foreignpolicy--2020-02-06--Is India Betting Big on Huawei?

Is India Betting Big on Huawei?

Countries all around the world are busy creating their policies around the next generation of wireless technology , the 5G network .
With greater speed and capacity , 5G is expected to spur innovation and underpin future smart city technology .
In India , for example , it will not only provide economic benefits—estimated by some to be as much as $ 1 trillion by 2035—but can also be a crucial tool for social transformation by increasing access to quality education , health care , and transportation services .
Not surprisingly , New Delhi wants to be at the forefront @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 2017 , India ’ s Ministry of Communications set up a High Level Forum comprising representatives from key ministries , academia , experts , and industry stakeholders to approve a road map for deploying 5G by 2020 .
By mid-2018 , the committee submitted its report with policy recommendations for technology demonstration , 5G trials , and spectrum allocations .
However , the simple task of adopting the most affordable and reliable vendor for the technology has swiftly become a tangle .
The Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has risen to the top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supplier , but it is also at the center of an ongoing battle between the United States and China for technological dominance .
Huawei ’ s close ties with Beijing have stoked suspicions that its equipment could be used to facilitate espionage , surveillance , and cyberattacks .
In turn , the United States and some of its allies , such as Australia , have banned Huawei technology and are urging others to do the same .
And so the countries caught in the middle face a dilemma : choose Huawei or any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the United States or ban Huawei and face what are called “ reverse economic sanctions ” from China , which would entail restrictions on market access for foreign products and businesses .
Indian policymakers thus face a critical choice—one that will require them to carefully weigh and balance a broad range of economic , political , technical , and strategic considerations .
As a first step , in December 2019 , India ’ s minister for telecommunications , Ravi Shankar Prasad , announced that all applicants—including Huawei—would be allowed to participant in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must have been relieved .
The company had put in proposals to conduct 5G tests over the summer , and it had been allowed to showcase potential uses for its wares at the 2019 India Mobile Congress , a digital technology forum organized by India ’ s Department of Telecommunications .
Prasad ’ s December announcement—coupled with events over the last year—shows that India was probably never going to agree to the United States ’ demands to block Huawei from all consideration .
But that doesn ’ t mean that everyone in New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set to begin by March .
Some people close to Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s administration have explicitly criticized New Delhi ’ s decision .
For example , the Swadeshi Jagran Manch—an affiliate of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh , an organization that supports the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party—has repeatedly urged the government to ban Chinese telecom companies , saying they posed an “ unacceptable security risk.
” Meanwhile , V.K .
Saraswat , a member of the government ’ s policy think tank , the National Institution for Transforming India , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 5G trials will make India “ vulnerable ” to cyberattacks and could be a major setback to the indigenous development of 5G technology .
V. Kamakoti , a member of the National Security Advisory Board , which advises Modi on security matters , echoed similar concerns and emphasized that only a purely indigenous technology could offer a truly secure 5G network for India .
The potential for indigenous technology to provide a secure and strategically neutral solution to the Huawei conundrum can not be ignored .
But its success hinges on three critical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , technical know-how , and a sound policy framework .
India is yet to match the money spent by other countries on 5G technology ; a maiden effort to set up indigenous 5G test testing in 2018 was granted a relatively paltry sum of $ 31.5 million , compared to the hundreds of billions of dollars across a combination of government funding and commercial investments that China has reportedly spent .
On policy , although there has been talk of developing 5G under “ Make in India ” —a Modi initiative to boost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on how exactly the plan would be leveraged to develop 5G .
While a homegrown solution is important and should be encouraged , it may take a long while to come to fruition .
If the Modi administration wants to prioritize the early deployment of 5G , then it will likely have to consider conceding to the demands of either the United States or China .
Meanwhile , whatever the value of indigenous technology over the long term , India has to take cybersecurity seriously .
In the 2018 Global Cybersecurity Index released @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was downgraded by 24 positions to a rank of 47 .
Incidents of malicious cyberattacks and massive breaches of personal information continue to take place , such as the 2018 Aadhaar data breach and the 2019 cyberattack on the Indian Space Research Organization and the Kudankulam nuclear plant .
Further slippage , coupled with the lack of robust legal and institutional mechanisms for responding to cyber-threats could have grave ramifications for personal data protection , privacy , and security , and it may even deter businesses from investing in India if they feel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won ’ t be protected .
Another consideration for the Modi government is that India ’ s mobile operators—particularly the so-called Big Three , Bharti Airtel , Vodafone Idea , and Reliance Jio , which together hold a share of over 50 % of India ’ s total wireless subscriber base—are also split on Huawei .
A news report from January revealed that both Airtel and Vodafone have already partnered with Huawei , ZTE , Ericsson , and Nokia to conduct 5G trials .
In fact , those two companies are longstanding customers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2G , 3G , and 4G in certain service areas .
In October 2019 , Bharti Airtel Chairman Sunil Mittal praised Huawei ’ s superiority and asserted that India should leverage its population and geographical proximity to China to extract the best deal from Beijing.Yet Jio has so far avoided partnering with the Chinese firm , opting instead for Samsung .
Meanwhile , government-owned mobile operators such as Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited have entered into a memorandum of understanding with Nokia for 5G development .
While the state operator ’ s rationale is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ company ’ s network in 2009 and 2014 may give a hint for its reasons .
This puts New Delhi in a tough spot .
Should it ban Huawei , doing so will not only reduce competition and constrain operators from extracting the best deal from other 5G vendors , but it will also lead to policy uncertainty , increase prices for subscribers , and jeopardize future Chinese partnerships .
By allowing Huawei in , the government retains the benefit of choice and competitive prices for 5G equipment .
However , it may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operators from losses related to cyberattacks and breaches—should Huawei ’ s equipment genuinely prove to be Beijing ’ s instrument to carry out subversive activities .
Either way , the Cellular Operators Association of India , an industry association of telecom operators , wants the government to arrive at a decision quickly so that the association can “ future-proof ” its decisions .
For this group—which includes the Big Three and other tech companies—apart from honoring preexisting partnerships , affordability will probably be the most important factor in building the 5G network .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a triple whammy of high debts , low investments , and lack of adequate revenue .
At the same time , it is also looking at a bill of around 1.5 trillion rupees , about $ 21 million , after the Supreme Court ruled on a new definition for adjusted gross revenues .
In short , telecom operators are in no position to invest in expensive equipment , and that sets up Huawei as an attractive and viable option .
The question of geopolitical considerations also looms large .
Partnership with the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s increasing influence in Asia and the Indo-Pacific , courtesy of Beijing ’ s Belt and Road Initiative .
If it doesn ’ t ban Huawei tech , New Delhi may lose U.S. support in multilateral forums , such as the United Nations Security Council .
Other efforts to build the strategic partnership , such as the 2+2 ministerial dialogue and some military cooperation agreements , may also suffer .
At the same time , though , Chinese-Indian relations are riddled with mistrust .
Unresolved border issues and Beijing ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the potential use of Huawei tech to spy on India .
But , by banning Huawei , such mistrust would further deepen .
It could reverse what little progress was made between the two during the October 2019 Mamallapuram summit .
New Delhi ’ s cooperation with Beijing would also strengthen its position in platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS at a time when India may increasingly find itself alienated in continental Asia given the upswing in Russian-Chinese relations .
All factors require a careful cost-benefit analysis to determine which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , of course , is not alone in facing tough choices on 5G .
For example , in Germany , Berlin ’ s decision to allow Huawei to bid for contracts is facing opposition within Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s own ruling party—despite the fact that allowing Chinese manufacturers to participate in 5G trials does not even guarantee that they would eventually be allowed to secure contracts as vendors .
And due to Japan ’ s ban on Chinese equipment in public procurement , the Softbank group—a major mobile operator in the region—announced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Nokia and Ericsson as its vendors , despite having carried out widespread trials with Huawei .
In India ’ s case , it could likewise go through with some tests only to opt out later .
Yet banning Huawei post-5G trials may increase costs for operators that partnered with Chinese companies for the exercise .
Vodafone Hutchison Australia was a major customer of Huawei ’ s technology prior to Australia ’ s ban .
It subsequently signed a five-year deal with Nokia to supply equipment for its 5G rollout , but it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had set it back 12 months .
As of today , 55 telecom service providers across the world have commercially deployed 5G services , and over 150 commercial trials are underway .
Given the potential benefits of 5G , India wants to streamline its adoption .
Whereas a decision to include Huawei in that process would send a strong signal of rapprochement with China , it could potentially jeopardize India ’ s evolving strategic partnership with the United States .
On the other hand , banning the company may not only worsen Sino-Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stage of cautious amicability , but also increase financial costs and lengthen delays for swift deployment of 5G in the country .
The divergence of opinion among powerful stakeholders in India has further complicated this dilemma .
However , by allowing Huawei to participate in the upcoming 5G trials , New Delhi may have made a smart decision .
By not preemptively excluding any supplier , it has given itself more time to take a final call .
It has also given itself a unique opportunity to closely assess alleged risks and vulnerabilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be useful as it tries to balance all its domestic and strategic interests .

