foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--Iran May Be Eyeing the United States’ Soft Underbelly

Iran May Be Eyeing the United States ’ Soft Underbelly Following the U.S. killing of Qassem Suleimani , the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ’ Quds Force , in January , most attention focused on how Iran would react .
Ultimately , the Iranians did so with rocket attacks targeting Iraqi bases where both Iraqi and American troops were stationed .
The attacks did not result in any American deaths ( although soldiers reported traumatic brain injuries ) , and shortly after Iran stated publicly that it had achieved the “ great revenge ” it sought against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe that Tehran is finished with its response to the loss of its high-level military commander , who also held unique political clout in Iran .
Esmail Qaani , Suleimani ’ s replacement as the commander of Iran ’ s elite Quds Force , inherits a deep proxy network of capable actors such as Hezbollah in far-flung places , raising the specter of a retaliatory attack against U.S. interests or U.S. allies abroad .
The Suleimani strike is reminiscent of Israel ’ s targeted assassination of Hezbollah co-founder , and then-secretary-general , Abbas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ responded to that strike by targeting Israeli interests in Latin America , leveraging its Hezbollah proxy network to plan and execute bombings in Buenos Aires in both 1992 and , allegedly , in 1994 .
These strikes were massive and devastating—killing over 100 civilians and wounding several hundred more .
In the wake of the Suleimani killing , Iran may look abroad to seek revenge and could do so again in Latin America , where Hezbollah maintains deep roots .
The United States , Israel , and U.S. Latin American allies must be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the region , given its history of shocking attacks in Argentina .
During a recent visit to Colombia to participate in the Organization of American States ( OAS ) annual ministerial conference on terrorism , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo highlighted Hezbollah ’ s activities in South America and the robust material support the group receives from the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela .
This nexus dates back to the time of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez , who offered Iran a financial workaround during the initial period of U.S. sanctions .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ military doctrine focused on asymmetric warfare , engaged in joint military training , and built the architecture for important illicit pipelines and clandestine networks .
In total , Iran constructed 11 embassies and , by some counts , was involved with over 100 “ unofficial cultural centers ” throughout Latin America .
Iran also works behind the scenes to influence a range of non-Islamic groups throughout Latin America , including the Quebracho group in Argentina .
These groups adhere to a blend of revolutionary and leftist ideologies , and Tehran demonstrates its ideological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Bolivarianism , and anti-Americanism , all of which resonate more directly with these groups .
They also provide Iran with options beyond Hezbollah to conduct acts of sabotage and politically and ideologically motivated violence throughout the Southern Andes .
Hezbollah ’ s presence has been nurtured by high-level political figures such as Tareck El Aissami , former vice president of Venezuela and current minister of industries and national production , who has been accused of encouraging its growth through immigration and the granting of false documents at consulates throughout the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is exploiting gold mines and other resource extraction in Venezuela ’ s Bolivar state .
Much of this gold is ferried out of Venezuela by abusing the diplomatic pouch and operating near-empty flights between Tehran and Caracas .
Recently , the United States sanctioned Conviasa , the Venezuelan state-owned airline in charge of operating the weekly flight nicknamed “ aero-terror , ” aimed strictly at sanctions-busting and the trafficking of weapons , gold , and people .
Beyond Venezuela , Hezbollah also maintains a strong presence in the tri-border area , at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Argentina .
Over time , the group inserted itself into the hemisphere ’ s lucrative drug trafficking and weapons smuggling networks and became key money launderers , activity estimated as of 2003 to generate between $ 300 million and $ 500 million per year for all Islamist groups in the area .
( Under the Obama administration , the Drug Enforcement Administration ceased Project Cassandra , an investigation of Hezbollah ’ s sprawling Latin America network . )
The Clan Barakat group , which laundered money through casinos in the tri-border area and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Hezbollah leadership , demonstrates that Latin America ’ s deeply ingrained organized crime networks and Islamic terrorist groups can work together quite fruitfully .
The tri-border area also served as the planning and staging ground for the two deadliest terrorist attacks on South American soil—the aforementioned bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the bombing of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Aid Society ( AMIA ) in 1994 .
Quite troublingly , the U.S. State Department has highlighted Caracas ’ s lack of cooperation with Washington in counterterrorism efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a highly “ permissive environment for known terrorist groups.
” Maduro has enabled terrorist financial activities on Venezuelan territory .
And Hezbollah is not the only terrorist threat that deserves mention in Latin America .
Colombia recently detained three suspected members of al Qaeda attempting to enter its territory from Venezuela .
The OAS ’ s ministerial conferences have managed to elevate the issue of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere and pushed Latin American governments to take the threat more seriously .
Last year , the Second Hemispheric Ministerial Conference on Terrorism issued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s “ activities in some areas of the Western Hemisphere.
” Argentina played host to the conference—on the 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombings , no less—and , in dramatic fashion , designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization .
Shortly thereafter , Paraguay followed Argentina ’ s Hezbollah designation with one of its own .
After the most recent ministerial conference this year , Colombia , Honduras , and Guatemala all designated the group as a terrorist organization as well .
Brazil and other countries in the region should follow suit , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greater harmonization of the region ’ s legal frameworks for fighting terrorism and the illicit activities that often finance it .
Since an Iranian strike on the U.S. homeland in response to the Suleimani strike would be incredibly difficult to achieve—and would incur harsh American retaliation—most observers expect Iran to call on its deep proxy networks to execute a series of asymmetric attacks against U.S. interests and allies abroad , perhaps spread out over time and space .
If history is any guide , in the quest to continue avenging Suleimani ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consider an attack in Latin America as a means of sending an undeniable signal to the United States—to wit , of its continued capability to escalate with a strike in America ’ s backyard .

Following the U.S. killing of Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, in January, most attention focused on how Iran would react. Ultimately, the Iranians did so with rocket attacks targeting Iraqi bases where both Iraqi and American troops were stationed. The attacks did not result in any American deaths (although soldiers reported traumatic brain injuries), and shortly after Iran stated publicly that it had achieved the “great revenge” it sought against the United States.
Following the U.S. killing of Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, in January, most attention focused on how Iran would react. Ultimately, the Iranians did so with rocket attacks targeting Iraqi bases where both Iraqi and American troops were stationed. The attacks did not result in any American deaths (although soldiers reported traumatic brain injuries), and shortly after Iran stated publicly that it had achieved the “great revenge” it sought against the United States.
Yet few knowledgeable observers believe that Tehran is finished with its response to the loss of its high-level military commander, who also held unique political clout in Iran. Esmail Qaani, Suleimani’s replacement as the commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force, inherits a deep proxy network of capable actors such as Hezbollah in far-flung places, raising the specter of a retaliatory attack against U.S. interests or U.S. allies abroad.
The Suleimani strike is reminiscent of Israel’s targeted assassination of Hezbollah co-founder, and then-secretary-general, Abbas Musawi, in February 1992. Iran responded to that strike by targeting Israeli interests in Latin America, leveraging its Hezbollah proxy network to plan and execute bombings in Buenos Aires in both 1992 and, allegedly, in 1994. These strikes were massive and devastating—killing over 100 civilians and wounding several hundred more. In the wake of the Suleimani killing, Iran may look abroad to seek revenge and could do so again in Latin America, where Hezbollah maintains deep roots. The United States, Israel, and U.S. Latin American allies must be vigilant in defending against potential Iranian retaliation in the region, given its history of shocking attacks in Argentina.
During a recent visit to Colombia to participate in the Organization of American States (OAS) annual ministerial conference on terrorism, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo highlighted Hezbollah’s activities in South America and the robust material support the group receives from the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela. This nexus dates back to the time of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who offered Iran a financial workaround during the initial period of U.S. sanctions. During this period, Iran developed joint military doctrine focused on asymmetric warfare, engaged in joint military training, and built the architecture for important illicit pipelines and clandestine networks. In total, Iran constructed 11 embassies and, by some counts, was involved with over 100 “unofficial cultural centers” throughout Latin America.
