foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--Brexit Is the IRA’s Biggest Recruitment Tool

As Britain threatens to unilaterally ruin the border agreement in Northern Ireland , undermining the Good Friday deal that brought an end to the long nightmare of political violence , the threat of militant republicanism is growing again .
The enduring threat of militant republicanism in Ireland was brought forcefully to public attention in August , after a massive crackdown on the paramilitary New Irish Republican Army ( New IRA ) led to nearly a dozen arrests on terrorism-related charges and serious rioting .
If Brexit talks fail , worse is likely to follow , and the ranks of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The New IRA is the most prominent republican paramilitary group still active in Northern Ireland today , estimated by police to have had about 250-300 active members at the time of its formation in 2012 .
Like its predecessors , it is dedicated to the unification of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic , and it has carried out a violent campaign against the security forces .
It is firmly opposed to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement , the peace accord that ended the three decade-long conflict known as the Troubles , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killed and almost 50,000 were injured .
Dissident republicans like those in the New IRA differ from the mainstream brand of republicanism in that they reject the terms of the Good Friday Agreement , and believe that violence remains a legitimate means to achieve their objectives .
On Aug. 18 , police arrested 10 individuals in raids carried out across Ireland as part of a larger investigation into the New IRA ’ s activities .
Codenamed Operation Arbacia , it involved 500 personnel from across Britain and Ireland ’ s security and intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ largest security sweeps in the country since the end of the Troubles .
More arrests are expected in the coming weeks .
Authorities also raided all four offices of Saoradh , a far-left republican party that is widely believed to be the political wing of the New IRA , though it has long denied those claims .
All 10 individuals arrested in the initial sweep have been charged with terrorism-related offences , and nine are known to be leading members of Saoradh .
One of those standing trial was said to have met @ @ @ @ @ @ @ individual charged , in order to develop relationships with unnamed foreign governments considered “ hostile to the U.K. ” As police searched the Saoradh offices , a suspicious device was reported in Lurgan—a majority-Catholic town with an unusually high degree of support for dissident republicanism .
Police evacuated several homes in the area and conducted searches , and although the device in question turned out to be a hoax , police did recover an improvised heavy duty weapon .
Authorities were met with a barrage of petrol bombs that quickly descended into rioting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ backdrop of the ongoing negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom over their post-Brexit trade relationship .
A resolution appears increasingly unlikely , and there is growing concern that a deal won ’ t be reached before the end of the transition period on Dec. 31 when EU regulations will no longer apply to Britain .
Prime Minister Boris Johnson recently set a deadline of Oct. 15 for the British government ’ s participation in the talks , adding more pressure to an already strained process .
This has again raised @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of the bloc without a trade deal in place , which could necessitate a physical border in Ireland .
On Sept. 8 , the British government brought forward legislation aimed at overriding key parts of last year ’ s Withdrawal Agreement , including the Northern Ireland protocol , a mechanism that was put in place to ensure that the Irish border would remain open after Brexit in order to mitigate the potential threat posed by militant republicans .
During the bill ’ s first reading in parliament , the United Kingdom ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it would “ break international law in a very specific and limited way.
” Johnson has since come under a torrent of criticism , and Brussels demanded that he withdraw the bill by the end of the month or it would consider pursuing legal action .
The government quickly dismissed those warnings .
Even leaders in Washington have stepped into the fray .
In a statement , U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi warned that “ if the U.K. violates that international treaty and Brexit undermines the Good Friday accord , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a U.S.-U.K. trade agreement passing the Congress.
” The renewed possibility of a physical border in Ireland , coupled with the expected negative economic fallout of a no-deal Brexit , has prompted fears that militant republican groups like the New IRA could exploit local desperation and renew their campaigns of violence .
Brexit was a watershed moment for republicans because it made Irish unification a relevant and realistic policy proposal for the first time since the end of the Troubles .
They argue that the United Kingdom ’ s decision to leave the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ireland voting to remain highlights the harmful effects British imperialism still has on Ireland .
Republicans from across the political spectrum have responded to the resulting groundswell of support for Irish unity by intensifying their activities .
Sinn Fein , the country ’ s largest republican party and currently the leader of the opposition in Dublin , has consistently pushed for a unity referendum to be held within the lifetime of the current Irish government as a way of safeguarding the democratically expressed will of the people of Northern Ireland .
Brussels has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU membership in the event of unification , giving a powerful push to the pro-unity campaign .
Dissident republicans , meanwhile , reject Sinn Fein ’ s nonviolent approach to constitutional change , and although Saoradh has advocated for Ireland ’ s own withdrawal from the European Union , it still recognizes that Brexit has helped boost its own efforts .
“ Brexit is a huge opportunity .
It ’ s not the reason why people would resist British rule , but Brexit just gives it focus , gives it a physical picture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Saoradh Chairman Brian McKenna in an interview last year .
The New IRA has expressed similar sentiments .
“ Brexit has forced the IRA to refocus and has underlined how Ireland remains partitioned .
It would be remiss of us not to capitalize on the opportunity , ” a member of the group said last year in an interview .
As we reported in May 2019 , paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland has been on the rise since at least 2007 , but Brexit has provided this generation of militants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around .
“ It presents a unique opportunity to the New IRA and other violent dissident republicans , ” said John Mooney , a journalist at the Sunday Times and author of Black Operations : The Secret War Against the Real IRA .
“ It has injected life into these organizations and they have previously said they are using it to recruit new members.
” To underscore their newfound motivation , some militants have planned attacks to occur simultaneously with key Brexit events .
In February , it was reported that another group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bomb across the Irish Sea into Scotland , before transporting it to an unknown location in England where it would be detonated to coincide with the United Kingdom ’ s formal withdrawal from the European Union on Jan. 31 .
“ It was timed for Britain ’ s exit from the EU and to bring attention to the sea border , ” the group said in a statement .
The plot was thwarted , but several members of that group have since defected to the New IRA .
There is some speculation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack to coincide with the current round of Brexit negotiations , prompting the recent crackdown .
“ I understand [ the New IRA ] leadership was actively planning to carry out attacks which forced the Irish and British security services to move against them , ” said Mooney .
The recent arrests are a major victory for the security forces .
Dieter Reinisch , a historian at the National University of Ireland , Galway , and an expert on dissident republicanism , said that the crackdown was a “ serious blow ” to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IRA and both organizations will find it extremely difficult to recover and return to their past form .
But former members of the Provisional IRA—the New IRA ’ s far larger , deadlier , and more threatening predecessor—say the newest generation of militant republicans pose little ( if any ) meaningful threat to the state compared to their own era .
Anthony McIntyre , a former Provisional IRA prisoner and the author of Good Friday : The Death of Irish Republicanism , said that the New IRA ’ s “ level of activity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to carry out isolated attacks … But in terms of threat to the state , there is more of a threat from organized crime and even that threat is low.
” Yet the issues that have given rise to this new generation of militant republicans are unlikely to subside anytime soon .
As the post-Brexit vagaries shape and reshape the conversation in Ireland , republicanism will increasingly gain resonance far beyond its most dedicated adherents , and groups like Saoradh and the New IRA—though small—will benefit from a growing number of disenchanted people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cling onto .
More than that , militant republicanism has shown itself to be remarkably resilient over the course of its long history .
The Provisional IRA itself emerged in the 1970s out of an even older iteration of the IRA that , at the time , was thought to no longer possess any serious military capabilities .
Even if Saoradh and the New IRA are hobbled by this setback for the foreseeable future , they aren ’ t going to disband and , conversely , will continue to recruit and organize .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ around a new leadership , one that could be younger , more volatile , and more aggressive in its pursuit of change .
“ Saoradh activists remain committed , dedicated , disciplined , and prepared , ” said party spokesman Paddy Gallagher in a statement .
“ We are here to stay .
”

As Britain threatens to unilaterally ruin the border agreement in Northern Ireland, undermining the Good Friday deal that brought an end to the long nightmare of political violence, the threat of militant republicanism is still alive. The enduring threat of militant republicanism in Ireland was brought forcefully to public attention in August, after a massive crackdown on the paramilitary New Irish Republican Army (New IRA) led to nearly a dozen arrests on terrorism-related charges and serious rioting. If Brexit talks fail, worse is likely to follow, and the ranks of the New IRA and other groups could swell.
As Britain threatens to unilaterally ruin the border agreement in Northern Ireland, undermining the Good Friday deal that brought an end to the long nightmare of political violence, the threat of militant republicanism is still alive. The enduring threat of militant republicanism in Ireland was brought forcefully to public attention in August, after a massive crackdown on the paramilitary New Irish Republican Army (New IRA) led to nearly a dozen arrests on terrorism-related charges and serious rioting. If Brexit talks fail, worse is likely to follow, and the ranks of the New IRA and other groups could swell.
