foreignpolicy--2020-05-04--Coronavirus Disproportionately Affects Health Workers. Here Are the Countries Most at Risk.

As coronavirus cases pass 3 million worldwide , it ’ s clear that the pandemic has disproportionately affected health workers .
A shortage of gloves , masks , and other personal protective equipment has meant that those caring for the very ill are increasingly becoming ill themselves .
In the United States , the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that around 19 percent of confirmed coronavirus cases have been health workers .
In the United Kingdom , one-third of National Health Service staff and key workers tested for the coronavirus have been confirmed positive .
There is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ill—and in some cases die—from COVID-19 , already stretched health care systems could suffer a shortage of trained medical personnel .
Looking at the top 20 countries with the most coronavirus cases ( as of 10 a.m. May 4 ) , that danger is more acute in some nations than others .
Germany and Switzerland , followed closely by Spain , Italy , and Russia , have the highest number of physicians per capita .
In a worrying sign for the United States and Canada , their number of physicians per capita is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than it is to some of its economic peers , such as Germany .
It ’ s no surprise that India , the poorest country in the top 20 , also has the lowest density of physicians .
When it comes to nursing personnel , the picture is especially grim for Spain and Italy—the countries with the second- and third-highest coronavirus death tolls , respectively .
The two countries have a relatively low number of nurses compared to other European Union countries , suggesting these front-line staff are particularly vulnerable to any reduction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do the most damage with older populations , the relative age of the medical workforce gains importance when defining how resilient each country will ultimately be .
Nine countries in the top 20 have a physician workforce where more than 30 percent are over the age of 55 , including the five of the top six worst-hit countries .
The numbers are especially worrying for Italy , the only country in the set where a majority of physicians are over 55 .
China doesn ’ t report figures for the age of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at 55 and male physicians at 60 .
Italy does not keep figures for its nursing population , so it ’ s not possible to see whether that trend carries over .
Of the countries that do keep figures and have been especially hit by the coronavirus , the United States has the oldest nursing population and is the only country to have more than 30 percent of their nurses over the age of 55 .
The American Association of Colleges of Nursing projects a nursing shortage in the United States not just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is aging out , but because the overall aging of the population will drive the need for more geriatric care .
This problem isn ’ t unique to the United States : The World Health Organization ( WHO ) has declared a global nursing shortage , especially for African and Southeast Asian countries .
Hospitals worldwide have been stretched by the pandemic .
In the United States , public parks , convention centers , and Navy hospital ships have been recruited to build extra capacity .
Looking at the number of beds available @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to rapidly expand the number of hospital beds comes into focus .
The United States has relatively few , with 2.9 beds per 1,000 residents .
Germany , which has had a relatively low death rate during the pandemic , also had the highest number of hospital beds available .
Countries have deployed a variety of ways to increase their health care capacity .
In the United Kingdom , more than half a million people have volunteered to assist the National Health Service , and 11,000 former medical staff have returned to service @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thousands of medical students have been fast–tracked into practice .
In March , New York Governor Andrew Cuomo appealed for medical workers to come out of retirement or the private sector to help with the state ’ s coronavirus battle , and 40,000 people signed up .
As more health workers get infected , countries have turned to an underexplored phenomenon : immunity .
In northern Italy , tests have begun on approximately 3,000 health workers to see whether they have the requisite antibodies that would suggest a resistance to the coronavirus .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ultimately develop a license for workers to prove they are safe to return to work .
“ Some say [ the tests ] will work , others say they won ’ t , ” Luca Zaia , the governor of the region involved in testing , said .
“ It all has to be proven but that ’ s how vaccines are made as well.
” However , the WHO has warned against such quick fixes , pointing out that even if a test shows coronavirus antibodies , the levels may be too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this point in the pandemic , there is not enough evidence about the effectiveness of antibody-mediated immunity to guarantee the accuracy of an ‘ immunity passport ’ or ‘ risk-free certificate , ’ ” the WHO wrote in an April 24 scientific brief .
As countries continue their struggle against the coronavirus pandemic , it ’ s only natural that they will pursue unproven methods if they think it will make a difference .
The most effective protective measure remains the simplest : making sure health professionals have the right equipment to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @

As coronavirus cases pass 3 million worldwide, it’s clear that the pandemic has disproportionately affected health workers. A shortage of gloves, masks, and other personal protective equipment has meant that those caring for the very ill are increasingly becoming ill themselves. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that around 19 percent of confirmed coronavirus cases have been health workers. In the United Kingdom, one-third of National Health Service staff and key workers tested for the coronavirus have been confirmed positive. There is a danger that as more health workers fall ill—and in some cases die—from COVID-19, already stretched health care systems could suffer a shortage of trained medical personnel. Looking at the top 20 countries with the most coronavirus cases (as of 10 a.m. May 4), that danger is more acute in some nations than others.
Germany and Switzerland, followed closely by Spain, Italy, and Russia, have the highest number of physicians per capita. In a worrying sign for the United States and Canada, their number of physicians per capita is closer to middle-income countries such as China than it is to some of its economic peers, such as Germany. It’s no surprise that India, the poorest country in the top 20, also has the lowest density of physicians.
When it comes to nursing personnel, the picture is especially grim for Spain and Italy—the countries with the second- and third-highest coronavirus death tolls, respectively. The two countries have a relatively low number of nurses compared to other European Union countries, suggesting these front-line staff are particularly vulnerable to any reduction in workforce.
As COVID-19 seems to do the most damage with older populations, the relative age of the medical workforce gains importance when defining how resilient each country will ultimately be. Nine countries in the top 20 have a physician workforce where more than 30 percent are over the age of 55, including the five of the top six worst-hit countries. The numbers are especially worrying for Italy, the only country in the set where a majority of physicians are over 55. China doesn’t report figures for the age of its physicians, although female physicians must retire at 55 and male physicians at 60.
Italy does not keep figures for its nursing population, so it’s not possible to see whether that trend carries over. Of the countries that do keep figures and have been especially hit by the coronavirus, the United States has the oldest nursing population and is the only country to have more than 30 percent of their nurses over the age of 55. The American Association of Colleges of Nursing projects a nursing shortage in the United States not just because a significant portion of its workforce is aging out, but because the overall aging of the population will drive the need for more geriatric care. This problem isn’t unique to the United States: The World Health Organization (WHO) has declared a global nursing shortage, especially for African and Southeast Asian countries.
Hospitals worldwide have been stretched by the pandemic. In the United States, public parks, convention centers, and Navy hospital ships have been recruited to build extra capacity. Looking at the number of beds available before the epidemic hit, the need to rapidly expand the number of hospital beds comes into focus. The United States has relatively few, with 2.9 beds per 1,000 residents. Germany, which has had a relatively low death rate during the pandemic, also had the highest number of hospital beds available.
Countries have deployed a variety of ways to increase their health care capacity. In the United Kingdom, more than half a million people have volunteered to assist the National Health Service, and 11,000 former medical staff have returned to service. In countries such as Italy, thousands of medical students have been fast–tracked into practice. In March, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo appealed for medical workers to come out of retirement or the private sector to help with the state’s coronavirus battle, and 40,000 people signed up.
As more health workers get infected, countries have turned to an underexplored phenomenon: immunity. In northern Italy, tests have begun on approximately 3,000 health workers to see whether they have the requisite antibodies that would suggest a resistance to the coronavirus. The aim of the tests is to ultimately develop a license for workers to prove they are safe to return to work. “Some say [the tests] will work, others say they won’t,” Luca Zaia, the governor of the region involved in testing, said. “It all has to be proven but that’s how vaccines are made as well.”
However, the WHO has warned against such quick fixes, pointing out that even if a test shows coronavirus antibodies, the levels may be too low to prevent reinfection. “At this point in the pandemic, there is not enough evidence about the effectiveness of antibody-mediated immunity to guarantee the accuracy of an ‘immunity passport’ or ‘risk-free certificate,’” the WHO wrote in an April 24 scientific brief.
As countries continue their struggle against the coronavirus pandemic, it’s only natural that they will pursue unproven methods if they think it will make a difference. The most effective protective measure remains the simplest: making sure health professionals have the right equipment to do their jobs in the first place.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-04--Indonesians Fear Democracy Is the Next Pandemic Victim

Indonesians Fear Democracy Is the Next Pandemic Victim Some 3 million Indonesian workers have been laid off since the coronavirus pandemic hit the country in early March , many of them migrants who have been left stranded and homeless in the capital city of Jakarta .
Meanwhile , the Indonesian government is busy waging a war against scientists , playing down the pandemic by claiming warmer temperatures will kill the virus .
As a result , Indonesia has opted for large-scale restrictions instead of lockdowns—leaving it with the worst number of cases in Southeast Asia after Singapore as of May @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 800 fatalities , including .