Countries all around the world are busy creating their policies around the next generation of wireless technology, the 5G network. With greater speed and capacity, 5G is expected to spur innovation and underpin future smart city technology. In India, for example, it will not only provide economic benefits—estimated by some to be as much as $1 trillion by 2035 —but can also be a crucial tool for social transformation by increasing access to quality education, health care, and transportation services.
Countries all around the world are busy creating their policies around the next generation of wireless technology, the 5G network. With greater speed and capacity, 5G is expected to spur innovation and underpin future smart city technology. In India, for example, it will not only provide economic benefits—estimated by some to be as much as $1 trillion by 2035—but can also be a crucial tool for social transformation by increasing access to quality education, health care, and transportation services.
Not surprisingly, New Delhi wants to be at the forefront of adopting and deploying 5G networks. In 2017, India’s Ministry of Communications set up a High Level Forum comprising representatives from key ministries, academia, experts, and industry stakeholders to approve a road map for deploying 5G by 2020. By mid-2018, the committee submitted its report with policy recommendations for technology demonstration, 5G trials, and spectrum allocations.
However, the simple task of adopting the most affordable and reliable vendor for the technology has swiftly become a tangle. The Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has risen to the top as the most affordable and technologically advanced supplier, but it is also at the center of an ongoing battle between the United States and China for technological dominance.
Huawei’s close ties with Beijing have stoked suspicions that its equipment could be used to facilitate espionage, surveillance, and cyberattacks. In turn, the United States and some of its allies, such as Australia, have banned Huawei technology and are urging others to do the same. And so the countries caught in the middle face a dilemma: choose Huawei or any other Chinese technology company and suffer pushback from the United States or ban Huawei and face what are called “reverse economic sanctions” from China, which would entail restrictions on market access for foreign products and businesses.
Indian policymakers thus face a critical choice—one that will require them to carefully weigh and balance a broad range of economic, political, technical, and strategic considerations. As a first step, in December 2019, India’s minister for telecommunications, Ravi Shankar Prasad, announced that all applicants—including Huawei—would be allowed to participant in trials debuting 5G in India.
Huawei must have been relieved. The company had put in proposals to conduct 5G tests over the summer, and it had been allowed to showcase potential uses for its wares at the 2019 India Mobile Congress, a digital technology forum organized by India’s Department of Telecommunications.
Prasad’s December announcement—coupled with events over the last year—shows that India was probably never going to agree to the United States’ demands to block Huawei from all consideration. But that doesn’t mean that everyone in New Delhi is happy that trials are now set to begin by March.
Some people close to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration have explicitly criticized New Delhi’s decision. For example, the Swadeshi Jagran Manch—an affiliate of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, an organization that supports the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party—has repeatedly urged the government to ban Chinese telecom companies, saying they posed an “unacceptable security risk.” Meanwhile, V.K. Saraswat, a member of the government’s policy think tank, the National Institution for Transforming India, has said that allowing Huawei to participate in 5G trials will make India “vulnerable” to cyberattacks and could be a major setback to the indigenous development of 5G technology. V. Kamakoti, a member of the National Security Advisory Board, which advises Modi on security matters, echoed similar concerns and emphasized that only a purely indigenous technology could offer a truly secure 5G network for India.
The potential for indigenous technology to provide a secure and strategically neutral solution to the Huawei conundrum cannot be ignored. But its success hinges on three critical factors, namely: investment and funding, technical know-how, and a sound policy framework. India is yet to match the money spent by other countries on 5G technology; a maiden effort to set up indigenous 5G test testing in 2018 was granted a relatively paltry sum of $31.5 million, compared to the hundreds of billions of dollars across a combination of government funding and commercial investments that China has reportedly spent. On policy, although there has been talk of developing 5G under “Make in India”—a Modi initiative to boost domestic manufacturing and entrepreneurship—little has been revealed on how exactly the plan would be leveraged to develop 5G. While a homegrown solution is important and should be encouraged, it may take a long while to come to fruition. If the Modi administration wants to prioritize the early deployment of 5G, then it will likely have to consider conceding to the demands of either the United States or China.
Meanwhile, whatever the value of indigenous technology over the long term, India has to take cybersecurity seriously. In the 2018 Global Cybersecurity Index released by the International Telecommunication Union, India was downgraded by 24 positions to a rank of 47. Incidents of malicious cyberattacks and massive breaches of personal information continue to take place, such as the 2018 Aadhaar data breach and the 2019 cyberattack on the Indian Space Research Organization and the Kudankulam nuclear plant. Further slippage, coupled with the lack of robust legal and institutional mechanisms for responding to cyber-threats could have grave ramifications for personal data protection, privacy, and security, and it may even deter businesses from investing in India if they feel that their customer data and sensitive information won’t be protected.
Another consideration for the Modi government is that India’s mobile operators—particularly the so-called Big Three, Bharti Airtel, Vodafone Idea, and Reliance Jio, which together hold a share of over 50% of India’s total wireless subscriber base—are also split on Huawei. A news report from January revealed that both Airtel and Vodafone have already partnered with Huawei, ZTE, Ericsson, and Nokia to conduct 5G trials. In fact, those two companies are longstanding customers of Huawei and use its equipment for 2G, 3G, and 4G in certain service areas. In October 2019, Bharti Airtel Chairman Sunil Mittal praised Huawei’s superiority and asserted that India should leverage its population and geographical proximity to China to extract the best deal from Beijing.Yet Jio has so far avoided partnering with the Chinese firm, opting instead for Samsung. Meanwhile, government-owned mobile operators such as Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited have entered into a memorandum of understanding with Nokia for 5G development. While the state operator’s rationale is unclear, allegations that Huawei hacked the company’s network in 2009 and 2014 may give a hint for its reasons.
This puts New Delhi in a tough spot. Should it ban Huawei, doing so will not only reduce competition and constrain operators from extracting the best deal from other 5G vendors, but it will also lead to policy uncertainty, increase prices for subscribers, and jeopardize future Chinese partnerships. By allowing Huawei in, the government retains the benefit of choice and competitive prices for 5G equipment. However, it may not be able to adequately protect mobile operators from losses related to cyberattacks and breaches—should Huawei’s equipment genuinely prove to be Beijing’s instrument to carry out subversive activities.
Either way, the Cellular Operators Association of India, an industry association of telecom operators, wants the government to arrive at a decision quickly so that the association can “future-proof” its decisions. For this group—which includes the Big Three and other tech companies—apart from honoring preexisting partnerships, affordability will probably be the most important factor in building the 5G network. India’s telecom sector is facing a triple whammy of high debts, low investments, and lack of adequate revenue. At the same time, it is also looking at a bill of around 1.5 trillion rupees, about $21 million, after the Supreme Court ruled on a new definition for adjusted gross revenues. In short, telecom operators are in no position to invest in expensive equipment, and that sets up Huawei as an attractive and viable option.
The question of geopolitical considerations also looms large. Partnership with the United States helps India maintain a bulwark against China’s increasing influence in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, courtesy of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. If it doesn’t ban Huawei tech, New Delhi may lose U.S. support in multilateral forums, such as the United Nations Security Council. Other efforts to build the strategic partnership, such as the 2+2 ministerial dialogue and some military cooperation agreements, may also suffer.
At the same time, though, Chinese-Indian relations are riddled with mistrust. Unresolved border issues and Beijing’s close friendship with Pakistan raise tangible concerns about the potential use of Huawei tech to spy on India. But, by banning Huawei, such mistrust would further deepen. It could reverse what little progress was made between the two during the October 2019 Mamallapuram summit. New Delhi’s cooperation with Beijing would also strengthen its position in platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS at a time when India may increasingly find itself alienated in continental Asia given the upswing in Russian-Chinese relations. All factors require a careful cost-benefit analysis to determine which pushback will hurt India the most
India, of course, is not alone in facing tough choices on 5G. For example, in Germany, Berlin’s decision to allow Huawei to bid for contracts is facing opposition within Chancellor Angela Merkel’s own ruling party—despite the fact that allowing Chinese manufacturers to participate in 5G trials does not even guarantee that they would eventually be allowed to secure contracts as vendors. And due to Japan’s ban on Chinese equipment in public procurement, the Softbank group—a major mobile operator in the region—announced a surprise decision to select Europe’s Nokia and Ericsson as its vendors, despite having carried out widespread trials with Huawei. In India’s case, it could likewise go through with some tests only to opt out later.
Yet banning Huawei post-5G trials may increase costs for operators that partnered with Chinese companies for the exercise. Vodafone Hutchison Australia was a major customer of Huawei’s technology prior to Australia’s ban. It subsequently signed a five-year deal with Nokia to supply equipment for its 5G rollout, but it lamented that the government’s decision had set it back 12 months.
As of today, 55 telecom service providers across the world have commercially deployed 5G services, and over 150 commercial trials are underway. Given the potential benefits of 5G, India wants to streamline its adoption. Whereas a decision to include Huawei in that process would send a strong signal of rapprochement with China, it could potentially jeopardize India’s evolving strategic partnership with the United States. On the other hand, banning the company may not only worsen Sino-Indian bilateral ties, which are at a stage of cautious amicability, but also increase financial costs and lengthen delays for swift deployment of 5G in the country.
