foreignpolicy--2020-08-05--U.S. Troops Really Are in Syria to Protect the Oil—for the Kurds

U.S .
Troops Really Are in Syria to Protect the Oil—for the Kurds A U.S.-backed deal to develop oil fields in northern Syria is helping the State and Defense departments push for a continued American troop presence in the area to counter the Islamic State , current and former U.S. officials told Foreign Policy .
The deal , in which the Delaware-based Delta Crescent Energy is to revamp Syrian oil fields in conjunction with Kurdish authorities , was first revealed during a Senate hearing exchange between South Carolina Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the arrangement will both starve the Bashar al-Assad regime of money and give U.S. officials a way to make the case to keep troops on the ground in a still critical theater .
“ I think DoD and State can now make the argument to [ President Donald ] Trump that we have to stay and make sure the oil flows or the U.S. company will lose all their investment , ” a former senior Trump administration official told Foreign Policy .
“ So it ’ s a gift for those who want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former official said the United States still has forces in Syria only “ because of the State Department ’ s efforts ” to negotiate an oil deal .
There is a balancing act : Turkey remains concerned that U.S. efforts to help the Kurds will legitimize the Democratic Union Party ( PYD ) , an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party ( PKK ) , which is designated as a terrorist organization in the United States , Europe , and Turkey .
But a U.S. official said the oil deal would help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power in eastern Syria , ” referring to the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces .
The U.S. official said the effort to develop Syrian oil fields , taking away refining dollars from the Assad regime and potentially taking away a long-standing backdoor for oil deals between the rebel-held northeast and regime-held areas , would help double down on pressure after the Trump administration first instituted sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act in June .
The United States has been laying the groundwork , with the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force designed to protect petroleum fields in Hasakah and Deir Ezzor provinces , which are controlled by the Kurdish-dominated group .
“ The U.S. has been quietly moving the pieces in place to box Russia and Assad from Syrian oil , by trying to provide an alternate market to the regime , ” said Nicholas Heras , a Middle East expert at the Institute for the Study of War , a Washington-based think tank .
“ The effort requires an indefinite U.S. commitment to Syria , or it will collapse.
” But even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it remains unclear to Kurdish authorities and American observers how they ’ ll be able to conjure a market for Syrian oil beyond the regime .
Oil fields have sustained extensive damage from the conflict with the Islamic State as well as from the U.S.-backed coalition in air raids to root out the group .
More than 60 percent of eastern Syrian oil fields need to be repaired , said a source familiar with the matter , and providing for security expenses could wipe out any oil profits .
The United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the source added , but in the past , both the Kurdistan Regional Government across the border in Iraq and Turkey , a sworn rival of the Syrian Kurdish bloc , have balked at refining their oil .
The surprise news that Delta Crescent Energy had received a license from the Treasury Department ’ s Office of Foreign Assets Control earlier this year , first reported by Al-Monitor , has left Kurdish authorities scrambling to come up with plans to refine the oil amid festering political tensions as Russian forces have expanded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The announcement was a little bit rushed .
Some of the Kurds didn ’ t like the fact it was announced in this way , ” said the source familiar with the deal .
“ Now the Kurds are a bit confused , scared , I would say , due to the uncertainty .
Are there any commitments that come with the announcement ?
Because there is nothing on the ground.
” The source added that Graham , a Trump ally , had helped facilitate meetings between the politically connected Delta @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the Trump administration ’ s Syria policy has twisted and turned since the president reversed an October 2019 withdrawal announcement during a Turkish incursion into the country , only to say that U.S. troops would stay to protect the country ’ s damaged oil reserves , experts have questioned the legality and efficacy of the new policy .
While the U.N. process has sought to keep a single government in Damascus , the deal cooked up by the Pentagon and State Department would seem to give the Kurdish authorities more autonomy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And it may ignore that the Assad regime still has an upper hand over rebel groups—and over the ultimate destination for any Syrian oil .
“ You can get this dirty oil out of the ground , but you can ’ t do anything with it , ” a former congressional aide told Foreign Policy .
“ Really your choice is the Assad regime .
”

A U.S.-backed deal to develop oil fields in northern Syria is helping the State and Defense departments push for a continued American troop presence in the area to counter the Islamic State, current and former U.S. officials told Foreign Policy .
A U.S.-backed deal to develop oil fields in northern Syria is helping the State and Defense departments push for a continued American troop presence in the area to counter the Islamic State, current and former U.S. officials told Foreign Policy.
The deal, in which the Delaware-based Delta Crescent Energy is to revamp Syrian oil fields in conjunction with Kurdish authorities, was first revealed during a Senate hearing exchange between South Carolina Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last week.
Current and former U.S. officials say the arrangement will both starve the Bashar al-Assad regime of money and give U.S. officials a way to make the case to keep troops on the ground in a still critical theater.
“I think DoD and State can now make the argument to [President Donald] Trump that we have to stay and make sure the oil flows or the U.S. company will lose all their investment,” a former senior Trump administration official told Foreign Policy. “So it’s a gift for those who want us to stay in Syria.”
One former official said the United States still has forces in Syria only “because of the State Department’s efforts” to negotiate an oil deal. There is a balancing act: Turkey remains concerned that U.S. efforts to help the Kurds will legitimize the Democratic Union Party (PYD), an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization in the United States, Europe, and Turkey. But a U.S. official said the oil deal would help “perpetuate the SDF’s staying power in eastern Syria,” referring to the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.
The U.S. official said the effort to develop Syrian oil fields, taking away refining dollars from the Assad regime and potentially taking away a long-standing backdoor for oil deals between the rebel-held northeast and regime-held areas, would help double down on pressure after the Trump administration first instituted sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act in June.
The United States has been laying the groundwork, with the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria building up an SDF force designed to protect petroleum fields in Hasakah and Deir Ezzor provinces, which are controlled by the Kurdish-dominated group.
“The U.S. has been quietly moving the pieces in place to box Russia and Assad from Syrian oil, by trying to provide an alternate market to the regime,” said Nicholas Heras, a Middle East expert at the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank. “The effort requires an indefinite U.S. commitment to Syria, or it will collapse.”
But even after the dust settled around the hearing, it remains unclear to Kurdish authorities and American observers how they’ll be able to conjure a market for Syrian oil beyond the regime. Oil fields have sustained extensive damage from the conflict with the Islamic State as well as from the U.S.-backed coalition in air raids to root out the group.
More than 60 percent of eastern Syrian oil fields need to be repaired, said a source familiar with the matter, and providing for security expenses could wipe out any oil profits. The United States has agreed to provide two mobile refineries, the source added, but in the past, both the Kurdistan Regional Government across the border in Iraq and Turkey, a sworn rival of the Syrian Kurdish bloc, have balked at refining their oil.
The surprise news that Delta Crescent Energy had received a license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control earlier this year, first reported by Al-Monitor, has left Kurdish authorities scrambling to come up with plans to refine the oil amid festering political tensions as Russian forces have expanded their reach further into the war-torn country.
“The announcement was a little bit rushed. Some of the Kurds didn’t like the fact it was announced in this way,” said the source familiar with the deal. “Now the Kurds are a bit confused, scared, I would say, due to the uncertainty. Are there any commitments that come with the announcement? Because there is nothing on the ground.”
The source added that Graham, a Trump ally, had helped facilitate meetings between the politically connected Delta Crescent Energy and U.S. officials.
