foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--India and China Step Back From the Brink—for Now

India and China Step Back From the Brink—for Now Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief , the weekly newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity .
Today : India and China try to ease tensions after a deadly skirmish , Nepal approves a new map including land controlled by India , and coronavirus cases tick ominously higher .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every weekday , please sign up here .
Top diplomats in New Delhi and Beijing are signaling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadly skirmish between Indian and Chinese soldiers in the Ladakh border region on Monday .
The two countries ’ foreign ministers held a call on Wednesday and reached an agreement that “ neither side would take any action to escalate matters and instead ensure peace and tranquility.
” The question is whether that message trickles down clearly enough to the restive troops stationed on either side of the disputed border .
Gory details have emerged of the high-altitude clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers .
According to one image circulated on social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ studded with nails to beat their Indian counterparts .
Both sides refrained from using firearms , in part because of a 1996 agreement prohibiting the use of guns in the disputed area .
Remarkably , as Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar pointed out , India ’ s troops were carrying arms—they just didn ’ t use them , despite the nature of the fighting .
India has confirmed the deaths of 20 soldiers , the first combat fatalities on the disputed border since 1975 , but China has remained silent .
As FP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brief , this may be because “ Beijing wants to keep its options open—and it doesn ’ t want to be trapped by public opinion calling for escalation.
” No such luck for India , where the media is calling for a stronger response , as James and I explained earlier this week .
Asymmetric powers ?
It is conventional wisdom , as this newsletter has pointed out , that China has become a bigger global power than India .
While the two countries had similarly sized economies in 1975—when they last marked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ five times that of India .
Beijing also spends four times as much as New Delhi on defense .
But does that really mean the countries are asymmetrically matched on a hypothetical battlefield ?
According to a March report from Harvard University ’ s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs , India has 270 fighter jets compared to China ’ s 157 , which along with the positioning of their respective air bases gives New Delhi the advantage of a “ stronger regional air position.
” And China ’ s “ combat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ estimated ” because of an overdependence on ground commands , the report adds .
There may be a similar dynamic regarding ground troops .
Both countries have between 200,000 and 250,000 soldiers in the border regions , but India ’ s troops have more direct experience with war—albeit mostly in small skirmishes .
China ’ s army has not experienced combat since 1979 , when it fought with Vietnam .
Soldiers who saw active duty back then are now in their 60s .
So the two countries may be more evenly matched than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some source of comfort if it leads to deterrence , because it is up to New Delhi and Beijing to de-escalate on their own .
It ’ s difficult to imagine the United States or the United Nations mediating between the two nuclear powers .
Meanwhile , New Delhi and Beijing are encircling each other .
India has grown its ties with the Quad—a loose military alliance with the United States , Japan , and Australia—while China has poured resources into Pakistan , Sri Lanka , and Nepal , building important new friendships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the trade impact .
India is planning to raise import duties on about 300 products from China , according to government documents seen by Reuters .
The plan , under review since April , will affect imports worth as much as $ 10 billion .
Trade between the two countries amounted to $ 88 billion last year .
Economics may be the next frontier of tensions between the two countries—and New Delhi will find willing participants among its citizens , given growing nationalism .
Coronavirus cases are rising across South Asia , where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recorded 12,881 new infections on Thursday .
It has also seen a sharp rise in the number of deaths in recent days , with Mumbai blaming accounting “ discrepancies ” for a sudden revision to its numbers .
Meanwhile in Nepal , hundreds of people gathered in Kathmandu to protest against the government ’ s pandemic response .
The police arrested 10 people , including seven foreigners .
As shown below , India is still behind Russia , Brazil , and the United States in terms of total coronavirus cases , but it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Pakistan and Bangladesh are not far from breaking into the top 10 .
Bangladeshi officials recently reported a 25 percent year-on-year decline in remittances from citizens working abroad .
The World Bank expects a similar decline for the full year .
That brings me to my question this week : What percentage of Bangladesh ’ s GDP comes from remittances ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Nepal ’ s new map .
As if border clashes with China were not enough , India now has to contend with Nepal , whose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that includes land controlled by India .
The dispute came to the fore last month after India opened a new road along its border with Tibet .
Nepal says about 12 miles of the road passes through its territory , an assessment India disagrees with .
Beijing likely has an indirect role in the matter : When he visited in October 2019 , Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president to go to Nepal in two decades .
Afghan peace talks .
The so-called intra-Afghan dialogue—the proposed peace talks between Afghanistan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two sides agreed on Doha , Qatar , as the venue for talks .
If the negotiations go ahead , it will be the first official meeting between the leaders of the two sides in years .
But violence continues to stalk Afghanistan .
On Friday , a blast at a Kabul mosque killed four people .
No group has claimed responsibility .
Pakistan ’ s budget .
The coronavirus pandemic has cost the Pakistani economy $ 300 billion in losses , according to the country ’ s Minister for Industries and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its annual budget last Friday , the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan presented a rosy outlook , predicting the economy would expand by 2.1 percent in the next fiscal year .
The World Bank projects Pakistan ’ s economy will contract .
Jio ’ s $ 1.5 billion cash infusion .
Now it ’ s Saudi Arabia ’ s turn to get in on the action .
The country ’ s Public Investment Fund bought a $ 1.5 billion stake in India ’ s Jio Platforms , the digital services business run @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reliance Industries .
The Saudi fund joins Gulf entities such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Mubadala , as well as U.S. private equity firms and Facebook , in investing in India ’ s digital future .
Jio has raised $ 15 billion since the start of the pandemic , cushioning a blow to its traditional business in energy .
According to the World Economic Forum , about 10 million Bangladeshis living abroad sent nearly $ 18 billion home in 2019 , often in amounts ranging between $ 300 and $ 600 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in these remittances—because of pandemic-related income losses—will have a significant impact on families that rely on the deposits .
And it will likely have an adverse secondary effect on overall economic activity .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
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Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the weekly newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity. Today: India and China try to ease tensions after a deadly skirmish, Nepal approves a new map including land controlled by India, and coronavirus cases tick ominously higher.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the weekly newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity. Today: India and China try to ease tensions after a deadly skirmish, Nepal approves a new map including land controlled by India, and coronavirus cases tick ominously higher.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
A Deadly Battle at 14,000 Feet
Top diplomats in New Delhi and Beijing are signaling a desire to calm tensions after a deadly skirmish between Indian and Chinese soldiers in the Ladakh border region on Monday. The two countries’ foreign ministers held a call on Wednesday and reached an agreement that “neither side would take any action to escalate matters and instead ensure peace and tranquility.”
The question is whether that message trickles down clearly enough to the restive troops stationed on either side of the disputed border.
Gory details have emerged of the high-altitude clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers. According to one image circulated on social media, Chinese forces allegedly used iron rods studded with nails to beat their Indian counterparts. Both sides refrained from using firearms, in part because of a 1996 agreement prohibiting the use of guns in the disputed area. Remarkably, as Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar pointed out, India’s troops were carrying arms—they just didn’t use them, despite the nature of the fighting.
India has confirmed the deaths of 20 soldiers, the first combat fatalities on the disputed border since 1975, but China has remained silent. As FP’s James Palmer writes in China Brief, this may be because “Beijing wants to keep its options open—and it doesn’t want to be trapped by public opinion calling for escalation.” No such luck for India, where the media is calling for a stronger response, as James and I explained earlier this week.
Asymmetric powers? It is conventional wisdom, as this newsletter has pointed out, that China has become a bigger global power than India. While the two countries had similarly sized economies in 1975—when they last marked combat deaths—today China’s GDP is five times that of India. Beijing also spends four times as much as New Delhi on defense. But does that really mean the countries are asymmetrically matched on a hypothetical battlefield?
According to a March report from Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, India has 270 fighter jets compared to China’s 157, which along with the positioning of their respective air bases gives New Delhi the advantage of a “stronger regional air position.” And China’s “combat proficiency may be significantly weaker than often estimated” because of an overdependence on ground commands, the report adds.
There may be a similar dynamic regarding ground troops. Both countries have between 200,000 and 250,000 soldiers in the border regions, but India’s troops have more direct experience with war—albeit mostly in small skirmishes. China’s army has not experienced combat since 1979, when it fought with Vietnam. Soldiers who saw active duty back then are now in their 60s.
So the two countries may be more evenly matched than is commonly believed. That might be some source of comfort if it leads to deterrence, because it is up to New Delhi and Beijing to de-escalate on their own. It’s difficult to imagine the United States or the United Nations mediating between the two nuclear powers.
