foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--The Next Administration Needs a Plan for Deescalation in the Gulf

The Next Administration Needs a Plan for Deescalation in the Gulf Last year , the United States almost got dragged into war in the Persian Gulf .
That makes it a good time to think about what the next administration can do to deescalate tensions in the region .
What little public discussion there is usually boils down to two opposing alternatives .
One approach , often articulated by U.S. President Donald Trump and some of his supporters , is to show unconditional support for Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf States while putting “ maximum pressure ” on Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Trump and his supporters—but also by some on the left—is for Americans to wash their hands of the entire region .
A better approach would be for a new administration to use hard-nosed diplomacy and smart statecraft to pursue deescalation and calm .
On the Gulf Arab side there are also good reasons to pursue détente .
Success would be a long shot , of course , but not impossible because both sides have a compelling interest in deescalation .
Iran , with an economy in free fall and a discontented population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only desperate for relief from economic sanctions but knows it would suffer greatly in a direct military conflict .
Even if a future Biden administration rejoins the nuclear deal that Trump abandoned , the pressure for Iran to change will be kept up by low oil prices , a dysfunctional economy , and a large youth population eager to end the country ’ s isolation .
And the idea that Iran ’ s leaders must continue interfering in their neighbors ’ affairs to maintain legitimacy or satisfy their population is absurd .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and there is no sign that the Iranian public would rise up if the government started to prioritize domestic concerns such as jobs and health care over support to regional proxies .
On the Gulf Arab side there are also good reasons to pursue détente .
The military escalation that took place in the region during 2019—with tankers exploding in the Gulf , missile strikes in Iraq , and a direct Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia ’ s biggest oil refinery—was a wake-up call for Saudi and Emirati leaders .
Saudi Arabia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ militarily stronger than Iran , but they also have a lot more to lose than Iran in a military escalation—just imagine the economic impact of a single drone strike on Dubai .
This reality led the UAE last year to downplay the tanker attacks by declining to attribute them to Iran , pull its troops out of Yemen , and even pursue quiet diplomacy with Tehran .
Another factor is that , after years of supporting Trump , Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is so unpopular in Washington because of the war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ journalist Jamal Khashoggi that some are calling for an end to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia .
Embracing deescalation would take some of the political pressure off .
Obviously , any deescalation would be up to the parties , but the United States could help with leadership and diplomacy .
This could include , for example , ending U.S. military support to Saudi Arabia for the war in Yemen but telling Riyadh that other U.S. arms sales and the broader defense relationship could continue if the Saudis agree to a cease-fire and show @ @ @ @ @ @ @ To Iran , a new administration could make clear that peace in the region is not a precondition to a nuclear deal , but that abiding by it will not preclude the United States from responding vigorously to Iranian aggression in the region .
If Iranian behavior significantly improves , on the other hand , better relations and even direct trade between the two countries could be on offer .
The United States can not force Iran and Saudi Arabia to get along .
But the two countries have coexisted peacefully—and even cooperated—in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ profound interest in finding a way to do so again .
Given the alternatives , the next U.S. administration should try to steer them in that direction .

Last year, the United States almost got dragged into war in the Persian Gulf. That makes it a good time to think about what the next administration can do to de-escalate tensions in the region.
Last year, the United States almost got dragged into war in the Persian Gulf. That makes it a good time to think about what the next administration can do to de-escalate tensions in the region.
What little public discussion there is usually boils down to two opposing alternatives. One approach, often articulated by U.S. President Donald Trump and some of his supporters, is to show unconditional support for Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf States while putting “maximum pressure” on Iran. The other, sometimes also embraced by Trump and his supporters—but also by some on the left—is for Americans to wash their hands of the entire region. A better approach would be for a new administration to use hard-nosed diplomacy and smart statecraft to pursue de-escalation and calm.
On the Gulf Arab side there are also good reasons to pursue détente.
Success would be a long shot, of course, but not impossible because both sides have a compelling interest in de-escalation. Iran, with an economy in free fall and a discontented population hit hard by COVID-19, is not only desperate for relief from economic sanctions but knows it would suffer greatly in a direct military conflict. Even if a future Biden administration rejoins the nuclear deal that Trump abandoned, the pressure for Iran to change will be kept up by low oil prices, a dysfunctional economy, and a large youth population eager to end the country’s isolation. And the idea that Iran’s leaders must continue interfering in their neighbors’ affairs to maintain legitimacy or satisfy their population is absurd. The regime governs through force rather than legitimacy, and there is no sign that the Iranian public would rise up if the government started to prioritize domestic concerns such as jobs and health care over support to regional proxies.
On the Gulf Arab side there are also good reasons to pursue détente. The military escalation that took place in the region during 2019—with tankers exploding in the Gulf, missile strikes in Iraq, and a direct Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia’s biggest oil refinery—was a wake-up call for Saudi and Emirati leaders. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may be militarily stronger than Iran, but they also have a lot more to lose than Iran in a military escalation—just imagine the economic impact of a single drone strike on Dubai. This reality led the UAE last year to downplay the tanker attacks by declining to attribute them to Iran, pull its troops out of Yemen, and even pursue quiet diplomacy with Tehran. Another factor is that, after years of supporting Trump, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is so unpopular in Washington because of the war in Yemen and the killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi that some are calling for an end to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia. Embracing de-escalation would take some of the political pressure off.
Obviously, any de-escalation would be up to the parties, but the United States could help with leadership and diplomacy. This could include, for example, ending U.S. military support to Saudi Arabia for the war in Yemen but telling Riyadh that other U.S. arms sales and the broader defense relationship could continue if the Saudis agree to a cease-fire and show willingness to de-escalate on other fronts. To Iran, a new administration could make clear that peace in the region is not a precondition to a nuclear deal, but that abiding by it will not preclude the United States from responding vigorously to Iranian aggression in the region. If Iranian behavior significantly improves, on the other hand, better relations and even direct trade between the two countries could be on offer.
The United States cannot force Iran and Saudi Arabia to get along. But the two countries have coexisted peacefully—and even cooperated—in the past, and both have a profound interest in finding a way to do so again. Given the alternatives, the next U.S. administration should try to steer them in that direction.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--Trump and Biden Prepare for Final Showdown

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden face off in the final presidential debate , Brexit trade talks resume as an EU delegation heads to London , and Spain ’ s government faces a vote of no-confidence .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Tonight in Nashville , Tennessee , U.S. voters and the world will have their second and last chance to see U.S. President Donald Trump and his challenger , former Vice President Joe Biden , go head-to-head on the debate stage .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ meeting , Trump has been diagnosed with the coronavirus , a debate was cancelled , and Biden ’ s polling lead has grown in key states .
The Real Clear Politics average of polling data from the last ten days puts Biden 4.8 points ahead in Pennsylvania , 4.6 points ahead in Wisconsin , and 2.1 points ahead in Florida .
Nationally , Biden averages a 7.6 point lead .
Of course , Trump has been here before : widely deemed to have lost all three debates to Clinton in 2016 , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevail in an electoral college victory .
Mics dropped .
Tonight ’ s showdown will differ slightly from the barely coherent first debate , when Trump attempted constant interruptions .
This time around , opposing candidate microphones will be muted during the other candidate ’ s two-minute question response period—although both microphones will be back on for the longer discussion periods .
Foreign-policy will have its moment , if only tangentially , as “ National Security ” is one of the six topics under discussion .
FP on 2020 .
In advance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is featuring an array of analysis and argument addressing this election ’ s impact on the wider world , including spotlights on the niche foreign-policy issues that could sway certain constituencies in key battleground states—from Palestinian Americans in Michigan to Latinos in Georgia .
Trump ’ s foreign-policy report card .
On Oct. 14 , FP ’ s Robbie Gramer took a look at the Trump administration ’ s successes on foreign-policy from the Islamic State to taking on China , and considers whether his positive moves have outweighed the negatives .
Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first European country to reach 1 million confirmed coronavirus cases on Wednesday with France not far behind as the continent endures a second wave of cases following a summer lull .