Iran also works behind the scenes to influence a range of non-Islamic groups throughout Latin America, including the Quebracho group in Argentina. These groups adhere to a blend of revolutionary and leftist ideologies, and Tehran demonstrates its ideological flexibility by pushing the narrative of anti-imperialism, Bolivarianism, and anti-Americanism, all of which resonate more directly with these groups. They also provide Iran with options beyond Hezbollah to conduct acts of sabotage and politically and ideologically motivated violence throughout the Southern Andes.
Hezbollah’s presence has been nurtured by high-level political figures such as Tareck El Aissami, former vice president of Venezuela and current minister of industries and national production, who has been accused of encouraging its growth through immigration and the granting of false documents at consulates throughout the Middle East. One Maduro opponent has said Hezbollah is exploiting gold mines and other resource extraction in Venezuela’s Bolivar state. Much of this gold is ferried out of Venezuela by abusing the diplomatic pouch and operating near-empty flights between Tehran and Caracas. Recently, the United States sanctioned Conviasa, the Venezuelan state-owned airline in charge of operating the weekly flight nicknamed “aero-terror,” aimed strictly at sanctions-busting and the trafficking of weapons, gold, and people.
Beyond Venezuela, Hezbollah also maintains a strong presence in the tri-border area, at the borders of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. Over time, the group inserted itself into the hemisphere’s lucrative drug trafficking and weapons smuggling networks and became key money launderers, activity estimated as of 2003 to generate between $300 million and $500 million per year for all Islamist groups in the area. (Under the Obama administration, the Drug Enforcement Administration ceased Project Cassandra, an investigation of Hezbollah’s sprawling Latin America network.) The Clan Barakat group, which laundered money through casinos in the tri-border area and whose leader is said to have ties to Hezbollah leadership, demonstrates that Latin America’s deeply ingrained organized crime networks and Islamic terrorist groups can work together quite fruitfully. The tri-border area also served as the planning and staging ground for the two deadliest terrorist attacks on South American soil—the aforementioned bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the bombing of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Aid Society (AMIA) in 1994.
Quite troublingly, the U.S. State Department has highlighted Caracas’s lack of cooperation with Washington in counterterrorism efforts, while also noting that Venezuela maintains a highly “permissive environment for known terrorist groups.” Maduro has enabled terrorist financial activities on Venezuelan territory. And Hezbollah is not the only terrorist threat that deserves mention in Latin America. Colombia recently detained three suspected members of al Qaeda attempting to enter its territory from Venezuela.
The OAS’s ministerial conferences have managed to elevate the issue of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere and pushed Latin American governments to take the threat more seriously. Last year, the Second Hemispheric Ministerial Conference on Terrorism issued a communique with warnings about Hezbollah’s “activities in some areas of the Western Hemisphere.” Argentina played host to the conference—on the 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombings, no less—and, in dramatic fashion, designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Shortly thereafter, Paraguay followed Argentina’s Hezbollah designation with one of its own. After the most recent ministerial conference this year, Colombia, Honduras, and Guatemala all designated the group as a terrorist organization as well. Brazil and other countries in the region should follow suit, and future OAS ministerial conferences should focus on greater harmonization of the region’s legal frameworks for fighting terrorism and the illicit activities that often finance it.
Since an Iranian strike on the U.S. homeland in response to the Suleimani strike would be incredibly difficult to achieve—and would incur harsh American retaliation—most observers expect Iran to call on its deep proxy networks to execute a series of asymmetric attacks against U.S. interests and allies abroad, perhaps spread out over time and space.
If history is any guide, in the quest to continue avenging Suleimani’s death, Iran would be willing to consider an attack in Latin America as a means of sending an undeniable signal to the United States—to wit, of its continued capability to escalate with a strike in America’s backyard.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--Russia’s Defiance Sets the Stage for Oil Price ‘Bloodbath’

Russia surprisingly torpedoed an attempt by big oil producers to cut crude output and stabilize the market , sending the price of oil sharply down on Friday .
Saudi Arabia and other big oil exporters that make up OPEC had agreed on Thursday to further cut their oil output by 1.5 million barrels a day , a desperate attempt to shore up the price of oil as the new coronavirus wreaks havoc on the global economy .
But that agreement was conditional on the support of Russia—which ultimately balked , ending the two-day OPEC meeting in Vienna with no new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ It ’ s time for a good old-fashioned bloodbath , for which Russia deserves all the blame , ” said Matt Reed , the vice president at Foreign Reports , an energy consultancy .
OPEC had planned to make more cuts now and to extend the big production cuts they ’ d made last year , which are set to expire at the end of this month .
After the collapse of talks on Friday , it ’ s not even clear if those previous cuts will remain in place , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oil production that will add more barrels to the market right when they are least needed .
Oil demand in the first half of this year is projected to shrink the most in a decade as the virus outbreak hammers economic activity ( and demand for oil ) all around the world .
Crude prices plummeted by about 8 percent in both New York and London to levels not seen since 2017—and most analysts expect the breakdown of the three-year-old cooperation pact between OPEC and Russia will only send oil prices lower .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for all the major producers that staggered out of Vienna , and especially for U.S. shale oil producers already struggling with low prices .
Friday ’ s collapse was a stunning setback for OPEC , which has since 2016 aggressively managed the supply of oil to keep prices from falling too far as extra supplies from the booming U.S. oil patch threatened to flood the market .
Since 2017 , OPEC has cooperated informally with Russia , one of the world ’ s three biggest oil producers alongside the United States and Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ share the economic pain of pumping fewer barrels of oil .
Russia , which isn ’ t formally a member of OPEC , nevertheless managed to scupper the cartel ’ s efforts to deal with the collapse in oil demand and falling prices .
While Saudi Arabia has already cut production in recent months , and OPEC was prepared to cut a further 1 million barrels a day if Russia made cuts of its own , the big OPEC producers were not willing to unilaterally make bigger sacrifices to shore up the oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ The Saudis weren ’ t going to jump on this grenade alone , or with a small group of reliable Gulf Cooperation Council producers , ” Reed said .
“ ‘ We all sacrifice , or we all suffer , ’ is their thinking.
” Russia and OPEC agreed to continue consulting on oil supplies , but it ’ s not clear when they will meet again .
Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said that countries in OPEC+ , the broader grouping of OPEC plus Russia and some other producers , are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Even though prices are low , individual oil producers have an incentive to pump more oil , hoping that higher volumes will help offset the lower prices .
But when all big producers try to pump their way out of lower prices , it just makes things worse for everyone .
While Russia had been reluctant to make production cuts at this week ’ s meeting , most observers expected that OPEC and Russia would reach a deal in the end , if only because of the sheer magnitude of the economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moscow put those lingering hopes to rest Friday , and with them the three-plus years of cooperation with OPEC that had restored those big oil producers to their traditional role as arbiters of the world ’ s most important commodity market .
“ Russia decided the needed cuts were just too big and didn ’ t want to start down that road , ” said Bob McNally , the president of Rapidan Energy Group , an energy consultancy .
“ They think they can live with the lesser evil of lower prices .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Lower prices will also test Saudi leadership and Saudi Aramco—the largest oil company in the world just debuted on the stock market and was hoping for higher oil prices to boost its profitability and share price .
But some of the biggest losers from the debacle in Vienna are undoubtedly U.S. shale oil producers , which generally need oil prices above $ 50 a barrel to make any money—and which were ironically hoping their OPEC rivals would make production cuts that would help keep shale ’ s head above water .
After @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , U.S. crude prices fell to $ 42 a barrel , and they could keep falling .
Share prices in U.S. shale companies fell sharply Friday after the OPEC meeting collapsed without an agreement .

Russia surprisingly torpedoed an attempt by big oil producers to cut crude output and stabilize the market, sending the price of oil sharply down on Friday.
Russia surprisingly torpedoed an attempt by big oil producers to cut crude output and stabilize the market, sending the price of oil sharply down on Friday.
