foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--The White House Wants Peace With Sudan. Congress Wants Khartoum to Pay.

The White House Wants Peace With Sudan .
Congress Wants Khartoum to Pay .
Diplomats and politicians across the political spectrum in the United States have been heralding the once-in-a-generation opportunity to see Sudan transformed from pariah to partner .
But in an only-in-Washington storyline , these seemingly well-intentioned allies could well be pushing Sudan ’ s democratic experiment to the breaking point as they negotiate the terms for one of the biggest obstacles to the country ’ s future success and its relationship with Washington—being removed from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list .
An immensely complicated and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with few historical precedents to follow , being removed from the list has been Sudan ’ s biggest request of Washington since last year ’ s civilian protests led to the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir , the autocratic leader who landed Sudan on the list 27 years ago by sheltering Osama bin Laden while al Qaeda planned terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole .
Relatives of the victims have long demanded justice from the Sudanese government .
Washington has seen Sudan ’ s request as its biggest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aggressively pursues a set of political and economic reforms that would cement its place as one of the few democratic successes coming out of the Arab Spring tumult of the last decade .
As the two countries approach a deal that could see Sudan delisted once and for all , Washington is testing the limits of what more it can get beyond a stable , democratic partner in an unstable region .
Looking well beyond Sudan ’ s strategic position in the Horn of Africa astride the Sahel and the Red Sea , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Sudan as another Arab pearl in a necklace of Middle East peace it is stringing together before Election Day .
The administration staffers leading these efforts offer a clue : The State Department ’ s outgoing Iran envoy , Brian Hook , accompanied Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on his tour of Khartoum last month , and the White House senior director for the Middle East , Miguel Correa , who helped broker the Emirati-Israeli rapprochement , reprised that role again this week in secret talks with Sudan and the United Arab @ @ @ @ @ @ @ away from the Africa bureau , where Sudan has resided and which understands the country ’ s tumultuous history with the United States , however , underscores an at-all-costs approach to signing another Arab peace deal for the administration ’ s most prized diplomatic ally , Israel .
The United States and Israel see a match made in heaven in the rapprochement .
Sudan ’ s civilian leaders have also repeatedly emphasized their intention to establish a “ balanced foreign policy ” and deepen their relations with established democracies .
Viewed from Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demonstration that Sudan truly belongs off the terrorism list than normalizing relations with the Middle East ’ s only true democracy ?
For Israelis , diplomatic ties with Sudan open the channels for intelligence sharing and give them a window into the opaque world of Sudanese counterterrorism efforts .
As few as 10 years ago , Israeli Air Force jets were bombing smuggling routes across Sudan ’ s vast northern desert region , where well-established networks have for years ferried weapons up the Red Sea and into Gaza in support of Palestinian militants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that lifeline and build Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s diplomatic wall around the Palestinians even higher .
But what started out as a blind date of sorts between Netanyahu and Sudan ’ s de facto head of state , Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan , in February has taken on the contours of an arranged marriage seven months later .
The hoped-for wedding was disrupted by disputes over the dowry this week when the U.S. offer of as much as $ 500 million in unspecified “ aid and investment , ” Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in direct budgetary support , and the UAE ’ s promised $ 600 million in fuel trade deals weren ’ t enough to earn Sudan ’ s final blessing , according to officials who participated in the talks .
In the throes of an economic meltdown inherited by its corrupt and kleptocratic predecessor , and aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects of a historic flood , Sudan ’ s government needs cash to prop up its decimated currency , slow the pace of spiraling hyperinflation , and import basic commodities like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
An IOU simply can not be monetized in time to sell this deal with Israel to an ambivalent Sudanese public , which despite some opposition from left-leaning politicians and die-hard Islamists is mostly seen as a sideshow by the bulk of Sudan ’ s citizens .
With living standards cut by more than half over the last year and the government trumpeting a family assistance program that will distribute a mere $ 5 per month to those in greatest need , any effort by their government that doesn ’ t put money @ @ @ @ @ @ @ table feels a bit like wasted energy .
If the dowry offered to Sudan this week had been larger and more immediate , the diplomatic vows could well have been consecrated .
Still , all hope is not lost for the Sudanese .
Despite a last-ditch effort to get something for nothing , many in Washington appear to understand that allowing Sudan to retain the terrorism label will choke off the country from the outside investment it needs to avoid slipping into failed state status .
An even more powerful motivator than achieving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Sudan , something Washington has no wish to be blamed for—and which is likely if Sudan stays on the terrorism list .
Not to be outdone by the State Department ’ s attempts to extract even more benefit from the terrorism delisting , Congress , at the same time , has become locked in its own standoff—completely uncoordinated with administration efforts—over the terms of Sudan ’ s legal peace legislation .
The details of that deal will determine whether , even after being removed from the terrorism list , Sudan will continue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past cast over it and begin the long road toward economic recovery .
Without legal peace , the families of victims from the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa in the 1990s , with enforceable legal judgments against Sudan , will soon be empowered to deny Sudan access to U.S. capital markets , pursue any asset of Sudan found in the United States , and impede potential business deals through a discovery and subpoena process—effectively dampening any potential U.S. investments in the country and negating many of the curative effects of being removed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the list of aggrieved is a rump group of victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks who , while holding no legal judgments against Sudan , have blanketed Congress with a powerful and compelling narrative that if Sudan bears responsibility for the U.S. embassy and USS Cole bombings , then it likely bears some responsibility for 9/11 , too .
A recent court action on their part seeks to uncover a secret “ Sudan dossier ” inside Khartoum ’ s once powerful intelligence apparatus that they hope reveals a smoking gun of culpability .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the political muscle to block any deal on legal peace , are powerful Democratic Sens .
Chuck Schumer and Robert Menendez , both of whom bear the added responsibility of representing this powerful 9/11 constituency in Congress .
It is impossible to imagine that either would allow Sudan to escape with blanket immunity without first ensuring that their constituents had their day in court and ultimately enjoyed an equitable settlement from Sudan on par with other victim groups .
Recognizing this , a least bad outcome for the Sudanese has begun @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legal peace now for those terrorism cases in which it has reached financial settlement but would hold open the door to new 9/11 prosecutions and settlement payments for potentially years to come .
While not the clean break with the past it had hoped for , as Sudan will continue to bear some of the ill effects of the label even after it is removed from the list , the deal would clear a path for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to extend an immediate economic lifeline to the country , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ financial collapse .
The question that remains is whether this deal can be sold to the Sudanese people , who died for their own chance at democracy and who today suffer from the benign neglect of well-intentioned friends who claim , without the slightest hint of irony , to want nothing more than to see Sudan ’ s transition succeed .
The best way to demonstrate that commitment is to put forth a deal that recognizes Sudan ’ s efforts to change and offers its people a path forward to survive and prosper @

Diplomats and politicians across the political spectrum in the United States have been heralding the once-in-a-generation opportunity to see Sudan transformed from pariah to partner. But in an only-in-Washington storyline, these seemingly well-intentioned allies could well be pushing Sudan’s democratic experiment to the breaking point as they negotiate the terms for one of the biggest obstacles to the country’s future success and its relationship with Washington—being removed from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list.
Diplomats and politicians across the political spectrum in the United States have been heralding the once-in-a-generation opportunity to see Sudan transformed from pariah to partner. But in an only-in-Washington storyline, these seemingly well-intentioned allies could well be pushing Sudan’s democratic experiment to the breaking point as they negotiate the terms for one of the biggest obstacles to the country’s future success and its relationship with Washington—being removed from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list.
