foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--In Xi’s Little Red Article, the Monotony Is the Point

In Xi ’ s Little Red Article , the Monotony Is the Point Readers of the flagship journal of the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) , Qiushi ( “ seeking truth ” ) , received a special treat this week : a prominent article by President Xi Jinping himself , snappily titled , “ The Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party Is the Most Essential Characteristic of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics.
” Xinhua and People ’ s Daily—the state news service and the CCP newspaper—as well as the evening news led with the piece .
The article contained no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stitched together from Xi ’ s works over the last few years .
Each centers on one repetitive idea : Party leadership is everything .
“ The party is the core of leadership.
” “ It must be clearly understood that the greatest national feature of China is the leadership of the Communist Party.
” “ The leadership of the Communist Party of China is the common choice of all Chinese people , including democratic parties , organizations , nationalities , strata , and people from all walks of life.
” The phrase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South , and at the Center , the party leads everything ” is repeated—with slight variation—five times .
As the Chinese legal expert Carl Minzner points out , the editor ’ s note made the purpose of the piece clear : reasserting the total power of Xi himself .
The note uses the clunky term “ two upholds ” to mean simultaneously supporting the party ’ s total control and Xi ’ s total control over the party .
In Minzner ’ s translation : “ The content & requirements of ‘ two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jinping ’ s core role , with the focus of that being Xi Jinping & no one else ; upholding Central Party leadership , with the focus being Party Central & no other organization.
” Xi is the “ ultimate arbiter , ” a term repeatedly used in the note , of everything .
The timing and emphasis of Xi ’ s article suggest two things .
The first is that not everyone in the CCP has been happy with Xi ’ s one-man rule , hence the need for him to reassert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and its repetition throughout state media , indicates that his power within the party nevertheless remains nearly absolute .
Any mutterings among discontented members of the elite or retired party leaders—often an influential force themselves—about Xi ’ s failures in response to the coronavirus , botched international diplomacy , or rising tensions with the United States are taking place behind closed doors .
The utter dominance of the party is not a new idea .
Since Xi came to power , the CCP ’ s total control over Chinese life has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the classroom .
Party members and state employees have had to slog their way through Xi Jinping Thought , from introductory classes to a compulsory app .
They certainly had to endure Jiang Zemin Thought and Hu Jintao Thought as well—but not at this level of frequency or forced devotion .
The article ’ s format is particularly familiar .
It follows the same formula as Mao Zedong ’ s Little Red Book , the 1964 compilation that defined the lead-in to the Cultural Revolution , as the autocrat sought to reestablish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political violence of the Great Leap Forward .
Xi often deliberately echoes Mao , and the article is another piece of a familiar personality cult .
But there ’ s one big difference between Mao ’ s words and Xi ’ s .
Mao could write , especially when it came to pithy aphorisms .
Even English speakers can quote Mao—whether it ’ s “ Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun ” or “ A revolution is not a dinner party.
” His offhand speech was full of classical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the time he referred to himself as a “ monk with an umbrella.
” That caused the Western reporter and CCP stooge Edgar Snow to describe Mao ’ s humbleness , but the actual meaning of the idiom is that “ neither law nor heaven binds me.
” Mao was also a half-decent poet : Older Chinese can quote him by memory and not just because of the forced repetition in their youth .
Xi ’ s writing , in contrast , is dull .
Despite the occasional felicity of sign-makers with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long been degraded by the repetition of political clichés and worn-out thoughts .
When I worked in Chinese state media , it was common practice for editors to fill in missing space in pieces written by Chinese officials or academics with a few of the favorite phrases of the moment , whether it was “ sparing no effort ” to “ perfect the system ” or blaming the United States for being up to its “ old tricks , ” “ distorting facts , ” and “ creating trouble.
” Since the purpose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ careers by sticking to the right political line , the authors never complained .
But Xi ’ s writing has a particular tedium to it , a thudding repetition of banalities that comes with a lifetime of being a party man .
Imagine being stuck in an elevator with a business executive whose reading consists entirely of airport magazines and company reports .
Here ’ s Xi on innovation : “ China should seek momentum from reform and opening up ; unleash to the maximum the whole society ’ s power for innovation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ keep improving the country ’ s competitiveness in a world that ’ s undergoing profound changes.
” It takes a lot of scraping to discover any thought behind this kind of prose and a true sycophant to praise it without being forced .
In the 2018 compilation Xi Jinping : Wit and Vision , for example , the compiler ’ s desperation strains through every page .
The record for endurance may be Xi ’ s three-and-a-half-hour speech in 2018 at the 19th Party Congress , the kind you can inflict only on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might be purged if they fall asleep .
But Xi ’ s vision , with its narrowness and tedium , also has none of Mao ’ s embrace of chaos for his own purposes .
While Mao ’ s attempt to reassert control over the party depended on bloody chaos and mass violence against his enemies , Xi ’ s depends on vigorous adherence to the party line .
The vision laid out by his words is that of a smoothly functioning , clearly led system in which nothing deviates from CCP control—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s a company man ’ s vision , not the Maoist picture of development that comes from the churn of constant revolution .
The monotony doesn ’ t stop Xi ’ s reassertion of one-man rule from being dangerous , both for China and for the rest of the world .
Xi ’ s vision of total party rule includes the silencing of any opposing thought , ethnicity , workers , regional freedoms , or faith , not just within China but worldwide .
Officials whose first priority for personal survival is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t make great decisions .
Xi ’ s words are frighteningly boring—emphasis on the frightening .

Readers of the flagship journal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Qiushi (“seeking truth”), received a special treat this week: a prominent article by President Xi Jinping himself, snappily titled, “The Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party Is the Most Essential Characteristic of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics.” Xinhua and People’s Daily—the state news service and the CCP newspaper—as well as the evening news led with the piece.
Readers of the flagship journal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Qiushi (“seeking truth”), received a special treat this week: a prominent article by President Xi Jinping himself, snappily titled, “The Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party Is the Most Essential Characteristic of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics.” Xinhua and People’s Daily—the state news service and the CCP newspaper—as well as the evening news led with the piece.
The article contained no new material but instead 18 separate quotations stitched together from Xi’s works over the last few years. Each centers on one repetitive idea: Party leadership is everything.
“The party is the core of leadership.” “It must be clearly understood that the greatest national feature of China is the leadership of the Communist Party.” “The leadership of the Communist Party of China is the common choice of all Chinese people, including democratic parties, organizations, nationalities, strata, and people from all walks of life.” The phrase “East, West, North, South, and at the Center, the party leads everything” is repeated—with slight variation—five times.
As the Chinese legal expert Carl Minzner points out, the editor’s note made the purpose of the piece clear: reasserting the total power of Xi himself. The note uses the clunky term “two upholds” to mean simultaneously supporting the party’s total control and Xi’s total control over the party. In Minzner’s translation: “The content & requirements of ‘two upholds’ are clear: upholding Xi Jinping’s core role, with the focus of that being Xi Jinping & no one else; upholding Central Party leadership, with the focus being Party Central & no other organization.” Xi is the “ultimate arbiter,” a term repeatedly used in the note, of everything.
The timing and emphasis of Xi’s article suggest two things. The first is that not everyone in the CCP has been happy with Xi’s one-man rule, hence the need for him to reassert it with symbolic force. This reassertion, and its repetition throughout state media, indicates that his power within the party nevertheless remains nearly absolute. Any mutterings among discontented members of the elite or retired party leaders—often an influential force themselves—about Xi’s failures in response to the coronavirus, botched international diplomacy, or rising tensions with the United States are taking place behind closed doors.
The utter dominance of the party is not a new idea. Since Xi came to power, the CCP’s total control over Chinese life has been emphasized constantly in propaganda, media, and the classroom. Party members and state employees have had to slog their way through Xi Jinping Thought, from introductory classes to a compulsory app. They certainly had to endure Jiang Zemin Thought and Hu Jintao Thought as well—but not at this level of frequency or forced devotion.
The article’s format is particularly familiar. It follows the same formula as Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book, the 1964 compilation that defined the lead-in to the Cultural Revolution, as the autocrat sought to reestablish his power following the mass starvation and political violence of the Great Leap Forward. Xi often deliberately echoes Mao, and the article is another piece of a familiar personality cult.
