foreignpolicy--2020-01-10--Who’s Afraid of Mohammad Javad Zarif?

Who’s Afraid of Mohammad Javad Zarif?

This week , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo chided a group of American reporters for taking the pronouncements of his Iranian counterpart , Mohammad Javad Zarif , too seriously , describing him as a “ propagandist of the first order.
” It was meant as an insult , but it could just as well have been a tribute .
As the United States and Iran exchange missiles and drone strikes , the countries ’ top diplomats are fighting a global public relations campaign aimed at convincing the world they are in the right .
And Zarif is proving a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Zarif has tried to portray Iran as the victim of a reckless American president on U.S. news outlets and parried U.S. attempts to isolate him—even as reports emerged that Iran allegedly shot down a civilian airliner hours after its missile strike at the height of tensions with the United States .
Since the killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani on Jan. 3 , he has received an invitation from the European Union ’ s foreign-policy chief , Josep Borrell , to discuss Tehran ’ s tensions with Washington and made plans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his country ’ s behalf at the World Economic Forum in Davos , Switzerland , later this month .
U.S. President Donald Trump is also expected to attend .
“ Zarif is a very effective propagandist , ” said Behnam Ben Taleblu , an expert on Iran at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies .
“ He carries the regime ’ s message effectively and … he ’ s cognizant of fault lines both of international institutions against America and fault lines in American politics that align against current [ U.S. ] policy.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in international law and policy from the University of Denver—has been aided by the fact that he has likely cultivated a more extensive network of contacts with opinion-makers in the U.S. media and foreign-policy establishment than Pompeo , who has largely limited his public outreach to Sunday talk shows and conservative think tanks and news outlets , including many in his home state of Kansas .
Zarif also has far more diplomatic experience than Pompeo , having worked closely with the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama in forming an Afghan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and negotiating the 2015 Iran nuclear deal with then-Secretary of State John Kerry , who was on a first name basis with Zarif .
But critics counter that Zarif ’ s diplomatic skills mask the malign conduct of a repressive theocracy that brutally represses political freedom at home , killing hundreds of anti-government protesters in recent months , while bankrolling , training , and directing the activities of a broad network of extremist militias that commit atrocities .
Zarif ’ s latest remit—explaining away the alleged Iranian downing of a Ukrainian commercial jet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a man with an international reputation for promoting terrorism throughout the region—is unlikely to generate much sympathy from world leaders .
The Pentagon claims that Suleimani — who directed the Islamic Revolutionary Corps ’ Quds Force — is responsible for the deaths of at least 600 U.S. soldiers and the wounding of thousands more in Iraq .
“ Nobody wants to be an advocate for Suleimani because he was so demonstrably behind a trail of blood and destruction throughout the Middle East , ” said Robert Danin , a former State Department expert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School ’ s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs .
Still , Danin suggested that the U.S. decision to block Zarif from entering the United States this week to make his case before the U.N. Security Council , apparently in violation of U.S. treaty obligations , didn ’ t help its efforts to win broader international support for its actions .
“ It looked petulant and small , ” he said .
Trump also threatened to target Iranian cultural sites with strikes if escalations continued , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experts who consider targeting such sites a war crime .
Both Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper later insisted that the United States would follow the laws of armed conflict in any future response .
Both incidents gave Zarif more ammunition in his global PR campaign , who contended that America “ displays utter contempt ” for the U.N. and international law more broadly .
In the wake of the strike that killed Suleimani , Pompeo engaged in a flurry of diplomatic calls and meetings with his European , Middle Eastern , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the strike .
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson rallied behind the American flag , even while he sidestepped the question of whether Washington ’ s assassination of a senior Iranian official was legal .
“ That man had the blood of British troops on his hands , ” Johnson told the British Parliament .
“ Clearly , the strict issue of legality is not for the U.K. to determine since it was not our operation , ” he added .
“ But I think most reasonable people would accept that the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and its personnel.
” But it wasn ’ t enough to placate some European officials , officials and experts say .
Some were privately furious at the administration for carrying out the strike without any advance warning to allies and fearful the latest round of escalation could spiral into an all-out conflict .
They also fear it could further undermine hopes of salvaging the Iran nuclear deal .
Following the killing of Suleimani , Tehran decided to end all restrictions on the enrichment of uranium , a key provision of the landmark 2015 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Heiko Maas said the killing of Suleimani had “ not made it easier to reduce tensions ” in the region , but he acknowledged that the United States had acted following “ a series of dangerous provocations by Iran.
” The president ’ s action has even put some anti-Iran hawks in the Persian Gulf on edge .
Saudi Arabia ’ s de facto ruler , Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman , dispatched his brother Prince Khalid bin Salman to Washington to appeal for calm .
In a tweet , Prince Khalid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would “ do everything in its power to spare it the danger of war and conflict between external parties , ” an apparent reference to the ongoing fight between the United States and Iran .
Pompeo ’ s case has been made all the more difficult because he serves a president who is unpredictable and polarizing , and he has struggled to build trust with the media , foreign governments , and the U.S. Congress .
“ Killing Suleimani was the embodiment of [ the Trump administration ’ s ] approach : shoot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Danin said .
The biggest challenge for American partners in the Middle East is not that the United States has shown a willingness to strike Iran but that they don ’ t know what Washington wants to do in the region .
For instance , at a time when Trump is advocating a military drawdown in the region , he proposed on Wednesday a new role for NATO , the U.S.-led military alliance , in the Middle East .
“ For me , it ’ s no surprise that the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , because that has actually been the message from the United States for a long time , ” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Thursday .
But NATO officials had no advance warning of Trump ’ s pronouncement on Wednesday , several U.S. and NATO officials told Foreign Policy , and quickly dispatched a delegation to Washington to hash out next steps .
“ There is confusion and an inability to anticipate or understand what the administration wants , especially among allies who say , ‘ We don ’ t understand what the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and what role we can play , ’ ” Danin said .
Pompeo has strained to overcome doubts from Democratic lawmakers , allies , and regional experts that the assassination of Iran ’ s top military official , which accelerated the current crisis , was justified without congressional consultation and might lead the United States into a war that could pitch the region into chaos .
A briefing of congressional leaders by Pompeo and other senior administration officials on the Suleimani killing did little to allay any misgivings , with the House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limiting the president ’ s authority to fight Iran .
“ I thought we did a dynamite job .
I mean that in the truest sense .
We did our level best to present them with all the facts that we could in that setting , ” Pompeo told Fox News in an interview on Thursday .
Pompeo ’ s defense came after Republican Sen. Mike Lee of Utah angrily emerged from the classified briefing , saying it was one of the worst briefings he had ever been in and vowing to support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Pompeo insisted in a follow-up press briefing at the White House on Friday that an attack was imminent .
“ I don ’ t know exactly which minute , ” Pompeo said .
“ We don ’ t know exactly which day it would have been executed , but it was very clear : Qassem Suleimani himself was plotting a broad , large-scale attack against American interests , and those attacks were imminent.
” Some lawmakers remained unconvinced .
“ They keep suggesting there is an imminent threat , ” Sen. Bob @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , told MSNBC .
“ But when you press them on the question of immanency , there is no clear definition of what they consider imminent.
” “ Pompeo is primarily playing to an audience of one , which is Donald Trump , and Congress is bitterly divided on the issue of Donald Trump and just about everything he does , ” said Aaron David Miller , a former advisor on Middle East policy to six U.S. secretaries of state .
“ There is no rally-around-the-flag @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tap into a wide network of international opinion-makers in the United States and abroad and marshal the traditional constituencies that have invested in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal .
“ That gives him an inherently distinct advantage : He is pushing an open door of a large number of foreign-policy elites in the world who are against military conflict , ” Miller said .
“ Even our adversaries , the Russians and Chinese , don ’ t want a military conflict , even at the expense of embarrassing the United States.
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zarif began last summer , after the Iranian diplomat rebuffed an invitation to travel to Washington to meet with Trump .
In July , the State Department imposed restrictions on Zarif during his visits to the United States , limiting his movement to a few blocks between the Iranian mission and U.N. headquarters and denying him access to many television network studios , the Council on Foreign Relations , and others .
So , the opinion-makers came to him at the Iranian mission during the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a meeting with Zarif and having to wait in line with other notables , including Dennis Ross , a Middle East advisor to Democratic and Republican presidents , and Robert Malley , the president and CEO of the International Crisis Group .
But in the end , Zarif ’ s gift of the gab may not matter that much .
“ To be frank , if you want to say who is the winner , the winner is the United States , ” said Gérard Araud , a former French ambassador to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Not only did the Americans kill a major Iranian official , they have said , ‘ We killed him , and what are you going to do about it ?
