foreignpolicy--2020-12-08--Western Europe Is Losing Its Immigrants

Western Europe Is Losing Its Immigrants

Svilengrad is a small Bulgarian city of around 18,000 people on the border with Turkey .
It is mostly known for two very profitable endeavors : casinos and customs .
And like many other small cities in Central and Eastern Europe , it has been rapidly losing people to migration in recent decades .
Yet this spring , something totally unexpected happened : a population boom .
“ They have been returning from everywhere , mostly Western Europe , ” Anastas Karchev , the mayor of Svilengrad , said in a phone conversation in November .
It isn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , attracting scores of British or French high rollers .
Rather , the city is just one of many places affected by COVID-19 migration , a quiet tsunami that has been sweeping the eastern part of the European continent along with the pandemic .
The trend first became noticeable in late March .
At that time , a Bulgarian official involved in the pandemic response announced that tens of thousands Bulgarians had already returned that month .
By early summer , hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had come home .
Similar waves swept @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get a sense of the real scope of the return , my team at the European Council on Foreign Relations ’ office in Sofia , Bulgaria , examined data from Bulgaria between March and May of this year , the dates of the country ’ s first lockdown .
We assumed that anyone who was willing to brave the country ’ s checkpoints , infrequently available transportation , and 14 days of quarantine in that period was probably less likely to be traveling for leisure , tourism , or business .
Government data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around 550,000 Bulgarian citizens traveled back to the country .
Detailed records are available for about 150,000 of those .
Excluding crossings via the border with Greece , the main trade and tourism route , the number in our study came to about 121,000 people .
Looking at the data—particularly records on quarantines—it became quite clear why Svilengrad and other cities like it had started feeling crowded .
In many places , quarantined returnees were equal to between 4 and 8 percent of the working-age population .
Given that only about half of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were quarantined , and that the data from March was patchy , the real numbers were certainly much higher .
Through social media interviews with available returnees , our study found that by far the most popular reason for return was a “ desire to be with one ’ s family and relatives ” —understandable given the scary state of the world .
The second most popular reason was “ loss of employment.
” When asked whether they intend to go back to Western Europe at some point , over 10 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Around 16 percent said they were undecided .
Among those who had been living abroad for more than a year , the percentages were 19 for the “ no ” camp and 47 percent undecided .
First , in Eastern Europe , this trend has been long in the making .
The region is the world ’ s worst affected in terms of population decline and outward migration .
In fact , it is the only region that has seen a population decline in three consecutive decades .
In many ways , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU : You get the money , but you lose the people , as droves migrate westward for better options and lifestyles .
The brain drain made divisions within the EU even more stark .
It left eastern economies struggling to find the workforce to grow as quickly as needed to catch up with their wealthier western counterparts and keep their talent home .
Some regions were more or less deserted , with a whole spectrum of societal and political problems stemming from that .
In the last couple of years , though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the east and inequality between east and west starting to even out , more and more have decided to come home .
Pre-coronavirus internal EU migration data is notoriously hard to find , yet in nine of the 11 post-communist EU members , net emigration has fallen since 2010 .
Migration to the United Kingdom—a major magnet for Eastern Europeans—slumped sixfold in 2017 , compared to previous years .
Second , the economies of Eastern Europe might be able to absorb at least a part of the new wave .
Unlike the stagnating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example , many of Central and Eastern Europe ’ s countries have been growing steadily .
Unlike in Asia , meanwhile , where a labor glut is keeping salaries low and driving migrants abroad , the main pre-pandemic problem among businesses in Eastern Europe was a lack of labor , which in turn raised salaries .
Given the trends for the shortening of supply chains , where more and more goods sold in EU will be likely produced or assembled in Europe , the influx of workers will be more than welcome .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ membership plays a role .
No other labor-sending region is as connected to the labor-receiving regions as Eastern Europe is to Western Europe .
Moving within the EU is relatively cheap and frictionless , which will factor in as people plan their near-future and decide whether it is worth staying and trying , even for a while .
Migration has been replaced by mobility , with the European Union functioning more and more like the United States in that regard .
This means that cities in the east are no longer victims but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high-level talent as well as low-skilled labor .
And many of them have such benefits as lower cost of living , lower unemployment levels , and ( especially for their own nationals , as the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated ) the allure of emotional support networks .
The question for policymakers is how to deal with the sudden influx of people .
For now , local and national authorities must refocus from long-term policies to short-term measures , to try to keep some of that human capital from leaving again .
Ideas can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ places that have a long history of attracting talent .
Easy access to low or no-interest rate loans ; direct subsidies and tax breaks for people with proven interest in staying for longer periods ; and administrative help with finding places to live , local schools , and kindergartens are key .
Efforts like these do not require massive financial injections .
And any initiatives that do could tap into the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the React EU funds , which contain billions of euros for such matters .
In Svilengrad , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how many of new returnees will stay .
Yet he does know that “ salaries have skyrocketed in the past years in our local companies , and I have people telling me it ’ s now the same to live in Spain or here if you adjust it for purchase power parity.
” It took a pandemic to find that out , but the positive effects for the region may last for generations .

Svilengrad is a small Bulgarian city of around 18,000 people on the border with Turkey. It is mostly known for two very profitable endeavors: casinos and customs. And like many other small cities in Central and Eastern Europe, it has been rapidly losing people to migration in recent decades. Yet this spring, something totally unexpected happened: a population boom. “They have been returning from everywhere, mostly Western Europe,” Anastas Karchev, the mayor of Svilengrad, said in a phone conversation in November.
Svilengrad is a small Bulgarian city of around 18,000 people on the border with Turkey. It is mostly known for two very profitable endeavors: casinos and customs. And like many other small cities in Central and Eastern Europe, it has been rapidly losing people to migration in recent decades. Yet this spring, something totally unexpected happened: a population boom. “They have been returning from everywhere, mostly Western Europe,” Anastas Karchev, the mayor of Svilengrad, said in a phone conversation in November.
It isn’t that Svilengrad has become Las Vegas overnight, attracting scores of British or French high rollers. Rather, the city is just one of many places affected by COVID-19 migration, a quiet tsunami that has been sweeping the eastern part of the European continent along with the pandemic.
The trend first became noticeable in late March. At that time, a Bulgarian official involved in the pandemic response announced that tens of thousands Bulgarians had already returned that month. By early summer, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had come home. Similar waves swept the rest of the region.
To get a sense of the real scope of the return, my team at the European Council on Foreign Relations’ office in Sofia, Bulgaria, examined data from Bulgaria between March and May of this year, the dates of the country’s first lockdown. We assumed that anyone who was willing to brave the country’s checkpoints, infrequently available transportation, and 14 days of quarantine in that period was probably less likely to be traveling for leisure, tourism, or business. Government data shows that, in that period, around 550,000 Bulgarian citizens traveled back to the country. Detailed records are available for about 150,000 of those. Excluding crossings via the border with Greece, the main trade and tourism route, the number in our study came to about 121,000 people.
Looking at the data—particularly records on quarantines—it became quite clear why Svilengrad and other cities like it had started feeling crowded. In many places, quarantined returnees were equal to between 4 and 8 percent of the working-age population. Given that only about half of the people who returned to the country were quarantined, and that the data from March was patchy, the real numbers were certainly much higher.
Through social media interviews with available returnees, our study found that by far the most popular reason for return was a “desire to be with one’s family and relatives”—understandable given the scary state of the world. The second most popular reason was “loss of employment.” When asked whether they intend to go back to Western Europe at some point, over 10 percent of the respondents said, “No.” Around 16 percent said they were undecided. Among those who had been living abroad for more than a year, the percentages were 19 for the “no” camp and 47 percent undecided.
Around the world, return migration has boomed: More than 2.1 million Indians, 600,000 Afghans, and scores of others—especially migrant workers—have returned home during the pandemic, according to the International Organization for Migration. In many cases, that effect will disappear in a year or two; as global health and the economy recover, migrants will again make their way from developing to developed countries. But three things make the wave in European Union member states in Eastern Europe stand out.
