foreignpolicy--2020-12-23--What Does the Future of America’s Nuclear Briefcase Look Like?

What Does the Future of America ’ s Nuclear Briefcase Look Like ?
In October , the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons , an international ban on nuclear weapons with 86 state signatories , received its 50th ratification by a state signatory .
As a result , and despite U.S. attempts to scuttle the treaty , it will enter into force as legally binding international law in January 2021 .
It is unlikely that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will sign the treaty or reduce his country ’ s nuclear arsenal substantially during his presidency .
Still , his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump ’ s nuclear weapons policies and could promote significant nuclear nonproliferation measures .
Like the leadership of all nuclear-armed states , Biden ’ s administration will face continued pressure to sign the treaty and deeply engage in nuclear disarmament .
The 2017 international agreement bans the development , testing , use , or threat of use of nuclear weapons .
It also prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons .
The treaty was spearheaded by non-nuclear-armed states , survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and nuclear weapons testing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons , which won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize .
The nine nuclear-armed states—China , France , India , Israel , North Korea , Pakistan , Russia , the United Kingdom , and the United States—boycotted the 2017 treaty negotiations , oppose the treaty , and have not signed it .
Earlier this year , as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons edged closer to entering into force , the Trump administration urged states that had ratified the treaty to withdraw their ratifications—an effort that did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long-standing U.S. views that nuclear weapons enhance U.S. security and that of its key allies .
Had Biden been president at the time , he might well have done the same .
Like his predecessors , Biden is a proponent of nuclear deterrence .
As vice president in 2017 , he referred to it as “ the bedrock of [ U.S. ] national defense , ” and a statement on his campaign website affirmed that “ the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and if necessary , retaliating against—a nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is likely that Biden will continue Trump ’ s policy of opposing the new treaty .
Yet , the arguments mounted in favor of nuclear deterrence are deeply flawed .
As the nuclear weapons specialist Benoît Pelopidas has highlighted , nuclear weapons have not deterred war between nuclear-armed states or maintained international peace .
China and Russia engaged in a border clash in the late 1960s , and India and Pakistan were engaged in direct conflict over disputed territory in the 1990s .
Nuclear weapons did not keep the Cold War “ cold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wars in the global south resulting in the deaths of millions of civilians , and nuclear war almost broke out between the United States and Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis .
Furthermore , historians of nuclear weapons have argued that during the early Cold War , nuclear weapons contributed to an escalation in tensions between nuclear-armed states .
Not only are nuclear weapons of dubious value for deterrence , they also present immense threats to human health and the environment .
The U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August @ @ @ @ @ @ @ estimated 230,000 people from radiation sickness , burns , and injuries .
The radiation also increased risk of illnesses over the long term , created ongoing psychological trauma , and led to discrimination against survivors .
Since 1945 , nuclear tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands and in Nevada in areas with large Native American populations , by France in Algeria and French Polynesia , by the Soviet Union in Kazakhstan , by the United Kingdom in Australia in areas with sizable Indigenous populations , and by China in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facing high rates of cancer and birth defects , and the contamination of their environments .
Overall , since 1945 , atmospheric nuclear testing has resulted in at least 2 million global cancer deaths .
That is why the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is necessary on top of other measures like the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons , a key piece of international nuclear law , which many states have largely failed to adhere to .
The treaty allowed the United States , United Kingdom , France @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , then the only nuclear-armed powers , to maintain their existing arsenals and banned all other states from acquiring them .
Despite this , India , Pakistan , North Korea , and Israel developed and maintain nuclear weapons .
The treaty also required nuclear-armed states that are signatories to work toward nuclear disarmament , which the United States , United Kingdom , China , Russia , and France have largely not done , as they all continue to retain and modernize their nuclear arsenals , notably by developing nuclear warheads and nuclear-armed drones @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear weapons .
The new treaty would address the limitations of the earlier one by banning nuclear weapons outright , and for all states .
Regardless of nuclear-armed states ’ policies regarding the new treaty , the agreement is significant , as it considerably strengthens the body of international nuclear law , the norm of nuclear nonproliferation , and , crucially , as disarmament law specialist Anna Hood has argued , contributes to the delegitimization and stigmatization of all nuclear weapons regardless of which states possess them .
Importantly , increasing support for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons also increases pressure on nuclear-armed states to substantially and meaningfully engage in nuclear disarmament .
Biden has pledged a five-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ( New START ) between the United States and Russia , which caps the number of deployed nuclear weapons by both states to 1,550 .
New START is the only remaining arms control treaty between the two states .
In 2019 , Trump withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty , an arms control agreement signed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short- and medium-range nuclear missiles .
The Trump administration and Russia ’ s President Vladimir Putin have not yet agreed to extend New START , which will otherwise expire in February 2021—the Trump administration has proposed only extending the treaty for one year .
During his presidential campaign , Biden did embrace a “ no first use ” policy , which renounces a first use of nuclear weapons and advocates for using such weapons only in response to a nuclear attack .
If Biden did officially adopt “ no first use , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. president has sole authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons .
No previous U.S. administration has renounced first use .
Meanwhile , globally , only India and China have .
Biden is not the first Democratic leader to contemplate adopting a “ no first use ” policy for the United States .
Obama contemplated the policy but ultimately rejected it following opposition from hawkish Democrats in his administration .
Although Biden will also face opposition from some Democrats , he will also likely be under pressure from progressive members of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Sen. Elizabeth Warren introduced the No First Use Act in the U.S. Senate , seeking to bar the United States from conducting a first strike .
Furthermore , later that year , Democratic congressional advocates for the abolition of nuclear weapons—Reps .
James McGovern and Earl Blumenauer—introduced a resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives calling for the United States to adopt a “ no first use ” policy , embrace the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ’ goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons , and cease modernizing its nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will likely also face pressure from some progressive Democrats to sign the new treaty and deeply engage in nuclear disarmament .
In his famous 2009 Prague speech , Obama asserted that the United States “ will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons.
” These steps—which were important , but small , under the Obama administration and virtually nonexistent during Trump ’ s presidency—will likely remain only incremental during Biden ’ s presidency .

In October, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an international ban on nuclear weapons with 86 state signatories, received its 50th ratification by a state signatory. As a result, and despite U.S. attempts to scuttle the treaty, it will enter into force as legally binding international law in January 2021. It is unlikely that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will sign the treaty or reduce his country’s nuclear arsenal substantially during his presidency. Still, his administration is likely to reverse some of President Donald Trump’s nuclear weapons policies and could promote significant nuclear nonproliferation measures. Like the leadership of all nuclear-armed states, Biden’s administration will face continued pressure to sign the treaty and deeply engage in nuclear disarmament.
In October, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an international ban on nuclear weapons with 86 state signatories, received its 50th ratification by a state signatory. As a result, and despite U.S. attempts to scuttle the treaty, it will enter into force as legally binding international law in January 2021. It is unlikely that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will sign the treaty or reduce his country’s nuclear arsenal substantially during his presidency. Still, his administration is likely to reverse some of President Donald Trump’s nuclear weapons policies and could promote significant nuclear nonproliferation measures. Like the leadership of all nuclear-armed states, Biden’s administration will face continued pressure to sign the treaty and deeply engage in nuclear disarmament.
The 2017 international agreement bans the development, testing, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons. The treaty was spearheaded by non-nuclear-armed states, survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and nuclear weapons testing, and nongovernmental organizations, including the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. The nine nuclear-armed states—China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—boycotted the 2017 treaty negotiations, oppose the treaty, and have not signed it.
Earlier this year, as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons edged closer to entering into force, the Trump administration urged states that had ratified the treaty to withdraw their ratifications—an effort that did not work but was in keeping with long-standing U.S. views that nuclear weapons enhance U.S. security and that of its key allies.
Had Biden been president at the time, he might well have done the same. Like his predecessors, Biden is a proponent of nuclear deterrence. As vice president in 2017, he referred to it as “the bedrock of [U.S.] national defense,” and a statement on his campaign website affirmed that “the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack.” Once in office, it is likely that Biden will continue Trump’s policy of opposing the new treaty.
Yet, the arguments mounted in favor of nuclear deterrence are deeply flawed. As the nuclear weapons specialist Benoît Pelopidas has highlighted, nuclear weapons have not deterred war between nuclear-armed states or maintained international peace. China and Russia engaged in a border clash in the late 1960s, and India and Pakistan were engaged in direct conflict over disputed territory in the 1990s. Nuclear weapons did not keep the Cold War “cold”; tensions played out via proxy wars in the global south resulting in the deaths of millions of civilians, and nuclear war almost broke out between the United States and Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Furthermore, historians of nuclear weapons have argued that during the early Cold War, nuclear weapons contributed to an escalation in tensions between nuclear-armed states.
