Defund the Bankers

The coronavirus is supposed to change everything about the U.S. economy .
Analysts and commentators have found a new energy speculating about what the economy will , or should , look like after the pandemic .
Foreign Policy ’ s Adam Tooze recently wrote an analysis headlined : “ The Normal Economy Is Never Coming Back.
” New York Gov .
Andrew Cuomo doesn ’ t want to reopen his state , he wants to reimagine it .
Others have likewise called for the United States to be deliberate about change , to build back better , and to build @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to think change is warranted .
Prior to the pandemic , the global economy was not on track to meet the emission goals set by the Paris climate deal , both inequality and corporate debt were surging , and productivity growth had plummeted .
In the United States , meanwhile , as of 2016 the net worth of a typical white family ( $ 171,000 ) had become nearly 10 times that of a Black family ( $ 17,150 ) .
There is also good reason , of course , to believe that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Similar calls for reform followed the 2008 financial crisis—remember Occupy Wall Street ?
Not much happened .
Demands for economic justice and fundamental reform will inevitably be stymied when the most powerful economic institution in the United States and , arguably , the world—the U.S. Federal Reserve—is working , intentionally or not , to sustain the status quo .
The Federal Reserve is on a preservation mission .
The central bank is doing all it can , and more , to return the financial system to its pre-pandemic form .
Perhaps this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ After all , contemporary central banking is , as one former Fed official put it , “ a quest for stability ” —price stability , financial stability , economic stability .
The problem is , this quest for stability has become a mission to preserve .
Although it might be easy to mistake one goal for the other , the gulf between stability and preservation is vast .
Stability is the opposite of volatility ; preservation is the opposite of change .
A stable world can progress .
In contrast , a preserved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in amber—but it doesn ’ t change and , thus , can not progress .
Politicians , analysts , activists , and citizens are calling for change .
Monetary policymakers are working to preserve .
There might seem little to be done about the tension , but it is possible to put into practice the desire to build back better—to reimagine , rather than simply reopen .
The Black Lives Matter ( BLM ) movement offers the most sophisticated playbook to date .
The police are one particular pipeline in the social infrastructure—a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the police to address homelessness , domestic violence , stranded cats , missing property , and much more .
This particular pipeline was established to seek social stability .
And just as the Fed seeks economic and financial stability through preservation , the police forces in this country work to establish social stability through preservation .
In so doing , the police have preserved the systemic racism built into the fabric of this country .
Recognizing this , the BLM movement has coalesced around the idea of defunding the police and , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ piece of U.S. social infrastructure—eliminate the force designed to preserve a social arrangement characterized by systemic racism , because some things aren ’ t worth preserving .
Replace it with a new social infrastructure , a set of pipes and conduits that allow citizens to relate in ways which don ’ t preserve , but rather improve , our society .
Defunding the police entails taking responsibilities and powers away from the police force that are more appropriately and more effectively executed by others : social workers , mental health facilities , educators @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Fed is fighting the current economic crisis with all the tools in its arsenal .
Every action it takes , every time it injects funds into the economy , it goes via the financial system .
Scholars have referred to this fact as the infrastructural power of the financial sector .
Take one example : The Fed is working to support the Small Business Administration ’ s efforts to get loans out to small businesses .
To do so , the Fed has purchased those loans on the secondary market , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make more such loans , but inevitably enriching any financial actors involved in buying or selling them .
Meanwhile , out of urgency on the part of the Fed to get the banks to lend to small businesses , the central bank has temporarily reduced regulations on Wells Fargo that were originally implemented because of “ widespread compliance and operational breakdowns that resulted in harm to consumers.
” In other words , the Fed is easing up regulations meant to make Wells Fargo less predatory in hopes that Wells Fargo will , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All because the Fed itself can not make those loans directly .
The channels , the infrastructure , that are required to forge a better economy simply aren ’ t there .
The Fed ’ s coronavirus response is much like giving the police more power , more money , and more resources , and then increasing the police presence in Black communities in hopes that doing so will fix racism .
That wouldn ’ t work , and nor will the Fed ’ s efforts .
Giving more power , more resources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may achieve a certain level of preservation , but it won ’ t permit progress .
Just as the answer to the problem of racism in America is not to make each individual police officer anti-racist , the answer to the problem of inequality and access to economic resources in America is not to ask the Fed ’ s leadership ( multimillionaires and either former or perhaps future financiers ) to be less focused on finance .
The answer is to change the infrastructure .
Instead of depending on the Fed to decide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and insisting that it be disseminated via the financial sector , it is worth considering the creation of a national investment authority , designed to invest in American businesses , nonprofits , and state and local governments .
Instead of the Fed investing heavily in finance and the corporate sector to preserve the existing economy , perhaps this national investment authority would prioritize investing in Black-owned businesses , green businesses , and those businesses with good employment practices .
The United States should have a system of banking for all .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unbanked .
It ’ s no wonder it ’ s hard for the government to disseminate stimulus checks or provide loans to individuals or small businesses .
Access to economic resources in America is privatized .
If the Fed were to give every American a public bank account ( perhaps via the post office ) that would change .
Perhaps recognizing the task ahead , the chairman of the Federal Reserve System , Jerome Powell , gave a speech on Juneteenth this year .
“ It is not lost on me that we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reckoning of racial injustice , ” he said , continuing : The pandemic has again exposed a range of troubling inequalities , most of them of long standing .
As the national discussion continues , it is critical to remember that equity includes access to education , work , and economic opportunity .
I am reminded that Dr. King delivered his “ I Have a Dream ” speech , just a few short blocks from the Federal Reserve , at a rally whose full title was the March on Washington for Jobs and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he ’ s right .
Education , work , and economic opportunity are essential for establishing a just society .
The problem is that contemporary economic infrastructure is set up to preserve the existing economic arrangement , and that means preserving an arrangement in which large swaths of society don ’ t have access to the things Powell says they should .
Currently , both American policing and American monetary policy are designed to preserve , not progress .
And in both cases , the country is holding on to something not worth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to identify the perfect future in order to let go of a rotten past ; we just need to establish the infrastructure that will allow things to get better .

The coronavirus is supposed to change everything about the U.S. economy. Analysts and commentators have found a new energy speculating about what the economy will, or should, look like after the pandemic. Foreign Policy’s Adam Tooze recently wrote an analysis headlined: “ The Normal Economy Is Never Coming Back .” New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo doesn’t want to reopen his state, he wants to reimagine it. Others have likewise called for the United States to be deliberate about change, to build back better , and to build back greener .
The coronavirus is supposed to change everything about the U.S. economy. Analysts and commentators have found a new energy speculating about what the economy will, or should, look like after the pandemic. Foreign Policy’s Adam Tooze recently wrote an analysis headlined: “The Normal Economy Is Never Coming Back.” New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo doesn’t want to reopen his state, he wants to reimagine it. Others have likewise called for the United States to be deliberate about change, to build back better, and to build back greener.
There is good reason to think change is warranted. Prior to the pandemic, the global economy was not on track to meet the emission goals set by the Paris climate deal, both inequality and corporate debt were surging, and productivity growth had plummeted. In the United States, meanwhile, as of 2016 the net worth of a typical white family ($171,000) had become nearly 10 times that of a Black family ($17,150).
There is also good reason, of course, to believe that change will be hard to come by. Similar calls for reform followed the 2008 financial crisis—remember Occupy Wall Street? Not much happened. Demands for economic justice and fundamental reform will inevitably be stymied when the most powerful economic institution in the United States and, arguably, the world—the U.S. Federal Reserve—is working, intentionally or not, to sustain the status quo.
The Federal Reserve is on a preservation mission. The central bank is doing all it can, and more, to return the financial system to its pre-pandemic form. Perhaps this shouldn’t be a surprise. After all, contemporary central banking is, as one former Fed official put it, “a quest for stability”—price stability, financial stability, economic stability. The problem is, this quest for stability has become a mission to preserve. Although it might be easy to mistake one goal for the other, the gulf between stability and preservation is vast. Stability is the opposite of volatility; preservation is the opposite of change. A stable world can progress. In contrast, a preserved world may be stable—think of a bug in amber—but it doesn’t change and, thus, cannot progress.
Politicians, analysts, activists, and citizens are calling for change. Monetary policymakers are working to preserve. There might seem little to be done about the tension, but it is possible to put into practice the desire to build back better—to reimagine, rather than simply reopen. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement offers the most sophisticated playbook to date.
The state creates infrastructure. It builds physical infrastructure, like roads and bridges; it establishes political infrastructure, like voting systems; and it creates social infrastructure, like the police force. This infrastructure constitutes the pipelines through which citizens interact. We redistribute wealth via taxes, disseminate knowledge to one another via the education system, visit one another via the roads, and so on. The genius of the BLM movement is that it is not just about cultivating anti-racism among individual Americans. BLM does not hang its success on the hope that all the police officers in the United States will become successful and committed anti-racists in the near future. Rather, it calls for the United States to change its existing infrastructure.
