foreignpolicy--2020-10-31--On Election Eve, Economists Struggle to Figure Out a World That’s Unraveled

Once confident in their wisdom as a profession , many economists today admit they are trying desperately to understand the workings of a globalized system they now realize they never really grasped very well .
The so-called experts have been continually surprised by the ways in which a tightly knit , fast-paced world economy can produce panics , financial collapses , socially disrupting inequality , a still-mysterious low-interest-rate environment , and , now , a sudden pandemic that has caused continentwide shutdowns .
Most of the old models are broken .
But there ’ s little there to replace them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election only days away , that dearth of economic certainty is proving problematic , as politically expedient , populist policies are taking hold in both parties .
Economists still wonder how they misread things so badly that Donald Trump could be elected by promising to close borders and start trade wars in a bid to help a devastated middle class .
And they wonder how the once neoliberal , free-trading Biden could turn into a quasi-protectionist himself , proposing a $ 400 billion “ Buy American ” plan and pledging to renegotiate the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ address American workers ’ rights .
For many Americans , the economists have proved to be “ false prophets , ” as Binyamin Appelbaum called them in his harshly critical 2019 book , The Economists ’ Hour .
For many Americans , the economists have proved to be “ false prophets , ” as Binyamin Appelbaum called them in his harshly critical 2019 book If politicians everywhere—in Washington , in Tokyo , and all across Europe—are struggling to find the right recipes , they ’ re not alone .
“ Policy can not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behind the needs of policy , ” said Andrei Shleifer of Harvard University , one of the most cited economists in the world .
“ It is moving , but not fast enough .
I would say that it is clearly true that the standard New Keynesian model [ which has prevailed for decades as a predictor of economic conditions ] at this point is unhelpful , and needs to be replaced .
People are working on how to replace it.
” But that could take many years , he added .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sluggishness from the old ideas is significant.
” For decades , economists were able to come up with overarching theories that seemed to explain more or less how the economy worked , serving as at least a blueprint for policymakers .
John Maynard Keynes developed the field in the middle of the Great Depression , creating a theoretical model that explained why government spending could help boost employment and right a downturn .
Decades later , he was sidelined in favor of conservative economists led by Milton Friedman , who preached minimal monetary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ taxes and deregulation .
By the turn of the century , economists were calling a fairly stable , crisis-free economy the “ Great Moderation , ” when prudent management of interest rates could tame inflation , boost employment , and ensure steady growth .
Then it all blew up in their faces—and the aftershocks keep coming .
“ There is probably a bigger gap than there ever was between where mainstream economic theory is and where the policy is , ” said the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the crash of ] 2008 , the economy was always in equilibrium .
Except when it wasn ’ t .
That was true for over 100 years , but two events 12 years apart have upset that thinking .
… It showed economics was not a science.
” And yet , like physicists in search of a unified theory , economists are still looking for new ways to reinvent their science .
“ There isn ’ t a new unified framework yet , ” said Adam Posen , the president of the Peterson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think theory has yet to catch up to policy analysis.
” That disconnect is seen most clearly on Capitol Hill , where lawmakers have been unable to find a replacement for the $ 2 trillion CARES Act , the big stimulus package launched in the middle of the pandemic-related economic collapse .
As a first response to COVID-19 , it was a classic Keynesian move , and it seemed to work in avoiding an even worse recession : GDP grew 7.4 percent on a non-annualized basis in the third quarter , the Commerce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States has managed to claw back much of the economic damage done this year .
As a first response to COVID-19 , the CARES Act stimulus package was a classic Keynesian move , and it seemed to work in avoiding an even worse recession .
But Republicans are loath to open the taps again—even pointing to decent third-quarter growth as a reason not to—while Democrats push for more deficit spending , creating an impasse in Congress .
Meanwhile , businesses and homeowners are being forced to default on their mortgages , and unemployment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the problem is outdated economic ideas .
Budget deficits clearly matter less than they ever did , because near-zero interest rates make debt more sustainable , and private sector investment is clearly not being crowded out .
But Republicans , after overseeing a historic mushrooming of the national debt under Trump , have suddenly decided that deficits are a problem .
The ongoing political battle over a further coronavirus response is “ incredibly concerning , ” said Wendy Edelberg , a former chief economist at the Congressional Budget Office .
“ Humans seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take on new information .
And that is frustrating.
” It ’ s absurd , she said , that in the current environment political concerns about the U.S. debt and deficit should stand in the way of more deficit spending to right the economy .
“ What we ’ re seeing in the financial market demand for U.S. Treasurys says we have a different environment , and it would be foolish not to use that information , ” said Edelberg , today the director of the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ monetary policy operates when we ’ re at the zero lower bound , and we should take that on board .
It ’ s frustrating to be stuck in 2005 .
The world has changed.
” Volunteers hand out excess potatoes donated by Washington farmers as a result of the food-service industry slowdown during the coronavirus pandemic in Auburn , Washington , on May 7 .
JASON REDMOND/AFP via Getty Images If economists admit that pretty much everyone is winging it , it has been a tough decade .
Economists had barely begun @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Great Recession that began in 2008-2009 , and the anomalous low-interest rate , low-growth period that followed , when they were blindsided by COVID-19 ’ s attack on the sinews of the entire global economy .
All that came amid another still unfolding , and still little-understood crisis : the speed at which developing nations like China displaced U.S. jobs this century .
The co-called China shock helped fuel the rise of Trumpian populism , xenophobia , protectionism , and it ’ s one that most trade economists admit they didn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ complicated than we realized it was , ” said Karen Dynan , a former Federal Reserve and Treasury official now at Harvard University .
“ Economists have long recognized that not everyone gets the benefits but there is a net benefit .
Then the idea is you can take the benefits and compensate the losers .
But in truth we gave only lip service to the losers of globalization .
… I think it should make us really humble about our models.
” Or as Edelberg put it , “ economists always appreciated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ really serious distributional consequences , ” meaning the economy as a whole might win , but there will definitely be some losers .
“ Economists for far too long just swept those concerns away , figuring that surely the politicians will figure it out .
We said , ‘ We ’ re just going to focus on the aggregate.
’ I think that was a mistake.
” That clinical approach shone through when it came to the China shock and the large-scale destruction of manufacturing jobs in the last 20 years .
Politicians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next to nothing ; Washington spent very little on job retraining and education , while entire communities were devastated , turning some states from blue to red .
By the same token , economists and policymakers—eyes fixed on the aggregate—ignored the widening income gap .
In a world in which an ever-smaller proportion of people hold most of the wealth , consumption will be suppressed on a long-term basis simply because the rich are less likely to spend , while the growing numbers of poor don ’ t have the means .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for understanding growth—or the lack of it .
In a world in which an ever-smaller proportion of people hold most of the wealth , consumption will be suppressed on a long-term basis simply because the rich are less likely to spend , while the growing numbers of poor don ’ t have the means , even with easy credit , said Christopher Carroll , a leading economist at Johns Hopkins University .
Inequality , in other words , is leading to slower global economic growth on a chronic basis .
The new economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to model it—explains in large part the ad hoc and often unorthodox economics of Trump ’ s Republican Party , and the increasing support for once-radical ideas on the left .
Trump , despite or because of an ignorance of economics that Appelbaum notes is “ without parallel among modern American presidents , ” has single-handedly overturned free-market orthodoxy in the Republican Party .
He has made tariffs ( taxes on U.S. businesses and consumers ) his go-to trade weapon .
He has thrown tens of billions of dollars in government subsidies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made state-managed trade , once the purview of Maoists , the centerpiece of his trade deal with China .
Meanwhile , Democrats are pressing Biden to advance policy ideas like universal college education , universal health care , universal basic income , and a much more progressive tax code .
Above all , there is the danger of globalization unraveling and protectionism continuing to creep back , no matter who is elected president .
“ I think we could go very much the wrong way , ” said David Autor , an economist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Though it was Autor who largely documented the effect of the “ China shock ” on U.S. workers , he said : “ For the United States to disengage from the rest of the world is just a disaster .
