foreignpolicy--2020-09-24--A Perilous Presidential Handoff

A Perilous Presidential Handoff

The presidential transition is among the least studied moments of potential mayhem in the U.S. political system .
For as long as the United States has been a world power , other countries have watched one president pass the baton to another with anxiety and optimism .
Americans experienced the world ’ s first democratic transition of power more than 220 years ago .
If current trends hold , they may experience one of the very worst of such transitions this November ; when asked by a reporter this week whether he would commit to a peaceful transfer of power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump avoided the question .
Trump , who thinks only of the consequences of events for himself , may not care about any of this .
But the rest of the world does—and Americans should , as well .
When the United States , as the first democracy in the era of Westphalian nation-states , introduced the concept of transferring power from one living head of state to another , it also created the idea of a political transition—the interval between the election of a new leader and the actual assumption of power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when the sovereign was still a child and a relative or court official governed in the child ’ s place .
There were to be no regencies in the American republic : A president voted out of office or retiring didn ’ t administer the White House in the name of his successor but retained full powers until the latter ’ s inauguration .
But the country ’ s founders , who were better at crafting rules for government than elections , created the potential for an awkward twilight zone between presidencies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Adams , succeeded George Washington in 1797 , there was a long delay built into the political system between Adams ’ s election by the Electoral College in early December 1796 and his inauguration the following March .
This interval certainly reflected the slow pace of 18th-century transportation and communications .
But it was also a product of the fact that Americans do not select their presidents directly .
Voters only select presidential electors , who must then gather to vote for the new head of state .
It was not until the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the presidential transition period by six weeks .
Four months of a lame-duck presidency was an eternity during a national crisis .
The 20th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution , ratified in 1933 , moved Inauguration Day to Jan. 20 .
Unfortunately , it has been more common during the superpower era for transitions to hit snags .
Following World War II , as the United States became a world power with vast alliances , widespread military and covert activities , and hair-trigger nuclear guarantees , even an 11-week transition often seemed too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not just harmful miscues but disaster .
While Americans were capable , during the early phase of the Cold War , of amending the Constitution to limit presidents to two terms , they didn ’ t perceive the need to accelerate the transition between them even further .
The likely reason was the fast-growing size of the federal government , which required an incoming administration to fill ever more top-level jobs .
With respect to foreign policy , some transitions have been excellent , where the handoff of power and responsibility was neat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ principle that the United States has only one president at a time .
The transitions between Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter and between George W. Bush and Barack Obama , for example , were superb .
The latter not only took place during a rapidly worsening global economic disaster but also involved transferring responsibility for three wars—Afghanistan , Iraq , and the worldwide pursuit of Islamist terrorists .
Unfortunately , it has been more common during the superpower era for transitions to hit snags .
There have been three main reasons for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ why the length of the transition invites trouble for the United States and the world .
First , it is not unusual for presidents to still be in the business of building their legacies in the final months of their term .
This reflex , which usually has a foreign-policy dimension , has caused multiple problems for their successors .
Second , if there are sharp differences in philosophy or style between the outgoing and incoming administrations , the ball can be dropped on ongoing , normally nonpartisan national security engagements .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future president actively makes trouble while the incumbent still governs .
The transition between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the newly elected John F. Kennedy was a textbook case of last-minute legacy-building with disastrous and nearly disastrous consequences .
During his final 10 months in office , Eisenhower authorized covert programs for regime change in what is today the Democratic Republic of the Congo , in the Dominican Republic , and , most famously , against Fidel Castro ’ s Cuba .
None of these programs were completed by the time Kennedy took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite the defeat of Eisenhower ’ s vice president , Richard Nixon , in the 1960 election , the outgoing administration didn ’ t suspend or scale down these activities to give Kennedy ’ s team a chance to reassess .
Instead , it ramped them up , even though it was understood that none of the operations could be completed before Eisenhower left office .
A week before Kennedy ’ s inauguration , for example , the Eisenhower White House authorized giving weapons to a group of dissidents who had told the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dominican dictator , Rafael Trujillo .
What Kennedy inherited in the Dominican Republic would be a headache ; what he inherited with respect to Cuba—including the need to deal quickly with a growing group of Cuban exiles no longer welcome in Guatemala , where the CIA was training them to overthrow Castro—would contribute to the Bay of Pigs disaster .
In its final days , the Eisenhower administration also decided to ramp up U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia .
Unsettled by a Soviet airlift of military supplies to communist insurgents in Laos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was steadily expanding , the outgoing administration rushed jets and pilots to its Laotian allies in mid-January 1961 .
Eisenhower ’ s mistake wasn ’ t his decision to react to what he perceived as a test by Moscow during the transition ; his mistake was the mission he gave the Laotian government .
The administration actively encouraged the Laotians to use the jets to interdict Soviet aircraft , despite the risk of killing Soviet airmen—and of dropping a superpower crisis into Kennedy ’ s lap during his very first days in office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the standard for the most dangerous foreign-policy decisions by an outgoing administration , there have been other examples of outgoing presidents making post-election decisions that created significant unfinished business for their successors .
George H.W .
Bush , after his defeat by Bill Clinton , authorized U.S. military intervention in Somalia to protect food convoys—a humanitarian mission with no particular endpoint .
The disastrous expansion of this intervention under Clinton , a textbook case of mission creep , was not foreordained by what Bush left behind , but it is generally not a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open-ended military campaign just as you are starting to empty your national security files .
And in 2016 , even if one can hardly dispute the need for a U.S. reaction to Russian interference in the election campaign , the timing of Obama ’ s retaliation certainly complicated the transition to the Trump era .
The second form of trouble can come from the soon-to-be-powerful people on the receiving end of a transition .
Even when the outgoing administration ’ s final sprint for achievement doesn ’ t create new problems , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and missions with the potential for harmful disruption—especially if the runner receiving the baton bobbles or simply rejects it .
During the Cold War , for example , six administrations had to hand off an ongoing responsibility for containing Soviet power .
More recently , confronting terrorism would span multiple administrations .
In 1988 , the incoming Bush administration was skeptical of Ronald Reagan ’ s trust of his Soviet counterpart , Mikhail Gorbachev—despite the fact that both U.S. administrations involved many of the same people .
In the end , this skepticism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Cold War ; the Bush team would not only change its mind but become a perfect partner to Gorbachev .
Nevertheless , the Reagan-Bush handoff was not as smooth as one would have expected given that Bush had been Reagan ’ s vice president .
More consequential was the dropping of the baton by Bush ’ s son George W. Bush .
Clinton tried to impress on the president-elect the threat posed by Osama bin Laden .
Nevertheless , the Bush team took nine long months to focus on the problem of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to build armed drones with the capability of shooting bin Laden on sight—a decision that eventually produced the Predator drone .
Although the bipartisan 9/11 Commission didn ’ t determine there had been any missed opportunities to thwart the 2001 attacks during the first months of the Bush administration , the pause in the White House ’ s focus on al Qaeda did affect the general effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism .
As we confront the possibility of a transition out of the Trump era—and Trump ’ s potential refusal to let it progress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of disruption and how the current administration not only bobbled the baton on its way in but actively made trouble for Obama .
The Trump team didn ’ t even wait for Inauguration Day to begin undermining the U.S. government ’ s efforts to sanction the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin for intervening in the 2016 election campaign .
Trump ’ s designated national security advisor , Michael Flynn , made trouble for the country ( and for himself ) by signaling to the Russians in December 2016 that the incoming administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moscow ’ s activities .
To see similar mischief in foreign policy , one has to go back to the 1968 presidential campaign , when Nixon undermined the Lyndon B. Johnson administration ’ s sincere efforts to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War—though Nixon had the good sense to stop once he was elected .
