foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--The United States Needs More Wine to Stand Up to Chinese Bullying

The United States Needs More Wine to Stand Up to Chinese Bullying The United States needs a Strategic Shiraz Reserve .
China has been using its economic weight to bully middle powers without consequence , and the United States needs to consider radical departures from its usually staid trade policy to support allies in the face of Chinese aggression .
Upset over Australia ’ s call from early this year for an independent inquiry into the origin of the novel coronavirus , and its policies on Hong Kong and Xinjiang , China has targeted Australian exports with a vengeance .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ products , from beef and barley to wine and lobster .
If China ’ s antics continue , their moves could snowball into devastation for the Australian economy after three decades of unprecedented growth , as China buys 34 percent of its total exports .
The White House announced it would be serving Aussie wine at a holiday party , but much more is needed to ensure that the United States has its closest allies ’ backs .
In a recent New York Times interview , U.S. President-elect Joe Biden said that “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one of our … allies on the same page.
” Responding forcefully to Beijing ’ s bullying one of Washington ’ s closest allies should be a top priority in the first weeks of a Biden administration .
So what should the United States do ?
Yes , the United States needs to show up at the World Trade Organization in support of Australia ’ s complaint against China ’ s most recent actions , use WTO ’ s formal review of China ’ s trade policies coming up in July 2021 to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ joining a modified Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership ( the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership ) .
But American policymakers need to think bigger than these routine moves .
The United States has allowed such allies as Japan , South Korea , and Canada to suffer from China ’ s trade bullying for years , with little but rhetorical support coming from Washington .
The two to three years it takes for the WTO to respond to clear-cut cases of Chinese malfeasance is too slow and , ultimately , all that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to snap back with retaliatory measures .
The current WTO system clearly does not pack enough punch to deter Beijing or help to repair the damage to impacted countries .
China clearly sees the use of economic coercion as a central part of its foreign-policy toolkit , but U.S. allies should not fear that stances on Xinjiang , Hong Kong , 5G , or the South China Sea will cost them economically .
To change the state of play , the United States should consider supporting allies ’ domestic industries impacted by Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own producers get hit .
The most creative idea comes from the economics writer Matt Klein who has proposed a “ strategic Shiraz reserve.
” Under his idea , the government could create a special purpose vehicle to buy and hold foreign commodities that lose sales thanks to aggressive Chinese trade action , financed either directly by congressional appropriations or Federal Reserve borrowing .
The U.S. government , after all , already has experience managing reserves of oil , cheese and even mohair .
The money wouldn ’ t be thrown away , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could start selling back these nonperishable commodities onto the world market , perhaps even at a profit .
While economists may be concerned with quality issues given the guaranteed market for products , sommeliers hit hard by pandemic troubles in the hospitality industry would be only too happy to support Uncle Sam ’ s efforts to stock up .
And even if the United States doesn ’ t completely fill the gap China ’ s import restrictions open up , the symbolic impact of such a policy would be far more impactful on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marginal naval vessel docked overseas .
While policies like a Strategic Shiraz Reserve would blunt the economic impact of China ’ s actions , China should also be forced to pay a price for such behavior .
The United States already has mutual defense treaties with the likes of Australia and Japan—perhaps it could consider a mutual trade defense one as well ?
The U.S. government could organize like-minded countries to impose automatic tariffs on selected Chinese exports , which would only be lifted after China ceased its measures of economic coercion .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ tariffs on China to China ’ s coercive behavior .
Yes , moving quickly and multilaterally to impose costs would short-circuit the WTO dispute resolution process .
However , the current WTO system has clearly failed to dissuade China from resorting to coercive trade measures .
Stronger actions are required if the United States and its allies can even hope to change China ’ s cost-benefit calculus .
Finally , Biden should consider visiting Australia in his first overseas trip after the inauguration .
Australia is one of America ’ s most steadfast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States in every major conflict for more than 100 years—even in Vietnam .
Jumping Australia to the front of the line at this moment would send a clear message both to China and U.S. allies in the region that in the face of Chinese aggression , the United States has its friends ’ backs .

The United States needs a Strategic Shiraz Reserve. China has been using its economic weight to bully middle powers without consequence, and the United States needs to consider radical departures from its usually staid trade policy to support allies in the face of Chinese aggression.
The United States needs a Strategic Shiraz Reserve. China has been using its economic weight to bully middle powers without consequence, and the United States needs to consider radical departures from its usually staid trade policy to support allies in the face of Chinese aggression.
Upset over Australia’s call from early this year for an independent inquiry into the origin of the novel coronavirus, and its policies on Hong Kong and Xinjiang, China has targeted Australian exports with a vengeance. Its measures have hit a range of products, from beef and barley to wine and lobster. If China’s antics continue, their moves could snowball into devastation for the Australian economy after three decades of unprecedented growth, as China buys 34 percent of its total exports.
The White House announced it would be serving Aussie wine at a holiday party, but much more is needed to ensure that the United States has its closest allies’ backs. In a recent New York Times interview, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden said that “the best China strategy … gets every one of our … allies on the same page.” Responding forcefully to Beijing’s bullying one of Washington’s closest allies should be a top priority in the first weeks of a Biden administration.
So what should the United States do?
Yes, the United States needs to show up at the World Trade Organization in support of Australia’s complaint against China’s most recent actions, use WTO’s formal review of China’s trade policies coming up in July 2021 to make a real stink, and consider joining a modified Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership).
But American policymakers need to think bigger than these routine moves. The United States has allowed such allies as Japan, South Korea, and Canada to suffer from China’s trade bullying for years, with little but rhetorical support coming from Washington. The two to three years it takes for the WTO to respond to clear-cut cases of Chinese malfeasance is too slow and, ultimately, all that the WTO can offer is its blessing to snap back with retaliatory measures. The current WTO system clearly does not pack enough punch to deter Beijing or help to repair the damage to impacted countries.
China clearly sees the use of economic coercion as a central part of its foreign-policy toolkit, but U.S. allies should not fear that stances on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, 5G, or the South China Sea will cost them economically. To change the state of play, the United States should consider supporting allies’ domestic industries impacted by Chinese actions, as Washington does when its own producers get hit.
The most creative idea comes from the economics writer Matt Klein , who has proposed a “strategic Shiraz reserve.” Under his idea, the government could create a special purpose vehicle to buy and hold foreign commodities that lose sales thanks to aggressive Chinese trade action, financed either directly by congressional appropriations or Federal Reserve borrowing. The U.S. government, after all, already has experience managing reserves of oil, cheese , and even mohair. The money wouldn’t be thrown away, as at some point the United States could start selling back these nonperishable commodities onto the world market, perhaps even at a profit.
While economists may be concerned with quality issues given the guaranteed market for products, sommeliers hit hard by pandemic troubles in the hospitality industry would be only too happy to support Uncle Sam’s efforts to stock up. And even if the United States doesn’t completely fill the gap China’s import restrictions open up, the symbolic impact of such a policy would be far more impactful on the psychology of U.S. allies than a marginal naval vessel docked overseas.
While policies like a Strategic Shiraz Reserve would blunt the economic impact of China’s actions, China should also be forced to pay a price for such behavior. The United States already has mutual defense treaties with the likes of Australia and Japan—perhaps it could consider a mutual trade defense one as well? The U.S. government could organize like-minded countries to impose automatic tariffs on selected Chinese exports, which would only be lifted after China ceased its measures of economic coercion. Biden could also link unwinding current U.S. tariffs on China to China’s coercive behavior.
Yes, moving quickly and multilaterally to impose costs would short-circuit the WTO dispute resolution process. However, the current WTO system has clearly failed to dissuade China from resorting to coercive trade measures. Stronger actions are required if the United States and its allies can even hope to change China’s cost-benefit calculus.
Finally, Biden should consider visiting Australia in his first overseas trip after the inauguration. Australia is one of America’s most steadfast allies; it has fought alongside the United States in every major conflict for more than 100 years—even in Vietnam. Jumping Australia to the front of the line at this moment would send a clear message both to China and U.S. allies in the region that in the face of Chinese aggression, the United States has its friends’ backs.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--Biden Sees the A-Team. I See the Blob.

Biden Sees the A-Team. I See the Blob.

Biden Sees the A-Team .
I See the Blob .
Back in early 2001 , I attended a dinner of foreign-policy mavens with a friend who was about to join the incoming Bush administration .
His confidence in his future colleagues and his expectations for the future were sky-high .
He saw the Clinton administration as a bunch of well-meaning but naive amateurs who had repeatedly mishandled major foreign policy issues , and he told well-wishers at this gathering that they could relax , sit back , and watch how smoothly things would run now that a team of experienced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rice , Dick Cheney , etc.—were back in charge .
We all know how that turned out , alas , but I ’ ve been reminded of this episode as I ’ ve watched reactions to the roll-out of President-elect Joe Biden ’ s foreign policy team .
For some observers , the new team is manna from heaven ; just what the country needs after the incoherent , tweet-driven , and mostly ineffective chaos of the Trump/Pompeo era .
