foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--Europe Can Preserve the Iran Nuclear Deal Until November

But the Trump administration is not deterred : In response to the vote , President Donald Trump threatened that “ we ’ ll be doing a snapback ” —a reference to reimposing sanctions suspended under the 2015 nuclear deal from which the United States withdrew in 2018 .
The United States just lost the showdown at the United Nations Security Council over extending the terms of the arms embargo against Iran .
The U.S. government was left embarrassingly isolated , winning just one other vote for its proposed resolution ( from the Dominican Republic ) , while Russia and China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The dance around the arms embargo has always been a prelude to the bigger goal : burning down the remaining bridges that could lead back to the 2015 deal .
The Trump administration now seeks to snap back international sanctions using a measure built into the very nuclear agreement the Trump White House withdrew from two years ago .
This latest gambit by the Trump administration is unsurprisingly contested by other world powers .
On the one hand , Russia and China are making a technical , legal argument against the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forfeited its right to impose snapback sanctions once it exited the nuclear deal .
This is based on Security Council Resolution 2231 that enshrined the nuclear agreement , which clearly outlines that only a participant state to the nuclear deal can resort to snapback .
This is a legal position that even former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton—an opponent of the nuclear deal and under whose watch Trump left the agreement—has recently endorsed .
In the end , however , this is more a political fight than a legal one .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by European countries—is that the United States lacks the legitimacy to resort to snapback since it is primarily motivated by a desire to sabotage the multilateral agreement after spending the last two years undermining its foundations .
The main actor that will decide the fate of the nuclear deal after snapback sanctions is Iran itself .
Iran has already acted in response to the U.S. maximum pressure campaign , from increasing enrichment levels and exceeding other caps placed on its nuclear program , to attacking U.S. forces based in Iraq and threatening to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the calculations of decision-makers in Tehran will be influenced by the political and practical realities that follow snapback sanctions .
And here , the response from the remaining parties to the nuclear deal—France , the United Kingdom , Germany , China , and Russia—will be critical .
These countries remain committed to keeping the deal on life support—at least until the U.S. presidential election in November .
Seizing on its failure to extend the arms embargo , the United States now claims it can start the clock on a 30-day notification period , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the nuclear deal are reinstated .
This notification will be timed deliberately to end before October—when the arms embargo is set to expire , and also when Russia takes over presidency of the U.N. Security Council : a time when Washington could face more procedural hurdles .
Decision-makers in Tehran will be influenced by the political and practical realities that follow snapback sanctions .
The response from France , Britain , Germany , China , and Russia will be critical .
First , the United States will seek to build support for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that by the end of the 30-day notice period some U.N. member states agree to implement sanctions .
The Trump administration will likely use the threat of U.S. secondary sanctions , as it has done successfully over the last 18 months , if governments don ’ t move to enforce snapback sanctions .
Even if most governments around the world disagree that the United States has any authority to impose snapback sanctions , some countries may be forced to side with Washington given the threat that the United States could turn its economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be led by China and Russia , both of which have already started to push back .
Not only will this group refuse to implement the U.N. sanctions that the U.S. government claims should be reimposed , but they likely will throw obstacles into the mix , such as blocking the reinstitution of appropriate U.N. committees that will oversee the implementation of such sanctions .
This group may also see it as advantageous to seek a determination by the International Court of Justice on the legal question over the U.S. claim .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the France , Britain , and Germany , who remain united in the belief that the deal should be preserved to the greatest extent possible .
In a statement in June , the three governments already emphasized that they would not support unilateral snapback by the United States .
But it is unclear if this will translate into active opposition—and their approach will certainly not include the obstructionist moves that Russia and China may make .
This bloc will look to stall decisions to take the steps necessary to implement the U.N. sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as European countries are not in the habit of blatantly ignoring the binding framework of some of the U.N. ’ s directives , and will want to balance their actions against the risk of eroding the security council ’ s credibility further .
But they will also take advantage of whatever procedural avenues are in place to delay full enforcement of the sanctions , buying time to urge Iranian restraint in response to the U.S. moves .
As part of this approach , the 27 member states of the European Union could embark @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and if to implement snapback sanctions .
The separate EU-level sanctions targeting Iran ’ s nuclear program are unlikely to be reimposed so long as Iran takes a measured approach to its nuclear activities .
Reimposing EU sanctions against Iran will entail a series of steps , the first of which requires France , Britain , and Germany , together with the EU High Representative , to make a recommendation to the EU Council .
The return of EU sanctions would then require unanimity among member states , a goal which will take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington is largely viewed as sabotaging the nuclear deal .
In this process , the EU should seek to preserve as much space as possible to salvage the deal and avoid the reimposition of nuclear-focused sanctions against Iran—at least until the outcome of the U.S. election is clear .
The U.K. , in the run-up to Brexit , may well lean toward a similar position rather than tying itself too closely to an administration in Washington that may be on its way out .
Until now , the remaining parties to the nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s architecture despite its hollowing out .
The aim has been to stumble along until the U.S. election to see if a new opening is possible to resuscitate the agreement with a possible Biden administration in January .
While a Trump win could spell the end of the deal and further dim the prospects of diplomacy between the United States and Iran , the two sides could come to a new understanding over Iran ’ s nuclear program at some point during the second term that is premised on the original deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration ’ s nuclear diplomacy with North Korea , this will be a Herculean process with no certain outcome .
But with Iranian elections coming in the first half of 2021 , there will be great domestic pressure from more hardline forces to take assertive action , particularly on the nuclear program , to give Iran more leverage in any future talks with Washington .
In advance of the 2021 Iranian election , there will be domestic pressure from hardline forces to take assertive action , particularly on the nuclear program , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future talks with Washington .
If Iran takes more extreme steps on its nuclear activities , such as a major increase in its enrichment levels or reducing access to international monitors , it will make it nearly impossible for the Britain and the EU to remain committed to the deal in the short term .
There are also factors outside Iranian and U.S. control that could have an impact , such as a potential uptick in Israeli attacks against Iranian nuclear targets .
Over the course of the Trump administration , Europe and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the nuclear deal .
Having come so far , and just 11 weeks away from the U.S. election , they will need to work hard to prevent the total collapse of the agreement .
Even if Biden—who has vowed to re-enter the deal if Iran returns to compliance—is elected , the remaining parties will need to continue the hard slog to preserve it until January .

Ellie Geranmayeh and Elisa Catalano Ewers

But the Trump administration is not deterred: In response to the vote, President Donald Trump threatened that “we’ll be doing a snapback”—a reference to reimposing sanctions suspended under the 2015 nuclear deal from which the United States withdrew in 2018.
The United States just lost the showdown at the United Nations Security Council over extending the terms of the arms embargo against Iran. The U.S. government was left embarrassingly isolated, winning just one other vote for its proposed resolution (from the Dominican Republic), while Russia and China voted against and 11 other nations abstained.
The dance around the arms embargo has always been a prelude to the bigger goal: burning down the remaining bridges that could lead back to the 2015 deal. The Trump administration now seeks to snap back international sanctions using a measure built into the very nuclear agreement the Trump White House withdrew from two years ago. This latest gambit by the Trump administration is unsurprisingly contested by other world powers.
On the one hand, Russia and China are making a technical, legal argument against the U.S. move, namely that the United States forfeited its right to impose snapback sanctions once it exited the nuclear deal. This is based on Security Council Resolution 2231 that enshrined the nuclear agreement, which clearly outlines that only a participant state to the nuclear deal can resort to snapback. This is a legal position that even former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton—an opponent of the nuclear deal and under whose watch Trump left the agreement—has recently endorsed .
In the end, however, this is more a political fight than a legal one. The political case—which seems to be most favored by European countries—is that the United States lacks the legitimacy to resort to snapback since it is primarily motivated by a desire to sabotage the multilateral agreement after spending the last two years undermining its foundations.
The main actor that will decide the fate of the nuclear deal after snapback sanctions is Iran itself. Iran has already acted in response to the U.S. maximum pressure campaign, from increasing enrichment levels and exceeding other caps placed on its nuclear program, to attacking U.S. forces based in Iraq and threatening to exit the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But the calculations of decision-makers in Tehran will be influenced by the political and practical realities that follow snapback sanctions. And here, the response from the remaining parties to the nuclear deal—France, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, and Russia—will be critical. These countries remain committed to keeping the deal on life support—at least until the U.S. presidential election in November.
Seizing on its failure to extend the arms embargo, the United States now claims it can start the clock on a 30-day notification period, after which U.N. sanctions removed against Iran by the nuclear deal are reinstated. This notification will be timed deliberately to end before October—when the arms embargo is set to expire, and also when Russia takes over presidency of the U.N. Security Council: a time when Washington could face more procedural hurdles. Decision-makers in Tehran will be influenced by the political and practical realities that follow snapback sanctions. The response from France, Britain, Germany, China, and Russia will be critical.
What is likely to follow snapback is a messy scene at the U.N. in which council members will broadly fall into three groups.