The police are one particular pipeline in the social infrastructure—a large one. The United States depends on the police to address homelessness, domestic violence, stranded cats, missing property, and much more. This particular pipeline was established to seek social stability. And just as the Fed seeks economic and financial stability through preservation, the police forces in this country work to establish social stability through preservation. In so doing, the police have preserved the systemic racism built into the fabric of this country.
Recognizing this, the BLM movement has coalesced around the idea of defunding the police and, in so doing, dismantling this particular piece of U.S. social infrastructure—eliminate the force designed to preserve a social arrangement characterized by systemic racism, because some things aren’t worth preserving. Replace it with a new social infrastructure, a set of pipes and conduits that allow citizens to relate in ways which don’t preserve, but rather improve, our society. Defunding the police entails taking responsibilities and powers away from the police force that are more appropriately and more effectively executed by others: social workers, mental health facilities, educators, job creators, and the like.
There are lessons from the BLM movement for the U.S. economy, where monetary policy infrastructure is dominated by private financial institutions. Consider the Fed’s coronavirus response.
The Fed is fighting the current economic crisis with all the tools in its arsenal. Every action it takes, every time it injects funds into the economy, it goes via the financial system. Scholars have referred to this fact as the infrastructural power of the financial sector. Take one example: The Fed is working to support the Small Business Administration’s efforts to get loans out to small businesses. To do so, the Fed has purchased those loans on the secondary market, thereby (hopefully) incentivizing banks to make more such loans, but inevitably enriching any financial actors involved in buying or selling them.
Meanwhile, out of urgency on the part of the Fed to get the banks to lend to small businesses, the central bank has temporarily reduced regulations on Wells Fargo that were originally implemented because of “widespread compliance and operational breakdowns that resulted in harm to consumers.” In other words, the Fed is easing up regulations meant to make Wells Fargo less predatory in hopes that Wells Fargo will, in turn, help those in need. All because the Fed itself cannot make those loans directly. The channels, the infrastructure, that are required to forge a better economy simply aren’t there.
The Fed’s coronavirus response is much like giving the police more power, more money, and more resources, and then increasing the police presence in Black communities in hopes that doing so will fix racism. That wouldn’t work, and nor will the Fed’s efforts. Giving more power, more resources, and more support to the Fed may achieve a certain level of preservation, but it won’t permit progress.
Just as the answer to the problem of racism in America is not to make each individual police officer anti-racist, the answer to the problem of inequality and access to economic resources in America is not to ask the Fed’s leadership (multimillionaires and either former or perhaps future financiers) to be less focused on finance. The answer is to change the infrastructure.
Instead of depending on the Fed to decide if and when to create new money, and insisting that it be disseminated via the financial sector, it is worth considering the creation of a national investment authority, designed to invest in American businesses, nonprofits, and state and local governments. Instead of the Fed investing heavily in finance and the corporate sector to preserve the existing economy, perhaps this national investment authority would prioritize investing in Black-owned businesses, green businesses, and those businesses with good employment practices.
The United States should have a system of banking for all. A quarter of American households are underbanked or unbanked. It’s no wonder it’s hard for the government to disseminate stimulus checks or provide loans to individuals or small businesses. Access to economic resources in America is privatized. If the Fed were to give every American a public bank account (perhaps via the post office) that would change.
Perhaps recognizing the task ahead, the chairman of the Federal Reserve System, Jerome Powell, gave a speech on Juneteenth this year. “It is not lost on me that we are meeting on Juneteenth amid a renewed reckoning of racial injustice,” he said, continuing:
The pandemic has again exposed a range of troubling inequalities, most of them of long standing. As the national discussion continues, it is critical to remember that equity includes access to education, work, and economic opportunity. I am reminded that Dr. King delivered his “I Have a Dream” speech, just a few short blocks from the Federal Reserve, at a rally whose full title was the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.
And, of course, he’s right. Education, work, and economic opportunity are essential for establishing a just society. The problem is that contemporary economic infrastructure is set up to preserve the existing economic arrangement, and that means preserving an arrangement in which large swaths of society don’t have access to the things Powell says they should.
Currently, both American policing and American monetary policy are designed to preserve, not progress. And in both cases, the country is holding on to something not worth preserving. We don’t need to identify the perfect future in order to let go of a rotten past; we just need to establish the infrastructure that will allow things to get better.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-06--Beijing’s Secret Police Rule Hong Kong Now

Physically Hong Kong looks as it always did .
But last Tuesday it changed irreversibly .
The city was once proud of its distinct British-derived legal system , which guaranteed the rights of residents—and provided a solid foundation for its commercial glory .
That is being swept away .
Despite predictions that Beijing would not be ready to enforce its new national security law in Hong Kong until the fall , Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s government rushed the legislation , announced just six weeks ago , through the National People ’ s Congress .
The measure took effect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 30 , sight unseen by those now subject to its dictates .
Hong Kong ’ s old legal rules no longer apply .
Legislative interpretation will be up to China .
A new enforcement office , a national security commission , will be established under “ the supervision of the central government.
” Chinese security agents will operate openly and officially in Hong Kong .
Personnel will employ surveillance , including wiretaps , against suspects , who can be held without bail .
Trials can be conducted in secret .
Cases can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Special jurists will be appointed by the territory ’ s chief executive , who in turn is effectively chosen by China .
And offenders will in most cases be extradited to the mainland , where they will be tried and ( inevitably ) convicted and imprisoned .
What that means can be seen in the capital itself , where the professor Xu Zhangrun , one of the last remaining open critics of Xi-ism , was arrested on Monday .
Xu has long been under house arrest , but the operation—to detain a 57-year-old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 officers .
The limited tolerance that Chinese leaders once extended to critics , at home or in Hong Kong , is gone , replaced only with thuggery under the barest guise of law .
In Hong Kong , the day after the law was introduced , nine people were arrested for violating Beijing ’ s rules .
The first was a man waving a Hong Kong independence flag .
Another was wearing a “ Free Hong Kong ” T-shirt and found to possess an independence banner .
A woman was arrested for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is considered “ undermining national unification.
” Some 300 protesters also were arrested under Hong Kong law .
But the police department warned protesters that chanting pro-independence slogans “ may have breached ” the new restrictions and announced that it would “ take resolute enforcement action in accordance ” with the legislation .
Senior personnel were told that “ anybody searched and found to have independence flags in their possession will be arrested , ” according to CNN .
The law is “ much worse ” than predicted , in the view of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong .
He cited the measure ’ s extraterritorial reach , which “ will really alarm all the foreigners and foreign investment and no one could now feel safe.
” Seton Hall University ’ s Margaret Lewis argued that “ whatever barrier there was between Hong Kong and the mainland has at best turned into a highly porous membrane.
” The law penalizes separatism , subversion , and terrorism—none narrowly defined .
Advocating democracy or independence , and demonstrating without permission , could violate more than one provision .
Also illegal would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to endanger national security , ” which could mean most contacts with any foreigner , especially involving any criticism of China .
The law even would apply to overseas activities by nonresidents and foreign nationals , making them subject to prosecution on entering Hong Kong or China .
Penalties include up to life imprisonment .
Chief Executive Carrie Lam , who never saw the draft legislation , nevertheless assured residents that they had nothing to fear , that their “ legitimate rights and freedoms ” would be secure , the city ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ autonomy ” would be respected , and only a few lawbreakers would be targeted .
The pro-Beijing legislator Michael Tien insisted that “ the intention is not for it to suffocate everyone.
” Zhang Xiaoming , the executive deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office , essentially deputy Gauleiter to the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) , said : “ The purpose is not to take the pro-democratic camp in Hong Kong as an imaginary enemy .
The purpose is combating a narrow category of crimes against national security.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ by their own assessments .
For instance , Zhang explained that “ different views ” should not be used as “ a pretext ” to “ turn Hong Kong into a safe haven of anti-China forces.
” He told the press after the law took effect that suspects would be tried in China since the territory could not be expected to implement mainland laws—which apparently forbid wearing a pro-independence T-shirt and shouting a pro-independence slogan .
Pro-Beijing apparatchiks even see the law as providing an opportunity for revenge .
Former Hong Kong Chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2014 Umbrella Revolution , went on Facebook to offer a bounty for tips identifying those who violate the new law .
National security laws have been important weapons in China ’ s repressive arsenal , explained Yaqiu Wang of Human Rights Watch : “ The government has been abusing the laws .
They target Chinese dissidents or Uighur activists with bogus charges .
They use separatism or subversion to criminalize freedom of speech.
” Hong Kong will be no different .
The Xi government will likely initiate a handful of well-publicized prosecutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Lam administration appeared to be taking this course a few months ago when it arrested a score of top activists , including Apple Daily publisher Jimmy Lai , based on dubious charges dating back to last year ’ s demonstrations .