The New IRA is the most prominent republican paramilitary group still active in Northern Ireland today, estimated by police to have had about 250-300 active members at the time of its formation in 2012. Like its predecessors, it is dedicated to the unification of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, and it has carried out a violent campaign against the security forces. It is firmly opposed to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the peace accord that ended the three decade-long conflict known as the Troubles, during which more than 3,500 people were killed and almost 50,000 were injured. Dissident republicans like those in the New IRA differ from the mainstream brand of republicanism in that they reject the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, and believe that violence remains a legitimate means to achieve their objectives.
On Aug. 18, police arrested 10 individuals in raids carried out across Ireland as part of a larger investigation into the New IRA’s activities. Codenamed Operation Arbacia, it involved 500 personnel from across Britain and Ireland’s security and intelligence services, making it one of the largest security sweeps in the country since the end of the Troubles. More arrests are expected in the coming weeks.
Authorities also raided all four offices of Saoradh, a far-left republican party that is widely believed to be the political wing of the New IRA, though it has long denied those claims. All 10 individuals arrested in the initial sweep have been charged with terrorism-related offences, and nine are known to be leading members of Saoradh. One of those standing trial was said to have met with a Palestinian doctor, the 10th individual charged, in order to develop relationships with unnamed foreign governments considered “hostile to the U.K.”
As police searched the Saoradh offices, a suspicious device was reported in Lurgan—a majority-Catholic town with an unusually high degree of support for dissident republicanism. Police evacuated several homes in the area and conducted searches, and although the device in question turned out to be a hoax, police did recover an improvised heavy duty weapon. Authorities were met with a barrage of petrol bombs that quickly descended into rioting.
All this took place against the backdrop of the ongoing negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom over their post-Brexit trade relationship. A resolution appears increasingly unlikely, and there is growing concern that a deal won’t be reached before the end of the transition period on Dec. 31 when EU regulations will no longer apply to Britain. Prime Minister Boris Johnson recently set a deadline of Oct. 15 for the British government’s participation in the talks, adding more pressure to an already strained process.
This has again raised the possibility of the United Kingdom crashing out of the bloc without a trade deal in place, which could necessitate a physical border in Ireland. On Sept. 8, the British government brought forward legislation aimed at overriding key parts of last year’s Withdrawal Agreement, including the Northern Ireland protocol, a mechanism that was put in place to ensure that the Irish border would remain open after Brexit in order to mitigate the potential threat posed by militant republicans. During the bill’s first reading in parliament, the United Kingdom’s Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis admitted that it would “break international law in a very specific and limited way.”
Johnson has since come under a torrent of criticism, and Brussels demanded that he withdraw the bill by the end of the month or it would consider pursuing legal action. The government quickly dismissed those warnings. Even leaders in Washington have stepped into the fray. In a statement, U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi warned that “if the U.K. violates that international treaty and Brexit undermines the Good Friday accord, there will be absolutely no chance of a U.S.-U.K. trade agreement passing the Congress.”
The renewed possibility of a physical border in Ireland, coupled with the expected negative economic fallout of a no-deal Brexit, has prompted fears that militant republican groups like the New IRA could exploit local desperation and renew their campaigns of violence.
Brexit was a watershed moment for republicans because it made Irish unification a relevant and realistic policy proposal for the first time since the end of the Troubles. They argue that the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union despite a majority in Northern Ireland voting to remain highlights the harmful effects British imperialism still has on Ireland. Republicans from across the political spectrum have responded to the resulting groundswell of support for Irish unity by intensifying their activities.
Sinn Fein, the country’s largest republican party and currently the leader of the opposition in Dublin, has consistently pushed for a unity referendum to be held within the lifetime of the current Irish government as a way of safeguarding the democratically expressed will of the people of Northern Ireland. Brussels has said that Northern Ireland would regain its EU membership in the event of unification, giving a powerful push to the pro-unity campaign.
Dissident republicans, meanwhile, reject Sinn Fein’s nonviolent approach to constitutional change, and although Saoradh has advocated for Ireland’s own withdrawal from the European Union, it still recognizes that Brexit has helped boost its own efforts. “Brexit is a huge opportunity. It’s not the reason why people would resist British rule, but Brexit just gives it focus, gives it a physical picture. It’s a huge help,” said Saoradh Chairman Brian McKenna in an interview last year.
The New IRA has expressed similar sentiments. “Brexit has forced the IRA to refocus and has underlined how Ireland remains partitioned. It would be remiss of us not to capitalize on the opportunity,” a member of the group said last year in an interview.
As we reported in May 2019, paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland has been on the rise since at least 2007, but Brexit has provided this generation of militants with a potent new issue to rally around. “It presents a unique opportunity to the New IRA and other violent dissident republicans,” said John Mooney, a journalist at the Sunday Times and author of Black Operations: The Secret War Against the Real IRA. “It has injected life into these organizations and they have previously said they are using it to recruit new members.”
To underscore their newfound motivation, some militants have planned attacks to occur simultaneously with key Brexit events. In February, it was reported that another group calling itself the IRA tried to smuggle a bomb across the Irish Sea into Scotland, before transporting it to an unknown location in England where it would be detonated to coincide with the United Kingdom’s formal withdrawal from the European Union on Jan. 31. “It was timed for Britain’s exit from the EU and to bring attention to the sea border,” the group said in a statement. The plot was thwarted, but several members of that group have since defected to the New IRA.
There is some speculation that the New IRA was planning an attack to coincide with the current round of Brexit negotiations, prompting the recent crackdown. “I understand [the New IRA] leadership was actively planning to carry out attacks which forced the Irish and British security services to move against them,” said Mooney.
But the recent arrests are a major victory for the security forces. Dieter Reinisch, a historian at the National University of Ireland, Galway, and an expert on dissident republicanism, said that the crackdown was a serious blow to the leaderships of Saoradh and the New IRA and both organizations will find it extremely difficult to recover and return to their past form.
Former members of the Provisional IRA—the New IRA’s far larger, deadlier, and more threatening predecessor—say the newest generation of militant republicans pose little (if any) meaningful threat to the state compared to their own era. Anthony McIntyre, a former Provisional IRA prisoner and the author of Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism, said that the New IRA’s “level of activity is inconsequential. It has the capacity to carry out isolated attacks … But in terms of threat to the state, there is more of a threat from organized crime and even that threat is low.”
Yet the issues that have given rise to this new generation of militant republicans are unlikely to subside anytime soon. As the post-Brexit vagaries shape and reshape the conversation in Ireland, republicanism will increasingly gain resonance far beyond its most dedicated adherents, and groups like Saoradh and the New IRA—though small—will benefit from a growing number of disenchanted people looking for established vehicles of change to cling onto.
More than that, militant republicanism has shown itself to be remarkably resilient over the course of its long history. The Provisional IRA itself emerged in the 1970s out of an even older iteration of the IRA that, at the time, was thought to no longer possess any serious military capabilities. Even if Saoradh and the New IRA are hobbled by this setback for the foreseeable future, they aren’t going to disband and, conversely, will continue to recruit and organize. Eventually, they will regroup and coalesce around a new leadership, one that could be younger, more volatile, and more aggressive in its pursuit of change. “Saoradh activists remain committed, dedicated, disciplined, and prepared,” said party spokesman Paddy Gallagher in a statement. “We are here to stay.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--Israel’s Peace Deals Are a Strategic Nightmare for Iran

When U.S. President Donald Trump announced the Abraham Accord , which normalized relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel , on Aug. 13 , the world took note of it as a historic moment .
In Iran , the agreement also registered as a grave threat .
In a remarkable show of unanimity , diverse officials across the political establishment denounced the accord and warned about its consequences .
It was a signal of a coming , and unavoidable , change of strategy by Iran .
The day after the agreement , the Iranian foreign ministry condemned the pact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a stab by the UAE in the back of Palestinian people.
” One day later , the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) issued a fiery statement , dubbing the normalization “ historic idiocy ” that will bring about a “ dangerous future ” for the UAE leadership .
On the same day , Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also weighed in with his own opprobrium , describing the accord as “ betrayal ” and warning that if Emiratis “ allow Israel a foothold in the region , they will be treated differently.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ summoned Iran ’ s chargé dʼaffaires in Abu Dhabi to protest against Rouhani ’ s “ threatening ” and “ tension-instigating ” remarks . )
On Aug. 16 , Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri joined the chorus with a stark admonition that Iran ’ s policy toward the United Arab Emirates will “ fundamentally change ” and that “ the Islamic Republic ’ s armed forces will view this country with a different calculus.
” “ If something happens in the Persian Gulf and the Islamic Republic of Iran ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minor , we will hold the UAE responsible and won ’ t tolerate it , ” Iran ’ s top military commander asserted .
The slew of high-profile condemnations was topped off by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ’ s diatribe on Sept. 1 , which portrayed the pact as an Emirati attempt “ not only to subject the Palestinian question to oblivion , but also to allow Israel a foothold in the region.