Today , Ireland begins a six-week long lockdown in order to contain the virus , the first country to reimpose such an order nationwide .
Overall , the European Union has outpaced the United States in the number of daily confirmed cases on every day since October 5 .
Brexit talks back on .
Brexit trade talks are to resume today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where it appeared the United Kingdom had walked away from negotiations .
The talks offer a chance for an agreement just 10 weeks before the end of the post-Brexit transition period .
Despite striking a conciliatory tone with the U.K. in order to restart talks , EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier said “ the European Union ’ s attitude in this negotiation has in no way shifted and it will not shift.
” Post-election violence in Guinea .
At least 10 people were killed in the Guinean capital of Conakry on Wednesday , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dalein Diallo ’ s declaration of victory in last Sunday ’ s presidential election .
Initial tallies show President Alpha Condé in the lead , although the country ’ s electoral body has yet to make an official proclamation .
Spanish government faces no-confidence vote .
The Spanish parliament will vote today on a motion of no confidence in the government of Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez put forward by the far-right Vox party .
Vox accuses Spain ’ s left-wing government of botching the country ’ s response to the coronavirus pandemic as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is unlikely to succeed .
Vox is far short of the 176 votes needed for it to pass , while a senior leader in another conservative party derided the motion as “ a joke.
” Vaccine trial to continue following death of volunteer .
Trials of a coronavirus vaccine developed by AstraZeneca and Oxford University are to continue after the death of one of the study ’ s volunteers in Brazil .
Reuters speculates that the trial has not been suspended because the volunteer was likely part of the control group .
Trials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States have been suspended since September , after a British woman developed neurological symptoms .
DNI warns of Iran disinformation campaign .
U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe has said threatening emails recently sent to voters in Florida were part of a disinformation and interference campaign by Iran .
The emails , targeting Democratic voters , appeared to come from the far-right Proud Boys group , and were designed to “ communicate false information to registered voters that they hope will sow confusion chaos and undermine your confidence in American democracy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy on October 16 , Doowan Lee outlined how the United States can fight back against these kinds of disinformation campaigns .
Dozens of artworks and artifacts across three of Berlin ’ s history museums have been vandalized .
Items ranging from Egyptian sarcophagi , 19th century paintings , and stone sculptures were targeted , and were found to be marked with an unknown oily substance .
One of the museums , the Pergamon , has come under fire from German QAnon conspiracy theorists for its alleged links to Satanism and pedophilia .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that a conspiracy theorist-linked attack was unlikely since the objects affected were not related to each other .
“ One does not recognize any propaganda , ” Pfohl added .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden face off in the final presidential debate, Brexit trade talks resume as an EU delegation heads to London, and Spain ’s government faces a vote of no-confidence.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden face off in the final presidential debate, Brexit trade talks resume as an EU delegation heads to London, and Spain’s government faces a vote of no-confidence.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S. Election Campaign Endgame Nears
Tonight in Nashville, Tennessee, U.S. voters and the world will have their second and last chance to see U.S. President Donald Trump and his challenger, former Vice President Joe Biden, go head-to-head on the debate stage.
In the three weeks since their last meeting, Trump has been diagnosed with the coronavirus, a debate was cancelled, and Biden’s polling lead has grown in key states. The Real Clear Politics average of polling data from the last ten days puts Biden 4.8 points ahead in Pennsylvania, 4.6 points ahead in Wisconsin, and 2.1 points ahead in Florida. Nationally, Biden averages a 7.6 point lead.
Of course, Trump has been here before: widely deemed to have lost all three debates to Clinton in 2016, he faded in the pre-election polling only to prevail in an electoral college victory.
Mics dropped. Tonight’s showdown will differ slightly from the barely coherent first debate, when Trump attempted constant interruptions. This time around, opposing candidate microphones will be muted during the other candidate’s two-minute question response period—although both microphones will be back on for the longer discussion periods.
Foreign-policy will have its moment, if only tangentially, as “National Security” is one of the six topics under discussion.
FP on 2020. In advance of tonight’s debate, Foreign Policy is featuring an array of analysis and argument addressing this election’s impact on the wider world, including spotlights on the niche foreign-policy issues that could sway certain constituencies in key battleground states—from Palestinian Americans in Michigan to Latinos in Georgia.
Trump’s foreign-policy report card. On Oct. 14, FP’s Robbie Gramer took a look at the Trump administration’s successes on foreign-policy from the Islamic State to taking on China, and considers whether his positive moves have outweighed the negatives.
What We’re Following Today
Europe’s coronavirus rebound. Spain became the first European country to reach 1 million confirmed coronavirus cases on Wednesday with France not far behind as the continent endures a second wave of cases following a summer lull. Today, Ireland begins a six-week long lockdown in order to contain the virus, the first country to reimpose such an order nationwide. Overall, the European Union has outpaced the United States in the number of daily confirmed cases on every day since October 5.
Brexit talks back on. Brexit trade talks are to resume today in London, following a brief period where it appeared the United Kingdom had walked away from negotiations. The talks offer a chance for an agreement just 10 weeks before the end of the post-Brexit transition period. Despite striking a conciliatory tone with the U.K. in order to restart talks, EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier said “the European Union’s attitude in this negotiation has in no way shifted and it will not shift.”
Post-election violence in Guinea. At least 10 people were killed in the Guinean capital of Conakry on Wednesday, as protests flared following opposition candidate Cellou Dalein Diallo’s declaration of victory in last Sunday’s presidential election. Initial tallies show President Alpha Condé in the lead, although the country’s electoral body has yet to make an official proclamation.
Keep an Eye On
Spanish government faces no-confidence vote. The Spanish parliament will vote today on a motion of no confidence in the government of Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez put forward by the far-right Vox party. Vox accuses Spain’s left-wing government of botching the country’s response to the coronavirus pandemic as well as economic mismanagement.
The motion is unlikely to succeed. Vox is far short of the 176 votes needed for it to pass, while a senior leader in another conservative party derided the motion as “a joke.”
Vaccine trial to continue following death of volunteer. Trials of a coronavirus vaccine developed by AstraZeneca and Oxford University are to continue after the death of one of the study’s volunteers in Brazil. Reuters speculates that the trial has not been suspended because the volunteer was likely part of the control group. Trials of the vaccine candidate in the United States have been suspended since September, after a British woman developed neurological symptoms.
DNI warns of Iran disinformation campaign. U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe has said threatening emails recently sent to voters in Florida were part of a disinformation and interference campaign by Iran. The emails, targeting Democratic voters, appeared to come from the far-right Proud Boys group, and were designed to “communicate false information to registered voters that they hope will sow confusion chaos and undermine your confidence in American democracy,” Ratcliffe said. Writing in Foreign Policy on October 16, Doowan Lee outlined how the United States can fight back against these kinds of disinformation campaigns.
Odds and Ends
Dozens of artworks and artifacts across three of Berlin’s history museums have been vandalized. Items ranging from Egyptian sarcophagi, 19th century paintings, and stone sculptures were targeted, and were found to be marked with an unknown oily substance. One of the museums, the Pergamon, has come under fire from German QAnon conspiracy theorists for its alleged links to Satanism and pedophilia. Carsten Pfohl of the Berlin police said that a conspiracy theorist-linked attack was unlikely since the objects affected were not related to each other. “One does not recognize any propaganda,” Pfohl added.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--Kyrgyzstan’s Protests Won’t Keep Corrupt Criminals Out of Politics

Kyrgyzstan ’ s Protests Won ’ t Keep Corrupt Criminals Out of Politics Kyrgyzstan is in the midst of a political crisis .
Following parliamentary elections on Oct. 4 marred by vote buying and intimidation by pro-establishment political parties , President Sooronbai Jeenbekov was forced to resign , while his opponent from the Ata-Jurt ( Fatherland ) party , Sadyr Japarov—who was sprung from prison by his supporters days after the elections—declared himself the acting head of state .
The weeks following the elections have plunged the country into cycles of violent protest .
While there ’ s hope that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a rerun of the parliamentary elections scheduled for Dec. 20 , many in the country are concerned that the most powerful political parties are affiliated with individuals with criminal and corrupt backgrounds .
