foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--Iran’s Nurses Are Martyrs to Trump’s Maximum Pressure

Narjes Khanalizadeh was a 25-year-old nurse in Gilan , a province along the Caspian Sea in northern Iran .
In late February , after working with coronavirus patients at a hospital in the city of Lahijan , she fell sick .
Within a few days , she was dead .
A week later , results from a coronavirus test that had been administered before her death came back positive , sparking anger and fear among the country ’ s nurses .
Khanalizadeh , who had been working without adequate protective gear , is one of more than a dozen nurses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ February , despite desperate warnings from nurses about shortages of personal protective equipment at hospitals , including at Khanalizadeh ’ s .
Upwards of 100 Iranian health workers have died from the coronavirus , prompting Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to announce in March that doctors and nurses who die from the infection will be recognized as “ martyrs , ” an honorific usually used for soldiers who sacrifice themselves in battle and that authorizes the families of the deceased to receive certain benefits , such as subsidized housing and education .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the crisis has been slow and inefficient , and U.S. sanctions are making things worse .
In 2018 , U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed harsh economic sanctions on the country , hampering access to desperately needed medical supplies and equipment .
Now , Iran ’ s nurses—the majority of whom are women—are among those bearing the worst of the brunt of U.S. sanctions .
Official death counts from the Iranian government aren ’ t broken out by profession and are widely believed to understate coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran that has been tracking the deaths of health care workers puts the number of nurses who have died at at least 15 between late February and mid April , but even that almost certainly underestimates the toll as health workers have reportedly been instructed by government officials not to reveal information about shortages , infections , or deaths .
Dozens more nurses have been infected , in part as a result of restrictions imposed by the Trump administration .
While food and medicine are exempt from U.S. sanctions , many medical supplies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
To sell some protective items to Iran , including full face mask respirators and some decontamination systems used to sterilize them , companies need a special license from the U.S. Treasury Department ( see here for a list of items requiring special authorization ) .
In March , the Washington Post reported that the Trump administration has reduced the number of licenses granted to companies that export medical supplies to Iran .
Even when a license isn ’ t required to ship humanitarian items , some companies and banks avoid doing business @ @ @ @ @ @ @ penalized .
The country also has far fewer financial resources available to purchase necessary supplies due to sanctions .
“ This year , Iran is running its largest ever fiscal deficit—50 percent of its budget , ” said Hadi Kahalzadeh , a former economist for Iran ’ s Social Security Organization .
“ Iran ’ s health sector , especially hospitals and pharmacies , don ’ t have enough liquidity to purchase essential supplies .
And the Iranian government doesn ’ t have the financial means to fill the gap.
” Alan Veisi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a company in Iran that produces some medical equipment that the country isn ’ t able to import due to sanctions , said even one of Tehran ’ s most prominent hospitals , Imam Khomeini , has shortages of N95 masks , gloves , and protective gear .
“ They need 500 to 1000 masks every day , ” he said .
“ But get only 300.
” Other hospitals are experiencing similar shortages .
For Iran ’ s nurses , the risks of contracting the coronavirus are compounded by low wages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overwork .
It begins with the fact that there are far too few of them .
According to World Bank data from 2015 , Iran has 1.9 nurses per 1,000 people , compared with 2.3 in China , 5.9 in Italy ( in 2017 ) , and 8.6 in the United States .
Iran ’ s nurses are under intense psychological pressure , working long hours and even sleeping at hospitals .
Some haven ’ t seen their children or families for days or weeks .
The toll hasn ’ t been merely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far been restricted only to severe cases , so the dozens of officially reported infections among nurses are likely a vast undercount .
Meanwhile , the number of Iranian nurses who have died from the coronavirus is roughly on par with the number of nurses who have died in Italy , even though the official overall death toll there is more than four times higher , suggesting that Iranian nurses are disproportionately at risk .
Many experts and human rights groups also believe the Iranian government is underreporting coronavirus deaths to dispel criticism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and harsh U.S sanctions are failing Iranian nurses and health care workers , nonprofit organizations are partially stepping into the void .
Some of the need for protective equipment is being filled by humanitarian groups that already have licenses from the U.S. government to operate in Iran .
One of these organizations , Relief International , has been importing N95 masks and Tyvek 400 protective coveralls .
UNICEF Iran has also been importing two types of high-filtered respiratory surgical masks , N95 masks , and surgical gowns for Iranian health personnel .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supplier reluctance to ship to Iran , and the need for protective equipment far surpasses what they are able to provide .
Domestic producers have picked up some of the slack , but many medical supplies produced in Iran still rely on foreign equipment and raw materials imported from abroad—at prices far higher than what they would get if they could buy from countries directly .
“ Iranian importers have to pay around 30 to 50 percent more for goods through third countries , ” said Bijan Khajehpour , a managing partner at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that for a total annual import figure of $ 50 billion , Iran will end up paying about $ 15 billion more than the value of the goods.
” There is bipartisan precedent in the United States for sanctions relief for Iran in times of crisis .
After an earthquake devastated the country in 2003 , the usually hawkish George W. Bush administration eased sanctions for three months to expedite aid and assistance .
The Obama administration took similar measures after another earthquake hit Iran in 2012 , easing sanctions for 45 days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both domestic and international calls for Trump to follow suit , the current administration is showing no signs of giving Iran any relief during the pandemic , other than vaguely worded offers to “ assist the Iranian people in their response efforts.
” Tehran rejected the overture as “ insincere ” and politically motivated .
Last week , the State Department called the Iranian government ’ s requests for broader sanctions relief a “ scam , ” and the Trump administration has said it will block Iran ’ s request for $ 5 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Monetary Fund to deal with the outbreak .
In March , Mohammad Sharifi Moghaddam , the head of a leading nurses ’ union in Iran , told a local news organization that the death toll for nurses in Iran during the coronavirus pandemic has been “ unnatural ” compared with other countries that have been hit hard by the virus , blaming government mismanagement , staff shortages , and lack of protective equipment .
While there is little question that the Iranian government ’ s response to the coronavirus has been a failure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worse by disrupting other avenues for humanitarian aid—and the likely result is many more Iranian nurses and health care workers being made into martyrs .

Narjes Khanalizadeh was a 25-year-old nurse in Gilan, a province along the Caspian Sea in northern Iran. In late February, after working with coronavirus patients at a hospital in the city of Lahijan, she fell sick. Within a few days, she was dead.
Narjes Khanalizadeh was a 25-year-old nurse in Gilan, a province along the Caspian Sea in northern Iran. In late February, after working with coronavirus patients at a hospital in the city of Lahijan, she fell sick. Within a few days, she was dead.
A week later, results from a coronavirus test that had been administered before her death came back positive, sparking anger and fear among the country’s nurses. Khanalizadeh, who had been working without adequate protective gear, is one of more than a dozen nurses who have died from the coronavirus since February, despite desperate warnings from nurses about shortages of personal protective equipment at hospitals, including at Khanalizadeh’s.
Upwards of 100 Iranian health workers have died from the coronavirus, prompting Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to announce in March that doctors and nurses who die from the infection will be recognized as “martyrs,” an honorific usually used for soldiers who sacrifice themselves in battle and that authorizes the families of the deceased to receive certain benefits, such as subsidized housing and education. But Iran’s official response to the crisis has been slow and inefficient, and U.S. sanctions are making things worse. In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed harsh economic sanctions on the country, hampering access to desperately needed medical supplies and equipment.
Now, Iran’s nurses—the majority of whom are women—are among those bearing the worst of the brunt of U.S. sanctions. Official death counts from the Iranian government aren’t broken out by profession and are widely believed to understate coronavirus fatalities. A group of doctors in Iran that has been tracking the deaths of health care workers puts the number of nurses who have died at at least 15 between late February and mid April, but even that almost certainly underestimates the toll as health workers have reportedly been instructed by government officials not to reveal information about shortages, infections, or deaths. Dozens more nurses have been infected, in part as a result of restrictions imposed by the Trump administration.
While food and medicine are exempt from U.S. sanctions, many medical supplies and certain types of equipment are not. To sell some protective items to Iran, including full face mask respirators and some decontamination systems used to sterilize them, companies need a special license from the U.S. Treasury Department (see here for a list of items requiring special authorization). In March, the Washington Post reported that the Trump administration has reduced the number of licenses granted to companies that export medical supplies to Iran.
Even when a license isn’t required to ship humanitarian items, some companies and banks avoid doing business with Iran altogether for fear of being penalized. The country also has far fewer financial resources available to purchase necessary supplies due to sanctions. “This year, Iran is running its largest ever fiscal deficit—50 percent of its budget,” said Hadi Kahalzadeh, a former economist for Iran’s Social Security Organization. “Iran’s health sector, especially hospitals and pharmacies, don’t have enough liquidity to purchase essential supplies. And the Iranian government doesn’t have the financial means to fill the gap.”
Alan Veisi, a biomechanics engineer at Baran MicroTech, a company in Iran that produces some medical equipment that the country isn’t able to import due to sanctions, said even one of Tehran’s most prominent hospitals, Imam Khomeini, has shortages of N95 masks, gloves, and protective gear. “They need 500 to 1000 masks every day,” he said. “But get only 300.” Other hospitals are experiencing similar shortages.
