foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--U.S. Plans to Send New Weapons to Taiwan

U.S. Plans to Send New Weapons to Taiwan Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Washington to send advanced weapons systems to Taiwan , the head of Libya ’ s U.N.-backed government is set to resign , and a close ally of former Bolivian President Evo Morales leads presidential polls .
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The United States is planning to sell a range of new weapons to Taiwan , deepening its commitment to the island nation amid deteriorating relations with Beijing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ seven major weapons systems , including mines , cruise missiles , and drones ; a huge supply of weaponry that represents a major departure from the more conservative approach taken by past administrations .
Details obtained by the Wall Street Journal said that the deal was expected to total around $ 7 billion , and would include $ 400 million worth of sophisticated drones , complete with sensors , logistics , training , and other equipment .
Embracing Taiwan .
The Trump administration has shown a greater willingness to engage with Taiwan in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House announced that it had approved another arms sale to Taiwan worth $ 180 million , and last month , U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar visited Taiwan in the highest-level meeting between officials of the two countries since Washington severed diplomatic ties in 1979 .
Chinese backlash .
China has not yet responded to the reports , but the move is sure to provoke a strong reaction in Beijing .
China has long considered Taiwan to be part of its national territory , and it strongly opposes any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deeper ties with the Taiwanese country .
It is unclear if China will take any retaliatory measures , but it has slapped sanctions on U.S. officials in the past over other instances of perceived U.S. overreach .
China may instead choose to simply flex its military muscle .
Last week , Chinese forces conducted a series of military exercises off the coast of Taiwan , which Taiwanese officials called a serious provocation .
“ The relevant combat training activities by the People ’ s Liberation Army were a necessary action aimed at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and to safeguard national sovereignty , ” a spokesman for China ’ s Taiwan Affairs Office said in a statement .
Russian weapons to Belarus ?
Embattled Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko said he asked Russian President Vladimir Putin for weapons in a meeting between the two leaders over the weekend .
Russian officials denied the claim , however ; Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Putin did not discuss weapons in his meeting with Lukashenko .
Russia ’ s involvement in the crisis unfolding in Belarus has deepened considerably in the previous few weeks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Belarus , and it recently announced that it would conduct joint military exercises with other members of the post-Soviet Collective Security Treaty Organization in the country .
Last month , Putin said he had formed a reserve police force which could be used in Belarus if needed .
Washington backs Boris .
After a meeting with U.K. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that trade talks between the two countries were heading “ for a successful conclusion , ” despite recent backlash in Washington over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The bill , which was introduced in Parliament last week , would override key parts of last year ’ s Brexit withdrawal agreement , and many observers worry that this could undermine peace and stability in Northern Ireland .
U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi warned that if London pushed through legislation that threatened peace in Northern Ireland , it could expect no trade deal with the United States .
Pompeo ’ s meeting with Raab seems to have been an attempt to assuage concerns around Pelosi ’ s remarks and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as he works to get the bill passed .
Israeli bombing in Gaza .
The Israeli Defense Forces launched a series of air raids on Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip on Wednesday after 15 rockets were fired from the area into Israel .
Hamas warned Israel that it “ will pay the price for any aggression against our people or resistance sites and the response will be direct.
” The attacks on Israel coincided with the ceremony being held in Washington for the signing of the historic normalization deals between Israel , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Palestinians from across the political spectrum have been united in their opposition to the moves .
The Palestinian Authority has called efforts to normalize ties with Israel a betrayal of the cause of Palestinian statehood , and protesters have taken to the streets in recent weeks to rally against the deals .
Libya PM to step down .
Fayez al-Sarraj , the head of Libya ’ s U.N.-backed Government of National Accord ( GNA ) , announced that he will resign his post in the near-future , though he will stay on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ form a new government .
While at the helm , Sarraj successfully defended the capital city of Tripoli from a 14-month assault by Libyan National Army chief Khalifa Haftar .
But since Haftar ’ s defeat , the GNA has been crippled by infighting as well as protests against the government ’ s mismanagement .
Sarraj ’ s announcement comes at a key moment in the ongoing peace negotiations between Libyan actors and international powers .
On Wednesday , it was reported that Russian and Turkish officials moved closer to an agreement on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Turkey and Russia are two of the principal international actors in the conflict , with each supporting opposing sides .
Back to the past in Bolivia .
An opinion poll published on Wednesday suggests that Luis Arce , the candidate representing former Bolivian President Evo Morales ’ s Movement for Socialism , is leading all other candidates for next month ’ s presidential election , a sign that Morales ’ s legacy in the country is still strong .
Arce served as the country ’ s minister of finance from 2006 to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Morales .
According to the poll , Arce ’ s support stands at 40.3 percent , distantly followed by former President Carlos Mesa and current interim President Jeanine Áñez , the former senator who took over the presidency after Morales ’ s forced resignation in November .
Maduro accused of crimes against humanity .
On Wednesday , U.N. investigators said that the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro committed widespread human rights violations .
The findings were published in a damning report on Wednesday that investigated 3,000 alleged cases of torture , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and his defense and interior ministers were aware of—and sometimes ordered—crimes against humanity committed by the forces of the regime .
More than 200 naked prisoners are on the run somewhere in the north-eastern part of Uganda after escaping jail in the town of Moroto .
The escapees , described as “ hardcore ” criminals who were jailed over offenses related to cattle theft , broke into a local armory and stripped their bright yellow uniforms before fleeing .
Three people reportedly died in a gun battle between authorities and the escaping prisoners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the run .
A search is currently underway .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Washington to send advanced weapons systems to Taiwan , the head of Libya’s U.N.-backed government is set to resign, and a close ally of former Bolivian President Evo Morales leads presidential polls.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Washington to send advanced weapons systems to Taiwan, the head of Libya’s U.N.-backed government is set to resign, and a close ally of former Bolivian President Evo Morales leads presidential polls.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S. Sending Weapons to Taiwan as Tensions With China Remain High
The United States is planning to sell a range of new weapons to Taiwan, deepening its commitment to the island nation amid deteriorating relations with Beijing. Sources told Reuters that the sales include seven major weapons systems, including mines, cruise missiles, and drones; a huge supply of weaponry that represents a major departure from the more conservative approach taken by past administrations.
Details obtained by the Wall Street Journal said that the deal was expected to total around $7 billion, and would include $400 million worth of sophisticated drones, complete with sensors, logistics, training, and other equipment.
Embracing Taiwan. The Trump administration has shown a greater willingness to engage with Taiwan in recent months. In May, the White House announced that it had approved another arms sale to Taiwan worth $180 million, and last month, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar visited Taiwan in the highest-level meeting between officials of the two countries since Washington severed diplomatic ties in 1979.
Chinese backlash. China has not yet responded to the reports, but the move is sure to provoke a strong reaction in Beijing. China has long considered Taiwan to be part of its national territory, and it strongly opposes any overtures by the United States to develop deeper ties with the Taiwanese country. It is unclear if China will take any retaliatory measures, but it has slapped sanctions on U.S. officials in the past over other instances of perceived U.S. overreach.
China may instead choose to simply flex its military muscle. Last week, Chinese forces conducted a series of military exercises off the coast of Taiwan, which Taiwanese officials called a serious provocation. “The relevant combat training activities by the People’s Liberation Army were a necessary action aimed at the current security situation in the Taiwan Strait and to safeguard national sovereignty,” a spokesman for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said in a statement.
What We’re Following Today
Russian weapons to Belarus? Embattled Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko said he asked Russian President Vladimir Putin for weapons in a meeting between the two leaders over the weekend. Russian officials denied the claim, however; Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Putin did not discuss weapons in his meeting with Lukashenko.
Russia’s involvement in the crisis unfolding in Belarus has deepened considerably in the previous few weeks. It is currently undertaking military drills in Belarus, and it recently announced that it would conduct joint military exercises with other members of the post-Soviet Collective Security Treaty Organization in the country. Last month, Putin said he had formed a reserve police force which could be used in Belarus if needed.