An immensely complicated and highly political process in all circumstances, with few historical precedents to follow, being removed from the list has been Sudan’s biggest request of Washington since last year’s civilian protests led to the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir, the autocratic leader who landed Sudan on the list 27 years ago by sheltering Osama bin Laden while al Qaeda planned terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole. Relatives of the victims have long demanded justice from the Sudanese government.
Washington has seen Sudan’s request as its biggest point of leverage in ensuring the country aggressively pursues a set of political and economic reforms that would cement its place as one of the few democratic successes coming out of the Arab Spring tumult of the last decade. As the two countries approach a deal that could see Sudan delisted once and for all, Washington is testing the limits of what more it can get beyond a stable, democratic partner in an unstable region.
Looking well beyond Sudan’s strategic position in the Horn of Africa astride the Sahel and the Red Sea, the U.S. State Department has developed visions of Sudan as another Arab pearl in a necklace of Middle East peace it is stringing together before Election Day.
The administration staffers leading these efforts offer a clue: The State Department’s outgoing Iran envoy, Brian Hook, accompanied Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on his tour of Khartoum last month, and the White House senior director for the Middle East, Miguel Correa, who helped broker the Emirati-Israeli rapprochement, reprised that role again this week in secret talks with Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. That seemingly small bureaucratic shift away from the Africa bureau, where Sudan has resided and which understands the country’s tumultuous history with the United States, however, underscores an at-all-costs approach to signing another Arab peace deal for the administration’s most prized diplomatic ally, Israel.
The United States and Israel see a match made in heaven in the rapprochement. Sudan’s civilian leaders have also repeatedly emphasized their intention to establish a “balanced foreign policy” and deepen their relations with established democracies. Viewed from Washington, what better example of both and demonstration that Sudan truly belongs off the terrorism list than normalizing relations with the Middle East’s only true democracy?
For Israelis, diplomatic ties with Sudan open the channels for intelligence sharing and give them a window into the opaque world of Sudanese counterterrorism efforts. As few as 10 years ago, Israeli Air Force jets were bombing smuggling routes across Sudan’s vast northern desert region, where well-established networks have for years ferried weapons up the Red Sea and into Gaza in support of Palestinian militants. Ties to Khartoum would help cut that lifeline and build Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s diplomatic wall around the Palestinians even higher.
But what started out as a blind date of sorts between Netanyahu and Sudan’s de facto head of state, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in February has taken on the contours of an arranged marriage seven months later. The hoped-for wedding was disrupted by disputes over the dowry this week when the U.S. offer of as much as $500 million in unspecified “aid and investment,” Israel’s pledge of $10 million in direct budgetary support, and the UAE’s promised $600 million in fuel trade deals weren’t enough to earn Sudan’s final blessing, according to officials who participated in the talks.
In the throes of an economic meltdown inherited by its corrupt and kleptocratic predecessor, and aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects of a historic flood, Sudan’s government needs cash to prop up its decimated currency, slow the pace of spiraling hyperinflation, and import basic commodities like food and medicine for it short-term survival.
An IOU simply cannot be monetized in time to sell this deal with Israel to an ambivalent Sudanese public, which despite some opposition from left-leaning politicians and die-hard Islamists is mostly seen as a sideshow by the bulk of Sudan’s citizens. With living standards cut by more than half over the last year and the government trumpeting a family assistance program that will distribute a mere $5 per month to those in greatest need, any effort by their government that doesn’t put money in the bank or food on the table feels a bit like wasted energy. If the dowry offered to Sudan this week had been larger and more immediate, the diplomatic vows could well have been consecrated.
Still, all hope is not lost for the Sudanese. Despite a last-ditch effort to get something for nothing, many in Washington appear to understand that allowing Sudan to retain the terrorism label will choke off the country from the outside investment it needs to avoid slipping into failed state status. An even more powerful motivator than achieving Middle East peace is avoiding state failure in Sudan, something Washington has no wish to be blamed for—and which is likely if Sudan stays on the terrorism list.
Not to be outdone by the State Department’s attempts to extract even more benefit from the terrorism delisting, Congress, at the same time, has become locked in its own standoff—completely uncoordinated with administration efforts—over the terms of Sudan’s legal peace legislation. The details of that deal will determine whether, even after being removed from the terrorism list, Sudan will continue to have the long shadow of its past cast over it and begin the long road toward economic recovery.
Without legal peace, the families of victims from the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa in the 1990s, with enforceable legal judgments against Sudan, will soon be empowered to deny Sudan access to U.S. capital markets, pursue any asset of Sudan found in the United States, and impede potential business deals through a discovery and subpoena process—effectively dampening any potential U.S. investments in the country and negating many of the curative effects of being removed from the terrorism list.
Adding to the list of aggrieved is a rump group of victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks who, while holding no legal judgments against Sudan, have blanketed Congress with a powerful and compelling narrative that if Sudan bears responsibility for the U.S. embassy and USS Cole bombings, then it likely bears some responsibility for 9/11, too. A recent court action on their part seeks to uncover a secret “Sudan dossier” inside Khartoum’s once powerful intelligence apparatus that they hope reveals a smoking gun of culpability.
Backing this effort with a sympathetic ear, and the political muscle to block any deal on legal peace, are powerful Democratic Sens. Chuck Schumer and Robert Menendez, both of whom bear the added responsibility of representing this powerful 9/11 constituency in Congress. It is impossible to imagine that either would allow Sudan to escape with blanket immunity without first ensuring that their constituents had their day in court and ultimately enjoyed an equitable settlement from Sudan on par with other victim groups.
Recognizing this, a least bad outcome for the Sudanese has begun to emerge that would grant Sudan its legal peace now for those terrorism cases in which it has reached financial settlement but would hold open the door to new 9/11 prosecutions and settlement payments for potentially years to come. While not the clean break with the past it had hoped for, as Sudan will continue to bear some of the ill effects of the label even after it is removed from the list, the deal would clear a path for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to extend an immediate economic lifeline to the country, something it desperately needs to stave off financial collapse.
The question that remains is whether this deal can be sold to the Sudanese people, who died for their own chance at democracy and who today suffer from the benign neglect of well-intentioned friends who claim, without the slightest hint of irony, to want nothing more than to see Sudan’s transition succeed. The best way to demonstrate that commitment is to put forth a deal that recognizes Sudan’s efforts to change and offers its people a path forward to survive and prosper.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--Can the United States’ Democratic Institutions Survive the 2020 Election Campaign?

Can the United States ’ Democratic Institutions Survive the 2020 Election Campaign ?
Matthew Kroenig : Hi , Emma .
Are you and your family still hanging in there ?
Emma Ashford : Well , I have two toddlers upstairs on Zoom doing a group singalong , so we ’ ll see if my sanity holds up through the whole column .
Did you know Old MacDonald had a unicorn ?
MK : Are you sure they didn ’ t say Old McConnell ?
EA : I doubt the preschool set follows politics that closely .
Lucky them !
Mitch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but he does indeed have a Supreme Court seat to fill .
Of course , he did once promise to let the electorate decide on election-year appointments .
But I doubt the gentleman from Kentucky is going to let a little rank hypocrisy get in the way of filling another Supreme Court seat .
From our point of view , though , it ’ s less than six weeks to election day , and foreign policy has been pushed even further down the agenda by the death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ What do you think ?
