foreignpolicy--2020-03-12--Trump Suspends EU Travel, WHO Declares Pandemic

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The World Health Organization declares the coronavirus outbreak a pandemic , U.S. President Donald Trump bans EU travelers over coronavirus fears , and Saudi Arabia increases oil production to record highs .
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World Health Organization ( WHO ) Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus announced that the global coronavirus outbreak is now a pandemic , the organization ’ s highest health emergency level .
It ’ s the first time the WHO has used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flu in 2009 .
Why a pandemic ?
The designation is meant to underline the global nature of COVID-19 ’ s spread , now on six continents .
Tedros was at pains to point out that it did not mean that efforts to contain the outbreak were in vain , “ We can not say this loudly enough or clearly enough or often enough : All countries can still change the course of this pandemic , ” he said .
Trump bans European travelers .
In an Oval Office announcement on Wednesday night @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was banning travel from European countries for 30 days ; the United Kingdom and Ireland are excluded from the suspension .
Trump said the European Union had “ failed to take the same precautions ” as the United States in dealing with the coronavirus outbreak .
It was later clarified that the ban would only apply to the 26 nations in the Schengen zone , which includes some non-EU members .
Stocks drop again .
The Dow Jones Industrial Average entered bear market territory yesterday after a 5.9 percent drop following the WHO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ run .
The Dow ’ s cumulative 20 percent drop comes after record highs only a month ago .
At the time of writing , London ’ s FTSE 100 had fallen by more than 5 percent on Thursday morning and Dow futures , reacting to Trump ’ s speech , were already down 5 percent before the opening bell in U.S. markets .
It will get worse .
Anthony Fauci , director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases , told the House Committee on Oversight and Reform that there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virus in future and that any vaccine was more than a year away .
“ Bottom line , it ’ s going to get worse , ” he said .
With mass gatherings increasingly outlawed worldwide , it ’ s fitting that the forthcoming G-7 meeting of foreign ministers , scheduled for Pittsburgh on March 24 and 25 , will now be moving to video conference .
Diplomatic posturing .
Meanwhile , China is using the relative inaction of the United States to attempt to rebrand itself as the international leader in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a letter to United Nations member states by China ’ s U.N. ambassador Zhang Jun and obtained by Foreign Policy .
Reporters Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer said the letter “ appeared calculated to rebut growing criticism from the United States and elsewhere over its initial handling of the outbreak that allowed the disease to spread so rapidly.
” The coronavirus campaign .
The coronavirus is finally taking a toll on the U.S. Democratic primary , with both former Vice President Joe Biden and Sen. Bernie Sanders having to cancel rallies over fears @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy , Laurie Garrett argues that it ’ s now time to radically rethink how the 2020 campaign will be organized .
Mapping the coronavirus outbreak : Follow our daily updates on the epidemic and how it is affecting countries around the world here .
Saudi oil glut .
Saudi Arabia has ordered state oil company Aramco to increase production levels to a record 13 millions barrels per day as the kingdom attempts to strangle competition in the oil market .
The move comes after last week ’ s failed OPEC meeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to undercut Russian and U.S. oil producers .
Fatih Birol , head of the International Energy Agency , told CNN that oil producers should stop playing “ Russian roulette ” with the oil market .
Rocket attack kills three .
Three service members , two from the United States and one from the United Kingdom , were killed yesterday in a rocket strike on a military base in Taji , Iraq .
A U.S. military spokesman said that more than 15 rockets were launched at the base as part of the attack .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , pointed to Iran or Iranian-backed groups as the likely perpetrators .
U.S. House asserts war powers .
The U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation on Wednesday that would limit President Trump ’ s ability to wage war with Iran .
The law would require Trump to remove troops fighting against Iran unless specifically authorized by Congress .
The legislation is not expected to survive a presidential veto .
Afghanistan talks .
The Afghan government has said they will release 1,500 Taliban prisoners as part of steps toward dialogue between the two sides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before any talks take place .
President Ashraf Ghani has held back the release of the remaining 3,500 until certain conditions are met—a move the Taliban says goes against the Feb. 29 peace accord .
Poles melting faster .
Polar ice caps are melting six times faster than they did in the 1990s , according to a new analysis of ice loss in Greenland and Antarctica .
Almost all of the ice loss came from warming oceans melting the glaciers flowing from the ice caps .
Professor Andrew Shepherd of the University of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said that despite the melting rate the associated sea level rise could still be mitigated if measures to stop heating the planet were taken .
Scientists have identified a planet outside our solar system , Wasp-76b , that exhibits ultra-high temperatures of 2,400 degrees Celsius ( about 4,350 degrees Fahrenheit ) and winds of 10,000 miles per hour .
The planet—which is 640 light years away in the constellation of Pisces—is so hot that iron on the surface evaporates and forms into clouds , coming back down as iron rain .
The planet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new instrument on the Very Large Telescope , located in Chile .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The World Health Organization declares the coronavirus outbreak a pandemic , U.S. President Donald Trump bans EU travelers over coronavirus fears, and Saudi Arabia increases oil production to record highs.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The World Health Organization declares the coronavirus outbreak a pandemic, U.S. President Donald Trump bans EU travelers over coronavirus fears, and Saudi Arabia increases oil production to record highs.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
WHO Declares Pandemic as Trump Bans European Travelers
World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus announced that the global coronavirus outbreak is now a pandemic, the organization’s highest health emergency level. It’s the first time the WHO has used the term since the outbreak of swine flu in 2009.
Why a pandemic? The designation is meant to underline the global nature of COVID-19’s spread, now on six continents. Tedros was at pains to point out that it did not mean that efforts to contain the outbreak were in vain, “We cannot say this loudly enough or clearly enough or often enough: All countries can still change the course of this pandemic,” he said.
Trump bans European travelers. In an Oval Office announcement on Wednesday night, U.S. President Donald Trump said he was banning travel from European countries for 30 days; the United Kingdom and Ireland are excluded from the suspension. Trump said the European Union had “failed to take the same precautions” as the United States in dealing with the coronavirus outbreak. It was later clarified that the ban would only apply to the 26 nations in the Schengen zone, which includes some non-EU members.
Stocks drop again. The Dow Jones Industrial Average entered bear market territory yesterday after a 5.9 percent drop following the WHO announcement, halting an 11-year long bull run. The Dow’s cumulative 20 percent drop comes after record highs only a month ago. At the time of writing, London’s FTSE 100 had fallen by more than 5 percent on Thursday morning and Dow futures, reacting to Trump’s speech, were already down 5 percent before the opening bell in U.S. markets.
It will get worse. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, told the House Committee on Oversight and Reform that there would likely be more cases of the virus in future and that any vaccine was more than a year away. “Bottom line, it’s going to get worse,” he said. With mass gatherings increasingly outlawed worldwide, it’s fitting that the forthcoming G-7 meeting of foreign ministers, scheduled for Pittsburgh on March 24 and 25, will now be moving to video conference.
Diplomatic posturing. Meanwhile, China is using the relative inaction of the United States to attempt to rebrand itself as the international leader in the fight against the virus, according to a letter to United Nations member states by China’s U.N. ambassador Zhang Jun and obtained by Foreign Policy. Reporters Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer said the letter “appeared calculated to rebut growing criticism from the United States and elsewhere over its initial handling of the outbreak that allowed the disease to spread so rapidly.”
The coronavirus campaign. The coronavirus is finally taking a toll on the U.S. Democratic primary, with both former Vice President Joe Biden and Sen. Bernie Sanders having to cancel rallies over fears of spreading—or catching—the virus. Writing in Foreign Policy, Laurie Garrett argues that it’s now time to radically rethink how the 2020 campaign will be organized.
Mapping the coronavirus outbreak: Follow our daily updates on the epidemic and how it is affecting countries around the world here.
What We’re Following Today
Saudi oil glut. Saudi Arabia has ordered state oil company Aramco to increase production levels to a record 13 millions barrels per day as the kingdom attempts to strangle competition in the oil market. The move comes after last week’s failed OPEC meeting and a change in Saudi strategy designed to undercut Russian and U.S. oil producers. Fatih Birol, head of the International Energy Agency, told CNN that oil producers should stop playing “Russian roulette” with the oil market.
Rocket attack kills three. Three service members, two from the United States and one from the United Kingdom, were killed yesterday in a rocket strike on a military base in Taji, Iraq. A U.S. military spokesman said that more than 15 rockets were launched at the base as part of the attack. Unnamed U.S. officials, speaking to CNN, pointed to Iran or Iranian-backed groups as the likely perpetrators.
U.S. House asserts war powers. The U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation on Wednesday that would limit President Trump’s ability to wage war with Iran. The law would require Trump to remove troops fighting against Iran unless specifically authorized by Congress. The legislation is not expected to survive a presidential veto.
Keep an Eye On
Afghanistan talks. The Afghan government has said they will release 1,500 Taliban prisoners as part of steps toward dialogue between the two sides. The Taliban want 5,000 prisoners released before any talks take place. President Ashraf Ghani has held back the release of the remaining 3,500 until certain conditions are met—a move the Taliban says goes against the Feb. 29 peace accord.
Poles melting faster. Polar ice caps are melting six times faster than they did in the 1990s, according to a new analysis of ice loss in Greenland and Antarctica. Almost all of the ice loss came from warming oceans melting the glaciers flowing from the ice caps. Professor Andrew Shepherd of the University of Leeds, who co-led the assessment, said that despite the melting rate the associated sea level rise could still be mitigated if measures to stop heating the planet were taken.