Former Foreign Policy editor David Rothkopf sees Biden ’ s initial appointees as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believes “ they ’ re picking the A-team.
” Former top officials have hailed Secretary of State nominee Antony Blinken as someone with “ unique insight into the full range of national security issues ” and praised Biden ’ s nominee as Director of National Intelligence , Avril Haines , as a “ wonderful choice ” and “ whip-smart.
” The new team has won measured praise from experts who rarely , if ever , agree , such as the Quincy Institute ’ s Trita Parsi and Mark Wallace , CEO of United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ describing Biden ’ s initial picks as “ talented , thoughtful , and reasonable.
” Other supporters see them as an experienced , professional group that has worked together in the past , enjoys the president-elect ’ s full confidence , and is ready to repair relations with traditional U.S. partners .
At the same time , however , progressives and advocates of foreign-policy restraint have voiced greater misgivings .
Robert Wright and Connor Echols gave Blinken an overall grade of C- on their “ progressive realist ” report card , and others @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his top picks had openly supported the 2003 war in Iraq .
Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute went further , warning that Biden ’ s early appointments signaled that the “ The Blob was Back and Ready for War.
” From the right , Republican Reps. Marco Rubio and Tom Cotton , and lame-duck Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , have started denouncing Team Biden even before its members have been sworn in , no doubt in order to enhance their own presidential chances four years from now .
Who ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the pundits who are busily opining about foreign policy under a Biden administration—including yours truly—know exactly what they will do or how well they will do it .
Past attitudes and choices are suggestive but not dispositive : The question is not what they did in the past but rather what they do next year and beyond .
And despite my own misgivings about the new administration ( about which more below ) , they should be judged not on their past errors but on their future performance .
As former British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what blows governments off-course are “ events , dear boy , events.
” No administration anticipates every problem it will have to address , and the unexpected often overwhelms whatever well-laid plans one might have had on one ’ s first day in office .
Former President George W. Bush ran for office in 2000 opposing nation-building and promising a “ humble ” foreign policy , but he got blindsided by the September 11 attacks and it blew his entire foreign policy off-course .
Former Barack Obama didn ’ t see the Arab @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lots of time , energy , money , lives , and political capital , and brought no credit to his handling of foreign affairs .
Outgoing President Donald Trump never expected to face a global pandemic , and his inept response to it helped make him a one-term president .
No matter what Team Biden thinks it will do in foreign policy , success is likely to depend not on what they plan but on how they handle the things they didn ’ t expect .
That said , there are some obvious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s proclivities .
Both Biden and his closest advisors remain committed to an image of U.S. global leadership , that was never as successful as they believe and is badly outdated today .
It is a vision that assumes the United States can still exert the same level of global influence it did when it constituted upwards of 30 percent of the world economy and it enjoyed a well-deserved reputation for administrative competence and diplomatic prowess .
Although Biden et al may recognize that the unipolar era is over and that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problem on its own , their own statements suggest that they would still like to try .
Consider Biden ’ s March 2020 essay in Foreign Affairs .
The title , “ Why America Must Lead Again , ” is itself revealing , as is Biden ’ s confident assertion that his foreign policy “ will place the United States back at the head of the table.
” Not just at the table , mind you , but at the head .
That instinct is a recipe for overcommitment : If the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issue , it will provoke immediate resistance from some countries ( e.g.
, China , Russia ) and it will tempt others to once again let Uncle Sam bear a disproportionate share of the burden .
Biden ’ s essay offers a host of perfectly sensible ideas ( e.g.
, ending the forever wars , reinvesting in our diplomatic corps , rebuilding infrastructure , devoting more resources to research and development , etc . )
, but he also wants America to “ continue lifting up women and girls around the world , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a core national security interest , ” and to rally the free world behind “ the electric idea of liberty.
” Worthy goals , but each entails meddling in other countries , telling other societies what to do and how to live , and otherwise engaging in unpredictable efforts at social engineering abroad .
And while we ’ re advancing these noble ideals , Biden also intends to reaffirm the “ sacred ” commitment to NATO , maintain our “ ironclad commitment to Israel ’ s security , ” “ reinvest in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and “ do more to integrate our friends in Latin America and Africa into the broader network of democracies.
” And that ’ s just a part of his agenda .
If Biden and his team tore this to-do list in half and decided to work on the items that were left , they would still be very busy indeed .
Biden ’ s pick to run the National Security Council—Jake Sullivan—is on the same page as his future boss .
Writing in the Atlantic in January 2019 , Sullivan sought to reclaim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order to persuade an increasingly skeptical public to continue shouldering the burdens of global leadership .
In his words , “ The public will accept major investment in foreign policy only if it believes the United States is not just a normal country , with normal responsibilities.
” Yet on closer inspection , Sullivan ’ s notion of “ exceptionalism ” turns out to be the familiar nostrum that America “ has a unique capacity and responsibility to help make the world a better place.
” “ We live in a country of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a world full of problems.
” Even if true , it does not follow that every problem in the world would be properly met by a solution that is made in America .
Nor does it follow that solving every global problem is in America ’ s interest .
Sometimes it will be ; at other times , a foreign power may be better positioned and have greater incentive to provide a solution .
Both Sullivan and Biden acknowledge that the United States is not perfect and has made mistakes in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dwell on them for too long or hold those responsible accountable .
After all , Sullivan writes , “ A nation ’ s foreign policy is the total of imperfect decisions made by imperfect people facing imperfect choices with imperfect information.
” Granted , but that hardly absolves them ( and us ) from the responsibility to learn from past mistakes instead of repeating them .
Moreover , what may be a genuine strength of Team Biden—familiarity , experience working in past administrations , etc.—may also be a liability .
Although there will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over tactical decisions or even larger strategic priorities , these debates will be taking place among a group of people with strikingly similar world views and a certain nostalgia for earlier eras of U.S. primacy .
The danger , as Walter Lippmann once cautioned , is that “ when all think alike , no one thinks very much.
” One need not fully embrace the notion of a “ team of rivals ” to believe that the Biden administration might benefit from a few appointees who had managed to be on the opposite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the war in Iraq , the intervention in Libya , or the 2009 surge in Afghanistan .
Biden ’ s vocal commitment to democracy is also somewhat worrisome .
To be sure , restoring amity to America ’ s relations with other democratic countries makes sense in the wake of Trump ’ s petulant boorishness and his envious admiration of various authoritarian rulers .
But Biden ’ s pledge to convene a global Summit for Democracy during his first year in office and his frequent invocation of cliches like “ the free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it solves .
For starters , given the parlous state of America ’ s own democracy , it is just a tad presumptuous for Biden to summon other leaders to Washington to “ renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world.
” Second , will the guest list be confined to fully liberal democracies , or will it also include India , Turkey , Poland , Hungary , Israel , or other states whose democratic orders fall well short of liberal ideals ?
Third , making democracy the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will turn America ’ s deepening rivalry with China into an ideological contest , making cooperation on issues such as climate change harder and rendering the possibility of long-term coexistence less tenable .
Highlighting democracy in this fashion could also put the administration back on a slippery slope toward various forms of regime change .
If they genuinely believe in the “ electric idea of liberty , ” how will they resist the urge to support groups who are seeking to topple a dictator or advance some other set of liberal values ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As soon as Biden takes office , he and his associates will receive a steady stream of requests from a long line of supplicants .
Europeans will want to know what he ’ ll do about Ukraine , or the Greece-Turkey dispute in the Aegean , or the transatlantic rift over Big Tech .
Asian countries will want more help balancing China , and Afghans , Somalis , and more than a few others will be lobbying to keep U.S. troops committed against the Taliban , the Islamic State , al-Shabab , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle East clients will push hard to keep Biden from rejoining the nuclear deal with Iran ; if he goes ahead anyway , they ’ ll lobby for more U.S. weaponry and additional security assurances as compensation .
You won ’ t hear any of these countries volunteering to do more to help Uncle Sam , however , and if history is any guide , lofty promises to take greater responsibility for their own security will go unfulfilled .
The question is : How will Biden & Co. respond as these requests start @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first dibs , and which countries will be told to do more for themselves ?
The concept of buck-passing—the idea of getting others to do the heavy lifting instead of trying to do it all yourself—seems to largely absent from Team Biden ’ s worldview , and so I fear they ’ ll spend too much time convincing others that Trump was just a temporary aberration and too little time getting allies to pull their own weight .
Don ’ t get me wrong : I hope the Biden team is able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unipolar era and the ineffective shambles of the Trump years , and I ’ ll be delighted if my misgivings prove unfounded .
Indeed , despite having written an entire book arguing that America ’ s foreign-policy elite was stubbornly committed to a failing grand strategy and resistant to either accountability or reform , I ’ ll be more than pleasantly surprised if Team Biden embraces a different approach .
Go ahead , Joe : Prove me wrong .

