foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--Blindsided on the Supply Side

Blindsided on the Supply Side

On Feb. 27 , Apple CEO Tim Cook announced that the tech giant would be reopening its factories in China , which had been an early victim of the coronavirus .
Like Apple , companies around the world are discovering that their China-linked supply chains bring not only financial advantages but risks , too .
And COVID-19 won ’ t be the last such risk .
While everyone should spare a thought for COVID-19 ’ s victims , they also ought to learn lessons from the bug ’ s disruption of the unsexy but vital supply chain .
At the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s destruction in China was becoming apparent , U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross told Fox Business that “ I think it will help to accelerate the return of jobs to North America.
” Coming at a moment when some 8,100 Chinese had been infected with the virus , it was an extraordinarily callous comment , but the line was consistent with the so-called decoupling from China the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump advocates .
It was also incorrect .
In the short term , the virus won ’ t help bring jobs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the contrary , it ’ s likely to cause reduced manufacturing in North America and other Western countries as failing arrivals of Chinese-made components cause production delays .
That ’ s exactly what happened in 2011 , when a devastating tsunami and earthquake hit Japan ’ s Fukushima region .
Japanese high-tech firms are part of many companies ’ global supply chains—and executives soon discovered just how vital that Japanese cog was .
Before the earthquake , the Fukushima region produced , among other things , some 22 percent of the world ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used in semiconductors ; 60 percent of critical auto parts ; and a large share of lithium battery chemicals and the conductive film used in flat-panel liquid-crystal displays .
Indeed , the Japanese suppliers did such a good job that countless global manufacturers had gone single-source—that is , they were only using the Japanese firms .
That ’ s fine most of the time , but not when an earthquake strikes and renders factories unusable .
COVID-19 ’ s brutal world tour is not over yet , nor are the resulting supply-chain disruptions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ knows his or her companies ’ complete supply chain .
As I pointed out in an article last year , suppliers are just the first tier of the supply chain .
The suppliers have suppliers of their own , who may , in turn , even have a third layer of suppliers .
Michael Essig , a professor of supply management at the Bundeswehr University in Munich , calculated that a multinational company such as Volkswagen has 5,000 suppliers ( the so-called tier-one suppliers ) , each with an average of some 250 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ company actually has 1.25 million suppliers—the vast majority of whom it doesn ’ t know .
A multinational company such as Volkswagen has 5,000 suppliers , each with an average of some 250 tier-two suppliers .
That means that the company actually has 1.25 million suppliers Even if a company tried to keep track of all of its tier-two suppliers , it would struggle to do so .
“ COVID-19 can become a wakeup call for both businesses and government authorities , ” Daniel Jonsson , deputy head of the Department of Social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Research Agency , told me .
“ Here ’ s a very real opportunity to study which operations fare reasonably well during disruptions and which ones succumb .
The latter may need government contingency incentives.
” In fact , supply-chain vulnerabilities may only become apparent when there ’ s a crisis .
A new report by corporate data analytics firm Dun & Bradstreet calculates that some 51,000 companies around the world have one or more direct suppliers in Wuhan and at least 5 million companies around the world have one or more tier-two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s epicenter .
Fully 938 of the Fortune 1000 companies have tier-one or tier-two suppliers in the Wuhan region , Dun & Bradsteet reports .
When a crisis strikes it is , of course , extremely difficult to fix the problem because companies are all looking for substitutes at the same time—and the market doesn ’ t simply have lots of specialized companies able to spring into action if there ’ s trouble elsewhere .
Indeed , even though the U.S. pharmaceutical giant Merck and some other companies affected by the Fukushima @ @ @ @ @ @ @ critical components , many multinationals appear to have forgotten the lessons learned from Fukushima .
Indeed , when COVID-19 hit China , Apple was stuck .
So were other companies .
Microsoft—hardly a risk-seeking company—announced that its quarterly sales would be lower than expected as a result of the virus ’ s impact on its supply chains .
Such reports have caused stock markets to plummet .
The last week of February was one of the worst since the 2008 financial crisis for both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the London Stock @ @ @ @ @ @ @ learn from the Fukushima disaster ?
Many probably did but failed to take action , though some firms—including Levi ’ s—have cut their Chinese suppliers for fear they ’ ll be harmed in a U.S.-Chinese trade war .
“ And many companies have built supply chain risk management in order to identify problems and take action at an early stage , ” Essig told me .
“ The coronavirus is showing whether such systems work.
” Creating inventories , or moving to dual-source , is expensive , and natural disasters are relatively rare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , most years there ’ s only one major earthquake worldwide .
What ’ s more , CEOs are judged on their companies ’ quarterly results .
Why spend money on resilience , so the thinking goes , for a contingency that ’ s highly unlikely to occur ?
But the world is changing .
Severe-weather events are increasing .
Like earthquakes , flooding can cause factories to temporarily close .
Equally troubling , nation-state aggression is shifting its focus to the private sector .
China is emerging as an extremely skilled practitioner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries through means including intellectual property theft , cyberaggression , and predatory takeovers of cutting-edge firms—so skilled that the U.S. government has made the issue a priority .
Long international supply chains , then , pose an enormous vulnerability , not just to the companies relying on them but to the countries where those companies are based and where their products are delivered .
Consumers are , of course , ultimately affected , too .
That makes it extraordinarily tempting for one country wishing to harm another to do so by disrupting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that country .
Last year , long before the coronavirus paralyzed markets , German-based Adidas ’ s sales growth declined when the company ’ s suppliers—nearly all of whom are based outside Germany—failed to keep up with customer demand .
Imagine the effects if the Chinese government , or any other government with lots of companies supplying Western conglomerates , decided it wanted to harm another country .
For example , what if the Chinese government instructed Chinese companies to delay or halt deliveries to Swedish companies in order to punish Sweden for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong-based bookseller who has just been sentenced to 10 years in prison ?
Two years ago Gui , a Chinese-born Swedish citizen who had published books critical of Chinese leaders , was abducted by Chinese agents while traveling in China with two Swedish diplomats .
Gui received his sentence in February , following an apparently coerced confession and forced return to Chinese citizenship .
Delaying or halting Swedish firms ’ supply chains would cause a great deal of harm—and it would be virtually impossible to prove that the disruption had been instigated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diversify .
Having additional suppliers in other countries would cost more , as would maintaining large inventories , but it would also guarantee a modicum of stability in case of crises .
Ross ’ s comment about the virus helping bring U.S. jobs back was nasty and inaccurate in the short term , but it did point to a larger reality : In the longer run , it ’ s safer for companies to have their production closer to home .
Such localism also benefits the national security of the businesses ’ home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shipping and developing-country wages , it ’ s unfortunately also much more expensive , and thus unlikely to happen .
Instead , businesses should make a concerted move to diversification .
To be sure , having additional suppliers in other countries would cost more , as would maintaining large inventories , but it would also guarantee a modicum of stability in case of crises—whatever those crises might be .
The businesses currently slumping on Wall Street and other stock exchanges are surely now wishing they had done so .
After all , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t matter much when supply-chain disruptions—whether caused by animal-triggered viruses , Mother Nature , or hostile governments—can wipe away months of gains or billions of dollars in market value in a matter of days .

On Feb. 27, Apple CEO Tim Cook announced that the tech giant would be reopening its factories in China, which had been an early victim of the coronavirus. Like Apple, companies around the world are discovering that their China-linked supply chains bring not only financial advantages but risks, too. And COVID-19 won’t be the last such risk. While everyone should spare a thought for COVID-19’s victims, they also ought to learn lessons from the bug’s disruption of the unsexy but vital supply chain.
On Feb. 27, Apple CEO Tim Cook announced that the tech giant would be reopening its factories in China, which had been an early victim of the coronavirus. Like Apple, companies around the world are discovering that their China-linked supply chains bring not only financial advantages but risks, too. And COVID-19 won’t be the last such risk. While everyone should spare a thought for COVID-19’s victims, they also ought to learn lessons from the bug’s disruption of the unsexy but vital supply chain.
At the end of January, when COVID-19’s destruction in China was becoming apparent, U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross told Fox Business that “I think it will help to accelerate the return of jobs to North America.” Coming at a moment when some 8,100 Chinese had been infected with the virus, it was an extraordinarily callous comment, but the line was consistent with the so-called decoupling from China the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump advocates.
It was also incorrect. In the short term, the virus won’t help bring jobs back to the United States. On the contrary, it’s likely to cause reduced manufacturing in North America and other Western countries as failing arrivals of Chinese-made components cause production delays.