Saudi Arabia and other big oil exporters that make up OPEC had agreed on Thursday to further cut their oil output by 1.5 million barrels a day, a desperate attempt to shore up the price of oil as the new coronavirus wreaks havoc on the global economy. But that agreement was conditional on the support of Russia—which ultimately balked, ending the two-day OPEC meeting in Vienna with no new agreement and sending crude prices into freefall.
“It’s time for a good old-fashioned bloodbath, for which Russia deserves all the blame,” said Matt Reed, the vice president at Foreign Reports, an energy consultancy.
The bloodbath came on Monday as oil prices plunged by more than 20 percent to the low $30s per barrel after Saudi Arabia declared an all-out price war by sharply cutting the selling price of its crude. The combination of massive oversupply and shrinking demand from the impact of the coronavirus has “no equal in oil market history,” said Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy Agency. The IEA slashed its forecast for global oil demand this year, and said that in a worst-case scenario the economic impacts from the spread of Covid-19 could mean the world consumes 700,000 fewer barrels per day of oil this year–a historic drop in consumption.
OPEC had planned to make more cuts now and to extend the big production cuts they’d made last year, which are set to expire at the end of this month. After the collapse of talks on Friday, it’s not even clear if those previous cuts will remain in place, which could lead to a tsunami of oil production that will add more barrels to the market right when they are least needed. Oil demand in the first half of this year is projected to shrink the most in a decade as the virus outbreak hammers economic activity (and demand for oil) all around the world.
Crude prices plummeted by about 8 percent in both New York and London to levels not seen since 2017—and most analysts expect the breakdown of the three-year-old cooperation pact between OPEC and Russia will only send oil prices lower. That will mean plenty of budget pain for all the major producers that staggered out of Vienna, and especially for U.S. shale oil producers already struggling with low prices.
Friday’s collapse was a stunning setback for OPEC, which has since 2016 aggressively managed the supply of oil to keep prices from falling too far as extra supplies from the booming U.S. oil patch threatened to flood the market. Since 2017, OPEC has cooperated informally with Russia, one of the world’s three biggest oil producers alongside the United States and Saudi Arabia, to coordinate production cuts and share the economic pain of pumping fewer barrels of oil.
Russia, which isn’t formally a member of OPEC, nevertheless managed to scupper the cartel’s efforts to deal with the collapse in oil demand and falling prices. While Saudi Arabia has already cut production in recent months, and OPEC was prepared to cut a further 1 million barrels a day if Russia made cuts of its own, the big OPEC producers were not willing to unilaterally make bigger sacrifices to shore up the oil market unless Russia shared the effort.
“The Saudis weren’t going to jump on this grenade alone, or with a small group of reliable Gulf Cooperation Council producers,” Reed said. “‘We all sacrifice, or we all suffer,’ is their thinking.”
Russia and OPEC agreed to continue consulting on oil supplies, but it’s not clear when they will meet again. Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said that countries in OPEC+, the broader grouping of OPEC plus Russia and some other producers, are free to pump with abandon next month.
Even though prices are low, individual oil producers have an incentive to pump more oil, hoping that higher volumes will help offset the lower prices. But when all big producers try to pump their way out of lower prices, it just makes things worse for everyone.
While Russia had been reluctant to make production cuts at this week’s meeting, most observers expected that OPEC and Russia would reach a deal in the end, if only because of the sheer magnitude of the economic damage being wrought by the coronavirus. Moscow put those lingering hopes to rest Friday, and with them the three-plus years of cooperation with OPEC that had restored those big oil producers to their traditional role as arbiters of the world’s most important commodity market.
“Russia decided the needed cuts were just too big and didn’t want to start down that road,” said Bob McNally, the president of Rapidan Energy Group, an energy consultancy. “They think they can live with the lesser evil of lower prices. We’re going to test that.”
Lower prices will also test Saudi leadership and Saudi Aramco—the largest oil company in the world just debuted on the stock market and was hoping for higher oil prices to boost its profitability and share price.
But some of the biggest losers from the debacle in Vienna are undoubtedly U.S. shale oil producers, which generally need oil prices above $50 a barrel to make any money—and which were ironically hoping their OPEC rivals would make production cuts that would help keep shale’s head above water.
After the meeting’s collapse on Friday, U.S. crude prices fell to $42 a barrel, and they could keep falling. Share prices in U.S. shale companies fell sharply Friday after the OPEC meeting collapsed without an agreement.
This article was updated Mar. 9, 2020 to reflect market carnage.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--China Goes on Diplomatic Offensive Over Coronavirus Response

China Goes on Diplomatic Offensive Over Coronavirus Response In the weeks following the outbreak of coronavirus in Wuhan , China , Beijing ’ s international reputation took a severe blow as it faced international condemnation for mounting a slow and secretive response that helped enable the virus to spread to scores of countries .
But with the virus ’ spread slowing in China—while it picks up steam throughout much of the rest of the world—Beijing is trying to rebrand itself as part of the solution , not the problem .
In a March 3 letter to senior diplomats at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Ambassador Zhang Jun sought to portray China—and its president , Xi Jinping—as a critical leader in the international effort to halt the spread of the virus .
In doing so , he appeared to be taking a jab at other countries , including the United States , for placing restrictions , including on trade and travel , on certain countries .
“ China is fighting not just for itself , but also for the world , ” Zhang wrote in the letter , which a U.N.-based diplomat shared with Foreign Policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Document of the Week .
“ China treats its own people and people of other countries in the same way and applies prevention and control measures in a non-discriminatory manner.
” It was the second letter Zhang wrote to U.N. member states since the crisis began , part of an effort to encourage governments to maintain international trade and travel links with China , and to assure them Beijing was doing everything to steady a rocky international economy .
“ As the world ’ s second largest economy , China is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the letter reads .
“ China is taking a series of strong measures , including policy support in fiscal , taxation and industrial fields , to facilitate the restoration of work and production and to boost the economy.
” Zhang , who is serving this month as the president of the U.N. Security Council , has also sought to project confidence in the future of China ’ s economy in the face of a sharp downturn in global stock markets .
“ Definitely the epidemic , the coronavirus , has caused a negative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zhang said on Monday .
“ But meanwhile because of the strong resilience , because of the enormous domestic consumption and the domestic market and because of the solid foundation of the Chinese economy , we are very much confident that we are able to realize the goals we have set for this year , the economic goals , the social goals.
” The Chinese outreach comes at a time when anxiety over the course of the virus has forced the United Nations to rein in its activities .
Last week , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women from around the world to postpone their plans to attend the 25th anniversary of the Beijing women ’ s conference at U.N. headquarters in New York , which was scheduled to run from March 9 to March 20 .
Instead , U.S.-based diplomats will participate in a one-day meeting on Monday to adopt a declaration underscoring the importance of promoting women ’ s issues .
A full-blown session could be rescheduled later .
It remains unclear whether the U.N. will postpone other large meetings , including a major conference from April 27 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , which entered into force with the goal of stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and ultimately leading to nuclear disarmament of the key powers .
The U.N. , meanwhile , circulated a brochure for conference etiquette in the age of coronavirus .
Before U.N. meetings , participants should “ ensure you have health insurance for the United States ( and preferably , have the influenza vaccine ) and bring additional routine medications , spare contact lenses or spectacles , etc.
” “ Participants should … Strictly not attend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unwell , have a fever , cough or respiratory symptoms .
Undertake regular preventive measures such as cough etiquette and regular handwashing as described in the brochures provided .
Contact the medical service here in the Headquarters by telephone if you are unwell AND have also been to an ‘ at risk ’ location for coronavirus in the last 14 days , ” the brochure added .
The Chinese ambassador ’ s letter appears to be part of a broader effort by China to deflect criticism of Xi ’ s handling of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to portray him as the leader of global campaign to fight the virus , which has spread to more than 80 countries and infected more than 100,000 people .
Early this week , the news outlet Axios reported that a Chinese state-owned think tank floated the idea of creating “ a Beijing-led global health organization that would rival the WHO [ World Health Organization ] .
“ Beijing is seeking to turn the coronavirus , initially a disaster for China ’ s public image , into an opportunity to advance its global leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” reporter Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian wrote in Axios .

