foreignpolicy--2020-01-14--Americans Are Investing More in China—and They Don’t Even Know It

Americans Are Investing More in China—and They Don ’ t Even Know It As officials from the United States and China navigate not only a trade war but also growing geopolitical competition—as well as a clash of values on issues such as Hong Kong , Taiwan , and Xinjiang—an incongruous trend is accelerating : Americans are unwittingly becoming more heavily invested in Chinese companies and government securities .
Surveys show that 55 percent of Americans own stocks , mostly relying on professionally managed pension funds , mutual funds , or exchange-traded funds ( ETFs ) to run their current investments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a substantial 20 percent or more is generally allocated to international equities , usually in a mix of both developed and emerging markets .
But while it is well known that both actively managed and index-based funds have global allocations , one trend that has developed under the radar is the fact that the weight of Chinese companies within emerging market allocations has grown dramatically in the last year , partly because of technical changes made by the three major index providers—MSCI , FTSE Russell , and S & P Dow Jones @ @ @ @ @ @ @ billion of new foreign investment into Chinese equities was driven by changes in allocations within benchmark indexes , with American investors accounting for more than a third of these massive portfolio flows .
Similarly , global bond indexes that have started adding Chinese government bonds to their benchmarks accounted for an additional investment flow of more than $ 100 billion into China .
Put together , these major shifts in fund allocations could automatically grow U.S. portfolio investment in Chinese companies and government securities to more than $ 1 trillion by the end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or knowledge of most Americans .
This dichotomy—of Americans investing more in Chinese companies even as U.S. policies aim to punish China for its trade practices—poses significant risks .
Not only will Americans ’ portfolios become potentially too exposed to a single economy , but they will also be allocated to one that could be subject to U.S. sanctions or Chinese government controls .
To manage these and other inherent risks , U.S. investors need to take a closer look at what is inside their professionally managed portfolios .
Fiduciaries , investors , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similar historical market anomalies—such as with Japanese stocks in the late 1980s and the previously high weighting of Mexico , Malaysia , South Africa , and Taiwan in emerging markets—and consider alternative index construction approaches that moderate the investment concentration of China in their portfolios .
As index-based investments surge—for example , now representing more than half of all new mutual fund inflows—the influence of global index providers has grown considerably .
MSCI , FTSE Russell , and S & P Dow Jones collectively guide more than $ 20 trillion in global equity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which guides more than $ 1.7 trillion in investments in 26 developing countries , completed a major inclusion of locally listed Chinese stocks at the end of November , which increased China ’ s total weight to more than 34 percent of the index as of January 2020—an unprecedented proportion for a single country .
Similarly , the FTSE Emerging Index , the benchmark for nearly $ 1 trillion in assets , has recently increased its allocation to China to more than 37 percent , in turn impacting emerging market portfolios from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ funds for American individual investors as well as others .
S & P Dow Jones also has an emerging market index that now has approximately 37 percent of its investments allocated to Chinese companies .
Each of these providers of flagship emerging market benchmarks have indicated plans to further increase the weighting of locally listed Chinese equities in the next five years .
When these added allocations are enacted , China ’ s projected weight in emerging market indexes will rise toward 40 percent or more by the end of 2022 .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effects .
Other international equity indexes , which follow the allocations of popular emerging market indexes , and into which many American pension funds invest money , will also automatically tie a growing share of their savings to China .
Similarly , global bond indexes used by fixed income investors in the United States have a growing exposure to China .
The International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) estimates $ 300 billion in increased index-driven bond investments in China by 2022 .
Put together , the newly increased portfolio investments in China—and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that essentially contradicts current U.S. government policy .
Despite broad bipartisan consensus about U.S. efforts to constrain China ’ s economy , estimates by several major investment banks , the IMF , and BlueStar Indexes ( which I founded ) suggest aggregate equity and bond portfolio investment into China could exceed $ 800 billion between now and the end of 2023 .
Those investments will significantly support the Chinese economy and currency even as China ’ s current account balance has shifted to a deficit for the first time since 1993 .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face substantial pressure on its capital account , investment shifts that are virtually on autopilot from Americans and other global investors will materially contribute to relieving those pressures .
Not only that but the efforts of the U.S. government to impact the Chinese economy through tariffs and other policies will also be counteracted by these portfolio flows .
Put simply , the international investment allocations now being implemented by American investors are directly opposed to current U.S. trade and economic policy .
These portfolio shifts also pose significant investment risks .
While investing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China is unique in not only its unprecedented allocation within international equity funds but also because of the serious concerns expressed by American policymakers about its political and economic system .
The risks include the timing , coming as it does right as U.S. foreign and commercial policy galvanizes to contain China ; the possibility of interference from Beijing , given that most listed Chinese companies involve a degree of state control ; the potential imposition of capital controls , where investors may be denied the ability to extract their investments ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies ; and finally , the reputational risk from Chinese companies that have low ratings on the environment , on social factors , and governance.In other words , while China would otherwise face substantial pressure on its capital account , investment shifts that are virtually on autopilot from Americans and other global investors will materially contribute to relieving those pressures .
Of course , all forms of investment entail risks .
But it is imperative to ask whether average Americans should be investing in a country that is a major strategic competitor to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such a degree that these growing allocations are occurring without a full or explicit understanding of their relative size and the composition within portfolios .
This is not an argument against index funds , which strive to be objective and rigorous in their analysis , emphasizing investment-related issues to determine country categorizations between developed , emerging , and frontier markets .
Nor is it an argument about broad diversification toward international markets .
But institutional asset owners like pension funds—and especially individual investors—do not usually see the impact of major index changes .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in emerging and international indexes is dramatically skewing the weights of countries and stocks with unprecedented impact .
In addition to TSP , the federally administrated Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. ’ s portfolio includes a major emerging market allocation and has experienced the same increased exposure to Chinese equities this year , as will the portfolios of most state-administered public pension plans .
BlueStar estimates that just the 30 largest U.S. public pension plans have more than $ 150 billion in emerging market equities , of which more than $ 50 billion is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Congress and the White House consider potential legislation or directives , investors and fiduciaries should act too , and they have a straightforward two-step process ahead of them .
First , to do their homework and look under the hood of their international equity portfolios to understand the growing weight of China and the existence of so-called bad actor companies as defined by the U.S. government .
Second , if directed by investors or their advisors , fund managers should screen out companies that are under U.S. sanctions and those that do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transparency .
They could also consider adjusting the weight of China , based on their views on both portfolio risk and alignment of their values with their investments .
While many of the policy proscriptions emanating from Washington highlight the growing concentration of China in portfolios and the resultant disconnect with U.S. policy , it is essential to engage in the same intensity of scrutiny with all countries and companies .
The starting point for prospective solutions to this quandary is simply awareness of the scope of the problem .
For institutional pension @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the responsibility of their fiduciaries—the investment committees and boards that oversee these large pools of assets .
Beneficiaries are also stakeholders , and they should make their voice heard , too .
Next , fiduciaries should have a dialogue at the board and staff levels and eventually with their asset managers .
As an outcome of this process , the goal should be to determine how much single-country risk is acceptable and , if the large and growing weight of China is identified as a key issue , to articulate an intention to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a solution is to evolve or modify the choice of index benchmarks .
For the TSP , this could be as simple as backing away from its decision to shift from a developed market focus to one that includes emerging markets .
For the hundreds of public pension plans and millions of individual investors who already have substantial—and growing—exposure to Chinese stocks , it is essential that they consider an approach to control risks by attenuating the country , sector , and single stock concentration of the portfolio .
While it sounds complex @ @ @ @ @ @ @ achieve , as several index providers offer benchmarks that use alternative weighting approaches .
Even though the dominance of a single country—China—in emerging markets is unprecedented , this is not the first time that investors have felt the need to take steps to reduce the weight of a market or even remove a market from their portfolios .
We need only look back to the 1980s , when institutional investors successfully solved two thorny issues .
The first example was purely an investment risk-related decision regarding the soaring values of Japanese stocks in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which many considered unsustainable .
Institutional investors , together with their asset managers , took steps to reduce the weight of Japan in their developed market index funds , essentially taking a bet to correct what was perceived to be a market that displayed bubblelike characteristics .