That’s exactly what happened in 2011, when a devastating tsunami and earthquake hit Japan’s Fukushima region. Japanese high-tech firms are part of many companies’ global supply chains—and executives soon discovered just how vital that Japanese cog was.
In the short term, the virus won’t help bring jobs back to the United States. On the contrary, it’s likely to cause reduced manufacturing in North America and other Western countries
Before the earthquake, the Fukushima region produced, among other things, some 22 percent of the world’s 300-millimeter silicon wafers, which are used in semiconductors; 60 percent of critical auto parts; and a large share of lithium battery chemicals and the conductive film used in flat-panel liquid-crystal displays. Indeed, the Japanese suppliers did such a good job that countless global manufacturers had gone single-source—that is, they were only using the Japanese firms. That’s fine most of the time, but not when an earthquake strikes and renders factories unusable.
COVID-19’s brutal world tour is not over yet, nor are the resulting supply-chain disruptions. The trouble is no CEO actually knows his or her companies’ complete supply chain. As I pointed out in an article last year, suppliers are just the first tier of the supply chain. The suppliers have suppliers of their own, who may, in turn, even have a third layer of suppliers. Michael Essig, a professor of supply management at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, calculated that a multinational company such as Volkswagen has 5,000 suppliers (the so-called tier-one suppliers), each with an average of some 250 tier-two suppliers. That means that the company actually has 1.25 million suppliers—the vast majority of whom it doesn’t know.
Even if a company tried to keep track of all of its tier-two suppliers, it would struggle to do so. “COVID-19 can become a wakeup call for both businesses and government authorities,” Daniel Jonsson, deputy head of the Department of Social Security and Safety at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, told me. “Here’s a very real opportunity to study which operations fare reasonably well during disruptions and which ones succumb. The latter may need government contingency incentives.”
A multinational company such as Volkswagen has 5,000 suppliers, each with an average of some 250 tier-two suppliers. That means that the company actually has 1.25 million suppliers
In fact, supply-chain vulnerabilities may only become apparent when there’s a crisis. A new report by corporate data analytics firm Dun & Bradstreet calculates that some 51,000 companies around the world have one or more direct suppliers in Wuhan and at least 5 million companies around the world have one or more tier-two suppliers in the Wuhan region, COVID-19’s epicenter. Fully 938 of the Fortune 1000 companies have tier-one or tier-two suppliers in the Wuhan region, Dun & Bradsteet reports. When a crisis strikes it is, of course, extremely difficult to fix the problem because companies are all looking for substitutes at the same time—and the market doesn’t simply have lots of specialized companies able to spring into action if there’s trouble elsewhere.
Indeed, even though the U.S. pharmaceutical giant Merck and some other companies affected by the Fukushima earthquake responded by creating large inventories of critical components, many multinationals appear to have forgotten the lessons learned from Fukushima. Indeed, when COVID-19 hit China, Apple was stuck. So were other companies. Microsoft—hardly a risk-seeking company—announced that its quarterly sales would be lower than expected as a result of the virus’s impact on its supply chains.
Such reports have caused stock markets to plummet. The last week of February was one of the worst since the 2008 financial crisis for both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the London Stock Exchange.
Why didn’t executives learn from the Fukushima disaster? Many probably did but failed to take action, though some firms—including Levi’s—have cut their Chinese suppliers for fear they’ll be harmed in a U.S.-Chinese trade war. “And many companies have built supply chain risk management in order to identify problems and take action at an early stage,” Essig told me. “The coronavirus is showing whether such systems work.”
Creating inventories, or moving to dual-source, is expensive, and natural disasters are relatively rare. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, most years there’s only one major earthquake worldwide. What’s more, CEOs are judged on their companies’ quarterly results. Why spend money on resilience, so the thinking goes, for a contingency that’s highly unlikely to occur?
But the world is changing. Severe-weather events are increasing. Like earthquakes, flooding can cause factories to temporarily close. Equally troubling, nation-state aggression is shifting its focus to the private sector. China is emerging as an extremely skilled practitioner in using its companies to weaken other countries through means including intellectual property theft, cyberaggression, and predatory takeovers of cutting-edge firms—so skilled that the U.S. government has made the issue a priority.
Long international supply chains, then, pose an enormous vulnerability, not just to the companies relying on them but to the countries where those companies are based and where their products are delivered. Consumers are, of course, ultimately affected, too. That makes it extraordinarily tempting for one country wishing to harm another to do so by disrupting the supply chains of companies seen as representing that country.
Last year, long before the coronavirus paralyzed markets, German-based Adidas’s sales growth declined when the company’s suppliers—nearly all of whom are based outside Germany—failed to keep up with customer demand. Imagine the effects if the Chinese government, or any other government with lots of companies supplying Western conglomerates, decided it wanted to harm another country.
For example, what if the Chinese government instructed Chinese companies to delay or halt deliveries to Swedish companies in order to punish Sweden for standing up for Gui Minhai, a Hong Kong-based bookseller who has just been sentenced to 10 years in prison? Two years ago Gui, a Chinese-born Swedish citizen who had published books critical of Chinese leaders, was abducted by Chinese agents while traveling in China with two Swedish diplomats. Gui received his sentence in February, following an apparently coerced confession and forced return to Chinese citizenship. Delaying or halting Swedish firms’ supply chains would cause a great deal of harm—and it would be virtually impossible to prove that the disruption had been instigated by the Chinese government.
Businesses must diversify. Having additional suppliers in other countries would cost more, as would maintaining large inventories, but it would also guarantee a modicum of stability in case of crises.
Ross’s comment about the virus helping bring U.S. jobs back was nasty and inaccurate in the short term, but it did point to a larger reality: In the longer run, it’s safer for companies to have their production closer to home. Such localism also benefits the national security of the businesses’ home countries. Given the low cost of shipping and developing-country wages, it’s unfortunately also much more expensive, and thus unlikely to happen.
Instead, businesses should make a concerted move to diversification. To be sure, having additional suppliers in other countries would cost more, as would maintaining large inventories, but it would also guarantee a modicum of stability in case of crises—whatever those crises might be. The businesses currently slumping on Wall Street and other stock exchanges are surely now wishing they had done so.
After all, a string of fine quarterly results doesn’t matter much when supply-chain disruptions—whether caused by animal-triggered viruses, Mother Nature, or hostile governments—can wipe away months of gains or billions of dollars in market value in a matter of days.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--Economic Policymakers Seek to Limit Coronavirus Damage

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. Federal Reserve announces an emergency rate cut amid growing coronavirus fears , Trump speaks with a Taliban negotiator as a dispute threatens to derail U.S.-led Afghan peace efforts , and the European Union supports Greece as refugees gather along its border with Turkey .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
For the first time since the 2008 financial crisis , the U.S. Federal Reserve made an emergency interest rate cut of 50 basis points on Tuesday to mitigate the economic effects of the coronavirus .
With @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1.25 percent range , it was also the biggest single cut since 2008 .
“ The virus and the measures that are being taken to contain it will severely weigh on economic activity , both here and abroad for some time , ” Jerome Powell , the Fed chairman said .
But U.S. stocks fell after the news of the rate cut , which followed cuts by the central banks of Australia and Malaysia .
As the coronavirus spreads around the world , investors increasingly fear a global recession .
Outbreaks have already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ travel , and tourism .
Finance ministers and bankers from the G-7 countries released a statement on Tuesday pledging to take individual action , without providing details .
Will Europe follow suit ?
Christine Lagarde , the president of the European Central Bank , has indicated that it is increasingly willing to “ take appropriate and targeted measures , ” though those are limited , including monetary stimulus rather than cutting already-negative rates further .
In Germany , top officials disagreed on Tuesday over a proposed stimulus package in response to the virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supplies much of the world with generic drugs , restricted the export of medicines made from 26 active ingredients—including acetaminophen , used as a pain reliever and fever reducer .
Indian pharmacists in turn rely on China for the ingredients .
The move could affect supply of certain drugs in countries including the United States , which imports 31 percent of medicine ingredients from India .
Mapping the coronavirus outbreak : Follow our daily updates on the epidemic and how it is affecting countries around the world here .
Trump speaks with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a phone call with Mullah Baradar Akhund , the chief Taliban negotiator , on Tuesday as a Taliban demand for prisoner releases threatens to derail U.S. peace efforts in Afghanistan .
The conversation , believed to be the first between a U.S. leader and a top Taliban official , came days after the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement in Doha .
But Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has refused to release up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners—an obstacle to talks between the Taliban and the government .
Trump provided few details of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bolster Greece in border crisis .
