foreignpolicy--2020-03-09--Why This Oil Crash Is Different

Why This Oil Crash Is Different

Why This Oil Crash Is Different When Saudi Arabia , Russia , and other oil-producing countries met in Vienna last week , they debated who should slash oil output to offset the collapse in demand due to the coronavirus outbreak .
When the meeting was over , the answer was clear : America .
Last week ’ s drama between Saudi Arabia and Russia , the world ’ s two largest oil producers after the United States , made for a historic meeting of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries ( OPEC ) that may cripple the organization ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the shale revolution in the process .
While past oil shocks have been driven by either supply or demand , the price collapse of 2020 is highly unusual in oil market history : It results from a massive demand shock and a huge supply overhang at the same time .
With the economic slowdown from the coronavirus outbreak projected to cause the first annual drop in oil demand since the global financial crisis in 2009 , oil prices had already plunged 20 percent in the lead up to last week ’ s meeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ includes both OPEC members and several other oil-producing countries , most notably Russia .
As the extent of the demand drop became clear , Saudi Arabia pushed the other OPEC+ countries to agree to the steepest supply cuts in more than a decade .
Russia had made clear its ambivalence about cutting supply , given concerns about whether cuts would be effective in supporting prices , and Russia ‘ s reluctance to throw a lifeline to U.S. shale oil producers struggling under low prices and high debt .
Last month , Russia had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cut output .
Still , it was widely expected that Russia , in the end , would agree to the proposed supply cuts to keep oil prices from crashing .
On the eve of the Friday meeting , however , Saudi Arabia surprised its partners by publicly pushing for steeper and longer production cuts than had been expected .
Moscow felt Saudi Arabia was trying to jawbone it into agreeing to larger production cuts—by putting Russia in the position of either acquiescing or watching oil prices collapse .
Russia called Saudi Arabia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negotiations , ministers left Vienna without a deal .
Oil prices cratered .
The following day , Saudi Arabia responded with a shock-and-awe campaign seemingly intended to remind Moscow just how much economic pain the kingdom can imposeSaudi Arabia responded with a shock-and-awe campaign to remind Moscow just how much economic pain the kingdom can impose .
on other oil producers .
Saudi Arabia slashed its crude oil prices and promised to ramp up oil output .
When oil markets opened Sunday evening , prices plummeted to half what they had been in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cooperation—and the ensuing price war—will have significant ramifications .
First , Saudi Arabia ’ s decision to tank the oil market is a big gamble if it intends to bring Russia back to the negotiating table .
The problem for the kingdom is that Russia is more resilient to lower prices than it is , having added considerably to its foreign exchange reserves while Saudi Arabia ’ s fiscal cushion has dwindled since the 2014 oil price collapse .
Saudi Arabia still has ample financial reserves , but a prolonged period of low @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undermine investor confidence , and lead to speculation about the devaluation of the Saudi riyal .
If these factors force Saudi Arabia to reverse course before Russia capitulates , the kingdom ‘ s oil policy risks losing credibility .
Second , the collapse of the OPEC+ production agreement in Vienna risks long-lasting damage to the cartel .
In recent years , OPEC has already been challenged by the surge of shale oil output and decline in OPEC ’ s share of global oil supply .
At the same time , a combination of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries has meant that only a few OPEC members—essentially Saudi Arabia , the United Arab Emirates , and Kuwait—have been willing or able to cut production at all .
Qatar , another major producer , quit the cartel a little over a year ago .
For all these reasons , Saudi Arabia has viewed the participation of non-OPEC countries , especially Russia , as critical to the cartel ’ s success .
Yet allowing a nonmember of OPEC to scuttle a deal to which all OPEC countries had agreed is a blow to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the possible withdrawal of Russia from the cooperation agreement risks undermining the organization ’ s ability to manage oil markets effectively .
Third , the biggest loser in the Saudi-Russian spat may well end up being the U.S. shale oil industry.The biggest loser in the Saudi-Russian spat may well end up being the U.S. shale oil industry .
Many shale producers have hedged their production , but if the current U.S. benchmark oil price of around $ 30 per barrel persists for an extended time , there will be widespread bankruptcies .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lucky just to maintain production levels and dividends .
The U.S. rig count will fall dramatically .
Because shale oil supply declines far more steeply than conventional production , U.S. production levels will thus begin falling sharply as well .
Pioneer Natural Resources CEO Scott Sheffield estimates U.S. oil output will fall by more than 1 million barrels per day by next year if prices remain where they are today .
Of course , the demise of shale was predicted after the 2014 oil price collapse , as well .
Now as then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once the oil price recovers , since the reserves are still there .
But this time , the impact of the price collapse may last longer and cause permanent damage .
Even before this weekend , shale oil production growth was already projected to slow sharply due to lower oil prices and much tighter capital constraints as investors grew skeptical of the sector due to its poor profitability .
Bankruptcies would lead to consolidation and result in stronger shale companies , but would also weed out many companies that have been pursuing production @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As a result , this oil price war may impair shale ’ s ability to grow as quickly in the future as it has in the past .
Fourth , this oil price war reveals that the shale revolution brings the United States not only significant economic and geopolitical strengths , but new vulnerabilities as well .
Part of Russia ’ s motivation for spiking oil prices was not only its frustration with curbing output just to watch U.S. shale grow , but also reportedly Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s growing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the recent sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project and a trading arm of Rosneft .
That a key U.S , adversary believed it could inflict pain on the United States by pushing oil prices lower reveals just how much shale has upended traditional patterns of energy geopolitics .
In the same way that China threatened to retaliate for U.S. tariffs by imposing its own tariffs on U.S. natural gas and oil exports , Moscow ’ s move reveals that U.S. “ energy dominance ” has its limits .
Fifth , an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shale will mean far different winners and losers than in the past .
Oil-producing regions of the U.S. will be hit much harder economically : not just corporate investment and family incomes , but the fiscal base of local communities , affecting education , infrastructure , and other public services .
With the United States now importing about as much oil as it exports , the benefits of lower oil prices to consumers ( at the gas pump , for example ) roughly cancels out the harm to oil producers and workers .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ little to boost U.S. gross domestic product—a far cry from the economic lift the United States would have received from an oil price drop of this magnitude a decade ago .
Given the impact of gasoline prices on voters ’ pocket books , Putin ’ s effort to hurt the United States by cratering prices may end up helping U.S. President Donald Trump in an election year .
But the political benefits of lower oil prices for an incumbent president are hard to see when that price collapse is driven by an economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ restrict U.S. oil production and exports , their stance may prove less popular when U.S. supply is falling , the country ‘ s oil-producing states are hurting , and imports are starting to rise .
By launching a historic oil price war , Russia and Saudi Arabia are now engaged in a high-stakes game of chicken to see who blinks first .
Until one of them does , the oil market will rebalance itself largely at the expense of U.S. oil producers .
Meanwhile , consumers in the U.S. and other countries will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OPEC as a cartel are yet to be determined , but its credibility and effectiveness hang in the balance .

When Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other oil-producing countries met in Vienna last week, they debated who should slash oil output to offset the collapse in demand due to the coronavirus outbreak. When the meeting was over, the answer was clear: America.
When Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other oil-producing countries met in Vienna last week, they debated who should slash oil output to offset the collapse in demand due to the coronavirus outbreak. When the meeting was over, the answer was clear: America.
Last week’s drama between Saudi Arabia and Russia, the world’s two largest oil producers after the United States, made for a historic meeting of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that may cripple the organization’s credibility for years to come—and undermine the shale revolution in the process.
While past oil shocks have been driven by either supply or demand, the price collapse of 2020 is highly unusual in oil market history: It results from a massive demand shock and a huge supply overhang at the same time.
With the economic slowdown from the coronavirus outbreak projected to cause the first annual drop in oil demand since the global financial crisis in 2009, oil prices had already plunged 20 percent in the lead up to last week’s meeting of the so-called OPEC+ group, which includes both OPEC members and several other oil-producing countries, most notably Russia. As the extent of the demand drop became clear, Saudi Arabia pushed the other OPEC+ countries to agree to the steepest supply cuts in more than a decade.
Russia had made clear its ambivalence about cutting supply, given concerns about whether cuts would be effective in supporting prices, and Russia‘s reluctance to throw a lifeline to U.S. shale oil producers struggling under low prices and high debt. Last month, Russia had already balked at an emergency meeting to cut output. Still, it was widely expected that Russia, in the end, would agree to the proposed supply cuts to keep oil prices from crashing.
On the eve of the Friday meeting, however, Saudi Arabia surprised its partners by publicly pushing for steeper and longer production cuts than had been expected. Moscow felt Saudi Arabia was trying to jawbone it into agreeing to larger production cuts—by putting Russia in the position of either acquiescing or watching oil prices collapse. Russia called Saudi Arabia’s bluff. After hours of fruitless negotiations, ministers left Vienna without a deal. Oil prices cratered.