It creates an enormous opportunity for China , which is building counterpart institutions around the world and forcing some corporations to decide whether they want to hire English-speaking or Chinese-speaking personnel.
” As Fareed Zakaria points out in his new book , Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World , the entire axis of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ come to realize , slowly , that “ markets are not enough.
” He noted that 43 percent of Americans surveyed in 2019 agreed that “ some form of socialism would be good for the country , ” a nearly 20-point gain from the 1940s , when the United States was actually allied with the Soviet Union .
“ There seemed to be a quiet revolution afoot .
The country that defined itself by its unapologetic advocacy of capitalism now appeared to be increasingly embracing an ideology that it had fought against for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appears to have only accelerated this trend , ” Zakaria wrote .
Economists are still working through the masses of new data to create new models : Automatic stabilizers for downturns , greater capital reserves to make the financial sector more resilient , and advocacy of universal health care are all becoming mainstream .
Microeconomists like Carroll are working to reconcile the individual decisions of over 7 billion people with big macroeconomic models that are updated at a glacial pace .
There ’ s a new appreciation that old shibboleths , like the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broken , thanks to a globalization of the labor force and a mismatch in the power of labor and capital .
Being economists—about as contentious an academic field as there is—some disagree strenuously that the field has failed overall .
“ I think the profession is doing really well in how it ’ s responded to both crises , ” referring to 2008 and COVID-19 , said Mark Gertler of New York University .
“ There was an almost instantaneous stream of research to address the financial crisis and now the COVID crisis.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ macroeconomic models are sturdier than they were during the last great economic crisis—the stagflation of the 1960s and ’ 70s .
“ It ’ s all a matter of degree .
The first [ stagflation ] crisis created a fundamental change in the way we did macroeconomics , ” he said .
“ The old econometric models fell apart , because they could not explain the simultaneous increase in unemployment and inflation .
It blew apart the field.
” The solution ultimately came in shoring up microeconomics , which studies the decisions of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to modeling beliefs and expectations , price settings , and credit constraints .
Still , it ’ s all a far cry from the days of the Great Moderation before the 2008 crisis .
“ Mainstream economists thought we had just nailed it in understanding the business cycle , ” Dynan said .
“ The last two recessions have highlighted the fact that we are still exposed—and even more exposed—to mistakes than we used to be .
”

From the 2008 financial crisis to the COVID-19 shutdown, the world’s best economists have struggled—usually unsuccessfully—to regain the influence over policymakers they once wielded with such abandon. The problem is, most of them don’t have new theories ready that can actually make sense of a globalized world in disarray—and won’t for quite a while.
From the 2008 financial crisis to the COVID-19 shutdown, the world’s best economists have struggled—usually unsuccessfully—to regain the influence over policymakers they once wielded with such abandon. The problem is, most of them don’t have new theories ready that can actually make sense of a globalized world in disarray—and won’t for quite a while.
Once confident in their wisdom as a profession, many economists today admit they are trying desperately to understand the workings of a globalized system they now realize they never really grasped very well. The so-called experts have been continually surprised by the ways in which a tightly knit, fast-paced world economy can produce panics, financial collapses, socially disrupting inequality, a still-mysterious low-interest-rate environment, and, now, a sudden pandemic that has caused continentwide shutdowns. Most of the old models are broken. But there’s little there to replace them.
With the crucial 2020 U.S. presidential election only a day away, that dearth of economic certainty is proving problematic, as politically expedient, populist policies are taking hold in both parties. Economists still wonder how they misread things so badly that Donald Trump could be elected by promising to close borders and start trade wars in a bid to help a devastated middle class. And they wonder how the once neoliberal, free-trading Biden could turn into a quasi-protectionist himself, proposing a $400 billion “Buy American” plan and pledging to renegotiate the Obama administration’s Trans-Pacific Partnership to address American workers’ rights.
For many Americans, the economists have proved to be “false prophets,” as Binyamin Appelbaum called them in his harshly critical 2019 book, The Economists’ Hour.
For many Americans, the economists have proved to be “false prophets,” as Binyamin Appelbaum called them in his harshly critical 2019 book
If politicians everywhere—in Washington, in Tokyo, and all across Europe—are struggling to find the right recipes, they’re not alone.
“Policy cannot wait, and academic knowledge is way behind the needs of policy,” said Andrei Shleifer of Harvard University, one of the most cited economists in the world. “It is moving, but not fast enough. I would say that it is clearly true that the standard New Keynesian model [which has prevailed for decades as a predictor of economic conditions] at this point is unhelpful, and needs to be replaced. People are working on how to replace it.”
But that could take many years, he added. “Progress is pretty slow, and the sluggishness from the old ideas is significant.”
For decades, economists were able to come up with overarching theories that seemed to explain more or less how the economy worked, serving as at least a blueprint for policymakers. John Maynard Keynes developed the field in the middle of the Great Depression, creating a theoretical model that explained why government spending could help boost employment and right a downturn. Decades later, he was sidelined in favor of conservative economists led by Milton Friedman, who preached minimal monetary intervention and small government, especially low taxes and deregulation. By the turn of the century, economists were calling a fairly stable, crisis-free economy the “Great Moderation,” when prudent management of interest rates could tame inflation, boost employment, and ensure steady growth. Then it all blew up in their faces—and the aftershocks keep coming.
“There is probably a bigger gap than there ever was between where mainstream economic theory is and where the policy is,” said the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University. “The prevailing wisdom was, before [the crash of] 2008, the economy was always in equilibrium. Except when it wasn’t. That was true for over 100 years, but two events 12 years apart have upset that thinking. … It showed economics was not a science.”
And yet, like physicists in search of a unified theory, economists are still looking for new ways to reinvent their science. “There isn’t a new unified framework yet,” said Adam Posen, the president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “I think theory has yet to catch up to policy analysis.”
That disconnect is seen most clearly on Capitol Hill, where lawmakers have been unable to find a replacement for the $2 trillion CARES Act, the big stimulus package launched in the middle of the pandemic-related economic collapse. As a first response to COVID-19, it was a classic Keynesian move, and it seemed to work in avoiding an even worse recession: GDP grew 7.4 percent on a non-annualized basis in the third quarter, the Commerce Department said Thursday, meaning the United States has managed to claw back much of the economic damage done this year.
As a first response to COVID-19, the CARES Act stimulus package was a classic Keynesian move, and it seemed to work in avoiding an even worse recession.
But Republicans are loath to open the taps again—even pointing to decent third-quarter growth as a reason not to—while Democrats push for more deficit spending, creating an impasse in Congress. Meanwhile, businesses and homeowners are being forced to default on their mortgages, and unemployment claims remain stubbornly high. Part of the problem is outdated economic ideas. Budget deficits clearly matter less than they ever did, because near-zero interest rates make debt more sustainable, and private sector investment is clearly not being crowded out. But Republicans, after overseeing a historic mushrooming of the national debt under Trump, have suddenly decided that deficits are a problem.
The ongoing political battle over a further coronavirus response is “incredibly concerning,” said Wendy Edelberg, a former chief economist at the Congressional Budget Office. “Humans seem to be very slow to adapt to take on new information. And that is frustrating.”
It’s absurd, she said, that in the current environment political concerns about the U.S. debt and deficit should stand in the way of more deficit spending to right the economy. “What we’re seeing in the financial market demand for U.S. Treasurys says we have a different environment, and it would be foolish not to use that information,” said Edelberg, today the director of the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. “We understand a lot better how monetary policy operates when we’re at the zero lower bound, and we should take that on board. It’s frustrating to be stuck in 2005. The world has changed.”
Volunteers hand out excess potatoes donated by Washington farmers as a result of the food-service industry slowdown during the coronavirus pandemic in Auburn, Washington, on May 7.
If economists admit that pretty much everyone is winging it, it has been a tough decade. Economists had barely begun to figure out the lessons of the Great Recession that began in 2008-2009, and the anomalous low-interest rate, low-growth period that followed, when they were blindsided by COVID-19’s attack on the sinews of the entire global economy. All that came amid another still unfolding, and still little-understood crisis: the speed at which developing nations like China displaced U.S. jobs this century. The so-called China shock helped fuel the rise of Trumpian populism, xenophobia, protectionism, and it’s one that most trade economists admit they didn’t see coming.
