foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Afghanistan Takes One Small Step Toward Peace

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Intra-Afghan talks reach a key milestone , Iran approves a measure to enrich uranium to higher levels , and 2020 set to be the third-hottest year on record .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
After months of stalemate , peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban took a small but substantial step forward on Tuesday as both sides reached agreement on procedures and rules that will govern future peace talks .
The deal was hailed by U.S. Afghanistan envoy Zalmay Khalilzad , who has shuttled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ This agreement demonstrates that the negotiating parties can agree on tough issues .
We congratulate both sides on their perseverance , ” he said .
Although the agreement to begin working toward an agreement is a start , there are still hurdles to surmount : No agenda has been set for peace talks and both sides disagree on the order of priorities .
For Afghan government officials , a cease-fire is their top concern , while the Taliban want other issues—such as prisoner swaps and a future governing framework—ironed out first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country—whether it ’ s carried out by the Taliban , CIA-backed paramilitary groups , or the Islamic State—shows no sign of stopping .
And as U.S. troops prepare to leave , the Afghan government must be wary of the U.S. government ’ s interest in Afghanistan leaving along with them .
Zal may stay .
Wednesday ’ s declaration is a vindication of sorts for U.S. envoy Khalilzad , who could be out of a job once a Biden administration takes office .
As FP ’ s Jack Detsch , Robbie Gramer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think he may hold on to the position , although that sentiment is not universal .
“ I see a stronger logic for replacing him than keeping him , ” one official said .
“ It ’ s not like he is having wild success.
” The unheard .
As intra-Afghan talks slowly grind into gear , one group that will not be at the table are victims of decades of bloodshed .
“ Inclusion of the civilian victims in the negotiations , ” Ezzatullah Mehrdad writes in a dispatch from Kabul , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short-lived deals and rewarding violence.
” According to a new study by the United Nations Development Programme , the long-term impact of COVID-19 could increase the number of people living in extreme poverty by 207 million , pushing the total number above the 1 billion mark .
The study does leave room for optimism : a “ focused set of investments ” based on the U.N .
Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs ) would change the trend ’ s trajectory significantly .
Iran ratifies plan to boost uranium enrichment .
Iran ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Iran ’ s laws do not contradict the constitution or Shiite Islamic law , has ratified a bill passed by Iran ’ s parliament on Tuesday that would dramatically increase the potency of Iran ’ s enriched uranium stockpile if sanctions are not lifted within two months .
The law also calls for an end to international nuclear inspections under the same terms .
The move makes it difficult for President-elect Biden to swiftly re-enter the Iran nuclear deal , as Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has suggested ; Biden has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if Iran was in “ strict compliance with the nuclear deal.
” Trump blocks defense bill over social media grudge .
In the face of bipartisan pushback , U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to veto the U.S. defense budget unless lawmakers also agree to repeal Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act , a free speech provision that has served to protect internet platforms from legal challenges over content hosted on their services .
Right-wing opponents of Section 230 maintain that the law has been used to censor conservative voices , although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have the opposite effect and that internet platforms would be more likely to ban accounts posting incendiary content rather than face legal trouble .
As FP ’ s Jack Detsch points out , even if Trump vetoes the bill , support for it is so strong that Congress would likely have the two-thirds majority needed to override the president .
2020 to be third hottest year on record .
A report from the World Meteorological Organization , a U.N. agency , says that 2020 is set to be third hottest year on record @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Those years coincided with a warming phenomenon known as El Niño , however in 2020 the cooling La Niña event was taking place .
Despite the natural fluctuations , the WMO stated that the vast majority of warming occurred as a result of greenhouse gases in the earth ’ s atmosphere .
The report comes in the wake of another WMO study in November that showed global greenhouse gases did not decrease significantly this year , despite the global slowdown caused by the coronavirus pandemic .
Armenia ’ s leadership .
Armenian Prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to resign , more than three weeks after he signed a peace deal with Azerbaijan which ceded vast swaths of territory Armenia had held for more than two decades .
As thousands of protesters rallied on Wednesday in Yerevan to support the prime minister ’ s removal , Artur Vanetsyan , head of one of Armenia ’ s opposition parties , joined the calls for Pashinyan to go .
“ Pashinyan ’ s resignation would offer a chance to save our dignity , ” he said .
Islamophobia in India .
A Muslim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pradesh has been arrested by police for allegedly attempting to convert a Hindu woman to Islam .
The man ’ s arrest is the first under the state ’ s new law which prohibits “ forced ” religious conversions , which critics say is Islamophobic and is designed to forcibly segregate religious groups .
The arrest comes after recent depictions of interfaith couples in Indian media were condemned by right-wing Hindu groups .
Four other states , which like Uttar Pradesh are ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) , are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interfaith marriage .
U.S. out of Baghdad .
The United States is withdrawing staff from its embassy in Baghdad as tensions rise and the anniversary of the U.S. killing of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani approaches .
A Washington Post report said the exact number of personnel to be removed was not clear , and that the U.S. State Department neither confirmed nor denied the move .
U.S. embassy staff began leaving Baghdad in May 2019 when “ non-emergency ” staff were removed as a precaution against increased rocket attacks against Baghdad ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the number of U.S. troops in Iraq is set to decrease from approximately 3,000 to 2,500 .