MK : Only six weeks ( and three columns ) to go until the big day .
I still think this election won ’ t be decided on foreign policy .
An August Gallup poll placed it sixth among issues that voters care about ( after the economy , health care , Supreme Court appointments !
, COVID-19 , and violent crime ) .
But it is getting some more coverage in the press , and I know many foreign governments are trying to anticipate what U.S. foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What is your take ?
EA : You ’ re probably right , but I do find it interesting that Donald Trump is trying to recast himself as the peace candidate .
He slammed Joe Biden on his support for the Iraq War and told an ABC town hall audience that “ I ’ m bringing our troops back from Afghanistan .
I ’ m bringing our troops back from Iraq .
We ’ re almost out of almost every place.
” Clearly , the president thinks that his base wants to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many on the right and left calling for an end to “ endless wars , ” but it is not clear it is the majority .
In the most recent poll I could find from Gallup on the war in Afghanistan , a majority of Americans thought the war was not a mistake and a large majority of Republicans said the war made the country safer .
I think Trump ’ s popularity among Republican voters is not driven by anti-war sentiment but by other issues , like Supreme Court appointments .
EA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know that polling found 70-plus percent of veterans supported a full withdrawal from Afghanistan .
And I ’ ve seen more recent polling of smaller samples of Americans that found a majority of respondents agreed .
So I suspect that Trump was mostly worried about being seen about backing off of his 2016 promises .
And he has some high-profile supporters—most notably Tucker Carlson at Fox News—who are pushing him to get more serious on his anti-war bona fides .
Carlson said just recently that Biden and Kamala Harris will take us to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and he said that Trump ’ s announcement of a reduced footprint in Iraq should be a cause for “ widespread celebration.
” MK : These divergent results underscore that the public doesn ’ t really have firm views on foreign policy and they are heavily influenced by elite opinion .
It is also an interesting issue among experts , because positions don ’ t line up neatly by party .
You have interventionist and isolationist wings on both sides .
H.R .
McMaster ( Trump ’ s former national security advisor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign ’ s top foreign-policy advisor ) probably agree more with each other than with Sens .
Rand Paul or Bernie Sanders , prominent politicians in their respective parties .
EA : It doesn ’ t line up by issue , either .
I think both candidates are to some extent trying to portray themselves as opposed to pointless wars in the Middle East .
That polls fairly well , after all .
But on China , they ’ re both taking a tough line .
Did you see the president ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t start to describe it !
EA : Well , he slammed China , accusing it of spreading the “ plague , ” and described the World Health Organization as “ controlled ” by China .
He reiterated his line that countries should all seek what ’ s best for them and avoid cooperation .
It ’ s a pretty provocative approach to take during a pandemic that is likely to require substantial global health cooperation .
It made China ’ s Xi Jinping—who called for climate cooperation and said he opposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I thought .
MK : I find it amusing that people take Xi ’ s statements at face value .
The Chinese Communist Party routinely lies to the international community about everything ( the virus , their GDP numbers , ethnic cleansing in Tibet and now Xinjiang ) .
Statements about Xi sounding better than Trump say more about the observer than either leader .
EA : Ouch !
Look , I ’ m not saying I believe Xi Jinping or that I think his statements are truthful representations of what he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ probably not .
But I think he showed at the General Assembly that he can play the game of global influence better than the Trump administration .
Trump gave a grudging speech , yelled at everyone , and told them that he didn ’ t care about them .
Xi showed up and gave a normal-sounding speech extolling the virtues of international cooperation .
It might all be fake , but the delegates on Zoom lapped it up .
MK : It makes sense to be diplomatic in diplomatic settings .
But losing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t mean the U.S. government is wrong .
The other issue that caused a diplomatic rift but on which the United States has the correct position is the snapback of Iran sanctions .
Iran is clearly violating the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal .
The deal gives any of the parties to the agreement the ability to snap back sanctions—this kind of reverse U.N. Security Council veto was an ingenious part of an otherwise flawed agreement—and the United States has exercised that option .
Now the other parties to the agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ largest state sponsor of terrorism over Washington .
EA : There ’ s been a lot of confusion about snapback , because it ’ s so full of nitty-gritty legal details .
But perhaps an analogy would help : As I see it , last year , the United States got fed up with the nuclear deal , took its ball , and went home .
Now Trump administration officials have decided that they still should get a say in how the game is played .
It ’ s absurd .
I do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aren ’ t even suggesting the U.S. government might still get a say .
I think in almost any other situation in the last 20 years , that wouldn ’ t be the case .
It ’ s a testament to how badly U.S. influence has fared under the Trump administration .
Rand Corp. had a great report recently that found American soft power has declined substantially in recent years ; this is just Exhibit A .
But , speaking of things that are doing really badly since 2016 , would you like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy and institutions ?
MK : Let ’ s do it .
With the passing of the legendary Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and news that Republicans plan to fill the seat before or just after the election , Democrats are talking about expanding the court , adding states like the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico to the union , and other retaliatory measures if they take power .
The partisan fights seem more intense than usual , and some are warning about violence in the aftermath of the upcoming election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scholars have rated the United States as backsliding toward autocracy .
I am more optimistic about where things stand , but maybe you want to begin by elaborating on the pessimistic view ?
EA : Well , I ’ m certainly not running around screaming that Trump is Vladimir Putin ’ s puppet or anything .
But I do think we have to take seriously some of the concerns that scholars are raising about democratic institutions in the United States .
V-Dem , an academic project based in Sweden that rates various states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggested that the United States is undergoing “ substantial autocratization.
” Other academics—many of whom study these problems around the world—suggest similar things .
There ’ s a basic problem , which is that the United States has always been fairly undemocratic in form : There are lots of veto players and places where the popular will is translated into policy in an indirect way—the classic “ republic , not democracy ” problem .
But then there ’ s been another shift over the last few years , where more and more institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the institutions of the state itself are used in order to perpetuate their control .
Nobody ’ s saying the United States is turning into Zimbabwe , but it ’ s a pattern we have seen before in other states that slid from democracy back to autocracy .
MK : There is a fundamental contradiction in the argument that Trump is a dictator-in-waiting .
On one hand , his critics say that his administration is chaotic and lacks the ability to develop and implement clear strategies and policies .
On the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dismantle the world ’ s oldest continuous democracy .
Both charges can ’ t be true .
EA : Well , I think the word “ systematically ” is doing a lot of work there .
Does it really matter if a more competent would-be autocrat would do a better job of dismantling institutions ?
Trump is doing plenty to delegitimize elections .
And much of this isn ’ t about Trump .
As various observers have noted , if he successfully nominates a Supreme Court justice , then four of the nine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ filled by presidents who entered the White House after losing the popular vote .
The structure of the Senate and wide-ranging gerrymandering have given one political party a substantive advantage in electoral politics ; Nate Silver ’ s FiveThirtyEight estimates that the Senate is approximately 6 to 7 points more Republican than the voters .
Isn ’ t that problematic ?
MK : The rules of the game were set in 1789 , and now some Democrats are complaining that they can not win with these rules .
The system was designed from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ republic .
It is not a tyranny of the majority ; that is a strength , not a weakness .
Rather than fight the rules , Democrats should focus their efforts on better competing with the rules as they are and look to do more to appeal to people outside of coastal , metropolitan areas .
EA : Look , much of this isn ’ t a new problem .