Washington backs Boris. After a meeting with U.K. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that trade talks between the two countries were heading “for a successful conclusion,” despite recent backlash in Washington over the British government’s internal market bill. The bill, which was introduced in Parliament last week, would override key parts of last year’s Brexit withdrawal agreement, and many observers worry that this could undermine peace and stability in Northern Ireland.
U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi warned that if London pushed through legislation that threatened peace in Northern Ireland, it could expect no trade deal with the United States. Pompeo’s meeting with Raab seems to have been an attempt to assuage concerns around Pelosi’s remarks and give Prime Minister Boris Johnson a boost as he works to get the bill passed.
Israeli bombing in Gaza. The Israeli Defense Forces launched a series of air raids on Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip on Wednesday after 15 rockets were fired from the area into Israel. Hamas warned Israel that it “will pay the price for any aggression against our people or resistance sites and the response will be direct.”
The attacks on Israel coincided with the ceremony being held in Washington for the signing of the historic normalization deals between Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Palestinians from across the political spectrum have been united in their opposition to the moves. The Palestinian Authority has called efforts to normalize ties with Israel a betrayal of the cause of Palestinian statehood, and protesters have taken to the streets in recent weeks to rally against the deals.
Libya PM to step down. Fayez al-Sarraj, the head of Libya’s U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), announced that he will resign his post in the near-future, though he will stay on in a caretaker capacity during negotiations to form a new government. While at the helm, Sarraj successfully defended the capital city of Tripoli from a 14-month assault by Libyan National Army chief Khalifa Haftar. But since Haftar’s defeat, the GNA has been crippled by infighting as well as protests against the government’s mismanagement.
Sarraj’s announcement comes at a key moment in the ongoing peace negotiations between Libyan actors and international powers. On Wednesday, it was reported that Russian and Turkish officials moved closer to an agreement on a long-term ceasefire and a political deal. Turkey and Russia are two of the principal international actors in the conflict, with each supporting opposing sides.
Keep an Eye On
Back to the past in Bolivia. An opinion poll published on Wednesday suggests that Luis Arce, the candidate representing former Bolivian President Evo Morales’s Movement for Socialism, is leading all other candidates for next month’s presidential election, a sign that Morales’s legacy in the country is still strong. Arce served as the country’s minister of finance from 2006 to 2017, and was a close ally of Morales. According to the poll, Arce’s support stands at 40.3 percent, distantly followed by former President Carlos Mesa and current interim President Jeanine Áñez, the former senator who took over the presidency after Morales’s forced resignation in November.
Maduro accused of crimes against humanity. On Wednesday, U.N. investigators said that the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro committed widespread human rights violations. The findings were published in a damning report on Wednesday that investigated 3,000 alleged cases of torture, and concluded that leading officials including Maduro and his defense and interior ministers were aware of—and sometimes ordered—crimes against humanity committed by the forces of the regime.
Odds and Ends
More than 200 naked prisoners are on the run somewhere in the north-eastern part of Uganda after escaping jail in the town of Moroto. The escapees, described as “hardcore” criminals who were jailed over offenses related to cattle theft, broke into a local armory and stripped their bright yellow uniforms before fleeing. Three people reportedly died in a gun battle between authorities and the escaping prisoners, but the remaining escapees are still on the run. A search is currently underway.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--Sanctions Are Driving Iran and Venezuela Into Each Other’s Arms

Sanctions Are Driving Iran and Venezuela Into Each Other ’ s Arms Over the past few years , Venezuelans have seen thousands of shops shuttered , with business after business failing under the weight of a massive economic depression and crippling economic sanctions .
So it was somewhat of an event when a huge new supermarket opened in eastern Caracas in July .
Yet what was even more unusual was that shoppers who flocked to the store had a hard time understanding what they were buying : many of the products ’ labels were in Farsi , not Spanish .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ episode in the warming of the relationship between Venezuela and Iran—two countries subject to stringent U.S. economic sanctions .
U.S. policymakers were quick to denounce the event , with acting Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak describing the store as an example of “ an alliance of pariah states.
” Over the past five months , Iran has sent gasoline tankers , parts , and experts to fix an ailing refinery , and a ship full of food to help the crisis-ridden South American nation .
Foreign-policy experts often classify Venezuela and Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secondary sanctions , which deter other countries from trading with them for fear of being punished by Washington .
Over the past five months , Iran has sent gasoline tankers , parts , and experts to fix an ailing refinery , and a ship full of food to help the crisis-ridden South American nation .
Sanctions on Venezuela and Iran have been effective in cutting export revenues , contributing to one of the largest economic contractions in recorded Latin American history , and to a loss of more than two-thirds of the Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deficits in Iran—but it is also driving the two countries into each other ’ s arms .
Iran is not doing as badly as Venezuela , but its deep recession and accelerating inflation have fed concerns that Iran is on the verge of a Venezuela-style economic collapse , where hyperinflation stokes unrest and the delegitimization of the government .
Yet the simple fact that Iran , which has faced a broad campaign of sanctions for more than a decade , has recently come to the aid of Venezuela , which has been under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years , suggests a remarkable degree of economic resilience .
When comparing the two economies , the most salient question is not whether Iran will become like Venezuela , but rather whether Venezuela will become more like Iran .
In the year leading up to March 2020 , Iran generated $ 41.3 billion of export revenue from nonoil goods .
Around half of this total was from manufactured goods .
In the same period , Iran ’ s oil exports totaled just $ 9 billion , marking a historic moment in its modern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ industrial sector , which employs around one-third of the labor force , earned double the export revenue generated by the country ’ s oil sector .
Remarkably , Iran managed to grow nonoil exports during a period in which it was subject to U.S. secondary sanctions for all but two years .
One of the major consequences of sanctions pressure , the steep devaluation of the rial , actually served to make Iranian exports more competitive abroad .
The development of the Iranian private sector in the first decade of the millennium—encompassing improvements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as the capture of local market share—led to a larger number of manufacturing firms eyeing export potential .
From March 2019 to March 2020 , China was the top destination for nonoil exports , with Iraq , the United Arab Emirates , Turkey , and Afghanistan rounding out the top five destinations .
Iran still faces significant economic challenges because of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s “ maximum pressure ” campaign .
The knock-on effects of expensive and unreliable imports on Iran ’ s manufacturing sector not only short-circuit the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act as a driver for inflation .
This vulnerability can be seen in the recent depreciation of the rial , where pandemic-related disruptions to trade pushed the rial lower .
But Iranian policymakers are already indicating that their response will be to double down on what Alizadeh and Hakimian have described as a long-standing feature of Iranian economic policy under pressure : the “ search [ for ] beneficial opportunities for engagement with the international economy.
” Iran ’ s recent outreach to Venezuela , with the new spectacle of Iranian exports for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the latest example of this opportunistic approach to international engagement .
Yet , sanctions on Venezuela have been ineffective in generating the regime change U.S. officials want .
Twenty months after the decision by the United States and a large number of European and Latin American nations to recognize Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela , Maduro is , if anything , even more deeply entrenched in power .
Calling on Venezuelans to think of sanctions as the necessary pain that must be undergone to get rid of the Maduro regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better in Florida than it does in Caracas .
A recent unpublished survey by Venezuelan pollster Datanálisis found that 65.2 percent of Venezuelans are against oil sanctions .
That may be one of the reasons why over the past 18 months opposition leader Guaidó ’ s approval rating has fallen from 61 to 28 percent , according to the same survey .
Meanwhile , the dearth in foreign exchange revenue has forced the Maduro government to correct course in some areas .
Iran ’ s push to grow nonoil export revenue , along @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sector , is a model to emulate .
For example , in September 2018 , one year after the United States imposed financial sanctions and after a drop of around 800,000 barrels per day in oil production , the country overhauled its foreign exchange system , allowing the currency to become fully convertible for the first time in 15 years .
At first , these currency reforms were met with skepticism ; it wasn ’ t the first time that Maduro had tinkered with exchange rate flexibility .
Yet over time it became @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stunning reversal in one of the key policy levers used by the Venezuelan regime .
