foreignpolicy--2020-12-15--A High Court Decision in Britain Puts Trans People Everywhere at Risk

A High Court Decision in Britain Puts Trans People Everywhere at Risk Earlier this month , the British High Court judged that no children under the age of 16 can meet the standard for informed consent—a long-established norm known as “ Gillick competency ” —that would allow them to take puberty blockers , drugs that delay hormone-induced development .
In effect , the British courts intervened in the transition-related care of any children in the United Kingdom experiencing gender dysphoria , putting those children and their families in the position of having to seek care abroad .
To some children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the best of times—can be especially painful because it enacts changes to the body that may be irreversible without painful and costly surgeries .
That ’ s why the British Medical Association recently affirmed its position that transition-related care for minors should focus on delaying puberty .
Doctors recommend prescribing a medicine called leuprolide acetate , sold under the brand name Lupron , which has been used to hold off premature puberty , a condition known as “ central precocious puberty , ” since 1993 .
As with other puberty blockers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is an unprecedented juridical attack on the LGBT community in the U.K. , in which the British state has asserted a right to enforce unwanted puberty—and to arrest transitions that are already in progress—on the slimmest of pretexts .
It also reflects a disturbing escalation of anti-transgender policy across the United Kingdom .
A formerly highly marginal ideology , the so-called gender critical position , has captured British institutions .
The court ’ s decision was lauded not just by the British right-wing press like the Spectator but , more strikingly , by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ applauded the decision , suggesting that it will “ ensure that children will now receive the protection to which they are legally entitled.
” The author J.K. Rowling , whose anti-trans activism galvanized the movement earlier this year , took another opportunity to claim that there is a “ climate of fear ” around trans issues .
That ’ s true , although perhaps multimillionaires like Rowling have less reason to be afraid than the children and trans people targeted for abuse , harassment , and violence amid rapidly intensifying moral panic around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a broad church , but at its core is the belief that women are unified by what the Woman ’ s Place UK manifesto calls “ sex-based needs , ” so they are therefore in particular need of what they call “ sex-based rights.
” These might be characterized as the ever greater and more specific biological specification not merely of “ women ” as a legal entity but of various classes of women whose commonality might otherwise be understood not as biological , but cultural .
For example , a recent gender @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trans women “ within the legal categories of woman , of lesbian , and of mother threatens to remove all meaning from these categories.
” This position is profoundly at odds with both mainstream liberal feminism and with the left-wing radical feminists like Shulamith Firestone whom the gender critical advocates sometimes cite as influences .
While gender critical feminists demand more and more intense legal regulation of women ’ s personhoods and identities , radical feminists have historically seen the liberation of women from “ legal categories ” themselves as a vital component @ @ @ @ @ @ @ critical thought derives from the very marginal work of trans-exclusionary feminists such as Janice Raymond , whose manifesto The Transsexual Empire : The Making of the She-Male was published in 1979 .
Raymond argued that “ all transsexuals rape women ’ s bodies by reducing the real female form to an artifact , appropriating this body for themselves , ” and that consequently , “ the problem of transsexualism would be best served by morally mandating it out of existence.
” That explicitly essentialist line of thinking was contested by feminists like Gayle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that there is no single “ real female form ” to which all women ’ s bodies can be made to conform—that the oppression of women took place not on the grounds of women ’ s biological condition but on their social position .
The court ’ s decision in Bell v. Tavistock is a major achievement for the gender critical position and a disaster for both LGBT children and their families .
It is based on three flimsy pieces of reasoning .
First , and most consequentially , the decision had almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sought to address .
The complainant in that case , Keira Bell , brought a case based on a gender transition she regretted , and which she now feared had negatively impacted , in particular , her fertility .
But the remedy that the court proposed would have had no bearing on those damages : Bell began taking hormone replacement therapy ( HRT ) as an adult , at 18 , and obtained her top surgery at 20 .
Bell ’ s lawyer argued in court that her decision to seek treatment with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prescribed Lupron , a puberty blocker , at an earlier age .
It is unusual for courts to be swayed by this kind of “ slippery slope ” fallacy , especially when Bell was also , and contradictorily , arguing that her interest in transition was caused by “ the internet.
” But it was especially bizarre for the court to argue that the puberty blockers “ pave the way ” for the later , adult interventions because of the high percentage of patients who advance from puberty blockers to HRT ( though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any evidence on what that percentage actually is ) .
If that percentage is high , it would only be because the number is low—only 161 children were treated for gender dysphoria with puberty blockers in the year 2019-2020 , implying that there are , despite much propaganda to the contrary , significant screenings of children before they are prescribed Lupron .
One might think it a good thing that doctors tend to prescribe puberty blockers only to those who then go on to transition .
But the fact has created a very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involved in the court case had indeed been prescribing Lupron as carelessly as has been claimed , and therefore the rate of detransition were higher than it is , then the clinic would have removed one of the bases of the case against them .
The clinic was penalized , in other words , for demonstrating precisely the diagnostic restraint that the High Court judgment wants to encourage , but which it makes impossible .
And because it had accepted the argument that the blockers caused patients to transition , the court was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claiming that an irreversible puberty , rather than an easily reversible ( though rarely reversed ) intervention , would better give young people a chance to “ pause ” their decision .
The system that the court has dismantled was designed to give adolescents an opportunity to determine how they want to live and to look , without undergoing the irreversible and often profoundly disturbing physical transformations of an unwanted puberty .
That subtlety has now been erased in British law .
Finally , the particular concern over “ fertility ” that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ word appears 23 times in the decision , versus eight times for “ transgender ” ) , reveals the clearly conservative social project at the core of this decision .
The court determined that “ there is no age appropriate way to explain to many of these children what losing their fertility or full sexual function may mean to them in later years.
” But talking to children about fertility and sex was already routine in the decisions over contraception , surgery , and other treatments that were a key part of Gillick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any case , the medication in question , Lupron , has no effect on fertility or sexual function .
The muddled thinking and moral panic of the Bell v. Tavistock decision requires cultural analysis , not just legal dissection : How was such a wrong and dangerous decision met with almost universal acclaim in the British media ?
The root cause is the escalating and intensifying campaign against trans people being waged online .
A recent article in the Atlantic compares online “ gender critical ” activism to the alt-right message boards that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s presidential campaign in 2016 , and it quotes gender critical activists engaging in a similar type of cruel , trollish humor .
The analogy is more than theoretical : The Women ’ s Liberation Front , an anti-trans activist organization , has slowly allowed itself to become a front for the right-wing Heritage Foundation ; as Sophie Lewis argues in an essay in the New York Times , many of the most prominent “ gender critical feminists ” in the U.K. are , in fact , explicitly committed anti-feminists .
The anti-trans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and more mainstream faces of gender critical activism .
By her own account , Rowling was radicalized by her interest in Maya Forstater , who had lost her job after tweeting “ pronouns are rohypnol ” and posting an article implicitly comparing trans women with rapists .
( The notion that trans women are sexual predators who are aroused by using women ’ s restrooms is a common notion on gender critical message boards , despite this having no basis in reality . )
The alt-right and the gender critical movement also both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speech violations to create the impression that they are the victims of persecution .
Most recently , the anti-trans writer Suzanne Moore has been giving a suite of interviews about why she left the Guardian , citing a letter in which “ 338 colleagues basically bullied [ her ] .
” As was reported at the time , the letter in question made no mention of her by name , nor by any identifying detail , and simply recorded that the signatories were “ deeply distressed by the resignation of another trans colleague.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ are impacting the United States as well .
In the couple of weeks leading up to the Bell v. Tavistock decision , I was embroiled in a strange “ free speech ” controversy , after the anti-trans activist Abigail Shrier claimed in the Wall Street Journal that I was trying to silence her .
Her article ( to which I was not given a chance to respond ) ignited a cascade of follow-up panic-pieces in the Daily Wire , the Federalist , the Daily Caller , Fox News , and the rest of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turn , instigated a torrent of rape and death threats sent to my work email address , and a campaign of letters to my chair and dean trying to get me fired .
Meanwhile , Shrier got a laudatory review in the Economist and then was asked to cover the Bell decision by Newsweek , her third anti-trans article for the magazine this year .
Being “ silenced ” gives you plenty of chances to talk loudly .