Meanwhile, New Delhi and Beijing are encircling each other. India has grown its ties with the Quad—a loose military alliance with the United States, Japan, and Australia—while China has poured resources into Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, building important new friendships on the subcontinent.
Watch out for the trade impact. India is planning to raise import duties on about 300 products from China, according to government documents seen by Reuters. The plan, under review since April, will affect imports worth as much as $10 billion. Trade between the two countries amounted to $88 billion last year. Economics may be the next frontier of tensions between the two countries—and New Delhi will find willing participants among its citizens, given growing nationalism.
Coronavirus Rising
Coronavirus cases are rising across South Asia, where lockdowns have largely been lifted. India recorded 12,881 new infections on Thursday. It has also seen a sharp rise in the number of deaths in recent days, with Mumbai blaming accounting “discrepancies” for a sudden revision to its numbers. Meanwhile in Nepal, hundreds of people gathered in Kathmandu to protest against the government’s pandemic response. The police arrested 10 people, including seven foreigners.
As shown below, India is still behind Russia, Brazil, and the United States in terms of total coronavirus cases, but it will likely rise higher over the summer. Pakistan and Bangladesh are not far from breaking into the top 10.
Question of the Week
Bangladeshi officials recently reported a 25 percent year-on-year decline in remittances from citizens working abroad. The World Bank expects a similar decline for the full year.
That brings me to my question this week: What percentage of Bangladesh’s GDP comes from remittances?
A) 2 percent
B) 7 percent
C) 12 percent
D) 25 percent
Scroll down for the answer.
Keep an Eye On
Nepal’s new map. As if border clashes with China were not enough, India now has to contend with Nepal, whose parliament approved a new map on Thursday that includes land controlled by India. The dispute came to the fore last month after India opened a new road along its border with Tibet. Nepal says about 12 miles of the road passes through its territory, an assessment India disagrees with.
Beijing likely has an indirect role in the matter: When he visited in October 2019, Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president to go to Nepal in two decades.
Afghan peace talks. The so-called intra-Afghan dialogue—the proposed peace talks between Afghanistan’s government and the Taliban—may begin soon after the two sides agreed on Doha, Qatar, as the venue for talks. If the negotiations go ahead, it will be the first official meeting between the leaders of the two sides in years. But violence continues to stalk Afghanistan. On Friday, a blast at a Kabul mosque killed four people. No group has claimed responsibility.
South Asia, Inc.
Pakistan’s budget. The coronavirus pandemic has cost the Pakistani economy $300 billion in losses, according to the country’s Minister for Industries and Production. But at the presentation of its annual budget last Friday, the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan presented a rosy outlook, predicting the economy would expand by 2.1 percent in the next fiscal year. The World Bank projects Pakistan’s economy will contract.
Jio’s $1.5 billion cash infusion. Now it’s Saudi Arabia’s turn to get in on the action. The country’s Public Investment Fund bought a $1.5 billion stake in India’s Jio Platforms, the digital services business run by the billionaire Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Industries. The Saudi fund joins Gulf entities such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Mubadala, as well as U.S. private equity firms and Facebook, in investing in India’s digital future.
Jio has raised $15 billion since the start of the pandemic, cushioning a blow to its traditional business in energy.
And the Answer Is…
B) 7 percent.
According to the World Economic Forum, about 10 million Bangladeshis living abroad sent nearly $18 billion home in 2019, often in amounts ranging between $300 and $600 a month. A 25 percent decline in these remittances—because of pandemic-related income losses—will have a significant impact on families that rely on the deposits. And it will likely have an adverse secondary effect on overall economic activity.
That’s it for this week.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--America’s Politicized Military Is a Recipe for Disaster

There is simply no precedent in modern U.S. history for so many prominent retired generals and admirals—including former secretary of defense and retired general James Mattis , three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , former service chiefs and combat commanders , and many others—to publicly criticize the judgment of a sitting president .
The only incident that comes remotely close is the so-called revolt of the generals in 2006 , when a handful of retired military leaders spoke out against then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ’ s handling of the Iraq War .
This time , the dam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump threatened to use active-duty military to exert “ overwhelming force ” to “ dominate ” U.S. cities , and when the nation ’ s top military officer , Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley , walked with Trump in his combat uniform to a photo-op in front of St. John ’ s Episcopal Church through an area that had just been violently cleared of demonstrators .
On June 11 , Milley issued a remarkable apology , admitting his presence “ created a perception of the military involved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remarkable apology , admitting his presence “ created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.
” As remarkable as it was , Milley ’ s apology does not solve the problem of a U.S. military that has been politicized like never before in modern U.S. history .
In recent weeks , it has been drawn deeply into both sides of a domestic conflict surrounding racism , police brutality , and the use of force to quell domestic protests .
As stark divisions over these issues remain and protests continue , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military even deeper into what are quintessentially domestic political issues .
As protests continue and the presidential campaign heats up , this crisis in civilian-military relations therefore has the potential to turn into a full-blown constitutional crisis , in which the U.S. military either transgresses the legal limits of its role or disobeys civilian leaders .
The use of active-duty troops on U.S. soil remains a real possibility , as does violence against U.S. citizens by members of the National Guard or active troops .
This critical juncture has been a long time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well-deserved , according to many scholars studying civilian-military relations ) to place all the blame for the current situation on Trump , for whom this was not the first violation of U.S. civilian-military norms .
However , the problems in the civilian-military relationship have been developing for many decades .
Collapsing faith in U.S. political institutions , growing polarization , and increased threats of extremist violence have combined with rising public respect for and confidence in the military to set the stage for the crisis we face today .
At the end of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republicans held the military in low esteem .
But under Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan , bigger budgets and better recruiting rebuilt the military and its brand .
After the decisive U.S. victory in the 1991 Gulf War , Americans ’ trust in their military soared : In 1990 , 33 percent of Americans expressed “ a great deal ” of confidence in the military , compared to 61 percent saying the same in 1991—about where the number remains today .
Americans trust their military far more than the three branches of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s stellar reputation gave its leaders political power .
Colin Powell became the most powerful and revered general since World War II .
Norman Schwarzkopf , Wesley Clark , David Petraeus , Mattis , and others became national celebrities as cable news networks sought out retired generals as frequent commentators .
Confrontations between retired and active military brass became front-page news , helping force compromises on policies such as humanitarian interventions and “ don ’ t ask , don ’ t tell.
” Step by step , these military celebrities took on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ step , these military celebrities took on an active role in U.S. politics .
It became common for presidential candidates to try to bolster their national security credentials by seeking high-profile endorsements from retired generals and admirals—as Bill Clinton did when he convinced Reagan ’ s top military advisor , Bill Crowe , to endorse him .
Candidates have done so in every campaign since then .
During the 2012 campaign , the lists of retired generals endorsing presidential candidates of both parties reached into the hundreds of names .
The 2016 race @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former military leaders engaged in partisan attacks , with retired Marine Gen. John Allen criticizing Trump at the Democratic National Convention and retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn leading calls of “ lock her up ” against Hillary Clinton .
The increasingly political role of the military hasn ’ t been limited to elections .
Politicians opposed to White House policies began to call on top generals to resign in protest .
In 2014 , Republicans called on Gen. Martin Dempsey to resign over the Obama administration ’ s reluctance to take on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamic State in Syria and Iraq .
In 2019 , critics encouraged the chief of naval operations , Adm. Mike Gilday , to resign when Trump granted clemency to a convicted war criminal , Eddie Gallagher .
Military officers rarely disobey orders , but as their power over the national debate grew , presidents actively began trying to identify and appoint officers who shared their beliefs—and were often quite successful in doing so .
Finding these officers became much easier because the military elite joined the political elite in becoming more polarized .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ senior military officers identified with a political party ; in 2016 , 54 percent considered themselves Republicans and 19 percent Democrats .
This skew makes it even more remarkable that such a front of military critics spoke out against Trump .
With partisan divisions making political compromise more difficult , control of institutions became paramount .
An institution with a tradition of nonpartisanship became the nation ’ s top political prize .
These conditions made coalitions between politicians and military leaders both more likely and more dangerous .
Already , Trump talks about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military.
” Political polarization , very high confidence in the military , and the possibility that military force could be used domestically are a potentially explosive mix .
Trump didn ’ t start these trends , but as the defense policy expert Kori Schake has argued , he harnessed them , and his repeated violations of civilian-military norms helped instigate the current crisis .
When Trump asked Milley to follow him to that photo-op , he used the military as a symbol in a political dispute .
Using federal troops to quell protests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , could be far more problematic .
It was in response to these fears that Mattis and other retired military leaders spoke out.Political polarization , very high confidence in the military , and the possibility that military force could be used domestically are a potentially explosive mix .