One of the standard measures of economic distortions in highly regulated economies is the black market premium , which is defined as the difference between the price at which dollars are sold on the black market and their legal price .
In Venezuela , this premium captures the size of the profits that would accrue to persons sufficiently well connected to gain access to scarce dollars sold by the government at the lower official exchange rate .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 350,000 percent average in the 12 months before the reforms , averaged just 4 percent last month according to calculations based on foreign exchange and central bank data , and it is not unusual these days for it to be negative .
Just as with the partial liberalization in Iran , the end of the system of exchange controls in Venezuela had major macroeconomic implications .
First , it implied the end of substantial rents that accrued to those who were able to gain access to preferential dollars .
It also ended a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including joint venture partners in the oil sector , who had been previously been forced to sell dollars at the overvalued official rate .
Additionally , it put an end to the government ’ s attempts to enforce strict price controls on retailers , who previously were required to value their imported inputs at the official rate .
The rigid system of government-set prices in almost all sectors which had been in place since 2011 was replaced in 2018 by a system of “ accorded prices ” set in bilateral negotiations with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Venezuelan think tank Cedice , the government carried out only about 1,000 government audits of privately owned stores in the first seven months of 2019 , in contrast to an average of 7,700 per year between 2017 and 2018 .
By 2020 , accorded prices were denominated in foreign currency and were largely in line with private-sector requests .
The Maduro government in fact went further by not only tolerating but outright embracing the use of U.S. dollars for domestic transactions .
When opposition candidate Henri Falcón promised to dollarize the Venezuelan economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election , Maduro reacted by accusing his adversary of wanting “ to sell Venezuela out to imperialism.
” But by November 2019 , Maduro had completely changed tack , saying that he saw “ nothing wrong with it.
” In an echo of Iran ’ s November 2019 move to reduce long-standing fuel subsidies , Maduro put an end to the decades-old practice of selling gasoline at a near-zero price .
In a new scheme unveiled in May , the government will now ration access to subsidized gasoline yet allow buyers to purchase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international prices .
The retail sale of nonsubsidized gasoline will be carried out by privately owned stations .
Notably , Maduro explained that the need to sell gasoline at market prices had to do with the fact that the country had to pay in cash for the gasoline it was purchasing from Iran .
It will be long before Venezuela can think of private-sector investment as leading a role in the economy ’ s recovery .
But there is another way in which Venezuela has adjusted to the collapse of its oil industry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Over the past five years , more than 5 million Venezuelans—or around one-sixth of the population—are estimated to have left the country .
Remittances have now become one of the main sources of foreign currency .
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic , income from remittances has continued to flow into the country , allowing Venezuela to forgo further import substitution .
Imports actually rose 3 percent year-on-year in the first four months of the year based on data from 31 trading partners , despite a complete collapse in oil exports .
Venezuela ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and it is hard to disentangle how much of it is caused by mismanagement and how much by sanctions .
But what is clear is that both the government and the economy more generally have developed their own coping mechanisms to deal with a much more restrictive external environment—evidence that steps toward economic development can take place in periods of severe economic contraction .
For Venezuelan policymakers , Iran ’ s push to grow nonoil export revenue , along with its increased reliance on the private sector , is a model to emulate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the premise that the inevitable consequence of raising pressure beyond a certain point will be to force the sanctioned regime to abandon power , or at the very least change its conduct .
U.S. policymakers , while pandering to diaspora movements , are inclined to see isolation as the only sensible goal of sanctions policy .
Yet as many observers have pointed out , this approach begs the question of what to do if the regime in question survives the pressure and becomes more resilient .
A more balanced and realistic approach to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ understanding that positive inducements can play an important role in creating the incentives for economic and political reforms , particularly given the ways in which sanctioned countries continue to seek returns from foreign trade .
Countries such as Iran and Venezuela , which can demonstrate resilience in the face of short-term economic coercion , are likely to be responsive to medium- and long-term incentives given their fundamental orientation toward engagement with the global economy .
In this way , the very strategies that sanctioned countries adopt to defy sanctions and isolation can become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic and political engagement in the future .

Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Francisco Rodríguez

Over the past few years, Venezuelans have seen thousands of shops shuttered, with business after business failing under the weight of a massive economic depression and crippling economic sanctions. So it was somewhat of an event when a huge new supermarket opened in eastern Caracas in July. Yet what was even more unusual was that shoppers who flocked to the store had a hard time understanding what they were buying: many of the products’ labels were in Farsi, not Spanish.
Over the past few years, Venezuelans have seen thousands of shops shuttered, with business after business failing under the weight of a massive economic depression and crippling economic sanctions. So it was somewhat of an event when a huge new supermarket opened in eastern Caracas in July. Yet what was even more unusual was that shoppers who flocked to the store had a hard time understanding what they were buying: many of the products’ labels were in Farsi, not Spanish.
The supermarket opening was only the latest episode in the warming of the relationship between Venezuela and Iran—two countries subject to stringent U.S. economic sanctions. U.S. policymakers were quick to denounce the event, with acting Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak describing the store as an example of “an alliance of pariah states.” Over the past five months, Iran has sent gasoline tankers, parts, and experts to fix an ailing refinery, and a ship full of food to help the crisis-ridden South American nation.
[Lea este artículo en español]
Foreign-policy experts often classify Venezuela and Iran similarly—as pariah countries under pressure from U.S. secondary sanctions, which deter other countries from trading with them for fear of being punished by Washington.
Over the past five months, Iran has sent gasoline tankers, parts, and experts to fix an ailing refinery, and a ship full of food to help the crisis-ridden South American nation.
Sanctions on Venezuela and Iran have been effective in cutting export revenues, contributing to one of the largest economic contractions in recorded Latin American history, and to a loss of more than two-thirds of the Iranian rial’s value and high fiscal deficits in Iran—but it is also driving the two countries into each other’s arms.
Iran is not doing as badly as Venezuela, but its deep recession and accelerating inflation have fed concerns that Iran is on the verge of a Venezuela-style economic collapse, where hyperinflation stokes unrest and the delegitimization of the government.
Yet the simple fact that Iran, which has faced a broad campaign of sanctions for more than a decade, has recently come to the aid of Venezuela, which has been under concerted sanctions pressure for only a few years, suggests a remarkable degree of economic resilience. When comparing the two economies, the most salient question is not whether Iran will become like Venezuela, but rather whether Venezuela will become more like Iran.
Venezuelans shop at Megasis.
Since the international community first levied broad economic sanctions against Iran in the mid-2000s, Iranian policymakers, particularly those with a conservative outlook, have repeatedly asserted that the country would respond by adopting a “resistance economy” which would aim to reduce dependency on imports and Western investment. These statements gave rise to the belief that Iran would embrace economic isolation as well. But as Parvin Alizadeh and Hassan Hakimian argued in 2013, characterizations of Iran’s “attitude and posture towards the global economy as wholly distrustful, apprehensive, or critical would be a simplistic stance.” While it may be anti-imperialist, it isn’t isolated.
In the year leading up to March 2020, Iran generated $41.3 billion of export revenue from nonoil goods. Around half of this total was from manufactured goods. In the same period, Iran’s oil exports totaled just $9 billion, marking a historic moment in its modern economic history where the country’s industrial sector, which employs around one-third of the labor force, earned double the export revenue generated by the country’s oil sector.
Remarkably, Iran managed to grow nonoil exports during a period in which it was subject to U.S. secondary sanctions for all but two years. One of the major consequences of sanctions pressure, the steep devaluation of the rial, actually served to make Iranian exports more competitive abroad.
The development of the Iranian private sector in the first decade of the millennium—encompassing improvements in the quality and efficiency of manufacturing as well as the capture of local market share—led to a larger number of manufacturing firms eyeing export potential. From March 2019 to March 2020, China was the top destination for nonoil exports, with Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Afghanistan rounding out the top five destinations.
Iran still faces significant economic challenges because of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign. The knock-on effects of expensive and unreliable imports on Iran’s manufacturing sector not only short-circuit the push for nonoil exports, but also act as a driver for inflation. This vulnerability can be seen in the recent depreciation of the rial, where pandemic-related disruptions to trade pushed the rial lower.