Even the great scholar Juan Linz , when discussing the perils of presidentialism , included a carve-out for the United States , discussing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But he also highlighted that it ’ s far easier for these systems to slide into autocracy in certain circumstances .
And I really don ’ t think there ’ s a constitutional basis for rampant gerrymandering , for limited access to voting places , or for trying to delegitimize postal voting .
All of those smack more of attempts to maintain the power of a minority .
MK : Americans should carefully nurture the country ’ s democracy .
It is the United States ’ greatest asset , and some practices , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are badly in need of reform .
I also agree that strong executives paired with weak legislatures can contribute to democratic backsliding .
I even co-wrote an entire book on legislative strength around the world motivated by this precise concern .
But studying the issue only makes me more optimistic about where we stand .
To be honest , I think a lot of the recent concern is driven by Trump Derangement Syndrome .
V-Dem is a great project ( I helped design the original survey and still serve as an occasional advisor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of academic experts , and scholars have their biases .
Most are on the left , they don ’ t like Trump , and they are downgrading the state of U.S. democracy accordingly .
( Remember , many scholars incorrectly warned that George W. Bush was creating an imperial presidency , too . )
If Biden wins , I suspect the United States ’ “ democracy ” score will suddenly improve , even if he packs the Supreme Court and adds new states to the union .
In other words , it won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions that rapidly changed , only the mood of the survey participants .
EA : Isn ’ t that the problem ?
Everyone has been creating an imperial presidency for so long now that any leader or party with an inclination can turn it to decidedly undemocratic ends .
Both sides bear some guilt ; Trump is just the one exploiting it in an attempt to win reelection .
On the upside , I suppose that McConnell wouldn ’ t be trying so hard to push through a replacement for Ginsburg if he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In any case , it ’ s a toss-up as to whether my derangement comes from Trump or the toddler sing-along .
Though the two have some similarities : I ’ m worried that the wheels on the bus might just be falling off .
Until next time ?
MK : Sounds great .
But I ’ d like to drive .
My bus sounds safer .

Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma. Are you and your family still hanging in there?
Emma Ashford: Well, I have two toddlers upstairs on Zoom doing a group singalong, so we’ll see if my sanity holds up through the whole column. Did you know Old MacDonald had a unicorn?
MK: Are you sure they didn’t say Old McConnell?
EA: I doubt the preschool set follows politics that closely. Lucky them!
Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
Mitch McConnell may not have a unicorn, but he does indeed have a Supreme Court seat to fill. Of course, he did once promise to let the electorate decide on election-year appointments. But I doubt the gentleman from Kentucky is going to let a little rank hypocrisy get in the way of filling another Supreme Court seat.
From our point of view, though, it’s less than six weeks to election day, and foreign policy has been pushed even further down the agenda by the death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the epic battle to fill her seat. What do you think?
MK: Only six weeks (and three columns) to go until the big day. I still think this election won’t be decided on foreign policy. An August Gallup poll placed it sixth among issues that voters care about (after the economy, health care, Supreme Court appointments!, COVID-19, and violent crime). But it is getting some more coverage in the press, and I know many foreign governments are trying to anticipate what U.S. foreign policy will look like after the election. What is your take?
EA: You’re probably right, but I do find it interesting that Donald Trump is trying to recast himself as the peace candidate. He slammed Joe Biden on his support for the Iraq War and told an ABC town hall audience that “I’m bringing our troops back from Afghanistan. I’m bringing our troops back from Iraq. We’re almost out of almost every place.” Clearly, the president thinks that his base wants to hear that.
MK: There are many on the right and left calling for an end to “endless wars,” but it is not clear it is the majority. In the most recent poll I could find from Gallup on the war in Afghanistan, a majority of Americans thought the war was not a mistake and a large majority of Republicans said the war made the country safer. I think Trump’s popularity among Republican voters is not driven by anti-war sentiment but by other issues, like Supreme Court appointments.
EA: That’s interesting. I know that polling found 70-plus percent of veterans supported a full withdrawal from Afghanistan. And I’ve seen more recent polling of smaller samples of Americans that found a majority of respondents agreed. So I suspect that Trump was mostly worried about being seen about backing off of his 2016 promises. And he has some high-profile supporters—most notably Tucker Carlson at Fox News—who are pushing him to get more serious on his anti-war bona fides. Carlson said just recently that Biden and Kamala Harris will take us to war in Syria if they are elected, and he said that Trump’s announcement of a reduced footprint in Iraq should be a cause for “widespread celebration.”
MK: These divergent results underscore that the public doesn’t really have firm views on foreign policy and they are heavily influenced by elite opinion. It is also an interesting issue among experts, because positions don’t line up neatly by party. You have interventionist and isolationist wings on both sides. H.R. McMaster (Trump’s former national security advisor) and Antony Blinken (the Biden campaign’s top foreign-policy advisor) probably agree more with each other than with Sens. Rand Paul or Bernie Sanders, prominent politicians in their respective parties.
EA: It doesn’t line up by issue, either. I think both candidates are to some extent trying to portray themselves as opposed to pointless wars in the Middle East. That polls fairly well, after all. But on China, they’re both taking a tough line.
Did you see the president’s U.N. speech this week? Inflammatory doesn’t start to describe it!
MK: Why inflammatory?
EA: Well, he slammed China, accusing it of spreading the “plague,” and described the World Health Organization as “controlled” by China. He reiterated his line that countries should all seek what’s best for them and avoid cooperation. It’s a pretty provocative approach to take during a pandemic that is likely to require substantial global health cooperation. It made China’s Xi Jinping—who called for climate cooperation and said he opposed a new cold war—look reasonable in comparison, I thought.
MK: I find it amusing that people take Xi’s statements at face value. The Chinese Communist Party routinely lies to the international community about everything (the virus, their GDP numbers, ethnic cleansing in Tibet and now Xinjiang). Statements about Xi sounding better than Trump say more about the observer than either leader.
EA: Ouch! Look, I’m not saying I believe Xi Jinping or that I think his statements are truthful representations of what he intends to do. They’re probably not. But I think he showed at the General Assembly that he can play the game of global influence better than the Trump administration. Trump gave a grudging speech, yelled at everyone, and told them that he didn’t care about them. Xi showed up and gave a normal-sounding speech extolling the virtues of international cooperation. It might all be fake, but the delegates on Zoom lapped it up.
MK: It makes sense to be diplomatic in diplomatic settings. But losing a popularity contest at the U.N. doesn’t mean the U.S. government is wrong. The other issue that caused a diplomatic rift but on which the United States has the correct position is the snapback of Iran sanctions. Iran is clearly violating the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal. The deal gives any of the parties to the agreement the ability to snap back sanctions—this kind of reverse U.N. Security Council veto was an ingenious part of an otherwise flawed agreement—and the United States has exercised that option. Now the other parties to the agreement are essentially choosing the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism over Washington.
EA: There’s been a lot of confusion about snapback, because it’s so full of nitty-gritty legal details. But perhaps an analogy would help: As I see it, last year, the United States got fed up with the nuclear deal, took its ball, and went home. Now Trump administration officials have decided that they still should get a say in how the game is played. It’s absurd.
I do think it is notable that the Europeans aren’t even suggesting the U.S. government might still get a say. I think in almost any other situation in the last 20 years, that wouldn’t be the case. It’s a testament to how badly U.S. influence has fared under the Trump administration. Rand Corp. had a great report recently that found American soft power has declined substantially in recent years; this is just Exhibit A.
But, speaking of things that are doing really badly since 2016, would you like to talk about the state of American democracy and institutions?