But as the Trump administration’s Syria policy has twisted and turned since the president reversed an October 2019 withdrawal announcement during a Turkish incursion into the country, only to say that U.S. troops would stay to protect the country’s damaged oil reserves, experts have questioned the legality and efficacy of the new policy.
While the U.N. process has sought to keep a single government in Damascus, the deal cooked up by the Pentagon and State Department would seem to give the Kurdish authorities more autonomy and could potentially split up the country. And it may ignore that the Assad regime still has an upper hand over rebel groups—and over the ultimate destination for any Syrian oil.
“You can get this dirty oil out of the ground, but you can’t do anything with it,” a former congressional aide told Foreign Policy. “Really your choice is the Assad regime.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-05--The Beirut Blast Is Lebanon’s Chernobyl

The Beirut Blast Is Lebanon’s Chernobyl

Beirut Gov .
Marwan Abboud broke down in tears as he spoke to reporters on Tuesday evening while searching through the strewn rubble of Beirut ’ s destroyed sea port for the remains of missing firefighters .
“ It ’ s a national catastrophe , ” he said , comparing the devastation in the aftermath of the explosions to Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the bombings , before breaking down in tears .
But there is a more fitting nuclear metaphor for what shook Beirut : the Chernobyl meltdown .
Tuesday ’ s warehouse blast does not seem to have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of deliberate violence .
Instead , like the Soviet disaster , it is the work of gross incompetence , endemic corruption , and negligence—and its impact will spread far beyond the initial explosion .
Beirut has been declared a disaster zone by Lebanese authorities following two blasts that tore through the city just after 6 p.m. on Tuesday .
At the time of publishing , at least 135 people have been killed and thousands injured , and social media networks are flooded with the images of missing loved ones still unaccounted for .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Between 250,000 and 300,000 people have been left homeless—roughly 10 percent of the city ’ s population .
Thousands of people need treatment at hospitals already crammed full of COVID-19 victims .
The property destruction is estimated at $ 3 billion .
That ’ s a debilitating burden in a country where most people are struggling just to find the money to get by already .
Even before the blasts , Lebanon was already at a breaking point .
A refugee crisis from the war in neighboring Syria is almost entering its 10th @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meet the aid requirements of the 30 percent of its population that has been displaced from the war in Syria .
But it is not just refugees struggling to meet their needs , with the World Food Program recording that nearly half the Lebanese population was struggling to meet basic food needs .
Speaking to the Telegraph in June , Martin Keulertz , an assistant professor at the American University of Beirut , said : “ By the end of the year , we will see 75 percent of the population on food @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there will be food to hand out.
” The pandemic had already brought Lebanese hospitals to their knees , and COVID-19 hit Lebanon during a period of unprecedented economic destitution , with the nation buckling under the weight of its own debt .
Food prices had already risen by 247 percent , and with the blasts destroying tons of Lebanon ’ s remaining food stocks and wrecking a port vital to the nation ’ s infrastructure , the situation is set to deteriorate rapidly .
Even before the explosions , some Lebanese protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lebanon ’ s foreign minister , Nassif Hitti , had even resigned the day before the blasts , warning that “ Lebanon today is sliding toward becoming a failed state.
” Given Lebanon ’ s history , many people , including U.S. President Donald Trump , leapt to the idea that terrorism was involved .
Yet it ’ s not violence that has been poisoning the country in the last three decades .
It ’ s corruption .
While details are still emerging , the official story from Lebanese authorities is that a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ammonium nitrate , impounded from a ship at the port in 2013 and seemingly left there ever since .
Ammonium nitrate has a place in the annals of terrorism , such as when the white nationalist terrorist Timothy McVeigh detonated 2 metric tons of the industrial chemical in Oklahoma City in 1995 , killing 168 people and damaging 300 buildings .
But without McVeigh ’ s malice , just deadly negligence , 2,750 metric tons of ammonium nitrate—over a thousand times the amount he used—was allowed to pile up in a warehouse for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Beirut , seemingly “ awaiting auction.
” Could the lure of a financial reward for officials have led to the dangerous stockpiling of highly explosive material in the heart of Beirut ?
Some Lebanese journalists have been asking that question following the discovery of documents relating to the seizure of the shipment .
A photo shared on social media , allegedly of the warehouse in question , shows workers in front of a warehouse packed with 1,000-kilogram bags of ammonium nitrate stamped with “ Nitroprill HD , ” which the arms control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ knockoff brand of Orica ’ s Nitropril , a mining explosive .
The upper limit for storing Nitropril safely , according to the manufacturer , is 400 metric tons .
Whether corruption , negligence , or a combustible combination of both was responsible for this disaster , we may never truly know .
But the responsibility certainly doesn ’ t just lie with port workers who failed to do basic checks or took bribes to avoid handling problems .
It falls on the people who put them there and who created a system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war officially ended in 1990 , most of the surviving warlords , who had escaped accountability for their decades of atrocities , simply swapped militia uniforms for suits and took control of what remained of Lebanon ’ s fragile postwar state .
The Lebanese ruling classes have bled the country dry with near total impunity for generations .
Their corruption and greed have repeatedly plunged Lebanon into crisis , and that ’ s without even considering the rampant sectarianism of the political elite , .
Regulatory failure and routine incompetence haunt the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left mountains of rotting garbage choking the air to the tanking economy , hyperinflation and poverty are driving families to the brink of starvation , with dire warnings of a potential famine .
The existing crisis produced months of sustained protests against the Lebanese government , uniting Lebanon ’ s sects under the slogan “ all of them means all of them , ” a condemnation of the entire ruling class and a repudiation of the country ’ s sectarian political system .
Since the incident , Hassan Koraytem , the general manager @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the director-general of the Lebanese Customs Administration , have both declared that they warned about the dangers posed by the explosives and called for their removal .
Lebanese authorities have since announced that port officials responsible for storing and guarding the ammonium nitrate are being held under house arrest .
The traditional “ it wasn ’ t me ” blame game of contemporary Lebanese politics is now playing out , as the former warlords line up to shift the accountability toward anyone but themselves .
How that plays out with a Lebanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of potential insurrection remains unknown .
But the hashtag “ hang up the nooses ” trending in Arabic on Twitter may cause Lebanon ’ s corrupt warlords to wonder whether their impunity is soon to be tested .
Chernobyl was not just the story of a disastrous testing accident in a Soviet nuclear power plant .
It was the product of how endemic arrogance , negligence , careerism , and authoritarianism created a system that allowed that disaster .
It was the Soviet Union in a microcosm , a deadly outcrop of decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ultimate help bring down the entire nation .
The handful of local officials convicted and sentenced were guilty enough—but they weren ’ t the ultimate culprits .
Likewise , the story of the Beirut warehouse blasts is not one of a construction accident leading to a tragedy .
It ’ s the tale of how a gang of warlords carved up a country and governed with prejudice , incompetence , and a total indifference to human suffering while robbing a helpless and defenseless population blind .
And , like Chernobyl , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ truly responsible for this catastrophe will ever face justice for their crimes .

Beirut Gov. Marwan Abboud broke down in tears as he spoke to reporters on Tuesday evening while searching through the strewn rubble of Beirut’s destroyed sea port for the remains of missing firefighters.
Beirut Gov. Marwan Abboud broke down in tears as he spoke to reporters on Tuesday evening while searching through the strewn rubble of Beirut’s destroyed sea port for the remains of missing firefighters.
“It’s a national catastrophe,” he said, comparing the devastation in the aftermath of the explosions to Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the bombings, before breaking down in tears.