But there’s one big difference between Mao’s words and Xi’s. Mao could write, especially when it came to pithy aphorisms. Even English speakers can quote Mao—whether it’s “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” or “A revolution is not a dinner party.” His offhand speech was full of classical imagery often misinterpreted by foreigners, such as the time he referred to himself as a “monk with an umbrella.” That caused the Western reporter and CCP stooge Edgar Snow to describe Mao’s humbleness, but the actual meaning of the idiom is that “neither law nor heaven binds me.” Mao was also a half-decent poet: Older Chinese can quote him by memory and not just because of the forced repetition in their youth.
Xi’s writing, in contrast, is dull. Despite the occasional felicity of sign-makers with catchy slogans, Chinese political language has long been degraded by the repetition of political clichés and worn-out thoughts. When I worked in Chinese state media, it was common practice for editors to fill in missing space in pieces written by Chinese officials or academics with a few of the favorite phrases of the moment, whether it was “sparing no effort” to “perfect the system” or blaming the United States for being up to its “old tricks,” “distorting facts,” and “creating trouble.” Since the purpose of the articles was to bolster their careers by sticking to the right political line, the authors never complained.
But Xi’s writing has a particular tedium to it, a thudding repetition of banalities that comes with a lifetime of being a party man. Imagine being stuck in an elevator with a business executive whose reading consists entirely of airport magazines and company reports. Here’s Xi on innovation: “China should seek momentum from reform and opening up; unleash to the maximum the whole society’s power for innovation, entrepreneurship, and creativity; and keep improving the country’s competitiveness in a world that’s undergoing profound changes.”
It takes a lot of scraping to discover any thought behind this kind of prose and a true sycophant to praise it without being forced. In the 2018 compilation Xi Jinping: Wit and Vision, for example, the compiler’s desperation strains through every page. The record for endurance may be Xi’s three-and-a-half-hour speech in 2018 at the 19th Party Congress, the kind you can inflict only on an audience of officials who know they might be purged if they fall asleep.
But Xi’s vision, with its narrowness and tedium, also has none of Mao’s embrace of chaos for his own purposes. While Mao’s attempt to reassert control over the party depended on bloody chaos and mass violence against his enemies, Xi’s depends on vigorous adherence to the party line. The vision laid out by his words is that of a smoothly functioning, clearly led system in which nothing deviates from CCP control—and thus Xi’s control. It’s a company man’s vision, not the Maoist picture of development that comes from the churn of constant revolution.
The monotony doesn’t stop Xi’s reassertion of one-man rule from being dangerous, both for China and for the rest of the world. Xi’s vision of total party rule includes the silencing of any opposing thought, ethnicity, workers, regional freedoms, or faith, not just within China but worldwide. Officials whose first priority for personal survival is compliance with the leader’s vision don’t make great decisions. Xi’s words are frighteningly boring—emphasis on the frightening.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--America’s Post-Coronavirus Diplomacy Needs Middle-Powers Alliances

The COVID-19 pandemic has claimed nearly 600,000 lives , infected well over 13 million people , and threatened to send the global economy into its worst downturn since the Great Depression .
This human tragedy is occurring against the backdrop of a strategic one : Precisely when the need for emergency coordination between the United States and China is most self-evident , their relationship has reached its lowest level since normalization , with no bottom in sight .
Even those observers who hesitate to speak of a “ new cold war ” concede that Washington and Beijing view each other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States has an abiding interest in salvaging a baseline of cooperation with China , which has the world ’ s largest population and second-largest economy , there is an equally pressing , more achievable , objective at hand .
The United States needs to engage middle powers that are increasingly disillusioned by both countries ’ collective leadership—or lack thereof .
Washington and Beijing have both done themselves serious damage this year .
The former ’ s ongoing mismanagement and “ America First ” posture are eliciting growing criticism ; so , too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mishandling of the pandemic and its increasingly vocal “ Wolf Warrior ” diplomacy .
Where middle powers may have hoped at the beginning of this year that the two countries that collectively account for nearly 40 percent of the world ’ s economy would find common cause in stemming COVID-19 ’ s further spread , they are increasingly concluding that that reasonable expectation was , in fact , highly misguided and that they must coordinate among themselves—not only to ensure continued progress on specific fronts such as funding vaccine research , fighting climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also to uphold the broader promise of multilateralism .
The Brookings Institution ’ s Bruce Jones observes that the “ influence [ of middle powers ] on the world stage has increased markedly during the pandemic , which demands exactly the kind of multilateral coordination these powers have long championed.
” A renewed American diplomacy should heed this growing middle-powers activity , beginning by applauding the exemplary performances that many small- and medium-sized powers have delivered in responding to the pandemic—many of which , importantly , are China ’ s neighbors , some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s response has been sufficiently impressive , for example , that a growing number of countries are calling for it to be granted observer status at the World Health Organization ( WHO ) .
Vietnam , meanwhile , has no confirmed COVID-19 deaths even though , as the Washington Post ’ s Adam Taylor and Miriam Berger summarize , it is “ not a wealthy democracy like South Korea , nor a highly developed city-state like Singapore , and it has nowhere near China ’ s might.
” The United States should also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ powers to cultivate a more nimble , creative kind of multilateralism—one that can be organized on an ad hoc , opt-in basis and that can function outside of established institutions and prescheduled meetings .
One precedent to consider is the coordinated response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 , in which military and humanitarian personnel from Australia , India , Japan , and the United States came together to form the Tsunami Core Group .
While the tsunami ’ s scale may not compare directly to that of COVID-19 , the response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ With its epicenter in Indonesia , the disaster wreaked havoc on at least 13 countries in the Indian Ocean , killing around 230,000 people and even reaching Africa ’ s east coast .
The Tsunami Core Group paved the way for the emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—or the Quad , as it is more commonly known—involving the four democracies .
This sort of agile response will be essential not only to addressing the pandemic but also to building resilience in preparation for the full range of transnational crises , health and otherwise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In partnering more fully and intentionally with middle powers , though , the United States must take care to treat them as partners on their own strategic merits , not as instruments of an intensifying rivalry with China that is undermining the resilience of the postwar order and the potential for collective action .
To that end , the next administration—whether a second-term Trump administration or an incoming Joe Biden administration—should convene as soon as possible a forum of middle powers that handled COVID-19 well and hold lessons for the rest of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diverse group of countries—including but not limited to Australia , New Zealand , Singapore , South Korea , Vietnam , and Germany—would showcase various models of governance and systems of public health that have effectively combated the virus while leveraging the United States ’ unique and enduring ability to organize in times of global turmoil what the Lowy Institute ’ s Michael Fullilove has dubbed “ coalitions of the competent.
” Washington should also consider including representatives from Taiwan in such a summit , given that Taipei has registered one of the most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world—judged by its containment of COVID-19 as well as its exports of personal protective equipment .
Thus far , unfortunately , the United States has undercut collective action on perhaps the most urgent crisis thus far of this century .
The Trump administration failed to send a representative to a virtual conference of world leaders convened by the European Union in early May , aimed at mobilizing global efforts to develop a vaccine , and , more recently , it announced its withdrawal from WHO .
But it is not too late for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Successfully putting together a summit of middle powers would serve as a sorely needed signal that it is still committed to global cooperation .
Global opinion polls continue to indicate that despite unease with the Trump administration ’ s alliance management , protectionist impulses , and unorthodox diplomacy , many countries still hold out hope for the United States to play a leading role in world affairs .
According to a 2019 Global Attitudes Survey by Pew Research Center , India , Japan , Poland , and South Korea all regard the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ margin of over 30 percent ; the margins in Canada , Hungary , Italy , and Sweden , meanwhile , are greater than 20 percent .
In Southeast Asia , reeling from COVID-19 and home to the most acute U.S.-China competition , polls reveal persistent support for the United States and mistrust of Chinese influence , even as respondents identify China as the region ’ s most important economic and political power .
Resounding majorities express concern about China ’ s strategic intentions , and nearly a quarter of respondents report that they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States to uphold a rules-based order—more than Japan ( 20 percent ) , Australia ( 5.7 percent ) , or China ( 5.5 percent ) .
With Washington ’ s flailing response and unilateral instincts continuing to erode partners ’ patience , however , the next administration will face a constricted window of opportunity to dig itself out of its self-inflicted reputational hole .