For Iran’s nurses, the risks of contracting the coronavirus are compounded by low wages, poor working conditions, and severe overwork. It begins with the fact that there are far too few of them. According to World Bank data from 2015, Iran has 1.9 nurses per 1,000 people, compared with 2.3 in China, 5.9 in Italy (in 2017), and 8.6 in the United States. Iran’s nurses are under intense psychological pressure, working long hours and even sleeping at hospitals. Some haven’t seen their children or families for days or weeks.
The toll hasn’t been merely psychological. Testing in Iran has so far been restricted only to severe cases, so the dozens of officially reported infections among nurses are likely a vast undercount. Meanwhile, the number of Iranian nurses who have died from the coronavirus is roughly on par with the number of nurses who have died in Italy, even though the official overall death toll there is more than four times higher, suggesting that Iranian nurses are disproportionately at risk. Many experts and human rights groups also believe the Iranian government is underreporting coronavirus deaths to dispel criticism of its response.
Where official mismanagement and harsh U.S sanctions are failing Iranian nurses and health care workers, nonprofit organizations are partially stepping into the void. Some of the need for protective equipment is being filled by humanitarian groups that already have licenses from the U.S. government to operate in Iran. One of these organizations, Relief International, has been importing N95 masks and Tyvek 400 protective coveralls. UNICEF Iran has also been importing two types of high-filtered respiratory surgical masks, N95 masks, and surgical gowns for Iranian health personnel. But even these organizations have had to overcome supplier reluctance to ship to Iran, and the need for protective equipment far surpasses what they are able to provide.
Domestic producers have picked up some of the slack, but many medical supplies produced in Iran still rely on foreign equipment and raw materials imported from abroad—at prices far higher than what they would get if they could buy from countries directly. “Iranian importers have to pay around 30 to 50 percent more for goods through third countries,” said Bijan Khajehpour, a managing partner at Eurasian Nexus Partners. “This means that for a total annual import figure of $50 billion, Iran will end up paying about $15 billion more than the value of the goods.”
There is bipartisan precedent in the United States for sanctions relief for Iran in times of crisis. After an earthquake devastated the country in 2003, the usually hawkish George W. Bush administration eased sanctions for three months to expedite aid and assistance. The Obama administration took similar measures after another earthquake hit Iran in 2012, easing sanctions for 45 days to facilitate humanitarian aid.
But despite both domestic and international calls for Trump to follow suit, the current administration is showing no signs of giving Iran any relief during the pandemic, other than vaguely worded offers to “assist the Iranian people in their response efforts.” Tehran rejected the overture as “insincere” and politically motivated. Last week, the State Department called the Iranian government’s requests for broader sanctions relief a “scam,” and the Trump administration has said it will block Iran’s request for $5 billion in emergency assistance from the International Monetary Fund to deal with the outbreak.
In March, Mohammad Sharifi Moghaddam, the head of a leading nurses’ union in Iran, told a local news organization that the death toll for nurses in Iran during the coronavirus pandemic has been “unnatural” compared with other countries that have been hit hard by the virus, blaming government mismanagement, staff shortages, and lack of protective equipment. While there is little question that the Iranian government’s response to the coronavirus has been a failure, U.S. sanctions have made the situation worse by disrupting other avenues for humanitarian aid—and the likely result is many more Iranian nurses and health care workers being made into martyrs.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--Europe Needs an Alexander Hamilton, Not More Budget Hawks

Europe Needs an Alexander Hamilton , Not More Budget Hawks Together with many on Europe ’ s conservative and free market right , I long rejected the idea of a fiscal union in the eurozone .
The European Union is not a federal state , and adding a layer of European debt and taxes atop already profligate national budgets would mean more debt-financed spending and moral hazard .
The concern about fiscally prudent nations endlessly subsidizing the less disciplined ones , which I then shared , guided the choices of European leaders in the last financial crisis .
Instead of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bargain—a compromise involving the mutualization of public debt in the eurozone—Europeans muddled through thanks to large-scale asset purchases by the European Central Bank and a new credit facility for countries in financial distress , the European Stability Mechanism .
The price for governments accessing the financing , such as Greece and Italy , has been a constant micromanaging , from a distance , of their public finances .
But the crisis facing Europe today is qualitatively different , and the response has to be different , too .
Compared with the potential for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the global economy , the prospect of financial mismanagement in some European countries , subsidized by taxpayers in other countries , may be vexing but is trivial .
The crisis facing Europe today is qualitatively different than the last one , and the response has to be different , too .
While no one knows the exact size of the economic contraction coming this year , it is safe to assume that it will be more devastating than any event witnessed since 1945 .
It is also safe to assume that countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ debt-to-GDP ratio of 135 percent , are effectively bankrupt .
And unless the eurozone as a whole can mobilize enough financial firepower to keep them afloat , the bloc ’ s periphery will end up defaulting on its debt or crashing out , with further catastrophic effects on the global recovery and on Europe ’ s standing in the world .
Unlike an ordinary recession , the current situation involves bringing practically all economic activity to a sudden halt , with an uncertain prospect of gradual reopening .
If nothing is done , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and reconstituting them once the pandemic is over will be costly and will take a long time .
Hence the need , acknowledged across the political spectrum , for hitherto unseen levels of financial support to the private sector from public budgets .
Its purpose , unlike in a recession , is not to stimulate economic activity but rather to keep it alive while it is placed in a policy-induced coma in the form of lockdowns and extreme forms of social distancing .
Since , as the experience from the 2008 recovery illustrates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is difficult after economic crises , it is important that governments underwrite a substantial part of salary costs as the pandemic unfolds .
Such measures are expensive .
And those European countries that have been hit the hardest by COVID-19—Spain and Italy , for example—are the least able to afford them because of their debt overhang .
To be fair , the European Commission has set up a Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency scheme , which amounts to up to 100 billion euros ( $ 109 billion ) in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sustain employment .
Last week , the eurozone ’ s finance ministers also agreed on a package worth 240 billion euros ( $ 261 billion , around 2 percent of the eurozone ’ s GDP ) available to the bloc ’ s countries for emergency health care spending , with few or no strings attached .
Additional funding would be available through the European Stability Mechanism and new facilities , such as a guarantee fund of the European Investment Bank for small and medium-sized companies .
But is that going to be enough @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United Kingdom alone , the cost of the job protection scheme introduced by Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak to maintain employment was estimated at 78 billion pounds , or $ 97 billion .
The U.S. coronavirus relief bill mobilizes federal spending worth around $ 2 trillion , or 10 percent of America ’ s GDP , with a lot of the money ready to go immediately .
While many national governments can complement the EU programs with their own resources , Italy ’ s and Spain ’ s room to maneuver @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , taking advantage of the current European assistance carries significant risks for countries with large debt burdens , regardless of the favorable terms on which such loans are offered .
Yields on Spanish and Italian bonds are now growing , and the spread on Italy ’ s 10-year bond versus German bunds is up by around 80 basis points relative to its low of around 155 points at the end of March—notwithstanding the European Central Bank ’ s asset-buying program announced last month .
For Rome and Madrid to take on new loans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ willingness to constantly up the ante .
Toying with a sovereign debt crisis is risky not just for Spain and Italy but for the entire global economy , especially as portfolios of banks around the globe keep deteriorating .
As a result , a new debt instrument backed by the entire eurozone in order to navigate the crisis is not just a matter of solidarity with Spain and Italy and a powerful political signal .
It is first and foremost a matter of economic and financial self-preservation in a crisis that has no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for Dutch Finance Minister Wopke Hoekstra , what matters is that “ for every euro that is spent on the economy , the normal rules apply ; for example , if you have a shop that has shut down because of the virus.
” Mindlessly applying what German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called “ torture tools ” —the EU ’ s rules-based scrutiny of national budgets—in a situation that calls for leadership , vision , and generosity is simply penny-wise and pound-foolish .
After all , the economic shock of COVID-19 is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Italy ’ s previous policy mistakes .
And if those countries can not find economic relief within the confines of the common currency , they will look for alternatives .
Mindlessly applying what German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called “ torture tools ” —the EU ’ s rules-based scrutiny of national budgets—in a situation that calls for leadership , vision , and generosity is penny-wise and pound-foolish .
Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte stated last Friday that Italy did not need help from the “ inadequate and inappropriate ” European Stability Mechanism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conditionality has become .
Whether or not the decade of fiscal consolidation on the periphery can be blamed for Spain ’ s and Italy ’ s lack of preparedness for the pandemic , those countries will not hesitate to make that argument in the most demagogic way possible .
Unsurprisingly , a hypothetical referendum on Italy ’ s EU membership held today would end up in a coin toss , according to a recent poll .
It is an illusion to think , especially under the current circumstances , that Brexit has immunized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ At a time of an unprecedented global crisis happening against the backdrop of rising powers like Russia and China , whose influence poses a challenge to European democracies , and an arguable decline of U.S. leadership in the world , to insist on doing only what is “ fair to the Dutch taxpayer , ” as Hoekstra said , is simply petty .
