foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Nigeria’s Next-Generation Protest Movement

For once in Nigeria , the youth have united against tribe , religion , and ethnicity to demand change .
For years , the Nigerian police unit known as the Special Anti-Robbery Squad ( SARS ) —designed for tactical undercover operations to take down criminals—has extorted , harassed , and killed young people who happen to use expensive phones and drive flashy cars .
The plainclothes police also target those who sport dreadlocks and tattoos .
Despite the online campaign against SARS through the # EndSARS hashtag for four years , the government ’ s indifference and lip service inspired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But a viral video that circulated on social media on Oct. 3—a gory display of a man allegedly killed in broad daylight by a SARS squad—was the last straw .
Young Nigerians had had enough .
So they took action , first by trending the hashtag # EndSARS , which hit No .
1 worldwide on Twitter .
Next , they deployed a decentralized and organic strategy to drive youth from social media to the streets of Nigeria ’ s major cities—especially Lagos , Nigeria ’ s commercial hub—to demand an end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Folarin Falana , known as “ Falz , ” and Douglas Jack Agu , known as “ Runtown ” —both millennials—used their social media platforms to call for a peaceful demonstration on Oct. 8 , demanding justice for victims and survivors of police brutality .
That was how the protest started in Lagos ’ s upscale Lekki neighborhood , before it spread to other parts of the city and nationwide .
This strategy motivated more Nigerians to join the peaceful demonstrations .
It marked the birth of an unconventional nonviolent civil resistance movement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ icons to bring people onto the streets .
For a generation accused of clinging to smartphones and being addicted to the internet and pop culture , the protest was an unexpected shock .
The opposition to SARS caught the government off guard .
As the protests spread across Nigeria , other celebrities and social media influencers led the demonstrations in their various states .
When the government made a tone-deaf announcement that SARS has been disbanded , just as it had announced three years earlier , the youth followed up with a five-point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killed because of police brutality , police training , a judicial inquiry to prosecute perpetrators , psychological evaluation of members of the police force , and increased salaries for officers .
The protest organizers , led by a group of feminists , assisted in drafting the agenda .
They circulated it on social media , winning many supporters across the globe from Hillary Clinton to Beyoncé .
Within two weeks , the all-female Feminist Coalition reportedly raked in monetary donations of over $ 380,000 to coordinate its logistics .
They disbursed the funds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ medical bills for wounded protesters , food and drinks , and private security to protect demonstrators .
They also launched a help line to respond to emergencies .
For a generation accused of clinging to smartphones and being addicted to the internet and pop culture , the protest was an unexpected shock .
Standing behind the protesters were religious leaders , small and medium-sized businesses , and Nigerians living abroad , all lending their voices and platforms to call for the dismantling of the corrupt police unit .
Nigerians in the diaspora turned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ embassies , calling for an end to SARS .
The sheer organization of these young Nigerians gave hope and renewed faith that Nigeria—a country of more than 200 million people where nearly 40 percent of people live in abject poverty—can work .
The movement has now gone beyond calling for an end to corrupt policing ; it is also challenging the misuse of public funds and demanding solutions to the country ’ s unemployment crisis , poor infrastructure development , and bad governance .
Despite the violence , the # EndSARS protests could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Nigeria ’ s 200 million people are under the age of 25 .
The youth are now aware of their power more than ever .
Although the protests started peacefully , they turned ugly when the Nigerian Army shot at unarmed protesters on Oct. 20 at close range—an event that was recorded live on Instagram by a female DJ .
Many young protesters were killed and injured while thugs allegedly sponsored by politicians infiltrated and disrupted the protests .
Despite the violence , the # EndSARS protests could mark a turning point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with about 60 percent of its 200 million people under the age of 25 .
But political apathy among the youth has resulted in the election of elderly politicians to public office .
The youth are now aware of their power more than ever .
They ’ ve seen how much can be achieved with unity and are ready to demand change—especially as Nigerians look forward to the next general election in 2023 .

For once in Nigeria, the youth have united against tribe, religion, and ethnicity to demand change.
For once in Nigeria, the youth have united against tribe, religion, and ethnicity to demand change.
For years, the Nigerian police unit known as the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS)—designed for tactical undercover operations to take down criminals—has extorted, harassed, and killed young people who happen to use expensive phones and drive flashy cars. The plainclothes police also target those who sport dreadlocks and tattoos.
Despite the online campaign against SARS through the #EndSARS hashtag for four years, the government’s indifference and lip service inspired SARS to commit more atrocities against citizens. But a viral video that circulated on social media on Oct. 3—a gory display of a man allegedly killed in broad daylight by a SARS squad—was the last straw.
Young Nigerians had had enough. So they took action, first by trending the hashtag #EndSARS, which hit No. 1 worldwide on Twitter. Next, they deployed a decentralized and organic strategy to drive youth from social media to the streets of Nigeria’s major cities—especially Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial hub—to demand an end to SARS.
The Nigerian Afro-pop musicians Folarin Falana, known as “Falz,” and Douglas Jack Agu, known as “Runtown”—both millennials—used their social media platforms to call for a peaceful demonstration on Oct. 8, demanding justice for victims and survivors of police brutality. That was how the protest started in Lagos’s upscale Lekki neighborhood, before it spread to other parts of the city and nationwide.
This strategy motivated more Nigerians to join the peaceful demonstrations. It marked the birth of an unconventional nonviolent civil resistance movement, which leveraged Nigeria’s cultural icons to bring people onto the streets.
A woman holds a sign during a protest at the entrance to the Lekki Toll Plaza on Oct. 18.
For a generation accused of clinging to smartphones and being addicted to the internet and pop culture, the protest was an unexpected shock. The opposition to SARS caught the government off guard.
As the protests spread across Nigeria, other celebrities and social media influencers led the demonstrations in their various states. When the government made a tone-deaf announcement that SARS has been disbanded, just as it had announced three years earlier, the youth followed up with a five-point agenda. They demanded justice for citizens killed because of police brutality, police training, a judicial inquiry to prosecute perpetrators, psychological evaluation of members of the police force, and increased salaries for officers.
The protest organizers, led by a group of feminists, assisted in drafting the agenda. They circulated it on social media, winning many supporters across the globe from Hillary Clinton to Beyoncé.
Within two weeks, the all-female Feminist Coalition reportedly raked in monetary donations of over $380,000 to coordinate its logistics. They disbursed the funds to pay bail for arrested protesters, medical bills for wounded protesters, food and drinks, and private security to protect demonstrators. They also launched a help line to respond to emergencies.
For a generation accused of clinging to smartphones and being addicted to the internet and pop culture, the protest was an unexpected shock.
Standing behind the protesters were religious leaders, small and medium-sized businesses, and Nigerians living abroad, all lending their voices and platforms to call for the dismantling of the corrupt police unit. Nigerians in the diaspora turned up the pressure through protests at different embassies, calling for an end to SARS.
The sheer organization of these young Nigerians gave hope and renewed faith that Nigeria—a country of more than 200 million people where nearly 40 percent of people live in abject poverty—can work.
Protesters fly the Nigerian flag chanting “Soro soke,” a Yoruba phrase that translates to “Speak up” in English, in Lagos on Oct. 18.
The movement has now gone beyond calling for an end to corrupt policing; it is also challenging the misuse of public funds and demanding solutions to the country’s unemployment crisis, poor infrastructure development, and bad governance.
Despite the violence, the #EndSARS protests could mark a turning point; 60 percent of Nigeria’s 200 million people are under the age of 25. The youth are now aware of their power more than ever.
Although the protests started peacefully, they turned ugly when the Nigerian Army shot at unarmed protesters on Oct. 20 at close range—an event that was recorded live on Instagram by a female DJ. Many young protesters were killed and injured while thugs allegedly sponsored by politicians infiltrated and disrupted the protests.
Despite the violence, the #EndSARS protests could mark a turning point. Nigeria has a youthful population, with about 60 percent of its 200 million people under the age of 25. But political apathy among the youth has resulted in the election of elderly politicians to public office.
The youth are now aware of their power more than ever. They’ve seen how much can be achieved with unity and are ready to demand change—especially as Nigerians look forward to the next general election in 2023.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--The Mediterranean Red Prawn War Signals Italy’s Lost Leverage in Libya

MAZARA DEL VALLO , Italy—When Domenico Asaro heard that some Sicilian fishermen had been kidnapped off the Libyan coast at the beginning of September , he wasn ’ t surprised .
As a fisherman himself from Mazara del Vallo , a seaside town on the southwestern coast of Sicily , home to Italy ’ s largest fishing fleet , Asaro is aware of the dangers of the job .
“ In the 40 years I ’ ve worked as a fisherman , I ’ ve heard of over 100 attacks by Libyan authorities against my colleagues , ” Asaro said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ port beside dozens of docked fishing vessels .
“ We all feel that both Italy and the EU have failed to protect us.
” In the latest incident , Libyan militias stopped and seized two Italian fishing vessels operating 35 miles off the coast of Benghazi , a port city in eastern Libya that is currently controlled by General Khalifa Haftar .