First, the United States will seek to build support for its case—primarily through political and economic pressure—so that by the end of the 30-day notice period some U.N. member states agree to implement sanctions. The Trump administration will likely use the threat of U.S. secondary sanctions, as it has done successfully over the last 18 months, if governments don’t move to enforce snapback sanctions. Even if most governments around the world disagree that the United States has any authority to impose snapback sanctions, some countries may be forced to side with Washington given the threat that the United States could turn its economic pressure against them.
The second group will be led by China and Russia, both of which have already started to push back. Not only will this group refuse to implement the U.N. sanctions that the U.S. government claims should be reimposed, but they likely will throw obstacles into the mix, such as blocking the reinstitution of appropriate U.N. committees that will oversee the implementation of such sanctions. This group may also see it as advantageous to seek a determination by the International Court of Justice on the legal question over the U.S. claim.
The third grouping will be led by the France, Britain, and Germany, who remain united in the belief that the deal should be preserved to the greatest extent possible. In a statement in June, the three governments already emphasized that they would not support unilateral snapback by the United States. But it is unclear if this will translate into active opposition—and their approach will certainly not include the obstructionist moves that Russia and China may make.
This bloc will look to stall decisions to take the steps necessary to implement the U.N. sanctions. This is a delicate undertaking, as European countries are not in the habit of blatantly ignoring the binding framework of some of the U.N.’s directives, and will want to balance their actions against the risk of eroding the security council’s credibility further. But they will also take advantage of whatever procedural avenues are in place to delay full enforcement of the sanctions, buying time to urge Iranian restraint in response to the U.S. moves.
Countries such as India, South Korea, and Japan are likely to favor this approach. These governments may even go so far as to send a significant political signal to Iran and back a joint statement by most of the security council members vowing not to recognize unilateral U.S. snapback sanctions.
As part of this approach, the 27 member states of the European Union could embark on a prolonged consultation process over how and if to implement snapback sanctions. The separate EU-level sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program are unlikely to be reimposed so long as Iran takes a measured approach to its nuclear activities. Reimposing EU sanctions against Iran will entail a series of steps, the first of which requires France, Britain, and Germany, together with the EU High Representative, to make a recommendation to the EU Council. The return of EU sanctions would then require unanimity among member states, a goal which will take time to achieve in a context where Washington is largely viewed as sabotaging the nuclear deal.
In this process, the EU should seek to preserve as much space as possible to salvage the deal and avoid the reimposition of nuclear-focused sanctions against Iran—at least until the outcome of the U.S. election is clear. The U.K., in the run-up to Brexit, may well lean toward a similar position rather than tying itself too closely to an administration in Washington that may be on its way out.
Until now, the remaining parties to the nuclear deal have managed to preserve the deal’s architecture despite its hollowing out. The aim has been to stumble along until the U.S. election to see if a new opening is possible to resuscitate the agreement with a possible Biden administration in January. While a Trump win could spell the end of the deal and further dim the prospects of diplomacy between the United States and Iran, the two sides could come to a new understanding over Iran’s nuclear program at some point during the second term that is premised on the original deal. Judging by the pace of the Trump administration’s nuclear diplomacy with North Korea, this will be a Herculean process with no certain outcome.
But with Iranian elections coming in the first half of 2021, there will be great domestic pressure from more hardline forces to take assertive action, particularly on the nuclear program, to give Iran more leverage in any future talks with Washington. In advance of the 2021 Iranian election, there will be domestic pressure from hardline forces to take assertive action, particularly on the nuclear program, to give Iran more leverage in any future talks with Washington. If Iran takes more extreme steps on its nuclear activities, such as a major increase in its enrichment levels or reducing access to international monitors, it will make it nearly impossible for Britain and the EU to remain committed to the deal in the short term. There are also factors outside Iranian and U.S. control that could have an impact, such as a potential uptick in Israeli attacks against Iranian nuclear targets.
Over the course of the Trump administration, Europe and Iran have managed to avert the collapse of the nuclear deal. Having come so far, and just 11 weeks away from the U.S. election, they will need to work hard to prevent the total collapse of the agreement. Even if Biden—who has vowed to re-enter the deal if Iran returns to compliance—is elected, the remaining parties will need to continue the hard slog to preserve it until January.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--A Verdict That Pleases No One in Lebanon

A Verdict That Pleases No One in Lebanon BEIRUT—Lebanon waited 15 years for the answer to one burning question : Who assassinated Prime Minister Rafik Hariri ?
But when a United Nations-backed special tribunal delivered its verdict Tuesday in The Hague , convicting a senior Hezbollah member , it was met largely with resignation across the country .
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon said the Hezbollah man , Salim Ayyash , orchestrated the bomb attack that killed Hariri in February 2005 , convicting him in absentia .
But it acquitted three others and determined there was insufficient evidence to directly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syrian government to the crime .
Despite all the time and money spent on the case , the tribunal could not say who ordered the killing .
For Lebanese , divided across ethnic , religious , and political lines , and reeling from a huge blast that killed 180 people in Beirut this month , the decision contained just the right dose of ambiguity for all sides to find fault .
In the capital ’ s mostly Sunni neighborhood of Tarik al-Jadida , where Hariri ’ s Future Movement has long had popular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to gather as the verdict was announced .
Only a few dozen showed up .
There was no chanting , mostly just disappointment .
“ One guy did this murder alone ?
What is he , the Grendizer ?
” said Mahmoud Assi , referring to a character from a popular Japanese anime show who can do almost anything on his own .
“ The only thing that came out is that … the guy had an affair , ” he added , referring to what appeared to be hundreds of messages exchanged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The army deployed in advance of the verdict amid concerns the conviction of Shiite Hezbollah members could ignite sectarian tensions .
Instead , leaders called for calm and army vehicles filled with soldiers rolled past the small gathering .
Some of the men who gathered complained about the increasingly dire financial situation .
Lebanon ’ s currency has lost 80 percent of its value in recent months , the price of food and basic supplies have shot up , and electricity has dwindled .
Others dwelled on the verdict ’ s seeming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It was not just Ayyash , ” said Waleed Dana , indicating he believes it was Hezbollah .
“ Ayyash is just a soldier—we want the people who gave the order.
” All four defendants , including Ayyash , were tried in absentia , their whereabouts unknown .
Any arrest in the aftermath of the verdict seemed unlikely .
Saad Hariri , the son of Rafik Hariri and a former prime minister himself , said he accepted the court ’ s verdict but had a “ message for those who committed this terrorist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : The age of using crime for politics without punishment and without paying a price is over.
” He also said Hezbollah “ should make sacrifices.
” Hezbollah is already facing huge challenges , including U.S. sanctions , a financial crisis in Lebanon , and a protest movement that has taken aim at the group along with the country ’ s entire political class .
After the Aug. 4 blast that killed 180 people in Beirut and destroyed swaths of the city , protesters took to the streets , using nooses to hang @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including Hezbollah ’ s Hassan Nasrallah—an image that would have been unthinkable here last year .
Among Hezbollah ’ s supporters , the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was always seen as illegitimate—a foreign plot to hurt “ the resistance , ” as the group often called here .
“ I call on every Lebanese official and every citizen to boycott these investigators and not to co-operate with them , ” Nasrallah said in 2010 , shortly after the tribunal was formed .
“ If our brothers are unjustly sentenced , as we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” he said last week as the nation waited for the verdict , which was delayed following the blast .
His supporters seemed to be following suit .
On a busy street filled with Shiite religious flags and the flags of Hezbollah , Hussain , who didn ’ t want to give his last name , was quick to dismiss the verdict as a conspiracy by foreign states meant to create strife in Lebanon and weaken Hezbollah .
“ They pinned it on Hezbollah to make a new Middle East , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ windows blown out by the explosion two weeks ago that destroyed swaths of the city .
“ They killed an important leader like Rafik Hariri to cause unrest between the people.
” Like many of the group ’ s supporters , Hussain viewed the verdict as proof that Hezbollah was not involved in Hariri ’ s death .
But he said even if the Special Tribunal for Lebanon had determined Hezbollah was involved , it wouldn ’ t have changed his support for the group .
Many have also blamed Hezbollah for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ real proof , aside from the large political and military role the group plays in Lebanon .
Others have called for an international probe , having little faith in any government investigation .
Hezbollah has rejected the allegations , though it is now clear that at least some of Lebanon ’ s leaders knew about the nearly 3,000 tons of highly explosive ammonium nitrate stored in Beirut ’ s civilian port and did nothing about it .
In a country where political murders have occurred with some regularity , Hariri ’ s was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For years after the incident , large photos of the former prime minister hung on public walls around Beirut .
A massive billboard at the entrance to the Hamra district electronically counted the days since he died—along with 21 others in a massive explosion that shook the city .
Many people immediately suspected Hezbollah and its ally Syria , whose presence in Lebanon Hariri had long criticized .
In the wake of Hariri ’ s assassination , hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of central Beirut in protests dubbed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end of Syria ’ s decadeslong occupation of Lebanon .
It was the biggest political upheaval since the end of the country ’ s civil war in 1990 .
But 15 years later , the massive billboard counter is down , and photos of Rafik Hariri on the streets are increasingly hard to find .
At one cafe where photos of Hariri and his son Saad are still hanging , patrons said they wanted justice but were more concerned with the increasingly dire economic situation .