More than half of the fatalities have been in Jakarta , though elsewhere religious gatherings have helped spread the disease .
Mass Ramadan prayers continue to be performed despite health warnings .
While the country struggles to cope with the outbreak , the Indonesian government has other priorities : using the pandemic as an excuse to extend its own authority .
The government initially submitted a draft Omnibus Law on Job Creation to the House of Representatives , the lower house of the country ’ s parliament , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the draft Omnibus Law seen by Foreign Policy contained 11 discussion clusters ( sectors to be discussed , such as labor or the economy ) , with a total of 80 laws and 1,201 articles .
President Joko “ Jokowi ” Widodo told the BBC in February that he hoped to pass the law by mid-year .
The bill ’ s advocates say it aims to boost economic growth by simplifying 79 laws that are believed to hamper business .
According to his critics , however , the bill gives sweeping powers to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Article 170 , the bill gives authority to the central government to issue a regulation to change the provisions of the law that are not amended on the Omnibus Law in order to accelerate the implementation of vaguely defined “ national strategic policies.
” A proposed amendment to Article 251 of the Regional Government Law , meanwhile , would allow the president to revoke regional laws by decree .
The bill ’ s articles are in violation of the Indonesian Constitution , which states that the formation of laws is the authority of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government .
The 1945 constitution sets the parliament as the supreme authority , but the bill would effectively give the executive near-absolute power .
The president would have absolute executive and legislative power .
The bill is a stark contrast to the Regional Autonomy Act , passed in 2014 as a part of the reform agenda pushed by civil groups after more than three decades under the Suharto dictatorship .
During his administration , Suharto built a business empire involving his family and cronies in the Golkar Party , using centralized power to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across the more than 13,000 islands of the Indonesian archipelago and around the globe .
“ Our legal system has been messed up .
The power given to the executive [ by this bill ] is extraordinary , and small-scale businesses will not benefit , ” said Gita Putri Damayana , a researcher for the Indonesian Center for Law and Policy Studies .
She added that regional regulations should only be changed through a material test process in the Supreme Court , the highest judicial institution and the final court of appeal in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Omnibus Law Task Force assembled to help the government with the bill drew on only large-business owners such as the Employers ’ Association of Indonesia .
The lack of representation of small businesses suggests that the bill will benefit only elite investors .
Environmental activists are particularly skeptical of expanding the power of the executive .
Many disastrous megaprojects in Indonesia have been linked to tycoons close to Jokowi ’ s ministers , but environmental impact concerns have previously successfully halted some projects .
For instance , a PT Semen Indonesia cement factory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the concerns of local farmers and residents over the destruction of the water basin , and the controversial Benoa Bay reclamation project , backed by the notorious businessman Tomy Winata , was blocked over fears of soil erosion .
Nur Hidayati , the executive director of the Indonesian Forum for Environment , said the bill would only strengthen the executive and that it reduced the power of the environmental review process , which now applies only to high-risk projects .
“ But the central government gets to define what ‘ high risk ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hearings have also been abolished , and the whole process is now run online .
Ledia Hanifa Amaliah from the Prosperous Justice Party , part of the opposition , told Foreign Policy that her faction had expressed concern about the “ sweeping power issue.
” The party , as well as a leading labor union , has questioned the lack of public hearings for the bill .
Nining Elitos , the chairwoman of the Congress Alliance of Indonesian Labor Unions , noted that her group , which represents 130,000 members across Indonesia from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the bill strips labor of significant protections .
Despite the criticism , the government and parliament are still discussing the bill .
Last week , Jokowi decided to postpone hearings on the labor sections of the bill after hundreds of thousands of workers threatened to hold mass protests on April 30 .
“ This will provide us with the opportunity to explore substantial issues within the bill and also to accommodate input from stakeholders , ” he said .
However , the other 10 parts of the bill , including the economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A report from Kompas , the largest newspaper in the country , mentioned that the Golkar and Nasdem parties , which are part of the governing alliance , have been pushing to schedule time to discuss the bill .
Firman Subagyo , a Golkar politician and a member of the Omnibus Law ’ s working committee in the parliament , confirmed that his party has consistently pushed for the law as a matter of investment growth .
But he said Golkar would take into consideration withdrawing the controversial Article 170 .
“ None @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NGOs and labor unions ] would be able to intervene [ the process ] , ” he said confidently , implying that the party has the support of the other two dominant factions in the parliament , the NasDem and Gerindra parties .
As the process continues , unions have called for the government to cut the labor sections of the draft , promising a broader campaign if the bill isn ’ t altered .
Jumisih , the chairwoman of the Inter-Factory Workers ’ Federation , warned Jokowi last week that labor unions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As Indonesians across the country struggle to survive amid the pandemic , many of them have lost their jobs and face a bleak future of finding future placements to earn a living .
They need help from the government .
But once the pandemic ends , Indonesians ’ next struggle will be facing the endless desire of politicians and business elites to roll back the advances of democracy and return power to the center .

Some 3 million Indonesian workers have been laid off since the coronavirus pandemic hit the country in early March, many of them migrants who have been left stranded and homeless in the capital city of Jakarta. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government is busy waging a war against scientists , playing down the pandemic by claiming warmer temperatures will kill the virus .
Some 3 million Indonesian workers have been laid off since the coronavirus pandemic hit the country in early March, many of them migrants who have been left stranded and homeless in the capital city of Jakarta. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government is busy waging a war against scientists, playing down the pandemic by claiming warmer temperatures will kill the virus.
As a result, Indonesia has opted for large-scale restrictions instead of lockdowns—leaving it with the worst number of cases in Southeast Asia after Singapore as of May 1, with 10,551 confirmed cases and 800 fatalities, including 44 healthcare workers. More than half of the fatalities have been in Jakarta, though elsewhere religious gatherings have helped spread the disease. Mass Ramadan prayers continue to be performed despite health warnings.
While the country struggles to cope with the outbreak, the Indonesian government has other priorities: using the pandemic as an excuse to extend its own authority. The government initially submitted a draft Omnibus Law on Job Creation to the House of Representatives, the lower house of the country’s parliament, in February. A 1,028-page copy of the draft Omnibus Law seen by Foreign Policy contained 11 discussion clusters (sectors to be discussed, such as labor or the economy), with a total of 80 laws and 1,201 articles.
President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo told the BBC in February that he hoped to pass the law by mid-year. The bill’s advocates say it aims to boost economic growth by simplifying 79 laws that are believed to hamper business. According to his critics, however, the bill gives sweeping powers to the president—with no sunset clause.
In Article 170, the bill gives authority to the central government to issue a regulation to change the provisions of the law that are not amended on the Omnibus Law in order to accelerate the implementation of vaguely defined “national strategic policies.” A proposed amendment to Article 251 of the Regional Government Law, meanwhile, would allow the president to revoke regional laws by decree.
The bill’s articles are in violation of the Indonesian Constitution, which states that the formation of laws is the authority of the House of Representatives, not the government. The 1945 constitution sets the parliament as the supreme authority, but the bill would effectively give the executive near-absolute power. The president would have absolute executive and legislative power.
The bill is a stark contrast to the Regional Autonomy Act, passed in 2014 as a part of the reform agenda pushed by civil groups after more than three decades under the Suharto dictatorship. During his administration, Suharto built a business empire involving his family and cronies in the Golkar Party, using centralized power to enforce corruption. His family assets stretched across the more than 13,000 islands of the Indonesian archipelago and around the globe.
“Our legal system has been messed up. The power given to the executive [by this bill] is extraordinary, and small-scale businesses will not benefit,” said Gita Putri Damayana, a researcher for the Indonesian Center for Law and Policy Studies. She added that regional regulations should only be changed through a material test process in the Supreme Court, the highest judicial institution and the final court of appeal in Indonesia.
Damayana also noted that the Omnibus Law Task Force assembled to help the government with the bill drew on only large-business owners such as the Employers’ Association of Indonesia. The lack of representation of small businesses suggests that the bill will benefit only elite investors.
Environmental activists are particularly skeptical of expanding the power of the executive. Many disastrous megaprojects in Indonesia have been linked to tycoons close to Jokowi’s ministers, but environmental impact concerns have previously successfully halted some projects. For instance, a PT Semen Indonesia cement factory project in Central Java was halted by the concerns of local farmers and residents over the destruction of the water basin, and the controversial Benoa Bay reclamation project, backed by the notorious businessman Tomy Winata, was blocked over fears of soil erosion.
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Nur Hidayati, the executive director of the Indonesian Forum for Environment, said the bill would only strengthen the executive and that it reduced the power of the environmental review process, which now applies only to high-risk projects. “But the central government gets to define what ‘high risk’ is,” she noted.
Public hearings have also been abolished, and the whole process is now run online.
