foreignpolicy--2020-01-21--Khan and Ghani Headline South Asian Presence at Davos

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly South Asia Brief .
The highlights this week : The Pakistani and Afghan heads of state lead regional delegations at Davos , the Maldives appeals for climate change funds , and India ’ s Zomato takes over Uber Eats ’ local operations .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday , please sign up here .
As world leaders gather at the annual World Economic Forum ( WEF ) meeting in Davos , Switzerland , this week , much of their talk is about what the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ stakeholder capitalism.
” As Schwab argues in the Winter 2020 issue of Foreign Policy , today ’ s world needs more rather than less economic cooperation .
Collaborating on taxation , climate change , and workers ’ rights could “ go a long way in improving the lives of everyone across the world , ” he writes .
Who is representing South Asia ?
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan , who attended Davos frequently before he came to power in 2018 , is among the region ’ s most prominent delegates this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. President Donald Trump and is expected to tout his country ’ s economic improvements and to raise concerns about the security situation in Indian-administered Kashmir .
Afghanistan ’ s President Ashraf Ghani will also generate interest as he courts international support for a potential peace agreement .
India ’ s Davos delegation is led by Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal , who is scheduled to hold several bilateral meetings with ministers and CEOs .
Notably absent from Goyal ’ s schedule are the delegates from Malaysia , because “ a mutually agreeable time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imports of Malaysian palm oil after Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad criticized India ’ s new citizenship law and actions in Kashmir .
A drag on the world economy ?
Business leaders at Davos may have taken note of comments by the International Monetary Fund chief economist Gita Gopinath , who told India Today on Monday that the IMF has revised downward its global growth forecasts for 2020 , and that “ the vast majority of it comes from our downgrade for India.
” But , Gopinath added , “ We see India recovering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the next fiscal year.
” Despite projected growth , a set of indicators released this week by the WEF highlight how South Asia still has a long way to go in reducing inequality .
The WEF ’ s Global Social Mobility Index ranks countries based on the likelihood of families improving their economic outcomes , health care , education , and access to technology .
While Denmark , Norway , and Finland take the top spots , Sri Lanka is the highest-ranked South Asian country , at 59th .
An accompanying report says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ index score by 10 points , it would “ result in an additional GDP growth of 4.41 percent by 2030 , ” plus other social benefits .
Bangladesh says island is ready for refugees .
Last year , Bangladesh announced plans to move thousands of Myanmar ’ s Rohingya refugees from camps in Cox ’ s Bazar to an island in the Bay of Bengal , Bhasan Char .
Now the government says that the island , which floods regularly during monsoon season , is ready to welcome around 100,000 people—with newly built @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flood protection .
( Foreign media have not been allowed to visit the island . )
Meanwhile , violence and child trafficking are on the rise in Cox ’ s Bazar , where as many as 900,000 refugees reside .
Bangladesh fears a new flood of arrivals—this time from India—in the wake of India ’ s new Citizenship Amendment Act , which excludes Muslim refugees from those allowed a fast track to citizenship .
Several Bangladeshi officials have canceled meetings with their Indian counterparts amid strained relations .
The Maldives seeks climate change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has launched a new campaign for foreign funding to fight the effects of climate change in the island nation .
“ For small states , it is not easy , ” Shahid told Reuters .
“ By the time the financing is obtained , we may be underwater .
” The Maldives spends about $ 10 million a year on coastal protection , but according to estimates from its environment ministry , it will need up to $ 8.8 billion more .
Afghan deal or no deal ?
The United States and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace agreement .
Last week , the Taliban offered to temporarily reduce violence , which observers believe is an important gesture on the way to restarting peace talks and finalizing a preliminary agreement .
A Taliban spokesman even tweeted on Friday that the two sides had “ discussed the signing of the agreement and the ceremony for it , ” although it was unclear which agreement he was referring to .
On Jan. 26 , India celebrates its 71st Republic Day , which honors the day when a new constitution came into effect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a major military parade , showcasing the country ’ s service members and latest armaments .
New Delhi also likes to make sure that there are prominent foreign figures at the parade , with past guests including U.S. President Barack Obama , Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe , and Russian President Vladimir Putin .
This year , Jair Bolsonaro will become the third Brazilian head of state to attend .
Which countries are tied for sending the most chief guests to India ’ s Republic Day celebrations ?
A ) The United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Kingdom and France C ) The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia D ) France and the Soviet Union/Russia Scroll down for the answer .
Uber retreats .
Uber is selling its food delivery service in India to Zomato , a local start-up backed by Chinese conglomerate Alibaba , among others .
While the $ 172 million deal shuts down the loss-making Uber Eats division in India , it allows Uber to gain a 9.99 percent stake in a rising unicorn last valued at $ 3.55 billion .
Zomato ’ s primary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by another Chinese tech company , Tencent .
India ’ s tax hedge .
As India ’ s economy slows down , one of the government ’ s methods for reviving GDP growth has been tax cuts : rationalizing the goods and services tax rates and lowering corporate rates .
Some are now calling for a reduction on personal taxes .
Individual tax compliance in India is terrible—as low as 11.6 percent , according to recent data .
If the country needs some ideas for enforcing its codes , it may look to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ late 1800s , the British government in India built a massive hedge—more than 1,100 miles long , and12 feet tall and 14 feet across in parts .
It was designed to prevent the smuggling of salt to areas where the salt tax was high .
Eventually abandoned in 1879 , the hedge was only partially successful and required constant maintenance , including 100,000 tons of additional plant matter each year .
Sting operation .
A Chinese man was caught trying to smuggle 200 poisonous scorpions out of Sri Lanka last week .
He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around $ 550 .
Sri Lanka struggles to keep the trafficking of exotic animals under control .
It submits the most proposals for additional protections under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora , and it regularly stops attempts to sell elephants , rare bird nests , and pangolins .
Representatives from these countries have been the guest of honor five times .
Leaders from the Soviet Union/Russia have done so four times , as have leaders from Bhutan .
An American has only been the chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: The Pakistani and Afghan heads of state lead regional delegations at Davos , the Maldives appeals for climate change funds, and India’s Zomato takes over Uber Eats’ local operations.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: The Pakistani and Afghan heads of state lead regional delegations at Davos, the Maldives appeals for climate change funds, and India’s Zomato takes over Uber Eats’ local operations.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday, please sign up here.
South Asia’s Leaders Head to Davos
As world leaders gather at the annual World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Davos, Switzerland, this week, much of their talk is about what the organization’s founder Klaus Schwab calls “stakeholder capitalism.” As Schwab argues in the Winter 2020 issue of Foreign Policy, today’s world needs more rather than less economic cooperation. Collaborating on taxation, climate change, and workers’ rights could “go a long way in improving the lives of everyone across the world,” he writes.
Who is representing South Asia? Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, who attended Davos frequently before he came to power in 2018, is among the region’s most prominent delegates this year. Khan is scheduled to meet U.S. President Donald Trump and is expected to tout his country’s economic improvements and to raise concerns about the security situation in Indian-administered Kashmir. Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani will also generate interest as he courts international support for a potential peace agreement.
India’s Davos delegation is led by Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal, who is scheduled to hold several bilateral meetings with ministers and CEOs. Notably absent from Goyal’s schedule are the delegates from Malaysia, because “a mutually agreeable time has not been reached.” India restricted imports of Malaysian palm oil after Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad criticized India’s new citizenship law and actions in Kashmir.
A drag on the world economy? Business leaders at Davos may have taken note of comments by the International Monetary Fund chief economist Gita Gopinath, who told India Today on Monday that the IMF has revised downward its global growth forecasts for 2020, and that “the vast majority of it comes from our downgrade for India.” But, Gopinath added, “We see India recovering. There is significant recovery coming in the next fiscal year.”
Despite projected growth, a set of indicators released this week by the WEF highlight how South Asia still has a long way to go in reducing inequality. The WEF’s Global Social Mobility Index ranks countries based on the likelihood of families improving their economic outcomes, health care, education, and access to technology. While Denmark, Norway, and Finland take the top spots, Sri Lanka is the highest-ranked South Asian country, at 59th.