“ Rafik Hariri died 15 years ago @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anymore , we want to live , ” said Ossman Abdel Karim , who works as a driver and like so many here is struggling to support his family amid the country ’ s worst economic crisis in decades .
There is also a sense of defeat .
The few who spoke about justice or revenge also said they could do nothing against the well-armed and organized Hezbollah .
“ We can ’ t do anything .
Hezbollah has the country and has weapons , ” Abdel Karim said .
Across the table @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political leaders from all sects who have been assassinated over the past 50 years—in a bid , he says , to divide the county .
“ Why did they kill Bashir Gemayel ?
Why did they kill Musa Sadr ?
Why did they kill Hassan Khaled ?
Why kill Pierre Gemayel ?
” he asked .
“ Because they don ’ t want a [ united ] Lebanon .
”

BEIRUT—Lebanon waited 15 years for the answer to one burning question: Who assassinated Prime Minister Rafik Hariri? But when a United Nations-backed special tribunal delivered its verdict Tuesday in The Hague, convicting a senior Hezbollah member, it was met largely with resignation across the country.
BEIRUT—Lebanon waited 15 years for the answer to one burning question: Who assassinated Prime Minister Rafik Hariri? But when a United Nations-backed special tribunal delivered its verdict Tuesday in The Hague, convicting a senior Hezbollah member, it was met largely with resignation across the country.
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon said the Hezbollah man, Salim Ayyash, orchestrated the bomb attack that killed Hariri in February 2005, convicting him in absentia. But it acquitted three others and determined there was insufficient evidence to directly link Hezbollah’s leadership or the Syrian government to the crime.
Despite all the time and money spent on the case, the tribunal could not say who ordered the killing.
For Lebanese, divided across ethnic, religious, and political lines, and reeling from a huge blast that killed 180 people in Beirut this month, the decision contained just the right dose of ambiguity for all sides to find fault.
In the capital’s mostly Sunni neighborhood of Tarik al-Jadida, where Hariri’s Future Movement has long had popular support, there were calls for supporters to gather as the verdict was announced. Only a few dozen showed up. There was no chanting, mostly just disappointment.
“One guy did this murder alone? What is he, the Grendizer?” said Mahmoud Assi, referring to a character from a popular Japanese anime show who can do almost anything on his own. “The only thing that came out is that … the guy had an affair,” he added, referring to what appeared to be hundreds of messages exchanged between one the suspects and his girlfriends.
The army deployed in advance of the verdict amid concerns the conviction of Shiite Hezbollah members could ignite sectarian tensions. Instead, leaders called for calm and army vehicles filled with soldiers rolled past the small gathering. Some of the men who gathered complained about the increasingly dire financial situation. Lebanon’s currency has lost 80 percent of its value in recent months, the price of food and basic supplies have shot up, and electricity has dwindled. Others dwelled on the verdict’s seeming improbability.
“Who ordered it? It was not just Ayyash,” said Waleed Dana, indicating he believes it was Hezbollah. “Ayyash is just a soldier—we want the people who gave the order.”
All four defendants, including Ayyash, were tried in absentia, their whereabouts unknown. Any arrest in the aftermath of the verdict seemed unlikely.
Saad Hariri, the son of Rafik Hariri and a former prime minister himself, said he accepted the court’s verdict but had a “message for those who committed this terrorist crime and for the plotters behind them: The age of using crime for politics without punishment and without paying a price is over.”
He also said Hezbollah “should make sacrifices.”
Hezbollah is already facing huge challenges, including U.S. sanctions, a financial crisis in Lebanon, and a protest movement that has taken aim at the group along with the country’s entire political class.
After the Aug. 4 blast that killed 180 people in Beirut and destroyed swaths of the city, protesters took to the streets, using nooses to hang cutouts of some country’s leaders, including Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah—an image that would have been unthinkable here last year.
Among Hezbollah’s supporters, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was always seen as illegitimate—a foreign plot to hurt “the resistance,” as the group often called here.
“I call on every Lebanese official and every citizen to boycott these investigators and not to co-operate with them,” Nasrallah said in 2010, shortly after the tribunal was formed. “If our brothers are unjustly sentenced, as we expect, we will maintain their innocence,” he said last week as the nation waited for the verdict, which was delayed following the blast.
His supporters seemed to be following suit.
On a busy street filled with Shiite religious flags and the flags of Hezbollah, Hussain, who didn’t want to give his last name, was quick to dismiss the verdict as a conspiracy by foreign states meant to create strife in Lebanon and weaken Hezbollah.
“They pinned it on Hezbollah to make a new Middle East,” he said at his shop, its windows blown out by the explosion two weeks ago that destroyed swaths of the city. “They killed an important leader like Rafik Hariri to cause unrest between the people.”
Like many of the group’s supporters, Hussain viewed the verdict as proof that Hezbollah was not involved in Hariri’s death. But he said even if the Special Tribunal for Lebanon had determined Hezbollah was involved, it wouldn’t have changed his support for the group.
Many have also blamed Hezbollah for the port blast with varying theories but no real proof, aside from the large political and military role the group plays in Lebanon. Others have called for an international probe, having little faith in any government investigation.
Hezbollah has rejected the allegations, though it is now clear that at least some of Lebanon’s leaders knew about the nearly 3,000 tons of highly explosive ammonium nitrate stored in Beirut’s civilian port and did nothing about it.
In a country where political murders have occurred with some regularity, Hariri’s was perhaps Lebanon’s most consequential. For years after the incident, large photos of the former prime minister hung on public walls around Beirut. A massive billboard at the entrance to the Hamra district electronically counted the days since he died—along with 21 others in a massive explosion that shook the city. Many people immediately suspected Hezbollah and its ally Syria, whose presence in Lebanon Hariri had long criticized. In the wake of Hariri’s assassination, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of central Beirut in protests dubbed the Cedar Revolution that eventually led to the end of Syria’s decadeslong occupation of Lebanon.
It was the biggest political upheaval since the end of the country’s civil war in 1990.
But 15 years later, the massive billboard counter is down, and photos of Rafik Hariri on the streets are increasingly hard to find.
At one cafe where photos of Hariri and his son Saad are still hanging, patrons said they wanted justice but were more concerned with the increasingly dire economic situation.
“Rafik Hariri died 15 years ago we don’t want to fight anymore, we want to live,” said Ossman Abdel Karim, who works as a driver and like so many here is struggling to support his family amid the country’s worst economic crisis in decades.
There is also a sense of defeat. The few who spoke about justice or revenge also said they could do nothing against the well-armed and organized Hezbollah.
“We can’t do anything. Hezbollah has the country and has weapons,” Abdel Karim said.
Across the table, Mahmoud Halawane listed Lebanon’s political leaders from all sects who have been assassinated over the past 50 years—in a bid, he says, to divide the county.
“Why did they kill Bashir Gemayel? Why did they kill Musa Sadr? Why did they kill Hassan Khaled? Why kill Pierre Gemayel?” he asked. “Because they don’t want a [united] Lebanon.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--The Dangerous Illusion of Restraining U.S. Power

The Dangerous Illusion of Restraining U.S. Power U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced on July 29 that 11,900 U.S. military personnel will be leaving Germany , reducing the United States ’ footprint there from 36,000 to 24,000 soldiers .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s administration is weighing a similar drawdown from the 28,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in South Korea .
And that may be just the beginning .
According to Richard Grenell , the former U.S. ambassador to Germany who briefly served as acting director of national intelligence this spring , the goal is to “ bring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan , Iraq , from South Korea , Japan , and from Germany.
” The call for the United States to show “ restraint ” by withdrawing from foreign entanglements and keeping the focus at home is growing in foreign-policy circles—and not just in the Trump administration .
The current movement appears to have started in 2014 , when Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Barry Posen published the seminal work on foreign-policy restraint .
His work , not surprisingly , resonated with realists-cum-isolationists such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt , not to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new bottle for their old laissez-faire wine .
There is even a restrainers ’ think tank , the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft , erroneously named for former President John Quincy Adams owing to a fundamental misreading of his thinking and a failed attempt to apply cavalry-era strategizing to 21st-century superpower affairs .
Isolationist ideas clearly appeal to Trump .
But they have also taken hold on the left .
Sen. Bernie Sanders ’ s wing of the Democratic Party ensured that a call for the end of “ forever wars ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ platform .
At this week ’ s virtual convention , Democrats will surely blame Trump for undermining U.S. influence—but it ’ s unclear how many Democrats actually support a return to greater U.S. commitments around the world .
Presumptive candidate Joe Biden ’ s long record in the U.S. Senate as a foreign-policy internationalist—as well as his choice of Sen. Kamala Harris from the party ’ s moderate wing as his running mate—offers hope for greater U.S. engagement with traditional allies .
Yet it remains uncertain whether a Biden administration would push back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ determined adversaries .
And as vice president , Biden had a seat at the table when then President Barack Obama adopted his own elements of isolationism , including his withdrawal of troops from Iraq , his unwillingness to enforce his own “ red line ” against the Syrian regime ’ s use of chemical weapons , and his tepid response to Russia ’ s invasion and annexation of Crimea .