” “ The UAE both betrayed the world of Islam , and [ it ] betrayed Arab nations and regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ betrayed Palestine , ” Khamenei railed in his speech , one day after the first-ever flight was made from Israel through Saudi airspace to the UAE capital , Abu Dhabi , carrying top American and Israeli officials including senior White House advisor Jared Kushner—to whom Khamenei referred as “ that Jew in the Trump family ” in his address .
“ [ But ] of course this betrayal will not last long , ” Iran ’ s supreme leader promised .
The key to understanding Iran ’ s deep apprehension about the Emirati-Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an Israeli “ foothold ” in Iran ’ s immediate neighborhood .
In point of fact , ever since the 1979 revolution that gave birth to the Islamic Republic , Arab-Israeli schism over Palestine has supplied the Iranian revolutionary establishment with political ammunition in its ideological campaign against the “ cancerous tumor ” of Israel as well as the “ global arrogance ” of its allied “ Great Satan.
” But much more importantly for Iran ’ s national security , the animosity or alienation between Arabs and Israel has functioned as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from hostile Israeli-American campaigns in a generally rivalrous region .
More specifically , Tehran has long since relied on Arab-Israeli enmity as an organic security buffer not only to keep archfoe Israel from entrenching itself in Iran ’ s surroundings , geographically speaking , but also to advance its own “ strategic depth ” policy across the Middle East with rare convenience and efficacy .
Strategic “ depth ” ( omgh ) is also called “ backup ” or “ buttress ” ( aghabeh ) in the Iranian security-military literature .
It refers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as close to enemy territory as possible in the event of conflict .
Now the UAE-Israel normalization , which among other things spells systematic security cooperation and intelligence-sharing between the two partners against their common adversary , threatens to breach Iran ’ s natural buffer with Israel .
Tehran has previously shown its determination to protect this barrier .
In September 2017 , the IRGC actively threw its weight behind the Iraqi government of then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to thwart the Kurdistan Regional Government ’ s independence bid , following a local referendum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
At the time , Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani , the then-commander of the IRGC ’ s Quds Force , repeatedly threatened to dispatch Iran-backed paramilitary forces , along with Iraqi government troops , to the oil city of Kirkuk if Kurdish fighters did not withdraw from it .
A major motive for Tehran ’ s fierce opposition to the independence referendum was fear that Israel—which backed the initiative—would win a foothold in northern Iraq as a result .
The new Arab-Israeli alliance will likely make Iran more vulnerable to pressure campaigns and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s existing vulnerability was on full display in February 2018 , when a team of Mossad agents successfully extracted over half a ton of top-secret nuclear documents from an obscure district in Tehran and flew them to Tel Aviv , according to noteworthy speculations in the Iranian intelligence community , after transferring the haul through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan , a key Israeli ally in Iran ’ s northern neighborhood .
Iran has historically attached much greater strategic significance to its western and southern flanks than it has to northern neighbors—which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s backyard in the first place .
Arab-Israeli cooperation , facilitated by the United States under Trump , will further expose these weaknesses .
But these cracks in Iran ’ s regional security buffer haven ’ t only enabled such cloak-and-dagger strikes .
They have also made Trump ’ s “ maximum pressure ” policy of economic asphyxiation against Tehran more effective and painful than his predecessor ’ s sanctions campaign .
Increased Arab collaboration with Israel and the United States has helped the latter obstruct clandestine financial channels and escape valves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to evade U.S. sanctions .
The emerging Arab-Israeli alliance , exemplified by the Emirati-Israeli normalization , also augurs poorly for Iran ’ s typically successful pursuit of strategic depth across the Middle East .
According to media sources in Turkey—a major UAE rival and opponent of its rapprochement with Israel—Emiratis are affording Israel a unique opportunity to set up “ spy bases ” on the UAE-controlled island of Socotra south of Yemen .
The UAE ’ s facilitation of Israeli security engagement in the Gulf of Aden could fuel long-standing subterranean tensions in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran-allied Houthi rebels against Saudi-backed forces—potentially ends .
A similar kind of covert Iranian-Israeli animosity has already transpired in parts of Africa , with Arab partners traditionally favoring Israel over Iran , and if recent history is any guidance , there is no reason to believe it will not repeat itself in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Sea , which are of greater strategic importance to Tehran .
It is not surprising , therefore , that a comprehensive opening with regional Arab states , not least the Saudi-led bloc , enjoys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which are hard for Iranian leaders to rationalize and sell under the humiliating pressure of economic sanctions and following the U.S. assassination of Suleimani .
All told , the UAE-Israel diplomatic breakthrough is likely to aggravate Tehran ’ s extant perception of “ strategic encirclement ” and might provoke it to act more aggressively and with much less restraint in its neighborhood .
That ’ s perhaps what Iran ’ s chief of staff , Bagheri , means by a “ different calculus ” —unless a face-saving off-ramp strategy is devised to @ @ @ @ @ @ @

When U.S. President Donald Trump announced the Abraham Accord , which normalized relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, on Aug. 13, the world took note of it as a historic moment. In Iran, the agreement also registered as a grave threat. In a remarkable show of unanimity, diverse officials across the political establishment denounced the accord and warned about its consequences. It was a signal of a coming, and unavoidable, change of strategy by Iran.
When U.S. President Donald Trump announced the Abraham Accord, which normalized relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, on Aug. 13, the world took note of it as a historic moment. In Iran, the agreement also registered as a grave threat. In a remarkable show of unanimity, diverse officials across the political establishment denounced the accord and warned about its consequences. It was a signal of a coming, and unavoidable, change of strategy by Iran.
The day after the agreement, the Iranian foreign ministry condemned the pact as “strategic idiocy” and “a stab by the UAE in the back of Palestinian people.” One day later, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued a fiery statement, dubbing the normalization “historic idiocy” that will bring about a “dangerous future” for the UAE leadership. On the same day, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also weighed in with his own opprobrium, describing the accord as “betrayal” and warning that if Emiratis “allow Israel a foothold in the region, they will be treated differently.” (In response, the UAE summoned Iran’s chargé dʼaffaires in Abu Dhabi to protest against Rouhani’s “threatening” and “tension-instigating” remarks.) On Aug. 16, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri joined the chorus with a stark admonition that Iran’s policy toward the United Arab Emirates will “fundamentally change” and that “the Islamic Republic’s armed forces will view this country with a different calculus.” “If something happens in the Persian Gulf and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s national security suffers a breach, albeit minor, we will hold the UAE responsible and won’t tolerate it,” Iran’s top military commander asserted. The slew of high-profile condemnations was topped off by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s diatribe on Sept. 1, which portrayed the pact as an Emirati attempt “not only to subject the Palestinian question to oblivion, but also to allow Israel a foothold in the region.”
“The UAE both betrayed the world of Islam, and [it] betrayed Arab nations and regional countries, and [it] also betrayed Palestine,” Khamenei railed in his speech, one day after the first-ever flight was made from Israel through Saudi airspace to the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi, carrying top American and Israeli officials including senior White House advisor Jared Kushner—to whom Khamenei referred as “that Jew in the Trump family” in his address. “[But] of course this betrayal will not last long,” Iran’s supreme leader promised.
The key to understanding Iran’s deep apprehension about the Emirati-Israeli rapprochement lies in the potential cultivation of an Israeli “foothold” in Iran’s immediate neighborhood. In point of fact, ever since the 1979 revolution that gave birth to the Islamic Republic, Arab-Israeli schism over Palestine has supplied the Iranian revolutionary establishment with political ammunition in its ideological campaign against the “cancerous tumor” of Israel as well as the “global arrogance” of its allied “Great Satan.” But much more importantly for Iran’s national security, the animosity or alienation between Arabs and Israel has functioned as a natural geopolitical bulwark shielding core Iranian interests from hostile Israeli-American campaigns in a generally rivalrous region. More specifically, Tehran has long since relied on Arab-Israeli enmity as an organic security buffer not only to keep archfoe Israel from entrenching itself in Iran’s surroundings, geographically speaking, but also to advance its own “strategic depth” policy across the Middle East with rare convenience and efficacy.
Strategic “depth” (omgh) is also called “backup” or “buttress” (aghabeh) in the Iranian security-military literature. It refers to the ability to take the fight as close to enemy territory as possible in the event of conflict. Now the UAE-Israel normalization, which among other things spells systematic security cooperation and intelligence-sharing between the two partners against their common adversary, threatens to breach Iran’s natural buffer with Israel.
Tehran has previously shown its determination to protect this barrier. In September 2017, the IRGC actively threw its weight behind the Iraqi government of then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to thwart the Kurdistan Regional Government’s independence bid, following a local referendum in favor of an independent Kurdish state. At the time, Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the then-commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, repeatedly threatened to dispatch Iran-backed paramilitary forces, along with Iraqi government troops, to the oil city of Kirkuk if Kurdish fighters did not withdraw from it. A major motive for Tehran’s fierce opposition to the independence referendum was fear that Israel—which backed the initiative—would win a foothold in northern Iraq as a result.
