foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Washington Needs a Better Plan for Competing With China

Washington Needs a Better Plan for Competing With China On July 23 , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a major address on China that received widespread attention .
The speech contained much to commend , but it was missing an important element : It did not articulate a clear goal of the U.S. strategy for China .
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy declared that the return of great-power competition with China and Russia was the foremost threat facing the United States , but Washington has yet to articulate a clear objective for this competition , and many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ What are the United States and China competing for ?
When will the competition end ?
What does success look like ?
The goal was to make China the Germany of Asia .
It was a coherent approach , but it didn ’ t work .
A good strategy includes a clear statement of one ’ s goals and a plan for achieving them .
And in order to compete with China ’ s broadening economic and geopolitical ambitions , the United States needs to articulate a clearer end game for this competition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For most of the period since the end of the Cold War , the United States ’ goal vis-à-vis China was clear : to make Beijing a “ responsible stakeholder ” in the U.S.-led rules-based international system .
The theory was that by enmeshing China into the already established global institutions and trade links , China would eventually grow rich , democratize , and cooperate with the rest of the international community .
Basically , the goal was to make China the Germany of Asia .
It was a coherent approach , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China has become rich , but instead of moderating its behavior , it has grown more assertive and confrontational .
Contrary to hopes that China would democratize , President Xi Jinping has set himself up as China ’ s most powerful dictator since Mao Zedong .
He has eliminated term limits so that he can rule indefinitely .
He is cracking down on human rights in Hong Kong and engaging in ethnic cleansing in Xinjiang against the country ’ s Uighur community .
Beijing is also engaging in “ sharp power ” practices @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other authoritarian regimes and generally promoting autocratic states abroad .
Rather than acting as a responsible stakeholder , China continues to prey on the global economic system .
It provides subsidies to its own companies , conducts widespread intellectual property theft , restricts market access to foreign companies , and engages in many other unfair economic practices .
Perhaps most threateningly , China is also flexing its military muscle .
It has invested heavily in its military capabilities , steadily shifting the balance of power in Asia to the point that U.S. defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defend long-standing partners in the region , such as Taiwan .
It is beginning to show global security ambitions by building new bases overseas and conducting military exercises in Europe .
As the international community shows a reluctance to confront China head-on , Beijing has felt increasingly emboldened , using its newfound clout to coerce its neighbors , planting its flag on contested territory in the South China Sea and India .
There is little reason to think China ’ s assertiveness will be reversed on its own , and this seems to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world that the old strategy has failed .
But the United States has come up short in its efforts to articulate a new set of goals for a new era .
In addition to the aforementioned National Security Strategy , the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy also prioritized the return of great-power competition against China .
But recognizing that competition exists is not a strategy .
Neither document provided a clear objective or set of objectives for the United States and its allies .
Without clear objectives , it is hard to know @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy documents actually advance the U.S. position .
Few changes have taken place since then .
The White House released a new China strategy in May , and while it did provide greater detail , it still fell short .
Tellingly , it stated explicitly that the U.S. approach “ is not premised on determining a particular end state for China.
” In my conversations with senior Trump administration officials , I have also received conflicting and sometimes incoherent answers to my questions about the end goal of their China strategy .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Countries have always competed , and it will never end.
” But this obscures the reality of the situation .
Although some form of interstate rivalry has always existed in international relations , the United States hasn ’ t always been in competition with China , and the current rivalry can not last .
And no one seriously wants to engage in endless competition with China .
Another senior official went one step further , saying that the goal was simply to avoid the outbreak of a major conflict between the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ When asked if it would be a success if war was averted but China was able to undermine U.S. interests and establish a sphere of influence throughout the Indo-Pacific and beyond , he acknowledged he needed to rethink his answer .
And these were the rare officials with the confidence and ability to articulate a clear answer .
Most are unable or unwilling to express the goals of great-power competition .
To be fair , defining goals is hard .
But the reality remains that the Trump administration and the U.S. national security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goal for competition with China .
Washington needs to make China ’ s leadership understand that challenging the United States and its democratic allies is simply too difficult and too costly .
The problem becomes easier to parse if one distinguishes between short- and long-term goals .
Washington ’ s long-term objective should be to have a cooperative relationship with China .
The post-World War II rules-based international system , designed by the United States and its allies , has led to unprecedented levels of peace , prosperity , and freedom for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if China ( the world ’ s second-largest military and economic power ) is a constructive member and is not actively trying to tear it down .
In a sense , U.S. policymakers have known this to be the correct end state for decades .
This is what they envisioned when they talked about making China a responsible stakeholder .
The problem is that this scenario is impossible to actualize with Xi as president and the current generation of Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) leadership in power .
They are determined to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assertive course .
To achieve these long-term objectives , then , policymakers will need to convince the Chinese leadership to change course .
This brings us to the short-term goal .
Washington needs to make China ’ s leadership understand that challenging the United States and its democratic allies is simply too difficult and too costly .
Over time , Washington can convince Beijing that its own interests are better served by playing along with the rules-based system , rather than trying to challenge it .
This will not be easy .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until a new cohort of Chinese leaders comes to power chastened by their predecessors ’ experience of unsuccessful competition with the United States and its allies .
So how could this be achieved ?
First , policymakers must protect the United States , its allies , and its partners from the threats China currently poses in the security , economic , technology , and governance domains .
This will require Washington to strengthen itself , its allies , and the rules-based system for this new era of competition .
Necessary steps include reestablishing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Indo-Pacific ; placing tougher restrictions on foreign investments into sensitive areas of their economies ; investing and becoming a leader in the development of the technologies of the 21st century , including artificial intelligence ; reclaiming leadership of multilateral institutions ; and creating new frameworks for cooperation among democratic allies , such as the Quad alliance of the four leading democratic powers in the Indo-Pacific : the United States , Japan , India , and Australia .
Competition is generally more about strengthening oneself than about weakening one ’ s opponent , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signal to Beijing that there is a pathway to long-term cooperation that is beneficial to both sides and to the world .
Second , the United States , its allies , partners , and like-minded states should impose meaningful costs on China wherever it violates international standards .
This means developing coordinated approaches to punish Beijing for its misdeeds with measures that are consistent with their values but also strike at its vulnerabilities .
This should include countervailing tariffs against China ’ s unfair economic practices , targeted sanctions in response to China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ calibrated uses of military force to counter Chinese military aggression .
Some may see this element as risky or confrontational , but it will be necessary to convince Chinese leaders that challenging the United States and its allies is too costly .
Finally , Washington must signal to Beijing that there is a pathway to long-term cooperation that is beneficial to both sides and to the world .
There should be an engagement track .
The United States and its allies should have meaningful dialogue with Beijing in forums such as the G-20 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Beijing now on areas of mutual interest , such as arms control , nuclear nonproliferation , environmental policy , and coordinated economic measures to help the world recover from the coronavirus-induced global recession .
But , more importantly , it will demonstrate to the Chinese leadership that Washington and its allies are serious about cooperation if and when Beijing can be serious about abiding by international rules .
This element may be contrary to the prevailing political climate in Washington and the desire to get tough on China , but it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a rising power and the United States and its allies no longer have the capacity to implement such a strategy .
But China possesses only 15 percent of global GDP , compared with 59 percent for the United States and its formal treaty allies .
Add other democracies to the ledger and the latter figure increases to 75 percent .
Working together , the free world still possesses the preponderance of power necessary to decisively shape international outcomes .
Some might argue that this strategy is a veiled call for regime change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ true .
This goal can be accomplished if and when a more cooperative Chinese leadership comes to power in Beijing , whether or not it stands behind the CCP banner .
Washington and its allies can not afford strategic uncertainty as they confront their most serious geopolitical rival in decades .
They are on the starting blocks ready to race , but they do not yet know where the finish line is .