But there is a more fitting nuclear metaphor for what shook Beirut: the Chernobyl meltdown. Tuesday’s warehouse blast does not seem to have been a product of conflict or an act of deliberate violence. Instead, like the Soviet disaster, it is the work of gross incompetence, endemic corruption, and negligence—and its impact will spread far beyond the initial explosion.
Beirut has been declared a disaster zone by Lebanese authorities following two blasts that tore through the city just after 6 p.m. on Tuesday. At the time of publishing, at least 135 people have been killed and thousands injured, and social media networks are flooded with the images of missing loved ones still unaccounted for.
The immediate economic impact is devastating. Between 250,000 and 300,000 people have been left homeless—roughly 10 percent of the city’s population. Thousands of people need treatment at hospitals already crammed full of COVID-19 victims. The property destruction is estimated at $3 billion.
That’s a debilitating burden in a country where most people are struggling just to find the money to get by already. Even before the blasts, Lebanon was already at a breaking point. A refugee crisis from the war in neighboring Syria is almost entering its 10th year, with Lebanon already struggling to meet the aid requirements of the 30 percent of its population that has been displaced from the war in Syria.
But it is not just refugees struggling to meet their needs, with the World Food Program recording that nearly half the Lebanese population was struggling to meet basic food needs. Speaking to the Telegraph in June, Martin Keulertz, an assistant professor at the American University of Beirut, said: “By the end of the year, we will see 75 percent of the population on food handouts, but the question is whether there will be food to hand out.”
The pandemic had already brought Lebanese hospitals to their knees, and COVID-19 hit Lebanon during a period of unprecedented economic destitution, with the nation buckling under the weight of its own debt. Food prices had already risen by 247 percent, and with the blasts destroying tons of Lebanon’s remaining food stocks and wrecking a port vital to the nation’s infrastructure, the situation is set to deteriorate rapidly. Even before the explosions, some Lebanese protesters had gone as far as self-immolation.
Lebanon’s foreign minister, Nassif Hitti, had even resigned the day before the blasts, warning that “Lebanon today is sliding toward becoming a failed state.”
Given Lebanon’s history, many people, including U.S. President Donald Trump, leapt to the idea that terrorism was involved. Yet it’s not violence that has been poisoning the country in the last three decades. It’s corruption.
While details are still emerging, the official story from Lebanese authorities is that a warehouse fire ignited a seized shipment of ammonium nitrate, impounded from a ship at the port in 2013 and seemingly left there ever since.
Ammonium nitrate has a place in the annals of terrorism, such as when the white nationalist terrorist Timothy McVeigh detonated 2 metric tons of the industrial chemical in Oklahoma City in 1995, killing 168 people and damaging 300 buildings.
But without McVeigh’s malice, just deadly negligence, 2,750 metric tons of ammonium nitrate—over a thousand times the amount he used—was allowed to pile up in a warehouse for more than six years in the heart of Beirut, seemingly “awaiting auction.”
Could the lure of a financial reward for officials have led to the dangerous stockpiling of highly explosive material in the heart of Beirut? Some Lebanese journalists have been asking that question following the discovery of documents relating to the seizure of the shipment.
A photo shared on social media, allegedly of the warehouse in question, shows workers in front of a warehouse packed with 1,000-kilogram bags of ammonium nitrate stamped with “Nitroprill HD,” which the arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis suggested may be a knockoff brand of Orica’s Nitropril, a mining explosive. The upper limit for storing Nitropril safely, according to the manufacturer, is 400 metric tons.
Whether corruption, negligence, or a combustible combination of both was responsible for this disaster, we may never truly know.
But the responsibility certainly doesn’t just lie with port workers who failed to do basic checks or took bribes to avoid handling problems. It falls on the people who put them there and who created a system that rotten. While the Lebanese civil war officially ended in 1990, most of the surviving warlords, who had escaped accountability for their decades of atrocities, simply swapped militia uniforms for suits and took control of what remained of Lebanon’s fragile postwar state.
The Lebanese ruling classes have bled the country dry with near total impunity for generations. Their corruption and greed have repeatedly plunged Lebanon into crisis, and that’s without even considering the rampant sectarianism of the political elite,. Regulatory failure and routine incompetence haunt the country.
From a sanitation crisis that has left mountains of rotting garbage choking the air to the tanking economy, hyperinflation and poverty are driving families to the brink of starvation, with dire warnings of a potential famine.
The existing crisis produced months of sustained protests against the Lebanese government, uniting Lebanon’s sects under the slogan “all of them means all of them,” a condemnation of the entire ruling class and a repudiation of the country’s sectarian political system.
Since the incident, Hassan Koraytem, the general manager of the port, and Badri Daher, the director-general of the Lebanese Customs Administration, have both declared that they warned about the dangers posed by the explosives and called for their removal.
Lebanese authorities have since announced that port officials responsible for storing and guarding the ammonium nitrate are being held under house arrest. The traditional “it wasn’t me” blame game of contemporary Lebanese politics is now playing out, as the former warlords line up to shift the accountability toward anyone but themselves.
How that plays out with a Lebanese population already pushed long past the point of potential insurrection remains unknown. But the hashtag “hang up the nooses” trending in Arabic on Twitter may cause Lebanon’s corrupt warlords to wonder whether their impunity is soon to be tested.
Chernobyl was not just the story of a disastrous testing accident in a Soviet nuclear power plant. It was the product of how endemic arrogance, negligence, careerism, and authoritarianism created a system that allowed that disaster. It was the Soviet Union in a microcosm, a deadly outcrop of decades of political failure and negligence that would ultimate help bring down the entire nation. The handful of local officials convicted and sentenced were guilty enough—but they weren’t the ultimate culprits.
Likewise, the story of the Beirut warehouse blasts is not one of a construction accident leading to a tragedy. It’s the tale of how a gang of warlords carved up a country and governed with prejudice, incompetence, and a total indifference to human suffering while robbing a helpless and defenseless population blind.
And, like Chernobyl, it is almost guaranteed that none of the men truly responsible for this catastrophe will ever face justice for their crimes.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-05--In Colombia, the Pandemic Provides Fertile Ground for Illegal Armed Groups

As the coronavirus pandemic crept up in villages across Colombia in March and the country locked down , illegal armed groups began informing communities that they would take the law into their own hands .
On March 28 , the National Liberation Army ( ELN ) —a rebel group with a long history of abusing rights to impose its rules—announced a one-month nationwide cease-fire as a “ humanitarian gesture to the Colombian people.
” At the same time , ELN fighters in Bolívar , northern Colombia , released a pamphlet saying they felt “ forced to kill people in order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that armed groups including the ELN are using the pandemic to expand their control , threatening those who break the curfew with punishments and even death .
In June , an urban criminal group that dubbed itself the Organization of Mexico released a flyer in Quibdó , Chocó department , offering to work with the local government to implement the curfew .
The action was rejected by local authorities , but the group offered to contribute a fleet of 24 motorcycles to patrol the city to enforce the lockdown .
“ We won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they don ’ t respect those of our fellow countrymen with their actions , ” the flyer said , suggesting those who violated the curfew would be killed .
Rather than granting a pause in Colombia ’ s protracted conflict , the pandemic has caused further unrest and anguish among residents across the country .
The government ’ s historic absence in the remote territories where illegal trades such as drug trafficking and illegal mining thrive has long put communities in the crossfire .
The coronavirus pandemic lockdown has left them further detached @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Armed groups are now capitalizing on the fear caused by the pandemic to expand control over these vulnerable communities , as Human Rights Watch reported earlier this year .