The new Arab-Israeli alliance will likely make Iran more vulnerable to pressure campaigns and security-intelligence operations by its adversaries. Iran’s existing vulnerability was on full display in February 2018, when a team of Mossad agents successfully extracted over half a ton of top-secret nuclear documents from an obscure district in Tehran and flew them to Tel Aviv, according to noteworthy speculations in the Iranian intelligence community, after transferring the haul through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, a key Israeli ally in Iran’s northern neighborhood. Iran has historically attached much greater strategic significance to its western and southern flanks than it has to northern neighbors—which are largely viewed in Tehran as Russia’s backyard in the first place. Arab-Israeli cooperation, facilitated by the United States under Trump, will further expose these weaknesses.
But these cracks in Iran’s regional security buffer haven’t only enabled such cloak-and-dagger strikes. They have also made Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy of economic asphyxiation against Tehran more effective and painful than his predecessor’s sanctions campaign. Increased Arab collaboration with Israel and the United States has helped the latter obstruct clandestine financial channels and escape valves traditionally used by Iranian authorities and institutions to evade U.S. sanctions.
The emerging Arab-Israeli alliance, exemplified by the Emirati-Israeli normalization, also augurs poorly for Iran’s typically successful pursuit of strategic depth across the Middle East. According to media sources in Turkey—a major UAE rival and opponent of its rapprochement with Israel—Emiratis are affording Israel a unique opportunity to set up “spy bases” on the UAE-controlled island of Socotra south of Yemen. The UAE’s facilitation of Israeli security engagement in the Gulf of Aden could fuel long-standing subterranean tensions in the area even after the Yemen war—pitting Iran-allied Houthi rebels against Saudi-backed forces—potentially ends. A similar kind of covert Iranian-Israeli animosity has already transpired in parts of Africa, with Arab partners traditionally favoring Israel over Iran, and if recent history is any guidance, there is no reason to believe it will not repeat itself in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Sea, which are of greater strategic importance to Tehran.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a comprehensive opening with regional Arab states, not least the Saudi-led bloc, enjoys cross-partisan backing in Tehran—unlike negotiations with Washington, which are hard for Iranian leaders to rationalize and sell under the humiliating pressure of economic sanctions and following the U.S. assassination of Suleimani. All told, the UAE-Israel diplomatic breakthrough is likely to aggravate Tehran’s extant perception of “strategic encirclement” and might provoke it to act more aggressively and with much less restraint in its neighborhood. That’s perhaps what Iran’s chief of staff, Bagheri, means by a “different calculus”—unless a face-saving off-ramp strategy is devised to break the ongoing cycle of confrontation.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--Afghan Peace Talks Begin; Japan’s Ruling Party Elects New Leader

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Intra-Afghan talks begin as the leaders of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet for the first time , Japan ’ s Liberal Democratic Party anoints Yoshihide Suga as its new leader , and Putin meets with Lukashenko to discuss Belarus crisis .
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday , please sign up here .
Representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet today in their first face-to-face meeting as part of peace negotiations aimed at bringing an end to their nearly two-decade-old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Qatar , on Saturday in a formal ceremony attended by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
The start of the talks followed months of delays over the highly contentious issue of prisoner releases .
As part of the peace agreement signed with the United States in February , the Taliban agreed to release 1,000 Afghan military personnel in exchange for the government releasing 5,000 of its fighters .
After several false starts , President Ashraf Ghani agreed to authorize the release of the final 320 “ hardcore ” Taliban prisoners , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What ’ s on—and off—the agenda .
The negotiations are expected to cover the terms of a permanent ceasefire , the rights of women and minorities , and the disarmament of the country ’ s many militia groups .
More broadly , the two sides will also discuss long-term constitutional arrangements as well as a possible power-sharing arrangement between them .
As Ezzatullah Mehrdad wrote in Foreign Policy last week , many young Afghans who detest the Taliban feel their interests have been ignored and are taking to social media to vent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ghani recently told local reporters that “ peace does not mean a power sharing political deal.
” A significant portion of the talks will likely center around whether a political settlement will be implemented before or after a ceasefire .
The Afghan government has already said it wants to see a political settlement first , but the Taliban is unlikely to end its military activity before it achieves at least some of its political objectives .
The two sides could agree to appoint a transitional government to lead the effort on these issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are occurring against the backdrop of continuing violence across the country .
Last week , the United Nations ’ top official in Afghanistan warned that violence has reached near-record levels and threatened to derail the talks .
Just hours before the start of talks on Saturday , the Taliban carried out a wave of attacks on government installations across the country , and Afghan security forces responded with air and artillery strikes in some parts of the country on Saturday .
“ With the start of intra-Afghan talks we were expecting the Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but unfortunately their attacks are still going in high numbers , ” a spokesman for the Afghan defense ministry said .
September 14-18 .
Negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union continue .
September 17 .
France ’ s General Federation of Labor ( CGT ) trade union begins a general strike over wages and employment conditions .
September 18 .
The state of emergency in the Lebanese capital of Beirut , called after last month ’ s deadly explosions , is set to expire .
September 20 .
U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ banning the Chinese messaging app WeChat is due to take effect .
Japan ’ s new leader .
Japan ’ s Liberal Democratic Party chose Yoshihide Suga as its new leader earlier today .
Suga , who served as a top spokesman for the government over the past eight years , was elected to lead the ruling LDP by a large margin following the resignation of Shinzo Abe and he is expected to become prime minister after the LDP-dominated parliament confirms him later this week .
LDP members from both houses of parliament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of 534 votes .
Fumio Kishida , a former foreign minister , came in second with just 89 votes .
But Suga could face voters at the polls soon .
Taro Aso , Japan ’ s finance minister , is one of several LDP leaders to suggest that a general election could be imminent .
Fallout of normalization in Bahrain .
Some prominent Bahrainis have voiced their opposition to the country ’ s recent deal normalizing relations with Israel .
The Iran-based scholar Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim said that the deal contravenes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that “ there is a great divergence between the rulers and the ruled in thought , mind , aims and interests.
” Several political and civil society groups in the country echoed that sentiment , rejecting the deal in a joint statement and warning that it would “ not enjoy popular backing.
” Efforts at normalization have received significant pushback since the United Arab Emirates signed its historic deal with Israel last month .
Protesters in the occupied Palestinian territories have taken to the streets to rally against the moves , and citizens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voiced their opposition .
Lukashenko meets with Putin .
More than 100,000 protesters flooded the streets of the Belarusian capital of Minsk on Sunday in one of the largest demonstrations against the rule of longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko since his disputed victory in last month ’ s presidential elections .
Police said they detained 400 people during the protests .
The demonstrations came before a meeting between Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin scheduled for today , during which they will reportedly discuss deeper integration of their two countries .
Lukashenko ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ months leading up to the election , but he has since warmed to Moscow again as the threat to his reign has grown more acute .
Putin recently confirmed that he would send a reserve police force to Belarus if Lukashenko requested it .
Boris on the ropes .
U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson continues to face mounting criticism over his Conservative government ’ s ongoing effort to override key parts of last year ’ s Brexit withdrawal agreement , which many observers contend could threaten peace and stability in Northern Ireland .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Blair and John Major both weighed in on the move , co-authoring an article in which they warned that the bill threatens “ the very integrity of our nation.
” At least 20 Conservative members of parliament are expected to rally behind an amendment to the bill , part of the opposition ’ s strategy to tone down the legislation .
But as Owen Matthews reported for Foreign Policy , Johnson and his team are moving on full-steam ahead .
They “ seem to be betting that the threat of disruption to EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough to focus minds in Brussels and force concessions , ” he wrote .
Political strain in Mali .
The uncertainty surrounding the political situation in Mali continues despite a meeting last week between members of the ruling junta and political and civil society leaders aimed at finding a way out of the crisis .
At the conclusion of those talks on Saturday , the coup leaders proposed a plan to appoint a transitional government led by either a civilian or a military leader for a period of 18 months .
The possibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government was seen as a way for the junta to hang onto power .
On Sunday , the opposition June 5 Movement rejected the proposal , accusing the junta of having a “ desire to monopolize and confiscate power.
” Pushback over new Greek migrant camp .
Greek authorities said they will build a permanent refugee camp on the island of Lesbos after a major site burned down last week , sparking protests against the move by islanders and refugees .
The fire that destroyed Moria camp , which is notorious for its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 12,000 migrants homeless .
Greece ’ s decision to rebuild the camp has been met with fierce opposition from protesters .
Refugees hope to be relocated to other countries in the European Union , while locals have railed against the negative impact the camp has had on the local community .
A lock of former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln ’ s hair was sold at an auction in Boston , Massachusetts , along with a blood-stained telegram for more than $ 81,000 .