Not only are nuclear weapons of dubious value for deterrence, they also present immense threats to human health and the environment. The U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 resulted in the deaths of an estimated 230,000 people from radiation sickness, burns, and injuries. The radiation also increased risk of illnesses over the long term, created ongoing psychological trauma, and led to discrimination against survivors. Since 1945, nuclear tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands and in Nevada in areas with large Native American populations, by France in Algeria and French Polynesia, by the Soviet Union in Kazakhstan, by the United Kingdom in Australia in areas with sizable Indigenous populations, and by China in Xinjiang have also resulted in marginalized populations facing high rates of cancer and birth defects, and the contamination of their environments. Overall, since 1945, atmospheric nuclear testing has resulted in at least 2 million global cancer deaths.
That is why the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is necessary on top of other measures like the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a key piece of international nuclear law, which many states have largely failed to adhere to. The treaty allowed the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union, then the only nuclear-armed powers, to maintain their existing arsenals and banned all other states from acquiring them. Despite this, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel developed and maintain nuclear weapons. The treaty also required nuclear-armed states that are signatories to work toward nuclear disarmament, which the United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and France have largely not done, as they all continue to retain and modernize their nuclear arsenals, notably by developing nuclear warheads and nuclear-armed drones, and increasing the lethality of existing nuclear weapons. The new treaty would address the limitations of the earlier one by banning nuclear weapons outright, and for all states.
Regardless of nuclear-armed states’ policies regarding the new treaty, the agreement is significant, as it considerably strengthens the body of international nuclear law, the norm of nuclear nonproliferation, and, crucially, as disarmament law specialist Anna Hood has argued, contributes to the delegitimization and stigmatization of all nuclear weapons regardless of which states possess them. Importantly, increasing support for the treaty and the abolition of nuclear weapons also increases pressure on nuclear-armed states to substantially and meaningfully engage in nuclear disarmament.
Although Biden is likely to continue to snub the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, it does not mean that U.S. nuclear weapons policy will adhere entirely to the Trumpian status quo. Like former U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, Biden has been a long-standing advocate for arms control, including the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The agreement bans all nuclear testing and was signed by Clinton, but it has still not been ratified by the Senate, a process that would require a two-thirds majority. Facing a similar blockage, it is highly likely that Biden would continue America’s bipartisan moratorium on nuclear testing, which began during George H.W. Bush’s presidency and was almost interrupted by the Trump administration contemplating resuming nuclear testing.
Biden has pledged a five-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, which caps the number of deployed nuclear weapons by both states to 1,550. New START is the only remaining arms control treaty between the two states. In 2019, Trump withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, an arms control agreement signed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan that banned U.S. and Russian possession of short- and medium-range nuclear missiles. The Trump administration and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin have not yet agreed to extend New START, which will otherwise expire in February 2021—the Trump administration has proposed only extending the treaty for one year.
During his presidential campaign, Biden did embrace a “no first use” policy, which renounces a first use of nuclear weapons and advocates for using such weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. If Biden did officially adopt “no first use,” it would be significant, as the U.S. president has sole authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. No previous U.S. administration has renounced first use. Meanwhile, globally, only India and China have.
Biden is not the first Democratic leader to contemplate adopting a “no first use” policy for the United States. Obama contemplated the policy but ultimately rejected it following opposition from hawkish Democrats in his administration. Although Biden will also face opposition from some Democrats, he will also likely be under pressure from progressive members of his party. For example, in 2019, Sen. Elizabeth Warren introduced the No First Use Act in the U.S. Senate, seeking to bar the United States from conducting a first strike.
Furthermore, later that year, Democratic congressional advocates for the abolition of nuclear weapons—Reps. James McGovern and Earl Blumenauer—introduced a resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives calling for the United States to adopt a “no first use” policy, embrace the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, and cease modernizing its nuclear arsenal. As a result, Biden will likely also face pressure from some progressive Democrats to sign the new treaty and deeply engage in nuclear disarmament.
In his famous 2009 Prague speech, Obama asserted that the United States “will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons.” These steps—which were important, but small, under the Obama administration and virtually nonexistent during Trump’s presidency—will likely remain only incremental during Biden’s presidency.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-23--How China Shaped the World in 2020

How China Shaped the World in 2020

How China Shaped the World in 2020 Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief—the last edition of 2020 .
This week , we round up the biggest China stories of the year .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
It ’ s been the biggest year in U.S.-China relations since 1989 , and none of the news is good .
To be honest , neither is the news about relations between Beijing and anyone else .
From Australia to India and Mongolia to the European Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alienated potential allies and turned rivals into enemies .
Internationally , China is more unpopular than ever .
But it ’ s also a superpower that is shaken by the coronavirus pandemic but recovering faster than most of the world—and increasingly willing to put domestic demands ahead of its global reputation .
Here are five stories about China that dominated this year , with global consequences .
The virus that would change the world incubated in Wuhan , one of China ’ s great metropolises .
We still don ’ t know exactly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because China won ’ t cooperate with an outside investigation .
But we are reasonably sure it didn ’ t start with bat soup ( a dish unknown in the city ) or in a secret laboratory .
It probably didn ’ t even start in Wuhan itself but in the nearby countryside , where interactions between humans and animals are common .
The local authorities knew about the virus but kept it under wraps , perhaps even from the central government itself .
They were more worried about public panic and their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ got too big .
During the terrible weeks when it was the first COVID-19 epicenter , Wuhan was a hero city .
It ’ s still not clear how many people died , though the death toll is likely higher than the official figure : 3,869 .
Many front-line workers were among the dead , including Li Wenliang , the doctor who would become a martyr for both Communists and dissidents .
Wuhan was shuttered—and days later so was the rest of China , from other metropolises to small villages .
Perhaps the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well China slowed its own coronavirus outbreak after the cover-ups in December and January .
The world ’ s biggest-ever lockdown stopped the coronavirus in its tracks , containing the outbreaks beyond Wuhan despite the beginnings of Spring Festival travel .
Today , China is mostly open .
Crowds mix freely and maskless , although borders remain largely closed .
China isn ’ t the only country to successfully control the virus .
East Asian nations with the shared experience of SARS , from Taiwan to Japan , did remarkably well—as did Australia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries .
But given its large size and the virus ’ s origins there , China ’ s success is remarkable .
It has probably solidified the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) ’ s domestic reputation rather than shaking it .
Of course , it ’ s hard to separate the public ’ s opinion of the disaster from the massive censorship , propaganda , and coercion used to bolster the CCP ’ s image .
As Tracy Wen Liu wrote for Foreign Policy , the cover-ups didn ’ t stop in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of media control , covered in detail by both the New York Times and ChinaFile this week , to keep the public in line .
And while China closed cities at home , it coerced other countries , such as Pakistan , to keep their borders open to Chinese travelers—helping to give the virus a chance to spread worldwide .
Last year ’ s biggest China story was Hong Kong ’ s fight to keep its freedoms .
In 2020 , it lost that fight .
Beijing ’ s imposed a brutal national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the arrests of democratic activists over the next months and the expulsion and resignation of pro-democracy politicians from the Legislative Council in November .
To finish off the year , Beijing is effectively canceling the municipal elections in which it suffered a humiliating defeat in 2019—revoking the appointments of over 100 more pro-democracy politicians in order to give its lackies control of local councils .
The repercussions of the crackdown go far beyond the city itself .
Beijing broke promises made before the 1997 handover , causing outrage in the United Kingdom , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizenship for Hong Kongers who hold British National ( Overseas ) status .
The United States responded to the law by normalizing Hong Kong ’ s status , taking away a useful trade loophole for Beijing .
It is likely to open up other routes to refuge for Hong Kongers , although a first attempt was singlehandedly blocked by Sen. Ted Cruz this week .
One aspect of the national security law that has drawn particular worry abroad is that it says it applies worldwide—bolstering the case that China ’ s ambitions to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some defenders argue , purely domestic .
China ’ s genocidal repression of the Uighurs continued this year , with new information emerging on sterilization plans , the mass use of forced labor , and an ever-growing carceral system .
