foreignpolicy--2020-02-18--Iran’s Shifting Afghan Alliances Don’t Fit Easy Narratives

The assassination last month of Qassem Suleimani , the leader of the elite Quds Force of Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) , has set off a wave of debates in the United States about Iranian foreign policy .
Tehran ’ s opportunistic and pragmatic foreign policy does not always fit neatly into contemporary left- or right-wing narratives—especially when it comes to Afghanistan , where Suleimani played a critical role .
Left and progressive commentators in the United States position Iran as an “ anti-imperialist ” state resisting American influence in the Middle East , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups demonstrating across the West .
They claim Suleimani was creating regional stability by combating the Islamic State and protecting Shiite communities .
But being opposed to the Islamic State is a low bar—opposition to the militant organization has unified all armed actors in the region from the U.S.-led coalition to the Syrian Democratic Forces , the Kurdish Peshmerga , Bashar al-Assad ’ s Syrian Arab Armed Forces , the Iranian military , and even some hard-line Islamist groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham .
Right-wing pundits , in contrast , continue to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ axis of evil ” imagined by former U.S. President George W. Bush .
This vision of a consistently malign Iran has persisted in the United States since the 1979 revolution , but it bears little resemblance to reality .
Iranian policy is ruthless , but it is also flexible and pragmatic , as its history in Afghanistan shows .
At a press conference held on Jan. 9 by the IRGC Aerospace Force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh stood in front of the familiar flags of the IRGC , the Aerospace Force , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as those of lower-profile Shiite militias including the Houthis , the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq , the Pakistani Liwa Zainebiyoun , and the Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun .
But Iran has ties with a wide range of nonstate actors—including the Taliban .
In the late 1970s the situation in Asia for the Soviet Union was grim .
Infighting after Iran ’ s anti-monarchist revolution left the Khomeinist faction in power and in Pakistan Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq ousted the secular leftist government to form an Islamist military dictatorship .
The Moscow-backed People ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had come to power in a sudden coup and was struggling to maintain control between revolts across the country and internal factionalism .
In December 1979 , the Politburo opted for an invasion to prop up the floundering PDPA government , fearful Afghanistan would become another Islamic republic .
The fractured Afghan Muslim resistance to the atheist PDPA was licking their wounds across the Afghan-Pakistan border until the Soviets invaded and united all sectors of society in the popular armed mujahideen movement with calls to jihad against the foreign occupation .
Iran financed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ central highlands , and the United States worked with Pakistan and Gulf states to bankroll the Sunni mujahideen operating political offices out of Peshawar , Pakistan .
Once the USSR fell , Washington ’ s funding evaporated .
Tehran continued to support Persian-speaking Sunni and Shiite warlords throughout the civil war that followed .
In 1994 , the growing Taliban movement quickly forced Iran ’ s allies into exile , and Tehran worried that the militant Sunni group would spill over its border .
In response , Suleimani led Iran ’ s initiative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban from Tajikistan .
When the Americans arrived in 2001 , they coordinated and fought beside IRGC forces on the ground .
Iran and the United States worked closely together to secure the 2001 Bonn Agreement forming the Hamid Karzai government in Afghanistan , so it came as a shock when George W. Bush demonized Iran in his State of the Union address in 2002—especially since Iran ’ s government forcefully condemned the 9/11 attacks .
Afghan analysts and military figures have frequently alleged Iranian involvement with the Taliban since 2007 .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan , Mohammad Reza Bahrami , revealed that Tehran had lines of communication with the Taliban .
This news came despite Bahrami ’ s previous denial of involvement .
Then Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif confirmed that his country had contacts with the Taliban in early 2019 .
It was only in 2017 that Afghan Army Gen. Mohammad Sharif Yaftali confirmed that the military discovered documents providing evidence of Iranian collaboration .
After the city of Farah was briefly held by the Taliban in 2018 , Afghan analysts and officials asserted that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Taliban commanders such as Mullah Rasool reveal that parts of the Taliban are linked to Tehran .
The Taliban governing structure is spread across several leadership councils , or shuras , including the Mashhad Shura in Iran ’ s western province of Khorasan-e Razavi .
The Mashhad Shura initially opened as a liaison office between the Taliban and IRGC in 2007 .
It became a regional command center for western Afghanistan in 2011 .
The growth of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province ( ISKP ) coincided with the recognition of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban leader Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada .
Overseeing this relationship between the Taliban and the IRGC is the Ansar Corps , a group established by Suleimani and once commanded by his successor , Esmail Qaani .
Reportedly , at least four bases in Iran were created for training Taliban fighters in exchange for increased attacks on U.S.-led NATO forces and ISKP .
As the Taliban have softened their rhetoric toward Shiites in Afghanistan in recent years , ISKP has increased attacks targeting the Shiite minority .
Iran views itself as a defender of Shiite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the space for Tehran to forge closer ties with the previously highly sectarian Taliban .
Iran views the Islamic State as a threat to its existence and is willing to deal with the Taliban to fight it—a bargain overseen by Suleimani before he died .
Taliban relations with Iran and Russia also improved under previous Taliban leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour before his death .
This was in part because Mansour wanted to counter Pakistani influence .
From his interviews with senior Taliban cadres , the Taliban expert Antonio Giustozzi says that part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power is linked to his support from Iran and Russia .
Iran showed its willingness to make use of these ties to effect intra-Afghan dialogues when Tehran hosted the Taliban to discuss the peace process in November 2019 .
There is one other aspect of Iran ’ s involvement in Afghanistan that has often been overlooked .
Iran began recruiting Shiite Afghan refugees by appealing to their religious obligations to jihad against the Islamic State to create the Fatemiyoun Brigade to fight for Assad in Syria .
When families refused to send their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to bribes , coercion , and threats to conscript refugees , including minors .
While they did fight the Islamic State , the Fatemiyoun was also sent as the front line in the battle for Aleppo that crushed the city ’ s collection of rebel groups .
Suleimani ’ s recruitment of Afghan children into the Fatemiyoun Brigade as literal cannon fodder for Iran ’ s regional ambitions led many in Afghanistan to dub him as a “ murderer of their children.
” That cruelty , too , is part of Iran ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s shifting alliances are more driven by pragmatism than any sense of global mission or permanent antagonism—as Suleimani ’ s career demonstrated .
In Afghanistan , Tehran has walked the sectarian line and crossed the sectarian divide , worked with and against the United States , played both a covert role in defeating the Soviet Union and exacerbated internal conflicts—all to ensure the permanence of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a political project .
Though it would be absurd to describe Iran as a stabilizing force in the region considering its role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in the specific case of Afghanistan , Iran is eager for a regional partner , and the Taliban are eager for legitimacy .
Their relationship will play a crucial role in building a precarious foundation for lasting security as the United States exits the region .

The assassination last month of Qassem Suleimani, the leader of the elite Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has set off a wave of debates in the United States about Iranian foreign policy. Tehran’s opportunistic and pragmatic foreign policy does not always fit neatly into contemporary left- or right-wing narratives—especially when it comes to Afghanistan, where Suleimani played a critical role.
The assassination last month of Qassem Suleimani, the leader of the elite Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has set off a wave of debates in the United States about Iranian foreign policy. Tehran’s opportunistic and pragmatic foreign policy does not always fit neatly into contemporary left- or right-wing narratives—especially when it comes to Afghanistan, where Suleimani played a critical role.
Left and progressive commentators in the United States position Iran as an “anti-imperialist” state resisting American influence in the Middle East, as has been echoed by various supposed anti-war groups demonstrating across the West. They claim Suleimani was creating regional stability by combating the Islamic State and protecting Shiite communities. But being opposed to the Islamic State is a low bar—opposition to the militant organization has unified all armed actors in the region from the U.S.-led coalition to the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga, Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian Arab Armed Forces, the Iranian military, and even some hard-line Islamist groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Right-wing pundits, in contrast, continue to claim that Iran is a part of the “axis of evil” imagined by former U.S. President George W. Bush. This vision of a consistently malign Iran has persisted in the United States since the 1979 revolution, but it bears little resemblance to reality. Iranian policy is ruthless, but it is also flexible and pragmatic, as its history in Afghanistan shows.
At a press conference held on Jan. 9 by the IRGC Aerospace Force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh stood in front of the familiar flags of the IRGC, the Aerospace Force, Hezbollah, and Hamas, as well as those of lower-profile Shiite militias including the Houthis, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, the Pakistani Liwa Zainebiyoun, and the Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun. But Iran has ties with a wide range of nonstate actors—including the Taliban.
In the late 1970s the situation in Asia for the Soviet Union was grim. Infighting after Iran’s anti-monarchist revolution left the Khomeinist faction in power and in Pakistan Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq ousted the secular leftist government to form an Islamist military dictatorship. The Moscow-backed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had come to power in a sudden coup and was struggling to maintain control between revolts across the country and internal factionalism. In December 1979, the Politburo opted for an invasion to prop up the floundering PDPA government, fearful Afghanistan would become another Islamic republic.
