foreignpolicy--2020-01-06--The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away

The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away It has been a mantra of U.S. foreign policy for a decade or more that , without the United States , the Middle East would descend into chaos .
Or even worse , Iran would resurrect the Persian Empire and swallow the region whole .
Yet when U.S. President Donald Trump opted not to go to war with Iran after a series of Iranian-attributed attacks on Saudi Arabia last year and declared his intentions to pull troops out of the region , it wasn ’ t chaos or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regional diplomacy—particularly among Iran , Saudi Arabia , and the United Arab Emirates—and de-escalation followed .
To be sure , the cards were reshuffled again in January , when Trump ordered the assassination of Qassem Suleimani , one of Iran ’ s most important military figures .
Courtesy of Trump , the region is once more moving toward conflict , and the early signs of diplomatic progress achieved during the preceding months have vanished .
It is thus time for Washington to answer a crucial question that it has long evaded : Has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle East prevented regional actors from peacefully resolving conflicts on their own ?
And in that way , has it been an impediment to stability rather than the guarantor of it ?
But over time , that logic shifted .
In the 1980s , U.S. President Ronald Reagan expanded the doctrine to include threats to the flow of oil originating from inside the region , too .
As the geopolitical context changed still further , subsequent presidents found even more ways to justify America ’ s growing military presence in the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevent others from establishing hegemony over the oil-rich waters of the Persian Gulf morphed into a policy of asserting American hegemony in the region in order to “ save ” it .
As long as U.S. allies lack the capability or competence to secure the region , the thinking went , Washington would have no choice but to shoulder this responsibility .
U.S. President George W. Bush was explicit about that ; without an increase in U.S. troop levels in Iraq , he claimed , there would be chaos in the region .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that his invasion of Iraq was the single most destabilizing event in the Middle East of the past decades .
As the scholars Hal Brands , Steven Cook , and Kenneth Pollack wrote endorsing the Carter Doctrine and its continuation , “ the United States established and upheld the basic rules of conduct in the region : the United States would meet efforts to interfere with the free flow of oil by force ; uphold freedom of navigation ; demand that regional powers give up their irredentist claims on other states or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
” This account is accurate enough ( although the last rule on the list always exempted Israel ) , but the story glosses over how the policy also gave cover to U.S. allies for some fairly destabilizing behaviors of their own .
That ’ s an omission Brands makes in a Bloomberg article , too , where he points to Saudi Arabia ’ s slaughter of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi to argue that a “ post-American Middle East will not be stable and peaceful .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ turbulent than it is today.
” And in the words of U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham in 2018 , “ If it weren ’ t for the United States , they ’ d be speaking Farsi in about a week in Saudi Arabia.
” All this without a nod to the fact that , if anything , the United States ’ protection of the Saudi regime has enabled its promotion of terrorism and its destabilizing activities in the region , which have , in turn , prompted further Iranian response .
Further , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a result of Trump ’ s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019 .
Critics lamented the president ’ s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine , calling it a disaster for the GCC and warning that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons .
Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal , Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal , Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them .
For its part , Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer , Iran .
The level of violence on both sides declined as a result , and more than 100 prisoners of war were released .
In November , the United Nations ’ Yemen envoy , Martin Griffiths , reported an 80 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks .
Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar , a former ally that had become a nemesis .
The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir , Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani , and some sporting events between the two countries resumed , according to the New York Times .
Saudi officials also claimed that they had quietly reached out to Iran via intermediaries seeking ways to ease tensions .
Tehran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saudi-Qatari thaw and , according to the New York Times , floated a peace plan based on a mutual Iranian-Saudi pledge of nonaggression .
An even stronger change of heart occurred in Abu Dhabi .
In July , the UAE started withdrawing troops from Yemen .
The same month , it participated in direct talks with Tehran to discuss maritime security .
It even released $ 700 million in funds to Iran in contradiction to the Trump administration ’ s maximum pressure strategy .
Some of these measures may have been more tactical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi , human rights abuses at home , and brutal tactics in Yemen .
The UAE , too , may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted .
Nevertheless , as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region , its erstwhile allies ’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy .
The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States .
If stability in the Middle East is the United States ’ main goal , Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments .
Iran may very well conclude , rightly or wrongly , that Saudi Arabia and the UAE conspired with Washington to assassinate Suleimani and as a result not only end the recent diplomacy but also target Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as part of the revenge for Suleimani ’ s death .
This is yet one more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. activities in the region have brought more turmoil than stability .
To be sure , there is no guarantee that recent diplomatic efforts would have been successful .
A more responsible Riyadh might not have begotten a more responsible Tehran .
But it is noteworthy that diplomacy did not even begin in earnest until Washington clearly demonstrated its unwillingness to entangle itself in a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran .
And by returning to the region in a show of military force , Trump may once again disincentivize the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They may even interpret Suleimani ’ s killing as a license to resume their recklessness—activities like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ’ s purported kidnapping of the Lebanese prime minister and ordering of the dismemberment of Khashoggi ; Saudi Arabia and the UAE ’ s imposition of a blockade on Qatar ; and the two countries ’ further destabilization of Libya , Syria , Lebanon , Sudan , and Yemen .
As in the past , in other words , it seems as if the Middle East ’ s descent into chaos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than without it .

It has been a mantra of U.S. foreign policy for a decade or more that, without the United States, the Middle East would descend into chaos. Or even worse, Iran would resurrect the Persian Empire and swallow the region whole .
It has been a mantra of U.S. foreign policy for a decade or more that, without the United States, the Middle East would descend into chaos. Or even worse, Iran would resurrect the Persian Empire and swallow the region whole.
Yet when U.S. President Donald Trump opted not to go to war with Iran after a series of Iranian-attributed attacks on Saudi Arabia last year and declared his intentions to pull troops out of the region, it wasn’t chaos or conquest that ensued. Rather, nascent regional diplomacy—particularly among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—and de-escalation followed. To be sure, the cards were reshuffled again in January, when Trump ordered the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, one of Iran’s most important military figures. Courtesy of Trump, the region is once more moving toward conflict, and the early signs of diplomatic progress achieved during the preceding months have vanished.
It is thus time for Washington to answer a crucial question that it has long evaded: Has America’s military dominance in the Middle East prevented regional actors from peacefully resolving conflicts on their own? And in that way, has it been an impediment to stability rather than the guarantor of it?
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter proclaimed a new doctrine: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region,” he stated, “will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” In the context of the Cold War, preventing the Soviets—the main outside force Carter was worried about—from gaining control over the energy-rich region had a strategic logic.
But over time, that logic shifted. In the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald Reagan expanded the doctrine to include threats to the flow of oil originating from inside the region, too. As the geopolitical context changed still further, subsequent presidents found even more ways to justify America’s growing military presence in the Middle East. What started as a policy to prevent others from establishing hegemony over the oil-rich waters of the Persian Gulf morphed into a policy of asserting American hegemony in the region in order to “save” it.
As long as U.S. allies lack the capability or competence to secure the region, the thinking went, Washington would have no choice but to shoulder this responsibility. U.S. President George W. Bush was explicit about that; without an increase in U.S. troop levels in Iraq, he claimed, there would be chaos in the region. He missed the irony, of course, that his invasion of Iraq was the single most destabilizing event in the Middle East of the past decades.
As the scholars Hal Brands, Steven Cook, and Kenneth Pollack wrote endorsing the Carter Doctrine and its continuation, “the United States established and upheld the basic rules of conduct in the region: the United States would meet efforts to interfere with the free flow of oil by force; uphold freedom of navigation; demand that regional powers give up their irredentist claims on other states or face grave consequences; and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”
This account is accurate enough (although the last rule on the list always exempted Israel), but the story glosses over how the policy also gave cover to U.S. allies for some fairly destabilizing behaviors of their own. That’s an omission Brands makes in a Bloomberg article, too, where he points to Saudi Arabia’s slaughter of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi to argue that a “post-American Middle East will not be stable and peaceful. It will be even nastier and more turbulent than it is today.” And in the words of U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham in 2018, “If it weren’t for the United States, they’d be speaking Farsi in about a week in Saudi Arabia.”
All this without a nod to the fact that, if anything, the United States’ protection of the Saudi regime has enabled its promotion of terrorism and its destabilizing activities in the region, which have, in turn, prompted further Iranian response.
Assertions about the United States’ pivotal role in the Middle East, no matter how often repeated, have not been proved true. Iran, ravaged by sanctions, corruption, and economic mismanagement, is nowhere near establishing hegemony in the region. Saudi Arabia spends more than five times as much on its military than does Iran; the entire Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE—outspends Iran by a factor of eight. Meanwhile, whereas Iran has no nuclear weapons yet undergoes more inspections than any other country, Israel has a nuclear weapons program with no international transparency whatsoever. Iran may have been adept at taking advantage of U.S. overextension and missteps in the last few decades, but establishing hegemony is a different matter altogether.
Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019. Critics lamented the president’s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine, calling it a disaster for the GCC and warning that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons.
Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them.
Instead, recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks.
Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar, a former ally that had become a nemesis. The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and some sporting events between the two countries resumed, according to the New York Times.
Saudi officials also claimed that they had quietly reached out to Iran via intermediaries seeking ways to ease tensions. Tehran, in turn, welcomed the prospective Saudi-Qatari thaw and, according to the New York Times, floated a peace plan based on a mutual Iranian-Saudi pledge of nonaggression.
An even stronger change of heart occurred in Abu Dhabi. In July, the UAE started withdrawing troops from Yemen. The same month, it participated in direct talks with Tehran to discuss maritime security. It even released $700 million in funds to Iran in contradiction to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy.
Some of these measures may have been more tactical than strategic. Saudi Arabia may have reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi, human rights abuses at home, and brutal tactics in Yemen. The UAE, too, may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted.
Nevertheless, as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region, its erstwhile allies’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to cease some of their recklessness because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States. If stability in the Middle East is the United States’ main goal, Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments.
In the wake of the U.S. assassination of Suleimani—which some former U.S. officials have called an act of war—the calculations may change once more. According to Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Suleimani was in Iraq to bring him Tehran’s response to a message from Riyadh on how to defuse regional tensions, presumably as part of the House of Saud’s renewed interest in diplomacy. The Iraqis, according to him, were mediating between the two rivals, an initiative that has now been thrown into question.
Iran may very well conclude, rightly or wrongly, that Saudi Arabia and the UAE conspired with Washington to assassinate Suleimani and as a result not only end the recent diplomacy but also target Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as part of the revenge for Suleimani’s death. This is yet one more instance, it seems, in which U.S. activities in the region have brought more turmoil than stability.
To be sure, there is no guarantee that recent diplomatic efforts would have been successful. A more responsible Riyadh might not have begotten a more responsible Tehran. But it is noteworthy that diplomacy did not even begin in earnest until Washington clearly demonstrated its unwillingness to entangle itself in a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And by returning to the region in a show of military force, Trump may once again disincentivize the United States’ allies from taking diplomacy seriously. They may even interpret Suleimani’s killing as a license to resume their recklessness—activities like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s purported kidnapping of the Lebanese prime minister and ordering of the dismemberment of Khashoggi; Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s imposition of a blockade on Qatar; and the two countries’ further destabilization of Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen.
As in the past, in other words, it seems as if the Middle East’s descent into chaos is more likely with the United States than without it.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-06--Is Iran Abandoning the 2015 Nuclear Agreement?

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said that from now on , “ Iran ’ s nuclear program no longer faces any operating restrictions , ” including how many kilograms of uranium it can enrich and how much it can enrich it .
( Low-enriched uranium is suitable for powering nuclear reactors ; highly enriched uranium is needed to make a bomb . )
The fifth in an escalating series of breaches of Iran ’ s nuclear obligations under the 2015 accord , the latest step has sparked speculation that the nuclear pact , which has staggered along on life @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is now for all intents and purposes dead—with all that entails for the risk of a renewed nuclear arms race in the Middle East .
Does Iran ’ s latest announcement mean that it , too , is giving up on the nuclear deal ?
Not quite .
Iran simply continued the incremental breaches with limits on its nuclear program that it has been pursuing since May of last year .
And Tehran was clear that it will continue to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA ) , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provides regular reports on its compliance with the accord .
And Iran stressed that if the other signatories of the 2015 deal , especially European countries such as Britain , France , and Germany , can start to deliver some of the deal ’ s promised economic benefits—and if the Trump administration unwinds the economic sanctions it levied on Iran beginning in May 2019—Iran ’ s latest escalatory steps will be walked back .
“ If the sanctions are lifted and Iran benefits from its interests , the Islamic Republic of Iran is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Iran ’ s nuclear agency said in its announcement .
Ultimately , given Iran ’ s periodic notification of incremental violations of an agreement that other parties are not honoring , the latest announcement is just one step closer to the unraveling of the nuclear agreement , but not yet the final one .
( And it was not a direct response to the U.S. assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani on Friday ; Iran ’ s nuclear breaches were telegraphed well in advance . )
“ Sunday ’ s steps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Iran .
It is concerning , but it does not mean the death of the JCPOA , ” said Kelsey Davenport , the director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association , referring to the deal by its formal title , the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action .
Iran has already breached several elements of the nuclear deal in recent months .
What ’ s new in the latest announcement ?
The biggest new development is that Iran is throwing off any limits on the number of centrifuges that it can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2015 agreement , it was limited to a little over 5,000 first-generation centrifuges , which constrained its ability to enrich uranium to the levels needed to build a bomb .
Now , Iran can install more of the older and less-efficient centrifuges ( it has plenty ) as well as arrays of more advanced , and more efficient , centrifuges that can enrich more uranium more quickly .
That ’ s important because the quicker Iran can enrich uranium , the quicker it can build a big stockpile of the stuff and proceed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ words , more and more advanced centrifuges mean a shorter breakout time for Iran to get the bomb .
Previously , Iran had eschewed limits on the amount of low-enriched uranium it could stockpile , how much it could enrich that uranium , its ability to develop and deploy more advanced centrifuges , and its ability to carry out enrichment work at the heavily bunkered Fordow nuclear site .
The latest step creates the potential—if not yet the reality—of a more robust enrichment program that would be necessary to turn a ton or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kilograms of highly enriched uranium , the minimum needed for an atomic weapon .
“ Announcing an end to adherence limits isn ’ t the same as restarting prohibited activities , ” Davenport said .
Is there anything encouraging in Iran ’ s latest announcement ?
Despite the further apparent nuclear escalation , things could have been worse .
For starters , Iran didn ’ t say it would begin enriching uranium from current levels of about 4.5 percent to 20 percent—which is the next , and most important , step toward making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it would continue to offer the same level of cooperation with the IAEA , which is crucial to international oversight of the entire program .
“ Cooperation with the IAEA is critical—it sends the message that Iran is not dashing toward a bomb , ” Davenport said .
And , despite repeated Iranian threats to go back to the original design for the Arak nuclear reactor , the latest announcement said nothing about plans to do so .
That is good news from a proliferation point of view , because as long as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make medical isotopes , it would not be suitable for the production of plutonium—another , and potentially an easier , path to a bomb .
( Iran previously breached limits on the amount of heavy water it can store , which is important if it wants to operate that reactor as a breeder for plutonium . )
“ The plutonium route is a lot easier—they would only need about eight to 12 kilograms , ” said Michael Tanchum , a senior fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and running [ on the original design ] , they could do that in as little as 200 days , ” he said .
So is Iran trying to race for a bomb or pressure Europe for economic relief ?
While the full implications of Iran ’ s latest announcement remain unclear , the likeliest explanation is that Tehran is trying to ramp up pressure on key European countries to deliver some of the economic benefits that Iran was promised under the 2015 deal but that—due to U.S. sanctions—never arrived .
Josep Borrell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chief , spoke with Iran ’ s top diplomat , Mohammad Javad Zarif , over the weekend , and he stressed that the EU hopes to keep the nuclear deal alive .
He invited Zarif to Brussels to discuss ways to preserve what he called “ a corner stone of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and instrumental for the security of the region and the world.
” The problem is that Europe has tried for years to increase trade with Iran to help offset the economic impact of U.S. sanctions , but with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a trading system that could insulate European firms from U.S. sanctions for certain transactions with Iran have gone basically nowhere .
And there ’ s little chance European governments can convince European refiners to buy more Iranian oil—which would be manna for Iran—if it means risking the wrath of the U.S. Treasury .
One long shot might be to revive a recent French proposal to offer a multibillion-dollar line of credit to Iran in exchange for Tehran coming back into compliance with its nuclear obligations , but that requires Washington ’ s complaisance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bring Iran back into compliance with the deal and avert a nuclear crisis , but that window is rapidly closing and will continue to narrow if tensions between the United States and Iran continue to escalate , ” Davenport said .
If the 2015 deal isn ’ t dead yet , what might kill it , and what would that mean ?
At this point , a lot depends on Europe , which has greeted each Iranian step so far with caution along with threats to activate the nuclear pact ’ s dispute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a United Nations Security Council vote where the United States has a veto , would basically spell its demise .
Iran is trying to pressure Europe to deliver , but it risks pushing Europe to act—in the opposite fashion .