That was widely seen as an effort to capitalize on the COVID-19 pandemic , which had effectively shut down demonstrations .
Now the mainland government can double down , even adding Beijing show trials , guaranteed convictions , brutal punishments , and lengthy sentences served in mainland prisons .
The threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics .
Academic and artistic freedoms will inevitably be restricted .
Labor activists fear that strikes will be targeted by Beijing .
In view of the Xi regime ’ s fierce religious persecution on the mainland , faith groups fear prosecution as well .
Even commercial activities will be affected .
As the Financial Times reported in late June : “ Investors , economists and analysts in Hong Kong fear a new national security law will increase self-censorship of research provided to clients , and will raise questions over the city ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian told other nations to “ stop meddling with Hong Kong affairs and interfering with China ’ s internal politics.
” However , the territory is an international concern , returned to Chinese rule based on public assurances to the United Kingdom and the rest of the international community to maintain Hong Kong ’ s autonomy .
Unfortunately , criticism by Western governments may have spurred rather than slowed passage of the law .
There is no chance of convincing Beijing to reverse the measure .
The official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will not change its course of action to end chaos and violence in Hong Kong , protect national security and preserve the country ’ s sacred territorial integrity and sovereign rights simply because of U.S. pressure.
” A climbdown would be politically impossible .
Sanctions will be no more effective than statements , especially penalties voted by the U.S. Congress against Chinese officials involved in the ongoing crackdown , who , in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s words , are “ believed to be responsible for , or complicit in , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of autonomy.
” Denying CCP leaders visas might make legislators feel good—and make it appear that they are doing something—but will not change Chinese policy .
( Beijing responded by imposing a visa ban on Americans who interfere with the new law .
When asked who was subject to the prohibition , Zhao said , “ Relevant people would know clearly themselves.
” ) The United States and similarly inclined Western nations should adopt two strategies .
The first has already been initiated by the U.K. , which offered to create a pathway @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million Hong Kongers eligible to apply for British National ( Overseas ) passports .
Despite its perverse aversion to immigrants , the Trump administration should similarly offer residency , green cards , and the prospect of U.S. citizenship to all Hong Kongers .
They and the United States would benefit .
Japan , Australia , Canada , and European nations should adopt similar if more limited ( in numbers ) proposals .
The objective would be simple : offer refuge to productive people who want to live in a free society but are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would suffer by losing the same people .
Washington and its allies and partners also should end Hong Kong ’ s separate economic status .
Unfortunately , doing so will hurt Hong Kongers .
However , U.S. law provides for more liberal trade , investment , and visa treatment based on the presumption that the territory is autonomous with more liberal policies , genuinely separate from the mainland .
That is clearly no longer the case .
Washington should encourage other Western states to take similar measures .
No one is going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what is universally recognized as part of China .
The objective would be to prevent Beijing from benefiting from continued treatment of Hong Kong as a liberal oasis .
Although engagement remains the only realistic policy toward China , the United States and other democracies should confront it for violating its international commitments involving Hong Kong .
Despite its angry rhetoric , China has no cause for complaint : Hong Kong would be treated like any other Chinese city .
The economic impact on China would be real but not devastating .
Today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of Chinese GDP .
Hong Kong is more important as a base for Chinese wealth management , Western firms , and international finance .
Thus , losing Hong Kong ’ s special status would reduce foreign investment in China .
The impact likely would be intensified by ongoing U.S. and allied efforts to encourage economic decoupling .
Although the price would not be high enough to change Beijing ’ s treatment of the territory , at least the Xi regime would have to pay for its broken commitments .
While stripping Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration should look for a mutually acceptable off-ramp for Beijing .
For example , if China issued prosecution guidelines dramatically narrowing the law ’ s scope , the United States could reverse course .
And Washington could pledge to keep any celebration of the Chinese retreat low-key .
Perhaps a modus vivendi still could be found to preserve Hong Kong ’ s unique liberties .
China has found that free-thinking people with access to independent information almost always—and nearly unanimously—reject rule by Xi and the CCP .
No amount of propaganda will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regime has decided to enforce its tyranny on residents of Hong Kong in the same way as it rules over the mainland—with brutal repression .

Physically Hong Kong looks as it always did. But last Tuesday it changed irreversibly.
The city was once proud of its distinct British-derived legal system, which guaranteed the rights of residents—and provided a solid foundation for its commercial glory. That is being swept away. Despite predictions that Beijing would not be ready to enforce its new national security law in Hong Kong until the fall, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s government rushed the legislation, announced just six weeks ago, through the National People’s Congress. The measure took effect at 11 p.m. local time on June 30, sight unseen by those now subject to its dictates.
Hong Kong’s old legal rules no longer apply. Legislative interpretation will be up to China. A new enforcement office, a national security commission, will be established under “the supervision of the central government.” Chinese security agents will operate openly and officially in Hong Kong. Personnel will employ surveillance, including wiretaps, against suspects, who can be held without bail. Trials can be conducted in secret. Cases can be decided by judges rather than juries. Special jurists will be appointed by the territory’s chief executive, who in turn is effectively chosen by China. And offenders will in most cases be extradited to the mainland, where they will be tried and (inevitably) convicted and imprisoned.
What that means can be seen in the capital itself, where the professor Xu Zhangrun, one of the last remaining open critics of Xi-ism, was arrested on Monday. Xu has long been under house arrest, but the operation—to detain a 57-year-old academic—involved around 10 different police vehicles and 20 officers. The limited tolerance that Chinese leaders once extended to critics, at home or in Hong Kong, is gone, replaced only with thuggery under the barest guise of law.
In Hong Kong, the day after the law was introduced, nine people were arrested for violating Beijing’s rules. The first was a man waving a Hong Kong independence flag. Another was wearing a “Free Hong Kong” T-shirt and found to possess an independence banner. A woman was arrested for displaying a similar standard. Each action is considered “undermining national unification.”
Some 300 protesters also were arrested under Hong Kong law. But the police department warned protesters that chanting pro-independence slogans “may have breached” the new restrictions and announced that it would “take resolute enforcement action in accordance” with the legislation. Senior personnel were told that “anybody searched and found to have independence flags in their possession will be arrested,” according to CNN.
The law is “much worse” than predicted, in the view of Eric Cheung of the University of Hong Kong. He cited the measure’s extraterritorial reach, which “will really alarm all the foreigners and foreign investment and no one could now feel safe.” Seton Hall University’s Margaret Lewis argued that “whatever barrier there was between Hong Kong and the mainland has at best turned into a highly porous membrane.”
The law penalizes separatism, subversion, and terrorism—none narrowly defined. Advocating democracy or independence, and demonstrating without permission, could violate more than one provision. Also illegal would be “colluding with foreign and external forces to endanger national security,” which could mean most contacts with any foreigner, especially involving any criticism of China. The law even would apply to overseas activities by nonresidents and foreign nationals, making them subject to prosecution on entering Hong Kong or China. Penalties include up to life imprisonment.
Chief Executive Carrie Lam, who never saw the draft legislation, nevertheless assured residents that they had nothing to fear, that their “legitimate rights and freedoms” would be secure, the city’s judicial independence and “high degree of autonomy” would be respected, and only a few lawbreakers would be targeted. The pro-Beijing legislator Michael Tien insisted that “the intention is not for it to suffocate everyone.” Zhang Xiaoming, the executive deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, essentially deputy Gauleiter to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), said: “The purpose is not to take the pro-democratic camp in Hong Kong as an imaginary enemy. The purpose is combating a narrow category of crimes against national security.”
However, their reassurances were belied by their own assessments. For instance, Zhang explained that “different views” should not be used as “a pretext” to “turn Hong Kong into a safe haven of anti-China forces.” He told the press after the law took effect that suspects would be tried in China since the territory could not be expected to implement mainland laws—which apparently forbid wearing a pro-independence T-shirt and shouting a pro-independence slogan. Pro-Beijing apparatchiks even see the law as providing an opportunity for revenge. Former Hong Kong Chief Executive C.Y. Leung, battered by the 2014 Umbrella Revolution, went on Facebook to offer a bounty for tips identifying those who violate the new law.
National security laws have been important weapons in China’s repressive arsenal, explained Yaqiu Wang of Human Rights Watch: “The government has been abusing the laws. They target Chinese dissidents or Uighur activists with bogus charges. They use separatism or subversion to criminalize freedom of speech.” Hong Kong will be no different.
The Xi government will likely initiate a handful of well-publicized prosecutions of protest leaders. In fact, the Lam administration appeared to be taking this course a few months ago when it arrested a score of top activists, including Apple Daily publisher Jimmy Lai, based on dubious charges dating back to last year’s demonstrations. That was widely seen as an effort to capitalize on the COVID-19 pandemic, which had effectively shut down demonstrations. Now the mainland government can double down, even adding Beijing show trials, guaranteed convictions, brutal punishments, and lengthy sentences served in mainland prisons.
