immediate impact .
Mostly it ’ s been something happening to other people , far away .
Even if events hit relatively close to home , they don ’ t matter .
When Puerto Rico—a U.S. territory—was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the American public barely noticed .
It ’ s why the response of the liberal press in the early months of the pandemic was to try to turn the coronavirus into another participant in the culture war ; the real danger , papers earnestly proclaimed , was not the virus but racism .
Even when mass death came to the United States , its impact was brutally disproportionate .
At first , these outbreaks were small and localized , like that among Orthodox Jews in New York , but then , as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Black Americans three times harder than others .
To be sure , the United States has natural disasters .
But the regular exceptions are limited and regionally specific : floods in New Orleans , tornados in the Midwest .
They ’ re also much more visible than the pandemic ; nobody can disagree with the existence of a hurricane .
Throw into the difficulty of accepting an invisible foe the paranoid history of American conspiratorialism , and you end up with a nation dotted with denialists .
Being denied a high school party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for tens of millions of Americans as an act of government oppression , not a necessary sacrifice .
( In contrast , Chinese sacrificed the single-most important family event of the year , the Spring Festival , entirely . )
This was not inevitable , nor is it entirely unique .
Australia and New Zealand are proverbially lucky countries , with long histories of prosperity .
But their proximity to Asia , experience with SARS , and strong notions of communal support meant their response was fast and effective .
Europe lacks the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but its own seven decades of postwar complacency made its coronavirus response dangerously late and drained the will to sustain measures through the winter .
But America ’ s current path is now locked in , since the Republican Party has committed itself wholeheartedly to sustaining the same bad ideas that caused the disaster to begin with .
Even the incoming administration of Joe Biden will find itself effectively hamstrung on any action , literally unable to take the lifesaving measures—from a true lockdown to economic support—that the country desperately needs .
American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States .

As Thanksgiving approaches, some conservatives in the United States are boasting online of the mass gatherings they plan to hold in defiance of social distancing measures. This strange civil disobedience, even as the country’s coronavirus cases and deaths soar, has become a bizarre mark of status for them, as they plan public events that are likely to led to people’s deaths . The denial of facts and science extends to the deathbed, as the South Dakota nurse Jodi Doering told CNN : “People are still looking for something else, and they want a magic answer, and they don’t want to believe that COVID is real. … Their last dying words are, ‘This can’t be happening. It’s not real.’”
As Thanksgiving approaches, some conservatives in the United States are boasting online of the mass gatherings they plan to hold in defiance of social distancing measures. This strange civil disobedience, even as the country’s coronavirus cases and deaths soar, has become a bizarre mark of status for them, as they plan public events that are likely to led to people’s deaths. The denial of facts and science extends to the deathbed, as the South Dakota nurse Jodi Doering told CNN: “People are still looking for something else, and they want a magic answer, and they don’t want to believe that COVID is real. … Their last dying words are, ‘This can’t be happening. It’s not real.’”
The outright denialists are only the crudest representative of an idea that has dominated American (and to some degree, European) responses since the start of the pandemic: This can’t really be happening. As the second wave of the pandemic crashes down, the U.S. government has essentially surrendered: The Republican Party is adamantly anti-lockdown, and the country’s coronavirus task force is advised by a crank the president saw on TV. Usually, this kind of denial of reality is associated with authoritarian states and leaders who don’t need to answer to anyone. But American denialism hasn’t been driven by dictatorship or control of the media—although Donald Trump and Fox News have played a critical part in worsening things. Instead, the primary driver behind America’s current predicament has been the fundamental distrust of government itself—and the deep conviction that disaster is something that happens to other people.