As refugees continue to arrive at Turkey ’ s borders with the European Union , EU leaders are backing Greece ’ s efforts to keep the migrants out .
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen voiced her support alongside Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis on Tuesday .
Meanwhile , Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ’ s strategy has put the EU in a bind : Diplomatic sources say that the EU is considering pledging even more aid to Turkey to host refugees , following the 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reuters reports .
EU interior ministers are holding an extraordinary meeting today to discuss the crisis .
Iran struggles to contain virus outbreak .
Iran has now confirmed more than 2,300 cases of the coronavirus and at least 77 deaths .
It is one of the largest outbreaks beyond China , and the high mortality rate suggests the number of cases may be higher .
The virus has directly affected the government , with at least 23 members of parliament testing positive for the virus .
Iran ’ s physical interconnectivity and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. secondary sanctions have hampered humanitarian trade and cut Iran off from vital medical supplies , threatening to turn a crisis into a catastrophe , Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Abbas Kebriaeezadeh write for FP .
Biden ’ s Super Tuesday surge .
Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden appeared triumphant early on Super Tuesday , winning primaries in nine states while his rival Sen. Bernie Sanders was poised to pick up four , including delegate-rich California .
One state—Maine—remains too close to call .
Biden has courted the support of black voters , older @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg—who had an underwhelming showing and cleared the 15 percent threshold needed to win delegates in only six states—is expected to make a decision about the future of his campaign later today .
Read our coverage of foreign policy in the 2020 election here .
Protests in Chile .
Nearly 300 protesters were arrested in Santiago , Chile , after demonstrators shut down some metro stations and bus lines and clashed with police .
There were bursts of unrest in a few other cities .
With the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already a common month for protest in Chile .
This year , it follows the demonstrations over inequality that raged until December and coincides with the 30th anniversary of the fall of Chile ’ s military dictatorship .
U.S.-China media wars .
The Trump administration is capping the number of U.S. visas issued to five Chinese media organizations—known propaganda outlets .
While the State Department wasn ’ t technically wrong to designate the media outlets as foreign missions , the moves could endanger U.S. journalists in China , Steven Butler argues in FP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faithful on Tuesday that Pope Francis is not suffering from the coronavirus amid the outbreak in Italy—the worst affected country in Europe .
Due to an illness , the pope is skipping a weeklong retreat with senior officials for the first time in his papacy , raising concerns .
“ The cold the Holy Father was diagnosed as having is taking its course without symptoms related to other pathologies , ” said Vatican spokesperson Matteo Bruni .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Federal Reserve announces an emergency rate cut amid growing coronavirus fears, Trump speaks with a Taliban negotiator as a dispute threatens to derail U.S.-led Afghan peace efforts , and the European Union supports Greece as refugees gather along its border with Turkey .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Federal Reserve announces an emergency rate cut amid growing coronavirus fears, Trump speaks with a Taliban negotiator as a dispute threatens to derail U.S.-led Afghan peace efforts, and the European Union supports Greece as refugees gather along its border with Turkey.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Policymakers Hope to Soften Blow of Virus
For the first time since the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve made an emergency interest rate cut of 50 basis points on Tuesday to mitigate the economic effects of the coronavirus. With rates now set at the 1 to 1.25 percent range, it was also the biggest single cut since 2008. “The virus and the measures that are being taken to contain it will severely weigh on economic activity, both here and abroad for some time,” Jerome Powell, the Fed chairman said.
But U.S. stocks fell after the news of the rate cut, which followed cuts by the central banks of Australia and Malaysia. As the coronavirus spreads around the world, investors increasingly fear a global recession. Outbreaks have already caused disruptions to supply chains, air travel, and tourism. Finance ministers and bankers from the G-7 countries released a statement on Tuesday pledging to take individual action, without providing details.
Will Europe follow suit? Christine Lagarde, the president of the European Central Bank, has indicated that it is increasingly willing to “take appropriate and targeted measures,” though those are limited, including monetary stimulus rather than cutting already-negative rates further. In Germany, top officials disagreed on Tuesday over a proposed stimulus package in response to the virus.
Pharmaceutical impacts. India, which supplies much of the world with generic drugs, restricted the export of medicines made from 26 active ingredients—including acetaminophen, used as a pain reliever and fever reducer. Indian pharmacists in turn rely on China for the ingredients. The move could affect supply of certain drugs in countries including the United States, which imports 31 percent of medicine ingredients from India.
Mapping the coronavirus outbreak: Follow our daily updates on the epidemic and how it is affecting countries around the world here.
What We’re Following Today
Trump speaks with the Taliban. U.S. President Donald Trump held a phone call with Mullah Baradar Akhund, the chief Taliban negotiator, on Tuesday as a Taliban demand for prisoner releases threatens to derail U.S. peace efforts in Afghanistan. The conversation, believed to be the first between a U.S. leader and a top Taliban official, came days after the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement in Doha. But Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has refused to release up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners—an obstacle to talks between the Taliban and the government. Trump provided few details of his discussion with Baradar.
EU officials bolster Greece in border crisis. As refugees continue to arrive at Turkey’s borders with the European Union, EU leaders are backing Greece’s efforts to keep the migrants out. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen voiced her support alongside Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis on Tuesday. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s strategy has put the EU in a bind: Diplomatic sources say that the EU is considering pledging even more aid to Turkey to host refugees, following the 2016 deal to stop arrivals in Europe, Reuters reports. EU interior ministers are holding an extraordinary meeting today to discuss the crisis.
Iran struggles to contain virus outbreak. Iran has now confirmed more than 2,300 cases of the coronavirus and at least 77 deaths. It is one of the largest outbreaks beyond China, and the high mortality rate suggests the number of cases may be higher. The virus has directly affected the government, with at least 23 members of parliament testing positive for the virus. Iran’s physical interconnectivity and its political and economic isolation pose unprecedented challenges—and U.S. secondary sanctions have hampered humanitarian trade and cut Iran off from vital medical supplies, threatening to turn a crisis into a catastrophe, Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Abbas Kebriaeezadeh write for FP.
Keep an Eye On Biden’s Super Tuesday surge. Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden appeared triumphant early on Super Tuesday, winning primaries in nine states while his rival Sen. Bernie Sanders was poised to pick up four, including delegate-rich California. One state—Maine—remains too close to call. Biden has courted the support of black voters, older voters, and those in the suburbs. Former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg—who had an underwhelming showing and cleared the 15 percent threshold needed to win delegates in only six states—is expected to make a decision about the future of his campaign later today. Read our coverage of foreign policy in the 2020 election here.
Protests in Chile. Nearly 300 protesters were arrested in Santiago, Chile, after demonstrators shut down some metro stations and bus lines and clashed with police. There were bursts of unrest in a few other cities. With the end of summer holidays, March is already a common month for protest in Chile. This year, it follows the demonstrations over inequality that raged until December and coincides with the 30th anniversary of the fall of Chile’s military dictatorship.
U.S.-China media wars. The Trump administration is capping the number of U.S. visas issued to five Chinese media organizations—known propaganda outlets. While the State Department wasn’t technically wrong to designate the media outlets as foreign missions, the moves could endanger U.S. journalists in China, Steven Butler argues in FP.
The Decline of Democracy? Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2020 report, released today, finds that democracy has declined globally for the 14th consecutive year. The setbacks include the world’s two largest democracies, India and the United States, where the Trump administration “has failed to exhibit consistent commitment to a foreign policy based on the principles of democracy and human rights.” The United States’ Freedom in the World score has declined by eight points over 10 years to 86, putting it well below several of its usual democratic peers, as shown below. The United States’ Falling Freedom Score 2009 vs. 2019: countries with scores within 3 points of the United States with populations of 1 million or more
Odds and Ends
The Vatican sought to reassure the faithful on Tuesday that Pope Francis is not suffering from the coronavirus amid the outbreak in Italy—the worst affected country in Europe. Due to an illness, the pope is skipping a weeklong retreat with senior officials for the first time in his papacy, raising concerns. “The cold the Holy Father was diagnosed as having is taking its course without symptoms related to other pathologies,” said Vatican spokesperson Matteo Bruni.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--Selling Your Soul to the Kremlin

Selling Your Soul to the Kremlin

Selling Your Soul to the Kremlin Making sense of Russia has become more urgent since the Russian leadership threw down a gauntlet to the Western powers .
Vladimir Putin , coming to the presidency at the start of this millennium , at first played in harmony with the United States .
But unhinged by the so-called color revolutions that rocked Georgia and Ukraine in the early 2000s , he suspected U.S. meddling and resolved to challenge Washington in global affairs .
