foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--What Will Biden’s Foreign Policy Team Look Like?

What Will Biden ’ s Foreign Policy Team Look Like ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : What ’ s on tap today : U.S. President-elect Joe Biden looks to staff up mid-level national security posts , humanitarian groups call out the G-20 for arms exports in the war in Yemen , and another Trump appointee is in hot water for snarky tweets .
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There are 62 days until inauguration .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ effort to reverse the election results looks bleaker by the day , though not for lack of trying , President-elect Joe Biden and his top campaign aides are starting to staff his national security team .
The frontrunners for secretary of state and defense are well-known on the Washington rumor circuit .
Veteran defense expert Michele Flournoy is the top contender to run the Pentagon , while longtime Biden advisor Antony Blinken , former National Security Advisor Susan Rice , or one of a handful of influential Democratic senators could become the nation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s important to track who will take up important senior and mid-level posts at the Pentagon , State Department , and National Security Council .
They won ’ t be household names , but they will be the ones in the trenches implementing Biden ’ s foreign policy priorities .
While the Biden transition team is taking pains not to publicly telegraph who it has in mind , here are some names that several experts in Biden ’ s foreign policy circle have said they consider to be in the running for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stacked his transition team with budget and policy stalwarts from the Obama-era Pentagon , including former policy chief Christine Wormouth and Kath Hicks , who spearheaded the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review .
Notably , Biden has kept former top military officials as briefers during the transition .
Those include Ret .
Gen. Stanley McChrystal , the ousted commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan under Obama , and Ret .
Gen. Lloyd Austin , a former chief of U.S. Central Command .
Also in the mix are Adm. Bill McRaven , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for his role in organizing the 2011 Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden , and retired Marine Lt. Gen. Vince Stewart , a former Defense Intelligence Agency chief .
Middle East .
Some of the names being floated for senior Middle East posts are also Obama administration veterans .
They include Robert Malley , the current CEO of the International Crisis Group and former top Obama NSC advisor on the Middle East ; Mara Rudman , a former senior U.S. Agency for International Development official ; Daniel Benaim , a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Andrew Miller , another veteran of the Obama NSC ; and Dafna Rand , a former State Department official in the Obama administration .
Africa .
Those rumored for posts at the State Department or NSC include Michael Battle , who served as the U.S. ambassador to the African Union under Obama and Michelle Gavin , a senior fellow for African Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the U.S. ambassador to Botswana from 2011 to 2014 .
Allison Lombardo , who helped manage the Biden campaign ’ s working group on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be in the running .
Asia .
Some foreign policy experts in Biden circles expect Ely Ratner and Jung Pak to take up administration posts .
Ratner and Pak both headed the campaign ’ s working group on Asia .
Ratner , now with the Center for a New American Security and served as Biden ’ s deputy national security advisor from 2015 to 2017 .
Pak , a veteran senior U.S. intelligence official and an East Asia scholar at the Brookings Institution , is considered one of Washington ’ s top experts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Juan González , a former deputy assistant secretary of state during the Obama administration and an advisor to Biden on Latin America , is likely in line for another high-level post .
There was also buzz that Julissa Reynoso , a former senior diplomat in the Obama administration who served as U.S. ambassador to Paraguay from 2012 to 2014 , would take up a senior diplomatic role again , but on Tuesday she was named chief of staff to Jill Biden , the future first lady .
Other names for senior posts in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ include Julianne Smith , a former deputy national security advisor to Biden while he was vice president .
Also in the mix is Linda Thomas-Greenfield , the Biden transition team lead for the State Department who was a senior career foreign service officer and former assistant secretary of state for African Affairs .
The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , Rep. Eliot Engel , also expressed interest in a senior foreign policy role in the Biden administration , including an ambassador post , after losing his seat in a bruising primary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan policy experts are urging the future Biden administration to keep on Trump ’ s envoy for Afghanistan peace talks , Zalmay Khalilzad—though it ’ s unclear whether that will happen .
Trump ’ s last-minute moves on Yemen .
The Trump administration is poised to designate the Iran-backed Houthi rebel movement in Yemen as a terrorist group , as we reported this week .
The move aims to curtail Iran ’ s influence in the Gulf and sharpen the Trump administration ’ s support for the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and make it harder for humanitarian groups to deliver life-saving assistance to the country .
After six years of conflict , Yemen is considered the world ’ s worst humanitarian crisis , with millions on the brink of famine and most of the country reliant on humanitarian aid .
Meanwhile , Oxfam is calling out G-20 countries for exporting $ 17 billion worth of arms to Saudi Arabia over the past five years , while giving only about one-third of that amount to humanitarian aid in Yemen .
The Brereton report .
An @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military inspector general finds that Australian special forces were allegedly involved in dozens of unlawful killings of civilians in Afghanistan .
The findings of the so-called Brereton report , released after four years of investigation by Maj. Gen. Justice Paul Brereton , determined that a small number of soldiers within Australia ’ s elite Special Air Services murdered at least 39 Afghan civilians between 2006 and 2013 .
The chief of the Australian Defense Forces , Gen. Angus Campbell , vowed to act on the report and called its findings “ deeply disturbing.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Morning Herald , “ We were attacked at the time for speaking out , but what we have done has probably saved the regiment.
” Green betrayal .
A former U.S. Army Green Beret pleaded guilty in U.S. court on Wednesday to charges of providing sensitive national security information to Russian intelligence agents .
Court documents show that Peter Rafael Dzibinski Debbins periodically traveled to Russia and was selected for a special forces post after being urged to apply by Russian agents .
Debbins allegedly disclosed information about the chemical and special forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missions , and the names of his fellow soldiers .
Debbins served in the Army from 1998 to 2005 and allegedly passed secrets to the Russians until 2011 .
Remaking the Peace Corps .
A new report from an advisory council to the National Peace Corps Association is calling on the U.S. government volunteer program to get with the times—specifically by increasing recruitment of diverse volunteers , support for volunteers when they face discrimination in-country , and recruitment at historically Black colleges and universities and low-income communities .
For the organization to reflect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ also means ensuring that perceptions of a ‘ white savior complex and neocolonialism are not reinforced , ” the report says .
Assistant secretary of snarky tweets .
Trump has nominated Scott O ’ Grady , a retired U.S. Air Force fighter pilot who was famously shot down in Bosnia in 1995 , to be the Pentagon ’ s top international security affairs professional .
But O ’ Grady took little time to celebrate , instead jumping on Twitter to bash his critics .
“ Obvious joke : I thought Trump didn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down , ” one reporter joked , alluding to Trump ’ s 2016 criticism of the late Sen. John McCain , who was downed over North Vietnam in 1967 and spent nearly six years as a prisoner of war .
“ Would you like to tell me that in person , ” O ’ Grady responded , before jumping into the direct messages of other critics .
Reporter Yashar Ali also noted that O ’ Grady killed two elephants during a hunting trip in Zimbabwe in 2014 and later testified before Congress to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trophy imports from Africa .
Mudge .
Twitter has named Peiter Zatko , best known by the handle Mudge , to lead its security operations , after a data breach over the summer allowed young hackers to access the accounts of Joe Biden , Bill Gates , and Elon Musk .
Zatko previously headed up cybersecurity grants at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency .
He first became known in the 1990s for his role in the Cult of the Dead Cow and the Boston-based hacker collective l0pht that testified in front of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1998 .
Got a tip about recent Trump administration firings or the transition ?
Get in touch with Jack ( jack.detsch @ foreignpolicy.com ) or Robbie ( robbie.gramer @ foreignpolicy.com ) .
“ I have become the new God .
I rule the universe , nature and humanity … Now I shall be president.
” —Arstan Abdyldayev , an underdog—but clearly very confident—candidate for president in Kyrgyzstan ’ s presidential elections Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif travels to Russia to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Monday , Nov. 23 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Burns speaks at an event on U.S. diplomacy at George Washington University on Monday , Nov. 23 .
The U.N. Security Council convenes a meeting on Iraq on Tuesday , Nov. 24 .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Correction , Nov. 19 , 2020 : Julissa Reynoso was named chief of staff to Jill Biden .
A previous version of this article incorrectly stated her role in the @ @ @

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today:
What’s on tap today: U.S. President-elect Joe Biden looks to staff up mid-level national security posts, humanitarian groups call out the G-20 for arms exports in the war in Yemen, and another Trump appointee is in hot water for snarky tweets.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Not Biden His Time on Foreign Policy
There are 62 days until inauguration. While U.S. President Donald Trump’s effort to reverse the election results looks bleaker by the day, though not for lack of trying, President-elect Joe Biden and his top campaign aides are starting to staff his national security team.
The frontrunners for secretary of state and defense are well-known on the Washington rumor circuit. Veteran defense expert Michele Flournoy is the top contender to run the Pentagon, while longtime Biden advisor Antony Blinken, former National Security Advisor Susan Rice, or one of a handful of influential Democratic senators could become the nation’s top diplomat.
But it’s important to track who will take up important senior and mid-level posts at the Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Council. They won’t be household names, but they will be the ones in the trenches implementing Biden’s foreign policy priorities.
While the Biden transition team is taking pains not to publicly telegraph who it has in mind, here are some names that several experts in Biden’s foreign policy circle have said they consider to be in the running for administration jobs.
Defense. Biden has stacked his transition team with budget and policy stalwarts from the Obama-era Pentagon, including former policy chief Christine Wormouth and Kath Hicks, who spearheaded the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Notably, Biden has kept former top military officials as briefers during the transition.