In the weeks following the outbreak of coronavirus in Wuhan, China, Beijing’s international reputation took a severe blow as it faced international condemnation for mounting a slow and secretive response that helped enable the virus to spread to scores of countries.
In the weeks following the outbreak of coronavirus in Wuhan, China, Beijing’s international reputation took a severe blow as it faced international condemnation for mounting a slow and secretive response that helped enable the virus to spread to scores of countries.
But with the virus’ spread slowing in China—while it picks up steam throughout much of the rest of the world—Beijing is trying to rebrand itself as part of the solution, not the problem. In a March 3 letter to senior diplomats at the United Nations, China’s U.N. Ambassador Zhang Jun sought to portray China—and its president, Xi Jinping—as a critical leader in the international effort to halt the spread of the virus. In doing so, he appeared to be taking a jab at other countries, including the United States, for placing restrictions, including on trade and travel, on certain countries.
“China is fighting not just for itself, but also for the world,” Zhang wrote in the letter, which a U.N.-based diplomat shared with Foreign Policy. It is being highlighted as Foreign Policy’s Document of the Week. “China treats its own people and people of other countries in the same way and applies prevention and control measures in a non-discriminatory manner.”
It was the second letter Zhang wrote to U.N. member states since the crisis began, part of an effort to encourage governments to maintain international trade and travel links with China, and to assure them Beijing was doing everything to steady a rocky international economy. “As the world’s second largest economy, China is keenly aware of its responsibility,” the letter reads. “China is taking a series of strong measures, including policy support in fiscal, taxation and industrial fields, to facilitate the restoration of work and production and to boost the economy.”
Zhang, who is serving this month as the president of the U.N. Security Council, has also sought to project confidence in the future of China’s economy in the face of a sharp downturn in global stock markets. “Definitely the epidemic, the coronavirus, has caused a negative impact on the Chinese economy,” Zhang said on Monday. “But meanwhile because of the strong resilience, because of the enormous domestic consumption and the domestic market and because of the solid foundation of the Chinese economy, we are very much confident that we are able to realize the goals we have set for this year, the economic goals, the social goals.”
The Chinese outreach comes at a time when anxiety over the course of the virus has forced the United Nations to rein in its activities. Last week, the U.N. urged government ministers and thousands of women from around the world to postpone their plans to attend the 25th anniversary of the Beijing women’s conference at U.N. headquarters in New York, which was scheduled to run from March 9 to March 20. Instead, U.S.-based diplomats will participate in a one-day meeting on Monday to adopt a declaration underscoring the importance of promoting women’s issues. A full-blown session could be rescheduled later. It remains unclear whether the U.N. will postpone other large meetings, including a major conference from April 27 to May 22 to review progress on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force with the goal of stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and ultimately leading to nuclear disarmament of the key powers.
The U.N., meanwhile, circulated a brochure for conference etiquette in the age of coronavirus. Before U.N. meetings, participants should “ensure you have health insurance for the United States (and preferably, have the influenza vaccine) and bring additional routine medications, spare contact lenses or spectacles, etc.”
“Participants should … Strictly not attend the meeting [if] you are unwell, have a fever, cough or respiratory symptoms. Undertake regular preventive measures such as cough etiquette and regular handwashing as described in the brochures provided. Contact the medical service here in the Headquarters by telephone if you are unwell AND have also been to an ‘at risk’ location for coronavirus in the last 14 days,” the brochure added.
The Chinese ambassador’s letter appears to be part of a broader effort by China to deflect criticism of Xi’s handling of the crisis in its earliest days, and to portray him as the leader of global campaign to fight the virus, which has spread to more than 80 countries and infected more than 100,000 people.
Early this week, the news outlet Axios reported that a Chinese state-owned think tank floated the idea of creating “a Beijing-led global health organization that would rival the WHO [World Health Organization].
“Beijing is seeking to turn the coronavirus, initially a disaster for China’s public image, into an opportunity to advance its global leadership and bolster its soft power abroad,” reporter Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian wrote in Axios.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--Annexation Would Threaten U.S. Military Support for Israel

Annexation Would Threaten U.S. Military Support for Israel Israel ’ s March 2 election will likely leave Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the helm at least for the coming weeks , even if he is simply leading a caretaker government .
But although he once again heads Israel ’ s largest political party , the prime minister , whose corruption trial begins on March 17 , is now more exposed than ever before to challenges to his continued tenure .
In the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace , released in the final weeks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , this scenario places the future of U.S.-Israel security ties in grave danger .
That is because an increasingly desperate Netanyahu will have West Bank annexation firmly in his sights .
The logical conclusion of annexation is a single , nondemocratic state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea—and that eventuality will fundamentally alter the nature of the relationship between Israel and the United States .
In the past , Netanyahu might have adopted a more cautious position on annexation out of concern for U.S. opposition .
Now , annexation is enshrined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan .
The administration ’ s proposal permits Israel to annex 30 percent of the West Bank , and already last week , a joint U.S.-Israeli committee was in the West Bank to begin mapping out territories where Israel could “ extend its sovereignty ” —the Israeli right ’ s euphemism for annexation .
Bear in mind that not one member of this committee is drawn from the Israeli military , which would be tasked with defending the new borders it would create , nor is any member a Palestinian .
This deficiency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the administration did not consult any Palestinians or the Israel Defense Forces , according to recent conversations with senior I.D.F .
officials .
What ’ s more , the plan envisions a Palestinian entity that bears none of the characteristics of a sovereign state .
Instead , it would create disconnected Palestinian enclaves with limited autonomy under overall Israeli control .
This process will likely result in the Palestinian Authority ’ s collapse .
Its current leader , Mahmoud Abbas , is 84 and has struggled with health problems in recent years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders may feel compelled to end security cooperation with Israel when prospects of statehood are lost .
Israel could then find itself back in full military and civilian control of the entire West Bank , including major Palestinian cities which the Palestinian Authority currently governs .
Most of the world will view such an outcome as a single state ( excluding Gaza ) in which 3 million Palestinians lack citizenship rights .
The U.S.-Israel partnership would be threatened in various ways if Israel continues its slide toward nondemocracy .
For the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stake if Palestinians remain under perpetual Israeli control , but humanitarian concerns will likely take a back seat to a longstanding U.S. interest : maintaining a security partnership with Israel at its current level .
This partnership would be threatened in various ways if Israel continues to slide toward nondemocracy .
Israel ’ s legitimate security concerns , even if Israel looked less and less like a fully democratic state , would of course remain .
And the United States would still have an interest in Israel ’ s self-defense capabilities .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the foundation of the partnership would evaporate .
The United States ’ ability to manage a wide range of threats from the Middle East—terrorist organizations from Hezbollah to the Islamic State , aggressive states such as Iran pursuing weapons of mass destruction , and the instability and civil wars endemic in the Arab world—is complemented by Israel ’ s ability to defend itself from these same threats .
U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence professionals maintain deep , trusting relationships , the kind the United States only enjoys with its democratic allies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ all of this .
Moreover , future U.S. administrations and Congresses , even if they remain deeply committed to Israel ’ s security , could , at a minimum , feel compelled to restrict the use of U.S. assistance to enforce a nondemocratic system in the West Bank .
Indeed , Democratic members of Congress and presidential candidate Sen. Bernie Sanders have already raised questions about reducing or conditioning U.S. assistance to Israel , and such questions will only increase if annexation occurs .
Israeli operations against threats in Syria , Lebanon , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accounting for such distinctions—where and how dollars are spent , equipment is used , and intelligence is deployed—would be complex and a source of bilateral tension should Israel move further in a nondemocratic direction .
Thus , as U.S. military and intelligence officials designate certain Israeli activities as ineligible for Washington ’ s support , their relationships with their counterparts in Jerusalem would certainly be strained .
What would happen , for example , if the U.S. military tells Israel it can not use U.S.-supplied helicopters in a particular operation ?
When trust @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in both directions is stifled .
This scenario would undermine the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership , which is enormously beneficial to both countries .