On Sunday , Britain , France , and Germany urged Iran to walk back its latest noncompliance with the pact .
“ If the Iranians really start moving toward 20 percent enrichment , that would force the EU to activate dispute settlement , ” Tanchum said .
“ If the pact totally unravels @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nightmare.
” The final death of the nuclear deal would mean no limits—and no international oversight—on Iran ’ s nuclear activities , which would be a return to the more dangerous world of 2013 , when Iran was enriching uranium to 20 percent and was only months away from making a bomb .
And the problem isn ’ t just Iran : Since the Trump administration pulled out of the agreement—despite acknowledging Iran ’ s compliance—other countries are leery of entering nonproliferation talks with an unreliable negotiating partner .
“ The death of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Davenport said .
“ It risks reigniting a new , manufactured , nuclear crisis with Iran , but the implications go far beyond just Iran .
”

On Sunday, just days after the United States killed a top Iranian military commander in an airstrike in Baghdad, Iran announced that it would no longer abide by any restrictions on its nuclear program. Those limits were the centerpiece of the 2015 nuclear agreement that had checked Tehran’s efforts to build a nuclear weapon before the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the multiparty accord in 2018.
On Sunday, just days after the United States killed a top Iranian military commander in an airstrike in Baghdad, Iran announced that it would no longer abide by any restrictions on its nuclear program. Those limits were the centerpiece of the 2015 nuclear agreement that had checked Tehran’s efforts to build a nuclear weapon before the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the multiparty accord in 2018.
The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said that from now on, “Iran’s nuclear program no longer faces any operating restrictions,” including how many kilograms of uranium it can enrich and how much it can enrich it. (Low-enriched uranium is suitable for powering nuclear reactors; highly enriched uranium is needed to make a bomb.)
The fifth in an escalating series of breaches of Iran’s nuclear obligations under the 2015 accord, the latest step has sparked speculation that the nuclear pact, which has staggered along on life support for a year and a half, is now for all intents and purposes dead—with all that entails for the risk of a renewed nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
Does Iran’s latest announcement mean that it, too, is giving up on the nuclear deal?
Not quite. Iran simply continued the incremental breaches with limits on its nuclear program that it has been pursuing since May of last year. And Tehran was clear that it will continue to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which oversees Iran’s nuclear program and provides regular reports on its compliance with the accord. And Iran stressed that if the other signatories of the 2015 deal, especially European countries such as Britain, France, and Germany, can start to deliver some of the deal’s promised economic benefits—and if the Trump administration unwinds the economic sanctions it levied on Iran beginning in May 2019—Iran’s latest escalatory steps will be walked back.
“If the sanctions are lifted and Iran benefits from its interests, the Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to return to its obligations,” Iran’s nuclear agency said in its announcement.
Ultimately, given Iran’s periodic notification of incremental violations of an agreement that other parties are not honoring, the latest announcement is just one step closer to the unraveling of the nuclear agreement, but not yet the final one. (And it was not a direct response to the U.S. assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani on Friday; Iran’s nuclear breaches were telegraphed well in advance.)
“Sunday’s steps were serious, but expected, action by Iran. It is concerning, but it does not mean the death of the JCPOA,” said Kelsey Davenport, the director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, referring to the deal by its formal title, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Iran has already breached several elements of the nuclear deal in recent months. What’s new in the latest announcement?
The biggest new development is that Iran is throwing off any limits on the number of centrifuges that it can operate; under the terms of the 2015 agreement, it was limited to a little over 5,000 first-generation centrifuges, which constrained its ability to enrich uranium to the levels needed to build a bomb. Now, Iran can install more of the older and less-efficient centrifuges (it has plenty) as well as arrays of more advanced, and more efficient, centrifuges that can enrich more uranium more quickly.
That’s important because the quicker Iran can enrich uranium, the quicker it can build a big stockpile of the stuff and proceed to further enrich it. In other words, more and more advanced centrifuges mean a shorter breakout time for Iran to get the bomb.
Previously, Iran had eschewed limits on the amount of low-enriched uranium it could stockpile, how much it could enrich that uranium, its ability to develop and deploy more advanced centrifuges, and its ability to carry out enrichment work at the heavily bunkered Fordow nuclear site. The latest step creates the potential—if not yet the reality—of a more robust enrichment program that would be necessary to turn a ton or so of low-enriched uranium into about 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, the minimum needed for an atomic weapon.
“Announcing an end to adherence limits isn’t the same as restarting prohibited activities,” Davenport said.
Is there anything encouraging in Iran’s latest announcement?
Despite the further apparent nuclear escalation, things could have been worse. For starters, Iran didn’t say it would begin enriching uranium from current levels of about 4.5 percent to 20 percent—which is the next, and most important, step toward making weapons-grade uranium.
Iran also insisted that it would continue to offer the same level of cooperation with the IAEA, which is crucial to international oversight of the entire program. “Cooperation with the IAEA is critical—it sends the message that Iran is not dashing toward a bomb,” Davenport said.
And, despite repeated Iranian threats to go back to the original design for the Arak nuclear reactor, the latest announcement said nothing about plans to do so. That is good news from a proliferation point of view, because as long as Iran continues work to modify that reactor to make medical isotopes, it would not be suitable for the production of plutonium—another, and potentially an easier, path to a bomb. (Iran previously breached limits on the amount of heavy water it can store, which is important if it wants to operate that reactor as a breeder for plutonium.)
“The plutonium route is a lot easier—they would only need about eight to 12 kilograms,” said Michael Tanchum, a senior fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy. “If Iran had its reactor up and running [on the original design], they could do that in as little as 200 days,” he said.
So is Iran trying to race for a bomb or pressure Europe for economic relief?
While the full implications of Iran’s latest announcement remain unclear, the likeliest explanation is that Tehran is trying to ramp up pressure on key European countries to deliver some of the economic benefits that Iran was promised under the 2015 deal but that—due to U.S. sanctions—never arrived.
Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign-policy chief, spoke with Iran’s top diplomat, Mohammad Javad Zarif, over the weekend, and he stressed that the EU hopes to keep the nuclear deal alive. He invited Zarif to Brussels to discuss ways to preserve what he called “a corner stone of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and instrumental for the security of the region and the world.”
The problem is that Europe has tried for years to increase trade with Iran to help offset the economic impact of U.S. sanctions, but with very little success. Efforts to build a trading system that could insulate European firms from U.S. sanctions for certain transactions with Iran have gone basically nowhere. And there’s little chance European governments can convince European refiners to buy more Iranian oil—which would be manna for Iran—if it means risking the wrath of the U.S. Treasury.
One long shot might be to revive a recent French proposal to offer a multibillion-dollar line of credit to Iran in exchange for Tehran coming back into compliance with its nuclear obligations, but that requires Washington’s complaisance.
“There is still space to bring Iran back into compliance with the deal and avert a nuclear crisis, but that window is rapidly closing and will continue to narrow if tensions between the United States and Iran continue to escalate,” Davenport said.
If the 2015 deal isn’t dead yet, what might kill it, and what would that mean?
At this point, a lot depends on Europe, which has greeted each Iranian step so far with caution along with threats to activate the nuclear pact’s dispute settlement system, which, culminating in a United Nations Security Council vote where the United States has a veto, would basically spell its demise. Iran is trying to pressure Europe to deliver, but it risks pushing Europe to act—in the opposite fashion. On Sunday, Britain, France, and Germany urged Iran to walk back its latest noncompliance with the pact.
“If the Iranians really start moving toward 20 percent enrichment, that would force the EU to activate dispute settlement,” Tanchum said. “If the pact totally unravels, it’s potentially a real nightmare.”
The final death of the nuclear deal would mean no limits—and no international oversight—on Iran’s nuclear activities, which would be a return to the more dangerous world of 2013, when Iran was enriching uranium to 20 percent and was only months away from making a bomb. And the problem isn’t just Iran: Since the Trump administration pulled out of the agreement—despite acknowledging Iran’s compliance—other countries are leery of entering nonproliferation talks with an unreliable negotiating partner.
“The death of the JCPOA will have serious nonproliferation consequences,” Davenport said. “It risks reigniting a new, manufactured, nuclear crisis with Iran, but the implications go far beyond just Iran.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-06--There Is Nothing Left for Americans to Do in Iraq

There Is Nothing Left for Americans to Do in Iraq Qassem Suleimani is dead .
Good riddance .
In a region where there are a lot of bad actors , he was certainly among the worst .
There has been so much fearmongering over the potential ramifications from killing the head of Iran ’ s Quds Force that lost in all of the commentary is the fact that the man was drenched in blood .
