foreignpolicy--2020-08-03--‘It’s Hard to Be in Limbo,’ as COVID-19 Plays Havoc With Military Moves

‘ It ’ s Hard to Be in Limbo , ’ as COVID-19 Plays Havoc With Military Moves STUTTGART , Germany—Just over one month ago , my active-duty Air Force husband and I , along with two cats , three suitcases , and an acoustic guitar , set off from Washington , D.C. , for the southern German city of Stuttgart as one of many U.S. military families trying to make an overseas move during a pandemic .
Any overseas move is unpredictable and chaotic .
This year , the pandemic has made it even harder .
A turbulent process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before stepping on an airplane is reduced to a brief respite in purgatory—in our case , a Marriott hotel that has become our new home—where our lives are put on hold and our movements governed by local and U.S. military policies that can change in a day .
When we finally got to Stuttgart—home , for now , of U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command—we were taken to the drive-thru COVID-19 testing center at the Stuttgart Army Health Clinic .
There , we received nose swabs and were told to remain in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any reason—until receiving a negative result about four days later .
That result in hand , we could then enter “ working quarantine ” and be allowed to exercise outdoors and order restaurant takeout .
A week after our arrival , we got our second negative test , meaning we could move about freely—and finally begin all the nightmarish tasks required in a big move : setting up a local bank account , getting a local phone number , registering a vehicle , in-process on the base , and looking for a house @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secure ration cards to buy items such as coffee , alcohol , and fuel on the base—to prevent one from potentially selling such highly taxed items out on the local economy.Any overseas move is unpredictable and chaotic .
This year , the pandemic has made it even harder .
For many military families , the summer of 2020 will go down as the most stressful overseas move yet , thanks to increased health concerns , financial strain , and unpredictable schedules , according to nearly a dozen service members and their family members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in January that we would be moving to Stuttgart this summer but were left unsure of our status after U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper issued a “ stop movement ” order for all nonessential military personnel in March .
We were finally confirmed to move in early June .
Many other families have their orders on hold indefinitely .
Those stacked-up moves will create challenges for officers in charge of coordinating household pickups , flights , and other logistics , said Ben Hodges , a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general who served as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from 2014 to 2017 .
“ None of these moves happen in a vacuum .
That creates a bit of uncertainty , and that will create challenges for the contracting officers , ” he told Foreign Policy .
That said , it ’ s unlikely that the chaotic situation under COVID-19 will have a long-term impact on military readiness , however stressful it is for the families caught in the middle .
“ There is going to be a small percentage of efforts that are not perfectly aligned , but that would not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As COVID-19 cases soared in the United States this spring , the stop movement order was extended several times and coincided with the start of the summer season for the move , known as a permanent change of station , or PCS .
Military families typically know the location of their new assignments months in advance , and some had already put their houses on the market .
As their leave date was pushed back , they were left scrambling for a place to live .
Kaysie G. and her husband , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to relocate with their 2-year-old son and pet dog in late March from South Dakota to Stuttgart .
It was their first overseas move , and with a child to boot , so they got the ball rolling as soon as possible—and then got bushwhacked by the stop orders .
“ We had done everything as much as we could , and then they shut everything down , ” Kaysie told Foreign Policy .
“ We had to undo all of it … and we had to delist the house.
” “ It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because we did everything twice , ” she continued .
“ It ’ s hard to be in limbo.
” Simply getting permission to move during the stop movement order is an ordeal .
Service members are required to get paperwork signed by a general officer from both their old units and their new one—adding weeks of uncertainty chasing one- and two-star generals for a signature .
Even when those hoops are cleared , families soon find fresh ones .
Kat Lancaster and her husband , an Air Force major , arrived in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on July 15 , and were waiting in the drive-thru clinic line to get swabbed when the newest testing-and-quarantine policy came through .
Based on an uptick in COVID-19 cases coming from recently arrived service members , Lancaster , as the dependent , would no longer be tested .
Instead , she was required to spend two full weeks in the hotel room—no more working quarantine allowed—making it that much harder to start building her new life .
“ You want to be compliant , and you want to be doing the right @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But then when you do the right thing , and tomorrow it ’ s the wrong thing , it just gets really frustrating.
” Even after quarantine is at last over , these expats face new decisions to make .
Thanks to COVID-19 , many families are looking for bigger houses than they expected so they have enough space for everyone to work from home .
The tough choice of whether to put kids into schools on base or in local schools is complicated by ongoing plans for virtual learning in most schools @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home schooling.The stress of moving during a pandemic will not go away soon .
The stress of moving during a pandemic will not go away soon .
Several spouses said they took advantage of resources such as the military and family life counseling program for the first time after their move .
And then , at the end of July , came some news met with consternation in Stuttgart , as Esper announced plans to withdraw nearly 12,000 troops from Germany .
The announcement that the headquarters of Eucom as well as Special @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Mons , Belgium , and that Africom would also eventually leave Stuttgart , will deeply impact the community here .
Esper said in a July 29 Facebook post that no current PCS orders to Europe would be canceled as a result of the realignment plan , and analysts are skeptical such a move could be accomplished in less than three years , if it happens at all .
Still , the announcement cast new uncertainty in a community that has just undergone months of confusion .
While few believe current tours here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nature of the Trump administration has taught us to never say never .
Meanwhile , although the process of arriving and settling into Stuttgart has been far from smooth , families acknowledge the effort made by local military leadership to soften the impact through virtual town halls and community outreach .
“ I really do think they ’ re trying really hard ” to help new arrivals through the quarantine procedures , Lancaster said .
“ I don ’ t think it ’ s for lack of effort .
I think it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @

STUTTGART, Germany—Just over one month ago, my active-duty Air Force husband and I, along with two cats, three suitcases, and an acoustic guitar, set off from Washington, D.C., for the southern German city of Stuttgart as one of many U.S. military families trying to make an overseas move during a pandemic.
STUTTGART, Germany—Just over one month ago, my active-duty Air Force husband and I, along with two cats, three suitcases, and an acoustic guitar, set off from Washington, D.C., for the southern German city of Stuttgart as one of many U.S. military families trying to make an overseas move during a pandemic.
Any overseas move is unpredictable and chaotic. This year, the pandemic has made it even harder. A turbulent process that began weeks, even months, before stepping on an airplane is reduced to a brief respite in purgatory—in our case, a Marriott hotel that has become our new home—where our lives are put on hold and our movements governed by local and U.S. military policies that can change in a day.
When we finally got to Stuttgart—home, for now, of U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command—we were taken to the drive-thru COVID-19 testing center at the Stuttgart Army Health Clinic. There, we received nose swabs and were told to remain in full quarantine—no leaving our hotel room for any reason—until receiving a negative result about four days later.
That result in hand, we could then enter “working quarantine” and be allowed to exercise outdoors and order restaurant takeout. A week after our arrival, we got our second negative test, meaning we could move about freely—and finally begin all the nightmarish tasks required in a big move: setting up a local bank account, getting a local phone number, registering a vehicle, in-process on the base, and looking for a house. Overseas, you also need to secure ration cards to buy items such as coffee, alcohol, and fuel on the base—to prevent one from potentially selling such highly taxed items out on the local economy.Any overseas move is unpredictable and chaotic. This year, the pandemic has made it even harder.
For many military families, the summer of 2020 will go down as the most stressful overseas move yet, thanks to increased health concerns, financial strain, and unpredictable schedules, according to nearly a dozen service members and their family members interviewed by Foreign Policy.
We learned in January that we would be moving to Stuttgart this summer but were left unsure of our status after U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper issued a “stop movement” order for all nonessential military personnel in March. We were finally confirmed to move in early June. Many other families have their orders on hold indefinitely. Those stacked-up moves will create challenges for officers in charge of coordinating household pickups, flights, and other logistics, said Ben Hodges, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general who served as the commanding general of U.S. Army Europe from 2014 to 2017.
“None of these moves happen in a vacuum. That creates a bit of uncertainty, and that will create challenges for the contracting officers,” he told Foreign Policy.
That said, it’s unlikely that the chaotic situation under COVID-19 will have a long-term impact on military readiness, however stressful it is for the families caught in the middle. “There is going to be a small percentage of efforts that are not perfectly aligned, but that would not affect overall readiness,” Hodges said.
As COVID-19 cases soared in the United States this spring, the stop movement order was extended several times and coincided with the start of the summer season for the move, known as a permanent change of station, or PCS. Military families typically know the location of their new assignments months in advance, and some had already put their houses on the market. As their leave date was pushed back, they were left scrambling for a place to live.
Kaysie G. and her husband, an Air Force captain, were scheduled to relocate with their 2-year-old son and pet dog in late March from South Dakota to Stuttgart. It was their first overseas move, and with a child to boot, so they got the ball rolling as soon as possible—and then got bushwhacked by the stop orders.
“We had done everything as much as we could, and then they shut everything down,” Kaysie told Foreign Policy. “We had to undo all of it … and we had to delist the house.”
