foreignpolicy--2020-06-29--He Sends Up Balloons, and North Korea Wants Him Dead

He Sends Up Balloons , and North Korea Wants Him Dead SEOUL—A black car rolled into the parking lot in southern Seoul , and three men stepped out into the summer heat .
Two of the men were police officers , even though you couldn ’ t tell from their appearances .
The third was the man they were there to protect : Park Sang-hak , a North Korean defector now living in South Korea and sometimes referred to as “ Enemy Zero ” by the North .
“ I ’ ve already almost died twice , ” Park casually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where he escorted Foreign Policy and other international journalists .
In 2011 , he was supposed to meet another defector but was warned against it by South Korean intelligence agents .
They arrested the other defector and found two pens on his person , one with a concealed poisoned needle and the other that could fire a projectile coated in poisonous powder , as well as a flashlight capable of firing three bullets .
The following year , another North Korean spy was arrested for planning to assassinate Park .
He also gets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his back , he claimed .
“ Through the spies here in Korea , they send pigeon necks and even mice to my office , ” Park said as the two police officers blocked the trail leading down to the bench , so elderly citizens had to trek through some shrubbery to continue their daily stroll .
There ’ s a reason why North Korea wants to kill him .
He runs the organization Fighters for a Free North Korea , which keeps sending thousands of little leaflets across the border via balloons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ park and waved them around as he spoke .
These small pieces of light , see-through plastic , which also contains a pocket to hold $ 1 bills , is the cause of the latest inter-Korean diplomatic spat .
All because of the words printed on them .
“ It ’ s the truth about the Kim family , and Kim Jong Un is very scared of the truth .
In North Korea , people think of Kim Jong Un as a god .
They look up to him as a deity .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they wouldn ’ t think of him in this manner .
So that ’ s [ Kim ’ s ] biggest fear , for people to not think of him as a god , ” Park said .
“ No matter how much the Kim family will try to stop me , I will send the letter of truth to the people , ” he said .
Park fled the North Korean regime back in 1999 because his father had discovered a truth : the scale of the famine that had devastated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fresh purges , Park fled with his immediate family to China , ultimately ending up in South Korea .
In 2003 , he got news from back home that his fiancee had been so severely beaten that she no longer looked like her old self and his two uncles had been tortured to death .
So he started doing activism and founded Fighters for a Free North Korea .
The leaflets call Kim Jong Un a hypocrite for being educated in a Western country , call him a thief for stealing the fruits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard labor , and they even accuse him of sexual assaults of minors—harsh accusations in North Korea .
So , it did not come as a surprise this month when Kim Yo Jong , sister to the country ’ s leader , delivered a fiery condemnation of defectors in the South , labeling them as “ human scum ” and demanding punishment .
It was a quiet victory for Park .
“ For the first time in North Korean history , they used the word ‘ defectors.
’ The leaflets all mention the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can not hide it anymore .
That ’ s how much they ’ re scared of the truth , ” he said .
North Korean media has shown pictures of mass protests , where the people curse the defectors in the south and calling for their punishment .
And for a while , it seemed like military retaliation even could have been on the table .
“ It is said that the tree of peace lives off blood and that freedom is not free .
Somebody has to sacrifice themselves , so if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Un ’ s gun , it ’ ll be an honor , ” Park said .
After North Korea ’ s demolition of the inter-Korean liaison office , tensions on the Korean Peninsula have increased .
North Korean troops have also been spotted moving around in the Demilitarized Zone separating the two nations and threatening to take military action .
But according to experts studying North Korea , it ’ s not necessarily that clear-cut .
Some see the North using the leaflets as an excuse to ramp up the tensions as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaflets were never a good enough reason to blow up the [ liaison ] office .
Sure , they don ’ t like them , but [ Park ] has been doing this for the last two years , and North Korea didn ’ t react .
Why are they reacting now ?
” said Go Myong-hyun , a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul , focusing on North Korea .
Last year , Park and his organization had 11 launches , and so far this year they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Go believes that the North just selected the leaflets to legitimize escalating threats toward the South .
The regime does so in order to de-escalate later , with the end goal being to lift some of the sanctions devastating the country ’ s economy .
“ This is exactly what happened back in 2017 .
There ’ s a huge escalation between Pyongyang and Washington , ending up in ‘ fire and fury ’ and talking about who has the biggest nuclear button , then in 2018 Kim Jong Un said he ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out to America too , ” Go said .
“ And how did that work ?
Greatly for them , right .
They started a dialogue with the Americans , which ended up in the first summit between the leaders of the two countries .
So , success beyond belief from the North Korean point of view , ” he added .
No sanctions were lifted though , and the February 2019 summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim in Hanoi ended in a failure , but it was closer to something @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a long time .
And that ’ s what the regime is hoping could happen again .
Pyongyang will continue to rustle feathers before eventually directing the fury toward Washington rather than Seoul , maybe with an intercontinental ballistic missile engine test—all to try to secure a deal with the Trump administration before the U.S. presidential election in November .
And with presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden biting at the heels of Trump , it might be North Korea ’ s second chance , as Trump could be looking for a quick foreign-policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Security Advisor John Bolton is no longer there to sabotage a summit .
“ They ’ re doing what they ’ ve been doing the last five decades or so .
But then you know , people still buy it , and North Korea thinks that Trump is going to buy it again because it ’ s convenient for Trump for his political purposes , ” Go said .

SEOUL—A black car rolled into the parking lot in southern Seoul, and three men stepped out into the summer heat. Two of the men were police officers, even though you couldn’t tell from their appearances. The third was the man they were there to protect: Park Sang-hak, a North Korean defector now living in South Korea and sometimes referred to as “Enemy Zero” by the North.
SEOUL—A black car rolled into the parking lot in southern Seoul, and three men stepped out into the summer heat. Two of the men were police officers, even though you couldn’t tell from their appearances. The third was the man they were there to protect: Park Sang-hak, a North Korean defector now living in South Korea and sometimes referred to as “Enemy Zero” by the North.
“I’ve already almost died twice,” Park casually said last week from a park bench where he escorted Foreign Policy and other international journalists. In 2011, he was supposed to meet another defector but was warned against it by South Korean intelligence agents. They arrested the other defector and found two pens on his person, one with a concealed poisoned needle and the other that could fire a projectile coated in poisonous powder, as well as a flashlight capable of firing three bullets.
The following year, another North Korean spy was arrested for planning to assassinate Park. He also gets the occasional reminder of the target on his back, he claimed.
“Through the spies here in Korea, they send pigeon necks and even mice to my office,” Park said as the two police officers blocked the trail leading down to the bench, so elderly citizens had to trek through some shrubbery to continue their daily stroll.
There’s a reason why North Korea wants to kill him. He runs the organization Fighters for a Free North Korea, which keeps sending thousands of little leaflets across the border via balloons. He brought a couple to the park and waved them around as he spoke. These small pieces of light, see-through plastic, which also contains a pocket to hold $1 bills, is the cause of the latest inter-Korean diplomatic spat. All because of the words printed on them.
“It’s the truth about the Kim family, and Kim Jong Un is very scared of the truth. In North Korea, people think of Kim Jong Un as a god. They look up to him as a deity. If they know the truth about him, they wouldn’t think of him in this manner. So that’s [Kim’s] biggest fear, for people to not think of him as a god,” Park said.
“No matter how much the Kim family will try to stop me, I will send the letter of truth to the people,” he said.
Park fled the North Korean regime back in 1999 because his father had discovered a truth: the scale of the famine that had devastated North Korea in the 1990s. Fearing fresh purges, Park fled with his immediate family to China, ultimately ending up in South Korea. In 2003, he got news from back home that his fiancee had been so severely beaten that she no longer looked like her old self and his two uncles had been tortured to death. So he started doing activism and founded Fighters for a Free North Korea.
The leaflets call Kim Jong Un a hypocrite for being educated in a Western country, call him a thief for stealing the fruits of the North Korean people’s hard labor, and they even accuse him of sexual assaults of minors—harsh accusations in North Korea.
So, it did not come as a surprise this month when Kim Yo Jong, sister to the country’s leader, delivered a fiery condemnation of defectors in the South, labeling them as “human scum” and demanding punishment. It was a quiet victory for Park. “For the first time in North Korean history, they used the word ‘defectors.’ The leaflets all mention the word defectors, so they know they cannot hide it anymore. That’s how much they’re scared of the truth,” he said.
North Korean media has shown pictures of mass protests, where the people curse the defectors in the south and calling for their punishment. And for a while, it seemed like military retaliation even could have been on the table.
“It is said that the tree of peace lives off blood and that freedom is not free. Somebody has to sacrifice themselves, so if I’m killed by Kim Jong Un’s gun, it’ll be an honor,” Park said.
After North Korea’s demolition of the inter-Korean liaison office, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have increased. North Korean troops have also been spotted moving around in the Demilitarized Zone separating the two nations and threatening to take military action.