Trump ’ s personality and the patterns of his presidency suggest that should he lose in November , we will see a fraught transition .
Trump ’ s personality and the patterns of his presidency suggest that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will see a fraught transition with elements of the first two traditional kinds of trouble .
A defeated Trump would likely attempt some poisonous legacy-building before leaving office .
As his decision in July to pull thousands of troops out of Germany and his embrace of anti-China rhetoric in the pandemic indicate , Trump could use his remaining days in power to further undermine NATO and worsen relations with Beijing .
Fortunately , most of the likely late-stage initiatives—such as haphazard troop withdrawals or a barrage of tariffs on Chinese goods—would be reversible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process of rebuilding international trust .
On the other hand , Trump ’ s isolationist instincts suggest that he , unlike Eisenhower , would not start any new programs for regime change abroad that could complicate Democratic challenger Joe Biden ’ s first hundred days , should he become president .
The one possible exception is a last-minute move against Tehran , given both Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s hatred of the Iranian regime and the Trump family ’ s closeness to the governments of Israel , Saudi Arabia , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wins , the world is likely to witness a hostile—but peaceful—takeover in Washington .
It will be the first test of a law , supported by both parties and signed by Obama in 2016 , to improve transitions by mandating closer cooperation by the outgoing administration .
Especially if the margin of victory is close , however , there will likely be weeks of noise from Trump about alleged electoral fraud , coupled with a churlish unwillingness to assist the Biden transition team in any way .
No matter the circumstances , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minefield for the next administration .
Historically , all incoming administrations have faced the temptation—especially in a crisis or after a bitter campaign—of accelerating the start of the new era .
Foreign leaders , especially those of traditional U.S. allies , would be encouraging the Biden team to overturn the worst of Trump ’ s “ America First ” policies as quickly as possible .
Meanwhile , Trump would likely be on the lookout for any signs that Biden and his transition team are undermining the White House—a projection of Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s people should expect to be targeted by social media efforts and by leaks from Trump ’ s few allies in the national security world suggesting an ongoing conspiracy against the outgoing president .
Even without the added drama of the current presidency , the prospect of a U.S. presidential transition in November raises international anxiety and concern .
Biden ’ s challenge during the transition would be to signal impending U.S. reengagement with the world without seeming to violate the country ’ s tradition of having only one president at a time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for an incoming Biden team would be the urgency of de-Trumpification at home .
In terms of proven and alleged political crimes , the Nixon administration is the closest analogy to Trump ’ s .
After the justice system prosecuted Nixon ’ s most nefarious associates , the Ford and Carter administrations worked with the U.S. Congress to eliminate many of the institutional sources of Nixon-era abuses .
For a Biden White House , however , identifying and rooting out Trump administration abuses would be more of a challenge than it was for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who could rely on Nixon administration officials who had remained more committed to the Constitution than their president ; many of these men and women formed the core of the Ford administration and helped cleanse the U.S. government of the Nixon taint .
There is no reason to believe that , at most , more than a handful of people with senior responsibility in the current White House would provide similar assistance to the Biden team or Congress .
Indeed , it is very easy to imagine a transition where Trump appointees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while Trump issues last-minute pardons .
De-Trumpification will not be a purely domestic issue .
For the first time in modern U.S. history , the cleanup after a failed administration will likely involve unraveling political and financial abuses in foreign policy .
( The events related to Ukraine for which Trump was impeached are but one example . )
During a transition , it would be up to federal civil servants , public interest groups , and the media to make full use of existing laws , and whatever public pressure they can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration records as intact as possible .
Even without the added drama of the current presidency , the prospect of a U.S. presidential transition in November raises international anxiety and concern .
The long duration of the transition , coupled with the large-scale replacement of the U.S. policymaking elite , has traditionally been a source of disruption in U.S. foreign policy .
Out of spite , greed , and ignorance , Trump has already tested each and every U.S. political tradition .
Should he lose in November , there is every reason to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as he did four years ago , do all he can to subvert the already flawed institution of the presidential transition .
A silver lining , perhaps , is that misbehavior by a defeated Trump might inspire Americans to take a harder look at fixing their presidential twilight zone .
This story appears in the Fall 2020 print issue .

The presidential transition is among the least studied moments of potential mayhem in the U.S. political system. For as long as the United States has been a world power, other countries have watched one president pass the baton to another with anxiety and optimism. Americans experienced the world’s first democratic transition of power more than 220 years ago. If current trends hold, they may experience one of the very worst of such transitions this November; when asked by a reporter this week whether he would commit to a peaceful transfer of power should he lose, incumbent President Donald Trump avoided the question. Trump, who thinks only of the consequences of events for himself, may not care about any of this. But the rest of the world does—and Americans should, as well.
The presidential transition is among the least studied moments of potential mayhem in the U.S. political system. For as long as the United States has been a world power, other countries have watched one president pass the baton to another with anxiety and optimism. Americans experienced the world’s first democratic transition of power more than 220 years ago. If current trends hold, they may experience one of the very worst of such transitions this November; when asked by a reporter this week whether he would commit to a peaceful transfer of power should he lose, incumbent President Donald Trump avoided the question. Trump, who thinks only of the consequences of events for himself, may not care about any of this. But the rest of the world does—and Americans should, as well.
When the United States, as the first democracy in the era of Westphalian nation-states, introduced the concept of transferring power from one living head of state to another, it also created the idea of a political transition—the interval between the election of a new leader and the actual assumption of power. Monarchies had had regencies, usually when the sovereign was still a child and a relative or court official governed in the child’s place. There were to be no regencies in the American republic: A president voted out of office or retiring didn’t administer the White House in the name of his successor but retained full powers until the latter’s inauguration. But the country’s founders, who were better at crafting rules for government than elections, created the potential for an awkward twilight zone between presidencies. When the second U.S. president, John Adams, succeeded George Washington in 1797, there was a long delay built into the political system between Adams’s election by the Electoral College in early December 1796 and his inauguration the following March. This interval certainly reflected the slow pace of 18th-century transportation and communications. But it was also a product of the fact that Americans do not select their presidents directly. Voters only select presidential electors, who must then gather to vote for the new head of state.
It was not until the Great Depression that the United States cut the presidential transition period by six weeks. Four months of a lame-duck presidency was an eternity during a national crisis. The 20th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1933, moved Inauguration Day to Jan. 20.
Unfortunately, it has been more common during the superpower era for transitions to hit snags.
Following World War II, as the United States became a world power with vast alliances, widespread military and covert activities, and hair-trigger nuclear guarantees, even an 11-week transition often seemed too long, offering the quadrennial potential for not just harmful miscues but disaster. While Americans were capable, during the early phase of the Cold War, of amending the Constitution to limit presidents to two terms, they didn’t perceive the need to accelerate the transition between them even further. The likely reason was the fast-growing size of the federal government, which required an incoming administration to fill ever more top-level jobs.
With respect to foreign policy, some transitions have been excellent, where the handoff of power and responsibility was neat, crisp, and professional—consistent with the principle that the United States has only one president at a time. The transitions between Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter and between George W. Bush and Barack Obama, for example, were superb. The latter not only took place during a rapidly worsening global economic disaster but also involved transferring responsibility for three wars—Afghanistan, Iraq, and the worldwide pursuit of Islamist terrorists.