Relations between Moscow and Washington cooled under U.S. President George W. Bush and , despite a slight thaw when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian president , went into a deep freeze in 2012 after Putin returned to the highest Kremlin office .
He despised U.S. President Barack Obama almost as much as he hated Secretary of State Hillary Clinton .
Moscow ’ s propaganda outlets denounced the U.S. government as the fount of geostrategic evils and called for a multipolar world in which American power would be curtailed .
Meanwhile Russian foreign policy sought conciliation with U.S. rivals , notably the People ’ s Republic of China , while challenging the United States and its allies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pugnacious rhetoric imprinted itself on policy .
He accelerated nuclear arms modernization and annexed Crimea in 2014 .
Russian forces have continued to bathe eastern Ukraine in blood , Russian digital operatives and intelligence agents interfered maliciously in the 2016 U.S. presidential election , and Russian money was used as a tool to undermine the European Union .
Having castigated America ’ s endorsement of the Arab Spring , the Kremlin leadership from 2015 deployed Russian airpower to rescue Bashar al-Assad ’ s embattled regime in the Syrian civil war .
Although Putin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. President Donald Trump , official Russia ’ s anti-American polemics have been maintained .
Like most journalists who have lived in Russia while reporting on it , Joshua Yaffa focuses on the domestic situation in his new book , Between Two Fires .
But he does not ignore foreign policy , because Russian internal affairs help to condition the options favored by the Kremlin in international relations .
And it is difficult not to discern a parallel between the Kremlin ’ s belligerence abroad and its illiberal activities on the home front @ @ @ @ @ @ @ represses Russians who speak or act against it .
The electoral system has been further enfeebled since Boris Yeltsin stepped down from the presidency at the end of 1999 .
Opposition politicians and investigative reporters have been persecuted , sometimes even assassinated .
Parties gain the legal registration to contest national elections only if they represent no serious threat to the ruling elite .
The main TV stations dutifully repeat the news as dictated by the Kremlin .
The Russian people , as Yaffa points out , have grown habituated to this contemporary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1990s , they spend little time pondering whether a different outcome for Russia ’ s transition from communism was a realistic possibility .
Although Yeltsin pursued a foreign policy of collaboration with the United States , his management of elections and parliaments was characterized by persistent fraud , and it is misleading to picture Putin ’ s arrival in power as the first bridge on the road to illiberalism .
Yaffa ’ s highly original and riveting account describes how a growing number of more or less liberal-minded figures across the whole range @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make their peace with the ruling establishment .
Yaffa , however , deliberately directs his focus away from the Kremlin .
Instead , his highly original and riveting account describes how a growing number of more or less liberal-minded figures across the whole range of Russian professional life have decided to make their peace with the ruling establishment .
They have come to the judgement that political liberals are unlikely to win a national election in the near future .
They conclude that if they are to make an influential contribution to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pick up a long spoon and sup with the devil .
Putin for his part knows that he would lose more than he could gain by excluding them entirely from public affairs .
Their services make his Russia operate more effectively and increase the impression that he rules by consent .
The country is no longer a totalitarian dictatorship , and the Putin administration is flexible enough to allow breathing space for those who do not like its policies but agree to forswear open criticism of them .
It is a tacit compromise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Heda Saratova , for instance , is a human rights activist who worked for years to rescue victims of persecution and torture in Chechnya .
She built her career as an official of Memorial , which is the organization that fights to tell the truth about atrocities from the Stalinist 1930s to the present day .
In the course of her enquiries she witnessed the drastic narrowing of opportunities as the Chechen president and Putin loyalist Ramzan Kadyrov dealt as brutally with incoming investigators as he did with his critics among fellow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been to abandon overt criticism of Kadyrov so as to gain otherwise unlikely opportunities to save the lives of those whom he was abusing .
In her view , it was not a perfect solution but better than doing nothing .
Elizaveta Glinka , a medical doctor , faced a similar dilemma in her work among the dead and wounded in eastern Ukraine .
As the price of being able to continue her activities saving sick and injured children , she was drawn into cooperating with the state authorities in Moscow .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ which enabled it to burnish its own reputation for philanthropy while continuing the war .
Glinka was aware of how she was being used but saw it as the only available way that she could alleviate the appalling distress .
Her last exploit would have been to perform the same services in Syria , attended by television crews .
Tragically , her flight to the war zone crashed on takeoff from a Russian military airport near the southern city of Sochi .
Not all of Yaffa ’ s portraits of those cooperating with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to curb the murmurs of a liberal conscience .
Konstantin Ernst is a renowned TV producer who put his creativity as the disposal of the Russian authorities .
He has a chameleon ’ s ability to change color as circumstances shift .
He climbed to the apex of his career when he was assigned the task of directing the opening ceremony of the Sochi Winter Olympics in February 2014 .
The five rings of the Olympic symbol shone up to the heavens above the stadium in the form of five gigantic snowflakes ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but nobody minded ) , and the audience was treated to a balletic tableau of Russian history from tsarism to the present day .
Peace and love after much suffering was the unifying theme .
Ernst ’ s masterpiece of soft power would have had a more lasting effect worldwide if Putin had not decided to invade Ukraine and annex Crimea later that month .
There were no liberals in Putin ’ s inner circle involved in the fateful discussion , and he did not bother even to seek advice from either @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his foreign affairs minister , Sergei Lavrov .
The core of his thinking was that Russia should and could do whatever was necessary for recognition as a global colossus .
Indeed , nothing annoyed him more than when , in March 2014 , Obama scornfully referred to the Russian Federation as a mere regional power .
The Putin administration was determined to prove that Obama had seriously underestimated it and that economic sanctions against Russia would never deflect it from its desired objective .
Yaffa notes the national popularity and political supremacy that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Crimean land grab , when his poll ratings rose to 89 percent—an extraordinary achievement by someone who had held one or other of the two supreme offices of state for so long .
And Putin has predictably earned additional plaudits at home as Russian arms and diplomacy filled the vacuum left by Obama and Trump in the wars across the Middle East .
Russia ’ s renewed assertiveness welled up from deep and wide feelings among Russians in general that the country had to stand tall again after the humiliations of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the leadership ’ s calculation that such a stance would distract the electorate from the defects of their leaders .
This raises a question about the prospects for continued political and social stability , the same stability that—as Yaffa painstakingly describes—induced so many Russians to think it useless to engage in direct opposition to an obviously greedy , corrupt , and authoritarian administration .
When in 2011 Putin announced his intention to stand for a third presidential term , there was an upsurge of rallies and demonstrations against him .
In response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of promises about welfare benefits .
Evidently , he and his advisors sensed that there might be serious trouble for him unless he offered to relieve the material hardships endured by average Russian households .
Stability has convinced many Russians that it ’ s useless to engage in direct opposition to an obviously greedy , corrupt , and authoritarian administration .
An acute threat to the Putin administration arose in summer 2014 , when the price of oil plummeted on world markets .
As the finance ministry tightened its purse strings , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imposed .
By mid-2018 , the administration was pushed into extending the obligatory working years before retirement .
This time it was retirees rather than the usual political activists who protested , by occupying buses and trains and blocking highways .
Putin was shocked into agreeing to restrict the scope of pension reform .
Other countries , of course , have witnessed much more tumultuous groundswells of anti-government protest .
Russia in the last 30 years has seen nothing like the Arab Spring of 2011 , when long-ensconced ruling cliques were overturned by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quite as serious as even the gilets jaunes who brought Paris and other French cities to a standstill in the winter of 2018 to 2019 has yet transpired .
The likelihood at present is that the uppermost elite in Russia has the guile and ruthlessness to see off any disturbances .
But Putin can not rule forever , and he has repeatedly shown that he is capable of making mistakes by overplaying his hand .
Embracing the Chinese while annoying most Americans may soon come to be seen as a poorer strategy than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For the moment , though , he can count on many ambitious Russians concluding that their careers require them to compromise with the Kremlin .
Good and not-so-good men and women are forced to make difficult choices—and Joshua Yaffa ’ s remarkable book is a guide to the pain and pleasure of their lives in the public arena .

Making sense of Russia has become more urgent since the Russian leadership threw down a gauntlet to the Western powers. Vladimir Putin, coming to the presidency at the start of this millennium, at first played in harmony with the United States. But unhinged by the so-called color revolutions that rocked Georgia and Ukraine in the early 2000s, he suspected U.S. meddling and resolved to challenge Washington in global affairs.
