foreignpolicy--2020-12-31--The Best Deep Dives of 2020

The Best Deep Dives of 2020

The Best Deep Dives of 2020 In a year when the world briefly stood still , good storytelling and unvarnished analysis seemed as vital as ever .
In 2020 , Foreign Policy published a variety of long-form reporting and argument from around the world .
From a Chinese wind farm in Del Rio , Texas , to U.N. headquarters in New York , here are a few of the deep dives that shed light on a world shifting under the weight of an unprecedented pandemic—and what comes next .
1 .
Deep in the Heart of Texas , a Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic , Beijing ’ s repressive national security law in Hong Kong , and intensifying technology rivalry , 2020 was the biggest year for U.S.-China relations in decades .
In June , FP ’ s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer reported that U.S. competition with China had arrived in an unlikely place : Del Rio , Texas .
Chinese companies have jumped into the Texas energy market in recent years , and a wind farm project near the U.S. Air Force ’ s largest training base has raised concerns over potential espionage and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Congress .
“ Lawmakers who might normally welcome foreign investment with open arms are also looking askance at the project , ” Detsch and Gramer wrote .
The Trump administration ’ s decision not to block the Chinese project on national security grounds has set a precedent for further wind and solar development around the base and elsewhere in Texas .
In June , mass protests over police brutality that began in Minneapolis spread across the United States and then to cities around the world .
The movement triggered a cultural reckoning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the field of international relations ( IR ) .
In Foreign Policy , Kelebogile Zvobgo and Meredith Loken argued that race is a “ central organizing feature of world politics ” but that mainstream IR scholarship does not take race or racism seriously , diminishing the field ’ s integrity .
“ Race and the racism of historical statecraft are inextricable from the modern study and practice of international relations , ” Zvobgo and Loken wrote .
“ They are also not artefacts : Race continues to shape international and domestic threat perceptions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to immigrants and refugees ; and access to health and environmental stability.
” Zvobgo and Loken ’ s article helped prompt a wider debate within IR about the field ’ s problems—one that ’ s still ongoing .
This month , the United States announced it would withdraw troops from Somalia , leaving the task of countering the country ’ s jihadi insurgency to U.S.-trained Somali troops .
The move comes at an especially fragile moment for Somalia and the region , with the militant threat on the rise and a civil war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Katrina Manson profiled diaspora returnee Hodan Osman .
Hodan joined Somalia ’ s central bank as a senior advisor amid endemic corruption , at a time when some Somali soldiers hadn ’ t been paid for six months , and forced an internal review—reforming the system , bit by bit .
“ It shows how long it takes .
Slowly you address the issues , but you have to reach critical mass , ” Hodan told Manson .
“ It ’ s still a rogue kind of nation .
The most I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corner .
That corner ’ s clean.
” 4 .
How the Bottom Fell Out of the U.S.-Saudi Alliance This spring , as the global economy collapsed amid the coronavirus pandemic , Saudi Arabia unleashed its oil weapon—deliberately crashing oil prices and inflicting damage on the U.S. economy .
The move tested the patience of the Saudis ’ staunchest supporters in Congress , but many in Washington were already beginning to question the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship after a rocky few years , as FP ’ s Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it come to this ?
Today ’ s tensions stem , in many ways , from the original foundations of the odd-couple relationship : an oil-for-security bargain that always sought , but never fully managed , to bridge the divide between a liberal democracy and a conservative religious monarchy , ” they wrote .
In a year of global protest over racial injustice , the United Nations—one of the most diverse institutions in the world—came under fire for failing to promote equality within its own ranks , as FP ’ s Colum Lynch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ While there are plenty of field jobs available for people from the developing world , the best-paying , most senior jobs at U.N. headquarters go disproportionately to Westerners , Foreign Policy found—and nowhere is this gap between rich and poor countries more evident than in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs , the U.N. emergency relief agency .
“ The department ’ s Western tilt begins at the very top , ” Lynch wrote .
“ The vast majority of senior staff are recruited from Western countries that donate to U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the agency ’ s operations are in Africa and Asia.
” Plus : Into the Breach : How Data Is Driving the New U.S.-China Cold War As 2020 came to a close , Foreign Policy published a three-part investigation on the decade-long data war between the United States and China .
Zach Dorfman interviewed more than three dozen current and former U.S. intelligence officials , producing a sweeping story of China ’ s assault on U.S. personal data .
China ’ s newfound confidence has meant exposing CIA operatives , disrupting U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for an edge in the trade war with the United States .
“ The battle over data—who controls it , who secures it , who can steal it , and how it can be used for economic and security objectives—is defining the global conflict between Washington and Beijing , ” Dorfman wrote .
“ Data has already critically shaped the course of Chinese politics , and it is altering the course of U.S. foreign policy and intelligence gathering around the globe .
”

In a year when the world briefly stood still, good storytelling and unvarnished analysis seemed as vital as ever. In 2020, Foreign Policy published a variety of long-form reporting and argument from around the world. From a Chinese wind farm in Del Rio, Texas, to U.N. headquarters in New York, here are a few of the deep dives that shed light on a world shifting under the weight of an unprecedented pandemic—and what comes next.
2020 The Year In Review logo
In a year when the world briefly stood still, good storytelling and unvarnished analysis seemed as vital as ever. In 2020, Foreign Policy published a variety of long-form reporting and argument from around the world. From a Chinese wind farm in Del Rio, Texas, to U.N. headquarters in New York, here are a few of the deep dives that shed light on a world shifting under the weight of an unprecedented pandemic—and what comes next.
by Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, June 25
With the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing’s repressive national security law in Hong Kong, and intensifying technology rivalry, 2020 was the biggest year for U.S.-China relations in decades. In June, FP’s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer reported that U.S. competition with China had arrived in an unlikely place: Del Rio, Texas. Chinese companies have jumped into the Texas energy market in recent years, and a wind farm project near the U.S. Air Force’s largest training base has raised concerns over potential espionage and economic warfare among local officials and members of Congress.
“Lawmakers who might normally welcome foreign investment with open arms are also looking askance at the project,” Detsch and Gramer wrote. The Trump administration’s decision not to block the Chinese project on national security grounds has set a precedent for further wind and solar development around the base and elsewhere in Texas.
by Kelebogile Zvobgo and Meredith Loken, June 19
In June, mass protests over police brutality that began in Minneapolis spread across the United States and then to cities around the world. The movement triggered a cultural reckoning over race and injustice, including within the field of international relations (IR). In Foreign Policy, Kelebogile Zvobgo and Meredith Loken argued that race is a “central organizing feature of world politics” but that mainstream IR scholarship does not take race or racism seriously, diminishing the field’s integrity.
“Race and the racism of historical statecraft are inextricable from the modern study and practice of international relations,” Zvobgo and Loken wrote. “They are also not artefacts: Race continues to shape international and domestic threat perceptions and consequent foreign policy; international responses to immigrants and refugees; and access to health and environmental stability.” Zvobgo and Loken’s article helped prompt a wider debate within IR about the field’s problems—one that’s still ongoing.
by Katrina Manson, Sept. 27
This month, the United States announced it would withdraw troops from Somalia, leaving the task of countering the country’s jihadi insurgency to U.S.-trained Somali troops. The move comes at an especially fragile moment for Somalia and the region, with the militant threat on the rise and a civil war brewing in neighboring Ethiopia. In September, Katrina Manson profiled diaspora returnee Hodan Osman. Hodan joined Somalia’s central bank as a senior advisor amid endemic corruption, at a time when some Somali soldiers hadn’t been paid for six months, and forced an internal review—reforming the system, bit by bit.
“It shows how long it takes. Slowly you address the issues, but you have to reach critical mass,” Hodan told Manson. “It’s still a rogue kind of nation. The most I can do is this: Fix a corner. That corner’s clean.”
by Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer, April 23
This spring, as the global economy collapsed amid the coronavirus pandemic, Saudi Arabia unleashed its oil weapon—deliberately crashing oil prices and inflicting damage on the U.S. economy. The move tested the patience of the Saudis’ staunchest supporters in Congress, but many in Washington were already beginning to question the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship after a rocky few years, as FP’s Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer reported in April.
“How did it come to this? Today’s tensions stem, in many ways, from the original foundations of the odd-couple relationship: an oil-for-security bargain that always sought, but never fully managed, to bridge the divide between a liberal democracy and a conservative religious monarchy,” they wrote.
by Colum Lynch, Oct. 16
In a year of global protest over racial injustice, the United Nations—one of the most diverse institutions in the world—came under fire for failing to promote equality within its own ranks, as FP’s Colum Lynch reported in an exclusive in October. While there are plenty of field jobs available for people from the developing world, the best-paying, most senior jobs at U.N. headquarters go disproportionately to Westerners, Foreign Policy found—and nowhere is this gap between rich and poor countries more evident than in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the U.N. emergency relief agency.
“The department’s Western tilt begins at the very top,” Lynch wrote. “The vast majority of senior staff are recruited from Western countries that donate to U.N. relief efforts, even while the majority of the agency’s operations are in Africa and Asia.”
by Zach Dorfman, Dec. 21
As 2020 came to a close, Foreign Policy published a three-part investigation on the decade-long data war between the United States and China. Zach Dorfman interviewed more than three dozen current and former U.S. intelligence officials, producing a sweeping story of China’s assault on U.S. personal data. China’s newfound confidence has meant exposing CIA operatives, disrupting U.S. intelligence, and enlisting private technology firms for an edge in the trade war with the United States.
“The battle over data—who controls it, who secures it, who can steal it, and how it can be used for economic and security objectives—is defining the global conflict between Washington and Beijing,” Dorfman wrote. “Data has already critically shaped the course of Chinese politics, and it is altering the course of U.S. foreign policy and intelligence gathering around the globe.”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-31--Our Top Arguments of 2020