Those include Ret. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the ousted commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan under Obama, and Ret. Gen. Lloyd Austin, a former chief of U.S. Central Command. Also in the mix are Adm. Bill McRaven, a former U.S. special operations command chief known for his role in organizing the 2011 Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden, and retired Marine Lt. Gen. Vince Stewart, a former Defense Intelligence Agency chief.
Middle East. Some of the names being floated for senior Middle East posts are also Obama administration veterans. They include Robert Malley, the current CEO of the International Crisis Group and former top Obama NSC advisor on the Middle East; Mara Rudman, a former senior U.S. Agency for International Development official; Daniel Benaim, a former Obama White House Middle East advisor; Andrew Miller, another veteran of the Obama NSC; and Dafna Rand, a former State Department official in the Obama administration.
Africa. Those rumored for posts at the State Department or NSC include Michael Battle, who served as the U.S. ambassador to the African Union under Obama and Michelle Gavin, a senior fellow for African Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the U.S. ambassador to Botswana from 2011 to 2014. Allison Lombardo, who helped manage the Biden campaign’s working group on African issues, is also rumored to be in the running.
Asia. Some foreign policy experts in Biden circles expect Ely Ratner and Jung Pak to take up administration posts. Ratner and Pak both headed the campaign’s working group on Asia. Ratner, now with the Center for a New American Security and served as Biden’s deputy national security advisor from 2015 to 2017. Pak, a veteran senior U.S. intelligence official and an East Asia scholar at the Brookings Institution, is considered one of Washington’s top experts on North Korea.
Latin America. Juan González, a former deputy assistant secretary of state during the Obama administration and an advisor to Biden on Latin America, is likely in line for another high-level post. There was also buzz that Julissa Reynoso, a former senior diplomat in the Obama administration who served as U.S. ambassador to Paraguay from 2012 to 2014, would take up a senior diplomatic role again, but on Tuesday she was named chief of staff to Jill Biden, the future first lady.
Other names for senior posts in the National Security Council or other agencies include Julianne Smith, a former deputy national security advisor to Biden while he was vice president. Also in the mix is Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the Biden transition team lead for the State Department who was a senior career foreign service officer and former assistant secretary of state for African Affairs.
The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Eliot Engel, also expressed interest in a senior foreign policy role in the Biden administration, including an ambassador post, after losing his seat in a bruising primary challenge this summer.
Additionally, influential Afghanistan policy experts are urging the future Biden administration to keep on Trump’s envoy for Afghanistan peace talks, Zalmay Khalilzad—though it’s unclear whether that will happen.
What We’re Watching
Trump’s last-minute moves on Yemen. The Trump administration is poised to designate the Iran-backed Houthi rebel movement in Yemen as a terrorist group, as we reported this week. The move aims to curtail Iran’s influence in the Gulf and sharpen the Trump administration’s support for the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen. But it could derail precarious peace talks and make it harder for humanitarian groups to deliver life-saving assistance to the country.
After six years of conflict, Yemen is considered the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with millions on the brink of famine and most of the country reliant on humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, Oxfam is calling out G-20 countries for exporting $17 billion worth of arms to Saudi Arabia over the past five years, while giving only about one-third of that amount to humanitarian aid in Yemen.
The Brereton report. An explosive new report from Australia’s military inspector general finds that Australian special forces were allegedly involved in dozens of unlawful killings of civilians in Afghanistan. The findings of the so-called Brereton report, released after four years of investigation by Maj. Gen. Justice Paul Brereton, determined that a small number of soldiers within Australia’s elite Special Air Services murdered at least 39 Afghan civilians between 2006 and 2013.
The chief of the Australian Defense Forces, Gen. Angus Campbell, vowed to act on the report and called its findings “deeply disturbing.” One SAS whistleblower told the Sydney Morning Herald, “We were attacked at the time for speaking out, but what we have done has probably saved the regiment.”
Green betrayal. A former U.S. Army Green Beret pleaded guilty in U.S. court on Wednesday to charges of providing sensitive national security information to Russian intelligence agents. Court documents show that Peter Rafael Dzibinski Debbins periodically traveled to Russia and was selected for a special forces post after being urged to apply by Russian agents.
Debbins allegedly disclosed information about the chemical and special forces units he served in, his classified missions, and the names of his fellow soldiers. Debbins served in the Army from 1998 to 2005 and allegedly passed secrets to the Russians until 2011.
Remaking the Peace Corps. A new report from an advisory council to the National Peace Corps Association is calling on the U.S. government volunteer program to get with the times—specifically by increasing recruitment of diverse volunteers, support for volunteers when they face discrimination in-country, and recruitment at historically Black colleges and universities and low-income communities.
For the organization to reflect U.S. society as a whole, it “also means ensuring that perceptions of a ‘white savior complex and neocolonialism are not reinforced,” the report says.
Movers and Shakers
Assistant secretary of snarky tweets. Trump has nominated Scott O’Grady, a retired U.S. Air Force fighter pilot who was famously shot down in Bosnia in 1995, to be the Pentagon’s top international security affairs professional. But O’Grady took little time to celebrate, instead jumping on Twitter to bash his critics. “Obvious joke: I thought Trump didn’t like fliers who got shot down,” one reporter joked, alluding to Trump’s 2016 criticism of the late Sen. John McCain, who was downed over North Vietnam in 1967 and spent nearly six years as a prisoner of war.
“Would you like to tell me that in person,” O’Grady responded, before jumping into the direct messages of other critics. Reporter Yashar Ali also noted that O’Grady killed two elephants during a hunting trip in Zimbabwe in 2014 and later testified before Congress to protest against the temporary suspension of elephant trophy imports from Africa.
Mudge. Twitter has named Peiter Zatko, best known by the handle Mudge, to lead its security operations, after a data breach over the summer allowed young hackers to access the accounts of Joe Biden, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk. Zatko previously headed up cybersecurity grants at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
He first became known in the 1990s for his role in the Cult of the Dead Cow and the Boston-based hacker collective l0pht that testified in front of Congress about weak U.S. government cybersecurity in 1998.
Got a tip about recent Trump administration firings or the transition? Get in touch with Jack (jack.detsch@foreignpolicy.com) or Robbie (robbie.gramer@foreignpolicy.com).
Quote of the Week
“I have become the new God. I rule the universe, nature and humanity … Now I shall be president.”
—Arstan Abdyldayev, an underdog—but clearly very confident—candidate for president in Kyrgyzstan’s presidential elections
The Week Ahead
Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif travels to Russia to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Monday, Nov. 23.
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns speaks at an event on U.S. diplomacy at George Washington University on Monday, Nov. 23.
The U.N. Security Council convenes a meeting on Iraq on Tuesday, Nov. 24.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Correction, Nov. 19, 2020: Julissa Reynoso was named chief of staff to Jill Biden. A previous version of this article incorrectly stated her role in the incoming administration.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--Violence in Ethiopia Doesn’t Stay There

Violence in Ethiopia Doesn’t Stay There

Among other parting gifts , when U.S. President Donald Trump leaves office in January he will bequeath the incoming foreign policy team with an intractable conflict in Ethiopia , one that threatens to wreak havoc across northeast Africa and destroy the African Union ’ s fragile institutions for peace and security .
Like in all wars , the truth was an early casualty in Ethiopia .
Both sides—the government under President Abiy Ahmed and the leadership of the rebellious region of Tigray , the area where Ethiopia ’ s ruling class came from until Abiy took power—blames the other for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have their own interpretation of Ethiopia ’ s delicate federal constitution , and the powers it grants the central government and regions like Tigray .
With every passing day , every massacre of civilians , every air attack on a Tigrayan town and drone strike , every rocket launched by the Tigrayans at a city elsewhere in Ethiopia or in neighboring Eritrea , the grievances accumulate , and the risks of violent chaos across the region increase .
There ’ s history to learn here .
Over four decades ago , the incoming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human rights as a guiding principle for U.S. foreign policy .
One of its first challenges was Ethiopia , where a military junta had recently overthrown Emperor Haile Selassie and was embarked upon a ruthless campaign of suppression .
Barely two weeks after Carter ’ s inauguration , Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam , Ethiopia ’ s new dictator , held a mass rally in Addis Ababa ’ s newly renamed Revolution Square .
Addressing the crowd , he threw three bottles of a red liquid resembling blood to the ground , promising to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That day he launched the so-called Red Terror—a year-long campaign of torture and murder during which tens of thousands of Ethiopians were killed and millions driven into exile .
The United States didn ’ t contemplate military interventions in Africa in those days , and Carter couldn ’ t do much about Mengistu except condemn him and halt military aid—which he did .
Historians of diplomacy agree that Carter did dither , though , over what to do about the ambitions of the pro-Soviet dictator of neighboring Somalia , General Mohamed Siyad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of annexing Ethiopia ’ s Ogaden region—inhabited by ethnic Somalis—and making it part of Greater Somalia .
For Barre , Ethiopia ’ s turmoil was just too tempting , and he mobilized his army to invade .
But instead of clearly signaling that attacking Ethiopia was wrong , the Carter administration sent mixed messages , which Barre took as a green light to invade .
As Somali tanks crossed the border , Ethiopia called on the Soviet Union for military aid .
The United States , which had counted Ethiopia on its side @ @ @ @ @ @ @ otherwise intervened against Soviet involvement , blinked—it didn ’ t want to start World War III over an African territorial dispute .
In one of the most astonishing great power convulsions of the Cold War , Ethiopia and Somalia switched sides , with former Soviet ally Somalia becoming part of the Western bloc and Ethiopia allying with the Soviet Union .