The campaign is the grimmest part of Xi ’ s push toward a new ethnonationalism in China , exulting a Han triumphalism that looks to assimilate or exterminate China ’ s many minority cultures .
This shift has involved new crackdowns in Tibet , as well as an assault on Mongolian culture that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The CCP once denigrated the so-called big Han ideology of the Kuomintang and engaged in real efforts to protect minority cultures and languages .
Party leaders now see that agenda as failed and dangerous .
That fierce new nationalism is also visible on the diplomatic stage , where wolf warrior diplomats , led by foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian , have switched from denial to outright attacks on anyone who dares criticize China ’ s actions .
Officials have openly threatened Australia , deployed crude insults against foreign diplomats and politicians , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in China .
Paradoxically , these diplomats depended on access to the outside world—including VPNs banned in China—to bolster their own careers through domestic nationalism .
China did plenty of terrible things this year .
But just as the early years of the first Cold War produced wild McCarthyism alongside real Russian spies , so U.S. politics shows worrying signs of counterproductive and partisan paranoia about Chinese influence .
That has already caused problems in counterintelligence , but it could get much worse .
Trumpist conspiracy theories about the election are increasingly turning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month .
Republican politicians have taken a straightforwardly racist tone about China , while anti-Asian racism in the United States has increased this year—not for the first time .
These shifts are in part the result of a powerful network of far-right Chinese activists in the United States , most prominently the network centered around the Epoch Times , a newspaper run by the Falun Gong along with the billionaire and Steve Bannon ally Guo Wengui .
People like Guo and Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi are often cast as dissidents , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t ideological : They lost out in power struggles in China and fled as a result .
Foreign Policy rounded out its China coverage this year with a three-part investigation of the data wars between the United States and China , based on interviews with over three dozen former and current national security and intelligence officials .
Read about the struggle for the future between Beijing and Washington—a subject we ’ ll be returning to many times in 2021 .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief—the last edition of 2020. This week, we round up the biggest China stories of the year .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief—the last edition of 2020. This week, we round up the biggest China stories of the year.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
The Year in Review
It’s been the biggest year in U.S.-China relations since 1989, and none of the news is good. To be honest, neither is the news about relations between Beijing and anyone else. From Australia to India and Mongolia to the European Union, Xi Jinping’s China has alienated potential allies and turned rivals into enemies.
Internationally, China is more unpopular than ever. But it’s also a superpower that is shaken by the coronavirus pandemic but recovering faster than most of the world—and increasingly willing to put domestic demands ahead of its global reputation. Here are five stories about China that dominated this year, with global consequences.
The Wuhan Outbreak
The virus that would change the world incubated in Wuhan, one of China’s great metropolises. We still don’t know exactly how the coronavirus started, not least because China won’t cooperate with an outside investigation. But we are reasonably sure it didn’t start with bat soup (a dish unknown in the city) or in a secret laboratory. It probably didn’t even start in Wuhan itself but in the nearby countryside, where interactions between humans and animals are common.
The local authorities knew about the virus but kept it under wraps, perhaps even from the central government itself. They were more worried about public panic and their own reputation than the consequences—until the problem got too big.
During the terrible weeks when it was the first COVID-19 epicenter, Wuhan was a hero city. It’s still not clear how many people died, though the death toll is likely higher than the official figure: 3,869. Many front-line workers were among the dead, including Li Wenliang, the doctor who would become a martyr for both Communists and dissidents. Wuhan was shuttered—and days later so was the rest of China, from other metropolises to small villages.
Coronavirus—and the Public—Under Control
Perhaps the biggest surprise of 2020 was just how well China slowed its own coronavirus outbreak after the cover-ups in December and January. The world’s biggest-ever lockdown stopped the coronavirus in its tracks, containing the outbreaks beyond Wuhan despite the beginnings of Spring Festival travel.
Today, China is mostly open. Crowds mix freely and maskless, although borders remain largely closed. China isn’t the only country to successfully control the virus. East Asian nations with the shared experience of SARS, from Taiwan to Japan, did remarkably well—as did Australia, New Zealand, and many African countries. But given its large size and the virus’s origins there, China’s success is remarkable. It has probably solidified the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s domestic reputation rather than shaking it.
Of course, it’s hard to separate the public’s opinion of the disaster from the massive censorship, propaganda, and coercion used to bolster the CCP’s image. As Tracy Wen Liu wrote for Foreign Policy, the cover-ups didn’t stop in January. The government used a machinery of media control, covered in detail by both the New York Times and ChinaFile this week, to keep the public in line.
And while China closed cities at home, it coerced other countries, such as Pakistan, to keep their borders open to Chinese travelers—helping to give the virus a chance to spread worldwide.
Hong Kong Loses Its Freedom
People protest in support of Save12, the campaign to save twelve Hong Kong pro-democracy activists caught by mainland Chinese authorities trying to flee Hong Kong to Taiwan by boat, in central Taipei on Oct. 25.
Last year’s biggest China story was Hong Kong’s fight to keep its freedoms. In 2020, it lost that fight. Beijing’s imposed a brutal national security law in June, followed by the arrests of democratic activists over the next months and the expulsion and resignation of pro-democracy politicians from the Legislative Council in November.
To finish off the year, Beijing is effectively canceling the municipal elections in which it suffered a humiliating defeat in 2019—revoking the appointments of over 100 more pro-democracy politicians in order to give its lackies control of local councils.
The repercussions of the crackdown go far beyond the city itself. Beijing broke promises made before the 1997 handover, causing outrage in the United Kingdom, which is offering a new route to citizenship for Hong Kongers who hold British National (Overseas) status. The United States responded to the law by normalizing Hong Kong’s status, taking away a useful trade loophole for Beijing. It is likely to open up other routes to refuge for Hong Kongers, although a first attempt was singlehandedly blocked by Sen. Ted Cruz this week.
One aspect of the national security law that has drawn particular worry abroad is that it says it applies worldwide—bolstering the case that China’s ambitions to crush free speech are not, as some defenders argue, purely domestic.
Nationalists (and Racists) Take the Wheel
China’s genocidal repression of the Uighurs continued this year, with new information emerging on sterilization plans, the mass use of forced labor, and an ever-growing carceral system. The campaign is the grimmest part of Xi’s push toward a new ethnonationalism in China, exulting a Han triumphalism that looks to assimilate or exterminate China’s many minority cultures.
This shift has involved new crackdowns in Tibet, as well as an assault on Mongolian culture that prompted mass protest and resulting repression. The CCP once denigrated the so-called big Han ideology of the Kuomintang and engaged in real efforts to protect minority cultures and languages. Party leaders now see that agenda as failed and dangerous.
That fierce new nationalism is also visible on the diplomatic stage, where wolf warrior diplomats, led by foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian, have switched from denial to outright attacks on anyone who dares criticize China’s actions. Officials have openly threatened Australia, deployed crude insults against foreign diplomats and politicians, and issued wild denials that the coronavirus started in China.
Paradoxically, these diplomats depended on access to the outside world—including VPNs banned in China—to bolster their own careers through domestic nationalism.
America’s Dangerous Conspiratorialism
China did plenty of terrible things this year. But just as the early years of the first Cold War produced wild McCarthyism alongside real Russian spies, so U.S. politics shows worrying signs of counterproductive and partisan paranoia about Chinese influence. That has already caused problems in counterintelligence, but it could get much worse. Trumpist conspiracy theories about the election are increasingly turning around China, as I predicted last month.
Republican politicians have taken a straightforwardly racist tone about China, while anti-Asian racism in the United States has increased this year—not for the first time. These shifts are in part the result of a powerful network of far-right Chinese activists in the United States, most prominently the network centered around the Epoch Times, a newspaper run by the Falun Gong along with the billionaire and Steve Bannon ally Guo Wengui.
People like Guo and Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi are often cast as dissidents, but their objections to the CCP aren’t ideological: They lost out in power struggles in China and fled as a result.
And Finally…
Foreign Policy rounded out its China coverage this year with a three-part investigation of the data wars between the United States and China, based on interviews with over three dozen former and current national security and intelligence officials. Read about the struggle for the future between Beijing and Washington—a subject we’ll be returning to many times in 2021.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-23--Looming Aid Cuts Will Harm Afghan Women’s Health

HERAT , Afghanistan—On an October morning at the Kahdistan health clinic for internally displaced persons , the line of men , women , and children stretched around the street corner .
Inside , the health care workers at the small clinic , run by Doctors Without Borders ( MSF ) , prepared for the day ahead—working to provide vital services to as many women as possible .