“It was almost like we PCSed twice, because we did everything twice,” she continued. “It’s hard to be in limbo.”
Simply getting permission to move during the stop movement order is an ordeal. Service members are required to get paperwork signed by a general officer from both their old units and their new one—adding weeks of uncertainty chasing one- and two-star generals for a signature.
Even when those hoops are cleared, families soon find fresh ones. Kat Lancaster and her husband, an Air Force major, arrived in Stuttgart from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on July 15, and were waiting in the drive-thru clinic line to get swabbed when the newest testing-and-quarantine policy came through. Based on an uptick in COVID-19 cases coming from recently arrived service members, Lancaster, as the dependent, would no longer be tested. Instead, she was required to spend two full weeks in the hotel room—no more working quarantine allowed—making it that much harder to start building her new life.
“You want to be compliant, and you want to be doing the right thing,” Lancaster said. “But then when you do the right thing, and tomorrow it’s the wrong thing, it just gets really frustrating.”
Even after quarantine is at last over, these expats face new decisions to make. Thanks to COVID-19, many families are looking for bigger houses than they expected so they have enough space for everyone to work from home. The tough choice of whether to put kids into schools on base or in local schools is complicated by ongoing plans for virtual learning in most schools; several families are simply opting for home schooling.The stress of moving during a pandemic will not go away soon.
The stress of moving during a pandemic will not go away soon. Several spouses said they took advantage of resources such as the military and family life counseling program for the first time after their move.
And then, at the end of July, came some news met with consternation in Stuttgart, as Esper announced plans to withdraw nearly 12,000 troops from Germany. The announcement that the headquarters of Eucom as well as Special Operations Command Europe would move from Stuttgart to Mons, Belgium, and that Africom would also eventually leave Stuttgart, will deeply impact the community here.
Esper said in a July 29 Facebook post that no current PCS orders to Europe would be canceled as a result of the realignment plan, and analysts are skeptical such a move could be accomplished in less than three years, if it happens at all.
Still, the announcement cast new uncertainty in a community that has just undergone months of confusion. While few believe current tours here would be cut short, the mercurial nature of the Trump administration has taught us to never say never.
Meanwhile, although the process of arriving and settling into Stuttgart has been far from smooth, families acknowledge the effort made by local military leadership to soften the impact through virtual town halls and community outreach.
“I really do think they’re trying really hard” to help new arrivals through the quarantine procedures, Lancaster said. “I don’t think it’s for lack of effort. I think it’s just utterly confusing.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-03--COVID-19 Heats Up the New Great Game in Central Asia

COVID-19 Heats Up the New Great Game in Central Asia Amid the COVID-19 pandemic , Central Asian nations—Kazakhstan , Uzbekistan , Turkmenistan , Tajikistan , and Kyrgyzstan—are facing a particularly challenging test of their governments , health care systems , and fledgling economies , which are heavily dependent on commodity exports to global economic engines such as China .
Unlike many other developing countries left isolated by the pandemic , they have a choice of great-power backers , as China , Russia , and the United States compete to offer aid .
After recently rolling out its Central Asia strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ play against other great powers in a new Great Game faces its first major test in COVID-19 .
Although the United States may never wield as much influence in Central Asia as immediate neighbors such as Russia and China , engaging the region is necessary if it seeks to avoid ceding power and influence to China , especially in the wake of COVID-19 .
And to engage , the United States must offer alternatives to China and Russia that help Central Asian governments defeat COVID-19 , resist domination , maintain stability , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its strategy , the United States ’ first policy objective is to help Central Asian states maintain sovereignty and resist domination by the other great powers .
Great-power competition is , in part , a competition for strategic influence over precious resources .
To compete with Russia and China globally , the United States must force them to commit more attention and resources in Central Asia , a region long under Russia ’ s political dominion yet increasingly economically dependent on China .
In addition , any bandwidth China and Russia invest there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regions such as the South China Sea , the Arctic , the Indian Ocean , and Italy—alarmingly , a recent addition to China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative .
COVID-19 has accelerated a need for resources that in turn offers an opportunity for the United States to engage .
It must open a new front , away from traditional friction points , to frustrate the ambitions of China and Russia , which now openly cooperate to impede U.S. foreign-policy goals around the world .
Central Asia is more than just one such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Relative to its population and economy , no other region is enmeshed in as many pressing geopolitical issues such as energy , trade , religious extremism , conflict in Afghanistan , a hostile Iran , nuclear rivalry in South Asia , the international opium trade , Russian aggression in its “ near abroad , ” instability in China ’ s Xinjiang province , and China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative .
Russian political and security interests have increasingly converged with those of China as each seeks to assert itself—Russia to maintain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extremism , and China to stabilize its western flank from unrest tied to its persecution of Muslims and Turkic peoples .
India , too , sees opportunity , in its case to open a second strategic front against its rival Pakistan by gaining influence over economic and security matters , particularly in Tajikistan .
And Iran has developed closer economic and cultural ties with both Tajikistan and its neighbor Turkmenistan .
Thus far , the political uncertainty associated with the changing of the guard from Soviet-era dictators to new leaders—some with their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parties but the United States .
Critics of U.S. engagement in Central Asia might prefer to let China and Russia compete alone at no cost to the United States .
But to the extent that was ever possible with Russian power in decline , COVID-19 has changed the dynamic .
Russia ’ s ability to exert influence in Central Asia grows weaker as its overwhelmed and underprepared health care system is under siege at home and its government coffers are underfilled amid low oil prices .
Rather than compete directly with China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it—on missile defense , military exercises , energy deals , and cooperation against the United States in Syria and the Korean Peninsula .
Although the history of Sino-Russian distrust will likely always burden and constrain the relationship , Russia is likely to cooperate with China as it is less able than ever to take advantage of COVID-19 by mounting a competing effort for influence in Central Asia .
Facing little competition in Central Asia from either Russia or the United States thus far , China has seized the initiative in the wake of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experience dealing with the virus to advise governments such as Uzbekistan on mitigation .
Its quicker economic recovery has positioned it to resume purchases of the numerous commodities , including oil from Kazakhstan , on which the Central Asian economies depend .
It has provided medical equipment throughout the region .
And true to form , it has negotiated potentially billions of dollars in loans to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan , including through the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank .
Meanwhile , the United States has provided medical equipment worth just $ 4.3 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of President Donald Trump has reportedly offered $ 274 million to assist Central Asia in battling the pandemic .
That level of serious engagement bucks a historical trend of only nominal U.S. investment in the region .
After 1991 , when Central Asian countries earned newfound freedom as the Soviet Union dissolved , the United States adopted an optimistic but narrow view of their strategic value .
Efforts to appease a post-Soviet Russia , concern about proliferation of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction , and a desire for access to the region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drove a limited and focused U.S. foreign policy .
At the turn of the century , that focus shifted to the global war on terrorism .
Since 2001 , U.S. interest in Central Asia has only marginally extended beyond counterterrorism and support to the war in Afghanistan .
Before COVID-19 , the United States vacillated on Central Asian policy , with shifting emphases on human rights , governance , and security as preconditions to building stronger partnerships .
In 2005 , four years after the U.S. began basing military forces in Uzbekistan—and after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , despite then President Islam Karimov ’ s abysmal human rights record—it balked at his government ’ s brutal repression of protests in Andijan , which ultimately resulted in the expulsion of U.S. forces from the Kharshi-Khanabad air base .
In 2005 , the U.S. government welcomed the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan as a glimmer of progress towards anti-corruption and democracy .
Yet in 2009 , the U.S. ambassador to Kyrgyzstan cabled Washington that the son of Kyrgyzstan ’ s then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was “ smart , corrupt , and a good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ period , the United States limited its ambitions in the region so as not to upset the strategic balance with Russia .
With Russian cooperation necessary to maintain military bases and the Northern Distribution Network supporting operations in Afghanistan , the United States even renamed its small base in Kyrgyzstan the Transit Center at Manas to highlight its temporary noncombat nature , minimizing any apparent threat to Russian security domination .
Since Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan ’ s government resulted in the forced closure of the Manas base , the United States has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As a result , a long list of ambitious U.S. foreign-policy objectives envisioned in 2002 has gone mostly unfulfilled .
However , COVID-19 , transitions of political power , economic reforms , and public concerns about Chinese and Russian domination have created new openings for the United States .
Though Central Asian dictators have long sought to extract maximum concessions from the United States without legitimate interest in a long-term strategic relationship , new opportunity for rapprochement is worth exploring .
The growing dominance of China , combined with changes in political leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States to build stronger relations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan .
Both countries have undergone their first transitions of power , albeit from former communist dictators to those dictators ’ protégés .
While their reform agendas may demonstrate calculated pragmatism more than genuine commitments to liberal democracy and free markets , any reforms facilitating democratic governance , increased respect for human rights , and markets opened to U.S. investment are nonetheless positive progress .
To compete with Russia and China , the United States must find willing governments in Central Asia and build substantive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and results .