Ethiopia defeated Somalia , but the Ethiopian army—the largest in sub-Saharan Africa and lavishly equipped by the Soviets—still couldn ’ t crush rebellions elsewhere , in Eritrea , Tigray , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mengistu announced a final offensive promising to destroy the outlaws , bandits , terrorists , or secessionists .
Finally , in 1991 , the rebels drove him from power .
There ’ s a simple lesson for the U.S. administration : Wars in Ethiopia are easy to start and dreadfully difficult to stop .
Far better to head off military operations before they escalate and spread .
That lesson was painfully re-learned in 1998 .
By this time , Ethiopia was ruled by the Tigrayan-led rebels who had formed a government .
Neighboring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their allies in the liberation war against Mengistu .
Both the Ethiopian prime minister , Meles Zenawi , and the Eritrean president , Isseyas Afewerki , were considered close U.S. allies .
But in May that year , a minor border dispute over the town of Badme suddenly escalated into a military confrontation between the two .
And a newly appointed young U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa , Susan Rice , was confronted with her first tough challenge .
Working together with Rwandan President Paul Kagame , Rice nearly succeeded in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict .
But Isseyas rejected the formula at the last moment—he didn ’ t want to lose face and he thought he might just win a war .
He told me at the time that Ethiopia was like Yugoslavia , ready to fall apart .
In the end , Rice and Kagame did not succeed in preventing a war that became the continent ’ s bloodiest conventional conflict , costing 80,000 young soldiers ’ lives on both sides .
But their proposal had a vital afterlife .
It included an independent inquiry into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the African and American mediators could stay neutral , above the recriminations that flew between the two countries .
Ethiopia ’ s Meles was wise enough to limit his war aims to repelling Eritrea ’ s invasion and restoring the status quo , and when his army won on the battlefield and was on the point of overrunning Eritrea , he called a halt .
Isseyas never forgave Meles for that victory , and the disdain with which he refused to press it home .
Eighteen years of cold war between Ethiopia and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ethiopian prime minister , Abiy Ahmed , flew to Asmara in 2019 to embrace Isseyas and announce peace .
It was one of a number of dizzying reforms underway at that time , launched by Abiy ’ s predecessor , Hailemariam Desalegn , and continued by Abiy .
It won him acclaim and a Nobel Peace Prize .
But Isseyas didn ’ t reform .
Perhaps the most hardline and retrograde of any African ruler—Eritrea has no constitution , no political parties , no media—Isseyas saw peace with Ethiopia as a security pact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he could get the Ethiopian army to destroy itself on the Tigrayan rocks , as Mengistu had once done , he would achieve two long-cherished goals at once .
Like much of the world , the Trump administration was impressed by Abiy .
But in the Horn of Africa , reformist credentials—socialist or liberal—are always secondary to the cold calculus of power and the passions of national pride .
And naivete about that fact becomes hazardous when a country goes to war .
The circumstances of Ethiopia ’ s war in Tigray aren @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the dispute , notionally about whether Tigray was entitled to hold regional elections without the assent of the federal government , are open to interpretation in either direction , and it isn ’ t obvious who fired the first shots .
What ’ s clear is that there are three belligerents : the Federal Government in Ethiopia ; the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front ; and as discreetly as possible , the Eritreans .
The armed drones that are decimating the Tigrayan armor are flown from the Eritrean airbase at Assab .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ are actually United Arab Emirates weapons systems .
The UAE has been using Assab as a base for its military operations in Yemen . )
And the timing is suspicious .
Isseyas ’ s fingerprints appear to be all over the war , which he likely knows he couldn ’ t get away with it the moment that Rice is back in office—as she may be , under the Biden presidency .
What ’ s clear is that with pitched battles , air raids , missile attacks , massed infantry offensives , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major war .
It won ’ t be over if the Ethiopian army captures the Tigrayan towns and declares victory , it will mutate into a guerrilla fight .
Abiy has turned to nationalist rhetoric and Ethiopian media is indulging anti-Tigrayan hate speech , which will only deepen the society ’ s divisions .
Here , history should be our guide : Ethiopia ’ s wars kill tens of thousands if not millions .
Famine is possible .
Promises of quick victory are delusions .
There ’ s only one sensible policy in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Do everything possible to stop it .
Arms embargoes , sanctions , travel bans : All are appropriate .
The next few weeks are crucial .
Currently the Trump administration is indulging the Abiy government , following its line that it is conducting a policing operation against renegades that will be wound up in a week .
That ’ s absurd ; full armored divisions are in daily combat and hospitals are overflowing with thousands of wounded soldiers .
If Biden ’ s foreign policy transition team can ’ t get working with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy in the coming days , then Congress needs to send a bipartisan message to Abiy : Halt this needless war .
Or else Biden ’ s term will open with an insoluble quagmire in the Horn of Africa that will drag down his administration ’ s foreign policy and quite possibly destroy Ethiopia .

Among other parting gifts, when U.S. President Donald Trump leaves office in January he will bequeath the incoming foreign policy team with an intractable conflict in Ethiopia, one that threatens to wreak havoc across northeast Africa and destroy the African Union’s fragile institutions for peace and security.
Among other parting gifts, when U.S. President Donald Trump leaves office in January he will bequeath the incoming foreign policy team with an intractable conflict in Ethiopia, one that threatens to wreak havoc across northeast Africa and destroy the African Union’s fragile institutions for peace and security.
Like in all wars, the truth was an early casualty in Ethiopia. Both sides—the government under President Abiy Ahmed and the leadership of the rebellious region of Tigray, the area where Ethiopia’s ruling class came from until Abiy took power—blames the other for firing the first shot. And both have their own interpretation of Ethiopia’s delicate federal constitution, and the powers it grants the central government and regions like Tigray. With every passing day, every massacre of civilians, every air attack on a Tigrayan town and drone strike, every rocket launched by the Tigrayans at a city elsewhere in Ethiopia or in neighboring Eritrea, the grievances accumulate, and the risks of violent chaos across the region increase.
There’s history to learn here. Over four decades ago, the incoming Carter administration promised a new era of human rights as a guiding principle for U.S. foreign policy. One of its first challenges was Ethiopia, where a military junta had recently overthrown Emperor Haile Selassie and was embarked upon a ruthless campaign of suppression.
Barely two weeks after Carter’s inauguration, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, Ethiopia’s new dictator, held a mass rally in Addis Ababa’s newly renamed Revolution Square. Addressing the crowd, he threw three bottles of a red liquid resembling blood to the ground, promising to smash all his enemies in that way. That day he launched the so-called Red Terror—a year-long campaign of torture and murder during which tens of thousands of Ethiopians were killed and millions driven into exile.
The United States didn’t contemplate military interventions in Africa in those days, and Carter couldn’t do much about Mengistu except condemn him and halt military aid—which he did. Historians of diplomacy agree that Carter did dither, though, over what to do about the ambitions of the pro-Soviet dictator of neighboring Somalia, General Mohamed Siyad Barre, who had long nurtured dreams of annexing Ethiopia’s Ogaden region—inhabited by ethnic Somalis—and making it part of Greater Somalia.
For Barre, Ethiopia’s turmoil was just too tempting, and he mobilized his army to invade. But instead of clearly signaling that attacking Ethiopia was wrong, the Carter administration sent mixed messages, which Barre took as a green light to invade. As Somali tanks crossed the border, Ethiopia called on the Soviet Union for military aid.
The United States, which had counted Ethiopia on its side in the Cold War and might have otherwise intervened against Soviet involvement, blinked—it didn’t want to start World War III over an African territorial dispute. In one of the most astonishing great power convulsions of the Cold War, Ethiopia and Somalia switched sides, with former Soviet ally Somalia becoming part of the Western bloc and Ethiopia allying with the Soviet Union.
There’s a simple lesson for the U.S. administration: Wars in Ethiopia are easy to start and dreadfully difficult to stop.
Ethiopia defeated Somalia, but the Ethiopian army—the largest in sub-Saharan Africa and lavishly equipped by the Soviets—still couldn’t crush rebellions elsewhere, in Eritrea, Tigray, and the Oromo regions. Every few months, Mengistu announced a final offensive promising to destroy the outlaws, bandits, terrorists, or secessionists. Finally, in 1991, the rebels drove him from power.
There’s a simple lesson for the U.S. administration: Wars in Ethiopia are easy to start and dreadfully difficult to stop. Far better to head off military operations before they escalate and spread.
That lesson was painfully re-learned in 1998. By this time, Ethiopia was ruled by the Tigrayan-led rebels who had formed a government. Neighboring Eritrea, meanwhile, was ruled by their allies in the liberation war against Mengistu. Both the Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi, and the Eritrean president, Isaias Afwerki, were considered close U.S. allies. But in May that year, a minor border dispute over the town of Badme suddenly escalated into a military confrontation between the two. And a newly appointed young U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa, Susan Rice, was confronted with her first tough challenge.
Working together with Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Rice nearly succeeded in hammering out a compromise that de-escalated the conflict. But Isaias rejected the formula at the last moment—he didn’t want to lose face and he thought he might just win a war. He told me at the time that Ethiopia was like Yugoslavia, ready to fall apart.
In the end, Rice and Kagame did not succeed in preventing a war that became the continent’s bloodiest conventional conflict, costing 80,000 young soldiers’ lives on both sides. But their proposal had a vital afterlife. It included an independent inquiry into who started the war, so that the African and American mediators could stay neutral, above the recriminations that flew between the two countries. Ethiopia’s Meles was wise enough to limit his war aims to repelling Eritrea’s invasion and restoring the status quo, and when his army won on the battlefield and was on the point of overrunning Eritrea, he called a halt.