If all European leaders adopted a narrowly transactional view , not much would survive of the European project , from the single market that eroded the economic power of many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currently given to Italian patients by German hospitals with extra capacity .
That does not mean tossing fiscal conservatism out the window .
However , it means recognizing , as America ’ s Founding Fathers did , the magnitude of the challenges facing Europe and the need for the continent ’ s unity .
Here ’ s to hoping that Europe ’ s leaders can rise to the occasion .

Together with many on Europe’s conservative and free market right, I long rejected the idea of a fiscal union in the eurozone. The European Union is not a federal state, and adding a layer of European debt and taxes atop already profligate national budgets would mean more debt-financed spending and moral hazard.
Together with many on Europe’s conservative and free market right, I long rejected the idea of a fiscal union in the eurozone. The European Union is not a federal state, and adding a layer of European debt and taxes atop already profligate national budgets would mean more debt-financed spending and moral hazard.
The concern about fiscally prudent nations endlessly subsidizing the less disciplined ones, which I then shared, guided the choices of European leaders in the last financial crisis. Instead of seizing the opportunity for a Hamiltonian grand bargain—a compromise involving the mutualization of public debt in the eurozone—Europeans muddled through thanks to large-scale asset purchases by the European Central Bank and a new credit facility for countries in financial distress, the European Stability Mechanism. The price for governments accessing the financing, such as Greece and Italy, has been a constant micromanaging, from a distance, of their public finances.
But the crisis facing Europe today is qualitatively different, and the response has to be different, too. Compared with the potential for economic destruction from the current deep freeze of the global economy, the prospect of financial mismanagement in some European countries, subsidized by taxpayers in other countries, may be vexing but is trivial.
The crisis facing Europe today is qualitatively different than the last one, and the response has to be different, too.
While no one knows the exact size of the economic contraction coming this year, it is safe to assume that it will be more devastating than any event witnessed since 1945. It is also safe to assume that countries such as Italy, with a pre-coronavirus debt-to-GDP ratio of 135 percent, are effectively bankrupt. And unless the eurozone as a whole can mobilize enough financial firepower to keep them afloat, the bloc’s periphery will end up defaulting on its debt or crashing out, with further catastrophic effects on the global recovery and on Europe’s standing in the world.
Unlike an ordinary recession, the current situation involves bringing practically all economic activity to a sudden halt, with an uncertain prospect of gradual reopening. If nothing is done, businesses and jobs will be destroyed, and reconstituting them once the pandemic is over will be costly and will take a long time.
Hence the need, acknowledged across the political spectrum, for hitherto unseen levels of financial support to the private sector from public budgets. Its purpose, unlike in a recession, is not to stimulate economic activity but rather to keep it alive while it is placed in a policy-induced coma in the form of lockdowns and extreme forms of social distancing. Since, as the experience from the 2008 recovery illustrates, bringing down high rates of unemployment is difficult after economic crises, it is important that governments underwrite a substantial part of salary costs as the pandemic unfolds.
Such measures are expensive. And those European countries that have been hit the hardest by COVID-19—Spain and Italy, for example—are the least able to afford them because of their debt overhang. To be fair, the European Commission has set up a Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency scheme, which amounts to up to 100 billion euros ($109 billion) in loans available to governments in order to sustain employment.
Last week, the eurozone’s finance ministers also agreed on a package worth 240 billion euros ($261 billion, around 2 percent of the eurozone’s GDP) available to the bloc’s countries for emergency health care spending, with few or no strings attached. Additional funding would be available through the European Stability Mechanism and new facilities, such as a guarantee fund of the European Investment Bank for small and medium-sized companies.
But is that going to be enough to cushion the economic shock? In the United Kingdom alone, the cost of the job protection scheme introduced by Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak to maintain employment was estimated at 78 billion pounds, or $97 billion.
The U.S. coronavirus relief bill mobilizes federal spending worth around $2 trillion, or 10 percent of America’s GDP, with a lot of the money ready to go immediately. While many national governments can complement the EU programs with their own resources, Italy’s and Spain’s room to maneuver is limited.
What’s worse, taking advantage of the current European assistance carries significant risks for countries with large debt burdens, regardless of the favorable terms on which such loans are offered. Yields on Spanish and Italian bonds are now growing, and the spread on Italy’s 10-year bond versus German bunds is up by around 80 basis points relative to its low of around 155 points at the end of March—notwithstanding the European Central Bank’s asset-buying program announced last month.
For Rome and Madrid to take on new loans means gambling on the bank’s willingness to constantly up the ante. Toying with a sovereign debt crisis is risky not just for Spain and Italy but for the entire global economy, especially as portfolios of banks around the globe keep deteriorating.
As a result, a new debt instrument backed by the entire eurozone in order to navigate the crisis is not just a matter of solidarity with Spain and Italy and a powerful political signal. It is first and foremost a matter of economic and financial self-preservation in a crisis that has no precedent in peacetime living memory.
Yet, for Dutch Finance Minister Wopke Hoekstra, what matters is that “for every euro that is spent on the economy, the normal rules apply; for example, if you have a shop that has shut down because of the virus.”
Mindlessly applying what German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called “torture tools”—the EU’s rules-based scrutiny of national budgets—in a situation that calls for leadership, vision, and generosity is simply penny-wise and pound-foolish. After all, the economic shock of COVID-19 is not a result of Spain’s or Italy’s previous policy mistakes. And if those countries cannot find economic relief within the confines of the common currency, they will look for alternatives.
Mindlessly applying what German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called “torture tools”—the EU’s rules-based scrutiny of national budgets—in a situation that calls for leadership, vision, and generosity is penny-wise and pound-foolish.
Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte stated last Friday that Italy did not need help from the “inadequate and inappropriate” European Stability Mechanism, highlighting how politically toxic the troika-prescribed conditionality has become.
Whether or not the decade of fiscal consolidation on the periphery can be blamed for Spain’s and Italy’s lack of preparedness for the pandemic, those countries will not hesitate to make that argument in the most demagogic way possible. Unsurprisingly, a hypothetical referendum on Italy’s EU membership held today would end up in a coin toss, according to a recent poll. It is an illusion to think, especially under the current circumstances, that Brexit has immunized Europeans to the temptations of Euroskepticism.
At a time of an unprecedented global crisis happening against the backdrop of rising powers like Russia and China, whose influence poses a challenge to European democracies, and an arguable decline of U.S. leadership in the world, to insist on doing only what is “fair to the Dutch taxpayer,” as Hoekstra said, is simply petty.
If all European leaders adopted a narrowly transactional view, not much would survive of the European project, from the single market that eroded the economic power of many “national champions” to the treatments currently given to Italian patients by German hospitals with extra capacity.
That does not mean tossing fiscal conservatism out the window. However, it means recognizing, as America’s Founding Fathers did, the magnitude of the challenges facing Europe and the need for the continent’s unity. Here’s to hoping that Europe’s leaders can rise to the occasion.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--Pentagon Worries Social Distancing Could Impede America’s Deterrent

The U.S. military is chafing at social distancing guidelines for the coronavirus pandemic , in some cases ordering pilots and troops back to their posts , as the Defense Department grapples with a trade-off between war readiness and the health of service members .
In the wake of the death of a crew member of the virus-stricken USS Theodore Roosevelt this week , Defense Secretary Mark Esper acknowledged that not all commanders would be able to follow the social distancing guidelines set out by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , even as the Pentagon chief said the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extended beyond mid-May .
Though the debate over the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier , which spilled out into the public after a warning from the Roosevelt ’ s skipper leaked in the San Francisco Chronicle this month , has taken center stage in the military ’ s response to the coronavirus , the idea of U.S. troops going back to barracks , ships , submarines , tanks , and other installations where the Pentagon stages and fights from close quarters has service members and families concerned for their health and safety .
The military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops to execute its missions , from bringing soldiers into barracks for basic training to crews aboard nuclear-capable stealth bombers .
“ The military is not going to clamp down and distance as much as normal society because they can ’ t , ” said Thomas Spoehr , the director of the Heritage Foundation ’ s Center for National Defense and a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general .
At Fort Rucker in Alabama , home to the Army ’ s top aviation school , commander Maj. Gen. David J. Francis is ordering pilots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rotary wing training on Monday , even as the number of coronavirus cases has risen to more than 4,300 statewide .
The order has provoked some negative reaction .
“ Why are they putting these lives at risk ?
” said one family member of a soldier at Fort Rucker , speaking anonymously to avoid retribution .
“ It ’ s not part of their duty at this point .
It makes no sense to me.
” The directive was sent to company commanders on the base on Wednesday , two family members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still require troops to maintain as much social distancing as possible and stay in groups of 10 or fewer .
Trainees in the cockpit will be required to wear flight-approved personal protective equipment .
“ I ordered a halt to our Initial Entry Rotary Wing flight training during the projected peak in our area for COVID-19 cases .
This was intended as only a temporary pause—to afford us an opportunity to get our COVID-19 testing capability stood up here locally , to enable us to properly clean our aircraft and simulators , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soon as possible , ” Francis told Foreign Policy in a statement .
“ We have measures in place in the cockpit and simulators including through the use of approved masks .
