foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--What the International Community Can Do in Lebanon

What the International Community Can Do in Lebanon In the wake of its single most horrifying disaster since the end of its civil war , Lebanon has at last caught the world ’ s attention .
Following mounting fiscal and socioeconomic crises that had already brought the country to its knees , the devastating blast in Beirut on Aug. 4 was finally a spur to world powers to help Lebanon .
Led by French President Emmanuel Macron , the international community pledged around $ 300 million in aid at a donor conference on Aug. 9 , one day before Lebanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resigned under pressure from renewed protests demanding accountability for the disaster .
Yet the donors , together with Lebanon ’ s traumatized populace , find themselves in a difficult bind .
Putting Lebanon on a sustainable path to recovery will require its leaders to first put in place the much-needed structural and economic reforms that Lebanon ’ s governments have been unable , or unwilling , to implement for years .
As Lebanon ’ s political class begins to wrangle over the shape of the future cabinet for the second time in under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fall on the international community , together with Lebanese civil society , to rebuild Beirut and save the country from total collapse at the hands of its own rulers .
This means that donor countries will likely work directly with nongovernmental organizations and volunteers , many of whom have given up hope that they will receive any assistance at all from Lebanon ’ s bankrupt state , especially in the wake of Diab ’ s resignation .
“ We are now officially alone , ” Oula Nasser el-Dine , a doctor specializing in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had driven three hours from the northern Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon on the day of the explosion to volunteer as part of a medical response team working alongside the Lebanese Red Cross .
“ Now that the government resigned , we require nongovernmental references to bring all the teams together to put all the plans in place.
” Although the donor countries have promised that the funds raised this month , which fall far short of the multibillion-dollar cost of reconstruction , would be disbursed soon , further aid will likely be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has put forward an independent aid appeal of its own , but the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) , which had been negotiating with the Lebanese government on a reform package before talks fell apart last month , stated that an additional , more significant assistance package totaling billions of dollars won ’ t arrive until those reforms are implemented—something that Macron , the donor group , and U.S. officials had echoed as well .
With no real government to make those reforms , though , all of this suggests that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics , and as a guarantor of basic needs in the country , will undoubtedly grow .
This would mean temporarily managing the import of certain medical supplies and staple goods into the country while also guaranteeing access to adequate water and sanitation , much of which is included in the U.N. scheme .
The German company Siemens has already declared plans of its own , announcing that it would provide electricity for around 150,000 people in Lebanon for a year , free of charge .
On the political side , Macron seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some Lebanese asking him to place Lebanon under French stewardship , but has already taken an active role in guiding the formation of the country ’ s cabinet .
The French president asked Iran , which backs the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah , to avoid interfering in Lebanon ’ s government formation process , and called for the creation of a unity government reportedly at the behest of the United States .
Other reports have indicated that he is pushing for an interim technocratic government similar to outgoing Diab ’ s , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ changes .
Although donor countries can not force through the reforms they want to see themselves , it appears they are preparing to steer Lebanon ’ s ruling class toward a political reality that would give the international community the most amount of leverage .
As it does , “ the political impact of the international community is bound to increase , ” Karim Emile Bitar , an international relations professor at Beirut ’ s Saint Joseph University , told me , “ because Lebanon is about to become a failed state.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s World Food Program has already committed to sending 50,000 metric tons ( 55,000 tons ) of wheat flour to Lebanon amid fears of a bread shortage in as little as a week and a half , following the destruction of grain silos in the blast .
And according to Jihad el-Hokayem , a Lebanese financial market strategist , Lebanon ’ s gross domestic product could shrink by as much as much as 45 percent in 2020 , much more than the 11 percent drop predicted by the World Bank in April .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ It ’ s going to depend on how the international community is going to help Lebanon , ” Hokayem told me .
“ In case it ’ s going through the government ’ s wasteful process , it would be something surely not sustainable and people are just going to get a fraction of what they want.
” Wary of Lebanon ’ s widespread corruption , a number of Lebanese organizations are reportedly partnering to monitor how any reconstruction funds will be spent .
So far , the lion ’ s share @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by independent groups such as the Lebanese Red Cross and by citizens who are supporting their work , and it seems likely that international donor countries will need to work directly with them if they want to make good on their promise of keeping funds out of the hands of Lebanon ’ s corrupt leaders .
Although coordinating pledged emergency aid delivery with at least some help from the state may ultimately prove unavoidable , the political class ’ s position of weakness means it will likely have no choice but to acquiesce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the matter .
As for supplies in the immediate term , according to Nassif Saleh , the managing director of a shipping company that operates out of the port of Beirut , several quays are still able to receive cargo , and the port of Lebanon ’ s second-largest city Tripoli will temporarily be used to partially make up for the loss of Beirut ’ s capacity .
Nevertheless , the port reconstruction could take months to finish , and Saleh was generally far from optimistic .
“ The loss of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Lebanese economy , ” he told me .
“ The country was poor before the blast , so how do you expect things to improve ?
We are lucky if we can maintain half or three-quarters of [ imports that ] we had before.
” The Lebanese people ’ s access to health care and food , and their ability to rebuild Beirut , relies heavily on the speed with which the port ’ s capacity will be restored .
France , potentially together with the United Arab Emirates , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the port reconstruction project .
Current proposals for a unity government of all of Lebanon ’ s political blocs , which would likely continue business as usual , would not satisfy either the restive Lebanese public or international investors .
Bitar told me that the only way out of Lebanon ’ s trauma is a total overhaul of Lebanon ’ s political leadership and economic system , which would happen through reforms passed at the insistence of world powers .
With the international community already putting pressure on the Lebanese state through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the IMF , and the carrot of additional funds , the question is whether countries like France are willing to go the extra step and negotiate Lebanon ’ s political class out of the picture .
If they are , Lebanon ’ s recovery may be more durable , but at the cost of a good portion of its national sovereignty .
Yet if they aren ’ t , it is hard to see how the country pulls out of the morass at all .
“ The main problem of the past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political establishment was offered a lifeline by the international community which has allowed it to remain afloat , ” he said .
“ There is no future for Lebanon until we get rid of this oligarchy .
”

In the wake of its single most horrifying disaster since the end of its civil war, Lebanon has at last caught the world’s attention. Following mounting fiscal and socioeconomic crises that had already brought the country to its knees, the devastating blast in Beirut on Aug. 4 was finally a spur to world powers to help Lebanon. Led by French President Emmanuel Macron, the international community pledged around $300 million in aid at a donor conference on Aug. 9, one day before Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his cabinet resigned under pressure from renewed protests demanding accountability for the disaster.
In the wake of its single most horrifying disaster since the end of its civil war, Lebanon has at last caught the world’s attention. Following mounting fiscal and socioeconomic crises that had already brought the country to its knees, the devastating blast in Beirut on Aug. 4 was finally a spur to world powers to help Lebanon. Led by French President Emmanuel Macron, the international community pledged around $300 million in aid at a donor conference on Aug. 9, one day before Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his cabinet resigned under pressure from renewed protests demanding accountability for the disaster.
Yet the donors, together with Lebanon’s traumatized populace, find themselves in a difficult bind. Putting Lebanon on a sustainable path to recovery will require its leaders to first put in place the much-needed structural and economic reforms that Lebanon’s governments have been unable, or unwilling, to implement for years. As Lebanon’s political class begins to wrangle over the shape of the future cabinet for the second time in under a year, it will now largely fall on the international community, together with Lebanese civil society, to rebuild Beirut and save the country from total collapse at the hands of its own rulers.
Brazil, China, France, the United States, the European Union, and other governments that pledged funds for Lebanon this month are part of a global relief effort that also includes hundreds of thousands of small, private donors, many of whom are Lebanese expatriates. As the Lebanese themselves had asked, the donor countries have made clear that the aid would go to the people of Lebanon, rather than to its corrupt government, and would be spent according to a detailed framework set by the United Nations.
This means that donor countries will likely work directly with nongovernmental organizations and volunteers, many of whom have given up hope that they will receive any assistance at all from Lebanon’s bankrupt state, especially in the wake of Diab’s resignation. “We are now officially alone,” Oula Nasser el-Dine, a doctor specializing in physical therapy, told me. She had driven three hours from the northern Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon on the day of the explosion to volunteer as part of a medical response team working alongside the Lebanese Red Cross. “Now that the government resigned, we require nongovernmental references to bring all the teams together to put all the plans in place.”
Although the donor countries have promised that the funds raised this month, which fall far short of the multibillion-dollar cost of reconstruction, would be disbursed soon, further aid will likely be slow in coming. The United Nations has put forward an independent aid appeal of its own, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had been negotiating with the Lebanese government on a reform package before talks fell apart last month, stated that an additional, more significant assistance package totaling billions of dollars won’t arrive until those reforms are implemented—something that Macron, the donor group, and U.S. officials had echoed as well.
