foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--Team Biden Urged to Keep Trump’s Afghan Envoy

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Afghan policy experts are quietly urging the Biden transition team to consider asking President Donald Trump ’ s Afghan peace envoy , Zalmay Khalilzad , to remain on the job as a transitional negotiator after President-elect Joe Biden is inaugurated on Jan. 20 .
The effort reflects a belief that the ultimate end game sought by Trump and Biden—the withdrawal of U.S. forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a move to immediately replace Khalilzad at a sensitive stage in U.S. peace negotiations with the Taliban could complicate that effort .
Khalilzad , a veteran diplomat from the George W. Bush administration who grew up in Kabul , has a deep relationship with Afghan leaders such as President Ashraf Ghani dating back decades and command of the major languages of the region .
But his contacts with the Taliban , with whom he negotiated decades ago on behalf of a California oil company looking to build a pipeline through Afghanistan , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghan government officials resented being largely cut out of Washington ’ s secretive deal-making with the group that once harbored Osama bin Laden .
While Biden shares Trump ’ s goal of ultimately withdrawing troops from Afghanistan , Trump has drastically accelerated the timeline of the withdrawal in the past week , announcing a further reduction of troop levels in the country , to about 2,500 .
The move has rattled NATO allies and angered Trump ’ s allies on Capitol Hill , who warn a sudden drawdown could destabilize the country and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Taliban—thereby leaving a Biden administration with an even more precarious situation in Afghanistan .
Biden ’ s top foreign-policy advisors , including Antony Blinken , Jake Sullivan , and Michèle Flournoy , are said to be open to considering a possible extension for Khalilzad but are by no means committed .
“ I think there are scenarios in which the new administration may seek to build on what Zal has done , and there are scenarios in which they may opt for something different , ” one former U.S. official said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ next few months and Zal is in a good position to continue that progress , I can certainly see a scenario where they would ask him to stay for some period of time .
But I don ’ t think anyone should expect they are indispensable in a circumstance like this.
” Officials close to the campaign say they don ’ t expect the Biden administration to make any major policy or personnel decisions on Afghanistan during the transition and that any final decision will be formed by a coldhearted assessment of what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s rushed troop drawdown will alter the prospects for peace talks with the Taliban once Biden inherits the matter in January .
For now , the campaign ’ s top foreign-policy advisors are essentially soliciting recommendations from a wide range of foreign-policy experts , including some who have called for Khalilzad to stay and others who say it is time for a new approach .
For those who favor an extension , Khalilzad ’ s contacts and institutional knowledge of the peace negotiations are irreplaceable as Washington transitions from one president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the talks has sputtered and stalled amid a huge uptick in Taliban terrorist attacks .
“ Zal is uniquely positioned to move forward the peace process in Afghanistan , ” said Christopher Kolenda , a former senior advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Barack Obama-era Defense Department .
“ The dynamic circumstances will require some agile approaches and a willingness to make new mistakes.
” But even if he doesn ’ t succeed , there may be some logic to letting him continue .
“ The people I ’ ve spoken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to replace Zal , ” said another U.S. analyst familiar with the internal deliberations .
“ Let him finish the job he started.
” “ He is also arguably the best qualified person to negotiate with all the parties , ” the analyst added .
“ He knows them all , he knows the language , he knows the cultural context .
There are a bunch of Biden people who agree with what he is doing.
” But others are not so sure .
“ Zal is clearly trying to position himself as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said another former U.S. official .
“ But this decision is going to be made partly on policy and partly on politics .
I wouldn ’ t be surprised if he is kept on for a brief transitional time .
My personal wager is ‘ not for long.
’ ” “ I see a stronger logic for replacing him than keeping him , ” the official added .
“ It ’ s not like he is having wild success.
” The Biden transition team declined to comment for the story , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on whether or not Khalilzad or other Trump diplomatic appointees would retain their posts in the new administration .
Khalilzad ’ s relations remain strained with some House Democrats , who are still steaming that they had to threaten him with a subpoena to brief them on his peace talks in Afghanistan—though the decision to refuse the congressional request was reportedly taken by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
In the hyperpartisan atmosphere in Washington , Biden ’ s transition team is facing pressure , particularly among the progressive wing of the Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from government for a fresh start , according to several experts who advised and consulted the Biden campaign .
Moreover , Khalilzad himself is the source of controversy within Afghanistan , where he once reportedly weighed running for the presidency himself .
Khalilzad ’ s controversial standing among many corners of the Afghan government was thrown into the spotlight last year , when Afghanistan ’ s top national security advisor , Hamdullah Mohib , accused Khalilzad of trying to unseat Ghani and take power for himself in colonial-style rule .
His comments drew @ @ @ @ @ @ @ underscored the tensions between the U.S. and Afghan governments during Khalilzad ’ s negotiations with the Taliban .
Trump has used the lame-duck period to set the Pentagon on a course to draw down to 2,500 U.S. troops in the country by Jan. 15—five days before Biden is to be inaugurated as president .
National Security Adviser Robert O ’ Brien told reporters on Tuesday that the administration wants all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq by the spring of 2021 .
“ By May , it is President Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ safely—and in their entirety , ” O ’ Brien said .
“ I want to reiterate that this policy is not new .
This has been the president ’ s policy since he took office.
” But the hasty , and partial , pullout has plenty of detractors .
“ There ’ s no rationale here really for cutting the force now .
It doesn ’ t serve any purpose , ” said James Cunningham , who was U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2012 to 2014 and who said the decision would leave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops for years in the lurch .
“ It just is going to make life more difficult until the new administration comes in.
” Biden has pledged to leave a residual counterterrorism force in the war-torn nation , setting the table for potential turbulence as the handoff occurs .
With the peace talks wavering in October , the Taliban embarked on a military offensive in Afghanistan ’ s strategic Helmand province that displaced as many as 35,000 people .
The case for an extension of Khalilzad ’ s mandate as Afghan envoy has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan Study Group , co-chaired by Kelly Ayotte , a former Republican senator from New Hampshire ; Joseph Dunford , the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ; and Nancy Lindborg , the former president and CEO of the U.S. Institute of Peace .
The study group includes key policymakers such as Flournoy , who has been mentioned as a potential defense secretary under Biden , and Stephen Hadley , a former U.S. national security advisor under George W. Bush .
And several of the participants have been providing informal advice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be a case made for keeping Khalilzad at least during the transition .
“ I don ’ t see [ the Biden team ] shutting [ the talks ] down .
I could see them resetting the position of the United States in the negotiations and try to correct some deficiencies and problems that have emerged , ” he said .
If that is the case , he added , “ you can argue that you don ’ t want to fire him on day one , but you would want to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to transition .
You ’ d want to keep the talks alive until you reset , and once you reset , you can decide whether you want a new negotiator.
” Hadley said the latest plan by the Trump administration to draw down the U.S. military presence to 2,500 troops could have been worse .
“ I think it ’ s basically a compromise to allow the president to say he has dramatically reduced our troop levels and that we are on the road to ending these so-called endless wars without going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ precipitous and disruptive , undermine the talks , and would not be in America ’ s interest .
”

Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch

Afghan policy experts are quietly urging the Biden transition team to consider asking President Donald Trump’s Afghan peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, to remain on the job as a transitional negotiator after President-elect Joe Biden is inaugurated on Jan. 20.
Afghan policy experts are quietly urging the Biden transition team to consider asking President Donald Trump’s Afghan peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, to remain on the job as a transitional negotiator after President-elect Joe Biden is inaugurated on Jan. 20.
The effort reflects a belief that the ultimate end game sought by Trump and Biden—the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan—is largely the same and that a move to immediately replace Khalilzad at a sensitive stage in U.S. peace negotiations with the Taliban could complicate that effort.
Khalilzad, a veteran diplomat from the George W. Bush administration who grew up in Kabul, has a deep relationship with Afghan leaders such as President Ashraf Ghani dating back decades and command of the major languages of the region. But his contacts with the Taliban, with whom he negotiated decades ago on behalf of a California oil company looking to build a pipeline through Afghanistan, has badly dented his popularity in Kabul. Afghan government officials resented being largely cut out of Washington’s secretive deal-making with the group that once harbored Osama bin Laden.
While Biden shares Trump’s goal of ultimately withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, Trump has drastically accelerated the timeline of the withdrawal in the past week, announcing a further reduction of troop levels in the country, to about 2,500. The move has rattled NATO allies and angered Trump’s allies on Capitol Hill, who warn a sudden drawdown could destabilize the country and undercut U.S. leverage in peace talks with the Taliban—thereby leaving a Biden administration with an even more precarious situation in Afghanistan.
Biden’s top foreign-policy advisors, including Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, and Michèle Flournoy, are said to be open to considering a possible extension for Khalilzad but are by no means committed.
“I think there are scenarios in which the new administration may seek to build on what Zal has done, and there are scenarios in which they may opt for something different,” one former U.S. official said. “If there is progress over the next few months and Zal is in a good position to continue that progress, I can certainly see a scenario where they would ask him to stay for some period of time. But I don’t think anyone should expect they are indispensable in a circumstance like this.”
Officials close to the campaign say they don’t expect the Biden administration to make any major policy or personnel decisions on Afghanistan during the transition and that any final decision will be formed by a coldhearted assessment of what approach would best serve U.S. interests—and how Trump’s rushed troop drawdown will alter the prospects for peace talks with the Taliban once Biden inherits the matter in January.