According to official estimates , there have been at least 5,390 homicides across Colombia so far this year , and more than 60,000 people have been displaced or confined to their villages because of clashes between the armed groups that fight for control over criminal activities formerly carried out by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ( FARC-EP ) , which demobilized as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For more than five decades , the Colombian government has attempted—unsuccessfully—to achieve peace through negotiations with the various illegal armed groups plaguing its territories .
While the ELN remains the main active leftist group , in recent decades , the conflict has mutated from one driven by guerrilla and self-defense groups with clear ideologies to a fight over lucrative illegal business .
In the last two decades , the Colombian government has reached peace deals with two major illegal armed groups : the right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia ( AUC ) in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016 .
By 2017 , at least 7,000 fighters had disarmed from the FARC-EP , but the hype around the disarmament of Colombia ’ s largest guerrilla group was short-lived .
The government couldn ’ t effectively occupy the territories where former fighters operated , providing combatants with another opportunity to join dissident groups or create new groups with the aim of taking over illegal trades .
Likewise , groups such as the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia and the Organization of Mexico are examples of offspring groups from the 2006 peace process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ western department of Chocó are particularly vulnerable to displacement by armed groups .
Deserted jungles and a network of rivers running to the Pacific Ocean make it a profitable region for illegal trades such as mining and drug trafficking , and a hotbed of conflict between armed groups including the ELN and the Gaitanista Self-Defence Forces of Colombia .
Darwin Lozano , a community leader in Quibdó , has documented violence in the city for the past four years .
Between January and mid-July , violence by criminal bands caused 88 deaths in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have normalized the violence by saying that “ if you get plomo [ lead bullets ] , it is because you deserve it , ” he said .
But many victims are simply caught in the middle of the conflict .
In June , videos posted to social media attributed to the Organization of Mexico showed gang members beating residents with whips and sticks in Quibdó for breaking the curfew .
The statements by armed groups apparently siding with the government and threatening to enforce the curfew not only intimidate residents , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ They are trying to supplant the authorities , ” said Col. Henry Galán of the Chocó police department .
The police have asked for the cooperation of the community in informing the local authorities of the incidents , but residents fear reprisal , according to Lozano .
“ There is no confidence in the police , ” he said .
During Colombia ’ s civil war , nearly 17,000 minors were forcibly recruited by illegal armed groups as of 2017 .
According to the Coalition Against the Involvement of Children and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a local monitoring group , at least 190 children were enlisted by various armed groups in the first six months of the year—as many as were recruited during all of 2019 .
Derly Pastrana , a human rights activist in Huila department in southern Colombia—an area hit hard by the conflict for decades—said that the families of at least 70 children , including some as young as 10 years old , have been warned by FARC-EP dissidents of imminent recruitment .
In June , Pastrana led a mission to relocate a woman and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10 , in response to such threats .
There isn ’ t enough support from the government to protect those at risk , said Pastrana .
“ We have to do everything ourselves , ” she said .
Few cases get reported because victims fear retaliation , making it hard to keep an accurate toll of the number of recruited children .
“ It ’ s hard for people to come forward , because they ’ re scared , ” said Angie Zapata , a human rights activist in Cauca department , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issue has become particularly challenging during the pandemic , as Indigenous and government authorities , who usually mediate directly with the groups to negotiate releases , are unable to visit because of the lockdown .
For Ararat and other leaders , the lack of hospitals , telecommunications , roads , and infrastructure in their region puts their communities at higher risk—forcing them to make difficult decisions such as placing biosecurity checkpoints and sealing off outsiders .
Such measures have increased tensions with armed groups which fight to control the region , and further @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and food supplies .
Because of their remote location , the communities are ultimately at the mercy of the armed groups .
“ They are the law here , ” Ararat said .
Armed groups have imposed curfews and informed the communities the new rules and penalties for those who don ’ t obey , through flyers left at their homes or sent via WhatsApp .
The lockdown measures have made it harder for community leaders to meet and maintain communication , Ararat said , resulting in a vacuum of power that grants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Social leaders and observers monitoring communities in both Chocó and Cauca agree that the lockdown has created a suitable ground for illegal armed groups to strengthen and expand control by joining forces with other groups .
“ We have noticed a change in how the groups present themselves , ” Zapata said .
Prior to the pandemic , announcements suggested the presence of as many as ten groups , according to Zapata .
Now the groups appear to have centralized their branding under FARC-EP .
Still , Eriberto Andrades , the ombudsman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus remains a major challenge for the region—in part because of the ongoing violence .
“ People don ’ t want to obey the state , ” he said , adding that in Quibdó , people repeatedly broke the lockdown despite efforts by the authorities .
“ Now they see the pamphlets and everyone behaves , ” he said .
“ They respect that law because they know that those people don ’ t respect [ anyone ’ s ] life .
”

As the coronavirus pandemic crept up in villages across Colombia in March and the country locked down, illegal armed groups began informing communities that they would take the law into their own hands. On March 28, the National Liberation Army (ELN)—a rebel group with a long history of abusing rights to impose its rules—announced a one-month nationwide cease-fire as a “humanitarian gesture to the Colombian people.” At the same time, ELN fighters in Bolívar, northern Colombia, released a pamphlet saying they felt “forced to kill people in order to preserve lives.”
As the coronavirus pandemic crept up in villages across Colombia in March and the country locked down, illegal armed groups began informing communities that they would take the law into their own hands. On March 28, the National Liberation Army (ELN)—a rebel group with a long history of abusing rights to impose its rules—announced a one-month nationwide cease-fire as a “humanitarian gesture to the Colombian people.” At the same time, ELN fighters in Bolívar, northern Colombia, released a pamphlet saying they felt “forced to kill people in order to preserve lives.”
Rights groups warn that armed groups including the ELN are using the pandemic to expand their control, threatening those who break the curfew with punishments and even death. In June, an urban criminal group that dubbed itself the Organization of Mexico released a flyer in Quibdó, Chocó department, offering to work with the local government to implement the curfew. The action was rejected by local authorities, but the group offered to contribute a fleet of 24 motorcycles to patrol the city to enforce the lockdown. “We won’t respect their lives, as they don’t respect those of our fellow countrymen with their actions,” the flyer said, suggesting those who violated the curfew would be killed.
Rather than granting a pause in Colombia’s protracted conflict, the pandemic has caused further unrest and anguish among residents across the country. The government’s historic absence in the remote territories where illegal trades such as drug trafficking and illegal mining thrive has long put communities in the crossfire. The coronavirus pandemic lockdown has left them further detached from basic health services and food supplies. Armed groups are now capitalizing on the fear caused by the pandemic to expand control over these vulnerable communities, as Human Rights Watch reported earlier this year.
A Colombian soldier stands guard during a curfew imposed due to high numbers of coronavirus cases in Cali on July 17. In some of the country’s rural areas, illegal armed groups have taken the law into their own hands, implementing the curfews by force and threatening residents of harsh punishments if they fail to obey the lockdown rules.
According to official estimates, there have been at least 5,390 homicides across Colombia so far this year, and more than 60,000 people have been displaced or confined to their villages because of clashes between the armed groups that fight for control over criminal activities formerly carried out by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), which demobilized as result of the 2016 peace deal.
For more than five decades, the Colombian government has attempted—unsuccessfully—to achieve peace through negotiations with the various illegal armed groups plaguing its territories. While the ELN remains the main active leftist group, in recent decades, the conflict has mutated from one driven by guerrilla and self-defense groups with clear ideologies to a fight over lucrative illegal business.
