foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--The Pandemic Is Laying Bare a Global Water Crisis

Days after he shared images of municipal workers disinfecting the streets of Addis Ababa with high-powered hoses , Mayor Takele Uma Banti found himself struggling to explain a 72-hour water shortage .
For the 4.8 million residents of Ethiopia ’ s capital city , interruptions to the water supply are nothing new .
But in the grip of a pandemic , the latest disruption threw into sharp relief the inequality created by limited and unpredictable access to clean water .
Without a treatment or a vaccine , the primary advice to prevent the spread of the coronavirus is regular hand-washing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of reach for millions of Ethiopians living without sustainable access to clean water , laying bare the critical link between water and public health .
Water crises were ranked above both infectious diseases and food crises in the World Economic Forum ’ s latest Global Risks Report .
This year , the world is likely to see all three .
Inequality in water access worldwide will shape the course of the pandemic ; it must also be a priority in post-coronavirus economic reconstruction.In the immediate term , it is essential that clean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to enable them to take the basic precautions needed to reduce the risk of infection from the coronavirus .
Improving access to water , sanitation , and hygiene systems could bring down the overall global disease burden by 9 percent and reduce the number of deaths to disease by more than 6 percent .
This can not be achieved when more than 840 million people worldwide currently lack basic supply .
In the Arab region alone , for example , more than 74 million people are at greater risk of contracting COVID-19 because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their hands .
Inequality in water access worldwide will shape the course of the pandemic ; it must also be a priority in post-coronavirus economic reconstruction .
In Ethiopia , the International Water Management Institute has mobilized trained members of the public , known as parahydrologists , to collect data on household knowledge of the coronavirus and assess how the current access and use of water affects disease mitigation measures .
This information will help scientists and public agencies identify , among other things , more effective ways of implementing mitigation measures such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finding alternatives to communal water points , where people from several households might gather at the same time and risk spreading the virus .
Even amid a water shortage , new technologies have given struggling families tools to address shortfalls .
For instance , the expansion of relatively low-cost solar-powered irrigation pumps in low-income countries can provide a new ways for farmers to access more reliable water supplies , not only for irrigation but also for their daily use .
The pumps cost around $ 1,000 , and some governments have experimented with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make them affordable for farmers .
Solar pumps and other water-lifting technologies could be scaled up to reduce potential knock-on effects from the pandemic in remote areas by increasing access to safer and more reliable groundwater .
Other low-cost technologies include simple hand-pump designs and rainwater harvesting structures , including from rooftops .
The challenge , however , remains one of balancing water availability with water quality , including suitability for consumption at a domestic level .
In the longer term , new and emerging technologies including satellites and drones will monitor water @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scientists to identify water-related risks on the horizon further ahead of time and to prepare people for future shocks .
For example , one new initiative will use remote-sensing technology to gather continent-wide data on water in Africa over the next three years and store this in a format ready to be analyzed in an open-source database .
The aim is to equip governments and regional agencies with the information needed to make early decisions about managing water and reallocating resources where necessary .
This could be a crucial tool in understanding better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between domestic , agricultural , and industrial use , as well as safeguarding the future of environmental flows in river basins under significant pressure .
These measures could help to mitigate the impact of future destructive floods and droughts on food security , as well as help ensure clean water access for poor households as a first line of defense against the spread of disease .
Greater public and private investment in such tools will help improve modeling and forecasting systems , not only minimizing the risk of water-related setbacks to the global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better cope with droughts , floods , and other disasters going forward .
Compromises around water use are seen across economic sectors , and this has become more acute during the pandemic .
Demand for food from a rising global population will only continue to grow after the outbreak has subsided , meaning water resources will have to be more carefully managed to ensure irrigation for crops does not come at the cost of household hygiene .
Current food systems often operate on assumptions of security , gambling with “ just enough , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efficiency and profit .
But the panic sparked by measures to control the coronavirus pandemic highlights the vulnerability of these systems to external shocks and stresses .
In cities , water planning and management needs to focus more on reusing water to balance the needs of a rising population with the production of increasing levels of waste and wastewater .
In Addis Ababa , for example , the Akaki River supplies irrigation water for farmers downstream , who then supply food products to the city ’ s population—even though their irrigation source is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The capital is far from alone in this : Some 380 billion cubic meters of wastewater are produced globally every year , yet there is untapped potential to reuse and repurpose even this volume .
Within this waste can be found an estimated 16.6 million metric tons of nitrogen , a key nutrient for plant growth and one that is often applied on farms in the form of fertilizer .
By extracting this nitrogen , wastewater could be used to help improve soil fertility and offset 13 percent of global agricultural demand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from wastewater while mitigating health risks therefore becomes a classic win-win for people and the environment .
The adoption of a circular economy , in which new uses are found for waste , helps increase the value of what might otherwise be thrown away , and this can help in financing waste reuse and upcycling .
But ultimately this is a public-policy choice—and will require heavy subsidies and investment by the state , working in partnership with consumers and producers .
Building a post-coronavirus economy means reimagining how producers and consumers value water @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might grow economies more equitably and safely .
But changing directions will not be easy .
Public finance and political commitment will have to come to the fore , combined with new investment partnerships and stronger governance at all levels .
Exploiting and governing new technologies effectively will also be essential to support longer-term transformations required to better manage the world ’ s water resources .
The world must fundamentally reassess the value of safe and secure access to water supplies for all .
If it doesn ’ t , the poorest will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us will ultimately suffer from the threat to human security .
As nations begin to peek under the curtain of the global lockdown and start preparations for reopening their economies , governments should begin with an abundance of caution .
Rather than returning to our current , broken systems , we must tackle future risks head-on .
Without a sea change in our economic growth models to prioritize water for the poor and for healthier , more sustainable food systems and environments , we will continue to face further jeopardy and future risks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demands widespread basic hygiene and sanitation , this is an opportunity to finally make good on the promise of “ water for all .
”

Days after he shared images of municipal workers disinfecting the streets of Addis Ababa with high-powered hoses, Mayor Takele Uma Banti found himself struggling to explain a 72-hour water shortage.
For the 4.8 million residents of Ethiopia’s capital city, interruptions to the water supply are nothing new. But in the grip of a pandemic, the latest disruption threw into sharp relief the inequality created by limited and unpredictable access to clean water. Without a treatment or a vaccine, the primary advice to prevent the spread of the coronavirus is regular hand-washing and good hygiene. But this is out of reach for millions of Ethiopians living without sustainable access to clean water, laying bare the critical link between water and public health.
Water crises were ranked above both infectious diseases and food crises in the World Economic Forum’s latest Global Risks Report. This year, the world is likely to see all three.
Inequality in water access worldwide will shape the course of the pandemic; it must also be a priority in post-coronavirus economic reconstruction.In the immediate term, it is essential that clean water reaches as many people as possible to enable them to take the basic precautions needed to reduce the risk of infection from the coronavirus. Improving access to water, sanitation, and hygiene systems could bring down the overall global disease burden by 9 percent and reduce the number of deaths to disease by more than 6 percent. This cannot be achieved when more than 840 million people worldwide currently lack basic supply. In the Arab region alone, for example, more than 74 million people are at greater risk of contracting COVID-19 because they lack the facilities to properly wash their hands. Inequality in water access worldwide will shape the course of the pandemic; it must also be a priority in post-coronavirus economic reconstruction.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
In Ethiopia, the International Water Management Institute has mobilized trained members of the public, known as parahydrologists, to collect data on household knowledge of the coronavirus and assess how the current access and use of water affects disease mitigation measures. This information will help scientists and public agencies identify, among other things, more effective ways of implementing mitigation measures such as social distancing. This might include finding alternatives to communal water points, where people from several households might gather at the same time and risk spreading the virus.
Even amid a water shortage, new technologies have given struggling families tools to address shortfalls. For instance, the expansion of relatively low-cost solar-powered irrigation pumps in low-income countries can provide a new ways for farmers to access more reliable water supplies, not only for irrigation but also for their daily use. The pumps cost around $1,000, and some governments have experimented with financing models to subsidize the cost and make them affordable for farmers. Solar pumps and other water-lifting technologies could be scaled up to reduce potential knock-on effects from the pandemic in remote areas by increasing access to safer and more reliable groundwater. Other low-cost technologies include simple hand-pump designs and rainwater harvesting structures, including from rooftops. The challenge, however, remains one of balancing water availability with water quality, including suitability for consumption at a domestic level.