Odds and Ends
Scientists have identified a planet outside our solar system, Wasp-76b, that exhibits ultra-high temperatures of 2,400 degrees Celsius (about 4,350 degrees Fahrenheit) and winds of 10,000 miles per hour. The planet—which is 640 light years away in the constellation of Pisces—is so hot that iron on the surface evaporates and forms into clouds, coming back down as iron rain. The planet’s unusual weather was discovered using a new instrument on the Very Large Telescope, located in Chile.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-11--The India-U.S. Relationship Is Bigger Than Its Showboating Leaders

The India-U.S .
Relationship Is Bigger Than Its Showboating Leaders When it comes to pure political theater , few can match Donald Trump and Narendra Modi .
But during their recent encounter in New Delhi , the U.S. president and Indian prime minister were upstaged by the avoidable tragedy unfolding across town .
In the Indian capital ’ s worst communal violence in decades , clashes between Hindus and Muslims left over 50 people dead and injured more than 200 .
At least some local police , who fall under federal jurisdiction , failed to protect residents or even incited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. president a difficult test of how to react while on the foreign soil of an important but sensitive partner—with the whole world watching .
India ’ s leadership has been roundly criticized for the background to the violence .
After his 2019 reelection , Modi elevated the Bharatiya Janata Party ’ s Hindu majoritarian agenda .
He revoked the constitutionally provided autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir , India ’ s only Muslim-majority state .
His party ushered in a law expediting citizenship for religious minorities fleeing neighboring countries , but not Muslims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and set the stage for the debacle in Delhi .
Journalists , civil society , and businesses are all under pressure , not to mention India ’ s secular constitution .
As Trump himself related , he opted not to discuss the bloodshed with Modi , but he did raise the importance of religious freedom more generally .
The power of the private messages Trump said he delivered was effectively blunted by the effusive praise he lavished on the Indian leader ’ s record .
His bottom line ?
It is “ up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the free world said dismissively , when asked about the religious violence .
It ’ s not surprising that Trump and Modi should get along .
Despite one being the son of a millionaire and the other the child of a tea-seller , Trump and Modi share some qualities .
Neither shies from his strongman reputation , nor do they abide much criticism .
Both relish a good show in front of adoring followers wearing “ Make America Great Again ” hats or Modi masks .
India ’ s leadership has been happy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump threatened trade wars and other breaks .
They figure the best way to manage the unpredictable U.S. president is to smother him in a warm , personal embrace .
Last fall , the leaders strode hand in hand before an enthusiastic crowd of over 50,000 Indian Americans in Houston ’ s professional football stadium .
Modi ’ s invitation for a return engagement in his home state was simply irresistible .
But U.S.-India cooperation long predates either leader .
Following U.S. President Bill Clinton ’ s March 2000 trip to India , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Trump ’ s visit have aligned , with much difficulty , the world ’ s oldest and largest democracies .
Successive administrations grasped that India ’ s remarkable historical arc served as a beacon for liberal values and its vast , young population as an important market .
The countries quietly shared concerns over China ’ s ambitions and recognized that the world ’ s greatest challenges , like violent extremism , require India and the United States to work closely together .
However imperfectly , this administration has hewed to this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the U.S.-India defense partnership has experienced some surprising successes .
Despite persistent trade irritants with Delhi , Washington ’ s focus on Beijing as a strategic competitor has helped cement the relationship .
Against this backdrop , the first day of Trump ’ s visit went reasonably well .
In front of over 100,000 people , the president repeatedly invoked liberal values , highlighting India ’ s generally peaceful and tolerant democracy .
His stroll with the first lady at the majestic Taj Mahal sent a positive message about pluralism .
Day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a grim return to reality .
It wasn ’ t just the haunting image of an American president and an Indian prime minister holding forth as part of the city literally burned .
The trip ’ s business end proved short on substance , with several noticeable exceptions .
The leaders did muster significant defense sales announcements , tangible signs of energy collaboration , and nonbinding understandings on health and medical products .
As China expands its footprint deeper into the South China Sea , the Western Pacific , and the Indian Ocean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cooperation to safeguard well-established global norms .
They agreed to establish an office in India to help finance high-quality infrastructure .
These and various other joint activities should not be minimized .
Yet the U.S.-India relationship is perceptibly shrinking in ambition and dynamism .
After over a year of negotiations , a limited trade agreement still eluded Trump and Modi .
A so-called mini-deal would not have covered large swaths of business activity ( such as e-commerce and information technology ) , but it offered the prospect of building trust between economies in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ paid to pressing environmental challenges .
As China approaches world leadership in green technologies and India makes progress toward ambitious renewable energy targets , the Trump administration has by-and-large chosen to remain on the sidelines .
Trump may have spent more time in his Delhi press conference downplaying the risks of COVID-19 than he did discussing how the two countries can work together to fight it .
Even as bilateral ties grow , Trump and Modi are enabling each other ’ s more dubious tendencies .
After Trump was handed a giant political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it shouldn ’ t come as a shock that the president couldn ’ t find his voice as a wave of violence descended around him .
With his Muslim travel bans and false moral equivalencies , Trump has squandered his credibility .
Yet staying silent , after visiting the onetime home of Mahatma Gandhi , only provides cover for the erosion of civil rights and rule of law in India .
On trade , the transactional president is also ill suited to persuade India that opening markets can revive a sputtering economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ urgently needs .
As Trump goes on about tariffs , trade deficits , and related minutiae , small wonder that India ’ s 2020-2021 budget featured numerous duty hikes last month .
In Asia , the White House ’ s unpredictability and inattentiveness reinforce long-standing , latent Indian tendencies to question U.S. reliability on Afghanistan , Pakistan , and China .
Not a single diplomat from the State Department traveled to Delhi as part of Trump ’ s official delegation ( due to a scheduling conflict with the annual Global Chiefs of Mission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the administration ’ s “ Free and Open Indo-Pacific diplomacy are gradually coming unmoored .
If balancing China is a shared priority , both countries need to get their houses in order .
Fixing the fundamentals requires recognizing what largely brought India and the United States together in the first place : the sturdy bedrock of democratic principles , economic openness , and a more patient , long-term vision of their relationship .
What does that actually look like ?
With democracy in decline across parts of the world , the countries should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elections from direct and indirect attempts at foreign meddling .
Indeed , that kind of cooperation , or working together to tackle the corrupting role of black money in societies , would remind leaders across the U.S. political spectrum why they placed a strategic bet on India in the first place .
India still has extraordinary potential as a durable partner in a region that may be the world ’ s center of gravity for decades to come .
Prior to Trump ’ s visit , the experienced diplomat William J. Burns reminded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than these two leaders.
” That certainly has been the case in the past and can ring true in the days ahead .
The sooner that both governments and societies can take to heart Burns ’ s vital message , the better .

When it comes to pure political theater, few can match Donald Trump and Narendra Modi. But during their recent encounter in New Delhi, the U.S. president and Indian prime minister were upstaged by the avoidable tragedy unfolding across town.
When it comes to pure political theater, few can match Donald Trump and Narendra Modi. But during their recent encounter in New Delhi, the U.S. president and Indian prime minister were upstaged by the avoidable tragedy unfolding across town.
In the Indian capital’s worst communal violence in decades, clashes between Hindus and Muslims left over 50 people dead and injured more than 200. At least some local police, who fall under federal jurisdiction, failed to protect residents or even incited rioters. The calamity thrust upon the U.S. president a difficult test of how to react while on the foreign soil of an important but sensitive partner—with the whole world watching.
India’s leadership has been roundly criticized for the background to the violence. After his 2019 reelection, Modi elevated the Bharatiya Janata Party’s Hindu majoritarian agenda. He revoked the constitutionally provided autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state. His party ushered in a law expediting citizenship for religious minorities fleeing neighboring countries, but not Muslims. The measure touched off nationwide protests and set the stage for the debacle in Delhi. Journalists, civil society, and businesses are all under pressure, not to mention India’s secular constitution.
As Trump himself related, he opted not to discuss the bloodshed with Modi, but he did raise the importance of religious freedom more generally. The power of the private messages Trump said he delivered was effectively blunted by the effusive praise he lavished on the Indian leader’s record. His bottom line? It is “up to India,” the leader of the free world said dismissively, when asked about the religious violence.
It’s not surprising that Trump and Modi should get along. Despite one being the son of a millionaire and the other the child of a tea-seller, Trump and Modi share some qualities. Neither shies from his strongman reputation, nor do they abide much criticism. Both relish a good show in front of adoring followers wearing “Make America Great Again” hats or Modi masks.
India’s leadership has been happy to embrace those qualities, especially when Trump threatened trade wars and other breaks. They figure the best way to manage the unpredictable U.S. president is to smother him in a warm, personal embrace. Last fall, the leaders strode hand in hand before an enthusiastic crowd of over 50,000 Indian Americans in Houston’s professional football stadium. Modi’s invitation for a return engagement in his home state was simply irresistible.
But U.S.-India cooperation long predates either leader. Following U.S. President Bill Clinton’s March 2000 trip to India, 20 years of bipartisan efforts leading up to Trump’s visit have aligned, with much difficulty, the world’s oldest and largest democracies. Successive administrations grasped that India’s remarkable historical arc served as a beacon for liberal values and its vast, young population as an important market. The countries quietly shared concerns over China’s ambitions and recognized that the world’s greatest challenges, like violent extremism, require India and the United States to work closely together.
However imperfectly, this administration has hewed to this consensus. In fact, under Trump, the U.S.-India defense partnership has experienced some surprising successes. Despite persistent trade irritants with Delhi, Washington’s focus on Beijing as a strategic competitor has helped cement the relationship.