First, in Eastern Europe, this trend has been long in the making. The region is the world’s worst affected in terms of population decline and outward migration. In fact, it is the only region that has seen a population decline in three consecutive decades. In many ways, that was part of the deal with the EU: You get the money, but you lose the people, as droves migrate westward for better options and lifestyles. The brain drain made divisions within the EU even more stark. It left eastern economies struggling to find the workforce to grow as quickly as needed to catch up with their wealthier western counterparts and keep their talent home. Some regions were more or less deserted, with a whole spectrum of societal and political problems stemming from that.
In the last couple of years, though, thanks to rising living standards in the east and inequality between east and west starting to even out, more and more have decided to come home. Pre-coronavirus internal EU migration data is notoriously hard to find, yet in nine of the 11 post-communist EU members, net emigration has fallen since 2010. Migration to the United Kingdom—a major magnet for Eastern Europeans—slumped sixfold in 2017, compared to previous years.
Second, the economies of Eastern Europe might be able to absorb at least a part of the new wave. Unlike the stagnating economies elsewhere in Latin America, for example, many of Central and Eastern Europe’s countries have been growing steadily. Unlike in Asia, meanwhile, where a labor glut is keeping salaries low and driving migrants abroad, the main pre-pandemic problem among businesses in Eastern Europe was a lack of labor, which in turn raised salaries. Given the trends for the shortening of supply chains, where more and more goods sold in EU will be likely produced or assembled in Europe, the influx of workers will be more than welcome.
Last, but not least, EU membership plays a role. No other labor-sending region is as connected to the labor-receiving regions as Eastern Europe is to Western Europe. Moving within the EU is relatively cheap and frictionless, which will factor in as people plan their near-future and decide whether it is worth staying and trying, even for a while. Migration has been replaced by mobility, with the European Union functioning more and more like the United States in that regard. This means that cities in the east are no longer victims but are active players in a battle for high-level talent as well as low-skilled labor. And many of them have such benefits as lower cost of living, lower unemployment levels, and (especially for their own nationals, as the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated) the allure of emotional support networks.
The question for policymakers is how to deal with the sudden influx of people. For now, local and national authorities must refocus from long-term policies to short-term measures, to try to keep some of that human capital from leaving again. Ideas can be borrowed from the United States and other places that have a long history of attracting talent. Easy access to low or no-interest rate loans; direct subsidies and tax breaks for people with proven interest in staying for longer periods; and administrative help with finding places to live, local schools, and kindergartens are key. Efforts like these do not require massive financial injections. And any initiatives that do could tap into the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the React EU funds, which contain billions of euros for such matters.
In Svilengrad, Karchev said he doesn’t know how many of new returnees will stay. Yet he does know that “salaries have skyrocketed in the past years in our local companies, and I have people telling me it’s now the same to live in Spain or here if you adjust it for purchase power parity.” It took a pandemic to find that out, but the positive effects for the region may last for generations.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-08--Germany Could Have Delivered Justice for Civilian Drone Strike Victims. It Failed.

Germany Could Have Delivered Justice for Civilian Drone Strike Victims .
It Failed .
Eight years after my brother-in-law and nephew were blown to pieces by a Hellfire missile fired from a U.S. drone , I am still fighting for answers .
When a German court found in my favor last year , it looked like we might finally be able to bring some accountability to the U.S. drone program .
But on Nov. 25 , Germany ’ s Federal Administrative Court ruled that despite an earlier court ’ s finding that the U.S. military ’ s Ramstein Air Base @ @ @ @ @ @ @ central role ” in drone strikes in Yemen that result in “ civilian casualties on a regular basis , ” Germany has no obligation to do more than lodge diplomatic protests , encouraging the U.S. government to act lawfully .
It is hard for me to describe how I felt when my lawyer called with the news .
I have become accustomed to setbacks , but this loss was particularly devastating .
It has left me wondering if anyone will ever be held responsible for the damage U.S. drone strikes are inflicting on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2013 , I have been asking the same simple question : “ How is it that two innocent men , who actively opposed terrorism , were killed ?
” Well-meaning politicians in the United States , Europe , and my home country of Yemen have listened to my story and expressed their sympathy , but no one has provided an answer .
I filed a lawsuit in the Higher Administrative Court in Münster , Germany , and in March 2019 received a small measure of recognition when the court found the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The court also ruled that Germany bears responsibility for strikes like the one that killed my relatives , because the drones can not fly without the support of Ramstein Air Base .
The base plays a critical role by enabling communication between pilots in the United States and the drones flying in countries such as Yemen .
In 2019 , a court ruled that Germany bears responsibility for strikes like the one that killed my relatives , because the drones can ’ t fly without the support of Ramstein Air Base , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and the drones flying in Yemen .
This was , believe it or not , the first time a court anywhere in the Western world had been willing to weigh in .
The U.S. military will not confirm or deny that it fired the missile , and when I challenged this silence in U.S. federal court , the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that I did not have standing to do so , because only Congress can question the president ’ s political decision to kill people in secret @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brown called congressional oversight of the military a “ joke ” and warned of the “ outsized power ” of the president ’ s authority to kill , but the case was tossed out .
The German court ’ s ruling in March 2019 was also the first time one of the United States ’ international partners was judged to be potentially complicit in its global assassination program .
The United Nations ’ special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions , Agnès Callamard , called it a “ watershed ” decision that brings the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drone strikes into question .
Now even this small victory has been taken from us .
By declaring Ramstein ’ s role in the program merely “ technical , ” the Federal Administrative Court in effect absolved Germany of any responsibility for what happens on its territory .
In fact , the air base performs an essential function in strikes like the one that killed my relatives , as U.S. drones depend on the satellite connections it provides .
My brother-in-law , Salem , was an imam , dedicated to mobilizing the community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sermon explaining that there can be no religious or legal justification for attacks on civilians , three young men from outside the village asked to meet him .
He agreed , believing strongly that words , not weapons , solve problems .
To this day , we do not know who the men were or what they wanted .
Salem was conscious , though , that the sermon he had recently delivered may have angered some people .
So he took his nephew , Waleed , a policeman , along for protection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the threat he faced came not from those he was meeting but from the U.S. drone hovering overhead .
Was the United States targeting one of the men he met ?
Did the pilot even know whom he was firing on ?
Because the U.S. government will not say , we simply do not know—all we have is a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable , sent within hours of the strike , saying a mistake had been made and innocent people had been killed .
I was eating dinner with my family when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mile away .
It was as if the mountain had fallen .
We rushed out and were confronted by a horrific scene .
We initially had no idea our relatives were among the victims ; the missiles are so powerful that nothing resembling a human being was left .
But after talking to eyewitnesses and collecting scraps of clothing and burnt flesh , we realized the awful truth .
I have learned a lot about armed drones in my long search for justice , and I now know that the attack has the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ signature strike.
” This is when the drone pilot does not know who they are trying to kill , merely that the person targeted is exhibiting a pattern of “ suspicious ” behavior .
Often this pattern comes from metadata collected from mobile phones .
As one drone pilot said : “ We ’ re going after … phones , in the hopes that the person on the other end of that missile is the bad guy.
” Callamard , the U.N. special rapporteur , sets out data in her report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from armed drones .
For example , from 2009-2014 in Yemen , in attempting to kill 17 extremists , the U.S. drone program also killed 273 innocent men , women , and children .
The casualty monitoring group Airwars released new findings in October showing that under the Trump administration , U.S. drone strikes in Yemen have killed at least 86 civilians , including 28 children .
The United States has stopped even admitting to the strikes : The last one acknowledged by U.S. Central Command was in mid-2019 .
Since then , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. strikes in Yemen , most likely ordered by the CIA .
The Department of Defense does not even have a desk to monitor civilian casualties in Yemen .
This does not surprise me .
The U.S. government has denied my quest for justice and accountability at every turn .
The Supreme Court declined to hear my case , and a letter to then-President Barack Obama went unanswered .
I did manage to speak to officials at the Department of State and the National Security Council .
They nodded politely but remained silent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington , I was summoned to Yemen ’ s National Security Bureau , the CIA ’ s local partner in my home country .
An official handed me a blue plastic bag with $ 100,000 in sequentially marked $ 100 bills inside .
When I demanded to know where it came from , and what it was for , he shrugged .
This is the closest the United States has come to acknowledging it killed Salem and Waleed : an anonymous payoff , without any admission of responsibility .
