foreignpolicy--2020-04-17--A Global Pandemic Bailout Was Coming—Until America Stopped It

In mid-April , in a normal year , American citizens rush to finish their tax returns , and the world ’ s financial elite gathers in Washington , D.C. , for the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) and the World Bank .
It is an unmissable diary entry for finance ministers , central bankers , and finance types from around the world .
The spring meetings , unlike the World Economic Forum in Davos , Switzerland , in January , are an occasion at which policy is actually made .
This year is different .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the financial elite is grounded .
As the world economy reels from a shock more sudden and dramatic than ever before , the annual gatherings of the IMF and World Bank this week have been reduced to conference calls .
As French President Emmanuel Macron put it : “ We have stopped half the planet to save lives .
There are no precedents for that in our history.
” North America , the eurozone , China , and the East Asian manufacturing hub centered on South Korea and Japan are all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ latest data from the IMF and the World Bank makes clear , the impact is being felt around the globe .
Sub-Saharan Africa is facing its first recession in 25 years .
In March , with the U.S. Federal Reserve in the lead , central banks scrambled to stabilize the financial markets .
National governments have launched their lockdown life-support efforts .
The IMF estimates that around the world $ 8 trillion has been committed in spending , loans , and guarantees to cushion the impact of the shock .
That is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Deficits will rise more sharply than in 2009 at the low point of the financial crisis .
The countries that have the capacity to deliver this fiscal policy response are members of the G-20 .
It is already clear that many poorer countries and those with large foreign obligations can not meet the challenge alone .
The IMF , as the agency charged with handling immediate global financial problems , is on the front line .
In the last few weeks , more than 100 countries—that is , more than half the members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the IMF .
The need for a global support program raises a series of tricky technocratic questions .
First and foremost , does the IMF have enough resources ?
If it grants aid , what criteria should it apply in determining who qualifies ?
How does short-term aid relate to long-term development needs , the bailiwick of the World Bank ?
How does one ensure that financial support provided by the fund and the bank stays in the recipient country to pay for the crisis and does not end up paying off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ private banks and financial institutions ?
But this year ’ s spring meetings are also a political crossroads .
They are a test of the increasingly complex and fraught multipolar order .
Observers wondered : Would there be a comprehensive move to relieve the financial burden on the poorest ?
If so , would China join a common front , or would it insist on bilateral deals with recipients of Belt and Road loans ?
Where would the Trump administration stand ?
There has been much talk about the crisis of globalization , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new cold war .
Would the most powerful countries in the world be able to agree on a concerted program to assist the rest of the world ?
The G-20 as we know it today is a product of crisis .
It was set up as a club of finance ministers in the wake of the crises of the 1990s .
The expansion of the club to include not just China but South Korea , Indonesia , South Africa , Turkey , and Brazil was intended to represent the emerging multipolar order .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a gathering of heads of government took place in November 2008 in Washington in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers crash .
The upgrading of the G-20 reenergized the IMF .
In the early 2000s , the IMF was an institution in trouble .
The fund ’ s aggressive interventions in the financial crises of the late 1990s were widely seen as illegitimately intruding on national sovereignty .
Still today , across the world from Argentina to Indonesia , the memory of tough times under IMF programs stirs nationalist passions .
But if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s budget shrinks .
As the crisis struck in 2008 , the fund was shedding staff .
It was the backing of the G-20 that restored the IMF as a key agency of global crisis fighting .
At the G-20 summit in London in April 2009 , British Prime Minister Gordon Brown , with strong support from the Obama administration , pushed through an increase in the fund ’ s budget to $ 1 trillion .
The British talked enthusiastically about a new Bretton Woods moment .
That was an exaggeration , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on life .
It not only added to its client list .
It also began to creatively adapt the hidebound free market doctrines of the 1990s .
Beginning under IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn in 2007 , that process of policy innovation was continued under his successor , Christine Lagarde .
This week , it was no longer a scandal when the director of the IMF ’ s Asia and Pacific department endorsed capital controls as a means of limiting the destabilizing outflow of funds from fragile emerging markets .
In the days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , any mention of capital controls would have been anathema .
A decade after that financial crisis , the next global challenge has arrived in the form of the coronavirus pandemic : How would the IMF and the World Bank respond ?
In the days building up to this week ’ s meetings , there was a remarkable burst of activity on the part of veterans of 2009 .
Brown brought together a roster of more than 100 former presidents and prime ministers to call for a joint commitment on the part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their fight with the virus with tens of billions of dollars in health care and debt relief .
As international lending contracts and investors flee into dollars , there is also an acute concern that poorer countries will be left short of the hard currency that they need .
To address this risk , Brown teamed up with former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers to advocate a new issue of Special Drawing Rights ( SDRs ) —the IMF ’ s synthetic currency made up of a basket of the U.S. dollar , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yen , and the British pound .
The SDR is not a loan from the IMF but a claim recognized by all IMF member states on each other ’ s holdings of reserve currencies .
SDRs are limited to governments only and are booked at the IMF .
By political fiat , the existing stock of SDRs—which were mainly issued in 2009 , in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis—amounts to $ 281 billion .
Brown and Summers called for an additional $ 1 trillion to fight the coronavirus .
New issuance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of European and African nations , who joined forces in an appeal for a generous treatment of developing-country debt and an enhancement of the IMF ’ s lending power .
Some key parts of the agenda have been agreed this week .
There will be a debt standstill for the 76 poorest countries .
Furthermore , that initiative was joined by China , which has signaled its willingness to work cooperatively in a multilateral fashion .
The Institute of International Finance , the lobby group of the global financial industry , has also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IMF has deployed new facilities for quick emergency lending and created liquidity lines to help developing-country central banks gain access to the foreign exchange they need .
But the crucial question was always how the Trump administration would react to proposals to either to expand the IMF ’ s own firepower or to expand the stock of SDRs .
Relations between the Trump administration and the IMF have on the whole been cooperative .
At the end of March , the U.S. Congress approved a renewal of the so-called New Arrangements to Borrow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the IMF ’ s firepower .
But over the course of the spring meetings this week , the attitude of the Trump administration has hardened .
At the same time as , to the horror of global opinion , President Donald Trump took aim at the World Health Organization ( WHO ) , the U.S. Treasury made clear that it would not join the SDR bandwagon .
It is hardly surprising that there is little appetite in the Trump administration to make common cause with the veterans of 2009 .
And in fairness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did not simply reject the plan .
The U.S. Treasury views the proposals for SDR expansion as ill-targeted .
Because SDRs are issued on a symmetrical basis in proportion to existing shareholding , 70 percent would go to G-20 members—most of which did not need them .
Only 3 percent would go to those most in need .
If members of the G-20 want to increase the SDRs available to poorer countries , they can start by lending them some of theirs .
In making this case , Mnuchin is in line with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As they see it , the more important thing to do is to use as effectively and quickly as possible the resources that are already available to the fund and to target help to those most in need .
The upshot is that there has been temporary debt relief and new ways to quickly disburse funding from the IMF but no overall increase in the fund ’ s own resources and no increase in the SDR allocation to the poorest countries .
The situation of the low-income countries is dire , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ According to the World Bank , they owe a total of just over $ 150 billion in public debt .
By contrast , the middle-income countries , the emerging markets in the true sense , owe almost $ 7.69 trillion , of which $ 484 billion is long-term bonds held by private investors , $ 2 trillion is long-term debts owed to banks , and $ 2.1 trillion is short-term borrowing .
Little wonder that voices from Colombia , Mexico , Brazil , and Chile are asking : “ Where is the deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Georgieva , the current IMF managing director , has said she regards the figure of $ 2.5 trillion as a “ very conservative , low-end estimate ” of the financing needs of the world ’ s 165 low-income and emerging economies .
Compared with that number , the existing stock of SDRs and the IMF ’ s own lending power , which is somewhat less than $ 800 billion , are undersized .
Why then is the United States resisting the issuance of new SDRs ?
It is an easy technical fix .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ SDRs could be distributed immediately to every member of the IMF under existing rules without any change in U.S. law .
Unlike over WHO , there are no obvious points to be scored in the rivalry with China .
