foreignpolicy--2020-02-10--It’s Africa’s Turn to Leave the European Union

On Jan. 31 , Britain left the European Union , bringing to an end nearly three years of tortured , all-consuming negotiations .
With terms of severance agreed and a path forward with the United Kingdom still to be charted , Brussels now faces another deadline that could redefine its place in the world : The EU ’ s framework agreement with a 79-country bloc of African , Caribbean , and Pacific states is due to expire on Feb. 29 .
While simply extending the terms would be convenient for the EU , the global context is a world away @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cotonou Agreement with the African , Caribbean , and Pacific Group of States was signed in Benin .
And as African heads of state wrap up a two-day summit that began on Sunday at the 33rd Ordinary Session of the African Union in Addis Ababa , Ethiopia , they should reconsider whether it ’ s wise to remain party to an arrangement that is not helping them achieve their development goals , undermines the African integration project , and does not respect them as equal partners .
African visions of an integrated continent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as old as decolonization , but until recently there were few indicators that it was heading in the right direction .
The Organization of African Unity , founded in 1963 , was widely regarded a mere dictators ’ club and was succeeded in 2002 by the African Union , whose reputation fares marginally better .
Modeled to a fault on European Union institutions , the AU remains both overly centralized and lacking in capacity and accountability .
But in the last three years , the AU has begun to emerge as a globally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hurdle to pan-African progress .
In 2018 , the African Union adopted the African Continental Free Trade Area ( AfCFTA ) , the largest trade agreement concluded since the World Trade Organization in 1995 .
At more than $ 2.5 trillion , the economy of the African Union is nearly the size of the British and French economies , which rank sixth and seventh in the world .
Trading under the single continental market for goods and services begins on July 1 , when most of the 30 ratifying countries will drop tariffs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ products and progressively reduce tariffs to a maximum of 3 percent by 2035.The AU has begun to emerge as a globally relevant actor because it overcame a major hurdle to pan-African progress .
Developing in parallel to this trade liberalization and harmonization is a treaty on continentwide freedom of movement , which together paves the way for a customs union and gives political momentum to the African Union passport project , which would allow visa-free travel among the AU ’ s 55 member states .
These developments are expected to boost industrialization and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ times , attract foreign direct investment , diversify the commodity-driven economy , create jobs , reduce the prices of goods and services , allocate resources more efficiently , and increase intracontinental trade—an area in which Africa lags far behind the other continents .
While the AfCFTA will not transform Africa overnight , and its long-term prospects are contingent on successful implementation , it heralds a new era in which the AU can finally leverage its collective economic clout in its political relationships with the rest of the world .
Now is the time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their existing relationships and examine whether they are helping the AU achieve its Agenda 2063 vision , a 50-year strategic plan with goals closely linked to the U.N .
Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 that were adopted in 2015 .
Since 2000 , progress on the Sustainable Development Goals and their predecessor , the U.N. Millennium Development Goals , has been slow and unevenly distributed .
The 2019 Africa SDG Index finds that “ Across the board , African countries perform comparatively well in terms of sustainable production and consumption as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in goals related to human welfare ” such as poverty , hunger , and affordable and clean energy .
As African leaders consider their post-Cotonou Agreement options , they must weigh the merits of continuity against unsatisfactory development progress in light of evidence that EU priorities for African development do not correspond to the continent ’ s areas of greatest need .
The joint institution between the EU and the African , Caribbean , and Pacific countries for agricultural development ostensibly strives to “ advance food security , resilience and inclusive economic growth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pacific through innovations in sustainable agriculture , ” yet the solutions it envisions would be marginal improvements , not transformational changes .
In many African countries , agricultural development is comparable to Western Europe in the early to mid-19th century and requires major modernization to boost productivity , such as irrigation , tractors , improved grain varieties , fertilizer , and better storage to ameliorate food insecurity and close the widening gap between African crop outputs and those of other developing regions .
The joint institution is exclusively funded by the EU and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ More food is not the answer ” to hunger in Africa despite acknowledging that food imports are high and exports low.EU agricultural development policy is largely a neocolonial enterprise committed to protecting its own agricultural market .
Strengthening the value chains of small and medium-sized agribusinesses is desirable but not optimal , as it reinforces the existing trade dynamic of exporting raw materials to Europe .
In sum , EU agricultural development policy is largely a neocolonial enterprise committed to protecting its own agricultural market and producing value-added goods for export ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soft power and merchant interests than for African capacity-building .
Aid is also a problem .
The current architecture through which EU institutions have in recent years provided about $ 6 billion in annual aid to Africa—its second-largest source of multilateral donations—also stunts African economic integration and divides the continent politically .
While the EU provides assistance to the African , Caribbean , and Pacific Group of States through the European Development Fund , it groups North Africa—the continent ’ s best-performing region on sustainable development criteria—under its European Neighbourhood Policy funded through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states also provide bilateral aid to Africa but are required to coordinate their development assistance to align with EU prerogatives .
Not long ago , the European Union struggled with “ reconciling its strategic interests with its value-driven agenda , ” as a European Centre for Development Policy Management paper noted in 2012 .
Self-interest decisively won out three years later with the launch of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa , which diverts 73 percent of the European Development Fund toward combating the European migration crisis at its external points of origin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a crisis response to EU internal politics is inimical to Africa ’ s long-term needs .
Indeed , participating in the African , Caribbean , and Pacific Group prevents Africa from working with Europe toward African-oriented solutions .
Involvement in this top-down , donor-recipient framework deprives Africa of agency and leaves it vulnerable to its patron ’ s priorities .
The African Union recognizes this and has called for continent-to-continent engagement , but some member states have gravely undermined their ability to negotiate with European interlocutors as equals by insisting on operating under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ umbrella .
Mali , Togo , and Burkina Faso are among those whose dependency and risk-aversion is responsible for weakening African unity and , ultimately , themselves .
The EU , for its part , has made it clear that it hears the African Union .
New European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made a symbolically significant trip to AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa a week after taking office in December 2019 .
She came bearing a $ 188 million aid package for health programs , electoral systems , environmental policies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ message that the EU is going to be more than just a source of handouts from now on : “ The African Union is a partner I count on and I look forward working within the spirit of a true partnership of equals.
” If that sounds familiar , it ’ s because the EU has been deploying this flattering talking point of a “ true partnership of equals ” for more than a decade .
The EU and AU launched an official bilateral framework in 2007 that has done nothing toward its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ north-south relationship , aside from providing 50 million euros ( about $ 55 million ) for technical assistance in writing the AfCFTA regulatory standards .
Von der Leyen ’ s rumored creation of an Africa commissioner in the EU ’ s executive branch has not materialized , though she has rebranded the development commissioner as the commissioner for international partnerships .
Most tellingly , despite not wanting to talk about migration in Addis Ababa , von der Leyen is continuing the post-Cotonou negotiations that began in 2018—which inject aid conditioned on migration control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the EU and the African , Caribbean , and Pacific states , where under the current agreement it is not a feature .
Little wonder that Zimbabwe ’ s former finance minister said “ dictation and prescription ” are the defining characteristics of EU-Africa relations .
“ When you get to the negotiating table it is very clear that we are not equals , ” said Patrick Chinamasa , who served several stints as finance minister over the past decade .
The European Union ’ s actions make it clear that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a junior partner for as long as possible .
Even as Brexit has been a consuming priority item for Brussels , von der Leyen said last month the EU is trying to conclude a trade agreement with the United States “ in a few weeks.
” This behavior raises the question of how long the African Union will tolerate being strung along in arrangements that its high representative on the post-Cotonou talks , Carlos Lopes , has denounced .
Under the current arrangement , he said , “ there is one loser @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has also indicated “ there is no risk of no deal .
It is not like Brexit .
If we don ’ t have an agreement by 2020 then we will extend what we already have.
” The AU and its members have other options .
Both China and the United States offer models of development assistance that meet Africa ’ s development needs better than the European Union ’ s .