But Iranian policymakers are already indicating that their response will be to double down on what Alizadeh and Hakimian have described as a long-standing feature of Iranian economic policy under pressure: the “search [for] beneficial opportunities for engagement with the international economy.” Iran’s recent outreach to Venezuela, with the new spectacle of Iranian exports for sale on supermarket shelves in Caracas, is the latest example of this opportunistic approach to international engagement.
A Venezuelan oil worker waves an Iranian flag.
Venezuela’s economy has been hit hard by U.S. financial and economic sanctions imposed over the past several years—a blow that followed the damage done by the administrations of former President Hugo Chávez and President Nicolás Maduro, which both mismanaged one of the largest resource booms experienced by any country in the region.
Yet, sanctions on Venezuela have been ineffective in generating the regime change U.S. officials want. Twenty months after the decision by the United States and a large number of European and Latin American nations to recognize Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela, Maduro is, if anything, even more deeply entrenched in power.
Calling on Venezuelans to think of sanctions as the necessary pain that must be undergone to get rid of the Maduro regime is a message that plays a lot better in Florida than it does in Caracas. A recent unpublished survey by Venezuelan pollster Datanálisis found that 65.2 percent of Venezuelans are against oil sanctions. That may be one of the reasons why over the past 18 months opposition leader Guaidó’s approval rating has fallen from 61 to 28 percent, according to the same survey. Meanwhile, the dearth in foreign exchange revenue has forced the Maduro government to correct course in some areas.
Iran’s push to grow nonoil export revenue, along with its increased reliance on the private sector, is a model to emulate.
For example, in September 2018, one year after the United States imposed financial sanctions and after a drop of around 800,000 barrels per day in oil production, the country overhauled its foreign exchange system, allowing the currency to become fully convertible for the first time in 15 years.
At first, these currency reforms were met with skepticism; it wasn’t the first time that Maduro had tinkered with exchange rate flexibility. Yet over time it became clear that the new system implied a stunning reversal in one of the key policy levers used by the Venezuelan regime. One of the standard measures of economic distortions in highly regulated economies is the black market premium, which is defined as the difference between the price at which dollars are sold on the black market and their legal price.
In Venezuela, this premium captures the size of the profits that would accrue to persons sufficiently well connected to gain access to scarce dollars sold by the government at the lower official exchange rate. The measure, which had reached a surreal 350,000 percent average in the 12 months before the reforms, averaged just 4 percent last month according to calculations based on foreign exchange and central bank data, and it is not unusual these days for it to be negative.
Just as with the partial liberalization in Iran, the end of the system of exchange controls in Venezuela had major macroeconomic implications. First, it implied the end of substantial rents that accrued to those who were able to gain access to preferential dollars. It also ended a huge implicit tax on foreign companies, including joint venture partners in the oil sector, who had been previously been forced to sell dollars at the overvalued official rate. Additionally, it put an end to the government’s attempts to enforce strict price controls on retailers, who previously were required to value their imported inputs at the official rate.
The rigid system of government-set prices in almost all sectors which had been in place since 2011 was replaced in 2018 by a system of “accorded prices” set in bilateral negotiations with the private sector. According to the liberal Venezuelan think tank Cedice, the government carried out only about 1,000 government audits of privately owned stores in the first seven months of 2019, in contrast to an average of 7,700 per year between 2017 and 2018. By 2020, accorded prices were denominated in foreign currency and were largely in line with private-sector requests.
The Maduro government in fact went further by not only tolerating but outright embracing the use of U.S. dollars for domestic transactions. When opposition candidate Henri Falcón promised to dollarize the Venezuelan economy if he won the May 2018 presidential election, Maduro reacted by accusing his adversary of wanting “to sell Venezuela out to imperialism.” But by November 2019, Maduro had completely changed tack, saying that he saw “nothing wrong with it.”
In an echo of Iran’s November 2019 move to reduce long-standing fuel subsidies, Maduro put an end to the decades-old practice of selling gasoline at a near-zero price. In a new scheme unveiled in May, the government will now ration access to subsidized gasoline yet allow buyers to purchase as much gasoline as they want at international prices. The retail sale of nonsubsidized gasoline will be carried out by privately owned stations. Notably, Maduro explained that the need to sell gasoline at market prices had to do with the fact that the country had to pay in cash for the gasoline it was purchasing from Iran.
It will be long before Venezuela can think of private-sector investment as leading a role in the economy’s recovery. But there is another way in which Venezuela has adjusted to the collapse of its oil industry which also makes it much more resilient. Over the past five years, more than 5 million Venezuelans—or around one-sixth of the population—are estimated to have left the country. Remittances have now become one of the main sources of foreign currency. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, income from remittances has continued to flow into the country, allowing Venezuela to forgo further import substitution. Imports actually rose 3 percent year-on-year in the first four months of the year based on data from 31 trading partners, despite a complete collapse in oil exports.
Venezuela’s economic collapse has many causes, and it is hard to disentangle how much of it is caused by mismanagement and how much by sanctions. But what is clear is that both the government and the economy more generally have developed their own coping mechanisms to deal with a much more restrictive external environment—evidence that steps toward economic development can take place in periods of severe economic contraction. For Venezuelan policymakers, Iran’s push to grow nonoil export revenue, along with its increased reliance on the private sector, is a model to emulate.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif welcomes Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza.
It is not yet clear whether Venezuela will fully embrace Iranian-style resilience to sanctions by eschewing the populist notions of isolation and import substitution for the pragmatic pursuit of new sources of foreign exchange revenue. But the possibility raises important questions about the efficacy of the Trump administration’s sanctions policy on both countries.
Proponents of maximum pressure act from the premise that the inevitable consequence of raising pressure beyond a certain point will be to force the sanctioned regime to abandon power, or at the very least change its conduct. U.S. policymakers, while pandering to diaspora movements, are inclined to see isolation as the only sensible goal of sanctions policy. Yet as many observers have pointed out, this approach begs the question of what to do if the regime in question survives the pressure and becomes more resilient.
A more balanced and realistic approach to dealing with rogue regimes would start from understanding that positive inducements can play an important role in creating the incentives for economic and political reforms, particularly given the ways in which sanctioned countries continue to seek returns from foreign trade.
Countries such as Iran and Venezuela, which can demonstrate resilience in the face of short-term economic coercion, are likely to be responsive to medium- and long-term incentives given their fundamental orientation toward engagement with the global economy. In this way, the very strategies that sanctioned countries adopt to defy sanctions and isolation can become the basis for more robust and successful economic and political engagement in the future.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--TikTok’s Sale to Oracle Doesn’t Fix Anything

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : U.S. firm Oracle acquires TikTok under a dubious partnership arrangement , Chinese authorities crack down in Inner Mongolia after protests , and the U.S. Department of Justice indicts five Chinese hackers .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
After weeks of speculation that Microsoft would acquire TikTok , the Chinese-owned app will instead be acquired by the corporate technology company Oracle .
The deal , which has strong backing from the Trump administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ To begin with , the firm will remain majority-owned by Chinese parent company ByteDance , with a “ partnership ” with Oracle .
The arrangement does not resolve any of the issues surrounding Chinese influence efforts , although it may clear up some of the worries about U.S. data reaching China .
Serious concerns remain among the U.S. security community : One U.S. intelligence official told me that the deal “ invalidates everything we ’ ve been working on.
” Oracle ’ s CTO , Larry Ellison , is also a fundraiser and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ TikTok has become a platform for anti-Trump commentary , especially by young Americans , the question is whether Chinese censorship and algorithmic bias will now be supplemented by that of a new U.S. partner .
Oracle won ’ t be able to examine the source code for the app , a protection Beijing insisted on before it would approve the deal , meaning questions about aggressive data collection and censorship of particular terms will go unanswered .
A move that once seemed like a serious effort at blocking political influence by a hostile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shady deal between one of the president ’ s allies and Beijing .