Our Top Arguments of 2020

1 .
What I Learned About the Coronavirus World From Watching Zombie Flicks As the realization that the pandemic was here to stay sunk in , pundits sought insight in unexpected places .
Among them , Tufts University ’ s Daniel W. Drezner offered lessons for COVID-19 from zombie movies .
“ Unfortunately , ” he warned , “ the zombie genre can explain more about the first phase of the coronavirus pandemic than anyone should be comfortable with.
” A film in this canon , he explained , almost always starts with “ civilization and ends with a post-apocalyptic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that has seemed to be exactly where the world was heading .
But fortunately , Drezner pointed out , there are at least some differences between the living dead and humans in 2020 .
“ The zombie genre is overly pessimistic about the adaptability of human beings .
We can and should be more hopeful ” —good news for 2021 .
2 .
As the Coronavirus Spreads , Conspiracy Theories Are Going Viral Too Some attempts to understand the causes and consequences of the pandemic were even more outside the box than Drezner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As the journalist Elize Thomas explained , COVID-19 was the perfect fodder for conspiracy theories .
“ While propaganda campaigns amid pandemics are nothing new , what is new in the current crisis is the global information environment in which it is playing out.
” For example , social media platforms have a “ way of smashing social contexts into one another so that messages tailored for one audience end up hitting others as well and being interpreted in unanticipated ways.
” Networked media also allows rumors to spread quickly—so that misinformation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can correct it .
“ For governments seeking to build trust and communicate clearly , ” Thomas wrote , “ it ’ s a nightmare .
For those looking to sow chaos and doubt , it ’ s an opportunity.
” Still reeling from the pandemic , over the summer the United States faced a reckoning with an even deeper problem .
As protesters took to the streets to march against police violence and systemic racism , the field of international relations , or IR , was also due for some self-reflection .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the director of the International Justice Lab at William & Mary , and Meredith Loken , an assistant professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst , explained that the major schools of IR theory—realism , liberalism , and constructivism— “ are built on raced and racist intellectual foundations that limit the field ’ s ability to answer important questions about international security and organization.
” Indeed , they pointed out , “ [ c ] ore concepts , like anarchy and hierarchy , are raced : They are rooted in discourses that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
… And their use is racist : These invented binaries are used to explain subjugation and exploitation around the globe.
” What ’ s needed now , they urged , is a willingness among those who teach IR to better integrate scholarly work on race into every aspect of their curriculums .
4 .
The Republican and Democratic Parties Are Heading for Collapse Other institutions seemed stretched to the breaking point , too , especially as the U.S. presidential election approached .
Expanding on his theory of a political “ doom loop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Drutman warned in September that the United States ’ two main political parties were heading for collapse after the election .
Every few decades , he explained , the parties have reshuffled—and they ’ re now overdue .
That ’ s because , over time , “ the principles that unite a coalition together in one moment fray—and the governing ideologies that solved a previous problem create their own future problems , demanding a new ideology.
” To be sure , he wrote , “ voting loyalties are sticky .
And especially in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coalition comes at a high cost if the opposing coalition can ’ t accommodate your demands either .
That is why it typically takes a major event , like an economic depression or a major conflict over race , to break a coalition apart.
” And if a pandemic , a major movement to address racism , economic disaster , and an extremely partisan election aren ’ t just such a prompt , what is ?
In late fall , tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh exploded into war , occasioning a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and peace .
UMass Amherst ’ s Paul Musgrave looked at the idea that economic integration makes war less attractive , as pithily simplified by the journalist Tom Friedman : “ His thesis , originally expounded in a 1996 column , proposed to explain the decline in war as a result of the expansion of global capitalism : ‘ No two countries that both have a McDonald ’ s have ever fought a war against each other.
’ ” Yet here were Armenia and Azerbaijan—both with plenty of Golden Arches—at war .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be entering a “ new phase of more violent conflict—including major wars—and globalization will no more prevent them than burgeoning trade before Archduke Ferdinand ’ s assassination prevented World War I.
” In other words , beyond all the other problems the United States will be facing in 2021 , rising tensions around the world might just be the most enduring .

This year was no longer than any other, yet it contained enough news for several. Here are our top arguments that charted how the world changed in real time.
This year was no longer than any other, yet it contained enough news for several. Here are our top arguments that charted how the world changed in real time.
By Daniel W. Drezner, April 11
As the realization that the pandemic was here to stay sunk in, pundits sought insight in unexpected places. Among them, Tufts University’s Daniel W. Drezner offered lessons for COVID-19 from zombie movies. “Unfortunately,” he warned, “the zombie genre can explain more about the first phase of the coronavirus pandemic than anyone should be comfortable with.” A film in this canon, he explained, almost always starts with “civilization and ends with a post-apocalyptic hellscape.” At times this year, that has seemed to be exactly where the world was heading. But fortunately, Drezner pointed out, there are at least some differences between the living dead and humans in 2020. “The zombie genre is overly pessimistic about the adaptability of human beings. We can and should be more hopeful”—good news for 2021.
By Elise Thomas, April 14
Some attempts to understand the causes and consequences of the pandemic were even more outside the box than Drezner’s—and not in a good way. As the journalist Elize Thomas explained, COVID-19 was the perfect fodder for conspiracy theories. “While propaganda campaigns amid pandemics are nothing new, what is new in the current crisis is the global information environment in which it is playing out.” For example, social media platforms have a “way of smashing social contexts into one another so that messages tailored for one audience end up hitting others as well and being interpreted in unanticipated ways.” Networked media also allows rumors to spread quickly—so that misinformation has reached millions of eyes before anyone can correct it. “For governments seeking to build trust and communicate clearly,” Thomas wrote, “it’s a nightmare. For those looking to sow chaos and doubt, it’s an opportunity.”
Foreign Policy illustration
By Kelebogile Zvobgo and Meredith Loken, June 19
Still reeling from the pandemic, over the summer the United States faced a reckoning with an even deeper problem. As protesters took to the streets to march against police violence and systemic racism, the field of international relations, or IR, was also due for some self-reflection. In a June article, Kelebogile Zvobgo, the director of the International Justice Lab at William & Mary, and Meredith Loken, an assistant professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, explained that the major schools of IR theory—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—“are built on raced and racist intellectual foundations that limit the field’s ability to answer important questions about international security and organization.”
Indeed, they pointed out, “[c]ore concepts, like anarchy and hierarchy, are raced: They are rooted in discourses that center and favor Europe and the West. … And their use is racist: These invented binaries are used to explain subjugation and exploitation around the globe.” What’s needed now, they urged, is a willingness among those who teach IR to better integrate scholarly work on race into every aspect of their curriculums.
By Lee Drutman, Sept. 22
Other institutions seemed stretched to the breaking point, too, especially as the U.S. presidential election approached. Expanding on his theory of a political “doom loop,” New America’s Lee Drutman warned in September that the United States’ two main political parties were heading for collapse after the election. Every few decades, he explained, the parties have reshuffled—and they’re now overdue. That’s because, over time, “the principles that unite a coalition together in one moment fray—and the governing ideologies that solved a previous problem create their own future problems, demanding a new ideology.”
To be sure, he wrote, “voting loyalties are sticky. And especially in a two-party system, breaking from a coalition comes at a high cost if the opposing coalition can’t accommodate your demands either. That is why it typically takes a major event, like an economic depression or a major conflict over race, to break a coalition apart.” And if a pandemic, a major movement to address racism, economic disaster, and an extremely partisan election aren’t just such a prompt, what is?
By Paul Musgrave, Nov. 26
In late fall, tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh exploded into war, occasioning a reexamination of some foundational ideas about development and peace. UMass Amherst’s Paul Musgrave looked at the idea that economic integration makes war less attractive, as pithily simplified by the journalist Tom Friedman: “His thesis, originally expounded in a 1996 column, proposed to explain the decline in war as a result of the expansion of global capitalism: ‘No two countries that both have a McDonald’s have ever fought a war against each other.’”
Yet here were Armenia and Azerbaijan—both with plenty of Golden Arches—at war. The world, Musgrave argued, might well be entering a “new phase of more violent conflict—including major wars—and globalization will no more prevent them than burgeoning trade before Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination prevented World War I.” In other words, beyond all the other problems the United States will be facing in 2021, rising tensions around the world might just be the most enduring.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-31--Our Top Stories of 2020