The proposed summit would be a modest step the United States could take to signal a renewed commitment to partnerships and multilateralism—a commitment that must exist and endure independent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As the Financial Times recently editorialized , citing Beijing ’ s missteps will not compensate for America ’ s : “ America ’ s allies in Europe and Asia are also angered by Beijing ’ s behaviour .
They simply do not trust the Trump administration ’ s leadership in countering it .
”

The COVID-19 pandemic has claimed nearly 600,000 lives, infected well over 13 million people, and threatened to send the global economy into its worst downturn since the Great Depression. This human tragedy is occurring against the backdrop of a strategic one: Precisely when the need for emergency coordination between the United States and China is most self-evident, their relationship has reached its lowest level since normalization, with no bottom in sight. Even those observers who hesitate to speak of a “new cold war” concede that Washington and Beijing view each other in increasingly adversarial terms.
The COVID-19 pandemic has claimed nearly 600,000 lives, infected well over 13 million people, and threatened to send the global economy into its worst downturn since the Great Depression. This human tragedy is occurring against the backdrop of a strategic one: Precisely when the need for emergency coordination between the United States and China is most self-evident, their relationship has reached its lowest level since normalization, with no bottom in sight. Even those observers who hesitate to speak of a “new cold war” concede that Washington and Beijing view each other in increasingly adversarial terms.
While the United States has an abiding interest in salvaging a baseline of cooperation with China, which has the world’s largest population and second-largest economy, there is an equally pressing, more achievable, objective at hand. The United States needs to engage middle powers that are increasingly disillusioned by both countries’ collective leadership—or lack thereof. Washington and Beijing have both done themselves serious damage this year. The former’s ongoing mismanagement and “America First” posture are eliciting growing criticism; so, too, are the latter’s initial mishandling of the pandemic and its increasingly vocal “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy.
Where middle powers may have hoped at the beginning of this year that the two countries that collectively account for nearly 40 percent of the world’s economy would find common cause in stemming COVID-19’s further spread, they are increasingly concluding that that reasonable expectation was, in fact, highly misguided and that they must coordinate among themselves—not only to ensure continued progress on specific fronts such as funding vaccine research, fighting climate change, and sustaining open trade but also to uphold the broader promise of multilateralism. The Brookings Institution’s Bruce Jones observes that the “influence [of middle powers] on the world stage has increased markedly during the pandemic, which demands exactly the kind of multilateral coordination these powers have long championed.”
A renewed American diplomacy should heed this growing middle-powers activity, beginning by applauding the exemplary performances that many small- and medium-sized powers have delivered in responding to the pandemic—many of which, importantly, are China’s neighbors, some of them thriving democracies. Taiwan’s response has been sufficiently impressive, for example, that a growing number of countries are calling for it to be granted observer status at the World Health Organization (WHO). Vietnam, meanwhile, has no confirmed COVID-19 deaths even though, as the Washington Post’s Adam Taylor and Miriam Berger summarize, it is “not a wealthy democracy like South Korea, nor a highly developed city-state like Singapore, and it has nowhere near China’s might.”
The United States should also solicit proposals for and coordinate with middle powers to cultivate a more nimble, creative kind of multilateralism—one that can be organized on an ad hoc, opt-in basis and that can function outside of established institutions and prescheduled meetings. One precedent to consider is the coordinated response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, in which military and humanitarian personnel from Australia, India, Japan, and the United States came together to form the Tsunami Core Group. While the tsunami’s scale may not compare directly to that of COVID-19, the response can serve as a useful template. With its epicenter in Indonesia, the disaster wreaked havoc on at least 13 countries in the Indian Ocean, killing around 230,000 people and even reaching Africa’s east coast. The Tsunami Core Group paved the way for the emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—or the Quad, as it is more commonly known—involving the four democracies. This sort of agile response will be essential not only to addressing the pandemic but also to building resilience in preparation for the full range of transnational crises, health and otherwise, that will increasingly shape geopolitics.
In partnering more fully and intentionally with middle powers, though, the United States must take care to treat them as partners on their own strategic merits, not as instruments of an intensifying rivalry with China that is undermining the resilience of the postwar order and the potential for collective action.
To that end, the next administration—whether a second-term Trump administration or an incoming Joe Biden administration—should convene as soon as possible a forum of middle powers that handled COVID-19 well and hold lessons for the rest of the world to emulate. Bringing together a diverse group of countries—including but not limited to Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam, and Germany—would showcase various models of governance and systems of public health that have effectively combated the virus while leveraging the United States’ unique and enduring ability to organize in times of global turmoil what the Lowy Institute’s Michael Fullilove has dubbed “coalitions of the competent.” Washington should also consider including representatives from Taiwan in such a summit, given that Taipei has registered one of the most impressive responses to the pandemic in the world—judged by its containment of COVID-19 as well as its exports of personal protective equipment.
Thus far, unfortunately, the United States has undercut collective action on perhaps the most urgent crisis thus far of this century. The Trump administration failed to send a representative to a virtual conference of world leaders convened by the European Union in early May, aimed at mobilizing global efforts to develop a vaccine, and, more recently, it announced its withdrawal from WHO.
But it is not too late for Washington to return to the fold. Successfully putting together a summit of middle powers would serve as a sorely needed signal that it is still committed to global cooperation. Global opinion polls continue to indicate that despite unease with the Trump administration’s alliance management, protectionist impulses, and unorthodox diplomacy, many countries still hold out hope for the United States to play a leading role in world affairs. According to a 2019 Global Attitudes Survey by Pew Research Center, India, Japan, Poland, and South Korea all regard the United States more favorably than China by a margin of over 30 percent; the margins in Canada, Hungary, Italy, and Sweden, meanwhile, are greater than 20 percent.
In Southeast Asia, reeling from COVID-19 and home to the most acute U.S.-China competition, polls reveal persistent support for the United States and mistrust of Chinese influence, even as respondents identify China as the region’s most important economic and political power. Resounding majorities express concern about China’s strategic intentions, and nearly a quarter of respondents report that they have the most confidence in the United States to uphold a rules-based order—more than Japan (20 percent), Australia (5.7 percent), or China (5.5 percent).
With Washington’s flailing response and unilateral instincts continuing to erode partners’ patience, however, the next administration will face a constricted window of opportunity to dig itself out of its self-inflicted reputational hole. The proposed summit would be a modest step the United States could take to signal a renewed commitment to partnerships and multilateralism—a commitment that must exist and endure independent of China’s declarations and pronouncements. As the Financial Times recently editorialized, citing Beijing’s missteps will not compensate for America’s: “America’s allies in Europe and Asia are also angered by Beijing’s behaviour. They simply do not trust the Trump administration’s leadership in countering it.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--Pompeo’s Attack on ‘1619 Project’ Draws Fire From His Own Diplomats

Pompeo ’ s Attack on ‘ 1619 Project ’ Draws Fire From His Own Diplomats When U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a speech on “ unalienable human rights ” on Thursday , he made sure to wade into the so-called culture wars his boss frequently harps on , blasting protesters for tearing down statues and criticizing an expansive New York Times project on slavery for espousing a “ Marxist ideology ” and “ dark vision of America ’ s birth.
” The New York Times ’ “ 1619 Project , ” which examines the role of slavery in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focus of his speech , nor of the new draft report that his controversial Commission on Unalienable Rights produced .
But his comments have sparked fresh debate and criticism among diplomats who continue to raise alarm bells over long-standing issues of systemic racism and diversity challenges in the State Department .
Five officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity described a reaction of shock and fury .
“ Pompeo made it very clear where he stands and reaffirmed the purpose of the commission by denigrating the movement for equal justice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ healing in America , ” said one State Department official .
“ Everyone that I have spoken with is horrified and disgusted by the commission , his press conference , and [ the ] attack on 1619 , ” said the official .
“ Every public appearance since George Floyd ’ s murder has been to shore up the admin [ istration ] ’ s position , no matter how inappropriate the venue , ” said another .
These officials described portions of Pompeo ’ s remarks as unusual for a secretary of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a domestic political stump speech aimed at rallying President Donald Trump ’ s base ahead of the November election .
( Pompeo spent Friday in Iowa in closed-door meetings with local officials and was scheduled to give a speech at the Family Leaders Summit . )
“ The New York Times ’ ‘ 1619 Project ’ —so named for the year that the first slaves were transported to America—wants you to believe that our country was founded for human bondage , ” Pompeo said in his speech in Philadelphia on Thursday .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s institutions continue to reflect the country ’ s acceptance of slavery at our founding.