The criminal underworld has always played a role in supporting both government and opposition forces in Kyrgyzstan .
Political leaders turn to the help of criminal actors to prevail in a competitive political landscape , and individuals with corrupt and criminal backgrounds often try to enter the formal political process to shield themselves from prosecution .
Omurbek Suvanaliev , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Security Council , has publicly stated that criminal groups back the Birimdik ( United ) and Mekenim Kyrgyzstan ( My Fatherland Kyrgyzstan ) parties .
In the run-up to the election , he stated that the notorious criminal kingpin Kamchy Kolbayev allegedly supported parties aligned with Jeenbekov , while Mekenim Kyrgyzstan is represented by the brother of the former customs chief Raimbek Matraimov , who is allegedly involved in large-scale corruption and money laundering schemes according to journalistic investigations .
Both Kolbayev and Matraimov enjoy support in their hometowns and villages thanks to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Kolbayev raised his public profile during the pandemic this summer .
He distributed food and medical supplies in his native Issyk-Kul province .
Local doctors expressed personal gratitude to Kolbayev for the help when the public health care system quickly ran out of resources .
Kolbayev ’ s criminal network has also been on the U.S. State Department ’ s wanted list since 2014 and on the U.S. Treasury Narcotics Kingpin list since 2011 for its involvement in “ drug trafficking , arms trafficking , human trafficking , extortion , and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Embassy in Bishkek expressed concern about the involvement of organized crime and corruption in Kyrgyzstan ’ s political process .
The statement called on both citizens and political leaders to “ continue to fight against the influence of organized crime and corruption in politics.
” Months before the elections , a coalition of three media outlets—Kloop.kg , Radio Azattyk , and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project—produced a series of investigative reports revealing Matraimov ’ s funneling abroad of $ 700 million in cash as part of an elaborate money laundering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year and prompted protests in Bishkek by the urban middle class demanding that Jeenbekov investigate Matraimov and reduce the influence of corruption in national politics .
Ignoring journalistic accounts , Jeenbekov famously said he still needed to see facts to be able to hold Matraimov accountable .
Kyrgyzstan has seen forceful regime changes twice before—in March 2005 and in April 2010 .
Each time , formerly fugitive crime bosses found new opportunities to gain impunity by showing their opposition or support for incumbent politicians .
In April 2006 , Rysbek Akmatbayev , suspected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ court , walked in central Bishkek to show he wasn ’ t afraid to criticize then-President Kurmanbek Bakiyev .
He ran in parliamentary elections and won overwhelming support in his native Balykchy town .
A month later , he was shot dead near Bishkek .
Akmatbayev ’ s father suspects his son was killed by security authorities , but there has still been no formal investigation .
Today , Kolbayev also faces challenges from other rising criminal kingpins who may step into the center of political life under the new leadership .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , his political patrons are now gone , and he will have to adjust .
During Bakiyev ’ s regime , from 2005 to 2010 , politicians with criminal backgrounds were able to win seats in the parliament .
After Bakiyev was ousted in 2010 , interim President Roza Otunbayeva tried to prosecute up to 80 members of organized criminal groups across the country .
Kolbayev was briefly arrested in 2012 by Kyrgyz authorities after being extradited by United Arab Emirates but was soon released .
Both witnesses and victims withdrew their earlier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Supreme Court sentenced him to three years in jail , he was still able to walk free .
Criminal groups in Kyrgyzstan have international connections as well .
For over a decade , Kolbayev was the most influential crime boss with reported connections among criminal groups in Russia .
According to former Interior Minister Murat Sutalinov , Kolbayev ( known in Russia as Kolya-Kirghiz ) was “ crowned ” as Kyrgyzstan ’ s only “ thief-in-law , ” a tradition in the criminal underworld dating back to the Soviet times .
Another known @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chechen from Tokmok , also claimed thief-in-law status and was freed from jail in 2013 by former President Almazbek Atambayev ’ s administration for health reasons .
He was quickly extradited to Chechnya , reportedly thanks to mediation by Adam Delimkhanov , a member of the Russian Duma and a close ally of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov .
Batukayev has since appeared looking healthy and active in the Chechen capital , Grozny .
Jeenbekov later prosecuted Atambayev and several others from his administration for charges that included the unlawful release of Batukayev .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ trafficked from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe .
Drug trafficking has always been one of the major sources for criminal organizations there , especially in southern Kyrgyzstan .
Imports and contraband from China are another source of enrichment .
To prevail in a competitive political landscape , Kyrgyz politicians often rely on the support of physically fit men to intimidate opponents with the threat of potential violence .
For instance , the former mayor of Osh , Melis Myrzakhmetov , relied on a network of martial arts clubs .
Japarov ’ s supporters—mostly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bishkek .
With the latest round of regime change , criminal and corrupt networks are readapting to new political coalitions .
Matraimov could now challenge Japarov or choose to support him .
On Oct. 20 , Matraimov was arrested by the State Committee for National Security , but it remains to be seen if he will indeed be prosecuted for corruption .
Across Central Asia , human rights and political activists are calling for the U.S. government to sanction corrupt individuals under the Global Magnitsky Act , which would allow it to freeze @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In their book on international offshore vehicles , Dictators Without Borders , Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw examine how elites across Central Asia benefit from opportunities to launder money to Western markets .
To date , only Gulnara Karimova , the daughter of late Uzbek President Islam Karimov—who died while still in office in 2016—has been prosecuted and imprisoned .
Expanding this list to individuals like Matraimov could potentially help Kyrgyz authorities repatriate his laundered funds back to Kyrgyzstan .
But the new leadership isn ’ t so encouraging .
Acting President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 2013 , he was charged with taking hostage the head of Issyk-Kul province and sentenced to 11 and a half years in prison .
Japarov denied his involvement and briefly fled to Cyprus to avoid prosecution .
He was freed from jail days after the elections by his supporters , who used the political crisis to proclaim him their leader .
Japarov declared that he would fight organized crime and corruption , including by prosecuting Matraimov .
But his own controversial ascent to power undermines his image as an honest politician .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ often used by incumbents to jail their political opponents instead of going after criminal networks .
Thanks to the country ’ s free media landscape with award-winning investigative journalists , the public is able to learn about connections between criminal and political realms .
A new generation of political activists demanding clean politics and more efficient governance has emerged as a result of journalistic investigations .
Some of them have formed new political parties , like Reforma , which demands more transparent governance , while others were recruited to join more seasoned opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bir Bol ( Be One ) .
They see a fresh opportunity to prevail in elections in December and clean up politics from criminal and corrupt actors .
Given the history of deep connections between politics , crime , and corruption in Kyrgyzstan , it will be an uphill battle .

Kyrgyzstan is in the midst of a political crisis. Following parliamentary elections on Oct. 4 marred by vote buying and intimidation by pro-establishment political parties, President Sooronbai Jeenbekov was forced to resign, while his opponent from the Ata-Jurt (Fatherland) party, Sadyr Japarov—who was sprung from prison by his supporters days after the elections—declared himself the acting head of state. The weeks following the elections have plunged the country into cycles of violent protest.
Kyrgyzstan is in the midst of a political crisis. Following parliamentary elections on Oct. 4 marred by vote buying and intimidation by pro-establishment political parties, President Sooronbai Jeenbekov was forced to resign, while his opponent from the Ata-Jurt (Fatherland) party, Sadyr Japarov—who was sprung from prison by his supporters days after the elections—declared himself the acting head of state. The weeks following the elections have plunged the country into cycles of violent protest.
While there’s hope that political life will return to normal after a rerun of the parliamentary elections scheduled for Dec. 20, many in the country are concerned that the most powerful political parties are affiliated with individuals with criminal and corrupt backgrounds. The criminal underworld has always played a role in supporting both government and opposition forces in Kyrgyzstan. Political leaders turn to the help of criminal actors to prevail in a competitive political landscape, and individuals with corrupt and criminal backgrounds often try to enter the formal political process to shield themselves from prosecution.