The fractured Afghan Muslim resistance to the atheist PDPA was licking their wounds across the Afghan-Pakistan border until the Soviets invaded and united all sectors of society in the popular armed mujahideen movement with calls to jihad against the foreign occupation. Iran financed the Shiite mujahideen in Afghanistan’s central highlands, and the United States worked with Pakistan and Gulf states to bankroll the Sunni mujahideen operating political offices out of Peshawar, Pakistan.
Once the USSR fell, Washington’s funding evaporated. Tehran continued to support Persian-speaking Sunni and Shiite warlords throughout the civil war that followed. In 1994, the growing Taliban movement quickly forced Iran’s allies into exile, and Tehran worried that the militant Sunni group would spill over its border. In response, Suleimani led Iran’s initiative to support the Afghan warlords fighting the Taliban from Tajikistan.
When the Americans arrived in 2001, they coordinated and fought beside IRGC forces on the ground. Iran and the United States worked closely together to secure the 2001 Bonn Agreement forming the Hamid Karzai government in Afghanistan, so it came as a shock when George W. Bush demonized Iran in his State of the Union address in 2002—especially since Iran’s government forcefully condemned the 9/11 attacks.
Afghan analysts and military figures have frequently alleged Iranian involvement with the Taliban since 2007. In 2016, Iran’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Mohammad Reza Bahrami, revealed that Tehran had lines of communication with the Taliban. This news came despite Bahrami’s previous denial of involvement. Then Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif confirmed that his country had contacts with the Taliban in early 2019.
It was only in 2017 that Afghan Army Gen. Mohammad Sharif Yaftali confirmed that the military discovered documents providing evidence of Iranian collaboration. After the city of Farah was briefly held by the Taliban in 2018, Afghan analysts and officials asserted that Iran was behind the offensive. Interviews with Taliban commanders such as Mullah Rasool reveal that parts of the Taliban are linked to Tehran.
The Taliban governing structure is spread across several leadership councils, or shuras, including the Mashhad Shura in Iran’s western province of Khorasan-e Razavi. The Mashhad Shura initially opened as a liaison office between the Taliban and IRGC in 2007. It became a regional command center for western Afghanistan in 2011. The growth of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) coincided with the recognition of the Mashhad office as a full-fledged shura by Taliban leader Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada. Overseeing this relationship between the Taliban and the IRGC is the Ansar Corps, a group established by Suleimani and once commanded by his successor, Esmail Qaani. Reportedly, at least four bases in Iran were created for training Taliban fighters in exchange for increased attacks on U.S.-led NATO forces and ISKP.
As the Taliban have softened their rhetoric toward Shiites in Afghanistan in recent years, ISKP has increased attacks targeting the Shiite minority. Iran views itself as a defender of Shiite Muslims internationally, and this shift provided the space for Tehran to forge closer ties with the previously highly sectarian Taliban.
Iran views the Islamic State as a threat to its existence and is willing to deal with the Taliban to fight it—a bargain overseen by Suleimani before he died. Taliban relations with Iran and Russia also improved under previous Taliban leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour before his death. This was in part because Mansour wanted to counter Pakistani influence.
From his interviews with senior Taliban cadres, the Taliban expert Antonio Giustozzi says that part of Taliban leader Mawlawi Hibatullah’s personal power is linked to his support from Iran and Russia. Iran showed its willingness to make use of these ties to effect intra-Afghan dialogues when Tehran hosted the Taliban to discuss the peace process in November 2019.
There is one other aspect of Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan that has often been overlooked. Iran began recruiting Shiite Afghan refugees by appealing to their religious obligations to jihad against the Islamic State to create the Fatemiyoun Brigade to fight for Assad in Syria. When families refused to send their young men to war, recruiters resorted to bribes, coercion, and threats to conscript refugees, including minors. While they did fight the Islamic State, the Fatemiyoun was also sent as the front line in the battle for Aleppo that crushed the city’s collection of rebel groups.
Suleimani’s recruitment of Afghan children into the Fatemiyoun Brigade as literal cannon fodder for Iran’s regional ambitions led many in Afghanistan to dub him as a “murderer of their children.” That cruelty, too, is part of Iran’s legacy in Afghanistan.
Iran’s shifting alliances are more driven by pragmatism than any sense of global mission or permanent antagonism—as Suleimani’s career demonstrated. In Afghanistan, Tehran has walked the sectarian line and crossed the sectarian divide, worked with and against the United States, played both a covert role in defeating the Soviet Union and exacerbated internal conflicts—all to ensure the permanence of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a political project.
Though it would be absurd to describe Iran as a stabilizing force in the region considering its role in ongoing genocides in Syria and Yemen, in the specific case of Afghanistan, Iran is eager for a regional partner, and the Taliban are eager for legitimacy. Their relationship will play a crucial role in building a precarious foundation for lasting security as the United States exits the region.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-18--Lebanon Is Broken. So Are Its Protests.

Lebanon Is Broken. So Are Its Protests.

Lebanon Is Broken .
So Are Its Protests .
The mannequins at the Chanel showroom in downtown Beirut are hidden behind steel doors due to fears that protesters could unleash their anger on such potent symbols of inequality .
The historic Omari Grand Mosque is barricaded with layers of concertina wire to hold off the crowds of protesters outside .
Similarly , the parliament building is blocked with a thick concrete wall to protect it from the anger of the public .
These are the relics of several months of protests against Lebanon ’ s political system and its ruling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ epicenter of the now 4-month-old protests .
Thousands of people who gathered there called for the removal of the elite political class , an early election , and an end to the sectarian power-sharing system that has institutionalized clientelism and corruption in the country .
Now , the gatherings are smaller , and the chants of “ thawra ” —the Arabic word for revolution—are much softer .
Arrests do continue , but some protesters believe that the real reason behind their dwindling numbers is fatigue combined with a growing sense of hopelessness about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is no doubt that the protest movement succeeded in articulating a widespread sense of frustration with a system that has routinely failed to deliver jobs , affordable health care , and education .
But the protesters have so far been unable to articulate a coherent long-term strategy for change—and that ’ s because it never bothered to develop one .
In January , almost three months after Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned , a new government fit with presumably more responsive technocrats took power , but this has put protesters in an awkward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and some feel they should hold back and give it a chance .
But most protesters agree that the new government is little more than a shadow body representing the entrenched interests of Hezbollah and its allies , both of which took a stand against the protesters.The protesters have so far been unable to articulate a coherent long-term strategy for change—and that ’ s because it never bothered to develop one .
When the protesters first took to the streets , Hezbollah issued statements expressing sympathy with their demands .
This was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fighting to defend the rights of working-class Lebanese ( who predominantly come from Lebanon ’ s Shiite community ) .
But it could only go so far .
Over the course of its existence , Hezbollah has become an entrenched actor in Lebanese society , and its interests are now , somewhat ironically , intertwined with those of the establishment .
It made the pragmatic decision to stand with the protesters at the outset , but supporting the sweeping changes they demanded threatened its own standing .
When negotiations to name Hariri ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hassan Nasrallah made it clear that he did not want the protesters to be involved .
Now , in addition to clashes between the police and the protesters , there is also regular street fighting between protesters and Hezbollah motorbike gangs .
Ali , a Shiite from the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiye who declined to give his last name , was threatened by the group ’ s supporters because he was active in the protests .
He joined the demonstrations on the first day , helping to block roads , paint graffiti , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been looking forward to it because we can ’ t have change without a revolution , ” he said .
But he is increasingly worried about the protests losing steam .
“ They made a new government .
It ’ s like 20 random people agreed to give 20 random people some jobs .
It gives me the feeling that we have been through so much for nothing.
” So far , the protests have been impromptu and lacking any meaningful political patronage—little more than a leaderless outburst of public anger .
Although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movement a certain degree of credibility , it has not been conducive to advancing a defined plan and vision .
As the new status quo begins to settle , the protesters will need to develop an organized political strategy to unseat the ruling elite at the ballot box .
One of the main obstacles they face is finding a way to overcome voters ’ default sectarian impulses .
Otherwise , the movement could split along sectarian lines , putting it at risk of being outmaneuvered by a ruling elite that is far more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Lebanese elite is used to facing off against mass movements .
During the early days of the civil war in the 1970s , an alliance of leftist parties demanded an end to the sectarian power-sharing system of government .
The same demand was made during mass protests in 2005 and then again in 2015 .
Although political leaders do have the power to dissolve the confessional system at will , their collective interests are inextricably tied to the status quo , and they have resisted each successive demand for change .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enemy but also an armed one .
The supporters of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement , one of its main allies , attacked the protesters several times during the last few months .
There has been a palpable fear of Hezbollah taking over the streets , as it did in 2008 when its hold over communications and Lebanon ’ s airport was challenged .