But according to experts studying North Korea, it’s not necessarily that clear-cut. Some see the North using the leaflets as an excuse to ramp up the tensions as a means to an end. “The leaflets were never a good enough reason to blow up the [liaison] office. Sure, they don’t like them, but [Park] has been doing this for the last two years, and North Korea didn’t react. Why are they reacting now?” said Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, focusing on North Korea.
Last year, Park and his organization had 11 launches, and so far this year they’ve had five. Instead, Go believes that the North just selected the leaflets to legitimize escalating threats toward the South. The regime does so in order to de-escalate later, with the end goal being to lift some of the sanctions devastating the country’s economy.
“This is exactly what happened back in 2017. There’s a huge escalation between Pyongyang and Washington, ending up in ‘fire and fury’ and talking about who has the biggest nuclear button, then in 2018 Kim Jong Un said he’d talk to South Korea and reach out to America too,” Go said.
“And how did that work? Greatly for them, right. They started a dialogue with the Americans, which ended up in the first summit between the leaders of the two countries. So, success beyond belief from the North Korean point of view,” he added.
No sanctions were lifted though, and the February 2019 summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim in Hanoi ended in a failure, but it was closer to something tangible than Pyongyang had ever been in a long time. And that’s what the regime is hoping could happen again.
Pyongyang will continue to rustle feathers before eventually directing the fury toward Washington rather than Seoul, maybe with an intercontinental ballistic missile engine test—all to try to secure a deal with the Trump administration before the U.S. presidential election in November. And with presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden biting at the heels of Trump, it might be North Korea’s second chance, as Trump could be looking for a quick foreign-policy victory, especially now that former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton is no longer there to sabotage a summit.
“They’re doing what they’ve been doing the last five decades or so. But then you know, people still buy it, and North Korea thinks that Trump is going to buy it again because it’s convenient for Trump for his political purposes,” Go said.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--Beijing’s New Security Law Is a Warning Sign

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : Beijing ’ s new security law takes effect in Hong Kong , data reveals the forced sterilization of Uighur women , and India bans Chinese apps—including TikTok .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
The full text of Beijing ’ s new national security law imposed on Hong Kong was published only as the law came into effect on Tuesday .
It was an apt symbol of the secrecy and autocracy surrounding the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the effective end of their autonomy and of freedom of speech and protest in the city .
The law , which criminalizes “ secession , subversion of state power , terrorism and collusion with foreign entities , ” is worse than critics imagined .
It sets out potential life imprisonment for any violation , a new security body set up within the city to handle arrests , and a provision for cases to be handled on the mainland rather than by Hong Kong courts .
The response from Hong Kongers , who generally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fierce and despairing .
Despite pandemic restrictions , tens of thousands of people took to the streets in protest today .
The police arrested over 300 people and charged nine under the new law .
Details of the cases are not clear yet , except for one man charged for waving a “ Hong Kong Independence ” flag .
At the same time , many Hong Kongers have already deactivated their Twitter accounts out of fear of being charged for speech there , withdrawn from democratic organizations , and taken down anti-government signs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ keen on Chinese investment and eager to protect their own interests , have supported the law , despite the threat it poses to the city ’ s credibility as a financial hub .
Departure plans .
A large number of Hong Kong ’ s residents have plans to emigrate , primarily to Taiwan .
Britain swiftly denounced the move as a “ serious breach ” of the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong and promised a route to citizenship for those with British Nationals ( Overseas ) status , a designation held by many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means an end to meaningful electoral representation in Hong Kong , since opponents of Beijing are likely to face criminal charges merely for standing for office .
The mainland can impose other laws in the future at will .
Warning sign .
While the impact of the law is cruelest in Hong Kong , Beijing ’ s actions should worry everyone .
The tolerance extended to Hong Kong , where the first thing seen on arrival by ferry was often anti-government signs waved by Falun Gong practitioners , once showed that the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerns , treaty obligations , and its global reputation above domestic ideological worries .
That ’ s no longer the case , and that has serious implications for how China behaves on other issues .
Global jurisdiction .
Strikingly , the law explicitly says it applies to non-Hong Kong residents—and to offenses committed outside Hong Kong itself .
In theory , then , a U.S. citizen who tweeted support for Hong Kong independence or criticized the internment camps in Xinjiang could be arrested while passing through Hong Kong , extradited to the mainland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ term .
In practice , the law is likely to be deployed mostly against Hong Kongers .
But going by the record in the mainland , former Chinese citizens , dual nationals , and even non-citizens of Chinese descent may find themselves targeted .
In a disturbing move , China is also preventing Canada from consular access to a Chinese Canadian prisoner , sentenced to eight years for practicing Falun Gong , by claiming that she had renounced Canadian citizenship .
Xinjiang sterilizations .
A major investigation by the Associated Press , backed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorities have imposed draconian new family planning policies on ethnic minorities , especially Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang .
Minorities traditionally faced fewer restrictions on the number of children they could have than Han Chinese , but the situation has now reversed .
The Han majority is encouraged to have multiple children , while many Uighur women have been forcibly sterilized .
In two sample counties in Xinjiang , the targets given in documents were the sterilization of 14 percent and 34 percent women of child-bearing age in a single year .
While family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , they haven ’ t caused the baby boom desired by authorities .
That ’ s a problem for a greying nation , where the cost of supporting retirees may soon be prohibitive .
Given the coercive tools favored by the government , restrictions on Han Chinese reproductive freedoms could increase , with potential abortion bans on the horizon as sterilizations and forced abortions continue in minority areas .
Pandemic lockdowns .
In the county of Anxin , under 100 miles from Beijing , 400,000 people are under a fresh lockdown after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing ’ s previous small outbreak appears well under control .
China continues to take strict measures against any potential recurrence , in contrast to the rampant epidemic in the United States .
Meanwhile , reports of a new flu strain with pandemic potential in China are largely speculative : While the strain exists in human ’ s close neighbors—pigs—virtually any flu strain has pandemic potential , and there ’ s nothing unusual about this one .
Disease , however , is clearly very much on everyone ’ s minds .
U.S. media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of another four Chinese media outlets as foreign agents last week , China has unsurprisingly targeted four U.S.-based outlets in China with new demands for funding and staff information : the AP , CBS , UPI , and NPR .
Unlike the Chinese media outlets , none is controlled or owned by the U.S. government .
Picking the four appears somewhat random , although AP ’ s coverage of Xinjiang has been extensive .
Journalists haven ’ t been expelled yet , unlike in the last round of retaliations , but visa restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India bans Chinese apps .
India has issued a comprehensive ban on 59 Chinese mobile apps after the deadly clash between troops in the Galwan Valley .
The move appears rushed-through with little detail on implementation , though the Indian government has indicated that it will issue intellectual property blocks on the apps rather than just removing them from Indian app stores .
The apps include TikTok , as well as Alibaba ’ s UC Browser , the most widely used in India .
Alibaba estimates that it could lose up to $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has criticized the move for violating World Trade Organization rules—with no apparent sense of irony , despite its own massive restrictions on the internet .
It ’ s possible that the ban will be walked back in practice , but the trade war could also worsen .
India is an major market for Chinese technology and the single biggest importer of Chinese goods , while China depends on India for some critical pharmaceuticals .
U.S. security limits .
The U.S. Federal Communications Commission ( FCC ) has designated the Chinese suppliers ZTE and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the culmination of growing suspicions and barriers over the last few years .
The move means that federal funds—the $ 8.3 billion a year Universal Service Fund—can no longer be used for the purchase or maintenance of ZTE or Huawei goods , effectively ending any U.S. government use of either firm .
Those limits were already largely in place , but the FCC had held off from a final designation .
As the U.S.-China relationship spirals further , expect tighter limitations on any government body in the United States using Chinese equipment—limits that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies .
Business recovery .
Chinese business indexes were up across the board in June , indicating renewed activity as the coronavirus appears under control in China itself and as European markets begin to recover .
Exports and imports are still contracting , however , and economic activity remains below pre-coronavirus levels .
Many of the worst impacts , especially on small businesses and the self-employed , remain largely hidden thanks to pressure on the Chinese press to cover only positive stories .
Ashley Mears , a professor of sociology at Boston University @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kimberly Kay Hoang , an anthropologist who worked at several Saigon hostess bars for her research , each offers a powerful take on the commercialization of women ’ s bodies in worlds run by men .
Mears ’ s book concentrates on the nightlife scene in New York , where idealized white women—between 18 and 25 , and at least 5 feet , 9 inches tall—remain the strongest indicator of status for the ultra-rich and even Asian visitors such as the infamous Malaysian businessman Jho Low .
Hoang , meanwhile , shows how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asian century have raised the perceived value of Asian women , even as they remain essentially seen as commodities by powerful men .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: Beijing’s new security law takes effect in Hong Kong, data reveals the forced sterilization of Uighur women, and India bans Chinese apps —including TikTok.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: Beijing’s new security law takes effect in Hong Kong, data reveals the forced sterilization of Uighur women, and India bans Chinese apps—including TikTok.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
One Country, One System
The full text of Beijing’s new national security law imposed on Hong Kong was published only as the law came into effect on Tuesday. It was an apt symbol of the secrecy and autocracy surrounding the move, which Hong Kongers see as the effective end of their autonomy and of freedom of speech and protest in the city.
