foreignpolicy--2020-08-21--Don’t Discount the Dollar Yet

Don’t Discount the Dollar Yet

If some stories are easier to tell than others , the decline of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency is one of them .
It ’ s not hard to see why .
The cast of characters that avail themselves for the script includes international trade , financial architecture , great-power competition , cycles of history , and even parables from ancient Greece .
And on cue , the headlines are again churning out new versions of the familiar fable .
New plot lines include the economic fallout of a global pandemic as well as a “ capital war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in which Washington usurps Beijing ’ s traditionally lonely role as the imposer of the restrictions on how capital can move between their two countries , frightening global investors , who then forsake the fallen dollar .
Taken at face value , the headlines suggest that the dollar ’ s long-awaited dethroning may be here at last .
The Chinese Communist Party is the latest in a motley crew of conspirators serving , unwittingly , to prevent the dollar ’ s status .
But the economic forces that thwarted any demise of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They continue to render any end to the dollar ’ s reserve status today unlikely .
In fact , there is a new player keeping it on its throne : the Chinese Communist Party .
It ’ s the latest arrival to the motley crew of conspirators serving , unwittingly , to prevent the currency from leaving its seat .
The dollar can ’ t be displaced with nothing , and mainland China ’ s currency , the yuan , was once the most-viable something .
Global banks planned for it to “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speculated about the timing .
The country ’ s growing economy , after all , is the world ’ s second largest .
And Beijing is keen to take steps intended to promote its currency ’ s use in international trade .
Officials in the world ’ s third-largest economy , the European Union , may voice similar intentions .
But Beijing is not dealing in the currency of a monetary union that , according to research at its own central bank , maybe shouldn ’ t even exist .
“ Overall economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economists at the European Central Bank concluded in 2019 , “ are still not fully commensurate with the requirements of a monetary union.
” Nonetheless , Beijing ’ s recent actions have eviscerated the yuan ’ s prospects as a real reserve currency .
For a currency to function as an international reserve , global businesses need safe places to put it when it ’ s not in use .
After all , no one wants to sell stuff in exchange for money they ’ d struggle to safely store .
Without safe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least low-risk bonds , a currency can become a costly thing with which to do business .
The most natural home for these safe assets denominated in mainland China ’ s currency would be mainland China .
But Beijing imposes capital controls on flows of money in and out of the mainland .
These capital controls stymie the development of liquid , globally accessible capital markets that can offer safe assets .
Hence any market for Chinese yuan consistent with a role as a global reserve currency would need to exist outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong market once seemed like it could facilitate the yuan ’ s rise as a reserve currency , much as the offshore “ eurodollar ” market that emerged in 1960s London once did for the dollar .
But the market for U.S. dollars in London thrived in part because U.S. authorities resisted any desire to try to meddle in these offshore markets .
Beijing ’ s recent changes in how it governs Hong Kong evince an atomically opposite approach .
Even the financial institutions of Switzerland , traditionally paragons of political neutrality , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Hong Kong as a result .
Any offshore market for yuan , whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere , would require interfacing with mainland China ’ s financial system and ultimately its central bank .
This necessarily leaves any offshore yuan market vulnerable to Beijing ’ s whims .
And Beijing acts on its whims ; last year , Chinese officials punished the NBA because of a tweet from an employee of the Houston Rockets basketball team .
In this world , any new offshore market for yuan is unlikely to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s political cudgel than onshore Chinese markets—and thus not that safe .
To be fair , officials in China never had much of a shot at displacing the dollar ’ s reserve status .
Nor do governments anywhere .
The reason : Market incentives and economic self-interest are what keep the dollar ’ s status as a reserve currency steady .
And these market forces are largely impervious to the wishes of today ’ s governments , even if they do operate within structures created by past regimes .
To illustrate , imagine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the whole chain of events that culminated in the original arrival of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency after World War II .
What would happen to the dollar as the world readjusted ?
Virtually nothing .
The post-amnesia equilibrium would be today ’ s equilibrium .
Managers of businesses with operations abroad would find that about 50 percent of existing international trade invoices , cross-border loans , and international bonds are in U.S. dollars .
No other foreign currency would offer access to commercial and financial networks of this size @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the U.S. dollar would still be better than the alternatives .
Foreign governments and central banks would see businesses within their jurisdictions accumulate this dollar exposure .
In light of this exposure , to fulfill their domestic policy objectives , foreign officials would then stockpile U.S. dollars .
The dollar ’ s share of official foreign exchange reserves would have no reason to deviate from the roughly 60 percent level it is at now .
This thought experiment captures the basic dynamic of the dollar ’ s genesis as the reserve currency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ July 1944 unfolded , World War II was effectively purging the prewar monetary system from the rest of the world ’ s memory .
There , allied governments decided that everyone would wake up to find themselves rebuilding a world in which the U.S. dollar had become the reserve currency .
Whether everyone knew or cared about how or why this happened didn ’ t matter .
Due to the strong network effects that operate in currency markets , dollars then begot more dollars .
Even the suspension of the convertibility of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to disrupt the self-perpetuating logic of the dollar ’ s reserve role .
Nonetheless , when it comes to the dollar ’ s reserve status , many observers seem to assume that its longevity remains a function of the factors relevant to the circumstances of birth , like geopolitical clout and agreements with allies .
But this assumption has implications that are odds with observable features of reality .
For instance , by most accounts , the peak of U.S. geopolitical clout on the world stage came around 1990 .
The Iron Curtain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ended .
Yet the U.S. dollar ’ s role in international trade has increased since , even as its share of world trade and GDP have fallen .
The dollar ’ s share of official foreign exchange reserves has also since gone up , undermining the common analogy between mid-20th-century Britain and 21st-century America .
Meanwhile , some of the allied nations present at Bretton Woods have themselves explicitly tried to loosen the dollar hegemony their own predecessor governments helped to design .
But not even they can succeed .
In 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an alternative currency payment mechanism intended to circumvent U.S. sanctions on Iran .
In over a year , the European payment mechanism has now managed to facilitate all of a single transaction of 500,000 euros .
The U.S. sanctions had induced European firms to cancel billions of dollars of planned investments in Iran .
Even China can ’ t quit the dollar when it tries to .
Allies aside , currency markets have been an afterthought of Beijing ’ s policy in Hong Kong , but even China can ’ t quit the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ steady trillions of dollars in official reserves reflect its decision to deal with the global economy as it exists , rather than any goodwill or foreign-policy intentions .
But unfettered envy for the United States would be premature .
If the U.S. dollar ’ s reserve status stays steady as the U.S. share of world GDP falls , the United States may find “ exorbitant privilege ” turning into exorbitant handcuffs .
The resulting balance of payments trend would likely favor financiers on Wall Street at the expense of exporters on Main Street @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already dividing the United States .
Americans could tolerate this as a price of privilege .
Or they could look for escapes from it .
One route could entail balancing the federal budget or regulating U.S. dollar debt .
Another would entail restricting inflows of capital into the United States , much as mainland China does now .
Only time , and perhaps the American voter , will tell .
Tales of the dethroning the dollar may be fun to talk about .
And Chinese policymakers may have , alas , just removed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But that doesn ’ t mean the next phase of its life won ’ t be just as interesting .

If some stories are easier to tell than others, the decline of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency is one of them. It’s not hard to see why. The cast of characters that avail themselves for the script includes international trade , financial architecture , great-power competition , cycles of history , and even parables from ancient Greece.
If some stories are easier to tell than others, the decline of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency is one of them. It’s not hard to see why. The cast of characters that avail themselves for the script includes international trade, financial architecture, great-power competition, cycles of history, and even parables from ancient Greece.
And on cue, the headlines are again churning out new versions of the familiar fable. New plot lines include the economic fallout of a global pandemic as well as a “capital war” between the United States and China, in which Washington usurps Beijing’s traditionally lonely role as the imposer of the restrictions on how capital can move between their two countries, frightening global investors, who then forsake the fallen dollar. Taken at face value, the headlines suggest that the dollar’s long-awaited dethroning may be here at last.
The Chinese Communist Party is the latest in a motley crew of conspirators serving, unwittingly, to prevent the dollar’s status.
But the economic forces that thwarted any demise of the dollar in the past persist. They continue to render any end to the dollar’s reserve status today unlikely. In fact, there is a new player keeping it on its throne: the Chinese Communist Party. It’s the latest arrival to the motley crew of conspirators serving, unwittingly, to prevent the currency from leaving its seat.
The dollar can’t be displaced with nothing, and mainland China’s currency, the yuan, was once the most-viable something. Global banks planned for it to “inevitably” replace the dollar. Economists speculated about the timing. The country’s growing economy, after all, is the world’s second largest. And Beijing is keen to take steps intended to promote its currency’s use in international trade. Officials in the world’s third-largest economy, the European Union, may voice similar intentions. But Beijing is not dealing in the currency of a monetary union that, according to research at its own central bank, maybe shouldn’t even exist. “Overall economic structures in euro area countries,” economists at the European Central Bank concluded in 2019, “are still not fully commensurate with the requirements of a monetary union.”
Nonetheless, Beijing’s recent actions have eviscerated the yuan’s prospects as a real reserve currency.