Those who imagine that there could be no erosion in U.S.-Israeli security ties should look at Turkey , a NATO ally , but also a democracy under stress .
U.S. officials today no longer enjoy anything like the trust with their Turkish counterparts that they once did .
In nondemocracies such as Morocco and Jordan , where , unlike Turkey , the strategic alignment with the United States remains solid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assistance and intelligence are far more circumscribed than with Israel .
While these situations do not match the Israeli case precisely , they suggest that the U.S.-Israeli security partnership , important to the U.S. for moral and strategic reasons , would be severely weakened by aid restrictions and a trust deficit .
The Trump administration ’ s plan and its greenlighting of an annexation plan that would precipitate a decline in Israel ’ s democratic character could ultimately threaten broad support for U.S. security assistance to Israel—a rare point of bipartisan domestic consensus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society and bipartisan majorities in Congress still agree that the U.S.-Israel security partnership is worth investing in , as the administration of former President Barack Obama did when it signed a 10-year , $ 38 billion security assistance package , which runs through 2028 .
And Israel receives nearly 50 percent of all U.S. security assistance funds .
However , negotiations for a follow-on security assistance agreement , likely to begin in the next few years , will be more challenging if Israel proceeds with unilateral annexation and moves in a nondemocratic direction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no linkage to Israeli practices in the West Bank , enjoyed bipartisan support .
That would be at risk post-annexation .
In a recent study , we examined the likely results of each of the following scenarios : the two-state solution ; the status quo ; an Israeli-Palestinian confederation , in which Israel and Palestine share government institutions and open borders , similar to the European Union ; one democratic or binational state ; one nondemocratic Jewish state ; a Jordanian option , wherein Jordan is responsible for the Palestinians and may even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Trump plan .
The study concluded that the Trump plan propels Israel toward the single nondemocratic state outcome .
The threat to U.S.-Israel security ties this scenario poses is the most serious one , but is just one of many detrimental consequences .
Even if Netanyahu is ultimately unsuccessful in retaining the premiership , the Trump administration is now signaling that it intends to try moving ahead with its proposal regardless of who ends up in power in Jerusalem .
In the aftermath of Israel ’ s most recent election , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and its annexation provisions to catalyze support for a government under his leadership , or at least halt any effort to pass legislation that would prevent him from continuing to serve as prime minister .
He may need just a handful of Knesset members to take the bait .
And even if Netanyahu is ultimately unsuccessful in retaining the premiership , the Trump administration is now signaling that it intends to try moving ahead with its proposal regardless of who ends up in power in Jerusalem .
If the Palestinians don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ months , Jared Kushner told a group of U.S. senators this week , annexation will be under way sooner rather than later .
Yet the consequences of such a move will go beyond the Israeli domestic political sphere to the foundation of U.S.-Israel security ties .
Supporters of a strong U.S.-Israel relationship should recognize the Trump plan for the serious danger it poses , and the very realistic possibility that it will result in the institutionalization of an undeniably nondemocratic government .
Keeping alive prospects for a two-state solution , which would preserve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democratic , is critical for the future U.S.-Israel security ties , but the Trump plan may do them serious harm .

Daniel B. Shapiro, Shira Efron and Evan Gottesman

Israel’s March 2 election will likely leave Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the helm at least for the coming weeks, even if he is simply leading a caretaker government. But although he once again heads Israel’s largest political party, the prime minister, whose corruption trial begins on March 17, is now more exposed than ever before to challenges to his continued tenure.
Israel’s March 2 election will likely leave Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the helm at least for the coming weeks, even if he is simply leading a caretaker government. But although he once again heads Israel’s largest political party, the prime minister, whose corruption trial begins on March 17, is now more exposed than ever before to challenges to his continued tenure.
In the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, released in the final weeks of the most recent Israeli election campaign, this scenario places the future of U.S.-Israel security ties in grave danger. That is because an increasingly desperate Netanyahu will have West Bank annexation firmly in his sights.
The logical conclusion of annexation is a single, nondemocratic state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea—and that eventuality will fundamentally alter the nature of the relationship between Israel and the United States. In the past, Netanyahu might have adopted a more cautious position on annexation out of concern for U.S. opposition. Now, annexation is enshrined as official U.S. policy under the Trump plan.
The administration’s proposal permits Israel to annex 30 percent of the West Bank, and already last week, a joint U.S.-Israeli committee was in the West Bank to begin mapping out territories where Israel could “extend its sovereignty”—the Israeli right’s euphemism for annexation.
Bear in mind that not one member of this committee is drawn from the Israeli military, which would be tasked with defending the new borders it would create, nor is any member a Palestinian. This deficiency mirrors the plan itself: Its architects in the administration did not consult any Palestinians or the Israel Defense Forces, according to recent conversations with senior I.D.F. officials.
What’s more, the plan envisions a Palestinian entity that bears none of the characteristics of a sovereign state. Instead, it would create disconnected Palestinian enclaves with limited autonomy under overall Israeli control. This process will likely result in the Palestinian Authority’s collapse. Its current leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is 84 and has struggled with health problems in recent years, and a new generation of Palestinian leaders may feel compelled to end security cooperation with Israel when prospects of statehood are lost.
Israel could then find itself back in full military and civilian control of the entire West Bank, including major Palestinian cities which the Palestinian Authority currently governs. Most of the world will view such an outcome as a single state (excluding Gaza) in which 3 million Palestinians lack citizenship rights.
The U.S.-Israel partnership would be threatened in various ways if Israel continues its slide toward nondemocracy.
For the United States, there are serious humanitarian interests at stake if Palestinians remain under perpetual Israeli control, but humanitarian concerns will likely take a back seat to a longstanding U.S. interest: maintaining a security partnership with Israel at its current level.
This partnership would be threatened in various ways if Israel continues to slide toward nondemocracy. Israel’s legitimate security concerns, even if Israel looked less and less like a fully democratic state, would of course remain. And the United States would still have an interest in Israel’s self-defense capabilities. But the common values which have always been the foundation of the partnership would evaporate.
The United States’ ability to manage a wide range of threats from the Middle East—terrorist organizations from Hezbollah to the Islamic State, aggressive states such as Iran pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and the instability and civil wars endemic in the Arab world—is complemented by Israel’s ability to defend itself from these same threats. U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence professionals maintain deep, trusting relationships, the kind the United States only enjoys with its democratic allies. Israel’s democratic decline would jeopardize all of this.
Moreover, future U.S. administrations and Congresses, even if they remain deeply committed to Israel’s security, could, at a minimum, feel compelled to restrict the use of U.S. assistance to enforce a nondemocratic system in the West Bank. Indeed, Democratic members of Congress and presidential candidate Sen. Bernie Sanders have already raised questions about reducing or conditioning U.S. assistance to Israel, and such questions will only increase if annexation occurs.
Israeli operations against threats in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran would be unaffected. But accounting for such distinctions—where and how dollars are spent, equipment is used, and intelligence is deployed—would be complex and a source of bilateral tension should Israel move further in a nondemocratic direction.
Thus, as U.S. military and intelligence officials designate certain Israeli activities as ineligible for Washington’s support, their relationships with their counterparts in Jerusalem would certainly be strained. What would happen, for example, if the U.S. military tells Israel it cannot use U.S.-supplied helicopters in a particular operation?
When trust is degraded between security professionals, communication in both directions is stifled. This scenario would undermine the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership, which is enormously beneficial to both countries.
Those who imagine that there could be no erosion in U.S.-Israeli security ties should look at Turkey, a NATO ally, but also a democracy under stress. U.S. officials today no longer enjoy anything like the trust with their Turkish counterparts that they once did. In nondemocracies such as Morocco and Jordan, where, unlike Turkey, the strategic alignment with the United States remains solid, the range and uses of U.S. assistance and intelligence are far more circumscribed than with Israel.
While these situations do not match the Israeli case precisely, they suggest that the U.S.-Israeli security partnership, important to the U.S. for moral and strategic reasons, would be severely weakened by aid restrictions and a trust deficit.