In the longer term, new and emerging technologies including satellites and drones will monitor water resources faster and more accurately, allowing scientists to identify water-related risks on the horizon further ahead of time and to prepare people for future shocks.
For example, one new initiative will use remote-sensing technology to gather continent-wide data on water in Africa over the next three years and store this in a format ready to be analyzed in an open-source database. The aim is to equip governments and regional agencies with the information needed to make early decisions about managing water and reallocating resources where necessary. This could be a crucial tool in understanding better the trade-offs and complexities in water allocation between domestic, agricultural, and industrial use, as well as safeguarding the future of environmental flows in river basins under significant pressure. These measures could help to mitigate the impact of future destructive floods and droughts on food security, as well as help ensure clean water access for poor households as a first line of defense against the spread of disease. Greater public and private investment in such tools will help improve modeling and forecasting systems, not only minimizing the risk of water-related setbacks to the global recovery from coronavirus, but helping countries better cope with droughts, floods, and other disasters going forward.
Compromises around water use are seen across economic sectors, and this has become more acute during the pandemic. Demand for food from a rising global population will only continue to grow after the outbreak has subsided, meaning water resources will have to be more carefully managed to ensure irrigation for crops does not come at the cost of household hygiene.
Current food systems often operate on assumptions of security, gambling with “just enough, just in time” approaches to maximize efficiency and profit. But the panic sparked by measures to control the coronavirus pandemic highlights the vulnerability of these systems to external shocks and stresses.
In cities, water planning and management needs to focus more on reusing water to balance the needs of a rising population with the production of increasing levels of waste and wastewater. In Addis Ababa, for example, the Akaki River supplies irrigation water for farmers downstream, who then supply food products to the city’s population—even though their irrigation source is heavily polluted with industrial and domestic waste.
The capital is far from alone in this: Some 380 billion cubic meters of wastewater are produced globally every year, yet there is untapped potential to reuse and repurpose even this volume. Within this waste can be found an estimated 16.6 million metric tons of nitrogen, a key nutrient for plant growth and one that is often applied on farms in the form of fertilizer. By extracting this nitrogen, wastewater could be used to help improve soil fertility and offset 13 percent of global agricultural demand for fertilizers. Extracting nutrients and energy from wastewater while mitigating health risks therefore becomes a classic win-win for people and the environment. The adoption of a circular economy, in which new uses are found for waste, helps increase the value of what might otherwise be thrown away, and this can help in financing waste reuse and upcycling. But ultimately this is a public-policy choice—and will require heavy subsidies and investment by the state, working in partnership with consumers and producers.
Building a post-coronavirus economy means reimagining how producers and consumers value water and water security, and how we might grow economies more equitably and safely. But changing directions will not be easy. Public finance and political commitment will have to come to the fore, combined with new investment partnerships and stronger governance at all levels. Exploiting and governing new technologies effectively will also be essential to support longer-term transformations required to better manage the world’s water resources. The world must fundamentally reassess the value of safe and secure access to water supplies for all. If it doesn’t, the poorest will be disproportionately affected, but all of us will ultimately suffer from the threat to human security.
As nations begin to peek under the curtain of the global lockdown and start preparations for reopening their economies, governments should begin with an abundance of caution. Rather than returning to our current, broken systems, we must tackle future risks head-on. Without a sea change in our economic growth models to prioritize water for the poor and for healthier, more sustainable food systems and environments, we will continue to face further jeopardy and future risks. At a time when public health demands widespread basic hygiene and sanitation, this is an opportunity to finally make good on the promise of “water for all.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--Vietnam’s Coronavirus Success Is Built on Repression

When the Hanoi-based economic consultant Raymond Mallon returned home after a trip abroad in late March , he was immediately texted by the local police asking after his health .
Vietnam is a state that not only knows where you live but also knows when you go away—and your mobile phone number .
The degree of control matters because Vietnam has been widely praised for its success in tackling COVID-19 .
As of May 12 , the country had , according to official statistics , suffered no deaths from the virus and had limited total infections to just 288 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a popular holiday destination during the spring festival , when the coronavirus first hit the Chinese city of Wuhan .
This has led many observers to suggest that the country ’ s pandemic control strategy could be a model for others to copy , especially for developing countries .
But that is unlikely to succeed because few other countries have , or want to have , the structures of control that Vietnam possesses .
Todd Pollack , the country medical director of the Partnership for Health Advancement in Vietnam and a specialist in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ success to three factors : its relatively young population ( just 12 percent of Vietnamese are over 60 , compared with 22 percent in the United Kingdom ) ; rigorous testing combined with early hospitalization for those found to be infected ; and diligent contact tracing and isolation .
It is the last of those three—the tracing and isolating of infected people—that enabled Vietnam to get its outbreak under control .
As Matthew Moore , a Hanoi-based official from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , told Reuters : “ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to implement , yet they ’ ve been very successful at implementing them over and over again.
” But the reason Vietnam ’ s disease control mechanisms have been so effective , and the reason why they are unlikely to be copied , is that they are the same mechanisms that facilitate and protect the country ’ s one-party rule .
Vietnam has standing armies of neighborhood wardens and public security officers who keep constant watch over city blocks .
When required , they can be augmented by militia and self-defense forces with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The structures that control epidemics are the same ones that control public expressions of dissent .
Several countries have deployed police as troops in the war against COVID-19 , giving them extra powers to impose social order .
In the Philippine town of Santa Cruz , for example , police detained five youths who violated the national lockdown in a dog cage .
In March , France put 100,000 additional police officers on the streets to enforce its 15-day lockdown .
But in Vietnam , police are not only watching you on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ your front door , through your phone , and via your social media accounts .
In late March , a number of COVID-19 infections were discovered at the Bach Mai Hospital in southern Hanoi .
In response , the chairman of the Hanoi People ’ s Committee ( the city municipality ) , Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duc Chung , instructed thousands of police and local officials to visit every household in the neighborhoods for which they are responsible .
One resident , Dang Bich Thao , told Foreign Policy that the same evening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her door and those of other households in her building to ask if they or their families had visited the hospital .
Each inhabitant was checked against official residency lists and asked to explain their recent activities and travel history .
“ I felt like a criminal , ” Ngo Minh Hoang told Foreign Policy , after a police officer knocked on his door in late March asking if he had traveled abroad during the last 14 days .
“ Although [ the police ] explained that the check was just for our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Hoang added .
While the government has technological tools at its disposal , the foundation of its enormous security capacity is a vast human intelligence-gathering machine with the ability to trace and track individuals in person .
Chung was the right man when it came to controlling the capital city .
Until 2016 , he was the director of Hanoi ’ s police department .
On May 2 , the authorities closed off part of the Hanoi suburb of Gia Lam , quarantining 120 households ( around 600 people ) because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been COVID-19 .
So-called district functional forces—uniformed police and militia—were pictured erecting barricades .
Media photos also showed the men without uniforms who hold the real power in these situations .
They work for the Ministry of Public Security : shadowy enforcers in polo shirts and slacks who can , depending on the situation , dish out orders to local officials or summon up the heavy mob with a phone call .
These are the same people who can barricade government critics inside their houses to prevent them meeting journalists , convene @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or make sure someone ’ s kids get rough treatment at school if he or she makes too much noise about local corruption .
The enforcers can be quite sure that their behavior is not going to be challenged by an independent judiciary because the Communist Party decides what the law is .
Is it any wonder that people obey instructions to stay inside barricades when they live under a system that can make or break livelihoods by bureaucratic fiat ?
These are the actual mechanisms that make the difference between the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and United Kingdom were thought to enjoy and the real deal that Vietnam demonstrated .
They were born as tools of Communist Party control and have now been repurposed in the service of health protection .
The same systems , born from the same roots , made it possible for China to eventually control its outbreak , even after thousands of people died .
The party ’ s supporters will applaud its efforts and the domestic intelligence panopticon that made it possible .
Those who are more skeptical about surveillance states will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Caroline Mills , who runs a small island resort near Hoi An , described on Twitter in late February how this surveillance worked in the case of one French visitor .
According to Mills , the Frenchman had been flagged with a higher than normal temperature on arriving in Bangkok some 20 days earlier .
After two days passing through Cambodia , he arrived in Vietnam .
Unknown to him , the Vietnamese authorities monitored his entire journey through the country for 18 days .
Within minutes of Mills logging his arrival @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s database , she received a call from the police .