The threat posed by Hezbollah exacerbates one of the protest movement ’ s main organizational problems : its lack of a leadership structure .
Khalil Helou , a retired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most prominent voices of the protest movement , said the reason the protesters have not identified leaders is because of the fear that they may be assassinated .
“ The forces we are dealing with are dangerous , and by the ‘ forces , ’ I mean Hezbollah , ” he said .
“ They have killed opposition voices in 2005 .
Nothing is stopping them now.
” But that problem goes deeper than Hezbollah , and the movement is disadvantaged by its own fragmented base of support .
Helou admitted that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ umbrella “ because [ the protesters ] come from different backgrounds , different social milieus , ” he said .
“ They don ’ t have political maturity.
” The protesters may share the same broad objectives , but their specific demands are oftentimes irreconcilable .
Some are demanding cuts to the bloated public sector , but others reject all forms of austerity .
The final form the new political system would take is also in dispute .
One section advocates for a basic nonsectarian representative democracy , but others suggest a more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ form of hierarchy and instituting a direct democracy under which people vote on all policy measures via referendum .
Lina Hamdan , a member of the coordination committee of the protests , pointed to another paradox .
“ We are asking the same ruling elite whom we want to get rid of to change the system , ” she said .
Many protesters say the political elite would never willingly give up power , and a few of them advocate taking extreme measures to overthrow the government .
Most of the others worry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ popularity they have attained .
These are the contradictions protesters must resolve before they can realistically hope to force change .
It begins with the leadership .
Although the leaderless nature of the movement helped strengthen its initial appeal , if it continues to operate without the direction of a single person ( or group of people ) , it risks losing its momentum because a successful political movement eventually requires a recognizable leader to give direction , enforce a policy agenda , and take decisive action .
The movement also needs to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order to help resolve ideological discrepancies among its members ’ widely disparate viewpoints and to focus the movement ’ s efforts on a set of identifiable goals .
More than that , the movement needs to agree on a long-term strategy .
It must decide if it will continue to campaign in the streets , seek change through elections , or take more radical action .
All of these changes will necessarily lead some protesters to feel disenchanted and leave the movement , so the hypothetical leadership will have to pursue a course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ losses and withstand them .
Until now , the movement has been tremendously successful at drawing national and international attention to the deep problems of Lebanon ’ s governing system .
But the protesters want to do more than draw attention to what ’ s broken in their political system—they want to make sure it gets fixed .
They should start by fixing what ’ s broken in their own protests .

The mannequins at the Chanel showroom in downtown Beirut are hidden behind steel doors due to fears that protesters could unleash their anger on such potent symbols of inequality. The historic Omari Grand Mosque is barricaded with layers of concertina wire to hold off the crowds of protesters outside. Similarly, the parliament building is blocked with a thick concrete wall to protect it from the anger of the public. These are the relics of several months of protests against Lebanon’s political system and its ruling elite.
The mannequins at the Chanel showroom in downtown Beirut are hidden behind steel doors due to fears that protesters could unleash their anger on such potent symbols of inequality. The historic Omari Grand Mosque is barricaded with layers of concertina wire to hold off the crowds of protesters outside. Similarly, the parliament building is blocked with a thick concrete wall to protect it from the anger of the public. These are the relics of several months of protests against Lebanon’s political system and its ruling elite.
Martyrs’ Square is the epicenter of the now 4-month-old protests. Thousands of people who gathered there called for the removal of the elite political class, an early election, and an end to the sectarian power-sharing system that has institutionalized clientelism and corruption in the country. Now, the gatherings are smaller, and the chants of “thawra”—the Arabic word for revolution—are much softer. Arrests do continue, but some protesters believe that the real reason behind their dwindling numbers is fatigue combined with a growing sense of hopelessness about the movement’s future.
There is no doubt that the protest movement succeeded in articulating a widespread sense of frustration with a system that has routinely failed to deliver jobs, affordable health care, and education. But the protesters have so far been unable to articulate a coherent long-term strategy for change—and that’s because it never bothered to develop one.
In January, almost three months after Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned, a new government fit with presumably more responsive technocrats took power, but this has put protesters in an awkward position. They got their new government, and some feel they should hold back and give it a chance. But most protesters agree that the new government is little more than a shadow body representing the entrenched interests of Hezbollah and its allies, both of which took a stand against the protesters.The protesters have so far been unable to articulate a coherent long-term strategy for change—and that’s because it never bothered to develop one.
When the protesters first took to the streets, Hezbollah issued statements expressing sympathy with their demands. This was in line with its traditional claim of fighting to defend the rights of working-class Lebanese (who predominantly come from Lebanon’s Shiite community). But it could only go so far. Over the course of its existence, Hezbollah has become an entrenched actor in Lebanese society, and its interests are now, somewhat ironically, intertwined with those of the establishment. It made the pragmatic decision to stand with the protesters at the outset, but supporting the sweeping changes they demanded threatened its own standing. When negotiations to name Hariri’s replacement got underway, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah made it clear that he did not want the protesters to be involved. Now, in addition to clashes between the police and the protesters, there is also regular street fighting between protesters and Hezbollah motorbike gangs.
Ali, a Shiite from the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiye who declined to give his last name, was threatened by the group’s supporters because he was active in the protests. He joined the demonstrations on the first day, helping to block roads, paint graffiti, and chant slogans. “I had been looking forward to it because we can’t have change without a revolution,” he said. But he is increasingly worried about the protests losing steam. “They made a new government. It’s like 20 random people agreed to give 20 random people some jobs. It gives me the feeling that we have been through so much for nothing.”
So far, the protests have been impromptu and lacking any meaningful political patronage—little more than a leaderless outburst of public anger. Although this style of politics initially gave the movement a certain degree of credibility, it has not been conducive to advancing a defined plan and vision.
As the new status quo begins to settle, the protesters will need to develop an organized political strategy to unseat the ruling elite at the ballot box. One of the main obstacles they face is finding a way to overcome voters’ default sectarian impulses. Otherwise, the movement could split along sectarian lines, putting it at risk of being outmaneuvered by a ruling elite that is far more politically experienced than the protesters are.
The Lebanese elite is used to facing off against mass movements. During the early days of the civil war in the 1970s, an alliance of leftist parties demanded an end to the sectarian power-sharing system of government. The same demand was made during mass protests in 2005 and then again in 2015. Although political leaders do have the power to dissolve the confessional system at will, their collective interests are inextricably tied to the status quo, and they have resisted each successive demand for change.
The protesters face not just a politically astute enemy but also an armed one. The supporters of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, one of its main allies, attacked the protesters several times during the last few months. There has been a palpable fear of Hezbollah taking over the streets, as it did in 2008 when its hold over communications and Lebanon’s airport was challenged.
The threat posed by Hezbollah exacerbates one of the protest movement’s main organizational problems: its lack of a leadership structure. Khalil Helou, a retired Lebanese Army general and one of the prominent voices of the protest movement, said the reason the protesters have not identified leaders is because of the fear that they may be assassinated. “The forces we are dealing with are dangerous, and by the ‘forces,’ I mean Hezbollah,” he said. “They have killed opposition voices in 2005. Nothing is stopping them now.”
But that problem goes deeper than Hezbollah, and the movement is disadvantaged by its own fragmented base of support. Helou admitted that the movement has not coalesced under a single umbrella “because [the protesters] come from different backgrounds, different social milieus,” he said. “They don’t have political maturity.”
The protesters may share the same broad objectives, but their specific demands are oftentimes irreconcilable. Some are demanding cuts to the bloated public sector, but others reject all forms of austerity. The final form the new political system would take is also in dispute. One section advocates for a basic nonsectarian representative democracy, but others suggest a more radical solution, doing away with any form of hierarchy and instituting a direct democracy under which people vote on all policy measures via referendum.
Lina Hamdan, a member of the coordination committee of the protests, pointed to another paradox. “We are asking the same ruling elite whom we want to get rid of to change the system,” she said. Many protesters say the political elite would never willingly give up power, and a few of them advocate taking extreme measures to overthrow the government. Most of the others worry that pursuing that route risks the widespread popularity they have attained.
These are the contradictions protesters must resolve before they can realistically hope to force change. It begins with the leadership. Although the leaderless nature of the movement helped strengthen its initial appeal, if it continues to operate without the direction of a single person (or group of people), it risks losing its momentum because a successful political movement eventually requires a recognizable leader to give direction, enforce a policy agenda, and take decisive action. The movement also needs to articulate an agreed set of objectives in order to help resolve ideological discrepancies among its members’ widely disparate viewpoints and to focus the movement’s efforts on a set of identifiable goals. More than that, the movement needs to agree on a long-term strategy. It must decide if it will continue to campaign in the streets, seek change through elections, or take more radical action. All of these changes will necessarily lead some protesters to feel disenchanted and leave the movement, so the hypothetical leadership will have to pursue a course of action that can both minimize those losses and withstand them.