The divergence of opinion among powerful stakeholders in India has further complicated this dilemma. However, by allowing Huawei to participate in the upcoming 5G trials, New Delhi may have made a smart decision. By not preemptively excluding any supplier, it has given itself more time to take a final call. It has also given itself a unique opportunity to closely assess alleged risks and vulnerabilities in Huawei’s gear—information that will be useful as it tries to balance all its domestic and strategic interests.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-06--Is Afghan Intelligence Building a Regime of Terror With the CIA’s Help?

Is Afghan Intelligence Building a Regime of Terror With the CIA ’ s Help ?
KABUL—When Nazar Mohammad Motmaeen talks about the National Directorate of Security ( NDS ) , the Afghan intelligence service with close ties to the CIA , he becomes nervous .
“ They are dangerous , and they do not make any compromises , ” he said in a recent interview .
Motmaeen , a freelance political analyst from Kabul who often appears on TV , says he knows what he is talking about .
A few months ago , he says , he was attacked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Though he escaped , he later claimed that they belonged to the NDS , which allegedly wanted to silence him because of his political dissent .
Motmaeen is a regular critic of America ’ s military occupation of Afghanistan , and he supports a peace deal with the Taliban .
Motmaeen is hardly alone in telling such tales .
A few weeks after the alleged attempt on Motmaeen ’ s life , Mohammad Hassan Haqyar , another political dissident who regularly criticized the Kabul government , was attacked and injured by unknown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 , Waheed Mozhdah , a senior political analyst and writer , was assassinated in Kabul ’ s Dar-ul-Aman area after leaving his local mosque .
Until today , Mozhdah ’ s killers remain at large .
But he , too , was known for his critical views toward both Kabul and Washington .
Many observers linked pro-government forces to these “ chain attacks , ” as they have been described by some local Afghan news outlets .
“ It ’ s obvious that the government did this or it let it happen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a religious cleric and government critic , on Tolo News , Afghanistan ’ s biggest news channel .
According to family members , Mozhdah was killed by a high-tech pistol .
Afghanistan ’ s whole political landscape reacted to his killing .
While government officials claimed that they would investigate the case , the Taliban issued a statement calling the killing an “ intelligence operation.
” After Mozhdah ’ s death , Motmaeen left Afghanistan out of fear .
Haqyar also lives abroad at the moment .
“ The situation in Kabul is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
The government has declined to comment on most of the allegations .
But NDS director Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai was forced to resign last September after an NDS raid in Jalalabad , the capital of the eastern province of Nangarhar , targeted a prominent local family and killed four brothers , all civilians .
While the intelligence service claimed to have attacked alleged members of the Islamic State , locals rejected this version .
It was later revealed that all victims were innocent men between 24 and 30 years old who were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 02 unit , which is responsible for similar operations in the eastern region .
Stanekzai used to be part of the Afghan communist regime and fought against the mujahideen in the 1980s .
And many Afghans believe that the NDS , with the CIA ’ s help and approval , has already turned into a second incarnation of KhAD , the brutal intelligence service of the Afghan communists in the 1980s .
KhAD killed and tortured tens of thousands of people following the bloody communist coup in 1978 .
KhAD ’ s most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ later became Afghanistan ’ s last communist president .
As the former senior KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin noted , Comrade Najib , as he was known , was famous for beating and torturing prisoners to death .
Toward the end of his presidency , as the Soviets were preparing to withdraw , Najibullah called for a national reconciliation process with the very people he had spent years torturing .
His calls for uniting the fractured nation fell on deaf ears , as millions of Afghans still saw him as a brutal torturer .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ graves have not been located .
According to some people , the NDS is not just the official successor of KhAD—it is also imitating its brutal tactics to turn Afghanistan into a new police state with the help of U.S. intelligence , which is supporting the regime .
Around 7:30 p.m. on Jan. 5 , members of an NDS special forces unit burst into a residential home in one of Kabul ’ s busiest neighborhoods .
By the early morning , five people were dead , killed in cold blood .
“ They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manner .
It was a slaughter , ” one of the witnesses said .
One of the victims was Amer Abdul Sattar , a former anti-Soviet commander and noted political figure .
Sattar , who lived in nearby Parwan province , had been invited over the weekend to Kabul and was believed to have been the NDS ’ s primary target that night .
His son was also killed in the raid .
Until today , it is not known why the raid took place or why Sattar was killed .
It may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to other victims , he was a considered a pro-government figure and supported President Ashraf Ghani during his last election campaign in 2019 .
At the time of the raid , all of the victims were unarmed .
“ Five people were killed , and two were taken by the NDS .
Seven others remained in the house , ” Abdul Nasir , a relative of Sattar , told Foreign Policy .
According to the witnesses , the NDS unit intended to kill everyone in the apartment .
“ Amer Sattar and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killed with my father and one of my brothers , ” said Shafi Ghorbandi , the son of the homeowner .
But at the same time , it was obvious that the raid against Sattar would shake politics in the capital .
“ As soon as I heard , I reached out to the president , ” Amrullah Saleh , Ghani ’ s current running mate and a former NDS chief , said at Sattar ’ s funeral the following day .
Saleh was a close friend to Sattar .
After the funeral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members at the presidential palace and expressed his condolences .
He also promised an investigation of the raid .
The killing of Sattar also became a hotly debated issue in the Afghan parliament , with several legislators demanding a thorough , proper investigation into the raid .
The parliament took the opportunity to inquire about the increasing number of night raids that have been happening across the country .
In fact , while the parliament was still discussing the raid in the city of Kabul , there were reports of another night raid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in the eastern province of Laghman .
An elderly man was reportedly killed , and his four sons were taken into NDS detention .
In fact , similar incidents have taken place all over the country over the last several months .
Nearly every reported incident was said to have involved the NDS and the CIA , which simultaneously maintains its own force while also supporting its Afghan counterparts in the NDS .
In Afghanistan , both intelligence services have become notorious for their hunt-and-kill tactics , which often result in civilian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CIA units like the Khost Protection Force ( KPF ) , which is mainly present in the southeastern provinces , abduct , torture , and kill Afghan civilians deliberately—a fact that was underlined by a Human Rights Watch ( HRW ) report in late 2019 .
The 53-page report documents 14 cases across nine provinces from late 2017 to mid-2019 .
According to HRW , the cases clearly illustrate that the Afghan forces trained and funded by the CIA have shown little concern for civilian life or accountability to international law .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , most recently in the provinces of Khost , Paktia , Paktika , Nangarhar , and Maidan Wardak .
“ These abusive forces , which are backed by the CIA , have routinely disregarded protections to which civilians and detainees are entitled , ” Patricia Gossman , HRW ’ s associate Asia director and the report ’ s author , told Foreign Policy .
“ These are not isolated cases but illustrative of a larger pattern of serious laws-of-war violations—even war crimes—by these paramilitary forces .
In case after case , the NDS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people in their custody and consigned entire communities to the terror of abusive night raids and indiscriminate airstrikes .
The U.S. and Afghan governments should end this pathology and disband all irregular forces.
” Since transparency does not exist , it often appears unclear how far the NDS is involved in these operations and the control of militias like the KPF .
However , the hierarchy appears to be clear , which means that nothing can happen without the CIA ’ s approval .
At the same time , little is known about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to whom it is answering .
“ Many people who worked with NDS during the last years were communists who also used to work with KhAD .
This is not a coincidence , ” Motmaeen said .
During his lifetime , Mozhdah also claimed that many former communists took over the NDS and imitated KhAD practices to spread fear and terror .
While the function of militias like the KPF and its ties to the CIA are obvious—the KPF is being trained and equipped at Camp Chapman , a CIA base in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an official organ of Afghanistan ’ s security apparatus and claims to serve the nation ’ s interests , is much more ambiguous .
Stanekzai , the former NDS commander , has been succeeded by Ahmad Zia Saraj , who appears to have no clear political background .
“ Contrary to others , he has a clear intelligence background .
But he kept a low profile and worked his way up .
At the end , he took over with the blessing of both NDS and CIA , ” an Afghan security analyst @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nevertheless , there are rumors that Saraj might lose his position after the raid against Sattar .
“ He is facing a lot of pressure now .
We will see if he will remain on his seat or not , ” the analyst said .
But while criticism toward the NDS is growing , incidents like the raid that killed Sattar and his son reveal how confident the intelligence service feels while conducting human rights abuses , even in the middle of Kabul ’ s urban areas .
Sometimes its 01 unit can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the city .
“ There is a strong ‘ you are with us or against us ’ policy .
Any kind of political opposition and dissent is considered as ‘ terrorism ’ or ‘ warlordism ’ [ by the government ] .
Afghanistan faced such policies once in its darkest times , and the outcome is well known , ” said Saeed Jalal , a Kabul-based researcher and analyst .
Probably the most notorious spy chief in Kabul was Asadullah Khalid , who led the intelligence service from 2012 to 2015 .
Already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a long list of human rights abuses , including abduction , torture , rape , and murder .
In 2010 , Canadian government documents reported that Khalid had his own private dungeon while serving as the governor of Kandahar .
He was also accused of the murder of five United Nations workers allegedly to protect the local drug trafficking ring in which he was involved .
Khalid vanished from the political landscape after he was severely injured by a Taliban attack in December 2012 , a few months after he became NDS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appointed Khalid as defense minister .