Omurbek Suvanaliev, the former deputy secretary of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council, has publicly stated that criminal groups back the Birimdik (United) and Mekenim Kyrgyzstan (My Fatherland Kyrgyzstan) parties. In the run-up to the election, he stated that the notorious criminal kingpin Kamchy Kolbayev allegedly supported parties aligned with Jeenbekov, while Mekenim Kyrgyzstan is represented by the brother of the former customs chief Raimbek Matraimov, who is allegedly involved in large-scale corruption and money laundering schemes according to journalistic investigations. Both Kolbayev and Matraimov enjoy support in their hometowns and villages thanks to the protections they offer to local entrepreneurs.
Kolbayev raised his public profile during the pandemic this summer. He distributed food and medical supplies in his native Issyk-Kul province. Local doctors expressed personal gratitude to Kolbayev for the help when the public health care system quickly ran out of resources. Kolbayev’s criminal network has also been on the U.S. State Department’s wanted list since 2014 and on the U.S. Treasury Narcotics Kingpin list since 2011 for its involvement in “drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, extortion, and other crimes.” On Oct. 14, the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek expressed concern about the involvement of organized crime and corruption in Kyrgyzstan’s political process. The statement called on both citizens and political leaders to “continue to fight against the influence of organized crime and corruption in politics.”
The latest protests by opposition parties were intended as a rebuke to individuals affiliated with criminal groups and corruption gaining a majority of seats in the parliament.
Months before the elections, a coalition of three media outlets—Kloop.kg, Radio Azattyk, and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project—produced a series of investigative reports revealing Matraimov’s funneling abroad of $700 million in cash as part of an elaborate money laundering effort. The revelations began late last year and prompted protests in Bishkek by the urban middle class demanding that Jeenbekov investigate Matraimov and reduce the influence of corruption in national politics. Ignoring journalistic accounts, Jeenbekov famously said he still needed to see facts to be able to hold Matraimov accountable.
Kyrgyzstan has seen forceful regime changes twice before—in March 2005 and in April 2010. Each time, formerly fugitive crime bosses found new opportunities to gain impunity by showing their opposition or support for incumbent politicians. In April 2006, Rysbek Akmatbayev, suspected in a triple homicide but acquitted by court, walked in central Bishkek to show he wasn’t afraid to criticize then-President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. He ran in parliamentary elections and won overwhelming support in his native Balykchy town. A month later, he was shot dead near Bishkek.
Akmatbayev’s father suspects his son was killed by security authorities, but there has still been no formal investigation. Today, Kolbayev also faces challenges from other rising criminal kingpins who may step into the center of political life under the new leadership. If Kolbayev was indeed supportive of pro-establishment parties, his political patrons are now gone, and he will have to adjust.
During Bakiyev’s regime, from 2005 to 2010, politicians with criminal backgrounds were able to win seats in the parliament. After Bakiyev was ousted in 2010, interim President Roza Otunbayeva tried to prosecute up to 80 members of organized criminal groups across the country. Kolbayev was briefly arrested in 2012 by Kyrgyz authorities after being extradited by United Arab Emirates but was soon released. Both witnesses and victims withdrew their earlier testimonies, and although Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court sentenced him to three years in jail, he was still able to walk free.
Criminal groups in Kyrgyzstan have international connections as well. For over a decade, Kolbayev was the most influential crime boss with reported connections among criminal groups in Russia. According to former Interior Minister Murat Sutalinov, Kolbayev (known in Russia as Kolya-Kirghiz) was “crowned” as Kyrgyzstan’s only “thief-in-law,” a tradition in the criminal underworld dating back to the Soviet times. Another known criminal, Aziz Batukayev, an ethnic Chechen from Tokmok, also claimed thief-in-law status and was freed from jail in 2013 by former President Almazbek Atambayev’s administration for health reasons.
He was quickly extradited to Chechnya, reportedly thanks to mediation by Adam Delimkhanov, a member of the Russian Duma and a close ally of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Batukayev has since appeared looking healthy and active in the Chechen capital, Grozny. Jeenbekov later prosecuted Atambayev and several others from his administration for charges that included the unlawful release of Batukayev.
The country’s decentralized political landscape—with many different factions competing for representation in the parliament—is one of the reasons organized criminal groups find opportunities to influence politics. To cross the 7 percent threshold to enter the parliament (previously 9 percent), political parties need to raise sufficient funds to launch effective campaigns. As one candidate from Mekenim Kyrgyzstan confessed, wealthy politicians are expected to pay $500,000 to $1 million to political party leaders to secure positions at the top of the party list. Few individuals in the country can afford such payouts and are likely to be involved in the shadow economy.
Kyrgyzstan is a transit country for heroin trafficked from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe. Drug trafficking has always been one of the major sources for criminal organizations there, especially in southern Kyrgyzstan. Imports and contraband from China are another source of enrichment.
To prevail in a competitive political landscape, Kyrgyz politicians often rely on the support of physically fit men to intimidate opponents with the threat of potential violence. For instance, the former mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakhmetov, relied on a network of martial arts clubs. Japarov’s supporters—mostly young men—were bused to protest locations in Bishkek. With the latest round of regime change, criminal and corrupt networks are readapting to new political coalitions. Matraimov could now challenge Japarov or choose to support him. On Oct. 20, Matraimov was arrested by the State Committee for National Security, but it remains to be seen if he will indeed be prosecuted for corruption.
Across Central Asia, human rights and political activists are calling for the U.S. government to sanction corrupt individuals under the Global Magnitsky Act, which would allow it to freeze assets and limit travel in Western countries. In their book on international offshore vehicles, Dictators Without Borders, Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw examine how elites across Central Asia benefit from opportunities to launder money to Western markets. To date, only Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of late Uzbek President Islam Karimov—who died while still in office in 2016—has been prosecuted and imprisoned. Expanding this list to individuals like Matraimov could potentially help Kyrgyz authorities repatriate his laundered funds back to Kyrgyzstan.
But the new leadership isn’t so encouraging. Acting President Japarov himself is a convicted kidnapper. In 2013, he was charged with taking hostage the head of Issyk-Kul province and sentenced to 11 and a half years in prison. Japarov denied his involvement and briefly fled to Cyprus to avoid prosecution. He was freed from jail days after the elections by his supporters, who used the political crisis to proclaim him their leader. Japarov declared that he would fight organized crime and corruption, including by prosecuting Matraimov. But his own controversial ascent to power undermines his image as an honest politician.
Kyrgyzstan’s weak judicial system is often used by incumbents to jail their political opponents instead of going after criminal networks. Thanks to the country’s free media landscape with award-winning investigative journalists, the public is able to learn about connections between criminal and political realms.
A new generation of political activists demanding clean politics and more efficient governance has emerged as a result of journalistic investigations. Some of them have formed new political parties, like Reforma, which demands more transparent governance, while others were recruited to join more seasoned opposition parties like Ata-Meken (Homeland) and Bir Bol (Be One). They see a fresh opportunity to prevail in elections in December and clean up politics from criminal and corrupt actors. Given the history of deep connections between politics, crime, and corruption in Kyrgyzstan, it will be an uphill battle.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--Why Pakistanis Are Daring to Criticize Their Military

Why Pakistanis Are Daring to Criticize Their Military Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief .
Today : Pakistan ’ s army chief faces a rare public admonishment , a deadly airstrike hits a school in Afghanistan , Bangladesh passes an economic milestone , and how India is bucking conventional wisdom on clean energy .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Large protests are not uncommon in Pakistan .
Just last year , Prime Minister Imran Khan survived large demonstrations calling for his resignation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have regularly criticized a variety of administrations .
But there ’ s an unwritten rule : Protesters can direct their ire at civilian leaders but should refrain from attacking the all-powerful military , which has ruled Pakistan for nearly half of its existence .
Last Thursday , something changed in Pakistani politics .
Speaking remotely from London to an audience of tens of thousands of people in the Punjabi city of Gujranwala , former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif not only attacked the current government but also singled out the country ’ s army @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ You rejected the people ’ s choice in the [ 2018 ] elections and installed an inefficient and incapable group of people , ” Sharif said .