None of this means that military leaders shouldn ’ t speak out at all .
Their protests might not have much of an effect on the general public or Trump , but they could reinforce appropriate behavior in the ranks and provide senior officers cover @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in private .
And , as the security studies experts Deborah Avant and Kara Kingma Neu argue , dissent by military officers can potentially prevent violations of civil-military and democratic norms .
But military dissent also carries tremendous risks .
Trump does have the legal authority to use troops for law enforcement tasks on U.S. soil , at least under certain circumstances .
If protests continue and Trump issues a lawful order to active-duty troops to quell protests , Milley—who has reportedly voiced strong opposition to the use of active-duty troops—will be put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senior officers disobey a legal order , it could raise constitutional questions about civilian control of the military .
On the other hand , if Trump were to issue an illegal order that violates the rights of U.S. citizens , officers would have an obligation to disobey .
That legality can be difficult to determine .
Junior officers and troops may face immensely difficult decisions that do not become any easier when orders from their chain of command conflict with the political statements of retired generals .
To get out of the current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military ’ s status as a nonpartisan institution , five steps are necessary .
First , all attempts to politicize the military must be called out—by politicians , by the media , by fellow officers , by citizens .
Active-duty military officers should resist being used as political props , and Milley ’ s comments were a good first step to restoring that balance .
If political leaders from either party do attempt to portray the military as a partisan ally , active and retired officers can and should call this out as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the military should never be deployed in a politically charged , domestic situation unless absolutely necessary .
The National Guard might need to augment police forces with additional manpower in some cases , but it is best used in support , lightly armed , and away from the center of political protests .
Managing peaceful protests is a law enforcement task , and most National Guard and active-duty military units are not trained or equipped to do it well .
While use of active troops for law enforcement can be legal and there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it can be risky and sometimes violent .
Third , don ’ t encourage anyone in the military to take sides in this fall ’ s presidential election .
Forming two opposing civilian-military alliances as each candidate seeks endorsements , in response to opponents ’ attempts to establish their own coalition with the military instead of focusing on civilian levers of influence , only makes future crises more likely .
Democratic candidate Joe Biden ’ s recent comment that the military would escort Trump from the White House if he loses but refuses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and center in a partisan campaign .
The push to get more retired generals to enter the political fray must stop.Fourth , the push to get more retired generals to enter the fray must stop .
Retired generals have already made their concerns clear , and they may yet be needed to call out specific abuses or violations of norms .
The evidence tells us that military involvement in political campaigns works far less well in changing public opinion than most observers think it does .
Finally , if citizens think a leader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and nonpolitical status of the military , they should use the ballot box .
They can mobilize , protest , and vote , but they shouldn ’ t recruit the military to enter the campaign .
The military needs to be the entire country ’ s military , not Trump ’ s , Biden ’ s , or any other president ’ s or party ’ s .
The idea that a candidate requires the blessing of active or retired generals to win an election should cause all Americans serious concern .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s crisis in civilian-military relations have been developing for decades .
The problems won ’ t disappear anytime soon , regardless of who occupies the Oval Office next January .
But Americans must realize before it ’ s too late that no one should ask the military to take sides to save American democracy .
That is a task for civilian leaders and institutions .
The moment the military becomes the arbiter of political legitimacy in U.S. politics , democracy will have been lost .

There is simply no precedent in modern U.S. history for so many prominent retired generals and admirals—including former secretary of defense and retired general James Mattis , three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , former service chiefs and combat commanders , and many others —to publicly criticize the judgment of a sitting president. The only incident that comes remotely close is the so-called revolt of the generals in 2006, when a handful of retired military leaders spoke out against then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s handling of the Iraq War.
There is simply no precedent in modern U.S. history for so many prominent retired generals and admirals—including former secretary of defense and retired general James Mattis, three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former service chiefs and combat commanders, and many others—to publicly criticize the judgment of a sitting president. The only incident that comes remotely close is the so-called revolt of the generals in 2006, when a handful of retired military leaders spoke out against then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s handling of the Iraq War.
This time, the dam broke on June 1, when U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to use active-duty military to exert “overwhelming force” to “dominate” U.S. cities, and when the nation’s top military officer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, walked with Trump in his combat uniform to a photo-op in front of St. John’s Episcopal Church through an area that had just been violently cleared of demonstrators. On June 11, Milley issued a remarkable apology, admitting his presence “created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.”Milley issued a remarkable apology, admitting his presence “created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.”
As remarkable as it was, Milley’s apology does not solve the problem of a U.S. military that has been politicized like never before in modern U.S. history. In recent weeks, it has been drawn deeply into both sides of a domestic conflict surrounding racism, police brutality, and the use of force to quell domestic protests. As stark divisions over these issues remain and protests continue, the situation could easily escalate and draw the military even deeper into what are quintessentially domestic political issues.
As protests continue and the presidential campaign heats up, this crisis in civilian-military relations therefore has the potential to turn into a full-blown constitutional crisis, in which the U.S. military either transgresses the legal limits of its role or disobeys civilian leaders. The use of active-duty troops on U.S. soil remains a real possibility, as does violence against U.S. citizens by members of the National Guard or active troops.
This critical juncture has been a long time coming. It is easy (and well-deserved, according to many scholars studying civilian-military relations) to place all the blame for the current situation on Trump, for whom this was not the first violation of U.S. civilian-military norms. However, the problems in the civilian-military relationship have been developing for many decades. Collapsing faith in U.S. political institutions, growing polarization, and increased threats of extremist violence have combined with rising public respect for and confidence in the military to set the stage for the crisis we face today.
At the end of the Vietnam War, both Democrats and Republicans held the military in low esteem. But under Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, bigger budgets and better recruiting rebuilt the military and its brand. After the decisive U.S. victory in the 1991 Gulf War, Americans’ trust in their military soared: In 1990, 33 percent of Americans expressed “a great deal” of confidence in the military, compared to 61 percent saying the same in 1991—about where the number remains today. Americans trust their military far more than the three branches of government or other institutions.
The military’s stellar reputation gave its leaders political power. Colin Powell became the most powerful and revered general since World War II. Norman Schwarzkopf, Wesley Clark, David Petraeus, Mattis, and others became national celebrities as cable news networks sought out retired generals as frequent commentators. Confrontations between retired and active military brass became front-page news, helping force compromises on policies such as humanitarian interventions and “don’t ask, don’t tell.”
Step by step, these military celebrities took on an active role in U.S. politics.Step by step, these military celebrities took on an active role in U.S. politics. It became common for presidential candidates to try to bolster their national security credentials by seeking high-profile endorsements from retired generals and admirals—as Bill Clinton did when he convinced Reagan’s top military advisor, Bill Crowe, to endorse him. Candidates have done so in every campaign since then. During the 2012 campaign, the lists of retired generals endorsing presidential candidates of both parties reached into the hundreds of names. The 2016 race took this one step further: Several former military leaders engaged in partisan attacks, with retired Marine Gen. John Allen criticizing Trump at the Democratic National Convention and retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn leading calls of “lock her up” against Hillary Clinton.
The increasingly political role of the military hasn’t been limited to elections. Politicians opposed to White House policies began to call on top generals to resign in protest. In 2014, Republicans called on Gen. Martin Dempsey to resign over the Obama administration’s reluctance to take on a bigger role in the fight against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. In 2019, critics encouraged the chief of naval operations, Adm. Mike Gilday, to resign when Trump granted clemency to a convicted war criminal, Eddie Gallagher.
Military officers rarely disobey orders, but as their power over the national debate grew, presidents actively began trying to identify and appoint officers who shared their beliefs—and were often quite successful in doing so. Finding these officers became much easier because the military elite joined the political elite in becoming more polarized. In 1976, only 45 percent of senior military officers identified with a political party; in 2016, 54 percent considered themselves Republicans and 19 percent Democrats. This skew makes it even more remarkable that such a front of military critics spoke out against Trump.
With partisan divisions making political compromise more difficult, control of institutions became paramount. An institution with a tradition of nonpartisanship became the nation’s top political prize. These conditions made coalitions between politicians and military leaders both more likely and more dangerous. Already, Trump talks about “my generals” and “my military.”
Political polarization, very high confidence in the military, and the possibility that military force could be used domestically are a potentially explosive mix. Trump didn’t start these trends, but as the defense policy expert Kori Schake has argued, he harnessed them, and his repeated violations of civilian-military norms helped instigate the current crisis. When Trump asked Milley to follow him to that photo-op, he used the military as a symbol in a political dispute. Using federal troops to quell protests, as Trump has threatened to do, could be far more problematic. It was in response to these fears that Mattis and other retired military leaders spoke out.Political polarization, very high confidence in the military, and the possibility that military force could be used domestically are a potentially explosive mix.