’ And basically the Iranians did nothing.
” So far , the reaction in the United States and abroad has been colored by people ’ s disdain and distrust of Trump .
“ It is a reflection of the hysterical polarization of the public , ” he said .
“ Zarif is benefiting from his own qualities , because he is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also because the credibility of Trump and Pompeo is very low and very low among experts and the journalists , ” Araud added .
The trust deficit has provided “ an incredible opening to the Iranians .
It allows Zarif to play the game he is playing very well .
As you know , Suleimani was a terrorist , and Iran really has been conducting malign activities throughout the Middle East .
”

This week, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo chided a group of American reporters for taking the pronouncements of his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, too seriously, describing him as a “propagandist of the first order.”
This week, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo chided a group of American reporters for taking the pronouncements of his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, too seriously, describing him as a “propagandist of the first order.”
It was meant as an insult, but it could just as well have been a tribute.
As the United States and Iran exchange missiles and drone strikes, the countries’ top diplomats are fighting a global public relations campaign aimed at convincing the world they are in the right. And Zarif is proving a formidable adversary.
In the past week, Zarif has tried to portray Iran as the victim of a reckless American president on U.S. news outlets and parried U.S. attempts to isolate him—even as reports emerged that Iran allegedly shot down a civilian airliner hours after its missile strike at the height of tensions with the United States. Since the killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani on Jan. 3, he has received an invitation from the European Union’s foreign-policy chief, Josep Borrell, to discuss Tehran’s tensions with Washington and made plans to lobby ministers and world leaders on his country’s behalf at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, later this month. U.S. President Donald Trump is also expected to attend.
“Zarif is a very effective propagandist,” said Behnam Ben Taleblu, an expert on Iran at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “He carries the regime’s message effectively and … he’s cognizant of fault lines both of international institutions against America and fault lines in American politics that align against current [U.S.] policy.”
The U.S.-educated Zarif—he has a Ph.D. in international law and policy from the University of Denver—has been aided by the fact that he has likely cultivated a more extensive network of contacts with opinion-makers in the U.S. media and foreign-policy establishment than Pompeo, who has largely limited his public outreach to Sunday talk shows and conservative think tanks and news outlets, including many in his home state of Kansas.
Zarif also has far more diplomatic experience than Pompeo, having worked closely with the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama in forming an Afghan government after the fall of the Taliban and negotiating the 2015 Iran nuclear deal with then-Secretary of State John Kerry, who was on a first name basis with Zarif.
But critics counter that Zarif’s diplomatic skills mask the malign conduct of a repressive theocracy that brutally cracks down on political freedom at home, killing hundreds of anti-government protesters in recent months, while bankrolling, training, and directing the activities of a broad network of extremist militias that commit atrocities. Zarif’s latest remit—explaining away the alleged Iranian downing of a Ukrainian commercial jet and defending the legacy of Suleimani, a man with an international reputation for promoting terrorism throughout the region—is unlikely to generate much sympathy from world leaders. The Pentagon claims that Suleimani — who directed the Islamic Revolutionary Corps’ Quds Force — is responsible for the deaths of at least 600 U.S. soldiers and the wounding of thousands more in Iraq.
“Nobody wants to be an advocate for Suleimani because he was so demonstrably behind a trail of blood and destruction throughout the Middle East,” said Robert Danin, a former State Department expert on the Middle East and a nonresident senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Still, Danin suggested that the U.S. decision to block Zarif from entering the United States this week to make his case before the U.N. Security Council, apparently in violation of U.S. treaty obligations, didn’t help its efforts to win broader international support for its actions.
“It looked petulant and small,” he said.
Trump also threatened to target Iranian cultural sites with strikes if escalations continued, a measure that provoked outcry from international law experts who consider targeting such sites a war crime. Both Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper later insisted that the United States would follow the laws of armed conflict in any future response.
Both incidents gave Zarif more ammunition in his global PR campaign, who contended that America “displays utter contempt” for the U.N. and international law more broadly.
In the wake of the strike that killed Suleimani, Pompeo engaged in a flurry of diplomatic calls and meetings with his European, Middle Eastern, and Chinese counterparts to explain U.S. justification for the strike.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson rallied behind the American flag, even while he sidestepped the question of whether Washington’s assassination of a senior Iranian official was legal.
“That man had the blood of British troops on his hands,” Johnson told the British Parliament.
“Clearly, the strict issue of legality is not for the U.K. to determine since it was not our operation,” he added. “But I think most reasonable people would accept that the United States has the right to protect its bases and its personnel.”
But it wasn’t enough to placate some European officials, officials and experts say. Some were privately furious at the administration for carrying out the strike without any advance warning to allies and fearful the latest round of escalation could spiral into an all-out conflict. They also fear it could further undermine hopes of salvaging the Iran nuclear deal. Following the killing of Suleimani, Tehran decided to end all restrictions on the enrichment of uranium, a key provision of the landmark 2015 deal that Trump abandoned.
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said the killing of Suleimani had “not made it easier to reduce tensions” in the region, but he acknowledged that the United States had acted following “a series of dangerous provocations by Iran.”
The president’s action has even put some anti-Iran hawks in the Persian Gulf on edge. Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, dispatched his brother Prince Khalid bin Salman to Washington to appeal for calm. In a tweet, Prince Khalid sought to assure Iraq that his government would “do everything in its power to spare it the danger of war and conflict between external parties,” an apparent reference to the ongoing fight between the United States and Iran.
Pompeo’s case has been made all the more difficult because he serves a president who is unpredictable and polarizing, and he has struggled to build trust with the media, foreign governments, and the U.S. Congress.
“Killing Suleimani was the embodiment of [the Trump administration’s] approach: shoot first and ask for allies later,” Danin said.
The biggest challenge for American partners in the Middle East is not that the United States has shown a willingness to strike Iran but that they don’t know what Washington wants to do in the region. For instance, at a time when Trump is advocating a military drawdown in the region, he proposed on Wednesday a new role for NATO, the U.S.-led military alliance, in the Middle East.
“For me, it’s no surprise that the United States is calling for NATO to do more, because that has actually been the message from the United States for a long time,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Thursday.
But NATO officials had no advance warning of Trump’s pronouncement on Wednesday, several U.S. and NATO officials told Foreign Policy, and quickly dispatched a delegation to Washington to hash out next steps.
“There is confusion and an inability to anticipate or understand what the administration wants, especially among allies who say, ‘We don’t understand what the policy is, where it is going, and what role we can play,’” Danin said.
Pompeo has strained to overcome doubts from Democratic lawmakers, allies, and regional experts that the assassination of Iran’s top military official, which accelerated the current crisis, was justified without congressional consultation and might lead the United States into a war that could pitch the region into chaos.
A briefing of congressional leaders by Pompeo and other senior administration officials on the Suleimani killing did little to allay any misgivings, with the House of Representatives adopting a war powers resolution limiting the president’s authority to fight Iran.
“I thought we did a dynamite job. I mean that in the truest sense. We did our level best to present them with all the facts that we could in that setting,” Pompeo told Fox News in an interview on Thursday.
Pompeo’s defense came after Republican Sen. Mike Lee of Utah angrily emerged from the classified briefing, saying it was one of the worst briefings he had ever been in and vowing to support a war powers resolution in the Senate.
Pompeo insisted in a follow-up press briefing at the White House on Friday that an attack was imminent. “I don’t know exactly which minute,” Pompeo said. “We don’t know exactly which day it would have been executed, but it was very clear: Qassem Suleimani himself was plotting a broad, large-scale attack against American interests, and those attacks were imminent.”
Some lawmakers remained unconvinced. “They keep suggesting there is an imminent threat,” Sen. Bob Menendez of New Jersey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told MSNBC. “But when you press them on the question of immanency, there is no clear definition of what they consider imminent.”
“Pompeo is primarily playing to an audience of one, which is Donald Trump, and Congress is bitterly divided on the issue of Donald Trump and just about everything he does,” said Aaron David Miller, a former advisor on Middle East policy to six U.S. secretaries of state. “There is no rally-around-the-flag effect.”
In contrast, Zarif can tap into a wide network of international opinion-makers in the United States and abroad and marshal the traditional constituencies that have invested in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.
“That gives him an inherently distinct advantage: He is pushing an open door of a large number of foreign-policy elites in the world who are against military conflict,” Miller said. “Even our adversaries, the Russians and Chinese, don’t want a military conflict, even at the expense of embarrassing the United States.”
The latest round of tensions between Pompeo and Zarif began last summer, after the Iranian diplomat rebuffed an invitation to travel to Washington to meet with Trump.