“ General Bajwa , you will have to answer for inflated electricity bills , shortage of medicines , and poor people suffering.
” The criticism is extraordinary on several levels .
First , no mainstream politician had ever publicly criticized an army chief .
Second , the allegations were leveled in front of an audience of tens of thousands .
And third , the speech @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a traditional military stronghold .
Even though the event was not carried on television , video footage of the speech circulated widely on social media .
The protest movement .
Sharif ’ s speech was part of a larger event that saw several major opposition parties come together to demonstrate against Khan , including Sharif ’ s Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples Party—the party of the slain former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto .
The unlikely alliance , which calls itself the Pakistan Democratic Movement ( PDM ) , held a second large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ PDM argues that Khan didn ’ t win the country ’ s 2018 elections fairly and likes to say the prime minister was selected by the army rather than elected by the people .
In attacking the military more directly , the alliance has upped the ante in Pakistani politics .
What happens next ?
Even though Pakistani prime ministers are often toppled , they tend to fall in military coups rather than protest movements .
“ People vastly underestimate the power of the office of the PM in Pakistan , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tabadlab , a think tank in Islamabad .
“ As long as Khan has the support of the military , he is safe in his job.
” But precedent may not count for much in the current moment .
“ The only thing that can really damage Imran Khan to the point of the military questioning its support for him would be a severe economic crisis , ” Zaidi said .
And Pakistan ’ s economy is indeed in dire trouble , with rampant inflation , negative growth rates , and billions of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In the end , Khan ’ s larger problem may not be dissent but the coronavirus pandemic and a shackled global economy .
After all , for at least the next year , he has severely limited fiscal tools and international funding—not enough to turn around an economic crisis .
Coronavirus update .
Put together , South Asia ’ s eight countries have now recorded about as many coronavirus cases as the United States—a little more than 8.6 million .
But the data tells only a part of the story .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for every 1,000 citizens , India has tested only 71 people .
Bangladesh and Pakistan , the region ’ s next biggest countries , have tested only 13 and 18 people per 1,000 citizens , respectively .
Afghan attack .
At least 12 people , including some children , were killed on Wednesday after an Afghan military airstrike targeting Taliban fighters hit a religious school in the northeastern province of Takhar .
Afghanistan ’ s military has launched an investigation into the deadly error .
The tragedy comes amid increased fighting between Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ talks to end the war continue in Doha , Qatar .
Rajapaksa ’ s rise .
As long expected , Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa won a parliamentary vote on Thursday to restore sweeping executive powers and weaken the role of the prime minister .
Rajapaksa won 156 of 225 votes in the parliament , passing the supermajority threshold required to amend the constitution .
Other changes include giving Rajapaksa the authority to appoint members to Sri Lanka ’ s Election Commission and the Human Rights Commission—moves that will likely give him unchecked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper will travel to New Delhi next week to meet their Indian counterparts in what is known as the “ 2+2 Dialogue.
” China will once again be high on the agenda .
At a news conference this week , Pompeo told reporters that he would have “ discussions on how free nations can work together to thwart threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.
” Pompeo is also scheduled to stop by the Maldives , Sri Lanka , and Indonesia .
Bangladesh ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fall ?
Last week , when news broke that Bangladesh ’ s GDP per capita had surpassed India ’ s , “ the Indian press went wild in a paroxysm of angst , finger-pointing , and denial , ” wrote FP columnist Salvatore Babones .
But that doesn ’ t mean India should follow Bangladesh ’ s strategy of boosting exports through low-wage manufacturing jobs , he argues , because most Indian states don ’ t have the same demographics as Bangladesh and lack crucial logistics capabilities and port access .
India needs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the farm bill announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s government last month .
For more , read Babones ’ s essay .
Clean energy surprise ?
Conventional wisdom holds that India is the problem child in every discussion around climate change .
After all , it has 1.4 billion people with rising incomes and a growing appetite for energy—meaning India consumes more coal than the United States and Japan combined .
While all of that is true , FP columnist Vivek Wadhwa points out that India ’ s efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He cites how New Delhi broke a record this year for the world ’ s largest tender for renewable power , with several other clean energy projects commissioned—thanks to technological advances and lower setup costs for solar energy .
Don ’ t agree ?
Read Wadhwa ’ s take .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.
Today: Pakistan’s army chief faces a rare public admonishment, a deadly airstrike hits a school in Afghanistan, Bangladesh passes an economic milestone, and how India is bucking conventional wisdom on clean energy.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Pakistan’s Unusual Protests
Large protests are not uncommon in Pakistan. Just last year, Prime Minister Imran Khan survived large demonstrations calling for his resignation. And throughout Pakistani history, protesters have regularly criticized a variety of administrations. But there’s an unwritten rule: Protesters can direct their ire at civilian leaders but should refrain from attacking the all-powerful military, which has ruled Pakistan for nearly half of its existence.
Last Thursday, something changed in Pakistani politics. Speaking remotely from London to an audience of tens of thousands of people in the Punjabi city of Gujranwala, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif not only attacked the current government but also singled out the country’s army chief, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa.
“You rejected the people’s choice in the [2018] elections and installed an inefficient and incapable group of people,” Sharif said. “General Bajwa, you will have to answer for inflated electricity bills, shortage of medicines, and poor people suffering.”
The criticism is extraordinary on several levels. First, no mainstream politician had ever publicly criticized an army chief. Second, the allegations were leveled in front of an audience of tens of thousands. And third, the speech was heard and applauded in Punjab, a traditional military stronghold. Even though the event was not carried on television, video footage of the speech circulated widely on social media.
The protest movement. Sharif’s speech was part of a larger event that saw several major opposition parties come together to demonstrate against Khan, including Sharif’s Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples Party—the party of the slain former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The unlikely alliance, which calls itself the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), held a second large protest in Karachi on Sunday.
The PDM argues that Khan didn’t win the country’s 2018 elections fairly and likes to say the prime minister was selected by the army rather than elected by the people. In attacking the military more directly, the alliance has upped the ante in Pakistani politics.
What happens next? Even though Pakistani prime ministers are often toppled, they tend to fall in military coups rather than protest movements. “People vastly underestimate the power of the office of the PM in Pakistan,” said Mosharraf Zaidi, a senior fellow at Tabadlab, a think tank in Islamabad. “As long as Khan has the support of the military, he is safe in his job.”
But precedent may not count for much in the current moment. “The only thing that can really damage Imran Khan to the point of the military questioning its support for him would be a severe economic crisis,” Zaidi said. And Pakistan’s economy is indeed in dire trouble, with rampant inflation, negative growth rates, and billions of dollars in debt owed to international donors.
In the end, Khan’s larger problem may not be dissent but the coronavirus pandemic and a shackled global economy. After all, for at least the next year, he has severely limited fiscal tools and international funding—not enough to turn around an economic crisis.
What We’re Following
Coronavirus update. Put together, South Asia’s eight countries have now recorded about as many coronavirus cases as the United States—a little more than 8.6 million. But the data tells only a part of the story. While the United States has tested 391 people for every 1,000 citizens, India has tested only 71 people. Bangladesh and Pakistan, the region’s next biggest countries, have tested only 13 and 18 people per 1,000 citizens, respectively.
Afghan attack. At least 12 people, including some children, were killed on Wednesday after an Afghan military airstrike targeting Taliban fighters hit a religious school in the northeastern province of Takhar. Afghanistan’s military has launched an investigation into the deadly error. The tragedy comes amid increased fighting between Taliban and government forces, even as U.S.-brokered talks to end the war continue in Doha, Qatar.
Rajapaksa’s rise. As long expected, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa won a parliamentary vote on Thursday to restore sweeping executive powers and weaken the role of the prime minister. Rajapaksa won 156 of 225 votes in the parliament, passing the supermajority threshold required to amend the constitution. Other changes include giving Rajapaksa the authority to appoint members to Sri Lanka’s Election Commission and the Human Rights Commission—moves that will likely give him unchecked powers.
