foreignpolicy--2020-06-24--Poland’s President Visits White House Before Tight Election

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Polish President Andrzej Duda becomes the first foreign leader to visit the White House since the coronavirus pandemic began , the United States and Russia agree to continue talks on nuclear arms control , and Mexico suffers a powerful earthquake .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The White House will welcome Polish President Andrzej Duda today for the first visit from a foreign leader since the coronavirus pandemic began .
The meeting comes as Duda faces a potentially tough election contest this Sunday—with recent polls showing him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one of his challengers , and losing to another ( if Duda wins more than 50 percent of the vote , no run-off is needed ) .
U.S. President Donald Trump will be hoping to give his ideological ally the same edge he gave Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he hosted him in January before the Israeli elections .
Duda has come under fire after he described the LGBTQ rights movement as an “ ideology ” worse than communism .
He has also signed on to proposals to oppose same-sex marriage and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Polish politicians have been blunt about the value of the visit .
“ We love Donald Trump , we think he ’ s a great president , and I do believe he ’ s going to help us win the election , ” said Dominik Tarczynski , a member of parliament for the Duda-aligned Law and Justice party .
“ He ’ s going to help Andrzej Duda win.
” It ’ s not just one-way traffic for Duda , however .
U.S. officials have a chance to present Poland as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Poland ’ s defense spending as one of the few NATO members to reach the recommended 2 percent threshold .
Is Fort Trump back on the table ?
They also have a chance to discuss the allegedly stalled plan to station 1,000 U.S. troops in Poland .
With 9,500 troops set to leave Germany soon , speculation has grown that some will move east .
White House officials refused to be drawn on the question during a Tuesday briefing , instead referring press to an op-ed by U.S. National Security Advisor Robert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ the Cold War practice of garrisoning large numbers of troops with their families on massive bases in places like Germany is now , in part , obsolete.
” Diplomacy , COVID-style .
As a precaution against infection , the White House has said both delegations will be tested for the coronavirus in the morning before meetings begin .
They did not confirm whether participants would wear masks .
Poland loves the U.S. president .
Unlike their neighbors Germany , where a Pew poll showed only 13 percent of citizens have confidence in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right thing in global affairs , ” Polish citizens have faith—51 percent of Poles polled trust the president on the global stage .
Poles also have a highly favorable opinion of the United States , which at 79 percent was only beaten by the Philippines ( 80 percent ) and Israel ( 83 percent ) .
U.S.-Russia nuclear talks end without agreement , or Chinese involvement .
Nuclear talks between Russia and the United States in Vienna ended with no concrete agreement , except one to continue talking .
Marshal Billingslea , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said the talks were “ so productive that we found enough common ground to establish several technical working groups to dive further into the details of what a future trilateral arms control agreement should look like.
” Billingslea said the U.S. is hoping such an agreement would limit all nuclear weapons and not just “ strategic ” ones .
The U.S. envoy lamented China ’ s decision to rebuff his invitation to the talks , saying they have an “ obligation ” to negotiate .
Billingslea had set out Chinese flags at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ absence , a move the Chinese U.N. Mission in Vienna dismissed as “ performance art.
” High-altitude diplomacy .
India and China have agreed “ to take the necessary measures to lower the temperature on the situation ” after military leaders from both sides met for 11 hours on Monday near the site of the deadly confrontation in the Himalayas on June 15 .
“ There was a mutual consensus to disengage , ” an Indian government source told Reuters .
The news comes after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov , speaking at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and China , said the two countries could solve their issues without “ any help from outside.
” Kim cools on North Korea military rollout .
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un took his opportunity to play the statesman after a meeting he chaired decided to suspend plans to build up forces on its border with South Korea .
The move is a sign that North Korea could begin walking back its hostile rhetoric following last week ’ s comments from Kim ’ s sister Kim Yo Jong that the country would retaliate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to drop leaflets north of the border .
Powerful earthquake in Mexico .
At least six people were killed in Mexico after a 7.4 magnitude earthquake struck the country ’ s southern coastline .
The earthquake was powerful enough to sway buildings in Mexico City , more than 400 miles from the epicenter .
The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated the death toll will come to less than 100 people , although rescue workers have yet to reach all villages affected by the earthquake .
EU could ban U.S. travelers .
The European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the bloc , if proposed entry criteria are adopted .
The EU is considering using infection rates per capita as a deciding factor on whether to allow entry , although the threshold has not yet been agreed upon .
Earlier in June , the European Commission recommended that travel be restricted to those countries who are also willing to let in EU visitors , as well as countries who have an infection rate at least as low as the EU .
The U.S. seven-day rolling average is currently at roughly 28,300 cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same EU figure .
Because of the way the EU ’ s border policy is constructed , any recommendation would not be binding for member states , many of which are eager for travelers to return for the peak tourist season .
U.S. destroyer skirts Venezuelan waters .
The U.S.S .
Nitze , a U.S. Navy destroyer , navigated to within range of Venezuela ’ s exclusive economic zone in a freedom of navigation operation , or FONOP .
The United States has used FONOPs in the past as a way to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South China Sea .
The Nitze remained outside of the 12-mile exclusion zone extending from the Venezuelan coast , but entered an area that Venezuela “ falsely claims to have control over , ” according to a post on the website of U.S. Southern Command .
The move comes a day after an Iranian ship delivered a food shipment to the country .
Major cities in the United States are experiencing an unexplained explosion in fireworks use , with a corresponding rise in complaints ( as well as conspiracy theories ) .
Boston @ @ @ @ @ @ @ city ’ s police have increased by 2,300 percent .
In New York , police have recorded a 2,000 percent increase in complaints on the same period last year .
Julie Heckman , the executive director American Pyrotechnics Association , has a simple explanation for the increase .
“ I think the general public , due to COVID , is just itching to do something , ” she told Slate .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Polish President Andrzej Duda becomes the first foreign leader to visit the White House since the coronavirus pandemic began, the United States and Russia agree to continue talks on nuclear arms control, and Mexico suffers a powerful earthquake.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Polish President Andrzej Duda becomes the first foreign leader to visit the White House since the coronavirus pandemic began, the United States and Russia agree to continue talks on nuclear arms control, and Mexico suffers a powerful earthquake.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Duda Heads to White House For Pre-Election Boost
The White House will welcome Polish President Andrzej Duda today for the first visit from a foreign leader since the coronavirus pandemic began.
The meeting comes as Duda faces a potentially tough election contest this Sunday—with recent polls showing him tied in a second round run-off with one of his challengers, and losing to another (if Duda wins more than 50 percent of the vote, no run-off is needed). U.S. President Donald Trump will be hoping to give his ideological ally the same edge he gave Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he hosted him in January before the Israeli elections. Duda has come under fire after he described the LGBTQ rights movement as an “ideology” worse than communism. He has also signed on to proposals to oppose same-sex marriage and the teaching of LGBTQ issues in schools.
Polish politicians have been blunt about the value of the visit. “We love Donald Trump, we think he’s a great president, and I do believe he’s going to help us win the election,” said Dominik Tarczynski, a member of parliament for the Duda-aligned Law and Justice party. “He’s going to help Andrzej Duda win.”
It’s not just one-way traffic for Duda, however. U.S. officials have a chance to present Poland as a model nation—having been outspoken in their praise for Poland’s defense spending as one of the few NATO members to reach the recommended 2 percent threshold.
Is Fort Trump back on the table? They also have a chance to discuss the allegedly stalled plan to station 1,000 U.S. troops in Poland. With 9,500 troops set to leave Germany soon, speculation has grown that some will move east. White House officials refused to be drawn on the question during a Tuesday briefing, instead referring press to an op-ed by U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien where he declared that “the Cold War practice of garrisoning large numbers of troops with their families on massive bases in places like Germany is now, in part, obsolete.”
Diplomacy, COVID-style. As a precaution against infection, the White House has said both delegations will be tested for the coronavirus in the morning before meetings begin. They did not confirm whether participants would wear masks.