Against this backdrop, the first day of Trump’s visit went reasonably well. In front of over 100,000 people, the president repeatedly invoked liberal values, highlighting India’s generally peaceful and tolerant democracy. His stroll with the first lady at the majestic Taj Mahal sent a positive message about pluralism.
Day two in Delhi, however, was a grim return to reality. It wasn’t just the haunting image of an American president and an Indian prime minister holding forth as part of the city literally burned. The trip’s business end proved short on substance, with several noticeable exceptions.
The leaders did muster significant defense sales announcements, tangible signs of energy collaboration, and nonbinding understandings on health and medical products. As China expands its footprint deeper into the South China Sea, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, both countries have enhanced maritime security cooperation to safeguard well-established global norms. They agreed to establish an office in India to help finance high-quality infrastructure. These and various other joint activities should not be minimized.
Yet the U.S.-India relationship is perceptibly shrinking in ambition and dynamism. After over a year of negotiations, a limited trade agreement still eluded Trump and Modi. A so-called mini-deal would not have covered large swaths of business activity (such as e-commerce and information technology), but it offered the prospect of building trust between economies in rather different places. Scant attention was paid to pressing environmental challenges. As China approaches world leadership in green technologies and India makes progress toward ambitious renewable energy targets, the Trump administration has by-and-large chosen to remain on the sidelines. Trump may have spent more time in his Delhi press conference downplaying the risks of COVID-19 than he did discussing how the two countries can work together to fight it.
Even as bilateral ties grow, Trump and Modi are enabling each other’s more dubious tendencies. After Trump was handed a giant political stage by India in an election year, it shouldn’t come as a shock that the president couldn’t find his voice as a wave of violence descended around him. With his Muslim travel bans and false moral equivalencies, Trump has squandered his credibility. Yet staying silent, after visiting the onetime home of Mahatma Gandhi, only provides cover for the erosion of civil rights and rule of law in India.
On trade, the transactional president is also ill suited to persuade India that opening markets can revive a sputtering economy and create the jobs that India so urgently needs. As Trump goes on about tariffs, trade deficits, and related minutiae, small wonder that India’s 2020-2021 budget featured numerous duty hikes last month.
In Asia, the White House’s unpredictability and inattentiveness reinforce long-standing, latent Indian tendencies to question U.S. reliability on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China. Not a single diplomat from the State Department traveled to Delhi as part of Trump’s official delegation (due to a scheduling conflict with the annual Global Chiefs of Mission Conference). The twin anchors of the administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific ” diplomacy are gradually coming unmoored. If balancing China is a shared priority, both countries need to get their houses in order.
Fixing the fundamentals requires recognizing what largely brought India and the United States together in the first place: the sturdy bedrock of democratic principles, economic openness, and a more patient, long-term vision of their relationship. What does that actually look like? With democracy in decline across parts of the world, the countries should be swapping insights on how to protect elections from direct and indirect attempts at foreign meddling. Indeed, that kind of cooperation, or working together to tackle the corrupting role of black money in societies, would remind leaders across the U.S. political spectrum why they placed a strategic bet on India in the first place.
India still has extraordinary potential as a durable partner in a region that may be the world’s center of gravity for decades to come. Prior to Trump’s visit, the experienced diplomat William J. Burns reminded everyone that “the relationship is bigger than these two leaders.” That certainly has been the case in the past and can ring true in the days ahead. The sooner that both governments and societies can take to heart Burns’s vital message, the better.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-11--Trump and Johnson Can Quickly Strike a Trade Deal—If They Avoid the Pitfalls

Trump and Johnson Can Quickly Strike a Trade Deal—If They Avoid the Pitfalls Three-and-a-half tumultuous years after Britain ’ s referendum to leave the European Union , Brexit formally took place at the end of January .
Fresh off a resounding election victory , Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his post-Brexit government will make expanding trade a top priority , reordering trade arrangements not just with the EU , but with countries around the world .
In the coming months , the United Kingdom will begin negotiating a free trade agreement ( FTA ) with its most important trading partner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States .
Quickly reaching an accord is possible , but only if the two sides are willing to acknowledge political realities .
A U.S.-U.K. FTA makes sense for both countries .
It would join the world ’ s largest and fifth-largest economies .
Both countries are high-wage , modern , developed economies .
Both have strong finance sectors that could benefit from more liberalized trade in services .
Both would benefit from liberalized yet high-standard rules covering digital trade and e-commerce , the new frontier of trade in the 21st century .
Reducing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and facilitating uninhibited investment must be a top priority .
The U.K. Department of International Trade ’ s negotiating objectives , released in early March , note the United States as Britain ’ s largest bilateral trade and investment partner .
The department estimates that “ U.K.-U.S. total trade was valued at £220.9 billion , ” or about $ 284 billion , last year .
The United States accounts for nearly 20 percent of Britain ’ s total exports and 11 percent of its imports .
An FTA between the two countries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by more than £15 billion ( about $ 19 billion ) and increase total U.K. wages by £1.8 billion ( about $ 2.3 billion ) .
Not only would both sides benefit economically , but a quick deal with the U.K. would also give Washington leverage in any renewed negotiations with the EU , which were unwisely abandoned at the end of 2016 , in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum and President Donald Trump ’ s election .
There is clearly enthusiasm on both sides to reach a deal quickly .
Elizabeth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade secretary , recently penned a column in the Wall Street Journal laying out the economic merits of a deal .
Meanwhile , a bipartisan group of senators recently wrote a letter to the U.S. trade representative , Robert Lighthizer , urging the administration to make a post-Brexit FTA between the two countries a priority .
Nevertheless , negotiations will be fraught with peril .
Extremely sensitive issues will need to be reckoned with or avoided .
Transatlantic enthusiasm must be tempered by cold political realities .
First is the issue of Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Huawei ’ s connection to the Chinese government , the Trump administration , bolstered by a large bipartisan group of senators , has urged the U.K. to abandon plans to utilize Huawei component parts in building its 5G network infrastructure—going so far as to threaten to withhold certain intelligence if the British move forward .
Johnson recently canceled a planned trip to Washington after tensions over this issue erupted during a phone call with Trump .
Until resolved , it will overhang all negotiations between the two sides .
Equally fraught are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration will likely be pressing the U.K. to tighten its intellectual-property protections for pharmaceuticals , which would benefit U.S. drug companies but raise prices for Britain ‘ s National Health Service ( NHS ) .
This is a nonstarter for several reasons .
First , as the U.K. ’ s Department of International Trade made clear in its negotiating principles , “ The price the NHS pays for drugs will not be on the table.
” That is an unequivocal statement .
The issue of drug prices—and the potential impact of an FTA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role in the British election campaign last year , with Labour candidate Jeremy Corbyn using it to batter Johnson .
The subject is clearly sensitive .
Second , Democrats in the U.S. Congress also won ‘ t support strict pharmaceutical intellectual-proerty protections in an FTA with Britain—or with any country , for that matter .
Arguing that tighter intellectual-property protections on pharmaceuticals risk making health care even more expensive for Americans , Democrats successfully fought similar provisions during the recent ratification process for the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement .
Getting an agreement approved by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compromises , and this is one of their top demands .
On policy grounds , stricter intellectual-property standards don ’ t make sense , either .
Both the United States and Britain already have fairly strong protections for intellectual-property holders .
Both parties are members of the World Trade Organization ’ s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ( TRIPS ) , which establishes a baseline for protecting and enforcing intellectual-property rights .
A basic requirement to respect each other ’ s laws and enforce their own would be sufficient for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for any so-called “ TRIPS-plus ” rules .
Finally there is the issue of food safety—or what trade specialists call “ sanitary and phytosanitary standards ” .
Most of the controversy revolves around U.S. chicken exports .
In 1997 , the EU banned the use of chlorine and other disinfectants in cleaning meat at the end of the food production process , a common practice for certain meats in the United States .
As a result , U.S. chicken exports to the U.K. are virtually nonexistent .
Now that the U.K. is outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. chicken lobby will surely push to expand exports .
For his part , Lighthizer recently waved away concerns about chlorinated chicken by saying , “ Science-based standards , and then consumer preference—that ’ s what ’ s going to sort out this problem , and the United States and the U.K. are not going to go separate ways based on chicken.
” Regardless of the ban ‘ s merits and Britain ’ s new status outside EU law , the issue of chlorinated chicken is so controversial in the U.K. that any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slow or possibly derail the talks .
The U.S. trade representative should avoid the subject if it wants to quickly conclude an FTA .
Finally there is the issue of Trump ’ s ill-advised steel and aluminum tariffs , levied under the dubious guise of “ national security.
” Johnson ’ s government is asking the United States to remove the steel and aluminum tariffs .
Simply put , steel and aluminum imported from the U.K. does not in any way threaten U.S. national security .
A recent study by economists Kadee Russ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ 75,000 fewer jobs in manufacturing attributable ” to the steel and aluminum tariffs , “ not counting additional losses among U.S. exporters facing tariffs other countries levied in retaliation.
” It is well past time to lift the tariffs for all countries , but especially for imports from a long-standing ally like the United Kingdom .
A high-quality FTA between the United States and Britain would have many benefits for both sides , and could reaffirm the special relationship that has long existed between the two transatlantic powers .
But trade negotiators @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

Three-and-a-half tumultuous years after Britain’s referendum to leave the European Union, Brexit formally took place at the end of January. Fresh off a resounding election victory, Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his post-Brexit government will make expanding trade a top priority, reordering trade arrangements not just with the EU, but with countries around the world. In the coming months, the United Kingdom will begin negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with its most important trading partner other than the EU: the United States. Quickly reaching an accord is possible, but only if the two sides are willing to acknowledge political realities.
