foreignpolicy--2020-11-10--Biden Will Speak Softer but Act Stronger on Taiwan

Biden Will Speak Softer but Act Stronger on Taiwan Last week , the world was waiting to see whether U.S. President Donald Trump would be reelected .
Four days later , the verdict was in .
Joe Biden , winning more overall votes than any other candidate in U.S. history , will be the 46th president of the United States .
While the United States was fixated on the final days of campaigning , China didn ’ t miss a beat in its aggression toward Taiwan .
The day before the U.S. presidential election , Chinese aircraft flew into Taiwan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ These military maneuvers are part of a disturbing trend of increased Chinese military activity over the past two months .
Since Sept. 9 , Beijing has flown near-constant sorties into Taiwan ’ s Air Defense Identification Zone ( ADIZ ) , sometimes conducting as many as 30 in a day .
On Sept. 21 , China claimed that the median line , the boundary between the airspace of Taiwan and China that both sides had generally respected for decades , no longer existed .
These are the tense cross-strait circumstances a newly elected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the oath of office in January .
The decisions he makes concerning Taiwan will shape the future of the self-governing island , a democracy of nearly 24 million people and the 21st- largest economy in the world , as well as the tenor of U.S.-China relations regional stability .
So what can we expect from the next president on Taiwan ?
We can already see some differences emerge .
For example , when Trump won the 2016 election , he received congratulations from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen via phone .
This made him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ directly to the president of Taiwan since the United States normalized relations with Beijing in 1979 .
On the occasion of Biden ’ s election , no such phone call took place .
Instead , Tsai sent her congratulations via Twitter , avoiding direct contact between the two .
This is just one anecdote .
But does it suggest that Biden ’ s approach to Taiwan will differ greatly from that of the Trump administration ?
Yes and no .
The cornerstones of U.S. Taiwan policy—arms sales and strategic ambiguity—will change little under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be in how Biden tries to maintain stability across the Strait .
The Trump administration has been bold in its arms sales , approving over $ 17 billion worth of arms over the past four years and blurring the line between offensive and defensive weaponry .
Moreover , the Trump administration agreed to sell 66 F-16s to Taiwan in one of the largest arms sale packages ever offered to the island nation .
Yet while Trump earned praise for bolstering Taiwanese defenses against a possible mainland invasion , his approach to arms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predecessors .
The stated goal of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is to ensure the “ security , or social or economic system , of the people of Taiwan ” and to further the “ principle of maintaining peace and stability in the Western Pacific.
” In other words , arms sales are largely dependent on the military threat Beijing poses For example , relations between the PRC and Taiwan deteriorated during the early 1990s , leading to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and a spike in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump was also not the first president to sell high-end aircraft to Taiwan ; President George H. W. Bush sold F-16s .
And while Clinton , the second Bush , and Obama all decided against selling the F-16 , choosing instead to help upgrade and maintain aircraft already in Taiwan ’ s possession , the recent sale received bipartisan support largely because of the heightened threat posed by Beijing today .
Biden will maintain similar policies , continuing to offer arms to Taipei to address the growing threat across the Strait .
Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; he was one of the original senators who voted for the Taiwan Relations Act , which serves as the basis for the sales .
But that doesn ’ t mean that he will offer similarly large packages to Taipei ; much of the island ’ s need for weaponry and equipment has already been fulfilled through recent sales .
It is also possible that Biden may try to soften the blow to Beijing by not overly publicizing sales or by notifying Beijing privately before sales are announced .
But the sales themselves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to America ’ s overall position , strategic ambiguity has guided U.S. policy on Taiwan for decades .
Presidents have periodically questioned the policy , but none have gone so far as to change it .
The same can be said for Trump .
Initially , the direct call between him and Tsai caused many to speculate that he may choose to support Taiwan ’ s independence openly .
But he was cautious in the following years to avoid actions that Beijing or Taipei could construe as recognition .
Indeed , despite attempts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ambiguity , Trump limited himself to the vague , “ China knows what I ’ m gon na do.
” Recently , there has been a flurry of debate about whether it ’ s time to abandon the policy as a warning to Beijing .
But such views likely do not represent those of the president-elect .
Biden is on record with his support of strategic ambiguity , which he has described as “ reserv [ ing ] the right to use force to defend Taiwan but [ keep ] mum about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might not , intervene in a war across the Taiwan Strait.
” Continuing to embrace strategic ambiguity doesn ’ t mean Biden will be less supportive of Taiwan than Trump .
Biden was the first Democratic presidential candidate to extend congratulations to Tsai when she won reelection in January .
But he correctly views strategic ambiguity as the best way to deter Beijing without emboldening Taiwan .
In his words , “ The president should not cede to Taiwan , much less to China , the ability automatically to draw us into a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the main contours of U.S.-Taiwan policy remain the same , then does it make a difference who is president ?
Absolutely .
While Biden will work towards the same goal of deterring Beijing without emboldening Taipei , he will embrace different , more effective ways for achieving it .
Trump could not protect Taiwan ’ s international space because he purposefully reduced U.S. influence in international institutions .
He pulled out of numerous international organizations and deals , including the World Health Organization ( WHO ) , the Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nations Human Rights Council , and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency .
So there was little that could be done when China forced Taipei out of the WHO ’ s World Health Assembly in 2017 , where it had been an observer since a 2009 agreement .
In 2020 , China forced Taiwan ’ s exclusion even though its COVID-19 response was one of the most successful in the region , and condemnation from the State Department was largely ignored .
Similarly , Taipei has also been kept at the margins @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the United States left the Paris Agreement .
And although entry into the TTP is a priority for Taiwanese leaders , Taipei lost its best path to joining without Washington to champion its candidacy .
Biden , as he has already showed through moves such as cancelling Trump ’ s attempt to pull out of WHO , will be more involved in international institutions and strive to regain the United States ’ global leadership role .
This will give the United States more institutional power to advocate for Taipei ’ s inclusion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better than the Trump administration ’ s unilateral efforts .
Moreover , Biden is likely to reinstate the budgets for key U.S. organizations like USAID that Trump undermined and gutted .
He also nominated a critic of the World Bank and IMF to oversee the U.S. role in both institutions .
Reduced development aid and perceptions that American influence in the Pacific was declining have pushed countries toward China .
In 2019 , the Republic of Kiribati and the Solomon Islands both switched recognition from Taiwan to mainland China in exchange for multi-million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will also work more with allies to meet the broader challenges China poses .
The United States would not expect its security partners to play an integral role in any armed defense of Taiwan .
But even the diplomatic support of other countries could go far in cautioning an increasingly confident Beijing .
In contrast , the Trump administration has relied mainly on unilateral options to enhance deterrence against the PRC , like freedom of navigation operations ( FONOPs ) .
These operations in which the U.S. navy sails through areas over which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continue under a Biden administration , but less frequently as he shifts to utilizing nonmilitary tools as well .
But the bigger change will be Biden ’ s tone .
Trump has focused on provoking Beijing—using Taiwan as “ an instrument of pushback against China.
” Last month , a second high-level visit from a U.S. official to Taiwan within two months prompted China to fly 18 military aircraft across the sensitive midline on the Taiwan Strait , forcing Taipei to scramble fighter jets in response .
The sale of F-16s was delayed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bargaining chip in trade deal negotiations with China .
Biden ’ s goal will not be to threaten Chinese interests for its own sake but to maintain the status quo across the Strait .
For example , he has stated publicly that the United States should not come to Taiwan ’ s aid if Taiwan provokes war by declaring independence .
This more balanced approach will do much to reassure Beijing .
Deterrence requires both reassurance and credible threats .
The Trump administration has been effective at the former , signaling to Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if necessary .
But Washington must also avoid making Beijing believe that it will punish it no matter what , or else the United States loses the power to shape China ’ s potential use of force .
Thus , reassuring Beijing that the United States is not attempting to change the status quo by encouraging Taiwanese independence is equally important .
Hopefully , Biden will reinstate this balance .

Oriana Skylar Mastro and Emily Young Carr

Last week, the world was waiting to see whether U.S. President Donald Trump would be reelected. Four days later, the verdict was in. Joe Biden, winning more overall votes than any other candidate in U.S. history, will be the 46th president of the United States.
Last week, the world was waiting to see whether U.S. President Donald Trump would be reelected. Four days later, the verdict was in. Joe Biden, winning more overall votes than any other candidate in U.S. history, will be the 46th president of the United States.
While the United States was fixated on the final days of campaigning, China didn’t miss a beat in its aggression toward Taiwan. The day before the U.S. presidential election, Chinese aircraft flew into Taiwan’s airspace eight separate times. These military maneuvers are part of a disturbing trend of increased Chinese military activity over the past two months. Since Sept. 9, Beijing has flown near-constant sorties into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), sometimes conducting as many as 30 in a day. On Sept. 21, China claimed that the median line, the boundary between the airspace of Taiwan and China that both sides had generally respected for decades, no longer existed.