Poland loves the U.S. president. Unlike their neighbors Germany, where a Pew poll showed only 13 percent of citizens have confidence in the U.S. president “to do the right thing in global affairs,” Polish citizens have faith—51 percent of Poles polled trust the president on the global stage. Poles also have a highly favorable opinion of the United States, which at 79 percent was only beaten by the Philippines (80 percent) and Israel (83 percent).
What We’re Following Today
U.S.-Russia nuclear talks end without agreement, or Chinese involvement. Nuclear talks between Russia and the United States in Vienna ended with no concrete agreement, except one to continue talking. Marshal Billingslea, the U.S. special envoy for arms control, said the talks were “so productive that we found enough common ground to establish several technical working groups to dive further into the details of what a future trilateral arms control agreement should look like.”
Billingslea said the U.S. is hoping such an agreement would limit all nuclear weapons and not just “strategic” ones. The U.S. envoy lamented China’s decision to rebuff his invitation to the talks, saying they have an “obligation” to negotiate. Billingslea had set out Chinese flags at the negotiating table on Monday to highlight their absence, a move the Chinese U.N. Mission in Vienna dismissed as “performance art.”
High-altitude diplomacy. India and China have agreed “to take the necessary measures to lower the temperature on the situation” after military leaders from both sides met for 11 hours on Monday near the site of the deadly confrontation in the Himalayas on June 15. “There was a mutual consensus to disengage,” an Indian government source told Reuters. The news comes after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking at a trilateral meeting on Tuesday alongside India and China, said the two countries could solve their issues without “any help from outside.”
Kim cools on North Korea military rollout. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un took his opportunity to play the statesman after a meeting he chaired decided to suspend plans to build up forces on its border with South Korea. The move is a sign that North Korea could begin walking back its hostile rhetoric following last week’s comments from Kim’s sister Kim Yo Jong that the country would retaliate militarily against South Korea for allowing defectors to drop leaflets north of the border.
Powerful earthquake in Mexico. At least six people were killed in Mexico after a 7.4 magnitude earthquake struck the country’s southern coastline. The earthquake was powerful enough to sway buildings in Mexico City, more than 400 miles from the epicenter. The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated the death toll will come to less than 100 people, although rescue workers have yet to reach all villages affected by the earthquake.
Keep an Eye On
EU could ban U.S. travelers. The European Union could soon bar Americans from traveling to the bloc, if proposed entry criteria are adopted. The EU is considering using infection rates per capita as a deciding factor on whether to allow entry, although the threshold has not yet been agreed upon. Earlier in June, the European Commission recommended that travel be restricted to those countries who are also willing to let in EU visitors, as well as countries who have an infection rate at least as low as the EU.
The U.S. seven-day rolling average is currently at roughly 28,300 cases per day—more than 8 times higher than the same EU figure. Because of the way the EU’s border policy is constructed, any recommendation would not be binding for member states, many of which are eager for travelers to return for the peak tourist season.
U.S. destroyer skirts Venezuelan waters. The U.S.S. Nitze, a U.S. Navy destroyer, navigated to within range of Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone in a freedom of navigation operation, or FONOP. The United States has used FONOPs in the past as a way to remind China of its capabilities in the South China Sea. The Nitze remained outside of the 12-mile exclusion zone extending from the Venezuelan coast, but entered an area that Venezuela “falsely claims to have control over,” according to a post on the website of U.S. Southern Command. The move comes a day after an Iranian ship delivered a food shipment to the country.
Odds and Ends
Major cities in the United States are experiencing an unexplained explosion in fireworks use, with a corresponding rise in complaints (as well as conspiracy theories). Boston Mayor Marty Walsh said complaints to the city’s police have increased by 2,300 percent. In New York, police have recorded a 2,000 percent increase in complaints on the same period last year. Julie Heckman, the executive director American Pyrotechnics Association, has a simple explanation for the increase. “I think the general public, due to COVID, is just itching to do something,” she told Slate.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-24--Bolton Is the Villain of His Own Memoir

Bolton Is the Villain of His Own Memoir

Bolton Is the Villain of His Own Memoir John Bolton has studied this moment in U.S. history , but he has not learned very much .
In April 2019 he spoke , as President Donald Trump ’ s national security advisor , to the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association .
Who knew such a group existed ?
Mimicking Kennedy ’ s Cold War bluster more than 50 years later , he promised that his administration would finally overthrow Cuban and Russian influences south of the border , crushing what he called the “ troika of tyranny ” in Venezuela , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cuba .
It was time , at long last , to beat the dead horses .
Those who heard Bolton surely noted the similarities between his “ troika of tyranny ” and earlier invocations of an “ axis of evil , ” a “ communist monolith , ” and “ falling dominoes.
” These simple phrases seductively flatten the diversity of different regimes , exaggerate a wide range of threats , and grossly overstate U.S. power .
Kennedy began to recognize these shortcomings in U.S. strategic thinking after the Bay of Pigs fiasco @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his less thoughtful successors in Vietnam , Afghanistan , Iraq , and Libya .
Bolton still hasn ’ t learned .
His memoir , The Room Where It Happened , deserves a different title : How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb , after the subtitle of Stanley Kubrick ’ s 1964 film Dr. Strangelove .
Even Kubrick ’ s memorable militarist , Gen. “ Buck ” Turgidson , would blush at Bolton ’ s combination of seriousness , simplicity , and self-centeredness .
He seems unable to recognize that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ failed .
His chapter on Latin America closes with the unintentionally ironic promise : “ Venezuela will be free.
” Really ?
Just like Iraq and Afghanistan ?
And Bolton makes similar promises for unilateral U.S. power in Iran and North Korea .
He claims this is the appropriate mode for thinking about new zones of conflict .
Cyberspace , Bolton writes , should not be “ materially different from the rest of human experience : initially a state of anarchy from which strength and resolve , backed by substantial offensive weaponry , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adversaries that would eventually bring peace.
” Bolton ’ s vision is Hobbesian , with an overweening U.S. leviathan poised to force all the bad guys back into their caves ( and away from their screens ) .
He rejects nation-building and economic development for the exercise of hard power .
He also condemns virtually all multilateral agreements that might restrain U.S. prerogative in any way .
Of course , Bolton pushed Trump to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that sought to limit Iranian nuclear capabilities .
In a single page @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ theology masquerading as policy , ” then condemns the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea , the Treaty on Open Skies , the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty , and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty .
In the same chapter , he celebrates Trump ’ s withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty , initially signed by former President Ronald Reagan and former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev .
That was their first step in ending the Cold War—a mistake in Bolton ’ s flip assessment .
Other reviewers have concentrated on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s evident narcissism , disorganization , and corruption .
Bolton ’ s insider account of the president ’ s repeated appeals to Russian President Vladimir Putin is not entirely new , but it captures how ill-suited Trump is to lead the free world .
The president denies that Putin interfered in the 2016 election because it diminishes his victory , he has no patience for efforts to formulate a coordinated allied policy toward Russia , and , most astonishingly , he seeks to profit financially from these and other diplomatic interactions .
Bolton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ impeachment charges against Trump for trying to extort Ukrainian ( as well as Chinese ) assistance for his reelection , holding congressionally mandated security aid hostage .
The most powerful insight from The Room Where It Happened is that Bolton and Trump brought out the worst in one another , multiplying the enduring harm to U.S. national interests and the international system .
Bolton ’ s real revelations , however , are not about Trump , whose grave leadership failures were already evident to anyone who wished to look .
Nor is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who has followed his career .
The most powerful insight from The Room Where It Happened is that Bolton and Trump brought out the worst in one another , multiplying the enduring harm to U.S. national interests and the international system .
They are co-authors of global destruction .
Bolton made Trump even worse .
He tries to depict himself as a brake on the insane emperor , but he doesn ’ t paint a persuasive self-portrait as an Otto von Bismarck .
Bolton ’ s calls for permanent aggression egged on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan , and Venezuela—favored restraint .