An accompanying report says that if countries increased their social mobility index score by 10 points, it would “result in an additional GDP growth of 4.41 percent by 2030,” plus other social benefits.
The Global Social Mobility Index 2020 Rankings Based On 100-Point Index
The Global Social Mobility Index2020 Rankings based on 100-point index Source: World Economic forum
What We’re Following
Bangladesh says island is ready for refugees. Last year, Bangladesh announced plans to move thousands of Myanmar’s Rohingya refugees from camps in Cox’s Bazar to an island in the Bay of Bengal, Bhasan Char. Now the government says that the island, which floods regularly during monsoon season, is ready to welcome around 100,000 people—with newly built houses, hospitals, mosques, and flood protection. (Foreign media have not been allowed to visit the island.)
Meanwhile, violence and child trafficking are on the rise in Cox’s Bazar, where as many as 900,000 refugees reside. Bangladesh fears a new flood of arrivals—this time from India—in the wake of India’s new Citizenship Amendment Act, which excludes Muslim refugees from those allowed a fast track to citizenship. Several Bangladeshi officials have canceled meetings with their Indian counterparts amid strained relations.
The Maldives seeks climate change funds. Maldives Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid has launched a new campaign for foreign funding to fight the effects of climate change in the island nation. “For small states, it is not easy,” Shahid told Reuters. “By the time the financing is obtained, we may be underwater .” The Maldives spends about $10 million a year on coastal protection, but according to estimates from its environment ministry, it will need up to $8.8 billion more.
Afghan deal or no deal? The United States and the Taliban may actually be close to a peace agreement. Last week, the Taliban offered to temporarily reduce violence, which observers believe is an important gesture on the way to restarting peace talks and finalizing a preliminary agreement. A Taliban spokesman even tweeted on Friday that the two sides had “discussed the signing of the agreement and the ceremony for it,” although it was unclear which agreement he was referring to.
Question of the Week
On Jan. 26, India celebrates its 71st Republic Day, which honors the day when a new constitution came into effect after independence. Republic Day celebrations include a major military parade, showcasing the country’s service members and latest armaments.
New Delhi also likes to make sure that there are prominent foreign figures at the parade, with past guests including U.S. President Barack Obama, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. This year, Jair Bolsonaro will become the third Brazilian head of state to attend. Which countries are tied for sending the most chief guests to India’s Republic Day celebrations?
A) The United States and the United Kingdom
B) The United Kingdom and France
C) The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia
D) France and the Soviet Union/Russia
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
Uber retreats. Uber is selling its food delivery service in India to Zomato, a local start-up backed by Chinese conglomerate Alibaba, among others. While the $172 million deal shuts down the loss-making Uber Eats division in India, it allows Uber to gain a 9.99 percent stake in a rising unicorn last valued at $3.55 billion. Zomato’s primary domestic rival, Swiggy, is supported by another Chinese tech company, Tencent.
Odds and Ends
India’s tax hedge. As India’s economy slows down, one of the government’s methods for reviving GDP growth has been tax cuts: rationalizing the goods and services tax rates and lowering corporate rates. Some are now calling for a reduction on personal taxes. Individual tax compliance in India is terrible—as low as 11.6 percent, according to recent data.
If the country needs some ideas for enforcing its codes, it may look to its own imperial history. In the late 1800s, the British government in India built a massive hedge—more than 1,100 miles long, and12 feet tall and 14 feet across in parts. It was designed to prevent the smuggling of salt to areas where the salt tax was high. Eventually abandoned in 1879, the hedge was only partially successful and required constant maintenance, including 100,000 tons of additional plant matter each year.
Sting operation. A Chinese man was caught trying to smuggle 200 poisonous scorpions out of Sri Lanka last week. He allowed to return home after being fined around $550. Sri Lanka struggles to keep the trafficking of exotic animals under control. It submits the most proposals for additional protections under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and it regularly stops attempts to sell elephants, rare bird nests, and pangolins.
And the Answer Is…
B) The United Kingdom and France.
Representatives from these countries have been the guest of honor five times. Leaders from the Soviet Union/Russia have done so four times, as have leaders from Bhutan. An American has only been the chief guest once, in 2015.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


Succession and Punishment

The news last week that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not plan to retire when his term as president ends in 2024 was not particularly surprising .
Putin has ruled the country for more than two decades , including for four years in 2008-2012 during which , because of the Russian Constitution ’ s pesky term limits , he had to serve as prime minister rather than president .
It was never plausible that he would simply ride off into the sunset .
Instead , he declared , he will amend the constitution to formalize a yet undefined State Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The question of succession does , however , present Putin with a puzzle that he has only begun to solve .
The issue has bedeviled Russian leaders for centuries .
There is an obvious risk in staying around for too long .
Many of Russia ’ s tsars would have done well to have taken early retirement , before they built up powerful enemies who had them strangled ( Paul I ) , bombed ( Alexander II ) , or shot , bayoneted , and doused with acid ( Nicholas II ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had a softer touch , with deposed leaders generally allowed to retire in Siberian obscurity .
In the Soviet period , it was the ousted deputy leaders , men who came too close to taking power , who were often killed .
The long-serving secret police chief Lavrenty Beria was shot through the forehead in 1953 , while Joseph Stalin ’ s rival Leon Trotsky was felled with an ice pick wedged two inches deep in his skull .
More recently , the assassination of former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sobering reminder that political violence related to succession questions is not safely confined to the history books .
Russia ’ s rulers are trying hard to keep the succession process as controlled as they can .
Russia ’ s rulers are trying hard , therefore , to keep the succession process as controlled as they can .
Given the complicated history , one might have expected Putin to worry about surrendering the reins of presidential power in 2024 , even if he will stay on at the State Council .
Indeed , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ days ago , he was reportedly asked to stay in office , with the veterans requesting that “ his work as president running the country not be limited to a specific duration.
” Why not become president for life ?
It is a path trodden by many dictators before him .
Yet Putin told the veterans that his staying would put Russia on the road toward stagnation : “ It would be alarming to return to the situation in the mid-1980s , when the leaders of the state remained in power until the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ providing the necessary conditions for the transformation of government.
” He was thinking , of course , of the succession of Soviet leaders in the 1980s—Leonid Brezhnev , Yuri Andropov , Konstantin Chernenko—who were each so old and ill that government ground to a halt .
At the time , U.S. President Ronald Reagan joked that he couldn ’ t even negotiate with Soviet leaders because “ they keep dying on me.
” The Soviet leader who lived long enough to negotiate with Reagan—Mikhail Gorbachev , who launched the reform process that brought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evidently desires in his successors .
But Putin is looking for a very different set of results .
Many Russians , especially those who support the Kremlin , like to envision an alternate version of history whereby Andropov , who ruled the Soviet Union from 1982 to 1984 , had been healthier and lived longer .
Before catapulting to the country ’ s highest office , Andropov had run the KGB for more than a decade , so he knew the Soviet system ’ s weaknesses .
He backed a campaign against corruption @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was intended to purge crime and make government more efficient .
He realized the need for reforms but wanted them implemented in a way that threatened neither the anti-Western foreign policy nor the authoritarian politics that constituted the core of the Soviet system .
Perhaps if he had lived longer , many imagine , Andropov ’ s reforms might have saved the Soviet Union .
The rosy interpretation of Putin ’ s constitutional rejiggering is that it will enable him to select a successor who can implement an Andropov-style agenda of reforms to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and thereby strengthen and preserve Russia ’ s political and economic structure .
Seemingly to this end , Putin has already appointed a new prime minister , Mikhail Mishustin , a bureaucrat best known for skillfully using technology to make Russia ’ s tax collection more efficient .
More appointments of younger technocrats may follow .
Optimistic Russians , including some close to the Kremlin , imagine similarities to Singapore .
The city-state ’ s founding father , Lee Kuan Yew , continued to serve in the cabinet after he retired as prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as regimented and efficient as it was under his personal rule .
Similarly , Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping continued to shape Chinese politics long into his retirement in the 1990s , even though his only formal position was as honorary president of China ’ s association for bridge , his favorite card game .