Officers were at the hotel to interview and test the Frenchman within 15 minutes .
The military has also played a role in Vietnam ’ s battle against the virus .
Sixty-eight military camps with a capacity of 40,000 people were set up to receive people ordered into quarantine .
Nguyen Khanh ( whose name has been changed to protect her identity ) , a 19-year-old who returned from studying in the U.K. and was quarantined in one of the camps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 6 a.m. each day by a loudspeaker blaring a song declaring , “ Our lives are a military march.
” Similar messages were also being broadcast outside the camp .
Each morning , the loudspeakers found on every street corner in Hanoi were also praising the contributions of the military and law enforcement agencies in fighting the virus .
At the same time , the authorities were stepping up their efforts against unauthorized information .
According to local news reports , between Jan. 23 , when Vietnam detected its first case of infection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 300,000 posts on news sites and blogs and 600,000 posts on social media about COVID-19 .
During those two months , police took action against 654 cases of so-called fake news and sanctioned 146 people .
The overlap between the techniques useful for fighting misinformation and those for squashing political criticism is obvious .
Vietnam sits at 175th on the Reporters Without Borders 2020 World Press Freedom Index .
While some other Asian states , notably South Korea , have used phone tracking , credit card records , and video surveillance to trace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only Vietnam and China are able to combine such technologies with the street muscle to maintain direct personal control over large numbers of people .
Only Vietnam and China are able to do so permanently and without the need to submit to legal or parliamentary oversight .
While the international community has criticized Vietnam ’ s security apparatus in the past for violating its citizens ’ rights , the country has received near-unanimous praise for its successful handling of the current pandemic .
But the tools used are the same .
For decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , physical monitoring , and censorship to manage the population .
The techniques have become more sophisticated , but Vietnam does not provide a model that many other countries are likely to either want or be able to implement .

When the Hanoi-based economic consultant Raymond Mallon returned home after a trip abroad in late March, he was immediately texted by the local police asking after his health. Vietnam is a state that not only knows where you live but also knows when you go away—and your mobile phone number.
When the Hanoi-based economic consultant Raymond Mallon returned home after a trip abroad in late March, he was immediately texted by the local police asking after his health. Vietnam is a state that not only knows where you live but also knows when you go away—and your mobile phone number.
The degree of control matters because Vietnam has been widely praised for its success in tackling COVID-19. As of May 12, the country had, according to official statistics, suffered no deaths from the virus and had limited total infections to just 288, despite being next door to China and a popular holiday destination during the spring festival, when the coronavirus first hit the Chinese city of Wuhan. This has led many observers to suggest that the country’s pandemic control strategy could be a model for others to copy, especially for developing countries. But that is unlikely to succeed because few other countries have, or want to have, the structures of control that Vietnam possesses.
Todd Pollack, the country medical director of the Partnership for Health Advancement in Vietnam and a specialist in infectious diseases, ascribed Vietnam’s success to three factors: its relatively young population (just 12 percent of Vietnamese are over 60, compared with 22 percent in the United Kingdom); rigorous testing combined with early hospitalization for those found to be infected; and diligent contact tracing and isolation. It is the last of those three—the tracing and isolating of infected people—that enabled Vietnam to get its outbreak under control. As Matthew Moore, a Hanoi-based official from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, told Reuters: “The steps are easy to describe but difficult to implement, yet they’ve been very successful at implementing them over and over again.”
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
But the reason Vietnam’s disease control mechanisms have been so effective, and the reason why they are unlikely to be copied, is that they are the same mechanisms that facilitate and protect the country’s one-party rule. Vietnam has standing armies of neighborhood wardens and public security officers who keep constant watch over city blocks. When required, they can be augmented by militia and self-defense forces with the ability to seal off entire districts. The structures that control epidemics are the same ones that control public expressions of dissent.
Several countries have deployed police as troops in the war against COVID-19, giving them extra powers to impose social order. In the Philippine town of Santa Cruz, for example, police detained five youths who violated the national lockdown in a dog cage. In March, France put 100,000 additional police officers on the streets to enforce its 15-day lockdown. But in Vietnam, police are not only watching you on the street. They track you to your front door, through your phone, and via your social media accounts.
In late March, a number of COVID-19 infections were discovered at the Bach Mai Hospital in southern Hanoi. In response, the chairman of the Hanoi People’s Committee (the city municipality), Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duc Chung, instructed thousands of police and local officials to visit every household in the neighborhoods for which they are responsible. One resident, Dang Bich Thao, told Foreign Policy that the same evening, a local police officer knocked on her door and those of other households in her building to ask if they or their families had visited the hospital.
Each inhabitant was checked against official residency lists and asked to explain their recent activities and travel history. “I felt like a criminal,” Ngo Minh Hoang told Foreign Policy, after a police officer knocked on his door in late March asking if he had traveled abroad during the last 14 days. “Although [the police] explained that the check was just for our own safety, I was still horrified,” Hoang added.
While the government has technological tools at its disposal, the foundation of its enormous security capacity is a vast human intelligence-gathering machine with the ability to trace and track individuals in person. Chung was the right man when it came to controlling the capital city. Until 2016, he was the director of Hanoi’s police department.
On May 2, the authorities closed off part of the Hanoi suburb of Gia Lam, quarantining 120 households (around 600 people) because one person was showing symptoms that could have been COVID-19. So-called district functional forces—uniformed police and militia—were pictured erecting barricades. Media photos also showed the men without uniforms who hold the real power in these situations. They work for the Ministry of Public Security: shadowy enforcers in polo shirts and slacks who can, depending on the situation, dish out orders to local officials or summon up the heavy mob with a phone call.
These are the same people who can barricade government critics inside their houses to prevent them meeting journalists, convene a neighborhood denunciation session to intimidate dissidents, or make sure someone’s kids get rough treatment at school if he or she makes too much noise about local corruption. The enforcers can be quite sure that their behavior is not going to be challenged by an independent judiciary because the Communist Party decides what the law is. Is it any wonder that people obey instructions to stay inside barricades when they live under a system that can make or break livelihoods by bureaucratic fiat?
These are the actual mechanisms that make the difference between the notional pandemic preparedness that the United States and United Kingdom were thought to enjoy and the real deal that Vietnam demonstrated. They were born as tools of Communist Party control and have now been repurposed in the service of health protection. The same systems, born from the same roots, made it possible for China to eventually control its outbreak, even after thousands of people died. The party’s supporters will applaud its efforts and the domestic intelligence panopticon that made it possible. Those who are more skeptical about surveillance states will be wary of trying to emulate its success.
Caroline Mills, who runs a small island resort near Hoi An, described on Twitter in late February how this surveillance worked in the case of one French visitor. According to Mills, the Frenchman had been flagged with a higher than normal temperature on arriving in Bangkok some 20 days earlier. After two days passing through Cambodia, he arrived in Vietnam. Unknown to him, the Vietnamese authorities monitored his entire journey through the country for 18 days. Within minutes of Mills logging his arrival at her hotel with the immigration service’s database, she received a call from the police. Officers were at the hotel to interview and test the Frenchman within 15 minutes.
The military has also played a role in Vietnam’s battle against the virus. Sixty-eight military camps with a capacity of 40,000 people were set up to receive people ordered into quarantine. Nguyen Khanh (whose name has been changed to protect her identity), a 19-year-old who returned from studying in the U.K. and was quarantined in one of the camps, said she was woken up at 6 a.m. each day by a loudspeaker blaring a song declaring, “Our lives are a military march.” Similar messages were also being broadcast outside the camp. Each morning, the loudspeakers found on every street corner in Hanoi were also praising the contributions of the military and law enforcement agencies in fighting the virus.
At the same time, the authorities were stepping up their efforts against unauthorized information. According to local news reports, between Jan. 23, when Vietnam detected its first case of infection, and mid-March, police censored around 300,000 posts on news sites and blogs and 600,000 posts on social media about COVID-19. During those two months, police took action against 654 cases of so-called fake news and sanctioned 146 people. The overlap between the techniques useful for fighting misinformation and those for squashing political criticism is obvious. Vietnam sits at 175th on the Reporters Without Borders 2020 World Press Freedom Index.
While some other Asian states, notably South Korea, have used phone tracking, credit card records, and video surveillance to trace the travel history of infected people, only Vietnam and China are able to combine such technologies with the street muscle to maintain direct personal control over large numbers of people. Only Vietnam and China are able to do so permanently and without the need to submit to legal or parliamentary oversight.