Until now, the movement has been tremendously successful at drawing national and international attention to the deep problems of Lebanon’s governing system. But the protesters want to do more than draw attention to what’s broken in their political system—they want to make sure it gets fixed. They should start by fixing what’s broken in their own protests.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-18--Make Armenia Green Again

Make Armenia Green Again

In southern Armenia , not far from the Turkish and Iranian borders , the village of Paruyr Sevak straddles a strip of arid , treeless no man ’ s land between Armenia and Azerbaijan .
The border village was settled in 1978 as just a smattering of Soviet-built houses named after Armenia ’ s esteemed 20th-century poet , killed in a car crash farther up the road .
Before the village was founded , Azeri shepherds had wandered there freely with their flocks , but the outpost helped define and delimit the land .
In 1988 , a six-year war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the self-declared autonomous region that is historically Armenian but under Azerbaijani control .
The same period saw the fall of the Soviet Union and the redrawing of regional maps .
Protracted territorial disputes eventually slowed into a daily drum of Azeri sniper fire , and the village needed more than aging buildings to signal its status as Armenian .
“ For the land to be yours , it ’ s not enough just to have a signpost .
You have to cultivate the land .
You have to plant trees , ” Edik @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sunny afternoon this past October .
He ’ s the village mayor and moved there 40 years ago from the city of Ararat , named for the white-capped mountain considered sacred to Armenians , which now sits on Turkish soil .
Planting trees is just what the area is doing .
Running through the desert plains , on one side of a dusty two-lane thoroughfare , a towering dirt bulwark protects villagers from Azeri gunfire .
( “ If we didn ’ t hear the shootings , then we ’ d be worried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to it , ” joked the 60-year-old resident Mesrop Karamyan . )
On the other side , poking through the red , parched soil , still five or six years away from providing any shade , sit close to 5,000 green saplings—the makings of a community forest .
A white sedan sputters by with a treeling strapped to its roof .
Nearby Khosrov Forest , a protected nature reserve , is home to bears , wolves , ibex , and a handful of endangered Caucasian snow leopards , but sunbaked Paruyr Sevak , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virtually no tree cover .
The mayor hopes the new park will soften the harsh climate , with the bonus of doubling down on the village ’ s claim on the vulnerable stretch of borderland .
“ We always have to be alert .
That ’ s the only choice we have , ” Stepanyan said .
“ We either keep these borders or we lose everything.
” Besides , he added brightly , “ it will be a heavenly place.
” Stepanyan is one of many Armenians looking to transform the landscape @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a peaceful revolution that swept out years of corrupt oligarchy , Armenia ’ s new reformist government , led by the former journalist Nikol Pashinyan , has pledged to double the country ’ s tree cover by 2050 as part of Armenia ’ s commitment to the Paris climate agreement goals .
There is a lot to unpack in the plan to “ Make Armenia Green Again , ” as tongue-in-cheek comedy duo Narek Margaryan and Sergey Sargsyan have coined it .
More than an environmental strategy against climate change , illegal logging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Armenia tree planting is suffused with cultural survival .
Since 1994 , the Armenia Tree Project ( ATP ) , a Massachusetts-headquartered nonprofit staffed by Armenians and Armenian Americans , has led the country ’ s reforestation efforts .
ATP nurseries , greenhouses , community forests , and planting sites dot virtually every corner of Armenia , from the lush , leafy Georgian border down to disputed Nagorno-Karabakh .
Their forests often memorialize ; they ’ re named for genocide survivors or are dedicated to patriotic themes .
In 2001 , ATP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the roads around the 13th-century Noravank monastery to honor Armenia ’ s 1,700-year anniversary as the world ’ s first Christian nation .
Scaling up that model , in October at the country ’ s inaugural forest summit—Forest Summit : Global Action and Armenia , convened by ATP and the American University of Armenia—Pashinyan announced that doubling the tree cover would begin with 10 million trees planted by Oct. 10 , 2020—representing the global population of Armenians .
To put that number into perspective , after 25 years on the ground , ATP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ late last year .
Reforestation , a popular talking point in climate change adaptation efforts , is tricky that way .
It does have the potential to reduce air pollution , increase rainfall , and absorb harmful carbon emissions .
It is equally valuable in terms of symbolism ( even the reelection campaign of U.S. President Donald Trump has spoken of planting a trillion trees ) , whether it is for shoring up borders , committing to cleaner air , or self-aggrandizement .
But the danger in symbolism is that it can favor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ messy complexities , much like the identical rows of trees often planted to replace eroded forest cover .
These eerie , ersatz forests are about as natural-seeming as a strip of McMansions , and they are less adept at carbon absorption and more vulnerable to wildfires .
“ How can you compare these plantations to real forests , which we have and which we are losing now ?
” Karen Manvelyan , the director of the World Wildlife Fund ( WWF ) Armenia , told me this fall in Yerevan .
“ It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , forests , streams , and natural sites were considered state property , and in those days , timber was trucked in from Russia .
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a devastating energy crisis , with Armenians ransacking forests for fast firewood .
ATP founder Carolyn Mugar , living in Yerevan , watched branches stripped and trees felled—the degradation of those years became crucial to the nonprofit ’ s origin story .
“ We would cut , in secret , from places we weren ’ t supposed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 53-year-old Angela Minasyan , who now works as a laborer at an ATP nursery .
“ We always felt sorry for cutting anything , ” she added .
“ That ’ s why we ’ re planting trees now.
” Armenia ’ s current tree cover hovers at around 11 percent—almost half what it was during the 17th and 18th centuries .
Along with Armenia ’ s wood fuel crisis after the fall of the Soviet Union , industrial logging and open mining pits have also contributed to heavy tree losses—a trend that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the world .
Indeed , global deforestation rates continue at a frightening clip .
The world has lost 129 million hectares of forest since 1990—roughly the size of South Africa .
But the yield on new trees is not easy to calculate .
Near the village of Margahovit in northern Armenia , not far from the sprawling , thickly forested Dilijan National Park , Marik Nursery sits tucked into the low , mist-threaded hills .
Equipped with germination tables , its greenhouses can grow up to a million seedlings , including ash @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a point of only planting native tree species—which are placed outside to adapt to frigid winters .
Still , almost half of the seedlings will die once planted .
“ If we have 60 percent , it ’ s good , ” ATP forestry manager Navasard Dadyan told me this fall .
“ To plant [ a ] tree is the easier thing .
You can plant and go .
The harder thing is to take care of them .
I won ’ t say anything about 10 million trees , ” he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ATP issued a press release with cautious praise of Pashinyan ’ s bold announcement—and much concern .
It cautioned against planting nonnative or invasive species , which might add further strain to local ecology , and recommended mixed-species forests in place of the monoculture pines usually favored .
But the Pashinyan administration ’ s muscular , large-scale tree-planting plan not only raises concern about quantity over quality ; it also overlooks one of the main drivers of deforestation in Armenia , a cause far more controversial than its history of individual , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involves clearing swaths of forests in preparation for mining areas as well as new roads and related infrastructure .
Its reputation as a deforestation driver is well founded : Mining activity has caused almost 10 percent of the total tree loss in the Brazilian Amazon .
Many environmentalists complain that the new government has not done enough to denounce the lucrative , corruption-dogged industry , even greenlighting construction for $ 300 million gold mine in the spa town of Jermuk , located on the edge of landlocked Armenia ’ s largest freshwater source @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rich biodiversity , Armenia is home to more than 300 Red Book-listed endangered animal species and over 450 endangered plants .
But mines have been traced to habitat loss and toxic residue , known as tailings , and the lake is a protected area .
“ On the one hand , you say that we take a green direction , ” said Manvelyan , the WWF Armenia director .
“ On the other hand , you are giving license to new mines.
” The new government took power promising to fight corruption , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ old regime .
It adheres to a kind of social media-savvy transparency .
Pashinyan delivers speeches on Facebook Live .
Armenians breezily call the prime minister by his first name .
One night , I spot “ Nikol ” out at a jazz club in Yerevan , gamely posing for selfies .
That openness pervades the ranks of the administration .
Before I sat down with Vardan Melikyan , the deputy minister of environment , in between panels at the Forest Summit in Yerevan , a man in a dark suit rushed over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I instinctively stepped aside , giving them privacy .
“ Don ’ t leave.
” Melikyan waved me back .
“ There is no secret.
” But the mood noticeably soured when I brought up the mines , prompting a crisp “ no comment.
” “ Maybe people need to wait a bit , ” Melikyan finally offered , alluding to legal complications .
“ Actually , it ’ s not complicated , ” countered Artur Grigoryan , an environmental lawyer tapped by the Pashinyan administration to inspect mine sites and who was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in the summer of 2019 , Grigoryan had reported evidence of a Red Book-listed butterfly to the Environment Ministry , which would make mining in Jermuk a criminal offense .