Continuing his bare-fisted tactics from the administration of former President George W. Bush , Bolton kneecapped his peers who tried to salvage multilateral diplomacy .
Here Bolton replays the calumnies of former Vice President Dick Cheney , former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld , and former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz against former Secretary of State Colin Powell and other wise , cautionary voices .
Bolton ’ s memoir is filled with personal attacks on the alleged feckless behavior of former Defense Secretary James Mattis , former Secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary Stephen Mnuchin .
These three flawed figures were confirmed by Congress , but Bolton clearly believes they had no business asking tough questions about the interventionist plans he concocted in his White House office .
Although Bolton condemns Trump ’ s cravenness to please his “ base , ” he acts in similar ways to politicize policy .
When Mnuchin resists some of the proposed sanctions on Venezuela , Bolton condemns him as “ basically a Democrat.
” When then Chief of Staff John Kelly presciently worries that Trump could not manage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Bolton responds that if they allow this president to fail , Sen. Elizabeth Warren or Sen. Bernie Sanders will be worse .
Most jarringly , Bolton repeatedly attacks the credibility of the press—especially the Washington Post and the New York Times .
He treats them as enemies out to get the administration , rather than journalists seeking to understand a chaotic White House and inform the public about it .
Bolton ’ s words encourage the dangerous attacks on the free press that have permeated Trump ’ s presidency .
Bolton knows @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he relied on the press , and its resistance to the White House , to ensure the distribution of his memoir .
The barrage of information hides a deeper truth about what Bolton calls “ conservative ” foreign-policy ideas in the 21st century .
These ideas , it turns out , are not very conservative or very effective .
The Room Where It Happened is hefty in its details , many of which are indeed revealing .
But the barrage of information hides a deeper truth about what Bolton calls “ conservative ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ These ideas , it turns out , are not very conservative or very effective .
Bolton recycles the stale language from the Cold War and the old manipulations of fact to justify what amounts to a defense of “ endless wars.
” He calls for liberating Venezuelans from dictatorship , but defends continued U.S. aid to the Saudi monarchy , even after the assassination of Washington-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi .
Somehow , he surmises that Saudi tyranny and foreign murders are better than what exists in Venezuela .
The facts just do not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Iran .
Bolton ’ s apocalyptic assessment of Iran ’ s threat to the United States is exaggerated .
His repeated assertion that more U.S. force in the region will tame Tehran is , well , the reverse of the historical record .
The trillions of dollars and thousands of American lives lost in the Middle East since 2003 , with Bolton ’ s fulsome encouragement , have only increased Iran ’ s influence , often to the detriment of U.S. allies .
Bolton was the worst kind of national security advisor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with isolationist tendencies .
He helped purge the internationalists , the cautious realists , and even the few real conservatives lingering on the fringes of Trump ’ s court of sycophants .
He also helped to alienate long-standing international partners and long-serving U.S. civil servants .
Bolton raised already scorching partisan temperatures , and he brought that excess heat into the National Security Council , where his predecessor had tried , at least in part , to shield policy from ideological extremism .
In all these ways , Bolton did a lot of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president knew what he was doing after all .
If everything is personal politics for Trump , Bolton was very useful .
He drained a lot of swamps .
His memoir exposes his deeply complicit role , despite the author ’ s holier-than-thou protestations .
Kennedy and other foreign-policy thinkers learned a lot after the Bay of Pigs and the Cold War ; Bolton and his fans still resist , even as they die a slow death for enabling so much of Trump ’ s disastrous behavior .

At the lowest point in his presidency, after the terribly planned and poorly executed invasion to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs, John F. Kennedy lamented: “We got a big kick in the leg—and we deserved it. But maybe we’ll learn something from it.”
At the lowest point in his presidency, after the terribly planned and poorly executed invasion to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs, John F. Kennedy lamented: “We got a big kick in the leg—and we deserved it. But maybe we’ll learn something from it.”
John Bolton has studied this moment in U.S. history, but he has not learned very much. In April 2019 he spoke, as President Donald Trump’s national security advisor, to the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association. Who knew such a group existed? Mimicking Kennedy’s Cold War bluster more than 50 years later, he promised that his administration would finally overthrow Cuban and Russian influences south of the border, crushing what he called the “troika of tyranny” in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and, of course, Cuba. It was time, at long last, to beat the dead horses.
Those who heard Bolton surely noted the similarities between his “troika of tyranny” and earlier invocations of an “axis of evil,” a “communist monolith,” and “falling dominoes.” These simple phrases seductively flatten the diversity of different regimes, exaggerate a wide range of threats, and grossly overstate U.S. power. Kennedy began to recognize these shortcomings in U.S. strategic thinking after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, replayed, in part, by his less thoughtful successors in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.
The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir, John Bolton, Simon & Schuster, 592 pp., .50, June 2020
Bolton still hasn’t learned. His memoir, The Room Where It Happened, deserves a different title: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, after the subtitle of Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 film Dr. Strangelove. Even Kubrick’s memorable militarist, Gen. “Buck” Turgidson, would blush at Bolton’s combination of seriousness, simplicity, and self-centeredness. He seems unable to recognize that his calls for unilateral interventionism have repeatedly failed. His chapter on Latin America closes with the unintentionally ironic promise: “Venezuela will be free.”
Really? Just like Iraq and Afghanistan? And Bolton makes similar promises for unilateral U.S. power in Iran and North Korea. He claims this is the appropriate mode for thinking about new zones of conflict. Cyberspace, Bolton writes, should not be “materially different from the rest of human experience: initially a state of anarchy from which strength and resolve, backed by substantial offensive weaponry, could create structures of deterrence against potential adversaries that would eventually bring peace.”
Bolton’s vision is Hobbesian, with an overweening U.S. leviathan poised to force all the bad guys back into their caves (and away from their screens). He rejects nation-building and economic development for the exercise of hard power. He also condemns virtually all multilateral agreements that might restrain U.S. prerogative in any way. Of course, Bolton pushed Trump to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that sought to limit Iranian nuclear capabilities. In a single page, he calls the Paris climate agreement “theology masquerading as policy,” then condemns the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. In the same chapter, he celebrates Trump’s withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, initially signed by former President Ronald Reagan and former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. That was their first step in ending the Cold War—a mistake in Bolton’s flip assessment.
Other reviewers have concentrated on the sensational narrative Bolton spins around Trump’s evident narcissism, disorganization, and corruption. Bolton’s insider account of the president’s repeated appeals to Russian President Vladimir Putin is not entirely new, but it captures how ill-suited Trump is to lead the free world. The president denies that Putin interfered in the 2016 election because it diminishes his victory, he has no patience for efforts to formulate a coordinated allied policy toward Russia, and, most astonishingly, he seeks to profit financially from these and other diplomatic interactions. Bolton also largely confirms the House of Representatives’ impeachment charges against Trump for trying to extort Ukrainian (as well as Chinese) assistance for his reelection, holding congressionally mandated security aid hostage.
The most powerful insight from The Room Where It Happened is that Bolton and Trump brought out the worst in one another, multiplying the enduring harm to U.S. national interests and the international system.
Bolton’s real revelations, however, are not about Trump, whose grave leadership failures were already evident to anyone who wished to look. Nor is Bolton’s militarism surprising to anyone who has followed his career. The most powerful insight from The Room Where It Happened is that Bolton and Trump brought out the worst in one another, multiplying the enduring harm to U.S. national interests and the international system. They are co-authors of global destruction. Bolton made Trump even worse.
He tries to depict himself as a brake on the insane emperor, but he doesn’t paint a persuasive self-portrait as an Otto von Bismarck. Bolton’s calls for permanent aggression egged on the president when his own instincts—in Iran, Afghanistan, and Venezuela—favored restraint. Continuing his bare-fisted tactics from the administration of former President George W. Bush, Bolton kneecapped his peers who tried to salvage multilateral diplomacy. Here Bolton replays the calumnies of former Vice President Dick Cheney, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz against former Secretary of State Colin Powell and other wise, cautionary voices. Bolton’s memoir is filled with personal attacks on the alleged feckless behavior of former Defense Secretary James Mattis, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin. These three flawed figures were confirmed by Congress, but Bolton clearly believes they had no business asking tough questions about the interventionist plans he concocted in his White House office.
