foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--America’s Language of Mass Destruction Convinces Nobody

U.S. President Donald Trump was reportedly upset with North Korea ’ s latest military parade , especially the many missiles and mobile launchers .
He seems unlikely to return to the “ fire and fury ” days of 2017 , but renewed missile testing by Pyongyang is the logical next step for the large new intercontinental ballistic missile that was dramatically unveiled—as is an unpredictable response from Trump .
The threat of military action has become a constant of U.S. foreign policy toward the North .
Retired Gen. Vincent Brooks , a recent commander of U.S .
Forces Korea , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against North Korea .
Presidents should insist that “ all options are on the table , ” he contended .
He didn ’ t want war , he emphasized , but the threat should be part of the mix .
The presumption of the “ all options are on the table ” school is that such threats scare foreign leaders , deter them from taking provocative actions , and cow them into accepting American demands .
The reality , however , has always been very different .
Over the years , a stream @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea .
Presidents long have implicitly or explicitly threatened preventive war .
Both Bill Clinton and Donald Trump reportedly came close to ordering strikes .
North Korea , of course , isn ’ t the only target of such threats .
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama repeatedly insisted that war was a possibility in confronting Iran over its possible nuclear ambitions .
When visiting Israel in 2013 , Obama declared that “ All options are on the table.
” He added : “ We will do anything to make sure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapon.
” He concluded , with calculated understatement , that a diplomatic solution would be better .
Very often this language is backed by military maneuvers .
In March 2013 the Obama administration sent B-2 stealth bombers over South Korea .
U.S .
Forces Korea asserted that doing so “ demonstrates the United States ’ ability to conduct long-range , precision strikes quickly and at will.
” Four years later , Trump was involved in a highly publicized battle of insults with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and announced : “ We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
We have submarines , very powerful , far more powerful than the aircraft carrier , that I can tell you .
And we have the best military people on Earth .
And I will say this .
He is doing the wrong thing .
He is doing the wrong thing.
” Lest any foreign leader be so stupid or ignorant as to disbelieve such warnings , the arrival of U.S. warplanes or naval vessels is supposed to shock the target regime out of its overconfident stupor—a 21st-century version of gunboat diplomacy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ unaccountably didn ’ t realize that the Pentagon fielded planes and ships able to reach the Korean Peninsula , the arrival of the president ’ s armada off their coast would set them straight .
What could Kim do at that point but surrender ?
American policymakers seem to have little doubt in the efficacy of constantly threatening to bomb , invade , and occupy other nations .
It doesn ’ t sound quite as lurid as the North Korean announcement of plans to turn South Korean , Japanese , or American cities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 2013 Pyongyang even issued a video imagining such an attack on New York City .
But in practice U.S. warnings amount to the same thing .
When I first visited the North in 1992 my interlocuters talked about having to completely rebuild Pyongyang in 1953 , after it was reduced to rubble by American air attacks .
However , there ’ s no evidence that the bloviations of Washington policymakers achieved anything .
North Korea has not stopped developing nuclear weapons and missiles , including ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missile , both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The George W. Bush administration ’ s invasion of Iraq , which of course had no nuclear or chemical weapons , apparently encouraged Tehran to offer to discuss all issues with Washington , which was roughly rebuffed .
After this , Iran stepped up its nuclear ( though not explicitly nuclear weapons ) activities , despite continued U.S. threats of military action .
Trump administration sanctions backed by military warnings to Iran in language sometimes as blood-curdling as Pyongyang ’ s—a few days ago Trump declared : “ they know if they do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a thousand-fold ” —have only encouraged Iranian nuclear activity , steadily shortening the theoretical breakout time .
Iran also has harassed Persian Gulf oil traffic , struck Saudi petroleum facilities , and encouraged attacks on the U.S. Embassy and American bases in Iraq by Iranian-backed militias , as well as maintained support for Hamas , Hezbollah , the Yemeni Houthis , and Bashar al-Assad ’ s government in Syria .
The president ’ s latest warning came after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo publicly complained—whined , really—about the possibility of having to close @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if that government did not better protect it from attack .
North Korea and Iran clearly have taken their measure of Trump .
To his credit , he appears to be risk-averse in practice , despite his attempt to project an image of the baddest dude with the biggest gun .
However , there is no evidence that his predecessors ’ threats were more effective .
If the problem was simply failure , that is , that the warnings and demonstrations were ignored , the effort would be wasted but otherwise harmless .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and military sorties are actively counterproductive , likely to convince all but the most pacific or brainless North Koreans and Iranians that Washington might at any moment attempt to impose regime change , commit murder and mayhem , and play some mix of conquistador , gauleiter , colonist , and imperialist , and therefore must be resisted .
After all , that is America ’ s record .
As the Soviet Union entered terminal decline , the United States became the world ’ s most aggressive world power .
Washington attacked Panama , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan , Iraq , and Libya .
It threatened Haiti with invasion .
Intervened in Somalia against warlords and Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State .
Undertook massive and multiple drone campaigns in Afghanistan , Pakistan , Somalia , and Yemen .
And supported countries and groups against Syria ( along with its backers Iran and Russia ) and Yemen .
Only in the case of the 2003 Iraq invasion was the war presented as an effort to disarm a potential nuclear power .
The Libyan war was particularly noteworthy : After @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who relinquished his chemical weapons and missiles and ended his nascent nuclear program , the United States and Europe took him out when he was vulnerable .
The obvious lesson of this bellicose record is that disarmament is for fools .
Do American policymakers seriously believe that foreign dictators seeking nuclear weapons , building missiles , and creating proxy forces will voluntarily yield their weapons and trust in sweet nothings whispered in their ears by Western diplomats ?
Every new threat is another argument for speeding up existing programs and developing new weapons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all options on the table likely encourages target regimes to work even harder to ensure that they also can put all options on the table .
As has Kim , who today could deliver nuclear weapons on targets throughout East Asia and perhaps in the United States .
Washington ’ s endless threats pose another danger .
Constant belligerent rhetoric , backed by corresponding military deployments , likely make officials in target regimes more sensitive to the possibility of attack .
American conventional superiority gives credibility to the “ all options ” mantra @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quite aware of Washington ’ s vast military power even then after watching the first Gulf War .
U.S. capabilities have since multiplied .
It is obvious to decisionmakers in Pyongyang that if they give the American military time there won ’ t be much of a North Korean military left .
This would put pressure on Pyongyang to strike early .
And that requires discerning U.S. intentions .
In late 2017 , Trump was threatening “ fire and fury ” and moving military assets nearby .
His unpredictability was evident while his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress took a hawkish stance toward North Korea .
Sen. Lindsey Graham , an intimate of the president , dismissed concerns over a nuclear war , since it would be “ over there ” rather than “ over here , ” he explained .
What if , as tensions rose , a maladroit mix of aggressive rhetoric , incessant threats , and menacing deployments wrongly convinced Pyongyang that Washington was going to act ?
The North might decide to preempt and strike first , perhaps with a limited attack backed by the promise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stand down .
Such a step would be suicidal , but waiting for attack would also be deadly for the regime .
Most striking may be the presumption of the “ all options are on the table ” crew that Americans are unique , the only people on earth willing to stand up for themselves , determined to resist threats , and prepared to spend whatever is necessary for their defense .
A couple centuries ago , newly independent Americans , in what was then a pipsqueak power among great European empires , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not one cent for tribute ” in dealing with the Barbary states in the Mediterranean .
There is no reason to suppose that peoples with whom the United States deals today are any less brave and truculent when threatened by outsiders .
Nor is there any evidence that menacing words and gestures from Washington cause foreigners to embrace it over their own governments—especially when the latter emphasize nationalist sentiments .
While reaffirming its readiness to respond overwhelmingly against attack , Washington should stop promiscuously threatening war .