Christmas in Belgium may lead to some tough decisions this year , as citizens get their head around new limits on social mixing over the holiday period .
Under current guidelines , citizens are allowed to gather in groups of four at their homes as long as the guests are kept outdoors .
Where things get personal is the authorized use of bathroom facilities .
Hosts are allowed designate one—and only one— “ close contact ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use the bathroom .
“ So if you really have to go to the toilet , there will be nothing else to do but return home , ” a government spokesperson told local media .
Accusations of fraud are flying in South Africa after the national lottery pulled the numbers 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , and 10 in this week ’ s winning draw .
The numbers were played by 20 winners , who will now share in the roughly $ 7.5 million jackpot .
The lottery tweeted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we see many players opt to play these sequences.
” South Africa ’ s lottery regulator has vowed to investigate the draw—which happened on live television—for any irregularities .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Intra-Afghan talks reach a key milestone, Iran approves a measure to enrich uranium to higher levels, and 2020 set to be the third-hottest year on record.
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Afghanistan Peace Talks Inch Toward Progress
After months of stalemate, peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban took a small but substantial step forward on Tuesday as both sides reached agreement on procedures and rules that will govern future peace talks.
The deal was hailed by U.S. Afghanistan envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, who has shuttled between Doha and Kabul in recent months. “This agreement demonstrates that the negotiating parties can agree on tough issues. We congratulate both sides on their perseverance,” he said.
Although the agreement to begin working toward an agreement is a start, there are still hurdles to surmount: No agenda has been set for peace talks and both sides disagree on the order of priorities. For Afghan government officials, a cease-fire is their top concern, while the Taliban want other issues—such as prisoner swaps and a future governing framework—ironed out first.
All the while, violence in the country—whether it’s carried out by the Taliban, CIA-backed paramilitary groups, or the Islamic State—shows no sign of stopping. And as U.S. troops prepare to leave, the Afghan government must be wary of the U.S. government’s interest in Afghanistan leaving along with them.
Zal may stay. Wednesday’s declaration is a vindication of sorts for U.S. envoy Khalilzad, who could be out of a job once a Biden administration takes office. As FP’s Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer, and Colum Lynch report, insiders think he may hold on to the position, although that sentiment is not universal. “I see a stronger logic for replacing him than keeping him,” one official said. “It’s not like he is having wild success.”
The unheard. As intra-Afghan talks slowly grind into gear, one group that will not be at the table are victims of decades of bloodshed. “Inclusion of the civilian victims in the negotiations,” Ezzatullah Mehrdad writes in a dispatch from Kabul, “would break the old pattern of short-lived deals and rewarding violence.”
The COVID Poverty Trap
According to a new study by the United Nations Development Programme, the long-term impact of COVID-19 could increase the number of people living in extreme poverty by 207 million, pushing the total number above the 1 billion mark. The study does leave room for optimism: a “focused set of investments” based on the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) would change the trend’s trajectory significantly.
What We’re Following Today
Iran ratifies plan to boost uranium enrichment. Iran’s Guardian Council, which sees to it that Iran’s laws do not contradict the constitution or Shiite Islamic law, has ratified a bill passed by Iran’s parliament on Tuesday that would dramatically increase the potency of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile if sanctions are not lifted within two months. The law also calls for an end to international nuclear inspections under the same terms. The move makes it difficult for President-elect Biden to swiftly re-enter the Iran nuclear deal, as Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has suggested; Biden has said he would only rejoin the agreement if Iran was in “strict compliance with the nuclear deal.”
Trump blocks defense bill over social media grudge. In the face of bipartisan pushback, U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to veto the U.S. defense budget unless lawmakers also agree to repeal Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, a free speech provision that has served to protect internet platforms from legal challenges over content hosted on their services.
Right-wing opponents of Section 230 maintain that the law has been used to censor conservative voices, although advocacy groups argue that a repeal would have the opposite effect and that internet platforms would be more likely to ban accounts posting incendiary content rather than face legal trouble. As FP’s Jack Detsch points out, even if Trump vetoes the bill, support for it is so strong that Congress would likely have the two-thirds majority needed to override the president.
2020 to be third hottest year on record. A report from the World Meteorological Organization, a U.N. agency, says that 2020 is set to be third hottest year on record, behind only 2015 and 2016. Those years coincided with a warming phenomenon known as El Niño, however in 2020 the cooling La Niña event was taking place. Despite the natural fluctuations, the WMO stated that the vast majority of warming occurred as a result of greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere. The report comes in the wake of another WMO study in November that showed global greenhouse gases did not decrease significantly this year, despite the global slowdown caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
Keep an Eye On
Armenia’s leadership. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan continues to face pressure to resign, more than three weeks after he signed a peace deal with Azerbaijan which ceded vast swaths of territory Armenia had held for more than two decades. As thousands of protesters rallied on Wednesday in Yerevan to support the prime minister’s removal, Artur Vanetsyan, head of one of Armenia’s opposition parties, joined the calls for Pashinyan to go. “Pashinyan’s resignation would offer a chance to save our dignity,” he said.