Three-and-a-half tumultuous years after Britain’s referendum to leave the European Union, Brexit formally took place at the end of January. Fresh off a resounding election victory, Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his post-Brexit government will make expanding trade a top priority, reordering trade arrangements not just with the EU, but with countries around the world. In the coming months, the United Kingdom will begin negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with its most important trading partner other than the EU: the United States. Quickly reaching an accord is possible, but only if the two sides are willing to acknowledge political realities.
A U.S.-U.K. FTA makes sense for both countries. It would join the world’s largest and fifth-largest economies. Both countries are high-wage, modern, developed economies. Both have strong finance sectors that could benefit from more liberalized trade in services. Both would benefit from liberalized yet high-standard rules covering digital trade and e-commerce, the new frontier of trade in the 21st century. Reducing as many tariffs as quickly as possible and facilitating uninhibited investment must be a top priority.
The U.K. Department of International Trade’s negotiating objectives, released in early March, note the United States as Britain’s largest bilateral trade and investment partner. The department estimates that “U.K.-U.S. total trade was valued at £220.9 billion,” or about $284 billion, last year. The United States accounts for nearly 20 percent of Britain’s total exports and 11 percent of its imports. An FTA between the two countries, the department estimates, could boost trade by more than £15 billion (about $19 billion) and increase total U.K. wages by £1.8 billion (about $2.3 billion). Not only would both sides benefit economically, but a quick deal with the U.K. would also give Washington leverage in any renewed negotiations with the EU, which were unwisely abandoned at the end of 2016, in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum and President Donald Trump’s election.
There is clearly enthusiasm on both sides to reach a deal quickly. Elizabeth Truss, the U.K.’s international trade secretary, recently penned a column in the Wall Street Journal laying out the economic merits of a deal. Meanwhile, a bipartisan group of senators recently wrote a letter to the U.S. trade representative, Robert Lighthizer, urging the administration to make a post-Brexit FTA between the two countries a priority.
Nevertheless, negotiations will be fraught with peril. Extremely sensitive issues will need to be reckoned with or avoided. Transatlantic enthusiasm must be tempered by cold political realities.
First is the issue of Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. Citing security concerns with Huawei’s connection to the Chinese government, the Trump administration, bolstered by a large bipartisan group of senators, has urged the U.K. to abandon plans to utilize Huawei component parts in building its 5G network infrastructure—going so far as to threaten to withhold certain intelligence if the British move forward. Johnson recently canceled a planned trip to Washington after tensions over this issue erupted during a phone call with Trump. Until resolved, it will overhang all negotiations between the two sides.
Equally fraught are issues surrounding health care. The Trump administration will likely be pressing the U.K. to tighten its intellectual-property protections for pharmaceuticals, which would benefit U.S. drug companies but raise prices for Britain‘s National Health Service (NHS). This is a nonstarter for several reasons. First, as the U.K.’s Department of International Trade made clear in its negotiating principles, “The price the NHS pays for drugs will not be on the table.” That is an unequivocal statement. The issue of drug prices—and the potential impact of an FTA with the United States—also played a prominent role in the British election campaign last year, with Labour candidate Jeremy Corbyn using it to batter Johnson. The subject is clearly sensitive.
Second, Democrats in the U.S. Congress also won‘t support strict pharmaceutical intellectual-proerty protections in an FTA with Britain—or with any country, for that matter. Arguing that tighter intellectual-property protections on pharmaceuticals risk making health care even more expensive for Americans, Democrats successfully fought similar provisions during the recent ratification process for the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Getting an agreement approved by the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives will require compromises, and this is one of their top demands.
On policy grounds, stricter intellectual-property standards don’t make sense, either. Both the United States and Britain already have fairly strong protections for intellectual-property holders. Both parties are members of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which establishes a baseline for protecting and enforcing intellectual-property rights. A basic requirement to respect each other’s laws and enforce their own would be sufficient for an FTA. There is no need for any so-called “TRIPS-plus” rules.
Finally there is the issue of food safety—or what trade specialists call “sanitary and phytosanitary standards”. Most of the controversy revolves around U.S. chicken exports.
In 1997, the EU banned the use of chlorine and other disinfectants in cleaning meat at the end of the food production process, a common practice for certain meats in the United States. As a result, U.S. chicken exports to the U.K. are virtually nonexistent. Now that the U.K. is outside the purview of EU law, the U.S. chicken lobby will surely push to expand exports. For his part, Lighthizer recently waved away concerns about chlorinated chicken by saying, “Science-based standards, and then consumer preference—that’s what’s going to sort out this problem, and the United States and the U.K. are not going to go separate ways based on chicken.” Regardless of the ban‘s merits and Britain’s new status outside EU law, the issue of chlorinated chicken is so controversial in the U.K. that any effort to weaken the ban would significantly slow or possibly derail the talks. The U.S. trade representative should avoid the subject if it wants to quickly conclude an FTA.
Finally there is the issue of Trump’s ill-advised steel and aluminum tariffs, levied under the dubious guise of “national security.” Johnson’s government is asking the United States to remove the steel and aluminum tariffs. Simply put, steel and aluminum imported from the U.K. does not in any way threaten U.S. national security. A recent study by economists Kadee Russ and Lydia Cox found that there are “75,000 fewer jobs in manufacturing attributable” to the steel and aluminum tariffs, “not counting additional losses among U.S. exporters facing tariffs other countries levied in retaliation.” It is well past time to lift the tariffs for all countries, but especially for imports from a long-standing ally like the United Kingdom.
A high-quality FTA between the United States and Britain would have many benefits for both sides, and could reaffirm the special relationship that has long existed between the two transatlantic powers. But trade negotiators should beware of the pitfalls—and tread carefully.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-11--U.S. and China Turn Coronavirus Into a Geopolitical Football

U.S. and China Turn Coronavirus Into a Geopolitical Football In a bid to restore its reputation globally , China claims to have fundamentally contained the spread of coronavirus in its hardest-hit areas and has pledged $ 20 million to help the World Health Organization to help improve public health systems in poor countries , China ’ s United Nations ambassador wrote in a letter to U.N. member states .
The message—which was delivered as the United States and Europe brace for a major surge in cases—underscored how Beijing is attempting to rebrand itself as the international leader in a global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in its own territory and which WHO on Wednesday formally declared a pandemic .
The letter , obtained by Foreign Policy , appeared calculated to rebut growing criticism from the United States and elsewhere over its initial handling of the outbreak that allowed the disease to spread so rapidly .
“ The spread of the epidemic has been basically contained in Hubei and Wuhan , ” China ’ s U.N. ambassador Zhang Jun boasted in a letter to representatives of the U.N. ’ s other 192 member states .
“ We are ready @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the international community to jointly fight the epidemic.
” The race by medical workers to stop the deadly virus ’ s spread is playing out against a backdrop of big-power diplomatic rivalry between the United States and China , which are both seeking to use the calamity to stake out their claims to global influence .
At the moment , the contrast between their approaches is striking .
China ’ s focus on international cooperation differs sharply from that of the White House—which has mainly used the crisis to point blame at Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to domestic measures to protect against the virus .
Beyond that , the White House shuttered its pandemic preparedness office two years ago and recently proposed sharp cuts in U.S. financial contributions to WHO .
Last month , the White House request to authorize $ 2.5 billion—including $ 1.25 billion in new money—to fight coronavirus included no money for the Geneva-based health agency or other international programs aimed at coordinating the international response .
In news conferences this week , the head of Trump ’ s coronavirus task force , Vice President Mike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little about the need to cooperate with partnering countries and international institutions .
“ I don ’ t sense there is any huge , effective U.S. strategy internationally to fight COVID-19 any more than there is an effective U.S. strategy , ” said one Democratic congressional aide .
“ This administration doesn ’ t value multilateral institutions—they view them as merely as whipping boys and inefficient financial drains.
” For Trump administration officials , China ’ s sluggish and secretive early response to the outbreak also fits into a narrative they ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t be trusted as a global leader—on leadership in international institutions , on Chinese tech giant Huawei building sensitive 5G telecommunications networks in Europe , and on aid and investment in developing countries .
Reflecting his “ America First ” doctrine , Trump himself even suggested in the early days of the outbreak that it might be good for the United States if Americans couldn ’ t travel abroad .
“ We ’ re going to have Americans staying home instead of going and spending the money in other countries .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reasons the job numbers are so good , ” he said last Friday .
“ Unfortunately rather than using best practices , this outbreak in Wuhan was covered up , ” Robert O ’ Brien , Trump ’ s national security advisor , said in public remarks on Wednesday at the Heritage Foundation , a conservative think tank .
“ It probably cost the world community two months to respond.
” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled the virus the “ Wuhan virus ” —angering Chinese officials and others who say the label @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proven incredibly frustrating to work with the Chinese Communist Party ” to get accurate data on the outbreak .
The move comes as the United Nations has begun to scale back key conferences and meetings around the world .
Last week , the U.N. suspended a critical portion of a major U.N. conference on women ’ s rights in New York , turning away thousands of government officials and women ’ s rights advocates who planned to fly to New York for the meeting .
On Wednesday , the five-member bureau of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of representatives of the council ’ s five regional groups , recommended this years ’ session be suspended indefinitely on Friday , according to a confidential copy of the minutes of the bureau ’ s meeting .
The rights council ’ s 47 member states are expected to endorse the decision on Thursday .
The decision was taken after delegations raised concern about the spread of coronavirus .