The above strategy could help point them in the right direction .

On July 23, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a major address on China that received widespread attention. The speech contained much to commend, but it was missing an important element: It did not articulate a clear goal of the U.S. strategy for China.
On July 23, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a major address on China that received widespread attention. The speech contained much to commend, but it was missing an important element: It did not articulate a clear goal of the U.S. strategy for China.
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy declared that the return of great-power competition with China and Russia was the foremost threat facing the United States, but Washington has yet to articulate a clear objective for this competition, and many questions about its nature remain unanswered.
What are the United States and China competing for? When will the competition end? What does success look like?
The goal was to make China the Germany of Asia. It was a coherent approach, but it didn’t work.
A good strategy includes a clear statement of one’s goals and a plan for achieving them. And in order to compete with China’s broadening economic and geopolitical ambitions, the United States needs to articulate a clearer end game for this competition and a corresponding strategy for arriving there.
For most of the period since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ goal vis-à-vis China was clear: to make Beijing a “responsible stakeholder” in the U.S.-led rules-based international system. The theory was that by enmeshing China into the already established global institutions and trade links, China would eventually grow rich, democratize, and cooperate with the rest of the international community. Basically, the goal was to make China the Germany of Asia.
It was a coherent approach, but it didn’t work. China has become rich, but instead of moderating its behavior, it has grown more assertive and confrontational. Contrary to hopes that China would democratize, President Xi Jinping has set himself up as China’s most powerful dictator since Mao Zedong.
He has eliminated term limits so that he can rule indefinitely. He is cracking down on human rights in Hong Kong and engaging in ethnic cleansing in Xinjiang against the country’s Uighur community. Beijing is also engaging in “sharp power” practices against democracies and exporting surveillance technology to other authoritarian regimes and generally promoting autocratic states abroad.
Rather than acting as a responsible stakeholder, China continues to prey on the global economic system. It provides subsidies to its own companies, conducts widespread intellectual property theft, restricts market access to foreign companies, and engages in many other unfair economic practices.
Perhaps most threateningly, China is also flexing its military muscle. It has invested heavily in its military capabilities, steadily shifting the balance of power in Asia to the point that U.S. defense planners openly worry whether Washington can still defend long-standing partners in the region, such as Taiwan.
It is beginning to show global security ambitions by building new bases overseas and conducting military exercises in Europe. As the international community shows a reluctance to confront China head-on, Beijing has felt increasingly emboldened, using its newfound clout to coerce its neighbors, planting its flag on contested territory in the South China Sea and India.
There is little reason to think China’s assertiveness will be reversed on its own, and this seems to have convinced Washington and much of the world that the old strategy has failed. But the United States has come up short in its efforts to articulate a new set of goals for a new era.
In addition to the aforementioned National Security Strategy, the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy also prioritized the return of great-power competition against China. But recognizing that competition exists is not a strategy. Neither document provided a clear objective or set of objectives for the United States and its allies. Without clear objectives, it is hard to know whether the steps called for in these strategy documents actually advance the U.S. position.
Few changes have taken place since then. The White House released a new China strategy in May, and while it did provide greater detail, it still fell short. Tellingly, it stated explicitly that the U.S. approach “is not premised on determining a particular end state for China.”
In my conversations with senior Trump administration officials, I have also received conflicting and sometimes incoherent answers to my questions about the end goal of their China strategy. One said: “There is no goal. Countries have always competed, and it will never end.” But this obscures the reality of the situation. Although some form of interstate rivalry has always existed in international relations, the United States hasn’t always been in competition with China, and the current rivalry cannot last forever. And no one seriously wants to engage in endless competition with China.
Another senior official went one step further, saying that the goal was simply to avoid the outbreak of a major conflict between the two while maintaining a level of competition. When asked if it would be a success if war was averted but China was able to undermine U.S. interests and establish a sphere of influence throughout the Indo-Pacific and beyond, he acknowledged he needed to rethink his answer.
And these were the rare officials with the confidence and ability to articulate a clear answer. Most are unable or unwilling to express the goals of great-power competition. To be fair, defining goals is hard. But the reality remains that the Trump administration and the U.S. national security community do not yet have a clear goal for competition with China.
Washington needs to make China’s leadership understand that challenging the United States and its democratic allies is simply too difficult and too costly.
The problem becomes easier to parse if one distinguishes between short- and long-term goals. Washington’s long-term objective should be to have a cooperative relationship with China. The post-World War II rules-based international system, designed by the United States and its allies, has led to unprecedented levels of peace, prosperity, and freedom for the world. That system will function best if China (the world’s second-largest military and economic power) is a constructive member and is not actively trying to tear it down.
In a sense, U.S. policymakers have known this to be the correct end state for decades. This is what they envisioned when they talked about making China a responsible stakeholder. The problem is that this scenario is impossible to actualize with Xi as president and the current generation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in power. They are determined to launch China on a new and more assertive course.
To achieve these long-term objectives, then, policymakers will need to convince the Chinese leadership to change course. This brings us to the short-term goal. Washington needs to make China’s leadership understand that challenging the United States and its democratic allies is simply too difficult and too costly. Over time, Washington can convince Beijing that its own interests are better served by playing along with the rules-based system, rather than trying to challenge it.
This will not be easy. It will likely take a generation or more until a new cohort of Chinese leaders comes to power chastened by their predecessors’ experience of unsuccessful competition with the United States and its allies.
So how could this be achieved?
First, policymakers must protect the United States, its allies, and its partners from the threats China currently poses in the security, economic, technology, and governance domains. This will require Washington to strengthen itself, its allies, and the rules-based system for this new era of competition.
Necessary steps include reestablishing a favorable military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific; placing tougher restrictions on foreign investments into sensitive areas of their economies; investing and becoming a leader in the development of the technologies of the 21st century, including artificial intelligence; reclaiming leadership of multilateral institutions; and creating new frameworks for cooperation among democratic allies, such as the Quad alliance of the four leading democratic powers in the Indo-Pacific: the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. Competition is generally more about strengthening oneself than about weakening one’s opponent, and great-power politics is no different.Washington must signal to Beijing that there is a pathway to long-term cooperation that is beneficial to both sides and to the world.
Second, the United States, its allies, partners, and like-minded states should impose meaningful costs on China wherever it violates international standards. This means developing coordinated approaches to punish Beijing for its misdeeds with measures that are consistent with their values but also strike at its vulnerabilities. This should include countervailing tariffs against China’s unfair economic practices, targeted sanctions in response to China’s human rights violations, and calibrated uses of military force to counter Chinese military aggression. Some may see this element as risky or confrontational, but it will be necessary to convince Chinese leaders that challenging the United States and its allies is too costly.
Finally, Washington must signal to Beijing that there is a pathway to long-term cooperation that is beneficial to both sides and to the world. There should be an engagement track. The United States and its allies should have meaningful dialogue with Beijing in forums such as the G-20. This will allow them to collaborate with Beijing now on areas of mutual interest, such as arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, environmental policy, and coordinated economic measures to help the world recover from the coronavirus-induced global recession.
But, more importantly, it will demonstrate to the Chinese leadership that Washington and its allies are serious about cooperation if and when Beijing can be serious about abiding by international rules. This element may be contrary to the prevailing political climate in Washington and the desire to get tough on China, but it is critical.
Critics might contend that China is a rising power and the United States and its allies no longer have the capacity to implement such a strategy. But China possesses only 15 percent of global GDP, compared with 59 percent for the United States and its formal treaty allies. Add other democracies to the ledger and the latter figure increases to 75 percent. Working together, the free world still possesses the preponderance of power necessary to decisively shape international outcomes.
Some might argue that this strategy is a veiled call for regime change in China, but that is not true. This goal can be accomplished if and when a more cooperative Chinese leadership comes to power in Beijing, whether or not it stands behind the CCP banner.
