foreignpolicy--2020-01-28--How Ukraine Vanished in the Fog of Impeachment

How Ukraine Vanished in the Fog of Impeachment Last week , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reportedly posed a rhetorical question to an NPR reporter : “ Do you think Americans care about Ukraine ?
” By scheduling his own visit to Ukraine on Friday , Jan. 31 , Pompeo is demonstrating that they should .
Indeed , his visit is a timely reminder that this vast European country ’ s success in overcoming Russian aggression and reforming a corrupt politico-economic system is far more important to the United States than merely serving as a backdrop for U.S. domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of more than 40 million people , the largest country geographically that is fully within Europe , a potential agricultural and economic powerhouse , a barometer of the possibilities for success among other former Soviet states , and a country whose people share American values of freedom , democracy , human rights , and rule of law and who seek security in an existentially difficult environment .
Ukraine ’ s success—as a reforming democracy , a future member of trans-Atlantic institutions , and a bulwark against Russian aggression—is therefore of immense national security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States can stop and reverse Russian aggression in Ukraine , it can prevent it elsewhere—including against existing NATO allies , which the United States is obliged to protect .
If Ukraine , the cradle of Slavic civilization predating Moscow , succeeds as a freedom-loving , prosperous , and secure democracy , it gives the world enormous hope that Russia itself can one day change .
Just imagine if one day—instead of spending massive resources to defend itself and its allies against a belligerent Russia—the West can work together with a Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ life for the Russian people .
Imagine if Russia were to overcome its current plague of authoritarianism , corruption , aggression toward neighbors , subversion of NATO allies , and opportunistic support for disruptive forces and regimes globally .
Amid these threats and opportunities , Ukraine is key .
It is therefore a tragedy for both the United States and Ukraine that U.S. partisan politics , which have culminated in the ongoing impeachment process , have left Ukraine and its new , reform-minded president , Volodymyr Zelensky , exposed and relatively isolated .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is Russian President Vladimir Putin .
Pompeo ’ s visit is a critical opportunity to get U.S. support for Ukraine back on track .
And “ back ” on track is exactly the point .
For the first two and a half years of the Trump administration , U.S. policy toward Ukraine was quite strong .
In the early days of the Trump administration , there were major , complicated questions about the direction of U.S. policy .
Would the administration lift sanctions against Russia ?
Would it make some kind of grand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would trade recognition of Russia ’ s seizure of Ukrainian territory for some other deal in Syria or elsewhere ?
Would the administration recognize Russia ’ s claimed annexation of Crimea ?
Would it just become another frozen conflict ?
There were also a vast number of vacancies in key diplomatic positions ; at the time , no one was really representing the United States in the negotiating process about ending the war in eastern Ukraine .
Beginning in mid-2017 , and continuing until the impeachment investigation began in September 2019 , U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and enjoyed support across the administration , bipartisan support in Congress , and support among U.S. allies and in Ukraine itself .
The administration deliberately changed the language that had previously been used to describe the war .
Instead of “ the Ukraine conflict , ” the Trump administration referred to “ Russian aggression ” and “ occupation.
” Instead of a “ Non-Government-Controlled Area , ” the administration referred to “ Russian-controlled territory.
” Instead of “ Russian-backed separatists , ” the administration referred to “ Russian-led forces.
” Instead of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ show restraint , the United States called for the “ withdrawal ” of Russian forces and the “ dismantling ” of the “ so-called People ’ s Republics.
” This change in language helped to clarify Russia ’ s responsibility for the war , maintain strong European opposition to Russia ’ s occupation , sustain and strengthen U.S. sanctions , and keep EU sanctions against Russia in place .
The Trump administration also coordinated Ukraine policy closely with allies in Europe and Canada—maintaining a united front against Russian aggression and in favor of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sovereignty , and territorial integrity .
Ukraine policy is one of the few areas where U.S. and European policies have been in lockstep .
The administration lifted the Obama-era ban on the sale of lethal defensive arms to Ukraine , delivering , among other things , Javelin anti-tank missiles , coast guard cutters , and anti-sniper systems .
Despite the recent furor over the pause in U.S. security assistance this past summer , the circumstances of which are the topic of impeachment hearings , U.S. defensive support for Ukraine has been and remains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Pompeo issued the “ Crimea Declaration , ” which—like the Welles Declaration of 1940 concerning the Baltic States—clearly and definitively laid out the United States ’ policy of nonrecognition of Russia ’ s claimed annexation of Crimea .
Despite major flaws in the Minsk agreements , the administration recognized that they are the only post-conflict documents in which Russia formally recognizes Ukraine ’ s territorial integrity .
The administration therefore insisted on the full and faithful implementation of the Minsk agreements by Russia , which includes Russia handing back control of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukrainian authorities .
Whereas France and Germany have been reluctant to put pressure on Russia publicly , instead calling on “ both sides ” to take steps , the United States was more outspoken and direct in calling on Russia to fulfill its obligations under Minsk , including the withdrawal of foreign forces , disbanding of illegal armed groups , and dismantling of the so-called People ’ s Republics .
Since September 2019 , these U.S. polices—while unchanged—have lacked focus and energy .
Partisan politics , and in particular the impeachment process , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukraine either to leave government or hunker down to avoid getting caught in the crossfire .
As a result , there was little U.S. engagement and coordination in the run-up to the Normandy format summit , which took place on Dec. 9 , 2019 .
In the press conference that followed , Putin , sitting beside French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel , rejected any Russian responsibility for the war , instead saying the conflict was an internal Ukrainian matter and calling on Ukraine to negotiate directly with the “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
Neither Macron nor Merkel pushed back , and no U.S. voice was heard afterward .
On returning to Moscow , Putin further said that restoring Ukrainian control of its side of the international border with Russia—a critical element of the Minsk agreements—would lead to another Srebrenica-like massacre .
Putin ’ s statement , which directly contradicts Russia ’ s obligations under Minsk , went uncontested by the United States and Europe .
On Dec. 23 , Russia took a further step toward cementing its grip on Crimea .
Putin rode the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bridge to Crimea , opening a new supply route to the peninsula directly from Russian territory .
The European Union condemned the move .
The United States was silent .
On Jan. 15 , Putin replaced Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev , and on Jan. 25 , Vladislav Surkov , until then Russia ’ s point person on the Ukrainian occupation ( as well as its support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia , in Georgia ) , reportedly resigned .
These changes have potentially major implications for Russia ’ s Ukraine policy .
Again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ One key part of the problem is that the impeachment process has sidelined most of the personnel charged with Ukraine policy .
The administration decided not to name a new U.S. special representative following my departure on Sept. 27 , 2019 .
No new U.S. ambassador has been nominated and confirmed .
Philip Reeker , while doing an exceptional job as acting assistant secretary of state , can not give Ukraine the day-to-day focus it needs .
Tim Morrison , Fiona Hill , Marie Yovanovitch , Wess Mitchell , and Bill Taylor are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has distanced himself from those who remain in office , leaving foreign interlocutors to wonder whether they can actually speak on behalf of U.S. policy .
And other officials are reluctant to take on Ukraine policy because of unwanted political , or even legal , exposure .
This is why Pompeo ’ s trip is so important .
Only Pompeo can give an authoritative statement of continued , strong U.S. support for Ukraine .
Ideally , the Pompeo visit should accomplish several things .
First , the secretary should publicly announce the nomination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who will have the full confidence of the administration .
He should also designate Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun—who has a strong personal record and bipartisan credibility on issues of defending emerging European democracies against Russian aggression—as the administration ’ s point person for future Ukraine negotiations .
Rhetorically , at a time when impeachment has taken over U.S. dialogue about Ukraine , Pompeo should reaffirm U.S. support for the full restoration of Ukraine ’ s sovereignty and territorial integrity , including over the Crimean Peninsula ( something Pompeo is uniquely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2018 declaration ) .
He should also reiterate U.S. support for Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU and commit to pursue an increase in U.S. defense assistance to Ukraine in 2021 and to approve foreign military sales to Ukraine , including additional Javelin anti-tank missiles .
He should also voice U.S. support for Ukraine ’ s recent agreement with Russia on gas transits while affirming U.S. opposition to the completion of the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 pipeline .
Pompeo should also reaffirm strong U.S. support—and high expectations—for Zelensky ’ s efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This should include a strong U.S. push for antitrust legislation to break up the oligarchic system that has held Ukraine back for decades .