For a currency to function as an international reserve, global businesses need safe places to put it when it’s not in use. After all, no one wants to sell stuff in exchange for money they’d struggle to safely store. Without safe storage options, like easy-to-access banks or at least low-risk bonds, a currency can become a costly thing with which to do business. The most natural home for these safe assets denominated in mainland China’s currency would be mainland China. But Beijing imposes capital controls on flows of money in and out of the mainland. These capital controls stymie the development of liquid, globally accessible capital markets that can offer safe assets. Hence any market for Chinese yuan consistent with a role as a global reserve currency would need to exist outside of mainland China.
The offshore Hong Kong market once seemed like it could facilitate the yuan’s rise as a reserve currency, much as the offshore “eurodollar” market that emerged in 1960s London once did for the dollar. But the market for U.S. dollars in London thrived in part because U.S. authorities resisted any desire to try to meddle in these offshore markets. Beijing’s recent changes in how it governs Hong Kong evince an atomically opposite approach. Even the financial institutions of Switzerland, traditionally paragons of political neutrality, are now poised to scale back operations in Hong Kong as a result.
Any offshore market for yuan, whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere, would require interfacing with mainland China’s financial system and ultimately its central bank. This necessarily leaves any offshore yuan market vulnerable to Beijing’s whims. And Beijing acts on its whims; last year, Chinese officials punished the NBA because of a tweet from an employee of the Houston Rockets basketball team. In this world, any new offshore market for yuan is unlikely to be perceived as much safer from Beijing’s political cudgel than onshore Chinese markets—and thus not that safe.
To be fair, officials in China never had much of a shot at displacing the dollar’s reserve status. Nor do governments anywhere. The reason: Market incentives and economic self-interest are what keep the dollar’s status as a reserve currency steady. And these market forces are largely impervious to the wishes of today’s governments, even if they do operate within structures created by past regimes.
To illustrate, imagine the world waking up with amnesia about the whole chain of events that culminated in the original arrival of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency after World War II. What would happen to the dollar as the world readjusted?
Virtually nothing. The post-amnesia equilibrium would be today’s equilibrium.
Managers of businesses with operations abroad would find that about 50 percent of existing international trade invoices, cross-border loans, and international bonds are in U.S. dollars. No other foreign currency would offer access to commercial and financial networks of this size; for as many businesses as before, the U.S. dollar would still be better than the alternatives. Foreign governments and central banks would see businesses within their jurisdictions accumulate this dollar exposure. In light of this exposure, to fulfill their domestic policy objectives, foreign officials would then stockpile U.S. dollars. The dollar’s share of official foreign exchange reserves would have no reason to deviate from the roughly 60 percent level it is at now.
This thought experiment captures the basic dynamic of the dollar’s genesis as the reserve currency. As the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944 unfolded, World War II was effectively purging the prewar monetary system from the rest of the world’s memory. There, allied governments decided that everyone would wake up to find themselves rebuilding a world in which the U.S. dollar had become the reserve currency. Whether everyone knew or cared about how or why this happened didn’t matter. Due to the strong network effects that operate in currency markets, dollars then begot more dollars. Even the suspension of the convertibility of U.S. dollars to gold in the 1970s failed to disrupt the self-perpetuating logic of the dollar’s reserve role.
Nonetheless, when it comes to the dollar’s reserve status, many observers seem to assume that its longevity remains a function of the factors relevant to the circumstances of birth, like geopolitical clout and agreements with allies. But this assumption has implications that are odds with observable features of reality.
For instance, by most accounts, the peak of U.S. geopolitical clout on the world stage came around 1990. The Iron Curtain fell. Even history itself felt like it ended. Yet the U.S. dollar’s role in international trade has increased since, even as its share of world trade and GDP have fallen. The dollar’s share of official foreign exchange reserves has also since gone up, undermining the common analogy between mid-20th-century Britain and 21st-century America.
Meanwhile, some of the allied nations present at Bretton Woods have themselves explicitly tried to loosen the dollar hegemony their own predecessor governments helped to design. But not even they can succeed. In 2019, a coalition of European governments unveiled an alternative currency payment mechanism intended to circumvent U.S. sanctions on Iran. In over a year, the European payment mechanism has now managed to facilitate all of a single transaction of 500,000 euros. The U.S. sanctions had induced European firms to cancel billions of dollars of planned investments in Iran.
Even China can’t quit the dollar when it tries to.
Allies aside, currency markets have been an afterthought of Beijing’s policy in Hong Kong, but even China can’t quit the dollar when it tries to. Its steady trillions of dollars in official reserves reflect its decision to deal with the global economy as it exists, rather than any goodwill or foreign-policy intentions.
But unfettered envy for the United States would be premature.
If the U.S. dollar’s reserve status stays steady as the U.S. share of world GDP falls, the United States may find “exorbitant privilege” turning into exorbitant handcuffs. The resulting balance of payments trend would likely favor financiers on Wall Street at the expense of exporters on Main Street, widening the regional and income inequalities already dividing the United States. Americans could tolerate this as a price of privilege. Or they could look for escapes from it. One route could entail balancing the federal budget or regulating U.S. dollar debt. Another would entail restricting inflows of capital into the United States, much as mainland China does now. Only time, and perhaps the American voter, will tell.
Tales of the dethroning the dollar may be fun to talk about. And Chinese policymakers may have, alas, just removed the biggest risk to its health. But that doesn’t mean the next phase of its life won’t be just as interesting.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-21--It’s Not a Peace Deal. It’s a Powder Keg.

In August 1907 , Russia and the United Kingdom signed the Anglo-Russian Convention , which settled their geostrategic differences and brought them into a rough alliance after nearly a century as bitter and bloody adversaries .
Their confrontation around Eurasia had produced in part or whole the disastrous slaughters of the Crimean War , the Russo-Japanese War , the British invasions of Afghanistan in 1839 and 1878 , numerous crises over the Turkish straits , and the endless , wasteful competition across central Asia known as the Great Game .
To at least some contemporary observers , the agreement seemed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to come .
There was one problem : the Anglo-Russian Convention wasn ’ t the product of more peaceful attitudes in London or St. Petersburg , but of a dramatic shift in the balance of power and the rise of a new threat .
It was the belligerence of Wilhelmine Germany that made the Convention possible , even necessary , for both countries—and far from stemming conflict , the Convention made it far worse .
Now backed by England ( in addition to France ) , Russia asserted itself more forcefully in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regime against Austria and so transforming a Balkan crisis into the horror of World War I .
If Britain had continued to oppose Russian interventionism in the Balkans as it traditionally had before the 1907 Convention , history would have taken a very different course and that war , and the bloody 20th century it inaugurated , might have been avoided .
The lesson of the Anglo-Russian Convention is that a diplomatic event that brings a close to one longstanding geostrategic rivalry may not be the great boon it appears .
Instead , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to come .
And there is reason to be concerned that this is precisely how we might eventually look back on this week ’ s announcement that the UAE will normalize relations with Israel , in return for Jerusalem ’ s agreement not to annex any of the West Bank .
Was this a positive development ?
From one vantage point , sure .
It represents one more Arab government giving up on nearly a century of conflict with Israel .
There are rumblings that other Arab states may soon ( or eventually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , given the covert warming of ties between Israel and various Gulf and Maghreb countries over the past two decades , although it ’ s hardly inevitable .
If it were to happen , it would put to rest one of the most vexing , chronic conflicts of the 20th century .
But this is the 21st century .
The Arab-Israeli conflict has not been a defining factor in the geopolitics of the Middle East for decades .
There has not been a conventional war between Israel and an Arab state since 1982 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel and Hezbollah , the closest we ’ ve come , was notable because of how many of the Arab states condemned Hezbollah .
Indeed , for at least 30 years , the threat to Israeli security has come overwhelmingly from the Iranian-led “ Axis of Resistance , ” not from the Arab states .
Of course , like Europe in the early 20th century , the Middle East has seen its geostrategic problems multiply in the early 21st century rather than abate , despite the fading of the Arab-Israeli conflict .
Just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ epochal aftereffects of the industrial revolution , so the Middle East is being turned inside out by the impact of the equally profound information revolution .
The result has been massive economic , cultural , and demographic shifts that inevitably create political turmoil .
Iran ’ s Green Revolution of 2009 ; the Arab Spring of 2011 ; the civil wars in Syria , Yemen , Libya , Sinai , Turkish Kurdistan , and—to some extent—Iraq—are all part of this upheaval .
The unrest itself has created new opportunities for Iran , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to help its allies across the region .
Today , Hezbollah rules Lebanon .
Iran has greater sway in Syria and Yemen than ever before .
It wields considerable influence in Iraq , albeit less so at this moment than six months ago for reasons that might pass all too soon .
Yet of far greater geostrategic importance to the Middle East has been the disengagement of the United States .
Both the Obama and Trump Administrations have simultaneously denied this and bragged about it , but the reality on the ground is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump steadily distanced themselves from the problems of the region , despite the constant warnings of their diplomatic and military advisors along the way .
And just as the rise of a belligerent Germany overturned all the dynamics of Europe , so the disengagement of the United States has done the same in the Middle East .
Because the United States was the most powerful force in favor of the status quo , so our withdrawal has emboldened those actors seeking to overturn the regional order .