One suggestion is that the U.S. Treasury does not want to see an extra allocation of IMF resources to Iran and Venezuela , two enemies of the Trump administration .
Not only would the Trump administration be worried about the relief provided to Caracas and Tehran .
Even more important is the likely reaction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president ’ s own party .
Under the Obama administration , hawkish Republicans in Congress blockaded any effort at rebalancing voting rights at the IMF , to the profound embarrassment of the administration and the IMF leadership .
In the midst of the current crisis , Mnuchin ’ s Treasury no doubt prefers to let sleeping dogs lie .
An SDR allocation for Iran , with even the implicit approval of the Trump administration , would not be conducive to peace and quiet on Capitol Hill .
One might wish that , rather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration would take the lead on the issue .
Championing an expansion in IMF resources could have been a way for the United States to regain ground lost to China over the handling of the COVID-19 crisis .
But the Trump administration either lacks the vision or judges the political price too high .
Treasury officials may also genuinely believe that the fund ’ s resources are enough .
Let us hope that they are right .
If , in fact , we face the worst-case scenario of a prolonged and recurring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meetings have left the global financial safety net looking dangerously thin .

In mid-April, in a normal year, American citizens rush to finish their tax returns, and the world’s financial elite gathers in Washington, D.C., for the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It is an unmissable diary entry for finance ministers, central bankers, and finance types from around the world. The spring meetings, unlike the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January, are an occasion at which policy is actually made.
In mid-April, in a normal year, American citizens rush to finish their tax returns, and the world’s financial elite gathers in Washington, D.C., for the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It is an unmissable diary entry for finance ministers, central bankers, and finance types from around the world. The spring meetings, unlike the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January, are an occasion at which policy is actually made.
This year is different. Taxes aren’t due until July, and the financial elite is grounded. As the world economy reels from a shock more sudden and dramatic than ever before, the annual gatherings of the IMF and World Bank this week have been reduced to conference calls. As French President Emmanuel Macron put it: “We have stopped half the planet to save lives. There are no precedents for that in our history.”
North America, the eurozone, China, and the East Asian manufacturing hub centered on South Korea and Japan are all in shock. But, as the latest data from the IMF and the World Bank makes clear, the impact is being felt around the globe. Sub-Saharan Africa is facing its first recession in 25 years.
In March, with the U.S. Federal Reserve in the lead, central banks scrambled to stabilize the financial markets. National governments have launched their lockdown life-support efforts. The IMF estimates that around the world $8 trillion has been committed in spending, loans, and guarantees to cushion the impact of the shock. That is a remarkable 9.5 percent of global GDP. Deficits will rise more sharply than in 2009 at the low point of the financial crisis.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
The countries that have the capacity to deliver this fiscal policy response are members of the G-20. It is already clear that many poorer countries and those with large foreign obligations cannot meet the challenge alone. The IMF, as the agency charged with handling immediate global financial problems, is on the front line. In the last few weeks, more than 100 countries—that is, more than half the members of the United Nations—have applied for help from the IMF.
The need for a global support program raises a series of tricky technocratic questions. First and foremost, does the IMF have enough resources? If it grants aid, what criteria should it apply in determining who qualifies? How does short-term aid relate to long-term development needs, the bailiwick of the World Bank? How does one ensure that financial support provided by the fund and the bank stays in the recipient country to pay for the crisis and does not end up paying off debts owed to particular national lenders or private banks and financial institutions?
But this year’s spring meetings are also a political crossroads. They are a test of the increasingly complex and fraught multipolar order. Observers wondered: Would there be a comprehensive move to relieve the financial burden on the poorest? If so, would China join a common front, or would it insist on bilateral deals with recipients of Belt and Road loans? Where would the Trump administration stand? There has been much talk about the crisis of globalization, the end of multilateralism, and a new cold war. Would the most powerful countries in the world be able to agree on a concerted program to assist the rest of the world?
The IMF and the World Bank are global institutions, but unlike the United Nations, they do not engage in the hypocrisy of pretending that all states have an equal voice. Voting rights are in proportion to shareholding, which roughly reflects the size of national economies. The key players at the fund are all members of the G-20. The largest is the United States, which with 16.5 percent of the voting rights has a veto over many key decisions. The spring meetings are twinned with a gathering of G-20 finance ministers.
The G-20 as we know it today is a product of crisis. It was set up as a club of finance ministers in the wake of the crises of the 1990s. The expansion of the club to include not just China but South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil was intended to represent the emerging multipolar order. The first meeting of the G-20 as a gathering of heads of government took place in November 2008 in Washington in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers crash.
The upgrading of the G-20 reenergized the IMF. In the early 2000s, the IMF was an institution in trouble. The fund’s aggressive interventions in the financial crises of the late 1990s were widely seen as illegitimately intruding on national sovereignty. Still today, across the world from Argentina to Indonesia, the memory of tough times under IMF programs stirs nationalist passions. But if no one borrows, the IMF’s budget shrinks. As the crisis struck in 2008, the fund was shedding staff. It was the backing of the G-20 that restored the IMF as a key agency of global crisis fighting.
At the G-20 summit in London in April 2009, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, with strong support from the Obama administration, pushed through an increase in the fund’s budget to $1 trillion. The British talked enthusiastically about a new Bretton Woods moment. That was an exaggeration, but the IMF did gain a new lease on life. It not only added to its client list. It also began to creatively adapt the hidebound free market doctrines of the 1990s. Beginning under IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn in 2007, that process of policy innovation was continued under his successor, Christine Lagarde. This week, it was no longer a scandal when the director of the IMF’s Asia and Pacific department endorsed capital controls as a means of limiting the destabilizing outflow of funds from fragile emerging markets. In the days of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s, any mention of capital controls would have been anathema.
A decade after that financial crisis, the next global challenge has arrived in the form of the coronavirus pandemic: How would the IMF and the World Bank respond? In the days building up to this week’s meetings, there was a remarkable burst of activity on the part of veterans of 2009. Brown brought together a roster of more than 100 former presidents and prime ministers to call for a joint commitment on the part of the G-20 to support the poorest countries in their fight with the virus with tens of billions of dollars in health care and debt relief.
As international lending contracts and investors flee into dollars, there is also an acute concern that poorer countries will be left short of the hard currency that they need. To address this risk, Brown teamed up with former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers to advocate a new issue of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)—the IMF’s synthetic currency made up of a basket of the U.S. dollar, the euro, the renminbi, the yen, and the British pound. The SDR is not a loan from the IMF but a claim recognized by all IMF member states on each other’s holdings of reserve currencies. SDRs are limited to governments only and are booked at the IMF. By political fiat, the existing stock of SDRs—which were mainly issued in 2009, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis—amounts to $281 billion. Brown and Summers called for an additional $1 trillion to fight the coronavirus. New issuance of SDRs was also favored by leaders of European and African nations, who joined forces in an appeal for a generous treatment of developing-country debt and an enhancement of the IMF’s lending power.
Some key parts of the agenda have been agreed this week. There will be a debt standstill for the 76 poorest countries. Furthermore, that initiative was joined by China, which has signaled its willingness to work cooperatively in a multilateral fashion. The Institute of International Finance, the lobby group of the global financial industry, has also agreed to join the standstill. The IMF has deployed new facilities for quick emergency lending and created liquidity lines to help developing-country central banks gain access to the foreign exchange they need.
But the crucial question was always how the Trump administration would react to proposals to either to expand the IMF’s own firepower or to expand the stock of SDRs. Relations between the Trump administration and the IMF have on the whole been cooperative. At the end of March, the U.S. Congress approved a renewal of the so-called New Arrangements to Borrow, a fundraising facility essential to maintaining the IMF’s firepower. But over the course of the spring meetings this week, the attitude of the Trump administration has hardened. At the same time as, to the horror of global opinion, President Donald Trump took aim at the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S. Treasury made clear that it would not join the SDR bandwagon.
It is hardly surprising that there is little appetite in the Trump administration to make common cause with the veterans of 2009. And in fairness to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, he did not simply reject the plan. The U.S. Treasury views the proposals for SDR expansion as ill-targeted. Because SDRs are issued on a symmetrical basis in proportion to existing shareholding, 70 percent would go to G-20 members—most of which did not need them. Only 3 percent would go to those most in need. If members of the G-20 want to increase the SDRs available to poorer countries, they can start by lending them some of theirs. In making this case, Mnuchin is in line with seasoned U.S. Treasury officials like Mark Sobel. As they see it, the more important thing to do is to use as effectively and quickly as possible the resources that are already available to the fund and to target help to those most in need.