Set aside the American deaths on his hands and consider the hundreds of thousands who have died just in Syria after Iran , under Suleimani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its ally Bashar al-Assad .
The pitched debate over whether Suleimani was planning an imminent attack—something that is always in the eye of the beholder—on U.S. personnel and interests when he was struck down by a U.S. airstrike last week is important , but the fury with which it is being waged obscures a more fundamental concern about the Iranian general ’ s demise .
It would be one thing to kill Suleimani and bear the burden of the associated risks if there was a plausible case to be made that getting rid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Iraq and the U.S. ability to influence events there .
That seems unlikely .
Iraq is in a state of terminal collapse , and the United States is isolated and impotent there .
It is thus hard to understand what Washington wants , and what the Americans who were left vulnerable to the likes of Suleimani are actually able to accomplish .
The hard truth is that Iraq is lost , and it is time to leave .
The foreign-policy community is reluctant to relitigate the invasion of Iraq and its consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ analysts and officials—former and current—to bear , but it is worth understanding how and why the trillions of dollars spent , lives lost , and untold number of injured were simply a waste .
Iraq is not a state in the sense that it has a monopoly over violence or can enforce property rights .
The system of political and economic spoils set up after the 2003 invasion has led to rapacious thievery and corruption , robbing Iraq of its natural wealth and impoverishing its people .
As a result , Iraqis have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have poured onto the streets across much of the country to demand a new political order .
They have been met with violence at the hands of people allied to and supported by the now-dead Suleimani , whose mission was to ensure that post-invasion Iraq remained so weak and unstable it could never threaten Iran again .
This was an entirely predictable result , but the George W. Bush administration , 296 members of the House of Representatives , 77 Senators , and legions of pundits chose to believe fantasies about weapons of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end of an M1A1 tank .
No one understood Iraq in the run-up to the war , and in the almost two decades since , Americans have proved that the country remains beyond their grasp .
As recently as last spring , analysts and officials in Washington were claiming that after defeating the Islamic State in Mosul in 2017 , Iraq was on the path to stability .
Never mind that public opinion polling indicated Iraqis—across sects and ethnicities—were seething over the dysfunction in Baghdad .
Perhaps Washington would have had a better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leave their bunkerlike compounds , but they , through no fault of their own , have little contact with Iraqis .
It takes weeks of planning and robust security umbrellas for U.S. officials to go anywhere , so it does not happen all that often .
If policymakers do not understand how Iraq works , they have no way of knowing what resources to bring to bear in order to help Iraqis build a more stable political system and prosperous economy .
The result is wasted effort and throwing more good money after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that these goals are attainable and that the United States is working with its Iraqi partners to realize a stable and prosperous future for all Iraqis .
Who are these partners ?
People like Hadi al-Amiri , not only the leader of the notorious Badr Organization but also a member of Iraq ’ s parliament in good standing .
Is Faleh al-Fayyad , the national security advisor to the Iraqi prime minister , a partner ?
Both men participated in the siege at the U.S. Embassy along with other high-profile , notorious Iranian-linked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi , an apparently well-regarded technocrat , who has been vocal in the effort to push the United States out of Iraq .
It is surely the case that the Suleimani killing is putting the squeeze on those people who support a U.S.-Iraq relationship , but this group—with the exception of Iraq ’ s Kurds—never seemed large or terribly committed to the kind of strategic ties Washington sought .
Mostly , it seems , Iraqis just want the United States to get out .
It is hard to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country , have enabled almost 17 years of chaos , and now threaten a proxy war in which they will suffer .
There is an argument to be made that the United States must remain in Iraq to fight the Islamic State .
In the abstract that makes sense , but reality is different .
The central government in Baghdad—such as it is—through corruption , dysfunction , venality , and malevolence is contributing to conditions that are ripe for the Islamic State to reemerge as a significant threat .
That would be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ given the fact that the United States has zero influence over Iraqi politics , U.S. forces would be reduced to a never-ending mission of whack-a-mole in an environment in which there is even less trust and more enmity between the Iraqi and U.S. governments .
That makes it harder to fight terrorists .
The Trump administration also just killed the guy who—like it or not—was a virtual partner in the fight against the Islamic State , highlighting the strategic incoherence of killing Suleimani .
The strike and counterstrike that led to Suleimani ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Americans , whether on military bases or diplomatic compounds , being left vulnerable to Iran ’ s proxies .
It is not worth it .
There is nothing left for Americans to do in Iraq .
American officials and analysts can not allow themselves to be convinced that the United States must remain in Iraq because if diplomats and military officers try a little harder , things might get better , or because Washington has sunk vast sums into the country , or because it would be handing Iran a victory .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And the sooner U.S. policymakers can digest that fact , the better .
Qassem Suleimani was without a doubt a malign geopolitical actor .
But targeting him because he destabilized Iraq and threatened Americans there hardly seems worth the potential price .
If even parts of the worst-case scenarios come true , his death by drone along the Baghdad airport road will be yet another folly in the two-decade-long American misadventure in Iraq .

Qassem Suleimani is dead. Good riddance. In a region where there are a lot of bad actors, he was certainly among the worst. There has been so much fearmongering over the potential ramifications from killing the head of Iran’s Quds Force that lost in all of the commentary is the fact that the man was drenched in blood. Set aside the American deaths on his hands and consider the hundreds of thousands who have died just in Syria after Iran, under Suleimani’s direction, mobilized to save its ally Bashar al-Assad.
Qassem Suleimani is dead. Good riddance. In a region where there are a lot of bad actors, he was certainly among the worst. There has been so much fearmongering over the potential ramifications from killing the head of Iran’s Quds Force that lost in all of the commentary is the fact that the man was drenched in blood. Set aside the American deaths on his hands and consider the hundreds of thousands who have died just in Syria after Iran, under Suleimani’s direction, mobilized to save its ally Bashar al-Assad.
The pitched debate over whether Suleimani was planning an imminent attack—something that is always in the eye of the beholder—on U.S. personnel and interests when he was struck down by a U.S. airstrike last week is important, but the fury with which it is being waged obscures a more fundamental concern about the Iranian general’s demise. It would be one thing to kill Suleimani and bear the burden of the associated risks if there was a plausible case to be made that getting rid of him would have a salutary effect on Iraq and the U.S. ability to influence events there. That seems unlikely. Iraq is in a state of terminal collapse, and the United States is isolated and impotent there. It is thus hard to understand what Washington wants, and what the Americans who were left vulnerable to the likes of Suleimani are actually able to accomplish. The hard truth is that Iraq is lost, and it is time to leave. The foreign-policy community is reluctant to relitigate the invasion of Iraq and its consequences. Perhaps it is too much for analysts and officials—former and current—to bear, but it is worth understanding how and why the trillions of dollars spent, lives lost, and untold number of injured were simply a waste.
Iraq is not a state in the sense that it has a monopoly over violence or can enforce property rights. The system of political and economic spoils set up after the 2003 invasion has led to rapacious thievery and corruption, robbing Iraq of its natural wealth and impoverishing its people. As a result, Iraqis have lost faith in virtually every institution and have poured onto the streets across much of the country to demand a new political order. They have been met with violence at the hands of people allied to and supported by the now-dead Suleimani, whose mission was to ensure that post-invasion Iraq remained so weak and unstable it could never threaten Iran again. This was an entirely predictable result, but the George W. Bush administration, 296 members of the House of Representatives, 77 Senators, and legions of pundits chose to believe fantasies about weapons of mass destruction and democracy delivered at the end of an M1A1 tank.
No one understood Iraq in the run-up to the war, and in the almost two decades since, Americans have proved that the country remains beyond their grasp. As recently as last spring, analysts and officials in Washington were claiming that after defeating the Islamic State in Mosul in 2017, Iraq was on the path to stability. Never mind that public opinion polling indicated Iraqis—across sects and ethnicities—were seething over the dysfunction in Baghdad. Perhaps Washington would have had a better grasp had its diplomats been able to leave their bunkerlike compounds, but they, through no fault of their own, have little contact with Iraqis. It takes weeks of planning and robust security umbrellas for U.S. officials to go anywhere, so it does not happen all that often. If policymakers do not understand how Iraq works, they have no way of knowing what resources to bring to bear in order to help Iraqis build a more stable political system and prosperous economy. The result is wasted effort and throwing more good money after bad.