None of this means that military leaders shouldn’t speak out at all. Their protests might not have much of an effect on the general public or Trump, but they could reinforce appropriate behavior in the ranks and provide senior officers cover to give candid advice to the administration in private. And, as the security studies experts Deborah Avant and Kara Kingma Neu argue, dissent by military officers can potentially prevent violations of civil-military and democratic norms.
But military dissent also carries tremendous risks. Trump does have the legal authority to use troops for law enforcement tasks on U.S. soil, at least under certain circumstances. If protests continue and Trump issues a lawful order to active-duty troops to quell protests, Milley—who has reportedly voiced strong opposition to the use of active-duty troops—will be put in an extremely difficult situation. If senior officers disobey a legal order, it could raise constitutional questions about civilian control of the military. On the other hand, if Trump were to issue an illegal order that violates the rights of U.S. citizens, officers would have an obligation to disobey. That legality can be difficult to determine. Junior officers and troops may face immensely difficult decisions that do not become any easier when orders from their chain of command conflict with the political statements of retired generals.
To get out of the current crisis of civilian-military relations and restore the military’s status as a nonpartisan institution, five steps are necessary.
First, all attempts to politicize the military must be called out—by politicians, by the media, by fellow officers, by citizens. Active-duty military officers should resist being used as political props, and Milley’s comments were a good first step to restoring that balance. If political leaders from either party do attempt to portray the military as a partisan ally, active and retired officers can and should call this out as a breach of trust.
Second, the military should never be deployed in a politically charged, domestic situation unless absolutely necessary. The National Guard might need to augment police forces with additional manpower in some cases, but it is best used in support, lightly armed, and away from the center of political protests. Managing peaceful protests is a law enforcement task, and most National Guard and active-duty military units are not trained or equipped to do it well. While use of active troops for law enforcement can be legal and there is clear historical precedent for it, it can be risky and sometimes violent.
Third, don’t encourage anyone in the military to take sides in this fall’s presidential election. Forming two opposing civilian-military alliances as each candidate seeks endorsements, in response to opponents’ attempts to establish their own coalition with the military instead of focusing on civilian levers of influence, only makes future crises more likely. Democratic candidate Joe Biden’s recent comment that the military would escort Trump from the White House if he loses but refuses to leave only keeps the military front and center in a partisan campaign.
The push to get more retired generals to enter the political fray must stop.Fourth, the push to get more retired generals to enter the fray must stop. Retired generals have already made their concerns clear, and they may yet be needed to call out specific abuses or violations of norms. The evidence tells us that military involvement in political campaigns works far less well in changing public opinion than most observers think it does.
Finally, if citizens think a leader or candidate is damaging—or will damage—the neutral and nonpolitical status of the military, they should use the ballot box. They can mobilize, protest, and vote, but they shouldn’t recruit the military to enter the campaign. The military needs to be the entire country’s military, not Trump’s, Biden’s, or any other president’s or party’s. The idea that a candidate requires the blessing of active or retired generals to win an election should cause all Americans serious concern.
The conditions that set the stage for today’s crisis in civilian-military relations have been developing for decades. The problems won’t disappear anytime soon, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office next January. But Americans must realize before it’s too late that no one should ask the military to take sides to save American democracy. That is a task for civilian leaders and institutions. The moment the military becomes the arbiter of political legitimacy in U.S. politics, democracy will have been lost.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--Trump’s Anti-Immigration Crusade Is About to Strike at the Heart of the U.S. Economy

Trump ’ s Anti-Immigration Crusade Is About to Strike at the Heart of the U.S. Economy The United States and China are in a growing competition for technological leadership .
China is seeking to match or surpass its main rival in artificial intelligence , biotechnology , quantum computing , and other sectors vital to future economic and military prowess .
But if U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s administration has its way , it could dismantle the United States ’ most potent weapon—its ability to attract and retain the best science and engineering talent from across the planet.If Trump has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States ’ most potent weapon—its ability to attract the best science and engineering talent from across the planet .
According to the Wall Street Journal and other reports , the administration is preparing to suspend all employment-based visas for foreign workers , including the H-1B visa used by many foreign engineers and scientists working in the United States .
The administration is also considering curbing a program that allows foreign students in science , technology , engineering , and mathematics to work in the United States for up to three years after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ university ; more than 200,000 foreign graduates each year work under the program .
Trump administration officials argue that the spike in unemployment during the coronavirus pandemic justifies tough restrictions on foreign workers so that any new jobs coming out of the downturn only go to Americans .
For different reasons , the administration is also considering canceling thousands of visas held by Chinese graduate students and researchers living in the United States if they graduated from a Chinese university that has links to the country ’ s military .
The worry is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that boosts China ’ s military capabilities .
Rather than strengthening the U.S. economy and enhancing security , these restrictions would be a serious blow to the United States ’ lead in cutting-edge technologies .
The only way for the United States to stay ahead of China is to run faster in the technology race , and the ability to recruit and retain many of the top scientific minds from China and many other countries provides an enormous head start .
Consider the quest for leadership in artificial intelligence ( AI ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future industrial and military application .
China ’ s goal is to become the world ’ s dominant AI power in both innovation and deployment .
China has many advantages , including massive government support , a huge pool of data from its population of 1.4 billion , new infrastructure , and an ecosystem of competitive companies .
But the key ingredient for leadership in AI , as in most other new technologies , is attracting and retaining the most talented scientists and engineers .
Here the United States has no rival .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the in-house think tank of the Paulson Institute , found that nearly 60 percent of the top-tier AI researchers are working for U.S. companies and universities—the top three employers were Google , Stanford University , and Carnegie Mellon University .
That lead is “ built on attracting international talent , ” according to the MacroPolo report ; more than two-thirds of the world ’ s best AI researchers completed their undergraduate studies abroad , but then came to the United States .
Notably , China currently graduates more top AI researchers than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but more than half of those go on to study , work , and live in the United States .
The big magnet for the world ’ s talent is U.S. universities .
Top prospects from around the globe come here to do graduate research , and are then enticed to stay by the abundant work opportunities .
Navigating U.S. immigration rules to stay and work has never been easy ; the H-1B program , which allows U.S. companies to hire educated foreign workers , is capped at 85,000 visas per year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is arduous , often taking a decade or more .
But the lure of the United States has been so great that the best and brightest usually find a way to stay .
According to the most recent estimates , more than 75 percent of foreign-born doctoral students in engineering and science at U.S. universities plan to remain in the country after they graduate , a share that has risen steadily since the 1990s .
China and India are the two leading countries of origin for these advanced students ; South Korea is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese students working on AI who graduate with a doctorate degree , an astonishing 91 percent are still in the United States five years after graduation , according to a detailed study by Georgetown University ’ s Center for Security and Emerging Technology .
In other words , China is sending the United States its brightest AI scientists—and most of them are not going home .
But the Trump administration is doing its best to give away that advantage .
Over the past several years , immigration hurdles have grown from tall to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rates on H-1B visas have risen from just 6 percent in the 2015 fiscal year to 30 percent so far in the 2020 fiscal year .
For foreign students , long visa–processing delays have made it harder for many to come to the United States to study .
After decades of virtually uninterrupted growth , the number of new international students has been slowly declining since 2015 .
The pandemic is also making life far more difficult for foreign students already in the United States .
Their visa status prevents them from working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now closed .
They have also been barred from receiving any of the U.S. government funds for assisting students during the crisis .
U.S. colleges are anticipating a 25 percent drop in international student enrollment this fall .
The United States also has no visa for foreign students who want to start their own companies , discouraging the most entrepreneurial among them from staying in the country .
Adjusting U.S. visa policies is not without merit .
There are real concerns about foreign researchers and workers .
The H-1B program has been used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ routine work that has , at times , displaced Americans ; reform of the program by U.S. Congress is more than a decade overdue .
Chinese researchers and students working in sensitive technology fields should be properly screened and vetted by the U.S. government ; a recent probe at the National Institutes of Health resulted in 54 scientists being removed for failing to disclose financial ties to foreign governments .
All but a small handful were from China .
China has become more aggressive in trying to recruit its top scientists to return @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Talents Program , under which Chinese entities hire international researchers , sometimes in secret .
The scheme requires close U.S. monitoring and a targeted response , but a recent investigation by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that the administration was “ overstating the threat ” at the risk of “ alienating large numbers of ethnic Chinese scientists who were trained at the best schools in the United States and who prefer to remain in the United States.