The threat of prosecution will not be limited to politics. Academic and artistic freedoms will inevitably be restricted. Labor activists fear that strikes will be targeted by Beijing. In view of the Xi regime’s fierce religious persecution on the mainland, faith groups fear prosecution as well. Even commercial activities will be affected. As the Financial Times reported in late June: “Investors, economists and analysts in Hong Kong fear a new national security law will increase self-censorship of research provided to clients, and will raise questions over the city’s future as a global financial hub.”
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian told other nations to “stop meddling with Hong Kong affairs and interfering with China’s internal politics.” However, the territory is an international concern, returned to Chinese rule based on public assurances to the United Kingdom and the rest of the international community to maintain Hong Kong’s autonomy.
Unfortunately, criticism by Western governments may have spurred rather than slowed passage of the law. There is no chance of convincing Beijing to reverse the measure. The official Xinhua News Agency insisted: “Beijing will not change its course of action to end chaos and violence in Hong Kong, protect national security and preserve the country’s sacred territorial integrity and sovereign rights simply because of U.S. pressure.” A climbdown would be politically impossible.
Sanctions will be no more effective than statements, especially penalties voted by the U.S. Congress against Chinese officials involved in the ongoing crackdown, who, in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s words, are “believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy.” Denying CCP leaders visas might make legislators feel good—and make it appear that they are doing something—but will not change Chinese policy. (Beijing responded by imposing a visa ban on Americans who interfere with the new law. When asked who was subject to the prohibition, Zhao said, “Relevant people would know clearly themselves.”)
The United States and similarly inclined Western nations should adopt two strategies. The first has already been initiated by the U.K., which offered to create a pathway to citizenship for as many as 3 million Hong Kongers eligible to apply for British National (Overseas) passports.
Despite its perverse aversion to immigrants, the Trump administration should similarly offer residency, green cards, and the prospect of U.S. citizenship to all Hong Kongers. They and the United States would benefit. Japan, Australia, Canada, and European nations should adopt similar if more limited (in numbers) proposals. The objective would be simple: offer refuge to productive people who want to live in a free society but are vulnerable to Chinese government persecution. China would suffer by losing the same people.
Washington and its allies and partners also should end Hong Kong’s separate economic status. Unfortunately, doing so will hurt Hong Kongers. However, U.S. law provides for more liberal trade, investment, and visa treatment based on the presumption that the territory is autonomous with more liberal policies, genuinely separate from the mainland. That is clearly no longer the case.
Washington should encourage other Western states to take similar measures. No one is going to abandon commerce with Beijing over mistreatment of what is universally recognized as part of China. The objective would be to prevent Beijing from benefiting from continued treatment of Hong Kong as a liberal oasis. Although engagement remains the only realistic policy toward China, the United States and other democracies should confront it for violating its international commitments involving Hong Kong. Despite its angry rhetoric, China has no cause for complaint: Hong Kong would be treated like any other Chinese city.
The economic impact on China would be real but not devastating. Today the territory only accounts for about 3 percent of Chinese GDP. Hong Kong is more important as a base for Chinese wealth management, Western firms, and international finance. Thus, losing Hong Kong’s special status would reduce foreign investment in China. The impact likely would be intensified by ongoing U.S. and allied efforts to encourage economic decoupling. Although the price would not be high enough to change Beijing’s treatment of the territory, at least the Xi regime would have to pay for its broken commitments.
While stripping Hong Kong of its preferential status, the Trump administration should look for a mutually acceptable off-ramp for Beijing. For example, if China issued prosecution guidelines dramatically narrowing the law’s scope, the United States could reverse course. And Washington could pledge to keep any celebration of the Chinese retreat low-key. Perhaps a modus vivendi still could be found to preserve Hong Kong’s unique liberties. China has found that free-thinking people with access to independent information almost always—and nearly unanimously—reject rule by Xi and the CCP. No amount of propaganda will change that. So now the Xi regime has decided to enforce its tyranny on residents of Hong Kong in the same way as it rules over the mainland—with brutal repression.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-06--The Coronavirus Is Hastening Modi’s Transformation of India

The Coronavirus Is Hastening Modi ’ s Transformation of India Fifteen weeks ago , Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi placed his country under probably the most stringent coronavirus lockdown in the world .
It was the only way , Modi explained , to avert an apocalypse .
To stay put was to stay alive .
For those who could afford it , it was a price worth paying .
But no assistance was extended to the hundreds of millions of people who could not : Their predicament did not even occur to the prime minister .
Now , as India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ calamity is unfolding .
Despite enduring a shutdown that ravaged the economy and ruined the livelihoods of millions of Indians—estimates suggest 1 in 4 Indians lost their jobs in March and April—India finds itself in the uppermost ranks of the countries most severely stricken by the coronavirus .
At more than half a million , India ’ s known coronavirus caseload is exceeded only by the numbers in Brazil and the United States .
Fatalities have soared as the lockdown has eased , but India is still nowhere near the peak of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ course , to argue that this outcome was inevitable in a country with some of the world ’ s most densely populated cities , where soap is a luxury , and social distancing and physical isolation are privileges available only to a minority .
India , at any rate , could not afford to remain interminably shut .
But none of this disproves the utility of the lockdown in suppressing the spread of the virus .
It only demonstrates the failure of the Indian government to utilize the time afforded by the lockdown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to cope with a post-lockdown spike .
At every step , Modi improvised his response .
His announcement of an India-wide lockdown came in a brief speech delivered at 8 p.m. on March 24 and went into effect that midnight .
How did the blindingly obvious complications of ordering a population of 1.3 billion people to stay at home for three weeks with a four-hour notice escape him ?
As India begins to reopen , a public health calamity is unfolding .
The most charitable answer is that the prime minister is human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But human fallibility is precisely one of the reasons why India ’ s founders devised a system of government by cabinet .
Modi , however , can not be seen to consult or defer to others .
To do so would , as the Indian academic Pratap Bhanu Mehta has noted , rupture the myth that he is the “ sole vehicle for [ India ’ s ] manifest destiny.
” The misery that has washed over the country over the past three months is inseparable from the authoritarian and self-mythologizing personality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pandemic to solicit more than a billion dollars from Indians into a secretive fund that is beyond public scrutiny ; indulge his addiction for spectacle ( people were instructed to bang their pots and pans and light candles on their balconies , and the Indian Air Force was pressed into service to “ salute corona heroes ” by showering flower petals from the skies ) ; and gull the public with announcements of grand relief and stimulus packages that , on closer examination , turned out to be a fraction of what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now seeking to alleviate the social and economic woe aggravated by his own mismanagement of the lockdown by serving up Indians to the virus .
India ’ s big cities abound with horror stories of crowded hospitals turning away critically ill patients , congested wards stacked with dead bodies , and worn-out doctors and paramedics striving to function in unfathomable conditions .
After subjecting people to the most invasive abridgement of liberty in this century , the government is now striking a libertarian pose .
It has effectively abdicated its responsibilities .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into aiding those desperate for its help—but into silencing and punishing those who dissent from and defy the Modi regime .
Repression is the main feature of the state that has flourished during the pandemic .
The pandemic , in fact , was invoked early on to sanctify a brazen attempt by the government to muzzle the press : A week after imposing the lockdown , Modi sought a directive from the Supreme Court of India requiring the press to self-censor and turn itself into a bulletin board for government propaganda .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the media to publish the “ official version ” of events alongside independent coverage .
That was the warmup act .
In the weeks following , police departments up and down the country began properly harrying journalists .
In Kashmir , cases were filed under an oppressive piece of anti-terrorism legislation against Gowhar Geelani , the author of Kashmir : Rage and Reason , for apparently “ indulging in unlawful activities ” by posting on social media content “ prejudicial to the national integrity , sovereignty , and security of India , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ internationally acclaimed photojournalist , for publishing “ anti-national posts ” on her Facebook page .
In New Delhi , the distinguished journalist Siddharth Varadarajan was summoned to appear at a police station 435 miles from his home at the height of the lockdown because a quote in an article in the Wire , the independent publication he edits , had been misattributed to the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh .
The mistake had been corrected almost instantly , but Hindu nationalists evidently take journalistic accuracy extremely seriously .
Police across India have lodged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 55 journalists since March—the worst record of any democracy .
On the campaign trail , Modi has often bragged about his big chest .
Indians , meanwhile , pay the price of his thin skin .
Over the past six years , dozens of people have been hauled into prisons for the offense of being insufficiently deferential to the man exalted as the father of what his acolytes call “ New India.
” The trend began even before Modi was sworn into office .
In the summer of 2014 , after Modi ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the winner in that year ’ s general elections , a shipbuilder in Goa became the first Indian to be picked up by the police for posting a comment on Facebook critical of the incoming prime minister .