The step was criticized by several human rights organizations because of Khalid ’ s brutal past .
However , his reinstallment just underlined the path that Kabul ’ s security regime appears to be taking .

KABUL—When Nazar Mohammad Motmaeen talks about the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan intelligence service with close ties to the CIA, he becomes nervous. “They are dangerous, and they do not make any compromises,” he said in a recent interview. Motmaeen, a freelance political analyst from Kabul who often appears on TV, says he knows what he is talking about. A few months ago, he says, he was attacked by gunmen in the middle of Kabul. Though he escaped, he later claimed that they belonged to the NDS, which allegedly wanted to silence him because of his political dissent. Motmaeen is a regular critic of America’s military occupation of Afghanistan, and he supports a peace deal with the Taliban.
KABUL—When Nazar Mohammad Motmaeen talks about the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan intelligence service with close ties to the CIA, he becomes nervous. “They are dangerous, and they do not make any compromises,” he said in a recent interview. Motmaeen, a freelance political analyst from Kabul who often appears on TV, says he knows what he is talking about. A few months ago, he says, he was attacked by gunmen in the middle of Kabul. Though he escaped, he later claimed that they belonged to the NDS, which allegedly wanted to silence him because of his political dissent. Motmaeen is a regular critic of America’s military occupation of Afghanistan, and he supports a peace deal with the Taliban.
Motmaeen is hardly alone in telling such tales. A few weeks after the alleged attempt on Motmaeen’s life, Mohammad Hassan Haqyar, another political dissident who regularly criticized the Kabul government, was attacked and injured by unknown gunmen. And on Nov. 20, 2019, Waheed Mozhdah, a senior political analyst and writer, was assassinated in Kabul’s Dar-ul-Aman area after leaving his local mosque. Until today, Mozhdah’s killers remain at large. But he, too, was known for his critical views toward both Kabul and Washington.
Many observers linked pro-government forces to these “chain attacks,” as they have been described by some local Afghan news outlets. “It’s obvious that the government did this or it let it happen,” said Mawlavi Baharuddin Jowzjani, a religious cleric and government critic, on Tolo News, Afghanistan’s biggest news channel. According to family members, Mozhdah was killed by a high-tech pistol. Afghanistan’s whole political landscape reacted to his killing. While government officials claimed that they would investigate the case, the Taliban issued a statement calling the killing an “intelligence operation.”
After Mozhdah’s death, Motmaeen left Afghanistan out of fear. Haqyar also lives abroad at the moment. “The situation in Kabul is not safe for us,” Motmaeen said.
The government has declined to comment on most of the allegations. But NDS director Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai was forced to resign last September after an NDS raid in Jalalabad, the capital of the eastern province of Nangarhar, targeted a prominent local family and killed four brothers, all civilians. While the intelligence service claimed to have attacked alleged members of the Islamic State, locals rejected this version. It was later revealed that all victims were innocent men between 24 and 30 years old who were beaten and shot dead by the infamous 02 unit, which is responsible for similar operations in the eastern region.
Stanekzai used to be part of the Afghan communist regime and fought against the mujahideen in the 1980s. And many Afghans believe that the NDS, with the CIA’s help and approval, has already turned into a second incarnation of KhAD, the brutal intelligence service of the Afghan communists in the 1980s. KhAD killed and tortured tens of thousands of people following the bloody communist coup in 1978. KhAD’s most notorious chief was Mohammad Najibullah, who later became Afghanistan’s last communist president. As the former senior KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin noted, Comrade Najib, as he was known, was famous for beating and torturing prisoners to death. Toward the end of his presidency, as the Soviets were preparing to withdraw, Najibullah called for a national reconciliation process with the very people he had spent years torturing. His calls for uniting the fractured nation fell on deaf ears, as millions of Afghans still saw him as a brutal torturer. To this day, many KhAD mass graves have not been located.
According to some people, the NDS is not just the official successor of KhAD—it is also imitating its brutal tactics to turn Afghanistan into a new police state with the help of U.S. intelligence, which is supporting the regime.
All these questions came to a head when, a few weeks after Mozhdah’s killing, Kabul was shattered by another atrocity.
Around 7:30 p.m. on Jan. 5, members of an NDS special forces unit burst into a residential home in one of Kabul’s busiest neighborhoods. By the early morning, five people were dead, killed in cold blood. “They attacked our home in a very brutal manner. It was a slaughter,” one of the witnesses said. One of the victims was Amer Abdul Sattar, a former anti-Soviet commander and noted political figure. Sattar, who lived in nearby Parwan province, had been invited over the weekend to Kabul and was believed to have been the NDS’s primary target that night. His son was also killed in the raid.
Until today, it is not known why the raid took place or why Sattar was killed. It may have even been a mistake: Contrary to other victims, he was a considered a pro-government figure and supported President Ashraf Ghani during his last election campaign in 2019. At the time of the raid, all of the victims were unarmed. “Five people were killed, and two were taken by the NDS. Seven others remained in the house,” Abdul Nasir, a relative of Sattar, told Foreign Policy. According to the witnesses, the NDS unit intended to kill everyone in the apartment.
“Amer Sattar and his son were our guests. They were killed with my father and one of my brothers,” said Shafi Ghorbandi, the son of the homeowner.
But at the same time, it was obvious that the raid against Sattar would shake politics in the capital. “As soon as I heard, I reached out to the president,” Amrullah Saleh, Ghani’s current running mate and a former NDS chief, said at Sattar’s funeral the following day. Saleh was a close friend to Sattar. After the funeral, Ghani welcomed Sattar’s family members at the presidential palace and expressed his condolences. He also promised an investigation of the raid.
The killing of Sattar also became a hotly debated issue in the Afghan parliament, with several legislators demanding a thorough, proper investigation into the raid. The parliament took the opportunity to inquire about the increasing number of night raids that have been happening across the country.
In fact, while the parliament was still discussing the raid in the city of Kabul, there were reports of another night raid, again carried out by the NDS, in the eastern province of Laghman. An elderly man was reportedly killed, and his four sons were taken into NDS detention. In fact, similar incidents have taken place all over the country over the last several months. Nearly every reported incident was said to have involved the NDS and the CIA, which simultaneously maintains its own force while also supporting its Afghan counterparts in the NDS.
In Afghanistan, both intelligence services have become notorious for their hunt-and-kill tactics, which often result in civilian casualties. It is well documented that CIA units like the Khost Protection Force (KPF), which is mainly present in the southeastern provinces, abduct, torture, and kill Afghan civilians deliberately—a fact that was underlined by a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report in late 2019. The 53-page report documents 14 cases across nine provinces from late 2017 to mid-2019. According to HRW, the cases clearly illustrate that the Afghan forces trained and funded by the CIA have shown little concern for civilian life or accountability to international law. The militias are active all over the country, most recently in the provinces of Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Nangarhar, and Maidan Wardak.
“These abusive forces, which are backed by the CIA, have routinely disregarded protections to which civilians and detainees are entitled,” Patricia Gossman, HRW’s associate Asia director and the report’s author, told Foreign Policy. “These are not isolated cases but illustrative of a larger pattern of serious laws-of-war violations—even war crimes—by these paramilitary forces. In case after case, the NDS strike forces and KPF have simply shot people in their custody and consigned entire communities to the terror of abusive night raids and indiscriminate airstrikes. The U.S. and Afghan governments should end this pathology and disband all irregular forces.”
Since transparency does not exist, it often appears unclear how far the NDS is involved in these operations and the control of militias like the KPF. However, the hierarchy appears to be clear, which means that nothing can happen without the CIA’s approval. At the same time, little is known about the NDS, its structures, and to whom it is answering. “Many people who worked with NDS during the last years were communists who also used to work with KhAD. This is not a coincidence,” Motmaeen said. During his lifetime, Mozhdah also claimed that many former communists took over the NDS and imitated KhAD practices to spread fear and terror. While the function of militias like the KPF and its ties to the CIA are obvious—the KPF is being trained and equipped at Camp Chapman, a CIA base in the middle of Khost—the NDS, which is an official organ of Afghanistan’s security apparatus and claims to serve the nation’s interests, is much more ambiguous.
Stanekzai, the former NDS commander, has been succeeded by Ahmad Zia Saraj, who appears to have no clear political background. “Contrary to others, he has a clear intelligence background. But he kept a low profile and worked his way up. At the end, he took over with the blessing of both NDS and CIA,” an Afghan security analyst who requested anonymity told Foreign Policy. Nevertheless, there are rumors that Saraj might lose his position after the raid against Sattar. “He is facing a lot of pressure now. We will see if he will remain on his seat or not,” the analyst said.
But while criticism toward the NDS is growing, incidents like the raid that killed Sattar and his son reveal how confident the intelligence service feels while conducting human rights abuses, even in the middle of Kabul’s urban areas. Sometimes its 01 unit can even be seen in broad daylight in the city.
“There is a strong ‘you are with us or against us’ policy. Any kind of political opposition and dissent is considered as ‘terrorism’ or ‘warlordism’ [by the government]. Afghanistan faced such policies once in its darkest times, and the outcome is well known,” said Saeed Jalal, a Kabul-based researcher and analyst.