That makes the efforts by China hawks inside the administration—reportedly working to get the deal blocked—to present other sanctions as a serious challenge to China look far less credible .
The Oracle-ByteDance deal is yet another example of how Trump ’ s fundamentally self-serving vision of the world makes him a dangerous ally .
Inner Mongolia crackdown .
It was almost inevitable : Demonstrations against the implementation of compulsory Chinese-language study for students in Inner Mongolia have resulted in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move .
Like some other minority languages in China , Mongolian was once a standard mode of instruction but is now under threat .
Authorities already issued a list of wanted protesters and arrested more than 130 .
The latest announcement states that parents whose children do not return to school by Thursday will be blocked from receiving bank loans for five years , and their children will be expelled and forbidden to take the critical national university entrance exam .
Such threats aren ’ t new , but their systematic implementation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across multiple platforms , is a relatively recent development .
Cambodian sanctions .
In a move targeting both China and long-standing Cambodian autocrat Hun Sen , the United States has placed sanctions on a Chinese construction firm in Cambodia , the Union Development Group .
The United States alleges that the company , with the aid of the Cambodian military , has carried out extensive human rights violations against locals .
Cambodia , once relatively open to U.S. influence , has swung heavily toward China in recent years as Hun Sen has consolidated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ installation of Chinese military bases in Cambodia seems possible in the near future .
Xi ’ s new book .
In exciting news for fans of his work , another book of collected speeches by Chinese President Xi Jinping has been published—this one focused on responding to disasters and emergencies .
Some of the speeches , dating back several years , are notable for their rhetoric demonizing the United States , which Xi sees as the chief culprit behind the “ ideological warfare ” against China .
There is also strong rhetoric against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ eating the party ’ s food and smashing the party ’ s pot.
” Hacker indictments .
The U.S. Department of Justice has issued another set of indictments against Chinese hackers , this time focusing on five individuals said to have carried out a sweeping set of attacks on private companies .
The hacks , allegedly carried out by a Chengdu firm , appear to have targeted a mixture of commercial intelligence and the information of Chinese dissidents .
Like many security firms working in China , the firm boasts of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Meanwhile in Australia , a database assembled by the private Chinese firm Zhenhua has drawn attention by including a list of key individuals overseas .
But the story seems overblown .
The information compiled has been scraped from public sites such as Facebook ; Western firms sell this kind of data themselves ; and the database did not come , as initially claimed , from leaked information by dissidents but from a publicly available leak .
As the data breach expert Jeremy Kirk pointed out , “ The company wasn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very good at securing its own data.
” Xinjiang ban .
The United States , following up on earlier moves targeting the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps , has imposed new restrictions on cotton , tomatoes , and other goods from the region , where forced Uighur labor is being used on a large scale .
The U.S. government may further extend the limits after legal review , according to a U.S. spokesperson .
The outcry against the atrocities in Xinjiang is also starting to take a PR toll on companies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a supplier accused of using forced labor .
Disney fail .
Disney ’ s live-action Mulan has been panned by both the public and the party in China , with press coverage limited by officials after the film became a target in the West for shooting in Xinjiang and pandering to Han nationalist narratives .
The $ 200 million film brought in just $ 23 million on its opening weekend in China , despite being the only major release— paling in comparison to homegrown blockbusters such as the war epic The 800 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is getting harsh letters from lawmakers—a particular problem since Mickey Mouse ’ s initial copyright runs out in 2024 .
Disney has already launched a massive lobbying effort to get another Copyright Term Extension Act passed , but with surprisingly little success so far .
( Losing friends on the Hill is a serious issue . )
Cherishing Men from Afar : Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 , by James L. Hevia As the United States and China clash diplomatically and economically , return to James L. Hevia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meeting between China and the United Kingdom : the disastrous mission by Lord Macartney in 1793 .
The trip is often cited as an example of both European and Chinese arrogance .
Hevia ’ s study gives a more nuanced and complicated portrait of two sides with utterly different visions of the political world .
Macartney ’ s goals , soundly rejected by the Qianlong Emperor , would be achieved through British military might a few decades later in the Opium Wars .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome @ @ @ @ @ @ @ You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’s China Brief. The highlights this week: U.S. firm Oracle acquires TikTok under a dubious partnership arrangement, Chinese authorities crack down in Inner Mongolia after protests, and the U.S. Department of Justice indicts five Chinese hackers .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: U.S. firm Oracle acquires TikTok under a dubious partnership arrangement, Chinese authorities crack down in Inner Mongolia after protests, and the U.S. Department of Justice indicts five Chinese hackers.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Oracle’s TikTok Deal Raises Serious Questions
After weeks of speculation that Microsoft would acquire TikTok, the Chinese-owned app will instead be acquired by the corporate technology company Oracle. The deal, which has strong backing from the Trump administration, is dubious on several levels.
To begin with, the firm will remain majority-owned by Chinese parent company ByteDance, with a “partnership” with Oracle. The arrangement does not resolve any of the issues surrounding Chinese influence efforts, although it may clear up some of the worries about U.S. data reaching China. Serious concerns remain among the U.S. security community: One U.S. intelligence official told me that the deal “invalidates everything we’ve been working on.”
Oracle’s CTO, Larry Ellison, is also a fundraiser and supporter of President Donald Trump. As TikTok has become a platform for anti-Trump commentary, especially by young Americans, the question is whether Chinese censorship and algorithmic bias will now be supplemented by that of a new U.S. partner. Oracle won’t be able to examine the source code for the app, a protection Beijing insisted on before it would approve the deal, meaning questions about aggressive data collection and censorship of particular terms will go unanswered.
A move that once seemed like a serious effort at blocking political influence by a hostile foreign power has thus degenerated into a shady deal between one of the president’s allies and Beijing. That makes the efforts by China hawks inside the administration—reportedly working to get the deal blocked—to present other sanctions as a serious challenge to China look far less credible.
The Oracle-ByteDance deal is yet another example of how Trump’s fundamentally self-serving vision of the world makes him a dangerous ally.
What We’re Following
Inner Mongolia crackdown. It was almost inevitable: Demonstrations against the implementation of compulsory Chinese-language study for students in Inner Mongolia have resulted in a sweeping crackdown on parents who protested the move. Like some other minority languages in China, Mongolian was once a standard mode of instruction but is now under threat.
Authorities already issued a list of wanted protesters and arrested more than 130. The latest announcement states that parents whose children do not return to school by Thursday will be blocked from receiving bank loans for five years, and their children will be expelled and forbidden to take the critical national university entrance exam. Such threats aren’t new, but their systematic implementation, backed by coordinated data on dissidents shared across multiple platforms, is a relatively recent development.
Cambodian sanctions. In a move targeting both China and long-standing Cambodian autocrat Hun Sen, the United States has placed sanctions on a Chinese construction firm in Cambodia, the Union Development Group. The United States alleges that the company, with the aid of the Cambodian military, has carried out extensive human rights violations against locals.
Cambodia, once relatively open to U.S. influence, has swung heavily toward China in recent years as Hun Sen has consolidated power and destroyed the opposition. The installation of Chinese military bases in Cambodia seems possible in the near future.
Xi’s new book. In exciting news for fans of his work, another book of collected speeches by Chinese President Xi Jinping has been published—this one focused on responding to disasters and emergencies. Some of the speeches, dating back several years, are notable for their rhetoric demonizing the United States, which Xi sees as the chief culprit behind the “ideological warfare” against China.
There is also strong rhetoric against ideological traitors within the Chinese Communist Party—“eating the party’s food and smashing the party’s pot.”
Tech and Business
Hacker indictments. The U.S. Department of Justice has issued another set of indictments against Chinese hackers, this time focusing on five individuals said to have carried out a sweeping set of attacks on private companies. The hacks, allegedly carried out by a Chengdu firm, appear to have targeted a mixture of commercial intelligence and the information of Chinese dissidents. Like many security firms working in China, the firm boasts of its patriotism and connections to the Chinese military.