The Chinese initiative at the United Nations , meanwhile , appears calculated to burnish the image of Chinese President Xi Jinping himself , who faced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response in the critical early months , when government authorities actively sought to suppress information about the new virus and punished doctors and nurses who sought to ring the alarm bell .
( China ’ s central propaganda department is even reportedly in the process of producing a book lauding Xi ’ s leadership in the coronavirus response . )
“ Both the U.S. and China are trying to leverage the crisis to their own advantage , ” said Kristine Lee , an expert on the Asia-Pacific at the Center for a New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration ’ s tough rhetoric about the need to check Chinese influence in international organizations such as WHO , the State Department has done little to shore up its own influence , relying instead on denunciations .
Pompeo ’ s description of the coronavirus at the “ Wuhan flu ” only complicates already fraught relations with China at time when the two countries need to share information and know-how , a second Democratic congressional aide argued .
“ I expect my secretary of state to be an adult , and not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jollies off , ” the aide said in a phone interview .
With signs that the virus was abating at least at the epicenter of the outbreak , Xi traveled to Wuhan on March 10 to declare victory .
“ President Xi pointed out that with our hard work , the situation in Hubei and Wuhan has shown positive chances with important progress , ” Zhang wrote in the March 10 letter to representatives of the other U.N. member states .
Zhang highlighted the need for international cooperation in combating the virus , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries , infected over 120,000 people , and killed some 4,300 .
“ Public health emergencies are a common challenge to all countries , ” he added .
“ We thank all the countries and international organizations who have provided us with in-kind assistance , and we are now providing medical supplies including testing kits , face masks and preventive gears to several countries affected by the epidemic.
” Zhang later told reporters that China has sent medical teams and supplies to Japan , South Korea , and Italy .
“ We have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ We need to join hands , we need to show solidarity.
” The dueling narratives that both Beijing and Washington are putting out have increased pressure on WHO , the leading international body tasked with coordinating a global response to coronavirus .
Critics say the organization has been too soft on China in its response , particularly its director-general , Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , who has effusively praised China ’ s handling of the crisis .
The health organization faced criticism that it moved slowly in the early stages of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the spread of the virus constituted a global health emergency .
Facing push back from China , a WHO expert committee was unable to agree during a Jan. 22 meeting to issue the declaration .
Just over a week later , facing mounting concerns about the virus ’ spread , WHO declared the coronavirus a global health emergency but urged governments to continue trade and travel with China .
“ This is the time for solidarity , not stigma , ” Tedros said .
Following a fact-finding tour by 25 international experts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , WHO ’ s Bruce Aylward , who led the delegation , painted a highly flattering portrait of Beijing ’ s response .
“ Its hospitals looked better than some I see here in Switzerland , ” Aylward told the New York Times .
“ We ’ d ask , ‘ How many ventilators do you have ?
’ They ’ d say ‘ 50.
’ ” Michael Collins , a research associate for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations , described the report as a “ fusion of science and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he said , tracks with what he knows about the course of the pandemic .
But it makes a political judgement about the effectiveness of the Chinese response that “ does not strike me as connected with reality .
It strikes me that WHO is really doing a good job of refurbishing China ’ s image.
” Collins , who studied at Peking University , also challenged Aylward ’ s characterization of China ’ s state-of-the-art medical facilities , recalling long lines and inadequate services and equipment at one of the most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Anyone who lives there knows that the last place you want to go to in China is a Chinese hospital , ” Collins said .
“ There is a certain disconnect to WHO statements , ” noted Lawrence Gostin , the director of the O ’ Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown ’ s University ’ s law school , noting that the health agency has ditched its traditional defense of human rights and press freedom in dealing with China .
“ It has praised China , saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” he added .
“ Yet it has recommended against travel restrictions in all other countries.
” But Gostin and other experts concede that Tedros and other top WHO leaders are in a difficult spot , balancing competing interests and trying to keep their clout in China , one of the organization ’ s largest and most influential members .
“ Tedros is in a very difficult position .
And the truth is that WHO rarely criticizes countries that are at the epicenter of a pandemic , ” Gostin said .
Ultimately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington ’ s tit-for-tat fight over the coronavirus could undercut the international institutions they established to fight epidemics of this scale .
“ Not only the U.S. and China but all governments should really rise to the occasion and rise above the attempt to use this to fight each other but find ways to collaborate and cooperate , ” said Hung Tran , a former senior International Monetary Fund official and senior fellow with the Atlantic Council .
“ Unfortunately , it doesn ’ t look like it is happening that way .
@

In a bid to restore its reputation globally, China claims to have fundamentally contained the spread of coronavirus in its hardest-hit areas and has pledged $20 million to help the World Health Organization to help improve public health systems in poor countries, China’s United Nations ambassador wrote in a letter to U.N. member states.
In a bid to restore its reputation globally, China claims to have fundamentally contained the spread of coronavirus in its hardest-hit areas and has pledged $20 million to help the World Health Organization to help improve public health systems in poor countries, China’s United Nations ambassador wrote in a letter to U.N. member states.
The message—which was delivered as the United States and Europe brace for a major surge in cases—underscored how Beijing is attempting to rebrand itself as the international leader in a global fight against a virus that likely originated in its own territory and which WHO on Wednesday formally declared a pandemic.
The letter, obtained by Foreign Policy, appeared calculated to rebut growing criticism from the United States and elsewhere over its initial handling of the outbreak that allowed the disease to spread so rapidly. “The spread of the epidemic has been basically contained in Hubei and Wuhan,” China’s U.N. ambassador Zhang Jun boasted in a letter to representatives of the U.N.’s other 192 member states. “We are ready to strengthen solidarity with the rest of the international community to jointly fight the epidemic.”
The race by medical workers to stop the deadly virus’s spread is playing out against a backdrop of big-power diplomatic rivalry between the United States and China, which are both seeking to use the calamity to stake out their claims to global influence.
At the moment, the contrast between their approaches is striking. China’s focus on international cooperation differs sharply from that of the White House—which has mainly used the crisis to point blame at Beijing and has directed most of its energies to domestic measures to protect against the virus. Beyond that, the White House shuttered its pandemic preparedness office two years ago and recently proposed sharp cuts in U.S. financial contributions to WHO. Last month, the White House request to authorize $2.5 billion—including $1.25 billion in new money—to fight coronavirus included no money for the Geneva-based health agency or other international programs aimed at coordinating the international response. In news conferences this week, the head of Trump’s coronavirus task force, Vice President Mike Pence, and his team have said little about the need to cooperate with partnering countries and international institutions.
“I don’t sense there is any huge, effective U.S. strategy internationally to fight COVID-19 any more than there is an effective U.S. strategy,” said one Democratic congressional aide. “This administration doesn’t value multilateral institutions—they view them as merely as whipping boys and inefficient financial drains.”
For Trump administration officials, China’s sluggish and secretive early response to the outbreak also fits into a narrative they’ve been pushing for years: China can’t be trusted as a global leader—on leadership in international institutions, on Chinese tech giant Huawei building sensitive 5G telecommunications networks in Europe, and on aid and investment in developing countries. Reflecting his “America First” doctrine, Trump himself even suggested in the early days of the outbreak that it might be good for the United States if Americans couldn’t travel abroad. “We’re going to have Americans staying home instead of going and spending the money in other countries. And maybe that’s one of the reasons the job numbers are so good,” he said last Friday.
“Unfortunately rather than using best practices, this outbreak in Wuhan was covered up,” Robert O’Brien, Trump’s national security advisor, said in public remarks on Wednesday at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. “It probably cost the world community two months to respond.”
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled the virus the “Wuhan virus”—angering Chinese officials and others who say the label promotes xenophobia—and fumed that “it has proven incredibly frustrating to work with the Chinese Communist Party” to get accurate data on the outbreak.
The move comes as the United Nations has begun to scale back key conferences and meetings around the world. Last week, the U.N. suspended a critical portion of a major U.N. conference on women’s rights in New York, turning away thousands of government officials and women’s rights advocates who planned to fly to New York for the meeting.
On Wednesday, the five-member bureau of the U.N. Human Rights Council, which consists of representatives of the council’s five regional groups, recommended this years’ session be suspended indefinitely on Friday, according to a confidential copy of the minutes of the bureau’s meeting. The rights council’s 47 member states are expected to endorse the decision on Thursday. The decision was taken after delegations raised concern about the spread of coronavirus.
The Chinese initiative at the United Nations, meanwhile, appears calculated to burnish the image of Chinese President Xi Jinping himself, who faced international criticism for mishandling China’s response in the critical early months, when government authorities actively sought to suppress information about the new virus and punished doctors and nurses who sought to ring the alarm bell. (China’s central propaganda department is even reportedly in the process of producing a book lauding Xi’s leadership in the coronavirus response.)
“Both the U.S. and China are trying to leverage the crisis to their own advantage,” said Kristine Lee, an expert on the Asia-Pacific at the Center for a New American Security think tank.
But despite the Trump administration’s tough rhetoric about the need to check Chinese influence in international organizations such as WHO, the State Department has done little to shore up its own influence, relying instead on denunciations.
Pompeo’s description of the coronavirus at the “Wuhan flu” only complicates already fraught relations with China at time when the two countries need to share information and know-how, a second Democratic congressional aide argued. “I expect my secretary of state to be an adult, and not hurl schoolyard insults just to get his jollies off,” the aide said in a phone interview.
With signs that the virus was abating at least at the epicenter of the outbreak, Xi traveled to Wuhan on March 10 to declare victory. “President Xi pointed out that with our hard work, the situation in Hubei and Wuhan has shown positive chances with important progress,” Zhang wrote in the March 10 letter to representatives of the other U.N. member states.