For now, the campaign’s top foreign-policy advisors are essentially soliciting recommendations from a wide range of foreign-policy experts, including some who have called for Khalilzad to stay and others who say it is time for a new approach.
For those who favor an extension, Khalilzad’s contacts and institutional knowledge of the peace negotiations are irreplaceable as Washington transitions from one president to the next, even as progress on the talks has sputtered and stalled amid a huge uptick in Taliban terrorist attacks.
“Zal is uniquely positioned to move forward the peace process in Afghanistan,” said Christopher Kolenda, a former senior advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Barack Obama-era Defense Department. “The dynamic circumstances will require some agile approaches and a willingness to make new mistakes.”
But even if he doesn’t succeed, there may be some logic to letting him continue.
“The people I’ve spoken to all feel there is no rush to replace Zal,” said another U.S. analyst familiar with the internal deliberations. “Let him finish the job he started.”
“He is also arguably the best qualified person to negotiate with all the parties,” the analyst added. “He knows them all, he knows the language, he knows the cultural context. There are a bunch of Biden people who agree with what he is doing.”
But others are not so sure.
“Zal is clearly trying to position himself as acceptable to the Biden team,” said another former U.S. official. “But this decision is going to be made partly on policy and partly on politics. I wouldn’t be surprised if he is kept on for a brief transitional time. My personal wager is ‘not for long.’”
“I see a stronger logic for replacing him than keeping him,” the official added. “It’s not like he is having wild success.”
The Biden transition team declined to comment for the story, and the president-elect has not publicly given any indication on whether or not Khalilzad or other Trump diplomatic appointees would retain their posts in the new administration.
Khalilzad’s relations remain strained with some House Democrats, who are still steaming that they had to threaten him with a subpoena to brief them on his peace talks in Afghanistan—though the decision to refuse the congressional request was reportedly taken by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
In the hyperpartisan atmosphere in Washington, Biden’s transition team is facing pressure, particularly among the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, to expel all Trump-era appointees from government for a fresh start, according to several experts who advised and consulted the Biden campaign. Moreover, Khalilzad himself is the source of controversy within Afghanistan, where he once reportedly weighed running for the presidency himself.
Khalilzad’s controversial standing among many corners of the Afghan government was thrown into the spotlight last year, when Afghanistan’s top national security advisor, Hamdullah Mohib, accused Khalilzad of trying to unseat Ghani and take power for himself in colonial-style rule. His comments drew sharp backlash from the State Department but underscored the tensions between the U.S. and Afghan governments during Khalilzad’s negotiations with the Taliban.
Trump has used the lame-duck period to set the Pentagon on a course to draw down to 2,500 U.S. troops in the country by Jan. 15—five days before Biden is to be inaugurated as president. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien told reporters on Tuesday that the administration wants all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq by the spring of 2021.
“By May, it is President Trump’s hope that they will all come home safely—and in their entirety,” O’Brien said. “I want to reiterate that this policy is not new. This has been the president’s policy since he took office.”
But the hasty, and partial, pullout has plenty of detractors. “There’s no rationale here really for cutting the force now. It doesn’t serve any purpose,” said James Cunningham, who was U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2012 to 2014 and who said the decision would leave foreign allies who have fought alongside U.S. troops for years in the lurch. “It just is going to make life more difficult until the new administration comes in.”
Biden has pledged to leave a residual counterterrorism force in the war-torn nation, setting the table for potential turbulence as the handoff occurs. With the peace talks wavering in October, the Taliban embarked on a military offensive in Afghanistan’s strategic Helmand province that displaced as many as 35,000 people.
The case for an extension of Khalilzad’s mandate as Afghan envoy has emerged in discussions among members of the Afghanistan Study Group, co-chaired by Kelly Ayotte, a former Republican senator from New Hampshire; Joseph Dunford, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Nancy Lindborg, the former president and CEO of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The study group includes key policymakers such as Flournoy, who has been mentioned as a potential defense secretary under Biden, and Stephen Hadley, a former U.S. national security advisor under George W. Bush. And several of the participants have been providing informal advice to Khalilzad.
Hadley suggested that there could be a case made for keeping Khalilzad at least during the transition. “I don’t see [the Biden team] shutting [the talks] down. I could see them resetting the position of the United States in the negotiations and try to correct some deficiencies and problems that have emerged,” he said.
If that is the case, he added, “you can argue that you don’t want to fire him on day one, but you would want to have Khalilzad for a period of time to transition. You’d want to keep the talks alive until you reset, and once you reset, you can decide whether you want a new negotiator.”
Hadley said the latest plan by the Trump administration to draw down the U.S. military presence to 2,500 troops could have been worse.
“I think it’s basically a compromise to allow the president to say he has dramatically reduced our troop levels and that we are on the road to ending these so-called endless wars without going to zero, which everyone agrees would be precipitous and disruptive, undermine the talks, and would not be in America’s interest.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--Note to Biden: Forget Trade, the Real War With China Is Over Tech

Note to Biden : Forget Trade , the Real War With China Is Over Tech New administration , same old trade policy ?
There is a world of difference between outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump and President-elect Joe Biden , but when it comes to trade—especially with China—Biden has promised to out-protect even the exiting arch-protectionist .
Not only did Biden , as a candidate , pledge to take even more “ aggressive trade enforcement actions against China , ” but he also proposed to rewrite global procurement rules to accommodate his $ 400 billion “ buy American ” plan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European Union might have something to say about that .
If Biden really is the “ last , best hope for globalists , ” as the Financial Times made him out to be in April , the globalists should worry .
“ Deglobalization ” was the word of the year even before the coronavirus pandemic set country against country in the mad scramble for masks and ventilators .
And indeed , both U.S. imports and exports are down this year compared to the first nine months of 2019 .
That ’ s after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anyone who thinks globalization is still all about trade—as both Trump and Biden do—must have missed the 2010s entirely .
Today it ’ s technology that ties the world together , not the container ship .
To be effective in leading the United States in the 21st century , Biden will have to learn that dominance in technological networks is the key to success .
There ’ s no harm in trying to reshore some manufacturing , as he talked about during the campaign , but it ’ s not going to shift @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indo-Pacific .
If Biden really intends to get tough with China , he ’ ll have to double down on the U.S.-Chinese tech war that has seen Huawei crippled , Chinese semiconductor foundries put under severe pressure , and TikTok brought to the edge of divestment .
Contrary to media portrayals of Trump ’ s trade war as an abject failure , it has actually succeeded in driving down U.S. imports from China .
The seemingly inexorable long-term trend of increasing dependence on China has been reversed .
But the reduction in imports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the overall U.S. merchandise trade deficit , since supply chains have merely been redirected from China to other East Asian countries , particularly Taiwan and Vietnam .
Whatever that may mean for manufacturing towns in U.S. swing states , it ’ s bad news for China .
The massive shift in trans-Pacific supply chains is likely what prompted Chinese President Xi Jinping to announce his dual circulation strategy encouraging Chinese companies to buy fewer materials abroad , and source them at home instead .
Both Biden ’ s buy-American and Xi ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ autarky .
Neither stands much chance of success .
China has been trying to boost domestic demand for years , but has consistently been stymied by high inequality and a weak social safety net—problems the ruling Communist Party is in no hurry to solve .
And despite U.S. presidential candidates ’ rhetoric in the rust-belt states , the United States is too rich to ever again become a manufacturing powerhouse .
Advanced manufacturing countries like Germany and Japan have levels of national income per capita on a par with the poorest U.S. states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1984 , “ These jobs are going , boys , and they ain ’ t coming back.
” Manufacturing jobs are even less likely to come back if Biden really is as committed to working with allies as he constantly claims to be .
In the first three years of the Trump presidency , the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with the European Union boomed ( though it seems to have settled back in the first nine months of 2020 ) .
The Europeans won ’ t want to give up those gains .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on an aggressive program of regulation to hobble U.S. technology giants such as Amazon , Apple , Facebook , Google , and Microsoft .
European Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager has expressed alarm that the coronavirus pandemic “ showed how dependent we are on U.S. corporations.
” Biden will have a tough time building “ a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China ” when European countries and even Australia are lining up to regulate and fine the companies of some of Biden ’ s most committed campaign donors .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United Kingdom , had to be dragged kicking and screaming into banning Huawei from the country ’ s 5G networks .
Biden is right when he says that “ China can ’ t afford to ignore more than half the global economy , ” represented by the world ’ s liberal democracies if they present a united front on “ everything from the environment to labor , trade , technology , and transparency.
” But it is little more than wishful thinking to believe that a Western world without Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ front on these issues .
China ’ s increasing domestic repression , hostility toward foreigners , and general unpredictability will be enough to keep companies away .
If Biden does decide to end the trade war with China , it will probably have little effect on shifting trans-Pacific supply chains , because China ’ s increasing domestic repression , hostility toward foreigners , and general unpredictability will be enough to keep companies away .
When one of the country ’ s most loyal technology titans , Jack Ma , can have the $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Group ( the fintech giant he founded ) canceled at the last minute on Xi ’ s personal orders , foreign investors have to know that they don ’ t stand a chance .
The listing of Ant Group on the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges was supposed to demonstrate the continuing strength of Chinese financial markets .
Instead it showed the world that even Chinese national champions can ’ t risk offending the Communist Party .
Such a febrile environment is ripe for disruption by the United States .
Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about six months old , but it is already forcing decisive changes in Asian technology networks .
South Korean and Taiwanese firms have fallen into line with U.S. policy and have begun cutting some of their cords to China , and Huawei is on the verge of collapse .
China ’ s long-term strategy to build a domestic semiconductor industry is in shambles .
Follow-on effects are likely in related industries such as artificial intelligence , cloud computing , and self-driving vehicles .
China , which has long forced foreign firms to transfer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its domestic market , now faces the prospect that foreign firms will pass on the Chinese market in order to maintain access to the United States—and consequently keep their technologies to themselves .
It may be political anathema to admit it , but the United States doesn ’ t need a return of manufacturing jobs from China .
It is much more important for the country to preserve its technology lead over China .
Unlike his import tariffs with their flimsy legal basis , Trump ’ s China tech war was based on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ executive branch by Congressional legislation .
The president can add companies to the Entity List maintained by the Department of Commerce whenever it serves U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives .
That ’ s all the authority Biden needs to keep the pressure on China .
It might be nice if U.S. allies joined the effort , but it won ’ t be necessary .
For all his internationalist rhetoric , Biden may ultimately discover that it ’ s easier to go it alone .

New administration, same old trade policy? There is a world of difference between outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump and President-elect Joe Biden, but when it comes to trade—especially with China—Biden has promised to out-protect even the exiting arch-protectionist. Not only did Biden, as a candidate, pledge to take even more “aggressive trade enforcement actions against China,” but he also proposed to rewrite global procurement rules to accommodate his $400 billion “buy American” plan for government purchases. Japan and the European Union might have something to say about that.
New administration, same old trade policy? There is a world of difference between outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump and President-elect Joe Biden, but when it comes to trade—especially with China—Biden has promised to out-protect even the exiting arch-protectionist. Not only did Biden, as a candidate, pledge to take even more “aggressive trade enforcement actions against China,” but he also proposed to rewrite global procurement rules to accommodate his $400 billion “buy American” plan for government purchases. Japan and the European Union might have something to say about that.
If Biden really is the “last, best hope for globalists,” as the Financial Times made him out to be in April, the globalists should worry. “Deglobalization” was the word of the year even before the coronavirus pandemic set country against country in the mad scramble for masks and ventilators. And indeed, both U.S. imports and exports are down this year compared to the first nine months of 2019. That’s after running flat for a decade.
But anyone who thinks globalization is still all about trade—as both Trump and Biden do—must have missed the 2010s entirely. Today it’s technology that ties the world together, not the container ship. To be effective in leading the United States in the 21st century, Biden will have to learn that dominance in technological networks is the key to success. There’s no harm in trying to reshore some manufacturing, as he talked about during the campaign, but it’s not going to shift the geoeconomic balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. If Biden really intends to get tough with China, he’ll have to double down on the U.S.-Chinese tech war that has seen Huawei crippled, Chinese semiconductor foundries put under severe pressure, and TikTok brought to the edge of divestment.
Contrary to media portrayals of Trump’s trade war as an abject failure, it has actually succeeded in driving down U.S. imports from China. The seemingly inexorable long-term trend of increasing dependence on China has been reversed. But the reduction in imports from China has had essentially no effect on the overall U.S. merchandise trade deficit, since supply chains have merely been redirected from China to other East Asian countries, particularly Taiwan and Vietnam. Whatever that may mean for manufacturing towns in U.S. swing states, it’s bad news for China. The massive shift in trans-Pacific supply chains is likely what prompted Chinese President Xi Jinping to announce his dual circulation strategy encouraging Chinese companies to buy fewer materials abroad, and source them at home instead.
Both Biden’s buy-American and Xi’s dual-circulation strategies signal a shift toward autarky. Neither stands much chance of success. China has been trying to boost domestic demand for years, but has consistently been stymied by high inequality and a weak social safety net—problems the ruling Communist Party is in no hurry to solve. And despite U.S. presidential candidates’ rhetoric in the rust-belt states, the United States is too rich to ever again become a manufacturing powerhouse. Advanced manufacturing countries like Germany and Japan have levels of national income per capita on a par with the poorest U.S. states. As Bruce Springsteen sang back in 1984, “These jobs are going, boys, and they ain’t coming back.”
Manufacturing jobs are even less likely to come back if Biden really is as committed to working with allies as he constantly claims to be. In the first three years of the Trump presidency, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with the European Union boomed (though it seems to have settled back in the first nine months of 2020). The Europeans won’t want to give up those gains. More importantly, the EU has embarked on an aggressive program of regulation to hobble U.S. technology giants such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. European Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager has expressed alarm that the coronavirus pandemic “showed how dependent we are on U.S. corporations.”
Biden will have a tough time building “a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China” when European countries and even Australia are lining up to regulate and fine the companies of some of Biden’s most committed campaign donors. Even America’s closest security partner, the United Kingdom, had to be dragged kicking and screaming into banning Huawei from the country’s 5G networks. Biden is right when he says that “China can’t afford to ignore more than half the global economy,” represented by the world’s liberal democracies if they present a united front on “everything from the environment to labor, trade, technology, and transparency.” But it is little more than wishful thinking to believe that a Western world without Trump’s forcefulness on China will present a united front on these issues.
China’s increasing domestic repression, hostility toward foreigners, and general unpredictability will be enough to keep companies away.
If Biden does decide to end the trade war with China, it will probably have little effect on shifting trans-Pacific supply chains, because China’s increasing domestic repression, hostility toward foreigners, and general unpredictability will be enough to keep companies away. When one of the country’s most loyal technology titans, Jack Ma, can have the $300 billion initial public offering of Ant Group (the fintech giant he founded) canceled at the last minute on Xi’s personal orders, foreign investors have to know that they don’t stand a chance. The listing of Ant Group on the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges was supposed to demonstrate the continuing strength of Chinese financial markets. Instead it showed the world that even Chinese national champions can’t risk offending the Communist Party.
Such a febrile environment is ripe for disruption by the United States. Trump’s tech war on China is only about six months old, but it is already forcing decisive changes in Asian technology networks. South Korean and Taiwanese firms have fallen into line with U.S. policy and have begun cutting some of their cords to China, and Huawei is on the verge of collapse. China’s long-term strategy to build a domestic semiconductor industry is in shambles. Follow-on effects are likely in related industries such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and self-driving vehicles. China, which has long forced foreign firms to transfer technology as the price of entry into its domestic market, now faces the prospect that foreign firms will pass on the Chinese market in order to maintain access to the United States—and consequently keep their technologies to themselves.
It may be political anathema to admit it, but the United States doesn’t need a return of manufacturing jobs from China. It is much more important for the country to preserve its technology lead over China. Unlike his import tariffs with their flimsy legal basis, Trump’s China tech war was based on export licensing powers unambiguously vested in the executive branch by Congressional legislation. The president can add companies to the Entity List maintained by the Department of Commerce whenever it serves U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. That’s all the authority Biden needs to keep the pressure on China. It might be nice if U.S. allies joined the effort, but it won’t be necessary. For all his internationalist rhetoric, Biden may ultimately discover that it’s easier to go it alone.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--Biden in the Balkans

Biden in the Balkans

In winter 2001 , President-elect Joe Biden , then a senator , visited Visoki Decani , a Serb Orthodox Monastery in Kosovo , during a post-war trip to what was then a U.N. protectorate .
While there ( according to Mike Haltzel , Biden ’ s long-time foreign policy advisor ) , Biden briefly met Ramush Haradinaj , who had until recently been a guerilla fighter in Visoki Decani during the Kosovo war and who would later become prime minister of the country .
Biden , eager to ensure the protection of Orthodox culture , asked Haradinaj for his personal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the monastery .
When violence again erupted in Kosovo three years later , dozens of Serbian Orthodox churches were demolished , but the monastery remained untouched .
Years later , Haradinaj reportedly asked Haltzel to tell Biden that he had kept his promise .
This story evokes two simple principles that should inform future European and U.S. policy in the region .
First , instability often comes from the leaders , not the people .
Interethnic tensions , which Western diplomatic missions continue to treat as “ ancient , ” are steered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agendas .
There are divisions in the region , of course , but political leaders make a conscious choice to amplify or to tamp them down .
In the case of Visoki Decani , an influential strongman reportedly kept things in check as other areas descended into a flash of violence .
Second , clear signals from Washington and European capitals can prevent problems on the ground .
Biden asked for the monastery to be protected , and it was , at least in part because powerful leaders knew that Washington , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was watching .
Similarly , in 2016 , U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hoyt Yee and his EU colleagues facilitated neighboring Macedonia ’ s ( now North Macedonia ) transition to democratic government by repeated and intensive engagement .
The United States twice persuaded the EU , which had been mediating political disputes inside the country , to postpone elections on the grounds that they would not have been fair .
Such uncompromising engagement between Washington and Brussels , when goals are shared and well defined , can yield large results .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ counts .
It trivialized the complex political issues between Kosovo and Serbia and sought to claim quick credit for resolving ancient animosities in time for a campaign speech in North Carolina .
Meanwhile , it snubbed allies and sent confusing signals , often trampling on the very democratic principles Washington had spent more than two decades promoting in the region .
It will be easy for Biden to avoid President Donald Trump ’ s mistakes .
But it will be far less so to avoid repeating the errors made under President Barak Obama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States disengaged from the region , leaving it for the European Union to handle and offering no clear signal about the readiness of the United States to defend its bipartisan legacy of institution building in the region .