” The United States is not going to win the technology race with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The U.S government has managed these dilemmas before .
The 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in curbs on foreign students and some immigrants , but after several years the administration of President George W. Bush found its way back to a sensible balance between what it called “ secure borders and open doors.
” The pipeline of foreign talent remained largely uninterrupted .
But as the Center for Security and Emerging Technology report warns , the Trump administration is clamping down so hard that many top researchers may be driven away .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States stands to lose a vital asset in the international competition for AI leadership , ” it warns .
The United States is not going to win the technology race with China by trying to bar the door .
Unparalleled U.S. success in many areas of science and technology was built on attracting the world ’ s best talent , and then giving that talent the opportunity to build rewarding and often lucrative careers in the United States .
The United States tampers with that winning formula at its own peril .

The United States and China are in a growing competition for technological leadership. China is seeking to match or surpass its main rival in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing, and other sectors vital to future economic and military prowess. But if U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has its way, it could dismantle the United States’ most potent weapon—its ability to attract and retain the best science and engineering talent from across the planet.If Trump has his way, he could dismantle the United States’ most potent weapon—its ability to attract the best science and engineering talent from across the planet.
The United States and China are in a growing competition for technological leadership. China is seeking to match or surpass its main rival in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing, and other sectors vital to future economic and military prowess. But if U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has its way, it could dismantle the United States’ most potent weapon—its ability to attract and retain the best science and engineering talent from across the planet.If Trump has his way, he could dismantle the United States’ most potent weapon—its ability to attract the best science and engineering talent from across the planet.
According to the Wall Street Journal and other reports, the administration is preparing to suspend all employment-based visas for foreign workers, including the H-1B visa used by many foreign engineers and scientists working in the United States. The administration is also considering curbing a program that allows foreign students in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics to work in the United States for up to three years after they finish their studies at a U.S university; more than 200,000 foreign graduates each year work under the program. Trump administration officials argue that the spike in unemployment during the coronavirus pandemic justifies tough restrictions on foreign workers so that any new jobs coming out of the downturn only go to Americans.
For different reasons, the administration is also considering canceling thousands of visas held by Chinese graduate students and researchers living in the United States if they graduated from a Chinese university that has links to the country’s military. The worry is that these students could carry home knowledge that boosts China’s military capabilities.
Rather than strengthening the U.S. economy and enhancing security, these restrictions would be a serious blow to the United States’ lead in cutting-edge technologies. The only way for the United States to stay ahead of China is to run faster in the technology race, and the ability to recruit and retain many of the top scientific minds from China and many other countries provides an enormous head start.
Consider the quest for leadership in artificial intelligence (AI), which will be critical to almost every future industrial and military application. China’s goal is to become the world’s dominant AI power in both innovation and deployment. China has many advantages, including massive government support, a huge pool of data from its population of 1.4 billion, new infrastructure, and an ecosystem of competitive companies.
But the key ingredient for leadership in AI, as in most other new technologies, is attracting and retaining the most talented scientists and engineers. Here the United States has no rival. A report released last week by MacroPolo, the in-house think tank of the Paulson Institute, found that nearly 60 percent of the top-tier AI researchers are working for U.S. companies and universities—the top three employers were Google, Stanford University, and Carnegie Mellon University. That lead is “built on attracting international talent,” according to the MacroPolo report; more than two-thirds of the world’s best AI researchers completed their undergraduate studies abroad, but then came to the United States. Notably, China currently graduates more top AI researchers than any other country in the world, but more than half of those go on to study, work, and live in the United States.
The big magnet for the world’s talent is U.S. universities. Top prospects from around the globe come here to do graduate research, and are then enticed to stay by the abundant work opportunities. Navigating U.S. immigration rules to stay and work has never been easy; the H-1B program, which allows U.S. companies to hire educated foreign workers, is capped at 85,000 visas per year. The path from there to permanent residency is arduous, often taking a decade or more.
But the lure of the United States has been so great that the best and brightest usually find a way to stay. According to the most recent estimates, more than 75 percent of foreign-born doctoral students in engineering and science at U.S. universities plan to remain in the country after they graduate, a share that has risen steadily since the 1990s. China and India are the two leading countries of origin for these advanced students; South Korea is third by a considerable margin. Among Chinese students working on AI who graduate with a doctorate degree, an astonishing 91 percent are still in the United States five years after graduation, according to a detailed study by Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology. In other words, China is sending the United States its brightest AI scientists—and most of them are not going home.
But the Trump administration is doing its best to give away that advantage. Over the past several years, immigration hurdles have grown from tall to nearly impassable. For example, denial rates on H-1B visas have risen from just 6 percent in the 2015 fiscal year to 30 percent so far in the 2020 fiscal year. For foreign students, long visa–processing delays have made it harder for many to come to the United States to study. After decades of virtually uninterrupted growth, the number of new international students has been slowly declining since 2015.
The pandemic is also making life far more difficult for foreign students already in the United States. Their visa status prevents them from working, except on college campuses that are now closed. They have also been barred from receiving any of the U.S. government funds for assisting students during the crisis. U.S. colleges are anticipating a 25 percent drop in international student enrollment this fall. The United States also has no visa for foreign students who want to start their own companies, discouraging the most entrepreneurial among them from staying in the country.
Adjusting U.S. visa policies is not without merit. There are real concerns about foreign researchers and workers. The H-1B program has been used for both high-end scientific talent and more routine work that has, at times, displaced Americans; reform of the program by U.S. Congress is more than a decade overdue. Chinese researchers and students working in sensitive technology fields should be properly screened and vetted by the U.S. government; a recent probe at the National Institutes of Health resulted in 54 scientists being removed for failing to disclose financial ties to foreign governments. All but a small handful were from China.
China has become more aggressive in trying to recruit its top scientists to return home with initiatives such as the Thousand Talents Program, under which Chinese entities hire international researchers, sometimes in secret. The scheme requires close U.S. monitoring and a targeted response, but a recent investigation by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that the administration was “overstating the threat” at the risk of “alienating large numbers of ethnic Chinese scientists who were trained at the best schools in the United States and who prefer to remain in the United States.”The United States is not going to win the technology race with China by trying to bar the door.
The U.S government has managed these dilemmas before. The 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in curbs on foreign students and some immigrants, but after several years the administration of President George W. Bush found its way back to a sensible balance between what it called “secure borders and open doors.” The pipeline of foreign talent remained largely uninterrupted. But as the Center for Security and Emerging Technology report warns, the Trump administration is clamping down so hard that many top researchers may be driven away. “Without serious immigration policy changes, the United States stands to lose a vital asset in the international competition for AI leadership,” it warns.
The United States is not going to win the technology race with China by trying to bar the door. Unparalleled U.S. success in many areas of science and technology was built on attracting the world’s best talent, and then giving that talent the opportunity to build rewarding and often lucrative careers in the United States. The United States tampers with that winning formula at its own peril.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--Anguished by America’s Decline, More Foreign-Policy Wonks Run for Office

Anguished by America ’ s Decline , More Foreign-Policy Wonks Run for Office Sri Kulkarni was a foreign service officer for 14 years before the advent of the Trump era upended his career plans .
As a diplomat watching Washington ’ s tectonic shifts from abroad , Kulkarni became dejected with what he saw as a presidency that was accelerating America ’ s internal political divisions and tarnishing its global stature .
For him , the breaking points came in 2017 with the violent white supremacist rally in Charlottesville , Virginia , and President Donald Trump endorsing Republican Roy Moore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seat in Alabama despite allegations of sexual misconduct with underage girls .
Kulkarni was readying for his next assignment as spokesperson at the U.S. Embassy in India—an important posting that would put him on a glide path for promotions into the senior ranks of America ’ s diplomatic corps .
Instead , he quit and turned back to his home state of Texas to get involved in domestic politics .
“ I ’ ve worked in conflict zones before , and I could see the sort of tension rising in my own country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ treat each other like enemies , ” he told Foreign Policy .
“ I felt like everything that I had fought for overseas , everything that I stood up for the State Department was being threatened there at home.
” He contacted the Texas Democratic Party to see how he could contribute to campaigns that would blunt the rise of Trumpism sweeping across the country .
Instead , Kulkarni , who grew up in the Houston area , was asked if he wanted to run himself .
He narrowly lost his first bid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Texas ’ s 22nd district to incumbent Republican Pete Olson , but he is running again in 2020 .
Olson is retiring this year , and national political analysts see the onetime conservative stronghold—an increasingly diverse constituency in the suburbs of Houston—as a toss-up race ripe for a Democratic win .