He made similar findings in Kajaran , a privatized , Soviet-era open-pit copper mine in southern Armenia traced to rampant heavy metal pollution .
“ I spoke to the prime minister , ” Grigoryan said .
“ I presented the situation.
” Then Pashinyan jetted to Switzerland to talk up Armenia ’ s economic development at the 2019 World Economic Forum .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision to fire me , ” Grigoryan said .
Mines in Armenia are operated by offshore companies like Lydian International , which act as smokescreens for their owners .
This opaque financial structure makes it difficult to know what benefit is being reaped by whom .
“ Nobody knows what kind of influence they have on the current government , ” Grigoryan explained—if any at all .
Manvelyan believes that the massive reforestation plan was announced to deflect from a furor over unchecked mining policies .
It is “ a kind of compensation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ But you can ’ t compensate .
It ’ s two different stories.
” Along with doubling the country ’ s tree cover , the Pashinyan administration simultaneously announced at October ’ s Forest Summit that it would aim to increase the country ’ s population from 3 million to 5 million people , opening up new channels of immigration and recruiting Armenians from the diaspora .
In multiplying its forests and—very nearly , at least—also doubling its population , the Pashinyan government has promised hyperbolically bold economic and ecological investment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ striving to put Armenia back on the map .
Back in the southern village of Paruyr Sevak , the mayor looked out approvingly on the makings of the community park , with the clear line its trees had drawn in the sand .
He recalled many encroachments of Armenian territory by neighbors on all sides , most notoriously Turkey .
Mount Ararat—symbol of the Armenian people and faith—appears mostly as a haze-dulled backdrop from Armenian soil .
“ We have no more space to move back .
If you go and compare Armenia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , what ’ s left of it is so little , ” Stepanyan complained .
“ Our borders kept getting smaller and smaller.
” Beyond the craggy , rust-hued mountain range , dogs trawl the rings of landlocked desert , which sit baking under the sun .
The thin , sparsely foliaged treelings—wedged between Turkish , Iranian , and Azerbaijani borders—barely rise a foot off the ground .
But it won ’ t be long before they cast long shadows .

In southern Armenia, not far from the Turkish and Iranian borders, the village of Paruyr Sevak straddles a strip of arid, treeless no man’s land between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The border village was settled in 1978 as just a smattering of Soviet-built houses named after Armenia’s esteemed 20th-century poet, killed in a car crash farther up the road. Before the village was founded, Azeri shepherds had wandered there freely with their flocks, but the outpost helped define and delimit the land.
In southern Armenia, not far from the Turkish and Iranian borders, the village of Paruyr Sevak straddles a strip of arid, treeless no man’s land between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The border village was settled in 1978 as just a smattering of Soviet-built houses named after Armenia’s esteemed 20th-century poet, killed in a car crash farther up the road. Before the village was founded, Azeri shepherds had wandered there freely with their flocks, but the outpost helped define and delimit the land.
In 1988, a six-year war with Azerbaijan flared over nearby Nagorno-Karabakh, the self-declared autonomous region that is historically Armenian but under Azerbaijani control. The same period saw the fall of the Soviet Union and the redrawing of regional maps. Protracted territorial disputes eventually slowed into a daily drum of Azeri sniper fire, and the village needed more than aging buildings to signal its status as Armenian.
“For the land to be yours, it’s not enough just to have a signpost. You have to cultivate the land. You have to plant trees,” Edik Stepanyan told me on a dry, sunny afternoon this past October. He’s the village mayor and moved there 40 years ago from the city of Ararat, named for the white-capped mountain considered sacred to Armenians, which now sits on Turkish soil.
Planting trees is just what the area is doing. Running through the desert plains, on one side of a dusty two-lane thoroughfare, a towering dirt bulwark protects villagers from Azeri gunfire. (“If we didn’t hear the shootings, then we’d be worried, because we’re so used to it,” joked the 60-year-old resident Mesrop Karamyan.) On the other side, poking through the red, parched soil, still five or six years away from providing any shade, sit close to 5,000 green saplings—the makings of a community forest.
A white sedan sputters by with a treeling strapped to its roof. Nearby Khosrov Forest, a protected nature reserve, is home to bears, wolves, ibex, and a handful of endangered Caucasian snow leopards, but sunbaked Paruyr Sevak, lacking any rivers or streams, has virtually no tree cover. The mayor hopes the new park will soften the harsh climate, with the bonus of doubling down on the village’s claim on the vulnerable stretch of borderland.
“We always have to be alert. That’s the only choice we have,” Stepanyan said. “We either keep these borders or we lose everything.” Besides, he added brightly, “it will be a heavenly place.”
Stepanyan is one of many Armenians looking to transform the landscape. Riding high on the heels of a peaceful revolution that swept out years of corrupt oligarchy, Armenia’s new reformist government, led by the former journalist Nikol Pashinyan, has pledged to double the country’s tree cover by 2050 as part of Armenia’s commitment to the Paris climate agreement goals.
There is a lot to unpack in the plan to “Make Armenia Green Again,” as tongue-in-cheek comedy duo Narek Margaryan and Sergey Sargsyan have coined it. More than an environmental strategy against climate change, illegal logging, biodiversity loss, and desertification, in Armenia tree planting is suffused with cultural survival.
Since 1994, the Armenia Tree Project (ATP), a Massachusetts-headquartered nonprofit staffed by Armenians and Armenian Americans, has led the country’s reforestation efforts. ATP nurseries, greenhouses, community forests, and planting sites dot virtually every corner of Armenia, from the lush, leafy Georgian border down to disputed Nagorno-Karabakh. Their forests often memorialize; they’re named for genocide survivors or are dedicated to patriotic themes. In 2001, ATP planted the poplar and fruit trees skirting the roads around the 13th-century Noravank monastery to honor Armenia’s 1,700-year anniversary as the world’s first Christian nation.
Scaling up that model, in October at the country’s inaugural forest summit—Forest Summit: Global Action and Armenia, convened by ATP and the American University of Armenia—Pashinyan announced that doubling the tree cover would begin with 10 million trees planted by Oct. 10, 2020—representing the global population of Armenians. To put that number into perspective, after 25 years on the ground, ATP celebrated its 6 millionth tree planting only late last year.
Reforestation, a popular talking point in climate change adaptation efforts, is tricky that way. It does have the potential to reduce air pollution, increase rainfall, and absorb harmful carbon emissions. It is equally valuable in terms of symbolism (even the reelection campaign of U.S. President Donald Trump has spoken of planting a trillion trees), whether it is for shoring up borders, committing to cleaner air, or self-aggrandizement. But the danger in symbolism is that it can favor tidy, fast solutions in place of messy complexities, much like the identical rows of trees often planted to replace eroded forest cover.
These eerie, ersatz forests are about as natural-seeming as a strip of McMansions, and they are less adept at carbon absorption and more vulnerable to wildfires. “How can you compare these plantations to real forests, which we have and which we are losing now?” Karen Manvelyan, the director of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Armenia, told me this fall in Yerevan. “It’s PR.”
During Soviet rule, forests, streams, and natural sites were considered state property, and in those days, timber was trucked in from Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a devastating energy crisis, with Armenians ransacking forests for fast firewood. ATP founder Carolyn Mugar, living in Yerevan, watched branches stripped and trees felled—the degradation of those years became crucial to the nonprofit’s origin story. “We would cut, in secret, from places we weren’t supposed to, even national parks,” said 53-year-old Angela Minasyan, who now works as a laborer at an ATP nursery. “We always felt sorry for cutting anything,” she added. “That’s why we’re planting trees now.”
Armenia’s current tree cover hovers at around 11 percent—almost half what it was during the 17th and 18th centuries. Along with Armenia’s wood fuel crisis after the fall of the Soviet Union, industrial logging and open mining pits have also contributed to heavy tree losses—a trend that is reflected in waning forestland throughout much of the world. Indeed, global deforestation rates continue at a frightening clip. The world has lost 129 million hectares of forest since 1990—roughly the size of South Africa.
But the yield on new trees is not easy to calculate. Near the village of Margahovit in northern Armenia, not far from the sprawling, thickly forested Dilijan National Park, Mirak Nursery sits tucked into the low, mist-threaded hills. Equipped with germination tables, its greenhouses can grow up to a million seedlings, including ash, pine, and wild apple—ATP makes a point of only planting native tree species—which are placed outside to adapt to frigid winters. Still, almost half of the seedlings will die once planted.
“If we have 60 percent, it’s good,” ATP forestry manager Navasard Dadyan told me this fall. “To plant [a] tree is the easier thing. You can plant and go. The harder thing is to take care of them. I won’t say anything about 10 million trees,” he added, chuckling.
Early this January, ATP issued a press release with cautious praise of Pashinyan’s bold announcement—and much concern. It cautioned against planting nonnative or invasive species, which might add further strain to local ecology, and recommended mixed-species forests in place of the monoculture pines usually favored.