In particular , Europe and the United States could make a lot of progress in the region by focusing on fighting corruption , which will both signal that the United States does not view the Balkans through the lens of ancient hatreds and send a clear message about the West ’ s expectations for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Biden has made the fight against corruption and nepotism one of his domestic and foreign policy pledges .
In his Foreign Affairs article , “ Why America Must Lead Again , ” Biden emphasized his intention to “ tackle the self-dealing , conflicts of interest , dark money , and rank corruption that are serving narrow , private , or foreign agendas and undermining our democracy , ” and to establish “ combating corruption as a core national security interest and democratic responsibility ” —at home and abroad .
Meanwhile , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against corruption and organized crime the centerpiece of its efforts in the Western Balkans .
The European Commission ’ s progress reports for 2018 show that all countries in the region are lagging on three key priorities : the fight against the corruption ; tackling organized crime ; and improving the judiciary .
Some countries , including Bosnia , performed better on these metrics in the early 2000s than today .
In turn , the region has lost 5 percent of its population in the past five years .
In Bosnia and Herzegovina @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corruption as a key factor prompting their exodus .
Corruption , meanwhile , fuels organized crime and dumps money in the pockets of those who would foment unrest .
Biden could follow Obama ’ s lead and leave the Balkans to Europe , but for all the talk about EU strategic sovereignty , the bloc of 27 member states ( all with distinct interests ) remains unable to formulate an effective policy in the region .
Take , for example , Bulgaria ’ s drive to block North Macedonia from joining the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU policy on Bosnia and Herzegovina .
For better or worse , the most effective decision-making forum on the Western Balkans will not be the European Council , but a coalition of like-minded states , such as the United States , United Kingdom , Germany , France , Italy , and an EU representative .
The United States , in essence , can help drive European coherence on Western Balkans policy—especially if it maintains a focus on corruption and organized crime , which underlies the region ’ s economic , political , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States and Europe would each limit the investment they individually make to support the region .
Decades of transatlantic cooperation on the rule of law in the Western Balkans means that the policy framework is already in place .
What is missing is momentum to make use of the multiplicity of financial and policy instruments available .
The United States has traditionally been more willing to use sanctions to deter or punish political obstruction and corruption , as was the case when it sanctioned Milorad Dodik ( the Serb member of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) and Nikola Spiric ( a Bosnian Serb politician ) .
The United Kingdom has started to lean closer to the U.S. strategy , and EU leaders could follow suit .
Sanctions are one of the most cost-effective mechanisms for deterring obstruction , but they have to be credible , which is hard for the EU to manage given its decision-making structure .
Finally , working together , the United States and the European Union could better coordinate international financial leverage with political tools .
The IMF and the European Union have both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the region .
The IMF alone has earmarked 806 million euros for the region in emergency assistance for 2020 , and the EU ’ s macro-financial assistance amounts to 750 million .
The European Union ’ s recently announced Economic and Investment Plan includes further 9 billion euros in pre-accession funds and billions in loan guarantees to the Western Balkans .
This money , though , needs to be leveraged properly , with strict conditions on financial accountability and a push for the rule of law .
That ’ s something that will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States is part of the pressure campaign .
Instead of stepping away or trying to solve intractable frozen conflicts , United States—with the EU—needs to start tackling the actual problem of corruption .
If corruption can be brought under control , governance and the region ’ s economy can improve .
And that , in turn , will ease the Balkans ’ brain drain and , potentially , reinforce the peace as well .
The region ’ s nationalist spoilers depend on ethnic discourse to fuel their machine politics .
And Western leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other funds are not used to that end .
Rather , they should use their financial and political leverage to hold local leaders accountable through anti-corruption measures .
They ’ ve mastered the art of manufacturing instability for the purpose of staying in power .
The United States and Europe need to understand this game and parry back .
It is a game Biden , with his decades of granular experience in the region , knows well .
Hopefully , his administration will , despite numerous other foreign policy and security priorities , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to rebuild the transatlantic credibility in the region .

In winter 2001, President-elect Joe Biden, then a senator, visited Visoki Decani, a Serb Orthodox Monastery in Kosovo, during a post-war trip to what was then a U.N. protectorate.
While there (according to Mike Haltzel, Biden’s long-time foreign policy advisor), Biden briefly met Ramush Haradinaj, who had until recently been a guerilla fighter in Visoki Decani during the Kosovo war and who would later become prime minister of the country. Biden, eager to ensure the protection of Orthodox culture, asked Haradinaj for his personal assurances that he would give special care to the monastery. When violence again erupted in Kosovo three years later, dozens of Serbian Orthodox churches were demolished, but the monastery remained untouched. Years later, Haradinaj reportedly asked Haltzel to tell Biden that he had kept his promise.
This story evokes two simple principles that should inform future European and U.S. policy in the region. First, instability often comes from the leaders, not the people. Interethnic tensions, which Western diplomatic missions continue to treat as “ancient,” are steered and controlled by leaders with very immediate agendas. There are divisions in the region, of course, but political leaders make a conscious choice to amplify or to tamp them down. In the case of Visoki Decani, an influential strongman reportedly kept things in check as other areas descended into a flash of violence.
Second, clear signals from Washington and European capitals can prevent problems on the ground. Biden asked for the monastery to be protected, and it was, at least in part because powerful leaders knew that Washington, the country’s most important ally, was watching. Similarly, in 2016, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hoyt Yee and his EU colleagues facilitated neighboring Macedonia’s (now North Macedonia) transition to democratic government by repeated and intensive engagement. The United States twice persuaded the EU, which had been mediating political disputes inside the country, to postpone elections on the grounds that they would not have been fair. Such uncompromising engagement between Washington and Brussels, when goals are shared and well defined, can yield large results.
The Trump administration fell short on both counts. It trivialized the complex political issues between Kosovo and Serbia and sought to claim quick credit for resolving ancient animosities in time for a campaign speech in North Carolina. Meanwhile, it snubbed allies and sent confusing signals, often trampling on the very democratic principles Washington had spent more than two decades promoting in the region.
It will be easy for Biden to avoid President Donald Trump’s mistakes. But it will be far less so to avoid repeating the errors made under President Barak Obama’s watch, when the United States disengaged from the region, leaving it for the European Union to handle and offering no clear signal about the readiness of the United States to defend its bipartisan legacy of institution building in the region.
Given all the foreign policy challenges the new U.S. administration will face, the Western Balkans will not likely rank as top priority. However, Biden did discuss it in his first phone call as president-elect with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. The topic likely came up out of a desire to connect with Biden on an issue with which the incoming president is familiar, but it does show that the region will continue to bubble up. And with Berlin, Brussels, and Paris eager to mend relations with the United States after the past four years, the Western Balkans represents an opportunity for both sides to quickly show that a new era of transatlantic cooperation can produce results.
In particular, Europe and the United States could make a lot of progress in the region by focusing on fighting corruption, which will both signal that the United States does not view the Balkans through the lens of ancient hatreds and send a clear message about the West’s expectations for the region’s leaders and democratic governance.
Biden has made the fight against corruption and nepotism one of his domestic and foreign policy pledges. In his Foreign Affairs article, “Why America Must Lead Again,” Biden emphasized his intention to “tackle the self-dealing, conflicts of interest, dark money, and rank corruption that are serving narrow, private, or foreign agendas and undermining our democracy,” and to establish “combating corruption as a core national security interest and democratic responsibility”—at home and abroad.
Meanwhile, the European Union has likewise made the fight against corruption and organized crime the centerpiece of its efforts in the Western Balkans. The European Commission’s progress reports for 2018 show that all countries in the region are lagging on three key priorities: the fight against the corruption; tackling organized crime; and improving the judiciary. Some countries, including Bosnia, performed better on these metrics in the early 2000s than today. In turn, the region has lost 5 percent of its population in the past five years. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a majority of those leaving cite corruption as a key factor prompting their exodus. Corruption, meanwhile, fuels organized crime and dumps money in the pockets of those who would foment unrest.
Biden could follow Obama’s lead and leave the Balkans to Europe, but for all the talk about EU strategic sovereignty, the bloc of 27 member states (all with distinct interests) remains unable to formulate an effective policy in the region. Take, for example, Bulgaria’s drive to block North Macedonia from joining the EU and Croatian obstruction when it comes to EU policy on Bosnia and Herzegovina. For better or worse, the most effective decision-making forum on the Western Balkans will not be the European Council, but a coalition of like-minded states, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and an EU representative. The United States, in essence, can help drive European coherence on Western Balkans policy—especially if it maintains a focus on corruption and organized crime, which underlies the region’s economic, political, and security problems.
By working together, the United States and Europe would each limit the investment they individually make to support the region. Decades of transatlantic cooperation on the rule of law in the Western Balkans means that the policy framework is already in place. What is missing is momentum to make use of the multiplicity of financial and policy instruments available. The United States has traditionally been more willing to use sanctions to deter or punish political obstruction and corruption, as was the case when it sanctioned Milorad Dodik (the Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,) and Nikola Spiric (a Bosnian Serb politician). The United Kingdom has started to lean closer to the U.S. strategy, and EU leaders could follow suit. Sanctions are one of the most cost-effective mechanisms for deterring obstruction, but they have to be credible, which is hard for the EU to manage given its decision-making structure.