The difference between this scenario and Putin ’ s succession , however , is that Russia is not hyper-efficient Singapore .
Nor is it like Deng ’ s China , with its booming economy amid economic reforms .
No @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lee , Putin can continue yielding power from behind the scenes .
The question is whether the continuity Putin promises is a good thing for Russia .
When he was not playing cards , Deng used his power in retirement to defend China ’ s shift toward capitalism against those who wanted to reassert state control over the economy .
Lee , meanwhile , sought to preserve the economic miracle he had presided over .
Preserving Putin ’ s legacy means what , exactly ?
He will guarantee that Russia never surrenders Crimea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ West continues , and that its economy remains stuck in a rut .
More than half—59 percent—of Russians , most of whom are scarcely better off today than a decade ago , tell pollsters that they want “ decisive ” change .
That number that has grown with each passing year .
Putin ’ s succession plan , however , is to promise that nothing will change—and to appoint as prime minister a tax collector .
It is not a recipe for popular excitement .
For all of Putin ’ s interest in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which , as he noted in remarks this month , Soviet leaders delayed reforms and “ remained in power until the end of their days ” —the constitutional rejiggering shows that he doesn ’ t have any better ideas .
He may not be president-for-life .
But if he spends his life as chairman of the State Council , will things be any different ?
The dilemma is that Russians want change but Putin does not .
Russians want a fairer political system and higher living standards , but the political elites fear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Putin ’ s deputies fear change , too , lest one of their rivals takes the top slot , and they end up cast from power or worse .
Andropov , the Soviet leader whom Putin most admires , was actually lucky to have died in 1984 , after only a year and a half in office .
Had he lived longer , he would have discovered the difficulties of simultaneously satisfying a populace that demands change and an elite that refuses to surrender its privileges .
Putin appears to be hoping that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the State Council , he can leave to his underlings the tough work of managing a disgruntled population and a fractious elite .
But there will be no doubt about who is ultimately in charge .

The news last week that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not plan to retire when his term as president ends in 2024 was not particularly surprising. Putin has ruled the country for more than two decades, including for four years in 2008-2012 during which, because of the Russian Constitution’s pesky term limits, he had to serve as prime minister rather than president. It was never plausible that he would simply ride off into the sunset. Instead, he declared, he will amend the constitution to formalize a yet undefined State Council, which he seems likely to lead.
The news last week that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not plan to retire when his term as president ends in 2024 was not particularly surprising. Putin has ruled the country for more than two decades, including for four years in 2008-2012 during which, because of the Russian Constitution’s pesky term limits, he had to serve as prime minister rather than president. It was never plausible that he would simply ride off into the sunset. Instead, he declared, he will amend the constitution to formalize a yet undefined State Council, which he seems likely to lead.
The question of succession does, however, present Putin with a puzzle that he has only begun to solve. The issue has bedeviled Russian leaders for centuries. There is an obvious risk in staying around for too long. Many of Russia’s tsars would have done well to have taken early retirement, before they built up powerful enemies who had them strangled (Paul I), bombed (Alexander II), or shot, bayoneted, and doused with acid (Nicholas II). The Soviets, perhaps surprisingly, had a softer touch, with deposed leaders generally allowed to retire in Siberian obscurity.
In the Soviet period, it was the ousted deputy leaders, men who came too close to taking power, who were often killed. The long-serving secret police chief Lavrenty Beria was shot through the forehead in 1953, while Joseph Stalin’s rival Leon Trotsky was felled with an ice pick wedged two inches deep in his skull. More recently, the assassination of former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov on the street outside the Kremlin in 2015 provided a sobering reminder that political violence related to succession questions is not safely confined to the history books.
Russia’s rulers are trying hard to keep the succession process as controlled as they can.
Russia’s rulers are trying hard, therefore, to keep the succession process as controlled as they can. Given the complicated history, one might have expected Putin to worry about surrendering the reins of presidential power in 2024, even if he will stay on at the State Council. Indeed, meeting with a group of veterans several days ago, he was reportedly asked to stay in office, with the veterans requesting that “his work as president running the country not be limited to a specific duration.”
Why not become president for life? It is a path trodden by many dictators before him. Yet Putin told the veterans that his staying would put Russia on the road toward stagnation: “It would be alarming to return to the situation in the mid-1980s, when the leaders of the state remained in power until the end of their days … while not providing the necessary conditions for the transformation of government.” He was thinking, of course, of the succession of Soviet leaders in the 1980s—Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko—who were each so old and ill that government ground to a halt.
At the time, U.S. President Ronald Reagan joked that he couldn’t even negotiate with Soviet leaders because “they keep dying on me.” The Soviet leader who lived long enough to negotiate with Reagan—Mikhail Gorbachev, who launched the reform process that brought down Soviet communism—had the energy that Putin evidently desires in his successors. But Putin is looking for a very different set of results.
Many Russians, especially those who support the Kremlin, like to envision an alternate version of history whereby Andropov, who ruled the Soviet Union from 1982 to 1984, had been healthier and lived longer. Before catapulting to the country’s highest office, Andropov had run the KGB for more than a decade, so he knew the Soviet system’s weaknesses. He backed a campaign against corruption, spearheaded by the KGB, that was intended to purge crime and make government more efficient. He realized the need for reforms but wanted them implemented in a way that threatened neither the anti-Western foreign policy nor the authoritarian politics that constituted the core of the Soviet system. Perhaps if he had lived longer, many imagine, Andropov’s reforms might have saved the Soviet Union.
The rosy interpretation of Putin’s constitutional rejiggering is that it will enable him to select a successor who can implement an Andropov-style agenda of reforms to make the bureaucracy more efficient and effective and thereby strengthen and preserve Russia’s political and economic structure. Seemingly to this end, Putin has already appointed a new prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, a bureaucrat best known for skillfully using technology to make Russia’s tax collection more efficient. More appointments of younger technocrats may follow.
Optimistic Russians, including some close to the Kremlin, imagine similarities to Singapore. The city-state’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, continued to serve in the cabinet after he retired as prime minister, guaranteeing that everything would stay as regimented and efficient as it was under his personal rule. Similarly, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping continued to shape Chinese politics long into his retirement in the 1990s, even though his only formal position was as honorary president of China’s association for bridge, his favorite card game.
The difference between this scenario and Putin’s succession, however, is that Russia is not hyper-efficient Singapore. Nor is it like Deng’s China, with its booming economy amid economic reforms. No one doubts that, like Deng or Lee, Putin can continue yielding power from behind the scenes. The question is whether the continuity Putin promises is a good thing for Russia.
When he was not playing cards, Deng used his power in retirement to defend China’s shift toward capitalism against those who wanted to reassert state control over the economy. Lee, meanwhile, sought to preserve the economic miracle he had presided over. Preserving Putin’s legacy means what, exactly? He will guarantee that Russia never surrenders Crimea, that its costly clash with the West continues, and that its economy remains stuck in a rut. More than half—59 percent—of Russians, most of whom are scarcely better off today than a decade ago, tell pollsters that they want “decisive” change. That number that has grown with each passing year. Putin’s succession plan, however, is to promise that nothing will change—and to appoint as prime minister a tax collector. It is not a recipe for popular excitement.
For all of Putin’s interest in avoiding a scenario like the early 1980s—in which, as he noted in remarks this month, Soviet leaders delayed reforms and “remained in power until the end of their days”—the constitutional rejiggering shows that he doesn’t have any better ideas. He may not be president-for-life. But if he spends his life as chairman of the State Council, will things be any different?
The dilemma is that Russians want change but Putin does not. Russians want a fairer political system and higher living standards, but the political elites fear reforms that would threaten their status. Putin’s deputies fear change, too, lest one of their rivals takes the top slot, and they end up cast from power or worse. Andropov, the Soviet leader whom Putin most admires, was actually lucky to have died in 1984, after only a year and a half in office. Had he lived longer, he would have discovered the difficulties of simultaneously satisfying a populace that demands change and an elite that refuses to surrender its privileges. Putin appears to be hoping that, by moving from the presidency to the State Council, he can leave to his underlings the tough work of managing a disgruntled population and a fractious elite. But there will be no doubt about who is ultimately in charge.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-21--Senators Battle Over Rules as Trump Impeachment Trial Begins

In what may prove a relatively swift proceeding , U.S. senators began to decide Tuesday whether to take the unprecedented step of removing a sitting president from office as Donald Trump ’ s impeachment trial got underway .