In July, the State Department imposed restrictions on Zarif during his visits to the United States, limiting his movement to a few blocks between the Iranian mission and U.N. headquarters and denying him access to many television network studios, the Council on Foreign Relations, and others.
So, the opinion-makers came to him at the Iranian mission during the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September. One foreign official recalled showing up for a meeting with Zarif and having to wait in line with other notables, including Dennis Ross, a Middle East advisor to Democratic and Republican presidents, and Robert Malley, the president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.
But in the end, Zarif’s gift of the gab may not matter that much.
“To be frank, if you want to say who is the winner, the winner is the United States,” said Gérard Araud, a former French ambassador to the United States and the United Nations. “Not only did the Americans kill a major Iranian official, they have said, ‘We killed him, and what are you going to do about it?’ And basically the Iranians did nothing.”
So far, the reaction in the United States and abroad has been colored by people’s disdain and distrust of Trump. “It is a reflection of the hysterical polarization of the public,” he said.
“Zarif is benefiting from his own qualities, because he is good on TV, but it is also because the credibility of Trump and Pompeo is very low and very low among experts and the journalists,” Araud added.
The trust deficit has provided “an incredible opening to the Iranians. It allows Zarif to play the game he is playing very well. As you know, Suleimani was a terrorist, and Iran really has been conducting malign activities throughout the Middle East.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-10--China Isn’t the Only Problem With 5G

China Isn’t the Only Problem With 5G

China Isn ’ t the Only Problem With 5G The security risks inherent in Chinese-made 5G networking equipment are easy to understand .
Because the companies that make the equipment are subservient to the Chinese government , they could be forced to include backdoors in the hardware or software to give Beijing remote access .
Eavesdropping is also a risk , although efforts to listen in would almost certainly be detectable .
More insidious is the possibility that Beijing could use its access to degrade or disrupt communications services in the event of a larger geopolitical conflict .
Since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things , ” is expected to rely heavily on 5G infrastructure , potential Chinese infiltration is a serious national security threat .
But keeping untrusted companies like Huawei out of Western infrastructure isn ’ t enough to secure 5G .
Neither is banning Chinese microchips , software , or programmers .
Security vulnerabilities in the standards—the protocols and software for 5G—ensure that vulnerabilities will remain , regardless of who provides the hardware and software .
These insecurities are a result of market forces that prioritize costs over security and of governments , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ preserve the option of surveillance in 5G networks .
If the United States is serious about tackling the national security threats related to an insecure 5G network , it needs to rethink the extent to which it values corporate profits and government espionage over security .
To be sure , there are significant security improvements in 5G over 4G—in encryption , authentication , integrity protection , privacy , and network availability .
But the enhancements aren ’ t enough .
This design dramatically increases the points vulnerable to attack .
The 5G security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ standards are simply too complex to implement securely .
This is true for all software , but the 5G protocols offer particular difficulties .
Because of how it is designed , the system blurs the wireless portion of the network connecting phones with base stations and the core portion that routes data around the world .
Additionally , much of the network is virtualized , meaning that it will rely on software running on dynamically configurable hardware .
This design dramatically increases the points vulnerable to attack , as does the expected massive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ network and the data flying about it .
Second , there ’ s so much backward compatibility built into the 5G network that older vulnerabilities remain .
5G is an evolution of the decade-old 4G network , and most networks will mix generations .
Without the ability to do a clean break from 4G to 5G , it will simply be impossible to improve security in some areas .
Attackers may be able to force 5G systems to use more vulnerable 4G protocols , for example , and 5G networks will inherit many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ features defined as mandatory in the standard because implementing them was expensive .
Third , the 5G standards committees missed many opportunities to improve security .
Many of the new security features in 5G are optional , and network operators can choose not to implement them .
The same happened with 4G ; operators even ignored security features defined as mandatory in the standard because implementing them was expensive .
But even worse , for 5G , development , performance , cost , and time to market were all prioritized over security , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Already problems are being discovered .
In November 2019 , researchers published vulnerabilities that allow 5G users to be tracked in real time , be sent fake emergency alerts , or be disconnected from the 5G network altogether .
And this wasn ’ t the first reporting to find issues in 5G protocols and implementations .
Chinese , Iranians , North Koreans , and Russians have been breaking into U.S. networks for years without having any control over the hardware , the software , or the companies that produce the devices .
( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or NSA , has been breaking into foreign networks for years without having to coerce companies into deliberately adding backdoors . )
Nothing in 5G prevents these activities from continuing , even increasing , in the future .
Solutions are few and far between and not very satisfying .
It ’ s really too late to secure 5G networks .
Susan Gordon , then-U.S. principal deputy director of national intelligence , had it right when she said last March : “ You have to presume a dirty network.
” Indeed , the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insecurities and build secure systems on top of it .
In some cases , doing so isn ’ t hard : Adding encryption to an iPhone or a messaging system like WhatsApp provides security from eavesdropping , and distributed protocols provide security from disruption—regardless of how insecure the network they operate on is .
In other cases , it ’ s impossible .
If your smartphone is vulnerable to a downloaded exploit , it doesn ’ t matter how secure the networking protocols are .
Often , the task will be somewhere in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long term , the United States needs a national policy that prioritizes security over both corporate profits and government surveillance .
5G security is just one of the many areas in which near-term corporate profits prevailed against broader social good .
In a capitalist free market economy , the only solution is to regulate companies , and the United States has not shown any serious appetite for that .
What ’ s more , U.S. intelligence agencies like the NSA rely on inadvertent insecurities for their worldwide data collection efforts , and law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tried to introduce new ones to make their own data collection efforts easier .
Again , near-term self-interest has so far triumphed over society ’ s long-term best interests .
In turn , rather than mustering a major effort to fix 5G , what ’ s most likely to happen is that the United States will muddle along with the problems the network has , as it has done for decades .
Maybe things will be different with 6G , which is starting to be discussed in technical standards committees .
The U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ directing the State Department to participate in the international standards-setting process so that it is just run by telecommunications operators and more interested countries , but there is no chance of that measure becoming law .
The geopolitics of 5G are complicated , involving a lot more than security .
China is subsidizing the purchase of its companies ’ networking equipment in countries around the world .
The technology will quickly become critical national infrastructure , and security problems will become life-threatening .
Both criminal attacks and government cyber-operations will become more common @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will have do so something .
That something will be difficult and expensive—let ’ s hope it won ’ t also be too late .

The security risks inherent in Chinese-made 5G networking equipment are easy to understand. Because the companies that make the equipment are subservient to the Chinese government, they could be forced to include backdoors in the hardware or software to give Beijing remote access. Eavesdropping is also a risk, although efforts to listen in would almost certainly be detectable. More insidious is the possibility that Beijing could use its access to degrade or disrupt communications services in the event of a larger geopolitical conflict. Since the internet, especially the “internet of things,” is expected to rely heavily on 5G infrastructure, potential Chinese infiltration is a serious national security threat.
The security risks inherent in Chinese-made 5G networking equipment are easy to understand. Because the companies that make the equipment are subservient to the Chinese government, they could be forced to include backdoors in the hardware or software to give Beijing remote access. Eavesdropping is also a risk, although efforts to listen in would almost certainly be detectable. More insidious is the possibility that Beijing could use its access to degrade or disrupt communications services in the event of a larger geopolitical conflict. Since the internet, especially the “internet of things,” is expected to rely heavily on 5G infrastructure, potential Chinese infiltration is a serious national security threat.
But keeping untrusted companies like Huawei out of Western infrastructure isn’t enough to secure 5G. Neither is banning Chinese microchips, software, or programmers. Security vulnerabilities in the standards—the protocols and software for 5G—ensure that vulnerabilities will remain, regardless of who provides the hardware and software. These insecurities are a result of market forces that prioritize costs over security and of governments, including the United States, that want to preserve the option of surveillance in 5G networks. If the United States is serious about tackling the national security threats related to an insecure 5G network, it needs to rethink the extent to which it values corporate profits and government espionage over security.
To be sure, there are significant security improvements in 5G over 4G—in encryption, authentication, integrity protection, privacy, and network availability. But the enhancements aren’t enough.
This design dramatically increases the points vulnerable to attack.
The 5G security problems are threefold. First, the standards are simply too complex to implement securely. This is true for all software, but the 5G protocols offer particular difficulties. Because of how it is designed, the system blurs the wireless portion of the network connecting phones with base stations and the core portion that routes data around the world. Additionally, much of the network is virtualized, meaning that it will rely on software running on dynamically configurable hardware. This design dramatically increases the points vulnerable to attack, as does the expected massive increase in both things connected to the network and the data flying about it.