The Trump administration’s plan and its greenlighting of an annexation plan that would precipitate a decline in Israel’s democratic character could ultimately threaten broad support for U.S. security assistance to Israel—a rare point of bipartisan domestic consensus.
Today, wide segments of American society and bipartisan majorities in Congress still agree that the U.S.-Israel security partnership is worth investing in, as the administration of former President Barack Obama did when it signed a 10-year, $38 billion security assistance package, which runs through 2028. And Israel receives nearly 50 percent of all U.S. security assistance funds.
However, negotiations for a follow-on security assistance agreement, likely to begin in the next few years, will be more challenging if Israel proceeds with unilateral annexation and moves in a nondemocratic direction. The 2016 agreement, which includes no linkage to Israeli practices in the West Bank, enjoyed bipartisan support. That would be at risk post-annexation.
In a recent study, we examined the likely results of each of the following scenarios: the two-state solution; the status quo; an Israeli-Palestinian confederation, in which Israel and Palestine share government institutions and open borders, similar to the European Union; one democratic or binational state; one nondemocratic Jewish state; a Jordanian option, wherein Jordan is responsible for the Palestinians and may even be transformed into a Palestinian state; and the Trump plan.
The study concluded that the Trump plan propels Israel toward the single nondemocratic state outcome. The threat to U.S.-Israel security ties this scenario poses is the most serious one, but is just one of many detrimental consequences.
Even if Netanyahu is ultimately unsuccessful in retaining the premiership, the Trump administration is now signaling that it intends to try moving ahead with its proposal regardless of who ends up in power in Jerusalem.
In the aftermath of Israel’s most recent election, Netanyahu could seek to leverage the plan and its annexation provisions to catalyze support for a government under his leadership, or at least halt any effort to pass legislation that would prevent him from continuing to serve as prime minister. He may need just a handful of Knesset members to take the bait.
And even if Netanyahu is ultimately unsuccessful in retaining the premiership, the Trump administration is now signaling that it intends to try moving ahead with its proposal regardless of who ends up in power in Jerusalem. If the Palestinians don’t come to the table in a few months, Jared Kushner told a group of U.S. senators this week, annexation will be under way sooner rather than later.
Yet the consequences of such a move will go beyond the Israeli domestic political sphere to the foundation of U.S.-Israel security ties. Supporters of a strong U.S.-Israel relationship should recognize the Trump plan for the serious danger it poses, and the very realistic possibility that it will result in the institutionalization of an undeniably nondemocratic government.
Keeping alive prospects for a two-state solution, which would preserve Israel’s status as Jewish and democratic, is critical for the future U.S.-Israel security ties, but the Trump plan may do them serious harm.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-07--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

As the United States reconsiders its role in the Middle East , it should be cautious about becoming overdependent on potentially unreliable European allies , a former chief of U.S. Central Command and the head of the KKR Global Institute write .
Meanwhile , a spate of Islamophobic violence in the Indian capital of New Delhi threatens the country ’ s secular democratic fabric .
And as Iran considers its options in the wake of the U.S. assassination of its Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani , Latin America could offer an opportunity to get revenge on the United States .
1 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New Mission in Iraq In principle , having America ’ s NATO allies assume greater responsibility for preventing the resurgence of Islamist extremist groups in Iraq makes sense , but the United States should be cautious about relying too much on Europe , David Petraeus and Vance Serchuk write .
2 .
Beijing Knows Who to Blame for the Virus : America The Chinese government is peddling conspiracy theories that the coronavirus actually started in the United States and that Washington has been covering up its own outbreaks , Foreign Policy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ top aid agency is dismantling its presence in Iraq , leaving a skeleton crew ill-equipped to oversee over $ 1 billion in aid programs aimed in part at staving off the return of the Islamic State , Foreign Policy ’ s Robbie Gramer reports .
4 .
Modi ’ s India Is Racing to a Point of No Return The Indian government ’ s growing hostility toward its Muslim minority threatens to upend the world ’ s largest democracy , Kapil Komireddi writes .
5 .
Iran May Be Eyeing the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Suleimani killing , Iran may look abroad to seek revenge against the United States and could do so in Latin America , Ryan C. Berg and Colin P. Clarke write .

As the United States reconsiders its role in the Middle East, it should be cautious about becoming overdependent on potentially unreliable European allies, a former chief of U.S. Central Command and the head of the KKR Global Institute write.
As the United States reconsiders its role in the Middle East, it should be cautious about becoming overdependent on potentially unreliable European allies, a former chief of U.S. Central Command and the head of the KKR Global Institute write.
Meanwhile, a spate of Islamophobic violence in the Indian capital of New Delhi threatens the country’s secular democratic fabric.
And as Iran considers its options in the wake of the U.S. assassination of its Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, Latin America could offer an opportunity to get revenge on the United States.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
A French soldier, part of the international coalition against the Islamic State, stands guard near Al-Qaim in western Iraq on Feb. 9, 2019.
In principle, having America’s NATO allies assume greater responsibility for preventing the resurgence of Islamist extremist groups in Iraq makes sense, but the United States should be cautious about relying too much on Europe, David Petraeus and Vance Serchuk write.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar meet with pharmaceutical executives to discuss the coronavirus.
The Chinese government is peddling conspiracy theories that the coronavirus actually started in the United States and that Washington has been covering up its own outbreaks, Foreign Policy’s James Palmer writes.
Iraqi men unload USAID supplies north of Baghdad.
The United States’ top aid agency is dismantling its presence in Iraq, leaving a skeleton crew ill-equipped to oversee over $1 billion in aid programs aimed in part at staving off the return of the Islamic State, Foreign Policy’s Robbie Gramer reports.
Protesters burn an effigy of Indian Home Minister Amit Shah during a protest demanding his resignation.
The Indian government’s growing hostility toward its Muslim minority threatens to upend the world’s largest democracy, Kapil Komireddi writes.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani greets Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro
In the wake of the Suleimani killing, Iran may look abroad to seek revenge against the United States and could do so in Latin America, Ryan C. Berg and Colin P. Clarke write.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-07--Mozambique Is a Failed State. The West Isn’t Helping It.

Mozambique Is a Failed State .
The West Isn ’ t Helping It .
On Jan. 15 , 2020 , Filipe Nyusi was sworn in for his second term as the president of Mozambique following his reelection in October .
Elections have been held every five years since 1994 , soon after the country ended its decades long civil war and embarked on a democratic path .
On the economic front , Mozambique has an opportunity to tap into its rich energy resources in natural gas , coal , and hydroelectric power , which are set to attract billions in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for political stability and wealth don ’ t look promising .
While some observers have seen it as an African success story , Mozambique has become a borderline failed state , its democracy a sham , and its energy riches won ’ t guarantee that its security or governance will improve in the future .
And Mozambique is not unique .
It is an example of how rich countries say they want to improve the lives of people in poor countries , but through their failure to insist on better governance inadvertently wind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This gloomy prediction about Mozambique is due to several factors .
First and foremost is the government ’ s corruption .
It has been run by the same small group of politicians since independence in 1975 .
They have succeeded in abusing their power because of the lack of the countervailing forces such as an independent legislature and judiciary , a free press , and a strong civil society sector .
As a country where the per capita gross domestic product is less than 1 percent of that of the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ afford the necessary trappings of democracy that could provide a check and balance on the power of the ruling elite .
And these rulers have been aided by the complicity of some countries , energy companies such as ExxonMobil , and aid organizations such as the U.N. Development Program and the Millennium Challenge Corporation , and the indifference of others .
When Mozambique abruptly gained its independence in 1975 , it was totally unprepared for self-government because Portuguese colonial authorities had invested nothing in the education of the local population .
As a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they handed the government over to Mozambique Liberation Front ( Frelimo ) , a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that had been fighting for independence from Portugal for over a decade .
The leaders of Frelimo have been running the country ever since .
There have been regular elections since the civil war ended , but the government has continually used its power to rig them .
The European Union sent observers to the October election that Nyusi won , but they did not issue their final report until mid-February .