The lock was removed during Lincoln ’ s postmortem examination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ given to Dr. Lyman Beecher Todd , a cousin of Lincoln ’ s widow .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Intra-Afghan talks begin as the leaders of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet for the first time, Japan's Liberal Democratic Party anoints Yoshihide Suga as its new leader, and Putin meets with Lukashenko to discuss Belarus crisis.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Intra-Afghan talks begin as the leaders of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet for the first time, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party anoints Yoshihide Suga as its new leader, and Putin meets with Lukashenko to discuss Belarus crisis.
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Afghanistan’s Peace Process Hangs in the Balance
Representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet today in their first face-to-face meeting as part of peace negotiations aimed at bringing an end to their nearly two-decade-old conflict. The talks began in Doha, Qatar, on Saturday in a formal ceremony attended by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
The start of the talks followed months of delays over the highly contentious issue of prisoner releases. As part of the peace agreement signed with the United States in February, the Taliban agreed to release 1,000 Afghan military personnel in exchange for the government releasing 5,000 of its fighters. After several false starts, President Ashraf Ghani agreed to authorize the release of the final 320 “hardcore” Taliban prisoners, setting the stage for the current meeting.
What’s on—and off—the agenda. The negotiations are expected to cover the terms of a permanent ceasefire, the rights of women and minorities, and the disarmament of the country’s many militia groups. More broadly, the two sides will also discuss long-term constitutional arrangements as well as a possible power-sharing arrangement between them. As Ezzatullah Mehrdad wrote in Foreign Policy last week, many young Afghans who detest the Taliban feel their interests have been ignored and are taking to social media to vent their frustration.
Power sharing deal? Ghani recently told local reporters that “peace does not mean a power sharing political deal.” A significant portion of the talks will likely center around whether a political settlement will be implemented before or after a ceasefire. The Afghan government has already said it wants to see a political settlement first, but the Taliban is unlikely to end its military activity before it achieves at least some of its political objectives. The two sides could agree to appoint a transitional government to lead the effort on these issues.
Violence continues. But the negotiations are occurring against the backdrop of continuing violence across the country. Last week, the United Nations’ top official in Afghanistan warned that violence has reached near-record levels and threatened to derail the talks. Just hours before the start of talks on Saturday, the Taliban carried out a wave of attacks on government installations across the country, and Afghan security forces responded with air and artillery strikes in some parts of the country on Saturday.
“With the start of intra-Afghan talks we were expecting the Taliban to reduce the number of their attacks, but unfortunately their attacks are still going in high numbers,” a spokesman for the Afghan defense ministry said.
The World This Week
September 14. Top EU and Chinese officials meet for a virtual summit.
September 14-18. Negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union continue.
September 15. Journalist Bob Woodward’s new book Rage is released.
September 17. France’s General Federation of Labor (CGT) trade union begins a general strike over wages and employment conditions.
September 18. The state of emergency in the Lebanese capital of Beirut, called after last month’s deadly explosions, is set to expire.
September 20. U.S. President Donald Trump’s executive order banning the Chinese messaging app WeChat is due to take effect.
What We’re Following Today Japan’s new leader. Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party chose Yoshihide Suga as its new leader earlier today. Suga, who served as a top spokesman for the government over the past eight years, was elected to lead the ruling LDP by a large margin following the resignation of Shinzo Abe and he is expected to become prime minister after the LDP-dominated parliament confirms him later this week. LDP members from both houses of parliament and local party representatives gave Suga 377 out of 534 votes. Fumio Kishida, a former foreign minister, came in second with just 89 votes. But Suga could face voters at the polls soon. Taro Aso, Japan’s finance minister, is one of several LDP leaders to suggest that a general election could be imminent.
Fallout of normalization in Bahrain. Some prominent Bahrainis have voiced their opposition to the country’s recent deal normalizing relations with Israel. The Iran-based scholar Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim said that the deal contravenes the will of the people, saying that “there is a great divergence between the rulers and the ruled in thought, mind, aims and interests.” Several political and civil society groups in the country echoed that sentiment, rejecting the deal in a joint statement and warning that it would “not enjoy popular backing.”
Efforts at normalization have received significant pushback since the United Arab Emirates signed its historic deal with Israel last month. Protesters in the occupied Palestinian territories have taken to the streets to rally against the moves, and citizens of many other Arab countries have also voiced their opposition.
Lukashenko meets with Putin. More than 100,000 protesters flooded the streets of the Belarusian capital of Minsk on Sunday in one of the largest demonstrations against the rule of longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko since his disputed victory in last month’s presidential elections. Police said they detained 400 people during the protests.
The demonstrations came before a meeting between Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin scheduled for today, during which they will reportedly discuss deeper integration of their two countries. Lukashenko’s relations with Moscow had deteriorated in the months leading up to the election, but he has since warmed to Moscow again as the threat to his reign has grown more acute. Putin recently confirmed that he would send a reserve police force to Belarus if Lukashenko requested it.
Boris on the ropes. U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson continues to face mounting criticism over his Conservative government’s ongoing effort to override key parts of last year’s Brexit withdrawal agreement, which many observers contend could threaten peace and stability in Northern Ireland. On Saturday, former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Major both weighed in on the move, co-authoring an article in which they warned that the bill threatens “the very integrity of our nation.”
At least 20 Conservative members of parliament are expected to rally behind an amendment to the bill, part of the opposition’s strategy to tone down the legislation. But as Owen Matthews reported for Foreign Policy, Johnson and his team are moving on full-steam ahead. They “seem to be betting that the threat of disruption to EU businesses from a no-deal Brexit will be enough to focus minds in Brussels and force concessions,” he wrote.
Keep an Eye On
Political strain in Mali. The uncertainty surrounding the political situation in Mali continues despite a meeting last week between members of the ruling junta and political and civil society leaders aimed at finding a way out of the crisis. At the conclusion of those talks on Saturday, the coup leaders proposed a plan to appoint a transitional government led by either a civilian or a military leader for a period of 18 months.
The possibility that a military leader could lead the government was seen as a way for the junta to hang onto power. On Sunday, the opposition June 5 Movement rejected the proposal, accusing the junta of having a “desire to monopolize and confiscate power.”
Pushback over new Greek migrant camp. Greek authorities said they will build a permanent refugee camp on the island of Lesbos after a major site burned down last week, sparking protests against the move by islanders and refugees. The fire that destroyed Moria camp, which is notorious for its overcrowded and poor conditions, left some 12,000 migrants homeless. Greece’s decision to rebuild the camp has been met with fierce opposition from protesters. Refugees hope to be relocated to other countries in the European Union, while locals have railed against the negative impact the camp has had on the local community.
Odds and Ends
A lock of former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln’s hair was sold at an auction in Boston, Massachusetts, along with a blood-stained telegram for more than $81,000. The lock was removed during Lincoln’s postmortem examination after his assassination in 1865 and was given to Dr. Lyman Beecher Todd, a cousin of Lincoln’s widow.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--Public Support Surges for Trump-Backed Afghan Peace Plan

Public support for Trump administration-backed peace talks to end the 19-year U.S. war in Afghanistan is surging , according to a report provided to Foreign Policy , as Afghan and Taliban negotiators began talks in Qatar this weekend .
Though the talks remain mostly shrouded in secrecy from the U.S. Congress and the American public , the Eurasia Group Foundation , a New York-based nonprofit , found strong public support among both Republicans and Democrats for the planned withdrawal of all remaining U.S. troops over the next 14 months .
Meanwhile , the portion of those calling for U.S. forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defeat of the Taliban and al Qaeda has halved since last year , to just 15 percent of respondents .
The survey found that fatigue with the Afghan war is dovetailing with a broader public desire to see the U.S. Defense Department reduce its footprint overseas and for Congress to slash military spending while reasserting its authority over U.S. war-making authority .
Though the start of the talks has been delayed for months as the Taliban continued military offensives despite pledging to reduce violence , U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper touted the start @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moment ” in a statement on Saturday .
“ It is crucial for both sides to take advantage of this opportunity to make a truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process a success , ” he added .
Nearly two-thirds of supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump said they “ strongly ” or “ somewhat ” support the peace deal that commits all U.S. forces to leave the country within 14 months , a number nearly matched by supporters of Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden .
( Biden wants the Pentagon to leave a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contain any terrorist threat , as he advocated during his time as vice president . )
Last week , U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Kenneth McKenzie told reporters that the Pentagon would cut the number of troops in Afghanistan to 4,500 by November .
“ Young people ’ s experience of American foreign policy has been long and inconclusive wars in the Middle East , ” said Mark Hannah , a senior fellow at the Eurasia Group Foundation and a co-author of the survey .
“ We ’ re going into the 20th @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were not even born on Sept. 11 are being called to serve [ in Afghanistan ] , ” Hannah said .
“ I think there ’ s a sense that … the original motivation for going into Afghanistan in the first place has receded into the rearview mirror.
” But it ’ s not just Afghanistan , and it ’ s not just overseas deployments : Many voters are souring on the full range of overseas U.S. commitments , and younger voters want to slash defense spending .