With no real government to make those reforms, though, all of this suggests that the international community’s role in Lebanese politics, and as a guarantor of basic needs in the country, will undoubtedly grow. This would mean temporarily managing the import of certain medical supplies and staple goods into the country while also guaranteeing access to adequate water and sanitation, much of which is included in the U.N. scheme. The German company Siemens has already declared plans of its own, announcing that it would provide electricity for around 150,000 people in Lebanon for a year, free of charge. On the political side, Macron seems to have brushed aside frustrated calls by some Lebanese asking him to place Lebanon under French stewardship, but has already taken an active role in guiding the formation of the country’s cabinet. The French president asked Iran, which backs the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, to avoid interfering in Lebanon’s government formation process, and called for the creation of a unity government reportedly at the behest of the United States. Other reports have indicated that he is pushing for an interim technocratic government similar to outgoing Diab’s, which would put in place political and economic changes. Although donor countries cannot force through the reforms they want to see themselves, it appears they are preparing to steer Lebanon’s ruling class toward a political reality that would give the international community the most amount of leverage. As it does, “the political impact of the international community is bound to increase,” Karim Emile Bitar, an international relations professor at Beirut’s Saint Joseph University, told me, “because Lebanon is about to become a failed state.”
That seems correct. The U.N.’s World Food Program has already committed to sending 50,000 metric tons (55,000 tons) of wheat flour to Lebanon amid fears of a bread shortage in as little as a week and a half, following the destruction of grain silos in the blast. And according to Jihad el-Hokayem, a Lebanese financial market strategist, Lebanon’s gross domestic product could shrink by as much as 45 percent in 2020, much more than the 11 percent drop predicted by the World Bank in April. And that is a best-case scenario. “It’s going to depend on how the international community is going to help Lebanon,” Hokayem told me. “In case it’s going through the government’s wasteful process, it would be something surely not sustainable and people are just going to get a fraction of what they want.”
Wary of Lebanon’s widespread corruption, a number of Lebanese organizations are reportedly partnering to monitor how any reconstruction funds will be spent. So far, the lion’s share of the recovery process has been started by independent groups such as the Lebanese Red Cross and by citizens who are supporting their work, and it seems likely that international donor countries will need to work directly with them if they want to make good on their promise of keeping funds out of the hands of Lebanon’s corrupt leaders. Although coordinating pledged emergency aid delivery with at least some help from the state may ultimately prove unavoidable, the political class’s position of weakness means it will likely have no choice but to acquiesce to the international community’s terms on the matter.
As for supplies in the immediate term, according to Nassif Saleh, the managing director of a shipping company that operates out of the port of Beirut, several quays are still able to receive cargo, and the port of Lebanon’s second-largest city Tripoli will temporarily be used to partially make up for the loss of Beirut’s capacity. Nevertheless, the port reconstruction could take months to finish, and Saleh was generally far from optimistic.
“The loss of the port means the loss of the lung of the Lebanese economy,” he told me. “The country was poor before the blast, so how do you expect things to improve? We are lucky if we can maintain half or three-quarters of [imports that] we had before.” The Lebanese people’s access to health care and food, and their ability to rebuild Beirut, relies heavily on the speed with which the port’s capacity will be restored. France, potentially together with the United Arab Emirates, is reportedly being floated as a probable financier of the port reconstruction project.
Of course, there is only so much the international community can do. “An independent government is the only way to restore confidence,” Sami Nader, the director of the Levant Institute for Strategic Affairs, told me, stating that a new government must hold snap elections and put in place a full menu of financial-sector reforms.
Current proposals for a unity government of all of Lebanon’s political blocs, which would likely continue business as usual, would not satisfy either the restive Lebanese public or international investors. Bitar told me that the only way out of Lebanon’s trauma is a total overhaul of Lebanon’s political leadership and economic system, which would happen through reforms passed at the insistence of world powers. With the international community already putting pressure on the Lebanese state through backroom diplomacy, international financial organs such as the IMF, and the carrot of additional funds, the question is whether countries like France are willing to go the extra step and negotiate Lebanon’s political class out of the picture.
If they are, Lebanon’s recovery may be more durable, but at the cost of a good portion of its national sovereignty. Yet if they aren’t, it is hard to see how the country pulls out of the morass at all.
“The main problem of the past 20 years is that very often this political establishment was offered a lifeline by the international community which has allowed it to remain afloat,” he said. “There is no future for Lebanon until we get rid of this oligarchy.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Biden Sets Sights on Trump

Biden Sets Sights on Trump

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Democratic nominee Joe Biden gears up to face President Donald Trump in November , Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny is hospitalized after a suspected poisoning , and the officers who staged Mali ’ s military coup promise to hold new elections .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden formally accepted the Democratic Party ’ s nomination for president on Tuesday , setting up a battle between him and Republican President Donald Trump this November that could dramatically reshape the direction of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Biden will deliver his keynote address by video tonight to close the Democratic National Convention .
Reaching across the aisle .
Back on the campaign trail , the Biden team ’ s focus will be on winning back voters in swing states who traditionally voted for Democrats but flipped in 2016 to support Trump .
A recent poll from CNN showed that Biden is leading Trump in Florida and Michigan , two key battleground states that voted for Obama twice before backing Trump in 2016 .
The Biden team will also look @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become disenchanted with the Trump presidency .
In pursuit of that objective , several high-profile Republican figures have spoken at this week ’ s convention , including Sen. John Kasich ; former Secretary of State Colin Powell ; and Cindy McCain , the widow of the late Sen. John McCain .
Pivoting left ?
Perhaps Biden ’ s biggest challenge will be healing the factional tensions between the party ’ s moderate and left wings .
Biden has already tried to appease progressives by adopting versions of some of their signature policies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the party ’ s left wing to stump for him .
Sen. Bernie Sanders and Sen. Elizabeth Warren spoke in support of Biden ’ s candidacy at the convention , but there remains a hardcore that he ’ ll likely never reach .
A March poll found that 15 percent of those who supported Sanders ’ s own presidential campaign said they would vote for Trump if Biden was the nominee .
An eye to the future .
If Biden wins the vote on Nov. 3 and becomes president , he will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undoing the immense damage caused by the Trump administration .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Michael Hirsh wrote earlier this month , a President Biden will focus his efforts on rebuilding key international institutions while repairing Washington ’ s relationships with its key allies .
But he won ’ t ignore the homefront , likely leaving domestic affairs to his vice president , Kamala Harris , who will be tasked with mending the country ’ s badly damaged race relations and spearheading police reform .
Russian opposition leader Navalny hospitalized after suspected poisoning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is on a ventilator in an intensive care unit in the Siberian city of Omsk .
His plane made an emergency landing after he became ill in flight and ambulances met the plane on the runway to take the unconscious Navalny to a local hospital .
His spokeswoman Kira Yarmysh suspects that his tea had been poisoned prior to the flight .
“ We assume that Alexei was poisoned with something mixed into his tea .
That was the only thing he drank this morning .
The doctors say that the toxin was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liquid , ” she wrote on Twitter .
It is not the first time Navalny and his staff have suspected foul play .
Last year , he suffered a “ severe allergic reaction ” while in prison .
His doctor said it could have been the result of a poisoning , after he was arrested for leading an unauthorized protest .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Amy Mackinnon wrote after last year ’ s episode , if the Kremlin is directly or indirectly responsible , there is a logic to its tactics .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the amorphous nature of poisonings gives Moscow a veneer of deniability , which has become the cornerstone of Russian malfeasance in recent years , ” she wrote .
Malian coup leaders promise new elections .
A day after ousting Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the rest of the government , the military officers who staged Mali ’ s coup issued a statement promising to form a civilian transitional government to organize and hold new elections .
“ We are keen on the stability of the country , ” said the mutinying soldiers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ which will allow us to organise general elections to allow Mali to equip itself with strong institutions within the reasonable time limit.
” But as Vicki J. Huddleston and Witney Schneidman wrote yesterday in Foreign Policy , unless international actors formulate a comprehensive economic recovery plan , Mali is likely on the verge of a political and social catastrophe and extremist groups could soon threaten the broader region .
EU offers support to protesters in Belarus .
Speaking after an emergency meeting with EU officials on the crisis in Belarus , European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the EU “ stands in solidarity with the people of Belarus ” and that “ we don ’ t recognize the results ” of the Aug. 9 presidential elections , which returned longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko to office by a landslide amid widespread accusations of fraud .
The EU is also preparing a list of individuals to be sanctioned .
Feeling the pressure , Lukashenko is digging in his heels .
He accused the EU of “ fomenting unrest ” in the country , and tightened border security to protect against what he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
On Wednesday , he announced a new police operation to crush the demonstrations , though no further crackdown has yet taken place .
U.S. severing ties with Hong Kong .
The U.S. State Department announced on Wednesday that it is ending three key bilateral agreements with Hong Kong in response to Beijing ’ s passage of the controversial national security law in June , ramping up pressure on the semi-autonomous city over its crackdown on pro-democracy activists .