Then , on the day of Modi ’ s inauguration , five students in southern India were arrested for sharing a meme mocking Modi in a private WhatsApp group .
In the years since , the list of offenders has expanded to include teachers , businessmen , reporters , and an auto rickshaw driver .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to protect ordinary citizens have withered away .
The cabinet has been reduced to a fawning court .
Parliament , functioning as a rubber stamp , has granted oppressive powers to the government and stripped the presumption of innocence from individuals accused of terrorism.The government ’ s energies appear to be channeled into silencing and punishing those who dissent from and defy the Modi regime .
Consider the plight of Anand Teltumbde , a 70-year-old author , management consultant , academic , and champion of the rights of Dalits , the people deemed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ placed outside the hierarchical Hindu caste system .
In April , he was thrown in jail to await trial in a case in which he is accused , among other crimes , of plotting to assassinate Modi .
The poet Varavara Rao , one of the 10 other alleged plotters , was arrested two years ago and turned 80 in prison last year .
And incarcerated in a different part of India , the lawyer Sudha Bharadwaj , who has spent decades working with India ’ s tribal populations , is not allowed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a court order .
The coronavirus is raging in India ’ s prisons , and thousands of inmates have been freed to decongest them .
Such reprieve , however , is withheld from Modi ’ s elderly critics .
The case against them is so plainly risible that it is bound to fall apart in court .
But that is beside the point : The objective is to break them over the long years that it takes for cases to wind their way through the courts in India and hold them up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emulate them .
India under Modi had already traveled a considerable distance in the direction of authoritarianism before the coronavirus seeped into the country .
If the pandemic assisted the prime minister by derailing the nationwide protests against his amendment to India ’ s citizenship law , it also debunked the myth of Modi as a competent administrator : The dire state in which India finds itself today is the direct consequence of his ineptitude .
Modi , it is now abundantly clear , is not up to the job .
A healthy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ executive incompetence .
Indian democracy , however , is sick .
And it is this sickness , manifesting itself in the culture war waged over the past six years by the government machinery in which skeptics of the Modi dispensation have persistently been branded as “ anti-national , ” that sustains the cult of the prime minister .
It is by escalating that war—by inciting the wrath of the people against an assortment of imagined quislings and fifth columnists—that Modi will seek to distract the angry public as they survey the economic wreckage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exposed Modi ’ s staggering shortcomings .
It has also , tragically , created the conditions for him to quicken the conversion of the world ’ s largest democracy into something akin to a plebiscitary autocracy .

Fifteen weeks ago, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi placed his country under probably the most stringent coronavirus lockdown in the world. It was the only way, Modi explained, to avert an apocalypse. To stay put was to stay alive. For those who could afford it, it was a price worth paying. But no assistance was extended to the hundreds of millions of people who could not: Their predicament did not even occur to the prime minister. Now, as India begins to reopen, a public health calamity is unfolding. Despite enduring a shutdown that ravaged the economy and ruined the livelihoods of millions of Indians—estimates suggest 1 in 4 Indians lost their jobs in March and April—India finds itself in the uppermost ranks of the countries most severely stricken by the coronavirus. At more than half a million, India’s known coronavirus caseload is exceeded only by the numbers in Brazil and the United States. Fatalities have soared as the lockdown has eased, but India is still nowhere near the peak of the pandemic.
Fifteen weeks ago, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi placed his country under probably the most stringent coronavirus lockdown in the world. It was the only way, Modi explained, to avert an apocalypse. To stay put was to stay alive. For those who could afford it, it was a price worth paying. But no assistance was extended to the hundreds of millions of people who could not: Their predicament did not even occur to the prime minister. Now, as India begins to reopen, a public health calamity is unfolding. Despite enduring a shutdown that ravaged the economy and ruined the livelihoods of millions of Indians—estimates suggest 1 in 4 Indians lost their jobs in March and April—India finds itself in the uppermost ranks of the countries most severely stricken by the coronavirus. At more than half a million, India’s known coronavirus caseload is exceeded only by the numbers in Brazil and the United States. Fatalities have soared as the lockdown has eased, but India is still nowhere near the peak of the pandemic.
It is possible, of course, to argue that this outcome was inevitable in a country with some of the world’s most densely populated cities, where soap is a luxury, and social distancing and physical isolation are privileges available only to a minority. India, at any rate, could not afford to remain interminably shut. But none of this disproves the utility of the lockdown in suppressing the spread of the virus. It only demonstrates the failure of the Indian government to utilize the time afforded by the lockdown to scale up India’s capacities to cope with a post-lockdown spike. At every step, Modi improvised his response. His announcement of an India-wide lockdown came in a brief speech delivered at 8 p.m. on March 24 and went into effect that midnight. How did the blindingly obvious complications of ordering a population of 1.3 billion people to stay at home for three weeks with a four-hour notice escape him?As India begins to reopen, a public health calamity is unfolding.
The most charitable answer is that the prime minister is human and therefore capable of error and oversight. But human fallibility is precisely one of the reasons why India’s founders devised a system of government by cabinet. Modi, however, cannot be seen to consult or defer to others. To do so would, as the Indian academic Pratap Bhanu Mehta has noted, rupture the myth that he is the “sole vehicle for [India’s] manifest destiny.” The misery that has washed over the country over the past three months is inseparable from the authoritarian and self-mythologizing personality of the prime minister. He used the pandemic to solicit more than a billion dollars from Indians into a secretive fund that is beyond public scrutiny; indulge his addiction for spectacle (people were instructed to bang their pots and pans and light candles on their balconies, and the Indian Air Force was pressed into service to “salute corona heroes” by showering flower petals from the skies); and gull the public with announcements of grand relief and stimulus packages that, on closer examination, turned out to be a fraction of what the prime minister pledged. Modi is now seeking to alleviate the social and economic woe aggravated by his own mismanagement of the lockdown by serving up Indians to the virus.
India’s big cities abound with horror stories of crowded hospitals turning away critically ill patients, congested wards stacked with dead bodies, and worn-out doctors and paramedics striving to function in unfathomable conditions. After subjecting people to the most invasive abridgement of liberty in this century, the government is now striking a libertarian pose. It has effectively abdicated its responsibilities. And its energies appear to be channeled not into aiding those desperate for its help—but into silencing and punishing those who dissent from and defy the Modi regime. Repression is the main feature of the state that has flourished during the pandemic. The pandemic, in fact, was invoked early on to sanctify a brazen attempt by the government to muzzle the press: A week after imposing the lockdown, Modi sought a directive from the Supreme Court of India requiring the press to self-censor and turn itself into a bulletin board for government propaganda. The court, meeting Modi halfway, directed the media to publish the “official version” of events alongside independent coverage.
That was the warmup act. In the weeks following, police departments up and down the country began properly harrying journalists. In Kashmir, cases were filed under an oppressive piece of anti-terrorism legislation against Gowhar Geelani, the author of Kashmir: Rage and Reason, for apparently “indulging in unlawful activities” by posting on social media content “prejudicial to the national integrity, sovereignty, and security of India,” as well as Masrat Zahra, an internationally acclaimed photojournalist, for publishing “anti-national posts” on her Facebook page. In New Delhi, the distinguished journalist Siddharth Varadarajan was summoned to appear at a police station 435 miles from his home at the height of the lockdown because a quote in an article in the Wire, the independent publication he edits, had been misattributed to the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh. The mistake had been corrected almost instantly, but Hindu nationalists evidently take journalistic accuracy extremely seriously. Police across India have lodged cases or opened investigations against at least 55 journalists since March—the worst record of any democracy.
On the campaign trail, Modi has often bragged about his big chest. Indians, meanwhile, pay the price of his thin skin. Over the past six years, dozens of people have been hauled into prisons for the offense of being insufficiently deferential to the man exalted as the father of what his acolytes call “New India.” The trend began even before Modi was sworn into office. In the summer of 2014, after Modi’s Hindu-first Bharatiya Janata Party was declared the winner in that year’s general elections, a shipbuilder in Goa became the first Indian to be picked up by the police for posting a comment on Facebook critical of the incoming prime minister. Then, on the day of Modi’s inauguration, five students in southern India were arrested for sharing a meme mocking Modi in a private WhatsApp group. In the years since, the list of offenders has expanded to include teachers, businessmen, reporters, and an auto rickshaw driver. Institutions that could once be counted on to protect ordinary citizens have withered away. The cabinet has been reduced to a fawning court. Parliament, functioning as a rubber stamp, has granted oppressive powers to the government and stripped the presumption of innocence from individuals accused of terrorism.The government’s energies appear to be channeled into silencing and punishing those who dissent from and defy the Modi regime.