The following day, Saudi Arabia responded with a shock-and-awe campaign seemingly intended to remind Moscow just how much economic pain the kingdom can imposeSaudi Arabia responded with a shock-and-awe campaign to remind Moscow just how much economic pain the kingdom can impose. on other oil producers. Saudi Arabia slashed its crude oil prices and promised to ramp up oil output. When oil markets opened Sunday evening, prices plummeted to half what they had been in early January.
The collapse of Saudi-Russian cooperation—and the ensuing price war—will have significant ramifications.
First, Saudi Arabia’s decision to tank the oil market is a big gamble if it intends to bring Russia back to the negotiating table. The problem for the kingdom is that Russia is more resilient to lower prices than it is, having added considerably to its foreign exchange reserves while Saudi Arabia’s fiscal cushion has dwindled since the 2014 oil price collapse. Saudi Arabia still has ample financial reserves, but a prolonged period of low prices will strain the Saudi budget, undermine investor confidence, and lead to speculation about the devaluation of the Saudi riyal. If these factors force Saudi Arabia to reverse course before Russia capitulates, the kingdom‘s oil policy risks losing credibility.
Second, the collapse of the OPEC+ production agreement in Vienna risks long-lasting damage to the cartel. In recent years, OPEC has already been challenged by the surge of shale oil output and decline in OPEC’s share of global oil supply. At the same time, a combination of sanctions and political instability affecting many OPEC countries has meant that only a few OPEC members—essentially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait—have been willing or able to cut production at all. Qatar, another major producer, quit the cartel a little over a year ago. For all these reasons, Saudi Arabia has viewed the participation of non-OPEC countries, especially Russia, as critical to the cartel’s success. Yet allowing a nonmember of OPEC to scuttle a deal to which all OPEC countries had agreed is a blow to the cartel’s credibility, and the possible withdrawal of Russia from the cooperation agreement risks undermining the organization’s ability to manage oil markets effectively.
Third, the biggest loser in the Saudi-Russian spat may well end up being the U.S. shale oil industry.The biggest loser in the Saudi-Russian spat may well end up being the U.S. shale oil industry. Many shale producers have hedged their production, but if the current U.S. benchmark oil price of around $30 per barrel persists for an extended time, there will be widespread bankruptcies. Even companies with stronger balance sheets will be lucky just to maintain production levels and dividends. The U.S. rig count will fall dramatically. Because shale oil supply declines far more steeply than conventional production, U.S. production levels will thus begin falling sharply as well. Pioneer Natural Resources CEO Scott Sheffield estimates U.S. oil output will fall by more than 1 million barrels per day by next year if prices remain where they are today.
Of course, the demise of shale was predicted after the 2014 oil price collapse, as well. Now as then, production will begin to grow again once the oil price recovers, since the reserves are still there. But this time, the impact of the price collapse may last longer and cause permanent damage. Even before this weekend, shale oil production growth was already projected to slow sharply due to lower oil prices and much tighter capital constraints as investors grew skeptical of the sector due to its poor profitability. Bankruptcies would lead to consolidation and result in stronger shale companies, but would also weed out many companies that have been pursuing production growth at all costs despite being uneconomical. As a result, this oil price war may impair shale’s ability to grow as quickly in the future as it has in the past.
Fourth, this oil price war reveals that the shale revolution brings the United States not only significant economic and geopolitical strengths, but new vulnerabilities as well. Part of Russia’s motivation for spiking oil prices was not only its frustration with curbing output just to watch U.S. shale grow, but also reportedly Russian President Vladimir Putin’s growing anger with U.S. foreign policy, particularly the recent sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project and a trading arm of Rosneft. That a key U.S, adversary believed it could inflict pain on the United States by pushing oil prices lower reveals just how much shale has upended traditional patterns of energy geopolitics. In the same way that China threatened to retaliate for U.S. tariffs by imposing its own tariffs on U.S. natural gas and oil exports, Moscow’s move reveals that U.S. “energy dominance” has its limits.
Fifth, an oil price collapse in the age of shale will mean far different winners and losers than in the past. Oil-producing regions of the U.S. will be hit much harder economically: not just corporate investment and family incomes, but the fiscal base of local communities, affecting education, infrastructure, and other public services. With the United States now importing about as much oil as it exports, the benefits of lower oil prices to consumers (at the gas pump, for example) roughly cancels out the harm to oil producers and workers. The oil price collapse will therefore do little to boost U.S. gross domestic product—a far cry from the economic lift the United States would have received from an oil price drop of this magnitude a decade ago.
Given the impact of gasoline prices on voters’ pocket books, Putin’s effort to hurt the United States by cratering prices may end up helping U.S. President Donald Trump in an election year. But the political benefits of lower oil prices for an incumbent president are hard to see when that price collapse is driven by an economic downturn. For Democratic candidates calling to restrict U.S. oil production and exports, their stance may prove less popular when U.S. supply is falling, the country‘s oil-producing states are hurting, and imports are starting to rise.
By launching a historic oil price war, Russia and Saudi Arabia are now engaged in a high-stakes game of chicken to see who blinks first. Until one of them does, the oil market will rebalance itself largely at the expense of U.S. oil producers. Meanwhile, consumers in the U.S. and other countries will enjoy lower prices. The impacts on OPEC as a cartel are yet to be determined, but its credibility and effectiveness hang in the balance.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-09--South Korea’s President Tried to Help China Contain the Coronavirus. Now People Want Him Impeached.

South Korea ’ s President Tried to Help China Contain the Coronavirus .
Now People Want Him Impeached .
SEOUL—Despite the warnings against congregating in large groups while the new coronavirus rages , a giant crowd of South Koreans lined up outside Happy Department Store on the outskirts of Seoul , South Korea ’ s capital , on a Friday afternoon late last month .
Everyone was polite , and people moved forward at a measured pace—until they got inside the store , when they started running .
Inside was a setup that resembled a soup kitchen , but rather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the proprietors were selling face masks at a discounted price to frenzied buyers .
These days it seems like every South Korean you talk to on the street has one main concern for their personal safety : not being able to buy masks .
And they ’ re not shy about saying who they blame for the shortage : South Korean President Moon Jae-in , who in a misguided effort to bolster improving relations with China sent medical equipment worth $ 5 million to Wuhan , where the first cases arose , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including 2 million face masks and 1 million medical masks .
But now the virus is spreading rapidly in South Korea , and the news media and ordinary people keep asking , “ Why don ’ t I have enough masks ?
” and pointing the blame at neighboring China .
It is only one element of a Moon policy gone badly wrong and a wished-for rapprochement with China that is rapidly dissolving into anti-Chinese enmity and mistrust on both sides .
“ Moon Jae-in ’ s pro-China policy , I argue , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anti-China sentiment [ in South Korea ] , ” Lee Seong-hyon , the director of Chinese studies at the Sejong Institute , a South Korean think tank , told Foreign Policy .
Moon apparently had the best of intentions , even if they were largely political .
From the very beginning of the epidemic he sought to be supportive of China , not banning entry of travelers from China and sending supportive words and supplies .
Parliamentary elections take place next month in South Korea , and Moon knew that a planned state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be quite the boon for his party , showing that South Korea is back in business with China after several years of high tensions .
“ Xi ’ s visit to South Korea will officially be a sign that , finally , China is ending its economic retaliation against the South Korea over the THAAD issue , ” Lee said , referring to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense , the U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense system set up in South Korea in 2017 .
China saw this as a threat to its “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the system had a potential range much farther than just North Korea .
In response , Beijing began to batter the South Korean economy .
Tours to South Korea stopped coming , concerts got canceled , and Lotte Group , a conglomerate that owns the land that the missile system stands upon , saw a flurry of issues arise for its many supermarkets in China and has now closed them all , to name a few retaliations .
Now , South Koreans are looking with mistrust over at China—and to make matters worse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ putting travel restrictions on South Koreans to keep the virus out .
The epidemic of COVID-19 , the illness caused by the coronavirus , has claimed 53 lives in the country among more than 3,000 worldwide .
Some 1.45 million South Koreans have since signed a petition calling for Moon Jae-in to be impeached .
“ President Moon Jae-in ’ s response to the new coronavirus shows that he is more likely the president of China and not the president of the Republic of Korea .
In Korea , the price of masks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are difficult for people to find or sold out , ” reads the petition , which concludes : “ It is difficult to think of Moon as the president of Korea .
I request an impeachment.
” The Chinese themselves are also seen as a danger .
Currently , only people who are traveling from Hubei province , the epicenter of the current outbreak , have been banned from entering South Korea , but newspapers , petitions ( with over 760,000 signatures ) , and people online have been calling for sweeping bans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China is our enemy , we hate every communist party , ” Yang Sung-yol , 65 , told Foreign Policy at the scene of a protest on March 9 in the university district of Hongdae in Seoul .
“ We oppose every political move Moon makes .
Our rage level is high !
” In the background , a group of people wore masks depicting either Xi Jinping or Moon Jae-in .