Probably the most notorious spy chief in Kabul was Asadullah Khalid, who led the intelligence service from 2012 to 2015. Already before doing so, Khalid was accused of a long list of human rights abuses, including abduction, torture, rape, and murder. In 2010, Canadian government documents reported that Khalid had his own private dungeon while serving as the governor of Kandahar. He was also accused of the murder of five United Nations workers allegedly to protect the local drug trafficking ring in which he was involved. Khalid vanished from the political landscape after he was severely injured by a Taliban attack in December 2012, a few months after he became NDS chief.
In early 2019, Ghani appointed Khalid as defense minister. The step was criticized by several human rights organizations because of Khalid’s brutal past. However, his reinstallment just underlined the path that Kabul’s security regime appears to be taking.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-05--Canada’s Not-So-Green Green Energy

Canada’s Not-So-Green Green Energy

That ’ s why most Thursdays found the NunatuKavut elders Jim Learning and Eldred Davis joining other seniors of aboriginal descent down at the Labrador Friendship Centre community cafeteria , where the sounds of lively conversation drowned out the twin creaking of joints and chairs .
“ It ’ s a hard tack , ” Learning said , describing the traditional Newfoundland dish of fish and brewis , one Thursday in November 2019 .
“ Soaked but not boiled , and salt codfish and fatback pork .
And potatoes .
You mix those together.
” At 81 , the former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cabin he shares with his longtime partner , his thick , white hair flowing freely from his head .
Learning and Davis , a 72-year-old former utility company worker and lifelong bachelor , had nurtured a decadeslong friendship here in the Labrador region town of Happy Valley-Goose Bay .
The community of 8,000 sprang up around a military base built during World War II , where the Churchill River drains Labrador ’ s largest watershed by flowing into Lake Melville .
Over two years ago , in July 2017 , rather than chatting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over hot plates of fish and brewis , the pair found themselves nearly 1,000 miles away , locked in a bleak cell in the basement of Her Majesty ’ s Penitentiary in St. John ’ s , Newfoundland .
They were in the solitary confinement wing , but the day after Learning arrived , prison administrators surprised him by suggesting he share the cell ’ s single bunk bed and toilet with Davis .
Soon , Davis was walking down the cellblock toward him in a comically oversized orange jumpsuit , white bushy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ head and thick black eyeglass frames .
That Thursday , they later recalled , the usual thrice-daily ritual unfolded .
The door to the cellblock opened to admit a prison guard , who pushed a tray with gray hamburgers and room-temperature french fries through a slot in their cell door .
Davis and Learning , their faces covered stubble , exchanged a look but let the food sit .
“ This building must be over a hundred years old , ” Learning mused .
“ It ’ s a real rat ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for six days .
Within an hour , the burgers were withdrawn , leaving the men alone to mull their crimes against the state .
By refusing to eat , they hoped to draw the world ’ s attention to the construction of Muskrat Falls , a hydropower plant costing 12.7 billion Canadian dollars ( nearly $ 10 billion ) that would eventually , despite their efforts , dam the Churchill River , less than 25 miles upstream of Happy Valley-Goose Bay .
Muskrat Falls is just one example of the Canadian government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large-scale hydropower as a primary solution to climate change .
In the coming years , Canada ’ s state-owned hydropower industry plans to export that idea , in the form of billions of dollars ’ worth of energy , to U.S. markets that are facing intense political pressure to find renewable energy alternatives .
But those plans face a real threat—in the form of people like Learning and Davis , otherwise law-abiding residents of indigenous descent who are desperate to quell Canada ’ s enthusiasm for large-scale hydropower .
But that rosy outlook @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , where higher prices subsidize the enormous overhead associated with such projects .
Every year , the United States spends about $ 3 billion to purchase around 10 percent of Canada ’ s electricity production ; the power mostly flows to the Midwest , Northeast , and Pacific Northwest .
Companies like the Canadian energy firm Nalcor , which is developing the Muskrat Falls project , have reason to be optimistic that the U.S. demand for Canadian renewable energy will only grow .
Although U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ curbing greenhouse gas emissions , many states are setting their own strict targets , changing the energy landscape with blistering speed .
Indeed , when then-Vermont Gov .
Peter Shumlin signed the Vermont Comprehensive Energy Plan into law in 2016 , the goal of achieving 90 percent renewable energy in his state by 2050 was the most ambitious in the nation .
Over just the past four years , though , that goal has become relatively conservative .
For example , in 2019 , Minnesota Gov .
Tim Walz set a goal of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in New York and Washington states set mandates of 100 percent renewable by 2045 .
In January , Rhode Island Gov .
Gina Raimondo signed an executive order targeting 100 percent renewable by 2030 .
The world ’ s 1,292 gigawatts of installed capacity prevented 4 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases in 2018 , equivalent to about 75 percent of the United States ’ total emissions and a significant chunk of the 37.1 billion metric tons emitted globally , as calculated by the World Research Institute .
As states consider how to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hydropower is an attractive option .
According to the International Hydropower Association , the world ’ s 1,292 gigawatts of installed capacity prevented 4 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases in 2018 , equivalent to about 75 percent of the United States ’ total emissions and a significant chunk of the 37.1 billion metric tons emitted globally , as calculated by the World Research Institute .
In order to tap into the low-carbon bounty , Minnesota is building a $ 700 million Great Northern Transmission Line to pipe power from Manitoba ; Maine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Connect , a $ 950 million transmission line that cuts across its North Woods ; Massachusetts signed a 20-year deal that could generate $ 10 billion for Canada ’ s Hydro-Québec ; and New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that he would aggressively pursue a major energy contract with Quebec .
But the rush to import hydropower relies on continued Canadian public support for an energy source that is touted as “ clean and green.
” And those in Happy Valley-Goose Bay are not on board .
“ Listen to what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go in and talk to the people downstream of that particular dam , ” Davis said in November .
“ I guess if the promoter is talking about green hydro , clean hydro , it ’ s basically nonexistent .
For every hydro installation , there ’ s some damage somewhere , and large mega-dams with large reservoirs are the worst.
” When land is flooded to create a reservoir , a necessary step in building some hydroelectric facilities , naturally occurring mercury is released into the water column , where it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ methylmercury , a neurotoxin that can accumulate in the food chain and , in extreme cases , can cause serious damage to the neurological and nervous system of humans .
“ It ’ s an attack on our way of life , ” Charlotte Wolfrey , the elected leader of Rigolet , told me this fall .
“ It ’ s cultural genocide.
” There is sharp debate over the extent to which the Muskrat Falls project will affect the fish , seals , and waterfowl eaten by residents of Happy Valley-Goose Bay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the watershed .
Nalcor cites studies predicting no human health impact whatsoever , while the Nunatsiavut Government , which governs the small Inuit community of Rigolet , cites research predicting that as many as two-thirds of Rigolet residents , most of whom rely on wild-caught food to survive , could regularly take in more than the dose considered safe by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency .
The more dire predictions have stoked grave fear among the Inuit .
“ It ’ s an attack on our way of life , ” Charlotte Wolfrey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told me this fall .
“ It ’ s cultural genocide.
” Wolfrey , Learning , and Davis have joined hundreds of other local residents in resisting the dam on Muskrat Falls .
They began by speaking against it at public meetings , progressed to organizing community marches , and have lately turned to acts of civil disobedience .
Residents went on hunger strikes and performed drum ceremonies .
In 2016 , they set up an encampment at the construction site , and they sporadically gummed up construction activity by physically blocking employee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a wave of arrests in 2016 , during which dozens of people were jailed , a local judge issued an injunction prohibiting protesters from going within a kilometer , about half a mile , of Muskrat Falls .
Learning , Davis , and a third elder , Marjorie Flowers , earned their prison terms in 2017 by refusing to sign an agreement to obey the injunction .
In prison , Learning and Davis relied on each other to get through long hours staring at the rusted iron bars and cracks in the concrete @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confinement wing had been convicted of crimes ranging from dealing drugs to murder .
Davis said that , other than sleeping on the concrete floor , which was aggravating an old back injury , he was doing well .
But Learning seemed continually agitated by the injustice of it all .
He often harangued the guards about dehumanizing practices—he was reprimanded for refusing to open his mouth to allow a guard to ensure he had taken a pill , and on another occasion he summoned a jail administrator to argue against leaving the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t forget , in 1956 Canada signed on to the Geneva Convention , ” he told the unimpressed administrator .
“ We banned torture in Canada .
We can ’ t do it .
You are doing it.
” Davis worried about his friend .
“ I told him he should eat , because he was fighting cancer ” —Learning has been dealing with prostate cancer for 20 years— “ and he needed nutrition , ” Davis told me .
Learning , for his part , said he was energized , not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the crap , ” he said .
Instead , he was more worried about Davis .
During the first morning rounds , Davis would be so stiff that he could barely clamber to his feet to stand at attention .
“ It was hard for Eldred .
He couldn ’ t sleep because of the lights , ” Learning said .
“ He was really hurting.
” And there are signs of improvement , fueled in part by a landmark 2004 Canada Supreme Court case Haida Nation v. British Columbia , which found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with aboriginal groups before developing lands to which the groups have claims .