In the last two decades, the Colombian government has reached peace deals with two major illegal armed groups: the right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 2006, and the Marxist FARC-EP in 2016. By 2017, at least 7,000 fighters had disarmed from the FARC-EP, but the hype around the disarmament of Colombia’s largest guerrilla group was short-lived. The government couldn’t effectively occupy the territories where former fighters operated, providing combatants with another opportunity to join dissident groups or create new groups with the aim of taking over illegal trades. Likewise, groups such as the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia and the Organization of Mexico are examples of offspring groups from the 2006 peace process with the AUC.
A girl walks through an Emberá Indigenous community on the riverbank of the Baudó River on June 11, 2017. Recent clashes amid the pandemic killed a 9-year-old girl from an Emberá community, which had been displaced earlier this year by conflict in the region.
For many communities across Colombia, isolation is not a choice. The coronavirus has infected more than 300,000 Colombians and claimed more than 11,000 lives, leading the government to extend its national lockdown until Aug. 1. But villagers in rural areas are often confined to their homes by the violence in their communities. Despite various attempts to find a political solution to Colombia’s decades-long conflict, it has claimed more than 9 million victims—a number that continues to rise.
Residents of the western department of Chocó are particularly vulnerable to displacement by armed groups. Deserted jungles and a network of rivers running to the Pacific Ocean make it a profitable region for illegal trades such as mining and drug trafficking, and a hotbed of conflict between armed groups including the ELN and the Gaitanista Self-Defence Forces of Colombia.
Darwin Lozano, a community leader in Quibdó, has documented violence in the city for the past four years. Between January and mid-July, violence by criminal bands caused 88 deaths in Quibdó, according to Lozano. People have normalized the violence by saying that “if you get plomo [lead bullets], it is because you deserve it,” he said. But many victims are simply caught in the middle of the conflict. In June, videos posted to social media attributed to the Organization of Mexico showed gang members beating residents with whips and sticks in Quibdó for breaking the curfew.
The statements by armed groups apparently siding with the government and threatening to enforce the curfew not only intimidate residents, but also compromise the credibility of the authorities. “They are trying to supplant the authorities,” said Col. Henry Galán of the Chocó police department. The police have asked for the cooperation of the community in informing the local authorities of the incidents, but residents fear reprisal, according to Lozano. “There is no confidence in the police,” he said.
In Colombia, the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown has affected children in particular. With schools across the country shut down, students returned to their families in rural areas—where the lack of military presence makes them an easy target. According to experts, some parents report that fighters have warned them that their children would be taken to support their cause, while others say that children have been lured with gifts and money.
During Colombia’s civil war, nearly 17,000 minors were forcibly recruited by illegal armed groups as of 2017. According to the Coalition Against the Involvement of Children and Youth in the Colombian Armed Conflict, a local monitoring group, at least 190 children were enlisted by various armed groups in the first six months of the year—as many as were recruited during all of 2019.
Derly Pastrana, a human rights activist in Huila department in southern Colombia—an area hit hard by the conflict for decades—said that the families of at least 70 children, including some as young as 10 years old, have been warned by FARC-EP dissidents of imminent recruitment. In June, Pastrana led a mission to relocate a woman and her two children, aged 9 and 10, in response to such threats. There isn’t enough support from the government to protect those at risk, said Pastrana. “We have to do everything ourselves,” she said.
Few cases get reported because victims fear retaliation, making it hard to keep an accurate toll of the number of recruited children. “It’s hard for people to come forward, because they’re scared,” said Angie Zapata, a human rights activist in Cauca department, in the country’s southwest. The issue has become particularly challenging during the pandemic, as Indigenous and government authorities, who usually mediate directly with the groups to negotiate releases, are unable to visit because of the lockdown.
Members of an Indigenous guard in Cauca rest in the back of a truck after days of searching for a woman who was kidnapped by men wearing ELN-identifying armbands on Nov. 18, 2016. In Cauca, Indigenous and ethnic communities have a long history of organizing themselves, even acting as unarmed guardians of their own territories.
Cauca is a remote and mountainous region on Colombia’s Pacific coast with limited state presence, where ethnic Indigenous communities have a long history of organizing themselves. “Everyone knows that if that disease reaches us, there is no possibility of survival because there is no medical infrastructure,” said Lisifrey Ararat, a leader from the town of Suárez.
For Ararat and other leaders, the lack of hospitals, telecommunications, roads, and infrastructure in their region puts their communities at higher risk—forcing them to make difficult decisions such as placing biosecurity checkpoints and sealing off outsiders. Such measures have increased tensions with armed groups which fight to control the region, and further isolated the communities from basic health services and food supplies.
Emberá boys navigate a branch of the Baudó River in Chocó on June 11, 2017.
Because of their remote location, the communities are ultimately at the mercy of the armed groups. “They are the law here,” Ararat said. Armed groups have imposed curfews and informed the communities the new rules and penalties for those who don’t obey, through flyers left at their homes or sent via WhatsApp. The lockdown measures have made it harder for community leaders to meet and maintain communication, Ararat said, resulting in a vacuum of power that grants an opportunity to those threatening their communities.
Social leaders and observers monitoring communities in both Chocó and Cauca agree that the lockdown has created a suitable ground for illegal armed groups to strengthen and expand control by joining forces with other groups. “We have noticed a change in how the groups present themselves,” Zapata said. Prior to the pandemic, announcements suggested the presence of as many as ten groups, according to Zapata. Now the groups appear to have centralized their branding under FARC-EP.
Still, Eriberto Andrades, the ombudsman for Alto Baudó, said that containing the coronavirus remains a major challenge for the region—in part because of the ongoing violence. “People don’t want to obey the state,” he said, adding that in Quibdó, people repeatedly broke the lockdown despite efforts by the authorities. “Now they see the pamphlets and everyone behaves,” he said. “They respect that law because they know that those people don’t respect [anyone’s] life.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-05--How Biden Could Use Trump’s Trade War Thumbscrews to Fight Climate Change

How Biden Could Use Trump ’ s Trade War Thumbscrews to Fight Climate Change Over the past two years , the view that the United States must take drastic action to address global climate change has gained strong support within the Democratic Party .
In the U.S. Congress , 100 Democratic Representatives and 14 Senators have endorsed the Green New Deal , while presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden has called for spending $ 2 trillion to transform the economy in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and remove fossil fuels from the electricity supply by 2035 .
But even if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continuing political dysfunction in Congress could stall legislative action to address what is arguably humanity ’ s greatest long-term challenge .
Fortunately for supporters of aggressive curbs on global emissions , President Donald Trump has demonstrated a highly effective way to circumvent the legislative process .
His use of national security laws to impose tariffs and sanctions sets a precedent for a future Democratic president to address climate change even if Congress fails to act .
I have argued elsewhere that Trump has overused U.S. sanctions laws and that Congress should urgently enact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But Congress has shown no inclination to limit presidential powers .
The Supreme Court recently refused to hear a legal challenge to Trump ’ s tariffs on steel imports , leaving in place a broad lower court ruling affirming the president ’ s authority to impose tariffs based on his own interpretation of what constitutes a national security threat .
That has created a clear opening for a future Democratic president to impose wide-ranging tariffs and sanctions to combat climate change .
There are at least four ways a Democratic president could use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to address the climate crisis : tariffs on emissions-intensive products and countries ; reporting requirements on international investments ; limits on investing in carbon-intensive industries ; and sanctions and export controls on the most damaging projects .
