foreignpolicy--2020-09-24--The U.S. Needs An Endgame Before It Plunges Into the Next Cold War

The U.S .
Needs An Endgame Before It Plunges Into the Next Cold War The U.S. government has decided it is time to confront the People ’ s Republic of China , leading to what some have called “ a new cold war ” or the more benign and official “ great-power competition.
” But as many have pointed out , the United States currently lacks a coherent strategy about how to confront China .
Busy giving speeches and exploring new ways to hit China , U.S. officials are making the case that this confrontation is necessary to preserve freedom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must fight to win .
But nobody in Washington seems to have asked the most important question : How does this end ?
You never start a conflict , be it a real war or a “ just ” a cold one , without asking this question .
The United States ’ two greatest military blunders in the past century , the Vietnam War and the Iraq War , were both a consequence of not first asking this question and just assuming something can be improvised along the way .
Once withdrawal agreements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and material loses , South Vietnam ended up taken over by the communist North , and Iraq was invaded by the Islamic State—so much for victory .
Nazi Germany ’ s invasion of the Soviet Union and imperial Japan ’ s invasion of China and attack on Pearl Harbor ( or going back even further , World War I and Napoleon ’ s invasion of Russia ) , all with catastrophic results for the initiators , were also the byproducts of shortsighted decisions that assumed quick victories , without anybody asking how these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history as a great power , the United States has confronted four great enemies : Wilhelmine Germany , Nazi Germany , imperial Japan , and the Soviet Union .
The first three confrontations all took place before the advent of the nuclear era , so all were large-scale wars .
Once nukes entered the scene , such wars were no longer possible , so the Cold War was a long , intense struggle .
The first confrontation technically ended with a negotiated settlement with the loser , Wilhelmine Germany , but the real @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany lost , its regime collapsed , its army was crippled , and a democratic republic was founded , which was to pay massive reparations .
But Germany ’ s mindset , at both elite and popular levels , was never changed , setting the stage for another catastrophic war .
In World War II , the United States seemed to have learned a lesson .
After Nazi Germany and imperial Japan were defeated and destroyed , they weren ’ t just given a piece of paper to sign and left alone .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ law were consolidated , their armies were initially disbanded , and they were integrated into the U.S.-led bloc .
Today , Germany and Japan are powerful countries , but peaceful and democratic , with underdeveloped armies compared to their economic might , and—most importantly—they are still U.S. allies .
Even though the United States utterly defeated and later occupied them , it never acted as an imperial overlord or as a hateful and revengeful enemy .
There are people in both countries who dislike the United States and oppose the alliance with Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the decades , both elites and the public are generally friendly towards the United States .
Germany and Japan teach us two vital lessons : A great power can not be kept down forever , but will bounce back after defeat , and the real problem is not the power itself , but the mindset .
Victory consists not in defeating your opponent , but in changing their mindset .
And that leads us to the United States ’ ultimate confrontation—that with the Soviet Union .
From the start , it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia , but an ideological struggle against communism .
The Unites States won the Cold War against the Soviet Union with the fall of communism in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 .
A huge country of almost 300 million people was instantly reduced to half its population , but , most importantly , it lost the main source of its power : its ideological appeal .
The Soviet Union was a global threat not just because of its economic and military might , but especially because of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But after the United States won the Cold War , it didn ’ t care much about what happened to Russia .
Free-market reforms were intensively promoted , with devastating economic consequences , while too little attention was paid to building strong democratic institutions , developing the rule of law and a resilient civil society , changing the old military and political guard , and addressing Russia ’ s regional security concerns .
Russia became a democracy , but only for a decade .
A mindset just doesn ’ t simply erase itself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elite took over , ended Russia ’ s emergent democratic experiment , and brought back its aggressive foreign policy .
The only reason why today Russia isn ’ t an existential threat to the United States anymore is because it lacks both the ideological appeal and the economic and military might of the Soviet empire .
Today , its nominal gross domestic product is similar to that of South Korea .
Even if it were as developed as the United States , because of its demographic size , Russia ’ s GDP would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Soviet Union was defeated because it lost its source of power , communism , but it was never changed into a friend of the United States .
The Cold War with Russia never ended ; it was only its intensity that was dialed down through the defeat of communism and dissolution of the Soviet Union .
And this leads us to the People ’ s Republic of China .
How does this end ?
The current U.S. government is trying to paint this as an ideological confrontation , the enemy being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese Communist Party .
This could be a good strategy , but there is also something important to keep in mind .
China is powerful because of its demographic size , which translates into economic power and , ultimately , military and geopolitical power .
Its authoritarian system doesn ’ t offer any appeal and is in fact a burden for China .
This authoritarian system now fosters an aggressive foreign policy , but nationalism and militarism could live on even without it .
Regime change alone won ’ t be enough .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenge like China in its entire history , because all the enemies which it confronted before were equal to it or smaller ( demographically , economically , and ultimately militarily ) than it was .
Unlike the global threat of the Soviet Union , whose dissolution left a far smaller Russia as a regional threat , China will never go away .
It can ’ t .
Even if it were to lose territories such as Hong Kong , Tibet , or Xinjiang , it would be the same great power , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and an almost unchanged GDP .
Its transformation into a developed economy might take decades , but one day it will overtake the U.S. economy .
Because of its size and nuclear weapons , no war will ever end with China ’ s unconditional surrender and occupation .
Any possible U.S.-China war , such as over Taiwan or in the South China Sea , will end either in nuclear Armageddon or with a negotiated settlement , which might be unfavorable to China .
In the best-case scenario for the United States , China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a popular uprising against this defeat .
But that ’ s a risky scenario , given what happened to Germany after World War I .
So , how does this end ?
It ’ s easy to start a confrontation , but sometimes it might become impossible to stop it .
It ’ s easy to say that because the United States won the Cold War , it will eventually win again , even if it takes decades , but that paints a false portrait of the real challenge through a bad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thought out carefully and planned well , we ’ re talking about a never-ending confrontation with a country with four times the population of the United States , regardless of what happens with its political system .
Washington ’ s portrayal of China ’ s authoritarian system as the enemy leaves a door open for a future peace , but it risks remaining purely rhetorical when unmatched with action .
Right now , the U.S. government seems utterly uninterested about how to engage the Chinese people , how to win over support in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and friendly elements in the leadership or in the broader society , how to drive a wedge between the current party leadership and economic and intellectual elites , and how to offer positive and negative incentives to achieve certain outcomes .
It prefers to pick up a hammer and try to hit China in any way it can , regardless of how much the actions hurt ordinary people in China and drive them closer to the government .
The old strategy of “ engagement ” that has become a popular punching bag at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was a long , long way off : a peaceful , liberal China , integrated in the world order .
The current confrontational approach , with or without a strategy , doesn ’ t imagine any endgame .
The United States seems to focus only on how to confront and defeat the People ’ s Republic of China .
That ’ s not the endgame .
It will only end if the United States and the world can solve a far more difficult dilemma : How do you change China ?
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war and get ready for a disastrous 21st century .

The U.S. government has decided it is time to confront the People's Republic of China, leading to what some have called "a new cold war” or the more benign and official “great-power competition.” But as many have pointed out , the United States currently lacks a coherent strategy about how to confront China. Busy giving speeches and exploring new ways to hit China, U.S. officials are making the case that this confrontation is necessary to preserve freedom and democracy and that the United States must fight to win. But nobody in Washington seems to have asked the most important question: How does this end?
The U.S. government has decided it is time to confront the People’s Republic of China, leading to what some have called “a new cold war” or the more benign and official “great-power competition.” But as many have pointed out, the United States currently lacks a coherent strategy about how to confront China. Busy giving speeches and exploring new ways to hit China, U.S. officials are making the case that this confrontation is necessary to preserve freedom and democracy and that the United States must fight to win. But nobody in Washington seems to have asked the most important question: How does this end?