While senators in the Republican-held chamber have promised to pursue impartial justice as jurors , the proceeding was fraught with partisan rancor from the start as rules unveiled by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell set a speedy timetable that could see the third impeachment trial in U.S. history concluded ahead of the president ’ s State of the Union address on Feb. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he would use the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton as a blueprint for proceedings .
The rules for the Clinton trial were passed by the chamber in a unanimous vote , but key differences in McConnell ’ s resolution made such a display of bipartisanship unlikely this time around .
The proposed rules initially put forward by McConnell on Monday were a sharp departure from those that governed the Clinton impeachment trial .
However , by the time the resolution was read out in the Senate , a couple of key changes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those used in 1999 trial .
The initial draft rules would have given both House impeachment managers and the president ’ s defense team 24 hours to make their case to the chamber over a two-day period .
With proceedings set to being at 1 p.m. each day , this could have seen arguments continue until well past midnight and be wrapped up by the weekend .
Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer accused McConnell of orchestrating a “ cover-up ” and said that the proposed rules would see key evidence heard “ in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This was later extended to give both sides three days to present their arguments , mirroring the proceedings of the Clinton trial .
In another about-face , the draft resolution published Monday would have required a separate vote at the tail end of the trial to admit evidence gathered by House impeachment investigators .
But the resolution put forth on Tuesday would see the House ’ s evidence automatically entered into the record of the Senate trial , as happened during the Clinton impeachment trial .
The changes were made after Republican senators @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Maine , raised concerns about the two provisions , according to the New York Times .
Once both sides have presented their evidence , senators will have 16 hours to put their questions to either side , which is likely to take place early next week .
Questions will be submitted through Chief Justice John Roberts , who will preside over the trial .
After four more hours of arguments , lawmakers will weigh whether to subpoena further witnesses or documents .
The Democrats are keen to hear from witnesses close to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of staff Mick Mulvaney and former National Security Advisor John Bolton .
They have argued that these senior officials or ex-officials could give key evidence about Trump ’ s involvement in efforts to pressure Ukrainian authorities to announce corruption investigations that could aid his 2020 reelection chances .
It is unclear whether Schumer would be able to woo the four Republican votes needed to support calling further witnesses .
House Democrats concluded this past December that , in soliciting election interference , Trump had abused the power of his office , which was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impeachment .
The second article , obstruction of Congress , concerned the president ’ s efforts to prevent key officials and documents from being made available to House investigators during the fall .
In a 110-page brief submitted to the Senate on Monday , Trump ’ s lawyers outlined their defense of the president , describing the impeachment as a “ brazenly political act.
” Without disputing the underlying facts of the case , the president ’ s legal defense team argued that the articles of impeachment were baseless , as he hadn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acted within the bounds of executive privilege .
Legal scholars have challenged the notion that an impeachable offense must also be a criminal one .
Last week the Government Accountability Office , an independent federal watchdog , concluded that the president had broken the law by temporarily withholding almost $ 400 million in military aid to Ukraine , which had already been appropriated by Congress .
The decision was just the latest new development to emerge in recent weeks .
On the eve of Wednesday ’ s House vote to hand over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House Democrats released a tranche of documents and messages provided to lawmakers by Lev Parnas , who was closely involved in efforts by the president ’ s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani to lean on Ukrainian officials .
Included among the documents is a letter from Giuliani requesting a personal meeting with the president of Ukraine in which he states he was acting “ In my capacity as personal counsel to President Trump and with his knowledge and consent , ” the first explicit piece of evidence that undercuts the already strained argument that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Ukraine .
House impeachment managers , who serve as prosecutors during the trial , submitted their own detailed filing on Saturday , restating their case for impeaching the president and arguing that Trump ’ s conduct is an ongoing threat to the integrity of U.S. elections .
On Friday , the White House confirmed three new additions to Trump ’ s legal defense team : Ken Starr , who oversaw the investigation that led to Clinton ’ s impeachment ; the former Harvard University law professor Alan Dershowitz ; and Robert Ray @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counsel in the Clinton probe .
On Monday night the White House named the eight House Republican lawmakers who will serve as part of the president ’ s defense team .
Among them are John Ratcliffe of Texas , Jim Jordan of Ohio , Mark Meadows of North Carolina , and Elise Stefanik of New York , who were some of Trump ’ s most strident defenders during the impeachment investigation .
In what is set to be a day of dueling narratives , Trump is in Davos , Switzerland , where he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Forum on Tuesday morning .
Asked whether Trump was planning on watching the impeachment trial from Davos , White House press secretary Stephanie Grisham said , “ He has a full day here in Davos , but will be briefed by staff periodically.
” Update , Jan. 21 , 2020 : This story was updated to reflect changes to the rules proposed by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell .

In what may prove a relatively swift proceeding, U.S. senators began to decide Tuesday whether to take the unprecedented step of removing a sitting president from office as Donald Trump’s impeachment trial got underway.
In what may prove a relatively swift proceeding, U.S. senators began to decide Tuesday whether to take the unprecedented step of removing a sitting president from office as Donald Trump’s impeachment trial got underway.
While senators in the Republican-held chamber have promised to pursue impartial justice as jurors, the proceeding was fraught with partisan rancor from the start as rules unveiled by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell set a speedy timetable that could see the third impeachment trial in U.S. history concluded ahead of the president’s State of the Union address on Feb. 4.
McConnell had previously indicated that he would use the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton as a blueprint for proceedings. The rules for the Clinton trial were passed by the chamber in a unanimous vote, but key differences in McConnell’s resolution made such a display of bipartisanship unlikely this time around.
The proposed rules initially put forward by McConnell on Monday were a sharp departure from those that governed the Clinton impeachment trial. However, by the time the resolution was read out in the Senate, a couple of key changes had brought proceedings more in line with those used in 1999 trial.
The initial draft rules would have given both House impeachment managers and the president’s defense team 24 hours to make their case to the chamber over a two-day period. With proceedings set to being at 1 p.m. each day, this could have seen arguments continue until well past midnight and be wrapped up by the weekend.
Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer accused McConnell of orchestrating a “cover-up” and said that the proposed rules would see key evidence heard “in the wee hours of the morning.” This was later extended to give both sides three days to present their arguments, mirroring the proceedings of the Clinton trial.
In another about-face, the draft resolution published Monday would have required a separate vote at the tail end of the trial to admit evidence gathered by House impeachment investigators. But the resolution put forth on Tuesday would see the House’s evidence automatically entered into the record of the Senate trial, as happened during the Clinton impeachment trial.
The changes were made after Republican senators, including possible swing voter Susan Collins of Maine, raised concerns about the two provisions, according to the New York Times.
Once both sides have presented their evidence, senators will have 16 hours to put their questions to either side, which is likely to take place early next week. Questions will be submitted through Chief Justice John Roberts, who will preside over the trial. After four more hours of arguments, lawmakers will weigh whether to subpoena further witnesses or documents.
The Democrats are keen to hear from witnesses close to the president such as his acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and former National Security Advisor John Bolton. They have argued that these senior officials or ex-officials could give key evidence about Trump’s involvement in efforts to pressure Ukrainian authorities to announce corruption investigations that could aid his 2020 reelection chances. It is unclear whether Schumer would be able to woo the four Republican votes needed to support calling further witnesses.
House Democrats concluded this past December that, in soliciting election interference, Trump had abused the power of his office, which was the grounds for the first article of impeachment. The second article, obstruction of Congress, concerned the president’s efforts to prevent key officials and documents from being made available to House investigators during the fall.