Back in early 2001, I attended a dinner of foreign-policy mavens with a friend who was about to join the incoming Bush administration. His confidence in his future colleagues and his expectations for the future were sky-high. He saw the Clinton administration as a bunch of well-meaning but naive amateurs who had repeatedly mishandled major foreign policy issues, and he told well-wishers at this gathering that they could relax, sit back, and watch how smoothly things would run now that a team of experienced professionals—Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, etc.—were back in charge.
Back in early 2001, I attended a dinner of foreign-policy mavens with a friend who was about to join the incoming Bush administration. His confidence in his future colleagues and his expectations for the future were sky-high. He saw the Clinton administration as a bunch of well-meaning but naive amateurs who had repeatedly mishandled major foreign policy issues, and he told well-wishers at this gathering that they could relax, sit back, and watch how smoothly things would run now that a team of experienced professionals—Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, etc.—were back in charge.
We all know how that turned out, alas, but I’ve been reminded of this episode as I’ve watched reactions to the roll-out of President-elect Joe Biden’s foreign policy team. For some observers, the new team is manna from heaven; just what the country needs after the incoherent, tweet-driven, and mostly ineffective chaos of the Trump/Pompeo era. Former Foreign Policy editor David Rothkopf sees Biden’s initial appointees as an “all-star list,” and believes “they’re picking the A-team.” Former top officials have hailed Secretary of State nominee Antony Blinken as someone with “unique insight into the full range of national security issues” and praised Biden’s nominee as Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, as a “wonderful choice” and “whip-smart.”
The new team has won measured praise from experts who rarely, if ever, agree, such as the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi and Mark Wallace, CEO of United Against Nuclear Iran, with the latter describing Biden’s initial picks as “talented, thoughtful, and reasonable.” Other supporters see them as an experienced, professional group that has worked together in the past, enjoys the president-elect’s full confidence, and is ready to repair relations with traditional U.S. partners.
At the same time, however, progressives and advocates of foreign-policy restraint have voiced greater misgivings. Robert Wright and Connor Echols gave Blinken an overall grade of C- on their “progressive realist” report card, and others pointed out that Biden and almost all of his top picks had openly supported the 2003 war in Iraq. Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute went further, warning that Biden’s early appointments signaled that the “The Blob was Back and Ready for War.” From the right, Republican Reps. Marco Rubio and Tom Cotton, and lame-duck Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have started denouncing Team Biden even before its members have been sworn in, no doubt in order to enhance their own presidential chances four years from now.
Who’s right? In truth, none of the pundits who are busily opining about foreign policy under a Biden administration—including yours truly—know exactly what they will do or how well they will do it. Past attitudes and choices are suggestive but not dispositive: The question is not what they did in the past but rather what they do next year and beyond. And despite my own misgivings about the new administration (about which more below), they should be judged not on their past errors but on their future performance.
As former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan famously quipped, what blows governments off-course are “events, dear boy, events.” No administration anticipates every problem it will have to address, and the unexpected often overwhelms whatever well-laid plans one might have had on one’s first day in office. Former President George W. Bush ran for office in 2000 opposing nation-building and promising a “humble” foreign policy, but he got blindsided by the September 11 attacks and it blew his entire foreign policy off-course. Former Barack Obama didn’t see the Arab Spring coming, but it eventually consumed lots of time, energy, money, lives, and political capital, and brought no credit to his handling of foreign affairs. Outgoing President Donald Trump never expected to face a global pandemic, and his inept response to it helped make him a one-term president. No matter what Team Biden thinks it will do in foreign policy, success is likely to depend not on what they plan but on how they handle the things they didn’t expect.
That said, there are some obvious reasons to worry about the new administration’s proclivities. Both Biden and his closest advisors remain committed to an image of U.S. global leadership, that was never as successful as they believe and is badly outdated today. It is a vision that assumes the United States can still exert the same level of global influence it did when it constituted upwards of 30 percent of the world economy and it enjoyed a well-deserved reputation for administrative competence and diplomatic prowess. Although Biden et al may recognize that the unipolar era is over and that the United States cannot solve every global problem on its own, their own statements suggest that they would still like to try.
Consider Biden’s March 2020 essay in Foreign Affairs. The title, “Why America Must Lead Again,” is itself revealing, as is Biden’s confident assertion that his foreign policy “will place the United States back at the head of the table.” Not just at the table, mind you, but at the head. That instinct is a recipe for overcommitment: If the United States insists on leading on every important issue, it will provoke immediate resistance from some countries (e.g., China, Russia) and it will tempt others to once again let Uncle Sam bear a disproportionate share of the burden.
Biden’s essay offers a host of perfectly sensible ideas (e.g., ending the forever wars, reinvesting in our diplomatic corps, rebuilding infrastructure, devoting more resources to research and development, etc.), but he also wants America to “continue lifting up women and girls around the world,” to focus on “combating corruption as a core national security interest,” and to rally the free world behind “the electric idea of liberty.” Worthy goals, but each entails meddling in other countries, telling other societies what to do and how to live, and otherwise engaging in unpredictable efforts at social engineering abroad. And while we’re advancing these noble ideals, Biden also intends to reaffirm the “sacred” commitment to NATO, maintain our “ironclad commitment to Israel’s security,” “reinvest in our treaty alliances in Asia,” and “do more to integrate our friends in Latin America and Africa into the broader network of democracies.”
And that’s just a part of his agenda. If Biden and his team tore this to-do list in half and decided to work on the items that were left, they would still be very busy indeed.
Biden’s pick to run the National Security Council—Jake Sullivan—is on the same page as his future boss. Writing in the Atlantic in January 2019, Sullivan sought to reclaim the idea of American exceptionalism, in order to persuade an increasingly skeptical public to continue shouldering the burdens of global leadership. In his words, “The public will accept major investment in foreign policy only if it believes the United States is not just a normal country, with normal responsibilities.” Yet on closer inspection, Sullivan’s notion of “exceptionalism” turns out to be the familiar nostrum that America “has a unique capacity and responsibility to help make the world a better place.” “We live in a country of problem-solvers,” he writes, “in a world full of problems.”
Even if true, it does not follow that every problem in the world would be properly met by a solution that is made in America. Nor does it follow that solving every global problem is in America’s interest. Sometimes it will be; at other times, a foreign power may be better positioned and have greater incentive to provide a solution. Both Sullivan and Biden acknowledge that the United States is not perfect and has made mistakes in the past, but we shouldn’t dwell on them for too long or hold those responsible accountable. After all, Sullivan writes, “A nation’s foreign policy is the total of imperfect decisions made by imperfect people facing imperfect choices with imperfect information.” Granted, but that hardly absolves them (and us) from the responsibility to learn from past mistakes instead of repeating them.
Moreover, what may be a genuine strength of Team Biden—familiarity, experience working in past administrations, etc.—may also be a liability. Although there will undoubtedly be disagreements within the next administration over tactical decisions or even larger strategic priorities, these debates will be taking place among a group of people with strikingly similar world views and a certain nostalgia for earlier eras of U.S. primacy. The danger, as Walter Lippmann once cautioned, is that “when all think alike, no one thinks very much.” One need not fully embrace the notion of a “team of rivals” to believe that the Biden administration might benefit from a few appointees who had managed to be on the opposite side of earlier debates over NATO enlargement, the war in Iraq, the intervention in Libya, or the 2009 surge in Afghanistan.
Biden’s vocal commitment to democracy is also somewhat worrisome. To be sure, restoring amity to America’s relations with other democratic countries makes sense in the wake of Trump’s petulant boorishness and his envious admiration of various authoritarian rulers. But Biden’s pledge to convene a global Summit for Democracy during his first year in office and his frequent invocation of cliches like “the free world” could cause more problems than it solves.
For starters, given the parlous state of America’s own democracy, it is just a tad presumptuous for Biden to summon other leaders to Washington to “renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world.” Second, will the guest list be confined to fully liberal democracies, or will it also include India, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Israel, or other states whose democratic orders fall well short of liberal ideals? Third, making democracy the centerpiece of Biden’s foreign policy will turn America’s deepening rivalry with China into an ideological contest, making cooperation on issues such as climate change harder and rendering the possibility of long-term coexistence less tenable. Highlighting democracy in this fashion could also put the administration back on a slippery slope toward various forms of regime change. If they genuinely believe in the “electric idea of liberty,” how will they resist the urge to support groups who are seeking to topple a dictator or advance some other set of liberal values?
Which brings me to my final concern. As soon as Biden takes office, he and his associates will receive a steady stream of requests from a long line of supplicants. Europeans will want to know what he’ll do about Ukraine, or the Greece-Turkey dispute in the Aegean, or the transatlantic rift over Big Tech. Asian countries will want more help balancing China, and Afghans, Somalis, and more than a few others will be lobbying to keep U.S. troops committed against the Taliban, the Islamic State, al-Shabab, or whoever. America’s traditional Middle East clients will push hard to keep Biden from rejoining the nuclear deal with Iran; if he goes ahead anyway, they’ll lobby for more U.S. weaponry and additional security assurances as compensation. You won’t hear any of these countries volunteering to do more to help Uncle Sam, however, and if history is any guide, lofty promises to take greater responsibility for their own security will go unfulfilled.