Since then , the 18 crew members , who were accused of invading Libya ’ s waters , have been held inside detention facilities in Benghazi , while Italy and Libya @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 180-mile stretch of the Mediterranean sea that separates Sicily from Libya has been a diplomatic battleground in Italian-Libyan relations for years—especially since 2011 , when a civil war divided Libya into two factions : the United Nations-recognized government of Tripoli , now led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj , and eastern Libya , ruled by Haftar , a military warlord .
Ever since Libya ’ s regional fragmentation , the European Union has failed to form a unilateral diplomatic approach to the country .
That , combined with Europe ’ s growing worries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quietly claim a bigger portion of the Mediterranean : a controversial move that has put the lives and livelihoods of Italian fishermen at greater risk for almost a decade .
The maritime dispute dates back to the 1970s , when Libya began using force to protect its self-proclaimed fishing waters off the Gulf of Sidra from foreign fishing vessels , 12 miles from its coast .
But it worsened in 2005 , when then-Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi unilaterally extended the country ’ s waters from 12 to 74 miles offshore .
Those claims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ member states , and according to Stefano Marcuzzi , a Libya analyst at the NATO Defense College Foundation in Rome , many maritime law experts still consider them illegitimate .
“ Territorial waters can be extended up to 74 miles , according to the 1982 Montego Bay Convention , but that refers to oceans , ” Marcuzzi said .
“ The extension of that principle to the closed waters of the Mediterranean basin is debatable.
” “ Despite the risks , we have no choice but to keep sailing these troubled waters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ live.
” Despite this lack of formal recognition , Libyans have continued to treat foreign fishing in that 74-mile stretch as a territorial invasion—and as a theft of their natural resources , to be punished through detention and bail payment .
That ’ s a serious problem for fishermen from Mazara del Vallo who specialize in red prawns , which live 600 meters below sea level and fetch some of the highest prices among crustaceans in Europe .
They often have to sail farther south to find the prawns , toward international waters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they risk attacks from the Libyan coast guard .
Most fishermen will go that far , because they know it ’ s the only way to make enough money back home .
“ Our families ’ income has depended on fishing for generations .
Despite the risks , we have no choice but to keep sailing these troubled waters , because that ’ s where red prawns live , ” said Asaro , who was among the first Sicilian fishermen to experience detention—and a show trial—in Libya .
In 1996 , around 50 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Misrata , the Libyan coast guard chased Asaro ’ s vessel for four hours before they began shooting at his crew , who were then jailed in Libya for six months .
He ’ s since been detained twice more , most recently in 2012 , near Benghazi , when he was released after eight days on an 8,000-euro bail he paid out of his own pocket .
According to Distretto della Pesca , a Sicilian cooperative of the local fishing industry , about 40 fishermen have been injured and detained in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 50 boats have been seized , and the release of each one has cost up to 50,000 euros , a price usually paid by the fishermen themselves .
When Qaddafi was in power , the kidnappings were mostly a show of force that would resolve with a phone call from former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi , with whom he had close ties , said Michela Mercuri , a professor of Mediterranean geopolitics at Italy ’ s School of Diplomacy .
But the country has lost the influence it had under Qaddafi ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ow the situation is different because , since 2011 and the migration crisis , Italy lost its relevance in Libya , and the new leaders know they can advance bigger demands because they have larger bargaining powers , ” Mercuri said .
In the case of the 18 fishermen captured in September , Haftar has asked Rome not simply to pay bail , but to release four Libyan soccer players , who have been detained in Sicily since immigration prosecutors in Catania sentenced them to 30 years in jail for human trafficking .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ prisoners on both sides of the Mediterranean have staged protests to pressure both governments to accelerate their release .
But with a second coronavirus wave becoming Italy ’ s most pressing priority , the negotiations have been placed on the back burner . )
The EU ’ s migration policies haven ’ t helped the fishermen ’ s position.The EU ’ s policies haven ’ t helped the fishermen ’ s position .
The EU has kept prioritizing migration containment by signing agreements with Libya ’ s coast guard , which is part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proper nation-building and regional-stabilization policies—with mixed results .
And in the meantime , non-EU powers have begun to exert more political leverage in the country .
“ It ’ s other players that now have a greater influence among Libyan factions .
Not by chance , Rome has tried to pressure Haftar to free the fishermen via his backers : Russia , Egypt , and the UAE , ” Marcuzzi said .
The EU ’ s inability to see Libya outside the lens of migration has also allowed the country to take control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In June 2018 , the International Maritime Organization assigned Libyan a search-and-rescue zone to manage migration fluxes , extending about 100 miles off the coast , which Libyans have begun to consider their own territory .
The EU is even deputizing Libyan authorities under Sarraj to stop migrants from leaving Libyan waters , giving them further power beyond the country ’ s coast .
“ The larger stretch of sea falls into this definition , the more this is a Libyan—and not European—responsibility , ” Marcuzzi said .
However , allowing Libyans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them the opportunity to advance claims over natural resources , such as in the fishing dispute , and given them a base for potential military and trade movements deeper in the Mediterranean Sea .
The migrant crisis has led Italy to support Sarraj ’ s government in Tripoli and , according to the fishermen , has even pushed it to tolerate Libya ’ s right to restrict access to fishing near its coasts .
Since Rome and Tripoli signed an EU-backed agreement in 2017 to curb migrant flows across the Mediterranean , vessels @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operating in the 74 miles off the Libyan coast , and Italy has been helping to train and equip the Libyan coast guard—one of the groups that has been detaining its own fishermen .
“ Before 2011 , the Italian navy supported us .
Now as soon as we are 50 miles from the Libyan coasts , they also tell us to leave .
It seems as if they prefer to leave us with a smaller piece of sea to fish rather than irritating Libyans , who could then retaliate through migration deals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fisherman from Mazara del Vallo who ’ s been captured by the Libyan coast guard and detained in Libya twice , in 2015 and 2018 .
“ It seems as if they prefer to leave us with a smaller piece of sea to fish rather than irritating Libyans.
” Figuccia and his colleagues are demanding that the Italian government use some of the resources it has set aside to manage migrant flows to also protect its own citizens and economic interests , by providing a few Italian coast guard vessels to escort them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ environment .
So far , the Italian government ’ s inability to negotiate a fishing agreement with Libya has led Italian captains to forge their own ties with Haftar .
For instance , after three consecutive attacks on fishermen , in September 2019 the Italian National Federation of Fishing Companies announced a deal with Haftar ’ s Libyan National Army .
The agreement , however , was suspended a few days later due to backlash from Tripoli .
Rome ’ s inaction has also contributed to brewing anti-EU sentiments in the fishing industry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seen as accomplices of the illegitimate arrests .
“ If the Mediterranean has become a battleground , it is not only because of migrants , ” said Asaro , who recently ran—and lost—in local elections with the Lega party , which is known for its far-right and anti-EU rhetoric .
He believes that Lega , unlike Italy ’ s other political parties , would stand up for Italian citizens ’ rights over EU agreements .
“ I no longer feel as a European citizen .
The EU has left us alone .
”

MAZARA DEL VALLO, Italy—When Domenico Asaro heard that some Sicilian fishermen had been kidnapped off the Libyan coast at the beginning of September, he wasn’t surprised. As a fisherman himself from Mazara del Vallo, a seaside town on the southwestern coast of Sicily, home to Italy’s largest fishing fleet, Asaro is aware of the dangers of the job. “In the 40 years I’ve worked as a fisherman, I’ve heard of over 100 attacks by Libyan authorities against my colleagues,” Asaro said as he walked through Mazara’s port beside dozens of docked fishing vessels. “We all feel that both Italy and the EU have failed to protect us.”
MAZARA DEL VALLO, Italy—When Domenico Asaro heard that some Sicilian fishermen had been kidnapped off the Libyan coast at the beginning of September, he wasn’t surprised. As a fisherman himself from Mazara del Vallo, a seaside town on the southwestern coast of Sicily, home to Italy’s largest fishing fleet, Asaro is aware of the dangers of the job. “In the 40 years I’ve worked as a fisherman, I’ve heard of over 100 attacks by Libyan authorities against my colleagues,” Asaro said as he walked through Mazara’s port beside dozens of docked fishing vessels. “We all feel that both Italy and the EU have failed to protect us.”
In the latest incident, Libyan militias stopped and seized two Italian fishing vessels operating 35 miles off the coast of Benghazi, a port city in eastern Libya that is currently controlled by General Khalifa Haftar. Since then, the 18 crew members, who were accused of invading Libya’s waters, have been held inside detention facilities in Benghazi, while Italy and Libya continue to negotiate their release.
The 180-mile stretch of the Mediterranean sea that separates Sicily from Libya has been a diplomatic battleground in Italian-Libyan relations for years—especially since 2011, when a civil war divided Libya into two factions: the United Nations-recognized government of Tripoli, now led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, and eastern Libya, ruled by Haftar, a military warlord. Ever since Libya’s regional fragmentation, the European Union has failed to form a unilateral diplomatic approach to the country. That, combined with Europe’s growing worries over migration, has allowed Libya to quietly claim a bigger portion of the Mediterranean: a controversial move that has put the lives and livelihoods of Italian fishermen at greater risk for almost a decade.