Second, there’s so much backward compatibility built into the 5G network that older vulnerabilities remain. 5G is an evolution of the decade-old 4G network, and most networks will mix generations. Without the ability to do a clean break from 4G to 5G, it will simply be impossible to improve security in some areas. Attackers may be able to force 5G systems to use more vulnerable 4G protocols, for example, and 5G networks will inherit many existing problems.
Third, the 5G standards committees missed many opportunities to improve security. Many of the new security features in 5G are optional, and network operators can choose not to implement them. The same happened with 4G; operators even ignored security features defined as mandatory in the standard because implementing them was expensive. But even worse, for 5G, development, performance, cost, and time to market were all prioritized over security, which was treated as an afterthought.
Already problems are being discovered. In November 2019, researchers published vulnerabilities that allow 5G users to be tracked in real time, be sent fake emergency alerts, or be disconnected from the 5G network altogether. And this wasn’t the first reporting to find issues in 5G protocols and implementations.
Chinese, Iranians, North Koreans, and Russians have been breaking into U.S. networks for years without having any control over the hardware, the software, or the companies that produce the devices. (And the U.S. National Security Agency, or NSA, has been breaking into foreign networks for years without having to coerce companies into deliberately adding backdoors.) Nothing in 5G prevents these activities from continuing, even increasing, in the future.
Solutions are few and far between and not very satisfying. It’s really too late to secure 5G networks. Susan Gordon, then-U.S. principal deputy director of national intelligence, had it right when she said last March: “You have to presume a dirty network.” Indeed, the United States needs to accept 5G’s insecurities and build secure systems on top of it. In some cases, doing so isn’t hard: Adding encryption to an iPhone or a messaging system like WhatsApp provides security from eavesdropping, and distributed protocols provide security from disruption—regardless of how insecure the network they operate on is. In other cases, it’s impossible. If your smartphone is vulnerable to a downloaded exploit, it doesn’t matter how secure the networking protocols are. Often, the task will be somewhere in between these two extremes.
In the long term, the United States needs a national policy that prioritizes security over both corporate profits and government surveillance. 5G security is just one of the many areas in which near-term corporate profits prevailed against broader social good. In a capitalist free market economy, the only solution is to regulate companies, and the United States has not shown any serious appetite for that.
What’s more, U.S. intelligence agencies like the NSA rely on inadvertent insecurities for their worldwide data collection efforts, and law enforcement agencies like the FBI have even tried to introduce new ones to make their own data collection efforts easier. Again, near-term self-interest has so far triumphed over society’s long-term best interests.
In turn, rather than mustering a major effort to fix 5G, what’s most likely to happen is that the United States will muddle along with the problems the network has, as it has done for decades. Maybe things will be different with 6G, which is starting to be discussed in technical standards committees. The U.S. House of Representatives just passed a bill directing the State Department to participate in the international standards-setting process so that it is just run by telecommunications operators and more interested countries, but there is no chance of that measure becoming law.
The geopolitics of 5G are complicated, involving a lot more than security. China is subsidizing the purchase of its companies’ networking equipment in countries around the world. The technology will quickly become critical national infrastructure, and security problems will become life-threatening. Both criminal attacks and government cyber-operations will become more common and more damaging. Eventually, Washington will have do so something. That something will be difficult and expensive—let’s hope it won’t also be too late.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-10--Taiwan’s War on Fake News Is Hitting the Wrong Targets

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen faked her college degree .
And she ’ s a secret lesbian who wants to corrupt Taiwan ’ s children .
And she ’ s selling out the country to Japan and the United States .
None of this is true—but it ’ s been all over parts of Taiwanese social media .
A flood of disinformation has threatened to drown Taiwan in the months before this weekend ’ s election .
Media coverage has focused on the role of Chinese intelligence , which has a vested interest in discrediting Tsai , seen as an advocate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwanese authorities have rushed to establish laws and institutions to combat this so-called fake news—following in part the models of Russian neighbors such as Finland and Estonia .
Last week , Taiwan passed a law targeting Chinese infiltration in the nation ’ s democratic institutions .
But new rules have left Taipei seeing Beijing ’ s hand behind every online rumor—and experts warn they may prove more counterproductive than helpful .
One case exemplifies this : that of Su Chii-cherng , the director of Taiwan ’ s representative office ( the equivalent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who was tragically caught up in a bizarre series of events in September 2018 .
Taiwan was rocked that month by a false report claiming that Taiwanese travelers stranded at Osaka ’ s Kansai International Airport during a typhoon had been rescued by buses sent by the Chinese Embassy .
The story , originally posted on a Reddit-like forum called Professional Technology Temple ( PTT ) , was quickly circulated by both Taiwanese and Chinese media outlets , including the state-run tabloid Global Times .
It led to a torrent of online @ @ @ @ @ @ @ himself eight days later .
The initial account was quickly proved false , but it spawned several subsequent waves of bad information .
Taiwanese media , citing a report by the Japanese broadcaster NHK , widely reported that Su had taken his own life due to mounting pressure over the resulting spread of false information .
However , his widow later disputed this , saying in a statement he had feared “ anticipated humiliation ” by his superiors .
Questions also arose as to the source of the original PTT post .
Shortly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allegedly traced by internet users to an IP address in China .
Incensed government officials spoke of the post as a malicious Chinese plant .
In October , weeks before Taiwan ’ s regional elections , Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Minister Chen Ming-chi said the post “ originated from a content farm in Shanghai.
” The incident was thus held up as symbolic of the threat posed to Taiwan by Chinese influence operations .
It was widely cited by international media , by a Reporters Without Borders report , and by Tsai herself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example of “ fake news ” originating in China with malicious intent to target Taiwan .
However , in December 2018 , a court in Taiwan ’ s Nantou County alleged it had identified a Taiwanese university student as being responsible for making the original post online .
And the scandal surged back into the headlines last month after Slow Yang , a YouTuber and prominent supporter of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ) , was charged by a Taipei court with hiring internet trolls to criticize Su ’ s office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claim proved attractive to media outlets in both Taiwan and China .
“ The narrative of the PTT post plays into one Beijing wants to perpetuate and was ultimately able to capitalize off of , in painting the current DPP administration as ill-equipped to govern , ” said Jessica Drun , a fellow at the Center for Advanced China Research .
The courts , however , allege that much of the disinformation fracas—including , potentially , the post that sparked it all—originated not in China , but in Taiwan .
The revelation should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the actual scope , intent , and efficacy of state influence campaigns—along with the reality that , while Beijing aggressively attempts to influence Taiwan ’ s democratic institutions spanning from its media outlets to its temples , most disinformation circulating through Taiwan ’ s online ecosystem comes not from China but from within the country .
Government officials who had pinpointed the incident as an example of Chinese meddling during election season never provided evidence of their claims , nor have they since issued corrective statements .
Instead , Taiwan launched into a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ referred to as “ red media , ” that has gained support from the DPP but has faced virulent pushback from voices within both the opposition Kuomintang ( KMT ) , which takes a softer stance toward Beijing , and from press freedom advocates worried the cases could disrupt Taiwan ’ s commitment to free speech .
“ When people found that this news was posted by a college student in Taiwan , this made the DPP look really bad , ” said Wu Jun-deh , a disinformation researcher at Taiwan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Research .
The incident , Wu said , gave the KMT and its supporters the opportunity to question the DPP ’ s credibility when it discusses Beijing ’ s desire to meddle in Taiwanese politics .
That hasn ’ t stopped the DPP .
After the passage of last week ’ s anti-infiltration law , Tsai insisted it would not target the media .
“ No upright media company operating in Taiwan would engage in illicit activity on China ’ s behalf , ” she said .
The law , seen by supporters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s meddling in Taiwan ’ s politics , has galvanized the DPP and , along with Tsai ’ s support of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong , given it momentum leading into Saturday ’ s presidential and legislative elections .
But it has also proved polarizing .
The KMT has branded it a threat to Taiwan ’ s democracy .
The DPP has responded by saying the true threat lies across the Taiwan Strait .
The law was passed in a 67-0 vote , boycotted by every KMT lawmaker as protesters rallied outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Taiwan is bitterly divided .
Beijing ’ s hunger for cross-strait influence goes back decades , dating to when the Chinese and Taiwanese governments used billboards and loudspeakers to broadcast propaganda between China ’ s Fujian province and the outlying Taiwanese island of Kinmen , just one mile away .
Nowadays , it has carried on into what officials and observers fear is a campaign to destabilize Taiwan ’ s democracy through traditional media and social media apps such as Line , a WhatsApp-like platform rife with disinformation circulating within closed chat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what constitutes a Chinese state-run effort as opposed to the actions of private citizens .