The playbook for control of the coronavirus is, as countries across the Asia-Pacific have shown, simple—and painful. It begins with sharp lockdowns, pioneered by China’s near-total closure of the country for 76 days but also carried out skillfully in New Zealand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and elsewhere. In countries where the virus hasn’t taken a strong foothold, such as Japan and Australia, enforced social distancing, rather than a full lockdown, can work. During that lockdown, economic support has to flow from the government to a frozen private sector, whether through wage subsidies, direct payments, or, as in China, targeted business aid combined with restrictions on layoffs.
The United States never really had a lockdown. Even the stay-at-home orders issued in 43 states in March and April came nowhere close to the level of lockdown imposed in other countries—not least because of the lack of real penalties for violating the rules. In a rare success, though, the combination of direct payments and unemployment insurance kept the U.S. economy afloat.
But it’s the necessary follow-up stages where the United States has truly failed. It’s not just the lack of a centralized test-and-trace program, a necessity for spotting and stamping out future possible outbreaks. Key among these has been a centralized and mandatory system for quarantine and isolation, not just for patients themselves but for those exposed to them. It was this step that crushed the spread of the virus in China and has helped contain it elsewhere. In countries taking the virus seriously, such as Taiwan, Australia, and Israel, entering from abroad means two weeks of monitored observance in a hotel; in the United States, you can simply waltz in and say you intend to quarantine, with no checks or balances.
New York City now offers quarantine facilities for coronavirus sufferers in hotel rooms—on a purely volunteer basis. Centralized isolation is nowhere to be seen, and instead the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issues suggestions about confining the infected to a single room—an impossibility in many multigeneration households or in small city apartments. Internal travel rules are flimsy; take Washington, D.C., which has been relatively successful in coronavirus control. Its attempt to impose rules to prevent reinfection by visitors features no enforcement and a myriad of bizarre loopholes: If you’re visiting for less than 24 hours, for instance, that’s fine. Perhaps the virus likes to take a good look around first before it infects people. At every stage, loopholes dominate, a belief that somehow the virus can be cheated of its toll: We’ll keep restaurants open until 10 p.m. but no later! We’ll ban gatherings of more than 15 people! Arbitrary lines are adjusted to avoid necessary realities.
At the heart of these systemic flaws lie two fatal American convictions: The government can’t help, and disasters are things that happen to other people. That first idea is embedded so deep into American life that it becomes self-sustaining. Government departments are underfunded, often deliberately, so the everyday experience of Americans with government services becomes bureaucratic, oppressive, and unpleasant. Meanwhile, the parts of U.S. governance most frequently enforced are those that hit the most vulnerable—such as brutal policing. From crumbling infrastructure to a tax system and a carceral state that target the poor, Americans have ample reason to not trust the government to do its job.
But another factor contributing to national denialism may be the sheer prosperity and safety of modern American life. Americans are simply not used to the idea that what’s happening on the news might change their daily life. In countries where a political or natural disaster radically altered life within living memory, such as China or Vietnam, people were psychologically prepared for the impact of the coronavirus—for the idea that today’s headlines might mean your life will be different tomorrow.
But in the United States, the news has very rarely had that kind of immediate impact. Mostly it’s been something happening to other people, far away. Even if events hit relatively close to home, they don’t matter. When Puerto Rico—a U.S. territory—was devastated by Hurricane Maria in 2017, the American public barely noticed. It’s why the response of the liberal press in the early months of the pandemic was to try to turn the coronavirus into another participant in the culture war; the real danger, papers earnestly proclaimed, was not the virus but racism. Even when mass death came to the United States, its impact was brutally disproportionate. At first, these outbreaks were small and localized, like that among Orthodox Jews in New York, but then, as the virus spread, the first wave hit Black Americans three times harder than others.
To be sure, the United States has natural disasters. But the regular exceptions are limited and regionally specific: floods in New Orleans, tornados in the Midwest. They’re also much more visible than the pandemic; nobody can disagree with the existence of a hurricane. Throw into the difficulty of accepting an invisible foe the paranoid history of American conspiratorialism, and you end up with a nation dotted with denialists. Being denied a high school party or a Thanksgiving get-together has become defined for tens of millions of Americans as an act of government oppression, not a necessary sacrifice. (In contrast, Chinese sacrificed the single-most important family event of the year, the Spring Festival, entirely.)