At one point a girl wearing a Xi mask walked into the center of the protest carrying a rope that was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Moon mask .
She made “ Moon ” dance on command and beg .
“ Outright hate against China is not right , but diplomacy is all about prioritizing your country first , and I think our government didn ’ t do that , ” said Kim Keun-tae , 31 , who described himself as the spokesperson for the protest .
At a joint press conference Monday representing various South Korean ministries , departments , and disease control task forces , Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee Taeho defended the government ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ travel restrictions .
“ In this global age where people travel freely , we prosper because of it , ” he said in his prepared remarks .
“ The World Health Organization , based on past experience , claims that restricting movement on people and goods is ineffective and may divert resources from other places .
Despite public pressure and calls for stronger measures to restrict influx , my government has not imposed travel bans , except for people traveling from Hubei province , by introducing instead a special entry procedure , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must download an app in the airport where they put in daily measures such as whereabouts , possible symptoms , and fever temperatures , which the officials touted as a great tool for not restricting movement and simultaneously keeping any potentially infected people reined in .
The vice minister also mentioned the equipment his administration had sent across the Yellow Sea to help alleviate a troubled China , which in turn now is helping South Korea , he said .
“ With the global spread seemingly underway , it calls for cooperation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ against the spread but also against fear and discrimination , which strain our open democracy .
We must handle this situation without leaving lasting scars on trade , which is the basis for our prosperity , ” Lee Taeho said .
To further appease the mask-craving people , a new law completely bans the exports of South Korean masks and requires producers to distribute 80 percent of masks through official public channels such as post offices , local pharmacies , or publicly run stores that run events like the one at Happy Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the government to prepare and provide those masks to people , ” Cheong Jin-su , the director of the Small Business Distribution Center , an organization under the Ministry of SMEs and Start-ups , told Foreign Policy .
“ Today there are three times more people coming to buy than yesterday .
We have already sold 63,000 masks since yesterday , and we have prepared 250,000 to sell today , ” he added from the register line , where people flooded through grasping their maximum of five masks per person and hurried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potentially sick people .
The people who finally received masks were somewhat placated .
“ I think the government is handling the mask problem a little bit late , ” 50-year-old Kim Seo-young told Foreign Policy after she acquired her five masks .
But back at the protest , they were not satisfied with the export ban .
The protesters wanted more : that people traveling from China be entirely barred from the country .
Whether or not that would have made a difference is hard to say , as most confirmed cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ traced to a notorious religious sect called Shincheonji whose original infection route is uncertain , albeit two followers visited Wuhan in January , where one was confirmed infected in late February .
According to the Blue House , South Korea ’ s presidential office , the planned Chinese state visit will still take place sometime in the first half of the year .

SEOUL—Despite the warnings against congregating in large groups while the new coronavirus rages, a giant crowd of South Koreans lined up outside Happy Department Store on the outskirts of Seoul, South Korea’s capital, on a Friday afternoon late last month.
SEOUL—Despite the warnings against congregating in large groups while the new coronavirus rages, a giant crowd of South Koreans lined up outside Happy Department Store on the outskirts of Seoul, South Korea’s capital, on a Friday afternoon late last month.
Everyone was polite, and people moved forward at a measured pace—until they got inside the store, when they started running.
Inside was a setup that resembled a soup kitchen, but rather than slinging hot bowls of jjigae, the proprietors were selling face masks at a discounted price to frenzied buyers. These days it seems like every South Korean you talk to on the street has one main concern for their personal safety: not being able to buy masks.
And they’re not shy about saying who they blame for the shortage: South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who in a misguided effort to bolster improving relations with China sent medical equipment worth $5 million to Wuhan, where the first cases arose, in the early days of the epidemic, including 2 million face masks and 1 million medical masks. But now the virus is spreading rapidly in South Korea, and the news media and ordinary people keep asking, “Why don’t I have enough masks?” and pointing the blame at neighboring China.
It is only one element of a Moon policy gone badly wrong and a wished-for rapprochement with China that is rapidly dissolving into anti-Chinese enmity and mistrust on both sides.
“Moon Jae-in’s pro-China policy, I argue, actually created or made worse, the anti-China sentiment [in South Korea],” Lee Seong-hyon, the director of Chinese studies at the Sejong Institute, a South Korean think tank, told Foreign Policy.
Moon apparently had the best of intentions, even if they were largely political. From the very beginning of the epidemic he sought to be supportive of China, not banning entry of travelers from China and sending supportive words and supplies. Parliamentary elections take place next month in South Korea, and Moon knew that a planned state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping would be quite the boon for his party, showing that South Korea is back in business with China after several years of high tensions.
“Xi’s visit to South Korea will officially be a sign that, finally, China is ending its economic retaliation against the South Korea over the THAAD issue,” Lee said, referring to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, the U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense system set up in South Korea in 2017.
China saw this as a threat to its “legitimate national security interests,” because the system had a potential range much farther than just North Korea. In response, Beijing began to batter the South Korean economy. Tours to South Korea stopped coming, concerts got canceled, and Lotte Group, a conglomerate that owns the land that the missile system stands upon, saw a flurry of issues arise for its many supermarkets in China and has now closed them all, to name a few retaliations.
Now, South Koreans are looking with mistrust over at China—and to make matters worse, now some Chinese regions have started putting travel restrictions on South Koreans to keep the virus out. The epidemic of COVID-19, the illness caused by the coronavirus, has claimed 53 lives in the country among more than 3,000 worldwide.
Some 1.45 million South Koreans have since signed a petition calling for Moon Jae-in to be impeached. “President Moon Jae-in’s response to the new coronavirus shows that he is more likely the president of China and not the president of the Republic of Korea. In Korea, the price of masks soared more than 10 times, they are difficult for people to find or sold out,” reads the petition, which concludes: “It is difficult to think of Moon as the president of Korea. I request an impeachment.”
The Chinese themselves are also seen as a danger. Currently, only people who are traveling from Hubei province, the epicenter of the current outbreak, have been banned from entering South Korea, but newspapers, petitions (with over 760,000 signatures), and people online have been calling for sweeping bans on Chinese travelers in general.
“China is our enemy, we hate every communist party,” Yang Sung-yol, 65, told Foreign Policy at the scene of a protest on March 9 in the university district of Hongdae in Seoul. “We oppose every political move Moon makes. Our rage level is high!”
In the background, a group of people wore masks depicting either Xi Jinping or Moon Jae-in. At one point a girl wearing a Xi mask walked into the center of the protest carrying a rope that was around the neck of a man wearing a Moon mask. She made “Moon” dance on command and beg.
“Outright hate against China is not right, but diplomacy is all about prioritizing your country first, and I think our government didn’t do that,” said Kim Keun-tae, 31, who described himself as the spokesperson for the protest.
At a joint press conference Monday representing various South Korean ministries, departments, and disease control task forces, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee Taeho defended the government’s position of cooperation and lack of travel restrictions. “In this global age where people travel freely, we prosper because of it,” he said in his prepared remarks.
“The World Health Organization, based on past experience, claims that restricting movement on people and goods is ineffective and may divert resources from other places. Despite public pressure and calls for stronger measures to restrict influx, my government has not imposed travel bans, except for people traveling from Hubei province, by introducing instead a special entry procedure,” he said.
Any arrivals from China must download an app in the airport where they put in daily measures such as whereabouts, possible symptoms, and fever temperatures, which the officials touted as a great tool for not restricting movement and simultaneously keeping any potentially infected people reined in. The vice minister also mentioned the equipment his administration had sent across the Yellow Sea to help alleviate a troubled China, which in turn now is helping South Korea, he said.
“With the global spread seemingly underway, it calls for cooperation. We need to guard ourselves not only against the spread but also against fear and discrimination, which strain our open democracy. We must handle this situation without leaving lasting scars on trade, which is the basis for our prosperity,” Lee Taeho said.
To further appease the mask-craving people, a new law completely bans the exports of South Korean masks and requires producers to distribute 80 percent of masks through official public channels such as post offices, local pharmacies, or publicly run stores that run events like the one at Happy Department Store. “We’re appointed by the government to prepare and provide those masks to people,” Cheong Jin-su, the director of the Small Business Distribution Center, an organization under the Ministry of SMEs and Start-ups, told Foreign Policy.
“Today there are three times more people coming to buy than yesterday. We have already sold 63,000 masks since yesterday, and we have prepared 250,000 to sell today,” he added from the register line, where people flooded through grasping their maximum of five masks per person and hurried to get out of the mass of potentially sick people.
The people who finally received masks were somewhat placated. “I think the government is handling the mask problem a little bit late,” 50-year-old Kim Seo-young told Foreign Policy after she acquired her five masks.
But back at the protest, they were not satisfied with the export ban. The protesters wanted more: that people traveling from China be entirely barred from the country. Whether or not that would have made a difference is hard to say, as most confirmed cases of COVID-19 in South Korea have been traced to a notorious religious sect called Shincheonji whose original infection route is uncertain, albeit two followers visited Wuhan in January, where one was confirmed infected in late February.