The second example from the 1980s was essentially a political stand against apartheid in South Africa that rippled through American public and corporate pension plans as well as foundations and endowments .
Over the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s , divestment from South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much so that most institutional investors removed it completely from their benchmark indexes .
Today , a range of solutions can be developed , including screens at either the country or company level .
It is important to recognize that in the eyes of many investors , China is not the only home to so-called bad actor companies .
For example , some banks in Qatar and Jordan have been accused of facilitating payments to terrorist organizations ; Turkey ’ s Halkbank was indicted last October by the U.S. Justice Department for fraud @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. sanctions ; and several Russian banks have been sanctioned by the United States and the European Union for their involvement in trade with Iran and North Korea .
Adjusting one ’ s exposure to these companies can be accomplished through a relatively straightforward screening process by asset owners or index providers , using objective data from third-party providers .
Given how the evolution of global index benchmarks have created a major challenge for investors , a purely passive approach to the problem is not tenable .
A decisive course of analysis and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must address the glaring concerns of both the investment risks of China ’ s large and growing weight in most of their funds and the implications of a clash between their values and their portfolio holdings .
Given the intense competition between the United States and China , it could be considered illogical—and in the eyes of some observers , even immoral—to be investing retirement assets into holdings that might run counter to U.S. interests .
While the portfolio construction issues might seem arcane , addressing them is increasingly essential both to manage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investors ’ values .

As officials from the United States and China navigate not only a trade war but also growing geopolitical competition—as well as a clash of values on issues such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xinjiang—an incongruous trend is accelerating: Americans are unwittingly becoming more heavily invested in Chinese companies and government securities.
As officials from the United States and China navigate not only a trade war but also growing geopolitical competition—as well as a clash of values on issues such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xinjiang—an incongruous trend is accelerating: Americans are unwittingly becoming more heavily invested in Chinese companies and government securities.
Surveys show that 55 percent of Americans own stocks, mostly relying on professionally managed pension funds, mutual funds, or exchange-traded funds (ETFs) to run their current investments and retirement accounts. Among those investments, a substantial 20 percent or more is generally allocated to international equities, usually in a mix of both developed and emerging markets. But while it is well known that both actively managed and index-based funds have global allocations, one trend that has developed under the radar is the fact that the weight of Chinese companies within emerging market allocations has grown dramatically in the last year, partly because of technical changes made by the three major index providers—MSCI, FTSE Russell, and S&P Dow Jones.
In 2019, nearly $400 billion of new foreign investment into Chinese equities was driven by changes in allocations within benchmark indexes, with American investors accounting for more than a third of these massive portfolio flows. Similarly, global bond indexes that have started adding Chinese government bonds to their benchmarks accounted for an additional investment flow of more than $100 billion into China. Put together, these major shifts in fund allocations could automatically grow U.S. portfolio investment in Chinese companies and government securities to more than $1 trillion by the end of 2021, without the active consent or knowledge of most Americans.
This dichotomy—of Americans investing more in Chinese companies even as U.S. policies aim to punish China for its trade practices—poses significant risks. Not only will Americans’ portfolios become potentially too exposed to a single economy, but they will also be allocated to one that could be subject to U.S. sanctions or Chinese government controls. To manage these and other inherent risks, U.S. investors need to take a closer look at what is inside their professionally managed portfolios. Fiduciaries, investors, and their asset managers should look to similar historical market anomalies—such as with Japanese stocks in the late 1980s and the previously high weighting of Mexico, Malaysia, South Africa, and Taiwan in emerging markets—and consider alternative index construction approaches that moderate the investment concentration of China in their portfolios.
New York Stock Exchange President Tom Farley, Alibaba Chairman Jack Ma, and Alibaba CEO Daniel Zhang attend a long-distance ringing of the opening bell in New York from Beijing on Nov. 11, 2015.
Since around the middle of the last decade—well before its trade spat with the United States became a regular feature of news headlines—China was already the largest component of the main emerging market indexes. As Beijing steadily lifted what used to be strict restrictions on foreign portfolio investment, the major providers of benchmark indexes embarked on a historic inclusion of locally listed Chinese companies within their emerging market listings. Those inclusions are accelerating—as announced to the financial community in early 2019—despite the new public policy environment of increased U.S. economic and geopolitical tensions with China.
As index-based investments surge—for example, now representing more than half of all new mutual fund inflows—the influence of global index providers has grown considerably. MSCI, FTSE Russell, and S&P Dow Jones collectively guide more than $20 trillion in global equity assets. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index, which guides more than $1.7 trillion in investments in 26 developing countries, completed a major inclusion of locally listed Chinese stocks at the end of November, which increased China’s total weight to more than 34 percent of the index as of January 2020—an unprecedented proportion for a single country. Similarly, the FTSE Emerging Index, the benchmark for nearly $1 trillion in assets, has recently increased its allocation to China to more than 37 percent, in turn impacting emerging market portfolios from Vanguard, the largest manager of mutual funds for American individual investors as well as others. S&P Dow Jones also has an emerging market index that now has approximately 37 percent of its investments allocated to Chinese companies. Each of these providers of flagship emerging market benchmarks have indicated plans to further increase the weighting of locally listed Chinese equities in the next five years. When these added allocations are enacted, China’s projected weight in emerging market indexes will rise toward 40 percent or more by the end of 2022. This added exposure to China will have knock-on effects. Other international equity indexes, which follow the allocations of popular emerging market indexes, and into which many American pension funds invest money, will also automatically tie a growing share of their savings to China.
FP Analytics Special Report Mining the Future: How China is set to dominate the next Industrial Revolution. Read Now
Similarly, global bond indexes used by fixed income investors in the United States have a growing exposure to China. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates $300 billion in increased index-driven bond investments in China by 2022.
Put together, the newly increased portfolio investments in China—and the prospects of further increases—have a tremendous impact that essentially contradicts current U.S. government policy. Despite broad bipartisan consensus about U.S. efforts to constrain China’s economy, estimates by several major investment banks, the IMF, and BlueStar Indexes (which I founded) suggest aggregate equity and bond portfolio investment into China could exceed $800 billion between now and the end of 2023. Those investments will significantly support the Chinese economy and currency even as China’s current account balance has shifted to a deficit for the first time since 1993.
In other words, while China would otherwise face substantial pressure on its capital account, investment shifts that are virtually on autopilot from Americans and other global investors will materially contribute to relieving those pressures. Not only that but the efforts of the U.S. government to impact the Chinese economy through tariffs and other policies will also be counteracted by these portfolio flows. Put simply, the international investment allocations now being implemented by American investors are directly opposed to current U.S. trade and economic policy.
These portfolio shifts also pose significant investment risks. While investing in volatile emerging markets is inherently unpredictable, China is unique in not only its unprecedented allocation within international equity funds but also because of the serious concerns expressed by American policymakers about its political and economic system. The risks include the timing, coming as it does right as U.S. foreign and commercial policy galvanizes to contain China; the possibility of interference from Beijing, given that most listed Chinese companies involve a degree of state control; the potential imposition of capital controls, where investors may be denied the ability to extract their investments; the impact of U.S. sanctions on individual companies; and finally, the reputational risk from Chinese companies that have low ratings on the environment, on social factors, and governance.In other words, while China would otherwise face substantial pressure on its capital account, investment shifts that are virtually on autopilot from Americans and other global investors will materially contribute to relieving those pressures.
Of course, all forms of investment entail risks. But it is imperative to ask whether average Americans should be investing in a country that is a major strategic competitor to the United States, let alone to such a degree that these growing allocations are occurring without a full or explicit understanding of their relative size and the composition within portfolios.
This is not an argument against index funds, which strive to be objective and rigorous in their analysis, emphasizing investment-related issues to determine country categorizations between developed, emerging, and frontier markets. Nor is it an argument about broad diversification toward international markets. But institutional asset owners like pension funds—and especially individual investors—do not usually see the impact of major index changes. And the rapid inclusion of Chinese shares in emerging and international indexes is dramatically skewing the weights of countries and stocks with unprecedented impact.
A cargo ship loaded with containers berths at a port in Qingdao in China's eastern Shandong province on Jan. 14.