The law, which criminalizes “secession, subversion of state power, terrorism and collusion with foreign entities,” is worse than critics imagined. It sets out potential life imprisonment for any violation, a new security body set up within the city to handle arrests, and a provision for cases to be handled on the mainland rather than by Hong Kong courts.
The response from Hong Kongers, who generally oppose the law, has been both fierce and despairing. Despite pandemic restrictions, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in protest today. The police arrested over 300 people and charged nine under the new law. Details of the cases are not clear yet, except for one man charged for waving a “Hong Kong Independence” flag.
At the same time, many Hong Kongers have already deactivated their Twitter accounts out of fear of being charged for speech there, withdrawn from democratic organizations, and taken down anti-government signs. Both local and foreign businesses, keen on Chinese investment and eager to protect their own interests, have supported the law, despite the threat it poses to the city’s credibility as a financial hub.
Departure plans. A large number of Hong Kong’s residents have plans to emigrate, primarily to Taiwan. Britain swiftly denounced the move as a “serious breach” of the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong and promised a route to citizenship for those with British Nationals (Overseas) status, a designation held by many older Hong Kongers. The law effectively means an end to meaningful electoral representation in Hong Kong, since opponents of Beijing are likely to face criminal charges merely for standing for office. The mainland can impose other laws in the future at will.
Warning sign. While the impact of the law is cruelest in Hong Kong, Beijing’s actions should worry everyone. The tolerance extended to Hong Kong, where the first thing seen on arrival by ferry was often anti-government signs waved by Falun Gong practitioners, once showed that the Chinese Communist Party was capable of prioritizing pragmatic concerns, treaty obligations, and its global reputation above domestic ideological worries. That’s no longer the case, and that has serious implications for how China behaves on other issues.
Global jurisdiction. Strikingly, the law explicitly says it applies to non-Hong Kong residents—and to offenses committed outside Hong Kong itself. In theory, then, a U.S. citizen who tweeted support for Hong Kong independence or criticized the internment camps in Xinjiang could be arrested while passing through Hong Kong, extradited to the mainland, and sentenced to a Chinese prison term.
In practice, the law is likely to be deployed mostly against Hong Kongers. But going by the record in the mainland, former Chinese citizens, dual nationals, and even non-citizens of Chinese descent may find themselves targeted. In a disturbing move, China is also preventing Canada from consular access to a Chinese Canadian prisoner, sentenced to eight years for practicing Falun Gong, by claiming that she had renounced Canadian citizenship.
What We’re Following
Xinjiang sterilizations. A major investigation by the Associated Press, backed by data-driven research, shows that Chinese authorities have imposed draconian new family planning policies on ethnic minorities, especially Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. Minorities traditionally faced fewer restrictions on the number of children they could have than Han Chinese, but the situation has now reversed. The Han majority is encouraged to have multiple children, while many Uighur women have been forcibly sterilized. In two sample counties in Xinjiang, the targets given in documents were the sterilization of 14 percent and 34 percent women of child-bearing age in a single year.
While family planning restrictions have eased in most of China, they haven’t caused the baby boom desired by authorities. That’s a problem for a greying nation, where the cost of supporting retirees may soon be prohibitive. Given the coercive tools favored by the government, restrictions on Han Chinese reproductive freedoms could increase, with potential abortion bans on the horizon as sterilizations and forced abortions continue in minority areas.
Pandemic lockdowns. In the county of Anxin, under 100 miles from Beijing, 400,000 people are under a fresh lockdown after a burst of new coronavirus cases. Beijing’s previous small outbreak appears well under control. China continues to take strict measures against any potential recurrence, in contrast to the rampant epidemic in the United States.
Meanwhile, reports of a new flu strain with pandemic potential in China are largely speculative: While the strain exists in human’s close neighbors—pigs—virtually any flu strain has pandemic potential, and there’s nothing unusual about this one. Disease, however, is clearly very much on everyone’s minds.
U.S. media under scrutiny. Following the U.S. designation of another four Chinese media outlets as foreign agents last week, China has unsurprisingly targeted four U.S.-based outlets in China with new demands for funding and staff information: the AP, CBS, UPI, and NPR. Unlike the Chinese media outlets, none is controlled or owned by the U.S. government. Picking the four appears somewhat random, although AP’s coverage of Xinjiang has been extensive. Journalists haven’t been expelled yet, unlike in the last round of retaliations, but visa restrictions or expulsions are likely to come.
Tech and Business
India bans Chinese apps. India has issued a comprehensive ban on 59 Chinese mobile apps after the deadly clash between troops in the Galwan Valley. The move appears rushed-through with little detail on implementation, though the Indian government has indicated that it will issue intellectual property blocks on the apps rather than just removing them from Indian app stores. The apps include TikTok, as well as Alibaba’s UC Browser, the most widely used in India. Alibaba estimates that it could lose up to $6 billion as a result.
China has criticized the move for violating World Trade Organization rules—with no apparent sense of irony, despite its own massive restrictions on the internet. It’s possible that the ban will be walked back in practice, but the trade war could also worsen. India is an major market for Chinese technology and the single biggest importer of Chinese goods, while China depends on India for some critical pharmaceuticals.
U.S. security limits. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has designated the Chinese suppliers ZTE and Huawei as official national security threats, the culmination of growing suspicions and barriers over the last few years. The move means that federal funds—the $8.3 billion a year Universal Service Fund—can no longer be used for the purchase or maintenance of ZTE or Huawei goods, effectively ending any U.S. government use of either firm.
Those limits were already largely in place, but the FCC had held off from a final designation. As the U.S.-China relationship spirals further, expect tighter limitations on any government body in the United States using Chinese equipment—limits that already apply in China itself against U.S. companies.
Business recovery. Chinese business indexes were up across the board in June, indicating renewed activity as the coronavirus appears under control in China itself and as European markets begin to recover. Exports and imports are still contracting, however, and economic activity remains below pre-coronavirus levels. Many of the worst impacts, especially on small businesses and the self-employed, remain largely hidden thanks to pressure on the Chinese press to cover only positive stories.
What We’re Reading
Very Important People: Status and Beauty in the Global Party Circuit, by Ashley Mears (May 2020)Dealing in Desire: Asian Ascendancy, Western Decline, and the Hidden Currencies of Global Sex Work, by Kimberly Kay Hoang (2015)
Ashley Mears, a professor of sociology at Boston University and a former fashion model, and Kimberly Kay Hoang, an anthropologist who worked at several Saigon hostess bars for her research, each offers a powerful take on the commercialization of women’s bodies in worlds run by men.
Mears’s book concentrates on the nightlife scene in New York, where idealized white women—between 18 and 25, and at least 5 feet, 9 inches tall—remain the strongest indicator of status for the ultra-rich and even Asian visitors such as the infamous Malaysian businessman Jho Low. Hoang, meanwhile, shows how China’s rise and the so-called Asian century have raised the perceived value of Asian women, even as they remain essentially seen as commodities by powerful men.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--From India, Islamophobia Goes Global

From India, Islamophobia Goes Global

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s administration has long been criticized for discriminating against India ’ s estimated 200 million Muslims .
Tensions between this large minority and the Hindu nationalists who support Modi ’ s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) have been mounting in recent years , resulting in worrying laws , dangerous harassment , and deadly mob violence in India .
Now , the hostility has moved outside of India ’ s borders .
Thanks to social media and a dedicated diaspora , antagonism toward Muslims by supporters of India ’ s right-wing , Hindu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the international spread of domestic prejudices is causing diplomatic ripple effects for India ’ s allies .
This has been particularly apparent in the Persian Gulf region , home to millions of Indian expatriates .
Modi ’ s carefully cultivated ties to the Gulf regimes are now threatened by instances of ultra-nationalist Indian expats spewing Islamophobic rhetoric online .
While much of the vitriol has been aimed at the Muslim population back home in India , it has also taken the form of social media posts that denigrated Islam more generally , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation has led to rare criticism of Modi by Gulf elites .
In April , the government of Kuwait , along with a member of the Sharjah royal family , criticized widespread Islamophobic social media posts in India accusing the country ’ s Muslims of deliberately spreading the coronavirus and engaging in a “ corona jihad.
” Modi eventually responded by tweeting that the virus “ does not see race [ or ] religion , ” although his government ’ s rhetoric says otherwise .
A month later , the UAE Federal Public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after scores of Indian expats were fired from their jobs for anti-Muslim social media posts .
This and similar incidents led the Dubai-based Gulf News to run an editorial in May calling for India to stop “ exporting hate ” to the Gulf .
In the West , the BJP ’ s brand of Islamophobia has found an eager partner among the far-right , as recent developments in famously multicultural Canada demonstrate .
In April , city councils across Canada voted to allow the Islamic call to prayer , the azan , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day during the holy month of Ramadan .
The government hoped to foster a sense of inclusion as mosques and other places of worship were closed for the COVID-19 lockdown .
