foreignpolicy--2020-12-22--The Inside Story of How Sweden Botched Its Coronavirus Response

Sweden ’ s botched coronavirus response is no longer news : Even the country ’ s king , Carl XVI Gustaf , admitted in his annual Christmas address that the Swedish government had “ failed.
” But private emails seen by Foreign Policy , some of which have been previously reported in the Swedish press , reveal that Sweden ’ s health authorities were resigned to mass infections—so called herd immunity—all along , and no matter the costs .
Throughout the pandemic , Sweden ’ s health authorities have said one thing publicly and something different in private about nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis .
There were repeated public denials from the government that it deliberately sought to achieve herd immunity , even though that was the strategy pursued behind closed doors .
There were misleading statements on the availability of testing .
There was even continued public denial ( despite private acknowledgement ) of how the virus spreads , part of a pattern of apparent official obfuscation that ’ s lasted the whole pandemic .
And the result has been deadly .
While countries such as the United States , Brazil , and India have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of coronavirus-related fatalities , Sweden ’ s death rate of over 80 per 100,000 people is among Europe ’ s highest and is around 10 times as great as those of Norway and Finland , and over four times Denmark ’ s .
COVID-19 hospitalizations are now rising faster there than in most European countries , and Sweden is caring for more patients in hospital now than it did at the height of its first wave .
By Dec. 21 , Sweden had surpassed the United States and all major European countries in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Things have gotten so out of control in Sweden that neighboring Norway , for the first time since World War II , put troops on the border to prevent Swedes from crossing over .
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ’ s Nov. 19 report concluded that Sweden fared worst among 35 European countries in multiple coronavirus management metrics including lowering the spread of infection , reducing people ’ s mobility , and discharging patients from intensive care units .
Sweden ’ s true handling of the pandemic matters , and not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its population of just over 10 million .
Around much of Europe , and especially in the United States , Sweden ’ s hands-off approach to a deadly pandemic was , for some , a model to emulate .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s coronavirus advisor Scott Atlas , for example , publicly hailed Sweden ’ s approach as a model , even as its catastrophic performance—especially when compared to its neighbors—becomes ever clearer .
As he observed global coronavirus cases surge , Tull wrote an email to Tegnell on March 15 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the pandemic .
Option one , he said , would be to “ stop all movement and contacts for a four-week period.
” Another option , one recommended by the World Health Organization , would be to conduct intensive testing , tracking , and quarantine of infected patients .
Or , he said , Sweden could pursue a third option : “ Let the spread of infection take place , slowly or quickly , to achieve a hypothetical herd immunity.
” Tull warned : “ One thing is known that with option @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deaths , ” and concluded that “ option three appears to me as a defeatist and headless strategy , which I would never have accepted in my previous role.
” Right from the start , according to recently declassified internal emails , Tegnell seemed resigned to pursuing herd immunity for Swedes , seeing little chance of stopping COVID-19 through the means successfully employed in other countries .
Tegnell , the state epidemiologist , answered him the same day : “ Well , we have walked through this and after everything landed on [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a fairly extensive silent spread , which would mean that the first two would probably not work.
” Tull outlined actions to take including issuing general advice and regulations for testing and contact-tracing .
Tegnell demurred , arguing that such a strategy hadn ’ t worked in Italy .
Tull countered that it worked in China and South Korea—so why not in Sweden ?
Right from the start of the pandemic , according to recently declassified internal emails seen by Foreign Policy , Tegnell seemed resigned to pursuing herd immunity for Swedes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the means successfully employed in other countries such as South Korea or Vietnam .
Whether or not Sweden publicly admitted its strategy was to pursue herd immunity , other countries began to cite its approach as such .
In July , according to a report in Politico , White House advisors promoting herd immunity referenced a June study by Sweden ’ s pandemic modeler , Tom Britton , which said that herd immunity could occur after just 43 percent of a population became infected—an estimate far lower than what most other epidemiologists have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that his calculations that Sweden would reach herd immunity turned out to be incorrect .
Britton now says that U.S. government officials misinterpreted his study and that using his June research to promote herd immunity was wrong , adding that “ too many people will die in order to reach herd immunity.
” The Swedish and international public , though , were repeatedly told that herd immunity was not Stockholm ’ s objective .
On March 15 , the day Tegnell wrote Tull they had landed on option three , Tegnell said the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tactic ” was not herd immunity , adding that its goal and herd immunity were “ not contradictory.
” But in public , Tegnell frequently argued that herd immunity was “ definitely not ” a goal .
As recently as Nov. 18 , Minister of Health and Social Affairs Lena Hallengren said that the idea that Sweden had pursued a herd immunity strategy was a “ rumor.
” The day before his correspondence with Tull , Tegnell forwarded an email to his Finnish counterpart , Mika Salminen , which contained a recommendation from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infected with COVID-19 .
“ One point would be to keep schools open to reach herd immunity more quickly , ” Tegnell wrote .
Salminen said his agency had ultimately rejected such an approach , realizing children would still spread the virus , whereas closing schools could limit the disease ’ s impact on the elderly by about 10 percent .
Tegnell , who still thought that quickly achieving herd immunity was the best strategy , responded : “ 10 percent might be worth it ?
” The next day , Tegnell forwarded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with COVID-19 to Jan Albert , a professor of microbiology , who was part of a coronavirus expert group assembled a few weeks earlier by the Karolinska Institute , a university and the center of Sweden ’ s medical research community .
Tegnell pointed to what seemed to be a “ flattening of new cases ” there .
“ In the autumn there will be a second wave .
Sweden will have a high level of immunity and the number of cases will probably be quite low , ” Tegnell said , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ replied : “ Exactly .
But most people think it ’ s just the lockdown .
How much [ is because of ] lockdown and how much [ is because of ] herd immunity is really the key issue.
” Tegnell answered : “ If anyone had time , you should look at the various lockdowns that have been made and what the development looks like afterwards .
I believe more in herd immunity.
’ ’ Tegnell remained convinced that a rapid spread of the virus would shield Sweden , a belief that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whole response to the crisis .
A month after corresponding with Tull , Tegnell said Stockholm could achieve herd immunity in May .
Three weeks later , he said : “ In the autumn there will be a second wave .
Sweden will have a high level of immunity and the number of cases will probably be quite low , ” a claim he repeated into mid-October .
Carlson , Tegnell ’ s boss , echoed on Aug. 30 what Tegnell wrote Tull : “ It is not about us sacrificing a lot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ model was the only one that was feasible .
Our assessment has proven to be correct .
The strategy must last over time .
We are one of the few countries with a limited spread of infection , unlike several countries in Europe where the infection returns sharply.
” It didn ’ t work out that way .
Sweden is facing an increase in cases , hospitalizations , and deaths .
On Nov. 5 , the country reached the grim statistic of 6,000 deaths .
In the six weeks since , nearly 2,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ending Dec. 18 , Sweden registered 479 new deaths , more than Norway has during the entire pandemic .
From the very beginning , Sweden sought a different approach—even if it said publicly that it was following the same strategy as other countries .
On March 4 , before Sweden ’ s first official death from COVID-19 , the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control convened a meeting for European Union countries and WHO .
Sweden did not participate .
A day after Tegnell corresponded with Tull , he discussed the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health checks , with Andreas Johansson and others at the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs .
“ This table contains a long list of details where we have a completely different strategy in Sweden , ” he wrote .
Tegnell opposed border health screenings and did not support EU measures to limit case importation or exportation , arguing that since domestic spread had already begun in most countries , border limits would be relatively meaningless .
The very next day , March 17 , Tegnell said on television that he did not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries were doing and what Sweden was attempting .
“ I do not think these strategies are different , we are talking about exactly the same thing in both strategies , ” he said .
That was the same day that countries such as the United Kingdom , which had flirted with a strategy of herd immunity , switched to a strategy of suppression after the release of a study by Imperial College that concluded that such an approach was “ the only viable strategy at the current time ” to prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Public Health Agency and advisory health experts discounted the study ’ s findings and kept seeking herd immunity , emails show .