Isaias never forgave Meles for that victory, and the disdain with which he refused to press it home.
Eighteen years of cold war between Ethiopia and Eritrea followed, until a young new Ethiopian prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, flew to Asmara in 2019 to embrace Isseyas and announce peace. It was one of a number of dizzying reforms underway at that time, launched by Abiy’s predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn, and continued by Abiy. It won him acclaim and a Nobel Peace Prize. But Isseyas didn’t reform. Perhaps the most hardline and retrograde of any African ruler—Eritrea has no constitution, no political parties, no media—Isaias saw peace with Ethiopia as a security pact to crush the Tigrayans. And if he could get the Ethiopian army to destroy itself on the Tigrayan rocks, as Mengistu had once done, he would achieve two long-cherished goals at once.
Like much of the world, the Trump administration was impressed by Abiy. But in the Horn of Africa, reformist credentials—socialist or liberal—are always secondary to the cold calculus of power and the passions of national pride. And naivete about that fact becomes hazardous when a country goes to war.
The circumstances of Ethiopia’s war in Tigray aren’t clear. The legalities of the dispute, notionally about whether Tigray was entitled to hold regional elections without the assent of the federal government, are open to interpretation in either direction, and it isn’t obvious who fired the first shots.
What’s clear is that there are three belligerents: the Federal Government in Ethiopia; the Tigray People’s Liberation Front; and as discreetly as possible, the Eritreans. The armed drones that are decimating the Tigrayan armor are flown from the Eritrean airbase at Assab. (There are unconfirmed reports that they are actually United Arab Emirates weapons systems. The UAE has been using Assab as a base for its military operations in Yemen.) And the timing is suspicious. Isseyas’s fingerprints appear to be all over the war, which he likely knows he couldn’t get away with it the moment that Rice is back in office—as she may be, under the Biden presidency.
What’s clear is that with pitched battles, air raids, missile attacks, massed infantry offensives, and massacres of civilians, this is a major war. It won’t be over if the Ethiopian army captures the Tigrayan towns and declares victory, it will mutate into a guerrilla fight. Abiy has turned to nationalist rhetoric and Ethiopian media is indulging anti-Tigrayan hate speech, which will only deepen the society’s divisions. Here, history should be our guide: Ethiopia’s wars kill tens of thousands if not millions. Famine is possible. Promises of quick victory are delusions.
There’s only one sensible policy in dealing with a war like this: Do everything possible to stop it. Arms embargoes, sanctions, travel bans: All are appropriate.
The next few weeks are crucial. Currently the Trump administration is indulging the Abiy government, following its line that it is conducting a policing operation against renegades that will be wound up in a week. That’s absurd; full armored divisions are in daily combat and hospitals are overflowing with thousands of wounded soldiers.
If Biden’s foreign policy transition team can’t get working with the outgoing Trump officials to reorient U.S. policy in the coming days, then Congress needs to send a bipartisan message to Abiy: Halt this needless war. Or else Biden’s term will open with an insoluble quagmire in the Horn of Africa that will drag down his administration’s foreign policy and quite possibly destroy Ethiopia.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--Biden Knows Europe, and Europe Knows Biden. That’s Not Enough.

Biden Knows Europe , and Europe Knows Biden .
That ’ s Not Enough .
Never let a good crisis go to waste , as the saying goes .
President Donald Trump drove U.S. standing with its friends into a ditch , did little to improve things with its adversaries , and may do yet more damage on his way out .
But the incoming Biden administration has the opportunity to rebuild better alliances of democracies , starting with Europe , and put them to work on common challenges .
The problems—whether global like the pandemic or climate change , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , or economic and societal inequities at home and abroad—won ’ t yield easily .
Joe Biden ’ s team , however , can turn the massive relief at Trump ’ s imminent ( if unwilling ) departure into political capital to get things done .
The last four years have served as a warning to many Europeans of the risk of U.S. unilateralism and hostility , with much talk of Europe building and asserting its own power on the world stage .
Washington ’ s instinct may be to push back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it shouldn ’ t .
This newfound European energy should be harnessed by the Biden administration with a positive agenda to shape a forward-looking trans-Atlantic relationship .
Early Biden decisions , like rejoining the Paris climate accord or the World Health Organization , will go a long way to reassure Europe that the United States is a responsible partner .
But it ’ s not enough to restore some illusory good old days .
It ’ s time for a new trans-Atlantic deal—one that requires both America and Europe to do more .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ since George H.W .
Bush .
He came of age during the administration of John F. Kennedy , and one can hear in his language the commitment to the trans-Atlantic alliance and its principles—including support for a rules-based international order that favors freedom—that guided American foreign policy through successful post-World War II decades .
The Europeans know him .
He and his foreign-policy team rightfully seem determined to build on this legacy but to look forward , not back with nostalgia .
Such a new deal could go something like this : The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rules-based system and commit to partnership in leadership with the world ’ s great democracies , starting with Europe .
That means real partnership , not U.S. presumption of European deference but active consultations that form the basis for common decisions .
It means unambiguous support for NATO , an embrace of the European Union , but also fixing what ’ s wrong : adapting the rules-based system to meet current challenges .
It also means , in return , a real conversation about Europeans stepping up to the task .
Not because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re free riders , but because a more ambitious and capable Europe is good for the alliance .
As president , Biden needs to make that clear .
Europe can ’ t just welcome the United States back but needs to build its capacity for action and political willingness to take it , including but not just in its own neighborhood .
Europe has been a beneficiary of the U.S.-led international order .
Now it needs to be more of a leader and defender of that order , to own it .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ American administrations for two generations have been urging Europe to take up more responsibility but at the same time sending mixed signals about even the timid attempts at European defense .
But the near-death experience of the Trump administration may convince a lot of Europeans ( and Americans ) to get things right this time .
As president , Biden should convey that message clearly to Europeans .
Theological debates over “ strategic autonomy ” or the “ European pillar of NATO ” and acrimony over defense spending should be left behind to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ responsibilities .
Where should Europeans lead ?
Should Europeans continue to rely on the United States in their own neighborhood , from Libya to the Western Balkans , or be more engaged ?
The trans-Atlantic relationship must recognize the reality of gradual U.S. drawdown from certain theaters , or the United States playing a supportive but not lead role in others .
But this trend should be coordinated with European allies with a clear expectation of them stepping up .
U.S. support for a European lead in counterterrorism operations in the Sahel is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to defend their own security , beneficial to the alliance as a whole .
The Biden administration is likely to reinvest in NATO both for reasons of conviction and to show its difference from its predecessor .
But it ’ s time to put behind old debates on the compatibility between NATO and the EU : They are complementary pillars of a rules-based , liberal democratic order in Europe and the core of that order in the world .
The Biden administration should embrace and encourage a stronger , more responsible and capable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with its economic and normative power , and its standard-setting abilities , is an asset for the United States , especially in pushing back against authoritarian regimes ’ alternative model on emerging technologies .
From data privacy to countering disinformation , shaping common trans-Atlantic digital standards be will critical .
A new trans-Atlantic deal will have to contain not just large strategic principles but a plan for common action .
As a thought experiment , consider what a declaration coming from a trans-Atlantic summit ( the United States and EU , or United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2021 might include : Coronavirus solidarity .
This would include pledges to pool efforts on vaccines both for themselves and others , and common efforts to coordinate economic recovery efforts .
As Adam Tooze argued in Foreign Policy , the liberal global order will be tested by vaccine accessibility .
Climate change .
The United States would be back into the common effort , rejoining the Paris accord .
A trans-Atlantic summit could be a venue to launch its early initiatives , focused on emerging technologies , private sector involvement , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Russia .
The United States and Europe could lay out a strong common approach including resisting Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s aggression , stabilizing the relationship , seeking cooperation if possible , and investing in a better future with Russia , including supporting ties with Russian civil society .
Blunting Putin ’ s efforts to use energy as leverage ( for example , through the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline , a major U.S.-German-Polish irritant ) ought to be high on the agenda .
Killing Nord Steam 2 might be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ best might be action to mitigate its risks , including through increased support for the Central European infrastructure project , the Three Seas Initiative .
Managing the Chinese challenge .
The United States and Europe have been on a convergence course on China policy , with the EU dubbing Beijing a “ systemic rival ” in a 2019 paper .
Both recognize that China has been exploiting the international system even as it reverts to authoritarian behavior at home ( against the Uighur community , the people of Hong Kong , and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( in the South China Sea ) .
That free economic ride needs to end , and China must be pressed to play by common rules .
In combination , the United States and EU have significant economic and regulatory weight to make that message count .
Rather than fighting the EU on trade , as Trump has done , the Biden administration should enlist the EU to tackle unfair Chinese trade , including diversification of critical supply chains from China , and share best practices and information on investment screening .
Addressing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s authoritarianism at home and aggressiveness abroad , including the violation of Greek maritime sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean , was strongly condemned by candidate Biden during the campaign .
The new president will find eager partners , especially in Paris and Athens , to deal with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ’ s provocations , seeking to put Turkey ’ s relations with Europe and the West generally on a more sustainable footing .
Defense .
The Trump administration , like the Obama administration before it , was frustrated by European military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( Permanent Structured Cooperation , the EU defense organization ) and the European Defence Fund , as well as increasing defense spending in member states , Europeans are finally moving in the right direction .