The possibility , even probably , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incentive for other countries to better arm themselves , and especially to acquire weapons of mass destruction .
It is not just the United States that can put “ all options on the table .
”

U.S. President Donald Trump was reportedly upset with North Korea’s latest military parade, especially the many missiles and mobile launchers. He seems unlikely to return to the “ fire and fury ” days of 2017, but renewed missile testing by Pyongyang is the logical next step for the large new intercontinental ballistic missile that was dramatically unveiled—as is an unpredictable response from Trump.
U.S. President Donald Trump was reportedly upset with North Korea’s latest military parade, especially the many missiles and mobile launchers. He seems unlikely to return to the “fire and fury” days of 2017, but renewed missile testing by Pyongyang is the logical next step for the large new intercontinental ballistic missile that was dramatically unveiled—as is an unpredictable response from Trump.
The threat of military action has become a constant of U.S. foreign policy toward the North. Retired Gen. Vincent Brooks, a recent commander of U.S. Forces Korea, argued for continuing to threaten military action against North Korea. Presidents should insist that “all options are on the table,” he contended. He didn’t want war, he emphasized, but the threat should be part of the mix.
The presumption of the “all options are on the table” school is that such threats scare foreign leaders, deter them from taking provocative actions, and cow them into accepting American demands. The reality, however, has always been very different.
Over the years, a stream of policymakers have proposed military strikes on North Korea. Presidents long have implicitly or explicitly threatened preventive war. Both Bill Clinton and Donald Trump reportedly came close to ordering strikes.
North Korea, of course, isn’t the only target of such threats. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama repeatedly insisted that war was a possibility in confronting Iran over its possible nuclear ambitions. When visiting Israel in 2013, Obama declared that “All options are on the table.” He added: “We will do anything to make sure Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon.” He concluded, with calculated understatement, that a diplomatic solution would be better.
Very often this language is backed by military maneuvers. In March 2013 the Obama administration sent B-2 stealth bombers over South Korea. U.S. Forces Korea asserted that doing so “demonstrates the United States’ ability to conduct long-range, precision strikes quickly and at will.”
Four years later, Trump was involved in a highly publicized battle of insults with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and announced: “We are sending an armada, very powerful. We have submarines, very powerful, far more powerful than the aircraft carrier, that I can tell you. And we have the best military people on Earth. And I will say this. He is doing the wrong thing. He is doing the wrong thing.”
Lest any foreign leader be so stupid or ignorant as to disbelieve such warnings, the arrival of U.S. warplanes or naval vessels is supposed to shock the target regime out of its overconfident stupor—a 21st-century version of gunboat diplomacy. Thus, if Kim and his associates unaccountably didn’t realize that the Pentagon fielded planes and ships able to reach the Korean Peninsula, the arrival of the president’s armada off their coast would set them straight. What could Kim do at that point but surrender?
Except he didn’t.
American policymakers seem to have little doubt in the efficacy of constantly threatening to bomb, invade, and occupy other nations. It doesn’t sound quite as lurid as the North Korean announcement of plans to turn South Korean, Japanese, or American cities into a “lake of fire.” In 2013 Pyongyang even issued a video imagining such an attack on New York City. But in practice U.S. warnings amount to the same thing. When I first visited the North in 1992 my interlocuters talked about having to completely rebuild Pyongyang in 1953, after it was reduced to rubble by American air attacks.
However, there’s no evidence that the bloviations of Washington policymakers achieved anything. North Korea has not stopped developing nuclear weapons and missiles, including ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missile, both capable of hitting the United States. The George W. Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq, which of course had no nuclear or chemical weapons, apparently encouraged Tehran to offer to discuss all issues with Washington, which was roughly rebuffed. After this, Iran stepped up its nuclear (though not explicitly nuclear weapons) activities, despite continued U.S. threats of military action.
Trump administration sanctions backed by military warnings to Iran in language sometimes as blood-curdling as Pyongyang’s—a few days ago Trump declared: “they know if they do anything against us they’ll pay a thousand-fold”—have only encouraged Iranian nuclear activity, steadily shortening the theoretical breakout time. Iran also has harassed Persian Gulf oil traffic, struck Saudi petroleum facilities, and encouraged attacks on the U.S. Embassy and American bases in Iraq by Iranian-backed militias, as well as maintained support for Hamas, Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, and Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria. The president’s latest warning came after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo publicly complained—whined, really—about the possibility of having to close America’s enormous embassy in Iraq if that government did not better protect it from attack.
North Korea and Iran clearly have taken their measure of Trump. To his credit, he appears to be risk-averse in practice, despite his attempt to project an image of the baddest dude with the biggest gun. However, there is no evidence that his predecessors’ threats were more effective.
If the problem was simply failure, that is, that the warnings and demonstrations were ignored, the effort would be wasted but otherwise harmless. But the endless succession of heated rhetoric and military sorties are actively counterproductive, likely to convince all but the most pacific or brainless North Koreans and Iranians that Washington might at any moment attempt to impose regime change, commit murder and mayhem, and play some mix of conquistador, gauleiter, colonist, and imperialist, and therefore must be resisted.
After all, that is America’s record. As the Soviet Union entered terminal decline, the United States became the world’s most aggressive world power. Washington attacked Panama, Iraq, Bosnian Serbs, Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. It threatened Haiti with invasion. Intervened in Somalia against warlords and Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State. Undertook massive and multiple drone campaigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. And supported countries and groups against Syria (along with its backers Iran and Russia) and Yemen.
Only in the case of the 2003 Iraq invasion was the war presented as an effort to disarm a potential nuclear power. The Libyan war was particularly noteworthy: After making a deal with Muammar al-Qaddafi, who relinquished his chemical weapons and missiles and ended his nascent nuclear program, the United States and Europe took him out when he was vulnerable. The obvious lesson of this bellicose record is that disarmament is for fools.
Do American policymakers seriously believe that foreign dictators seeking nuclear weapons, building missiles, and creating proxy forces will voluntarily yield their weapons and trust in sweet nothings whispered in their ears by Western diplomats? Every new threat is another argument for speeding up existing programs and developing new weapons to establish military deterrence. Washington placing all options on the table likely encourages target regimes to work even harder to ensure that they also can put all options on the table. As has Kim, who today could deliver nuclear weapons on targets throughout East Asia and perhaps in the United States.
Washington’s endless threats pose another danger. Constant belligerent rhetoric, backed by corresponding military deployments, likely make officials in target regimes more sensitive to the possibility of attack. American conventional superiority gives credibility to the “all options” mantra. My 1992 North Korean hosts were quite aware of Washington’s vast military power even then after watching the first Gulf War. U.S. capabilities have since multiplied. It is obvious to decisionmakers in Pyongyang that if they give the American military time there won’t be much of a North Korean military left. This would put pressure on Pyongyang to strike early.
And that requires discerning U.S. intentions. In late 2017, Trump was threatening “fire and fury” and moving military assets nearby. His unpredictability was evident while his reluctance to act was not yet. Congress took a hawkish stance toward North Korea. Sen. Lindsey Graham, an intimate of the president, dismissed concerns over a nuclear war, since it would be “over there” rather than “over here,” he explained. What if, as tensions rose, a maladroit mix of aggressive rhetoric, incessant threats, and menacing deployments wrongly convinced Pyongyang that Washington was going to act? The North might decide to preempt and strike first, perhaps with a limited attack backed by the promise of more if the allies did not stand down. Such a step would be suicidal, but waiting for attack would also be deadly for the regime.
Most striking may be the presumption of the “all options are on the table” crew that Americans are unique, the only people on earth willing to stand up for themselves, determined to resist threats, and prepared to spend whatever is necessary for their defense. A couple centuries ago, newly independent Americans, in what was then a pipsqueak power among great European empires, insisted “millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute” in dealing with the Barbary states in the Mediterranean. There is no reason to suppose that peoples with whom the United States deals today are any less brave and truculent when threatened by outsiders. Nor is there any evidence that menacing words and gestures from Washington cause foreigners to embrace it over their own governments—especially when the latter emphasize nationalist sentiments.