I am extremely proud of the hard work our team has done to set conditions to resume training.
” Yet provisions of supplies to troops remain limited—as is the case throughout the armed forces .
Another family member of a soldier on the base said units recommended wearing neck gaiters in place of a mask .
“ The Army is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Most people are relying on volunteers.
” Uniform standards have further complicated the problem , the source added , “ because most people don ’ t have uniform-compliant fabric.
” Fort Rucker has paused aviation training since April 2 , after Esper ordered U.S. military units to freeze movement for 60 days , an order that the Pentagon plans to extend .
The resumption of training at Fort Rucker follows the expiration of the Army ’ s freeze on basic training on Monday .
The Pentagon has ordered local installations to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security , angering some family members who are desperate for details about the impact of the disease .
Even Esper acknowledged in a Pentagon press conference on Tuesday that the Defense Department will have difficulty balancing social distancing mandates and training measures .
Restrictions on training and imposing severe travel restrictions will be increasingly challenged as commanders face a difficult trade-off between preparing for a potential war with China or Russia and protecting the health of their troops , even without a vaccine .
Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy said Thursday that the Walter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three vaccine types for COVID-19 , eyeing a summer date for testing on humans .
As a small outbreak of the disease has ensnared some 50 soldiers at Fort Jackson in South Carolina , military officials insist they can continue training new soldiers by creating “ safety bubbles ” that put distance between units and limit exposure .
“ We ’ ll manage the risk .
We don ’ t have a vaccination right now , and we ’ re training soldiers , ” Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville told Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thursday .
“ We need to make sure that our army is ready to go to war.
” A defense official told Foreign Policy that once Esper finalizes a stop-movement date for the U.S. military , the Army will do an analysis on how to conduct training until the freeze ends and efforts to mitigate impacts on readiness .
The Army is currently allowed to do training as long as the proper protocols are observed , such as wearing face masks and keeping 6 feet of distance , the official added .
Some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard for the military to wait much longer to resume the normal pace of training , including at the Army ’ s National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California .
“ Everything you do as a commander , especially in combat or an operation , is about balancing risks , ” Sean MacFarland , a retired lieutenant general and a former deputy commander of the Army ’ s Training and Doctrine Command , told Foreign Policy .
“ It would be difficult to wait for the vaccine to come online before we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just over a month , the U.S. military has made drastic changes in its operations as the virus has infected nearly 2,900 U.S. troops and left 19 Pentagon service members , contractors , civilians , and family dead , according to Defense Department statistics released on Thursday .
The Pentagon has halted port calls .
In the wake of the coronavirus outbreak on the USS Theodore Roosevelt that eventually prompted acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly to resign this month , the Defense Department has ordered the USS Harry S. Truman to remain at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nimitz , is ready to set sail .
“ There ’ s not going to be these giant groups of exercises , ” Spoehr said .
“ Ships are going to self-quarantine for 14 days before you go to sea .
Once you set out , you ’ re like a little island until you come back.
” The Pentagon is already organizing a debriefing from the pandemic to codify the lessons it has learned to face another outbreak in the future , Gen. Mark Milley , the chairman of the Joint Chiefs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ It ’ s not going to be business as usual , ” Milley said .
“ We ’ ve got to take a hard look at how we as a military , we as a Department of Defense , conduct operations in the future.
” The Defense Department ’ s testing regimen will prioritize groups in tighter quarters , such as submarine and bomber crews and basic trainees .
But much of military culture isn ’ t designed to support U.S. government guidance to fight the coronavirus centered on maintaining a 6-foot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about a viral video of U.S. Marines appearing to break social distancing guidance while lining up for haircuts at Camp Pendleton in California , Milley said he supported continuing haircuts through the pandemic .
The classic “ high and tight ” look promotes discipline , the top U.S. military officer said , similar to that which was necessary for U.S. Marines to storm the beaches at Iwo Jima , Japan , during World War II .
“ It may seem superficial to some , but getting a haircut is part of that discipline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , top Defense Department officials pushed back against the notion that the agency should have more centralized guidance for far-flung commanders trying to fight the pandemic .
In the wake of highly praised efforts to fight the coronavirus by U.S. forces in South Korea and Africa this year , Esper has delegated major decisions to U.S. Northern Command and local commanders , who officials insist are better equipped to understand local needs .
“ I know Secretary Esper is very interested in delegating authority down to the lowest possible level because these are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Matthew Donovan , who took over last month as the Defense Department ’ s undersecretary for personnel and readiness .
“ They have the best situational awareness of the needs of their local installations .
”

The U.S. military is chafing at social distancing guidelines for the coronavirus pandemic, in some cases ordering pilots and troops back to their posts, as the Defense Department grapples with a trade-off between war readiness and the health of service members.
The U.S. military is chafing at social distancing guidelines for the coronavirus pandemic, in some cases ordering pilots and troops back to their posts, as the Defense Department grapples with a trade-off between war readiness and the health of service members.
In the wake of the death of a crew member of the virus-stricken USS Theodore Roosevelt this week, Defense Secretary Mark Esper acknowledged that not all commanders would be able to follow the social distancing guidelines set out by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, even as the Pentagon chief said the agency’s stop-movement order would be extended beyond mid-May.
Though the debate over the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which spilled out into the public after a warning from the Roosevelt’s skipper leaked in the San Francisco Chronicle this month, has taken center stage in the military’s response to the coronavirus, the idea of U.S. troops going back to barracks, ships, submarines, tanks, and other installations where the Pentagon stages and fights from close quarters has service members and families concerned for their health and safety. The military is heavily dependent on close quartering of troops to execute its missions, from bringing soldiers into barracks for basic training to crews aboard nuclear-capable stealth bombers.
“The military is not going to clamp down and distance as much as normal society because they can’t,” said Thomas Spoehr, the director of the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense and a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general.
At Fort Rucker in Alabama, home to the Army’s top aviation school, commander Maj. Gen. David J. Francis is ordering pilots back into simulators and cockpits for basic rotary wing training on Monday, even as the number of coronavirus cases has risen to more than 4,300 statewide.
The order has provoked some negative reaction. “Why are they putting these lives at risk?” said one family member of a soldier at Fort Rucker, speaking anonymously to avoid retribution. “It’s not part of their duty at this point. It makes no sense to me.”
The directive was sent to company commanders on the base on Wednesday, two family members told Foreign Policy, though it will still require troops to maintain as much social distancing as possible and stay in groups of 10 or fewer. Trainees in the cockpit will be required to wear flight-approved personal protective equipment.
“I ordered a halt to our Initial Entry Rotary Wing flight training during the projected peak in our area for COVID-19 cases. This was intended as only a temporary pause—to afford us an opportunity to get our COVID-19 testing capability stood up here locally, to enable us to properly clean our aircraft and simulators, and set conditions to resume flight training as soon as possible,” Francis told Foreign Policy in a statement. “We have measures in place in the cockpit and simulators including through the use of approved masks. I am extremely proud of the hard work our team has done to set conditions to resume training.”
Yet provisions of supplies to troops remain limited—as is the case throughout the armed forces. Another family member of a soldier on the base said units recommended wearing neck gaiters in place of a mask. “The Army is not providing them,” the source said. “Most people are relying on volunteers.” Uniform standards have further complicated the problem, the source added, “because most people don’t have uniform-compliant fabric.”
Fort Rucker has paused aviation training since April 2, after Esper ordered U.S. military units to freeze movement for 60 days, an order that the Pentagon plans to extend. The resumption of training at Fort Rucker follows the expiration of the Army’s freeze on basic training on Monday.
The Pentagon has ordered local installations to stop publicly reporting coronavirus cases, citing operational security, angering some family members who are desperate for details about the impact of the disease. Even Esper acknowledged in a Pentagon press conference on Tuesday that the Defense Department will have difficulty balancing social distancing mandates and training measures.
Restrictions on training and imposing severe travel restrictions will be increasingly challenged as commanders face a difficult trade-off between preparing for a potential war with China or Russia and protecting the health of their troops, even without a vaccine.
Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy said Thursday that the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research had selected three vaccine types for COVID-19, eyeing a summer date for testing on humans. As a small outbreak of the disease has ensnared some 50 soldiers at Fort Jackson in South Carolina, military officials insist they can continue training new soldiers by creating “safety bubbles” that put distance between units and limit exposure.
“We’ll manage the risk. We don’t have a vaccination right now, and we’re training soldiers,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville told Foreign Policy at a Pentagon press briefing on Thursday. “We need to make sure that our army is ready to go to war.”
A defense official told Foreign Policy that once Esper finalizes a stop-movement date for the U.S. military, the Army will do an analysis on how to conduct training until the freeze ends and efforts to mitigate impacts on readiness.
The Army is currently allowed to do training as long as the proper protocols are observed, such as wearing face masks and keeping 6 feet of distance, the official added. Some former military officials think it will be hard for the military to wait much longer to resume the normal pace of training, including at the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California.
“Everything you do as a commander, especially in combat or an operation, is about balancing risks,” Sean MacFarland, a retired lieutenant general and a former deputy commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, told Foreign Policy. “It would be difficult to wait for the vaccine to come online before we wait to resume some activity.”