Unfortunately, it has been more common during the superpower era for transitions to hit snags. There have been three main reasons for this, which to varying degrees underline why the length of the transition invites trouble for the United States and the world. First, it is not unusual for presidents to still be in the business of building their legacies in the final months of their term. This reflex, which usually has a foreign-policy dimension, has caused multiple problems for their successors. Second, if there are sharp differences in philosophy or style between the outgoing and incoming administrations, the ball can be dropped on ongoing, normally nonpartisan national security engagements. And finally, on rare occasions, a future president actively makes trouble while the incumbent still governs.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower brings President-elect John F. Kennedy up to speed on national security matters during a pre-inauguration meeting in Washington on Jan. 19, 1961.
The transition between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the newly elected John F. Kennedy was a textbook case of last-minute legacy-building with disastrous and nearly disastrous consequences. During his final 10 months in office, Eisenhower authorized covert programs for regime change in what is today the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the Dominican Republic, and, most famously, against Fidel Castro’s Cuba. None of these programs were completed by the time Kennedy took the oath of office. Indeed, despite the defeat of Eisenhower’s vice president, Richard Nixon, in the 1960 election, the outgoing administration didn’t suspend or scale down these activities to give Kennedy’s team a chance to reassess. Instead, it ramped them up, even though it was understood that none of the operations could be completed before Eisenhower left office. A week before Kennedy’s inauguration, for example, the Eisenhower White House authorized giving weapons to a group of dissidents who had told the CIA that they intended to assassinate the Dominican dictator, Rafael Trujillo. What Kennedy inherited in the Dominican Republic would be a headache; what he inherited with respect to Cuba—including the need to deal quickly with a growing group of Cuban exiles no longer welcome in Guatemala, where the CIA was training them to overthrow Castro—would contribute to the Bay of Pigs disaster.
In its final days, the Eisenhower administration also decided to ramp up U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. Unsettled by a Soviet airlift of military supplies to communist insurgents in Laos that had started only weeks before and was steadily expanding, the outgoing administration rushed jets and pilots to its Laotian allies in mid-January 1961. Eisenhower’s mistake wasn’t his decision to react to what he perceived as a test by Moscow during the transition; his mistake was the mission he gave the Laotian government. The administration actively encouraged the Laotians to use the jets to interdict Soviet aircraft, despite the risk of killing Soviet airmen—and of dropping a superpower crisis into Kennedy’s lap during his very first days in office.
Although the Eisenhower administration arguably set the standard for the most dangerous foreign-policy decisions by an outgoing administration, there have been other examples of outgoing presidents making post-election decisions that created significant unfinished business for their successors. George H.W. Bush, after his defeat by Bill Clinton, authorized U.S. military intervention in Somalia to protect food convoys—a humanitarian mission with no particular endpoint. The disastrous expansion of this intervention under Clinton, a textbook case of mission creep, was not foreordained by what Bush left behind, but it is generally not a good idea to begin a new, open-ended military campaign just as you are starting to empty your national security files. And in 2016, even if one can hardly dispute the need for a U.S. reaction to Russian interference in the election campaign, the timing of Obama’s retaliation certainly complicated the transition to the Trump era.
The second form of trouble can come from the soon-to-be-powerful people on the receiving end of a transition. Even when the outgoing administration’s final sprint for achievement doesn’t create new problems, there are always ongoing programs, policies, and missions with the potential for harmful disruption—especially if the runner receiving the baton bobbles or simply rejects it. During the Cold War, for example, six administrations had to hand off an ongoing responsibility for containing Soviet power. More recently, confronting terrorism would span multiple administrations.
In 1988, the incoming Bush administration was skeptical of Ronald Reagan’s trust of his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev—despite the fact that both U.S. administrations involved many of the same people. In the end, this skepticism did not complicate the winding down of the Cold War; the Bush team would not only change its mind but become a perfect partner to Gorbachev. Nevertheless, the Reagan-Bush handoff was not as smooth as one would have expected given that Bush had been Reagan’s vice president.
More consequential was the dropping of the baton by Bush’s son George W. Bush. Clinton tried to impress on the president-elect the threat posed by Osama bin Laden. Nevertheless, the Bush team took nine long months to focus on the problem of al Qaeda and the decision of whether to build armed drones with the capability of shooting bin Laden on sight—a decision that eventually produced the Predator drone. Although the bipartisan 9/11 Commission didn’t determine there had been any missed opportunities to thwart the 2001 attacks during the first months of the Bush administration, the pause in the White House’s focus on al Qaeda did affect the general effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism.
President George W. Bush meets with President-elect Barack Obama during Obama’s first visit to the Oval Office at the White House on Nov. 10, 2008.
As we confront the possibility of a transition out of the Trump era—and Trump’s potential refusal to let it progress peacefully—it is worth considering the third source of disruption and how the current administration not only bobbled the baton on its way in but actively made trouble for Obama. The Trump team didn’t even wait for Inauguration Day to begin undermining the U.S. government’s efforts to sanction the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin for intervening in the 2016 election campaign. Trump’s designated national security advisor, Michael Flynn, made trouble for the country (and for himself) by signaling to the Russians in December 2016 that the incoming administration would have a more benevolent view of Moscow’s activities. To see similar mischief in foreign policy, one has to go back to the 1968 presidential campaign, when Nixon undermined the Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s sincere efforts to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War—though Nixon had the good sense to stop once he was elected.
Trump’s personality and the patterns of his presidency suggest that should he lose in November, we will see a fraught transition.
Trump’s personality and the patterns of his presidency suggest that should he lose in November, we will see a fraught transition with elements of the first two traditional kinds of trouble. A defeated Trump would likely attempt some poisonous legacy-building before leaving office. As his decision in July to pull thousands of troops out of Germany and his embrace of anti-China rhetoric in the pandemic indicate, Trump could use his remaining days in power to further undermine NATO and worsen relations with Beijing. Fortunately, most of the likely late-stage initiatives—such as haphazard troop withdrawals or a barrage of tariffs on Chinese goods—would be reversible, even if they complicate the long process of rebuilding international trust. On the other hand, Trump’s isolationist instincts suggest that he, unlike Eisenhower, would not start any new programs for regime change abroad that could complicate Democratic challenger Joe Biden’s first hundred days, should he become president. The one possible exception is a last-minute move against Tehran, given both Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s hatred of the Iranian regime and the Trump family’s closeness to the governments of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
If Biden wins, the world is likely to witness a hostile—but peaceful—takeover in Washington. It will be the first test of a law, supported by both parties and signed by Obama in 2016, to improve transitions by mandating closer cooperation by the outgoing administration. Especially if the margin of victory is close, however, there will likely be weeks of noise from Trump about alleged electoral fraud, coupled with a churlish unwillingness to assist the Biden transition team in any way. No matter the circumstances, a Trump-Biden transition would almost certainly be a minefield for the next administration.
Historically, all incoming administrations have faced the temptation—especially in a crisis or after a bitter campaign—of accelerating the start of the new era. Foreign leaders, especially those of traditional U.S. allies, would be encouraging the Biden team to overturn the worst of Trump’s “America First” policies as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, Trump would likely be on the lookout for any signs that Biden and his transition team are undermining the White House—a projection of Trump’s own behavior in 2016. Biden’s people should expect to be targeted by social media efforts and by leaks from Trump’s few allies in the national security world suggesting an ongoing conspiracy against the outgoing president.
Even without the added drama of the current presidency, the prospect of a U.S. presidential transition in November raises international anxiety and concern.