You never start a conflict, be it a real war or a “just” a cold one, without asking this question. The United States’ two greatest military blunders in the past century, the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, were both a consequence of not first asking this question and just assuming something can be improvised along the way. Once withdrawal agreements were finally signed, after huge human and material loses, South Vietnam ended up taken over by the communist North, and Iraq was invaded by the Islamic State—so much for victory. Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union and imperial Japan’s invasion of China and attack on Pearl Harbor (or going back even further, World War I and Napoleon’s invasion of Russia), all with catastrophic results for the initiators, were also the byproducts of shortsighted decisions that assumed quick victories, without anybody asking how these wars could really end.
In its history as a great power, the United States has confronted four great enemies: Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union. The first three confrontations all took place before the advent of the nuclear era, so all were large-scale wars. Once nukes entered the scene, such wars were no longer possible, so the Cold War was a long, intense struggle.
The first confrontation technically ended with a negotiated settlement with the loser, Wilhelmine Germany, but the real fundamental problem was not addressed. Imperial Germany lost, its regime collapsed, its army was crippled, and a democratic republic was founded, which was to pay massive reparations. But Germany’s mindset, at both elite and popular levels, was never changed, setting the stage for another catastrophic war.
In World War II, the United States seemed to have learned a lesson. After Nazi Germany and imperial Japan were defeated and destroyed, they weren’t just given a piece of paper to sign and left alone. Democratic political institutions and the rule of law were consolidated, their armies were initially disbanded, and they were integrated into the U.S.-led bloc. Today, Germany and Japan are powerful countries, but peaceful and democratic, with underdeveloped armies compared to their economic might, and—most importantly—they are still U.S. allies.
Even though the United States utterly defeated and later occupied them, it never acted as an imperial overlord or as a hateful and revengeful enemy. There are people in both countries who dislike the United States and oppose the alliance with Washington, but thanks to the connection established over the decades, both elites and the public are generally friendly towards the United States. Germany and Japan teach us two vital lessons: A great power cannot be kept down forever, but will bounce back after defeat, and the real problem is not the power itself, but the mindset. Victory consists not in defeating your opponent, but in changing their mindset.
And that leads us to the United States’ ultimate confrontation—that with the Soviet Union. From the start, it was branded not as a nationalist struggle against Russia, but an ideological struggle against communism. The Unites States won the Cold War against the Soviet Union with the fall of communism in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. A huge country of almost 300 million people was instantly reduced to half its population, but, most importantly, it lost the main source of its power: its ideological appeal. The Soviet Union was a global threat not just because of its economic and military might, but especially because of its ideological appeal to revolutionary moments worldwide.
But after the United States won the Cold War, it didn’t care much about what happened to Russia. Free-market reforms were intensively promoted, with devastating economic consequences, while too little attention was paid to building strong democratic institutions, developing the rule of law and a resilient civil society, changing the old military and political guard, and addressing Russia’s regional security concerns. Russia became a democracy, but only for a decade. A mindset just doesn’t simply erase itself. A section of its unreconstructed military-security elite took over, ended Russia’s emergent democratic experiment, and brought back its aggressive foreign policy. The only reason why today Russia isn’t an existential threat to the United States anymore is because it lacks both the ideological appeal and the economic and military might of the Soviet empire. Today, its nominal gross domestic product is similar to that of South Korea. Even if it were as developed as the United States, because of its demographic size, Russia’s GDP would only be half of America’s. The Soviet Union was defeated because it lost its source of power, communism, but it was never changed into a friend of the United States. The Cold War with Russia never ended; it was only its intensity that was dialed down through the defeat of communism and dissolution of the Soviet Union.
And this leads us to the People’s Republic of China. How does this end? The current U.S. government is trying to paint this as an ideological confrontation, the enemy being not the Chinese people, but the Chinese Communist Party. This could be a good strategy, but there is also something important to keep in mind. China is powerful because of its demographic size, which translates into economic power and, ultimately, military and geopolitical power. Its authoritarian system doesn’t offer any appeal and is in fact a burden for China. This authoritarian system now fosters an aggressive foreign policy, but nationalism and militarism could live on even without it. Regime change alone won’t be enough.
The United States has never confronted a challenge like China in its entire history, because all the enemies which it confronted before were equal to it or smaller (demographically, economically, and ultimately militarily) than it was. Unlike the global threat of the Soviet Union, whose dissolution left a far smaller Russia as a regional threat, China will never go away. It can’t. Even if it were to lose territories such as Hong Kong, Tibet, or Xinjiang, it would be the same great power, with 1.35 billion people instead of 1.4 billion and an almost unchanged GDP. Its transformation into a developed economy might take decades, but one day it will overtake the U.S. economy. Because of its size and nuclear weapons, no war will ever end with China’s unconditional surrender and occupation. Any possible U.S.-China war, such as over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, will end either in nuclear Armageddon or with a negotiated settlement, which might be unfavorable to China. In the best-case scenario for the United States, China’s authoritarian system might be overturned in a popular uprising against this defeat. But that’s a risky scenario, given what happened to Germany after World War I.
So, how does this end? It’s easy to start a confrontation, but sometimes it might become impossible to stop it. It’s easy to say that because the United States won the Cold War, it will eventually win again, even if it takes decades, but that paints a false portrait of the real challenge through a bad analogy. If this isn’t thought out carefully and planned well, we’re talking about a never-ending confrontation with a country with four times the population of the United States, regardless of what happens with its political system.
Washington’s portrayal of China’s authoritarian system as the enemy leaves a door open for a future peace, but it risks remaining purely rhetorical when unmatched with action. Right now, the U.S. government seems utterly uninterested about how to engage the Chinese people, how to win over support in China, how to cultivate more liberal and friendly elements in the leadership or in the broader society, how to drive a wedge between the current party leadership and economic and intellectual elites, and how to offer positive and negative incentives to achieve certain outcomes. It prefers to pick up a hammer and try to hit China in any way it can, regardless of how much the actions hurt ordinary people in China and drive them closer to the government.
The old strategy of “engagement” that has become a popular punching bag at least imagined an endgame, even if it was a long, long way off: a peaceful, liberal China, integrated in the world order. The current confrontational approach, with or without a strategy, doesn’t imagine any endgame. The United States seems to focus only on how to confront and defeat the People’s Republic of China. That’s not the endgame. It will only end if the United States and the world can solve a far more difficult dilemma: How do you change China? If not, welcome to the real forever war and get ready for a disastrous 21st century.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-24--The Case for Black American Self-Defense

In the United States , Martin Luther King Jr. reigns over the collective imagination , a prince of peace immortalizing nonviolent resistance as the only effective means to effect political change .
Black Americans , in particular , are chastised if they stray from this nostalgic reinvention of King , the nationally admired so-called good protester who rejected all forms of political violence and succeeded in ending racism by the power of Christian faith and love alone .
But it is also true that the Sons of Liberty in Revolutionary Boston are revered for fomenting armed revolt .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a free militia to stand up to state tyranny .
Crispus Attucks , a Black man , was the first to die in a rock-throwing mob facing down British soldiers .
Calls for Black violent resistance grow from an intrinsically American brand of patriotic insurrection that needs to be recognized for its moral and political validity .
I am not advocating in support of the riots that often accompany social unrest , though King would and did disagree with those who use his example as a nightstick against any radical action for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of organized , armed self-defense should be regarded as one of the many tools in the repertoire of modern protest movements .
But prior to the Civil War , there were numerous attempted slave revolts—large , small , and rumored .
The threat of slave insurrection increased after the Haitian Revolution of 1791-1804 , when self-liberated slaves won their independence from France and sent shockwaves through the Americas .
At least two uprisings—Denmark Vesey ’ s near-miss in Charleston , South Carolina , and John Brown ’ s raid on Harpers Ferry—had ties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a time in Haiti and had reportedly promised his followers that official support from the Haitian government was imminent .
Not only had Brown ’ s co-conspirator Francis Jackson Meriam just returned from Haiti before joining the mission , but Brown ’ s entire perspective on the feasibility of slave insurrection was guided by Haiti ’ s example .
These violent uprisings were regularly used by legislators and abolitionists as a rationale to pass state laws that curtailed or outright banned the slave trade .
But though they were partially successful , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into increasingly brutal and public retaliation .
The revolt in Haiti created absolute panic in the American South .
There , states expanded insular legislation and created a regional police state to quarantine against insurrectionist ideology .
After the 1811 revolt in what is now Louisiana , the heads of slaves were staked along the road for all to see .