In just over a month, the U.S. military has made drastic changes in its operations as the virus has infected nearly 2,900 U.S. troops and left 19 service members, contractors, civilians, and family dead, according to Defense Department statistics released on Thursday.
The Pentagon has halted port calls. In the wake of the coronavirus outbreak on the USS Theodore Roosevelt that eventually prompted acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly to resign this month, the Defense Department has ordered the USS Harry S. Truman to remain at sea until its replacement, the USS Nimitz, is ready to set sail.
“There’s not going to be these giant groups of exercises,” Spoehr said. “Ships are going to self-quarantine for 14 days before you go to sea. Once you set out, you’re like a little island until you come back.”
The Pentagon is already organizing a debriefing from the pandemic to codify the lessons it has learned to face another outbreak in the future, Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Tuesday.
“It’s not going to be business as usual,” Milley said. “We’ve got to take a hard look at how we as a military, we as a Department of Defense, conduct operations in the future.” The Defense Department’s testing regimen will prioritize groups in tighter quarters, such as submarine and bomber crews and basic trainees.
But much of military culture isn’t designed to support U.S. government guidance to fight the coronavirus centered on maintaining a 6-foot distance from most people. When asked about a viral video of U.S. Marines appearing to break social distancing guidance while lining up for haircuts at Camp Pendleton in California, Milley said he supported continuing haircuts through the pandemic. The classic “high and tight” look promotes discipline, the top U.S. military officer said, similar to that which was necessary for U.S. Marines to storm the beaches at Iwo Jima, Japan, during World War II. “It may seem superficial to some, but getting a haircut is part of that discipline,” Milley told reporters.
Elsewhere, top Defense Department officials pushed back against the notion that the agency should have more centralized guidance for far-flung commanders trying to fight the pandemic.
In the wake of highly praised efforts to fight the coronavirus by U.S. forces in South Korea and Africa this year, Esper has delegated major decisions to U.S. Northern Command and local commanders, who officials insist are better equipped to understand local needs.
“I know Secretary Esper is very interested in delegating authority down to the lowest possible level because these are the commanders that are on the ground,” said Matthew Donovan, who took over last month as the Defense Department’s undersecretary for personnel and readiness. “They have the best situational awareness of the needs of their local installations.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--No, the Coronavirus Will Not Change the Global Order

No , the Coronavirus Will Not Change the Global Order How will the coronavirus pandemic reshape geopolitics ?
Many commentators predict the end of an era of globalization that has prospered under U.S. leadership since 1945 .
Some see a turning point at which China surpasses the United States as a global power .
Certainly , there will be changes , but one should be wary of assuming that big causes have big effects.There will certainly be changes , but one should be wary of assuming that big causes have big effects .
For example , the 1918-1919 flu pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , yet the lasting global changes that unfolded over the next two decades were a consequence of the war , not the disease .
Globalization—or interdependence across continents—is the result of changes in transportation and communication technology , and these are unlikely to cease .
Some aspects of economic globalization such as trade will be curtailed but financial flows less so .
And while economic globalization is influenced by the laws of governments , other aspects of globalization such as pandemics and climate change are determined more by the laws of biology and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tariffs do not stop their transnational effects , though deep and persistent economic stagnation would slow them down .
This century has seen three crises in two decades .
The 9/11 terrorist attacks did not kill very many people—but like jujitsu , terrorism is a game in which a smaller player can use the shock of horror to create a disproportionate impact on the opponent ’ s agenda .
U.S. foreign policy was profoundly distorted by choices made in a state of panic that led to long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis , brought on the Great Recession , gave rise to populism in Western democracies , and strengthened autocratic movements in many countries .
China ’ s fast , massive , and successful stimulus package contrasted with the West ’ s lagged response , leading many to predict that China was on course to become the world ’ s economic leader .
Initial responses to the century ’ s third crisis , the coronavirus pandemic , also went down the wrong path .
Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Delays and obfuscation wasted crucial time for testing and containment , and the opportunity for international cooperation was squandered .
Instead , after imposing costly lockdowns , the world ’ s two largest economies engaged in propaganda battles .
China has blamed the U.S. military for the presence of the virus in Wuhan , and Trump has spoken about the “ Chinese virus.
” The European Union , with an economy roughly the size of the United States ’ , dithered in the face of disunity .
Yet a virus could not care @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its victims .
The incompetence of its response has hurt the United States ’ reputational ( or soft ) power .
China has provided aid , manipulated statistics for political reasons , and engaged in vigorous propaganda—all in an attempt to turn the narrative of its early failure into one of a benign response to the pandemic .
However , much of Beijing ’ s effort to restore its soft power has been treated with skepticism in Europe and elsewhere .
That is because soft power rests on attraction .
The best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power , China starts from a weak position .
Despite major efforts since former President Hu Jintao announced the objective of increasing the country ’ s soft power at the 17th National Congress in 2007 , Beijing has created its own obstacles by exacerbating territorial disputes with neighboring countries and by its insistence on repressive party control , which prevents the full talents of society from being unleashed in the way that happens in democracies .
It is not surprising that global public opinion polls and rankings such as the Soft Power 30 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not surprising that global public opinion polls and rankings such as the Soft Power 30 show China weak in soft power .
The top 20 spots in the index are held by democracies .
In hard power , too , the balance favoring the United States will not be changed by the pandemic .
Both the U.S. and Chinese economies have been hit hard , as have those of the United States ’ European and East Asian allies .
Before the crisis , China ’ s economy had grown to two-thirds the size @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at exchange rates ) , but China entered the crisis with a slowing growth rate and declining exports .
Beijing has also been investing heavily in military power , but remains far behind the United States and may slow down its military investments in a more adverse budgetary climate .
Among other things that the crisis has exposed is China ’ s need for major expenditures on its inadequate health care system .
Moreover , the United States has geopolitical advantages that will persist despite the pandemic .
The first is geography : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighbors , while China has territorial disputes with Brunei , India , Indonesia , Japan , Malaysia , the Philippines , Taiwan , and Vietnam .
A second advantage is energy : The shale oil and gas revolution has transformed the United States from an energy importer to a net exporter .
China , on the other hand , is highly dependent on energy imports passing through the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean , where the United States has naval supremacy .
The United States also has a demographic advantages : Over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to research by Stanford University ’ s Adele Hayutin , the U.S. workforce is likely to grow by 5 percent , while China ’ s will shrink by 9 percent , mainly a result of its former one-child policy .
China ’ s working-age population peaked in 2015 , and India will soon pass China as the world ’ s most populous nation .
And it barely needs repeating that U.S. power also results from its place at the forefront of the development of key technologies including biotechnology , nanotechnology , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ research universities dominate higher education .
All this suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to prove a geopolitical turning point.All this suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to prove a geopolitical turning point .
But while the United States will continue to hold most of the high cards , misguided policy decisions could cause it to play these cards poorly .
Discarding the aces of alliances and international institutions would be one such misguided decision .
Another one would be a severe restriction of immigration .
Long before this crisis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lee Kuan Yew why he did not think China would surpass the United States as a global power anytime soon , one reason he cited was the United States ’ ability to draw on the talents of the entire world and to recombine them in diversity and creativity .
Given its ethnic Han nationalism , this kind of openness would be impossible for China .
But if populism leads the United States to toss away its valuable cards of alliances , international institutions , and openness , Lee could be wrong .
Alternatively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its cue from the post-1945 U.S. presidents whose successes I describe in my book Do Morals Matter ?
Presidents and Foreign Policy From FDR to Trump .
The United States could launch a massive COVID-19 aid program—a medical version of the Marshall Plan .
As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently argued , leaders should choose a path of cooperation that leads toward international resilience .
Instead of competing in propaganda , leaders could articulate the importance of power with rather than over others and set up bilateral and multilateral frameworks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ realize that recurrent waves of COVID-19 will affect poorer countries less able to cope and that such a developing-world reservoir will hurt everyone if it spills back northward in a seasonal resurgence .
It was like that in 1918 , when the second wave of the pandemic killed more people than the first .
Both for self-interested and humanitarian reasons , the United States should lead the G-20 in generous contributions to a major new COVID-19 fund that is open to all countries .
If a U.S. president were to choose such cooperative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yet come out of the pandemic—a geopolitical path to a better world .
If U.S. policies continue on the current path , however , the new coronavirus will simply accelerate existing trends toward nationalist populism and authoritarianism .
But it is still much too early to predict a geopolitical turning point that would fundamentally alter the power relationship between the United States and China .

How will the coronavirus pandemic reshape geopolitics? Many commentators predict the end of an era of globalization that has prospered under U.S. leadership since 1945. Some see a turning point at which China surpasses the United States as a global power. Certainly, there will be changes, but one should be wary of assuming that big causes have big effects. For example, the 1918-1919 flu pandemic killed more people than World War I, yet the lasting global changes that unfolded over the next two decades were a consequence of the war, not the disease.