U.S. authorities may already be considering curbs on American investments in China, underscoring the importance of this issue. The Trump administration has been deliberating the imposition of limits on U.S. pension funds’ positions in China. Last August, Sens. Jeanne Shaheen and Marco Rubio urged the administrator of the federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), the largest retirement plan in the United States, to reverse its decision to include emerging markets—because of the exposure to Chinese equities—in its benchmark. Their concerns were followed in November with a bill that would conditionally ban the investment of TSP funds for military and federal government employees in securities listed on mainland Chinese exchanges.
In addition to TSP, the federally administrated Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.’s portfolio includes a major emerging market allocation and has experienced the same increased exposure to Chinese equities this year, as will the portfolios of most state-administered public pension plans. BlueStar estimates that just the 30 largest U.S. public pension plans have more than $150 billion in emerging market equities, of which more than $50 billion is now invested in Chinese companies.
Even as Congress and the White House consider potential legislation or directives, investors and fiduciaries should act too, and they have a straightforward two-step process ahead of them. First, to do their homework and look under the hood of their international equity portfolios to understand the growing weight of China and the existence of so-called bad actor companies as defined by the U.S. government. Second, if directed by investors or their advisors, fund managers should screen out companies that are under U.S. sanctions and those that do not adhere to American standards of accounting transparency. They could also consider adjusting the weight of China, based on their views on both portfolio risk and alignment of their values with their investments. While many of the policy proscriptions emanating from Washington highlight the growing concentration of China in portfolios and the resultant disconnect with U.S. policy, it is essential to engage in the same intensity of scrutiny with all countries and companies.
The starting point for prospective solutions to this quandary is simply awareness of the scope of the problem. For institutional pension fund and endowment portfolios, this is the responsibility of their fiduciaries—the investment committees and boards that oversee these large pools of assets. Beneficiaries are also stakeholders, and they should make their voice heard, too. Next, fiduciaries should have a dialogue at the board and staff levels and eventually with their asset managers. As an outcome of this process, the goal should be to determine how much single-country risk is acceptable and, if the large and growing weight of China is identified as a key issue, to articulate an intention to address it.
One key element of a solution is to evolve or modify the choice of index benchmarks. For the TSP, this could be as simple as backing away from its decision to shift from a developed market focus to one that includes emerging markets. For the hundreds of public pension plans and millions of individual investors who already have substantial—and growing—exposure to Chinese stocks, it is essential that they consider an approach to control risks by attenuating the country, sector, and single stock concentration of the portfolio. While it sounds complex, this can be relatively easy to achieve, as several index providers offer benchmarks that use alternative weighting approaches.
Even though the dominance of a single country—China—in emerging markets is unprecedented, this is not the first time that investors have felt the need to take steps to reduce the weight of a market or even remove a market from their portfolios. We need only look back to the 1980s, when institutional investors successfully solved two thorny issues.
The first example was purely an investment risk-related decision regarding the soaring values of Japanese stocks in the second half of the 1980s, which many considered unsustainable. Institutional investors, together with their asset managers, took steps to reduce the weight of Japan in their developed market index funds, essentially taking a bet to correct what was perceived to be a market that displayed bubblelike characteristics.
The second example from the 1980s was essentially a political stand against apartheid in South Africa that rippled through American public and corporate pension plans as well as foundations and endowments. Over the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s, divestment from South African stocks gained near-universal acceptance, so much so that most institutional investors removed it completely from their benchmark indexes.
Today, a range of solutions can be developed, including screens at either the country or company level. It is important to recognize that in the eyes of many investors, China is not the only home to so-called bad actor companies. For example, some banks in Qatar and Jordan have been accused of facilitating payments to terrorist organizations; Turkey’s Halkbank was indicted last October by the U.S. Justice Department for fraud and money laundering while helping Iran evade U.S. sanctions; and several Russian banks have been sanctioned by the United States and the European Union for their involvement in trade with Iran and North Korea. Adjusting one’s exposure to these companies can be accomplished through a relatively straightforward screening process by asset owners or index providers, using objective data from third-party providers.
Given how the evolution of global index benchmarks have created a major challenge for investors, a purely passive approach to the problem is not tenable. A decisive course of analysis and action is required. Fiduciaries and stakeholders must address the glaring concerns of both the investment risks of China’s large and growing weight in most of their funds and the implications of a clash between their values and their portfolio holdings. Given the intense competition between the United States and China, it could be considered illogical—and in the eyes of some observers, even immoral—to be investing retirement assets into holdings that might run counter to U.S. interests. While the portfolio construction issues might seem arcane, addressing them is increasingly essential both to manage risk and to ensure an alignment with investors’ values.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-14--Why India Is Greeting the World’s Richest Person With Protests—and an Antitrust Case

Why India Is Greeting the World ’ s Richest Person With Protests—and an Antitrust Case Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly South Asia Brief .
The highlights this week : India hits Amazon and Walmart with an antitrust case , a Pakistani high court overturns an ex-leader ’ s death sentence , and why Bangladesh arrested a top Sufi singer .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday , please sign up here .
When Amazon founder and CEO Jeff Bezos decided to visit India this week , he may have imagined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ welcome him with open arms .
It seems the opposite will happen .
On Monday , India ’ s antitrust regulator ordered a formal probe of allegations that Amazon and Walmart ’ s Flipkart were promoting some brands over others—practices that would violate Indian laws requiring foreign-owned e-commerce businesses to be neutral marketplaces .
It ’ s not just legal trouble that awaits the world ’ s richest man in India .
On Wednesday , a trade union representing 70 million brick and mortar retailers has planned protests in 300 cities .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ small businesses and are now trying to build a false narrative of empowering small retailers , ” Praveen Khandelwal , the leader of the Confederation of All India Traders , told Bloomberg .
Economic dilemma .
New Delhi needs all the foreign investment it can get : New projections show that India ’ s economy will grow by just 5 percent this year .
Given the immense potential market in India , major players such as Amazon and Walmart have long jostled for influence in the e-commerce space .
But the small merchants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s protests control 90 percent of India ’ s retail , and they broadly support protectionist measures .
There is also often widespread opposition to privatization in India .
Last week , banks and businesses closed as millions of workers protested against proposed government divestment from creaking enterprises such as Air India , Bharat Petroleum , and the Shipping Corporation of India .
The workers fear the job cuts that would inevitably follow private ownership .
Local challenge .
When India introduced in 2018 barring foreign-owned companies from selling their own inventory—forcing companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eBay and sell only third-party goods—it opened the door for local companies to exploit the e-commerce market .
Reliance , the country ’ s biggest company by market capitalization , is jumping into the fray with .
If the platform succeeds , it could link up the millions of mom and pop stores around India , creating better supply chains .
But it would be yet another sign to foreign companies that New Delhi can change its laws at any time to favor its own .
As shown below , India has the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who have yet to use the internet—another reason why foreign companies such as Google , Facebook , Apple , and Uber see it as a massive potential growth market .
Pakistan overturns ex-dictator ’ s death sentence .
A Pakistani high court on Monday overturned a death sentence issued to retired Gen. Pervez Musharraf , the military dictator who ruled the country from 2001 to 2008 .
The court said that the case , which alleged that Musharraf committed high treason and subverted the constitution , was politically motivated and that the special @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Musharraf may be in the clear , but one of the problems that plagued his tenure , domestic terrorism , persists .
Last Friday , a suicide bomber killed at least 15 people in an attack on a mosque in Quetta .
The Islamic State claimed responsibility , saying it was targeting a Taliban seminary .
( Local Islamic State branches are splinters from the Taliban . )
Will Kashmir go back online ?
Late last week , India ’ s Supreme Court ruled that internet access is protected by the constitution and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its digital blackout in Indian-administered Kashmir—now the longest ever imposed by a democracy .
Kashmiris have largely been without internet access since August 2019 , just before Prime Minister Narendra Modi revoked Kashmir ’ s special status .
India is a world leader in internet shutdowns , recording more than Pakistan , Syria , Iraq , and Ethiopia combined .
No refuge for Afghans .
Tens of thousands of Afghan refugees cross the border into Iran in search of a better life every year .
Against a background of regional turmoil , Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them .
In 2019 alone , the country sent more than 450,000 people back to Afghanistan—where many fall prey to human smugglers in desperate attempts to return to Iran , Ruchi Kumar and Hikmat Noori report for FP .