Some 44 percent of those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ draw down troops in Europe , Asia , and the Middle East and shift away from security guarantees in those regions—a constant refrain in Trump ’ s foreign policy since before taking office .
The finding shows voter skepticism of U.S. alliances remaining a consistent theme of the Trump years : In last year ’ s survey , more than 57 percent of respondents called for the United States to reduce its military presence in Asia , and only half said the United States should respond militarily to a Russian invasion of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of voters under 30 called on the United States to decrease defense spending , after years of inconclusive wars and economic dislocation on the homefront .
“ It ’ s not surprising to us that younger Americans are less bullish on military spending , ” Hannah said .
While most respondents support the Trump administration ’ s effort to scale back military commitments , that doesn ’ t mean they share the administration ’ s lurch toward unilateralism , highlighted by the withdrawal from the Paris climate accord , the Iran nuclear deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as the administration ’ s persistent efforts to cut spending on U.S. diplomacy .
Nearly 56 percent of those polled said the United States should engage more in international negotiations , such as rejoining talks with adversaries and international organizations that the Trump administration has withdrawn from .

Public support for Trump administration-backed peace talks to end the 19-year U.S. war in Afghanistan is surging, according to a report provided to Foreign Policy , as Afghan and Taliban negotiators began talks in Qatar this weekend.
Public support for Trump administration-backed peace talks to end the 19-year U.S. war in Afghanistan is surging, according to a report provided to Foreign Policy, as Afghan and Taliban negotiators began talks in Qatar this weekend.
Though the talks remain mostly shrouded in secrecy from the U.S. Congress and the American public, the Eurasia Group Foundation, a New York-based nonprofit, found strong public support among both Republicans and Democrats for the planned withdrawal of all remaining U.S. troops over the next 14 months. Meanwhile, the portion of those calling for U.S. forces to stay in Afghanistan to ensure the defeat of the Taliban and al Qaeda has halved since last year, to just 15 percent of respondents.
The survey found that fatigue with the Afghan war is dovetailing with a broader public desire to see the U.S. Defense Department reduce its footprint overseas and for Congress to slash military spending while reasserting its authority over U.S. war-making authority.
Though the start of the talks has been delayed for months as the Taliban continued military offensives despite pledging to reduce violence, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper touted the start of Afghan negotiations as a “historic moment” in a statement on Saturday. “It is crucial for both sides to take advantage of this opportunity to make a truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process a success,” he added.
Nearly two-thirds of supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump said they “strongly” or “somewhat” support the peace deal that commits all U.S. forces to leave the country within 14 months, a number nearly matched by supporters of Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden. (Biden wants the Pentagon to leave a small troop presence in the country to contain any terrorist threat, as he advocated during his time as vice president.) Last week, U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Kenneth McKenzie told reporters that the Pentagon would cut the number of troops in Afghanistan to 4,500 by November.
“Young people’s experience of American foreign policy has been long and inconclusive wars in the Middle East,” said Mark Hannah, a senior fellow at the Eurasia Group Foundation and a co-author of the survey.
“We’re going into the 20th year of this war where people who were not even born on Sept. 11 are being called to serve [in Afghanistan],” Hannah said. “I think there’s a sense that … the original motivation for going into Afghanistan in the first place has receded into the rearview mirror.”
But it’s not just Afghanistan, and it’s not just overseas deployments: Many voters are souring on the full range of overseas U.S. commitments, and younger voters want to slash defense spending.
Some 44 percent of those surveyed called for the United States to draw down troops in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and shift away from security guarantees in those regions—a constant refrain in Trump’s foreign policy since before taking office. The finding shows voter skepticism of U.S. alliances remaining a consistent theme of the Trump years: In last year’s survey, more than 57 percent of respondents called for the United States to reduce its military presence in Asia, and only half said the United States should respond militarily to a Russian invasion of the Baltic countries.
Meanwhile, a plurality of voters under 30 called on the United States to decrease defense spending, after years of inconclusive wars and economic dislocation on the homefront. “It’s not surprising to us that younger Americans are less bullish on military spending,” Hannah said.
While most respondents support the Trump administration’s effort to scale back military commitments, that doesn’t mean they share the administration’s lurch toward unilateralism, highlighted by the withdrawal from the Paris climate accord, the Iran nuclear deal, and the World Health Organization, as well as the administration’s persistent efforts to cut spending on U.S. diplomacy. Nearly 56 percent of those polled said the United States should engage more in international negotiations, such as rejoining talks with adversaries and international organizations that the Trump administration has withdrawn from.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-15--The 75th Session of the U.N. General Assembly Opens

The 75th Session of the U.N. General Assembly Opens Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.N. General Assembly convenes virtually for its historic 75th session , Putin offers a massive loan to Lukashenko as his commitment to Belarus deepens , and protests in the Ivory Coast against President Alassane Ouattara turn violent .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly opens today against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic .
Representatives of the U.N. member states will deliver virtual addresses before meeting next week to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including long-term sustainable development and the unprecedented loss of global biodiversity .
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has called for an extended “ people ’ s debate ” that “ promises to be the largest and furthest-reaching global conversation ever on building the future we want.
” The general debate will begin on Sep. 22 .
The big issue .
Efforts to combat the coronavirus pandemic will form a key part of next week ’ s proceedings as global cases continue to rise .
On Friday , the General Assembly passed a sweeping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and solidarity to contain , mitigate and overcome the pandemic and its consequences.
” But a discussion on pandemic relief efforts could prove to be a contentious affair .
The United States and Israel were the only two states to vote against last week ’ s resolution , and U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently shown himself to be an opponent of multilateralism and a critic of the United Nations .
Peacebuilding .
The General Assembly will also include discussions on global peace efforts , including the moves toward peace currently underway in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Afghan government recently began long-awaited talks with each other in an attempt to end their decades-long conflict .
In November 2019 , the General Assembly passed a resolution welcoming efforts by the Afghan government to promote a peace process led by Afghans .
Snapback coming back ?
Washington could use the General Assembly to rehash its prior attempt to reimpose sanctions on Iran .
Last month , U.S. officials tried to pass a U.N. Security Council resolution that would have extended the deadline of the moratorium on arms sales to Iran .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to try to trigger the nuclear deal ’ s snapback mechanism , which allows signatories to reimpose all pre-2015 U.N. sanctions on Iran .
The United States has faced considerable resistance to this effort on the grounds that it has withdrawn from the deal , but next week ’ s debate could give it another opportunity to circumvent the other big players .
New leader in Japan .
Japan ’ s ruling Liberal Democratic Party voted overwhelmingly for Yoshihide Suga to replace outgoing party leader and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe , setting him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ premier at a parliamentary vote later this week .
A close political ally of Abe and a longtime top official , Suga ’ s approach to government will largely mirror his predecessor ’ s .
He has already signalled that his priority is stability , not innovation .
As William Sposato wrote for Foreign Policy , Suga ’ s personal preference might be to adopt Abe ’ s unwillingness to confront China head on , but he will have to contend with an increasingly restive faction within its own party that sees China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ TikTok could have a deal .
Trump administration officials will review a “ technical partnership ” between the software company Oracle and ByteDance this week ahead of Trump ’ s executive order banning TikTok is due to go into effect .
U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin said the deal will be reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment , an interagency body that can block business sales if it believes they threaten U.S. national security .
The proposed partnership is not the full sale that Trump originally demanded , but it could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to operate in the United States .
The ban is expected to go into effect on Sep. 20 .
Putin commits money to Lukashenko .
Russian President Vladimir Putin promised a $ 1.5 billion loan to embattled Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko during a meeting between the two leaders in Moscow on Monday , a day after more than 100,000 people gathered in the streets of Minsk to protest against Lukashenko ’ s rule .
The loan is an important show of support on Russia ’ s part , and is the latest effort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the crisis .
Last month , he formed a reserve police unit and promised to use it in Belarus if Lukashenko requested it .
Once considered a staunch ally of Moscow , Lukashenko fell out of the Kremlin ’ s favor in the months leading up to the Aug. 9 presidential election , but he has since reingratiated himself to the Russian president as his grip on power has weakened .
Violence in the Ivory Coast .
Protests against Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara ’ s decision to seek a third term as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s largest city , Abidjan .
The violence centered on a district loyal to former President Laurent Gbagbo , whose loss to Ouattara in the presidential election in 2010 plunged the country into a civil war that killed around 3,000 people .
The recent surge of violence has raised concerns that next month ’ s election could spark a return to war .
Ouattara has faced widespread criticism due to the constitution ’ s ban on individuals serving more than two terms as president .
But he and his supporters argue that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it does not apply to Ouattara , who started his term in office in 2010 .
Palestinians question the Arab League .
Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said his government will recommend to President Mahmoud Abbas that he reconsider relations with the Arab League as more Arab countries move toward normalizing relations with Israel .