Finally , Pompeo should come to Kyiv prepared to announce the date ( post-Senate vote on impeachment ) of a future White House visit for Zelensky .
Despite the pressures and setbacks that have confronted him since the summer , Zelensky remains the best hope for Ukraine in terms of creating substantial reforms that break the oligarchs ’ grip on the country and restoring sovereignty over the Donbass .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ efforts .
Pompeo ’ s visit to Ukraine is an important opportunity to finally make that a reality .

Last week, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reportedly posed a rhetorical question to an NPR reporter: “Do you think Americans care about Ukraine?” By scheduling his own visit to Ukraine on Friday, Jan. 31, Pompeo is demonstrating that they should. Indeed, his visit is a timely reminder that this vast European country’s success in overcoming Russian aggression and reforming a corrupt politico-economic system is far more important to the United States than merely serving as a backdrop for U.S. domestic political battles.
Last week, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reportedly posed a rhetorical question to an NPR reporter: “Do you think Americans care about Ukraine?” By scheduling his own visit to Ukraine on Friday, Jan. 31, Pompeo is demonstrating that they should. Indeed, his visit is a timely reminder that this vast European country’s success in overcoming Russian aggression and reforming a corrupt politico-economic system is far more important to the United States than merely serving as a backdrop for U.S. domestic political battles.
Ukraine is a nation of more than 40 million people, the largest country geographically that is fully within Europe, a potential agricultural and economic powerhouse, a barometer of the possibilities for success among other former Soviet states, and a country whose people share American values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of law and who seek security in an existentially difficult environment. Ukraine’s success—as a reforming democracy, a future member of trans-Atlantic institutions, and a bulwark against Russian aggression—is therefore of immense national security importance to the United States. If the United States can stop and reverse Russian aggression in Ukraine, it can prevent it elsewhere—including against existing NATO allies, which the United States is obliged to protect.
If Ukraine, the cradle of Slavic civilization predating Moscow, succeeds as a freedom-loving, prosperous, and secure democracy, it gives the world enormous hope that Russia itself can one day change. Just imagine if one day—instead of spending massive resources to defend itself and its allies against a belligerent Russia—the West can work together with a Russia that is focused on providing a better life for the Russian people. Imagine if Russia were to overcome its current plague of authoritarianism, corruption, aggression toward neighbors, subversion of NATO allies, and opportunistic support for disruptive forces and regimes globally. Amid these threats and opportunities, Ukraine is key.
It is therefore a tragedy for both the United States and Ukraine that U.S. partisan politics, which have culminated in the ongoing impeachment process, have left Ukraine and its new, reform-minded president, Volodymyr Zelensky, exposed and relatively isolated. The only one who benefits from this is Russian President Vladimir Putin. Pompeo’s visit is a critical opportunity to get U.S. support for Ukraine back on track.
And “back” on track is exactly the point. For the first two and a half years of the Trump administration, U.S. policy toward Ukraine was quite strong. In the early days of the Trump administration, there were major, complicated questions about the direction of U.S. policy. Would the administration lift sanctions against Russia? Would it make some kind of grand bargain with Russia, in which it would trade recognition of Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian territory for some other deal in Syria or elsewhere? Would the administration recognize Russia’s claimed annexation of Crimea? Would it just become another frozen conflict? There were also a vast number of vacancies in key diplomatic positions; at the time, no one was really representing the United States in the negotiating process about ending the war in eastern Ukraine.
Beginning in mid-2017, and continuing until the impeachment investigation began in September 2019, U.S. policy toward Ukraine was strong, consistent, and enjoyed support across the administration, bipartisan support in Congress, and support among U.S. allies and in Ukraine itself. The administration deliberately changed the language that had previously been used to describe the war. Instead of “the Ukraine conflict,” the Trump administration referred to “Russian aggression” and “occupation.” Instead of a “Non-Government-Controlled Area,” the administration referred to “Russian-controlled territory.” Instead of “Russian-backed separatists,” the administration referred to “Russian-led forces.” Instead of calling for “both sides” to show restraint, the United States called for the “withdrawal” of Russian forces and the “dismantling” of the “so-called People’s Republics.” This change in language helped to clarify Russia’s responsibility for the war, maintain strong European opposition to Russia’s occupation, sustain and strengthen U.S. sanctions, and keep EU sanctions against Russia in place.
The Trump administration also coordinated Ukraine policy closely with allies in Europe and Canada—maintaining a united front against Russian aggression and in favor of Ukraine’s democracy, reform, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Ukraine policy is one of the few areas where U.S. and European policies have been in lockstep. The administration lifted the Obama-era ban on the sale of lethal defensive arms to Ukraine, delivering, among other things, Javelin anti-tank missiles, coast guard cutters, and anti-sniper systems. Despite the recent furor over the pause in U.S. security assistance this past summer, the circumstances of which are the topic of impeachment hearings, U.S. defensive support for Ukraine has been and remains robust.
On July 25, 2018, Pompeo issued the “Crimea Declaration,” which—like the Welles Declaration of 1940 concerning the Baltic States—clearly and definitively laid out the United States’ policy of nonrecognition of Russia’s claimed annexation of Crimea. Despite major flaws in the Minsk agreements, the administration recognized that they are the only post-conflict documents in which Russia formally recognizes Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The administration therefore insisted on the full and faithful implementation of the Minsk agreements by Russia, which includes Russia handing back control of the Ukrainian side of the international border to Ukrainian authorities. Whereas France and Germany have been reluctant to put pressure on Russia publicly, instead calling on “both sides” to take steps, the United States was more outspoken and direct in calling on Russia to fulfill its obligations under Minsk, including the withdrawal of foreign forces, disbanding of illegal armed groups, and dismantling of the so-called People’s Republics.
Since September 2019, these U.S. polices—while unchanged—have lacked focus and energy. Partisan politics, and in particular the impeachment process, caused most officials dealing with expertise on Ukraine either to leave government or hunker down to avoid getting caught in the crossfire.
As a result, there was little U.S. engagement and coordination in the run-up to the Normandy format summit, which took place on Dec. 9, 2019. In the press conference that followed, Putin, sitting beside French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, rejected any Russian responsibility for the war, instead saying the conflict was an internal Ukrainian matter and calling on Ukraine to negotiate directly with the “separatist” regimes (which Russia controls). Neither Macron nor Merkel pushed back, and no U.S. voice was heard afterward.
On returning to Moscow, Putin further said that restoring Ukrainian control of its side of the international border with Russia—a critical element of the Minsk agreements—would lead to another Srebrenica-like massacre. Putin’s statement, which directly contradicts Russia’s obligations under Minsk, went uncontested by the United States and Europe. On Dec. 23, Russia took a further step toward cementing its grip on Crimea. Putin rode the first railroad train across the Kerch Strait bridge to Crimea, opening a new supply route to the peninsula directly from Russian territory. The European Union condemned the move. The United States was silent. On Jan. 15, Putin replaced Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and on Jan. 25, Vladislav Surkov, until then Russia’s point person on the Ukrainian occupation (as well as its support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Georgia), reportedly resigned. These changes have potentially major implications for Russia’s Ukraine policy. Again, silence from the United States.
One key part of the problem is that the impeachment process has sidelined most of the personnel charged with Ukraine policy. The administration decided not to name a new U.S. special representative following my departure on Sept. 27, 2019. No new U.S. ambassador has been nominated and confirmed. Philip Reeker, while doing an exceptional job as acting assistant secretary of state, cannot give Ukraine the day-to-day focus it needs. Tim Morrison, Fiona Hill, Marie Yovanovitch, Wess Mitchell, and Bill Taylor are all long since gone. The president has distanced himself from those who remain in office, leaving foreign interlocutors to wonder whether they can actually speak on behalf of U.S. policy. And other officials are reluctant to take on Ukraine policy because of unwanted political, or even legal, exposure.
This is why Pompeo’s trip is so important. Only Pompeo can give an authoritative statement of continued, strong U.S. support for Ukraine. Ideally, the Pompeo visit should accomplish several things.
First, the secretary should publicly announce the nomination of a new U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, who will have the full confidence of the administration. He should also designate Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun—who has a strong personal record and bipartisan credibility on issues of defending emerging European democracies against Russian aggression—as the administration’s point person for future Ukraine negotiations.