Iran and its allies are the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but so too are various radical Sunni Islamist groups .
Predictably , America ’ s detachment has terrified our allies , and that fear has pushed them to take actions they never otherwise would have—some good , some dangerous , some both at the same time , like Israel-UAE normalization .
For all its economic and military strength , Israel remains a small , beleaguered country , at least psychologically .
Of course , Iran is trying to do everything it can to turn that perception of menace into a strategic reality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a vast military infrastructure in Syria ; reaching out to radical Palestinian groups in the West Bank and Jordan ; mounting cyberattacks against Israeli infrastructure , and so on .
Because of its small size , extreme casualty sensitivity , and historic ghosts , Israel ’ s inclination—and its strategic doctrine—is to strike hard and fast at potential threats before they can become existential .
That is what it has been doing for years in Syria , waging a war of attrition with Iran and its allies to try to prevent Tehran from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new front against Israel .
The UAE has pursued a similar approach to its security concerns over the past two decades , albeit without quite the capabilities or psychological scars of the Israelis .
Along with Saudi Arabia , the UAE intervened with conventional land and air forces in Yemen , employed its air force and covert support in Libya and Syria , and led the blockade of Qatar by the other Gulf states .
Yemen is a particularly important case to understand .
There , the UAE and Saudi Arabia decided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military victory by what they saw as an Iranian-allied Shi ’ a militia , the Houthis .
However , they did so only after repeatedly asking the United States to do more to prevent the expansion of Iranian power in Yemen , Syria , and Iraq to no avail .
Their leaders explicitly said that since the United States wasn ’ t going to act to limit the Iranian threat , they felt they had no choice but to do so themselves .
Thus , the fear of growing Iranian power in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Emiratis and Saudis to embark on a risky and bellicose course of action .
It is no accident that both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have begun nuclear programs in the past dozen years .
These are both ostensibly for power generation and to save their oil supplies for export , not for producing weapons .
Of course , so too was/is Iran ’ s nuclear program , Tehran claimed , and Saddam ’ s , and North Korea ’ s , and the list goes on .
In private , Gulf leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will acquire nuclear weapons and without the United States to protect them , they feel they may have no choice but be able to match Iran to deter it .
It gets worse when you recognize that none of these countries—not even Israel—has the same military or intelligence capabilities as the United States .
We are usually better able to gauge the level of threat in the Middle East than our regional allies , the Iraq WMD fiasco notwithstanding .
Other countries , starting with Iran , won ’ t pick fights with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will with one another .
Iran is wary of Israel , but it may be less so in future as its own capabilities and those of its allies expand .
Meanwhile , it has never shown any fear of the Arab states .
Thus , just as the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention closed out one of the great conflicts of the 19th century only to help enflame the great conflict of the 20th century , so the Israel-UAE agreement must be seen as part of the ending of a 20th-century conflict , but also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 21st-century conflict that may dominate the Middle East .
In that Middle East , without an American hegemon to keep a lid on aggression , status quo powers as diverse in other ways as Israel and the UAE have no choice but to find common cause .
To band together as best they can to fight their common enemy , as the British and Russians did in 1907 .
All of this is a recipe for greater tensions , fear , conflict , and potentially outright war .
We may be putting to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to watch another arise .
And that should temper our enthusiasm for the latest turn of events , no matter how positive it may seem in the short term .

In August 1907, Russia and the United Kingdom signed the Anglo-Russian Convention, which settled their geostrategic differences and brought them into a rough alliance after nearly a century as bitter and bloody adversaries. Their confrontation around Eurasia had produced in part or whole the disastrous slaughters of the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, the British invasions of Afghanistan in 1839 and 1878, numerous crises over the Turkish straits, and the endless, wasteful competition across central Asia known as the Great Game. To at least some contemporary observers, the agreement seemed to be a sign of greater peace to come.
In August 1907, Russia and the United Kingdom signed the Anglo-Russian Convention, which settled their geostrategic differences and brought them into a rough alliance after nearly a century as bitter and bloody adversaries. Their confrontation around Eurasia had produced in part or whole the disastrous slaughters of the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, the British invasions of Afghanistan in 1839 and 1878, numerous crises over the Turkish straits, and the endless, wasteful competition across central Asia known as the Great Game. To at least some contemporary observers, the agreement seemed to be a sign of greater peace to come.
There was one problem: the Anglo-Russian Convention wasn’t the product of more peaceful attitudes in London or St. Petersburg, but of a dramatic shift in the balance of power and the rise of a new threat. It was the belligerence of Wilhelmine Germany that made the Convention possible, even necessary, for both countries—and far from stemming conflict, the Convention made it far worse. Now backed by England (in addition to France), Russia asserted itself more forcefully in the Balkans, egging on a terroristic Serb regime against Austria and so transforming a Balkan crisis into the horror of World War I. If Britain had continued to oppose Russian interventionism in the Balkans as it traditionally had before the 1907 Convention, history would have taken a very different course and that war, and the bloody 20th century it inaugurated, might have been avoided.
The lesson of the Anglo-Russian Convention is that a diplomatic event that brings a close to one longstanding geostrategic rivalry may not be the great boon it appears. Instead, it might be a harbinger of worse to come. And there is reason to be concerned that this is precisely how we might eventually look back on this week’s announcement that the UAE will normalize relations with Israel, in return for Jerusalem’s agreement not to annex any of the West Bank.
Was this a positive development? From one vantage point, sure. It represents one more Arab government giving up on nearly a century of conflict with Israel. There are rumblings that other Arab states may soon (or eventually) follow. That seems entirely plausible, given the covert warming of ties between Israel and various Gulf and Maghreb countries over the past two decades, although it’s hardly inevitable. If it were to happen, it would put to rest one of the most vexing, chronic conflicts of the 20th century.
But this is the 21st century. The Arab-Israeli conflict has not been a defining factor in the geopolitics of the Middle East for decades. There has not been a conventional war between Israel and an Arab state since 1982. The 2006 Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah, the closest we’ve come, was notable because of how many of the Arab states condemned Hezbollah. Indeed, for at least 30 years, the threat to Israeli security has come overwhelmingly from the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance,” not from the Arab states.
Of course, like Europe in the early 20th century, the Middle East has seen its geostrategic problems multiply in the early 21st century rather than abate, despite the fading of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Just as Europe then still suffered from the epochal aftereffects of the industrial revolution, so the Middle East is being turned inside out by the impact of the equally profound information revolution. The result has been massive economic, cultural, and demographic shifts that inevitably create political turmoil. Iran’s Green Revolution of 2009; the Arab Spring of 2011; the civil wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sinai, Turkish Kurdistan, and—to some extent—Iraq—are all part of this upheaval.
The unrest itself has created new opportunities for Iran, which has used the chaos and civil war to help its allies across the region. Today, Hezbollah rules Lebanon. Iran has greater sway in Syria and Yemen than ever before. It wields considerable influence in Iraq, albeit less so at this moment than six months ago for reasons that might pass all too soon.
Yet of far greater geostrategic importance to the Middle East has been the disengagement of the United States. Both the Obama and Trump Administrations have simultaneously denied this and bragged about it, but the reality on the ground is far more straightforward. Both Obama and Trump steadily distanced themselves from the problems of the region, despite the constant warnings of their diplomatic and military advisors along the way. And just as the rise of a belligerent Germany overturned all the dynamics of Europe, so the disengagement of the United States has done the same in the Middle East. Because the United States was the most powerful force in favor of the status quo, so our withdrawal has emboldened those actors seeking to overturn the regional order. Iran and its allies are the most obvious and successful of these beneficiaries, but so too are various radical Sunni Islamist groups. Predictably, America’s detachment has terrified our allies, and that fear has pushed them to take actions they never otherwise would have—some good, some dangerous, some both at the same time, like Israel-UAE normalization.
For all its economic and military strength, Israel remains a small, beleaguered country, at least psychologically. Of course, Iran is trying to do everything it can to turn that perception of menace into a strategic reality: bolstering Hezbollah and Hamas; building a vast military infrastructure in Syria; reaching out to radical Palestinian groups in the West Bank and Jordan; mounting cyberattacks against Israeli infrastructure, and so on. Because of its small size, extreme casualty sensitivity, and historic ghosts, Israel’s inclination—and its strategic doctrine—is to strike hard and fast at potential threats before they can become existential. That is what it has been doing for years in Syria, waging a war of attrition with Iran and its allies to try to prevent Tehran from building a military base there to open a new front against Israel.
The UAE has pursued a similar approach to its security concerns over the past two decades, albeit without quite the capabilities or psychological scars of the Israelis. Along with Saudi Arabia, the UAE intervened with conventional land and air forces in Yemen, employed its air force and covert support in Libya and Syria, and led the blockade of Qatar by the other Gulf states. Yemen is a particularly important case to understand. There, the UAE and Saudi Arabia decided to intervene in 2015 to prevent a military victory by what they saw as an Iranian-allied Shi’a militia, the Houthis. However, they did so only after repeatedly asking the United States to do more to prevent the expansion of Iranian power in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq to no avail. Their leaders explicitly said that since the United States wasn’t going to act to limit the Iranian threat, they felt they had no choice but to do so themselves. Thus, the fear of growing Iranian power in the face of a retreating America pushed the Emiratis and Saudis to embark on a risky and bellicose course of action.