It must strengthen the political and security relationships needed to combat extremism .
It must create conditions for U.S. businesses to invest .
And , despite the potentially authoritarian aims of new leaders in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan , the United States can influence the arc of those governments by creating incentives for further democratic , human rights , and economic reforms .
Central Asian regimes have depended and will continue to depend on strong economic relationships with China , but their concerns about Chinese intentions and debt diplomacy—exacerbated by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States is as well positioned as China to provide advice , equipment , and other aid to help Central Asian governments defeat the pandemic .
Beyond COVID-19 , it should offer alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative for strategic development projects through its public investment programs and public-private partnerships .
U.S. agencies should work with Central Asian governments to enact regulatory reforms and open their economies to private investment .
And the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development manage a multitude of diplomatic and aid programs the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continued reforms that resist both Russian and Chinese political influence toward authoritarianism .
As an alternative to both Russian and Chinese military domination , the United States can offer equipment and training that allow Central Asian countries to hedge their security dependences while opening markets for the U.S. defense industry .
Many Central Asian countries are facing key procurement decisions as they are forced to replace obsolete Soviet-era military equipment ; the equipment they purchase will require decades of spare parts , training , and tactics that will form the core of their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China are more than willing to address their modernization needs with heavy subsidies , but without the same governance and human-rights strings attached .
Increased U.S. security assistance can provide Central Asian countries with tools and incentives to cooperate closely with the United States against regional extremist groups , an important U.S. security interest .
Furthermore , unlike that of competitors , increased U.S. security assistance would subject potentially unscrupulous actors to the strictest , albeit imperfect , human-rights protections on military equipment sales and use in the world .
The United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia to Russia and China .
With even a limited commitment of resources , it can inhibit the detrimental effects of their activities , defeat COVID-19 , and improve the lives of the region ’ s 72 million people—causes consistent with its own Central Asia strategy and worthy of its attention .

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Central Asian nations—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—are facing a particularly challenging test of their governments, health care systems, and fledgling economies, which are heavily dependent on commodity exports to global economic engines such as China. Unlike many other developing countries left isolated by the pandemic, they have a choice of great-power backers, as China, Russia, and the United States compete to offer aid. After recently rolling out its Central Asia strategy , the United States’ resolve to play against other great powers in a new Great Game faces its first major test in COVID-19. Although the United States may never wield as much influence in Central Asia as immediate neighbors such as Russia and China, engaging the region is necessary if it seeks to avoid ceding power and influence to China, especially in the wake of COVID-19. And to engage, the United States must offer alternatives to China and Russia that help Central Asian governments defeat COVID-19, resist domination, maintain stability, and continue reforms.
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Central Asian nations—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—are facing a particularly challenging test of their governments, health care systems, and fledgling economies, which are heavily dependent on commodity exports to global economic engines such as China. Unlike many other developing countries left isolated by the pandemic, they have a choice of great-power backers, as China, Russia, and the United States compete to offer aid. After recently rolling out its Central Asia strategy, the United States’ resolve to play against other great powers in a new Great Game faces its first major test in COVID-19. Although the United States may never wield as much influence in Central Asia as immediate neighbors such as Russia and China, engaging the region is necessary if it seeks to avoid ceding power and influence to China, especially in the wake of COVID-19. And to engage, the United States must offer alternatives to China and Russia that help Central Asian governments defeat COVID-19, resist domination, maintain stability, and continue reforms.
As laid out in its strategy, the United States’ first policy objective is to help Central Asian states maintain sovereignty and resist domination by the other great powers. Great-power competition is, in part, a competition for strategic influence over precious resources. To compete with Russia and China globally, the United States must force them to commit more attention and resources in Central Asia, a region long under Russia’s political dominion yet increasingly economically dependent on China.
In addition, any bandwidth China and Russia invest there is effectively diverted from other strategically significant regions such as the South China Sea, the Arctic, the Indian Ocean, and Italy—alarmingly, a recent addition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. COVID-19 has accelerated a need for resources that in turn offers an opportunity for the United States to engage. It must open a new front, away from traditional friction points, to frustrate the ambitions of China and Russia, which now openly cooperate to impede U.S. foreign-policy goals around the world.
Central Asia is more than just one such front; strategically, the region matters. Relative to its population and economy, no other region is enmeshed in as many pressing geopolitical issues such as energy, trade, religious extremism, conflict in Afghanistan, a hostile Iran, nuclear rivalry in South Asia, the international opium trade, Russian aggression in its “near abroad,” instability in China’s Xinjiang province, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Russian political and security interests have increasingly converged with those of China as each seeks to assert itself—Russia to maintain its sphere of influence and buffer against extremism, and China to stabilize its western flank from unrest tied to its persecution of Muslims and Turkic peoples. India, too, sees opportunity, in its case to open a second strategic front against its rival Pakistan by gaining influence over economic and security matters, particularly in Tajikistan. And Iran has developed closer economic and cultural ties with both Tajikistan and its neighbor Turkmenistan. Thus far, the political uncertainty associated with the changing of the guard from Soviet-era dictators to new leaders—some with their own autocratic ambitions—has incited deeper engagement from all parties but the United States.
Critics of U.S. engagement in Central Asia might prefer to let China and Russia compete alone at no cost to the United States. But to the extent that was ever possible with Russian power in decline, COVID-19 has changed the dynamic. Russia’s ability to exert influence in Central Asia grows weaker as its overwhelmed and underprepared health care system is under siege at home and its government coffers are underfilled amid low oil prices. Rather than compete directly with China, Russia increasingly looks to forge partnerships with it—on missile defense, military exercises, energy deals, and cooperation against the United States in Syria and the Korean Peninsula. Although the history of Sino-Russian distrust will likely always burden and constrain the relationship, Russia is likely to cooperate with China as it is less able than ever to take advantage of COVID-19 by mounting a competing effort for influence in Central Asia.
Facing little competition in Central Asia from either Russia or the United States thus far, China has seized the initiative in the wake of COVID-19. It has trumpeted its early experience dealing with the virus to advise governments such as Uzbekistan on mitigation. Its quicker economic recovery has positioned it to resume purchases of the numerous commodities, including oil from Kazakhstan, on which the Central Asian economies depend. It has provided medical equipment throughout the region. And true to form, it has negotiated potentially billions of dollars in loans to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, including through the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Meanwhile, the United States has provided medical equipment worth just $4.3 million to the region, though the administration of President Donald Trump has reportedly offered $274 million to assist Central Asia in battling the pandemic.
That level of serious engagement bucks a historical trend of only nominal U.S. investment in the region. After 1991, when Central Asian countries earned newfound freedom as the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States adopted an optimistic but narrow view of their strategic value. Efforts to appease a post-Soviet Russia, concern about proliferation of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, and a desire for access to the region’s well-known oil and gas wealth drove a limited and focused U.S. foreign policy. At the turn of the century, that focus shifted to the global war on terrorism. Since 2001, U.S. interest in Central Asia has only marginally extended beyond counterterrorism and support to the war in Afghanistan.
Before COVID-19, the United States vacillated on Central Asian policy, with shifting emphases on human rights, governance, and security as preconditions to building stronger partnerships. In 2005, four years after the U.S. began basing military forces in Uzbekistan—and after more than $400 million in aid, despite then President Islam Karimov’s abysmal human rights record—it balked at his government’s brutal repression of protests in Andijan, which ultimately resulted in the expulsion of U.S. forces from the Kharshi-Khanabad air base. In 2005, the U.S. government welcomed the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan as a glimmer of progress towards anti-corruption and democracy. Yet in 2009, the U.S. ambassador to Kyrgyzstan cabled Washington that the son of Kyrgyzstan’s then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was “smart, corrupt, and a good ally to have.” Over the same period, the United States limited its ambitions in the region so as not to upset the strategic balance with Russia. With Russian cooperation necessary to maintain military bases and the Northern Distribution Network supporting operations in Afghanistan, the United States even renamed its small base in Kyrgyzstan the Transit Center at Manas to highlight its temporary noncombat nature, minimizing any apparent threat to Russian security domination. Since Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan’s government resulted in the forced closure of the Manas base, the United States has been largely restrained in the region. As a result, a long list of ambitious U.S. foreign-policy objectives envisioned in 2002 has gone mostly unfulfilled.
However, COVID-19, transitions of political power, economic reforms, and public concerns about Chinese and Russian domination have created new openings for the United States. Though Central Asian dictators have long sought to extract maximum concessions from the United States without legitimate interest in a long-term strategic relationship, new opportunity for rapprochement is worth exploring.
The growing dominance of China, combined with changes in political leadership, is an opportunity for the United States to build stronger relations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Both countries have undergone their first transitions of power, albeit from former communist dictators to those dictators’ protégés. While their reform agendas may demonstrate calculated pragmatism more than genuine commitments to liberal democracy and free markets, any reforms facilitating democratic governance, increased respect for human rights, and markets opened to U.S. investment are nonetheless positive progress.