Rhetorically, at a time when impeachment has taken over U.S. dialogue about Ukraine, Pompeo should reaffirm U.S. support for the full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including over the Crimean Peninsula (something Pompeo is uniquely positioned to do, given his July 2018 declaration). He should also reiterate U.S. support for Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU and commit to pursue an increase in U.S. defense assistance to Ukraine in 2021 and to approve foreign military sales to Ukraine, including additional Javelin anti-tank missiles. He should also voice U.S. support for Ukraine’s recent agreement with Russia on gas transits while affirming U.S. opposition to the completion of the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
Pompeo should also reaffirm strong U.S. support—and high expectations—for Zelensky’s efforts to fight corruption and implement needed reforms. This should include a strong U.S. push for antitrust legislation to break up the oligarchic system that has held Ukraine back for decades.
Finally, Pompeo should come to Kyiv prepared to announce the date (post-Senate vote on impeachment) of a future White House visit for Zelensky.
Despite the pressures and setbacks that have confronted him since the summer, Zelensky remains the best hope for Ukraine in terms of creating substantial reforms that break the oligarchs’ grip on the country and restoring sovereignty over the Donbass. Zelensky deserves full U.S. support in these efforts. Pompeo’s visit to Ukraine is an important opportunity to finally make that a reality.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-28--Kim Jong Un Rides to His Family’s Battles

A new film has been airing daily on North Korean television recounting Kim Jong Un ’ s “ legendary miracle year of 2019.
” Opening with a smiling Kim astride his white horse on the snowcapped summit of Mount Paektu , the two-and-a-half-hour feature shows the portly dictator hosting Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Pyongyang , greeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok , and defiantly facing down U.S. President Donald Trump at summit after summit as he denounces U.S. sanctions and vows to follow a “ new path.
” There have been repeated hints since the start of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might involve , with Kim threatening to unveil a “ new strategic weapon ” and warning that North Korea is no longer bound by its self-imposed nuclear test moratorium .
While he has not closed the door entirely to further talks with Trump , the message the North Korean leader is now delivering to his citizens is that they should be prepared for a prolonged struggle and no short-term sanctions relief , with blame squarely aimed at the “ hostile forces ” whose scheme to “ isolate and crush us to death is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Kim and his top officials riding into the sunset on Mount Paektu , accompanied by rousing martial music , as the narrator urges viewers to follow the leader ’ s example and “ advance , advance , advance.
” Behind these horseback exploits and the fiery rhetoric is an old , almost entirely fictional story that the Kim regime has relied on for generations .
With stalled denuclearization talks now deadlocked and a return to military threats , it ’ s important to understand this familial-national myth and the reality Kim Jong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insists he is protecting his country from the nuclear threat posed by the United States and that the hardship his citizens must endure is the result of American hostility .
A good place to start is Mount Paektu , where the current leader ’ s grandfather , Kim Il Sung , supposedly waged a guerrilla struggle to liberate the country from Japanese colonial rule in the mid-20 century .
Revered both north and south of the border as the ancient birthplace of the Korean people , the first Kim is meant to have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mountain , conveniently linking the family dynasty with existing mythology .
His son , Kim Jong Il , is said to have been born during the conflict ( his birth preceded by the appearance of a new star in the sky and a double rainbow ) , neatly tying him to the story and reinforcing his claim to rule as a direct descendant of the “ Paektu bloodline , ” as the Kim family now refers to its lineage .
In some North Korean books , you can still find references to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan , but most of the credit is given to Kim Il Sung , who is described in the regime ’ s propaganda as “ the anti-Japanese legendary brilliant commander.
” As the Pyongyang-published Outstanding Leadership and Brilliant Victory explains , “ President Kim Il Sung , the peerless patriot … led the Korean people to victory in the anti-Japanese revolutionary war by employing Protean tactics of guerrilla warfare , and liberated the country on August 15 , 1945.
” In fact , the future leader was not even in the country at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ great liberation war .
Japan ’ s control of Korea ended with its surrender to the Allied powers at the conclusion of World War II , not as the result of a battle with Kim Il Sung .
While it is true that he was a guerrilla fighter , Kim fought primarily in Manchuria , northeastern China , not on Mount Paektu , and his struggle was over by the winter of 1940-1941 , when he fled across the border into the Soviet Union .
According to a report from the Soviet archives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict with a Red Army unit in the Russian far east , where Kim Jong Il was really born .
When he returned home in September 1945 , it was not at the head of a victorious army but as an unremarkable young man on board a Soviet naval ship .
Fortunately for Kim , he had some powerful help building up his image .
With Cold War tensions escalating and the better-known U.S.-backed Syngman Rhee in the south , Soviet leader Joseph Stalin needed a credible leader to hold his own in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not the Soviets ’ first choice , but once he had been selected , Stalin ’ s officials set about promoting him , embellishing his guerrilla credentials , and laying the foundations for the cult of personality that persists to this day .
That first purported victory over Japan became the basis for Kim ’ s second great myth , as he claimed to have harnessed his earlier guerrilla experience to defeat the United States in the Korean War .
Here , too , the history has been twisted and wildly distorted , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that North Korea was attacked by the United States and its “ puppet army ” in South Korea at the start of the conflict in June 1950 , instead of the truth that Kim Il Sung invaded the south .
But thanks to their leader ’ s strategic genius , so the official story goes , Kim ’ s forces prevailed , winning the conflict known there as the Fatherland Liberation War .
“ On the basis of the rich experience and diverse tactics he had accumulated and created in the days of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kim ’ s propagandists explain , “ he defeated the US imperialists who had been making a show of their power , believing in their numerical and technical superiority.
” It was , they note , his second great victory , as he vanquished “ two imperialisms—Japan and the United States—in a single generation and demonstrated the heroic mettle of the Korean people to the whole word.
” This is the history his grandson Kim Jong Un now invokes as he positions himself as the new great savior of the nation , securing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles—or as he put it in his latest speech , “ defending ourselves by bolstering up our power sufficiently enough to keep the hostile forces at bay.
” And it helps explain why Kim has taken to touring these mythical battle sites on horseback of late , reminding his compatriots of the great struggle his ancestors are supposed to have waged and in whose illustrious footsteps he purports to follow .
“ Riding a steed across the vast area of Mount Paektu , ” the report on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ he recollected the bloody history of the guerrillas who recorded dignity on the first page of the history of the Korean revolution by shedding their blood in the vast plain of Mount Paektu.
” Calling on his people to “ instill the indefatigable revolutionary spirit of Mount Paektu , ” he urged them to defy the “ unprecedented blockade and pressure imposed by the imperialists ” and to prepare for “ the harshness and protracted character of our revolution.
” Just as his grandfather faced down their past enemies on this battlefield @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jong Un claims to be waging his own battle against the country ’ s contemporary adversaries , chief among them of course , the United States .
This does not just apply to military matters .
When Kim opened a new ski resort and hot springs facility last month , for instance , the party newspaper described the achievement as a “ decisive match fought without guns ” and a victory over “ the enemies who adamantly attempt to halt our advance.
” All of the country ’ s problems—its citizens ’ hunger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these external enemies , not the policies of the leadership .
As Kim now returns to the path of overt weapons development and provocation , he will double down on this narrative , framing any new crisis as just the latest campaign in the country ’ s decadeslong struggle for survival and sovereignty .
While his citizens continue to suffer the consequences of his actions with another year of sanctions and shortages ahead , Kim will continue to insist that he is the hero , not the villain , of the story .

A new film has been airing daily on North Korean television recounting Kim Jong Un’s “legendary miracle year of 2019.” Opening with a smiling Kim astride his white horse on the snowcapped summit of Mount Paektu, the two-and-a-half-hour feature shows the portly dictator hosting Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Pyongyang, greeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok, and defiantly facing down U.S. President Donald Trump at summit after summit as he denounces U.S. sanctions and vows to follow a “new path.”
A new film has been airing daily on North Korean television recounting Kim Jong Un’s “legendary miracle year of 2019.” Opening with a smiling Kim astride his white horse on the snowcapped summit of Mount Paektu, the two-and-a-half-hour feature shows the portly dictator hosting Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Pyongyang, greeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok, and defiantly facing down U.S. President Donald Trump at summit after summit as he denounces U.S. sanctions and vows to follow a “new path.”