” “ They want you to believe that Marxist ideology that America is only the oppressors and the oppressed .
The Chinese Communist Party must be gleeful when they see the New York Times spout this ideology , ” he added .
“ This is a dark vision of America ’ s birth .
I reject it .
It ’ s a disturbed reading of history .
It is a slander on our great people.
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ August 2019 , is an award-winning historical analysis of how slavery drove and shaped the United States .
The project immediately sparked debate among historians , some of whom lauded the efforts as a sorely needed reappraisal of American history .
It also prompted backlash from some historians and conservative scholars who characterized it as a cynical and incomplete version of America ’ s history .
Pompeo ’ s comments drew swift condemnation from many within the State Department , including from many diplomats of color , just as the department was emerging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issues with racism .
“ In order for something to be slander , the statement has to be false .
Just because the truths outlined in the ‘ 1619 Project ’ may be tough for some people to swallow doesn ’ t make them any less true , ” said a third State official .
“ The Secretary drew a sharp distinction between the view of the 1619 Project—that America was founded on repression—and his own view that America , uniquely , was founded on a then-new conception of universal unalienable human rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy by email .
“ Secretary Pompeo is fully committed to building a diverse and inclusive workforce representative of America ’ s devotion to the principle of equal opportunity .
This commitment to diversity and inclusion reflects the Department ’ s professional ethos.
” Pompeo established the Commission on Unalienable Rights a year ago , hoping the commission and newly unveiled draft report would help influence U.S. and international policies on fundamental human rights , at a time when U.S. soft power is wilting around the world .
Some human rights groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the endeavor , arguing it was surreptitiously trying to narrow down how the U.S. government defines fundamental human rights with an eye toward excluding LGBTQ and sexual and reproductive rights .
The public will have two weeks to offer comment to the commission on the draft report before it is finalized .
Pompeo ’ s defenders say the commission will help policymakers better understand the country ’ s founding principles and , in their minds , counter the growing narrative that the United States ’ human rights track record is comparable to autocracies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American history is reducible to racism , and the principles of the Declaration of Independence are simply high-toned hypocrisy , why should other countries pay attention to U.S. human-rights advocacy ?
” wrote the scholar Walter Russell Mead in a Wall Street Journal op-ed defending the commission .
Pompeo ’ s Democratic critics , meanwhile , saw his speech as a sign that Trump was using his top diplomat to sow division amid an uphill reelection battle .
“ Everyone who works for Trump is under instructions to ramp up the culture war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , told Foreign Policy in an interview .
“ I think Secretary Pompeo has been a loyal servant of Donald Trump for his entire tenure and he is following instructions.
” The State Department declined repeatedly to say whether Pompeo had read the “ 1619 Project.
” Update , July 17 , 2020 : This article was updated to add further comment from a State Department official .

When U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a speech on “unalienable human rights” on Thursday, he made sure to wade into the so-called culture wars his boss frequently harps on, blasting protesters for tearing down statues and criticizing an expansive New York Times project on slavery for espousing a “Marxist ideology” and “dark vision of America’s birth.”
When U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a speech on “unalienable human rights” on Thursday, he made sure to wade into the so-called culture wars his boss frequently harps on, blasting protesters for tearing down statues and criticizing an expansive New York Times project on slavery for espousing a “Marxist ideology” and “dark vision of America’s birth.”
The New York Times ’ “1619 Project,” which examines the role of slavery in U.S. history, was not the central focus of his speech, nor of the new draft report that his controversial Commission on Unalienable Rights produced.
But his comments have sparked fresh debate and criticism among diplomats who continue to raise alarm bells over long-standing issues of systemic racism and diversity challenges in the State Department. Five officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity described a reaction of shock and fury.
“Pompeo made it very clear where he stands and reaffirmed the purpose of the commission by denigrating the movement for equal justice and the call for racial reckoning and healing in America,” said one State Department official. “Everyone that I have spoken with is horrified and disgusted by the commission, his press conference, and [the] attack on 1619,” said the official.
“Every public appearance since George Floyd’s murder has been to shore up the admin[istration]’s position, no matter how inappropriate the venue,” said another.
These officials described portions of Pompeo’s remarks as unusual for a secretary of state, and they perceived it as a domestic political stump speech aimed at rallying President Donald Trump’s base ahead of the November election. (Pompeo spent Friday in Iowa in closed-door meetings with local officials and was scheduled to give a speech at the Family Leaders Summit.)
“The New York Times’ ‘1619 Project’—so named for the year that the first slaves were transported to America—wants you to believe that our country was founded for human bondage,” Pompeo said in his speech in Philadelphia on Thursday. “They want you to believe that America’s institutions continue to reflect the country’s acceptance of slavery at our founding.”
“They want you to believe that Marxist ideology that America is only the oppressors and the oppressed. The Chinese Communist Party must be gleeful when they see the New York Times spout this ideology,” he added. “This is a dark vision of America’s birth. I reject it. It’s a disturbed reading of history. It is a slander on our great people.”
The “1619 Project,” published in August 2019, is an award-winning historical analysis of how slavery drove and shaped the United States. The project immediately sparked debate among historians, some of whom lauded the efforts as a sorely needed reappraisal of American history. It also prompted backlash from some historians and conservative scholars who characterized it as a cynical and incomplete version of America’s history.
Pompeo’s comments drew swift condemnation from many within the State Department, including from many diplomats of color, just as the department was emerging from difficult internal conversations about its own issues with racism.
“In order for something to be slander, the statement has to be false. Just because the truths outlined in the ‘1619 Project’ may be tough for some people to swallow doesn’t make them any less true,” said a third State official.
“The Secretary drew a sharp distinction between the view of the 1619 Project—that America was founded on repression—and his own view that America, uniquely, was founded on a then-new conception of universal unalienable human rights,” a State Department spokeswoman told Foreign Policy by email.
“Secretary Pompeo is fully committed to building a diverse and inclusive workforce representative of America’s devotion to the principle of equal opportunity. This commitment to diversity and inclusion reflects the Department’s professional ethos.”
Pompeo established the Commission on Unalienable Rights a year ago, hoping the commission and newly unveiled draft report would help influence U.S. and international policies on fundamental human rights, at a time when U.S. soft power is wilting around the world. Some human rights groups and other scholars have been critical of the endeavor, arguing it was surreptitiously trying to narrow down how the U.S. government defines fundamental human rights with an eye toward excluding LGBTQ and sexual and reproductive rights.
The public will have two weeks to offer comment to the commission on the draft report before it is finalized.
Pompeo’s defenders say the commission will help policymakers better understand the country’s founding principles and, in their minds, counter the growing narrative that the United States’ human rights track record is comparable to autocracies and other nondemocratic regimes.
“If American history is reducible to racism, and the principles of the Declaration of Independence are simply high-toned hypocrisy, why should other countries pay attention to U.S. human-rights advocacy?” wrote the scholar Walter Russell Mead in a Wall Street Journal op-ed defending the commission.
Pompeo’s Democratic critics, meanwhile, saw his speech as a sign that Trump was using his top diplomat to sow division amid an uphill reelection battle.
“Everyone who works for Trump is under instructions to ramp up the culture war,” Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told Foreign Policy in an interview. “I think Secretary Pompeo has been a loyal servant of Donald Trump for his entire tenure and he is following instructions.”
The State Department declined repeatedly to say whether Pompeo had read the “1619 Project.”
Update, July 17, 2020: This article was updated to add further comment from a State Department official.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--U.S. Sees Russian Push to Consolidate Foothold in Georgia

U.S. Sees Russian Push to Consolidate Foothold in Georgia Russia is using frozen conflicts in Georgia ’ s breakaway regions to further undermine the Caucasian nation ’ s stability and the viability of its bid to join the European community , according to a State Department report obtained by Foreign Policy , using physical obstructions to harden borders and prevent access .
In a yearly report to Congress sent in May marked “ sensitive but unclassified , ” the State Department said open-source reporting indicated that Russia provided up to $ 275 million in 2019 to finance the vast majority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Abkhazia—breakaway republics that comprise about one-fifth of Georgia and which Russian forces have occupied since a five-day war in August 2008 .