Our Top Stories of 2020

One big story has dominated 2020 : the coronavirus pandemic .
But it didn ’ t put everything on hold .
As the end of the year approaches , U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is preparing to take office and try to rebuild America ’ s international relationships .
Meanwhile , major protest movements look set to continue in the United States , India , Belarus , and beyond .
Still , what has captured Foreign Policy readers ’ attention this year is the response to the pandemic—and more broadly , China ’ s role on the global stage .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus—and paid the price in November , as Micah Zenko warned as early as March .
Early in the year , it was clear that the virus was spreading a lot faster and more stealthily than Chinese or U.S. officials acknowledged , and the aftershocks are still reverberating .
Meanwhile , China and India came to blows over a disputed border—and not even a big purchase of French-made fighter jets will restore the military balance .
Here are 10 of our most read stories this year , as measured by website traffic .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Technologically Sophisticated Genocide Is Happening in Xinjiang U.S.-China relations reached a new low in 2020 under the pressure of the pandemic , lingering trade war , cyberattacks , and the repressive national security law in Hong Kong .
The extent of China ’ s abuses against Uighurs and other minorities in Xinjiang also grew much clearer this year .
Chinese authorities have reportedly driven Uighurs into slave labor and forcibly sterilized women , all while trying to hide the abuses from the world .
The United States has imposed sanctions against Chinese government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Yonah Diamond argue that Washington should go a step further and make an official determination of genocide .
by Isaac Stone Fish and Maria Krol Sinclair , May 12 Beijing ’ s tight control of information has also led to skepticism in the rest of the world toward its official coronavirus figures , even more than a year after the first recorded cases in Wuhan .
To date , mainland China has reported fewer than 90,000 total cases and just over 4,600 deaths—a tiny fraction of the cases and deaths in countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in a Foreign Policy exclusive , Isaac Stone Fish and Maria Krol Sinclair reported on a leaked dataset about coronavirus cases in 230 Chinese cities .
“ Why does Beijing restrict access to its coronavirus data ?
Possibly because of malice or mistrust toward the United States , at a time when tensions are running high .
Possibly because of bureaucratic errors .
And possibly because Beijing fears that outside researchers will learn of its extensive cover-up , destroying the narrative that an authoritarian nation like China is better equipped to protect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they wrote .
Over the past two decades , the Indian Air Force has seen its advantage narrow over regional rivals Pakistan and China .
This year , it faced significant challenges from both—with Beijing activating aircraft from its Tibetan airfields and Islamabad running exercises along the border—and the rising prospect of possible collusion .
China ’ s Western Theater Command comprises some 200 fighter aircraft , and the Pakistan Air Force has around 350 fighters it could mobilize against India—and both air forces operate more early warning surveillance aircraft than India ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the arrival of Rafale fighter jets from France “ won ’ t do much to change the hard reality that , as an air power , India is falling far behind , ” Harsh V. Pant and Angad Singh write .
7 .
Why We Should Worry About China and India ’ s Border Skirmishes by Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi , May 23 India and China saw a major escalation of tensions on the ground in 2020 along their disputed border in the mountainous Ladakh region .
In June , at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soldiers were killed or wounded in hand-to-hand combat—the first deadly clash between the two countries in decades .
In May , Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi argued that the military buildup along the border and increasing Chinese transgressions suggested that escalations were likely after a long period of relative quiet .
The tensions have since simmered , but “ [ p ] eace can no longer be taken for granted , ” as they write .
6 .
China Is Already Breaking Its Vatican Deal In October , the Vatican renewed a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the appointment of bishops in China .
The agreement calls for China to formally recognize the pope ’ s authority within the church and in return grants legitimacy to bishops previously appointed by the Chinese government .
Benedict Rogers argues that only China stands to gain from the deal—and that Beijing is already breaking it by placing dissenting priests under house arrest .
“ The deal has succeeded in furthering the regime ’ s control of the church in China , repressing dissent , and buying the pope ’ s silence , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Is Abandoning Italy in Its Hour of Need Italy became the first country in Europe to enter a strict coronavirus lockdown in early March—a harbinger of a pandemic spring .
But Italy ’ s plight revealed a lack of solidarity from the European Union .
Early on , Brussels failed to send medical assistance and supplies to the member state that needed them the most .
In its place , a “ partial and flawed savior ” —China—stepped in to fill the gap , FP ’ s Elisabeth Braw wrote .
The “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points to a larger issue : How would European allies respond in case of crisis even more devastating than the coronavirus ?
” 4 .
Petraeus Says Trump May Have Helped ‘ Reestablish Deterrence ’ by Killing Suleimani In the early hours of Jan. 3 , the United States carried out a drone strike in Baghdad that killed the powerful Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani .
The provocation sharply escalated tensions , leading Iran to retaliate against a U.S. base in Iraq and to mistakenly shoot down a passenger jet in Tehran .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ FP ’ s Lara Seligman interviewed retired U.S. Gen. David Petraeus , who said the killing was “ more significant than the killing of Osama bin Laden or even the death of [ Islamic State leader Abu Bakr ] al-Baghdadi.
” Taking out Iran ’ s most capable mischief-maker , he said , was a huge blow to Iran ’ s regional ambitions .
“ It is impossible to overstate the importance of this particular action , ” he said .
3 .
The Coronavirus Is the Worst Intelligence Failure in U.S. History @ @ @ @ @ @ @ March , it became clear that the Trump administration was unprepared .
The U.S. government did not have an adequate plan for a nationwide response to the threat of COVID-19—despite having inherited from the Obama administration an entire playbook for pandemic response—and administration officials repeatedly downplayed warnings from the intelligence community about the threat .
“ The White House detachment and nonchalance during the early stages of the coronavirus outbreak will be among the most costly decisions of any modern presidency , ” FP ’ s Micah Zenko wrote at the time .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Is Spreading—and How to Stop It In the first weeks of the coronavirus crisis , the limited clinical information coming out of China , where the outbreak began , meant that the rest of the world only had knowledge of its mid-to-worst-case outcomes .
Back in January , Annie Sparrow analyzed some of this early information in Foreign Policy—an eerie warning of what was to come .
“ Fever clinics and screening are an exercise in clinical insanity , attempting to discern corona patients from every other common winter illness , ” she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people can spread the coronavirus , the focus on symptoms may be causing dangerous oversights.
” 1 .
Sorry , America , the Full Lockdown Is Coming On March 18 , FP ’ s Laurie Garrett said what many in the United States had long been dreading : that the American iteration of the coronavirus lockdown was imminent and its duration yet unknown .
( In February , Foreign Policy deputy editor James Palmer had also published a list of essential lockdown preparations . )
As offices across the United States closed their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her words .
“ Plan now for your state of siege .
Don ’ t delay .
Choose where you want to survive the pandemic , with whom , and how .
Your window of opportunity to act is shrinking , very fast , ” she wrote .

One big story has dominated 2020: the coronavirus pandemic. But it didn’t put everything on hold. As the end of the year approaches, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is preparing to take office and try to rebuild America’s international relationships. Meanwhile, major protest movements look set to continue in the United States, India, Belarus, and beyond.
One big story has dominated 2020: the coronavirus pandemic. But it didn’t put everything on hold. As the end of the year approaches, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is preparing to take office and try to rebuild America’s international relationships. Meanwhile, major protest movements look set to continue in the United States, India, Belarus, and beyond.
Still, what has captured Foreign Policy readers’ attention this year is the response to the pandemic—and more broadly, China’s role on the global stage. The Trump administration flubbed its response to the coronavirus—and paid the price in November, as Micah Zenko warned as early as March. Early in the year, it was clear that the virus was spreading a lot faster and more stealthily than Chinese or U.S. officials acknowledged, and the aftershocks are still reverberating. Meanwhile, China and India came to blows over a disputed border—and not even a big purchase of French-made fighter jets will restore the military balance.
Here are 10 of our most read stories this year, as measured by website traffic.
by Rayhan Asat and Yonah Diamond, July 15
U.S.-China relations reached a new low in 2020 under the pressure of the pandemic, lingering trade war, cyberattacks, and the repressive national security law in Hong Kong. The extent of China’s abuses against Uighurs and other minorities in Xinjiang also grew much clearer this year. Chinese authorities have reportedly driven Uighurs into slave labor and forcibly sterilized women, all while trying to hide the abuses from the world. The United States has imposed sanctions against Chinese government entities and officials, but Rayhan Asat and Yonah Diamond argue that Washington should go a step further and make an official determination of genocide.
by Isaac Stone Fish and Maria Krol Sinclair, May 12
Beijing’s tight control of information has also led to skepticism in the rest of the world toward its official coronavirus figures, even more than a year after the first recorded cases in Wuhan. To date, mainland China has reported fewer than 90,000 total cases and just over 4,600 deaths—a tiny fraction of the cases and deaths in countries with much smaller populations. In May, in a Foreign Policy exclusive, Isaac Stone Fish and Maria Krol Sinclair reported on a leaked dataset about coronavirus cases in 230 Chinese cities.
“Why does Beijing restrict access to its coronavirus data? Possibly because of malice or mistrust toward the United States, at a time when tensions are running high. Possibly because of bureaucratic errors. And possibly because Beijing fears that outside researchers will learn of its extensive cover-up, destroying the narrative that an authoritarian nation like China is better equipped to protect its people against a pandemic,” they wrote.
by Harsh V. Pant and Angad Singh, Aug. 10
Over the past two decades, the Indian Air Force has seen its advantage narrow over regional rivals Pakistan and China. This year, it faced significant challenges from both—with Beijing activating aircraft from its Tibetan airfields and Islamabad running exercises along the border—and the rising prospect of possible collusion. China’s Western Theater Command comprises some 200 fighter aircraft, and the Pakistan Air Force has around 350 fighters it could mobilize against India—and both air forces operate more early warning surveillance aircraft than India’s.
Unfortunately for New Delhi, the arrival of Rafale fighter jets from France “won’t do much to change the hard reality that, as an air power, India is falling far behind,” Harsh V. Pant and Angad Singh write.
A Chinese soldier gestures as he stands near an Indian soldier on the Chinese side of the ancient Nathu La border crossing between India and China on July 10, 2008.
by Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, May 23
India and China saw a major escalation of tensions on the ground in 2020 along their disputed border in the mountainous Ladakh region. In June, at least 20 Indian soldiers and 43 Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded in hand-to-hand combat—the first deadly clash between the two countries in decades. In May, Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi argued that the military buildup along the border and increasing Chinese transgressions suggested that escalations were likely after a long period of relative quiet. The tensions have since simmered, but “[p]eace can no longer be taken for granted,” as they write.
by Benedict Rogers, Sept. 17
In October, the Vatican renewed a historic and secretive deal with Beijing over the appointment of bishops in China. The agreement calls for China to formally recognize the pope’s authority within the church and in return grants legitimacy to bishops previously appointed by the Chinese government. Benedict Rogers argues that only China stands to gain from the deal—and that Beijing is already breaking it by placing dissenting priests under house arrest. “The deal has succeeded in furthering the regime’s control of the church in China, repressing dissent, and buying the pope’s silence,” he writes.
Hospital employees work at a temporary emergency structure at the Brescia hospital, in Lombardy, Italy, on March 13.
by Elisabeth Braw, March 14
Italy became the first country in Europe to enter a strict coronavirus lockdown in early March—a harbinger of a pandemic spring. But Italy’s plight revealed a lack of solidarity from the European Union. Early on, Brussels failed to send medical assistance and supplies to the member state that needed them the most. In its place, a “partial and flawed savior”—China—stepped in to fill the gap, FP’s Elisabeth Braw wrote. The “cold response to Italy’s plea points to a larger issue: How would European allies respond in case of crisis even more devastating than the coronavirus?”
by Lara Seligman, Jan. 3
In the early hours of Jan. 3, the United States carried out a drone strike in Baghdad that killed the powerful Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani. The provocation sharply escalated tensions, leading Iran to retaliate against a U.S. base in Iraq and to mistakenly shoot down a passenger jet in Tehran. Hours after Suleimani’s assassination, FP’s Lara Seligman interviewed retired U.S. Gen. David Petraeus, who said the killing was “more significant than the killing of Osama bin Laden or even the death of [Islamic State leader Abu Bakr] al-Baghdadi.” Taking out Iran’s most capable mischief-maker, he said, was a huge blow to Iran’s regional ambitions. “It is impossible to overstate the importance of this particular action,” he said.
by Micah Zenko, March 25
As the coronavirus swept the globe in March, it became clear that the Trump administration was unprepared. The U.S. government did not have an adequate plan for a nationwide response to the threat of COVID-19—despite having inherited from the Obama administration an entire playbook for pandemic response—and administration officials repeatedly downplayed warnings from the intelligence community about the threat. “The White House detachment and nonchalance during the early stages of the coronavirus outbreak will be among the most costly decisions of any modern presidency,” FP’s Micah Zenko wrote at the time.
A medical staff member takes the temperature of a man at the Wuhan Red Cross Hospital in China on Jan. 25.
by Annie Sparrow, Jan. 26
In the first weeks of the coronavirus crisis, the limited clinical information coming out of China, where the outbreak began, meant that the rest of the world only had knowledge of its mid-to-worst-case outcomes. Back in January, Annie Sparrow analyzed some of this early information in Foreign Policy—an eerie warning of what was to come. “Fever clinics and screening are an exercise in clinical insanity, attempting to discern corona patients from every other common winter illness,” she wrote. “Moreover, if nonsymptomatic people can spread the coronavirus, the focus on symptoms may be causing dangerous oversights.”
by Laurie Garrett, March 18
On March 18, FP’s Laurie Garrett said what many in the United States had long been dreading: that the American iteration of the coronavirus lockdown was imminent and its duration yet unknown. (In February, Foreign Policy deputy editor James Palmer had also published a list of essential lockdown preparations.) As offices across the United States closed their doors, Garrett didn’t mince her words. “Plan now for your state of siege. Don’t delay. Choose where you want to survive the pandemic, with whom, and how. Your window of opportunity to act is shrinking, very fast,” she wrote.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-31--Is Ethiopia the Next Yugoslavia?