The decision elicited a major backlash , including mass petitions and online hate , with the far-right suggesting “ Islamism ” had infiltrated Canadian society and politics .
Some members of Canada ’ s Indian diaspora echoed such sentiments , tweeting comments about how the prayer call broadcasts are part of an Islamist “ strategical campaign through out the world ” or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be “ peaceful.
” Several of the tweeters have quietly lost their jobs since then , amid pressure from anti-hate groups .
But few cases have garnered much attention .
The exception is that of Ravi Hooda , who sat on a regional school board in the Toronto area and tweeted that allowing the prayer calls to be broadcast opens the door for “ Separate lanes for camel & goat riders ” or laws “ requiring all women to cover themselves from head to toe in tents.
” When Hooda ’ s tweet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Network , a Twitter war ensued .
Dozens of pro-Indian accounts , often with usernames containing an eight-digit string of numbers—a common indicator of a bot account—came to Hooda ’ s defense .
A local controversy instantly took on an international character .
Hooda , for his part , is a volunteer for the local branch of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh , which represents the overseas interests of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh ( RSS ) , the right-wing Hindu nationalist organization that promotes the Hindutva ( literally , “ Hindu-ness ” ) ideology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at its core .
Modi himself is a lifelong RSS member , and a majority of his ministers have a background in the organization .
The Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh opened its first chapter in 1947 , in Kenya , and today has more than 500 branches in 39 countries .
The group ’ s chapters are called shakhas ( branches ) and , in addition to offering community services , help organize the diaspora through lectures , camps , and other organizational sessions that are aligned with the RSS ’ s ideological outlook @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Canada has allegedly dovetailed with efforts by Indian intelligence agencies to “ covertly influence ” Canadian politicians to support Indian government positions through disinformation and money , according to documents obtained by Global News .
There ’ s no proof of how successful this lobbying has been , but it ’ s clear that New Delhi is stretching its global reach at the same time that the BJP ’ s rhetoric and actions have politicized a new generation of Indian expats .
A glimpse of this global reach was provided by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ detailing a network of over 260 pro-India “ fake local media outlets ” spanning 65 countries , including throughout the West .
The media organizations bear the names of local towns and cities , but none of them has any real connection with the localities they purport to represent , and all feature pro-India and anti-Pakistan content .
Every news site was registered by the Srivastava Group , an Indian corporation that last year took right-wing European politicians on a trip to Kashmir , where they met with Modi .
Such reach can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indian expats and Indian Americans in the United States who organized last fall ’ s “ Howdy , Modi !
” event in Houston attended by 50,000 people , including U.S. President Donald Trump and other Republican and Democratic politicians .
Indian American volunteers did the heavy lifting and funded the event , which turned a meeting between heads of state into a public spectacle .
The event was meant to cement Trump-Modi relations as well as to rally the U.S.-based diaspora around the BJP , thus bolstering the prime minister ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ RSS-minded , pro-BJP diaspora in the West and beyond would obviously be a great asset for Modi ’ s government .
Elected officials would think twice before criticizing India , already a rising and influential power , for fear of angering their constituents .
There are already hints that such calculations are being made by leaders .
After an anti-Muslim pogrom broke out in Delhi in February , resulting in more than 50 deaths—the worst sectarian violence India has seen in years—Canada kept almost silent .
While speaking to his Indian counterpart after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offered a note of vague concern , roundly criticized in Canadian media .
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made no statement , and the four Indian Canadian members of Trudeau ’ s Liberal caucus showed a similar reluctance to comment , drawing criticism from community organizations .
Similarly , foreign governments remained largely silent last summer when Modi stripped Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir of its special status and placed it under a brutal military lockdown .
This had observers wondering whether “ Hindutva-inspired lobbies in the West , ” as the researcher Fareeha Shamim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of building global influence from the ground up .
Liberal politicians now hold an uncomfortable position , reluctant to criticize Modi lest they be attacked by his supporters in the diaspora .
The anti-Islam social media backlash that set off a small firestorm in Canada could well prove a one-off , but such cases pose a litmus test for how democracies may manage imported conflicts , particularly when Western politicians become heavily invested in one side of the divide .
Modi ’ s brand of Hindutva has found an eager partner among the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberal leaders would be wise to pay attention .

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration has long been criticized for discriminating against India’s estimated 200 million Muslims. Tensions between this large minority and the Hindu nationalists who support Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have been mounting in recent years, resulting in worrying laws, dangerous harassment, and deadly mob violence in India. Now, the hostility has moved outside of India’s borders. Thanks to social media and a dedicated diaspora, antagonism toward Muslims by supporters of India’s right-wing, Hindu nationalist government has gone global. And the international spread of domestic prejudices is causing diplomatic ripple effects for India’s allies.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration has long been criticized for discriminating against India’s estimated 200 million Muslims. Tensions between this large minority and the Hindu nationalists who support Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have been mounting in recent years, resulting in worrying laws, dangerous harassment, and deadly mob violence in India. Now, the hostility has moved outside of India’s borders. Thanks to social media and a dedicated diaspora, antagonism toward Muslims by supporters of India’s right-wing, Hindu nationalist government has gone global. And the international spread of domestic prejudices is causing diplomatic ripple effects for India’s allies.
This has been particularly apparent in the Persian Gulf region, home to millions of Indian expatriates. Modi’s carefully cultivated ties to the Gulf regimes are now threatened by instances of ultra-nationalist Indian expats spewing Islamophobic rhetoric online. While much of the vitriol has been aimed at the Muslim population back home in India, it has also taken the form of social media posts that denigrated Islam more generally, as well as the Prophet Mohammed. The situation has led to rare criticism of Modi by Gulf elites. In April, the government of Kuwait, along with a member of the Sharjah royal family in the United Arab Emirates , criticized widespread Islamophobic social media posts in India accusing the country’s Muslims of deliberately spreading the coronavirus and engaging in a “corona jihad.” Modi eventually responded by tweeting that the virus “does not see race [or] religion,” although his government’s rhetoric says otherwise. A month later, the UAE Federal Public Prosecution issued a public warning against discrimination after scores of Indian expats were fired from their jobs for anti-Muslim social media posts. This and similar incidents led the Dubai-based Gulf News to run an editorial in May calling for India to stop “exporting hate” to the Gulf.
In the West, the BJP’s brand of Islamophobia has found an eager partner among the far-right, as recent developments in famously multicultural Canada demonstrate. In April, city councils across Canada voted to allow the Islamic call to prayer, the azan, to be broadcasted for a few minutes a day during the holy month of Ramadan. The government hoped to foster a sense of inclusion as mosques and other places of worship were closed for the COVID-19 lockdown. The decision elicited a major backlash, including mass petitions and online hate, with the far-right suggesting “Islamism” had infiltrated Canadian society and politics.
Some members of Canada’s Indian diaspora echoed such sentiments, tweeting comments about how the prayer call broadcasts are part of an Islamist “strategical campaign through out the world” or that “blaring loudspeakers” can never be “peaceful.” Several of the tweeters have quietly lost their jobs since then, amid pressure from anti-hate groups.
But few cases have garnered much attention. The exception is that of Ravi Hooda, who sat on a regional school board in the Toronto area and tweeted that allowing the prayer calls to be broadcast opens the door for “Separate lanes for camel & goat riders” or laws “requiring all women to cover themselves from head to toe in tents.” When Hooda’s tweet was called out by the Canadian Anti-Hate Network, a Twitter war ensued. Dozens of pro-Indian accounts, often with usernames containing an eight-digit string of numbers—a common indicator of a bot account—came to Hooda’s defense. A local controversy instantly took on an international character.
Hooda, for his part, is a volunteer for the local branch of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh, which represents the overseas interests of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the right-wing Hindu nationalist organization that promotes the Hindutva (literally, “Hindu-ness”) ideology that India is a purely Hindu nation at its core. Modi himself is a lifelong RSS member, and a majority of his ministers have a background in the organization. The Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh opened its first chapter in 1947, in Kenya, and today has more than 500 branches in 39 countries. The group’s chapters are called shakhas (branches) and, in addition to offering community services, help organize the diaspora through lectures, camps, and other organizational sessions that are aligned with the RSS’s ideological outlook.
The spread of right-wing Hindu nationalism in Canada has allegedly dovetailed with efforts by Indian intelligence agencies to “covertly influence” Canadian politicians to support Indian government positions through disinformation and money, according to documents obtained by Global News. There’s no proof of how successful this lobbying has been, but it’s clear that New Delhi is stretching its global reach at the same time that the BJP’s rhetoric and actions have politicized a new generation of Indian expats.
A glimpse of this global reach was provided by the EU DisinfoLab last fall in a report detailing a network of over 260 pro-India “fake local media outlets” spanning 65 countries, including throughout the West. The media organizations bear the names of local towns and cities, but none of them has any real connection with the localities they purport to represent, and all feature pro-India and anti-Pakistan content. Every news site was registered by the Srivastava Group, an Indian corporation that last year took right-wing European politicians on a trip to Kashmir, where they met with Modi.
