foreignpolicy--2020-10-27--Abortion Rights Protests Paralyze Poland

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Abortion rights protests continue in Poland , there is only a week to go in the U.S. presidential election campaign , and the latest cease-fire attempt in Nagorno-Karabakh fails .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Protests in Poland against the constitutional court decision to further restrict abortion rights enter their sixth day today with no end in sight .
Today ’ s protests follow widespread action on the streets of more than 150 Polish cities on Monday .
In the capital , Warsaw , demonstrators shut down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intersections at rush-hour and chanting for the right-wing government to step down .
Not all right .
The scale of the protests seems to indicate that Poland ’ s rightward shift—egged on by U.S. President Trump and his allies—is facing some headwinds .
Last Tuesday , Trump ’ s former U.S .
Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell boasted of the “ rising special relationship ” between the two countries .
But President Andrzej Duda ’ s extremely narrow election victory in July—with just 51.2 percent of the vote—suggests that the right ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A long time coming .
The court decision was in some ways expected .
As Madeline Roache argued in Foreign Policy in early 2019 , “ The church , anti-abortion groups , and government have transformed abortion into a deeply moral issue that has polarized the population.
” Some campaigners have “ displayed graphic posters of fetuses alongside images of Adolf Hitler , with text comparing abortion to genocide , ” while several regional governments have effectively banned the procedure , causing many women to leave the country to seek abortions in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Such a full-throated defense of abortion rights also reflects the fading influence of the Catholic church in Poland , which itself been a target of protesters .
By aligning themselves with the traditionalist values of the Law and Justice party , Conservative clerics have risked alienating a younger , more socially moderate , population .
Many have voted with their feet , with church attendance among the young falling at the fastest rate in the world .
As a whole , Poles are not monolithic in their approach to the institution .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Poles do not trust the Church , versus 33 percent who said they do .
What next ?
Protest organizers Women ’ s Strike have called for a nationwide strike to take place on Wednesday , with a march on Warsaw planned for this Friday .
One week to go .
The U.S. Presidential election campaign is now in its final week .
Former Vice President Joe Biden is campaigning in Georgia while his running mate , Kamala Harris , visits Nevada .
President Donald Trump will hold rallies in Michigan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Mike Pence campaigns in both North and South Carolina .
Whoever wins , the practice of doling out foreign ambassadorships to wealthy donors may soon be history , as FP ’ s Robbie Gramer reports .
For more on Election 2020 and its international implications , read FP ’ s in-depth coverage here .
Nagorno-Karabakh cease-fire broken .
A U.S.-brokered cease-fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict failed to hold on Monday , with both Armenia and Azerbaijan accusing one another of shooting first .
In a televised address , Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by France , Russia , and the United States .
“ For almost 30 years , the Minsk Group co-chairs have tried to reconcile Azerbaijan with the process of freezing the conflict , but we have created a new reality , ” Aliyev said .
“ We are fed up with these negotiations .
How long can you negotiate ?
” The Minsk group is set to meet again with the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan on Oct. 29 .
China sanctions U.S. weapons manufacturers .
China will impose sanctions on three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department approved the sale of $ 1.8 billion worth of weapons and equipment to Taiwan last Wednesday .
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said the sanctions were necessary “ in order to uphold national interests.
” It ’ s not yet clear what form the sanctions will take .
More sanctions could soon be on the way , as the State Department approved a further $ 2.37 billion in weapons sales to Taiwan on Monday .
Thai protesters call for Germany ’ s help .
Pro-democracy protesters in Thailand marched on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ letter asking German authorities to investigate whether King Maha Vajiralongkorn “ has conducted Thai politics using his royal prerogative from German soil or not.
” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas , speaking from Berlin , said the German government was “ examining ” the issue “ and if there are things we feel to be unlawful , then that will have immediate consequences.
” Erdogan calls for French boycott .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called for a boycott of French goods as backlash against French President Emmanuel Macron ’ s remarks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ depicting the Prophet Mohammed grows .
Erdogan has accused Macron of running a “ hate campaign ” against the religion and asked the Turkish people to join the boycott already underway in some Muslim-majority countries .
EU to back Okonjo-Iweala in WTO bid .
The European Union is set to publicly endorse former Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in her bid to become the new director general of the World Trade Organization .
Only one other candidate remains in the race , South Korean Trade Minister Yoo Myung-hee , who is reportedly preferred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is chosen by consensus , so either one could still be blocked if one of the WTO ’ s 164 member states wishes to do so .
Whichever candidate prevails , it will be the first time a woman has led the organization .
Scientists have found the most compelling evidence yet for the existence of large amounts of water on the surface of the moon .
The discovery has the potential to revolutionize lunar exploration .
The findings , published in the journal Nature Astronomy , came after an infrared telescope mounted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ molecules in a crater in the moon ’ s southern region , suggesting that the moon could potentially sustain astronaut crews or provide a rocket fuel source .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Abortion rights protests continue in Poland , there is only a week to go in the U.S. presidential election campaign, and the latest cease-fire attempt in Nagorno-Karabakh fails.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Abortion rights protests continue in Poland, there is only a week to go in the U.S. presidential election campaign, and the latest cease-fire attempt in Nagorno-Karabakh fails.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Abortion Rights Protests in Poland Enter Sixth Day
Protests in Poland against the constitutional court decision to further restrict abortion rights enter their sixth day today with no end in sight.
Today’s protests follow widespread action on the streets of more than 150 Polish cities on Monday. In the capital, Warsaw, demonstrators shut down traffic through the city, flooding major intersections at rush-hour and chanting for the right-wing government to step down.
Not all right. The scale of the protests seems to indicate that Poland’s rightward shift—egged on by U.S. President Trump and his allies—is facing some headwinds. Last Tuesday, Trump’s former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell boasted of the “rising special relationship” between the two countries. But President Andrzej Duda’s extremely narrow election victory in July—with just 51.2 percent of the vote—suggests that the right’s dominance may not be set in stone.
A long time coming. The court decision was in some ways expected. As Madeline Roache argued in Foreign Policy in early 2019, “The church, anti-abortion groups, and government have transformed abortion into a deeply moral issue that has polarized the population.” Some campaigners have “displayed graphic posters of fetuses alongside images of Adolf Hitler, with text comparing abortion to genocide,” while several regional governments have effectively banned the procedure, causing many women to leave the country to seek abortions in Germany or Slovakia.
A waning Church. Such a full-throated defense of abortion rights also reflects the fading influence of the Catholic church in Poland, which itself been a target of protesters. By aligning themselves with the traditionalist values of the Law and Justice party, Conservative clerics have risked alienating a younger, more socially moderate, population. Many have voted with their feet, with church attendance among the young falling at the fastest rate in the world. As a whole, Poles are not monolithic in their approach to the institution. A 2019 poll found that 54 percent of Poles do not trust the Church, versus 33 percent who said they do.
What next? Protest organizers Women’s Strike have called for a nationwide strike to take place on Wednesday, with a march on Warsaw planned for this Friday.
What We’re Following Today
One week to go. The U.S. Presidential election campaign is now in its final week. Former Vice President Joe Biden is campaigning in Georgia while his running mate, Kamala Harris, visits Nevada. President Donald Trump will hold rallies in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Nebraska, while Vice President Mike Pence campaigns in both North and South Carolina.
Whoever wins, the practice of doling out foreign ambassadorships to wealthy donors may soon be history, as FP’s Robbie Gramer reports.
For more on Election 2020 and its international implications, read FP’s in-depth coverage here.
Nagorno-Karabakh cease-fire broken. A U.S.-brokered cease-fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict failed to hold on Monday, with both Armenia and Azerbaijan accusing one another of shooting first. In a televised address, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev criticized the OSCE Minsk group, led by France, Russia, and the United States. “For almost 30 years, the Minsk Group co-chairs have tried to reconcile Azerbaijan with the process of freezing the conflict, but we have created a new reality,” Aliyev said. “We are fed up with these negotiations. How long can you negotiate?” The Minsk group is set to meet again with the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan on Oct. 29.
China sanctions U.S. weapons manufacturers. China will impose sanctions on three U.S.-based weapons manufacturers after the U.S. State Department approved the sale of $1.8 billion worth of weapons and equipment to Taiwan last Wednesday. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said the sanctions were necessary “in order to uphold national interests.” It’s not yet clear what form the sanctions will take.