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees , there are as of 2018 around 2.4 million registered refugees from Afghanistan around the world .
While many end up in Iran , the majority are in Pakistan .
How many ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Oyo scales back .
The Japanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to India .
The Indian startup hotel chain Oyo , backed heavily by SoftBank funds , is eliminating 2,000 jobs around the world and cutting back on rooms .
Oyo is one of several SoftBank-backed companies that have recently come under scrutiny : WeWork , the dog-walking startup Wag , and the delivery app Rappi have faced similar problems with overpriced valuations and job cuts .
Earlier this month , the New York Times published an expose on Oyo ’ s questionable business practices , including potential bribes to government officials .
Off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ renowned Sufi folk singer , Shariat Sarker , for “ hurting the religious sentiment of Muslims ” on Monday .
The initial case against Sarker was filed by an Islamic scholar over comments made at a show last month and posted on YouTube .
( Sarker reportedly said the Quran did not prohibit practicing music . )
Hundreds of people protested last week calling for his arrest .
At least 29 people have been jailed under the Digital Security Act passed in 2018 , according to the human rights group Odhikar .
Don @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sri Lanka , last year was record-setting—and not in a good way .
A record 361 elephants died in the country 2019—mostly because of humans , according to a report this week .
In Sri Lanka , elephants ’ habitats are shrinking as farming expands , increasing contact and conflict between people and pachyderm , according to the Sri Lankan Centre for Conservation and Research .
The Afghan refugee population in Pakistan is one of the largest in the world .
The majority of other Afghan refugees—1 million people—live in Iran .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: India hits Amazon and Walmart with an antitrust case , a Pakistani high court overturns an ex-leader’s death sentence, and why Bangladesh arrested a top Sufi singer .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: India hits Amazon and Walmart with an antitrust case, a Pakistani high court overturns an ex-leader’s death sentence, and why Bangladesh arrested a top Sufi singer.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday, please sign up here.
The World’s Richest Person Goes to India
When Amazon founder and CEO Jeff Bezos decided to visit India this week, he may have imagined the country and its struggling economy would welcome him with open arms. It seems the opposite will happen. On Monday, India’s antitrust regulator ordered a formal probe of allegations that Amazon and Walmart’s Flipkart were promoting some brands over others—practices that would violate Indian laws requiring foreign-owned e-commerce businesses to be neutral marketplaces.
It’s not just legal trouble that awaits the world’s richest man in India. On Wednesday, a trade union representing 70 million brick and mortar retailers has planned protests in 300 cities. “Bezos and Amazon have already destroyed many small businesses and are now trying to build a false narrative of empowering small retailers,” Praveen Khandelwal, the leader of the Confederation of All India Traders, told Bloomberg.
Economic dilemma. New Delhi needs all the foreign investment it can get: New projections show that India’s economy will grow by just 5 percent this year. Given the immense potential market in India, major players such as Amazon and Walmart have long jostled for influence in the e-commerce space. But the small merchants whose trade lobby is organizing Wednesday’s protests control 90 percent of India’s retail, and they broadly support protectionist measures.
There is also often widespread opposition to privatization in India. Last week, banks and businesses closed as millions of workers protested against proposed government divestment from creaking enterprises such as Air India, Bharat Petroleum, and the Shipping Corporation of India. The workers fear the job cuts that would inevitably follow private ownership.
Local challenge. When India introduced new laws in 2018 barring foreign-owned companies from selling their own inventory—forcing companies such as Amazon to operate more like eBay and sell only third-party goods—it opened the door for local companies to exploit the e-commerce market. Reliance, the country’s biggest company by market capitalization, is jumping into the fray with Jiomart . If the platform succeeds, it could link up the millions of mom and pop stores around India, creating better supply chains. But it would be yet another sign to foreign companies that New Delhi can change its laws at any time to favor its own.
As shown below, India has the world’s largest population of people who have yet to use the internet—another reason why foreign companies such as Google, Facebook, Apple, and Uber see it as a massive potential growth market.
Global Internet Use Top Countries, 2018
SOURCE: Mary Meeker’s Internet Trends 2019
What We’re Following
Pakistan overturns ex-dictator’s death sentence. A Pakistani high court on Monday overturned a death sentence issued to retired Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the military dictator who ruled the country from 2001 to 2008. The court said that the case, which alleged that Musharraf committed high treason and subverted the constitution, was politically motivated and that the special court that handled it was unconstitutional. Musharraf may be in the clear, but one of the problems that plagued his tenure, domestic terrorism, persists. Last Friday, a suicide bomber killed at least 15 people in an attack on a mosque in Quetta. The Islamic State claimed responsibility, saying it was targeting a Taliban seminary. (Local Islamic State branches are splinters from the Taliban.)
Will Kashmir go back online? Late last week, India’s Supreme Court ruled that internet access is protected by the constitution and gave the government one week to review its digital blackout in Indian-administered Kashmir—now the longest ever imposed by a democracy. Kashmiris have largely been without internet access since August 2019, just before Prime Minister Narendra Modi revoked Kashmir’s special status. India is a world leader in internet shutdowns, recording more than Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, and Ethiopia combined.
No refuge for Afghans. Tens of thousands of Afghan refugees cross the border into Iran in search of a better life every year. Against a background of regional turmoil, Iran has ramped up its efforts to deport them. In 2019 alone, the country sent more than 450,000 people back to Afghanistan—where many fall prey to human smugglers in desperate attempts to return to Iran, Ruchi Kumar and Hikmat Noori report for FP.
Question of the Week
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are as of 2018 around 2.4 million registered refugees from Afghanistan around the world. While many end up in Iran, the majority are in Pakistan. How many?
A) 1 million
B) 1.2 million
C) 1.4 million
D) 2 million
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
Oyo scales back. The Japanese conglomerate SoftBank’s troubles now extend to India. The Indian startup hotel chain Oyo, backed heavily by SoftBank funds, is eliminating 2,000 jobs around the world and cutting back on rooms. Oyo is one of several SoftBank-backed companies that have recently come under scrutiny: WeWork, the dog-walking startup Wag, and the delivery app Rappi have faced similar problems with overpriced valuations and job cuts. Earlier this month, the New York Times published an expose on Oyo’s questionable business practices, including potential bribes to government officials.
Odds and Ends
Off key. Police in Bangladesh arrested a renowned Sufi folk singer, Shariat Sarker, for “hurting the religious sentiment of Muslims” on Monday. The initial case against Sarker was filed by an Islamic scholar over comments made at a show last month and posted on YouTube. (Sarker reportedly said the Quran did not prohibit practicing music.) Hundreds of people protested last week calling for his arrest. At least 29 people have been jailed under the Digital Security Act passed in 2018, according to the human rights group Odhikar.
Don’t forget the elephants. For Sri Lanka, last year was record-setting—and not in a good way. A record 361 elephants died in the country 2019—mostly because of humans, according to a report this week. In Sri Lanka, elephants’ habitats are shrinking as farming expands, increasing contact and conflict between people and pachyderm, according to the Sri Lankan Centre for Conservation and Research.
And the Answer Is…
C) 1.4 million
The Afghan refugee population in Pakistan is one of the largest in the world. The majority of other Afghan refugees—1 million people—live in Iran.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-14--Nervous U.S. Allies Brace for Iran Fallout

Caught off guard by U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s decision to order the killing of the most powerful Iranian general , the United States ’ longtime Gulf and European allies are eyeing Washington nervously and bracing for further retaliation from Tehran .
The strike on Qassem Suleimani , the commander of Iran ’ s elite Quds Force , was an unexpected blow to Tehran after months of a muted U.S. response to the regime ’ s increased aggressiveness across the region .
And it seems to have demonstrated that the United States was serious about enforcing the president ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But it also caught close U.S. allies in the Middle East and Europe flat-footed and—despite an apparent de-escalation in the wake of a token Iranian missile attack on Jan. 8—has sparked fears of an uptick in violence that would be primarily felt in their backyard .
Trump ’ s unpredictable behavior and inflammatory rhetoric have these nations worried that , while the U.S. president will respond forcefully when American lives are at stake , he may not have their backs if regional interests are threatened .
Trump , for instance , declined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saudi oil facilities last September , a surprisingly subdued response for an administration that has said protecting Saudi Arabia is a policy priority .