These are the tense cross-strait circumstances a newly elected Biden will step into when he takes the oath of office in January. The decisions he makes concerning Taiwan will shape the future of the self-governing island, a democracy of nearly 24 million people and the 21st- largest economy in the world, as well as the tenor of U.S.-China relations regional stability.
So what can we expect from the next president on Taiwan? We can already see some differences emerge. For example, when Trump won the 2016 election, he received congratulations from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen via phone. This made him the first president or president-elect to speak directly to the president of Taiwan since the United States normalized relations with Beijing in 1979. On the occasion of Biden’s election, no such phone call took place. Instead, Tsai sent her congratulations via Twitter, avoiding direct contact between the two.
This is just one anecdote. But does it suggest that Biden’s approach to Taiwan will differ greatly from that of the Trump administration?
Yes and no. The cornerstones of U.S. Taiwan policy—arms sales and strategic ambiguity—will change little under a Biden administration. The big difference will be in how Biden tries to maintain stability across the Strait.
The Trump administration has been bold in its arms sales, approving over $17 billion worth of arms over the past four years and blurring the line between offensive and defensive weaponry. Moreover, the Trump administration agreed to sell 66 F-16s to Taiwan in one of the largest arms sale packages ever offered to the island nation.
Yet while Trump earned praise for bolstering Taiwanese defenses against a possible mainland invasion, his approach to arms sales did not deviate significantly from his predecessors. The stated goal of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is to ensure the “security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan” and to further the “principle of maintaining peace and stability in the Western Pacific.” In other words, arms sales are largely dependent on the military threat Beijing poses.
For example, relations between the PRC and Taiwan deteriorated during the early 1990s, leading to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and a spike in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan at the beginning of the Clinton administration. Trump was also not the first president to sell high-end aircraft to Taiwan; President George H. W. Bush sold F-16s. And while Clinton, the second Bush, and Obama all decided against selling the F-16, choosing instead to help upgrade and maintain aircraft already in Taiwan’s possession, the recent sale received bipartisan support largely because of the heightened threat posed by Beijing today.
Biden will maintain similar policies, continuing to offer arms to Taipei to address the growing threat across the Strait. Biden is a strong supporter of the policy; he was one of the original senators who voted for the Taiwan Relations Act, which serves as the basis for the sales. But that doesn’t mean that he will offer similarly large packages to Taipei; some of the island’s need for weaponry and equipment has already been fulfilled through recent sales. It is also possible that Biden may try to soften the blow to Beijing by not overly publicizing sales or by notifying Beijing privately before sales are announced. But the sales themselves will continue regardless.
When it comes to America’s overall position, strategic ambiguity has guided U.S. policy on Taiwan for decades. Presidents have periodically questioned the policy, but none have gone so far as to change it.
The same can be said for Trump. Initially, the direct call between him and Tsai caused many to speculate that he may choose to support Taiwan’s independence openly. But he was cautious in the following years to avoid actions that Beijing or Taipei could construe as recognition. Indeed, despite attempts from within his party to discard strategic ambiguity, Trump limited himself to the vague, “China knows what I’m gonna do.”
Recently, there has been a flurry of debate about whether it’s time to abandon the policy as a warning to Beijing. But such views likely do not represent those of the president-elect. Biden is on record with his support of strategic ambiguity, which he has described as “reserv[ing] the right to use force to defend Taiwan but [keep] mum about the circumstances in which we might, or might not, intervene in a war across the Taiwan Strait.”
Continuing to embrace strategic ambiguity doesn’t mean Biden will be less supportive of Taiwan than Trump. Biden was the first Democratic presidential candidate to extend congratulations to Tsai when she won reelection in January. But he correctly views strategic ambiguity as the best way to deter Beijing without emboldening Taiwan. In his words, “The president should not cede to Taiwan, much less to China, the ability automatically to draw us into a war across the Taiwan Strait.”
If the main contours of U.S.-Taiwan policy remain the same, then does it make a difference who is president? Absolutely. While Biden will work towards the same goal of deterring Beijing without emboldening Taipei, he will embrace different, more effective ways for achieving it.
Trump could not protect Taiwan’s international space because he purposefully reduced U.S. influence in international institutions. He pulled out of numerous international organizations and deals, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Paris Climate Agreement, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. So there was little that could be done when China forced Taipei out of the WHO’s World Health Assembly in 2017, where it had been an observer since a 2009 agreement. In 2020, China forced Taiwan’s exclusion even though its COVID-19 response was one of the most successful in the region, and condemnation from the State Department was largely ignored. Similarly, Taipei has also been kept at the margins of the United Nations Climate Change Conference since the United States left the Paris Agreement. And although entry into the TTP is a priority for Taiwanese leaders, Taipei lost its best path to joining without Washington to champion its candidacy.
Biden, as he has already showed through moves such as cancelling Trump’s attempt to pull out of WHO, will be more involved in international institutions and strive to regain the United States’ global leadership role. This will give the United States more institutional power to advocate for Taipei’s inclusion and protect Taiwan’s international space better than the Trump administration’s unilateral efforts. Moreover, Biden is likely to reinstate the budgets for key U.S. organizations like USAID that Trump undermined and gutted. He also nominated a critic of the World Bank and IMF to oversee the U.S. role in both institutions. Reduced development aid and perceptions that American influence in the Pacific was declining have pushed countries toward China. In 2019, the Republic of Kiribati and the Solomon Islands both switched recognition from Taiwan to mainland China in exchange for multi-million dollar infrastructure deals.
A Biden administration will also work more with allies to meet the broader challenges China poses. The United States would not expect its security partners to play an integral role in any armed defense of Taiwan. But even the diplomatic support of other countries could go far in cautioning an increasingly confident Beijing.
In contrast, the Trump administration has relied mainly on unilateral options to enhance deterrence against the PRC, like freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). These operations in which the U.S. navy sails through areas over which China has illegally declared sovereignty will likely continue under a Biden administration, but less frequently as he shifts to utilizing nonmilitary tools as well.
But the bigger change will be Biden’s tone. Trump has focused on provoking Beijing—using Taiwan as “an instrument of pushback against China.” Last month, a second high-level visit from a U.S. official to Taiwan within two months prompted China to fly 18 military aircraft across the sensitive midline on the Taiwan Strait, forcing Taipei to scramble fighter jets in response. The sale of F-16s was delayed because Trump was using it as a bargaining chip in trade deal negotiations with China.
Biden’s goal will not be to threaten Chinese interests for its own sake but to maintain the status quo across the Strait. For example, he has stated publicly that the United States should not come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan provokes war by declaring independence.
This more balanced approach will do much to reassure Beijing. Deterrence requires both reassurance and credible threats. The Trump administration has been effective at the former, signaling to Beijing that Washington is willing to defend Taiwan if necessary. But Washington must also avoid making Beijing believe that it will punish it no matter what, or else the United States loses the power to shape China’s potential use of force. Thus, reassuring Beijing that the United States is not attempting to change the status quo by encouraging Taiwanese independence is equally important. Hopefully, Biden will reinstate this balance.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-10--How Trump’s Defeat Could Mean More Policy Favors for Israel

How Trump ’ s Defeat Could Mean More Policy Favors for Israel TEL AVIV , Israel—For nearly four years , U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s Middle East policy—from axing the Iran nuclear deal to marginalizing Palestinians to brokering normalization deals between Israel and Gulf Arab states—has been the gift that keeps on giving for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu .
The policies have helped endear Trump to his evangelical base and allowed Netanyahu to advance his hard-line agenda .
Now , with Trump raging over baseless claims that the U.S. election was “ stolen , ” some officials and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use the last 10 weeks of his term to grant more favors to Netanyahu—on Iran and on Jewish settlements in the West Bank—that could complicate President-elect Joe Biden ’ s approach to the region or , worse , tip it further into chaos .
“ Netanyahu hopes to get other things from the Trump administration in the weeks that remain , ” said Moav Vardi , an international affairs reporter for Israel ’ s public broadcaster .
“ There are a number of issues on the agenda.
” The two sides are already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran , an issue that reportedly came up during a stop in Jerusalem this week by the U.S. special representative for Iran , Elliott Abrams .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will follow up with a visit to Israel on Nov. 18 .
But sanctions might not be the only thing Trump is planning .
His recent dismissal of Defense Secretary Mark Esper has spurred speculation that the president might be considering a military attack on Iran .
Netanyahu , long concerned about Iran ’ s nuclear program , has been agitating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years .
In addition to pressuring Iran , the Trump administration could still help the Israeli leader by brokering a new diplomatic opening in the Arab world or by looking the other way while Israel takes steps to expand Jewish settlements in the West Bank .