Kulkarni ’ s story is not unique , and it ’ s one that veteran Democratic campaign strategists see as a key to keeping their majority in the House in 2020 .
During the 2018 midterms , an unprecedented number of foreign-policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these candidates made their campaigns about local issues—not the president himself—though for many Trump ’ s ascent to the White House was a driving factor in their decision to run .
Across the board , there were mixed results , with nearly as many losses as wins for the foreign-policy wonks who ran .
But among those who did win , a pattern emerged that has excited Democratic political analysts and spurred on high-profile support—including massive influxes of campaign cash—for candidates with national security-centric resumes .
Democrats seem poised to consolidate their holds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ levels of income and education , some that have been red for decades .
Before 2018 , the Republican Party held 13 of the top 25 House districts ranked for education levels and 13 for median income .
After the midterms , they held just five and four respectively .
In the 2018 race , foreign-policy wonks showed a track record of doing well in such districts .
Andrew Albertson , the head of the advocacy group Foreign Policy for America , said candidates with a foreign-policy background are at the “ center @ @ @ @ @ @ @ battleground districts toward the Democrats .
“ Having some real credibility and expertise on national security issues—it ’ s not necessarily a question that ’ s going to get asked in a lot of town halls , but voters seem to gravitate toward candidates who can check that box and make them feel safe and make them feel like there ’ s a serious professional who knows what they ’ re talking about on the big issues , ” he said .
The list of such candidates who won in 2018 includes Elissa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official in Michigan ’ s 8th district , and Andy Kim , a former Obama National Security Council staffer in New Jersey ’ s 3rd district .
Tom Malinowski , a former senior human rights envoy at the State Department under President Barack Obama , was the first Democratic candidate to win New Jersey ’ s 7th district since 1981 .
Abigail Spanberger , a former CIA operations officer , turned Virginia ’ s 7th district blue for the first time since 1968 .
Alongside Kulkarni , newcomers vying for congressional seats in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closely include : Gina Ortiz Jones , an Iraq war veteran and former Air Force intelligence officer running for Texas ’ s 23rd district after narrowly losing the race in 2018 ; Evelyn Farkas , a former Pentagon official who oversaw Russia and Ukraine policy , running in New York ’ s 17th district ; and Kate Schroder , a global health care and aid expert running in Ohio ’ s 1st district .
Foreign Policy for America established a political action committee to donate to candidates based on their platforms or voting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ June , the organization had raised over half a million dollars ahead of the 2020 elections , according to Albertson .
“ Some of my colleagues say that you have to stay in to steer the ship , and make sure that once we get past this period , we actually can rebuild these institutions , ” Kulkarni said .
“ Others like myself , obviously , they make the personal choice that you can ’ t steer a ship that ’ s gone completely off the rails like this.
” “ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk our lives for our country overseas in places like Iraq , we should be willing to risk our careers to stand up for our country at home , ” he said .
Whatever their motivations , the end result could be an unprecedented number of former national security pros filling the ranks of a new Congress in 2021 , many of whom would be poised to make their mark on American foreign policy from the perch of powerful oversight committees like the House Armed Services Committee or Foreign Affairs Committee .
Those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ led the charge on flexing congressional war powers resolutions to curb the president ’ s ability to use the military abroad without prior legislative approval .
They also played an influential role in drafting bills that would reform the long-troubled U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs , and spurring the president to use the 1950s-era Defense Production Act to boost the production of medical supplies during the coronavirus pandemic .
The new wave of candidates vying for congressional seats comes as what looked to be a key set of issues at the beginning of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and domestic health care policy—were eclipsed by a global coronavirus pandemic and civic unrest that have put foreign-policy threats and America ’ s standing in the world at the forefront of both Trump ’ s and Democratic challenger Joe Biden ’ s campaigns .
“ I do think foreign policy is going to be more important this year than it has been in the past , probably since the immediate post-9/11 elections , ” said Jennifer Holdsworth , a veteran Democratic campaign strategist .
“ From a Democratic strategist ’ s perspective , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on domestic policy right now , but there ’ s still a significant portion of American voters who are very concerned about receding American leadership abroad.
” Still , some of their opponents are casting their work in Washington as a liability .
These candidates have faced attacks from their political opponents over their background and record .
Kathaleen Wall , one of Kulkarni ’ s Republican opponents , went after him in a series of attacks focused on China ’ s role in the spread of the coronavirus pandemic , calling him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats who refuse to stand up to the thuggish Chinese government.
” “ The days of so-called ‘ diplomats ’ like Sri Preston Kulkarni being allowed to remain silent against Communist China are over , ” she said , as the Fort Bend Herald reported in May .
Nonetheless , former senior diplomats and national security heavyweights are backing these candidates with endorsements , hoping Congress can step up its voice on foreign affairs in part to course-correct Trump ’ s iconoclast vision of American foreign policy .
“ Evelyn can be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s values are under assault , ” former Secretary of State John Kerry said in a statement endorsing Farkas .
“ She ’ s both practical and principled , and the district would be well-served to have her expertise at work in our dangerous world.
” One major question for these races will be how much concern over America ’ s role in the world translates into an issue constituents hinge their votes on .
Foreign policy always takes a backseat to district issues , and it ’ s unclear whether national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters in 2020 .
The race for Texas ’ s 23rd district , where Jones is running , could be a key test of this question .
The sprawling district , bigger than some U.S. states , covers some 800 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border and has found itself at the center of the pitched battle in Washington over Trump ’ s border wall and immigration policy .
It is also home to multiple U.S. military installations , including Laughlin Air Force Base and Joint Base San Antonio .
Republican Will Hurd , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the only black Republican House member , beat out Jones by a razor-thin majority of less than 1,000 votes for the district in 2018 .
In a blow to the Republicans , he announced last year he would not be seeking reelection , increasing the chance that Jones can secure the district for Democrats this time around .
“ This is a community that absolutely understands the importance of national security because it ’ s our friends , our neighbors , if something were to happen , it would be exactly our community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where asked to , ” Jones told Foreign Policy .
Jones , an openly gay first-generation American whose mother is from the Philippines , worked as a civil servant in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative following her military service .
Six months into the Trump administration , fed up by the president ’ s policies , she quit her trade job and decided to run for Congress .
For candidates that represent border districts , understanding the inner workings of U.S. foreign policy with Latin America is important , Jones said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are described at our border , anyone that ’ s worked in national security knows that key to addressing that is making sure that we ’ ve got good relationships with our partners and allies in Central and South America.
” She added that in the current political climate , she understands why many people from the foreign policy world like her are running for political office at home .
“ I ’ m not super surprised that people that have a background in national security and public service are stepping up again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think it ’ s that type of leadership , that values-based leadership , that is so needed at this moment in time .
”

Sri Kulkarni was a foreign service officer for 14 years before the advent of the Trump era upended his career plans. As a diplomat watching Washington’s tectonic shifts from abroad, Kulkarni became dejected with what he saw as a presidency that was accelerating America’s internal political divisions and tarnishing its global stature.
Sri Kulkarni was a foreign service officer for 14 years before the advent of the Trump era upended his career plans. As a diplomat watching Washington’s tectonic shifts from abroad, Kulkarni became dejected with what he saw as a presidency that was accelerating America’s internal political divisions and tarnishing its global stature.
For him, the breaking points came in 2017 with the violent white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, and President Donald Trump endorsing Republican Roy Moore in his failed bid for a Senate seat in Alabama despite allegations of sexual misconduct with underage girls. Kulkarni was readying for his next assignment as spokesperson at the U.S. Embassy in India—an important posting that would put him on a glide path for promotions into the senior ranks of America’s diplomatic corps. Instead, he quit and turned back to his home state of Texas to get involved in domestic politics.
“I’ve worked in conflict zones before, and I could see the sort of tension rising in my own country along that same continuum, where people treat each other like enemies,” he told Foreign Policy. “I felt like everything that I had fought for overseas, everything that I stood up for the State Department was being threatened there at home.”
He contacted the Texas Democratic Party to see how he could contribute to campaigns that would blunt the rise of Trumpism sweeping across the country. Instead, Kulkarni, who grew up in the Houston area, was asked if he wanted to run himself.
He narrowly lost his first bid for Congress in the 2018 midterms for Texas’s 22nd district to incumbent Republican Pete Olson, but he is running again in 2020. Olson is retiring this year, and national political analysts see the onetime conservative stronghold—an increasingly diverse constituency in the suburbs of Houston—as a toss-up race ripe for a Democratic win.