Islamophobia in India. A Muslim man in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh has been arrested by police for allegedly attempting to convert a Hindu woman to Islam. The man’s arrest is the first under the state’s new law which prohibits “forced” religious conversions, which critics say is Islamophobic and is designed to forcibly segregate religious groups. The arrest comes after recent depictions of interfaith couples in Indian media were condemned by right-wing Hindu groups. Four other states, which like Uttar Pradesh are ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), are planning to pass their own laws targeting interfaith marriage.
U.S. out of Baghdad. The United States is withdrawing staff from its embassy in Baghdad as tensions rise and the anniversary of the U.S. killing of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani approaches. A Washington Post report said the exact number of personnel to be removed was not clear, and that the U.S. State Department neither confirmed nor denied the move. U.S. embassy staff began leaving Baghdad in May 2019 when “non-emergency” staff were removed as a precaution against increased rocket attacks against Baghdad’s Green Zone. The move comes as the number of U.S. troops in Iraq is set to decrease from approximately 3,000 to 2,500.
Odds and Ends
Christmas in Belgium may lead to some tough decisions this year, as citizens get their head around new limits on social mixing over the holiday period. Under current guidelines, citizens are allowed to gather in groups of four at their homes as long as the guests are kept outdoors. Where things get personal is the authorized use of bathroom facilities. Hosts are allowed designate one—and only one—“close contact” who is allowed enter a home to use the bathroom. “So if you really have to go to the toilet, there will be nothing else to do but return home,” a government spokesperson told local media.
Accusations of fraud are flying in South Africa after the national lottery pulled the numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 in this week’s winning draw. The numbers were played by 20 winners, who will now share in the roughly $7.5 million jackpot. The lottery tweeted that the results were “unexpected but we see many players opt to play these sequences.” South Africa’s lottery regulator has vowed to investigate the draw—which happened on live television—for any irregularities.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Biden Needs to Move Fast if He Wants a New Deal With Iran

Biden Needs to Move Fast if He Wants a New Deal With Iran This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Although President-elect Joe Biden had promised before this year ’ s U.S. election that he would return to the nuclear deal with Iran , doing so will be very difficult for him and for all those who hope that the 2015 agreement will be revived with U.S. support .
Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will not have much time to revive the deal if that is his plan .
There will be about five months while moderate President Hassan Rouhani , whose administration signed the deal , is still in power in Tehran .
That ’ s because the next Iranian president , to be elected in June 2021 , will likely be one of Iran ’ s hardliners .
They opposed signing the deal long before outgoing President Donald Trump withdrew from it in May 2018—and they would harshly criticize Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Mohammad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a weak agreement with the United States .
Although Rouhani himself will not be able to run again due to term limits , members of his cabinet or politicians close to the reformists and moderates will certainly compete .
Under the current circumstances , reformists and moderates have no chance of winning the election unless the deal returns to the center of Iranian politics .
Moderates will have a difficult job persuading voters in the upcoming elections to come to the polls , and without the deal ’ s revival , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the deal by Biden would boost the Iranian economy and more importantly lead to the appreciation of the Iranian rial ahead of the presidential election—a significant issue for ordinary Iranians suffering from inflation and one that could convince them to vote for pro-diplomacy reformists .
Even so , the moderates will have a difficult job persuading voters in the upcoming elections to come to the polls , and without the deal ’ s revival , they will definitely lose .
Politicians from various factions believe that low turnout will help the hardliners win @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parliamentary elections proved .
In the February 2020 parliamentary elections , the lowest turnout since the 1979 Revolution gave an absolute majority to the hardliners .
According to the official figures , the turnout stood at only 42 percent overall in the whole country with only 26 percent of the people in Tehran province coming to the ballot box .
Although there is no official polling in Iran , reformist and moderate politicians are not optimistic about their base in the next year ’ s presidential election .
Mahmoud Sadeghi , a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predicted in an interview on June 20 , 2020 that no more than 30 percent of the population would turn out in next year ’ s presidential race .
Since low turnout in the Islamic Republic elections has historically meant hardliner victories , this decline in turnout rate would be good news for conservatives .
They could return to power and the world will face a similar experience to what it went through during the administration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from 2005 to 2013 .
“ A government that has for many times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past four years lacks the ability to distinguish opportunity from threat , ” Mehdi Mohammadi , an adviser to hardliner Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf , tweeted on Nov. 13 .
The hardliner politician and columnist with the Vatan-e-Emrooz newspaper , one of the main conservative media outlets in Iran , added : “ If only one thing is certain , it is that JCPOA [ Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ] can not lift the sanctions.
” Anti-negotiation arguments like these are common in the Iranian media these days .
On Nov. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Iranian parliament representing Tehran , described the nuclear deal as dead .
“ There is nothing left of the JCPOA , and if wisdom prevails in our foreign policy , we should never return to this agreement to which no one is committed anymore , ” Naderi added .
“ Democrats have always imposed the most sanctions on Iran , but the pro-Western current in Iran still thinks that Biden ’ s presidency will solve the country ’ s problems , which is very unrealistic.
” Such statements and warnings followed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that : “ If Tehran returns to compliance with the deal , President Biden would re-enter the agreement , using hard-nosed diplomacy and support from our allies to strengthen and extend it , while more effectively pushing back against Iran ’ s other destabilizing activities.
” Meanwhile , in a speech on Nov.15 , Qalibaf criticized the Rouhani government ’ s poor economic record and advised the president to focus on the country ’ s internal capabilities .