Biden’s challenge during the transition would be to signal impending U.S. reengagement with the world without seeming to violate the country’s tradition of having only one president at a time. An even greater source of temptation for an incoming Biden team would be the urgency of de-Trumpification at home. In terms of proven and alleged political crimes, the Nixon administration is the closest analogy to Trump’s. After the justice system prosecuted Nixon’s most nefarious associates, the Ford and Carter administrations worked with the U.S. Congress to eliminate many of the institutional sources of Nixon-era abuses. For a Biden White House, however, identifying and rooting out Trump administration abuses would be more of a challenge than it was for Nixon’s successors in the 1970s, who could rely on Nixon administration officials who had remained more committed to the Constitution than their president; many of these men and women formed the core of the Ford administration and helped cleanse the U.S. government of the Nixon taint. There is no reason to believe that, at most, more than a handful of people with senior responsibility in the current White House would provide similar assistance to the Biden team or Congress. Indeed, it is very easy to imagine a transition where Trump appointees attempt to hide evidence of their misdeeds while Trump issues last-minute pardons.
De-Trumpification will not be a purely domestic issue. For the first time in modern U.S. history, the cleanup after a failed administration will likely involve unraveling political and financial abuses in foreign policy. (The events related to Ukraine for which Trump was impeached are but one example.) During a transition, it would be up to federal civil servants, public interest groups, and the media to make full use of existing laws, and whatever public pressure they can bring to bear, to keep Trump administration records as intact as possible.
Even without the added drama of the current presidency, the prospect of a U.S. presidential transition in November raises international anxiety and concern. The long duration of the transition, coupled with the large-scale replacement of the U.S. policymaking elite, has traditionally been a source of disruption in U.S. foreign policy. Out of spite, greed, and ignorance, Trump has already tested each and every U.S. political tradition. Should he lose in November, there is every reason to assume that he will once again, as he did four years ago, do all he can to subvert the already flawed institution of the presidential transition. A silver lining, perhaps, is that misbehavior by a defeated Trump might inspire Americans to take a harder look at fixing their presidential twilight zone.
This story appears in the Fall 2020 print issue.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-24--The African Union Needs to Resolve Ethiopia’s Dam Dispute

The African Union Needs to Resolve Ethiopia ’ s Dam Dispute Egypt and Sudan have threatened to withdraw from negotiations over the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile , which flows into the Nile River .
Thus , Ethiopia , Egypt , and Sudan all ultimately share the water of the Blue Nile , but Egypt and Sudan—both of which sit downstream from Ethiopia on the river—fear putting control of a vitally needed water supply in Ethiopia ’ s hands .
The dispute has lasted for years , but with the livelihoods of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the smooth flow of the water , it is crucial that the African Union ( AU ) helps to resolve the deadlock imminently .
Negotiations involving the U.S. Treasury Department and the World Bank have failed , thanks to the perceived U.S. bias toward Egypt , a long-term ally of the United States .
Even worse , the United States is now suspending aid to Ethiopia over the dam , a crude threat that worsens the odds of any resolution .
But the AU can speak from an African perspective , and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are AU members , and some AU officials have a rich and nuanced understanding of the problems of the Nile Basin .
The $ 4.6 billion hydroelectric project , which began nearly a decade ago , is being built along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border .
From the start , it was a controversial scheme , and the three Nile Basin countries have failed , despite years of negotiations , to reach a trilateral agreement .
Ethiopia sees the dam as a means to drive forward its economy by improving access to electricity in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the population are not connected to the power grid .
Egypt however , worries that Ethiopia will have too much control over the Nile , a huge risk given that up to 90 percent of Egypt ’ s water supply for fresh water and agriculture comes from the river .
Sudan is stuck in the middle—literally .
On the one hand , it welcomes the idea of Ethiopia being able to produce and supply energy , as it will mean that Sudan can buy cheap hydropower .
The dam could also help to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hand , it doesn ’ t want Ethiopia to become a hegemon fueled by control over the Nile .
Mediation efforts by the African Union , chaired by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa , are ongoing , and Ethiopia has welcomed them .
Egypt and Sudan have committed to reaching a solution .
The first meeting took place in late June , and a follow-up video teleconference chaired by Ramaphosa was held on July 21 with the view of reviewing progress made with the trilateral negotiations .
But any negotiations face a number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ To begin with , Egypt does not want the dam to be filled too quickly .
It has proposed that the reservoir be filled over a 12- to 20-year period , whereas Ethiopia has argued for a five- to seven-year period so that it can reap the economic rewards of the dam sooner rather than later .
Ethiopia , Sudan , and Egypt have also been unable to reach any agreement over drought mitigation .
Egypt would like assurances that during periods of drought , Ethiopia will not leave too much water in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from being able to irrigate their lands .
But perhaps most critical is establishing clear mechanisms for managing future disputes or water conflicts .
As the climate shifts , such disputes seem inevitable ; in the past few years alone East Africa has seen flooding caused by unprecedented levels of rainfall , the worst locust crisis in decades , and severe droughts , all of which have posed a serious threat to food security in the region .
Behind each of these disputes is the fraught relationship between the Nile powers and Ethiopia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and colonial ties have undoubtedly favored Egypt and Sudan .
The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Britain , which at the time held colonial power over several Nile Basin countries , gave Egypt the right to veto any projects along the Nile .
Likewise , a treaty established in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan apportioned the vast majority of the Nile ’ s waters to Egypt and a sizable allocation to Sudan .
Ethiopia was never consulted for either treaty .
As a result , Egypt in particular thinks of itself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which it has dominated for centuries .
Ethiopians , in contrast , have been historically unable to exercise any natural rights over the Nile despite the fact that 86 percent of the water that reaches Egypt originally flows from their country .
And despite Ethiopia ’ s heavy natural contribution to the flow of the Nile River , its use of the water has been minimal .
The feelings of historical injustice in Ethiopia and the rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia emanate largely from outdated agreements that need to be reformed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the importance of an African-led arbitration .
The dam dispute is an African issue and so requires an African solution .
Besides , as Ethiopia ’ s minister for water , irrigation and energy , Seleshi Bekele , has asserted , the resolution of the dispute will help create a pathway for resolving African issues .
African-led negotiations should be encouraged and normalized .
The AU understands the importance of regional cooperation among all riparian countries , especially as the African Continental Free Trade Area—the AU ’ s planned single market for goods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and investments—begins to take shape .
The wider agenda of establishing a single market will require a greater need for pan-African solidarity .
As William Davison , senior analyst at the International Crisis Group , suggested on The Horn podcast , the Nile Basin needs to be seen as a zone of cooperation and not one of zero-sum competition .
Climate change remains a strong concern , too , as East Africa has grappled with extreme conditions .
An interconnected region with a cohesive hydrological ecosystem will help the region ’ s countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The United Nations Development Programme Climate Change Adaptation reports that in the decades ahead , there will be increased incidences of drought and larger volumes of rainfall during rainy seasons combined with prolonged dry seasons .
The AU is the only body that can realistically emphasize the need for solidarity , unification , and cooperation and ensure an appropriate mediation process is in place in the event of a drought .
Finally , the Nile dam dispute has been a long protracted process , and arriving at a mutually beneficial solution will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also lend more credence to the AU itself .
If the international community begins to play a reduced role in settling disputes across the continent as countries begin to prioritize their own domestic affairs , the AU ’ s strength and capability will become critical to Africa ’ s future .

Egypt and Sudan have threatened to withdraw from negotiations over the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, which flows into the Nile River. Thus, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan all ultimately share the water of the Blue Nile, but Egypt and Sudan—both of which sit downstream from Ethiopia on the river—fear putting control of a vitally needed water supply in Ethiopia’s hands. The dispute has lasted for years , but with the livelihoods of millions depending on the project and on the smooth flow of the water, it is crucial that the African Union (AU) helps to resolve the deadlock imminently.