To compete with Russia and China, the United States must find willing governments in Central Asia and build substantive partnerships with them that drive real impact and results. It must strengthen the political and security relationships needed to combat extremism. It must create conditions for U.S. businesses to invest. And, despite the potentially authoritarian aims of new leaders in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the United States can influence the arc of those governments by creating incentives for further democratic, human rights, and economic reforms.
Central Asian regimes have depended and will continue to depend on strong economic relationships with China, but their concerns about Chinese intentions and debt diplomacy—exacerbated by the COVID-19 borrowing frenzy—are growing steeply. The United States is as well positioned as China to provide advice, equipment, and other aid to help Central Asian governments defeat the pandemic. Beyond COVID-19, it should offer alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative for strategic development projects through its public investment programs and public-private partnerships. U.S. agencies should work with Central Asian governments to enact regulatory reforms and open their economies to private investment. And the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development manage a multitude of diplomatic and aid programs the United States can bring to bear in support of continued reforms that resist both Russian and Chinese political influence toward authoritarianism.
As an alternative to both Russian and Chinese military domination, the United States can offer equipment and training that allow Central Asian countries to hedge their security dependences while opening markets for the U.S. defense industry. Many Central Asian countries are facing key procurement decisions as they are forced to replace obsolete Soviet-era military equipment; the equipment they purchase will require decades of spare parts, training, and tactics that will form the core of their security relationships going forward.
Russia and China are more than willing to address their modernization needs with heavy subsidies, but without the same governance and human-rights strings attached. Increased U.S. security assistance can provide Central Asian countries with tools and incentives to cooperate closely with the United States against regional extremist groups, an important U.S. security interest. Furthermore, unlike that of competitors, increased U.S. security assistance would subject potentially unscrupulous actors to the strictest, albeit imperfect, human-rights protections on military equipment sales and use in the world.
The United States cannot cede its opportunity in Central Asia to Russia and China. With even a limited commitment of resources, it can inhibit the detrimental effects of their activities, defeat COVID-19, and improve the lives of the region’s 72 million people—causes consistent with its own Central Asia strategy and worthy of its attention.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-03--Boris Johnson’s Remarkable U-Turn From Sinophile to China Hawk

China ’ s ambassador to the United Kingdom , Liu Xiaoming , could hardly have been clearer .
“ We want to be your friend , ” he told reporters in early July , not long before British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced plans to ban equipment purchases from the Chinese telecommunications group Huawei on espionage concerns .
“ But if you want to make China a hostile country , you will have to bear the consequences , ” Liu ominously warned .
Britain will soon find out what those consequences will be .
That ’ s because it has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy that goes far beyond the decision to block Huawei , which has now overtaken Samsung as the world ’ s largest supplier of smartphones .
During his time in office , former U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron talked of new “ golden era ” of Sino-British relations and made the country arguably the most pro-Chinese state in Western Europe .
Johnson has unwound all this in little more than six months , leaving in its place an administration dominated by newly converted fervent China hawks .
Explaining this change is trickier , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s about-face comes in reaction to Beijing ’ s more aggressive global posture , it also reflects broad shifts on both the right and left of domestic British politics .
And underneath lie the more general insecurities that come with the U.K. ’ s post-Brexit position as a declining middle power struggling to rediscover its sense of strategic direction .
One thing is clear : Johnson ’ s shift does not represent a consistent ideological position .
Although he is both an opportunist and populist , his instincts are economically liberal—hence his enthusiasm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global Britain , ” with a particular focus on fast-growing Asian economies .
As mayor of London , he backed Cameron ’ s moves to win Chinese investment .
“ I ’ m a Sinophile and believe we should continue to work with this great and rising power , ” Johnson said in June , even as he was preparing to reverse his earlier position favoring Huawei .
In short , Johnson is by no means a natural new Cold Warrior .
As much as London ’ s about-face comes in reaction to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it also reflects broad shifts in domestic British politics .
Backers of the new , harder line toward China suggest that Britain ’ s position is merely a response to Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s aggressive diplomacy .
By this account , it is Beijing ’ s military and diplomatic actions during the coronavirus pandemic—in the South China Sea and on the Chinese-Indian border , for instance , but also against British allies such as Australia and Sweden—that have stiffened London ’ s spine .
An especially important contributing factor was Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which London sees as a clear violation of the 1985 Sino-British agreement on handing the former colony back to China .
China ’ s recent shifts are real—but they are not enough to explain how far and quickly Britain has turned .
Instead , two key factors came together earlier this year to force Johnson to rethink his position on Huawei and , in the process , develop a more skeptical view of Chinese power : One is rooted in post-Brexit domestic politics , while the other involves Britain ’ s changing relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ source of Britain ’ s tougher stance on China can be traced to a revolt on the right of Johnson ’ s governing Conservative Party after he launched his initial Huawei policy back in January .
The prime minister ’ s initial instincts had been commercial .
Johnson ’ s Conservatives had won reelection in 2019 on a manifesto filled with ambitious pledges to build new broadband networks .
“ Everyone knew these were unrealistic , ” one former senior figure at the British Treasury told me .
“ But for Boris and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a post-Brexit priority.
” Removing Huawei would jeopardize that investment , and thus hopes for economic renewal outside the European Union .
Britain ’ s security services said Huawei ’ s risks could be managed , so Johnson settled on a muddled middle ground , in which Huawei ’ s equipment would be allowed in around one-third of the U.K. ’ s future 5G market—much to the anger of U.S. President Donald Trump , who has been pressuring Britain and other European countries to block Huawei .
That decision quickly ran into opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of older figures on the Tories ’ anti-European , Atlanticist right wing .
These included a former Conservative leader , Iain Duncan Smith , who in late July was also part of a large Tory delegation that met with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to discuss China policy during the latter ’ s visit to London .
The power of this new Tory anti-Chinese faction is clear enough from the policies it has produced .
Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab , another staunch Brexiteer , promised in July that Britain would allow as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ apply for British citizenship in reaction to China ’ s crackdown .
This was an admirable move , but it was also a remarkable one , given that Johnson , Raab , and so many other Brexit backers wanted to leave the EU precisely to stop this kind of uncontrolled migration .
Britain ’ s hawkish China turn can also be explained by its post-Brexit identity crisis .
In a broader sense , Britain ’ s hawkish China turn can also be explained by its post-Brexit identity crisis .
For decades , large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ convenient villain in Brussels .
When the U.K. left the EU in January , that villain disappeared .
China now provides an alternative , giving a pleasing element of moral clarity to Britain ’ s otherwise confusing and diminished post-Brexit global environment .
Euroskeptics suddenly became Sinoskeptics instead .
Yet these rumblings alone can not entirely explain an anti-China turn that is also remarkably bipartisan .
Much of the pressure for a Huawei rethink came via the China Research Group , a grouping of younger , centrist Conservatives , some of whom voted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tougher Chinese line has emerged on the British left , too , as the Labour Party ’ s new leader , Keir Starmer , attempts to jettison the legacy of his left-wing predecessor , Jeremy Corbyn .
Focusing on China allows Labour to paint itself as a newly serious on national security , while also attacking Johnson for inaction on Chinese human rights abuses such as its treatment of minority Uighurs .
There are a few voices who still worry about jeopardizing Chinese investment—ex-Chancellor Philip Hammond is one—but they have become increasingly marginal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strong populist instincts , Johnson therefore found himself on the wrong side of a new cross-party anti-China consensus earlier this year , and he began to scramble to make amends .
But it was a second factor that propelled his broader rethink and sealed his Huawei U-turn on July 14 : Britain ’ s changing relations with the United States .
Britain justified its change of heart over Huawei with reference to a U.S. Commerce Department ruling in May , which amended export rules to block global semiconductor providers from supplying the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force Huawei to use Chinese components , raising new security risks .
But in truth , Britain ’ s volte-face was driven by baser trans-Atlantic politics .
Johnson had been taken aback by the ferocity of Trump ’ s response to his initial Huawei compromise .
With little sign that Trump or a future administration under presidential candidate Joe Biden would soften the U.S. position , Johnson realized he was risking lasting damage to Britain ’ s ties with its most important ally .
For all of China ’ s warnings about consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worried about the consequences from the United States , both in terms of security cooperation and delays to any potential future trade deal .
For all of China ’ s warnings , Britain was much more worried about the consequences from the United States , both in terms of security cooperation and any potential future trade deal .
The politics aside , there is actually much to admire in Johnson ’ s new position .
On the balance , and given the security concerns , his new Huawei policy looks more defensible .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be recalibrated after the naive “ golden era ” phase , especially given the new situation in Hong Kong .
More importantly , after years devoted to internal navel-gazing over Brexit , Johnson ’ s government appears to be finding its feet again as an outward-looking middle power , ready to play a more strategic role in the world .
London ’ s recent support for the establishment of a new D-10 club of democracies , banding together the existing G-7 countries with India and others , was one example .
Its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ push to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement are others .