At the same time , Southern states successfully expanded slavery westward into new territories .
With no emancipatory legislation forthcoming , many African Americans saw Southern entrenchment and expansion as an existential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with by decades more of nonviolent moral suasion .
By the 1850s , even the prominent abolitionist and journalist William Lloyd Garrison , who earlier had admonished fellow members of his movement who endorsed violence , had come to the conclusion it was time for slaves to take their freedom by force .
War , the purest form of political violence , had been a great liberator .
Tens of thousands had won their freedom by enlisting during the American Revolution and , later , the War of 1812 .
Haiti and political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ David Walker , a prominent Black abolitionist , published his popular “ Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World ” in 1829 , an incendiary defense of slave revolts as a last resort against oppression .
In 1847 , the Troy National Convention of Colored People and their Friends called for a resolution for “ instructing their sons in the art of war.
” In 1848 , the Ohio convention ordered the printing and redistribution of Walker ’ s “ Appeal.
” It was during this period , a decade before the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forming in the North , ready to take up arms .
And it was during the war that President Abraham Lincoln finally came to see the advantage of emancipating slaves to save the Union .
The price Black Americans paid for successfully toppling the Antebellum economic and social order was nearly as great as the cost of failure .
They were pushed out of the arenas of promised legislative power and devastated by a murderous tidal wave of white terrorism that lasted for generations and enshrined a new anti-Black hierarchy : Jim Crow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pattern of African American violent resistance followed by overwhelming white retaliation .
At least a thousand slaves escaped the South every year .
After the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 , those former slaves and their allies formed vigilance committees to protect themselves from slave hunters and law enforcement , and to exact retribution upon enablers of kidnapping .
This form of resistance did not result in passage of new , federal anti-slavery legislation .
But it effectively protected escaping slaves without triggering anywhere near the same level of backlash and brutal retaliation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it that were persuadable—found the Black case for self-defense through protective violence convincing .
It galvanized other groups , both Black and white , to defy the law , sometimes through violence of their own .
Federal and state government-sanctioned slave hunters were often forced to work in secret in the North as a result .
Armed Black resistance did not end with the Civil War .
Even into the Civil Rights era , it played a critical role .
The conventional story goes something like this : Martin Luther King Jr. and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ John F. Kennedy ’ s and then Lyndon B. Johnson ’ s administrations , passed civil rights voting acts and desegregation legislation using passive resistance .
But their inflexible philosophy of nonviolence was incompatible with the emerging leaders of the Black Power movement , many of whom were severely frustrated over concessions old guard leaders made with Democratic liberals .
After King ’ s assassination in 1968 , the more militant and internationalist leaders took center stage and grabbed the public ’ s attention , giving voice to a nascent Black nationalism .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ including the Black Panther Party and older but reinvented organizations such as the Congress of Racial Equality ( CORE ) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee ( SNCC ) , drew their inspiration from Malcolm X and Robert Williams , whose Radio Free Dixie broadcast from Cuba bore an uncanny resemblance to David Walker ’ s defense of violent remedies in the face of oppression .
They made loud and public common cause with pan-African freedom fighters and invested in the guerrilla tactics of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro .
For a time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The vicious harassment and defamation of Black nationalist radicals echoed the reactionary and fearful politics of the American South .
The movement fractured under anti-Black government pressure .
But this telling obscures one important fact : At least for a time , those advocating violent self-defense formed a stable symbiosis with the pacifists .
Although he was not armed during his protests , King carried at least one firearm when he traveled .
This was neither hypocritical nor rare .
Though King disagreed on many things with Stokely Carmichael ( and Williams , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ truce on the right to self-protection .
In 1959 , the NAACP passed a resolution affirming that right .
Furthermore , a significant number of adamantly nonviolent protesters from CORE and SNCC who worked the South either carried guns ( if they were local ) or were under the protective watch of those who did .
Despite—or perhaps because of—Jim Crow and the terror that enforced it , a surprisingly integrated gun culture had bloomed across the South .
The Black community rose to defend activists with lethal force if necessary .
When @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Elizabeth Till-Mobley , attended the trial of her son ’ s death , the Regional Council of Negro Leadership escorted her with a caravan of armed men .
After John Lewis and others were beaten by police in Selma , Alabama , the Deacons for Defense and Justice , a multistate Black militia , was there for round two , as was the National Guard , called in by President Johnson .
Despite fear of counterattacks , there was no repeat performance from law enforcement or white supremacists , and the protesters marched @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need for another Civil War .
For a host of complex reasons including the limited but still significant integration brought on by Civil Rights legislation , the browning of the country , and near-universal de jure enfranchisement , moral suasion has evolved into a more effective tool .
It has always been and continues to be the preferred method of protest .
The necessity of self-defense is not a theoretical principle up for debate but the lived experience of African American communities .
But the necessity of self-defense—and armed self-defense at that—is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the lived experience of African American communities for centuries .
Today , emboldened white nationalist terrorism is on the rise with a chilling synergy between such groups and the police .
The current administration has fostered an atmosphere where government overreach in the name of law and order gives cover for these groups to act .
The second march to Selma shows the way .
There were strains of Northern Antebellum vigilance groups , except this time they were much better armed and highly discerning in the violence they deployed or threatened .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ force , and always in service to it .
Protests are messy by nature .
There is an alphabet soup of different organizations rallying behind Black Lives Matter , and there are real concerns that violence of any kind—often encouraged or even perpetuated by infiltrating groups or state agents—could be used to discredit the movement .
A Black militia marched to the Stone Mountain Confederate Memorial in Georgia in a show of force against white supremacists .
A Washington protester was killed by police after essentially admitting to shooting a white supremacist in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been manageable .
So I am hopeful .
This generation of protesters , many of whom are white , grew up with the memory of both King and Malcolm X , and they are chanting Black names : Sandra Bland .
Breonna Taylor .
George Floyd .
Tamir Rice .
Some of their parents are , too .
Malcolm X never directly engaged with Martin Luther King Jr. , though not for lack for trying .
In one of those attempts , Malcolm X instead met Coretta Scott King in , of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her that , “ if the white people realize what the alternative is [ political violence ] , perhaps they will be more willing to hear Dr. King.
” While they never worked together in person , King and Malcolm X did in spirit .
The Black liberation movements are known more for their martyrs than militias , but neither are in short supply .

In the United States, Martin Luther King Jr. reigns over the collective imagination, a prince of peace immortalizing nonviolent resistance as the only effective means to effect political change. Black Americans, in particular, are chastised if they stray from this nostalgic reinvention of King, the nationally admired so-called good protester who rejected all forms of political violence and succeeded in ending racism by the power of Christian faith and love alone.
In the United States, Martin Luther King Jr. reigns over the collective imagination, a prince of peace immortalizing nonviolent resistance as the only effective means to effect political change. Black Americans, in particular, are chastised if they stray from this nostalgic reinvention of King, the nationally admired so-called good protester who rejected all forms of political violence and succeeded in ending racism by the power of Christian faith and love alone.
But it is also true that the Sons of Liberty in Revolutionary Boston are revered for fomenting armed revolt. It is conveniently forgotten that President James Madison advocated for a free militia to stand up to state tyranny. Crispus Attucks, a Black man, was the first to die in a rock-throwing mob facing down British soldiers. Calls for Black violent resistance grow from an intrinsically American brand of patriotic insurrection that needs to be recognized for its moral and political validity.
I am not advocating in support of the riots that often accompany social unrest, though King would and did disagree with those who use his example as a nightstick against any radical action for social justice. But the Black tradition of organized, armed self-defense should be regarded as one of the many tools in the repertoire of modern protest movements.
African American communities have always been well aware of the cost and tactical range of violence in the name of liberty, and yet they never stopped resisting by any means necessary. Slaves certainly did run away from their captors, and freed African Americans engaged in nonviolent moral suasion for years. Still, the image of the meek slave waiting to be freed by the grace of the state is a sanitized oversimplification that begins in public school curriculums and is rarely corrected.