Across Afghanistan , women have minimal access to reproductive health care and safe delivery services .
For displaced women , the situation is more dire .
More than 4 million people are displaced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens return every day from neighboring Pakistan and Iran , many by deportation .
This influx threatens to push the country ’ s straining health care system to a breaking point , particularly in poorly equipped border regions such as Herat province .
The coronavirus pandemic has already exacerbated many problems facing Afghan women .
Restrictions on movement have likely worsened women ’ s access to health care .
COVID-19 has increased stress on facilities providing care to people who are displaced , just as donor funding for health care is beginning to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the economic stress of the pandemic .
After Kabul , Herat province has the country ’ s second-highest number of cases of COVID-19 .
Since 2001 , international donor funding has led to crucial improvements in health care access in Afghanistan , with nongovernmental organizations delivering vital services in Taliban-controlled districts and other insecure regions .
International funds currently make up more than 50 percent of the Afghan government ’ s national budget .
But as violence rises again in Afghanistan and the United States prepares to draw its military presence down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ donors are disengaging .
Last month , foreign donors met at a conference in Geneva to discuss the future of aid to Afghanistan .
Despite a dire need for continued assistance , the country received $ 12 billion over the next four years—a $ 3 billion decrease compared to the past four years .
The pledges also come with stricter conditions , including stipulations for progress in the peace deal with the Taliban .
Many Afghans fear that the funds may never reach them if violence keeps escalating , removing assistance when it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a second wave of the coronavirus , and as winter sets in and emergency needs arise , the looming funding shortfalls could hit aid programs for displaced people the hardest .
Small health facilities such as the Kahdistan health clinic , often the sole care providers for many women , will be the worst-affected by a decrease in donor funding .
The MSF clinic caters to Shahrak-e-Sabz , the largest settlement of displaced people in western Afghanistan , most of whom fled fighting and drought in 2018 .
It was established in 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all patients , providing basic health care , including vaccinations .
Bridging the gap between the camp and hospitals in Herat , it remains the only port of call for thousands of women from the camp seeking reproductive health care .
Parisa Mohammadi , 24 , is the only midwife at the clinic , and she works six days a week .
Though its staff do not deliver babies , the clinic is the first stop for pregnant women from the camp , and demand for both checkups and contraception is high .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ day here and most of them are pregnant , ” she said .
“ They don ’ t have money to travel to the city , and we have an ambulance here so we can take them if it is an emergency.
” At the same time , the midwife has also witnessed the effects of declining international support for aid to Afghanistan .
For example , World Vision ’ s current program in the camp is due to end on Dec. 31 , according to its national director , Asuntha Charles .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mohammadi said , an influx in female patients to the Kahdistan clinic followed .
While women can access basic care , medicine , and contraception at the clinic , the MSF staff can not always address the varied complications the patients face , including malnourishment and anemia .
Limited supply caused by funding issues means that only the most severely malnourished pregnant women receive ready-to-use therapeutic food .
And some issues do not even reach the Kahdistan clinic ’ s doorstep .
The clinic does not have the capacity to handle severe complications @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most cases in Afghanistan and often carried out without supervision .
Marie Stopes International is the leading post-abortion care provider in Afghanistan , but Herat has no hospital or clinic that treats abortion complications .
“ After the baby was born , [ the MSF clinic ] vaccinated her and I am very grateful to them , ” Somaya said .
“ But the problem is that they are only giving basic medicine .
For many problems , the clinic can ’ t provide the medicine or surgery we need.
” Zarmina , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for two years , driven away from her home in Ghor province by fighting between government forces and the Taliban .
“ At the camp , we are suffering from hunger .
Some are starving .
We are homeless , ” she said .
“ We are suffering but at least our life is safe here.
” She gave birth to her third child at home in September because there was no vehicle available to take her to the hospital in Herat .
Like Somaya , Zarmina said that the MSF clinic has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ me some medicine to calm me down , ” she said .
“ They didn ’ t have the medicines I needed and I didn ’ t have money to go to the city to the hospital.
” Meanwhile , conditions at the camp are growing worse .
More than 2,000 new families arrived between April and June , and the pandemic has further affected the livelihoods of those who rely primarily on daily wages and humanitarian assistance .
Shahrak-e Sabz is government-owned land , and the site has no legal recognition .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Norwegian Refugee Council has reported police demolishing homes , evicting families from the land , and in some cases arresting residents .
With international support waning , Afghanistan is on the brink of a humanitarian crisis .
As the harsh winter sets in , bringing more patients to the MSF clinic , it will soon face more operational challenges .
“ The people at the camp rely on this clinic and clinics like ours can not continue our work without foreign support , ” Mohammadi , the midwife , said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ will increase and the women will be more desperate for support.
” As Afghans hold their breath for the outcome of the peace negotiations , millions of vulnerable women ’ s access to the most basic of human services hangs in the balance .

HERAT, Afghanistan—On an October morning at the Kahdistan health clinic for internally displaced persons, the line of men, women, and children stretched around the street corner. Inside, the health care workers at the small clinic, run by Doctors Without Borders (MSF), prepared for the day ahead—working to provide vital services to as many women as possible.
HERAT, Afghanistan—On an October morning at the Kahdistan health clinic for internally displaced persons, the line of men, women, and children stretched around the street corner. Inside, the health care workers at the small clinic, run by Doctors Without Borders (MSF), prepared for the day ahead—working to provide vital services to as many women as possible.
Across Afghanistan, women have minimal access to reproductive health care and safe delivery services. For displaced women, the situation is more dire. More than 4 million people are displaced within the country, and thousands of citizens return every day from neighboring Pakistan and Iran, many by deportation. This influx threatens to push the country’s straining health care system to a breaking point, particularly in poorly equipped border regions such as Herat province.
The coronavirus pandemic has already exacerbated many problems facing Afghan women. Restrictions on movement have likely worsened women’s access to health care. COVID-19 has increased stress on facilities providing care to people who are displaced, just as donor funding for health care is beginning to dwindle, both because of declining interest and the economic stress of the pandemic. After Kabul, Herat province has the country’s second-highest number of cases of COVID-19.
Since 2001, international donor funding has led to crucial improvements in health care access in Afghanistan, with nongovernmental organizations delivering vital services in Taliban-controlled districts and other insecure regions. International funds currently make up more than 50 percent of the Afghan government’s national budget. But as violence rises again in Afghanistan and the United States prepares to draw its military presence down to 2,500 troops on the ground, donors are disengaging.
Last month, foreign donors met at a conference in Geneva to discuss the future of aid to Afghanistan. Despite a dire need for continued assistance, the country received $12 billion over the next four years—a $3 billion decrease compared to the past four years. The pledges also come with stricter conditions, including stipulations for progress in the peace deal with the Taliban. Many Afghans fear that the funds may never reach them if violence keeps escalating, removing assistance when it is needed most.
Shahrak-e-Sabz is the largest camp for people who are displaced in western Afghanistan—home to an estimated 80,000 Afghans, most of whom fled fighting and drought in 2018.
The deteriorating security situation will only displace more people, increasing the demand for health services. But facilities providing care to women in Afghanistan have also come under deadly attack. After militants stormed an MSF-operated maternity ward in Kabul in May, the organization decided to withdraw from the hospital—leaving women in the area without vital emergency obstetric care.
Afghanistan now faces a second wave of the coronavirus, and as winter sets in and emergency needs arise, the looming funding shortfalls could hit aid programs for displaced people the hardest. Small health facilities such as the Kahdistan health clinic, often the sole care providers for many women, will be the worst-affected by a decrease in donor funding.
Women at the Shahrak-e-Sabz camp wait for a ride to take them to the Kahdistan health clinic in Herat on Oct. 7.
The MSF clinic caters to Shahrak-e-Sabz, the largest settlement of displaced people in western Afghanistan, most of whom fled fighting and drought in 2018. It was established in 2018 as a maternal clinic but now welcomes all patients, providing basic health care, including vaccinations. Bridging the gap between the camp and hospitals in Herat, it remains the only port of call for thousands of women from the camp seeking reproductive health care.
Parisa Mohammadi, 24, is the only midwife at the clinic, and she works six days a week. Though its staff do not deliver babies, the clinic is the first stop for pregnant women from the camp, and demand for both checkups and contraception is high. “We see about 70 patients a day here and most of them are pregnant,” she said. “They don’t have money to travel to the city, and we have an ambulance here so we can take them if it is an emergency.”