Further decisions in the vein of the new Huawei policy are now likely , too , including reducing Chinese involvement in a new generation of British nuclear power stations and revisiting rules governing inward investment and foreign involvement in its universities .
For all of the Chinese ambassador ’ s angry statements , it is far from clear whether these changes will irk China that much or prod it into a reaction that risks even more of an anti-China backlash in Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China has avoided hitting the U.K. with the kind of coercive diplomacy that has recently characterized its relationship with Australia .
That said , Britain ’ s new China stance still leaves a host of difficult questions unanswered .
Seeking to outdo Trump ’ s hawkishness , as some British China skeptics seem to want , is unlikely to end well .
A more measured policy could provide more common ground with a possible Biden administration and the EU .
Domestically , Johnson ’ s position poses dilemmas for his Conservative Party .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in part because it has long been an outlier in Europe , both in its enthusiasm for free trade and its laissez-faire economic policies .
China ’ s role as a major non-market economy with significant global influence poses complex questions for those on the right who favor freer trade abroad and lax investment rules at home .
What remains for Johnson ’ s government is a series of hard choices about how Britain might find a role for itself .
Although a tougher line on China has won plaudits at home and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an answer to the larger question of the shape of the U.K. ’ s post-Brexit foreign policy .
Britain is a middle power with middling global reach .
Its reputation as Europe ’ s strongest military player is much diminished .
Most of its allies view its decision to leave the EU as a mistake .
It has not been a serious player in Asia for decades .
Despite talk of deploying a new aircraft carrier to the region , Britain is unlikely now to become one .
What remains for Johnson ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choices about how Britain might find a role for itself , both by forging new relationships with the United States and EU , and by deciding where to spend its limited military and security resources , especially now that the COVID-19 pandemic has stretched budgets even more .
London needs to avoid any further sharp deterioration in relations with Beijing , while also rebuilding ties with Asian allies such as Japan , which have been dismayed by the U.K. ’ s changeable positions on China .
Ultimately , Johnson ’ s anti-China turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his earlier , buccaneering vision of a “ global Britain , ” which now lies rightfully abandoned .
What will replace it remains far less clear .

China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu Xiaoming, could hardly have been clearer. “We want to be your friend,” he told reporters in early July, not long before British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced plans to ban equipment purchases from the Chinese telecommunications group Huawei on espionage concerns. “But if you want to make China a hostile country, you will have to bear the consequences,” Liu ominously warned.
China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu Xiaoming, could hardly have been clearer. “We want to be your friend,” he told reporters in early July, not long before British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced plans to ban equipment purchases from the Chinese telecommunications group Huawei on espionage concerns. “But if you want to make China a hostile country, you will have to bear the consequences,” Liu ominously warned.
Britain will soon find out what those consequences will be. That’s because it has made a remarkable U-turn in its China policy that goes far beyond the decision to block Huawei, which has now overtaken Samsung as the world’s largest supplier of smartphones. During his time in office, former U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron talked of new “golden era” of Sino-British relations and made the country arguably the most pro-Chinese state in Western Europe. Johnson has unwound all this in little more than six months, leaving in its place an administration dominated by newly converted fervent China hawks.
Explaining this change is trickier, however. As much as London’s about-face comes in reaction to Beijing’s more aggressive global posture, it also reflects broad shifts on both the right and left of domestic British politics. And underneath lie the more general insecurities that come with the U.K.’s post-Brexit position as a declining middle power struggling to rediscover its sense of strategic direction.
One thing is clear: Johnson’s shift does not represent a consistent ideological position. Although he is both an opportunist and populist, his instincts are economically liberal—hence his enthusiasm for a post-Brexit free-trading vision of “global Britain,” with a particular focus on fast-growing Asian economies. As mayor of London, he backed Cameron’s moves to win Chinese investment. “I’m a Sinophile and believe we should continue to work with this great and rising power,” Johnson said in June, even as he was preparing to reverse his earlier position favoring Huawei. In short, Johnson is by no means a natural new Cold Warrior.
As much as London’s about-face comes in reaction to Beijing’s more aggressive stance, it also reflects broad shifts in domestic British politics.
Backers of the new, harder line toward China suggest that Britain’s position is merely a response to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s aggressive diplomacy. By this account, it is Beijing’s military and diplomatic actions during the coronavirus pandemic—in the South China Sea and on the Chinese-Indian border, for instance, but also against British allies such as Australia and Sweden—that have stiffened London’s spine. An especially important contributing factor was Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong, which London sees as a clear violation of the 1985 Sino-British agreement on handing the former colony back to China.
China’s recent shifts are real—but they are not enough to explain how far and quickly Britain has turned. Instead, two key factors came together earlier this year to force Johnson to rethink his position on Huawei and, in the process, develop a more skeptical view of Chinese power: One is rooted in post-Brexit domestic politics, while the other involves Britain’s changing relationship with the United States.
The domestic source of Britain’s tougher stance on China can be traced to a revolt on the right of Johnson’s governing Conservative Party after he launched his initial Huawei policy back in January. The prime minister’s initial instincts had been commercial. Johnson’s Conservatives had won reelection in 2019 on a manifesto filled with ambitious pledges to build new broadband networks. “Everyone knew these were unrealistic,” one former senior figure at the British Treasury told me. “But for Boris and his team, building digital infrastructure was a post-Brexit priority.” Removing Huawei would jeopardize that investment, and thus hopes for economic renewal outside the European Union. Britain’s security services said Huawei’s risks could be managed, so Johnson settled on a muddled middle ground, in which Huawei’s equipment would be allowed in around one-third of the U.K.’s future 5G market—much to the anger of U.S. President Donald Trump, who has been pressuring Britain and other European countries to block Huawei.
That decision quickly ran into opposition, led at first by a band of older figures on the Tories’ anti-European, Atlanticist right wing. These included a former Conservative leader, Iain Duncan Smith, who in late July was also part of a large Tory delegation that met with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to discuss China policy during the latter’s visit to London. The power of this new Tory anti-Chinese faction is clear enough from the policies it has produced. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, another staunch Brexiteer, promised in July that Britain would allow as many as 3 million Hong Kongers to apply for British citizenship in reaction to China’s crackdown. This was an admirable move, but it was also a remarkable one, given that Johnson, Raab, and so many other Brexit backers wanted to leave the EU precisely to stop this kind of uncontrolled migration.
Britain’s hawkish China turn can also be explained by its post-Brexit identity crisis.
In a broader sense, Britain’s hawkish China turn can also be explained by its post-Brexit identity crisis. For decades, large swaths of the British right found a convenient villain in Brussels. When the U.K. left the EU in January, that villain disappeared. China now provides an alternative, giving a pleasing element of moral clarity to Britain’s otherwise confusing and diminished post-Brexit global environment. Euroskeptics suddenly became Sinoskeptics instead.
Yet these rumblings alone cannot entirely explain an anti-China turn that is also remarkably bipartisan. Much of the pressure for a Huawei rethink came via the China Research Group, a grouping of younger, centrist Conservatives, some of whom voted to remain in the EU. A tougher Chinese line has emerged on the British left, too, as the Labour Party’s new leader, Keir Starmer, attempts to jettison the legacy of his left-wing predecessor, Jeremy Corbyn. Focusing on China allows Labour to paint itself as a newly serious on national security, while also attacking Johnson for inaction on Chinese human rights abuses such as its treatment of minority Uighurs. There are a few voices who still worry about jeopardizing Chinese investment—ex-Chancellor Philip Hammond is one—but they have become increasingly marginal.
As a leader typically blessed with strong populist instincts, Johnson therefore found himself on the wrong side of a new cross-party anti-China consensus earlier this year, and he began to scramble to make amends. But it was a second factor that propelled his broader rethink and sealed his Huawei U-turn on July 14: Britain’s changing relations with the United States.
Britain justified its change of heart over Huawei with reference to a U.S. Commerce Department ruling in May, which amended export rules to block global semiconductor providers from supplying the Chinese company. Johnson said the ruling would force Huawei to use Chinese components, raising new security risks. But in truth, Britain’s volte-face was driven by baser trans-Atlantic politics. Johnson had been taken aback by the ferocity of Trump’s response to his initial Huawei compromise. With little sign that Trump or a future administration under presidential candidate Joe Biden would soften the U.S. position, Johnson realized he was risking lasting damage to Britain’s ties with its most important ally. For all of China’s warnings about consequences, a post-Brexit U.K. was much more worried about the consequences from the United States, both in terms of security cooperation and delays to any potential future trade deal.
For all of China’s warnings, Britain was much more worried about the consequences from the United States, both in terms of security cooperation and any potential future trade deal.
The politics aside, there is actually much to admire in Johnson’s new position. On the balance, and given the security concerns, his new Huawei policy looks more defensible. Britain’s China policy also needed to be recalibrated after the naive “golden era” phase, especially given the new situation in Hong Kong. More importantly, after years devoted to internal navel-gazing over Brexit, Johnson’s government appears to be finding its feet again as an outward-looking middle power, ready to play a more strategic role in the world. London’s recent support for the establishment of a new D-10 club of democracies, banding together the existing G-7 countries with India and others, was one example. Its tough position on Hong Kong and its push to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement are others.