Zhang highlighted the need for international cooperation in combating the virus, which has now spread to over 100 countries, infected over 120,000 people, and killed some 4,300. “Public health emergencies are a common challenge to all countries,” he added. “We thank all the countries and international organizations who have provided us with in-kind assistance, and we are now providing medical supplies including testing kits, face masks and preventive gears to several countries affected by the epidemic.” Zhang later told reporters that China has sent medical teams and supplies to Japan, South Korea, and Italy. “We have only one world,” he said. “We need to join hands, we need to show solidarity.”
The dueling narratives that both Beijing and Washington are putting out have increased pressure on WHO, the leading international body tasked with coordinating a global response to coronavirus. Critics say the organization has been too soft on China in its response, particularly its director-general, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who has effusively praised China’s handling of the crisis.
The health organization faced criticism that it moved slowly in the early stages of the crisis to issue a formal declaration that the spread of the virus constituted a global health emergency. Facing push back from China, a WHO expert committee was unable to agree during a Jan. 22 meeting to issue the declaration. Just over a week later, facing mounting concerns about the virus’ spread, WHO declared the coronavirus a global health emergency but urged governments to continue trade and travel with China. “This is the time for solidarity, not stigma,” Tedros said.
Following a fact-finding tour by 25 international experts to China’s hardest hit-areas in February, WHO’s Bruce Aylward, who led the delegation, painted a highly flattering portrait of Beijing’s response. “Its hospitals looked better than some I see here in Switzerland,” Aylward told the New York Times. “We’d ask, ‘How many ventilators do you have?’ They’d say ‘50.’”
Michael Collins, a research associate for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, described the report as a “fusion of science and politics.” The report’s science, he said, tracks with what he knows about the course of the pandemic. But it makes a political judgement about the effectiveness of the Chinese response that “does not strike me as connected with reality. It strikes me that WHO is really doing a good job of refurbishing China’s image.”
Collins, who studied at Peking University, also challenged Aylward’s characterization of China’s state-of-the-art medical facilities, recalling long lines and inadequate services and equipment at one of the most prestigious academic institutes in the country. “Anyone who lives there knows that the last place you want to go to in China is a Chinese hospital,” Collins said.
“There is a certain disconnect to WHO statements,” noted Lawrence Gostin, the director of the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown’s University’s law school, noting that the health agency has ditched its traditional defense of human rights and press freedom in dealing with China. “It has praised China, saying the China model should be copied globally,” he added. “Yet it has recommended against travel restrictions in all other countries.”
But Gostin and other experts concede that Tedros and other top WHO leaders are in a difficult spot, balancing competing interests and trying to keep their clout in China, one of the organization’s largest and most influential members. “Tedros is in a very difficult position. And the truth is that WHO rarely criticizes countries that are at the epicenter of a pandemic,” Gostin said.
Ultimately, some experts fear that Beijing and Washington’s tit-for-tat fight over the coronavirus could undercut the international institutions they established to fight epidemics of this scale.
“Not only the U.S. and China but all governments should really rise to the occasion and rise above the attempt to use this to fight each other but find ways to collaborate and cooperate,” said Hung Tran, a former senior International Monetary Fund official and senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. “Unfortunately, it doesn’t look like it is happening that way.”


foreignpolicy--2020-03-11--Taiwan’s Opposition Struggles to Shake Pro-China Image

In the aftermath of an astounding defeat in Taiwan ’ s January presidential elections , the opposition Kuomintang ( KMT ) is reexamining its policy priorities under new party leadership .
In a March 7 by-election , the KMT elected Johnny Chiang , a legislator from the central city of Taichung , as its next chair for the upcoming year , defeating former Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin with 68.8 percent of the vote .
The KMT has plenty of issues to wrestle with—but the international audience has focused on the party ’ s cross-strait policy with China and , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will endure as the foundation for official mechanisms between the two sides .
The KMT is by far the most pro-mainland of Taiwan ’ s two major political parties , with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ) taking a much tougher stance on relations with Beijing .
The KMT ’ s position stems largely from the legacy of the Chinese Civil War with the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) and the complicated history of vying to represent “ China , ” as the Republic of China or the People ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ underscored the notion of “ One China ” in the 1992 Consensus .
In contrast , the DPP played a prominent role in Taiwan ’ s democratization and places a greater emphasis on a unique Taiwanese identity and history separate from that of China ’ s .
Notably , the Financial Times reported the day before Chiang ’ s victory that both candidates were poised to “ discard ” the 1992 Consensus , citing key party officials who believe that the consensus has lost its utility and undergone “ distortion ” when linked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ systems ” model of relations with Beijing used in Hong Kong , which leaves Hong Kong technically beholden to Beijing as it retains its own political and economic structure .
The January elections were seen as a mandate for maintaining the status quo as pursued by current President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP and as a rejection of China ’ s continued attempts to redefine it under its terms , such as by equating the 1992 Consensus with “ one country , two systems.
” Tsai and the DPP were adept at weaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protests in Hong Kong and the KMT ’ s insistence on revitalizing relations with Beijing , casting her party as the defender of Taiwan ’ s democracy , values , and way of life against those encroaching on it .
And yet a departure from the underlying substance of the 1992 Consensus seems unlikely—as the KMT is constrained by the inconvenient history of Taiwan , an electoral base that either benefits from or lauds enhanced cross-strait engagement , and , in some cases , unique access to the CCP through party-to-party ties .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ would remain , even if the KMT were to move away from the appellation itself and repurpose it under a new name more palatable for Taiwan ’ s people .
Under similar domestic considerations , the KMT is also attempting to stay ahead of the narrative , in light of China ’ s signaling that it aims to clarify specific elements of the consensus and move away from long-held ambiguities by demonstrating to Taiwan ’ s people that any shift in policy is proactive , rather than just a reaction to what China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Consensus is contentious in Taiwan , from its questionable origins to its fundamental contradictions .
The 1992 Consensus was first officially advanced by that name under the KMT ’ s Ma Ying-jeou , Taiwan ’ s president from 2008 to 2016 , with Ma continuously crediting his recognition of the 1992 Consensus for bringing about the period of cross-strait rapprochement during his presidency .
The consensus was supposedly born of a 1992 Hong Kong meeting between the KMT and CCP through semi-official channels , during which time the two sides reportedly struggled to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cross-strait negotiations and agreements would be based .
In the aftermath , the two sides only reached an oral agreement to state their respective , divergent views .
The actual term , “ 1992 Consensus , ” was not coined until April 2000 , though the Ma administration insisted that the “ content ” of the 1992 Consensus—in each side holding its own interpretation—has endured since the meeting , even if the formal appellation came only afterward .
In essence , the 1992 Consensus endured during the Ma years as a tacit agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grounded in the understanding that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of that China .
For China , it stops there—in line with the tenets of its “ One China ” principle .
For the KMT , the “ 1992 Consensus ” is caveated with the phrase “ One China , respective interpretations , ” holding that when Beijing says “ China ” it means the CCP-led People ’ s Republic of China and when Taipei says “ China ” it means the Republic of China government that fled to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Civil War .
Until recently , Beijing has been careful in not only avoiding explicit acknowledgement of “ respective interpretations ” but also not refuting it .
This approach allowed the two sides to operate in a gray zone of sorts between 2008 and 2016 , while keeping a window open for plausible deniability on the part of Beijing , as well as latitude to redefine the 1992 Consensus if needed .
That time may have now come .
Signs out of China have suggested that Beijing may be moving to shift the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be more in line with its own views and may no longer tolerate the “ respective interpretations ” the KMT espouses .
Since Tsai took office in 2016 , there have been murmurs out of China that the “ respective interpretations ” of the KMT ’ s framing of the 1992 Consensus will perhaps no longer be permitted .
This signaling , however , has always been through unofficial channels , such as in op-eds reposted to official government websites—as well as a rumored internal directive for state media .
Statements from former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In January 2019 , Wang Zaixi , a former deputy director of Beijing ’ s Taiwan Affairs Office , was quoted as saying that the KMT ’ s “ respective interpretations ” distracts from the “ original meaning ” of the “ 1992 Consensus ” and that the “ 1992 Consensus ” was clarified by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his New Year ’ s speech to include unification—assumedly under the “ one country , two systems ” rubric .
At the same time , however , China has stayed the course in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of “ respective interpretations , ” with Taiwan Affairs Office spokespeople stressing the importance of adhering to the 1992 Consensus and “ One China , ” commending the progress achieved under the 1992 Consensus during the Ma administration , and refraining from fully answering the question when asked at press conferences .
With China signaling that a future cross-strait framework for official contacts should better align with Beijing ’ s position of “ One China ” with no caveats and the KMT considering a more neutral , perhaps more Taiwan-centric , approach , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and further than ever from a consensus .
Yet , a critical component undercutting any new formulation by the KMT is whether it would be accepted by the party ’ s counterparts in Beijing if the KMT takes office .
Signs out of China have pointed to an unwillingness to accept a more muted approach .
For example , as the KMT presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu ’ s team of advisors was coming together in the summer of 2019 and debate over whether he would stick to the party line on the 1992 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chang San-cheng , a former premier under Ma who advised Han ’ s campaign , proposed an alternative formula under “ a constitutional ‘ One China ’ that prioritizes Taiwan.
” Chang argued that the 1992 Consensus has been stigmatized and equated with acceptance of “ one country , two systems , ” and he said it should instead be replaced with a “ more neutral ” term .