Although Bolton condemns Trump’s cravenness to please his “base,” he acts in similar ways to politicize policy. When Mnuchin resists some of the proposed sanctions on Venezuela, Bolton condemns him as “basically a Democrat.” When then Chief of Staff John Kelly presciently worries that Trump could not manage a “real crisis like 9/11,” Bolton responds that if they allow this president to fail, Sen. Elizabeth Warren or Sen. Bernie Sanders will be worse. Most jarringly, Bolton repeatedly attacks the credibility of the press—especially the Washington Post and the New York Times. He treats them as enemies out to get the administration, rather than journalists seeking to understand a chaotic White House and inform the public about it. Bolton’s words encourage the dangerous attacks on the free press that have permeated Trump’s presidency. Bolton knows better, and it is ironic that he relied on the press, and its resistance to the White House, to ensure the distribution of his memoir.
The barrage of information hides a deeper truth about what Bolton calls “conservative” foreign-policy ideas in the 21st century. These ideas, it turns out, are not very conservative or very effective.
The Room Where It Happened is hefty in its details, many of which are indeed revealing. But the barrage of information hides a deeper truth about what Bolton calls “conservative” foreign-policy ideas in the 21st century. These ideas, it turns out, are not very conservative or very effective. Bolton recycles the stale language from the Cold War and the old manipulations of fact to justify what amounts to a defense of “endless wars.” He calls for liberating Venezuelans from dictatorship, but defends continued U.S. aid to the Saudi monarchy, even after the assassination of Washington-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Somehow, he surmises that Saudi tyranny and foreign murders are better than what exists in Venezuela. The facts just do not support that.
The same is true for Iran. Bolton’s apocalyptic assessment of Iran’s threat to the United States is exaggerated. His repeated assertion that more U.S. force in the region will tame Tehran is, well, the reverse of the historical record. The trillions of dollars and thousands of American lives lost in the Middle East since 2003, with Bolton’s fulsome encouragement, have only increased Iran’s influence, often to the detriment of U.S. allies.
Bolton was the worst kind of national security advisor for a president who mixes militant language with isolationist tendencies. He helped purge the internationalists, the cautious realists, and even the few real conservatives lingering on the fringes of Trump’s court of sycophants. He also helped to alienate long-standing international partners and long-serving U.S. civil servants. Bolton raised already scorching partisan temperatures, and he brought that excess heat into the National Security Council, where his predecessor had tried, at least in part, to shield policy from ideological extremism. In all these ways, Bolton did a lot of the dirtiest work for Trump.
Perhaps the president knew what he was doing after all. If everything is personal politics for Trump, Bolton was very useful. He drained a lot of swamps. His memoir exposes his deeply complicit role, despite the author’s holier-than-thou protestations.
Kennedy and other foreign-policy thinkers learned a lot after the Bay of Pigs and the Cold War; Bolton and his fans still resist, even as they die a slow death for enabling so much of Trump’s disastrous behavior.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-24--The Trump Administration’s Divisions Over China Are Deeper Than Ever

The Trump Administration ’ s Divisions Over China Are Deeper Than Ever Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : The Trump administration contradicts itself over the U.S.-China trade deal , the Three Gorges Dam could be at risk of failure , and how Beijing slowed its renewed coronavirus outbreak .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
Six months on , the status of the U.S.-China trade deal remains murky .
On Monday , U.S. trade advisor and China hawk Peter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a TV interview , only to have President Donald Trump contradict him hours later after markets dipped .
Trump attempted to put the onus of the breakdown in relations on China , but the state of the global economy makes fulfillment of even the “ phase one ” terms , which governed the first two years , unlikely .
Meanwhile , in a week that typified the administration ’ s inconsistent attitude on China , Trump has also doubled down on anti-Chinese racism , repeatedly using a racist term to describe the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing , seeking to position itself as the global defender of the Chinese diaspora against anti-Asian racism stirred by the pandemic .
The wild swings coming out of Washington make it difficult to form coherent policy , but they also stir further mistrust in Beijing , where officials find it hard to grasp that the administration can be as chaotic as it is and instead see plots or deceit .
Political revelations .
The rhetoric followed the release of former National Security Advisor John Bolton ’ s book , which alleges that Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him win reelection , sided with Xi on China ’ s description of its concentration camps for ethnic minorities , and dismissed the plight of the Uighurs in Xinjiang .
Trump signed the Uighur Human Rights Act last week after congressional pressure but admitted in an interview that he delayed sanctions in order to push through the trade deal—as FP ’ s Amy Mackinnon reported last year .
Today it emerged that the White House had asked a senator to hold up another China sanctions bill .
Divided team .
There have always @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on China : the business-first approach of Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin ; the racism of advisors such as Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon ; the full-blown hawkishness of Navarro ; the human rights-led policy of Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger .
As Bolton ’ s book shows , Trump—who has praised the 1989 Tiananmen massacre as showing “ strength ” —couldn ’ t give a damn about human rights in China .
As in the rest of his foreign policy , personal need and flattery have shaped his attitude toward Beijing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Chinese government is denying that the infamous Three Gorges Dam is at risk of collapse after heavy flooding and a warning from a famous hydrologist—raising suspicions , naturally , that it is in fact at risk .
Foreign journalists attempting to report on the recent issues were followed and their sources threatened .
A Three Gorges Dam collapse would be a disaster even greater than the last time a major dam failed in China .
In 1975 , the collapse of the Banqiao Dam killed 230,000 people .
Media spat intensifies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese outlets as “ foreign missions , ” requiring them to register their staff and property in the United States .
This round includes the Global Times , a belligerent tabloid owned by the People ’ s Daily , and the China News Service , which traditionally targets overseas Chinese communities and has been involved in social media propaganda campaigns .
( I worked at both when I lived in China , and while there are diligent journalists at these publications doing the best they can , there ’ s no doubt the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Expect a round of retaliatory expulsions of Western journalists , like the ones that followed the earlier measures in March .
Beijing ’ s new outbreak is halted .
The comprehensive measures taken against a renewed coronavirus outbreak in Beijing appear successful , with just 249 cases reported total since the outbreak emerged last week .
Chinese epidemiologists have warned that the country will live with the risk of future outbreaks for the foreseeable future , even when there are zero cases officially reported .
Beijing performed 300,000 daily tests during this new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the entire United States in one day .
Contentious book release delayed .
A new book by Clive Hamilton—the author of the controversial but influential Silent Invasion—and Mareike Ohlberg on Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) influence in Western democracies is being held up by legal action threatened by one of the groups named , a Sino-British business association called the 48 Group Club .
This is notable because it presages future legal battles over ties to Beijing—and because it shows how clumsy Chinese influence can be .
It ’ s often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s important in other countries : The 48 Group Club holds little significance in U.K. politics but has been heavily promoted by Chinese media .
Trade threats against India .
Following the deadly border clash last week , Chinese media is making threats against India ’ s economy if boycotts continue .
“ Boycott China ” is a popular call in India—even predating the border violence—and it is likely to pick up steam as India ’ s pandemic death toll grows .
States are already canceling deals with Chinese firms .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back , attracting criticism at home .
But Beijing ’ s desire to pick fights—literal and metaphorical—seems strong at the moment , from Australia to Taiwan .
Tech backlash .
Another consequence of the border clash is India ’ s decision to exclude Chinese companies from critical telecommunications infrastructure .
That ’ s new : Even at the end of last year , India was looking to Huawei and other firms as potential partners .
It ’ s going to be tough for Indian firms to separate from Chinese funding , but it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerns over 5G are the potential foundation of a loose alliance directed at containing Chinese influence .