The upshot is that there has been temporary debt relief and new ways to quickly disburse funding from the IMF but no overall increase in the fund’s own resources and no increase in the SDR allocation to the poorest countries.
The situation of the low-income countries is dire, but they are small in economic terms. According to the World Bank, they owe a total of just over $150 billion in public debt. By contrast, the middle-income countries, the emerging markets in the true sense, owe almost $7.69 trillion, of which $484 billion is long-term bonds held by private investors, $2 trillion is long-term debts owed to banks, and $2.1 trillion is short-term borrowing. Little wonder that voices from Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile are asking: “Where is the deal for the middle-income countries?”
Kristalina Georgieva, the current IMF managing director, has said she regards the figure of $2.5 trillion as a “very conservative, low-end estimate” of the financing needs of the world’s 165 low-income and emerging economies. Compared with that number, the existing stock of SDRs and the IMF’s own lending power, which is somewhat less than $800 billion, are undersized.
Why then is the United States resisting the issuance of new SDRs? It is an easy technical fix. An allowance of $650 billion in SDRs could be distributed immediately to every member of the IMF under existing rules without any change in U.S. law. Unlike over WHO, there are no obvious points to be scored in the rivalry with China.
One suggestion is that the U.S. Treasury does not want to see an extra allocation of IMF resources to Iran and Venezuela, two enemies of the Trump administration. Not only would the Trump administration be worried about the relief provided to Caracas and Tehran. Even more important is the likely reaction in Congress from the ranks of the president’s own party.
Under the Obama administration, hawkish Republicans in Congress blockaded any effort at rebalancing voting rights at the IMF, to the profound embarrassment of the administration and the IMF leadership. In the midst of the current crisis, Mnuchin’s Treasury no doubt prefers to let sleeping dogs lie. An SDR allocation for Iran, with even the implicit approval of the Trump administration, would not be conducive to peace and quiet on Capitol Hill.
One might wish that, rather than shrinking from a clash, the Trump administration would take the lead on the issue. Championing an expansion in IMF resources could have been a way for the United States to regain ground lost to China over the handling of the COVID-19 crisis. But the Trump administration either lacks the vision or judges the political price too high. Treasury officials may also genuinely believe that the fund’s resources are enough. Let us hope that they are right. If, in fact, we face the worst-case scenario of a prolonged and recurring pandemic, this year’s spring meetings have left the global financial safety net looking dangerously thin.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-17--Nicaragua Is Stumbling Into Coronavirus Disaster

While much of the world has instituted lockdowns or heavily restricted movement and economic activity in response to the coronavirus pandemic , Nicaragua remains an island of inaction in Central America and the broader Latin American region .
President Daniel Ortega and Vice President ( and first lady ) Rosario Murillo have downplayed the seriousness of the coronavirus and its potentially devastating health impacts , continuing to hold large-scale public events , while nationwide control by the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front forestalls action by local leaders .
Only a single Nicaraguan has officially died of the COVID-19 disease , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are drastically underreported .
This anomalous response is an effort to project normality by an authoritarian regime , even after Ortega himself disappeared without explanation for over a month .
Ortega finally emerged for a rambling April 15 speech broadcast after hours of delays , leading to suspicions it was previously recorded and being edited .
Over 30 minutes , Ortega touted Nicaragua ’ s health system and preparedness , listed off all the other causes of death of Nicaraguans beyond the sole official COVID-19 death , attacked militarization and imperialism—saying arms spending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he can ’ t order Nicaraguans to stay home , because “ if this country stops working , it dies.
” Attendees sat close together , and no one wore masks .
Ortega and Murillo shook hands with and embraced everyone afterward , Murillo kissing cheeks and then touching her face .
As coronavirus cases increase in Nicaragua , with limited testing and health care capacity , the government ’ s inaction threatens a public health disaster—with the outbreak in Guayaquil , Ecuador , already showing how devastating the pandemic can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis may undermine the Ortega-Murillo regime , two years after it survived a mass civil resistance campaign , but also risks spillovers in Central America and a new wave of Nicaraguan refugees fleeing dictatorship , dysfunction , and economic collapse .
No regime type has necessarily performed better than others in the coronavirus crisis .
Both authoritarian and democratic governments have bungled or handled responses well , but the lack of transparency and accountability characteristic of authoritarian regimes can easily worsen the pandemic .
Beyond Nicaragua , authoritarian leaders and illiberal populists have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkmenistan ’ s Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and Tanzania ’ s John Magufuli .
Leaders have been obscuring information in China and Iran and cracking down on critical journalists or citizens in countries such as Turkey and Cambodia .
Some have feuded with subnational leaders who are taking action , including Brazil ’ s Jair Bolsonaro and U.S. President Donald Trump .
In Hungary , the prime minister is using the pandemic as an excuse for an anti-democratic coup de grâce .
Delayed responses , denial , and the spread of false information by leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only exacerbate the coronavirus pandemic ’ s impacts .
Nicaragua ’ s lagging response and its potential disastrous effects are directly related to the authoritarian nature of the Ortega-Murillo regime .
After years of eroding democracy since Ortega ’ s return to the presidency in 2007 , government repression reached new levels in 2018 and 2019 .
In the face of protests against social security cuts that grew into a national pro-democracy movement , the government responded with a brutal crackdown that killed over 300 people and sent over 100,000 Nicaraguans fleeing abroad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shaping the failure to respond to the coronavirus today .
The Ortega-Murillo family and government supporters had already consolidated media dominance , with Murillo long controlling the government ’ s public relations apparatus .
They took advantage of the 2018 crisis , however , to crush independent media and increase censorship , denouncing critical coverage as “ fake news ” and unleashing pro-government social media hashtags and trolls .
This media echo chamber helped shore up a hard core of followers whom Ortega and Murillo had cultivated through targeting social programs and government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sandinista party ’ s branding on government agencies and projects , and building up the Sandinista youth wing in a country where the majority of the population is under 30 years old .
A significant portion of the country now depends on the government for both information and economic well-being .
This makes it easier for the government to control the narrative around the coronavirus and proclaim its own success , and also to mobilize followers to ignore opposition calls for social distancing and instead attend events like the “ Love in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ March 14 , and then—after the first reported coronavirus cases in mid-March—an April 4 marathon and a food festival the same day .
The government ’ s limited informational outreach efforts around the coronavirus involved government employees going house to house , but without masks and gloves .
Matches continue in the soccer and baseball leagues , global outliers .
The government claims there are only a handful of coronavirus cases and no community transmission , while Nicaragua ’ s Central American neighbors have hundreds of confirmed cases .
The uprising and subsequent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , secretive , and isolated , all problems in a global health crisis requiring clear communication , transparent exchange of information , and international cooperation .
Positions in Nicaragua ’ s government are filled with loyalists who will not question Ortega and Murillo .
Former allies in the business community and Catholic Church have become enemies for opposing the regime ’ s repression and throwing in their lot with the protesters , with churches and priests coming under attack , most recently in November 2019 in Masaya and Managua .
As civil society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government says they are unnecessary .
This official inaction has sparked concern from proactive neighbors such as El Salvador and Costa Rica , as well as Pan American Health Organization Director Carissa Etienne , and Nicaraguans have been left looking to Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele for leadership .
Nicaragua already has a very weak health system , and it has been undermined further by the Ortega-Murillo regime ’ s crackdown and megalomania .
The government fired hundreds of doctors and nurses who aided wounded protesters or joined the opposition , and when the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to set up health centers to treat and track coronavirus cases , the government blocked it .
Government officials maintained secrecy around tests that were donated to Nicaragua , ordering that only 50 per day be administered , making it impossible to know the true extent of infection .
Ortega swapped out the health minister on April 1 , and the government has promoted as a coronavirus cure the unproven Cuban drug interferon alfa-2b ( only potentially useful in a multidrug cocktail ) , which Ortega brought up in his speech .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in rural areas , and Nicaragua ’ s indigenous populations , threatened with violence by government-abetted colonizing settlers , may face the virus , too , as has already happened to the Yanomami in Brazil .