Sweden relied on advice to wash hands ; other voluntary measures , such as that people stay home when sick , limit unnecessary travel , and work from home if possible , were advised only after there was already community spread in the country .
The government limited public gatherings to 50 people—but not until March 27 .
And then , as the country began to see a rise of cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ event limit to 300 people on Oct. 22 , which the government then decreased to eight effective on Nov. 24 as cases , hospitalizations , and deaths continued to rise .
Throughout the pandemic , Stockholm issued no general national mask recommendations , not even for general elder care , unless there was evidence patients had the coronavirus .
The government ’ s official health guidance still casts doubt on the efficacy of wearing masks , even as authorities in most other countries have come to appreciate the role that masks play in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But then Swedish health authorities remain unconvinced the virus even is airborne , officially telling citizens “ COVID-19 does not count as an airborne infection.
” On Dec. 18 , the government announced that the Public Health Agency would draw up recommendations for wearing masks during crowded commuting hours on public transit , but those will only come into force after Jan. 7 .
The updated official advice includes the line , “ We do not currently recommend a broad use of masks in society , ” and continues to cast doubt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even saying that masks may provide a false sense of security .
Unlike in neighboring countries , bars , restaurants , and gyms remained open .
Compulsory in-person schooling continued through middle school ; high school and post-secondary education moved online on March 17 .
Not until March 24 , two weeks after the risk level was raised to the highest level , was the general public encouraged to socially distance if possible .
Nursing homes stayed open to visitors until April 1 .
While neighbors began to introduce curbs on public life @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neither .
Denmark , which entered a short lockdown on March 17 , began easing it when it announced the beginning of widespread testing on March 30 .
Internal emails show it wasn ’ t until Denmark implemented its testing plan that the Swedish government and the Public Health Agency even began discussing one .
Whether authorities were talking about herd immunity , access to hospital care , how the virus spreads , or how testing was determined , Sweden told one story in public and a different one in private .
Prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but a spokesperson said : “ Herd immunity is not a strategy , but a potential consequence of how the spread of the virus develops .
Herd immunity has never been a part of the Swedish Government ’ s strategy.
” Lofven , through a spokesperson , previously said that Sweden ’ s “ strategy is not much different from other countries , ” yet Sweden is the only democratic country in the world that does not mandate even limited use of masks .
A full government reckoning of the handling of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public until 2022 , but an interim report on the spread of the virus in nursing homes was released on Dec. 15 .
It noted that government measures were late and inadequate , and called the spread of the virus in society the “ single most important factor behind the major outbreaks and the high number of deaths in residential care.
” Carlson , Tegnell , and Hallengren did not respond to requests for comment .
Ebba Busch , the leader of the opposition Christian Democrats party , said that “ the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would mean a higher degree of contagion in society , ” calling the quest for herd immunity “ naive.
” Contrary to the expectations of Tegnell and others , the quest for herd immunity neither materialized nor shielded Sweden from the ravages of a second wave in the autumn .
The Public Health Agency ’ s reports from June showed the level of people with coronavirus nationwide to be 7.1 percent , far from the 60-75 percent experts say is needed .
Finally , on Nov. 24 , Tegnell said that Sweden may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a second wave , ’ ’ despite having argued the opposite along with Carlson for months .
One man at least , Tull , had seen what was coming and tried to warn experts not to make matters worse .
In his final email to Tegnell on March 15 , Tull , who had worked to eradicate smallpox in Bangladesh , implored health authorities not to throw up their hands and to give science and precautionary measures a chance .
“ You can not just watch when you fear that a large number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrote .
“ Every effort must be made to prevent this from happening .
It is not enough to ‘ believe ’ that it is not possible .
”

A sign instructing people to wash their hands—featuring a portrait of chief epidemiologist Anders Tegnell, the face of Sweden’s response to the pandemic—hangs at an entrance to a restaurant in Stockholm on May 10. JONATHAN NACKSTRAND/AFP via Getty Images
One month after declaring the coronavirus a “socially dangerous” disease in February, the Swedish Public Health Agency essentially threw up its hands and chose to seek herd immunity rather than take serious steps to mitigate the virus’s spread, confidential internal documents show. That fateful—and fatalistic—early decision shaped Sweden’s entire response to the pandemic, from a refusal to mandate masks to a haphazard testing regime.
Sweden’s botched coronavirus response is no longer news: Even the country’s king, Carl XVI Gustaf, admitted in his annual Christmas address that the Swedish government had “failed.” But private emails seen by Foreign Policy, some of which have been previously reported in the Swedish press, reveal that Sweden’s health authorities were resigned to mass infections—so called herd immunity—all along, and no matter the costs. Throughout the pandemic, Sweden’s health authorities have said one thing publicly and something different in private about nearly every aspect of their management of the crisis. There were repeated public denials from the government that it deliberately sought to achieve herd immunity, even though that was the strategy pursued behind closed doors. There were misleading statements on the availability of testing. There was even continued public denial (despite private acknowledgement) of how the virus spreads, part of a pattern of apparent official obfuscation that’s lasted the whole pandemic.
And the result has been deadly. While countries such as the United States, Brazil, and India have made headlines for recording the highest number of coronavirus-related fatalities, Sweden’s death rate of over 80 per 100,000 people is among Europe’s highest and is around 10 times as great as those of Norway and Finland, and over four times Denmark’s. COVID-19 hospitalizations are now rising faster there than in most European countries, and Sweden is caring for more patients in hospital now than it did at the height of its first wave. By Dec. 21, Sweden had surpassed the United States and all major European countries in its daily confirmed cases per million. Things have gotten so out of control in Sweden that neighboring Norway, for the first time since World War II, put troops on the border to prevent Swedes from crossing over.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Nov. 19 report concluded that Sweden fared worst among 35 European countries in multiple coronavirus management metrics including lowering the spread of infection, reducing people’s mobility, and discharging patients from intensive care units.
Sweden’s true handling of the pandemic matters, and not just because of how it has impacted its population of just over 10 million. Around much of Europe, and especially in the United States, Sweden’s hands-off approach to a deadly pandemic was, for some, a model to emulate. U.S. President Donald Trump’s coronavirus advisor Scott Atlas, for example, publicly hailed Sweden’s approach as a model, even as its catastrophic performance—especially when compared to its neighbors—becomes ever clearer.
When the Swedish government categorized COVID-19 as a socially dangerous disease on Feb. 2, Peet Tull was sitting on a lonely farm on the Swedish island of Gotland, watching developments with concern. Tull was one of the people who built up the country’s infection control unit: He had been Public Health Agency Director Johan Carlson’s boss and also given assignments to Anders Tegnell, the agency’s chief epidemiologist, whom he knows well. Another thing Tull knows well is the Infection Control Act, because he participated in drafting it—and he wondered why Sweden hadn’t implemented a contact-tracing system or put travelers from international COVID-19 hot spots in quarantine.
As he observed global coronavirus cases surge, Tull wrote an email to Tegnell on March 15, proposing three possible options to deal with the pandemic. Option one, he said, would be to “stop all movement and contacts for a four-week period.” Another option, one recommended by the World Health Organization, would be to conduct intensive testing, tracking, and quarantine of infected patients. Or, he said, Sweden could pursue a third option: “Let the spread of infection take place, slowly or quickly, to achieve a hypothetical herd immunity.”
Tull warned: “One thing is known that with option three Sweden will probably have thousands of deaths,” and concluded that “option three appears to me as a defeatist and headless strategy, which I would never have accepted in my previous role.”
Right from the start, according to recently declassified internal emails, Tegnell seemed resigned to pursuing herd immunity for Swedes, seeing little chance of stopping COVID-19 through the means successfully employed in other countries.
Tegnell, the state epidemiologist, answered him the same day: “Well, we have walked through this and after everything landed on [option] three. We probably have a fairly extensive silent spread, which would mean that the first two would probably not work.”
Tull outlined actions to take including issuing general advice and regulations for testing and contact-tracing. Tegnell demurred, arguing that such a strategy hadn’t worked in Italy. Tull countered that it worked in China and South Korea—so why not in Sweden?