“ Russia has continued to use the conflicts involving Abkhazia and South Ossetia to undermine the independence and stability of Georgia , limit the country ’ s attractiveness as a potential economic partner , and complicate its EU and NATO aspirations , ” according to the report , seen by Foreign Policy .
“ Russia has not fulfilled its obligations under the 2008 ceasefire agreement , including the withdrawal of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has Russia fully implemented its commitment to permit free access for humanitarian organizations in the regions it occupies.
” Though Russia has long sought to distance Georgia from the European community , the news comes as U.S. President Donald Trump , trailing former Vice President Joe Biden in election polls , is facing increasing questions from Congress and NATO allies about his failure to condemn Russian aggression , including intelligence community reporting of Russian bounties for Taliban fighters to take out American troops in Afghanistan , first reported by the New York Times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ German Chancellor Angela Merkel , by proposing to reinvite Russia to the delayed G-7 summit planned for Camp David in the fall and unilaterally slashing U.S. troop levels in Germany , some on Capitol Hill are worried that Russia could make more foreign-policy mischief ahead of the November U.S. election without a tougher line from Washington .
Trump ’ s war of words with allies such as Germany “ delights the Russians and gives them tremendous opportunities , ” Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy , a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Russia knows that the clock is ticking , ” he said .
“ There ’ s likely only six months left in the Trump administration .
They ’ re going to try and take advantage of this time to advance as many of their interests and solidify as many of their gains they ’ ve achieved over the past few years as possible.
” While much of Russia ’ s destabilization efforts in recent years have focused on Ukraine and cyberattacks , the Kremlin is continuing its efforts to undermine Georgia .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia has backed a push by the breakaway regions to physically distance themselves from Georgia , constructing fences and installing observation towers and cameras along the proclaimed borders to “ to destabilize the security situation and separate Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia , ” which has hampered movement into the rest of the country , the State Department reported .
In Georgia ’ s separatist territories , the United States is increasingly cut off from having any impact .
The State Department said new precautions for international visitors in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there and limiting access for aid organizations .
“ The international assistance community has warned this policy could lead to a severe reduction in aid to Abkhazia , as international actors lose access necessary to manage and monitor their programs , ” the State Department reported .
The United States has substantially upped military sales and aid to Georgia since the 2008 war , with the Trump administration overriding Barack Obama-era hesitation to provide $ 75 million worth of Javelin anti-tank missiles in 2017 .
The European Union has provided as much as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Georgia since 2017 .
What ’ s more , some in Washington fear that Russia is using allies to reinforce the separation of the Georgian regions and that of eastern Ukraine .
South Ossetian authorities support their counterparts in the so-called “ Donetsk and Luhansk People ’ s Republics ” in Russia-controlled areas of Ukraine , allowing them to use banks to “ launder money and evade international sanctions , ” the State Department reported , citing open-source reports .
Only Russia , Nauru , Nicaragua , Syria , and Venezuela recognize Georgia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has used recent State Department appropriations bills to prevent U.S. aid to countries that recognize their sovereignty .
Former U.S. officials see Russia ’ s further reinforcement of separatist areas as a sign that Moscow is primed to further disrupt U.S. foreign policy during an election year .
“ Looking at the scene , I think that Putin finds he ’ s in a pretty good position to take advantage of problems in the world , ” said Jim Townsend , who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He ’ s a jiujitsu master .
If he can check his hip a bit , he can flip his opponent without a lot of energy expended—that ’ s what he does .
”

Russia is using frozen conflicts in Georgia’s breakaway regions to further undermine the Caucasian nation’s stability and the viability of its bid to join the European community, according to a State Department report obtained by Foreign Policy , using physical obstructions to harden borders and prevent access.
Russia is using frozen conflicts in Georgia’s breakaway regions to further undermine the Caucasian nation’s stability and the viability of its bid to join the European community, according to a State Department report obtained by Foreign Policy, using physical obstructions to harden borders and prevent access.
In a yearly report to Congress sent in May marked “sensitive but unclassified,” the State Department said open-source reporting indicated that Russia provided up to $275 million in 2019 to finance the vast majority of state budgets in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia—breakaway republics that comprise about one-fifth of Georgia and which Russian forces have occupied since a five-day war in August 2008.
“Russia has continued to use the conflicts involving Abkhazia and South Ossetia to undermine the independence and stability of Georgia, limit the country’s attractiveness as a potential economic partner, and complicate its EU and NATO aspirations,” according to the report, seen by Foreign Policy. “Russia has not fulfilled its obligations under the 2008 ceasefire agreement, including the withdrawal of its forces to pre-conflict positions, nor has Russia fully implemented its commitment to permit free access for humanitarian organizations in the regions it occupies.”
Though Russia has long sought to distance Georgia from the European community, the news comes as U.S. President Donald Trump, trailing former Vice President Joe Biden in election polls, is facing increasing questions from Congress and NATO allies about his failure to condemn Russian aggression, including intelligence community reporting of Russian bounties for Taliban fighters to take out American troops in Afghanistan, first reported by the New York Times.
With Trump angering allies, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, by proposing to reinvite Russia to the delayed G-7 summit planned for Camp David in the fall and unilaterally slashing U.S. troop levels in Germany, some on Capitol Hill are worried that Russia could make more foreign-policy mischief ahead of the November U.S. election without a tougher line from Washington.
Trump’s war of words with allies such as Germany “delights the Russians and gives them tremendous opportunities,” Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told Foreign Policy in an interview.
“Russia knows that the clock is ticking,” he said. “There’s likely only six months left in the Trump administration. They’re going to try and take advantage of this time to advance as many of their interests and solidify as many of their gains they’ve achieved over the past few years as possible.”
While much of Russia’s destabilization efforts in recent years have focused on Ukraine and cyberattacks, the Kremlin is continuing its efforts to undermine Georgia. For much of the past year, Russia has backed a push by the breakaway regions to physically distance themselves from Georgia, constructing fences and installing observation towers and cameras along the proclaimed borders to “to destabilize the security situation and separate Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia,” which has hampered movement into the rest of the country, the State Department reported.
In Georgia’s separatist territories, the United States is increasingly cut off from having any impact. The State Department said new precautions for international visitors in Abkhazia are preventing U.S. personnel from traveling there and limiting access for aid organizations.
“The international assistance community has warned this policy could lead to a severe reduction in aid to Abkhazia, as international actors lose access necessary to manage and monitor their programs,” the State Department reported.
The United States has substantially upped military sales and aid to Georgia since the 2008 war, with the Trump administration overriding Barack Obama-era hesitation to provide $75 million worth of Javelin anti-tank missiles in 2017. The European Union has provided as much as $511 million in programming assistance for Georgia since 2017.
What’s more, some in Washington fear that Russia is using allies to reinforce the separation of the Georgian regions and that of eastern Ukraine. South Ossetian authorities support their counterparts in the so-called “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics” in Russia-controlled areas of Ukraine, allowing them to use banks to “launder money and evade international sanctions,” the State Department reported, citing open-source reports.
Only Russia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Syria, and Venezuela recognize Georgia’s breakaway regions, and Congress has used recent State Department appropriations bills to prevent U.S. aid to countries that recognize their sovereignty.
Former U.S. officials see Russia’s further reinforcement of separatist areas as a sign that Moscow is primed to further disrupt U.S. foreign policy during an election year.
“Looking at the scene, I think that Putin finds he’s in a pretty good position to take advantage of problems in the world,” said Jim Townsend, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy during the Obama administration.
“He’s a jiujitsu master. If he can check his hip a bit, he can flip his opponent without a lot of energy expended—that’s what he does.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--To Downsize Bloated, Too-Powerful Police, Look at These Examples

To Downsize Bloated , Too-Powerful Police , Look at These Examples Across the United States , the debate over the future of policing is gathering steam .
In the wake of deadly police violence and massive protests led by the Black Lives Matter movement , law enforcement agencies are banning so-called neck restraints , as well as increasing oversight of police departments and setting up task forces to propose further reforms .
Calls for defunding and even abolishing the police have gained substantial momentum .
Some proposals are more radical than others , leading to worries that hasty cuts and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as rising criminality , especially in the most vulnerable communities .
Most reformers believe that a lighter policing model could make cities safer .
Reducing the size and influence of police forces is a legitimate priority : The United States spends twice as much on police , courts , and prisons than on welfare payments such as temporary assistance , food stamps , and supplemental social security .
The country also has more police officers per capita than Australia , Britain , or Canada , despite the fact that there is no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rates .