A growing number of states once willing to work with Chinese firms , such as the U.K. , are now calling for alternatives .
Baidu ends U.S. deal .
The Chinese search giant Baidu , which has rebranded itself as an artificial intelligence firm in recent years , has left the Partnership for AI—a largely U.S.-led effort on global AI ethics .
Baidu ’ s official reasoning was cost , but the increasingly cold atmosphere over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Other AI firms have already been banned from working in the United States due to involvement with surveillance and control in Xinjiang .
As Jacob Helberg wrote in Foreign Policy this week , the walls are going up : Even firms that want to be neutral will have to pick sides .
Reading the China Dream does essential work collecting and translating Chinese essays by establishment intellectuals—and their critics .
This full-on blast by the critic Rong Jian against the New Left scholar Wang Hui ’ s essay on Lenin shows how interesting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ able to write with some freedom .
Rong and Wang were both Tiananmen participants , but Rong sees Wang as having sold out to the CCP .
Rong gets straight to the hollow ideas of establishment Maoists in contemporary China : “ The conundrum faced by today ’ s Maoists is not much better ; they would like to bring back Lenin ’ s ideas by commemorating the 150th anniversary of Lenin ’ s birth , but are prisoners of their poor imagination , crude language , and outdated notions , and are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ into a modern Internet celebrity , ” he writes .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: The Trump administration contradicts itself over the U.S.-China trade deal, the Three Gorges Dam could be at risk of failure, and how Beijing slowed its renewed coronavirus outbreak .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: The Trump administration contradicts itself over the U.S.-China trade deal, the Three Gorges Dam could be at risk of failure, and how Beijing slowed its renewed coronavirus outbreak.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Trump Has Had a Bad Week on China Policy
Six months on, the status of the U.S.-China trade deal remains murky. On Monday, U.S. trade advisor and China hawk Peter Navarro called the deal “over” in a TV interview, only to have President Donald Trump contradict him hours later after markets dipped. Trump attempted to put the onus of the breakdown in relations on China, but the state of the global economy makes fulfillment of even the “phase one” terms, which governed the first two years, unlikely.
Meanwhile, in a week that typified the administration’s inconsistent attitude on China, Trump has also doubled down on anti-Chinese racism, repeatedly using a racist term to describe the coronavirus. That gives easy ammunition to Beijing, seeking to position itself as the global defender of the Chinese diaspora against anti-Asian racism stirred by the pandemic. The wild swings coming out of Washington make it difficult to form coherent policy, but they also stir further mistrust in Beijing, where officials find it hard to grasp that the administration can be as chaotic as it is and instead see plots or deceit.
Political revelations. The rhetoric followed the release of former National Security Advisor John Bolton’s book, which alleges that Trump asked Chinese President Xi Jinping to help him win reelection, sided with Xi on China’s description of its concentration camps for ethnic minorities, and dismissed the plight of the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Trump signed the Uighur Human Rights Act last week after congressional pressure but admitted in an interview that he delayed sanctions in order to push through the trade deal—as FP’s Amy Mackinnon reported last year. Today it emerged that the White House had asked a senator to hold up another China sanctions bill.
Divided team. There have always been factions within Trump’s administration on China: the business-first approach of Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin; the racism of advisors such as Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon; the full-blown hawkishness of Navarro; the human rights-led policy of Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger.
As Bolton’s book shows, Trump—who has praised the 1989 Tiananmen massacre as showing “strength”—couldn’t give a damn about human rights in China. As in the rest of his foreign policy, personal need and flattery have shaped his attitude toward Beijing.
What We’re Following
Three Gorges Dam is at risk. The Chinese government is denying that the infamous Three Gorges Dam is at risk of collapse after heavy flooding and a warning from a famous hydrologist—raising suspicions, naturally, that it is in fact at risk. Foreign journalists attempting to report on the recent issues were followed and their sources threatened. A Three Gorges Dam collapse would be a disaster even greater than the last time a major dam failed in China. In 1975, the collapse of the Banqiao Dam killed 230,000 people.
Media spat intensifies. The United States has listed four more Chinese outlets as “foreign missions,” requiring them to register their staff and property in the United States. This round includes the Global Times, a belligerent tabloid owned by the People’s Daily, and the China News Service, which traditionally targets overseas Chinese communities and has been involved in social media propaganda campaigns. (I worked at both when I lived in China, and while there are diligent journalists at these publications doing the best they can, there’s no doubt the government ultimately pulls the strings.)
Expect a round of retaliatory expulsions of Western journalists, like the ones that followed the earlier measures in March.
Beijing’s new outbreak is halted. The comprehensive measures taken against a renewed coronavirus outbreak in Beijing appear successful, with just 249 cases reported total since the outbreak emerged last week. Chinese epidemiologists have warned that the country will live with the risk of future outbreaks for the foreseeable future, even when there are zero cases officially reported. Beijing performed 300,000 daily tests during this new outbreak, over half the number administered in the entire United States in one day.
Contentious book release delayed. A new book by Clive Hamilton—the author of the controversial but influential Silent Invasion—and Mareike Ohlberg on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence in Western democracies is being held up by legal action threatened by one of the groups named, a Sino-British business association called the 48 Group Club.
This is notable because it presages future legal battles over ties to Beijing—and because it shows how clumsy Chinese influence can be. It’s often difficult for Chinese officials to know what’s important in other countries: The 48 Group Club holds little significance in U.K. politics but has been heavily promoted by Chinese media.
Tech and Business
Trade threats against India. Following the deadly border clash last week, Chinese media is making threats against India’s economy if boycotts continue. “Boycott China” is a popular call in India—even predating the border violence—and it is likely to pick up steam as India’s pandemic death toll grows. States are already canceling deals with Chinese firms. The Indian national leadership has so far held back, attracting criticism at home. But Beijing’s desire to pick fights—literal and metaphorical—seems strong at the moment, from Australia to Taiwan.
Tech backlash. Another consequence of the border clash is India’s decision to exclude Chinese companies from critical telecommunications infrastructure. That’s new: Even at the end of last year, India was looking to Huawei and other firms as potential partners. It’s going to be tough for Indian firms to separate from Chinese funding, but it’s a significant step. Security concerns over 5G are the potential foundation of a loose alliance directed at containing Chinese influence. A growing number of states once willing to work with Chinese firms, such as the U.K., are now calling for alternatives.
Baidu ends U.S. deal. The Chinese search giant Baidu, which has rebranded itself as an artificial intelligence firm in recent years, has left the Partnership for AI—a largely U.S.-led effort on global AI ethics. Baidu’s official reasoning was cost, but the increasingly cold atmosphere over tech policy likely played a role. Other AI firms have already been banned from working in the United States due to involvement with surveillance and control in Xinjiang.
As Jacob Helberg wrote in Foreign Policy this week, the walls are going up: Even firms that want to be neutral will have to pick sides.
What We’re Reading
Reading the China Dream does essential work collecting and translating Chinese essays by establishment intellectuals—and their critics. This full-on blast by the critic Rong Jian against the New Left scholar Wang Hui’s essay on Lenin shows how interesting this work can be when writers are able to write with some freedom. Rong and Wang were both Tiananmen participants, but Rong sees Wang as having sold out to the CCP.
Rong gets straight to the hollow ideas of establishment Maoists in contemporary China: “The conundrum faced by today’s Maoists is not much better; they would like to bring back Lenin’s ideas by commemorating the 150th anniversary of Lenin’s birth, but are prisoners of their poor imagination, crude language, and outdated notions, and are hence unable to reshape ‘Comrade Lenin’ into a modern Internet celebrity,” he writes.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-24--Anatomy of a Kosovo Summit Catastrophe

Anatomy of a Kosovo Summit Catastrophe

In March of this year , the Trump administration successfully engineered the collapse of a friendly government in Pristina , the capital of Kosovo .
Rather than a covert CIA operation , the administration and the U.S. Embassy mounted overt pressure .