The United States needs to support ( and stop fretting about ) EU military structures ; there is nothing wrong with a capacity for the EU to undertake military operations on its own .
And a recent compromise on third-party access to the European Defence Fund should provide an incentive to put aside trans-Atlantic differences about defense theology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the United States need to invest more in NATO , which is not just a military structure ( ever more relevant in Europe ’ s east ) but also a common forum for security and political discussions .
Fighting dark money through transparency .
Autocrats , including Putin and his circle , use the international financial system to launder money and buy assets in secret .
Biden himself has called for international efforts to combat it .
The United States and Europe ( plus the U.K. and others ) should agree to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , LLCs , real estate , investments , and more .
Digital regulation .
Europeans have been developing in the last years a distinct approach to tackling new technologies , dubbed “ digital sovereignty.
” This has included digital taxation and antitrust measures by the European Commission that critics claim target major U.S. tech companies .
Perhaps so .
But such policy differences should not hijack a positive trans-Atlantic dialogue on emerging technologies .
The Biden administration could propose setting up a trans-Atlantic digital council , an idea advocated by Atlantic Council experts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the private sector to shape common standards .
Trans-Atlantic differences are a sideshow .
As China grows assertive in the technological sphere , with dangerous consequences for security , privacy , and data , Europe and the United States need to combine efforts to set digital rules or have Beijing set the rules for them .
Democratic solidarity .
U.S. and European leaders could commit to the above and more , pledging solidarity among themselves and with other leading democracies around the world .
That fits with the Biden campaign ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ summit.
” It would also give the U.K. an entry point , as U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s government has been calling for building up a “ D-10 ” summit of democracies ( including G-7 governments plus South Korea , Australia , and possibly India ) .
Brexit was an awful decision , but , as the Biden administration will understand , errant countries need a path back .
The Trump era has given Europeans and Americans a look at what the world looks like without trans-Atlantic solidarity .
It isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world think that the liberal order is dead and their time has come again .
As president , Biden will have enormous political capital in his first year to try to fix that , and it ’ s clear he means to try .
But the United States can ’ t do it alone .
Europe ’ s stake is enormous , and Europeans have agency .
They should use the next two months to shape ideas and present an ambitious , common agenda to the Biden administration .
One can hope that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retrospect as the catalyst for a new trans-Atlantic age .

Never let a good crisis go to waste, as the saying goes. President Donald Trump drove U.S. standing with its friends into a ditch, did little to improve things with its adversaries, and may do yet more damage on his way out. But the incoming Biden administration has the opportunity to rebuild better alliances of democracies, starting with Europe, and put them to work on common challenges. The problems—whether global like the pandemic or climate change, or from authoritarian aggressors like Russia or China, or economic and societal inequities at home and abroad—won’t yield easily. Joe Biden’s team, however, can turn the massive relief at Trump’s imminent (if unwilling) departure into political capital to get things done.
Never let a good crisis go to waste, as the saying goes. President Donald Trump drove U.S. standing with its friends into a ditch, did little to improve things with its adversaries, and may do yet more damage on his way out. But the incoming Biden administration has the opportunity to rebuild better alliances of democracies, starting with Europe, and put them to work on common challenges. The problems—whether global like the pandemic or climate change, or from authoritarian aggressors like Russia or China, or economic and societal inequities at home and abroad—won’t yield easily. Joe Biden’s team, however, can turn the massive relief at Trump’s imminent (if unwilling) departure into political capital to get things done.
The last four years have served as a warning to many Europeans of the risk of U.S. unilateralism and hostility, with much talk of Europe building and asserting its own power on the world stage. Washington’s instinct may be to push back against this or fear decoupling. But it shouldn’t. This newfound European energy should be harnessed by the Biden administration with a positive agenda to shape a forward-looking trans-Atlantic relationship. Early Biden decisions, like rejoining the Paris climate accord or the World Health Organization, will go a long way to reassure Europe that the United States is a responsible partner. But it’s not enough to restore some illusory good old days.
It’s time for a new trans-Atlantic deal—one that requires both America and Europe to do more.
Biden is the most pro-European U.S. president since George H.W. Bush. He came of age during the administration of John F. Kennedy, and one can hear in his language the commitment to the trans-Atlantic alliance and its principles—including support for a rules-based international order that favors freedom—that guided American foreign policy through successful post-World War II decades. The Europeans know him. He and his foreign-policy team rightfully seem determined to build on this legacy but to look forward, not back with nostalgia.
Such a new deal could go something like this: The United States would come back to the rules-based system and commit to partnership in leadership with the world’s great democracies, starting with Europe. That means real partnership, not U.S. presumption of European deference but active consultations that form the basis for common decisions. It means unambiguous support for NATO, an embrace of the European Union, but also fixing what’s wrong: adapting the rules-based system to meet current challenges. It also means, in return, a real conversation about Europeans stepping up to the task. Not because they owe something, or because they’re free riders, but because a more ambitious and capable Europe is good for the alliance. As president, Biden needs to make that clear.
Europe can’t just welcome the United States back but needs to build its capacity for action and political willingness to take it, including but not just in its own neighborhood. Europe has been a beneficiary of the U.S.-led international order. Now it needs to be more of a leader and defender of that order, to own it.
Easier said than done, perhaps. American administrations for two generations have been urging Europe to take up more responsibility but at the same time sending mixed signals about even the timid attempts at European defense. But the near-death experience of the Trump administration may convince a lot of Europeans (and Americans) to get things right this time. As president, Biden should convey that message clearly to Europeans. Theological debates over “strategic autonomy” or the “European pillar of NATO” and acrimony over defense spending should be left behind to focus on real operational capabilities and sharing responsibilities. Where should Europeans lead? Should Europeans continue to rely on the United States in their own neighborhood, from Libya to the Western Balkans, or be more engaged? The trans-Atlantic relationship must recognize the reality of gradual U.S. drawdown from certain theaters, or the United States playing a supportive but not lead role in others. But this trend should be coordinated with European allies with a clear expectation of them stepping up. U.S. support for a European lead in counterterrorism operations in the Sahel is a good example of Europeans stepping up to defend their own security, beneficial to the alliance as a whole.
The Biden administration is likely to reinvest in NATO both for reasons of conviction and to show its difference from its predecessor. But it’s time to put behind old debates on the compatibility between NATO and the EU: They are complementary pillars of a rules-based, liberal democratic order in Europe and the core of that order in the world. The Biden administration should embrace and encourage a stronger, more responsible and capable EU. A strong European Union, with its economic and normative power, and its standard-setting abilities, is an asset for the United States, especially in pushing back against authoritarian regimes’ alternative model on emerging technologies. From data privacy to countering disinformation, shaping common trans-Atlantic digital standards be will critical.
A new trans-Atlantic deal will have to contain not just large strategic principles but a plan for common action. As a thought experiment, consider what a declaration coming from a trans-Atlantic summit (the United States and EU, or United States, EU and United Kingdom) in 2021 might include:
Coronavirus solidarity. This would include pledges to pool efforts on vaccines both for themselves and others, and common efforts to coordinate economic recovery efforts. As Adam Tooze argued in Foreign Policy, the liberal global order will be tested by vaccine accessibility.
Climate change. The United States would be back into the common effort, rejoining the Paris accord. A trans-Atlantic summit could be a venue to launch its early initiatives, focused on emerging technologies, private sector involvement, and support for renewables.
Dealing with Putin’s Russia. The United States and Europe could lay out a strong common approach including resisting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression, stabilizing the relationship, seeking cooperation if possible, and investing in a better future with Russia, including supporting ties with Russian civil society. Blunting Putin’s efforts to use energy as leverage (for example, through the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, a major U.S.-German-Polish irritant) ought to be high on the agenda. Killing Nord Steam 2 might be a best-case scenario, but a second best might be action to mitigate its risks, including through increased support for the Central European infrastructure project, the Three Seas Initiative.
Managing the Chinese challenge. The United States and Europe have been on a convergence course on China policy, with the EU dubbing Beijing a “systemic rival” in a 2019 paper. Both recognize that China has been exploiting the international system even as it reverts to authoritarian behavior at home (against the Uighur community, the people of Hong Kong, and its own society generally) and regional aggression (in the South China Sea). That free economic ride needs to end, and China must be pressed to play by common rules. In combination, the United States and EU have significant economic and regulatory weight to make that message count. Rather than fighting the EU on trade, as Trump has done, the Biden administration should enlist the EU to tackle unfair Chinese trade, including diversification of critical supply chains from China, and share best practices and information on investment screening.
Addressing Turkey’s behavior. Ankara’s authoritarianism at home and aggressiveness abroad, including the violation of Greek maritime sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean, was strongly condemned by candidate Biden during the campaign. The new president will find eager partners, especially in Paris and Athens, to deal with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s provocations, seeking to put Turkey’s relations with Europe and the West generally on a more sustainable footing.
Defense. The Trump administration, like the Obama administration before it, was frustrated by European military weakness. With the development of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation, the EU defense organization) and the European Defence Fund, as well as increasing defense spending in member states, Europeans are finally moving in the right direction. The United States needs to support (and stop fretting about) EU military structures; there is nothing wrong with a capacity for the EU to undertake military operations on its own. And a recent compromise on third-party access to the European Defence Fund should provide an incentive to put aside trans-Atlantic differences about defense theology. At the same time, Europeans and the United States need to invest more in NATO, which is not just a military structure (ever more relevant in Europe’s east) but also a common forum for security and political discussions.