“ On the one hand , they are happy that Trump is willing to sanction and pressure and take Iran down a notch , ” said Ilan Goldenberg , an expert on Middle East issues with the Center for a New American Security .
But on the other : “ They are nervous that he is unsteady and goes too far .
… No one really knows what Donald @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no love lost for Suleimani , who is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American and coalition forces in Iraq alone , behind closed doors , Gulf nations , in particular , blame the United States for unnecessarily escalating the crisis , current and former officials told Foreign Policy .
After the strike , Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly was so alarmed that he dispatched his younger brother Khalid bin Salman , the deputy defense minister , to Washington to urge restraint .
Riyadh ’ s vulnerability to Iran was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drone and missile attack on Saudi Arabia ’ s Abqaiq oil processing facility .
Next time , officials worry that Tehran could go after even more critical infrastructure—such as desalination plants , which provide clean water to the population .
Barbara Leaf , a former U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates , said Gulf allies are watching Trump with trepidation—particularly his comments signaling that he wants to bring U.S. troops home from the Middle East and touting U.S. energy independence .
“ There is huge relief , even glee , I ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ great uncertainty on both counts : How will the Iranians ultimately respond because [ the missile strike ] was just an initial dish on the menu , and then what does the U.S. administration intend to do , and what is its larger strategy ?
” Leaf said .
Top administration officials insist that killing Suleimani will make Iran think twice before lashing out at the United States again , though they still acknowledge that Iran poses a lingering threat .
“ We now enjoy a great position of strength regarding Iran .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ has ever been , and Iran has never been in the place that it is today , ” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a speech at Stanford University on Monday .
“ We have reestablished deterrence , but we know it ’ s not everlasting , that risk remains .
We are determined not to lose that deterrence.
” Retired Gen. Jack Keane , a close confidant of the president , said the attack on Suleimani was a “ turning point ” that has caused Iran to reevaluate its dealings in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retaliatory strikes on U.S. and coalition troops in Iraq , which did damage to infrastructure but did not cause a single death , were “ rather insignificant ” compared with the regime ’ s rhetoric .
It is “ noteworthy ” that Iran took direct responsibility for the strikes , rather than handing the job over to proxies , because it wanted to “ control the outcome , ” he said .
“ Khamenei blinked , ” Keane said , referring to Iran ’ s supreme leader , Ayatollah Ali Khamenei .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 40 years , and both times it had to do with American use of force.
” But privately , some current and former officials said U.S. allies were not so sure .
“ None of them think we ’ ve deterred Iran , ” one former U.S. administration official said .
Many Gulf and European partners are “ panicking ” because no one understands the U.S. strategy or can predict what Iran will do next , said Ariane Tabatabai , an analyst with the Rand Corp. , a U.S.-based think tank .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ lack of coordination ahead of the attack and confusing messaging from the administration afterward .
With its actions over the last six months since Iran started lashing out , the United States has sent a signal that it will respond only if U.S. interests are threatened—and even then the red line is unclear .
In the eyes of U.S. allies , the Trump administration ’ s response to Iran ’ s aggression is difficult to predict .
After Iran shot down a U.S. drone in June 2019 , Trump said he approved and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ targets .
“ We will go from 0 to 100 if there is a single American casualty , but we ’ re not going to do anything if Iran attacks major facilities ” in the region , Tabatabai said .
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain , two countries that have taken a hard line on Iran , were likely more supportive of the strike than some other countries , but there is still concern about the impact on the region , Tabatabai said .
The Emiratis are also tough on Iran but have economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of energy—that could be hurt by any escalation in the region .
Oman and Qatar , meanwhile , are more sympathetic to Iran and have tried hard to balance the opposing interests in the Gulf .
Among America ’ s Western allies , countries with forces in the region , such as Britain and Canada , have moved to temporarily withdraw or reposition their troops , bracing for further Iranian reprisals .
NATO also paused its training mission in Iraq after Suleimani ’ s killing , citing concern for the safety of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington and its European allies , who privately remain angry that they weren ’ t notified in advance that the United States would carry out a strike on Suleimani—even after Trump sought to ease tensions with Tehran , experts and several European officials said .
Tom Tugendhat , a top Conservative member of the British Parliament , complained about allies being left in the dark on such decisions .
“ I ’ ve long believed that the purpose of having allies is that we can surprise our enemies and not each other , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , sadly , which has been a bit of a shame , that the U.S. administration of late has not shared with us , and that is a matter of concern , ” he said in an interview with BBC News after Suleimani ’ s assassination .
“ European allies are understandably frustrated , ” said Rachel Rizzo , a Berlin-based expert on trans-Atlantic relations with the Center for a New American Security .
She said keeping allies in the dark on major policy decisions is part of a pattern under this administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were notified of the impending strike is exactly the kind of surprise from the Trump administration that places stress on the U.S.-European relationship , ” she said .
“ It ’ s similar to when the administration suddenly announced it was pulling U.S. troops from Syria and the Europeans were caught totally off guard.
” Although Iranian officials have ratcheted down rhetoric in recent days , experts caution against taking Tehran at its word that the conflict is over .
While they acknowledge that Iran ’ s direct retaliation is done , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proxies to carry out attacks against Western forces .
“ They are going to take their time , and they are going to revert to the playbook of indirect action—that ’ s where they have the advantage , ” Leaf said .

Caught off guard by U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to order the killing of the most powerful Iranian general, the United States’ longtime Gulf and European allies are eyeing Washington nervously and bracing for further retaliation from Tehran.
Caught off guard by U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to order the killing of the most powerful Iranian general, the United States’ longtime Gulf and European allies are eyeing Washington nervously and bracing for further retaliation from Tehran.
The strike on Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force, was an unexpected blow to Tehran after months of a muted U.S. response to the regime’s increased aggressiveness across the region. And it seems to have demonstrated that the United States was serious about enforcing the president’s red line—the death of an American.
But it also caught close U.S. allies in the Middle East and Europe flat-footed and—despite an apparent de-escalation in the wake of a token Iranian missile attack on Jan. 8—has sparked fears of an uptick in violence that would be primarily felt in their backyard. Trump’s unpredictable behavior and inflammatory rhetoric have these nations worried that, while the U.S. president will respond forcefully when American lives are at stake, he may not have their backs if regional interests are threatened. Trump, for instance, declined to respond after Iran allegedly struck key Saudi oil facilities last September, a surprisingly subdued response for an administration that has said protecting Saudi Arabia is a policy priority.
“On the one hand, they are happy that Trump is willing to sanction and pressure and take Iran down a notch,” said Ilan Goldenberg, an expert on Middle East issues with the Center for a New American Security. But on the other: “They are nervous that he is unsteady and goes too far. … No one really knows what Donald Trump will do.”
Although there is no love lost for Suleimani, who is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American and coalition forces in Iraq alone, behind closed doors, Gulf nations, in particular, blame the United States for unnecessarily escalating the crisis, current and former officials told Foreign Policy. After the strike, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly was so alarmed that he dispatched his younger brother Khalid bin Salman, the deputy defense minister, to Washington to urge restraint.
Riyadh’s vulnerability to Iran was on sharp display in September by the drone and missile attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil processing facility. Next time, officials worry that Tehran could go after even more critical infrastructure—such as desalination plants, which provide clean water to the population.
Barbara Leaf, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, said Gulf allies are watching Trump with trepidation—particularly his comments signaling that he wants to bring U.S. troops home from the Middle East and touting U.S. energy independence.
“There is huge relief, even glee, I’m sure in private quarters, but great uncertainty on both counts: How will the Iranians ultimately respond because [the missile strike] was just an initial dish on the menu, and then what does the U.S. administration intend to do, and what is its larger strategy?” Leaf said.
Top administration officials insist that killing Suleimani will make Iran think twice before lashing out at the United States again, though they still acknowledge that Iran poses a lingering threat. “We now enjoy a great position of strength regarding Iran. It’s as good as it has ever been, and Iran has never been in the place that it is today,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a speech at Stanford University on Monday. “We have reestablished deterrence, but we know it’s not everlasting, that risk remains. We are determined not to lose that deterrence.”