Within weeks of suspending development assistance and threatening to withdraw U.S. troops from the NATO peacekeeping force , the government of reformist Prime Minister Albin Kurti was gone .
While Washington was busy pressuring Kosovo , Moscow and Beijing were doing the opposite in Serbia : providing critical pandemic support as the coronavirus began sweeping across the Balkans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of materials ranging from personal protective equipment to ventilators , Russia and China shrewdly sent personnel to perform highly visible missions .
Russian biological warfare experts disinfected hospitals .
Chinese public health experts from Wuhan guided Serbian officials in the strict test-and-quarantine model that became the basis for the Serbian response to the coronavirus .
The still-unfolding tumult from the COVID-19 pandemic , which threatens to turn the Balkans into a Sino-Russian influence zone , puts this week ’ s White House meeting between Serbia and Kosovo—billed as a “ historic ” breakthrough—in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s national security interests lie in staving off Russian and Chinese designs on the region by closely cooperating with its European allies .
Unfortunately , the Trump administration , in a rushed bid for a one-day public relations coup this Saturday , has shattered Western unity at the very moment when Russia and China are closing ranks on an agenda of regional subversion .
What ’ s more , the short-sighted strategy has complicated achievement of a Kosovo settlement , instead , reinforcing the appeal to Belgrade of a highly-problematic land swap @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kosovo ’ s President Hashim Thaci has been indicted for war crimes has kicked the legs out from under the administration ’ s strategy , spoiling its machinations in Kosovo ’ s politics , and setting up Saturday ’ s meeting to be a fiasco .
U.S. President Donald Trump himself set out the administration ’ s goals in letters sent in 2018 and 2019 to the presidents of Serbia and of Kosovo , urging them to reach a “ historic accord ” for a “ comprehensive peace ” that would include as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( Serbia refuses to recognize its former province , leaving Kosovo out of the United Nations and most international organizations . )
Trump appointed then-Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell as his special envoy for Kosovo and Serbia negotiations .
Grenell dove into his assignment with gusto , focusing on job-creation in a region that is hemorrhaging its young people .
But this Saturday ’ s anticipated deal on economic cooperation falls far short of Trump ’ s own terms for success—and may not go far to achieve Grenell ’ s .
According to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the talks will be agreements on air , rail , and motorway connectivity between Serbia and Kosovo .
His vision is to create “ momentum ” from “ economic normalization , ” paving the way for a political settlement .
There are good reasons to be skeptical .
First , the special envoy has skewed the negotiating dynamics in favor of the intransigent side , Belgrade .
To get talks going , Grenell had in January demanded that each side reciprocally remove its obstacle—lifting tariffs on the Kosovo side and halting the d-recognition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( Serbia has persuaded a number of countries in the developing world to drop their recognition of Kosovo . )
In his announcement of this week ’ s White House parley , Grenell moved the goal posts in Serbia ’ s favor .
Beyond lifting tariffs , Kosovo had to agree to suspend its effort to join international organizations .
This was the main reason the administration wanted Kurti , who has fought for equity in the negotiations with Serbia , removed .
The concession was also a serious negotiating blunder .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ point of pressure that it had on Belgrade , which was forced to expend considerable diplomatic energy to keep Kosovo out of organizations like Interpol .
This gives Serbia one more reason to sit on its hands .
And Kosovo has gained nothing in return for this concession , not even stepped-up U.S. political support .
To the contrary , Grenell announced this week that all the difficult political issues will be left to the European Union in a phase-two dialogue , while the United States focuses exclusively on the economy at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insistence on initially mediating by itself defies the record of success .
The 2013 Brussels Normalization Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo was achieved with close-knit U.S. and EU political cooperation .
Notably , it was Aleksandar Vucic and Ivica Dacic , now Serbia ’ s president and foreign minister , respectively , who accepted the Brussels Agreement .
Their acquiescence is a reminder that with airtight diplomatic collaboration , the West can apply leverage to powerful effect .
Third , the expectation that the EU will later take the lead on resolving outstanding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is Europe more splintered politically than on Kosovo .
Five EU countries do not recognize Kosovo ’ s independence , including Slovakia and Spain , the home countries , respectively , of the EU special envoy on Serbia and Kosovo , Miroslav Lajcak , and the EU ’ s overall foreign minister , Josep Borrell .
Because of the split , the EU doesn ’ t even speak of recognition , asking only that Belgrade “ normalize ” its relations in order to qualify for EU membership .
Citing this weakness , Kosovo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favor of Grenell , but now Thaci is gone from the picture and the Kosovo side will have to depend on the EU envoy as its mainstay on political negotiations that look even more difficult .
Pristina is now in complete disarray , with brand new Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti dragooned into a White House orchestrated meeting with Serbia ’ s President Vucic , whose powers have never been greater .
Rarely has a sensitive diplomatic negotiation been so mismatched .
Fourth , even assuming that the Grenell theory of the case is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ breakthrough—the US special envoy has only made it harder to realize his vision , particularly for a free trade zone .
The one goal that Serbia and Kosovo share with all their neighbors is to join the largest free trade zone of all , the European Union .
Removing existing ( pre-membership ) barriers to commerce requires intricate knowledge of EU regulations because Balkan countries are at different stages of harmonization with the EU .
Instead of partnering on this worthy endeavor , Grenell has gone out of his way to alienate the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic actor , Germany .
The U.S. envoy has ignored the EU ’ s own efforts with business communities , bringing the heads of Serbia ’ s and Kosovo ’ s Chambers of Commerce together , for example .
In so doing , he has made it less likely that Brussels will listen to Washington and grant Kosovo much-needed visa liberalization .
Fifth , Grenell ignores the severe impact of corruption and weak rule of law on Balkan economies .
The exodus of young people from around the region ’ s economies is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and also the sclerotic system for allocating them—through connections , not merit .
If economic growth and jobs were truly Grenell ’ s priority , he never would have expelled Prime Minister Kurti , who had already begun taking bold steps to fight corruption and boost transparency in Kosovo .
Sixth , even assuming that the United States overcomes all of these obstacles and manages , alone or with EU assistance , to catalyze development and trade between Serbia and Kosovo , that will still not alter their fundamental power and size imbalance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laudable—is unlikely to ever become of decisive importance for Serbia .
Seventh , and most sobering , there are few examples from the region of economic interest driving political agreement .
For example , Greece has long been a top investor in North Macedonia , and yet for almost three decades Athens acted against its financial interest , keeping its weaker northern neighbor out of NATO and the EU , just as Serbia isolates Kosovo .
Instead of trade or growth , the biggest political breakthroughs in the region have come as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incentives ( as in 2013 ) or visionary leadership , as shown by Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras , who summoned the courage to finally resolve the Macedonian name dispute in 2018 .
In another profile in courage , Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic , having taken a decisive turn to the West , apologized to Croatia in 2000 for the bombardment of Dubrovnik .
In both cases , political breakthroughs paved the way for precisely what Grenell is seeking for Kosovo and Serbia : genuine reconciliation between bitter enemies and expanding economic cooperation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vucic refuses to take the decisive step that Djukanovic did toward the West , instead “ balancing ” Serbia ’ s EU and U.S. relationship on the one hand with China and Russia on the other .
Nor is he willing , like Tsipras , to preserve national honor through mutual respect and a genuine spirit of compromise .
While Vucic speaks of compromise , he refuses to lay the groundwork for it , instead framing his core demand as compensation for a bitter loss .
The autocrat almost totally controls the media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant political opposition , yet he has never seriously pursued the promised “ internal dialogue ” on Kosovo that would open up acknowledgement of heavy Serbian responsibility for the Kosovo standoff and lower the threshold for a final settlement.. Today ’ s announcement by the Specialist Chambers in the Hague of the egregious allegations against Thaci and his associate , PDK party leader Kadri Veseli , only underscores the need for thorough Serbian self-examination .
As the taboo in Kosovo on speaking about crimes against Serbs is finally shattered , so must be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sordid past , going back to the original act of dismantling Kosovo ’ s autonomy and instituting repression .