Kulkarni’s story is not unique, and it’s one that veteran Democratic campaign strategists see as a key to keeping their majority in the House in 2020. During the 2018 midterms, an unprecedented number of foreign-policy experts ran for Congress. Most of these candidates made their campaigns about local issues—not the president himself—though for many Trump’s ascent to the White House was a driving factor in their decision to run.
Across the board, there were mixed results, with nearly as many losses as wins for the foreign-policy wonks who ran. But among those who did win, a pattern emerged that has excited Democratic political analysts and spurred on high-profile support—including massive influxes of campaign cash—for candidates with national security-centric resumes.
Democrats seem poised to consolidate their holds on key suburban swing districts with high levels of income and education, some that have been red for decades. Before 2018, the Republican Party held 13 of the top 25 House districts ranked for education levels and 13 for median income. After the midterms, they held just five and four respectively. In the 2018 race, foreign-policy wonks showed a track record of doing well in such districts.
Andrew Albertson, the head of the advocacy group Foreign Policy for America, said candidates with a foreign-policy background are at the “center of the story” for shifting important battleground districts toward the Democrats.
“Having some real credibility and expertise on national security issues—it’s not necessarily a question that’s going to get asked in a lot of town halls, but voters seem to gravitate toward candidates who can check that box and make them feel safe and make them feel like there’s a serious professional who knows what they’re talking about on the big issues,” he said.
The list of such candidates who won in 2018 includes Elissa Slotkin, a former CIA and Pentagon official in Michigan’s 8th district, and Andy Kim, a former Obama National Security Council staffer in New Jersey’s 3rd district. Tom Malinowski, a former senior human rights envoy at the State Department under President Barack Obama, was the first Democratic candidate to win New Jersey’s 7th district since 1981. Abigail Spanberger, a former CIA operations officer, turned Virginia’s 7th district blue for the first time since 1968.
Alongside Kulkarni, newcomers vying for congressional seats in 2020 whose races campaign strategists are tracking closely include: Gina Ortiz Jones, an Iraq war veteran and former Air Force intelligence officer running for Texas’s 23rd district after narrowly losing the race in 2018; Evelyn Farkas, a former Pentagon official who oversaw Russia and Ukraine policy, running in New York’s 17th district; and Kate Schroder, a global health care and aid expert running in Ohio’s 1st district.
Foreign Policy for America established a political action committee to donate to candidates based on their platforms or voting record on foreign policy issues. By June, the organization had raised over half a million dollars ahead of the 2020 elections, according to Albertson.
“Some of my colleagues say that you have to stay in to steer the ship, and make sure that once we get past this period, we actually can rebuild these institutions,” Kulkarni said. “Others like myself, obviously, they make the personal choice that you can’t steer a ship that’s gone completely off the rails like this.”
“I think if we’re willing to risk our lives for our country overseas in places like Iraq, we should be willing to risk our careers to stand up for our country at home,” he said.
Whatever their motivations, the end result could be an unprecedented number of former national security pros filling the ranks of a new Congress in 2021, many of whom would be poised to make their mark on American foreign policy from the perch of powerful oversight committees like the House Armed Services Committee or Foreign Affairs Committee.
Those who came to Capitol Hill in 2018 led the charge on flexing congressional war powers resolutions to curb the president’s ability to use the military abroad without prior legislative approval. They also played an influential role in drafting bills that would reform the long-troubled U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and spurring the president to use the 1950s-era Defense Production Act to boost the production of medical supplies during the coronavirus pandemic.
The new wave of candidates vying for congressional seats comes as what looked to be a key set of issues at the beginning of the election year—impeachment, the economy, and domestic health care policy—were eclipsed by a global coronavirus pandemic and civic unrest that have put foreign-policy threats and America’s standing in the world at the forefront of both Trump’s and Democratic challenger Joe Biden’s campaigns.
“I do think foreign policy is going to be more important this year than it has been in the past, probably since the immediate post-9/11 elections,” said Jennifer Holdsworth, a veteran Democratic campaign strategist. “From a Democratic strategist’s perspective, there’s obviously a huge focus on domestic policy right now, but there’s still a significant portion of American voters who are very concerned about receding American leadership abroad.”
Still, some of their opponents are casting their work in Washington as a liability. These candidates have faced attacks from their political opponents over their background and record. Kathaleen Wall, one of Kulkarni’s Republican opponents, went after him in a series of attacks focused on China’s role in the spread of the coronavirus pandemic, calling him one of the “spineless, silent Democrats who refuse to stand up to the thuggish Chinese government.”
“The days of so-called ‘diplomats’ like Sri Preston Kulkarni being allowed to remain silent against Communist China are over,” she said, as the Fort Bend Herald reported in May.
Nonetheless, former senior diplomats and national security heavyweights are backing these candidates with endorsements, hoping Congress can step up its voice on foreign affairs in part to course-correct Trump’s iconoclast vision of American foreign policy.
“Evelyn can be a powerful voice at a time when America’s values are under assault,” former Secretary of State John Kerry said in a statement endorsing Farkas. “She’s both practical and principled, and the district would be well-served to have her expertise at work in our dangerous world.”
One major question for these races will be how much concern over America’s role in the world translates into an issue constituents hinge their votes on. Foreign policy always takes a backseat to district issues, and it’s unclear whether national security would become a deciding factor for voters in 2020.
The race for Texas’s 23rd district, where Jones is running, could be a key test of this question. The sprawling district, bigger than some U.S. states, covers some 800 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border and has found itself at the center of the pitched battle in Washington over Trump’s border wall and immigration policy. It is also home to multiple U.S. military installations, including Laughlin Air Force Base and Joint Base San Antonio.
Republican Will Hurd, a former CIA case officer himself and the only black Republican House member, beat out Jones by a razor-thin majority of less than 1,000 votes for the district in 2018. In a blow to the Republicans, he announced last year he would not be seeking reelection, increasing the chance that Jones can secure the district for Democrats this time around.
“This is a community that absolutely understands the importance of national security because it’s our friends, our neighbors, if something were to happen, it would be exactly our community members that would have to go serve where asked to,” Jones told Foreign Policy.
Jones, an openly gay first-generation American whose mother is from the Philippines, worked as a civil servant in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative following her military service. Six months into the Trump administration, fed up by the president’s policies, she quit her trade job and decided to run for Congress.
For candidates that represent border districts, understanding the inner workings of U.S. foreign policy with Latin America is important, Jones said. “Some of the challenges that are described at our border, anyone that’s worked in national security knows that key to addressing that is making sure that we’ve got good relationships with our partners and allies in Central and South America.”
She added that in the current political climate, she understands why many people from the foreign policy world like her are running for political office at home. “I’m not super surprised that people that have a background in national security and public service are stepping up again,” she said. “I think it’s that type of leadership, that values-based leadership, that is so needed at this moment in time.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--Pompeo Quietly Meets Chinese Counterpart Amid Mounting Tensions

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is under fire amid a Hawaii trip , tensions rise on the Korean peninsula , and the United States green-lights new weapons for Ukraine .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo traveled to Hawaii this week for private meetings with his Chinese counterpart that were shrouded in secrecy—opening a new diplomatic channel between two countries that have been at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Hong Kong , and Taiwan .
Pompeo met with China ’ s top diplomat , Yang Jiechi , on Tuesday and Wednesday , though there are few details about what was discussed .
A State Department readout said they spoke about the need for “ fully reciprocal ” deals on security and trade issues , and that Pompeo stressed the need for “ full transparency and information sharing ” on the pandemic .
In recent months , U.S. President Donald Trump has blamed China for fumbling its response at the beginning of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back with its own brand of bellicose diplomacy .
He said , Xi said .
Underscoring the gap between China and the United States is the fact that neither agree on who requested the meeting , as the Washington Post reports .
Diplomats on both sides told foreign counterparts that it was the other country that first asked for talks .
It ’ s still unclear what the discussions accomplished , and neither side indicated whether there would be a follow-up .
Something to keep in mind .
The United States can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , the country ’ s biggest benefactor .
Pyongyang signaled its unhappiness with stalled nuclear talks this week with classic diplomatic subtlety : by blowing up South Korea ’ s de facto embassy in the north this week .
Two summits between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un haven ’ t led to a breakthrough .
And on Wednesday , North Korea announced that it would remilitarize parts of the border where both countries agreed to reduce tensions just two years ago .
Bolton bombshells hit Pompeo .
Pompeo ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his former colleague , former National Security Advisor John Bolton , whose book on his time in the Trump administration reportedly includes allegations that the secretary of state badmouthed the president behind closed doors .