The European Development Fund won ’ t vanish , and slow-growing Europe is ill-positioned to compete with China ’ s largesse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , use the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation as a frame of reference for how the EU should channel development aid under the Africa-EU Partnership : country-led solutions and country-led implementation of initiatives that advance Agenda 2063 , such as irrigation , sanitation , and regional electrical grids—with positive conditionality but no threat of sanctions , as is in the Cotonou agreement .
Post-Cotonou negotiations are behind schedule and are likely to continue beyond the deadline , but a new African , Caribbean , and Pacific Group secretary-general , Angola ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ five-year term on March 1 .
His tenure will be successful if it is brief .
The African Union will either step forward or backward on Leap Day , when the Cotonou agreement runs out .
Allowing the partnership to expire instead of attempting to rejuvenate it would force a reset , just as Brexit did , and from there the African Union could engage the EU bilaterally , playing to the latter ’ s anxieties about Chinese and Russian influence on a continent in which it feels entitled to primacy .
Only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , occurring later this year , be held on equal footing .

On Jan. 31, Britain left the European Union, bringing to an end nearly three years of tortured, all-consuming negotiations. With terms of severance agreed and a path forward with the United Kingdom still to be charted, Brussels now faces another deadline that could redefine its place in the world: The EU’s framework agreement with a 79-country bloc of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states is due to expire on Feb. 29.
On Jan. 31, Britain left the European Union, bringing to an end nearly three years of tortured, all-consuming negotiations. With terms of severance agreed and a path forward with the United Kingdom still to be charted, Brussels now faces another deadline that could redefine its place in the world: The EU’s framework agreement with a 79-country bloc of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states is due to expire on Feb. 29.
While simply extending the terms would be convenient for the EU, the global context is a world away from that of 2000, when the Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States was signed in Benin. And as African heads of state wrap up a two-day summit that began on Sunday at the 33rd Ordinary Session of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, they should reconsider whether it’s wise to remain party to an arrangement that is not helping them achieve their development goals, undermines the African integration project, and does not respect them as equal partners.
African visions of an integrated continent with political solidarity and interlinked prosperity are as old as decolonization, but until recently there were few indicators that it was heading in the right direction. The Organization of African Unity, founded in 1963, was widely regarded a mere dictators’ club and was succeeded in 2002 by the African Union, whose reputation fares marginally better. Modeled to a fault on European Union institutions, the AU remains both overly centralized and lacking in capacity and accountability. But in the last three years, the AU has begun to emerge as a globally relevant actor because it overcame a major hurdle to pan-African progress.
In 2018, the African Union adopted the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the largest trade agreement concluded since the World Trade Organization in 1995. At more than $2.5 trillion, the economy of the African Union is nearly the size of the British and French economies, which rank sixth and seventh in the world. Trading under the single continental market for goods and services begins on July 1, when most of the 30 ratifying countries will drop tariffs on at least 90 percent of their products and progressively reduce tariffs to a maximum of 3 percent by 2035.The AU has begun to emerge as a globally relevant actor because it overcame a major hurdle to pan-African progress.
Developing in parallel to this trade liberalization and harmonization is a treaty on continentwide freedom of movement, which together paves the way for a customs union and gives political momentum to the African Union passport project, which would allow visa-free travel among the AU’s 55 member states. These developments are expected to boost industrialization and exports, cut nontariff barriers and transport times, attract foreign direct investment, diversify the commodity-driven economy, create jobs, reduce the prices of goods and services, allocate resources more efficiently, and increase intracontinental trade—an area in which Africa lags far behind the other continents.
While the AfCFTA will not transform Africa overnight, and its long-term prospects are contingent on successful implementation, it heralds a new era in which the AU can finally leverage its collective economic clout in its political relationships with the rest of the world. Now is the time for African leaders to take stock of their existing relationships and examine whether they are helping the AU achieve its Agenda 2063 vision, a 50-year strategic plan with goals closely linked to the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 that were adopted in 2015.
Since 2000, progress on the Sustainable Development Goals and their predecessor, the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, has been slow and unevenly distributed. The 2019 Africa SDG Index finds that “Across the board, African countries perform comparatively well in terms of sustainable production and consumption as well as in climate action … but perform poorly in goals related to human welfare” such as poverty, hunger, and affordable and clean energy.
As African leaders consider their post-Cotonou Agreement options, they must weigh the merits of continuity against unsatisfactory development progress in light of evidence that EU priorities for African development do not correspond to the continent’s areas of greatest need. The joint institution between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries for agricultural development ostensibly strives to “advance food security, resilience and inclusive economic growth in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific through innovations in sustainable agriculture,” yet the solutions it envisions would be marginal improvements, not transformational changes.
In many African countries, agricultural development is comparable to Western Europe in the early to mid-19th century and requires major modernization to boost productivity, such as irrigation, tractors, improved grain varieties, fertilizer, and better storage to ameliorate food insecurity and close the widening gap between African crop outputs and those of other developing regions. The joint institution is exclusively funded by the EU and flatly states in its strategic plan that “More food is not the answer” to hunger in Africa despite acknowledging that food imports are high and exports low.EU agricultural development policy is largely a neocolonial enterprise committed to protecting its own agricultural market.
Strengthening the value chains of small and medium-sized agribusinesses is desirable but not optimal, as it reinforces the existing trade dynamic of exporting raw materials to Europe. In sum, EU agricultural development policy is largely a neocolonial enterprise committed to protecting its own agricultural market and producing value-added goods for export; it is a greater vehicle for European soft power and merchant interests than for African capacity-building.
Aid is also a problem. The current architecture through which EU institutions have in recent years provided about $6 billion in annual aid to Africa—its second-largest source of multilateral donations—also stunts African economic integration and divides the continent politically. While the EU provides assistance to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States through the European Development Fund, it groups North Africa—the continent’s best-performing region on sustainable development criteria—under its European Neighbourhood Policy funded through the European Neighbourhood Instrument. EU member states also provide bilateral aid to Africa but are required to coordinate their development assistance to align with EU prerogatives.
Not long ago, the European Union struggled with “reconciling its strategic interests with its value-driven agenda,” as a European Centre for Development Policy Management paper noted in 2012. Self-interest decisively won out three years later with the launch of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which diverts 73 percent of the European Development Fund toward combating the European migration crisis at its external points of origin.
Redistributing these funds as part of a crisis response to EU internal politics is inimical to Africa’s long-term needs. Indeed, participating in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group prevents Africa from working with Europe toward African-oriented solutions. Involvement in this top-down, donor-recipient framework deprives Africa of agency and leaves it vulnerable to its patron’s priorities. The African Union recognizes this and has called for continent-to-continent engagement, but some member states have gravely undermined their ability to negotiate with European interlocutors as equals by insisting on operating under the African, Caribbean, and Pacific umbrella. Mali, Togo, and Burkina Faso are among those whose dependency and risk-aversion is responsible for weakening African unity and, ultimately, themselves.
The EU, for its part, has made it clear that it hears the African Union. New European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made a symbolically significant trip to AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa a week after taking office in December 2019. She came bearing a $188 million aid package for health programs, electoral systems, environmental policies, and economic development initiatives to buoy her message that the EU is going to be more than just a source of handouts from now on: “The African Union is a partner I count on and I look forward working within the spirit of a true partnership of equals.” If that sounds familiar, it’s because the EU has been deploying this flattering talking point of a “true partnership of equals” for more than a decade.
The EU and AU launched an official bilateral framework in 2007 that has done nothing toward its intended purpose of moving beyond a traditional north-south relationship, aside from providing 50 million euros (about $55 million) for technical assistance in writing the AfCFTA regulatory standards. Von der Leyen’s rumored creation of an Africa commissioner in the EU’s executive branch has not materialized, though she has rebranded the development commissioner as the commissioner for international partnerships.
Most tellingly, despite not wanting to talk about migration in Addis Ababa, von der Leyen is continuing the post-Cotonou negotiations that began in 2018—which inject aid conditioned on migration control as a central plank of the relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states, where under the current agreement it is not a feature. Little wonder that Zimbabwe’s former finance minister said “dictation and prescription” are the defining characteristics of EU-Africa relations. “When you get to the negotiating table it is very clear that we are not equals,” said Patrick Chinamasa, who served several stints as finance minister over the past decade.