According to the Blue House, South Korea’s presidential office, the planned Chinese state visit will still take place sometime in the first half of the year.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-09--The Coronavirus Is Putting Globalization in the ICU

The Coronavirus Is Putting Globalization in the ICU The realist approach to international politics and foreign policy does not devote much , if any , attention to the issue of potential pandemics like the COVID-19 outbreak .
No theory explains everything , of course , and realism focuses primarily on the constraining effects of anarchy , the reasons why great powers compete for advantage , and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation among states .
It has little to say about interspecies viral transmission , epidemiology , or public health best practices , so you shouldn ’ t ask a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ start working from home .
Despite these obvious limitations , realism can still offer useful insights into some of the issues that the new coronavirus outbreak has raised .
It is worth remembering , for example , that a central event in Thucydides ’ account of the Peloponnesian War ( one of the founding texts in the realist tradition ) is the plague that struck Athens in 430 B.C .
and persisted for more than three years .
Historians believe the plague may have killed about a third of Athens ’ population—including prominent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negative effects on Athens ’ long-term power potential .
Might realism have something to say about the situation we find ourselves in today ?
First , and most obviously , the present emergency reminds us that states are still the main actors in global politics .
Every few years , scholars and pundits suggest that states are becoming less relevant in world affairs and that other actors or social forces ( i.e.
, nongovernmental organizations , multinational corporations , international terrorists , global markets , etc . )
are undermining sovereignty and pushing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
When new dangers arise , however , humans look first and foremost to national governments for protection .
After 9/11 , Americans didn ’ t turn to the United Nations , Microsoft Corp. , or Amnesty International to protect them from al Qaeda ; they looked to Washington and the federal government .
And so it is today : All over the world , citizens are looking to public officials to provide authoritative information and to fashion an effective response .
As the journalist Derek Thompson wrote on Twitter last week : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic.
” That is not to say that broader global efforts are not necessary as well ; it is simply to remind us that despite globalization , states remain the central political actors in the contemporary world .
Realists have emphasized this point for decades , and the coronavirus is providing yet another vivid reminder .
Second , although the more structural versions of realism tend to downplay differences among states ( apart from relative power ) , thus far responses to the coronavirus outbreak are exposing the strengths and weakness of different @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggested that rigid dictatorships are more vulnerable to famines , epidemics , and other disasters , largely because they tend to suppress information and top officials may not recognize the gravity of the situation until it is too late to prevent it .
This is precisely what appears to have happened in China and also Iran : People who tried to sound the alarm were silenced or punished , and top officials tried to hide what was happening instead of mobilizing promptly to address it .
Authoritarian governments can be good at mobilizing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s ability to quarantine whole cities and impose other far-reaching controls—but only after the people at the top figure out and acknowledge what is going on .
Because information flows more freely in democracies—due in part to independent media and the ability of lower-level officials to sound the alarm without being punished—they should be better at identifying when a problem is emerging .
For democracies , however , problems may emerge when trying to fashion and implement timely responses .
This deficiency may be especially severe in the United States , because the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the real work in an emergency are mostly under the control of a plethora of state or local governments .
Unless there is adequate prior planning and effective coordination from Washington—something that is not easy to pull off in the best of circumstances—even accurate and timely warnings may not produce effective emergency measures .
The bungled reactions to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico are obvious cases in point .
Unfortunately , as Michelle Goldberg pointed out in a recent New York Times column , “ Donald Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the worst features of autocracy and of democracy , mixing opacity and propaganda with leaderless inefficiency.
” Having previously downgraded disaster preparedness throughout the federal government and in the White House itself , Trump has consistently downplayed the seriousness of the coronavirus outbreak , overruled or challenged the assessments of qualified scientists , failed to coordinate an effective federal response , picked fights with local officials who are on the front lines , and blamed it all on his predecessor , who has now been out of office for more than three years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a decentralized democratic system , add a serious emergency , and this is the sort of train-wreck to expect .
Is there a silver lining ?
Realism suggests there might be a small one .
In a competitive world , states cast a wary eye on what others are doing and have a big incentive to imitate success .
New military innovations tend to be quickly adopted by others , for example , because failing to adapt can lead one to fall behind and become vulnerable .
This perspective suggests that as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus , others will quickly follow suit .
Over time , a set of global best practices will emerge , a process that will occur more rapidly if states share accurate information with one another and refrain from politicizing it or using it to gain advantage .
Unfortunately , realism also reminds us that achieving effective international cooperation on this issue may not be easy , despite the obvious need for it .
Realists recognize that cooperation happens all the time , and that norms and institutions can help states cooperate when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so .
But realists also warn that international cooperation is often fragile , either because states fear that others will not abide by their commitments , worry that cooperation will benefit others more than it benefits them , or want to avoid bearing a disproportionate share of the costs .
I don ’ t think such concerns will prevent states from doing a lot to help one another address this global problem , but any or all of them could make the collective response less effective .
Lastly , foreign-policy realism also suggests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quickly and more or less permanently ( as the 2003 SARS epidemic did ) , it will reinforce the growing trend toward deglobalization that is already underway .
Back in the 1990s , apostles of globalization believed the world was becoming ever-more-tightly connected by trade , travel , global financial integration , the digital revolution , and the apparent superiority of liberal capitalist democracy , and concluded that we ’ d all get busy getting rich in an increasingly flat and borderless world .
The past decade or more has witnessed a steady @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more and more people willing to trade efficiency , growth , and openness for the sake of autonomy and the preservation of cherished ways of life .
As the Brexiteers in the United Kingdom put it , they want to “ take back control.
” For realists , this backlash is unsurprising .
As the realist Kenneth Waltz wrote in his landmark Theory of International Politics , “ the domestic imperative is ‘ specialize , ’ ” and “ the international imperative is ‘ take care of yourself ’ !
” The Christian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the 1930s , writing that “ the development of international commerce , the increased economic interdependence among the nations , and the whole apparatus of a technological civilisation , increase the problems and issues between nations much more rapidly than the intelligence to solve them can be created.
” Liberal theorists have long argued that increasing interdependence between states would be a source of prosperity and an obstacle to international rivalry .
By contrast , realists warn that close ties are also a source of vulnerability and a potential cause of conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is that ever-tighter connections between states create as many problems as they solve , sometimes more quickly than we can devise solutions for them .
For this reason , states—the critical building blocks of international politics—try to reduce risks and vulnerabilities by placing limits on their dealings with one another .
From a realist perspective , therefore , the coronavirus is likely to give states another reason to limit globalization .
Hyperglobalization made the global financial system more vulnerable to crises and created serious domestic political problems due to job displacement ; we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exposure—literally—to the sort of global pandemic we may be witnessing today .
To be clear : Realism doesn ’ t predict a retreat to autarky or even the same level of deglobalization that occurred as a result of the two world wars and the Great Depression .
Contemporary states can not afford to sever all ties , even in the face of something like the coronavirus .
But I ’ m guessing that the high-water mark of contemporary globalization is now behind us , and that a virus that crossed the boundary between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the reasons that borders between states will become a bit higher .

The realist approach to international politics and foreign policy does not devote much, if any, attention to the issue of potential pandemics like the COVID-19 outbreak. No theory explains everything, of course, and realism focuses primarily on the constraining effects of anarchy, the reasons why great powers compete for advantage, and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation among states. It has little to say about interspecies viral transmission, epidemiology, or public health best practices, so you shouldn’t ask a realist to tell you whether you should start working from home.
The realist approach to international politics and foreign policy does not devote much, if any, attention to the issue of potential pandemics like the COVID-19 outbreak. No theory explains everything, of course, and realism focuses primarily on the constraining effects of anarchy, the reasons why great powers compete for advantage, and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation among states. It has little to say about interspecies viral transmission, epidemiology, or public health best practices, so you shouldn’t ask a realist to tell you whether you should start working from home.
Despite these obvious limitations, realism can still offer useful insights into some of the issues that the new coronavirus outbreak has raised. It is worth remembering, for example, that a central event in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War (one of the founding texts in the realist tradition) is the plague that struck Athens in 430 B.C. and persisted for more than three years. Historians believe the plague may have killed about a third of Athens’ population—including prominent leaders such as Pericles—and it had obvious negative effects on Athens’ long-term power potential. Might realism have something to say about the situation we find ourselves in today?
First, and most obviously, the present emergency reminds us that states are still the main actors in global politics. Every few years, scholars and pundits suggest that states are becoming less relevant in world affairs and that other actors or social forces (i.e., nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, international terrorists, global markets, etc.) are undermining sovereignty and pushing the state toward the dustbin of history. When new dangers arise, however, humans look first and foremost to national governments for protection. After 9/11, Americans didn’t turn to the United Nations, Microsoft Corp., or Amnesty International to protect them from al Qaeda; they looked to Washington and the federal government. And so it is today: All over the world, citizens are looking to public officials to provide authoritative information and to fashion an effective response. As the journalist Derek Thompson wrote on Twitter last week: “There are no libertarians in a pandemic.” That is not to say that broader global efforts are not necessary as well; it is simply to remind us that despite globalization, states remain the central political actors in the contemporary world. Realists have emphasized this point for decades, and the coronavirus is providing yet another vivid reminder.