Right from the start of the pandemic, according to recently declassified internal emails seen by Foreign Policy, Tegnell seemed resigned to pursuing herd immunity for Swedes, seeing little chance of stopping COVID-19 through the means successfully employed in other countries such as South Korea or Vietnam.
Whether or not Sweden publicly admitted its strategy was to pursue herd immunity, other countries began to cite its approach as such. In July, according to a report in Politico, White House advisors promoting herd immunity referenced a June study by Sweden’s pandemic modeler, Tom Britton, which said that herd immunity could occur after just 43 percent of a population became infected—an estimate far lower than what most other epidemiologists have put forward. Britton told Foreign Policy that his calculations that Sweden would reach herd immunity turned out to be incorrect. Britton now says that U.S. government officials misinterpreted his study and that using his June research to promote herd immunity was wrong, adding that “too many people will die in order to reach herd immunity.”
The Swedish and international public, though, were repeatedly told that herd immunity was not Stockholm’s objective.
State epidemiologist Anders Tegnell of the Public Health Agency of Sweden talks to reporters after a news conference in Stockholm on May 6.
On March 15, the day Tegnell wrote Tull they had landed on option three, Tegnell said the Public Health Agency’s “main tactic” was not herd immunity, adding that its goal and herd immunity were “not contradictory.” But in public, Tegnell frequently argued that herd immunity was “definitely not” a goal. As recently as Nov. 18, Minister of Health and Social Affairs Lena Hallengren said that the idea that Sweden had pursued a herd immunity strategy was a “rumor.”
The day before his correspondence with Tull, Tegnell forwarded an email to his Finnish counterpart, Mika Salminen, which contained a recommendation from a doctor to allow people to become infected with COVID-19. “One point would be to keep schools open to reach herd immunity more quickly,” Tegnell wrote.
Salminen said his agency had ultimately rejected such an approach, realizing children would still spread the virus, whereas closing schools could limit the disease’s impact on the elderly by about 10 percent. Tegnell, who still thought that quickly achieving herd immunity was the best strategy, responded: “10 percent might be worth it?”
The next day, Tegnell forwarded a study on Italy’s experience with COVID-19 to Jan Albert, a professor of microbiology, who was part of a coronavirus expert group assembled a few weeks earlier by the Karolinska Institute, a university and the center of Sweden’s medical research community. Tegnell pointed to what seemed to be a “flattening of new cases” there.
“In the autumn there will be a second wave. Sweden will have a high level of immunity and the number of cases will probably be quite low,” Tegnell said, a claim he repeated into mid-October.
Albert replied: “Exactly. But most people think it’s just the lockdown. How much [is because of] lockdown and how much [is because of] herd immunity is really the key issue.” Tegnell answered: “If anyone had time, you should look at the various lockdowns that have been made and what the development looks like afterwards. I believe more in herd immunity.’’
Tegnell remained convinced that a rapid spread of the virus would shield Sweden, a belief that seemed to lead the country’s whole response to the crisis. A month after corresponding with Tull, Tegnell said Stockholm could achieve herd immunity in May. Three weeks later, he said: “In the autumn there will be a second wave. Sweden will have a high level of immunity and the number of cases will probably be quite low,” a claim he repeated into mid-October.
Carlson, Tegnell’s boss, echoed on Aug. 30 what Tegnell wrote Tull: “It is not about us sacrificing a lot of people to achieve immunity. This model was the only one that was feasible. Our assessment has proven to be correct. The strategy must last over time. We are one of the few countries with a limited spread of infection, unlike several countries in Europe where the infection returns sharply.”
It didn’t work out that way. Sweden is facing an increase in cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. On Nov. 5, the country reached the grim statistic of 6,000 deaths. In the six weeks since, nearly 2,000 more have died. In the week ending Dec. 18, Sweden registered 479 new deaths, more than Norway has during the entire pandemic.
People gather for drinks at the Half Way Inn pub in central Stockholm on March 23. Sweden is the only democratic country in the world that does not recommend masks as the coronavirus pandemic continues.
The fatalistic approach taken by Sweden’s health authorities beginning in March shaped nearly every aspect of the country’s response to the pandemic for the rest of the year: If the coronavirus can’t be successfully contained, as Tegnell and others argued in private, then why implement measures such as mask mandates, limits on retirement home visits, or restricting people’s movements?
From the very beginning, Sweden sought a different approach—even if it said publicly that it was following the same strategy as other countries. On March 4, before Sweden’s first official death from COVID-19, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control convened a meeting for European Union countries and WHO. Sweden did not participate.
A day after Tegnell corresponded with Tull, he discussed the EU’s not-yet-released border recommendations, including health checks, with Andreas Johansson and others at the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. “This table contains a long list of details where we have a completely different strategy in Sweden,” he wrote. Tegnell opposed border health screenings and did not support EU measures to limit case importation or exportation, arguing that since domestic spread had already begun in most countries, border limits would be relatively meaningless.
The very next day, March 17, Tegnell said on television that he did not think there was any difference between what other countries were doing and what Sweden was attempting. “I do not think these strategies are different, we are talking about exactly the same thing in both strategies,” he said.
That was the same day that countries such as the United Kingdom, which had flirted with a strategy of herd immunity, switched to a strategy of suppression after the release of a study by Imperial College that concluded that such an approach was “the only viable strategy at the current time” to prevent 250,000 British deaths. But the Swedish Public Health Agency and advisory health experts discounted the study’s findings and kept seeking herd immunity, emails show.
Sweden relied on advice to wash hands; other voluntary measures, such as that people stay home when sick, limit unnecessary travel, and work from home if possible, were advised only after there was already community spread in the country. The government limited public gatherings to 50 people—but not until March 27. And then, as the country began to see a rise of cases in October, the government increased the event limit to 300 people on Oct. 22, which the government then decreased to eight effective on Nov. 24 as cases, hospitalizations, and deaths continued to rise.
Residents in Stockholm watch Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven address the nation on the COVID-19 pandemic on March 22.
Throughout the pandemic, Stockholm issued no general national mask recommendations, not even for general elder care, unless there was evidence patients had the coronavirus. The government’s official health guidance still casts doubt on the efficacy of wearing masks, even as authorities in most other countries have come to appreciate the role that masks play in limiting the spread of an airborne virus. But then Swedish health authorities remain unconvinced the virus even is airborne, officially telling citizens “COVID-19 does not count as an airborne infection.” On Dec. 18, the government announced that the Public Health Agency would draw up recommendations for wearing masks during crowded commuting hours on public transit, but those will only come into force after Jan. 7. The updated official advice includes the line, “We do not currently recommend a broad use of masks in society,” and continues to cast doubt on the scientific evidence for masks, even saying that masks may provide a false sense of security.
Unlike in neighboring countries, bars, restaurants, and gyms remained open. Compulsory in-person schooling continued through middle school; high school and post-secondary education moved online on March 17. Not until March 24, two weeks after the risk level was raised to the highest level, was the general public encouraged to socially distance if possible. Nursing homes stayed open to visitors until April 1.
While neighbors began to introduce curbs on public life and speed up testing, Sweden did neither. Denmark, which entered a short lockdown on March 17, began easing it when it announced the beginning of widespread testing on March 30. Internal emails show it wasn’t until Denmark implemented its testing plan that the Swedish government and the Public Health Agency even began discussing one.
A Taxi Stockholm driver collects COVID-19 test kits from a station in Stockholm on Dec. 4. Drivers from two firms deliver around 25,000 tests a week in the region to people who suspect they have the coronavirus, according to Karolinska University Hospital, which is involved in testing in the area.
Whether authorities were talking about herd immunity, access to hospital care, how the virus spreads, or how testing was determined, Sweden told one story in public and a different one in private.
Prime Minister Stefan Lofven declined to be interviewed, but a spokesperson said: “Herd immunity is not a strategy, but a potential consequence of how the spread of the virus develops. Herd immunity has never been a part of the Swedish Government’s strategy.” Lofven, through a spokesperson, previously said that Sweden’s “strategy is not much different from other countries,” yet Sweden is the only democratic country in the world that does not mandate even limited use of masks.