These bloated police numbers are starting to change , albeit very slowly : In Austin , Texas , and Camden , New Jersey , the police were defunded , dismantled , and rebuilt .
In Minneapolis , the city council has moved to defund the largely white police force and establish a department of community safety and violence prevention instead .
Cities such as Baltimore , Los Angeles , New York , Oakland , and Portland have also committed to significant cuts to police budgets and re-routing education and social services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officers in the United States kill between 60 and 100 times more people than their counterparts in Australia or Britain .
Another reason campaigners want to reform—and , in some cases , to disband—police is to limit the potential for their excessive use of force , especially against minorities and other vulnerable groups .
Police officers in the United States kill between 60 and 100 times more people than their counterparts in Australia or Britain .
Only in Brazil , India , the Philippines , and Syria do police kill civilians at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American police are often put in situations they are ill-suited to handle , in which unnecessary escalation into violent abuse abounds .
According to a 2015 report , roughly 50 million people in the United States come into contact with police every year .
About half of them are pulled over while driving , while 9 million more call police for incidents that do not qualify as a crime .
At least 1 in 4 Americans killed in a fatal police encounter suffers from untreated mental illness .
As a consequence , one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ debate over reducing the size and discretionary powers of police forces is to divert responsibilities and funds to social services and other non-police responders .
The goal is to lower the likelihood of violent escalation and deploy more appropriate expertise than officers trained for law enforcement—an idea with deep roots .
But while it sounds promising in principle , doing this in a country like the United States—with roughly 18,000 federal , state , county , and municipal police departments—is trickier in practice .
Law enforcement agencies in the United States and around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to limit the potential confrontation between officers and mentally ill people for years .
They have done so in one of three ways : providing mental health training to officers ( often as part of specialized crisis intervention teams ) ; fielding co-response approaches with mental health and social service professionals ; or passing on interventions to non-police responders .
Limiting police involvement in nonessential scenarios is an especially effective tactic .
In the United States , armed police are often involved in road safety incidents , where simple encounters can lead to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the other hand , unarmed traffic police and uniformed community support officers can issue citations and have the power to carry out road checks , confiscate alcohol in designated areas , and even make arrests .
Belgium , Britain , France , the Netherlands , and South Africa also rely on community safety professionals—unarmed personnel that do not have formal policing powers but perform youth outreach , conflict mediation , and neighborhood patrols .
While there are still few evaluations of their impact , we do know that their deployment can help improve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and provide local training and employment for residents .
In Britain , unarmed traffic police and uniformed community support officers can issue citations , carry out road checks , confiscate alcohol , and even make arrests .
One of the best-documented programs using non-police responders to reduce crime and violence was established in Scotland , which a United Nations report in 2005 declared the most violent country in the developed world .
Facing soaring rates of serious crime , the police in Strathclyde , a region in southwest Scotland , set up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extending the program to other parts of Scotland in 2006 .
Inspired by successful gun violence reduction efforts in Boston during the mid-1990s , the program focused initially on Glasgow .
The program treated violent behavior like a contagious disease and focused on interrupting transmission .
Medical and health professionals traveled to schools to explain the risks and consequences of knife fights .
Former offenders were offered work in cafes and doubled as mentors .
Community outreach programs emphasized building trust .
The program is credited with halving homicidal violence in a decade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and New Zealand have also adopted an array of community-oriented self-policing models .
These experiences are particularly instructive for the United States , with its history of racial bias in policing , because they were explicitly introduced to reverse a long legacy of repressive policing of minority indigenous communities , often a result of racial discrimination .
In Australia , the Julalikari Night Patrol and the Nyoongar Patrol are widely known examples among hundreds of such self-policing operations .
Although these patrols do not exert formal policing powers , they are empowered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Preliminary reviews suggest these activities have led to higher levels of police accountability and less adversarial police-community relations , though more evaluation is needed .
Another widely reported non-police approach was recently adopted by Stockholm .
Since 2015 , the Swedish capital has tested the use of a mental health ambulance as part of its psychiatric emergency response team .
The first of its kind , this specialized unit includes two nurses and a paramedic and is frequently deployed instead of police to respond to people at risk of psychotic episodes and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ access to high-quality care and to avoid the escalation that often accompanies police calls .
While still in its infancy , the initiative has handled over 1,250 cases a year—an average of more than four requests a day—and is credited with having a positive effect on de-escalating delicate emergencies .
Variations of the program are being explored in other Swedish cities and regions such as Gothenburg , Jonkoping , and Skane .
The United States , too , has a trove of experience with non-police approaches for municipalities from which to learn .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , launched in Chicago in 1995 and now operating in over 25 cities including Baltimore ( where it is known as Safe Streets ) , Phoenix ( Truce ) and Pittsburgh ( One Vision One Life ) .
These programs train , pay , and deploy so-called “ interrupters ” who use intervention techniques borrowed from cognitive behavioral therapy to nip disputes in the bud before they turn bloody .
Cure Violence recruits locals with credibility in their communities—many of them shooting victims and former gang members or prison inmates—to disrupt transmission of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and change local norms .
By building positive relationships in high-risk communities , these interventions can potentially reduce tensions before they require police intervention .
The results of these interventions are mixed but promising , including a reduction in gun violence .
Experience around the world has shown that police brutality and excessive violence is by no means inevitable .
Another much-cited program is HomeBoy Industries .
First established in Los Angeles by Gregory Boyle , a Jesuit priest , the program has offered alternatives to gang violence in inner cities since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as problematic youths are assigned case managers and , after formulating a plan , are provided with job training , free social services , and access to education or other skills development .
Qualitative evaluations suggest that participation is associated with decreased involvement in criminality and declines in associated risk factors such as alcoholism , drug abuse , anger management issues , and mental health conditions .
Another non-police approach already deployed in the United States is Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Street , or Cahoots , founded in Oregon in 1989 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disputes in danger of escalation , homelessness , and mental illness .
The program is connected to the city ’ s 911 dispatch system but responds without involving the police .
In recent years , the initiative has been expanded across Oregon as well as to Colorado , Indiana , New York , and the state of Washington .
The current push in the United States to shift more responsibilities to non-police responders is understandable and justified .
Yet the enthusiasm for testing new programs should be tempered with caution : Such measures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potentially costly , and need to be rigorously and regularly evaluated to ensure they achieve their desired outcomes .
They can and should be tested—with a view to scaling up what works and discarding what does not .
What experience around the world has shown is that police brutality and excessive violence is by no means inevitable .
On the contrary : With the right combination of measures , it is eminently preventable .

Across the United States, the debate over the future of policing is gathering steam. In the wake of deadly police violence and massive protests led by the Black Lives Matter movement, law enforcement agencies are banning so-called neck restraints , as well as increasing oversight of police departments and setting up task forces to propose further reforms. Calls for defunding and even abolishing the police have gained substantial momentum. Some proposals are more radical than others, leading to worries that hasty cuts and declining police morale could yield perverse effects such as rising criminality, especially in the most vulnerable communities.
Across the United States, the debate over the future of policing is gathering steam. In the wake of deadly police violence and massive protests led by the Black Lives Matter movement, law enforcement agencies are banning so-called neck restraints, as well as increasing oversight of police departments and setting up task forces to propose further reforms. Calls for defunding and even abolishing the police have gained substantial momentum. Some proposals are more radical than others, leading to worries that hasty cuts and declining police morale could yield perverse effects such as rising criminality, especially in the most vulnerable communities.
Most reformers believe that a lighter policing model could make cities safer. Reducing the size and influence of police forces is a legitimate priority: The United States spends twice as much on police, courts, and prisons than on welfare payments such as temporary assistance, food stamps, and supplemental social security. The country also has more police officers per capita than Australia, Britain, or Canada, despite the fact that there is no evidence that larger police forces reduce crime rates. These bloated police numbers are starting to change, albeit very slowly: In Austin, Texas, and Camden, New Jersey, the police were defunded, dismantled, and rebuilt. In Minneapolis, the city council has moved to defund the largely white police force and establish a department of community safety and violence prevention instead. Cities such as Baltimore, Los Angeles, New York, Oakland, and Portland have also committed to significant cuts to police budgets and re-routing education and social services to poorer, marginalized communities.
Police officers in the United States kill between 60 and 100 times more people than their counterparts in Australia or Britain.