Meanwhile in Australia, a database assembled by the private Chinese firm Zhenhua has drawn attention by including a list of key individuals overseas. But the story seems overblown. The information compiled has been scraped from public sites such as Facebook; Western firms sell this kind of data themselves; and the database did not come, as initially claimed, from leaked information by dissidents but from a publicly available leak.
As the data breach expert Jeremy Kirk pointed out, “The company wasn’t trying to hide. Neither was it very good at securing its own data.”
Xinjiang ban. The United States, following up on earlier moves targeting the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, has imposed new restrictions on cotton, tomatoes, and other goods from the region, where forced Uighur labor is being used on a large scale. The U.S. government may further extend the limits after legal review, according to a U.S. spokesperson. The outcry against the atrocities in Xinjiang is also starting to take a PR toll on companies, with H&M cutting ties to a supplier accused of using forced labor.
Disney fail. Disney’s live-action Mulan has been panned by both the public and the party in China, with press coverage limited by officials after the film became a target in the West for shooting in Xinjiang and pandering to Han nationalist narratives. The $200 million film brought in just $23 million on its opening weekend in China, despite being the only major release— paling in comparison to homegrown blockbusters such as the war epic The 800.
Back in the United States, Disney is getting harsh letters from lawmakers—a particular problem since Mickey Mouse’s initial copyright runs out in 2024. Disney has already launched a massive lobbying effort to get another Copyright Term Extension Act passed, but with surprisingly little success so far. (Losing friends on the Hill is a serious issue.)
What We’re Reading
Cherishing Men From Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793, James L. Hevia, Duke University Press, 1995.
Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793, by James L. Hevia
As the United States and China clash diplomatically and economically, return to James L. Hevia’s 1995 study of the first major meeting between China and the United Kingdom: the disastrous mission by Lord Macartney in 1793. The trip is often cited as an example of both European and Chinese arrogance. Hevia’s study gives a more nuanced and complicated portrait of two sides with utterly different visions of the political world.
Macartney’s goals, soundly rejected by the Qianlong Emperor, would be achieved through British military might a few decades later in the Opium Wars.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--The Only People Panicking Are the People in Charge

The Only People Panicking Are the People in Charge Over the past week , several Republicans have defended the idea of avoiding panic as a justification for lying to the public in crisis situations , following the revelations in Bob Woodward ’ s book that Trump was well aware of the dangers of the coronavirus at the same time he was downplaying it .
The problem , as the disaster science expert Samantha Montano noted on Twitter , is that mass panic should be the least of our worries in a disaster—because it doesn ’ t happen .
That may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve all seen screaming hordes of people fleeing disaster areas : It ’ s a staple trope of movies and TV shows .
But there are more than 50 years of disaster studies demonstrating that people don ’ t do that in real life .
As early as 1954 , E.L. Quarantelli , who later founded the Disaster Research Center , had enough data to suggest that panic after a disaster was “ uncommon.
” Studies of disasters—from hurricanes to snowstorms isolating people in highway rest stops to the collapse of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public does not panic , does not run screaming , and typically reacts in a reasonably rational way .
In fact , studies show that people tend to react in highly social ways after a catastrophe ; the first assistance to victims almost invariably comes from nonprofessionals , and affected people tend to come together and organize to improve their situation .
My own anecdotal experience as a disaster responder supports this conclusion .
I have a clear memory of a late-night motorcycle ride in from the airport in Padang , West Sumatra @ @ @ @ @ @ @ earthquake had collapsed buildings in the city , and seeing snaky lines of people on foot waiting to buy gas .
Uh oh , I thought , but I needn ’ t have worried : People waited calmly in line , and there were no major incidents .
Or take another late night , in northeastern Japan , when a strong aftershock to the 2011 quake that triggered a tsunami rousted us from our hotel rooms and knocked out grid electricity to the whole region .
I expected chaos ; instead , I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in place of nonfunctioning traffic lights and polite hotel staff warning us to be quick as we cleaned out our tumbled rooms , just in case .
So why does this myth about public panic persist ?
Part of it , of course , is the aforementioned movies and TV shows , which in their uniformity create a kind of vicious cycle of what I call narrative disorder .
When we see the behavior often enough , we start to believe it—even knowing that movies aren ’ t real—to the point that we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the point of even seeing it where it isn ’ t happening .
Since we accept that that is what happens , more scriptwriters and filmmakers , who typically don ’ t know more about disasters than the general public , put it into their movies , and we become more and more convinced that it is true .
While this is understandable for people who aren ’ t in charge of setting policy for disasters or leading responses , it ’ s a sorry excuse for elected officials who should have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , disaster studies have found a more insidious reason that leaders cling to such ideas .
While it is the well-evidenced conclusion that the masses do not panic in disasters , the literature does point to another pattern : Elites , who have the most to lose in the case of disruption , do .
Lee Clarke and Caron Chess , two researchers at Rutgers University who are usually credited with coining the phrase “ elite panic , ” argue with persuasive examples that elites fear panic , cause panic , and often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( Clarke has created a set of presentation slides about social behavior in disasters ; the final slide , titled “ Modeling official behavior , ” gives us the evocative bullet points : “ Ignorance , ” “ Arrogance , ” “ Hubris , ” and “ Officials can cause ‘ panic.
’ ” ) Kathleen Tierney of the University of Colorado looked at elite panic in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina , such as when then-Louisiana Gov .
Kathleen Blanco first called off the emergency response and then threatened shoot-to-kill orders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which as later reporting showed was highly exaggerated .
Similarly , police from a neighboring parish blocked evacuees from New Orleans from entering , firing shotguns over their heads , because of their fears of the “ criminal element ” based on those same exaggerated reports of looting and mayhem .
The impacts of this , as Tierney notes , include the direct damage to people who were frightened or unable to scavenge for food .
Tierney asks : “ How much resident-to-resident helping behavior was prevented or suppressed because people were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighbors out of fear of being killed or arrested ?
” Clarke and Chess write : “ Planners and policy makers sometimes act as if the human response to threatening conditions is more dangerous than the threatening conditions themselves.
” That false claim becomes a way for elites to maintain control and protect their own interests .
Typically shielded from the immediate impacts of a disaster , elites tend to be much more worried about disruption to the status quo and the loss of political capital and power .
That they use a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do this adds insult to injury .
It ’ s also a dereliction of duty , because while lies and exaggerations about the potential for panic worsen a crisis response , working with the public to deal with the disaster tends to improve it .
For example , rational behaviors like evacuating in the face of a hurricane or stocking up on essential goods can cause problems when a lot of people try to do them at the same time .
But planning and communications by leaders can mitigate that .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Katrina was the counterflow approach to evacuation , which made highways unidirectional and asked the public to respect staggered time frames to allow the municipalities closer to landfall to escape before the larger cities clogged the roads .
Disaster studies also show that , given enough time and ability to communicate , communities will come together even without official leadership ( as in this wonderful study of a group of strangers stranded at a highway rest stop in 1958 ) .
Faced with a dearth of official information and planning during the COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States set up mutual aid systems to shop for older people or check in on people living alone .
Apartment buildings and shops took it on themselves to adopt policies based on the information they could access , taking steps like mask requirements and curbside pickup in order to mitigate the danger , rather than panicking .
In a 2002 article about managing panic in the case of bioterrorism , Thomas Glass and Monica Schoch-Spana of Johns Hopkins University write that a primary guideline should be to “ treat the public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to an epidemic , ” because everything we know about disasters tells us that that is exactly what the public can be .
When officials lie to the public about an epidemic , they are not only putting people in danger—they are also giving up one of their best strategies for an effective response .

Over the past week, several Republicans have defended the idea of avoiding panic as a justification for lying to the public in crisis situations, following the revelations in Bob Woodward’s book that Trump was well aware of the dangers of the coronavirus at the same time he was downplaying it. The problem, as the disaster science expert Samantha Montano noted on Twitter, is that mass panic should be the least of our worries in a disaster—because it doesn’t happen.
Over the past week, several Republicans have defended the idea of avoiding panic as a justification for lying to the public in crisis situations, following the revelations in Bob Woodward’s book that Trump was well aware of the dangers of the coronavirus at the same time he was downplaying it. The problem, as the disaster science expert Samantha Montano noted on Twitter, is that mass panic should be the least of our worries in a disaster—because it doesn’t happen.