He urged Rouhani to look for solutions to the problems at home , not from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a column in the weekly Sobh-e Sadegh belonging to the political bureau of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) called for returning responsibility for leading the nuclear talks from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—headed by Zarif , a moderate—to the Country ’ s Supreme National Security Council ( SNSC ) when Biden takes office .
The SNSC is run by Admiral Ali Shamkhani , and Saeed Jalili—the former nuclear negotiator during Ahmadinejad ’ s era—is a senior member .
If Biden sets any non-nuclear preconditions—issues such as addressing Iran ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the country—as prerequisites for returning to the deal , he would simply be letting down all those who are hoping to revive the accord and play into the conservatives ’ attempt to sabotage a deal .
Hardliners , after all , have been arguing for decades that the United States will not ease its pressure unless the Islamic Republic fundamentally changes or disappears .
With such limited time to reach a deal , adding any other issues to the negotiations will make it impossible for the two sides to reach a deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will simply not have time to lay the groundwork for a process similar to the one that led to the signing of the landmark 2015 agreement .
Meanwhile , the wide-ranging sanctions that the Trump administration has imposed on Tehran has left almost no room for the Rouhani administration to maneuver in the domestic political arena , and he appears empty-handed when he comes under attack from his hardliner opponents .
As a result , it will not be surprising if hardliners in Iran and the groups they control resort to acts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ months in order to disrupt any possible agreement between Iran and the United States .
That ’ s because hardliners are trying their best to undermine an atmosphere conducive to negotiations between the Rouhani government and the Biden White House .
The incoming administration needs to be even more prepared for further destructive action by the Iranian hardliners—both inside and outside the region—with the aim of hindering a new deal .
Recently , despite Zarif ’ s repeated denials that he has no intention to run in the next presidential election , some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the reformists have been pushing for his candidacy .
On the opposite side , the hardliners have recently intensified their campaign to defame the foreign minister for fear that if he enters the race , it will be harder for them to win .
Despite increasing attacks on Zarif from the right , he has remained popular and is capable of garnering the support of Iranians .
In various published polls , Zarif is among the most popular figures in the country , and his extraordinary rhetorical skills would cause problems for his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the deal is revived and Zarif enters the race for president , there would no guarantee that the dissatisfied , tired , and angry people of Iran would be willing to turn out at the polls .
But there is one definite possibility : If Biden fails to revive the JCPOA in the coming months , and the pro-negotiation camp fails to win the June 2021 election , his foreign-policy team will have to prepare themselves to negotiate and deal with a conservative president similar to Ahmadinejad and a hardliner diplomat like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They would be far less amicable negotiating partners than Rouhani and Zarif .

Although President-elect Joe Biden had promised before this year’s U.S. election that he would return to the nuclear deal with Iran, doing so will be very difficult for him and for all those who hope that the 2015 agreement will be revived with U.S. support.
Although President-elect Joe Biden had promised before this year’s U.S. election that he would return to the nuclear deal with Iran, doing so will be very difficult for him and for all those who hope that the 2015 agreement will be revived with U.S. support.
Biden will take office on Jan. 20 and will not have much time to revive the deal if that is his plan. There will be about five months while moderate President Hassan Rouhani, whose administration signed the deal, is still in power in Tehran. That’s because the next Iranian president, to be elected in June 2021, will likely be one of Iran’s hardliners. They opposed signing the deal long before outgoing President Donald Trump withdrew from it in May 2018—and they would harshly criticize Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif for signing what they perceive as a weak agreement with the United States.
Although Rouhani himself will not be able to run again due to term limits, members of his cabinet or politicians close to the reformists and moderates will certainly compete. Under the current circumstances, reformists and moderates have no chance of winning the election unless the deal returns to the center of Iranian politics.
A revival of the deal by Biden would boost the Iranian economy and more importantly lead to the appreciation of the Iranian rial ahead of the presidential election—a significant issue for ordinary Iranians suffering from inflation and one that could convince them to vote for pro-diplomacy reformists. Even so, the moderates will have a difficult job persuading voters in the upcoming elections to come to the polls, and without the deal’s revival, they will definitely lose.
Politicians from various factions believe that low turnout will help the hardliners win the election as this year’s parliamentary elections proved. In the February 2020 parliamentary elections, the lowest turnout since the 1979 Revolution gave an absolute majority to the hardliners.
According to the official figures, the turnout stood at only 42 percent overall in the whole country with only 26 percent of the people in Tehran province coming to the ballot box. Although there is no official polling in Iran, reformist and moderate politicians are not optimistic about their base in the next year’s presidential election. Mahmoud Sadeghi, a former lawmaker from Tehran in the previous parliament predicted in an interview on June 20, 2020 that no more than 30 percent of the population would turn out in next year’s presidential race.
Since low turnout in the Islamic Republic elections has historically meant hardliner victories, this decline in turnout rate would be good news for conservatives. They could return to power and the world will face a similar experience to what it went through during the administration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from 2005 to 2013.
Iran’s hardliners are already angry about Biden’s victory in the U.S. election because they believe that if Trump had been reelected, they would have been able bring down the reformists and moderates. But they are now worried that the opposite camp could stay in power with Biden at the White House.