More sanctions could soon be on the way, as the State Department approved a further $2.37 billion in weapons sales to Taiwan on Monday.
Thai protesters call for Germany’s help. Pro-democracy protesters in Thailand marched on the German Embassy in Bangkok to deliver a letter asking German authorities to investigate whether King Maha Vajiralongkorn “has conducted Thai politics using his royal prerogative from German soil or not.” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, speaking from Berlin, said the German government was “examining” the issue “and if there are things we feel to be unlawful, then that will have immediate consequences.”
Keep an Eye On World’s biggest IPO to take place outside U.S. Jack Ma, China’s richest man, is set to snub U.S. markets as he launches the world’s biggest initial public offering of shares in his financial technology company Ant. Ma intends to list the company on both the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets, a patriotic move that also allows him avoid to avoid further scrutiny from U.S. regulators. At $34 billion, the stock offering will eclipse the previous IPO record, set by Saudi Aramco in December 2019.
Erdogan calls for French boycott. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called for a boycott of French goods as backlash against French President Emmanuel Macron’s remarks on Islam and his defense of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed grows. Erdogan has accused Macron of running a “hate campaign” against the religion and asked the Turkish people to join the boycott already underway in some Muslim-majority countries.
EU to back Okonjo-Iweala in WTO bid. The European Union is set to publicly endorse former Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in her bid to become the new director general of the World Trade Organization. Only one other candidate remains in the race, South Korean Trade Minister Yoo Myung-hee, who is reportedly preferred by the United States. The candidate is chosen by consensus, so either one could still be blocked if one of the WTO’s 164 member states wishes to do so. Whichever candidate prevails, it will be the first time a woman has led the organization.
Odds and Ends
Scientists have found the most compelling evidence yet for the existence of large amounts of water on the surface of the moon. The discovery has the potential to revolutionize lunar exploration. The findings, published in the journal Nature Astronomy, came after an infrared telescope mounted on a modified Boeing 747 detected water molecules in a crater in the moon’s southern region, suggesting that the moon could potentially sustain astronaut crews or provide a rocket fuel source.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-27--Myanmar’s Elections Won’t Be Free or Fair

On Oct. 16 , Myanmar ’ s election commission canceled upcoming elections in nine of 17 townships in conflict-torn Rakhine state .
Many of the unaffected townships are held by the ruling National League for Democracy ( NLD ) , and the move tilts the electoral playing field in the party ’ s favor in the state where it needs it the most .
On top of other violations of democratic norms , the decision further undermines the credibility of an election that the NLD was always going to win .
The party of the civilian leader and onetime democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ came to power in 2015 , still retains broad support elsewhere in Myanmar .
But weeks ahead of the national vote on Nov. 8 , the NLD government has excluded the Rohingya Muslim minority from voting or standing for election , censored rival political parties and critical websites , and obstructed Myanmar ’ s biggest election monitor .
A new surge of COVID-19 in Myanmar has compounded these obstacles , restricting campaigning across the country—but particularly in Rakhine state and Yangon , the largest city—and leading the major opposition parties to request a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the assault on democracy by the party that once represented it , Western countries have been almost completely silent .
After the NLD won in a landslide five years ago , many observers anticipated a liberal shift in Myanmar after decades of military rule .
But today political apathy dominates : A preelection survey by the People ’ s Alliance for Credible Elections ( PACE ) found that only 30 percent of respondents were interested in politics , a major decline from 58 percent in 2016 .
And as the NLD prepares to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the party is largely failing to live up to its name .
The elections look certain to fall short of democratic standards .
The NLD enjoys widespread popularity among the Bamar ethnic majority and would most likely win a free and fair election .
But rather than take the risk , it has undermined democracy in Myanmar , pursuing policies that resemble those of the military government that it fought for decades .
The political playing field still isn ’ t level—with the military automatically retaining control over 25 percent of seats in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the police—so the NLD may see itself as violating democratic rights to uphold democracy as part of an ongoing political transition .
Normally , there would be international condemnation over these violations—in fact , the European Union condemned similar policies ahead of the 2015 election overseen by a military-aligned party—but countries that might normally speak out are now turning a blind eye to the NLD ’ s practices .
The NLD ’ s most egregious violation of democratic norms is the exclusion of the Rohingya .
The 2017 military campaign against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ genocide by the United Nations and others , sent hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into neighboring Bangladesh .
Those who remain in Myanmar mostly live in camps described as open-air prisons , and they have been largely denied the right to vote or stand for election for failing to meet citizenship requirements that critics say are racist and arbitrary .
To some Western observers , this exclusion is merely a blemish on Myanmar ’ s otherwise encouraging democratic transition .
In a toothless joint statement , a group of eight countries including the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the inclusion of Rohingya in the elections , while failing to take any specific action .
Excluding the Rohingya is a symptom of the NLD ’ s broader reluctance to uphold democratic values .
Excluding the Rohingya is a symptom of the NLD ’ s broader reluctance to uphold democratic values .
Kyaw Min , a Rohingya politician whose candidacy was rejected by the Union Election Commission that was appointed by the NLD government , says the laws that govern eligibility are the same today as they were 30 years ago .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the military in its own quest to maintain power .
“ We are not foreigners , our parents are not foreigners , we have been here for many , many generations , ” Kyaw Min told me , adding that the NLD politicians “ don ’ t understand what democracy and human rights are—they are just trying to get power from the military.
” The NLD has either supported or remained silent on other violations of democratic norms .
At least nine parties—all ethnic minority parties or minor pro-democracy parties—have complained of election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media .
The Rakhine-based Arakan National Party , the third-largest party in parliament , said the commission forced it to remove criticism of the 2008 constitution and a comment about election apathy in Rakhine .
The government has blocked hundreds of websites for allegedly spreading “ fake news , ” including credible media outlets and the site of an activist group that exposes military corruption .
Across the country , activists have been arrested for protesting the military campaign against the Arakan Army in Rakhine .
The Arakan National Party won resoundingly in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did not significantly increase its political power at the national level , eroding faith in electoral politics and encouraging the rise of the separatist Arakan Army .
Earlier this year , the NLD voted down a proposal to allow state and regional legislatures to select their own chief ministers , which would be an important step toward long-promised federalist reform .
The Union Election Commission initially blocked PACE , the country ’ s largest election monitor , from observing the vote because it receives foreign funding .
The move provoked widespread outcry given @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S.-based Carter Center and the European Union , will be severely limited in Myanmar by COVID-19 restrictions .
The commission eventually relented , but the delay prevented PACE from observing the public posting of voter lists , which have come under criticism for rampant errors , including incorrect names and the inclusion of deceased citizens .
In July , a “ no vote ” campaign emerged , spearheaded by activists disillusioned with the NLD who argued that a legitimate election was impossible under the military-drafted constitution .
The campaign rankled NLD leadership and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , such as the All Burma Federation of Student Unions .
Though NLD politicians famously boycotted the 2010 military-organized election , its officials slammed the “ no vote ” campaign as an insult to the historical fight for democracy .
The NLD and Union Election Commission threatened the boycotters with arrest , dampening the movement .
The NLD ’ s intolerance for dissent sends a threatening message that it is the sole guardian of democracy , and that anyone who opposes the NLD must therefore oppose democracy .
In the face of these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have generally remained silent .
Thomas Andrews , the U.N. special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar , is one of the few prominent diplomats to criticize the recent censorship .
“ Information is the heartbeat of a free and fair election , ” Andrews said at a Human Rights Council meeting in September , adding the election “ will fail to meet this standard.
” The NLD ’ s intolerance for dissent sends a threatening message that it is the sole guardian of democracy .
An EU representative in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ balanced ” approach by supporting the democratic transition “ while advocating accountability.
” While condemning the “ systematic discrimination ” against the Rohingya , the representative said the EU would “ continue to support [ Myanmar ’ s ] electoral process ” —and did not answer questions about whether these issues undermined the legitimacy of the election .
Perhaps many Western countries are holding their tongues because the military still poses a greater threat to Myanmar ’ s democratic transition .
The military and its aligned party have already vetoed an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the parliament .
Some may fairly point out that Myanmar ’ s nascent democracy requires patience , but authoritarian regimes often invoke this excuse .
In nearby Cambodia , Prime Minister Hun Sen is still asking for patience for its democratic transition as he approaches 36 years in power .