How will the coronavirus pandemic reshape geopolitics? Many commentators predict the end of an era of globalization that has prospered under U.S. leadership since 1945. Some see a turning point at which China surpasses the United States as a global power. Certainly, there will be changes, but one should be wary of assuming that big causes have big effects. For example, the 1918-1919 flu pandemic killed more people than World War I, yet the lasting global changes that unfolded over the next two decades were a consequence of the war, not the disease.
Globalization—or interdependence across continents—is the result of changes in transportation and communication technology, and these are unlikely to cease. Some aspects of economic globalization such as trade will be curtailed but financial flows less so. And while economic globalization is influenced by the laws of governments, other aspects of globalization such as pandemics and climate change are determined more by the laws of biology and physics. Walls, weapons, and tariffs do not stop their transnational effects, though deep and persistent economic stagnation would slow them down.
This century has seen three crises in two decades. The 9/11 terrorist attacks did not kill very many people—but like jujitsu, terrorism is a game in which a smaller player can use the shock of horror to create a disproportionate impact on the opponent’s agenda. U.S. foreign policy was profoundly distorted by choices made in a state of panic that led to long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The second shock, the 2008 financial crisis, brought on the Great Recession, gave rise to populism in Western democracies, and strengthened autocratic movements in many countries. China’s fast, massive, and successful stimulus package contrasted with the West’s lagged response, leading many to predict that China was on course to become the world’s economic leader.
Initial responses to the century’s third crisis, the coronavirus pandemic, also went down the wrong path. Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump started off with denial and misinformation. Delays and obfuscation wasted crucial time for testing and containment, and the opportunity for international cooperation was squandered. Instead, after imposing costly lockdowns, the world’s two largest economies engaged in propaganda battles. China has blamed the U.S. military for the presence of the virus in Wuhan, and Trump has spoken about the “Chinese virus.” The European Union, with an economy roughly the size of the United States’, dithered in the face of disunity. Yet a virus could not care less about borders or about the nationality of its victims.
The incompetence of its response has hurt the United States’ reputational (or soft) power. China has provided aid, manipulated statistics for political reasons, and engaged in vigorous propaganda—all in an attempt to turn the narrative of its early failure into one of a benign response to the pandemic. However, much of Beijing’s effort to restore its soft power has been treated with skepticism in Europe and elsewhere. That is because soft power rests on attraction. The best propaganda is not propaganda.
In soft power, China starts from a weak position. Despite major efforts since former President Hu Jintao announced the objective of increasing the country’s soft power at the 17th National Congress in 2007, Beijing has created its own obstacles by exacerbating territorial disputes with neighboring countries and by its insistence on repressive party control, which prevents the full talents of society from being unleashed in the way that happens in democracies. It is not surprising that global public opinion polls and rankings such as the Soft Power 30 rank China low in soft power.It is not surprising that global public opinion polls and rankings such as the Soft Power 30 show China weak in soft power. The top 20 spots in the index are held by democracies.
In hard power, too, the balance favoring the United States will not be changed by the pandemic. Both the U.S. and Chinese economies have been hit hard, as have those of the United States’ European and East Asian allies. Before the crisis, China’s economy had grown to two-thirds the size of the United States’ (measured at exchange rates), but China entered the crisis with a slowing growth rate and declining exports. Beijing has also been investing heavily in military power, but remains far behind the United States and may slow down its military investments in a more adverse budgetary climate. Among other things that the crisis has exposed is China’s need for major expenditures on its inadequate health care system.
Moreover, the United States has geopolitical advantages that will persist despite the pandemic. The first is geography: It is bordered by oceans and friendly neighbors, while China has territorial disputes with Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. A second advantage is energy: The shale oil and gas revolution has transformed the United States from an energy importer to a net exporter. China, on the other hand, is highly dependent on energy imports passing through the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, where the United States has naval supremacy. The United States also has a demographic advantages: Over the next decade and a half, according to research by Stanford University’s Adele Hayutin, the U.S. workforce is likely to grow by 5 percent, while China’s will shrink by 9 percent, mainly a result of its former one-child policy. China’s working-age population peaked in 2015, and India will soon pass China as the world’s most populous nation. And it barely needs repeating that U.S. power also results from its place at the forefront of the development of key technologies including biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information technology. U.S. and other Western research universities dominate higher education.
All this suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to prove a geopolitical turning point.All this suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to prove a geopolitical turning point. But while the United States will continue to hold most of the high cards, misguided policy decisions could cause it to play these cards poorly. Discarding the aces of alliances and international institutions would be one such misguided decision. Another one would be a severe restriction of immigration. Long before this crisis, when I asked former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew why he did not think China would surpass the United States as a global power anytime soon, one reason he cited was the United States’ ability to draw on the talents of the entire world and to recombine them in diversity and creativity. Given its ethnic Han nationalism, this kind of openness would be impossible for China. But if populism leads the United States to toss away its valuable cards of alliances, international institutions, and openness, Lee could be wrong.
Alternatively, a new U.S. administration might take its cue from the post-1945 U.S. presidents whose successes I describe in my book Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy From FDR to Trump. The United States could launch a massive COVID-19 aid program—a medical version of the Marshall Plan. As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently argued, leaders should choose a path of cooperation that leads toward international resilience. Instead of competing in propaganda, leaders could articulate the importance of power with rather than over others and set up bilateral and multilateral frameworks to enhance cooperation. Rich countries should realize that recurrent waves of COVID-19 will affect poorer countries less able to cope and that such a developing-world reservoir will hurt everyone if it spills back northward in a seasonal resurgence. It was like that in 1918, when the second wave of the pandemic killed more people than the first. Both for self-interested and humanitarian reasons, the United States should lead the G-20 in generous contributions to a major new COVID-19 fund that is open to all countries.
If a U.S. president were to choose such cooperative and soft-power-enhancing policies, something good may yet come out of the pandemic—a geopolitical path to a better world. If U.S. policies continue on the current path, however, the new coronavirus will simply accelerate existing trends toward nationalist populism and authoritarianism. But it is still much too early to predict a geopolitical turning point that would fundamentally alter the power relationship between the United States and China.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--The Coronavirus Is Exposing Populists’ Hollow Politics

At first , the spread of the coronavirus seemed like a boon for Europe ’ s populists .
In Italy , Matteo Salvini , the leader of the far-right League party , used COVID-19 to advance his xenophobia .
Salvini circulated a video of a migrant ship arriving in Italy , falsely implying that migrants were responsible for the outbreak .
Along with other far-right leaders in Europe , Salvini also used Europe ’ s border closures as another opportunity to vilify the European Union and its commitment to the free movement of people .
Yet the continuing crisis is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Salvini ’ s shortcomings and undermining many of the drivers that fueled his support .
Since the start of the pandemic , Salvini ’ s public support has fallen to its lowest point since July 2018 .
But rather than ushering in gains for Italy ’ s more centrist , mainstream parties , Brothers of Italy—a party to the right of even Salvini ’ s League , with ties to fascism—has gained in the polls .
Italy ’ s experience may very well foreshadow how populism will evolve in the wake of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parties of the moment support and potentially pushing these parties to adopt more nationalist and overtly authoritarian positions .
As in Italy , the pandemic is eroding many traditional pillars of populist support .
Populism divides society into two homogenous groups : the pure people and the corrupt elite .
In the current crisis , this antagonistic framing doesn ’ t resonate .
Unlike the 2008 global financial crisis , which accelerated Europe ’ s populist surge , the coronavirus can not easily be blamed on the elite .
If anything , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have demanded unity and reduced the polarization that populists thrive on .
The shared nature of the COVID-19 crisis undermines another key driver of populism : identity politics .
Populists have long sought to instill fear within dominant groups that their status is being threatened by outsiders or minority groups , such as by the influx of Syrian migrants into Europe .
But the coronavirus knows no borders and affects all of society , regardless of race or identity .
The pandemic is also renewing faith in mainstream political parties and experts .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ disenchantment with parties in the political center .
But populist leaders not just in Europe but also farther afield—from Brazil to Indonesia—have failed to adequately respond to the crisis .
In this way , the coronavirus is exposing the empty rhetoric of these parties and leaders and underscoring the need for competent and capable governments .
In Germany , for example , Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s catch-all center-right Christian Democratic Union is climbing in the polls .
The coronavirus is changing Europe ’ s political landscape .
As a result , many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to suffer .
But as the case of Italy underscores , it would be unwise to assume that what follows today ’ s populists would translate into gains for liberal democracy .
To remain politically viable , the new populists who emerge will adapt to changes in the post-coronavirus environment , ushering in a new brand of populism .
The new crop of populists will benefit from the economic challenges that the pandemic will leave behind .
Research shows that crisis-driven unemployment and economic insecurity are correlated with populist voting .
Likewise , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affects low-income workers , for example—aggravating divisions that new populists can exploit .
But trends emerging in Europe ’ s democracies suggest that future populists will likely take on more nationalist or overtly authoritarian characteristics .
As the traditional sources of support for populism erode , the next generation of Europe ’ s populists will seek to exploit the growing nationalism that the pandemic has produced .
Giorgia Meloni , the leader of Brothers of Italy , accused the EU of profiting off of Italy ’ s difficulties by aiming to purchase the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some European leaders have warned against giving in to such coronavirus nationalism , the pandemic is pulling at divisions within the EU .