Finally, working together, the United States and the European Union could better coordinate international financial leverage with political tools. The IMF and the European Union have both committed a substantial amount of funding to the region. The IMF alone has earmarked 806 million euros for the region in emergency assistance for 2020, and the EU’s macro-financial assistance amounts to 750 million. The European Union’s recently announced Economic and Investment Plan includes further 9 billion euros in pre-accession funds and billions in loan guarantees to the Western Balkans. This money, though, needs to be leveraged properly, with strict conditions on financial accountability and a push for the rule of law. That’s something that will be easier to accomplish if the United States is part of the pressure campaign.
Instead of stepping away or trying to solve intractable frozen conflicts, United States—with the EU—needs to start tackling the actual problem of corruption. If corruption can be brought under control, governance and the region’s economy can improve. And that, in turn, will ease the Balkans’ brain drain and, potentially, reinforce the peace as well. The region’s nationalist spoilers depend on ethnic discourse to fuel their machine politics. And Western leaders need to make sure their loans and other funds are not used to that end. Rather, they should use their financial and political leverage to hold local leaders accountable through anti-corruption measures. They’ve mastered the art of manufacturing instability for the purpose of staying in power. The United States and Europe need to understand this game and parry back.
It is a game Biden, with his decades of granular experience in the region, knows well. Hopefully, his administration will, despite numerous other foreign policy and security priorities, set aside the modest political capital needed to rebuild the transatlantic credibility in the region.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--After Biden Win, U.S. Intelligence Community ‘Probably Doing Cartwheels’

After Biden Win , U.S. Intelligence Community ‘ Probably Doing Cartwheels ’ This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
People working at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the historic building .
But unlike others , during his two terms as vice president , Joe Biden made a point of taking guests down to the Situation Room , said Larry Pfeiffer , a veteran intelligence official then serving as the room ’ s senior director .
Biden would look over the team of analysts monitoring world events , point to them , and tell his guests , “ These are the smartest people in the world , ” Pfeiffer said .
“ That was something you didn ’ t have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heck of a long way to raising the morale of people who were working 12-hour shifts around the clock .
It demonstrated a guy who really had a lot of respect for intelligence.
” When U.S. President-elect Biden takes office in January , he will have his work cut out for him as he inherits an intelligence community that has been demoralized by President Donald Trump ’ s repeated attacks maligning and politicizing the work of the country ’ s spy agencies .
But former intelligence officials said Biden ’ s election will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that make up the U.S. intelligence community as the welcome beginning of a less turbulent relationship with the executive branch .
“ I think the intelligence community is probably doing cartwheels in the halls , ” said Pfeiffer .
While Trump was easily bored by intelligence briefings , former intelligence officials who have worked with Biden say he has shown a deep understanding and respect for the work of intelligence agencies .
“ I knew then-Vice President Biden as an interested , appreciative consumer of intelligence .
He always asked thoughtful , substantive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who served as director of national intelligence during the Obama administration .
With over three decades in the Senate , including 10 years on the Senate Intelligence Committee , and two terms as vice president , Biden is also familiar with many of the people who make up the senior ranks of the U.S. intelligence agencies .
Former CIA Director John Brennan , who worked closely with Biden during the Obama administration , described him as an “ avid ” and “ diligent ” consumer of intelligence .
“ He ’ s somebody @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respect and regard for the importance of the work in the mission and the people , ” Brennan said .
That will be welcomed by Biden ’ s briefers—though , contrary to all past practice , Biden has not yet been given access to the daily intelligence briefing a president-elect normally receives .
“ We ’ re dealing with people who know what intelligence is supposed to do , and what it ’ s not supposed to do , ” said David Priess , the chief operating officer of the Lawfare Institute , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ daily briefer during the George W. Bush administration .
Trump increasingly favored loyalty over experience in his choice of people to helm the country ’ s intelligence apparatus .
For weeks there has been mounting speculation that Trump may look to fire current CIA Director Gina Haspel , who is reported to have fallen out of favor with the president for pushing back on requests to declassify information that could be politically beneficial to him .
( On Tuesday , Trump fired the head of the government ’ s cybersecurity agency for declaring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history . )
Biden has not named his picks to lead the CIA or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence , but those reportedly under consideration , including former acting CIA Director Michael Morell and former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon , are all career national security officials with a deep understanding of the intelligence community .
“ He will return the IC to pre-Trump ‘ normal , ’ where a premium is placed on professional competence , not incompetent loyalty , ” Clapper said .
Something that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his presidency to signal his support for the intelligence community would be to make a visit to the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence , said Marc Polymeropoulos , the CIA ’ s former chief of operations for Europe and Eurasia who retired in 2019 .
Biden could “ reassure the employees that they ’ re not the ‘ deep state , ’ that he has faith in the product , ” he said .
Another early priority for the Biden administration will be to bolster checks and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the system of whistleblower statutes and inspectors general , Polymeropoulos said .
Protections for intelligence community whistleblowers are relatively new , signed into law in 2012 , and were little tested before Trump and his allies sought to expose the identity of the CIA whistleblower whose complaint triggered the House impeachment investigation into Trump .
One of Biden ’ s tasks will likely be “ expressing the sanctity of the whistleblower statutes and a robust Inspector General , all of the things that have sort of fallen apart under the Trump administration , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacks on U.S. intelligence agencies , which determined that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to bolster Trump ’ s chances , began even before his inauguration , when he likened them to Nazis .
That has taken a toll on morale , but it won ’ t take much to repair the relationship .
“ [ The intelligence community ] doesn ’ t need petting and stroking , it just needs not to be beat on , ” said John Sipher , who spent 28 years with the CIA , serving in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the agency ’ s Russia operations .
One key aspect of that will be restoring balanced congressional oversight of the intelligence community .
As vice president , Biden helped mediate between the Senate Intelligence Committee and the CIA , which were embroiled in a bitter fight over allegations the CIA had spied on Senate staffers , Brennan recalled in his memoir Undaunted , which was released last month .
“ ‘ We have to get this behind us , folks .
There are too many important national security matters that the committee and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ’ ” Brennan recounts Biden saying .
As president , Biden could seek to reprise that role .
“ I ’ d expect that to be what President-elect Biden feels his role is , to sort out these differences and make sure that there is oversight of the intelligence agencies that doesn ’ t cripple the intelligence agencies ’ functions , ” said Irvin McCullough , a national security analyst with the Government Accountability Project .
But that doesn ’ t mean the next administration should be unquestioning cheerleaders of the intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an administration that challenges assumptions , ” Sipher said .
“ You don ’ t want an intelligence community that has people downtown saying , ‘ Oh yeah , you guys are great.
’ That ’ s not comfortable either .
”

People working at the White House often take guests on tours of the historic building. But unlike others, during his two terms as vice president, Joe Biden made a point of taking guests down to the Situation Room, said Larry Pfeiffer, a veteran intelligence official then serving as the room’s senior director.
People working at the White House often take guests on tours of the historic building. But unlike others, during his two terms as vice president, Joe Biden made a point of taking guests down to the Situation Room, said Larry Pfeiffer, a veteran intelligence official then serving as the room’s senior director.
Biden would look over the team of analysts monitoring world events, point to them, and tell his guests, “These are the smartest people in the world,” Pfeiffer said. “That was something you didn’t have to do, but it went a heck of a long way to raising the morale of people who were working 12-hour shifts around the clock. It demonstrated a guy who really had a lot of respect for intelligence.”
When U.S. President-elect Biden takes office in January, he will have his work cut out for him as he inherits an intelligence community that has been demoralized by President Donald Trump’s repeated attacks maligning and politicizing the work of the country’s spy agencies. But former intelligence officials said Biden’s election will likely be seen within the 17 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community as the welcome beginning of a less turbulent relationship with the executive branch.
“I think the intelligence community is probably doing cartwheels in the halls,” said Pfeiffer.
While Trump was easily bored by intelligence briefings, former intelligence officials who have worked with Biden say he has shown a deep understanding and respect for the work of intelligence agencies.
“I knew then-Vice President Biden as an interested, appreciative consumer of intelligence. He always asked thoughtful, substantive questions,” said James Clapper, who served as director of national intelligence during the Obama administration.
With over three decades in the Senate, including 10 years on the Senate Intelligence Committee, and two terms as vice president, Biden is also familiar with many of the people who make up the senior ranks of the U.S. intelligence agencies. Former CIA Director John Brennan, who worked closely with Biden during the Obama administration, described him as an “avid” and “diligent” consumer of intelligence. “He’s somebody who has intimate familiarity as well as respect and regard for the importance of the work in the mission and the people,” Brennan said.
That will be welcomed by Biden’s briefers—though, contrary to all past practice, Biden has not yet been given access to the daily intelligence briefing a president-elect normally receives.
“We’re dealing with people who know what intelligence is supposed to do, and what it’s not supposed to do,” said David Priess, the chief operating officer of the Lawfare Institute, who served as a president’s daily briefer during the George W. Bush administration.
Trump increasingly favored loyalty over experience in his choice of people to helm the country’s intelligence apparatus. For weeks there has been mounting speculation that Trump may look to fire current CIA Director Gina Haspel, who is reported to have fallen out of favor with the president for pushing back on requests to declassify information that could be politically beneficial to him. (On Tuesday, Trump fired the head of the government’s cybersecurity agency for declaring the 2020 elections the most secure in history.)