That may seem counterintuitive. After all, we’ve all seen screaming hordes of people fleeing disaster areas: It’s a staple trope of movies and TV shows. But there are more than 50 years of disaster studies demonstrating that people don’t do that in real life. As early as 1954, E.L. Quarantelli, who later founded the Disaster Research Center, had enough data to suggest that panic after a disaster was “uncommon.” Studies of disasters—from hurricanes to snowstorms isolating people in highway rest stops to the collapse of the World Trade Center on 9/11—show that the public does not panic, does not run screaming, and typically reacts in a reasonably rational way. In fact, studies show that people tend to react in highly social ways after a catastrophe; the first assistance to victims almost invariably comes from nonprofessionals, and affected people tend to come together and organize to improve their situation.
My own anecdotal experience as a disaster responder supports this conclusion. I have a clear memory of a late-night motorcycle ride in from the airport in Padang, West Sumatra, some 24 hours after a strong earthquake had collapsed buildings in the city, and seeing snaky lines of people on foot waiting to buy gas. Uh oh, I thought, but I needn’t have worried: People waited calmly in line, and there were no major incidents.
Or take another late night, in northeastern Japan, when a strong aftershock to the 2011 quake that triggered a tsunami rousted us from our hotel rooms and knocked out grid electricity to the whole region. I expected chaos; instead, I found people in reflective gear directing traffic in place of nonfunctioning traffic lights and polite hotel staff warning us to be quick as we cleaned out our tumbled rooms, just in case.
So why does this myth about public panic persist? Part of it, of course, is the aforementioned movies and TV shows, which in their uniformity create a kind of vicious cycle of what I call narrative disorder. When we see the behavior often enough, we start to believe it—even knowing that movies aren’t real—to the point that we may expect that kind of behavior and to the point of even seeing it where it isn’t happening. Since we accept that that is what happens, more scriptwriters and filmmakers, who typically don’t know more about disasters than the general public, put it into their movies, and we become more and more convinced that it is true.
While this is understandable for people who aren’t in charge of setting policy for disasters or leading responses, it’s a sorry excuse for elected officials who should have access to emergency management experts. However, disaster studies have found a more insidious reason that leaders cling to such ideas. While it is the well-evidenced conclusion that the masses do not panic in disasters, the literature does point to another pattern: Elites, who have the most to lose in the case of disruption, do.
Lee Clarke and Caron Chess, two researchers at Rutgers University who are usually credited with coining the phrase “elite panic,” argue with persuasive examples that elites fear panic, cause panic, and often panic themselves, reacting disproportionately to threats. (Clarke has created a set of presentation slides about social behavior in disasters; the final slide, titled “Modeling official behavior,” gives us the evocative bullet points: “Ignorance,” “Arrogance,” “Hubris,” and “Officials can cause ‘panic.’”)
Kathleen Tierney of the University of Colorado looked at elite panic in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, such as when then-Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco first called off the emergency response and then threatened shoot-to-kill orders in response to the problem of looting, which as later reporting showed was highly exaggerated. Similarly, police from a neighboring parish blocked evacuees from New Orleans from entering, firing shotguns over their heads, because of their fears of the “criminal element” based on those same exaggerated reports of looting and mayhem. The impacts of this, as Tierney notes, include the direct damage to people who were frightened or unable to scavenge for food. Tierney asks: “How much resident-to-resident helping behavior was prevented or suppressed because people were afraid to venture out to help their neighbors out of fear of being killed or arrested?”
Clarke and Chess write: “Planners and policy makers sometimes act as if the human response to threatening conditions is more dangerous than the threatening conditions themselves.” That false claim becomes a way for elites to maintain control and protect their own interests. Typically shielded from the immediate impacts of a disaster, elites tend to be much more worried about disruption to the status quo and the loss of political capital and power. That they use a long-discredited fallacy about the public behaving irrationally to do this adds insult to injury.
It’s also a dereliction of duty, because while lies and exaggerations about the potential for panic worsen a crisis response, working with the public to deal with the disaster tends to improve it. For example, rational behaviors like evacuating in the face of a hurricane or stocking up on essential goods can cause problems when a lot of people try to do them at the same time. But planning and communications by leaders can mitigate that. One of the largely unsung successes of Hurricane Katrina was the counterflow approach to evacuation, which made highways unidirectional and asked the public to respect staggered time frames to allow the municipalities closer to landfall to escape before the larger cities clogged the roads.
Disaster studies also show that, given enough time and ability to communicate, communities will come together even without official leadership (as in this wonderful study of a group of strangers stranded at a highway rest stop in 1958). Faced with a dearth of official information and planning during the COVID-19 pandemic, communities in many places in the United States set up mutual aid systems to shop for older people or check in on people living alone. Apartment buildings and shops took it on themselves to adopt policies based on the information they could access, taking steps like mask requirements and curbside pickup in order to mitigate the danger, rather than panicking.
In a 2002 article about managing panic in the case of bioterrorism, Thomas Glass and Monica Schoch-Spana of Johns Hopkins University write that a primary guideline should be to “treat the public as a capable ally in the response to an epidemic,” because everything we know about disasters tells us that that is exactly what the public can be. When officials lie to the public about an epidemic, they are not only putting people in danger—they are also giving up one of their best strategies for an effective response.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--Netanyahu Can’t Catch a Break

Netanyahu Can’t Catch a Break

On Aug. 23 , when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that he would support a bill whose purpose was to prevent the government from falling the next day , Israelis breathed a sigh of relief .
For weeks , his coalition government had been teetering on the brink of collapse as a legal mandate to pass the state budget by Aug. 24 drew closer , with no clarity on what kind of budget the government would support .
Just three months after the latest Netanyahu government had been formed , it looked like Israelis would be trudging off to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less than two years .
That immediate crisis passed , but what Netanyahu offered was only a temporary reprieve .
He extended the budget deadline by 120 days and made clear by his remarks that he was buying time , not making peace with his coalition partners .
He called for coalition unity but in the same breath attacked his chief partner , Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz ’ s Blue and White party .
In fact , he hadn ’ t even taken the trouble to tell Gantz that he had decided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadline ; like everyone else , Gantz learned of it watching the television broadcast .
And so the threat of new elections still looms .
The performance was typical of Netanyahu since the government took office in May .
Dubbed a “ national unity ” coalition of Netanyahu ’ s Likud , Blue and White , and two ultra-Orthodox parties , coalition negotiations were based on mutual distrust and the final agreement was structured on the assumption that each side would try to undercut the other .
Designed to ensure stability , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The coalition didn ’ t have to turn out that way .
After three inconclusive elections , Israelis wanted a unity government , and there was no overwhelming political reason why they couldn ’ t get one .
Likud and Blue and White are not that far apart ideologically , especially on core issues such as defense and the economy .
And there was no fundamental disagreement about coronavirus policy .
Just as the new government was coming into office , it looked as though Israel had defeated COVID-19 .
With the number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government lifted its most restrictive measures , and Netanyahu himself urged Israelis to go out and have fun .
That turned out to be a huge mistake .
Within two weeks , the number of new cases was climbing quickly , and nothing officials have done since has succeeded in reversing the trend .
Of late , there have been days when Israel has had the highest rate of new COVID-19 cases per capita in the world .
After much dithering , the government realized it had no choice but to order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into effect this Friday for three weeks .
A resurgent pandemic could have been a catalyst for coalition unity .
A successful effort would have been a big political victory for all the coalition partners , and especially for the prime minister .
But Netanyahu almost single-handedly prevented the creation of a united front .
He repeatedly blocked efforts to give Gantz ’ s defense ministry more responsibility for crisis management or to appoint a coronavirus czar .
With elections in mind , he rejected a plan to impose a lockdown on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is highest .
Meanwhile , the prime minister is in a bidding war with his finance minister over who can look more generous with handouts to the public .