The question is: How will Biden & Co. respond as these requests start piling up? Which regions will get first dibs, and which countries will be told to do more for themselves? The concept of buck-passing—the idea of getting others to do the heavy lifting instead of trying to do it all yourself—seems to largely absent from Team Biden’s worldview, and so I fear they’ll spend too much time convincing others that Trump was just a temporary aberration and too little time getting allies to pull their own weight.
Don’t get me wrong: I hope the Biden team is able to avoid both the overweening ambitions of the unipolar era and the ineffective shambles of the Trump years, and I’ll be delighted if my misgivings prove unfounded. Indeed, despite having written an entire book arguing that America’s foreign-policy elite was stubbornly committed to a failing grand strategy and resistant to either accountability or reform, I’ll be more than pleasantly surprised if Team Biden embraces a different approach. Go ahead, Joe: Prove me wrong.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--Old Rivals in Kashmir Are Joining Forces Against Modi

Old Rivals in Kashmir Are Joining Forces Against Modi SRINAGAR , Jammu and Kashmir—A day before India stripped Indian-administered Kashmir of its special status in August 2019 and downgraded it to a federally controlled territory , all the regional political parties held an emergency meeting in Srinagar .
The regional parties had sensed that the country ’ s ruling right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) was planning to fiddle with Kashmir ’ s special status and vowed to defend the legislation .
The joint declaration by the Kashmiri political parties came to be known as the Gupkar Declaration , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Srinagar where several former ministers live .
Hours before the Indian home minister announced in parliament the decision that would change the course of Kashmiri politics , almost all of the top and lower-rung politicians in Kashmir were detained .
Among those were three former chief ministers of Jammu and Kashmir : Mehbooba Mufti , Omar Abdullah , and Farooq Abdullah .
The rest of the world discovered on Aug. 5 , 2019 that the Indian government had revoked Article 370 of the constitution , erasing the quasi-autonomous status of Kashmir—a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ creation of India and Pakistan and is currently disputed by the two countries .
The move was widely seen as an attempt to change the demography of the region .
The senior Kashmiri politician Naeem Akhtar , who was a cabinet minister in the last elected government in Kashmir , said the move was also aimed at “ disempowering and disenfranchising ” Kashmiri politicians .
On India ’ s 74th Independence Day on Aug. 15 this year , Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that Kashmir will soon have elected representatives and a chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time Kashmir had an elected government was in 2018 .
Since then , it has been ruled by New Delhi through its representatives .
When Modi made the pledge , the most recent chief minister of the region , Mufti , had just completed her year in detention .
Other politicians who were released before her were either restricted to their homes or barred from meeting other party members .
No political activities were allowed .
Several politicians said they were asked to sign a declaration pledging silence over all developments in Kashmir @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chief Minister Omar Abdullah , in an interview with the Indian website the Wire , revealed that while he was in detention , he was told if he signed a document pledging silence on all developments in the erstwhile state he would be released immediately .
But , Abdullah said , he refused the deal .
It was only after Mufti was released that political parties from across the political spectrum—which were once fierce rivals—began to work and indulge actively in political activities .
At least seven regional political parties met Mufti at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the face of a challenge from Modi ’ s handpicked local operatives .
Modi ’ s BJP has been trying to create new political forces in Kashmir to sideline the established parties like Farooq and Omar Abdullah ’ s National Conference and Mufti ’ s Peoples Democratic Party ( PDP ) , which are demanding the restoration of Article 370 .
As a result , fresh faces have started to emerge since August of last year that have been favoring the BJP ’ s decisions on Kashmir .
When most of the politicians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new political start-up called the Apni Party was formed .
Interestingly , it was only the Apni Party and the BJP that have been allowed to carry out political activities in Kashmir when all other politicians were barred from doing so .
The two parties used to campaign on promises of proper roads , uninterrupted electricity supplies , jobs , and an amicable solution of the Kashmir issue within the ambit of the Indian Constitution .
The National Conference advocated complete autonomy for the disputed region—with only defense , foreign policy , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The PDP ’ s softer policy of self-rule proposed economic integration and a political superstructure that would empower subregions within Kashmir .
Since both the parties used to bank on these agendas to remain relevant , the abrogation of Article 370 has pushed them into an identity crisis .
Indeed , the PDP was formed in 1999 to counter the long-standing clout of the National Conference .
“ Our growth is at the cost of the other .
Our constituencies are in conflict with each other , ” the PDP youth leader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now , he added , “ there are more threats than conflicts that are uniting us.
” Former chief minister and National Conference leader Omar Abdullah said the Gupkar Alliance is a sign of the times .
“ Last year it would have been unthinkable for the political parties that have been rivals for as long as you can remember .
… The alliance is a response to the unprecedented situation that we find ourselves in , ” he said .
The alliance is all the more significant because it includes both parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kashmir intact since 1947 , when Kashmir acceded to the Union of India .
New Delhi has always relied on a local face to extend its control .
The National Conference , and later the PDP , filled that space .
Without a local politician to represent India in Kashmir , it would have been difficult for New Delhi to counter separatist groups there .
But after the Indian government struck down Kashmir ’ s semi-autonomous status , both the PDP and National Conference agendas—the very essence of their existence—were rendered irrelevant .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sheikh Showkat Hussain told Foreign Policy that ever since the autonomy of Kashmir was taken away , the “ so-called mainstream politicians ” are facing an existential crisis because the slogan they used for mobilizing people has lost its value.
” That slogan was the promise of autonomy for the erstwhile state .
“ We are in a George Floyd moment : Like he was pinned to the ground and choked , all the political parties , the religious parties , and even the separatist groups are fighting for an identity now , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the National Conference , told Foreign Policy .
The Indian government adopted the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act to amend or repeal these laws .
As such , it does not require the nod of Jammu and Kashmir ’ s government to make these changes .
With no elected government in place , the administration functions through a government-appointed representative , called the lieutenant governor , who furthers their powers and control through bureaucrats .
The appointment of these representatives and bureaucrats is also politically driven .
Current Lt. Gov .
Manoj @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and has also been a strong proponent of right-wing Hindutva—an ideology that seeks Hindu dominance in India .
The political parties in Kashmir say that concentrating power and control in the hands of bureaucrats dilutes democratically-elected institutions and strengthens New Delhi ’ s rule in the region .
The Indian government , on the other hand , maintains that it aims to strengthen grassroots democracy .
Modi and the entire BJP camp have been targeting the families of former chief ministers Mufti and Abdullah for strengthening what they call dynastic politics .
Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when it comes to ideology and policy , Modi sees the two families as a hindrance to making inroads in the Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley .
With no government in place , the BJP government in New Delhi can directly rule and control Kashmir through its handpicked representatives .
National Conference ’ s Dar told Foreign Policy that the entire power and control in Indian-administered Kashmir now lies with BJP bureaucrats and the security agencies .
The PDP ’ s Akhtar agrees , calling it “ bureaucratization ” of the region .
With what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Kashmir , the PDP ’ s Parra and Akhtar said India has created a political vacuum in Kashmir .
As such , “ there is an absence of politics in Kashmir , and everyone who indulges in political activities is attacked , ” Parra said .
Explaining these attacks , Parra said that since Aug. 5 , 2019 , no politician was allowed to speak of politics ; lawyers and journalists were summoned and some of them even booked under an anti-terrorism law .
“ There was a crackdown on everyone who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its Kashmir policies , ” Parra said on Oct. 31 .
A few weeks after we spoke , Parra was arrested by India ’ s National Investigation Agency on the dubious charge of allegedly supporting the banned pro-Pakistan militant outfit Hizbul Mujahideen .
Even Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan , who has long advocated a bilateral resolution of the Kashmir dispute , is now also talking about restoration of Kashmir ’ s special status .
That acts in favor of New Delhi at two levels : It erodes the relevance of National Conference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ self-rule and autonomy , and it shifts the focus from larger demands for independence and freedom from India to simply restoring autonomy and sovereignty .
Dar , whose party ’ s agenda has been autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir , told Foreign Policy that right now they are only fighting for the reversal of Article 370 .
But as far as the National Conference is concerned , Dar added , “ Our stand is clear , that is the restoration of the pre-1953 situation [ when the Indian government had no control over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ external affairs , and communications ] and that is never going to change.
” Meanwhile , most of the region ’ s secessionists have been dormant since the abrogation of Kashmir ’ s special status .
While many of them are either under house arrest or lodged in different jails across India , those who are free have remained out of the spotlight and maintained their silence on political issues since August 2019 .
The secessionists have long demanded the solution of the Kashmir dispute according to resolutions passed in the United Nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the secessionists are known in political parlance—demand to secede from India .
As such , the abrogation of Article 370 only vindicated their political standing , the political analyst Hussain said .
The secessionists have called for a statewide lockdown only once .