Left: The nurses and doctors at the Kahdistan clinic try to tackle issues of reproductive health and family planning methods using picture books. Each patient receives a book marked with their contraception instructions. Right: Despite cultural sensitivities, all forms of family planning are available in the clinic. “Most women come with their husbands to the clinic, but some take the pill secretly because they know they cannot face the difficulties of feeding another child when they can hardly cater for those they have,” Mohammadi said.
At the same time, the midwife has also witnessed the effects of declining international support for aid to Afghanistan. For example, World Vision’s current program in the camp is due to end on Dec. 31, according to its national director, Asuntha Charles. As the organization reduced its operations, Mohammadi said, an influx in female patients to the Kahdistan clinic followed.
While women can access basic care, medicine, and contraception at the clinic, the MSF staff cannot always address the varied complications the patients face, including malnourishment and anemia. Limited supply caused by funding issues means that only the most severely malnourished pregnant women receive ready-to-use therapeutic food.
A doctor attends to a baby who was brought to the Kahdistan clinic with respiratory problems on Oct. 7.
Staff members take their lunch break at the clinic Oct. 7.
And some issues do not even reach the Kahdistan clinic’s doorstep. The clinic does not have the capacity to handle severe complications from abortion, which is illegal in most cases in Afghanistan and often carried out without supervision. Marie Stopes International is the leading post-abortion care provider in Afghanistan, but Herat has no hospital or clinic that treats abortion complications.
Mothers in the Shahrak-e-Sabz camp have also watched as outside support for maternal health care has decreased. Somaya, 24, a mother of four who moved from Badghis province in 2018, gave birth to her youngest child at home in January because of the lack of maternity wards in close proximity to the camp.
“After the baby was born, [the MSF clinic] vaccinated her and I am very grateful to them,” Somaya said. “But the problem is that they are only giving basic medicine. For many problems, the clinic can’t provide the medicine or surgery we need.”
Zarmina, 25, has lived in the camp for two years, driven away from her home in Ghor province by fighting between government forces and the Taliban. “At the camp, we are suffering from hunger. Some are starving. We are homeless,” she said. “We are suffering but at least our life is safe here.” She gave birth to her third child at home in September because there was no vehicle available to take her to the hospital in Herat.
Like Somaya, Zarmina said that the MSF clinic has limited resources. “They just gave me some medicine to calm me down,” she said. “They didn’t have the medicines I needed and I didn’t have money to go to the city to the hospital.”
Young boys return home to the Shahrak-e-Sabz camp after finishing their classes at school on Oct. 7.
Meanwhile, conditions at the camp are growing worse. More than 2,000 new families arrived between April and June, and the pandemic has further affected the livelihoods of those who rely primarily on daily wages and humanitarian assistance. Shahrak-e Sabz is government-owned land, and the site has no legal recognition. Families are at risk of being evicted. The Norwegian Refugee Council has reported police demolishing homes, evicting families from the land, and in some cases arresting residents.
With international support waning, Afghanistan is on the brink of a humanitarian crisis. As the harsh winter sets in, bringing more patients to the MSF clinic, it will soon face more operational challenges. “The people at the camp rely on this clinic and clinics like ours cannot continue our work without foreign support,” Mohammadi, the midwife, said. “When America leaves, the insecurity will increase and the women will be more desperate for support.”
As Afghans hold their breath for the outcome of the peace negotiations, millions of vulnerable women’s access to the most basic of human services hangs in the balance.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-23--Pompeo Weighs Genocide Designation for China

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has ordered a review to determine whether China ’ s repression of ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang amounts to genocide , several officials and people familiar with the matter said , raising expectations that America ’ s top diplomat may charge China with committing genocide before he leaves office next month .
Pompeo has instructed Morse Tan , the U.S. ambassador-at-large for the Office of Global Criminal Justice , to oversee the internal review .
The review would involve an assessment by the State Department ’ s acting legal advisor , Marik String , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s internal intelligence shop , as well as the department ’ s human rights and regional bureaus , according to current and former officials .
The review could trigger a final determination from the United States , following years of pressure from U.S. lawmakers and human rights organizations , and would be a significant symbolic and diplomatic message by itself .
But what the outgoing Trump and incoming Biden administrations decide to do if and when the determination is made matters as much , if not more , human rights experts said—as it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ penalties .
Officials said the timing of when the determination will be made is unclear .
If it is made in the final weeks of the Trump administration , it could significantly raise tensions between Washington and Beijing just as President-elect Joe Biden enters office—though Biden ’ s campaign already used the word “ genocide ” to describe the crackdowns in Xinjiang as early as August .
The review comes as lawmakers from both parties have increasingly called on the Trump administration to act over human rights abuses in Xinjiang .
In October @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jersey , the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , and John Cornyn , a Texas Republican , introduced a bipartisan resolution designating China ’ s treatment of the Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang as genocide .
The United States rarely makes a formal declaration of genocide , considered one of the most serious crimes against humanity in international law .
If confirmed , this would be the first genocide determination by the State Department since March 2016 , when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry determined that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for genocide ” against the region ’ s Yazidi , Christian , and Shiite Muslim minorities .
In August 2017 , President Donald Trump ’ s first Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also concluded that the Islamic State was “ certainly responsible for genocide.
” During the George W. Bush administration , then-Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the Sudanese government had committed genocide against ethnic minority groups in Darfur , a decision that was followed by a U.N. Security Council resolution triggering an investigation into mass atrocities by the International Criminal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s then-president , Omar al-Bashir , with genocide .
President Bill Clinton ’ s secretary of state , Warren Christopher , also cited the mass atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda as genocide .
In recent years , China has undertaken a sweeping campaign of repression against what are estimated to be millions of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in its western Xinjiang province under the guise of security and counterterrorism programs .
Human rights groups have reported that Uighurs are being rounded up in mass internment camps and face human rights abuses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arbitrary detentions , mistreatment , torture , and even forced abortions and sterilization .
The Chinese government has consistently denied any wrongdoing , dismissing reports from human rights organizations and claiming the internment camps were for vocational training and countering extremism .
It has rejected Western criticisms of its human rights records and rebuked the United States for “ interfering ” in its internal affairs .
The Trump administration levied sanctions against Chinese officials involved in running the detention camps and designated companies that allegedly used forced labor from the camps .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ away from labeling the crackdown in Xinjiang as a genocide .
In August , Politico reported that the Trump administration was considering the move , but until this point hasn ’ t kickstarted the formal determination process .
Trump ’ s former National Security Advisor John Bolton wrote in his memoir that at a dinner at the G-20 meeting in Osaka , Japan , in June 2019 , Chinese President Xi Jinping explained to Trump why he was building mass internment camps .
“ According to our interpreter , Trump said that Xi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Bolton wrote .
Last year Foreign Policy reported that sanctions on Chinese officials had been drafted by late 2018 , but were put on ice as the Trump administration pursued trade talks with Beijing .
Some current and former officials attribute the timing of this new review to a push from Congress .
Others describe it as an eleventh-hour move by the outgoing administration to box in Biden on his China policy .
Legislation spearheaded by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio to prompt the secretary of state to make a determination on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constitutes genocide was included as part of broader appropriations package passed on Monday .
Rubio , acting chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , is a vocal critic of China .
“ Regardless of motivation , it is the right thing for the Trump administration to do , ” said Francisco Bencosme , a senior policy advisor with the Open Society Foundations .
After that , he said , the question is how the determination will be made meaningful—such as by getting like-minded countries to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ determination or by prompting international organizations to carry out an investigation .
Biden ’ s campaign used the term “ genocide ” to describe Beijing ’ s policies beginning in August , laying down its marker on human rights issues in China and setting the stage for a tense relationship between the two rival global powers once he takes office in late January .
But formalizing that decision as president could prove tricky .
Traditionally , the State Department based its decision on a rather narrow interpretation of genocide in the Genocide Convention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to physically destroy a people in whole or in part , a standard that may not have been met in Xinjiang .
Previous deliberations have been cautious .
During the Obama administration , the State Department weighed whether Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s regime had committed genocide in a violent crackdown on civilians living in opposition-controlled territory that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians .
It concluded it did not have sufficient evidence for the determination .
Given the symbolic and diplomatic weight of such a determination , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ formula for the department to follow ; each case is handled differently depending on the circumstances , current and former officials said .