Isolationist ideas clearly appeal to Trump , but they have also taken hold on the left .
The common theme among restrainers : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in other nations ’ affairs .
Or , as H.R .
McMaster , a 34-year veteran of the U.S. Army and former national security advisor to Trump , has noted , isolationists hold the “ romantic view that restraint abroad is almost always an unmitigated good.
” In some ways , the restraint movement echoes the isolationism championed in the 1930s and 1940s by Charles Lindbergh ’ s America First Committee .
Like that earlier isolationism , the restraint movement attempts to draw lessons and inferences from U.S. wars .
In the 1930s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which almost 120,000 Americans perished , as a reason to avoid challenging German and Japanese fascism .
The thought was that if Americans just stayed out of World War II , the totalitarians would leave them alone .
Today ’ s restrainers similarly seek to capitalize on the suffering and difficulties associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan , as well as the broader fight against terrorism , when they argue for the withdrawal of the remaining forces in these conflicts and others .
Restrainers , however , often conflate the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a conflict is subsequently managed or how eventually to withdraw .
These are different policy decisions .
Indeed , one can be critical of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and how the war was managed—while also believing that Washington should retain a modest U.S. military presence there to help prevent a return of the Islamic State or to counter the influence of Iran .
The restraint movement echoes the isolationism championed in the 1930s and 1940s by Charles Lindbergh ’ s America First Committee .
Restrainers have also attempted to use the Great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the COVID-19 pandemic as leverage to incite populist passions .
They do this by falsely suggesting that defense spending is the primary source of the federal deficit and debt .
They also suggest a false choice between domestic priorities and spending on defense , which amounts to less than 4 percent of U.S. gross domestic product .
Restrainers consistently paint existing and potential conflicts and U.S. military deployments with the same brush , warning of another “ forever war.
” However , not every conflict leads to an interminable quagmire .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its headaches , so far has helped prevent another major foreign terrorist attack on the United States , which many had predicted to be inevitable after 9/11 .
The term “ forever war ” is itself curious .
History , unfortunately , is a forever war—the chronicle of states ’ struggles with their enemies .
To be sure , one can write a truly wondrous history of human achievement .
But sadly , as the Spanish writer George Santayana observed , “ only the dead have seen the end of war.
” It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ronald Reagan advocated “ peace through strength.
” This view served the United States and its NATO allies well in Europe during the Cold War .
Reagan , of course , was only borrowing from the Roman adage : “ If you want peace , prepare for war.
” The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and his Prussian counterpart Carl von Clausewitz offered similar advice .
Their common belief : Weakness and lack of resolution invite aggression .
Restrainers operate under the mistaken assertion that the world would be a safer or better place @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The 20th century tells another story .
As the historian Robert Kagan argued in his 2012 book The World America Made , the U.S.-led world order has heralded a global rise in liberalism and human rights , better education and health , greater wealth , and more access to information .
Isolationism doesn ’ t work because the enemy gets a vote , and what happens abroad inevitably affects Americans at home .
Equally puzzling is the notion that the world ’ s problems and conflicts are of little consequence to the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , because the enemy gets a vote , and what happens abroad inevitably affects Americans at home .
Al Qaeda launched the 9/11 attacks despite the United States ’ best efforts to steer clear of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan , where al Qaeda was based .
The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor despite the United States ’ best efforts to stay out of the fray .
Isolationists initially blocked then President Franklin D. Roosevelt from providing greater support to an embattled Britain , and millions of lives were lost from not confronting German leader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had the United States stayed engaged in Europe in the 1920s , Hitler ’ s rise might have been preventable .
The best way to preserve the U.S.-led global order and to prevent attacks on the United States is to remain engaged and keep a well-designed , forward-deployed military presence alongside allies and partners .
As Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell have noted , U.S. deployments of varying magnitude along what they call the “ unquiet frontier ” that stretches from the Baltic Sea to the South China Sea counter the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Russia , and Iran .
Support for U.S. allies , coupled with a U.S. military presence in forward bases , today helps deter gathering threats .
Trump ’ s decision to remove significant numbers of U.S. troops from Germany , and his threat to do the same from South Korea , may be a negotiating tactic to extract greater cost-sharing from other NATO members and Seoul .
But that approach is ill-advised .
U.S. soldiers are not mercenaries available to the highest bidder .
Nor is the U.S. military presence in these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to deter adversaries and protect core U.S. national security interests .
When Washington plays an outsized role in shaping and maintaining the international rules-based order , Americans and people around the world are safer and more prosperous .
That ’ s what the United States has done , for the most part , since World War II .
And that leadership role has helped ensure that global conflicts such as the Cold War did not erupt into devastating military confrontations .
Admittedly , the U.S.-led international order certainly has not prevented all wars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the way .
But responding to those mistakes by relinquishing the United States ’ leadership role—and deliberately drawing down U.S. military power—would be shortsighted and counterproductive .
Those who welcome the demise of U.S. power have yet to fully answer one important question : What happens after the United States goes home ?
Those who welcome the demise of U.S. power have yet to fully answer one important question : What happens after the United States goes home ?
When the British Empire unraveled after World War II , the United States stepped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system based on the rule of law .
Who will follow the United States ?
The alternatives are frightening .
Russia is far less equipped to become a superpower , but would be a particularly predatory , corrupt , and avaricious one under Russian President Vladimir Putin .
China seeks global leadership .
But the Chinese Communist Party ’ s authoritarian hostility to democracy ; weaponization of data ; human rights abuses ; support for rogue states such as Iran , North Korea , and Pakistan ; threats to Hong Kong and Taiwan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; and massive theft of intellectual property should all serve as warnings .
And let us all dispense with the fiction that the European Union could be an alternative to the United States in defending democracies .
U.S. power , therefore , must be retained , not restrained .
Retaining U.S. power should take different forms depending on the region and country .
A reflexive tendency to retain all U.S. military deployments would be as unwise as a reflexive tendency to withdraw them .
Each must be measured methodically in terms of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this should be accomplished with the smallest U.S. force posture necessary .
Thankfully , the military isn ’ t the only tool of national power at Washington ’ s disposal .
Another is economic warfare .
The economic tools created in the aftermath of 9/11 are targeted and surgical .
Their strength derives from the dollar-denominated financial system constructed by the United States , and under which the world still operates .
Sanctions have allowed the United States to maintain important leverage over adversaries .
These tools must be used judiciously , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But restrainers often deride these economic tools , claiming they are a gateway to war rather than a means of suasion and avoiding war .
They lambaste their use against U.S. enemies and adversaries such as Iran and Russia , even as some restrainers seem eager to use the same tools of economic warfare against U.S. allies such as Israel .
U.S. wealth should be guarded—the goal should be to fight battles only when core national interests demand it .
Restrainers are , of course , justified in their desire to avoid needless @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States ’ willingness to confront challenges can not be discounted .
Weakness makes war more likely , not less .
Diplomacy without leverage leads to discussions about how much the United States is willing to retreat .
This will only leave Americans more alone and more insecure .
In the end , not all conflict is avoidable , just as not all withdrawals are advisable .
The United States must therefore wield its military judiciously , not least to protect its service members .
And U.S. wealth should be guarded—the goal should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national interests demand it .
But in the 21st century , if Americans want to be safe at home , some of their best and brightest must stand watch abroad .
For that reason , restraint in the form of reflexive military withdrawal is the wrong prescription .
With new threats gathering , it ’ s the retainers who should win this debate .

U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced on July 29 that 11,900 U.S. military personnel will be leaving Germany, reducing the United States’ footprint there from 36,000 to 24,000 soldiers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration is weighing a similar drawdown from the 28,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in South Korea. And that may be just the beginning. According to Richard Grenell , the former U.S. ambassador to Germany who briefly served as acting director of national intelligence this spring, the goal is to “bring [home] troops from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, from South Korea, Japan, and from Germany.”
U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced on July 29 that 11,900 U.S. military personnel will be leaving Germany, reducing the United States’ footprint there from 36,000 to 24,000 soldiers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration is weighing a similar drawdown from the 28,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in South Korea. And that may be just the beginning. According to Richard Grenell, the former U.S. ambassador to Germany who briefly served as acting director of national intelligence this spring, the goal is to “bring [home] troops from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, from South Korea, Japan, and from Germany.”
The call for the United States to show “restraint” by withdrawing from foreign entanglements and keeping the focus at home is growing in foreign-policy circles—and not just in the Trump administration. The current movement appears to have started in 2014, when Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Barry Posen published the seminal work on foreign-policy restraint. His work, not surprisingly, resonated with realists-cum-isolationists such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, not to mention a gaggle of libertarians who found a new bottle for their old laissez-faire wine. There is even a restrainers’ think tank, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, erroneously named for former President John Quincy Adams owing to a fundamental misreading of his thinking and a failed attempt to apply cavalry-era strategizing to 21st-century superpower affairs.