When the Italian government first activated the EU ’ s solidarity mechanism , not one country came to its aid .
Some countries banned the export of crucial medical supplies .
Borders have been reerected .
Faith in the EU has diminished .
A recent poll shows that 67 percent of Italians believe being an EU member is a disadvantage for Italy , up from 47 percent in November 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the new populists could step in and exploit them .
Brothers of Italy has shown how political fortunes can rise amid growing nationalism .
The new political context is also likely to usher in populists with more overtly authoritarian tendencies .
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has highlighted the direction that things could go .
Orban passed a bill allowing him to rule by decree for an indefinite period and jail journalists who publish what the government deems to be false information .
Even in the United Kingdom , Parliament rushed through a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to detain and isolate people indefinitely and ban public gatherings , including protests , all with little oversight .
Moreover , governments across the globe are deploying surveillance and other technologies to contain the virus in ways that strain the balance between privacy and public health and safety .
If in power , the next crop of populists would likely seize on these currents to consolidate their control .
Yet these are the early days of a long crisis , and it is premature to entirely write off the possibility that the erosion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could create an opportunity for liberal democracies .
Europe ’ s democracies were slow out of the gates to respond to the pandemic , but cross-border cooperation is ramping up .
France donated 1 million masks to Italy , hospitals opened up across borders , and the EU announced a $ 110 billion job support program for its hardest-hit member states .
Now , proceeding with the so-called coronabonds—a funding mechanism to mitigate the economic fallout from COVID-19 and shore up European unity—is a critical next step .
If Europeans emerge from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inclusiveness , and the government institutions that populist leaders revile , then the pandemic could usher in a truly post-populist era in Europe .

Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Carisa Nietsche

At first, the spread of the coronavirus seemed like a boon for Europe’s populists. In Italy, Matteo Salvini, the leader of the far-right League party, used COVID-19 to advance his xenophobia. Salvini circulated a video of a migrant ship arriving in Italy, falsely implying that migrants were responsible for the outbreak. Along with other far-right leaders in Europe, Salvini also used Europe’s border closures as another opportunity to vilify the European Union and its commitment to the free movement of people.
At first, the spread of the coronavirus seemed like a boon for Europe’s populists. In Italy, Matteo Salvini, the leader of the far-right League party, used COVID-19 to advance his xenophobia. Salvini circulated a video of a migrant ship arriving in Italy, falsely implying that migrants were responsible for the outbreak. Along with other far-right leaders in Europe, Salvini also used Europe’s border closures as another opportunity to vilify the European Union and its commitment to the free movement of people.
Yet the continuing crisis is having the opposite effect—it’s exposing Salvini’s shortcomings and undermining many of the drivers that fueled his support. Since the start of the pandemic, Salvini’s public support has fallen to its lowest point since July 2018. But rather than ushering in gains for Italy’s more centrist, mainstream parties, Brothers of Italy—a party to the right of even Salvini’s League, with ties to fascism—has gained in the polls.
Italy’s experience may very well foreshadow how populism will evolve in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, both costing the populist parties of the moment support and potentially pushing these parties to adopt more nationalist and overtly authoritarian positions.
As in Italy, the pandemic is eroding many traditional pillars of populist support. Populism divides society into two homogenous groups: the pure people and the corrupt elite. In the current crisis, this antagonistic framing doesn’t resonate. Unlike the 2008 global financial crisis, which accelerated Europe’s populist surge, the coronavirus cannot easily be blamed on the elite. If anything, the urgency and magnitude of this shared crisis have demanded unity and reduced the polarization that populists thrive on.
The shared nature of the COVID-19 crisis undermines another key driver of populism: identity politics. Populists have long sought to instill fear within dominant groups that their status is being threatened by outsiders or minority groups, such as by the influx of Syrian migrants into Europe. But the coronavirus knows no borders and affects all of society, regardless of race or identity.
The pandemic is also renewing faith in mainstream political parties and experts. Populists have long benefited from voters’ disenchantment with parties in the political center. But populist leaders not just in Europe but also farther afield—from Brazil to Indonesia—have failed to adequately respond to the crisis. In this way, the coronavirus is exposing the empty rhetoric of these parties and leaders and underscoring the need for competent and capable governments. In Germany, for example, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s catch-all center-right Christian Democratic Union is climbing in the polls.
The coronavirus is changing Europe’s political landscape. As a result, many existing populist parties and leaders are likely to suffer. But as the case of Italy underscores, it would be unwise to assume that what follows today’s populists would translate into gains for liberal democracy. To remain politically viable, the new populists who emerge will adapt to changes in the post-coronavirus environment, ushering in a new brand of populism.
The new crop of populists will benefit from the economic challenges that the pandemic will leave behind. Research shows that crisis-driven unemployment and economic insecurity are correlated with populist voting. Likewise, inequality is likely to grow—the pandemic disproportionately affects low-income workers, for example—aggravating divisions that new populists can exploit. But trends emerging in Europe’s democracies suggest that future populists will likely take on more nationalist or overtly authoritarian characteristics.
As the traditional sources of support for populism erode, the next generation of Europe’s populists will seek to exploit the growing nationalism that the pandemic has produced. Giorgia Meloni, the leader of Brothers of Italy, accused the EU of profiting off of Italy’s difficulties by aiming to purchase the country’s strategic assets. Although some European leaders have warned against giving in to such coronavirus nationalism, the pandemic is pulling at divisions within the EU. When the Italian government first activated the EU’s solidarity mechanism, not one country came to its aid. Some countries banned the export of crucial medical supplies. Borders have been reerected. Faith in the EU has diminished. A recent poll shows that 67 percent of Italians believe being an EU member is a disadvantage for Italy, up from 47 percent in November 2018. If divisions among nations grow, the new populists could step in and exploit them. Brothers of Italy has shown how political fortunes can rise amid growing nationalism.
The new political context is also likely to usher in populists with more overtly authoritarian tendencies. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has highlighted the direction that things could go. Orban passed a bill allowing him to rule by decree for an indefinite period and jail journalists who publish what the government deems to be false information. Even in the United Kingdom, Parliament rushed through a bill that gives the government the power to detain and isolate people indefinitely and ban public gatherings, including protests, all with little oversight. Moreover, governments across the globe are deploying surveillance and other technologies to contain the virus in ways that strain the balance between privacy and public health and safety. If in power, the next crop of populists would likely seize on these currents to consolidate their control.
Yet these are the early days of a long crisis, and it is premature to entirely write off the possibility that the erosion of populism’s pillars of support could create an opportunity for liberal democracies. Europe’s democracies were slow out of the gates to respond to the pandemic, but cross-border cooperation is ramping up. France donated 1 million masks to Italy, hospitals opened up across borders, and the EU announced a $110 billion job support program for its hardest-hit member states. Now, proceeding with the so-called coronabonds—a funding mechanism to mitigate the economic fallout from COVID-19 and shore up European unity—is a critical next step. If Europeans emerge from the crisis recognizing the importance of cohesion, inclusiveness, and the government institutions that populist leaders revile, then the pandemic could usher in a truly post-populist era in Europe.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-16--Key Nominees Sit in Limbo as Trump Grapples with Senate

Key Nominees Sit in Limbo as Trump Grapples with Senate More than a dozen nominees for key Trump administration foreign-policy posts are caught in limbo as lawmakers grapple with how to conduct oversight and nomination hearings during a pandemic lockdown .
Some of the nominees stuck in place are poised to take up important ambassadorships or senior posts in the U.S. Agency for International Development , which is now tasked with helping developing countries and humanitarian crisis hot spots avert the worst effects of the coronavirus pandemic .
One is a nominee to sit on the executive board of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nations agency that is leading the global response to the pandemic but which U.S. President Donald Trump earlier this week said he was defunding .
On Wednesday , the controversy over the Senate ’ s advice and consent powers erupted into what could prove a constitutional crisis .
Congress has extended its recess until at least early May to adhere to public health guidelines on preventing the spread of the coronavirus , which has infected over 2 million people and killed around 140,000 worldwide .
In the meantime , it is holding pro @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adjourning , a move that has drawn sharp criticism from Trump .
In response , Trump threatened to use a never-exercised constitutional power to force Congress to formally adjourn , which would allow him to install his nominees in recess and go around the traditional Senate confirmation process .
It ’ s unclear that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell would be on board with this approach , and Trump ’ s plan could be hampered by Senate rules .
“ The current practice of leaving town while conducting phony pro forma sessions is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people can not afford during this crisis .
It is a scam .
What they do , it ’ s a scam and everybody knows it , ” Trump said at his daily White House briefing .
Across the board , Congress still doesn ’ t have clear answers on how to conduct business amid the coronavirus lockdown .
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is no different , leaving open questions about when , or how , those nominees will be vetted or confirmed when the Senate comes back from recess .
Sen. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the committee , and Sen. Bob Menendez , the top Democrat on the committee , are in talks to expedite the nomination of Brett Giroir , Trump ’ s pick to be U.S. representative to the board of the World Health Organization , given its role in the pandemic response .
But the two parties disagree over how to handle other nominations , enflaming tensions in a committee historically known for its bipartisanship , according to multiple congressional aides familiar with the matter .