Fighting dark money through transparency. Autocrats, including Putin and his circle, use the international financial system to launder money and buy assets in secret. Biden himself has called for international efforts to combat it. The United States and Europe (plus the U.K. and others) should agree to increase and enforce transparency in financial markets, LLCs, real estate, investments, and more.
Digital regulation. Europeans have been developing in the last years a distinct approach to tackling new technologies, dubbed “digital sovereignty.” This has included digital taxation and antitrust measures by the European Commission that critics claim target major U.S. tech companies. Perhaps so. But such policy differences should not hijack a positive trans-Atlantic dialogue on emerging technologies. The Biden administration could propose setting up a trans-Atlantic digital council, an idea advocated by Atlantic Council experts, to bring together stakeholders, policymakers, and the private sector to shape common standards. Trans-Atlantic differences are a sideshow. As China grows assertive in the technological sphere, with dangerous consequences for security, privacy, and data, Europe and the United States need to combine efforts to set digital rules or have Beijing set the rules for them.
Democratic solidarity. U.S. and European leaders could commit to the above and more, pledging solidarity among themselves and with other leading democracies around the world. That fits with the Biden campaign’s call for an international “democracy summit.” It would also give the U.K. an entry point, as U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s government has been calling for building up a “D-10” summit of democracies (including G-7 governments plus South Korea, Australia, and possibly India). Brexit was an awful decision, but, as the Biden administration will understand, errant countries need a path back.
The Trump era has given Europeans and Americans a look at what the world looks like without trans-Atlantic solidarity. It isn’t pretty. Autocrats around the world think that the liberal order is dead and their time has come again. As president, Biden will have enormous political capital in his first year to try to fix that, and it’s clear he means to try. But the United States can’t do it alone. Europe’s stake is enormous, and Europeans have agency. They should use the next two months to shape ideas and present an ambitious, common agenda to the Biden administration. One can hope that the Trump years will be regarded in retrospect as the catalyst for a new trans-Atlantic age.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--The Head of ISIS Is a Hypocrite and a Traitor

The Head of ISIS Is a Hypocrite and a Traitor Recently declassified U.S. military documents suggest that the purported new caliph of the Islamic State , Amir Muhammad Said Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla , betrayed dozens of Islamic State of Iraq members to interrogators while held at the U.S.-run Camp Bucca prison in southern Iraq in 2008 .
The Tactical Interrogation Reports were released by West Point ’ s Combating Terrorism Center in September , although the significance of the documents and their implications for efforts to counter Islamic State influence seem to have been lost amid a competitive U.S. election and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s interrogation reports reveal a great deal about the man who would be caliph as well as the inner workings of the Islamic State at a critical moment in its evolution .
More importantly , they provide an opportunity to degrade the Islamic State ’ s brand at a time when it is strategically vulnerable .
After all , the Islamic State ’ s leadership ranks have been devastated by targeted strikes , while the pressures of decline threaten to exacerbate tensions inside the Islamic State as well as with its jihadi rivals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the group ’ s so-called caliph by exposing him as a snitch and a hypocrite has the potential , if harnessed effectively and synchronized with broader influence efforts , to undermine not only his perceived authority but also the credibility of the movement he leads .
Of the 66 reports related to Mawla ’ s interrogations held by the U.S. Department of Defense , only three were released , limiting a complete analysis of Mawla—who was given the flattering but likely inaccurate nom de guerre Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Quraishi , which implies a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how his relationship with interrogators evolved .
What is beyond question is that he was an informant while detained by U.S. military forces in Iraq .
If recent State Department and United Nations reports identifying the Islamic State ’ s new caliph as Mawla are accurate , that means the Islamic State is now led by a man who betrayed dozens of Islamic State members , including many senior leaders holding Sharia Council , administrative , and military positions in Mosul , going so far as to give their physical descriptions and phone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and their predecessors within the organizational hierarchy .
From 2008 to 2009 , counterterrorism operations in Mosul , largely led by U.S. forces , devastated the Islamic State ’ s leadership , and it seems Mawla identified many of them in January 2008 .
The CTC Sentinel , published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point , which first analyzed the interrogation reports , writes that 11 of 20 individuals who featured in Mawla ’ s testimonies are authentic ; many of them subsequently faced imprisonment or death .
Drawing on an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2004 , it seems that other leaders faced similar fortunes , including Muhammed Bazzuna , a “ Military Amir ” in Mosul , who was killed in 2008 ; Firas al-Luhaibi , who took over Mosul with al Qaeda and was arrested in 2008 ; and Muadh Abdullah , the son of a former mufti for an al Qaeda ally , Ansar al-Sunna , who was killed in 2009 .
For many victims of the Islamic State ’ s violence there must be a bitter irony to knowing that during Mawla ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deaths of countless people for supposed disloyalty while knowing that his own treachery had once devastated the group ’ s ranks .
Mawla ’ s testimonies also show how the Islamic State survived and rebuilt itself in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 U.S. troop surge and the so-called Sunni Awakening .
This is an important historical period for the Islamic State movement because it represents the group ’ s historical and strategic nadir but also , in its aftermath , a crucial period of rebuilding , under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resurgence in 2014 .
Indeed the Islamic State will likely look back to this period for inspiration and a strategic blueprint to guide its current efforts to recover after devastating defeats .
Although the Islamic State ’ s first generation—under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—is revered for founding the movement , it is arguably members of the generation that joined and stayed through the years of near-decimation beginning in 2007 who are crucial for understanding the group ’ s approach to survival and revival .
While Mawla provided insights into the personalities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mosul , it is his explanations of receipts and letters found in his possession that suggest how the group was raising funds and using Iraq ’ s deserts to reconstruct itself .
Over a decade later , the Islamic State is once again using Iraq ’ s deserts to regenerate , slowly rebuilding its ranks , and mounting a grinding insurgency to exhaust its enemies .
Just as these lessons from history must not be ignored , neither should openings to opportunistically exploit missteps by the Islamic State , especially when it involves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamic State ’ s leadership succession procedure is to conceal the identity of its top leader , a practice that has attracted intense criticism , to protect his security and give the group time to sculpt an image of him and his message to the world .
Publicly releasing Mawla ’ s interrogation reports throws a wrench into these plans , because it provides a range of potential Islamic State detractors—including rival jihadi groups—with messaging fodder ready-made to attack Mawla ’ s character , reputation , and authority , as well as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not enough , however , to simply release material into an information ecosystem and rely on these largely ad hoc and informal processes to take effect .
It will be necessary to engage in targeted and coordinated efforts wherever the Islamic State is active , whether led by government agencies nationally or civil society locally , using a variety of online and offline platforms to maximize the reach and impact of an “ al-Khalifah al–Mukhbir ” ( “ The Treacherous Caliph ” ) campaign .
Second , Mawla ’ s history of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be one of several interconnected themes that contribute to undermining his credibility and that of the Islamic State ’ s brand more broadly .
For example , Mawla ’ s ascension of the leadership ranks after engaging in behavior that would have led to subordinates being tortured and killed can be leveraged to highlight an elitist culture within the Islamic State movement , where there is a double standard between leaders and rank-and-file members .
When the Islamic State was losing territory across Syria and Iraq , there were reports of leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while others were expected to remain and fight to the death .
Mawla ’ s duplicity emerges as symbolic of a range of other issues .
After all , to join the Islamic State , one must pledge to the caliph and , after previous leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ’ s death last year , pledges flowed from all over the world to his successor .
But , as the Islamic State ’ s critics highlighted , those pledges were made to an unknown figure .
Now the world knows that , if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than what some have called a “ canary caliph.
” Moreover , while the Islamic State ’ s pitch to potential supporters was much easier to make five years ago when it could use its propaganda to project an image of strength and success , it is now an insurgency on the run everywhere that it claims to operate .
Undermining Mawla ’ s credibility helps to degrade an Islamic State brand in decline and intensifies the pressures at a critical moment for the movement .
Credibility and trust are important values upon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ build and project its brand .
Both its credibility as a political-military movement and the trust that is vital for its survival are largely based on its ability to convince supporters and enemies that it is not corrupt or hypocritical and that—compared to its adversaries in the West or among rival jihadis—it is reliable and consistent .
The military war against the Islamic State has devastated its ranks and resources , but the propaganda war has not been won .
Exposing its leaders ’ betrayals undermines their credibility among potential supporters and erodes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State movement has slaughtered hundreds , if not thousands , of people for supposedly betraying the group .
But today ’ s Islamic State is unlikely to execute its own leader for treachery .
Given its long history of hypocrisy and double standards , this should not come as a surprise .
With the Islamic State on the ropes but still demonstrating its ability to inspire and direct attacks from Kabul and Vienna to Cabo Delgado , Mozambique , it is time for a rejuvenated international campaign to degrade the Islamic State brand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and ruin morale within its ranks .

Recently declassified U.S. military documents suggest that the purported new caliph of the Islamic State, Amir Muhammad Said Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla, betrayed dozens of Islamic State of Iraq members to interrogators while held at the U.S.-run Camp Bucca prison in southern Iraq in 2008. The Tactical Interrogation Reports were released by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center in September, although the significance of the documents and their implications for efforts to counter Islamic State influence seem to have been lost amid a competitive U.S. election and a rampant global pandemic.
Recently declassified U.S. military documents suggest that the purported new caliph of the Islamic State, Amir Muhammad Said Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla, betrayed dozens of Islamic State of Iraq members to interrogators while held at the U.S.-run Camp Bucca prison in southern Iraq in 2008. The Tactical Interrogation Reports were released by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center in September, although the significance of the documents and their implications for efforts to counter Islamic State influence seem to have been lost amid a competitive U.S. election and a rampant global pandemic.