Consider the plight of Anand Teltumbde, a 70-year-old author, management consultant, academic, and champion of the rights of Dalits, the people deemed so impure by scriptures that they are placed outside the hierarchical Hindu caste system. In April, he was thrown in jail to await trial in a case in which he is accused, among other crimes, of plotting to assassinate Modi. The poet Varavara Rao, one of the 10 other alleged plotters, was arrested two years ago and turned 80 in prison last year. And incarcerated in a different part of India, the lawyer Sudha Bharadwaj, who has spent decades working with India’s tribal populations, is not allowed to speak to her daughter in spite of a court order. The coronavirus is raging in India’s prisons, and thousands of inmates have been freed to decongest them. Such reprieve, however, is withheld from Modi’s elderly critics. The case against them is so plainly risible that it is bound to fall apart in court. But that is beside the point: The objective is to break them over the long years that it takes for cases to wind their way through the courts in India and hold them up as an example for others wishing to emulate them.
India under Modi had already traveled a considerable distance in the direction of authoritarianism before the coronavirus seeped into the country. If the pandemic assisted the prime minister by derailing the nationwide protests against his amendment to India’s citizenship law, it also debunked the myth of Modi as a competent administrator: The dire state in which India finds itself today is the direct consequence of his ineptitude. Modi, it is now abundantly clear, is not up to the job. A healthy democracy can find the means to countervail executive incompetence. Indian democracy, however, is sick. And it is this sickness, manifesting itself in the culture war waged over the past six years by the government machinery in which skeptics of the Modi dispensation have persistently been branded as “anti-national,” that sustains the cult of the prime minister. It is by escalating that war—by inciting the wrath of the people against an assortment of imagined quislings and fifth columnists—that Modi will seek to distract the angry public as they survey the economic wreckage of the pandemic. The coronavirus has exposed Modi’s staggering shortcomings. It has also, tragically, created the conditions for him to quicken the conversion of the world’s largest democracy into something akin to a plebiscitary autocracy.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-06--The Tip of the American Military Spear Is Being Blunted

Yet in an overwhelming vote , both houses of Congress agreed to put a tight ceiling on the number of men the Pentagon could cut from the ranks of the Corps .
Rep. Carl Vinson explained on the floor of the House why this was necessary : “ The Marine Corps can be and is called upon first to go into combat to establish our defenses until the Army , Navy , or Air Force can be called to the scene .
It stands to reason that a full-strength army , navy , or air force can not be called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hat .
… [ There is ] the need for a ready force.
” Since then , that has been the Marine Corps clear mission : If the U.S. president requires American troops to deploy to some far-flung corner of the globe today , the U.S. Marines are ready to go .
Sometimes , as in Korea or Iraq , this meant being the “ tip of the spear ” of a much larger host .
At other times , as in Panama or Nicaragua , it has meant being the main combined-arms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough to justify boots on the ground yet small enough to avoid full national mobilization for war .
In all these cases , the Corps has sought to fulfill the injunction of the 82nd Congress to be “ a force most ready when the Nation is least ready.
” If enacted , the changes Berger proposes will drastically transform the doctrine that guides Marine Corps operations and will likely lead to permanent changes in the Marine Corps ’ s future force structure .
Now the purpose of the Corps is once again up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of growing Chinese power , the current Marine Corps Commandant David Berger has reimagined the Corps ’ s role in America ’ s national security architecture .
If enacted , the changes he proposes will drastically transform the doctrine that guides Marine Corps operations and will likely lead to permanent changes in the Marine Corps ’ s future force structure .
However , ultimate responsibility for the future of the Marine Corps rests in the hands of the U.S. Congress .
Congress now has the responsibility to carefully evaluate whether this new path @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ plans reflects a broader change of focus by the Pentagon , which has been ordered by the White House to redirect its focus from counterinsurgency campaigns toward what it dubs “ great-power competition ” with Russia and China .
The threat posed by China ’ s People ’ s Liberation Army ( PLA ) is especially dire .
While American forces were campaigning in the mountains of Afghanistan , the commanders of the PLA slowly shaped their military into the world ’ s premier counter-American military force .
The PLA realized that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operating freely in the airspace and neighboring waters of its enemies .
To counter this way of war , a terrific percentage of the Chinese defense budget has been directed to developing weapons that might challenge American control of the sea and air .
The result : thousands of what are known as “ anti-access ” and “ area denial ” weapons whose range and precision create a death zone extending hundreds of miles from the Chinese coast .
These precision weapons , launched from an ever-growing number of PLA Navy vessels , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rocket Force units , will make it impossible for traditional expeditionary forces—like the existing U.S. Marine Expeditionary Units—to get within striking range of any East Asian battlefield without risking destruction .
When these long-range weapons are combined with the PLA ’ s air defense systems , sea mines , submarines , and electronic warfare and cyber-capabilities , the result is a gauntlet of fire that American expeditionary forces can not be expected to securely traverse .
All services of the U.S. military are scrambling to find a response to the problem posed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ service , however , has proposed a response more radical than that of the U.S. Marine Corps .
This paradigm shift has been outlined by Berger in a series of guidance and planning documents released over the last few months .
Recognizing that the Marines will not be able to pierce through enemy “ weapons engagement zones ” once hostilities begin , Berger proposes that the United States should have Marine Corps units stationed inside these zones before war begins .
He envisions turning the islands of the West Pacific into small redoubts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be armed to the teeth with long-range missiles and unmanned aircraft , each with the ability to target Chinese ships from hundreds of miles away .
In Berger ’ s words , this “ inside force ” will “ reverse the cost imposition that determined adversaries seek to impose ” on American forces , putting the PLA Navy in the same desperate situation now faced by U.S. ships .
This will enable the Marine Corps “ to create a mutually contested space in the South or East China Seas if directed to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new posture will have a powerful deterrent effect on Chinese decision-making .
As the Marines ’ new bases will exist inside the Chinese weapons engagement zone , they will be able to attack PLA platforms in the very first minutes of war .
To retool the U.S. Marine Corps as an “ inside force ” in the West Pacific , the commandant has directed the Marine Corps to ax many of its current capabilities .
The Marine Corps ’ s cannon artillery ( e.g.
, its howitzer batteries ) are being reduced from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ armor forces ( e.g.
, its tank battalions ) will be completely eliminated .
The Marine Corps will also cut its helicopter squadrons and amphibious assault vehicle companies by a third and reduce the number of manned attack aircraft and logistics teams it can put into the field .
These changes reflect the sort of war Berger believes Marines must prepare to fight .
Suppressing fire from cannon artillery and the mobility of Marines armor forces are cornerstones of the Corps ’ s maneuver warfare doctrine , a set of tactics the commandant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when the land battlespace is reduced to small Pacific islands .
The cuts in the Corps ’ s aircraft , logistics teams , and amphibious vehicles likewise signify that the Marine Corps will be focusing on its new role as coastal artillery , not its traditional expertise in expeditionary campaigning or amphibious assault .
The human resources and money—around $ 12 billion—that are now being spent on armor , cannon artillery , and the rest will instead be poured into long-range missiles , unmanned aircraft , and the education and training of Marines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the end result of a process that began a few years ago , when congressional leadership pressured the Department of Defense to link the money it requested from the American taxpayer to the goal it claimed it was pursuing—preserving the integrity of the international order in the face of growing Russian hostility and growing Chinese power .
The time has now come for Congress to assess the results of this process .
The need for strong congressional buy-in is critical , because many of the changes the commandant has planned for the Marine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are extremely competent at maneuver warfare , combined-arms tactics , and deploying quickly with a short logistical tail .
They have also acquired competencies in special operations , counterinsurgency , and similar small wars operations .
Each of these competencies is less a matter of weapons platforms or technology than training and knowledge passed from one Marine to another , creating institutional knowledge of the type that is not easily rebuilt when abandoned .
If the need arose , the Marine Corps can buy tanks again—but all Marines who know how to operate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Marine Corps ’ s competency in combined-arms fighting would have gone with them .
Civilian overseers must require the Marine Corps to justify its plan and carefully examine and address potential weaknesses that Congress may find in it .
The opportunity costs of the restructure are high , and the potential drawbacks many .
These should be explored fully before the U.S. government commits taxpayer funds and American lives to the commandant ’ s plan .
In particular , Congress should press Berger to answer the following three questions .
Was this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Indo-Pacific allies or with the other branches of the U.S. military , all of whose cooperation is needed for its success ?
Concerns here range from the technical and the tactical up to the grand strategic .
The U.S. Army currently has far more service members trained in rocket artillery than the Marines do , and Indo-Pacific Command has already been developing the doctrine to make Army Field Artillery brigades stationed in the Pacific possible .
So why disrupt Army plans and give this task to the Marines ?
The U.S. Army @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accommodate the Marines—after all , if the Marines ever do get into a serious firefight ( as they did in the Battle of Fallujah ) the Marines will now need the presence of armor battalions from the U.S. Army to succeed .