His emphasis on the Taiwanese Constitution was quickly rebuked as a nonstarter by media outlets with ties to the Chinese party-state ’ s top-level @ @ @ @ @ @ @ responses from China following Chiang ’ s election as party leader .
A spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office released a statement commending the progress achieved under “ the common political foundation of the ‘ 1992 Consensus ’ ” while voicing his hope that Chiang will “ cherish and safeguard the existing political foundation between the two parties.
” China ’ s state news agency Xinhua posted an editorial that took a harsher tone , claiming that “ scrapping the ‘ 1992 Consensus ’ to ‘ steal votes ’ from the DPP is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to KMT efforts to enhance cross-strait ties and serve the interests of the Taiwanese people .
The KMT urgently needs to redefine itself in the eyes of Taiwanese voters .
But it may be impossible to find a cross-strait formula that can simultaneously reassure citizens increasingly nervous of Beijing ’ s attentions and maintain the ties with China that the party has prided itself on .
Absent that , any reworking of the language is largely illusory—and effectively the same as the current DPP administration ’ s .

In the aftermath of an astounding defeat in Taiwan’s January presidential elections, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) is reexamining its policy priorities under new party leadership. In a March 7 by-election, the KMT elected Johnny Chiang, a legislator from the central city of Taichung, as its next chair for the upcoming year, defeating former Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin with 68.8 percent of the vote.
In the aftermath of an astounding defeat in Taiwan’s January presidential elections, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) is reexamining its policy priorities under new party leadership. In a March 7 by-election, the KMT elected Johnny Chiang, a legislator from the central city of Taichung, as its next chair for the upcoming year, defeating former Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin with 68.8 percent of the vote.
The KMT has plenty of issues to wrestle with—but the international audience has focused on the party’s cross-strait policy with China and, in particular, whether the so-called 1992 Consensus will endure as the foundation for official mechanisms between the two sides. The KMT is by far the most pro-mainland of Taiwan’s two major political parties, with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) taking a much tougher stance on relations with Beijing. The KMT’s position stems largely from the legacy of the Chinese Civil War with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the complicated history of vying to represent “China,” as the Republic of China or the People’s Republic of China, which has underscored the notion of “One China” in the 1992 Consensus. In contrast, the DPP played a prominent role in Taiwan’s democratization and places a greater emphasis on a unique Taiwanese identity and history separate from that of China’s.
Notably, the Financial Times reported the day before Chiang’s victory that both candidates were poised to “discard” the 1992 Consensus, citing key party officials who believe that the consensus has lost its utility and undergone “distortion” when linked with the “one country, two systems” model of relations that Beijing uses in Hong Kong, which leaves Hong Kong technically beholden to Beijing as it retains its own political and economic structure. The January elections were seen as a mandate for maintaining the status quo as pursued by current President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP and as a rejection of China’s continued attempts to redefine it under its terms, such as by equating the 1992 Consensus with “one country, two systems.” Tsai and the DPP were adept at weaving a compelling narrative that tied together pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and the KMT’s insistence on revitalizing relations with Beijing, casting her party as the defender of Taiwan’s democracy, values, and way of life against those encroaching on it.
And yet a departure from the underlying substance of the 1992 Consensus seems unlikely—as the KMT is constrained by the inconvenient history of Taiwan, an electoral base that either benefits from or lauds enhanced cross-strait engagement, and, in some cases, unique access to the CCP through party-to-party ties. The underlying spirit of the 1992 Consensus would remain, even if the KMT were to move away from the appellation itself and repurpose it under a new name more palatable for Taiwan’s people. Under similar domestic considerations, the KMT is also attempting to stay ahead of the narrative, in light of China’s signaling that it aims to clarify specific elements of the consensus and move away from long-held ambiguities by demonstrating to Taiwan’s people that any shift in policy is proactive, rather than just a reaction prompted by policy changes on China’s end.
The whole of the 1992 Consensus is contentious in Taiwan, from its questionable origins to its fundamental contradictions. The 1992 Consensus was first officially advanced by that name under the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president from 2008 to 2016, with Ma continuously crediting his recognition of the 1992 Consensus for bringing about the period of cross-strait rapprochement during his presidency.
The consensus was supposedly born of a 1992 Hong Kong meeting between the KMT and CCP through semi-official channels, during which time the two sides reportedly struggled to determine a mutually acceptable foundation off which cross-strait negotiations and agreements would be based. In the aftermath, the two sides only reached an oral agreement to state their respective, divergent views. The actual term, “1992 Consensus,” was not coined until April 2000, though the Ma administration insisted that the “content” of the 1992 Consensus—in each side holding its own interpretation—has endured since the meeting, even if the formal appellation came only afterward.
In essence, the 1992 Consensus endured during the Ma years as a tacit agreement between the KMT and the CCP, grounded in the understanding that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of that China. For China, it stops there—in line with the tenets of its “One China” principle. For the KMT, the “1992 Consensus” is caveated with the phrase “One China, respective interpretations,” holding that when Beijing says “China” it means the CCP-led People’s Republic of China and when Taipei says “China” it means the Republic of China government that fled to the island of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War.
Until recently, Beijing has been careful in not only avoiding explicit acknowledgement of “respective interpretations” but also not refuting it. This approach allowed the two sides to operate in a gray zone of sorts between 2008 and 2016, while keeping a window open for plausible deniability on the part of Beijing, as well as latitude to redefine the 1992 Consensus if needed. That time may have now come. Signs out of China have suggested that Beijing may be moving to shift the acceptable parameters of the 1992 Consensus to be more in line with its own views and may no longer tolerate the “respective interpretations” the KMT espouses.
Since Tsai took office in 2016, there have been murmurs out of China that the “respective interpretations” of the KMT’s framing of the 1992 Consensus will perhaps no longer be permitted. This signaling, however, has always been through unofficial channels, such as in op-eds reposted to official government websites—as well as a rumored internal directive for state media. Statements from former officials pointed in the same directions. In January 2019, Wang Zaixi, a former deputy director of Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office, was quoted as saying that the KMT’s “respective interpretations” distracts from the “original meaning” of the “1992 Consensus” and that the “ true 1992 Consensus” was clarified by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his New Year’s speech to include unification—assumedly under the “one country, two systems” rubric.
At the same time, however, China has stayed the course in official channels by continuing to avoid mention of “respective interpretations,” with Taiwan Affairs Office spokespeople stressing the importance of adhering to the 1992 Consensus and “One China,” commending the progress achieved under the 1992 Consensus during the Ma administration, and refraining from fully answering the question when asked at press conferences.
With China signaling that a future cross-strait framework for official contacts should better align with Beijing’s position of “One China” with no caveats and the KMT considering a more neutral, perhaps more Taiwan-centric, approach, the two sides appear increasingly at odds and further than ever from a consensus. Yet, a critical component undercutting any new formulation by the KMT is whether it would be accepted by the party’s counterparts in Beijing if the KMT takes office.
Signs out of China have pointed to an unwillingness to accept a more muted approach. For example, as the KMT presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu’s team of advisors was coming together in the summer of 2019 and debate over whether he would stick to the party line on the 1992 Consensus continued, Taiwanese media reported that Chang San-cheng, a former premier under Ma who advised Han’s campaign, proposed an alternative formula under “a constitutional ‘One China’ that prioritizes Taiwan.” Chang argued that the 1992 Consensus has been stigmatized and equated with acceptance of “one country, two systems,” and he said it should instead be replaced with a “more neutral” term. His emphasis on the ROC Constitution was quickly rebuked as a nonstarter by media outlets with ties to the Chinese party-state’s top-level Taiwan policy organs.
More telling are responses from China following Chiang’s election as party leader. A spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office released a statement commending the progress achieved under “the common political foundation of the ‘1992 Consensus’” while voicing his hope that Chiang will “cherish and safeguard the existing political foundation between the two parties.” China’s state news agency Xinhua posted an editorial that took a harsher tone, claiming that “scrapping the ‘1992 Consensus’ to ‘steal votes’ from the DPP is political illusion of self-deception” and counter to KMT efforts to enhance cross-strait ties and serve the interests of the Taiwanese people.
The KMT urgently needs to redefine itself in the eyes of Taiwanese voters. But it may be impossible to find a cross-strait formula that can simultaneously reassure citizens increasingly nervous of Beijing’s attentions and maintain the ties with China that the party has prided itself on. Absent that, any reworking of the language is largely illusory—and effectively the same as the current DPP administration’s.


China’s New Normal

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : What China ’ s new normal looks like after the worst of the coronavirus epidemic , the Chinese Communist Party continues its propaganda campaign about the origins of the disease , and a facial recognition company has figured out how to see past masks .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
Life in China appears to be beginning to return to normal after weeks of lockdown due to the coronavirus .
Although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t anywhere near as crowded as before , people are coming out again and offices and factories are starting to spring back to life .
The makeshift hospitals erected in Wuhan amid the outbreak have been closed , and the epidemic seems to have been broken there .
On Tuesday , President Xi Jinping arrived in Wuhan for a carefully planned visit .
There , local leaders have demanded that the people show their gratitude to the party , which received some pushback .
Don ’ t confuse this with actual normality .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the shadow of the virus , with temperature checks , app monitoring , and other biosecurity measures .
That includes a just-announced 14-day quarantine period for all international arrivals at Beijing ’ s airports , which could extend across the country soon .
( That make Beijing ’ s insistence in February that other countries ’ travel restrictions were unnecessary look a little hypocritical . )
Movement within the country is still restricted , including for migrant workers .
But China is edging toward a consensus on what life will look like now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ending the worst in Wuhan appears to have been centralized quarantine , despite initial worries from public health experts that it might cause further contagion .