How will this fever be broken ?
Feminists around the world need to take more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this chimerical blend of biological essentialism and cultural conservatism .
This will mean confronting the reductive slogans ( “ a woman is an adult human female ” ) with which the gender critical groups seek to bypass critical thought , and learning to recognize the arcane vocabulary they trade in .
The fact of trans people can not itself be a matter for debate , despite the eliminationist fever dreams of Raymond ’ s inheritors in the British High Court .
Vital and profound questions about sex , gender , nature , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fact of trans life—those questions are profoundly enriched by our presence in the world .
They have been addressed powerfully and persuasively by trans feminist thinkers , writers , and activists such as Jules Gill-Peterson , Emma Heaney , Marquis Bey , Sophie Lewis , C. Riley Snorton , and Che Gossett .
The gender critical attempt to reduce terms like “ woman ” to chromosomes—or what online activists sometimes refer to , with an almost comical pedantry , as “ large , immotile gametes ” —is profoundly misguided .
It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by their height ; one might expect gymnasts to share a particular shape , but that isn ’ t definitive of their social position , and there will always be outliers .
There are complexities in the relation between social type and logical category—indeed , that problem has been central to philosophy since Aristotle—but the naive insistence on the self-evidence of natural types is a path to confusion .
That ’ s the route that the court in Bell v. Tavistock took into an erroneous decision that endangers the lives and well-being of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of those who believe fertility , rather than self-determination , is what makes a woman ’ s body worth preserving .

Earlier this month, the British High Court judged that children under the age of 16 have "enormous difficulties" in meeting the standard for informed consent—a long-established norm known as “Gillick competency”—that would allow them to take puberty blockers, drugs that delay hormone-induced development. In effect, the courts intervened in the transition-related care of children experiencing gender dysphoria, putting those children and their families in the position of having to seek care abroad .
Earlier this month, the British High Court judged that children under the age of 16 have “enormous difficulties” in meeting the standard for informed consent—a long-established norm known as “Gillick competency”—that would allow them to take puberty blockers, drugs that delay hormone-induced development. In effect, the courts intervened in the transition-related care of children experiencing gender dysphoria, putting those children and their families in the position of having to seek care abroad.
To some children experiencing gender dysphoria, puberty—a difficult experience at the best of times—can be especially painful because it enacts changes to the body that may be irreversible without painful and costly surgeries. That’s why the British Medical Association recently affirmed its position that transition-related care for minors should focus on delaying puberty.
The decision is an unprecedented juridical attack on the LGBT community in the U.K., in which the British state has asserted a right to enforce unwanted puberty—and to arrest transitions that are already in progress—on the slimmest of pretexts.
It also reflects a disturbing escalation of anti-transgender policy across the United Kingdom. (The law does not yet apply in Scotland, but campaigners are attempting the same change there.) A formerly highly marginal ideology, the so-called gender critical position, has captured British institutions. The court’s decision was lauded not just by the British right-wing press like the Spectator but, more strikingly, by center-left media like the Observer, which applauded the decision, suggesting that it will “ensure that children will now receive the protection to which they are legally entitled.”
The author J.K. Rowling, whose anti-trans activism galvanized the movement earlier this year, took another opportunity to claim that there is a “climate of fear” around trans issues. That’s true, although perhaps multimillionaires like Rowling have less reason to be afraid than the children and trans people targeted for abuse, harassment, and violence amid rapidly intensifying moral panic around the world.
Gender critical feminism is a broad church, but at its core is the belief that women are unified by what the Woman’s Place UK manifesto calls “sex-based needs,” so they are therefore in particular need of what they call “sex-based rights.” These might be characterized as the ever greater and more specific biological specification not merely of “women” as a legal entity but of various classes of women whose commonality might otherwise be understood not as biological, but cultural.
For example, a recent gender critical manifesto argues that the inclusion of trans women “within the legal categories of woman, of lesbian, and of mother threatens to remove all meaning from these categories.” This position is profoundly at odds with both mainstream liberal feminism and with the left-wing radical feminists like Shulamith Firestone whom the gender critical advocates sometimes cite as influences. While gender critical feminists demand more and more intense legal regulation of women’s personhoods and identities, radical feminists have historically seen the liberation of women from “legal categories” themselves as a vital component of feminist liberation.
Instead, gender critical thought derives from the very marginal work of trans-exclusionary feminists such as Janice Raymond, whose manifesto The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male was published in 1979. Raymond argued that “all transsexuals rape women’s bodies by reducing the real female form to an artifact, appropriating this body for themselves,” and that consequently, “the problem of transsexualism would be best served by morally mandating it out of existence.” That explicitly essentialist line of thinking was contested by feminists like Gayle Rubin and Judith Butler, who argued that there is no single “real female form” to which all women’s bodies can be made to conform—that the oppression of women took place not on the grounds of women’s biological condition but on their social position.
The court’s decision in Bell v. Tavistock is a major achievement for the gender critical position and a disaster for both LGBT children and their families. It is based on three flimsy pieces of reasoning.
First, and most consequentially, the decision had almost nothing to do with the case it sought to address. The complainant in that case, Keira Bell, brought a case based on a gender transition she regretted, and which she now feared had negatively impacted, in particular, her fertility. But the remedy that the court proposed would have had no bearing on those damages: Bell began taking hormone replacement therapy (HRT) at age 17 and obtained her top surgery at 20. Bell’s lawyer argued in court that her decision to seek treatment with HRT was caused by her having been prescribed a puberty blocker at an earlier age. It is unusual for courts to be swayed by this kind of “slippery slope” fallacy, especially when Bell was also, and contradictorily, arguing that her interest in transition was caused by “the internet.”
But it was especially bizarre for the court to argue that the puberty blockers “pave the way” for the later, adult interventions because of the high percentage of patients who advance from puberty blockers to HRT (though the court did not in fact collect evidence on what that percentage actually is). If that percentage is high, it would only be because the number is low—only 161 children were treated for gender dysphoria with puberty blockers in the year 2019-2020, implying that there are, despite much propaganda to the contrary, significant screenings of children before they are prescribed puberty blockers.
One might think it a good thing that doctors tend to prescribe puberty blockers only to those who then go on to transition. But the fact has created a very odd paradox: If the Tavistock clinic involved in the court case had indeed been prescribing puberty blockers as carelessly as has been claimed, and therefore the rate of detransition were higher than it is, then the clinic would have removed one of the bases of the case against them. The clinic was penalized, in other words, for demonstrating precisely the diagnostic restraint that the High Court judgment wants to encourage, but which it makes impossible.
And because it had accepted the argument that the blockers caused patients to transition, the court was put in the still stranger position of claiming that an irreversible puberty, rather than an easily reversible (though rarely reversed) intervention, would better give young people a chance to “pause” their decision. The system that the court has dismantled was designed to give adolescents an opportunity to determine how they want to live and to look, without undergoing the irreversible and often profoundly disturbing physical transformations of an unwanted puberty. That subtlety has now been erased in British law.
Finally, the particular concern over “fertility” that the court adduced in many places (the word appears 23 times in the decision, versus eight times for “transgender”), reveals the clearly conservative social project at the core of this decision. The court determined that “there is no age appropriate way to explain to many of these children what losing their fertility or full sexual function may mean to them in later years.” But talking to children about fertility and sex was already routine in the decisions over contraception, surgery, and other treatments that were a key part of Gillick competency in the first place.
The muddled thinking and moral panic of the Bell v. Tavistock decision requires cultural analysis, not just legal dissection: How was such a wrong and dangerous decision met with almost universal acclaim in the British media? The root cause is the escalating and intensifying campaign against trans people being waged online.
A recent article in the Atlantic compares online “gender critical” activism to the alt-right message boards that organized online mobs for Donald Trump’s presidential campaign in 2016, and it quotes gender critical activists engaging in a similar type of cruel, trollish humor. The analogy is more than theoretical: The Women’s Liberation Front, an anti-trans activist organization, has slowly allowed itself to become a front for the right-wing Heritage Foundation; as Sophie Lewis argues in an essay in the New York Times, many of the most prominent “gender critical feminists” in the U.K. are, in fact, explicitly committed anti-feminists.