MK: Let’s do it. With the passing of the legendary Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and news that Republicans plan to fill the seat before or just after the election, Democrats are talking about expanding the court, adding states like the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico to the union, and other retaliatory measures if they take power. The partisan fights seem more intense than usual, and some are warning about violence in the aftermath of the upcoming election. And this comes amid reports that scholars have rated the United States as backsliding toward autocracy.
I am more optimistic about where things stand, but maybe you want to begin by elaborating on the pessimistic view?
EA: Well, I’m certainly not running around screaming that Trump is Vladimir Putin’s puppet or anything. But I do think we have to take seriously some of the concerns that scholars are raising about democratic institutions in the United States. V-Dem, an academic project based in Sweden that rates various states on their democratic bona fides, recently suggested that the United States is undergoing “substantial autocratization.” Other academics—many of whom study these problems around the world—suggest similar things.
There’s a basic problem, which is that the United States has always been fairly undemocratic in form: There are lots of veto players and places where the popular will is translated into policy in an indirect way—the classic “republic, not democracy” problem. But then there’s been another shift over the last few years, where more and more institutions are captured by a minority of voters, and the institutions of the state itself are used in order to perpetuate their control. Nobody’s saying the United States is turning into Zimbabwe, but it’s a pattern we have seen before in other states that slid from democracy back to autocracy.
MK: There is a fundamental contradiction in the argument that Trump is a dictator-in-waiting. On one hand, his critics say that his administration is chaotic and lacks the ability to develop and implement clear strategies and policies. On the other, he is systematically working to dismantle the world’s oldest continuous democracy. Both charges can’t be true.
EA: Well, I think the word “systematically” is doing a lot of work there. Does it really matter if a more competent would-be autocrat would do a better job of dismantling institutions? Trump is doing plenty to delegitimize elections.
And much of this isn’t about Trump. As various observers have noted, if he successfully nominates a Supreme Court justice, then four of the nine seats on the court will have been filled by presidents who entered the White House after losing the popular vote. The structure of the Senate and wide-ranging gerrymandering have given one political party a substantive advantage in electoral politics; Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight estimates that the Senate is approximately 6 to 7 points more Republican than the voters. Isn’t that problematic?
MK: The rules of the game were set in 1789, and now some Democrats are complaining that they cannot win with these rules. The system was designed from the beginning as federalist and as a republic. It is not a tyranny of the majority; that is a strength, not a weakness. Rather than fight the rules, Democrats should focus their efforts on better competing with the rules as they are and look to do more to appeal to people outside of coastal, metropolitan areas.
EA: Look, much of this isn’t a new problem. Even the great scholar Juan Linz, when discussing the perils of presidentialism, included a carve-out for the United States, discussing how presidential systems can be democratic. But he also highlighted that it’s far easier for these systems to slide into autocracy in certain circumstances. And I really don’t think there’s a constitutional basis for rampant gerrymandering, for limited access to voting places, or for trying to delegitimize postal voting. All of those smack more of attempts to maintain the power of a minority.
MK: Americans should carefully nurture the country’s democracy. It is the United States’ greatest asset, and some practices, like the drawing of legislative districts, are badly in need of reform. I also agree that strong executives paired with weak legislatures can contribute to democratic backsliding. I even co-wrote an entire book on legislative strength around the world motivated by this precise concern.
But studying the issue only makes me more optimistic about where we stand. To be honest, I think a lot of the recent concern is driven by Trump Derangement Syndrome. V-Dem is a great project (I helped design the original survey and still serve as an occasional advisor) But, it relies on surveys of academic experts, and scholars have their biases. Most are on the left, they don’t like Trump, and they are downgrading the state of U.S. democracy accordingly. (Remember, many scholars incorrectly warned that George W. Bush was creating an imperial presidency, too.)
If Biden wins, I suspect the United States’ “democracy” score will suddenly improve, even if he packs the Supreme Court and adds new states to the union. In other words, it won’t be the country’s institutions that rapidly changed, only the mood of the survey participants.
EA: Isn’t that the problem? Everyone has been creating an imperial presidency for so long now that any leader or party with an inclination can turn it to decidedly undemocratic ends. Both sides bear some guilt; Trump is just the one exploiting it in an attempt to win reelection. On the upside, I suppose that McConnell wouldn’t be trying so hard to push through a replacement for Ginsburg if he thought that Trump was certain to win.
In any case, it’s a toss-up as to whether my derangement comes from Trump or the toddler sing-along. Though the two have some similarities: I’m worried that the wheels on the bus might just be falling off. Until next time?
MK: Sounds great. But I’d like to drive. My bus sounds safer.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--Want to Learn How the Pentagon Works? Then Play This Board Game.

Want to Learn How the Pentagon Works ?
Then Play This Board Game .
If you are someone who ’ d like to learn how to create a defense policy that balances strategic goals , military means , and a tight defense budget , there ’ s a board game for that .
The ink drawing of the Pentagon—surrounded by little tanks and planes—on the game box is the first clue that Hedgemony : A Game of Strategic Choices is no ordinary tabletop game .
It ’ s published by Rand Corp. , the federally funded think tank known for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Rand has been making games since the 1950s , ” said Michael Spirtas , a Rand scientist and one of Hedgemony ’ s designers .
“ But we ’ ve never made one for sale to the general public until now.
” In fact , Hedgemony wasn ’ t initially meant for the public either .
Instead , the U.S. Defense Department used it to help write the 2018 National Defense Strategy .
But the designers at Rand had a bright idea : Why not repackage it as a teaching tool for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public policy and the military staff colleges ?
“ There are very few places where people who are interested in defense policy can see the Department of Defense writ large , ” Spirtas said .
“ Usually people stay in just one silo , like working on readiness or defense posture .
It ’ s very rare to get a broader view of the DoD.
” Hedgemony is a strange beast and not just because its title is spelled with a “ d. ” ( “ The game forces players to adopt hedging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Spirtas explained . )
It ’ s part family game like Risk , part paper wargame of the type favored by military history buffs , and tinged with a bit of Dungeons & Dragons-ish role-playing .
There is a Blue team ( the United States and the European Union/NATO ) and a Red team ( perennial Pentagon nemeses China , Russia , Iran , and North Korea ) .
Players are assigned specific roles , with the most important being the U.S. defense secretary and the secretary ’ s staff of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focuses on Blue , with Red there just to make the game educational and challenging .
Further proof that this is a Pentagon-focused game is the map .
Hedgemony may be the only nonclassified board game that divides the world not by political or geographic boundaries but rather by the U.S. military ’ s regionally based combatant commands , such as Indo-Pacific Command , European Command , and Central Command .
Blue deploys its military forces between these commands using small cardboard tokens .
There are also Event Cards drawn randomly to simulate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and civil wars to terrorist attacks and technological breakthroughs .
Victory is determined by Influence Points that players gain and lose depending on the actions they and their opponents take .
( Those familiar with the popular Cold War board game Twilight Struggle will notice the resemblance . )
To gain these rewards , each nation has a pool of Resource Points that it can spend building and maintaining military forces , redeploying troops between the combatant commands , and investing in researching various capabilities such as long-range missiles , missile defense , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
If Hedgemony were simple , it probably wouldn ’ t be a very realistic simulation of how the Pentagon works .
For starters , every nation—even those on the same team—has its own goals .
This means that even though the United States is mostly aligned against the Red nations , it is also competing with Blue Europe .