While reaffirming its readiness to respond overwhelmingly against attack, Washington should stop promiscuously threatening war. The possibility, even probably, of a U.S. attack is a powerful incentive for other countries to better arm themselves, and especially to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It is not just the United States that can put “all options on the table.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--Foreign Fighters’ Life After the Caliphate

Since the fall of the Islamic State in 2014 , countries from the United States to Indonesia have had to consider what to do with citizens who left home to join the militant group , particularly whether to repatriate them .
Those conversations have recently taken on new urgency , especially after the beheading by a Chechen Islamist ( whose affiliations and history are as yet unconfirmed ) of a schoolteacher in France—an attack that has been followed by more than 40 raids on the homes of alleged radicals .
Such gruesome incidents aside , as countries consider repatriating the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is worth considering some of the lives of those who already turned against the group and made it out of the Middle East .
Many of those who fled in 2015 , when it became clear that the caliphate was not going to survive much longer , now have regular lives with partners , kids , and pets .
“ The only reminder of my life in Syria is a scar on the leg and a cat called Assad , ” said one former member in an August interview .
( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means “ lion.
” ) And like everyone else , especially now during the pandemic , their main concern is supporting themselves and their families .
Some former Islamic State members who escaped from Syria with significant amounts of money now live a comfortable life .
Some of them profited from corruption—looting and ransom—or were paid large sums of money to recruit new members .
The Islamic State gave others wads of cash to purchase expensive military and medical equipment abroad , but those operatives then left with the money and never returned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gave them information on the group in exchange for protection and new documents .
Other former Islamic State foreign fighters , especially those who were never added to the international terrorist list , have been able to obtain middle-class office jobs , just as they had before going to Syria .
For example , one German citizen was briefly a member of the Islamic State but managed to escape it in 2014 .
He claims that he was sent on assignment for the group but never returned .
Because he is not wanted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ life in another country .
He is able to travel freely and currently runs an international trade business .
But being well-off or middle class is far from average .
A more typical male foreign fighter will have started his post-Islamic State life in debt after borrowing money from relatives to arrange fake documents and smugglers to escape .
In one case , a foreign fighter ’ s parents had sold their family house to collect $ 40,000 , in a country with an average monthly salary of $ 600 , to bribe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not spend the next decade behind bars .
They now rent an unfinished house in the far outskirts of the city , and the fighter ’ s father , formerly retired , had to return to work .
For former Islamic State fighters like these , reintegration may be harder—and the pull to stay in the group greater .
One person who led a small ( 25-person ) Islamic State unit and got wounded in Syria returned home to Central Asia in 2015 to establish a sleeper cell .
He was caught and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to get him out .
Thanks to family support , he was able to study to be a chiropractor .
His private practice is doing very well now and is even popular with local members of law enforcement who have work-related injuries .
In an interview , which was constantly interrupted by his patients calling for consultation , he said , “ When I will finish paying debt for the court bribe that I am repaying for three years now , I will open my own medical office and go to study to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State fighter , who is wanted in his home country in Eastern Europe , nonetheless returned hoping to stay under the legal radar .
He set up a bread stall close to his town ’ s main government offices and police station .
According to him , “ it was a good place for business because police bought a lot of bread for lunch and … did not care who sells it to them.
” The benefit of more informal work like his is that he is very rarely asked to show documentation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as driving taxis , construction , delivery services , and sales , where many former fighters find themselves .
Yet in the countries to where most former fighters have fled , like Turkey , Ukraine , and those in Central Asia , such jobs do not provide enough for a living .
According to one former Islamic State member with a university degree , who used to work in the research center of a major university but is now in hiding , “ I work full time , and my salary is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for my mother sending me $ 250 monthly from her pension , I would not be able to afford food for me , my wife , and a kid and rent my one room in a shared apartment.
” Those with no money and who don ’ t want to take further risks to cross borders in search of other work often have no other option but to return to crime .
And the criminal world may welcome them because , with few other choices , they are loyal workers with valuable fighting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jobs as extortion , handing out threats , and physical protection of illegal business , according to former foreign fighters in Eastern Europe .
Regardless of the kind of work a former fighter could find , returning to civilian life has been difficult for all of those interviewed .
For about a year after their return from the battlefield , they reported staying in contact with people back in Syria and carefully following all news from the region .
But now , several years on , their energies have largely turned elsewhere .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ meanwhile , varied with their reasons for going to Syria in the first place .
Many of those who said they went to Syria to live under sharia , or Islamic law , left after coming to the conclusion that the Islamic State was not truly Islamic .
They are still religiously radical .
Women in this category wear niqabs where it is safe to do so , and one former member noted that when he was offered a managerial job at a friend ’ s company , he had to turn it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which he considers being against Islam .
He chose to drive taxis instead .
Those who went to Syria for adventure or for money or because it seemed the best opportunity to use skills they had developed in the course of other wars do not care about strict religious rules anymore .
For example , a person who is a chiropractor now even welcomes female clients , which would have been absolutely unimaginable during their Islamic State years .
For the most part , the return home of those who no longer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dangerous , especially if they can reintegrate into society and try to live normal lives .
What is dangerous is their unregulated return .
In that case , they are often put in a position ( lack of documents and debt ) that pushes them to turn to crime to earn money .
Many countries , including in Eastern Europe and Central Asia , have stood opposed to repatriation of foreign fighters .
But because those countries typically have weak law enforcement and widespread corruption , those men and women are coming home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can do is to make it legal and official .

Since the fall of the Islamic State in 2014, countries from the United States to Indonesia have had to consider what to do with citizens who left home to join the militant group, particularly whether to repatriate them. Those conversations have recently taken on new urgency, especially after the beheading by a Chechen Islamist (whose affiliations and history are as yet unconfirmed) of a schoolteacher in France—an attack that has been followed by more than 40 raids on the homes of alleged radicals.
Since the fall of the Islamic State in 2014, countries from the United States to Indonesia have had to consider what to do with citizens who left home to join the militant group, particularly whether to repatriate them. Those conversations have recently taken on new urgency, especially after the beheading by a Chechen Islamist (whose affiliations and history are as yet unconfirmed) of a schoolteacher in France—an attack that has been followed by more than 40 raids on the homes of alleged radicals.
Such gruesome incidents aside, as countries consider repatriating the fighters who once joined the Islamic State, it is worth considering some of the lives of those who already turned against the group and made it out of the Middle East. Many of those who fled in 2015, when it became clear that the caliphate was not going to survive much longer, now have regular lives with partners, kids, and pets. “The only reminder of my life in Syria is a scar on the leg and a cat called Assad,” said one former member in an August interview. (The name Assad, in Arabic, means “lion.”)
And like everyone else, especially now during the pandemic, their main concern is supporting themselves and their families.
Some former Islamic State members who escaped from Syria with significant amounts of money now live a comfortable life. Some of them profited from corruption—looting and ransom—or were paid large sums of money to recruit new members. The Islamic State gave others wads of cash to purchase expensive military and medical equipment abroad, but those operatives then left with the money and never returned. Some cooperated with Western governments and gave them information on the group in exchange for protection and new documents.
Other former Islamic State foreign fighters, especially those who were never added to the international terrorist list, have been able to obtain middle-class office jobs, just as they had before going to Syria. For example, one German citizen was briefly a member of the Islamic State but managed to escape it in 2014. He claims that he was sent on assignment for the group but never returned. Because he is not wanted internationally, he now lives a normal life in another country. He is able to travel freely and currently runs an international trade business.