But prior to the Civil War, there were numerous attempted slave revolts—large, small, and rumored. The threat of slave insurrection increased after the Haitian Revolution of 1791-1804, when self-liberated slaves won their independence from France and sent shockwaves through the Americas. At least two uprisings—Denmark Vesey’s near-miss in Charleston, South Carolina, and John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry—had ties with post-revolutionary Haiti. Vesey had lived for a time in Haiti and had reportedly promised his followers that official support from the Haitian government was imminent. Not only had Brown’s co-conspirator Francis Jackson Meriam just returned from Haiti before joining the mission, but Brown’s entire perspective on the feasibility of slave insurrection was guided by Haiti’s example.
These violent uprisings were regularly used by legislators and abolitionists as a rationale to pass state laws that curtailed or outright banned the slave trade. But though they were partially successful, the backlash to these attempted revolts escalated into increasingly brutal and public retaliation. The revolt in Haiti created absolute panic in the American South. There, states expanded insular legislation and created a regional police state to quarantine against insurrectionist ideology. After the 1811 revolt in what is now Louisiana, the heads of slaves were staked along the road for all to see. At the same time, Southern states successfully expanded slavery westward into new territories.
With no emancipatory legislation forthcoming, many African Americans saw Southern entrenchment and expansion as an existential threat that could not be decisively dealt with by decades more of nonviolent moral suasion. By the 1850s, even the prominent abolitionist and journalist William Lloyd Garrison, who earlier had admonished fellow members of his movement who endorsed violence, had come to the conclusion it was time for slaves to take their freedom by force.
War, the purest form of political violence, had been a great liberator. Tens of thousands had won their freedom by enlisting during the American Revolution and, later, the War of 1812. Haiti and political inaction innervated this hope once again.
David Walker, a prominent Black abolitionist, published his popular “Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World” in 1829, an incendiary defense of slave revolts as a last resort against oppression. In 1847, the Troy National Convention of Colored People and their Friends called for a resolution for “instructing their sons in the art of war.” In 1848, the Ohio convention ordered the printing and redistribution of Walker’s “Appeal.” It was during this period, a decade before the Civil war, that Black militias began forming in the North, ready to take up arms. And it was during the war that President Abraham Lincoln finally came to see the advantage of emancipating slaves to save the Union.
The price Black Americans paid for successfully toppling the Antebellum economic and social order was nearly as great as the cost of failure. They were pushed out of the arenas of promised legislative power and devastated by a murderous tidal wave of white terrorism that lasted for generations and enshrined a new anti-Black hierarchy: Jim Crow.
There was one exception to this pattern of African American violent resistance followed by overwhelming white retaliation. At least a thousand slaves escaped the South every year. After the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, those former slaves and their allies formed vigilance committees to protect themselves from slave hunters and law enforcement, and to exact retribution upon enablers of kidnapping. This form of resistance did not result in passage of new, federal anti-slavery legislation. But it effectively protected escaping slaves without triggering anywhere near the same level of backlash and brutal retaliation. Public opinion—at least those parts of it that were persuadable—found the Black case for self-defense through protective violence convincing. It galvanized other groups, both Black and white, to defy the law, sometimes through violence of their own. Federal and state government-sanctioned slave hunters were often forced to work in secret in the North as a result.
Armed Black resistance did not end with the Civil War. Even into the Civil Rights era, it played a critical role. The conventional story goes something like this: Martin Luther King Jr. and fellow activists, in partnership with first John F. Kennedy’s and then Lyndon B. Johnson’s administrations, passed civil rights voting acts and desegregation legislation using passive resistance. But their inflexible philosophy of nonviolence was incompatible with the emerging leaders of the Black Power movement, many of whom were severely frustrated over concessions old guard leaders made with Democratic liberals.
After King’s assassination in 1968, the more militant and internationalist leaders took center stage and grabbed the public’s attention, giving voice to a nascent Black nationalism. This new generation of activist organizations, including the Black Panther Party and older but reinvented organizations such as the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), drew their inspiration from Malcolm X and Robert Williams, whose Radio Free Dixie broadcast from Cuba bore an uncanny resemblance to David Walker’s defense of violent remedies in the face of oppression. They made loud and public common cause with pan-African freedom fighters and invested in the guerrilla tactics of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro.
For a time, Cuba was the new Haiti. The vicious harassment and defamation of Black nationalist radicals echoed the reactionary and fearful politics of the American South. The movement fractured under anti-Black government pressure. But this telling obscures one important fact: At least for a time, those advocating violent self-defense formed a stable symbiosis with the pacifists.
Although he was not armed during his protests, King carried at least one firearm when he traveled. This was neither hypocritical nor rare. Though King disagreed on many things with Stokely Carmichael (and Williams, earlier), they came to a truce on the right to self-protection. In 1959, the NAACP passed a resolution affirming that right. Furthermore, a significant number of adamantly nonviolent protesters from CORE and SNCC who worked the South either carried guns (if they were local) or were under the protective watch of those who did.
Despite—or perhaps because of—Jim Crow and the terror that enforced it, a surprisingly integrated gun culture had bloomed across the South. The Black community rose to defend activists with lethal force if necessary. When Emmett Till’s mother, Mamie Elizabeth Till-Mobley, attended the trial of her son’s death, the Regional Council of Negro Leadership escorted her with a caravan of armed men. After John Lewis and others were beaten by police in Selma, Alabama, the Deacons for Defense and Justice, a multistate Black militia, was there for round two, as was the National Guard, called in by President Johnson. Despite fear of counterattacks, there was no repeat performance from law enforcement or white supremacists, and the protesters marched on.
Today, there is no need for another Civil War. For a host of complex reasons including the limited but still significant integration brought on by Civil Rights legislation, the browning of the country, and near-universal de jure enfranchisement, moral suasion has evolved into a more effective tool. It has always been and continues to be the preferred method of protest.
The necessity of self-defense is not a theoretical principle up for debate but the lived experience of African American communities.
But the necessity of self-defense—and armed self-defense at that—is not a theoretical principle up for debate but the lived experience of African American communities for centuries. Today, emboldened white nationalist terrorism is on the rise with a chilling synergy between such groups and the police. The current administration has fostered an atmosphere where government overreach in the name of law and order gives cover for these groups to act.
The second march to Selma shows the way. There were strains of Northern Antebellum vigilance groups, except this time they were much better armed and highly discerning in the violence they deployed or threatened. Physical force was in sync with moral force, and always in service to it.
Protests are messy by nature. There is an alphabet soup of different organizations rallying behind Black Lives Matter, and there are real concerns that violence of any kind—often encouraged or even perpetuated by infiltrating groups or state agents—could be used to discredit the movement. A Black militia marched to the Stone Mountain Confederate Memorial in Georgia in a show of force against white supremacists. A Washington protester was killed by police after essentially admitting to shooting a white supremacist in self-defense. And yet, the backlash has been manageable.
So I am hopeful. This generation of protesters, many of whom are white, grew up with the memory of both King and Malcolm X, and they are chanting Black names: Sandra Bland. Breonna Taylor. George Floyd. Tamir Rice. Some of their parents are, too.
Malcolm X never directly engaged with Martin Luther King Jr., though not for lack for trying. In one of those attempts, Malcolm X instead met Coretta Scott King in, of all places, Selma. He told her that, “if the white people realize what the alternative is [political violence], perhaps they will be more willing to hear Dr. King.” While they never worked together in person, King and Malcolm X did in spirit. The Black liberation movements are known more for their martyrs than militias, but neither are in short supply.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-23--Turkish Military Maneuvering Pushed Italy and France to Join Forces in the Mediterranean. Now What?

Turkish Military Maneuvering Pushed Italy and France to Join Forces in the Mediterranean .
Now What ?
On Sept. 25 , the heads of the 27 European Union nations were supposed to assemble at the European Council in Brussels to vote on sanctioning Turkey .
At issue was what the EU had declared as Ankara ’ s illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus , both EU members .
Specifically , Turkey has sent , and continues to send , ships to explore for undersea energy resources in those countries ’ sovereign waters .
The vote has now been pushed back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the council ’ s president , but for Ankara , the delay only represents a postponement of the inevitable : a potential divorce from Europe .
The troubled relationship has been frozen since 2018 , when Ankara began its gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean .
At that time , the council voted to freeze Turkey ’ s EU accession negotiations , and it suspended work on modernizing the bloc ’ s customs union with its eastern neighbor .