Clinical data produced by Chinese doctors with support from Harvard University shows the number of people infected by each carrier has dropped to 0.3 as a result of the measure .
( Caveat : This research is a pre-print and has not been peer-reviewed . )
Wuhan doctor speaks .
Ai Fen , the director of the emergency department at Wuhan Central Hospital , has spoken out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , throwing a wrench into the Chinese government ’ s attempt to rewrite the story as one of national triumph .
Ai ’ s interview in a Chinese magazine was quickly censored , but it is still being shared in creative ways : including telling it through emojis and using the Star Wars opening crawl .
The unfortunate lesson of the last two decades has been that the censorship still works : Even if Ai ’ s story spreads quickly for a brief period of time , it will be forgotten by most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a false dawn ?
The consensus among many epidemiologists now is that the spread of the pandemic is inevitable and that 60 to 70 percent of the world population will eventually contract the virus .
That doesn ’ t take away from China ’ s achievements in slowing its spread since January , which will make a difference in the ability of health care systems to cope .
Here ’ s what worries me : Now that the messaging has shifted , any local official who reports new cases could risk political danger—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ errors of the early cover-up .
If we ’ re lucky , China ’ s central government will send signals to discourage this .
Admitting the odds of future infection in China rather than trying to claim a final victory against the virus would be a good start , even if outsiders are blamed .
Obscuring the origins .
The propaganda push that began last week to try to deny that the coronavirus outbreak started in China at all is getting stronger .
Foreign journalists have received emails from Chinese diplomats denying that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began on the mainland rather than being imported from elsewhere , and there is a concerted effort to blame other countries .
So far , the botched U.S. response is boosting the propaganda .
The politicized attempt by the American right wing to use the phrase “ Wuhan virus ” or “ China virus ” instead of COVID-19 , the official name for the disease , doesn ’ t help .
It does nothing to challenge the Chinese Communist Party , but it does put ordinary Chinese on the defense and give unwanted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to be ready to challenge powerful governments ’ falsehoods , as Thomas J. Bollyky and Yanzhong Huang write in FP .
China sells supplies to Italy .
Beijing has seized upon its production capacities to promise medical goods to other nations hard hit by the virus .
With the lack of European aid directed to Italy , the worst-affected country in Europe , China is selling—not donating—2 million masks and other equipment such as ventilators to fill urgently needed gaps .
Psychological damage .
Weeks of quarantine are beginning to take their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been an increase in cases of domestic violence , already a serious problem in China .
As the rest of the world contemplates its response to the virus , that is another argument for more flexible measures such as in South Korea .
Facial recognition improves .
A potentially disturbing development : Amid the coronavirus outbreak , a Chinese facial recognition software company now claims to be able to detect faces even through masks—one of the ways protesters in Hong Kong and elsewhere had avoided being identified .
It ’ s only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the camera giant Hikvision has been training at a paramilitary base in Xinjiang that bans Uighurs from participating , the future is beginning to look darker .
Local food chains .
One underrated success during the lockdowns in China has been keeping supply chains intact , especially for fresh vegetables .
That traces to the Vegetable Basket Project , initiated in the late 1980s to increase urban access to fresh fruit and vegetables .
The program got a push a few years ago when it was used to evaluate mayoral performance .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , at least in the big cities , and is a model that others could learn from .
( Hat tip on this one to Even Rogers Pay , an invaluable agricultural expert . )
Exports in free fall .
Chinese trade dropped 17.2 percent in January and February , according to official data .
The government is hoping for a recovery in May .
But if the rest of the world is swept up by coronavirus panic and slowed production , how likely is that ?
The odds of a rapid recovery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nature of the epidemic .
There ’ s really only one thing you need to listen to this week : the British-accented tones of myself and Foreign Policy staff writer Amy Mackinnon on Don ’ t Touch Your Face , FP ’ s new daily podcast on the coronavirus .
This week we ’ ve spoken with health expert Annie Sparrow about the front-line fight against epidemics and frequent contributor Lauren Teixeira about the quarantines in China and the United States .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: What China's new normal looks like after the worst of the coronavirus epidemic, the Chinese Communist Party continues its propaganda campaign about the origins of the disease, and a facial recognition company has figured out how to see past masks.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: What China’s new normal looks like after the worst of the coronavirus epidemic, the Chinese Communist Party continues its propaganda campaign about the origins of the disease, and a facial recognition company has figured out how to see past masks.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Is China Returning to Business as Usual?
Life in China appears to be beginning to return to normal after weeks of lockdown due to the coronavirus. Although the streets of major cities aren’t anywhere near as crowded as before, people are coming out again and offices and factories are starting to spring back to life. The makeshift hospitals erected in Wuhan amid the outbreak have been closed, and the epidemic seems to have been broken there. On Tuesday, President Xi Jinping arrived in Wuhan for a carefully planned visit. There, local leaders have demanded that the people show their gratitude to the party, which received some pushback.
Don’t confuse this with actual normality. Life in China is still happening under the shadow of the virus, with temperature checks, app monitoring, and other biosecurity measures. That includes a just-announced 14-day quarantine period for all international arrivals at Beijing’s airports, which could extend across the country soon. (That make Beijing’s insistence in February that other countries’ travel restrictions were unnecessary look a little hypocritical.) Movement within the country is still restricted, including for migrant workers. But China is edging toward a consensus on what life will look like now.
Quarantine success? The key to ending the worst in Wuhan appears to have been centralized quarantine, despite initial worries from public health experts that it might cause further contagion. Clinical data produced by Chinese doctors with support from Harvard University shows the number of people infected by each carrier has dropped to 0.3 as a result of the measure. (Caveat: This research is a pre-print and has not been peer-reviewed.)
Wuhan doctor speaks. Ai Fen, the director of the emergency department at Wuhan Central Hospital, has spoken out about the early cover-up of the outbreak, throwing a wrench into the Chinese government’s attempt to rewrite the story as one of national triumph. Ai’s interview in a Chinese magazine was quickly censored, but it is still being shared in creative ways: including telling it through emojis and using the Star Wars opening crawl.
The unfortunate lesson of the last two decades has been that the censorship still works: Even if Ai’s story spreads quickly for a brief period of time, it will be forgotten by most in the long term.
Is it a false dawn? The consensus among many epidemiologists now is that the spread of the pandemic is inevitable and that 60 to 70 percent of the world population will eventually contract the virus. That doesn’t take away from China’s achievements in slowing its spread since January, which will make a difference in the ability of health care systems to cope. Here’s what worries me: Now that the messaging has shifted, any local official who reports new cases could risk political danger—and that means a potential return to the errors of the early cover-up.
If we’re lucky, China’s central government will send signals to discourage this. Admitting the odds of future infection in China rather than trying to claim a final victory against the virus would be a good start, even if outsiders are blamed.
What We’re Following
Obscuring the origins. The propaganda push that began last week to try to deny that the coronavirus outbreak started in China at all is getting stronger. Foreign journalists have received emails from Chinese diplomats denying that there’s evidence that the virus began on the mainland rather than being imported from elsewhere, and there is a concerted effort to blame other countries. So far, the botched U.S. response is boosting the propaganda.
The politicized attempt by the American right wing to use the phrase “Wuhan virus” or “China virus” instead of COVID-19, the official name for the disease, doesn’t help. It does nothing to challenge the Chinese Communist Party, but it does put ordinary Chinese on the defense and give unwanted cover to racists. International organizations also need to be ready to challenge powerful governments’ falsehoods, as Thomas J. Bollyky and Yanzhong Huang write in FP.
China sells supplies to Italy. Beijing has seized upon its production capacities to promise medical goods to other nations hard hit by the virus. With the lack of European aid directed to Italy, the worst-affected country in Europe, China is selling—not donating—2 million masks and other equipment such as ventilators to fill urgently needed gaps.
Psychological damage. Weeks of quarantine are beginning to take their toll on families in China. There has been an increase in cases of domestic violence, already a serious problem in China. As the rest of the world contemplates its response to the virus, that is another argument for more flexible measures such as in South Korea.
Tech and Business
Facial recognition improves. A potentially disturbing development: Amid the coronavirus outbreak, a Chinese facial recognition software company now claims to be able to detect faces even through masks—one of the ways protesters in Hong Kong and elsewhere had avoided being identified. It’s only one firm, but with the revelation that the camera giant Hikvision has been training at a paramilitary base in Xinjiang that bans Uighurs from participating, the future is beginning to look darker.
Local food chains. One underrated success during the lockdowns in China has been keeping supply chains intact, especially for fresh vegetables. That traces to the Vegetable Basket Project, initiated in the late 1980s to increase urban access to fresh fruit and vegetables. The program got a push a few years ago when it was used to evaluate mayoral performance. It has kept shortages to a minimum, at least in the big cities, and is a model that others could learn from. (Hat tip on this one to Even Rogers Pay, an invaluable agricultural expert.)
Exports in free fall. Chinese trade dropped 17.2 percent in January and February, according to official data. The government is hoping for a recovery in May. But if the rest of the world is swept up by coronavirus panic and slowed production, how likely is that? The odds of a rapid recovery seem very low, given the global nature of the epidemic.
What We’re Listening To
There’s really only one thing you need to listen to this week: the British-accented tones of myself and Foreign Policy staff writer Amy Mackinnon on Don’t Touch Your Face, FP’s new daily podcast on the coronavirus. This week we’ve spoken with health expert Annie Sparrow about the front-line fight against epidemics and frequent contributor Lauren Teixeira about the quarantines in China and the United States.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.