There have been repeated hints since the start of the year as to what this new path might involve, with Kim threatening to unveil a “new strategic weapon” and warning that North Korea is no longer bound by its self-imposed nuclear test moratorium. While he has not closed the door entirely to further talks with Trump, the message the North Korean leader is now delivering to his citizens is that they should be prepared for a prolonged struggle and no short-term sanctions relief, with blame squarely aimed at the “hostile forces” whose scheme to “isolate and crush us to death is at its height.” The film ends with Kim and his top officials riding into the sunset on Mount Paektu, accompanied by rousing martial music, as the narrator urges viewers to follow the leader’s example and “advance, advance, advance.”
Behind these horseback exploits and the fiery rhetoric is an old, almost entirely fictional story that the Kim regime has relied on for generations. With stalled denuclearization talks now deadlocked and a return to military threats, it’s important to understand this familial-national myth and the reality Kim Jong Un presents at home, as he insists he is protecting his country from the nuclear threat posed by the United States and that the hardship his citizens must endure is the result of American hostility.
A good place to start is Mount Paektu, where the current leader’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, supposedly waged a guerrilla struggle to liberate the country from Japanese colonial rule in the mid-20 century. Revered both north and south of the border as the ancient birthplace of the Korean people, the first Kim is meant to have fought from secret bases around the sacred mountain, conveniently linking the family dynasty with existing mythology. His son, Kim Jong Il, is said to have been born during the conflict (his birth preceded by the appearance of a new star in the sky and a double rainbow), neatly tying him to the story and reinforcing his claim to rule as a direct descendant of the “Paektu bloodline,” as the Kim family now refers to its lineage.
In some North Korean books, you can still find references to the Soviet army’s role in defeating Japan, but most of the credit is given to Kim Il Sung, who is described in the regime’s propaganda as “the anti-Japanese legendary brilliant commander.” As the Pyongyang-published Outstanding Leadership and Brilliant Victory explains, “President Kim Il Sung, the peerless patriot … led the Korean people to victory in the anti-Japanese revolutionary war by employing Protean tactics of guerrilla warfare, and liberated the country on August 15, 1945.”
In fact, the future leader was not even in the country at the time, let alone mounting a great liberation war. Japan’s control of Korea ended with its surrender to the Allied powers at the conclusion of World War II, not as the result of a battle with Kim Il Sung. While it is true that he was a guerrilla fighter, Kim fought primarily in Manchuria, northeastern China, not on Mount Paektu, and his struggle was over by the winter of 1940-1941, when he fled across the border into the Soviet Union. According to a report from the Soviet archives, he spent the rest of the conflict with a Red Army unit in the Russian far east, where Kim Jong Il was really born. When he returned home in September 1945, it was not at the head of a victorious army but as an unremarkable young man on board a Soviet naval ship.
Fortunately for Kim, he had some powerful help building up his image. With Cold War tensions escalating and the better-known U.S.-backed Syngman Rhee in the south, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin needed a credible leader to hold his own in the north. Kim Il Sung was not the Soviets’ first choice, but once he had been selected, Stalin’s officials set about promoting him, embellishing his guerrilla credentials, and laying the foundations for the cult of personality that persists to this day.
That first purported victory over Japan became the basis for Kim’s second great myth, as he claimed to have harnessed his earlier guerrilla experience to defeat the United States in the Korean War. Here, too, the history has been twisted and wildly distorted, with the Kim regime telling its citizens that North Korea was attacked by the United States and its “puppet army” in South Korea at the start of the conflict in June 1950, instead of the truth that Kim Il Sung invaded the south. But thanks to their leader’s strategic genius, so the official story goes, Kim’s forces prevailed, winning the conflict known there as the Fatherland Liberation War.
“On the basis of the rich experience and diverse tactics he had accumulated and created in the days of the arduous anti-Japanese armed struggle,” Kim’s propagandists explain, “he defeated the US imperialists who had been making a show of their power, believing in their numerical and technical superiority.” It was, they note, his second great victory, as he vanquished “two imperialisms—Japan and the United States—in a single generation and demonstrated the heroic mettle of the Korean people to the whole word.”
This is the history his grandson Kim Jong Un now invokes as he positions himself as the new great savior of the nation, securing the country this time through his pursuit of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles—or as he put it in his latest speech, “defending ourselves by bolstering up our power sufficiently enough to keep the hostile forces at bay.”
And it helps explain why Kim has taken to touring these mythical battle sites on horseback of late, reminding his compatriots of the great struggle his ancestors are supposed to have waged and in whose illustrious footsteps he purports to follow. “Riding a steed across the vast area of Mount Paektu,” the report on Kim’s December outing noted, “he recollected the bloody history of the guerrillas who recorded dignity on the first page of the history of the Korean revolution by shedding their blood in the vast plain of Mount Paektu.” Calling on his people to “instill the indefatigable revolutionary spirit of Mount Paektu,” he urged them to defy the “unprecedented blockade and pressure imposed by the imperialists” and to prepare for “the harshness and protracted character of our revolution.”
Just as his grandfather faced down their past enemies on this battlefield, in other words, so Kim Jong Un claims to be waging his own battle against the country’s contemporary adversaries, chief among them of course, the United States.
This does not just apply to military matters. When Kim opened a new ski resort and hot springs facility last month, for instance, the party newspaper described the achievement as a “decisive match fought without guns” and a victory over “the enemies who adamantly attempt to halt our advance.” All of the country’s problems—its citizens’ hunger, isolation, and hardship—are blamed on these external enemies, not the policies of the leadership.
As Kim now returns to the path of overt weapons development and provocation, he will double down on this narrative, framing any new crisis as just the latest campaign in the country’s decadeslong struggle for survival and sovereignty. While his citizens continue to suffer the consequences of his actions with another year of sanctions and shortages ahead, Kim will continue to insist that he is the hero, not the villain, of the story.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-29--Boris Johnson’s New Scramble for Africa

Boris Johnson’s New Scramble for Africa

LONDON—It was the maiden voyage of “ Global Britain , ” as Prime Minister Boris Johnson played host to African leaders and representatives in London on Jan. 20 .
Soon to be free to set its own trade agenda , with Brexit taking effect on Jan. 31 , the United Kingdom hopes to project the image of a nation untethered from the rules and regulations of the European Union .
Africa—with its rapidly growing populations and economies , rising middle class , and recent ratification of a continentwide free trade agreement—was as good a place as any to start .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that outstrips much of Asia , all of Latin America , and the average of the world ’ s developed economies , there is little doubting the money to be made in Africa , too .
However , a splashy summit and tall talk will not do the trick .
Reaching Britain ’ s goals will require a scale of investment and a humbling of its traditional role as a great power , of which the government gives no guarantee .
Although the prime minister tried not to wade into the waters of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has so often done in the past , Johnson remained committed to the idea that the U.K. can overcome Africa ’ s “ suitors ” to become the “ obvious partner of choice.
” It was a tired recapitulation of an old trope—competition on the continent , a “ scramble for Africa ” —which reflects neither Africa ’ s politics nor Britain ’ s prospects in the 21st century .
 For all the ambitions of the Global Britain agenda , however , the summit was a rather muted event .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Russia-Africa Summit last year , when Russian President Vladimir Putin showed off his jets and tanks at his seaside resort in Sochi .
Neither was there any of the grandeur of the most recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2018 , when Xi Jinping feted 51 African leaders in Beijing ’ s Great Hall of the People as he promised world-historical transformation— “ The ocean is vast because it rejects no rivers , ” Xi prophesied of the opportunities China and Africa shared .
Nor did it seem to show the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ summit in 2014 , when 37 African heads of state gathered in Washington as then-President Barack Obama advanced a range of health , security , and investment initiatives while knocking Chinese intentions on the continent .
But it was still a productive day for the 13 African leaders who made the frosty trek to a blocky InterContinental Hotel on the Greenwich Peninsula , an industrial stretch of land in southeast London .
Indeed , it was likely all the more productive for focusing on trade and investment , rather than the conflict and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as of late .
“ The world needs to be seeing Africa less as a problem and more as an opportunity , ” said Gyude Moore , Liberia ’ s former public works minister and a fellow at the Center for Global Development .
The crowd in London seemed to agree .
“ Let us seize the opportunities that are before us here today , ” Johnson told the representatives of the governments and corporations in attendance .
His goals , though pacific , were still ambitious .
Within two years , Britain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Africa—a feat that will require a 75 percent increase in capital invested to top the United States and a more than 90 percent increase to top France .
To be sure , this goal is largely , if not entirely , implausible .