“ We haven ’ t seen much activity that we suspect from China engaging in the same behavior as , for example , we ’ ve seen from Russia and Iran , ” said Lee Foster , a senior manager for information operations with the United States cybersecurity firm FireEye , after analyzing Taiwan ’ s November 2018 elections .
He noted that Chinese internet users are often happy to defend their government online out of their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia-style large-scale disinformation apparatus , its state and private actors have successfully stirred the pot in Taiwan .
The 2018 mayoral campaign of Kaohsiung ’ s Han Kuo-yu , now the KMT presidential candidate , received support from a Facebook group run by administrators in China , according to a June 2019 report , and Facebook recently removed several fan pages supporting his presidential run .
Taiwan ’ s Want Want China Times media conglomerate—chaired by the notoriously Beijing-friendly businessman Tsai Eng-meng , and the target of massive rallies in Taipei decrying the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and published paid content from Beijing ’ s Taiwan Affairs Office , according to reports by the Financial Times and Reuters .
Want Want said it would sue the Financial Times , calling its report “ fake news.
” The DPP has responded by pushing Taiwan ’ s National Communications Commission ( NCC ) , which regulates broadcast and telecommunications operations , to strike back .
The commission , along with Taiwanese authorities , has levied fines on news organizations and private citizens for spreading so-called fake news , including internet rumors—a controversial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equated to a desire for censorship shortly after her resignation in April 2019 .
“ If there is any website , any TV station they report to be untrue or disinformation , they want the NCC to punish them or block the website , ” Chan told Foreign Policy .
“ For me , it is impossible to do that .
That is not the responsibility of the NCC.
” The agency announced in July 2019 that it would investigate the Want Want-run CtiTV and CTV , the television stations named in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of three broadcasting acts .
An NCC spokesperson said the case could be transferred to other authorities if further security violations are found .
The commission has not released results of its July investigation , but this past November , it said it would investigate CtiTV and CTV , along with Eastern Broadcasting Co. , after the self-proclaimed former Chinese spy Wang Liqiang said they had been paid by China to disparage the DPP .
The KMT has seized on the opportunity to cast the DPP as an enemy of free speech , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that favor the opposition party .
“ Does the NCC work for the public or work for the DPP ?
” Han , the KMT candidate , wrote on Facebook after the NCC announced its November investigation .
Han added a hashtag meaning “ green terror ” —a play on the DPP ’ s symbolic color and the White Terror , a term for martial law under the KMT dictator Chiang Kai-shek , weaponized by the campaign in increasingly incensed attacks on the ruling party .
Last March , Taiwan ’ s Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s freedom of expression on Twitter .
“ I ’ ve said it before : Tweeting is fun !
The people of # China should be allowed to enjoy it , too , ” Wu wrote .
“ And there ’ s no need to fear wumao , we don ’ t have any in # Taiwan.
” Taiwan may be free of China ’ s notorious wumao , or “ 50 Cent Army , ” known for publishing articles and forum posts that positively portray the Chinese government , but it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ generated disinformation .
As the DPP frames Saturday ’ s presidential election as a battle between democracy and unification with China , it has left itself vulnerable to waves of accusations—ridiculous as many of them may be—that its designs for a disinformation-free media are interlaced with a desire to deny free speech for political enemies .
“ We have felt the brunt of China ’ s intensified campaign to subvert Taiwan ’ s democracy every day , through military intimidation , economic coercion , diplomatic assaults , disinformation , and political subversion , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interfere with our elections , ” he said .
Since it swept to power in 2016 , Taiwan ’ s ruling DPP government has operated in a climate of cross-strait acrimony .
Beijing quickly severed all ties between officials on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait and has engaged in a campaign to limit Taiwan ’ s international image , poaching its diplomatic allies and pressuring international organizations and corporations to refer to Taiwan on its terms rather than those of Taipei .
And Chinese actors have been behind false reports targeting Taiwan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ benign .
In 2016 , the Chinese People ’ s Liberation Army Air Force published a photo of a fighter jet flying near a Taiwanese mountain , leading to speculation it was doctored .
In 2018 , an online post claiming Honduras , one of Taipei ’ s 15 remaining diplomatic allies , was on the verge of defecting to Beijing was quickly debunked and allegedly sourced to a Chinese IP address .
Prior to the November 2018 regional elections , which saw the DPP suffer a crushing islandwide defeat , a national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese government agency was responsible for using disinformation to influence public morale , but the source did not elaborate .
Days before polls opened , Tsai warned against online falsehoods in a Facebook post .
However , experts say it is unlikely Chinese influence actors played a significant role in the DPP defeat .
While Chinese internet users made significant efforts to support KMT candidates online—and Want Want media outlets pushed KMT candidates such as Han Kuo-yu in Kaohsiung—the seeds of discontent had already been planted by what voters perceived as domestic policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what they saw as an underperforming ruling party .
Talk of Chinese meddling in Taiwan ’ s elections died down after the vote , likely due to the DPP ’ s reluctance to blame its defeat on outside forces as its members picked up the pieces .
But in recent months , with a resurgent Tsai regaining popularity by promising to safeguard democracy from China as protests in Hong Kong surged , the party has vowed to fight red media using punitive measures .
The NCC was placed firmly at the forefront of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the NCC fined the Want Want-run CtiTV News 1 million new Taiwan dollars ( about $ 33,000 ) for failing to fact-check reports favorable to Han and other KMT mayors .
The commission also said it analyzed the station ’ s news broadcasts for one week in February of that year and found that on one day coverage of Han made up 56.7 percent of the network ’ s total content .
“ We are not saying that CtiTV can not report on Han , but it must follow its code of conduct @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Wong Po-tsung , then the NCC ’ s spokesman .
Days later , Wong became acting NCC chairperson after the resignation of Nicole Chan , widely reported to be under pressure from DPP legislators who accused her of not doing enough to punish networks for airing false or politically motivated reports .
Within weeks , the NCC fined Want Want ’ s CTi News another NT $ 1 million for not fact-checking a man ’ s claim that 2.6 million pounds of pomelos had been dumped in a reservoir by farmers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before a critical legislative by-election in which the DPP incumbent was being challenged .
In July 2019 , it fined CtiTV News NT $ 1.6 million , about $ 50,000 , for falsely reporting on the previous fines it had received from the NCC .
Global best practices for combating false reports strongly discourage allowing a government body to police disinformation .
Crackdowns on fake news in Singapore , Malaysia , Thailand , and other less democratic states have received global criticism .
Taiwan ’ s new legislation is potentially as far-reaching as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moves have drawn hard scrutiny from observers within and outside of the country .
“ When the government is in a position to declare something ‘ fake news , ’ it just opens the door to abuse , ” said Steven Butler , the Asia program coordinator for the Committee to Protect Journalists ( CPJ ) .
“ In no case can the executive power take the responsibility to decide what is fake news and what is legitimate news , ” said Cedric Alviani , the director of the Asia bureau of Reporters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acronym RSF .
“ By finding scapegoats , blaming China , and not solving the problem , Taiwan is actually letting the gap narrow between itself and China.
” Alviani accused China of “ exploiting a weakness ” in Taiwan ’ s media environment , long a hotbed of poor journalistic standards as outlets rush to be first to publish .
In response , the country has lent support to its nascent media watchdogs , including the first-of-its-kind Taiwan FactCheck Center , whose initial chief editor was hired last year by the public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the broadcast level .
As NCC chairperson , Chan oversaw the adoption of international fact-checking standards and asked TV stations to utilize those guidelines .
But Chan ’ s resistance to calls from within the DPP to wield the commission ’ s legal power to punish media outlets sympathetic to China—and to extend its regulatory domain into the policing of online content—ultimately led to her resignation , which Chan insists was voluntary .
The NCC , Chan said , should never “ get involved in true or false.
” In October 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chan ’ s performance .
“ It is like you are holding a sword of the state in your hand , but you never use it , ” he said .
DPP officials , including Premier Su Tseng-chang , renewed their criticism in March 2019 , prior to the resignation of Chan , who had insisted on upholding the freedom of speech and using smart methods to combat fake news .
“ The key word is ‘ smart , ’ ” Chan said of the DPP legislators critical of what they perceived as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They don ’ t get the points .
They don ’ t know how to be smart.
” To Chan , this means committing to a rules-based approach to overseeing broadcast news content and not mixing external issues , such as regulating internet content and serving as arbiter of debates over the veracity of news , with the NCC ’ s actual scope of responsibility .
Since resigning , Chan has urged Taiwan ’ s National Security Council to take the lead in defending Taiwan against foreign threats , a position echoed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Taiwan should focus on investigating foul play by Want Want rather than penalizing its unbalanced coverage .