Washington and its allies cannot afford strategic uncertainty as they confront their most serious geopolitical rival in decades. They are on the starting blocks ready to race, but they do not yet know where the finish line is. The above strategy could help point them in the right direction.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Normal Is Over for Russia’s Hinterland

Normal Is Over for Russia’s Hinterland

Normal Is Over for Russia ’ s Hinterland The Far Eastern Russian city of Khabarovsk , located just 19 miles from the Chinese border , was not incorporated into the Russian Empire until the mid-19th century .
Imperial Russia ’ s control over its easternmost regions was always shaky : It ’ s hard to keep tabs on a place that lies thousands of miles away from the capital , across ancient forests and frozen rivers .
Today , eastern Russia is poor and sparsely populated , a booming China is eager to exploit Russian lumber and other resources in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ restive , as evidenced by a series of major protests in Khabarovsk and neighboring cities over the past month .
Throughout Russia ’ s years under President Vladimir Putin , hot spots of resentment and anger have flared up now and then across the country .
Protests in the provinces have tended to center on economic questions such as pensions , tariffs , and tolls , while more glamorous pro-democracy protests—the ones most likely to attract international attention—have been concentrated in Moscow .
But bread-and-butter issues may have greater potential to unify a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ empire has fallen thanks to unrest in its hinterlands .
The Khabarovsk demonstrations began after the July 9 arrest of the region ’ s governor , Sergei Furgal , who is accused of ordering four murders in 2004 and 2005 .
The people of Khabarovsk were furious at the arrest , which they viewed , quite reasonably , as a Kremlin plot against democracy .
Pro-Furgal memes circulated online , a petition garnered more than 30,000 signatures , and in a city of just 600,000 people , tens of thousands came out to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with major demonstrations every Saturday .
Chants have included slogans such as “ Our vote , our Furgal ” and “ Putin , resign.
” Furgal didn ’ t set out to become an opposition hero .
Before going into politics in 2005 , he ran businesses that managed lumber and scrap metal , two hypercompetitive industries in the Far East that are often connected to organized crime .
( Local voters are willing to excuse a checkered past . )
He was elected in 2018 in a surprise victory over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Then a long-serving member of the State Duma , Furgal didn ’ t even bother to think up a campaign slogan for his gubernatorial run .
His billboards showed only his face and name , without even stating which position he was running for .
But United Russia , Putin ’ s party , had so angered voters with its attempts to raise the retirement age that many voted for Furgal simply because he was the candidate of the Liberal Democratic Party , which opposed the change .
Furgal virtually tied with Shport @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure from the Kremlin to drop out , Furgal remained in the race—though he did leave town during the runoff to avoid unduly influencing the results .
He won 70 percent of votes in that second round .
The Kremlin punished him by changing the Far Eastern Federal District ’ s capital from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok , and by opening an investigation against a former governor who had supported Furgal ’ s campaign .
This retaliation made Furgal a “ symbol of popular resistance , ” according to Meduza ’ s Andrey Pertsev @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , joining protesters and criticizing United Russia officials .
The Liberal Democratic Party swept the 2019 Khabarovsk elections , though Furgal again declined to campaign .
Putin ’ s ratings in Khabarovsk fell , provoking further federal wrath .
The authorities raided a firm linked to Furgal and arrested his ex-business partner on murder charges ; the ex-partner then testified against him on murder charges from his scrap-metal career .
Furgal ’ s days of freedom were numbered .
Wild though the Khabarovsk scrap-metal scene may have been , it seems that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigation by the independent paper Novaya Gazeta suggested that two of the murders of which Furgal is accused were not his doing , but were the result of a mafia conflict involving a man called “ the Crab ” and a food-cart business .
A third charge doesn ’ t hold up to scrutiny , and the fourth murder , which was committed by Furgal ’ s driver , occurred spontaneously after a spat over a scrap-metal delivery .
So far , federal authorities have responded to the Khabarovsk protests with a mixture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Given the harsh treatment of protesters in Moscow—for instance , widespread arbitrary arrests during last summer ’ s protests over unfair city elections—the relatively gentle treatment of Khabarovsk marchers suggests that Moscow may find it harder or less desirable to bully citizens in far-flung places .
Mikhail Degtiarev , the Liberal Democratic Party member of the State Duma who was appointed acting governor on July 20 , told residents that Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin had pledged 1.3 trillion rubles ( $ 17.9 million ) in funding for Khabarovsk .
( Degtiarev has never @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the weekend protests , to the disgust of the demonstrators . )
Degtiarev also promised to create a “ People ’ s Council ” that could communicate popular demands to the governor .
Degtiarev posted on Instagram about armed and dangerous protesters and has made suggestions about foreign incitement , but he has avoided decisive action against the movement .
So far , two protesters have been arrested and sentenced to weeklong jail terms for organizing unsanctioned rallies , two have been fined , and a few more have been detained before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But for the most part , the Khabarovsk police have let the marches continue unhindered .
The most recent Saturday march , on Aug. 1 , was the smallest so far , perhaps because of heavy rain that day .
But “ small ” is relative : There were about 10,000 people marching .
The highest-profile protests of the Putin era thus far have been the demonstrations from 2011 to 2013 against election fraud , which centered in Moscow and included famous writers and many members of Moscow ’ s cosmopolitan , well-educated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movement , which threatened to become a Russian version of a Ukrainian-style “ color revolution , ” Putin and his administration attempted to pit the Moscow and St. Petersburg creative class against the supposed silent majority of the Russian provinces .
The Pussy Riot show trial , for example , was part of an effort to portray Moscow protesters as blasphemous European-style hipsters who spat on the faith of ordinary Orthodox Russians .
It was easy to stimulate resentment against Moscow privilege : After all , the government had been concentrating power and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the city into a top-tier glittering international capital even as the provinces languished .
But the provinces haven ’ t been as silent as the Russian government might like .
Over the past two decades , there have been a number of significant protests outside Moscow and St. Petersburg .
These have often been linked to straightforward economic grievances—in particular to falling living standards and efforts to dismantle the Soviet-style social safety net , which many Russians still consider to be a basic right .
In 2005 , an attempt to switch from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protests in a dozen Russian cities .
Demonstrators blocked highways and railways and took over government buildings .
In 2008 , the riot police broke up a demonstration in Vladivostok against new tariffs on imported cars ; from 2009 to 2010 , Kaliningrad residents demonstrated against new vehicle tariffs , and eventually against their United Russia governor and Putin .
Beginning in 2015 , truckers organized a strike against a new toll road system , and from 2017 to 2018 there were anti-corruption protests across the country , led by anti-corruption activist and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2018 proposal to raise the retirement age was not limited to Khabarovsk ; it provoked protests in most of Russia ’ s major cities , and contributed to several significant losses for United Russia in the 2018 elections .
As climate change accelerates , environmental questions are moving to the forefront of provincial protests .
More and more Russians are demonstrating against deforestation , pollution , and government failure to prevent or control disasters such as the wildfires that now choke Siberia every summer .
Last year , protesters in Krasnoyarsk demanded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at his statement that it didn ’ t make economic sense to fight the wildfires that filled the region ’ s air with smoke .
The Shiyes landfill protests from 2018 to 2020 , in the Arkhangelsk region and the Komi Republic , have had a particularly strong metaphorical charge .
When hunters discovered a secret construction site in the forest , locals learned of plans to build a new dump for Moscow ’ s unsorted garbage , which would have released large quantities of toxic effluvia that could have entered waterways , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Barents Sea .
Activists built roadblocks to prevent construction and established a large tent city .
This protest movement , which included Indigenous activists , environmentalists , and communists , had endurance : In December 2019 , activists reported that a protest in Kotlas ( which is , coincidentally , the birthplace of Yerofey Khabarov , the 17th-century explorer for whom Khabarovsk is named ) attracted between 5,000 and 10,000 people , in a town of just 60,000 .