Some of Canada ’ s biggest hydropower companies—Nalcor , Hydro-Québec , and BC Hydro , among others—have responded to concerns with a slate of measures designed to include indigenous communities into the planning process , with robust indigenous relations departments , community programs , and increased levels of consultation .
But the industry continues to draw criticism from human rights advocates like Amnesty International .
And during a 2019 visit to Canada to assess its conformance with the U.N .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Baskut Tuncak , the special rapporteur on human rights and hazardous substances and wastes , singled out Muskrat Falls as one of several areas of concern in a landscape in which marginalized indigenous people “ find themselves on the wrong side of a toxic divide , subject to conditions that would not be acceptable elsewhere in Canada.
” Future damming projects will invariably continue to butt up against marginalized communities .
Although Nalcor negotiated a deal that garnered support from Innu Nation , which had a recognized land claim to the site @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of dollars in compensation , when it came to the Inuit and NunatuKavut , Tuncak said he ’ d heard notable concerns “ regarding the absence of meaningful consultation afforded to two affected First Nations , the risk of methyl mercury releases contaminating traditional foods and impacting health , ” among other concerns .
And future damming projects will invariably continue to butt up against marginalized communities .
Ryan Calder , a Duke University researcher who has for years studied the impacts of dam-related toxins and the wild-caught food supplies of Canada ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016 that 22 of 22 future dam proposals he ’ d identified , including another Nalcor project on the Churchill River , were located within 60 miles of indigenous communities .
The drive for renewable energy is bumping up against increasing levels of dissatisfaction with large-scale hydro among many environmental leaders and policymakers in the United States , too .
“ The question is , should we put our time into that or put our time into developing renewable energy in Maine and New England , where we get more economic benefits ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 .
He is the climate and clean energy director for the Natural Resources Council of Maine , a state that serves as a critical physical link in Canadian exports .
“ Wind and solar have vastly lower impacts than the mega-dams in Canada , and there ’ s a whole host of social and cultural issues.
” While the Canadian federal government sees little difference between hydropower , wind , and solar , the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency does not consider large-scale hydro to be “ green , ” defined as energy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” In addition to long-standing concerns about disruptions to fish migrations and the hydrologic cycle of wild rivers , recent research has also called attention to the considerable carbon emissions of dam reservoirs , mostly from carbon and methane that is released when flooded vegetation rots .
No wonder that , in January 2019 , hundreds of environmental groups in the United States including Friends of the Earth and the Climate Justice Alliance signed onto a letter of support for the Green New Deal , a sweeping set of emissions-reduction measures that specifically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ renewable energy .
Such opposition owes a debt to people like Learning and Davis , whose 2017 battle of wills with the Canadian justice system couldn ’ t last forever .
After 10 days in solitary confinement , they were shackled and transported to a courtroom , where they stood before the judge , looking much more haggard than they had upon arrest .
Well aware of the media attention that had followed their incarceration , the judge offered them another chance to sign the agreement to stay away from the Muskrat Falls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some ways , he felt broken by his experience .
Learning said that his brief time as a political prisoner in the twilight of his life would be a badge of honor .
“ I was on a cause .
I could have been in there for a month , ” he said .
“ I only regret that I didn ’ t get back in there.
” “ I can ’ t go back to jail , ” he told Learning .
“ The back problem is only going to get more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not getting any younger.
” After Davis signed , Learning and Flowers refused , essentially daring the judge to send them back to prison .
But the judge crafted a compromise , in which they were held on house arrest for months .
As Learning recalled the story in his cabin in late 2019 , he said that his brief time as a political prisoner in the twilight of his life would be a badge of honor .
“ I was on a cause .
I could have been in there for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I only regret that I didn ’ t get back in there.
” Then his eyes flickered to a clock on a side table .
“ Oh no , ” he said .
“ Did I miss it ?
” No , he realized .
It was only Wednesday .
“ It ’ s tomorrow , ” he said , sinking back into his couch .
“ Tomorrow is fish and brewis day.
” This story was supported by the Pulitzer Center .

HAPPY VALLEY-GOOSE BAY, Newfoundland—Thursday is fish and brewis day.
That’s why most Thursdays found the NunatuKavut elders Jim Learning and Eldred Davis joining other seniors of aboriginal descent down at the Labrador Friendship Centre community cafeteria, where the sounds of lively conversation drowned out the twin creaking of joints and chairs.
“It’s a hard tack,” Learning said, describing the traditional Newfoundland dish of fish and brewis, one Thursday in November 2019. “Soaked but not boiled, and salt codfish and fatback pork. And potatoes. You mix those together.” At 81, the former woodcutter sat on a couch in the cabin he shares with his longtime partner, his thick, white hair flowing freely from his head.
Learning and Davis, a 72-year-old former utility company worker and lifelong bachelor, had nurtured a decadeslong friendship here in the Labrador region town of Happy Valley-Goose Bay. The community of 8,000 sprang up around a military base built during World War II, where the Churchill River drains Labrador’s largest watershed by flowing into Lake Melville.
Over two years ago, in July 2017, rather than chatting about the quirks of their respective woodstoves over hot plates of fish and brewis, the pair found themselves nearly 1,000 miles away, locked in a bleak cell in the basement of Her Majesty’s Penitentiary in St. John’s, Newfoundland. They were in the solitary confinement wing, but the day after Learning arrived, prison administrators surprised him by suggesting he share the cell’s single bunk bed and toilet with Davis. Soon, Davis was walking down the cellblock toward him in a comically oversized orange jumpsuit, white bushy eyebrows splitting the difference between his domed head and thick black eyeglass frames.
Jim Learning, left, and Davis stand by Learning's truck at the gate to Muskrat Falls Generating Facility on the North Spur near Happy Valley-Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador, on Nov. 16, 2019.
That Thursday, they later recalled, the usual thrice-daily ritual unfolded. The door to the cellblock opened to admit a prison guard, who pushed a tray with gray hamburgers and room-temperature french fries through a slot in their cell door. Davis and Learning, their faces covered in stubble, exchanged a look but let the food sit.
“This building must be over a hundred years old,” Learning mused. “It’s a real rat’s nest.”
They hadn’t eaten for six days. Within an hour, the burgers were withdrawn, leaving the men alone to mull their crimes against the state.
By refusing to eat, they hoped to draw the world’s attention to the construction of Muskrat Falls, a hydropower plant costing 12.7 billion Canadian dollars (nearly $10 billion) that would eventually, despite their efforts, dam the Churchill River, less than 25 miles upstream of Happy Valley-Goose Bay.
Muskrat Falls is just one example of the Canadian government’s ongoing and massive investment in large-scale hydropower as a primary solution to climate change. In the coming years, Canada’s state-owned hydropower industry plans to export that idea, in the form of billions of dollars’ worth of energy, to U.S. markets that are facing intense political pressure to find renewable energy alternatives. But those plans face a real threat—in the form of people like Learning and Davis, otherwise law-abiding residents of indigenous descent who are desperate to quell Canada’s enthusiasm for large-scale hydropower.
The Muskrat Falls Generating Facility on the Churchill River near Happy Valley-Goose Bay on Nov. 17, 2019.
It took 70 years for Canada to grow its hydropower industry into the juggernaut it is now. Today, 500 energy-generating facilities shuttle electricity over a mammoth web of transmission lines and substations to power two-thirds of Canadian homes and businesses, making the country the third-largest producer of hydropower in the world behind China and Brazil. In the coming decades, the industry is expected to receive $125 billion in funding and create 1 million Canadian jobs.
But that rosy outlook depends on Canada selling power to the United States, where higher prices subsidize the enormous overhead associated with such projects. Every year, the United States spends about $3 billion to purchase around 10 percent of Canada’s electricity production; the power mostly flows to the Midwest, Northeast, and Pacific Northwest.
Companies like the Canadian energy firm Nalcor, which is developing the Muskrat Falls project, have reason to be optimistic that the U.S. demand for Canadian renewable energy will only grow. Although U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of the United Nations-brokered 2016 Paris agreement on curbing greenhouse gas emissions, many states are setting their own strict targets, changing the energy landscape with blistering speed. Indeed, when then-Vermont Gov. Peter Shumlin signed the Vermont Comprehensive Energy Plan into law in 2016, the goal of achieving 90 percent renewable energy in his state by 2050 was the most ambitious in the nation. Over just the past four years, though, that goal has become relatively conservative.
For example, in 2019, Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz set a goal of 100 percent by 2050, while legislation in New York and Washington states set mandates of 100 percent renewable by 2045. In January, Rhode Island Gov. Gina Raimondo signed an executive order targeting 100 percent renewable by 2030.
The world’s 1,292 gigawatts of installed capacity prevented 4 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases in 2018, equivalent to about 75 percent of the United States’ total emissions and a significant chunk of the 37.1 billion metric tons emitted globally, as calculated by the World Resources Institute.
As states consider how to follow through on those goals, large-scale hydropower is an attractive option. According to the International Hydropower Association, the world’s 1,292 gigawatts of installed capacity prevented 4 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases in 2018, equivalent to about 75 percent of the United States’ total emissions and a significant chunk of the 37.1 billion metric tons emitted globally, as calculated by the World Resources Institute.