But being well-off or middle class is far from average. A more typical male foreign fighter will have started his post-Islamic State life in debt after borrowing money from relatives to arrange fake documents and smugglers to escape. In one case, a foreign fighter’s parents had sold their family house to collect $40,000, in a country with an average monthly salary of $600, to bribe the judge so that their son would not spend the next decade behind bars. They now rent an unfinished house in the far outskirts of the city, and the fighter’s father, formerly retired, had to return to work.
For former Islamic State fighters like these, reintegration may be harder—and the pull to stay in the group greater. One person who led a small (25-person) Islamic State unit and got wounded in Syria returned home to Central Asia in 2015 to establish a sleeper cell. He was caught and was briefly imprisoned until his family paid to get him out. Thanks to family support, he was able to study to be a chiropractor. His private practice is doing very well now and is even popular with local members of law enforcement who have work-related injuries. In an interview, which was constantly interrupted by his patients calling for consultation, he said, “When I will finish paying debt for the court bribe that I am repaying for three years now, I will open my own medical office and go to study to increase my qualification.”
Another former Islamic State fighter, who is wanted in his home country in Eastern Europe, nonetheless returned hoping to stay under the legal radar. He set up a bread stall close to his town’s main government offices and police station. According to him, “it was a good place for business because police bought a lot of bread for lunch and … did not care who sells it to them.” The benefit of more informal work like his is that he is very rarely asked to show documentation. The same goes for other work such as driving taxis, construction, delivery services, and sales, where many former fighters find themselves.
Yet in the countries to where most former fighters have fled, like Turkey, Ukraine, and those in Central Asia, such jobs do not provide enough for a living. According to one former Islamic State member with a university degree, who used to work in the research center of a major university but is now in hiding, “I work full time, and my salary is $400 per month. If not for my mother sending me $250 monthly from her pension, I would not be able to afford food for me, my wife, and a kid and rent my one room in a shared apartment.”
Those with no money and who don’t want to take further risks to cross borders in search of other work often have no other option but to return to crime. And the criminal world may welcome them because, with few other choices, they are loyal workers with valuable fighting skills. They are usually given such jobs as extortion, handing out threats, and physical protection of illegal business, according to former foreign fighters in Eastern Europe.
Regardless of the kind of work a former fighter could find, returning to civilian life has been difficult for all of those interviewed. For about a year after their return from the battlefield, they reported staying in contact with people back in Syria and carefully following all news from the region. But now, several years on, their energies have largely turned elsewhere.
The change in their religious opinions, meanwhile, varied with their reasons for going to Syria in the first place. Many of those who said they went to Syria to live under sharia, or Islamic law, left after coming to the conclusion that the Islamic State was not truly Islamic. They are still religiously radical. Women in this category wear niqabs where it is safe to do so, and one former member noted that when he was offered a managerial job at a friend’s company, he had to turn it down because it required working with banks, which he considers being against Islam. He chose to drive taxis instead.
Those who went to Syria for adventure or for money or because it seemed the best opportunity to use skills they had developed in the course of other wars do not care about strict religious rules anymore. For example, a person who is a chiropractor now even welcomes female clients, which would have been absolutely unimaginable during their Islamic State years.
For the most part, the return home of those who no longer support the Islamic State is not particularly dangerous, especially if they can reintegrate into society and try to live normal lives. What is dangerous is their unregulated return. In that case, they are often put in a position (lack of documents and debt) that pushes them to turn to crime to earn money. Many countries, including in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, have stood opposed to repatriation of foreign fighters. But because those countries typically have weak law enforcement and widespread corruption, those men and women are coming home regardless. The best thing the government can do is to make it legal and official.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--What Would a Less Europhobic Trump Look Like—if He Wins?

What Would a Less Europhobic Trump Look Like—if He Wins ?
We all know that transatlantic relations are at a low point .
U.S. President Donald Trump has started a trade war with the European Union , ordered the drawdown of U.S. troops from Germany , and abandoned the Iran nuclear agreement jointly negotiated with France , Germany , and the UK .
He plans to exit the Paris Climate Agreement on the day after the Nov. 3 election .
Little wonder , then , that only one in three Europeans holds a favorable view of the United States .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ familiar , offering important lessons for a potential reversal .
In 2005 , in the wake of the Iraq War , transatlantic relations were also in deep decline .
To reverse course , the George W. Bush administration launched a charm offensive .
Bush made his first trip to Brussels to reopen a dialogue .
European public opinion did not recover until the Obama years , but official U.S.-European ties began to mend .
Earlier this year , I asked a former high-ranking Bush administration official—who played a direct role in rejuvenating relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ties with Europe if he is reelected .
The official gave me a big smile before he burst out laughing .
To this veteran diplomat , it was a fool ’ s errand .
But if Trump does win , the challenges facing the United States are too great , the need for allies in solving these challenges too obvious , and the time until the next crisis hits too short not to find some way to cooperate with Europe .
Collaboration would obviously be easier for a Biden administration , but that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decide .
If the voters give us lemons , history will judge us harshly if we do not at least try to make lemonade .
If the voters give us lemons , history will judge us harshly if we do not at least try to make lemonade .
So , laughter aside , what would a less Euro-phobic Trump administration look like ?
The most immediate and promising area for transatlantic cooperation—potentially even under Trump—is on China .
More than 70 percent of Americans and Europeans hold an unfavorable view of China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cooperation .
The United States and most European countries are already giving closer scrutiny to Chinese investment .
As both the United States and Europe seek new investment during the pandemic-induced recession , this scrutiny should be coordinated so that Beijing does not play one side off against the other .
Many U.S. and European China experts are also calling for greater scrutiny of Chinese ties with Western universities and think tanks .
The European Union ’ s External Action Service—the bloc ’ s relatively powerless foreign office—and the U.S. State Department have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have a regular dialogue about China .
This could be given more political clout by having it chaired by the U.S. vice-president and an EU vice-president , and by including , depending on the topic to be discussed , ministers of defense , finance , and commerce from key European countries and the United States .
A key irritant in U.S.-European relations during the first Trump administration has been trade .
But here , too , there are areas of potential collaboration for a second Trump administration .
Europeans agree with Americans that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for settling trade disputes needs reform and are awaiting concrete proposals by Washington .
To curtail unfair subsidies , especially by China , the United States has already reached a preliminary agreement with the EU and Japan that should be finalized .
Both Europe and the United States want greater diversity and resiliency in their supply chains in the wake of disruptions experienced during the initial Covid-19 outbreak , particularly in medical supplies .
Why not strike a bilateral trade agreement that eliminates tariffs and trade barriers on medical goods , thereby creating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on China ?
Willie Sutton , the famous American bank robber , supposedly once said that he robbed banks because that ’ s where the money is .
On both sides of the Atlantic , cash-strapped governments will have to begin to tax the digital economy—because that ’ s where the money is .
Negotiations over acceptable taxation of digital services are already under way and scheduled to wrap up in mid-2021 .
Neither the Trump administration nor the American public has much love for the big digital-services companies whose gargantuan profits go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe on a minimal digital tax to avoid unilateral moves by various European capitals would not only avoid an otherwise likely trade war , but also provide the Trump administration with much-needed revenue .
Whoever is the next president , the challenges facing both Americans and Europeans will not change .
Another area where the United States and its European NATO allies have a common interest is arms control .
The Trump administration has reportedly reached a tentative agreement with the Russian government to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty , due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one year .
If this extension is achieved , the time should be used to hammer out a longer deal to limit the number of nuclear warheads and strengthen the inspection regime .
And Washington should enlist European governments to encourage Moscow to participate in further arms-control talks covering non-strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles that threaten Europe most directly .
Similarly , the United States and Europe have a strong joint interest in updating the Wassenaar Arrangement , a multilateral agreement that controls arms exports and restricts the sale of dual-use technologies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law governing these exports , the existing agreement needs to be brought up to date by including various newer technologies already being used in military applications such as robotics , 3D printing , quantum computing , and advanced surveillance technology .