In a 110-page brief submitted to the Senate on Monday, Trump’s lawyers outlined their defense of the president, describing the impeachment as a “brazenly political act.” Without disputing the underlying facts of the case, the president’s legal defense team argued that the articles of impeachment were baseless, as he hadn’t broken the law and had acted within the bounds of executive privilege. Legal scholars have challenged the notion that an impeachable offense must also be a criminal one.
Last week the Government Accountability Office, an independent federal watchdog, concluded that the president had broken the law by temporarily withholding almost $400 million in military aid to Ukraine, which had already been appropriated by Congress. The decision was just the latest new development to emerge in recent weeks.
On the eve of Wednesday’s House vote to hand over the articles of impeachment to the Senate, House Democrats released a tranche of documents and messages provided to lawmakers by Lev Parnas, who was closely involved in efforts by the president’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani to lean on Ukrainian officials.
Included among the documents is a letter from Giuliani requesting a personal meeting with the president of Ukraine in which he states he was acting “In my capacity as personal counsel to President Trump and with his knowledge and consent,” the first explicit piece of evidence that undercuts the already strained argument that Giuliani was acting on his own initiative in Ukraine.
House impeachment managers, who serve as prosecutors during the trial, submitted their own detailed filing on Saturday, restating their case for impeaching the president and arguing that Trump’s conduct is an ongoing threat to the integrity of U.S. elections.
On Friday, the White House confirmed three new additions to Trump’s legal defense team: Ken Starr, who oversaw the investigation that led to Clinton’s impeachment; the former Harvard University law professor Alan Dershowitz; and Robert Ray, who succeeded Starr as the independent counsel in the Clinton probe.
On Monday night the White House named the eight House Republican lawmakers who will serve as part of the president’s defense team. Among them are John Ratcliffe of Texas, Jim Jordan of Ohio, Mark Meadows of North Carolina, and Elise Stefanik of New York, who were some of Trump’s most strident defenders during the impeachment investigation.
In what is set to be a day of dueling narratives, Trump is in Davos, Switzerland, where he gave a speech at the World Economic Forum on Tuesday morning.
Asked whether Trump was planning on watching the impeachment trial from Davos, White House press secretary Stephanie Grisham said, “He has a full day here in Davos, but will be briefed by staff periodically.”
Update, Jan. 21, 2020: This story was updated to reflect changes to the rules proposed by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-21--Will Abiy Ahmed’s Bet on Ethiopia’s Political Future Pay Off?

Will Abiy Ahmed ’ s Bet on Ethiopia ’ s Political Future Pay Off ?
In its place a new party was formed , led by Ethiopia ’ s new prime minister and the EPRDF ’ s last chairman , Abiy Ahmed—heralding , according to its supporters , an entirely new mode of politics .
The Prosperity Party ( PP ) has done away with the four-part ethnic coalition structure which made up the EPRDF : the Tigrayan Peoples ’ Liberation Front , the Amhara National Democratic Movement ( later Amhara Democratic Party ) , the Oromo Peoples ’ Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the Southern Ethiopian Peoples ’ Democratic Movement .
It will instead be a single organization spanning the entire country .
To its supporters , the PP offers an escape from the divisive and , increasingly deadly , ethnic politics which characterized three decades of EPRDF rule .
To its critics , it is the thin end of the wedge towards abandonment of the 1995 constitution and the principle of ethnic self-rule—ethnic federalism—which it enshrines .
It is perhaps the single most significant—some say boldest—move yet from the Nobel Peace Prize-winning prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an already desperately polarized country even further apart .
Two new books provide some insight into how Ethiopia reached this epochal juncture .
In Laying the Past to Rest , former insider Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe narrates the history of the EPRDF from its origins in the student movement of the 1960s through the untimely death of Meles , its chief ideological architect , in 2012 .
Appropriately , given his background as one its early founders , the book focuses on TPLF , the ethnic Tigrayan guerrilla movement which created the EPRDF in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Marxist junta known as the Derg , and dominated it from the latter ’ s overthrow in 1991 until Abiy ’ s appointment in early 2018 .
Though the book stops before the EPRDF ’ s final act , it nonetheless helps explain the mindset—a mixture of conviction and arrogance—that led the TPLF to announce this month that it alone among the EPRDF ’ s four constituent organizations would not join the PP .
Mulugeta , now a senior fellow at Tufts University ’ s World Peace Foundation , offers a granular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it would later come to dominate .
He draws on his experience as a “ participant-observer ” of the struggle and the EPRDF ’ s first decade in power , as well as extensive interviews with senior party members and a close reading of its official documents .
The book reads not as memoir but as a dispassionate academic analysis , which can be frustrating .
But beneath the dry , detached prose lies a sharp and ultimately excoriating critique of the party to which he once devoted his life .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the halls of power with astonishing discipline and guile .
But , like the hero of a Greek tragedy , it was undone by a fatal flaw : a culture of secrecy and insularity formed in the struggle years that gradually pulled it apart from its own members and coalition partners .
He quotes a TPLF veteran recalling the self-denial of the early days : “ Our fighters made their own shoes from local materials .
They wore clothes taken from the government army during battles and secondhand clothes collected by our supporters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Europe .
We discouraged smoking among our fighters and only provided 5 pieces of cigarettes to those who prior to joining the liberation army had an addiction , and we had detailed guidelines that enabled us to discourage smoking.
” The contrast with the corruption and entitlement which , by the turn of the millennium , began to characterize senior cadres—not only within the TPLF but also the OPDO and the ANDM—is as poignant as it is striking .
But the change was hardly unexpected for a rebel movement-turned-ruling party , whose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ struggle .
Rather , what was uniquely damaging , Mulugeta argues , was the wholesale capture of the state by the party , especially in the years following the 2005 national election—the closest thing to a free contest in Ethiopian history and in which a coalition of opposition parties claimed victory .
Spooked , the EPRDF ramped up repression and vastly expanded its ranks , tying civil service recruitment to party membership .
What was uniquely damaging , Mulugeta argues , was the wholesale capture of the state by the party , especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election .
This mattered not only because it made the state less effective in delivering the rapid development the party promised but also because it widened the scope for “ rent-seeking ” and corruption , as politics became one of the few avenues for advancement .
An organization renowned for its intellectualism was overrun by grifters and opportunists .
Political education atrophied : Mulugeta recounts with mild horror how , by the mid-2000s , “ efforts to create a wide-ranging consensus on EPRDF values were limited to irregular lectures given to thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Cadres ceased to read ideological literature , and were no longer encouraged to do so .
Anyone with critical or independent thought deserted .
As Mulugeta , himself among them , once put it to me : “ By the time of Meles ’ s death , the whole organization was done.
” These were the roots of the crisis of 2016 , which erupted following the government ’ s doomed attempt to introduce a new “ integrated ” master plan for Addis Ababa , the capital , and the surrounding region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of this period is quietly damning , blaming “ careerist elites ” within the OPDO ( including some of Abiy ’ s allies , many would argue ) for cynically stirring up opposition among Oromo farmers : “ The elites administering the environs of Addis were against this plan as it might curb their rent-seeking by setting out a plan that controls the use of land they used to allocate in different ways.
” Rather than trying to assuage concerns , he argues , they deliberately misrepresented the master plan as a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ young Oromo men , by this point known as the Qeerroo , in a revolt against it .
The rest is history : Protests , galvanized by activists in the diaspora , swept across Oromia and then into Amhara—the two largest regions—and increasingly focused on bringing down the TPLF , which both the OPDO and ANDM shared an interest in dislodging from the leadership of the EPRDF .
States of emergency , first in 2016-2017 and then again in early 2018 , forced Meles ’ s successor , Hailemariam Desalegn , to resign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the OPDO to take the helm of the ruling party .
What Mulugeta does not say , but which is implicit in this critique , is that Abiy and his colleagues were brought to power less by the street than by the venality of Oromo elites , whose rent-seeking behavior unleashed popular discontent and furthered their political ambitions .
Whether this in the long-run may have been a good thing—he concludes the book by calling for “ a more liberal form of democracy ” as an answer to Ethiopia ’ s woes—is unclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ me he expressed deep skepticism toward the country ’ s new leaders , despite their more liberal leanings .