While the international community has criticized Vietnam’s security apparatus in the past for violating its citizens’ rights, the country has received near-unanimous praise for its successful handling of the current pandemic. But the tools used are the same. For decades, the Communist Party has used surveillance, physical monitoring, and censorship to manage the population. The techniques have become more sophisticated, but Vietnam does not provide a model that many other countries are likely to either want or be able to implement.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--It’s Too Soon to Call Coronavirus Winners and Losers

It ’ s Too Soon to Call Coronavirus Winners and Losers The coronavirus pandemic has claimed hundreds of thousands of victims and triggered the greatest economic crisis in nearly a century .
Confirmed case counts and deaths are updated daily as locked-down citizens wait anxiously for signs that the pandemic might be easing .
Coronavirus statistics have quickly emerged as the ultimate indicator for national performance .
The media rewards countries that successfully “ flatten the curve , ” and leaders have seen dramatic fluctuations in their public approval as the disease ebbs and flows .
Better coronavirus response has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women leaders .
But due caution is needed when attributing variation in coronavirus intensity to government policy .
Government leaders have obvious incentives to bend statistics and paint themselves in the best light .
Furthermore , we still have a limited understanding of the virus : Low case and death numbers may reflect luck rather than the skill of political leaders .
Much as medical experts urge caution about unproven treatments , journalists and scholars should be skeptical about political leaders seeking to cash in from the crisis .
Governments have been quick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government has sought to resuscitate its tarnished international reputation by emphasizing how quickly it brought the epidemic under control .
U.S. President Donald Trump has deflected criticism of his dismissive approach by scapegoating the World Health Organization and China .
The Democratic Party of Korea scored a landslide victory in South Korea ’ s parliamentary elections last month in a show of public support for President Moon Jae-in ’ s coronavirus response .
The political stakes are extremely high .
Governments have incentives to report coronavirus statistics that paint themselves in the most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be suppressed by limiting tests .
Deaths can be attributed to other causes .
Autocracies such as China are notorious for manipulating economic statistics even under normal conditions .
The coronavirus gained a foothold in the Chinese city of Wuhan because local officials sought to suppress information about the initial outbreak .
It was telling when China closed its border with Russia to prevent an influx of cases despite official Russian statistics suggesting the outbreak was well under control .
Russian doctors who spoke out are mysteriously falling out of windows to their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media postings and government actions can shed some light , but there is little reason to trust official coronavirus statistics published by autocratic countries .
Democracies have the advantage of transparency .
However , even in democratic states , recent studies suggest that official statistics vastly understate coronavirus prevalence due to asymptomatic cases and limited testing .
Official figures from New York appear to understate actual cases by an order of magnitude .
This means comparing official coronavirus statistics across countries is unlikely to be informative : Much of the variation may be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actual cases .
Even if the statistics are accurate , there is a deeper problem : Countries may be confronting very different challenges based on factors we do not yet understand .
This is a new virus .
The science is still evolving on factors that might limit transmission or intensity of the virus .
Without having a better understanding of these factors , it ’ s impossible to know if a country responded successfully through policy measures or just lucked out .
For example , consider two plausible but unproven explanations for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( BCG ) vaccine and warm weather .
There is some speculation that the BCG vaccine , an anti-tuberculosis vaccine commonly given to babies in some countries , may strengthen the immune system ’ s response to the coronavirus .
Clinical trials are underway .
There is some interesting circumstantial evidence : Regions with universal BCG vaccination programs appear to be experiencing less intense outbreaks compared to their immediate neighbors , such as Portugal versus Spain and East Germany versus West Germany .
Similarly , there is some suggestive evidence that warm , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ though probably not enough to make the virus go away during the summer months .
If these two explanations turn out to be correct , it would cast serious doubt on current narratives about the countries that responded effectively to the coronavirus .
The absence of universal BCG vaccination programs is concentrated in wealthy Western countries that are being hit the hardest by the virus .
If BCG reduces coronavirus transmission or intensity , it is misleading to compare policy responses in the West and in East Asia .
Countries with universal BCG @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan , Singapore , South Korea , and Taiwan , may be responding to a less serious challenge than such countries as Italy and the United States .
What about weather ?
If hot , humid weather reduces coronavirus transmission rates , it means the outbreak is less challenging in countries in equatorial regions such as India and Singapore , as well as countries in the Southern Hemisphere , including Australia and New Zealand , where it was summer during the early phases of the global pandemic .
The low number of coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government policy , but it is also possible that they reflect nothing more than good fortune .
The same could be true of the less intense outbreak in California and the U.S. South compared to New York .
These are , of course , big ifs .
Brazil , for instance , is seeing over 500 deaths a day despite its warm climate .
The point is not to claim that BCG and weather are the most convincing explanations for variation in coronavirus intensity across countries , but to show there is still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The media loves to cover medical pre-prints and unreviewed papers , but the work of building scientific evidence is long , slow , and grueling .
Eventually , we will have a more complete picture of this virus , but for now we have , at best , an incomplete image built up over these few desperate months .
There may be reasons why coronavirus intensity varies across countries that are still unknown , like variation in virus strains .
Demographics , too , could play a role if young people are not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also less likely to catch it in the first place .
Developed Western countries such as Italy have relatively older populations .
However , so does Japan , which has weathered the pandemic fairly well .
And never underestimate the power of sheer dumb luck ; it may be that a few coughing travelers flying to Milan over Mumbai in the early days of the epidemic made a critical difference .
The point is that we must be extremely cautious about jumping to conclusions about national responses to the coronavirus without knowing much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particularly important in the presence of propaganda campaigns by authoritarian leaders and would-be autocrats who cynically seek to take advantage of the pandemic .
Much as medical experts encourage caution about unproven remedies , we must be skeptical of political leaders bearing snake oil .

The coronavirus pandemic has claimed hundreds of thousands of victims and triggered the greatest economic crisis in nearly a century. Confirmed case counts and deaths are updated daily as locked-down citizens wait anxiously for signs that the pandemic might be easing. Coronavirus statistics have quickly emerged as the ultimate indicator for national performance. The media rewards countries that successfully “flatten the curve,” and leaders have seen dramatic fluctuations in their public approval as the disease ebbs and flows. Better coronavirus response has been credited to everything including authoritarianism and women leaders .
The coronavirus pandemic has claimed hundreds of thousands of victims and triggered the greatest economic crisis in nearly a century. Confirmed case counts and deaths are updated daily as locked-down citizens wait anxiously for signs that the pandemic might be easing. Coronavirus statistics have quickly emerged as the ultimate indicator for national performance. The media rewards countries that successfully “flatten the curve,” and leaders have seen dramatic fluctuations in their public approval as the disease ebbs and flows. Better coronavirus response has been credited to everything including authoritarianism and women leaders.
But due caution is needed when attributing variation in coronavirus intensity to government policy. Government leaders have obvious incentives to bend statistics and paint themselves in the best light. Furthermore, we still have a limited understanding of the virus: Low case and death numbers may reflect luck rather than the skill of political leaders. Much as medical experts urge caution about unproven treatments, journalists and scholars should be skeptical about political leaders seeking to cash in from the crisis.
Governments have been quick to politicize coronavirus statistics. The Chinese government has sought to resuscitate its tarnished international reputation by emphasizing how quickly it brought the epidemic under control. U.S. President Donald Trump has deflected criticism of his dismissive approach by scapegoating the World Health Organization and China. The Democratic Party of Korea scored a landslide victory in South Korea’s parliamentary elections last month in a show of public support for President Moon Jae-in’s coronavirus response.
The political stakes are extremely high. Governments have incentives to report coronavirus statistics that paint themselves in the most favorable light possible. Reported cases can be suppressed by limiting tests. Deaths can be attributed to other causes. Autocracies such as China are notorious for manipulating economic statistics even under normal conditions. The coronavirus gained a foothold in the Chinese city of Wuhan because local officials sought to suppress information about the initial outbreak. It was telling when China closed its border with Russia to prevent an influx of cases despite official Russian statistics suggesting the outbreak was well under control. Russian doctors who spoke out are mysteriously falling out of windows to their deaths. Indirect information such as social media postings and government actions can shed some light, but there is little reason to trust official coronavirus statistics published by autocratic countries.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Democracies have the advantage of transparency. However, even in democratic states, recent studies suggest that official statistics vastly understate coronavirus prevalence due to asymptomatic cases and limited testing. Official figures from New York appear to understate actual cases by an order of magnitude. This means comparing official coronavirus statistics across countries is unlikely to be informative: Much of the variation may be due to differing testing rates rather than actual cases.