This was not inevitable, nor is it entirely unique. Australia and New Zealand are proverbially lucky countries, with long histories of prosperity. But their proximity to Asia, experience with SARS, and strong notions of communal support meant their response was fast and effective. Europe lacks the degree of American mistrust in government, but its own seven decades of postwar complacency made its coronavirus response dangerously late and drained the will to sustain measures through the winter.
But America’s current path is now locked in, since the Republican Party has committed itself wholeheartedly to sustaining the same bad ideas that caused the disaster to begin with. Even the incoming administration of Joe Biden will find itself effectively hamstrung on any action, literally unable to take the lifesaving measures—from a true lockdown to economic support—that the country desperately needs. American exceptionalism has finally caught up with the United States.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--U.N. Pulling Americans From Northern Yemen Ahead of Houthi Terrorist Designation

American staffers for the United Nations and some workers at nongovernmental organizations have been relocated out of northern Yemen in anticipation of the Trump administration ’ s possible terrorist designation for the Iran-backed Houthi rebels that is likely to complicate aid deliveries and further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in the war-torn country .
Officials familiar with the decision said that more than a dozen Americans working for the U.N. and international relief agencies in Yemen have been transferred temporarily out of Houthi-controlled territory in Sanaa .
It remained unclear whether they have been redeployed to southern Yemen or to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when they might return .
Depending on conditions in the country , the staff could return to regular rotations after a short leave .
On Monday night , the U.N. sent an urgent WhatsApp message to relief agencies warning it was “ most likely the designation of AA [ Ansar Allah ] as a terrorist organization will take place tonight by US Gov .
UN are encouraging all US citizens to leave the North of Yemen as the implications are unknown.
” Ansar Allah is the formal name of the Houthi movement , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the lead-up to the US election , which had been seen as a potential thaw with the group .
“ While it is not likely to be too harsh e.g .
kidnapping it could result in restriction of movement .
A list of those wishing to leave Sanaa to Aden or Addis on the Wednesday flight will be accommodated , ” the WhatsApp message continued .
The U.N. ’ s expectation that the U.S. designation would occur on Monday was not borne out , but U.N. officials went through with the relocation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ characterizing the move as a formal evacuation but a forward rotation of Americans out of Houthi-controlled zones , akin to an early leave that officials take each month .
But it reflects growing concern among aid organizations and the U.N. that the Houthis , a Shiite group that controls territory in Yemen ’ s mountainous northern region that ’ s home to the bulk of the country ’ s population , could retaliate against U.S. citizens after the Trump administration designates the group as a terrorist organization .
Last year , aid agencies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with rocket-propelled grenades , forcing 12 organizations to suspend operations .
But it also reflects growing pessimism about the impact of the designation on a potential humanitarian response , which had already been hampered by the coronavirus pandemic and a prior suspension of U.S. aid .
Yemen is considered the world ’ s worst humanitarian crisis , with over 24 million people , around 80 percent of the country ’ s total population , in need of humanitarian aid and millions of people on the brink of famine .
Aid organizations and experts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further food insecurity , as well as complicating international financial transfers for a nation heavily reliant on imports and remittances .
“ The lives of millions of vulnerable children in Yemen are already at risk—this policy will only deepen their suffering by further restricting humanitarian access to vulnerable communities .
Recent evidence continues to point to a worsening malnutrition crisis for children , ” said Janti Soeripto , the president and CEO of Save the Children .
“ Even if a humanitarian exemption is permitted , this designation will likely make reaching children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heighten security risks for our staff and hinder the fragile peace process.
” While current and former U.S. officials said the decision was imminent , Trump administration officials haven ’ t made any public announcements about designating the Houthi movement .