While the NLD ’ s victory is a forgone conclusion , democracy is as much about the process as it is about the result—and the NLD has so far shown little respect for that process .
In Rakhine , the Rohingya don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how it all shakes out .
Every election held without their participation further entrenches their status as outsiders .

On Oct. 16, Myanmar’s election commission canceled upcoming elections in nine of 17 townships in conflict-torn Rakhine state. Many of the unaffected townships are held by the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD), and the move tilts the electoral playing field in the party’s favor in the state where it needs it the most. On top of other violations of democratic norms, the decision further undermines the credibility of an election that the NLD was always going to win. The party of the civilian leader and onetime democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, which came to power in 2015, still retains broad support elsewhere in Myanmar.
On Oct. 16, Myanmar’s election commission canceled upcoming elections in nine of 17 townships in conflict-torn Rakhine state. Many of the unaffected townships are held by the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD), and the move tilts the electoral playing field in the party’s favor in the state where it needs it the most. On top of other violations of democratic norms, the decision further undermines the credibility of an election that the NLD was always going to win. The party of the civilian leader and onetime democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, which came to power in 2015, still retains broad support elsewhere in Myanmar.
But weeks ahead of the national vote on Nov. 8, the NLD government has excluded the Rohingya Muslim minority from voting or standing for election, censored rival political parties and critical websites, and obstructed Myanmar’s biggest election monitor. A new surge of COVID-19 in Myanmar has compounded these obstacles, restricting campaigning across the country—but particularly in Rakhine state and Yangon, the largest city—and leading the major opposition parties to request a delay to no avail. Yet despite the assault on democracy by the party that once represented it, Western countries have been almost completely silent.
After the NLD won in a landslide five years ago, many observers anticipated a liberal shift in Myanmar after decades of military rule. But today political apathy dominates: A preelection survey by the People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE) found that only 30 percent of respondents were interested in politics, a major decline from 58 percent in 2016. And as the NLD prepares to defend its majority at the polls, the party is largely failing to live up to its name. The elections look certain to fall short of democratic standards.
The NLD enjoys widespread popularity among the Bamar ethnic majority and would most likely win a free and fair election. But rather than take the risk, it has undermined democracy in Myanmar, pursuing policies that resemble those of the military government that it fought for decades. The political playing field still isn’t level—with the military automatically retaining control over 25 percent of seats in parliament and controlling key institutions, such as the police—so the NLD may see itself as violating democratic rights to uphold democracy as part of an ongoing political transition.
Normally, there would be international condemnation over these violations—in fact, the European Union condemned similar policies ahead of the 2015 election overseen by a military-aligned party—but countries that might normally speak out are now turning a blind eye to the NLD’s practices.
The NLD’s most egregious violation of democratic norms is the exclusion of the Rohingya. The 2017 military campaign against the minority in Rakhine state, called a genocide by the United Nations and others, sent hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into neighboring Bangladesh. Those who remain in Myanmar mostly live in camps described as open-air prisons, and they have been largely denied the right to vote or stand for election for failing to meet citizenship requirements that critics say are racist and arbitrary.
To some Western observers, this exclusion is merely a blemish on Myanmar’s otherwise encouraging democratic transition. In a toothless joint statement, a group of eight countries including the United States and the United Kingdom called for the inclusion of Rohingya in the elections, while failing to take any specific action.
Excluding the Rohingya is a symptom of the NLD’s broader reluctance to uphold democratic values.
Excluding the Rohingya is a symptom of the NLD’s broader reluctance to uphold democratic values. Kyaw Min, a Rohingya politician whose candidacy was rejected by the Union Election Commission that was appointed by the NLD government, says the laws that govern eligibility are the same today as they were 30 years ago. He accused the current government of imitating the military in its own quest to maintain power.
“We are not foreigners, our parents are not foreigners, we have been here for many, many generations,” Kyaw Min told me, adding that the NLD politicians “don’t understand what democracy and human rights are—they are just trying to get power from the military.”
The NLD has either supported or remained silent on other violations of democratic norms. At least nine parties—all ethnic minority parties or minor pro-democracy parties—have complained of election commission censorship of their platforms on state media. The Rakhine-based Arakan National Party, the third-largest party in parliament, said the commission forced it to remove criticism of the 2008 constitution and a comment about election apathy in Rakhine. The government has blocked hundreds of websites for allegedly spreading “fake news,” including credible media outlets and the site of an activist group that exposes military corruption.
Across the country, activists have been arrested for protesting the military campaign against the Arakan Army in Rakhine. The Arakan National Party won resoundingly in Rakhine in 2015, but local success did not significantly increase its political power at the national level, eroding faith in electoral politics and encouraging the rise of the separatist Arakan Army. Earlier this year, the NLD voted down a proposal to allow state and regional legislatures to select their own chief ministers, which would be an important step toward long-promised federalist reform.
The Union Election Commission initially blocked PACE, the country’s largest election monitor, from observing the vote because it receives foreign funding. The move provoked widespread outcry given that most foreign observers, including the U.S.-based Carter Center and the European Union, will be severely limited in Myanmar by COVID-19 restrictions. The commission eventually relented, but the delay prevented PACE from observing the public posting of voter lists, which have come under criticism for rampant errors, including incorrect names and the inclusion of deceased citizens.
In July, a “no vote” campaign emerged, spearheaded by activists disillusioned with the NLD who argued that a legitimate election was impossible under the military-drafted constitution. The campaign rankled NLD leadership and was amplified by more prominent activist organizations, such as the All Burma Federation of Student Unions. Though NLD politicians famously boycotted the 2010 military-organized election, its officials slammed the “no vote” campaign as an insult to the historical fight for democracy. The NLD and Union Election Commission threatened the boycotters with arrest, dampening the movement.
The NLD’s intolerance for dissent sends a threatening message that it is the sole guardian of democracy, and that anyone who opposes the NLD must therefore oppose democracy. In the face of these restrictions on free expression, Western countries have generally remained silent. Thomas Andrews, the U.N. special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, is one of the few prominent diplomats to criticize the recent censorship. “Information is the heartbeat of a free and fair election,” Andrews said at a Human Rights Council meeting in September, adding the election “will fail to meet this standard.”
The NLD’s intolerance for dissent sends a threatening message that it is the sole guardian of democracy.
An EU representative in Myanmar told Foreign Policy it is taking a “balanced” approach by supporting the democratic transition “while advocating accountability.” While condemning the “systematic discrimination” against the Rohingya, the representative said the EU would “continue to support [Myanmar’s] electoral process”—and did not answer questions about whether these issues undermined the legitimacy of the election.
Perhaps many Western countries are holding their tongues because the military still poses a greater threat to Myanmar’s democratic transition. The military and its aligned party have already vetoed an amendment to remove unelected military legislators from the parliament. Some may fairly point out that Myanmar’s nascent democracy requires patience, but authoritarian regimes often invoke this excuse. In nearby Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen is still asking for patience for its democratic transition as he approaches 36 years in power.
While the NLD’s victory is a forgone conclusion, democracy is as much about the process as it is about the result—and the NLD has so far shown little respect for that process. In Rakhine, the Rohingya don’t have time to wait and see how it all shakes out. Every election held without their participation further entrenches their status as outsiders.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-27--Trump’s Trade Wars Have Made Bad Agriculture Policies Worse

Recent years have been tumultuous for American farmers and ranchers .
Thanks to advanced technologies and generous subsidies , their products have become so abundant that the United States usually ends up exporting about 20 percent of its agricultural output abroad .
To keep growing , U.S. farmers and ranchers need better access to markets abroad .
But U.S. agriculture and trade policies run counter to the more liberalized and open markets that would benefit U.S. farmers .
These obstacles didn ’ t originate with President Donald Trump .
He ’ s raised them higher , to be sure , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already deeply flawed .
One of Trump ’ s first actions as president was to make good on a campaign pledge to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) , a promising free-trade agreement with Pacific Rim nations signed in early 2016 .
No one would have gained more from the TPP than U.S. farmers and ranchers , who would have seen significantly improved access to the notoriously closed agricultural markets of Asian countries such as Japan .
Following the same refrain , Trump then threatened to withdraw the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) with Canada and Mexico , before settling on minor revisions of the 25-year-old pact .