These actions could complement domestic regulatory action to limit carbon emissions by the U.S. energy and transportation sectors , and to rejoin the 2015 Paris Agreement on CO2 reductions .
While using national security laws to combat climate change would be no substitute for new legislation and would be virtually certain to face legal challenge , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the executive branch could spur Congress to act .
Under a Democratic president , the Commerce Department could investigate carbon-intensive imports and determine that they impair U.S. national security .
Tariffs on carbon-intensive products and countries : Any unilateral U.S. greenhouse gas reduction scheme runs the risk that tough anti-emission rules could give an advantage to companies operating in countries with looser regulation , thereby simply driving manufacturing away from the United States to countries that fail to act to address climate change .
This concern has already prompted the Biden campaign to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on imports of carbon-intensive goods , something that the European Union is also considering .
Trump ’ s resurrection of long-standing national security clauses in U.S. trade law to impose tariffs provides a future Democratic president with a blueprint to impose a border adjustment tax even without congressional action .
Trump deployed Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 as the legal basis for tariffs on U.S. imports of aluminum and steel .
That clause authorizes the Commerce Department to investigate imports to determine whether goods are being imported “ in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they impair national security .
Under a Democratic president , the Commerce Department could investigate—as several Democratic Representatives have already recommended—carbon-intensive imports , and determine that these emissions in other countries impair U.S. national security .
This would then serve as the legal basis to impose tariffs or other restrictions on these imports .
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 , meanwhile , authorizes a president to impose tariffs on countries that engage in an “ unjustifiable ” trade practice which “ burdens or restricts United States commerce.
” Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on most U.S. imports from China after finding that China ’ s theft of intellectual property met the statutory threshold .
Currently , he is also threatening to use Section 301 to impose tariffs on imports from France and other countries planning to impose taxes on certain digital services , which would predominantly affect U.S. tech giants such as Google and Facebook .
A future Democratic administration could find that countries failing to take adequate steps to address climate change are engaging in an unjustifiable practice that burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regulations .
This would allow the president to impose tariffs on imports from countries that failed to meet global climate change commitments , such as those made in the 2015 Paris Agreement .
Global climate impact reporting requirements : A growing number of financial institutions have begun to assess the carbon impact of investments .
The CEO of BlackRock , for example , has committed to “ making sustainability integral to portfolio construction and risk management.
” Even central banks and financial regulators are beginning to press commercial banks and investment funds to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pose to investments .
But regulations regarding impact assessments are spotty and , in the United States , such assessments are largely voluntary .
Various experts and several members of Congress have proposed climate sanctions to target individual companies and projects .
In 2013 , when the administration of then-President Barack Obama unwound sanctions on Myanmar , it required U.S. companies making new investments of $ 500,000 or more in the country to file periodic reports on the social impacts of their investments .
A future Democratic administration could take a similar approach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outside the United States , requiring U.S. companies that make investments in such sectors as power generation , industrial production , or even airlines to report publicly on climate impacts and any planned mitigation strategies .
Restrictions on investments in carbon-intensive industries : A Democratic president could also use sanctions authorities to go beyond mere impact reporting to prohibit categories of new investment altogether .
The United States ’ foundational sanctions statute , the International Emergency Economic Powers Act , authorizes a president to impose a wide range of restrictions in response to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the national security , foreign policy , or economy of the United States.
” Presidents have deployed this authority against a huge variety of threats , from human rights abuses to drug trafficking to cyberattacks .
The potential of catastrophic climate change certainly meets the standard .
Much as the Obama administration restricted new investments in certain Russian energy projects in response to Russia ’ s 2014 invasion of Ukraine , a future Democratic president could use the law to restrict U.S. private investment in various high-emissions projects , such as extracting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involving substantial tropical deforestation .
Sanctions and export controls on severely carbon-intensive projects and companies : Finally , a new president could use U.S. export controls and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to target individual companies and projects with high emissions around the world .
Various experts and several members of Congress have proposed climate sanctions , and former Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders endorsed the concept during his campaign .
Given the economic effects and deterrent impact of U.S. sanctions , the mere threat would likely steer domestic and foreign companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to even comparatively low levels of sanctions risk .
If targeted sanctions appear a step too far , a Democratic president could use the Commerce Department ’ s Entity List—which Trump has used to limit U.S. exports to Huawei and other Chinese companies—to prohibit U.S. exports to foreign companies that egregiously contribute to global climate change .
Of course , many of these proposals would be challenging to implement .
Identifying the appropriate scope for investment prohibitions and sanctions , for example , would require careful consideration , as would the selection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Many foreign governments would see the U.S. actions as highly provocative , especially following the Trump administration ’ s aggressive trade policies and the United States ’ own repudiation of climate commitments .
Tariffs could easily fall afoul of World Trade Organization rules , though Trump ’ s dismemberment of the WTO ’ s Appellate Body has made any future challenge to U.S. trade actions toothless .
Companies would be virtually certain to challenge the proposals in court , which would test whether the Supreme Court ’ s recent deference to executive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a Democrat .
And a potential Biden administration would also have to decide whether it really wants to keep expanding the scope of trade and sanctions authority that Trump has already stretched far beyond the laws ’ intended purposes .
All that said , global climate change is undeniably a crisis , arguably the single greatest national security challenge the United States faces , and certainly a vastly greater threat than many current targets of U.S. tariffs and sanctions .
If Congress refuses to act , would it be unreasonable for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boundaries of his or her authority to protect the planet for future generations ?

Over the past two years, the view that the United States must take drastic action to address global climate change has gained strong support within the Democratic Party. In the U.S. Congress, 100 Democratic Representatives and 14 Senators have endorsed the Green New Deal, while presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden has called for spending $2 trillion to transform the economy in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and remove fossil fuels from the electricity supply by 2035. But even if Democrats win the election in November, continuing political dysfunction in Congress could stall legislative action to address what is arguably humanity’s greatest long-term challenge.
Over the past two years, the view that the United States must take drastic action to address global climate change has gained strong support within the Democratic Party. In the U.S. Congress, 100 Democratic Representatives and 14 Senators have endorsed the Green New Deal, while presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden has called for spending $2 trillion to transform the economy in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and remove fossil fuels from the electricity supply by 2035. But even if Democrats win the election in November, continuing political dysfunction in Congress could stall legislative action to address what is arguably humanity’s greatest long-term challenge.
Fortunately for supporters of aggressive curbs on global emissions, President Donald Trump has demonstrated a highly effective way to circumvent the legislative process. His use of national security laws to impose tariffs and sanctions sets a precedent for a future Democratic president to address climate change even if Congress fails to act. I have argued elsewhere that Trump has overused U.S. sanctions laws and that Congress should urgently enact procedural reforms to rein this in. But Congress has shown no inclination to limit presidential powers. The Supreme Court recently refused to hear a legal challenge to Trump’s tariffs on steel imports, leaving in place a broad lower court ruling affirming the president’s authority to impose tariffs based on his own interpretation of what constitutes a national security threat. That has created a clear opening for a future Democratic president to impose wide-ranging tariffs and sanctions to combat climate change.
There are at least four ways a Democratic president could use Trump’s favorite national security tools to address the climate crisis: tariffs on emissions-intensive products and countries; reporting requirements on international investments; limits on investing in carbon-intensive industries; and sanctions and export controls on the most damaging projects. These actions could complement domestic regulatory action to limit carbon emissions by the U.S. energy and transportation sectors, and to rejoin the 2015 Paris Agreement on CO2 reductions. While using national security laws to combat climate change would be no substitute for new legislation and would be virtually certain to face legal challenge, the credible threat of unilateral action by the executive branch could spur Congress to act.