Isolationist ideas clearly appeal to Trump. But they have also taken hold on the left. Sen. Bernie Sanders’s wing of the Democratic Party ensured that a call for the end of “forever wars” found its way into the Democrats’ platform. At this week’s virtual convention, Democrats will surely blame Trump for undermining U.S. influence—but it’s unclear how many Democrats actually support a return to greater U.S. commitments around the world. Presumptive candidate Joe Biden’s long record in the U.S. Senate as a foreign-policy internationalist—as well as his choice of Sen. Kamala Harris from the party’s moderate wing as his running mate—offers hope for greater U.S. engagement with traditional allies. Yet it remains uncertain whether a Biden administration would push back decisively against the country’s most determined adversaries. And as vice president, Biden had a seat at the table when then President Barack Obama adopted his own elements of isolationism, including his withdrawal of troops from Iraq, his unwillingness to enforce his own “red line” against the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons, and his tepid response to Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea.
Isolationist ideas clearly appeal to Trump, but they have also taken hold on the left.
The common theme among restrainers: The United States has no business intervening in other nations’ affairs. Or, as H.R. McMaster, a 34-year veteran of the U.S. Army and former national security advisor to Trump, has noted, isolationists hold the “romantic view that restraint abroad is almost always an unmitigated good.”
In some ways, the restraint movement echoes the isolationism championed in the 1930s and 1940s by Charles Lindbergh’s America First Committee. Like that earlier isolationism, the restraint movement attempts to draw lessons and inferences from U.S. wars. In the 1930s, isolationists invoked World War I, in which almost 120,000 Americans perished, as a reason to avoid challenging German and Japanese fascism. The thought was that if Americans just stayed out of World War II, the totalitarians would leave them alone.
Today’s restrainers similarly seek to capitalize on the suffering and difficulties associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the broader fight against terrorism, when they argue for the withdrawal of the remaining forces in these conflicts and others. Restrainers, however, often conflate the decision to intervene at all with how a conflict is subsequently managed or how eventually to withdraw. These are different policy decisions. Indeed, one can be critical of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and how the war was managed—while also believing that Washington should retain a modest U.S. military presence there to help prevent a return of the Islamic State or to counter the influence of Iran.
The restraint movement echoes the isolationism championed in the 1930s and 1940s by Charles Lindbergh’s America First Committee.
Restrainers have also attempted to use the Great Recession and the current economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic as leverage to incite populist passions. They do this by falsely suggesting that defense spending is the primary source of the federal deficit and debt. They also suggest a false choice between domestic priorities and spending on defense, which amounts to less than 4 percent of U.S. gross domestic product.
Restrainers consistently paint existing and potential conflicts and U.S. military deployments with the same brush, warning of another “forever war.” However, not every conflict leads to an interminable quagmire. Even the so-called war on terror, despite its headaches, so far has helped prevent another major foreign terrorist attack on the United States, which many had predicted to be inevitable after 9/11.
The term “forever war” is itself curious. History, unfortunately, is a forever war—the chronicle of states’ struggles with their enemies. To be sure, one can write a truly wondrous history of human achievement. But sadly, as the Spanish writer George Santayana observed, “only the dead have seen the end of war.”
It is for this reason that former President Ronald Reagan advocated “peace through strength.” This view served the United States and its NATO allies well in Europe during the Cold War. Reagan, of course, was only borrowing from the Roman adage: “If you want peace, prepare for war.” The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and his Prussian counterpart Carl von Clausewitz offered similar advice. Their common belief: Weakness and lack of resolution invite aggression.
Restrainers operate under the mistaken assertion that the world would be a safer or better place if U.S. influence would simply recede. The 20th century tells another story. As the historian Robert Kagan argued in his 2012 book The World America Made, the U.S.-led world order has heralded a global rise in liberalism and human rights, better education and health, greater wealth, and more access to information.
Isolationism doesn’t work because the enemy gets a vote, and what happens abroad inevitably affects Americans at home.
Equally puzzling is the notion that the world’s problems and conflicts are of little consequence to the United States. Isolationism doesn’t work, however, because the enemy gets a vote, and what happens abroad inevitably affects Americans at home. Al Qaeda launched the 9/11 attacks despite the United States’ best efforts to steer clear of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where al Qaeda was based. The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor despite the United States’ best efforts to stay out of the fray. Isolationists initially blocked then President Franklin D. Roosevelt from providing greater support to an embattled Britain, and millions of lives were lost from not confronting German leader Adolf Hitler sooner. In fact, had the United States stayed engaged in Europe in the 1920s, Hitler’s rise might have been preventable.
The best way to preserve the U.S.-led global order and to prevent attacks on the United States is to remain engaged and keep a well-designed, forward-deployed military presence alongside allies and partners. As Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell have noted, U.S. deployments of varying magnitude along what they call the “unquiet frontier” that stretches from the Baltic Sea to the South China Sea counter the rise of revisionist powers such as China, Russia, and Iran. Support for U.S. allies, coupled with a U.S. military presence in forward bases, today helps deter gathering threats.
Trump’s decision to remove significant numbers of U.S. troops from Germany, and his threat to do the same from South Korea, may be a negotiating tactic to extract greater cost-sharing from other NATO members and Seoul. But that approach is ill-advised. U.S. soldiers are not mercenaries available to the highest bidder. Nor is the U.S. military presence in these countries charity; U.S. troops are forward-deployed to deter adversaries and protect core U.S. national security interests.
When Washington plays an outsized role in shaping and maintaining the international rules-based order, Americans and people around the world are safer and more prosperous. That’s what the United States has done, for the most part, since World War II. And that leadership role has helped ensure that global conflicts such as the Cold War did not erupt into devastating military confrontations.
Admittedly, the U.S.-led international order certainly has not prevented all wars. There have been costly mistakes along the way. But responding to those mistakes by relinquishing the United States’ leadership role—and deliberately drawing down U.S. military power—would be shortsighted and counterproductive.
Those who welcome the demise of U.S. power have yet to fully answer one important question: What happens after the United States goes home?
Those who welcome the demise of U.S. power have yet to fully answer one important question: What happens after the United States goes home? When the British Empire unraveled after World War II, the United States stepped into the void, promoting an international system based on the rule of law. Who will follow the United States? The alternatives are frightening.
Russia is far less equipped to become a superpower, but would be a particularly predatory, corrupt, and avaricious one under Russian President Vladimir Putin. China seeks global leadership. But the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian hostility to democracy; weaponization of data; human rights abuses; support for rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan; threats to Hong Kong and Taiwan; militarization of the South China Sea; and massive theft of intellectual property should all serve as warnings. And let us all dispense with the fiction that the European Union could be an alternative to the United States in defending democracies.
U.S. power, therefore, must be retained, not restrained.
Retaining U.S. power should take different forms depending on the region and country. A reflexive tendency to retain all U.S. military deployments would be as unwise as a reflexive tendency to withdraw them. Each must be measured methodically in terms of U.S. interests and threats to them. And this should be accomplished with the smallest U.S. force posture necessary.
Thankfully, the military isn’t the only tool of national power at Washington’s disposal. Another is economic warfare. The economic tools created in the aftermath of 9/11 are targeted and surgical. Their strength derives from the dollar-denominated financial system constructed by the United States, and under which the world still operates. Sanctions have allowed the United States to maintain important leverage over adversaries. These tools must be used judiciously, as should all instruments of national power. But restrainers often deride these economic tools, claiming they are a gateway to war rather than a means of suasion and avoiding war. They lambaste their use against U.S. enemies and adversaries such as Iran and Russia, even as some restrainers seem eager to use the same tools of economic warfare against U.S. allies such as Israel.
U.S. wealth should be guarded—the goal should be to fight battles only when core national interests demand it.
Restrainers are, of course, justified in their desire to avoid needless conflict. But the importance of the United States’ willingness to confront challenges cannot be discounted. Weakness makes war more likely, not less. Diplomacy without leverage leads to discussions about how much the United States is willing to retreat. This will only leave Americans more alone and more insecure.
In the end, not all conflict is avoidable, just as not all withdrawals are advisable. The United States must therefore wield its military judiciously, not least to protect its service members. And U.S. wealth should be guarded—the goal should be to fight battles only when core national interests demand it.
But in the 21st century, if Americans want to be safe at home, some of their best and brightest must stand watch abroad. For that reason, restraint in the form of reflexive military withdrawal is the wrong prescription. With new threats gathering, it’s the retainers who should win this debate.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--Hong Kong Is a Local Tragedy, Not a Geopolitical Shuttlecock

The protests in Hong Kong last year produced stunning spectacles .
The march of more than 1 million people on June 9 , 2019 , calling for withdrawal of an extradition bill that protesters felt would undermine the rule of law in Hong Kong was eye-catching .
So were later actions fueled by both this original grievance and new ones , such as anger at police violence .
Audiences around the world were captivated by sights such as crowds of protesters converging on Hong Kong airport to disrupt flights , the city ’ s financial district turning once again into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a 30-mile human chain .
Since the implementation of the new national security law on June 30 , mass demonstrations have stopped .
When Hong Kong returns to the front pages now , the photos accompanying the stories show new kinds of spectacular images , such as respected figures being taken from their homes or offices in handcuffs .