“Globalization is more complicated than we realized it was,” said Karen Dynan, a former Federal Reserve and Treasury official now at Harvard University. “Economists have long recognized that not everyone gets the benefits but there is a net benefit. Then the idea is you can take the benefits and compensate the losers. But in truth we gave only lip service to the losers of globalization. … I think it should make us really humble about our models.”
Or as Edelberg put it, “economists always appreciated that trade increases aggregate output but has really serious distributional consequences,” meaning the economy as a whole might win, but there will definitely be some losers. “Economists for far too long just swept those concerns away, figuring that surely the politicians will figure it out. We said, ‘We’re just going to focus on the aggregate.’ I think that was a mistake.”
That clinical approach shone through when it came to the China shock and the large-scale destruction of manufacturing jobs in the last 20 years. Politicians, consumed with deficit reduction, did next to nothing; Washington spent very little on job retraining and education, while entire communities were devastated, turning some states from blue to red. By the same token, economists and policymakers—eyes fixed on the aggregate—ignored the widening income gap.
In a world in which an ever-smaller proportion of people hold most of the wealth, consumption will be suppressed on a long-term basis simply because the rich are less likely to spend, while the growing numbers of poor don’t have the means.
But that, too, has big implications for understanding growth—or the lack of it. In a world in which an ever-smaller proportion of people hold most of the wealth, consumption will be suppressed on a long-term basis simply because the rich are less likely to spend, while the growing numbers of poor don’t have the means, even with easy credit, said Christopher Carroll, a leading economist at Johns Hopkins University. Inequality, in other words, is leading to slower global economic growth on a chronic basis.
The new economic reality—which has surged ahead of economists’ ability to model it—explains in large part the ad hoc and often unorthodox economics of Trump’s Republican Party, and the increasing support for once-radical ideas on the left.
Trump, despite or because of an ignorance of economics that Appelbaum notes is “without parallel among modern American presidents,” has single-handedly overturned free-market orthodoxy in the Republican Party. He has made tariffs (taxes on U.S. businesses and consumers) his go-to trade weapon. He has thrown tens of billions of dollars in government subsidies at politically favored sectors. He has made state-managed trade, once the purview of Maoists, the centerpiece of his trade deal with China.
Meanwhile, Democrats are pressing Biden to advance policy ideas like universal college education, universal health care, universal basic income, and a much more progressive tax code. Above all, there is the danger of globalization unraveling and protectionism continuing to creep back, no matter who is elected president.
“I think we could go very much the wrong way,” said David Autor, an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Though it was Autor who largely documented the effect of the “China shock” on U.S. workers, he said: “For the United States to disengage from the rest of the world is just a disaster. It creates an enormous opportunity for China, which is building counterpart institutions around the world and forcing some corporations to decide whether they want to hire English-speaking or Chinese-speaking personnel.”
A child walks by graffiti on H St. NW near the White House in Washington on June 1, after protests sparked by the killing of George Floyd.
As Fareed Zakaria points out in his new book, Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World, the entire axis of economic thinking is moving leftward as policymakers come to realize, slowly, that “markets are not enough.” He noted that 43 percent of Americans surveyed in 2019 agreed that “some form of socialism would be good for the country,” a nearly 20-point gain from the 1940s, when the United States was actually allied with the Soviet Union.
“There seemed to be a quiet revolution afoot. The country that defined itself by its unapologetic advocacy of capitalism now appeared to be increasingly embracing an ideology that it had fought against for most of the twentieth century. COVID-19 appears to have only accelerated this trend,” Zakaria wrote.
Economists are still working through the masses of new data to create new models: Automatic stabilizers for downturns, greater capital reserves to make the financial sector more resilient, and advocacy of universal health care are all becoming mainstream. Microeconomists like Carroll are working to reconcile the individual decisions of over 7 billion people with big macroeconomic models that are updated at a glacial pace. There’s a new appreciation that old shibboleths, like the relationship between employment and wages, are broken, thanks to a globalization of the labor force and a mismatch in the power of labor and capital.
Being economists—about as contentious an academic field as there is—some disagree strenuously that the field has failed overall. “I think the profession is doing really well in how it’s responded to both crises,” referring to 2008 and COVID-19, said Mark Gertler of New York University. “There was an almost instantaneous stream of research to address the financial crisis and now the COVID crisis.”
Gertler says he believes the current macroeconomic models are sturdier than they were during the last great economic crisis—the stagflation of the 1960s and ’70s. “It’s all a matter of degree. The first [stagflation] crisis created a fundamental change in the way we did macroeconomics,” he said. “The old econometric models fell apart, because they could not explain the simultaneous increase in unemployment and inflation. It blew apart the field.” The solution ultimately came in shoring up microeconomics, which studies the decisions of individuals and companies, bringing more rigor to modeling beliefs and expectations, price settings, and credit constraints.
Still, it’s all a far cry from the days of the Great Moderation before the 2008 crisis. “Mainstream economists thought we had just nailed it in understanding the business cycle,” Dynan said.
“The last two recessions have highlighted the fact that we are still exposed—and even more exposed—to mistakes than we used to be.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-31--What Is India’s Foreign Policy Vision?

What Is India’s Foreign Policy Vision?

Consequently , Subrahmanyam Jaishankar ’ s new book , The India Way , marks an important departure from the past .
Jaishankar , currently India ’ s minister of external affairs , has enjoyed a distinguished diplomatic career : A former ambassador to the United States and to China , he was appointed foreign secretary in 2015 , the highest civil service post in the Indian foreign service .
After a brief stint in the corporate world following his retirement in 2018 , Prime Minister Narendra Modi inducted him into his cabinet in May 2019 .
Why write a book @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how India should forge a foreign policy in a world where China ’ s rise and assertiveness are changing the contours of global politics .
It also sketches out a pathway for India to deal with significant and novel forces in international politics—especially resurgent nationalism and a rejection of globalization .
But while Jaishankar touches on these subjects , his book suffers from too many abstractions and generalities .
After all , writing a book about a country ’ s foreign policy while serving as its foreign minister is laden with pitfalls .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the critical question of candor .
How does Jaishankar ’ s book fare on this score ?
The writer deserves credit for bluntly stating that three events and choices have hobbled India ’ s emergence on the global stage : the partition of British India at the time of independence in 1947 , the delay in undertaking economic reforms until 1991 , and deferring the decision to cross the nuclear Rubicon until 1998 .
Writing a book about a country ’ s foreign policy while serving as its foreign minister is laden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can not be wholly blamed on India ’ s nationalist leadership .
British colonial policies , in considerable measure , contributed to a tragic outcome that cost the lives of at least 1 million people during the 1947 partition and resulted in the transfer of more than 10 million across borders in a matter of months .
There is little question , however , that both the deferral of economic reforms and India ’ s nuclear ambivalence until 1998 constrained its rise .
But while Jaishankar forthrightly addresses these issues , he also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ animate the beliefs of India ’ s foreign-policy establishment , namely that it has neglected the country ’ s vital national security interests , paid inadequate attention to economic prowess , and pursued a risk-averse course in the world arena .
The Modi administration has not evinced any enthusiasm for India ’ s erstwhile attachment to the doctrine of nonalignment .
Nevertheless , Jaishankar suggests that the policy served India ’ s interests well during much of the Cold War years .
Apart from its tilt toward the Soviet Union from the early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end , nonalignment had long outlived whatever might have been its utility .
It is unfortunate that someone as astute a practitioner of Indian foreign policy as Jaishankar is can not forthrightly bid goodbye to the anachronistic doctrine of nonalignment .
At best , the only novel guidance he offers up is that India should clearly define its national interests and pursue them with vigor .
Jaishankar does , however , display flashes of candor on other issues , which makes his book somewhat useful to readers in the foreign-policy community .
Most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ambivalence toward the use of force in international politics .
This hesitancy , Jaishankar correctly argues , has left the country vulnerable to external threats .