Still, U.S. officials insist that these goals are attainable and that the United States is working with its Iraqi partners to realize a stable and prosperous future for all Iraqis. Who are these partners? People like Hadi al-Amiri, not only the leader of the notorious Badr Organization but also a member of Iraq’s parliament in good standing. Is Faleh al-Fayyad, the national security advisor to the Iraqi prime minister, a partner? Both men participated in the siege at the U.S. Embassy along with other high-profile, notorious Iranian-linked militia leaders late last month. Then there is Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, an apparently well-regarded technocrat, who has been vocal in the effort to push the United States out of Iraq. It is surely the case that the Suleimani killing is putting the squeeze on those people who support a U.S.-Iraq relationship, but this group—with the exception of Iraq’s Kurds—never seemed large or terribly committed to the kind of strategic ties Washington sought. Mostly, it seems, Iraqis just want the United States to get out. It is hard to blame them. Americans marched into their country, have enabled almost 17 years of chaos, and now threaten a proxy war in which they will suffer.
There is an argument to be made that the United States must remain in Iraq to fight the Islamic State. In the abstract that makes sense, but reality is different. The central government in Baghdad—such as it is—through corruption, dysfunction, venality, and malevolence is contributing to conditions that are ripe for the Islamic State to reemerge as a significant threat. That would be a reason to stay in Iraq, but given the fact that the United States has zero influence over Iraqi politics, U.S. forces would be reduced to a never-ending mission of whack-a-mole in an environment in which there is even less trust and more enmity between the Iraqi and U.S. governments. That makes it harder to fight terrorists. The Trump administration also just killed the guy who—like it or not—was a virtual partner in the fight against the Islamic State, highlighting the strategic incoherence of killing Suleimani.
The strike and counterstrike that led to Suleimani’s demise last Friday is the result of Americans, whether on military bases or diplomatic compounds, being left vulnerable to Iran’s proxies. It is not worth it. There is nothing left for Americans to do in Iraq. American officials and analysts cannot allow themselves to be convinced that the United States must remain in Iraq because if diplomats and military officers try a little harder, things might get better, or because Washington has sunk vast sums into the country, or because it would be handing Iran a victory. The Iranians have already won that battle. And the sooner U.S. policymakers can digest that fact, the better.
Qassem Suleimani was without a doubt a malign geopolitical actor. But targeting him because he destabilized Iraq and threatened Americans there hardly seems worth the potential price. If even parts of the worst-case scenarios come true, his death by drone along the Baghdad airport road will be yet another folly in the two-decade-long American misadventure in Iraq.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-06--Iran Can Find a New Suleimani

Iran Can Find a New Suleimani

One of the strongest arguments for killing Qassem Suleimani—Iran ’ s longtime leader of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) , who was killed in a U.S. airstrike last week—was that he was unusually , perhaps uniquely , dangerous .
Mark Dubowitz , an Iran hawk with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies , declared that Suleimani “ has been the equivalent of the JSOC commander , the CIA director , and Iran ’ s real foreign minister ” and called his death “ devastating ” for the IRGC and for the Iranian regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration official , voiced similar sentiments .
“ Soleimani was Iran ’ s David Petraeus and Stan McChrystal and Brett McGurk all rolled into one , ” he wrote in the Atlantic .
Exum added that Iran faces a shortage of human capital and that “ I do not know of a single Iranian who was more indispensable to his government ’ s ambitions in the Middle East.
” Suleimani ’ s key role and the emphasis the Iranian government placed on his achievements make it easy to exaggerate his irreplaceability .
Suleimani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Gen. Esmail Qaani , will of course bring different skills and talents to the position .
But he ’ ll inherit existing networks and institutions that were not solely reliant on the man who helped build them .
For sure , there is no question Suleimani ’ s death is a serious loss for Iran .
The IRGC leader had decades of experience in revolutionary warfare .
He personally nurtured relationships with the Lebanese Hezbollah , Houthi groups in Yemen , Palestinian terrorists , paramilitary groups in Iraq , and other components @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran Threat Network.
” He was also regularly described as charismatic , and over time his experience and reputation created a star quality that , by itself , was probably compelling to his interlocutors .
Suleimani himself spoke Arabic , helping bridge a cultural gap between Persian-speaking Iran and its many prospective clients in the Arab world .
Suleimani already played an important role leading paramilitary operations for Iran in such key theaters as Lebanon in the 1990s and then became even more important for Iran ’ s ambitions as Iraq slid into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ His role grew even further following the 2011 Syrian civil war .
In both cases , Suleimani managed Iran ’ s clients highly successfully , greatly expanding Iran ’ s influence .
Suleimani was also an important domestic character .
Though he was initially a shadowy figure , over time Iran burnished his image , giving him a glamorous and iconic status as the country ’ s heroic defender .
The Iranian regime has faced severe economic problems , in part due to the U.S. “ maximum pressure ” campaign that followed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A hero portrayed as fighting the country ’ s enemies thus bolstered the regime ’ s overall prestige .
Propaganda centered around Suleimani such as him posing with children or wearing a Palestinian keffiyeh often appeared when the regime felt the need to burnish its credentials with the public .
Some analysts have made a comparison to the U.S. killing of the al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and the Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi , both of which dealt severe blows to the terrorist groups .
This obscures more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often .
Iran and the IRGC , in contrast , are well institutionalized , as the swift succession decision illustrates .
Indeed , as the Iran analyst Suzanne Maloney points out , Iran has regularly lost leaders on the battlefield since the first days of the revolution .
The IRGC , with its many years of waging unconventional warfare , has a deep bench of experienced officers .
Suleimani , of course , was a highly skilled officer , but one of the hallmarks of a great leader is that they create institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran has a tradition of rewarding aggressive officers , suggesting Suleimani ’ s successors may also be eager for confrontation .
Lebanese Hezbollah— —might be the most appropriate comparison .
In 1992 , Israel killed .
That seemed to be a no-brainer decision given Musawi ’ s skill and charisma , as well as the prowess Hezbollah had displayed in what was then almost a decade of fighting Israel .
Hezbollah , however , is well institutionalized and has a deep bench of experienced leaders .
Musawi ’ s replacement , Hassan Nasrallah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most charismatic and competent militant leaders of our time .
Under Suleimani ’ s leadership , the IRGC vastly expanded its networks in the Middle East and globally .
But Suleimani , of course , did not run every or even most networks on a day-to-day basis , leaving that to his underlings , including Qaani , who was active in Afghanistan and other theaters .
The nuts and bolts of the relationships will remain in place even with a new man at the top .
Iran will also try to play @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is already doing so in its propaganda and by sending his body to multiple shrine cities in Iran for mourning .
And , for now , Iranians are rallying together against the strike , allowing the regime to put the unrest that has plagued the country for months behind it , at least for now .
The IRGC in particular will be likely to laud Suleimani in the years to come , using his example to inspire the force as a whole .
It is Suleimani ’ s public profile that is perhaps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short term .
Heroes , however , can be created .
The Iranian regime uses propaganda skillfully , and it may elevate Qaani or perhaps another leader to fill the heroic defender role that Suleimani occupied in the regime ’ s pantheon .
If Iran does strike back and a broader confrontation with the United States ensues , the regime may play up the accomplishments of one of Iran ’ s commanders to inspire the public .
This is particularly likely if public discontent with the regime continues to grow .
Suleimani ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IRGC and to Iran ’ s overall capabilities .
It would be a mistake , however , to assume that the death of one military commander , no matter how formidable , will dramatically change either Iran ’ s policies or its ability to wreak havoc around the world .

One of the strongest arguments for killing Qassem Suleimani—Iran’s longtime leader of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was killed in a U.S. airstrike last week—was that he was unusually, perhaps uniquely, dangerous. Mark Dubowitz, an Iran hawk with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, declared that Suleimani “has been the equivalent of the JSOC commander , the CIA director, and Iran’s real foreign minister” and called his death “devastating” for the IRGC and for the Iranian regime. Andrew Exum, a former Obama administration official, voiced similar sentiments. “Soleimani was Iran’s David Petraeus and Stan McChrystal and Brett McGurk all rolled into one,” he wrote in the Atlantic. Exum added that Iran faces a shortage of human capital and that “I do not know of a single Iranian who was more indispensable to his government’s ambitions in the Middle East.”
One of the strongest arguments for killing Qassem Suleimani—Iran’s longtime leader of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was killed in a U.S. airstrike last week—was that he was unusually, perhaps uniquely, dangerous. Mark Dubowitz, an Iran hawk with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, declared that Suleimani “has been the equivalent of the JSOC commander, the CIA director, and Iran’s real foreign minister” and called his death “devastating” for the IRGC and for the Iranian regime. Andrew Exum, a former Obama administration official, voiced similar sentiments. “Soleimani was Iran’s David Petraeus and Stan McChrystal and Brett McGurk all rolled into one,” he wrote in the Atlantic. Exum added that Iran faces a shortage of human capital and that “I do not know of a single Iranian who was more indispensable to his government’s ambitions in the Middle East.”