( Before August 2019 , the separatist camp would frequently call for shutdowns and protests against what they deemed anti-Kashmir policies . )
The Hurriyat Conference—an amalgam of political and religious groups demanding freedom from India and accession to Pakistan—only spoke on Article 370 after more than seven months .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Front—a secessionist group that demands the complete independence of Jammu and Kashmir with no ties to India or Pakistan—issued its first official statement on the move after six months .
These secessionists maintain that their fight is not for autonomy but for freedom from India ; events in the past two years have likely made their anti-India position more attractive , even if they are unable to organize due to house arrests and detention of their leaders .
The National Conference leader Abdullah told Foreign Policy that as of now they are taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the Indian government since last year .
“ The fight for the restoration of Article 370 as of now is a legal fight .
We are bolstering the legal fight with a political fight , ” he said .
The Gupkar Alliance has also reached out to several political groups in Ladakh—which was carved out of Jammu and Kashmir in August of last year and downgraded to a federally controlled territory—and in Jammu , a predominantly Hindu region .
Bringing the politicians from Ladakh and Jammu on board holds significance , because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resistance when Kashmir ’ s special status was abolished .
Now , with them on board , the Gupkar Alliance can build significant pressure on Modi ’ s government by contesting local elections together .
PDP ’ s Akhtar and Parra said the strategy to reverse the changes made by the Indian government will evolve with time .
But the ruling BJP has time and again made it clear that it is nearly impossible to reverse what it did in August 2019 .
The BJP is trying to project the revocation of Kashmir @ @ @ @ @ @ @ era of development and peace for the region ; it maintains that the old order bred separatism and corruption in Kashmir .
The Gupkar Alliance is in its infancy right now .
As old rivalries between political parties take a back seat to cooperation , the alliance sounds hopeful , so much so that when Mufti—the leader of a party that always emphasized the positives of union with India—addressed a press conference for the first time after her yearlong detention , she placed her party ’ s flag next to the flag of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New Delhi has removed from official buildings in Kashmir , and said she would not hoist the Indian tricolor until Kashmir ’ s special status is restored .

SRINAGAR, Jammu and Kashmir—A day before India stripped Indian-administered Kashmir of its special status in August 2019 and downgraded it to a federally controlled territory, all the regional political parties held an emergency meeting in Srinagar. The regional parties had sensed that the country’s ruling right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was planning to fiddle with Kashmir’s special status and vowed to defend the legislation. The joint declaration by the Kashmiri political parties came to be known as the Gupkar Declaration, borrowing its name from the posh neighborhood in Srinagar where several former ministers live.
SRINAGAR, Jammu and Kashmir—A day before India stripped Indian-administered Kashmir of its special status in August 2019 and downgraded it to a federally controlled territory, all the regional political parties held an emergency meeting in Srinagar. The regional parties had sensed that the country’s ruling right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was planning to fiddle with Kashmir’s special status and vowed to defend the legislation. The joint declaration by the Kashmiri political parties came to be known as the Gupkar Declaration, borrowing its name from the posh neighborhood in Srinagar where several former ministers live.
Hours before the Indian home minister announced in parliament the decision that would change the course of Kashmiri politics, almost all of the top and lower-rung politicians in Kashmir were detained. Among those were three former chief ministers of Jammu and Kashmir: Mehbooba Mufti, Omar Abdullah, and Farooq Abdullah.
The rest of the world discovered on Aug. 5, 2019 that the Indian government had revoked Article 370 of the constitution, erasing the quasi-autonomous status of Kashmir—a former princely state that was independent before the creation of India and Pakistan and is currently disputed by the two countries. The move was widely seen as an attempt to change the demography of the region. The senior Kashmiri politician Naeem Akhtar, who was a cabinet minister in the last elected government in Kashmir, said the move was also aimed at “disempowering and disenfranchising” Kashmiri politicians.
Naeem Akhtar, a senior PDP leader and former cabinet minister, at his residence in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, on Nov. 2.
On India’s 74th Independence Day on Aug. 15 this year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that Kashmir will soon have elected representatives and a chief minister of its own. The last time Kashmir had an elected government was in 2018. Since then, it has been ruled by New Delhi through its representatives.
When Modi made the pledge, the most recent chief minister of the region, Mufti, had just completed her year in detention. Other politicians who were released before her were either restricted to their homes or barred from meeting other party members. No political activities were allowed. Several politicians said they were asked to sign a declaration pledging silence over all developments in Kashmir after the Article 370 decision. Former Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, in an interview with the Indian website the Wire, revealed that while he was in detention, he was told if he signed a document pledging silence on all developments in the erstwhile state he would be released immediately. But, Abdullah said, he refused the deal.
The last time Kashmir had an elected government was in 2018. Since then, it has been ruled by New Delhi through its representatives.
It was only after Mufti was released that political parties from across the political spectrum—which were once fierce rivals—began to work and indulge actively in political activities. At least seven regional political parties met Mufti at her residence and formed an alliance in the face of a challenge from Modi’s handpicked local operatives.
Modi’s BJP has been trying to create new political forces in Kashmir to sideline the established parties like Farooq and Omar Abdullah’s National Conference and Mufti’s Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which are demanding the restoration of Article 370. As a result, fresh faces have started to emerge since August of last year that have been favoring the BJP’s decisions on Kashmir. When most of the politicians in Kashmir were in detention, a new political start-up called the Apni Party was formed. Interestingly, it was only the Apni Party and the BJP that have been allowed to carry out political activities in Kashmir when all other politicians were barred from doing so.
The formation of the alliance marks the beginning of a new chapter in Kashmiri politics. The two key members of the alliance, the National Conference and PDP, have long been engaged in a turf war with each other.
The two parties used to campaign on promises of proper roads, uninterrupted electricity supplies, jobs, and an amicable solution of the Kashmir issue within the ambit of the Indian Constitution. The National Conference advocated complete autonomy for the disputed region—with only defense, foreign policy, and communications being handled by the Indian government. The PDP’s softer policy of self-rule proposed economic integration and a political superstructure that would empower subregions within Kashmir. Since both the parties used to bank on these agendas to remain relevant, the abrogation of Article 370 has pushed them into an identity crisis.
Indeed, the PDP was formed in 1999 to counter the long-standing clout of the National Conference. “Our growth is at the cost of the other. Our constituencies are in conflict with each other,” the PDP youth leader Waheed Ur Rehman Parra said. But now, he added, “there are more threats than conflicts that are uniting us.”
Former chief minister and National Conference leader Omar Abdullah said the Gupkar Alliance is a sign of the times. “Last year it would have been unthinkable for the political parties that have been rivals for as long as you can remember. … The alliance is a response to the unprecedented situation that we find ourselves in,” he said.
The alliance is all the more significant because it includes both parties that kept India’s hold on Kashmir intact since 1947, when Kashmir acceded to the Union of India. New Delhi has always relied on a local face to extend its control. The National Conference, and later the PDP, filled that space. Without a local politician to represent India in Kashmir, it would have been difficult for New Delhi to counter separatist groups there.
But after the Indian government struck down Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status, both the PDP and National Conference agendas—the very essence of their existence—were rendered irrelevant. The Kashmir-based political analyst and noted academician Sheikh Showkat Hussain told Foreign Policy that ever since the autonomy of Kashmir was taken away, the “so-called mainstream politicians” are facing an existential crisis because the slogan they used for mobilizing people has lost its value.” That slogan was the promise of autonomy for the erstwhile state.
Imran Nabi Dar, spokesperson of the National Conference, at his residence in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, on Nov. 1.
“We are in a George Floyd moment: Like he was pinned to the ground and choked, all the political parties, the religious parties, and even the separatist groups are fighting for an identity now,” Imran Nabi Dar, a spokesperson for the National Conference, told Foreign Policy.
Since August 2019, India has amended or repealed over 200 laws of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir through executive orders. Some of the laws, like the new land law, throw Kashmir open for sale to every Indian citizen wanting to buy land or property. Kashmir-based politicians and critics see these executive orders as an effort to change the political and geographical demography of the disputed region.
The Indian government adopted the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act to amend or repeal these laws. As such, it does not require the nod of Jammu and Kashmir’s government to make these changes. With no elected government in place, the administration functions through a government-appointed representative, called the lieutenant governor, who furthers their powers and control through bureaucrats. The appointment of these representatives and bureaucrats is also politically driven. Current Lt. Gov. Manoj Sinha is a veteran of the BJP and has also been a strong proponent of right-wing Hindutva—an ideology that seeks Hindu dominance in India.
With no government in place, the BJP government in New Delhi can directly rule and control Kashmir through its handpicked representatives.
The political parties in Kashmir say that concentrating power and control in the hands of bureaucrats dilutes democratically elected institutions and strengthens New Delhi’s rule in the region. The Indian government, on the other hand, maintains that it aims to strengthen grassroots democracy. Modi and the entire BJP camp have been targeting the families of former chief ministers Mufti and Abdullah for strengthening what they call dynastic politics. Since both parties fundamentally differ from the BJP when it comes to ideology and policy, Modi sees the two families as a hindrance to making inroads in the Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley. With no government in place, the BJP government in New Delhi can directly rule and control Kashmir through its handpicked representatives.