The requirement that perpetrators intend to “ destroy ” a people is literal elimination , not just erasing their cultural identity , said Todd Buchwald , who served as special coordinator in the State Department ’ s Office of Global Criminal Justice and who co-authored a major study on the history of the department ’ s genocide determinations for the Holocaust Memorial Museum .
“ The popular definition of genocide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ genocide .
The hardest thing for the State Department in coming to view on this is how do you prove , and how do you show , sufficient evidence to infer intent , ” said Anna Cave , who served as principal deputy in the Office of Global Criminal Justice .
“ In most cases perpetrators don ’ t say expressly ‘ it is my intent to destroy this group in whole or in substantial part .
’ ”

Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer and Amy Mackinnon

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has ordered a review to determine whether China’s repression of ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang amounts to genocide, several officials and people familiar with the matter said, raising expectations that America’s top diplomat may charge China with committing genocide before he leaves office next month.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has ordered a review to determine whether China’s repression of ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang amounts to genocide, several officials and people familiar with the matter said, raising expectations that America’s top diplomat may charge China with committing genocide before he leaves office next month.
Pompeo has instructed Morse Tan, the U.S. ambassador-at-large for the Office of Global Criminal Justice, to oversee the internal review. The review would involve an assessment by the State Department’s acting legal advisor, Marik String, and the head of the State Department’s internal intelligence shop, as well as the department’s human rights and regional bureaus, according to current and former officials.
The review could trigger a final determination from the United States, following years of pressure from U.S. lawmakers and human rights organizations, and would be a significant symbolic and diplomatic message by itself. But what the outgoing Trump and incoming Biden administrations decide to do if and when the determination is made matters as much, if not more, human rights experts said—as it could include imposing sanctions or other economic penalties.
Officials said the timing of when the determination will be made is unclear. If it is made in the final weeks of the Trump administration, it could significantly raise tensions between Washington and Beijing just as President-elect Joe Biden enters office—though Biden’s campaign already used the word “genocide” to describe the crackdowns in Xinjiang as early as August.
The review comes as lawmakers from both parties have increasingly called on the Trump administration to act over human rights abuses in Xinjiang. In October, Sens. Bob Menendez of New Jersey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and John Cornyn, a Texas Republican, introduced a bipartisan resolution designating China’s treatment of the Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang as genocide.
The United States rarely makes a formal declaration of genocide, considered one of the most serious crimes against humanity in international law. If confirmed, this would be the first genocide determination by the State Department since March 2016, when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry determined that the Islamic State terrorist organization was “responsible for genocide” against the region’s Yazidi, Christian, and Shiite Muslim minorities. In August 2017, President Donald Trump’s first Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also concluded that the Islamic State was “certainly responsible for genocide.”
During the George W. Bush administration, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the Sudanese government had committed genocide against ethnic minority groups in Darfur, a decision that was followed by a U.N. Security Council resolution triggering an investigation into mass atrocities by the International Criminal Court, which later charged the country’s then-president, Omar al-Bashir, with genocide. President Bill Clinton’s secretary of state, Warren Christopher, also cited the mass atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda as genocide.
In recent years, China has undertaken a sweeping campaign of repression against what are estimated to be millions of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in its western Xinjiang province under the guise of security and counterterrorism programs. Human rights groups have reported that Uighurs are being rounded up in mass internment camps and face human rights abuses such as forced labor, brainwashing, arbitrary detentions, mistreatment, torture, and even forced abortions and sterilization.
The Chinese government has consistently denied any wrongdoing, dismissing reports from human rights organizations and claiming the internment camps were for vocational training and countering extremism. It has rejected Western criticisms of its human rights records and rebuked the United States for “interfering” in its internal affairs.
The Trump administration levied sanctions against Chinese officials involved in running the detention camps and designated companies that allegedly used forced labor from the camps. But top Trump officials have so far shied away from labeling the crackdown in Xinjiang as a genocide. In August, Politico reported that the Trump administration was considering the move, but until this point hasn’t kickstarted the formal determination process.
Trump’s former National Security Advisor John Bolton wrote in his memoir that at a dinner at the G-20 meeting in Osaka, Japan, in June 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping explained to Trump why he was building mass internment camps. “According to our interpreter, Trump said that Xi should go ahead with building the camps,” Bolton wrote. Last year Foreign Policy reported that sanctions on Chinese officials had been drafted by late 2018, but were put on ice as the Trump administration pursued trade talks with Beijing.
Some current and former officials attribute the timing of this new review to a push from Congress. Others describe it as an eleventh-hour move by the outgoing administration to box in Biden on his China policy.
Legislation spearheaded by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio to prompt the secretary of state to make a determination on whether China’s crackdown in Xinjiang constitutes genocide was included as part of broader appropriations package passed on Monday. Rubio, acting chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is a vocal critic of China.
“Regardless of motivation, it is the right thing for the Trump administration to do,” said Francisco Bencosme, a senior policy advisor with the Open Society Foundations. After that, he said, the question is how the determination will be made meaningful—such as by getting like-minded countries to join the United States in a genocide determination or by prompting international organizations to carry out an investigation.
Biden’s campaign used the term “genocide” to describe Beijing’s policies beginning in August, laying down its marker on human rights issues in China and setting the stage for a tense relationship between the two rival global powers once he takes office in late January. But formalizing that decision as president could prove tricky.
Traditionally, the State Department based its decision on a rather narrow interpretation of genocide in the Genocide Convention, which requires the perpetrator to intend to physically destroy a people in whole or in part, a standard that may not have been met in Xinjiang.
Previous deliberations have been cautious. During the Obama administration, the State Department weighed whether Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime had committed genocide in a violent crackdown on civilians living in opposition-controlled territory that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians. It concluded it did not have sufficient evidence for the determination.
Given the symbolic and diplomatic weight of such a determination, there is still no clear-cut blueprint or formula for the department to follow; each case is handled differently depending on the circumstances, current and former officials said. The requirement that perpetrators intend to “destroy” a people is literal elimination, not just erasing their cultural identity, said Todd Buchwald, who served as special coordinator in the State Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice and who co-authored a major study on the history of the department’s genocide determinations for the Holocaust Memorial Museum.
“The popular definition of genocide is different from the legal definition of genocide. The hardest thing for the State Department in coming to view on this is how do you prove, and how do you show, sufficient evidence to infer intent,” said Anna Cave, who served as principal deputy in the Office of Global Criminal Justice.
“In most cases perpetrators don’t say expressly ‘it is my intent to destroy this group in whole or in substantial part.’”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-23--America’s History of Luck Is Running Out

America ’ s History of Luck Is Running Out The United States is the luckiest country in modern history .
It began as a set of marginal European outposts , separated from the settlers ’ home countries by a difficult sea voyage .
When the colonies gained independence , they were weak , poor , and fractious .
But in less than a century and a half , those 13 original colonies had expanded across North America , survived a civil war , driven other great powers from the Western Hemisphere , and created the world ’ s largest and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t stop until the end of the 20th century , when victory in the Cold War left the United States alone at the pinnacle of power .
For a little while .
Americans like to attribute this remarkable story to their ancestors ’ virtues , the enlightened wisdom of the Founding Fathers , and the intrinsic merits of America ’ s peculiar blend of liberal democratic capitalism .
But in addition to the considerable cruelty displayed toward the native population and the slaves imported from Africa , good fortune played a major @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that North America was rich with natural resources and fertile land , traversed by navigable rivers , and had a mostly temperate climate .
And from the very beginning , the United States benefited from rivalries among the existing great powers .
France backed the American Revolution in order to weaken its British rival , and the new nation doubled its territory when Napoleon needed money to wage war in Europe and was willing to sell the Louisiana Purchase at a bargain price .
War in Europe also helped the United States survive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the War of 1812 ; Britain was too busy defeating Napoleon to turn its full strength against its obnoxious former colonists .
The United States gradually attracted more attention as it expanded across the continent and took Texas , New Mexico , Arizona , and California from Mexico , but the European powers spent most of the time competing with each other and for the most part left the United States alone .
By 1900 , British concerns about a rising Germany led them to abandon their territorial claims in the Pacific Northwest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States .
And at that moment , the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 became a reality .
Indeed , no other great power has enjoyed the so-called free security that America has possessed since its founding .
Apart from Britain , every other major power has been invaded at least once in the past 200 years , and several of them have been conquered and at least temporarily occupied .
Even Britain lost some 50,000 civilians to German bombings during World War II .
Foreign troops last occupied U.S. soil during the War of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was effectively unscathed during the two world wars that decimated Europe and Asia during the 20th century .