After discussing it with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; missing two breadwinners , taken in their prime , the family has few other means of support .
But if it was meant to keep me quiet , it has not succeeded .
If anything , knowing how cheap the U.S. government considers Yemeni lives to be has made me more determined .
At the very least , Salem and Waleed deserve the same apology Obama rightfully gave to two white Western hostages his government killed in a drone strike in Pakistan .
Perhaps the recent election of Joe Biden provides the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ am not optimistic .
Yes , President Donald Trump loosened the targeting standards and removed the requirement for the Pentagon to report civilian casualty figures , but it was Obama who escalated the program worldwide .
My hope is that Germany will stop supporting the United States ’ crimes .
We in Yemen appreciate the support Germany has provided to our country through this difficult time of war , so it is disappointing that Germany continues to help the United States target our communities with drones .
My family in Khashamir talks about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
My young nieces have never known anything different : The Reapers and Predators , and the threat of instant , violent death they represent , have been present all their lives .
When people count civilian casualties , they often forget that whole communities are traumatized too , and that the trauma is long-lasting .
Moreover , the use of drones in this cowardly manner also helps terrorist groups by attracting young people to join them .
Obama and Trump did not seem to care .
Perhaps President-elect Biden and German Chancellor @ @ @ @ @

Eight years after my brother-in-law and nephew were blown to pieces by a Hellfire missile fired from a U.S. drone, I am still fighting for answers.
Eight years after my brother-in-law and nephew were blown to pieces by a Hellfire missile fired from a U.S. drone, I am still fighting for answers.
When a German court found in my favor last year, it looked like we might finally be able to bring some accountability to the U.S. drone program. But on Nov. 25, Germany’s Federal Administrative Court ruled that despite an earlier court’s finding that the U.S. military’s Ramstein Air Base in southwestern Germany had played a “central role” in drone strikes in Yemen that result in “civilian casualties on a regular basis,” Germany has no obligation to do more than lodge diplomatic protests, encouraging the U.S. government to act lawfully.
It is hard for me to describe how I felt when my lawyer called with the news. I have become accustomed to setbacks, but this loss was particularly devastating. It has left me wondering if anyone will ever be held responsible for the damage U.S. drone strikes are inflicting on Yemen.
Since my visit to Washington in 2013, I have been asking the same simple question: “How is it that two innocent men, who actively opposed terrorism, were killed?” Well-meaning politicians in the United States, Europe, and my home country of Yemen have listened to my story and expressed their sympathy, but no one has provided an answer.
I filed a lawsuit in the Higher Administrative Court in Münster, Germany, and in March 2019 received a small measure of recognition when the court found the U.S. drone program in Yemen to be unlawful. The court also ruled that Germany bears responsibility for strikes like the one that killed my relatives, because the drones cannot fly without the support of Ramstein Air Base. The base plays a critical role by enabling communication between pilots in the United States and the drones flying in countries such as Yemen.
In 2019, a court ruled that Germany bears responsibility for strikes like the one that killed my relatives, because the drones can’t fly without the support of Ramstein Air Base, which enables communication between pilots in the United States and the drones flying in Yemen.
This was, believe it or not, the first time a court anywhere in the Western world had been willing to weigh in. The U.S. military will not confirm or deny that it fired the missile, and when I challenged this silence in U.S. federal court, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that I did not have standing to do so, because only Congress can question the president’s political decision to kill people in secret by remote control. Judge Janice Rogers Brown called congressional oversight of the military a “joke” and warned of the “outsized power” of the president’s authority to kill, but the case was tossed out.
The German court’s ruling in March 2019 was also the first time one of the United States’ international partners was judged to be potentially complicit in its global assassination program. The United Nations’ special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Agnès Callamard, called it a “watershed” decision that brings the U.S. government’s legal justification of lethal drone strikes into question.
Now even this small victory has been taken from us. By declaring Ramstein’s role in the program merely “technical,” the Federal Administrative Court in effect absolved Germany of any responsibility for what happens on its territory. In fact, the air base performs an essential function in strikes like the one that killed my relatives, as U.S. drones depend on the satellite connections it provides.
My village, Khashamir, is not a war zone now, and it was not a war zone in August 2012, when my relatives were struck by U.S. missiles. There are militants operating in the region, members of al Qaeda, but they are outsiders with little support in the community.
My brother-in-law, Salem, was an imam, dedicated to mobilizing the community against al Qaeda. After he gave a sermon explaining that there can be no religious or legal justification for attacks on civilians, three young men from outside the village asked to meet him. He agreed, believing strongly that words, not weapons, solve problems.
To this day, we do not know who the men were or what they wanted. Salem was conscious, though, that the sermon he had recently delivered may have angered some people. So he took his nephew, Waleed, a policeman, along for protection. He had no way of knowing that the threat he faced came not from those he was meeting but from the U.S. drone hovering overhead.
Was the United States targeting one of the men he met? Did the pilot even know whom he was firing on? Because the U.S. government will not say, we simply do not know—all we have is a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable, sent within hours of the strike, saying a mistake had been made and innocent people had been killed.
I was eating dinner with my family when the missiles struck, less than a mile away. It was as if the mountain had fallen. We rushed out and were confronted by a horrific scene. We initially had no idea our relatives were among the victims; the missiles are so powerful that nothing resembling a human being was left. But after talking to eyewitnesses and collecting scraps of clothing and burnt flesh, we realized the awful truth.
I have learned a lot about armed drones in my long search for justice, and I now know that the attack has the hallmarks of what’s known as a “signature strike.” This is when the drone pilot does not know who they are trying to kill, merely that the person targeted is exhibiting a pattern of “suspicious” behavior. Often this pattern comes from metadata collected from mobile phones. As one drone pilot said: “We’re going after … phones, in the hopes that the person on the other end of that missile is the bad guy.”
Callamard, the U.N. special rapporteur, sets out data in her report showing the scale of unacknowledged civilian casualties from armed drones. For example, from 2009-2014 in Yemen, in attempting to kill 17 extremists, the U.S. drone program also killed 273 innocent men, women, and children.
The casualty monitoring group Airwars released new findings in October showing that under the Trump administration, U.S. drone strikes in Yemen have killed at least 86 civilians, including 28 children. The United States has stopped even admitting to the strikes: The last one acknowledged by U.S. Central Command was in mid-2019. Since then, Airwars has documented 30 local allegations of U.S. strikes in Yemen, most likely ordered by the CIA. The Department of Defense does not even have a desk to monitor civilian casualties in Yemen.
This does not surprise me. The U.S. government has denied my quest for justice and accountability at every turn. The Supreme Court declined to hear my case, and a letter to then-President Barack Obama went unanswered. I did manage to speak to officials at the Department of State and the National Security Council. They nodded politely but remained silent.
Not long after my trip to Washington, I was summoned to Yemen’s National Security Bureau, the CIA’s local partner in my home country. An official handed me a blue plastic bag with $100,000 in sequentially marked $100 bills inside. When I demanded to know where it came from, and what it was for, he shrugged.
This is the closest the United States has come to acknowledging it killed Salem and Waleed: an anonymous payoff, without any admission of responsibility. After discussing it with my relatives, we took the money; missing two breadwinners, taken in their prime, the family has few other means of support. But if it was meant to keep me quiet, it has not succeeded. If anything, knowing how cheap the U.S. government considers Yemeni lives to be has made me more determined.
At the very least, Salem and Waleed deserve the same apology Obama rightfully gave to two white Western hostages his government killed in a drone strike in Pakistan.
Perhaps the recent election of Joe Biden provides the opportunity for a reset, but I am not optimistic. Yes, President Donald Trump loosened the targeting standards and removed the requirement for the Pentagon to report civilian casualty figures, but it was Obama who escalated the program worldwide.
My hope is that Germany will stop supporting the United States’ crimes. We in Yemen appreciate the support Germany has provided to our country through this difficult time of war, so it is disappointing that Germany continues to help the United States target our communities with drones.
My family in Khashamir talks about the drones that still regularly buzz overhead. My young nieces have never known anything different: The Reapers and Predators, and the threat of instant, violent death they represent, have been present all their lives.