A full government reckoning of the handling of the pandemic won’t be made public until 2022, but an interim report on the spread of the virus in nursing homes was released on Dec. 15. It noted that government measures were late and inadequate, and called the spread of the virus in society the “single most important factor behind the major outbreaks and the high number of deaths in residential care.”
Carlson, Tegnell, and Hallengren did not respond to requests for comment. Ebba Busch, the leader of the opposition Christian Democrats party, said in June that “the government actively and openly chose a strategy that would mean a higher degree of contagion in society,” calling the quest for herd immunity “naive.”
The results of that quest for elusive herd immunity are sadly well known. By the end of May, when some neighbors reopened without seeing big spikes, Swedes were restricted from traveling to many countries.
Contrary to the expectations of Tegnell and others, the quest for herd immunity neither materialized nor shielded Sweden from the ravages of a second wave in the autumn. The Public Health Agency’s reports from June showed the level of people with coronavirus nationwide to be 7.1 percent, far from the 60-75 percent experts say is needed.
Finally, on Nov. 24, Tegnell said that Sweden may be ‘’in the peak of a second wave,’’ despite having argued the opposite along with Carlson for months.
One man at least, Tull, had seen what was coming and tried to warn experts not to make matters worse. In his final email to Tegnell on March 15, Tull, who had worked to eradicate smallpox in Bangladesh, implored health authorities not to throw up their hands and to give science and precautionary measures a chance.
“You cannot just watch when you fear that a large number of people may die,” he wrote. “Every effort must be made to prevent this from happening. It is not enough to ‘believe’ that it is not possible.”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-22--Why Biden Needs to Confront Corruption

Why Biden Needs to Confront Corruption

Why Biden Needs to Confront Corruption This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
When U.S. President-elect Joe Biden takes office in January , he ’ ll immediately confront a dizzying array of near- and long-term crises—not least an economy in peril , an uncontrolled pandemic , and looming climate change .
Despite this already crowded agenda , the Biden administration must not forget to make space for another priority : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about restoring trust in the rule of law and democracy at home and abroad , as he affirmed over the course of his campaign , tackling corruption will be essential .
But doing so effectively will require honesty about the United States ’ own failings and swift action to address them in the administration ’ s first 100 days , alongside a robust foreign-policy agenda that includes erecting new barriers to ill-gotten gains , reassuming the role of a global anti-corruption leader , and supporting those fighting for accountability in their own countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can not be an effective champion for the rule of law abroad without getting its own house in order .
The U.S. campaign finance system is often described abroad as “ legalized bribery , ” and Washington ’ s reputation for corruption has only worsened over the past four years .
In the TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix , which evaluates business bribery risk in 194 markets , the United States has fallen eight places in the rankings since last year , from 15th to 23rd .
Instances of bribery and corruption across the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the executive branch , have skyrocketed since 2016 , according to TRACE Matrix data .
Over that same period , public sector theft—stealing or embezzling public resources—has become more frequent , and fewer government officials are being sanctioned for their misconduct .
Meanwhile , the federal government has become less inclusive of social groups in its selection of vendors—a trend that projects an image of nepotism and favoritism in Washington .
These shifts have coincided with a decline in civil society participation , the TRACE Matrix shows , and a frontal assault @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subject to fewer nongovernmental checks .
All of these domestic problems must be acknowledged and addressed with transparency and accountability .
Aside from the basics , such as refraining from gratuitous attacks on the press , Biden should follow through with his proposed ethics reforms for the U.S. government : stronger whistleblower protections , mandatory financial disclosures by candidates for federal office , and greater autonomy for government watchdogs .
Meanwhile , when it comes to countering corruption abroad , the Biden administration should move swiftly to address the most pressing priorities .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ actors access to U.S. markets where they can launder and stow their plunder .
Under current regulations , foreign kleptocrats have a suite of tools at their disposal to pump dirty money into the U.S. financial system .
Behind the anonymity of easily established shell companies , they are free—in most American cities—to purchase real estate in cash with no scrutiny , visibility , or accountability .
Through these loopholes , criminals can hide their wealth while damaging American communities : As their properties often sit vacant , there is less affordable housing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of revenue .
The United States can not be an effective champion for the rule of law abroad without getting its own house in order .
The Biden administration can take clear steps early on to make the U.S. financial system far less hospitable to corrupt foreign money .
Before Biden even takes office , Washington will abolish shell company anonymity as part of a bipartisan reform rolled into this year ’ s National Defense Authorization Act , likely to become law this month .
The Biden administration should build on this progress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high-dollar industries popular among kleptocrats , including real estate , private aircrafts , superyachts , luxury cars , and hedge funds .
Biden can also address corrupt foreign money in the United States at its source .
He has already pledged to pursue kleptocrats abroad by continuing Obama- and Trump-era practices of using targeted sanctions , seizing stolen assets , and denying visas to warn corrupt actors and keep them accountable .
But his administration should bring more transparency to these programs and supplement existing tools with innovative approaches .
Several countries—including the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Singapore—legally require potential investors to explain the source of any questionable money with “ unexplained wealth orders , ” flipping the burden of proof .
The Biden administration could ask Congress to subject foreign investors to a similar policy and embed unexplained wealth provisions in the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States .
Regulating U.S. advocacy institutions would create additional barriers to corrupt funds from abroad .
Because nonprofit organizations with lobbying arms have no obligation to disclose foreign donors , there ’ s nothing stopping kleptocrats , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , from covertly bankrolling nonprofits that play key roles in influencing U.S. policy .
To prevent such actors from indirectly participating in U.S. policymaking , Biden should ask Congress to require all organizations with a lobbying function to publicly disclose a list of their foreign donors .
He should also more consistently enforce the Foreign Agents Registration Act , which requires individuals representing the interests of foreign countries to disclose both their ties to those governments and information about their related finances .
The Biden administration can ’ t just voice solidarity with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them in their quest for transparency and accountability .
In all this , the Biden administration can ’ t just voice solidarity with democrats in other countries—it must actually help them in their quest for transparency and accountability .
Popular movements in favor of democratic accountability often collapse because they lack resources , organization , or access to information .
Biden should therefore work with Congress to pass the remaining provisions of the bipartisan Crook Act , which would support the fight against corruption abroad by allocating resources to countries on the brink @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their civil society organizations and objective journalism .
The proposed legislation has garnered widespread support , and some of its provisions are included in the 2021 defense bill—but important financial support measures are still outstanding .
Journalists and activists have a vital role not only in uncovering misdeeds but also in demanding reliable financial information on government contracts and officials ’ tax returns .
The United States should endeavor to support these checks on government globally .
Additionally , bribery cases are complex and require specific legal and accounting expertise , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for anti-corruption legal enforcement training .
The Biden administration can support them by ramping up FBI and Justice Department personnel exchanges to provide support and training in countries that are developing anti-corruption legal investigative and enforcement programs .
Concrete action to combat corruption will be essential if the United States aims to restore its leadership and shore up global governance , and thus far the signs are encouraging that the president-elect will engage eagerly with this issue .
In his victory speech on Nov. 7 , Biden swore to marshal the forces of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of an era of toxic politics , cynicism , and mistrust .
Over the past couple years , he has written and spoken widely about the need to resist the creeping authoritarianism that ’ s taking root in so much of the world .
Biden should know that the menace of corruption is one of the most daunting obstacles to realizing this vision—and if he acts soon , the world will see that trust and fairness have a fighting chance .

When U.S. President-elect Joe Biden takes office in January, he’ll immediately confront a dizzying array of near- and long-term crises—not least an economy in peril, an uncontrolled pandemic, and looming climate change. Despite this already crowded agenda, the Biden administration must not forget to make space for another priority: combating corruption. If Biden is serious about restoring trust in the rule of law and democracy at home and abroad, as he affirmed over the course of his campaign, tackling corruption will be essential. But doing so effectively will require honesty about the United States’ own failings and swift action to address them in the administration’s first 100 days, alongside a robust foreign-policy agenda that includes erecting new barriers to ill-gotten gains, reassuming the role of a global anti-corruption leader, and supporting those fighting for accountability in their own countries.