Making sense of Russia has become more urgent since the Russian leadership threw down a gauntlet to the Western powers. Vladimir Putin, coming to the presidency at the start of this millennium, at first played in harmony with the United States. But unhinged by the so-called color revolutions that rocked Georgia and Ukraine in the early 2000s, he suspected U.S. meddling and resolved to challenge Washington in global affairs.
Relations between Moscow and Washington cooled under U.S. President George W. Bush and, despite a slight thaw when Putin’s protege Dmitry Medvedev was Russian president, went into a deep freeze in 2012 after Putin returned to the highest Kremlin office. He despised U.S. President Barack Obama almost as much as he hated Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Moscow’s propaganda outlets denounced the U.S. government as the fount of geostrategic evils and called for a multipolar world in which American power would be curtailed. Meanwhile Russian foreign policy sought conciliation with U.S. rivals, notably the People’s Republic of China, while challenging the United States and its allies at every turn.
Putin’s pugnacious rhetoric imprinted itself on policy. He accelerated nuclear arms modernization and annexed Crimea in 2014. Russian forces have continued to bathe eastern Ukraine in blood, Russian digital operatives and intelligence agents interfered maliciously in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and Russian money was used as a tool to undermine the European Union.
Having castigated America’s endorsement of the Arab Spring, the Kremlin leadership from 2015 deployed Russian airpower to rescue Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime in the Syrian civil war. Although Putin apparently enjoys a friendly relationship with current U.S. President Donald Trump, official Russia’s anti-American polemics have been maintained.
Like most journalists who have lived in Russia while reporting on it, Joshua Yaffa focuses on the domestic situation in his new book, Between Two Fires. But he does not ignore foreign policy, because Russian internal affairs help to condition the options favored by the Kremlin in international relations. And it is difficult not to discern a parallel between the Kremlin’s belligerence abroad and its illiberal activities on the home front.
Indeed, the Putin administration savagely represses Russians who speak or act against it. The electoral system has been further enfeebled since Boris Yeltsin stepped down from the presidency at the end of 1999. Opposition politicians and investigative reporters have been persecuted, sometimes even assassinated. Parties gain the legal registration to contest national elections only if they represent no serious threat to the ruling elite. The main TV stations dutifully repeat the news as dictated by the Kremlin.
The Russian people, as Yaffa points out, have grown habituated to this contemporary reality. When Russians think about the 1990s, they spend little time pondering whether a different outcome for Russia’s transition from communism was a realistic possibility. Although Yeltsin pursued a foreign policy of collaboration with the United States, his management of elections and parliaments was characterized by persistent fraud, and it is misleading to picture Putin’s arrival in power as the first bridge on the road to illiberalism.
Yaffa’s highly original and riveting account describes how a growing number of more or less liberal-minded figures across the whole range of Russian professional life have decided to make their peace with the ruling establishment.
Yaffa, however, deliberately directs his focus away from the Kremlin. Instead, his highly original and riveting account describes how a growing number of more or less liberal-minded figures across the whole range of Russian professional life have decided to make their peace with the ruling establishment. They have come to the judgement that political liberals are unlikely to win a national election in the near future. They conclude that if they are to make an influential contribution to the life of the nation, they have pick up a long spoon and sup with the devil.
Putin for his part knows that he would lose more than he could gain by excluding them entirely from public affairs. Their services make his Russia operate more effectively and increase the impression that he rules by consent. The country is no longer a totalitarian dictatorship, and the Putin administration is flexible enough to allow breathing space for those who do not like its policies but agree to forswear open criticism of them. It is a tacit compromise that suits both sides in current circumstances.
Heda Saratova, for instance, is a human rights activist who worked for years to rescue victims of persecution and torture in Chechnya. She built her career as an official of Memorial, which is the organization that fights to tell the truth about atrocities from the Stalinist 1930s to the present day. In the course of her enquiries she witnessed the drastic narrowing of opportunities as the Chechen president and Putin loyalist Ramzan Kadyrov dealt as brutally with incoming investigators as he did with his critics among fellow Chechens. Her life’s choice has been to abandon overt criticism of Kadyrov so as to gain otherwise unlikely opportunities to save the lives of those whom he was abusing. In her view, it was not a perfect solution but better than doing nothing.
Elizaveta Glinka, a medical doctor, faced a similar dilemma in her work among the dead and wounded in eastern Ukraine. As the price of being able to continue her activities saving sick and injured children, she was drawn into cooperating with the state authorities in Moscow. The Kremlin showered her with honors, which enabled it to burnish its own reputation for philanthropy while continuing the war. Glinka was aware of how she was being used but saw it as the only available way that she could alleviate the appalling distress. Her last exploit would have been to perform the same services in Syria, attended by television crews. Tragically, her flight to the war zone crashed on takeoff from a Russian military airport near the southern city of Sochi.
Not all of Yaffa’s portraits of those cooperating with the establishment have involved individuals who needed to curb the murmurs of a liberal conscience. Konstantin Ernst is a renowned TV producer who put his creativity as the disposal of the Russian authorities. He has a chameleon’s ability to change color as circumstances shift. He climbed to the apex of his career when he was assigned the task of directing the opening ceremony of the Sochi Winter Olympics in February 2014. The five rings of the Olympic symbol shone up to the heavens above the stadium in the form of five gigantic snowflakes (one of which didn’t work, but nobody minded), and the audience was treated to a balletic tableau of Russian history from tsarism to the present day. Peace and love after much suffering was the unifying theme.
Ernst’s masterpiece of soft power would have had a more lasting effect worldwide if Putin had not decided to invade Ukraine and annex Crimea later that month. There were no liberals in Putin’s inner circle involved in the fateful discussion, and he did not bother even to seek advice from either his prime minister, Medvedev, or his foreign affairs minister, Sergei Lavrov. The core of his thinking was that Russia should and could do whatever was necessary for recognition as a global colossus.
Indeed, nothing annoyed him more than when, in March 2014, Obama scornfully referred to the Russian Federation as a mere regional power. The Putin administration was determined to prove that Obama had seriously underestimated it and that economic sanctions against Russia would never deflect it from its desired objective.
Yaffa notes the national popularity and political supremacy that accrued to Putin as the result of the Crimean land grab, when his poll ratings rose to 89 percent—an extraordinary achievement by someone who had held one or other of the two supreme offices of state for so long. And Putin has predictably earned additional plaudits at home as Russian arms and diplomacy filled the vacuum left by Obama and Trump in the wars across the Middle East.
Russia’s renewed assertiveness welled up from deep and wide feelings among Russians in general that the country had to stand tall again after the humiliations of the 1990s. It derived just as much from the leadership’s calculation that such a stance would distract the electorate from the defects of their leaders.
This raises a question about the prospects for continued political and social stability, the same stability that—as Yaffa painstakingly describes—induced so many Russians to think it useless to engage in direct opposition to an obviously greedy, corrupt, and authoritarian administration. When in 2011 Putin announced his intention to stand for a third presidential term, there was an upsurge of rallies and demonstrations against him. In response, his campaign slogans noticeably increased the number of promises about welfare benefits. Evidently, he and his advisors sensed that there might be serious trouble for him unless he offered to relieve the material hardships endured by average Russian households.
Stability has convinced many Russians that it’s useless to engage in direct opposition to an obviously greedy, corrupt, and authoritarian administration.
An acute threat to the Putin administration arose in summer 2014, when the price of oil plummeted on world markets. As the finance ministry tightened its purse strings, sharp new cutbacks on welfare payments were imposed. By mid-2018, the administration was pushed into extending the obligatory working years before retirement. This time it was retirees rather than the usual political activists who protested, by occupying buses and trains and blocking highways. Putin was shocked into agreeing to restrict the scope of pension reform.
Other countries, of course, have witnessed much more tumultuous groundswells of anti-government protest. Russia in the last 30 years has seen nothing like the Arab Spring of 2011, when long-ensconced ruling cliques were overturned by the fury of street demonstrations. Nothing quite as serious as even the gilets jaunes who brought Paris and other French cities to a standstill in the winter of 2018 to 2019 has yet transpired.
The likelihood at present is that the uppermost elite in Russia has the guile and ruthlessness to see off any disturbances. But Putin cannot rule forever, and he has repeatedly shown that he is capable of making mistakes by overplaying his hand. Embracing the Chinese while annoying most Americans may soon come to be seen as a poorer strategy than playing them off against each other.