Though it was seen as likely that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would announce during his trip to Saudi Arabia next week , the State Department could also drag out the decision in order to give Riyadh leverage to eke out a back-channel cease-fire deal with the Houthis in talks that resumed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doesn ’ t offer sneak previews of any designations actions that we might or might not be considering , ” said Nathan Sales , the State Department coordinator for counterterrorism , when asked about the matter in a briefing to reporters on Tuesday .
But humanitarian organizations still worry about the chilling effect a blanket terrorism designation could have on the banks and insurance companies they work with to operate in Yemen .
Zoe Paxton , the chief spokesperson for the U.N. relief coordinator , Mark Lowcock , did not respond to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pull Americans out of Northern Yemen .
But she noted that “ the growing risk of famine in Yemen underlines the need to ensure that principled humanitarian assistance can continue to reach all the people who need it across the country.
” “ The humanitarian situation in Yemen has never been worse , ” she added .
“ We are calling on the whole world to do everything it can to stop such a catastrophe from happening.
” Analysts see the expected designation of the Houthi movement as a terrorist organization as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s countering of Iran in the Middle East .
Depending on what measures the United States uses to designate the group , the consequences could range from sanctioning top Houthi leaders to sanctioning all affiliates of the movement and subjecting anyone who had financial or business dealings with the group to criminal penalties .
The expected designation has faced internal pushback from career officials in the Defense and State departments , as well as from U.S. Special Representative for Iran Elliott Abrams , current and former officials said .
It has also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operate in Yemen .
Critics of the decision said it could jeopardize the fragile U.N.-brokered peace talks between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government .
Aid groups fear it could restrict their ability to provide vital humanitarian assistance in Houthi-controlled areas of the country , which includes Yemen ’ s capital of Sanaa and a majority of the country ’ s civilian population .
“ In these dire circumstances , a new group designation of Ansar Allah could have a near paralyzing impact on already stretched humanitarian operations across the country , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ organizations—Oxfam America , Save the Children , Mercy Corps , CARE USA , and the International Rescue Committee—in a letter sent to Pompeo on Nov. 16 pressing him to reconsider the decision .
“ We urge you to put Yemenis at the center of U.S. Yemen policy and refrain from taking any actions that could further jeopardize their access to lifesaving assistance .
”

Jack Detsch, Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer

American staffers for the United Nations and some workers at nongovernmental organizations have been relocated out of northern Yemen in anticipation of the Trump administration’s possible terrorist designation for the Iran-backed Houthi rebels that is likely to complicate aid deliveries and further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in the war-torn country.
American staffers for the United Nations and some workers at nongovernmental organizations have been relocated out of northern Yemen in anticipation of the Trump administration’s possible terrorist designation for the Iran-backed Houthi rebels that is likely to complicate aid deliveries and further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in the war-torn country.
Officials familiar with the decision said that more than a dozen Americans working for the U.N. and international relief agencies in Yemen have been transferred temporarily out of Houthi-controlled territory in Sanaa. It remained unclear whether they have been redeployed to southern Yemen or to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, or when they might return. Depending on conditions in the country, the staff could return to regular rotations after a short leave.
On Monday night, the U.N. sent an urgent WhatsApp message to relief agencies warning it was “most likely the designation of AA [Ansar Allah] as a terrorist organization will take place tonight by US Gov. UN are encouraging all US citizens to leave the North of Yemen as the implications are unknown.” Ansar Allah is the formal name of the Houthi movement, which recently freed two American hostages in the lead-up to the US election, which had been seen as a potential thaw with the group.
“While it is not likely to be too harsh e.g. kidnapping it could result in restriction of movement. A list of those wishing to leave Sanaa to Aden or Addis on the Wednesday flight will be accommodated,” the WhatsApp message continued.
The U.N.’s expectation that the U.S. designation would occur on Monday was not borne out, but U.N. officials went through with the relocation of American workers.