The European Union’s actions make it clear that it wants to continue treating the African Union as a junior partner for as long as possible. Even as Brexit has been a consuming priority item for Brussels, von der Leyen said last month the EU is trying to conclude a trade agreement with the United States “in a few weeks.”
This behavior raises the question of how long the African Union will tolerate being strung along in arrangements that its high representative on the post-Cotonou talks, Carlos Lopes, has denounced. Under the current arrangement, he said, “there is one loser: African regional integration.” But Lopes has also indicated “there is no risk of no deal. It is not like Brexit. If we don’t have an agreement by 2020 then we will extend what we already have.”
The AU and its members have other options. Both China and the United States offer models of development assistance that meet Africa’s development needs better than the European Union’s. The European Development Fund won’t vanish, and slow-growing Europe is ill-positioned to compete with China’s largesse on infrastructure projects.
The AU could, however, use the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation as a frame of reference for how the EU should channel development aid under the Africa-EU Partnership: country-led solutions and country-led implementation of initiatives that advance Agenda 2063, such as irrigation, sanitation, and regional electrical grids—with positive conditionality but no threat of sanctions, as is in the Cotonou agreement. Post-Cotonou negotiations are behind schedule and are likely to continue beyond the deadline, but a new African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group secretary-general, Angola’s Georges Rebelo Pinto Chikoti, begins his five-year term on March 1. His tenure will be successful if it is brief.
The African Union will either step forward or backward on Leap Day, when the Cotonou agreement runs out. Allowing the partnership to expire instead of attempting to rejuvenate it would force a reset, just as Brexit did, and from there the African Union could engage the EU bilaterally, playing to the latter’s anxieties about Chinese and Russian influence on a continent in which it feels entitled to primacy. Only then could the sixth triennial AU-EU summit, occurring later this year, be held on equal footing.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-10--Navy Prepares to Slash Funding for New Warships

Navy Prepares to Slash Funding for New Warships The U.S. Navy is requesting $ 19.9 billion for shipbuilding in fiscal year 2021 , which if approved by Congress would reflect a 20 percent cut from last year ’ s funding even as President Donald Trump pressures the service to fulfill his campaign promise to grow to 355 ships by 2030 .
In the Pentagon ’ s budget proposal for the fiscal year , released Monday , the Navy is asking for $ 19.9 billion , down from $ 24 billion Congress appropriated last year .
The request also seeks just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from 12 in fiscal year 2020 .
The cuts reflect the Pentagon ’ s overall belt-tightening as officials prepare for an end to three consecutive years of growth under Trump .
The department ’ s overall budget request this year is $ 705.4 billion—a decrease from $ 712.6 billion Congress appropriated for it last year .
Despite the proposed shipbuilding cut , defense officials stressed that the Pentagon remains “ committed ” to reaching Trump ’ s promised 355 ships , which is now mandated by law .
Experts say growing the fleet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which is reportedly on track to reach 420 ships by 2035 .
But if budgets remain flat as projected , officials said the department may need to rely on smaller , cheaper—and possibly unmanned—ships instead of the large , expensive vessels that currently make up the fleet .
“ As you know , 355 is the law , so we have a desire to get there , but the reality is if you look at the money we have to get there now and the flat budgets we have , we have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ron Boxall , the director for force structure , resources , and assessment on the Joint Staff , at the Pentagon on Monday .
Boxall said that to spend the Pentagon ’ s limited money more efficiently , the Navy will look at “ a new warfighting concept ” that includes moving to unmanned or “ optionally manned ” vessels that have “ better concept value ” than traditional warships .
But experts are skeptical that the Navy will reach 355 ships on the promised timeline if budgets remain flat .
The Navy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had the service reaching 355 ships by 2034 .
With a cut to shipbuilding this year , it ’ s not clear how the service plans to reach that goal even sooner “ The Navy ’ s problem is there is no foreseeable solution , ” said Mark Cancian , a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies , noting that the White House ’ s directive puts the service in an impossible position .
“ They were locked into a 355-ship Navy , they didn ’ t want it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Cancian said .
“ But the White House came back and said no , the president said 355 ; 355 is the number.
” According to documents released along with the budget on Monday , the Navy currently has 293 battle force ships in industry , including 108 deployed around the world ( the rest are typically undergoing maintenance or preparing to deploy ) .
The overall inventory is expected to increase to 297 in fiscal year 2020 and 306 in fiscal year 2021 .
The proposal to increase the number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an enticing opportunity for smaller shipyards .
There are only a handful of shipyards remaining that build large ships such as aircraft carriers , submarines , and destroyers .
But the new shipbuilding blueprint may be dead on arrival on Capitol Hill .
Driven by the powerful shipbuilding industry , lawmakers have historically pushed back on the Navy cutting its force structure .
Last year , for example , members of Congress were outraged when the Navy proposed retiring the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman , and the decision was ultimately reversed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Navy ’ s budget request became public .
Rep .
Rob Wittman of Virginia , the top Republican on the House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee , said that a decrease in the shipbuilding account “ is the opposite direction we need to be going if we are to compete ” with China .
“ Simply put , the budget published today does not invest nearly enough in shipbuilding , ” Wittman said , adding that he will be working on this year ’ s defense policy bill to add @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I won ’ t allow us to lose ground.
” Experts also warned that the Pentagon already has massive modernization bills coming due in the next few years , including recapitalizing the nuclear triad—a project the Congressional Budget Office projects will cost roughly $ 500 billion through 2028 .
The Navy is already building new class of submarines and aircraft carriers ; the Air Force , meanwhile , is building a new stealth bomber , air-launched cruise missile , and intercontinental ballistic missiles .
If defense budgets remain flat and modernization continues to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to dip into operations and maintenance or personnel costs , said Todd Harrison , the director of defense budget analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies .
“ If you ’ re going to invest in modernization in a flat budget , you ’ re going to have cut force structure , ” Harrison said .
“ There ’ s not a lot of room around that.
” Along with the budget proposal , the Pentagon announced that it had identified $ 5.7 billion in savings that will be reallocated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Russia , such as hypersonic weapons technology and artificial intelligence .
These savings are part of Esper ’ s internal review of the department ’ s so-called fourth-estate offices , roughly 50 defense agencies outside the military departments .
Update Feb. 10 , 2020 : This story was updated with comments from Rep .
Rob Wittman , a Republican from Virginia .

The U.S. Navy is requesting $19.9 billion for shipbuilding in fiscal year 2021, which if approved by Congress would reflect a 20 percent cut from last year’s funding even as President Donald Trump pressures the service to fulfill his campaign promise to grow to 355 ships by 2030.
The U.S. Navy is requesting $19.9 billion for shipbuilding in fiscal year 2021, which if approved by Congress would reflect a 20 percent cut from last year’s funding even as President Donald Trump pressures the service to fulfill his campaign promise to grow to 355 ships by 2030.
In the Pentagon’s budget proposal for the fiscal year, released Monday, the Navy is asking for $19.9 billion, down from $24 billion Congress appropriated last year. The request also seeks just eight new ships this year, down from 12 in fiscal year 2020.
The cuts reflect the Pentagon’s overall belt-tightening as officials prepare for an end to three consecutive years of growth under Trump. The department’s overall budget request this year is $705.4 billion—a decrease from $712.6 billion Congress appropriated for it last year.
Despite the proposed shipbuilding cut, defense officials stressed that the Pentagon remains “committed” to reaching Trump’s promised 355 ships, which is now mandated by law. Experts say growing the fleet is critical to compete with China, which is reportedly on track to reach 420 ships by 2035. But if budgets remain flat as projected, officials said the department may need to rely on smaller, cheaper—and possibly unmanned—ships instead of the large, expensive vessels that currently make up the fleet.