“A government that has for many times sought to negotiate with Trump over the past four years lacks the ability to distinguish opportunity from threat,” Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to hardliner Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, tweeted on Nov. 13. The hardliner politician and columnist with the Vatan-e-Emrooz newspaper, one of the main conservative media outlets in Iran, added: “If only one thing is certain, it is that JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] cannot lift the sanctions.”
Anti-negotiation arguments like these are common in the Iranian media these days. On Nov. 10, Ahmad Naderi, a lawmaker in the Iranian parliament representing Tehran, described the nuclear deal as dead. “There is nothing left of the JCPOA, and if wisdom prevails in our foreign policy, we should never return to this agreement to which no one is committed anymore,” Naderi added. “Democrats have always imposed the most sanctions on Iran, but the pro-Western current in Iran still thinks that Biden’s presidency will solve the country’s problems, which is very unrealistic.”
Such statements and warnings followed the Biden team’s statement promising that: “If Tehran returns to compliance with the deal, President Biden would re-enter the agreement, using hard-nosed diplomacy and support from our allies to strengthen and extend it, while more effectively pushing back against Iran’s other destabilizing activities.”
Meanwhile, in a speech on Nov.15, Qalibaf criticized the Rouhani government’s poor economic record and advised the president to focus on the country’s internal capabilities. He urged Rouhani to look for solutions to the problems at home, not from Washington.
On the same day, a column in the weekly Sobh-e Sadegh belonging to the political bureau of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) called for returning responsibility for leading the nuclear talks from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—headed by Zarif, a moderate—to the Country’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) when Biden takes office. The SNSC is run by Admiral Ali Shamkhani, and Saeed Jalili—the former nuclear negotiator during Ahmadinejad’s era—is a senior member.
If Biden sets any non-nuclear preconditions as prerequisites for returning to the deal, he would simply be letting down all those who are hoping to revive the accord.
If Biden sets any non-nuclear preconditions—issues such as addressing Iran’s missile program or the human rights situation in the country—as prerequisites for returning to the deal, he would simply be letting down all those who are hoping to revive the accord and play into the conservatives’ attempt to sabotage a deal.
Hardliners, after all, have been arguing for decades that the United States will not ease its pressure unless the Islamic Republic fundamentally changes or disappears. With such limited time to reach a deal, adding any other issues to the negotiations will make it impossible for the two sides to reach a deal in the next few months. Biden will simply not have time to lay the groundwork for a process similar to the one that led to the signing of the landmark 2015 agreement.
Meanwhile, the wide-ranging sanctions that the Trump administration has imposed on Tehran has left almost no room for the Rouhani administration to maneuver in the domestic political arena, and he appears empty-handed when he comes under attack from his hardliner opponents.
As a result, it will not be surprising if hardliners in Iran and the groups they control resort to acts of sabotage in the region in the coming months in order to disrupt any possible agreement between Iran and the United States. That’s because hardliners are trying their best to undermine an atmosphere conducive to negotiations between the Rouhani government and the Biden White House. The incoming administration needs to be even more prepared for further destructive action by the Iranian hardliners—both inside and outside the region—with the aim of hindering a new deal.
Recently, despite Zarif’s repeated denials that he has no intention to run in the next presidential election, some political activists and media outlets close to the reformists have been pushing for his candidacy. On the opposite side, the hardliners have recently intensified their campaign to defame the foreign minister for fear that if he enters the race, it will be harder for them to win.
Despite increasing attacks on Zarif from the right, he has remained popular and is capable of garnering the support of Iranians. In various published polls, Zarif is among the most popular figures in the country, and his extraordinary rhetorical skills would cause problems for his rivals in an election campaign.
Even if the deal is revived and Zarif enters the race for president, there would no guarantee that the dissatisfied, tired, and angry people of Iran would be willing to turn out at the polls.
But there is one definite possibility: If Biden fails to revive the JCPOA in the coming months, and the pro-negotiation camp fails to win the June 2021 election, his foreign-policy team will have to prepare themselves to negotiate and deal with a conservative president similar to Ahmadinejad and a hardliner diplomat like Jalili for the next four years. They would be far less amicable negotiating partners than Rouhani and Zarif.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-02--Assad’s Syria Is Starting to Starve Like Saddam’s Iraq

Assad ’ s Syria Is Starting to Starve Like Saddam ’ s Iraq Thirty-year-old Ayman fled Damascus , Syria , for Beirut at the beginning of the Syrian civil war .
Over the last year , while Lebanon ’ s economy collapsed and it became harder for him to find work , the conflict back home seemed to be subsiding .
So he called several of his friends , all living in regime-controlled territory , to inquire if it was time to return .
They were unequivocal .
“ They said , ‘ Stay wherever you are , there ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ’ ” Ayman said , on condition of anonymity because of security concerns .
During the nine-year civil war , much of Syria ’ s infrastructure was destroyed by the blind bombing of the regime and its Russian allies , as well as front-line fighting .
Food production , power generation , and other industries fell by the wayside .
Syria ’ s economy , tethered to Lebanon ’ s , hobbled on for a while .
However , early this year , as Lebanon ’ s monetary policy unraveled and capital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the banks , billions of dollars of deposits by Syrian businesses were also blocked .
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad claims Lebanese banks hold at least $ 20 billion of Syrians ’ earnings , which , if they were accessible , would resolve the Syrian economic crisis all at once .