Biden has not named his picks to lead the CIA or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, but those reportedly under consideration, including former acting CIA Director Michael Morell and former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon, are all career national security officials with a deep understanding of the intelligence community.
“He will return the IC to pre-Trump ‘normal,’ where a premium is placed on professional competence, not incompetent loyalty,” Clapper said.
Something that Biden could do in the early days of his presidency to signal his support for the intelligence community would be to make a visit to the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, said Marc Polymeropoulos, the CIA’s former chief of operations for Europe and Eurasia who retired in 2019. Biden could “reassure the employees that they’re not the ‘deep state,’ that he has faith in the product,” he said.
Another early priority for the Biden administration will be to bolster checks and balances on the intelligence agencies and rebuild the system of whistleblower statutes and inspectors general, Polymeropoulos said. Protections for intelligence community whistleblowers are relatively new, signed into law in 2012, and were little tested before Trump and his allies sought to expose the identity of the CIA whistleblower whose complaint triggered the House impeachment investigation into Trump.
One of Biden’s tasks will likely be “expressing the sanctity of the whistleblower statutes and a robust Inspector General, all of the things that have sort of fallen apart under the Trump administration,” Polymeropoulos said.
Trump’s attacks on U.S. intelligence agencies, which determined that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to bolster Trump’s chances, began even before his inauguration, when he likened them to Nazis. That has taken a toll on morale, but it won’t take much to repair the relationship.
“[The intelligence community] doesn’t need petting and stroking, it just needs not to be beat on,” said John Sipher, who spent 28 years with the CIA, serving in Moscow in the 1990s and later running the agency’s Russia operations.
One key aspect of that will be restoring balanced congressional oversight of the intelligence community. As vice president, Biden helped mediate between the Senate Intelligence Committee and the CIA, which were embroiled in a bitter fight over allegations the CIA had spied on Senate staffers, Brennan recalled in his memoir Undaunted, which was released last month. “‘We have to get this behind us, folks. There are too many important national security matters that the committee and the CIA need to work on together,’” Brennan recounts Biden saying.
As president, Biden could seek to reprise that role. “I’d expect that to be what President-elect Biden feels his role is, to sort out these differences and make sure that there is oversight of the intelligence agencies that doesn’t cripple the intelligence agencies’ functions,” said Irvin McCullough, a national security analyst with the Government Accountability Project.
But that doesn’t mean the next administration should be unquestioning cheerleaders of the intelligence community, either.
“We want an administration that challenges assumptions,” Sipher said. “You don’t want an intelligence community that has people downtown saying, ‘Oh yeah, you guys are great.’ That’s not comfortable either.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-18--Trump Ousts Cybersecurity Chief Over Election Claims

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Outgoing President Donald Trump fired the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ’ s cybersecurity chief in a tweet on Tuesday evening , falsely claiming that Chris Krebs had covered up improprieties and fraud in the 2020 U.S. election .
Krebs , the director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency at DHS , was fired by tweet late Tuesday , just days after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no evidence that any voting system used in 2020 was compromised , lost , or involved altered ballots , and that the 2020 election was “ the most secure in American history.
” Reuters reported last week that the top election security official had expected to be fired .
Trump has continued to insist , with no evidence , that his resounding election defeat was due to fraud and voting irregularities .
“ The recent statement by Chris Krebs on the security of the 2020 Election was highly inaccurate , in that there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voting , Poll Watchers not allowed into polling locations , ‘ glitches ’ in the voting machines which changed votes from Trump to Biden , late voting , and many more , ” Trump tweeted on Tuesday night .
“ Therefore , effective immediately , Chris Krebs has been terminated as director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
” ( None of Trump ’ s claims have been verified by state election officials or courts . )
Krebs had drawn the ire of the White House with a CISA-run website known as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as notions of voter fraud pushed by Trump and unfounded concerns about the use of mail-in ballots that were widely used due to the coronavirus pandemic .
Krebs ’ ousting marks the latest administration purge since major news networks and wire services called the presidential election for former Vice President Joe Biden .
Last week , Trump fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper in a tweet after the Pentagon chief reportedly pushed back against White House plans to rapidly withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan .
“ Honored to serve .
We did it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Krebs tweeted from his personal account after his dismissal .
The Trump team has also targeted officials in Krebs ’ s orbit who pushed for election security during the last presidential cycle .
Last week , Assistant Director for Cybersecurity at CISA Bryan Ware confirmed he had handed in his resignation , and CyberScoop News reported on Tuesday after Krebs was pushed out that the White House had also fired his deputy , Matt Travis .
Though experts said that Krebs was not expected to stay on through the transition to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ met with pushback from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress , many of whom saw him as a truth-teller in the face of persistent election disinformation from Trump and his surrogates .
“ The fact is that , since Election Day , President Trump has sought to delegitimize the election results by engaging in a disinformation campaign that could shatter public confidence in our elections for generations , ” said Democratic Reps. Bennie Thompson of Mississippi , chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee , and Lauren Underwood of Illinois , the chairwoman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statement .
“ In firing Director Krebs for refusing to lend credibility to his baseless claims and conspiracy theories about voter fraud , the president is telling officials throughout the administration to put his political interests ahead of their responsibilities to the American people .
That is not only disturbing , it is antidemocratic.
” “ Chris Krebs is an extraordinary public servant and exactly the person Americans want protecting the security of our elections , ” said Mark Warner , the top-ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to fire him simply for telling the truth.
” “ Chris Krebs did his job and did it extremely well , ” said Wisconsin Republican Rep. Mike Gallagher .
“ The country is safer and our elections more secure from foreign interference because of his leadership at CISA.
” As an administration official , the White House could block Krebs from testifying before Congress .
Now , as a private citizen , he can testify freely if called .

Outgoing President Donald Trump fired the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity chief in a tweet on Tuesday evening, falsely claiming that Chris Krebs had covered up improprieties and fraud in the 2020 U.S. election.
Outgoing President Donald Trump fired the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity chief in a tweet on Tuesday evening, falsely claiming that Chris Krebs had covered up improprieties and fraud in the 2020 U.S. election.
Krebs, the director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency at DHS, was fired by tweet late Tuesday, just days after the former Microsoft employee said there was no evidence that any voting system used in 2020 was compromised, lost, or involved altered ballots, and that the 2020 election was “the most secure in American history.” Reuters reported last week that the top election security official had expected to be fired.
Trump has continued to insist, with no evidence, that his resounding election defeat was due to fraud and voting irregularities.
“The recent statement by Chris Krebs on the security of the 2020 Election was highly inaccurate, in that there were massive improprieties and fraud—including dead people voting, Poll Watchers not allowed into polling locations, ‘glitches’ in the voting machines which changed votes from Trump to Biden, late voting, and many more,” Trump tweeted on Tuesday night. “Therefore, effective immediately, Chris Krebs has been terminated as director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.” (None of Trump’s claims have been verified by state election officials or courts.)
Krebs had drawn the ire of the White House with a CISA-run website known as Rumor Control that contradicted election misinformation, such as notions of voter fraud pushed by Trump and unfounded concerns about the use of mail-in ballots that were widely used due to the coronavirus pandemic.
Krebs’ ousting marks the latest administration purge since major news networks and wire services called the presidential election for former Vice President Joe Biden. Last week, Trump fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper in a tweet after the Pentagon chief reportedly pushed back against White House plans to rapidly withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan.
“Honored to serve. We did it right. Defend Today, Secure Tomorrow,” Krebs tweeted from his personal account after his dismissal.
The Trump team has also targeted officials in Krebs’s orbit who pushed for election security during the last presidential cycle. Last week, Assistant Director for Cybersecurity at CISA Bryan Ware confirmed he had handed in his resignation, and CyberScoop News reported on Tuesday after Krebs was pushed out that the White House had also fired his deputy, Matt Travis.
Though experts said that Krebs was not expected to stay on through the transition to a Biden administration, his removal was met with pushback from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, many of whom saw him as a truth-teller in the face of persistent election disinformation from Trump and his surrogates.
“The fact is that, since Election Day, President Trump has sought to delegitimize the election results by engaging in a disinformation campaign that could shatter public confidence in our elections for generations,” said Democratic Reps. Bennie Thompson of Mississippi, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, and Lauren Underwood of Illinois, the chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity in a statement. “In firing Director Krebs for refusing to lend credibility to his baseless claims and conspiracy theories about voter fraud, the president is telling officials throughout the administration to put his political interests ahead of their responsibilities to the American people. That is not only disturbing, it is antidemocratic.”
“Chris Krebs is an extraordinary public servant and exactly the person Americans want protecting the security of our elections,” said Mark Warner, the top-ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “It speaks volumes that the president chose to fire him simply for telling the truth.”
“Chris Krebs did his job and did it extremely well,” said Wisconsin Republican Rep. Mike Gallagher. “The country is safer and our elections more secure from foreign interference because of his leadership at CISA.”
As an administration official, the White House could block Krebs from testifying before Congress. Now, as a private citizen, he can testify freely if called.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--The Real Meaning of Trump’s Post-Election Defiance

Loudspeaker announcement during the Stop-the-Steal demonstration in support of U.S. President Donald Trump on Pennsylvania Avenue , Washington , Nov. 14 .
In the meantime , whatever happens next , his headline-grabbing refusal to concede Biden ’ s victory raises a deeper question .
It focuses attention on a mystery that lies at the heart of democratic politics—namely why electoral losers , especially when they are incumbents , willingly accept defeat .