The prime minister can not command the private sector to deploy the necessary $ 16 billion to Africa in order to achieve his ambitions there , and it is highly unlikely that the Department for International Development ( which the prime minister is considering closing ) would cough up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ either .
That French President Emmanuel Macron is equally eager to reshape French-African relations and will be hosting a summit of his own this summer makes Britain ’ s goal even less achievable .
Nevertheless , the U.K.-Africa sessions succeeded in broadening the traditional horizons of political summitry from its focus on conflict and development to sustainable finance , infrastructure , and clean energy .
This was a sure step in the right direction , but there is still much work to be done .
Within two years , Britain aims to become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that will require a 75 percent increase in capital invested to top the United States and a more than 90 percent increase to top France .
To be sure , this goal is largely , if not entirely , implausible .
The first task , said Emma Wade-Smith , the British trade commissioner for Africa , is diversification .
Given the concentration of British capital in a few select—and underperforming—countries and industries , this much is long overdue .
At present , 30 percent of the U.K. ’ s foreign direct investment in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is located in South Africa .
The problem is not the sum ; it ’ s the proportion .
“ What we want to do is increase the flow of investments so we can see the numbers that we have in South Africa replicated elsewhere around the continent , ” Wade-Smith told Foreign Policy .
It makes sense that British investments would be so prominent in South Africa , a prized former colony where old interests and networks have endured and which continues to rank as the largest and one of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ given that the continent contains 27 of the world ’ s 50 fastest-growing economies , and that South Africa—with its 0.8 percent growth rate , intractable political problems , and ongoing battle against corruption—is not among them , opportunities to diversify would seem to abound .
Some of these lie within the U.K. ’ s traditional field of investment , such as Kenya , which has an economy less than one-third the size of South Africa ’ s and development scores that trail as well .
Nevertheless , Kenya has become a cornerstone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gateway to the Indian Ocean that represents 33 percent of East Africa ’ s rapidly growing market and boasts a growth rate of 6 percent .
It is hard for any African state to top Kenya ’ s economic profile , but still the country receives a paltry 2 percent of the U.K. ’ s investment in the continent .
This shouldn ’ t be the case , said Nicolle Richards , the head of investor relations at Lendable Marketplace , a financial services firm in Nairobi .
“ There ’ s a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argued , “ and not just for development organizations.
” This much has grown increasingly clear in the case of Kenya ’ s technology sector , what some have taken to calling the “ Silicon Savannah.
” Last year , Nairobi ’ s burgeoning start-up scene attracted $ 149 million in funding , leading the field of the African tech market , which brought in a total of $ 492 million .
Contributing to the industry ’ s success were profitable , scalable start-ups such as Lori Systems , an “ Uber for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which is cutting the sky-high cost of logistics in Kenya by providing trucks and truck drivers to suppliers at the click of a button—and wooing a number of Chinese , American , and Nigerian investors in the process .
There is also M-Kopa , an impressive pay-as-you-go solar energy company that has been able to deliver affordable electricity to hundreds of thousands of Kenyans through a savvy mobile payment system .
Kenya ’ s highly advanced financial technology ( fintech ) sector , where simple mobile payments are used for personal transactions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , makes this app and many others like it possible , not to mention profitable .
ITIKI , a drought-forecasting start-up that aims to improve crop yields and prepare farmers for the scourge of climate change , has become operational in Kenya , Mozambique , and South Africa as well .
“ People are very optimistic about what ’ s going on because start-ups here are solving real problems that no other businesses are trying to solve , ” Richards said .
But for all the opportunities on offer—in logistics and energy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to capital remains a key concern .
The cash shortage is only partially sensible .
To wary investors ’ credit , there have been few initial public offerings or acquisitions for Kenyan start-ups , meaning that there is no reliable route for earning returns .
However , the pace of innovation and the expanse of the market speak for themselves .
More than anything else , exposure to the Silicon Savannah and Africa ’ s tech scene appears to be the limiting factor .
As a result , Nairobi is a logical destination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government initiative hopes to bridge the capital gap .
“ Go Global Africa , ” launched last year , invites Kenyan , Nigerian , and South African start-ups to compete for a five-day training and networking session in the U.K. Its participants have already included leading lights such as Muthoni Masinde , the founder of ITIKI .
However , without any new investment pledges , and with only the annual competition on Go Global ’ s agenda , it is clear that the U.K. will have to redouble its efforts if it expects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is clear that the U.K. will have to redouble its efforts if it expects to make any real progress .
The situation is much the same on the other side of the continent , in Ghana , where a different British initiative seeks to assist a local agricultural renaissance .
Since taking office in 2017 , President Nana Akufo-Addo has made a push for greater agricultural productivity , sending thousands of government officials across the country on motorbikes to work with the country ’ s farmers .
Given that agricultural yields in sub-Saharan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of what they could be—due to the fact that just 4 to 6 percent of agricultural land is irrigated and best practices on which fertilizers and seeds to use are not always implemented—the upside potential is exceptional .
A new initiative of the British High Commission in Ghana , the Agricultural Transformation Programme , which was announced at the summit , hopes to advance this productivity project and benefit from its rewards .
Boasting a decently diversified , high-tech , multibillion-dollar industry of its own , Britain should be well placed to promote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certainly possesses the experience , technology , and capital to assist Ghana , by funding the government ’ s own campaign , educating farmers directly , providing and subsidizing proper seeds , or helping to irrigate the fields .
However , it ’ s not quite clear if and how Britain intends to do any of this .
The Agricultural Transformation Programme ’ s mandate , to “ develop new agriculture markets and climate resilience , ” is bold but vague .
Its machinations are , too .
Neither the Department for International @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could offer any information on how the program works , how it is run , or how it is funded .
Nevertheless , the direction of the pivot is promising .
As was Johnson ’ s pledge to forbid further investment in coal-related projects .
Such a sectoral shift will be important for the U.K. given that 51 percent of its investments in Africa are currently concentrated in extractive industries , according to the Overseas Development Institute .
It is also a laudable decision that cuts against the grain of some Chinese investments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 13 coal plants in Kenya , Malawi , Zimbabwe , South Africa , and Madagascar—and leaving public displeasure in their wake .
It helps , too , that Britain ’ s pivot will coincide with the environmentally conscious progress the African Union hopes to achieve by 2063 .
There is good reason to believe that the U.K. can diversify away from extractive industries and in line with the AU .
“ The world is changing , the U.K. economy is changing , and our expertise and experience are well beyond mining , oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the trade commissioner .
One such alternative area of expertise is infrastructure .
To be sure , the industry presents its fair share of challenges—China being chief among them .
No country can match the money Beijing pours into the continent , having pledged to spend $ 60 billion in the three years to 2021 , and no one can beat the excess capacity and low bids Chinese firms have to offer .
Nor , moreover , could any one nation construct , all at once , multiple railways in Nigeria , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Democratic Republic of the Congo , hundreds of miles of roads in Ghana , and sports stadiums in Rwanda , to name a few .
However , not all hope is lost for the U.K. , said Moore , the former Liberian public works minister .
When Moore was in office , a clear and lucrative opportunity for the U.K. emerged in the area of supervision .
“ One of the big problems we ’ ve had with Chinese construction is the quality of what is delivered , ” Moore said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kenya , a road in Zambia , and a hospital in Angola all attest to this .
To offset this risk , Moore would call on U.K.-based firms for the less exciting but equally important work of quality control .
IMC Worldwide , for example , a small firm based in southern England , has provided expert assistance to a handful of countries , including Liberia , as they—or the Chinese—build their roads .
Finding niches like these may not match the ambitions of the “ Global Britain ” agenda , and identifying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certainly not what the summit had in mind , but it may be all Britain has to offer .
The opportunity puts Britain in an uncomfortable position .
By any estimation , working alongside China is not the preferred outcome of a push into African industry .
In his opening remarks , Johnson made this clear as he sounded off on China , castigating its “ extraordinarily one-sided terms ” and its “ vast imported workforce.
” ( Experts have called into question the latter accusation , with recent research finding African workers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ labor on Chinese projects . )
But Britain may not have much of a choice on the matter .
“ The U.K. always had advantages but never actually paid attention to them until the rise of China and China ’ s domination of trade and commerce , ” Moore said .
Now those advantages , though still present , are slipping away .
A zero-sum push into Africa , in which Britain sees itself as a competitor in a latter-day scramble for the continent , determined to work against rather than with Africa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threatens to put the U.K. ’ s advantages to rest for good .