It is no accident that both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have begun nuclear programs in the past dozen years. These are both ostensibly for power generation and to save their oil supplies for export, not for producing weapons. Of course, so too was/is Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran claimed, and Saddam’s, and North Korea’s, and the list goes on. In private, Gulf leaders will say that they fear that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons and without the United States to protect them, they feel they may have no choice but be able to match Iran to deter it.
It gets worse when you recognize that none of these countries—not even Israel—has the same military or intelligence capabilities as the United States. We are usually better able to gauge the level of threat in the Middle East than our regional allies, the Iraq WMD fiasco notwithstanding. Other countries, starting with Iran, won’t pick fights with the United States the way that they will with one another. Iran is wary of Israel, but it may be less so in future as its own capabilities and those of its allies expand. Meanwhile, it has never shown any fear of the Arab states.
Thus, just as the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention closed out one of the great conflicts of the 19th century only to help enflame the great conflict of the 20th century, so the Israel-UAE agreement must be seen as part of the ending of a 20th-century conflict, but also as potentially the beginning of a new 21st-century conflict that may dominate the Middle East. In that Middle East, without an American hegemon to keep a lid on aggression, status quo powers as diverse in other ways as Israel and the UAE have no choice but to find common cause. To band together as best they can to fight their common enemy, as the British and Russians did in 1907. All of this is a recipe for greater tensions, fear, conflict, and potentially outright war.
We may be putting to bed one great regional conflict, only to watch another arise. And that should temper our enthusiasm for the latest turn of events, no matter how positive it may seem in the short term.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-21--Accepting Nomination, Biden Implores Voters to Dump Trump

Capping the kaleidoscope of color and youth that was the Democratic National Convention , a 77-year-old white man from a previous era , Joe Biden , called passionately for unity Thursday to defeat the “ darkness ” of Donald Trump and overcome the unprecedented national crises exacerbated by the Trump presidency .
But the freshly anointed Democratic nominee , in his acceptance speech , also appeared to suggest that he is a transitional figure who mainly intends fulfill his “ mission ” to undo the damage caused by the “ current occupant of the White House , ” whom he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can and will overcome this season of darkness in America , ” Biden said .
“ This is a life-changing election .
This is going to determine what America is going to look like for a long , long time .
… The choice could not be more clear.
” Biden has previously suggested that , once he addresses the problems of COVID-19 and its economic fallout and restores America ’ s relations with the world , he might step aside after one term , when he will be 82 .
The baton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Biden ’ s vice presidential nominee , Sen. Kamala Harris , 55 .
While asking voters to support “ Joe and me ” the night before , Harris appeared to be largely setting herself up to take over leadership of the party in 2024 and become the first female president .
Her vision , said Harris , the first Black and South Asian major-party vice presidential candidate , is “ one that Joe Biden shares.
” In a high-stakes juggling act that involved placating the young and progressive in the party while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ organizers balanced a parade of old-timers and anti-Trump Republicans—from former Presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter to former Republican firebrand Ohio Gov .
John Kasich—with an array of fresh , often nonwhite liberal voices from all over the nation , many of them unknown ordinary citizens and front-line responders to the COVID-19 crisis .
“ Defeat Trump ” was the singular common message , but much of the virtual convention—with its unique format of speeches delivered from all 50 states and several U.S. territories—was dominated by appeals to support activist movements such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and immigrants .
Nonwhite , particularly Black and Latino , voices were heard throughout the four-day spectacle , but Harris , House Speaker Nancy Pelosi , and 2016 candidate Hillary Clinton focused on women ’ s rights on the 100th anniversary of the 19th Amendment , which gave women the vote .
Even before she mentioned her running mate , Harris cited previous Black women ’ s activists such as Mary Church Terrell and Shirley Chisholm who “ paved the way for the trail-blazing leadership of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.
” Some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imagery might feed into the clear tactic of the Republicans—who kick off their own convention on Monday—to label the Democratic Party as increasingly dominated by a radical left-wing agenda .
Still , even some prominent Democratic centrists said they thought the balance of forces across the spectrum was about right .
“ I think the Biden people have been doing a very delicate dance from the beginning , ” said Matt Bennett of the Third Way , a centrist Democratic think tank in Washington .
“ They really wanted to avoid what happened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of Bernie Sanders ’ s supporters didn ’ t vote for her and half of them voted for Trump.
” In contrast to his tepid support for Clinton in 2016 , especially after it was revealed by WikiLeaks that some in the Democratic National Committee sought to skew the race toward her in favor of Sanders , on Monday the Vermont senator , Biden ’ s No .
1 primary rival , “ was as full throated in his endorsement of Biden as any of us could have asked him to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , another leading centrist voice who is president of the Center for American Progress , agreed .
“ Like 90 percent of Sanders supporters are already supporting Biden , ” she said by email .
Indeed , Sanders on Thursday night joined an extraordinary Zoom meeting of former Democratic contenders for the nomination , including former South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg and Sen. Amy Klobuchar , who together reminisced about Biden ’ s good qualities as a man and candidate .
The main reason for the deeper unity is plainly a common desire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama led the way in an unprecedented attack by a previous president on his successor , saying Trump has “ no interest in treating the presidency as anything but one more reality show he can use to get the attention that he craves.
” “ Donald Trump hasn ’ t grown into the job , because he can ’ t .
And the consequences of that failure are severe : 170,000 Americans dead , millions of jobs gone while those at the top take in more than ever .
Our worst impulses unleashed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ badly diminished , and our democratic institutions threatened like never before , ” said Obama , who declared that the 2020 vote was so critical to saving American democracy that “ what we do these next 76 days will echo through generations to come.
” Still , some analysts worried that Biden and his supporters were still defining him too vaguely , constantly touting his “ empathy ” and decency in contrast to Trump while short-shrifting details of his programs .
Many voters remain confused about how progressive—and therefore identified with the party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama spoke mainly of Biden ’ s character rather than his programs , saying , “ For eight years , Joe was the last one in the room whenever I faced a big decision .
He made me a better president—and he ’ s got the character and the experience to make us a better country.
” “ It ’ s hard to know what Biden moving left even looks like , ” Bennett said .
“ He doesn ’ t think he can carry that mantle himself .
He ’ s saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ figure .
I ’ m here to rescue the country from catastrophe.
’ … But if not for the COVID crisis I do think this would be a very fraught moment inside our party .
”

Capping the kaleidoscope of color and youth that was the Democratic National Convention, a 77-year-old white man from a previous era, Joe Biden, called passionately for unity Thursday to defeat the "darkness" of Donald Trump and overcome the unprecedented national crises exacerbated by the Trump presidency.
Capping the kaleidoscope of color and youth that was the Democratic National Convention, a 77-year-old white man from a previous era, Joe Biden, called passionately for unity Thursday to defeat the “darkness” of Donald Trump and overcome the unprecedented national crises exacerbated by the Trump presidency.
But the freshly anointed Democratic nominee, in his acceptance speech, also appeared to suggest that he is a transitional figure who mainly intends fulfill his “mission” to undo the damage caused by the “current occupant of the White House,” whom he did not name. “United we can and will overcome this season of darkness in America,” Biden said. “This is a life-changing election. This is going to determine what America is going to look like for a long, long time. … The choice could not be more clear.”
Biden has previously suggested that, once he addresses the problems of COVID-19 and its economic fallout and restores America’s relations with the world, he might step aside after one term, when he will be 82.
The baton of the future already seemed taken up by Biden’s vice presidential nominee, Sen. Kamala Harris, 55. While asking voters to support “Joe and me” the night before, Harris appeared to be largely setting herself up to take over leadership of the party in 2024 and become the first female president. Her vision, said Harris, the first Black and South Asian major-party vice presidential candidate, is “one that Joe Biden shares.”
In a high-stakes juggling act that involved placating the young and progressive in the party while reassuring mainstreamers and centrists, the Democratic organizers balanced a parade of old-timers and anti-Trump Republicans—from former Presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter to former Republican firebrand Ohio Gov. John Kasich—with an array of fresh, often nonwhite liberal voices from all over the nation, many of them unknown ordinary citizens and front-line responders to the COVID-19 crisis.
“Defeat Trump” was the singular common message, but much of the virtual convention—with its unique format of speeches delivered from all 50 states and several U.S. territories—was dominated by appeals to support activist movements such as Black Lives Matter and progress for women and immigrants. Nonwhite, particularly Black and Latino, voices were heard throughout the four-day spectacle, but Harris, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and 2016 candidate Hillary Clinton focused on women’s rights on the 100th anniversary of the 19th Amendment, which gave women the vote. Even before she mentioned her running mate, Harris cited previous Black women’s activists such as Mary Church Terrell and Shirley Chisholm who “paved the way for the trail-blazing leadership of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.”
Some mainstream Democrats fretted that the relentless multicultural imagery might feed into the clear tactic of the Republicans—who kick off their own convention on Monday—to label the Democratic Party as increasingly dominated by a radical left-wing agenda. Still, even some prominent Democratic centrists said they thought the balance of forces across the spectrum was about right.