But the Pashinyan administration’s muscular, large-scale tree-planting plan not only raises concern about quantity over quality; it also overlooks one of the main drivers of deforestation in Armenia, a cause far more controversial than its history of individual, poverty-driven logging: mineral mining, which involves clearing swaths of forests in preparation for mining areas as well as new roads and related infrastructure. Its reputation as a deforestation driver is well founded: Mining activity has caused almost 10 percent of the total tree loss in the Brazilian Amazon.
Many environmentalists complain that the new government has not done enough to denounce the lucrative, corruption-dogged industry, even greenlighting construction for a $300 million gold mine in the spa town of Jermuk, located on the edge of landlocked Armenia’s largest freshwater source, Lake Sevan. Known for its rich biodiversity, Armenia is home to more than 300 Red Book-listed endangered animal species and over 450 endangered plants. But mines have been traced to habitat loss and toxic residue, known as tailings, and the lake is a protected area.
“On the one hand, you say that we take a green direction,” said Manvelyan, the WWF Armenia director. “On the other hand, you are giving license to new mines.”
The new government took power promising to fight corruption, chase out oligarchs, and dismantle the old regime. It adheres to a kind of social media-savvy transparency. Pashinyan delivers speeches on Facebook Live. Armenians breezily call the prime minister by his first name. One night, I spot “Nikol” out at a jazz club in Yerevan, gamely posing for selfies.
That openness pervades the ranks of the administration. Before I sat down with Vardan Melikyan, the deputy minister of environment, in between panels at the Forest Summit in Yerevan, a man in a dark suit rushed over, interrupting with an urgent-sounding murmur. I instinctively stepped aside, giving them privacy. “Don’t leave.” Melikyan waved me back. “There is no secret.” But the mood noticeably soured when I brought up the mines, prompting a crisp “no comment.” “Maybe people need to wait a bit,” Melikyan finally offered, alluding to legal complications.
“Actually, it’s not complicated,” countered Artur Grigoryan, an environmental lawyer tapped by the Pashinyan administration to inspect mine sites and who was subsequently fired. After a monthlong investigation, in the summer of 2019, Grigoryan had reported evidence of a Red Book-listed butterfly to the Environment Ministry, which would make mining in Jermuk a criminal offense. He made similar findings in Kajaran, a privatized, Soviet-era open-pit copper mine in southern Armenia traced to rampant heavy metal pollution.
“I spoke to the prime minister,” Grigoryan said. “I presented the situation.” Then Pashinyan jetted to Switzerland to talk up Armenia’s economic development at the 2019 World Economic Forum. “From Davos, he signed the decision to fire me,” Grigoryan said.
Mines in Armenia are operated by offshore companies like Lydian International, which act as smokescreens for their owners. This opaque financial structure makes it difficult to know what benefit is being reaped by whom. “Nobody knows what kind of influence they have on the current government,” Grigoryan explained—if any at all.
Manvelyan believes that the massive reforestation plan was announced to deflect from a furor over unchecked mining policies. It is “a kind of compensation” for the public, he said. “But you can’t compensate. It’s two different stories.”
Along with doubling the country’s tree cover, the Pashinyan administration simultaneously announced at October’s Forest Summit that it would aim to increase the country’s population from 3 million to 5 million people, opening up new channels of immigration and recruiting Armenians from the diaspora. In multiplying its forests and—very nearly, at least—also doubling its population, the Pashinyan government has promised hyperbolically bold economic and ecological investment. Each looks to the past while striving to put Armenia back on the map.
Back in the southern village of Paruyr Sevak, the mayor looked out approvingly on the makings of the community park, with the clear line its trees had drawn in the sand. He recalled many encroachments of Armenian territory by neighbors on all sides, most notoriously Turkey. Mount Ararat—symbol of the Armenian people and faith—appears mostly as a haze-dulled backdrop from Armenian soil. “We have no more space to move back. If you go and compare Armenia’s maps from before and now, what’s left of it is so little,” Stepanyan complained. “Our borders kept getting smaller and smaller.”
Beyond the craggy, rust-hued mountain range, dogs trawl the rings of landlocked desert, which sit baking under the sun. The thin, sparsely foliaged treelings—wedged between Turkish, Iranian, and Azerbaijani borders—barely rise a foot off the ground. But it won’t be long before they cast long shadows.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-18--Trump’s India Visit Is Mostly About Optics

Trump ’ s India Visit Is Mostly About Optics Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly South Asia Brief .
The highlights this week : India gets ready for Trump ’ s visit , an Afghan peace deal grows closer , and Pakistan approves new rules for social media .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday , please sign up here .
U.S. President Donald Trump lands in New Delhi early next week to meet his Indian counterpart , Prime Minister Narendra Modi .
International media is almost certain to focus on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s two largest democracies .
Former U.S. President Barack Obama predicted the two would form a “ defining partnership ” of the 21st century , and advancing ties with India is one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement in Washington .
A broad consensus of foreign-policy thinkers view an India-U.S. relationship as a hedge against the rise of China .
TV channels and newspapers—especially in India—are likely to devote a considerable amount of coverage to a joint appearance in Ahmedabad , where Trump and Modi will address an expected 100,000 people at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The glitzy optics of that event will prompt analysis about the budding personal chemistry between the two leaders—how both are men of the people who share a disdain for the media .
But media coverage will miss the mark .
The more substantive issues lie in the growing differences between the two countries and their leaders .
First of all , Trump and Modi actually aren ’ t that similar , as the Wall Street Journal ’ s Sadanand Dhume writes .
Unlike Modi , Trump has an elite background .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just as Modi criticizes India ’ s , a key difference is that the American superrich far outnumbers India ’ s .
U.S. institutions are stronger than those in India .
And not surprisingly , popular and media opposition to Trump is robust .
In India , Modi remains widely popular and enjoys a largely adoring media .
More substantially , despite about two decades of moving closer , India and the United States have begun to show signs of divergence on at least two key issues .
As Foreign Policy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s niggling trade demands ” are holding the larger strategic relationship hostage .
As U.S. officials focus only on limiting their trade deficits with partners—browbeating over walnuts and Harley-Davidsons with India—Washington is ill-suited to push New Delhi toward more broadly trade-friendly policies , as it has in the past .
As with trade , so too with foreign policy .
Washington ’ s shunning of liberal alliances has opened the door for New Delhi ’ s increasingly muscular geopolitics .
At the Munich Security Conference over the weekend , U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and its unilateral decision to scrap Indian-administered Kashmir ’ s autonomy last year .
“ I don ’ t know how it ends , but let ’ s make sure that two democracies will end it differently , ” he said .
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar , who shared the stage with Graham , immediately quipped back : “ Don ’ t worry , senator .
One democracy will settle it .
And you know which one.
” While India has long made clear that it views Kashmir as a domestic matter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s comments and statements from other top officials highlight a growing confidence in New Delhi—and a sharp decline in Washington ’ s influence .
In the Trump era , the India-U.S. partnership has hardly been “ defining.
” It has served mainly to advance Trump ’ s most pressing concerns in any given moment .
New Delhi is responding accordingly .
More on the Trump-Modi summit in next week ’ s edition of South Asia Brief .
For now , amid the onslaught of media commentary , know that much of what you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that hides growing cracks and frustrations in a relationship for which many had greater hopes .
Afghanistan ’ s future .
After months of delay , Afghanistan ’ s election chief declared President Ashraf Ghani the winner of last September ’ s election , giving him a second term in power .
A spokesman for rival Abdullah Abdullah , who was declared runner-up , has already disputed the results as having “ no legitimacy , ” alleging fraud .
While Afghanistan has a population of 37 million , only 1.82 million votes were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of irregularities .
Over the weekend , the United States and the Taliban agreed to a seven-day reduction in violence .
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper has described the start of the truce as a “ moving date.
” If both parties stick to the reduction in hostilities , it could be followed by a peace deal between the United States and the Taliban—potentially to be signed while Trump is in the region next week for his meeting with Modi .
Women in India ’ s army .
Despite opposition from India ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ruled that female army officers should have parity with their male counterparts , a move that will allow them to hold commanding positions and access to equal promotions , benefits , and pensions .
The government argued that “ the troops are not yet mentally schooled to accept women officers in command.
” The Supreme Court rejected that theory , saying that citing “ social norms to deny opportunity to women officers is disturbing and can not be accepted.
” Sri Lanka sanctions .
Last Friday , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shavendra Silva , the country ’ s army chief , who is barred from entering the United States “ due to his involvement in extrajudicial killings ” —alleged war crimes committed during the end stages of the country ’ s civil war in 2009 .
The travel ban marks the first time any major figure involved in the deaths of as many as 70,000 Tamil civilians in a no-fire zone has been held to account on the global stage .
Read the complete public designation .
On Sunday , a Nepal Airlines flight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak .
Nepal will keep the evacuees under quarantine for two weeks .