“ If you bring attention to that and can actually find out the basis to that , that ’ s going to be a lot more effective than slapping a meaningless fine on a media property , ” he said .
Chan expressed concern over the NCC ’ s penalty of CtiTV for dedicating too much coverage to Han Kuo-yu , saying that under her watch , her commission had favored disclosing the results of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decide from there .
“ I don ’ t think it is appropriate to draw a line and set up a certain percentage ” of coverage deemed as fair , she said .
Chiang Ya-chi , a professor researching comparative responses to disinformation campaigns at National Taiwan University of Science and Technology , warned that should government agencies be asked to decide on the veracity of a story , “ we fall into a trap.
” “ I think it ’ s very important [ for the NCC ] to establish a fair @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Chiang , who has participated in government forums discussing responses to disinformation .
She cautions against any steps that would further polarize Taiwan ’ s political environment—and as the KMT continues to attack the DPP as an enemy of free speech in Taiwan , that environment is becoming more polarized than ever .
“ The government says disinformation is the enemy of an open and democratic society , ” she said .
“ But we don ’ t want to lose that open society by fighting against it.
” This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recuse themselves from debates over true and false .
When Audrey Tang , Taiwan ’ s first digital minister , oversaw the 2018 implementation of a real-time clarification platform for government ministries to respond to inaccurate or incomplete reports , she told me the platform was not a fact-checking mechanism .
But the government ’ s push to hold disinformation peddlers accountable—with its sights firmly set on influence from China—has led to an internal game of hot potato , with the NCC bearing the public brunt of facing a problem that other agencies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little interest in taking responsibility for .
Taiwan ’ s new anti-infiltration law faces similar concerns , as critics note it does not clearly specify an arbiter assigned to investigate cases .
Long-term solutions to healing Taiwan ’ s media environment , such as media literacy education campaigns , fail to satiate DPP officials who see the issue as an existential threat not only to Taiwan , but also to their own political survival .
The specter of Chinese meddling is thus being emphasized by the DPP and discounted by the KMT , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be properly defined and for claims of Chinese meddling to be verified before being repeated by politicians .
Deputy Minister Chen of the Mainland Affairs Council , who in October 2019 claimed the Kansai airport post originated in a Shanghai content farm , said in an email his comments “ were according to the published information at the time ” and that Taiwan-based media had “ cited a report on a Shanghai-based online platform guancha.cn.
” Most analysts and subsequent media reports repeated these claims as DPP officials continued to echo them without @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s handling of the Kansai incident , Chiang said , left it at risk of losing the trust of voters as it tries to raise awareness of actual disinformation from foreign forces .
“ The DPP government should present more evidence of the cases of disinformation they are asking the people to be aware of , ” she said .
Joseph Wu , Taiwan ’ s foreign minister , quickly pushed for the Taiwanese student who allegedly made the false PTT post to be prosecuted .
Wu cited Taiwan ’ s Social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ penalizes those found guilty of spreading rumors that “ undermine public order and peace.
” The country ’ s legislature had previously proposed amending the law to punish purveyors of fake news , drawing a rebuke from CPJ .
“ The authorities can not just brush responsibility away and say , oh , let ’ s punish that kid .
They have to face the problem , ” said Alviani of RSF , referring to Taiwan ’ s own crumbling media environment .
“ To put all the blame on Chinese propaganda is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amendment , but the law has since been used to summon private citizens who share false information online—often those critical of the DPP .
In July 2019 , a man was referred to police after sharing a meme on Facebook falsely claiming the Tsai administration had spent millions on renovating the official presidential residence .
Last week , the university professor Su Hung-dah said he received a police notice after posting a video this past November accusing the DPP of trying to destroy Taiwan ’ s National Palace Museum , which contains Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces after they fled China in 1949 .
The KMT candidate Han ’ s deputy chief campaign officer said the DPP was curtailing “ freedom of speech and freedom of privacy , ” while a KMT spokeswoman referred to reports of citizens being summoned by police as a “ green terror.
” The police summons have amplified a KMT onslaught of unsubstantiated accusations , further fueled by the new anti-infiltration law , that a DPP “ internet army ” is targeting Han ’ s supporters .
Its retaliation has become ugly : The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ reward ” for finding Slow Yang , the DPP-supporting YouTube personality charged with spreading Kansai airport rumors .
For Butler of CPJ , the practice of fining citizens for spreading false information is “ a terrible weapon in the hand of the government.
” “ To go in the direction of censorship , in the end , is going to be self-defeating , ” he said .
Taiwan has also considered amending its draft digital communications act , which follows the Manila Principles of online freedom from censorship , to give @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ask platforms hosting the content to remove it and compensate the victims , a requirement that Google Taiwan said would violate its policy of neutrality if passed .
Chan , the former NCC minister who was a key figure behind the drafting of the bill , believes further changes may be proposed by DPP officials during the bill ’ s second and third readings .
Alviani has been critical of Taiwan ’ s fight against disinformation in the past .
In 2018 , the Mainland Affairs Council denied a journalist visa to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ false information and “ creating cross-strait conflict , ” a move RSF sharply opposed .
While Alviani does not advocate a full freedom to publish anything without consequences—which he calls the “ freedom of the strong to impose propaganda ” —his organization wants to see Taiwan improve its own media environment rather than pointing its finger at China .
Taiwan , Alviani noted , regularly places among the top Asian countries in RSF ’ s annual Press Freedom Index—but “ it ’ s not because the Taiwanese media is so outstanding.
” Instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because the whole of Asia is run by strongmen , by dictatorships .
”

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen faked her college degree. And she’s a secret lesbian who wants to corrupt Taiwan’s children. And she’s selling out the country to Japan and the United States.
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen faked her college degree. And she’s a secret lesbian who wants to corrupt Taiwan’s children. And she’s selling out the country to Japan and the United States.
None of this is true—but it’s been all over parts of Taiwanese social media. A flood of disinformation has threatened to drown Taiwan in the months before this weekend’s election. Media coverage has focused on the role of Chinese intelligence, which has a vested interest in discrediting Tsai, seen as an advocate of Taiwanese independence.
In response, Taiwanese authorities have rushed to establish laws and institutions to combat this so-called fake news—following in part the models of Russian neighbors such as Finland and Estonia. Last week, Taiwan passed a law targeting Chinese infiltration in the nation’s democratic institutions. But new rules have left Taipei seeing Beijing’s hand behind every online rumor—and experts warn they may prove more counterproductive than helpful.
One case exemplifies this: that of Su Chii-cherng, the director of Taiwan’s representative office (the equivalent of a consulate) in Osaka, Japan, who was tragically caught up in a bizarre series of events in September 2018. Taiwan was rocked that month by a false report claiming that Taiwanese travelers stranded at Osaka’s Kansai International Airport during a typhoon had been rescued by buses sent by the Chinese Embassy.
The story, originally posted on a Reddit-like forum called Professional Technology Temple (PTT), was quickly circulated by both Taiwanese and Chinese media outlets, including the state-run tabloid Global Times. It led to a torrent of online criticism directed at Su, who killed himself eight days later. The initial account was quickly proved false, but it spawned several subsequent waves of bad information. Taiwanese media, citing a report by the Japanese broadcaster NHK, widely reported that Su had taken his own life due to mounting pressure over the resulting spread of false information. However, his widow later disputed this, saying in a statement he had feared “anticipated humiliation” by his superiors.
Questions also arose as to the source of the original PTT post. Shortly after the incident, the post was allegedly traced by internet users to an IP address in China. Incensed government officials spoke of the post as a malicious Chinese plant. In October, weeks before Taiwan’s regional elections, Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Minister Chen Ming-chi said the post “originated from a content farm in Shanghai.”
The incident was thus held up as symbolic of the threat posed to Taiwan by Chinese influence operations. It was widely cited by international media, by a Reporters Without Borders report, and by Tsai herself in a March 2019 interview as an example of “fake news” originating in China with malicious intent to target Taiwan.
However, in December 2018, a court in Taiwan’s Nantou County alleged it had identified a Taiwanese university student as being responsible for making the original post online. And the scandal surged back into the headlines last month after Slow Yang, a YouTuber and prominent supporter of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was charged by a Taipei court with hiring internet trolls to criticize Su’s office.
The salacious nature of the original claim proved attractive to media outlets in both Taiwan and China. “The narrative of the PTT post plays into one Beijing wants to perpetuate and was ultimately able to capitalize off of, in painting the current DPP administration as ill-equipped to govern,” said Jessica Drun, a fellow at the Center for Advanced China Research.
The courts, however, allege that much of the disinformation fracas—including, potentially, the post that sparked it all—originated not in China, but in Taiwan.