Finally , there is growing concern on both sides of the Atlantic about climate change .
A majority of Americans believe it poses a direct threat to the United States and nine-in-ten Europeans agree that it is a serious problem .
Despite the Trump administration ’ s efforts to gut U.S. policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.S. and European cities and other subnational entities are already cooperating on climate action .
This could continue and even expand during a second Trump term , whether supported from the top or not .
Whoever is the next president , the challenges facing both Americans and Europeans will not change .
The last four years have taught us that transatlantic cooperation on these shared concerns would not be easy in a potential second Trump term .
But both sides have no choice but to try .
In the words of Benjamin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t hang together , we will certainly hang separately .
”

We all know that transatlantic relations are at a low point. U.S. President Donald Trump has started a trade war with the European Union, ordered the drawdown of U.S. troops from Germany, and abandoned the Iran nuclear agreement jointly negotiated with France, Germany, and the UK. He plans to exit the Paris Climate Agreement on the day after the Nov. 3 election. Little wonder, then, that only one in three Europeans holds a favorable view of the United States.
We all know that transatlantic relations are at a low point. U.S. President Donald Trump has started a trade war with the European Union, ordered the drawdown of U.S. troops from Germany, and abandoned the Iran nuclear agreement jointly negotiated with France, Germany, and the UK. He plans to exit the Paris Climate Agreement on the day after the Nov. 3 election. Little wonder, then, that only one in three Europeans holds a favorable view of the United States.
But this downward spiral in relations is familiar, offering important lessons for a potential reversal. In 2005, in the wake of the Iraq War, transatlantic relations were also in deep decline. To reverse course, the George W. Bush administration launched a charm offensive. Bush made his first trip to Brussels to reopen a dialogue. European public opinion did not recover until the Obama years, but official U.S.-European ties began to mend.
Earlier this year, I asked a former high-ranking Bush administration official—who played a direct role in rejuvenating relations in 2005—what Trump could do to repair ties with Europe if he is reelected. The official gave me a big smile before he burst out laughing. To this veteran diplomat, it was a fool’s errand.
But if Trump does win, the challenges facing the United States are too great, the need for allies in solving these challenges too obvious, and the time until the next crisis hits too short not to find some way to cooperate with Europe. Collaboration would obviously be easier for a Biden administration, but that will be up to American voters to decide. If the voters give us lemons, history will judge us harshly if we do not at least try to make lemonade.
If the voters give us lemons, history will judge us harshly if we do not at least try to make lemonade.
So, laughter aside, what would a less Euro-phobic Trump administration look like? The most immediate and promising area for transatlantic cooperation—potentially even under Trump—is on China. More than 70 percent of Americans and Europeans hold an unfavorable view of China, which would provide some popular support for cooperation. The United States and most European countries are already giving closer scrutiny to Chinese investment. As both the United States and Europe seek new investment during the pandemic-induced recession, this scrutiny should be coordinated so that Beijing does not play one side off against the other. Many U.S. and European China experts are also calling for greater scrutiny of Chinese ties with Western universities and think tanks. The European Union’s External Action Service—the bloc’s relatively powerless foreign office—and the U.S. State Department have already agreed, in principle, to have a regular dialogue about China. This could be given more political clout by having it chaired by the U.S. vice-president and an EU vice-president, and by including, depending on the topic to be discussed, ministers of defense, finance, and commerce from key European countries and the United States.
A key irritant in U.S.-European relations during the first Trump administration has been trade. But here, too, there are areas of potential collaboration for a second Trump administration. Europeans agree with Americans that the World Trade Organization’s mechanism for settling trade disputes needs reform and are awaiting concrete proposals by Washington. To curtail unfair subsidies, especially by China, the United States has already reached a preliminary agreement with the EU and Japan that should be finalized. Both Europe and the United States want greater diversity and resiliency in their supply chains in the wake of disruptions experienced during the initial Covid-19 outbreak, particularly in medical supplies. Why not strike a bilateral trade agreement that eliminates tariffs and trade barriers on medical goods, thereby creating transatlantic supply chains that are not dependent on China?
Willie Sutton, the famous American bank robber, supposedly once said that he robbed banks because that’s where the money is. On both sides of the Atlantic, cash-strapped governments will have to begin to tax the digital economy—because that’s where the money is. Negotiations over acceptable taxation of digital services are already under way and scheduled to wrap up in mid-2021. Neither the Trump administration nor the American public has much love for the big digital-services companies whose gargantuan profits go largely untaxed. Striking a deal with Europe on a minimal digital tax to avoid unilateral moves by various European capitals would not only avoid an otherwise likely trade war, but also provide the Trump administration with much-needed revenue.
Whoever is the next president, the challenges facing both Americans and Europeans will not change.
Another area where the United States and its European NATO allies have a common interest is arms control. The Trump administration has reportedly reached a tentative agreement with the Russian government to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, due to expire in February 2021, by one year. If this extension is achieved, the time should be used to hammer out a longer deal to limit the number of nuclear warheads and strengthen the inspection regime. And Washington should enlist European governments to encourage Moscow to participate in further arms-control talks covering non-strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles that threaten Europe most directly.
Similarly, the United States and Europe have a strong joint interest in updating the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral agreement that controls arms exports and restricts the sale of dual-use technologies. Building on recent reforms of U.S. law governing these exports, the existing agreement needs to be brought up to date by including various newer technologies already being used in military applications such as robotics, 3D printing, quantum computing, and advanced surveillance technology.
Finally, there is growing concern on both sides of the Atlantic about climate change. A majority of Americans believe it poses a direct threat to the United States and nine-in-ten Europeans agree that it is a serious problem. Despite the Trump administration’s efforts to gut U.S. policies aiming to slow global warming, hundreds of U.S. and European cities and other subnational entities are already cooperating on climate action. This could continue and even expand during a second Trump term, whether supported from the top or not.
Whoever is the next president, the challenges facing both Americans and Europeans will not change. The last four years have taught us that transatlantic cooperation on these shared concerns would not be easy in a potential second Trump term. But both sides have no choice but to try. In the words of Benjamin Franklin: “If we don’t hang together, we will certainly hang separately.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--Trump Looks to Score Last-Minute Foreign Policy Points

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
We hope everyone is having a better week than Fort Bragg ’ s social media team .
What ’ s on tap today : Team Trump pushes for foreign policy victories before Nov. 3 , NATO increases its defense spending—but not enough to make Trump happy , and the secretive military intelligence world gets a big budget boost .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Facing a tough reelection battle , the Trump administration is rushing to net @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Nov. 3 presidential elections : on troop withdrawals from Afghanistan , pressuring countries in the Arab world to recognize Israel , and trying to clinch deals on a key nuclear arms agreement with Russia .
As much as we hate to admit it , foreign policy isn ’ t the biggest election issue .
But the Trump administration still looks eager to clinch victories abroad that are important to its conservative base and potentially to swing state voters , particularly on fulfilling long-standing campaign promises like bolstering U.S. support for Israel .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ down U.S. troops in Afghanistan to 4,500 before next month , and then to between 2,500 and 2,800 by early 2021 .
The issue has pitted National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien against Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley , as Politico reports .
Milley said in an NPR interview that O ’ Brien was engaging in “ speculation ” by discussing specifics : Troop levels are set based on conditions on the ground in Afghanistan .
This week , the Trump administration appeared to pressure a third country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ties with Israel , following deals with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain .
This came after months of tense negotiations with Sudan ’ s new civilian-led government to remove the country from the United States ’ state sponsors of terrorism list after nearly three decades .
( We reported on the behind-the-scenes details of those negotiations . )
Then there ’ s the New START nuclear arms treaty with Russia , set to expire in February .
Initially Trump had big plans for expanding the treaty to include China , but China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
After months of impasse , the Trump administration now appears close to an interim deal to extend the treaty for one year while talks over a newer , better deal continue .