That slate of potential unfinished business might help explain Netanyahu ’ s silence for more than 12 hours after U.S. news organizations over the weekend projected Biden as the winner in the election , Vardi said .
Netanyahu was among the first foreign leaders to congratulate Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his silence on Sunday morning Israel time , he refrained from referring to Biden as the president-elect .
And he paired his congratulations with gratitude to Trump for “ the friendship you have shown the state of Israel and me personally … and for bringing the American-Israeli alliance to unprecedented heights.
” The deference to the president , who has refused to concede the race , reflects Netanyahu ’ s debt to Trump for the diplomatic windfall bequeathed to Israel—like normalization with the United Arab Emirates or the controversial recognition of Jerusalem as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. president would have dared to bestow .
“ You don ’ t want to be the first world leader to send congratulations , ” Vardi said .
“ To congratulate Biden , it would have been like turning his back or insulting him .
Then Trump won ’ t want to involve himself ” on the issues that matter to the Israeli prime minister .
The pause wasn ’ t lost on alumni of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East .
“ I wondered whether @ netanyahu ’ s 12 hour delayed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because he was expecting Trump to do something for him in his last days , ” tweeted Martin Indyk , a former U.S. ambassador to Israel .
“ Turns out he was cooking up more sanctions on Iran w Pompeo .
Wonder what else is in the pipeline.
” Yet analysts noted that Netanyahu is likely to tread carefully for fear of getting off on the wrong foot with the new administration .
Despite personal ties with the president-elect , Netanyahu is seen as having thrown in his lot with the Republican Party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visit to Israel in 2010 , when Netanyahu ’ s government famously snubbed Biden by announcing settlement-building in East Jerusalem .
The current talks between Israel and the United States reportedly involve sanctions targeting individuals and entities associated with Iran ’ s ballistic missile program—measures that could potentially hamper an effort by the Biden administration to reengage diplomatically with Iran on its nuclear program .
Trump in 2018 abandoned the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by members of the Obama administration .
Netanyahu , long critical of the deal , applauded the decision .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump and Israel would do anything in their power to make going back to a deal with Iran impossible , ” said Shira Efron , a policy fellow at the Israel Policy Forum .
“ They are going to sanction things that would be difficult for Biden to unravel.
” It wouldn ’ t be the first time a U.S. president embarked on a lame-duck policy move that ruffled feathers in the region .
In January 2001 , weeks before his term expired , President Bill Clinton published his parameters for a peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In December 2016 , the Obama administration abstained on a seminal United Nations Security Council resolution calling Israeli settlements in the West Bank a “ flagrant violation ” of international law , outraging both Netanyahu and Trump .
There ’ s also speculation that Netanyahu and Trump administration officials might be working toward normalization deals with other Arab countries , after security agreements with the United Arab Emirates , Bahrain , and Sudan .
Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen told Israel Radio recently that Saudi Arabia , Qatar , Morocco , and Oman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the next administration would continue the policy .
Trump ’ s lame-duck period comes at a sensitive political juncture in Israel .
The government could unravel in the coming weeks over the passage of a new budget , forcing Israel into yet another election—the fourth since early 2019 .
Parting gifts from the Trump administration could provide Netanyahu with political momentum ahead of a vote .
At the same time , the prospect of conflicts with the incoming Biden administration—over a new Iran deal or West Bank settlements—could help Netanyahu argue to voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up to international pressure .
“ Bibi is going to be more domestically vulnerable with a Biden administration .
This interim period might affect our political stability , ” said Jonathan Rynhold , a political science professor focusing on Israel-U.S. ties at Bar-Ilan University , referring to Netanyahu by his nickname .
He said political favors from Trump could help Netanyahu in a coming Israeli election .
They could also help Trump cement his foreign-policy legacy while having the added benefit of complicating Biden ’ s job .
For Palestinians , the concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Relations between the United States and the Palestinians reached a low point over the past four years , with Trump cutting funds to the Palestinian Authority , closing the Palestinian diplomatic mission in the United States , and issuing a peace proposal that envisioned Israeli annexation of wide swaths of the West Bank .
Hanan Ashrawi , a member of the PLO Executive Committee , called Trump ’ s defeat a “ momentous occasion ” but expressed worry about the lame-duck period .
“ It ’ s very scary .
Because these guys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an interview .
“ They are hellbent on giving everything to Israel and creating the facts on the ground.
” Indeed , right-wing politicians have called on Netanyahu to persuade the Trump administration to greenlight annexation of parts of the West Bank .
While that ’ s seen as unlikely because it could jeopardize ties between Israel and the UAE , Trump could give his consent to more subtle moves , including settlement construction in areas that foreclose on any possibility of a Palestinian state or U.S. recognition of hilltop outposts that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S .
Ambassador to Israel David Friedman , a Trump associate and patron of the settlers , may also push for U.S. steps aimed at further normalizing Israel ’ s presence in the West Bank , like an agreement signed in October allowing U.S. research money to go to Ariel University in the West Bank .
“ I would be watching David Friedman because he was the architect of this relationship .
He would be looking for last-minute achievements , ” said Tal Shalev , a political reporter for Walla !
News , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can assume that Bibi and David Friedman will try to get as much done to mark changes on the ground.
” A spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in Israel did not respond to queries on the issue .
One dovish former Israeli diplomat urged caution when it comes to parting gifts from Trump .
“ Even if there are no Israeli fingerprints , it can be costly , ” said Alon Liel , a former director general of the foreign ministry .
“ If you try to fool the new administration , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be paid for a blitz .
”

TEL AVIV, Israel—For nearly four years, U.S. President Donald Trump’s Middle East policy—from axing the Iran nuclear deal to marginalizing Palestinians to brokering normalization deals between Israel and Gulf Arab states—has been the gift that keeps on giving for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
TEL AVIV, Israel—For nearly four years, U.S. President Donald Trump’s Middle East policy—from axing the Iran nuclear deal to marginalizing Palestinians to brokering normalization deals between Israel and Gulf Arab states—has been the gift that keeps on giving for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The policies have helped endear Trump to his evangelical base and allowed Netanyahu to advance his hard-line agenda.
Now, with Trump raging over baseless claims that the U.S. election was “stolen,” some officials and analysts are worried that he’ll use the last 10 weeks of his term to grant more favors to Netanyahu—on Iran and on Jewish settlements in the West Bank—that could complicate President-elect Joe Biden’s approach to the region or, worse, tip it further into chaos.
“Netanyahu hopes to get other things from the Trump administration in the weeks that remain,” said Moav Vardi, an international affairs reporter for Israel’s public broadcaster. “There are a number of issues on the agenda.”
The two sides are already discussing a new round of sanctions on Iran, an issue that reportedly came up during a stop in Jerusalem this week by the U.S. special representative for Iran, Elliott Abrams. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will follow up with a visit to Israel on Nov. 18.
But sanctions might not be the only thing Trump is planning. His recent dismissal of Defense Secretary Mark Esper has spurred speculation that the president might be considering a military attack on Iran.
Netanyahu, long concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, has been agitating for war against the Islamic republic for years.
In addition to pressuring Iran, the Trump administration could still help the Israeli leader by brokering a new diplomatic opening in the Arab world or by looking the other way while Israel takes steps to expand Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
That slate of potential unfinished business might help explain Netanyahu’s silence for more than 12 hours after U.S. news organizations over the weekend projected Biden as the winner in the election, Vardi said.
Netanyahu was among the first foreign leaders to congratulate Trump in 2016. When he finally broke his silence on Sunday morning Israel time, he refrained from referring to Biden as the president-elect. And he paired his congratulations with gratitude to Trump for “the friendship you have shown the state of Israel and me personally … and for bringing the American-Israeli alliance to unprecedented heights.”
The deference to the president, who has refused to concede the race, reflects Netanyahu’s debt to Trump for the diplomatic windfall bequeathed to Israel—like normalization with the United Arab Emirates or the controversial recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital—political presents no previous U.S. president would have dared to bestow.
“You don’t want to be the first world leader to send congratulations,” Vardi said. “To congratulate Biden, it would have been like turning his back or insulting him. Then Trump won’t want to involve himself” on the issues that matter to the Israeli prime minister.
The pause wasn’t lost on alumni of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East.
“I wondered whether @netanyahu’s 12 hour delayed, half-hearted congrats to @joebiden was because he was expecting Trump to do something for him in his last days,” tweeted Martin Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel. “Turns out he was cooking up more sanctions on Iran w Pompeo. Wonder what else is in the pipeline.”
Yet analysts noted that Netanyahu is likely to tread carefully for fear of getting off on the wrong foot with the new administration. Despite personal ties with the president-elect, Netanyahu is seen as having thrown in his lot with the Republican Party. Memories linger of the vice presidential visit to Israel in 2010, when Netanyahu’s government famously snubbed Biden by announcing settlement-building in East Jerusalem.