Construction halted , but activists remained on guard .
In June 2020 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the construction company .
Most recently , Putin caused an outcry from environmentalists when he signed a new measure , on July 31 , that will open protected areas around Siberia ’ s Lake Baikal , the largest freshwater lake in the world and home to a unique , ancient ecosystem .
Last year , locals managed to block plans to build a Chinese water bottling plant along the shores of the lake , which has long been threatened by pollution from industry , mining , and agriculture .
With Russia warming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the world , environmental protests will most likely grow in the coming years .
In a 2018 poll by the Presidential Human Rights Council , respondents said that the right most often violated by the authorities was the right to a healthy environment .
( Runners-up were the rights to fair trials and elections . )
As climate change continues to affect harvests , damage infrastructure ( which is particularly vulnerable in areas where it was built on permafrost , which is now thawing ) , and contribute to natural disasters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potentially giving rise to new protests across Siberia , the Far East , and the Arctic .
The Putin administration spends much of its energy worrying about NATO and its western border , but trouble is stirring in the east and the north , too .
What would it take to turn these bursts of regional protest into a sustained national movement ?
Organizers will need to find problems that can unite Russians across regions and across the political spectrum .
Navalny ’ s signature issue , the fight against corruption , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activists of many stripes .
A lack of democratic representation , falling living standards , and the erosion of the social safety net cause indignation in the metropolitan centers as well as in the provinces .
Climate change still has little political currency in Russia , but concern over environmental degradation has the potential to gain national political prominence , as it did in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s .
In the end , real change may be a matter of numbers : of protesters , of activists , of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Once the whole forest is aflame , it becomes very hard to put out the fire .

The Far Eastern Russian city of Khabarovsk, located just 19 miles from the Chinese border, was not incorporated into the Russian Empire until the mid-19th century. Imperial Russia’s control over its easternmost regions was always shaky: It’s hard to keep tabs on a place that lies thousands of miles away from the capital, across ancient forests and frozen rivers. Today, eastern Russia is poor and sparsely populated, a booming China is eager to exploit Russian lumber and other resources in the area, and the locals are restive, as evidenced by a series of major protests in Khabarovsk and neighboring cities over the past month.
The Far Eastern Russian city of Khabarovsk, located just 19 miles from the Chinese border, was not incorporated into the Russian Empire until the mid-19th century. Imperial Russia’s control over its easternmost regions was always shaky: It’s hard to keep tabs on a place that lies thousands of miles away from the capital, across ancient forests and frozen rivers. Today, eastern Russia is poor and sparsely populated, a booming China is eager to exploit Russian lumber and other resources in the area, and the locals are restive, as evidenced by a series of major protests in Khabarovsk and neighboring cities over the past month.
Throughout Russia’s years under President Vladimir Putin, hot spots of resentment and anger have flared up now and then across the country. Protests in the provinces have tended to center on economic questions such as pensions, tariffs, and tolls, while more glamorous pro-democracy protests—the ones most likely to attract international attention—have been concentrated in Moscow. But bread-and-butter issues may have greater potential to unify a sprawling country, and more than one empire has fallen thanks to unrest in its hinterlands.
The Khabarovsk demonstrations began after the July 9 arrest of the region’s governor, Sergei Furgal, who is accused of ordering four murders in 2004 and 2005. The people of Khabarovsk were furious at the arrest, which they viewed, quite reasonably, as a Kremlin plot against democracy. Pro-Furgal memes circulated online, a petition garnered more than 30,000 signatures, and in a city of just 600,000 people, tens of thousands came out to protest. There have been daily rallies, with major demonstrations every Saturday. Chants have included slogans such as “Our vote, our Furgal” and “Putin, resign.”
Furgal didn’t set out to become an opposition hero. Before going into politics in 2005, he ran businesses that managed lumber and scrap metal, two hypercompetitive industries in the Far East that are often connected to organized crime. (Local voters are willing to excuse a checkered past.) He was elected in 2018 in a surprise victory over the United Russia incumbent, Vyacheslav Shport. Then a long-serving member of the State Duma, Furgal didn’t even bother to think up a campaign slogan for his gubernatorial run. His billboards showed only his face and name, without even stating which position he was running for. But United Russia, Putin’s party, had so angered voters with its attempts to raise the retirement age that many voted for Furgal simply because he was the candidate of the Liberal Democratic Party, which opposed the change. Furgal virtually tied with Shport in the first round. Despite reported pressure from the Kremlin to drop out, Furgal remained in the race—though he did leave town during the runoff to avoid unduly influencing the results. He won 70 percent of votes in that second round. The Kremlin punished him by changing the Far Eastern Federal District’s capital from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok, and by opening an investigation against a former governor who had supported Furgal’s campaign.
This retaliation made Furgal a “symbol of popular resistance,” according to Meduza’s Andrey Pertsev. Furgal experimented with a new identity, joining protesters and criticizing United Russia officials. The Liberal Democratic Party swept the 2019 Khabarovsk elections, though Furgal again declined to campaign. Putin’s ratings in Khabarovsk fell, provoking further federal wrath. The authorities raided a firm linked to Furgal and arrested his ex-business partner on murder charges; the ex-partner then testified against him on murder charges from his scrap-metal career. Furgal’s days of freedom were numbered.
Wild though the Khabarovsk scrap-metal scene may have been, it seems that the charges against Furgal are bogus. An investigation by the independent paper Novaya Gazeta suggested that two of the murders of which Furgal is accused were not his doing, but were the result of a mafia conflict involving a man called “the Crab” and a food-cart business. A third charge doesn’t hold up to scrutiny, and the fourth murder, which was committed by Furgal’s driver, occurred spontaneously after a spat over a scrap-metal delivery.
So far, federal authorities have responded to the Khabarovsk protests with a mixture of soothing promises and mild punishment. Given the harsh treatment of protesters in Moscow—for instance, widespread arbitrary arrests during last summer’s protests over unfair city elections—the relatively gentle treatment of Khabarovsk marchers suggests that Moscow may find it harder or less desirable to bully citizens in far-flung places. Mikhail Degtiarev, the Liberal Democratic Party member of the State Duma who was appointed acting governor on July 20, told residents that Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin had pledged 1.3 trillion rubles ($17.9 million) in funding for Khabarovsk. (Degtiarev has never lived in Khabarovsk and keeps leaving town during the weekend protests, to the disgust of the demonstrators.) Degtiarev also promised to create a “People’s Council” that could communicate popular demands to the governor.
Degtiarev posted on Instagram about armed and dangerous protesters and has made suggestions about foreign incitement, but he has avoided decisive action against the movement. So far, two protesters have been arrested and sentenced to weeklong jail terms for organizing unsanctioned rallies, two have been fined, and a few more have been detained before protests or attacked by unidentified men. But for the most part, the Khabarovsk police have let the marches continue unhindered. The most recent Saturday march, on Aug. 1, was the smallest so far, perhaps because of heavy rain that day. But “small” is relative: There were about 10,000 people marching.
The highest-profile protests of the Putin era thus far have been the demonstrations from 2011 to 2013 against election fraud, which centered in Moscow and included famous writers and many members of Moscow’s cosmopolitan, well-educated creative class. In response to this movement, which threatened to become a Russian version of a Ukrainian-style “color revolution,” Putin and his administration attempted to pit the Moscow and St. Petersburg creative class against the supposed silent majority of the Russian provinces. The Pussy Riot show trial, for example, was part of an effort to portray Moscow protesters as blasphemous European-style hipsters who spat on the faith of ordinary Orthodox Russians. It was easy to stimulate resentment against Moscow privilege: After all, the government had been concentrating power and wealth there since the 1990s, making the city into a top-tier glittering international capital even as the provinces languished.