The anti-trans trolls are worryingly close to the friendlier and more mainstream faces of gender critical activism. By her own account, Rowling was radicalized by her interest in Maya Forstater, who lost a preliminary employment tribunal hearing after tweeting a Medium article titled “Pronouns are Rohypnol,” which implicitly compared trans women to rapists and was later taken down by Medium. (The notion that trans women are sexual predators who are aroused by using women’s restrooms is a common notion on gender critical message boards, despite this having no basis in reality.)
The alt-right and the gender critical movement also both delight in confecting entirely fictional supposed free speech violations to create the impression that they are the victims of persecution. Most recently, the anti-trans writer Suzanne Moore has been giving a suite of interviews about why she left the Guardian, citing a letter in which “338 colleagues basically bullied [her].” As was reported at the time, the letter in question made no mention of her by name, nor by any identifying detail, and simply recorded that the signatories were “deeply distressed by the resignation of another trans colleague.”
The effects of the U.K. movement are impacting the United States as well. In the couple of weeks leading up to the Bell v. Tavistock decision, I was embroiled in a strange “free speech” controversy, after the anti-trans activist Abigail Shrier claimed in the Wall Street Journal that I was trying to silence her. Her article (to which I was not given a chance to respond) ignited a cascade of follow-up panic-pieces in the Daily Wire, the Federalist, the Daily Caller, Fox News, and the rest of the right-wing press. That, in turn, instigated a torrent of rape and death threats sent to my work email address, and a campaign of letters to my chair and dean trying to get me fired. Meanwhile, Shrier got a laudatory review in the Economist and then was asked to cover the Bell decision by Newsweek, her third anti-trans article for the magazine this year. Being “silenced” gives you plenty of chances to talk loudly.
How will this fever be broken? Feminists around the world need to take more seriously than we have the rise of this chimerical blend of biological essentialism and cultural conservatism. This will mean confronting the reductive slogans (“a woman is an adult human female”) with which the gender critical groups seek to bypass critical thought, and learning to recognize the arcane vocabulary they trade in.
The fact of trans people cannot itself be a matter for debate, despite the eliminationist fever dreams of Raymond’s inheritors in the British High Court. Vital and profound questions about sex, gender, nature, and nurture do not end when one accepts the fact of trans life—those questions are profoundly enriched by our presence in the world. They have been addressed powerfully and persuasively by trans feminist thinkers, writers, and activists such as Jules Gill-Peterson, Emma Heaney, Marquis Bey, Sophie Lewis, C. Riley Snorton, and Che Gossett.
The gender critical attempt to reduce terms like “woman” to chromosomes—or what online activists sometimes refer to, with an almost comical pedantry, as “large, immotile gametes”—is profoundly misguided. It’s like trying to define a gymnast by their height; one might expect gymnasts to share a particular shape, but that isn’t definitive of their social position, and there will always be outliers.
There are complexities in the relation between social type and logical category—indeed, that problem has been central to philosophy since Aristotle—but the naive insistence on the self-evidence of natural types is a path to confusion. That’s the route that the court in Bell v. Tavistock took into an erroneous decision that endangers the lives and well-being of sexual minorities, while flattering the sensibilities of those who believe fertility, rather than self-determination, is what makes a woman’s body worth preserving.
Correction, Dec. 16, 2020: Maya Forstater lost a preliminary employment tribunal hearing after posting tweets critical of transgender rights. A previous version of this article misstated the timing of her tweets.
Correction, Feb. 1, 2021: The original version of this article misstated the scope of the High Court’s ruling; the judgment only applies to those in England. Also, Keira Bell began hormone replacement therapy at 17; a previous version misstated her age at the time. In addition, an earlier version of this article incorrectly referred to a hormone blocker that the claimant has said elsewhere that she was not prescribed; references to this medication have been removed. An earlier version of this article also misrepresented the court’s evidence collection on the percentage of children who progress from puberty blockers to hormones.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-15--Drug Cartels Are All Over Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok

Drug Cartels Are All Over Instagram , Facebook , and TikTok Late last year , Colombia ’ s federal police arrested Diego Optra , a crime boss who heads a ruthless gang called La Local in the port city of Buenaventura .
In addition to overseeing drug trafficking and extortion rings , La Local was reportedly behind over 90 percent of the city ’ s homicides .
Optra had successfully evaded the police for months , but he left digital breadcrumbs in the form of his meticulously curated Instagram profile .
There , his many fans were regaled regularly with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ designer clothes , and an arsenal of firearms .
According to police officials , his lively social media profile was key to his arrest and conviction .
Optra is not the first crime boss to display his gangster lifestyle on Facebook , Twitter , YouTube , or Instagram .
Nor is he the first to get caught after doing so .
Drug traffickers and gangs are lively social media users across the Americas .
Cartel bosses and their underlings use mainstream social media and popular messaging apps such as Telegram to shore up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , recruit new members , conduct sex trafficking , and sell drugs and contraband .
Mexico used to be ground zero for this kind of activity , where researchers created a new discipline out of studying these narco posts .
Now , gangs in Brazil , Colombia , El Salvador , and the United States are also involved .
Brazil is one of the world ’ s largest consumers and producers of social media content , so it ’ s not surprising that its gangs , militias , and mafia groups regularly post @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drug trafficking factions avoid having too much of a digital footprint , local cells are very active .
Comando Vermelho , one of Brazil ’ s largest arms and drug trafficking organization , uses Twitter as a way to poach young recruits from a rival group in Rio de Janeiro , the Terceiro Comando Puro .
Their tactics are not so subtle : Comando Vermelho ’ s messages urge Terceiro Comando Puro members to switch sides or face a violent end .
These same groups also turn to Facebook to publicize their exploits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while intimidating enemies , including the police .
Instagram is currently the leading platform for selling drugs directly to consumers , while Facebook comes a close second .
Social media is the site of serious competition involving violence .
Comando Vermelho and São Paulo-based Primeiro Comando da Capital , another large trafficking organization—frequently exchange extremely gruesome messages .
These serve a performative purpose : Taped executions of rival gang members , including inside prisons , often circulate on YouTube , WhatsApp , and Telegram .
The goal is not just to frighten opponents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local communities demonstrating who is boss .
Facebook and Instagram are also convenient tools for gangs to select their targets .
The published photos and posts of suspected gangsters and informants are closely monitored , often used by factions and police as justification for their capture and extralegal execution .
In neighborhoods where drug factions are the judges , jurors , and executioners , Facebook has been used to publicize convictions and sentences during mock tribunais do crime , or criminal courts .
Primeiro Comando da Capital , Comando Vermelho , and Guardiões @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the state of Ceará , have issued brutal—and occasionally lethal—sentences against young women accused of treachery and snitching .
In some cases , these show trials are filmed , and the videos are circulated on WhatsApp to warn other locals against crossing the gangs .
In an attempt to gain sympathy , Primeiro Comando da Capital also circulates photos and videos on Facebook and YouTube denouncing the mistreatment of prison inmates .
These videos are often distributed by the faction ’ s legal arm , the Sintonia dos Gravatas .
While increasingly mindful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cartels and street gangs are also avid users of social platforms such as Snapchat and TikTok .
These tools have been especially effective at circulating narco culture at scale .
In Mexico , cartel-generated musical content is technically illegal , including the country ’ s infamous gangster ballads , known as narcocorridos .
TikTok videos , for example , feature the guns , gangs , and gore tropes of some cartels and have racked up millions of views , including among younger audiences in the United States .
This so-called Cartel TikTok has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lifestyle and potentially attracting younger recruits to join criminal factions from Sinaloa in Mexico to Medellín in Colombia .
Social media use by criminal organizations is hardly limited to Latin America .
There are many examples of members of the Italian mafia , especially the Camorra , using TikTok , though the posts have been quickly removed from the site .
After many of the mafia ’ s old guard were arrested during the 2000s , the younger leaders who then assumed command are , unsurprisingly , avid consumers of social media .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ their weapons , tattoos , cars , motorbikes , and other paraphernalia to tunes in the local dialect .
As in the Americas , the Italian mafia also uses social media to recruit new members from Italy ’ s disaffected youth , especially in Sicily and the southern regions of Calabria and Puglia .
Social platforms such as Snapchat and TikTok have been especially effective at circulating narco culture at scale .