The currencies of Lebanon ’ s neighbors plummeted simultaneously as prices of basic commodities skyrocketed , in Syria by more than 200 percent .
Life became hard for the Lebanese , but harder still for war-ravaged Syrians .
Images of hundreds of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bread and parked for hours on end at fuel stations flooded social media .
Residents complained of the worst food and fuel crisis ever in their country .
“ Power cuts make it near impossible for businesses to operate , ” said one of Ayman ’ s friends from Damascus .
“ Fuel is too expensive to run generators.
” According to the World Food Program , 9.3 million Syrians are unsure where their next meal is coming from , an increase of around 1.4 million in the first six months of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s breadbasket , is under the control of the United States ’ Kurdish allies the Syrian Democratic Forces , which are yet to come to an agreement with the regime on grain supply .
Once a wheat exporter , Syria had become partly dependent on supplies from Russia , but even that aid failed when Moscow reduced flour sales abroad to maintain reserves at home during the uncertain times of the coronavirus pandemic .
Furthermore , U.S. sanctions on oil and gas meant only Iranian crude found its way to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has had a ripple effect on the agriculture and energy sectors , also impacting local businesses .
More than 80 percent of Syrians now live below the poverty line .
Desperation to make ends meet has caused a concomitant rise in crime .
Gangs smuggling contraband , guns , and drugs , as well as kidnapping people for ransom , are running amok in several parts of the country .
Whilst this is all deeply linked to decades of corruption , mismanagement , and a brutal pulverization of rebel-held territory , some critics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ result of America ’ s sectoral sanctions .
A troubling comparison is being made : whether sanctions will be as cruel and self-defeating in Syria as they were in Iraq two decades ago .
The numbers are disputed , but according to one study half a million children were said to have died in Iraq as a result of U.S.-led sanctions .
Saddam Hussein remained as dictatorial as ever and was ousted after years of suffering only when the United States attacked with its military .
The aim of this year ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defector who fled Syria with the evidence of the killing of thousands of Syrians in state-run prisons , is likewise to compel the Syrian regime to change its behavior toward its people from “ murderous ” to more accommodating .
Senior Western diplomats have told Foreign Policy on many occasions that sanctions are the West ’ s last leverage against Assad to pressure him to release political prisoners , ensure the safe return of refugees , and agree to a political reconciliation that , if carried out sincerely , would eventually mean him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Syrian reconstruction , including of infrastructure like power plants and irrigation systems that are necessary for the country ’ s food security and daily life , will end up strengthening the regime ’ s oppression .
They say they have no intention of letting Assad succeed in that , at least not unless he makes significant concessions .
Moreover , the West is worried that Assad may simply siphon off the funds , as he has allegedly done with a large portion of the humanitarian aid already sent for the war-afflicted .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ reform an incorrigible dictator and are merely punishing the Syrian people .
They posit that , as in Iraq , the Syrian population is bearing the brunt of sanctions while Assad and his cronies are facing neither food nor fuel shortages .
They assert that it is naive for the United States to expect Assad to hold war criminals accountable , as he can hardly be expected to indict himself .
Their argument is that the United States must reverse its maximum pressure policy and institute stage-by-stage waivers on sanctions that it would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ delivery of more pragmatic demands .
Bente Scheller , the head of the Middle East and North Africa Division at the Heinrich Böll Foundation , said there was no disagreement on targeted sanctions against Assad ’ s cronies but that America ’ s sectoral sanctions were having a negative impact on ordinary people .
“ U.S .
sanctions are based on a ‘ maximum pressure ’ logic , ” she said .
“ This is why they include sectoral sanctions , while only in a second step listing individuals .
[ European Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They consist of travel bans on regime officials and proxies based on their respective role in human rights violations .
Sectoral sanctions such as against Syrian banks curb the regime ’ s abilities to purchase goods from outside .
Humanitarian and medical goods are clearly exempted—Syrian civil society has pointed out , however , that over-compliance is affecting them.
” Aron Lund , a Syria specialist with the Swedish Defence Research Agency , said both the U.S. and EU sanctions came with exemptions for humanitarian activities and legitimate civilian trade .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do with a country under sanctions , simply because it was too complicated to understand the rules and they did not want to take any risks .
“ Companies avoid even permissible trade , simply to stay clear of risks and legal hassle , ” he said .
“ When international banks or shipping companies decide that navigating the sanctions system just isn ’ t worth the trouble , it makes imports difficult and costly across the board.
” Zahraa Matr is a 55-year-old woman nicknamed Zahraa Dollars in Iraq .
She smuggled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the sanctions against Saddam and remembers the hard times .
“ Kids started to die because of the lack of medicines and medical supplies at the hospitals during the sanction years , ” she said .
“ People sold their belongings like furniture , metal—anything else they could sell to survive.
” In Syria , even anti-regime Syrians are beginning to say that sectoral sanctions in the oil and gas and construction sectors hurt the people more than the regime .
In Quneitra , southern Syria , 29-year-old father of three Abu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diesel , so to keep his family warm this winter he was burning garbage , plastic , and dung .
“ Sanctions have made goods more expensive for ordinary Syrians .
I don ’ t think that the Syrian regime officials and their families are going to sleep hungry or cold , ” Abu Mishal said .