Suleimani’s key role and the emphasis the Iranian government placed on his achievements make it easy to exaggerate his irreplaceability. Suleimani’s successor, his deputy Brig. Gen. Esmail Qaani, will of course bring different skills and talents to the position. But he’ll inherit existing networks and institutions that were not solely reliant on the man who helped build them.
For sure, there is no question Suleimani’s death is a serious loss for Iran. The IRGC leader had decades of experience in revolutionary warfare. He personally nurtured relationships with the Lebanese Hezbollah, Houthi groups in Yemen, Palestinian terrorists, paramilitary groups in Iraq, and other components of what analysts have labeled the “Iran Threat Network.” He was also regularly described as charismatic, and over time his experience and reputation created a star quality that, by itself, was probably compelling to his interlocutors. Suleimani himself spoke Arabic, helping bridge a cultural gap between Persian-speaking Iran and its many prospective clients in the Arab world. Suleimani already played an important role leading paramilitary operations for Iran in such key theaters as Lebanon in the 1990s and then became even more important for Iran’s ambitions as Iraq slid into chaos following the 2003 U.S. invasion. His role grew even further following the 2011 Syrian civil war. In both cases, Suleimani managed Iran’s clients highly successfully, greatly expanding Iran’s influence.
Suleimani was also an important domestic character. Though he was initially a shadowy figure, over time Iran burnished his image, giving him a glamorous and iconic status as the country’s heroic defender. The Iranian regime has faced severe economic problems, in part due to the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign that followed the American withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. A hero portrayed as fighting the country’s enemies thus bolstered the regime’s overall prestige. Propaganda centered around Suleimani such as him posing with children or wearing a Palestinian keffiyeh often appeared when the regime felt the need to burnish its credentials with the public.
Some analysts have made a comparison to the U.S. killing of the al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and the Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, both of which dealt severe blows to the terrorist groups. This obscures more than it illuminates. Sunni jihadi terrorist groups often depend heavily on a charismatic leader . Iran and the IRGC, in contrast, are well institutionalized, as the swift succession decision illustrates.
Indeed, as the Iran analyst Suzanne Maloney points out, Iran has regularly lost leaders on the battlefield since the first days of the revolution. The IRGC, with its many years of waging unconventional warfare, has a deep bench of experienced officers. Suleimani, of course, was a highly skilled officer, but one of the hallmarks of a great leader is that they create institutions and inspire others. In addition, Iran has a tradition of rewarding aggressive officers, suggesting Suleimani’s successors may also be eager for confrontation.
Lebanese Hezbollah— Iran’s most important and powerful substate ally —might be the most appropriate comparison. In 1992, Israel killed Hezbollah’s leader Abbas Musawi . That seemed to be a no-brainer decision given Musawi’s skill and charisma, as well as the prowess Hezbollah had displayed in what was then almost a decade of fighting Israel. Hezbollah, however, is well institutionalized and has a deep bench of experienced leaders. Musawi’s replacement, Hassan Nasrallah, turned out to be one of the most charismatic and competent militant leaders of our time.
Under Suleimani’s leadership, the IRGC vastly expanded its networks in the Middle East and globally. But Suleimani, of course, did not run every or even most networks on a day-to-day basis, leaving that to his underlings, including Qaani, who was active in Afghanistan and other theaters. The nuts and bolts of the relationships will remain in place even with a new man at the top.
Iran will also try to play up Suleimani as a martyr—indeed, it is already doing so in its propaganda and by sending his body to multiple shrine cities in Iran for mourning. And, for now, Iranians are rallying together against the strike, allowing the regime to put the unrest that has plagued the country for months behind it, at least for now. The IRGC in particular will be likely to laud Suleimani in the years to come, using his example to inspire the force as a whole.
It is Suleimani’s public profile that is perhaps most irreplaceable, at least in the short term. Heroes, however, can be created. The Iranian regime uses propaganda skillfully, and it may elevate Qaani or perhaps another leader to fill the heroic defender role that Suleimani occupied in the regime’s pantheon. If Iran does strike back and a broader confrontation with the United States ensues, the regime may play up the accomplishments of one of Iran’s commanders to inspire the public. This is particularly likely if public discontent with the regime continues to grow.
Suleimani’s death is a blow to the IRGC and to Iran’s overall capabilities. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the death of one military commander, no matter how formidable, will dramatically change either Iran’s policies or its ability to wreak havoc around the world.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-06--Trump Doubles Down on Threats Against Iran as Regional Tensions Soar

Trump Doubles Down on Threats Against Iran as Regional Tensions Soar Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : U.S. President Donald Trump doubles down on threats against Iran if it retaliates for the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani , Turkey will send troops to Libya , and the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan steps down .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Monday , please sign up here .
U.S. President Donald Trump has doubled down on threats to strike Iranian cultural sites if Tehran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the targeted killing of Qassem Suleimani , the latest escalation in the aftermath of Trump ’ s decision to take out the second most powerful Iranian in a U.S. drone strike last week .
Aboard Air Force One on Sunday , Trump threatened “ major retaliation ” if Iran targets Americans or American interests , reiterating the spirit of his Saturday tweet declaring that the United States had identified 52 sites—some of “ cultural ” significance—to strike .
The president seems undeterred by critics , who said such a move would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Troops on alert .
Trump ’ s comments came as the region braced for conflict .
U.S. troops in the Middle East and Europe are on heightened alert , and the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State said Sunday it had suspended operations against the terrorist group .
In Iraq , tens of thousands of mourners took to the streets of Baghdad calling for revenge .
Two rocket attacks occurred near Iraqi bases that host U.S. troops , though none were injured .
U.S. forces out ?
Iraq ’ s parliament passed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. troops that remain in the country .
Experts said the move could have disastrous consequences , crippling the fight against ISIS and abandoning Iraq to Iranian influence .
For now the vote is mainly symbolic , as the expulsion of U.S. troops requires signoff from Iraq ’ s executive branch .
That may be in the cards : NBC reported Sunday that Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi is expected to tell U.S .
Ambassador Matthew Tueller that U.S. troops must leave the country .
Iran all but ends nuclear deal .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ final death knell for the 2015 nuclear deal , as Iran announced on Sunday it would abandon the accord ’ s central provisions .
Iran will no longer limit uranium enrichment , the amount of stockpiled uranium , or research and development in nuclear activities—all key ways the agreement blocked Tehran from having enough material to build a nuclear weapon .
Iran said it remains open to negotiations with European partners , leaving room to return to the deal if U.S. sanctions were lifted .
Maduro takeover ?
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consolidating power on Sunday , replacing Juan Guaidó with purported ally Luis Parra as leader of the National Assembly—widely seen as the last democratic institution in the country .
( Guaidó in part based his claim for Venezuela ’ s presidency on his position as congress chief . )
A crisis erupted when the doors to the parliament building were locked , and troops loyal to Maduro prevented Guaidó and other lawmakers from entering—stopping his bid for reelection .
Opposition lawmakers then voted to reelect Guaidó in a session held elsewhere , meaning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legislature .
The international community still supports Guaidó ’ s claim to the presidency , but the move by Maduro ’ s regime will likely diminish his role in Venezuelan domestic politics .
Turkey sending troops to Libya .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced Sunday that he was sending troops to Libya to support the internationally recognized government in Tripoli .
The move is the latest Turkish attempt to embed itself in regional affairs .
It has sent arms to Libya for months and recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ influence in the eastern Mediterranean .
Turkey ’ s deepening involvement in Libya is part of an effort by international powers to shape the outcome of the country ’ s civil war .
In September 2019 , Russian mercenaries were deployed in Libya to support Gen. Khalifa Haftar in his bid to overtake Tripoli .
Al-Shabab attacks in Kenya .
The Islamist militant group Al-Shabab launched an attack on U.S. and Kenyan personnel at an air base near the border with Somalia on Sunday , killing one U.S. service member and two U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the attack was successfully repelled by U.S. and Kenyan forces , and Kenyan Defense Forces spokesman Lt. Col. Paul Njuguna said they had killed five al-Shabab militants .
The attack comes days after AFRICOM launched three airstrikes on al-Shabab targets in Somalia , killing four militants .
Afghanistan ambassador out .
U.S .
Ambassador to Afghanistan John Bass is stepping down after just two years in the position , he announced on Monday .
State Department officials said short stints in the Afghanistan post are common due to the stressful nature of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peculiar given the imminence of a peace deal between the United States and the Taliban .
Bass will be replaced by career diplomat Ross Wilson .
It is unclear where he will be reassigned after he formally leaves his role in the coming weeks .
Chewning to leave DoD .