Second, although the more structural versions of realism tend to downplay differences among states (apart from relative power), thus far responses to the coronavirus outbreak are exposing the strengths and weakness of different types of regimes. Scholars have previously suggested that rigid dictatorships are more vulnerable to famines, epidemics, and other disasters, largely because they tend to suppress information and top officials may not recognize the gravity of the situation until it is too late to prevent it. This is precisely what appears to have happened in China and also Iran: People who tried to sound the alarm were silenced or punished, and top officials tried to hide what was happening instead of mobilizing promptly to address it. Authoritarian governments can be good at mobilizing resources and undertaking ambitious responses—witness Beijing’s ability to quarantine whole cities and impose other far-reaching controls—but only after the people at the top figure out and acknowledge what is going on.
Because information flows more freely in democracies—due in part to independent media and the ability of lower-level officials to sound the alarm without being punished—they should be better at identifying when a problem is emerging. For democracies, however, problems may emerge when trying to fashion and implement timely responses. This deficiency may be especially severe in the United States, because the first responders and other agencies that do the real work in an emergency are mostly under the control of a plethora of state or local governments. Unless there is adequate prior planning and effective coordination from Washington—something that is not easy to pull off in the best of circumstances—even accurate and timely warnings may not produce effective emergency measures. The bungled reactions to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico are obvious cases in point.
Unfortunately, as Michelle Goldberg pointed out in a recent New York Times column, “Donald Trump’s response to the coronavirus combines the worst features of autocracy and of democracy, mixing opacity and propaganda with leaderless inefficiency.” Having previously downgraded disaster preparedness throughout the federal government and in the White House itself, Trump has consistently downplayed the seriousness of the coronavirus outbreak, overruled or challenged the assessments of qualified scientists, failed to coordinate an effective federal response, picked fights with local officials who are on the front lines, and blamed it all on his predecessor, who has now been out of office for more than three years. Put a would-be authoritarian in charge of a decentralized democratic system, add a serious emergency, and this is the sort of train-wreck to expect.
Is there a silver lining? Realism suggests there might be a small one. In a competitive world, states cast a wary eye on what others are doing and have a big incentive to imitate success. New military innovations tend to be quickly adopted by others, for example, because failing to adapt can lead one to fall behind and become vulnerable. This perspective suggests that as some states develop more effective responses to the coronavirus, others will quickly follow suit. Over time, a set of global best practices will emerge, a process that will occur more rapidly if states share accurate information with one another and refrain from politicizing it or using it to gain advantage.
Unfortunately, realism also reminds us that achieving effective international cooperation on this issue may not be easy, despite the obvious need for it. Realists recognize that cooperation happens all the time, and that norms and institutions can help states cooperate when it is in their interest to do so. But realists also warn that international cooperation is often fragile, either because states fear that others will not abide by their commitments, worry that cooperation will benefit others more than it benefits them, or want to avoid bearing a disproportionate share of the costs. I don’t think such concerns will prevent states from doing a lot to help one another address this global problem, but any or all of them could make the collective response less effective.
Lastly, foreign-policy realism also suggests that if the epidemic does not subside quickly and more or less permanently (as the 2003 SARS epidemic did), it will reinforce the growing trend toward deglobalization that is already underway. Back in the 1990s, apostles of globalization believed the world was becoming ever-more-tightly connected by trade, travel, global financial integration, the digital revolution, and the apparent superiority of liberal capitalist democracy, and concluded that we’d all get busy getting rich in an increasingly flat and borderless world. The past decade or more has witnessed a steady retreat from that optimistic vision, with more and more people willing to trade efficiency, growth, and openness for the sake of autonomy and the preservation of cherished ways of life. As the Brexiteers in the United Kingdom put it, they want to “take back control.”
For realists, this backlash is unsurprising. As the realist Kenneth Waltz wrote in his landmark Theory of International Politics, “the domestic imperative is ‘specialize,’” and “the international imperative is ‘take care of yourself’!” The Christian realist Reinhold Niebuhr offered a similar warning in the 1930s, writing that “the development of international commerce, the increased economic interdependence among the nations, and the whole apparatus of a technological civilisation, increase the problems and issues between nations much more rapidly than the intelligence to solve them can be created.”
Liberal theorists have long argued that increasing interdependence between states would be a source of prosperity and an obstacle to international rivalry. By contrast, realists warn that close ties are also a source of vulnerability and a potential cause of conflict. What Waltz and Niebuhr are saying is that ever-tighter connections between states create as many problems as they solve, sometimes more quickly than we can devise solutions for them. For this reason, states—the critical building blocks of international politics—try to reduce risks and vulnerabilities by placing limits on their dealings with one another.
From a realist perspective, therefore, the coronavirus is likely to give states another reason to limit globalization. Hyperglobalization made the global financial system more vulnerable to crises and created serious domestic political problems due to job displacement; we now know that it also increased our exposure—literally—to the sort of global pandemic we may be witnessing today.
To be clear: Realism doesn’t predict a retreat to autarky or even the same level of deglobalization that occurred as a result of the two world wars and the Great Depression. Contemporary states cannot afford to sever all ties, even in the face of something like the coronavirus. But I’m guessing that the high-water mark of contemporary globalization is now behind us, and that a virus that crossed the boundary between two species is going to one of the reasons that borders between states will become a bit higher.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-09--Truth Has Become a Coronavirus Casualty

Truth Has Become a Coronavirus Casualty

As the coronavirus spreads , another dangerous virus has followed closely behind : the scourge of government leaders and official authorities obfuscating data , suppressing information , and misinforming citizens about the outbreak .
With the crisis likely to get worse before it gets better , many countries ’ citizens are increasingly unsure just whom or what to believe .
This not only increases the threat to public health , but it also undermines trust in the very institutions on which we rely to fight the virus .
This new virus of disinformation also has its origin in China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Iran and Russia , and has now infected the highest levels of government in the United States .
The disease of disinformation first broke out in Wuhan .
Its most prominent victim is a Wuhan doctor , Li Wenliang , who first posted an alert about a mysterious illness to a group chat of medical colleagues in late December .
Accused of spreading rumors , he was summoned by health authorities in the middle of the night and forced to confess to making “ false comments.
” His warning went unheeded , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the virus .
As the epidemic began to take hold , Wuhan became a jarring tale of two different stories : a sanitized , government-approved version of events—and a very different reality on the ground .
Private citizens posted cellphone videos as the quarantine was being imposed through brute force : neighbors and passersby being dragged kicking and screaming down corridors and into vans , or of workers hammering boards over the doors of apartment buildings .
Meanwhile , state-controlled media posted a steady stream of cheery snippets showing what were allegedly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beds , and happy health care workers shaving their hair to promote hygiene .
It got worse from there .
At least three Chinese citizen journalists reporting on the virus have disappeared into detention , their whereabouts unknown .
One , a former Chinese government television journalist , filmed his own arrest ; his video has now been seen by more than 375,000 viewers on YouTube ( though likely censored inside China ) .
After criticizing Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s response to the virus , the essayist and activist Xu Zhiyong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faces a potential 15-year prison sentence for “ subversion.
” China and Iran stand out for muzzling doctors who tried to warn about the coronavirus , and for downplaying the number of cases and deaths as the epidemic progressed .
After several panicky weeks of lying low , Chinese President Xi Jinping has mounted a propaganda offensive aimed at burnishing China ’ s image to both an increasingly angry populace and a skeptical world .
Widely criticized for delaying and dissembling , Xi is aggressively pushing a counternarrative that touts his handling of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the virtues of the authoritarian system .
Many in the West have fallen for this narrative , Xi will be happy to know .
Despite still-rising numbers of cases and drastic lockdowns still in place , Xi ’ s government is already planning to publish a book , translated from Mandarin into five languages , that trumpets his victory over the virus .
Shameless puffery coupled with ruthless suppression of dissent is nothing new in China .
Nor is it any surprise that Iran , the worst-hit country outside East Asia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of information to blame for a rapid spread of the virus .
The BBC reports that 24 Iranians have been arrested for “ spreading rumors ” while another 118 have received warnings .
For reporting on the health crisis in Iran based on sources in the country ’ s hospitals , Tehran has accused the BBC of spreading falsehoods .
With no reliable information to be had , Iranian social media and messaging apps are rife with false information , as well as genuine leaks aimed to counter misleading government narratives .
China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who tried to warn about the coronavirus , downplaying the number of cases and deaths as the epidemic progressed , and inflating the success of their containment efforts .
The predictable result was that the virus spread more quickly and widely than if these governments had been forthright from the start .
Russia , whose government has weaponized disinformation at home and abroad , is up to its usual antics of spreading conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus ( no , coronavirus was not bioengineered by the CIA ) .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not exactly surprising .