When it did come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ words .
Among the multiple problems they found were “ ballot-box stuffing , organised multiple voting , intentional invalidation of votes for the opposition , altering of polling station results with the fraudulent addition of extra votes , unlikely turnout figures , [ and ] major results deviations between polling stations in the same polling centre.
” The EU found irregularities in every province that were made possible by the complicity of local election authorities , the police , state officials , and Frelimo sympathizers .
In major opposition strongholds , the observers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” from those in the 2018 municipal election results , giving further evidence of fraud .
Yet Nyusi supposedly won a second term with 73 percent of the vote when he garnered only 57 percent in his first election .
That is even more implausible given the poor record in his first five years as president , on which he had to run .
One independent report found the country ’ s position in a number of important social welfare indicators had deteriorated significantly compared to its neighbors during his first term .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Frelimo took no chances that its grip on power might slip in the election and even employed intimidation and violence against those that it perceived as a threat .
The worst example of this was the murder of a civil-society activist , Anastacio Matavel .
He was killed on Oct. 7 , 2019 , after he attended a training session for local observers for the presidential election that was only a week away .
A report in the weekly newspaper Savana , based on court documents , made clear his assassins were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They crashed their getaway car , which was owned by the local mayor , less than a mile from the scene of the crime , which is the only reason they were caught .
About two weeks earlier they had murdered by mistake someone else , who they thought was Matavel .
That person , ironically , was a former police officer—the irony being that the five assassins who later pumped 10 bullets into Matavel are also police officers .
It is unclear who ordered the hit on Matavel , but four @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an elite unit called the Rapid Intervention Force .
In many poor countries , the police are a national force under the control of the central government and are neither accountable to nor under the control of local officials .
In many of those countries , the main mission of the police is not to protect the people from criminals ; it is to protect the government from the people .
The most glaring recent example of government criminality in Mozambique has been the case of the “ hidden debts.
” In 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) announced the government had admitted that Credit Suisse and the Russian bank VTB Capital had secretly lent more than $ 1 billion to three government-owned companies .
The loans had not disclosed to the parliament of Mozambique , as required by law , or to the IMF or international donors .
Various court cases have revealed that hundreds of millions of dollars in “ commissions ” were paid for these loans .
Twenty people , including the son of former President Armando Guebuza , have been charged for their roles in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the former finance minister who arranged the deal .
He was arrested while traveling through South Africa in December 2018 .
Competing requests for his extradition from the United States , where he is wanted on charges of money laundering and conspiracy to commit fraud , and Mozambique have left the minister in a South African jail since then and it is unclear where or whether he will face justice .
Mozambique requested the former minister ’ s extradition even though at the time he had not been charged with any crime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ request has been dropped in an attempt to speed up a decision , but the Mozambican government still claims it wants him back to stand trial even though he is likely to implicate other former and current high level officials .
Another indicator of the corruption in Mozambique is Transparency International ’ s ranking on its Corruption Perceptions Index .
In 2019 , the country came in 146th out of 180 nations ranked , meaning that only 34 countries in the world were considered more corrupt .
Ten years ago it ranked 130th @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a decade .
Corruption is made easy in a country as poor as Mozambique , where the vast majority of the people are subsistence farmers trying to scratch a living out of the ground .
Because civil society is weak , the parliament and judiciary are fully under the thumb of Frelimo , and the press is largely government-run or thoroughly intimidated , leaders face little pressure to govern democratically or honestly .
Because of this lack of opportunity to obtain some share of political power , elements of the main opposition party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacking transportation routes in the center of the country even though a peace agreement was signed with the party last year before the elections .
In the extreme north of the country , an Islamist terrorist group is running amok and has killed hundreds , though its origins and goals are unclear .
Since the north is where much of the nation ’ s energy resources lie , Russian mercenaries have been sent in to help the Mozambican army , but they have suffered casualties and failed to restore order .
As in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the so-called Islamist terrorists appear to be unemployed youth who see no hope in the future because of the corruption and indifference of their government .
Since there are no internal constraints on the government ’ s power in Mozambique , the only hope is that the international community might try to impose some .
But that would elicit charges of infringement of sovereignty and neocolonialism from Frelimo .
It is unlikely to happen because , given the number of truly failed states in the world to worry about , rich countries care @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partial failures than they do about democracy .
Last year ’ s clear case of election fraud in Mozambique is one example .
It only elicited the mildest criticism from abroad .
When the results were finally certified on Dec. 23 , 2019 , the U.S. State Department congratulated the Mozambican people for their participation , but noted that “ opposition parties , civil society groups , and election observers have made credible allegations of significant election-related fraud and intimidation.
” The statement then went on to “ urge Mozambican authorities to fully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” In other words , the State Department was suggesting the government ought to investigate itself for the tactics it has widely employed to ensure it wins elections .
Rich countries care more about stability in countries that are partial failures than they do about democracy .
Such mild rebukes did not deter donor organizations .
The U.N. Development Program announced in December a five-year , $ 60 million project to help the government decentralize governance and encourage digital participation in democracy .
Only 21 percent of Mozambicans have Internet access , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear over the years is that it does not intend to loosen its grip on power by giving local officials , who might not be Frelimo loyalists , any measure of authority .
Also in December , the Millennium Challenge Corporation ( MCC ) announced a new five-year grant to Mozambique .
The MCC , a U.S. Government agency , supposedly gives funds to developing countries “ that meet rigorous standards for good governance , from fighting corruption to respecting democratic rights.
” Its new CEO is a former Republican party operative , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had no experience in development and had never previously set foot in any of the countries where the MCC operates .
As with many such organizations , the primary objective of UNDP and the MCC seems to be shoveling money out the door and that is impeded if they make demands on recipient countries beyond asking for a receipt .
They and other donor agencies have so far refused to place any limitations on the Mozambican government ’ s abuse of power even though they provide half the government ’ s budget .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be concerned with the long-term stability of the country , but they only pay attention to their short-term profits .
To protect those profits , ExxonMobil and Total have asked the government to send hundreds of more soldiers to defend their projects .
So the energy companies will harvest Mozambique ’ s resources and provide hundreds of millions of dollars to the government , creating new opportunities for corruption and millions of reasons for it not to lessen its monopoly on power .
Some of the money that does not find its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward paying for more weapons and more mercenaries to maintain Frelimo ’ s dominance .
As a result , the insurgency and terrorism in the north will remain .
And the Mozambican people will be left to wonder which is more destructive , the cyclones which have frequently struck the country or their own government .
The donor community ignores corruption and continues to offer humanitarian and development aid that is little more than a Band-Aid .
Treating the basic cause of the country ’ s ills—bad governance—rather than the symptoms of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rich countries and at variance with their commercial interests .
And so the people of Mozambique are left with the options of armed resistance , Islamist terrorism , emigration , or resignation .

On Jan. 15, 2020, Filipe Nyusi was sworn in for his second term as the president of Mozambique following his reelection in October. Elections have been held every five years since 1994, soon after the country ended its decades long civil war and embarked on a democratic path. On the economic front, Mozambique has an opportunity to tap into its rich energy resources in natural gas, coal, and hydroelectric power, which are set to attract billions in foreign investment. Unfortunately, the prospects for political stability and wealth don’t look promising.
On Jan. 15, 2020, Filipe Nyusi was sworn in for his second term as the president of Mozambique following his reelection in October. Elections have been held every five years since 1994, soon after the country ended its decades long civil war and embarked on a democratic path. On the economic front, Mozambique has an opportunity to tap into its rich energy resources in natural gas, coal, and hydroelectric power, which are set to attract billions in foreign investment. Unfortunately, the prospects for political stability and wealth don’t look promising.
While some observers have seen it as an African success story, Mozambique has become a borderline failed state, its democracy a sham, and its energy riches won’t guarantee that its security or governance will improve in the future. And Mozambique is not unique. It is an example of how rich countries say they want to improve the lives of people in poor countries, but through their failure to insist on better governance inadvertently wind up ensuring that their poverty will endure.