Law enforcement agencies have been warning for years that the so-called darknet—the unmonitored reaches of the internet—is one of the largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other illicit goods and services .
Transnational law enforcement operations involving simultaneous takedowns of darknet vendors are routine .
Yet hiding in plain sight is the sale of illicit goods on public social media .
Instagram is currently the leading platform for selling drugs directly to consumers , while Facebook comes a close second .
These platforms serve as a kind of halfway point between the street market and the darknet .
Buyers and sellers use traditional social media platforms and virtual private networks to plug contacts into encrypted services such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wickr .
All social media companies are aware of the risk of organized crime colonizing their sites .
They are equally clear that glorifying violence and engaging in criminal activities violates their terms of use .
Content moderators have been kept busy , with videos and posts rapidly removed after they are identified .
Yet there are concerns that the tech giants are not doing enough and that a more proactive approach is needed .
Precisely how to do this—while also avoiding violations of the right to privacy and free speech—is complex .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brazilian Congress , for example , is reviewing a bill to punish anyone who posts or shares any content that in any way endorses criminal activity on social media .
In Colombia , the national policing authorities have invested in digital surveillance technologies to track criminal behavior and trends in social media .
Not surprisingly , digital rights groups are raising alarm bells .
Ultimately , a coordinated and comprehensive approach is essential .
Intelligence agencies and criminal investigators will need to track activities .
Tech companies must step up their efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And digital rights groups and consumers must stay watchful and keep governments and tech companies from going too far .

Robert Muggah and Pedro Augusto P. Francisco

Late last year, Colombia’s federal police arrested Diego Optra , a crime boss who heads a ruthless gang called La Local in the port city of Buenaventura. In addition to overseeing drug trafficking and extortion rings, La Local was reportedly behind over 90 percent of the city’s homicides. Optra had successfully evaded the police for months, but he left digital breadcrumbs in the form of his meticulously curated Instagram profile . There, his many fans were regaled regularly with photos of Optra donning diamond-encrusted bracelets, designer clothes, and an arsenal of firearms. According to police officials, his lively social media profile was key to his arrest and conviction.
Late last year, Colombia’s federal police arrested Diego Optra, a crime boss who heads a ruthless gang called La Local in the port city of Buenaventura. In addition to overseeing drug trafficking and extortion rings, La Local was reportedly behind over 90 percent of the city’s homicides. Optra had successfully evaded the police for months, but he left digital breadcrumbs in the form of his meticulously curated Instagram profile. There, his many fans were regaled regularly with photos of Optra donning diamond-encrusted bracelets, designer clothes, and an arsenal of firearms. According to police officials, his lively social media profile was key to his arrest and conviction.
Optra is not the first crime boss to display his gangster lifestyle on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or Instagram. Nor is he the first to get caught after doing so. Drug traffickers and gangs are lively social media users across the Americas. Cartel bosses and their underlings use mainstream social media and popular messaging apps such as Telegram to shore up power and influence, threaten the competition, recruit new members, conduct sex trafficking, and sell drugs and contraband. Mexico used to be ground zero for this kind of activity, where researchers created a new discipline out of studying these narco posts. Now, gangs in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and the United States are also involved.
Brazil is one of the world’s largest consumers and producers of social media content, so it’s not surprising that its gangs, militias, and mafia groups regularly post online. Although the upper echelons of drug trafficking factions avoid having too much of a digital footprint, local cells are very active. Comando Vermelho, one of Brazil’s largest arms and drug trafficking organization, uses Twitter as a way to poach young recruits from a rival group in Rio de Janeiro, the Terceiro Comando Puro. Their tactics are not so subtle: Comando Vermelho’s messages urge Terceiro Comando Puro members to switch sides or face a violent end. These same groups also turn to Facebook to publicize their exploits, a useful way to cement loyalties while intimidating enemies, including the police.
Instagram is currently the leading platform for selling drugs directly to consumers, while Facebook comes a close second.
Social media is the site of serious competition involving violence. Comando Vermelho and São Paulo-based Primeiro Comando da Capital, another large trafficking organization—frequently exchange extremely gruesome messages. These serve a performative purpose: Taped executions of rival gang members, including inside prisons, often circulate on YouTube, WhatsApp, and Telegram. The goal is not just to frighten opponents but also to send a message to local communities demonstrating who is boss. Facebook and Instagram are also convenient tools for gangs to select their targets. The published photos and posts of suspected gangsters and informants are closely monitored, often used by factions and police as justification for their capture and extralegal execution.
In neighborhoods where drug factions are the judges, jurors, and executioners, Facebook has been used to publicize convictions and sentences during mock tribunais do crime, or criminal courts. Primeiro Comando da Capital, Comando Vermelho, and Guardiões do Estado, a criminal group from the state of Ceará, have issued brutal—and occasionally lethal—sentences against young women accused of treachery and snitching. In some cases, these show trials are filmed, and the videos are circulated on WhatsApp to warn other locals against crossing the gangs. In an attempt to gain sympathy, Primeiro Comando da Capital also circulates photos and videos on Facebook and YouTube denouncing the mistreatment of prison inmates. These videos are often distributed by the faction’s legal arm, the Sintonia dos Gravatas.
While increasingly mindful of being monitored, members of drug cartels and street gangs are also avid users of social platforms such as Snapchat and TikTok. These tools have been especially effective at circulating narco culture at scale. In Mexico, cartel-generated musical content is technically illegal, including the country’s infamous gangster ballads, known as narcocorridos. TikTok videos, for example, feature the guns, gangs, and gore tropes of some cartels and have racked up millions of views, including among younger audiences in the United States. This so-called Cartel TikTok has the intention and effect of normalizing cartel lifestyle and potentially attracting younger recruits to join criminal factions from Sinaloa in Mexico to Medellín in Colombia.
Social media use by criminal organizations is hardly limited to Latin America. There are many examples of members of the Italian mafia, especially the Camorra, using TikTok, though the posts have been quickly removed from the site. After many of the mafia’s old guard were arrested during the 2000s, the younger leaders who then assumed command are, unsurprisingly, avid consumers of social media. Videos have emerged showing camorristi bragging about their weapons, tattoos, cars, motorbikes, and other paraphernalia to tunes in the local dialect. As in the Americas, the Italian mafia also uses social media to recruit new members from Italy’s disaffected youth, especially in Sicily and the southern regions of Calabria and Puglia.
Social platforms such as Snapchat and TikTok have been especially effective at circulating narco culture at scale.
Law enforcement agencies have been warning for years that the so-called darknet—the unmonitored reaches of the internet—is one of the largest sources of direct sales of illegal drugs and other illicit goods and services. Transnational law enforcement operations involving simultaneous takedowns of darknet vendors are routine. Yet hiding in plain sight is the sale of illicit goods on public social media. Instagram is currently the leading platform for selling drugs directly to consumers, while Facebook comes a close second. These platforms serve as a kind of halfway point between the street market and the darknet. Buyers and sellers use traditional social media platforms and virtual private networks to plug contacts into encrypted services such as Telegram, Signal, WhatsApp, and Wickr.
All social media companies are aware of the risk of organized crime colonizing their sites. They are equally clear that glorifying violence and engaging in criminal activities violates their terms of use. Content moderators have been kept busy, with videos and posts rapidly removed after they are identified. Yet there are concerns that the tech giants are not doing enough and that a more proactive approach is needed. Precisely how to do this—while also avoiding violations of the right to privacy and free speech—is complex. Some governments are stepping in.
The Brazilian Congress, for example, is reviewing a bill to punish anyone who posts or shares any content that in any way endorses criminal activity on social media. In Colombia, the national policing authorities have invested in digital surveillance technologies to track criminal behavior and trends in social media. Not surprisingly, digital rights groups are raising alarm bells. Ultimately, a coordinated and comprehensive approach is essential. Intelligence agencies and criminal investigators will need to track activities. Tech companies must step up their efforts to monitor and take down dangerous content. And digital rights groups and consumers must stay watchful and keep governments and tech companies from going too far.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-15--Biden Must Reverse Course on Western Sahara

Biden Must Reverse Course on Western Sahara This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Outgoing President Donald Trump ’ s Dec. 11 proclamation that the United States would recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara marked yet another low for his administration .