In a statement , the State Department said the agreements covered “ the surrender @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sentenced persons , and reciprocal tax exemptions on income derived from the international operation of ships.
” The move comes weeks after Trump signed an executive order ending Hong Kong ’ s special status with the United States .
It also follows a recent decision by the White House to sanction several high-profile individuals in Hong Kong , including Chief Executive Carrie Lam .
Peace negotiator killed in Afghanistan .
A car bomb exploded in the Afghan capital of Kabul on Wednesday , killing a prominent Afghan government official who had taken part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The death of Abdul Baqi Amin is the latest in a string of attacks on peace activists and other participants in the ongoing peace negotiations in the country .
No group claimed responsibility for the attack , and the Taliban was quick to condemn the killing , saying the perpetrators were “ the enemies of the Islamic system , prosperity and peace.
” For many , the recent spate of violence against peace activists is a reflection of a small but substantial feeling of opposition to the peace process , and a sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is working to undermine the process before negotiations begin in the coming weeks .
Netanyahu faces internal opposition over UAE deal .
They say the sign of a good compromise is that it leaves both parties unsatisfied , and that might offer some solace to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu .
Led by Hamas , hundreds of protesters have taken to the streets in the Gaza Strip to rally against the recent Israel-UAE peace agreement , which they claim is an abandonment of the cause of Palestinian statehood by a key Arab state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territories .
But Netanyahu is facing pressure from his right , too .
He notably made annexation a central plank of his recent election campaigns in an effort to shore up support among West Bank settlers , a constituency that is essential for his Likud party , as Albert Wolf pointed out in a recent FP article on the deal ’ s weaknesses .
“ Abandoning annexation altogether would be seen as the ultimate flip-flop , and Netanyahu does not have any available substitutes to satisfy these supporters , ” he wrote .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ his Likud party and throw their support behind other parties on the right.
” Settlers are reportedly seething over Netanyahu ’ s decision to shelve annexation as part of the deal , with the head of the Yesha settlers ’ council telling Reuters that “ he deceived us , defrauded us , duped us.
” Road sleeping epidemic .
An odd trend has taken hold in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa .
Local police reported more than 7,000 cases of people found sleeping in the middle of the road last year .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as rojo-ne , and it is a surprisingly common occurrence on the island .
In most cases , sleepers are simply awoken and directed home , though it has resulted in some fatalities .
Locals and experts alike are uncertain what causes rojo-ne .
Some attribute it to the island ’ s warm tropical climate mixed with the overconsumption of a popular rice-based alcoholic beverage .
But coronavirus lockdowns have shuttered bars and are forcing people to stay home , and yet people are still falling asleep in roads , leaving observers at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Democratic nominee Joe Biden gears up to face President Donald Trump in November, Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny is hospitalized after a suspected poisoning, and the officers who staged Mali’s military coup promise to hold new elections.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Democratic nominee Joe Biden gears up to face President Donald Trump in November, Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny is hospitalized after a suspected poisoning, and the officers who staged Mali’s military coup promise to hold new elections.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Biden Prepares for the Final Stretch of the Campaign
Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden formally accepted the Democratic Party’s nomination for president on Tuesday, setting up a battle between him and Republican President Donald Trump this November that could dramatically reshape the direction of the country and its place in the world. Biden will deliver his keynote address by video tonight to close the Democratic National Convention.
Reaching across the aisle. Back on the campaign trail, the Biden team’s focus will be on winning back voters in swing states who traditionally voted for Democrats but flipped in 2016 to support Trump. A recent poll from CNN showed that Biden is leading Trump in Florida and Michigan, two key battleground states that voted for Obama twice before backing Trump in 2016.
The Biden team will also look to embrace longtime Republican voters who have become disenchanted with the Trump presidency. In pursuit of that objective, several high-profile Republican figures have spoken at this week’s convention, including Sen. John Kasich; former Secretary of State Colin Powell; and Cindy McCain, the widow of the late Sen. John McCain.
Pivoting left? Perhaps Biden’s biggest challenge will be healing the factional tensions between the party’s moderate and left wings. Biden has already tried to appease progressives by adopting versions of some of their signature policies, and he has recruited several high-profile figures from the party’s left wing to stump for him.
Sen. Bernie Sanders and Sen. Elizabeth Warren spoke in support of Biden’s candidacy at the convention, but there remains a hardcore that he’ll likely never reach. A March poll found that 15 percent of those who supported Sanders’s own presidential campaign said they would vote for Trump if Biden was the nominee.
An eye to the future. If Biden wins the vote on Nov. 3 and becomes president, he will be faced with the herculean task of undoing the immense damage caused by the Trump administration. As Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh wrote earlier this month, a President Biden will focus his efforts on rebuilding key international institutions while repairing Washington’s relationships with its key allies.
But he won’t ignore the homefront, likely leaving domestic affairs to his vice president, Kamala Harris, who will be tasked with mending the country’s badly damaged race relations and spearheading police reform.
What We’re Following Today Russian opposition leader Navalny hospitalized after suspected poisoning. The Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny is on a ventilator in an intensive care unit in the Siberian city of Omsk. His plane made an emergency landing after he became ill in flight and ambulances met the plane on the runway to take the unconscious Navalny to a local hospital. His spokeswoman Kira Yarmysh suspects that his tea had been poisoned prior to the flight. “We assume that Alexei was poisoned with something mixed into his tea. That was the only thing he drank this morning. The doctors say that the toxin was absorbed more quickly because of the hot liquid,” she wrote on Twitter. It is not the first time Navalny and his staff have suspected foul play. Last year, he suffered a “severe allergic reaction” while in prison. His doctor said it could have been the result of a poisoning, after he was arrested for leading an unauthorized protest. As Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon wrote after last year’s episode, if the Kremlin is directly or indirectly responsible, there is a logic to its tactics. “Beyond the grisly chilling effect, the amorphous nature of poisonings gives Moscow a veneer of deniability, which has become the cornerstone of Russian malfeasance in recent years,” she wrote.
Malian coup leaders promise new elections. A day after ousting Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the rest of the government, the military officers who staged Mali’s coup issued a statement promising to form a civilian transitional government to organize and hold new elections. “We are keen on the stability of the country,” said the mutinying soldiers’ spokesman, Col. Ismael Wagué, “which will allow us to organise general elections to allow Mali to equip itself with strong institutions within the reasonable time limit.”
But as Vicki J. Huddleston and Witney Schneidman wrote yesterday in Foreign Policy, unless international actors formulate a comprehensive economic recovery plan, Mali is likely on the verge of a political and social catastrophe and extremist groups could soon threaten the broader region.
EU offers support to protesters in Belarus. Speaking after an emergency meeting with EU officials on the crisis in Belarus, European Council President Charles Michel told reporters that the EU “stands in solidarity with the people of Belarus” and that “we don’t recognize the results” of the Aug. 9 presidential elections, which returned longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko to office by a landslide amid widespread accusations of fraud. The EU is also preparing a list of individuals to be sanctioned.
Feeling the pressure, Lukashenko is digging in his heels. He accused the EU of “fomenting unrest” in the country, and tightened border security to protect against what he claims are foreign agents infiltrating the protests. On Wednesday, he announced a new police operation to crush the demonstrations, though no further crackdown has yet taken place.
U.S. severing ties with Hong Kong. The U.S. State Department announced on Wednesday that it is ending three key bilateral agreements with Hong Kong in response to Beijing’s passage of the controversial national security law in June, ramping up pressure on the semi-autonomous city over its crackdown on pro-democracy activists. In a statement, the State Department said the agreements covered “the surrender of fugitive offenders, the transfer of sentenced persons, and reciprocal tax exemptions on income derived from the international operation of ships.”
The move comes weeks after Trump signed an executive order ending Hong Kong’s special status with the United States. It also follows a recent decision by the White House to sanction several high-profile individuals in Hong Kong, including Chief Executive Carrie Lam.
Keep an Eye On
Peace negotiator killed in Afghanistan. A car bomb exploded in the Afghan capital of Kabul on Wednesday, killing a prominent Afghan government official who had taken part in several meetings with the Taliban. The death of Abdul Baqi Amin is the latest in a string of attacks on peace activists and other participants in the ongoing peace negotiations in the country.
No group claimed responsibility for the attack, and the Taliban was quick to condemn the killing, saying the perpetrators were “the enemies of the Islamic system, prosperity and peace.” For many, the recent spate of violence against peace activists is a reflection of a small but substantial feeling of opposition to the peace process, and a sign that a hardcore group of unreformed militants is working to undermine the process before negotiations begin in the coming weeks.
Netanyahu faces internal opposition over UAE deal. They say the sign of a good compromise is that it leaves both parties unsatisfied, and that might offer some solace to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Led by Hamas, hundreds of protesters have taken to the streets in the Gaza Strip to rally against the recent Israel-UAE peace agreement, which they claim is an abandonment of the cause of Palestinian statehood by a key Arab state and normalizes the occupation of the Palestinian territories.