When people count civilian casualties, they often forget that whole communities are traumatized too, and that the trauma is long-lasting. Moreover, the use of drones in this cowardly manner also helps terrorist groups by attracting young people to join them. Obama and Trump did not seem to care. Perhaps President-elect Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel will reconsider.


The Virtual Transition

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
The Trump administration has finally extended an invitation to President-elect Joe Biden ’ s transition teams to set up shop in offices across scores of U.S. federal agencies .
But Biden ’ s people are declining the offer .
From the U.S. Agency for International Development to the Defense Department , the incoming administration ’ s transition offices are stocked with coffee machines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are largely going unused , as Biden ’ s teams prefer to interact through Google Hangouts , Zoom , and encrypted video conferences .
Biden team members fear that meeting Trump officials in person during a pandemic in which the president and his aides have repeatedly flouted safety guidelines could be hazardous to their health , while providing little benefit .
“ They don ’ t get anything out of value from the White House , ” a former senior Trump official working with the Biden transition team told Foreign Policy .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nobody wears masks and it ’ s just obvious that they ’ re trying to make some kind of political point.
” The former senior Trump official working with the Biden transition team said the incoming administration had insisted on digital-only briefings with White House staffers , amid fear that masking protocols were being ignored by those closest to the president .
Those concerns were reinforced on Sunday , when President Donald Trump tweeted that his personal attorney , former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani , had tested positive for COVID-19 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration or Trump ’ s inner circle—including the president himself—who have contracted the coronavirus , according to a tally compiled by the New York Times .
And another top Trump lawyer , Jenna Ellis , reportedly tested positive for the coronavirus after attending a White House Christmas party last week without a mask .
“ The president , his senior officials , engage in the stupidest behavior imaginable , which all public health experts say is irresponsible and dangerous , ” said one former U.S. official who has been in touch with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the transition I would be very concerned .
I certainly wouldn ’ t be going to State Department Christmas parties , which I might have done in a previous transition.
” The virtual transition reflects Biden ’ s more judicious approach to the pandemic than the Trump administration ’ s .
Trump has repeatedly downplayed the threat posed by the virus , which has killed more than 284,000 Americans to date and infected more than 14 million others .
But it also reflects a palpable anxiety in the Biden camp about interacting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has hosted events in the White House and massive campaign rallies that turned into superspreader events .
With the coronavirus continuing to spread uncontrolled throughout the country despite U.S. regulators pushing to clear an experimental vaccine , experts said the Biden team is already looking to do damage control instead of expecting a smooth handoff from the outgoing Trump administration .
“ This isn ’ t a normal transition , ” said Richard Gowan , an expert on the United Nations at the International Crisis Group .
“ It ’ s more like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a blaze to see what remains structurally sound .
And on issues like Iran , the current administration is still trying to start a few more small fires.
” The infection concerns are not limited to interactions with the White House .
The Biden team conducted 21 interviews with top Pentagon military and civilian leaders as of last week , according to a senior defense official , including with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley and the vice chairman , Gen. John Hyten , and have nearly 50 more meetings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Defense David Norquist .
While the Biden team has been provided with workspaces at the Pentagon , they are using the offices “ to a minimal amount ” and requesting as many as 90 percent of their meetings to be virtual , the senior official said .
Most of the briefings have been on the COVID-19 response , and personnel and readiness , expected to be major focal points for Biden .
The Defense Department has also provided 1,500 pages of briefing materials on Microsoft tablets , including transition books , organizational @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden transition team is also getting classified updates from Milley , the top U.S. military officer , and the secret budgets for intelligence agencies .
Many meetings are taking place via secured teleconferences on classified systems , senior defense officials said .
Senior defense officials said that the Pentagon has been working with the Biden transition team , known as the agency review team , since the General Services Administration allowed the transition to go forward last month , beginning dialogue that night via email and starting virtual meetings the next morning .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ has asked for a preference for video teleconference meetings versus in-person , ” one official said .
“ They have requested virtual meetings for nearly all interviews they ’ ve conducted to date.
” At the State Department , meanwhile , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is moving forward with plans to host indoor diplomatic holiday parties with hundreds of guests , running against Washington , D.C. , health guidelines and raising alarm bells among medical experts .
Last week , Biden ’ s landing team met remotely with the leadership of USAID @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administrator , John Barsa , a political appointee who recently tested positive for COVID-19 , and who is quarantining at home .
Barsa also reportedly had a reputation for eschewing masks , according to the Washington Post .
“ There is no expectation of in-person briefings , ” said one U.S. official .
The transition to the Biden presidency has already been strained by unprecedented challenges , including Trump ’ s refusal to accept his electoral defeat .
For weeks after Biden was declared the winner of the 2020 elections , routine transition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ General Services Administration refused to greenlight the formal transition process until the election results were made clearer .
( On Nov. 23 , Trump authorized the agency to finally begin the transition process ) .
Now , despite media reports that the Trump administration blocked the Biden transition team from meeting with Pentagon intelligence officials , senior defense say the president-elect ’ s landing teams are getting proper briefings .
“ The DoD and its transition leadership are fully cooperating with the Biden transition team , placing national security and the protection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any and all discussions , ” acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller said in a statement on Saturday .

The Trump administration has finally extended an invitation to President-elect Joe Biden’s transition teams to set up shop in offices across scores of U.S. federal agencies. But Biden’s people are declining the offer.
The Trump administration has finally extended an invitation to President-elect Joe Biden’s transition teams to set up shop in offices across scores of U.S. federal agencies. But Biden’s people are declining the offer.
From the U.S. Agency for International Development to the Defense Department, the incoming administration’s transition offices are stocked with coffee machines, computers, and office supplies that are largely going unused, as Biden’s teams prefer to interact through Google Hangouts, Zoom, and encrypted video conferences. Biden team members fear that meeting Trump officials in person during a pandemic in which the president and his aides have repeatedly flouted safety guidelines could be hazardous to their health, while providing little benefit.
“They don’t get anything out of value from the White House,” a former senior Trump official working with the Biden transition team told Foreign Policy. “You go into the White House and nobody wears masks and it’s just obvious that they’re trying to make some kind of political point.”
The former senior Trump official working with the Biden transition team said the incoming administration had insisted on digital-only briefings with White House staffers, amid fear that masking protocols were being ignored by those closest to the president. Those concerns were reinforced on Sunday, when President Donald Trump tweeted that his personal attorney, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, had tested positive for COVID-19, joining over 40 members of the U.S. administration or Trump’s inner circle—including the president himself—who have contracted the coronavirus, according to a tally compiled by the New York Times. And another top Trump lawyer, Jenna Ellis, reportedly tested positive for the coronavirus after attending a White House Christmas party last week without a mask.
“The president, his senior officials, engage in the stupidest behavior imaginable, which all public health experts say is irresponsible and dangerous,” said one former U.S. official who has been in touch with the transition team. “If I was in the transition I would be very concerned. I certainly wouldn’t be going to State Department Christmas parties, which I might have done in a previous transition.”
The virtual transition reflects Biden’s more judicious approach to the pandemic than the Trump administration’s. Trump has repeatedly downplayed the threat posed by the virus, which has killed more than 284,000 Americans to date and infected more than 14 million others. But it also reflects a palpable anxiety in the Biden camp about interacting directly with representatives of a president who has hosted events in the White House and massive campaign rallies that turned into superspreader events.
With the coronavirus continuing to spread uncontrolled throughout the country despite U.S. regulators pushing to clear an experimental vaccine, experts said the Biden team is already looking to do damage control instead of expecting a smooth handoff from the outgoing Trump administration.
“This isn’t a normal transition,” said Richard Gowan, an expert on the United Nations at the International Crisis Group. “It’s more like firefighters going into a burned-out house after a blaze to see what remains structurally sound. And on issues like Iran, the current administration is still trying to start a few more small fires.”
The infection concerns are not limited to interactions with the White House.
The Biden team conducted 21 interviews with top Pentagon military and civilian leaders as of last week, according to a senior defense official, including with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley and the vice chairman, Gen. John Hyten, and have nearly 50 more meetings this week, including with Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist. While the Biden team has been provided with workspaces at the Pentagon, they are using the offices “to a minimal amount” and requesting as many as 90 percent of their meetings to be virtual, the senior official said.