A vote against Turkey next week could make the estrangement permanent .
The outcome @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Italy ’ s longtime ambivalence .
In the Byzantine complexity of Mediterranean geopolitics , it is Italy ’ s energy interests in war-torn Libya rather than its considerable investments in Eastern Mediterranean energy that will likely determine Rome ’ s choice .
The mid-September resignation of the prime minister of Libya ’ s Government of National Accord ( GNA ) , who had been caught in complicated politicking among Italy , France , and Turkey , suggests that Italy may have arrived at a tipping point and a major reset in Italy ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is Italy the European Union ’ s swing state ?
To sanction Turkey , the European Council will need the unanimous approval of all EU member states , and the votes are far from assured .
Stepping into the breach to rally the EU ’ s support for Greece and Cyprus , in early September , French President Emmanuel Macron declared that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ’ s Turkey was “ no longer a partner ” in the Eastern Mediterranean and urged Europe to speak with “ a more united and clear voice.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s exhortation was Italy , which is France ’ s traditional European competitor in the Mediterranean and which has been among the strongest advocates of closer EU-Turkey relations .
With Greece , Cyprus , and France advocating strong action against Turkey while Italy , Malta , and Spain demur , the Mediterranean is evenly split .
But if Italy shifts toward France , resulting in a meeting of minds between the EU ’ s two largest Mediterranean states , then it is likely that the entire southern EU will swing in favor of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the EU as whole would then be for a tougher line toward Turkey .
To this end , Macron has called for a “ Pax Mediterranea , ” managed by a partnership of the EU ’ s Mediterranean nations .
Behind his high-flown Latin , Macron is offering Italy a realpolitik reset in the Mediterranean ’ s great game—a comprehensive Franco-Italian partnership to police the region .
Who sets the rules of the Mediterranean ’ s great game ?
The four largest countries in the Mediterranean basin—Egypt , Turkey , France , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s population and define the rules of the Mediterranean ’ s great game .
Despite the interventions of outside actors , from Russia to the United Arab Emirates , it is the jockeying among the Mediterranean ’ s big four to dominate the region ’ s energy resources and commercial transit routes that defines regional geopolitics .
The hard-power competition among the four—which also boast the Mediterranean ’ s four most powerful militaries—has mostly played out in the Libyan civil war , which has pitted a partnership consisting of France and Egypt against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s largest weapons supplier and has covertly cooperated with Cairo in support of eastern Libyan forces against the western GNA , which is militarily backed by Turkey and which Italy supports .
Italy ’ s decision to side with the GNA and Turkey is part of a broader effort to protect its own energy interests in Libya and to pivot to the Mediterranean basin .
That rebalancing has seen Italy ’ s exports to Mediterranean markets outstrip exports to the United States and to China .
Yet despite Italy ’ s trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s southern shores , the country ’ s development of markets in North Africa has been constrained by France ’ s supersized influence .
Until Macron ’ s reprioritization of French foreign policy , leading ultimately to his call for a Pax Mediterranea , Paris had been unwilling to allow its relationship with Rome to develop greater parity .
But Turkey ’ s increasing assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya changed Paris ’ s strategic calculus—and may make Rome think twice about its alignment with Ankara—providing momentum for a comprehensive Franco-Italian rapprochement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Italy ’ s Mediterranean energy conundrum ?
At the center of Italy ’ s policies in the Mediterranean and Middle East is the energy company Eni , Italy ’ s largest company by revenue .
Eni itself is under the de facto control of the Italian government , which holds the company ’ s largest share ( 30.33 percent ) .
Oftentimes , that investment makes Italy ’ s interest in Eni ’ s operations barely distinguishable from Italian foreign policy overall .
Eni ’ s holdings have been the source of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The country is aligned against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean , where Eni is the leading partner in Cyprus ’ s and Egypt ’ s natural gas development , but works in alignment with Turkey to support the GNA , in whose territory almost all of Eni ’ s oil and natural gas assets are concentrated .
In 2015 , two events brought Italy ’ s Mediterranean energy paradox into a sharper contradiction .
Eni ’ s August 2015 game-changing discovery of Egypt ’ s massive Zohr natural gas field , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Eastern Mediterranean now collectively had marketable volumes of natural gas .
Eni , also the lead operator in Cyprus ’ s natural gas development and the lead stakeholder in one of Egypt ’ s two liquefaction plants , began promoting a plan to pool Cypriot , Egyptian , and Israeli gas and use Egypt ’ s liquefaction facilities to cost-effectively market the region ’ s gas to Europe as liquefied natural gas .
Eni ’ s marketing scheme left no role for Turkey and its pipeline infrastructure to Europe .
Dashing Ankara @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a regional energy hub , Eni ’ s energy development in Egypt and Cyprus set Italy and Turkey on a geopolitical collision course .
At the same time , Eni controls about 45 percent of Libya ’ s oil and gas production .
In 2015 , the year of Eni ’ s Zohr discovery , the GNA formed in Libya under Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj , who enabled Eni to maintain stable energy production in the areas under the protection of the GNA-aligned militias supported by Turkey .
In 2019 , exports from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Italy ’ s total natural gas demand .
With Eni holding its Eastern Mediterranean interests in one hand while holding its Libyan energy interests in the other , Italy maintained an uneasy balancing act .
But Turkey ’ s 2020 military intervention in Libya reshuffled Eni ’ s geopolitical deck .
How did Turkey reshuffle the deck for Italy ’ s energy geopolitics ?
My previous explainer recounts why Turkey opted for a breakout strategy in Libya to redress its grievances with Greece and Cyprus over maritime boundaries .
By helping the GNA-aligned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to eastern Libya , Turkey reversed the course of Libya ’ s civil war .
Turkey ’ s considerable air force presence at the recaptured al-Watiya air base , located 17 miles from Tunisia ’ s border , and its developing naval presence in the GNA coastal stronghold of Misrata have increased Ankara ’ s clout in neighboring Tunisia and Algeria .
But Turkey ’ s new outsized military presence in Libya and its growing regional influence have caused alarm in Italy .
Although Turkey rescued Sarraj ’ s GNA , Rome can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Turkey as a security provider to the extent it will render Eni ’ s energy interests subject to Ankara ’ s dictates .
And it is not just in Libya that Italy ’ s Eni feels vulnerable .
In Algeria , Africa ’ s top natural gas producer , Eni is one of the leading foreign partners of Algeria ’ s state oil company Sonatrach .
Eni and Sonatrach jointly own the 1,500-mile Trans-Mediterranean pipeline that transports Algerian natural gas via Tunisia to Italy .
Natural gas from Algeria and Libya combined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s gas imports .
In 2018 , when Turkey started its gunboat diplomacy off the shores of Cyprus , Italy began turning to France to mitigate the risks in both the Eastern Mediterranean and the central Maghreb .
In February 2018 , the Turkish navy blocked an Eni ship from reaching its intended drill site in Cypriot waters , forcing the company to withdraw the vessel .
In response , Eni brought on the French energy giant Total as a partner in all of its Cyprus operations .
Also in 2018 , Eni @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two companies formed a consortium with Sonatrach for the exclusive rights to explore for energy off Algeria ’ s coast .
Within the same time frame , Total acquired significant new oil holdings in Libya without objection from Eni .
With Franco-Italian energy cooperation already established , Rome and Paris would not have much further to go to implement Macron ’ s Pax Mediterranea .
And at least in Libya , the Franco-Italian reset may have already happened .
On Sept. 13 , the head of Turkey ’ s Foreign Economic Relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GNA was on the verge of signing an agreement to give Turkish energy firms a share of Libya ’ s oil and natural gas production .
Two days later , Sarraj made the stunning announcement that he would resign in October , apparently catching Turkey off guard .
Sarraj ’ s move paves the way for the dissolution of the GNA and the formation of a unity government composed of officials from Libya ’ s rival halves that will be less beholden to Ankara .
A strategic boon for Italy and France , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ action between Paris and Rome .
Could Turkey ’ s estrangement from Europe be permanent ?
Even with newfound solidarity among the EU ’ s Mediterranean states , it will still be difficult to obtain the required unanimous vote of the 27 EU members to sanction Turkey .