When it comes to U.S. producers , however , the damage from Trump ’ s actions on these agreements pales next to the damage done by his tariffs and trade wars .
In early 2018 , Trump invoked highly dubious national security concerns in order to slap tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from virtually every country in the world , including long-standing allies .
Predictably , the United States ’ trading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including on a number of U.S. agricultural products .
China ’ s agricultural purchases were barely half of what they ’ d need to be to reach the agreed target .
Trump ’ s aggressive trade war with China took things from bad to worse for U.S. farmers .
Over the course of about 18 months , Washington and Beijing engaged in a back-and-forth volley of escalating trade restrictions , including Chinese retaliatory tariffs on more than 1,000 categories of U.S. agricultural products such as pork , soybeans , dairy products , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two sides signed a detente , but it ’ s only a temporary reprieve to a conflict that continues to fester and is likely to resurface in the near future .
As part of the so-called phase one agreement , Beijing agreed to purchase about $ 40 billion worth of U.S. agricultural products over two years , but as of September , China ’ s agricultural purchases were barely half of what they ’ d need to be to reach the agreed target for 2020 .
Meanwhile , heavy tariffs remain in place @ @ @ @ @ @ @ caught in the middle of Trump ’ s trade wars , the sector has predictably suffered .
Farm bankruptcies are soaring as farmers lose market access abroad .
To help mitigate the fallout from his trade wars and combat the financial toll of COVID-19 , the Trump administration has shoveled tens of billions of dollars to farmers , ranchers , and companies in the sector—a key electoral constituency for Trump ’ s reelection prospects .
In 2020 alone , the Trump administration will have paid an estimated $ 45 billion to the agricultural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ income , which is up sharply since 2016 , mainly thanks to Trump ’ s subsidies .
But the bulk of these payments went to wealthy farms and well-connected corporations while providing little relief to the neediest farmers and ranchers .
It is estimated that a staggering 40 percent of the sector ’ s income this year will come from government subsidies .
As the election nears , many are wondering about Trump ’ s political calculus .
The Office of Special Counsel recently chided Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue for violating federal law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Trump , promising a North Carolina crowd in August that subsidies will continue for “ four more years … if America gets out and votes for this man , Donald J. Trump.
” The Trump administration ’ s aggressive foray into protectionism has been costly to farmers , but misguided agricultural policies obviously predate the trade war .
Every five years in an overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion , the U.S. Congress doles out billions of dollars in subsidies to the U.S. agriculture industry in a hodgepodge of various programs .
Like the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aren ’ t just expensive .
They also largely benefit wealthy farms and corporations while failing to provide an adequate safety net for family farms .
This inequity extends beyond U.S. borders : Domestic subsidies hurt farmers in developing countries who can not compete with heavily subsidized agriculture from the wealthiest country in the world .
A staggering 40 percent of the agriculture sector ’ s income this year will come from government subsidies .
Despite the enormous setback for American farmers due to Trump ’ s tariffs and trade wars , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public has soured on foreign trade is a popular political narrative , but it ’ s unfounded .
In fact , more Americans support trade than any other time in the last quarter century .
Policymakers in Washington can capitalize on this enthusiasm to expand market access for American farmers and ranchers by unwinding Trump ’ s tariff wars and rejoining the TPP to improve access to vital Asian markets .
Finally , and perhaps most critically , the United States should use its biggest bargaining chip—reining in domestic subsidies—to jumpstart multilateral negotiations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agricultural subsidies and tariffs have long been a major stumbling block .
Trump deserves a lot of blame for his misguided trade and agriculture policies .
But many of the excesses in the U.S. system—sold to the public as a safety net for family farms but largely a system of corporate welfare for the largest producers—have a long bipartisan history .
The next administration can and should do better .

Recent years have been tumultuous for American farmers and ranchers. Thanks to advanced technologies and generous subsidies, their products have become so abundant that the United States usually ends up exporting about 20 percent of its agricultural output abroad. To keep growing, U.S. farmers and ranchers need better access to markets abroad. But U.S. agriculture and trade policies run counter to the more liberalized and open markets that would benefit U.S. farmers. These obstacles didn’t originate with President Donald Trump. He’s raised them higher, to be sure, but only within a system that was already deeply flawed.
Recent years have been tumultuous for American farmers and ranchers. Thanks to advanced technologies and generous subsidies, their products have become so abundant that the United States usually ends up exporting about 20 percent of its agricultural output abroad. To keep growing, U.S. farmers and ranchers need better access to markets abroad. But U.S. agriculture and trade policies run counter to the more liberalized and open markets that would benefit U.S. farmers. These obstacles didn’t originate with President Donald Trump. He’s raised them higher, to be sure, but only within a system that was already deeply flawed.
One of Trump’s first actions as president was to make good on a campaign pledge to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a promising free-trade agreement with Pacific Rim nations signed in early 2016. No one would have gained more from the TPP than U.S. farmers and ranchers, who would have seen significantly improved access to the notoriously closed agricultural markets of Asian countries such as Japan. Following the same refrain, Trump then threatened to withdraw the United States from the Clinton-era North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, before settling on minor revisions of the 25-year-old pact.
When it comes to U.S. producers, however, the damage from Trump’s actions on these agreements pales next to the damage done by his tariffs and trade wars. In early 2018, Trump invoked highly dubious national security concerns in order to slap tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from virtually every country in the world, including long-standing allies. Predictably, the United States’ trading partners retaliated with their own tariffs, including on a number of U.S. agricultural products.
China’s agricultural purchases were barely half of what they’d need to be to reach the agreed target.
Trump’s aggressive trade war with China took things from bad to worse for U.S. farmers. Over the course of about 18 months, Washington and Beijing engaged in a back-and-forth volley of escalating trade restrictions, including Chinese retaliatory tariffs on more than 1,000 categories of U.S. agricultural products such as pork, soybeans, dairy products, and nuts. In January 2020, the two sides signed a detente, but it’s only a temporary reprieve to a conflict that continues to fester and is likely to resurface in the near future. As part of the so-called phase one agreement, Beijing agreed to purchase about $40 billion worth of U.S. agricultural products over two years, but as of September, China’s agricultural purchases were barely half of what they’d need to be to reach the agreed target for 2020. Meanwhile, heavy tariffs remain in place on both sides.
With American agriculture caught in the middle of Trump’s trade wars, the sector has predictably suffered. Farm bankruptcies are soaring as farmers lose market access abroad. To help mitigate the fallout from his trade wars and combat the financial toll of COVID-19, the Trump administration has shoveled tens of billions of dollars to farmers, ranchers, and companies in the sector—a key electoral constituency for Trump’s reelection prospects. In 2020 alone, the Trump administration will have paid an estimated $45 billion to the agricultural sector. This has increased net farm income, which is up sharply since 2016, mainly thanks to Trump’s subsidies. But the bulk of these payments went to wealthy farms and well-connected corporations while providing little relief to the neediest farmers and ranchers. It is estimated that a staggering 40 percent of the sector’s income this year will come from government subsidies.
As the election nears, many are wondering about Trump’s political calculus. The Office of Special Counsel recently chided Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue for violating federal law by using his official position to campaign for Trump, promising a North Carolina crowd in August that subsidies will continue for “four more years … if America gets out and votes for this man, Donald J. Trump.”
The Trump administration’s aggressive foray into protectionism has been costly to farmers, but misguided agricultural policies obviously predate the trade war. Every five years in an overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion, the U.S. Congress doles out billions of dollars in subsidies to the U.S. agriculture industry in a hodgepodge of various programs. Like the Trump administration’s bailouts, these policies aren’t just expensive. They also largely benefit wealthy farms and corporations while failing to provide an adequate safety net for family farms. This inequity extends beyond U.S. borders: Domestic subsidies hurt farmers in developing countries who cannot compete with heavily subsidized agriculture from the wealthiest country in the world.
A staggering 40 percent of the agriculture sector’s income this year will come from government subsidies.
Despite the enormous setback for American farmers due to Trump’s tariffs and trade wars, a reversal is possible. That the U.S. public has soured on foreign trade is a popular political narrative, but it’s unfounded. In fact, more Americans support trade than any other time in the last quarter century. Policymakers in Washington can capitalize on this enthusiasm to expand market access for American farmers and ranchers by unwinding Trump’s tariff wars and rejoining the TPP to improve access to vital Asian markets. Finally, and perhaps most critically, the United States should use its biggest bargaining chip—reining in domestic subsidies—to jumpstart multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization, where agricultural subsidies and tariffs have long been a major stumbling block.