Even if the statistics are accurate, there is a deeper problem: Countries may be confronting very different challenges based on factors we do not yet understand. This is a new virus. The science is still evolving on factors that might limit transmission or intensity of the virus. Without having a better understanding of these factors, it’s impossible to know if a country responded successfully through policy measures or just lucked out.
For example, consider two plausible but unproven explanations for reduced coronavirus prevalence: the bacillus Calmette-Guerin (BCG) vaccine and warm weather. There is some speculation that the BCG vaccine, an anti-tuberculosis vaccine commonly given to babies in some countries, may strengthen the immune system’s response to the coronavirus. Clinical trials are underway. There is some interesting circumstantial evidence: Regions with universal BCG vaccination programs appear to be experiencing less intense outbreaks compared to their immediate neighbors, such as Portugal versus Spain and East Germany versus West Germany. Similarly, there is some suggestive evidence that warm, humid weather may reduce coronavirus transmission, though probably not enough to make the virus go away during the summer months.
If these two explanations turn out to be correct, it would cast serious doubt on current narratives about the countries that responded effectively to the coronavirus. The absence of universal BCG vaccination programs is concentrated in wealthy Western countries that are being hit the hardest by the virus. If BCG reduces coronavirus transmission or intensity, it is misleading to compare policy responses in the West and in East Asia. Countries with universal BCG vaccination programs, such as China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, may be responding to a less serious challenge than such countries as Italy and the United States.
What about weather? If hot, humid weather reduces coronavirus transmission rates, it means the outbreak is less challenging in countries in equatorial regions such as India and Singapore, as well as countries in the Southern Hemisphere, including Australia and New Zealand, where it was summer during the early phases of the global pandemic. The low number of coronavirus cases in these countries may reflect good government policy, but it is also possible that they reflect nothing more than good fortune. The same could be true of the less intense outbreak in California and the U.S. South compared to New York.
These are, of course, big ifs. Brazil, for instance, is seeing over 500 deaths a day despite its warm climate. The point is not to claim that BCG and weather are the most convincing explanations for variation in coronavirus intensity across countries, but to show there is still much to learn about the virus. The media loves to cover medical pre-prints and unreviewed papers, but the work of building scientific evidence is long, slow, and grueling. Eventually, we will have a more complete picture of this virus, but for now we have, at best, an incomplete image built up over these few desperate months.
There may be reasons why coronavirus intensity varies across countries that are still unknown, like variation in virus strains. Demographics, too, could play a role if young people are not only less vulnerable to the virus but also less likely to catch it in the first place. Developed Western countries such as Italy have relatively older populations. However, so does Japan, which has weathered the pandemic fairly well. And never underestimate the power of sheer dumb luck; it may be that a few coughing travelers flying to Milan over Mumbai in the early days of the epidemic made a critical difference.
The point is that we must be extremely cautious about jumping to conclusions about national responses to the coronavirus without knowing much more about the virus. This is particularly important in the presence of propaganda campaigns by authoritarian leaders and would-be autocrats who cynically seek to take advantage of the pandemic. Much as medical experts encourage caution about unproven remedies, we must be skeptical of political leaders bearing snake oil.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--This Is What a War Economy Would Actually Look Like

This Is What a War Economy Would Actually Look Like On March 18 , U.S. President Donald Trump joined world leaders in declaring that their countries were at war with COVID-19 .
But are they really ?
Sure , Trump invoked the Defense Production Act , a piece of legislation forged in the crucible of the Korean War to mobilize private industry for arms production .
But he still refuses to use the act systematically instead of haphazardly to order production of scarce and essential medical equipment .
Trump has also joined French President Emmanuel Macron , German Chancellor Angela @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Johnson in their use of wartime rhetoric .
Calls for collective solidarity or a general mobilization of society are unprecedented since the days of World War II ; the glorification of emergency workers as “ heroes , ” the framing of general citizens as “ warriors , ” and Trump ’ s escalation of anti-immigration policy resemble wartime propaganda .
All this rhetoric seeks to fortify the population to bear the sacrifices required of them to fight the pandemic .
The problem now is that the propaganda is not being paired with true @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 would not look like the hands-off , conservative , and woefully inadequate response of the Trump administration .
It is high time for the government to mobilize and coordinate all of its national resources to fight the pandemic and mitigate the shutdown ’ s socioeconomic costs .
There is no better policy template than the war economies of the last century .
In a strange sense , it ’ s precisely the current shutdown of large parts of the national and global economy that beckons the analogy to wartime economic organization .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to war economies .
The reallocation of capital , raw materials , and people to factories for military-industrial production and to the front lines required a deliberate demobilization of civilian economies in both World War I and World War II .
Car manufacturers , such as Renault in France and Ford in the United States , stopped mass-producing automobiles and began turning out tanks .
Comprehensive rationing also forced civilians to spend less on consumer goods .
This suppression of the consumer economy increased household savings and encouraged the purchase of war bonds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war economy was arguably taken furthest , the Reich economic ministry and Reichsbank devised a sophisticated system of “ silent war finance ” ( geräuschlose Kriegsfinanzierung ) as an alternative to raising taxes .
Extreme rationing forced households to deposit their surplus savings in local banks .
The banks then invested the surplus in government bonds and other debt instruments to finance rearmament .
But if current shutdown policies do not disqualify the war economy model , there is a more urgent reason to embrace it more fully .
The United States is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the civilian economy , without the remobilization necessary to win the battle against COVID-19 .
Unemployment claims have hit record highs , unmatched since the Great Depression .
The Federal Reserve reported a whopping drop of 5.4 percent in total industrial production in March , the largest since 1946 .
The automotive industry has been hit hardest , as all major factories have shut down across the nation .
But the U.S. government is not organizing—neither directly through mass purchasing and mass production , nor indirectly through mass investment and partnership with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ labor , and vital materials toward the health care economy : the front-line sector .
Trump ’ s symbolic invocation of the Defense Production Act plus the issue of a one-time $ 1,200 stimulus check to eligible U.S. residents and his pretensions of being a “ wartime president ” do not come close to a war economy .
Just contrast that with the steps taken by the United States upon entering World War II , when the War Production Board gave the federal government powers to order procurement and production of armaments .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ supply of vital raw materials .
Until the United States sees a similar kind of government mobilization of the economy , its present crisis may never end .
Select industries that have closed shop should be systematically incentivized to produce test kits , ventilators , personal protective equipment , and , when the time comes , vaccines .
Production and wage subsidies , tax deductions , and guaranteed government contracts could all encourage this conversion .
Instead , conversion of existing industries has only occurred voluntarily and haphazardly .
Without this remobilization , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dire shortages of medical supplies will continue to delay the conditions for a sound reopening .
The United States currently faces the costs of an incomplete war economy , without its benefits .
Hoarding , profiteering , shortages , inflationary pressures , business concentration , depleted morale , curtailment of civil liberties , sharpened inequalities , and increasing protests have become fixtures of our pandemic society .
These are classic pathologies of a war economy .
The shutdown has already become unbearable for those suffering its greatest economic hardships .
Popular protests pressuring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do so are perhaps already becoming irresistible .
Yet despite all their leaders ’ war rhetoric , virtually no OECD government has adopted signatory war measures to mitigate the crisis .
Neither price controls nor rationing has been introduced .
The price of N95 masks in the United States has jumped at least sixfold from $ 1 to $ 6 apiece .
In Europe , it easily surpasses 10 euros , nearly $ 11 .
To combat rocketing price inflation and mitigate scarcities during World War II , the United States joined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agency , the Office of Price Administration , which set maximum price and wage regulations .
Panicked hoarding of essential medical products and foodstuffs is now contributing to critical shortages and price-gouging .
France has made the first move to impose price ceilings on surgical masks ( capped at 0.95 euros ) after mounting calls from the political opposition .
Such interventions have remained off the table in the United States .
Rationing in both world wars had two purposes : to manage real shortages and to establish a sense of fairness and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic hardship .
Without an overall policy , grocery stores , distributors , and producers have taken the initiative to implement their own quotas on the sale of staple foods .
This haphazard approach to rationing not only is inefficient , but it also risks fueling popular discontent and encouraging further supply chain imbalances .
Corporate excess profit taxes may also be called for .