Further decisions in the vein of the new Huawei policy are now likely, too, including reducing Chinese involvement in a new generation of British nuclear power stations and revisiting rules governing inward investment and foreign involvement in its universities. For all of the Chinese ambassador’s angry statements, it is far from clear whether these changes will irk China that much or prod it into a reaction that risks even more of an anti-China backlash in Europe. So far, at least, China has avoided hitting the U.K. with the kind of coercive diplomacy that has recently characterized its relationship with Australia.
That said, Britain’s new China stance still leaves a host of difficult questions unanswered. Seeking to outdo Trump’s hawkishness, as some British China skeptics seem to want, is unlikely to end well. A more measured policy could provide more common ground with a possible Biden administration and the EU. Domestically, Johnson’s position poses dilemmas for his Conservative Party. Britain’s recent shifts look dramatic in part because it has long been an outlier in Europe, both in its enthusiasm for free trade and its laissez-faire economic policies. China’s role as a major non-market economy with significant global influence poses complex questions for those on the right who favor freer trade abroad and lax investment rules at home.
What remains for Johnson’s government is a series of hard choices about how Britain might find a role for itself.
Although a tougher line on China has won plaudits at home and abroad, it is by no means an answer to the larger question of the shape of the U.K.’s post-Brexit foreign policy. Britain is a middle power with middling global reach. Its reputation as Europe’s strongest military player is much diminished. Most of its allies view its decision to leave the EU as a mistake. It has not been a serious player in Asia for decades. Despite talk of deploying a new aircraft carrier to the region, Britain is unlikely now to become one.
What remains for Johnson’s government is a series of hard choices about how Britain might find a role for itself, both by forging new relationships with the United States and EU, and by deciding where to spend its limited military and security resources, especially now that the COVID-19 pandemic has stretched budgets even more. London needs to avoid any further sharp deterioration in relations with Beijing, while also rebuilding ties with Asian allies such as Japan, which have been dismayed by the U.K.’s changeable positions on China. Ultimately, Johnson’s anti-China turn has been helpful for exposing the shallowness of his earlier, buccaneering vision of a “global Britain,” which now lies rightfully abandoned. What will replace it remains far less clear.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-03--Latin America Can’t Survive the Coronavirus Crisis Alone

After ravaging China , Europe , and the United States , the coronavirus is now cutting a swath through Latin America and the Caribbean .
In late May , the World Health Organization declared South America “ a new epicenter ” of the COVID-19 pandemic .
Even with numbers on the rise in the United States once more , South America ’ s situation remains critical .
As of July 31 , there were more than 2.6 million recorded cases of the coronavirus in Brazil and more than 400,000 cases each in Mexico and Peru .
More people have died @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 than in the United States and Canada combined .
As in other parts of the world , analyses of excess mortality figures indicate that the actual numbers of confirmed cases and deaths directly or indirectly due to COVID-19 are likely many times higher than officially reported figures suggest .
Compounding the health crisis is the region ’ s looming economic crisis .
In late June , the International Monetary Fund forecast that Latin American and the Caribbean ’ s economy would contract by 9.4 percent in 2020 , the largest forecast contraction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Chile and Peru have fiscal positions and precautionary credit lines from the IMF that make them among the most prepared countries in the region to weather the twin health and economic crises ahead , but other countries ’ economies are more vulnerable .
Argentina and Ecuador have already defaulted on their debt this year , and Belize and Suriname are close to doing so .
Brazil and Mexico have high fiscal deficits , have high external debt levels denominated in dollars , and have experienced significant capital outflows because of COVID-19 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ pay for its immediate economic needs , but its fiscal position will deteriorate if it experiences a prolonged economic and health crisis .
Downward economic pressure and global growth concerns mean that the window has closed for many national governments to access private capital markets .
Economic shocks in the region are approaching , albeit at different times for different countries .
Typically , in such scenarios , countries turn to the IMF and multilateral banks .
These institutions have so far provided unprecedented support to the region , offering relief for short-term @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economic impact of the pandemic on Latin American and Caribbean countries is so enormous that many analysts suggest that the IMF and multilateral banks can not afford to lend to every country that needs help .
The region is in a tough spot .
Unlike many other low- and middle-income parts of the world , there are few other major funding mechanisms available to most countries in Latin American and in the Caribbean , outside of loans .
The vast majority of the world ’ s nondefense international development assistance flows to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia , not these countries .
In health , for example , international assistance mostly flows through a few large organizations to fight specific diseases .
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS , Tuberculosis , and Malaria disburses more than $ 4 billion every year to countries with high burdens of those three diseases .
The U.S. government allocated around 75 percent of its 2020 $ 11 billion global health budget to fight the same three diseases .
Much of the $ 19.3 billion that donors had pledged for low- and middle-income countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been funneled through or reprogrammed within existing global health mechanisms , and most countries in the region are ineligible to apply for the bulk of this funding .
As of July 31 , the Global Fund had approved nearly $ 610 million of a $ 1 billion pledge to help countries fight COVID-19 , with less than 3 percent designated for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean .
The problem is that most Latin American countries have “ graduated ” from donors ’ development assistance programs .
For many international development @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s per capita gross domestic product rises to middle-income status , or if a country achieves certain targets—such as high vaccination coverage rates—funding is cut off in favor of poorer nations .
On a per capita GDP basis , most countries in the region are considered too wealthy to qualify for most nondebt forms of development assistance .
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have low incidences of what are referred to as “ priority diseases , ” making them further ineligible for funding from the international organizations that fund activities to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the region largely die from noncommunicable diseases like heart disease , not from malaria , HIV , polio , or measles .
But such metrics can ’ t account for a catastrophe like the coronavirus .
The international community should do more to help these countries face the health and economic crises ahead .
The United States in particular , as a good neighbor—and a self-interested one—needs the region to weather this storm .
The United States and other advanced economies can take clear steps to help the region .
As advanced economies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they should also increase their foreign assistance budgets and provide additional capital to the multilateral banks and the IMF so that these institutions can continue to lend and provide distressed economies lines of credit .
This liquidity will help vulnerable economies , not just in Latin America and the Caribbean but worldwide , access the dollars they need to withstand prolonged economic challenges , avoid financial crises , and jump-start their economies , while also strengthening their health systems to fight COVID-19 and other diseases .
At the same time , the multilateral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ give countries on the brink of economic collapse the option to renegotiate ( and in some exceptional cases , forgive ) their debt .
To address the health crisis , donor countries and international organizations should also revisit how they categorize which countries are eligible for concessional loans and other forms of international assistance , giving more attention to subnational level indicators .
Donors generally use countries ’ national-level data , such as national per capita GDP averages , to calculate assistance eligibility .
But this methodology masks significant poverty in many parts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is rife and health systems need more targeted support to fight COVID-19 .
For example , the northeast Brazilian state of Maranhão has a per capita GDP that is on par with Angola ’ s .
Zimbabwe and Papua New Guinea have higher per capita GDPs than Argentina ’ s northern Chaco province .
Donors involved with the Salud Mesoamérica Initiative are helping municipalities across southern Mexico and seven countries in Central America to improve maternal and child health by using municipality-level data to determine where to direct aid , for instance .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ results in reducing early maternal and childhood death .
It is a good example for how other development programs that target subnational levels can work .
And in addition to funding initiatives that predominantly strengthen health systems in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa , the United States should pay more attention to also funding initiatives that strengthen health systems and bolster regional health coordination in Latin America and the Caribbean .
This includes providing more support for activities that strengthen health supply chains and laboratory and disease surveillance systems there as part of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Pandemic Influenza , initiatives launched during the Obama administration to better prepare countries to detect and fight infectious disease outbreaks .
The World Bank estimates that 53 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean will see their incomes fall below the regional poverty line of $ 5.50 per day as a result of the health and economic impacts of COVID-19 .
But advanced economies , and especially the United States , should not wait for these countries to drop to low-income status to provide the help the region needs today .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ do more now to help prevent these countries from backsliding in the first place .
Global health security and a strong global economy depend on it .

After ravaging China, Europe, and the United States, the coronavirus is now cutting a swath through Latin America and the Caribbean. In late May, the World Health Organization declared South America “ a new epicenter ” of the COVID-19 pandemic. Even with numbers on the rise in the United States once more, South America’s situation remains critical.
After ravaging China, Europe, and the United States, the coronavirus is now cutting a swath through Latin America and the Caribbean. In late May, the World Health Organization declared South America “a new epicenter” of the COVID-19 pandemic. Even with numbers on the rise in the United States once more, South America’s situation remains critical.