One of the principal examples he cites was India ’ s failure to adequately appreciate the security threat that it confronted from China prior to the disastrous 1962 Sino-Indian border war .
That said , his prescriptions for India to ensure that it can cope with China ’ s present assertiveness are surprisingly anodyne .
To wit , he suggests that India needs to boost its domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development , where it significantly lags behind China .
That , of course , could take decades at the earliest .
Jaishankar discusses the transformation of the global order through the emergence of a number of social forces .
The first is the growth of resurgent nationalism : He sees this as the return of an enduring phenomenon and argues that efforts to transcend it are unlikely .
More to the point , Jaishankar believes that nationalism is challenging the status quo in the global order , as seen through India and China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and in their increased negotiating muscle at global forums like that for the Paris climate change accord .
This , he argues , has led to a backlash in economically privileged countries , which has contributed to the rise of protectionism and xenophobia .
Finally , he contends that there is an emerging contest between globalist and nationalist forces , a competition that will make the world more turbulent .
To that end , he highlights the growth of reactionary , xenophobic nationalism in various @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from war-torn societies in the Middle East .
Oddly enough , he does not mention the rise of vicious anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States , which President Donald Trump has done much to fan.India ’ s traditions of pluralism and its democratic institutions are today under severe duress .
Closer to India ’ s own neighborhood and on matters dealing with New Delhi ’ s immediate security concerns , Jaishankar displays a curious amalgam of naivete and sophistication .
This ingenuousness is evident in his discussion of the significance of Modi ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a thaw in Sino-Indian relations .
Admittedly written before the current border standoff with China , it nevertheless reveals a remarkable and ill-placed faith in dealing with a state that has clear revisionist ambitions .
On the other hand , his discussion of relations with the United States despite New Delhi ’ s checkered past history with Washington is free of cant and recriminations .
Instead , it provides a nuanced account of the significance of the United States in India ’ s present strategic calculus .
In this regard , it should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not carry the burden of India ’ s previous hostility toward the United States .
Indeed , it has sought to deal with Washington with a remarkable degree of pragmatism .
What , in the end , is the India Way ?
Reading Jaishankar ’ s take could confuse a reader familiar with how India is depicted in newspapers around the world today .
Jaishankar repeatedly extolls India ’ s commitment to pluralism and democracy and how its values have helped secure New Delhi ’ s standing in the world .
There is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of India ’ s democracy against immense odds is a story worth highlighting .
Yet whether Jaishankar wishes to acknowledge it or not , India ’ s traditions of pluralism and its democratic institutions are today under severe duress .
His government has displayed outright hostility toward any significant dissent , cowed a previously feisty Indian press , and rendered India ’ s judiciary into a mostly pliant institution .
Unless those trends are contained , India ’ s democratic experiment will be at grave risk : It will be at odds with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s founders .

Since India’s independence in 1947, several of its diplomats have produced diplomatic memoirs, sometimes of great quality. Those familiar with this genre will recall the account of K.P.S. Menon, one of India’s ambassadors to Moscow, or K.M. Panikkar or Sisir Gupta, both noted scholar-diplomats. But few Indian foreign-policy officials have written a book on New Delhi’s relations with the world while still in office.
Since India’s independence in 1947, several of its diplomats have produced diplomatic memoirs, sometimes of great quality. Those familiar with this genre will recall the account of K.P.S. Menon, one of India’s ambassadors to Moscow, or K.M. Panikkar or Sisir Gupta, both noted scholar-diplomats. But few Indian foreign-policy officials have written a book on New Delhi’s relations with the world while still in office.
Consequently, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s new book, The India Way, marks an important departure from the past. Jaishankar, currently India’s minister of external affairs, has enjoyed a distinguished diplomatic career: A former ambassador to the United States and to China, he was appointed foreign secretary in 2015, the highest civil service post in the Indian foreign service. After a brief stint in the corporate world following his retirement in 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inducted him into his cabinet in May 2019.
Why write a book now? Jaishankar attempts to sketch out how India should forge a foreign policy in a world where China’s rise and assertiveness are changing the contours of global politics. It also sketches out a pathway for India to deal with significant and novel forces in international politics—especially resurgent nationalism and a rejection of globalization. But while Jaishankar touches on these subjects, his book suffers from too many abstractions and generalities.
After all, writing a book about a country’s foreign policy while serving as its foreign minister is laden with pitfalls. One of them, of course, is the critical question of candor. How does Jaishankar’s book fare on this score? The writer deserves credit for bluntly stating that three events and choices have hobbled India’s emergence on the global stage: the partition of British India at the time of independence in 1947, the delay in undertaking economic reforms until 1991, and deferring the decision to cross the nuclear Rubicon until 1998.
Writing a book about a country’s foreign policy while serving as its foreign minister is laden with pitfalls.The first, of course, cannot be wholly blamed on India’s nationalist leadership. British colonial policies, in considerable measure, contributed to a tragic outcome that cost the lives of at least 1 million people during the 1947 partition and resulted in the transfer of more than 10 million across borders in a matter of months. There is little question, however, that both the deferral of economic reforms and India’s nuclear ambivalence until 1998 constrained its rise.
But while Jaishankar forthrightly addresses these issues, he also repeats some long-held shibboleths that continue to animate the beliefs of India’s foreign-policy establishment, namely that it has neglected the country’s vital national security interests, paid inadequate attention to economic prowess, and pursued a risk-averse course in the world arena.
The Modi administration has not evinced any enthusiasm for India’s erstwhile attachment to the doctrine of nonalignment. Nevertheless, Jaishankar suggests that the policy served India’s interests well during much of the Cold War years. Apart from its tilt toward the Soviet Union from the early 1970s to the Cold War’s end, nonalignment had long outlived whatever might have been its utility. It is unfortunate that someone as astute a practitioner of Indian foreign policy as Jaishankar is cannot forthrightly bid goodbye to the anachronistic doctrine of nonalignment. At best, the only novel guidance he offers up is that India should clearly define its national interests and pursue them with vigor.
Jaishankar does, however, display flashes of candor on other issues, which makes his book somewhat useful to readers in the foreign-policy community. Most interestingly, this includes India’s ambivalence toward the use of force in international politics. This hesitancy, Jaishankar correctly argues, has left the country vulnerable to external threats. One of the principal examples he cites was India’s failure to adequately appreciate the security threat that it confronted from China prior to the disastrous 1962 Sino-Indian border war. That said, his prescriptions for India to ensure that it can cope with China’s present assertiveness are surprisingly anodyne. To wit, he suggests that India needs to boost its domestic capabilities especially in the arena of human development, where it significantly lags behind China. That, of course, could take decades at the earliest.
Jaishankar discusses the transformation of the global order through the emergence of a number of social forces. The first is the growth of resurgent nationalism: He sees this as the return of an enduring phenomenon and argues that efforts to transcend it are unlikely. More to the point, Jaishankar believes that nationalism is challenging the status quo in the global order, as seen through India and China’s demands for better representation in multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and in their increased negotiating muscle at global forums like that for the Paris climate change accord.
This, he argues, has led to a backlash in economically privileged countries, which has contributed to the rise of protectionism and xenophobia. Finally, he contends that there is an emerging contest between globalist and nationalist forces, a competition that will make the world more turbulent. To that end, he highlights the growth of reactionary, xenophobic nationalism in various parts of Europe as it confronts refugees from war-torn societies in the Middle East. Oddly enough, he does not mention the rise of vicious anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States, which President Donald Trump has done much to fan.India’s traditions of pluralism and its democratic institutions are today under severe duress.
Closer to India’s own neighborhood and on matters dealing with New Delhi’s immediate security concerns, Jaishankar displays a curious amalgam of naivete and sophistication. This ingenuousness is evident in his discussion of the significance of Modi’s personal diplomacy in attempting to generate a thaw in Sino-Indian relations. Admittedly written before the current border standoff with China, it nevertheless reveals a remarkable and ill-placed faith in dealing with a state that has clear revisionist ambitions. On the other hand, his discussion of relations with the United States despite New Delhi’s checkered past history with Washington is free of cant and recriminations. Instead, it provides a nuanced account of the significance of the United States in India’s present strategic calculus. In this regard, it should be highlighted that the Modi government does not carry the burden of India’s previous hostility toward the United States. Indeed, it has sought to deal with Washington with a remarkable degree of pragmatism.