Trump ’ s top arms control negotiator , Marshall Billingslea , has pushed Russia for some sort of deal before Nov. 3 , as the Wall Street Journal reports .
If Trump is a one-term president , his legacy on foreign policy will likely be as controversial as the man himself .
Most foreign policy experts—even some of his sharpest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but whether they outweigh his blunders and everything else remains to be seen .
Check the bank account .
Ahead of a virtual meeting of NATO defense ministers on Thursday , the alliance released a new rundown of defense spending among its 30 members .
Trump has fixated on defense spending as one of NATO ’ s biggest shortcomings , making these numbers something to ( warily ) watch .
Ten members now meet the alliance ’ s benchmark of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense—meaning the other 20 don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has increased overall since 2014 , though that ’ s more due to Russia ’ s invasion of Ukraine than Trump ’ s Twitter rants .
But the defense spending fights already have big consequences for U.S. force posture in Europe .
Earlier this year , Trump announced plans to pull 12,000 troops from Germany , after accusing the country of being “ delinquent ” on payments to NATO .
( That ’ s not at all how national defense spending works . )
The plan was met with some anger and opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Still , it could take years to execute—by which point there could be a new president , who would reverse the order .
Big secrets .
The Pentagon ’ s secret intelligence budget hit a nine-year high in the fiscal 2020 , Defense News reports .
The Military Intelligence Program grew to $ 23.1 billion in appropriated funds in the fiscal year that ended in September , the highest mark since Congress appropriated $ 24 billion for it in 2011 .
Second chance .
Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just one year after he resigned amid mass demonstrations against the country ’ s anemic political system , ruled by the same class of families for decades .
Hariri , himself the son of the prime minister slain in 2005 , notched his victory with a far-flung coalition that included secular parties closely allied with Iran-backed Hezbollah .
The combination of the coronavirus pandemic , an economic crisis , political strife , and the massive explosion at Beirut ’ s port in August have fomented the worst crisis Lebanon has seen since its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in chief Jonathan Tepperman and former Democratic presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg on Monday , Oct. 26 , at 11 a.m .
ET for a wide-ranging discussion of how U.S. foreign policy must be adapted to meet current and coming challenges .
Register here .
Revolving door .
Recently retired Maj. Gen. Mike Fantini , who last served as the director of Air Force warfighting integration capability and acting deputy chief of staff , is joining Pallas Advisors , a Washington advisory firm headed by Sally Donnelly and Tony DeMartino , two top aides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Judicial watch .
The Senate Judiciary Committee approved Amy Coney Barrett ’ s nomination to the Supreme Court on a party line vote on Thursday , with 10 Democrats on the panel boycotting the proceedings .
Lawmakers who did not attend left images of people in their seats who they said would be hurt by the potential repeal of the Affordable Care Act .
“ Of course , should President Trump lose to former Vice President Joe Biden , he could— and almost certainly would at least —consider a return to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hewitt in the Washington Post , giving the dozens of people who aren ’ t tired of the 2020 election cycle something to look forward to in the next one How to fix the Army .
Responding to decades-old concerns about toxic leadership in the Army , Army Chief of Staff James McConville has put into place a new process for selecting battalion commanders to rejuvenate the service ’ s leadership .
Harvard Business Review takes a look under the hood , including McConville ’ s efforts to redefine how the Army identifies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ business review of human resources practices ” doesn ’ t sound like a thrilling read to you , defense wonks should take some time with this one , an interesting dive into how to reform a massive and sprawling bureaucracy .
Should Mexico join NATO ?
A new report from the Atlantic Council compiles 20 essays with some interesting and potentially controversial policy proposals for modernizing NATO , including having the alliance christen its own carrier strike group , having NATO create a strategy for the Arctic , and even an argument for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the full report .
The final U.S. presidential debate between Trump and Biden will be held tonight in Nashville .
( Read all of Foreign Policy ’ s election coverage here to catch up . )
Acting U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator John Barsa speaks about advancing religious freedom through U.S. aid at the conservative Hudson Institute on Tuesday , Oct. 27 .
C4ISRNET ’ s Cybercon conference kicks off on Wednesday , Oct. 28 , with remarks by the Pentagon ’ s Chief of Information Security for Acquisition Katie Arrington and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. We hope everyone is having a better week than Fort Bragg’s social media team .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. We hope everyone is having a better week than Fort Bragg’s social media team.
What’s on tap today: Team Trump pushes for foreign policy victories before Nov. 3, NATO increases its defense spending—but not enough to make Trump happy, and the secretive military intelligence world gets a big budget boost.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Trump’s 11th-Hour Foreign Policy Playbook
Facing a tough reelection battle, the Trump administration is rushing to net some last-minute foreign policy points ahead of the Nov. 3 presidential elections: on troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, pressuring countries in the Arab world to recognize Israel, and trying to clinch deals on a key nuclear arms agreement with Russia.
As much as we hate to admit it, foreign policy isn’t the biggest election issue. But the Trump administration still looks eager to clinch victories abroad that are important to its conservative base and potentially to swing state voters, particularly on fulfilling long-standing campaign promises like bolstering U.S. support for Israel.
Here’s what we’re tracking:
The White House seems intent on drawing down U.S. troops in Afghanistan to 4,500 before next month, and then to between 2,500 and 2,800 by early 2021. The issue has pitted National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien against Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, as Politico reports. Milley said in an NPR interview that O’Brien was engaging in “speculation” by discussing specifics: Troop levels are set based on conditions on the ground in Afghanistan.
This week, the Trump administration appeared to pressure a third country in the Arab world—Sudan—to establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel, following deals with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. This came after months of tense negotiations with Sudan’s new civilian-led government to remove the country from the United States’ state sponsors of terrorism list after nearly three decades. (We reported on the behind-the-scenes details of those negotiations.)
Then there’s the New START nuclear arms treaty with Russia, set to expire in February. Initially Trump had big plans for expanding the treaty to include China, but China flatly rejected any opening offer for talks. After months of impasse, the Trump administration now appears close to an interim deal to extend the treaty for one year while talks over a newer, better deal continue. Trump’s top arms control negotiator, Marshall Billingslea, has pushed Russia for some sort of deal before Nov. 3, as the Wall Street Journal reports.
If Trump is a one-term president, his legacy on foreign policy will likely be as controversial as the man himself. Most foreign policy experts—even some of his sharpest critics—concede that he has won important victories, but whether they outweigh his blunders and everything else remains to be seen.
What We’re Watching
Check the bank account. Ahead of a virtual meeting of NATO defense ministers on Thursday, the alliance released a new rundown of defense spending among its 30 members. Trump has fixated on defense spending as one of NATO’s biggest shortcomings, making these numbers something to (warily) watch. Ten members now meet the alliance’s benchmark of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense—meaning the other 20 don’t.
NATO members’ defense spending has increased overall since 2014, though that’s more due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine than Trump’s Twitter rants. But the defense spending fights already have big consequences for U.S. force posture in Europe. Earlier this year, Trump announced plans to pull 12,000 troops from Germany, after accusing the country of being “delinquent” on payments to NATO. (That’s not at all how national defense spending works.)
The plan was met with some anger and opposition in Congress, including from Republican members. Still, it could take years to execute—by which point there could be a new president, who would reverse the order.
Big secrets. The Pentagon’s secret intelligence budget hit a nine-year high in the fiscal 2020, Defense News reports. The Military Intelligence Program grew to $23.1 billion in appropriated funds in the fiscal year that ended in September, the highest mark since Congress appropriated $24 billion for it in 2011.
Second chance. Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri has been tasked with forming a new government, just one year after he resigned amid mass demonstrations against the country’s anemic political system, ruled by the same class of families for decades. Hariri, himself the son of the prime minister slain in 2005, notched his victory with a far-flung coalition that included secular parties closely allied with Iran-backed Hezbollah.