Eric Chewning , the current chief of staff to U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper , is scheduled to leave his post at the end of January .
He had served as acting Secretary of Defense Pat Shanahan ’ s chief of staff @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stay on after Esper took over .
Chewning ’ s departure is the latest in a series of high-profile exits from the Pentagon in the last month .
Northwestern Syria investigation .
Bombings of hospitals , schools , and other civilian infrastructure , legally off-limits in times of war , have intensified over the past year in northwestern Syria .
Political tensions on the U.N. Security Council have limited the U.N. inquiry into the attacks .
The New York Times takes a deeper look , finding that most of the attacks could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ governments .
The advantages of climate change ?
Russia is likely one of the countries that will be most severely affected by the climate crisis .
President Vladimir Putin is skeptical of the science .
But Moscow recently published a plan detailing how the country can adapt to climate change and “ use the advantages ” of global warming , from expanding agriculture to exploration in the melting Arctic region .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: U.S. President Donald Trump doubles down on threats against Iran if it retaliates for the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, Turkey will send troops to Libya, and the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan steps down.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: U.S. President Donald Trump doubles down on threats against Iran if it retaliates for the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, Turkey will send troops to Libya, and the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan steps down.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Monday, please sign up here.
Middle East Braces for Fallout of Suleimani Strike
U.S. President Donald Trump has doubled down on threats to strike Iranian cultural sites if Tehran plans retaliatory attacks against the United States for the targeted killing of Qassem Suleimani, the latest escalation in the aftermath of Trump’s decision to take out the second most powerful Iranian in a U.S. drone strike last week.
Aboard Air Force One on Sunday, Trump threatened “major retaliation” if Iran targets Americans or American interests, reiterating the spirit of his Saturday tweet declaring that the United States had identified 52 sites—some of “cultural” significance—to strike. The president seems undeterred by critics, who said such a move would be considered a war crime under international law.
Troops on alert. Trump’s comments came as the region braced for conflict. U.S. troops in the Middle East and Europe are on heightened alert, and the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State said Sunday it had suspended operations against the terrorist group. In Iraq, tens of thousands of mourners took to the streets of Baghdad calling for revenge. Two rocket attacks occurred near Iraqi bases that host U.S. troops, though none were injured.
U.S. forces out? Iraq’s parliament passed a resolution calling expel the roughly 5,200 U.S. troops that remain in the country. Experts said the move could have disastrous consequences, crippling the fight against ISIS and abandoning Iraq to Iranian influence. For now the vote is mainly symbolic, as the expulsion of U.S. troops requires signoff from Iraq’s executive branch.
That may be in the cards: NBC reported Sunday that Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi is expected to tell U.S. Ambassador Matthew Tueller that U.S. troops must leave the country.
Iran all but ends nuclear deal. The killing of Suleimani appears to be the final death knell for the 2015 nuclear deal, as Iran announced on Sunday it would abandon the accord’s central provisions. Iran will no longer limit uranium enrichment, the amount of stockpiled uranium, or research and development in nuclear activities—all key ways the agreement blocked Tehran from having enough material to build a nuclear weapon.
Iran said it remains open to negotiations with European partners, leaving room to return to the deal if U.S. sanctions were lifted.
What We’re Watching
Maduro takeover? Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his supporters took a major step toward consolidating power on Sunday, replacing Juan Guaidó with purported ally Luis Parra as leader of the National Assembly—widely seen as the last democratic institution in the country. (Guaidó in part based his claim for Venezuela’s presidency on his position as congress chief.) A crisis erupted when the doors to the parliament building were locked, and troops loyal to Maduro prevented Guaidó and other lawmakers from entering—stopping his bid for reelection. Opposition lawmakers then voted to reelect Guaidó in a session held elsewhere, meaning two politicians now claim to lead the legislature.
The international community still supports Guaidó’s claim to the presidency, but the move by Maduro’s regime will likely diminish his role in Venezuelan domestic politics.
Turkey sending troops to Libya. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced Sunday that he was sending troops to Libya to support the internationally recognized government in Tripoli. The move is the latest Turkish attempt to embed itself in regional affairs. It has sent arms to Libya for months and recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the government to carve out a sphere of influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s deepening involvement in Libya is part of an effort by international powers to shape the outcome of the country’s civil war. In September 2019, Russian mercenaries were deployed in Libya to support Gen. Khalifa Haftar in his bid to overtake Tripoli.
Al-Shabab attacks in Kenya. The Islamist militant group Al-Shabab launched an attack on U.S. and Kenyan personnel at an air base near the border with Somalia on Sunday, killing one U.S. service member and two U.S. contractors. The U.S. Africa Command announced that the attack was successfully repelled by U.S. and Kenyan forces, and Kenyan Defense Forces spokesman Lt. Col. Paul Njuguna said they had killed five al-Shabab militants. The attack comes days after AFRICOM launched three airstrikes on al-Shabab targets in Somalia, killing four militants.
Movers and Shakers
Afghanistan ambassador out. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan John Bass is stepping down after just two years in the position, he announced on Monday. State Department officials said short stints in the Afghanistan post are common due to the stressful nature of the job, but the timing is peculiar given the imminence of a peace deal between the United States and the Taliban. Bass will be replaced by career diplomat Ross Wilson. It is unclear where he will be reassigned after he formally leaves his role in the coming weeks.
Chewning to leave DoD. Eric Chewning, the current chief of staff to U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, is scheduled to leave his post at the end of January. He had served as acting Secretary of Defense Pat Shanahan’s chief of staff since Jan. 2019 and was selected to stay on after Esper took over. Chewning’s departure is the latest in a series of high-profile exits from the Pentagon in the last month.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Northwestern Syria investigation. Bombings of hospitals, schools, and other civilian infrastructure, legally off-limits in times of war, have intensified over the past year in northwestern Syria. Political tensions on the U.N. Security Council have limited the U.N. inquiry into the attacks. The New York Times takes a deeper look, finding that most of the attacks could be traced back to the Russian and Syrian governments.
Odds and Ends
The advantages of climate change? Russia is likely one of the countries that will be most severely affected by the climate crisis. President Vladimir Putin is skeptical of the science. But Moscow recently published a plan detailing how the country can adapt to climate change and “use the advantages” of global warming, from expanding agriculture to exploration in the melting Arctic region.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Dan Haverty contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-06--U.S. Faces Fallout Over Suleimani Killing

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The fallout from the U.S. strike against Iran ’ s Suleimani ripples through the region , Juan Guaidó ’ s position in Venezuela ’ s congress is weakened , and what to watch in the world this week .
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday , please sign up here .
Iran announced on Sunday that it would remove all limits on enriching uranium , days after a U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani in Baghdad and escalated hostilities between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to announce another step away from the 2015 nuclear agreement over the weekend , the move seems to signal the deal ’ s total demise .
It also comes as the United States grapples with the regional consequences of Friday ’ s targeted strike , including possible retaliation from Iran .
As the backlash against the United States grows , Iraq ’ s parliament has called for U.S. military forces to leave the country , with many there fearful of being caught in the crossfire between the two powers .
Leaders across the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and Syria announced on Sunday it would suspend its fight against the Islamic State .
More than 5,000 U.S. troops still remain in Iraq , where they could be targets of Iranian retaliation .
Unpredictable .
Many senior defense officials were not included in the decision to target Suleimani—and the lasting consequences of the strike may not yet be clear , FP ’ s Lara Seligman reports .
“ Eventually we are going to run out of escalation room , ” said retired Vice Adm. John Miller .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ red lines and they don ’ t fully understand ours.
” Retaliation ?
U.S. officials have said they expect retaliation from Iran in the coming weeks , and an advisor to Iran ’ s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told CNN that any response would involve “ U.S .
military targets.
” Meanwhile , the White House is escalating its rhetoric .
On Sunday , U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated a threat to target Iranian cultural sites—a move that would be considered a war crime under international law .
Oil prices are expected to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of retaliation .
The killing of Suleimani caused a 3.6 percent jump on Friday .
Chaos erupts over Guaidó ’ s congress leadership .
Venezuela ’ s government set up checkpoints around the National Assembly building on Sunday to stop lawmakers from reelecting the opposition politician Juan Guaidó as congress chief , installing Luis Parra instead .
But meeting elsewhere , opposition members did reelect Guaidó , setting up competing claims for leadership .
Parra is a nominal member of the opposition whom critics say supports the regime of President Nicolas Maduro .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s attempts to oust Maduro : The National Assembly is the only state institution not directly controlled by his regime .
Violent clashes rock Indian university campus .
More than a dozen people were injured on Sunday at New Delhi ’ s Jawaharlal Nehru University ( JNU ) during clashes between students protesting against a rise in fees and members of a youth organization tied to India ’ s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) .