Trump deserves a lot of blame for his misguided trade and agriculture policies. But many of the excesses in the U.S. system—sold to the public as a safety net for family farms but largely a system of corporate welfare for the largest producers—have a long bipartisan history. The next administration can and should do better.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-27--Trump Turning More Countries in Europe Against Huawei

Trump Turning More Countries in Europe Against Huawei The Trump administration has signed a raft of bilateral declarations with countries in Central and Eastern Europe aimed at rolling back Chinese influence in cutting-edge 5G telecommunications infrastructure , notching an important eleventh-hour success for an administration that has sought to counter Beijing ’ s growing global influence .
In the past week , the State Department announced that it had clinched agreements with Slovakia , North Macedonia , Kosovo , and Bulgaria on high-speed wireless network technology .
The memorandums make no explicit mention of other countries , but they stress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into account whether the network suppliers are subject “ to control by a foreign government , ” taking indirect aim at Chinese telecoms giants like Huawei and ZTE that are building up 5G infrastructure all over the world , including in Europe .
During a visit to Washington , Slovak Foreign Minister Ivan Korcok said in an interview that the memorandum with the United States “ is fully consistent with our own national effort to do everything that is needed to make sure that 5G will be secure.
” “ Everybody ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he said .
“ And we don ’ t want to see any backdoor players coming in unless we know and decide that on [ the ] national level.
” Slovakia ’ s position is emblematic of how many smaller countries in Central and Eastern Europe are braving new geopolitical headwinds amid competition among the United States , Europe , Russia , and China .
Slovakia ’ s new government , propelled into office on a wave of protests and promises of anti-corruption reform , has actively sought to tighten relations with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States and other NATO allies .
In August , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Central Europe and warned against both Russian and Chinese influence in Europe , part of a monthslong diplomatic offensive to convince European countries to block Chinese companies from developing their telecommunications systems .
That same month , the Trump administration unveiled what it called a “ Clean Network ” program to counter “ long-term threats to data privacy , security and human rights posed to the free world from authoritarian malign actors , such as the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States launched a new U.S.-EU dialogue on China aimed at coordinating policies across the Atlantic to address China ’ s emerging role as a global superpower .
U.S. officials and top European intelligence officials warned that allowing Chinese companies to develop Europe ’ s 5G systems could be a Trojan horse for high-tech snooping from Chinese spy services and could grant Beijing undue influence over the trans-Atlantic community ’ s critical infrastructure .
This month , Sweden became the latest European country to ban Huawei and ZTE from its 5G infrastructure .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to completely purge Chinese equipment from its 5G networks in the next seven years .
Other major European powers such as Germany , France , and Italy have stopped short of banning Huawei from its networks outright but have pushed its own industries to move away from cooperating with the Chinese company and placed tighter restrictions on its 5G networks that could serve as insurmountable barriers to Huawei .
Both the Chinese government and Huawei representatives have repeatedly dismissed the claims that Chinese-built infrastructure is risky .
“ Huawei is a private commercial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
There are no factual grounds to support any allegations of Huawei posing any security threat .
We find the exclusion of Huawei simply based on groundless presumption , unfair and unacceptable , ” Huawei said in response to Sweden ’ s decision .
In Central Europe , the new Slovakian government is pursuing an abrupt about-face .
The previous government downplayed Huawei as a security threat and stood out as the only country in Central and Eastern Europe not to expel Russian diplomats from the country after the 2018 poisoning of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kingdom—even as senior Hungarian and Czech officials faced criticism for maintaining warm relations with Moscow .
But under center-right Prime Minister Igor Matovic , who took office in March , the Slovak government expelled Russian officials for abusing Slovak visas , reportedly tied to the murder of a Georgian man in Berlin in 2019 .
When it comes to China , Slovak President Zuzana Caputova went as far as to refuse to speak at a think tank conference due to the conference ’ s partnership with Huawei .
( The think tank later @ @ @ @ @ @ @ . )
Korcok , the foreign minister , was careful to point out that the new agreement with the United States does not explicitly ban specific companies from its networks , but he indicated his country was waking up to the geopolitical implications of foreign investment from rivals like Russia and China .
For years , China has tried to make investment in Central and Eastern European countries—the so-called 17-plus-1 group—a key plank in its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative , with an eye toward gaining a stronger foothold in European markets and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ run interference in Brussels for Beijing on issues like human rights , which some analysts attribute to substantial Chinese investments in Greek ports . )
“ China is a country that we recognize as a partner , ” Korcok said .
“ But at the same time , China is a competitor , and … it ’ s a systemic rival .
So I ’ m looking at partners like China through very realistic optics .
”

The Trump administration has signed a raft of bilateral declarations with countries in Central and Eastern Europe aimed at rolling back Chinese influence in cutting-edge 5G telecommunications infrastructure, notching an important eleventh-hour success for an administration that has sought to counter Beijing’s growing global influence.
The Trump administration has signed a raft of bilateral declarations with countries in Central and Eastern Europe aimed at rolling back Chinese influence in cutting-edge 5G telecommunications infrastructure, notching an important eleventh-hour success for an administration that has sought to counter Beijing’s growing global influence.
In the past week, the State Department announced that it had clinched agreements with Slovakia, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bulgaria on high-speed wireless network technology. The memorandums make no explicit mention of other countries, but they stress that any new 5G systems should take into account whether the network suppliers are subject “to control by a foreign government,” taking indirect aim at Chinese telecoms giants like Huawei and ZTE that are building up 5G infrastructure all over the world, including in Europe.
During a visit to Washington, Slovak Foreign Minister Ivan Korcok said in an interview that the memorandum with the United States “is fully consistent with our own national effort to do everything that is needed to make sure that 5G will be secure.”
“Everybody’s aware of all the risks involved,” he said. “And we don’t want to see any backdoor players coming in unless we know and decide that on [the] national level.”
Slovakia’s position is emblematic of how many smaller countries in Central and Eastern Europe are braving new geopolitical headwinds amid competition among the United States, Europe, Russia, and China. Slovakia’s new government, propelled into office on a wave of protests and promises of anti-corruption reform, has actively sought to tighten relations with fellow European Union members—and with the United States and other NATO allies.
In August, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Central Europe and warned against both Russian and Chinese influence in Europe, part of a monthslong diplomatic offensive to convince European countries to block Chinese companies from developing their telecommunications systems. That same month, the Trump administration unveiled what it called a “Clean Network” program to counter “long-term threats to data privacy, security and human rights posed to the free world from authoritarian malign actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party.”
This month, the United States launched a new U.S.-EU dialogue on China aimed at coordinating policies across the Atlantic to address China’s emerging role as a global superpower.
U.S. officials and top European intelligence officials warned that allowing Chinese companies to develop Europe’s 5G systems could be a Trojan horse for high-tech snooping from Chinese spy services and could grant Beijing undue influence over the trans-Atlantic community’s critical infrastructure. This month, Sweden became the latest European country to ban Huawei and ZTE from its 5G infrastructure. The United Kingdom in July announced plans to completely purge Chinese equipment from its 5G networks in the next seven years. Other major European powers such as Germany, France, and Italy have stopped short of banning Huawei from its networks outright but have pushed its own industries to move away from cooperating with the Chinese company and placed tighter restrictions on its 5G networks that could serve as insurmountable barriers to Huawei.
Both the Chinese government and Huawei representatives have repeatedly dismissed the claims that Chinese-built infrastructure is risky. “Huawei is a private commercial company 100% owned by its employees. There are no factual grounds to support any allegations of Huawei posing any security threat. We find the exclusion of Huawei simply based on groundless presumption, unfair and unacceptable,” Huawei said in response to Sweden’s decision.
In Central Europe, the new Slovakian government is pursuing an abrupt about-face. The previous government downplayed Huawei as a security threat and stood out as the only country in Central and Eastern Europe not to expel Russian diplomats from the country after the 2018 poisoning of a former Russian intelligence officer in the United Kingdom—even as senior Hungarian and Czech officials faced criticism for maintaining warm relations with Moscow.