Retired Gen. Jack Keane, a close confidant of the president, said the attack on Suleimani was a “turning point” that has caused Iran to reevaluate its dealings in the region. Keane noted that the retaliatory strikes on U.S. and coalition troops in Iraq, which did damage to infrastructure but did not cause a single death, were “rather insignificant” compared with the regime’s rhetoric.
It is “noteworthy” that Iran took direct responsibility for the strikes, rather than handing the job over to proxies, because it wanted to “control the outcome,” he said.
“Khamenei blinked,” Keane said, referring to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “He’s only done it twice in 40 years, and both times it had to do with American use of force.”
But privately, some current and former officials said U.S. allies were not so sure. “None of them think we’ve deterred Iran,” one former U.S. administration official said.
Many Gulf and European partners are “panicking” because no one understands the U.S. strategy or can predict what Iran will do next, said Ariane Tabatabai, an analyst with the Rand Corp., a U.S.-based think tank. She said she was struck by the lack of coordination ahead of the attack and confusing messaging from the administration afterward.
With its actions over the last six months since Iran started lashing out, the United States has sent a signal that it will respond only if U.S. interests are threatened—and even then the red line is unclear. In the eyes of U.S. allies, the Trump administration’s response to Iran’s aggression is difficult to predict. After Iran shot down a U.S. drone in June 2019, Trump said he approved and then abruptly called off strikes against Iranian targets.
“We will go from 0 to 100 if there is a single American casualty, but we’re not going to do anything if Iran attacks major facilities” in the region, Tabatabai said.
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, two countries that have taken a hard line on Iran, were likely more supportive of the strike than some other countries, but there is still concern about the impact on the region, Tabatabai said. The Emiratis are also tough on Iran but have economic interests—for example, tourism and the flow of energy—that could be hurt by any escalation in the region. Oman and Qatar, meanwhile, are more sympathetic to Iran and have tried hard to balance the opposing interests in the Gulf.
Among America’s Western allies, countries with forces in the region, such as Britain and Canada, have moved to temporarily withdraw or reposition their troops, bracing for further Iranian reprisals. NATO also paused its training mission in Iraq after Suleimani’s killing, citing concern for the safety of its personnel. These moves exacerbated tensions between Washington and its European allies, who privately remain angry that they weren’t notified in advance that the United States would carry out a strike on Suleimani—even after Trump sought to ease tensions with Tehran, experts and several European officials said.
Tom Tugendhat, a top Conservative member of the British Parliament, complained about allies being left in the dark on such decisions. “I’ve long believed that the purpose of having allies is that we can surprise our enemies and not each other, and it’s been a pattern, sadly, which has been a bit of a shame, that the U.S. administration of late has not shared with us, and that is a matter of concern,” he said in an interview with BBC News after Suleimani’s assassination.
“European allies are understandably frustrated,” said Rachel Rizzo, a Berlin-based expert on trans-Atlantic relations with the Center for a New American Security. She said keeping allies in the dark on major policy decisions is part of a pattern under this administration.
“The fact that no allies were notified of the impending strike is exactly the kind of surprise from the Trump administration that places stress on the U.S.-European relationship,” she said. “It’s similar to when the administration suddenly announced it was pulling U.S. troops from Syria and the Europeans were caught totally off guard.”
Although Iranian officials have ratcheted down rhetoric in recent days, experts caution against taking Tehran at its word that the conflict is over. While they acknowledge that Iran’s direct retaliation is done, the regime will likely enlist its many global proxies to carry out attacks against Western forces.
“They are going to take their time, and they are going to revert to the playbook of indirect action—that’s where they have the advantage,” Leaf said.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-14--Mexican Diplomacy Has Gone Feminist

Mexican Diplomacy Has Gone Feminist

Last week , Mexico became the first global south country—and only the third country worldwide—to launch an explicitly feminist foreign policy .
With this new policy platform , the government is setting a new global standard and , in its own words , “ breaking glass ceilings.
” “ The government of Mexico is feminist , and our foreign policy should be , too , ” said Foreign Secretary Marcelo Luis Ebrard Casaubón .
Starting now , the new policy mandates that gender equality be core to all aspects of Mexican foreign policy .
The first feminist foreign policy was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ giggles ” and suspicion at the time , according to then-Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom .
Canada became the second , with its Feminist International Assistance Policy , in 2017 , followed by announcements by Mexico , France , and Luxembourg that such policies were under development .
And last week , Mexico publicly rolled out its new policy guidance as all of Mexico ’ s ambassadors and heads of mission were gathered in Mexico City for their annual training and policy updates .
The Mexican policy is already setting the tone for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as they grapple with how best to take on the most pressing issues facing the world today : violence and war , climate change , and structural and social inequality .
But what exactly is a “ feminist ” foreign policy ?
Following more than a year of global consultation and research on the world ’ s handful of existing feminist foreign policies , the International Center for Research on Women has established a working definition for government policy that “ prioritizes gender equality and enshrines the human rights of women and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to achieve that vision and seeks through its implementation to disrupt patriarchal and male-dominated power structures across all of its levers of influence ( aid , trade , defense and diplomacy ) , informed by the voices of feminist activists , groups and movements.
” By our measure , the Mexican government has laid out a foundation for what is emerging as a global gold standard .
“ Mexico is determined to move forward a progressive foreign policy , ” said Cristopher Ballinas Valdés , the director-general for human rights and democracy at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a main focus on promoting human rights , equality , and women ’ s rights .
The feminist foreign policy is based on five principles that rule all foreign-policy activities.
” Those five principles include : conducting all aspects of foreign policy with the intent to advance gender equality and a feminist agenda ; achieving gender parity at all levels of staff in the foreign ministry ; combatting all forms of gender-based violence , including within the ministry ; making equality visible ; and practicing intersectional feminism , which is to say , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s rights but also other intersecting social , economic , and environmental justice issues .
The government of Mexico has opted for a very broad vision for what its policy would achieve—not simply the advancement of women , but also the fulfilment of rights for lesbian , gay , bisexual , and transgender people ( the Mexican foreign ministry participated in Mexico City ’ s pride march for the first time last year ) and the advancement of broader social and economic justice initiatives .
Quoting work by the International Center for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obligates Mexican leadership to advance “ issues that others are not prioritizing , ” including sexual and reproductive health and rights , as well as climate change .
Given the prevalence of gender-based violence and femicide in Mexico , the new policy marks a welcome change of pace .
With the policy , according to Ballinas Valdés , “ Mexico will pay justice to a long overdue agenda on women ’ s and girls ’ rights.
” This is the first time such an overt women ’ s rights agenda has been advanced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inside the ministry have indicated that the establishment of a gender-balanced cabinet in President Andrés Manuel López Obrador ’ s administration went a long way toward enabling such change .
Mexico ’ s feminist foreign policy commits to an ambitious number of immediate actions across all five areas of engagement , stipulating precise timelines by which they are to be achieved .
Trainings , workshops , working groups , and manuals are to be developed and deployed within the first year .
By 2024 , the government is aiming for full employment parity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a gender lens to every foreign-policy position , resolution , and mandate .
This is a tall order—and one that will undoubtedly encounter resistance .
But if past is prologue , Mexico seems positioned to excel .
The new policy ’ s antecedents have already been shaping Mexico ’ s behavior internally and on the world stage .
Case in point , Mexico took a clear leadership position at the United Nations Climate Change Conference ( COP25 ) held last month in Spain , where the government promoted gender equality as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change .
“ [ Mexico is ] simply one of the few countries that comes to the table with gender equality and human rights as a red line , ” said conference attendee Bridget Burns , a climate activist and the executive director of the Women ’ s Environment and Development Organization .
“ Many other actors say it ’ s a priority for them , but Mexico showed real strength in not letting these principles become bargaining chips in a process that often dwindles issues down to the lowest common denominator.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the likely outcome of COP25 at one point , as countries worked together to exclude activists from the negotiations and even locked a number of activists and indigenous women out of in the cold .
But Mexican negotiators made sure feminist climate activists had a seat at the table and led a process that ultimately developed a Gender Action Plan , one of the only tangible outcomes in a conference that otherwise “ fell short ” of meaningful progress on climate initiatives .
“ Having witnessed Mexico championing human rights and gender equality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negotiations , it ’ s exciting to see the launch of this feminist foreign policy , principled on an intersectional feminist approach , ” Burns said .