The maritime dispute dates back to the 1970s, when Libya began using force to protect its self-proclaimed fishing waters off the Gulf of Sidra from foreign fishing vessels, 12 miles from its coast. But it worsened in 2005, when then-Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi unilaterally extended the country’s waters from 12 to 74 miles offshore. Those claims were always formally rejected by main EU member states, and according to Stefano Marcuzzi, a Libya analyst at the NATO Defense College Foundation in Rome, many maritime law experts still consider them illegitimate. “Territorial waters can be extended up to 74 miles, according to the 1982 Montego Bay Convention, but that refers to oceans,” Marcuzzi said. “The extension of that principle to the closed waters of the Mediterranean basin is debatable.”
“Despite the risks, we have no choice but to keep sailing these troubled waters, because that’s where red prawns live.”Despite this lack of formal recognition, Libyans have continued to treat foreign fishing in that 74-mile stretch as a territorial invasion—and as a theft of their natural resources, to be punished through detention and bail payment. That’s a serious problem for fishermen from Mazara del Vallo who specialize in red prawns, which live 600 meters below sea level and fetch some of the highest prices among crustaceans in Europe. They often have to sail farther south to find the prawns, toward international waters and into that disputed area, where they risk attacks from the Libyan coast guard. Most fishermen will go that far, because they know it’s the only way to make enough money back home.
“Our families’ income has depended on fishing for generations. Despite the risks, we have no choice but to keep sailing these troubled waters, because that’s where red prawns live,” said Asaro, who was among the first Sicilian fishermen to experience detention—and a show trial—in Libya. In 1996, around 50 miles off the coast of the city of Misrata, the Libyan coast guard chased Asaro’s vessel for four hours before they began shooting at his crew, who were then jailed in Libya for six months. He’s since been detained twice more, most recently in 2012, near Benghazi, when he was released after eight days on an 8,000-euro bail he paid out of his own pocket.
According to Distretto della Pesca, a Sicilian cooperative of the local fishing industry, about 40 fishermen have been injured and detained in the past 25 years. More than 50 boats have been seized, and the release of each one has cost up to 50,000 euros, a price usually paid by the fishermen themselves.
The Italian government hasn’t ignored the issue, but since civil war broke out in Libya in 2011, Italy and the EU have lost much of their influence in the country. And the bloc’s migration policies haven’t helped.
When Qaddafi was in power, the kidnappings were mostly a show of force that would resolve with a phone call from former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, with whom he had close ties, said Michela Mercuri, a professor of Mediterranean geopolitics at Italy’s School of Diplomacy. But the country has lost the influence it had under Qaddafi’s rule. “[N]ow the situation is different because, since 2011 and the migration crisis, Italy lost its relevance in Libya, and the new leaders know they can advance bigger demands because they have larger bargaining powers,” Mercuri said.
In the case of the 18 fishermen captured in September, Haftar has asked Rome not simply to pay bail, but to release four Libyan soccer players, who have been detained in Sicily since immigration prosecutors in Catania sentenced them to 30 years in jail for human trafficking. (Meanwhile, friends and relatives of prisoners on both sides of the Mediterranean have staged protests to pressure both governments to accelerate their release. But with a second coronavirus wave becoming Italy’s most pressing priority, the negotiations have been placed on the back burner.)
The EU’s migration policies haven’t helped the fishermen’s position.The EU’s policies haven’t helped the fishermen’s position. The EU has kept prioritizing migration containment by signing agreements with Libya’s coast guard, which is part of Tripoli’s navy, over proper nation-building and regional-stabilization policies—with mixed results. And in the meantime, non-EU powers have begun to exert more political leverage in the country. “It’s other players that now have a greater influence among Libyan factions. Not by chance, Rome has tried to pressure Haftar to free the fishermen via his backers: Russia, Egypt, and the UAE,” Marcuzzi said.
The EU’s inability to see Libya outside the lens of migration has also allowed the country to take control of a bigger portion of the Mediterranean. In June 2018, the International Maritime Organization assigned Libyan a search-and-rescue zone to manage migration fluxes, extending about 100 miles off the coast, which Libyans have begun to consider their own territory. The EU is even deputizing Libyan authorities under Sarraj to stop migrants from leaving Libyan waters, giving them further power beyond the country’s coast. “The larger stretch of sea falls into this definition, the more this is a Libyan—and not European—responsibility,” Marcuzzi said.
However, allowing Libyans to assert larger maritime sovereignty has allowed them the opportunity to advance claims over natural resources, such as in the fishing dispute, and given them a base for potential military and trade movements deeper in the Mediterranean Sea.
The migrant crisis has led Italy to support Sarraj’s government in Tripoli and, according to the fishermen, has even pushed it to tolerate Libya’s right to restrict access to fishing near its coasts. Since Rome and Tripoli signed an EU-backed agreement in 2017 to curb migrant flows across the Mediterranean, vessels from the EU have been barred from operating in the 74 miles off the Libyan coast, and Italy has been helping to train and equip the Libyan coast guard—one of the groups that has been detaining its own fishermen.
Mazara del Vallo’s fishermen, who are attentive observers of the sea, have a unique perspective on the shifting geopolitical arrangements. Even though venturing toward Libya was always risky, they say that a lot has changed since the EU began forging ties with Libyans to contain migration.
“Before 2011, the Italian navy supported us. Now as soon as we are 50 miles from the Libyan coasts, they also tell us to leave. It seems as if they prefer to leave us with a smaller piece of sea to fish rather than irritating Libyans, who could then retaliate through migration deals,” said Roberto Figuccia, another fisherman from Mazara del Vallo who’s been captured by the Libyan coast guard and detained in Libya twice, in 2015 and 2018.
“It seems as if they prefer to leave us with a smaller piece of sea to fish rather than irritating Libyans.”Figuccia and his colleagues are demanding that the Italian government use some of the resources it has set aside to manage migrant flows to also protect its own citizens and economic interests, by providing a few Italian coast guard vessels to escort them and help them work in a safer environment.
So far, the Italian government’s inability to negotiate a fishing agreement with Libya has led Italian captains to forge their own ties with Haftar. For instance, after three consecutive attacks on fishermen, in September 2019 the Italian National Federation of Fishing Companies announced a deal with Haftar’s Libyan National Army. The agreement, however, was suspended a few days later due to backlash from Tripoli.
Rome’s inaction has also contributed to brewing anti-EU sentiments in the fishing industry, where Rome and Brussels are now seen as accomplices of the illegitimate arrests. “If the Mediterranean has become a battleground, it is not only because of migrants,” said Asaro, who recently ran—and lost—in local elections with the Lega party, which is known for its far-right and anti-EU rhetoric. He believes that Lega, unlike Italy’s other political parties, would stand up for Italian citizens’ rights over EU agreements. “I no longer feel as a European citizen. The EU has left us alone.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--The U.S. Middle East Strategy’s Missing Piece is Iraq

The U.S. Middle East Strategy ’ s Missing Piece is Iraq This article is part of Election 2020 : What We ’ re Missing , FP ’ s series of daily takes by leading global thinkers on the most important foreign-policy issues not being talked about during the presidential election campaign .
One critical foreign policy issue that has been almost entirely absent from the U.S. election debate is Iraq—and with it , the U.S. role in the wider Middle East .
The United States ’ place in the world has been greatly shaped over the last 17 years by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President George W. Bush oversaw the start of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with a set of decisions that made them into “ forever wars.
” His successor , President Barack Obama , ran on a platform of bringing troops home from Iraq .
Most U.S. soldiers were duly withdrawn by December 2011 , even as Obama and then-Vice President Joe Biden ignored the ongoing civil strife in the country .
But they could not ignore Iraq for long : By 2014 , U.S. troops were back in Iraq to fight the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could provide the political and economic support to sway Baghdad towards the political pluralism and liberal market policies that are needed in the Middle East .
Today , the United States is on course to draw down its troops once again—from 5,200 to 3,000 by the end of this year .
No matter who wins the election next week , that number is unlikely to go back up , barring a major development such as the emergence of another international terrorist organization that threatens to destabilize the region .
But there is every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq , provided that this engagement is no longer measured by the number of its troops .
Since leading a global coalition to remove Saddam Hussein ’ s regime in 2003 , the United States continues to enjoy great influence in a country that is a linchpin of any U.S. strategy in the Middle East , not least due to the border it shares with Iran , Jordan , Kuwait , Saudi Arabia , Syria , and Turkey .
Furthermore , Iraq has one of the world ’ s largest reserves of hydrocarbons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to global economic growth for years to come .
Most Iraqis believe that the United States could help them overturn years of instability , internal conflict , and corruption .
Whether this is realistic or not , a reengaged United States could provide the political and economic support to sway Baghdad towards the political pluralism and liberal market policies that are needed in the Middle East .
Iraq matters not only because of its economic and strategic potential , but also because of Iran .
For better or worse , U.S. policies towards @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ramped up sanctions on Iran , Iran increased its economic pressure on Iraq .
And if Washington hopes to limit Tehran ’ s network of militias and armed groups in the region , it must do so in Iraq .