National Conference’s Dar told Foreign Policy that the entire power and control in Indian-administered Kashmir now lies with BJP bureaucrats and the security agencies. The PDP’s Akhtar agrees, calling it “bureaucratization” of the region.
Waheed Ur Rehman Parra, the youth leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party, at his Srinagar residence on Oct. 31.
With what these politicians call “bureaucratic rule” in Kashmir, the PDP’s Parra and Akhtar said India has created a political vacuum in Kashmir. As such, “there is an absence of politics in Kashmir, and everyone who indulges in political activities is attacked,” Parra said.
Explaining these attacks, Parra said that since Aug. 5, 2019, no politician was allowed to speak of politics; lawyers and journalists were summoned and some of them even booked under an anti-terrorism law. “There was a crackdown on everyone who tried to question the Indian government for its Kashmir policies,” Parra said on Oct. 31.
A few weeks after we spoke, Parra was arrested by India’s National Investigation Agency on the dubious charge of allegedly supporting the banned pro-Pakistan militant outfit Hizbul Mujahideen.
While the politicians differ in their views on whether they face an existential crisis, there is a consensus on the fact that the Indian government has managed to shift the goal posts and agendas for Kashmiri political parties. Parra, who is president of the PDP’s youth wing, said the Indian government has “successfully” moved the goal posts from the complete resolution of the Kashmir conflict to the much smaller aim of restoring autonomy under Article 370.
Even Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, who has long advocated a bilateral resolution of the Kashmir dispute, is now also talking about restoration of Kashmir’s special status. That acts in favor of New Delhi at two levels: It erodes the relevance of National Conference and PDP, which had been proposing self-rule and autonomy, and it shifts the focus from larger demands for independence and freedom from India to simply restoring autonomy and sovereignty.
Dar, whose party’s agenda has been autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir, told Foreign Policy that right now they are only fighting for the reversal of Article 370. But as far as the National Conference is concerned, Dar added, “Our stand is clear, that is the restoration of the pre-1953 situation [when the Indian government had no control over Kashmir except in areas like defense, external affairs, and communications] and that is never going to change.”
Meanwhile, most of the region’s secessionists have been dormant since the abrogation of Kashmir’s special status. While many of them are either under house arrest or lodged in different jails across India, those who are free have remained out of the spotlight and maintained their silence on political issues since August 2019.
The secessionists have long demanded the solution of the Kashmir dispute according to resolutions passed in the United Nations and all groups in the separatist camp—as the secessionists are known in political parlance—demand to secede from India. As such, the abrogation of Article 370 only vindicated their political standing, the political analyst Hussain said.
The secessionists have called for a statewide lockdown only once. (Before August 2019, the separatist camp would frequently call for shutdowns and protests against what they deemed anti-Kashmir policies.) The Hurriyat Conference—an amalgam of political and religious groups demanding freedom from India and accession to Pakistan—only spoke on Article 370 after more than seven months. And the pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front—a secessionist group that demands the complete independence of Jammu and Kashmir with no ties to India or Pakistan—issued its first official statement on the move after six months. These secessionists maintain that their fight is not for autonomy but for freedom from India; events in the past two years have likely made their anti-India position more attractive, even if they are unable to organize due to house arrests and detention of their leaders.
The National Conference leader Abdullah told Foreign Policy that as of now they are taking legal recourse to reverse the decisions taken by the Indian government since last year. “The fight for the restoration of Article 370 as of now is a legal fight. We are bolstering the legal fight with a political fight,” he said.
The Gupkar Alliance has also reached out to several political groups in Ladakh—which was carved out of Jammu and Kashmir in August of last year and downgraded to a federally controlled territory—and in Jammu, a predominantly Hindu region. Bringing the politicians from Ladakh and Jammu on board holds significance, because people from these regions showed the least resistance when Kashmir’s special status was abolished. Now, with them on board, the Gupkar Alliance can build significant pressure on Modi’s government by contesting local elections together. PDP’s Akhtar and Parra said the strategy to reverse the changes made by the Indian government will evolve with time.
But the ruling BJP has time and again made it clear that it is nearly impossible to reverse what it did in August 2019. The BJP is trying to project the revocation of Kashmir’s special status as a new era of development and peace for the region; it maintains that the old order bred separatism and corruption in Kashmir.
The Gupkar Alliance is in its infancy right now. As old rivalries between political parties take a back seat to cooperation, the alliance sounds hopeful, so much so that when Mufti—the leader of a party that always emphasized the positives of union with India—addressed a press conference for the first time after her yearlong detention, she placed her party’s flag next to the flag of Jammu and Kashmir, a flag that New Delhi has removed from official buildings in Kashmir, and said she would not hoist the Indian tricolor until Kashmir’s special status is restored.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--Turkey’s Luck Runs Out Over Russian S-400 Purchase

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. government prepares to sanction Turkey over its purchase of a Russian air defense system , the Trump administration recognizes Morocco ’ s sovereignty in Western Sahara as part of an Israeli-Moroccan normalization deal , and Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The Trump administration is set to sanction Turkey over its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system .
The move was threatened for months but now appears imminent , and likely to be announced as soon as today .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The move would represent a further deterioration in relations between two NATO allies , and provide President-elect Joe Biden with more bridges to build as he inherits the White House on Jan. 20 .
The move was reportedly suggested by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , who pointedly did not meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a recent trip to Turkey .
The measures are to be imposed under the Countering America ’ s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act ( CAATSA ) , which includes a provision that allows for sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense companies .
The United States fears that Russia will gain access to the F-35 fighter jet ’ s stealth technology if paired with the Russian system .
As FP ’ s Jack Detsch reports , the sanctions are a way of pre-empting a demand in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that calls for sanctions on Turkey over the S-400 purchase within 30 days .
They are likely to be a “ softer package of sanctions that include penalties against Turkey ’ s Presidency of Defense Industries but spare … Erdogan and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ banks , ” Detsch writes .
The price of friendship .
As recent U.S.-brokered peace deals between Israel and Arab nations have made clear , weapons purchases are a sure way to curry favor with the Trump administration .
The United States announced a $ 23 billion weapons sale to the United Arab Emirates following its normalization deal with Israel , and just yesterday it was reported that the U.S. was negotiating a sale of advanced drones to Morocco—the same day U.S. President Donald Trump announced the North African country had signed a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Russia , Turkey diluted the favor it had gained in purchasing 100 F-35 fighter jets—ultimately having its pilots kicked off the program as a result .
A fraying alliance .
The move also comes as Western nations adopt a more aggressive posture against Turkey : European Union ministers are said to be preparing sanctions against the country over alleged unauthorized drilling activity tied to energy exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean .
The U.S. move effectively legitimizes Morocco ’ s controversial occupation of what the U.N. considers a “ non-self-governing territory , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ armed struggle for independence from Morocco and the creation of a Sahrawi Republic .
( Polisario had agreed in 1991 to suspend its armed struggle in exchange for a U.N. supervised referendum that Morocco has never permitted to take place . )
A spokesman for U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated that the “ the solution to the question can still be found based on Security Council resolutions , ” characterizing the U.N. position as “ unchanged ” despite Washington ’ s shift .
The day before the announcement , Stephen Zunes warned in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stake than a conflict in a sparsely populated corner of Africa .
“ Washington must recognize the importance of upholding international legal norms , even if the violator is a U.S. ally , ” he argued .
“ Failing to do so not only has the potential to prolong the bitter conflict in Western Sahara , but to upend the liberal global order in its entirety.
” Ghana challenger rejects presidential result .
Ghanaian presidential challenger John Mahama has rejected the results of Monday ’ s election as “ fraudulent ” after official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Akufo-Addo , receiving 47 percent of the vote to Akufo-Addo ’ s 51.5 percent .
Mahama , who preceded Akufo-Addo as president , described the results as “ fictionalized ” and said he would “ take all legitimate steps to reverse this tragedy of justice.
” Mahama ’ s claims are a reversal of roles from 2012 , when Akufo-Addo rejected Mahama ’ s victory .
Media tycoon charged in Hong Kong .
Jimmy Lai , a Hong Kong pro-democracy figure and founder of the popular Apple Daily newspaper , has been charged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Lai was arrested in August and now faces formal charges of colluding with foreign forces , although authorities did not state specifics .
Lai has been outspoken about Beijing ’ s crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong , and brought the issue up to U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on a visit to Washington last year .
After that meeting , a mainland representative said Beijing “ resolutely opposes foreign forces ’ intervention in Hong Kong affairs.
” War crimes in Nagorno-Karabakh .
The human rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigation into possible war crimes committed during the brief conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh .
Amnesty said it was able to verify a number of videos filmed on both sides of the battlefield that show “ extrajudicial executions , the mistreatment of prisoners of war and other captives , and desecration of the dead bodies of enemy soldiers.
” On Nov. 2 , United Nations Human Rights chief Michele Bachelet expressed concern over videos coming out of the conflict that appeared to show war crimes being committed .