In turn , Europe will probably opt for only mild sanctions at most .
Eastern EU states whose foremost concern is Russia are reluctant to antagonize Ankara , which fields NATO ’ S largest military after the United States and plays an important role in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s eastern borders .
Vividly illustrating the EU ’ s south-versus-east divide , Greece and Cyprus threatened to hold up pending EU sanctions on Belarus unless the council imposes “ severe ” sanctions on Turkey .
On Sept. 21 , Cyprus made good on that threat .
No matter the outcome of the council ’ s vote , Europe and Turkey may be on the path to a permanent estrangement .
In the post-Brexit EU , the Germany-France-Italy triad is likely to replace the Germany-France-United Kingdom trio as the principal driver of European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partnering up in the Mediterranean , Europe ’ s future stance toward Turkey is likely to stiffen .

On Sept. 25, the heads of the 27 European Union nations were supposed to assemble at the European Council in Brussels to vote on sanctioning Turkey. At issue was what the EU had declared as Ankara’s illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus, both EU members. Specifically, Turkey has sent, and continues to send, ships to explore for undersea energy resources in those countries’ sovereign waters. The vote has now been pushed back a week due to a quarantine of the council’s president, but for Ankara, the delay only represents a postponement of the inevitable: a potential divorce from Europe. The troubled relationship has been frozen since 2018, when Ankara began its gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At that time, the council voted to freeze Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, and it suspended work on modernizing the bloc’s customs union with its eastern neighbor. A vote against Turkey next week could make the estrangement permanent.
On Sept. 25, the heads of the 27 European Union nations were supposed to assemble at the European Council in Brussels to vote on sanctioning Turkey. At issue was what the EU had declared as Ankara’s illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus, both EU members. Specifically, Turkey has sent, and continues to send, ships to explore for undersea energy resources in those countries’ sovereign waters. The vote has now been pushed back a week due to a quarantine of the council’s president, but for Ankara, the delay only represents a postponement of the inevitable: a potential divorce from Europe. The troubled relationship has been frozen since 2018, when Ankara began its gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At that time, the council voted to freeze Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, and it suspended work on modernizing the bloc’s customs union with its eastern neighbor. A vote against Turkey next week could make the estrangement permanent.
The outcome of the sanctions vote could hinge on Italy’s longtime ambivalence. In the Byzantine complexity of Mediterranean geopolitics, it is Italy’s energy interests in war-torn Libya rather than its considerable investments in Eastern Mediterranean energy that will likely determine Rome’s choice. The mid-September resignation of the prime minister of Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), who had been caught in complicated politicking among Italy, France, and Turkey, suggests that Italy may have arrived at a tipping point and a major reset in Italy’s Mediterranean policy is underway.
Why is Italy the European Union’s swing state?
To sanction Turkey, the European Council will need the unanimous approval of all EU member states, and the votes are far from assured. Stepping into the breach to rally the EU’s support for Greece and Cyprus, in early September, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey was “no longer a partner” in the Eastern Mediterranean and urged Europe to speak with “a more united and clear voice.” The main target of Macron’s exhortation was Italy, which is France’s traditional European competitor in the Mediterranean and which has been among the strongest advocates of closer EU-Turkey relations.
With Greece, Cyprus, and France advocating strong action against Turkey while Italy, Malta, and Spain demur, the Mediterranean is evenly split. But if Italy shifts toward France, resulting in a meeting of minds between the EU’s two largest Mediterranean states, then it is likely that the entire southern EU will swing in favor of some form of sanctions. The momentum in the EU as whole would then be for a tougher line toward Turkey. To this end, Macron has called for a “Pax Mediterranea,” managed by a partnership of the EU’s Mediterranean nations. Behind his high-flown Latin, Macron is offering Italy a realpolitik reset in the Mediterranean’s great game—a comprehensive Franco-Italian partnership to police the region.
Who sets the rules of the Mediterranean’s great game?
The four largest countries in the Mediterranean basin—Egypt, Turkey, France, and Italy—comprise over half the region’s population and define the rules of the Mediterranean’s great game. Despite the interventions of outside actors, from Russia to the United Arab Emirates, it is the jockeying among the Mediterranean’s big four to dominate the region’s energy resources and commercial transit routes that defines regional geopolitics.
The hard-power competition among the four—which also boast the Mediterranean’s four most powerful militaries—has mostly played out in the Libyan civil war, which has pitted a partnership consisting of France and Egypt against Turkey. France is one of Egypt’s largest weapons supplier and has covertly cooperated with Cairo in support of eastern Libyan forces against the western GNA, which is militarily backed by Turkey and which Italy supports.
Italy’s decision to side with the GNA and Turkey is part of a broader effort to protect its own energy interests in Libya and to pivot to the Mediterranean basin. That rebalancing has seen Italy’s exports to Mediterranean markets outstrip exports to the United States and to China. Yet despite Italy’s trade advances and proximity to the Mediterranean’s southern shores, the country’s development of markets in North Africa has been constrained by France’s supersized influence.
Until Macron’s reprioritization of French foreign policy, leading ultimately to his call for a Pax Mediterranea, Paris had been unwilling to allow its relationship with Rome to develop greater parity. But Turkey’s increasing assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya changed Paris’s strategic calculus—and may make Rome think twice about its alignment with Ankara—providing momentum for a comprehensive Franco-Italian rapprochement.
Why is Turkey at the heart of Italy’s Mediterranean energy conundrum?
At the center of Italy’s policies in the Mediterranean and Middle East is the energy company Eni, Italy’s largest company by revenue. Eni itself is under the de facto control of the Italian government, which holds the company’s largest share (30.33 percent). Oftentimes, that investment makes Italy’s interest in Eni’s operations barely distinguishable from Italian foreign policy overall. Eni’s holdings have been the source of contradictions in Italy’s foreign policy. The country is aligned against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Eni is the leading partner in Cyprus’s and Egypt’s natural gas development, but works in alignment with Turkey to support the GNA, in whose territory almost all of Eni’s oil and natural gas assets are concentrated.
In 2015, two events brought Italy’s Mediterranean energy paradox into a sharper contradiction. Eni’s August 2015 game-changing discovery of Egypt’s massive Zohr natural gas field, the region’s largest, meant that the Eastern Mediterranean now collectively had marketable volumes of natural gas. Eni, also the lead operator in Cyprus’s natural gas development and the lead stakeholder in one of Egypt’s two liquefaction plants, began promoting a plan to pool Cypriot, Egyptian, and Israeli gas and use Egypt’s liquefaction facilities to cost-effectively market the region’s gas to Europe as liquefied natural gas. Eni’s marketing scheme left no role for Turkey and its pipeline infrastructure to Europe. Dashing Ankara’s previously developed plans to become a regional energy hub, Eni’s energy development in Egypt and Cyprus set Italy and Turkey on a geopolitical collision course.
At the same time, Eni controls about 45 percent of Libya’s oil and gas production. In 2015, the year of Eni’s Zohr discovery, the GNA formed in Libya under Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, who enabled Eni to maintain stable energy production in the areas under the protection of the GNA-aligned militias supported by Turkey. In 2019, exports from GNA-held territories accounted for 8 percent of Italy’s total natural gas demand.
With Eni holding its Eastern Mediterranean interests in one hand while holding its Libyan energy interests in the other, Italy maintained an uneasy balancing act. But Turkey’s 2020 military intervention in Libya reshuffled Eni’s geopolitical deck.
How did Turkey reshuffle the deck for Italy’s energy geopolitics?
My previous explainer recounts why Turkey opted for a breakout strategy in Libya to redress its grievances with Greece and Cyprus over maritime boundaries. By helping the GNA-aligned forces drive back their opponents 280 miles to eastern Libya, Turkey reversed the course of Libya’s civil war. Turkey’s considerable air force presence at the recaptured al-Watiya air base, located 17 miles from Tunisia’s border, and its developing naval presence in the GNA coastal stronghold of Misrata have increased Ankara’s clout in neighboring Tunisia and Algeria.