While both U.S. President Donald Trump and Biden have said that they are interested in reaching a deal with Iran , the nature of that deal will impact Iraq .
Many Iraqis fear that a Biden administration would seek to revert to Iranian nuclear agreement without restricting the activities of the Iranian Revolutionary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Similarly , they fear that a second Trump presidency could see a rush to strike a deal at almost any price , that also fails to take Iraq ’ s fate into account .
Both kinds of deals would shortchange Iraq—and the United States ’ own strategic interests as well .

One critical foreign policy issue that has been almost entirely absent from the U.S. election debate is Iraq—and with it, the U.S. role in the wider Middle East.
One critical foreign policy issue that has been almost entirely absent from the U.S. election debate is Iraq—and with it, the U.S. role in the wider Middle East.
The United States’ place in the world has been greatly shaped over the last 17 years by its presence in Iraq. Former U.S. President George W. Bush oversaw the start of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with a set of decisions that made them into “forever wars.” His successor, President Barack Obama, ran on a platform of bringing troops home from Iraq. Most U.S. soldiers were duly withdrawn by December 2011, even as Obama and then-Vice President Joe Biden ignored the ongoing civil strife in the country. But they could not ignore Iraq for long: By 2014, U.S. troops were back in Iraq to fight the Islamic State.
A reengaged United States could provide the political and economic support to sway Baghdad towards the political pluralism and liberal market policies that are needed in the Middle East.
Today, the United States is on course to draw down its troops once again—from 5,200 to 3,000 by the end of this year. No matter who wins the election next week, that number is unlikely to go back up, barring a major development such as the emergence of another international terrorist organization that threatens to destabilize the region.
But there is every reason for Washington to stay engaged in Iraq, provided that this engagement is no longer measured by the number of its troops. Since leading a global coalition to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the United States continues to enjoy great influence in a country that is a linchpin of any U.S. strategy in the Middle East, not least due to the border it shares with Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. Furthermore, Iraq has one of the world’s largest reserves of hydrocarbons, whose free flow will be essential to global economic growth for years to come.
Most Iraqis believe that the United States could help them overturn years of instability, internal conflict, and corruption. Whether this is realistic or not, a reengaged United States could provide the political and economic support to sway Baghdad towards the political pluralism and liberal market policies that are needed in the Middle East.
Iraq matters not only because of its economic and strategic potential, but also because of Iran. For better or worse, U.S. policies towards Iran spill into Iraq. When Washington ramped up sanctions on Iran, Iran increased its economic pressure on Iraq. And if Washington hopes to limit Tehran’s network of militias and armed groups in the region, it must do so in Iraq.
While both U.S. President Donald Trump and Biden have said that they are interested in reaching a deal with Iran, the nature of that deal will impact Iraq. Many Iraqis fear that a Biden administration would seek to revert to the Iranian nuclear agreement without restricting the activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies in Iraq. Similarly, they fear that a second Trump presidency could see a rush to strike a deal at almost any price that also fails to take Iraq’s fate into account. Both kinds of deals would shortchange Iraq—and the United States’ own strategic interests as well.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Tanzania Votes Today. Its Democracy Is Under Strain.

Tanzania Votes Today .
Its Democracy Is Under Strain .
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Tanzania holds presidential and legislative elections , six days to go until U.S. presidential election , and Iran begins building a new centrifuge plant .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Tanzania goes to the polls today to elect a president and to fill the 366 seats in the country ’ s Parliament .
Usually perceived as one of Africa ’ s model democracies , recent developments have caused human rights groups to question that designation .
Tanzanian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a second term after winning 58 percent of the vote in 2015 , came under fire from Amnesty International earlier this month for building up “ a formidable arsenal of laws to stifle all forms of dissent and effectively clamp down on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.
” The opposition .
Magufuli is going up against Tundu Lissu , the opposition candidate who recently returned to the country in July after three years in exile .
His exit from Tanzania in 2017 was prompted by an assassination attempt during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lissu , already facing an uphill battle against the incumbent , was banned from campaigning for seven days earlier this month after the country ’ s electoral commission ( itself appointed by Magufuli ) charged him with using “ seditious language ” on the campaign trail .
Avoiding COVID .
Lauded for his success in developing Tanzania ’ s infrastructure , Magufuli has had a less than concrete approach to handling the coronavirus pandemic : Tanzania has not submitted coronavirus data to the World Health Organization since April .
In May , Magufuli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national laboratory—the person in charge of leading coronavirus testing .
He made headlines in June when he declared the coronavirus had been removed from the country “ by the powers of God.
” Peaceful action ?
Although opinion polls are banned , Magufuli is still expected to triumph .
A Magufuli victory is unlikely to come easily , however : Lissu has said the opposition was “ not going to accept stolen elections , ” but has said any response will be peaceful .
“ We will call millions of our people onto @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and peaceful action to defend the integrity of the election , to defend their voice—if it comes to that , ” Lissu told Al Jazeera .
Unencumbered by the same regulations as its competitors , China has raced ahead of the rest of the world in the production and control of rare earths , the metals and alloys used in many high-tech devices .
That ’ s the argument put forth by Jamil Hijazi and James Kennedy in their latest piece in Foreign Policy , “ How the United States Handed China its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shows just how quickly China has come to dominate this critical field , to the point where key components in U.S. weapons manufacturing are made using metals derived from China .
Six days to go .
As the U.S. presidential election approaches , Donald Trump holds two rallies in Arizona , while his vice president , Mike Pence , campaigns in Wisconsin .
Democratic vice presidential candidate Sen. Kamala Harris will also be in Arizona , stopping in both Tucson and Phoenix .
Joe Biden campaigned in the Republican stronghold of Georgia on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bus tour across Texas , another historically Republican state , on Wednesday .
For more on Election 2020 and its international implications , read FP ’ s in-depth coverage here .
Tech on the Hill .
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg , Alphabet ’ s ( Google ) CEO Sundar Pichai , and Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey testify virtually today before the Senate Committee on Commerce , Science , and Transportation to defend their companies ’ content-moderation practices .
Tensions are high between lawmakers and Big Tech , with Republicans accusing the internet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are concerned the companies are not doing enough to combat extremism and outside interference from foreign actors .
Poland to strike over abortion ban .
Workers across Poland are expected to join a national strike today as protests against abortion restrictions imposed by the country ’ s constitutional court enter a seventh day .
Poland ’ s right-wing government has so far made no moves to concede ground to the demonstrators .
On Tuesday , Jaroslaw Kaczynski , the leader of Poland ’ s ruling Law and Justice party said that churches , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , must be defended “ at any price.
” He further warned protesters that they were “ committing a serious crime ” by breaching coronavirus restrictions .
Israel and Lebanon resume talks .
Representatives from Israel and Lebanon meet today to continue talks on resolving a dispute over the maritime border between the two countries .
The discussions come after Claudine Aoun Roukoz , the daughter of Lebanese President Michel Aoun , was reported as saying that she would “ not mind that the Lebanese state makes peace with Israel , after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Speaking Tuesday at a military exercise simulating war with Hezbollah , Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz said he had heard “ positive voices in Lebanon that are maybe talking about peace and relations with Israel .
These are welcome words.
” Evo ’ s return .
Evo Morales will return to Bolivia on Nov. 9 , the day after President-elect Luis Arce is sworn in .
Morales ’ s return will come just over a year after he was forced out of the country .
An outstanding arrest warrant for sedition and terrorism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , paving the way for his return .
Meanwhile , hundreds of supporters of the right-wing opposition marched on a military barracks on Tuesday asking for “ military help ” to stop the Movement for Socialism ( MAS ) party from regaining power .
Iran is building a new centrifuge plant .
The International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA ) head Rafael Grossi has confirmed that Iran has begun construction on a new underground centrifuge plant , without providing further details , citing “ confidential information.
” When finished , the plant would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in mysterious circumstances last July .
South African president to self-quarantine .
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that he would self-quarantine and perform his duties remotely after a guest at a dinner he hosted tested positive for COVID-19 .
The 35 guests at the dinner all reportedly wore masks and the president only removed his own mask to eat and give a speech .
According to a spokesman , Ramaphosa is not experiencing any symptoms and is being screened regularly by the South African Military Health Service .
Scale of Qatar Airways @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10 aircraft in total ” were forced into invasive physical examinations at Doha airport on Oct. 2 , Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne said on Wednesday , as the Qatari government apologized publicly and began an investigation into the incident .
The women were removed from flights after a newborn baby was found abandoned in one of the airport bathrooms .
The Transport Workers ’ Union of New South Wales , whose members service Qatar Airways planes in Sydney , condemned “ the brutal attack on the human rights of Australian female airline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in response .
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison pledged a “ further response ” after reviewing the results of an investigation .
He told reporters , “ As a father of daughters , I could only shudder at the thought that any woman , Australian or otherwise , would be subjected to that.
” Cybersecurity and U.S. Election Infrastructure—As voters prepare to cast their ballots in the 2020 election , this FP Insider Special Report analyzes the underreported issue of voting machine infrastructure security , derives insights from other countries ’ experiences with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and officials can do to strengthen security on Election Day—and beyond .