At one time or another , Global Britain will have to reckon with its outsized ambition—in Europe , in Africa , and around the world .
It will do no good to cast aspersions on Britain ’ s potential partners in Africa , the Chinese , or any of the continent ’ s other “ suitors , ” as the prime minister said in his opening remarks .
In the 21st century , such a strategy of unnecessarily opposing China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic prospects in Africa and elsewhere .
A Global Britain , loosely defined , remains possible , but a humbling will have to come first .
Although a recommitment to its relationship with African countries is important , the U.K. can not reasonably expect to out-invest the United States and France or outbid China .
Nor should it assume that half-measures and shortcuts , such as the Go Global tech campaign and the Agricultural Transformation Programme , will be able to grow and sustain ties to the continent .
The U.K. government can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the summit , that some 54 distinct African countries should select Britain—and Britain alone—to be their partner of choice .
Casting its relations with African states as a matter of geopolitical competition , and reproducing fading memories of imperial glory in the process , will not deliver results .
Back in his days as a journalist , Johnson memorably wrote of the African continent : “ The problem is not that we were once in charge , but that we are not in charge anymore.
” Fortunately , the revanchist rhetoric has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it should , too .

LONDON—It was the maiden voyage of “Global Britain,” as Prime Minister Boris Johnson played host to African leaders and representatives in London on Jan. 20. Soon to be free to set its own trade agenda, with Brexit taking effect on Jan. 31, the United Kingdom hopes to project the image of a nation untethered from the rules and regulations of the European Union. Africa—with its rapidly growing populations and economies , rising middle class , and recent ratification of a continentwide free trade agreement —was as good a place as any to start.
LONDON—It was the maiden voyage of “Global Britain,” as Prime Minister Boris Johnson played host to African leaders and representatives in London on Jan. 20. Soon to be free to set its own trade agenda, with Brexit taking effect on Jan. 31, the United Kingdom hopes to project the image of a nation untethered from the rules and regulations of the European Union. Africa—with its rapidly growing populations and economies, rising middle class, and recent ratification of a continentwide free trade agreement—was as good a place as any to start.
With a rate of return on investment that outstrips much of Asia, all of Latin America, and the average of the world’s developed economies, there is little doubting the money to be made in Africa, too. However, a splashy summit and tall talk will not do the trick. Reaching Britain’s goals will require a scale of investment and a humbling of its traditional role as a great power, of which the government gives no guarantee.
Although the prime minister tried not to wade into the waters of nostalgic imperialism at the summit, as he has so often done in the past, Johnson remained committed to the idea that the U.K. can overcome Africa’s “suitors” to become the “obvious partner of choice.” It was a tired recapitulation of an old trope—competition on the continent, a “scramble for Africa”—which reflects neither Africa’s politics nor Britain’s prospects in the 21st century.
For all the ambitions of the Global Britain agenda, however, the summit was a rather muted event. There was no show of force to rival the Russia-Africa Summit last year, when Russian President Vladimir Putin showed off his jets and tanks at his seaside resort in Sochi. Neither was there any of the grandeur of the most recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2018, when Xi Jinping feted 51 African leaders in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People as he promised world-historical transformation—“The ocean is vast because it rejects no rivers,” Xi prophesied of the opportunities China and Africa shared. Nor did it seem to show the same significance of the United States’ last summit in 2014, when 37 African heads of state gathered in Washington as then-President Barack Obama advanced a range of health, security, and investment initiatives while knocking Chinese intentions on the continent.
But it was still a productive day for the 13 African leaders who made the frosty trek to a blocky InterContinental Hotel on the Greenwich Peninsula, an industrial stretch of land in southeast London. Indeed, it was likely all the more productive for focusing on trade and investment, rather than the conflict and contestation that have consumed so many summits as of late. “The world needs to be seeing Africa less as a problem and more as an opportunity,” said Gyude Moore, Liberia’s former public works minister and a fellow at the Center for Global Development.
The crowd in London seemed to agree. “Let us seize the opportunities that are before us here today,” Johnson told the representatives of the governments and corporations in attendance. His goals, though pacific, were still ambitious. Within two years, Britain aims to become the largest G-7 investor in Africa—a feat that will require a 75 percent increase in capital invested to top the United States and a more than 90 percent increase to top France. To be sure, this goal is largely, if not entirely, implausible.
The prime minister cannot command the private sector to deploy the necessary $16 billion to Africa in order to achieve his ambitions there, and it is highly unlikely that the Department for International Development (which the prime minister is considering closing) would cough up 112 percent of its annual aid budget either. That French President Emmanuel Macron is equally eager to reshape French-African relations and will be hosting a summit of his own this summer makes Britain’s goal even less achievable.
Nevertheless, the U.K.-Africa sessions succeeded in broadening the traditional horizons of political summitry from its focus on conflict and development to sustainable finance, infrastructure, and clean energy. This was a sure step in the right direction, but there is still much work to be done.
Within two years, Britain aims to become the largest G-7 investor in Africa—a feat that will require a 75 percent increase in capital invested to top the United States and a more than 90 percent increase to top France. To be sure, this goal is largely, if not entirely, implausible.
The first task, said Emma Wade-Smith, the British trade commissioner for Africa, is diversification. Given the concentration of British capital in a few select—and underperforming—countries and industries, this much is long overdue.
At present, 30 percent of the U.K.’s foreign direct investment in Africa, $15 billion in 2018, is located in South Africa. The problem is not the sum; it’s the proportion. “What we want to do is increase the flow of investments so we can see the numbers that we have in South Africa replicated elsewhere around the continent,” Wade-Smith told Foreign Policy.
It makes sense that British investments would be so prominent in South Africa, a prized former colony where old interests and networks have endured and which continues to rank as the largest and one of the most developed countries in Africa. But given that the continent contains 27 of the world’s 50 fastest-growing economies, and that South Africa—with its 0.8 percent growth rate, intractable political problems, and ongoing battle against corruption—is not among them, opportunities to diversify would seem to abound.
Some of these lie within the U.K.’s traditional field of investment, such as Kenya, which has an economy less than one-third the size of South Africa’s and development scores that trail as well. Nevertheless, Kenya has become a cornerstone of the East African economy, a gateway to the Indian Ocean that represents 33 percent of East Africa’s rapidly growing market and boasts a growth rate of 6 percent. It is hard for any African state to top Kenya’s economic profile, but still the country receives a paltry 2 percent of the U.K.’s investment in the continent.
This shouldn’t be the case, said Nicolle Richards, the head of investor relations at Lendable Marketplace, a financial services firm in Nairobi. “There’s a lot of opportunity here,” Richards argued, “and not just for development organizations.”
This much has grown increasingly clear in the case of Kenya’s technology sector, what some have taken to calling the “Silicon Savannah.” Last year, Nairobi’s burgeoning start-up scene attracted $149 million in funding, leading the field of the African tech market, which brought in a total of $492 million.
Contributing to the industry’s success were profitable, scalable start-ups such as Lori Systems, an “Uber for trucking,” as Richards described it, which is cutting the sky-high cost of logistics in Kenya by providing trucks and truck drivers to suppliers at the click of a button—and wooing a number of Chinese, American, and Nigerian investors in the process. There is also M-Kopa, an impressive pay-as-you-go solar energy company that has been able to deliver affordable electricity to hundreds of thousands of Kenyans through a savvy mobile payment system.
Kenya’s highly advanced financial technology (fintech) sector, where simple mobile payments are used for personal transactions, utility bills, and much more, makes this app and many others like it possible, not to mention profitable. ITIKI, a drought-forecasting start-up that aims to improve crop yields and prepare farmers for the scourge of climate change, has become operational in Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa as well.
“People are very optimistic about what’s going on because start-ups here are solving real problems that no other businesses are trying to solve,” Richards said. But for all the opportunities on offer—in logistics and energy, fintech, health tech, and more—access to capital remains a key concern. The cash shortage is only partially sensible. To wary investors’ credit, there have been few initial public offerings or acquisitions for Kenyan start-ups, meaning that there is no reliable route for earning returns. However, the pace of innovation and the expanse of the market speak for themselves. More than anything else, exposure to the Silicon Savannah and Africa’s tech scene appears to be the limiting factor.