“As you know, 355 is the law, so we have a desire to get there, but the reality is if you look at the money we have to get there now and the flat budgets we have, we have to continue there,” said Vice Adm. Ron Boxall, the director for force structure, resources, and assessment on the Joint Staff, at the Pentagon on Monday.
Boxall said that to spend the Pentagon’s limited money more efficiently, the Navy will look at “a new warfighting concept” that includes moving to unmanned or “optionally manned” vessels that have “better concept value” than traditional warships.
But experts are skeptical that the Navy will reach 355 ships on the promised timeline if budgets remain flat. The Navy’s most recent force structure plan had the service reaching 355 ships by 2034. With a cut to shipbuilding this year, it’s not clear how the service plans to reach that goal even sooner
“The Navy’s problem is there is no foreseeable solution,” said Mark Cancian, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noting that the White House’s directive puts the service in an impossible position.
“They were locked into a 355-ship Navy, they didn’t want it, they backed off from that,” Cancian said. “But the White House came back and said no, the president said 355; 355 is the number.”
According to documents released along with the budget on Monday, the Navy currently has 293 battle force ships in industry, including 108 deployed around the world (the rest are typically undergoing maintenance or preparing to deploy). The overall inventory is expected to increase to 297 in fiscal year 2020 and 306 in fiscal year 2021.
The proposal to increase the number of smaller, lightly manned ships could be an enticing opportunity for smaller shipyards. There are only a handful of shipyards remaining that build large ships such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and destroyers.
The U.S. Navy Plan for 355 Ships by 2034
But the new shipbuilding blueprint may be dead on arrival on Capitol Hill. Driven by the powerful shipbuilding industry, lawmakers have historically pushed back on the Navy cutting its force structure. Last year, for example, members of Congress were outraged when the Navy proposed retiring the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman, and the decision was ultimately reversed.
Lawmakers expressed concern on Monday after the Navy’s budget request became public. Rep. Rob Wittman of Virginia, the top Republican on the House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee, said that a decrease in the shipbuilding account “is the opposite direction we need to be going if we are to compete” with China.
“Simply put, the budget published today does not invest nearly enough in shipbuilding,” Wittman said, adding that he will be working on this year’s defense policy bill to add funding for the shipbuilding account. “I won’t allow us to lose ground.”
Experts also warned that the Pentagon already has massive modernization bills coming due in the next few years, including recapitalizing the nuclear triad—a project the Congressional Budget Office projects will cost roughly $500 billion through 2028. The Navy is already building new class of submarines and aircraft carriers; the Air Force, meanwhile, is building a new stealth bomber, air-launched cruise missile, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
If defense budgets remain flat and modernization continues to eat up funding, the department may need to dip into operations and maintenance or personnel costs, said Todd Harrison, the director of defense budget analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“If you’re going to invest in modernization in a flat budget, you’re going to have cut force structure,” Harrison said. “There’s not a lot of room around that.”
Along with the budget proposal, the Pentagon announced that it had identified $5.7 billion in savings that will be reallocated toward new priorities needed to counter China and Russia, such as hypersonic weapons technology and artificial intelligence. These savings are part of Esper’s internal review of the department’s so-called fourth-estate offices, roughly 50 defense agencies outside the military departments.
Update Feb. 10, 2020: This story was updated with comments from Rep. Rob Wittman, a Republican from Virginia.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-10--Why Angela Merkel’s Succession Plan Failed

The succession plan German Chancellor Angela Merkel carefully set into motion one year ago collapsed Monday when her preferred replacement , Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer , abruptly announced she would resign as leader of the Christian Democratic Union ( CDU ) party .
The only remaining certainty in German politics is that Merkel isn ’ t running for reelection .
Everything else—the date of the next election , the platforms of the major parties , the candidates themselves—has been subsumed into the general confusion of Merkel ’ s extended lame duck reign .
Here ’ s a brief rundown of how Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ here—and where it may be heading next .
Kramp-Karrenbauer has been a minor player in national German politics for most of her career .
That was still the case during the refugee crisis of 2015 , when Merkel famously responded to the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Middle Eastern migrants on Germany ’ s doorstep with a temporary open-door policy .
That decision opened up new divisions over migration in German politics—and within Merkel ’ s own center-right CDU party .
By 2018 , those internal divisions had become impossible for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Kramp-Karrenbauer became her solution for managing her exit while securing her legacy .
Kramp-Karrenbauer was governor of the small western German state of Saarland when Merkel tapped her to serve as deputy party leader in Berlin .
That provided sufficient runway for Kramp-Karrenbauer to successfully run for party leader less than a year later .
( Merkel then appointed her to her cabinet as defense minister in 2019 . )
Kramp-Karrenbauer ’ s pitch to CDU party members was that she would heal the divisions within the party without ditching Merkel ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between ideology and pragmatism in a way that would satisfy the base without turning off German voters more broadly .
Merkel and Kramp-Karrenbauer seemed to share an ultimate goal : elevating the latter to the chancellery seat eventually vacated by the former .
Kramp-Karrenbauer ’ s resignation on Monday culminated what had been a catastrophic week .
Last Wednesday , in the eastern German state of Thuringia , the CDU broke a postwar taboo by cooperating with the far-right Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) to elevate a new regional governor .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which triggered outrage across the country , was made by the CDU ’ s regional branch—in defiance of Kramp-Karrenbauer , who had expressly recommended against it .
The insubordination continued in the days afterward , as Kramp-Karrenbauer demanded new elections in the state , while local party leaders refused to accede .
Lacking the authority to enforce red lines within her own party , she had little choice but to resign .
She will remain defense minister .
How did things get to that point ?
Although her end came suddenly , Kramp-Karrenbauer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moment she became party leader .
That was partly due to avoidable personal missteps .
More than once , she had to backtrack on public comments—whether on transgender rights or fake news—that were widely interpreted as more inflammatory than she intended .
She also failed to deliver on promises to her party ’ s economically conservative wing .
More fundamentally , however , she failed to develop an effective strategy for her central ambition : resolving her party ’ s division over migration .
It was not for lack of trying .
Over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between her party ’ s culturally conservative factions and its liberal wing .
These efforts had the opposite of their intended effect , with both the far-right and the multiculturalist Greens enjoying rising poll numbers—thus producing deeper grumbling within her own party , especially in eastern Germany , where the AfD ’ s insurgency has threatened to depose the CDU as the largest force on the right .
Still unclear is whether any strategy can succeed where Kramp-Karrenbauer failed .
Who are the other options to take over leadership of the CDU ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ranks who will presumably soon begin competing with one another to succeed her .
The most prominent is Friedrich Merz , who positioned himself as a more conservative alternative to Kramp-Karrenbauer in last year ’ s intraparty primary and only narrowly lost to her in a runoff vote .
Where she promised to mediate between the party ’ s—and the country ’ s—increasingly unruly factions , Merz signaled that the only way forward would be to embrace a principled identity on questions of economic policy and cultural politics , even at the expense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expected to fill the CDU ’ s moderate lane is Armin Laschet , the governor of North Rhine-Westphalia , Germany ’ s most populous state .
The 39-year-old Jens Spahn , Merkel ’ s health minister , is the youngest of the top candidates and may offer a message of generational change that could prove appealing .
Although popular among conservatives , he has also distinguished himself among the broader public as one of the most competent and energetic ministers in a government that has otherwise mostly been marked by malaise .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in for a long wait—a party conference to select the new leader may not happen until December .
How will all this affect Merkel ?
On the most basic level , Kramp-Karrenbauer ’ s resignation may accelerate Merkel ’ s departure from office .
The lack of authority Kramp-Karrenbauer suffered from was partly a reflection of the objective reality that she didn ’ t have ultimate control over government policy .
Any successor is unlikely to want to be in a similar position .
( Any attempt to depose her ahead of schedule @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ruling coalition with Social Democrats , thus triggering early elections . )
More broadly , however , Kramp-Karrenbauer ’ s failure is likely to trigger a reassessment of Merkel ’ s legacy .
Nobody can doubt the basic facts of Merkel ’ s extraordinary run atop German politics .