Egypt and Sudan have threatened to withdraw from negotiations over the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, which flows into the Nile River. Thus, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan all ultimately share the water of the Blue Nile, but Egypt and Sudan—both of which sit downstream from Ethiopia on the river—fear putting control of a vitally needed water supply in Ethiopia’s hands. The dispute has lasted for years, but with the livelihoods of millions depending on the project and on the smooth flow of the water, it is crucial that the African Union (AU) helps to resolve the deadlock imminently.
Negotiations involving the U.S. Treasury Department and the World Bank have failed, thanks to the perceived U.S. bias toward Egypt, a long-term ally of the United States. Even worse, the United States is now suspending aid to Ethiopia over the dam, a crude threat that worsens the odds of any resolution. But the AU can speak from an African perspective, and a relatively unbiased one. All three states are AU members, and some AU officials have a rich and nuanced understanding of the problems of the Nile Basin.
The $4.6 billion hydroelectric project, which began nearly a decade ago, is being built along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. From the start, it was a controversial scheme, and the three Nile Basin countries have failed, despite years of negotiations, to reach a trilateral agreement. Ethiopia sees the dam as a means to drive forward its economy by improving access to electricity in a country where up to 65 percent of the population are not connected to the power grid. Egypt however, worries that Ethiopia will have too much control over the Nile, a huge risk given that up to 90 percent of Egypt’s water supply for fresh water and agriculture comes from the river. Sudan is stuck in the middle—literally. On the one hand, it welcomes the idea of Ethiopia being able to produce and supply energy, as it will mean that Sudan can buy cheap hydropower. The dam could also help to prevent floods. But on the other hand, it doesn’t want Ethiopia to become a hegemon fueled by control over the Nile.
Mediation efforts by the African Union, chaired by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, are ongoing, and Ethiopia has welcomed them. Egypt and Sudan have committed to reaching a solution. The first meeting took place in late June, and a follow-up video teleconference chaired by Ramaphosa was held on July 21 with the view of reviewing progress made with the trilateral negotiations.
But any negotiations face a number of tricky points of contention still. To begin with, Egypt does not want the dam to be filled too quickly. It has proposed that the reservoir be filled over a 12- to 20-year period, whereas Ethiopia has argued for a five- to seven-year period so that it can reap the economic rewards of the dam sooner rather than later.
Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt have also been unable to reach any agreement over drought mitigation. Egypt would like assurances that during periods of drought, Ethiopia will not leave too much water in its reservoirs, thus blocking Egyptian farmers from being able to irrigate their lands.
But perhaps most critical is establishing clear mechanisms for managing future disputes or water conflicts. As the climate shifts, such disputes seem inevitable; in the past few years alone East Africa has seen flooding caused by unprecedented levels of rainfall, the worst locust crisis in decades, and severe droughts, all of which have posed a serious threat to food security in the region.
Behind each of these disputes is the fraught relationship between the Nile powers and Ethiopia. Historical treaties established in the 1920s and colonial ties have undoubtedly favored Egypt and Sudan.
The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Britain, which at the time held colonial power over several Nile Basin countries, gave Egypt the right to veto any projects along the Nile. Likewise, a treaty established in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan apportioned the vast majority of the Nile’s waters to Egypt and a sizable allocation to Sudan. Ethiopia was never consulted for either treaty.
As a result, Egypt in particular thinks of itself as the natural owner of the Nile, which it has dominated for centuries. Ethiopians, in contrast, have been historically unable to exercise any natural rights over the Nile despite the fact that 86 percent of the water that reaches Egypt originally flows from their country. And despite Ethiopia’s heavy natural contribution to the flow of the Nile River, its use of the water has been minimal. The feelings of historical injustice in Ethiopia and the rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia emanate largely from outdated agreements that need to be reformed.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has echoed the importance of an African-led arbitration. The dam dispute is an African issue and so requires an African solution. Besides, as Ethiopia’s minister for water, irrigation and energy, Seleshi Bekele, has asserted, the resolution of the dispute will help create a pathway for resolving African issues. African-led negotiations should be encouraged and normalized.
The AU understands the importance of regional cooperation among all riparian countries, especially as the African Continental Free Trade Area—the AU’s planned single market for goods and services with free movement of people and investments—begins to take shape. The wider agenda of establishing a single market will require a greater need for pan-African solidarity. As William Davison, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, suggested on The Horn podcast, the Nile Basin needs to be seen as a zone of cooperation and not one of zero-sum competition.
Climate change remains a strong concern, too, as East Africa has grappled with extreme conditions. An interconnected region with a cohesive hydrological ecosystem will help the region’s countries to navigate these challenges in future. The United Nations Development Programme Climate Change Adaptation reports that in the decades ahead, there will be increased incidences of drought and larger volumes of rainfall during rainy seasons combined with prolonged dry seasons. The AU is the only body that can realistically emphasize the need for solidarity, unification, and cooperation and ensure an appropriate mediation process is in place in the event of a drought.
Finally, the Nile dam dispute has been a long protracted process, and arriving at a mutually beneficial solution will not only benefit riparian countries, but will also lend more credence to the AU itself. If the international community begins to play a reduced role in settling disputes across the continent as countries begin to prioritize their own domestic affairs, the AU’s strength and capability will become critical to Africa’s future.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-24--Trump’s National Security Team Is Making Politics, Not Policy

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Trump ’ s top national security aides draw questions with campaign-style speeches , 500 national security leaders back Biden , and the White House taps a new intelligence watchdog .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
In any other election year , U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden would mobilize athletes and celebrities to get out the vote in swing states , with campaign fixtures such as Kid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Voight stumping for the Republicans , and Bruce Springsteen , Beyoncé , and LeBron James taking to the stage for the Democrats .
But in 2020 , Trump—who has nominally passed off control of his real estate and entertainment empire to his children—has also decided to keep the business of campaigning in the family , so to speak .
The president has dispatched top national security aides to battleground states , raising concerns among lawmakers and some veteran experts worry that he is blurring the hard-drawn line between foreign policy and political campaigning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mike Pompeo , already subject to criticism for repeated trips to his native Kansas on the taxpayers ’ dime , traveled on an official State Department trip to Wisconsin , a key state that helped Trump dent the Democrats ’ electoral firewall in the Midwest in 2016 .
National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien is also under fire for politically tinged speeches that appear aimed at boosting Trump ’ s case for re-election in swing states .
In Iowa , O ’ Brien drew criticism for a speech that promised “ more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Next month , he will visit Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Southern Maine , near the border with swing state New Hampshire , to tout the Trump administration ’ s strategy for a 355-ship Navy .
The speeches have raised eyebrows about potential violations of the Hatch Act , the 1939 U.S. law that limits civilian appointees from engaging in political activity .
And the stops aren ’ t lost on political experts , either : Biden and Trump are neck and neck in Iowa , and recent polls show Biden with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s speech focused on the threat posed by China .
“ Democrat , Republican , independent , you have a friend in the Trump administration to help you push back against the [ Chinese Communist Party ’ s ] exploitation of our open society , ” Pompeo told Wisconsin lawmakers .
State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity questioned whether the speech benefited the work of diplomats .
Officially , the State Department brushed aside these criticisms : “ Clearly , House Democrats and the media are unfamiliar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of State ’ s mission , ” a spokesperson said .
Who CARES ?
Despite top U.S. health officials calling for more funding for the Trump administration ’ s coronavirus response , the Pentagon used most of a $ 1 billion CARES Act fund from Congress for military gadgets and gizmos rather than medical supplies , The Washington Post reports .
House Democrats immediately called for hearings and a probe after the report .
Robert Redfield , the director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , told Congress last week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 6 billion to distribute COVID-19 vaccines .