Dye or don @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s soccer team was forced to forfeit a game with a rival school after its players were deemed to have the wrong color hair , the New York Times reports .
The game between Fuzhou University and Jimei University was almost abandoned over disputes over some of the players ’ dyed hair , which goes against intercollegiate rules .
Coaches from both teams attempted to rectify the situation by buying hair dye and fielding a seven players per side , only for a Jimei player to argue that her opponents hair was not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ejected and Fuzhou forfeited the game .
China ’ s commitment to decorum on the soccer field goes right up to the national team : In 2019 , players were forced to wear long sleeves while playing in the heat of Abu Dhabi in order to stay on the right side of a ban on the display of tattoos .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com @

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. government prepares to sanction Turkey over its purchase of a Russian air defense system, the Trump administration recognizes Morocco’s sovereignty in Western Sahara as part of an Israeli-Moroccan normalization deal, and Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. government prepares to sanction Turkey over its purchase of a Russian air defense system, the Trump administration recognizes Morocco’s sovereignty in Western Sahara as part of an Israeli-Moroccan normalization deal, and Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S. to Sanction Turkey over Russian Air Defense System
The Trump administration is set to sanction Turkey over its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. The move was threatened for months but now appears imminent, and likely to be announced as soon as today. The decision was first reported by Reuters.
The move would represent a further deterioration in relations between two NATO allies, and provide President-elect Joe Biden with more bridges to build as he inherits the White House on Jan. 20. The move was reportedly suggested by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who pointedly did not meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a recent trip to Turkey.
The measures are to be imposed under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which includes a provision that allows for sanctions on entities that do business with Russian defense companies. The United States fears that Russia will gain access to the F-35 fighter jet’s stealth technology if paired with the Russian system.
As FP’s Jack Detsch reports, the sanctions are a way of pre-empting a demand in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that calls for sanctions on Turkey over the S-400 purchase within 30 days. They are likely to be a “softer package of sanctions that include penalties against Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries but spare … Erdogan and his family or harder retribution against Turkish banks,” Detsch writes.
The price of friendship. As recent U.S.-brokered peace deals between Israel and Arab nations have made clear, weapons purchases are a sure way to curry favor with the Trump administration. The United States announced a $23 billion weapons sale to the United Arab Emirates following its normalization deal with Israel, and just yesterday it was reported that the U.S. was negotiating a sale of advanced drones to Morocco—the same day U.S. President Donald Trump announced the North African country had signed a normalization deal with Israel. By buying from Russia, Turkey diluted the favor it had gained in purchasing 100 F-35 fighter jets—ultimately having its pilots kicked off the program as a result.
A fraying alliance. The move also comes as Western nations adopt a more aggressive posture against Turkey: European Union ministers are said to be preparing sanctions against the country over alleged unauthorized drilling activity tied to energy exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.
What We’re Following Today U.S. recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. In exchange for the normalization of ties between Morocco and Israel, the U.S. government has reversed its stance on one of the world’s longest-standing territorial disputes in Western Sahara. As Barak Ravid notes in Axios, “While the normalization deal is a win for Israel and a significant achievement for Trump, recognition of Western Sahara as part of Morocco is a big shift in U.S. policy—and a major diplomatic achievement for Morocco.”
The U.S. move effectively legitimizes Morocco’s controversial occupation of what the U.N. considers a “non-self-governing territory,” just as the Polisario Front renews its armed struggle for independence from Morocco and the creation of a Sahrawi Republic. (Polisario had agreed in 1991 to suspend its armed struggle in exchange for a U.N. supervised referendum that Morocco has never permitted to take place.) A spokesman for U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres stated that the “the solution to the question can still be found based on Security Council resolutions,” characterizing the U.N. position as “unchanged” despite Washington’s shift.
The day before the announcement, Stephen Zunes warned in Foreign Policy that much more is at stake than a conflict in a sparsely populated corner of Africa. “Washington must recognize the importance of upholding international legal norms, even if the violator is a U.S. ally,” he argued. “Failing to do so not only has the potential to prolong the bitter conflict in Western Sahara, but to upend the liberal global order in its entirety.”
Ghana challenger rejects presidential result. Ghanaian presidential challenger John Mahama has rejected the results of Monday’s election as “fraudulent” after official results showed he lost to President Nana Akufo-Addo, receiving 47 percent of the vote to Akufo-Addo’s 51.5 percent. Mahama, who preceded Akufo-Addo as president, described the results as “fictionalized” and said he would “take all legitimate steps to reverse this tragedy of justice.” Mahama’s claims are a reversal of roles from 2012, when Akufo-Addo rejected Mahama’s victory.
Media tycoon charged in Hong Kong. Jimmy Lai, a Hong Kong pro-democracy figure and founder of the popular Apple Daily newspaper, has been charged under the new Beijing-imposed national security laws. Lai was arrested in August and now faces formal charges of colluding with foreign forces, although authorities did not state specifics. Lai has been outspoken about Beijing’s crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong, and brought the issue up to U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on a visit to Washington last year. After that meeting, a mainland representative said Beijing “resolutely opposes foreign forces’ intervention in Hong Kong affairs.”
Keep an Eye On Gay rights in Asia. Bhutan has decriminalized homosexuality after a vote in the country’s bicameral parliament to scrap a law criminalizing “unnatural sex,” widely believed to mean homosexuality. The change now goes to Bhutan’s king in order to pass into law. The move is the latest relaxation of laws against homosexuality in some countries in Asia and follows India’s decision to decriminalize gay sex in 2018.
War crimes in Nagorno-Karabakh. The human rights group Amnesty International has called for an investigation into possible war crimes committed during the brief conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Amnesty said it was able to verify a number of videos filmed on both sides of the battlefield that show “extrajudicial executions, the mistreatment of prisoners of war and other captives, and desecration of the dead bodies of enemy soldiers.” On Nov. 2, United Nations Human Rights chief Michele Bachelet expressed concern over videos coming out of the conflict that appeared to show war crimes being committed.
Odds and Ends
Dye or don’t. A Chinese university’s soccer team was forced to forfeit a game with a rival school after its players were deemed to have the wrong color hair, the New York Times reports. The game between Fuzhou University and Jimei University was almost abandoned over disputes over some of the players’ dyed hair, which goes against intercollegiate rules. Coaches from both teams attempted to rectify the situation by buying hair dye and fielding a seven players per side, only for a Jimei player to argue that her opponents hair was not “black enough.” The player was ejected and Fuzhou forfeited the game.
China’s commitment to decorum on the soccer field goes right up to the national team: In 2019, players were forced to wear long sleeves while playing in the heat of Abu Dhabi in order to stay on the right side of a ban on the display of tattoos.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--Why India’s Farmers Are Protesting

Why India’s Farmers Are Protesting

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief .
Today : Why India ’ s farmers are protesting , Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality , and Twitter stirs controversy in India .
Before we get to the news , a personal note : Readers , this is my final South Asia Brief .
Right before Thanksgiving , I was named FP ’ s new editor in chief .
In my new role , I plan to write more broadly for FP and have decided to pass on this newsletter to another writer , preferably based in the region .
If you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fit , the job posting is here or you can email me at ravi.agrawal @ foreignpolicy.com .
Although I now live in New York , writing this newsletter has been a nice way to stay in touch with news and trends from across South Asia , my old stomping grounds .
Thanks for your time and feedback , and I hope you ’ ll keep reading as this newsletter evolves with a new writer in 2021 .
I also encourage you to subscribe to Foreign Policy .
( We have special rupee rates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than two weeks , tens of thousands of Indian farmers have camped out around New Delhi to protest a set of farm bills passed by the country ’ s parliament in September .
Thousands more from the neighboring states of Haryana , Punjab , and Uttar Pradesh look set to join in the coming days , even as police try to block them from entering the city .
The protests are not an isolated movement .
On Nov. 26 , an estimated 250 million citizens participated in a 24-hour general strike held @ @ @ @ @ @ @ magnitude of the protests should not be a surprise : Agriculture employs about half of the Indian workforce , although it accounts for only one-sixth of India ’ s GDP .
What ’ s at stake ?
So far , Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government are holding firm against the protesters , arguing that the new laws will give farmers more autonomy , allow better marketing , and remove regulatory barriers .
To some extent , the government has a point .
Economists have long pointed out that India needs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where middlemen drive up prices , slow down supply chains , and contribute to food wastage .
Most Indian farmers operate with just a few acres of land , unable to afford the mechanization and efficiencies of scale common in developed economies .
But India ’ s millions of farmers are clearly angry .
They believe the new rules will open them up to exploitation by giant companies .
And as Barkha Dutt writes in the Washington Post , there is broad national sympathy for the protests .
“ The moral force of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” she argues , describing scenes of elderly protesters spreading blankets under the wheels of their trucks to sleep in the cold of winter .
“ There is subliminal collective guilt at the sight of farmers.
” What it means for Modi .
Whether or not the farm reforms were essential or economically viable seems to be a question for another time .