U.S.-India 2+2 Dialogue. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper will travel to New Delhi next week to meet their Indian counterparts in what is known as the “2+2 Dialogue.” China will once again be high on the agenda. At a news conference this week, Pompeo told reporters that he would have “discussions on how free nations can work together to thwart threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.”
Pompeo is also scheduled to stop by the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia.
South Asia Inc.
Bangladesh’s rise … or India’s fall? Last week, when news broke that Bangladesh’s GDP per capita had surpassed India’s, “the Indian press went wild in a paroxysm of angst, finger-pointing, and denial,” wrote FP columnist Salvatore Babones.
But that doesn’t mean India should follow Bangladesh’s strategy of boosting exports through low-wage manufacturing jobs, he argues, because most Indian states don’t have the same demographics as Bangladesh and lack crucial logistics capabilities and port access. India needs to focus instead on economic reforms such as the farm bill announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government last month. For more, read Babones’s essay.
And Finally…
Clean energy surprise? Conventional wisdom holds that India is the problem child in every discussion around climate change. After all, it has 1.4 billion people with rising incomes and a growing appetite for energy—meaning India consumes more coal than the United States and Japan combined.
While all of that is true, FP columnist Vivek Wadhwa points out that India’s efforts to boost green energy are chronically underreported. He cites how New Delhi broke a record this year for the world’s largest tender for renewable power, with several other clean energy projects commissioned—thanks to technological advances and lower setup costs for solar energy. Don’t agree? Read Wadhwa’s take.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--Why Is Saad Hariri Back In Charge of Lebanon?

Why Is Saad Hariri Back In Charge of Lebanon ?
Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri is back by unpopular demand , pledging to do better this time ( his fourth as premier ) as Lebanon reels from its months of political paralysis , its worst financial crisis in decades , the coronavirus pandemic , and the aftermath of the deadly Aug. 4 explosion at the port of Beirut .
On Thursday , a slim majority of the Lebanon ’ s members of parliament agreed to have Hariri return as prime minister-designate and form a new cabinet—which will be his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not be welcomed by the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who have been in the streets in protest since last October , when they secured their biggest victory by forcing Hariri ’ s resignation .
But after a year of dashed hopes , protesters are greeting his return with more despair than anger .
Wait , Hariri resigned a year ago in answer to the popular protests .
How is his return supposed to be the solution to Lebanon ’ s problems , which have only gotten worse since then ?
Hariri is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because there ’ s not really anybody else whom Lebanon ’ s political parties would agree on .
Hassan Diab , who succeeded Hariri last fall , resigned himself after the August explosion , which killed almost 200 people and was widely seen as the result of government incompetence and corruption .
After him came Mustapha Adib , then ( and now again ) Lebanon ’ s ambassador to Germany .
But he couldn ’ t form a new cabinet and stepped down as prime minister late last month .
The biggest cabinet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a powerful position , as financial signoff can influence the work of other ministries .
Lebanon ’ s Shiite parties , Hezbollah and Amal , wanted the post , but there was resistance from other groups .
Hariri is believed to be more likely to accommodate that demand—and indeed , while Hezbollah declined to nominate anyone for prime minister , it has said it won ’ t stand in the way of forming a new government .
At the same time , though , Hariri has promised to assemble a cabinet of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mission to implement the economic , financial and administrative reforms ” the country desperately needs .
Of course , that ’ s the same promise Adib and Diab made before him .
Hariri is an old hand in Lebanon ’ s political game and more likely to accommodate the demands of the traditional political parties than Adib was , but success in forming a cabinet is not guaranteed .
It will be a balancing act of political interests .
The process could go on for months .
If it ’ s unsuccessful , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in less than a year and more delays on its road to recovery .
But there must be other options , right ?
Other names were floated to head the next government , but the pool is limited .
Under Lebanon ’ s sectarian political system , the prime minister has to be a Sunni Muslim , just as the president has to be a Christian and the speaker of the house a Shiite Muslim .
Then , he has to be seen as acceptable to most of the sect-based political parties .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Shiite Amal Movement , the Druze Progressive Socialist Party , and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party all voted in favor of Hariri ’ s return , but the Free Patriotic Movement of President Michel Aoun and the Christian Lebanese Forces did not .
In the end , Hariri passed with a slim majority—just 65 of the 128 seats .
That sectarian political system breeds the very sort of dynastic approach to politics that brought the protesters in the streets in the first place .
This week , a two-year-old clip of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ viral , in which he says that he didn ’ t want to be in politics , but it ’ s a “ family business.
” And that ’ s true across sectarian lines .
Hariri ’ s father , Rafik , was previously prime minister , too , for 10 years , but he was killed by Hezbollah in 2005 .
Saad Hariri ’ s brother Bahaa has also been floated as a future prime minister .
The son-in-law of current President Aoun was foreign minister until last year , and so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s civil war of 1975 to 1990 still casts the biggest shadow over the political landscape .
Lebanon ’ s political system—the very thing the protesters were up in arms about—has been dominated by the same sect-based political parties and often the same rulers , many of them former wartime militia leaders and their relatives .
If protesters brought down Hariri once before , how are they reacting now ?
Hariri ’ s resignation—just weeks after the protests started last October—was the most substantial victory for the protest movement and gave it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time names associated with Lebanon ’ s old guard were floated for government posts , protesters headed back out to the streets .
But as of late Thursday , demonstrations were small , and there is a sense of defeat among many who saw their calls to end corruption , mismanagement , and the sectarian political system doused with tear gas .
Hariri ’ s return almost exactly one year later suggests to many protesters that it was all for naught .
Hassan Safsouf , who took part in the protests starting last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ English exam , as part of the process of emigrating to Canada .
He says he doesn ’ t see the point in going to the streets anymore and just wants to leave the country .
“ The political decisions are not taken by the Lebanese people .
The decisions are taken by the corrupt leaders , ” said Safsouf , walking in Beirut ’ s Gemmayze neighborhood with two friends—both of whom are also trying to emigrate .
But if so many poured into the streets demanding change , how is Lebanon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under the slogan “ killon yani killon , ” or “ everyone means everyone , ” a shot at the entire political class—of which Hariri is very much an exemplar .
The key demand of the protests has been the fall of the system , not just individual leaders , but that hasn ’ t happened , and it ’ s not clear what would replace it .
Even if new elections were held tomorrow , results would probably vary little from the current parliament , experts say .
Independents outside of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a handful of seats in the 128-seat Lebanese parliament , but not enough to fundamentally change things .
And that stasis is itself a reflection of the end of the civil war .
The Taif Agreement , which ended the fighting , only further entrenched the country ’ s sectarian system as warlords divvied up power to secure their own interests .
It ’ s a system that is now deeply entrenched in almost every aspect of social , political , and economic life .
Many Lebanese still feel dependent on warlords-turned-politicians for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries , as well as economic sustenance .
Basic foodstuffs , government jobs , education , and health care—all even more important now due to the country ’ s economic collapse and the COVID-19 pandemic—are doled out as political patronage rather than as state services .
That keeps people deeply reliant on their parties and ends up entrenching the leaders in power .
Will the fourth time be the charm for Hariri as prime minister ?
Unlikely .
The first task for Hariri will be to form a cabinet , no easy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are made through political wrangling and horse-trading to appease the country ’ s political elites .
All of Lebanon ’ s sect-based political parties will need to be accommodated , in what is more like a balancing act than a democratic process .
Protesters say the country ’ s leaders negotiate for their own interests , not what ’ s good for the country or even their own constituents .
The key task of the new government—if and when it is formed—will be to implement economic and financial reforms to meet the conditions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , needed to unlock billions of dollars in badly needed aid .
That could avert complete collapse in the short term but would not solve Lebanon ’ s structural problems .
It ’ s got one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world and is highly reliant on imports , including food , that it can no longer afford as the currency has lost 80 percent of its value since last fall .
Half of Lebanese are now below the poverty line , and reforms will likely mean removing the subsidies on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of State David Schenker told reporters Thursday : “ Whatever government comes next must commit to and have the ability to implement reforms that can lead to economic opportunity , better governance , and an end to endemic corruption.