“ We know that to be truly ‘ feminist , ’ foreign policy must understand gender equality in the context of all issues , from environment and trade , to peace and economy .
We look forward to seeing Mexico put these words into action , and to serving as inspiration for other governments , particularly given their leadership in the upcoming Beijing+25 Generation Equality Forum.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action , watershed agreements outlining women ’ s human rights .
It also marks the first major multilateral test of Mexico ’ s new foreign policy .
Mexico and France , which has also recently announced but not yet released a feminist foreign policy , will be co-hosting a “ champions only ” progressive , multilateral space , where heads of state from progressive countries will gather to make commitments to the next generation of women ’ s rights issues .
The path forward will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policies , including that of the United States , have instilled little trust in some governments to advance and protect the women ’ s rights standards laid out 25 years ago .
But if Mexico ’ s level of ambition and the growing number of countries turning their eyes on their own foreign policies are signs of what is to come , the momentum may be just enough to carry this movement forward .
“ It ’ s very encouraging to see , ” said Kristina Lunz , a co-founder of the Centre @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Mexico the first global south country presented a feminist foreign policy .
In international circles , there still tends to be this biased perception that industrial countries such as Germany would be leading on topics of social justice and equality—but especially when it comes to feminism in foreign policy , Germany and others can learn lots from Mexico .
”

Last week, Mexico became the first global south country—and only the third country worldwide—to launch an explicitly feminist foreign policy. With this new policy platform , the government is setting a new global standard and, in its own words, “breaking glass ceilings.”
Last week, Mexico became the first global south country—and only the third country worldwide—to launch an explicitly feminist foreign policy. With this new policy platform, the government is setting a new global standard and, in its own words, “breaking glass ceilings.”
“The government of Mexico is feminist, and our foreign policy should be, too,” said Foreign Secretary Marcelo Luis Ebrard Casaubón. Starting now, the new policy mandates that gender equality be core to all aspects of Mexican foreign policy.
The first feminist foreign policy was debuted by Sweden in 2014, to “giggles” and suspicion at the time, according to then-Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom. Canada became the second, with its Feminist International Assistance Policy, in 2017, followed by announcements by Mexico, France, and Luxembourg that such policies were under development. And last week, Mexico publicly rolled out its new policy guidance as all of Mexico’s ambassadors and heads of mission were gathered in Mexico City for their annual training and policy updates.
The Mexican policy is already setting the tone for other countries that want to follow suit as they grapple with how best to take on the most pressing issues facing the world today: violence and war, climate change, and structural and social inequality.
But what exactly is a “feminist” foreign policy?
Following more than a year of global consultation and research on the world’s handful of existing feminist foreign policies, the International Center for Research on Women has established a working definition for government policy that “prioritizes gender equality and enshrines the human rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups, allocates significant resources to achieve that vision and seeks through its implementation to disrupt patriarchal and male-dominated power structures across all of its levers of influence (aid, trade, defense and diplomacy), informed by the voices of feminist activists, groups and movements.”
By our measure, the Mexican government has laid out a foundation for what is emerging as a global gold standard. “Mexico is determined to move forward a progressive foreign policy,” said Cristopher Ballinas Valdés, the director-general for human rights and democracy at the Mexican foreign ministry, “with a main focus on promoting human rights, equality, and women’s rights. The feminist foreign policy is based on five principles that rule all foreign-policy activities.”
Those five principles include: conducting all aspects of foreign policy with the intent to advance gender equality and a feminist agenda; achieving gender parity at all levels of staff in the foreign ministry; combatting all forms of gender-based violence, including within the ministry; making equality visible; and practicing intersectional feminism, which is to say, an approach that values not only women’s rights but also other intersecting social, economic, and environmental justice issues.
The government of Mexico has opted for a very broad vision for what its policy would achieve—not simply the advancement of women, but also the fulfilment of rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people (the Mexican foreign ministry participated in Mexico City’s pride march for the first time last year) and the advancement of broader social and economic justice initiatives. Quoting work by the International Center for Research on Women, the policy explicitly obligates Mexican leadership to advance “issues that others are not prioritizing,” including sexual and reproductive health and rights, as well as climate change.
Given the prevalence of gender-based violence and femicide in Mexico, the new policy marks a welcome change of pace. With the policy, according to Ballinas Valdés, “Mexico will pay justice to a long overdue agenda on women’s and girls’ rights.” This is the first time such an overt women’s rights agenda has been advanced in Mexican foreign policy, and officials inside the ministry have indicated that the establishment of a gender-balanced cabinet in President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s administration went a long way toward enabling such change.
Mexico’s feminist foreign policy commits to an ambitious number of immediate actions across all five areas of engagement, stipulating precise timelines by which they are to be achieved. Trainings, workshops, working groups, and manuals are to be developed and deployed within the first year. By 2024, the government is aiming for full employment parity, equal pay, and the application of a gender lens to every foreign-policy position, resolution, and mandate. This is a tall order—and one that will undoubtedly encounter resistance.
But if past is prologue, Mexico seems positioned to excel. The new policy’s antecedents have already been shaping Mexico’s behavior internally and on the world stage. Case in point, Mexico took a clear leadership position at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25) held last month in Spain, where the government promoted gender equality as a nonnegotiable component of any agreement on climate change.
“[Mexico is] simply one of the few countries that comes to the table with gender equality and human rights as a red line,” said conference attendee Bridget Burns, a climate activist and the executive director of the Women’s Environment and Development Organization. “Many other actors say it’s a priority for them, but Mexico showed real strength in not letting these principles become bargaining chips in a process that often dwindles issues down to the lowest common denominator.”
The lowest common denominator appeared to be the likely outcome of COP25 at one point, as countries worked together to exclude activists from the negotiations and even locked a number of activists and indigenous women out of in the cold. But Mexican negotiators made sure feminist climate activists had a seat at the table and led a process that ultimately developed a Gender Action Plan, one of the only tangible outcomes in a conference that otherwise “fell short” of meaningful progress on climate initiatives.
“Having witnessed Mexico championing human rights and gender equality in the context of the U.N. climate negotiations, it’s exciting to see the launch of this feminist foreign policy, principled on an intersectional feminist approach,” Burns said. “We know that to be truly ‘feminist,’ foreign policy must understand gender equality in the context of all issues, from environment and trade, to peace and economy. We look forward to seeing Mexico put these words into action, and to serving as inspiration for other governments, particularly given their leadership in the upcoming Beijing+25 Generation Equality Forum.”
That forum marks the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, watershed agreements outlining women’s human rights. It also marks the first major multilateral test of Mexico’s new foreign policy. Mexico and France, which has also recently announced but not yet released a feminist foreign policy, will be co-hosting a “champions only” progressive, multilateral space, where heads of state from progressive countries will gather to make commitments to the next generation of women’s rights issues.
The path forward will not be an easy one. Retrogressive foreign policies, including that of the United States, have instilled little trust in some governments to advance and protect the women’s rights standards laid out 25 years ago. But if Mexico’s level of ambition and the growing number of countries turning their eyes on their own foreign policies are signs of what is to come, the momentum may be just enough to carry this movement forward.
“It’s very encouraging to see,” said Kristina Lunz, a co-founder of the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, “that with Mexico the first global south country presented a feminist foreign policy. In international circles, there still tends to be this biased perception that industrial countries such as Germany would be leading on topics of social justice and equality—but especially when it comes to feminism in foreign policy, Germany and others can learn lots from Mexico.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--European Powers Censure Iran Over Nuclear Breaches

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The European signatories to the 2015 nuclear deal formally accuse Iran of breaching it , the U.S. and China are set to sign their “ phase one ” trade deal , and foreign policy at last takes center stage in a U.S. Democratic presidential debate .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Britain , France , and Germany on Tuesday took formal action against Iran for its breaches of the 2015 nuclear agreement , triggering the deal ’ s so-called dispute settlement mechanism .
That could mean the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the pact , but the European parties insist they want to keep the deal afloat .
The mechanism now begins a 65-day review period for all remaining signatories to the deal , including Iran and Russia .