What ’ s new and deeply disturbing is that the virus of disinformation has infected the highest levels of a Western government like the United States ’ .
What ’ s new and deeply disturbing is that the virus of disinformation has infected the highest levels of a Western government like the United States ’ .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s public downplaying of the outbreak—and his administration ’ s muzzling of scientists , attacks on journalists , and lashing out at critics—have slowed and obstructed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk undermining efforts to control the virus as it spreads .
What ’ s more , the administration ’ s actions risk fatally undermining citizens ’ trust in public health authorities , scientists , and doctors—the very people on whose information and judgment any effective epidemic response depends .
As the first cases of the coronavirus showed up in the United States and Americans were thirsting for information , the administration treated legitimate questions about the country ’ s public health response as personal or partisan attacks .
Mick Mulvaney , then the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accused the media of reporting on the virus in order to attack Trump .
“ The reason you ’ re seeing so much attention to [ the coronavirus ] today is that they think this is going to be the thing that brings down the president , ” Mulvaney told a conservative conference audience .
“ That ’ s what this is all about.
” More frighteningly , Trump is using the language of conspiracy theories to discredit criticism of his handling of the outbreak , claiming the coronavirus is the Democrats ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ endangered the health and lives of Americans by spreading falsehoods and encouraging complacency .
On Feb. 26 , when there were just 15 known cases of coronavirus disease in the United States , Trump predicted that the number of people infected “ within a couple of days , is going to be down to close to zero.
” And he patted himself on the back for his administration ’ s policies to stop the outbreak : “ That ’ s a pretty good job we ’ ve done.
” Trump ’ s top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a television interview on Feb. 25 , “ We have contained this , ” adding that containment was “ pretty close to airtight.
” As we know , the first death was reported later that week .
Many more have followed , with over 500 confirmed cases and nearly two dozen deaths in the United States .
The president ’ s self-congratulatory narrative , his administration ’ s attacks on journalists reporting the grim realities , and his treatment of critics as partisan all make it impossible to trust him or his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Mike Pence as the administration ’ s coronavirus czar is troubling on many levels , including Pence ’ s record mishandling an HIV epidemic when he was governor of Indiana .
In this White House , czar seems to mean chief spin doctor , following a decree that scientists working at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health—leading experts in their fields—may no longer speak directly to the press or the public without first clearing their comments with Pence ’ s office .
While it makes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ messaging and avert confusion , this edict is alarming because of the White House ’ s long track record of mendacity ; the public must now ask whether a scientist ’ s statement has been doctored or dressed up by White House officials.The public must now ask whether a scientist ’ s statement has been doctored or dressed up by White House officials .
Case in point : It fell to a whistleblower , rather than a public health professional in their official capacity , to reveal that basic quarantine protocols were violated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia , endangering the health of many more people .
This epidemic has brought the United States to a dangerous situation where citizens wonder if they can still trust their government .
When freedom of speech and freedom of the press are not respected , truth erodes—and with it , other rights such as the right to health and to effective treatment .
The responsibility for rebuilding trust lies with everyone .
The White House should stop opining on matters of health and science and let those speak who have both professional expertise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Anthony Fauci , the head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases ) .
It is scientists who should be vetting the coronavirus statements by politicians , not the other way around .
Political officials , including members of Congress , must hold the executive branch accountable and strongly stick up for scientists in the federal agencies , ensuring that their expert opinions see the light of day and prevail in policy debates .
The news media have a duty , even more than usual , to make sure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what is false , and what is unknown .
Scientists and public health professionals must tell it like it is , whether by providing factual information to the public or by calling out government statements that mislead .
Most Americans are accustomed to the belief that , while the world ’ s autocracies might mislead their people and international organizations are often inept , they can count on their own elected government to be trustworthy and truthful .
Americans take comfort in having world-class scientists to whom their government can turn for advice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that inform the public and hold officials accountable .
As the coronavirus epidemic shows , however , these treasured attributes of America ’ s democratic system have become feverish and wheezing .
In a pandemic , the truth matters .
Political leaders , public health officials , and the media must put an urgent premium on candid , truthful , unvarnished facts so that this unprecedented global health crisis doesn ’ t balloon into an irreversible destruction of trust in the institutions Americans count on to keep them healthy and safe .

As the coronavirus spreads, another dangerous virus has followed closely behind: the scourge of government leaders and official authorities obfuscating data, suppressing information, and misinforming citizens about the outbreak. With the crisis likely to get worse before it gets better, many countries’ citizens are increasingly unsure just whom or what to believe. This not only increases the threat to public health, but it also undermines trust in the very institutions on which we rely to fight the virus.
As the coronavirus spreads, another dangerous virus has followed closely behind: the scourge of government leaders and official authorities obfuscating data, suppressing information, and misinforming citizens about the outbreak. With the crisis likely to get worse before it gets better, many countries’ citizens are increasingly unsure just whom or what to believe. This not only increases the threat to public health, but it also undermines trust in the very institutions on which we rely to fight the virus.
This new virus of disinformation also has its origin in China, has spread to other authoritarian states such as Iran and Russia, and has now infected the highest levels of government in the United States.
The disease of disinformation first broke out in Wuhan. Its most prominent victim is a Wuhan doctor, Li Wenliang, who first posted an alert about a mysterious illness to a group chat of medical colleagues in late December. Accused of spreading rumors, he was summoned by health authorities in the middle of the night and forced to confess to making “false comments.” His warning went unheeded, and by early February he was dead from the virus.
As the epidemic began to take hold, Wuhan became a jarring tale of two different stories: a sanitized, government-approved version of events—and a very different reality on the ground. Private citizens posted cellphone videos as the quarantine was being imposed through brute force: neighbors and passersby being dragged kicking and screaming down corridors and into vans, or of workers hammering boards over the doors of apartment buildings. Meanwhile, state-controlled media posted a steady stream of cheery snippets showing what were allegedly virus patients, dancing beside their hospital beds, and happy health care workers shaving their hair to promote hygiene.
It got worse from there. At least three Chinese citizen journalists reporting on the virus have disappeared into detention, their whereabouts unknown. One, a former Chinese government television journalist, filmed his own arrest; his video has now been seen by more than 375,000 viewers on YouTube (though likely censored inside China). After criticizing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s response to the virus, the essayist and activist Xu Zhiyong is being held in secret detention and faces a potential 15-year prison sentence for “subversion.”
China and Iran stand out for muzzling doctors who tried to warn about the coronavirus, and for downplaying the number of cases and deaths as the epidemic progressed.
After several panicky weeks of lying low, Chinese President Xi Jinping has mounted a propaganda offensive aimed at burnishing China’s image to both an increasingly angry populace and a skeptical world. Widely criticized for delaying and dissembling, Xi is aggressively pushing a counternarrative that touts his handling of the virus as exemplary and a testament to the virtues of the authoritarian system. Many in the West have fallen for this narrative, Xi will be happy to know. Despite still-rising numbers of cases and drastic lockdowns still in place, Xi’s government is already planning to publish a book, translated from Mandarin into five languages, that trumpets his victory over the virus.
Shameless puffery coupled with ruthless suppression of dissent is nothing new in China. Nor is it any surprise that Iran, the worst-hit country outside East Asia, has its own government’s suppression of information to blame for a rapid spread of the virus. The BBC reports that 24 Iranians have been arrested for “spreading rumors” while another 118 have received warnings. For reporting on the health crisis in Iran based on sources in the country’s hospitals, Tehran has accused the BBC of spreading falsehoods. With no reliable information to be had, Iranian social media and messaging apps are rife with false information, as well as genuine leaks aimed to counter misleading government narratives.
China and Iran stand out for muzzling doctors who tried to warn about the coronavirus, downplaying the number of cases and deaths as the epidemic progressed, and inflating the success of their containment efforts. The predictable result was that the virus spread more quickly and widely than if these governments had been forthright from the start. Russia, whose government has weaponized disinformation at home and abroad, is up to its usual antics of spreading conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus (no, coronavirus was not bioengineered by the CIA).
That authoritarian states would engage in such practices is not exactly surprising. What’s new and deeply disturbing is that the virus of disinformation has infected the highest levels of a Western government like the United States’. What’s new and deeply disturbing is that the virus of disinformation has infected the highest levels of a Western government like the United States’. U.S. President Donald Trump’s public downplaying of the outbreak—and his administration’s muzzling of scientists, attacks on journalists, and lashing out at critics—have slowed and obstructed the U.S. response to the coronavirus, and risk undermining efforts to control the virus as it spreads. What’s more, the administration’s actions risk fatally undermining citizens’ trust in public health authorities, scientists, and doctors—the very people on whose information and judgment any effective epidemic response depends.