What, in the end, is the India Way? Reading Jaishankar’s take could confuse a reader familiar with how India is depicted in newspapers around the world today. Jaishankar repeatedly extolls India’s commitment to pluralism and democracy and how its values have helped secure New Delhi’s standing in the world. There is little question that the genesis and sustenance of India’s democracy against immense odds is a story worth highlighting. Yet whether Jaishankar wishes to acknowledge it or not, India’s traditions of pluralism and its democratic institutions are today under severe duress. His government has displayed outright hostility toward any significant dissent, cowed a previously feisty Indian press, and rendered India’s judiciary into a mostly pliant institution. Unless those trends are contained, India’s democratic experiment will be at grave risk: It will be at odds with the India Way envisioned by the country’s founders.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-31--How to Fix Argentina’s Recurrent Debt Crises

When Argentina ’ s economy grows , imports generally rise faster than exports—unless commodity prices are sky-high .
What happens next is fairly predictable : Argentina runs out of dollars , the depreciation of the peso kindles inflation , and borrowing dries up .
The resulting economic recession eventually reverses current account deficits , but poverty soars and incumbent governments overspend to quench social unrest ( and win the next election ) .
When a sovereign default is imminent , the government calls in the IMF—a plea for help that has taken place 22 times in Argentina ’ s history @ @ @ @ @ @ @ took place in 2018 , but in the face of the coronavirus pandemic and an expected 12 percent economic contraction in 2020 , Buenos Aires is looking at asking the IMF to defer its repayments on a $ 44-billion loan for at least three years .
The root of Argentina ’ s recurrent crisis is a lack of competitiveness—yet every IMF program has been premised on the assumption that tightening monetary policy would tame inflation and reconcile Argentines with their currency , the peso .
This is a big mistake .
About a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coffee at the IMF ’ s cafeteria with an IMF high official .
We were , of course , discussing Argentina .
Then-President Mauricio Macri had just lost the primary elections by a wide margin , and it was evident that Peronists would win the government .
“ Argentina is quite unique , ” said the official .
“ For Chileans it is their peso that moves up or down ; in Brazil it is the real and in France it is the euro that rises or falls , but for Argentineans it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( mostly upwards ) .
How come you don ’ t see that it is the peso that moves ?
” The root of Argentina ’ s recurrent crisis is a lack of competitivenessI was taken aback by the question , but the answer is simple .
For Argentines , the peso is just a transactional currency , and nobody wants to save in pesos .
When it raises interest rates , the country ’ s central bank can only postpone demand for dollars .
Fixed-term deposits in pesos increase , but it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A currency run is always around the corner .
The IMF should know this , yet it stepped again on the same rake in 2018 .
However , in one important aspect , Argentina ’ s last IMF program was unique .
Rather than the IMF imposing conditions on Argentina—an often painful process ingrained in the local culture—it was Argentina that imposed the program on the IMF .
How so ?
The answer leads to U.S. President Donald Trump .
Macri and Trump had done real-estate business together ; Macri had Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to persuade him that a shower of IMF dollars would facilitate his reelection , preventing Argentina from sliding into Venezuelan-style populism .
The argument aligned neatly with Trump ’ s “ Do I win ?
” approach to foreign policy , and eventually he helped cajole the IMF to approve a $ 57 billion loan ( its biggest on record ) , frontloading about 90 percent of the money before Argentina ’ s presidential election .
Macri was not reelected , but Argentina did not slide into a Venezuelan-style dictatorship .
Even so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The new Peronist government run by President Alberto Fernández inherited an economy in recession , a central bank with dwindling foreign reserves , and creditors bracing for yet another sovereign default .
The coronavirus pandemic compounded Argentina ’ s predicament , but not everything could be blamed on the virus .
Argentina ’ s economic and political problems are intertwined as never before .
Public opinion is deeply polarized , and Fernández ’ s government has evident problems in lining up political support within its own coalition .
He refused to continue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arguing that one doesn ’ t get out of debt by taking on more debt , and appointed an economic minister—Martín Guzmán—with academic credentials but little experience in dealing with real problems .
Rather than putting together an economic plan and asking for IMF ’ s financial support , Guzmán decided to start by marshalling Pope Francis ’ moral support and by asking private creditors to prepare for a haircut .
He requested a technical assessment of Argentina ’ s foreign debt and , predictably , the IMF concluded that Argentina ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with private creditors started in March 2020 , about four months after Guzmán took office , and concluded in late August .
Meanwhile , the IMF was very patient and Kristalina Georgieva , the fund ’ s managing director , showered Argentina with lip-service support , but more recently she asked the government to “ put in place a credible and comprehensive economic agenda.
” A new IMF program will have to mirror what Macri obtained thanks to Trump ’ s help : frontloaded financial support , in exchange for promises of reforms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s decisive support , but Fernández ’ s foreign policy is flirting with Venezuela rather than the United States .
In the Organization of American States it has refused to accept that Venezuela ’ s regime is violating human rights ( despite a conclusive report from Michel Bachelet , the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner ) and abstained from supporting a call for free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections .
Barely two months after striking an agreement with private creditors , Argentina is once again threatened by default .
The value of public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had before negotiations concluded , and alarmed private creditors stated that “ policy actions taken in the immediate aftermath of the debt restructuring have dramatically worsened the country ’ s economic crisis ” Barely two months after striking an agreement with private creditors , Argentina is once again threatened by default.Argentina ’ s economy can not be fixed in one or two years .
It needs active policies to support startups , the formation of human capital formation , and above all , to reduce the tax burden on those that work in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 8 million of Argentina ’ s 45 million population work in the private sector , while public sector workers , pensioners , and those living on public handouts add up to more than 20 million .
Structural reforms are indispensable , but they always imply trading short-term costs for long-term benefits .
The next IMF program should be an Extended Fund Facility .
However , committing to implement reforms that must be continued by the next government will require a rare degree of political consensus—a long shot for a society that remains polarized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vice president but someone who actually holds real power .
Kirchner and her husband ruled Argentina between 2003 and 2015 .
Their legacy left a deep imprint in Argentina ’ s relation with the United States .
The Kirchners were fond of Hugo Chávez , the founder of Venezuela ’ s “ Bolivarian Revolution.
” And Chávez was the prime client of one of Argentina ’ s main exports : IOUs .
Borrowing from a fellow Latin American so-called revolutionary was politically more palatable than depending on capitalist markets , and Chávez @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s debt to Venezuelan banks eager to circumvent the restrictions he imposed for sending dollars abroad .
Everybody was happy .
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is not Chávez , but Trump ’ s frequent salvos lends him an anti-imperialist legitimacy he does not deserve .
Not surprisingly , Fernández takes much pain in explaining that Maduro is a not a dictator , but rather just authoritarian .
With over 40 percent of its population under the poverty line , Argentina desperately needs IMF ’ s money .
Yet that will necessarily require @ @ @ @ @ @ @ main shareholder , the United States .
Fernández , already too much of a moderate for his fellow “ Kirchneristas ” , does not have much wiggle room to exchange gifts with a transactional president like Trump .
On the other hand , U.S. Democratic contender Joe Biden is more of a multilateralist , and is expected to have a less confrontational and more sophisticated foreign policy .
Fernández is said to be hoping for a Biden victory .
Either way , whether 2021 sees a Trump or a Biden White House , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States must be edified on trust and mutually cherished values , and democracy and respect for human rights should be at top at the list .

When Argentina’s economy grows, imports generally rise faster than exports—unless commodity prices are sky-high. What happens next is fairly predictable: Argentina runs out of dollars, the depreciation of the peso kindles inflation, and borrowing dries up.
When Argentina’s economy grows, imports generally rise faster than exports—unless commodity prices are sky-high. What happens next is fairly predictable: Argentina runs out of dollars, the depreciation of the peso kindles inflation, and borrowing dries up.