Another reason campaigners want to reform—and, in some cases, to disband—police is to limit the potential for their excessive use of force, especially against minorities and other vulnerable groups. Police officers in the United States kill between 60 and 100 times more people than their counterparts in Australia or Britain. Only in Brazil, India, the Philippines, and Syria do police kill civilians at a higher rate. One reason is that American police are often put in situations they are ill-suited to handle, in which unnecessary escalation into violent abuse abounds. According to a 2015 report, roughly 50 million people in the United States come into contact with police every year. About half of them are pulled over while driving, while 9 million more call police for incidents that do not qualify as a crime. At least 1 in 4 Americans killed in a fatal police encounter suffers from untreated mental illness.
As a consequence, one of the most popular proposals of the debate over reducing the size and discretionary powers of police forces is to divert responsibilities and funds to social services and other non-police responders. The goal is to lower the likelihood of violent escalation and deploy more appropriate expertise than officers trained for law enforcement—an idea with deep roots. But while it sounds promising in principle, doing this in a country like the United States—with roughly 18,000 federal, state, county, and municipal police departments—is trickier in practice.
Law enforcement agencies in the United States and around the world have been experimenting with ways to limit the potential confrontation between officers and mentally ill people for years. They have done so in one of three ways: providing mental health training to officers (often as part of specialized crisis intervention teams); fielding co-response approaches with mental health and social service professionals; or passing on interventions to non-police responders.
Limiting police involvement in nonessential scenarios is an especially effective tactic. In the United States, armed police are often involved in road safety incidents, where simple encounters can lead to unnecessary escalation. In Britain, on the other hand, unarmed traffic police and uniformed community support officers can issue citations and have the power to carry out road checks, confiscate alcohol in designated areas, and even make arrests. Belgium, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and South Africa also rely on community safety professionals—unarmed personnel that do not have formal policing powers but perform youth outreach, conflict mediation, and neighborhood patrols. While there are still few evaluations of their impact, we do know that their deployment can help improve perceptions of security, bolster social cohesion, and provide local training and employment for residents.
In Britain, unarmed traffic police and uniformed community support officers can issue citations, carry out road checks, confiscate alcohol, and even make arrests.
One of the best-documented programs using non-police responders to reduce crime and violence was established in Scotland, which a United Nations report in 2005 declared the most violent country in the developed world. Facing soaring rates of serious crime, the police in Strathclyde, a region in southwest Scotland, set up a violence reduction unit that year before extending the program to other parts of Scotland in 2006. Inspired by successful gun violence reduction efforts in Boston during the mid-1990s, the program focused initially on Glasgow. The program treated violent behavior like a contagious disease and focused on interrupting transmission. Medical and health professionals traveled to schools to explain the risks and consequences of knife fights. Former offenders were offered work in cafes and doubled as mentors. Community outreach programs emphasized building trust. The program is credited with halving homicidal violence in a decade.
Countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have also adopted an array of community-oriented self-policing models. These experiences are particularly instructive for the United States, with its history of racial bias in policing, because they were explicitly introduced to reverse a long legacy of repressive policing of minority indigenous communities, often a result of racial discrimination. In Australia, the Julalikari Night Patrol and the Nyoongar Patrol are widely known examples among hundreds of such self-policing operations. Although these patrols do not exert formal policing powers, they are empowered by community councils and sanctioned by elders. Preliminary reviews suggest these activities have led to higher levels of police accountability and less adversarial police-community relations, though more evaluation is needed.
Another widely reported non-police approach was recently adopted by Stockholm. Since 2015, the Swedish capital has tested the use of a mental health ambulance as part of its psychiatric emergency response team. The first of its kind, this specialized unit includes two nurses and a paramedic and is frequently deployed instead of police to respond to people at risk of psychotic episodes and suicide. Its focus is to ensure access to high-quality care and to avoid the escalation that often accompanies police calls. While still in its infancy, the initiative has handled over 1,250 cases a year—an average of more than four requests a day—and is credited with having a positive effect on de-escalating delicate emergencies. Variations of the program are being explored in other Swedish cities and regions such as Gothenburg, Jonkoping, and Skane.
The United States, too, has a trove of experience with non-police approaches for municipalities from which to learn. These include programs such as Cure Violence, launched in Chicago in 1995 and now operating in over 25 cities including Baltimore (where it is known as Safe Streets), Phoenix (Truce) and Pittsburgh (One Vision One Life). These programs train, pay, and deploy so-called “interrupters” who use intervention techniques borrowed from cognitive behavioral therapy to nip disputes in the bud before they turn bloody. Cure Violence recruits locals with credibility in their communities—many of them shooting victims and former gang members or prison inmates—to disrupt transmission of violent behavior, prevent its future spread, and change local norms. By building positive relationships in high-risk communities, these interventions can potentially reduce tensions before they require police intervention. The results of these interventions are mixed but promising, including a reduction in gun violence.
Experience around the world has shown that police brutality and excessive violence is by no means inevitable.
Another much-cited program is HomeBoy Industries. First established in Los Angeles by Gregory Boyle, a Jesuit priest, the program has offered alternatives to gang violence in inner cities since 1988. Specific “clients” such as problematic youths are assigned case managers and, after formulating a plan, are provided with job training, free social services, and access to education or other skills development. Qualitative evaluations suggest that participation is associated with decreased involvement in criminality and declines in associated risk factors such as alcoholism, drug abuse, anger management issues, and mental health conditions.
Another non-police approach already deployed in the United States is Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Street, or Cahoots, founded in Oregon in 1989. The program prioritizes non-criminal cases including disputes in danger of escalation, homelessness, and mental illness. The program is connected to the city’s 911 dispatch system but responds without involving the police. In recent years, the initiative has been expanded across Oregon as well as to Colorado, Indiana, New York, and the state of Washington.
The current push in the United States to shift more responsibilities to non-police responders is understandable and justified. Yet the enthusiasm for testing new programs should be tempered with caution: Such measures can take time to implement, are potentially costly, and need to be rigorously and regularly evaluated to ensure they achieve their desired outcomes. They can and should be tested—with a view to scaling up what works and discarding what does not. What experience around the world has shown is that police brutality and excessive violence is by no means inevitable. On the contrary: With the right combination of measures, it is eminently preventable.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--Funding Unity in the EU

Funding Unity in the EU

This week marks the middle of July , and the clock is ticking for Europe ’ s political leaders .
By the end of this month , they are determined to agree to the European Union budget for the next seven years along with a recovery fund to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic .
A special European Council meeting has been called for July 17 and 18 , with capitals , instead of winding down for the summer , engaging in shuttle diplomacy , in the hope of finding some consensus for a deal .
Representatives have also aired the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month .
Some committed heads of state are even postponing their wedding plans in order to work on the agreement .
The stakes are high .
In the EU , Council President Charles Michel ’ s latest proposal is a budget of just over 1.1 trillion euros ( $ 1.25 trillion ) over seven years .
He also wants to empower the European Commission to borrow up to 750 billion euros ( $ 860 billion ) for the pandemic recovery fund .
But there remain a number of sticking points .
Chief among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ firmly held view that any decisions about the recovery fund have to made unanimously .
There ’ s also the difficulty of ensuring that taxpayers ’ money goes toward a green recovery for a rules-based Europe while states such as Hungary and Poland are dragging their feet on both the transition away from carbon and respecting European values .
With these countries set to do relatively well in terms of the allocations of the recovery fund , commentators have voiced concerns about how they can be convinced to play ball .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this week ’ s special European Council is going to be far from easy .
This is especially true in light of a survey commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations ( ECFR ) in late spring , which found significant differences in national positions about how the recovery should be handled .
In the survey of 11,000 people covering nine EU member states that together account for two-thirds of the EU population and GDP , which I worked on , there was large support for financial burden-sharing in countries that would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fund , such as Spain and Italy .
There was no such appetite , or majority , in net contributor states .
Even in France , which has been trying to bridge the divide between the union ’ s donor north and recipient south , only 47 percent of respondents support financial burden-sharing .
In Germany , this number fell to 43 percent .
In Sweden and Denmark , the figures were 30 percent and 24 percent , respectively .
If European leaders mishandle this moment and allow the union ’ s south @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consequences could be dire .
ECFR ’ s survey data shows clearly that the diversity in experience of the coronavirus crisis is driving differences of opinion across the EU .