The grave consequences of fusing party and state is also a central theme of The Puzzle of Ethiopian Politics by Terrance Lyons , a longtime American observer of Ethiopian politics at George Mason University .
This book , which takes a wider view of the EPRDF , focusing less on the culture of the TPLF and more on the evolving power dynamics between the four member organizations , provides an eminently readable and accessible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dissents from Mulugeta ’ s view that the merging of party and state represented a reversal of the TPLF ’ s early instincts .
Rather , he sees it as a natural extension into government of the TPLF ’ s neo-Maoist wartime tendency to combine military and political authority .
“ The blurring of institutional roles present during the armed struggle remained after the transition , ” he writes , “ re-created in the relationship between the political party and the country.
” He is also less delicate in denouncing it .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ … [ It ] is a party-business-non-government-organization-military-mass-organization-state , where the lines among all of these different facets of the EPRDF overlap and are blurred by design.
” This had a disturbing impact on Ethiopian politics , entrenching a culture of paranoid authoritarianism , which may take decades to unwind .
As Lyons explains , “ when combined with the conviction that the party represents the ‘ people , ’ then the party-state-people complex is complete and impossible for the opposition to challenge without being categorized as ‘ anti-people , ’ ‘ anti-development , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now , despite a more tolerant disposition towards dissent , those in government , including Abiy himself , can be quick to smear critics as “ anti-peace , ” or , in the latest lexicon , “ enemies of the reform.
” This is part of the EPRDF ’ s legacy .
Lyons ’ s study is particularly illuminating in explaining why the coalition unraveled .
Uniquely , he offers statistics to show how the TPLF ’ s dominance was gradually eroded by the OPDO and ANDM in the years after Meles ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , SEPDM , was always weakest ) .
Data on appointments to the central committees of each is especially revealing .
Between 2003 and 2013 , the TPLF added an average of eight new members , fewer than the others , which helped to ensure its cohesion and stability .
But this advantage diminished over time .
“ By the mid-2010s , ” Lyons observes , “ the ANDM and the OPDO had Central Committees that more closely resembled that of the TPLF and , therefore , were positioned better to compete with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” By 2015 , the leadership of all four organizations converged in terms of seniority and experience .
But neither anticipated such a sudden demise ( both books were released before the PP came into existence ) .
Indeed , Lyons argues that “ the EPRDF as a political organization remains dominant and is likely to remain , ” not least because the dramatic change of leadership at the top belies “ considerable continuity ” in the party structures beneath .
Moreover , he adds , “ each member party has strong incentives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ access to the resources that remain concentrated at the center.
” This then poses an important question : Is the EPRDF really dead ?
In some respects , after all , it has simply been rebranded .
Minus the TPLF , and the many low-level officials purged over the last two years , the personnel is unchanged ; Abiy and his colleagues are all children of the EPRDF .
Party offices remain the same , only with a new logo .
Its enormous economic assets—notably party-owned endowment funds with sprawling interests across a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pending a settlement with the TPLF over its share .
And when it comes to the election scheduled for later this year , the PP will enjoy the same advantages of incumbency , not least a pliant state media .
Meles ’ s death simply removed the last line of defense against eventual fragmentation , ultimately precipitating a violent rush for control of both the party and the state .
In a recent article , a senior PP official made the case for the new party , promising a radical break from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the PP would do what the EPRDF failed to do , and separate itself from the state entirely .
“ The courts really should be courts .
Parliament really should be parliament .
And , above all , the party really should just be a party , ” he wrote .
But old habits die hard : In recent weeks , for instance , the Addis Ababa city administration used public money to hold forums across the capital educating ordinary citizens on the PP ’ s bylaws and political program .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the selective prosecution of senior TPLF figures , pursued by the attorney general ’ s office as part of Abiy ’ s battle against his political rivals .
Still , as both books make amply clear , an EPRDF without the TPLF can not be the EPRDF .
In this respect , and more , the old party is dead .
Ideologically , the difference is profound .
The TPLF ’ s Marxist-tinged leftism is gone ; the PP is so much more economically liberal that it recently signed a $ 2.9 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , something the party of Meles always resisted out of pride , ideology , and refusal of conditions imposed from abroad .
The TPLF ’ s core ideological doctrines of “ revolutionary democracy ” ( a Leninist-Maoist form of mass participation conceived in opposition to Western liberal democracy ) and “ democratic centralism ” ( a form of party democracy which strictly prohibits internal dissent once an agreement is reached through theoretically open deliberation ) have been ditched .
In their place is Abiy ’ s notion of “ Medemer , ” published @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appears to advocate something like a “ third way ” between free market capitalism and state-led development .
In his article , the senior PP official described the party as centrist .
“ Instead of ideological certainty , there is a need for the Prosperity Party to embrace a more pragmatic , reflective mode of inquiry , ” he wrote .
More significant still is the dissolution of the ethnic factions .
The OPDO , ANDM , and SEPDM no longer exist , replaced instead by “ regional chapters “ open to individuals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the country .
This means , as one senior PP official stressed to me , that the party can now incorporate all Ethiopians , including those of mixed heritage .
Moreover , he added , “ now people living in Oromia with an Amhara background , for instance , can be represented .
That is the fundamental difference with the EPRDF.
” It is also the most controversial part—for those who cherish the ethnic basis of the federal system .
It forced Abiy ’ s closest ally , defense minister and former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to publicly denounce the plan ( though he seems to have been won over , at least reluctantly , in recent weeks ) .
It also prompted the influential Oromo activist Jawar Mohammed to announce that he will run in the election explicitly on a platform of defending the ethno-federal set-up .
The TPLF , meanwhile , decried the PP as “ illegal and reactionary.
” For the latter , part of the objection lies in the fact that the new party will have to scrap the equal voting model of the EPRDF—each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of party votes , regardless of population size—in favor of a proportional system , inevitably favoring the much more numerous Amhara and Oromo .
However , like other ethnonationalists , they also fear that the PP , with its more centralized and streamlined model of decision-making—the party ’ s national leadership will nominate the heads of its regional branches , for instance—will over time erode ethnic and regional autonomy .
Although the EPRDF was weak , divided and bereft of legitimacy , its sudden death was not inevitable .
Such a change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , perverse : Jawar has often noted that the wave of protests in Oromia which brought Abiy to power explicitly demanded less interference in regional affairs , not more .
The fact that opposition to the plan has come from so many quarters—including from those , like Jawar , who were once staunch critics of the EPRDF—is revealing .
It shows that although the EPRDF was weak , divided , and bereft of legitimacy , its sudden death was not inevitable .
The puzzle of why it disappeared so rapidly is an issue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on organization and structure rather than the work of individuals , are less equipped to answer .
This is because a large part of the explanation lies with Abiy himself .
Since coming to power in April 2018 , he has taken steps—some admirable , some avoidable—which made the end of the EPRDF much more likely .
First , his decision to move so aggressively against the TPLF—removing their leaders from federal institutions , issuing arrest warrants—destroyed whatever remained of the trust between it and the rest of the coalition .
Second , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EPRDF and its guiding doctrines , while allowing colleagues to publicly and often savagely censure each other , he ensured the irrevocable loss of internal unity .
Finally , he simply made it happen .
Believing the EPRDF brand to be too toxic for a successful election campaign , Abiy decided he had no alternative but to ditch it and create something new in time for 2020 .
He rammed the merger through the party organs so quickly ( some say illegally ) that it was almost impossible to mount any organized opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ city of Adama told me only weeks before the dissolution was finalized that he and his colleagues had been told barely anything about the plan .
By then it was , in effect , a fait accompli .
It remains to be seen whether a precipitous wind-up of a party so closely entwined with the state will be a salve for Ethiopia ’ s troubles .
Nor is it yet clear what its demise means for ethnic federalism .
In fact , Abiy and the PP publicly argue ( albeit unconvincingly ) that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of federalism , not its demise .
They insist—contrary to the claims of the TPLF , Jawar , and others—that there will be no repeal of regional rights guaranteed by the current model of ethnic federalism even if constitutional changes are on the horizon .
There could also be political fallout from his reforms .