Mawla’s interrogation reports reveal a great deal about the man who would be caliph as well as the inner workings of the Islamic State at a critical moment in its evolution. More importantly, they provide an opportunity to degrade the Islamic State’s brand at a time when it is strategically vulnerable.
After all, the Islamic State’s leadership ranks have been devastated by targeted strikes, while the pressures of decline threaten to exacerbate tensions inside the Islamic State as well as with its jihadi rivals, such as al Qaeda. Discrediting the group’s so-called caliph by exposing him as a snitch and a hypocrite has the potential, if harnessed effectively and synchronized with broader influence efforts, to undermine not only his perceived authority but also the credibility of the movement he leads.
Of the 66 reports related to Mawla’s interrogations held by the U.S. Department of Defense, only three were released, limiting a complete analysis of Mawla—who was given the flattering but likely inaccurate nom de guerre Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Quraishi, which implies a lineage tracing back to the Prophet Mohammed—or how his relationship with interrogators evolved. What is beyond question is that he was an informant while detained by U.S. military forces in Iraq. If recent State Department and United Nations reports identifying the Islamic State’s new caliph as Mawla are accurate, that means the Islamic State is now led by a man who betrayed dozens of Islamic State members, including many senior leaders holding Sharia Council, administrative, and military positions in Mosul, going so far as to give their physical descriptions and phone numbers. He even identified these individuals and their predecessors within the organizational hierarchy.
From 2008 to 2009, counterterrorism operations in Mosul, largely led by U.S. forces, devastated the Islamic State’s leadership, and it seems Mawla identified many of them in January 2008. The CTC Sentinel, published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, which first analyzed the interrogation reports, writes that 11 of 20 individuals who featured in Mawla’s testimonies are authentic; many of them subsequently faced imprisonment or death.
Drawing on an archive of terrorist activities in Mosul since 2004, it seems that other leaders faced similar fortunes, including Muhammed Bazzuna, a “Military Amir” in Mosul, who was killed in 2008; Firas al-Luhaibi, who took over Mosul with al Qaeda and was arrested in 2008; and Muadh Abdullah, the son of a former mufti for an al Qaeda ally, Ansar al-Sunna, who was killed in 2009. For many victims of the Islamic State’s violence there must be a bitter irony to knowing that during Mawla’s sordid ascent to chief he ordered the deaths of countless people for supposed disloyalty while knowing that his own treachery had once devastated the group’s ranks.
Mawla’s testimonies also show how the Islamic State survived and rebuilt itself in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 U.S. troop surge and the so-called Sunni Awakening. This is an important historical period for the Islamic State movement because it represents the group’s historical and strategic nadir but also, in its aftermath, a crucial period of rebuilding, under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, that laid the foundations for its resurgence in 2014. Indeed the Islamic State will likely look back to this period for inspiration and a strategic blueprint to guide its current efforts to recover after devastating defeats.
Although the Islamic State’s first generation—under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—is revered for founding the movement, it is arguably members of the generation that joined and stayed through the years of near-decimation beginning in 2007 who are crucial for understanding the group’s approach to survival and revival. While Mawla provided insights into the personalities and hierarchies within the Islamic State in Mosul, it is his explanations of receipts and letters found in his possession that suggest how the group was raising funds and using Iraq’s deserts to reconstruct itself.
Over a decade later, the Islamic State is once again using Iraq’s deserts to regenerate, slowly rebuilding its ranks, and mounting a grinding insurgency to exhaust its enemies. Just as these lessons from history must not be ignored, neither should openings to opportunistically exploit missteps by the Islamic State, especially when it involves its top leaders.
Today, the Islamic State is vulnerable. Having lost all its territorial control and its first caliph, it is now mounting an insurgency across Syria and Iraq while managing its global operations. The Mawla testimonies are an opportunity for government and civil society actors to launch new campaigns designed to erode trust in the Islamic State and its ideology, harm its image, and deplete its ranks. There are certain guiding principles that should be central to any such effort.
First, the Islamic State’s leadership succession procedure is to conceal the identity of its top leader, a practice that has attracted intense criticism, to protect his security and give the group time to sculpt an image of him and his message to the world. Publicly releasing Mawla’s interrogation reports throws a wrench into these plans, because it provides a range of potential Islamic State detractors—including rival jihadi groups—with messaging fodder ready-made to attack Mawla’s character, reputation, and authority, as well as the Islamic State project more broadly.
It is not enough, however, to simply release material into an information ecosystem and rely on these largely ad hoc and informal processes to take effect. It will be necessary to engage in targeted and coordinated efforts wherever the Islamic State is active, whether led by government agencies nationally or civil society locally, using a variety of online and offline platforms to maximize the reach and impact of an “al-Khalifah al–Mukhbir” (“The Treacherous Caliph”) campaign.
Second, Mawla’s history of informing on his fellow Islamic State members should be one of several interconnected themes that contribute to undermining his credibility and that of the Islamic State’s brand more broadly. For example, Mawla’s ascension of the leadership ranks after engaging in behavior that would have led to subordinates being tortured and killed can be leveraged to highlight an elitist culture within the Islamic State movement, where there is a double standard between leaders and rank-and-file members. When the Islamic State was losing territory across Syria and Iraq, there were reports of leaders being ferried away from cities under siege while others were expected to remain and fight to the death.
Mawla’s duplicity emerges as symbolic of a range of other issues. After all, to join the Islamic State, one must pledge to the caliph and, after previous leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s death last year, pledges flowed from all over the world to his successor. But, as the Islamic State’s critics highlighted, those pledges were made to an unknown figure. Now the world knows that, if nothing else, Mawla is nothing more than what some have called a “canary caliph.” Moreover, while the Islamic State’s pitch to potential supporters was much easier to make five years ago when it could use its propaganda to project an image of strength and success, it is now an insurgency on the run everywhere that it claims to operate. Undermining Mawla’s credibility helps to degrade an Islamic State brand in decline and intensifies the pressures at a critical moment for the movement.
Credibility and trust are important values upon which the Islamic State has attempted to build and project its brand. Both its credibility as a political-military movement and the trust that is vital for its survival are largely based on its ability to convince supporters and enemies that it is not corrupt or hypocritical and that—compared to its adversaries in the West or among rival jihadis—it is reliable and consistent.
The military war against the Islamic State has devastated its ranks and resources, but the propaganda war has not been won. Exposing its leaders’ betrayals undermines their credibility among potential supporters and erodes trust within its ranks. The Islamic State movement has slaughtered hundreds, if not thousands, of people for supposedly betraying the group. But today’s Islamic State is unlikely to execute its own leader for treachery.
Given its long history of hypocrisy and double standards, this should not come as a surprise. With the Islamic State on the ropes but still demonstrating its ability to inspire and direct attacks from Kabul and Vienna to Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, it is time for a rejuvenated international campaign to degrade the Islamic State brand, expose the duplicity of its leaders, and ruin morale within its ranks.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--Getting Human Rights Right

Getting Human Rights Right

When he takes office , President-elect Joe Biden will face an extraordinary array of global challenges : the COVID-19 pandemic ; deepening economic inequality exacerbated by the coronavirus ; disproportionate influence of a handful of technology and social media companies in the public sphere ; frayed relations with world leaders and global institutions ; reduced trust in U.S. diplomacy ; rising authoritarianism ; and attacks on ethnic and religious minorities .
To be truly effective on all those fronts , Biden must focus on addressing some key domestic challenges first .
After all , the United States ’ ability to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part on its capacity to get its own house in order .
The first challenge is immigration .
President Donald Trump made immigration and attacks on immigrants a hallmark of his 2016 presidential campaign .
His rhetoric and his administration ’ s policies on building a border wall , separating and detaining families at the U.S.-Mexican border , the overall treatment of asylum-seekers , the reduction in refugees welcomed to an all-time historical low , the ban on travelers from many Muslim-majority countries , attempts to abolish Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mexicans and other nationalities , were cruel and racist .
With over 400 executive actions on immigration from the past four years to review and reverse , Biden must prioritize vulnerable asylum-seekers on the border , who suffered under policies and actions that were in violation of international and domestic law .
Revoking cruel and inhumane policies won ’ t be sufficient—Biden will need to complement that with new policies that are humane , just , and in accordance with international law .
A pro-immigrant and refugee policy is an area where the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not just framed as national security threats , but as assets .
Connected to this pivot on immigration is the need for a real “ Marshall Plan ” for Mexico and Central America .
Trump ’ s efforts in Mexico and Central America focused on cutting aid and designating the region as safe to receive asylum seekers .
The Northern Triangle—Guatemala , El Salvador , and Honduras—is plagued by entrenched corruption , poverty , violence , high rates of homicides and gang activity , and agricultural failure due to climate change .
Recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been reactive—focusing on regional security and stemming migration—but coordinated investment in education , public health , agricultural development and diversification , sustainable development , and anti-corruption initiatives can be more effective .
Most importantly , a focus on human rights , gender justice , and climate resilience are essential in ensuring that regional peace and human security .
The second area for focus should be race and reparations .
This year ’ s Black Lives Matter protests focused on police violence but addressing entrenched racism must extend far beyond police reform .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communities , reducing the militarization of the police and redirecting those resources to community development , abolishing the incarceration system that disproportionately affects Black Americans , and reparations for past harms—both slavery , and , when slavery ended , the new forms of discrimination white America found to keep Black America down , including the Jim Crow laws and beyond .