As a result, Nairobi is a logical destination for British investors, and a new government initiative hopes to bridge the capital gap. “Go Global Africa,” launched last year, invites Kenyan, Nigerian, and South African start-ups to compete for a five-day training and networking session in the U.K. Its participants have already included leading lights such as Muthoni Masinde, the founder of ITIKI. However, without any new investment pledges, and with only the annual competition on Go Global’s agenda, it is clear that the U.K. will have to redouble its efforts if it expects to make any real progress.
It is clear that the U.K. will have to redouble its efforts if it expects to make any real progress.
The situation is much the same on the other side of the continent, in Ghana, where a different British initiative seeks to assist a local agricultural renaissance. Since taking office in 2017, President Nana Akufo-Addo has made a push for greater agricultural productivity, sending thousands of government officials across the country on motorbikes to work with the country’s farmers. Given that agricultural yields in sub-Saharan Africa are just 20 to 30 percent of what they could be—due to the fact that just 4 to 6 percent of agricultural land is irrigated and best practices on which fertilizers and seeds to use are not always implemented—the upside potential is exceptional.
A new initiative of the British High Commission in Ghana, the Agricultural Transformation Programme, which was announced at the summit, hopes to advance this productivity project and benefit from its rewards. Boasting a decently diversified, high-tech, multibillion-dollar industry of its own, Britain should be well placed to promote Ghana’s agricultural agenda.
It certainly possesses the experience, technology, and capital to assist Ghana, by funding the government’s own campaign, educating farmers directly, providing and subsidizing proper seeds, or helping to irrigate the fields. However, it’s not quite clear if and how Britain intends to do any of this. The Agricultural Transformation Programme’s mandate, to “develop new agriculture markets and climate resilience,” is bold but vague. Its machinations are, too. Neither the Department for International Development nor the Foreign and Commonwealth Office could offer any information on how the program works, how it is run, or how it is funded.
Nevertheless, the direction of the pivot is promising. As was Johnson’s pledge to forbid further investment in coal-related projects. Such a sectoral shift will be important for the U.K. given that 51 percent of its investments in Africa are currently concentrated in extractive industries, according to the Overseas Development Institute.
It is also a laudable decision that cuts against the grain of some Chinese investments, which are supporting the construction of 13 coal plants in Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Madagascar—and leaving public displeasure in their wake. It helps, too, that Britain’s pivot will coincide with the environmentally conscious progress the African Union hopes to achieve by 2063.
There is good reason to believe that the U.K. can diversify away from extractive industries and in line with the AU. “The world is changing, the U.K. economy is changing, and our expertise and experience are well beyond mining, oil, and gas,” said Wade-Smith, the trade commissioner.
One such alternative area of expertise is infrastructure. To be sure, the industry presents its fair share of challenges—China being chief among them. No country can match the money Beijing pours into the continent, having pledged to spend $60 billion in the three years to 2021, and no one can beat the excess capacity and low bids Chinese firms have to offer. Nor, moreover, could any one nation construct, all at once, multiple railways in Nigeria, the world’s largest dam in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, hundreds of miles of roads in Ghana, and sports stadiums in Rwanda, to name a few.
However, not all hope is lost for the U.K., said Moore, the former Liberian public works minister. When Moore was in office, a clear and lucrative opportunity for the U.K. emerged in the area of supervision. “One of the big problems we’ve had with Chinese construction is the quality of what is delivered,” Moore said. The collapse of a Chinese-built bridge in Kenya, a road in Zambia, and a hospital in Angola all attest to this.
To offset this risk, Moore would call on U.K.-based firms for the less exciting but equally important work of quality control. IMC Worldwide, for example, a small firm based in southern England, has provided expert assistance to a handful of countries, including Liberia, as they—or the Chinese—build their roads. Finding niches like these may not match the ambitions of the “Global Britain” agenda, and identifying new ways to aid Chinese investments is certainly not what the summit had in mind, but it may be all Britain has to offer.
The opportunity puts Britain in an uncomfortable position. By any estimation, working alongside China is not the preferred outcome of a push into African industry. In his opening remarks, Johnson made this clear as he sounded off on China, castigating its “extraordinarily one-sided terms” and its “vast imported workforce.” (Experts have called into question the latter accusation, with recent research finding African workers to constitute upwards of 85 percent of labor on Chinese projects.)
But Britain may not have much of a choice on the matter. “The U.K. always had advantages but never actually paid attention to them until the rise of China and China’s domination of trade and commerce,” Moore said. Now those advantages, though still present, are slipping away. A zero-sum push into Africa, in which Britain sees itself as a competitor in a latter-day scramble for the continent, determined to work against rather than with Africa’s other allies and investors, threatens to put the U.K.’s advantages to rest for good.
At one time or another, Global Britain will have to reckon with its outsized ambition—in Europe, in Africa, and around the world. It will do no good to cast aspersions on Britain’s potential partners in Africa, the Chinese, or any of the continent’s other “suitors,” as the prime minister said in his opening remarks. In the 21st century, such a strategy of unnecessarily opposing China surely bodes poorly for Britain’s economic prospects in Africa and elsewhere.
A Global Britain, loosely defined, remains possible, but a humbling will have to come first. Although a recommitment to its relationship with African countries is important, the U.K. cannot reasonably expect to out-invest the United States and France or outbid China. Nor should it assume that half-measures and shortcuts, such as the Go Global tech campaign and the Agricultural Transformation Programme, will be able to grow and sustain ties to the continent.
The U.K. government can’t assert, as it did at the summit, that some 54 distinct African countries should select Britain—and Britain alone—to be their partner of choice. Casting its relations with African states as a matter of geopolitical competition, and reproducing fading memories of imperial glory in the process, will not deliver results.
Back in his days as a journalist, Johnson memorably wrote of the African continent: “The problem is not that we were once in charge, but that we are not in charge anymore.” Fortunately, the revanchist rhetoric has since disappeared. Now the outlook underlying it should, too.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-29--Countries Begin Evacuating Citizens From Wuhan

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Several countries have evacuated citizens from Wuhan—the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak , U.S. senators question both legal teams in Trump ’ s impeachment trial , and the EU Parliament votes on the U.K. Withdrawal Agreement .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Global alarm about the Wuhan coronavirus is rising , with some governments arranging evacuation plans to get their nationals out of the city , which is under quarantine , via charter plane .
On Tuesday , the European Commission announced it would partially fund two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ French nationals .
U.S. diplomats and other citizens were evacuated to California on Tuesday .
Meanwhile , British Airways has suspended all flights to and from mainland China and the British government is evacuating citizens—but in some cases U.K. authorities are dividing families by refusing to evacuate dual citizens and British permanent residents with Chinese passports , the Guardian reports .
The evacuations come alongside other prevention measures .
Most of the virus cases—4,633 , according to official figures—so far are in China , but Germany , Vietnam , Taiwan , the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases , raising fears of contagion elsewhere .
The United States has increased its screening of passengers from Wuhan to include 20 ports of entry , and its health secretary said it wasn ’ t ruling out further travel restrictions .
Read all of FP ’ s coverage of the Wuhan coronavirus here .
China ’ s official response .
In China , the death toll from the Wuhan virus exceeded 100 on Tuesday .
The Chinese National Health Commission was expected to deliver an update on the virus on Wednesday , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ join the effort to contain the outbreak .
There are concerns that a number of cases in China have gone unreported due to a shortage of test kits , including in Wuhan itself .
Access to health care—mostly private in China—is becoming a critical issue , as Andreea Brinza writes for FP .
Will the virus wreck the economy ?
Markets rebounded on Tuesday , showing that investors are still trying to figure out how much the Wuhan virus outbreak will affect the global economy .
If the epidemic extends into the summer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on China ’ s economy could be wide-reaching , FP ’ s Keith Johnson and James Palmer report .
For more news and analysis on stories like this , sign up for China Brief , delivered on Wednesdays .
Senators ask questions in impeachment trial .
With U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s defense team wrapping up its case in his impeachment trial in the Senate , senators now have the chance to question both legal teams over the next two days .
Revelations this week from former National Security Advisor John Bolton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ derail Trump ’ s lawyers ’ plan for a quick acquittal .
His claims that the president explicitly linked withholding military aid from Ukraine to its potential investigation of former Vice President Joe Biden could come up in questioning .
The Senate is expected to vote on whether or not to call witnesses—such as Bolton—on Friday .
EU Parliament votes on Brexit bill .
The European Parliament votes today on the U.K. Withdrawal Agreement , which it is expected to pass .
The vote comes two days before the Brexit deadline on Friday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s government signing off on the bill last week .