” Jan Kubis , the United Nations special coordinator for Lebanon , warned the country ’ s leaders not to “ count on miracles , foreign elections , or external donors—the rescue must start in Lebanon , by Lebanon .
”

Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri is back by unpopular demand, pledging to do better this time (his fourth as premier) as Lebanon reels from its months of political paralysis, its worst financial crisis in decades, the coronavirus pandemic, and the aftermath of the deadly Aug. 4 explosion at the port of Beirut.
Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri is back by unpopular demand, pledging to do better this time (his fourth as premier) as Lebanon reels from its months of political paralysis, its worst financial crisis in decades, the coronavirus pandemic, and the aftermath of the deadly Aug. 4 explosion at the port of Beirut.
On Thursday, a slim majority of the Lebanon’s members of parliament agreed to have Hariri return as prime minister-designate and form a new cabinet—which will be his first tough test. His return will not be welcomed by the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who have been in the streets in protest since last October, when they secured their biggest victory by forcing Hariri’s resignation. But after a year of dashed hopes, protesters are greeting his return with more despair than anger.
Wait, Hariri resigned a year ago in answer to the popular protests. How is his return supposed to be the solution to Lebanon’s problems, which have only gotten worse since then?
Hariri is back as prime minister in large part because there’s not really anybody else whom Lebanon’s political parties would agree on. Hassan Diab, who succeeded Hariri last fall, resigned himself after the August explosion, which killed almost 200 people and was widely seen as the result of government incompetence and corruption. After him came Mustapha Adib, then (and now again) Lebanon’s ambassador to Germany. But he couldn’t form a new cabinet and stepped down as prime minister late last month.
The biggest cabinet hurdle was the post of finance minister, a powerful position, as financial signoff can influence the work of other ministries. Lebanon’s Shiite parties, Hezbollah and Amal, wanted the post, but there was resistance from other groups. Hariri is believed to be more likely to accommodate that demand—and indeed, while Hezbollah declined to nominate anyone for prime minister, it has said it won’t stand in the way of forming a new government.
At the same time, though, Hariri has promised to assemble a cabinet of “nonpartisan specialists” with a “mission to implement the economic, financial and administrative reforms” the country desperately needs. Of course, that’s the same promise Adib and Diab made before him.
Hariri is an old hand in Lebanon’s political game and more likely to accommodate the demands of the traditional political parties than Adib was, but success in forming a cabinet is not guaranteed. It will be a balancing act of political interests. The process could go on for months. If it’s unsuccessful, Lebanon could see its fourth prime minister in less than a year and more delays on its road to recovery.
But there must be other options, right?
Other names were floated to head the next government, but the pool is limited. Under Lebanon’s sectarian political system, the prime minister has to be a Sunni Muslim, just as the president has to be a Christian and the speaker of the house a Shiite Muslim. Then, he has to be seen as acceptable to most of the sect-based political parties. Hariri’s own Future Movement, the Shiite Amal Movement, the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party all voted in favor of Hariri’s return, but the Free Patriotic Movement of President Michel Aoun and the Christian Lebanese Forces did not. In the end, Hariri passed with a slim majority—just 65 of the 128 seats.
That sectarian political system breeds the very sort of dynastic approach to politics that brought the protesters in the streets in the first place. This week, a two-year-old clip of the son of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt went viral, in which he says that he didn’t want to be in politics, but it’s a “family business.” And that’s true across sectarian lines.
Hariri’s father, Rafik, was previously prime minister, too, for 10 years, but he was killed by Hezbollah in 2005. Saad Hariri’s brother Bahaa has also been floated as a future prime minister. The son-in-law of current President Aoun was foreign minister until last year, and so on.
In a way, Lebanon’s civil war of 1975 to 1990 still casts the biggest shadow over the political landscape. Lebanon’s political system—the very thing the protesters were up in arms about—has been dominated by the same sect-based political parties and often the same rulers, many of them former wartime militia leaders and their relatives.
If protesters brought down Hariri once before, how are they reacting now?
Hariri’s resignation—just weeks after the protests started last October—was the most substantial victory for the protest movement and gave it momentum. For months afterward, every time names associated with Lebanon’s old guard were floated for government posts, protesters headed back out to the streets.
But as of late Thursday, demonstrations were small, and there is a sense of defeat among many who saw their calls to end corruption, mismanagement, and the sectarian political system doused with tear gas. Hariri’s return almost exactly one year later suggests to many protesters that it was all for naught. Hassan Safsouf, who took part in the protests starting last fall, instead spent Thursday completing an English exam, as part of the process of emigrating to Canada. He says he doesn’t see the point in going to the streets anymore and just wants to leave the country.
“The political decisions are not taken by the Lebanese people. The decisions are taken by the corrupt leaders,” said Safsouf, walking in Beirut’s Gemmayze neighborhood with two friends—both of whom are also trying to emigrate.
But if so many poured into the streets demanding change, how is Lebanon back where it started?
Protesters marched under the slogan “killon yani killon,” or “everyone means everyone,” a shot at the entire political class—of which Hariri is very much an exemplar. The key demand of the protests has been the fall of the system, not just individual leaders, but that hasn’t happened, and it’s not clear what would replace it.
Even if new elections were held tomorrow, results would probably vary little from the current parliament, experts say. Independents outside of the established political class would probably pick up a handful of seats in the 128-seat Lebanese parliament, but not enough to fundamentally change things.
And that stasis is itself a reflection of the end of the civil war. The Taif Agreement, which ended the fighting, only further entrenched the country’s sectarian system as warlords divvied up power to secure their own interests. It’s a system that is now deeply entrenched in almost every aspect of social, political, and economic life.
Many Lebanese still feel dependent on warlords-turned-politicians for safety, whether from other sects or other countries, as well as economic sustenance. Basic foodstuffs, government jobs, education, and health care—all even more important now due to the country’s economic collapse and the COVID-19 pandemic—are doled out as political patronage rather than as state services. That keeps people deeply reliant on their parties and ends up entrenching the leaders in power.
Will the fourth time be the charm for Hariri as prime minister?
Unlikely. The first task for Hariri will be to form a cabinet, no easy task in Lebanese politics, where decisions are made through political wrangling and horse-trading to appease the country’s political elites. All of Lebanon’s sect-based political parties will need to be accommodated, in what is more like a balancing act than a democratic process. Protesters say the country’s leaders negotiate for their own interests, not what’s good for the country or even their own constituents.
The key task of the new government—if and when it is formed—will be to implement economic and financial reforms to meet the conditions of France and the International Monetary Fund, needed to unlock billions of dollars in badly needed aid. That could avert complete collapse in the short term but would not solve Lebanon’s structural problems. It’s got one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world and is highly reliant on imports, including food, that it can no longer afford as the currency has lost 80 percent of its value since last fall. Half of Lebanese are now below the poverty line, and reforms will likely mean removing the subsidies on fuel and bread.
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker told reporters Thursday: “Whatever government comes next must commit to and have the ability to implement reforms that can lead to economic opportunity, better governance, and an end to endemic corruption.” Jan Kubis, the United Nations special coordinator for Lebanon, warned the country’s leaders not to “count on miracles, foreign elections, or external donors—the rescue must start in Lebanon, by Lebanon.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--Poll: How Biden and Trump Differ on Foreign Policy

In mid-September , the Teaching , Research , and International Policy Project at William & Mary ’ s Global Research Institute , with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York , surveyed IR scholars at U.S. colleges and universities on the consequences of the presidential election for U.S. foreign policy .
The results we report below are based on responses from the 706 scholars who responded to our invitation to participate in the survey .
Respondents see glaring differences between President Donald Trump and Democratic contender Joe Biden ’ s policies on climate change , global health , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well as the likelihood that other countries will cooperate with a United States led by each candidate .
IR scholars see a similarly large gap in the candidates ’ respective competence and ability to effectively implement their different policy agendas .
In sum , the respondents give Trump a failing grade on foreign policy .
( Complete results can be found here . )
Where the candidates differ on foreign policy IR experts believe that Trump and Biden will pursue starkly different policies across almost all major foreign-policy issues but especially with regard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global public health .