Hong Kongers have shocked by just how far-reaching the national security law is , but most were not surprised by Beijing ’ s decision to impose a set of draconian policies to suppress dissent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ controversy in 2012 , to the abduction of Hong Kong booksellers by Chinese state agents in 2015 , to Beijing ’ s manipulation of the Hong Kong Legislative Council election in 2016 , there have been hints along the way that signal to Hong Kongers that their political freedom were imperiled .
Few were fooled by the claims by Beijing spokespeople and Hong Kong officials that the national security law would only affect a small number of extremists .
Knowing their locale ’ s history , many Hong Kongers fearfully expected , rightly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ widely .
The defining moment that marks the impact of the national security law might be the police raid on Aug. 10 , when 200 police officers descended upon the headquarters of Next Digital , arresting its founder , Jimmy Lai .
Lai and his newspaper Apple Daily have been staunch supporters of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong .
Later that same day , the journalist Wilson Li and the prominent young activist Agnes Chow , who renounced her British citizenship a few years ago in order to be able to run @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only to be disqualified for standing for the post due to her political views ) , were also arrested for “ colluding with foreign powers ” and “ inciting secession.
” These are charges that under the draconian terms of the new national security law could have resulted in them being denied bail , taken across to the mainland for trial , and imprisoned for long stretches .
( They are now out on bail , perhaps due in part to the outcry over their arrests , internationally as well as locally .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ national security law was also invoked when four student activists were arrested at their homes , having drawn the ire of the authorities solely by their social media activities .
As nationalist discourse from Beijing and Washington dominates mainstream news media , it is tempting to understand the recent events in Hong Kong as merely collateral damage between China and the United States as the relationship spirals downward .
The fact that official denigration of Lai and Chow has emphasized their supposed ties to foreign powers fit into this narrative line , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ agendas—and dueling strongman leaders who seem to think only they can make their countries “ great again , ” as one likes to put it—are factors here .
But the people of Hong Kong who have fought so hard for the values they treasure , and who are experiencing today ’ s traumas and developing new strategies of resistance , deserve better than to have their agency stripped away .
Their spectacles from last year should not be discounted , nor should the quieter and less photogenic ways they are expressing themselves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multiple copies of issues of Apple Daily after the police raid and buying stock in its parent company to show support for Lai .
The mogul is a complex figure whose mixture of political views has generated controversy in Hong Kong activist circles in the past ( e.g.
, his appeal to U.S. President Donald Trump to “ save ” Hong Kong angered many progressives who simultaneously applaud his criticism of Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam ) , but he is being rallied around now because his arrest is seen by so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the press .
A state-against-state narrative obscures key local contexts .
In Hong Kong itself , what matters is not the top-down narrative but the successive targeting of individuals and groups as part of a new terror .
A local-centered approach focuses not on the rhythm of U.S.-China jabs but on that of successive state efforts to strike fear into different social sectors , striking at young activists one week , academics another , journalists , publishers and political party founders ( such as Chow ) this week .
A short view that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Chinese President Xi Jinping misses most of what ’ s important in Hong Kong , where a layered history informs the current set of nightmarish images .
For example , the legal scholar and activist Benny Tai was recently fired by the University of Hong Kong for his involvement in the 2014 Occupy Central movement .
Tai ’ s participation in pro-democracy movements extends all the way back to 2003 , when massive protests broke out over the government ’ s plan to implement a national security law .
At the time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government to hold off on the bill .
It is this very localism that threatens Beijing itself .
The distinctive cultural and political features of Hong Kong society are deemed threatening to Beijing ’ s nationalist integration project and are no longer allowed to exist freely .
Take the long-running satirical show Headliner , canceled in May , after Radio Television Hong Kong , a public media station , succumbed to pressure from the government .
Combining political satire with local pop music and cultural references , Headliner offered humor and solace to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it began before the 1997 handover and early on often skewered colonial authorities .
Incidents like this show something Hong Kongers understand intimately : that the national security law does not only threaten specific sectors .
Rather , the law has been deployed by the Hong Kong government and Beijing to undermine all aspects of civil society .
Tai ’ s firing , for instance , coincided with other state efforts to suppress intellectual freedom : Books written by Joshua Wong and other activists were taken off the shelves of public libraries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to self-censor to avoid prosecution , and the Education Bureau cautioned teachers not to allow anti-government activities in the classroom .
For Hong Kong , 2012 stands out not just as the year Xi was anointed head of the Chinese Communist Party , but the year that a teenage Agnes Chow worked with her now much more famous classmate Joshua Wong to spearhead a movement that blocked the imposition of a pro-Beijing national education on Hong Kong schools , which some criticized as “ patriotic brainwashing.
” For Hong Kong , November 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was elected but one during which a key precedent for Beijing ’ s imposition of the national security law on Hong Kong was set .
In 2016 , a local court was trying to decide whether the dismissal from office of two elected officials , who had taken their oath in a manner deemed highly disrespectful , was justified .
Beijing grew impatient and intervened before the supposedly autonomous Hong Kong court reached a decision : Beijing declared that the dismissal was right .
Late last month , history repeated itself : The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates from running in the upcoming Legislative Council election .
The entire election was later postponed for a year , crushing the dreams many Hong Kongers have to reclaim the Legislative Council from the hands of pro-Beijing legislators .
The new national security law has altered the landscape in Hong Kong in deeply disturbing ways , but many Hong Kongers see a clear line from the foreshocks of the past to the earthquake of the present .
Hong Kongers who seek political freedom have faced heartbreak after heartbreak since the handover in 1997 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lens illuminates Hong Kongers ’ collective memories and traumas—exactly the things that Beijing has tried hard to erase .

Shui-Yin Sharon Yam and Jeffrey Wasserstrom

The protests in Hong Kong last year produced stunning spectacles. The march of more than 1 million people on June 9, 2019, calling for withdrawal of an extradition bill that protesters felt would undermine the rule of law in Hong Kong was eye-catching. So were later actions fueled by both this original grievance and new ones, such as anger at police violence . Audiences around the world were captivated by sights such as crowds of protesters converging on Hong Kong airport to disrupt flights, the city’s financial district turning once again into a sea of colorful umbrellas , and a 30-mile human chain . Since the implementation of the new national security law on June 30, mass demonstrations have stopped. When Hong Kong returns to the front pages now, the photos accompanying the stories show new kinds of spectacular images, such as respected figures being taken from their homes or offices in handcuffs.
The protests in Hong Kong last year produced stunning spectacles. The march of more than 1 million people on June 9, 2019, calling for withdrawal of an extradition bill that protesters felt would undermine the rule of law in Hong Kong was eye-catching. So were later actions fueled by both this original grievance and new ones, such as anger at police violence. Audiences around the world were captivated by sights such as crowds of protesters converging on Hong Kong airport to disrupt flights, the city’s financial district turning once again into a sea of colorful umbrellas, and a 30-mile human chain. Since the implementation of the new national security law on June 30, mass demonstrations have stopped. When Hong Kong returns to the front pages now, the photos accompanying the stories show new kinds of spectacular images, such as respected figures being taken from their homes or offices in handcuffs.
Hong Kongers have shocked by just how far-reaching the national security law is, but most were not surprised by Beijing’s decision to impose a set of draconian policies to suppress dissent. From the moral and national education controversy in 2012, to the abduction of Hong Kong booksellers by Chinese state agents in 2015, to Beijing’s manipulation of the Hong Kong Legislative Council election in 2016, there have been hints along the way that signal to Hong Kongers that their political freedom were imperiled. Few were fooled by the claims by Beijing spokespeople and Hong Kong officials that the national security law would only affect a small number of extremists. Knowing their locale’s history, many Hong Kongers fearfully expected, rightly, that the net would be cast widely.
The defining moment that marks the impact of the national security law might be the police raid on Aug. 10, when 200 police officers descended upon the headquarters of Next Digital, arresting its founder, Jimmy Lai. Lai and his newspaper Apple Daily have been staunch supporters of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. Later that same day, the journalist Wilson Li and the prominent young activist Agnes Chow, who renounced her British citizenship a few years ago in order to be able to run for a seat on Legislative Council (only to be disqualified for standing for the post due to her political views), were also arrested for “colluding with foreign powers” and “inciting secession.” These are charges that under the draconian terms of the new national security law could have resulted in them being denied bail, taken across to the mainland for trial, and imprisoned for long stretches. (They are now out on bail, perhaps due in part to the outcry over their arrests, internationally as well as locally.) Just two weeks prior, the national security law was also invoked when four student activists were arrested at their homes, having drawn the ire of the authorities solely by their social media activities.
As nationalist discourse from Beijing and Washington dominates mainstream news media, it is tempting to understand the recent events in Hong Kong as merely collateral damage between China and the United States as the relationship spirals downward. The fact that official denigration of Lai and Chow has emphasized their supposed ties to foreign powers fit into this narrative line, and there is no doubt that dueling states’ agendas—and dueling strongman leaders who seem to think only they can make their countries “great again,” as one likes to put it—are factors here.