As the first cases of the coronavirus showed up in the United States and Americans were thirsting for information, the administration treated legitimate questions about the country’s public health response as personal or partisan attacks. Mick Mulvaney, then the acting White House chief of staff, accused the media of reporting on the virus in order to attack Trump. “The reason you’re seeing so much attention to [the coronavirus] today is that they think this is going to be the thing that brings down the president,” Mulvaney told a conservative conference audience. “That’s what this is all about.” More frighteningly, Trump is using the language of conspiracy theories to discredit criticism of his handling of the outbreak, claiming the coronavirus is the Democrats’ “new hoax.”
The administration has endangered the health and lives of Americans by spreading falsehoods and encouraging complacency. On Feb. 26, when there were just 15 known cases of coronavirus disease in the United States, Trump predicted that the number of people infected “within a couple of days, is going to be down to close to zero.” And he patted himself on the back for his administration’s policies to stop the outbreak: “That’s a pretty good job we’ve done.” Trump’s top economic advisor, Larry Kudlow, said in a television interview on Feb. 25, “We have contained this,” adding that containment was “pretty close to airtight.” As we know, the first death was reported later that week. Many more have followed, with over 500 confirmed cases and nearly two dozen deaths in the United States. The president’s self-congratulatory narrative, his administration’s attacks on journalists reporting the grim realities, and his treatment of critics as partisan all make it impossible to trust him or his top aides.
The designation of Vice President Mike Pence as the administration’s coronavirus czar is troubling on many levels, including Pence’s record mishandling an HIV epidemic when he was governor of Indiana. In this White House, czar seems to mean chief spin doctor, following a decree that scientists working at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health—leading experts in their fields—may no longer speak directly to the press or the public without first clearing their comments with Pence’s office. While it makes sense for governments to want to coordinate messaging and avert confusion, this edict is alarming because of the White House’s long track record of mendacity; the public must now ask whether a scientist’s statement has been doctored or dressed up by White House officials.The public must now ask whether a scientist’s statement has been doctored or dressed up by White House officials. Case in point: It fell to a whistleblower, rather than a public health professional in their official capacity, to reveal that basic quarantine protocols were violated during the evacuation of American citizens from Asia, endangering the health of many more people.
This epidemic has brought the United States to a dangerous situation where citizens wonder if they can still trust their government. When freedom of speech and freedom of the press are not respected, truth erodes—and with it, other rights such as the right to health and to effective treatment. The responsibility for rebuilding trust lies with everyone. The White House should stop opining on matters of health and science and let those speak who have both professional expertise and a track record for trustworthiness (such as Anthony Fauci, the head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases). It is scientists who should be vetting the coronavirus statements by politicians, not the other way around. Political officials, including members of Congress, must hold the executive branch accountable and strongly stick up for scientists in the federal agencies, ensuring that their expert opinions see the light of day and prevail in policy debates. The news media have a duty, even more than usual, to make sure their audiences understand what is true, what is false, and what is unknown. Scientists and public health professionals must tell it like it is, whether by providing factual information to the public or by calling out government statements that mislead.
Most Americans are accustomed to the belief that, while the world’s autocracies might mislead their people and international organizations are often inept, they can count on their own elected government to be trustworthy and truthful. Americans take comfort in having world-class scientists to whom their government can turn for advice, and in having professional news organizations that inform the public and hold officials accountable. As the coronavirus epidemic shows, however, these treasured attributes of America’s democratic system have become feverish and wheezing.
In a pandemic, the truth matters. Political leaders, public health officials, and the media must put an urgent premium on candid, truthful, unvarnished facts so that this unprecedented global health crisis doesn’t balloon into an irreversible destruction of trust in the institutions Americans count on to keep them healthy and safe.


An Economic Pandemic

The coronavirus now appears to be infecting economies as quickly as it does people .
An oil price war is fueling a broader , global market rout as investors are increasingly panicking over the economic impact of the COVID-19 .
Meanwhile , yields on long-term U.S. government debt—a port in a storm for nervous investors—fell to all-time lows , a clear indicator of a looming recession that could come more quickly than many experts feared .
Oil prices plunged about 25 percent in New York and London , dragging down stock markets in Europe and Asia .
In New York @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the opening bell before trading was briefly suspended , and traded well down the rest of the day , with the Dow Jones Industrial Average finishing down 2013.76 points or nearly 8 percent , the worst single-day drop since the financial crisis of 2008 .
“ This virus is as economically contagious as it is medically contagious , ” said Richard Baldwin , a professor of international economics at the Graduate Institute in Geneva .
It amounts to a triple whammy for the manufacturing sector in most major economies : outright closures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disruptions all over , and topped off with a plunge in demand for cars , electronics , and many other manufactured goods as people take a wait-and-see attitude to the crisis .
“ This one is economically big , because it is now hitting the big economies , ” Baldwin said .
“ The size of the economic shock is a different order of magnitude than any pandemic we have seen.
” The fear now gripping financial markets reflects a recognition of this growing economic impact .
The coronavirus , which had already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across East Asia , is now wreaking havoc in Europe .
Japan ’ s economy shrank last quarter even more than initially thought , and Tokyo is toying with another huge fiscal stimulus to goose the economy back to life .
Germany , too , is mulling a multibillion-euro economic injection to offset the worst of the crisis , while France is staring at now-stagnant growth .
Italy has essentially shut down the industrial northern part of the country as cases and fatalities continue to mount , all but guaranteeing another recession .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Monday a lockdown on movement in the entire country . )
While U.S. President Donald Trump initially dismissed concern over the virus and its impacts as “ fake news , ” some economists are predicting that the aftershocks could send the world ’ s biggest economy into a recession this year .
With Trump facing re-election in November , the president , Vice President Mike Pence and their advisers held a news conference after markets closed Monday to lay out further efforts to contain the virus domestically and ease the economic pain of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president said he would announce “ major ” measures on Tuesday after consulting with Congress .
“ This blindsided the world and I think we handled it very , very well , ” Trump said .
China , where the virus first broke out , seems to have passed the peak of its crisis , and economic activity is slowly returning .
The concern is that other major economies , especially the United States , will see a big spike in the number of virus cases with the corresponding impacts on trade , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fallout of the virus is making clear just how interdependent the global economy really is , despite years of efforts by Trump to partially undo globalization by forcing companies to move supply chains out of China and restricting trade in certain critical sectors .
What ’ s not yet clear is whether the ultimate fallout of the virus will be to accelerate the breakdown of globalization , sending firms scurrying to bring manufacturing back home so as to avoid these kinds of disruptions , or just the opposite .
“ In the longer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and undo these value chains , ” Baldwin said .
“ Or it might be that we finally understand that if somebody gets sick in China , it ’ s a problem for all the G-7 countries ” and end up boosting multilateral cooperation and coordination , he said .
Monday ’ s bloodbath on global markets was a timely reminder of how the real-world economic impacts of the virus , the oil market , geopolitics , and the global market panic are all closely linked .
Because of the physical disruption to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oil consumption to decline this year , for the first time since the financial crisis a decade ago .
On Monday , the International Energy Agency said it expects global oil demand to fall by almost 100,000 barrels a day—compared with expected growth of more than 800,000 barrels before the outbreak .
That collapse in demand comes amid a massive oversupply of oil .
“ The situation we are witnessing today seems to have no equal in oil market history , ” International Energy Agency Executive Director Fatih Birol said .
Last week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saudi Arabia , thought they had found a way to limit the fallout from that declining demand by cutting oil production , which would have helped prop up prices .
But Russia declined to go along with the production cuts , preferring to inflict pain on the still-growing U.S. oil industry instead .
Once that Saudi-Russian agreement broke down on Friday , all bets were off : Over the weekend , Saudi Arabia dramatically cut the sales price of its own oil exports , sending the price of oil down as much as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in turn scared the pants off markets in Asia , Europe , and finally the United States , which in turn sent investors fleeing toward safe debt like U.S. Treasury bonds .
Russia ’ s refusal to go along with the cuts makes some sense from Moscow ’ s point of view .
Russia has squirrelled away about $ 150 billion in a rainy-day fund , and officials on Monday said that would enable the country to weather as much as six years of oil prices below the $ 42 a barrel or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ budget .
And by ensuring that oil prices fall , Russia could take a swipe at the U.S. oil patch , which is uniquely vulnerable this year after spending years running up debt and which is running out of ways to improve productivity , leaving it more exposed to falling prices .
More to the point , from Russia ’ s perch : The U.S. shale energy boom is what has enabled recent U.S. administrations to wage more aggressive financial warfare through sanctions , including against Russia and regimes it supports , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian oil would in the past have led to higher global oil prices , but rising U.S. production kept that threat at bay—tempting first the Obama administration and now the Trump administration to use sanctions much more often .
Ditto for the shale gas boom , which has turned the United States into an exporter of natural gas and a potential alternative to Russian supplies in Europe .
The shale gale makes it that much easier for Washington to threaten sanctions on Russia ’ s big Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Germany , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s plan to slash prices and ramp up production is a little trickier .
Like Russia , it bristled at competition from U.S. oil producers and wasn ’ t happy that its rivals would benefit from higher oil prices bought with its own sacrifices .