The revelation should have highlighted the well-known difficulties in determining the actual scope, intent, and efficacy of state influence campaigns—along with the reality that, while Beijing aggressively attempts to influence Taiwan’s democratic institutions spanning from its media outlets to its temples, most disinformation circulating through Taiwan’s online ecosystem comes not from China but from within the country.
Government officials who had pinpointed the incident as an example of Chinese meddling during election season never provided evidence of their claims, nor have they since issued corrective statements. Instead, Taiwan launched into a drive to combat Chinese-influenced news, often referred to as “red media,” that has gained support from the DPP but has faced virulent pushback from voices within both the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), which takes a softer stance toward Beijing, and from press freedom advocates worried the cases could disrupt Taiwan’s commitment to free speech. “When people found that this news was posted by a college student in Taiwan, this made the DPP look really bad,” said Wu Jun-deh, a disinformation researcher at Taiwan’s state-funded Institute for National Defense and Security Research. The incident, Wu said, gave the KMT and its supporters the opportunity to question the DPP’s credibility when it discusses Beijing’s desire to meddle in Taiwanese politics.
That hasn’t stopped the DPP. After the passage of last week’s anti-infiltration law, Tsai insisted it would not target the media. “No upright media company operating in Taiwan would engage in illicit activity on China’s behalf,” she said. The law, seen by supporters as essential to rooting out Beijing’s meddling in Taiwan’s politics, has galvanized the DPP and, along with Tsai’s support of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, given it momentum leading into Saturday’s presidential and legislative elections.
But it has also proved polarizing. The KMT has branded it a threat to Taiwan’s democracy. The DPP has responded by saying the true threat lies across the Taiwan Strait. The law was passed in a 67-0 vote, boycotted by every KMT lawmaker as protesters rallied outside the legislature. Days before the election, Taiwan is bitterly divided.
Beijing’s hunger for cross-strait influence goes back decades, dating to when the Chinese and Taiwanese governments used billboards and loudspeakers to broadcast propaganda between China’s Fujian province and the outlying Taiwanese island of Kinmen, just one mile away. Nowadays, it has carried on into what officials and observers fear is a campaign to destabilize Taiwan’s democracy through traditional media and social media apps such as Line, a WhatsApp-like platform rife with disinformation circulating within closed chat groups—although it has proved difficult to discern what constitutes a Chinese state-run effort as opposed to the actions of private citizens.
“We haven’t seen much activity that we suspect from China engaging in the same behavior as, for example, we’ve seen from Russia and Iran,” said Lee Foster, a senior manager for information operations with the United States cybersecurity firm FireEye, after analyzing Taiwan’s November 2018 elections. He noted that Chinese internet users are often happy to defend their government online out of their own volition.
Even if China lacks a Russia-style large-scale disinformation apparatus, its state and private actors have successfully stirred the pot in Taiwan. The 2018 mayoral campaign of Kaohsiung’s Han Kuo-yu, now the KMT presidential candidate, received support from a Facebook group run by administrators in China, according to a June 2019 report, and Facebook recently removed several fan pages supporting his presidential run. Taiwan’s Want Want China Times media conglomerate—chaired by the notoriously Beijing-friendly businessman Tsai Eng-meng, and the target of massive rallies in Taipei decrying the proliferation of China-backed red media—has received directives and published paid content from Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office, according to reports by the Financial Times and Reuters. Want Want said it would sue the Financial Times, calling its report “fake news.”
The DPP has responded by pushing Taiwan’s National Communications Commission (NCC), which regulates broadcast and telecommunications operations, to strike back. The commission, along with Taiwanese authorities, has levied fines on news organizations and private citizens for spreading so-called fake news, including internet rumors—a controversial tactic that former NCC Chairperson Nicole Chan equated to a desire for censorship shortly after her resignation in April 2019.
“If there is any website, any TV station they report to be untrue or disinformation, they want the NCC to punish them or block the website,” Chan told Foreign Policy. “For me, it is impossible to do that. That is not the responsibility of the NCC.”
The agency announced in July 2019 that it would investigate the Want Want-run CtiTV and CTV, the television stations named in the Financial Times report, for potential violations of three broadcasting acts. An NCC spokesperson said the case could be transferred to other authorities if further security violations are found. The commission has not released results of its July investigation, but this past November, it said it would investigate CtiTV and CTV, along with Eastern Broadcasting Co., after the self-proclaimed former Chinese spy Wang Liqiang said they had been paid by China to disparage the DPP.
The KMT has seized on the opportunity to cast the DPP as an enemy of free speech, accusing the NCC of targeting media outlets that favor the opposition party. “Does the NCC work for the public or work for the DPP?” Han, the KMT candidate, wrote on Facebook after the NCC announced its November investigation. Han added a hashtag meaning “green terror”—a play on the DPP’s symbolic color and the White Terror, a term for martial law under the KMT dictator Chiang Kai-shek, weaponized by the campaign in increasingly incensed attacks on the ruling party.
Last March, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu touted his country’s freedom of expression on Twitter. “I’ve said it before: Tweeting is fun! The people of #China should be allowed to enjoy it, too,” Wu wrote. “And there’s no need to fear wumao, we don’t have any in #Taiwan.”
Taiwan may be free of China’s notorious wumao, or “50 Cent Army,” known for publishing articles and forum posts that positively portray the Chinese government, but it is hardly free from the threat of domestically generated disinformation. As the DPP frames Saturday’s presidential election as a battle between democracy and unification with China, it has left itself vulnerable to waves of accusations—ridiculous as many of them may be—that its designs for a disinformation-free media are interlaced with a desire to deny free speech for political enemies.
Supporters wave Taiwanese flags during a campaign rally for Han Kuo-yu, the Kuomintang candidate and more pro-Beijing challenger to the sitting president, in Taipei on Jan. 9.
Taiwan, Wu told an audience in Los Angeles in March 2019, is “the first line of defense in an ideological battle that is taking place … in like-minded societies all over the world.”
“We have felt the brunt of China’s intensified campaign to subvert Taiwan’s democracy every day, through military intimidation, economic coercion, diplomatic assaults, disinformation, and political subversion, seeking to undermine our elected government and interfere with our elections,” he said.
Since it swept to power in 2016, Taiwan’s ruling DPP government has operated in a climate of cross-strait acrimony. Beijing quickly severed all ties between officials on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait and has engaged in a campaign to limit Taiwan’s international image, poaching its diplomatic allies and pressuring international organizations and corporations to refer to Taiwan on its terms rather than those of Taipei. And Chinese actors have been behind false reports targeting Taiwan ranging from the genuinely harmful to the benign. In 2016, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force published a photo of a fighter jet flying near a Taiwanese mountain, leading to speculation it was doctored. In 2018, an online post claiming Honduras, one of Taipei’s 15 remaining diplomatic allies, was on the verge of defecting to Beijing was quickly debunked and allegedly sourced to a Chinese IP address.
Prior to the November 2018 regional elections, which saw the DPP suffer a crushing islandwide defeat, a national security source told the Taipei Times a Chinese government agency was responsible for using disinformation to influence public morale, but the source did not elaborate. Days before polls opened, Tsai warned against online falsehoods in a Facebook post.
However, experts say it is unlikely Chinese influence actors played a significant role in the DPP defeat. While Chinese internet users made significant efforts to support KMT candidates online—and Want Want media outlets pushed KMT candidates such as Han Kuo-yu in Kaohsiung—the seeds of discontent had already been planted by what voters perceived as domestic policy failures, leaving them eager to punish what they saw as an underperforming ruling party.
Talk of Chinese meddling in Taiwan’s elections died down after the vote, likely due to the DPP’s reluctance to blame its defeat on outside forces as its members picked up the pieces. But in recent months, with a resurgent Tsai regaining popularity by promising to safeguard democracy from China as protests in Hong Kong surged, the party has vowed to fight red media using punitive measures. The NCC was placed firmly at the forefront of the battle.
In March 2019, the NCC fined the Want Want-run CtiTV News 1 million new Taiwan dollars (about $33,000) for failing to fact-check reports favorable to Han and other KMT mayors. The commission also said it analyzed the station’s news broadcasts for one week in February of that year and found that on one day coverage of Han made up 56.7 percent of the network’s total content.
“We are not saying that CtiTV cannot report on Han, but it must follow its code of conduct and self-discipline guidelines when covering him,” said Wong Po-tsung, then the NCC’s spokesman.