There can be multiple winners , but somebody has to lose : For example , Europe loses if Russia achieves its goals , and the United States and China both lose if North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States and China may be adversaries in this game , they also have reason to cooperate on some issues .
The United States starts with a much larger pool of Resource Points to spend than the other nations , but most of that budget is consumed by maintenance of existing forces .
To research new technologies or modernize its military means giving up something else .
The other nations have far fewer resources ( North Korea has one-eighth the U.S. total ) , but they also have no global commitments .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , consider a single turn in a demo game that Rand conducted .
( I had a minor role as an intelligence briefer for the Red team . )
The Blue team must formulate a defense policy at the outset : In this game , Blue announced that it would focus on maintaining the United States ’ technological edge and on creating a small rapid reaction force to deal with global crises , even if doing so came at the expense of existing forces .
Small numbers of troops would be based in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region , but U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Centcom to save money and create a reserve based in the United States .
The Red team then drew several Event Cards and could play one this turn : China , for example , could choose to invest in anti-ship ballistic missiles or take a more aggressive stance in the South China Sea .
In Hedgemony , the Red team must function as both adversary and mentor to Blue .
Red has to brief Blue on its intentions and reveal what cards it drew @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to disclose which card it is going to pick .
The United States , in other words , has an inkling of what its adversary is capable of but not what it would do .
It ’ s the classic dilemma between assessing an opponent ’ s capabilities and figuring out its intentions , something every Pentagon decision-maker faces .

If you are someone who’d like to learn how to create a defense policy that balances strategic goals, military means, and a tight defense budget, there’s a board game for that.
If you are someone who’d like to learn how to create a defense policy that balances strategic goals, military means, and a tight defense budget, there’s a board game for that.
The ink drawing of the Pentagon—surrounded by little tanks and planes—on the game box is the first clue that Hedgemony: A Game of Strategic Choices is no ordinary tabletop game. It’s published by Rand Corp., the federally funded think tank known for wonkish policy papers and mathematical analyses. “Rand has been making games since the 1950s,” said Michael Spirtas, a Rand scientist and one of Hedgemony’s designers. “But we’ve never made one for sale to the general public until now.”
In fact, Hedgemony wasn’t initially meant for the public either. Instead, the U.S. Defense Department used it to help write the 2018 National Defense Strategy. But the designers at Rand had a bright idea: Why not repackage it as a teaching tool for aspiring defense professionals at graduate schools of public policy and the military staff colleges? “There are very few places where people who are interested in defense policy can see the Department of Defense writ large,” Spirtas said. “Usually people stay in just one silo, like working on readiness or defense posture. It’s very rare to get a broader view of the DoD.”
Hedgemony is a strange beast and not just because its title is spelled with a “d.” (“The game forces players to adopt hedging strategies that trade off between different priorities,” Spirtas explained.) It’s part family game like Risk, part paper wargame of the type favored by military history buffs, and tinged with a bit of Dungeons & Dragons-ish role-playing.
There is a Blue team (the United States and the European Union/NATO) and a Red team (perennial Pentagon nemeses China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea). Players are assigned specific roles, with the most important being the U.S. defense secretary and the secretary’s staff of assistants and intelligence briefers. The game focuses on Blue, with Red there just to make the game educational and challenging.
Further proof that this is a Pentagon-focused game is the map. Hedgemony may be the only nonclassified board game that divides the world not by political or geographic boundaries but rather by the U.S. military’s regionally based combatant commands, such as Indo-Pacific Command, European Command, and Central Command.
Blue deploys its military forces between these commands using small cardboard tokens. There are also Event Cards drawn randomly to simulate global and domestic developments, from coups and civil wars to terrorist attacks and technological breakthroughs.
Victory is determined by Influence Points that players gain and lose depending on the actions they and their opponents take. (Those familiar with the popular Cold War board game Twilight Struggle will notice the resemblance.) To gain these rewards, each nation has a pool of Resource Points that it can spend building and maintaining military forces, redeploying troops between the combatant commands, and investing in researching various capabilities such as long-range missiles, missile defense, and special operations forces.
Sound simple? If Hedgemony were simple, it probably wouldn’t be a very realistic simulation of how the Pentagon works. For starters, every nation—even those on the same team—has its own goals. This means that even though the United States is mostly aligned against the Red nations, it is also competing with Blue Europe. There can be multiple winners, but somebody has to lose: For example, Europe loses if Russia achieves its goals, and the United States and China both lose if North Korea wins. Which means that while the United States and China may be adversaries in this game, they also have reason to cooperate on some issues.
The United States starts with a much larger pool of Resource Points to spend than the other nations, but most of that budget is consumed by maintenance of existing forces. To research new technologies or modernize its military means giving up something else. The other nations have far fewer resources (North Korea has one-eighth the U.S. total), but they also have no global commitments.
To give the flavor of the game, consider a single turn in a demo game that Rand conducted. (I had a minor role as an intelligence briefer for the Red team.) The Blue team must formulate a defense policy at the outset: In this game, Blue announced that it would focus on maintaining the United States’ technological edge and on creating a small rapid reaction force to deal with global crises, even if doing so came at the expense of existing forces. Small numbers of troops would be based in Europe, Korea, and the Indo-Pacific region, but U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Centcom to save money and create a reserve based in the United States.
The Red team then drew several Event Cards and could play one this turn: China, for example, could choose to invest in anti-ship ballistic missiles or take a more aggressive stance in the South China Sea. In Hedgemony, the Red team must function as both adversary and mentor to Blue. Red has to brief Blue on its intentions and reveal what cards it drew, but it doesn’t have to disclose which card it is going to pick. The United States, in other words, has an inkling of what its adversary is capable of but not what it would do. It’s the classic dilemma between assessing an opponent’s capabilities and figuring out its intentions, something every Pentagon decision-maker faces.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--Can Thailand’s Protest Movement Broaden Its Appeal?

After holding the largest mass demonstration in Thailand in several years on Sept. 19-20 , on Thursday the student protesters moved to the country ’ s parliament to press home their demands for democratic reform .
Hours later , a deal between the sitting government—which is closely associated with the military , which ruled the country from 2014 to 2019—and opposition parties that might have slowed the marches fell apart .
The two sides had agreed to move ahead with legislation that would allow Thailand ’ s 2017 constitution , which had been crafted by the military junta and is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ replaced by an entirely new charter .
But something went wrong , and the deal came unstuck .
Parliament kicked the issue down the road by calling for a month of further study , an important victory for the conservative establishment and especially for the unelected Senate that stands to be abolished under a revised constitution .
Until the deal fell apart , the existing administration , still led by retired generals closely associated with the 2014 coup , had appeared willing to listen to student calls for wide-ranging political reforms .
Now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ smooth political reform process are in more doubt than ever .
For years , Thailand has been extremely polarized , divided along regional and class lines as seen in the color-coded red versus yellow protest movements that have repeatedly emerged in Bangkok for the past 15 years .
But now those existing political cleavages have been joined by a new one : a yawning generational chasm .
Digital natives under 25 , who have grown up accessing information online , are questioning the hierarchies that have long shaped Thailand ’ s conservative society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alarmed by what they see as the disrespect from young protesters who are questioning seniority and tradition , instead of showing deference to the military and monarchy .
These divides came to the fore in February , when the Thai Constitutional Court dissolved the progressive Future Forward Party .
Soon , protests by university and high school students broke out all over the country .