But prices were already sliding after OPEC failed to reach an agreement last week ; it ’ s not clear that starting an all-out price war will make Russia regret its decision to ditch Saudi cooperation last week at the OPEC meeting and sign on to a fresh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the goal is to shock Russia with weak oil prices in order to drag Moscow back to the table , we think it will fail , ” noted Amrita Sen , the chief oil analyst at Energy Aspects , a consultancy , in a note .
“ This new Saudi approach will only harden Russia ’ s position.
” The move is another risky gambit from Saudi Arabia ’ s de facto leader , Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman .
Saudi Arabia needs crude prices closer to $ 80 a barrel to balance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ got fewer currency reserves and more public spending than it did in 2014 , the last time OPEC crashed oil prices to drive out U.S. rivals .
“ Saudi Arabia can afford to wait out low oil prices .
But , there is little to suggest that Riyadh is in a better position now than in 2014 to absorb sustained low prices , ” said Torbjorn Soltvedt , the principal Middle East and North Africa analyst at Verisk Maplecroft , a risk consultancy .
And lower oil prices will also mean more economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq to Mexico to Brazil .
But the immediate pain was felt in the U.S. oil patch , where shares in many energy companies fell by nearly half on Monday , outstripping even the wider carnage in the rest of the market .
With oil prices headed lower , some producers wasted no time in announcing cuts to drilling and production plans .
Most analysts expect a wave of bankruptcies and restructuring to tear through the U.S. shale sector if low oil prices persist—which could end up being an economic black eye for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election year .
This article was updated Mar .
9 , 2020 to reflect the broadening of the Italian lockdown and the announcement from the White House .

The coronavirus now appears to be infecting economies as quickly as it does people.
An oil price war is fueling a broader, global market rout as investors are increasingly panicking over the economic impact of the COVID-19. Meanwhile, yields on long-term U.S. government debt—a port in a storm for nervous investors—fell to all-time lows, a clear indicator of a looming recession that could come more quickly than many experts feared.
Oil prices plunged about 25 percent in New York and London, dragging down stock markets in Europe and Asia. In New York, stocks fell 1,800 points within minutes of the opening bell before trading was briefly suspended, and traded well down the rest of the day, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average finishing down 2013.76 points or nearly 8 percent, the worst single-day drop since the financial crisis of 2008.
“This virus is as economically contagious as it is medically contagious,” said Richard Baldwin, a professor of international economics at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. It amounts to a triple whammy for the manufacturing sector in most major economies: outright closures in many Asian plants, supply chain disruptions all over, and topped off with a plunge in demand for cars, electronics, and many other manufactured goods as people take a wait-and-see attitude to the crisis.
“This one is economically big, because it is now hitting the big economies,” Baldwin said. “The size of the economic shock is a different order of magnitude than any pandemic we have seen.”
The fear now gripping financial markets reflects a recognition of this growing economic impact. The coronavirus, which had already disrupted factories and trade in China and across East Asia, is now wreaking havoc in Europe. Japan’s economy shrank last quarter even more than initially thought, and Tokyo is toying with another huge fiscal stimulus to goose the economy back to life. Germany, too, is mulling a multibillion-euro economic injection to offset the worst of the crisis, while France is staring at now-stagnant growth. Italy has essentially shut down the industrial northern part of the country as cases and fatalities continue to mount, all but guaranteeing another recession. (Scratch that: Italy announced late Monday a lockdown on movement in the entire country.)
While U.S. President Donald Trump initially dismissed concern over the virus and its impacts as “fake news,” some economists are predicting that the aftershocks could send the world’s biggest economy into a recession this year. With Trump facing re-election in November, the president, Vice President Mike Pence and their advisers held a news conference after markets closed Monday to lay out further efforts to contain the virus domestically and to ease the economic pain of Americans who might be affected, including a payroll tax cut. The president said he would announce “major” measures on Tuesday after consulting with Congress.
“This blindsided the world and I think we handled it very, very well,” Trump said.
China, where the virus first broke out, seems to have passed the peak of its crisis, and economic activity is slowly returning. The concern is that other major economies, especially the United States, will see a big spike in the number of virus cases with the corresponding impacts on trade, travel, and manufacturing.
The economic fallout of the virus is making clear just how interdependent the global economy really is, despite years of efforts by Trump to partially undo globalization by forcing companies to move supply chains out of China and restricting trade in certain critical sectors. What’s not yet clear is whether the ultimate fallout of the virus will be to accelerate the breakdown of globalization, sending firms scurrying to bring manufacturing back home so as to avoid these kinds of disruptions, or just the opposite.
“In the longer run, it could encourage more populism and undo these value chains,” Baldwin said. “Or it might be that we finally understand that if somebody gets sick in China, it’s a problem for all the G-7 countries” and end up boosting multilateral cooperation and coordination, he said.
Monday’s bloodbath on global markets was a timely reminder of how the real-world economic impacts of the virus, the oil market, geopolitics, and the global market panic are all closely linked.
Because of the physical disruption to global economic activity, forecasters expect global oil consumption to decline this year, for the first time since the financial crisis a decade ago. On Monday, the International Energy Agency said it expects global oil demand to fall by almost 100,000 barrels a day—compared with expected growth of more than 800,000 barrels before the outbreak. That collapse in demand comes amid a massive oversupply of oil. “The situation we are witnessing today seems to have no equal in oil market history,” International Energy Agency Executive Director Fatih Birol said.
Last week, big oil producers, led by Saudi Arabia, thought they had found a way to limit the fallout from that declining demand by cutting oil production, which would have helped prop up prices. But Russia declined to go along with the production cuts, preferring to inflict pain on the still-growing U.S. oil industry instead. Once that Saudi-Russian agreement broke down on Friday, all bets were off: Over the weekend, Saudi Arabia dramatically cut the sales price of its own oil exports, sending the price of oil down as much as 30 percent in overnight trading, which in turn scared the pants off markets in Asia, Europe, and finally the United States, which in turn sent investors fleeing toward safe debt like U.S. Treasury bonds.
Russia’s refusal to go along with the cuts makes some sense from Moscow’s point of view. Russia has squirrelled away about $150 billion in a rainy-day fund, and officials on Monday said that would enable the country to weather as much as six years of oil prices below the $42 a barrel or so that Moscow needs to balance its budget. And by ensuring that oil prices fall, Russia could take a swipe at the U.S. oil patch, which is uniquely vulnerable this year after spending years running up debt and which is running out of ways to improve productivity, leaving it more exposed to falling prices.
More to the point, from Russia’s perch: The U.S. shale energy boom is what has enabled recent U.S. administrations to wage more aggressive financial warfare through sanctions, including against Russia and regimes it supports, such as Venezuela. Sanctions on Venezuelan or Iranian oil would in the past have led to higher global oil prices, but rising U.S. production kept that threat at bay—tempting first the Obama administration and now the Trump administration to use sanctions much more often. Ditto for the shale gas boom, which has turned the United States into an exporter of natural gas and a potential alternative to Russian supplies in Europe. The shale gale makes it that much easier for Washington to threaten sanctions on Russia’s big Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Germany, for instance.
Understanding Saudi Arabia’s plan to slash prices and ramp up production is a little trickier. Like Russia, it bristled at competition from U.S. oil producers and wasn’t happy that its rivals would benefit from higher oil prices bought with its own sacrifices. But prices were already sliding after OPEC failed to reach an agreement last week; it’s not clear that starting an all-out price war will make Russia regret its decision to ditch Saudi cooperation last week at the OPEC meeting and sign on to a fresh pact to curb output.
“If the goal is to shock Russia with weak oil prices in order to drag Moscow back to the table, we think it will fail,” noted Amrita Sen, the chief oil analyst at Energy Aspects, a consultancy, in a note. “This new Saudi approach will only harden Russia’s position.”
The move is another risky gambit from Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Saudi Arabia needs crude prices closer to $80 a barrel to balance its budget. It’s also got fewer currency reserves and more public spending than it did in 2014, the last time OPEC crashed oil prices to drive out U.S. rivals.
“Saudi Arabia can afford to wait out low oil prices. But, there is little to suggest that Riyadh is in a better position now than in 2014 to absorb sustained low prices,” said Torbjorn Soltvedt, the principal Middle East and North Africa analyst at Verisk Maplecroft, a risk consultancy.
And lower oil prices will also mean more economic pain for other big producers, from Iraq to Mexico to Brazil.
But the immediate pain was felt in the U.S. oil patch, where shares in many energy companies fell by nearly half on Monday, outstripping even the wider carnage in the rest of the market. With oil prices headed lower, some producers wasted no time in announcing cuts to drilling and production plans. Most analysts expect a wave of bankruptcies and restructuring to tear through the U.S. shale sector if low oil prices persist—which could end up being an economic black eye for Trump in traditionally red states in an election year.
This article was updated Mar. 9, 2020 to reflect the broadening of the Italian lockdown and the announcement from the White House.