Days later, Wong became acting NCC chairperson after the resignation of Nicole Chan, widely reported to be under pressure from DPP legislators who accused her of not doing enough to punish networks for airing false or politically motivated reports. Within weeks, the NCC fined Want Want’s CTi News another NT$1 million for not fact-checking a man’s claim that 2.6 million pounds of pomelos had been dumped in a reservoir by farmers to rot, a report aired days before a critical legislative by-election in which the DPP incumbent was being challenged. In July 2019, it fined CtiTV News NT$1.6 million, about $50,000, for falsely reporting on the previous fines it had received from the NCC. Global best practices for combating false reports strongly discourage allowing a government body to police disinformation. Crackdowns on fake news in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and other less democratic states have received global criticism. Taiwan’s new legislation is potentially as far-reaching as that of its Asian neighbors—and its recent moves have drawn hard scrutiny from observers within and outside of the country.
“When the government is in a position to declare something ‘fake news,’ it just opens the door to abuse,” said Steven Butler, the Asia program coordinator for the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
“In no case can the executive power take the responsibility to decide what is fake news and what is legitimate news,” said Cedric Alviani, the director of the Asia bureau of Reporters Without Borders, known by the French acronym RSF. “By finding scapegoats, blaming China, and not solving the problem, Taiwan is actually letting the gap narrow between itself and China.”
Alviani accused China of “exploiting a weakness” in Taiwan’s media environment, long a hotbed of poor journalistic standards as outlets rush to be first to publish. In response, the country has lent support to its nascent media watchdogs, including the first-of-its-kind Taiwan FactCheck Center, whose initial chief editor was hired last year by the public TV station CTS to implement verification methods at the broadcast level. As NCC chairperson, Chan oversaw the adoption of international fact-checking standards and asked TV stations to utilize those guidelines.
But Chan’s resistance to calls from within the DPP to wield the commission’s legal power to punish media outlets sympathetic to China—and to extend its regulatory domain into the policing of online content—ultimately led to her resignation, which Chan insists was voluntary. The NCC, Chan said, should never “get involved in true or false.”
In October 2018, DPP Legislator Cheng Pao-ching sharply questioned Chan’s performance. “It is like you are holding a sword of the state in your hand, but you never use it,” he said. DPP officials, including Premier Su Tseng-chang, renewed their criticism in March 2019, prior to the resignation of Chan, who had insisted on upholding the freedom of speech and using smart methods to combat fake news.
“The key word is ‘smart,’” Chan said of the DPP legislators critical of what they perceived as the NCC’s inaction. “They don’t get the points. They don’t know how to be smart.”
To Chan, this means committing to a rules-based approach to overseeing broadcast news content and not mixing external issues, such as regulating internet content and serving as arbiter of debates over the veracity of news, with the NCC’s actual scope of responsibility. Since resigning, Chan has urged Taiwan’s National Security Council to take the lead in defending Taiwan against foreign threats, a position echoed by many domestic critics.
Butler of CPJ said Taiwan should focus on investigating foul play by Want Want rather than penalizing its unbalanced coverage.
“If you bring attention to that and can actually find out the basis to that, that’s going to be a lot more effective than slapping a meaningless fine on a media property,” he said.
Chan expressed concern over the NCC’s penalty of CtiTV for dedicating too much coverage to Han Kuo-yu, saying that under her watch, her commission had favored disclosing the results of broadcasting fairness studies but letting the audience decide from there. “I don’t think it is appropriate to draw a line and set up a certain percentage” of coverage deemed as fair, she said.
Chiang Ya-chi, a professor researching comparative responses to disinformation campaigns at National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, warned that should government agencies be asked to decide on the veracity of a story, “we fall into a trap.”
“I think it’s very important [for the NCC] to establish a fair standard and apply that standard to everyone,” said Chiang, who has participated in government forums discussing responses to disinformation. She cautions against any steps that would further polarize Taiwan’s political environment—and as the KMT continues to attack the DPP as an enemy of free speech in Taiwan, that environment is becoming more polarized than ever.
“The government says disinformation is the enemy of an open and democratic society,” she said. “But we don’t want to lose that open society by fighting against it.”
Protesters in Taipei hold signs stating their opposition to Chinese media disinformation and the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian rule in China on June 23, 2019.
When someone cries “fake news,” it often sets a vicious cycle into motion. Accuse someone else of spreading fake news, as Taiwanese authorities have done to Want Want, and you are likely to be tagged as a source of fake news yourself, as Want Want has done to its critics.
This is why democratic governments have tried to recuse themselves from debates over true and false. When Audrey Tang, Taiwan’s first digital minister, oversaw the 2018 implementation of a real-time clarification platform for government ministries to respond to inaccurate or incomplete reports, she told me the platform was not a fact-checking mechanism.
But the government’s push to hold disinformation peddlers accountable—with its sights firmly set on influence from China—has led to an internal game of hot potato, with the NCC bearing the public brunt of facing a problem that other agencies, along with Taiwanese courts, have little interest in taking responsibility for. Taiwan’s new anti-infiltration law faces similar concerns, as critics note it does not clearly specify an arbiter assigned to investigate cases. Long-term solutions to healing Taiwan’s media environment, such as media literacy education campaigns, fail to satiate DPP officials who see the issue as an existential threat not only to Taiwan, but also to their own political survival.
The specter of Chinese meddling is thus being emphasized by the DPP and discounted by the KMT, leaving little room for Chinese influence to be properly defined and for claims of Chinese meddling to be verified before being repeated by politicians.
Deputy Minister Chen of the Mainland Affairs Council, who in October 2019 claimed the Kansai airport post originated in a Shanghai content farm, said in an email his comments “were according to the published information at the time” and that Taiwan-based media had “cited a report on a Shanghai-based online platform guancha.cn.”
Most analysts and subsequent media reports repeated these claims as DPP officials continued to echo them without publicly providing concrete proof. The government’s handling of the Kansai incident, Chiang said, left it at risk of losing the trust of voters as it tries to raise awareness of actual disinformation from foreign forces. “The DPP government should present more evidence of the cases of disinformation they are asking the people to be aware of,” she said.
Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s foreign minister, quickly pushed for the Taiwanese student who allegedly made the false PTT post to be prosecuted. Wu cited Taiwan’s Social Order Maintenance Act, a law that penalizes those found guilty of spreading rumors that “undermine public order and peace.” The country’s legislature had previously proposed amending the law to punish purveyors of fake news, drawing a rebuke from CPJ.
“The authorities cannot just brush responsibility away and say, oh, let’s punish that kid. They have to face the problem,” said Alviani of RSF, referring to Taiwan’s own crumbling media environment. “To put all the blame on Chinese propaganda is a mistake.”
Lawmakers withdrew the proposed amendment, but the law has since been used to summon private citizens who share false information online—often those critical of the DPP. In July 2019, a man was referred to police after sharing a meme on Facebook falsely claiming the Tsai administration had spent millions on renovating the official presidential residence. Last week, the university professor Su Hung-dah said he received a police notice after posting a video this past November accusing the DPP of trying to destroy Taiwan’s National Palace Museum, which contains Chinese artifacts brought to the island by KMT forces after they fled China in 1949. The KMT candidate Han’s deputy chief campaign officer said the DPP was curtailing “freedom of speech and freedom of privacy,” while a KMT spokeswoman referred to reports of citizens being summoned by police as a “green terror.”
The police summons have amplified a KMT onslaught of unsubstantiated accusations, further fueled by the new anti-infiltration law, that a DPP “internet army” is targeting Han’s supporters. Its retaliation has become ugly: The party’s official Twitter account offered a “reward” for finding Slow Yang, the DPP-supporting YouTube personality charged with spreading Kansai airport rumors.
For Butler of CPJ, the practice of fining citizens for spreading false information is “a terrible weapon in the hand of the government.”
“To go in the direction of censorship, in the end, is going to be self-defeating,” he said.
Taiwan has also considered amending its draft digital communications act, which follows the Manila Principles of online freedom from censorship, to give targets of fake news the right to ask platforms hosting the content to remove it and compensate the victims, a requirement that Google Taiwan said would violate its policy of neutrality if passed. Chan, the former NCC minister who was a key figure behind the drafting of the bill, believes further changes may be proposed by DPP officials during the bill’s second and third readings.
Alviani has been critical of Taiwan’s fight against disinformation in the past. In 2018, the Mainland Affairs Council denied a journalist visa to a Chinese reporter after accusing him of spreading false information and “creating cross-strait conflict,” a move RSF sharply opposed. While Alviani does not advocate a full freedom to publish anything without consequences—which he calls the “freedom of the strong to impose propaganda”—his organization wants to see Taiwan improve its own media environment rather than pointing its finger at China.
Taiwan, Alviani noted, regularly places among the top Asian countries in RSF’s annual Press Freedom Index—but “it’s not because the Taiwanese media is so outstanding.” Instead, he said, it is “because the whole of Asia is run by strongmen, by dictatorships.”