That free security also permitted the United States to be the last major power to enter both wars , to suffer the fewest losses , and to emerge in a dominant position when the fighting stopped .
To be sure , U.S. leaders also made some smart decisions that took advantage of these lucky breaks .
They adopted a constitution that privileged individual freedom and spurred the creation of a boisterous capitalist economy .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the world and managed to contain the frictions that waves of immigrants occasioned .
And while the shameful legacy of slavery continues to blight the American experience , the North ’ s victory in the Civil War prevented a permanent division of the continent and allowed the reunited country to reach its full power potential .
Since becoming a great power , the United States has also been fortunate in its choice of enemies .
Imperial Germany was a daunting military power , but its armed forces had been depleted by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1918 .
The Nazi Wehrmacht was even more capable , but Adolf Hitler was an incompetent strategist , and the Soviet Union did most of the work to defeat Germany anyway .
Imperial Japan ’ s economy was roughly a fifth the size of America ’ s in 1941 , its wartime leadership was deeply divided , and it already had thousands of troops bogged down fighting in China .
World War II in the Pacific was hardly a cakewalk , but the outcome was not in doubt once the United States mobilized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by far America ’ s most formidable adversary , but the deck was still heavily stacked in America ’ s favor .
The Soviet economy was significantly smaller , its allies were much weaker and less reliable , and it faced serious rivals on several frontiers while America sat unthreatened in the Western Hemisphere .
The Soviet command economy was a wonderland of waste and inefficiency , and Soviet leaders had to devote a much higher percentage of GDP to defense just to keep the United States in sight .
Mikhail Gorbachev ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ failed , and the Soviet Union collapsed not with a bang but with a whimper .
The result was a brief unipolar moment when the United States faced no serious rivals and both politicians and pundits convinced themselves that America had found the magic formula for success in an increasingly globalized world .
The hubris of the 1990s was to be expected , perhaps : No other country could claim such a long and mostly unbroken run of success , where ill fortune never seemed to hold the country back for long .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Can Americans continue to assume that the world is their oyster and that things will always turn out right no matter how irresponsibly they seem to behave ?
Maybe , but maybe not .
Here are four reasons why the United States ’ luck just might be running out .
First of all , the free security that the nation has known since its founding is not quite as profound as it used to be .
Don ’ t get me wrong : Having no serious enemies nearby is still a considerable benefit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still protect the United States from a fair number of potential problems .
The Pentagon is formally the “ Defense Department , ” but America ’ s armed forces don ’ t spend much time or money defending U.S. soil directly .
Instead , they go into harm ’ s way in order to try to shape political conditions in a host of faraway places .
Why can they do that ?
Because Americans don ’ t have to worry about an invasion from Canada or Mexico—or anybody else .
Unfortunately , 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the protection the United States once enjoyed is not as ironclad as it once was .
Case in point : In less than a year , the coronavirus has killed more Americans than World War I , the Korean War , and the Vietnam War combined .
As I write this , the daily death toll in the United States is larger than the number of Americans killed on 9/11 .
Distance still matters , but it does not protect against every danger .
We also learned last week that a foreign power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has hacked into a vast array of government computer systems , including many that are part of the U.S. national security establishment .
The full extent of the damage is still unknown , but the incident illustrates another vulnerability that distance can not diminish .
The United States is still fortunate to be located where it is , but that advantage is not as great as it once was .
The second cause for concern is China , which is a far more formidable rival than the Soviet Union ever was .
Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ streak from 1776 to the mid-1990s , but China boasts a much better record since then .
China ’ s economy will soon be substantially larger than that of the United States , it has stayed out of ruinous wars , its ruling elites believe they are destined to be a ( if not the ) leading power in this century , their model of single-party state capitalism has generally worked well , and they are fully engaged in key international institutions and in every region in the world .
While the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forms of protectionism , China has been negotiating and signing new trade and investment deals .
Beijing ’ s mishandling of the coronavirus outbreak allowed it to spread abroad , but its subsequent response ( and the cooperation of the population ) has kept its own death toll below a reported 5,000 lives ( in a country of 1.4 billion people ) .
As a result , the Chinese economy is back open for business .
The United States had more time to prepare for the pandemic , but the number of dead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. economy is still devastated by lockdowns and other pandemic-related restrictions .
The challenge China poses could be overstated .
China ’ s per capita income is still significantly lower than America ’ s , and its new power surplus ( i.e.
, the amount of wealth that can be mobilized to shape events elsewhere once domestic needs are met ) is smaller .
Its splashy Belt and Road Initiative hasn ’ t gone nearly as well as Xi Jinping hoped , and its recent embrace of belligerent “ wolf warrior ” diplomacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trading partners , and its Uighur minority have sparked growing concerns about China ’ s long-term intentions .
Even so , only an incurable optimist would assume that China will fall by the wayside as readily as America ’ s earlier rivals did .
A third reason to wonder about the United States ’ continued good fortune is the series of wounds Americans decided to inflict on themselves .
The list is long : the ; the deliberately manufactured polarization and the resulting gridlock that makes timely action on vital issues difficult to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” to the point that millions of Americans think refusing to wear a mask in the middle of a pandemic is not stupid but heroic ; the enduring public prominence of a phalanx of liars , charlatans , and trolls who have built lucrative careers spewing a toxic blend of falsehoods and hatred ; the pervasive influence of well-funded lobbying organizations whose commitment to truth is paper-thin ; the distorting impact of money in U.S. politics and a ramshackle electoral system that increasingly enshrines minority rule ; and a foreign-policy elite that is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of learning from past mistakes .
I could go on , but you get the idea .
And then there ’ s climate change .
The atmosphere doesn ’ t care what you or I happen to think about this problem ; it ’ s going to follow the laws of physics and chemistry no matter what we choose to believe .
Humans are free to deny the reality of climate change , but the planet isn ’ t paying attention .
Favorable geopolitics won ’ t rescue the United States if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries will face even greater hardships ) , and having big-deck aircraft carriers , sophisticated ballistic missiles , state-of-the-art anti-submarine warfare or cyberwarfare capabilities , and the other trappings of a modern great power won ’ t help on this front either .
A large economy , well-trained scientists and engineers , and an innovative private sector may help the country mitigate , adapt , and adjust in various ways , but the challenges they will have to address grow ever more daunting each year .
When you marry what is happening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discussed above , it ’ s easy to imagine how the United States ’ long run of good fortune could come to a sad end in a generation or two .
Am I being too gloomy ?
I hope so .
The United States retains many strengths—especially in science and technology—and its potential rivals face serious problems of their own .
A return to the unchecked primacy of the 1990s is not in the cards , but intelligent reforms could go a long way to preserving the security and prosperity of the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The imminent departure of the Worst President Ever will surely help .
Branch Rickey famously remarked that “ luck is the residue of design.
” Americans should no longer assume that success is simply their birthright or that Otto von Bismarck was right when he reportedly quipped that there is “ special providence for fools , drunkards , and the United States of America.
” If Americans want to enjoy a future as favorable as their past , it will take a willingness to work together that has gone missing for a couple @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t bring it back , the United States ’ long run of luck is likely to come to an end .

The United States is the luckiest country in modern history. It began as a set of marginal European outposts, separated from the settlers’ home countries by a difficult sea voyage. When the colonies gained independence, they were weak, poor, and fractious. But in less than a century and a half, those 13 original colonies had expanded across North America, survived a civil war, driven other great powers from the Western Hemisphere, and created the world’s largest and most dynamic economy. That ascent didn’t stop until the end of the 20th century, when victory in the Cold War left the United States alone at the pinnacle of power. For a little while.
The United States is the luckiest country in modern history. It began as a set of marginal European outposts, separated from the settlers’ home countries by a difficult sea voyage. When the colonies gained independence, they were weak, poor, and fractious. But in less than a century and a half, those 13 original colonies had expanded across North America, survived a civil war, driven other great powers from the Western Hemisphere, and created the world’s largest and most dynamic economy. That ascent didn’t stop until the end of the 20th century, when victory in the Cold War left the United States alone at the pinnacle of power. For a little while.
Americans like to attribute this remarkable story to their ancestors’ virtues, the enlightened wisdom of the Founding Fathers, and the intrinsic merits of America’s peculiar blend of liberal democratic capitalism. But in addition to the considerable cruelty displayed toward the native population and the slaves imported from Africa, good fortune played a major role as well.