The New York Times , which got an advance copy of the book , reports that Bolton alleged Pompeo slipped him a note during the president ’ s meeting with Kim in 2018 that said Trump was “ so full of shit ” —though a source close to Pompeo disputes this account , according to Politico ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s closest confidantes , working to ensure there is never any daylight between him and the president .
Revelations that Pompeo disparaged Trump could undercut their relationship .
Maligning Trump in private ended badly for Pompeo ’ s predecessor , Rex Tillerson , who reportedly called Trump a “ moron ” after a July 2017 meeting at the Pentagon .
Seven months later , Trump fired Tillerson via Twitter .
U.S. military aid to Ukraine .
The U.S. Congress approved a $ 250 million defense package for Ukraine last week , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the face of Russian aggression .
The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv announced on Wednesday that $ 60 million worth of weapons and other military equipment was en route to Ukraine as part of the package .
Military aid to Ukraine became a hot-button issue last year , when it was revealed that Trump had ordered his administration to withhold assistance to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate the business dealings of the family of Joe Biden—leading to Trump ’ s impeachment .
Russian aircraft in Libya .
The U.S. Defense Department has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Group paramilitaries in the war-torn country , the U.S. Africa Command said in a statement this morning .
On a call with reporters , U.S. Europe and Africa Air Forces chief Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian said the number of Russian aircraft is in the “ upper teens.
” If Russia gains a more permanent foothold , “ that ’ s going to be a significant security concern ” to Europe , Harrigian said .
All quiet on the southern front ?
China is tamping down conflict on its border with India after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decades : Clashes on Monday between its troops and Indian forces left at least 20 Indian soldiers dead .
The number of Chinese casualties is not known , but it could be as many as 35 .
Beijing has gone uncharacteristically quiet on the matter , potentially paving the way for talks to de-escalate tensions between the two nuclear powers .
Wednesday night massacre .
All four heads of the media organizations under the U.S. Agency for Global Media ( USAGM ) have been sacked in an unprecedented move .
The heads of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia , the Middle East Broadcasting Network , and the Open Technology Fund were all fired Wednesday evening , officials and congressional aides told Foreign Policy .
Top leaders at the Voice of America ( VOA ) , which is also under USAGM , resigned earlier in the week .
The shake-up comes after Trump railed against VOA—a U.S.-funded but independent agency—and accused it of spreading Chinese propaganda .
Democratic lawmakers have condemned the firings , which they say undercut the organizations ’ independence .
Michael Pack , a former conservative filmmaker and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Steve Bannon , was confirmed this month as the new USAGM chief despite an investigation by the D.C. attorney general for improperly using funds from his former nonprofit .
U.S. sailors implicated in sex trafficking ring .
An deeply reported investigation by the Military Times lays bare the extent of sex crimes committed by U.S. sailors in Bahrain , including the trafficking of women and potentially underage girls for prostitution in U.S. taxpayer-funded housing .
The U.S. Navy says it has the issue under control after investigations in 2017 and 2018 .
Former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Afghan peace talks in an event hosted by the United States Institute of Peace next Wednesday , June 24 .
Abdullah was recently appointed chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation , which will oversee the Afghan government ’ s talks with the Taliban .
No happy birthday for Xi .
Since taking office , Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has never missed Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s birthday , always sending a pleasant birthday message to his Chinese counterpart .
Not this this year—which is unsurprising , given the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is under fire amid a Hawaii trip, tensions rise on the Korean peninsula , and the United States green-lights new weapons for Ukraine .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is under fire amid a Hawaii trip, tensions rise on the Korean peninsula, and the United States green-lights new weapons for Ukraine.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
A New Diplomatic Channel Between Washington and Beijing
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo traveled to Hawaii this week for private meetings with his Chinese counterpart that were shrouded in secrecy—opening a new diplomatic channel between two countries that have been at loggerheads for months over the coronavirus pandemic, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
Pompeo met with China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, on Tuesday and Wednesday, though there are few details about what was discussed. A State Department readout said they spoke about the need for “fully reciprocal” deals on security and trade issues, and that Pompeo stressed the need for “full transparency and information sharing” on the pandemic.
In recent months, U.S. President Donald Trump has blamed China for fumbling its response at the beginning of the pandemic, and China has shot back with its own brand of bellicose diplomacy.
He said, Xi said. Underscoring the gap between China and the United States is the fact that neither agree on who requested the meeting, as the Washington Post reports. Diplomats on both sides told foreign counterparts that it was the other country that first asked for talks. It’s still unclear what the discussions accomplished, and neither side indicated whether there would be a follow-up.
Something to keep in mind. The United States can’t tackle the North Korea problem without China, the country’s biggest benefactor. Pyongyang signaled its unhappiness with stalled nuclear talks this week with classic diplomatic subtlety: by blowing up South Korea’s de facto embassy in the north this week. Two summits between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un haven’t led to a breakthrough. And on Wednesday, North Korea announced that it would remilitarize parts of the border where both countries agreed to reduce tensions just two years ago.
Bolton bombshells hit Pompeo. Pompeo’s trip to Hawaii was overshadowed by his former colleague, former National Security Advisor John Bolton, whose book on his time in the Trump administration reportedly includes allegations that the secretary of state badmouthed the president behind closed doors. The New York Times, which got an advance copy of the book, reports that Bolton alleged Pompeo slipped him a note during the president’s meeting with Kim in 2018 that said Trump was “so full of shit”—though a source close to Pompeo disputes this account, according to Politico’s Jake Sherman.
Pompeo is one of Trump’s closest confidantes, working to ensure there is never any daylight between him and the president. Revelations that Pompeo disparaged Trump could undercut their relationship. Maligning Trump in private ended badly for Pompeo’s predecessor, Rex Tillerson, who reportedly called Trump a “moron” after a July 2017 meeting at the Pentagon. Seven months later, Trump fired Tillerson via Twitter.
What We’re Watching
U.S. military aid to Ukraine. The U.S. Congress approved a $250 million defense package for Ukraine last week, aimed at boosting Ukrainian military capabilities in the face of Russian aggression. The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv announced on Wednesday that $60 million worth of weapons and other military equipment was en route to Ukraine as part of the package. Military aid to Ukraine became a hot-button issue last year, when it was revealed that Trump had ordered his administration to withhold assistance to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate the business dealings of the family of Joe Biden—leading to Trump’s impeachment.
Russian aircraft in Libya. The U.S. Defense Department has spotted Russian aircraft in Libya aiding Wagner Group paramilitaries in the war-torn country, the U.S. Africa Command said in a statement this morning. On a call with reporters, U.S. Europe and Africa Air Forces chief Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian said the number of Russian aircraft is in the “upper teens.” If Russia gains a more permanent foothold, “that’s going to be a significant security concern” to Europe, Harrigian said.
All quiet on the southern front? China is tamping down conflict on its border with India after the country’s deadliest military action in decades: Clashes on Monday between its troops and Indian forces left at least 20 Indian soldiers dead. The number of Chinese casualties is not known, but it could be as many as 35. Beijing has gone uncharacteristically quiet on the matter, potentially paving the way for talks to de-escalate tensions between the two nuclear powers.
Movers and Shakers
Wednesday night massacre. All four heads of the media organizations under the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) have been sacked in an unprecedented move. The heads of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East Broadcasting Network, and the Open Technology Fund were all fired Wednesday evening, officials and congressional aides told Foreign Policy.
Top leaders at the Voice of America (VOA), which is also under USAGM, resigned earlier in the week. The shake-up comes after Trump railed against VOA—a U.S.-funded but independent agency—and accused it of spreading Chinese propaganda. Democratic lawmakers have condemned the firings, which they say undercut the organizations’ independence.
Michael Pack, a former conservative filmmaker and an associate of former White House strategist Steve Bannon, was confirmed this month as the new USAGM chief despite an investigation by the D.C. attorney general for improperly using funds from his former nonprofit.
Foreign Policy Recommends
U.S. sailors implicated in sex trafficking ring. An deeply reported investigation by the Military Times lays bare the extent of sex crimes committed by U.S. sailors in Bahrain, including the trafficking of women and potentially underage girls for prostitution in U.S. taxpayer-funded housing. The U.S. Navy says it has the issue under control after investigations in 2017 and 2018.
The Week Ahead
Former Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah will discuss the Afghan peace talks in an event hosted by the United States Institute of Peace next Wednesday, June 24. Abdullah was recently appointed chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, which will oversee the Afghan government’s talks with the Taliban.
Odds and Ends
No happy birthday for Xi. Since taking office, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has never missed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s birthday, always sending a pleasant birthday message to his Chinese counterpart. Not this this year—which is unsurprising, given the worsening relations between India and China.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.