Future Forward had embodied the hopes and dreams of younger voters , and its seemingly arbitrary banning was a bitter blow .
The COVID-19 pandemic dampened public dissent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the students were back with a vengeance .
The protesters ’ demands are threefold : dissolution of the current parliament ( which they believe was elected through a flawed and rigged process ) ; extensive constitutional amendments ( especially abolishing the unelected Senate and changing the election system ) ; and an end to official harassment of government critics .
More radical critics of the government are demanding that constitutional change go hand in hand with reform of the monarchy , a previously taboo topic in Thailand .
With provocative , iconoclastic speeches @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the royal envelope in ways that delighted their core supporters but alarmed many prospective allies .
Over the past two months , the students have tried to expand their support to other social groups , including people adversely affected by the pandemic , which has decimated the tourist industry and much of the service sector , and even to conservatives disillusioned by the lackluster performance of the military-dominated government and uneasy with the new reign of King Maha Vajiralongkorn , who assumed the throne following the passing of his father in 2016 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ people across the old red-yellow divide .
Preaching to the converted is the easy part : The protesters need above all to reach out those millions of Thais who may have supported previous military coups but who now recognize the importance of a more balanced and sustainable political system that respects differences and is not overshadowed by either the army or the palace .
Those in the center might be won over by a more temperate protest movement that focused most of its criticism on the increasingly unpopular Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the current economic crisis .
Even if the current movement does reach new demographics , the odds are stacked against it : Previous rounds of protests have too often culminated in state violence or military coups .
For now , the response from the government has been to kill the protests with legalistic kindness .
Officials have tried to neutralize the protesters by shifting the agenda to familiar , circular debates about how to draft Thailand ’ s 21st constitution since 1932 .
But Thursday ’ s parliamentary vote could mean that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The authorities may sense that the students are proving unable to expand their movement , which means that the government may simply dig in and stall for time , hoping the protests eventually fizzle out .
The students already gained plenty of attention—now they need to win friends .
Opening up political space is a good start .
But in order to advance their goals , they next have to populate this space with Thais from other persuasions and generations , who agree that the vicious cycle of dysfunctional politics has to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a strong showing in the streets , but the establishment has used the second match in parliament to put the ball firmly back in its own court .

After holding the largest mass demonstration in Thailand in several years on Sept. 19-20, on Thursday the student protesters moved to the country’s parliament to press home their demands for democratic reform.
After holding the largest mass demonstration in Thailand in several years on Sept. 19-20, on Thursday the student protesters moved to the country’s parliament to press home their demands for democratic reform.
Hours later, a deal between the sitting government—which is closely associated with the military, which ruled the country from 2014 to 2019—and opposition parties that might have slowed the marches fell apart. The two sides had agreed to move ahead with legislation that would allow Thailand’s 2017 constitution, which had been crafted by the military junta and is widely viewed as undemocratic, to be replaced by an entirely new charter. But something went wrong, and the deal came unstuck. Parliament kicked the issue down the road by calling for a month of further study, an important victory for the conservative establishment and especially for the unelected Senate that stands to be abolished under a revised constitution.
Until the deal fell apart, the existing administration, still led by retired generals closely associated with the 2014 coup, had appeared willing to listen to student calls for wide-ranging political reforms. Now, though, the prospects for a smooth political reform process are in more doubt than ever.
For years, Thailand has been extremely polarized, divided along regional and class lines as seen in the color-coded red versus yellow protest movements that have repeatedly emerged in Bangkok for the past 15 years. But now those existing political cleavages have been joined by a new one: a yawning generational chasm. Digital natives under 25, who have grown up accessing information online, are questioning the hierarchies that have long shaped Thailand’s conservative society. Meanwhile, many older people are alarmed by what they see as the disrespect from young protesters who are questioning seniority and tradition, instead of showing deference to the military and monarchy.
These divides came to the fore in February, when the Thai Constitutional Court dissolved the progressive Future Forward Party. Soon, protests by university and high school students broke out all over the country. Future Forward had embodied the hopes and dreams of younger voters, and its seemingly arbitrary banning was a bitter blow. The COVID-19 pandemic dampened public dissent for a while, but by mid-July the students were back with a vengeance.
The protesters’ demands are threefold: dissolution of the current parliament (which they believe was elected through a flawed and rigged process); extensive constitutional amendments (especially abolishing the unelected Senate and changing the election system); and an end to official harassment of government critics. More radical critics of the government are demanding that constitutional change go hand in hand with reform of the monarchy, a previously taboo topic in Thailand. With provocative, iconoclastic speeches, last weekend’s protesters pushed the royal envelope in ways that delighted their core supporters but alarmed many prospective allies.
Over the past two months, the students have tried to expand their support to other social groups, including people adversely affected by the pandemic, which has decimated the tourist industry and much of the service sector, and even to conservatives disillusioned by the lackluster performance of the military-dominated government and uneasy with the new reign of King Maha Vajiralongkorn, who assumed the throne following the passing of his father in 2016. If they succeed, they could unify people across the old red-yellow divide.
In his speech to a crowd gathered in front of the Grand Palace on Saturday night, the student leader Parit “Penguin” Chiwarak acknowledged that the protest movement could only promote wholesale changes to Thailand’s state and society by bringing more than half of the country’s population on board. Yet while the past weekend’s protests were groundbreaking in their witty symbolism, bold agenda, and youthful ambition, they were less successful in building a broader range of alliances.
Preaching to the converted is the easy part: The protesters need above all to reach out those millions of Thais who may have supported previous military coups but who now recognize the importance of a more balanced and sustainable political system that respects differences and is not overshadowed by either the army or the palace. Those in the center might be won over by a more temperate protest movement that focused most of its criticism on the increasingly unpopular Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and his government’s inept handling of the current economic crisis.
Even if the current movement does reach new demographics, the odds are stacked against it: Previous rounds of protests have too often culminated in state violence or military coups. For now, the response from the government has been to kill the protests with legalistic kindness. Officials have tried to neutralize the protesters by shifting the agenda to familiar, circular debates about how to draft Thailand’s 21st constitution since 1932.
But Thursday’s parliamentary vote could mean that the soft approach has run its course. The authorities may sense that the students are proving unable to expand their movement, which means that the government may simply dig in and stall for time, hoping the protests eventually fizzle out.
The students already gained plenty of attention—now they need to win friends. Opening up political space is a good start. But in order to advance their goals, they next have to populate this space with Thais from other persuasions and generations, who agree that the vicious cycle of dysfunctional politics has to be ended. The students may have had a strong showing in the streets, but the establishment has used the second match in parliament to put the ball firmly back in its own court.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--The State Department’s Struggles to Diversify Just Got Harder

The State Department ’ s Struggles to Diversify Just Got Harder President Donald Trump this week issued a sweeping executive order banning federal money from some diversity training programs meant to address racism and inequality .
U.S. diplomats , frustrated with diversity challenges the State Department has grappled with for decades , worry that the president ’ s executive order will have a chilling effect on the department ’ s ability to improve its record , according to interviews with five current and former officials .
Trump ’ s order came the same week that the head of America ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State Department ’ s efforts to improve its dismal record on diversity and inclusion .
The executive order is meant to bar funding for U.S. service personnel , federal contractors , and federal grant recipients for some diversity training that includes what the White House considers “ divisive concepts.