In an unrelated deal to facilitate the exchange of diplomatic relations between Israel and Morocco , Trump ’ s decision to throw the Sahrawi people under the bus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their self-determination via a referendum of the Sahrawi people on the territory ’ s future status .
Republican Sen. James Inhofe was exactly right when he said in a Senate floor speech on Dec. 10 that Trump “ could have made this deal without trading away the rights of this voiceless people.
” Inhofe is one of the few U.S. experts on Western Sahara , built up through years of service on both the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services , which he now chairs .
I have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sahara issue over the years , dating back to my own initial involvement as assistant secretary of state for international organizations during the George H.W .
Bush administration .
Warm but unofficial relations between Israel and Morocco are nothing new .
Morocco has long considered recognizing Israel , and King Hassan II aggressively pursued that option during the 1990s , as did other Arab nations .
Secret Israeli-Moroccan contacts have been commonplace since .
Today , full relations are thus neither new nor difficult to achieve .
The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more could follow .
But what Morocco has actually agreed to remains unclear ; Rabat denies it will open anything more than a “ liaison office ” in Israel ( which it did in the 1990s ) , or that its deal actually involves full diplomatic relations .
In making his rash decision , Trump consulted neither the Polisario Front—which has long represented the Sahrawis—nor Algeria and Mauritania , the most concerned neighboring countries , nor anyone else .
This is what happens when dilettantes handle U.S. diplomacy , and it is sadly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approach during his tenure .
To him , everything is a potential deal , viewed in very narrow terms through the attention span of a fruit fly .
Fully weighing all the merits and equities involved in complex international scenarios is not his style .
Historical background and future ramifications ?
Those are for losers .
Fortunately , Trump made no nuclear deal with North Korea or Iran ; one can only imagine what he might have given away .
His casual approach to notching one more ostensible international victory raises significant problems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crossing Inhofe , reelected last month to another six-year Senate term , was a major political mistake .
Trump knows exactly how Inhofe feels about the Western Sahara ; I was there in the Oval Office on May 1 , 2019 , when the Oklahoma senator explained his support for a referendum .
Trump said he had never heard of Western Sahara , and Inhofe replied , “ Oh , we spoke before , but you weren ’ t listening.
” The Washington Post reports that in recent weeks , Trump became irate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amendments that the president wanted in the annual defense authorization bill , such as repealing Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act , which shields social media platforms from liability for what they publish .
Trump ’ s advisors reportedly persuaded the president to stiff Inhofe on the Western Sahara in retaliation .
But this standoff is far from over .
Inhofe is a determined Sahrawi proponent , and , from his powerful position as chairman of the Armed Services Committee , he will make the argument to reverse Trump ’ s decision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The answer begins with the obvious—the very name of the U.N. peacekeeping operation authorized by Resolution 690 of 1991 was “ Mission of the United Nations for the Referendum in Western Sahara ” ( MINURSO being the Spanish acronym ) .
When Spain ’ s colonial rule collapsed with Francisco Franco ’ s 1975 death , and after an initial conflict between Mauritania and Morocco , the Polisario-Moroccan military hostilities left the territory partitioned and its status unresolved .
The Polisario ’ s fundamental choice in 1991 was to suspend its ongoing confrontation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in which the choice would be between independence or unification with Morocco .
King Hassan II fully understood that this deal was , in Resolution 690 ’ s express terms , “ a referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.
” The choice , stated in the first paragraph of the U.N. Secretary General ’ s report approved by Resolution 690 , was “ to choose between independence and integration with Morocco.
” The 1997 Houston Accords , negotiated under James Baker ’ s auspices as the Secretary General ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( At the time , I worked for Baker at the U.S. State Department , and I later assisted him in his work as the U.N .
envoy . )
Nonetheless , Morocco has spent nearly three decades preventing the referendum from taking place .
Together with France and other Security Council allies , it has tried , unfortunately with some success , to blur Resolution 690 ’ s referendum commitment .
Rabat has offered a variety of so-called autonomy proposals , not one of which has ever come close to being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ referendum on incorporation versus “ autonomy.
” To the Sahrawi , this is a take it or leave it proposition , and has therefore always been unacceptable .
From Morocco ’ s perspective , this kind of so-called peace process could go on forever : Rabat not only controls the vast bulk of the Western Sahara ’ s territory militarily , but , through successive waves of settlement from Morocco proper , is trying to overwhelm the ethnic Sahrawi population .
Secretary General António Guterres ’ s statement following Trump ’ s announcement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1991 cease-fire , but spoke only about a “ resumption of the peace process.
” If Morocco won ’ t accept a referendum , it doesn ’ t deserve a cease-fire or a false “ peace process.
” This is a pathetic—and authoritative—admission of 30 years of U.N. failure .
The Polisario did not abandon its war against Morocco for a “ peace process , ” but for a referendum .
One obvious option , therefore , is to terminate MINURSO , and return to the status quo ante of open hostilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Morocco for three decades evincing no intention of accepting a referendum , why keep a U.N. peacekeeping operation on perpetual life support ?
If Morocco won ’ t accept a referendum , it doesn ’ t deserve a cease-fire or a false “ peace process.
” In fact , a major cease-fire violation occurred last month , so serious that many believed full military hostilities might resume .
For now , there is no way to tell whether this is likely , or what the outcome might be .
But make no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crucial juncture .
It would be fully justified if it chooses to return to the battlefield , but much depends on the positions of Algeria , Mauritania , and others—and what resources are available .
For the Polisario , Trump ’ s about-face is more than disappointing .
It broke a U.S. commitment that once looked rock-solid , and which I tried to defend and advance during my time as national security advisor—often in the face of the State Department ’ s determination to find a way to solidify Moroccan control of Western @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not the first during Trump ’ s tenure to experience an assault on one U.S. undertaking after another , imperiling even long-standing formal U.S. alliances like NATO .
It is perfectly appropriate for a nation to modify its responsibilities in light of changed national-security circumstances , but it is quite another to gratuitously destroy a commitment , with no consultation , just to make a so-called deal in a completely separate context .
Fortunately , Trump ’ s time is all but over .
From the perspective of U.S. policy , the best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inaugurated , to reverse Trump ’ s acquiescence to Moroccan sovereignty .
This will not be easy , given the expectations—misguided though they are—already built up in Rabat and Jerusalem .
If Biden wants to do a 180-degree turn , he should do so immediately on taking office , which would minimize any damage .
There are other obstacles .
Ironically , Trump ’ s insouciance gave the State Department bureaucracy exactly what it has wanted since Resolution 690 first encountered stiff Moroccan resistance within months of its adoption nearly three decades ago @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western Sahara referendum would destabilize its monarchy , and the State Department ’ s bureaucrats lapped it up .
In fact , the referendum ’ s outcome would almost certainly depend on who constitutes the voting-eligible population , yet another issue Morocco has contested despite its earlier commitment to the 1975 Spanish census defining the universe of eligible voters—an era before Morocco sought to engineer the territory ’ s demographics in its favor .
Notwithstanding substantial Moroccan transfers of population into Western Sahara , and the supposed benefits of its rule , Rabat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they haven ’ t done enough to achieve the result they want .
Morocco is no longer really concerned about its monarchy ’ s stability being undermined by formal diplomatic ties with Israel than are Bahrain , the United Arab Emirates , or other Gulf Arab states yet to come around .
What is really behind Morocco ’ s argument is that Rabat has come to believe its own propaganda , rather than its underlying reason for the occupation—which is that it wants control over possible substantial mineral resources buried under all that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible resort development opportunities for tourists .
Biden , of course , will have a few other things on his mind on Jan. 20 apart from Western Sahara .
While Biden and his advisors formulate their own policy , they can lay down a marker that Trump ’ s about-face is under review , insisting in the meantime that a referendum is still a prerequisite before the United States will consider the Western Sahara issue resolved .
There should be no outcome acceptable to Washington that is not approved by the Sahrawis in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fair vote—with a yes-or-no choice on full independence on the ballot .
Morocco may gag at this option , but it has little choice but to accept it if the United States insists on it .
For Algeria , Mauritania , Israel , and European leaders , there is not much to lose if Biden reverses Trump ’ s misguided move .
It will be a welcome relief that the prospect of conflict with Morocco has been at least postponed .