Is Ethiopia the Next Yugoslavia?

Is Ethiopia the Next Yugoslavia ?
In December 2019 , Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was in Oslo receiving the Nobel Peace Prize ; less than a year later , he was commanding Ethiopian troops in battle against the country ’ s former dominant party—the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front ( TPLF ) .
Shepherding an ethnically diverse country with a federalist system through a transition to democracy was always a daunting task .
But as a spate of political assassinations and growing demands from ethnonationalist groups gave way to open conflict in the northern Tigray region in November @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increasingly bleak , with some analysts warning that there is a risk of Yugoslav-style disintegration .
Foreign Policy has followed the country closely in recent years , featuring the views of Ethiopian writers and regional experts from a range of perspectives .
Here are five of Foreign Policy ’ s key stories on Ethiopia from 2020 .
The war in Tigray has received most of the attention this year—but there is another taking place in cyberspace , as Ayenat Mersie argued in September .
As fraught negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to conflict with downstream countries like Sudan and Egypt , the online war took off—posing concrete problems for traditional diplomacy .
“ [ S ] urging nationalist sentiment means that it ’ s harder for officials to agree to , and for the public to accept , compromise , ” Mersie wrote .
“ [ M ] uch of the online rhetoric remains maximalist , even rejecting items that have already been unanimously decided … raising the possibility that the online tensions and attacks may not subside anytime soon.
” 2 .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Ethiopian Civil War From Becoming a Broader Ethnic Conflict In January 2019 , Florian Bieber and Wondemagegn Tadesse Goshu wrote presciently that Ethiopia could become the next Yugoslavia .
In November , as war raged in Tigray , they revisited the issue , arguing that once “ violence becomes a means to address disputes , it is hard to stop , and demands for autonomy quickly escalate toward claims for independence , ” likening the current situation to the early days of fragmentation in Tito ’ s Yugoslavia and offering recommendations for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tigray ’ s War Against Ethiopia Isn ’ t About Autonomy .
It ’ s About Economic Power .
When conflict broke out in Tigray on the eve of the U.S. presidential election , many outside observers assumed it was a battle over autonomy between the country ’ s ousted old regime and Abiy ’ s new government .
Kassahun Melesse argued that , in fact , the TPLF ’ s goals had much more to do with maintaining control of the economy .
“ [ W ] hat ’ s at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s economic and political reforms and the unrelenting pace at which they were unveiled—moves that TPLF leaders perceive as unacceptably threatening to the economic and political dominance they have long enjoyed and the considerable influence they still wield across Ethiopia , ” he wrote .
4 .
Ethiopia ’ s Government and the TPLF Leadership Are Not Morally Equivalent In late November , Ethiopia ’ s most recent former prime minister , Hailemariam Desalegn , took to these pages to criticize some of his former colleagues in government from the once dominant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as “ nothing more than a criminal enterprise ” while taking the international community to task for “ the assumption of moral equivalence ” between the two sides .
Equating the TPLF and the Ethiopian government would , he wrote , lead “ foreign governments to adopt an attitude of false balance and bothsidesism .
Facts and details regarding the true nature of conflicts and the forces igniting and driving them are frequently lost in international efforts to broker peace deals that often crumble as soon as they have been signed.
” 5 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fight Over Ethiopia ’ s Past—and Future The war in Tigray is merely the latest battle in a long-running conflict over history and memory , Teferi Mergo argued this month .
“ By and large , the Tigray war is part of the same debate that has plagued Ethiopia since its foundation as an empire state : whether Ethiopia is an exceptional country that ought to be governed in a more centralized manner or one that needs to be ruled as a decentralized polity , ” he wrote .
And in order to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the incoming U.S. administration must eschew short-term thinking and instead “ use this historical opening to rebalance its foreign policy toward the country , with the view of serving as an impartial arbiter of the conflicts between the two sides .
”

In December 2019, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was in Oslo receiving the Nobel Peace Prize; less than a year later, he was commanding Ethiopian troops in battle against the country’s former dominant party—the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
In December 2019, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was in Oslo receiving the Nobel Peace Prize; less than a year later, he was commanding Ethiopian troops in battle against the country’s former dominant party—the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). 2020 The Year In Review logo Shepherding an ethnically diverse country with a federalist system through a transition to democracy was always a daunting task. But as a spate of political assassinations and growing demands from ethnonationalist groups gave way to open conflict in the northern Tigray region in November, Ethiopia’s future is looking increasingly bleak, with some analysts warning that there is a risk of Yugoslav-style disintegration. Foreign Policy has followed the country closely in recent years, featuring the views of Ethiopian writers and regional experts from a range of perspectives. Here are five of Foreign Policy’s key stories on Ethiopia from 2020.
by Ayenat Mersie, Sept. 22
The war in Tigray has received most of the attention this year—but there is another taking place in cyberspace, as Ayenat Mersie argued in September. As fraught negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile threatened to lead to conflict with downstream countries like Sudan and Egypt, the online war took off—posing concrete problems for traditional diplomacy. “[S]urging nationalist sentiment means that it’s harder for officials to agree to, and for the public to accept, compromise,” Mersie wrote. “[M]uch of the online rhetoric remains maximalist, even rejecting items that have already been unanimously decided … raising the possibility that the online tensions and attacks may not subside anytime soon.”
by Florian Bieber and Wondemagegn Tadesse Goshu, Nov. 18
In January 2019, Florian Bieber and Wondemagegn Tadesse Goshu wrote presciently that Ethiopia could become the next Yugoslavia. In November, as war raged in Tigray, they revisited the issue, arguing that once “violence becomes a means to address disputes, it is hard to stop, and demands for autonomy quickly escalate toward claims for independence,” likening the current situation to the early days of fragmentation in Tito’s Yugoslavia and offering recommendations for a constitutional way out.
Ethiopian soldiers and thousands of mourners attend the official state funeral of Ethiopia's late prime minister, Meles Zenawi
by Kassahun Melesse, Nov. 19
When conflict broke out in Tigray on the eve of the U.S. presidential election, many outside observers assumed it was a battle over autonomy between the country’s ousted old regime and Abiy’s new government. Kassahun Melesse argued that, in fact, the TPLF’s goals had much more to do with maintaining control of the economy. “[W]hat’s at the heart of the ongoing conflict are Abiy’s economic and political reforms and the unrelenting pace at which they were unveiled—moves that TPLF leaders perceive as unacceptably threatening to the economic and political dominance they have long enjoyed and the considerable influence they still wield across Ethiopia,” he wrote.
by Hailemariam Desalegn, Nov. 24
In late November, Ethiopia’s most recent former prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, took to these pages to criticize some of his former colleagues in government from the once dominant TPLF—referring to the group’s leadership as “nothing more than a criminal enterprise” while taking the international community to task for “the assumption of moral equivalence” between the two sides. Equating the TPLF and the Ethiopian government would, he wrote, lead “foreign governments to adopt an attitude of false balance and bothsidesism. Facts and details regarding the true nature of conflicts and the forces igniting and driving them are frequently lost in international efforts to broker peace deals that often crumble as soon as they have been signed.”
by Teferi Mergo, Dec. 18
The war in Tigray is merely the latest battle in a long-running conflict over history and memory, Teferi Mergo argued this month. “By and large, the Tigray war is part of the same debate that has plagued Ethiopia since its foundation as an empire state: whether Ethiopia is an exceptional country that ought to be governed in a more centralized manner or one that needs to be ruled as a decentralized polity,” he wrote. And in order to resolve the conflict, Mergo insisted, the incoming U.S. administration must eschew short-term thinking and instead “use this historical opening to rebalance its foreign policy toward the country, with the view of serving as an impartial arbiter of the conflicts between the two sides.”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-31--Boris Johnson’s Year From Hell