( It ’ s not yet clear if the United States will play a role . )
The Europeans have distanced themselves from the U.S. “ maximum pressure ” campaign against Iran , but the decision to trigger the dispute mechanism does mark a desperate attempt to save the nuclear deal , as FP ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been alarmed about Iran ’ s recent breaches , particularly its growing uranium enrichment capacity .
Doomed strategy ?
“ Our goal is clear , ” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said on Tuesday .
“ We want to preserve the accord and come to a diplomatic solution within the agreement.
” Still , the dispute settlement process could portend the deal ’ s ultimate demise .
Iran still hinges its return to compliance with the accord on relief from crippling U.S. sanctions amid the highest tensions between the countries in decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ question of Iran ’ s compliance will first be put to a joint commission of signatories to the deal , who might not agree .
Russia criticized the decision to trigger the mechanism .
Iran , meanwhile , immediately dismissed the move .
“ The usage of the dispute mechanism is legally baseless and a strategic mistake from a political standpoint , ” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Tuesday .
U.S. and China sign “ phase one ” trade deal .
The United States and China will ink a preliminary trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two years of trade war .
But the “ phase one ” agreement is more of a negotiating victory than a full trade truce , as FP ’ s Keith Johnson explained last month .
It ’ s not yet clear how the terms will play out : While China has agreed to buy nearly $ 80 billion of U.S. goods , skeptics say that target isn ’ t realistic .
Plus , existing U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods will likely remain until the 2020 U.S. presidential election—with reductions contingent on China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cracks down on dissent .
Iran announced on Tuesday that it had detained at least 30 people for protesting against the government after it admitted its military mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane amid heightened tensions with the United States .
It has also arrested people allegedly responsible for downing the plane .
Amid the unrest , the government still appears desperate to control the narrative .
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps detained one person who posted a video of a missile hitting the plane , and several journalists have resigned from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ admission .
Despite the apparent de-escalation after Iran ’ s missile attack last week , U.S. allies in the Middle East and Europe remain nervous about the possibility of increased violence in the region , Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer report .
U.S. Democratic candidates take on foreign policy .
In Tuesday ’ s Democratic debate , foreign policy at last took center stage , as six candidates sparred over the Middle East , North Korea , trade , and national security issues .
All appeared to agree on the urgency of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plans to make the United States carbon neutral in the next three decades .
Both former Vice President Joe Biden and Mayor Pete Buttigieg called for replacing the president ’ s 9/11-era authorizations for use of military force—an issue that has taken on new urgency after a dangerous escalation of U.S.-Iran tensions last week .
Sudan ’ s government .
Sudan ’ s new government confronted the biggest challenge to its administration on Tuesday , putting down a revolt by security agents associated with ousted President Omar al-Bashir .
Demanding better severance pay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ headquarters , leading to a 15-hour standoff .
( Bashir ’ s security service was disbanded after the April coup . )
The German economy .
Germany will release its 2019 GDP data today .
It is expected to show that its economic growth is slowing significantly .
After expanding by 1.5 percent in 2018 , the German economy likely grew only 0.5 percent last year—weighed down by trade conflicts , political uncertainty , and a downturn in the auto industry .
Ethiopia ’ s dam dispute .
Today marks the deadline for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resolve their disagreement over Ethiopia ’ s hydropower dam project on the Nile , but the countries remain deadlocked after U.S.-sponsored talks .
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has now called on South Africa to intervene in the years-long dispute .
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador put his presidential jet up for sale a year ago as part of his austerity program .
But Mexico hasn ’ t been able to sell the Boeing Dreamliner—which can ’ t be converted back into a commercial plane—and it has racked up $ 1.5 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government is just hoping to offset its losses on the plane .
It ’ s also placed another 19 planes and nine helicopters up for auction .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The European signatories to the 2015 nuclear deal formally accuse Iran of breaching it, the U.S. and China are set to sign their “phase one” trade deal , and foreign policy at last takes center stage in a U.S. Democratic presidential debate .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The European signatories to the 2015 nuclear deal formally accuse Iran of breaching it, the U.S. and China are set to sign their “phase one” trade deal, and foreign policy at last takes center stage in a U.S. Democratic presidential debate.
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European Powers Accuse Iran of Nuclear Breaches
Britain, France, and Germany on Tuesday took formal action against Iran for its breaches of the 2015 nuclear agreement, triggering the deal’s so-called dispute settlement mechanism. That could mean the eventual return of the U.N. sanctions lifted by the pact, but the European parties insist they want to keep the deal afloat. The mechanism now begins a 65-day review period for all remaining signatories to the deal, including Iran and Russia. (It’s not yet clear if the United States will play a role.)
The Europeans have distanced themselves from the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, but the decision to trigger the dispute mechanism does mark a desperate attempt to save the nuclear deal, as FP’s Colum Lynch explains. European leaders have been alarmed about Iran’s recent breaches, particularly its growing uranium enrichment capacity.
Doomed strategy? “Our goal is clear,” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said on Tuesday. “We want to preserve the accord and come to a diplomatic solution within the agreement.” Still, the dispute settlement process could portend the deal’s ultimate demise. Iran still hinges its return to compliance with the accord on relief from crippling U.S. sanctions amid the highest tensions between the countries in decades.
What’s next? The question of Iran’s compliance will first be put to a joint commission of signatories to the deal, who might not agree. Russia criticized the decision to trigger the mechanism. Iran, meanwhile, immediately dismissed the move. “The usage of the dispute mechanism is legally baseless and a strategic mistake from a political standpoint,” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Tuesday.
What We’re Following Today
U.S. and China sign “phase one” trade deal. The United States and China will ink a preliminary trade deal today in Washington, after nearly two years of trade war. But the “phase one” agreement is more of a negotiating victory than a full trade truce, as FP’s Keith Johnson explained last month. It’s not yet clear how the terms will play out: While China has agreed to buy nearly $80 billion of U.S. goods, skeptics say that target isn’t realistic. Plus, existing U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods will likely remain until the 2020 U.S. presidential election—with reductions contingent on China’s compliance with the deal.
Iran cracks down on dissent. Iran announced on Tuesday that it had detained at least 30 people for protesting against the government after it admitted its military mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane amid heightened tensions with the United States. It has also arrested people allegedly responsible for downing the plane. Amid the unrest, the government still appears desperate to control the narrative. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps detained one person who posted a video of a missile hitting the plane, and several journalists have resigned from state media in the aftermath of the admission.
Despite the apparent de-escalation after Iran’s missile attack last week, U.S. allies in the Middle East and Europe remain nervous about the possibility of increased violence in the region, Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer report.
U.S. Democratic candidates take on foreign policy. In Tuesday’s Democratic debate, foreign policy at last took center stage, as six candidates sparred over the Middle East, North Korea, trade, and national security issues. All appeared to agree on the urgency of the climate crisis, and most have outlined plans to make the United States carbon neutral in the next three decades. Both former Vice President Joe Biden and Mayor Pete Buttigieg called for replacing the president’s 9/11-era authorizations for use of military force—an issue that has taken on new urgency after a dangerous escalation of U.S.-Iran tensions last week.
Keep an Eye On
Sudan’s government. Sudan’s new government confronted the biggest challenge to its administration on Tuesday, putting down a revolt by security agents associated with ousted President Omar al-Bashir. Demanding better severance pay, the security agents stormed the intelligence headquarters, leading to a 15-hour standoff. (Bashir’s security service was disbanded after the April coup.)
The German economy. Germany will release its 2019 GDP data today. It is expected to show that its economic growth is slowing significantly. After expanding by 1.5 percent in 2018, the German economy likely grew only 0.5 percent last year—weighed down by trade conflicts, political uncertainty, and a downturn in the auto industry.
Ethiopia’s dam dispute. Today marks the deadline for Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to resolve their disagreement over Ethiopia’s hydropower dam project on the Nile, but the countries remain deadlocked after U.S.-sponsored talks. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has now called on South Africa to intervene in the years-long dispute.
Odds and Ends
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador put his presidential jet up for sale a year ago as part of his austerity program. But Mexico hasn’t been able to sell the Boeing Dreamliner—which can’t be converted back into a commercial plane—and it has racked up $1.5 million in maintenance costs. Now, the government is just hoping to offset its losses on the plane. It’s also placed another 19 planes and nine helicopters up for auction.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Robbie Gramer contributed to this report.