Trump ’ s “ America First ” rhetoric has been matched by his skepticism and even outright hostility toward multilateral organizations , reflected in his decisions to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization ( WHO ) and the U.N. Human Rights Council and his threat to withdraw from NATO .
On climate change , Trump has taken similar steps , taking the United States out of the Paris agreement .
In contrast , Biden has voiced his support for a return to the post-World War II @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for renewing U.S. support for NATO , continued U.S. membership in WHO , and a recommitment to the Paris agreement on climate change .
IR scholars see less daylight between the candidates on exchange rates , the use of military force , counterterrorism , and relations with China .
IR experts see little difference between the two candidates on their propensity to use military force , with nearly half of respondents saying that the outcome of the election won ’ t affect Washington ’ s use of force abroad .
This suggests that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as an isolationist and more as a unilateralist .
IR scholars see a much wider gulf between the candidates when it comes to other countries ’ responses to the outcome of the U.S. election .
Ninety-two percent of experts said foreign governments would be more willing to collaborate with the United States if Biden won .
This is surprising since , traditionally , most IR scholars tend to avoid ascribing outcomes in world affairs to the traits or personalities of particular leaders .
In recent years , however , this reticence to assign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and our survey results seem to support this rekindled attention to leaders and leadership .
Respondents also think Trump and Biden are worlds apart in their ability to achieve their respective foreign-policy goals over the next four years .
On average , IR scholars believe that a President Biden would be more than twice as effective as Trump ( 61 percent versus 30 percent , respectively ) in achieving his stated foreign-policy goals .
How does Trump compare with his predecessor Barack Obama on foreign-policy issues ?
Our survey asked respondents to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Obama across a variety of foreign-policy issues .
Seventy-one percent of respondents indicated that Obama outperformed Trump in every area of foreign policy .
Trump received his strongest grades on the use of military force , where about 19 percent of IR scholars thought he performed as well or better than Obama .
About 12 percent responded that Trump ’ s China policies fared as well or better than Obama ’ s .
Who will IR scholars support for president ?
Although not a crucial voting bloc in the upcoming election , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unanimous in their support of Biden over Trump in the upcoming election .
Among those who are eligible to vote in the election , about 91 percent say they would vote for Biden , and only about 5 percent say they would vote for Trump if the election were held today .
It is unsurprising that self-identified liberal Democrats say they will vote for Biden , and our sample of scholars is disproportionately composed of liberals and Democrats .
Like Republican foreign policy and national security experts outside academia , however , our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ co-partisans in the general public to cross party lines to support Biden .
The graph below highlights the gap ( about 30 percentage points ) between Republican experts and Republican members of the public and an even greater gap ( about 35 percentage points ) between independent experts and independent members of the public .
Deep knowledge of international relations and foreign policy seems to have a large effect on vote choice that is independent of partisan affiliation for the experts in our sample .
Data on public vote intentions is from a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ field at the same time as our survey of scholars .
Is there hope for a bipartisan foreign policy in 2021 ?
When asked which foreign-policy issue was most likely to attract bipartisan support in 2021 , IR scholars ’ most frequent answer was China .
Both the Trump administration and the Biden campaign have signaled an increasingly assertive approach to China .
In a highly polarized political environment , the wisdom of our expert respondents suggests that U.S. policy toward China , as well as cybersecurity and counterterrorism , represents rare opportunities @ @ @

Irene Entringer Garcia Blanes, Alexandra Murphy, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers and Michael J. Tierney

U.S. presidential elections rarely focus on foreign policy, and the 2020 election campaign has been no exception so far. In fact, international affairs appear to be taking even more of a back seat during the current election season as the nation focuses on the domestic economy, racial justice issues, and a public health crisis. Even so, international relations (IR) experts believe that the election outcome will have outsized implications for U.S. foreign policy and America’s place in the world.
In mid-September, the Teaching, Research, and International Policy Project at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute, with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, surveyed IR scholars at U.S. colleges and universities on the consequences of the presidential election for U.S. foreign policy. The results we report below are based on responses from the 706 scholars who responded to our invitation to participate in the survey.
Respondents see glaring differences between President Donald Trump and Democratic contender Joe Biden’s policies on climate change, global health, and engagement with multilateral organizations, as well as the likelihood that other countries will cooperate with a United States led by each candidate. IR scholars see a similarly large gap in the candidates’ respective competence and ability to effectively implement their different policy agendas. In sum, the respondents give Trump a failing grade on foreign policy. (Complete results can be found here.)
Where the candidates differ on foreign policy
IR experts believe that Trump and Biden will pursue starkly different policies across almost all major foreign-policy issues but especially with regard to multilateralism, climate change, and global public health. Trump’s “America First” rhetoric has been matched by his skepticism and even outright hostility toward multilateral organizations, reflected in his decisions to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the U.N. Human Rights Council and his threat to withdraw from NATO. On climate change, Trump has taken similar steps, taking the United States out of the Paris agreement. In contrast, Biden has voiced his support for a return to the post-World War II multilateral status quo, arguing in particular for renewing U.S. support for NATO, continued U.S. membership in WHO, and a recommitment to the Paris agreement on climate change.
IR scholars see less daylight between the candidates on exchange rates, the use of military force, counterterrorism, and relations with China.
IR experts see little difference between the two candidates on their propensity to use military force, with nearly half of respondents saying that the outcome of the election won’t affect Washington’s use of force abroad. This suggests that Trump is viewed by IR scholars less as an isolationist and more as a unilateralist.
IR scholars see a much wider gulf between the candidates when it comes to other countries’ responses to the outcome of the U.S. election. Ninety-two percent of experts said foreign governments would be more willing to collaborate with the United States if Biden won. This is surprising since, traditionally, most IR scholars tend to avoid ascribing outcomes in world affairs to the traits or personalities of particular leaders. In recent years, however, this reticence to assign causal importance to individual leaders has declined, and our survey results seem to support this rekindled attention to leaders and leadership.
Respondents also think Trump and Biden are worlds apart in their ability to achieve their respective foreign-policy goals over the next four years. On average, IR scholars believe that a President Biden would be more than twice as effective as Trump (61 percent versus 30 percent, respectively) in achieving his stated foreign-policy goals.
A report card on Trump’s foreign policy
How does Trump compare with his predecessor Barack Obama on foreign-policy issues? Our survey asked respondents to compare Trump’s performance with that of Obama across a variety of foreign-policy issues. Seventy-one percent of respondents indicated that Obama outperformed Trump in every area of foreign policy. Trump received his strongest grades on the use of military force, where about 19 percent of IR scholars thought he performed as well or better than Obama. About 12 percent responded that Trump’s China policies fared as well or better than Obama’s.
Who will IR scholars support for president?
Although not a crucial voting bloc in the upcoming election, IR scholars—who rarely agree on anything—are nearly unanimous in their support of Biden over Trump in the upcoming election. Among those who are eligible to vote in the election, about 91 percent say they would vote for Biden, and only about 5 percent say they would vote for Trump if the election were held today. It is unsurprising that self-identified liberal Democrats say they will vote for Biden, and our sample of scholars is disproportionately composed of liberals and Democrats. Like Republican foreign policy and national security experts outside academia, however, our respondents are much more likely than their co-partisans in the general public to cross party lines to support Biden. The graph below highlights the gap (about 30 percentage points) between Republican experts and Republican members of the public and an even greater gap (about 35 percentage points) between independent experts and independent members of the public. Deep knowledge of international relations and foreign policy seems to have a large effect on vote choice that is independent of partisan affiliation for the experts in our sample. Data on public vote intentions is from a Quinnipiac University poll that was in the field at the same time as our survey of scholars.
Is there hope for a bipartisan foreign policy in 2021?
When asked which foreign-policy issue was most likely to attract bipartisan support in 2021, IR scholars’ most frequent answer was China. Both the Trump administration and the Biden campaign have signaled an increasingly assertive approach to China. In a highly polarized political environment, the wisdom of our expert respondents suggests that U.S. policy toward China, as well as cybersecurity and counterterrorism, represents rare opportunities for bipartisanship.