Americans were fortunate that North America was rich with natural resources and fertile land, traversed by navigable rivers, and had a mostly temperate climate. And from the very beginning, the United States benefited from rivalries among the existing great powers. France backed the American Revolution in order to weaken its British rival, and the new nation doubled its territory when Napoleon needed money to wage war in Europe and was willing to sell the Louisiana Purchase at a bargain price. War in Europe also helped the United States survive its foolish decision to invade Canada in the War of 1812; Britain was too busy defeating Napoleon to turn its full strength against its obnoxious former colonists. The United States gradually attracted more attention as it expanded across the continent and took Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California from Mexico, but the European powers spent most of the time competing with each other and for the most part left the United States alone. By 1900, British concerns about a rising Germany led them to abandon their territorial claims in the Pacific Northwest and South America and appease the United States. And at that moment, the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 became a reality.
Indeed, no other great power has enjoyed the so-called free security that America has possessed since its founding. Apart from Britain, every other major power has been invaded at least once in the past 200 years, and several of them have been conquered and at least temporarily occupied. Even Britain lost some 50,000 civilians to German bombings during World War II. Foreign troops last occupied U.S. soil during the War of 1812, and the continental United States was effectively unscathed during the two world wars that decimated Europe and Asia during the 20th century. That free security also permitted the United States to be the last major power to enter both wars, to suffer the fewest losses, and to emerge in a dominant position when the fighting stopped.
To be sure, U.S. leaders also made some smart decisions that took advantage of these lucky breaks. They adopted a constitution that privileged individual freedom and spurred the creation of a boisterous capitalist economy. They opened the continent to immigrants from all over the world and managed to contain the frictions that waves of immigrants occasioned. And while the shameful legacy of slavery continues to blight the American experience, the North’s victory in the Civil War prevented a permanent division of the continent and allowed the reunited country to reach its full power potential.
Since becoming a great power, the United States has also been fortunate in its choice of enemies. Imperial Germany was a daunting military power, but its armed forces had been depleted by the time the American Expeditionary Force arrived in 1918. The Nazi Wehrmacht was even more capable, but Adolf Hitler was an incompetent strategist, and the Soviet Union did most of the work to defeat Germany anyway. Imperial Japan’s economy was roughly a fifth the size of America’s in 1941, its wartime leadership was deeply divided, and it already had thousands of troops bogged down fighting in China. World War II in the Pacific was hardly a cakewalk, but the outcome was not in doubt once the United States mobilized for war.
The Soviet Union was by far America’s most formidable adversary, but the deck was still heavily stacked in America’s favor. The Soviet economy was significantly smaller, its allies were much weaker and less reliable, and it faced serious rivals on several frontiers while America sat unthreatened in the Western Hemisphere. The Soviet command economy was a wonderland of waste and inefficiency, and Soviet leaders had to devote a much higher percentage of GDP to defense just to keep the United States in sight. Mikhail Gorbachev’s belated efforts to reform the system failed, and the Soviet Union collapsed not with a bang but with a whimper.
The result was a brief unipolar moment when the United States faced no serious rivals and both politicians and pundits convinced themselves that America had found the magic formula for success in an increasingly globalized world. The hubris of the 1990s was to be expected, perhaps: No other country could claim such a long and mostly unbroken run of success, where ill fortune never seemed to hold the country back for long.
Is this still the case today? Can Americans continue to assume that the world is their oyster and that things will always turn out right no matter how irresponsibly they seem to behave?
Maybe, but maybe not. Here are four reasons why the United States’ luck just might be running out.
First of all, the free security that the nation has known since its founding is not quite as profound as it used to be. Don’t get me wrong: Having no serious enemies nearby is still a considerable benefit, and those two vast oceanic moats still protect the United States from a fair number of potential problems. The Pentagon is formally the “Defense Department,” but America’s armed forces don’t spend much time or money defending U.S. soil directly. Instead, they go into harm’s way in order to try to shape political conditions in a host of faraway places. Why can they do that? Because Americans don’t have to worry about an invasion from Canada or Mexico—or anybody else.
Unfortunately, 2020 has given us a grim reminder that the protection the United States once enjoyed is not as ironclad as it once was. Case in point: In less than a year, the coronavirus has killed more Americans than World War I, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War combined. As I write this, the daily death toll in the United States is larger than the number of Americans killed on 9/11. Distance still matters, but it does not protect against every danger.
We also learned last week that a foreign power (generally believed to be Russia) has hacked into a vast array of government computer systems, including many that are part of the U.S. national security establishment. The full extent of the damage is still unknown, but the incident illustrates another vulnerability that distance cannot diminish. The United States is still fortunate to be located where it is, but that advantage is not as great as it once was.
The second cause for concern is China, which is a far more formidable rival than the Soviet Union ever was. Americans may have racked up a long winning streak from 1776 to the mid-1990s, but China boasts a much better record since then. China’s economy will soon be substantially larger than that of the United States, it has stayed out of ruinous wars, its ruling elites believe they are destined to be a (if not the) leading power in this century, their model of single-party state capitalism has generally worked well, and they are fully engaged in key international institutions and in every region in the world. While the Trump administration has been busy flirting with various forms of protectionism, China has been negotiating and signing new trade and investment deals. Beijing’s mishandling of the coronavirus outbreak allowed it to spread abroad, but its subsequent response (and the cooperation of the population) has kept its own death toll below a reported 5,000 lives (in a country of 1.4 billion people). As a result, the Chinese economy is back open for business. The United States had more time to prepare for the pandemic, but the number of dead is well over 300,000, and the U.S. economy is still devastated by lockdowns and other pandemic-related restrictions.
The challenge China poses could be overstated. China’s per capita income is still significantly lower than America’s, and its new power surplus (i.e., the amount of wealth that can be mobilized to shape events elsewhere once domestic needs are met) is smaller. Its splashy Belt and Road Initiative hasn’t gone nearly as well as Xi Jinping hoped, and its recent embrace of belligerent “wolf warrior” diplomacy and its heavy-handed approach toward dissidents, trading partners, and its Uighur minority have sparked growing concerns about China’s long-term intentions. Even so, only an incurable optimist would assume that China will fall by the wayside as readily as America’s earlier rivals did.
A third reason to wonder about the United States’ continued good fortune is the series of wounds Americans decided to inflict on themselves. The list is long: the ; the deliberately manufactured polarization and the resulting gridlock that makes timely action on vital issues difficult to impossible; the fetishizing of “liberty” to the point that millions of Americans think refusing to wear a mask in the middle of a pandemic is not stupid but heroic; the enduring public prominence of a phalanx of liars, charlatans, and trolls who have built lucrative careers spewing a toxic blend of falsehoods and hatred; the pervasive influence of well-funded lobbying organizations whose commitment to truth is paper-thin; the distorting impact of money in U.S. politics and a ramshackle electoral system that increasingly enshrines minority rule; and a foreign-policy elite that is largely free from accountability and seems incapable of learning from past mistakes. I could go on, but you get the idea.
And then there’s climate change. The atmosphere doesn’t care what you or I happen to think about this problem; it’s going to follow the laws of physics and chemistry no matter what we choose to believe. Humans are free to deny the reality of climate change, but the planet isn’t paying attention. Favorable geopolitics won’t rescue the United States if the atmosphere keeps heating up (though some other countries will face even greater hardships), and having big-deck aircraft carriers, sophisticated ballistic missiles, state-of-the-art anti-submarine warfare or cyberwarfare capabilities, and the other trappings of a modern great power won’t help on this front either. A large economy, well-trained scientists and engineers, and an innovative private sector may help the country mitigate, adapt, and adjust in various ways, but the challenges they will have to address grow ever more daunting each year. When you marry what is happening to the planet to the political dysfunctions discussed above, it’s easy to imagine how the United States’ long run of good fortune could come to a sad end in a generation or two.
Am I being too gloomy? I hope so. The United States retains many strengths—especially in science and technology—and its potential rivals face serious problems of their own. A return to the unchecked primacy of the 1990s is not in the cards, but intelligent reforms could go a long way to preserving the security and prosperity of the country along with its core political values. The imminent departure of the Worst President Ever will surely help.
Branch Rickey famously remarked that “luck is the residue of design.” Americans should no longer assume that success is simply their birthright or that Otto von Bismarck was right when he reportedly quipped that there is “special providence for fools, drunkards, and the United States of America.” If Americans want to enjoy a future as favorable as their past, it will take a willingness to work together that has gone missing for a couple of decades. If they can’t bring it back, the United States’ long run of luck is likely to come to an end.