Boris Johnson’s Year From Hell

After spending more than four years debating Brexit , on Dec. 30 the British Parliament spent only about four hours discussing Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s last-minute trade deal with the European Union before approving it by a 521-73 margin .
Reached on Dec. 24 , only days before the year-end deadline , the agreement will allow Britain to formally end the so-called transition period and leave the EU for good .
The vote passed easily in the House of Commons , given the opposition Labour Party ’ s support , and sailed through the House of Lords , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dec. 31 .
It comes as the country is reeling from a new strain of the coronavirus that has pushed infections higher than ever and hospitalization numbers beyond the April peak of COVID-19 ’ s first wave .
Johnson famously pledged to “ get Brexit done ” —and has now delivered on that promise .
Unfortunately , the public health crisis that engulfed the country while his government was busy trying to “ take back control ” from the EU is far from over , and Britain ’ s coronavirus curve now seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Here are five of Foreign Policy ’ s top stories on British politics from 2020 .
In May , a quarantine violation by Johnson ’ s advisor Dominic Cummings blew up into a national scandal .
FP ’ s James Palmer explained how Cummings ’ s cross-country drive while exhibiting coronavirus symptoms and a later lockdown jaunt to a local castle turned him into a pariah for blatantly breaking the rules while tens of millions of Britons suffered in order to obey them .
The scandal also confirmed that “ Johnson finds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being held accountable abhorrent.
” 2 .
Brexit Is a Distraction From the United Kingdom ’ s Real Economic Woes In September , before COVID-19 came roaring back , Tej Parikh argued that the U.K. government had a rare opportunity to reset the economy .
“ Successive governments have discussed ad nauseam the need to capitalize on the United Kingdom ’ s economic strengths and to invest where it is weak .
But it never happens , ” Parikh wrote .
With uncertainty still hanging over London ’ s lucrative financial sector and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the need to rewire the economy for the long haul remains .
3 .
Deal or No Deal Is No Longer the Point As Britain was still toying with the idea of crashing out of the EU without a deal earlier this year and talking tough in negotiations , Joseph de Weck argued that Brexit would be a blow to the British economy whether or not there was a deal—for the simple reason that any deal “ still leaves British firms ’ at a significant competitive disadvantage in the EU ’ s 448-million-person @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 4 .
Why a Biden Win Is Bad News for Boris Johnson In the wake of the U.S. presidential election , Nick Cohen argued that Johnson had aligned himself too closely with Donald Trump ’ s far-right nationalist vision and will be in for a rude awakening once Joe Biden takes office in January .
“ The British prime minister now looks like yesterday ’ s man , ” Cohen wrote .
“ The spirit of the age has left him behind , and he seems a relic of a discredited past.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Johnson ’ s miserable Christmas and how his slow reactions and ongoing indecisiveness had doomed Britain to a far higher death toll than countries that reacted swiftly to rising caseloads—both in March and now in early winter .
“ A ‘ great year for Britain , ’ in Johnson ’ s cocky words in January , has turned into an unprecedented disaster , ” she wrote .

After spending more than four years debating Brexit, on Dec. 30 the British Parliament spent only about four hours discussing Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s last-minute trade deal with the European Union before approving it by a 521-73 margin . Reached on Dec. 24, only days before the year-end deadline, the agreement will allow Britain to formally end the so-called transition period and leave the EU for good. The vote passed easily in the House of Commons, given the opposition Labour Party’s support, and sailed through the House of Lords, receiving royal assent at 12:25 a.m. on Dec. 31. It comes as the country is reeling from a new strain of the coronavirus that has pushed infections higher than ever and hospitalization numbers beyond the April peak of COVID-19’s first wave.
After spending more than four years debating Brexit, on Dec. 30 the British Parliament spent only about four hours discussing Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s last-minute trade deal with the European Union before approving it by a 521-73 margin. Reached on Dec. 24, only days before the year-end deadline, the agreement will allow Britain to formally end the so-called transition period and leave the EU for good. The vote passed easily in the House of Commons, given the opposition Labour Party’s support, and sailed through the House of Lords, receiving royal assent at 12:25 a.m. on Dec. 31. It comes as the country is reeling from a new strain of the coronavirus that has pushed infections higher than ever and hospitalization numbers beyond the April peak of COVID-19’s first wave.
Johnson famously pledged to “get Brexit done”—and has now delivered on that promise. Unfortunately, the public health crisis that engulfed the country while his government was busy trying to “take back control” from the EU is far from over, and Britain’s coronavirus curve now seems to be on an uncontrolled upward trajectory.
Here are five of Foreign Policy’s top stories on British politics from 2020.
by James Palmer, May 26
In May, a quarantine violation by Johnson’s advisor Dominic Cummings blew up into a national scandal. FP’s James Palmer explained how Cummings’s cross-country drive while exhibiting coronavirus symptoms and a later lockdown jaunt to a local castle turned him into a pariah for blatantly breaking the rules while tens of millions of Britons suffered in order to obey them. The scandal also confirmed that “Johnson finds the idea of any of his friends being held accountable abhorrent.”
by Tej Parikh, Sept. 18
In September, before COVID-19 came roaring back, Tej Parikh argued that the U.K. government had a rare opportunity to reset the economy. “Successive governments have discussed ad nauseam the need to capitalize on the United Kingdom’s economic strengths and to invest where it is weak. But it never happens,” Parikh wrote. With uncertainty still hanging over London’s lucrative financial sector and its future in a post-Brexit world, the need to rewire the economy for the long haul remains.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson wears a protective face covering as he arrives at the BBC in central London on Oct. 4.
by Joseph de Weck, Oct. 14
As Britain was still toying with the idea of crashing out of the EU without a deal earlier this year and talking tough in negotiations, Joseph de Weck argued that Brexit would be a blow to the British economy whether or not there was a deal—for the simple reason that any deal “still leaves British firms’ at a significant competitive disadvantage in the EU’s 448-million-person market compared with their EU rivals.”
by Nick Cohen, Nov. 5
In the wake of the U.S. presidential election, Nick Cohen argued that Johnson had aligned himself too closely with Donald Trump’s far-right nationalist vision and will be in for a rude awakening once Joe Biden takes office in January. “The British prime minister now looks like yesterday’s man,” Cohen wrote. “The spirit of the age has left him behind, and he seems a relic of a discredited past.”
by Harriet Williamson, Dec. 22
Last week, Harriet Williamson reflected on Johnson’s miserable Christmas and how his slow reactions and ongoing indecisiveness had doomed Britain to a far higher death toll than countries that reacted swiftly to rising caseloads—both in March and now in early winter. “A ‘great year for Britain,’ in Johnson’s cocky words in January, has turned into an unprecedented disaster,” she wrote.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-31--Macron Wants a French Empire Built on Language