This gloomy prediction about Mozambique is due to several factors. First and foremost is the government’s corruption. It has been run by the same small group of politicians since independence in 1975. They have succeeded in abusing their power because of the lack of the countervailing forces such as an independent legislature and judiciary, a free press, and a strong civil society sector.
As a country where the per capita gross domestic product is less than 1 percent of that of the United States, Mozambique is simply too poor to afford the necessary trappings of democracy that could provide a check and balance on the power of the ruling elite. And these rulers have been aided by the complicity of some countries, energy companies such as ExxonMobil, and aid organizations such as the U.N. Development Program and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the indifference of others.
When Mozambique abruptly gained its independence in 1975, it was totally unprepared for self-government because Portuguese colonial authorities had invested nothing in the education of the local population. As a result, when the Portuguese departed, they handed the government over to Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that had been fighting for independence from Portugal for over a decade.
The leaders of Frelimo have been running the country ever since. There have been regular elections since the civil war ended, but the government has continually used its power to rig them. The European Union sent observers to the October election that Nyusi won, but they did not issue their final report until mid-February. When it did come out, the observers did not mince words. Among the multiple problems they found were “ballot-box stuffing, organised multiple voting, intentional invalidation of votes for the opposition, altering of polling station results with the fraudulent addition of extra votes, unlikely turnout figures, [and] major results deviations between polling stations in the same polling centre.”
The EU found irregularities in every province that were made possible by the complicity of local election authorities, the police, state officials, and Frelimo sympathizers. In major opposition strongholds, the observers noted “an astonishing reversal of results” from those in the 2018 municipal election results, giving further evidence of fraud.
Yet Nyusi supposedly won a second term with 73 percent of the vote when he garnered only 57 percent in his first election. That is even more implausible given the poor record in his first five years as president, on which he had to run. One independent report found the country’s position in a number of important social welfare indicators had deteriorated significantly compared to its neighbors during his first term.
In part because of that poor performance, Frelimo took no chances that its grip on power might slip in the election and even employed intimidation and violence against those that it perceived as a threat. The worst example of this was the murder of a civil-society activist, Anastacio Matavel. He was killed on Oct. 7, 2019, after he attended a training session for local observers for the presidential election that was only a week away.
A report in the weekly newspaper Savana, based on court documents, made clear his assassins were not the most professional of hit men. They crashed their getaway car, which was owned by the local mayor, less than a mile from the scene of the crime, which is the only reason they were caught. About two weeks earlier they had murdered by mistake someone else, who they thought was Matavel. That person, ironically, was a former police officer—the irony being that the five assassins who later pumped 10 bullets into Matavel are also police officers.
It is unclear who ordered the hit on Matavel, but four of the five policemen were members of an elite unit called the Rapid Intervention Force. In many poor countries, the police are a national force under the control of the central government and are neither accountable to nor under the control of local officials. In many of those countries, the main mission of the police is not to protect the people from criminals; it is to protect the government from the people.
The most glaring recent example of government criminality in Mozambique has been the case of the “hidden debts.” In 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced the government had admitted that Credit Suisse and the Russian bank VTB Capital had secretly lent more than $1 billion to three government-owned companies. The loans had not disclosed to the parliament of Mozambique, as required by law, or to the IMF or international donors. Various court cases have revealed that hundreds of millions of dollars in “commissions” were paid for these loans. Twenty people, including the son of former President Armando Guebuza, have been charged for their roles in the scheme.
Among those in legal jeopardy is the former finance minister who arranged the deal. He was arrested while traveling through South Africa in December 2018. Competing requests for his extradition from the United States, where he is wanted on charges of money laundering and conspiracy to commit fraud, and Mozambique have left the minister in a South African jail since then and it is unclear where or whether he will face justice.
Mozambique requested the former minister’s extradition even though at the time he had not been charged with any crime and still had parliamentary immunity. That request has been dropped in an attempt to speed up a decision, but the Mozambican government still claims it wants him back to stand trial even though he is likely to implicate other former and current high level officials.
Another indicator of the corruption in Mozambique is Transparency International’s ranking on its Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2019, the country came in 146th out of 180 nations ranked, meaning that only 34 countries in the world were considered more corrupt. Ten years ago it ranked 130th; it has slipped 16 places in a decade.
Corruption is made easy in a country as poor as Mozambique, where the vast majority of the people are subsistence farmers trying to scratch a living out of the ground. Because civil society is weak, the parliament and judiciary are fully under the thumb of Frelimo, and the press is largely government-run or thoroughly intimidated, leaders face little pressure to govern democratically or honestly.
Because of this lack of opportunity to obtain some share of political power, elements of the main opposition party, Renamo, have once again begun attacking transportation routes in the center of the country even though a peace agreement was signed with the party last year before the elections. In the extreme north of the country, an Islamist terrorist group is running amok and has killed hundreds, though its origins and goals are unclear.
Since the north is where much of the nation’s energy resources lie, Russian mercenaries have been sent in to help the Mozambican army, but they have suffered casualties and failed to restore order. As in other parts of Africa, many of the so-called Islamist terrorists appear to be unemployed youth who see no hope in the future because of the corruption and indifference of their government.
Since there are no internal constraints on the government’s power in Mozambique, the only hope is that the international community might try to impose some. But that would elicit charges of infringement of sovereignty and neocolonialism from Frelimo. It is unlikely to happen because, given the number of truly failed states in the world to worry about, rich countries care more about stability in those that are partial failures than they do about democracy.
Last year’s clear case of election fraud in Mozambique is one example. It only elicited the mildest criticism from abroad. When the results were finally certified on Dec. 23, 2019, the U.S. State Department congratulated the Mozambican people for their participation, but noted that “opposition parties, civil society groups, and election observers have made credible allegations of significant election-related fraud and intimidation.” The statement then went on to “urge Mozambican authorities to fully address the serious concerns by observer missions.” In other words, the State Department was suggesting the government ought to investigate itself for the tactics it has widely employed to ensure it wins elections.
Rich countries care more about stability in countries that are partial failures than they do about democracy.
Such mild rebukes did not deter donor organizations. The U.N. Development Program announced in December a five-year, $60 million project to help the government decentralize governance and encourage digital participation in democracy. Only 21 percent of Mozambicans have Internet access, however, and one thing Frelimo has made clear over the years is that it does not intend to loosen its grip on power by giving local officials, who might not be Frelimo loyalists, any measure of authority.
Also in December, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) announced a new five-year grant to Mozambique. The MCC, a U.S. Government agency, supposedly gives funds to developing countries “that meet rigorous standards for good governance, from fighting corruption to respecting democratic rights.” Its new CEO is a former Republican party operative, and advisor to President Trump, who had no experience in development and had never previously set foot in any of the countries where the MCC operates.
As with many such organizations, the primary objective of UNDP and the MCC seems to be shoveling money out the door and that is impeded if they make demands on recipient countries beyond asking for a receipt. They and other donor agencies have so far refused to place any limitations on the Mozambican government’s abuse of power even though they provide half the government’s budget.
Energy companies are another group that ought to be concerned with the long-term stability of the country, but they only pay attention to their short-term profits. To protect those profits, ExxonMobil and Total have asked the government to send hundreds of more soldiers to defend their projects. So the energy companies will harvest Mozambique’s resources and provide hundreds of millions of dollars to the government, creating new opportunities for corruption and millions of reasons for it not to lessen its monopoly on power.
Some of the money that does not find its way to bank accounts abroad will go toward paying for more weapons and more mercenaries to maintain Frelimo’s dominance. As a result, the insurgency and terrorism in the north will remain. And the Mozambican people will be left to wonder which is more destructive, the cyclones which have frequently struck the country or their own government.
The donor community ignores corruption and continues to offer humanitarian and development aid that is little more than a Band-Aid. Treating the basic cause of the country’s ills—bad governance—rather than the symptoms of the problem seems beyond the attention span of the rich countries and at variance with their commercial interests. And so the people of Mozambique are left with the options of armed resistance, Islamist terrorism, emigration, or resignation.