Most of the briefings have been on the COVID-19 response, and personnel and readiness, expected to be major focal points for Biden. The Defense Department has also provided 1,500 pages of briefing materials on Microsoft tablets, including transition books, organizational charts, and contingency plans. The Biden transition team is also getting classified updates from Milley, the top U.S. military officer, and the secret budgets for intelligence agencies. Many meetings are taking place via secured teleconferences on classified systems, senior defense officials said.
Senior defense officials said that the Pentagon has been working with the Biden transition team, known as the agency review team, since the General Services Administration allowed the transition to go forward last month, beginning dialogue that night via email and starting virtual meetings the next morning. “The [agency review team] has asked for a preference for video teleconference meetings versus in-person,” one official said. “They have requested virtual meetings for nearly all interviews they’ve conducted to date.”
At the State Department, meanwhile, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is moving forward with plans to host indoor diplomatic holiday parties with hundreds of guests, running against Washington, D.C., health guidelines and raising alarm bells among medical experts.
Last week, Biden’s landing team met remotely with the leadership of USAID, including the agency’s acting administrator, John Barsa, a political appointee who recently tested positive for COVID-19, and who is quarantining at home. Barsa also reportedly had a reputation for eschewing masks, according to the Washington Post. “There is no expectation of in-person briefings,” said one U.S. official.
The transition to the Biden presidency has already been strained by unprecedented challenges, including Trump’s refusal to accept his electoral defeat. For weeks after Biden was declared the winner of the 2020 elections, routine transition work was delayed as Trump’s General Services Administration refused to greenlight the formal transition process until the election results were made clearer. (On Nov. 23, Trump authorized the agency to finally begin the transition process).
Now, despite media reports that the Trump administration blocked the Biden transition team from meeting with Pentagon intelligence officials, senior defense say the president-elect’s landing teams are getting proper briefings.
“The DoD and its transition leadership are fully cooperating with the Biden transition team, placing national security and the protection of the American people at the forefront of any and all discussions,” acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller said in a statement on Saturday.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-08--What Is Europe’s ‘Once-in-a-Generation’ Offer to America?

What Is Europe ’ s ‘ Once-in-a-Generation ’ Offer to America ?
To the extent that Europe is openly debating any foreign-policy issue at present , it is the transatlantic relationship .
It has been bracing to see French President Emmanuel Macron and German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer offer their opposing views .
The EU , for its part , has rejected the “ false debates ” between transatlanticists and Europeanists—which have pitched the two paths as mutually exclusive—as a cul-de-sac , and instead argued strength reinforces strength on both sides of the Atlantic .
This week , the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decide the strategy to offer toward its transatlantic partner .
They will do so against the background of recommendations issued last week by the European Commission and the European External Action Service for policy proposals spanning the whole gamut of transatlantic issues , such as pandemics , climate change , trade , technology , security , and defense .
Gesturing to what could be the most transatlanticist U.S. administration in decades with the election of Joe Biden to the presidency , the EU stressed the need to seize this “ once-in-a-generation opportunity.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ real partners beset by conflicting trends : greater ambition but fewer resources , visions of autonomy combined with the reality of interdependence , in search of strategy but with disjointed tactics , with good intentions but discordant outcomes .
The main challenge for both sides will be to translate high-level strategic agreement into concrete policies that can deliver tangible results in the short term and over time .
Concepts such as “ strategic autonomy , ” a European defense union , and European sovereignty have become common parlance among European decision-makers to signify @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a global actor and shape the world order .
But sometimes such concepts obfuscate rather than clarify strategic choices .
In the words of Acheson , each idea is “ clearer than truth , ” capturing the core essence but also easily misunderstood without the full context and background understanding .
Each is essential to pragmatic cooperation and can be used by European leaders to pursue visionary steps without illusions and with a deep sense of realism .
But what is most striking is that there is often little substance behind the concepts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be chosen as a slogan looking for strategy—only later to be defined or , more frequently , left undefined and contested .
For instance , countless hours and pages have been spent over the past four years over the notion of strategic autonomy—without much progress .
First introduced by the EU Global Strategy in 2016 , the concept was left undefined but at least constrained as an “ appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy.
” Greater insight can be gleaned from the 2017 French Strategic Review , which outlines as objectives , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Europe .
It defines France ’ s strategic autonomy as “ its capability to decide and act alone to defend its interests.
” For Europe , however , strategic autonomy “ requires the development of a common strategic culture ” and can be autonomous from the EU itself ; as an example , the French white paper provides the European Intervention Initiative , a French-led coalition of willing EU and non-EU states , that is separate from the EU institutions .
In French doctrine , the concept of strategic autonomy dates back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez Crisis—when then U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower told Britain and France to call off their intervention in Egypt—de Gaulle determined that France should always preserve its freedom of maneuver , backed by its own nuclear arsenal and independence from NATO ’ s military structures .
“ Nuclear deterrence ” guarantees France its “ freedom of decision and action.
” Yet , the EU , with multilateralism at the core of its decision-making , clearly can not seek the same unilateral freedom of maneuver .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the French defense white book to define the EU ’ s strategic autonomy .
Strikingly , neither the German , Spanish , nor Polish strategies—all of which postdate the EU Global Strategy—include the concept at the national or EU level .
Moreover , the debate over strategic autonomy has not been advanced by substituting other slogans , such as “ strategic sovereignty ” or “ cooperative autonomy.
” Likewise , the European defense union has been bedeviled by similar conceptual confusion .
One former EU official tried to explain to me several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the EU about common defense—but could not expound on the substantive distinction beyond this semantic difference .
Much greater effort has gone into describing what the defense union is not—does not duplicate NATO , does not envision an EU army , does not transfer defense responsibility to the EU level—rather than what it is .
This gap is particularly surprising , given that there is no shortage of models , including the unratified 1952 treaty establishing the European Defense Community ; this version , however , would compete with NATO .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also been unclear : whether to increase capabilities ( the German-led view ) , to serve operations ( the French-led view ) , or generate savings .
Efficiency gains became a particularly attractive argument , but rested on widely divergent estimates : between 25 billion and 100 billion euros , or between 10 and 40 percent of Europe ’ s collective defense budgets .
This analysis was based solely on an outdated seven-year old report from the European Parliament , which itself was highly circumspect in the accuracy of its prediction .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by senior officials , the lower end of the range would be dropped in favor of the more ambitious estimate of 100 billion euros ( $ 121 billion ) .
And thus paradoxically , the main strategic logic for a European defense union appeared to be to cut spending by 40 percent , at a time when many of the same countries had committed ( at NATO ’ s summit in 2014 ) to a 40 percent increase .
The main focus of the debate has been on streamlining weapons systems and avoiding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on whether various types of defense spending are tied to overall operational objectives : Military missions can be accomplished with different guns , tanks , and planes as much as with one standardized system .
Finally , European sovereignty was highlighted by former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in his 2018 State of the European Union speech .
He argued that the “ geopolitical situation makes this Europe ’ s hour : The time for European sovereignty has come.
” He further stated that “ European sovereignty is born of member states ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Sharing sovereignty—when and where needed—makes each of our nation-states stronger.
” Likewise , Macron has called for European sovereignty to guarantee Europe ’ s “ ability to exist in today ’ s world to defend our values and interests.
” The Élysée has organized disparate lines of policy across security , defense , economics , migration , social affairs , technology , culture , and education under the framework of European sovereignty .
And France and Germany enshrined it as a legal concept in the Treaty of Aachen signed in January 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not clarified basic questions such as who the European sovereign is and what the concept ’ s scope is in relation to national sovereignty .
Perhaps even worse than the lack of answers to such questions is that such fundamental issues never get raised nor fully analyzed .
Unlike the United States , with its unitary presidency , the EU has a complex collection of foreign-policy actors : heads of state and government in the European Council , foreign and defense ministers in the Council of the EU , the College of Commissioners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Even if the institution is just the European Council or the Commission , the number of decision-makers is already nearly 30 .
Over the five-year term of members of the Commission and Parliament , European Council members change frequently , with several national elections each year adding further complexity to the policymaking process .