Under a Democratic president, the Commerce Department could investigate carbon-intensive imports and determine that they impair U.S. national security.
Tariffs on carbon-intensive products and countries: Any unilateral U.S. greenhouse gas reduction scheme runs the risk that tough anti-emission rules could give an advantage to companies operating in countries with looser regulation, thereby simply driving manufacturing away from the United States to countries that fail to act to address climate change. This concern has already prompted the Biden campaign to announce support for a border adjustment tax on imports of carbon-intensive goods, something that the European Union is also considering. Trump’s resurrection of long-standing national security clauses in U.S. trade law to impose tariffs provides a future Democratic president with a blueprint to impose a border adjustment tax even without congressional action.
Trump deployed Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 as the legal basis for tariffs on U.S. imports of aluminum and steel. That clause authorizes the Commerce Department to investigate imports to determine whether goods are being imported “in such quantities or under such circumstances” that they impair national security. Under a Democratic president, the Commerce Department could investigate—as several Democratic Representatives have already recommended—carbon-intensive imports, and determine that these emissions in other countries impair U.S. national security. This would then serve as the legal basis to impose tariffs or other restrictions on these imports.
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, meanwhile, authorizes a president to impose tariffs on countries that engage in an “unjustifiable” trade practice which “burdens or restricts United States commerce.” Trump has used this clause to impose tariffs on most U.S. imports from China after finding that China’s theft of intellectual property met the statutory threshold. Currently, he is also threatening to use Section 301 to impose tariffs on imports from France and other countries planning to impose taxes on certain digital services, which would predominantly affect U.S. tech giants such as Google and Facebook. A future Democratic administration could find that countries failing to take adequate steps to address climate change are engaging in an unjustifiable practice that burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by undercutting companies that are subject to tougher regulations. This would allow the president to impose tariffs on imports from countries that failed to meet global climate change commitments, such as those made in the 2015 Paris Agreement.
Global climate impact reporting requirements: A growing number of financial institutions have begun to assess the carbon impact of investments. The CEO of BlackRock, for example, has committed to “making sustainability integral to portfolio construction and risk management.” Even central banks and financial regulators are beginning to press commercial banks and investment funds to evaluate the risks that climate change could pose to investments. But regulations regarding impact assessments are spotty and, in the United States, such assessments are largely voluntary.
Various experts and several members of Congress have proposed climate sanctions to target individual companies and projects.
In 2013, when the administration of then-President Barack Obama unwound sanctions on Myanmar, it required U.S. companies making new investments of $500,000 or more in the country to file periodic reports on the social impacts of their investments. A future Democratic administration could take a similar approach toward new investments in identified high-emissions industries outside the United States, requiring U.S. companies that make investments in such sectors as power generation, industrial production, or even airlines to report publicly on climate impacts and any planned mitigation strategies.
Restrictions on investments in carbon-intensive industries: A Democratic president could also use sanctions authorities to go beyond mere impact reporting to prohibit categories of new investment altogether. The United States’ foundational sanctions statute, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, authorizes a president to impose a wide range of restrictions in response to “any unusual and extraordinary threat … to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” Presidents have deployed this authority against a huge variety of threats, from human rights abuses to drug trafficking to cyberattacks. The potential of catastrophic climate change certainly meets the standard. Much as the Obama administration restricted new investments in certain Russian energy projects in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, a future Democratic president could use the law to restrict U.S. private investment in various high-emissions projects, such as extracting petroleum from oil sands and agricultural projects involving substantial tropical deforestation.
Sanctions and export controls on severely carbon-intensive projects and companies: Finally, a new president could use U.S. export controls and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to target individual companies and projects with high emissions around the world. Various experts and several members of Congress have proposed climate sanctions, and former Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders endorsed the concept during his campaign. Given the economic effects and deterrent impact of U.S. sanctions, the mere threat would likely steer domestic and foreign companies away from projects that could expose them to even comparatively low levels of sanctions risk. If targeted sanctions appear a step too far, a Democratic president could use the Commerce Department’s Entity List—which Trump has used to limit U.S. exports to Huawei and other Chinese companies—to prohibit U.S. exports to foreign companies that egregiously contribute to global climate change.
Of course, many of these proposals would be challenging to implement. Identifying the appropriate scope for investment prohibitions and sanctions, for example, would require careful consideration, as would the selection of products upon which tariffs would be imposed. Many foreign governments would see the U.S. actions as highly provocative, especially following the Trump administration’s aggressive trade policies and the United States’ own repudiation of climate commitments. Tariffs could easily fall afoul of World Trade Organization rules, though Trump’s dismemberment of the WTO’s Appellate Body has made any future challenge to U.S. trade actions toothless. Companies would be virtually certain to challenge the proposals in court, which would test whether the Supreme Court’s recent deference to executive branch power under Trump would carry over to a Democrat. And a potential Biden administration would also have to decide whether it really wants to keep expanding the scope of trade and sanctions authority that Trump has already stretched far beyond the laws’ intended purposes.
All that said, global climate change is undeniably a crisis, arguably the single greatest national security challenge the United States faces, and certainly a vastly greater threat than many current targets of U.S. tariffs and sanctions. If Congress refuses to act, would it be unreasonable for a new president to threaten to push the boundaries of his or her authority to protect the planet for future generations?


foreignpolicy--2020-08-05--Trump’s Hand-Picked State Department Watchdog Quits Less Than 3 Months Into the Job

Trump ’ s Hand-Picked State Department Watchdog Quits Less Than 3 Months Into the Job President Donald Trump abruptly fired the U.S. State Department ’ s inspector general in May , following the official ’ s probes into allegations of malfeasance and mismanagement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other administration appointees .
Now , less than three months into his new post , the acting inspector general who replaced him has stepped down , too , officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy .
Stephen Akard , a close associate of Vice President Mike Pence , was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Inspector General , or OIG , shortly after Trump fired Steve Linick at the recommendation of Pompeo in May .
Akard will depart his post for a job in the private sector and be replaced temporarily by his deputy , Diana Shaw , a State Department spokesperson told Foreign Policy .
The Washington Post and CNN first reported Akard ’ s departure .
To some diplomats , Akard ’ s abrupt exit underscores heightened levels of politicization , turmoil , and dysfunction in the State Department during the Trump era , beginning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and continuing under Pompeo .
Some officials said it has also had a chilling effect on employees ’ willingness to come forward with evidence of wrongdoing or abuse .
“ The system is broken .
The work of IG has been made so political that it ’ s no longer safe for anyone to come forward , especially with allegations against political appointees , ” said one State Department official , speaking on condition of anonymity .
“ It is clear that the leadership of the department is sidestepping the watchdog and is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the department , but instead a select few at the top.
” The State Department inspector general ’ s office has drawn criticism from senior administration officials for allegedly leaking sensitive information to the media and for pursuing investigations into allegations that Pompeo and his wife , Susan Pompeo , were misusing State Department resources for personal gain .
In recent years , the OIG has served as a rare check on mismanagement by career diplomats in the Trump era , issuing damning reports on such issues as the State Department ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Bureau of International Organization Affairs .
The OIG was also conducting an investigation into Pompeo ’ s decision to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia , despite strong opposition from a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers .
Linick ’ s sacking , and Akard ’ s appointment to replace him , raised concerns among former diplomats and Democratic lawmakers of the growing politicization of the State Department in the Trump era .
In an interview with lawmakers in June , Linick said a senior political appointee attempted to “ bully ” him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the arms sale to Saudi Arabia over congressional objections .
During the interview , Linick denied allegations he leaked investigations to the press .
Akard , who previously worked with Pence when he was governor of Indiana , is one of the highest-profile political appointees to depart the State Department in recent months , and his departure has added to the perception of an inspector general ’ s office in turmoil , according to several State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity .
While acting watchdog , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Office of Foreign Missions , which oversees U.S. embassies and consulates abroad as well as foreign missions based in the United States .
His dual-hatted role raised concerns about a potential conflict of interest among some former diplomats and Democratic lawmakers ; by keeping both roles , Akard was in effect overseeing himself .
When asked for comment , a State Department spokesperson said : “ Ambassador Stephen J. Akard , the State Department ’ s Acting Inspector General and the Director of the Office of Foreign Missions , has announced he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years of public service .
We appreciate his dedication to the Department and to our country .
The Deputy Inspector General , Diana R. Shaw , will become the new Acting Inspector General.
” The OIG has also become a flash point of political tensions between the administration and Democrats in Congress .
Top Democrats on committees that oversee the State Department have accused the administration of stonewalling them on the justification for Linick ’ s firing .
On Aug. 3 , top Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , House Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Oversight and Reform issued subpoenas for four senior political appointees at the State Department over Linick ’ s abrupt firing in May .
“ The Administration continues to cover up the real reasons for Mr. Linick ’ s firing by stonewalling the Committees ’ investigation and refusing to engage in good faith , ” the Democrats—Sen .
Bob Menendez of New Jersey , Rep. Eliot Engel of New York , and Rep. Carolyn Maloney of New York—said in a joint statement .
“ That stonewalling has made today ’ s subpoenas necessary , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this investigation to uncover the truth that the American people deserve.
” At the time , Pompeo justified Linick ’ s firing with vague criticisms of his job performance .
“ I went to the president and made clear to him that Inspector General Linick wasn ’ t performing a function in a way that we had tried to get him to , that was additive for the State Department , very consistent with what the statute says he ’ s supposed to be doing , ” he told the Washington Post in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kinds of activities he ’ s supposed to undertake to make us better , to improve us.
” Facing questioning from Democratic lawmakers during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on July 30 , Pompeo said Linick was fired due to how he handled a leak investigation .
“ He didn ’ t comply with the instructions about how we felt that leak needed to be investigated so that we could have an independent investigator do it .
And then he wasn ’ t candid about that process either , ” Pompeo said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This article was updated to include comments from a State Department spokesperson .

President Donald Trump abruptly fired the U.S. State Department’s inspector general in May, following the official’s probes into allegations of malfeasance and mismanagement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other administration appointees. Now, less than three months into his new post, the acting inspector general who replaced him has stepped down, too, officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy.
President Donald Trump abruptly fired the U.S. State Department’s inspector general in May, following the official’s probes into allegations of malfeasance and mismanagement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other administration appointees. Now, less than three months into his new post, the acting inspector general who replaced him has stepped down, too, officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy.
Stephen Akard, a close associate of Vice President Mike Pence, was installed as acting head of the Office of Inspector General, or OIG, shortly after Trump fired Steve Linick at the recommendation of Pompeo in May.
Akard will depart his post for a job in the private sector and be replaced temporarily by his deputy, Diana Shaw, a State Department spokesperson told Foreign Policy. The Washington Post and CNN first reported Akard’s departure.
To some diplomats, Akard’s abrupt exit underscores heightened levels of politicization, turmoil, and dysfunction in the State Department during the Trump era, beginning under former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and continuing under Pompeo. Some officials said it has also had a chilling effect on employees’ willingness to come forward with evidence of wrongdoing or abuse.
“The system is broken. The work of IG has been made so political that it’s no longer safe for anyone to come forward, especially with allegations against political appointees,” said one State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity. “It is clear that the leadership of the department is sidestepping the watchdog and is not looking out for the best interest of the department, but instead a select few at the top.”
The State Department inspector general’s office has drawn criticism from senior administration officials for allegedly leaking sensitive information to the media and for pursuing investigations into allegations that Pompeo and his wife, Susan Pompeo, were misusing State Department resources for personal gain.
In recent years, the OIG has served as a rare check on mismanagement by career diplomats in the Trump era, issuing damning reports on such issues as the State Department’s Office of the Chief of Protocol and Bureau of International Organization Affairs. The OIG was also conducting an investigation into Pompeo’s decision to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia, despite strong opposition from a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers.
Linick’s sacking, and Akard’s appointment to replace him, raised concerns among former diplomats and Democratic lawmakers of the growing politicization of the State Department in the Trump era. In an interview with lawmakers in June, Linick said a senior political appointee attempted to “bully” him into halting his investigation into the justification for the arms sale to Saudi Arabia over congressional objections. During the interview, Linick denied allegations he leaked investigations to the press.
Akard, who previously worked with Pence when he was governor of Indiana, is one of the highest-profile political appointees to depart the State Department in recent months, and his departure has added to the perception of an inspector general’s office in turmoil, according to several State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity. While acting watchdog, Akard simultaneously headed the State Department’s Office of Foreign Missions, which oversees foreign diplomatic missions based in the United States. His dual-hatted role raised concerns about a potential conflict of interest among some former diplomats and Democratic lawmakers; by keeping both roles, Akard was in effect overseeing himself.
When asked for comment, a State Department spokesperson said: “Ambassador Stephen J. Akard, the State Department’s Acting Inspector General and the Director of the Office of Foreign Missions, has announced he is returning to the private sector after years of public service. We appreciate his dedication to the Department and to our country. The Deputy Inspector General, Diana R. Shaw, will become the new Acting Inspector General.”
The OIG has also become a flash point of political tensions between the administration and Democrats in Congress. Top Democrats on committees that oversee the State Department have accused the administration of stonewalling them on the justification for Linick’s firing. On Aug. 3, top Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and House Committee on Oversight and Reform issued subpoenas for four senior political appointees at the State Department over Linick’s abrupt firing in May.
“The Administration continues to cover up the real reasons for Mr. Linick’s firing by stonewalling the Committees’ investigation and refusing to engage in good faith,” the Democrats—Sen. Bob Menendez of New Jersey, Rep. Eliot Engel of New York, and Rep. Carolyn Maloney of New York—said in a joint statement. “That stonewalling has made today’s subpoenas necessary, and the Committees will continue to pursue this investigation to uncover the truth that the American people deserve.”
At the time, Pompeo justified Linick’s firing with vague criticisms of his job performance. “I went to the president and made clear to him that Inspector General Linick wasn’t performing a function in a way that we had tried to get him to, that was additive for the State Department, very consistent with what the statute says he’s supposed to be doing,” he told the Washington Post in an interview in May. “The kinds of activities he’s supposed to undertake to make us better, to improve us.”
Facing questioning from Democratic lawmakers during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on July 30, Pompeo said Linick was fired due to how he handled a leak investigation.
“He didn’t comply with the instructions about how we felt that leak needed to be investigated so that we could have an independent investigator do it. And then he wasn’t candid about that process either,” Pompeo said.
Update, Aug. 5 2020: This article was updated to include comments from a State Department spokesperson.
Correction, Aug. 6, 2020: This article originally incorrectly stated the role of the State Department Office of Foreign Missions. It has been corrected.