A leaked Health Ministry document from February predicted over 30,000 infections and over 1,000 patients needing intensive care , but the government failed to act on its own forecasts .
Even when the government has taken limited actions , its authoritarianism shines through : A mass prisoner release , for instance , excluded political prisoners , whose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ masks or hand sanitizer .
Police , meanwhile , have been given masks , and Ortega used a security argument to justify not giving a stay-at-home order , saying , “ If we ordered police to isolate , the military to isolate … the country would die , ” before discussing rebuilding health centers allegedly damaged by protesters—despite no evidence of any hospital or health center destruction in the protests .
These dynamics mostly unfolded with Ortega out of the picture , publicly appearing on Feb. 21 and last seen in a March @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Central American leaders before the April 15 speech , leaving Murillo to lead the public response to the pandemic .
Public absences are not out of character , with Murillo for years considered the hand “ behind the throne ” in Nicaragua , while the 74-year-old Ortega has long been rumored to have the autoimmune disease lupus .
Ortega may be sick or taking personal precautions around the coronavirus—the government placed a March 15 order for gloves and sanitizer for the ruling family and their entourage .
Yet while such leaders as Berdimuhamedov @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Uganda ’ s Yoweri Museveni show off exercises to demonstrate that they are literally “ strong men , ” Ortega routinely takes advantage of appearing weak or sick , using underestimation to his benefit .
In prison for much of the revolutionary struggle in the 1970s , Ortega became the Sandinistas ’ representative on the governing junta and then president the 1979-1990 revolutionary period because he was seen as a relatively weak compromise candidate , in lieu of more charismatic but controversial leaders like Tomás Borge .
In the 1990s , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy , he consolidated control within the Sandinista party , freezing out rivals and personalizing politics .
Then , in the 2000s , he made a co-governing pact with right-wing President Arnoldo Alemán that helped Ortega return to the presidency in 2007 , which has ultimately resulted in the demobilization of major conservative parties .
After the eruption of the 2018 protests , Ortega seemed on the ropes , but he used concessions and negotiations strategically to buy time and sow discord among the opposition .
What explains Ortega and Murillo ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has become so centered around the Ortega-Murillo family ’ s maintenance of power and pursuit of wealth that there are few independent voices left in their inner circle to challenge their whims or tell unpopular truths .
Having weathered mass protests and economic decline with their power intact , they may also feel unthreatened by the coronavirus : With so little accountability already , why worry about losing more popular backing , especially if propaganda and payoffs can keep dedicated followers on board ?
Yet as the 2018 protests and Ortega ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government supporters may flip in a crisis .
Ortega could lose even more of his limited remaining legitimacy if the pandemic hits Nicaragua hard .
Proactive civil society leaders and subnational politicians may gain more popular allegiance , but organized criminal actors and local gangs in Managua and the Caribbean coast may emulate gangs and insurgents elsewhere by taking action against the virus and gaining greater legitimacy .
The Nicaraguan economy , already hit hard by the unrest of the last two years , is projected to experience a third straight year of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the coronavirus takes a heavy toll .
Despite neighboring countries ’ efforts at mitigation and prevention , including Costa Rica pressing Nicaragua ’ s military to block blind spots in border enforcement , a bad coronavirus outbreak in Nicaragua will mean spillover and a longer pandemic throughout the region .
New waves of migrants might seek to leave Nicaragua for Costa Rica , Mexico , the United States , and Europe , even as countries are closing borders and curtailing asylum .
For Nicaragua itself and for countries and regions with large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Spain and California and Florida in the United States , worse and longer impacts due to Ortega and Murillo ’ s behavior will mean an even slower return to some semblance of normalcy .
As we see elsewhere , the coronavirus ’ s impacts are more severe and full lockdowns may not make sense for lower- and middle-income countries with high levels of poverty and informal and migrant labor , as well as a lack of water and sanitation services in informal settlements .
Inaction , however , is not a good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wealthier countries like Sweden—and may lead to a deeper economic depression , while implementing social distancing , quarantine , and contact-tracing policies can both lower mortality and limit the economic damage of a pandemic .
Nicaragua ’ s failure to act may have severely damaging effects for its own population , potentially sowing the seeds for renewed protests , like the corrupt government response to the 1972 Managua earthquake contributing to the fall of Nicaragua ’ s last dictator , Anastasio Somoza Debayle .
But Ortega and Murillo are also endangering the rest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against the coronavirus , and international pressure is needed to spur a stronger government response .
Ortega , Murillo , and top government officials are under sanctions from the United States and European Union , and they distrust international organizations , so efforts might fruitfully be channeled through Cuba , Nicaragua ’ s closest stable ally .
Cuba has a vested interest in preventing a larger outbreak in Nicaragua , since there have already been coronavirus cases stemming from Nicaraguans traveling to Cuba .
Like in Brazil and the United States , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders and ordinary Nicaraguans to take life-saving measures before it ’ s too late .

While much of the world has instituted lockdowns or heavily restricted movement and economic activity in response to the coronavirus pandemic, Nicaragua remains an island of inaction in Central America and the broader Latin American region . President Daniel Ortega and Vice President (and first lady) Rosario Murillo have downplayed the seriousness of the coronavirus and its potentially devastating health impacts, continuing to hold large-scale public events, while nationwide control by the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front forestalls action by local leaders.
While much of the world has instituted lockdowns or heavily restricted movement and economic activity in response to the coronavirus pandemic, Nicaragua remains an island of inaction in Central America and the broader Latin American region. President Daniel Ortega and Vice President (and first lady) Rosario Murillo have downplayed the seriousness of the coronavirus and its potentially devastating health impacts, continuing to hold large-scale public events, while nationwide control by the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front forestalls action by local leaders.
Only a single Nicaraguan has officially died of the COVID-19 disease, but Nicaraguan health professionals worry that cases are drastically underreported. This anomalous response is an effort to project normality by an authoritarian regime, even after Ortega himself disappeared without explanation for over a month. Ortega finally emerged for a rambling April 15 speech broadcast after hours of delays, leading to suspicions it was previously recorded and being edited. Over 30 minutes, Ortega touted Nicaragua’s health system and preparedness, listed off all the other causes of death of Nicaraguans beyond the sole official COVID-19 death, attacked militarization and imperialism—saying arms spending should go to health care instead—and argued that he can’t order Nicaraguans to stay home, because “if this country stops working, it dies.” Attendees sat close together, and no one wore masks. Ortega and Murillo shook hands with and embraced everyone afterward, Murillo kissing cheeks and then touching her face.
As coronavirus cases increase in Nicaragua, with limited testing and health care capacity, the government’s inaction threatens a public health disaster—with the outbreak in Guayaquil, Ecuador, already showing how devastating the pandemic can be in Latin America. The looming coronavirus crisis may undermine the Ortega-Murillo regime, two years after it survived a mass civil resistance campaign, but also risks spillovers in Central America and a new wave of Nicaraguan refugees fleeing dictatorship, dysfunction, and economic collapse.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
No regime type has necessarily performed better than others in the coronavirus crisis. Both authoritarian and democratic governments have bungled or handled responses well, but the lack of transparency and accountability characteristic of authoritarian regimes can easily worsen the pandemic. Beyond Nicaragua, authoritarian leaders and illiberal populists have been denying the coronavirus threat, including Turkmenistan’s Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and Tanzania’s John Magufuli. Leaders have been obscuring information in China and Iran and cracking down on critical journalists or citizens in countries such as Turkey and Cambodia. Some have feuded with subnational leaders who are taking action, including Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and U.S. President Donald Trump. In Hungary, the prime minister is using the pandemic as an excuse for an anti-democratic coup de grâce. Delayed responses, denial, and the spread of false information by leaders have already had deadly consequences and will only exacerbate the coronavirus pandemic’s impacts.
Nicaragua’s lagging response and its potential disastrous effects are directly related to the authoritarian nature of the Ortega-Murillo regime. After years of eroding democracy since Ortega’s return to the presidency in 2007, government repression reached new levels in 2018 and 2019. In the face of protests against social security cuts that grew into a national pro-democracy movement, the government responded with a brutal crackdown that killed over 300 people and sent over 100,000 Nicaraguans fleeing abroad.