The combination of the coronavirus pandemic, an economic crisis, political strife, and the massive explosion at Beirut’s port in August have fomented the worst crisis Lebanon has seen since its civil war.
Join Foreign Policy editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman and former Democratic presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg on Monday, Oct. 26, at 11 a.m. ET for a wide-ranging discussion of how U.S. foreign policy must be adapted to meet current and coming challenges. Register here.
Movers and Shakers
Revolving door. Recently retired Maj. Gen. Mike Fantini, who last served as the director of Air Force warfighting integration capability and acting deputy chief of staff, is joining Pallas Advisors, a Washington advisory firm headed by Sally Donnelly and Tony DeMartino, two top aides to former Secretary of Defense James Mattis.
Judicial watch. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved Amy Coney Barrett’s nomination to the Supreme Court on a party line vote on Thursday, with 10 Democrats on the panel boycotting the proceedings. Lawmakers who did not attend left images of people in their seats who they said would be hurt by the potential repeal of the Affordable Care Act.
Quote of the Week
“Of course, should President Trump lose to former Vice President Joe Biden, he could— and almost certainly would at least —consider a return to the ring in 2024.”
—Conservative columnist Hugh Hewitt in the Washington Post, giving the dozens of people who aren’t tired of the 2020 election cycle something to look forward to in the next one
Foreign Policy Recommends
How to fix the Army. Responding to decades-old concerns about toxic leadership in the Army, Army Chief of Staff James McConville has put into place a new process for selecting battalion commanders to rejuvenate the service’s leadership. Harvard Business Review takes a look under the hood, including McConville’s efforts to redefine how the Army identifies talent.
Skeptics: Even if “business review of human resources practices” doesn’t sound like a thrilling read to you, defense wonks should take some time with this one, an interesting dive into how to reform a massive and sprawling bureaucracy.
Should Mexico join NATO? A new report from the Atlantic Council compiles 20 essays with some interesting and potentially controversial policy proposals for modernizing NATO, including having the alliance christen its own carrier strike group, having NATO create a strategy for the Arctic, and even an argument for getting Mexico to join NATO. Read the full report.
The Week Ahead
The final U.S. presidential debate between Trump and Biden will be held tonight in Nashville. (Read all of Foreign Policy’s election coverage here to catch up.)
Acting U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator John Barsa speaks about advancing religious freedom through U.S. aid at the conservative Hudson Institute on Tuesday, Oct. 27.
C4ISRNET’s Cybercon conference kicks off on Wednesday, Oct. 28, with remarks by the Pentagon’s Chief of Information Security for Acquisition Katie Arrington and Rep. Jim Langevin.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--Surprise! India Is Leaping Ahead in Clean Energy

No country will contribute more to the rise in global carbon emissions than India .
Energy consumption among its 1.4 billion people is rising fast , with 65 percent of the country ’ s electrical power currently generated from coal .
The world ’ s filthiest fossil fuel—of which India consumes more than the United States and Japan combined—will “ remain ingrained under the fingernails of the nation ” because of “ politics , economics , and the complications of generating electricity.
” So said the Economist in a 2018 briefing .
The British magazine ’ s briefing perfectly encapsulates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy ’ s problem child .
But the conventional wisdom couldn ’ t be more wrong .
Little noticed in the West , India is undergoing a green-energy revolution—exceeding targets , breaking records , and quickly making the age of cheap clean energy a reality .
Because of the dominance of India ’ s coal industry , few experts ever expected India to be on track to significantly exceed two key commitments to the Paris Agreement .
One is India ’ s pledge to increase the share of power-generation capacity that doesn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by 2030 ; today , generation capacity from renewable , hydroelectric , and nuclear sources already reaches 38 percent , putting India on track to comfortably exceed its target .
The other commitment is to reduce carbon emissions by 33 to 35 percent ( from 2005 levels ) by 2030 .
Today , India looks likely to reduce emissions by as much as 45 percent by 2030 , far surpassing its Paris target .
India has set its own ambitious renewable-energy goals—and is exceeding even them .
Its fossil-fuel power-generation capacity is presently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of which 205 GW come from coal .
When , in 2015 , Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced plans to build 175 GW of new renewable-energy capacity by 2022 , the announcement was met with skepticism .
After all , India at the time only had renewable generating capacity of 34 GW .
According to Amitabh Kant , CEO of the government policy think tank NITI Aayog , India has already installed 89 GW of renewable power capacity and will achieve Modi ’ s 175 GW target as planned .
Modi ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in sharp contrast to the United States , where clean-energy initiatives are highly politicized .
And Modi has further raised the stakes : At the September 2019 United Nations Climate Action Summit , he announced a new target of 450 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030 .
Motivating him are the deadly pollution in Indian cities , the threat of devastating impacts from climate change , and the high bill for energy imports .
Modi ’ s ambition and India ’ s successes stand in sharp contrast to the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Democratic nominee for president , former Vice President Joe Biden , has developed an ambitious $ 2 trillion plan to produce 100 percent of the country ’ s energy from cleaner sources by 2050 , but even if he wins on Nov. 3 , this is all but certain to face opposition and roadblocks .
India , on the other hand , was able to impose a tax on coal production equivalent to $ 6 per ton with nearly unanimous approval from the 36 political parties represented in the Indian parliament .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ wind at their back thanks to global advances in green technology—especially solar power , wind power , and energy storage .
These technologies are progressing exponentially and have entered a virtuous cycle—as prices for these technologies fall , demand for them rises , and as production is expanded to meet demand , prices fall some more , all of which contributes to accelerating adoption .
When Bell Labs built its first solar photovoltaic panel in 1954 , the panel cost $ 1,000 per watt of electrical power it could generate .
By 2008 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cost $ 3.65 per watt ; by 2018 , that figure had fallen to less than 40 cents .
In India that year , solar power generation crossed an important threshold , becoming cheaper than coal ( by 14 percent on a “ levelized ” basis , which adjusts for the impact of subsidies , construction costs , and financing ) .
Fast-plunging costs have allowed India to increase its solar-power generation capacity more than tenfold since 2015 .
Other renewables , too , follow this trend .
Wind power became cost-competitive with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to plummet .
Battery technology , once the crucial weak link in renewable energy , is rapidly approaching the point where it solves a critical problem that has held most clean energy back : Solar panels only generate power when the sun shines and windmills only turn when it is windy .
Until now , the dirty secret of green power has been that every gigawatt of sometimes-on , sometimes-off renewable generating capacity has required another gigawatt of fossil-fuel power generation capacity to stand by as a backup .
Batteries resolve that conundrum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needed ; a more brute-force , low-tech method of storing wind or solar power is to pump water up a hill into a reservoir , from where it can generate hydroelectric power on demand .
India made green history this year , breaking not one but two records .
In January , it conducted the world ’ s largest tender for renewable power that no longer requires fossil-fuel backup .
One company , Greenko , will provide 900 megawatts of uninterrupted , unsubsidized power using a combination of solar panels and hydroelectric storage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 300 MW of steady power using solar panels and battery storage .
In May , ReNew made another successful bid to provide 400 MW of solar power with battery storage .
At a levelized first-year cost of 2.90 rupees ( $ 0.04 ) per kilowatt-hour , it will be among the world ’ s lowest rate for uninterrupted renewable power—finally making generating and storing clean energy cheaper than burning coal .
India made green history this year , breaking not one but two records .
India is a major beneficiary of these technological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capacity as it develops , avoiding many of the costly and politically charged adjustments as developed countries replace one energy technology ( and its jobs ) with another .
It also has large stretches of sunny , sparsely populated land for acreage-hungry solar arrays .
Low labor costs make the installation and maintenance of renewable generation inexpensive ; solar is a low-skilled sector once the panels have left the factory .