“ In my opinion , the regime and its mafia also used the sanctions as an excuse to raise prices and exploit poor people more and more.
” Faced with an obstinate and intransigent Assad , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Former U.S. President Barack Obama did not repeat an Iraq-style war that would oust Assad but commit the United States to yet another country for the foreseeable future .
The Syrian question remains unresolved nonetheless .
Nine years on , Obama ’ s vice president , President-elect Joe Biden , confronts a different challenge : how to stop starvation in Syria and help people resurrect their lives while not benefiting Assad .
The guilty feelings of his former colleagues in the Obama administration , who watched the Syrian war devolve into chaos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ keen interest .
How far up the incoming president ’ s list of priorities Syria will be is another matter .

Thirty-year-old Ayman fled Damascus, Syria, for Beirut at the beginning of the Syrian civil war. Over the last year, while Lebanon’s economy collapsed and it became harder for him to find work, the conflict back home seemed to be subsiding. So he called several of his friends, all living in regime-controlled territory, to inquire if it was time to return. They were unequivocal. “They said, ‘Stay wherever you are, there’s not even enough to eat here,’” Ayman said, on condition of anonymity because of security concerns.
Thirty-year-old Ayman fled Damascus, Syria, for Beirut at the beginning of the Syrian civil war. Over the last year, while Lebanon’s economy collapsed and it became harder for him to find work, the conflict back home seemed to be subsiding. So he called several of his friends, all living in regime-controlled territory, to inquire if it was time to return. They were unequivocal. “They said, ‘Stay wherever you are, there’s not even enough to eat here,’” Ayman said, on condition of anonymity because of security concerns.
During the nine-year civil war, much of Syria’s infrastructure was destroyed by the blind bombing of the regime and its Russian allies, as well as front-line fighting. Food production, power generation, and other industries fell by the wayside. Syria’s economy, tethered to Lebanon’s, hobbled on for a while. However, early this year, as Lebanon’s monetary policy unraveled and capital controls were imposed to avoid a run on the banks, billions of dollars of deposits by Syrian businesses were also blocked. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad claims Lebanese banks hold at least $20 billion of Syrians’ earnings, which, if they were accessible, would resolve the Syrian economic crisis all at once. The currencies of Lebanon’s neighbors plummeted simultaneously as prices of basic commodities skyrocketed, in Syria by more than 200 percent. Life became hard for the Lebanese, but harder still for war-ravaged Syrians.
Images of hundreds of Syrians lining up outside bakeries for subsidized bread and parked for hours on end at fuel stations flooded social media. Residents complained of the worst food and fuel crisis ever in their country. “Power cuts make it near impossible for businesses to operate,” said one of Ayman’s friends from Damascus. “Fuel is too expensive to run generators.”
According to the World Food Program, 9.3 million Syrians are unsure where their next meal is coming from, an increase of around 1.4 million in the first six months of the year. Moreover, northeast Syria, the country’s breadbasket, is under the control of the United States’ Kurdish allies the Syrian Democratic Forces, which are yet to come to an agreement with the regime on grain supply. Once a wheat exporter, Syria had become partly dependent on supplies from Russia, but even that aid failed when Moscow reduced flour sales abroad to maintain reserves at home during the uncertain times of the coronavirus pandemic. Furthermore, U.S. sanctions on oil and gas meant only Iranian crude found its way to Syria. Lack of that basic resource has had a ripple effect on the agriculture and energy sectors, also impacting local businesses.
More than 80 percent of Syrians now live below the poverty line. Desperation to make ends meet has caused a concomitant rise in crime. Gangs smuggling contraband, guns, and drugs, as well as kidnapping people for ransom, are running amok in several parts of the country.
Whilst this is all deeply linked to decades of corruption, mismanagement, and a brutal pulverization of rebel-held territory, some critics say that the crises are also a result of America’s sectoral sanctions.
A troubling comparison is being made: whether sanctions will be as cruel and self-defeating in Syria as they were in Iraq two decades ago. The numbers are disputed, but according to one study half a million children were said to have died in Iraq as a result of U.S.-led sanctions. Saddam Hussein remained as dictatorial as ever and was ousted after years of suffering only when the United States attacked with its military.
The aim of this year’s Caesar sanctions, named after the police defector who fled Syria with the evidence of the killing of thousands of Syrians in state-run prisons, is likewise to compel the Syrian regime to change its behavior toward its people from “murderous” to more accommodating. Senior Western diplomats have told Foreign Policy on many occasions that sanctions are the West’s last leverage against Assad to pressure him to release political prisoners, ensure the safe return of refugees, and agree to a political reconciliation that, if carried out sincerely, would eventually mean him leaving power. They insist that paying for Syrian reconstruction, including of infrastructure like power plants and irrigation systems that are necessary for the country’s food security and daily life, will end up strengthening the regime’s oppression. They say they have no intention of letting Assad succeed in that, at least not unless he makes significant concessions. Moreover, the West is worried that Assad may simply siphon off the funds, as he has allegedly done with a large portion of the humanitarian aid already sent for the war-afflicted.