In the last few years , Georgetown University apologized to the descendants of 272 people who were enslaved by the university and sold in 1878 to pay off debts , while Wake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the school ’ s connection with slavery , saying , “ I apologize for the exploitation and use of enslaved people—both those known and unknown—who helped create and build this university through no choice of their own.
” Predecessor banks to modern institutions such as J.P. Morgan , Wells Fargo , and Citigroup had ties to slavery , often allowing enslaved people to be treated as collateral for loans and later perpetuating discriminatory practices such as redlining .
Such banks are under pressure to apologize , as well as to provide reparations .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ beyond individual institutions : It implicates the entire nation .
Today , the net worth of a typical white family is ten times greater than a typical Black family , with inheritances and intergenerational transfers of wealth accounting for much of the racial wealth gap .
Black Americans are incarcerated at more than five times the rate of whites in state prisons and at least ten times in five states .
Two out of three people currently in jail are not convicted of any crime—rather , they are in pre-trial detention—and Black Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration passes H.R .
40—legislation seeking to establish a commission to study and propose reparations—it would be an important step in a national conversation around racial reckoning and in reimagining institutions , laws , and policies in order to eradicate the racial disparities that are often woven into their fabric .
More immediate policy solutions to close the racial wealth gap such as “ baby bonds ” could help create trust accounts for newborns that could help build individual and family resilience and opportunity and enable individuals to access higher education , launch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expenses , and the like .
Meanwhile efforts to expand rules for the auto-expungement of past criminal records , such as Pennsylvania ’ s Clean Slate Law , can serve as a model to help individuals with criminal records to enter the workforce and housing market .
Biden ’ s third area for focus should be the role and power of technology in society .
Although technology is truly global in its reach , many of the major technology companies are American .
The spread of misinformation and disinformation on social media platforms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ YouTube helped fuel the rise of white nationalism in recent years .
It is only recently that Twitter has started posting warnings or clarifying messages on untrue posts , but labels like “ this tweet is disputed and might be misleading ” or “ this claim about election fraud is disputed ” are too little and too late .
And even after former Trump operative Steve Bannon called for the beheading of Anthony Fauci , the director of the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease , on his podcast , which was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Facebook staff that Bannon should not be banned from the platform .
But the reach of technology goes far beyond media manipulation and disinformation about the pandemic and election .
Between 2009 and 2019 , the Silicon Six—Facebook , Apple , Amazon , Google , and Microsoft—had a gap of $ 100 billion in the taxes the owed and the taxes they actually paid .
This “ tax gap ” has significant consequences for inequality and economic rights , and must be addressed if we wish to invest in better public health , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technology must mean policies that protect : consumers and their privacy and data ; respect for the dignity of all individuals and no room for hate speech , calls for violence , and disinformation ; and ensuring tax compliance for technology companies .
Biden ’ s ability and strategy to effect change will depend , in part , on the run-off elections in Georgia and their impact on whether Republicans retain control over the Senate .
They also depend on how quickly the nation can tackle the twin crises of the pandemic and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facing a deeply polarized nation—divisions that are being stoked by the outgoing president .
But Biden must remember that he was elected with 78 million votes , and that should be plenty of backing for him to repudiate the rhetoric and policy of the Trump administration .

When he takes office, President-elect Joe Biden will face an extraordinary array of global challenges: the COVID-19 pandemic; deepening economic inequality exacerbated by the coronavirus; disproportionate influence of a handful of technology and social media companies in the public sphere; frayed relations with world leaders and global institutions; reduced trust in U.S. diplomacy; rising authoritarianism; and attacks on ethnic and religious minorities. To be truly effective on all those fronts, Biden must focus on addressing some key domestic challenges first. After all, the United States’ ability to lead in the world will rest in part on its capacity to get its own house in order.
When he takes office, President-elect Joe Biden will face an extraordinary array of global challenges: the COVID-19 pandemic; deepening economic inequality exacerbated by the coronavirus; disproportionate influence of a handful of technology and social media companies in the public sphere; frayed relations with world leaders and global institutions; reduced trust in U.S. diplomacy; rising authoritarianism; and attacks on ethnic and religious minorities. To be truly effective on all those fronts, Biden must focus on addressing some key domestic challenges first. After all, the United States’ ability to lead in the world will rest in part on its capacity to get its own house in order.
The first challenge is immigration. President Donald Trump made immigration and attacks on immigrants a hallmark of his 2016 presidential campaign. His rhetoric and his administration’s policies on building a border wall, separating and detaining families at the U.S.-Mexican border, the overall treatment of asylum-seekers, the reduction in refugees welcomed to an all-time historical low, the ban on travelers from many Muslim-majority countries, attempts to abolish Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and countless attacks on Mexicans and other nationalities, were cruel and racist. With over 400 executive actions on immigration from the past four years to review and reverse, Biden must prioritize vulnerable asylum-seekers on the border, who suffered under policies and actions that were in violation of international and domestic law.
Revoking cruel and inhumane policies won’t be sufficient—Biden will need to complement that with new policies that are humane, just, and in accordance with international law. A pro-immigrant and refugee policy is an area where the administration should lead—whereby immigrants and refugees are not just framed as national security threats, but as assets.
Connected to this pivot on immigration is the need for a real “Marshall Plan” for Mexico and Central America. Trump’s efforts in Mexico and Central America focused on cutting aid and designating the region as safe to receive asylum seekers. The Northern Triangle—Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras—is plagued by entrenched corruption, poverty, violence, high rates of homicides and gang activity, and agricultural failure due to climate change. Recent efforts to invest in the region have been reactive—focusing on regional security and stemming migration—but coordinated investment in education, public health, agricultural development and diversification, sustainable development, and anti-corruption initiatives can be more effective. Most importantly, a focus on human rights, gender justice, and climate resilience are essential in ensuring that regional peace and human security.
The second area for focus should be race and reparations. This year’s Black Lives Matter protests focused on police violence but addressing entrenched racism must extend far beyond police reform. It must include investing in Black-led organizations and communities, reducing the militarization of the police and redirecting those resources to community development, abolishing the incarceration system that disproportionately affects Black Americans, and reparations for past harms—both slavery, and, when slavery ended, the new forms of discrimination white America found to keep Black America down, including the Jim Crow laws and beyond.
In the last few years, Georgetown University apologized to the descendants of 272 people who were enslaved by the university and sold in 1878 to pay off debts, while Wake Forest University’s president apologized for the school’s connection with slavery, saying, “I apologize for the exploitation and use of enslaved people—both those known and unknown—who helped create and build this university through no choice of their own.” Predecessor banks to modern institutions such as J.P. Morgan, Wells Fargo, and Citigroup had ties to slavery, often allowing enslaved people to be treated as collateral for loans and later perpetuating discriminatory practices such as redlining. Such banks are under pressure to apologize, as well as to provide reparations. But the issue of exploitation goes far beyond individual institutions: It implicates the entire nation.
Today, the net worth of a typical white family is ten times greater than a typical Black family, with inheritances and intergenerational transfers of wealth accounting for much of the racial wealth gap. Black Americans are incarcerated at more than five times the rate of whites in state prisons and at least ten times in five states. Two out of three people currently in jail are not convicted of any crime—rather, they are in pre-trial detention—and Black Americans are disproportionately affected.
If the Biden administration passes H.R. 40—legislation seeking to establish a commission to study and propose reparations—it would be an important step in a national conversation around racial reckoning and in reimagining institutions, laws, and policies in order to eradicate the racial disparities that are often woven into their fabric. More immediate policy solutions to close the racial wealth gap such as “baby bonds” could help create trust accounts for newborns that could help build individual and family resilience and opportunity and enable individuals to access higher education, launch a businesses, pay for unexpected medical expenses, and the like. Meanwhile efforts to expand rules for the auto-expungement of past criminal records, such as Pennsylvania’s Clean Slate Law, can serve as a model to help individuals with criminal records to enter the workforce and housing market.
Biden’s third area for focus should be the role and power of technology in society. Although technology is truly global in its reach, many of the major technology companies are American. The spread of misinformation and disinformation on social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube helped fuel the rise of white nationalism in recent years. It is only recently that Twitter has started posting warnings or clarifying messages on untrue posts, but labels like “this tweet is disputed and might be misleading” or “this claim about election fraud is disputed” are too little and too late. And even after former Trump operative Steve Bannon called for the beheading of Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease, on his podcast, which was shared on Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg told Facebook staff that Bannon should not be banned from the platform.
But the reach of technology goes far beyond media manipulation and disinformation about the pandemic and election. Between 2009 and 2019, the Silicon Six—Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft—had a gap of $100 billion in the taxes the owed and the taxes they actually paid. This “tax gap” has significant consequences for inequality and economic rights, and must be addressed if we wish to invest in better public health, education, and infrastructure. Regulation of technology must mean policies that protect: consumers and their privacy and data; respect for the dignity of all individuals and no room for hate speech, calls for violence, and disinformation; and ensuring tax compliance for technology companies.
Biden’s ability and strategy to effect change will depend, in part, on the run-off elections in Georgia and their impact on whether Republicans retain control over the Senate. They also depend on how quickly the nation can tackle the twin crises of the pandemic and a just economic recovery. He is facing a deeply polarized nation—divisions that are being stoked by the outgoing president. But Biden must remember that he was elected with 78 million votes, and that should be plenty of backing for him to repudiate the rhetoric and policy of the Trump administration.