The result has been that the government has been spending very heavily , but not very effectively , to keep the economy afloat .
If that weren ’ t bad enough , Netanyahu has chosen to keep Israel on edge with the threat of new elections almost since the first day his government was formed .
The most common explanation for his behavior is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the premiership to Gantz come November 2021 , as is stipulated under the coalition agreement .
He is seemingly prepared to do whatever it takes , including dragging the country into a fourth election and even a fifth one , to ensure that he remains in office .
To be sure , those elections would also likely end inconclusively .
None of the polls show Netanyahu coming close to forming the religious-right government he aspires to .
In the worst case , he might find himself in the opposition .
His hated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Naftali Bennett , has been climbing up the ranks by capitalizing on the government ’ s coronavirus failures to present himself as the manager of the moment who can accomplish what Netanyahu ’ s bumbling government has failed to do .
But Netanyahu seems convinced the polls are either wrong or that voters will realize before election day that he is the only one capable of leading Israel .
One attempt to demonstrate as much was last month ’ s much-heralded normalization agreement with the United Arab Emirates .
It may have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Netanyahu ’ s famed diplomatic skills and vision , but it didn ’ t .
The UAE is not among Israel ’ s mortal enemies .
It is so remote in the Israeli mind that news of normalization was accompanied by articles describing the country in a way that resembled an entry from the World Book Encyclopedia .
More importantly , the agreement managed to alienate the far-right by trading normalization of relations for a halt to West Bank annexation .
Netanyahu also apparently consented to the UAE ’ s buying state-of-the-art @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , thereby harming Israel ’ s military edge .
Netanyahu has claimed that annexation is only “ suspended ” and that he never agreed to the sale of the F-35s .
Whether he is being truthful or not , the blame is all his .
As is his style , Netanyahu kept Gantz and Blue and White Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi in the dark about the UAE talks until the last minute .
If they had been consulted , the result would not have necessarily been better—but , because he didn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s .
Although many Israelis are fearful of admitting it , Netanyahu is past his political prime and is coasting on his reputation as the grandmaster of national security , diplomacy , and economics .
He is increasingly politically isolated .
The list of allies and associates who have turned on him and left the Likud party in frustration is long , including a few like Bennett and Moshe Yaalon , Netanyahu ’ s former defense minister , who have turned into bitter enemies .
These days , Netanyahu seems to rely on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , such as Public Security Minister Amir Ohana .
Just as the coronavirus has threatened Israel with its greatest health and economic crisis ever , the country is under the thumb of a leader who can only stay in power by creating chaos .

On Aug. 23, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that he would support a bill whose purpose was to prevent the government from falling the next day, Israelis breathed a sigh of relief. For weeks, his coalition government had been teetering on the brink of collapse as a legal mandate to pass the state budget by Aug. 24 drew closer, with no clarity on what kind of budget the government would support. Just three months after the latest Netanyahu government had been formed, it looked like Israelis would be trudging off to the polls for the fourth time in less than two years.
On Aug. 23, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that he would support a bill whose purpose was to prevent the government from falling the next day, Israelis breathed a sigh of relief. For weeks, his coalition government had been teetering on the brink of collapse as a legal mandate to pass the state budget by Aug. 24 drew closer, with no clarity on what kind of budget the government would support. Just three months after the latest Netanyahu government had been formed, it looked like Israelis would be trudging off to the polls for the fourth time in less than two years.
That immediate crisis passed, but what Netanyahu offered was only a temporary reprieve. He extended the budget deadline by 120 days and made clear by his remarks that he was buying time, not making peace with his coalition partners. He called for coalition unity but in the same breath attacked his chief partner, Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz’s Blue and White party. In fact, he hadn’t even taken the trouble to tell Gantz that he had decided to support the legislation to change the deadline; like everyone else, Gantz learned of it watching the television broadcast. And so the threat of new elections still looms.
The performance was typical of Netanyahu since the government took office in May. Dubbed a “national unity” coalition of Netanyahu’s Likud, Blue and White, and two ultra-Orthodox parties, coalition negotiations were based on mutual distrust and the final agreement was structured on the assumption that each side would try to undercut the other. Designed to ensure stability, it seems to have done the opposite.
The coalition didn’t have to turn out that way. After three inconclusive elections, Israelis wanted a unity government, and there was no overwhelming political reason why they couldn’t get one. Likud and Blue and White are not that far apart ideologically, especially on core issues such as defense and the economy. And there was no fundamental disagreement about coronavirus policy.
Just as the new government was coming into office, it looked as though Israel had defeated COVID-19. With the number of new daily cases near zero, the government lifted its most restrictive measures, and Netanyahu himself urged Israelis to go out and have fun. That turned out to be a huge mistake. Within two weeks, the number of new cases was climbing quickly, and nothing officials have done since has succeeded in reversing the trend. Of late, there have been days when Israel has had the highest rate of new COVID-19 cases per capita in the world. After much dithering, the government realized it had no choice but to order a new general lockdown, which goes into effect this Friday for three weeks.
A resurgent pandemic could have been a catalyst for coalition unity. A successful effort would have been a big political victory for all the coalition partners, and especially for the prime minister. But Netanyahu almost single-handedly prevented the creation of a united front. He repeatedly blocked efforts to give Gantz’s defense ministry more responsibility for crisis management or to appoint a coronavirus czar. With elections in mind, he rejected a plan to impose a lockdown on the mostly ultra-Orthodox cities where the infection rate is highest. Meanwhile, the prime minister is in a bidding war with his finance minister over who can look more generous with handouts to the public. The result has been that the government has been spending very heavily, but not very effectively, to keep the economy afloat.
If that weren’t bad enough, Netanyahu has chosen to keep Israel on edge with the threat of new elections almost since the first day his government was formed. The most common explanation for his behavior is that he has no intention of turning over the premiership to Gantz come November 2021, as is stipulated under the coalition agreement. He is seemingly prepared to do whatever it takes, including dragging the country into a fourth election and even a fifth one, to ensure that he remains in office.
To be sure, those elections would also likely end inconclusively. None of the polls show Netanyahu coming close to forming the religious-right government he aspires to. In the worst case, he might find himself in the opposition. His hated archrival for the votes of the right, Naftali Bennett, has been climbing up the ranks by capitalizing on the government’s coronavirus failures to present himself as the manager of the moment who can accomplish what Netanyahu’s bumbling government has failed to do. But Netanyahu seems convinced the polls are either wrong or that voters will realize before election day that he is the only one capable of leading Israel.
One attempt to demonstrate as much was last month’s much-heralded normalization agreement with the United Arab Emirates. It may have been meant to serve as a reminder of Netanyahu’s famed diplomatic skills and vision, but it didn’t. The UAE is not among Israel’s mortal enemies. It is so remote in the Israeli mind that news of normalization was accompanied by articles describing the country in a way that resembled an entry from the World Book Encyclopedia. More importantly, the agreement managed to alienate the far-right by trading normalization of relations for a halt to West Bank annexation. Netanyahu also apparently consented to the UAE’s buying state-of-the-art F-35 fighter jets from the United States, thereby harming Israel’s military edge.
Netanyahu has claimed that annexation is only “suspended” and that he never agreed to the sale of the F-35s. Whether he is being truthful or not, the blame is all his. As is his style, Netanyahu kept Gantz and Blue and White Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi in the dark about the UAE talks until the last minute. If they had been consulted, the result would not have necessarily been better—but, because he didn’t, the blame is only Netanyahu’s.
Although many Israelis are fearful of admitting it, Netanyahu is past his political prime and is coasting on his reputation as the grandmaster of national security, diplomacy, and economics. He is increasingly politically isolated. The list of allies and associates who have turned on him and left the Likud party in frustration is long, including a few like Bennett and Moshe Yaalon, Netanyahu’s former defense minister, who have turned into bitter enemies. These days, Netanyahu seems to rely on his family and a few unquestioning loyalists, such as Public Security Minister Amir Ohana. Just as the coronavirus has threatened Israel with its greatest health and economic crisis ever, the country is under the thumb of a leader who can only stay in power by creating chaos.