As India imports the vast majority of its oil and a significant part of its coal , it is happy to replace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which also helps explain the relative lack of opposition to it .
What ’ s more , the country ’ s power supply has been unreliable , its national energy grid feeble , and electricity beyond the reach of nearly 100 million rural homes .
As solar panels and battery storage become cheaper and diffuse across the subcontinent , a major impediment to India ’ s development and prosperity will be removed .
That ’ s something Tata Power and the Rockefeller Foundation hope to accelerate : Last November , they announced a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ microgrids in Indian villages by 2026 , connecting more than 5 million households to small distribution networks of local renewable power .
With India ’ s costs already among the lowest in the world , it is at the cusp of an age of truly competitive , unsubsidized clean energy .
When the price of solar panels and batteries falls another 50 percent , as is likely during the next three years , market forces will take over , and Indian consumers will take the clean-energy mantle from the government—something that still looks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries .
As Europe loses momentum in its transition to clean energy , as a possible new U.S. administration struggles to get green policies back on track , and as China makes great strides in finally turning away from fossil fuels , India will play an increasingly important global role in transitioning the planet to a cleaner , safer , more sustainable future .

No country will contribute more to the rise in global carbon emissions than India. Energy consumption among its 1.4 billion people is rising fast, with 65 percent of the country’s electrical power currently generated from coal. The world’s filthiest fossil fuel—of which India consumes more than the United States and Japan combined—will “remain ingrained under the fingernails of the nation” because of “politics, economics, and the complications of generating electricity.” So said the Economist in a 2018 briefing .
No country will contribute more to the rise in global carbon emissions than India. Energy consumption among its 1.4 billion people is rising fast, with 65 percent of the country’s electrical power currently generated from coal. The world’s filthiest fossil fuel—of which India consumes more than the United States and Japan combined—will “remain ingrained under the fingernails of the nation” because of “politics, economics, and the complications of generating electricity.” So said the Economist in a 2018 briefing.
The British magazine’s briefing perfectly encapsulates the widespread view of India as climate policy’s problem child. But the conventional wisdom couldn’t be more wrong. Little noticed in the West, India is undergoing a green-energy revolution—exceeding targets, breaking records, and quickly making the age of cheap clean energy a reality.
Because of the dominance of India’s coal industry, few experts ever expected India to be on track to significantly exceed two key commitments to the Paris Agreement. One is India’s pledge to increase the share of power-generation capacity that doesn’t use fossil fuels to 40 percent by 2030; today, generation capacity from renewable, hydroelectric, and nuclear sources already reaches 38 percent, putting India on track to comfortably exceed its target. The other commitment is to reduce carbon emissions by 33 to 35 percent (from 2005 levels) by 2030. Today, India looks likely to reduce emissions by as much as 45 percent by 2030, far surpassing its Paris target.
India has set its own ambitious renewable-energy goals—and is exceeding even them. Its fossil-fuel power-generation capacity is presently about 230 gigawatts (GW), of which 205 GW come from coal. When, in 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced plans to build 175 GW of new renewable-energy capacity by 2022, the announcement was met with skepticism. After all, India at the time only had renewable generating capacity of 34 GW. According to Amitabh Kant, CEO of the government policy think tank NITI Aayog, India has already installed 89 GW of renewable power capacity and will achieve Modi’s 175 GW target as planned.
Modi’s ambition and India’s successes stand in sharp contrast to the United States, where clean-energy initiatives are highly politicized.
And Modi has further raised the stakes: At the September 2019 United Nations Climate Action Summit, he announced a new target of 450 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030. Motivating him are the deadly pollution in Indian cities, the threat of devastating impacts from climate change, and the high bill for energy imports.
Modi’s ambition and India’s successes stand in sharp contrast to the United States, where clean-energy initiatives are highly politicized. The Democratic nominee for president, former Vice President Joe Biden, has developed an ambitious $2 trillion plan to produce 100 percent of the country’s energy from cleaner sources by 2050, but even if he wins on Nov. 3, this is all but certain to face opposition and roadblocks. India, on the other hand, was able to impose a tax on coal production equivalent to $6 per ton with nearly unanimous approval from the 36 political parties represented in the Indian parliament.
India’s clean-energy initiatives have the wind at their back thanks to global advances in green technology—especially solar power, wind power, and energy storage. These technologies are progressing exponentially and have entered a virtuous cycle: As prices for these technologies fall, demand for them rises, and as production is expanded to meet demand, prices fall some more, all of which contributes to accelerating adoption. When Bell Labs built its first solar photovoltaic panel in 1954, the panel cost $1,000 per watt of electrical power it could generate. By 2008, the modules used in solar arrays cost $3.65 per watt; by 2018, that figure had fallen to less than 40 cents. In India that year, solar power generation crossed an important threshold, becoming cheaper than coal (by 14 percent on a “levelized” basis, which adjusts for the impact of subsidies, construction costs, and financing). Fast-plunging costs have allowed India to increase its solar-power generation capacity more than tenfold since 2015.
Other renewables, too, follow this trend. Wind power became cost-competitive with coal in 2018, and costs continue to plummet. Battery technology, once the crucial weak link in renewable energy, is rapidly approaching the point where it solves a critical problem that has held most clean energy back: Solar panels only generate power when the sun shines and windmills only turn when it is windy. Until now, the dirty secret of green power has been that every gigawatt of sometimes-on, sometimes-off renewable generating capacity has required another gigawatt of fossil-fuel power generation capacity to stand by as a backup. Batteries resolve that conundrum by storing power and releasing it when needed; a more brute-force, low-tech method of storing wind or solar power is to pump water up a hill into a reservoir, from where it can generate hydroelectric power on demand.
India made green history this year, breaking not one but two records. In January, it conducted the world’s largest tender for renewable power that no longer requires fossil-fuel backup. One company, Greenko, will provide 900 megawatts of uninterrupted, unsubsidized power using a combination of solar panels and hydroelectric storage. Another, ReNew, will supply 300 MW of steady power using solar panels and battery storage. In May, ReNew made another successful bid to provide 400 MW of solar power with battery storage. At a levelized first-year cost of 2.90 rupees ($0.04) per kilowatt-hour, it will be among the world’s lowest rate for uninterrupted renewable power—finally making generating and storing clean energy cheaper than burning coal.
India made green history this year, breaking not one but two records.
India is a major beneficiary of these technological advances because it is rapidly adding generating capacity as it develops, avoiding many of the costly and politically charged adjustments as developed countries replace one energy technology (and its jobs) with another. It also has large stretches of sunny, sparsely populated land for acreage-hungry solar arrays. Low labor costs make the installation and maintenance of renewable generation inexpensive; solar is a low-skilled sector once the panels have left the factory. As India imports the vast majority of its oil and a significant part of its coal, it is happy to replace costly imports with home-generated clean energy, which also helps explain the relative lack of opposition to it.
What’s more, the country’s power supply has been unreliable, its national energy grid feeble, and electricity beyond the reach of nearly 100 million rural homes. As solar panels and battery storage become cheaper and diffuse across the subcontinent, a major impediment to India’s development and prosperity will be removed. That’s something Tata Power and the Rockefeller Foundation hope to accelerate: Last November, they announced a collaborative effort to set up 10,000 so-called microgrids in Indian villages by 2026, connecting more than 5 million households to small distribution networks of local renewable power.
With India’s costs already among the lowest in the world, it is at the cusp of an age of truly competitive, unsubsidized clean energy. When the price of solar panels and batteries falls another 50 percent, as is likely during the next three years, market forces will take over, and Indian consumers will take the clean-energy mantle from the government—something that still looks quite a ways off in most developed countries. As Europe loses momentum in its transition to clean energy, as a possible new U.S. administration struggles to get green policies back on track, and as China makes great strides in finally turning away from fossil fuels, India will play an increasingly important global role in transitioning the planet to a cleaner, safer, more sustainable future.