The resulting economic recession eventually reverses current account deficits, but poverty soars and incumbent governments overspend to quench social unrest (and win the next election). When a sovereign default is imminent, the government calls in the IMF—a plea for help that has taken place 22 times in Argentina’s history.
Argentina’s last such bailout took place in 2018, but in the face of the coronavirus pandemic and an expected 12 percent economic contraction in 2020, Buenos Aires is looking at asking the IMF to defer its repayments on a $44-billion loan for at least three years.
The root of Argentina’s recurrent crisis is a lack of competitiveness—yet every IMF program has been premised on the assumption that tightening monetary policy would tame inflation and reconcile Argentines with their currency, the peso. This is a big mistake.
About a year ago, I was having a coffee at the IMF’s cafeteria with an IMF high official. We were, of course, discussing Argentina. Then-President Mauricio Macri had just lost the primary elections by a wide margin, and it was evident that Peronists would win the government. “Argentina is quite unique,” said the official. “For Chileans it is their peso that moves up or down; in Brazil it is the real and in France it is the euro that rises or falls, but for Argentineans it is only the U.S. dollar that moves (mostly upwards). How come you don’t see that it is the peso that moves?”
The root of Argentina’s recurrent crisis is a lack of competitivenessI was taken aback by the question, but the answer is simple. For Argentines, the peso is just a transactional currency, and nobody wants to save in pesos. When it raises interest rates, the country’s central bank can only postpone demand for dollars. Fixed-term deposits in pesos increase, but it is only because returns in dollars rise. A currency run is always around the corner.
The IMF should know this, yet it stepped again on the same rake in 2018. However, in one important aspect, Argentina’s last IMF program was unique. Rather than the IMF imposing conditions on Argentina—an often painful process ingrained in the local culture—it was Argentina that imposed the program on the IMF.
How so? The answer leads to U.S. President Donald Trump. Macri and Trump had done real-estate business together; Macri had Trump’s ear and he used it to persuade him that a shower of IMF dollars would facilitate his reelection, preventing Argentina from sliding into Venezuelan-style populism. The argument aligned neatly with Trump’s “Do I win?” approach to foreign policy, and eventually he helped cajole the IMF to approve a $57 billion loan (its biggest on record), frontloading about 90 percent of the money before Argentina’s presidential election.
Macri was not reelected, but Argentina did not slide into a Venezuelan-style dictatorship. Even so, the country is in deep trouble. The new Peronist government run by President Alberto Fernández inherited an economy in recession, a central bank with dwindling foreign reserves, and creditors bracing for yet another sovereign default. The coronavirus pandemic compounded Argentina’s predicament, but not everything could be blamed on the virus.
Argentina’s economic and political problems are intertwined as never before. Public opinion is deeply polarized, and Fernández’s government has evident problems in lining up political support within its own coalition. He refused to continue with Macri’s IMF program, arguing that one doesn’t get out of debt by taking on more debt, and appointed an economic minister—Martín Guzmán—with academic credentials but little experience in dealing with real problems. Rather than putting together an economic plan and asking for IMF’s financial support, Guzmán decided to start by marshalling Pope Francis’ moral support and by asking private creditors to prepare for a haircut. He requested a technical assessment of Argentina’s foreign debt and, predictably, the IMF concluded that Argentina’s debt was “not sustainable.”
Negotiations with private creditors started in March 2020, about four months after Guzmán took office, and concluded in late August. Meanwhile, the IMF was very patient and Kristalina Georgieva, the fund’s managing director, showered Argentina with lip-service support, but more recently she asked the government to “put in place a credible and comprehensive economic agenda.”
A new IMF program will have to mirror what Macri obtained thanks to Trump’s help: frontloaded financial support, in exchange for promises of reforms. This will again require Washington’s decisive support, but Fernández’s foreign policy is flirting with Venezuela rather than the United States. In the Organization of American States it has refused to accept that Venezuela’s regime is violating human rights (despite a conclusive report from Michel Bachelet, the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner) and abstained from supporting a call for free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections.
Barely two months after striking an agreement with private creditors, Argentina is once again threatened by default. The value of public debt has fallen below the levels it had before negotiations concluded, and alarmed private creditors stated that “policy actions taken in the immediate aftermath of the debt restructuring have dramatically worsened the country’s economic crisis”
Barely two months after striking an agreement with private creditors, Argentina is once again threatened by default.Argentina’s economy cannot be fixed in one or two years. It needs active policies to support startups, the formation of human capital formation, and above all, to reduce the tax burden on those that work in its dwindling private sector. Only about 8 million of Argentina’s 45 million population work in the private sector, while public sector workers, pensioners, and those living on public handouts add up to more than 20 million. Structural reforms are indispensable, but they always imply trading short-term costs for long-term benefits. The next IMF program should be an Extended Fund Facility. However, committing to implement reforms that must be continued by the next government will require a rare degree of political consensus—a long shot for a society that remains polarized between Macri and Cristina Kirchner, formally the vice president but someone who actually holds real power.
Kirchner and her husband ruled Argentina between 2003 and 2015. Their legacy left a deep imprint in Argentina’s relation with the United States. The Kirchners were fond of Hugo Chávez, the founder of Venezuela’s “Bolivarian Revolution.” And Chávez was the prime client of one of Argentina’s main exports: IOUs. Borrowing from a fellow Latin American so-called revolutionary was politically more palatable than depending on capitalist markets, and Chávez made a handsome profit by selling Argentina’s debt to Venezuelan banks eager to circumvent the restrictions he imposed for sending dollars abroad. Everybody was happy.
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is not Chávez, but Trump’s frequent salvos lends him an anti-imperialist legitimacy he does not deserve. Not surprisingly, Fernández takes much pain in explaining that Maduro is a not a dictator, but rather just authoritarian.
With over 40 percent of its population under the poverty line, Argentina desperately needs IMF’s money. Yet that will necessarily require the support of the Fund’s main shareholder, the United States. Fernández, already too much of a moderate for his fellow “Kirchneristas”, does not have much wiggle room to exchange gifts with a transactional president like Trump. On the other hand, U.S. Democratic contender Joe Biden is more of a multilateralist, and is expected to have a less confrontational and more sophisticated foreign policy. Fernández is said to be hoping for a Biden victory.
Either way, whether 2021 sees a Trump or a Biden White House, Argentina’s relations with the United States must be edified on trust and mutually cherished values, and democracy and respect for human rights should be at top at the list.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-31--What Will the U.S. Election Mean for Brazil’s Diplomacy?

What Will the U.S. Election Mean for Brazil ’ s Diplomacy ?
While U.S. presidential elections traditionally attract limited attention among the Brazilian public , few observers in Latin America ’ s largest country are indifferent to the 2020 campaign .
That is because Brazil ’ s populist leader , Jair Bolsonaro—often dubbed the “ Trump of the Tropics ” —has made alignment with U.S. President Donald Trump a centerpiece of his foreign policy .
During his first visit to Washington as president , Bolsonaro used a press conference in the White House to announce that he “ firmly believed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Late last month , in response to a debate comment from Trump ’ s Democratic rival , Joe Biden , in which the candidate suggested making a global offer of $ 20 billion to end deforestation and alluded to unspecified economic consequences , Bolsonaro replied in an all-caps tweet that “ OUR SOVEREIGNTY IS NONNEGOTIABLE , ” adding that he would not accept “ bribes ” or “ baseless threats.
” Brazilian Environment Minister Ricardo Salles also publicly responded to Biden ’ s offer , posting : “ Just one question : Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is that yearly ?
” Still , analysts in Brazil have been cautiously optimistic about the future of U.S.-Brazilian ties in the event that Biden defeats Trump in November .
In an interview with Bloomberg , foreign minister Ernesto Araújo said that “ despite some adjustments , [ Brazil ’ s government ] would be able to maintain a very positive agenda under a possible Democratic administration , ” further pointing out that “ while Presidents Bolsonaro and Trump have built a very close relationship that has brought mutual benefits , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , not between two presidents.