Produced by FP Analytics .
Kazakhstan has decided to lean in to its unwanted fame as the home of Borat , the Sacha Baron Cohen creation , by adopting the character ’ s catchphrase “ Very Nice !
” as part of a tourism push .
The idea to use the catchphrase to promote tourism was thought up by Dennis Keen , a U.S. citizen living in Kazakhstan and swiftly embraced by government tourism officials .
“ It ’ s actually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most sincere way .
The people and the food are very nice , ” Keen said .
Record numbers of Americans are renouncing their U.S. citizenship , according to State Department statistics .
The Washington Post reports that in the first six months of 2020 , a total of 5,816 Americans surrendered their citizenship .
Rather than trying to send a political message , it appears the main factor driving the surge is a desire to avoid paying U.S. taxes , which can apply whether one is living in the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans who want to renounce their citizenship have found that embassy and consulate closures due to coronavirus restrictions are making it difficult to sever their ties with the United States .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Tanzania holds presidential and legislative elections, six days to go until U.S. presidential election , and Iran begins building a new centrifuge plant.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Tanzania holds presidential and legislative elections, six days to go until U.S. presidential election, and Iran begins building a new centrifuge plant.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Tanzania Puts Its Democracy to the Test
Tanzania goes to the polls today to elect a president and to fill the 366 seats in the country’s Parliament. Usually perceived as one of Africa’s model democracies, recent developments have caused human rights groups to question that designation.
Tanzanian President John Magufuli, who is seeking a second term after winning 58 percent of the vote in 2015, came under fire from Amnesty International earlier this month for building up “a formidable arsenal of laws to stifle all forms of dissent and effectively clamp down on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.”
The opposition. Magufuli is going up against Tundu Lissu, the opposition candidate who recently returned to the country in July after three years in exile. His exit from Tanzania in 2017 was prompted by an assassination attempt during which he was shot 16 times. Lissu, already facing an uphill battle against the incumbent, was banned from campaigning for seven days earlier this month after the country’s electoral commission (itself appointed by Magufuli) charged him with using “seditious language” on the campaign trail.
Avoiding COVID. Lauded for his success in developing Tanzania’s infrastructure, Magufuli has had a less than concrete approach to handling the coronavirus pandemic: Tanzania has not submitted coronavirus data to the World Health Organization since April. In May, Magufuli fired the head of Tanzania’s national laboratory—the person in charge of leading coronavirus testing. He made headlines in June when he declared the coronavirus had been removed from the country “by the powers of God.”
Peaceful action? Although opinion polls are banned, Magufuli is still expected to triumph. A Magufuli victory is unlikely to come easily, however: Lissu has said the opposition was “not going to accept stolen elections,” but has said any response will be peaceful. “We will call millions of our people onto the streets who will take mass democratic and peaceful action to defend the integrity of the election, to defend their voice—if it comes to that,” Lissu told Al Jazeera.
China’s Rare Earth Domination
Unencumbered by the same regulations as its competitors, China has raced ahead of the rest of the world in the production and control of rare earths, the metals and alloys used in many high-tech devices. That’s the argument put forth by Jamil Hijazi and James Kennedy in their latest piece in Foreign Policy, “How the United States Handed China its Rare Earth Monopoly.” The chart below shows just how quickly China has come to dominate this critical field, to the point where key components in U.S. weapons manufacturing are made using metals derived from China.
What We’re Following Today
Six days to go. As the U.S. presidential election approaches, Donald Trump holds two rallies in Arizona, while his vice president, Mike Pence, campaigns in Wisconsin. Democratic vice presidential candidate Sen. Kamala Harris will also be in Arizona, stopping in both Tucson and Phoenix. Joe Biden campaigned in the Republican stronghold of Georgia on Tuesday and his campaign surrogates are launching a bus tour across Texas, another historically Republican state, on Wednesday.
For more on Election 2020 and its international implications, read FP’s in-depth coverage here.
Tech on the Hill. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, Alphabet’s (Google) CEO Sundar Pichai, and Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey testify virtually today before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation to defend their companies’ content-moderation practices. Tensions are high between lawmakers and Big Tech, with Republicans accusing the internet giants of silencing conservative voices while Democrats are concerned the companies are not doing enough to combat extremism and outside interference from foreign actors.
Poland to strike over abortion ban. Workers across Poland are expected to join a national strike today as protests against abortion restrictions imposed by the country’s constitutional court enter a seventh day. Poland’s right-wing government has so far made no moves to concede ground to the demonstrators. On Tuesday, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party said that churches, which have become a target of protests, must be defended “at any price.” He further warned protesters that they were “committing a serious crime” by breaching coronavirus restrictions.
Israel and Lebanon resume talks. Representatives from Israel and Lebanon meet today to continue talks on resolving a dispute over the maritime border between the two countries. The discussions come after Claudine Aoun Roukoz, the daughter of Lebanese President Michel Aoun, was reported as saying that she would “not mind that the Lebanese state makes peace with Israel, after the demarcation and the guarantee of resources.” Speaking Tuesday at a military exercise simulating war with Hezbollah, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz said he had heard “positive voices in Lebanon that are maybe talking about peace and relations with Israel. These are welcome words.”
Keep an Eye On
Evo’s return. Evo Morales will return to Bolivia on Nov. 9, the day after President-elect Luis Arce is sworn in. Morales’s return will come just over a year after he was forced out of the country. An outstanding arrest warrant for sedition and terrorism issued for Morales was annulled on Tuesday, paving the way for his return. Meanwhile, hundreds of supporters of the right-wing opposition marched on a military barracks on Tuesday asking for “military help” to stop the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party from regaining power.
Iran is building a new centrifuge plant. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head Rafael Grossi has confirmed that Iran has begun construction on a new underground centrifuge plant, without providing further details, citing “confidential information.” When finished, the plant would replace one in Natanz destroyed by fire in mysterious circumstances last July.
South African president to self-quarantine. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that he would self-quarantine and perform his duties remotely after a guest at a dinner he hosted tested positive for COVID-19. The 35 guests at the dinner all reportedly wore masks and the president only removed his own mask to eat and give a speech. According to a spokesman, Ramaphosa is not experiencing any symptoms and is being screened regularly by the South African Military Health Service.
Scale of Qatar Airways scandal revealed. Female passengers on “10 aircraft in total” were forced into invasive physical examinations at Doha airport on Oct. 2, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne said on Wednesday, as the Qatari government apologized publicly and began an investigation into the incident.
The women were removed from flights after a newborn baby was found abandoned in one of the airport bathrooms. The Transport Workers’ Union of New South Wales, whose members service Qatar Airways planes in Sydney, condemned “the brutal attack on the human rights of Australian female airline passengers” and is considering industrial action in response. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison pledged a “further response” after reviewing the results of an investigation. He told reporters, “As a father of daughters, I could only shudder at the thought that any woman, Australian or otherwise, would be subjected to that.”
Cybersecurity and U.S. Election Infrastructure—As voters prepare to cast their ballots in the 2020 election, this FP Insider Special Report analyzes the underreported issue of voting machine infrastructure security, derives insights from other countries’ experiences with foreign interference, and pinpoints what voters and officials can do to strengthen security on Election Day—and beyond. Produced by FP Analytics.
Odds and Ends
Kazakhstan has decided to lean in to its unwanted fame as the home of Borat, the Sacha Baron Cohen creation, by adopting the character’s catchphrase “Very Nice!” as part of a tourism push. The idea to use the catchphrase to promote tourism was thought up by Dennis Keen, a U.S. citizen living in Kazakhstan and swiftly embraced by government tourism officials. “It’s actually the perfect description of the country in the most sincere way. The people and the food are very nice,” Keen said.
Record numbers of Americans are renouncing their U.S. citizenship, according to State Department statistics. The Washington Post reports that in the first six months of 2020, a total of 5,816 Americans surrendered their citizenship. Rather than trying to send a political message, it appears the main factor driving the surge is a desire to avoid paying U.S. taxes, which can apply whether one is living in the United States or not. Even so, many Americans who want to renounce their citizenship have found that embassy and consulate closures due to coronavirus restrictions are making it difficult to sever their ties with the United States.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Xi Is Out to Prove That This Is China’s Moment

Xi Is Out to Prove That This Is China ’ s Moment Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : The Chinese leadership convenes at a Beijing plenum , a cluster of COVID-19 cases in Xinjiang prompts testing and lockdown , and why Ant Financial could be the world ’ s biggest IPO when it goes public next week .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
The Chinese leadership is currently meeting in Beijing to set economic and political goals for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as usual , the outcomes are already agreed .
On the agenda : a “ Vision 2035 ” program that will likely cement a new focus on domestic consumption and technology , as well as an increased role for Chinese Communist Party leadership in the private economy .
It may also cement Xi ’ s place as a president-for-life .
More conventionally , the plenum will also set the official five-year plan , a feature of communist governments since the days of the Soviet Union .
The strongest influence of the five-year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last year of its implementation .
In the first year , leaders try to show that they ’ re following the new line , by the second year things slip back to existing structures , and in the final year officials scramble to meet targets at the last minute .