Commentators are divided in trying to make sense of Trump ’ s last-ditch gambit to prevent the certification of election results .
Many have focused on his psychological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a loser .
After all , when his reckless business ventures went belly up , didn ’ t he always claim to have scored another great victory , as if spinning it would make it so ?
Others , more cynically , have assumed that he is simply scamming his supporters into contributing online to a nonexistent legal defense fund to line his pockets .
Still others argue that he is taking a wrecking ball to the well-established transition process to regain the limelight he has lost since becoming a lame duck : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the news cycle than to threaten to end U.S. democracy ?
Alternatively , some of his sworn critics have speculated that he is desperately stalling to postpone the moment when Biden ’ s so-called landing teams gain access to government offices in order to destroy records of money laundering and similar malfeasance .
And a few have implied that he is exploiting the unconscionably lengthy U.S. interregnum to declassify information helpful to Russian President Vladimir Putin and to transfer sophisticated weapons systems to Persian Gulf states in exchange , in both cases , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Or perhaps he just relishes the thought of making life as difficult as possible for the incoming administration , while informing the rest of the world that the United States will no longer be lecturing dictators about the virtues of free and fair elections .
These factors may all be relevant .
But the main reason he is obstinately refusing to concede involves the dependence of democracy on faith in a yet-unwritten future where the electorally defeated get a second chance .
Trump believes , and his supporters seemingly agree , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there may never be another election .
More forcefully than any other politician , Trump has given voice to the average white voter ’ s fear of being politically marginalized by demographic and generational change .
For these voters , U.S. elections are indeed rigged .
But the cheating , ultimately , has little to do with ballot-tampering , despite the frivolous claims now being lodged by Trump ’ s lawyers .
The United States ’ elections , Trump ’ s most fervid supporters feel , are rigged by open borders and low @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have entered the country illegally and by making it easier for African-Americans to register and vote , policies introduced by Democrats who are thereby seeking to lock in their future preeminence by reshaping the electorate to their advantage .
Such fearmongering helps us understand what exactly Trump and his supporters mean when , without a shred of evidence , they claim there was electoral fraud .
They do not only mean fraud in the technical sense of stuffed ballots or incorrectly tabulated votes .
More important for them is that the wrong sort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the first place .
The only reason Trump lost , they believe , is that the Democrats , by supporting minority rights and a liberal immigration policy , have betrayed the racial solidarity of the majority-white electorate .
The corrosive and undemocratic implication that all votes should not count equally was also conveyed by Trump ’ s baseless distinction between the brave souls who would defy the pandemic to vote in person and the cowards who planned to cast their ballots by mail .
The distinction was arbitrary and did not map @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden voters .
But it did reflect the anti-democratic premise that the votes of certain citizens , contrary to the 14th Amendment , are worth more than others .
Trump ’ s allegation that the presidential election was rigged is the 2020 version of so-called birtherism .
To say that former President Barack Obama was not born in the United States is to say that a Black man has no right to become President .
In the same way , to say that we can not trust the results of this election is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Detroit , Philadelphia , and Atlanta have no right to vote .
Drawing a parallel between the two bogus charges makes additional sense if we assume that Obama ’ s election triggered , as it certainly did , deep fears among many white Americans of demographic inundation .
In any case , the multiethnic lines of citizens seen waiting to cast their ballots at polling stations were an accurate mirror of the multiethnic United States .
The contrast with Trump ’ s largely monoethnic rallies could not be starker .
Seen from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rally , increasingly multiracial voter rolls are the sign of an electorate unfairly stacked against the rallygoers .
They are also an omen of an imagined future where defunded police departments will no longer be able to protect the besieged white majority from antifa rioters presumably in league with racial minorities .
The percentage of white voters is decreasing over the long term .
Hence the democratic legitimacy formula , giving the loser hope for a comeback , is forfeiting its ability to reconcile the defeated to their defeat .
The fact that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against Trump reinforces his supporters ’ sense that the future is not on their side .
That is why his baseless accusations of electoral fraud are so dangerous .
They suggest to his supporters that the moment to abandon democracy itself is drawing near .
To this explanation for Trump ’ s refusal to concede , we need to add the subconscious impact of the pandemic on the country , including on his supporters .
His shameless lie that “ we are rounding the turn ” did not change the fact that Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pointless , arbitrary death .
The rise of an apocalyptic mindset should therefore come as no surprise .
COVID-19 merely reinforces the sky-is-falling mentality that characterizes the worldview of most populist voters .
The dizzying peaks and troughs of the pandemic have created additional uncertainty about a future which is unpredictable even in normal times and which feels especially ominous to those panicked by demographic and generational change .
Trump is signaling to his supporters that they must never concede that this election was fairly decided .
To do so would be to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the electorate that will put future races for the presidency out of their reach .
This fear of the future seems to resonate powerfully with roiling insecurity about an unpredictably spreading pandemic .
There are presumably many psychological , social , and economic reasons why a large swath of the U.S. electorate , under Trump ’ s hypnotic spell , seems ready to abandon democracy .
But distrust of the future based on their fear that “ real Americans ” will never again win an election is the most decisive factor .
Lockdowns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it should also be said , have created a pent-up popular thirst for collective action which is meaningful , spectacular and even defiant .
This urgency , on full display in the Black Lives Matter demonstrations sparked by the killing of George Floyd , also helps explain why Trump ’ s supporters feel emboldened to ignore the electoral outcome .
Although voting is a public act , there is nothing heroic , daring , sensational , or even particularly memorable about it .
But a protester , perhaps masquerading as a freedom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is or least can pretend to be a heroic figure .
Defying the outcome of the election and trying to prevent the certification of valid votes presumably gives Trump ’ s voters a sense of participating in large events , of rattling history ’ s cage .
This is an appealing opportunity given the small , housebound , risk-averse , and inconsequential repetitiveness of life under COVID-19 .
Needing Trump ’ s support to keep their majority in the Senate in the two upcoming Georgia runoffs , the Republican establishment continues to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrong .
Under no illusion about the Electoral College vote , perfectly normal politicians such as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell ( who would feel totally out of his element at a Trump rally ) , understand that Biden is the president-elect .
But they have not publicly said as much because doing so would break their tenuous connection to those Trump voters who inhabit a make-believe world in which “ Make America Great Again ” can never lose .
Trump may even be blackmailing McConnell into keeping quiet about Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election in the Democrats ’ favor .
Be that as it may , Trump bested the Republican establishment in 2016 because , unlike them , he was willing to question Obama ’ s right to be president .
And he intimidates them today because , unlike them , he is willing to suggest , without resorting to euphemism , that the African American voters of Detroit , Philadelphia , and Atlanta , in particular , have no right to vote .
Can the Republican establishment keep its balance and its bearings with one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reality and the other in an impossible , not to mention morally repugnant , dream of restoring white supremacy ?
They are temporarily indulging Trump ’ s claim that “ the Election was Rigged , ” pretending that he is referring to a falsification of votes when they know that , in fact , his voter-fraud claim is really about the extension of the franchise to the wrong kind of people .
The Republican establishment is presumably plotting life after Trump .
But can it publicly acknowledge that Biden won the election while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the conspiracy theories peddled by the president and accepted by his credulous supporters ?
Straddling these two mutually incompatible worlds , one real and the other hallucinatory , is anatomically uncomfortable .
Indeed , it is a posture impossible to sustain over time .
Elected Republicans , especially those whose power depends on equal State suffrage in the Senate , are not going to accept Trump ’ s invitation to destroy the legitimacy of the American electoral system .
Under this system , unlike him , most of them have a good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the future , despite the unstoppable changes in the United States ’ demography .
The GOP is not demographically doomed , whatever nightmares of ethnic disappearance haunt Trump ’ s electorate .
While the United States ’ demography is changing , U.S. voters are too opportunistic and parties are too adaptable for ethnicity to remain a reliable predictor of party affiliation even in the medium term .
In the short run , however , Republicans may well lose the majority in the Senate if they dare slap down the fantasy that Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take place .
For the next two months , it seems , a myopic Republican leadership will continue to regard the Jan. 5 runoff as the only future election that counts .
It is unclear what price , if any , Republicans will pay for temporarily indulging Trump ’ s flirtation with ending the democracy on which their own legitimacy depends .
What is quite clear , on the other hand , is that the party ’ s current leaders can live neither with nor without the apocalyptically minded voters that the current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abandoning democracy .
Trump built his political brand not only by promising to humiliate Obama , but also by encouraging many Republican voters to see themselves as belonging to a shrinking white majority that can only maintain control of the commanding heights by undemocratic means .
The intense polarization of the U.S. electorate , deliberately exacerbated by Trump , poses an existential threat to democracy because his half of the electorate has lost faith in the future .
When supporters of a defeated candidate believe that they are demographically doomed , they have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The unsettling consequences are playing out before our eyes .

“If they steal the 2020 election, there won’t be a 2024 election!”
Loudspeaker announcement during the Stop-the-Steal demonstration in support of U.S. President Donald Trump on Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, Nov. 14.
It will be some time before members of U.S. President Donald Trump’s shrinking inner circle publish their tell-all memoirs recounting, in lurid detail, how the White House first reacted when Joe Biden was declared president-elect of the United States. Even as we already have a rough sense of the scale of rage and the swirl of conspiracy theories, we will probably be surprised when we discover the jumble of hopeless stratagems for clinging to power that Trump and his entourage have been desperately concocting.