Thus , the challenge is not to present clear choices , with arguments in favor and against , for a particular decision-maker to resolve , but rather to identify a potential center of gravity that can serve as consensus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clouds real choices and competing analyses to the extent that individual decision-makers or their advisors dampen their own viewpoints and instead tend toward the lowest common denominator as a default position .
What is the point of sharpening arguments and positions if ultimately they will become diluted anyway ?
Avoidance of internal conflict is corrosive for decision-making not only because it can lead to groupthink , but more importantly because it numbs the underlying intellectual analysis and sometimes prevents individuals from developing their own considered judgments and opinions .
The objective of each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rather to prevent disagreement .
Everyone speaks the same terms , nodding in approval , but no one shares the same meaning .
Language is sanitized and thereby made empty .
Slogans abound but strategy , which relies on choices , priorities , and objectives , is missing .
These internal dynamics within the EU ’ s institutions , in turn , affect public debate , which similarly rehearses consensus arguments and echoes catchphrases .
No wonder the former EU official advised me to pepper my paper with trendy buzzwords .
Thus , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to move beyond merely similar statements with European partners to common action : whether on COVID-19 , climate change , economic recovery , the rise of China and resurgence of Russia , or more broadly the contest between authoritarianism and liberal democracy .
And European counterparts , in turn , will need to refocus their efforts on resources rather than rhetoric .
Macron at times alternated between the necessity of Europe or the wider West in defending the liberal order .
In front of Congress , he emphasized “ the friendship between our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forging this Western world based on democracy , the freedom of individuals , and enabled us to build the international order that we know.
” In other speeches , however , he distinguished European civilization and notions of freedom from U.S. norms .
In outlining what ’ s been referred to as the Macron Doctrine , he also equated the United States with Russia and China—just another great power against which Europe should balance in a 19th-century fashion without distinguishing ally from adversary , friend from foe .
Nonetheless , he has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in guiding his strategic thinking , and his oscillations in rhetoric toward the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump perhaps merely reflected an initial open hand in search of a like-minded partner and subsequent frustration and disappointment in this endeavor .
One bold symbolic move to launch this new era of transatlantic cooperation would be for Europe to award Biden the Charlemagne Prize for work done in the service of European unification .
Just as the Nobel Prize committee was visionary in recognizing former U.S. President Barack Obama ’ s promise of peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the United States seize this unique strategic opportunity to make the promise of transatlantic partnership a reality .
For Europe , the road to success in foreign policy—whether confronting Beijing , Moscow , COVID-19 , or the Islamic State—leads through synergy with the United States , and vice versa .

A former European Union official—apparently in good faith and with genuine intentions—once told me one of my articles about European foreign policy did not have enough “buzzwords” and proceeded to list various terms and phrases to sprinkle throughout my text. I politely declined the edits. But the comment was emblematic of a general emphasis in European policy circles on formulating a catchy headline, alongside perhaps some flashy visuals, as a way of drawing attention but not stimulating constructive debate. Improving Europe’s so-called strategic culture has ironically itself become more of a slogan than a practical aim.
To the extent that Europe is openly debating any foreign-policy issue at present, it is the transatlantic relationship. It has been bracing to see French President Emmanuel Macron and German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer offer their opposing views. The EU, for its part, has rejected the “false debates” between transatlanticists and Europeanists—which have pitched the two paths as mutually exclusive—as a cul-de-sac, and instead argued strength reinforces strength on both sides of the Atlantic.
This week, the EU’s national leaders will meet to decide the strategy to offer toward its transatlantic partner. They will do so against the background of recommendations issued last week by the European Commission and the European External Action Service for policy proposals spanning the whole gamut of transatlantic issues, such as pandemics, climate change, trade, technology, security, and defense. Gesturing to what could be the most transatlanticist U.S. administration in decades with the election of Joe Biden to the presidency, the EU stressed the need to seize this “once-in-a-generation opportunity.”
The Biden team will find in Europe real partners beset by conflicting trends: greater ambition but fewer resources, visions of autonomy combined with the reality of interdependence, in search of strategy but with disjointed tactics, with good intentions but discordant outcomes. The main challenge for both sides will be to translate high-level strategic agreement into concrete policies that can deliver tangible results in the short term and over time.
At a quick glance, debates in Brussels and around Europe sometimes seem a bit like what they may have been in Washington in the late 1940s, when George Kennan and Paul Nitze designed strategies of containment and cold war and George Marshall and Dean Acheson shaped the liberal order. At a deeper level, however, fundamental questions and big ideas in Europe have had few concrete policy implications.
Concepts such as “strategic autonomy,” a European defense union, and European sovereignty have become common parlance among European decision-makers to signify Europe’s ambition to act as a global actor and shape the world order. But sometimes such concepts obfuscate rather than clarify strategic choices. In the words of Acheson, each idea is “clearer than truth,” capturing the core essence but also easily misunderstood without the full context and background understanding. Each is essential to pragmatic cooperation and can be used by European leaders to pursue visionary steps without illusions and with a deep sense of realism. But what is most striking is that there is often little substance behind the concepts. Typically, a phrase seems to be chosen as a slogan looking for strategy—only later to be defined or, more frequently, left undefined and contested.
For instance, countless hours and pages have been spent over the past four years over the notion of strategic autonomy—without much progress. First introduced by the EU Global Strategy in 2016, the concept was left undefined but at least constrained as an “appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy.” Greater insight can be gleaned from the 2017 French Strategic Review, which outlines as objectives, paradoxically, strategic autonomy for both France and Europe. It defines France’s strategic autonomy as “its capability to decide and act alone to defend its interests.” For Europe, however, strategic autonomy “requires the development of a common strategic culture” and can be autonomous from the EU itself; as an example, the French white paper provides the European Intervention Initiative, a French-led coalition of willing EU and non-EU states, that is separate from the EU institutions.
In French doctrine, the concept of strategic autonomy dates back to the presidency of Charles de Gaulle: In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez Crisis—when then U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower told Britain and France to call off their intervention in Egypt—de Gaulle determined that France should always preserve its freedom of maneuver, backed by its own nuclear arsenal and independence from NATO’s military structures. “Nuclear deterrence” guarantees France its “freedom of decision and action.” Yet, the EU, with multilateralism at the core of its decision-making, clearly cannot seek the same unilateral freedom of maneuver. And in any event, it is not for the French defense white book to define the EU’s strategic autonomy. Strikingly, neither the German, Spanish, nor Polish strategies—all of which postdate the EU Global Strategy—include the concept at the national or EU level. Moreover, the debate over strategic autonomy has not been advanced by substituting other slogans, such as “strategic sovereignty” or “cooperative autonomy.”
Likewise, the European defense union has been bedeviled by similar conceptual confusion. One former EU official tried to explain to me several times that NATO is about collective defense and the EU about common defense—but could not expound on the substantive distinction beyond this semantic difference. Much greater effort has gone into describing what the defense union is not—does not duplicate NATO, does not envision an EU army, does not transfer defense responsibility to the EU level—rather than what it is. This gap is particularly surprising, given that there is no shortage of models, including the unratified 1952 treaty establishing the European Defense Community; this version, however, would compete with NATO.
The underlying purposes of the defense union have also been unclear: whether to increase capabilities (the German-led view), to serve operations (the French-led view), or generate savings. Efficiency gains became a particularly attractive argument, but rested on widely divergent estimates: between 25 billion and 100 billion euros, or between 10 and 40 percent of Europe’s collective defense budgets. This analysis was based solely on an outdated seven-year old report from the European Parliament, which itself was highly circumspect in the accuracy of its prediction. By the time the information filtered into speeches by senior officials, the lower end of the range would be dropped in favor of the more ambitious estimate of 100 billion euros ($121 billion). And thus paradoxically, the main strategic logic for a European defense union appeared to be to cut spending by 40 percent, at a time when many of the same countries had committed (at NATO’s summit in 2014) to a 40 percent increase. The main focus of the debate has been on streamlining weapons systems and avoiding duplication, whereas the priority should be on whether various types of defense spending are tied to overall operational objectives: Military missions can be accomplished with different guns, tanks, and planes as much as with one standardized system.