The impact of lagging EU support for Italy at the beginning of the crisis is well documented , and the ECFR ’ s research underlines this .
In our data , 58 percent of Italians report their perceptions of the EU had worsened during the crisis .
Meanwhile , in Spain ( which has been a persistently strong Europhile state in Eurobarometer surveys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ levels of disappointment with the EU , at 50 percent and 41 percent respectively .
The growing sense of disillusionment with the EU seen in Italian politics in recent years may be a harbinger of things to come in the rest of Southern Europe , especially if voters are dissatisfied with the EU ’ s plans for a recovery after the pandemic .
Skepticism of the EU may also allow external actors to step in and exploit the growing drift .
China ’ s mask diplomacy , for example , has been largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , where Beijing is portraying itself less as a systemic rival and more as an alternative to European support .
But the good news for the EU diplomats putting in the hours at this week ’ s council meeting is that the European public does see a clear role for European cooperation .
Now , as the first wave of the health crisis is receding in Europe , it is clear that the experience sensitized European voters to the need to be prepared for the next crisis .
The ECFR survey shows that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change has grown everywhere—as much as 61 percent of the population in the United Kingdom and 60 percent in Spain say they are now more supportive of climate efforts—with those who have grown more supportive outstripping those who are less so in every country covered .
Europeans are likewise strongly in favor of a European Union that will shape the post-pandemic international order ; 63 percent of Europeans believe the crisis has shown the need for more European cooperation , and when asked how Europe should change after the crisis , the most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respondents , was that the EU should provide a more coordinated response to global threats and challenges .
The EU , many believed , should also do more to keep its own population safe .
In Germany and France , in particular , there were strong reported increases in support for business being encouraged to bring production back to Europe : over 50 percent in both for medical supplies , and around 40 percent for non-medical supplies .
Europe ’ s leaders have an opportunity to build a Europe that protects—economically and physically—its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the international stage .
But to bring European voters along with this project , they need to ensure that the recovery deal doesn ’ t focus on the abstract idea of solidarity but on ensuring an EU budget and recovery fund that support practical projects .
Europe ’ s governments should also look at investment protections for pharmaceuticals , medical equipment , and other key industries as a means of strengthening the bloc ’ s economic position .
They could add further parts of the health sector to investment screening , going @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fierce U.S.-Chinese competition , Europe should put its weight behind international institutions to reinforce a level playing field .
The EU could position itself as the convening platform for actors , such as the World Health Organization , the G-7 , the G-20 , foundations , and the pharmaceutical industry .
Despite the complexity of budget deal that the European Council has to make this month , Europe ’ s political leaders should know that this is not the moment to turn inward and focus on technical , institutional questions .
The steady @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beginnings of which can be traced to the EU ’ s long and tortuous response to 2008 financial crisis , should teach them that .
This time Europeans want to see the practical ways in which the EU can help shape their future for the better .
The budget for the next seven years has to set the course for that .

This week marks the middle of July, and the clock is ticking for Europe’s political leaders. By the end of this month, they are determined to agree to the European Union budget for the next seven years along with a recovery fund to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. A special European Council meeting has been called for July 17 and 18, with capitals, instead of winding down for the summer, engaging in shuttle diplomacy, in the hope of finding some consensus for a deal. Representatives have also aired the possibility of a second meeting later this month. Some committed heads of state are even postponing their wedding plans in order to work on the agreement.
This week marks the middle of July, and the clock is ticking for Europe’s political leaders. By the end of this month, they are determined to agree to the European Union budget for the next seven years along with a recovery fund to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. A special European Council meeting has been called for July 17 and 18, with capitals, instead of winding down for the summer, engaging in shuttle diplomacy, in the hope of finding some consensus for a deal. Representatives have also aired the possibility of a second meeting later this month. Some committed heads of state are even postponing their wedding plans in order to work on the agreement.
The stakes are high. In the EU, Council President Charles Michel’s latest proposal is a budget of just over 1.1 trillion euros ($1.25 trillion) over seven years. He also wants to empower the European Commission to borrow up to 750 billion euros ($860 billion) for the pandemic recovery fund. But there remain a number of sticking points. Chief among them is the government of the Netherlands’ firmly held view that any decisions about the recovery fund have to made unanimously. There’s also the difficulty of ensuring that taxpayers’ money goes toward a green recovery for a rules-based Europe while states such as Hungary and Poland are dragging their feet on both the transition away from carbon and respecting European values. With these countries set to do relatively well in terms of the allocations of the recovery fund, commentators have voiced concerns about how they can be convinced to play ball.
In short, coming to an agreement at this week’s special European Council is going to be far from easy. This is especially true in light of a survey commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in late spring, which found significant differences in national positions about how the recovery should be handled.
In the survey of 11,000 people covering nine EU member states that together account for two-thirds of the EU population and GDP, which I worked on, there was large support for financial burden-sharing in countries that would likely be net beneficiaries of a recovery fund, such as Spain and Italy. There was no such appetite, or majority, in net contributor states. Even in France, which has been trying to bridge the divide between the union’s donor north and recipient south, only 47 percent of respondents support financial burden-sharing. In Germany, this number fell to 43 percent. In Sweden and Denmark, the figures were 30 percent and 24 percent, respectively.
If European leaders mishandle this moment and allow the union’s south and north to drift apart, the consequences could be dire. ECFR’s survey data shows clearly that the diversity in experience of the coronavirus crisis is driving differences of opinion across the EU. The impact of lagging EU support for Italy at the beginning of the crisis is well documented, and the ECFR’s research underlines this. In our data, 58 percent of Italians report their perceptions of the EU had worsened during the crisis.
Meanwhile, in Spain (which has been a persistently strong Europhile state in Eurobarometer surveys) and France, there are worrying levels of disappointment with the EU, at 50 percent and 41 percent respectively. The growing sense of disillusionment with the EU seen in Italian politics in recent years may be a harbinger of things to come in the rest of Southern Europe, especially if voters are dissatisfied with the EU’s plans for a recovery after the pandemic. Skepticism of the EU may also allow external actors to step in and exploit the growing drift. China’s mask diplomacy, for example, has been largely concentrated on the EU’s periphery, where Beijing is portraying itself less as a systemic rival and more as an alternative to European support.
But the good news for the EU diplomats putting in the hours at this week’s council meeting is that the European public does see a clear role for European cooperation. Now, as the first wave of the health crisis is receding in Europe, it is clear that the experience sensitized European voters to the need to be prepared for the next crisis. The ECFR survey shows that support for more efforts to tackle climate change has grown everywhere—as much as 61 percent of the population in the United Kingdom and 60 percent in Spain say they are now more supportive of climate efforts—with those who have grown more supportive outstripping those who are less so in every country covered.
Europeans are likewise strongly in favor of a European Union that will shape the post-pandemic international order; 63 percent of Europeans believe the crisis has shown the need for more European cooperation, and when asked how Europe should change after the crisis, the most frequent answer, at 52 percent of respondents, was that the EU should provide a more coordinated response to global threats and challenges. The EU, many believed, should also do more to keep its own population safe. In Germany and France, in particular, there were strong reported increases in support for business being encouraged to bring production back to Europe: over 50 percent in both for medical supplies, and around 40 percent for non-medical supplies.
Europe’s leaders have an opportunity to build a Europe that protects—economically and physically—its citizens and that has an influential voice on the international stage. But to bring European voters along with this project, they need to ensure that the recovery deal doesn’t focus on the abstract idea of solidarity but on ensuring an EU budget and recovery fund that support practical projects.
Europe’s governments should also look at investment protections for pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and other key industries as a means of strengthening the bloc’s economic position. They could add further parts of the health sector to investment screening, going beyond biotech. In a world of fierce U.S.-Chinese competition, Europe should put its weight behind international institutions to reinforce a level playing field. The EU could position itself as the convening platform for actors, such as the World Health Organization, the G-7, the G-20, foundations, and the pharmaceutical industry.
Despite the complexity of budget deal that the European Council has to make this month, Europe’s political leaders should know that this is not the moment to turn inward and focus on technical, institutional questions. The steady rise in populism in Europe, the beginnings of which can be traced to the EU’s long and tortuous response to 2008 financial crisis, should teach them that. This time Europeans want to see the practical ways in which the EU can help shape their future for the better. The budget for the next seven years has to set the course for that.