That crackdown’s consequences are shaping the failure to respond to the coronavirus today. The Ortega-Murillo family and government supporters had already consolidated media dominance, with Murillo long controlling the government’s public relations apparatus. They took advantage of the 2018 crisis, however, to crush independent media and increase censorship, denouncing critical coverage as “fake news” and unleashing pro-government social media hashtags and trolls. This media echo chamber helped shore up a hard core of followers whom Ortega and Murillo had cultivated through targeting social programs and government hiring toward supporters, putting the ruling Sandinista party’s branding on government agencies and projects, and building up the Sandinista youth wing in a country where the majority of the population is under 30 years old.
A significant portion of the country now depends on the government for both information and economic well-being. This makes it easier for the government to control the narrative around the coronavirus and proclaim its own success, and also to mobilize followers to ignore opposition calls for social distancing and instead attend events like the “Love in the Time of COVID-19” mass parade on March 14, and then—after the first reported coronavirus cases in mid-March—an April 4 marathon and a food festival the same day. The government’s limited informational outreach efforts around the coronavirus involved government employees going house to house, but without masks and gloves. Matches continue in the soccer and baseball leagues, global outliers. The government claims there are only a handful of coronavirus cases and no community transmission, while Nicaragua’s Central American neighbors have hundreds of confirmed cases.
The uprising and subsequent repression made the Ortega-Murillo regime more insular, secretive, and isolated, all problems in a global health crisis requiring clear communication, transparent exchange of information, and international cooperation. Positions in Nicaragua’s government are filled with loyalists who will not question Ortega and Murillo. Former allies in the business community and Catholic Church have become enemies for opposing the regime’s repression and throwing in their lot with the protesters, with churches and priests coming under attack, most recently in November 2019 in Masaya and Managua.
As civil society leaders have promoted voluntary quarantines, the government says they are unnecessary. This official inaction has sparked concern from proactive neighbors such as El Salvador and Costa Rica, as well as Pan American Health Organization Director Carissa Etienne, and Nicaraguans have been left looking to Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele for leadership.
Nicaragua already has a very weak health system, and it has been undermined further by the Ortega-Murillo regime’s crackdown and megalomania. The government fired hundreds of doctors and nurses who aided wounded protesters or joined the opposition, and when the archdiocese in Matagalpa tried earlier this month to set up health centers to treat and track coronavirus cases, the government blocked it. Government officials maintained secrecy around tests that were donated to Nicaragua, ordering that only 50 per day be administered, making it impossible to know the true extent of infection. Ortega swapped out the health minister on April 1, and the government has promoted as a coronavirus cure the unproven Cuban drug interferon alfa-2b (only potentially useful in a multidrug cocktail), which Ortega brought up in his speech. There are limited health services and higher comorbidities in rural areas, and Nicaragua’s indigenous populations, threatened with violence by government-abetted colonizing settlers, may face the virus, too, as has already happened to the Yanomami in Brazil.
A leaked Health Ministry document from February predicted over 30,000 infections and over 1,000 patients needing intensive care, but the government failed to act on its own forecasts. Even when the government has taken limited actions, its authoritarianism shines through: A mass prisoner release, for instance, excluded political prisoners, whose relatives have been unable to give them masks or hand sanitizer. Police, meanwhile, have been given masks, and Ortega used a security argument to justify not giving a stay-at-home order, saying, “If we ordered police to isolate, the military to isolate … the country would die,” before discussing rebuilding health centers allegedly damaged by protesters—despite no evidence of any hospital or health center destruction in the protests.
These dynamics mostly unfolded with Ortega out of the picture, publicly appearing on Feb. 21 and last seen in a March 12 virtual meeting about the coronavirus with Central American leaders before the April 15 speech, leaving Murillo to lead the public response to the pandemic. Public absences are not out of character, with Murillo for years considered the hand “behind the throne” in Nicaragua, while the 74-year-old Ortega has long been rumored to have the autoimmune disease lupus.
Ortega may be sick or taking personal precautions around the coronavirus—the government placed a March 15 order for gloves and sanitizer for the ruling family and their entourage. Yet while such leaders as Berdimuhamedov, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni show off exercises to demonstrate that they are literally “strong men,” Ortega routinely takes advantage of appearing weak or sick, using underestimation to his benefit.
In prison for much of the revolutionary struggle in the 1970s, Ortega became the Sandinistas’ representative on the governing junta and then president the 1979-1990 revolutionary period because he was seen as a relatively weak compromise candidate, in lieu of more charismatic but controversial leaders like Tomás Borge. In the 1990s, however, after Nicaragua’s return to democracy, he consolidated control within the Sandinista party, freezing out rivals and personalizing politics. Then, in the 2000s, he made a co-governing pact with right-wing President Arnoldo Alemán that helped Ortega return to the presidency in 2007, which has ultimately resulted in the demobilization of major conservative parties. After the eruption of the 2018 protests, Ortega seemed on the ropes, but he used concessions and negotiations strategically to buy time and sow discord among the opposition.
What explains Ortega and Murillo’s current inaction and denialism? The government has become so centered around the Ortega-Murillo family’s maintenance of power and pursuit of wealth that there are few independent voices left in their inner circle to challenge their whims or tell unpopular truths. Having weathered mass protests and economic decline with their power intact, they may also feel unthreatened by the coronavirus: With so little accountability already, why worry about losing more popular backing, especially if propaganda and payoffs can keep dedicated followers on board?
Yet as the 2018 protests and Ortega’s rapidly tumbling approval ratings revealed, even government supporters may flip in a crisis. Ortega could lose even more of his limited remaining legitimacy if the pandemic hits Nicaragua hard. Proactive civil society leaders and subnational politicians may gain more popular allegiance, but organized criminal actors and local gangs in Managua and the Caribbean coast may emulate gangs and insurgents elsewhere by taking action against the virus and gaining greater legitimacy. The Nicaraguan economy, already hit hard by the unrest of the last two years, is projected to experience a third straight year of recession, which will only get worse if the coronavirus takes a heavy toll.
Despite neighboring countries’ efforts at mitigation and prevention, including Costa Rica pressing Nicaragua’s military to block blind spots in border enforcement, a bad coronavirus outbreak in Nicaragua will mean spillover and a longer pandemic throughout the region. New waves of migrants might seek to leave Nicaragua for Costa Rica, Mexico, the United States, and Europe, even as countries are closing borders and curtailing asylum. For Nicaragua itself and for countries and regions with large Nicaraguan and Central American populations, such as Spain and California and Florida in the United States, worse and longer impacts due to Ortega and Murillo’s behavior will mean an even slower return to some semblance of normalcy.
As we see elsewhere, the coronavirus’s impacts are more severe and full lockdowns may not make sense for lower- and middle-income countries with high levels of poverty and informal and migrant labor, as well as a lack of water and sanitation services in informal settlements. Inaction, however, is not a good option for health and the economy—even in wealthier countries like Sweden—and may lead to a deeper economic depression, while implementing social distancing, quarantine, and contact-tracing policies can both lower mortality and limit the economic damage of a pandemic.
Nicaragua’s failure to act may have severely damaging effects for its own population, potentially sowing the seeds for renewed protests, like the corrupt government response to the 1972 Managua earthquake contributing to the fall of Nicaragua’s last dictator, Anastasio Somoza Debayle. But Ortega and Murillo are also endangering the rest of the Americas and the global fight against the coronavirus, and international pressure is needed to spur a stronger government response.
Ortega, Murillo, and top government officials are under sanctions from the United States and European Union, and they distrust international organizations, so efforts might fruitfully be channeled through Cuba, Nicaragua’s closest stable ally. Cuba has a vested interest in preventing a larger outbreak in Nicaragua, since there have already been coronavirus cases stemming from Nicaraguans traveling to Cuba. Like in Brazil and the United States, however, it may be left to lower-level leaders and ordinary Nicaraguans to take life-saving measures before it’s too late.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-17--Thais Show How to Beat China’s Online Army

It doesn ’ t take much to set off Chinese social media , especially when foreigners are involved .