” It is worth asking , then , how a Biden victory in November would affect ties between the United States and Brazil .
While Biden ’ s foreign-policy advisors are unlikely to support many of Bolsonaro ’ s policies , they will be aware of Brazil ’ s relevance when it comes to one of the United States ’ main strategic concerns in Latin America : containing Beijing ’ s growing influence .
Indeed , Democratic strategists largely agree with Trump that China should be treated as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the United States would continue to have an active interest in convincing Bolsonaro to exclude Huawei from the bidding process to build the country ’ s 5G telecommunications infrastructure , scheduled to take place in 2021 .
With a population of over 200 million and a high percentage of smartphone usage and ownership , Brazil is one of the main prizes in the emerging tech war between Washington and Beijing .
In the same way , there is reason to believe that cautious efforts to facilitate trade ties between the two countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration .
Broader strategic concerns , optimists believe , would have a greater impact than the profound personal and ideological differences between Biden and Bolsonaro .
Drastic changes also seem unlikely given that compared to the United States ’ major foreign-policy challenges , including contentious relationships with China and Russia , Iran ’ s nuclear ambitions , and the global migration crisis , Brazilian politics do not figure among the most pressing concerns .
Even in Latin America , the country often appears behind priorities such as migration and developments in Cuba , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under former U.S. President Barack Obama , Brazil may end up fairly far down the list of priorities in a potential Biden administration .
The busier Biden might be dealing with other foreign-policy challenges , the better for the Bolsonaro government , since it would help the relationship stay under the public radar in the United States .
However , such stability may be unrealistic .
A close examination of his international record suggests that Bolsonaro has consistently used foreign policy as a tool to satisfy his most radical supporters , even if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or strategic cost to the country—an approach that is likely to continue regardless of any change of administrations in the United States .
Three examples stand out .
First , Bolsonaro chose to become one of Latin America ’ s first leaders to embrace anti-China rhetoric during his presidential campaign , and he even visited Taiwan and then proclaimed on Twitter , that his government would end , as he put it , previous governments ’ tradition of being “ friendly with communist regimes.
” Most observers expected him , once elected , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bolsonaro indeed traveled to China during his first year in office to affirm his commitment to strengthening ties .
And yet continued attacks on China by his allies and followers have led to a rebuttal of unprecedented severity by the Chinese government earlier this year .
Brazil-China ties today are marked by mutual distrust and could easily worsen further with continued comments by Bolsonaro allies—a likely scenario given the frequent need to divert public attention from domestic challenges .
Last week , after being criticized by supporters on social media , Bolsonaro said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus vaccine and questioned its safety “ due to its origin , ” adding that Brazilians would not be “ anyone ’ s guinea pig ” —even after his health minister had confirmed Brazil ’ s inclusion in the immunization program .
In short , Bolsonaro opted for the political benefit of continuously whipping up anti-China sentiment among his most loyal followers , even though it could provoke a crisis with Brazil ’ s most important trading partner , which purchases 34.1 percent of Brazilian exports .
( Only 9.7 percent go to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ second-most-important export destination . )
For either a Trump or Biden administration , then , the tightrope Bolsonaro walks with regard to China shows that Brazil ’ s president is willing to take enormous risks on the foreign-policy front to keep his radical followers energized .
Second , Bolsonaro has not embraced a pragmatic foreign-policy stance where one of the country ’ s historic political and economic partners , Argentina , is concerned .
When it became clear that his preferred candidate , Mauricio Macri , would lose the Argentine presidential election in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observers argued that Bolsonaro would have no choice but to establish a productive working relationship with his Argentine counterpart .
After all , it would be impossible to coordinate the complex bilateral relationship between South America ’ s largest countries unless the two presidents got along reasonably well .
Instead , the opposite happened .
Bolsonaro ridiculed Fernández by visiting a Brazilian border town and telling his audience that they should prepare for Argentine refugees fleeing from the economic ruin the Peronist would unleash .
Brazil ’ s president then refused to attend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brazilian presidents had done with Argentine winners .
Despite efforts by Argentina ’ s ambassador in Brasília to establish a working relationship , little suggests Bolsonaro has any interest in repairing ties—the political benefit of issuing warnings of an impending communist takeover across Latin America is too great .
Finally , Bolsonaro ’ s refusal to adopt a more moderate environmental stance in the face of growing European pressure has surprised many observers , who believed Brazil ’ s powerful agribusiness would convince the president to not to endanger ratification of the historic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreed upon in 2019 after 20 years of arduous debates .
Indeed , by ridiculing European environmental concerns as little more than protectionist excuses or neocolonial efforts to undermine Brazil ’ s sovereignty over the Amazon , Bolsonaro has torpedoed the efforts of Germany , the greatest beneficiary of the deal , and given limitless ammunition to the Austrians , Irish , and French , who are skeptical about the deal .
After growing pressure from environmental movements , a spokesman for German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently said she has “ considerable doubts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The reason for Bolsonaro ’ s strategy is simple : Easing environmental regulation was one of his key campaign promises and is a priority for miners , loggers , and members of other key sectors of his electoral coalition .
This could pose challenges for U.S. cooperation under a potential Biden administration when it comes to climate change , a topic a Biden administration would almost certainly prioritize .
Yet given how forcefully Bolsonaro has lashed out against criticism from France and Germany , he would be expected to do the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lawmakers speak out against Brazil .
If the growing global reaction to the yearly fires in the Amazon are any guide , Biden would not be able to hide behind EU leadership on the matter but would face strong domestic pressure to take a tough stance against Bolsonaro ’ s environmental policies—indeed , as the Biden campaign recently stressed , climate concerns would be at the heart of U.S. diplomacy .
The bilateral relationship is likely to be troubled from the start if Biden were to be elected .
These are formidable obstacles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Bolsonaro , with potentially dire consequences for the two politicians ’ capacity to address regional challenges together .
Should he win , Biden is expected to signal a fresh start for U.S.-Latin American relations , as with most other foreign-policy priorities .
He would almost certainly reverse course on Cuba policy and overhaul U.S. immigration policy .
This would strain the relationship with Bolsonaro , who has been supportive of Trump ’ s approach , and make broader cooperation between Washington and Brasília more difficult on issues such as transnational crime , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of which can be addressed effectively by one nation alone .
A Trump win would not be entirely good news for the bilateral relationship , either .
The Trump-Bolsonaro partnership ultimately produced very few results , particularly when compared to initial optimism and expectations of increased trade and the pushing out of Venezuela ’ s President Nicolás Maduro .
In fact , trade between the two nations has recently fallen to the lowest level in 11 years , and the prospect of new U.S. tariffs on Brazilian products has been a continued source @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would not guarantee significant progress in the relationship .
If Biden wins , however , the bilateral relationship will require a heavy dose of realism and awareness that things will be very difficult from the start .
In this sense , it ’ s not unlike Biden ’ s promise to revive bipartisanship at home ; working with the “ Trump of the Tropics ” may be about as difficult as reaching across the aisle to the opposition in Washington .

While U.S. presidential elections traditionally attract limited attention among the Brazilian public, few observers in Latin America’s largest country are indifferent to the 2020 campaign. That is because Brazil’s populist leader, Jair Bolsonaro—often dubbed the “Trump of the Tropics”—has made alignment with U.S. President Donald Trump a centerpiece of his foreign policy. During his first visit to Washington as president, Bolsonaro used a press conference in the White House to announce that he “firmly believed in Donald Trump’s reelection.”
While U.S. presidential elections traditionally attract limited attention among the Brazilian public, few observers in Latin America’s largest country are indifferent to the 2020 campaign. That is because Brazil’s populist leader, Jair Bolsonaro—often dubbed the “Trump of the Tropics”—has made alignment with U.S. President Donald Trump a centerpiece of his foreign policy. During his first visit to Washington as president, Bolsonaro used a press conference in the White House to announce that he “firmly believed in Donald Trump’s reelection.”