But under center-right Prime Minister Igor Matovic, who took office in March, the Slovak government expelled Russian officials for abusing Slovak visas, reportedly tied to the murder of a Georgian man in Berlin in 2019. When it comes to China, Slovak President Zuzana Caputova went as far as to refuse to speak at a think tank conference due to the conference’s partnership with Huawei. (The think tank later withdrew from its sponsorship pact with Huawei.)
Korcok, the foreign minister, was careful to point out that the new agreement with the United States does not explicitly ban specific companies from its networks, but he indicated his country was waking up to the geopolitical implications of foreign investment from rivals like Russia and China. For years, China has tried to make investment in Central and Eastern European countries—the so-called 17-plus-1 group—a key plank in its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, with an eye toward gaining a stronger foothold in European markets and reaping geopolitical rewards. (Greece has run interference in Brussels for Beijing on issues like human rights, which some analysts attribute to substantial Chinese investments in Greek ports.)
“China is a country that we recognize as a partner,” Korcok said. “But at the same time, China is a competitor, and … it’s a systemic rival. So I’m looking at partners like China through very realistic optics.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-27--Trump Appointee Seeks to Turn U.S. Media Agency Into a Political Cheerleader

Trump Appointee Seeks to Turn U.S. Media Agency Into a Political Cheerleader A week before the U.S. presidential election , the Trump administration sought sweeping changes to transform U.S. government broadcasting agencies into cheerleading networks for the president ’ s foreign-policy agenda .
But congressional Democrats vowed to push back on the administration ’ s efforts to undermine the independence of the government broadcasters .
The head of the U.S. broadcasting agency has eliminated a recent firewall provision established to ensure the independence of news operations at Voice of America ( VOA ) and other government-sponsored news outlets and to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political leadership .
In a Monday night memo , Michael Pack , the CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media ( USAGM ) , which oversees VOA ’ s news operations , issued the repeal of a June federal regulation that limited political interference in U.S. government broadcasting .
For VOA staffers , the memo represented the clearest sign yet of Pack ’ s effort to remake the government news agency into a state propaganda network for Trump .
“ This is a terrible move by Mr .
Pack .
It will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the realm for VOA and other broadcasters , which is their credibility , ” said David Ensor , a former journalist who served as director of VOA from 2011 to 2015 .
“ They get their credibility from having a firewall between the political powers in Washington and their journalism.
” The administration previously launched an investigation into VOA ’ s White House reporter , Steve Herman , to determine whether he had shown an alleged bias against Trump .
The administration has also issued guidelines prohibiting reporters from reporting on Trump if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ article or cartoon critical of the president .
“ A VOA journalist who expresses personal views on political topics in their personal social media creates the potential for a conflict of interest and should consider whether recusal or mitigation is required , ” according to guidance issued on Oct. 2 .
“ For example , a journalist who on Facebook ‘ likes ’ a comment or political cartoon that aggressively attacks or disparages the President must recuse themselves from covering the President.
” The repeal memo claimed that the firewall regulation was in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mandate to promote American interests abroad .
VOA and other U.S.-sponsored news agencies , it claimed , “ do not function as a traditional news or media agency and were never intended to do so .
… By design , their purpose and focus is foreign relations and the promotion of American objectives—not simply presenting news or engaging in journalistic expression .
For example , the Networks are to articulate the American perspective while countering international views that undermine American values and freedom , or that might aid our enemies ’ messaging.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Free Europe/Radio Liberty ( RFE/RL ) and Radio Free Asia are intended to provide independent news to audiences in countries where media freedoms are curtailed , but could also be affected by the policy changes .
Jamie Fly , who served as President of RFE/RL until he was dismissed by Pack in June , said he feared the memo would put the services ’ s reporters based in Eurasia at increased risk of harassment by governments that already do not welcome their presence .
“ They ’ re often harassed , sometimes physically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them , governments in many of these countries already accuse them of being spies , ” he said .
“ When the CEO who is funding these networks is putting out policy statements which talk about how he wants the journalists to focus more on foreign policy objectives , that creates a toxic brew which could easily be used against these journalists in the field , ” said Fly .
The notion of a firewall between VOA ’ s journalists and Washington ’ s political masters was embedded in the agency ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and signed by President Gerald Ford in 1976 .
But the broadcaster ’ s leadership sought to codify those protections in a formal regulation in June , anticipating the arrival of a Trump appointee they feared would undercut its independence .
“ I think those regulations were written in a bit of a panic about what by then looked like the immediate arrival for a Trump appointee , ” Ensor said .
“ I can see why he might be offended by that and not want them to stand .
But the fact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bad sign.
” Ensor questioned whether Pack had the legal right to remove the firewall , which was based on the agency ’ s own legal interpretation of the 1976 charter .
“ I ’ m sure it will be reversed by anybody that Biden appoints .
But this is another example of someone who doesn ’ t understand journalism or why VOA has credibility , ” he said .
During his confirmation hearing in 2019 , Pack was asked by Sen. Bob Menendez , the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firewall .
“ I ’ m not sure about all the journalistic practices and techniques inside the agency now to do that , but I would look at those and try to strengthen them , ” Pack said .
In a memo to staff , VOA ’ s acting director , Elez Biberaj , sought to assure staffers that the repeal only applied to the June regulation but that the long-standing firewall between the broadcaster ’ s journalists and the government remained in force .
“ While some may see [ the repeal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agency ’ s statutory mission to provide fair and balanced news coverage on behalf of the United States government , the repeal of the regulation only returns VOA and the agency to the pre-June 15 practices regarding the firewall , ” Biberaj wrote .
“ As was the case before the regulation , it is my position that the repeal does not allow [ the ] government to tamper with or otherwise distort VOA content.
” “ The importance of the firewall remains at the heart of VOA ’ s operations , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ committed to protecting VOA ’ s journalistic integrity.
” Rep. Eliot Engel , the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , said Pack ’ s move would not stand and renewed his call for Pack ’ s resignation or firing .
“ Mr .
Pack has taken his rampage on America ’ s international broadcasting to another level , ” Engel said in a statement issued Tuesday .
“ He ’ s trying to tear down the legally mandated firewall that protects [ U.S. government ] broadcasters from outside interference .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ although Mr .
Pack can huff and puff , he can ’ t blow that wall down .
The rule he rescinded yesterday clarified the legal protections .
The firewall remains.
” USAGM oversees VOA , the Office of Cuba Broadcasting , Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty , Radio Free Asia , and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks .
Collectively , the U.S. government-backed media outlets reach an estimated 345 million people per week worldwide .
Pack ’ s brief tenure at USAGM is so rocky that it has even drawn the ire of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public breach with the Trump administration .
The top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee , Rep. Michael McCaul , joined with Democrats to issue a subpoena for Pack last month to attend a hearing on his management practices .
Pack flouted the subpoena and never showed up to testify .
In his place , USAGM ’ s former acting CEO and Chief Financial Officer Grant Turner testified before the committee and accused Pack of mismanagement ; undercutting programs aimed at circumventing Chinese , Russian , and Iranian firewalls ; and firing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration .
“ Nothing in my 17 years comes even close to the gross mismanagement , the abuse of authority , the violations of law that have occurred since Michael Pack assumed the role of CEO , ” he told the committee .

Colum Lynch, Amy Mackinnon and Robbie Gramer

A week before the U.S. presidential election, the Trump administration sought sweeping changes to transform U.S. government broadcasting agencies into cheerleading networks for the president’s foreign-policy agenda. But congressional Democrats vowed to push back on the administration’s efforts to undermine the independence of the government broadcasters.
A week before the U.S. presidential election, the Trump administration sought sweeping changes to transform U.S. government broadcasting agencies into cheerleading networks for the president’s foreign-policy agenda. But congressional Democrats vowed to push back on the administration’s efforts to undermine the independence of the government broadcasters.
The head of the U.S. broadcasting agency has eliminated a recent firewall provision established to ensure the independence of news operations at Voice of America (VOA) and other government-sponsored news outlets and to shield their journalists from the interference of political leadership.
In a Monday night memo, Michael Pack, the CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which oversees VOA’s news operations, issued the repeal of a June federal regulation that limited political interference in U.S. government broadcasting.
For VOA staffers, the memo represented the clearest sign yet of Pack’s effort to remake the government news agency into a state propaganda network for Trump.