“I think the Biden people have been doing a very delicate dance from the beginning,” said Matt Bennett of the Third Way, a centrist Democratic think tank in Washington. “They really wanted to avoid what happened to Hillary, which is that 24 percent of Bernie Sanders’s supporters didn’t vote for her and half of them voted for Trump.”
In contrast to his tepid support for Clinton in 2016, especially after it was revealed by WikiLeaks that some in the Democratic National Committee sought to skew the race toward her in favor of Sanders, on Monday the Vermont senator, Biden’s No. 1 primary rival, “was as full throated in his endorsement of Biden as any of us could have asked him to be,” Bennett said. Neera Tanden, another leading centrist voice who is president of the Center for American Progress, agreed. “Like 90 percent of Sanders supporters are already supporting Biden,” she said by email. Indeed, Sanders on Thursday night joined an extraordinary Zoom meeting of former Democratic contenders for the nomination, including former South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg and Sen. Amy Klobuchar, who together reminisced about Biden’s good qualities as a man and candidate.
The main reason for the deeper unity is plainly a common desire to oust Trump. Former President Barack Obama led the way in an unprecedented attack by a previous president on his successor, saying Trump has “no interest in treating the presidency as anything but one more reality show he can use to get the attention that he craves.”
“Donald Trump hasn’t grown into the job, because he can’t. And the consequences of that failure are severe: 170,000 Americans dead, millions of jobs gone while those at the top take in more than ever. Our worst impulses unleashed, our proud reputation around the world badly diminished, and our democratic institutions threatened like never before,” said Obama, who declared that the 2020 vote was so critical to saving American democracy that “what we do these next 76 days will echo through generations to come.”
Still, some analysts worried that Biden and his supporters were still defining him too vaguely, constantly touting his “empathy” and decency in contrast to Trump while short-shrifting details of his programs. Many voters remain confused about how progressive—and therefore identified with the party’s future—Biden really is. Even Obama spoke mainly of Biden’s character rather than his programs, saying, “For eight years, Joe was the last one in the room whenever I faced a big decision. He made me a better president—and he’s got the character and the experience to make us a better country.”
“It’s hard to know what Biden moving left even looks like,” Bennett said. “He doesn’t think he can carry that mantle himself. He’s saying, ‘I’m the transition figure. I’m here to rescue the country from catastrophe.’ … But if not for the COVID crisis I do think this would be a very fraught moment inside our party.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-22--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

The Israel-United Arab Emirates deal might not have much impact on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , but it will have profound effects elsewhere—especially in war-torn Libya .
Meanwhile , one soldier ’ s suicide has revealed the dire shape of Taiwan ’ s army in the face of a growing military threat from China .
And a fatal disaster at a jade mine in Myanmar lays bare the government ’ s empty promises for minority ethnic groups .
1 .
The Israel-UAE Deal Won ’ t Bring Peace , but It Will Prolong the War in Libya Despite being hailed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the UAE-Israel agreement only cements the divide between traditionalist monarchies and their rivals that has gripped the Middle East since the Arab Spring .
That will make it even more difficult to end Libya ’ s proxy war , Jason Pack writes .
2 .
The Biden Doctrine Exists Already .
Here ’ s an Inside Preview .
Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden is an old-school sentimental patriot .
He really regards the United States as the “ indispensable nation , ” in former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright ’ s much-mocked formulation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who do too , Foreign Policy ’ s James Traub writes .
3 .
Taiwan ’ s Military Has Flashy American Weapons but No Ammo Taiwanese politicians like to showcase flashy U.S. weapons , but Taiwan ’ s military hardly stands a chance against Chinese aggression .
One soldier ’ s suicide reveals the state of the country ’ s dangerously underprepared military , Paul Huang reports .
4 .
Lockdowns Have Been Amazing for the Environment , but COVID-19 Won ’ t Heal the Planet The steep decline in global carbon dioxide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lining of the pandemic .
But these improvements will be negligible if industrial activity and energy use roar back unchanged in 2021 , Robert Muggah writes .
5 .
After Another Mining Disaster , Ethnic Minorities Lose Patience With Myanmar ’ s Leadership Fatal mining incidents in Myanmar , the world ’ s largest single source of jade , occur too often .
For many , a recent disaster is another deadly reminder of the government ’ s inaction on long-overdue reforms , Emily Fishbein and Stella Naw write .

The Israel-United Arab Emirates deal might not have much impact on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it will have profound effects elsewhere—especially in war-torn Libya.
The Israel-United Arab Emirates deal might not have much impact on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it will have profound effects elsewhere—especially in war-torn Libya.
Meanwhile, one soldier’s suicide has revealed the dire shape of Taiwan’s army in the face of a growing military threat from China.
And a fatal disaster at a jade mine in Myanmar lays bare the government’s empty promises for minority ethnic groups.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Fighters loyal to the U.N.-recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) secure the area of Abu Qurain, halfway between the capital Tripoli and Libya's second city Benghazi, against forces loyal to Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by the United Arab Emirates and Russia, on July 20.
Despite being hailed as a “peace deal,” the UAE-Israel agreement only cements the divide between traditionalist monarchies and their rivals that has gripped the Middle East since the Arab Spring. That will make it even more difficult to end Libya’s proxy war, Jason Pack writes.
Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden is an old-school sentimental patriot. He really regards the United States as the “indispensable nation,” in former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s much-mocked formulation, and he tends to attract aides who do too, Foreign Policy’s James Traub writes.
A U.S.-made F-16V
Taiwanese politicians like to showcase flashy U.S. weapons, but Taiwan’s military hardly stands a chance against Chinese aggression. One soldier’s suicide reveals the state of the country’s dangerously underprepared military, Paul Huang reports.
The nearly empty A3 highway near Leverkusen, western Germany, on April 19 amid the pandemic.
The steep decline in global carbon dioxide emissions has been described as the silver lining of the pandemic. But these improvements will be negligible if industrial activity and energy use roar back unchanged in 2021, Robert Muggah writes.
A recent landslide at Gwi Hka jade mining site in Myanmar.
Fatal mining incidents in Myanmar, the world’s largest single source of jade, occur too often. For many, a recent disaster is another deadly reminder of the government’s inaction on long-overdue reforms, Emily Fishbein and Stella Naw write.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-22--Trump’s a Fool, Not a Strategic Lunatic

Trump’s a Fool, Not a Strategic Lunatic

The cover of Jim Sciutto ’ s new book , The Madman Theory , depicts a blindfolded U.S. President Donald Trump with a bat , ready to take a swing at the world-turned-piñata .
Sciutto ’ s previous work , The Shadow War , explored the threats Russia and China posed to the United States—now , he ’ s turned his attention around to consider America ’ s own contribution to global instability .
Well before he assumed office , Trump made clear he would operate differently and set out to break conventional wisdom when it came to foreign affairs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until he decided after he entered office it was “ no longer obsolete.
” He toyed with bringing waterboarding back as a U.S. practice .
And he questioned why he couldn ’ t speak by phone with the president of Taiwan .
By the end of his first year , some policymakers attempted to make sense of his mercuriality by describing his approach as “ madman theory.
” U.S. President Richard Nixon famously invoked the “ madman theory ” when he sought to convey to North Vietnam via his National Security Advisor Henry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means possible against them .
But he was hardly inventive .
An early reference shows up in Niccolò Machiavelli ’ s Discourses on Livy , when he notes that it can be “ a very wise thing to simulate madness.
” Whatever his character flaws , Nixon ’ s nuclear threat was a ploy , not a reality—albeit one that failed as badly as the rest of the country ’ s Vietnam strategy .
Trump ’ s “ madman ” role , on the other hand , feels less simulated and much more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the piñata , he has targeted Germany , announcing the withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in the country .
Already , officials warn the process could take months , in what looks to be a move to buy time and mitigate the commander in chief ’ s bad call .
Sciutto describes Trump ’ s style of diplomacy as a tactic that “ is sometimes by accident and sometimes deliberate , ” a brand of brinkmanship whereby his unpredictability would corner opponents into concessions .
But is a “ madman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ always intentional ?
Peter Navarro , the president ’ s trade advisor and sycophant , believes it .
“ He ’ s a strategic chess player , seeing all angles and moves , ” he enthuses .
“ There ’ s no preformed playbook .
It ’ s jazz versus classical music.
” For a brief while , North Korea was held up as the chief success of this strategy .
Trump ’ s see-sawing from insults to praise of Kim Jong Un brought the North Korean leader to the negotiating table in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argued .
That looks a lot less credible when the North returned to testing and its usual explosive rhetoric .
But Sciutto keeps score , chapter by chapter , country by country , from Pyongyang to Moscow to Beijing .
Perhaps mindful of critics from the right who consider CNN , where he is chief national security correspondent , a partisan news outlet , he anchors his book on interviews with people who work or worked for the administration and , as he emphasizes , “ chose to do so.
” You will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , railing predictably against the president .
Sciutto isn ’ t both-siding this—the withering words come from Trump ’ s own team .
Nearly every official has something unflattering to say about the president — except Navarro , who is also the only one speaking under his own name and still serving .
The experts “ failed on every foreign policy major initiative , in the last thirty years , ” Navarro reminds Sciutto .