As of July 31, there were more than 2.6 million recorded cases of the coronavirus in Brazil and more than 400,000 cases each in Mexico and Peru. More people have died in Latin America and the Caribbean from COVID-19 than in the United States and Canada combined. As in other parts of the world, analyses of excess mortality figures indicate that the actual numbers of confirmed cases and deaths directly or indirectly due to COVID-19 are likely many times higher than officially reported figures suggest.
Compounding the health crisis is the region’s looming economic crisis. In late June, the International Monetary Fund forecast that Latin American and the Caribbean’s economy would contract by 9.4 percent in 2020, the largest forecast contraction of any emerging market in the world. Chile and Peru have fiscal positions and precautionary credit lines from the IMF that make them among the most prepared countries in the region to weather the twin health and economic crises ahead, but other countries’ economies are more vulnerable.
Argentina and Ecuador have already defaulted on their debt this year, and Belize and Suriname are close to doing so. Brazil and Mexico have high fiscal deficits, have high external debt levels denominated in dollars, and have experienced significant capital outflows because of COVID-19. Colombia starts in a better position to pay for its immediate economic needs, but its fiscal position will deteriorate if it experiences a prolonged economic and health crisis.
Downward economic pressure and global growth concerns mean that the window has closed for many national governments to access private capital markets. Economic shocks in the region are approaching, albeit at different times for different countries.
Typically, in such scenarios, countries turn to the IMF and multilateral banks. These institutions have so far provided unprecedented support to the region, offering relief for short-term needs. But the potential scale of the economic impact of the pandemic on Latin American and Caribbean countries is so enormous that many analysts suggest that the IMF and multilateral banks cannot afford to lend to every country that needs help.
The region is in a tough spot. Unlike many other low- and middle-income parts of the world, there are few other major funding mechanisms available to most countries in Latin American and in the Caribbean, outside of loans. The vast majority of the world’s nondefense international development assistance flows to sub-Saharan Africa and to South and Southeast Asia, not these countries.
In health, for example, international assistance mostly flows through a few large organizations to fight specific diseases. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria disburses more than $4 billion every year to countries with high burdens of those three diseases. The U.S. government allocated around 75 percent of its 2020 $11 billion global health budget to fight the same three diseases.
Much of the $19.3 billion that donors had pledged for low- and middle-income countries to address the health effects of COVID-19 has been funneled through or reprogrammed within existing global health mechanisms, and most countries in the region are ineligible to apply for the bulk of this funding. As of July 31, the Global Fund had approved nearly $610 million of a $1 billion pledge to help countries fight COVID-19, with less than 3 percent designated for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The problem is that most Latin American countries have “graduated” from donors’ development assistance programs. For many international development institutions, after a low-income country’s per capita gross domestic product rises to middle-income status, or if a country achieves certain targets—such as high vaccination coverage rates—funding is cut off in favor of poorer nations.
On a per capita GDP basis, most countries in the region are considered too wealthy to qualify for most nondebt forms of development assistance. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have low incidences of what are referred to as “priority diseases,” making them further ineligible for funding from the international organizations that fund activities to fight specific communicable diseases. People in the region largely die from noncommunicable diseases like heart disease, not from malaria, HIV, polio, or measles. But such metrics can’t account for a catastrophe like the coronavirus.
The international community should do more to help these countries face the health and economic crises ahead. The United States in particular, as a good neighbor—and a self-interested one—needs the region to weather this storm.
The United States and other advanced economies can take clear steps to help the region. As advanced economies inject stimuluses into their own economies, they should also increase their foreign assistance budgets and provide additional capital to the multilateral banks and the IMF so that these institutions can continue to lend and provide distressed economies lines of credit. This liquidity will help vulnerable economies, not just in Latin America and the Caribbean but worldwide, access the dollars they need to withstand prolonged economic challenges, avoid financial crises, and jump-start their economies, while also strengthening their health systems to fight COVID-19 and other diseases. At the same time, the multilateral banks and IMF should also continue to give countries on the brink of economic collapse the option to renegotiate (and in some exceptional cases, forgive) their debt.
To address the health crisis, donor countries and international organizations should also revisit how they categorize which countries are eligible for concessional loans and other forms of international assistance, giving more attention to subnational level indicators. Donors generally use countries’ national-level data, such as national per capita GDP averages, to calculate assistance eligibility. But this methodology masks significant poverty in many parts of the region, where economic inequality is rife and health systems need more targeted support to fight COVID-19. For example, the northeast Brazilian state of Maranhão has a per capita GDP that is on par with Angola’s. Zimbabwe and Papua New Guinea have higher per capita GDPs than Argentina’s northern Chaco province.
Donors involved with the Salud Mesoamérica Initiative are helping municipalities across southern Mexico and seven countries in Central America to improve maternal and child health by using municipality-level data to determine where to direct aid, for instance. Experts have lauded the program for its results in reducing early maternal and childhood death. It is a good example for how other development programs that target subnational levels can work.
And in addition to funding initiatives that predominantly strengthen health systems in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, the United States should pay more attention to also funding initiatives that strengthen health systems and bolster regional health coordination in Latin America and the Caribbean. This includes providing more support for activities that strengthen health supply chains and laboratory and disease surveillance systems there as part of the Global Health Security Agenda and the North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza, initiatives launched during the Obama administration to better prepare countries to detect and fight infectious disease outbreaks.
The World Bank estimates that 53 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean will see their incomes fall below the regional poverty line of $5.50 per day as a result of the health and economic impacts of COVID-19. But advanced economies, and especially the United States, should not wait for these countries to drop to low-income status to provide the help the region needs today. A more prudent decision would be to do more now to help prevent these countries from backsliding in the first place. Global health security and a strong global economy depend on it.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-03--India and the United States Need Each Other Mostly Because of China

India and the United States Need Each Other Mostly Because of China On Dec. 15 , 1971 , the USS Enterprise , the largest aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy at the time , entered the Bay of Bengal as the spearhead of a naval task force of the U.S. 7th Fleet .
The task force had been dispatched to help evacuate beleaguered Pakistani forces in East Pakistan as the Indian military steadily advanced toward Dhaka , the regional capital .
But Dhaka fell to Indian forces on Dec. 16 , and the task force ’ s entry into the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
East Pakistan soon became Bangladesh , and India gained a grateful new regional ally .
Washington ’ s main goal , it turned out , was to send a signal to Islamabad and Beijing that it was a reliable ally that would stand by its commitments at a time of need .
The message to China was especially important because Henry Kissinger , then-secretary of state , had recently made a clandestine trip to Beijing using Islamabad as an interlocutor .
Kissinger ’ s mission , as is now well known , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s outreach to China .
Indian policymakers knew about these motivations , but they didn ’ t forget Washington ’ s great show of might : They would remember it as an act designed to intimidate them .
Decades later , the episode still deeply rankled policymakers in New Delhi .
In its wake , some , most notably India ’ s leading strategist of the time , K. Subrahmanyam , even argued that India should pursue nuclear weapons to ensure that no country could again have the ability to threaten it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official U.S.-India meetings , the incident almost invariably affected the tenor of discussions.The contrast between the two episodes in the Bay of Bengal underscores how dramatically U.S.-India security ties have evolved .
In world politics , however , the worm often turns , even if very , very slowly .
Last month , a contingent of U.S. warships carried out a naval exercise with their Indian counterparts near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal .
The stated objective of the exercise was to enhance military interoperability and training .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ which saw the United States deploy the USS Nimitz , its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier , took place against a backdrop of growing Sino-Indian tensions along the Himalayan border .
Skirmishes in May and June had resulted in the loss of lives of both Chinese and Indian forces .
They also led U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to reprimand China for its “ incredibly aggressive ” actions .
The contrast between the two episodes in the Bay of Bengal—nearly 50 years apart—underscores how dramatically U.S.-India security ties have evolved .
The basis of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2008 U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement under the George W. Bush administration .
The deal , for all practical purposes , recognized India as a de facto nuclear weapons state .
Since then there has been substantial growth in military-to-military contacts and a spurt of arms sales to India .
The relationship has now acquired a distinct strategic ballast .
What then is the principal basis for this strategic convergence between two states that were mostly at odds with each other during much of the Cold War ?
The answer is quite straightforward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ misgivings about China ’ s growing aggressiveness across much of Asia .
Despite a spate of efforts on the part of the Narendra Modi government in India to improve relations with China , including the staging of two high-level summits at Wuhan and then in Chennai , it had made little headway .
Instead , clashes with China ’ s army along the so-called Line of Actual Control in May and June highlighted the limits of India ’ s diplomatic overtures .
The border incidents shocked Modi ’ s government into reassessing its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Clearly , expanding trade ties and diplomatic outreach had done little to improve the security issues dividing the two countries .
Not surprisingly , in the wake of the border incidents , India expedited the acquisition of the Rafale fighter jets that it had contracted to buy from France .
( Five such jets arrived in India last week , to great media fanfare . )
Defense Minister Rajnath Singh also dashed off to Moscow , one of India ’ s principal defense suppliers , to acquire more MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-30 aircraft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s acute sense of threat from China .