National security leaders back Biden .
‘ Tis the season for open letters .
With just over a month to go until election day , 500 national security leaders—a mix of retired generals , admirals , ambassadors , and senior civilians—endorsed Biden to be the next commander-in-chief in an open letter today .
One of the most notable names on the list : Ret .
Gen. Paul Selva , one of Trump ’ s most senior military advisors during his first two years in office .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pack , the chief executive officer of the U.S. Agency for Global Media ( USAGM ) , failed to appear for a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing today despite a subpoena to testify on his role in forcing out top officials and Voice of America journalists .
While it ’ s not immediately clear how Democrats will respond , they used Pack ’ s empty chair to bring in Grant Turner , USAGM ’ s former chief financial officer and interim CEO , for damning testimony .
Turner accused his former boss of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian , and Chinese news firewalls ; replacing officials who maintained balanced journalism standards with Trump appointees ; and denying U.S. visas to USAGM journalists whose lives might be at risk in their home countries .
“ Nothing in my seventeen years comes even close to the gross mismanagement , the abuse of authority , the violations of law that have occurred since Michael Pack assumed the role of CEO , ” Turner said .
When the troops go marching in .
The Pentagon is sending 100 more U.S. troops into Syria after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ road in the country ’ s northeast—ground zero for the five-year U.S. fight against the Islamic State .
As Vox ’ s Alex Ward reports , there ’ s one person who ’ s not all-in on a continued U.S. presence in the war-torn country : Trump .
“ We ’ re out of Syria , other than we kept the oil , ” the president said at a press conference last week .
Trump picks Qatar envoy .
Trump nominated retired Lt. Gen. Eric Wendt on Wednesday to serve as U.S. ambassador @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s push for Gulf states to normalize ties with Israel heats up ahead of the election .
In his last job in uniform , Wendt served as the U.S. security coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority .
New intelligence watchdog .
Trump has nominated Allen Robert Souza to be the next inspector general of the intelligence community .
The previous inspector general was fired by Trump after he handled the whistleblower complaint that led to the president ’ s impeachment .
Souza is currently the principal deputy senior director for intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was the former minority staff director on the House Intelligence Committee .
Senate committee approves a dozen ambassador nominees .
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a dozen ambassador nominees this week , including Trump ’ s envoy picks for Ukraine , Belarus , Venezuela , and Japan .
“ I ’ m not surprised at all to see leaders like Esper and Milley tread carefully around the public square .
If I was advising them , I ’ d tell them to stay on the sidewalks as much as possible.
” —Retired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense secretary and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff are trying to avoid politics ahead of the election , despite the president ’ s best efforts .
How Trump fell out of love with his generals .
Reuters ’ Phil Stewart , Idrees Ali , and Steve Holland have an in-depth account of how Trump had a falling out with nearly all of the former generals he tapped to help run his administration when he entered office in 2016 .
Trump and Biden face off in the first U.S. presidential debate in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sept. 29 Under Secretary Of Defense For Acquisition And Sustainment Ellen Lord is scheduled to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday , Oct. 1 .
Grand Theft Ayatollah .
Iran ’ s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is investing in a new video game in which Iranian paramilitaries rescue George Floyd from U.S. police , according to Khosro Kalbasi , a reporter for Iran ’ s independent Financial Tribune .
It ’ s not the first time Middle Eastern powers have used video games and cartoons to make foreign-policy commentary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ produced an animated video depicting Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman commanding a successful invasion of Iran .
Airing his dirty laundry .
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly developed a reputation among White House guest house staff : for traveling with suitcases full of dirty laundry for them to clean free of charge .
“ After multiple trips , it became clear this was intentional , ” one U.S. official told the Washington Post ’ s John Hudson .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump’s top national security aides draw questions with campaign-style speeches , 500 national security leaders back Biden , and the White House taps a new intelligence watchdog.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump’s top national security aides draw questions with campaign-style speeches, 500 national security leaders back Biden, and the White House taps a new intelligence watchdog.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Secretaries of Swing
In any other election year, U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden would mobilize athletes and celebrities to get out the vote in swing states, with campaign fixtures such as Kid Rock, Dennis Rodman, and Jon Voight stumping for the Republicans, and Bruce Springsteen, Beyoncé, and LeBron James taking to the stage for the Democrats.
But in 2020, Trump—who has nominally passed off control of his real estate and entertainment empire to his children—has also decided to keep the business of campaigning in the family, so to speak. The president has dispatched top national security aides to battleground states, raising concerns among lawmakers and some veteran experts worry that he is blurring the hard-drawn line between foreign policy and political campaigning.
On Wednesday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, already subject to criticism for repeated trips to his native Kansas on the taxpayers’ dime, traveled on an official State Department trip to Wisconsin, a key state that helped Trump dent the Democrats’ electoral firewall in the Midwest in 2016.
National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien is also under fire for politically tinged speeches that appear aimed at boosting Trump’s case for re-election in swing states. In Iowa, O’Brien drew criticism for a speech that promised “more to come in a second Trump term.” Next month, he will visit Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Southern Maine, near the border with swing state New Hampshire, to tout the Trump administration’s strategy for a 355-ship Navy.
The speeches have raised eyebrows about potential violations of the Hatch Act, the 1939 U.S. law that limits civilian appointees from engaging in political activity. And the stops aren’t lost on political experts, either: Biden and Trump are neck and neck in Iowa, and recent polls show Biden with a slight lead in Wisconsin.
Pompeo’s speech focused on the threat posed by China. “Democrat, Republican, independent, you have a friend in the Trump administration to help you push back against the [Chinese Communist Party’s] exploitation of our open society,” Pompeo told Wisconsin lawmakers. State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity questioned whether the speech benefited the work of diplomats.
Officially, the State Department brushed aside these criticisms: “Clearly, House Democrats and the media are unfamiliar with the domestic aspect of the Department of State’s mission,” a spokesperson said.
What We’re Watching
Who CARES? Despite top U.S. health officials calling for more funding for the Trump administration’s coronavirus response, the Pentagon used most of a $1 billion CARES Act fund from Congress for military gadgets and gizmos rather than medical supplies, The Washington Post reports. House Democrats immediately called for hearings and a probe after the report. Robert Redfield, the director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, told Congress last week that states may need up to $6 billion to distribute COVID-19 vaccines.
National security leaders back Biden. ‘Tis the season for open letters. With just over a month to go until election day, 500 national security leaders—a mix of retired generals, admirals, ambassadors, and senior civilians—endorsed Biden to be the next commander-in-chief in an open letter today. One of the most notable names on the list: Ret. Gen. Paul Selva, one of Trump’s most senior military advisors during his first two years in office.
Packing it in. Trump loyalist Michael Pack, the chief executive officer of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), failed to appear for a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing today despite a subpoena to testify on his role in forcing out top officials and Voice of America journalists. While it’s not immediately clear how Democrats will respond, they used Pack’s empty chair to bring in Grant Turner, USAGM’s former chief financial officer and interim CEO, for damning testimony.
Turner accused his former boss of freezing critical funds to circumvent Iranian, Russian, and Chinese news firewalls; replacing officials who maintained balanced journalism standards with Trump appointees; and denying U.S. visas to USAGM journalists whose lives might be at risk in their home countries.
“Nothing in my seventeen years comes even close to the gross mismanagement, the abuse of authority, the violations of law that have occurred since Michael Pack assumed the role of CEO,” Turner said.