But the people of Hong Kong who have fought so hard for the values they treasure, and who are experiencing today’s traumas and developing new strategies of resistance, deserve better than to have their agency stripped away. Their spectacles from last year should not be discounted, nor should the quieter and less photogenic ways they are expressing themselves right now, such as buying up multiple copies of issues of Apple Daily after the police raid and buying stock in its parent company to show support for Lai. The mogul is a complex figure whose mixture of political views has generated controversy in Hong Kong activist circles in the past (e.g., his appeal to U.S. President Donald Trump to “save” Hong Kong angered many progressives who simultaneously applaud his criticism of Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam), but he is being rallied around now because his arrest is seen by so many as an assault on freedom of the press.
A state-against-state narrative obscures key local contexts. In Hong Kong itself, what matters is not the top-down narrative but the successive targeting of individuals and groups as part of a new terror. A local-centered approach focuses not on the rhythm of U.S.-China jabs but on that of successive state efforts to strike fear into different social sectors, striking at young activists one week, academics another, journalists, publishers and political party founders (such as Chow) this week.
A short view that concentrates only on the exchanges between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping misses most of what’s important in Hong Kong, where a layered history informs the current set of nightmarish images. For example, the legal scholar and activist Benny Tai was recently fired by the University of Hong Kong for his involvement in the 2014 Occupy Central movement. Tai’s participation in pro-democracy movements extends all the way back to 2003, when massive protests broke out over the government’s plan to implement a national security law. At the time, Tai helped convince the Hong Kong government to hold off on the bill.
It is this very localism that threatens Beijing itself. The distinctive cultural and political features of Hong Kong society are deemed threatening to Beijing’s nationalist integration project and are no longer allowed to exist freely. Take the long-running satirical show Headliner, canceled in May, after Radio Television Hong Kong, a public media station, succumbed to pressure from the government. Combining political satire with local pop music and cultural references, Headliner offered humor and solace to Hong Kongers of many generations , as it began before the 1997 handover and early on often skewered colonial authorities.
Incidents like this show something Hong Kongers understand intimately: that the national security law does not only threaten specific sectors. Rather, the law has been deployed by the Hong Kong government and Beijing to undermine all aspects of civil society. Tai’s firing, for instance, coincided with other state efforts to suppress intellectual freedom: Books written by Joshua Wong and other activists were taken off the shelves of public libraries, Hong Kong publishers and bookstores have begun to self-censor to avoid prosecution, and the Education Bureau cautioned teachers not to allow anti-government activities in the classroom.
For Hong Kong, 2012 stands out not just as the year Xi was anointed head of the Chinese Communist Party, but the year that a teenage Agnes Chow worked with her now much more famous classmate Joshua Wong to spearhead a movement that blocked the imposition of a pro-Beijing national education on Hong Kong schools, which some criticized as “patriotic brainwashing.”
For Hong Kong, November 2016 was not just as the month Trump was elected but one during which a key precedent for Beijing’s imposition of the national security law on Hong Kong was set. In 2016, a local court was trying to decide whether the dismissal from office of two elected officials, who had taken their oath in a manner deemed highly disrespectful, was justified. Beijing grew impatient and intervened before the supposedly autonomous Hong Kong court reached a decision: Beijing declared that the dismissal was right. Late last month, history repeated itself: The Hong Kong government disqualified a dozen pro-democracy candidates from running in the upcoming Legislative Council election. The entire election was later postponed for a year, crushing the dreams many Hong Kongers have to reclaim the Legislative Council from the hands of pro-Beijing legislators.
The new national security law has altered the landscape in Hong Kong in deeply disturbing ways, but many Hong Kongers see a clear line from the foreshocks of the past to the earthquake of the present. Hong Kongers who seek political freedom have faced heartbreak after heartbreak since the handover in 1997. Seeing the recent crackdown through their lens illuminates Hong Kongers’ collective memories and traumas—exactly the things that Beijing has tried hard to erase.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--Are the Democrats Downplaying Biden’s Record?

Who really is Joe Biden ?
As the Democrats ’ first-ever virtual convention got underway Monday night , headliners from former first lady Michelle Obama to Sen. Bernie Sanders assaulted the putative evils of Donald Trump and his administration—inveighing against the president ’ s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic , racial injustice , and economic inequality .
But throughout the big show , the party ’ s proposed alternative to Trump , Biden , seemed to come off as more of a character actor than a leading man .
Oh , there were plenty of nice things said about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a great and genuine guy he is .
“ Decent.
” “ Empathetic.
” “ Respectful.
” Such words were often heard during the two-hour TV spectacle—usually at the tail end of an attack on Trump .
“ Joe knows what it ’ s like to struggle , ” Obama said in her keynote address .
“ His life is testament to getting back up … to help us heal and guide us forward.
” “ I mean , you can ’ t fake that kind of a smile , ” former Marine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ video appearance .
Yet barely a specific detail was delivered about what Biden achieved in a half-century as U.S. senator and vice president .
Indeed , the Democrats were more than an hour into the convention before Michigan Gov .
Gretchen Whitmer mentioned , briefly , Biden ’ s leadership along with President Barack Obama on the 2009 bailout of General Motors and Chrysler .
This continued a trend that Sen. Kamala Harris began last week , when in her debut remarks as Biden ’ s vice presidential choice she also devoted most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spent very little time talking about the long record of the man she was now working for , except to extol her relationship with Biden ’ s late son Beau , with whom she served as a state attorney general , and what a fine father Joe was .
To a certain extent , this is a deliberate strategy , some Democratic tacticians said .
“ The election is first and foremost about character , ” one senior Biden campaign advisor told Foreign Policy .
They say Trump ’ s divisive and dangerous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his hints at rejecting the 2020 electoral results—is on the ballot even more than his policies .
Hence the continuing emphasis on Biden ’ s decency , humanity , and devotion to American democracy .
“ At its most basic , this election is about preserving our democracy , ” Sanders said .
“ During this president ’ s term , the unthinkable has become normal.
” But some Biden advocates said they found the current approach more than a little irritating—and risky in that it leaves Biden somewhat undefined .
“ They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than a father figure , ” said Michael Haltzel , a former senior Biden advisor when the then-Delaware senator was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee .
Haltzel argues that many of Biden ’ s positions over the past four decades were gutsy , smart , and prescient—and will provide the needed positive definition of the candidate that remains somewhat lacking even as he remains well ahead in most polls .
“ It ’ s a bit like a prevent defense in the NFL .
Do no harm .
But I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not so overwhelming as they seem , ” Haltzel said .
He added that Trump , meanwhile , will make a big show of his accomplishments in office—in particular last week ’ s historic deal normalizing relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates .
“ You can count on Trump calling the UAE and [ Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin ] Netanyahu to the White House for some big show this fall .
… That ’ s another reason for talking about Biden ’ s remarkable record on foreign policy.
” Starting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to go into more detail about his array of new plans for the country and his many past votes and accomplishments , first as an influential U.S. senator who served for 36 years and then as Obama ’ s vice president for eight years .
But this will amount to some careful cherry-picking , since Democrats also recognize that Biden ’ s long voting record is something of a political minefield at a time of racial tension and global retrenchment .
It is littered with deeply unpopular votes that may only remind people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prior era—such as his 1970s opposition to desegregation busing ; his spearheading of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act , which overloaded prisons with first offenders and long-serving “ three strikes ” inmates ; his vote in favor of the Defense of Marriage Act , which prohibited the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages ( he later reversed his position ) ; and his tentative vote for the disastrous Iraq War .
As Michelle Obama put it in her speech with somewhat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not perfect , and he ’ d be the first to tell you that , but there is no perfect candidate , no perfect president .
And his ability to learn and grow—we find in that the kind of humility and maturity that so many of us yearn for right now , ” she said .
Such backhanded compliments may only serve to reinforce the Republican critique that Biden has never been considered quite presidential timber—that he ’ s “ Sleepy Joe ” or “ Slow Joe , ” as Trump likes to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the times .
Many of his greatest accomplishments in foreign policy—for example his leadership in taking on Slobodan Milosevic ’ s murderous campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s—predate 9/11 and hark back to a more interventionist time that Americans are less comfortable with now .
“ Yes , 20 years ago is like a hundred years ago .
I agree , ” said Haltzel , who today teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies .
“ But it doesn ’ t change the fact that Biden is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one of the smartest guys I ’ ve ever met.
” Indeed , many political observers would agree that in many respects Biden ’ s restraint and prudence , especially while serving with Obama , look prescient now .
On Afghanistan , Biden gave cautious counsel to Obama to rebuff the Pentagon and not to add too many U.S. troops—that nation-building was a bridge too far .
“ In Afghanistan he ’ s been proven right , that instead of doing this overall nation-building which hasn ’ t worked , it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Haltzel said .
“ It was really an attempt to focus on why we were there in the first place , and for better or worse it wasn ’ t to remake the country in some better way , ” one of Biden ’ s top foreign-policy advisors , Antony Blinken , told me in 2019 .
“ It was to deal with the threat posed by al Qaeda with a much narrower counterterrorism campaign .
He was convinced early on that it was beyond our capacity to remake the country in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in addition , one of the leaders in the Obama administration in arguing for tough sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin , whom Trump has sought to restore to the G-7 conferences .
The former vice president ’ s position on Iraq has also been often misunderstood and mischaracterized , his supporters say .