The current talks between Israel and the United States reportedly involve sanctions targeting individuals and entities associated with Iran’s ballistic missile program—measures that could potentially hamper an effort by the Biden administration to reengage diplomatically with Iran on its nuclear program. Trump in 2018 abandoned the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by members of the Obama administration. Netanyahu, long critical of the deal, applauded the decision.
“It’s very clear that Trump and Israel would do anything in their power to make going back to a deal with Iran impossible,” said Shira Efron, a policy fellow at the Israel Policy Forum. “They are going to sanction things that would be difficult for Biden to unravel.”
It wouldn’t be the first time a U.S. president embarked on a lame-duck policy move that ruffled feathers in the region. In January 2001, weeks before his term expired, President Bill Clinton published his parameters for a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. In December 2016, the Obama administration abstained on a seminal United Nations Security Council resolution calling Israeli settlements in the West Bank a “flagrant violation” of international law, outraging both Netanyahu and Trump.
There’s also speculation that Netanyahu and Trump administration officials might be working toward normalization deals with other Arab countries, after security agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan. Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen told Israel Radio recently that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Morocco, and Oman could come next and expressed hope that the next administration would continue the policy.
Trump’s lame-duck period comes at a sensitive political juncture in Israel. The government could unravel in the coming weeks over the passage of a new budget, forcing Israel into yet another election—the fourth since early 2019. Parting gifts from the Trump administration could provide Netanyahu with political momentum ahead of a vote. At the same time, the prospect of conflicts with the incoming Biden administration—over a new Iran deal or West Bank settlements—could help Netanyahu argue to voters that he alone is capable of standing up to international pressure.
“Bibi is going to be more domestically vulnerable with a Biden administration. This interim period might affect our political stability,” said Jonathan Rynhold, a political science professor focusing on Israel-U.S. ties at Bar-Ilan University, referring to Netanyahu by his nickname. He said political favors from Trump could help Netanyahu in a coming Israeli election.
They could also help Trump cement his foreign-policy legacy while having the added benefit of complicating Biden’s job.
For Palestinians, the concern is mainly focused on settlement expansion. Relations between the United States and the Palestinians reached a low point over the past four years, with Trump cutting funds to the Palestinian Authority, closing the Palestinian diplomatic mission in the United States, and issuing a peace proposal that envisioned Israeli annexation of wide swaths of the West Bank.
Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, called Trump’s defeat a “momentous occasion” but expressed worry about the lame-duck period.
“It’s very scary. Because these guys have no restraints,” she said in an interview. “They are hellbent on giving everything to Israel and creating the facts on the ground.”
Indeed, right-wing politicians have called on Netanyahu to persuade the Trump administration to greenlight annexation of parts of the West Bank.
While that’s seen as unlikely because it could jeopardize ties between Israel and the UAE, Trump could give his consent to more subtle moves, including settlement construction in areas that foreclose on any possibility of a Palestinian state or U.S. recognition of hilltop outposts that are disputed even under Israeli law.
U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman, a Trump associate and patron of the settlers, may also push for U.S. steps aimed at further normalizing Israel’s presence in the West Bank, like an agreement signed in October allowing U.S. research money to go to Ariel University in the West Bank.
“I would be watching David Friedman because he was the architect of this relationship. He would be looking for last-minute achievements,” said Tal Shalev, a political reporter for Walla! News, an Israeli online website. “One can assume that Bibi and David Friedman will try to get as much done to mark changes on the ground.”
A spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in Israel did not respond to queries on the issue.
One dovish former Israeli diplomat urged caution when it comes to parting gifts from Trump.
“Even if there are no Israeli fingerprints, it can be costly,” said Alon Liel, a former director general of the foreign ministry. “If you try to fool the new administration, it will hurt you. There are prices to be paid for a blitz.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-10--Afghans Caught in the Crossfire While U.S. Prepares to Clear Out

Afghans Caught in the Crossfire While U.S .
Prepares to Clear Out When Ejaz Malikzada got home from work last Saturday , his wife was in tears and his father was so ill he had to be taken to the hospital .
Both have begged him for months to quit his job , quit social media , keep a low profile , even leave the country—anything to avoid becoming a statistic in Afghanistan ’ s worsening war .
Malikzada , 26 , works in the office of Afghanistan ’ s First Vice President Amrullah Saleh , the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Taliban .
Since reaching a peace deal with the United States earlier this year , the Taliban have gone on a rampage—against Afghans .
As terrorist attacks and assassinations become more frequent—one car bombing early Saturday killed Yama Siawash , a 36-year-old former television presenter who ’ d just joined the central bank—Malikzada ’ s family fears he will be next .
The near misses are growing , he acknowledges , while his odds are growing shorter .
But he remains defiant .
“ The more they do it , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacks , “ the more you want to raise your voice.
” In the two months since the Afghan government sent representatives to Doha , Qatar , to meet with Taliban leaders to discuss an end to the war , the violence has only intensified .
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ( SIGAR ) in its latest quarterly report says that “ average daily enemy-initiated attacks … were 50 % higher ” in the July-September quarter than the previous three months , with 876 deaths .
SIGAR said the “ high @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an ongoing peace process and despite Taliban commitments to reduce violence.
” Across the country , the story is the same , with attacks on Afghan forces , sieges of southern regions including Helmand and Kandahar , assassinations of officials and their relatives , and the inevitable collateral damage of dead and wounded civilians .
Like many Afghans , Malikzada has lost friends , relatives , and colleagues in terrorist attacks over the years .
He was on his way to a birthday party at the American University of Afghanistan on Aug. 24 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by gunmen who killed 17 people .
“ I lost friends , teachers , a lot of the people who died were my friends , ” Malikzada said .
Weeks earlier , he was in Kabul ’ s Deh Mazang Square when an attack on a protest march of ethnic Shiite Hazaras killed almost 100 people .
“ I was in the middle of the roundabout and had to carry dead bodies and wounded people , ” he said .
He wasn ’ t far from his boss ’ s office on July @ @ @ @ @ @ @ detonated a car full of explosives , destroying the building and killing at least 20 people .
He often used to see Fatima Khalil , 24 , who worked for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission , in a local cafe until she and her driver were murdered in a bomb attack on June 27 this year .
“ Every new attack is a reminder of past traumas , ” Malikzada said .
Meanwhile , the U.S. and NATO coalition that has maintained a military presence in the country since 2001 is pulling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plans to withdraw all of its troops by early next year .
“ As the international community , do you even care ?
” Malikzada asked .
“ What are they going to do for us beyond offering ‘ heartfelt condolences ’ ?
That does nothing .
It is just empty words .
It is increasing pressure on us to give up.
” When the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement on Feb. 29 that led to the talks between Kabul and the insurgents in mid-September , the Taliban agreed not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States agreed to pull troops out .
Though the Taliban have largely avoided attacking U.S. forces , they have redoubled their attacks on Afghan troops and civilians .
SIGAR noted that senior U.S. officials , including then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , have said “ the level of Taliban violence was ‘ too high , ’ contrary with the Taliban ’ s broader commitments in the … agreement to reduce violence.
” SIGAR ’ s report , quoting the U.S. Department of Defense , accuses the Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against Afghan security forces that “ it perceives is within the bounds of the agreement , probably to encourage a U.S. troop withdrawal and set favorable conditions for a post-withdrawal Afghanistan.
” There is little doubt among the U.S. military and political establishment that Taliban leaders could curtail the killing if they chose—two short cease-fires this year demonstrated “ the Taliban ’ s ability to exert command and control of their fighters , ” the report noted .
Their failure to do so could put the whole peace deal in jeopardy .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believes violence has reached such an “ unacceptably ” high level that “ it could undermine the agreement.
” Few Afghans would disagree with that assessment , though they see no consequences for the Taliban ’ s continued attacks .
The Doha talks are deadlocked as both sides play for time amid America ’ s own political impasse .
The U.S. drawdown continues apace .
Afghans continue to die .
As authority drains away from Afghan President Ashraf Ghani , who was excluded from the U.S.-Taliban talks , fears grow , too , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kabul will undermine what progress has been made since 2001 for women , rights activists , media , and minorities .
Malikzada said he wondered if the attack in May on a Kabul maternity hospital , killing newborns and women in labor , was not enough to shut down the talks , what is ?
“ The purpose of the attacks is to spread fear .
The odds of me becoming a target are growing , it is going to be me one day , but I ’ m going to keep fighting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Malikzada said .
“ This is my home .
I could leave , but why should I ?
I don ’ t see any way out of this , apart from fighting back .
Leaving and giving up is not the way , ” he added .
“ I and people like me are the ones who are able to fight .
If we leave , who picks up the fight ?