But Netanyahu is facing pressure from his right, too. He notably made annexation a central plank of his recent election campaigns in an effort to shore up support among West Bank settlers, a constituency that is essential for his Likud party, as Albert Wolf pointed out in a recent FP article on the deal’s weaknesses. “Abandoning annexation altogether would be seen as the ultimate flip-flop, and Netanyahu does not have any available substitutes to satisfy these supporters,” he wrote. “This could lead them to abandon his Likud party and throw their support behind other parties on the right.”
Settlers are reportedly seething over Netanyahu’s decision to shelve annexation as part of the deal, with the head of the Yesha settlers’ council telling Reuters that “he deceived us, defrauded us, duped us.”
Odds and Ends
Road sleeping epidemic. An odd trend has taken hold in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa. Local police reported more than 7,000 cases of people found sleeping in the middle of the road last year. The phenomenon is known in the local language as rojo-ne, and it is a surprisingly common occurrence on the island. In most cases, sleepers are simply awoken and directed home, though it has resulted in some fatalities.
Locals and experts alike are uncertain what causes rojo-ne. Some attribute it to the island’s warm tropical climate mixed with the overconsumption of a popular rice-based alcoholic beverage. But coronavirus lockdowns have shuttered bars and are forcing people to stay home, and yet people are still falling asleep in roads, leaving observers at a loss to explain the cause.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Johnson Is Bringing Brits Home, but They’re Probably Safer in Spain

Johnson Is Bringing Brits Home , but They ’ re Probably Safer in Spain On July 25 , the British government removed Spain from the list of countries deemed safe to visit , imposing a two-week self-isolation period for anyone traveling back from the country after 11 p.m. that same day .
The move baffled and inconvenienced holidaymakers and angered the Spanish government , and for good reason : Many regions of Spain still have lower infection rates than the U.K. as a whole—as they did when the measure was announced—and the barriers to easy travel between the two countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Spanish tourism sector , which accounts for nearly 15 percent of the country ’ s GDP .
It ’ s yet another blow to an industry that was already facing a long summer of cancellations and no-shows .
Almost two-thirds of Spain ’ s new cases , however , were recorded in the northeasterly regions of Aragon and Catalonia—far from many of the sun-and-sand destinations favored by British tourists in the south .
Boris Johnson ’ s government cited these outbreaks to justify the imposition of a quarantine for travelers returning from Spain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far from obvious why the entire country was targeted , rather than just the worst-affected areas .
Spain continues to record new infections at a rapid rate , and has seen an 11 percent increase in the cumulative number of cases in the last seven days ( at the time of writing ) .
But again , the vast majority of these outbreaks are occurring in Madrid , the Basque country , Catalonia , and Aragon—all regions that are hundreds of miles from the Costa del Sol , where many of the British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.K.-Spain quarantine rule based on an insufficiently nuanced reading of the statistics , it will also be very damaging for Spain ’ s struggling tourism industry , which is heavily reliant on British visitors .
Last year , one in five international visitors to Spain was British , making Britain the most important market for Spanish tourism , followed by Germany and France .
In addition to the islands and the Costa Brava , many of these sun-seekers head to the southern region of Andalusia ( especially Málaga ’ s Costa del @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for exemption from the U.K. travel measures so as to not sustain further economic damage .
Cases of COVID-19 in Andalusia have recently risen to 248 cases per 100,000 people , although the difference between the southern region and Aragon , where that figure soars to 1,681 per 100,000 , remains considerable .
Since introducing the travel restrictions on Spain , Britain ’ s government has also imposed a quarantine on people returning from France , the second most popular holiday destination for Britons .
British holidaymakers in France had barely 24 hours @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resulting in chaos as an estimated half a million tourists rushed back to a supposedly safer environment .
Again , the move was justified by clusters of new cases , but overall France remains several notches below the U.K. on the World Health Organization ’ s dashboard , with 207,545 cumulative cases compared to the U.K. ’ s 320,290 , and 30,318 deaths compared to 41,381 .
Since the end of July , the British government has also imposed similar last-minute quarantines for U.K. citizens returning from Malta , Monaco , the Netherlands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citing outbreaks of new cases as the justification .
For the moment , Turkey remains on the list of safe countries , despite the fact that its cumulative number of cases is higher than France ’ s , according to the WHO .
So too do Croatia and Greece , where there have also been surges of new infections—although the U.K. government is now said to be considering taking all three countries of the “ safe list ” if their numbers continue to rise .
What ’ s surprising , given the U.K. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of these major tourist destinations , including France and Spain , has yet to retaliate and impose restrictions on citizens returning from Britain , perhaps because the unpredictable British climate makes it a far less pleasurable place to spend a summer than southern Europe ( although the French government said that it would “ apply reciprocal measures ” after the U.K. quarantine rule came into effect ) .
No wonder both these clusters of islands , which rely heavily on summer tourism to sustain their economies , immediately asked for exemption from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case of the Balearics , where the number of cases is now 391 per 100,000 people—possibly due to visiting tourists—exemption is unlikely to be granted any time soon .
Given these vast regional disparities , one wonders why Johnson couldn ’ t have imposed self-isolation only on people coming back from the worst-affected parts of Spain , like other European countries are doing , or even just issue safety advice and warnings , as other governments have done .
Spain ’ s Socialist prime minister , Pedro Sánchez , was right to say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in “ [ contemplating ] the total accumulated incidents as if they were the country as a whole.
” Other countries are concerned about the rising number of cases in Spain , too—but most of their travel recommendations take into account the geographical unevenness with which the outbreaks are occurring .
Belgium has entirely banned travel to the provinces of Huesca in Aragon and Lleida in Catalonia , issuing only guidelines to Belgians visiting the rest of the country .
France has recommended that its citizens don ’ t cross the border to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the Netherlands has also warned against traveling to .
So far , Norway is the only other European country to have adopted a similar approach to the U.K. , and has imposed a 10-day quarantine for anyone returning from all and any parts of Spain .
Sweden—which , like the U.K. , has an unenviable record on containing COVID-19—has also imposed a quarantine for citizens returning from Spain , but has exempted those coming back from the Balearic and Canary Islands .
The quarantine announced by Johnson on July 25 might have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enormous discrepancy between the U.K. and Spain ’ s numbers at the time .
This was the case with Sweden and its neighboring countries , where the restrictions on travel were much more justifiable than those now in place between the U.K. and Spain .
Partly because of its government ’ s hands-off approach to dealing with the spread of COVID-19 , Sweden saw much higher per capita infection and deaths rates than Denmark , Norway and Finland , all of which closed their borders to a country widely criticized for not imposing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only one of those three countries to have completely lifted the ban on travel to and from Sweden , which it did at the end of July in response to the country ’ s falling rates ( Finland ’ s border remains closed and Norway currently only permits travel to some parts of Sweden ) .
Of course , Johnson may argue that excessive caution in imposing travel restrictions is necessary for the U.K. to further reduce its number of cases and deaths—and that if lower numbers can only be achieved with spoiled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ What British tourists really need protecting from this summer are the panicked decisions of their mercurial government .
But he should consider looking within rather than focusing on other countries .
Johnson ’ s administration has a sorry track record of dealing with the virus within the U.K. , which is evident in more or less everything it does—from lagging behind the rest of Europe in imposing lockdown earlier this year to its bizarre announcement on Aug. 1 that pubs might need to close in September in order for schools to reopen .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ also resulting in the imposition of travel rules of questionable efficacy , which leave disruption , anger , and economic damage in their wake .
Such measures , of course , are presented as being necessary for the preservation of British citizens ’ safety—but what British tourists really need protecting from this summer are the panicked decisions of their mercurial government .
One could very plausibly argue that the U.K. ’ s high numbers now are due to a disorganized approach to containing the virus back in the spring , and that Johnson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a second wave , not try and stop people holidaying in countries which are generally safer than Britain .
The flurry of new travel restrictions , especially applying to Spain , show the British government to be obsessed with the COVID-19 statistics of other countries , rather than paying enough attention to its own .

On July 25, the British government removed Spain from the list of countries deemed safe to visit, imposing a two-week self-isolation period for anyone traveling back from the country after 11 p.m. that same day. The move baffled and inconvenienced holidaymakers and angered the Spanish government, and for good reason: Many regions of Spain still have lower infection rates than the U.K. as a whole—as they did when the measure was announced—and the barriers to easy travel between the two countries will further slow the recovery of the Spanish tourism sector, which accounts for nearly 15 percent of the country’s GDP. It’s yet another blow to an industry that was already facing a long summer of cancellations and no-shows.