“ On China , on NAFTA , on Iraq , on Afghanistan.
” The book also features Steve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Trump ’ s “ Make America Great Again ” campaign .
( “ We ’ ve been in managed decline now for thirty years by our elites , ” he says . )
They may be the usual suspects , but that ’ s because both wield significant influence—Bannon exited early from the White House , but he continues to speak to people in the administration multiple times a day .
On North Korea , the book relays the remarkable dynamic following Trump ’ s “ fire and fury ” and “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when Pyongyang and Seoul — sworn enemies — coordinated to avert existential disaster by overpromising on the possibility of a denuclearized North , if only the president would restart talks .
“ They were in cahoots , ” a former official claims .
Trump , Sciutto points out , was possibly “ being played by both the ally and the adversary.
” This is where , perhaps , the United States may have come closest to war .
Measured by volume alone , two long , tense chapters cover the Koreas .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little to show beyond the pomp , while North Korea has used these years to expand its nuclear program .
Do not expect an excoriation of all of Trump ’ s actions .
Confronting China has become a bipartisan position , and regardless of who wins in November , “ the upending of the US-China relationship is the element of Trump ’ s foreign policy least likely to change when he leaves office , ” Sciutto observes .
In his previous work , he described China as conducting a “ shadow war , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nothing about .
This is no longer the case , and bilateral spats frequently top domestic headlines now .
Not a week goes by without a story of Chinese espionage , incursion , or “ Wolf Warrior ” diplomacy , often matched by an equally polemical United States .
If madman diplomacy is the approach , far less clear are what goals , if any , Trump has when it comes to China .
His main obsession seems to be the same one he focuses on with almost all foreign powers : the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cheated .
China ’ s growing human rights crisis certainly isn ’ t a concern .
When told of the so-called reeducation camps in Xinjiang , Trump ’ s former advisor John Bolton claimed the president essentially signed off on the idea to Chinese leader Xi Jinping .
Trump has even given up on his signature trade policy , and we ’ ll likely not see a “ phase two ” U.S.-China trade deal .
Most observers assume his China policy has become an election ploy—a dangerous affair considering how badly Trump hates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passing through the Taiwan Strait and Chinese fighter jets entering Taiwan ’ s air defense identification zone in the last few weeks , a clumsy few minutes might change the course of history .
Meanwhile , the administration ’ s hostility to China—from initiating the trade war to its barely disguised racism when calling the novel coronavirus a “ Chinese virus ” —has done little to substantively check Beijing .
The country continues to militarize the South China Sea , installing missiles on the Spratly Islands .
It has essentially thrown out Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And it continues to detain Uighurs in its western Xinjiang territory , despite growing global outcry .
Trump ’ s bluster and swings have largely been ignored by Beijing when it comes to actual actions , while it has continued to simply press on with its own concerned nationalist agenda .
If the relative high point in Sciutto ’ s estimation is China , the nadir is Syria and U.S. abandonment of Kurdish fighters there .
Sciutto ’ s account of the president ’ s own officials seeking creative ways to circumvent his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it serves as just one instance of many in this book when officials had to manage his worst decisions .
It is a mortifying moment when the commander of the Syrian Kurdish military forces sends a message to his friends in the U.S. military absolving them of blame , implicit in the communication a judgment on how morally bankrupt Trump ’ s decision was .
The author is clear here : Trump had a foreign-policy victory in his hands that he squandered .
The United States had partnered with a capable local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State territory and killed tens of thousands of its fighters .
It ceded that progress , allowing Bashar al-Assad ’ s government , Turkey , Russia , and Iran to make gains .
The madman , it turns out , does not like war , and he measures military options from a bang-for-your-buck benchmark .
He could pursue a one-off strike to kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani ( and was lucky the decision did not spiral into something greater ) , but he generally prefers withdrawals over deployments—a consistency China may have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan .
What emerges in addition to the prevailing “ madman theory ” in these pages are a few steady strands the president sticks to , at least directionally , if unevenly , such as on military conflict .
Sciutto ’ s book is a first-rate attempt to map a method behind four years of foreign-policy mayhem .
Even as he writes about the past , it ’ s difficult to shake the feeling he is constantly thinking—and worried—about the future .
Regardless of the election outcome , America faces tough years ahead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ madman ’ s impulsiveness .

The cover of Jim Sciutto’s new book, The Madman Theory, depicts a blindfolded U.S. President Donald Trump with a bat, ready to take a swing at the world-turned-piñata. Sciutto’s previous work, The Shadow War, explored the threats Russia and China posed to the United States—now, he’s turned his attention around to consider America’s own contribution to global instability.
The cover of Jim Sciutto’s new book, The Madman Theory, depicts a blindfolded U.S. President Donald Trump with a bat, ready to take a swing at the world-turned-piñata. Sciutto’s previous work, The Shadow War, explored the threats Russia and China posed to the United States—now, he’s turned his attention around to consider America’s own contribution to global instability.
Well before he assumed office, Trump made clear he would operate differently and set out to break conventional wisdom when it came to foreign affairs. NATO was “obsolete,” until he decided after he entered office it was “no longer obsolete.” He toyed with bringing waterboarding back as a U.S. practice. And he questioned why he couldn’t speak by phone with the president of Taiwan. By the end of his first year, some policymakers attempted to make sense of his mercuriality by describing his approach as “madman theory.”
The Madman Theory: Trump Takes On the World, Jim Sciutto, Harper, 320 pp., .99, Aug. 11, 2020
U.S. President Richard Nixon famously invoked the “madman theory” when he sought to convey to North Vietnam via his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger his supposed willingness to use any means possible against them. But he was hardly inventive. An early reference shows up in Niccolò Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, when he notes that it can be “a very wise thing to simulate madness.” Whatever his character flaws, Nixon’s nuclear threat was a ploy, not a reality—albeit one that failed as badly as the rest of the country’s Vietnam strategy. Trump’s “madman” role, on the other hand, feels less simulated and much more lived. In his most recent whack at the piñata, he has targeted Germany, announcing the withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in the country. Already, officials warn the process could take months, in what looks to be a move to buy time and mitigate the commander in chief’s bad call.
Sciutto describes Trump’s style of diplomacy as a tactic that “is sometimes by accident and sometimes deliberate,” a brand of brinkmanship whereby his unpredictability would corner opponents into concessions. But is a “madman theory” real if it is not always intentional? Peter Navarro, the president’s trade advisor and sycophant, believes it. “He’s a strategic chess player, seeing all angles and moves,” he enthuses. “There’s no preformed playbook. It’s jazz versus classical music.”
For a brief while, North Korea was held up as the chief success of this strategy. Trump’s see-sawing from insults to praise of Kim Jong Un brought the North Korean leader to the negotiating table in Hanoi, the president’s defenders argued. That looks a lot less credible when the North returned to testing and its usual explosive rhetoric. But Sciutto keeps score, chapter by chapter, country by country, from Pyongyang to Moscow to Beijing. Perhaps mindful of critics from the right who consider CNN, where he is chief national security correspondent, a partisan news outlet, he anchors his book on interviews with people who work or worked for the administration and, as he emphasizes, “chose to do so.” You will not find many Democrats in these pages, railing predictably against the president. Sciutto isn’t both-siding this—the withering words come from Trump’s own team.
Nearly every official has something unflattering to say about the president — except Navarro, who is also the only one speaking under his own name and still serving. The experts “failed on every foreign policy major initiative, in the last thirty years,” Navarro reminds Sciutto. “On China, on NAFTA, on Iraq, on Afghanistan.” The book also features Steve Bannon, one of the original orchestrators of Trump’s “Make America Great Again” campaign. (“We’ve been in managed decline now for thirty years by our elites,” he says.) They may be the usual suspects, but that’s because both wield significant influence—Bannon exited early from the White House, but he continues to speak to people in the administration multiple times a day.
On North Korea, the book relays the remarkable dynamic following Trump’s “fire and fury” and “bloody nose” comments against Kim, when Pyongyang and Seoul — sworn enemies — coordinated to avert existential disaster by overpromising on the possibility of a denuclearized North, if only the president would restart talks. “They were in cahoots,” a former official claims. Trump, Sciutto points out, was possibly “being played by both the ally and the adversary.” This is where, perhaps, the United States may have come closest to war. Measured by volume alone, two long, tense chapters cover the Koreas. And after three face-to-face meetings, Trump has little to show beyond the pomp, while North Korea has used these years to expand its nuclear program.
Do not expect an excoriation of all of Trump’s actions. Confronting China has become a bipartisan position, and regardless of who wins in November, “the upending of the US-China relationship is the element of Trump’s foreign policy least likely to change when he leaves office,” Sciutto observes. In his previous work, he described China as conducting a “shadow war,” one most Americans know little or nothing about. This is no longer the case, and bilateral spats frequently top domestic headlines now. Not a week goes by without a story of Chinese espionage, incursion, or “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, often matched by an equally polemical United States.