Ledia Hanifa Amaliah from the Prosperous Justice Party, part of the opposition, told Foreign Policy that her faction had expressed concern about the “sweeping power issue.” The party, as well as a leading labor union, has questioned the lack of public hearings for the bill.
Nining Elitos, the chairwoman of the Congress Alliance of Indonesian Labor Unions, noted that her group, which represents 130,000 members across Indonesia from industrial sectors, was not consulted and that the bill strips labor of significant protections.
Despite the criticism, the government and parliament are still discussing the bill. Last week, Jokowi decided to postpone hearings on the labor sections of the bill after hundreds of thousands of workers threatened to hold mass protests on April 30. “This will provide us with the opportunity to explore substantial issues within the bill and also to accommodate input from stakeholders,” he said.
However, the other 10 parts of the bill, including the economic portions, will still be discussed. A report from Kompas, the largest newspaper in the country, mentioned that the Golkar and Nasdem parties, which are part of the governing alliance, have been pushing to schedule time to discuss the bill.
Firman Subagyo, a Golkar politician and a member of the Omnibus Law’s working committee in the parliament, confirmed that his party has consistently pushed for the law as a matter of investment growth. But he said Golkar would take into consideration withdrawing the controversial Article 170.
“None of these communities who opposed us [NGOs and labor unions] would be able to intervene [the process],” he said confidently, implying that the party has the support of the other two dominant factions in the parliament, the NasDem and Gerindra parties.
As the process continues, unions have called for the government to cut the labor sections of the draft, promising a broader campaign if the bill isn’t altered. Jumisih, the chairwoman of the Inter-Factory Workers’ Federation, warned Jokowi last week that labor unions wanted the whole bill withdrawn or delayed.
As Indonesians across the country struggle to survive amid the pandemic, many of them have lost their jobs and face a bleak future of finding future placements to earn a living. They need help from the government. But once the pandemic ends, Indonesians’ next struggle will be facing the endless desire of politicians and business elites to roll back the advances of democracy and return power to the center.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-04--China Will Be Front and Center During the 2020 Election

China Will Be Front and Center During the 2020 Election The relationship between the United States and China is the most uncertain , most interesting , and most consequential bilateral relationship in international politics today—and likely to remain that way in the coming decades .
China ’ s growing economic weight and the continued absolute control over its politics by the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) make the role of China a unique dynamic in the world .
A new Pew poll released in April shows that Americans have increasingly negative views of China.A new Pew poll shows @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China—and their concerns go far beyond a single issue .
When Pew first started tracking U.S. attitudes to China , in 2005 , 43 percent saw China favorably and 35 percent unfavorably ; this year , the balance has changed to 66 percent having an unfavorable view versus only 26 percent with a favorable one .
While attitudes toward Chinese President Xi Jinping appear to have been particularly affected by the coronavirus pandemic , the poll also shows that concerns about China go far beyond a single issue .
More than 4 in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the following is a problem for the United States : the trade deficit with China , the loss of U.S. jobs to China , China ’ s growing military power , China ’ s environmental impact , cyberattacks from China , and China ’ s policies on human rights .
While there are some gaps between Republicans and Democrats overall and on specific issues ( Democrats are more concerned about China ’ s impact on the environment , for example , while Republicans more concerned about the trade deficit ) , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concern .
It is unusual that two-thirds of Americans agree on a political matter , and when they do , especially in an election year , politicians often find themselves competing to outdo one another in giving voice to popular opinion .
Candidates—not just for president , but for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate too—are going to talk about China a lot as the election season heats up this year .
The ways in which they do so , and whether they engage with the issue seriously or not , will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for U.S. influence in the world , as well as for the United States ’ capacity to manage its relationship with China and challenge China ’ s bad behavior .
There is no need for bombast : The facts about the Chinese regime ’ s actions are damning enough .
China ’ s government is a brutal authoritarian regime and a strategic competitor of the United States .
It is right for candidates to say as much , and to talk about the challenges that China poses , or could pose , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States and its allies .
Criticism of China is not ipso facto racist or “ China bashing.
” Responsible and reasonable arguments about China should follow some general principles .
First , it should be clear that the target of criticism and concern is the Chinese government and CCP leadership , not the people of China , and certainly not people of Chinese origin or descent.It should be clear that the target of criticism is the Chinese government and CCP leadership , not the people of China , and certainly not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Second , the criticism should be related to specific policies or behaviors of the Chinese regime—for example , its failure to provide accurate and timely public health data both at home and abroad , its forced imprisonment of more than 1 million Uighurs and members of other Muslim minorities in concentration camps in Xinjiang , its apparent adoption of Russian disinformation tactics , its creeping power grab in the South China Sea , its massive number of domestic and foreign political prisoners , its use of state-sponsored corporate espionage , and its engagement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when politicians identify such problematic behaviors , they should propose how the United States , working with allies when possible and appropriate , might best respond to them .
Candidates who propose policy responses are doing more than opportunistically exploiting popular concerns , they are appealing to use government action to address them .
Finally , they shouldn ’ t use implicitly or explicitly racist language in their critiques , and those who do should be called out .
Irresponsible rhetoric on China will fall back on and damage the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rhetoric can encourage the perpetrators of hate crimes against U.S. citizens and residents .
At the same time , it empowers the Chinese regime by reinforcing its propaganda that paints U.S. criticism of the CCP regime as just a cover for a supposed secret agenda to hold the Chinese people back .
Moreover , the more factual and specific U.S. politicians are about the challenges and threats posed by the Chinese regime , the more likely they are to build international support for managing those challenges and threats effectively .
Conversely , reckless @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies and partners more likely to see the U.S.-Chinese relationship as a confrontation that they ’ d just as soon stay out of .
The United States has an opportunity to maintain a moral high ground that will enhance its influence with its partners and give it an advantage as it seeks to manage a difficult but necessary bilateral relationship with the Chinese government in the coming years .
To be clear : This is not an argument to pull punches , but rather to land them squarely .
For those who believe—as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more about the Chinese government ’ s negligence and cover-up with respect to the coronavirus in the months to come , and that there will be new instances of aggressive behavior by the regime to confront in the years ahead , maintaining one ’ s credibility in holding the CCP to account is essential , as is the ability to rally others in the international community to do likewise .
The focus needs to be on substance , not tone : Louder and more offensive is not the same as tougher.The focus needs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Louder and more offensive is not the same as tougher .
The more outrageous and obnoxious actors—such as U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and ( when he isn ’ t fawning over Xi ’ s leadership ) President Donald Trump , play right into the Chinese regime ’ s hands while undermining U.S. credibility .
Fact-free or crude criticism of China aimed at distracting Americans from the failings of the Trump administration won ’ t do anything to address those failings and will exacerbate the challenges the United States faces going @ @ @ @ @ @ @ merit the prosecution of a sober , robust , facts-based critique .
Political stunts don ’ t advance that objective .
It is unsurprising that after a generation of U.S. dominance of a unipolar world following the Cold War , China ’ s rise provokes unease .
Even if China were a democratic , rights-respecting state , the erosion of U.S. hegemony would still constitute a significant change in the international political system and would induce anxiety in some quarters , as all changes do .
Because China is not a democracy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ share a vision for the world that is compatible with that of the United States and its allies , these anxieties are multiplied and amplified .
But it is precisely because the anxieties are well founded , and the challenges posed by China so significant and lasting , that precipitous and reckless rhetoric should be avoided—including by the candidates in this year ’ s election .

The relationship between the United States and China is the most uncertain, most interesting, and most consequential bilateral relationship in international politics today—and likely to remain that way in the coming decades. China’s growing economic weight and the continued absolute control over its politics by the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party (CCP) make the role of China a unique dynamic in the world.
The relationship between the United States and China is the most uncertain, most interesting, and most consequential bilateral relationship in international politics today—and likely to remain that way in the coming decades. China’s growing economic weight and the continued absolute control over its politics by the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party (CCP) make the role of China a unique dynamic in the world.
A new Pew poll released in April shows that Americans have increasingly negative views of China. When Pew first started tracking U.S. attitudes to China, in 2005, 43 percent saw China favorably and 35 percent unfavorably; this year, the balance has changed to 66 percent having an unfavorable view versus only 26 percent with a favorable one. While attitudes toward Chinese President Xi Jinping appear to have been particularly affected by the coronavirus pandemic, the poll also shows that concerns about China go far beyond a single issue. More than 4 in 5 polled Americans believe that every one of the following is a problem for the United States: the trade deficit with China, the loss of U.S. jobs to China, China’s growing military power, China’s environmental impact, cyberattacks from China, and China’s policies on human rights.