In 2018 Macron , newly elected as France ’ s president , announced plans to restore the château and turn it into an international center for the French language .
The French government has set aside 210 million euros for the project , with the château due to reopen in 2022 .
Work toward this goal has continued through 2020 , and archaeological excavations , cleaning , and decontamination operations are now said to be well under way .
Progress on the restoration has been one of the few bright spots in what should have been a year of celebration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ internationale de la Francophonie , the institution representing French on the global stage , marked its 50th anniversary this year , and an elaborate , year-long program of festivities was due to climax this month with a summit of the OIF ’ s 88 member states in Tunisia .
Owing to the pandemic , many of these plans were either shelved or scaled down and moved online ; the organization ’ s biennial summit has now been moved to next year .
Amid the disruption , Macron has pushed ahead with ambitious plans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and “ rebrand ” Francophonie—a word used to denote both the community of French-speaking nations and the operation to spread and maintain French throughout the world—as an engine of diversity and creativity .
But critics are not convinced Francophonie can shed the baggage of its colonial history , and the chaos of the OIF ’ s anniversary has exposed tensions at the heart of the project to invest the French language ’ s global mission with fresh purpose .
But if Europe is to have one voice on the world stage , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to speak on its behalf ?
France ’ s economy remains smaller than that of Germany , the de facto leader of post-Cold War Europe , as does , for now , its population ( though if current growth trends hold France will become the largest country in Europe within the next few decades ) .
Macron ’ s case for French leadership of Europe—and European polarity in global affairs—is intimately bound to one resource with which France enjoys a clear advantage over Germany : language .
French is the world ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about 300 million speakers ( a figure that includes both native and daily , fluent speakers ) , and its future looks bright .
Almost half of the world ’ s French-speaking population lives in Africa , comfortably the fastest-growing continent ; the OIF estimates that French speakers could number anywhere between 477 and 747 million by 2070 .
Africa has been at the heart of France ’ s linguistic dreams since the early days of colonialism , which is really another way of saying that Africa has been at heart of France @ @ @ @ @ @ @ days of French language policy .
The term “ francophonie ” was coined by geographer Onésime Reclus at the end of the 19th century , as the European powers ’ scramble for Africa was getting under way .
Writing in the years following France ’ s humiliation at the hands of the Prussians in the war of 1870-1871 , Reclus was chiefly concerned with restoring France ’ s prestige in the face of an ascendant Germany .
The goal , as Reclus and subsequent generations of French leaders saw it , was not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of overseas territory , but to ensure the longevity of the French nation through the colonial propagation of language .
This was a racist program premised on France ’ s mission civilisatrice and the historical mythology of the country ’ s special linguistic genius , according to which French was a language of both unique clarity ( “ What is not clear is not French , ” 18th-century writer Antoine de Rivarol once declared ) and revolutionary potential , the language of human rights and cultural universalism .
“ As soon as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , all the racial elements of that people subordinate themselves to that language , ” Reclus wrote .
This was a common view among French intellectuals of the time .
Economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu argued in 1874 that “ it is by its language that a people puts its stamp on a land and a race.
” Language was not just indispensable to French colonialism ; in many senses it was French colonialism .
By the power of its conjugations France hoped to cement a global hegemony that would render competition on the continent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how things worked out , but echoes of this dream survive among the French establishment today .
Africa remains essential to French attempts to engineer a global order more favorable to its own interests , and language is at the heart of this drive .
In a speech delivered at Burkina Faso ’ s University of Ouagadougou in 2017 , Macron invited Congolese-French writer Alain Mabanckou to lead a special project to examine ways to mobilize French as a motor of “ African creativity.
” After thinking the proposal over for a few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Le Nouvel Observateur that made specific mention of Reclus and Francophonie ’ s origins in the imperial adventurism of the Third Republic .
“ What has changed since then ?
” he wrote .
“ Unfortunately , Francophonie is still seen as the continuation of France ’ s foreign policy in its former colonies.
” Yet despite these emancipatory origins , Francophonie remains saddled with the perception articulated by Mabanckou .
Fifty years after the foundation of the OIF , much of the French-speaking world still sees Francophonie as a vehicle for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of French neocolonial meddling in Africa whose main characteristics are corruption , patronage , and a studied indifference to any deviations from the democratic ideal .
In his many speeches on the subject , Macron has worked hard to dispel the suspicion that his “ new ” Francophonie will perpetuate the clientelist patterns of the past .
Whereas in recent decades the OIF has taken on a relatively broad mandate , promoting economic development , human rights , and democracy ( often imperfectly , as critics such as Mabanckou have noted ) in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Macron wants to steer Francophonie back to its original vocation .
French , in his view , should be “ a language of the universal , of translation , of authors , of exchange , ” as he put it at the last summit of the OIF in 2018 .
In contrast to English , the “ language of consumption , ” Macron wants French to be a “ language of creation , ” and while recognizing the violence that was often done in France ’ s name throughout its former empire , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rallying point for linguistic pluralism , as a mechanism that strengthens less popular languages—especially the local idioms of Africa—by exposing their cultural goods , in translation , to the Francophone market .
These are speeches dense with both ideas and contradictions .
Macron claims Francophonie has outgrown France and now belongs to all the nations of the French-speaking community together : The “ epicenter ” of French , he said in 2018 , “ is neither on the left or the right of the Seine , but without doubt somewhere in the basin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and political leadership of the project is still very much a French affair .
Macron rejects the premise that the success of French must come at the expense of other languages , but he is sharply critical of the hegemony of English .
He ’ s an advocate of linguistic pluralism , but repeatedly presents Francophonie as a project of “ conquest ” or “ reconquest.
” Macron is particularly enamored of the old idea that French is the language of “ universality.
” Ignoring its historical association with colonialism , he puts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , sheltering it within a forest of allusions to the work of authors not born in France who wrote in French , such as Eugène Ionesco and Milan Kundera—the equivalent of an English-speaking politician proclaiming the vitality of English by reference to the work of Joseph Conrad or Vladimir Nabokov .
But in his attempt to maintain balance on this rhetorical high wire—to condemn Francophonie ’ s legacy of colonialism while pushing French toward an idiomatic “ reconquest ” of the globe ; to disavow competition between languages even as he advances a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local linguistic rivals ; to promote pluralism and French primacy at the same time ; and to recenter the fiction that French is a language of universal rights rather than , say , slavery , absolutism , and Vichy collaboration , which is a working alternative description—Macron may simply end up confusing everyone , himself included .
Nothing captures the enduring centrality of France to Francophonie better than Macron ’ s choice of Villers-Cotterêts , a powerful symbol of French monarchic power , to ornament his planned linguistic renaissance .
It was there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signed the ordinance mandating French , rather than Latin , as the official language of government , thus setting in train a process of linguistic centralization and homogenization that contributed , over several centuries , to the decline of France ’ s regional tongues .
This lust for uniformity eventually carried over into the colonial project ; as linguist Louis-Jean Calvet has shown , French colonialism in Africa and the Caribbean led to “ glottophagie , ” or the imposition of French to the detriment of native languages .
French language policy has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its hegemonic and destructive history .
This makes the town ’ s royal château perhaps an odd place for Macron to launch his bid for Francophonie to be considered the new global face of linguistic pluralism .
Relatively marginal to the elaboration of these plans has been the OIF itself , an absence perhaps reflecting recent instability within the organization .
Two years ago , France , the OIF ’ s largest funder , forced Canadian Michaëlle Jean out as secretary-general , securing the support of the institution ’ s 54 voting members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rwanda ’ s former foreign affairs minister—a change Macron heralded as a boost for African engagement in Francophonie .
But Mushikiwabo ’ s elevation was not without controversy , given Rwanda ’ s poor human-rights record under President Paul Kagame and what one former French minister described as the Kagame administration ’ s “ hostility ” to the French language : Rwanda , a former Belgian colony , replaced French with English as the primary language of school instruction in 2008 , and joined the Commonwealth a year later , despite having no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Announcing Mushikiwabo ’ s candidacy for the position of OIF secretary-general at a joint press conference with Macron in 2018 , Kagame spoke in English .
Once in the job , Mushikiwabo wasted no time clearing the OIF of officials appointed under her predecessor , but bitter , high-profile departures have been a continuing feature of her reign .
In October the OIF ’ s administrator and second-in-command , Canadian Catherine Cano , quit suddenly amid rumors of persistent disagreement at the top of the organization ; an OIF spokesperson told reporters Cano @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work with , which did not endear Mushikiwabo to Canada , still sore over the sidelining of former secretary-general Jean .
At a moment when Macron needs the OIF to lend institutional legitimacy to his big rebrand of Francophonie , tensions have now emerged with the organization ’ s second biggest financial contributor .
These tensions don ’ t help Macron ’ s cause , but they are unlikely to throw him off course .
A guiding historical thread of French language policy is paranoia .
For centuries , even as French expanded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have imagined their language to be under threat , with dangers to the Republic often taking the form of other languages .
In 1794 Bertrand Barère declared before France ’ s revolutionary Convention that “ federalism and superstition speak Low Breton , emigration and hatred of the Republic speak German , counter-revolution speaks Italian , and fanaticism speaks Basque.
” Something of that old linguistic siege mentality survives today , as Mabanckou noted in his acid rejection of Macron : “ Rethinking Francophonie is not only about protecting the French language , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threatened as is often declared in a typically French spirit of self-flagellation.
” French , in all likelihood , will continue to grow over the decades ahead , regardless of the institutional shuffling committed in its name .
The challenge Macron has set for himself is to build French into a passable Trojan horse for France ’ s global ambitions , disguising a politics of national grandeur in the feel-good language of cultural connectivity and inclusiveness .
So far , the results are not convincing .