Nepal ’ s economy is more dependent on remittances than any other South Asian country .
Our question : What percentage of Nepal ’ s GDP comes from personal remittances ?
Scroll down for the answer .
India vs. Vodafone .
India ’ s Supreme Court has issued a ruling that could have dramatic consequences for the country ’ s economy .
On Friday , the top court ordered Vodafone Idea , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and India ’ s Idea Cellular , to pay $ 7 billion in retrospective license and spectrum fees .
Vodafone Idea ’ s shares plunged on the news of the ruling : The cellular provider has said in the past that it would go bankrupt if forced to pay up .
Vodafone Idea has 13,000 employees , and , analysts say , its default could increase India ’ s fiscal deficit by 40 basis points .
India ’ s reputation as a country that levies retrospective taxation will keep scaring off potential investors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s new social media rules .
Last month , Pakistan ’ s cabinet approved a set of regulations that would force social media companies to hand over data to the government and to remove content it deems unlawful .
While the new rules were not made public , Reuters accessed a copy of the document .
It shows that the rules could give Islamabad unprecedented power to censor dissent and free speech .
Buffalo Bolt ?
Here ’ s a fun one .
Last week , videos of 28-year-old Srinivas Gowda , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because he ran 142 meters—along with two buffalos—in 13.42 seconds .
Gowda was taking part in Kambala , an annual race staged with buffalo in paddy fields in the southern state of Karnataka .
The video led people to compare Gowda to the Jamaican sprinter Usain Bolt—and for India ’ s sports minister to offer him a chance to join India ’ s national sprint trials .
For now , Gowda says , his focus is on Kambala .
As shown below , in 2001 Nepal ’ s economic reliance on remittances jumped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than three times that amount .
It rose steadily every year afterward before dropping a bit over the last three years .
According to 2018 World Bank data , personal remittances now account for 27.77 percent of Nepal ’ s GDP—far more than any other South Asian country .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: India gets ready for Trump’s visit , an Afghan peace deal grows closer, and Pakistan approves new rules for social media .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: India gets ready for Trump’s visit, an Afghan peace deal grows closer, and Pakistan approves new rules for social media.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday, please sign up here.
Trump’s India Visit Is Mostly About Optics
U.S. President Donald Trump lands in New Delhi early next week to meet his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Narendra Modi. International media is almost certain to focus on a growing friendship between the world’s two largest democracies. Former U.S. President Barack Obama predicted the two would form a “defining partnership” of the 21st century, and advancing ties with India is one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement in Washington. A broad consensus of foreign-policy thinkers view an India-U.S. relationship as a hedge against the rise of China.
TV channels and newspapers—especially in India—are likely to devote a considerable amount of coverage to a joint appearance in Ahmedabad, where Trump and Modi will address an expected 100,000 people at the world’s biggest cricket stadium. The glitzy optics of that event will prompt analysis about the budding personal chemistry between the two leaders—how both are men of the people who share a disdain for the media.
But media coverage will miss the mark. The more substantive issues lie in the growing differences between the two countries and their leaders.
First of all, Trump and Modi actually aren’t that similar, as the Wall Street Journal’s Sadanand Dhume writes. Unlike Modi, Trump has an elite background. While Trump may rant against the American elite just as Modi criticizes India’s, a key difference is that the American superrich far outnumbers India’s. U.S. institutions are stronger than those in India. And not surprisingly, popular and media opposition to Trump is robust. In India, Modi remains widely popular and enjoys a largely adoring media.
More substantially, despite about two decades of moving closer, India and the United States have begun to show signs of divergence on at least two key issues.
As Foreign Policy’s Keith Johnson writes, “Trump’s niggling trade demands” are holding the larger strategic relationship hostage. As U.S. officials focus only on limiting their trade deficits with partners—browbeating over walnuts and Harley-Davidsons with India—Washington is ill-suited to push New Delhi toward more broadly trade-friendly policies, as it has in the past.
As with trade, so too with foreign policy. Washington’s shunning of liberal alliances has opened the door for New Delhi’s increasingly muscular geopolitics. At the Munich Security Conference over the weekend, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham chided India over its relationship with Pakistan and its unilateral decision to scrap Indian-administered Kashmir’s autonomy last year. “I don’t know how it ends, but let’s make sure that two democracies will end it differently,” he said. Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who shared the stage with Graham, immediately quipped back: “Don’t worry, senator. One democracy will settle it. And you know which one.”
While India has long made clear that it views Kashmir as a domestic matter, shunning U.S. involvement, Jaishankar’s comments and statements from other top officials highlight a growing confidence in New Delhi—and a sharp decline in Washington’s influence. In the Trump era, the India-U.S. partnership has hardly been “defining.” It has served mainly to advance Trump’s most pressing concerns in any given moment. New Delhi is responding accordingly.
More on the Trump-Modi summit in next week’s edition of South Asia Brief. For now, amid the onslaught of media commentary, know that much of what you will see is about optics. And that hides growing cracks and frustrations in a relationship for which many had greater hopes.
What We’re Following
Afghanistan’s future. After months of delay, Afghanistan’s election chief declared President Ashraf Ghani the winner of last September’s election, giving him a second term in power. A spokesman for rival Abdullah Abdullah, who was declared runner-up, has already disputed the results as having “no legitimacy,” alleging fraud. While Afghanistan has a population of 37 million, only 1.82 million votes were counted—with nearly 1 million thrown out because of irregularities.
Over the weekend, the United States and the Taliban agreed to a seven-day reduction in violence. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper has described the start of the truce as a “moving date.” If both parties stick to the reduction in hostilities, it could be followed by a peace deal between the United States and the Taliban—potentially to be signed while Trump is in the region next week for his meeting with Modi.
Women in India’s army. Despite opposition from India’s government, its top court has ruled that female army officers should have parity with their male counterparts, a move that will allow them to hold commanding positions and access to equal promotions, benefits, and pensions. The government argued that “the troops are not yet mentally schooled to accept women officers in command.” The Supreme Court rejected that theory, saying that citing “social norms to deny opportunity to women officers is disturbing and cannot be accepted.”
Sri Lanka sanctions. Last Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced sanctions against Sri Lankan Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva, the country’s army chief, who is barred from entering the United States “due to his involvement in extrajudicial killings”—alleged war crimes committed during the end stages of the country’s civil war in 2009. The travel ban marks the first time any major figure involved in the deaths of as many as 70,000 Tamil civilians in a no-fire zone has been held to account on the global stage. Read the complete public designation.
Question of the Week
On Sunday, a Nepal Airlines flight evacuated 175 Nepali nationals—mostly students—from Wuhan, China, the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak. Nepal will keep the evacuees under quarantine for two weeks.
Nepal’s economy is more dependent on remittances than any other South Asian country. Our question: What percentage of Nepal’s GDP comes from personal remittances?
A) 8 percent
B) 18 percent
C) 28 percent
D) 38 percent
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
India vs. Vodafone. India’s Supreme Court has issued a ruling that could have dramatic consequences for the country’s economy. On Friday, the top court ordered Vodafone Idea, a joint venture between Britain’s Vodafone and India’s Idea Cellular, to pay $7 billion in retrospective license and spectrum fees. Vodafone Idea’s shares plunged on the news of the ruling: The cellular provider has said in the past that it would go bankrupt if forced to pay up.
Vodafone Idea has 13,000 employees, and, analysts say, its default could increase India’s fiscal deficit by 40 basis points. India’s reputation as a country that levies retrospective taxation will keep scaring off potential investors and could jeopardize economic growth.
Pakistan’s new social media rules. Last month, Pakistan’s cabinet approved a set of regulations that would force social media companies to hand over data to the government and to remove content it deems unlawful. While the new rules were not made public, Reuters accessed a copy of the document. It shows that the rules could give Islamabad unprecedented power to censor dissent and free speech.
Odds and Ends
Srinivas Gowda district runs alongside his buffalos during Kambala, the traditional buffalo racing event held near Mangalore, Karnataka, India, on Jan. 31.
Buffalo Bolt? Here’s a fun one. Last week, videos of 28-year-old Srinivas Gowda, an Indian buffalo racer, went viral because he ran 142 meters—along with two buffalos—in 13.42 seconds. Gowda was taking part in Kambala, an annual race staged with buffalo in paddy fields in the southern state of Karnataka. The video led people to compare Gowda to the Jamaican sprinter Usain Bolt—and for India’s sports minister to offer him a chance to join India’s national sprint trials. For now, Gowda says, his focus is on Kambala.
And the Answer Is…
C) 28 percent.
As shown below, in 2001 Nepal’s economic reliance on remittances jumped sharply from less than 3 percent to more than three times that amount. It rose steadily every year afterward before dropping a bit over the last three years. According to 2018 World Bank data, personal remittances now account for 27.77 percent of Nepal’s GDP—far more than any other South Asian country.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-18--Coronavirus Begins to Spread Economic Gloom Worldwide

The cascading economic impact of the new coronavirus outbreak in China is becoming more apparent worldwide , with Apple ’ s surprise cut to its sales forecast due to supply chain disruptions spooking global markets and Asian governments downgrading growth prospects .