On Monday , the EU ’ s chief Brexit negotiator called for the agreement to be implemented “ with rigor , ” with the EU closely monitoring the situation in Northern Ireland .
Britain ’ s departure from the European Parliament will leave 73 seats vacant , with 27 reallocated to other countries whose new members will begin on Feb. 1 .
Did Trump give Netanyahu a boost ?
At the White House on Tuesday , Trump at last announced his long-delayed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by his side .
The proposal would discard a longstanding U.S. policy consensus : that a future political settlement in Israel would be based on the 1967 borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors .
As he faces another election campaign and corruption charges , the plan is certainly a boost for Netanyahu , FP ’ s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report .
On Sunday , Israel ’ s cabinet will vote on a proposal to annex parts of the occupied West Bank where Israeli settlements are located , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military cuts in Africa .
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper is weighing a proposal to significantly reduce U.S. forces in Africa , including in the Sahel region where they are engaged in combating Islamic extremism .
Some Pentagon and State Department officials see the drawdown as “ about politics ” —tied to Trump ’ s reelection .
They also worry it could cede ground to Chinese influence , FP ’ s Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer report .
Kenya ’ s new digital IDs .
Kenya plans to issue its citizens new digital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , education , voting rights , and housing .
Nearly 40 million people have already signed up for the new biometric system , but millions of minorities say they are facing obstacles to registration , the New York Times reports .
Kenya ’ s high court will rule on Thursday on whether the plan is constitutional .
The Fed ’ s press conference .
Concluding a meeting this week , the U.S. Federal Reserve is expected to announce today that it will hold interest rates steady—despite Trump ’ s calls that they go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fed this week include whether to slow the expansion of its asset portfolio and wind down its short-term lending .
All four sugar factories in Belarus saw their directors vanish last week : One “ went on vacation , ” one “ went to Minsk , ” another was pulled off a Munich-bound flight , and the fourth vanished while on the job .
Belarusian authorities have not offered an official explanation for the disappearances , but according to the news site Tut.by [ link in Russian ] , 11 people were detained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ probe that could involve the factory directors .
Ex-Belgian monarch King Albert II at last acknowledged this week that he was the biological father of the 51-year-old artist Delphine Boël , according to DNA tests .
The admission comes after years of lawsuits involving Boël , who has publicly claimed since 2005 that she was King Albert ’ s daughter from an extramarital affair .
The former monarch only submitted to a DNA test last year .
Boël could now stand to inherit some of the king ’ s private fortune .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hostel operating on the grounds of North Korea ’ s embassy in Berlin has to close because it violates U.N. sanctions and a European directive intended to stop cash from flowing to the regime in Pyongyang .
The hostel currently leases one building from the embassy , which kept operating after German reunification in 1990 .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Several countries have evacuated citizens from Wuhan—the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak , U.S. senators question both legal teams in Trump’s impeachment trial , and the EU Parliament votes on the U.K. Withdrawal Agreement.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Several countries have evacuated citizens from Wuhan—the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak, U.S. senators question both legal teams in Trump’s impeachment trial, and the EU Parliament votes on the U.K. Withdrawal Agreement.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Global Concern Rising Over Coronavirus
Global alarm about the Wuhan coronavirus is rising, with some governments arranging evacuation plans to get their nationals out of the city, which is under quarantine, via charter plane. On Tuesday, the European Commission announced it would partially fund two planes for EU citizens, including 250 French nationals. U.S. diplomats and other citizens were evacuated to California on Tuesday.
Meanwhile, British Airways has suspended all flights to and from mainland China and the British government is evacuating citizens—but in some cases U.K. authorities are dividing families by refusing to evacuate dual citizens and British permanent residents with Chinese passports, the Guardian reports.
The evacuations come alongside other prevention measures. Most of the virus cases—4,633, according to official figures—so far are in China, but Germany, Vietnam, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan have confirmed cases, raising fears of contagion elsewhere. The United States has increased its screening of passengers from Wuhan to include 20 ports of entry, and its health secretary said it wasn’t ruling out further travel restrictions.
Read all of FP’s coverage of the Wuhan coronavirus here.
China’s official response. In China, the death toll from the Wuhan virus exceeded 100 on Tuesday. The Chinese National Health Commission was expected to deliver an update on the virus on Wednesday, and the government will allow international experts to join the effort to contain the outbreak. There are concerns that a number of cases in China have gone unreported due to a shortage of test kits, including in Wuhan itself. Access to health care—mostly private in China—is becoming a critical issue, as Andreea Brinza writes for FP.
Will the virus wreck the economy? Markets rebounded on Tuesday, showing that investors are still trying to figure out how much the Wuhan virus outbreak will affect the global economy. If the epidemic extends into the summer as some experts predict, the effects on China’s economy could be wide-reaching, FP’s Keith Johnson and James Palmer report.
For more news and analysis on stories like this, sign up for China Brief, delivered on Wednesdays.
What We’re Following Today
Senators ask questions in impeachment trial. With U.S. President Donald Trump’s defense team wrapping up its case in his impeachment trial in the Senate, senators now have the chance to question both legal teams over the next two days. Revelations this week from former National Security Advisor John Bolton’s upcoming book have threatened to derail Trump’s lawyers’ plan for a quick acquittal. His claims that the president explicitly linked withholding military aid from Ukraine to its potential investigation of former Vice President Joe Biden could come up in questioning. The Senate is expected to vote on whether or not to call witnesses—such as Bolton—on Friday.
EU Parliament votes on Brexit bill. The European Parliament votes today on the U.K. Withdrawal Agreement, which it is expected to pass. The vote comes two days before the Brexit deadline on Friday, with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s government signing off on the bill last week. On Monday, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator called for the agreement to be implemented “with rigor,” with the EU closely monitoring the situation in Northern Ireland. Britain’s departure from the European Parliament will leave 73 seats vacant, with 27 reallocated to other countries whose new members will begin on Feb. 1.
Did Trump give Netanyahu a boost? At the White House on Tuesday, Trump at last announced his long-delayed Middle East peace plan with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by his side. The proposal would discard a longstanding U.S. policy consensus: that a future political settlement in Israel would be based on the 1967 borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors. As he faces another election campaign and corruption charges, the plan is certainly a boost for Netanyahu, FP’s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report. On Sunday, Israel’s cabinet will vote on a proposal to annex parts of the occupied West Bank where Israeli settlements are located, according to local TV reports.
Keep an Eye On
U.S. military cuts in Africa. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper is weighing a proposal to significantly reduce U.S. forces in Africa, including in the Sahel region where they are engaged in combating Islamic extremism. Some Pentagon and State Department officials see the drawdown as “about politics”—tied to Trump’s reelection. They also worry it could cede ground to Chinese influence, FP’s Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer report.
Kenya’s new digital IDs. Kenya plans to issue its citizens new digital identification numbers needed to access health care, education, voting rights, and housing. Nearly 40 million people have already signed up for the new biometric system, but millions of minorities say they are facing obstacles to registration, the New York Times reports. Kenya’s high court will rule on Thursday on whether the plan is constitutional.
The Fed’s press conference. Concluding a meeting this week, the U.S. Federal Reserve is expected to announce today that it will hold interest rates steady—despite Trump’s calls that they go lower. Other questions faced by the Fed this week include whether to slow the expansion of its asset portfolio and wind down its short-term lending.
Odds and Ends
All four sugar factories in Belarus saw their directors vanish last week: One “went on vacation,” one “went to Minsk,” another was pulled off a Munich-bound flight, and the fourth vanished while on the job. Belarusian authorities have not offered an official explanation for the disappearances, but according to the news site Tut.by [link in Russian], 11 people were detained last week as part of a corruption probe that could involve the factory directors.
Ex-Belgian monarch King Albert II at last acknowledged this week that he was the biological father of the 51-year-old artist Delphine Boël, according to DNA tests. The admission comes after years of lawsuits involving Boël, who has publicly claimed since 2005 that she was King Albert’s daughter from an extramarital affair. The former monarch only submitted to a DNA test last year. Boël could now stand to inherit some of the king’s private fortune.
A German court has ruled that a backpacker hostel operating on the grounds of North Korea’s embassy in Berlin has to close because it violates U.N. sanctions and a European directive intended to stop cash from flowing to the regime in Pyongyang. The hostel currently leases one building from the embassy, which kept operating after German reunification in 1990.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Amy Mackinnon contributed to this report.