If madman diplomacy is the approach, far less clear are what goals, if any, Trump has when it comes to China. His main obsession seems to be the same one he focuses on with almost all foreign powers: the idea that the United States is being cheated. China’s growing human rights crisis certainly isn’t a concern. When told of the so-called reeducation camps in Xinjiang, Trump’s former advisor John Bolton claimed the president essentially signed off on the idea to Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
Trump has even given up on his signature trade policy, and we’ll likely not see a “phase two” U.S.-China trade deal. Most observers assume his China policy has become an election ploy—a dangerous affair considering how badly Trump hates to lose. With the U.S. Navy passing through the Taiwan Strait and Chinese fighter jets entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in the last few weeks, a clumsy few minutes might change the course of history.
Meanwhile, the administration’s hostility to China—from initiating the trade war to its barely disguised racism when calling the novel coronavirus a “Chinese virus”—has done little to substantively check Beijing. The country continues to militarize the South China Sea, installing missiles on the Spratly Islands. It has essentially thrown out Hong Kong’s constitution and independence. And it continues to detain Uighurs in its western Xinjiang territory, despite growing global outcry. Trump’s bluster and swings have largely been ignored by Beijing when it comes to actual actions, while it has continued to simply press on with its own concerned nationalist agenda.
If the relative high point in Sciutto’s estimation is China, the nadir is Syria and U.S. abandonment of Kurdish fighters there. Sciutto’s account of the president’s own officials seeking creative ways to circumvent his withdrawal orders make for painful reading, but it serves as just one instance of many in this book when officials had to manage his worst decisions. It is a mortifying moment when the commander of the Syrian Kurdish military forces sends a message to his friends in the U.S. military absolving them of blame, implicit in the communication a judgment on how morally bankrupt Trump’s decision was. The author is clear here: Trump had a foreign-policy victory in his hands that he squandered. The United States had partnered with a capable local fighting force and had vastly diminished Islamic State territory and killed tens of thousands of its fighters. It ceded that progress, allowing Bashar al-Assad’s government, Turkey, Russia, and Iran to make gains.
The madman, it turns out, does not like war, and he measures military options from a bang-for-your-buck benchmark. He could pursue a one-off strike to kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani (and was lucky the decision did not spiral into something greater), but he generally prefers withdrawals over deployments—a consistency China may have noticed as it ratchets up tensions with Taiwan. What emerges in addition to the prevailing “madman theory” in these pages are a few steady strands the president sticks to, at least directionally, if unevenly, such as on military conflict.
Sciutto’s book is a first-rate attempt to map a method behind four years of foreign-policy mayhem. Even as he writes about the past, it’s difficult to shake the feeling he is constantly thinking—and worried—about the future. Regardless of the election outcome, America faces tough years ahead, much of it because of a madman’s impulsiveness.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-23--The Refugee Crisis Is Now a German Superhero Movie

The Refugee Crisis Is Now a German Superhero Movie The book was published in 2017 by Robin Alexander , the political editor of the conservative daily Die Welt , under the title Die Getriebenen : Merkel und die Flüchtlingspolitik : Report aus dem Innern der Macht ( The Driven Ones : Merkel and Refugee Policy : Report from the Halls of Power ) .
It depicts Merkel as a naive and indecisive leader who , out of fear that the world might reproach the German people for slamming borders shut in the face of dark-skinned women and children , opted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Austria trekking toward Germany to pass into the country where they could apply for political asylum .
She lacked the nerve , Alexander implies , to do the right thing as a self-confident German leader—namely to close the border with Austria , damn the consequences .
This is the narrative that has settled into consensus among many Germans , especially in her own Christian Democratic Union party .
The hugely popular German film , directed by the filmmaker Stephan Wagner and broadcast earlier this year on the national television channel ARD , relies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ screenplay ( and its title ) but places entirely new accents on the material .
The movie chronicles the crisis from July to November 2015 told through the up-tempo , behind-the-scenes politicking of Merkel , her cabinet , German authorities such as the heads of the federal and border police , and the foreign leaders involved , such as Hungary ’ s Prime Minister Viktor Orban .
The movie earned positive reviews , but the actress Imogen Kogge , who plays Merkel , deserves special praise for transcending the source material .
Whereas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as weak and indecisive , Kogge ’ s Merkel is principled and soul-searching .
She is forced to confront a European Union refugee regime that is obviously broken beyond repair : People hoping to receive political asylum in the EU—a right not only enshrined in EU law but also in the Geneva Convention—are obliged to remain in the country in which they originally file their application until their cases are adjudicated .
But as the number of arrivals grows , their interest in staying in Greece and Italy diminishes , and the authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them from leaving .
It soon becomes clear that other nearby countries on the so-called Balkan trail don ’ t want to take them in either—which raises the question of what Germany will do .
Suddenly , Merkel is under attack from all sides in Germany , including the hard-liners in her own government—and especially Horst Seehofer , the Bavarian premier at the time , who insists that the refugee inflows be stanched .
Kogge plays Merkel as on-the-ball , closely following events—but also conflicted from the beginning of the crisis .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ depiction than Alexander ’ s own but , crucially , a more accurate one , as anyone who has seen Merkel ’ s fateful press conference on Aug. 31 , 2015 , would know .
As the movie shows in detail , tens of thousands of refugees had crossed into Hungary that month before Orban could finish erecting the barbed-wire fence that aimed to cut off Hungary from Serbia .
It was the scenes of atrocities—refugees camping out in horrific conditions in Budapest ’ s Keleti Station , the families drowned in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been found along an Austrian highway with 71 asphyxiated refugees inside of it—that finally moved Merkel , not simply the calculation of reputational damage that would come from a hard-line response , which Alexander emphasizes .
German conservatives , including figures in her administration , were shrilly insisting that the German border be sealed , even if that meant razor wire , tear gas , and German police units repelling destitute families .
Federal police units were in place near the frontier , prepared to try to do it .
But Merkel desisted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible , she concluded , to erect a wall like Hungary did—which took around four months to complete .
In the film , the voice of conscience was her husband , Joachim Sauer , whose evening pep talk strengthened the chancellor ’ s resolve .
But this should not be taken to suggest the decision was purely emotional ; Merkel understood that the events bore on the moral meaning of European law .
The most widely quoted line from the press conference at which Merkel announced Germany ’ s open borders has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we can do this.
” But her analysis extended beyond that phrase .
As she pointed out , political asylum is a fundamental right enshrined in the German constitution , as is respect for human dignity , regardless of nationality .
There was also a more purely democratic reason—one that Alexander never acknowledged in his book : Welcoming the refugees was initially popular among Germans , especially in the Protestant and Catholic churches .
“ Our freedom , our constitutional state , our economic strength , the order in which we live together—this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experienced persecution , war , and despotism in their lives , ” Merkel said .
“ The world sees Germany as a country of hope and opportunity , and it wasn ’ t always that way.
” In September 2015 , opinion polls showed two-thirds of Germans in favor of her refugee policies .
In communities across the country volunteers were erecting shelters , donating food and blankets , and taking families into their homes .
Merkel ’ s brave stance was not to endure .
Hungary , then Croatia , and then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ southern Mediterranean , EU patrols began to intercept boats smuggling migrants and return them to shore .
Even countries such as Sweden and Finland , which had taken large numbers of refugees , signaled their limits .
Though Merkel exerted all of Germany ’ s formidable muscle , the EU found it impossible to win approval to distribute refugees proportionally across the bloc .
In Germany , conservatives attacked Merkel fiercely and shifted the tenor of the discourse .
In the final scene of The Driven Ones film , Merkel gets the bad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ halls in the Munich Exhibition Center , where crowding had led to tensions .
Under her breath she mutters , “ Scheisse.
” Indeed , the mood swung in late 2015 .
Merkel had neither backing in her own party nor the backbone to stick to her convictions .
Seehofer ’ s public badgering lasted for years to come and fueled the fortunes of the young Alternative for Germany party , which soared in the polls from just 4 percent in early 2015 to over 12 percent in the 2017 general election .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ refuses to take in 2015 , she does avail herself to in 2016 : sitting down with Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan ( whom she had called an authoritarian despot ) to hammer out a deal in which the EU would pay for Turkey ’ s refugee camps and offer Turks visa-free travel into Europe in exchange for Turkey ’ s strict patrol of its western border .
The EU also replaced marine operations designed to rescue refugees crossing the Mediterranean with naval ships and helicopters with orders to stop them from crossing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Morocco , Algeria , and Tunisia were labeled as “ safe ” states and thus no longer places from which their citizens could apply for political asylum .
By 2017 the inflow of refugees into Europe , and Germany , had slowed to a trickle , but the narratives that arose from the crisis persist to today .
Merkel is accused of “ opening borders ” and inviting migrants into Germany when in fact they had long been on their way and crossed an Austrian-German border that had been open for decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beyond conservative circles , the 2015-2016 refugees ( and indeed most refugees ) are deemed “ economic migrants , ” namely people looking for better jobs in richer countries .
In fact , in 2015 85 percent of the 1.3 million people who applied for political asylum in Europe came from Syria , Afghanistan , Iraq , and Eritrea—all countries with wars in progress .
About half of those asylum applicants who were granted either political asylum or a more temporary form of residence in Germany have filled open job and training position @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy since 2016 .
Five years after the migration crisis , neither Germany nor the EU is any closer to formulating a new common refugee policy .
The EU ’ s criticism of Turkey ’ s human rights violations are held in check by Erdogan ’ s control of the sprawling refugee camps in Turkey .