But the provinces haven’t been as silent as the Russian government might like. Over the past two decades, there have been a number of significant protests outside Moscow and St. Petersburg. These have often been linked to straightforward economic grievances—in particular to falling living standards and efforts to dismantle the Soviet-style social safety net, which many Russians still consider to be a basic right. In 2005, an attempt to switch from in-kind social benefits to cash payments prompted protests in a dozen Russian cities. Demonstrators blocked highways and railways and took over government buildings. In 2008, the riot police broke up a demonstration in Vladivostok against new tariffs on imported cars; from 2009 to 2010, Kaliningrad residents demonstrated against new vehicle tariffs, and eventually against their United Russia governor and Putin. Beginning in 2015, truckers organized a strike against a new toll road system, and from 2017 to 2018 there were anti-corruption protests across the country, led by anti-corruption activist and opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Anger against the 2018 proposal to raise the retirement age was not limited to Khabarovsk; it provoked protests in most of Russia’s major cities, and contributed to several significant losses for United Russia in the 2018 elections.
As climate change accelerates, environmental questions are moving to the forefront of provincial protests. More and more Russians are demonstrating against deforestation, pollution, and government failure to prevent or control disasters such as the wildfires that now choke Siberia every summer. Last year, protesters in Krasnoyarsk demanded their governor’s resignation, furious at his statement that it didn’t make economic sense to fight the wildfires that filled the region’s air with smoke.
The Shiyes landfill protests from 2018 to 2020, in the Arkhangelsk region and the Komi Republic, have had a particularly strong metaphorical charge. When hunters discovered a secret construction site in the forest, locals learned of plans to build a new dump for Moscow’s unsorted garbage, which would have released large quantities of toxic effluvia that could have entered waterways, potentially making it all the way to the Barents Sea. Activists built roadblocks to prevent construction and established a large tent city. This protest movement, which included Indigenous activists, environmentalists, and communists, had endurance: In December 2019, activists reported that a protest in Kotlas (which is, coincidentally, the birthplace of Yerofey Khabarov, the 17th-century explorer for whom Khabarovsk is named) attracted between 5,000 and 10,000 people, in a town of just 60,000. Construction halted, but activists remained on guard. In June 2020, the Arkhangelsk regional government terminated its agreement with the construction company.
Most recently, Putin caused an outcry from environmentalists when he signed a new measure, on July 31, that will open protected areas around Siberia’s Lake Baikal, the largest freshwater lake in the world and home to a unique, ancient ecosystem. Last year, locals managed to block plans to build a Chinese water bottling plant along the shores of the lake, which has long been threatened by pollution from industry, mining, and agriculture. With Russia warming about twice as fast as the rest of the world, environmental protests will most likely grow in the coming years. In a 2018 poll by the Presidential Human Rights Council, respondents said that the right most often violated by the authorities was the right to a healthy environment. (Runners-up were the rights to fair trials and elections.) As climate change continues to affect harvests, damage infrastructure (which is particularly vulnerable in areas where it was built on permafrost, which is now thawing), and contribute to natural disasters, environmental and economic concerns will converge, potentially giving rise to new protests across Siberia, the Far East, and the Arctic. The Putin administration spends much of its energy worrying about NATO and its western border, but trouble is stirring in the east and the north, too.
What would it take to turn these bursts of regional protest into a sustained national movement? Organizers will need to find problems that can unite Russians across regions and across the political spectrum. Navalny’s signature issue, the fight against corruption, has proven its enduring appeal for voters and activists of many stripes. A lack of democratic representation, falling living standards, and the erosion of the social safety net cause indignation in the metropolitan centers as well as in the provinces. Climate change still has little political currency in Russia, but concern over environmental degradation has the potential to gain national political prominence, as it did in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. In the end, real change may be a matter of numbers: of protesters, of activists, of regions ready to take to the streets. Once the whole forest is aflame, it becomes very hard to put out the fire.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Iraq’s New Prime Minister Wants to Control the Iran-Backed Militias. It Won’t Be Easy.

Iraq ’ s New Prime Minister Wants to Control the Iran-Backed Militias .
It Won ’ t Be Easy .
When Mustafa al-Kadhimi was sworn in as Iraq ’ s new prime minister on May 7 , one of his main pledges was to bring every armed group in the country under state control , after almost two decades of nonstate actors wielding significant influence over the government .
Recent arrests in Baghdad show just how difficult that will be .
Overnight on June 25 , members of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service raided the southern Baghdad headquarters of the Popular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state-sponsored umbrella organization that includes several quasi-independent paramilitary groups .
They arrested over a dozen members of the PMU ’ s 45th Brigade , which answers to the Iran-linked Shiite armed group Kataib Hezbollah .
Kataib Hezbollah is one of the PMU ’ s largest individual groups and is controversial in Iraq because it has long received funding , training , and other forms of support from Iran ’ s military and religious establishments and it makes no secret of its loyalty to Iran ’ s supreme leader , Ayatollah Ali Khamenei .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ extrajudicial activities , killing and kidnapping protesters , activists , and other civilians .
The United States officially designated it a terrorist organization in 2009 for “ committing or posing a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism.
” The June arrests came in the wake of repeated attacks on Iraqi facilities hosting international coalition troops , presumably by armed groups linked to Iran operating around the country .
Details of this particular raid are murky , but most of those detained had been released by June 29 .
A statement issued by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Command claimed that 14 “ defendants ” had been arrested , noting that “ [ a ] ccurate intelligence was available on people who had previously targeted the Green Zone and Baghdad International Airport with indirect fire several times.
” Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Jaafar al-Husseini told Foreign Policy in a WhatsApp voice message that those who had been arrested were involved in logistical support for the group .
He warned that “ there is no local , regional , or international power that will be able to take the weapons out of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the “ resistance ” axis spanning from Iran to Lebanon .
He accused Kadhimi of simply “ trying to impress the Americans.
” Kataib Hezbollah is widely considered the greatest challenge to the Iraqi government ’ s aspirations to exert a monopoly of force over its territory , and moves against it will likely serve as a test case for other Iran-linked groups operating in the country .
The PMU was officially formed in June 2014 through a fatwa issued by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani after the Islamic State took over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been incorporated into the state ’ s official forces .
The group was deployed widely by the government during its campaign against the Islamic State and played a significant role in retaking large swaths of Iraqi territory .
Despite the government ’ s attempt to extend its authority over the organization , many of its affiliated groups continue to operate at least partially outside of state control .
In its attempt to exert the state ’ s authority , the government has granted the PMU some of the protections and benefits usually reserved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attempt to exert the state ’ s authority , the government has granted the PMU some of the protections and benefits usually reserved for other national forces , such as the right to an internal judge and court , as well as government salaries and pensions .
The aim of these initiatives , presumably , is to absorb some of the moderate elements more deeply into the state and , therefore , bring them under tighter government control .
There are other signs that Kadhimi ’ s government is working to undermine the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to act autonomously .
Foreign Policy reported in May that four PMU groups linked to Iraq ’ s holy shrines “ would be placed directly under the prime minister ’ s office , ” signaling “ an attempt to draw some of the factions from the more than 100,000-strong motley fighting force further away from Iranian and Kataib Hezbollah influence.
” Kadhimi ’ s government is also prepared to crack down on their resource stream .
Smuggling has long been a lucrative source of income for whoever controls unofficial routes between Iraq , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Iraq ’ s western border said smuggling routes in the area have been controlled by Iran-linked nonstate actors since the defeat of the Islamic State there in 2017 .
Many of these groups have been accused of partially using these activities to fund themselves .
On July 11 , Kadhimi visited Iraq ’ s Mandali border crossing with Iran as part of a campaign to fight corruption in the customs services .