( The Soviets had a term for this : shturmovshchina , or “ storming.
” ) Growing ego .
In the run-up to the plenum , speeches by President Xi Jinping and others have demonstrated a bold confidence that this is China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He put it , “ Bad things are turning into good ones.
” Despite the damage to China ’ s global reputation this year , its leaders seem to believe that Western economic weakness and mishandling of the coronavirus have created opportunities .
That may be true , but it may also encourage dangerous overconfidence , as happened in 2009 , when the Chinese leadership was convinced the economic crisis had significantly weakened Washington .
What will China do ?
That overconfidence is most frightening when it comes to Taiwan , where recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an invasion .
Distinguishing signal from noise on Taiwan is difficult , but the traditional restraints on Chinese military action—fear of U.S. intervention , reputational damage , and corruption inside the People ’ s Liberation Army—have weakened .
The odds of Chinese action in Taiwan increase if the U.S. election doesn ’ t produce a clear result , or if a lame duck President Donald Trump embarks on a scorched-earth program on his way out—since Beijing may be convinced that a distracted Washington has no will to block it .
Xinjiang outbreak .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ mass testing and the lockdown of 4.5 million people in Kashgar , Xinjiang .
The circumstances appear to be connected to the coerced labor that has caused Western firms to break ties with Xinjiang suppliers .
Rumors about deadly outbreaks in camps and prisons are circulating in the Uighur diaspora , and it ’ s possible that prisons—a site of outbreaks worldwide—may be a reservoir for the disease in China .
U.S. media retaliation .
Following last week ’ s measures by the United States against another cluster of Chinese media outlets , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in China : the Los Angeles Times , ABC , Minnesota Public Radio , the Bureau of National Affairs ( now owned by Bloomberg and known as Bloomberg Industry Group ) , Newsweek , and Feature Story News .
The move goes after smaller bureaus , in part because China has already targeted the larger ones .
Minnesota Public Radio ’ s Marketplace program has excellent Shanghai correspondence , while the Los Angeles Times has thrived in China since the New York Times and the Washington Post lost their U.S. staff there .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden , based on the false claim that that he profited from his son Hunter Biden ’ s overseas connections , has some ties to China .
A recent sex tape purporting to show Hunter was hosted on GNews , a website owned by the exiled business magnate and Steve Bannon ally Guo Wengui .
Meanwhile , researcher Elise Thomas at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute found that a dossier making spurious allegations against Biden that has circulated in Trump-supporting Chinese circles appears to have originated with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a fake analyst named Martin Aspen , using a computer-generated face , fake social media accounts , and a false address .
Biggest IPO ever .
Ant Group , the financial arm of Alibaba , is potentially set to have the biggest initial public offering ever—around $ 34 billion—when it opens on the Hong Kong and Shanghai markets next week .
Ant ’ s Alipay is one of two e-payment systems , along with WeChat Pay , that dominates payments in China .
China is clearly a global leader in electronic payments , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States .
Large parts of the country have transitioned straight from cash payments to mobile payments .
Violence in Kyrgyzstan .
Amid the chaotic overthrow of the government in Kyrgyzstan , mobs have reportedly targeted Chinese businesses and workers for intimidation and extortion .
That reflects a long-term problem for Chinese enterprises in Central Asia : Close ties to political elites can backfire when those elites fall , and Chinese firms are seen as complicit in local corruption .
The promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative hasn ’ t helped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many locals see the initiative as a way for their own corrupt officials to launder money .
Slow economic rebound .
China ’ s economic recovery appears more substantial than even other countries that have controlled COVID-19 , owing to the size of its domestic market and a successful program of government support for businesses .
Growth this year is set to come in at 2.1 percent , according to a Reuters survey of leading economists .
That project is still a 44-year low in a developing economy , but it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A U.S. indictment that reads like a thriller The United States has just indicted seven individuals for a program of coercion and intimidation directed against an unnamed Chinese exile in an attempt to force him to return home for punishment .
The detailed indictment describes how the target—from context , likely to be Xu Jin , the former head of the Wuhan Development and Reform Commission who fled in 2011—was threatened , stalked , and had his family used as leverage .
China ’ s program of intimidation of former high-level officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fox Hunt , has made considerable use of shady methods , as well as more conventional channels such as Interpol ’ s Red Notices .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: The Chinese leadership convenes at a Beijing plenum, a cluster of COVID-19 cases in Xinjiang prompts testing and lockdown, and why Ant Financial could be the world’s biggest IPO when it goes public next week.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: The Chinese leadership convenes at a Beijing plenum, a cluster of COVID-19 cases in Xinjiang prompts testing and lockdown, and why Ant Financial could be the world’s biggest IPO when it goes public next week.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
China’s New Confidence on Display
The Chinese leadership is currently meeting in Beijing to set economic and political goals for the next five years—a plenum at which, as usual, the outcomes are already agreed. On the agenda: a “Vision 2035” program that will likely cement a new focus on domestic consumption and technology, as well as an increased role for Chinese Communist Party leadership in the private economy. It may also cement Xi’s place as a president-for-life.
More conventionally, the plenum will also set the official five-year plan, a feature of communist governments since the days of the Soviet Union. The strongest influence of the five-year plan comes in the first and the last year of its implementation. In the first year, leaders try to show that they’re following the new line, by the second year things slip back to existing structures, and in the final year officials scramble to meet targets at the last minute. (The Soviets had a term for this: shturmovshchina, or “storming.”)
Growing ego. In the run-up to the plenum, speeches by President Xi Jinping and others have demonstrated a bold confidence that this is China’s moment. As economic policymaker Liu He put it, “Bad things are turning into good ones.”
Despite the damage to China’s global reputation this year, its leaders seem to believe that Western economic weakness and mishandling of the coronavirus have created opportunities. That may be true, but it may also encourage dangerous overconfidence, as happened in 2009, when the Chinese leadership was convinced the economic crisis had significantly weakened Washington.
What will China do? That overconfidence is most frightening when it comes to Taiwan, where recent saber-rattling has again raised the specter of an invasion. Distinguishing signal from noise on Taiwan is difficult, but the traditional restraints on Chinese military action—fear of U.S. intervention, reputational damage, and corruption inside the People’s Liberation Army—have weakened.
The odds of Chinese action in Taiwan increase if the U.S. election doesn’t produce a clear result, or if a lame duck President Donald Trump embarks on a scorched-earth program on his way out—since Beijing may be convinced that a distracted Washington has no will to block it.
What We’re Following
Xinjiang outbreak. A new cluster of COVID-19 cases prompted mass testing and the lockdown of 4.5 million people in Kashgar, Xinjiang. The circumstances appear to be connected to the coerced labor that has caused Western firms to break ties with Xinjiang suppliers. Rumors about deadly outbreaks in camps and prisons are circulating in the Uighur diaspora, and it’s possible that prisons—a site of outbreaks worldwide—may be a reservoir for the disease in China.
U.S. media retaliation. Following last week’s measures by the United States against another cluster of Chinese media outlets, Beijing has targeted six more U.S. bureaus in China: the Los Angeles Times, ABC, Minnesota Public Radio, the Bureau of National Affairs (now owned by Bloomberg and known as Bloomberg Industry Group), Newsweek, and Feature Story News. The move goes after smaller bureaus, in part because China has already targeted the larger ones.
Minnesota Public Radio’s Marketplace program has excellent Shanghai correspondence, while the Los Angeles Times has thrived in China since the New York Times and the Washington Post lost their U.S. staff there.
Disinformation effort. The disinformation campaign against U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, based on the false claim that that he profited from his son Hunter Biden’s overseas connections, has some ties to China. A recent sex tape purporting to show Hunter was hosted on GNews, a website owned by the exiled business magnate and Steve Bannon ally Guo Wengui.
Meanwhile, researcher Elise Thomas at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute found that a dossier making spurious allegations against Biden that has circulated in Trump-supporting Chinese circles appears to have originated with a man who doesn’t exist: a fake analyst named Martin Aspen, using a computer-generated face, fake social media accounts, and a false address.
Tech and Business
Biggest IPO ever. Ant Group, the financial arm of Alibaba, is potentially set to have the biggest initial public offering ever—around $34 billion—when it opens on the Hong Kong and Shanghai markets next week. Ant’s Alipay is one of two e-payment systems, along with WeChat Pay, that dominates payments in China. China is clearly a global leader in electronic payments, ahead of Europe and well ahead of the United States. Large parts of the country have transitioned straight from cash payments to mobile payments.
Violence in Kyrgyzstan. Amid the chaotic overthrow of the government in Kyrgyzstan, mobs have reportedly targeted Chinese businesses and workers for intimidation and extortion. That reflects a long-term problem for Chinese enterprises in Central Asia: Close ties to political elites can backfire when those elites fall, and Chinese firms are seen as complicit in local corruption. The promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative hasn’t helped. In Kazakhstan, for example, many locals see the initiative as a way for their own corrupt officials to launder money.