The need in Serbia and in Kosovo to confront the past is as overdue and essential as efforts to grow the economy—and now , with the facts in the open , far more feasible .
From time to time , Vucic sprinkles cryptic mentions of the need to “ accept reality ” on top of the baseline narrative of wholesale Serbian victimization in Kosovo at the hands of NATO and perfidious Albanians .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the growing sense of security among Kosovo Serbs and their diminished preoccupation with inter-ethnic questions .
Curiously , Belgrade seems to have lost interest in establishing an association of Kosovo Serb municipalities , once a core demand that Kosovars had signed up to .
Standing next to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov , Vucic last week voiced his clearest demand for compensation for recognizing Kosovo , explicitly stating that EU membership alone would not be enough .
Diplomats have long indulged Vucic on the topic of compensation , helping lead to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to with his counterpart , Thaci , last year .
But trading territory between Kosovo and Serbia also means trading populations , a serious problem in Kosovo , where more than half the country ’ s Serbs would end up on the “ wrong side ” of the new border .
Partition of Kosovo would also excite similar ethno-territorial impulses around the region , the primary reason that the EU envoy Lajcak along with other European figures have ruled it out .
Grenell insists that the land swap is not part of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evidence of Grenell having matched his pressure on Pristina with anything similar on Belgrade , a step that might stem the appetite for compensation .
Ironically , as the Serbian president becomes more dominant domestically—after Sunday ’ s elections , which were boycotted by the opposition , Vucic ’ s party and affiliates now control virtually the entire Serbian parliament—less is asked of him internationally .
This trend seems set to continue .
Vucic enjoys the protection of his neighbor , Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban .
Orban is Vucic ’ s closest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Serbia ’ s EU membership .
So far , Orban is the only EU leader to congratulate Vucic on his dubious election victory .
Orban offers Vucic a political model for embracing Russia and China while keeping the EU at bay.. Belgrade has already taken an alarming turn toward the East , particularly as China builds on its COVID-19 “ mask diplomacy.
” The Sino-Serbian relationship has moved beyond the signature , opaque Chinese-financed investments into the realm of national security and even national values .
To cite one troubling example , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Huawei to install 1,000 security cameras in Belgrade .
This step comes as Vucic has achieved wholesale party control over Serbia ’ s security , investigative , and intelligence apparatus , including the installation of loyalists at senior and even operational levels , raising the potential for abuse by Belgrade or Beijing alike .
Russia and China both enjoy highly favorable treatment in the Serbian media compared to the EU , which Vucic slammed at the onset of the pandemic for its self-centered initial response .
The autocrat revels in fawning displays of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and dotting Serbia with cult-like billboards expressing gratitude to “ Brother Xi.
” Vucic just returned from Moscow and his 18th meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin whom Vucic has effusively thanked and whose instructions he seems to be following .
The abject disparity in treatment between West and East has had a stark impact on public opinion in Serbia .
Almost 3 in 4 Serbs mistakenly believe that Russia and China are the country ’ s most important trading partners , although more than two-thirds of Serbia ’ s trade is with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China and Russia show no signs of rivalry over Serbia .
To the contrary , the coronavirus pandemic has brought them closer together , while the Trump administration ’ s misguided Kosovo venture has driven another stake between the United States and its allies As the increasingly shaky White House gathering of Serbia and Kosovo approaches , it ’ s time for senior officials like the nominal host , National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien , to have a closer look at Grenell ’ s handiwork .
Trump ’ s own stated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk .

In March of this year, the Trump administration successfully engineered the collapse of a friendly government in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. Rather than a covert CIA operation, the administration and the U.S. Embassy mounted overt pressure. Within weeks of suspending development assistance and threatening to withdraw U.S. troops from the NATO peacekeeping force, the government of reformist Prime Minister Albin Kurti was gone.
In March of this year, the Trump administration successfully engineered the collapse of a friendly government in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. Rather than a covert CIA operation, the administration and the U.S. Embassy mounted overt pressure. Within weeks of suspending development assistance and threatening to withdraw U.S. troops from the NATO peacekeeping force, the government of reformist Prime Minister Albin Kurti was gone.
While Washington was busy pressuring Kosovo, Moscow and Beijing were doing the opposite in Serbia: providing critical pandemic support as the coronavirus began sweeping across the Balkans. In addition to planeloads and truckloads of materials ranging from personal protective equipment to ventilators, Russia and China shrewdly sent personnel to perform highly visible missions. Russian biological warfare experts disinfected hospitals. Chinese public health experts from Wuhan guided Serbian officials in the strict test-and-quarantine model that became the basis for the Serbian response to the coronavirus.
The still-unfolding tumult from the COVID-19 pandemic, which threatens to turn the Balkans into a Sino-Russian influence zone, puts this week’s White House meeting between Serbia and Kosovo—billed as a “historic” breakthrough—in a new and troubling perspective. America’s national security interests lie in staving off Russian and Chinese designs on the region by closely cooperating with its European allies. Unfortunately, the Trump administration, in a rushed bid for a one-day public relations coup this Saturday, has shattered Western unity at the very moment when Russia and China are closing ranks on an agenda of regional subversion. What’s more, the short-sighted strategy has complicated achievement of a Kosovo settlement, instead, reinforcing the appeal to Belgrade of a highly-problematic land swap. Today’s bombshell announcement that Kosovo’s President Hashim Thaci has been indicted for war crimes has kicked the legs out from under the administration’s strategy, spoiling its machinations in Kosovo’s politics, and setting up Saturday’s meeting to be a fiasco.
U.S. President Donald Trump himself set out the administration’s goals in letters sent in 2018 and 2019 to the presidents of Serbia and of Kosovo, urging them to reach a “historic accord” for a “comprehensive peace” that would include as its central element “mutual recognition.” (Serbia refuses to recognize its former province, leaving Kosovo out of the United Nations and most international organizations.) Trump appointed then-Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell as his special envoy for Kosovo and Serbia negotiations. Grenell dove into his assignment with gusto, focusing on job-creation in a region that is hemorrhaging its young people. But this Saturday’s anticipated deal on economic cooperation falls far short of Trump’s own terms for success—and may not go far to achieve Grenell’s. According to the U.S. envoy, the backbone of the talks will be agreements on air, rail, and motorway connectivity between Serbia and Kosovo. His vision is to create “momentum” from “economic normalization,” paving the way for a political settlement.
There are good reasons to be skeptical. First, the special envoy has skewed the negotiating dynamics in favor of the intransigent side, Belgrade. To get talks going, Grenell had in January demanded that each side reciprocally remove its obstacle—lifting tariffs on the Kosovo side and halting the d-recognition campaign against Kosovo on the Serbian side. (Serbia has persuaded a number of countries in the developing world to drop their recognition of Kosovo.) In his announcement of this week’s White House parley, Grenell moved the goal posts in Serbia’s favor. Beyond lifting tariffs, Kosovo had to agree to suspend its effort to join international organizations. This was the main reason the administration wanted Kurti, who has fought for equity in the negotiations with Serbia, removed. The concession was also a serious negotiating blunder. The Kosovo delegation has surrendered the one point of pressure that it had on Belgrade, which was forced to expend considerable diplomatic energy to keep Kosovo out of organizations like Interpol. This gives Serbia one more reason to sit on its hands. And Kosovo has gained nothing in return for this concession, not even stepped-up U.S. political support. To the contrary, Grenell announced this week that all the difficult political issues will be left to the European Union in a phase-two dialogue, while the United States focuses exclusively on the economy at the outset.
Second, Washington’s insistence on initially mediating by itself defies the record of success. The 2013 Brussels Normalization Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo was achieved with close-knit U.S. and EU political cooperation. Notably, it was Aleksandar Vucic and Ivica Dacic, now Serbia’s president and foreign minister, respectively, who accepted the Brussels Agreement. Their acquiescence is a reminder that with airtight diplomatic collaboration, the West can apply leverage to powerful effect.