German investor sentiment , meanwhile , is collapsing amid fears the outbreak will kneecap the incipient recovery in global manufacturing .
The fallout from the outbreak of the virus and China ’ s efforts to contain it—with more than 70,000 known cases and more than 1,800 deaths so far—comes at a particularly bad time for economies like Japan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to recover after a year of global trade tensions weighed on their manufacturing and exports .
The virus has hit the global automotive industry particularly hard , which has a nasty knock-on effect not just inside China but also in Japan , South Korea , Germany—and potentially even the United States .
Despite China ’ s insistence that the rate of new infections is stabilizing , alongside an ostensible return to business earlier this month , the economic damage is most apparent inside China .
Some sectors , like automobiles , are still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worker absences and supply chain shortages and most car dealers remain closed .
Other sectors , including mining , travel , construction , and retail , are also taking a big hit as Chinese consumers and workers , limited by travel restrictions and fears of infection , have halted most of their usual activity .
“ It seems increasingly likely that February will prove to be an economic write-off for China , ” said the commodities consultancy Wood Mackenzie in a note .
Most forecasters expected the Chinese economy to take a big @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before recovering—thanks to government-fueled stimulus—later in the year .
But sentiment about China ’ s growth prospects is souring : The new Bank of America fund managers survey shows top investors expect Chinese GDP growth rates to stabilize just over 5 percent per year for the next three years , a big drop from last year ’ s already sluggish 6 percent and a far cry from the halcyon days of double-digit growth less than a decade ago .
Chinese recovery could prove elusive despite Beijing ’ s efforts to boost lending and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Small and medium-sized businesses were meant to keep paying salaries for absent workers during the shutdown , but many won ’ t be able to as their own revenues are squeezed .
That means less disposable income for consumers down the road—turning what should have been a temporary pause in domestic demand for consumer goods into potential permanent demand destruction , the consultancy said .
And even though most of the virus infections and deaths have occurred inside China , the economic fallout is becoming increasingly visible among its Asian neighbors .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jae-in essentially declared an economic emergency , calling for desperate measures to limit the damage to an economy deeply intermeshed with China ’ s .
Singapore , for its part , slashed its growth outlook this year and is planning a multibillion-dollar stimulus package to offset lost economic activity .
Thailand and Malaysia , too , have cut their own growth expectations , and Malaysia is planning an economic stimulus of its own to contain the damage .
But Japan , which has the most virus cases outside China , might be facing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fourth quarter showed a shrinking economy , with the biggest contraction in more than five years .
Japanese automakers like Toyota and Nissan have seen output disrupted both at Chinese factories and at home , while inbound Chinese tourism is paralyzed for now .
That raises the real risk of a recession for Japan , which just launched a huge economic stimulus package late last year and may need to prime the pump even further to avoid a full-blown crisis .
Even further afield , the virus is taking its toll .
Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Road Initiative around Southeast Asia will almost certainly suffer delays and higher costs as supply-chain and worker disruptions percolate through to projects on the ground .
Brazil , which relies on the Chinese market as its largest trading partner , will likely see slower growth this year due to the fallout from the outbreak .
And , of course , the slowdown will likely derail U.S. plans to massively increase exports of farm produce , energy , and manufactured goods to China , which could delay any real recovery in the distressed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe , too , is starting to worry .
European automakers such as Volkswagen have already seen production affected at factories inside China , and now there are growing concerns of additional supply chain disruptions that could affect manufacturing in European plants .
Investors in Germany fear the worst , after a dismal year for Europe ’ s biggest economy , mired in a manufacturing slump thanks to a dire outlook for its key auto sector .
On Tuesday , the ZEW survey of German investors showed a collapse in sentiment , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effects in China will upend global trade and hamstring Germany ’ s export-led recovery .
The gloomy outlook briefly sent the euro to almost three-year lows against the dollar—which , given U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s constant tirades against unfair competition from lesser-valued foreign currencies , only threatens to ratchet up trans-Atlantic trade tensions even further .

The cascading economic impact of the new coronavirus outbreak in China is becoming more apparent worldwide, with Apple’s surprise cut to its sales forecast due to supply chain disruptions spooking global markets and Asian governments downgrading growth prospects. German investor sentiment, meanwhile, is collapsing amid fears the outbreak will kneecap the incipient recovery in global manufacturing.
The cascading economic impact of the new coronavirus outbreak in China is becoming more apparent worldwide, with Apple’s surprise cut to its sales forecast due to supply chain disruptions spooking global markets and Asian governments downgrading growth prospects. German investor sentiment, meanwhile, is collapsing amid fears the outbreak will kneecap the incipient recovery in global manufacturing.
The fallout from the outbreak of the virus and China’s efforts to contain it—with more than 70,000 known cases and more than 1,800 deaths so far—comes at a particularly bad time for economies like Japan and Germany, which were just beginning to recover after a year of global trade tensions weighed on their manufacturing and exports. The virus has hit the global automotive industry particularly hard, which has a nasty knock-on effect not just inside China but also in Japan, South Korea, Germany—and potentially even the United States.
Despite China’s insistence that the rate of new infections is stabilizing, alongside an ostensible return to business earlier this month, the economic damage is most apparent inside China. Some sectors, like automobiles, are still all but shuttered as factories deal with worker absences and supply chain shortages and most car dealers remain closed. Other sectors, including mining, travel, construction, and retail, are also taking a big hit as Chinese consumers and workers, limited by travel restrictions and fears of infection, have halted most of their usual activity.
“It seems increasingly likely that February will prove to be an economic write-off for China,” said the commodities consultancy Wood Mackenzie in a note.
Most forecasters expected the Chinese economy to take a big hit to growth in the first quarter before recovering—thanks to government-fueled stimulus—later in the year. But sentiment about China’s growth prospects is souring: The new Bank of America fund managers survey shows top investors expect Chinese GDP growth rates to stabilize just over 5 percent per year for the next three years, a big drop from last year’s already sluggish 6 percent and a far cry from the halcyon days of double-digit growth less than a decade ago.
Chinese recovery could prove elusive despite Beijing’s efforts to boost lending and lower interest rates, Wood Mackenzie said. Small and medium-sized businesses were meant to keep paying salaries for absent workers during the shutdown, but many won’t be able to as their own revenues are squeezed. That means less disposable income for consumers down the road—turning what should have been a temporary pause in domestic demand for consumer goods into potential permanent demand destruction, the consultancy said.
And even though most of the virus infections and deaths have occurred inside China, the economic fallout is becoming increasingly visible among its Asian neighbors. On Tuesday, South Korean President Moon Jae-in essentially declared an economic emergency, calling for desperate measures to limit the damage to an economy deeply intermeshed with China’s. Singapore, for its part, slashed its growth outlook this year and is planning a multibillion-dollar stimulus package to offset lost economic activity. Thailand and Malaysia, too, have cut their own growth expectations, and Malaysia is planning an economic stimulus of its own to contain the damage.
But Japan, which has the most virus cases outside China, might be facing the biggest challenges after an already dismal fourth quarter showed a shrinking economy, with the biggest contraction in more than five years. Japanese automakers like Toyota and Nissan have seen output disrupted both at Chinese factories and at home, while inbound Chinese tourism is paralyzed for now. That raises the real risk of a recession for Japan, which just launched a huge economic stimulus package late last year and may need to prime the pump even further to avoid a full-blown crisis.
Even further afield, the virus is taking its toll. Chinese companies working on projects for the Belt and Road Initiative around Southeast Asia will almost certainly suffer delays and higher costs as supply-chain and worker disruptions percolate through to projects on the ground. Brazil, which relies on the Chinese market as its largest trading partner, will likely see slower growth this year due to the fallout from the outbreak. And, of course, the slowdown will likely derail U.S. plans to massively increase exports of farm produce, energy, and manufactured goods to China, which could delay any real recovery in the distressed Farm Belt and Rust Belt.
And Europe, too, is starting to worry. European automakers such as Volkswagen have already seen production affected at factories inside China, and now there are growing concerns of additional supply chain disruptions that could affect manufacturing in European plants.
Investors in Germany fear the worst, after a dismal year for Europe’s biggest economy, mired in a manufacturing slump thanks to a dire outlook for its key auto sector. On Tuesday, the ZEW survey of German investors showed a collapse in sentiment, with fears that the virus and its knock-on effects in China will upend global trade and hamstring Germany’s export-led recovery.
The gloomy outlook briefly sent the euro to almost three-year lows against the dollar—which, given U.S. President Donald Trump’s constant tirades against unfair competition from lesser-valued foreign currencies, only threatens to ratchet up trans-Atlantic trade tensions even further.