”

When Ejaz Malikzada got home from work last Saturday, his wife was in tears and his father was so ill he had to be taken to the hospital. Both have begged him for months to quit his job, quit social media, keep a low profile, even leave the country—anything to avoid becoming a statistic in Afghanistan’s worsening war.
When Ejaz Malikzada got home from work last Saturday, his wife was in tears and his father was so ill he had to be taken to the hospital. Both have begged him for months to quit his job, quit social media, keep a low profile, even leave the country—anything to avoid becoming a statistic in Afghanistan’s worsening war.
Malikzada, 26, works in the office of Afghanistan’s First Vice President Amrullah Saleh, the country’s former spy chief and an uncompromising critic of the Taliban. Since reaching a peace deal with the United States earlier this year, the Taliban have gone on a rampage—against Afghans.
As terrorist attacks and assassinations become more frequent—one car bombing early Saturday killed Yama Siawash, a 36-year-old former television presenter who’d just joined the central bank—Malikzada’s family fears he will be next.
The near misses are growing, he acknowledges, while his odds are growing shorter. But he remains defiant. “The more they do it,” he said of the Taliban’s attacks, “the more you want to raise your voice.”
In the two months since the Afghan government sent representatives to Doha, Qatar, to meet with Taliban leaders to discuss an end to the war, the violence has only intensified.
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in its latest quarterly report says that “average daily enemy-initiated attacks … were 50% higher” in the July-September quarter than the previous three months, with 876 deaths. SIGAR said the “high figures are notable because they occurred during an ongoing peace process and despite Taliban commitments to reduce violence.”
Across the country, the story is the same, with attacks on Afghan forces, sieges of southern regions including Helmand and Kandahar, assassinations of officials and their relatives, and the inevitable collateral damage of dead and wounded civilians.
Like many Afghans, Malikzada has lost friends, relatives, and colleagues in terrorist attacks over the years. He was on his way to a birthday party at the American University of Afghanistan on Aug. 24, 2016, when it was attacked by gunmen who killed 17 people. “I lost friends, teachers, a lot of the people who died were my friends,” Malikzada said.
Weeks earlier, he was in Kabul’s Deh Mazang Square when an attack on a protest march of ethnic Shiite Hazaras killed almost 100 people. “I was in the middle of the roundabout and had to carry dead bodies and wounded people,” he said.
He wasn’t far from his boss’s office on July 28 last year when a suicide bomber detonated a car full of explosives, destroying the building and killing at least 20 people. He often used to see Fatima Khalil, 24, who worked for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, in a local cafe until she and her driver were murdered in a bomb attack on June 27 this year.
“Every new attack is a reminder of past traumas,” Malikzada said.
Meanwhile, the U.S. and NATO coalition that has maintained a military presence in the country since 2001 is pulling up the stakes as the United States plans to withdraw all of its troops by early next year.
“As the international community, do you even care?” Malikzada asked. “What are they going to do for us beyond offering ‘heartfelt condolences’? That does nothing. It is just empty words. It is increasing pressure on us to give up.”
When the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement on Feb. 29 that led to the talks between Kabul and the insurgents in mid-September, the Taliban agreed not to attack U.S. forces, and the United States agreed to pull troops out.
Though the Taliban have largely avoided attacking U.S. forces, they have redoubled their attacks on Afghan troops and civilians. SIGAR noted that senior U.S. officials, including then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have said “the level of Taliban violence was ‘too high,’ contrary with the Taliban’s broader commitments in the … agreement to reduce violence.”
SIGAR’s report, quoting the U.S. Department of Defense, accuses the Taliban of exerting a calculated level of violence against Afghan security forces that “it perceives is within the bounds of the agreement, probably to encourage a U.S. troop withdrawal and set favorable conditions for a post-withdrawal Afghanistan.”
There is little doubt among the U.S. military and political establishment that Taliban leaders could curtail the killing if they chose—two short cease-fires this year demonstrated “the Taliban’s ability to exert command and control of their fighters,” the report noted.
Their failure to do so could put the whole peace deal in jeopardy. The Defense Department, according to SIGAR, believes violence has reached such an “unacceptably” high level that “it could undermine the agreement.”
Few Afghans would disagree with that assessment, though they see no consequences for the Taliban’s continued attacks. The Doha talks are deadlocked as both sides play for time amid America’s own political impasse. The U.S. drawdown continues apace. Afghans continue to die.
As authority drains away from Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, who was excluded from the U.S.-Taliban talks, fears grow, too, that a Taliban return to power in Kabul will undermine what progress has been made since 2001 for women, rights activists, media, and minorities.
Malikzada said he wondered if the attack in May on a Kabul maternity hospital, killing newborns and women in labor, was not enough to shut down the talks, what is?
“The purpose of the attacks is to spread fear. The odds of me becoming a target are growing, it is going to be me one day, but I’m going to keep fighting to do what I can,” Malikzada said.
“This is my home. I could leave, but why should I? I don’t see any way out of this, apart from fighting back. Leaving and giving up is not the way,” he added.
“I and people like me are the ones who are able to fight. If we leave, who picks up the fight?”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-10--More Top Pentagon Officials Out After Trump Sacks Esper

More Top Pentagon Officials Out After Trump Sacks Esper The U.S. Department of Defense ’ s top policy official was dismissed on Tuesday , three sources familiar with the move said , one day after President Donald Trump terminated his Senate-confirmed defense secretary in a mid-morning tweet .
James Anderson , who was confirmed as deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and was elevated to serve as an acting official in the top policy job , was forced out on Tuesday after a tumultuous relationship with the White House .
Anderson , a former George W. Bush administration official , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new Trump appointees seen as loyal to the White House .
Anthony Tata , a Trump loyalist , conspiracy theorist , and former Fox News contributor was appointed to serve in an interim role as the No .
2 official in the Pentagon ’ s powerful policy shop after his nomination to the undersecretary role was withdrawn over conspiratorial and Islamophobic comments .
With Anderson ’ s ouster , Tata is now performing the duties of the top policy job , current and former officials said .
Officials feared Tata ’ s elevation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demand more resignations across the department .
The rapid-fire personnel changes at the Pentagon are emblematic of overall confusion and unease at the president ’ s refusal to accept the election results , officials said .
Trump insists the election results are not final , alleging baseless claims of voter fraud .
Even as President-elect Joe Biden fields congratulatory calls and messages from foreign leaders around the world , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stuck by the president ’ s claims , saying in a press conference on Tuesday : “ There will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration.
” In his internal resignation letter , Anderson praised the “ dedicated team of national security professionals ” he worked with and said “ [ i ] t is clear that despite profound national security and defense challenges , America is more secure than it was four years ago.
” He also appeared to offer a subtle hint at the legal and ethical challenges facing Trump appointees who are caught in a bind as Biden tries to begin the formal transition process .
Trump continues to refuse to concede his defeat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials across the administration against cooperating in a transition .
“ Now , as ever , our long-term success depends on adhering to the U.S. Constitution all public servants swear to defend , ” Anderson wrote .
Multiple current and former officials said that he was given the option to resign or be fired by Christopher Miller , the new acting Pentagon chief , Trump ’ s fifth in less than four years .
Anderson ’ s ouster—which officials said he expected for weeks—is anticipated to be among the spate of other potential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expect to come .
Joseph Kernan , the agency ’ s top intelligence official , and Jen Stewart , outgoing Defense Secretary Mark Esper ’ s former chief of staff , are also expected to be removed .
The ouster of Stewart , who was just named to head up the Pentagon ’ s transition team to the incoming Biden administration , could further disrupt the turnover of the agency , which has already been interrupted by the Trump administration .
Pentagon officials have been told they can have no contact with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Administration certifies the results of last week ’ s election to greenlight the formal transition process .
The Pentagon confirmed the moves in a statement late Tuesday .
Politico was the first to report the news of Anderson ’ s ouster .
A defense official confirmed that Anderson had resigned but did not immediately respond to further inquiries .
The White House recently froze a hold on new appointees at the Pentagon at the deputy assistant secretary level and above , likely in preparation for Esper ’ s firing , two officials said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House Presidential Personnel Office , led by former Trump body man John McEntee , who sought to insert unqualified Trump loyalists into top policy jobs .
Those included Tata and Rich Higgins , a former National Security Council staffer known for circulating a conspiratorial memo , whom the Pentagon ’ s liaison office directed the policy shop to hire as chief of staff in May .
The policy office under Anderson also pushed back on the hiring of Frank Wuco , a former State Department official and radio host known for posing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was eventually hired to a front office job at the U.S. Agency for Global Media .
But recently the battles have only gotten more intense , prompting Anderson ’ s ouster .
For instance , Anderson stood up for Michael Ryan , the Pentagon ’ s top Europe and NATO official , who was also pushed out of the building early this month , officials said .