Finally, European sovereignty was highlighted by former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in his 2018 State of the European Union speech. He argued that the “geopolitical situation makes this Europe’s hour: The time for European sovereignty has come.” He further stated that “European sovereignty is born of member states’ national sovereignty and does not replace it. Sharing sovereignty—when and where needed—makes each of our nation-states stronger.” Likewise, Macron has called for European sovereignty to guarantee Europe’s “ability to exist in today’s world to defend our values and interests.” The Élysée has organized disparate lines of policy across security, defense, economics, migration, social affairs, technology, culture, and education under the framework of European sovereignty. And France and Germany enshrined it as a legal concept in the Treaty of Aachen signed in January 2019. However, its repeated use has not clarified basic questions such as who the European sovereign is and what the concept’s scope is in relation to national sovereignty. Perhaps even worse than the lack of answers to such questions is that such fundamental issues never get raised nor fully analyzed.
The gravest problem with contemporary European debate is not necessarily the lack of content behind particular ideas, but rather the absence of contestation around competing visions. Sometimes the fault lies with the lack of seriousness on the part of the participants, as they launch various slogans or buzzwords to see what will stick. The ephemeral media market, driven by the latest tweet or headline, also does not facilitate considered debate. But the main reason is paradoxically due to consensus decision-making within the EU.
Unlike the United States, with its unitary presidency, the EU has a complex collection of foreign-policy actors: heads of state and government in the European Council, foreign and defense ministers in the Council of the EU, the College of Commissioners, and potentially the European Parliament. Even if the institution is just the European Council or the Commission, the number of decision-makers is already nearly 30. Over the five-year term of members of the Commission and Parliament, European Council members change frequently, with several national elections each year adding further complexity to the policymaking process. Thus, the challenge is not to present clear choices, with arguments in favor and against, for a particular decision-maker to resolve, but rather to identify a potential center of gravity that can serve as consensus.
Structurally, this drive for consensus clouds real choices and competing analyses to the extent that individual decision-makers or their advisors dampen their own viewpoints and instead tend toward the lowest common denominator as a default position. What is the point of sharpening arguments and positions if ultimately they will become diluted anyway?
Avoidance of internal conflict is corrosive for decision-making not only because it can lead to groupthink, but more importantly because it numbs the underlying intellectual analysis and sometimes prevents individuals from developing their own considered judgments and opinions. The objective of each position is not to persuade, but rather to prevent disagreement. Everyone speaks the same terms, nodding in approval, but no one shares the same meaning. Language is sanitized and thereby made empty. Slogans abound but strategy, which relies on choices, priorities, and objectives, is missing. These internal dynamics within the EU’s institutions, in turn, affect public debate, which similarly rehearses consensus arguments and echoes catchphrases. No wonder the former EU official advised me to pepper my paper with trendy buzzwords.
Thus, Biden’s team will quickly need to move beyond merely similar statements with European partners to common action: whether on COVID-19, climate change, economic recovery, the rise of China and resurgence of Russia, or more broadly the contest between authoritarianism and liberal democracy. And European counterparts, in turn, will need to refocus their efforts on resources rather than rhetoric.
Appearing before a joint session of the U.S. Congress in 2018, French Macron argued: “If we do not act with urgency as a global community.… We would then inevitably and severely undermine the liberal order we built after World War II. Other powers, with a stronger strategy and ambition, will then fill the void we would leave empty.”
Macron at times alternated between the necessity of Europe or the wider West in defending the liberal order. In front of Congress, he emphasized “the friendship between our two countries, which has contributed to forging this Western world based on democracy, the freedom of individuals, and enabled us to build the international order that we know.” In other speeches, however, he distinguished European civilization and notions of freedom from U.S. norms. In outlining what’s been referred to as the Macron Doctrine, he also equated the United States with Russia and China—just another great power against which Europe should balance in a 19th-century fashion without distinguishing ally from adversary, friend from foe. Nonetheless, he has been consistent on the centrality of Enlightenment values in guiding his strategic thinking, and his oscillations in rhetoric toward the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump perhaps merely reflected an initial open hand in search of a like-minded partner and subsequent frustration and disappointment in this endeavor.
One bold symbolic move to launch this new era of transatlantic cooperation would be for Europe to award Biden the Charlemagne Prize for work done in the service of European unification. Just as the Nobel Prize committee was visionary in recognizing former U.S. President Barack Obama’s promise of peace, the Charlemagne committee can help Europe and the United States seize this unique strategic opportunity to make the promise of transatlantic partnership a reality. For Europe, the road to success in foreign policy—whether confronting Beijing, Moscow, COVID-19, or the Islamic State—leads through synergy with the United States, and vice versa.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-09--Senate to Vote on Blocking $23 Billion UAE Arms Sale

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. Senate votes on whether to block an arms sale to the UAE , British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meet for last-ditch Brexit talks , and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan heads to Azerbaijan .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The U.S. Senate is expected to vote today on whether to block a $ 23 billion arms and ammunition sale to the United Arab Emirates , in a further sign of strained ties between the U.S. Congress and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The vote was spurred after the White House informed Congress of the sale—which includes 50 F-35 fighter jets—in November .
The deal follows the White House-brokered Abraham Accords , in which the UAE and Israel normalized ties .
Responding to a tweet by Sen. Chris Murphy on Dec. 3 , the UAE ’ s U.S .
Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba summed up why he believes the sale is necessary .
“ In the world ’ s most dangerous neighborhood , it is critical for our protection and for our shared interests and values @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has made his views clear .
“ It ’ s a little baffling to suggest that , now of all times , a protest gesture with no chance of obtaining a veto-proof majority is a valuable use of the Senate ’ s time , ” he said , adding that “ the strategic realities dictate that Congress should not stand in the way of this sale.
” In the face of a Senate revolt , the White House has reportedly launched a late lobbying effort to convince @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one Democratic aide telling CNN , “ the fact that the White House is doing such a full-court press suggests they are nervous about vote count.
” Mattis as lobbyist ?
And in a week where former generals and their influence on U.S. defense policy is in the spotlight after President-elect Joe Biden ’ s nomination of retired Gen. Lloyd Austin for secretary of defense , another former Pentagon chief and military officer is weighing in .
The Huffington Post reports that James Mattis , President Donald Trump ’ s first defense secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ambassador to assuage senators ’ concerns about the deal .
External criticism .
Outside of Congress , the deal has come in for bipartisan criticism .
Writing in the American Conservative , Daniel Larison called the sale “ outrageous , ” accusing the UAE of being “ reckless and destructive in its regional conduct.
” “ A vote for the F-35s to the UAE is a vote for endless war for a very simple reason : The UAE doesn ’ t need F-35s to protect itself—it needs them to oblige the U.S. to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military dominion over the Mideast , ” Trita Parsi , Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute , said in a statement .
Regional issues .
The vote also comes at an awkward time for the UAE and its relationship with the U.S. defense establishment .
A report from the Pentagon ’ s Inspector General for counterterrorism operations in Africa issued in late November said that the UAE was apparently financing Russian mercenaries in Libya .
FP ’ s Amy Mackinnon and Jack Detsch reported on the claim , which Amb .
Otaiba @ @ @ @ @ @ @ What comes next ?
If the House and Senate do not approve the weapons sale , Trump can always use his veto power to revive it .
Whether the Senate has the votes to override that veto will become clearer following today ’ s vote .
Similar measures to block support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE failed in 2019 after Congress failed to override a presidential veto .
Last-ditch dinner .
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has called the likelihood of reaching a deal between his government and the European Union “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a make-or-break dinner meeting in Brussels with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen today .
The prime minister ’ s trip comes as EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier told a closed-door meeting of the bloc ’ s ministers that it was now more likely that the United Kingdom would exit the Brexit transition without a trade deal .
The British government has shown signs of a desire for compromise after it dropped controversial clauses in legislation that would have breached the initial Brexit terms .
“ Hopefully this is a signal that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney said .
Erdogan in Azerbaijan .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan heads to Azerbaijan for a two-day visit , beginning with a victory parade in the capital of Baku .
The celebratory atmosphere in Azerbaijan after their successful military campaign in Nagorno-Karabkah is a contrast to the scene in Armenia , where hundreds filled the streets of the capital Yerevan on Tuesday , continuing calls for the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan .
Opposition parties advised Pashinyan to resign by noon on Tuesday or face @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has ignored .