Indeed , Abiy ’ s biggest gamble could backfire electorally : Many observers reckon the PP will struggle to win votes in his home region of Oromia , where it will be competing with a raft of explicitly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Liberation Front .
What is not in doubt , however , is that Abiy has done something which will recast Ethiopian politics more dramatically than either of these authors until very recently thought possible .

The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was once Africa’s largest, and arguably most powerful, political party. It was also, thanks to its business interests, its richest. Since coming to power in 1991, the coalition party controlled each tier of government in Africa’s second most-populous nation. In the last national election, held in 2015, it won every seat in the federal parliament.
The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was once Africa’s largest, and arguably most powerful, political party. It was also, thanks to its business interests, its richest. Since coming to power in 1991, the coalition party controlled each tier of government in Africa’s second most-populous nation. In the last national election, held in 2015, it won every seat in the federal parliament. Until as recently as 2016, it seemed indomitable, its leadership boasting that the vision set out by former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi would guide the country for decades into the future. Yet, on Dec. 1, 2019, the EPRDF quietly disappeared—“demolished,” according to one of its former leaders, “with betrayal.”
In its place a new party was formed, led by Ethiopia’s new prime minister and the EPRDF’s last chairman, Abiy Ahmed—heralding, according to its supporters, an entirely new mode of politics. The Prosperity Party (PP) has done away with the four-part ethnic coalition structure which made up the EPRDF: the Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (later Amhara Democratic Party), the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (later Oromo Democratic Party), and the Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement. It will instead be a single organization spanning the entire country.
To its supporters, the PP offers an escape from the divisive and, increasingly deadly, ethnic politics which characterized three decades of EPRDF rule. To its critics, it is the thin end of the wedge towards abandonment of the 1995 constitution and the principle of ethnic self-rule—ethnic federalism—which it enshrines. It is perhaps the single most significant—some say boldest—move yet from the Nobel Peace Prize-winning prime minister. But it could also tear an already desperately polarized country even further apart.
Two new books provide some insight into how Ethiopia reached this epochal juncture. In Laying the Past to Rest, former insider Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe narrates the history of the EPRDF from its origins in the student movement of the 1960s through the untimely death of Meles, its chief ideological architect, in 2012. Appropriately, given his background as one its early founders, the book focuses on TPLF, the ethnic Tigrayan guerrilla movement which created the EPRDF in the late 1980s during the struggle against the Marxist junta known as the Derg, and dominated it from the latter’s overthrow in 1991 until Abiy’s appointment in early 2018.
Though the book stops before the EPRDF’s final act, it nonetheless helps explain the mindset—a mixture of conviction and arrogance—that led the TPLF to announce this month that it alone among the EPRDF’s four constituent organizations would not join the PP.
Mulugeta, now a senior fellow at Tufts University’s World Peace Foundation, offers a granular history of the TPLF and the EPRDF that it would later come to dominate. He draws on his experience as a “participant-observer” of the struggle and the EPRDF’s first decade in power, as well as extensive interviews with senior party members and a close reading of its official documents. The book reads not as memoir but as a dispassionate academic analysis, which can be frustrating. But beneath the dry, detached prose lies a sharp and ultimately excoriating critique of the party to which he once devoted his life.
The TPLF climbed out the bush and into the halls of power with astonishing discipline and guile. But, like the hero of a Greek tragedy, it was undone by a fatal flaw: a culture of secrecy and insularity formed in the struggle years that gradually pulled it apart from its own members and coalition partners.
Mulugeta tells the story of a movement whose success in battle was unmatched almost anywhere on the continent. But then, like many other African liberation movements, it failed to adapt to the demands of government—transparency and accountability, above all. As he has put it elsewhere: “It was like having a football team, a really good football team, suddenly transform into a basketball team. It did not go smoothly.” Instead it began to resemble an oligarchy.
He quotes a TPLF veteran recalling the self-denial of the early days: “Our fighters made their own shoes from local materials. They wore clothes taken from the government army during battles and secondhand clothes collected by our supporters and/or purchased in the secondhand clothing market in Europe. We discouraged smoking among our fighters and only provided 5 pieces of cigarettes to those who prior to joining the liberation army had an addiction, and we had detailed guidelines that enabled us to discourage smoking.”
The contrast with the corruption and entitlement which, by the turn of the millennium, began to characterize senior cadres—not only within the TPLF but also the OPDO and the ANDM—is as poignant as it is striking. But the change was hardly unexpected for a rebel movement-turned-ruling party, whose leaders gave their best years to the struggle. Rather, what was uniquely damaging, Mulugeta argues, was the wholesale capture of the state by the party, especially in the years following the 2005 national election—the closest thing to a free contest in Ethiopian history and in which a coalition of opposition parties claimed victory. Spooked, the EPRDF ramped up repression and vastly expanded its ranks, tying civil service recruitment to party membership.
What was uniquely damaging, Mulugeta argues, was the wholesale capture of the state by the party, especially in the years following the 2005 national election.
This mattered not only because it made the state less effective in delivering the rapid development the party promised but also because it widened the scope for “rent-seeking” and corruption, as politics became one of the few avenues for advancement.
An organization renowned for its intellectualism was overrun by grifters and opportunists. Political education atrophied: Mulugeta recounts with mild horror how, by the mid-2000s, “efforts to create a wide-ranging consensus on EPRDF values were limited to irregular lectures given to thousands of members at a time via video conferences.” Cadres ceased to read ideological literature, and were no longer encouraged to do so. Anyone with critical or independent thought deserted. As Mulugeta, himself among them, once put it to me: “By the time of Meles’s death, the whole organization was done.”
These were the roots of the crisis of 2016, which erupted following the government’s doomed attempt to introduce a new “integrated” master plan for Addis Ababa, the capital, and the surrounding region of Oromia. Mulugeta’s account of this period is quietly damning, blaming “careerist elites” within the OPDO (including some of Abiy’s allies, many would argue) for cynically stirring up opposition among Oromo farmers: “The elites administering the environs of Addis were against this plan as it might curb their rent-seeking by setting out a plan that controls the use of land they used to allocate in different ways.”
Rather than trying to assuage concerns, he argues, they deliberately misrepresented the master plan as a “land grab” and mobilized farmers and young Oromo men, by this point known as the Qeerroo, in a revolt against it. The rest is history: Protests, galvanized by activists in the diaspora, swept across Oromia and then into Amhara—the two largest regions—and increasingly focused on bringing down the TPLF, which both the OPDO and ANDM shared an interest in dislodging from the leadership of the EPRDF.
States of emergency, first in 2016-2017 and then again in early 2018, forced Meles’s successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, to resign, paving the way for Abiy and the OPDO to take the helm of the ruling party. What Mulugeta does not say, but which is implicit in this critique, is that Abiy and his colleagues were brought to power less by the street than by the venality of Oromo elites, whose rent-seeking behavior unleashed popular discontent and furthered their political ambitions. Whether this in the long-run may have been a good thing—he concludes the book by calling for “a more liberal form of democracy” as an answer to Ethiopia’s woes—is unclear, though in a recent conversation with me he expressed deep skepticism toward the country’s new leaders, despite their more liberal leanings.
The grave consequences of fusing party and state is also a central theme of The Puzzle of Ethiopian Politics by Terrance Lyons, a longtime American observer of Ethiopian politics at George Mason University. This book, which takes a wider view of the EPRDF, focusing less on the culture of the TPLF and more on the evolving power dynamics between the four member organizations, provides an eminently readable and accessible overview of the subject.
But Lyons dissents from Mulugeta’s view that the merging of party and state represented a reversal of the TPLF’s early instincts. Rather, he sees it as a natural extension into government of the TPLF’s neo-Maoist wartime tendency to combine military and political authority. “The blurring of institutional roles present during the armed struggle remained after the transition,” he writes, “re-created in the relationship between the political party and the country.”
He is also less delicate in denouncing it. “Ethiopia is more than a party-state. … [It] is a party-business-non-government-organization-military-mass-organization-state, where the lines among all of these different facets of the EPRDF overlap and are blurred by design.” This had a disturbing impact on Ethiopian politics, entrenching a culture of paranoid authoritarianism, which may take decades to unwind.