The latest spark in a tinder-dry landscape were tweets by two Thai celebrities that have ignited a battle pitting China ’ s keyboard warriors against a united front of Twitter users from across the Asia-Pacific region .
What might at first look like a pointless spat is exposing the weaknesses of China ’ s propaganda efforts when they cross the firewall .
Battles over national honor led by online pop fans are nothing new .
During the Hong Kong protests last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to hop over the firewall and spam pro-Hong Kong social media accounts under the auspices of defending their idol “ A-Zhong ” —a stand-in for the Chinese nation .
In 2016 , expeditions of angered Chinese keyboard warriors raided the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians after the Taiwanese K-pop idol Chou Tzu-yu waved Taiwan ’ s flag on South Korean television .
This time , coronavirus anxiety is in the mix .
Last week , the Thai idol Vachirawit Chivaaree aka Bright , who has recently become popular in China thanks to his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : The Series , retweeted a post sharing photos of the skylines in four “ countries , ” one of which was Hong Kong .
This upset Chinese fans , who hold that Hong Kong is part of China , and they demanded Bright apologize , which he did .
Just when the controversy seemed about to fizzle out , Bright ’ s rumored girlfriend , the Thai influencer Weeraya Sukaram , who goes by Nnevvy on Twitter , retweeted a Thai-language tweet questioning why China would not let foreigners investigate whether the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lab while at the same time accusing foreigners of having brought the virus to the country .
That pushed Chinese fans to surmount the firewall to hurl insults at those slandering the motherland on Twitter and Instagram .
Chinese keyboard warriors insulted the Thai king , the Thai prime minister , and dismissed the country as poor and backward .
They were surprised to find Thais did not seem to care .
In fact , many were exultant to have someone else lend a hand in disparaging their government , which many Thais @ @ @ @ @ @ @ king , who is far less popular than his father despite harsh lèse-majesté laws .
Soon the hashtag # nnevvy , which now has over 2 million posts , was full of Thai Twitter users making self-deprecating and often hilarious memes about themselves .
In response to Chinese taunts of “ NMSL , ” which means something like “ hope your mother dies , ” Thais retorted that they have 20 mothers , a reference to the Thai king ’ s supposed harem .
Chinese users were baffled by this , and some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the meaning of patriotism .
In addition to the Twitter incident , Chinese fans had unearthed one of Weeraya ’ s Instagram posts from a few years ago in which she had responded “ Taiwanese ” to a commenter asking what style of clothing she was wearing .
This supposed recognition of a separate Taiwan from China was taken as another piece of evidence against Bright .
( Chinese media uses absurd politicized circumlocution to avoid admitting the existence of Taiwan . )
Thai warriors thus became fevered supporters of the sovereignty of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which China claims as its own .
Moved by this show of solidarity , netizens from Hong Kong and Taiwan , as well as the Philippines , Malaysia , Vietnam , and other Asian countries that have long-standing anxieties about Chinese territorial bullying , mobilized to join the # nnevvy war .
A widely shared meme took a still from the classic anime Sailor Moon and overlaid various Asian flags on each of the magical warriors .
The # nnevvy war reflected a growing awareness and resentment outside the firewall , at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seeks to influence public discourse .
Thai users and their allies referred to their opponents as “ wumao , ” the word used in China for internet warriors paid by the government ( supposedly 50 cents a post , thus the name ) to bombard platforms like Weibo with pro-Communist Party comments .
In recent years , an increasing number of reports suggest , the Chinese government has been sending wumao over the firewall to post on Twitter—although , as a new investigation by ProPublica finds , the wumao may not be people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In fact , the Chinese partisans hopping the firewall to battle Thais were probably spontaneous rather than paid or organized .
In the August expedition over the firewall , the keyboard warriors had enjoyed explicit encouragement and support from the Chinese government .
But this time the Chinese government seemed to be encouraging netizens to hold back .
On Weibo , the hashtag # ThailandInsultsChina mysteriously disappeared from the hot searches bar , and Diba , the Reddit-like forum partially responsible for organizing the August expedition , posted on Weibo explicitly discouraging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it would only embolden Hong Kong and Taiwan separatists .
Clearly the Chinese censors felt it was a war not worth fighting , especially at a time when the authorities are trying to put out fires on multiple public relations fronts , from the mistreatment of Africans in southern China to the Communist Party ’ s culpability in spreading the coronavirus to articles claiming Kazakhstan for China .
Regardless of the actual authenticity of their opponents , Thais cheerfully enjoyed portraying their opponents as monolithic , insincere , and humorless .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in army fatigues all typing “ China # 1 ” “ Democracy also has problems ” “ CIA plant ” and other staples ; another simply changed the stars in the Chinese flag to NMSL .
Memes also poked fun at the fact that Chinese have to use a virtual private network , which is illegal in China , to defend their country on most social media platforms .
In one cartoon , a group of Chinese keyboard warriors surreptitiously climb over the firewall , yell about China ’ s superiority at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ climb back over .
Overall , the memes painted a picture of Chinese as simply unequipped to withstand warfare outside of the firewall , having been coddled all their lives by the one-sided ideological bent of the Chinese internet .
Some tweets noted Chinese trolls ’ poor command of English and uncreative insults .
In image after image , Chinese warriors were shown breaking down at the slightest mention of Taiwan ’ s independence , the Tiananmen Square massacre , or the coronavirus originating from their country .
China ’ s sound defeat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go unnoticed at home .
While the # ThailandInsultsChina hashtag on Weibo was full of the usual outraged nationalism , just as many posts shared the memes from Twitter , praised the Thai sense of humor , and admitted that they contained some truth .
Even self-identified patriots denigrated the keyboard warriors ’ “ uncivilized ” tactics .
“ When you go over the wall to defend our country and all you can say is ‘ NMSL , ’ who is really shaming China ?
” one widely shared post asked .
Other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ glass-hearted ” or thin-skinned , noting that “ the world has 7 billion people , not every one of them has to love China.
” The incident also prompted a degree of self-reflection on Weibo about Chinese internet culture .
Many scolded the keyboard warriors for not understanding how online discourse works outside of the firewall , noting that Chinese attempts to report slanderous Thai memes to the Thai government were of no use because the outside internet is not as rigorously monitored as the Chinese internet .
( “ I guess @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” one account reflected sarcastically about the reporting attempts . )
Moreover , Chinese netizens explained , it was normal for Thais to say whatever they want about their government .
Many shared “ Prathet Ku Mee , ” a popular Thai rap video in which the rappers curse the military government as evidence of this fact .
“ Only Chinese and North Koreans don ’ t dare to curse their government , ” one comment reflected .
In fact , Thai social media , especially about the king , is pretty heavily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mee ” were threatened with arrest ( although not actually detained ) .
Still , the Weibo posts showed increasing awareness that dissent is not as taboo in other countries as it is in China .
The self-reflection exercised by ordinary Chinese citizens on Weibo may not make it to the highest levels of the Chinese state .
The Chinese government is only becoming more aggressive , and it is investing increasingly in propaganda outside the firewall .
But the # nnevvy war shows that no amount of investing in propaganda is effective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the dynamics of the outside internet .
It may be time to bring in some meme consultants .

It doesn’t take much to set off Chinese social media, especially when foreigners are involved. The latest spark in a tinder-dry landscape were tweets by two Thai celebrities that have ignited a battle pitting China’s keyboard warriors against a united front of Twitter users from across the Asia-Pacific region. What might at first look like a pointless spat is exposing the weaknesses of China’s propaganda efforts when they cross the firewall.
It doesn’t take much to set off Chinese social media, especially when foreigners are involved. The latest spark in a tinder-dry landscape were tweets by two Thai celebrities that have ignited a battle pitting China’s keyboard warriors against a united front of Twitter users from across the Asia-Pacific region. What might at first look like a pointless spat is exposing the weaknesses of China’s propaganda efforts when they cross the firewall.
Battles over national honor led by online pop fans are nothing new. During the Hong Kong protests last August, Chinese fangirls organized in order to hop over the firewall and spam pro-Hong Kong social media accounts under the auspices of defending their idol “A-Zhong”—a stand-in for the Chinese nation. In 2016, expeditions of angered Chinese keyboard warriors raided the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians after the Taiwanese K-pop idol Chou Tzu-yu waved Taiwan’s flag on South Korean television.