But Turkey’s new outsized military presence in Libya and its growing regional influence have caused alarm in Italy. Although Turkey rescued Sarraj’s GNA, Rome cannot tolerate the GNA’s dependence on Turkey as a security provider to the extent it will render Eni’s energy interests subject to Ankara’s dictates.
And it is not just in Libya that Italy’s Eni feels vulnerable. In Algeria, Africa’s top natural gas producer, Eni is one of the leading foreign partners of Algeria’s state oil company Sonatrach. Eni and Sonatrach jointly own the 1,500-mile Trans-Mediterranean pipeline that transports Algerian natural gas via Tunisia to Italy. Natural gas from Algeria and Libya combined account for 28 percent of Italy’s gas imports.
In 2018, when Turkey started its gunboat diplomacy off the shores of Cyprus, Italy began turning to France to mitigate the risks in both the Eastern Mediterranean and the central Maghreb. In February 2018, the Turkish navy blocked an Eni ship from reaching its intended drill site in Cypriot waters, forcing the company to withdraw the vessel. In response, Eni brought on the French energy giant Total as a partner in all of its Cyprus operations. Also in 2018, Eni and Total joined forces in Algeria when the two companies formed a consortium with Sonatrach for the exclusive rights to explore for energy off Algeria’s coast. Within the same time frame, Total acquired significant new oil holdings in Libya without objection from Eni.
With Franco-Italian energy cooperation already established, Rome and Paris would not have much further to go to implement Macron’s Pax Mediterranea. And at least in Libya, the Franco-Italian reset may have already happened. On Sept. 13, the head of Turkey’s Foreign Economic Relations Board responsible for Libya announced that the GNA was on the verge of signing an agreement to give Turkish energy firms a share of Libya’s oil and natural gas production. Two days later, Sarraj made the stunning announcement that he would resign in October, apparently catching Turkey off guard.
Sarraj’s move paves the way for the dissolution of the GNA and the formation of a unity government composed of officials from Libya’s rival halves that will be less beholden to Ankara. A strategic boon for Italy and France, Sarraj’s resignation likely involved coordinated action between Paris and Rome.
Could Turkey’s estrangement from Europe be permanent?
Even with newfound solidarity among the EU’s Mediterranean states, it will still be difficult to obtain the required unanimous vote of the 27 EU members to sanction Turkey. In turn, Europe will probably opt for only mild sanctions at most. Eastern EU states whose foremost concern is Russia are reluctant to antagonize Ankara, which fields NATO’S largest military after the United States and plays an important role in restraining Russian military adventurism on Europe’s eastern borders. Vividly illustrating the EU’s south-versus-east divide, Greece and Cyprus threatened to hold up pending EU sanctions on Belarus unless the council imposes “severe” sanctions on Turkey. On Sept. 21, Cyprus made good on that threat.
No matter the outcome of the council’s vote, Europe and Turkey may be on the path to a permanent estrangement. In the post-Brexit EU, the Germany-France-Italy triad is likely to replace the Germany-France-United Kingdom trio as the principal driver of European politics. And with France and Italy partnering up in the Mediterranean, Europe’s future stance toward Turkey is likely to stiffen.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--Trump Readies His Pick to Replace Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Trump ’ s Supreme Court justice pick is imminent , Mali swears in its new interim president , and China continues to expand internment camps in Xinjiang .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to announce his nominee to replace Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Saturday , setting up a major battle in Congress just over a month before the presidential election .
Top of the shortlist .
Trump has already pledged to nominate a woman for the seat , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as frontrunners since Ginsburg ’ s death last weekend .
One of the names being floated is 7th Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett , whose devout Catholic faith has made her a favorite among social conservatives but has raised concerns among liberals that she could roll back protections for women ’ s health .
After passing on Barrett to replace retiring justice Anthony Kennedy in 2018 , Trump reportedly told people close to him that he ’ s “ saving her for Ginsburg.
” Trump is also considering 11th Circuit Judge Barbara Lagoa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same level of support from the ideological conservatives surrounding Trump that Barrett does .
However , as a Cuban-American from Florida , Lagoa has the support of Republican strategists who believe she could give the president a needed boost in the swing state .
Senate support .
There was some initial speculation over whether Republicans would hold a vote on the pick in the Senate , after refusing to facilitate the nomination process for President Barack Obama ’ s pick to replace Justice Antonin Scalia in 2016 because it was an election year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Susan Collins both released statements opposing a vote before the election .
But Trump cleared a crucial hurdle after a statement released by Sen. Mitt Romney , one of Trump ’ s most consistent and vocal Republican critics , said he would vote on the nominee if it reached the Senate floor .
With Republicans holding a slim majority in the Senate , Democrats would only need four senators to cross the aisle to oppose the pick , but it now appears that enough Republicans will back Trump ’ s nominee .
What @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats have been left scrambling over how to respond .
Some have pushed Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to initiate impeachment proceedings against Attorney General William Barr or seek to impeach Trump again to stall the confirmation process after Trump nominates a replacement , while others have called for Democratic nominee Joe Biden to add new justices to the court if he wins the presidency in November .
“ We have arrows in our quiver that I ’ m not about to discuss right now , ” Pelosi said in an interview @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drama surrounding the Supreme Court nomination is occurring against the backdrop of a new round of protests in U.S. cities .
The decision by a judge not to charge three out of four officers involved in the police killing of Breonna Taylor in March has incited unrest in Louisville , where the shooting took place , and in other cities across the country .
On Wednesday , when asked by reporters to commit to a peaceful transfer of power , Trump refrained , saying “ we ’ re going to have to see @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that “ there won ’ t be a transfer , frankly … There ’ ll be a continuation.
” As Timothy Naftali wrote in Foreign Policy , the transfer of power during presidential transitions has always been a weak spot in the U.S. constitutional system ; if Trump loses the election , the January 2021 handover could be the most chaotic yet .
Progress in Mali .
Former Malian Defense Minister Bah Ndaw will be sworn-in as interim president today to lead the transition back to civilian rule after last month ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Ndaw , a retired colonel , will be joined by junta leader Col. Assimi Goita as vice president , a sign that the military will retain significant influence over the transitional government despite demands from opposition leaders and regional powers that civilians be appointed to both positions .
But regional powers have sent signals that they might approve of the move .
On Thursday , Ndaw met former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan on a mission for the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) , which imposed crippling sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ECOWAS has not yet expressed its stance on the appointments , Jonathan praised the developments in Mali and suggested that sanctions could be lifted .
Sanctions against Belarus .
International pressure on Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko is growing after he was inaugurated in a secret ceremony on Wednesday , leading to a new round of protests in Minsk as thousands rallied against the move .
On Thursday , sources told Reuters that the United States , United Kingdom , and Canada were all prepared to impose sanctions against key Belarusian individuals over allegations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s presidential election that handed Lukashenko a landslide victory .
The United States and Canada have each already said they don ’ t recognize Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus .
The response from international actors has been slow in part due to concern surrounding Russia ’ s position .
Late last month , Russian President Vladimir Putin warned against foreign actors getting involved in Belarus , and later formed a reserve police unit that could be deployed to the country if Lukashenko requested it .
Palestinian elections .
Fatah and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the occupied Palestinian territories , have agreed to hold elections for the first time in almost 15 years .
The last elections , held in 2006 , resulted in a landslide victory for Hamas , leading to bloody clashes between the two sides and a de facto split within Palestine , with Hamas taking control of the Gaza Strip and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority ( PA ) retaining control of the West Bank .
Leaders said a vote will be held within six months .
The move follows an unprecedented show of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moves by several Arab states to normalize diplomatic ties with Israel .
PA President Mahmoud Abbas has called Israel ’ s recent deal with Bahrain a “ betrayal of the Palestinians and Jerusalem , ” echoing a widely held sentiment toward that and the earlier deal with the United Arab Emirates .
Detention centers expanding in Xinjiang .
Researchers at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute said they found more than 380 suspected internment camps in China ’ s Xinjiang province , 40 percent more than previous estimates , refuting claims from Chinese officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ re-education ” program of the country ’ s ethnic Uighur population .
The research also found that at least 61 of the detention centers had been expanded since July , further evidence that the program is still in full operation .
“ Available evidence suggests that many extrajudicial detainees are now being formally charged and locked up in higher security facilities , ” lead researcher Nathan Ruser wrote .