As Lyons explains, “when combined with the conviction that the party represents the ‘people,’ then the party-state-people complex is complete and impossible for the opposition to challenge without being categorized as ‘anti-people,’ ‘anti-development,’ or ‘anti-peace.’” Even now, despite a more tolerant disposition towards dissent, those in government, including Abiy himself, can be quick to smear critics as “anti-peace,” or, in the latest lexicon, “enemies of the reform.” This is part of the EPRDF’s legacy.
Lyons’s study is particularly illuminating in explaining why the coalition unraveled. Uniquely, he offers statistics to show how the TPLF’s dominance was gradually eroded by the OPDO and ANDM in the years after Meles’s death (the fractious fourth organization, SEPDM, was always weakest). Data on appointments to the central committees of each is especially revealing.
Between 2003 and 2013, the TPLF added an average of eight new members, fewer than the others, which helped to ensure its cohesion and stability. But this advantage diminished over time. “By the mid-2010s,” Lyons observes, “the ANDM and the OPDO had Central Committees that more closely resembled that of the TPLF and, therefore, were positioned better to compete with the TPLF in intra-EPRDF struggles for power.” By 2015, the leadership of all four organizations converged in terms of seniority and experience.
Both authors see the EPRDF as a victim of its own success in part. A growing economy in the 2000s, and stronger regional governments, both exacerbated the centrifugal tendencies which the 1995 constitution arguably promoted, in part by creating more rent-seeking opportunities for regional elites, and by fueling resentment of the TPLF among Oromo and Amhara elites in particular. Meles’s death simply removed the last line of defense against eventual fragmentation, ultimately precipitating a violent rush for control of both the party and the state.
But neither anticipated such a sudden demise (both books were released before the PP came into existence). Indeed, Lyons argues that “the EPRDF as a political organization remains dominant and is likely to remain,” not least because the dramatic change of leadership at the top belies “considerable continuity” in the party structures beneath. Moreover, he adds, “each member party has strong incentives to remain within the EPRDF to have access to the resources that remain concentrated at the center.”
This then poses an important question: Is the EPRDF really dead? In some respects, after all, it has simply been rebranded. Minus the TPLF, and the many low-level officials purged over the last two years, the personnel is unchanged; Abiy and his colleagues are all children of the EPRDF. Party offices remain the same, only with a new logo. Its enormous economic assets—notably party-owned endowment funds with sprawling interests across a range of industries—will be rolled over, pending a settlement with the TPLF over its share. And when it comes to the election scheduled for later this year, the PP will enjoy the same advantages of incumbency, not least a pliant state media.
Meles’s death simply removed the last line of defense against eventual fragmentation, ultimately precipitating a violent rush for control of both the party and the state.
In a recent article, a senior PP official made the case for the new party, promising a radical break from the past. In particular, he claimed, the PP would do what the EPRDF failed to do, and separate itself from the state entirely. “The courts really should be courts. Parliament really should be parliament. And, above all, the party really should just be a party,” he wrote.
But old habits die hard: In recent weeks, for instance, the Addis Ababa city administration used public money to hold forums across the capital educating ordinary citizens on the PP’s bylaws and political program. Even more troubling is what many see as the selective prosecution of senior TPLF figures, pursued by the attorney general’s office as part of Abiy’s battle against his political rivals.
Still, as both books make amply clear, an EPRDF without the TPLF cannot be the EPRDF. In this respect, and more, the old party is dead. Ideologically, the difference is profound. The TPLF’s Marxist-tinged leftism is gone; the PP is so much more economically liberal that it recently signed a $2.9 billion financing deal with the International Monetary Fund, something the party of Meles always resisted out of pride, ideology, and refusal of conditions imposed from abroad.
The TPLF’s core ideological doctrines of “revolutionary democracy” (a Leninist-Maoist form of mass participation conceived in opposition to Western liberal democracy) and “democratic centralism” (a form of party democracy which strictly prohibits internal dissent once an agreement is reached through theoretically open deliberation) have been ditched.
In their place is Abiy’s notion of “Medemer,” published as a book last October, which appears to advocate something like a “third way” between free market capitalism and state-led development. In his article, the senior PP official described the party as centrist. “Instead of ideological certainty, there is a need for the Prosperity Party to embrace a more pragmatic, reflective mode of inquiry,” he wrote.
More significant still is the dissolution of the ethnic factions. The OPDO, ANDM, and SEPDM no longer exist, replaced instead by “regional chapters“ open to individuals of all ethnicities, in every corner of the country. This means, as one senior PP official stressed to me, that the party can now incorporate all Ethiopians, including those of mixed heritage. Moreover, he added, “now people living in Oromia with an Amhara background, for instance, can be represented. That is the fundamental difference with the EPRDF.”
It is also the most controversial part—for those who cherish the ethnic basis of the federal system. It forced Abiy’s closest ally, defense minister and former president of Oromia, Lemma Megersa, to publicly denounce the plan (though he seems to have been won over, at least reluctantly, in recent weeks). It also prompted the influential Oromo activist Jawar Mohammed to announce that he will run in the election explicitly on a platform of defending the ethno-federal set-up. The TPLF, meanwhile, decried the PP as “illegal and reactionary.”
For the latter, part of the objection lies in the fact that the new party will have to scrap the equal voting model of the EPRDF—each of the four organizations enjoyed the same number of party votes, regardless of population size—in favor of a proportional system, inevitably favoring the much more numerous Amhara and Oromo. However, like other ethnonationalists, they also fear that the PP, with its more centralized and streamlined model of decision-making—the party’s national leadership will nominate the heads of its regional branches, for instance—will over time erode ethnic and regional autonomy.
Although the EPRDF was weak, divided and bereft of legitimacy, its sudden death was not inevitable.
Such a change would seem, from a certain perspective, perverse: Jawar has often noted that the wave of protests in Oromia which brought Abiy to power explicitly demanded less interference in regional affairs, not more.
The fact that opposition to the plan has come from so many quarters—including from those, like Jawar, who were once staunch critics of the EPRDF—is revealing. It shows that although the EPRDF was weak, divided, and bereft of legitimacy, its sudden death was not inevitable. The puzzle of why it disappeared so rapidly is an issue that both books, with their focus on organization and structure rather than the work of individuals, are less equipped to answer.
This is because a large part of the explanation lies with Abiy himself. Since coming to power in April 2018, he has taken steps—some admirable, some avoidable—which made the end of the EPRDF much more likely. First, his decision to move so aggressively against the TPLF—removing their leaders from federal institutions, issuing arrest warrants—destroyed whatever remained of the trust between it and the rest of the coalition. Second, by publicly criticizing the record of the EPRDF and its guiding doctrines, while allowing colleagues to publicly and often savagely censure each other, he ensured the irrevocable loss of internal unity.
Finally, he simply made it happen. Believing the EPRDF brand to be too toxic for a successful election campaign, Abiy decided he had no alternative but to ditch it and create something new in time for 2020. He rammed the merger through the party organs so quickly (some say illegally) that it was almost impossible to mount any organized opposition. A low-level ODP member in the city of Adama told me only weeks before the dissolution was finalized that he and his colleagues had been told barely anything about the plan. By then it was, in effect, a fait accompli.
It remains to be seen whether a precipitous wind-up of a party so closely entwined with the state will be a salve for Ethiopia’s troubles. Nor is it yet clear what its demise means for ethnic federalism. In fact, Abiy and the PP publicly argue (albeit unconvincingly) that the new party represents the full realization of federalism, not its demise. They insist—contrary to the claims of the TPLF, Jawar, and others—that there will be no repeal of regional rights guaranteed by the current model of ethnic federalism even if constitutional changes are on the horizon.
There could also be political fallout from his reforms. Indeed, Abiy’s biggest gamble could backfire electorally: Many observers reckon the PP will struggle to win votes in his home region of Oromia, where it will be competing with a raft of explicitly ethnic parties, including the once-banned Oromo Liberation Front. What is not in doubt, however, is that Abiy has done something which will recast Ethiopian politics more dramatically than either of these authors until very recently thought possible.