When the troops go marching in. The Pentagon is sending 100 more U.S. troops into Syria after Russian vehicles ran U.S. forces off the road in the country’s northeast—ground zero for the five-year U.S. fight against the Islamic State. As Vox’s Alex Ward reports, there’s one person who’s not all-in on a continued U.S. presence in the war-torn country: Trump. “We’re out of Syria, other than we kept the oil,” the president said at a press conference last week.
Movers and Shakers
Trump picks Qatar envoy. Trump nominated retired Lt. Gen. Eric Wendt on Wednesday to serve as U.S. ambassador to Qatar, as the U.S. administration’s push for Gulf states to normalize ties with Israel heats up ahead of the election. In his last job in uniform, Wendt served as the U.S. security coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
New intelligence watchdog. Trump has nominated Allen Robert Souza to be the next inspector general of the intelligence community. The previous inspector general was fired by Trump after he handled the whistleblower complaint that led to the president’s impeachment. Souza is currently the principal deputy senior director for intelligence programs at the National Security Council and was the former minority staff director on the House Intelligence Committee.
Senate committee approves a dozen ambassador nominees. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a dozen ambassador nominees this week, including Trump’s envoy picks for Ukraine, Belarus, Venezuela, and Japan.
Quote of the Week
“I’m not surprised at all to see leaders like Esper and Milley tread carefully around the public square. If I was advising them, I’d tell them to stay on the sidewalks as much as possible.”
—Retired Rear Adm. John Kirby on how the defense secretary and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff are trying to avoid politics ahead of the election, despite the president’s best efforts.
Foreign Policy Recommends
How Trump fell out of love with his generals. Reuters’ Phil Stewart, Idrees Ali, and Steve Holland have an in-depth account of how Trump had a falling out with nearly all of the former generals he tapped to help run his administration when he entered office in 2016.
The Week Ahead
Saudi Arabia hosts a meeting of G-20 energy ministers on Sunday, Sept. 27.
Trump and Biden face off in the first U.S. presidential debate in Cleveland, Ohio, on Tuesday, Sept. 29
Under Secretary Of Defense For Acquisition And Sustainment Ellen Lord is scheduled to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday, Oct. 1.
Odds and Ends
Grand Theft Ayatollah. Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is investing in a new video game in which Iranian paramilitaries rescue George Floyd from U.S. police, according to Khosro Kalbasi, a reporter for Iran’s independent Financial Tribune. It’s not the first time Middle Eastern powers have used video games and cartoons to make foreign-policy commentary: In 2018, a pro-Saudi group produced an animated video depicting Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman commanding a successful invasion of Iran.
Airing his dirty laundry. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly developed a reputation among White House guest house staff: for traveling with suitcases full of dirty laundry for them to clean free of charge. “After multiple trips, it became clear this was intentional,” one U.S. official told the Washington Post’s John Hudson.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-24--Make Surveillance Capitalists Pay Their Dues

It seemed like the beginnings of a redemption story of epic proportions .
In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic , the Big Tech surveillance capitalists , such as Amazon , Apple , Facebook , and Google , which had been in the public crosshairs only weeks earlier suddenly became essential to survival .
With worldwide lockdowns , everything that could be moved online went digital , handing us the purest test yet of Big Tech ’ s usefulness for our very day-to-day survival—from work to school to telemedicine , entertainment , and sadly even goodbyes .
Despite complaints @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the many challenges of online learning , and more , the internet mostly held up .
Throughout the spring , it seemed as if Big Tech was perhaps on its way to earning back some public affection and becoming the good guys again .
But the goodwill was short-lived ; in July , four of the biggest Big Tech CEOs were hauled up and grilled remotely from Capitol Hill .
In August polling , 45 percent of American adults said they wanted presidential candidates to be more critical of the industry , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The House antitrust panel chair , Democratic Rep. David Cicilline , is finally poised to rein in the industry .
This month , the Justice Department will brief U.S. states on its plan to launch a landmark antitrust suit against Google , and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust , Competition Policy , and Consumer Rights will hold a hearing on enforcement of antitrust laws .
Some analysts advocate for action to break up the big four .
Others believe that the industry should be regulated as a public utility .
Although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practical , and neither solves the most fundamental challenge , made amply clear by the pandemic : the broken state of internet access and its disastrous implications for digital inclusion and justice .
Even those who advocate breaking up big tech firms would separate tech platforms from services that also use the platform .
That is , they would seek to prevent a dominant platform , like Google , from giving unfair advantage for its own service , like the navigation app Waze .
Many experts question the wisdom of a breakup at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consumers , rather than competitors , being harmed by Google ?
” asked Herbert Hovenkamp , an antitrust scholar at the University of Pennsylvania .
“ Will the search engine work as well without Waze , Gmail , YouTube , and so on ?
” questioned Jean Tirole , a Nobel laureate and industrial organization scholar .
Still others doubt that a breakup would succeed in the courts , given the hostility on the federal bench to antitrust action .
As for regulating Big Tech as a utility , doing so would require @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diverse body of platforms as “ common carriers ” and the creation of an entirely new regulatory agency .
It is unlikely that lawmakers will come together on such drastic steps , especially in an election year and with a polarized Congress .
Although the history of antitrust action on tech is not encouraging for those advocating breakups , it does point to some ideas for a solution .
The 1956 federal consent decree against the Bell System kept the telephone monopoly intact after a seven-year legal saga .
In exchange , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ patents royalty-free to other businesses , unlocking the transistor , the solar cell , and the laser to the world through Bell Labs .
The antitrust action against IBM lasted 13 years , and the company wasn ’ t broken up either .
Instead , IBM agreed to separate pricing for its hardware and software products , giving rise to a software start-up that eventually became Microsoft .
When it was Microsoft ’ s turn to face antitrust action , which lasted from 1998 to 2001 , again , there was no breakup @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Microsoft agreed to ensure its products were compatible with competitors ’ software .
This opened the door to a plethora of competing web browsers and numerous apps and innovations .
There are lessons here for today .
No question , the world is now facing many technology crises : limited choices of search engines , social media platforms , and e-commerce sites ; digital misinformation , concern about which is heightened this year ; and accumulation of data by Big Tech , which raises concerns about privacy , breaches , and abuse of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a spotlight on an even more fundamental crisis that begs an urgent response : the extreme unevenness of internet access at a time when such access gaps are truly devastating .
According to the Federal Communications Commission ( FCC ) , 21.3 million Americans lacked broadband internet in 2019 , a number the FCC chairman attempted to fudge .
A Microsoft analysis puts the figure at a staggering 162 million in 2019 .
What is clear is that the United States is poorly connected , and broadband access is among the most expensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gaps are unevenly spread .
Data from Tufts University ’ s Fletcher School , where I am the dean of global business , shows that states where schools with the greatest need to be run remotely because they have not met public health guidelines overlap with those that fail “ digital readiness ” tests .
The problems extend into other key areas , from telemedicine to the state of employment or government services online , where the United States performs poorly overall .
Even worse , the access gap is wider in poorer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less able to connect than white households .
Families have to drive to public libraries or even Taco Bell restaurants to find free Wi-Fi hot spots to educate children .
This ought to be unacceptable in the world ’ s largest economy .
Since history tells us that antitrust action takes a long time and doesn ’ t usually lead to a company breakup , it is worth fast-forwarding to the endgame and settling with Big Tech now .
Lawmakers have the leverage now , and the industry has the resources to spare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress does , the foundation of a settlement ought to be a requirement to help close the access gaps .
They ought to be required to do so in ways that provide affordable , inclusive , and reliable internet access to all while ensuring that none becomes an access gatekeeper .
Amazon , Apple , Facebook , and Google are not just good at e-commerce , beautiful devices , social media , and search .
Each has cutting-edge competencies in providing internet access .