Republicans say Democrats have rejected a proposal to hold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , under which lawmakers would submit questions and get responses in writing to fulfill their oversight duties—all of which would be made public .
Under the Republican plan , nominees would be made available for one-on-one phone calls with members .
They would prioritize nominees who are deemed uncontroversial , including career diplomats up for ambassador posts .
Democrats say the Republicans ’ proposal is a nonstarter , because lawmakers can ’ t properly grill nominees and assess whether they are fit for confirmation through written exchanges and phone calls alone .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and flexible so members got what they felt they needed and everything would be made publicly available , ” a Republican aide said .
The longer the nominations are delayed , “ the longer the backlog will get.
” “ We will not have capacity to do as many policy-focused subcommittee hearings when the Senate returns if this list continues to grow , with no agreement from Dems to work together on processing nominations , ” the aide said .
Lawmakers on the committee have criticized some of Trump ’ s past nominees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( One of them , the millionaire Trump donor Gordon Sondland , was later thrust into the center of the impeachment investigation over his role in Trump ’ s Ukraine policy . )
Others faced scrutiny over prior legal troubles , controversial statements , or not being forthright with the committee during the vetting process , raising questions over whether “ paper hearings ” are sufficient for nominees .
“ While Senator Menendez is committed to getting nominees into place necessary to respond to the COVID crisis , he will not agree @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Juan Pachón , the committee communications director for Menendez .
Trump “ has nominated and re-nominated individuals with serious problems including : restraining orders for threats of violence ; people who made material omissions , sometimes on a repeated basis , in their nomination materials ; people who tweeted and retweeted vile things about Senators and their families ; and who have engaged in incidents that should , frankly , mean they never should have been nominated , ” Pachón said .
“ The last thing we should be doing is walking away @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s advice and consent process seriously.
” The other nominees currently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are : Jennifer Barber , nominated to be U.S. envoy to the U.N. Economic and Social Council ; Natalie Brown , nominated to be ambassador to Uganda ; Jason Chung , to be U.S. director of the Asian Development Bank ; Sandra Clark to be U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso ; Joseph Manso to be U.S. envoy to the U.N. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ; C.J .
Mahoney to be the State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be deputy permanent representative to the United Nations ; Ramsey Day to be assistant administrator for Africa at USAID ; J. Steven Dowd to be U.S. director for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ; Henry Wooster to be U.S. ambassador to Jordan ; William Grayson to be U.S. ambassador to Estonia ; Alex Wong to be alternate U.S. representative for special political affairs at the United Nations ; and Aldona Wos to be U.S. ambassador to Canada .
Senior administration posts require presidential nomination and Senate confirmation .
Other committees in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out how to vet and vote on nominees , in part waiting for direction from Senate leadership and the Senate Rules Committee .
Even before the pandemic struck , many senior State Department posts languished for years without nominees from Trump .
Other nominees were held up in the Senate over questions over their suitability or partisan disputes .
Former senior diplomats say filling these positions during a global crisis is critical—lower-level officials temporarily filling those roles in acting capacities don ’ t have the same clout or authority within Washington or with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who are caught in limbo were put forward as early as summer or fall of 2019 , well before the pandemic hit the United States and derailed business as usual on Capitol Hill .
Democratic aides say Risch has not scheduled enough regular committee hearings and business meetings , contributing to the backlog in nominees sitting in the committee .
Republican aides say the Democratic-led impeachment trial against Trump earlier this year contributed to the delays .

More than a dozen nominees for key Trump administration foreign-policy posts are caught in limbo as lawmakers grapple with how to conduct oversight and nomination hearings during a pandemic lockdown.
More than a dozen nominees for key Trump administration foreign-policy posts are caught in limbo as lawmakers grapple with how to conduct oversight and nomination hearings during a pandemic lockdown.
Some of the nominees stuck in place are poised to take up important ambassadorships or senior posts in the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is now tasked with helping developing countries and humanitarian crisis hot spots avert the worst effects of the coronavirus pandemic. One is a nominee to sit on the executive board of the World Health Organization, the embattled United Nations agency that is leading the global response to the pandemic but which U.S. President Donald Trump earlier this week said he was defunding.
On Wednesday, the controversy over the Senate’s advice and consent powers erupted into what could prove a constitutional crisis. Congress has extended its recess until at least early May to adhere to public health guidelines on preventing the spread of the coronavirus, which has infected over 2 million people and killed around 140,000 worldwide. In the meantime, it is holding pro forma sessions from afar rather than formally adjourning, a move that has drawn sharp criticism from Trump.
In response, Trump threatened to use a never-exercised constitutional power to force Congress to formally adjourn, which would allow him to install his nominees in recess and go around the traditional Senate confirmation process. It’s unclear that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell would be on board with this approach, and Trump’s plan could be hampered by Senate rules.
“The current practice of leaving town while conducting phony pro forma sessions is a dereliction of duty that the American people cannot afford during this crisis. It is a scam. What they do, it’s a scam and everybody knows it,” Trump said at his daily White House briefing.
Across the board, Congress still doesn’t have clear answers on how to conduct business amid the coronavirus lockdown. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is no different, leaving open questions about when, or how, those nominees will be vetted or confirmed when the Senate comes back from recess.
Sen. Jim Risch, the Republican chairman of the committee, and Sen. Bob Menendez, the top Democrat on the committee, are in talks to expedite the nomination of Brett Giroir, Trump’s pick to be U.S. representative to the board of the World Health Organization, given its role in the pandemic response.
But the two parties disagree over how to handle other nominations, enflaming tensions in a committee historically known for its bipartisanship, according to multiple congressional aides familiar with the matter.
Republicans say Democrats have rejected a proposal to hold “paper hearings” for the nominees, under which lawmakers would submit questions and get responses in writing to fulfill their oversight duties—all of which would be made public. Under the Republican plan, nominees would be made available for one-on-one phone calls with members. They would prioritize nominees who are deemed uncontroversial, including career diplomats up for ambassador posts.
Democrats say the Republicans’ proposal is a nonstarter, because lawmakers can’t properly grill nominees and assess whether they are fit for confirmation through written exchanges and phone calls alone.
“The idea was to be very transparent and flexible so members got what they felt they needed and everything would be made publicly available,” a Republican aide said. The longer the nominations are delayed, “the longer the backlog will get.”
“We will not have capacity to do as many policy-focused subcommittee hearings when the Senate returns if this list continues to grow, with no agreement from Dems to work together on processing nominations,” the aide said.
Lawmakers on the committee have criticized some of Trump’s past nominees for being woefully unqualified for their posts. (One of them, the millionaire Trump donor Gordon Sondland, was later thrust into the center of the impeachment investigation over his role in Trump’s Ukraine policy.) Others faced scrutiny over prior legal troubles, controversial statements, or not being forthright with the committee during the vetting process, raising questions over whether “paper hearings” are sufficient for nominees.
“While Senator Menendez is committed to getting nominees into place necessary to respond to the COVID crisis, he will not agree to rubber stamp nominees,” said Juan Pachón, the committee communications director for Menendez.
Trump “has nominated and re-nominated individuals with serious problems including: restraining orders for threats of violence; people who made material omissions, sometimes on a repeated basis, in their nomination materials; people who tweeted and retweeted vile things about Senators and their families; and who have engaged in incidents that should, frankly, mean they never should have been nominated,” Pachón said.
“The last thing we should be doing is walking away from our responsibility to take the Senate’s advice and consent process seriously.”
The other nominees currently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are: Jennifer Barber, nominated to be U.S. envoy to the U.N. Economic and Social Council; Natalie Brown, nominated to be ambassador to Uganda; Jason Chung, to be U.S. director of the Asian Development Bank; Sandra Clark to be U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso; Joseph Manso to be U.S. envoy to the U.N. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; C.J. Mahoney to be the State Department legal advisor; Richard Mills to be deputy permanent representative to the United Nations; Ramsey Day to be assistant administrator for Africa at USAID; J. Steven Dowd to be U.S. director for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Henry Wooster to be U.S. ambassador to Jordan; William Grayson to be U.S. ambassador to Estonia; Alex Wong to be alternate U.S. representative for special political affairs at the United Nations; and Aldona Wos to be U.S. ambassador to Canada.
Senior administration posts require presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. Other committees in the Senate are also scrambling to sort out how to vet and vote on nominees, in part waiting for direction from Senate leadership and the Senate Rules Committee.
Even before the pandemic struck, many senior State Department posts languished for years without nominees from Trump. Other nominees were held up in the Senate over questions over their suitability or partisan disputes. Former senior diplomats say filling these positions during a global crisis is critical—lower-level officials temporarily filling those roles in acting capacities don’t have the same clout or authority within Washington or with foreign counterparts.
Some of the nominees who are caught in limbo were put forward as early as summer or fall of 2019, well before the pandemic hit the United States and derailed business as usual on Capitol Hill. Democratic aides say Risch has not scheduled enough regular committee hearings and business meetings, contributing to the backlog in nominees sitting in the committee. Republican aides say the Democratic-led impeachment trial against Trump earlier this year contributed to the delays.