When the EU monies dry up , as they did earlier this year , the Turkish president showed he is prepared to unleash waves of refugees in the direction of the Aegean coast to elicit a response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now de facto restricted in Europe—an unavoidable evil , it is said , to keep the far-right from flourishing .
How many persecuted people from war-torn Libya can ’ t make it to EU borders to apply for asylum ?
No one knows .
But they ’ re dying in the Mediterranean trying to do it .
What we also will never know is how Germans would have reacted had Merkel continued to defend her original reasons for accepting refugees in August 2015 .
If Merkel no longer offers that nuanced and ethical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now fortunate they can find a reasonable enough facsimile on national television .

German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s momentous decision five years to welcome into Germany an unprecedented number of refugees from the Middle East and Northern Africa triggered political repercussions across much of the world. Only in Germany has it also caused pop cultural ferment. One bestselling book about Merkel’s decision has now inspired a hugely popular television movie. Any attempt to understand the legacy of the summer of 2015 must reckon with both works—and the crucial differences between them. The distortions of one are corrected by the artistry of the other, and they point to the same learning process that awaits the broader German public as it struggles to define the legacy of the events in question.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s momentous decision five years to welcome into Germany an unprecedented number of refugees from the Middle East and Northern Africa triggered political repercussions across much of the world. Only in Germany has it also caused pop cultural ferment. One bestselling book about Merkel’s decision has now inspired a hugely popular television movie. Any attempt to understand the legacy of the summer of 2015 must reckon with both works—and the crucial differences between them. The distortions of one are corrected by the artistry of the other, and they point to the same learning process that awaits the broader German public as it struggles to define the legacy of the events in question.
The book was published in 2017 by Robin Alexander, the political editor of the conservative daily Die Welt, under the title Die Getriebenen: Merkel und die Flüchtlingspolitik: Report aus dem Innern der Macht (The Driven Ones: Merkel and Refugee Policy: Report from the Halls of Power). It depicts Merkel as a naive and indecisive leader who, out of fear that the world might reproach the German people for slamming borders shut in the face of dark-skinned women and children, opted to allow the refugees in Hungary and Austria trekking toward Germany to pass into the country where they could apply for political asylum. She lacked the nerve, Alexander implies, to do the right thing as a self-confident German leader—namely to close the border with Austria, damn the consequences. This is the narrative that has settled into consensus among many Germans, especially in her own Christian Democratic Union party.
Die Getriebenen: Merkel und die Flüchtlingspolitik: Report aus dem Innern der Macht, Robin Al-exander, Siedler Verlag, 288 pp., €19.99, March 2017 (in German)
The hugely popular German film, directed by the filmmaker Stephan Wagner and broadcast earlier this year on the national television channel ARD, relies upon Alexander’s book for its screenplay (and its title) but places entirely new accents on the material. The movie chronicles the crisis from July to November 2015 told through the up-tempo, behind-the-scenes politicking of Merkel, her cabinet, German authorities such as the heads of the federal and border police, and the foreign leaders involved, such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban.
The movie earned positive reviews, but the actress Imogen Kogge, who plays Merkel, deserves special praise for transcending the source material. Whereas Alexander’s book depicts the chancellor as weak and indecisive, Kogge’s Merkel is principled and soul-searching. She is forced to confront a European Union refugee regime that is obviously broken beyond repair: People hoping to receive political asylum in the EU—a right not only enshrined in EU law but also in the Geneva Convention—are obliged to remain in the country in which they originally file their application until their cases are adjudicated. But as the number of arrivals grows, their interest in staying in Greece and Italy diminishes, and the authorities in those countries won’t impede them from leaving. It soon becomes clear that other nearby countries on the so-called Balkan trail don’t want to take them in either—which raises the question of what Germany will do. Suddenly, Merkel is under attack from all sides in Germany, including the hard-liners in her own government—and especially Horst Seehofer, the Bavarian premier at the time, who insists that the refugee inflows be stanched.
Kogge plays Merkel as on-the-ball, closely following events—but also conflicted from the beginning of the crisis. This is not simply a more morally praiseworthy depiction than Alexander’s own but, crucially, a more accurate one, as anyone who has seen Merkel’s fateful press conference on Aug. 31, 2015, would know. As the movie shows in detail, tens of thousands of refugees had crossed into Hungary that month before Orban could finish erecting the barbed-wire fence that aimed to cut off Hungary from Serbia. It was the scenes of atrocities—refugees camping out in horrific conditions in Budapest’s Keleti Station, the families drowned in the Mediterranean, and a truck that had been found along an Austrian highway with 71 asphyxiated refugees inside of it—that finally moved Merkel, not simply the calculation of reputational damage that would come from a hard-line response, which Alexander emphasizes. German conservatives, including figures in her administration, were shrilly insisting that the German border be sealed, even if that meant razor wire, tear gas, and German police units repelling destitute families. Federal police units were in place near the frontier, prepared to try to do it. But Merkel desisted: It wouldn’t have been possible, she concluded, to erect a wall like Hungary did—which took around four months to complete.
In the film, the voice of conscience was her husband, Joachim Sauer, whose evening pep talk strengthened the chancellor’s resolve. But this should not be taken to suggest the decision was purely emotional; Merkel understood that the events bore on the moral meaning of European law. The most widely quoted line from the press conference at which Merkel announced Germany’s open borders has been “Wir schaffen das”—“we can do this.” But her analysis extended beyond that phrase. As she pointed out, political asylum is a fundamental right enshrined in the German constitution, as is respect for human dignity, regardless of nationality.
There was also a more purely democratic reason—one that Alexander never acknowledged in his book: Welcoming the refugees was initially popular among Germans, especially in the Protestant and Catholic churches. “Our freedom, our constitutional state, our economic strength, the order in which we live together—this is what people dream of who have experienced persecution, war, and despotism in their lives,” Merkel said. “The world sees Germany as a country of hope and opportunity, and it wasn’t always that way.” In September 2015, opinion polls showed two-thirds of Germans in favor of her refugee policies. In communities across the country volunteers were erecting shelters, donating food and blankets, and taking families into their homes.
Merkel’s brave stance was not to endure. Hungary, then Croatia, and then Austria closed their borders. In the southern Mediterranean, EU patrols began to intercept boats smuggling migrants and return them to shore. Even countries such as Sweden and Finland, which had taken large numbers of refugees, signaled their limits. Though Merkel exerted all of Germany’s formidable muscle, the EU found it impossible to win approval to distribute refugees proportionally across the bloc. In Germany, conservatives attacked Merkel fiercely and shifted the tenor of the discourse. In the final scene of The Driven Ones film, Merkel gets the bad news that refugees stormed one of the halls in the Munich Exhibition Center, where crowding had led to tensions. Under her breath she mutters, “Scheisse.”
Indeed, the mood swung in late 2015. Merkel had neither backing in her own party nor the backbone to stick to her convictions. Seehofer’s public badgering lasted for years to come and fueled the fortunes of the young Alternative for Germany party, which soared in the polls from just 4 percent in early 2015 to over 12 percent in the 2017 general election. An option that in the film Merkel refuses to take in 2015, she does avail herself to in 2016: sitting down with Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan (whom she had called an authoritarian despot) to hammer out a deal in which the EU would pay for Turkey’s refugee camps and offer Turks visa-free travel into Europe in exchange for Turkey’s strict patrol of its western border. The EU also replaced marine operations designed to rescue refugees crossing the Mediterranean with naval ships and helicopters with orders to stop them from crossing. Countries in the Balkans as well as Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were labeled as “safe” states and thus no longer places from which their citizens could apply for political asylum.
By 2017 the inflow of refugees into Europe, and Germany, had slowed to a trickle, but the narratives that arose from the crisis persist to today. Merkel is accused of “opening borders” and inviting migrants into Germany when in fact they had long been on their way and crossed an Austrian-German border that had been open for decades. Moreover, in rhetoric that extends beyond conservative circles, the 2015-2016 refugees (and indeed most refugees) are deemed “economic migrants,” namely people looking for better jobs in richer countries. In fact, in 2015 85 percent of the 1.3 million people who applied for political asylum in Europe came from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Eritrea—all countries with wars in progress. About half of those asylum applicants who were granted either political asylum or a more temporary form of residence in Germany have filled open job and training position slots, thus contributing to the German economy since 2016.
Five years after the migration crisis, neither Germany nor the EU is any closer to formulating a new common refugee policy. The EU’s criticism of Turkey’s human rights violations are held in check by Erdogan’s control of the sprawling refugee camps in Turkey. When the EU monies dry up, as they did earlier this year, the Turkish president showed he is prepared to unleash waves of refugees in the direction of the Aegean coast to elicit a response. The right to political asylum is now de facto restricted in Europe—an unavoidable evil, it is said, to keep the far-right from flourishing. How many persecuted people from war-torn Libya can’t make it to EU borders to apply for asylum? No one knows. But they’re dying in the Mediterranean trying to do it.
What we also will never know is how Germans would have reacted had Merkel continued to defend her original reasons for accepting refugees in August 2015. If Merkel no longer offers that nuanced and ethical explanation herself, Germans are at least now fortunate they can find a reasonable enough facsimile on national television.