Studies confirm that the COVID-19 crisis is exacerbating economic inequalities .
The United States , the United Kingdom , France , and Germany all began taxing what they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of World War I .
They did so again in World War II .
This helped to allay popular outcries against profiteers and speculators who enriched themselves from the wars .
The measures helped promote a sense of fairness by redistributing some of the war ’ s unequal sacrifices , while also raising needed government revenue .
Although most companies are suffering severe losses under the pandemic , a few are racking in massive gains .
Big business—and big tech first of all—has expanded its market power as brick-and-mortar shops across the nation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ price has risen 30 percent this year , and sales soared by 50 percent in March .
Meanwhile , Standard & Poor ’ s 500 index reported one of its strongest monthly returns in April since 1987 , though the market dipped again in May .
In a true war economy , the government would step in to attenuate these growing inequalities , arrest rising monopoly power ( by directing perhaps more bailouts to small and medium sized business ) , and manage distributional conflicts to maintain popular morale .
We should not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rhetoric of being at war against an “ invisible enemy.
” He may certainly be waging a war against immigrants and threatening war with China and Iran .
But this is to distract Americans from the economic war his administration refuses to wage .
Overcoming the COVID-19 crisis will require a version of wartime mobilization led by government coordination of the national economy .
A reorientation toward productivity-enhancing policies that also redistribute the costs and benefits of the shutdown in a more egalitarian way are essential to sustaining the fight against this virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hostile to state intervention in the economy may prefer only to preach the urgency of war .
A rising death toll , galloping inequalities , more monopoly power , mounting protests , and potential revolt all await inaction .

On March 18, U.S. President Donald Trump joined world leaders in declaring that their countries were at war with COVID-19. But are they really?
Sure, Trump invoked the Defense Production Act, a piece of legislation forged in the crucible of the Korean War to mobilize private industry for arms production. But he still refuses to use the act systematically instead of haphazardly to order production of scarce and essential medical equipment. Trump has also joined French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in their use of wartime rhetoric. Calls for collective solidarity or a general mobilization of society are unprecedented since the days of World War II; the glorification of emergency workers as “heroes,” the framing of general citizens as “warriors,” and Trump’s escalation of anti-immigration policy resemble wartime propaganda. All this rhetoric seeks to fortify the population to bear the sacrifices required of them to fight the pandemic. The problem now is that the propaganda is not being paired with true wartime leadership.
A genuine war against COVID-19 would not look like the hands-off, conservative, and woefully inadequate response of the Trump administration. It is high time for the government to mobilize and coordinate all of its national resources to fight the pandemic and mitigate the shutdown’s socioeconomic costs. There is no better policy template than the war economies of the last century.
In a strange sense, it’s precisely the current shutdown of large parts of the national and global economy that beckons the analogy to wartime economic organization. Selective suppression of economic activity is fundamental to war economies. The reallocation of capital, raw materials, and people to factories for military-industrial production and to the front lines required a deliberate demobilization of civilian economies in both World War I and World War II. Car manufacturers, such as Renault in France and Ford in the United States, stopped mass-producing automobiles and began turning out tanks. Comprehensive rationing also forced civilians to spend less on consumer goods. This suppression of the consumer economy increased household savings and encouraged the purchase of war bonds. In Nazi Germany, where the war economy was arguably taken furthest, the Reich economic ministry and Reichsbank devised a sophisticated system of “silent war finance” (geräuschlose Kriegsfinanzierung) as an alternative to raising taxes. Extreme rationing forced households to deposit their surplus savings in local banks. The banks then invested the surplus in government bonds and other debt instruments to finance rearmament.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
But if current shutdown policies do not disqualify the war economy model, there is a more urgent reason to embrace it more fully. The United States is suffering the costs of an unprecedented demobilization of the civilian economy, without the remobilization necessary to win the battle against COVID-19. Unemployment claims have hit record highs, unmatched since the Great Depression. The Federal Reserve reported a whopping drop of 5.4 percent in total industrial production in March, the largest since 1946. The automotive industry has been hit hardest, as all major factories have shut down across the nation. But the U.S. government is not organizing—neither directly through mass purchasing and mass production, nor indirectly through mass investment and partnership with private business—any national reallocation of capital, labor, and vital materials toward the health care economy: the front-line sector. Trump’s symbolic invocation of the Defense Production Act plus the issue of a one-time $1,200 stimulus check to eligible U.S. residents and his pretensions of being a “wartime president” do not come close to a war economy. Just contrast that with the steps taken by the United States upon entering World War II, when the War Production Board gave the federal government powers to order procurement and production of armaments. This included the authority to organize the supply of vital raw materials.
Until the United States sees a similar kind of government mobilization of the economy, its present crisis may never end. Select industries that have closed shop should be systematically incentivized to produce test kits, ventilators, personal protective equipment, and, when the time comes, vaccines. Production and wage subsidies, tax deductions, and guaranteed government contracts could all encourage this conversion. Instead, conversion of existing industries has only occurred voluntarily and haphazardly. Without this remobilization, infection rates will continue to soar. Dire shortages of medical supplies will continue to delay the conditions for a sound reopening.
The United States currently faces the costs of an incomplete war economy, without its benefits. Hoarding, profiteering, shortages, inflationary pressures, business concentration, depleted morale, curtailment of civil liberties, sharpened inequalities, and increasing protests have become fixtures of our pandemic society. These are classic pathologies of a war economy. The shutdown has already become unbearable for those suffering its greatest economic hardships. Popular protests pressuring authorities to reopen before it is safe to do so are perhaps already becoming irresistible. Yet despite all their leaders’ war rhetoric, virtually no OECD government has adopted signatory war measures to mitigate the crisis.
Neither price controls nor rationing has been introduced. The price of N95 masks in the United States has jumped at least sixfold from $1 to $6 apiece. In Europe, it easily surpasses 10 euros, nearly $11. To combat rocketing price inflation and mitigate scarcities during World War II, the United States joined other belligerents in creating a price control agency, the Office of Price Administration, which set maximum price and wage regulations. Panicked hoarding of essential medical products and foodstuffs is now contributing to critical shortages and price-gouging. France has made the first move to impose price ceilings on surgical masks (capped at 0.95 euros) after mounting calls from the political opposition. Such interventions have remained off the table in the United States. Rationing in both world wars had two purposes: to manage real shortages and to establish a sense of fairness and mitigate discontent among those who suffered disproportionate economic hardship. Without an overall policy, grocery stores, distributors, and producers have taken the initiative to implement their own quotas on the sale of staple foods. This haphazard approach to rationing not only is inefficient, but it also risks fueling popular discontent and encouraging further supply chain imbalances.
Corporate excess profit taxes may also be called for. Studies confirm that the COVID-19 crisis is exacerbating economic inequalities. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany all began taxing what they defined as excess profits at the end of World War I. They did so again in World War II. This helped to allay popular outcries against profiteers and speculators who enriched themselves from the wars. The measures helped promote a sense of fairness by redistributing some of the war’s unequal sacrifices, while also raising needed government revenue. Although most companies are suffering severe losses under the pandemic, a few are racking in massive gains. Big business—and big tech first of all—has expanded its market power as brick-and-mortar shops across the nation go under. Amazon’s share price has risen 30 percent this year, and sales soared by 50 percent in March. Meanwhile, Standard & Poor’s 500 index reported one of its strongest monthly returns in April since 1987, though the market dipped again in May. In a true war economy, the government would step in to attenuate these growing inequalities, arrest rising monopoly power (by directing perhaps more bailouts to small and medium sized business), and manage distributional conflicts to maintain popular morale.
We should not be fooled by Trump’s high-minded rhetoric of being at war against an “invisible enemy.” He may certainly be waging a war against immigrants and threatening war with China and Iran. But this is to distract Americans from the economic war his administration refuses to wage. Overcoming the COVID-19 crisis will require a version of wartime mobilization led by government coordination of the national economy. A reorientation toward productivity-enhancing policies that also redistribute the costs and benefits of the shutdown in a more egalitarian way are essential to sustaining the fight against this virus. Unfortunately, a Republican government ideologically hostile to state intervention in the economy may prefer only to preach the urgency of war. A rising death toll, galloping inequalities, more monopoly power, mounting protests, and potential revolt all await inaction.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--We Can’t Stop the Coronavirus Unless We Stop Corruption

We Can ’ t Stop the Coronavirus Unless We Stop Corruption To misquote a superhero comic : “ With great funding comes great responsibility.