When U.S. President-elect Joe Biden takes office in January, he’ll immediately confront a dizzying array of near- and long-term crises—not least an economy in peril, an uncontrolled pandemic, and looming climate change. Despite this already crowded agenda, the Biden administration must not forget to make space for another priority: combating corruption. If Biden is serious about restoring trust in the rule of law and democracy at home and abroad, as he affirmed over the course of his campaign, tackling corruption will be essential. But doing so effectively will require honesty about the United States’ own failings and swift action to address them in the administration’s first 100 days, alongside a robust foreign-policy agenda that includes erecting new barriers to ill-gotten gains, reassuming the role of a global anti-corruption leader, and supporting those fighting for accountability in their own countries.
Of course, the United States cannot be an effective champion for the rule of law abroad without getting its own house in order. The U.S. campaign finance system is often described abroad as “legalized bribery,” and Washington’s reputation for corruption has only worsened over the past four years. In the TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix, which evaluates business bribery risk in 194 markets, the United States has fallen eight places in the rankings since last year, from 15th to 23rd. Instances of bribery and corruption across the government, including at the highest levels of the executive branch, have skyrocketed since 2016, according to TRACE Matrix data. Over that same period, public sector theft—stealing or embezzling public resources—has become more frequent, and fewer government officials are being sanctioned for their misconduct. Meanwhile, the federal government has become less inclusive of social groups in its selection of vendors—a trend that projects an image of nepotism and favoritism in Washington. These shifts have coincided with a decline in civil society participation, the TRACE Matrix shows, and a frontal assault on the media that leaves public officials subject to fewer nongovernmental checks.
All of these domestic problems must be acknowledged and addressed with transparency and accountability. Aside from the basics, such as refraining from gratuitous attacks on the press, Biden should follow through with his proposed ethics reforms for the U.S. government: stronger whistleblower protections, mandatory financial disclosures by candidates for federal office, and greater autonomy for government watchdogs.
Meanwhile, when it comes to countering corruption abroad, the Biden administration should move swiftly to address the most pressing priorities. First, it should deny corrupt foreign actors access to U.S. markets where they can launder and stow their plunder. Under current regulations, foreign kleptocrats have a suite of tools at their disposal to pump dirty money into the U.S. financial system. Behind the anonymity of easily established shell companies, they are free—in most American cities—to purchase real estate in cash with no scrutiny, visibility, or accountability. Through these loopholes, criminals can hide their wealth while damaging American communities: As their properties often sit vacant, there is less affordable housing, and nearby small businesses are starved of revenue.
The United States cannot be an effective champion for the rule of law abroad without getting its own house in order.
The Biden administration can take clear steps early on to make the U.S. financial system far less hospitable to corrupt foreign money. Before Biden even takes office, Washington will abolish shell company anonymity as part of a bipartisan reform rolled into this year’s National Defense Authorization Act, likely to become law this month. The Biden administration should build on this progress by mandating transparency and due diligence in high-dollar industries popular among kleptocrats, including real estate, private aircrafts, superyachts, luxury cars, and hedge funds.
Biden can also address corrupt foreign money in the United States at its source. He has already pledged to pursue kleptocrats abroad by continuing Obama- and Trump-era practices of using targeted sanctions, seizing stolen assets, and denying visas to warn corrupt actors and keep them accountable. But his administration should bring more transparency to these programs and supplement existing tools with innovative approaches. Several countries—including the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, and Singapore—legally require potential investors to explain the source of any questionable money with “unexplained wealth orders,” flipping the burden of proof. The Biden administration could ask Congress to subject foreign investors to a similar policy and embed unexplained wealth provisions in the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.
Regulating U.S. advocacy institutions would create additional barriers to corrupt funds from abroad. Because nonprofit organizations with lobbying arms have no obligation to disclose foreign donors, there’s nothing stopping kleptocrats, including those with close ties to foreign governments, from covertly bankrolling nonprofits that play key roles in influencing U.S. policy. To prevent such actors from indirectly participating in U.S. policymaking, Biden should ask Congress to require all organizations with a lobbying function to publicly disclose a list of their foreign donors. He should also more consistently enforce the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which requires individuals representing the interests of foreign countries to disclose both their ties to those governments and information about their related finances.
As he seeks to reset U.S. leadership on the international stage, the president-elect has an opportunity to frame anti-corruption as a global democratization, security, and human rights priority. The Summit for Democracy that the Biden team has already proposed offers an important opportunity to renew U.S. commitment to anti-corruption, anti-authoritarianism, and human rights worldwide. But the test of its efficacy will be in what comes next: It will be essential to commit to a concrete agenda, iterative meetings, and accountability for all parties to show that Washington is fully invested in fighting kleptocracy and the authoritarian regimes it fuels.
The Biden administration can’t just voice solidarity with democrats in other countries—it must actually help them in their quest for transparency and accountability.
In all this, the Biden administration can’t just voice solidarity with democrats in other countries—it must actually help them in their quest for transparency and accountability. Popular movements in favor of democratic accountability often collapse because they lack resources, organization, or access to information. Biden should therefore work with Congress to pass the remaining provisions of the bipartisan Crook Act, which would support the fight against corruption abroad by allocating resources to countries on the brink of democratic transition in order to bolster their civil society organizations and objective journalism. The proposed legislation has garnered widespread support, and some of its provisions are included in the 2021 defense bill—but important financial support measures are still outstanding. Journalists and activists have a vital role not only in uncovering misdeeds but also in demanding reliable financial information on government contracts and officials’ tax returns. The United States should endeavor to support these checks on government globally.
Additionally, bribery cases are complex and require specific legal and accounting expertise, and the United States’ allies depend on it for anti-corruption legal enforcement training. The Biden administration can support them by ramping up FBI and Justice Department personnel exchanges to provide support and training in countries that are developing anti-corruption legal investigative and enforcement programs.
Concrete action to combat corruption will be essential if the United States aims to restore its leadership and shore up global governance, and thus far the signs are encouraging that the president-elect will engage eagerly with this issue. In his victory speech on Nov. 7, Biden swore to marshal the forces of decency and fairness to guide the country out of an era of toxic politics, cynicism, and mistrust. Over the past couple years, he has written and spoken widely about the need to resist the creeping authoritarianism that’s taking root in so much of the world. Biden should know that the menace of corruption is one of the most daunting obstacles to realizing this vision—and if he acts soon, the world will see that trust and fairness have a fighting chance.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-22--Boris Johnson’s Christmas Coronavirus Nightmare

Sixty-seven thousand people are dead , to begin with .
There is no doubt whatever about that .
And as British Prime Minister Boris Johnson tries to sleep on Christmas Eve , three ghosts are set to haunt him : Coronavirus Past , Coronavirus Present , and Coronavirus Future .
Each of them looks , frankly , pretty horrifying .
With plans for a Christmas easing of lockdown now canceled following dramatically surging numbers , the question remains : Why can ’ t a country considered at the cutting edge of scientific research and disaster response handle the virus with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first of the specters , and it ’ s not a pleasant sight .
The U.K. should have been better prepared for this disaster .
A pre-pandemic assessment of national readiness for pandemics placed it second—just behind the United States .
It has a world-leading biotechnology sector and a hugely competent and hard-working health care sector .
To be sure , a national lockdown was introduced on March 23 , creating a temporary impression of competence at the beginning of the crisis .
In May , only 39 percent of people believed that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic well , but that had risen to 56 percent in July .
This was a real lockdown , after all .
A televised address from the prime minister told the public that they “ must stay at home , ” allowed to leave only for limited purposes including to buy food , to exercise once a day , and to collect prescriptions .
Millions of people were placed on a government furlough scheme .
This meant that workers placed on leave due to COVID-19 were able to receive 80 percent of their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2,500 pounds ( $ 3,400 ) per month for three months—although the system left out self-employed people .
But even that lockdown decision arguably came too late .
One of the scientific advisors to the Johnson administration , John Edmunds , a member of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies , told the BBC : “ I wish we had gone into lockdown earlier .