While there are some gaps between Republicans and Democrats overall and on specific issues (Democrats are more concerned about China’s impact on the environment, for example, while Republicans more concerned about the trade deficit), there is broad alignment on the level of concern. It is unusual that two-thirds of Americans agree on a political matter, and when they do, especially in an election year, politicians often find themselves competing to outdo one another in giving voice to popular opinion.
Candidates—not just for president, but for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate too—are going to talk about China a lot as the election season heats up this year. The ways in which they do so, and whether they engage with the issue seriously or not, will have consequences for U.S. domestic politics, for U.S. influence in the world, as well as for the United States’ capacity to manage its relationship with China and challenge China’s bad behavior.
There is no need for bombast: The facts about the Chinese regime’s actions are damning enough. China’s government is a brutal authoritarian regime and a strategic competitor of the United States. It is right for candidates to say as much, and to talk about the challenges that China poses, or could pose, to the national security and long-term prosperity of the United States and its allies. Criticism of China is not ipso facto racist or “China bashing.”
Responsible and reasonable arguments about China should follow some general principles. First, it should be clear that the target of criticism and concern is the Chinese government and CCP leadership, not the people of China, and certainly not people of Chinese origin or descent.It should be clear that the target of criticism is the Chinese government and CCP leadership, not the people of China, and certainly not people of Chinese origin or descent. Second, the criticism should be related to specific policies or behaviors of the Chinese regime—for example, its failure to provide accurate and timely public health data both at home and abroad, its forced imprisonment of more than 1 million Uighurs and members of other Muslim minorities in concentration camps in Xinjiang, its apparent adoption of Russian disinformation tactics, its creeping power grab in the South China Sea, its massive number of domestic and foreign political prisoners, its use of state-sponsored corporate espionage, and its engagement in unfair trade practices. Better yet, when politicians identify such problematic behaviors, they should propose how the United States, working with allies when possible and appropriate, might best respond to them. Candidates who propose policy responses are doing more than opportunistically exploiting popular concerns, they are appealing to use government action to address them. Finally, they shouldn’t use implicitly or explicitly racist language in their critiques, and those who do should be called out.
Irresponsible rhetoric on China will fall back on and damage the United States in several ways. First, racist rhetoric can encourage the perpetrators of hate crimes against U.S. citizens and residents. At the same time, it empowers the Chinese regime by reinforcing its propaganda that paints U.S. criticism of the CCP regime as just a cover for a supposed secret agenda to hold the Chinese people back. Moreover, the more factual and specific U.S. politicians are about the challenges and threats posed by the Chinese regime, the more likely they are to build international support for managing those challenges and threats effectively. Conversely, reckless bombast or hyperbole is likely to make allies and partners more likely to see the U.S.-Chinese relationship as a confrontation that they’d just as soon stay out of. The United States has an opportunity to maintain a moral high ground that will enhance its influence with its partners and give it an advantage as it seeks to manage a difficult but necessary bilateral relationship with the Chinese government in the coming years.
To be clear: This is not an argument to pull punches, but rather to land them squarely. For those who believe—as I do—that the world will learn much more about the Chinese government’s negligence and cover-up with respect to the coronavirus in the months to come, and that there will be new instances of aggressive behavior by the regime to confront in the years ahead, maintaining one’s credibility in holding the CCP to account is essential, as is the ability to rally others in the international community to do likewise.
The focus needs to be on substance, not tone: Louder and more offensive is not the same as tougher.The focus needs to be on substance, not tone: Louder and more offensive is not the same as tougher. The more outrageous and obnoxious actors—such as U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and (when he isn’t fawning over Xi’s leadership) President Donald Trump, play right into the Chinese regime’s hands while undermining U.S. credibility. Fact-free or crude criticism of China aimed at distracting Americans from the failings of the Trump administration won’t do anything to address those failings and will exacerbate the challenges the United States faces going forward. China’s demonstrable misdeeds merit the prosecution of a sober, robust, facts-based critique. Political stunts don’t advance that objective.
It is unsurprising that after a generation of U.S. dominance of a unipolar world following the Cold War, China’s rise provokes unease. Even if China were a democratic, rights-respecting state, the erosion of U.S. hegemony would still constitute a significant change in the international political system and would induce anxiety in some quarters, as all changes do. Because China is not a democracy, and because its authoritarian government does not share a vision for the world that is compatible with that of the United States and its allies, these anxieties are multiplied and amplified. But it is precisely because the anxieties are well founded, and the challenges posed by China so significant and lasting, that precipitous and reckless rhetoric should be avoided—including by the candidates in this year’s election.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-04--The U.S.-Iraqi Relationship Is Coming to a Head—and That’s a Good Thing

The U.S.-Iraqi Relationship Is Coming to a Head—and That ’ s a Good Thing In June , the United States and Iraq will launch a “ strategic dialogue ” that is supposed to address all issues in their bilateral relationship , including the presence of U.S. forces .
With Iraq now serving as ground zero in the escalating confrontation between the United States and Iran , it ’ s hard not to feel like the U.S.-Iraqi relationship might be coming to a head .
That is a good thing , and the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump should make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s high time that Washington reassessed its Iraq policy .
Over the past year , the relationship has grown increasingly dysfunctional from the standpoint of U.S. interests .
Iraqi security services have brutally killed hundreds of innocent civilians for peacefully protesting the government ’ s rampant failings .
Iran has systematically exploited the Iraqi economy to circumvent U.S. sanctions .
Worst of all , Iranian-backed militias—some sanctioned by the United States , most on Baghdad ’ s payroll—have conducted several rocket attacks against U.S. troops , diplomats , and private-sector actors , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ account .
This situation is not sustainable .
Since 2003 , year in and year out , the United States has provided Iraq with hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military assistance , as well as crucial diplomatic backing .
That support was premised on the assumption that Iraq would emerge over time as a key partner in preserving stability and security in the Middle East .
Instead , the Iraqi government today is headed increasingly in the opposite direction , visiting horrific levels of violence on its own people , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions , and economy are subverted by the United States ’ most dangerous foe in the region , Iran .
The upcoming strategic dialogue offers what could be the last chance to reverse this destructive trajectory and salvage a viable long-term U.S. partnership with Iraq .
This opportunity should not be squandered .
At the heart of the Trump administration ’ s approach should be the introduction of much stricter conditionality of U.S. support .
This is a matter of necessity as much as choice .
The COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ budget for years to come .
Going forward , there will be no tolerance for foreign assistance programs that fail to pay visible dividends for U.S. interests—let alone those which appear to be strengthening enemies such as Iran .
The time has come for some hard choices to be put before the Iraqi government .
It needs to be brought to the full realization of how much it has to lose if it doesn ’ t begin demonstrating at least some minimal resolve to resist Iranian imperialism and fight for Iraqi sovereignty.The upcoming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last chance to salvage a viable partnership between the United States and Iraq .
The Trump administration is seeking more than $ 600 million this fiscal year to help train and equip Iraqi security forces in the ongoing fight against the remnants of the Islamic State .
That ’ s on top of the critical contributions that the U.S. military provides to Iraqi counterterrorism operations in terms of logistics , intelligence , and combat air power .
The administration is also requesting more than $ 120 million to support the Iraqi economy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ removal .
In addition , the United States has long served as Iraq ’ s key advocate in gaining access to billions of dollars of economic assistance from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank .
Perhaps most important , however , the Federal Reserve Bank of New York maintains a dollar account for Iraqi foreign reserves and annually ships the country billions of dollars ’ worth of $ 100 bills to keep its cash-based economy afloat and functioning .
Needless to say , much of this assistance would be irreplaceable .
Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it .
Absent U.S. support , Iraq ’ s economic and security situation , already dire , would slide ever closer to disaster .
Especially in the context of the current collapse in world oil prices ( the source of 90 percent of Iraq ’ s government revenues ) , the last thing Iraq can afford to lose is the political , economic , and military backing of its most powerful international benefactor .
That constitutes significant leverage for the U.S. going into the June discussions—if it ’ s prepared to use it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if Washington let Baghdad know that its growing acquiescence to Iranian hegemony could increasingly put Iraq in the crosshairs of more punitive U.S. measures—from travel bans and asset freezes against senior political leaders to targeted strikes against sanctioned militia commanders .
Even restrictions on Iraq ’ s ability to sell oil , similar to the sanctions against Iran , could be credibly put on the table , especially at a moment when global markets are massively oversupplied by as much as 20 million barrels of oil per day .
To further bolster the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan should also be developed to consolidate all U.S. forces in Iraq to the relative safety of the country ’ s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region .
Unlike the Iraqi political elite , the Kurdish government and security forces are universally supportive of the United States ’ military presence and have gone out of their way to combat threats to U.S. troops and diplomats they host .
From a secure foothold in a pro-U.S. Kurdistan , the United States would still be able to conduct essential counterterrorism missions against the Islamic State , including in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protection concerns that currently constrain its operations elsewhere in Iraq .