Slow economic rebound. China’s economic recovery appears more substantial than even other countries that have controlled COVID-19, owing to the size of its domestic market and a successful program of government support for businesses. Growth this year is set to come in at 2.1 percent, according to a Reuters survey of leading economists. That project is still a 44-year low in a developing economy, but it’s less of a blow than once feared.
What We’re Reading
A U.S. indictment that reads like a thriller
The United States has just indicted seven individuals for a program of coercion and intimidation directed against an unnamed Chinese exile in an attempt to force him to return home for punishment. The detailed indictment describes how the target—from context, likely to be Xu Jin, the former head of the Wuhan Development and Reform Commission who fled in 2011—was threatened, stalked, and had his family used as leverage.
China’s program of intimidation of former high-level officials who fled overseas, known as the Fox Hunt, has made considerable use of shady methods, as well as more conventional channels such as Interpol’s Red Notices.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Taiwan Is More Than a Pawn to Be Sacrificed to China

Taiwan Is More Than a Pawn to Be Sacrificed to China In a better world , Taiwan , a quietly successful East Asian nation , wouldn ’ t be in the news that much , save perhaps for its victory over COVID-19 .
But the disturbing possibility of an invasion by China means Taiwan regularly pops up in the headlines .
Having long claimed that the island state is a part of the People ’ s Republic of China ( PRC ) and needs to be “ reunified , ” Beijing has been ramping up threats and military provocations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack .
Given that the United States is Taiwan ’ s major unofficial ally and protector , military intervention by Washington would be very likely in the still unlikely but worryingly possible event of an invasion .
But many people still seem confused about exactly what Taiwan represents .
This has led to experts openly questioning whether Taiwan is worth defending and even positing that a Chinese seizure of Taiwan would be inconsequential or inevitable .
Sometimes Taiwan is seen as a mere pawn in U.S.-China relations , with little agency of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
There have even been comparisons of Taiwan to the Crimean Peninsula , which was annexed by Russia from Ukraine in 2014 without a military response from the European Union or the United States .
Yet Taiwan is no Crimea , whether in global economic importance , military strategic value , or demographically .
On the map , Taiwan is a moderately sized island that is geographically tiny compared with China .
This obscures the fact that with a population of almost 24 million , Taiwan has as many people as Australia and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Netherlands , Greece , and Sweden .
When it comes to the United States , Taiwan is smaller in land area than all but nine of the 50 states but has more people than Florida or New York .
Taiwan ’ s GDP is $ 636 billion , which puts it just outside the world ’ s top 20 economies in 21st place , and is Asia ’ s seventh-largest economy , according to the International Monetary Fund .
This is amplified further by its significant position in the global technological chain due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firms , which include computer and smartphone manufacturers , chipmakers , and components firms .
For instance , Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. , whose advanced chips power Apple iPhones and iPads , is considered the world ’ s leading semiconductor manufacturer , well ahead of South Korean , U.S. , and Chinese competitors .
Taiwanese firms like Quanta and Foxconn are the world ’ s largest contract electronic and computer manufacturers .
If Taiwan is taken over by China , a lot of this vital technology will be in the hands of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Besides technology , Taiwan also holds vital strategic importance due to its geographical location .
Along with Japan to the north and the Philippines to its south , Taiwan is part of the “ first island chain ” along China ’ s coast that hinders the country ’ s access to the Pacific Ocean .
If Taiwan is occupied by China , this provides Beijing with a free lane into the Pacific , and its military planes , ships , and long-range missiles will be able to threaten U.S. territories such as Guam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be able to control regional shipping lanes and threaten Japan and be well within striking range of Okinawa , where a large U.S. contingent of more than 25,000 military personnel is stationed .
To the south , the Philippines would also have reason to be very nervous as Taiwan ’ s southern tip lies just over 230 miles from the northernmost shore of Luzon .
Taiwan does have an ambiguous political status , a result of 20th-century history and an ongoing claim by China that Taiwan belongs to it .
As an extension @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China forces countries that it has official relations with to stop recognizing Taiwan , meaning that Taiwan is only officially recognized by 15 countries , the majority of these being tiny Caribbean and Pacific nations .
Taiwan is also excluded from multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and its related agencies and forced to participate under artificial names such as “ Chinese Taipei ” in the Olympics or the “ Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan , Penghu , Kinmen , and Matsu ( Chinese Taipei ) ” in the World Trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Republic of China ( ROC ) , doesn ’ t even include the word “ Taiwan , ” as this was a continuation of the state brought over by the Kuomintang ( KMT ) regime that governed China until losing the civil war to the CCP in 1949 and being forced to reestablish itself in Taiwan .
It must be noted that while China ’ s “ One China ” principle is acknowledged by various countries like the United States through the “ One Country ” policy , the two are not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not constitute an endorsement or agreement with China ’ s claim to Taiwan , as some might mistakenly believe .
The nature of the Taiwanese themselves is also far more complicated than simple tellings convey .
To be sure , as a result of the autocracy that lasted until the late 1980s , Taiwan ’ s main language is Mandarin , and it continues to use traditional Chinese characters—unlike China , which uses simplified characters .
Over 95 percent of Taiwanese are ethnic Han , comprising Hoklo and Hakka people as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1940s with the KMT .
Due to certain Chinese cultural influences , such as in literature and culinary dishes , and the preservation of religious traditions by the Hoklo and Hakka , whose ancestors came to Taiwan from China centuries ago , there are some cultural practices that survived on the island while they were stamped out by Maoist oppression in China .
On the surface , this presents an image of a society that used to be seen by some as more traditional , and thus more Chinese , than China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and misleading judgment .
The majority of Taiwanese families , whether ethnic Han or aboriginal , were in Taiwan long before 1949 .
The people who came over with the KMT in the 1940s have always made up roughly 15 percent of the population , never exceeding one-fifth .
Taiwan ’ s first city , Tainan , was founded in 1624 by the Dutch East India Company , after which ethnic Han came over from China in numbers .
In this way , Taiwan could be considered to have a history of almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that of Singapore , which celebrated its 200th anniversary as a settlement last year .
Just as it would be inaccurate to brand Singapore as a Chinese state , so it is with Taiwan .
No knowledgeable person would ever call the United States a British state , even though the United States speaks English and has a strong Anglo-Protestant heritage , nor Mexico a Spanish state , even though it is a Spanish-speaking country whose main religion is the Catholic faith brought over by Spanish colonizers hundreds of years ago .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ROC banner with the name , flag , and constitution all harboring a link with China .
Under the rule of the KMT , ROC President Chiang Kai-shek and his successor maintained a claim to China and promoted a Chinese-centric identity .
But since the democratic era , things have changed , and hardly anybody in Taiwan truly fosters any claim to represent China .
Without Chinese pressure , Taiwan would be able to shake off the legacy of the 20th-century Chinese civil war and openly declare itself an independent state ; as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force by China restricts Taiwan ’ s own choices .
The 1992 Consensus—which the KMT , as the then-ruling government , claimed was an agreement with the PRC—was also ripe for confusion .
Supposedly a tacit agreement between the two parties , the 1992 Consensus was never formally signed or written out .
While the KMT ’ s view was that the 1992 Consensus allowed both the ROC and PRC to coexist as part of the same unspecified “ China ” ( but with both sides free to interpret which “ China ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never been ambivalent at all that Taiwan belongs to it .
In any case , the 1992 Consensus has been proved to be hollow after Xi Jinping ’ s announcement in a New Year ’ s speech in 2019 that the 1992 Consensus meant Taiwan was unequivocally part of China .
In the past , the sense of identity of some Taiwanese encompassed both China and Taiwan .
However , over the last few years , there has been a growing Taiwanese identity that has manifested itself politically , especially in the electoral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ founded by Taiwanese activists during the martial law era , in 2016 and 2020 .
In line with this , the majority of Taiwan ’ s people also don ’ t think of themselves as Chinese but Taiwanese , with the proportion being as high as 67 percent in a recent poll , with only 2.4 percent considering themselves Chinese .
However , Taiwan can do its own part in helping to clear up misunderstandings and reinforce perceptions of its importance .
While its government under Tsai Ing-wen has remained stoic in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needs to do more in boosting Taiwan ’ s defense capabilities , especially given some serious deficiencies .
Major arms purchases , such as the recent $ 1.8 billion deal for U.S. weapons system and the purchase of 66 new F-16s , and the development of indigenous planes and submarines are one thing , but making urgent defense reforms such as increasing the existing four-month conscription and improving reservist systems are another .
This also means preparing the public for conflict , whether it happens anytime soon or in the distant future , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ entail .
If Taiwan can make it clear that its military and society are prepared for all-out resistance if China attacks , this makes the case for international assistance much clearer .
Taiwan also has a reputation as a democracy with high levels of political and civil liberties , especially in Asia .
As such , it has been hailed as a sort of human rights haven and progressive paradise .
While that might sound good , this bestows on Taiwan a fanciful image that paints it in an unrealistic light and masks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan has restrictive immigration policies , does not have an official refugee law or policy , and has an atrocious record regarding the abusive treatment of foreign labor in its fishing fleet .
To be sure , its record on things like media freedoms and LGBT rights is better than many states—but it , like anywhere else , could be doing more .