He was replaced by Andrew Winternitz , a career defense official , according to his LinkedIn profile .
Anderson , who anticipated his ouster in advance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pentagon weeks ago—and others have done the same .
Tata ’ s nomination for the job foundered over the summer after he faced criticism from lawmakers for offensive and conspiratorial social media posts , including falsely claiming that former CIA Director John Brennan ordered the assassination of Trump via a coded message on social media .
Tata apologized for his remarks in a letter to the leaders of the Senate Armed Services Committee .
Yet with Tata moving into the top job , he is expected to bring more loyalists along with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Security Council official also who worked to help House Republicans attempt to discredit the investigation into ties between the Trump campaign and Russia , would potentially move into Stewart ’ s role as chief of staff to the new acting Defense Secretary Miller , who also worked on the National Security Council , one current U.S. official and former senior administration official briefed on the matter said .
Taking over for Kernan in the top intelligence job will be Ezra Cohen-Watnick , the acting civilian official overseeing special forces who joined the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been forced off of the Michael Flynn-era National Security Council after the retired Army lieutenant general was fired and indicted by the FBI .
Tata ’ s new deputy will be Thomas Williams , the Pentagon said in a statement .
Anderson ’ s ouster continues a trend of the White House overruling the Pentagon to fill key policy positions with officials loyal to Trump , headlined by the ouster of Esper .
In September , the Pentagon ’ s White House Liaison Office was remade with less experienced officials loyal only to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ John Rood , was also pushed out earlier this year .
“ They are filling all of the positions with political types not policy people , ” said a former senior administration official , speaking on the condition of anonymity .
“ So they are the crew they sent over from the [ White House ] .
” The ousters come a day after Trump announced he was firing Esper on Twitter , saying that he had been “ terminated ” and would be replaced in an acting capacity by Miller , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Trump and Esper ’ s relationship had soured over the past several months , stemming from concerns that the defense secretary was not sufficiently loyal to the White House .
While Miller , the new acting secretary , is not seen as overtly political , he has won over Trump loyalists because of his long track record on counterterrorism—dating back to his combat tours as a special forces officer during the initial invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq—and his easygoing demeanor , officials said .
Though he had a good relationship with Anderson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pentagon ’ s top acting civilian official overseeing special operations and low-intensity conflict , he was under significant pressure to remove the acting policy chief after the election .
“ This will be disruptive to the transition process in that what has always been followed is the outgoing [ defense secretary ] stays in place until the incoming [ defense secretary ] is confirmed and appointed like Carter and Mattis , ” said Arnold Punaro , a retired Marine major general and former staff director for the Senate Armed Services Committee .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ almost four years , and Secretary of Defense for over a year .
Miller will not have the knowledge or level of detail for transition discussions , and he will only be there 73 days before he is replaced on January 20th.
” The Pentagon is not the only agency in turmoil .
The Justice Department ’ s top election crimes prosecutor quit in protest Monday night after Attorney General Bill Barr called on U.S. prosecutors to take account of election irregularities before the Electoral College certifies Biden as the winner of last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s embarrassing for the United States .
I was a CIA officer for 26 years , ” said Marc Polymeropoulos , a former senior officer with the intelligence agency .
“ These are the [ situation reports ] that I ’ d be writing about a dictator who ’ s mad at his defense minister and has his interior minister fire him .
It ’ s like something out of the Middle East.
” Update , Nov. 10 , 2020 : This article was updated with further details on transition-period personnel changes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Update , Nov. 10 , 2020 : This article was updated to provide information from a Defense Department statement .

The U.S. Department of Defense’s top policy official was dismissed on Tuesday, three sources familiar with the move said, one day after President Donald Trump terminated his Senate-confirmed defense secretary in a mid-morning tweet.
The U.S. Department of Defense’s top policy official was dismissed on Tuesday, three sources familiar with the move said, one day after President Donald Trump terminated his Senate-confirmed defense secretary in a mid-morning tweet.
James Anderson, who was confirmed as deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and was elevated to serve as an acting official in the top policy job, was forced out on Tuesday after a tumultuous relationship with the White House. Anderson, a former George W. Bush administration official, had pushed back on a series of new Trump appointees seen as loyal to the White House.
Anthony Tata, a Trump loyalist, conspiracy theorist, and former Fox News contributor was appointed to serve in an interim role as the No. 2 official in the Pentagon’s powerful policy shop after his nomination to the undersecretary role was withdrawn over conspiratorial and Islamophobic comments. With Anderson’s ouster, Tata is now performing the duties of the top policy job, current and former officials said. Officials feared Tata’s elevation could put him in a position to demand more resignations across the department.
The rapid-fire personnel changes at the Pentagon are emblematic of overall confusion and unease at the president’s refusal to accept the election results, officials said. Trump insists the election results are not final, alleging baseless claims of voter fraud. Even as President-elect Joe Biden fields congratulatory calls and messages from foreign leaders around the world, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stuck by the president’s claims, saying in a press conference on Tuesday: “There will be a smooth transition to a second Trump administration.”
In his internal resignation letter, Anderson praised the “dedicated team of national security professionals” he worked with and said “[i]t is clear that despite profound national security and defense challenges, America is more secure than it was four years ago.”
He also appeared to offer a subtle hint at the legal and ethical challenges facing Trump appointees who are caught in a bind as Biden tries to begin the formal transition process. Trump continues to refuse to concede his defeat, and his top aides have warned officials across the administration against cooperating in a transition.
“Now, as ever, our long-term success depends on adhering to the U.S. Constitution all public servants swear to defend,” Anderson wrote. Multiple current and former officials said that he was given the option to resign or be fired by Christopher Miller, the new acting Pentagon chief, Trump’s fifth in less than four years.
Anderson’s ouster—which officials said he expected for weeks—is anticipated to be among the spate of other potential firings that some current and former officials expect to come. Joseph Kernan, the agency’s top intelligence official, and Jen Stewart, outgoing Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s former chief of staff, are also expected to be removed. The ouster of Stewart, who was just named to head up the Pentagon’s transition team to the incoming Biden administration, could further disrupt the turnover of the agency, which has already been interrupted by the Trump administration. Pentagon officials have been told they can have no contact with the incoming Biden team until the General Services Administration certifies the results of last week’s election to greenlight the formal transition process. The Pentagon confirmed the moves in a statement late Tuesday.
Politico was the first to report the news of Anderson’s ouster. A defense official confirmed that Anderson had resigned but did not immediately respond to further inquiries. The White House recently froze a hold on new appointees at the Pentagon at the deputy assistant secretary level and above, likely in preparation for Esper’s firing, two officials said.
Anderson had long clashed with the White House Presidential Personnel Office, led by former Trump body man John McEntee, who sought to insert unqualified Trump loyalists into top policy jobs. Those included Tata and Rich Higgins, a former National Security Council staffer known for circulating a conspiratorial memo, whom the Pentagon’s liaison office directed the policy shop to hire as chief of staff in May. The policy office under Anderson also pushed back on the hiring of Frank Wuco, a former State Department official and radio host known for posing as a fictional jihadi, and who was eventually hired to a front office job at the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
But recently the battles have only gotten more intense, prompting Anderson’s ouster. For instance, Anderson stood up for Michael Ryan, the Pentagon’s top Europe and NATO official, who was also pushed out of the building early this month, officials said. He was replaced by Andrew Winternitz, a career defense official, according to his LinkedIn profile. Anderson, who anticipated his ouster in advance, began moving his belongings out of the Pentagon weeks ago—and others have done the same.
Tata’s nomination for the job foundered over the summer after he faced criticism from lawmakers for offensive and conspiratorial social media posts, including falsely claiming that former CIA Director John Brennan ordered the assassination of Trump via a coded message on social media. Tata apologized for his remarks in a letter to the leaders of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Yet with Tata moving into the top job, he is expected to bring more loyalists along with him.
Kash Patel, a former National Security Council official also who worked to help House Republicans attempt to discredit the investigation into ties between the Trump campaign and Russia, would potentially move into Stewart’s role as chief of staff to the new acting Defense Secretary Miller, who also worked on the National Security Council, one current U.S. official and former senior administration official briefed on the matter said. Taking over for Kernan in the top intelligence job will be Ezra Cohen-Watnick, the acting civilian official overseeing special forces who joined the Pentagon in May. He had previously been forced off of the Michael Flynn-era National Security Council after the retired Army lieutenant general was fired and indicted by the FBI. Tata’s new deputy will be Thomas Williams, the Pentagon said in a statement.
Anderson’s ouster continues a trend of the White House overruling the Pentagon to fill key policy positions with officials loyal to Trump, headlined by the ouster of Esper. In September, the Pentagon’s White House Liaison Office was remade with less experienced officials loyal only to Trump. Anderson’s predecessor, John Rood, was also pushed out earlier this year.