But a growing number of Germans are questioning why her personal successes no longer translate ( if they ever did ) to the institutions she ’ s been a part of , beginning with her own party .
Kramp-Karrenbauer ran for the party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ changing circumstances in the country .
Merz , however , blamed Merkel ’ s entire theory of leadership : The chancellor ’ s strategy of avoiding conflict and controversy on issues ranging from public spending to cultural change , Merz argues , had the effect of repressing political desires that eventually reemerged in the form of the reactionary far-right AfD .
It ’ s clear the CDU has grown tired of Merkel ’ s leadership .
The question now is whether that will result in the party pursuing an entirely new political direction @

The succession plan German Chancellor Angela Merkel carefully set into motion one year ago collapsed Monday when her preferred replacement, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, abruptly announced she would resign as leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party. The only remaining certainty in German politics is that Merkel isn’t running for reelection. Everything else—the date of the next election, the platforms of the major parties, the candidates themselves—has been subsumed into the general confusion of Merkel’s extended lame duck reign. Here’s a brief rundown of how Europe’s most powerful country ended up here—and where it may be heading next.
The succession plan German Chancellor Angela Merkel carefully set into motion one year ago collapsed Monday when her preferred replacement, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, abruptly announced she would resign as leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party. The only remaining certainty in German politics is that Merkel isn’t running for reelection. Everything else—the date of the next election, the platforms of the major parties, the candidates themselves—has been subsumed into the general confusion of Merkel’s extended lame duck reign. Here’s a brief rundown of how Europe’s most powerful country ended up here—and where it may be heading next.
Who is Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer?
Kramp-Karrenbauer has been a minor player in national German politics for most of her career. That was still the case during the refugee crisis of 2015, when Merkel famously responded to the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Middle Eastern migrants on Germany’s doorstep with a temporary open-door policy. That decision opened up new divisions over migration in German politics—and within Merkel’s own center-right CDU party. By 2018, those internal divisions had become impossible for the chancellor to tame on her own, and Kramp-Karrenbauer became her solution for managing her exit while securing her legacy.
Kramp-Karrenbauer was governor of the small western German state of Saarland when Merkel tapped her to serve as deputy party leader in Berlin. That provided sufficient runway for Kramp-Karrenbauer to successfully run for party leader less than a year later. (Merkel then appointed her to her cabinet as defense minister in 2019.) Kramp-Karrenbauer’s pitch to CDU party members was that she would heal the divisions within the party without ditching Merkel’s broadly popular political agenda, balancing between ideology and pragmatism in a way that would satisfy the base without turning off German voters more broadly. Merkel and Kramp-Karrenbauer seemed to share an ultimate goal: elevating the latter to the chancellery seat eventually vacated by the former.
What triggered her resignation?
Kramp-Karrenbauer’s resignation on Monday culminated what had been a catastrophic week. Last Wednesday, in the eastern German state of Thuringia, the CDU broke a postwar taboo by cooperating with the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) to elevate a new regional governor. The decision to participate in that selection, which triggered outrage across the country, was made by the CDU’s regional branch—in defiance of Kramp-Karrenbauer, who had expressly recommended against it. The insubordination continued in the days afterward, as Kramp-Karrenbauer demanded new elections in the state, while local party leaders refused to accede. Lacking the authority to enforce red lines within her own party, she had little choice but to resign. She will remain defense minister.
How did things get to that point?
Although her end came suddenly, Kramp-Karrenbauer’s authority began dwindling from the moment she became party leader. That was partly due to avoidable personal missteps. More than once, she had to backtrack on public comments—whether on transgender rights or fake news—that were widely interpreted as more inflammatory than she intended. She also failed to deliver on promises to her party’s economically conservative wing.
More fundamentally, however, she failed to develop an effective strategy for her central ambition: resolving her party’s division over migration. It was not for lack of trying. Over and again, she tried to mediate between her party’s culturally conservative factions and its liberal wing. These efforts had the opposite of their intended effect, with both the far-right and the multiculturalist Greens enjoying rising poll numbers—thus producing deeper grumbling within her own party, especially in eastern Germany, where the AfD’s insurgency has threatened to depose the CDU as the largest force on the right. Still unclear is whether any strategy can succeed where Kramp-Karrenbauer failed.
Who are the other options to take over leadership of the CDU?
Kramp-Karrenbauer had several rivals within the party ranks who will presumably soon begin competing with one another to succeed her. The most prominent is Friedrich Merz, who positioned himself as a more conservative alternative to Kramp-Karrenbauer in last year’s intraparty primary and only narrowly lost to her in a runoff vote. Where she promised to mediate between the party’s—and the country’s—increasingly unruly factions, Merz signaled that the only way forward would be to embrace a principled identity on questions of economic policy and cultural politics, even at the expense of polarization.
The candidate most widely expected to fill the CDU’s moderate lane is Armin Laschet, the governor of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state. The 39-year-old Jens Spahn, Merkel’s health minister, is the youngest of the top candidates and may offer a message of generational change that could prove appealing. Although popular among conservatives, he has also distinguished himself among the broader public as one of the most competent and energetic ministers in a government that has otherwise mostly been marked by malaise.
In any case, the CDU is likely in for a long wait—a party conference to select the new leader may not happen until December.
How will all this affect Merkel?
On the most basic level, Kramp-Karrenbauer’s resignation may accelerate Merkel’s departure from office. The lack of authority Kramp-Karrenbauer suffered from was partly a reflection of the objective reality that she didn’t have ultimate control over government policy. Any successor is unlikely to want to be in a similar position. (Any attempt to depose her ahead of schedule would almost certainly cause the collapse of the ruling coalition with Social Democrats, thus triggering early elections.)
More broadly, however, Kramp-Karrenbauer’s failure is likely to trigger a reassessment of Merkel’s legacy. Nobody can doubt the basic facts of Merkel’s extraordinary run atop German politics. But a growing number of Germans are questioning why her personal successes no longer translate (if they ever did) to the institutions she’s been a part of, beginning with her own party. Kramp-Karrenbauer ran for the party leadership promising tactical changes in response to changing circumstances in the country. Merz, however, blamed Merkel’s entire theory of leadership: The chancellor’s strategy of avoiding conflict and controversy on issues ranging from public spending to cultural change, Merz argues, had the effect of repressing political desires that eventually reemerged in the form of the reactionary far-right AfD.
It’s clear the CDU has grown tired of Merkel’s leadership. The question now is whether that will result in the party pursuing an entirely new political direction.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-10--Filipinos Turn on Duterte as Coronavirus Fears Spread

MANILA , Philippines—On Feb. 2 , the Philippines announced the first death outside China from the coronavirus , which originated in the central Chinese city of Wuhan late last year .
The news set into motion a considerable public outcry targeting popular Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and pried open the wounds of a long history of racist treatment toward those of Chinese heritage .
Duterte ’ s perceived reluctance to respond quickly to the virus , which critics saw as tied to his administration ’ s warm relations with the Chinese government , led the hashtag # OustDuterte to trend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only shaken public trust in Duterte ’ s government , which remains broadly popular , but it has also worsened the already fraught relationship between the majority of ethnic Filipinos and the country ’ s sizable community of Chinese Filipinos , known locally as Tsinoys , along with hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals residing in the Philippines .
While Chinese Filipinos are well integrated into Philippine society , resentment sometimes arises due to their relative wealth and their traditional presence among the nation ’ s elite .
Duterte announced an entry ban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jan. 31 , one day after saying he did not want to restrict the entry of Chinese nationals .
Two days later , the ban was expanded to all foreigners traveling from China , Hong Kong , and Macau .
The travel restrictions , however , came long after two infected Chinese nationals had arrived in Manila from Wuhan via Hong Kong on Jan. 21 and traveled to three Philippine provinces before being hospitalized on Jan. 25 .
One of the patients , a 44-year-old man from Wuhan , died from the virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , three cases had been confirmed in the Philippines , and 215 people remain under watch for possible infections .
The anti-government backlash was sparked in the days before the travel ban .