If ever China makes good on its threats and attacks , there will be calls to help defend Taiwan .
But before the United States and the international community decide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most essential thing is to understand Taiwan for what it is—its own place , not a mere appendage of China .

In a better world, Taiwan, a quietly successful East Asian nation, wouldn’t be in the news that much, save perhaps for its victory over COVID-19. But the disturbing possibility of an invasion by China means Taiwan regularly pops up in the headlines. Having long claimed that the island state is a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and needs to be “reunified,” Beijing has been ramping up threats and military provocations , raising fears of a potential invasion or attack. Given that the United States is Taiwan’s major unofficial ally and protector, military intervention by Washington would be very likely in the still unlikely but worryingly possible event of an invasion .
In a better world, Taiwan, a quietly successful East Asian nation, wouldn’t be in the news that much, save perhaps for its victory over COVID-19. But the disturbing possibility of an invasion by China means Taiwan regularly pops up in the headlines. Having long claimed that the island state is a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and needs to be “reunified,” Beijing has been ramping up threats and military provocations, raising fears of a potential invasion or attack. Given that the United States is Taiwan’s major unofficial ally and protector, military intervention by Washington would be very likely in the still unlikely but worryingly possible event of an invasion.
But many people still seem confused about exactly what Taiwan represents. This has led to experts openly questioning whether Taiwan is worth defending and even positing that a Chinese seizure of Taiwan would be inconsequential or inevitable. Sometimes Taiwan is seen as a mere pawn in U.S.-China relations, with little agency of its own other than as a bargaining chip. There have even been comparisons of Taiwan to the Crimean Peninsula, which was annexed by Russia from Ukraine in 2014 without a military response from the European Union or the United States.
Yet Taiwan is no Crimea, whether in global economic importance, military strategic value, or demographically. On the map, Taiwan is a moderately sized island that is geographically tiny compared with China. This obscures the fact that with a population of almost 24 million, Taiwan has as many people as Australia and more than EU countries such as the Netherlands, Greece, and Sweden. When it comes to the United States, Taiwan is smaller in land area than all but nine of the 50 states but has more people than Florida or New York.
Taiwan’s GDP is $636 billion, which puts it just outside the world’s top 20 economies in 21st place, and is Asia’s seventh-largest economy, according to the International Monetary Fund. This is amplified further by its significant position in the global technological chain due to its many information and communications technology firms, which include computer and smartphone manufacturers, chipmakers, and components firms. For instance, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., whose advanced chips power Apple iPhones and iPads, is considered the world’s leading semiconductor manufacturer, well ahead of South Korean, U.S., and Chinese competitors. Taiwanese firms like Quanta and Foxconn are the world’s largest contract electronic and computer manufacturers. If Taiwan is taken over by China, a lot of this vital technology will be in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Besides technology, Taiwan also holds vital strategic importance due to its geographical location. Along with Japan to the north and the Philippines to its south, Taiwan is part of the “first island chain” along China’s coast that hinders the country’s access to the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan is occupied by China, this provides Beijing with a free lane into the Pacific, and its military planes, ships, and long-range missiles will be able to threaten U.S. territories such as Guam and even Hawaii. China would also be able to control regional shipping lanes and threaten Japan and be well within striking range of Okinawa, where a large U.S. contingent of more than 25,000 military personnel is stationed. To the south, the Philippines would also have reason to be very nervous as Taiwan’s southern tip lies just over 230 miles from the northernmost shore of Luzon.
Taiwan does have an ambiguous political status, a result of 20th-century history and an ongoing claim by China that Taiwan belongs to it. As an extension of this “One China” principle, China forces countries that it has official relations with to stop recognizing Taiwan, meaning that Taiwan is only officially recognized by 15 countries, the majority of these being tiny Caribbean and Pacific nations.
Taiwan is also excluded from multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and its related agencies and forced to participate under artificial names such as “Chinese Taipei” in the Olympics or the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)” in the World Trade Organization. Taiwan’s official name, Republic of China (ROC), doesn’t even include the word “Taiwan,” as this was a continuation of the state brought over by the Kuomintang (KMT) regime that governed China until losing the civil war to the CCP in 1949 and being forced to reestablish itself in Taiwan.
It must be noted that while China’s “One China” principle is acknowledged by various countries like the United States through the “One Country” policy, the two are not the same, and the latter does not constitute an endorsement or agreement with China’s claim to Taiwan, as some might mistakenly believe.
The nature of the Taiwanese themselves is also far more complicated than simple tellings convey. To be sure, as a result of the autocracy that lasted until the late 1980s, Taiwan’s main language is Mandarin, and it continues to use traditional Chinese characters—unlike China, which uses simplified characters. Over 95 percent of Taiwanese are ethnic Han, comprising Hoklo and Hakka people as well as those who came over from China in the 1940s with the KMT.
Due to certain Chinese cultural influences, such as in literature and culinary dishes, and the preservation of religious traditions by the Hoklo and Hakka, whose ancestors came to Taiwan from China centuries ago, there are some cultural practices that survived on the island while they were stamped out by Maoist oppression in China. On the surface, this presents an image of a society that used to be seen by some as more traditional, and thus more Chinese, than China.
However, this is a superficial and misleading judgment. The majority of Taiwanese families, whether ethnic Han or aboriginal, were in Taiwan long before 1949. The people who came over with the KMT in the 1940s have always made up roughly 15 percent of the population, never exceeding one-fifth.
Taiwan’s first city, Tainan, was founded in 1624 by the Dutch East India Company, after which ethnic Han came over from China in numbers. In this way, Taiwan could be considered to have a history of almost 400 years. This is almost twice that of Singapore, which celebrated its 200th anniversary as a settlement last year. Just as it would be inaccurate to brand Singapore as a Chinese state, so it is with Taiwan. No knowledgeable person would ever call the United States a British state, even though the United States speaks English and has a strong Anglo-Protestant heritage, nor Mexico a Spanish state, even though it is a Spanish-speaking country whose main religion is the Catholic faith brought over by Spanish colonizers hundreds of years ago.
It is true that Taiwan exists under the ROC banner with the name, flag, and constitution all harboring a link with China. Under the rule of the KMT, ROC President Chiang Kai-shek and his successor maintained a claim to China and promoted a Chinese-centric identity. But since the democratic era, things have changed, and hardly anybody in Taiwan truly fosters any claim to represent China. Without Chinese pressure, Taiwan would be able to shake off the legacy of the 20th-century Chinese civil war and openly declare itself an independent state; as things stand, the threat of murderous force by China restricts Taiwan’s own choices.
The 1992 Consensus—which the KMT, as the then-ruling government, claimed was an agreement with the PRC—was also ripe for confusion. Supposedly a tacit agreement between the two parties, the 1992 Consensus was never formally signed or written out. While the KMT’s view was that the 1992 Consensus allowed both the ROC and PRC to coexist as part of the same unspecified “China” (but with both sides free to interpret which “China” this was), the PRC has never been ambivalent at all that Taiwan belongs to it. In any case, the 1992 Consensus has been proved to be hollow after Xi Jinping’s announcement in a New Year’s speech in 2019 that the 1992 Consensus meant Taiwan was unequivocally part of China.
In the past, the sense of identity of some Taiwanese encompassed both China and Taiwan. However, over the last few years, there has been a growing Taiwanese identity that has manifested itself politically, especially in the electoral victories of the Democratic Progressive Party, founded by Taiwanese activists during the martial law era, in 2016 and 2020. In line with this, the majority of Taiwan’s people also don’t think of themselves as Chinese but Taiwanese, with the proportion being as high as 67 percent in a recent poll, with only 2.4 percent considering themselves Chinese.
However, Taiwan can do its own part in helping to clear up misunderstandings and reinforce perceptions of its importance. While its government under Tsai Ing-wen has remained stoic in the face of continuous Chinese aggression, it needs to do more in boosting Taiwan’s defense capabilities, especially given some serious deficiencies.
Major arms purchases, such as the recent $1.8 billion deal for U.S. weapons system and the purchase of 66 new F-16s, and the development of indigenous planes and submarines are one thing, but making urgent defense reforms such as increasing the existing four-month conscription and improving reservist systems are another. This also means preparing the public for conflict, whether it happens anytime soon or in the distant future, and the likely casualties that it will entail. If Taiwan can make it clear that its military and society are prepared for all-out resistance if China attacks, this makes the case for international assistance much clearer.
Taiwan also has a reputation as a democracy with high levels of political and civil liberties, especially in Asia. As such, it has been hailed as a sort of human rights haven and progressive paradise. While that might sound good, this bestows on Taiwan a fanciful image that paints it in an unrealistic light and masks some serious issues. After all, Taiwan has restrictive immigration policies, does not have an official refugee law or policy, and has an atrocious record regarding the abusive treatment of foreign labor in its fishing fleet. To be sure, its record on things like media freedoms and LGBT rights is better than many states—but it, like anywhere else, could be doing more.
If ever China makes good on its threats and attacks, there will be calls to help defend Taiwan. But before the United States and the international community decide on a course of action, the most essential thing is to understand Taiwan for what it is—its own place, not a mere appendage of China.