Eritrean troops in Ethiopia ?
Eritrean forces have crossed the border into Ethiopia to assist in Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ’ s war against the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front , according to a Reuters report .
The report , citing unnamed regional diplomats , said that Eritrean forces entered Ethiopia through three border towns in mid-November .
The alleged incursion would back up the justification the TPLF used while launching rocket attacks against the Eritrean capital of Asmara in November .
Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh Mohammed has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Paying the price of a pandemic .
A policy proposal that could become attractive for governments in wealthy countries has emerged in the United Kingdom as a group of tax experts and economists has called for a one-off wealth tax on households worth more than £1 million ( about $ 1.3 million ) in order to offset the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic .
The group , brought together by the London School of Economics and Warwick University , calls for a 1 percent levy on assets above £1 million , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The gap between rich and poor during the pandemic has been seen in some purchasing trends .
For example , sales of luxury jewelry have increased over the course of the pandemic .
Hackers target cyber firm .
FireEye , one of the world ’ s leading cybersecurity firms , has been hacked by what it called a “ a nation with top-tier offensive capabilities.
” Hackers reportedly gained access to cyber tools used by the company to detect vulnerabilities in their client ’ s networks .
The company has been hired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as in the cases of Sony and Equifax , and had also consulted with the U.S. government following intrusions by Russian hackers in 2015 .
FireEye did not name which country may have been responsible for the hack , but the New York Times reports that the case has been referred to Russia specialists at the F.B.I .
Netanyahu rival leaves Likud .
Gideon Saar , a onetime party rival to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has resigned from Likud in order to form his own political party , potentially becoming a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the new year .
In announcing the move , Saar equated support for Netanyahu among Likud supporters as a “ personality cult.
” A Likud statement said Saar ’ s departure was due to his poor performance in a leadership primary last December , when Netanyahu handily defeated Saar by a 42 percent margin .
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Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Senate votes on whether to block an arms sale to the UAE , British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meet for last-ditch Brexit talks , and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan heads to Azerbaijan.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Senate votes on whether to block an arms sale to the UAE, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meet for last-ditch Brexit talks, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan heads to Azerbaijan.
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Senate Votes on Whether to Block UAE Arms Sale
The U.S. Senate is expected to vote today on whether to block a $23 billion arms and ammunition sale to the United Arab Emirates, in a further sign of strained ties between the U.S. Congress and U.S. allies in the Middle East. The vote was spurred after the White House informed Congress of the sale—which includes 50 F-35 fighter jets—in November. The deal follows the White House-brokered Abraham Accords, in which the UAE and Israel normalized ties.
Responding to a tweet by Sen. Chris Murphy on Dec. 3, the UAE’s Ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba summed up why he believes the sale is necessary. “In the world’s most dangerous neighborhood, it is critical for our protection and for our shared interests and values with the U.S.,” he wrote.
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has made his views clear. “It’s a little baffling to suggest that, now of all times, a protest gesture with no chance of obtaining a veto-proof majority is a valuable use of the Senate’s time,” he said, adding that “the strategic realities dictate that Congress should not stand in the way of this sale.”
In the face of a Senate revolt, the White House has reportedly launched a late lobbying effort to convince lawmakers to reject the resolution, with one Democratic aide telling CNN, “the fact that the White House is doing such a full-court press suggests they are nervous about vote count.”
Mattis as lobbyist? And in a week where former generals and their influence on U.S. defense policy is in the spotlight after President-elect Joe Biden’s nomination of retired Gen. Lloyd Austin for secretary of defense, another former Pentagon chief and military officer is weighing in. The Huffington Post reports that James Mattis, President Donald Trump’s first defense secretary, has been drafted by the UAE ambassador to assuage senators’ concerns about the deal.
External criticism. Outside of Congress, the deal has come in for bipartisan criticism. Writing in the American Conservative, Daniel Larison called the sale “outrageous,” accusing the UAE of being “reckless and destructive in its regional conduct.”
“A vote for the F-35s to the UAE is a vote for endless war for a very simple reason: The UAE doesn’t need F-35s to protect itself—it needs them to oblige the U.S. to defend the UAE and to sustain its military dominion over the Mideast,” Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, said in a statement.
Regional issues. The vote also comes at an awkward time for the UAE and its relationship with the U.S. defense establishment. A report from the Pentagon’s Inspector General for counterterrorism operations in Africa issued in late November said that the UAE was apparently financing Russian mercenaries in Libya. FP’s Amy Mackinnon and Jack Detsch reported on the claim, which Amb. Otaiba described as “vague and unsubstantiated.”
What comes next? If the House and Senate do not approve the weapons sale, Trump can always use his veto power to revive it. Whether the Senate has the votes to override that veto will become clearer following today’s vote. Similar measures to block support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE failed in 2019 after Congress failed to override a presidential veto.
What We’re Following Today
Last-ditch dinner. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has called the likelihood of reaching a deal between his government and the European Union “very, very difficult” ahead of a make-or-break dinner meeting in Brussels with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen today. The prime minister’s trip comes as EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier told a closed-door meeting of the bloc’s ministers that it was now more likely that the United Kingdom would exit the Brexit transition without a trade deal.
The British government has shown signs of a desire for compromise after it dropped controversial clauses in legislation that would have breached the initial Brexit terms. “Hopefully this is a signal that the British government is in deal-making mood,” Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney said.
Erdogan in Azerbaijan. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan heads to Azerbaijan for a two-day visit, beginning with a victory parade in the capital of Baku. The celebratory atmosphere in Azerbaijan after their successful military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh is a contrast to the scene in Armenia, where hundreds filled the streets of the capital Yerevan on Tuesday, continuing calls for the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Opposition parties advised Pashinyan to resign by noon on Tuesday or face widespread unrest, a deadline that Pashinyan has ignored.
Eritrean troops in Ethiopia? Eritrean forces have crossed the border into Ethiopia to assist in Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s war against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, according to a Reuters report. The report, citing unnamed regional diplomats, said that Eritrean forces entered Ethiopia through three border towns in mid-November. The alleged incursion would back up the justification the TPLF used while launching rocket attacks against the Eritrean capital of Asmara in November. Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh Mohammed has dismissed the report as “propaganda.”
Keep an Eye On Paying the price of a pandemic. A policy proposal that could become attractive for governments in wealthy countries has emerged in the United Kingdom as a group of tax experts and economists has called for a one-off wealth tax on households worth more than £1 million (about $1.3 million) in order to offset the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic. The group, brought together by the London School of Economics and Warwick University, calls for a 1 percent levy on assets above £1 million, which could raise £260 billion over five years. The gap between rich and poor during the pandemic has been seen in some purchasing trends. For example, sales of luxury jewelry have increased over the course of the pandemic.
Hackers target cyber firm. FireEye, one of the world’s leading cybersecurity firms, has been hacked by what it called a “a nation with top-tier offensive capabilities.” Hackers reportedly gained access to cyber tools used by the company to detect vulnerabilities in their client’s networks. The company has been hired by companies following large-scale security breaches, such as in the cases of Sony and Equifax, and had also consulted with the U.S. government following intrusions by Russian hackers in 2015. FireEye did not name which country may have been responsible for the hack, but the New York Times reports that the case has been referred to Russia specialists at the F.B.I.
Netanyahu rival leaves Likud. Gideon Saar, a onetime party rival to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has resigned from Likud in order to form his own political party, potentially becoming a spoiler if Israel decides to hold elections in the new year. In announcing the move, Saar equated support for Netanyahu among Likud supporters as a “personality cult.” A Likud statement said Saar’s departure was due to his poor performance in a leadership primary last December, when Netanyahu handily defeated Saar by a 42 percent margin.
Odds and Ends Although it’s not quite as bad as the mayor of Austin, Texas advising residents on coronavirus safety from a beachside resort in Mexico, it appears that Russian President Vladimir Putin might have also embraced the freedom of remote working—with a twist. A report from Russian outlet Proyekt Media claims that Putin has been spending time at the Black Sea resort of Sochi without attracting public notice by working out of an office identical to his one in Moscow. Proyekt analyzed flight tracking data and compared images of the alleged twin offices in making the claim. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov rubbished the report, calling it “stupidity.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.