This time, coronavirus anxiety is in the mix. Last week, the Thai idol Vachirawit Chivaaree aka Bright, who has recently become popular in China thanks to his role in the Thai boy-love drama 2gether: The Series, retweeted a post sharing photos of the skylines in four “countries,” one of which was Hong Kong. This upset Chinese fans, who hold that Hong Kong is part of China, and they demanded Bright apologize, which he did. Just when the controversy seemed about to fizzle out, Bright’s rumored girlfriend, the Thai influencer Weeraya Sukaram, who goes by Nnevvy on Twitter, retweeted a Thai-language tweet questioning why China would not let foreigners investigate whether the novel coronavirus was leaked from a Chinese lab while at the same time accusing foreigners of having brought the virus to the country.
That pushed Chinese fans to surmount the firewall to hurl insults at those slandering the motherland on Twitter and Instagram. Chinese keyboard warriors insulted the Thai king, the Thai prime minister, and dismissed the country as poor and backward.
They were surprised to find Thais did not seem to care. In fact, many were exultant to have someone else lend a hand in disparaging their government, which many Thais despise, and even their infamously thuggish king, who is far less popular than his father despite harsh lèse-majesté laws. Soon the hashtag #nnevvy, which now has over 2 million posts, was full of Thai Twitter users making self-deprecating and often hilarious memes about themselves. In response to Chinese taunts of “NMSL,” which means something like “hope your mother dies,” Thais retorted that they have 20 mothers, a reference to the Thai king’s supposed harem. Chinese users were baffled by this, and some attempted to lecture their Thai enemies on the meaning of patriotism.
In addition to the Twitter incident, Chinese fans had unearthed one of Weeraya’s Instagram posts from a few years ago in which she had responded “Taiwanese” to a commenter asking what style of clothing she was wearing. This supposed recognition of a separate Taiwan from China was taken as another piece of evidence against Bright. (Chinese media uses absurd politicized circumlocution to avoid admitting the existence of Taiwan.) Thai warriors thus became fevered supporters of the sovereignty of Taiwan and Hong Kong, both of which China claims as its own. Moved by this show of solidarity, netizens from Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and other Asian countries that have long-standing anxieties about Chinese territorial bullying, mobilized to join the #nnevvy war. A widely shared meme took a still from the classic anime Sailor Moon and overlaid various Asian flags on each of the magical warriors.
The #nnevvy war reflected a growing awareness and resentment outside the firewall, at least in Asia, of how exactly China seeks to influence public discourse. Thai users and their allies referred to their opponents as “wumao,” the word used in China for internet warriors paid by the government (supposedly 50 cents a post, thus the name) to bombard platforms like Weibo with pro-Communist Party comments. In recent years, an increasing number of reports suggest, the Chinese government has been sending wumao over the firewall to post on Twitter—although, as a new investigation by ProPublica finds, the wumao may not be people at all but a collection of algorithms.
In fact, the Chinese partisans hopping the firewall to battle Thais were probably spontaneous rather than paid or organized. In the August expedition over the firewall, the keyboard warriors had enjoyed explicit encouragement and support from the Chinese government. But this time the Chinese government seemed to be encouraging netizens to hold back. On Weibo, the hashtag #ThailandInsultsChina mysteriously disappeared from the hot searches bar, and Diba, the Reddit-like forum partially responsible for organizing the August expedition, posted on Weibo explicitly discouraging Chinese from hopping the wall, saying that it would only embolden Hong Kong and Taiwan separatists. Clearly the Chinese censors felt it was a war not worth fighting, especially at a time when the authorities are trying to put out fires on multiple public relations fronts, from the mistreatment of Africans in southern China to the Communist Party’s culpability in spreading the coronavirus to articles claiming Kazakhstan for China.
Regardless of the actual authenticity of their opponents, Thais cheerfully enjoyed portraying their opponents as monolithic, insincere, and humorless. One meme showed a computer lab of men in army fatigues all typing “China #1” “Democracy also has problems” “CIA plant” and other staples; another simply changed the stars in the Chinese flag to NMSL. Memes also poked fun at the fact that Chinese have to use a virtual private network, which is illegal in China, to defend their country on most social media platforms. In one cartoon, a group of Chinese keyboard warriors surreptitiously climb over the firewall, yell about China’s superiority at a Thai sipping tea unimpressed, and hurriedly climb back over.
Overall, the memes painted a picture of Chinese as simply unequipped to withstand warfare outside of the firewall, having been coddled all their lives by the one-sided ideological bent of the Chinese internet. Some tweets noted Chinese trolls’ poor command of English and uncreative insults. In image after image, Chinese warriors were shown breaking down at the slightest mention of Taiwan’s independence, the Tiananmen Square massacre, or the coronavirus originating from their country.
China’s sound defeat in the #nnevvy war did not go unnoticed at home. While the #ThailandInsultsChina hashtag on Weibo was full of the usual outraged nationalism, just as many posts shared the memes from Twitter, praised the Thai sense of humor, and admitted that they contained some truth. Even self-identified patriots denigrated the keyboard warriors’ “uncivilized” tactics. “When you go over the wall to defend our country and all you can say is ‘NMSL,’ who is really shaming China?” one widely shared post asked. Other posters reprimanded their compatriots for being too “glass-hearted” or thin-skinned, noting that “the world has 7 billion people, not every one of them has to love China.”
The incident also prompted a degree of self-reflection on Weibo about Chinese internet culture. Many scolded the keyboard warriors for not understanding how online discourse works outside of the firewall, noting that Chinese attempts to report slanderous Thai memes to the Thai government were of no use because the outside internet is not as rigorously monitored as the Chinese internet. (“I guess we really are exporting our values,” one account reflected sarcastically about the reporting attempts.) Moreover, Chinese netizens explained, it was normal for Thais to say whatever they want about their government. Many shared “Prathet Ku Mee,” a popular Thai rap video in which the rappers curse the military government as evidence of this fact. “Only Chinese and North Koreans don’t dare to curse their government,” one comment reflected. In fact, Thai social media, especially about the king, is pretty heavily censored—and the rappers behind “Prathet Ku Mee” were threatened with arrest (although not actually detained). Still, the Weibo posts showed increasing awareness that dissent is not as taboo in other countries as it is in China.
The self-reflection exercised by ordinary Chinese citizens on Weibo may not make it to the highest levels of the Chinese state. The Chinese government is only becoming more aggressive, and it is investing increasingly in propaganda outside the firewall. But the #nnevvy war shows that no amount of investing in propaganda is effective if not coupled with a sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of the outside internet. It may be time to bring in some meme consultants.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-17--Fake News, Real Arrests

Fake News, Real Arrests

MUMBAI—Rumor travels faster than the coronavirus in India .
False data has flown across social media , and fake remedies have abounded .
Conspiracy theories about the virus ’ s origins , and about those responsible for its spread , have gained traction as they move across WhatsApp and Facebook .
But rather than tackle the source of the problem , police have been carrying out rampant arrests—raising concerns over human rights and questions over the ability of local and national government to control misinformation .
In Mizoram , at least 15 people were arrested for sharing a fake circular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home immediately .
In Odisha , a man was arrested for posting to Facebook “ fake news ” about a supposedly infected person who arrived from out of state—information he said he received on WhatsApp .
In Rajasthan , a health care worker was arrested for posting misleading data on the number of COVID-19 cases .
Similar cases have appeared across the country .
A recent tally by Agence France-Presse found that nearly 100 people had been arrested in India on charges related to spreading misinformation about the coronavirus .
Though India does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law , most cases have been registered under existing provisions such as the Indian Penal Code and the Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897 .
At least one state , Maharashtra , has passed orders specifically related to the coronavirus—mandating that any information on the virus must be approved by the government before dissemination .
The coronavirus crisis has hit the country hard , spreading rapidly and ravaging the economy .
India now has over 13,800 confirmed cases with 452 deaths , though given the relatively low rate of testing , the real figure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On March 24 , Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a three-week lockdown as a means of slowing the pandemic .