For the moment, though, he can count on many ambitious Russians concluding that their careers require them to compromise with the Kremlin. Good and not-so-good men and women are forced to make difficult choices—and Joshua Yaffa’s remarkable book is a guide to the pain and pleasure of their lives in the public arena.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--Trump Loyalist Appointed to Oversee Relations With U.N., World Health Organization

Sean Doocey , the former chief of the White House personnel office , has been appointed to a senior position at the State Department Bureau of International Organization Affairs , putting another political appointee with little experience in multilateral affairs in the top ranks of an agency responsible for managing U.S. relations with the United Nations , the World Health Organization , and other international organizations .
The appointment—which hasn ’ t been publicly announced—comes just weeks after the White House announced that Pam Pryor would serve as the bureau ’ s acting assistant secretary of state .
Pryor—who made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as an aide to former Alaska Gov .
Sarah Palin and who served as Donald Trump ’ s primary liaison to evangelical Christians during the 2016 presidential election—previously worked as a senior advisor in State ’ s Office of Civilian Security , Democracy , and Human Rights , where she promoted international abortion restrictions and advocated for the rights of Christian minorities in the Middle East .
The dual hires have dealt a blow to morale among State Department career staffers , who have endured nearly three years of hostile treatment from Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the department ’ s Office of the Inspector General and to State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy .
It has also buttressed fears that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will do little to protect the foreign service from political pressure from the White House , which has become a sensitive subject after the State Department found itself at the center of the impeachment battle on Capitol Hill .
“ There is a real sense of dread across the bureau , ” said one U.S. official .
Foreign delegates say that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration has little interest in multilateral diplomacy , beyond its stated desire to counter Chinese diplomatic influence .
“ It adds to the narrative that this is a domestic-focused administration and they don ’ t really care what ’ s happening here , ” said one U.N.-based diplomat .
Long before President Trump declared political war on his Ukraine experts , the Bureau of International Organization Affairs was ground zero for the administration ’ s reign of retaliation against career diplomats deemed insufficiently loyal to the president .
In August 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Steve Linick , issued a scathing report that concluded two top Trump appointees had harassed “ career employees premised on claims that they were ‘ disloyal ’ based on their perceived political views.
” Both denied the charges against them , and both have since left the department .
In a town hall meeting after the report ’ s publication , John Sullivan , then deputy secretary of state , and David Hale , the U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs , sought to assure staff from the bureau that a new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would take a personal role in assuring the best , most experienced people would come to the bureau .
Hale said that he intended to exercise “ direct oversight of all personnel appointments at the deputy director level and above ” to ensure the bureau was attracting the “ greatest expertise , ” according to an account of the closed-door meeting reviewed by Foreign Policy .
Sullivan , who has since become U.S. ambassador to Russia , echoed that sentiment , telling the staffers he was committed to making sure the bureau “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it has many other times in its history.
” Sullivan reminisced about the days under the George W. Bush administration when the bureau was at the center of U.S. policy debates over decisions to pursue war or peace in the Middle East .
But the latest hires have doused hopes the bureau can recover its stature .
Doocey is replacing Kathy Wright , who oversees the department ’ s management portfolio , as deputy assistant secretary of state for management issues .
In his new post , Doocey will be responsible for handling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appointments of American nationals to international jobs , and U.N. elections .
He is also expected to play a role in ramping up the department ’ s capacity to contain China ’ s ability to secure top jobs at the U.N .
The State Department has also recently appointed a special envoy—Mark Lambert , a career diplomat—to counter Chinese influence in international organizations .
Doocey was serving in the White House Office of Presidential Personnel in the summer of 2018 when the office issued a questionnaire to American nationals seeking U.S. support when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The questionnaire appeared crafted to detect a candidate ’ s political leanings .
The form inquires whether the candidate has ever spoken publicly about political issues , addressed Congress , supported a political candidate , or appeared on major cable news networks like Fox and CNN .
It also requests disclosure of social media accounts .
“ Have you ever maintained a blog ?
Written an opinion piece that appeared in a traditional newspaper like the Wall Street Journal or New York Times ?
Written for an online publication like Breitbart , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asks the questionnaire , a copy of which was obtained by Foreign Policy .
“ Have you given speeches on a controversial issue ?
” But Doocey himself has faced questions of loyalty from the White House .
Trump sent a memo to Doocey last year accusing him and another official of obstructionism amid a push to root out officials from the government deemed insufficiently loyal , according to a report from Axios last month .
The memo reportedly listed State Department officials who should be fired , including Undersecretary for Management Bill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whose positions require presidential nomination and Senate confirmation .
Hale testified in the impeachment hearing , and Sullivan is now ambassador to Russia .
Axios reported that the memo apparently falsely accused Doocey of “ sneakily ” swapping Mira Ricardel ’ s name for Sean Cairncross as Trump ’ s nominee to lead the Millennium Challenge Corporation , a small U.S. foreign investment assistance agency .
Cairncross leads the agency now , and Ricardel was ousted as deputy national security advisor in November 2018 , after disagreements with the first lady ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Foreign Policy dismissed the charge against Doocey as wholly unfounded .
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment for this story .
Doocey ’ s fellow newcomer to the bureau , Pryor , in her time at State explored the role that women might play in fighting Islamic extremism in the Middle East at U.N. meetings .
She also served as the most senior member of the U.S. delegation at certain key U.N. meetings , leading U.S. efforts to strike any language from international agreements that dealt with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ viewing it as a stealth effort to promote abortion around the world .
“ She ’ s got this religious , conservative evangelical bent that manifested itself in her anti-terrorism advocacy , ” said one former U.S. colleague .
But the initiative , this person said , “ never seemed to go anywhere.
” One foreign diplomat said that Pryor has “ always been quite pleasant ” to work with but that she has not demonstrated “ a lot of grasp of the details.
” “ At least she is nice , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kind of work with her.
” But the diplomat said her No .
1 priority , like that of the administration at large , is to roll back commitments to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights in international agreements .
In advance of negotiations on a declaration to be adopted on the 25th anniversary of the Beijing summit on women ’ s rights , the United States has repeatedly strived to block proposals by European countries to include a phrase underscoring the importance of such rights .
Senior administration officials say the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women ’ s advocacy organizations dispute this view and say the international community can ’ t address issues of sexual violence or women ’ s health without prioritizing sexual and reproductive health issues .
The disagreements have led to heated disputes between the United States and its European allies , which back resolutions on sexual and reproductive health at the United Nations .
“ I am sure you are all familiar with the constant drumbeat in the halls of the United Nations and the WHO [ World Health Organization ] to normalize the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and ‘ reproductive rights , ’ ” Alex Azar , the U.S. secretary of health and human services , told a gathering of foreign health leaders in Washington in January .
“ What reproductive rights are they talking about ?
In this context , it is increasingly becoming clear that some U.N. agencies and countries want this to mean unfettered access to abortion.
” In recent weeks , the Trump administration brought together a coalition of conservative governments—including those of Brazil , Hungary , and Poland—in New York to highlight the importance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ During the session , Hungary ’ s and Poland ’ s representatives sought to strike a more conciliatory tone with its more liberal counterparts , highlighting the importance of promoting paid family leave policies and better work life balance .
But the U.S. delegate , Valerie Huber , the global women ’ s health envoy from the Department of Health and Human Services , showed little interest in subtlety , according to one diplomat in attendance .
The diplomat recalled that Huber called the United States a “ pro-life country ” and said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to promote a family.
” The diplomat said her speech was met with a cool reception : “ It was tone deaf .
I thought we were supposed to be having a conversation .
”

Sean Doocey, the former chief of the White House personnel office, has been appointed to a senior position at the State Department Bureau of International Organization Affairs, putting another political appointee with little experience in multilateral affairs in the top ranks of an agency responsible for managing U.S. relations with the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and other international organizations.
Sean Doocey, the former chief of the White House personnel office, has been appointed to a senior position at the State Department Bureau of International Organization Affairs, putting another political appointee with little experience in multilateral affairs in the top ranks of an agency responsible for managing U.S. relations with the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and other international organizations.
The appointment—which hasn’t been publicly announced—comes just weeks after the White House announced that Pam Pryor would serve as the bureau’s acting assistant secretary of state. Pryor—who made a name for herself in Republican politics as an aide to former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin and who served as Donald Trump’s primary liaison to evangelical Christians during the 2016 presidential election—previously worked as a senior advisor in State’s Office of Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, where she promoted international abortion restrictions and advocated for the rights of Christian minorities in the Middle East.
The dual hires have dealt a blow to morale among State Department career staffers, who have endured nearly three years of hostile treatment from Trump appointee loyalists, according to a report by the department’s Office of the Inspector General and to State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy. It has also buttressed fears that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will do little to protect the foreign service from political pressure from the White House, which has become a sensitive subject after the State Department found itself at the center of the impeachment battle on Capitol Hill.