” Anytime there is money sloshing around and through the halls of government , authorities need to double down on transparency and controls—or risk a hemorrhage of funds .
The world has seen examples of graft and misappropriation of money in situations ranging from international sporting events to devastating tsunamis .
Public health crises are at least as vulnerable to abuse .
It is now clear that restoring something that approximates a pre-pandemic lifestyle depends on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deployment of effective therapeutics and vaccines .
Many world leaders have stepped up : Earlier this month , in response to a call by the World Health Organization ( WHO ) to accelerate pharmaceuticals and technology to treat the coronavirus , a pledging event co-led by the European Commission raised $ 8 billion .
While extraordinary , this number pales in comparison to the more than $ 8 trillion in global stimulus funds distributed since the beginning of the crisis .
Without stringent anti-corruption safeguards in place , it is not difficult to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions , and ultimately , devastating effects on communities and individuals .
But by proactively identifying and deterring certain behaviors , the world has a chance to make the fullest use of an unprecedented flow of global aid money .
First , a public health crisis can set the stage for governments to directly determine prices for medical products , a process that can create endless opportunities for corruption across a supply chain .
To prevent that outcome , governments and multilateral organizations should establish a transparent , verifiable royalties structure that balances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need for affordable , equitably distributed drugs , medical equipment , and vaccines—and apply these rules universally .
Pharmaceutical companies will struggle to balance already palpable investor pressure with global demand for affordable products , protracted research and development timelines , and an unrelenting sense of urgency .
Meanwhile , nongovernmental organizations and public officials are calling for intellectual property-sharing , including compulsory licenses , which grant permission for third-party production of patented products without the patent owner ’ s permission in exchange for a royalty set by the government .
The need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part by setting royalties for compulsory licenses that reflect the extraordinary and speculative investment companies decide to make .
But without transparent , fair , and comprehensive pricing and licensing measures , governments and NGOs will be left to individually negotiate with pharmaceutical companies .
And transactions in which governments have substantial discretion , such as telecommunications and defense contracts , are among the most vulnerable to corruption , kickback schemes , and manipulation for the benefit of big donors .
Transparency and consistency can guard against these risks.Anytime there is money sloshing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , authorities need to double down on transparency and controls Second , governments need to double down on their vigilance within markets , cross-border cooperation , and legal enforcement to deter bad actors .
For example , a rush to increase the number of compulsory pharmaceutical licenses may dilute oversight and quality control , and risk a race to the bottom for unqualified manufacturers that , even without a pandemic , profit from unsafe and counterfeit drugs .
There are well-traveled routes for black-market products from the countries where they typically originate—with India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common destinations in Africa , Europe , and the United States .
But by ramping up intelligence coordination among global agencies , interventions in illicit trade networks , and more frequent cargo checks—the same tools employed by organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Interpol—the distribution of counterfeit pharmaceutical products can be curtailed .
Enforcing laws that have extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes across borders , along with platforms for collaboration and added pressure from multilateral organizations such as the U.N. , would encourage governments to prioritize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the market , those who are desperate and able to pay will always pay .
Under the current circumstances , one should also expect to see distributors that control the sale and delivery of scarce resources engaging in illicit price-gouging , and others accepting kickbacks and enriching themselves at the expense of the needy .
Governments have the legal tools to address this sort of financial crime , but enforcement will have to become a very public priority , and substantial penalties will have to be assessed to provide sufficient deterrence in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ varying levels of commitment to prosecuting commercial bribery more generally , prioritizing the punishment of exploitative practices amid an international health crisis should be politically palatable even to reluctant regimes .
Third , to avoid fratricidal competition , governments must establish international supply networks for essential equipment , tests , therapeutics , and vaccines—and ensure these systems are run by politically neutral bureaucrats rather than partisan politicians .
The scramble to secure test kits , personal protective equipment , and ventilators has already spurred competition on a smaller scale , pitting governors against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders against one another .
In the United States , Maryland ’ s governor and first lady leveraged diplomatic connections to directly negotiate the purchase of 500,000 test kits from South Korea .
That was good news for Maryland residents , but it ’ s hardly a scalable solution .
Without an international alliance in place to ensure equitable distribution , global competition for pharmaceuticals and equipment will move along similar paths , with leaders driven to exploit whatever connections are available to them .
Some will be legitimate and transparent , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far less so.A public health crisis can create endless opportunities for corruption across a supply chain .
WHO announced in late April a multilateral collaboration for equitable access to coronavirus vaccines , tests , and treatments .
A successful global alliance , however , will require unwavering commitment from all heads of state .
While some national governments may be able to address uneven resources domestically , mitigating the risk of resource-hoarding by wealthy nations to the detriment of countries with greater or more immediate need requires global cooperation .
To address viral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the framework of the global Ebola vaccine emergency stockpile—funded in 2019 by Gavi , the Vaccine Alliance—which incorporated transparency and fair pricing measures from the outset .
The target and scope of the program can adapt to reflect evolving recommendations by WHO ’ s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization and the tender process is managed by UNICEF .
Though political discrepancies may be inevitable , relying on a collectively governed , transparent , and inclusive multilateral panel of experts to make informed decisions about the deployment of drugs and vaccines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and shady bilateral deals .
Fourth , the public and private sectors must overcome long-standing cultural stigma and finally support and protect whistleblowers .
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Working Group on Bribery has warned that corruption could undermine coronavirus crisis responses and urged greater support for people who raise an alarm over graft .
Whistleblower protections , in particular , vary extensively in both substance and application worldwide : Far too many are narrow in their scope and feeble in their application , and most lack meaningful anti-retaliation protections .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ corporations and governments both must publicly and consistently embrace whistleblower protection measures , which should provide a clear path for reporting , either anonymously or confidentially , that guarantees defined legal and employment protections .
Fifth , countries should fund and defend investigative journalism—especially at a time when traditional revenue models are under unprecedented threat .
High-quality , objective , professional reporting is a powerful tool for countering financial crime , particularly when whistleblowers are hesitant to be publicly identified .
Reporters can investigate and expose malfeasance while protecting confidentiality , and , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A strong media will also be critical in tracking financial flows of the pandemic response for years to come.Recent emergency power grabs endanger the viability of independent journalism .
Recent emergency power grabs , such as the one in March by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban , endanger the viability of independent journalism by enabling political leaders to silence reporters they accuse of spreading misinformation .
To counter these abuses of power , governments that support democracy and free , independent press should continue to fund NGOs , diplomatic missions , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for human rights , democratization , and anti-corruption efforts .
To determine where funds should be directed , reporting and accountability are critical : Foreign and domestic government agencies and independent watchdogs should closely track how emergency power grabs evolve .
And as the world recovers from the crisis , international development banks should condition loans and aid on the finite term and ultimate discontinuation of emergency power measures—especially those that repress civil society and objective journalism—to ensure they do not become permanent installations .
Sixth , organizations should elevate and entrench the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global regulators .
The World Bank and other international organizations have emphasized that typical accountability measures , including meticulous record-keeping and tracking the movement of supplies , must be maintained well after the crisis has subsided .
The world should not miss the chance now to install auditable controls to help deter and hold accountable bad actors in the future .
Both government and corporate procurement safeguards have evolved over time to address increasingly sophisticated corrupt schemes .
An effective crisis response will require the public and private sectors to engage in ongoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for compliance , and resist the rush to scale back safeguards under cover of the pandemic .
Close to $ 500 billion is lost annually to fraud and abuse in the health care sector , and financial misconduct is exacerbated by any sudden and critical imbalance of supply and demand .
Well-worn channels of corruption remain pervasive .
Shifting supply chains can lead to rushed or haphazard vetting , enabling corruption at the delivery stage .
Established money-laundering tactics support the efficient diversion of emergency funds to shell companies and offshore accounts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will require heightened vigilance by government , corporate , and nonprofit leaders , along with civil society—but governments and global watchdogs have the ability to do more than one thing at a time .
None of this is impossible if authorities avoid the impulse to shrug it off as the unfortunate cost of doing business during a public health crisis .

To misquote a superhero comic: “With great funding comes great responsibility.” Anytime there is money sloshing around and through the halls of government, authorities need to double down on transparency and controls—or risk a hemorrhage of funds. The world has seen examples of graft and misappropriation of money in situations ranging from international sporting events to devastating tsunamis. Public health crises are at least as vulnerable to abuse.