Fifty miles northeast of Paris sits a ruined château that Emmanuel Macron hopes can catalyze an era of fresh glory for France. Built over the course of the 16th century, the Château de Villers-Cotterêts served two centuries of French kings before gradually falling into disrepair. During the 19th century it was repurposed as a dépôt de mendicité, a hybrid hospice-prison for the destitute, while in more recent decades it became a retirement home. The last residents left in 2014, after which the building was abandoned in a state of damp decay.
Fifty miles northeast of Paris sits a ruined château that Emmanuel Macron hopes can catalyze an era of fresh glory for France. Built over the course of the 16th century, the Château de Villers-Cotterêts served two centuries of French kings before gradually falling into disrepair. During the 19th century it was repurposed as a dépôt de mendicité, a hybrid hospice-prison for the destitute, while in more recent decades it became a retirement home. The last residents left in 2014, after which the building was abandoned in a state of damp decay.
In 2018 Macron, newly elected as France’s president, announced plans to restore the château and turn it into an international center for the French language. The French government has set aside 210 million euros for the project, with the château due to reopen in 2022. Work toward this goal has continued through 2020, and archaeological excavations, cleaning, and decontamination operations are now said to be well under way.
Progress on the restoration has been one of the few bright spots in what should have been a year of celebration for the French language. The Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, the institution representing French on the global stage, marked its 50th anniversary this year, and an elaborate, year-long program of festivities was due to climax this month with a summit of the OIF’s 88 member states in Tunisia. Owing to the pandemic, many of these plans were either shelved or scaled down and moved online; the organization’s biennial summit has now been moved to next year.
Amid the disruption, Macron has pushed ahead with ambitious plans to boost the international standing of French and “rebrand” Francophonie—a word used to denote both the community of French-speaking nations and the operation to spread and maintain French throughout the world—as an engine of diversity and creativity. But critics are not convinced Francophonie can shed the baggage of its colonial history, and the chaos of the OIF’s anniversary has exposed tensions at the heart of the project to invest the French language’s global mission with fresh purpose.
With the United Kingdom defenestrating and Germany in stasis, Macron has not been shy about affirming France’s ambition to lead the European Union. In November Macron gave an interview to French foreign affairs journal Le Grand Continent in which he set out a foreign-policy doctrine based on two fundamental principles: a reinvigorated multilateralism, centered on new poles of power, institutions, and forms of cooperation (“The U.N. Security Council no longer produces useful solutions today”); and a strengthened, political Europe that can offer a third way to countries not satisfied with the current menu of great-power options. “We cannot accept to live in a bipolar world made up of the United States and China,” Macron told students at the University of Vilnius in Lithuania in September. The subtext of these remarks is clear: France will be the leader of Europe’s push for a multipolar global order.
But if Europe is to have one voice on the world stage, as Macron hopes, what claim does France have to speak on its behalf? France’s economy remains smaller than that of Germany, the de facto leader of post-Cold War Europe, as does, for now, its population (though if current growth trends hold France will become the largest country in Europe within the next few decades). Macron’s case for French leadership of Europe—and European polarity in global affairs—is intimately bound to one resource with which France enjoys a clear advantage over Germany: language.
French is the world’s fifth most popular language, with about 300 million speakers (a figure that includes both native and daily, fluent speakers), and its future looks bright. Almost half of the world’s French-speaking population lives in Africa, comfortably the fastest-growing continent; the OIF estimates that French speakers could number anywhere between 477 and 747 million by 2070.
Africa has been at the heart of France’s linguistic dreams since the early days of colonialism, which is really another way of saying that Africa has been at heart of France’s colonial dreams since the early days of French language policy. The term “francophonie” was coined by geographer Onésime Reclus at the end of the 19th century, as the European powers’ scramble for Africa was getting under way. Writing in the years following France’s humiliation at the hands of the Prussians in the war of 1870-1871, Reclus was chiefly concerned with restoring France’s prestige in the face of an ascendant Germany. The goal, as Reclus and subsequent generations of French leaders saw it, was not only to expand France’s control of overseas territory, but to ensure the longevity of the French nation through the colonial propagation of language.
This was a racist program premised on France’s mission civilisatrice and the historical mythology of the country’s special linguistic genius, according to which French was a language of both unique clarity (“What is not clear is not French,” 18th-century writer Antoine de Rivarol once declared) and revolutionary potential, the language of human rights and cultural universalism. “As soon as a language has ‘coagulated’ a people, all the racial elements of that people subordinate themselves to that language,” Reclus wrote. This was a common view among French intellectuals of the time. Economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu argued in 1874 that “it is by its language that a people puts its stamp on a land and a race.” Language was not just indispensable to French colonialism; in many senses it was French colonialism. By the power of its conjugations France hoped to cement a global hegemony that would render competition on the continent irrelevant.
That’s not exactly how things worked out, but echoes of this dream survive among the French establishment today. Africa remains essential to French attempts to engineer a global order more favorable to its own interests, and language is at the heart of this drive. In a speech delivered at Burkina Faso’s University of Ouagadougou in 2017, Macron invited Congolese-French writer Alain Mabanckou to lead a special project to examine ways to mobilize French as a motor of “African creativity.” After thinking the proposal over for a few months, Mabanckou delivered a withering reply in Le Nouvel Observateur that made specific mention of Reclus and Francophonie’s origins in the imperial adventurism of the Third Republic. “What has changed since then?” he wrote. “Unfortunately, Francophonie is still seen as the continuation of France’s foreign policy in its former colonies.”
This is not the future that the creators of institutional Francophonie—including those from France’s former colonies—had hoped for. African leaders of the decolonization era were instrumental in the establishment of the OIF, despite the opposition of Charles de Gaulle, who wished to prevent France’s overseas dominions from becoming fully independent. For leaders such as Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba, Niger’s Hamani Diori, and Senegal’s Léopold Sédar Senghor, institutionalizing Francophonie through the OIF, whose constitution was formally sealed in 1970, offered a mechanism for their fledgling nations to gain an equal footing with more developed powers. Membership of a larger body, the thinking went, would allow the former colonies to aggregate their influence on the world stage, across politics, business, and culture. Senghor, the most influential of these advocates, initially saw Francophonie as a vehicle to introduce African literature into French universities; subscribing wholeheartedly to the myth of French as a language of science, analysis, and humanism, he felt that Francophonie would become a vehicle of mutual exchange between France and its former colonies, that the two could “colonize each other reciprocally,” as he wrote in 1962.
Yet despite these emancipatory origins, Francophonie remains saddled with the perception articulated by Mabanckou. Fifty years after the foundation of the OIF, much of the French-speaking world still sees Francophonie as a vehicle for “Françafrique,” the peculiar brand of French neocolonial meddling in Africa whose main characteristics are corruption, patronage, and a studied indifference to any deviations from the democratic ideal.
In his many speeches on the subject, Macron has worked hard to dispel the suspicion that his “new” Francophonie will perpetuate the clientelist patterns of the past. Whereas in recent decades the OIF has taken on a relatively broad mandate, promoting economic development, human rights, and democracy (often imperfectly, as critics such as Mabanckou have noted) in the manner of a mini-United Nations, Macron wants to steer Francophonie back to its original vocation. French, in his view, should be “a language of the universal, of translation, of authors, of exchange,” as he put it at the last summit of the OIF in 2018. In contrast to English, the “language of consumption,” Macron wants French to be a “language of creation,” and while recognizing the violence that was often done in France’s name throughout its former empire, he believes French can serve as a rallying point for linguistic pluralism, as a mechanism that strengthens less popular languages—especially the local idioms of Africa—by exposing their cultural goods, in translation, to the Francophone market.
These are speeches dense with both ideas and contradictions. Macron claims Francophonie has outgrown France and now belongs to all the nations of the French-speaking community together: The “epicenter” of French, he said in 2018, “is neither on the left or the right of the Seine, but without doubt somewhere in the basin of the Congo River.” But intellectual and political leadership of the project is still very much a French affair. Macron rejects the premise that the success of French must come at the expense of other languages, but he is sharply critical of the hegemony of English. He’s an advocate of linguistic pluralism, but repeatedly presents Francophonie as a project of “conquest” or “reconquest.”
Macron is particularly enamored of the old idea that French is the language of “universality.” Ignoring its historical association with colonialism, he puts this cliche to work over and over, sheltering it within a forest of allusions to the work of authors not born in France who wrote in French, such as Eugène Ionesco and Milan Kundera—the equivalent of an English-speaking politician proclaiming the vitality of English by reference to the work of Joseph Conrad or Vladimir Nabokov. But in his attempt to maintain balance on this rhetorical high wire—to condemn Francophonie’s legacy of colonialism while pushing French toward an idiomatic “reconquest” of the globe; to disavow competition between languages even as he advances a cause historically associated with the extinction of local linguistic rivals; to promote pluralism and French primacy at the same time; and to recenter the fiction that French is a language of universal rights rather than, say, slavery, absolutism, and Vichy collaboration, which is a working alternative description—Macron may simply end up confusing everyone, himself included.
Nothing captures the enduring centrality of France to Francophonie better than Macron’s choice of Villers-Cotterêts, a powerful symbol of French monarchic power, to ornament his planned linguistic renaissance. It was there that François I, in 1539, signed the ordinance mandating French, rather than Latin, as the official language of government, thus setting in train a process of linguistic centralization and homogenization that contributed, over several centuries, to the decline of France’s regional tongues. This lust for uniformity eventually carried over into the colonial project; as linguist Louis-Jean Calvet has shown, French colonialism in Africa and the Caribbean led to “glottophagie,” or the imposition of French to the detriment of native languages.
French language policy has always been zero-sum, and Villers-Cotterêts symbolizes its hegemonic and destructive history. This makes the town’s royal château perhaps an odd place for Macron to launch his bid for Francophonie to be considered the new global face of linguistic pluralism.
For now, policy action to give shape to Francophonie’s facelift remains modest: Apart from the restoration at Villers-Cotterêts, Macron has appointed a minister to represent the portfolio, announced plans for a dictionary of Francophonie, pledged to reinvest in the network of French schools abroad, and promised that African artifacts housed in French museums will be returned to their countries of origin.
Relatively marginal to the elaboration of these plans has been the OIF itself, an absence perhaps reflecting recent instability within the organization. Two years ago, France, the OIF’s largest funder, forced Canadian Michaëlle Jean out as secretary-general, securing the support of the institution’s 54 voting members to replace her with Louise Mushikiwabo, Rwanda’s former foreign affairs minister—a change Macron heralded as a boost for African engagement in Francophonie. But Mushikiwabo’s elevation was not without controversy, given Rwanda’s poor human-rights record under President Paul Kagame and what one former French minister described as the Kagame administration’s “hostility” to the French language: Rwanda, a former Belgian colony, replaced French with English as the primary language of school instruction in 2008, and joined the Commonwealth a year later, despite having no historical ties to the United Kingdom. Announcing Mushikiwabo’s candidacy for the position of OIF secretary-general at a joint press conference with Macron in 2018, Kagame spoke in English.
Once in the job, Mushikiwabo wasted no time clearing the OIF of officials appointed under her predecessor, but bitter, high-profile departures have been a continuing feature of her reign. In October the OIF’s administrator and second-in-command, Canadian Catherine Cano, quit suddenly amid rumors of persistent disagreement at the top of the organization; an OIF spokesperson told reporters Cano was “chaotic” and difficult to work with, which did not endear Mushikiwabo to Canada, still sore over the sidelining of former secretary-general Jean. At a moment when Macron needs the OIF to lend institutional legitimacy to his big rebrand of Francophonie, tensions have now emerged with the organization’s second biggest financial contributor.
These tensions don’t help Macron’s cause, but they are unlikely to throw him off course. A guiding historical thread of French language policy is paranoia. For centuries, even as French expanded in popularity, France’s leaders have imagined their language to be under threat, with dangers to the Republic often taking the form of other languages. In 1794 Bertrand Barère declared before France’s revolutionary Convention that “federalism and superstition speak Low Breton, emigration and hatred of the Republic speak German, counter-revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque.” Something of that old linguistic siege mentality survives today, as Mabanckou noted in his acid rejection of Macron: “Rethinking Francophonie is not only about protecting the French language, which in any event is not at all threatened as is often declared in a typically French spirit of self-flagellation.”
French, in all likelihood, will continue to grow over the decades ahead, regardless of the institutional shuffling committed in its name. The challenge Macron has set for himself is to build French into a passable Trojan horse for France’s global ambitions, disguising a politics of national grandeur in the feel-good language of cultural connectivity and inclusiveness. So far, the results are not convincing.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-31--What Merkel Really Thinks About China—and the World