Having significantly reduced the vulnerability of its troops , the United States would arguably also have greater flexibility to take action , as needed , against the continued threat posed by Iran and its militia proxies .
In exchange for its continued support , the United States should keep its demands of the Iraqi government limited and realistic .
No matter how much pressure Washington might apply , Iraq will not go to war with Iran .
Nor will it act to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can legitimately insist that the Iraqi government start taking meaningful , but realistic steps that , first and foremost , stand up for Iraq ’ s sovereignty , while simultaneously addressing several core U.S. concerns .
Politically , the violent repression of peaceful protests should end .
Elements of the security services and militias responsible for the worst atrocities must be held to account through a credible process of investigation , prosecution , and punishment .
A serious national dialogue with the protest movement should be established .
Economically , the government needs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choke off Iran ’ s most egregious sanctions-busting schemes in Iraq , particularly the export of Iranian oil and Iran ’ s access to U.S. dollars via Iraq—activities that put Iraq ’ s own economy at serious risk of U.S. secondary sanctions .
Militarily , the United States needs to see evidence that the Iraqi government is making a concerted effort to end the attacks against U.S. military and diplomatic personnel—even if it doesn ’ t end them completely .
That not only means unequivocally condemning them as unlawful , but assertively deploying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to deter , disrupt , and punish attacks , including by cutting off government salaries to militia members .
While the United States will never forgo its right to act unilaterally to defend its personnel , it ’ s also true that the more Iraq does , the less U.S. forces will need to do on their own .
The resource demands on the United States during and after the coronavirus pandemic will be staggering .
Maintaining support for Iraq would be an uphill battle in the best of circumstances .
But it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ environment where the Iraqi government increasingly appears more invested in being an Iranian satrapy than a U.S. partner .
Time is rapidly running out for the Iraqi government to alter that perception by demonstrating that it ’ s at least as committed to defending Iraq ’ s sovereignty as the United States has been for the past 17 years .
That ’ s the stark reality that the Trump administration needs to drive home to Iraqi leaders in the upcoming strategic dialogue .
For better or worse , this difficult , tortured , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hurtling toward a fateful inflection point .
While the stakes are no doubt important for U.S. interests , they could well be existential for Iraq .
The government in Baghdad needs to be disabused of any illusions to the contrary .

In June, the United States and Iraq will launch a “strategic dialogue” that is supposed to address all issues in their bilateral relationship, including the presence of U.S. forces. With Iraq now serving as ground zero in the escalating confrontation between the United States and Iran, it’s hard not to feel like the U.S.-Iraqi relationship might be coming to a head. That is a good thing, and the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump should make sure that it does.
In June, the United States and Iraq will launch a “strategic dialogue” that is supposed to address all issues in their bilateral relationship, including the presence of U.S. forces. With Iraq now serving as ground zero in the escalating confrontation between the United States and Iran, it’s hard not to feel like the U.S.-Iraqi relationship might be coming to a head. That is a good thing, and the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump should make sure that it does.
It’s high time that Washington reassessed its Iraq policy. Over the past year, the relationship has grown increasingly dysfunctional from the standpoint of U.S. interests. Iraqi security services have brutally killed hundreds of innocent civilians for peacefully protesting the government’s rampant failings. Iran has systematically exploited the Iraqi economy to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Worst of all, Iranian-backed militias—some sanctioned by the United States, most on Baghdad’s payroll—have conducted several rocket attacks against U.S. troops, diplomats, and private-sector actors, with the Iraqi government holding no one to account.
This situation is not sustainable. Since 2003, year in and year out, the United States has provided Iraq with hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military assistance, as well as crucial diplomatic backing. That support was premised on the assumption that Iraq would emerge over time as a key partner in preserving stability and security in the Middle East. Instead, the Iraqi government today is headed increasingly in the opposite direction, visiting horrific levels of violence on its own people, while standing aside as its territory, institutions, and economy are subverted by the United States’ most dangerous foe in the region, Iran.
The upcoming strategic dialogue offers what could be the last chance to reverse this destructive trajectory and salvage a viable long-term U.S. partnership with Iraq. This opportunity should not be squandered.
At the heart of the Trump administration’s approach should be the introduction of much stricter conditionality of U.S. support. This is a matter of necessity as much as choice. The COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout will put unprecedented strains on the U.S. budget for years to come. Going forward, there will be no tolerance for foreign assistance programs that fail to pay visible dividends for U.S. interests—let alone those which appear to be strengthening enemies such as Iran. The time has come for some hard choices to be put before the Iraqi government. It needs to be brought to the full realization of how much it has to lose if it doesn’t begin demonstrating at least some minimal resolve to resist Iranian imperialism and fight for Iraqi sovereignty.The upcoming strategic dialogue offers what might be the last chance to salvage a viable partnership between the United States and Iraq.
The Trump administration is seeking more than $600 million this fiscal year to help train and equip Iraqi security forces in the ongoing fight against the remnants of the Islamic State. That’s on top of the critical contributions that the U.S. military provides to Iraqi counterterrorism operations in terms of logistics, intelligence, and combat air power. The administration is also requesting more than $120 million to support the Iraqi economy and for other programs, including land mine removal. In addition, the United States has long served as Iraq’s key advocate in gaining access to billions of dollars of economic assistance from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Perhaps most important, however, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York maintains a dollar account for Iraqi foreign reserves and annually ships the country billions of dollars’ worth of $100 bills to keep its cash-based economy afloat and functioning.
Needless to say, much of this assistance would be irreplaceable. Iran is certainly in no position to supply it. Absent U.S. support, Iraq’s economic and security situation, already dire, would slide ever closer to disaster. Especially in the context of the current collapse in world oil prices (the source of 90 percent of Iraq’s government revenues), the last thing Iraq can afford to lose is the political, economic, and military backing of its most powerful international benefactor.
That constitutes significant leverage for the U.S. going into the June discussions—if it’s prepared to use it. That leverage would be even higher if Washington let Baghdad know that its growing acquiescence to Iranian hegemony could increasingly put Iraq in the crosshairs of more punitive U.S. measures—from travel bans and asset freezes against senior political leaders to targeted strikes against sanctioned militia commanders. Even restrictions on Iraq’s ability to sell oil, similar to the sanctions against Iran, could be credibly put on the table, especially at a moment when global markets are massively oversupplied by as much as 20 million barrels of oil per day.
To further bolster the U.S. bargaining position, a serious contingency plan should also be developed to consolidate all U.S. forces in Iraq to the relative safety of the country’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. Unlike the Iraqi political elite, the Kurdish government and security forces are universally supportive of the United States’ military presence and have gone out of their way to combat threats to U.S. troops and diplomats they host. From a secure foothold in a pro-U.S. Kurdistan, the United States would still be able to conduct essential counterterrorism missions against the Islamic State, including in Syria, but without the severe force protection concerns that currently constrain its operations elsewhere in Iraq. Having significantly reduced the vulnerability of its troops, the United States would arguably also have greater flexibility to take action, as needed, against the continued threat posed by Iran and its militia proxies.
In exchange for its continued support, the United States should keep its demands of the Iraqi government limited and realistic. No matter how much pressure Washington might apply, Iraq will not go to war with Iran. Nor will it act to eradicate militias overnight. But the administration can legitimately insist that the Iraqi government start taking meaningful, but realistic steps that, first and foremost, stand up for Iraq’s sovereignty, while simultaneously addressing several core U.S. concerns.
Politically, the violent repression of peaceful protests should end. Elements of the security services and militias responsible for the worst atrocities must be held to account through a credible process of investigation, prosecution, and punishment. A serious national dialogue with the protest movement should be established.
Economically, the government needs to partner with the United States to choke off Iran’s most egregious sanctions-busting schemes in Iraq, particularly the export of Iranian oil and Iran’s access to U.S. dollars via Iraq—activities that put Iraq’s own economy at serious risk of U.S. secondary sanctions.
Militarily, the United States needs to see evidence that the Iraqi government is making a concerted effort to end the attacks against U.S. military and diplomatic personnel—even if it doesn’t end them completely. That not only means unequivocally condemning them as unlawful, but assertively deploying Iraq’s intelligence and security services to deter, disrupt, and punish attacks, including by cutting off government salaries to militia members. While the United States will never forgo its right to act unilaterally to defend its personnel, it’s also true that the more Iraq does, the less U.S. forces will need to do on their own.
The resource demands on the United States during and after the coronavirus pandemic will be staggering. Maintaining support for Iraq would be an uphill battle in the best of circumstances. But it will be an impossible mission in an environment where the Iraqi government increasingly appears more invested in being an Iranian satrapy than a U.S. partner. Time is rapidly running out for the Iraqi government to alter that perception by demonstrating that it’s at least as committed to defending Iraq’s sovereignty as the United States has been for the past 17 years.