I think that has cost a lot of lives , unfortunately.
” The austerity measures imposed by the Conservative government over the past decade had already left critical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stockpiles had fallen by 40 percent since 2013 .
And boosted by seeming success , the government started prioritizing the economy over health .
Chancellor Rishi Sunak launched an Eat Out To Help Out initiative on Aug. 3 , allowing restaurants and cafes to offer a 50 percent reduction on meals from Monday to Wednesday .
The uptake on this was massive , with more than 100 million meals claimed .
Newspapers welcomed Eat Out To Help Out with open arms .
The government expressly encouraged people to support pubs , cafes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more socializing and heaped praise on the resilience of the British pub .
That led to Coronavirus Present , an even uglier apparition .
Numbers have been rising sharply since September , hitting a horrifying peak of nearly 36,000 new cases reported on Dec. 20 .
Over the past few months , the government has introduced new measures via a scattergun approach , culminating in the three-tier system that was a purported attempt to clarify complex localized regulations .
Most of the north of England , including West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parts of Northern Ireland , the west of Scotland , and Wales were already under local lockdown , with specific rules for each region .
Towns 10 minutes away from each other were under different regulations .
Local governments have struggled with the confused messaging that has marred the government approach from the outset .
In Greater Manchester , you could not meet others from different households in your home or garden , unless they were part of your support bubble—another widely misunderstood and poorly communicated idea from the government—but you could go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work .
One Twitter user wrote : “ So just to check : sitting in a room with people is not safe until there ’ s a card reader.
” To top it all off , the three-tier system suddenly developed another tier over the weekend , with London and southeastern England being put under a new “ Tier 4 ” with even stricter regulations .
That ’ s left plans for a Christmas break—an easing of lockdown to let families reunite , in itself a bizarre idea—in tatters and shattered any public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was doing .
The purpose of the first , national lockdown , meanwhile , was supposedly to buy time to implement test-and-trace programs similar to those that have been successful in South Korea , Taiwan , and Australia .
But that has also proven to be a disaster .
As of mid-September , the government was facing a backlog of around 200,000 tests , and completed swabs were reportedly being sent to labs in Germany and Italy to be processed .
Up and down the country , people are being told they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get the tests they need , with some being sent from Greater Manchester to Scotland or Shropshire .
It ’ s not just the system of coronavirus testing that ’ s not working .
Tracing is also in a shambolic state .
In the northern town of Bradford , one of the worst-hit areas for COVID-19 cases , tracing as of September has been able to reach less than half the people who have been in contact with a coronavirus sufferer .
A data processing disaster left tens of thousands of people in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government has been forced to take a U-turn on the extension of their furlough scheme .
After replacing it with a less generous job support effort , they caved to pressure and extended the original furlough scheme , which will continue at least until the end of March .
According to research from YouGov in October , more than one-third of U.K. employers were planning to make staff redundant by the end of the year .
A sweeping avalanche of job losses is expected to hit Britain this winter .
And what of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hand and leading him to a joyless future ?
Well , it ’ s not a happy picture .
Even if the lockdown keeps numbers down long enough to roll out new vaccines and control the pandemic , the apparition of a no-deal Brexit is days away .
That could leave the economy ravaged and severely disrupt supplies across the country , slowing a rollout and causing a public revolt .
A “ great year for Britain , ” in Johnson ’ s cocky words in January , has turned into an unprecedented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the gravestone of what ’ s likely to be a short-lived premiership .

Sixty-seven thousand people are dead, to begin with. There is no doubt whatever about that. And as British Prime Minister Boris Johnson tries to sleep on Christmas Eve, three ghosts are set to haunt him: Coronavirus Past, Coronavirus Present, and Coronavirus Future. Each of them looks, frankly, pretty horrifying. With plans for a Christmas easing of lockdown now canceled following dramatically surging numbers, the question remains: Why can’t a country considered at the cutting edge of scientific research and disaster response handle the virus with minimal competence?
Sixty-seven thousand people are dead, to begin with. There is no doubt whatever about that. And as British Prime Minister Boris Johnson tries to sleep on Christmas Eve, three ghosts are set to haunt him: Coronavirus Past, Coronavirus Present, and Coronavirus Future. Each of them looks, frankly, pretty horrifying. With plans for a Christmas easing of lockdown now canceled following dramatically surging numbers, the question remains: Why can’t a country considered at the cutting edge of scientific research and disaster response handle the virus with minimal competence?
Coronavirus Past is the first of the specters, and it’s not a pleasant sight. The U.K. should have been better prepared for this disaster. A pre-pandemic assessment of national readiness for pandemics placed it second—just behind the United States. It has a world-leading biotechnology sector and a hugely competent and hard-working health care sector.
To be sure, a national lockdown was introduced on March 23, creating a temporary impression of competence at the beginning of the crisis. In May, only 39 percent of people believed that the government had not handled the coronavirus pandemic well, but that had risen to 56 percent in July.
This was a real lockdown, after all. A televised address from the prime minister told the public that they “must stay at home,” allowed to leave only for limited purposes including to buy food, to exercise once a day, and to collect prescriptions. Millions of people were placed on a government furlough scheme. This meant that workers placed on leave due to COVID-19 were able to receive 80 percent of their pay, up to a maximum of 2,500 pounds ($3,400) per month for three months—although the system left out self-employed people.
But even that lockdown decision arguably came too late. One of the scientific advisors to the Johnson administration, John Edmunds, a member of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, told the BBC: “I wish we had gone into lockdown earlier. I think that has cost a lot of lives, unfortunately.” The austerity measures imposed by the Conservative government over the past decade had already left critical shortages of personal protective equipment; government stockpiles had fallen by 40 percent since 2013.
And boosted by seeming success, the government started prioritizing the economy over health. Chancellor Rishi Sunak launched an Eat Out To Help Out initiative on Aug. 3, allowing restaurants and cafes to offer a 50 percent reduction on meals from Monday to Wednesday. The uptake on this was massive, with more than 100 million meals claimed. Newspapers welcomed Eat Out To Help Out with open arms. The government expressly encouraged people to support pubs, cafes, and restaurants, while Johnson called for more socializing and heaped praise on the resilience of the British pub.
That led to Coronavirus Present, an even uglier apparition. Numbers have been rising sharply since September, hitting a horrifying peak of nearly 36,000 new cases reported on Dec. 20. Over the past few months, the government has introduced new measures via a scattergun approach, culminating in the three-tier system that was a purported attempt to clarify complex localized regulations. Most of the north of England, including West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester, as well as the West Midlands, parts of Northern Ireland, the west of Scotland, and Wales were already under local lockdown, with specific rules for each region. Towns 10 minutes away from each other were under different regulations.
Local governments have struggled with the confused messaging that has marred the government approach from the outset. In Greater Manchester, you could not meet others from different households in your home or garden, unless they were part of your support bubble—another widely misunderstood and poorly communicated idea from the government—but you could go to restaurants and pubs, and to work. One Twitter user wrote: “So just to check: sitting in a room with people is not safe until there’s a card reader.” To top it all off, the three-tier system suddenly developed another tier over the weekend, with London and southeastern England being put under a new “Tier 4” with even stricter regulations. That’s left plans for a Christmas break—an easing of lockdown to let families reunite, in itself a bizarre idea—in tatters and shattered any public hope that the government might know what it was doing.
The purpose of the first, national lockdown, meanwhile, was supposedly to buy time to implement test-and-trace programs similar to those that have been successful in South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia. But that has also proven to be a disaster. As of mid-September, the government was facing a backlog of around 200,000 tests, and completed swabs were reportedly being sent to labs in Germany and Italy to be processed. Up and down the country, people are being told they need to travel hundreds of miles to get the tests they need, with some being sent from Greater Manchester to Scotland or Shropshire.
It’s not just the system of coronavirus testing that’s not working. Tracing is also in a shambolic state. In the northern town of Bradford, one of the worst-hit areas for COVID-19 cases, tracing as of September has been able to reach less than half the people who have been in contact with a coronavirus sufferer. A data processing disaster left tens of thousands of people in the dark about possible exposure.