These states should all insist that the Western Sahara ’ s future @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development that only benefits Morocco , given its de facto control over the bulk of the territory .
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have already freed Israel from the formal diplomatic isolation it faced for many years .
Whatever Morocco does in response to a new Biden policy that reaffirms Western Sahara ’ s status quo will affect Israel only slightly .
And graciously accepting what a new Biden administration says about the territory may well be in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s interest .
In this way he could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which the Western Sahara is a non-issue—add to his political capital with Biden for issues that really matter , like taking on the threat posed by Iran .
The European Union—especially Spain , the former colonial power , where support for the Sahrawi remains quite strong ; and France , Morocco ’ s protector—could summon up a few words about self-determination to help move the process along .
If they choose not to say anything , they should remain silent bystanders and avoid compounding Trump ’ s mistake .
A post-inauguration bipartisan agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disarray caused by Trump ’ s gratuitous grandstanding .
Such a deal would mark a welcome change from the past four years of chaos and division , and a return to pursuing U.S. national interests rather than those of Donald Trump .

Outgoing President Donald Trump’s Dec. 11 proclamation that the United States would recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara marked yet another low for his administration. In an unrelated deal to facilitate the exchange of diplomatic relations between Israel and Morocco, Trump’s decision to throw the Sahrawi people under the bus ditches three decades of U.S. support for their self-determination via a referendum of the Sahrawi people on the territory’s future status.
Outgoing President Donald Trump’s Dec. 11 proclamation that the United States would recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara marked yet another low for his administration. In an unrelated deal to facilitate the exchange of diplomatic relations between Israel and Morocco, Trump’s decision to throw the Sahrawi people under the bus ditches three decades of U.S. support for their self-determination via a referendum of the Sahrawi people on the territory’s future status.
Republican Sen. James Inhofe was exactly right when he said in a Senate floor speech on Dec. 10 that Trump “could have made this deal without trading away the rights of this voiceless people.” Inhofe is one of the few U.S. experts on Western Sahara, built up through years of service on both the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, which he now chairs. I have worked frequently with Inhofe on the Western Sahara issue over the years, dating back to my own initial involvement as assistant secretary of state for international organizations during the George H.W. Bush administration.
Warm but unofficial relations between Israel and Morocco are nothing new. Morocco has long considered recognizing Israel, and King Hassan II aggressively pursued that option during the 1990s, as did other Arab nations. Secret Israeli-Moroccan contacts have been commonplace since. Today, full relations are thus neither new nor difficult to achieve. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have recently taken the plunge, and more could follow. But what Morocco has actually agreed to remains unclear; Rabat denies it will open anything more than a “liaison office” in Israel (which it did in the 1990s), or that its deal actually involves full diplomatic relations.
In making his rash decision, Trump consulted neither the Polisario Front—which has long represented the Sahrawis—nor Algeria and Mauritania, the most concerned neighboring countries, nor anyone else. This is what happens when dilettantes handle U.S. diplomacy, and it is sadly typical of Trump’s nakedly transactional approach during his tenure. To him, everything is a potential deal, viewed in very narrow terms through the attention span of a fruit fly. Fully weighing all the merits and equities involved in complex international scenarios is not his style. Historical background and future ramifications? Those are for losers. Fortunately, Trump made no nuclear deal with North Korea or Iran; one can only imagine what he might have given away.
His casual approach to notching one more ostensible international victory raises significant problems of stability across the Maghreb. And crossing Inhofe, reelected last month to another six-year Senate term, was a major political mistake. Trump knows exactly how Inhofe feels about the Western Sahara; I was there in the Oval Office on May 1, 2019, when the Oklahoma senator explained his support for a referendum. Trump said he had never heard of Western Sahara, and Inhofe replied, “Oh, we spoke before, but you weren’t listening.”
The Washington Post reports that in recent weeks, Trump became irate that Inhofe would not accede to nongermane amendments that the president wanted in the annual defense authorization bill, such as repealing Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which shields social media platforms from liability for what they publish. Trump’s advisors reportedly persuaded the president to stiff Inhofe on the Western Sahara in retaliation. But this standoff is far from over. Inhofe is a determined Sahrawi proponent, and, from his powerful position as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, he will make the argument to reverse Trump’s decision directly to Biden if need be.
Where, then, does Trump’s reckless and unnecessary move leave President-elect Joe Biden and the foreign governments most directly interested in the Western Sahara?
The answer begins with the obvious—the very name of the U.N. peacekeeping operation authorized by Resolution 690 of 1991 was “Mission of the United Nations for the Referendum in Western Sahara” (MINURSO being the Spanish acronym). When Spain’s colonial rule collapsed with Francisco Franco’s 1975 death, and after an initial conflict between Mauritania and Morocco, the Polisario-Moroccan military hostilities left the territory partitioned and its status unresolved. The Polisario’s fundamental choice in 1991 was to suspend its ongoing confrontation with Morocco in exchange for a referendum, in which the choice would be between independence or unification with Morocco.
King Hassan II fully understood that this deal was, in Resolution 690’s express terms, “a referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.” The choice, stated in the first paragraph of the U.N. Secretary General’s report approved by Resolution 690, was “to choose between independence and integration with Morocco.” The 1997 Houston Accords, negotiated under James Baker’s auspices as the Secretary General’s personal envoy, reinforced that understanding. (At the time, I worked for Baker at the U.S. State Department, and I later assisted him in his work as the U.N. envoy.)
Nonetheless, Morocco has spent nearly three decades preventing the referendum from taking place. Together with France and other Security Council allies, it has tried, unfortunately with some success, to blur Resolution 690’s referendum commitment. Rabat has offered a variety of so-called autonomy proposals, not one of which has ever come close to being acceptable to the Polisario, proposing a referendum on incorporation versus “autonomy.” To the Sahrawi, this is a take it or leave it proposition, and has therefore always been unacceptable. From Morocco’s perspective, this kind of so-called peace process could go on forever: Rabat not only controls the vast bulk of the Western Sahara’s territory militarily, but, through successive waves of settlement from Morocco proper, is trying to overwhelm the ethnic Sahrawi population. Secretary General António Guterres’s statement following Trump’s announcement, for example, called for preserving the 1991 cease-fire, but spoke only about a “resumption of the peace process.”
If Morocco won’t accept a referendum, it doesn’t deserve a cease-fire or a false “peace process.”
This is a pathetic—and authoritative—admission of 30 years of U.N. failure. The Polisario did not abandon its war against Morocco for a “peace process,” but for a referendum. One obvious option, therefore, is to terminate MINURSO, and return to the status quo ante of open hostilities. With the original deal broken, and Morocco for three decades evincing no intention of accepting a referendum, why keep a U.N. peacekeeping operation on perpetual life support? If Morocco won’t accept a referendum, it doesn’t deserve a cease-fire or a false “peace process.”
In fact, a major cease-fire violation occurred last month, so serious that many believed full military hostilities might resume. For now, there is no way to tell whether this is likely, or what the outcome might be. But make no mistake, the Polisario is at a crucial juncture. It would be fully justified if it chooses to return to the battlefield, but much depends on the positions of Algeria, Mauritania, and others—and what resources are available.
For the Polisario, Trump’s about-face is more than disappointing. It broke a U.S. commitment that once looked rock-solid, and which I tried to defend and advance during my time as national security advisor—often in the face of the State Department’s determination to find a way to solidify Moroccan control of Western Sahara.
Unfortunately, the Sahrawis are not the first during Trump’s tenure to experience an assault on one U.S. undertaking after another, imperiling even long-standing formal U.S. alliances like NATO. It is perfectly appropriate for a nation to modify its responsibilities in light of changed national-security circumstances, but it is quite another to gratuitously destroy a commitment, with no consultation, just to make a so-called deal in a completely separate context. Fortunately, Trump’s time is all but over.
From the perspective of U.S. policy, the best outcome would be for Biden, once inaugurated, to reverse Trump’s acquiescence to Moroccan sovereignty. This will not be easy, given the expectations—misguided though they are—already built up in Rabat and Jerusalem. If Biden wants to do a 180-degree turn, he should do so immediately on taking office, which would minimize any damage.