The order is among the strictest in the world , covering some 1.3 billion people who are not allowed to step foot outside their homes except to get food and medicine .
On April 14 , Modi extended the lockdown for another 19 days .
With little focus on combating misinformation , erratic and unclear communication from the government allowing rumors to flourish , and rising strain on the population , the number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Extraordinary times absolutely call for extraordinary measures , but those measures should be positive investments in independent and credible information , not steps that will do little or nothing to stop misinformation while doing great collateral damage to fundamental rights , ” said Rasmus Nielsen , the director of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford , who has worked extensively on disinformation .
India has 451 million monthly active internet users , according to a 2019 report , and 400 million WhatsApp users , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ market .
WhatsApp has been one of the key platforms for spreading disinformation in India—to such a degree that the company in 2018 limited how many times a message can be forwarded after a spate of mob killings driven by rumors spread on the platform .
As in other countries , the spread of fake news has long been a concern in India—the rumormongering around COVID-19 is simply following prevailing patterns .
“ It is part of a larger ecosystem , it ’ s not like it is suddenly happening now , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ honorary associate professor at Hong Kong University , whose research work has focused on risk communication during epidemics .
“ You stop one person , someone else will start doing it .
If you have a culture of doing it , it will continue.
” In India , this culture has been aided by politicians and influential public figures peddling bogus information .
In recent weeks , some leaders advised using cow urine and cow dung to combat the virus .
On WhatsApp , netizens have been forwarding messages ranging from the dubious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ various liquids and avoiding meat , and the claim that the prime minister ’ s recent appeal to Indians to applaud health care workers in unison “ will create so much vibrations that virus will lose all potency.
” Perhaps most worryingly , online conspiracy theories claiming Muslims are responsible for the spread of the virus have led to violence .
Though some of these messages are patently nonsense , the question of how to clearly distinguish real news , opinion , misinformation , and deliberate fakes is a tough one .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ fake news , ” allowing law enforcement authorities to exercise their discretion allows arrests to be driven by politics or police whim .
“ When you start arresting people what happens is you pick up random people , they haven ’ t necessarily started those forwards .
In the age of social media you may never find out who posted it , ” said Pratik Sinha , the founder and editor of Alt News , a fact-checking site .
“ So , you will pick on two or three people but a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , are you going to fill jails with thousands of people ?
No , you pick on a few and put them in jail .
Very often you find there is a political slant to it , because you pick up people from opposing parties.
” And there is little to suggest arrests work as a deterrent .
“ China has been extraordinarily draconian in restricting citizens ’ communication and cracking down on voices , and yet there is plenty of misinformation in circulation , ” Nielsen pointed out .
It is imperative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ information with good information and curtail the room for speculation .
“ What public authorities can do is to make sure that they are communicating effectively , and they are not leaving a vacuum , ” Abraham said .
“ Are they getting through to people ?
If they are , then the problem of fake news disappears.
” But as long as the government benefits from the rapid spread of false information , there is little likelihood of pivoting .
“ Every single month we have a plethora of political misinformation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do people fall for it ?
Because they are not taught to think critically toward the information they receive .
That is what we as a country need to work on , to think more critically and build more scientific temper , but we are going exactly in the opposite direction .
”

MUMBAI—Rumor travels faster than the coronavirus in India. False data has flown across social media, and fake remedies have abounded. Conspiracy theories about the virus’s origins, and about those responsible for its spread, have gained traction as they move across WhatsApp and Facebook. But rather than tackle the source of the problem, police have been carrying out rampant arrests—raising concerns over human rights and questions over the ability of local and national government to control misinformation.
MUMBAI—Rumor travels faster than the coronavirus in India. False data has flown across social media, and fake remedies have abounded. Conspiracy theories about the virus’s origins, and about those responsible for its spread, have gained traction as they move across WhatsApp and Facebook. But rather than tackle the source of the problem, police have been carrying out rampant arrests—raising concerns over human rights and questions over the ability of local and national government to control misinformation.
In Mizoram, at least 15 people were arrested for sharing a fake circular telling locals outside the state to come home immediately. In Odisha, a man was arrested for posting to Facebook “fake news” about a supposedly infected person who arrived from out of state—information he said he received on WhatsApp. In Rajasthan, a health care worker was arrested for posting misleading data on the number of COVID-19 cases. Similar cases have appeared across the country. A recent tally by Agence France-Presse found that nearly 100 people had been arrested in India on charges related to spreading misinformation about the coronavirus. Though India does not have a “fake news” law, most cases have been registered under existing provisions such as the Indian Penal Code and the Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897. At least one state, Maharashtra, has passed orders specifically related to the coronavirus—mandating that any information on the virus must be approved by the government before dissemination.
The coronavirus crisis has hit the country hard, spreading rapidly and ravaging the economy. India now has over 13,800 confirmed cases with 452 deaths, though given the relatively low rate of testing, the real figure is likely to be far higher. On March 24, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a three-week lockdown as a means of slowing the pandemic. The order is among the strictest in the world, covering some 1.3 billion people who are not allowed to step foot outside their homes except to get food and medicine. On April 14, Modi extended the lockdown for another 19 days. With little focus on combating misinformation, erratic and unclear communication from the government allowing rumors to flourish, and rising strain on the population, the number of arrests might be expected to grow.
“Extraordinary times absolutely call for extraordinary measures, but those measures should be positive investments in independent and credible information, not steps that will do little or nothing to stop misinformation while doing great collateral damage to fundamental rights,” said Rasmus Nielsen, the director of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford, who has worked extensively on disinformation.
India has 451 million monthly active internet users, according to a 2019 report, and 400 million WhatsApp users, making it the company’s largest market. WhatsApp has been one of the key platforms for spreading disinformation in India—to such a degree that the company in 2018 limited how many times a message can be forwarded after a spate of mob killings driven by rumors spread on the platform.
As in other countries, the spread of fake news has long been a concern in India—the rumormongering around COVID-19 is simply following prevailing patterns.
“It is part of a larger ecosystem, it’s not like it is suddenly happening now,” said Thomas Abraham, a journalist and honorary associate professor at Hong Kong University, whose research work has focused on risk communication during epidemics. “You stop one person, someone else will start doing it. If you have a culture of doing it, it will continue.”
In India, this culture has been aided by politicians and influential public figures peddling bogus information. In recent weeks, some leaders advised using cow urine and cow dung to combat the virus. On WhatsApp, netizens have been forwarding messages ranging from the dubious to the dangerous—including advice on gargling with various liquids and avoiding meat, and the claim that the prime minister’s recent appeal to Indians to applaud health care workers in unison “will create so much vibrations that virus will lose all potency.” Perhaps most worryingly, online conspiracy theories claiming Muslims are responsible for the spread of the virus have led to violence.
Though some of these messages are patently nonsense, the question of how to clearly distinguish real news, opinion, misinformation, and deliberate fakes is a tough one. In the absence of a clear definition of “fake news,” allowing law enforcement authorities to exercise their discretion allows arrests to be driven by politics or police whim.
“When you start arresting people what happens is you pick up random people, they haven’t necessarily started those forwards. In the age of social media you may never find out who posted it,” said Pratik Sinha, the founder and editor of Alt News, a fact-checking site. “So, you will pick on two or three people but a popular forward gets sent thousands of times, are you going to fill jails with thousands of people? No, you pick on a few and put them in jail. Very often you find there is a political slant to it, because you pick up people from opposing parties.”
And there is little to suggest arrests work as a deterrent. “China has been extraordinarily draconian in restricting citizens’ communication and cracking down on voices, and yet there is plenty of misinformation in circulation,” Nielsen pointed out.
It is imperative for authorities to instead begin combating bad information with good information and curtail the room for speculation. “What public authorities can do is to make sure that they are communicating effectively, and they are not leaving a vacuum,” Abraham said. “Are they getting through to people? If they are, then the problem of fake news disappears.”
But as long as the government benefits from the rapid spread of false information, there is little likelihood of pivoting. “Every single month we have a plethora of political misinformation,” Sinha said. “And why do people fall for it? Because they are not taught to think critically toward the information they receive. That is what we as a country need to work on, to think more critically and build more scientific temper, but we are going exactly in the opposite direction.”