Late last month, in response to a debate comment from Trump’s Democratic rival, Joe Biden, in which the candidate suggested making a global offer of $20 billion to end deforestation and alluded to unspecified economic consequences, Bolsonaro replied in an all-caps tweet that “OUR SOVEREIGNTY IS NONNEGOTIABLE,” adding that he would not accept “bribes” or “baseless threats.”
Brazilian Environment Minister Ricardo Salles also publicly responded to Biden’s offer, posting: “Just one question: Biden’s $20 billion in aid, is that yearly?”
Still, analysts in Brazil have been cautiously optimistic about the future of U.S.-Brazilian ties in the event that Biden defeats Trump in November. In an interview with Bloomberg, foreign minister Ernesto Araújo said that “despite some adjustments, [Brazil’s government] would be able to maintain a very positive agenda under a possible Democratic administration,” further pointing out that “while Presidents Bolsonaro and Trump have built a very close relationship that has brought mutual benefits, the advancements happened between Brazil and the U.S., not between two presidents.”
It is worth asking, then, how a Biden victory in November would affect ties between the United States and Brazil. While Biden’s foreign-policy advisors are unlikely to support many of Bolsonaro’s policies, they will be aware of Brazil’s relevance when it comes to one of the United States’ main strategic concerns in Latin America: containing Beijing’s growing influence. Indeed, Democratic strategists largely agree with Trump that China should be treated as a disruptive competitor. If Biden wins, the United States would continue to have an active interest in convincing Bolsonaro to exclude Huawei from the bidding process to build the country’s 5G telecommunications infrastructure, scheduled to take place in 2021. With a population of over 200 million and a high percentage of smartphone usage and ownership, Brazil is one of the main prizes in the emerging tech war between Washington and Beijing. In the same way, there is reason to believe that cautious efforts to facilitate trade ties between the two countries may continue as well under a Biden administration. Broader strategic concerns, optimists believe, would have a greater impact than the profound personal and ideological differences between Biden and Bolsonaro.
Drastic changes also seem unlikely given that compared to the United States’ major foreign-policy challenges, including contentious relationships with China and Russia, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the global migration crisis, Brazilian politics do not figure among the most pressing concerns. Even in Latin America, the country often appears behind priorities such as migration and developments in Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela. Just like under former U.S. President Barack Obama, Brazil may end up fairly far down the list of priorities in a potential Biden administration. The busier Biden might be dealing with other foreign-policy challenges, the better for the Bolsonaro government, since it would help the relationship stay under the public radar in the United States.
However, such stability may be unrealistic. A close examination of his international record suggests that Bolsonaro has consistently used foreign policy as a tool to satisfy his most radical supporters, even if doing so comes at a significant economic or strategic cost to the country—an approach that is likely to continue regardless of any change of administrations in the United States.
Three examples stand out. First, Bolsonaro chose to become one of Latin America’s first leaders to embrace anti-China rhetoric during his presidential campaign, and he even visited Taiwan and then proclaimed on Twitter, that his government would end, as he put it, previous governments’ tradition of being “friendly with communist regimes.” Most observers expected him, once elected, to tone down his rhetoric, and Bolsonaro indeed traveled to China during his first year in office to affirm his commitment to strengthening ties. And yet continued attacks on China by his allies and followers have led to a rebuttal of unprecedented severity by the Chinese government earlier this year. Brazil-China ties today are marked by mutual distrust and could easily worsen further with continued comments by Bolsonaro allies—a likely scenario given the frequent need to divert public attention from domestic challenges. Last week, after being criticized by supporters on social media, Bolsonaro said the government will not purchase a Chinese-made coronavirus vaccine and questioned its safety “due to its origin,” adding that Brazilians would not be “anyone’s guinea pig”—even after his health minister had confirmed Brazil’s inclusion in the immunization program.
In short, Bolsonaro opted for the political benefit of continuously whipping up anti-China sentiment among his most loyal followers, even though it could provoke a crisis with Brazil’s most important trading partner, which purchases 34.1 percent of Brazilian exports. (Only 9.7 percent go to the United States, Brazil’s second-most-important export destination.) For either a Trump or Biden administration, then, the tightrope Bolsonaro walks with regard to China shows that Brazil’s president is willing to take enormous risks on the foreign-policy front to keep his radical followers energized.
Second, Bolsonaro has not embraced a pragmatic foreign-policy stance where one of the country’s historic political and economic partners, Argentina, is concerned. When it became clear that his preferred candidate, Mauricio Macri, would lose the Argentine presidential election in 2019 to center-left candidate Alberto Fernández, observers argued that Bolsonaro would have no choice but to establish a productive working relationship with his Argentine counterpart. After all, it would be impossible to coordinate the complex bilateral relationship between South America’s largest countries unless the two presidents got along reasonably well. Instead, the opposite happened. Bolsonaro ridiculed Fernández by visiting a Brazilian border town and telling his audience that they should prepare for Argentine refugees fleeing from the economic ruin the Peronist would unleash. Brazil’s president then refused to attend Fernandez’s inauguration, as previous Brazilian presidents had done with Argentine winners. Despite efforts by Argentina’s ambassador in Brasília to establish a working relationship, little suggests Bolsonaro has any interest in repairing ties—the political benefit of issuing warnings of an impending communist takeover across Latin America is too great.
Finally, Bolsonaro’s refusal to adopt a more moderate environmental stance in the face of growing European pressure has surprised many observers, who believed Brazil’s powerful agribusiness would convince the president to not to endanger ratification of the historic European Union-Mercosur trade deal, which negotiators agreed upon in 2019 after 20 years of arduous debates. Indeed, by ridiculing European environmental concerns as little more than protectionist excuses or neocolonial efforts to undermine Brazil’s sovereignty over the Amazon, Bolsonaro has torpedoed the efforts of Germany, the greatest beneficiary of the deal, and given limitless ammunition to the Austrians, Irish, and French, who are skeptical about the deal. After growing pressure from environmental movements, a spokesman for German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently said she has “considerable doubts” about the ratification of the deal. The reason for Bolsonaro’s strategy is simple: Easing environmental regulation was one of his key campaign promises and is a priority for miners, loggers, and members of other key sectors of his electoral coalition.
This could pose challenges for U.S. cooperation under a potential Biden administration when it comes to climate change, a topic a Biden administration would almost certainly prioritize. Yet given how forcefully Bolsonaro has lashed out against criticism from France and Germany, he would be expected to do the same if U.S. cabinet members or leading Democratic lawmakers speak out against Brazil. If the growing global reaction to the yearly fires in the Amazon are any guide, Biden would not be able to hide behind EU leadership on the matter but would face strong domestic pressure to take a tough stance against Bolsonaro’s environmental policies—indeed, as the Biden campaign recently stressed, climate concerns would be at the heart of U.S. diplomacy. The bilateral relationship is likely to be troubled from the start if Biden were to be elected.
These are formidable obstacles to a productive bilateral relationship between Biden and Bolsonaro, with potentially dire consequences for the two politicians’ capacity to address regional challenges together. Should he win, Biden is expected to signal a fresh start for U.S.-Latin American relations, as with most other foreign-policy priorities. He would almost certainly reverse course on Cuba policy and overhaul U.S. immigration policy. This would strain the relationship with Bolsonaro, who has been supportive of Trump’s approach, and make broader cooperation between Washington and Brasília more difficult on issues such as transnational crime, deforestation, and the pandemic, none of which can be addressed effectively by one nation alone.
A Trump win would not be entirely good news for the bilateral relationship, either. The Trump-Bolsonaro partnership ultimately produced very few results, particularly when compared to initial optimism and expectations of increased trade and the pushing out of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro. In fact, trade between the two nations has recently fallen to the lowest level in 11 years, and the prospect of new U.S. tariffs on Brazilian products has been a continued source of tension. Trump’s reelection would not guarantee significant progress in the relationship.
If Biden wins, however, the bilateral relationship will require a heavy dose of realism and awareness that things will be very difficult from the start. In this sense, it’s not unlike Biden’s promise to revive bipartisanship at home; working with the “Trump of the Tropics” may be about as difficult as reaching across the aisle to the opposition in Washington.