There are other obstacles. Ironically, Trump’s insouciance gave the State Department bureaucracy exactly what it has wanted since Resolution 690 first encountered stiff Moroccan resistance within months of its adoption nearly three decades ago. Rabat had argued that losing the Western Sahara referendum would destabilize its monarchy, and the State Department’s bureaucrats lapped it up. In fact, the referendum’s outcome would almost certainly depend on who constitutes the voting-eligible population, yet another issue Morocco has contested despite its earlier commitment to the 1975 Spanish census defining the universe of eligible voters—an era before Morocco sought to engineer the territory’s demographics in its favor. Notwithstanding substantial Moroccan transfers of population into Western Sahara, and the supposed benefits of its rule, Rabat and the U.S. State Department both fear they haven’t done enough to achieve the result they want.
Morocco is no longer really concerned about its monarchy’s stability being undermined by formal diplomatic ties with Israel than are Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, or other Gulf Arab states yet to come around. What is really behind Morocco’s argument is that Rabat has come to believe its own propaganda, rather than its underlying reason for the occupation—which is that it wants control over possible substantial mineral resources buried under all that Saharan sand, fishing assets, and possible resort development opportunities for tourists.
Biden, of course, will have a few other things on his mind on Jan. 20 apart from Western Sahara. While Biden and his advisors formulate their own policy, they can lay down a marker that Trump’s about-face is under review, insisting in the meantime that a referendum is still a prerequisite before the United States will consider the Western Sahara issue resolved. There should be no outcome acceptable to Washington that is not approved by the Sahrawis in an internationally conducted, free, and fair vote—with a yes-or-no choice on full independence on the ballot. Morocco may gag at this option, but it has little choice but to accept it if the United States insists on it.
For Algeria, Mauritania, Israel, and European leaders, there is not much to lose if Biden reverses Trump’s misguided move. It will be a welcome relief that the prospect of conflict with Morocco has been at least postponed. These states should all insist that the Western Sahara’s future should not be shuffled aside, a development that only benefits Morocco, given its de facto control over the bulk of the territory.
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have already freed Israel from the formal diplomatic isolation it faced for many years. Whatever Morocco does in response to a new Biden policy that reaffirms Western Sahara’s status quo will affect Israel only slightly. And graciously accepting what a new Biden administration says about the territory may well be in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s interest. In this way he could, at essentially no cost to Israel—for which the Western Sahara is a non-issue—add to his political capital with Biden for issues that really matter, like taking on the threat posed by Iran.
The European Union—especially Spain, the former colonial power, where support for the Sahrawi remains quite strong; and France, Morocco’s protector—could summon up a few words about self-determination to help move the process along. If they choose not to say anything, they should remain silent bystanders and avoid compounding Trump’s mistake.
A post-inauguration bipartisan agreement between Biden and Inhofe could repair the disarray caused by Trump’s gratuitous grandstanding. Such a deal would mark a welcome change from the past four years of chaos and division, and a return to pursuing U.S. national interests rather than those of Donald Trump.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-15--It Is Time to Let Turkey Go

It Is Time to Let Turkey Go

It Is Time to Let Turkey Go If , as observers like to suggest , the U.S.-Turkish relationship resembles a slow-motion train wreck , the good news is that the trains have been moving more slowly than some expected .
The bad news is that they are still heading toward each other on the same track .
Present-elect Joe Biden is now in the unenviable position of brakeman… and he can ’ t expect much help from his counterpart in the oncoming train .
For Biden , the challenge will be to minimize the damage that Turkey can do to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreclosing the possibility of future cooperation .
His work must begin with recognizing that Washington can not single-handedly rescue the U.S.-Turkish alliance , nor will Erdogan ever offer any real or lasting reset—no matter how many times he seems to do so .
The United States and Turkey will continue to work at cross purposes and there will continue to be more crises .
If everyone is lucky , there will also be periods of respite and some progress on areas of common interest .
To best navigate this no-win situation , Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role in U.S. foreign policy , and also about its own role in Turkish domestic politics : It will be nearly impossible to cooperate with Turkey when the Turkish government sees the United States as a threat , and it will be difficult to support Turkish democracy when much of Turkey ’ s opposition does too .
A number of explanations have been offered as to why Turkey has taken a more combative approach toward the United States and its other Western allies in recent years .
Some analysts have highlighted the domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bellicose , anti-Western stance , particularly now that he is in an electoral alliance with Turkey ’ s ultra-nationalist party .
Others have emphasized the role of Erdogan ’ s Islamist ideology and aspirations for leadership in the Muslim world .
Still others point to a series of specific Turkish grievances , such as Washington ’ s support for Syrian Kurdish fighters or its refusal to extradite the Turkish preacher Fethullah Gulen back to Turkey , and argue that these explain or justify Turkish hostility .
The more alarming reality is that ideology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all come together to shape a new Turkish security doctrine that identifies the United States as a major threat .
There is a good deal of truth to all of these explanations .
And that , in itself , is reason to suspect that rapprochement might be difficult .
But taken alone , they still don ’ t convey the full extent of the challenge .
The more alarming reality is that ideology , grievances , and domestic politics have all come together to shape a new Turkish security doctrine that , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identifies the United States as a major threat to be overcome with aggressive countermeasures .
Turkish pro-government pundits have been eager to highlight the thinking behind Turkey ’ s new foreign policy .
They believe that Western powers are alarmed by Turkey ’ s newfound independence and , as a result , are working on multiple fronts to check the country ’ s rise .
And yet , because the West ’ s power is declining and the world is becoming more multipolar , they also believe that Turkey can use hard power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rules of the game in its favor .
This approach to the world is popular among Erdogan ’ s voters , fits well with the president ’ s ideological assumptions , and has received just enough external validation that it will be hard to discredit .
For Washington , taking Turkey ’ s new foreign policy seriously means accepting that no combination of threats or incentives will restore a cooperative relationship any time soon .
Instead , U.S. policymakers face a more long-term challenge in disproving the assumptions driving Turkish policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to show Ankara that antagonizing its former allies has consequences .
But it also requires leaving the door open for Ankara to deescalate if it decides to .
In other words , policymakers shouldn ’ t leap at every reconciliatory statement from Erdogan , or see his offers of a reset as a reason to give Ankara concessions .
At the same time , they should recognize that negotiations and working groups can play a valuable role in putting problems on the backburner , even when neither side expects them to be solved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington ’ s growing frustration with Erdogan , some have already concluded that real cooperation with Turkey will only be possible once Erdogan is voted out of office .
There is certainly reason to hope that a government led by Turkey ’ s main opposition , the Republican People ’ s Party , would be less antagonistic toward the United States and the EU .
Such a government might also prove more eager to reconcile with neighbors like Egypt , while showing less enthusiasm for other regional actors like Hamas .
But there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Turkish opposition shares many of the government ’ s suspicions about Washington and supports many of the Erdogan ’ s efforts to push back against it .
Moreover , were they to find themselves in power , they would almost certainly face new political pressures , requiring them to prove their nationalist bona fides .
Of course , one of the main reasons both Erdogan and his opponents are suspicious of Washington is their shared belief that American support for democracy in Turkey has always hinged on what Turkey ’ s domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Washington ’ s Cold War record certainly shows that its approach to Turkish democracy often revolved around which parties they thought had America ’ s best interests at heart .
The result is that , today , explicitly supporting Turkey ’ s opposition is not necessarily the best way to support Turkey ’ s opposition .
Last summer , a video circulated showing Biden , in an earlier conversation with the New York Times editorial staff , calling for America embolden those within Turkey working to take on Erdogan through the electoral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Turkey ’ s opposition leaders leapt to condemn Biden ’ s comments .
They decried American interference in Turkey ’ s internal affairs and insisted they would not be party to Washington ’ s imperialist game .
This reaction speaks to a deeper divide among Turkey ’ s nationalist opposition over how they think Washington can best help their country .
By insisting that “ Turkey is bigger than Erdogan , ” many of Erdogan ’ s opponents have argued that Western countries should not punish all of Turkey because of their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They claim that to avoid losing the 50 percent of Turkey that hates Erdogan , the United States and EU should offer Turkey improved trade opportunities instead of sanctions , while working to accommodate widely shared Turkish concerns over the Gulen movement , the YPG , and the Eastern Mediterranean .