As Filipinos fretted about the virus ’ s arrival , Health Secretary Francisco Duque rejected the idea of a temporary ban on Chinese tourists , saying it would spark “ political and diplomatic repercussions.
” The government ’ s slow response—and the public outcry over it—has ignited long-standing perceptions that Duterte is soft on China at the expense of protecting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s sovereignty , said Herman Kraft , an associate professor of political science at the University of the Philippines Diliman .
The popular president has faced criticism for a weak response to Chinese naval incursions into Philippine-claimed areas of the South China Sea , along with allowing China to build artificial islands in the South China Sea and signing high-interest loan deals with Chinese companies for big-ticket infrastructure projects .
“ It feeds impressions that more people who might carry the virus could have entered the country because the president was more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than protecting Filipinos , ” Kraft said .
Duterte recognized that calls to ban entry to travelers from China “ threatened the goodwill he had built ” with Chinese leadership , Kraft said , contrasting Duterte ’ s hesitance to implement a travel ban with his plan to end an agreement allowing visiting U.S. forces legal status in the Philippines after the United States canceled the visa of Ronald Dela Rosa , a senator who led the national police during the peak of the deadly drug war .
The online response to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but has spawned online misinformation racially targeting people of Chinese ethnicity , mirroring similar trends throughout the rest of the world—including Indonesia , which also has a large Chinese community .
For some Philippine politicians , the virus isn ’ t the real enemy .
At a Tuesday Senate hearing to discuss government responses to the coronavirus—the culmination of an effort to combat the virus that the public already sees as clumsy and slow-moving—Sen .
Christopher “ Bong ” Go lashed out at internet users peddling fake news , saying they should be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Senate President Vicente Sotto III used his time to show a debunked video accusing Western countries of developing the coronavirus as a biowarfare weapon against China , calling the conspiracy theory “ very interesting , if not revealing.
” Teodoro Locsin Jr. , the foreign secretary , criticized the video in response and simultaneously praised the Chinese government ’ s handling of the coronavirus , saying the disease was “ proving the resilience and strength of China.
” But the praise did not align with the Philippine public ’ s distrust of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The virus response has played into that distrust .
On Jan. 26 , Sen. Richard Gordon , the CEO of the Philippine Red Cross , said $ 1.4 million worth of Philippine-made face masks had been sent to China to help combat the spread of coronavirus .
Filipinos quickly noted that the government had failed to provide masks to those affected by the Taal volcano eruption in January .
There are no plans to hand out free masks to the public , according to presidential spokesman Salvador Panelo , who said on Jan. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ face masks for free ] if there ’ s none ?
” In Davao City , the hometown of Duterte , sidewalk peddlers hawked masks at inflated prices as pharmacies posted signs saying they were out of stock .
Scheduled flights from Jinjiang , in China ’ s Fujian province , entered Davao as late as Jan. 29 , infuriating residents .
On Saturday , the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that Chinese visitors had entered a tourist destination in Mindanao without going through a mandatory 14-day quarantine .
Tyrone Velez , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Davao , said the city had begun to prioritize mainland Chinese business over local Tsinoy enterprise since Duterte , who was formerly the mayor of Davao , became president .
The resentment toward Duterte ’ s rapprochement with China , he added , has only boiled over during the coronavirus outbreak .
“ There seems to be no one in government in control , even just simply showing a presence that is calm or on top of the situation , ” Velez said .
This left Tsinoys , many of whom champion trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an awkward position .
Henry Lim Bon Liong , the president of the Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry , said in a statement that Filipinos should refrain from “ anti-China racist stereotypes ” and instead praise China and its government for its transparency and “ remarkable political will , ” noting its importance as an “ ally and long-standing trade partner.
” Tsinoys , who make up as much as 25 percent of the country ’ s population , are often caught in the middle when anti-China sentiments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not as acute as in some Southeast Asia countries , such as Indonesia , and the community is generally well integrated , but Tsinoy citizens come in for scrutiny when Beijing and Manila clash .
The Chinese Filipino business community , many of whose members are descendants of merchants from Fujian , has traditionally promoted economic and cultural ties with China , leaving it vulnerable to critics of Duterte ’ s China policy and subjected to essential loyalty tests by some Filipino writers and columnists .
The vast majority of Chinese Filipinos consider @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in disputes with China .
However , when Tsinoy organizations are perceived as mixing accusations of racism with calls of support for China , it “ ignores the real concerns of Filipinos over how China has treated the Philippines , ” Kraft said , citing territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea , as Filipinos call the South China Sea , and the image of Duterte as subservient to the whims of Chinese leadership—famously summarized by internet users in a popular meme portraying Winnie the Pooh , representing China , eagerly eating out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Many Chinese nationals also work in the Philippines , with insiders estimating that around 100,000 to 250,000 Chinese work illegally in its online gambling industry alone .
The public reputation of some Chinese for what one regulator called “ unruly behavior , ” along with sentiments that Chinese nationals are taking jobs from Filipinos , renders them a frequent target of racism in the Philippines .
On Jan. 31 , Manila ’ s Adamson University ordered all its students from China to self-quarantine for 14 days “ to ensure a healthy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next day , saying the quarantine order covered those who had traveled in affected countries within the last month .
A Facebook post lauding a group of Chinese nationals distributing free face masks in Manila was inundated with racist comments calling Chinese “ thieves ” of Philippine wealth and telling them to go back to China .
Marietta Subong , an actress and comedian who goes by Pokwang , released a statement on Instagram apologizing on behalf of Filipinos for the “ harsh words and the rejection ” directed toward Chinese tourists and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suit .
Duterte , responding on Feb. 3 to online calls to ban all Chinese nationals from the Philippines , said blaming Chinese for the spread of the virus was “ xenophobia.
” For many Filipinos , including the Tsinoy community , the hope is that the rapidly spreading coronavirus and the recent surge of anti-Chinese racism can both be contained .
“ We should act as one , ” Teresita Ang See of the Tsinoy organization Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran said in a statement .
“ The ‘ you vs. us ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadlier and cause more permanent damage than the virus we are now fighting collectively as one humanity .
”

MANILA, Philippines—On Feb. 2, the Philippines announced the first death outside China from the coronavirus, which originated in the central Chinese city of Wuhan late last year. The news set into motion a considerable public outcry targeting popular Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and pried open the wounds of a long history of racist treatment toward those of Chinese heritage.
MANILA, Philippines—On Feb. 2, the Philippines announced the first death outside China from the coronavirus, which originated in the central Chinese city of Wuhan late last year. The news set into motion a considerable public outcry targeting popular Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and pried open the wounds of a long history of racist treatment toward those of Chinese heritage.
Duterte’s perceived reluctance to respond quickly to the virus, which critics saw as tied to his administration’s warm relations with the Chinese government, led the hashtag #OustDuterte to trend on Twitter. The virus has not only shaken public trust in Duterte’s government, which remains broadly popular, but it has also worsened the already fraught relationship between the majority of ethnic Filipinos and the country’s sizable community of Chinese Filipinos, known locally as Tsinoys, along with hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals residing in the Philippines. While Chinese Filipinos are well integrated into Philippine society, resentment sometimes arises due to their relative wealth and their traditional presence among the nation’s elite.
Duterte announced an entry ban on Chinese travelers from affected areas on Jan. 31, one day after saying he did not want to restrict the entry of Chinese nationals. Two days later, the ban was expanded to all foreigners traveling from China, Hong Kong, and Macau. The travel restrictions, however, came long after two infected Chinese nationals had arrived in Manila from Wuhan via Hong Kong on Jan. 21 and traveled to three Philippine provinces before being hospitalized on Jan. 25. One of the patients, a 44-year-old man from Wuhan, died from the virus on Feb. 1.
As of Friday, three cases had been confirmed in the Philippines, and 215 people remain under watch for possible infections.
The anti-government backlash was sparked in the days before the travel ban. As Filipinos fretted about the virus’s arrival, Health Secretary Francisco Duque rejected the idea of a temporary ban on Chinese tourists, saying it would spark “political and diplomatic repercussions.”