As Azeem Ibrahim argued in Foreign Policy in December 2019 , the evidence pointing to cultural genocide in Xinjiang is now overwhelming , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act on behalf of human rights in China .
Constitutional vote pushed off in Thailand .
Thailand ’ s parliament opted to postpone a vote on constitutional changes until November , defying one of the key demands of anti-monarchy protesters who have been demonstrating in the streets for more than two months .
Pro-government lawmakers have said the vote is being delayed to allow for the formation of a committee to determine how a constitutional amendment could be implemented in the country .
But opposition leaders say this is little more than a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ If the process is delayed by a month to set up this committee , and if the motion is rejected then , it will mean members of parliament can not propose another such motion again until next year , ” said Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn , a member of the opposition Move Forward Party .
Bibi ’ s dirty laundry .
On Wednesday , the Washington Post reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his family routinely bring bags of their dirty laundry on official visits to Washington to take advantage of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Although the service is available to all foreign leaders visiting the United States , Netanyahu is reportedly unique in how frequently he uses the service .
“ The Netanyahus are the only ones who bring actual suitcases of dirty laundry for us to clean , ” said one U.S. official .
“ After multiple trips , it became clear this was intentional.
” Netanyahu ’ s office has pushed back on the claims , calling them “ absurd.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Trump’s Supreme Court justice pick is imminent, Mali swears in its new interim president, and China continues to expand its internment camps in Xinjiang .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Trump’s Supreme Court justice pick is imminent, Mali swears in its new interim president, and China continues to expand its internment camps in Xinjiang.
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Senate Republicans Back Trump as Democrats Consider Options
U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to announce his nominee to replace Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Saturday, setting up a major battle in Congress just over a month before the presidential election.
Top of the shortlist. Trump has already pledged to nominate a woman for the seat, and a handful of names have emerged as frontrunners since Ginsburg’s death last weekend. One of the names being floated is 7th Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett, whose devout Catholic faith has made her a favorite among social conservatives but has raised concerns among liberals that she could roll back protections for women’s health.
After passing on Barrett to replace retiring justice Anthony Kennedy in 2018, Trump reportedly told people close to him that he’s “saving her for Ginsburg.”
Trump is also considering 11th Circuit Judge Barbara Lagoa, who doesn’t command the same level of support from the ideological conservatives surrounding Trump that Barrett does. However, as a Cuban-American from Florida, Lagoa has the support of Republican strategists who believe she could give the president a needed boost in the swing state.
Senate support. There was some initial speculation over whether Republicans would hold a vote on the pick in the Senate, after refusing to facilitate the nomination process for President Barack Obama’s pick to replace Justice Antonin Scalia in 2016 because it was an election year. Republican Sens. Lisa Murkowski and Susan Collins both released statements opposing a vote before the election.
But Trump cleared a crucial hurdle after a statement released by Sen. Mitt Romney, one of Trump’s most consistent and vocal Republican critics, said he would vote on the nominee if it reached the Senate floor. With Republicans holding a slim majority in the Senate, Democrats would only need four senators to cross the aisle to oppose the pick, but it now appears that enough Republicans will back Trump’s nominee.
What to do, what to do. Democrats have been left scrambling over how to respond. Some have pushed Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to initiate impeachment proceedings against Attorney General William Barr or seek to impeach Trump again to stall the confirmation process after Trump nominates a replacement, while others have called for Democratic nominee Joe Biden to add new justices to the court if he wins the presidency in November. “We have arrows in our quiver that I’m not about to discuss right now,” Pelosi said in an interview.
The shadow of violence. The drama surrounding the Supreme Court nomination is occurring against the backdrop of a new round of protests in U.S. cities. The decision by a judge not to charge three out of four officers involved in the police killing of Breonna Taylor in March has incited unrest in Louisville, where the shooting took place, and in other cities across the country.
On Wednesday, when asked by reporters to commit to a peaceful transfer of power, Trump refrained, saying “we’re going to have to see what happens,” before adding ominously that “there won’t be a transfer, frankly … There’ll be a continuation.” As Timothy Naftali wrote in Foreign Policy, the transfer of power during presidential transitions has always been a weak spot in the U.S. constitutional system; if Trump loses the election, the January 2021 handover could be the most chaotic yet.
What We’re Following Today
Progress in Mali. Former Malian Defense Minister Bah Ndaw will be sworn-in as interim president today to lead the transition back to civilian rule after last month’s military coup ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. Ndaw, a retired colonel, will be joined by junta leader Col. Assimi Goita as vice president, a sign that the military will retain significant influence over the transitional government despite demands from opposition leaders and regional powers that civilians be appointed to both positions.
But regional powers have sent signals that they might approve of the move. On Thursday, Ndaw met former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan on a mission for the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which imposed crippling sanctions on Mali after the coup. Although ECOWAS has not yet expressed its stance on the appointments, Jonathan praised the developments in Mali and suggested that sanctions could be lifted.
Sanctions against Belarus. International pressure on Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko is growing after he was inaugurated in a secret ceremony on Wednesday, leading to a new round of protests in Minsk as thousands rallied against the move. On Thursday, sources told Reuters that the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada were all prepared to impose sanctions against key Belarusian individuals over allegations of widespread electoral fraud in last month’s presidential election that handed Lukashenko a landslide victory. The United States and Canada have each already said they don’t recognize Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus.
The response from international actors has been slow in part due to concern surrounding Russia’s position. Late last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned against foreign actors getting involved in Belarus, and later formed a reserve police unit that could be deployed to the country if Lukashenko requested it.
Palestinian elections. Fatah and Hamas, the two largest political factions in the occupied Palestinian territories, have agreed to hold elections for the first time in almost 15 years. The last elections, held in 2006, resulted in a landslide victory for Hamas, leading to bloody clashes between the two sides and a de facto split within Palestine, with Hamas taking control of the Gaza Strip and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) retaining control of the West Bank. Leaders said a vote will be held within six months.
The move follows an unprecedented show of unity among Palestinians in opposition to recent moves by several Arab states to normalize diplomatic ties with Israel. PA President Mahmoud Abbas has called Israel’s recent deal with Bahrain a “betrayal of the Palestinians and Jerusalem,” echoing a widely held sentiment toward that and the earlier deal with the United Arab Emirates.
Keep an Eye On
Detention centers expanding in Xinjiang. Researchers at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute said they found more than 380 suspected internment camps in China’s Xinjiang province, 40 percent more than previous estimates, refuting claims from Chinese officials that Beijing is winding down its “re-education” program of the country’s ethnic Uighur population. The research also found that at least 61 of the detention centers had been expanded since July, further evidence that the program is still in full operation. “Available evidence suggests that many extrajudicial detainees are now being formally charged and locked up in higher security facilities,” lead researcher Nathan Ruser wrote.
As Azeem Ibrahim argued in Foreign Policy in December 2019, the evidence pointing to cultural genocide in Xinjiang is now overwhelming, and the international community has a responsibility to act on behalf of human rights in China.
Constitutional vote pushed off in Thailand. Thailand’s parliament opted to postpone a vote on constitutional changes until November, defying one of the key demands of anti-monarchy protesters who have been demonstrating in the streets for more than two months. Pro-government lawmakers have said the vote is being delayed to allow for the formation of a committee to determine how a constitutional amendment could be implemented in the country.
But opposition leaders say this is little more than a ploy to push off the vote indefinitely. “If the process is delayed by a month to set up this committee, and if the motion is rejected then, it will mean members of parliament cannot propose another such motion again until next year,” said Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, a member of the opposition Move Forward Party.
Odds and Ends
Bibi’s dirty laundry. On Wednesday, the Washington Post reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his family routinely bring bags of their dirty laundry on official visits to Washington to take advantage of free laundry services offered to foreign dignitaries. Although the service is available to all foreign leaders visiting the United States, Netanyahu is reportedly unique in how frequently he uses the service.
“The Netanyahus are the only ones who bring actual suitcases of dirty laundry for us to clean,” said one U.S. official. “After multiple trips, it became clear this was intentional.” Netanyahu’s office has pushed back on the claims, calling them “absurd.”
That’s it for today.
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