In order to tap into the low-carbon bounty, Minnesota is building a $700 million Great Northern Transmission Line to pipe power from Manitoba; Maine is considering the New England Clean Energy Connect, a $950 million transmission line that cuts across its North Woods; Massachusetts signed a 20-year deal that could generate $10 billion for Canada’s Hydro-Québec; and New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that he would aggressively pursue a major energy contract with Quebec.
But the rush to import hydropower relies on continued Canadian public support for an energy source that is touted as “clean and green.” And those in Happy Valley-Goose Bay are not on board. “Listen to what the seller has to say and then go in and talk to the people downstream of that particular dam,” Davis said in November. “I guess if the promoter is talking about green hydro, clean hydro, it’s basically nonexistent. For every hydro installation, there’s some damage somewhere, and large mega-dams with large reservoirs are the worst.”
In 2006, when then-Newfoundland and Labrador Premier Danny Williams announced that the province would pursue the Muskrat Falls project, many indigenous people in the region saw it as the latest step in a centuries-long pattern of colonization of the First Nations people.
When land is flooded to create a reservoir, a necessary step in building some hydroelectric facilities, naturally occurring mercury is released into the water column, where it is taken up by bacteria and transformed into methylmercury, a neurotoxin that can accumulate in the food chain and, in extreme cases, can cause serious damage to the neurological and nervous system of humans.
“It’s an attack on our way of life,” Charlotte Wolfrey, the elected leader of Rigolet, told me this fall. “It’s cultural genocide.”
There is sharp debate over the extent to which the Muskrat Falls project will affect the fish, seals, and waterfowl eaten by residents of Happy Valley-Goose Bay and Rigolet, an Inuit community in the watershed. Nalcor cites studies predicting no human health impact whatsoever, while the Nunatsiavut Government, which governs the small Inuit community of Rigolet, cites research predicting that as many as two-thirds of Rigolet residents, most of whom rely on wild-caught food to survive, could regularly take in more than the dose considered safe by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
The more dire predictions have stoked grave fear among the Inuit. “It’s an attack on our way of life,” Charlotte Wolfrey, the elected leader of Rigolet, told me this fall. “It’s cultural genocide.”
Wolfrey, Learning, and Davis have joined hundreds of other local residents in resisting the dam on Muskrat Falls. They began by speaking against it at public meetings, progressed to organizing community marches, and have lately turned to acts of civil disobedience. Residents went on hunger strikes and performed drum ceremonies. In 2016, they set up an encampment at the construction site, and they sporadically gummed up construction activity by physically blocking employee vehicles from entering and exiting.
Charlotte Wolfrey, an elder and elected leader of the small Inuit community of Rigolet, in Newfoundland and Labrador, at her home on Nov. 11, 2019. Wolfrey worries that methylmercury poisoning from a recently completed hydropower project will destroy the community's deep cultural connection to seals and other wild-caught food.
After a wave of arrests in 2016, during which dozens of people were jailed, a local judge issued an injunction prohibiting protesters from going within a kilometer, about half a mile, of Muskrat Falls. Learning, Davis, and a third elder, Marjorie Flowers, earned their prison terms in 2017 by refusing to sign an agreement to obey the injunction.
In prison, Learning and Davis relied on each other to get through long hours staring at the rusted iron bars and cracks in the concrete walls. Other residents of the solitary confinement wing had been convicted of crimes ranging from dealing drugs to murder.
Davis said that, other than sleeping on the concrete floor, which was aggravating an old back injury, he was doing well. But Learning seemed continually agitated by the injustice of it all.
He often harangued the guards about dehumanizing practices—he was reprimanded for refusing to open his mouth to allow a guard to ensure he had taken a pill, and on another occasion he summoned a jail administrator to argue against leaving the lights on all night.
“Don’t forget, in 1956 Canada signed on to the Geneva Convention,” he told the unimpressed administrator. “We banned torture in Canada. We can’t do it. You are doing it.”
Davis worried about his friend. “I told him he should eat, because he was fighting cancer”—Learning has been dealing with prostate cancer for 20 years—“and he needed nutrition,” Davis told me.
Learning, for his part, said he was energized, not agitated. “I was reveling in the crap,” he said.
Instead, he was more worried about Davis. During the first morning rounds, Davis would be so stiff that he could barely clamber to his feet to stand at attention. “It was hard for Eldred. He couldn’t sleep because of the lights,” Learning said. “He was really hurting.”
Canada’s sprawling efforts to build dams have resulted in relationships with indigenous groups that run the gamut from forced resettlement to mutually beneficial partnerships.
And there are signs of improvement, fueled in part by a landmark 2004 Canada Supreme Court case Haida Nation v. British Columbia, which found that governments are legally bound to consult with aboriginal groups before developing lands to which the groups have claims. Some of Canada’s biggest hydropower companies—Nalcor, Hydro-Québec, and BC Hydro, among others—have responded to concerns with a slate of measures designed to include indigenous communities in the planning process, with robust indigenous relations departments, community programs, and increased levels of consultation.
But the industry continues to draw criticism from human rights advocates like Amnesty International. And during a 2019 visit to Canada to assess its conformance with the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Baskut Tuncak, the special rapporteur on human rights and hazardous substances and wastes, singled out Muskrat Falls as one of several areas of concern in a landscape in which marginalized indigenous people “find themselves on the wrong side of a toxic divide, subject to conditions that would not be acceptable elsewhere in Canada.”
Future damming projects will invariably continue to butt up against marginalized communities.
Although Nalcor negotiated a deal that garnered support from Innu Nation, which had a recognized land claim to the site, in exchange for hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation, when it came to the Inuit and NunatuKavut, Tuncak said he’d heard notable concerns “regarding the absence of meaningful consultation afforded to two affected First Nations, the risk of methyl mercury releases contaminating traditional foods and impacting health,” among other concerns.
And future damming projects will invariably continue to butt up against marginalized communities. Ryan Calder, a Duke University researcher who has for years studied the impacts of dam-related toxins and the wild-caught food supplies of Canada’s First Nations communities, found in 2016 that 22 of 22 future dam proposals he’d identified, including another Nalcor project on the Churchill River, were located within 60 miles of indigenous communities.
The drive for renewable energy is bumping up against increasing levels of dissatisfaction with large-scale hydro among many environmental leaders and policymakers in the United States, too.
Learning at his home in Happy Valley-Goose Bay on Nov. 6, 2019.
“The question is, should we put our time into that or put our time into developing renewable energy in Maine and New England, where we get more economic benefits?” Dylan Voorhees told me in October 2019. He is the climate and clean energy director for the Natural Resources Council of Maine, a state that serves as a critical physical link in Canadian exports. “Wind and solar have vastly lower impacts than the mega-dams in Canada, and there’s a whole host of social and cultural issues.”
While the Canadian federal government sees little difference between hydropower, wind, and solar, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency does not consider large-scale hydro to be “green,” defined as energy that provides the “highest environmental benefit.” In addition to long-standing concerns about disruptions to fish migrations and the hydrologic cycle of wild rivers, recent research has also called attention to the considerable carbon emissions of dam reservoirs, mostly from carbon and methane that is released when flooded vegetation rots.
No wonder that, in January 2019, hundreds of environmental groups in the United States including Friends of the Earth and the Climate Justice Alliance signed onto a letter of support for the Green New Deal, a sweeping set of emissions-reduction measures that specifically excludes large-scale hydro from any definition of renewable energy.
Such opposition owes a debt to people like Learning and Davis, whose 2017 battle of wills with the Canadian justice system couldn’t last forever. After 10 days in solitary confinement, they were shackled and transported to a courtroom, where they stood before the judge, looking much more haggard than they had upon arrest. Well aware of the media attention that had followed their incarceration, the judge offered them another chance to sign the agreement to stay away from the Muskrat Falls site.
Davis said that, in some ways, he felt broken by his experience.
Learning said that his brief time as a political prisoner in the twilight of his life would be a badge of honor. “I was on a cause. I could have been in there for a month,” he said. “I only regret that I didn’t get back in there.”
“I can’t go back to jail,” he told Learning. “The back problem is only going to get more and more, and I’m not getting any younger.”
After Davis signed, Learning and Flowers refused, essentially daring the judge to send them back to prison. But the judge crafted a compromise, in which they were held on house arrest for months.
As Learning recalled the story in his cabin in late 2019, he said that his brief time as a political prisoner in the twilight of his life would be a badge of honor. “I was on a cause. I could have been in there for a month,” he said. “I only regret that I didn’t get back in there.”
Then his eyes flickered to a clock on a side table.
“Oh no,” he said. “Did I miss it?” No, he realized. It was only Wednesday.
“It’s tomorrow,” he said, sinking back into his couch. “Tomorrow is fish and brewis day.”
This story was supported by the Pulitzer Center.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-07--Iraq’s Protesters Appeal to Top Shiite Cleric

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Protesters in Iraq call on Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to make a statement during his Friday sermon , a coronavirus whistleblower ’ s death sparks outrage in China , and Venezuela detains Citgo executives—drawing condemnation from the United States .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Amid months of unrest some Iraqi activists are calling on Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani , Iraq ’ s most prominent Shiite leader , to take a stand during his Friday sermon in the sacred city of Karbala after the followers of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacked an anti-government protest camp this week in the nearby holy city of Najaf , killing at least eight people .