“ The first phase [ of this campaign ] is to protect border crossings with new security forces , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The second is to fight ‘ ghosts ’ trying to blackmail Iraqis , ” he added , using a term that has at times been used to refer to Kataib Hezbollah .
Days later , the Joint Operations Command announced that one of its regional commands would be tasked with patrolling the Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran as well as the Safwan crossing with Kuwait .
The statement noted that the regular Iraqi Army would continue to bolster those border crossings , signaling the government ’ s seriousness in controlling its borders and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ principle sources of power .
Unlike some of his predecessors , Kadhimi has broad political support .
Ammar al-Hakim , a prominent Shiite cleric , recently formed a coalition containing around 40 members of parliament to support the prime minister , who also commands the largest political grouping in parliament .
Hakim heads the National Wisdom Movement , a major Islamist political coalition , and led the influential Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq from 2009 to 2017 .
He wrote an op-ed on July 20 stating that all military activity outside the state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a response to armed groups shooting rockets at Baghdad ’ s Green Zone and other such attacks in recent months .
Though he had initially supported Kadhimi ’ s predecessor , Adil Abdul-Mahdi , Hakim turned on him last year and called anti-government protests across several provinces in July 2019 , which were followed a few months later by major protests that brought down Abdul-Mahdi ’ s government .
Hakim ’ s standing in the country—but especially in Iraq ’ s Shiite community—could give Kadhimi critical support in his effort to curb @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kadhimi has much of the public behind him and could leverage that support over his opponents .
If nothing else , Kadhimi has much of the public behind him and could leverage that support over his opponents .
Since taking power in May , Kadhimi has boosted his government ’ s image in the public eye .
He reinstated the immensely popular counterterrorism chief , Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi , whose dismissal fueled anti-government protests in late 2019 and sent the country into crisis .
This move alone helped him restore much trust among both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ More than that , many people consider nonstate militias to be an increasing threat to peace and stability , and Kadhimi ’ s efforts to bring them under control are in line with the demands of many ordinary Iraqis .
But the militias won ’ t go easily .
The leader of another PMU-affiliated group , Asaib Ahl al-Haq ’ s Qais al-Khazali , gave a televised statement responding to the arrest of Kataib Hezbollah personnel in which he warned Kadhimi against getting involved in any issues other than preparing the country for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health matters that Iraq is suffering from .
The implication was that armed groups should continue to be autonomous from the state .
Khazali stressed that Kadhimi would not be able to stop the attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq by the “ resistance factions ” and openly stated that the previous governments had all “ ignored this issue because they knew they couldn ’ t touch it.
” The armed group he leads has been accused of being involved in the killings of protesters and activists during the recent anti-government protests .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ onside is a significant development , but Kadhimi will need to find more allies .
Although the PMU ’ s parliamentary Fatah Alliance gave its support to the government , its leader , Hadi al-Amiri , made it clear that it was conditional on holding early elections and removing U.S. forces .
He further warned that his support could be withdrawn at any time .
While there are many political figures who want to see a stronger , more stable Iraq and would be willing to work with Kadhimi , there are still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s armed groups outside of state control .
Kadhimi is walking a tightrope , and he must balance the opinions of the public , the military , other politicians , and , of course , Iran in order to cement the Iraqi state ’ s legitimacy and authority .
It won ’ t be easy , but Kadhimi ’ s standing in the country coupled with his efforts thus far suggest he is better placed to move toward a state monopoly on violence in Iraq than his predecessors .

When Mustafa al-Kadhimi was sworn in as Iraq’s new prime minister on May 7, one of his main pledges was to bring every armed group in the country under state control, after almost two decades of nonstate actors wielding significant influence over the government.
When Mustafa al-Kadhimi was sworn in as Iraq’s new prime minister on May 7, one of his main pledges was to bring every armed group in the country under state control, after almost two decades of nonstate actors wielding significant influence over the government.
Recent arrests in Baghdad show just how difficult that will be.
Overnight on June 25, members of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service raided the southern Baghdad headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), a state-sponsored umbrella organization that includes several quasi-independent paramilitary groups. They arrested over a dozen members of the PMU’s 45th Brigade, which answers to the Iran-linked Shiite armed group Kataib Hezbollah.
Kataib Hezbollah is controversial in Iraq because it has long received funding, training, and other forms of support from Iran’s military and religious establishments and it makes no secret of its loyalty to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It has been accused of engaging in extrajudicial activities, killing and kidnapping protesters, activists, and other civilians. The United States officially designated it a terrorist organization in 2009 for “committing or posing a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism.”
The June arrests came in the wake of repeated attacks on Iraqi facilities hosting international coalition troops, presumably by armed groups linked to Iran operating around the country. Details of this particular raid are murky, but most of those detained had been released by June 29.
A statement issued by the Iraqi Army’s Joint Operations Command claimed that 14 “defendants” had been arrested, noting that “[a]ccurate intelligence was available on people who had previously targeted the Green Zone and Baghdad International Airport with indirect fire several times.”
Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Jaafar al-Husseini told Foreign Policy in a WhatsApp voice message that those who had been arrested were involved in logistical support for the group. He warned that “there is no local, regional, or international power that will be able to take the weapons out of the hands of the muqawama,” referring to the “resistance” axis spanning from Iran to Lebanon. He accused Kadhimi of simply “trying to impress the Americans.”
Kataib Hezbollah is widely considered the greatest challenge to the Iraqi government’s aspirations to exert a monopoly of force over its territory, and moves against it will likely serve as a test case for other Iran-linked groups operating in the country.
The PMU was officially formed in June 2014 through a fatwa issued by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani after the Islamic State took over the Iraqi city of Mosul and has since been incorporated into the state’s official forces. The group was deployed widely by the government during its campaign against the Islamic State and played a significant role in retaking large swaths of Iraqi territory. Despite the government’s attempt to extend its authority over the organization, many of its affiliated groups continue to operate at least partially outside of state control.
In its attempt to exert the state’s authority, the government has granted the PMU some of the protections and benefits usually reserved for other national forces.
In its attempt to exert the state’s authority, the government has granted the PMU some of the protections and benefits usually reserved for other national forces, such as the right to an internal judge and court, as well as government salaries and pensions. The aim of these initiatives, presumably, is to absorb some of the moderate elements more deeply into the state and, therefore, bring them under tighter government control.
There are other signs that Kadhimi’s government is working to undermine the influence of individual PMU factions that continue to act autonomously. Foreign Policy reported in May that four PMU groups linked to Iraq’s holy shrines “would be placed directly under the prime minister’s office,” signaling “an attempt to draw some of the factions from the more than 100,000-strong motley fighting force further away from Iranian and Kataib Hezbollah influence.”
Kadhimi’s government is also prepared to crack down on their resource stream. Smuggling has long been a lucrative source of income for whoever controls unofficial routes between Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and sources on Iraq’s western border said smuggling routes in the area have been controlled by Iran-linked nonstate actors since the defeat of the Islamic State there in 2017. Many of these groups have been accused of partially using these activities to fund themselves.
On July 11, Kadhimi visited Iraq’s Mandali border crossing with Iran as part of a campaign to fight corruption in the customs services. “The first phase [of this campaign] is to protect border crossings with new security forces,” Kadhimi said during his visit. “The second is to fight ‘ghosts’ trying to blackmail Iraqis,” he added, using a term that has at times been used to refer to Kataib Hezbollah.
Days later, the Joint Operations Command announced that one of its regional commands would be tasked with patrolling the Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran as well as the Safwan crossing with Kuwait. The statement noted that the regular Iraqi Army would continue to bolster those border crossings, signaling the government’s seriousness in controlling its borders and undermining one of the PMU’s principle sources of power.
Unlike some of his predecessors, Kadhimi has broad political support. Ammar al-Hakim, a prominent Shiite cleric, recently formed a coalition containing around 40 members of parliament to support the prime minister, who also commands the largest political grouping in parliament.