The government’s slow response—and the public outcry over it—has ignited long-standing perceptions that Duterte is soft on China at the expense of protecting the rights of Filipinos and the country’s sovereignty, said Herman Kraft, an associate professor of political science at the University of the Philippines Diliman.
The popular president has faced criticism for a weak response to Chinese naval incursions into Philippine-claimed areas of the South China Sea, along with allowing China to build artificial islands in the South China Sea and signing high-interest loan deals with Chinese companies for big-ticket infrastructure projects.
“It feeds impressions that more people who might carry the virus could have entered the country because the president was more concerned with hurting China’s feelings than protecting Filipinos,” Kraft said.
Duterte recognized that calls to ban entry to travelers from China “threatened the goodwill he had built” with Chinese leadership, Kraft said, contrasting Duterte’s hesitance to implement a travel ban with his plan to end an agreement allowing visiting U.S. forces legal status in the Philippines after the United States canceled the visa of Ronald Dela Rosa, a senator who led the national police during the peak of the deadly drug war.
The online response to the coronavirus outbreak has not only ensnared Duterte but has spawned online misinformation racially targeting people of Chinese ethnicity, mirroring similar trends throughout the rest of the world—including Indonesia, which also has a large Chinese community.
For some Philippine politicians, the virus isn’t the real enemy. At a Tuesday Senate hearing to discuss government responses to the coronavirus—the culmination of an effort to combat the virus that the public already sees as clumsy and slow-moving—Sen. Christopher “Bong” Go lashed out at internet users peddling fake news, saying they should be “quarantined.” Later in the hearing, Senate President Vicente Sotto III used his time to show a debunked video accusing Western countries of developing the coronavirus as a biowarfare weapon against China, calling the conspiracy theory “very interesting, if not revealing.”
Teodoro Locsin Jr., the foreign secretary, criticized the video in response and simultaneously praised the Chinese government’s handling of the coronavirus, saying the disease was “proving the resilience and strength of China.” But the praise did not align with the Philippine public’s distrust of China and its closeness to Duterte.
The virus response has played into that distrust. On Jan. 26, Sen. Richard Gordon, the CEO of the Philippine Red Cross, said $1.4 million worth of Philippine-made face masks had been sent to China to help combat the spread of coronavirus. Filipinos quickly noted that the government had failed to provide masks to those affected by the Taal volcano eruption in January. There are no plans to hand out free masks to the public, according to presidential spokesman Salvador Panelo, who said on Jan. 31: “How can you give [face masks for free] if there’s none?”
In Davao City, the hometown of Duterte, sidewalk peddlers hawked masks at inflated prices as pharmacies posted signs saying they were out of stock. Scheduled flights from Jinjiang, in China’s Fujian province, entered Davao as late as Jan. 29, infuriating residents. On Saturday, the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that Chinese visitors had entered a tourist destination in Mindanao without going through a mandatory 14-day quarantine.
Tyrone Velez, a Tsinoy and a columnist for the SunStar Davao, said the city had begun to prioritize mainland Chinese business over local Tsinoy enterprise since Duterte, who was formerly the mayor of Davao, became president. The resentment toward Duterte’s rapprochement with China, he added, has only boiled over during the coronavirus outbreak.
“There seems to be no one in government in control, even just simply showing a presence that is calm or on top of the situation,” Velez said.
This left Tsinoys, many of whom champion trade with China but identify as Filipinos, in an awkward position. Henry Lim Bon Liong, the president of the Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, said in a statement that Filipinos should refrain from “anti-China racist stereotypes” and instead praise China and its government for its transparency and “remarkable political will,” noting its importance as an “ally and long-standing trade partner.”
Tsinoys, who make up as much as 25 percent of the country’s population, are often caught in the middle when anti-China sentiments wash over the Philippines. Tensions are not as acute as in some Southeast Asia countries, such as Indonesia, and the community is generally well integrated, but Tsinoy citizens come in for scrutiny when Beijing and Manila clash. The Chinese Filipino business community, many of whose members are descendants of merchants from Fujian, has traditionally promoted economic and cultural ties with China, leaving it vulnerable to critics of Duterte’s China policy and subjected to essential loyalty tests by some Filipino writers and columnists.
The vast majority of Chinese Filipinos consider themselves Filipinos first and support the country in disputes with China. However, when Tsinoy organizations are perceived as mixing accusations of racism with calls of support for China, it “ignores the real concerns of Filipinos over how China has treated the Philippines,” Kraft said, citing territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea, as Filipinos call the South China Sea, and the image of Duterte as subservient to the whims of Chinese leadership—famously summarized by internet users in a popular meme portraying Winnie the Pooh, representing China, eagerly eating out of the honey pot of Philippine sovereignty.
Many Chinese nationals also work in the Philippines, with insiders estimating that around 100,000 to 250,000 Chinese work illegally in its online gambling industry alone. The public reputation of some Chinese for what one regulator called “unruly behavior,” along with sentiments that Chinese nationals are taking jobs from Filipinos, renders them a frequent target of racism in the Philippines.
On Jan. 31, Manila’s Adamson University ordered all its students from China to self-quarantine for 14 days “to ensure a healthy and virus-free environment.” The school apologized the next day, saying the quarantine order covered those who had traveled in affected countries within the last month. A Facebook post lauding a group of Chinese nationals distributing free face masks in Manila was inundated with racist comments calling Chinese “thieves” of Philippine wealth and telling them to go back to China.
Marietta Subong, an actress and comedian who goes by Pokwang, released a statement on Instagram apologizing on behalf of Filipinos for the “harsh words and the rejection” directed toward Chinese tourists and citizens. Other public figures have followed suit. Duterte, responding on Feb. 3 to online calls to ban all Chinese nationals from the Philippines, said blaming Chinese for the spread of the virus was “xenophobia.”
For many Filipinos, including the Tsinoy community, the hope is that the rapidly spreading coronavirus and the recent surge of anti-Chinese racism can both be contained.
“We should act as one,” Teresita Ang See of the Tsinoy organization Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran said in a statement. “The ‘you vs. us’ attitude, finger-pointing, and racism are deadlier and cause more permanent damage than the virus we are now fighting collectively as one humanity.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-10--Pentagon to Roll Out $705 Billion Budget

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : The Pentagon braces for budget cuts , Iraq and Russia are exploring deeper defense ties , and what to make of Iran ’ s failed satellite launch .
An announcement before we get started : Security Brief is getting an upgrade and moving to Thursdays beginning Feb. 20 .
The newsletter will now include an expanded section on industry moves , plus a look at major events in the week ahead .
Premium subscribers and FP Insiders can also get email alerts as soon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You can sign up for the alerts here .
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The Department of Defense ’ s full proposal will be released along with the rest of the White House budget for 2021 later today .
But leaked details indicate that the department is bracing for tough tradeoffs in the years to come , including cuts to legacy aircraft and the Navy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cuts .
The overall budget proposal will reportedly boost funding for nuclear weapons such as the Air Force ’ s new intercontinental ballistic missiles and provide more money for research on hypersonic weapons and the Space Force .
In order to move to new technology , the services will begin retiring legacy platforms : The Air Force , for example , will divest hundreds of old fighters and bombers , as well as Global Hawk drones , Lara Seligman scooped last week .
Navy slashes ships .
One surprise in the Pentagon ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is slashing spending on new ships by about $ 4 billion .
The service is calling for procurement of 44 ships through 2025 instead of the 55 projected last year .
The overall decline starts this year , with the Navy asking to buy just eight new vessels , down from 12 in the current budget .
Last year , the Navy projected asking for 10 ships this year .
What about 355 ?
The news comes even as Trump puts pressure on the Navy to reach his goal of a 355-ship fleet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Defense News , Defense Secretary Mark Esper attempted to square the circle , stressing that he is “ fully committed ” to 355 ships .
To get there , the Navy will have to fundamentally reshape itself around smaller , less expensive vessels .
Trump impeachment witnesses sacked .