To misquote a superhero comic: “With great funding comes great responsibility.” Anytime there is money sloshing around and through the halls of government, authorities need to double down on transparency and controls—or risk a hemorrhage of funds. The world has seen examples of graft and misappropriation of money in situations ranging from international sporting events to devastating tsunamis. Public health crises are at least as vulnerable to abuse.
It is now clear that restoring something that approximates a pre-pandemic lifestyle depends on the development, manufacturing, and global deployment of effective therapeutics and vaccines. Many world leaders have stepped up: Earlier this month, in response to a call by the World Health Organization (WHO) to accelerate pharmaceuticals and technology to treat the coronavirus, a pledging event co-led by the European Commission raised $8 billion. While extraordinary, this number pales in comparison to the more than $8 trillion in global stimulus funds distributed since the beginning of the crisis. Without stringent anti-corruption safeguards in place, it is not difficult to predict wasted public funds, weakened government institutions, and ultimately, devastating effects on communities and individuals. But by proactively identifying and deterring certain behaviors, the world has a chance to make the fullest use of an unprecedented flow of global aid money.
Anytime there is money sloshing around and through the halls of government, authorities need to double down on transparency and controls.
First, a public health crisis can set the stage for governments to directly determine prices for medical products, a process that can create endless opportunities for corruption across a supply chain. To prevent that outcome, governments and multilateral organizations should establish a transparent, verifiable royalties structure that balances incentives for private sector research with the need for affordable, equitably distributed drugs, medical equipment, and vaccines—and apply these rules universally. Pharmaceutical companies will struggle to balance already palpable investor pressure with global demand for affordable products, protracted research and development timelines, and an unrelenting sense of urgency. Meanwhile, nongovernmental organizations and public officials are calling for intellectual property-sharing, including compulsory licenses, which grant permission for third-party production of patented products without the patent owner’s permission in exchange for a royalty set by the government. The need for market incentives can be addressed in part by setting royalties for compulsory licenses that reflect the extraordinary and speculative investment companies decide to make. But without transparent, fair, and comprehensive pricing and licensing measures, governments and NGOs will be left to individually negotiate with pharmaceutical companies. And transactions in which governments have substantial discretion, such as telecommunications and defense contracts, are among the most vulnerable to corruption, kickback schemes, and manipulation for the benefit of big donors. Transparency and consistency can guard against these risks.
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Second, governments need to double down on their vigilance within markets, cross-border cooperation, and legal enforcement to deter bad actors. For example, a rush to increase the number of compulsory pharmaceutical licenses may dilute oversight and quality control, and risk a race to the bottom for unqualified manufacturers that, even without a pandemic, profit from unsafe and counterfeit drugs. There are well-traveled routes for black-market products from the countries where they typically originate—with India and China accounting for around 80 percent—to common destinations in Africa, Europe, and the United States. But by ramping up intelligence coordination among global agencies, interventions in illicit trade networks, and more frequent cargo checks—the same tools employed by organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Interpol—the distribution of counterfeit pharmaceutical products can be curtailed. Enforcing laws that have extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes across borders, along with platforms for collaboration and added pressure from multilateral organizations such as the U.N., would encourage governments to prioritize these measures.
Once viable products reach the market, those who are desperate and able to pay will always pay. Under the current circumstances, one should also expect to see distributors that control the sale and delivery of scarce resources engaging in illicit price-gouging, and others accepting kickbacks and enriching themselves at the expense of the needy. Governments have the legal tools to address this sort of financial crime, but enforcement will have to become a very public priority, and substantial penalties will have to be assessed to provide sufficient deterrence in a lucrative market. While countries have shown varying levels of commitment to prosecuting commercial bribery more generally, prioritizing the punishment of exploitative practices amid an international health crisis should be politically palatable even to reluctant regimes.
Third, to avoid fratricidal competition, governments must establish international supply networks for essential equipment, tests, therapeutics, and vaccines—and ensure these systems are run by politically neutral bureaucrats rather than partisan politicians. The scramble to secure test kits, personal protective equipment, and ventilators has already spurred competition on a smaller scale, pitting governors against governors in the United States and European leaders against one another. In the United States, Maryland’s governor and first lady leveraged diplomatic connections to directly negotiate the purchase of 500,000 test kits from South Korea. That was good news for Maryland residents, but it’s hardly a scalable solution. Without an international alliance in place to ensure equitable distribution, global competition for pharmaceuticals and equipment will move along similar paths, with leaders driven to exploit whatever connections are available to them. Some will be legitimate and transparent, as in Maryland, while others will be far less so.
WHO announced in late April a multilateral collaboration for equitable access to coronavirus vaccines, tests, and treatments. A successful global alliance, however, will require unwavering commitment from all heads of state. While some national governments may be able to address uneven resources domestically, mitigating the risk of resource-hoarding by wealthy nations to the detriment of countries with greater or more immediate need requires global cooperation. To address viral outbreaks, a multilateral agreement could draw on the framework of the global Ebola vaccine emergency stockpile—funded in 2019 by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance—which incorporated transparency and fair pricing measures from the outset. The target and scope of the program can adapt to reflect evolving recommendations by WHO’s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization and the tender process is managed by UNICEF. Though political discrepancies may be inevitable, relying on a collectively governed, transparent, and inclusive multilateral panel of experts to make informed decisions about the deployment of drugs and vaccines can reduce the likelihood of perceived injustice and shady bilateral deals.
Fourth, the public and private sectors must overcome long-standing cultural stigma and finally support and protect whistleblowers. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Working Group on Bribery has warned that corruption could undermine coronavirus crisis responses and urged greater support for people who raise an alarm over graft. Whistleblower protections, in particular, vary extensively in both substance and application worldwide: Far too many are narrow in their scope and feeble in their application, and most lack meaningful anti-retaliation protections. To advance efforts to uncover corruption, corporations and governments both must publicly and consistently embrace whistleblower protection measures, which should provide a clear path for reporting, either anonymously or confidentially, that guarantees defined legal and employment protections.
Fifth, countries should fund and defend investigative journalism—especially at a time when traditional revenue models are under unprecedented threat. High-quality, objective, professional reporting is a powerful tool for countering financial crime, particularly when whistleblowers are hesitant to be publicly identified. Reporters can investigate and expose malfeasance while protecting confidentiality, and, often, their presence alone deters corruption. A strong media will also be critical in tracking financial flows of the pandemic response for years to come.Recent emergency power grabs endanger the viability of independent journalism.
Recent emergency power grabs, such as the one in March by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, endanger the viability of independent journalism by enabling political leaders to silence reporters they accuse of spreading misinformation. To counter these abuses of power, governments that support democracy and free, independent press should continue to fund NGOs, diplomatic missions, and other institutions abroad that provide on-the-ground support for human rights, democratization, and anti-corruption efforts. To determine where funds should be directed, reporting and accountability are critical: Foreign and domestic government agencies and independent watchdogs should closely track how emergency power grabs evolve. And as the world recovers from the crisis, international development banks should condition loans and aid on the finite term and ultimate discontinuation of emergency power measures—especially those that repress civil society and objective journalism—to ensure they do not become permanent installations.
Sixth, organizations should elevate and entrench the decades of anti-corruption best practices developed by global regulators. The World Bank and other international organizations have emphasized that typical accountability measures, including meticulous record-keeping and tracking the movement of supplies, must be maintained well after the crisis has subsided. The world should not miss the chance now to install auditable controls to help deter and hold accountable bad actors in the future. Both government and corporate procurement safeguards have evolved over time to address increasingly sophisticated corrupt schemes. An effective crisis response will require the public and private sectors to engage in ongoing risk assessments, continue funding and providing support for compliance, and resist the rush to scale back safeguards under cover of the pandemic.
Close to $500 billion is lost annually to fraud and abuse in the health care sector, and financial misconduct is exacerbated by any sudden and critical imbalance of supply and demand. Well-worn channels of corruption remain pervasive. Shifting supply chains can lead to rushed or haphazard vetting, enabling corruption at the delivery stage. Established money-laundering tactics support the efficient diversion of emergency funds to shell companies and offshore accounts. Preventing the devastating effects of corruption will require heightened vigilance by government, corporate, and nonprofit leaders, along with civil society—but governments and global watchdogs have the ability to do more than one thing at a time. None of this is impossible if authorities avoid the impulse to shrug it off as the unfortunate cost of doing business during a public health crisis.