“They are filling all of the positions with political types not policy people,” said a former senior administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “So they are the crew they sent over from the [White House].”
The ousters come a day after Trump announced he was firing Esper on Twitter, saying that he had been “terminated” and would be replaced in an acting capacity by Miller, the current director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Trump and Esper’s relationship had soured over the past several months, stemming from concerns that the defense secretary was not sufficiently loyal to the White House.
While Miller, the new acting secretary, is not seen as overtly political, he has won over Trump loyalists because of his long track record on counterterrorism—dating back to his combat tours as a special forces officer during the initial invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq—and his easygoing demeanor, officials said. Though he had a good relationship with Anderson when he briefly filled in as the Pentagon’s top acting civilian official overseeing special operations and low-intensity conflict, he was under significant pressure to remove the acting policy chief after the election.
“This will be disruptive to the transition process in that what has always been followed is the outgoing [defense secretary] stays in place until the incoming [defense secretary] is confirmed and appointed like Carter and Mattis,” said Arnold Punaro, a retired Marine major general and former staff director for the Senate Armed Services Committee. “Esper has been in the Pentagon for almost four years, and Secretary of Defense for over a year. Miller will not have the knowledge or level of detail for transition discussions, and he will only be there 73 days before he is replaced on January 20th.”
The Pentagon is not the only agency in turmoil. The Justice Department’s top election crimes prosecutor quit in protest Monday night after Attorney General Bill Barr called on U.S. prosecutors to take account of election irregularities before the Electoral College certifies Biden as the winner of last week’s vote.
“It’s embarrassing for the United States. I was a CIA officer for 26 years,” said Marc Polymeropoulos, a former senior officer with the intelligence agency. “These are the [situation reports] that I’d be writing about a dictator who’s mad at his defense minister and has his interior minister fire him. It’s like something out of the Middle East.”
Update, Nov. 10, 2020: This article was updated with further details on transition-period personnel changes at the U.S. Department of Defense.
Update, Nov. 10, 2020: This article was updated to provide information from a Defense Department statement.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-10--How to Refute Vote Fraud Claims Like Trump’s

How to Refute Vote Fraud Claims Like Trump ’ s This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Since Joe Biden was declared U.S. President-elect on Saturday , outgoing President Donald Trump and his Republican allies have doubled down on their baseless allegations that the voting process was fraudulent and that Biden is “ stealing ” the election with “ illegal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in certain countries around the world , where voting fraud is often alleged in problematic elections—with or without basis .
In fact , allegations of vote manipulation are a classic characteristic of elections in struggling democracies and authoritarian states .
But election monitors in such countries have ways to verify the vote count that generally make it possible to detect any significant cheating in the aggregation of election results .
This allows them to quickly assess the probability of any claims of voting irregularities or fraud—and their potential effect on the election outcome @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is no basis for any of Trump ’ s claims of systematic fraud , could such techniques have worked in the 2020 U.S. election to assess the possibility of fraud , even if only to refute the claims ?
Unfortunately , highly effective techniques used to verify the vote count in other countries either do not work in the U.S. election system or have not been widely attempted .
Since the 1980s , election-monitoring organizations such as Democracy International , of which I am president , have conducted a form of vote-count verification @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
Also known as quick counts , PVTs assess the accuracy or verify the integrity of election results as reported by electoral authorities in controversial elections .
The way they work is that local election observers at a sample of polling stations observe the actual balloting and counting , and then independently report the local polling station results .
This enables the monitoring organization to independently assess the accuracy of the aggregated , reported results within statistically significant margins of error .
While PVTs can ’ t replace a recount when the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any systematic false reporting of the actual results , the main method in which elections have been manipulated in problematic elections around the world .
Could the United States deploy PVTs to increase trust in the voting process and prevent frivolous and destructive claims of election fraud from gaining traction ?
Unfortunately , there are several ways in which elections are currently different in the United States from most other countries in which PVTs are used .
For one thing , because each U.S. state does its own vote count instead of having @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in most other countries , there would need to be a separate , statistically significant PVT for each swing state .
That greatly increases the complexity and expense .
More fundamentally , PVTs work best for elections that use paper ballots deposited into physical ballot boxes .
When elections are run using multiple technologies and highly automated vote counts , as they are in most U.S. states , PVTs would require significantly different techniques .
In the United States , there are extensive efforts by the national media to collect enough local information @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Since these calls shape public perceptions , this would suggest the possibility of problems if election authorities reported different outcomes .
But unlike PVTs , these calls are not based on independent observation of the balloting and counting , but on a statistical analysis of the authorities ’ preliminary results .
Because media projections are , in effect , only reporting the aggregation of counts by local and state authorities , they don ’ t provide much information about whether there were problems with those local vote counts .
And of course , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack from Trump as well .
Another way monitoring organizations around the world often draw inferences about election integrity is by looking at exit polls and public opinion surveys .
In an exit poll , researchers ask selected voters from a sample of polling places about how they have just voted .
The researchers can then compare the findings to reported results .
( Some U.S. media projections use exit polling as part of their process as well . )
In some cases , international observers have pointed to a divergence between pre-election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the authorities as a basis for questioning the latter .
The current elections in the United States , however , call into question the accuracy of pre-election polling rather than the other way around .
No one is using pre-election polling numbers that favored Biden in order to suggest that the vote has been manipulated to favor Trump .
Likewise , few would believe that exit poll numbers could be used to challenge the integrity of reported election results .
Moreover , any polling or sample-based process would be too blunt an instrument @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the likelihood of fraud in the count in a very close election , as in most of the states where the process is currently under scrutiny , such as Georgia and Wisconsin .
To assess the legitimacy of Trump ’ s attacks on the vote count in the current election , Americans will need to trust the integrity of state and local election officials conducting in the count and to rely on the results of the counts and potential recounts as witnessed by representatives of both parties .
Fortunately , we have no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ every reason to believe that these officials are fully committed to the integrity of the process .

Since Joe Biden was declared U.S. President-elect on Saturday, outgoing President Donald Trump and his Republican allies have doubled down on their baseless allegations that the voting process was fraudulent and that Biden is “stealing” the election with “illegal” votes. This is not unusual in certain countries around the world, where voting fraud is often alleged in problematic elections—with or without basis. In fact, allegations of vote manipulation are a classic characteristic of elections in struggling democracies and authoritarian states.
Since Joe Biden was declared U.S. President-elect on Saturday, outgoing President Donald Trump and his Republican allies have doubled down on their baseless allegations that the voting process was fraudulent and that Biden is “stealing” the election with “illegal” votes. This is not unusual in certain countries around the world, where voting fraud is often alleged in problematic elections—with or without basis. In fact, allegations of vote manipulation are a classic characteristic of elections in struggling democracies and authoritarian states.
But election monitors in such countries have ways to verify the vote count that generally make it possible to detect any significant cheating in the aggregation of election results. This allows them to quickly assess the probability of any claims of voting irregularities or fraud—and their potential effect on the election outcome.
Leaving aside the fact that there is no basis for any of Trump’s claims of systematic fraud, could such techniques have worked in the 2020 U.S. election to assess the possibility of fraud, even if only to refute the claims? Unfortunately, highly effective techniques used to verify the vote count in other countries either do not work in the U.S. election system or have not been widely attempted.
Since the 1980s, election-monitoring organizations such as Democracy International, of which I am president, have conducted a form of vote-count verification known as parallel vote tabulations (PVTs). Also known as quick counts, PVTs assess the accuracy or verify the integrity of election results as reported by electoral authorities in controversial elections. The way they work is that local election observers at a sample of polling stations observe the actual balloting and counting, and then independently report the local polling station results. This enables the monitoring organization to independently assess the accuracy of the aggregated, reported results within statistically significant margins of error. While PVTs can’t replace a recount when the margin is razor-thin, they generally detect any systematic false reporting of the actual results, the main method in which elections have been manipulated in problematic elections around the world.
Could the United States deploy PVTs to increase trust in the voting process and prevent frivolous and destructive claims of election fraud from gaining traction? Unfortunately, there are several ways in which elections are currently different in the United States from most other countries in which PVTs are used. For one thing, because each U.S. state does its own vote count instead of having a single, nationwide voting system as in most other countries, there would need to be a separate, statistically significant PVT for each swing state. That greatly increases the complexity and expense. More fundamentally, PVTs work best for elections that use paper ballots deposited into physical ballot boxes. When elections are run using multiple technologies and highly automated vote counts, as they are in most U.S. states, PVTs would require significantly different techniques.
In the United States, there are extensive efforts by the national media to collect enough local information to “call” election outcomes. Since these calls shape public perceptions, this would suggest the possibility of problems if election authorities reported different outcomes. But unlike PVTs, these calls are not based on independent observation of the balloting and counting, but on a statistical analysis of the authorities’ preliminary results. Because media projections are, in effect, only reporting the aggregation of counts by local and state authorities, they don’t provide much information about whether there were problems with those local vote counts. And of course, the media’s calls are under attack from Trump as well.