That’s the stark reality that the Trump administration needs to drive home to Iraqi leaders in the upcoming strategic dialogue. For better or worse, this difficult, tortured, but important relationship is now almost certainly hurtling toward a fateful inflection point. While the stakes are no doubt important for U.S. interests, they could well be existential for Iraq. The government in Baghdad needs to be disabused of any illusions to the contrary.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-04--Lebanon’s Banks Are Burning

Lebanon’s Banks Are Burning

BEIRUT—Lebanon has flattened its coronavirus curve but the country ’ s protesters are rising up once again .
Rather than the placards and clever anti-government slogans that have defined earlier demonstrations in Lebanon , protesters are increasingly wielding Molotov cocktails and makeshift battering rams .
With inflation raging , they have taken aim at the country ’ s banks in recent days , smashing windows and lighting them on fire .
“ We are heading to a situation that is more dangerous than the virus , ” said Mohamed Sabbah , 29 , a protester in Beirut .
“ People @ @ @ @ @ @ @ People are going to starve.
” Ironically , on the same day that Lebanon announced it would be relaxing its coronavirus lockdown measures , the army was sent to the streets to confront desperate protesters in the northern city of Tripoli .
Lebanese have been in the streets since October asking for a new political system and an end to corruption , but now the message is different : “ We are hungry.
” Months of economic crisis have been compounded by a strict lockdown that helped avert a medical crisis here but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ downfall and quickened the sink of many Lebanese below the poverty line .
As the Lebanese currency—the lira—declines , the price of food is rising , and cashiers quietly warn customers to stock up because what they are buying may increase in price the following day .
Last week , the lira saw its biggest daily fall against the U.S. dollar ever , inflating to more than 4,000 lira to the dollar on the black market , helping to spark the new wave of protests .
“ A can of tuna was 2,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and it ’ s going up , ” said Radwan , a 36-year-old protester who didn ’ t give her last name .
“ Instead of people maybe having caught corona , you have kids that will not have milk.
” Nearby the Beirut protest , police guarded a branch of a major bank with one window already smashed .
A couple blocks away , the windows of the Association of Banks in Lebanon lay shattered on the sidewalk .
Across the country , branches of Lebanon ’ s central bank have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fire .
More and more banks in Beirut are reinforcing their facades with sheets of metal to protect them from the smashing and burning .
Each morning frustrated customers linger outside in face masks waiting to get in and try to negotiate to get their money out .
The banks were a target of protest earlier this year , but now they have become the focus .
Unregulated illegal capital controls mean that many Lebanese can not access their money , with caps on withdrawals and transfers that vary among banks , branches @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Imagine you can ’ t feed your children , but you have money in the bank you can ’ t access , ” said Nizar Ghanem , the director of research at the Triangle think tank in Beirut .
The banks are a target not just because they are holding personal funds hostage but for their role in causing the current crisis .
Lebanon ’ s economic system has been compared to a Ponzi scheme .
For decades , Lebanese depositors put their money in the bank , and their banks lent that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rates , earning excessive profits for the banking sector , in which political elites own significant stakes .
“ The banks hold the majority of the responsibility because they are responsible for the bad investment , ” Ghanem said .
That bad investment was the Lebanese government .
Ghanem said the government used this expensive debt in failing projects , expanding patronage networks in the form of public sector jobs and unneeded infrastructure projects that were plagued by corruption and did little to help the Lebanese economy .
The debt grew to 150 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world ’ s highest .
Too few said anything about it until it was too late .
“ The banks invested in a Ponzi scheme , and now it has collapsed , ” Ghanem said .
As the economy faces a reckoning , average Lebanese are paying the price .
Workers who have saved money for decades are watching their accounts devalue by the day , and their futures look bleaker and bleaker .
Those who were living from day to day can ’ t afford to feed their families .
And while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the banks , $ 5.7 billion was mysteriously transferred out of Lebanon in January and February—despite the capital controls and presumably by the country ’ s elites .
Ghanem said that as inflation pushes basic sustenance out of reach for an increasing number of Lebanese , the protests have taken on a new , more radical character .
“ People are fed up , and the protests are getting more violent because the government has failed , ” Ghanem said .
“ At the beginning of the protests , there was still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that if we got a new government that was independent , we could respond to the crisis .
That didn ’ t happen.
” Instead , the Lebanese currency continues to sink .
The country now has four different exchange rates for U.S. dollars : the official , decades-old bank rate , a semiofficial rate the central bank wants money exchangers to use , another rate banks are promising to give account holders , and the rate actually available at black market money exchangers .
The black market rate sometimes fluctuates throughout the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down over the weeks .
Prices of imported goods—which is almost everything here—have climbed in recent months , diminishing the purchasing power of most Lebanese significantly .
Analysts debate whether Lebanon is headed down a path similar to Venezuela ’ s , though without oil .
Then came the novel coronavirus , just as Lebanon defaulted for the first time on its international debt payment in March .
Experts warned that an outbreak of COVID-19 in Lebanon would be a disaster , but so far the country has pulled off something of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases , two dozen deaths , and ventilators sitting idle .
The country locked down early and hard , imposing a state of medical emergency and evening curfew .
At the protest in Beirut , Radwan said it ’ s not the government that deserves credit but people who stayed home knowing the fragility of the country ’ s health care system and because they didn ’ t trust the government could protect them .
She and others say the ruling elites instead used the pandemic to their advantage , shuttering banks , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the streets , and dissuading protest .
Those restrictions also hit the most vulnerable Lebanese the hardest , with almost no help from the government , and the currency slid even further .
Those who were scraping by now can ’ t even do that .
The protests are no longer just about changing the politicians or the political system to avoid financial collapse but about survival for the people it has impacted the most .
“ The areas that are the poorest in Lebanon are seeing the largest demonstrations now , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the poorest Lebanese coming out saying they aren ’ t going to be silent anymore.
” In the northern city of Tripoli , the epicenter of the recent unrest , protesters clashed with security forces last week , chanting , “ Our people should not starve , master .
Master , you are a thief.
” Dozens of protesters and security forces were injured , and one protester died .
Most of the banks around Tripoli ’ s Al-Nour Square , the heart of the protests , are now charred and smashed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ looking for potentially valuable pieces of scrap .
Before the pandemic , the World Bank warned that 45 percent of Lebanese could soon be living below the poverty line , but COVID-19 has likely made that an understatement , and the government has now put the estimate above 70 percent .
At another protest , as a scuffle broke out , demonstrators shouted , “ I am hungry !
” Amid the confrontation , one of the officers shot back : “ I am hungrier than you are .
”

BEIRUT—Lebanon has flattened its coronavirus curve, but the country’s protesters are rising up once again.
Rather than the placards and clever anti-government slogans that have defined earlier demonstrations in Lebanon, protesters are increasingly wielding Molotov cocktails and makeshift battering rams. With inflation raging, they have taken aim at the country’s banks in recent days, smashing windows and lighting them on fire.
“We are heading to a situation that is more dangerous than the virus,” said Mohamed Sabbah, 29, a protester in Beirut. “People are going to lose their house. People are going to starve.”
Ironically, on the same day that Lebanon announced it would be relaxing its coronavirus lockdown measures, the army was sent to the streets to confront desperate protesters in the northern city of Tripoli. Lebanese have been in the streets since October asking for a new political system and an end to corruption, but now the message is different: “We are hungry.”
Months of economic crisis have been compounded by a strict lockdown that helped avert a medical crisis here but has accelerated the country’s economic downfall and quickened the sink of many Lebanese below the poverty line.
As the Lebanese currency—the lira—declines, the price of food is rising, and cashiers quietly warn customers to stock up because what they are buying may increase in price the following day. Last week, the lira saw its biggest daily fall against the U.S. dollar ever, inflating to more than 4,000 lira to the dollar on the black market, helping to spark the new wave of protests.
“A can of tuna was 2,000 lira, now it’s 5,000, and it’s going up,” said Radwan, a 36-year-old protester who didn’t give her last name. “Instead of people maybe having caught corona, you have kids that will not have milk.”
Nearby the Beirut protest, police guarded a branch of a major bank with one window already smashed. A couple blocks away, the windows of the Association of Banks in Lebanon lay shattered on the sidewalk. Across the country, branches of Lebanon’s central bank have been pelted with rocks and set on fire. More and more banks in Beirut are reinforcing their facades with sheets of metal to protect them from the smashing and burning. Each morning frustrated customers linger outside in face masks waiting to get in and try to negotiate to get their money out.
The banks were a target of protest earlier this year, but now they have become the focus. Unregulated illegal capital controls mean that many Lebanese cannot access their money, with caps on withdrawals and transfers that vary among banks, branches, and even account holders.