Such reach can also be seen in the efforts of Indian expats and Indian Americans in the United States who organized last fall’s “Howdy, Modi!” event in Houston attended by 50,000 people, including U.S. President Donald Trump and other Republican and Democratic politicians. Indian American volunteers did the heavy lifting and funded the event, which turned a meeting between heads of state into a public spectacle. The event was meant to cement Trump-Modi relations as well as to rally the U.S.-based diaspora around the BJP, thus bolstering the prime minister’s popularity back home.
An organized, RSS-minded, pro-BJP diaspora in the West and beyond would obviously be a great asset for Modi’s government. Elected officials would think twice before criticizing India, already a rising and influential power, for fear of angering their constituents. There are already hints that such calculations are being made by leaders. After an anti-Muslim pogrom broke out in Delhi in February, resulting in more than 50 deaths—the worst sectarian violence India has seen in years—Canada kept almost silent. While speaking to his Indian counterpart after the riots, the Canadian foreign minister offered a note of vague concern, roundly criticized in Canadian media. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made no statement, and the four Indian Canadian members of Trudeau’s Liberal caucus showed a similar reluctance to comment, drawing criticism from community organizations.
Similarly, foreign governments remained largely silent last summer when Modi stripped Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir of its special status and placed it under a brutal military lockdown. This had observers wondering whether “Hindutva-inspired lobbies in the West,” as the researcher Fareeha Shamim labeled them, succeeded in their goals of building global influence from the ground up. Liberal politicians now hold an uncomfortable position, reluctant to criticize Modi lest they be attacked by his supporters in the diaspora.
The anti-Islam social media backlash that set off a small firestorm in Canada could well prove a one-off, but such cases pose a litmus test for how democracies may manage imported conflicts, particularly when Western politicians become heavily invested in one side of the divide. Modi’s brand of Hindutva has found an eager partner among the right wing in the West, and liberal leaders would be wise to pay attention.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--This Time, Russia Is in Afghanistan to Win

This Time , Russia Is in Afghanistan to Win The recent revelations in the New York Times and other media that U.S. intelligence officials believed a Russian military intelligence unit had offered secret bounties to the Taliban for killing U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan renew deep concerns about the nefarious agenda Vladimir Putin ’ s Russia has not only in Afghanistan but also to destabilize the West .
The timing of the revelations—the findings were briefed to U.S. President Donald Trump in late February—is significant as it coincided with the signing of the U.S.-Taliban peace deal in Doha , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is likely that the Taliban ’ s murky dealings with Russia were taking place while they were negotiating with the United States throughout 2019 and 2020 , calling into question the insurgent group ’ s commitment to any peace deal .
The agreement provided for a phased withdrawal of NATO forces , with the United States pulling out 5,000 of its 13,000 troops over the next few months .
In return , the Taliban claim they would not enable Afghan soil to be used for terrorism .
But the obstacles to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the chances of the deal being honored are slim .
A United Nations report stated that the Taliban retained close links to al Qaeda and sought its counsel during the negotiations with U.S. officials .
And the Haqqani network , the biggest faction of the Taliban , has been accused by the Afghan government of collaborating with an ISIS affiliate—Islamic State Khorasan Province ( ISKP ) —to carry out numerous attacks in Afghanistan in 2020 .
( The most horrific examples were the suicide and gun attack on a Sikh gurdwara and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maternity ward in Kabul , killing nurses , women in labor , and newly born babies . )
Amid the peace talks brokered by the United States , one angle that most observers of Afghanistan have ignored is the role of Russia , which has enthusiastically supported the agreement .
Along with Pakistan , Russia stands to be one of the biggest beneficiaries of any NATO withdrawal .
Over the past several years , it has been quietly working in the background to enhance its ties with the Taliban , with the purpose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the process exorcising the failings of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s .
Once NATO and U.S. forces leave , Russia will once again have an opportunity to step in .
And in that sense , the recent revelations about Moscow ’ s sordid arrangement with the Taliban should come as no surprise .
On Feb. 15 , 1989 , a column of armored personnel carriers rolled across the then-named Friendship Bridge , the last of a Soviet military contingent that fought a 10-year war in Afghanistan .
After losing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Soviet Union withdrew , beaten and humiliated .
Later that year , the Congress of People ’ s Deputies passed a resolution that denounced the war .
Consensus developed over decades that the Afghan occupation and war were costly mistakes .
However , during Vladimir Putin ’ s third term as president , the Russian government began reevaluating the intervention as one that took place within the bounds of international law and in the interests of the Soviet Union .
While remaining critical of the excesses of the Soviet past , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security forces created during the Soviet era that somehow compensated for its brutalities .
Putin ’ s focus on Afghanistan is an essential aspect of how Russia seeks to reevaluate its past while furthering its future strategic interests .
As Syria demonstrates , the Kremlin is rewriting history to retrospectively justify intervention abroad as it seeks to regain its status as a global power .
Putin may have intervened in Syria because of legitimate security concerns , a legacy of friendship with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad , and because of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Russia was able to avoid the perception that its incursion into Syria was similar to the Soviet Afghan experience while also ensuring there was no blowback to Russia from its nationals from the Caucuses who joined jihadi groups like the Islamic State .
Russia is now using its successful Syria experience to leverage its interests in Afghanistan.Putin ’ s focus on Afghanistan is an essential aspect of how Russia seeks to reevaluate its past while furthering its future strategic interests .
2014 signaled an important shift in Russian foreign policy after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Afghan affairs .
In doing so , Moscow adopted several different roles : It simultaneously styled itself as peacemaker , military enforcer , and , most concerning from Washington ’ s perspective , funder of terrorist insurgents .
On a surface level , Russia increased its presence in Afghanistan because of the threat of ISKP .
For Moscow , ISKP poses three main challenges to its strategic interests : the potential of Russian citizens travelling to Afghanistan as foreign terrorist fighters ; pledges of loyalty by North Caucasian militant groups establishing informal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spillover of violent extremism into Central Asia , which in turn directly affects Russian interests .
The Kremlin admitted to its strategic relationship with the Taliban in 2015 , when Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced that Russia was sharing intelligence with the Taliban pertaining to ISKP movements .
However , this is just one factor in its decision to reinfiltrate Afghanistan .
In a surprise step , following the U.S.-Taliban agreement in Doha , the United States and Russia issued a joint statement on mutually agreeable issues pertaining to Afghanistan .
Both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would not be recognized by the international community .
However , Russia ’ s prior interactions with the Taliban indicate a different story especially as the group is treated by Moscow with much reverence and courted just like a recognized state actor .
The joint U.S.-Russia statement also calls on the Taliban “ to take concrete steps to ensure that the territory of Afghanistan should not be used by al-Qa-ida , Daesh [ ISIS ] , or other international terrorist groups ” against others .
But the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concrete steps on how this will be achieved , nor are there any verification mechanisms .
For Russia , this disconnect can be ignored if it can achieve its broader strategic goals in Afghanistan .
But it ’ s harder for the West to reconcile these problems .
Much as it did during the Cold War , Russia has once again identified Afghanistan as a theater in which to challenge the United States .
At both the foreign relations and security levels , Russian activities in Afghanistan are products of strategies designed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most important lessons Russian policymakers have learned from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is to refrain from forging local allies in their own image and to instead seek to galvanize partners wherever mutual interests intersect .
A case in point is the nexus with the Taliban .
While the Kremlin maintains that its relationship with the Taliban is limited only to fighting ISKP and reconciliation within Afghanistan , its activities go much deeper .
Russia has been accused of funding and arming the Taliban .
Russian night vision sniper scopes have been discovered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 2017 , Gen. John Nicholson , then-commander of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan , revealed in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that Russia was actively funding the Taliban and therefore , by proxy , al Qaeda .
In 2018 , Nicholson followed that up by stating , “ We ’ ve had weapons brought to this headquarters and given to us by Afghan leaders and [ they ] said , ‘ This was given by the Russians to the Taliban.
’ ” The Taliban is treated by Moscow with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recognized state actor .
There is also evidence that Russia has set up supply networks to deliver weapons across the border between Iran and Afghanistan .
In 2017 , Abdul Jabar Qahraman , who then oversaw the security situation in Helmand province for the Afghan government , said Russia had collaborated with Iran to create training camps for Taliban fighters in Iran , who in turn would then deliver Russian weapons throughout western and southern Afghanistan .
Perhaps more alarming are reports that Russia is funneling resources into Afghanistan that can be sold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ includes shipping fuel tankers from Uzbekistan through the Hairatan border crossing , where they are delivered to Taliban front companies that sell fuel worth $ 2.5 million per month .
The Taliban distribute the money directly to their commanders to use and launch attacks against the Afghan government , forces , and civilians .
While Russian intelligence services smuggle weapons and resources to the Taliban , the Russian government continues to present itself as a suitable alternative to the United States in terms of political guidance and aid for Afghanistan .
Russia has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it stands by its allies , like the Taliban , no matter how ruthless .
Simultaneously , it has denounced the United States as an untrustworthy ally that will abandon its friends .
In May 2019 , the Putin administration invited senior members of the Afghan government and the Taliban to Moscow to celebrate what it called “ 100 years of Russo-Afghan friendship.