The U.N. is not characterizing the move as a formal evacuation but a forward rotation of Americans out of Houthi-controlled zones, akin to an early leave that officials take each month. But it reflects growing concern among aid organizations and the U.N. that the Houthis, a Shiite group that controls territory in Yemen’s mountainous northern region that’s home to the bulk of the country’s population, could retaliate against U.S. citizens after the Trump administration designates the group as a terrorist organization. Last year, aid agencies in the town of Dhale were attacked with rocket-propelled grenades, forcing 12 organizations to suspend operations.
But it also reflects growing pessimism about the impact of the designation on a potential humanitarian response, which had already been hampered by the coronavirus pandemic and a prior suspension of U.S. aid. Yemen is considered the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with over 24 million people, around 80 percent of the country’s total population, in need of humanitarian aid and millions of people on the brink of famine. Aid organizations and experts worry that the designation could lead to further food insecurity, as well as complicating international financial transfers for a nation heavily reliant on imports and remittances.
“The lives of millions of vulnerable children in Yemen are already at risk—this policy will only deepen their suffering by further restricting humanitarian access to vulnerable communities. Recent evidence continues to point to a worsening malnutrition crisis for children,” said Janti Soeripto, the president and CEO of Save the Children. “Even if a humanitarian exemption is permitted, this designation will likely make reaching children and families more difficult and could also heighten security risks for our staff and hinder the fragile peace process.”
While current and former U.S. officials said the decision was imminent, Trump administration officials haven’t made any public announcements about designating the Houthi movement. Though it was seen as likely that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would announce during his trip to Saudi Arabia next week, the State Department could also drag out the decision in order to give Riyadh leverage to eke out a back-channel cease-fire deal with the Houthis in talks that resumed this week.
“The State Department doesn’t offer sneak previews of any designations actions that we might or might not be considering,” said Nathan Sales, the State Department coordinator for counterterrorism, when asked about the matter in a briefing to reporters on Tuesday.
But humanitarian organizations still worry about the chilling effect a blanket terrorism designation could have on the banks and insurance companies they work with to operate in Yemen.
Zoe Paxton, the chief spokesperson for the U.N. relief coordinator, Mark Lowcock, did not respond to a request for comment on the U.N. decision to pull Americans out of Northern Yemen. But she noted that “the growing risk of famine in Yemen underlines the need to ensure that principled humanitarian assistance can continue to reach all the people who need it across the country.”
“The humanitarian situation in Yemen has never been worse,” she added. “We are calling on the whole world to do everything it can to stop such a catastrophe from happening.”
Analysts see the expected designation of the Houthi movement as a terrorist organization as the latest escalation in the Trump administration’s countering of Iran in the Middle East. Depending on what measures the United States uses to designate the group, the consequences could range from sanctioning top Houthi leaders to sanctioning all affiliates of the movement and subjecting anyone who had financial or business dealings with the group to criminal penalties.
The expected designation has faced internal pushback from career officials in the Defense and State departments, as well as from U.S. Special Representative for Iran Elliott Abrams, current and former officials said. It has also drawn opposition from humanitarian aid organizations that operate in Yemen. Critics of the decision said it could jeopardize the fragile U.N.-brokered peace talks between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government. Aid groups fear it could restrict their ability to provide vital humanitarian assistance in Houthi-controlled areas of the country, which includes Yemen’s capital of Sanaa and a majority of the country’s civilian population.
“In these dire circumstances, a new group designation of Ansar Allah could have a near paralyzing impact on already stretched humanitarian operations across the country,” wrote the heads of five top humanitarian organizations—Oxfam America, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, CARE USA, and the International Rescue Committee—in a letter sent to Pompeo on Nov. 16 pressing him to reconsider the decision.
“We urge you to put Yemenis at the center of U.S. Yemen policy and refrain from taking any actions that could further jeopardize their access to lifesaving assistance.”