( Follow Foreign Policy this weekend for more on this by Sumit Ganguly and Surupa Gupta . )
For now , what is clear is that New Delhi may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only were the reforms passed quickly in September without referral to a parliamentary panel , but they also came amid India ’ s botched response to the coronavirus pandemic , with most people busy with other issues .
At least some of the anger of the protest movement likely stems from this lack of consultation or debate .
Modi has gotten away with other big , bold decisions with little care for democratic decision-making .
In 2016 , he announced the sudden demonetization of the Indian rupee , wreaking havoc on the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New Delhi ’ s abrogation of Kashmir ’ s special status caught the country by surprise .
And in February , Modi announced a sudden lockdown—one of the strictest in the world—that left millions of migrant workers no choice but to journey on foot from the cities to their homes in far-off villages .
However , none of these shocks to India ’ s system ended up hurting Modi ’ s reputation .
If anything , the public mood seems to support a decisive , strongman leader .
Will the sheer strength of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ serious challenge for Modi ?
It ’ s difficult to tell .
Controversies—and even mistakes—don ’ t seem to hurt India ’ s prime minister .
Until the day they do .
ISIS claims killing of female TV presenter .
The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the targeted killing of Malalai Maiwand , a presenter at Enikas Radio and TV in Nangarhar , Afghanistan , on Thursday .
Maiwand ’ s death highlights a worrying trend of increased terrorist activity in the region , often targeting journalists .
According to a count @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been killed in Afghanistan this year .
Maiwand was only 25 years old .
Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality .
A joint session of Bhutan ’ s two houses of parliament approved a bill today to legalize gay sex .
All 63 members of parliament present voted in favor of the bill .
The changes still need to be approved by the country ’ s king , but that is seen as a formality .
Bhutan ’ s move comes just two years after India made a similar decision to remove a colonial-era prohibition on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over Rohingya resettlement .
The United Nations says it has been denied access to Bhasan Char , a remote and flood-prone island in the Bay of Bengal to which Bangladesh moved 1,600 Rohingya refugees last week .
The U.N. ’ s call for a safety assessment of the island comes amid concerns from the United States over whether the relocations were voluntary or forced .
Twitter controversy .
It ’ s been a mixed week for Twitter in South Asia .
Last Sunday , several famous writers including Salman Rushdie and Amitav Ghosh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of writer and activist Salil Tripathi .
A fringe right-wing Hindu outfit called the Deshi Army claimed victory for the suspension , but it was unclear why exactly the decision was made .
Tripathi , who wrote an essay for FP last month called “ Why India Has Become a Different Country , ” told me that Twitter later asked him to remove a personal list of muted users that he maintained .
Tripathi is now back on Twitter .
The surprising aspect of the temporary suspension was that it targeted a well-known @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even as abusive trolls often swarm the social media platform .
Meanwhile , Twitter flagged a post by politician Amit Malviya as “ manipulated content , ” marking the first time it had targeted a prominent member of Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party .
Gitanjali Rao , a 15-year-old Indian American inventor , landed on the cover of Time magazine last week as its first ever Kid of the Year .
Rao has invented a device that identifies contaminations in drinking water and an app that detects cyberbullying .
Imagine being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On the one hand , there ’ s the obvious pride and sense of representation at seeing a young brown girl on the most recognizable cover on earth .
But on the other hand , imagine all the parents going , “ See ?
Instead of those video games , this is what you could be doing !
” I ’ m excited to see what Rao does next .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. Today: Why India’s farmers are protesting, Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality, and Twitter stirs controversy in India.
Before we get to the news, a personal note: Readers, this is my final South Asia Brief. Right before Thanksgiving, I was named FP’s new editor in chief. In my new role, I plan to write more broadly for FP and have decided to pass on this newsletter to another writer, preferably based in the region.
If you know someone who could be a good fit, the job posting is here or you can email me at ravi.agrawal@foreignpolicy.com. Although I now live in New York, writing this newsletter has been a nice way to stay in touch with news and trends from across South Asia, my old stomping grounds. Thanks for your time and feedback, and I hope you’ll keep reading as this newsletter evolves with a new writer in 2021.
I also encourage you to subscribe to Foreign Policy. (We have special rupee rates for readers in India.)
Why India’s Farmers Are Protesting
For more than two weeks, tens of thousands of Indian farmers have camped out around New Delhi to protest a set of farm bills passed by the country’s parliament in September. Thousands more from the neighboring states of Haryana, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh look set to join in the coming days, even as police try to block them from entering the city.
The protests are not an isolated movement. On Nov. 26, an estimated 250 million citizens participated in a 24-hour general strike held to challenge the new laws. The magnitude of the protests should not be a surprise: Agriculture employs about half of the Indian workforce, although it accounts for only one-sixth of India’s GDP.
What’s at stake? So far, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government are holding firm against the protesters, arguing that the new laws will give farmers more autonomy, allow better marketing, and remove regulatory barriers. To some extent, the government has a point. Economists have long pointed out that India needs to reform its archaic farm sector, where middlemen drive up prices, slow down supply chains, and contribute to food wastage. Most Indian farmers operate with just a few acres of land, unable to afford the mechanization and efficiencies of scale common in developed economies.
But India’s millions of farmers are clearly angry. They believe the new rules will open them up to exploitation by giant companies. And as Barkha Dutt writes in the Washington Post, there is broad national sympathy for the protests. “The moral force of the Indian farmer cannot be underestimated,” she argues, describing scenes of elderly protesters spreading blankets under the wheels of their trucks to sleep in the cold of winter. “There is subliminal collective guilt at the sight of farmers.”
What it means for Modi. Whether or not the farm reforms were essential or economically viable seems to be a question for another time. (Follow Foreign Policy this weekend for more on this by Sumit Ganguly and Surupa Gupta.) For now, what is clear is that New Delhi may have made a political miscalculation.
Not only were the reforms passed quickly in September without referral to a parliamentary panel, but they also came amid India’s botched response to the coronavirus pandemic, with most people busy with other issues. At least some of the anger of the protest movement likely stems from this lack of consultation or debate.
Modi has gotten away with other big, bold decisions with little care for democratic decision-making. In 2016, he announced the sudden demonetization of the Indian rupee, wreaking havoc on the country’s markets. Last year, New Delhi’s abrogation of Kashmir’s special status caught the country by surprise. And in February, Modi announced a sudden lockdown—one of the strictest in the world—that left millions of migrant workers no choice but to journey on foot from the cities to their homes in far-off villages.
However, none of these shocks to India’s system ended up hurting Modi’s reputation. If anything, the public mood seems to support a decisive, strongman leader. Will the sheer strength of the sustained farmers’ protests present a serious challenge for Modi? It’s difficult to tell. Controversies—and even mistakes—don’t seem to hurt India’s prime minister. Until the day they do.
What We’re Following
ISIS claims killing of female TV presenter. The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the targeted killing of Malalai Maiwand, a presenter at Enikas Radio and TV in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, on Thursday. Maiwand’s death highlights a worrying trend of increased terrorist activity in the region, often targeting journalists. According to a count by Reuters, 10 media workers have been killed in Afghanistan this year. Maiwand was only 25 years old.
Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality. A joint session of Bhutan’s two houses of parliament approved a bill today to legalize gay sex. All 63 members of parliament present voted in favor of the bill. The changes still need to be approved by the country’s king, but that is seen as a formality. Bhutan’s move comes just two years after India made a similar decision to remove a colonial-era prohibition on gay sex.
Rights groups voice concerns over Rohingya resettlement. The United Nations says it has been denied access to Bhasan Char, a remote and flood-prone island in the Bay of Bengal to which Bangladesh moved 1,600 Rohingya refugees last week. The U.N.’s call for a safety assessment of the island comes amid concerns from the United States over whether the relocations were voluntary or forced.
Twitter controversy. It’s been a mixed week for Twitter in South Asia. Last Sunday, several famous writers including Salman Rushdie and Amitav Ghosh expressed alarm over Twitter’s suspension of writer and activist Salil Tripathi. A fringe right-wing Hindu outfit called the Deshi Army claimed victory for the suspension, but it was unclear why exactly the decision was made.
Tripathi, who wrote an essay for FP last month called “Why India Has Become a Different Country,” told me that Twitter later asked him to remove a personal list of muted users that he maintained. Tripathi is now back on Twitter. The surprising aspect of the temporary suspension was that it targeted a well-known advocate of human rights and free speech, even as abusive trolls often swarm the social media platform.
Meanwhile, Twitter flagged a post by politician Amit Malviya as “manipulated content,” marking the first time it had targeted a prominent member of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party.
And Finally…
Gitanjali Rao, a 15-year-old Indian American inventor, landed on the cover of Time magazine last week as its first ever Kid of the Year. Rao has invented a device that identifies contaminations in drinking water and an app that detects cyberbullying. Imagine being a South Asian teenager right now. On the one hand, there’s the obvious pride and sense of representation at seeing a young brown girl on the most recognizable cover on earth. But on the other hand, imagine all the parents going, “See? Instead of those video games, this is what you could be doing!”
I’m excited to see what Rao does next.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.