” At this meeting , Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for a “ total pullout of foreign forces ” from Afghanistan .
It is ironic that Russia continually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Afghanistan despite maintaining its own presence in the area .
The implication is obvious : Russia is engaging in a diplomatic and military relationship with the Taliban in order to counter the United States .
For Russia to succeed in Afghanistan , it also needs to rectify a relationship with an old adversary : Pakistan was essential to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in the 1980s by supplying weapons and providing logistics to the Afghan-Arab mujahideen .
Converging interests in Afghanistan have been a key factor in warming relations between Russia and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of cooperation and support to bring the Taliban into the mainstream .
The commencement of U.S.-Taliban peace talks in October 2018 was a political success for both Russia and Pakistan , which share a mutual recognition that the Taliban are a key stakeholder in Afghanistan ’ s future .
Russia arranged Moscow-based talks to augment the U.S.-Taliban negotiations , which included regional nations , Afghan opposition leaders , and the Taliban , although the Kabul government did not attend .
Pakistan actively participated in meetings in Russia and also hosted a separate trilateral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to advocate greater Taliban involvement .
Russia and Pakistan ’ s interests continued to align following the breakdown of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks .
This was underscored in September 2019 , when Russia again invited Taliban members to Moscow .
At this meeting , Zakharova , the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson , announced : “ We are convinced that the complete end to foreign military presence is an inalienable condition of durable peace in Afghanistan.
” Meanwhile , Pakistan hosted Zalmay Khalilzad , the U.S. special representative for Afghan reconciliation , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to succeed in Afghanistan , it also needs to rectify a relationship with an old adversary : Pakistan .
For Russia , the Afghanistan issue can help Moscow achieve its goal of splintering the U.S. foreign-policy establishment ahead of the 2020 presidential election .
But the sacrifices of NATO troops , who have given blood and treasure for an honorable outcome in Afghanistan , demand that the West negotiate an outcome that does not amount to abandoning Afghanistan or lead to endorsing Russia ’ s goals .
There should also be an assurance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and civil society , which the Taliban historically and continually neglect .
Russia has made serious progress toward fulfilling both its Syrian and Afghan strategic objectives by maintaining a decisive hand in the respective region ’ s politics .
Equally , there should be no doubt that the Taliban will forcibly extend their control within Afghanistan , fueled by opium cultivation .
This would restart a civil war and consequently result in substantial civilian deaths and exacerbate the number of refugees fleeing Afghanistan .
With Western troops leaving , it will have devastating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rely and depend on them for their own safety .
Furthermore , any guarantees that the Taliban offer to prevent al Qaeda or its affiliates returning to Afghanistan will not be worth the paper they are written on .
Russia will assume an advantageous position , having nurtured both the Taliban and the Afghan civilian government while taking a back seat to the insecurity that will grip the country .
Russia ’ s physical footprint will help Moscow ensure its strategic interests .
How can the West still justify withdrawing from Afghanistan when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to being a hotbed for terrorism , which will have direct and consequential ramifications for the West itself ?
The temporary relief in leaving the region will eventually give way to the stark reality that Western nationals will be traveling to Afghanistan for terrorist training .
This will mirror the situation in Syria and Iraq with the Islamic State .
However , this time the West will find it much harder to go back into Afghanistan with the crowded field of Pakistan , Iran , Russia , and China , all of which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anyone else .
There is an emerging Great Game Redux in Afghanistan—and Russia is in it this time to win it .

The recent revelations in the New York Times and other media that U.S. intelligence officials believed a Russian military intelligence unit had offered secret bounties to the Taliban for killing U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan renew deep concerns about the nefarious agenda Vladimir Putin’s Russia has not only in Afghanistan but also to destabilize the West.
The recent revelations in the New York Times and other media that U.S. intelligence officials believed a Russian military intelligence unit had offered secret bounties to the Taliban for killing U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan renew deep concerns about the nefarious agenda Vladimir Putin’s Russia has not only in Afghanistan but also to destabilize the West.
The timing of the revelations—the findings were briefed to U.S. President Donald Trump in late February—is significant as it coincided with the signing of the U.S.-Taliban peace deal in Doha, Qatar, at the end of February. It is likely that the Taliban’s murky dealings with Russia were taking place while they were negotiating with the United States throughout 2019 and 2020, calling into question the insurgent group’s commitment to any peace deal.
The agreement provided for a phased withdrawal of NATO forces, with the United States pulling out 5,000 of its 13,000 troops over the next few months. In return, the Taliban claim they would not enable Afghan soil to be used for terrorism. But the obstacles to peace are so profound and numerous that the chances of the deal being honored are slim. A United Nations report stated that the Taliban retained close links to al Qaeda and sought its counsel during the negotiations with U.S. officials. And the Haqqani network, the biggest faction of the Taliban, has been accused by the Afghan government of collaborating with an ISIS affiliate—Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—to carry out numerous attacks in Afghanistan in 2020. (The most horrific examples were the suicide and gun attack on a Sikh gurdwara and the storming of the Dasht-e-Barchi hospital’s maternity ward in Kabul, killing nurses, women in labor, and newly born babies.)
Amid the peace talks brokered by the United States, one angle that most observers of Afghanistan have ignored is the role of Russia, which has enthusiastically supported the agreement. Along with Pakistan, Russia stands to be one of the biggest beneficiaries of any NATO withdrawal. Over the past several years, it has been quietly working in the background to enhance its ties with the Taliban, with the purpose of expanding its strategic interests in Afghanistan—and in the process exorcising the failings of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Once NATO and U.S. forces leave, Russia will once again have an opportunity to step in. And in that sense, the recent revelations about Moscow’s sordid arrangement with the Taliban should come as no surprise.
On Feb. 15, 1989, a column of armored personnel carriers rolled across the then-named Friendship Bridge, the last of a Soviet military contingent that fought a 10-year war in Afghanistan. After losing more than 13,000 troops in the conflict, the Soviet Union withdrew, beaten and humiliated. Later that year, the Congress of People’s Deputies passed a resolution that denounced the war. Consensus developed over decades that the Afghan occupation and war were costly mistakes.
However, during Vladimir Putin’s third term as president, the Russian government began reevaluating the intervention as one that took place within the bounds of international law and in the interests of the Soviet Union. While remaining critical of the excesses of the Soviet past, Putin legitimized the strong state and powerful security forces created during the Soviet era that somehow compensated for its brutalities. Putin’s focus on Afghanistan is an essential aspect of how Russia seeks to reevaluate its past while furthering its future strategic interests. As Syria demonstrates, the Kremlin is rewriting history to retrospectively justify intervention abroad as it seeks to regain its status as a global power.
Putin may have intervened in Syria because of legitimate security concerns, a legacy of friendship with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, and because of the opportunity it represented to oppose U.S. interests. Russia was able to avoid the perception that its incursion into Syria was similar to the Soviet Afghan experience while also ensuring there was no blowback to Russia from its nationals from the Caucuses who joined jihadi groups like the Islamic State. Russia is now using its successful Syria experience to leverage its interests in Afghanistan.Putin’s focus on Afghanistan is an essential aspect of how Russia seeks to reevaluate its past while furthering its future strategic interests.
2014 signaled an important shift in Russian foreign policy after the Kremlin moved to involve itself more centrally in Afghan affairs. In doing so, Moscow adopted several different roles: It simultaneously styled itself as peacemaker, military enforcer, and, most concerning from Washington’s perspective, funder of terrorist insurgents. On a surface level, Russia increased its presence in Afghanistan because of the threat of ISKP. For Moscow, ISKP poses three main challenges to its strategic interests: the potential of Russian citizens travelling to Afghanistan as foreign terrorist fighters; pledges of loyalty by North Caucasian militant groups establishing informal and formal ties; and the potential spillover of violent extremism into Central Asia, which in turn directly affects Russian interests. The Kremlin admitted to its strategic relationship with the Taliban in 2015, when Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced that Russia was sharing intelligence with the Taliban pertaining to ISKP movements. However, this is just one factor in its decision to reinfiltrate Afghanistan.
In a surprise step, following the U.S.-Taliban agreement in Doha, the United States and Russia issued a joint statement on mutually agreeable issues pertaining to Afghanistan. Both sides concurred that the preferred Taliban designation as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would not be recognized by the international community. However, Russia’s prior interactions with the Taliban indicate a different story especially as the group is treated by Moscow with much reverence and courted just like a recognized state actor.
The joint U.S.-Russia statement also calls on the Taliban “to take concrete steps to ensure that the territory of Afghanistan should not be used by al-Qa-ida, Daesh [ISIS], or other international terrorist groups” against others. But the Taliban are not obliged to provide any concrete steps on how this will be achieved, nor are there any verification mechanisms. For Russia, this disconnect can be ignored if it can achieve its broader strategic goals in Afghanistan. But it’s harder for the West to reconcile these problems.