On Thursday , Sadr ’ s followers raided another camp in Karbala .
Many of the anti-government protesters are Shiites and they are now appealing to Sistani to intervene .
Although Sistani tends to keep his distance from politics , his past interventions have been extremely influential , as Mohammad R. Kalantari and Ali Hashem argued last week in Foreign Policy .
The attacks came after Sadr told his followers , many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to abandon the demonstrations when Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi was named prime minister on Saturday .
The protesters have urged Sistani to reject Allawi .
“ Sistani is the one leader left who ’ s both part of the system and has supported our cause , ” one activist told Reuters on Thursday .
Who is Moqtada al-Sadr ?
He rose to prominence as the leader of a militia during the U.S. occupation of Iraq but is now part of the political establishment : He controls the largest bloc in Iraq ’ s parliament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s shift , which has weakened protest turnout .
Sadr has built a populist movement and often issues directives on Twitter , though the move this week has led to divisions among his followers , Agence France-Presse reports .
What ’ s next ?
Hundreds of protesters marched in the streets of Najaf on Thursday , condemning the violence .
The activists say they plan to rebuild their protest camp in the city ’ s main square .
Protests are likely to continue today .
Meanwhile , Allawi is tasked with forming a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him down .
Early coronavirus whistleblower dies in Wuhan .
Li Wenliang , one of eight doctors who tried to raise the alarm about the new coronavirus in December , has died of the disease .
After he first alerted fellow doctors of the outbreak in December , he was silenced by local authorities .
The news of Li ’ s death went viral on Chinese social media and has sparked calls for greater freedom of speech , which were quickly censored .
It remains to be seen whether the Chinese government will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , FP ’ s James Palmer writes .
Meanwhile , Beijing declared a “ people ’ s war ” against the virus outbreak , with one official declaring the virus had peaked .
The World Health Organization said that it was too early to tell , with nearly 2,500 new cases reported in China on Friday .
U.S. condemns Venezuela over Citgo detentions .
On Thursday , the United States condemned Venezuela ’ s government for the detention of six executives from Citgo—the U.S. subsidiary of the state-owned oil company PDVSA .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ house arrest to a prison in Caracas .
Elliott Abrams , the U.S. special representative for Venezuela , called the action “ cruel and indefensible.
” It came after U.S. President Donald Trump welcomed Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó at the White House and threatened “ crippling ” sanctions on Nicolás Maduro ’ s government .
Abrams also warned of potential sanctions against Russia , which supports Maduro .
Canada tries to boost its bid for Security Council seat .
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is in Addis Ababa , Ethiopia , today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where he will try to win support for Canada ’ s bid to take a rotating seat on the U.N. Security Council .
Voting will be held on June 17 .
Canada , Ireland , and Norway are vying for two available two-year seats .
Canada , which spends less of its GDP on foreign aid than the other two countries , will also need to lobby envoys at the United Nations .
If Canada fails to get the seat , it would be a blow to Trudeau .
Ireland ’ s election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ireland on Saturday , with the left-wing nationalist party Sinn Fein emerging as the unlikely frontrunner .
Many voters still oppose Sinn Fein for its past role as the political wing of the Irish Republican Army .
It ’ s not likely to lead the next administration and rival parties say they won ’ t join a Sinn Fein coalition—but a strong showing could bring the issue of Irish unification to the forefront of political debate and force mainstream parties to cooperate with Sinn Fein .
India ’ s bet on Huawei .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of deploying 5G networks , and it ’ s allowing the Chinese firm Huawei to participate in trials within its borders .
But a divided telecoms industry , security concerns , and disagreements within the central government have complicated the country ’ s calculations , Harsh V. Pant and Aarshi Tirkey write for FP .
Afghanistan ’ s intelligence service .
The National Directorate of Security ( NDS ) , the Afghan intelligence service , has close links to the CIA .
As government dissidents are attacked and murdered , critics liken the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s communist regime in the 1980s , Emran Feroz reports for FP .
Three astronauts landed safely in Kazakhstan on Thursday after finishing missions on the International Space Station .
The crew included NASA astronaut Christina Koch , who set a record for the longest spaceflight by a woman : 328 days in orbit .
Koch took part in the first all-female space walk last October .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Protesters in Iraq call on Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to make a statement during his Friday sermon, a coronavirus whistleblower's death sparks outrage in China, and Venezuela detains Citgo executives—drawing condemnation from the United States.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Protesters in Iraq call on Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to make a statement during his Friday sermon, a coronavirus whistleblower’s death sparks outrage in China, and Venezuela detains Citgo executives—drawing condemnation from the United States.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Protesters Appeal to Iraq’s Ayatollah Sistani
Amid months of unrest some Iraqi activists are calling on Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s most prominent Shiite leader, to take a stand during his Friday sermon in the sacred city of Karbala after the followers of a populist Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, attacked an anti-government protest camp this week in the nearby holy city of Najaf, killing at least eight people. On Thursday, Sadr’s followers raided another camp in Karbala.
Many of the anti-government protesters are Shiites and they are now appealing to Sistani to intervene. Although Sistani tends to keep his distance from politics, his past interventions have been extremely influential, as Mohammad R. Kalantari and Ali Hashem argued last week in Foreign Policy.
The attacks came after Sadr told his followers, many of whom participated in the protests, to abandon the demonstrations when Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi was named prime minister on Saturday. The protesters have urged Sistani to reject Allawi. “Sistani is the one leader left who’s both part of the system and has supported our cause,” one activist told Reuters on Thursday.
Who is Moqtada al-Sadr? He rose to prominence as the leader of a militia during the U.S. occupation of Iraq but is now part of the political establishment: He controls the largest bloc in Iraq’s parliament. Activists are disappointed in Sadr’s shift, which has weakened protest turnout. Sadr has built a populist movement and often issues directives on Twitter, though the move this week has led to divisions among his followers, Agence France-Presse reports.
What’s next? Hundreds of protesters marched in the streets of Najaf on Thursday, condemning the violence. The activists say they plan to rebuild their protest camp in the city’s main square. Protests are likely to continue today. Meanwhile, Allawi is tasked with forming a government, with activists determined to bring him down.
What We’re Following Today
Early coronavirus whistleblower dies in Wuhan. Li Wenliang, one of eight doctors who tried to raise the alarm about the new coronavirus in December, has died of the disease. After he first alerted fellow doctors of the outbreak in December, he was silenced by local authorities. The news of Li’s death went viral on Chinese social media and has sparked calls for greater freedom of speech, which were quickly censored.
It remains to be seen whether the Chinese government will celebrate Li or cover up his story, FP’s James Palmer writes. Meanwhile, Beijing declared a “people’s war” against the virus outbreak, with one official declaring the virus had peaked. The World Health Organization said that it was too early to tell, with nearly 2,500 new cases reported in China on Friday.
U.S. condemns Venezuela over Citgo detentions. On Thursday, the United States condemned Venezuela’s government for the detention of six executives from Citgo—the U.S. subsidiary of the state-owned oil company PDVSA. They are believed to have been taken from house arrest to a prison in Caracas. Elliott Abrams, the U.S. special representative for Venezuela, called the action “cruel and indefensible.” It came after U.S. President Donald Trump welcomed Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó at the White House and threatened “crippling” sanctions on Nicolás Maduro’s government. Abrams also warned of potential sanctions against Russia, which supports Maduro.
Canada tries to boost its bid for Security Council seat. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, today at the annual African Union summit, where he will try to win support for Canada’s bid to take a rotating seat on the U.N. Security Council. Voting will be held on June 17. Canada, Ireland, and Norway are vying for two available two-year seats. Canada, which spends less of its GDP on foreign aid than the other two countries, will also need to lobby envoys at the United Nations. If Canada fails to get the seat, it would be a blow to Trudeau.
Keep an Eye On
Ireland’s election. Voters head to the polls in Ireland on Saturday, with the left-wing nationalist party Sinn Fein emerging as the unlikely frontrunner. Many voters still oppose Sinn Fein for its past role as the political wing of the Irish Republican Army. It’s not likely to lead the next administration and rival parties say they won’t join a Sinn Fein coalition—but a strong showing could bring the issue of Irish unification to the forefront of political debate and force mainstream parties to cooperate with Sinn Fein.
India’s bet on Huawei. India wants to be at the forefront of deploying 5G networks, and it’s allowing the Chinese firm Huawei to participate in trials within its borders. But a divided telecoms industry, security concerns, and disagreements within the central government have complicated the country’s calculations, Harsh V. Pant and Aarshi Tirkey write for FP.
Afghanistan’s intelligence service. The National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan intelligence service, has close links to the CIA. As government dissidents are attacked and murdered, critics liken the NDS to the intelligence service of the country’s communist regime in the 1980s, Emran Feroz reports for FP.
Odds and Ends
Three astronauts landed safely in Kazakhstan on Thursday after finishing missions on the International Space Station. The crew included NASA astronaut Christina Koch, who set a record for the longest spaceflight by a woman: 328 days in orbit. Koch took part in the first all-female space walk last October.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.