They know how to solve this problem .
Facebook @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provide free access to a limited version of the internet to those without access .
The service , created in partnership with local telecommunications operators , spread to more than 60 countries , despite criticism .
Currently , it offers an entire portfolio of access initiatives under Facebook Connectivity , including high-altitude platform stations and satellite technology , “ internet exchange points ” to make access cheaper , efforts to lower the cost of deploying fiber , and open-source software platforms to allow operators to establish mobile networks in remote areas .
Google @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Its parent company , Alphabet , also has an initiative , Loon , that uses balloons , unmanned aircraft , high-altitude stations , and terrestrial networks to deliver internet access worldwide .
Google is winding down its Google Station program to provide free Wi-Fi in railway stations in several developing countries , but that could be revived .
Amazon has plans for deploying more than 3,000 low Earth orbit satellites , with the goal of offering broadband service everywhere—for a price .
Apple has a similar project in the works .
Much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and how to rein them in .
But the pandemic has revealed that the most fundamental of our digital vulnerabilities is one that Big Tech can help solve .
It is time to turn to that deal from ancient tech history , when in the 1930s Bell System was permitted to maintain a monopoly in exchange for ensuring universal service , to solve for a problem that ought not exist in 2020 .
Every household in the United States should have the opportunity to complain about Zoom fatigue and to thank the surveillance @ @ @ @ @ @ @

It seemed like the beginnings of a redemption story of epic proportions.
In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Big Tech surveillance capitalists, such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google, which had been in the public crosshairs only weeks earlier suddenly became essential to survival. With worldwide lockdowns, everything that could be moved online went digital, handing us the purest test yet of Big Tech’s usefulness for our very day-to-day survival—from work to school to telemedicine, entertainment, and sadly even goodbyes. Despite complaints of Zoom fatigue, jittery connections, the many challenges of online learning, and more, the internet mostly held up. Throughout the spring, it seemed as if Big Tech was perhaps on its way to earning back some public affection and becoming the good guys again.
But the goodwill was short-lived; in July, four of the biggest Big Tech CEOs were hauled up and grilled remotely from Capitol Hill. In August polling, 45 percent of American adults said they wanted presidential candidates to be more critical of the industry, a 5 percent jump from the previous year. The House antitrust panel chair, Democratic Rep. David Cicilline, is finally poised to rein in the industry. This month, the Justice Department will brief U.S. states on its plan to launch a landmark antitrust suit against Google, and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights will hold a hearing on enforcement of antitrust laws.
Some analysts advocate for action to break up the big four. Others believe that the industry should be regulated as a public utility. Although interesting in theory, neither action is practical, and neither solves the most fundamental challenge, made amply clear by the pandemic: the broken state of internet access and its disastrous implications for digital inclusion and justice.
Even those who advocate breaking up big tech firms would separate tech platforms from services that also use the platform. That is, they would seek to prevent a dominant platform, like Google, from giving unfair advantage for its own service, like the navigation app Waze. Many experts question the wisdom of a breakup at all. “To what extent are consumers, rather than competitors, being harmed by Google?” asked Herbert Hovenkamp, an antitrust scholar at the University of Pennsylvania. “Will the search engine work as well without Waze, Gmail, YouTube, and so on?” questioned Jean Tirole, a Nobel laureate and industrial organization scholar. Still others doubt that a breakup would succeed in the courts, given the hostility on the federal bench to antitrust action.
As for regulating Big Tech as a utility, doing so would require an act of Congress to redefine a diverse body of platforms as “common carriers” and the creation of an entirely new regulatory agency. It is unlikely that lawmakers will come together on such drastic steps, especially in an election year and with a polarized Congress.
Although the history of antitrust action on tech is not encouraging for those advocating breakups, it does point to some ideas for a solution. The 1956 federal consent decree against the Bell System kept the telephone monopoly intact after a seven-year legal saga. In exchange, the company was required to license all its patents royalty-free to other businesses, unlocking the transistor, the solar cell, and the laser to the world through Bell Labs. The antitrust action against IBM lasted 13 years, and the company wasn’t broken up either. Instead, IBM agreed to separate pricing for its hardware and software products, giving rise to a software start-up that eventually became Microsoft. When it was Microsoft’s turn to face antitrust action, which lasted from 1998 to 2001, again, there was no breakup. As part of a settlement, Microsoft agreed to ensure its products were compatible with competitors’ software. This opened the door to a plethora of competing web browsers and numerous apps and innovations.
There are lessons here for today. No question, the world is now facing many technology crises: limited choices of search engines, social media platforms, and e-commerce sites; digital misinformation, concern about which is heightened this year; and accumulation of data by Big Tech, which raises concerns about privacy, breaches, and abuse of power. But the pandemic has put a spotlight on an even more fundamental crisis that begs an urgent response: the extreme unevenness of internet access at a time when such access gaps are truly devastating. According to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 21.3 million Americans lacked broadband internet in 2019, a number the FCC chairman attempted to fudge. A Microsoft analysis puts the figure at a staggering 162 million in 2019. What is clear is that the United States is poorly connected, and broadband access is among the most expensive in the world.
Moreover, the gaps are unevenly spread. Data from Tufts University’s Fletcher School, where I am the dean of global business, shows that states where schools with the greatest need to be run remotely because they have not met public health guidelines overlap with those that fail “digital readiness” tests. The problems extend into other key areas, from telemedicine to the state of employment or government services online, where the United States performs poorly overall. Even worse, the access gap is wider in poorer neighborhoods, with Black and Hispanic households less able to connect than white households. Families have to drive to public libraries or even Taco Bell restaurants to find free Wi-Fi hot spots to educate children. This ought to be unacceptable in the world’s largest economy.
Since history tells us that antitrust action takes a long time and doesn’t usually lead to a company breakup, it is worth fast-forwarding to the endgame and settling with Big Tech now. Lawmakers have the leverage now, and the industry has the resources to spare to meet their demands. Whatever else Congress does, the foundation of a settlement ought to be a requirement to help close the access gaps. They ought to be required to do so in ways that provide affordable, inclusive, and reliable internet access to all while ensuring that none becomes an access gatekeeper.
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google are not just good at e-commerce, beautiful devices, social media, and search. Each has cutting-edge competencies in providing internet access. They know how to solve this problem.
Facebook’s Internet.org launched in 2013 to provide free access to a limited version of the internet to those without access. The service, created in partnership with local telecommunications operators, spread to more than 60 countries, despite criticism. Currently, it offers an entire portfolio of access initiatives under Facebook Connectivity, including high-altitude platform stations and satellite technology, “internet exchange points” to make access cheaper, efforts to lower the cost of deploying fiber, and open-source software platforms to allow operators to establish mobile networks in remote areas. Google has a project for fiber internet deployment. Its parent company, Alphabet, also has an initiative, Loon, that uses balloons, unmanned aircraft, high-altitude stations, and terrestrial networks to deliver internet access worldwide. Google is winding down its Google Station program to provide free Wi-Fi in railway stations in several developing countries, but that could be revived. Amazon has plans for deploying more than 3,000 low Earth orbit satellites, with the goal of offering broadband service everywhere—for a price. Apple has a similar project in the works.
Much ink has been spilled on surveillance capitalists and how to rein them in. But the pandemic has revealed that the most fundamental of our digital vulnerabilities is one that Big Tech can help solve. It is time to turn to that deal from ancient tech history, when in the 1930s Bell System was permitted to maintain a monopoly in exchange for ensuring universal service, to solve for a problem that ought not exist in 2020. Every household in the United States should have the opportunity to complain about Zoom fatigue and to thank the surveillance capitalists for making that problem universal.