“Imagine you can’t feed your children, but you have money in the bank you can’t access,” said Nizar Ghanem, the director of research at the Triangle think tank in Beirut.
The banks are a target not just because they are holding personal funds hostage but for their role in causing the current crisis. Lebanon’s economic system has been compared to a Ponzi scheme. For decades, Lebanese depositors put their money in the bank, and their banks lent that money to the government at high interest rates, earning excessive profits for the banking sector, in which political elites own significant stakes.
“The banks hold the majority of the responsibility because they are responsible for the bad investment,” Ghanem said. That bad investment was the Lebanese government. Ghanem said the government used this expensive debt in failing projects, expanding patronage networks in the form of public sector jobs and unneeded infrastructure projects that were plagued by corruption and did little to help the Lebanese economy. The debt grew to 150 percent of GDP, one of the world’s highest. Too few said anything about it until it was too late.
“The banks invested in a Ponzi scheme, and now it has collapsed,” Ghanem said.
As the economy faces a reckoning, average Lebanese are paying the price. Workers who have saved money for decades are watching their accounts devalue by the day, and their futures look bleaker and bleaker. Those who were living from day to day can’t afford to feed their families. And while regular Lebanese people have their money stuck in the banks, $5.7 billion was mysteriously transferred out of Lebanon in January and February—despite the capital controls and presumably by the country’s elites.
Ghanem said that as inflation pushes basic sustenance out of reach for an increasing number of Lebanese, the protests have taken on a new, more radical character.
“People are fed up, and the protests are getting more violent because the government has failed,” Ghanem said. “At the beginning of the protests, there was still a belief in the democratic process, that if we got a new government that was independent, we could respond to the crisis. That didn’t happen.”
Instead, the Lebanese currency continues to sink. The country now has four different exchange rates for U.S. dollars: the official, decades-old bank rate, a semiofficial rate the central bank wants money exchangers to use, another rate banks are promising to give account holders, and the rate actually available at black market money exchangers. The black market rate sometimes fluctuates throughout the day but has steadily worked its way down over the weeks. Prices of imported goods—which is almost everything here—have climbed in recent months, diminishing the purchasing power of most Lebanese significantly. Analysts debate whether Lebanon is headed down a path similar to Venezuela’s, though without oil.
Then came the novel coronavirus, just as Lebanon defaulted for the first time on its international debt payment in March. Experts warned that an outbreak of COVID-19 in Lebanon would be a disaster, but so far the country has pulled off something of a miracle, with just around 740 confirmed cases, two dozen deaths, and ventilators sitting idle. The country locked down early and hard, imposing a state of medical emergency and evening curfew. At the protest in Beirut, Radwan said it’s not the government that deserves credit but people who stayed home knowing the fragility of the country’s health care system and because they didn’t trust the government could protect them.
She and others say the ruling elites instead used the pandemic to their advantage, shuttering banks, increasing the presence of security forces on the streets, and dissuading protest. Those restrictions also hit the most vulnerable Lebanese the hardest, with almost no help from the government, and the currency slid even further. Those who were scraping by now can’t even do that. The protests are no longer just about changing the politicians or the political system to avoid financial collapse but about survival for the people it has impacted the most.
“The areas that are the poorest in Lebanon are seeing the largest demonstrations now,” Ghanem said. “The protests are the poorest Lebanese coming out saying they aren’t going to be silent anymore.”
In the northern city of Tripoli, the epicenter of the recent unrest, protesters clashed with security forces last week, chanting, “Our people should not starve, master. Master, you are a thief.” Dozens of protesters and security forces were injured, and one protester died. Most of the banks around Tripoli’s Al-Nour Square, the heart of the protests, are now charred and smashed. Young men picked through the rubble, looking for potentially valuable pieces of scrap.
Before the pandemic, the World Bank warned that 45 percent of Lebanese could soon be living below the poverty line, but COVID-19 has likely made that an understatement, and the government has now put the estimate above 70 percent.
At another protest, as a scuffle broke out, demonstrators shouted, “I am hungry!” Amid the confrontation, one of the officers shot back: “I am hungrier than you are.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-04--In Rural Afghanistan, Taliban Gingerly Welcome Girls Schools

BADIKHEL , Afghanistan—For the last year , Habib-ur-Rahman has been running a small girls school in his own home in this remote area of rural Afghanistan , which is largely dominated by the Taliban .
In a previous era , when the Taliban completely ruled the country before 9/11 , that would have been impossible : The radical Islamist group forbade formal education for girls .
But things are different this time , villagers say .
Some of the girls at Rahman ’ s school are actually related to active Taliban members , and according to the villagers , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no qualms with his girls school .
“ Some of my students are daughters , sisters , or nieces of Taliban fighters .
Mostly , all of these men are not living in our village , ” Rahman told Foreign Policy .
“ They are busy with fighting and hiding .
But they encouraged their relatives to visit my school and get educated.
” “ My brother is a Taliban fighter .
But he does not have any problems with the school .
He wants me to seek wisdom and education , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s students .
Even as the fighting rages outside the village between the Taliban and Afghan national forces , despite a U.S.-orchestrated cease-fire , Rahman said he is cautiously hopeful that things won ’ t go back to the way they were before .
“ I ’ m proud of my work , and I know that it ’ s dismantling a lot of prejudices , ” said the teacher , who was himself educated in the capital of Kabul .
“ Education is an important part of the Islamic religion .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ it seems that they don ’ t have a clear stance on girls ’ education.
” When the Taliban came to power in the 1990s , they imposed a very extremist patriarchal rule and banned female education all over the country .
Additionally , women were not allowed to work and could not leave their homes without a close male relative .
But in fact , misogynist policies were already shaped before the Taliban were created .
After the mujahideen overran Kabul and toppled the last communist government in 1992 , hostility toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the whole issue has always been exploited by both local governments and foreign powers that invaded the country .
When the Afghan communists staged a brutal coup in the late 1970s , they portrayed themselves as the liberators of Afghan women and underlined the importance of education .
Often , this happened through propaganda movies focusing on the alleged transition of Afghan society after the so-called revolution , as the communists viewed their coup , in 1978 .
In such movies , the liberation of women had a very clear depiction : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same time , many schools were shut down—the total number of them actually decreased throughout the country—while many female dissidents were tortured and killed in hidden dungeons .
When the Russians invaded Afghanistan , they introduced themselves as defenders of women ’ s rights against so-called barbaric Islamists , while many Afghan women supported the mujahideen rebels .
In 2001 , a déjà vu took place when the Americans and their Western allies entered Afghanistan and proclaimed women ’ s rights , and especially girls ’ education , as one of their chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace deal with the Taliban in late February , it has become clear that , sooner or later , the insurgent group would somehow return to power in some form , at the very least in some sort of power-sharing arrangement with the government in Kabul .
In fact , large parts of Afghanistan are already under the Taliban ’ s control .
But especially in urban areas like Kabul and elsewhere , many Afghans still fear a regression toward the dark days of the Taliban regime .
Especially when it comes to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe that the Taliban would ban any kind of education for girls and young women again .
Both the Kabul government and the American negotiators made clear that such a regression would not take place , while the Taliban leadership preferred to stay vague and underlined the importance of Islamic norms in the context of women ’ s work and girls ’ education .
“ We are not against female education or work .
But we have Islamic norms .
This is still not the West , ” Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Qatar , previously said in an interview .
The case of the girls school in Badikhel , however , shows that things are much more complex .
“ This is not surprising .
The Taliban were never able to have a clear position to even convince their own men about the validity of un-Islamic orders like closing girls schools , ” said Orzala Nemat , a political ethnographer and head of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit , an independent research organization based in Kabul .
She described how even during Taliban ruling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made arrangements with local communities to keep the schools open .
“ This whole rule is one among a number of rules perhaps imposed on Taliban leadership by those who aimed to destroy the foundations of a progressive thinking in the country.
” The villagers in Badikhel have witnessed the Taliban ’ s discordant stance firsthand .
While some Taliban members sent their female relatives to Rahman ’ s school , which now has about 30 students , others sent threats .
According to Akhtar Zaman , a local villager , unknown militants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If not , Rahman would face “ consequences.
” Subsequently , the villagers reached out to the family members of the students .
“ After we talked with the Taliban members we knew , they became angry .
They said they would find out who threatened the school , and they took it personally since their own girls are visiting the school , ” Zaman said .
Rahman also faced other kinds of local resistance .
Often , families rejected giving the girls into the custody of a man unrelated to them .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the idea of sending their female relatives to any kind of school .
But , after some time and many efforts , Rahman managed to persuade most of his fellow villagers to allow him to continue the effort .
“ Striving for education has always been a problem for Afghan women .