Biden was not a gung-ho supporter of invasion ; in fact , he pressed hard for a resolution in the run-up to the war that would have required the George W. Bush administration to delay the use of force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resolution to disarm Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein or to ascertain that the threat was “ so grave that the use of force is necessary.
” The resolution failed largely because Biden ’ s own fellow Democrat , then-House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt , sided with administration hawks by supporting a resolution that permitted Bush to move ahead with his invasion plans by declaring diplomacy to be useless .
In an interview with me in late 2004 , Biden laid out what later became Obama ’ s own position on Iran , saying that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomacy with Tehran “ because he has no alternative.
” He also insisted , long before most other senators , that Bush start up bilateral talks with North Korea—a policy that Trump later followed , albeit with little success .
And while Biden ’ s support for tough crime bills that may have disadvantaged Black Americans draws criticism now , some members of the African American community were with him at the time .
“ For example , the 1994 crime bill that he gets pilloried for—more than two-thirds of the Congressional Black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Haltzel .
“ There was a real crime wave then and a lot of drugs and gangs were coming up , and the Black community was overwhelmingly in favor of it .
And his support of the Violence Against Women Act is a huge thing.
” But in the end Biden himself wishes to focus far more on his plans for the future than his past , analysts say .
And among those who have gone into the most specifics about his programs is none other than his fiercest primary rival , Sanders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outlined Biden ’ s support for progressive programs such as raising the minimum wage to $ 15 , making it easier for workers to join unions , lowering the eligibility age for Medicare , dramatically expanding health care , and “ transitioning to 100 percent clean electricity over the next 15 years.
” The candidate ’ s goal , his strategists say , is to build a new presidential Biden on the considerable architecture of the old .

Who really is Joe Biden? As the Democrats’ first-ever virtual convention got underway Monday night, headliners from former first lady Michelle Obama to Sen. Bernie Sanders assaulted the putative evils of Donald Trump and his administration—inveighing against the president’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, racial injustice, and economic inequality.
Who really is Joe Biden? As the Democrats’ first-ever virtual convention got underway Monday night, headliners from former first lady Michelle Obama to Sen. Bernie Sanders assaulted the putative evils of Donald Trump and his administration—inveighing against the president’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, racial injustice, and economic inequality.
But throughout the big show, the party’s proposed alternative to Trump, Biden, seemed to come off as more of a character actor than a leading man.
Oh, there were plenty of nice things said about the presumptive Democratic nominee, mostly about what a great and genuine guy he is. “Decent.” “Empathetic.” “Respectful.” Such words were often heard during the two-hour TV spectacle—usually at the tail end of an attack on Trump. “Joe knows what it’s like to struggle,” Obama said in her keynote address. “His life is testament to getting back up … to help us heal and guide us forward.” “I mean, you can’t fake that kind of a smile,” former Marine Capt. Kevin Penn said in another video appearance. Yet barely a specific detail was delivered about what Biden achieved in a half-century as U.S. senator and vice president. Indeed, the Democrats were more than an hour into the convention before Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer mentioned, briefly, Biden’s leadership along with President Barack Obama on the 2009 bailout of General Motors and Chrysler.
This continued a trend that Sen. Kamala Harris began last week, when in her debut remarks as Biden’s vice presidential choice she also devoted most of her attention to attacking Trump and spent very little time talking about the long record of the man she was now working for, except to extol her relationship with Biden’s late son Beau, with whom she served as a state attorney general, and what a fine father Joe was.
To a certain extent, this is a deliberate strategy, some Democratic tacticians said. “The election is first and foremost about character,” one senior Biden campaign advisor told Foreign Policy. They say Trump’s divisive and dangerous behavior—especially his identification with white supremacists and his hints at rejecting the 2020 electoral results—is on the ballot even more than his policies. Hence the continuing emphasis on Biden’s decency, humanity, and devotion to American democracy. “At its most basic, this election is about preserving our democracy,” Sanders said. “During this president’s term, the unthinkable has become normal.”
But some Biden advocates said they found the current approach more than a little irritating—and risky in that it leaves Biden somewhat undefined. “They really ought to make Biden into something more than a father figure,” said Michael Haltzel, a former senior Biden advisor when the then-Delaware senator was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Haltzel argues that many of Biden’s positions over the past four decades were gutsy, smart, and prescient—and will provide the needed positive definition of the candidate that remains somewhat lacking even as he remains well ahead in most polls.
“It’s a bit like a prevent defense in the NFL. Do no harm. But I think the numbers [favoring Biden] are not so overwhelming as they seem,” Haltzel said. He added that Trump, meanwhile, will make a big show of his accomplishments in office—in particular last week’s historic deal normalizing relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. “You can count on Trump calling the UAE and [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu to the White House for some big show this fall. … That’s another reason for talking about Biden’s remarkable record on foreign policy.”
Starting Tuesday night, the Biden team intends to go into more detail about his array of new plans for the country and his many past votes and accomplishments, first as an influential U.S. senator who served for 36 years and then as Obama’s vice president for eight years. But this will amount to some careful cherry-picking, since Democrats also recognize that Biden’s long voting record is something of a political minefield at a time of racial tension and global retrenchment. It is littered with deeply unpopular votes that may only remind people that the 77-year-old Biden harks from a prior era—such as his 1970s opposition to desegregation busing; his spearheading of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which overloaded prisons with first offenders and long-serving “three strikes” inmates; his vote in favor of the Defense of Marriage Act, which prohibited the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages (he later reversed his position); and his tentative vote for the disastrous Iraq War.
As Michelle Obama put it in her speech with somewhat surprising bluntness: “Now Joe is not perfect, and he’d be the first to tell you that, but there is no perfect candidate, no perfect president. And his ability to learn and grow—we find in that the kind of humility and maturity that so many of us yearn for right now,” she said.
Such backhanded compliments may only serve to reinforce the Republican critique that Biden has never been considered quite presidential timber—that he’s “Sleepy Joe” or “Slow Joe,” as Trump likes to call him, and out of touch with the times. Many of his greatest accomplishments in foreign policy—for example his leadership in taking on Slobodan Milosevic’s murderous campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s—predate 9/11 and hark back to a more interventionist time that Americans are less comfortable with now. “Yes, 20 years ago is like a hundred years ago. I agree,” said Haltzel, who today teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “But it doesn’t change the fact that Biden is an incredibly substantive guy—in fact he is one of the smartest guys I’ve ever met.”
Indeed, many political observers would agree that in many respects Biden’s restraint and prudence, especially while serving with Obama, look prescient now. On Afghanistan, Biden gave cautious counsel to Obama to rebuff the Pentagon and not to add too many U.S. troops—that nation-building was a bridge too far. “In Afghanistan he’s been proven right, that instead of doing this overall nation-building which hasn’t worked, it’s basically about suppression of the terrorists,” Haltzel said.
“It was really an attempt to focus on why we were there in the first place, and for better or worse it wasn’t to remake the country in some better way,” one of Biden’s top foreign-policy advisors, Antony Blinken, told me in 2019. “It was to deal with the threat posed by al Qaeda with a much narrower counterterrorism campaign. He was convinced early on that it was beyond our capacity to remake the country in a sustainable way.”
Biden was, in addition, one of the leaders in the Obama administration in arguing for tough sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom Trump has sought to restore to the G-7 conferences.
The former vice president’s position on Iraq has also been often misunderstood and mischaracterized, his supporters say. Biden was not a gung-ho supporter of invasion; in fact, he pressed hard for a resolution in the run-up to the war that would have required the George W. Bush administration to delay the use of force until the United Nations approved a new resolution to disarm Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein or to ascertain that the threat was “so grave that the use of force is necessary.” The resolution failed largely because Biden’s own fellow Democrat, then-House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, sided with administration hawks by supporting a resolution that permitted Bush to move ahead with his invasion plans by declaring diplomacy to be useless.
In an interview with me in late 2004, Biden laid out what later became Obama’s own position on Iran, saying that George W. Bush should open up direct diplomacy with Tehran “because he has no alternative.” He also insisted, long before most other senators, that Bush start up bilateral talks with North Korea—a policy that Trump later followed, albeit with little success.
And while Biden’s support for tough crime bills that may have disadvantaged Black Americans draws criticism now, some members of the African American community were with him at the time. “For example, the 1994 crime bill that he gets pilloried for—more than two-thirds of the Congressional Black Caucus voted for it,” said Haltzel. “There was a real crime wave then and a lot of drugs and gangs were coming up, and the Black community was overwhelmingly in favor of it. And his support of the Violence Against Women Act is a huge thing.”
But in the end Biden himself wishes to focus far more on his plans for the future than his past, analysts say. And among those who have gone into the most specifics about his programs is none other than his fiercest primary rival, Sanders, who in his speech Monday night outlined Biden’s support for progressive programs such as raising the minimum wage to $15, making it easier for workers to join unions, lowering the eligibility age for Medicare, dramatically expanding health care, and “transitioning to 100 percent clean electricity over the next 15 years.”
The candidate’s goal, his strategists say, is to build a new presidential Biden on the considerable architecture of the old.