A meeting of Arab League nations last week failed to produce a resolution denouncing normalization efforts , despite the Palestinian delegation chairing the meeting .
It is considered a sign that the priority of many Arab states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to confronting the threat posed by Iran .
Palestinians have reacted angrily to the decision by the leaders of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to open diplomatic relations with Israel , and residents of the Gaza Strip have taken to the streets to protest the recent move by Bahrain in recent days .
The Trump administration will hold a signing ceremony at the White House today to formalize the deal with the UAE and the intent for Israel and Bahrain to normalize ties .
A recent discovery on Venus could be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s nearest planetary neighbor .
On Monday , scientists said they discovered high levels of a gas called phosphine in Venus ’ s harsh atmosphere .
Although they didn ’ t find any actual life forms , phosphine is known to be the byproduct of several microbial forms of life in oxygen-starved environments on Earth .
“ With what we currently know of Venus , the most plausible explanation for phosphine , as fantastical as it might sound , is life , ” said Clara Sousa-Silva , a molecular astrophysicist and co-author @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.N. General Assembly convenes virtually for its historic 75th session, Putin offers a massive loan to Lukashenko as his commitment to Belarus deepens, and protests in the Ivory Coast against President Alassane Ouattara turn violent.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.N. General Assembly convenes virtually for its historic 75th session, Putin offers a massive loan to Lukashenko as his commitment to Belarus deepens, and protests in the Ivory Coast against President Alassane Ouattara turn violent.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pandemic Front and Center as UNGA Meets
The 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly opens today against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic. Representatives of the U.N. member states will deliver virtual addresses before meeting next week to discuss this year’s priority issues, including long-term sustainable development and the unprecedented loss of global biodiversity.
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres has called for an extended “people’s debate” that “promises to be the largest and furthest-reaching global conversation ever on building the future we want.” The general debate will begin on Sept. 22.
The big issue. Efforts to combat the coronavirus pandemic will form a key part of next week’s proceedings as global cases continue to rise. On Friday, the General Assembly passed a sweeping resolution calling for “intensified international cooperation and solidarity to contain, mitigate and overcome the pandemic and its consequences.”
But a discussion on pandemic relief efforts could prove to be a contentious affair. The United States and Israel were the only two states to vote against last week’s resolution, and U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently shown himself to be an opponent of multilateralism and a critic of the United Nations.
Peacebuilding. The General Assembly will also include discussions on global peace efforts, including the moves toward peace currently underway in Afghanistan. Representatives of the Taliban and the Afghan government recently began long-awaited talks with each other in an attempt to end their decades-long conflict. In November 2019, the General Assembly passed a resolution welcoming efforts by the Afghan government to promote a peace process led by Afghans.
Snapback coming back? Washington could use the General Assembly to rehash its prior attempt to reimpose sanctions on Iran. Last month, U.S. officials tried to pass a U.N. Security Council resolution that would have extended the deadline of the moratorium on arms sales to Iran. Its failure to do so led Washington to try to trigger the nuclear deal’s snapback mechanism, which allows signatories to reimpose all pre-2015 U.N. sanctions on Iran. The United States has faced considerable resistance to this effort on the grounds that it has withdrawn from the deal, but next week’s debate could give it another opportunity to circumvent the other big players.
What We’re Following Today
New leader in Japan. Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party voted overwhelmingly for Yoshihide Suga to replace outgoing party leader and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, setting him up to become Japan’s next premier at a parliamentary vote later this week. A close political ally of Abe and a longtime top official, Suga’s approach to government will largely mirror his predecessor’s. He has already signalled that his priority is stability, not innovation.
As William Sposato wrote for Foreign Policy, Suga’s personal preference might be to adopt Abe’s unwillingness to confront China head on, but he will have to contend with an increasingly restive faction within its own party that sees China as a threat and a rival.
TikTok could have a deal. Trump administration officials will review a “technical partnership” between the software company Oracle and ByteDance this week ahead of Trump’s executive order banning TikTok is due to go into effect. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin said the deal will be reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment, an interagency body that can block business sales if it believes they threaten U.S. national security.
The proposed partnership is not the full sale that Trump originally demanded, but it could be enough to ensure that TikTok can continue to operate in the United States. The ban is expected to go into effect on Sept. 20.
Putin commits money to Lukashenko. Russian President Vladimir Putin promised a $1.5 billion loan to embattled Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko during a meeting between the two leaders in Moscow on Monday, a day after more than 100,000 people gathered in the streets of Minsk to protest against Lukashenko’s rule. The loan is an important show of support on Russia’s part, and is the latest effort by Putin to deepen his involvement in the crisis. Last month, he formed a reserve police unit and promised to use it in Belarus if Lukashenko requested it.
Once considered a staunch ally of Moscow, Lukashenko fell out of the Kremlin’s favor in the months leading up to the Aug. 9 presidential election, but he has since reingratiated himself to the Russian president as his grip on power has weakened.
Keep an Eye On
Violence in the Ivory Coast. Protests against Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara’s decision to seek a third term as president have turned violent in the country’s largest city, Abidjan. The violence centered on a district loyal to former President Laurent Gbagbo, whose loss to Ouattara in the presidential election in 2010 plunged the country into a civil war that killed around 3,000 people. The recent surge of violence has raised concerns that next month’s election could spark a return to war.
Ouattara has faced widespread criticism due to the constitution’s ban on individuals serving more than two terms as president. But he and his supporters argue that because the constitution was ratified in 2016, it does not apply to Ouattara, who started his term in office in 2010.
Palestinians question the Arab League. Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said his government will recommend to President Mahmoud Abbas that he reconsider relations with the Arab League as more Arab countries move toward normalizing relations with Israel. A meeting of Arab League nations last week failed to produce a resolution denouncing normalization efforts, despite the Palestinian delegation chairing the meeting. It is considered a sign that the priority of many Arab states has shifted away from backing Palestinian statehood to confronting the threat posed by Iran.
Palestinians have reacted angrily to the decision by the leaders of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to open diplomatic relations with Israel, and residents of the Gaza Strip have taken to the streets to protest the recent move by Bahrain in recent days.
The Trump administration will hold a signing ceremony at the White House today to formalize the deal with the UAE and the intent for Israel and Bahrain to normalize ties.
Odds and Ends
A recent discovery on Venus could be a sign that there is life on Earth’s nearest planetary neighbor. On Monday, scientists said they discovered high levels of a gas called phosphine in Venus’s harsh atmosphere. Although they didn’t find any actual life forms, phosphine is known to be the byproduct of several microbial forms of life in oxygen-starved environments on Earth. “With what we currently know of Venus, the most plausible explanation for phosphine, as fantastical as it might sound, is life,” said Clara Sousa-Silva, a molecular astrophysicist and co-author of the study publicizing the discovery.
That’s it for today.
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foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--China Is Already Breaking Its Vatican Deal

China Is Already Breaking Its Vatican Deal At a time when much of the rest of the world is starting to wake up to the repression , mendacity , and dangers of the Chinese Communist Party regime , the Vatican is getting even deeper in bed with it .
And at a time when that regime is intensifying repression of religion—including Catholics—in China , Pope Francis is renewing an accord with Beijing that has yielded no benefits yet save for President Xi Jinping and only disunity and suffering for the Catholic Church .
Two years ago , the Vatican signed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for two years .
It had been a long time coming , and I and others tried to warn of the dangers before the deal was done .
When it was announced , I expressed concerns—but also tried to give a pope whom I admire the benefit of the doubt .
China is already breaking the deal .
Only last week in Jiangxi province , dissenting Catholic priests have been placed under house arrest , in breach of an agreement to protect clergy from coercion .
Priests from Yujiang diocese , under surveillance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in any religious activity in the capacity of clergy ” after they refused to join the regime ’ s so-called “ patriotic church , ” and Bishop Lu Xinping was barred from celebrating Mass .
This was predictable from the start .
Everything about the deal was wrong .
Firstly , the timing : in the midst of the worst crackdown on religion since the Cultural Revolution .
The text was , and remains , secret , so no one other than its negotiators and the pope know the details .
And the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a decision-making role in the appointment of bishops .
But two years ago , while I expressed my skepticism , I held out for the possibility that I was wrong and that the pope was right .
I am , after all , only a 7-year-old Catholic , having been received into the church on Palm Sunday 2013 in Myanmar by Cardinal Charles Bo , and I didn ’ t come into the church to take on the Vatican hierarchy , let alone the pope .
Indeed , I am not—other than on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ love his emphasis on mercy and forgiveness , and I came into the church just 11 days after he was elected to the papacy .
I have grown up as a Catholic with him and I want to support him .
Yet in the past two years , nothing has made me think that my skepticism about the deal was misplaced .
On the contrary , I remain more convinced today than ever that the deal is very profoundly naïve , wrong , immoral , and dangerous .
I don ’ t doubt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are deeply misplaced .
For a start , why was the release of Catholic clergy and laity in jail before the deal was signed not made—and secured—as a precondition ?