After all , despite the bluster common in Indian media , New Delhi is aware of its standing compared with Beijing .
India ’ s defense budget is a less than a third of China ’ s , its GDP is one-fifth the size of China ’ s , and it has a much smaller standing military force .
And the reality is that India has no possible pathway to swiftly augment its military capabilities to catch up and cope with China .
Short of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , India has no choice but to turn to what scholars of international relations refer to as external balancing—seeking the support of a more powerful state to secure one ’ s national security interests .
This explains India ’ s newfound willingness to expand the scope of its existing military-to-military cooperation with the United States .
In turn , the United States , which has witnessed China ’ s increasing aggressiveness from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Straits and now in the Himalayas , has powerful incentives to bolster its strategic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ naval assets as well as its base facilities in the Indian Ocean make it a useful partner.India has no choice but to turn to what scholars of international relations refer to as external balancing .
Is this security partnership likely to endure ?
Given India ’ s position , with China encircling it by deepening ties with countries such as Bangladesh , Nepal , Pakistan , and Sri Lanka , there is every reason to believe that the relationship will not only be sustained but deepened .
In reality , India has no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an important weapons supplier , has little or no interest in bolstering India ’ s security .
Moscow ’ s willingness to sell weaponry at short notice does not stem from any particular affinity for New Delhi but reflects its commercial interests .
And these acquisitions are , at best , stopgap measures for India .
To tackle the security threat posed by China , India needs a long-term strategy .
A security partnership with the United States is the only viable option .
It is all but evident that the Modi government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the need to work with the United States .
Should a Congress government , were it to come to power in India in 2024 , fundamentally change course ?
Admittedly , some within its ranks still entertain fond hopes of resurrecting their old doctrine of nonalignment .
They would , no doubt , caution against an excessive reliance on the United States to protect India ’ s security .
But as the threat from China grows—as now seems very likely—it is easy to imagine a bipartisan Indian support for a continued partnership with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the United States will change course either .
Despite dramatic foreign-policy shifts from the Obama years to the Trump administration , there has been remarkable policy continuity toward both China and India .
Shared concerns about the dramatic rise and aggressiveness of China constitute the principal impetus underlying this partnership .
However , unlike in the past , the U.S.-India relationship has become multifaceted , making it all the more likely to endure .
India and the United States , unlike in 1971 , now confront a common challenge to their security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and prime minister Lord Palmerston once stated , countries have no permanent friends or enemies , just enduring interests .
Today , the security interests of India and the United States have neatly dovetailed .
The worm has indeed turned .

On Dec. 15, 1971, the USS Enterprise, the largest aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy at the time, entered the Bay of Bengal as the spearhead of a naval task force of the U.S. 7th Fleet. The task force had been dispatched to help evacuate beleaguered Pakistani forces in East Pakistan as the Indian military steadily advanced toward Dhaka, the regional capital. But Dhaka fell to Indian forces on Dec. 16, and the task force’s entry into the Bay of Bengal seemed to be futile. East Pakistan soon became Bangladesh, and India gained a grateful new regional ally.
On Dec. 15, 1971, the USS Enterprise, the largest aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy at the time, entered the Bay of Bengal as the spearhead of a naval task force of the U.S. 7th Fleet. The task force had been dispatched to help evacuate beleaguered Pakistani forces in East Pakistan as the Indian military steadily advanced toward Dhaka, the regional capital. But Dhaka fell to Indian forces on Dec. 16, and the task force’s entry into the Bay of Bengal seemed to be futile. East Pakistan soon became Bangladesh, and India gained a grateful new regional ally.
Washington’s main goal, it turned out, was to send a signal to Islamabad and Beijing that it was a reliable ally that would stand by its commitments at a time of need. The message to China was especially important because Henry Kissinger, then-secretary of state, had recently made a clandestine trip to Beijing using Islamabad as an interlocutor. Kissinger’s mission, as is now well known, was the opening gambit in Richard Nixon’s outreach to China.
Indian policymakers knew about these motivations, but they didn’t forget Washington’s great show of might: They would remember it as an act designed to intimidate them.
Decades later, the episode still deeply rankled policymakers in New Delhi. In its wake, some, most notably India’s leading strategist of the time, K. Subrahmanyam, even argued that India should pursue nuclear weapons to ensure that no country could again have the ability to threaten it. And in subsequent years, in official U.S.-India meetings, the incident almost invariably affected the tenor of discussions.The contrast between the two episodes in the Bay of Bengal underscores how dramatically U.S.-India security ties have evolved.
In world politics, however, the worm often turns, even if very, very slowly. Last month, a contingent of U.S. warships carried out a naval exercise with their Indian counterparts near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal. The stated objective of the exercise was to enhance military interoperability and training. Left unstated was that the exercise, which saw the United States deploy the USS Nimitz, its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, took place against a backdrop of growing Sino-Indian tensions along the Himalayan border. Skirmishes in May and June had resulted in the loss of lives of both Chinese and Indian forces. They also led U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to reprimand China for its “incredibly aggressive” actions.
The contrast between the two episodes in the Bay of Bengal—nearly 50 years apart—underscores how dramatically U.S.-India security ties have evolved. The basis of the transformation, perhaps, began with the 2008 U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement under the George W. Bush administration. The deal, for all practical purposes, recognized India as a de facto nuclear weapons state. Since then there has been substantial growth in military-to-military contacts and a spurt of arms sales to India. The relationship has now acquired a distinct strategic ballast.
What then is the principal basis for this strategic convergence between two states that were mostly at odds with each other during much of the Cold War? The answer is quite straightforward: It can be attributed to shared misgivings about China’s growing aggressiveness across much of Asia. Despite a spate of efforts on the part of the Narendra Modi government in India to improve relations with China, including the staging of two high-level summits at Wuhan and then in Chennai, it had made little headway. Instead, clashes with China’s army along the so-called Line of Actual Control in May and June highlighted the limits of India’s diplomatic overtures. The border incidents shocked Modi’s government into reassessing its entire approach toward its northern neighbor. Clearly, expanding trade ties and diplomatic outreach had done little to improve the security issues dividing the two countries.
Not surprisingly, in the wake of the border incidents, India expedited the acquisition of the Rafale fighter jets that it had contracted to buy from France. (Five such jets arrived in India last week, to great media fanfare.) Defense Minister Rajnath Singh also dashed off to Moscow, one of India’s principal defense suppliers, to acquire more MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-30 aircraft. These frantic efforts underscored India’s acute sense of threat from China. After all, despite the bluster common in Indian media, New Delhi is aware of its standing compared with Beijing. India’s defense budget is a less than a third of China’s, its GDP is one-fifth the size of China’s, and it has a much smaller standing military force. And the reality is that India has no possible pathway to swiftly augment its military capabilities to catch up and cope with China.
Short of capitulating to China on its border dispute, India has no choice but to turn to what scholars of international relations refer to as external balancing—seeking the support of a more powerful state to secure one’s national security interests. This explains India’s newfound willingness to expand the scope of its existing military-to-military cooperation with the United States. In turn, the United States, which has witnessed China’s increasing aggressiveness from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Straits and now in the Himalayas, has powerful incentives to bolster its strategic partnership with India. India’s naval assets as well as its base facilities in the Indian Ocean make it a useful partner.India has no choice but to turn to what scholars of international relations refer to as external balancing.
Is this security partnership likely to endure? Given India’s position, with China encircling it by deepening ties with countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, there is every reason to believe that the relationship will not only be sustained but deepened. In reality, India has no other good options. Russia, though an important weapons supplier, has little or no interest in bolstering India’s security. Moscow’s willingness to sell weaponry at short notice does not stem from any particular affinity for New Delhi but reflects its commercial interests. And these acquisitions are, at best, stopgap measures for India. To tackle the security threat posed by China, India needs a long-term strategy. A security partnership with the United States is the only viable option.
It is all but evident that the Modi government recognizes India’s security predicament and the need to work with the United States. Should a Congress government, were it to come to power in India in 2024, fundamentally change course? Admittedly, some within its ranks still entertain fond hopes of resurrecting their old doctrine of nonalignment. They would, no doubt, caution against an excessive reliance on the United States to protect India’s security. But as the threat from China grows—as now seems very likely—it is easy to imagine a bipartisan Indian support for a continued partnership with the United States.
It is unlikely that the United States will change course either. Despite dramatic foreign-policy shifts from the Obama years to the Trump administration, there has been remarkable policy continuity toward both China and India. Shared concerns about the dramatic rise and aggressiveness of China constitute the principal impetus underlying this partnership. However, unlike in the past, the U.S.-India relationship has become multifaceted, making it all the more likely to endure.
India and the United States, unlike in 1971, now confront a common challenge to their security interests. As the 19th-century British diplomat and prime minister Lord Palmerston once stated, countries have no permanent friends or enemies, just enduring interests. Today, the security interests of India and the United States have neatly dovetailed. The worm has indeed turned.