But successful combined-arms tactics require training—does the Corps expect the Army to lend it tank battalions to train with ?
Similar questions must be asked about the relationship between the new Marine Corps and the other services .
This style of war the Marine Corps wishes to specialize in demands that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Air Force and Navy ’ s existing intelligence and reconnaissance platforms .
Gaining the technical expertise and equipment to use these services ’ existing tactical data links is not easy , nor is it a capability the Marine Corps can currently deploy at scale .
How long will it take before they can ?
This issue of tactical and technical integration only grows more nettlesome when the focus shifts to foreign military partners .
Will the Philippine or Taiwanese forces be integrated into these networks ?
If not , who will be providing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it needs to sink PLA Navy ships hundreds of miles away ?
The act of targeting a ship from an ally or partner ’ s home territory carries serious diplomatic and military policy implications .
The act of targeting a ship from an ally or partner ’ s home territory also carries serious diplomatic and military policy implications .
Authorities to sink a ship , not as an act of self-defense , need to reside somewhere .
Has a policy framework with capabilities and authorities been erected that could create a realistic chance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s regional allies play in the creation of the force plan that demands such a framework ?
There is a risk that the Marines ’ new operational concepts and force structure could be fatally undermined if regional allies and partners are not willing to host new distributed Marine deployments .
Tokyo ’ s longstanding policy has been to concentrate American forces in as few bases as possible , and the governor of Okinawa has already declared that he opposes any deployments of new U.S. rocket battalions to his prefecture .
Even if its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currently governed by an anti-American demagogue who has worked to shrink America ’ s military presence in his country .
The final link in the island chain is Taiwan , a country that has not hosted American troops since 1979 .
Given these realities , are the commandant ’ s plans for deterring the PLA politically possible ?
Is the Marine Corps optimizing itself for the range of possible conflicts with China , or just the one it most wants to fight ?
The commandant ’ s plan assumes that a limited number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first hours or days of a conflict with China will make a critical difference in its outcome .
Is that assumption valid in all scenarios ?
In a potential invasion of Taiwan , for example , the conflict ’ s center of gravity will not be the East China Sea or the South China Sea , but the Taiwan Strait .
Many of the locations the Marine Corps has identified as potential staging points for its rockets and unmanned aircraft are not close enough to the Taiwan Strait to meaningfully participate in that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before American leadership authorizes the deployment of Marines to Taiwan , what good will all of these investments in long-range precision weapons have been ?
That is assuming , of course , the Marines can even get to Taiwan in the first place and are not stranded on their island redoubts until the war is over .
The prospect of being stranded in the islands of the West Pacific looms large in another conflict scenario .
What if the war with China does turn out to be a long , protracted conflict—as wars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the war is not quickly concluded , it is not clear that the Marine Corps positions will be able to survive a volley contest with the PLA Rocket Force , which will have a much deeper arsenal and much greater freedom of movement .
When the Marines have expended their limited precision weapons supply , what will they do ?
How will they be resupplied when located on remote islands inside the enemy ’ s weapons engagement zone ?
In the Battle for Wake Island in World War II , the Marine Corps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whose anti-ship platforms are exhausted early .
There is a risk of repeating their mistakes .
What if the Marine Corps ’ s predictions for the future are wrong ?
Why doesn ’ t the Marine Corps hedge ?
The Corps could reduce Marine armor to one or two battalions instead of no battalions .
It could keep some of this capacity in reserve just in case the international situation changes and these skills are suddenly needed .
Because the Marine Corps is much smaller than the other branches it does not have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Transforming the Marine Corps into a force optimized to lob missiles at Chinese ships thus carries high opportunity cost .
This opportunity cost is larger than would be paid by asking a larger service like the U.S. Army to devote comparable manpower to the China threat .
For the Corps , extreme optimization for the counter-China fight might still be worth it—if China was certainly the cause of America ’ s next war .
But what if it isn ’ t ?
It is not difficult to imagine a 2028 conflict contingency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Mexico .
Will the Marines be excusing themselves from participating in any such contingency ?
This question is particularly important to ask of the U.S. Marine Corps , because for most of the past century the Marine Corps was the hedge .
Great-power competition with the Soviet Union meant keeping a large proportion of the U.S. Army tied down blocking up the Fulda Gap .
When other contingencies arose—say , in Lebanon , Grenada , or Panama—it was Marines who were deployed to handle them .
If not the Marines , then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the 21st century ?
It is quite possible that good answers can be given to each one of these questions .
It is Congress ’ s role to ensure that these answers are found .
The pride Marines take in the last 70 years of their history as America ’ s premier expeditionary force are the direct product of congressional interest in the purpose and structure of the Marine Corps .
The future victories of the Marine Corps over the next few decades may well be the product of similar congressional interest @ @

In 1952, the Marine Corps almost lost its way. Since its formal establishment in 1798, it had served as America’s premier amphibious assault force, garrisoned coastal forts, led naval raids, provided shipboard security, conducted so-called small wars campaigns, and engaged in extended land campaigns far from any coastline. But just what role it should play in the postwar order was unclear. Many in the Pentagon believed that the Marine Corps had no need to be an independent force, and they sought to cut its numbers to irrelevance.
Yet in an overwhelming vote, both houses of Congress agreed to put a tight ceiling on the number of men the Pentagon could cut from the ranks of the Corps. Rep. Carl Vinson explained on the floor of the House why this was necessary: “The Marine Corps can be and is called upon first to go into combat to establish our defenses until the Army, Navy, or Air Force can be called to the scene. It stands to reason that a full-strength army, navy, or air force cannot be called into combat at the drop of a hat. … [There is] the need for a ready force.” Since then, that has been the Marine Corps clear mission: If the U.S. president requires American troops to deploy to some far-flung corner of the globe today, the U.S. Marines are ready to go. Sometimes, as in Korea or Iraq, this meant being the “tip of the spear” of a much larger host. At other times, as in Panama or Nicaragua, it has meant being the main combined-arms force in a campaign that was important enough to justify boots on the ground yet small enough to avoid full national mobilization for war. In all these cases, the Corps has sought to fulfill the injunction of the 82nd Congress to be “a force most ready when the Nation is least ready.”
If enacted, the changes Berger proposes will drastically transform the doctrine that guides Marine Corps operations and will likely lead to permanent changes in the Marine Corps’s future force structure.
Now the purpose of the Corps is once again up for debate. To meet the threat of growing Chinese power, the current Marine Corps Commandant David Berger has reimagined the Corps’s role in America’s national security architecture. If enacted, the changes he proposes will drastically transform the doctrine that guides Marine Corps operations and will likely lead to permanent changes in the Marine Corps’s future force structure. However, ultimate responsibility for the future of the Marine Corps rests in the hands of the U.S. Congress. Congress now has the responsibility to carefully evaluate whether this new path is the right one.
The Marines’ plans reflects a broader change of focus by the Pentagon, which has been ordered by the White House to redirect its focus from counterinsurgency campaigns toward what it dubs “great-power competition” with Russia and China. The threat posed by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is especially dire. While American forces were campaigning in the mountains of Afghanistan, the commanders of the PLA slowly shaped their military into the world’s premier counter-American military force.
The PLA realized that the U.S. military had grown accustomed to operating freely in the airspace and neighboring waters of its enemies. To counter this way of war, a terrific percentage of the Chinese defense budget has been directed to developing weapons that might challenge American control of the sea and air. The result: thousands of what are known as “anti-access” and “area denial” weapons whose range and precision create a death zone extending hundreds of miles from the Chinese coast. These precision weapons, launched from an ever-growing number of PLA Navy vessels, PLA Air Force craft, and PLA Rocket Force units, will make it impossible for traditional expeditionary forces—like the existing U.S. Marine Expeditionary Units—to get within striking range of any East Asian battlefield without risking destruction. When these long-range weapons are combined with the PLA’s air defense systems, sea mines, submarines, and electronic warfare and cyber-capabilities, the result is a gauntlet of fire that American expeditionary forces cannot be expected to securely traverse.
Gen. David Berger, the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, attends a meeting at the White House on May 9.
All services of the U.S. military are scrambling to find a response to the problem posed by this ever-growing zone of death. No service, however, has proposed a response more radical than that of the U.S. Marine Corps. This paradigm shift has been outlined by Berger in a series of guidance and planning documents released over the last few months. Recognizing that the Marines will not be able to pierce through enemy “weapons engagement zones” once hostilities begin, Berger proposes that the United States should have Marine Corps units stationed inside these zones before war begins. He envisions turning the islands of the West Pacific into small redoubts bristling with Marines.