” In the order , Trump railed against what he calls “ the pernicious and false belief that America is an irredeemably racist and sexist country ” and said that “ malign ideology is now migrating from the fringes of American society ” into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some diplomats view the executive order as mere political signaling ahead of the elections , as Trump wades chest-deep into the culture wars following months of nationwide protests against racism and police violence in the wake of the police killings of George Floyd , Breonna Taylor , and other Black Americans .
But diplomats say Trump ’ s political signaling could have real impacts , potentially halting new training efforts by the department or its contractors .
The executive order , they said , is another sign that senior administration officials don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ federal workers—of color face in their day-to-day jobs .
“ This is a message to a base … that he sees no reason for any change despite the calls by people of color , all summer , all year , all administration , ” one official said .
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment , including on whether the executive order would halt or otherwise impact existing State Department training and diversity programs .
During a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Tuesday , the head of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a rocky track record on diversity and inclusion .
“ I ’ m a 33-year foreign service officer .
I ’ ve seen a lot of change , but I ’ ve seen a lot of things that haven ’ t changed , ” said Carol Perez , the director-general of the foreign service , during the congressional hearing .
“ We have to get at the culture of the institution , and I have to be perfectly frank when I talk to my predecessors , this is the hard part .
… @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a problem two to five years ago.
” Texas Democratic Rep. Joaquin Castro , who led the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on the matter , noted that only four U.S. ambassadors are Black or Latino—out of a total of 187 ambassador positions , according to the American Foreign Service Association .
“ The numbers paint a staggering picture .
It ’ s clear the State Department must act , ” Castro said .
A federal watchdog report released earlier this year found that the department had improved in some areas and gone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the proportion of African Americans working at the State Department fell from 17 to 15 percent from 2002 to 2018 , despite a big jump in the overall workforce .
In the foreign service specifically , the percentage of African American officers marginally increased from 6 to 7 percent over that same time .
The numbers are even starker for African American women : They represented 13 percent of all State Department employees in 2002 , but only 9 percent in 2018 ; within the foreign service , their ranks increased from 2 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Perez and the lawmakers noted the State Department was beginning to make new changes to course-correct .
This includes expanding two programs , the Pickering and Rangel fellowships aimed at recruiting new minority and underserved diplomats ; instituting a formal exit survey process for diplomats leaving the department ; and expanding unconscious bias training .
Perez also asked for Congress to fund paid internships with the foreign service , one aspect of what she described as the State Department ’ s new “ bottom-up ” approach to improving diversity .
Castro and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican , are working on legislation to do so , according to a congressional aide .
But other proposed bills have drawn criticism from the State Department ’ s own ranks .
In June , California Democratic Rep. Karen Bass , the chair of the Congressional Black Caucus , introduced legislation that would allow for “ mid-career professionals from minority groups ” to laterally join the foreign service at mid- and senior-levels .
If passed , the legislation would mark a significant break from the way the foreign service works—it would be like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ majors or colonels based on their outside experience .
“ I think the spirit of the bill is great in terms of wanting to diversify the diplomatic corps and recognizing we have a problem , ” said one State Department official , speaking on condition of anonymity .
“ But there ’ s talent already inside the system .
… They should be looking to find ways to promote women and people of color who started from scratch and worked their way up .
”

President Donald Trump this week issued a sweeping executive order banning federal money from some diversity training programs meant to address racism and inequality. U.S. diplomats, frustrated with diversity challenges the State Department has grappled with for decades, worry that the president’s executive order will have a chilling effect on the department’s ability to improve its record, according to interviews with five current and former officials.
President Donald Trump this week issued a sweeping executive order banning federal money from some diversity training programs meant to address racism and inequality. U.S. diplomats, frustrated with diversity challenges the State Department has grappled with for decades, worry that the president’s executive order will have a chilling effect on the department’s ability to improve its record, according to interviews with five current and former officials.
Trump’s order came the same week that the head of America’s diplomatic corps admitted shortcomings in the State Department’s efforts to improve its dismal record on diversity and inclusion.
The executive order is meant to bar funding for U.S. service personnel, federal contractors, and federal grant recipients for some diversity training that includes what the White House considers “divisive concepts.” In the order, Trump railed against what he calls “the pernicious and false belief that America is an irredeemably racist and sexist country” and said that “malign ideology is now migrating from the fringes of American society” into workplace diversity training programs.
Privately, some diplomats view the executive order as mere political signaling ahead of the elections, as Trump wades chest-deep into the culture wars following months of nationwide protests against racism and police violence in the wake of the police killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and other Black Americans.
But diplomats say Trump’s political signaling could have real impacts, potentially halting new training efforts by the department or its contractors. The executive order, they said, is another sign that senior administration officials don’t grasp the difficulties that diplomats—and other federal workers—of color face in their day-to-day jobs.
“This is a message to a base … that he sees no reason for any change despite the calls by people of color, all summer, all year, all administration,” one official said.
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment, including on whether the executive order would halt or otherwise impact existing State Department training and diversity programs.
During a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Tuesday, the head of the U.S. foreign service conceded the agency had a rocky track record on diversity and inclusion.
“I’m a 33-year foreign service officer. I’ve seen a lot of change, but I’ve seen a lot of things that haven’t changed,” said Carol Perez, the director-general of the foreign service, during the congressional hearing. “We have to get at the culture of the institution, and I have to be perfectly frank when I talk to my predecessors, this is the hard part. … This is not something that just became a problem two to five years ago.”
Texas Democratic Rep. Joaquin Castro, who led the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on the matter, noted that only four U.S. ambassadors are Black or Latino—out of a total of 187 ambassador positions, according to the American Foreign Service Association.
“The numbers paint a staggering picture. It’s clear the State Department must act,” Castro said.
A federal watchdog report released earlier this year found that the department had improved in some areas and gone backward in others.
The study found the proportion of African Americans working at the State Department fell from 17 to 15 percent from 2002 to 2018, despite a big jump in the overall workforce. In the foreign service specifically, the percentage of African American officers marginally increased from 6 to 7 percent over that same time. The numbers are even starker for African American women: They represented 13 percent of all State Department employees in 2002, but only 9 percent in 2018; within the foreign service, their ranks increased from 2 to 3 percent.
During the hearing, Perez and the lawmakers noted the State Department was beginning to make new changes to course-correct. This includes expanding two programs, the Pickering and Rangel fellowships aimed at recruiting new minority and underserved diplomats; instituting a formal exit survey process for diplomats leaving the department; and expanding unconscious bias training.
Perez also asked for Congress to fund paid internships with the foreign service, one aspect of what she described as the State Department’s new “bottom-up” approach to improving diversity. Castro and Rep. Lee Zeldin, a New York Republican, are working on legislation to do so, according to a congressional aide.
But other proposed bills have drawn criticism from the State Department’s own ranks. In June, California Democratic Rep. Karen Bass, the chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, introduced legislation that would allow for “mid-career professionals from minority groups” to laterally join the foreign service at mid- and senior-levels. If passed, the legislation would mark a significant break from the way the foreign service works—it would be like the military slotting in new officers as majors or colonels based on their outside experience.
Some current State Department officials said the legislation, while well-meaning, was a band-aid fix that would not address the department’s problems of retaining talent—and could fill competitive promotion slots, making it even more challenging the diplomatic corps’ relatively few diplomats of color to rise through the ranks.
“I think the spirit of the bill is great in terms of wanting to diversify the diplomatic corps and recognizing we have a problem,” said one State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity. “But there’s talent already inside the system. … They should be looking to find ways to promote women and people of color who started from scratch and worked their way up.”