In the meantime, whatever happens next, his headline-grabbing refusal to concede Biden’s victory raises a deeper question. It focuses attention on a mystery that lies at the heart of democratic politics—namely why electoral losers, especially when they are incumbents, willingly accept defeat.
Commentators are divided in trying to make sense of Trump’s last-ditch gambit to prevent the certification of election results. Many have focused on his psychological or strategic aversion to being seen as a loser. After all, when his reckless business ventures went belly up, didn’t he always claim to have scored another great victory, as if spinning it would make it so? Others, more cynically, have assumed that he is simply scamming his supporters into contributing online to a nonexistent legal defense fund to line his pockets. Still others argue that he is taking a wrecking ball to the well-established transition process to regain the limelight he has lost since becoming a lame duck: What better way to regain control over the news cycle than to threaten to end U.S. democracy?
Alternatively, some of his sworn critics have speculated that he is desperately stalling to postpone the moment when Biden’s so-called landing teams gain access to government offices in order to destroy records of money laundering and similar malfeasance. And a few have implied that he is exploiting the unconscionably lengthy U.S. interregnum to declassify information helpful to Russian President Vladimir Putin and to transfer sophisticated weapons systems to Persian Gulf states in exchange, in both cases, for kickbacks or favors after Jan. 20. Or perhaps he just relishes the thought of making life as difficult as possible for the incoming administration, while informing the rest of the world that the United States will no longer be lecturing dictators about the virtues of free and fair elections.
These factors may all be relevant. But the main reason he is obstinately refusing to concede involves the dependence of democracy on faith in a yet-unwritten future where the electorally defeated get a second chance. Trump believes, and his supporters seemingly agree, that for him as well as for them there may never be another election.
More forcefully than any other politician, Trump has given voice to the average white voter’s fear of being politically marginalized by demographic and generational change. For these voters, U.S. elections are indeed rigged. But the cheating, ultimately, has little to do with ballot-tampering, despite the frivolous claims now being lodged by Trump’s lawyers. The United States’ elections, Trump’s most fervid supporters feel, are rigged by open borders and low hurdles to the naturalization of people who have entered the country illegally and by making it easier for African-Americans to register and vote, policies introduced by Democrats who are thereby seeking to lock in their future preeminence by reshaping the electorate to their advantage.
Such fearmongering helps us understand what exactly Trump and his supporters mean when, without a shred of evidence, they claim there was electoral fraud. They do not only mean fraud in the technical sense of stuffed ballots or incorrectly tabulated votes. More important for them is that the wrong sort of people have been registered to vote in the first place. The only reason Trump lost, they believe, is that the Democrats, by supporting minority rights and a liberal immigration policy, have betrayed the racial solidarity of the majority-white electorate.
The corrosive and undemocratic implication that all votes should not count equally was also conveyed by Trump’s baseless distinction between the brave souls who would defy the pandemic to vote in person and the cowards who planned to cast their ballots by mail. The distinction was arbitrary and did not map neatly onto the difference between Trump and Biden voters. But it did reflect the anti-democratic premise that the votes of certain citizens, contrary to the 14th Amendment, are worth more than others.
Trump’s allegation that the presidential election was rigged is the 2020 version of so-called birtherism. To say that former President Barack Obama was not born in the United States is to say that a Black man has no right to become President. In the same way, to say that we cannot trust the results of this election is to say that the African American citizens of Detroit, Philadelphia, and Atlanta have no right to vote. Drawing a parallel between the two bogus charges makes additional sense if we assume that Obama’s election triggered, as it certainly did, deep fears among many white Americans of demographic inundation.
In any case, the multiethnic lines of citizens seen waiting to cast their ballots at polling stations were an accurate mirror of the multiethnic United States. The contrast with Trump’s largely monoethnic rallies could not be starker. Seen from the perspective of an almost all-white campaign rally, increasingly multiracial voter rolls are the sign of an electorate unfairly stacked against the rallygoers. They are also an omen of an imagined future where defunded police departments will no longer be able to protect the besieged white majority from antifa rioters presumably in league with racial minorities. The percentage of white voters is decreasing over the long term. Hence the democratic legitimacy formula, giving the loser hope for a comeback, is forfeiting its ability to reconcile the defeated to their defeat. The fact that 60 percent of voters under 30 voted against Trump reinforces his supporters’ sense that the future is not on their side. That is why his baseless accusations of electoral fraud are so dangerous. They suggest to his supporters that the moment to abandon democracy itself is drawing near.
To this explanation for Trump’s refusal to concede, we need to add the subconscious impact of the pandemic on the country, including on his supporters. His shameless lie that “we are rounding the turn” did not change the fact that Americans are living in the constant presence of pointless, arbitrary death. The rise of an apocalyptic mindset should therefore come as no surprise. COVID-19 merely reinforces the sky-is-falling mentality that characterizes the worldview of most populist voters. The dizzying peaks and troughs of the pandemic have created additional uncertainty about a future which is unpredictable even in normal times and which feels especially ominous to those panicked by demographic and generational change. Trump is signaling to his supporters that they must never concede that this election was fairly decided. To do so would be to accept the changes in the composition of the electorate that will put future races for the presidency out of their reach. This fear of the future seems to resonate powerfully with roiling insecurity about an unpredictably spreading pandemic. There are presumably many psychological, social, and economic reasons why a large swath of the U.S. electorate, under Trump’s hypnotic spell, seems ready to abandon democracy. But distrust of the future based on their fear that “real Americans” will never again win an election is the most decisive factor.
Lockdowns, face masks, and social distancing, it should also be said, have created a pent-up popular thirst for collective action which is meaningful, spectacular and even defiant. This urgency, on full display in the Black Lives Matter demonstrations sparked by the killing of George Floyd, also helps explain why Trump’s supporters feel emboldened to ignore the electoral outcome. Although voting is a public act, there is nothing heroic, daring, sensational, or even particularly memorable about it. But a protester, perhaps masquerading as a freedom fighter and agitating raucously against stolen elections, is or least can pretend to be a heroic figure. Defying the outcome of the election and trying to prevent the certification of valid votes presumably gives Trump’s voters a sense of participating in large events, of rattling history’s cage. This is an appealing opportunity given the small, housebound, risk-averse, and inconsequential repetitiveness of life under COVID-19.
Needing Trump’s support to keep their majority in the Senate in the two upcoming Georgia runoffs, the Republican establishment continues to walk the thin line between right and wrong. Under no illusion about the Electoral College vote, perfectly normal politicians such as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (who would feel totally out of his element at a Trump rally), understand that Biden is the president-elect. But they have not publicly said as much because doing so would break their tenuous connection to those Trump voters who inhabit a make-believe world in which “Make America Great Again” can never lose. Trump may even be blackmailing McConnell into keeping quiet about Biden’s win by threatening to tilt the Georgia election in the Democrats’ favor. Be that as it may, Trump bested the Republican establishment in 2016 because, unlike them, he was willing to question Obama’s right to be president. And he intimidates them today because, unlike them, he is willing to suggest, without resorting to euphemism, that the African American voters of Detroit, Philadelphia, and Atlanta, in particular, have no right to vote.
Can the Republican establishment keep its balance and its bearings with one foot in the United States’ multiethnic reality and the other in an impossible, not to mention morally repugnant, dream of restoring white supremacy? They are temporarily indulging Trump’s claim that “the Election was Rigged,” pretending that he is referring to a falsification of votes when they know that, in fact, his voter-fraud claim is really about the extension of the franchise to the wrong kind of people. The Republican establishment is presumably plotting life after Trump. But can it publicly acknowledge that Biden won the election while pandering to white grievance and lending credence to the conspiracy theories peddled by the president and accepted by his credulous supporters? Straddling these two mutually incompatible worlds, one real and the other hallucinatory, is anatomically uncomfortable. Indeed, it is a posture impossible to sustain over time.
Elected Republicans, especially those whose power depends on equal State suffrage in the Senate, are not going to accept Trump’s invitation to destroy the legitimacy of the American electoral system. Under this system, unlike him, most of them have a good chance of winning free and fair elections in the future, despite the unstoppable changes in the United States’ demography. The GOP is not demographically doomed, whatever nightmares of ethnic disappearance haunt Trump’s electorate. While the United States’ demography is changing, U.S. voters are too opportunistic and parties are too adaptable for ethnicity to remain a reliable predictor of party affiliation even in the medium term. In the short run, however, Republicans may well lose the majority in the Senate if they dare slap down the fantasy that Trump won an imaginary election that did not take place. For the next two months, it seems, a myopic Republican leadership will continue to regard the Jan. 5 runoff as the only future election that counts.
It is unclear what price, if any, Republicans will pay for temporarily indulging Trump’s flirtation with ending the democracy on which their own legitimacy depends. What is quite clear, on the other hand, is that the party’s current leaders can live neither with nor without the apocalyptically minded voters that the current president has led to the brink of abandoning democracy. Trump built his political brand not only by promising to humiliate Obama, but also by encouraging many Republican voters to see themselves as belonging to a shrinking white majority that can only maintain control of the commanding heights by undemocratic means. The intense polarization of the U.S. electorate, deliberately exacerbated by Trump, poses an existential threat to democracy because his half of the electorate has lost faith in the future. When supporters of a defeated candidate believe that they are demographically doomed, they have no incentive to play by the rules. The unsettling consequences are playing out before our eyes.