“There is a real sense of dread across the bureau,” said one U.S. official.
Foreign delegates say that the high-level appointments reinforce suspicions that the Trump administration has little interest in multilateral diplomacy, beyond its stated desire to counter Chinese diplomatic influence. “It adds to the narrative that this is a domestic-focused administration and they don’t really care what’s happening here,” said one U.N.-based diplomat.
Long before President Trump declared political war on his Ukraine experts, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs was ground zero for the administration’s reign of retaliation against career diplomats deemed insufficiently loyal to the president. In August 2019, the department’s inspector general, Steve Linick, issued a scathing report that concluded two top Trump appointees had harassed “career employees premised on claims that they were ‘disloyal’ based on their perceived political views.” Both denied the charges against them, and both have since left the department.
In a town hall meeting after the report’s publication, John Sullivan, then deputy secretary of state, and David Hale, the U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, sought to assure staff from the bureau that a new day was coming, and that they would take a personal role in assuring the best, most experienced people would come to the bureau.
Hale said that he intended to exercise “direct oversight of all personnel appointments at the deputy director level and above” to ensure the bureau was attracting the “greatest expertise,” according to an account of the closed-door meeting reviewed by Foreign Policy.
Sullivan, who has since become U.S. ambassador to Russia, echoed that sentiment, telling the staffers he was committed to making sure the bureau “will attract the very best, as it has many other times in its history.”
Sullivan reminisced about the days under the George W. Bush administration when the bureau was at the center of U.S. policy debates over decisions to pursue war or peace in the Middle East. But the latest hires have doused hopes the bureau can recover its stature.
Doocey is replacing Kathy Wright, who oversees the department’s management portfolio, as deputy assistant secretary of state for management issues. In his new post, Doocey will be responsible for handling the department’s budget, senior appointments of American nationals to international jobs, and U.N. elections. He is also expected to play a role in ramping up the department’s capacity to contain China’s ability to secure top jobs at the U.N. The State Department has also recently appointed a special envoy—Mark Lambert, a career diplomat—to counter Chinese influence in international organizations.
Doocey was serving in the White House Office of Presidential Personnel in the summer of 2018 when the office issued a questionnaire to American nationals seeking U.S. support when applying for job postings at the U.N. The questionnaire appeared crafted to detect a candidate’s political leanings.
The form inquires whether the candidate has ever spoken publicly about political issues, addressed Congress, supported a political candidate, or appeared on major cable news networks like Fox and CNN. It also requests disclosure of social media accounts.
“Have you ever maintained a blog? Written an opinion piece that appeared in a traditional newspaper like the Wall Street Journal or New York Times? Written for an online publication like Breitbart, Newsmax, or Mother Jones?” asks the questionnaire, a copy of which was obtained by Foreign Policy. “Have you given speeches on a controversial issue?”
But Doocey himself has faced questions of loyalty from the White House.
Trump sent a memo to Doocey last year accusing him and another official of obstructionism amid a push to root out officials from the government deemed insufficiently loyal, according to a report from Axios last month. The memo reportedly listed State Department officials who should be fired, including Undersecretary for Management Bill Todd, Sullivan, and Hale, whose positions require presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. Hale testified in the impeachment hearing, and Sullivan is now ambassador to Russia.
Axios reported that the memo apparently falsely accused Doocey of “sneakily” swapping Mira Ricardel’s name for Sean Cairncross as Trump’s nominee to lead the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a small U.S. foreign investment assistance agency. Cairncross leads the agency now, and Ricardel was ousted as deputy national security advisor in November 2018, after disagreements with the first lady’s office. One senior official who spoke to Foreign Policy dismissed the charge against Doocey as wholly unfounded.
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment for this story.
Doocey’s fellow newcomer to the bureau, Pryor, in her time at State explored the role that women might play in fighting Islamic extremism in the Middle East at U.N. meetings. She also served as the most senior member of the U.S. delegation at certain key U.N. meetings, leading U.S. efforts to strike any language from international agreements that dealt with sexual and reproductive health and rights, viewing it as a stealth effort to promote abortion around the world.
“She’s got this religious, conservative evangelical bent that manifested itself in her anti-terrorism advocacy,” said one former U.S. colleague. But the initiative, this person said, “never seemed to go anywhere.”
One foreign diplomat said that Pryor has “always been quite pleasant” to work with but that she has not demonstrated “a lot of grasp of the details.”
“At least she is nice,” the diplomat said. “You can kind of work with her.”
But the diplomat said her No. 1 priority, like that of the administration at large, is to roll back commitments to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights in international agreements. In advance of negotiations on a declaration to be adopted on the 25th anniversary of the Beijing summit on women’s rights, the United States has repeatedly strived to block proposals by European countries to include a phrase underscoring the importance of such rights.
Senior administration officials say the language tacitly promotes abortion. But outside women’s advocacy organizations dispute this view and say the international community can’t address issues of sexual violence or women’s health without prioritizing sexual and reproductive health issues.
The disagreements have led to heated disputes between the United States and its European allies, which back resolutions on sexual and reproductive health at the United Nations.
“I am sure you are all familiar with the constant drumbeat in the halls of the United Nations and the WHO [World Health Organization] to normalize the terms ‘sexual and reproductive health’ and ‘reproductive rights,’” Alex Azar, the U.S. secretary of health and human services, told a gathering of foreign health leaders in Washington in January. “What reproductive rights are they talking about? In this context, it is increasingly becoming clear that some U.N. agencies and countries want this to mean unfettered access to abortion.”
In recent weeks, the Trump administration brought together a coalition of conservative governments—including those of Brazil, Hungary, and Poland—in New York to highlight the importance of promoting family values in U.N. agreements. During the session, Hungary’s and Poland’s representatives sought to strike a more conciliatory tone with its more liberal counterparts, highlighting the importance of promoting paid family leave policies and better work life balance.
But the U.S. delegate, Valerie Huber, the global women’s health envoy from the Department of Health and Human Services, showed little interest in subtlety, according to one diplomat in attendance. The diplomat recalled that Huber called the United States a “pro-life country” and said Trump was the “best president ever to promote a family.”
The diplomat said her speech was met with a cool reception: “It was tone deaf. I thought we were supposed to be having a conversation.”


foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal Under Fire

U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal Under Fire

KABUL—The fragile peace deal between the United States and the Taliban appeared to hang in the balance Wednesday as the U.S. Defense Department announced its first airstrike against Taliban forces in 11 days and bitter disagreements between the radical Islamist movement and the Afghan government , as well as internal divisions in Kabul , threatened to nullify the pact .
People throughout the nation were holding their breath , caught in a limbo between fear and hope , as new violence erupted in a country long torn by civil war .
Both U.S. and Afghan officials suggested that the Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ telephone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Taliban political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on Tuesday , after which Trump said the two had agreed there would be “ no violence.
” In a series of tweets , Col. Sonny Leggett , the spokesman for U.S. forces in Afghanistan , said the Taliban had conducted 43 attacks against Afghan national forces on Tuesday alone .
In response , he said .
“ The US conducted an airstrike on March 4 against Taliban fighters in Nahr-e Saraj , Helmand , who were actively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Defense and Security Forces ] checkpoint .
This was a defensive strike to disrupt the attack .
This was our 1st strike against the Taliban in 11 days.
” Meanwhile Afghan President Ashraf Ghani , his own future in dispute not only because of the Taliban , who want an interim government established , but because of a challenge from his election rival , Abdullah Abdullah , has cast doubt on the deal .
The pact , which was signed by Baradar and U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad on Feb. 29 , stated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with all relevant sides on a plan to expeditiously release ” Taliban prisoners , with the release date determined ahead of March 10 , the planned beginning of direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government .
But Ghani said there was “ no commitment ” to freeing the prisoners .
Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said in a tweet on Monday that the deal will not go ahead unless the prisoners were released .
An estimated 10,000 captured Taliban members are being held in Afghanistan , and around 5,000 Taliban prisoners were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political prisoners from the government ’ s side .
Trump said that 5,000 U.S. troops would leave Afghanistan by May and he was ready to meet Taliban leaders in the near future .
But as a result of the impasse , some observers believe the scheduled date for “ intra-Afghan dialogue , ” as the agreement terms it , will be pushed back .
“ The prisoner exchange issue could delay intra-Afghan talks , ” Shaharzad Akbar , the chairperson of Afghanistan ’ s Independent Human Rights Commission , told Foreign Policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t a full understanding on this issue between the U.S. and Afghan governments prior to finalizing the U.S.-Taliban deal .