Hakim heads the National Wisdom Movement, a major Islamist political coalition, and led the influential Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq from 2009 to 2017. He wrote an op-ed on July 20 stating that all military activity outside the state must be banned in what appeared to be a response to armed groups shooting rockets at Baghdad’s Green Zone and other such attacks in recent months.
Though he had initially supported Kadhimi’s predecessor, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Hakim turned on him last year and called anti-government protests across several provinces in July 2019, which were followed a few months later by major protests that brought down Abdul-Mahdi’s government. Hakim’s standing in the country—but especially in Iraq’s Shiite community—could give Kadhimi critical support in his effort to curb the power of independent Shiite militias.
Kadhimi has much of the public behind him and could leverage that support over his opponents.
If nothing else, Kadhimi has much of the public behind him and could leverage that support over his opponents. Since taking power in May, Kadhimi has boosted his government’s image in the public eye. He reinstated the immensely popular counterterrorism chief, Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi, whose dismissal fueled anti-government protests in late 2019 and sent the country into crisis. This move alone helped him restore much trust among both military personnel and the general population. More than that, many people consider nonstate militias to be an increasing threat to peace and stability, and Kadhimi’s efforts to bring them under control are in line with the demands of many ordinary Iraqis.
But the militias won’t go easily. The leader of another PMU-affiliated group, Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s Qais al-Khazali, gave a televised statement responding to the arrest of Kataib Hezbollah personnel in which he warned Kadhimi against getting involved in any issues other than preparing the country for early elections and handling the economic and health matters that Iraq is suffering from. The implication was that armed groups should continue to be autonomous from the state.
Khazali stressed that Kadhimi would not be able to stop the attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq by the “resistance factions” and openly stated that the previous governments had all “ignored this issue because they knew they couldn’t touch it.” The armed group he leads has been accused of being involved in the killings of protesters and activists during the recent anti-government protests.
On the political front, bringing Hakim onside is a significant development, but Kadhimi will need to find more allies. Although the PMU’s parliamentary Fatah Alliance gave its support to the government, its leader, Hadi al-Amiri, made it clear that it was conditional on holding early elections and removing U.S. forces. He further warned that his support could be withdrawn at any time. While there are many political figures who want to see a stronger, more stable Iraq and would be willing to work with Kadhimi, there are still others who prefer to keep the country’s armed groups outside of state control.
Kadhimi is walking a tightrope, and he must balance the opinions of the public, the military, other politicians, and, of course, Iran in order to cement the Iraqi state’s legitimacy and authority. It won’t be easy, but Kadhimi’s standing in the country coupled with his efforts thus far suggest he is better placed to move toward a state monopoly on violence in Iraq than his predecessors.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--U.S. Officials to Hold High-Level Talks With Taiwan as Tensions With China Worsen

U.S. Officials to Hold High-Level Talks With Taiwan as Tensions With China Worsen Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The United States will hold high-level talks with Taiwan , calls for revolution greet French President Emmanuel Macron in Beirut , and the Rajapaksa family wins Sri Lanka ’ s election in a landslide .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar will lead a delegation to Taiwan on Sunday to meet with senior Taiwanese officials in a rare high-profile visit to the island .
Planned discussions will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 pandemic , but the visit comes as tensions between Washington and Beijing have rapidly escalated .
It is expected to provoke a strong reaction from China .
China considers Taiwan to be a part of its national territory , and it has blocked the island from joining several international bodies .
The United States broke off formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979 as it began cultivating a closer relationship with Beijing , but it has continued to sell weapons to the country and continues to be its biggest arms supplier .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ trips to the island but visits by cabinet officials are rare .
China threatens countermeasures .
In advance of Sunday ’ s visit , China threatened to take “ strong countermeasures in response to the U.S. behavior.
” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Wenbin did not provide details on what retaliatory action Beijing might take , but it threatened to sanction the U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin last month for selling weapons to Taiwan .
Recent decisions to close a U.S. consulate in Chengdu and to sanction some U.S. politicians could also provide insight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The meeting is also expected to involve discussions on the broader U.S.-Taiwanese relationship .
The Taiwanese Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the visit would be a “ testament to the solid mutual trust and smooth communication between Taiwan and the U.S. ” On Thursday , Reuters reported that the United States was negotiating a deal that would send four large , sophisticated drones to Taiwan , meaning the island nation will join an exclusive cadre of U.S. allies that have been allowed to purchase U.S.-made drones .
Skip the nukes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with arms procurements , are part of a wider effort by Taiwan to strengthen its ties to the United States in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness in the region .
Some hawkish voices in Washington have even suggested arming Taiwan with nuclear weapons in response to Beijing ’ s growing aggression in the region .
“ That would be a provocative mistake , as students of the Cuban missile crisis might predict , ” Bradley Bowman and Andrea Stricker argued earlier this week in FP .
“ Instead , the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to address the dangerous shift in the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait , which if left unchecked could invite aggression by mainland China , ” they wrote .
Calls for revolution in Beirut .
The shock that followed the explosions in the Lebanese capital of Beirut has turned into anger as details of the government ’ s negligence are coming to light .
French President Emmanuel Macron paid a visit to the city on Thursday and delivered a speech in which he announced aid to support relief efforts and assured citizens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pact to the country ’ s leaders .
During the speech , protesters chanted “ revolution , revolution !
, ” echoing a growing chorus of opposition to the government .
Information showing that high-level officials not only knew about a massive supply of ammonium nitrate in the city , but that they were aware of the immense danger it posed is emerging .
The resulting backlash against the government is part of a much wider feeling of discontent that has been evident in the country since late last year .
Protests against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further inflamed more recently after the pandemic hit and a severe financial crisis set in .
The future of Belarus is at stake .
Belarusians will head to the polls on Sunday in an election that could dramatically change the country ’ s political landscape .
President Aleksandr Lukashenko is trying to extend his 16-year presidency , a term that stretches back to the early post-Cold War days .
But he ’ s fighting an uphill battle .
Facing his stiffest opposition in years and massive protests against his rule , Lukashenko ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ erratic .
The one-time Moscow favorite recently defended the arrest of 33 Russian mercenaries in the country , claiming they were quietly staging a revolution to overthrow him .
Lukashenko ’ s shift away from Russia is reflective of the fact that even he doesn ’ t know whether Belarus should tilt east or west .
If he loses and the election is followed by a prolonged period of political instability , it may entice Russia to make that decision itself .
Microsoft wants all of TikTok .
The United States just upped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the popular social networking company TikTok .
On Thursday , the Financial Times reported that U.S. tech giant Microsoft now wants to purchase all of TikTok ’ s global operations , after announcing on Sunday that it was in discussions with ByteDance , the Chinese parent company that owns TikTok , to buy the platform ’ s U.S. operations .
Microsoft announced the move after President Donald Trump threatened to ban TikTok from the country .
Negotiations are ongoing , but Microsoft executives are reportedly pushing hard to strike a deal ahead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set for the ban to come into force .
In Sri Lanka , Rajapaksas romp to victory .
Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa ’ s party has won a landslide victory in the country ’ s parliamentary elections , securing 145 of 225 seats while the main opposition party secured only 54 .
The result puts both the legislature and the presidency in the hands of the Rajapaksa family , which controls the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna party .
The vote was considered a crucial test for the future of democracy in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ known during the campaign that their objective was to secure more than two-thirds of seats in the country ’ s parliament , enough to change the constitution and return sweeping powers to the president .
While the 145 seats they won are just short of a two-thirds supermajority , they can likely count on the support of some smaller parties .
New leader for Mauritania .
On Thursday , Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani appointed Mohamed Ould Bilal , a longtime public administrator , as the country ’ s next prime minister after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mauritania has been in the throes of a political crisis since a parliamentary investigation was opened into cases of alleged corruption by the government of longtime President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz earlier this year .