“This is a terrible move by Mr. Pack. It will only serve to damage the coin of the realm for VOA and other broadcasters, which is their credibility,” said David Ensor, a former journalist who served as director of VOA from 2011 to 2015. “They get their credibility from having a firewall between the political powers in Washington and their journalism.”
The administration previously launched an investigation into VOA’s White House reporter, Steve Herman, to determine whether he had shown an alleged bias against Trump. The administration has also issued guidelines prohibiting reporters from reporting on Trump if they had ever retweeted or liked an article or cartoon critical of the president.
“A VOA journalist who expresses personal views on political topics in their personal social media creates the potential for a conflict of interest and should consider whether recusal or mitigation is required,” according to guidance issued on Oct. 2. “For example, a journalist who on Facebook ‘likes’ a comment or political cartoon that aggressively attacks or disparages the President must recuse themselves from covering the President.”
The repeal memo claimed that the firewall regulation was in conflict with the agency’s original mandate to promote American interests abroad. VOA and other U.S.-sponsored news agencies, it claimed, “do not function as a traditional news or media agency and were never intended to do so. … By design, their purpose and focus is foreign relations and the promotion of American objectives—not simply presenting news or engaging in journalistic expression. For example, the Networks are to articulate the American perspective while countering international views that undermine American values and freedom, or that might aid our enemies’ messaging.”
Other networks under USAGM such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Radio Free Asia are intended to provide independent news to audiences in countries where media freedoms are curtailed, but could also be affected by the policy changes.
Jamie Fly, who served as President of RFE/RL until he was dismissed by Pack in June, said he feared the memo would put the services’s reporters based in Eurasia at increased risk of harassment by governments that already do not welcome their presence. “They’re often harassed, sometimes physically attacked, they have intelligence agencies following them, governments in many of these countries already accuse them of being spies,” he said.
“When the CEO who is funding these networks is putting out policy statements which talk about how he wants the journalists to focus more on foreign policy objectives, that creates a toxic brew which could easily be used against these journalists in the field,” said Fly.
The notion of a firewall between VOA’s journalists and Washington’s political masters was embedded in the agency’s charter, which was established by Congress and signed by President Gerald Ford in 1976. But the broadcaster’s leadership sought to codify those protections in a formal regulation in June, anticipating the arrival of a Trump appointee they feared would undercut its independence.
“I think those regulations were written in a bit of a panic about what by then looked like the immediate arrival for a Trump appointee,” Ensor said. “I can see why he might be offended by that and not want them to stand. But the fact that he has repealed them is a bad sign.”
Ensor questioned whether Pack had the legal right to remove the firewall, which was based on the agency’s own legal interpretation of the 1976 charter. “I’m sure it will be reversed by anybody that Biden appoints. But this is another example of someone who doesn’t understand journalism or why VOA has credibility,” he said.
During his confirmation hearing in 2019, Pack was asked by Sen. Bob Menendez, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, how he would protect the firewall. “I’m not sure about all the journalistic practices and techniques inside the agency now to do that, but I would look at those and try to strengthen them,” Pack said.
In a memo to staff, VOA’s acting director, Elez Biberaj, sought to assure staffers that the repeal only applied to the June regulation but that the long-standing firewall between the broadcaster’s journalists and the government remained in force.
“While some may see [the repeal] as a fundamental assault on the agency’s statutory mission to provide fair and balanced news coverage on behalf of the United States government, the repeal of the regulation only returns VOA and the agency to the pre-June 15 practices regarding the firewall,” Biberaj wrote. “As was the case before the regulation, it is my position that the repeal does not allow [the] government to tamper with or otherwise distort VOA content.”
“The importance of the firewall remains at the heart of VOA’s operations,” Biberaj added. “I am fully committed to protecting VOA’s journalistic integrity.”
Rep. Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said Pack’s move would not stand and renewed his call for Pack’s resignation or firing.
“Mr. Pack has taken his rampage on America’s international broadcasting to another level,” Engel said in a statement issued Tuesday. “He’s trying to tear down the legally mandated firewall that protects [U.S. government] broadcasters from outside interference. But Congress created that firewall by law and although Mr. Pack can huff and puff, he can’t blow that wall down. The rule he rescinded yesterday clarified the legal protections. The firewall remains.”
USAGM oversees VOA, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks. Collectively, the U.S. government-backed media outlets reach an estimated 345 million people per week worldwide.
Pack’s brief tenure at USAGM is so rocky that it has even drawn the ire of senior Republican lawmakers, in a rare public breach with the Trump administration. The top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Michael McCaul, joined with Democrats to issue a subpoena for Pack last month to attend a hearing on his management practices. Pack flouted the subpoena and never showed up to testify.
In his place, USAGM’s former acting CEO and Chief Financial Officer Grant Turner testified before the committee and accused Pack of mismanagement; undercutting programs aimed at circumventing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian firewalls; and firing officials who upheld journalistic standards while covering the Trump administration.
“Nothing in my 17 years comes even close to the gross mismanagement, the abuse of authority, the violations of law that have occurred since Michael Pack assumed the role of CEO,” he told the committee.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-27--How the United States Handed China its Rare Earth Monopoly

How the United States Handed China its Rare Earth Monopoly At the end of September , U.S. President Donald Trump released an executive order amounting to an all-hands-on-deck call to end China ’ s monopoly on rare earths , the metals and alloys used in many high-tech devices .
It was high time ; China ’ s dominance of these resources has resulted in the transfer of entire U.S. industries ( medical imaging , for example ) , technologies , and jobs to China while also compromising the U.S. defense industry ’ s supply chain .
China didn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) industry .
In fact , up until 1980 , 99 percent of the world ’ s heavy REs were a byproduct of U.S. mining operations for titanium , zircon , and phosphate .
In fact , it was only because of changes in U.S. regulations , the voluntary transfer of expertise and intellectual property , and the absence of an industrial policy that China has been able to corner this market .
The story of how the United States and others surrendered the RE industry to China may suggest the ways in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , meanwhile , is not constrained by IAEA regulations , since it is only an observer of the agency , not a member .
It was able to step in to replace the United States in the production and processing of REs .
Also at play was the transfer of relevant technology from the West to China .
While the United States and other IAEA nations were busy limiting their RE capacity in the 1980s , the U.S Congress granted China most favored nation trading status .
In doing so , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goods , knowledge , and technology between the two nations .
Over the years , U.S. , Japanese , and French companies transferred their intellectual property in refining and metallurgical technologies to China , which had lower cost of production , resulting from cheap labor , lax environmental regulation , and generous Chinese state subsidies .
China took that technology and ran with it .
The United States was the first nation to file an international patent for REs in the 1950s .
China ’ s first RE patent did not come until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lost time by establishing five well-funded National Rare Earth Laboratories operating under a series of National Industrial Policy initiatives .
( By contrast , the United States has one National Lab .
The Ames National Laboratory works on REs on an on-again/off-again basis . )
In turn , China surpassed the United States in the number of field patents by 1997 , and by 2021 , it is estimated that China will have accumulated more RE patents than the United States and the rest of the world combined .
China has also been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shift focus to the upper end of the RE value chain ; China produces or controls over 70 percent of the world ’ s mined REs , and it refines more than 80 percent of all REs into mixed oxides and separates more than 90 percent of all REs into individual elements .
China and Chinese-controlled enterprises produce more than 99 percent of all so-called new REs metals ( produced from virgin ore ) .
With most of the economic value from rare earths coming from the production of metals , alloys , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modern technology work ) , China is now looking to other countries , including Myanmar , Vietnam , Burundi , and the United States to do the dirty work of mining .
This new strategy protects China ’ s environment , preserves its resources , and creates a highly priced competitive environment among its suppliers .
In contrast to China ’ s quick moves on RE , the United States has not had base RE-metal production capabilities for over a decade .
Japan , likewise , ended production in 2018 .
In turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process has allowed the country to force foreign technology companies to move IP and manufacturing to China .
Perhaps even worse , under an obscure critical materials law , 10 U.S. Code § 2533b , Chinese RE base metals have been used in the defense industry for the last decade and a half .
The law , which was meant to ensure domestic production of “ critical materials , ” defined those materials as magnets and alloys .
But even U.S.-made magnets and alloys use Chinese base metals , which means that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China to build its weapon systems .
The first real steps to correct the problem were taken by Trump administration in 2019 , beginning with his amendment of the Defense Production Act of 1950 .