On July 25, the British government removed Spain from the list of countries deemed safe to visit, imposing a two-week self-isolation period for anyone traveling back from the country after 11 p.m. that same day. The move baffled and inconvenienced holidaymakers and angered the Spanish government, and for good reason: Many regions of Spain still have lower infection rates than the U.K. as a whole—as they did when the measure was announced—and the barriers to easy travel between the two countries will further slow the recovery of the Spanish tourism sector, which accounts for nearly 15 percent of the country’s GDP. It’s yet another blow to an industry that was already facing a long summer of cancellations and no-shows.
Almost two-thirds of Spain’s new cases, however, were recorded in the northeasterly regions of Aragon and Catalonia—far from many of the sun-and-sand destinations favored by British tourists in the south. Boris Johnson’s government cited these outbreaks to justify the imposition of a quarantine for travelers returning from Spain as a whole, but it was far from obvious why the entire country was targeted, rather than just the worst-affected areas.
Spain continues to record new infections at a rapid rate, and has seen an 11 percent increase in the cumulative number of cases in the last seven days (at the time of writing). But again, the vast majority of these outbreaks are occurring in Madrid, the Basque country, Catalonia, and Aragon—all regions that are hundreds of miles from the Costa del Sol, where many of the British tourists are concentrated.
Not only was the U.K.-Spain quarantine rule based on an insufficiently nuanced reading of the statistics, it will also be very damaging for Spain’s struggling tourism industry, which is heavily reliant on British visitors. Last year, one in five international visitors to Spain was British, making Britain the most important market for Spanish tourism, followed by Germany and France.
In addition to the islands and the Costa Brava, many of these sun-seekers head to the southern region of Andalusia (especially Málaga’s Costa del Sol), which is also asking for exemption from the U.K. travel measures so as to not sustain further economic damage. Cases of COVID-19 in Andalusia have recently risen to 248 cases per 100,000 people, although the difference between the southern region and Aragon, where that figure soars to 1,681 per 100,000, remains considerable.
Since introducing the travel restrictions on Spain, Britain’s government has also imposed a quarantine on people returning from France, the second most popular holiday destination for Britons. British holidaymakers in France had barely 24 hours to comply with the new regulations, resulting in chaos as an estimated half a million tourists rushed back to a supposedly safer environment.
Again, the move was justified by clusters of new cases, but overall France remains several notches below the U.K. on the World Health Organization’s dashboard, with 207,545 cumulative cases compared to the U.K.’s 320,290, and 30,318 deaths compared to 41,381. Since the end of July, the British government has also imposed similar last-minute quarantines for U.K. citizens returning from Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, and Belgium, in each case citing outbreaks of new cases as the justification.
For the moment, Turkey remains on the list of safe countries, despite the fact that its cumulative number of cases is higher than France’s, according to the WHO. So too do Croatia and Greece, where there have also been surges of new infections—although the U.K. government is now said to be considering taking all three countries of the “safe list” if their numbers continue to rise.
What’s surprising, given the U.K.’s statistics, is that none of these major tourist destinations, including France and Spain, has yet to retaliate and impose restrictions on citizens returning from Britain, perhaps because the unpredictable British climate makes it a far less pleasurable place to spend a summer than southern Europe (although the French government said that it would “apply reciprocal measures” after the U.K. quarantine rule came into effect).
When the tougher travel measures between Spain and the U.K. were announced, two of the former’s most popular summer destinations were, statistically speaking, much safer than Britain. In the Canary and Balearic Islands, the 14-day cumulative occurrence of the virus per 100,000 inhabitants was 5.8 and 8 respectively; by marked contrast, it was 14.7 in Britain when the quarantine was announced, less than Spain’s overall figure at the time (39.4) but higher—and in some cases far higher—than in nine of Spain’s 17 regions.
No wonder both these clusters of islands, which rely heavily on summer tourism to sustain their economies, immediately asked for exemption from the Spain-U.K. travel regulations. But in the case of the Balearics, where the number of cases is now 391 per 100,000 people—possibly due to visiting tourists—exemption is unlikely to be granted any time soon.
Given these vast regional disparities, one wonders why Johnson couldn’t have imposed self-isolation only on people coming back from the worst-affected parts of Spain, like other European countries are doing, or even just issue safety advice and warnings, as other governments have done. Spain’s Socialist prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, was right to say that the U.K.’s error lay in “[contemplating] the total accumulated incidents as if they were the country as a whole.”
Other countries are concerned about the rising number of cases in Spain, too—but most of their travel recommendations take into account the geographical unevenness with which the outbreaks are occurring. Belgium has entirely banned travel to the provinces of Huesca in Aragon and Lleida in Catalonia, issuing only guidelines to Belgians visiting the rest of the country. France has recommended that its citizens don’t cross the border to visit Catalonia, a badly affected region that the Netherlands has also warned against traveling to.
So far, Norway is the only other European country to have adopted a similar approach to the U.K., and has imposed a 10-day quarantine for anyone returning from all and any parts of Spain. Sweden—which, like the U.K., has an unenviable record on containing COVID-19—has also imposed a quarantine for citizens returning from Spain, but has exempted those coming back from the Balearic and Canary Islands.
The quarantine announced by Johnson on July 25 might have made more sense had there been an enormous discrepancy between the U.K. and Spain’s numbers at the time. This was the case with Sweden and its neighboring countries, where the restrictions on travel were much more justifiable than those now in place between the U.K. and Spain. Partly because of its government’s hands-off approach to dealing with the spread of COVID-19, Sweden saw much higher per capita infection and deaths rates than Denmark, Norway and Finland, all of which closed their borders to a country widely criticized for not imposing lockdown in March.
Denmark remains the only one of those three countries to have completely lifted the ban on travel to and from Sweden, which it did at the end of July in response to the country’s falling rates (Finland’s border remains closed and Norway currently only permits travel to some parts of Sweden).
Of course, Johnson may argue that excessive caution in imposing travel restrictions is necessary for the U.K. to further reduce its number of cases and deaths—and that if lower numbers can only be achieved with spoiled holidays, then so be it.
What British tourists really need protecting from this summer are the panicked decisions of their mercurial government.
But he should consider looking within rather than focusing on other countries. Johnson’s administration has a sorry track record of dealing with the virus within the U.K., which is evident in more or less everything it does—from lagging behind the rest of Europe in imposing lockdown earlier this year to its bizarre announcement on Aug. 1 that pubs might need to close in September in order for schools to reopen.
This haphazard way of operating is now also resulting in the imposition of travel rules of questionable efficacy, which leave disruption, anger, and economic damage in their wake. Such measures, of course, are presented as being necessary for the preservation of British citizens’ safety—but what British tourists really need protecting from this summer are the panicked decisions of their mercurial government.
One could very plausibly argue that the U.K.’s high numbers now are due to a disorganized approach to containing the virus back in the spring, and that Johnson needs to tighten internal regulations to prevent a second wave, not try and stop people holidaying in countries which are generally safer than Britain. The flurry of new travel restrictions, especially applying to Spain, show the British government to be obsessed with the COVID-19 statistics of other countries, rather than paying enough attention to its own.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Why Palestinians Need to Reclaim the PLO

Why Palestinians Need to Reclaim the PLO The COVID-19 pandemic and the Israeli government ’ s plans to further annex occupied Palestinian territories have shown the Palestinian leadership—once again—what it means to run a government without sovereignty .
The recently announced deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates is further evidence of the leadership ’ s inability to influence events that shape the fate of the Palestinian people .
These recent developments underscore the failure of the Palestinian Authority ( PA ) statehood project , and with it the two-state solution paradigm .
Israel ’ s annexation plans—which are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—would leave fragmented West Bank enclaves under nominal PA control , with ultimate control exercised by Israel , as has been the case since the occupation began in 1967 .
Similarly , Hamas would rule the Gaza Strip within the narrow confines of the Israeli siege imposed in 2007 and supported by Egypt .
These outcomes are neither what the Palestine Liberation Organization ( PLO ) leadership envisaged when it signed the Oslo Accords with Israel beginning in 1993 , nor what the international community intended to sponsor when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the region .
The PA , initially established as an interim government , has from the start been unable to defend its territory and population against the expansionist Israeli colonial project , or to manage an economically viable entity that could ensure a dignified livelihood for the Palestinians , especially at times of acute crisis .
The much-touted good-governance approach the PA adopted over the past few decades has resulted , ironically , in the growth of authoritarian trends and structures of repression rather than a process of democratization and accountability .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dates back to 2007 meant that the Fatah-led PA focused its power over the West Bank , while international donors invested heavily in strengthening the PA ’ s security establishment .
Today , the Palestinians ’ governance structures are weak and undemocratic at all levels .
The Palestinian resistance factions which took over the PLO in the late 1960s had succeeded in uniting the dispersed Palestinian communities in refugee camps and the diaspora with the collective aim of liberating Palestine .
The PLO housed many Palestinian political factions , including Fatah ( its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the Liberation of Palestine , and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine , among many others .