On Wednesday , investigators submitted the report on their findings , which documented corruption on the part of several current ministers .
The publication of the report led to the government ’ s resignation .
Turkey faces currency crisis .
The Turkish lira plummeted against the U.S. dollar on Thursday , suffering its steepest decline since March 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the currency in March when investors started pulling out of emerging markets as the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic hit .
The Turkish central bank has since invested an estimated $ 65 billion in an effort to keep the lira afloat , but those efforts failed on Thursday when the currency dropped 2.7 percent in a single day , falling to approximately 7.24 against the dollar .
Beaver rights .
The British government granted a family of beavers the legal “ right to remain ” on the River Otter in East Devon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lasting implications for wildlife and environmental regulation .
The Devon Wildlife Trust , which produced a five-year study on the impact beavers have on their environment , found that the animals improved water quality and their dams worked as natural flood defenses , helping to reduce the risk of homes flooding downstream .
The Trust called the ruling “ the most ground-breaking government decision for England ’ s wildlife for a generation.
” Beavers went extinct in England centuries ago due to overhunting , but Thursday ’ s decision marks the first time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reintroducing a previously extinct native mammal .
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Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States will hold high-level talks with Taiwan , calls for revolution greet French President Emmanuel Macron in Beirut, and the Rajapaksa family wins Sri Lanka’s election in a landslide.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States will hold high-level talks with Taiwan, calls for revolution greet French President Emmanuel Macron in Beirut, and the Rajapaksa family wins Sri Lanka’s election in a landslide.
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Top U.S. Officials Travel to Taiwan
U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar will lead a delegation to Taiwan on Sunday to meet with senior Taiwanese officials in a rare high-profile visit to the island. Planned discussions will focus on the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the visit comes as tensions between Washington and Beijing have rapidly escalated. It is expected to provoke a strong reaction from China.
China considers Taiwan to be a part of its national territory, and it has blocked the island from joining several international bodies. The United States broke off formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979 as it began cultivating a closer relationship with Beijing, but it has continued to sell weapons to the country and continues to be its biggest arms supplier. Members of the U.S. government occasionally make trips to the island but visits by cabinet officials are rare.
China threatens countermeasures. In advance of Sunday’s visit, China threatened to take “strong countermeasures in response to the U.S. behavior.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Wenbin did not provide details on what retaliatory action Beijing might take, but it threatened to sanction the U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin last month for selling weapons to Taiwan. Recent decisions to close a U.S. consulate in Chengdu and to sanction some U.S. politicians could also provide insight into the Chinese response.
Something more. The meeting is also expected to involve discussions on the broader U.S.-Taiwanese relationship. The Taiwanese Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the visit would be a “testament to the solid mutual trust and smooth communication between Taiwan and the U.S.” On Thursday, Reuters reported that the United States was negotiating a deal that would send four large, sophisticated drones to Taiwan, meaning the island nation will join an exclusive cadre of U.S. allies that have been allowed to purchase U.S.-made drones.
Skip the nukes. Sunday’s meeting, coupled with arms procurements, are part of a wider effort by Taiwan to strengthen its ties to the United States in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness in the region. Some hawkish voices in Washington have even suggested arming Taiwan with nuclear weapons in response to Beijing’s growing aggression in the region. “That would be a provocative mistake, as students of the Cuban missile crisis might predict,” Bradley Bowman and Andrea Stricker argued earlier this week in FP. “Instead, the United States should urgently provide additional conventional military aid to address the dangerous shift in the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait, which if left unchecked could invite aggression by mainland China,” they wrote.
What We’re Following Today
Calls for revolution in Beirut. The shock that followed the explosions in the Lebanese capital of Beirut has turned into anger as details of the government’s negligence are coming to light. French President Emmanuel Macron paid a visit to the city on Thursday and delivered a speech in which he announced aid to support relief efforts and assured citizens that he would propose a new political pact to the country’s leaders. During the speech, protesters chanted “revolution, revolution!,” echoing a growing chorus of opposition to the government.
Information showing that high-level officials not only knew about a massive supply of ammonium nitrate in the city, but that they were aware of the immense danger it posed is emerging. The resulting backlash against the government is part of a much wider feeling of discontent that has been evident in the country since late last year. Protests against government corruption erupted in October and were further inflamed more recently after the pandemic hit and a severe financial crisis set in.
The future of Belarus is at stake. Belarusians will head to the polls on Sunday in an election that could dramatically change the country’s political landscape. President Aleksandr Lukashenko is trying to extend his 16-year presidency, a term that stretches back to the early post-Cold War days.
But he’s fighting an uphill battle. Facing his stiffest opposition in years and massive protests against his rule, Lukashenko’s behavior has become increasingly paranoid and erratic. The one-time Moscow favorite recently defended the arrest of 33 Russian mercenaries in the country, claiming they were quietly staging a revolution to overthrow him. Lukashenko’s shift away from Russia is reflective of the fact that even he doesn’t know whether Belarus should tilt east or west. If he loses and the election is followed by a prolonged period of political instability, it may entice Russia to make that decision itself.
Microsoft wants all of TikTok. The United States just upped the ante in its dispute with China over the popular social networking company TikTok. On Thursday, the Financial Times reported that U.S. tech giant Microsoft now wants to purchase all of TikTok’s global operations, after announcing on Sunday that it was in discussions with ByteDance, the Chinese parent company that owns TikTok, to buy the platform’s U.S. operations. Microsoft announced the move after President Donald Trump threatened to ban TikTok from the country. Negotiations are ongoing, but Microsoft executives are reportedly pushing hard to strike a deal ahead of the Sep. 15 deadline Washington has set for the ban to come into force.
Keep an Eye On
In Sri Lanka, Rajapaksas romp to victory. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa’s party has won a landslide victory in the country’s parliamentary elections, securing 145 of 225 seats while the main opposition party secured only 54.
The result puts both the legislature and the presidency in the hands of the Rajapaksa family, which controls the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna party. The vote was considered a crucial test for the future of democracy in the country. The Rajapaksas made it known during the campaign that their objective was to secure more than two-thirds of seats in the country’s parliament, enough to change the constitution and return sweeping powers to the president. While the 145 seats they won are just short of a two-thirds supermajority, they can likely count on the support of some smaller parties.
New leader for Mauritania. On Thursday, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani appointed Mohamed Ould Bilal, a longtime public administrator, as the country’s next prime minister after the resignation of the entire government. Mauritania has been in the throes of a political crisis since a parliamentary investigation was opened into cases of alleged corruption by the government of longtime President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz earlier this year. On Wednesday, investigators submitted the report on their findings, which documented corruption on the part of several current ministers. The publication of the report led to the government’s resignation.
Turkey faces currency crisis. The Turkish lira plummeted against the U.S. dollar on Thursday, suffering its steepest decline since March 2019. Turkish officials first became concerned about the currency in March when investors started pulling out of emerging markets as the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic hit. The Turkish central bank has since invested an estimated $65 billion in an effort to keep the lira afloat, but those efforts failed on Thursday when the currency dropped 2.7 percent in a single day, falling to approximately 7.24 against the dollar.
Odds and Ends
Beaver rights. The British government granted a family of beavers the legal “right to remain” on the River Otter in East Devon in an important decision that could have lasting implications for wildlife and environmental regulation. The Devon Wildlife Trust, which produced a five-year study on the impact beavers have on their environment, found that the animals improved water quality and their dams worked as natural flood defenses, helping to reduce the risk of homes flooding downstream.
The Trust called the ruling “the most ground-breaking government decision for England’s wildlife for a generation.” Beavers went extinct in England centuries ago due to overhunting, but Thursday’s decision marks the first time the government has ruled in favor of reintroducing a previously extinct native mammal.
That’s it for today.
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