The ink was barely dry on on Trump ’ s impeachment acquittal when he moved against those drawn into the trial .
On Friday evening , the White House escorted Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman , a military officer serving on the National Security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the trial , out of the building .
His brother , an ethics lawyer for the NSC , was also removed from his post .
Both are expected to transfer back to the Pentagon .
Hours later , Trump sacked his ambassador to the European Union , Gordon Sondland , another witness in the trial .
There is no word yet on whether other witnesses , including State Department officials , will face reprisals or retaliation .
On Monday , Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer sent a letter to inspector generals across the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whistleblowers reporting presidential misconduct have faced retaliation .
Troubling FBI surveillance .
An FBI report obtained by Yahoo News reveals that state and local law enforcement agencies are collecting private information of individuals already on the FBI ’ s terror watch list , despite a federal judge ruling in September that the list violates basic constitutional protections .
The size of the watch list has ballooned to over 1.1 million people since it was created in 2003 , leading to accusations that some—or most—people on it are not involved in terrorism at all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have simply found a workaround to continue collecting data .
Deepening Iraq-Russia ties ?
Iraq ’ s defense ministry said the country was exploring deepening its ties with Russia .
The meeting comes amid worsening relations between Iraq and United States following the assassination of Iranian military commander Gen. Qassem Suleimani .
Powerful Shiite political parties called for a full withdrawal of U.S. troops in the immediate aftermath of the killing .
According to a senior Iraqi military official , Russia was among several states that opened a dialogue with Iraq over strengthening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Iranian satellite fails to reach orbit .
On Sunday , Iran launched a satellite that failed to reach orbit , in addition to unveiling a new short-range missile .
U.S. officials have warned in the past that the missile technology used to launch satellites into orbit could also be used to launch nuclear warheads .
From New York to Washington .
Karen Pierce , the current U.K. ambassador to the United Nations , was recently appointed U.K. ambassador to the United States .
Pierce is considered one of the most experienced British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her the first woman to serve in the role .
The race to evacuate U.S. citizens from Wuhan .
For two weeks , a group of U.S. officials in the State Department have been working around the clock on logistics to evacuate U.S. citizens stranded in the region of China hit by the coronavirus .
The Washington Post ’ s Carol Morello wrote an inside account of how it ’ s happening .
NATO popularity contest .
Despite growing transatlantic tensions , a majority of citizens in NATO ’ s member states hold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to a new Pew Research Center poll .
The range of opinion varies widely by country , with Poland topping the survey at 82 percent in favor of NATO and only 21 percent in favor in Turkey .
Supply and demand .
Iran ’ s relations with the United States and Israel aren ’ t exactly on the best of terms these days .
For one factory in Iran , that means business is booming .
The factory produces American and Israeli flags—so demonstrators at pro-government rallies can burn them .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. flags has been tripled , ” the factory owner said .
“ What eventually happens to my products is on its end user.
” For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: The Pentagon braces for budget cuts , Iraq and Russia are exploring deeper defense ties, and what to make of Iran’s failed satellite launch .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: The Pentagon braces for budget cuts, Iraq and Russia are exploring deeper defense ties, and what to make of Iran’s failed satellite launch.
An announcement before we get started: Security Brief is getting an upgrade and moving to Thursdays beginning Feb. 20. The newsletter will now include an expanded section on industry moves, plus a look at major events in the week ahead.
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What to Expect in the DoD’s Budget Proposal Today the Pentagon is expected to roll out a $705.4 billion budget request for fiscal year 2021, a slight decrease from last year that indicates the department is resigned to an end to the growth it has enjoyed so far under U.S. President Donald Trump. Congress appropriated $712.6 billion for the department in fiscal year 2020, which ends on Oct. 1.
The Department of Defense’s full proposal will be released along with the rest of the White House budget for 2021 later today. But leaked details indicate that the department is bracing for tough tradeoffs in the years to come, including cuts to legacy aircraft and the Navy’s ship procurement.
Bracing for cuts. The overall budget proposal will reportedly boost funding for nuclear weapons such as the Air Force’s new intercontinental ballistic missiles and provide more money for research on hypersonic weapons and the Space Force. In order to move to new technology, the services will begin retiring legacy platforms: The Air Force, for example, will divest hundreds of old fighters and bombers, as well as Global Hawk drones, Lara Seligman scooped last week.
Navy slashes ships. One surprise in the Pentagon’s budget request is that the Navy is slashing spending on new ships by about $4 billion. The service is calling for procurement of 44 ships through 2025 instead of the 55 projected last year. The overall decline starts this year, with the Navy asking to buy just eight new vessels, down from 12 in the current budget. Last year, the Navy projected asking for 10 ships this year.
What about 355? The news comes even as Trump puts pressure on the Navy to reach his goal of a 355-ship fleet sooner than planned. In an interview with Defense News, Defense Secretary Mark Esper attempted to square the circle, stressing that he is “fully committed” to 355 ships. To get there, the Navy will have to fundamentally reshape itself around smaller, less expensive vessels.
What We’re Watching
Trump impeachment witnesses sacked. The ink was barely dry on on Trump’s impeachment acquittal when he moved against those drawn into the trial. On Friday evening, the White House escorted Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, a military officer serving on the National Security Council (NSC) who testified in the trial, out of the building. His brother, an ethics lawyer for the NSC, was also removed from his post. Both are expected to transfer back to the Pentagon.
Hours later, Trump sacked his ambassador to the European Union, Gordon Sondland, another witness in the trial. There is no word yet on whether other witnesses, including State Department officials, will face reprisals or retaliation. On Monday, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer sent a letter to inspector generals across the government pushing them to dig into whether whistleblowers reporting presidential misconduct have faced retaliation.
Troubling FBI surveillance. An FBI report obtained by Yahoo News reveals that state and local law enforcement agencies are collecting private information of individuals already on the FBI’s terror watch list, despite a federal judge ruling in September that the list violates basic constitutional protections. The size of the watch list has ballooned to over 1.1 million people since it was created in 2003, leading to accusations that some—or most—people on it are not involved in terrorism at all. The FBI report suggests that officials have simply found a workaround to continue collecting data.
Deepening Iraq-Russia ties? Iraq’s defense ministry said the country was exploring deepening its ties with Russia. The meeting comes amid worsening relations between Iraq and United States following the assassination of Iranian military commander Gen. Qassem Suleimani. Powerful Shiite political parties called for a full withdrawal of U.S. troops in the immediate aftermath of the killing. According to a senior Iraqi military official, Russia was among several states that opened a dialogue with Iraq over strengthening military ties after Suleimani’s assasssination.
Iranian satellite fails to reach orbit. On Sunday, Iran launched a satellite that failed to reach orbit, in addition to unveiling a new short-range missile. U.S. officials have warned in the past that the missile technology used to launch satellites into orbit could also be used to launch nuclear warheads.
Movers and Shakers
From New York to Washington. Karen Pierce, the current U.K. ambassador to the United Nations, was recently appointed U.K. ambassador to the United States. Pierce is considered one of the most experienced British diplomats, and her new appointment makes her the first woman to serve in the role.
Foreign Policy Recommends
The race to evacuate U.S. citizens from Wuhan. For two weeks, a group of U.S. officials in the State Department have been working around the clock on logistics to evacuate U.S. citizens stranded in the region of China hit by the coronavirus. The Washington Post’s Carol Morello wrote an inside account of how it’s happening.
NATO popularity contest. Despite growing transatlantic tensions, a majority of citizens in NATO’s member states hold a favorable view of the alliance, according to a new Pew Research Center poll. The range of opinion varies widely by country, with Poland topping the survey at 82 percent in favor of NATO and only 21 percent in favor in Turkey.
Odds and Ends
Supply and demand. Iran’s relations with the United States and Israel aren’t exactly on the best of terms these days. For one factory in Iran, that means business is booming. The factory produces American and Israeli flags—so demonstrators at pro-government rallies can burn them. “In recent years, the production of the U.S. flags has been tripled,” the factory owner said. “What eventually happens to my products is on its end user.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Dan Haverty contributed to this report.