The JNU student union has blamed the Hindu nationalist group for inciting attacks led by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is known for left-wing activism and was recently the site of protests against India ’ s controversial new citizenship law .
For more news and analysis on stories like this , sign up for South Asia Brief , delivered on Tuesdays .
Australia races to evacuate those stranded by fires .
Two days of light rain have brought a brief break from the devastating bush fires in southeastern Australia , with officials racing to reopen roads and evacuate people who have been trapped since last week before conditions worsen again .
Thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Australia ’ s coast on Monday morning local time , with dozens of fires still burning .
At least 24 people have died .
Experts warn that bad weather conditions are expected later this week , raising the risk for more fires .
France ’ s strikes over pension reforms look set to escalate this week , with talks between unions and the government resuming on Tuesday .
So far , the public sector strike has gone on for a month , severely disrupting transit .
Nationwide protests are expected on Thursday and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a blockade of oil refineries beginning on Tuesday , which would cause fuel shortages and further disruption .
Spain ’ s Socialist leader Pedro Sánchez on Tuesday is expected to be confirmed as prime minister , after months of political deadlock .
He has served as acting leader since April .
Though he lost a first confirmation vote on Sunday , Sánchez needs only a simple majority for Tuesday ’ s vote .
Last week , a Catalan separatist party agreed to abstain , ensuring he had the support .
Taiwan holds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ running for president .
Incumbent leader Tsai Ing-wen is favored to win a second term , but her Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ) could lose its legislative majority .
The outcome will likely shape Taiwan ’ s relations with mainland China : In comparison to the DPP , the opposition Kuomintang party and its presidential candidate , Han Kuo-yu , are seen as pro-Beijing .
In June , Paul Huang reported for FP on Han ’ s rise in Taiwan and the Chinese cyber-operatives that boosted his success .
The next president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a former prime minister , defeated Croatia ’ s incumbent President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic in a runoff election on Sunday , running on a platform to fight corruption .
While the president holds a primarily ceremonial role in Croatia , Milanovic will shape foreign policy—and as of Jan. 1 , Croatia holds the presidency of the European Union for six months .
Chile ’ s concessions .
Chilean President Sebastián Piñera has announced a proposal to overhaul the public health care system in another move meant to placate those who took part in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demonstrations were touched off by a transit price hike in October .
Though smaller in size , scattered protests have continued in Santiago , the capital .
Al-Shabab in East Africa .
Somalia ’ s al-Shabab militant group carried out an attack on a military base in Kenya used by U.S. and Kenyan troops on Sunday , killing three Americans .
The assault came just over a week after al-Shabab killed dozens in Mogadishu with a truck bomb—Somalia ’ s deadliest terror attack in two years .
The world ’ s oldest living @ @ @ @ @ @ @ celebrated her 117th birthday on Sunday at a nursing home in Fukuoka—extending her world record .
Tanaka was confirmed to be the world ’ s oldest person last year .
Her advanced age reflects Japan ’ s quickly graying population , which has raised concerns about its economic future .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The fallout from the U.S. strike against Iran’s Suleimani ripples through the region, Juan Guaidó ’s position in Venezuela’s congress is weakened, and what to watch in the world this week .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The fallout from the U.S. strike against Iran’s Suleimani ripples through the region, Juan Guaidó’s position in Venezuela’s congress is weakened, and what to watch in the world this week.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S.-Iran Tensions Grip the Region
Iran announced on Sunday that it would remove all limits on enriching uranium, days after a U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani in Baghdad and escalated hostilities between the countries. While Iran was expected to announce another step away from the 2015 nuclear agreement over the weekend, the move seems to signal the deal’s total demise. It also comes as the United States grapples with the regional consequences of Friday’s targeted strike, including possible retaliation from Iran.
As the backlash against the United States grows, Iraq’s parliament has called for U.S. military forces to leave the country, with many there fearful of being caught in the crossfire between the two powers. Leaders across the Middle East have expressed concern. The U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and Syria announced on Sunday it would suspend its fight against the Islamic State. More than 5,000 U.S. troops still remain in Iraq, where they could be targets of Iranian retaliation.
Unpredictable. Many senior defense officials were not included in the decision to target Suleimani—and the lasting consequences of the strike may not yet be clear, FP’s Lara Seligman reports. “Eventually we are going to run out of escalation room,” said retired Vice Adm. John Miller. “We don’t fully understand their red lines and they don’t fully understand ours.”
Retaliation? U.S. officials have said they expect retaliation from Iran in the coming weeks, and an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told CNN that any response would involve “U.S. military targets.” Meanwhile, the White House is escalating its rhetoric. On Sunday, U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated a threat to target Iranian cultural sites—a move that would be considered a war crime under international law.
Oil prices are expected to rise sharply this week over the threat of retaliation. The killing of Suleimani caused a 3.6 percent jump on Friday.
What We’re Following Today
Chaos erupts over Guaidó’s congress leadership. Venezuela’s government set up checkpoints around the National Assembly building on Sunday to stop lawmakers from reelecting the opposition politician Juan Guaidó as congress chief, installing Luis Parra instead. But meeting elsewhere, opposition members did reelect Guaidó, setting up competing claims for leadership. Parra is a nominal member of the opposition whom critics say supports the regime of President Nicolas Maduro.
The move could further weaken the opposition’s attempts to oust Maduro: The National Assembly is the only state institution not directly controlled by his regime.
Violent clashes rock Indian university campus. More than a dozen people were injured on Sunday at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) during clashes between students protesting against a rise in fees and members of a youth organization tied to India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The JNU student union has blamed the Hindu nationalist group for inciting attacks led by masked men carrying batons. The university is known for left-wing activism and was recently the site of protests against India’s controversial new citizenship law.
For more news and analysis on stories like this, sign up for South Asia Brief, delivered on Tuesdays.
Australia races to evacuate those stranded by fires. Two days of light rain have brought a brief break from the devastating bush fires in southeastern Australia, with officials racing to reopen roads and evacuate people who have been trapped since last week before conditions worsen again. Thousands of people were still stranded in towns along Australia’s coast on Monday morning local time, with dozens of fires still burning. At least 24 people have died. Experts warn that bad weather conditions are expected later this week, raising the risk for more fires.
The World This Week
France’s strikes over pension reforms look set to escalate this week, with talks between unions and the government resuming on Tuesday. So far, the public sector strike has gone on for a month, severely disrupting transit. Nationwide protests are expected on Thursday and Friday. One hardline union has called for a blockade of oil refineries beginning on Tuesday, which would cause fuel shortages and further disruption.
Spain’s Socialist leader Pedro Sánchez on Tuesday is expected to be confirmed as prime minister, after months of political deadlock. He has served as acting leader since April. Though he lost a first confirmation vote on Sunday, Sánchez needs only a simple majority for Tuesday’s vote. Last week, a Catalan separatist party agreed to abstain, ensuring he had the support.
Taiwan holds elections on Saturday, with three candidates running for president. Incumbent leader Tsai Ing-wen is favored to win a second term, but her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) could lose its legislative majority. The outcome will likely shape Taiwan’s relations with mainland China: In comparison to the DPP, the opposition Kuomintang party and its presidential candidate, Han Kuo-yu, are seen as pro-Beijing.
In June, Paul Huang reported for FP on Han’s rise in Taiwan and the Chinese cyber-operatives that boosted his success.
Keep an Eye On
The next president of Croatia. Opposition candidate Zoran Milanovic, a former prime minister, defeated Croatia’s incumbent President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic in a runoff election on Sunday, running on a platform to fight corruption. While the president holds a primarily ceremonial role in Croatia, Milanovic will shape foreign policy—and as of Jan. 1, Croatia holds the presidency of the European Union for six months.
Chile’s concessions. Chilean President Sebastián Piñera has announced a proposal to overhaul the public health care system in another move meant to placate those who took part in two months of mass protests. The demonstrations were touched off by a transit price hike in October. Though smaller in size, scattered protests have continued in Santiago, the capital.
Al-Shabab in East Africa. Somalia’s al-Shabab militant group carried out an attack on a military base in Kenya used by U.S. and Kenyan troops on Sunday, killing three Americans. The assault came just over a week after al-Shabab killed dozens in Mogadishu with a truck bomb—Somalia’s deadliest terror attack in two years.
Odds and Ends
The world’s oldest living person, Japanese woman Kane Tanaka, celebrated her 117th birthday on Sunday at a nursing home in Fukuoka—extending her world record. Tanaka was confirmed to be the world’s oldest person last year. Her advanced age reflects Japan’s quickly graying population, which has raised concerns about its economic future.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.