The government has been forced to take a U-turn on the extension of their furlough scheme. After replacing it with a less generous job support effort, they caved to pressure and extended the original furlough scheme, which will continue at least until the end of March. According to research from YouGov in October, more than one-third of U.K. employers were planning to make staff redundant by the end of the year. A sweeping avalanche of job losses is expected to hit Britain this winter.
And what of Coronavirus Future, taking Johnson by the hand and leading him to a joyless future? Well, it’s not a happy picture. Even if the lockdown keeps numbers down long enough to roll out new vaccines and control the pandemic, the apparition of a no-deal Brexit is days away. That could leave the economy ravaged and severely disrupt supplies across the country, slowing a rollout and causing a public revolt. A “great year for Britain,” in Johnson’s cocky words in January, has turned into an unprecedented disaster—and Johnson himself is left staring at the gravestone of what’s likely to be a short-lived premiership.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-23--What Hannah Arendt Would Do About Trump’s Former Bureaucrats

What Hannah Arendt Would Do About Trump ’ s Former Bureaucrats With the infamous cry “ Lock her up !
” outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s supporters have long called for the prosecution of Hillary Clinton for crimes she allegedly committed as secretary of state under the Obama administration and as a presidential candidate .
Last year Trump himself was impeached , and afterward he demanded to investigate the investigators .
He has since ordered criminal inquiries into his campaign rival Joe Biden and Biden ’ s son Hunter .
Now , in the wake of the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prospect of holding Trump and his staff accountable for their own misdeeds may seem like the next turn in a loop-the-loop of political prosecutions .
But as much as Americans may like to move on , it ’ s important to recognize the depth of the Trump administration ’ s corruption and malfeasance .
Trump entered office uniquely compromised by financial conflicts of interest .
He will leave office after running an intimidation campaign against state officials that aimed to disenfranchise hundreds of thousands of voters .
Worst of all , the administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic .
Today , about as many Americans die each day of this disease than were killed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks .
Trump ’ s own White House events and indoor campaign rallies have violated local public health decrees and knowingly caused the infection of numerous attendees .
The administration ’ s distortion of health information and encouragement of vigilante action against state officials who enforced mask mandates could even amount to reckless endangerment .
Trump is already making moves to protect himself and his family from criminal liability .
But what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further down the bureaucratic ladder ?
The German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt offers a useful reference point for thinking about issues of complicity , resistance , and “ just following orders ” under corrupt regimes .
She argues that the erosion of democratic institutions and criminal acts at the state level are made possible by a combination of fanatical leaders , mass consent , and bureaucratic apparatuses that deflect responsibility .
In the interest of justice , government officials must be judged and held accountable—not as symbolic representatives of a regime but for their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state crimes .
Arendt ’ s focus on the individual actions of bureaucrats ( most infamously those of Adolf Eichmann during the Holocaust ) is relevant in light of both the Trump administration ’ s efforts to undermine democracy and its attempts to suppress and distort information about public health .
How should Americans treat appointees who were serving in their positions in violation of the law because they were never approved by Congress ?
Or immigration officers who disregarded a federal judge ’ s order to restore the Deferred Action for Childhood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S.-Mexico border ?
Or members of the Republican Party who have weaponized conspiracy theories about voter fraud in order to intimidate officials into denying the results of free and fair elections ?
In her 1967 essay “ Truth and Politics , ” Arendt noted that organized lying can serve as a kind of political violence that completely reshapes “ the whole factual texture ” of society .
She wrote that one key symptom of a broken democracy is “ a peculiar kind of cynicism—an absolute refusal to believe in the truth of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ truth may be established.
” For her , the survival of democracy depends in part on the independence of the judiciary and other public institutions whose mission it is to seek information with some degree of freedom from political pressure .
Paradoxically , it is always a political decision to support such institutions .
Thus , the boundary between partisanship , the law , and disinterested research for the public good is fragile and subject to contestation .
But that boundary can ’ t be dissolved totally without destroying the formal basis for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a more robust social democracy .
Arendt had occasion to comment on this contested boundary in 1971 after the release of the Pentagon Papers .
This act of resistance by the intelligence analyst Daniel Ellsberg shattered the “ internal self-deception , ” as he called it , of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations with regard to their conduct of the war in Vietnam .
For those who lied about the reality of the war , “ Defactualization , ” as Arendt called it in her essay “ Lying in Politics : Reflections on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ welcomed because disregard of reality was inherent in the policies and goals themselves.
” Officials falsified statistics and deceived the public in order to indulge the U.S. military and intelligence community ’ s hubris about winning an unwinnable war .
Organized lying , cynicism , and a total dissolution of the fluid boundary between partisanship and disinterested government : These are clear and present dangers to democracy , Arendt warned .
Today , Trump and the Republican Party ’ s refusal to recognize the validity of the election results as well as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mention the existential threat of climate change ) have threatened to make party loyalty the arbiter of reality itself .
To those who succumb to that cynicism , bureaucratic agencies such as the National Institutes of Health or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , which are supposed to operate with a degree of independence , appear as the deep state .
It becomes impossible to conceive of any administrative independence that is not partisan and conspiratorial .
A deep state does exist , of course , but not in the insane @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Instead it refers to the array of minor bureaucrats and low-level appointees whose work depends on society maintaining contested boundaries between partisan loyalty , official duty , and the law .
Tending these boundaries is not sufficient for a democratic society , but it is necessary .
Whether or not members of the Trump administration will be subject to professional discipline or legal action , the recent election has made one thing clear about the American democratic state : The individual choices of even minor bureaucrats matter .
Ultimately the certification and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down to decisions made not only by the courts but also by a small number of low-profile officials , such as the Board of Canvassers in Wayne County , Michigan , and Georgia ’ s voting system implementation manager .
Particularly in Georgia , those Republicans who have stood up to intense and unprecedented pressure from within their own party should be commended for their integrity .
But it is also deeply unsettling that the choice to uphold a democratic election finally lay in their hands , not those of the voters .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ who have acted honorably under a presidency that is not only ideologically distasteful but also potentially criminal have simply been fired by Trump .
Within the government , acts of resistance that merit the name have involved people speaking out publicly , non-anonymously , and at risk of losing their jobs .
Getting denounced by Trump is perhaps the only badge of honor that some of these officials may wear .
Just as it is important to recognize officials who have stood their ground to expose government abuses and stop the circulation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the many acts of complicity that increased the misery of the pandemic and brought their country to the brink of another stolen election .
We must share Arendt ’ s insistence on ascertaining the individual responsibility of bureaucrats and holding them accountable .
If Trump officials did commit crimes or abuse their power , they must either be prosecuted or professionally disciplined .
The more time it takes to investigate any evidence of wrongdoing , the more we risk losing the factual record itself .
It ’ s not automatic that the basic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration will persist in history .
This kind of political record , Arendt thought , is particularly vulnerable to erasure .
Trump ’ s habit of ripping up every piece of paper that comes into his hands in the White House , even as workers desperately piece them back together for the National Archives , is a caricature of this real risk .
Of course , setting the record straight and holding officials accountable when it ’ s clear they have abused their power or even committed criminal offenses won ’ t be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that this administration has eroded .
The loss of transparency in governmental decision-making , the expansion of unaccountable national security agencies , the hobbling of all other agencies , the paralysis of Congress : These processes began well before Trump ’ s presidency , although their acceleration over the past four years is stunning .
The strategist and media operator Steve Bannon fell out of Trump ’ s good graces several years ago , but his right-wing libertarian project aiming for the “ deconstruction of the administrative state ” has continued to guide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partisan appointments , the judiciary and elections officials have stopped Trump and his allies from stealing the Presidency .
The levee didn ’ t break , this time .
But we shouldn ’ t put total faith in the permanence of our democracy ’ s institutions .
Seventy-four million Americans who exercised their right to vote this year chose an authoritarian conspiracy-monger who encourages racist paramilitary groups and has fatally mismanaged a vast public health crisis .