It also included unions of workers , writers , students , and women , among others , though it excluded Islamist groups .
The creation of the PA gutted the PLO politically as decision-making power shifted to the PA .
Meanwhile , the influx of foreign aid ensured the PA ’ s place as the de facto Palestinian representative in relations with Israel and in the so-called peace process .
Yet , despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to dominate the PLO and to diminish the latter ’ s role as the sole representative of the Palestinian people , as recognized by the United Nations and the Arab League in 1974 , and as the spearhead of the Palestinian national liberation movement .
That must change—and the first step is to shift the center of gravity back to the PLO .
But after nearly three decades of existence , the PA has not brought the Palestinian people any closer to realizing their inalienable right to self-determination .
It is past time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obsolete : It is simply unfit for present and future Palestinian generations that seek equality , justice , and freedom above all .
Palestinians are faced , once more , with the challenging task of reimagining their future and charting their trajectory toward justice and freedom .
Palestinians are faced , once more , with the challenging task of reimagining their future and charting their trajectory toward justice and freedom .
The fundamental rethinking of the existing , dominant framework means questioning the institutional utility of the PA and its role in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be better served in reviving , reforming , and reclaiming a potentially more representative and inclusive institution : the PLO .
Over the past year , a dozen Palestinian policy analysts at Al-Shabaka have sought to tackle the thorny questions to which the Palestinian people , especially the youth , demand answers .
These questions included : How can the PLO maintain accountability as both a national liberation movement and governing body ?
How might Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement be integrated in the PLO ’ s structures after decades of exclusion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leadership can be further developed for the coming era ?
The key messages of the report “ Reclaiming the PLO , Engaging the Youth ” —available here—are that inclusiveness , accountability , and youth leadership matter .
Reconstituting the PLO would mean bringing Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement into the fold .
A PLO without these two major factions undermines its claims to be representative of all Palestinians and erodes its legitimacy .
Token representation is not enough : Their inclusion needs to be part and parcel of a national dialogue that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ importantly , revisits its leadership models and styles of governance .
Israel has often exploited the actions of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement to evade its commitments under the Oslo peace agreements and to justify its violence against the Palestinian people .
However , Israel has itself several times reached agreements with Hamas—which Hamas has upheld—and which it has ensured other factions within Gaza have upheld .
Moreover , Israel ’ s military occupation and expansion of illegal settlements , despite Fatah ’ s control of the West Bank , dispel the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to peace .
Accountability also matters as a way out of the current morass .
Not only have the Palestinians ’ current political leaders in the PLO and the PA evolved into a self-serving elite largely disconnected from those they claim to represent , but so has , to a large extent , Hamas in Gaza since 2007 .
The gap is stark : Few Palestinians—whether they live in the occupied Palestinian territories or in the diaspora—have had a say in any of the political decisions taken on their behalf .
While opinion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the majority of Palestinians in the occupied territories are frustrated with the Palestinian leadership , the PA , and the Palestinian political factions , Palestinians have no political mechanism to change their leaders , let alone rebuild their political system .
As such , there can be no serious discussion about reforming Palestinian leadership without Palestinian people everywhere having a say in the decision-making process , in correcting course , and in holding their political leaders to account .
A reformed PLO must answer to the Palestinian people first and foremost .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders is imperative .
However , the Palestinian political playing field is currently dotted with structural obstacles to the emergence of young Palestinian leaders committed to the Palestinian struggle for justice and freedom .
From international donors ’ obsession with cultivating Palestinian technocrats , who are divorced from the lived realities of Palestinians under occupation and in the diaspora , to the protection of the ruling elites and the violent suppression of voices that could challenge the status quo , young Palestinian leaders are undermined at every turn .
Palestinians can draw lessons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leadership , including the beginnings of the PLO itself , where Palestinians formed collective leadership based on consensus and succeeded in the mass mobilization and participation of Palestinians at the grassroots level .
While the current PA leadership rightly rejected U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s peace plan , they continue to cling to a political program that has failed the Palestinian people , continuing to place their hopes in actors , such as the United States and the European Union , who have demonstrated for decades that they do not have the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is impossible amid this chaos to build a new , representative Palestinian body with an effective political program .
Regardless of the PLO ’ s current semidormant status , it is still the body closest to Palestinian communities at home and in the diaspora .
The only way out of the current political dead end is for Palestinians to revive and build their grassroots networks at home , in refugee camps , and in the diaspora from the ground up .
A new generation of Palestinian leaders must reclaim the PLO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Palestinian people can convene , organize , elect their representatives , recreate a unified national narrative , and debate and decide on a political program that will best realize the Palestinian people ’ s rights to self-determination , freedom , and justice .

The COVID-19 pandemic and the Israeli government’s plans to further annex occupied Palestinian territories have shown the Palestinian leadership—once again—what it means to run a government without sovereignty. The recently announced deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates is further evidence of the leadership’s inability to influence events that shape the fate of the Palestinian people.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the Israeli government’s plans to further annex occupied Palestinian territories have shown the Palestinian leadership—once again—what it means to run a government without sovereignty. The recently announced deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates is further evidence of the leadership’s inability to influence events that shape the fate of the Palestinian people.
These recent developments underscore the failure of the Palestinian Authority (PA) statehood project, and with it the two-state solution paradigm. Israel’s annexation plans—which are still on the table, according to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—would leave fragmented West Bank enclaves under nominal PA control, with ultimate control exercised by Israel, as has been the case since the occupation began in 1967.
Similarly, Hamas would rule the Gaza Strip within the narrow confines of the Israeli siege imposed in 2007 and supported by Egypt. These outcomes are neither what the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership envisaged when it signed the Oslo Accords with Israel beginning in 1993, nor what the international community intended to sponsor when it agreed to support peace efforts in the region.
The PA, initially established as an interim government, has from the start been unable to defend its territory and population against the expansionist Israeli colonial project, or to manage an economically viable entity that could ensure a dignified livelihood for the Palestinians, especially at times of acute crisis.
The Palestinian economy is still dependent on foreign aid as well as on the Israeli economy and the detrimental arrangements put in place under the Oslo Accords. These include the 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations, which formalized Palestinian-Israeli economic relations within a skewed customs union that favors Israel’s stronger economy and left Palestinians limited space to develop economic independence and self-reliance. The PA, initially established as an interim government, has from the start been unable to defend its territory and population against the expansionist Israeli colonial project
The much-touted good-governance approach the PA adopted over the past few decades has resulted, ironically, in the growth of authoritarian trends and structures of repression rather than a process of democratization and accountability. The political schism between Fatah and Hamas that dates back to 2007 meant that the Fatah-led PA focused its power over the West Bank, while international donors invested heavily in strengthening the PA’s security establishment. Today, the Palestinians’ governance structures are weak and undemocratic at all levels.
The Palestinian resistance factions which took over the PLO in the late 1960s had succeeded in uniting the dispersed Palestinian communities in refugee camps and the diaspora with the collective aim of liberating Palestine. The PLO housed many Palestinian political factions, including Fatah (its largest member), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, among many others. It also included unions of workers, writers, students, and women, among others, though it excluded Islamist groups.
The creation of the PA gutted the PLO politically as decision-making power shifted to the PA. Meanwhile, the influx of foreign aid ensured the PA’s place as the de facto Palestinian representative in relations with Israel and in the so-called peace process.
Yet, despite its weakness, the PA has managed to dominate the PLO and to diminish the latter’s role as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, as recognized by the United Nations and the Arab League in 1974, and as the spearhead of the Palestinian national liberation movement. That must change—and the first step is to shift the center of gravity back to the PLO.
The PA’s lack of sovereignty has meant total dependence on the financial and political will of the international community for survival, and consequently the loss of independent political decision-making. Indeed, the international community’s decision to suspend PA funding after Hamas won legislative elections in 2006 is a clear example of how the PA is unable to protect Palestinians’ democratic choices—even if they come through free and fair elections. What keeps the PA from disbanding is the international backing it receives: If the PA collapses, so would its security coordination with Israel, which is an outcome that the international community prefers to avoid.
But after nearly three decades of existence, the PA has not brought the Palestinian people any closer to realizing their inalienable right to self-determination. It is past time to declare the PA and its structures obsolete: It is simply unfit for present and future Palestinian generations that seek equality, justice, and freedom above all.
Palestinians are faced, once more, with the challenging task of reimagining their future and charting their trajectory toward justice and freedom.
Palestinians are faced, once more, with the challenging task of reimagining their future and charting their trajectory toward justice and freedom. The fundamental rethinking of the existing, dominant framework means questioning the institutional utility of the PA and its role in the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Palestinians might be better served in reviving, reforming, and reclaiming a potentially more representative and inclusive institution: the PLO.