The problem , of course , is that other more outspoken members of the opposition insist that this approach would simply strengthen Erdogan at their expense .
Giving Erdogan high-profile foreign-policy victories , they insist , only encourages him .
And sparing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measures like a revised EU customs union , gives Erdogan a vital economic lifeline that sustains his authoritarian role .
In the face of these contradictory expectations , Biden should simply be consistent in criticizing Erdogan ’ s undemocratic behavior .
He should condemn the arrest of Erdogan ’ s democratic opponents and push for the release of political prisoners .
That alone would be a welcome change , both from outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s gleefully amoral embrace of Erdogan but also from former President Barack Obama ’ s occasional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of securing Ankara ’ s cooperation .
The president need not openly endorse the opposition , but he also shouldn ’ t hesitate to push back against Erdogan ’ s foreign-policy provocations in the hopes of winning their sympathy .
Ultimately , divorcing the United States ’ support for democracy from its specific geopolitical ambitions might be the best way to show that Americans really do support Turkish democracy for its own sake .
The United States has long been condemned for cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East .
Trump added @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s authoritarianism and not even getting cooperation in return .
Biden may have inherited a train wreck in the making , but at least he has no room for moral compromise .
You can ’ t cooperate with an authoritarian regime that is dead set against cooperating with you .

If, as observers like to suggest , the U.S.-Turkish relationship resembles a slow-motion train wreck, the good news is that the trains have been moving more slowly than some expected. The bad news is that they are still heading toward each other on the same track. Present-elect Joe Biden is now in the unenviable position of brakeman… and he can’t expect much help from his counterpart in the oncoming train.
If, as observers like to suggest, the U.S.-Turkish relationship resembles a slow-motion train wreck, the good news is that the trains have been moving more slowly than some expected. The bad news is that they are still heading toward each other on the same track. Present-elect Joe Biden is now in the unenviable position of brakeman… and he can’t expect much help from his counterpart in the oncoming train.
For Biden, the challenge will be to minimize the damage that Turkey can do to U.S. interests without provoking new conflicts or foreclosing the possibility of future cooperation. His work must begin with recognizing that Washington cannot single-handedly rescue the U.S.-Turkish alliance, nor will Erdogan ever offer any real or lasting reset—no matter how many times he seems to do so. The United States and Turkey will continue to work at cross purposes and there will continue to be more crises. If everyone is lucky, there will also be periods of respite and some progress on areas of common interest.
To best navigate this no-win situation, Washington should be clear-eyed about Turkey’s role in U.S. foreign policy, and also about its own role in Turkish domestic politics: It will be nearly impossible to cooperate with Turkey when the Turkish government sees the United States as a threat, and it will be difficult to support Turkish democracy when much of Turkey’s opposition does too.
A number of explanations have been offered as to why Turkey has taken a more combative approach toward the United States and its other Western allies in recent years. Some analysts have highlighted the domestic political benefits that Erdogan derives from his bellicose, anti-Western stance, particularly now that he is in an electoral alliance with Turkey’s ultra-nationalist party. Others have emphasized the role of Erdogan’s Islamist ideology and aspirations for leadership in the Muslim world. Still others point to a series of specific Turkish grievances, such as Washington’s support for Syrian Kurdish fighters or its refusal to extradite the Turkish preacher Fethullah Gulen back to Turkey, and argue that these explain or justify Turkish hostility.
The more alarming reality is that ideology, grievances, and domestic politics have all come together to shape a new Turkish security doctrine that identifies the United States as a major threat.
There is a good deal of truth to all of these explanations. And that, in itself, is reason to suspect that rapprochement might be difficult. But taken alone, they still don’t convey the full extent of the challenge. The more alarming reality is that ideology, grievances, and domestic politics have all come together to shape a new Turkish security doctrine that, in coherent if not necessarily accurate terms, identifies the United States as a major threat to be overcome with aggressive countermeasures.
Turkish pro-government pundits have been eager to highlight the thinking behind Turkey’s new foreign policy. They believe that Western powers are alarmed by Turkey’s newfound independence and, as a result, are working on multiple fronts to check the country’s rise. And yet, because the West’s power is declining and the world is becoming more multipolar, they also believe that Turkey can use hard power and selective cooperation with Russia to rewrite the rules of the game in its favor.
This approach to the world is popular among Erdogan’s voters, fits well with the president’s ideological assumptions, and has received just enough external validation that it will be hard to discredit. For Washington, taking Turkey’s new foreign policy seriously means accepting that no combination of threats or incentives will restore a cooperative relationship any time soon. Instead, U.S. policymakers face a more long-term challenge in disproving the assumptions driving Turkish policy. This will require keeping up lasting pressure to show Ankara that antagonizing its former allies has consequences. But it also requires leaving the door open for Ankara to deescalate if it decides to. In other words, policymakers shouldn’t leap at every reconciliatory statement from Erdogan, or see his offers of a reset as a reason to give Ankara concessions. At the same time, they should recognize that negotiations and working groups can play a valuable role in putting problems on the backburner, even when neither side expects them to be solved any time soon.
Indeed, given Washington’s growing frustration with Erdogan, some have already concluded that real cooperation with Turkey will only be possible once Erdogan is voted out of office. There is certainly reason to hope that a government led by Turkey’s main opposition, the Republican People’s Party, would be less antagonistic toward the United States and the EU. Such a government might also prove more eager to reconcile with neighbors like Egypt, while showing less enthusiasm for other regional actors like Hamas. But there is also every reason to believe that the Turkish opposition shares many of the government’s suspicions about Washington and supports many of the Erdogan’s efforts to push back against it. Moreover, were they to find themselves in power, they would almost certainly face new political pressures, requiring them to prove their nationalist bona fides.
Of course, one of the main reasons both Erdogan and his opponents are suspicious of Washington is their shared belief that American support for democracy in Turkey has always hinged on what Turkey’s domestic system might mean for the United States. Washington’s Cold War record certainly shows that its approach to Turkish democracy often revolved around which parties they thought had America’s best interests at heart. The result is that, today, explicitly supporting Turkey’s opposition is not necessarily the best way to support Turkey’s opposition. Last summer, a video circulated showing Biden, in an earlier conversation with the New York Times editorial staff, calling for America embolden those within Turkey working to take on Erdogan through the electoral process. Almost as quickly as Erdogan, Turkey’s opposition leaders leapt to condemn Biden’s comments. They decried American interference in Turkey’s internal affairs and insisted they would not be party to Washington’s imperialist game.
This reaction speaks to a deeper divide among Turkey’s nationalist opposition over how they think Washington can best help their country. By insisting that “Turkey is bigger than Erdogan,” many of Erdogan’s opponents have argued that Western countries should not punish all of Turkey because of their anger at the man in charge. They claim that to avoid losing the 50 percent of Turkey that hates Erdogan, the United States and EU should offer Turkey improved trade opportunities instead of sanctions, while working to accommodate widely shared Turkish concerns over the Gulen movement, the YPG, and the Eastern Mediterranean. The problem, of course, is that other more outspoken members of the opposition insist that this approach would simply strengthen Erdogan at their expense. Giving Erdogan high-profile foreign-policy victories, they insist, only encourages him. And sparing Turkey from sanctions, much less offering measures like a revised EU customs union, gives Erdogan a vital economic lifeline that sustains his authoritarian role.
In the face of these contradictory expectations, Biden should simply be consistent in criticizing Erdogan’s undemocratic behavior. He should condemn the arrest of Erdogan’s democratic opponents and push for the release of political prisoners. That alone would be a welcome change, both from outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump’s gleefully amoral embrace of Erdogan but also from former President Barack Obama’s occasional willingness to withhold criticism in the hopes of securing Ankara’s cooperation. The president need not openly endorse the opposition, but he also shouldn’t hesitate to push back against Erdogan’s foreign-policy provocations in the hopes of winning their sympathy. Ultimately, divorcing the United States’ support for democracy from its specific geopolitical ambitions might be the best way to show that Americans really do support Turkish democracy for its own sake.
The United States has long been condemned for cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Trump added a twist to this, accommodating Erdogan’s authoritarianism and not even getting cooperation in return. Biden may have inherited a train wreck in the making, but at least he has no room for moral compromise. You can’t cooperate with an authoritarian regime that is dead set against cooperating with you.