Another way monitoring organizations around the world often draw inferences about election integrity is by looking at exit polls and public opinion surveys. In an exit poll, researchers ask selected voters from a sample of polling places about how they have just voted. The researchers can then compare the findings to reported results. (Some U.S. media projections use exit polling as part of their process as well.) In some cases, international observers have pointed to a divergence between pre-election opinion polls and the results reported by the authorities as a basis for questioning the latter.
The current elections in the United States, however, call into question the accuracy of pre-election polling rather than the other way around. No one is using pre-election polling numbers that favored Biden in order to suggest that the vote has been manipulated to favor Trump. Likewise, few would believe that exit poll numbers could be used to challenge the integrity of reported election results. Moreover, any polling or sample-based process would be too blunt an instrument from which to draw any inferences about the likelihood of fraud in the count in a very close election, as in most of the states where the process is currently under scrutiny, such as Georgia and Wisconsin.
To assess the legitimacy of Trump’s attacks on the vote count in the current election, Americans will need to trust the integrity of state and local election officials conducting in the count and to rely on the results of the counts and potential recounts as witnessed by representatives of both parties. Fortunately, we have no reason so far to question that process—and every reason to believe that these officials are fully committed to the integrity of the process.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-11--Putin Expects a Long Confrontation With America Under Biden

This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Russian President Vladimir Putin has not congratulated U.S. President-elect Joe Biden , and will not do so until outgoing President Donald Trump ’ s legal battle in the U.S. courts is over .
“ We think it ’ s appropriate to wait until an official announcement on the outcome of the election is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explained on Monday .
Even after official congratulations are offered , the Kremlin expects a prolonged confrontation with the United States under the new Biden administration .
Not too many people in Russia ’ s corridors of power will miss the outgoing president , however .
Despite Trump ’ s friendly rhetoric toward Moscow—and especially toward Putin—the United States and its European allies agreed on multiple rounds of economic sanctions against Russia during the Trump administration , and his signing of the Countering America ’ s Adversaries through Sanctions Act has set that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ views on Russia on Capitol Hill , the Kremlin believes that those sanctions are here to stay indefinitely .
In addition , Trump took a wrecking ball to the U.S.-Russian arms control regime , further shrinking a bilateral agenda that had already become very sparse after the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2014 and Russia ’ s annexation of the Crimean peninsula .
The positive aspects of Trump ’ s presidency , from the Kremlin ’ s viewpoint , were the intensified domestic polarization in United States and Washington ’ s increasing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also some positive aspects for Russia in the 2020 election and a Biden presidency .
The election results have shown that the deep divisions in U.S. society are not going anywhere , so the new administration may well be consumed by domestic issues .
The possibility of a Republican-dominated Senate also weakens the incoming administration .
In addition , the long and painful election process and Trump ’ s attacks on it have provided boundless talking points for Russia ’ s domestic propaganda machine aimed at convincing ordinary Russians that their own system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy .
Pragmatists in Putin ’ s government hope that Biden ’ s approach to future sanctions against Russia will be guided by strategy , not just a hostile attitude .
They expect that sanctions will be deployed to punish Moscow for serious missteps , and will be calibrated to minimize side effects such as hurting the economic interests of major European allies or increasing Moscow ’ s dependence on China , which Biden has described as a major challenge for U.S. foreign policy .
Finally , there is now a chance to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which Biden has promised to do unconditionally .
This , however , is where the silver linings of a Biden presidency end—and the long list of Russian worries begins .
Putin has a very negative personal view of the president-elect , fueled by Biden ’ s March 2011 trip to Moscow as vice president .
At a meeting with a group of Russian opposition leaders , Biden reportedly said that Putin ought not to run for president again in 2012 , and that he should instead allow then President Dmitry Medvedev , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Barack Obama , to serve a second term .
This remark , and the fact that it became public via the blog of the ( later murdered ) opposition politician Boris Nemtsov , infuriated Putin .
Then there are the tough views of Biden and his senior Russia advisors on Putin ’ s regime , which are well known and were expressed during the campaign on multiple occasions .
Biden wrote in an article that he wants to focus his foreign-policy agenda on restoring global faith in democracy , and on fighting authoritarianism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that smacks of future efforts to promote democracy and the risk of exposing the hidden wealth of Russian elites with ties to the regime .
Finally , the Russian foreign-policy establishment is aware of the amount of anger that Moscow ’ s interference in the 2016 U.S. election has generated among American foreign-policy professionals , including some core members of Biden ’ s team , and is also aware of the resulting desire to punish the Kremlin and put a bigger price tag on bad behavior .
That said , the new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issues and competition with China , and its precise policy toward Russia will be determined by the team that Biden brings in to take the controls of the U.S. national security machine .
So Moscow ’ s judgment of what to expect from a Biden presidency depends largely on the final composition of the team in charge of U.S. foreign and Russia policy .

Russian President Vladimir Putin has not congratulated U.S. President-elect Joe Biden, and will not do so until outgoing President Donald Trump’s legal battle in the U.S. courts is over. “We think it’s appropriate to wait until an official announcement on the outcome of the election is made,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov explained on Monday. Even after official congratulations are offered, the Kremlin expects a prolonged confrontation with the United States under the new Biden administration.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has not congratulated U.S. President-elect Joe Biden, and will not do so until outgoing President Donald Trump’s legal battle in the U.S. courts is over. “We think it’s appropriate to wait until an official announcement on the outcome of the election is made,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov explained on Monday. Even after official congratulations are offered, the Kremlin expects a prolonged confrontation with the United States under the new Biden administration.
Not too many people in Russia’s corridors of power will miss the outgoing president, however. Despite Trump’s friendly rhetoric toward Moscow—and especially toward Putin—the United States and its European allies agreed on multiple rounds of economic sanctions against Russia during the Trump administration, and his signing of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act has set that regime in stone. Given the dominant views on Russia on Capitol Hill, the Kremlin believes that those sanctions are here to stay indefinitely. In addition, Trump took a wrecking ball to the U.S.-Russian arms control regime, further shrinking a bilateral agenda that had already become very sparse after the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2014 and Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The positive aspects of Trump’s presidency, from the Kremlin’s viewpoint, were the intensified domestic polarization in United States and Washington’s increasing estrangement from its allies.
There are also some positive aspects for Russia in the 2020 election and a Biden presidency. The election results have shown that the deep divisions in U.S. society are not going anywhere, so the new administration may well be consumed by domestic issues. The possibility of a Republican-dominated Senate also weakens the incoming administration. In addition, the long and painful election process and Trump’s attacks on it have provided boundless talking points for Russia’s domestic propaganda machine aimed at convincing ordinary Russians that their own system is far superior to the chaos of democracy.
Pragmatists in Putin’s government hope that Biden’s approach to future sanctions against Russia will be guided by strategy, not just a hostile attitude. They expect that sanctions will be deployed to punish Moscow for serious missteps, and will be calibrated to minimize side effects such as hurting the economic interests of major European allies or increasing Moscow’s dependence on China, which Biden has described as a major challenge for U.S. foreign policy. Finally, there is now a chance to extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which Biden has promised to do unconditionally.
This, however, is where the silver linings of a Biden presidency end—and the long list of Russian worries begins. Putin has a very negative personal view of the president-elect, fueled by Biden’s March 2011 trip to Moscow as vice president. At a meeting with a group of Russian opposition leaders, Biden reportedly said that Putin ought not to run for president again in 2012, and that he should instead allow then President Dmitry Medvedev, who had a good rapport with former President Barack Obama, to serve a second term. This remark, and the fact that it became public via the blog of the (later murdered) opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, infuriated Putin.
Then there are the tough views of Biden and his senior Russia advisors on Putin’s regime, which are well known and were expressed during the campaign on multiple occasions. Biden wrote in an article that he wants to focus his foreign-policy agenda on restoring global faith in democracy, and on fighting authoritarianism and corruption abroad. For the Kremlin, that smacks of future efforts to promote democracy and the risk of exposing the hidden wealth of Russian elites with ties to the regime. Finally, the Russian foreign-policy establishment is aware of the amount of anger that Moscow’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election has generated among American foreign-policy professionals, including some core members of Biden’s team, and is also aware of the resulting desire to punish the Kremlin and put a bigger price tag on bad behavior.
That said, the new administration is likely to focus on domestic issues and competition with China, and its precise policy toward Russia will be determined by the team that Biden brings in to take the controls of the U.S. national security machine. So Moscow’s judgment of what to expect from a Biden presidency depends largely on the final composition of the team in charge of U.S. foreign and Russia policy.