Over the past year, a dozen Palestinian policy analysts at Al-Shabaka have sought to tackle the thorny questions to which the Palestinian people, especially the youth, demand answers. These questions included: How can the PLO maintain accountability as both a national liberation movement and governing body? How might Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement be integrated in the PLO’s structures after decades of exclusion? And what models of Palestinian youth leadership can be further developed for the coming era? The key messages of the report “Reclaiming the PLO, Engaging the Youth”—available here—are that inclusiveness, accountability, and youth leadership matter.
Reconstituting the PLO would mean bringing Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement into the fold. A PLO without these two major factions undermines its claims to be representative of all Palestinians and erodes its legitimacy. Token representation is not enough: Their inclusion needs to be part and parcel of a national dialogue that rethinks the Palestinian political program and, importantly, revisits its leadership models and styles of governance.
Israel has often exploited the actions of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement to evade its commitments under the Oslo peace agreements and to justify its violence against the Palestinian people. However, Israel has itself several times reached agreements with Hamas—which Hamas has upheld—and which it has ensured other factions within Gaza have upheld. Moreover, Israel’s military occupation and expansion of illegal settlements, despite Fatah’s control of the West Bank, dispel the myth that Hamas is the main obstacle to peace.
Reconstituting the PLO will require meaningful consensus-building, which is crucial for a national liberation movement. As it is not a government, it needs to achieve accountability to the people it represents through consulting them and coming to a consensus rather than through elections.
Accountability also matters as a way out of the current morass. Not only have the Palestinians’ current political leaders in the PLO and the PA evolved into a self-serving elite largely disconnected from those they claim to represent, but so has, to a large extent, Hamas in Gaza since 2007.
The gap is stark: Few Palestinians—whether they live in the occupied Palestinian territories or in the diaspora—have had a say in any of the political decisions taken on their behalf. While opinion polls show, year after year, that the majority of Palestinians in the occupied territories are frustrated with the Palestinian leadership, the PA, and the Palestinian political factions, Palestinians have no political mechanism to change their leaders, let alone rebuild their political system.
As such, there can be no serious discussion about reforming Palestinian leadership without Palestinian people everywhere having a say in the decision-making process, in correcting course, and in holding their political leaders to account. A reformed PLO must answer to the Palestinian people first and foremost.
Bringing in the new generation of Palestinian leaders is imperative. However, the Palestinian political playing field is currently dotted with structural obstacles to the emergence of young Palestinian leaders committed to the Palestinian struggle for justice and freedom. From international donors’ obsession with cultivating Palestinian technocrats, who are divorced from the lived realities of Palestinians under occupation and in the diaspora, to the protection of the ruling elites and the violent suppression of voices that could challenge the status quo, young Palestinian leaders are undermined at every turn.
Palestinians can draw lessons from their own history for models of leadership, including the beginnings of the PLO itself, where Palestinians formed collective leadership based on consensus and succeeded in the mass mobilization and participation of Palestinians at the grassroots level.
While the current PA leadership rightly rejected U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace plan, they continue to cling to a political program that has failed the Palestinian people, continuing to place their hopes in actors, such as the United States and the European Union, who have demonstrated for decades that they do not have the political will to deliver on Palestinian rights. It is impossible amid this chaos to build a new, representative Palestinian body with an effective political program.
Regardless of the PLO’s current semidormant status, it is still the body closest to Palestinian communities at home and in the diaspora. The only way out of the current political dead end is for Palestinians to revive and build their grassroots networks at home, in refugee camps, and in the diaspora from the ground up.
A new generation of Palestinian leaders must reclaim the PLO as the one roof under which the Palestinian people can convene, organize, elect their representatives, recreate a unified national narrative, and debate and decide on a political program that will best realize the Palestinian people’s rights to self-determination, freedom, and justice.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Why India Is Considering a Probe Into Facebook

Why India Is Considering a Probe Into Facebook Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief , the newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity .
This week : Facebook faces a crisis in India , South Asia records more than 3.5 million coronavirus cases , Pakistan ’ s spat with Saudi Arabia , and Afghanistan delays peace talks once again .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
India ’ s opposition Congress Party has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ revelations in a Wall Street Journal article that the social media platform chose not to apply its hate speech rules to a ruling party politician who called Muslims traitors .
The story , published last Friday by the reporters Newley Purnell and Jeff Horwitz , outlined how T. Raja Singh , a member of Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) , used his personal Facebook page to call for Rohingya immigrants to be shot and for mosques to be razed .
In March , Facebook ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and recommended that Singh be banned from Facebook ’ s platforms .
But according to the Journal , the company ’ s top public policy executive in India , Ankhi Das , argued against applying the company ’ s hate speech rules because it would impact Facebook ’ s business in India .
Singh ’ s accounts remain on Facebook and Instagram .
Political impact .
The issue has since exploded in India .
The Congress Party has written a letter to Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg asking him to look into the allegations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its India management team , while the BJP ’ s chief of information and technology wrote in an Indian newspaper that it was “ ludicrous to suggest that Facebook is amenable to the BJP.
” Facebook ’ s own employees are now speaking out .
Eleven Facebook India staffers wrote an open letter to the company ’ s leadership calling for more consistent applications of their policies .
“ It is hard not to feel frustrated by the incidents reported [ in the Journal ] , ” they wrote , according to Reuters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ letter .
“ The Muslim community at Facebook would like to hear from Facebook leadership.
” Das , meanwhile , has asked for police protection after receiving death threats on Facebook and Twitter .
What ’ s next .
The issue won ’ t simply peter out .
Once the monsoon session of parliament begins next month , it is fair to assume that politicians such as Shashi Tharoor , who heads the committee on information technology , will demand further investigation .
In Delhi , the state government led by the Aam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Facebook ’ s senior management for a hearing with its peace and harmony committee—a group formed after deadly communal violence erupted in the capital in February .
Both actions will likely generate more embarrassing press coverage for Facebook—and greater scrutiny of whether it has given preferential treatment to the BJP .
Facebook won ’ t be cowed .
India represents its biggest market in terms of users—a major potential source of revenue—but the company also has deep political connections , in part through the lobbying work of Das and other top executives .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Delhi and in Menlo Park , California .
And by investing $ 5.7 billion this year in Reliance Jio , owned by the billionaire Mukesh Ambani , Facebook gained indirect access to insights into navigating Delhi ’ s murky political corridors .
Finally , India represents just one flash point among many around the world for the social media giant .
It now has a well-honed machinery for dealing with public relations crises and a formidable legal team to defend itself from potential action .
While Facebook has grown remarkably in India , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way .
In 2016 , its plans to provide a gated version of the internet were blocked by Indian regulators on the grounds that they would violate net neutrality .
But India has struggled to cobble together firm regulations on social media content and preventing the scourge of fake news .
The latest controversy could be an opportunity to begin that discussion .
Meanwhile in neighboring Nepal , there has been a small surge in cases , leading to a reversal of some moves to ease lockdowns .
Kathmandu has banned the movement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gatherings .
I ’ ve previously written about my surprise at the relatively low numbers of new cases in Bangladesh and Pakistan ; those trends remain in place , in part because the countries have the lowest rates of testing among the 20 most affected countries .
Pakistan-Saudi Arabia tiff ?
Pakistan ’ s army chief , Gen. Qamar Bajwa , traveled to Riyadh this week for what Islamabad has officially described as a “ primarily military affairs-related ” visit .
The trip comes after Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi complained about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ criticizing India over its Kashmir policies .
The complaint was not well received .
Riyadh has reportedly asked Islamabad to push forward repayments on a $ 3 billion loan over disagreements on Kashmir .
Last week , FP columnist Azeem Ibrahim argued that Islamabad has botched its biggest foreign-policy issue .
“ Pakistan ’ s historical approach to Kashmir is just as responsible for enabling and facilitating this crisis as those Indians who vote for Modi in India ’ s general elections , ” he wrote .
Afghan peace talks .
Afghanistan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the final 320 Taliban prisoners , going against the decision of last week ’ s grand gathering of elders .
“ If we take this bold step , releasing all these guys , all these bad people , why are the Taliban not releasing our captives , which is a very small number ?
” government spokesperson Sediq Sediqqi told The Associated Press .
Monday ’ s announcement by Kabul once again delays the start of peace talks between the elected government and the Taliban .
Harris accepts nomination .
Sen. Kamala Harris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Wednesday at the virtual party convention , becoming the first Black and Indian American woman to hold that position .
I already shared some of FP ’ s coverage in last week ’ s newsletter , but I thought I ’ d share one more article—this time by Sanjena Sathian in the Washington Post .
Arguing that Indian Americans should refrain from seeing Harris ’ s selection purely as a victory for immigrants , she writes that it represents instead an identity crisis .
“ Spotting ourselves on the highest stages of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brings , opens the door to other toxic ideas , such as nationalism ( especially among Hindu Indians ) , ” Sathian writes .
“ President Trump , in part through his amicable relationship with right-wing Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi , has attempted to woo wealthy Indians ; Democrats like Rep. Tulsi Gabbard , a practicing Hindu , have also cozied up to Modi and his party , earning Indian accolades as a result.