It ’ s possible that we ’ ve only seen a preview of a more successful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
To avoid that scenario , a long-term process of cultural reckoning and thoroughgoing democratization must address the myriad forces that enabled Trumpism—a process that in the end goes far beyond questions of bureaucratic accountability .

With the infamous cry “Lock her up!” outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump’s supporters have long called for the prosecution of Hillary Clinton for crimes she allegedly committed as secretary of state under the Obama administration and as a presidential candidate. Last year Trump himself was impeached, and afterward he demanded to investigate the investigators. He has since ordered criminal inquiries into his campaign rival Joe Biden and Biden’s son Hunter. Now, in the wake of the election and Biden’s victory, the prospect of holding Trump and his staff accountable for their own misdeeds may seem like the next turn in a loop-the-loop of political prosecutions.
With the infamous cry “Lock her up!” outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump’s supporters have long called for the prosecution of Hillary Clinton for crimes she allegedly committed as secretary of state under the Obama administration and as a presidential candidate. Last year Trump himself was impeached, and afterward he demanded to investigate the investigators. He has since ordered criminal inquiries into his campaign rival Joe Biden and Biden’s son Hunter. Now, in the wake of the election and Biden’s victory, the prospect of holding Trump and his staff accountable for their own misdeeds may seem like the next turn in a loop-the-loop of political prosecutions.
But as much as Americans may like to move on, it’s important to recognize the depth of the Trump administration’s corruption and malfeasance. Trump entered office uniquely compromised by financial conflicts of interest. He will leave office after running an intimidation campaign against state officials that aimed to disenfranchise hundreds of thousands of voters. Worst of all, the administration has spread fatal disinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic. Today, about as many Americans die each day of this disease than were killed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Trump’s own White House events and indoor campaign rallies have violated local public health decrees and knowingly caused the infection of numerous attendees. The administration’s distortion of health information and encouragement of vigilante action against state officials who enforced mask mandates could even amount to reckless endangerment.
Trump is already making moves to protect himself and his family from criminal liability. But what about officials who worked in his administration further down the bureaucratic ladder? The German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt offers a useful reference point for thinking about issues of complicity, resistance, and “just following orders” under corrupt regimes. She argues that the erosion of democratic institutions and criminal acts at the state level are made possible by a combination of fanatical leaders, mass consent, and bureaucratic apparatuses that deflect responsibility. In the interest of justice, government officials must be judged and held accountable—not as symbolic representatives of a regime but for their particular roles in abuses of power and state crimes.
Arendt’s focus on the individual actions of bureaucrats (most infamously those of Adolf Eichmann during the Holocaust) is relevant in light of both the Trump administration’s efforts to undermine democracy and its attempts to suppress and distort information about public health. How should Americans treat appointees who were serving in their positions in violation of the law because they were never approved by Congress? Or immigration officers who disregarded a federal judge’s order to restore the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program and enforced family separation at the U.S.-Mexico border? Or members of the Republican Party who have weaponized conspiracy theories about voter fraud in order to intimidate officials into denying the results of free and fair elections?
In her 1967 essay “Truth and Politics,” Arendt noted that organized lying can serve as a kind of political violence that completely reshapes “the whole factual texture” of society. She wrote that one key symptom of a broken democracy is “a peculiar kind of cynicism—an absolute refusal to believe in the truth of anything, no matter how well this truth may be established.” For her, the survival of democracy depends in part on the independence of the judiciary and other public institutions whose mission it is to seek information with some degree of freedom from political pressure. Paradoxically, it is always a political decision to support such institutions. Thus, the boundary between partisanship, the law, and disinterested research for the public good is fragile and subject to contestation. But that boundary can’t be dissolved totally without destroying the formal basis for democracy, be it liberal democracy or a more robust social democracy.
Arendt had occasion to comment on this contested boundary in 1971 after the release of the Pentagon Papers. This act of resistance by the intelligence analyst Daniel Ellsberg shattered the “internal self-deception,” as he called it, of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations with regard to their conduct of the war in Vietnam. For those who lied about the reality of the war, “Defactualization,” as Arendt called it in her essay “Lying in Politics: Reflections on The Pentagon Papers,” was “welcomed because disregard of reality was inherent in the policies and goals themselves.” Officials falsified statistics and deceived the public in order to indulge the U.S. military and intelligence community’s hubris about winning an unwinnable war.
Organized lying, cynicism, and a total dissolution of the fluid boundary between partisanship and disinterested government: These are clear and present dangers to democracy, Arendt warned. Today, Trump and the Republican Party’s refusal to recognize the validity of the election results as well as the horrific toll of COVID-19 (not to mention the existential threat of climate change) have threatened to make party loyalty the arbiter of reality itself. To those who succumb to that cynicism, bureaucratic agencies such as the National Institutes of Health or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which are supposed to operate with a degree of independence, appear as the deep state. It becomes impossible to conceive of any administrative independence that is not partisan and conspiratorial.
A deep state does exist, of course, but not in the insane form imagined by Trump or QAnon followers. Instead it refers to the array of minor bureaucrats and low-level appointees whose work depends on society maintaining contested boundaries between partisan loyalty, official duty, and the law. Tending these boundaries is not sufficient for a democratic society, but it is necessary. Whether or not members of the Trump administration will be subject to professional discipline or legal action, the recent election has made one thing clear about the American democratic state: The individual choices of even minor bureaucrats matter. Ultimately the certification and defense of the election results has come down to decisions made not only by the courts but also by a small number of low-profile officials, such as the Board of Canvassers in Wayne County, Michigan, and Georgia’s voting system implementation manager. Particularly in Georgia, those Republicans who have stood up to intense and unprecedented pressure from within their own party should be commended for their integrity. But it is also deeply unsettling that the choice to uphold a democratic election finally lay in their hands, not those of the voters.
Over the past four years, bureaucrats who have acted honorably under a presidency that is not only ideologically distasteful but also potentially criminal have simply been fired by Trump. Within the government, acts of resistance that merit the name have involved people speaking out publicly, non-anonymously, and at risk of losing their jobs. Getting denounced by Trump is perhaps the only badge of honor that some of these officials may wear.
Just as it is important to recognize officials who have stood their ground to expose government abuses and stop the circulation of disinformation, Americans shouldn’t ignore the many acts of complicity that increased the misery of the pandemic and brought their country to the brink of another stolen election. We must share Arendt’s insistence on ascertaining the individual responsibility of bureaucrats and holding them accountable. If Trump officials did commit crimes or abuse their power, they must either be prosecuted or professionally disciplined. The more time it takes to investigate any evidence of wrongdoing, the more we risk losing the factual record itself. It’s not automatic that the basic facts of what happened under the Trump administration will persist in history. This kind of political record, Arendt thought, is particularly vulnerable to erasure. Trump’s habit of ripping up every piece of paper that comes into his hands in the White House, even as workers desperately piece them back together for the National Archives, is a caricature of this real risk.
Of course, setting the record straight and holding officials accountable when it’s clear they have abused their power or even committed criminal offenses won’t be enough to restore fundamental confidence in government that this administration has eroded. The loss of transparency in governmental decision-making, the expansion of unaccountable national security agencies, the hobbling of all other agencies, the paralysis of Congress: These processes began well before Trump’s presidency, although their acceleration over the past four years is stunning. The strategist and media operator Steve Bannon fell out of Trump’s good graces several years ago, but his right-wing libertarian project aiming for the “deconstruction of the administrative state” has continued to guide this administration.
Though weakened by deeply partisan appointments, the judiciary and elections officials have stopped Trump and his allies from stealing the Presidency. The levee didn’t break, this time. But we shouldn’t put total faith in the permanence of our democracy’s institutions. Seventy-four million Americans who exercised their right to vote this year chose an authoritarian conspiracy-monger who encourages racist paramilitary groups and has fatally mismanaged a vast public health crisis. It’s possible that we’ve only seen a preview of a more successful version of American fascism still to come. To avoid that scenario, a long-term process of cultural reckoning and thoroughgoing democratization must address the myriad forces that enabled Trumpism—a process that in the end goes far beyond questions of bureaucratic accountability.