This illustrates the difficulty and messiness of this process and the remaining ambiguity regarding the real and expected role of different actors at each stage.
” The Taliban—who don ’ t recognize the Afghan government ’ s legitimacy—have since declared they will again take up weapons against Kabul ( while refraining from attacking U.S. forces and targets ) after a weeklong reduction of violence that had been expected to continue , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ turn it into a cease-fire.
” On Tuesday , while visiting Afghanistan ’ s eastern Nangarhar province , Ghani once again addressed the Taliban , saying that killing other Afghans is a crime .
“ You have made peace with the foreigners , so what does your jihad mean now ?
” he asked .
But Taliban officials say their “ jihad ” will continue .
The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces said they were ready to “ respond forcefully ” to possible Taliban attacks .
Scores of people have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with the Afghan National Army reporting at least 16 soldiers killed in the northern province of Kunduz .
Austin Scott Miller , the senior U.S. general in Afghanistan , said in a statement Monday that the reduction in violence ahead of the deal signing was intended as a confidence-builder .
“ We ’ re very serious about our obligations and we expect the Taliban will be serious about their obligations .
The United States has been very clear … the violence must remain low , ” Miller said .
Afghans throughout the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of hope and fear .
“ The U.S. troops leaving worries me , ” said Zarifa Ghafari , the mayor of Maidan Shahr , the capital of Wardak , a province with large parts occupied by the Taliban .
She said she didn ’ t feel optimistic about the group ’ s possible integration into the government .
“ The Taliban are still a group of terrorists .
Giving them a chance to come back , on top of American soldiers leaving within 14 months is not good news .
I hope the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well as social , economical , and political progress in Afghanistan .
As a woman , I am looking at a dark future with the Taliban in power.
” Ghafari ’ s concern is echoed by many Afghan women .
While the atmosphere in Kabul had been relaxed and hopeful during the week of reduced violence , the situation has tensed up , with many people swaying between hope and worry , frustrated that violence has resumed across the country .
“ The resumption of violence by the Taliban is concerning and not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but it is also not surprising , ” said Andrew Watkins , an analyst at the International Crisis Group .
“ As an insurgent movement , the group draws most of its political leverage from the threat and use of violence.
” Afghanistan ’ s war has been deadly .
In the last year alone , over 10,000 civilian casualties were recorded by the United Nations , including at least 3,403 civilians killed .
Since the start of the U.S.-led invasion in 2001 , more than 3,500 U.S. and coalition troops have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been seen as a beginning to the end of America ’ s longest war in history , and both the Taliban and the United States say they remain committed to it .
Afghanistan ’ s government , that hasn ’ t yet been part of the negotiations has described the deal as “ an important step in the peace process.
” Although the disputes over the prisoner exchange and the government ’ s divisions could potentially delay the start of intra-Afghan negotiations , the International Crisis Group ’ s Watkins said he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hold .
“ It doesn ’ t seem as if it ’ s already breaking down , ” he said .
“ Even historically successful peace processes have been full of misunderstandings .
”

KABUL—The fragile peace deal between the United States and the Taliban appeared to hang in the balance Wednesday as the U.S. Defense Department announced its first airstrike against Taliban forces in 11 days and bitter disagreements between the radical Islamist movement and the Afghan government, as well as internal divisions in Kabul, threatened to nullify the pact.
KABUL—The fragile peace deal between the United States and the Taliban appeared to hang in the balance Wednesday as the U.S. Defense Department announced its first airstrike against Taliban forces in 11 days and bitter disagreements between the radical Islamist movement and the Afghan government, as well as internal divisions in Kabul, threatened to nullify the pact.
People throughout the nation were holding their breath, caught in a limbo between fear and hope, as new violence erupted in a country long torn by civil war. Both U.S. and Afghan officials suggested that the Taliban were violating the pact despite an unprecedented telephone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Taliban political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on Tuesday, after which Trump said the two had agreed there would be “no violence.”
In a series of tweets, Col. Sonny Leggett, the spokesman for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said the Taliban had conducted 43 attacks against Afghan national forces on Tuesday alone. In response, he said: “The US conducted an airstrike on March 4 against Taliban fighters in Nahr-e Saraj, Helmand, who were actively attacking an #ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] checkpoint. This was a defensive strike to disrupt the attack. This was our 1st strike against the Taliban in 11 days.”
Meanwhile Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, his own future in dispute not only because of the Taliban, who want an interim government established, but because of a challenge from his election rival, Abdullah Abdullah, has cast doubt on the deal. The pact, which was signed by Baradar and U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad on Feb. 29, stated that the United States would “work with all relevant sides on a plan to expeditiously release” Taliban prisoners, with the release date determined ahead of March 10, the planned beginning of direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. But Ghani said there was “no commitment” to freeing the prisoners.
Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said in a tweet on Monday that the deal will not go ahead unless the prisoners were released. An estimated 10,000 captured Taliban members are being held in Afghanistan, and around 5,000 Taliban prisoners were to be released in exchange for 1,000 political prisoners from the government’s side.
Children play in a West Kabul neighborhood on Nov. 2, 2019.
Trump said that 5,000 U.S. troops would leave Afghanistan by May and he was ready to meet Taliban leaders in the near future.
But as a result of the impasse, some observers believe the scheduled date for “intra-Afghan dialogue,” as the agreement terms it, will be pushed back. “The prisoner exchange issue could delay intra-Afghan talks,” Shaharzad Akbar, the chairperson of Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission, told Foreign Policy.
“It is surprising that there wasn’t a full understanding on this issue between the U.S. and Afghan governments prior to finalizing the U.S.-Taliban deal. This illustrates the difficulty and messiness of this process and the remaining ambiguity regarding the real and expected role of different actors at each stage.”
The Taliban—who don’t recognize the Afghan government’s legitimacy—have since declared they will again take up weapons against Kabul (while refraining from attacking U.S. forces and targets) after a weeklong reduction of violence that had been expected to continue, with Ghani declaring that the objective was to “turn it into a cease-fire.”
On Tuesday, while visiting Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar province, Ghani once again addressed the Taliban, saying that killing other Afghans is a crime. “You have made peace with the foreigners, so what does your jihad mean now?” he asked. But Taliban officials say their “jihad” will continue.
The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces said they were ready to “respond forcefully” to possible Taliban attacks. Scores of people have been killed since the signing of the deal, with the Afghan National Army reporting at least 16 soldiers killed in the northern province of Kunduz.
Austin Scott Miller, the senior U.S. general in Afghanistan, said in a statement Monday that the reduction in violence ahead of the deal signing was intended as a confidence-builder. “We’re very serious about our obligations and we expect the Taliban will be serious about their obligations. The United States has been very clear … the violence must remain low,” Miller said.
Afghans throughout the country are voicing their usual tense mixture of hope and fear. “The U.S. troops leaving worries me,” said Zarifa Ghafari, the mayor of Maidan Shahr, the capital of Wardak, a province with large parts occupied by the Taliban. She said she didn’t feel optimistic about the group’s possible integration into the government.
“The Taliban are still a group of terrorists. Giving them a chance to come back, on top of American soldiers leaving within 14 months is not good news. I hope the international community will protect the future as well as social, economical, and political progress in Afghanistan. As a woman, I am looking at a dark future with the Taliban in power.”
Local milita in Nangarhar's Achin district on Oct. 2, 2019.
Ghafari’s concern is echoed by many Afghan women. While the atmosphere in Kabul had been relaxed and hopeful during the week of reduced violence, the situation has tensed up, with many people swaying between hope and worry, frustrated that violence has resumed across the country.
“The resumption of violence by the Taliban is concerning and not conducive to the atmosphere of upcoming talks, but it is also not surprising,” said Andrew Watkins, an analyst at the International Crisis Group. “As an insurgent movement, the group draws most of its political leverage from the threat and use of violence.”
Afghanistan’s war has been deadly. In the last year alone, over 10,000 civilian casualties were recorded by the United Nations, including at least 3,403 civilians killed. Since the start of the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, more than 3,500 U.S. and coalition troops have been killed.
Saturday’s deal has been seen as a beginning to the end of America’s longest war in history, and both the Taliban and the United States say they remain committed to it. Afghanistan’s government, that hasn’t yet been part of the negotiations has described the deal as “an important step in the peace process.”
Although the disputes over the prisoner exchange and the government’s divisions could potentially delay the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, the International Crisis Group’s Watkins said he was still confident that the deal will hold.
“It doesn’t seem as if it’s already breaking down,” he said. “Even historically successful peace processes have been full of misunderstandings.”