Much as it did during the Cold War, Russia has once again identified Afghanistan as a theater in which to challenge the United States. At both the foreign relations and security levels, Russian activities in Afghanistan are products of strategies designed to counter American influence. One of the most important lessons Russian policymakers have learned from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is to refrain from forging local allies in their own image and to instead seek to galvanize partners wherever mutual interests intersect. A case in point is the nexus with the Taliban.
While the Kremlin maintains that its relationship with the Taliban is limited only to fighting ISKP and reconciliation within Afghanistan, its activities go much deeper. Russia has been accused of funding and arming the Taliban. Russian night vision sniper scopes have been discovered in the hands of the Taliban. In 2017, Gen. John Nicholson, then-commander of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, revealed in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that Russia was actively funding the Taliban and therefore, by proxy, al Qaeda. In 2018, Nicholson followed that up by stating, “We’ve had weapons brought to this headquarters and given to us by Afghan leaders and [they] said, ‘This was given by the Russians to the Taliban.’”The Taliban is treated by Moscow with much reverence and courted just like a recognized state actor.
There is also evidence that Russia has set up supply networks to deliver weapons across the border between Iran and Afghanistan. In 2017, Abdul Jabar Qahraman, who then oversaw the security situation in Helmand province for the Afghan government, said Russia had collaborated with Iran to create training camps for Taliban fighters in Iran, who in turn would then deliver Russian weapons throughout western and southern Afghanistan.
Perhaps more alarming are reports that Russia is funneling resources into Afghanistan that can be sold for profit by the Taliban. This includes shipping fuel tankers from Uzbekistan through the Hairatan border crossing, where they are delivered to Taliban front companies that sell fuel worth $2.5 million per month. The Taliban distribute the money directly to their commanders to use and launch attacks against the Afghan government, forces, and civilians.
While Russian intelligence services smuggle weapons and resources to the Taliban, the Russian government continues to present itself as a suitable alternative to the United States in terms of political guidance and aid for Afghanistan. Russia has attained short-term benefits by presenting a narrative that it stands by its allies, like the Taliban, no matter how ruthless. Simultaneously, it has denounced the United States as an untrustworthy ally that will abandon its friends.
In May 2019, the Putin administration invited senior members of the Afghan government and the Taliban to Moscow to celebrate what it called “100 years of Russo-Afghan friendship.” At this meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for a “total pullout of foreign forces” from Afghanistan. It is ironic that Russia continually calls for an end to foreign military in Afghanistan despite maintaining its own presence in the area. The implication is obvious: Russia is engaging in a diplomatic and military relationship with the Taliban in order to counter the United States.
For Russia to succeed in Afghanistan, it also needs to rectify a relationship with an old adversary: Pakistan was essential to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in the 1980s by supplying weapons and providing logistics to the Afghan-Arab mujahideen. Converging interests in Afghanistan have been a key factor in warming relations between Russia and Pakistan, and both have voiced affirmations of cooperation and support to bring the Taliban into the mainstream.
The commencement of U.S.-Taliban peace talks in October 2018 was a political success for both Russia and Pakistan, which share a mutual recognition that the Taliban are a key stakeholder in Afghanistan’s future. Russia arranged Moscow-based talks to augment the U.S.-Taliban negotiations, which included regional nations, Afghan opposition leaders, and the Taliban, although the Kabul government did not attend. Pakistan actively participated in meetings in Russia and also hosted a separate trilateral mechanism with China and the Afghan government to advocate greater Taliban involvement.
Russia and Pakistan’s interests continued to align following the breakdown of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks. This was underscored in September 2019, when Russia again invited Taliban members to Moscow. At this meeting, Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, announced: “We are convinced that the complete end to foreign military presence is an inalienable condition of durable peace in Afghanistan.” Meanwhile, Pakistan hosted Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. special representative for Afghan reconciliation, and the Taliban leadership for meetings in Islamabad.For Russia to succeed in Afghanistan, it also needs to rectify a relationship with an old adversary: Pakistan.
For Russia, the Afghanistan issue can help Moscow achieve its goal of splintering the U.S. foreign-policy establishment ahead of the 2020 presidential election. But the sacrifices of NATO troops, who have given blood and treasure for an honorable outcome in Afghanistan, demand that the West negotiate an outcome that does not amount to abandoning Afghanistan or lead to endorsing Russia’s goals. There should also be an assurance of protection of women’s rights and civil society, which the Taliban historically and continually neglect.
Russia has made serious progress toward fulfilling both its Syrian and Afghan strategic objectives by maintaining a decisive hand in the respective region’s politics. Equally, there should be no doubt that the Taliban will forcibly extend their control within Afghanistan, fueled by opium cultivation. This would restart a civil war and consequently result in substantial civilian deaths and exacerbate the number of refugees fleeing Afghanistan. With Western troops leaving, it will have devastating consequences for the civilian population, who rely and depend on them for their own safety. Furthermore, any guarantees that the Taliban offer to prevent al Qaeda or its affiliates returning to Afghanistan will not be worth the paper they are written on. Russia will assume an advantageous position, having nurtured both the Taliban and the Afghan civilian government while taking a back seat to the insecurity that will grip the country. Russia’s physical footprint will help Moscow ensure its strategic interests.
How can the West still justify withdrawing from Afghanistan when it clearly has the potential of returning to being a hotbed for terrorism, which will have direct and consequential ramifications for the West itself? The temporary relief in leaving the region will eventually give way to the stark reality that Western nationals will be traveling to Afghanistan for terrorist training. This will mirror the situation in Syria and Iraq with the Islamic State. However, this time the West will find it much harder to go back into Afghanistan with the crowded field of Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and China, all of which will be very reluctant to let in anyone else. There is an emerging Great Game Redux in Afghanistan—and Russia is in it this time to win it.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--The Pandemic Is the World’s Long Overdue Reality Check

The Pandemic Is the World ’ s Long Overdue Reality Check Something may have broken—or rather , begun to break—last month when U.S. President Donald Trump held an indoor rally in Tulsa , Oklahoma in open defiance of the public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic and found , to his shock and outrage , that his own supporters had failed to show up .
That something is the politics of alternate reality that he and other illiberal populists have ridden to power in recent years .
It has long been understood that totalitarian leaders sustain themselves through the manipulation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is the theme of George Orwell ’ s 1984 and Arthur Koestler ’ s Darkness at Noon .
Orwell , who understood clearly the power of language to obscure rather than reveal , would hardly have been shocked to see the practice transposed to democracies , but it didn ’ t fully happen in his day .
Perhaps it awaited the shotgun marriage of extreme polarization and social media .
Over the last few years , Trump , Boris Johnson in the United Kingdom , Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil , Narendra Modi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out an experiment in the mass manufacture of alternative realities in a democratic society .
Their success has forced a question : What reality , if any , will prove so terrible that it will expose their game ?
Americans have experienced a few false starts , including an impeachment trial , that have only proved that much of what transpires in political life does not reach people intimately enough to dispel the shadows .
Nothing , however , is more intimate than the prospect of sickness and death .
Three of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , Brazil , and the U.K.—now rank one , two , and three in deaths from the coronavirus .
( India currently lags behind but is moving up with frightening speed . )
That is not a coincidence , for the leaders in each country have tried to minimize the gravity of the disease or—in Bolsonaro ’ s case—deny it altogether .
Populist leaders deny COVID-19 for the same reasons they deny climate change : first , because acknowledging a force beyond their control might break the spell of omniscience in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and second , because deference to science and logic undermines the emotional sources of their appeal .
If Anthony Fauci is right , Trump must be wrong .
The overwhelming signs that the world is warming have done nothing to break the hold of the populists , perhaps because few of their followers have experienced climate change as a personal catastrophe .
At first , while it chiefly affected a handful of wealthy nations and blue states in the United States , the same was true of the coronavirus .
But we have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has become ubiquitous and ill-prepared countries are paying a terrible price .
The connection between state failure and death has become too obvious to ignore .
The political consequences of this dawning recognition have become clear in the last few months as populist leaders and parties have suffered a serious erosion of support .
The New York Times reported last week that Trump has fallen a staggering 14 points behind Joe Biden in the presidential contest as voters have spurned his response both to the pandemic and to the killing of George Floyd @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has lost 20 points both in approval of his response to the coronavirus and in his Conservative Party ’ s lead over Labour .
Bolsonaro ’ s approval rating has dropped eight points since the beginning of the year as virtually all Brazilians disagree with his open contempt for social distancing .
Even Vladimir Putin , who pioneered the techniques of fabrication that the populists now emulate , has seen his popularity fall to the lowest levels ever as coronavirus cases have surged in Russia .
The major European right-wing parties that have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the European Union gravely threatened national sovereignty and then by stoking apocalyptic fears over the influx of refugees and immigrants—have similarly fallen back in the wake of the pandemic , especially in countries where citizens have found the government response reassuring .
A recent poll showed the Alternative for Germany party enjoying the support of only 9 percent of Germans , its worst result in two and a half years .
The far-right Sweden Democrats , tied in polls with the ruling Social Democrats at the outbreak of the pandemic , have now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , of course , is only a snapshot in time .
Trump could still beat Biden , and Bolsonaro , as Foreign Policy recently observed , still has a vast reservoir of support .