As a result of that amendment , the Department of Interior , in coordination with other agencies , redefined critical materials to their point of origin , not alloying .
The move forced the Pentagon to seek alternatives to the long-standing practice of directly or indirectly utilizing Chinese RE metals within the U.S. defense industry .
More recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order to expedite public policy focused on REs and other critical minerals .
Meanwhile , there are numerous legislative efforts from the Pentagon and Department of Energy to invest in domestic capacity .
These plans include subsidies and injecting funding for research and development into the private sector .
This scramble to action was initiated only after a long decade of private investment failures intended to challenge China ’ s monopoly .
With over 400 business failed startups in the rare earth mining space since 2010 , Washington has finally started looking at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ One recent Congressional proposal— “ Onshoring Rare Earth Act , ” which was introduced by Republican Senator Ted Cruz of Texas this spring—suggested that the United State could mine its way out of this problem with massive subsidies directed to domestic metal and magnet makers .
However , targeting subsidies this way will translate into chaos at the mining and refining level because the miners will be subject to China ’ s substantial global pricing power .
Subsistence mining operations , taking environmental short cuts , and attempts to elude responsibilities through bankruptcies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidies to miners and refiners could lead to greater inefficiencies and pricing distortions .
The act also has no answer for dealing with Chinese price manipulation and other new low-cost producers in the Asian and African region .
Another effort is the REE-Coop 21st Century Manufacturing Act , introduced by Republican Senator Marco Rubio last year .
This act proposes that the United States start using the high-value REs , historically a byproduct of many other commodities , that are currently disposed of as part of the 1980 regulatory change .
These resources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , operated , and funded RE production facility operated for the benefit of U.S. and other technology firms that use rare earths .
Such cooperatives could pass along the savings of using mining byproducts to the end-users .
The history around publicly funding private ventures that require subsidies to survive also suggests that Rubio ’ s proposal may be more on the mark—particularly since it addresses one of the root causes of the United States ’ fall from dominance to begin with .
In that way , the plan may put the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @

At the end of September, U.S. President Donald Trump released an executive order amounting to an all-hands-on-deck call to end China’s monopoly on rare earths, the metals and alloys used in many high-tech devices. It was high time; China’s dominance of these resources has resulted in the transfer of entire U.S. industries (medical imaging, for example), technologies, and jobs to China while also compromising the U.S. defense industry’s supply chain.
At the end of September, U.S. President Donald Trump released an executive order amounting to an all-hands-on-deck call to end China’s monopoly on rare earths, the metals and alloys used in many high-tech devices. It was high time; China’s dominance of these resources has resulted in the transfer of entire U.S. industries (medical imaging, for example), technologies, and jobs to China while also compromising the U.S. defense industry’s supply chain.
China didn’t always dominate the rare-earth (RE) industry. In fact, up until 1980, 99 percent of the world’s heavy REs were a byproduct of U.S. mining operations for titanium, zircon, and phosphate. In fact, it was only because of changes in U.S. regulations, the voluntary transfer of expertise and intellectual property, and the absence of an industrial policy that China has been able to corner this market.
The story of how the United States and others surrendered the RE industry to China may suggest the ways in which the country might reestablish self-reliance.
The United States’ downfall as a leader in the RE industry was set in motion in 1980, when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) amended its definition of source material (broadly, material containing uranium or thorium) for nuclear weapons. Previously, heavy RE byproducts had not been considered source materials, which meant that they could be easily sold and processed into high-value materials. But under the amended definition, they were suddenly placed under extensive licensing, regulatory, disposal, and liability rules. Given the added cost and liabilities, their production and refining was eventually terminated in the United States and other IAEA member states.
China, meanwhile, is not constrained by IAEA regulations, since it is only an observer of the agency, not a member. It was able to step in to replace the United States in the production and processing of REs.
Also at play was the transfer of relevant technology from the West to China. While the United States and other IAEA nations were busy limiting their RE capacity in the 1980s, the U.S Congress granted China most favored nation trading status. In doing so, it opened the door for the exchange of goods, knowledge, and technology between the two nations.
Over the years, U.S., Japanese, and French companies transferred their intellectual property in refining and metallurgical technologies to China, which had lower cost of production, resulting from cheap labor, lax environmental regulation, and generous Chinese state subsidies.
China took that technology and ran with it.
The United States was the first nation to file an international patent for REs in the 1950s. China’s first RE patent did not come until 1983, but it made up for lost time by establishing five well-funded National Rare Earth Laboratories operating under a series of National Industrial Policy initiatives. (By contrast, the United States has one National Lab. The Ames National Laboratory works on REs on an on-again/off-again basis.) In turn, China surpassed the United States in the number of field patents by 1997, and by 2021, it is estimated that China will have accumulated more RE patents than the United States and the rest of the world combined.
China has also been able to tailor its industrial policy to shift focus to the upper end of the RE value chain; China produces or controls over 70 percent of the world’s mined REs, and it refines more than 80 percent of all REs into mixed oxides and separates more than 90 percent of all REs into individual elements. China and Chinese-controlled enterprises produce more than 99 percent of all so-called new REs metals (produced from virgin ore).
With most of the economic value from rare earths coming from the production of metals, alloys, and magnets (the materials that make modern technology work), China is now looking to other countries, including Myanmar, Vietnam, Burundi, and the United States to do the dirty work of mining. This new strategy protects China’s environment, preserves its resources, and creates a highly priced competitive environment among its suppliers.
In contrast to China’s quick moves on RE, the United States has not had base RE-metal production capabilities for over a decade. Japan, likewise, ended production in 2018. In turn, China’s control over the process has allowed the country to force foreign technology companies to move IP and manufacturing to China. Perhaps even worse, under an obscure critical materials law, 10 U.S. Code § 2533b, Chinese RE base metals have been used in the defense industry for the last decade and a half. The law, which was meant to ensure domestic production of “critical materials,” defined those materials as magnets and alloys. But even U.S.-made magnets and alloys use Chinese base metals, which means that the U.S. military is still entirely dependent on China to build its weapon systems.
The first real steps to correct the problem were taken by Trump administration in 2019, beginning with his amendment of the Defense Production Act of 1950. As a result of that amendment, the Department of Interior, in coordination with other agencies, redefined critical materials to their point of origin, not alloying. The move forced the Pentagon to seek alternatives to the long-standing practice of directly or indirectly utilizing Chinese RE metals within the U.S. defense industry.
Mining the Future, a special report by FP Analytics, is the first systematic and comprehensive assessment of China’s accumulation of control and influence over a range of critical metals and minerals, and the supply chains upon which the future of the high-tech industry depends. Read it now.
More recently, the administration issued a new executive order to expedite public policy focused on REs and other critical minerals. Meanwhile, there are numerous legislative efforts from the Pentagon and Department of Energy to invest in domestic capacity. These plans include subsidies and injecting funding for research and development into the private sector. This scramble to action was initiated only after a long decade of private investment failures intended to challenge China’s monopoly. With over 400 business failed start-ups in the rare-earth mining space since 2010, Washington has finally started looking at ways to balance the uneven contest.
One recent Congressional proposal—“Onshoring Rare Earth Act,” which was introduced by Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas this spring—suggested that the United State could mine its way out of this problem with massive subsidies directed to domestic metal and magnet makers. However, targeting subsidies this way will translate into chaos at the mining and refining level because the miners will be subject to China’s substantial global pricing power. Subsistence mining operations, taking environmental short cuts, and attempts to elude responsibilities through bankruptcies would become the norm. Yet providing subsidies to miners and refiners could lead to greater inefficiencies and pricing distortions. The act also has no answer for dealing with Chinese price manipulation and other new low-cost producers in the Asian and African region.
Another effort is the REE-Coop 21st Century Manufacturing Act, introduced by Republican Senator Marco Rubio last year. This act proposes that the United States start using the high-value REs, historically a byproduct of many other commodities, that are currently disposed of as part of the 1980 regulatory change. These resources would be sent to a privately owned, operated, and funded RE production facility operated for the benefit of U.S. and other technology firms that use rare earths. Such cooperatives could pass along the savings of using mining byproducts to the end-users.
The history around publicly funding private ventures that require subsidies to survive also suggests that Rubio’s proposal may be more on the mark—particularly since it addresses one of the root causes of the United States’ fall from dominance to begin with. In that way, the plan may put the United States back on the right path.