But I ’ m optimistic that certain circumstances are changing slowly .
Personally , I ’ m happy to go to school and learn so many different things , ” said Mahbuba , one of the schoolgirls , who declined to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some of her family members at first resisted her attending Rahman ’ s school .
But over time , all of them started supporting her and even encouraged their relatives to send their daughters and sisters and nieces to school too .
Also , Mahbuba wants to go to university one day .
“ We are a crucial part of Afghan society , but we need to be educated to serve our purposes in the best way , ” she told Foreign Policy .
Another student , Maryam , who also did not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brother encouraged her to go to Rahman ’ s school .
“ I hope that the situation improves and that we would be able to continue visiting school .
The worst thing would be a closure , ” she said .
Nor is the lack of education in Afghanistan ’ s rural areas solely tied to problems with the Taliban .
“ I wonder if the government even knows that I ’ m running a school in my own house in a village , ” Rahman said while underlining his limited resources .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ donations to build up the school .
“ Mostly , people talk about schools and universities in Kabul .
But what about the villages ?
It ’ s as if we don ’ t exist , ” he said .
From 2002 , the U.S. government reportedly invested around $ 1 billion to build schools , staff classrooms , and flood provinces with textbooks .
But most of the money went into the gaping pockets of warlords and corrupt government officials , leaving entire schools empty and decaying .
By 2015 , at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2011 by the Afghan Education Ministry were not at all operational .
Later , these places became famous as “ ghost schools.
” Also , girls were often overcounted by officials to accumulate more U.S. aid money .
The failure of the United States in Afghanistan was probably best , and most disturbingly , epitomized by the very existence of what are now known as ghost schools , where no female students actually exist .
Rahman knows he ’ ll be very much on his own in the future , especially after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very real .
But I doubt that those people in Western capitals or in the Kabul bubble will care about us .
”

BADIKHEL, Afghanistan—For the last year, Habib-ur-Rahman has been running a small girls school in his own home in this remote area of rural Afghanistan, which is largely dominated by the Taliban. In a previous era, when the Taliban completely ruled the country before 9/11, that would have been impossible: The radical Islamist group forbade formal education for girls. But things are different this time, villagers say.
BADIKHEL, Afghanistan—For the last year, Habib-ur-Rahman has been running a small girls school in his own home in this remote area of rural Afghanistan, which is largely dominated by the Taliban. In a previous era, when the Taliban completely ruled the country before 9/11, that would have been impossible: The radical Islamist group forbade formal education for girls. But things are different this time, villagers say.
Some of the girls at Rahman’s school are actually related to active Taliban members, and according to the villagers, the insurgents have assured them that they have no qualms with his girls school. “Some of my students are daughters, sisters, or nieces of Taliban fighters. Mostly, all of these men are not living in our village,” Rahman told Foreign Policy. “They are busy with fighting and hiding. But they encouraged their relatives to visit my school and get educated.”
“My brother is a Taliban fighter. But he does not have any problems with the school. He wants me to seek wisdom and education,” said Latifa Khostai, one of Rahman’s students.
Even as the fighting rages outside the village between the Taliban and Afghan national forces, despite a U.S.-orchestrated cease-fire, Rahman said he is cautiously hopeful that things won’t go back to the way they were before. “I’m proud of my work, and I know that it’s dismantling a lot of prejudices,” said the teacher, who was himself educated in the capital of Kabul. “Education is an important part of the Islamic religion. The Taliban know that too, but it seems that they don’t have a clear stance on girls’ education.”
When the Taliban came to power in the 1990s, they imposed a very extremist patriarchal rule and banned female education all over the country. Additionally, women were not allowed to work and could not leave their homes without a close male relative. But in fact, misogynist policies were already shaped before the Taliban were created. After the mujahideen overran Kabul and toppled the last communist government in 1992, hostility toward women in urban areas increased. Also, the whole issue has always been exploited by both local governments and foreign powers that invaded the country.
Some of ur-Rahman’s students on April 1. Several are related to Taliban members. "My brother is a Taliban fighter. He encouraged me to visit school," said Latifa (right).
When the Afghan communists staged a brutal coup in the late 1970s, they portrayed themselves as the liberators of Afghan women and underlined the importance of education. Often, this happened through propaganda movies focusing on the alleged transition of Afghan society after the so-called revolution, as the communists viewed their coup, in 1978. In such movies, the liberation of women had a very clear depiction: miniskirts and alcohol. But at the same time, many schools were shut down—the total number of them actually decreased throughout the country—while many female dissidents were tortured and killed in hidden dungeons. When the Russians invaded Afghanistan, they introduced themselves as defenders of women’s rights against so-called barbaric Islamists, while many Afghan women supported the mujahideen rebels. In 2001, a déjà vu took place when the Americans and their Western allies entered Afghanistan and proclaimed women’s rights, and especially girls’ education, as one of their chief purposes.
Since the Americans signed a peace deal with the Taliban in late February, it has become clear that, sooner or later, the insurgent group would somehow return to power in some form, at the very least in some sort of power-sharing arrangement with the government in Kabul. In fact, large parts of Afghanistan are already under the Taliban’s control. But especially in urban areas like Kabul and elsewhere, many Afghans still fear a regression toward the dark days of the Taliban regime. Especially when it comes to female education, some observers and activists believe that the Taliban would ban any kind of education for girls and young women again. Both the Kabul government and the American negotiators made clear that such a regression would not take place, while the Taliban leadership preferred to stay vague and underlined the importance of Islamic norms in the context of women’s work and girls’ education. “We are not against female education or work. But we have Islamic norms. This is still not the West,” Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the head of the Taliban office in Qatar, previously said in an interview.
The case of the girls school in Badikhel, however, shows that things are much more complex. “This is not surprising. The Taliban were never able to have a clear position to even convince their own men about the validity of un-Islamic orders like closing girls schools,” said Orzala Nemat, a political ethnographer and head of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, an independent research organization based in Kabul. She described how even during Taliban ruling in the late 1990s, local officers made arrangements with local communities to keep the schools open. “This whole rule is one among a number of rules perhaps imposed on Taliban leadership by those who aimed to destroy the foundations of a progressive thinking in the country.”
The villagers in Badikhel have witnessed the Taliban’s discordant stance firsthand. While some Taliban members sent their female relatives to Rahman’s school, which now has about 30 students, others sent threats. According to Akhtar Zaman, a local villager, unknown militants demanded the closure of the school. If not, Rahman would face “consequences.” Subsequently, the villagers reached out to the family members of the students. “After we talked with the Taliban members we knew, they became angry. They said they would find out who threatened the school, and they took it personally since their own girls are visiting the school,” Zaman said.
Rahman also faced other kinds of local resistance. Often, families rejected giving the girls into the custody of a man unrelated to them. Additionally, many still did not like the idea of sending their female relatives to any kind of school. But, after some time and many efforts, Rahman managed to persuade most of his fellow villagers to allow him to continue the effort.
Students at ur-Rahman's school on April 1.
“Striving for education has always been a problem for Afghan women. But I’m optimistic that certain circumstances are changing slowly. Personally, I’m happy to go to school and learn so many different things,” said Mahbuba, one of the schoolgirls, who declined to give her surname. She described how some of her family members at first resisted her attending Rahman’s school. But over time, all of them started supporting her and even encouraged their relatives to send their daughters and sisters and nieces to school too. Also, Mahbuba wants to go to university one day. “We are a crucial part of Afghan society, but we need to be educated to serve our purposes in the best way,” she told Foreign Policy.
Another student, Maryam, who also did not give her surname, said her older brother encouraged her to go to Rahman’s school. “I hope that the situation improves and that we would be able to continue visiting school. The worst thing would be a closure,” she said.
Nor is the lack of education in Afghanistan’s rural areas solely tied to problems with the Taliban. “I wonder if the government even knows that I’m running a school in my own house in a village,” Rahman said while underlining his limited resources. He used his own savings and local donations to build up the school. “Mostly, people talk about schools and universities in Kabul. But what about the villages? It’s as if we don’t exist,” he said.
From 2002, the U.S. government reportedly invested around $1 billion to build schools, staff classrooms, and flood provinces with textbooks. But most of the money went into the gaping pockets of warlords and corrupt government officials, leaving entire schools empty and decaying. By 2015, at least 1,100 schools listed as active in 2011 by the Afghan Education Ministry were not at all operational. Later, these places became famous as “ghost schools.” Also, girls were often overcounted by officials to accumulate more U.S. aid money. The failure of the United States in Afghanistan was probably best, and most disturbingly, epitomized by the very existence of what are now known as ghost schools, where no female students actually exist.
Rahman knows he’ll be very much on his own in the future, especially after the Americans leave. “Our school is very real. But I doubt that those people in Western capitals or in the Kabul bubble will care about us.”