These Marines will be armed to the teeth with long-range missiles and unmanned aircraft, each with the ability to target Chinese ships from hundreds of miles away. In Berger’s words, this “inside force” will “reverse the cost imposition that determined adversaries seek to impose” on American forces, putting the PLA Navy in the same desperate situation now faced by U.S. ships. This will enable the Marine Corps “to create a mutually contested space in the South or East China Seas if directed to do so.” The commandant believes that this new posture will have a powerful deterrent effect on Chinese decision-making. As the Marines’ new bases will exist inside the Chinese weapons engagement zone, they will be able to attack PLA platforms in the very first minutes of war.
To retool the U.S. Marine Corps as an “inside force” in the West Pacific, the commandant has directed the Marine Corps to ax many of its current capabilities. The Marine Corps’s cannon artillery (e.g., its howitzer batteries) are being reduced from 21 to five batteries, and its armor forces (e.g., its tank battalions) will be completely eliminated. The Marine Corps will also cut its helicopter squadrons and amphibious assault vehicle companies by a third and reduce the number of manned attack aircraft and logistics teams it can put into the field.
These changes reflect the sort of war Berger believes Marines must prepare to fight. Suppressing fire from cannon artillery and the mobility of Marines armor forces are cornerstones of the Corps’s maneuver warfare doctrine, a set of tactics the commandant thinks Marines will have little use for when the land battlespace is reduced to small Pacific islands. The cuts in the Corps’s aircraft, logistics teams, and amphibious vehicles likewise signify that the Marine Corps will be focusing on its new role as coastal artillery, not its traditional expertise in expeditionary campaigning or amphibious assault. The human resources and money—around $12 billion—that are now being spent on armor, cannon artillery, and the rest will instead be poured into long-range missiles, unmanned aircraft, and the education and training of Marines.
Chinese soldiers stand on the deck of the amphibious transport dock Yimen Shan as it participates in a naval parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in the sea near Qingdao in eastern China’s Shandong province on April 23, 2019.
The commandant’s plan is the end result of a process that began a few years ago, when congressional leadership pressured the Department of Defense to link the money it requested from the American taxpayer to the goal it claimed it was pursuing—preserving the integrity of the international order in the face of growing Russian hostility and growing Chinese power. The time has now come for Congress to assess the results of this process.
The need for strong congressional buy-in is critical, because many of the changes the commandant has planned for the Marine Corps will likely be permanent. Marines are extremely competent at maneuver warfare, combined-arms tactics, and deploying quickly with a short logistical tail. They have also acquired competencies in special operations, counterinsurgency, and similar small wars operations. Each of these competencies is less a matter of weapons platforms or technology than training and knowledge passed from one Marine to another, creating institutional knowledge of the type that is not easily rebuilt when abandoned. If the need arose, the Marine Corps can buy tanks again—but all Marines who know how to operate those tanks would be gone, and the Marine Corps’s competency in combined-arms fighting would have gone with them.
Civilian overseers must require the Marine Corps to justify its plan and carefully examine and address potential weaknesses that Congress may find in it. The opportunity costs of the restructure are high, and the potential drawbacks many. These should be explored fully before the U.S. government commits taxpayer funds and American lives to the commandant’s plan. In particular, Congress should press Berger to answer the following three questions.
Philippine troops and U.S. Marines take position for a beach landing during joint naval exercises at a base in Ternate, Cavite province, Philippines, on Oct. 8, 2015.
Was this plan developed in consultation with America’s Indo-Pacific allies or with the other branches of the U.S. military, all of whose cooperation is needed for its success?
Concerns here range from the technical and the tactical up to the grand strategic. The U.S. Army currently has far more service members trained in rocket artillery than the Marines do, and Indo-Pacific Command has already been developing the doctrine to make Army Field Artillery brigades stationed in the Pacific possible. So why disrupt Army plans and give this task to the Marines? The U.S. Army might need to make other changes to accommodate the Marines—after all, if the Marines ever do get into a serious firefight (as they did in the Battle of Fallujah) the Marines will now need the presence of armor battalions from the U.S. Army to succeed. But successful combined-arms tactics require training—does the Corps expect the Army to lend it tank battalions to train with?
Similar questions must be asked about the relationship between the new Marine Corps and the other services. This style of war the Marine Corps wishes to specialize in demands that the Corps be integrated into the U.S. Air Force and Navy’s existing intelligence and reconnaissance platforms. Gaining the technical expertise and equipment to use these services’ existing tactical data links is not easy, nor is it a capability the Marine Corps can currently deploy at scale. How long will it take before they can? This issue of tactical and technical integration only grows more nettlesome when the focus shifts to foreign military partners. Will the Philippine or Taiwanese forces be integrated into these networks? If not, who will be providing the Marine Corps with the targeting data it needs to sink PLA Navy ships hundreds of miles away?
The act of targeting a ship from an ally or partner’s home territory carries serious diplomatic and military policy implications.
The act of targeting a ship from an ally or partner’s home territory also carries serious diplomatic and military policy implications. Authorities to sink a ship, not as an act of self-defense, need to reside somewhere. Has a policy framework with capabilities and authorities been erected that could create a realistic chance of success—and what role did America’s regional allies play in the creation of the force plan that demands such a framework? There is a risk that the Marines’ new operational concepts and force structure could be fatally undermined if regional allies and partners are not willing to host new distributed Marine deployments. Tokyo’s longstanding policy has been to concentrate American forces in as few bases as possible, and the governor of Okinawa has already declared that he opposes any deployments of new U.S. rocket battalions to his prefecture. Even if its army remains pro-American, the Philippines is currently governed by an anti-American demagogue who has worked to shrink America’s military presence in his country. The final link in the island chain is Taiwan, a country that has not hosted American troops since 1979. Given these realities, are the commandant’s plans for deterring the PLA politically possible?
Marines with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Amphibious Reconnaissance Platoon participate in training in the East China Sea on Oct. 14, 2018. The unit provides a flexible force ready to perform a wide range of military operations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Is the Marine Corps optimizing itself for the range of possible conflicts with China, or just the one it most wants to fight?
The commandant’s plan assumes that a limited number of successful precision missile strikes in the first hours or days of a conflict with China will make a critical difference in its outcome. Is that assumption valid in all scenarios?
In a potential invasion of Taiwan, for example, the conflict’s center of gravity will not be the East China Sea or the South China Sea, but the Taiwan Strait. Many of the locations the Marine Corps has identified as potential staging points for its rockets and unmanned aircraft are not close enough to the Taiwan Strait to meaningfully participate in that fight. If an amphibious invasion happens before American leadership authorizes the deployment of Marines to Taiwan, what good will all of these investments in long-range precision weapons have been? That is assuming, of course, the Marines can even get to Taiwan in the first place and are not stranded on their island redoubts until the war is over.
The prospect of being stranded in the islands of the West Pacific looms large in another conflict scenario. What if the war with China does turn out to be a long, protracted conflict—as wars between great powers often are? If the war is not quickly concluded, it is not clear that the Marine Corps positions will be able to survive a volley contest with the PLA Rocket Force, which will have a much deeper arsenal and much greater freedom of movement. When the Marines have expended their limited precision weapons supply, what will they do? How will they be resupplied when located on remote islands inside the enemy’s weapons engagement zone? In the Battle for Wake Island in World War II, the Marine Corps learned what happens to isolated island garrisons whose anti-ship platforms are exhausted early. There is a risk of repeating their mistakes.
U.S. Marines from the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force participate in a winter military training exercise with South Korean soldiers in Pyeongchang-gun, South Korea, on Jan. 24, 2017.
What if the Marine Corps’s predictions for the future are wrong?
Why doesn’t the Marine Corps hedge? The Corps could reduce Marine armor to one or two battalions instead of no battalions. It could keep some of this capacity in reserve just in case the international situation changes and these skills are suddenly needed. Because the Marine Corps is much smaller than the other branches it does not have the depth to specialize in multiple domains. Transforming the Marine Corps into a force optimized to lob missiles at Chinese ships thus carries high opportunity cost. This opportunity cost is larger than would be paid by asking a larger service like the U.S. Army to devote comparable manpower to the China threat. For the Corps, extreme optimization for the counter-China fight might still be worth it—if China was certainly the cause of America’s next war. But what if it isn’t? It is not difficult to imagine a 2028 conflict contingency in Venezuela, or North Korea, or Mexico. Will the Marines be excusing themselves from participating in any such contingency?
This question is particularly important to ask of the U.S. Marine Corps, because for most of the past century the Marine Corps was the hedge. Great-power competition with the Soviet Union meant keeping a large proportion of the U.S. Army tied down blocking up the Fulda Gap. When other contingencies arose—say, in Lebanon, Grenada, or Panama—it was Marines who were deployed to handle them. If not the Marines, then who will be handling the other contingencies of the 21st century?
It is quite possible that good answers can be given to each one of these questions. It is Congress’s role to ensure that these answers are found. The pride Marines take in the last 70 years of their history as America’s premier expeditionary force are the direct product of congressional interest in the purpose and structure of the Marine Corps. The future victories of the Marine Corps over the next few decades may well be the product of similar congressional interest today.