What Merkel Really Thinks About China—and the World Last year , I asked a diplomat who had worked closely with Angela Merkel for many years to sum up the German leader ’ s views on China .
I was expecting to hear a list of concerns about the country ’ s authoritarian tilt under Xi Jinping , the plight of the Uighurs , and the role of the state in the Chinese economy .
Instead , the diplomat talked about Merkel ’ s admiration for China ’ s economic achievements and her appreciation of the role Beijing had played during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ago , when China bought the bonds of ailing eurozone member states and provided a market in which German firms could continue to thrive .
“ She has not forgotten this , ” I was told .
I was reminded of this conversation in recent weeks as news emerged that Merkel , now in her 16th and final year as chancellor , was pushing other EU member states to approve a major investment agreement with China .
The timing of the deal , after a year of escalating tensions between Europe and China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. President-elect Joe Biden , looks odd to say the least .
It is hard not to view it as a geopolitical gift to Beijing and slap in the face to an incoming Biden administration that has vowed to repair trans-Atlantic ties and work more closely with Europe on the strategic challenges posed by China .
But to those who have followed Merkel and her approach to China over the years , the rush to seal a deal with Beijing comes as no surprise .
Just a week before news from the investment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ draft law that—against the tide in Europe—could open the door for Huawei to play a role in Germany ’ s 5G network .
The law is the culmination of a two-year tussle in which Merkel doggedly resisted pressure from members of her own party , her Social Democrat coalition partners , German intelligence agencies , and key allies , including the United States , to keep Huawei out .
I have heard many theories about why a leader who has a reputation for moral integrity and who grew up under a repressive East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left by the Nazis continues to embrace China as a partner even as it locks up its Muslim minority in camps and builds a digital surveillance state that would shame the Stasi .
Most of them begin and end with the economic argument : that Germany and its biggest companies are simply too dependent on China for Berlin to risk alienating the Communist Party leadership in Beijing .
This is certainly a factor in Merkel ’ s thinking , as the German diplomat ’ s comments make clear .
For German carmakers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future .
This year alone , they have invested billions of euros in electric vehicle ventures in China .
Other German companies , such as the chemicals group BASF , are also doubling down on the vast Chinese market , ignoring talk of decoupling and betting on an economy that has bounced back faster and stronger than others from COVID-19 .
If you forced Germany ’ s biggest firms to choose between China and the United States right now , many would pick China , despite concerns about the hand of the Communist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic argument alone is insufficient to explain Merkel ’ s positioning on China .
There is also a geopolitical dimension that often gets lost in the discussion .
In a series of speeches over the past few years , Merkel has made clear that she sees Germany as highly vulnerable in a more hostile world of great-power competition .
The conclusion she draws from this is that Berlin can not afford to get on the wrong side of Beijing at a time when its weight , influence , and reach seem bound to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in early 2019 , Merkel plaintively described Germany ’ s prospects in this new geopolitical landscape as “ poor.
” A year later , in a speech at the American Academy in Berlin , she talked extensively about Europe ’ s geographic vulnerabilities .
“ If you look at what we Europeans have on our doorstep , it looks quite challenging , ” she said .
“ We have Russia and right after that China .
China and Russia are moving closer.
” The authoritarians to the east might not be a problem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States .
But Merkel has also come to the conclusion that Washington is no longer a reliable partner .
This is a theme that she touched on in a Munich beer tent speech back in 2017 , following the first in a series of disastrous NATO and G-7 summits with Donald Trump .
But the past years have only reinforced this view .
Trump did lose to Biden in November .
But the number that truly reverberated in Berlin , I am told , was not the 306 electoral votes that put Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ votes that Trump received .
Trump may soon be gone , but his followers are here to stay .
It is only a matter of time before someone else takes up his nativist battle cry .
Against this backdrop , the only responsible path forward , in Merkel ’ s view , is to hedge .
Finally , Merkel sees Germany as a mediating force in the escalating confrontation between the United States and China .
Her push to reengage with Beijing on the investment agreement , climate change , and other areas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that dialogue with the Chinese leadership still makes sense .
In her view , attempts to isolate and contain China can only lead to disaster .
In an increasingly black-and-white world where liberal democracies face an existential challenge from authoritarians and populists , Merkel still sees gray—and not only with China .
The bargain she brokered recently with democratic backsliders Hungary and Poland to avert a clash over the EU budget is another example .
George Soros accused her of surrendering to extortion .
Merkel ’ s approach to China no longer reflects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , where positions have hardened substantially over the past year .
Some 71 percent of Germans now have a negative view of China , according to a Pew Research Center survey published in October .
And Merkel can expect political pushback against her plans for the EU-China investment deal .
No one can predict where Germany will come down on China when she leaves the political stage next year .
Much will depend on who replaces her , the makeup of the next German government , and how Beijing and the Biden administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own legacy on China is already set in stone .
The history books may not be kind .

Last year, I asked a diplomat who had worked closely with Angela Merkel for many years to sum up the German leader’s views on China. I was expecting to hear a list of concerns about the country’s authoritarian tilt under Xi Jinping, the plight of the Uighurs, and the role of the state in the Chinese economy.
Last year, I asked a diplomat who had worked closely with Angela Merkel for many years to sum up the German leader’s views on China. I was expecting to hear a list of concerns about the country’s authoritarian tilt under Xi Jinping, the plight of the Uighurs, and the role of the state in the Chinese economy.
Instead, the diplomat talked about Merkel’s admiration for China’s economic achievements and her appreciation of the role Beijing had played during Europe’s financial crisis a decade ago, when China bought the bonds of ailing eurozone member states and provided a market in which German firms could continue to thrive. “She has not forgotten this,” I was told.
I was reminded of this conversation in recent weeks as news emerged that Merkel, now in her 16th and final year as chancellor, was pushing other EU member states to approve a major investment agreement with China.
The timing of the deal, after a year of escalating tensions between Europe and China and just weeks before the inauguration of U.S. President-elect Joe Biden, looks odd to say the least. It is hard not to view it as a geopolitical gift to Beijing and slap in the face to an incoming Biden administration that has vowed to repair trans-Atlantic ties and work more closely with Europe on the strategic challenges posed by China.
But to those who have followed Merkel and her approach to China over the years, the rush to seal a deal with Beijing comes as no surprise. Just a week before news from the investment talks broke, her cabinet approved a draft law that—against the tide in Europe—could open the door for Huawei to play a role in Germany’s 5G network. The law is the culmination of a two-year tussle in which Merkel doggedly resisted pressure from members of her own party, her Social Democrat coalition partners, German intelligence agencies, and key allies, including the United States, to keep Huawei out.
I have heard many theories about why a leader who has a reputation for moral integrity and who grew up under a repressive East German regime that rose from the devastation left by the Nazis continues to embrace China as a partner even as it locks up its Muslim minority in camps and builds a digital surveillance state that would shame the Stasi.
Most of them begin and end with the economic argument: that Germany and its biggest companies are simply too dependent on China for Berlin to risk alienating the Communist Party leadership in Beijing. This is certainly a factor in Merkel’s thinking, as the German diplomat’s comments make clear.
For German carmakers, China is both the present and the future. This year alone, they have invested billions of euros in electric vehicle ventures in China. Other German companies, such as the chemicals group BASF, are also doubling down on the vast Chinese market, ignoring talk of decoupling and betting on an economy that has bounced back faster and stronger than others from COVID-19. If you forced Germany’s biggest firms to choose between China and the United States right now, many would pick China, despite concerns about the hand of the Communist Party in the economy.
But the economic argument alone is insufficient to explain Merkel’s positioning on China. There is also a geopolitical dimension that often gets lost in the discussion.
In a series of speeches over the past few years, Merkel has made clear that she sees Germany as highly vulnerable in a more hostile world of great-power competition. The conclusion she draws from this is that Berlin cannot afford to get on the wrong side of Beijing at a time when its weight, influence, and reach seem bound to increase.
At the Munich Security Conference in early 2019, Merkel plaintively described Germany’s prospects in this new geopolitical landscape as “poor.” A year later, in a speech at the American Academy in Berlin, she talked extensively about Europe’s geographic vulnerabilities. “If you look at what we Europeans have on our doorstep, it looks quite challenging,” she said. “We have Russia and right after that China. China and Russia are moving closer.”
The authoritarians to the east might not be a problem if Europe could count on the United States. But Merkel has also come to the conclusion that Washington is no longer a reliable partner. This is a theme that she touched on in a Munich beer tent speech back in 2017, following the first in a series of disastrous NATO and G-7 summits with Donald Trump. But the past years have only reinforced this view.
Trump did lose to Biden in November. But the number that truly reverberated in Berlin, I am told, was not the 306 electoral votes that put Biden over the top but the 74.2 million votes that Trump received. Trump may soon be gone, but his followers are here to stay. It is only a matter of time before someone else takes up his nativist battle cry. Against this backdrop, the only responsible path forward, in Merkel’s view, is to hedge.
Finally, Merkel sees Germany as a mediating force in the escalating confrontation between the United States and China. Her push to reengage with Beijing on the investment agreement, climate change, and other areas this year was an attempt to show that dialogue with the Chinese leadership still makes sense. In her view, attempts to isolate and contain China can only lead to disaster.
In an increasingly black-and-white world where liberal democracies face an existential challenge from authoritarians and populists, Merkel still sees gray—and not only with China. The bargain she brokered recently with democratic backsliders Hungary and Poland to avert a clash over the EU budget is another example. George Soros accused her of surrendering to extortion.
Merkel’s approach to China no longer reflects the consensus in Germany or in Europe, where positions have hardened substantially over the past year. Some 71 percent of Germans now have a negative view of China, according to a Pew Research Center survey published in October. And Merkel can expect political pushback against her plans for the EU-China investment deal.
No one can predict where Germany will come down on China when she leaves the political stage next year. Much will depend on who replaces her, the makeup of the next German government, and how Beijing and the Biden administration position themselves. But Merkel’s own legacy on China is already set in stone. The history books may not be kind.