The immense charisma of successful populists makes them almost immune to mistakes that would destroy a lesser figure .
But democratic leaders have , of course , a smaller margin of error than do true autocrats ; they depend on good luck to hide their shortcomings .
What is now clear , at least in the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a charmed life in which no real crisis challenged his simple-minded answers to complicated problems ; now the law of averages has caught up with him .
It is true , of course , that populists on the left can prey on widespread resentments as easily as can those on the right ; dangerous leaders from the time of Maximilien Robespierre and Jean-Paul Marat have exploited hatred of the entitled and the rich .
The rising intensity of feeling on the left implies that such a world may lie before us ; it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we live in .
When Bernie Sanders blames corporate greed for the plight of the working class , he is advancing an arguable , if perhaps hyperbolic , proposition ; when Trump describes Mexican immigrants as rapists and gangsters , or peaceful protesters as violent radicals , he is inviting his listeners to enter a parallel world .
Leaders on the left in the United States do not traffic in hate as do leaders on the right .
It is true as well that we will never lack for politicians prepared to peddle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ powerful motivations to embrace them .
People who feel left behind by immense changes in the economy and in social values will continue to grasp for satisfying explanations of their plight ; social media will presumably only get better at magnifying grievance and vindicating conspiracy theories .
Nations with strong democratic institutions and widely held democratic norms manage to confine this kind of demagoguery to the margins , but those with weak institutions , like Brazil or Poland , or states where norms have lost their cohesive force , like the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be prey to the politics of resentment .
If Poland ’ s liberal secular Civic Platform defeats the ruling Law and Justice party in elections this month , millions of Poles who are neither liberal nor secular will continue to believe that a German-led EU is plotting to destroy Poland ’ s Catholic values and traditions .
If Biden defeats Trump in November , millions of the president ’ s supporters will continue to regard climate change as a hoax perpetrated by left-wing scientists in league with China .
Nevertheless , leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as a consequence of American derangement .
For that reason , one can at least hope that a clear-cut victory for Biden based on the growing recognition that the pandemic can not be wished away , and that a history of racism can not be wished away , will start to dispel the noxious pollutants from our mental atmosphere .
In Plato ’ s famous allegory , prisoners chained inside a cave since childhood mistake the flickering shadows they see on the wall before them for the reality of things .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ back the news of the world of tangible things , the prisoners refuse to break their chains for fear of being blinded by the sun—they can not bear the full light of the real .
Plato had a very dim regard for the wisdom of the people and thus for the idea of popular self-government ; he assumed that democracy would bring forth the likes of Trump .
But democracy has the capacity to cure its own ills , and that is its saving grace .

Something may have broken—or rather, begun to break—last month when U.S. President Donald Trump held an indoor rally in Tulsa, Oklahoma in open defiance of the public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic and found, to his shock and outrage, that his own supporters had failed to show up. That something is the politics of alternate reality that he and other illiberal populists have ridden to power in recent years.
Something may have broken—or rather, begun to break—last month when U.S. President Donald Trump held an indoor rally in Tulsa, Oklahoma in open defiance of the public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic and found, to his shock and outrage, that his own supporters had failed to show up. That something is the politics of alternate reality that he and other illiberal populists have ridden to power in recent years.
It has long been understood that totalitarian leaders sustain themselves through the manipulation of reality; that, after all, is the theme of George Orwell’s 1984 and Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon. Orwell, who understood clearly the power of language to obscure rather than reveal, would hardly have been shocked to see the practice transposed to democracies, but it didn’t fully happen in his day. Perhaps it awaited the shotgun marriage of extreme polarization and social media.
Over the last few years, Trump, Boris Johnson in the United Kingdom, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Narendra Modi in India, and others have carried out an experiment in the mass manufacture of alternative realities in a democratic society. Their success has forced a question: What reality, if any, will prove so terrible that it will expose their game? Americans have experienced a few false starts, including an impeachment trial, that have only proved that much of what transpires in political life does not reach people intimately enough to dispel the shadows. Nothing, however, is more intimate than the prospect of sickness and death.
Three of the four largest democracies run by illiberal populists—the United States, Brazil, and the U.K.—now rank one, two, and three in deaths from the coronavirus. (India currently lags behind but is moving up with frightening speed.) That is not a coincidence, for the leaders in each country have tried to minimize the gravity of the disease or—in Bolsonaro’s case—deny it altogether. Populist leaders deny COVID-19 for the same reasons they deny climate change: first, because acknowledging a force beyond their control might break the spell of omniscience in which they have bound their followers; and second, because deference to science and logic undermines the emotional sources of their appeal. If Anthony Fauci is right, Trump must be wrong.
The overwhelming signs that the world is warming have done nothing to break the hold of the populists, perhaps because few of their followers have experienced climate change as a personal catastrophe. At first, while it chiefly affected a handful of wealthy nations and blue states in the United States, the same was true of the coronavirus. But we have entered a new phase where the disease has become ubiquitous and ill-prepared countries are paying a terrible price. The connection between state failure and death has become too obvious to ignore.
The political consequences of this dawning recognition have become clear in the last few months as populist leaders and parties have suffered a serious erosion of support. The New York Times reported last week that Trump has fallen a staggering 14 points behind Joe Biden in the presidential contest as voters have spurned his response both to the pandemic and to the killing of George Floyd. Since the spring, Boris Johnson has lost 20 points both in approval of his response to the coronavirus and in his Conservative Party’s lead over Labour. Bolsonaro’s approval rating has dropped eight points since the beginning of the year as virtually all Brazilians disagree with his open contempt for social distancing. Even Vladimir Putin, who pioneered the techniques of fabrication that the populists now emulate, has seen his popularity fall to the lowest levels ever as coronavirus cases have surged in Russia.
The major European right-wing parties that have thrived in recent years—first by insisting that the European Union gravely threatened national sovereignty and then by stoking apocalyptic fears over the influx of refugees and immigrants—have similarly fallen back in the wake of the pandemic, especially in countries where citizens have found the government response reassuring. A recent poll showed the Alternative for Germany party enjoying the support of only 9 percent of Germans, its worst result in two and a half years. The far-right Sweden Democrats, tied in polls with the ruling Social Democrats at the outbreak of the pandemic, have now fallen 11 points behind.
A poll, of course, is only a snapshot in time. Trump could still beat Biden, and Bolsonaro, as Foreign Policy recently observed, still has a vast reservoir of support. The immense charisma of successful populists makes them almost immune to mistakes that would destroy a lesser figure. But democratic leaders have, of course, a smaller margin of error than do true autocrats; they depend on good luck to hide their shortcomings. What is now clear, at least in the United States, is that for three years Trump enjoyed a charmed life in which no real crisis challenged his simple-minded answers to complicated problems; now the law of averages has caught up with him.
It is true, of course, that populists on the left can prey on widespread resentments as easily as can those on the right; dangerous leaders from the time of Maximilien Robespierre and Jean-Paul Marat have exploited hatred of the entitled and the rich. The rising intensity of feeling on the left implies that such a world may lie before us; it is not, however, the one we live in. When Bernie Sanders blames corporate greed for the plight of the working class, he is advancing an arguable, if perhaps hyperbolic, proposition; when Trump describes Mexican immigrants as rapists and gangsters, or peaceful protesters as violent radicals, he is inviting his listeners to enter a parallel world. Leaders on the left in the United States do not traffic in hate as do leaders on the right.
It is true as well that we will never lack for politicians prepared to peddle pernicious fictions so long as citizens have powerful motivations to embrace them. People who feel left behind by immense changes in the economy and in social values will continue to grasp for satisfying explanations of their plight; social media will presumably only get better at magnifying grievance and vindicating conspiracy theories. Nations with strong democratic institutions and widely held democratic norms manage to confine this kind of demagoguery to the margins, but those with weak institutions, like Brazil or Poland, or states where norms have lost their cohesive force, like the United States and perhaps the U.K., will continue to be prey to the politics of resentment. If Poland’s liberal secular Civic Platform defeats the ruling Law and Justice party in elections this month, millions of Poles who are neither liberal nor secular will continue to believe that a German-led EU is plotting to destroy Poland’s Catholic values and traditions. If Biden defeats Trump in November, millions of the president’s supporters will continue to regard climate change as a hoax perpetrated by left-wing scientists in league with China.
Nevertheless, leaders shape norms: Trump is a cause as well as a consequence of American derangement. For that reason, one can at least hope that a clear-cut victory for Biden based on the growing recognition that the pandemic cannot be wished away, and that a history of racism cannot be wished away, will start to dispel the noxious pollutants from our mental atmosphere.
In Plato’s famous allegory, prisoners chained inside a cave since childhood mistake the flickering shadows they see on the wall before them for the reality of things. When one prisoner finally escapes and brings back the news of the world of tangible things, the prisoners refuse to break their chains for fear of being blinded by the sun—they cannot bear the full light of the real. Plato had a very dim regard for the wisdom of the people and thus for the idea of popular self-government; he assumed that democracy would bring forth the likes of Trump. But democracy has the capacity to cure its own ills, and that is its saving grace.