Third, the expectation that the EU will later take the lead on resolving outstanding political issues defies common sense. Nowhere is Europe more splintered politically than on Kosovo. Five EU countries do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, including Slovakia and Spain, the home countries, respectively, of the EU special envoy on Serbia and Kosovo, Miroslav Lajcak, and the EU’s overall foreign minister, Josep Borrell. Because of the split, the EU doesn’t even speak of recognition, asking only that Belgrade “normalize” its relations in order to qualify for EU membership. Citing this weakness, Kosovo President Hashim Thaci has scorned Lajcak in favor of Grenell, but now Thaci is gone from the picture and the Kosovo side will have to depend on the EU envoy as its mainstay on political negotiations that look even more difficult. Pristina is now in complete disarray, with brand new Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti dragooned into a White House orchestrated meeting with Serbia’s President Vucic, whose powers have never been greater. Rarely has a sensitive diplomatic negotiation been so mismatched.
Fourth, even assuming that the Grenell theory of the case is correct—that economic normalization will lead to political breakthrough—the US special envoy has only made it harder to realize his vision, particularly for a free trade zone. The one goal that Serbia and Kosovo share with all their neighbors is to join the largest free trade zone of all, the European Union. Removing existing (pre-membership) barriers to commerce requires intricate knowledge of EU regulations because Balkan countries are at different stages of harmonization with the EU. Instead of partnering on this worthy endeavor, Grenell has gone out of his way to alienate the Europeans, including Europe’s biggest economic actor, Germany. The U.S. envoy has ignored the EU’s own efforts with business communities, bringing the heads of Serbia’s and Kosovo’s Chambers of Commerce together, for example. In so doing, he has made it less likely that Brussels will listen to Washington and grant Kosovo much-needed visa liberalization.
Fifth, Grenell ignores the severe impact of corruption and weak rule of law on Balkan economies. The exodus of young people from around the region’s economies is driven both by scarcity of good jobs and also the sclerotic system for allocating them—through connections, not merit. If economic growth and jobs were truly Grenell’s priority, he never would have expelled Prime Minister Kurti, who had already begun taking bold steps to fight corruption and boost transparency in Kosovo.
Sixth, even assuming that the United States overcomes all of these obstacles and manages, alone or with EU assistance, to catalyze development and trade between Serbia and Kosovo, that will still not alter their fundamental power and size imbalance. Expanded trade with Kosovo—however desirable and laudable—is unlikely to ever become of decisive importance for Serbia.
Seventh, and most sobering, there are few examples from the region of economic interest driving political agreement. For example, Greece has long been a top investor in North Macedonia, and yet for almost three decades Athens acted against its financial interest, keeping its weaker northern neighbor out of NATO and the EU, just as Serbia isolates Kosovo.
Instead of trade or growth, the biggest political breakthroughs in the region have come as a result of either concerted Western pressure or incentives (as in 2013) or visionary leadership, as shown by Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, who summoned the courage to finally resolve the Macedonian name dispute in 2018. In another profile in courage, Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, having taken a decisive turn to the West, apologized to Croatia in 2000 for the bombardment of Dubrovnik. In both cases, political breakthroughs paved the way for precisely what Grenell is seeking for Kosovo and Serbia: genuine reconciliation between bitter enemies and expanding economic cooperation.
Unfortunately, Serbia’s President Vucic refuses to take the decisive step that Djukanovic did toward the West, instead “balancing” Serbia’s EU and U.S. relationship on the one hand with China and Russia on the other. Nor is he willing, like Tsipras, to preserve national honor through mutual respect and a genuine spirit of compromise. While Vucic speaks of compromise, he refuses to lay the groundwork for it, instead framing his core demand as compensation for a bitter loss. The autocrat almost totally controls the media and narrative in Serbia and faces no significant political opposition, yet he has never seriously pursued the promised “internal dialogue” on Kosovo that would open up acknowledgement of heavy Serbian responsibility for the Kosovo standoff and lower the threshold for a final settlement.. Today’s announcement by the Specialist Chambers in the Hague of the egregious allegations against Thaci and his associate, PDK party leader Kadri Veseli, only underscores the need for thorough Serbian self-examination. As the taboo in Kosovo on speaking about crimes against Serbs is finally shattered, so must be the case in Serbia with its own sordid past, going back to the original act of dismantling Kosovo’s autonomy and instituting repression. The need in Serbia and in Kosovo to confront the past is as overdue and essential as efforts to grow the economy—and now, with the facts in the open, far more feasible.
From time to time, Vucic sprinkles cryptic mentions of the need to “accept reality” on top of the baseline narrative of wholesale Serbian victimization in Kosovo at the hands of NATO and perfidious Albanians. There is little acknowledgement of progress, such as the growing sense of security among Kosovo Serbs and their diminished preoccupation with inter-ethnic questions. Curiously, Belgrade seems to have lost interest in establishing an association of Kosovo Serb municipalities, once a core demand that Kosovars had signed up to.
Standing next to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Vucic last week voiced his clearest demand for compensation for recognizing Kosovo, explicitly stating that EU membership alone would not be enough. Diplomats have long indulged Vucic on the topic of compensation, helping lead to the controversial land swap that Vucic reportedly agreed to with his counterpart, Thaci, last year. But trading territory between Kosovo and Serbia also means trading populations, a serious problem in Kosovo, where more than half the country’s Serbs would end up on the “wrong side” of the new border. Partition of Kosovo would also excite similar ethno-territorial impulses around the region, the primary reason that the EU envoy Lajcak along with other European figures have ruled it out. Grenell insists that the land swap is not part of his plan. Nonetheless, there is no evidence of Grenell having matched his pressure on Pristina with anything similar on Belgrade, a step that might stem the appetite for compensation.
Ironically, as the Serbian president becomes more dominant domestically—after Sunday’s elections, which were boycotted by the opposition, Vucic’s party and affiliates now control virtually the entire Serbian parliament—less is asked of him internationally. This trend seems set to continue. Vucic enjoys the protection of his neighbor, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Orban is Vucic’s closest EU partner and the most vocal champion of Serbia’s EU membership. So far, Orban is the only EU leader to congratulate Vucic on his dubious election victory.
Orban offers Vucic a political model for embracing Russia and China while keeping the EU at bay.. Belgrade has already taken an alarming turn toward the East, particularly as China builds on its COVID-19 “mask diplomacy.” The Sino-Serbian relationship has moved beyond the signature, opaque Chinese-financed investments into the realm of national security and even national values. To cite one troubling example, Belgrade has contracted with the Chinese company Huawei to install 1,000 security cameras in Belgrade. This step comes as Vucic has achieved wholesale party control over Serbia’s security, investigative, and intelligence apparatus, including the installation of loyalists at senior and even operational levels, raising the potential for abuse by Belgrade or Beijing alike.
Russia and China both enjoy highly favorable treatment in the Serbian media compared to the EU, which Vucic slammed at the onset of the pandemic for its self-centered initial response. The autocrat revels in fawning displays of sycophancy, like kissing the Chinese flag and dotting Serbia with cult-like billboards expressing gratitude to “Brother Xi.” Vucic just returned from Moscow and his 18th meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin whom Vucic has effusively thanked and whose instructions he seems to be following. The abject disparity in treatment between West and East has had a stark impact on public opinion in Serbia. Almost 3 in 4 Serbs mistakenly believe that Russia and China are the country’s most important trading partners, although more than two-thirds of Serbia’s trade is with the EU.
Unlike the West, China and Russia show no signs of rivalry over Serbia. To the contrary, the coronavirus pandemic has brought them closer together, while the Trump administration’s misguided Kosovo venture has driven another stake between the United States and its allies. As the increasingly shaky White House gathering of Serbia and Kosovo approaches, it’s time for senior officials like the nominal host, National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, to have a closer look at Grenell’s handiwork. Trump’s own stated goals—on China and on Kosovo itself—are at risk.