As it is , to my knowledge there have been no releases and yet more arrests and detentions , as the Jiangxi case shows .
Even in Hong Kong , the regime appears to have already exerted an influence over the Catholic diocese , directly or indirectly .
Cardinal John Tong issued instructions to all priests to “ watch your language ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comments .
The diocese has issued new instructions to Catholic schools to discourage students from participating in protests , and published religious textbooks with guidance on how Hong Kong students can “ contribute to their nation ” with a clear pro-Beijing slant , and it effectively banned an initiative by Catholic activists to mobilize a prayer campaign for Hong Kong .
It is unclear whether the pressure for these measures came from Beijing or Rome , or out of fear in the diocese of the wrath of both .
The brazenness of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before the renewal of the agreement—illustrates how one-sided this deal is .
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said last week that the agreement was implemented “ successfully ” and that the two sides “ will continue to maintain close communication and consultation and improve bilateral relations.
” From Beijing ’ s point of view , he is right .
The deal has succeeded in furthering the regime ’ s control of the church in China , repressing dissent , and buying the pope ’ s silence .
Francis—who most Sundays highlights one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights around the world , and rightly so when he prays the Angelus—has stayed conspicuously silent on the persecution of Christians in China , the atrocities committed against the Uighurs which may well amount to a genocide , or the repression in Hong Kong or Tibet .
Until now , not a word of prayer or solidarity for the repressed peoples of China has passed his lips publicly .
Such is the tragic price of this worthless deal .
Ideally , I would advocate for this deal to be abandoned .
And I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there are two reasons I don ’ t in practice , just yet .
First , I know it will fall on deaf ears .
The diplomats in the Vatican are determined , and it will be renewed .
Second , we still do not know in detail what is in the agreement .
It is difficult to categorically reject a text we have not yet fully seen .
So instead I say this to Rome : If it ’ s such a great deal—despite all the evidence to the contrary—tell us what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , pleasantly surprise us !
As a Catholic , I believe in miracles and I am prepared to be persuaded .
But secrecy and silence are not the way .
So reveal , review , and then—if it ’ s as bad as the current evidence suggests—repeal the deal .
Supporters of the deal will say that the Vatican is playing a long game .
But if so , it ’ s too long for the millions of Uighurs in prison camps , slavery , or under Orwellian surveillance ; too long for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , under surveillance , or whose crosses are torn down and priests jailed ; too long for prisoners of conscience whose organs are harvested ; too long for Hong Kong , whose freedoms are being rapidly dismantled .
Compromise for short-term gain may be defensible ; total sell-out for no gain at all and an undermining of the church ’ s moral authority is not .
The Chinese Communist Party knows how to make use of what Lenin described as “ useful idiots.
” Mao was adept at using “ fellow travellers.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virtues of Chinese communism , as the chancellor of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences , Bishop Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo , did when he described it as the best example of Catholic Social Teaching , it is evident that the Vatican has provided Beijing with both useful idiots and fellow travellers .
I will always genuflect at an altar in a Catholic Church .
What I won ’ t do—and I don ’ t think any Catholic should do—is kowtow to a brutal , repressive , tyrannical regime .
I don ’ t think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so either .

At a time when much of the rest of the world is starting to wake up to the repression, mendacity, and dangers of the Chinese Communist Party regime, the Vatican is getting even deeper in bed with it. And at a time when that regime is intensifying repression of religion—including Catholics—in China, Pope Francis is renewing an accord with Beijing that has yielded no benefits yet save for President Xi Jinping and only disunity and suffering for the Catholic Church.
At a time when much of the rest of the world is starting to wake up to the repression, mendacity, and dangers of the Chinese Communist Party regime, the Vatican is getting even deeper in bed with it. And at a time when that regime is intensifying repression of religion—including Catholics—in China, Pope Francis is renewing an accord with Beijing that has yielded no benefits yet save for President Xi Jinping and only disunity and suffering for the Catholic Church.
Two years ago, the Vatican signed a provisional agreement with Beijing, valid for two years. It had been a long time coming, and I and others tried to warn of the dangers before the deal was done. When it was announced, I expressed concerns—but also tried to give a pope whom I admire the benefit of the doubt.
China is already breaking the deal. Only last week in Jiangxi province, dissenting Catholic priests have been placed under house arrest, in breach of an agreement to protect clergy from coercion. Priests from Yujiang diocese, under surveillance, have been forbidden from “engaging in any religious activity in the capacity of clergy” after they refused to join the regime’s so-called “patriotic church,” and Bishop Lu Xinping was barred from celebrating Mass.
This was predictable from the start. Everything about the deal was wrong.
Firstly, the timing: in the midst of the worst crackdown on religion since the Cultural Revolution.
The text was, and remains, secret, so no one other than its negotiators and the pope know the details.
And the result was to give an atheist dictatorship a decision-making role in the appointment of bishops.
But two years ago, while I expressed my skepticism, I held out for the possibility that I was wrong and that the pope was right. I am, after all, only a 7-year-old Catholic, having been received into the church on Palm Sunday 2013 in Myanmar by Cardinal Charles Bo, and I didn’t come into the church to take on the Vatican hierarchy, let alone the pope. Indeed, I am not—other than on this issue—a critic of Francis. I love his emphasis on mercy and forgiveness, and I came into the church just 11 days after he was elected to the papacy. I have grown up as a Catholic with him and I want to support him.
Yet in the past two years, nothing has made me think that my skepticism about the deal was misplaced. On the contrary, I remain more convinced today than ever that the deal is very profoundly naïve, wrong, immoral, and dangerous. I don’t doubt the good intentions behind it, but they are deeply misplaced.
For a start, why was the release of Catholic clergy and laity in jail before the deal was signed not made—and secured—as a precondition? As it is, to my knowledge there have been no releases and yet more arrests and detentions, as the Jiangxi case shows.
Even in Hong Kong, the regime appears to have already exerted an influence over the Catholic diocese, directly or indirectly. Cardinal John Tong issued instructions to all priests to “watch your language” in homilies and avoid making politically provocative comments. The diocese has issued new instructions to Catholic schools to discourage students from participating in protests, and published religious textbooks with guidance on how Hong Kong students can “contribute to their nation” with a clear pro-Beijing slant, and it effectively banned an initiative by Catholic activists to mobilize a prayer campaign for Hong Kong. It is unclear whether the pressure for these measures came from Beijing or Rome, or out of fear in the diocese of the wrath of both.
The brazenness of the regime—tightening the screws in Jiangxi just days before the renewal of the agreement—illustrates how one-sided this deal is. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said last week that the agreement was implemented “successfully” and that the two sides “will continue to maintain close communication and consultation and improve bilateral relations.”
From Beijing’s point of view, he is right. The deal has succeeded in furthering the regime’s control of the church in China, repressing dissent, and buying the pope’s silence.
Francis—who most Sundays highlights one or another area of injustice and human rights around the world, and rightly so when he prays the Angelus—has stayed conspicuously silent on the persecution of Christians in China, the atrocities committed against the Uighurs which may well amount to a genocide, or the repression in Hong Kong or Tibet. Until now, not a word of prayer or solidarity for the repressed peoples of China has passed his lips publicly. Such is the tragic price of this worthless deal.
Ideally, I would advocate for this deal to be abandoned. And I do in principle, absolutely. But there are two reasons I don’t in practice, just yet. First, I know it will fall on deaf ears. The diplomats in the Vatican are determined, and it will be renewed. Second, we still do not know in detail what is in the agreement. It is difficult to categorically reject a text we have not yet fully seen.
So instead I say this to Rome: If it’s such a great deal—despite all the evidence to the contrary—tell us what’s in it. Come on, pleasantly surprise us! As a Catholic, I believe in miracles and I am prepared to be persuaded. But secrecy and silence are not the way.
So reveal, review, and then—if it’s as bad as the current evidence suggests—repeal the deal.
Supporters of the deal will say that the Vatican is playing a long game. But if so, it’s too long for the millions of Uighurs in prison camps, slavery, or under Orwellian surveillance; too long for the churches which are bulldozed, closed, under surveillance, or whose crosses are torn down and priests jailed; too long for prisoners of conscience whose organs are harvested; too long for Hong Kong, whose freedoms are being rapidly dismantled. Compromise for short-term gain may be defensible; total sell-out for no gain at all and an undermining of the church’s moral authority is not.
The Chinese Communist Party knows how to make use of what Lenin described as “useful idiots.” Mao was adept at using “fellow travellers.” When you have Vatican officials extolling the virtues of Chinese communism, as the chancellor of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Bishop Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, did when he described it as the best example of Catholic Social Teaching, it is evident that the Vatican has provided Beijing with both useful idiots and fellow travellers.
I will always genuflect at an altar in a Catholic Church. What I won’t do—and I don’t think any Catholic should do—is kowtow to a brutal, repressive, tyrannical regime. I don’t think the pope should be made to do so either.