” India-Nepal talks .
India ’ s Independence Day on Saturday provided Nepali Prime Minister K.P .
Sharma @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counterpart and mend relations after a recent spat over disputed territory .
Nepal ’ s Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the two sides “ looked forward to meaningful bilateral cooperation.
” Three South Asian countries marked their independence days in the last week .
Pakistan and India were born as the clock struck midnight on Aug. 15 , 1947 .
Which other country in the region celebrated its independence last week ?
Hint : It goes back to 1919 .
Scroll down for the answer .
Gandhi , the game .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which players control one of four competing factions .
Players representing Congress and the Muslim League are restricted to nonviolent protest , while members of the Raj and the Revolutionaries can use all the force they want to .
Michael Peck reviewed the game for FP this week .
“ While ‘ Gandhi ’ depicts a largely nonviolent independence movement , it really is a wargame at heart .
Staging protests and strikes—or smashing them—involves as much strategy and tactics as any military campaign , ” he writes .
“ Proper allocation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and resilience when the enemy interrupts your plans : Whether Napoleon ’ s army at Waterloo or Mahatma Gandhi ’ s followers in Delhi , the same principles apply.
” This was a bit of a trick question .
Bhutan and Nepal were never colonized , and the Maldives gained its independence from Britain on July 26 , 1965 .
That leaves Afghanistan , which signed the Anglo-Afghan Treaty , or the Treaty of Rawalpindi , with Britain on Aug. 8 , 1919 , to gain its independence .
Afghanistan marks Aug. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity.
This week: Facebook faces a crisis in India, South Asia records more than 3.5 million coronavirus cases, Pakistan’s spat with Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan delays peace talks once again.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Facebook’s India Problem
India’s opposition Congress Party has called for a probe into Facebook after revelations in a Wall Street Journal article that the social media platform chose not to apply its hate speech rules to a ruling party politician who called Muslims traitors.
The story, published last Friday by the reporters Newley Purnell and Jeff Horwitz, outlined how T. Raja Singh, a member of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), used his personal Facebook page to call for Rohingya immigrants to be shot and for mosques to be razed. In March, Facebook’s internal watchdogs flagged the account as dangerous and recommended that Singh be banned from Facebook’s platforms.
But according to the Journal, the company’s top public policy executive in India, Ankhi Das, argued against applying the company’s hate speech rules because it would impact Facebook’s business in India. Singh’s accounts remain on Facebook and Instagram.
Political impact. The issue has since exploded in India. The Congress Party has written a letter to Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg asking him to look into the allegations in the report and to consider changing its India management team, while the BJP’s chief of information and technology wrote in an Indian newspaper that it was “ludicrous to suggest that Facebook is amenable to the BJP.”
Facebook’s own employees are now speaking out. Eleven Facebook India staffers wrote an open letter to the company’s leadership calling for more consistent applications of their policies. “It is hard not to feel frustrated by the incidents reported [in the Journal],” they wrote, according to Reuters, which viewed a copy of the letter. “The Muslim community at Facebook would like to hear from Facebook leadership.”
Das, meanwhile, has asked for police protection after receiving death threats on Facebook and Twitter.
What’s next. The issue won’t simply peter out. Once the monsoon session of parliament begins next month, it is fair to assume that politicians such as Shashi Tharoor, who heads the committee on information technology, will demand further investigation. In Delhi, the state government led by the Aam Aadmi Party has said it will summon Facebook’s senior management for a hearing with its peace and harmony committee—a group formed after deadly communal violence erupted in the capital in February.
Both actions will likely generate more embarrassing press coverage for Facebook—and greater scrutiny of whether it has given preferential treatment to the BJP.
Facebook won’t be cowed. India represents its biggest market in terms of users—a major potential source of revenue—but the company also has deep political connections, in part through the lobbying work of Das and other top executives. Zuckerberg has personally met Modi in New Delhi and in Menlo Park, California. And by investing $5.7 billion this year in Reliance Jio, owned by the billionaire Mukesh Ambani, Facebook gained indirect access to insights into navigating Delhi’s murky political corridors.
Finally, India represents just one flash point among many around the world for the social media giant. It now has a well-honed machinery for dealing with public relations crises and a formidable legal team to defend itself from potential action.
While Facebook has grown remarkably in India, it hasn’t always had its way. In 2016, its plans to provide a gated version of the internet were blocked by Indian regulators on the grounds that they would violate net neutrality. But India has struggled to cobble together firm regulations on social media content and preventing the scourge of fake news. The latest controversy could be an opportunity to begin that discussion.
What We’re Following Coronavirus update. India counted a record 69,652 new coronavirus cases on Thursday, as well as 977 deaths. India is now testing more than 900,000 people every day and leads the world in new reported cases. According to the head of one private laboratory, 1 in 4 Indians may be infected, a theory that indicates rates of testing are still nowhere near enough to track the spread of the virus. India is now one of the few big countries in the world that has not flattened its curve.
Meanwhile in neighboring Nepal, there has been a small surge in cases, leading to a reversal of some moves to ease lockdowns. Kathmandu has banned the movement of vehicles and issued curbs on religious gatherings.
I’ve previously written about my surprise at the relatively low numbers of new cases in Bangladesh and Pakistan; those trends remain in place, in part because the countries have the lowest rates of testing among the 20 most affected countries.
Pakistan-Saudi Arabia tiff? Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Qamar Bajwa, traveled to Riyadh this week for what Islamabad has officially described as a “primarily military affairs-related” visit. The trip comes after Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi complained about Saudi Arabia not being vocal enough in criticizing India over its Kashmir policies.
The complaint was not well received. Riyadh has reportedly asked Islamabad to push forward repayments on a $3 billion loan over disagreements on Kashmir. Last week, FP columnist Azeem Ibrahim argued that Islamabad has botched its biggest foreign-policy issue. “Pakistan’s historical approach to Kashmir is just as responsible for enabling and facilitating this crisis as those Indians who vote for Modi in India’s general elections,” he wrote.
Afghan peace talks. Afghanistan’s government is withholding the release of the final 320 Taliban prisoners, going against the decision of last week’s grand gathering of elders. “If we take this bold step, releasing all these guys, all these bad people, why are the Taliban not releasing our captives, which is a very small number?” government spokesperson Sediq Sediqqi told The Associated Press. Monday’s announcement by Kabul once again delays the start of peace talks between the elected government and the Taliban.
Harris accepts nomination. Sen. Kamala Harris accepted the U.S. Democratic vice presidential nomination on Wednesday at the virtual party convention, becoming the first Black and Indian American woman to hold that position. I already shared some of FP’s coverage in last week’s newsletter, but I thought I’d share one more article—this time by Sanjena Sathian in the Washington Post.
Arguing that Indian Americans should refrain from seeing Harris’s selection purely as a victory for immigrants, she writes that it represents instead an identity crisis. “Spotting ourselves on the highest stages of public life, and the complacency that brings, opens the door to other toxic ideas, such as nationalism (especially among Hindu Indians),” Sathian writes.
“President Trump, in part through his amicable relationship with right-wing Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has attempted to woo wealthy Indians; Democrats like Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, a practicing Hindu, have also cozied up to Modi and his party, earning Indian accolades as a result.”
India-Nepal talks. India’s Independence Day on Saturday provided Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli the opportunity to call his Indian counterpart and mend relations after a recent spat over disputed territory. Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the two sides “looked forward to meaningful bilateral cooperation.”
Question of the Week
Three South Asian countries marked their independence days in the last week. Pakistan and India were born as the clock struck midnight on Aug. 15, 1947. Which other country in the region celebrated its independence last week? Hint: It goes back to 1919.
A) Bhutan
B) Afghanistan
C) Maldives
D) Nepal
Scroll down for the answer.
What We’re Playing
Gandhi, the game. “Gandhi” is a new board game in which players control one of four competing factions. Players representing Congress and the Muslim League are restricted to nonviolent protest, while members of the Raj and the Revolutionaries can use all the force they want to. Michael Peck reviewed the game for FP this week.
“While ‘Gandhi’ depicts a largely nonviolent independence movement, it really is a wargame at heart. Staging protests and strikes—or smashing them—involves as much strategy and tactics as any military campaign,” he writes. “Proper allocation of resources, exquisite timing, flexibility, and resilience when the enemy interrupts your plans: Whether Napoleon’s army at Waterloo or Mahatma Gandhi’s followers in Delhi, the same principles apply.”
And the Answer Is…
B) Afghanistan.
This was a bit of a trick question. Bhutan and Nepal were never colonized, and the Maldives gained its independence from Britain on July 26, 1965. That leaves Afghanistan, which signed the Anglo-Afghan Treaty, or the Treaty of Rawalpindi, with Britain on Aug. 8, 1919, to gain its independence. Afghanistan marks Aug. 19 as its formal Independence Day.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.