But others say that sanctions cannot reform an incorrigible dictator and are merely punishing the Syrian people. They posit that, as in Iraq, the Syrian population is bearing the brunt of sanctions while Assad and his cronies are facing neither food nor fuel shortages. They assert that it is naive for the United States to expect Assad to hold war criminals accountable, as he can hardly be expected to indict himself. Their argument is that the United States must reverse its maximum pressure policy and institute stage-by-stage waivers on sanctions that it would be ready to provide in return for delivery of more pragmatic demands.
Bente Scheller, the head of the Middle East and North Africa Division at the Heinrich Böll Foundation, said there was no disagreement on targeted sanctions against Assad’s cronies but that America’s sectoral sanctions were having a negative impact on ordinary people. “U.S. sanctions are based on a ‘maximum pressure’ logic,” she said. “This is why they include sectoral sanctions, while only in a second step listing individuals. [European Union] sanctions have been largely targeted: They consist of travel bans on regime officials and proxies based on their respective role in human rights violations. Sectoral sanctions such as against Syrian banks curb the regime’s abilities to purchase goods from outside. Humanitarian and medical goods are clearly exempted—Syrian civil society has pointed out, however, that over-compliance is affecting them.”
Aron Lund, a Syria specialist with the Swedish Defence Research Agency, said both the U.S. and EU sanctions came with exemptions for humanitarian activities and legitimate civilian trade. However, businesses tended to fear having anything to do with a country under sanctions, simply because it was too complicated to understand the rules and they did not want to take any risks. “Companies avoid even permissible trade, simply to stay clear of risks and legal hassle,” he said. “When international banks or shipping companies decide that navigating the sanctions system just isn’t worth the trouble, it makes imports difficult and costly across the board.”
Zahraa Matr is a 55-year-old woman nicknamed Zahraa Dollars in Iraq. She smuggled dollars inside the country at the peak of the sanctions against Saddam and remembers the hard times. “Kids started to die because of the lack of medicines and medical supplies at the hospitals during the sanction years,” she said. “People sold their belongings like furniture, metal—anything else they could sell to survive.”
In Syria, even anti-regime Syrians are beginning to say that sectoral sanctions in the oil and gas and construction sectors hurt the people more than the regime. In Quneitra, southern Syria, 29-year-old father of three Abu Mishal said that he could rarely afford diesel, so to keep his family warm this winter he was burning garbage, plastic, and dung. “Sanctions have made goods more expensive for ordinary Syrians. I don’t think that the Syrian regime officials and their families are going to sleep hungry or cold,” Abu Mishal said. “In my opinion, the regime and its mafia also used the sanctions as an excuse to raise prices and exploit poor people more and more.”
Faced with an obstinate and intransigent Assad, the United States faces an impossible conundrum. Former U.S. President Barack Obama did not repeat an Iraq-style war that would oust Assad but commit the United States to yet another country for the foreseeable future. The Syrian question remains unresolved nonetheless. Nine years on, Obama’s vice president, President-elect Joe Biden, confronts a different challenge: how to stop starvation in Syria and help people resurrect their lives while not benefiting Assad. The guilty feelings of his former colleagues in the Obama administration, who watched the Syrian war devolve into chaos, would urge him to take a keen interest. How far up the incoming president’s list of priorities Syria will be is another matter.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Pompeo Plans Parties Flouting COVID-19 Guidelines as Death Toll Mounts

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is proceeding with plans to host holiday diplomatic parties with hundreds of invitees at the U.S. State Department despite coronavirus lockdown protocols and the department ’ s advice to its own employees , current and former officials told Foreign Policy .
The State Department ’ s plans to push ahead with annual holiday parties , even as the Trump administration ’ s own health experts urge people to avoid large gatherings as coronavirus cases surge across the United States , will heighten the risk of exposure and infection for State government employees and contractors required @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the attendees themselves .
Outside Foggy Bottom , the United States reported more than 2,800 COVID-19 deaths on Wednesday , the highest single-day toll since the beginning of the pandemic .
But catering and waitstaff for the State Department work for contractors , and many are not provided with employer health insurance , according to four officials familiar with the matter , all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity .
At least one member of the catering staff at the State Department who has worked on the eighth floor , where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rooms and event spaces are , has already contracted the coronavirus .
His family is organizing an online fundraiser to cover the cost of hospital bills , according to several officials .
To some officials , the parties highlight a broader issue with the Trump administration ’ s approach to the coronavirus pandemic that has killed over 270,000 Americans : Even as the administration ’ s top health experts are urging strict mask protocols and imploring Americans to stay home and avoid contact with other people , the president and his retinue are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spurning the health procedures themselves .
“ I ’ m flabbergasted .
… An indoor event of this kind is dangerous on so many levels , ” Ian Lipkin , the director of the Center for Infection and Immunity at Columbia University , told the Washington Post , which was first to break the story .
The State Department plans to follow guidelines “ in compliance with health officials ’ guidance ” and require all attendees to wear masks and social distance , as well as receive temperature checks with forehead scanners before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spokesperson told Foreign Policy in an email response .
“ We ’ ve taken every precaution to thin out the number of individuals in all spaces at one time , and plan to keep outdoors space open and available to attendees , weather permitting , ” the spokesperson added .
The department is also splitting its annual diplomatic corps reception into two parties and organizing entrance into at least one of the events into three time blocks to limit the size of the entrance lines and gatherings .
“ We do not anticipate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ individuals in these indoor spaces or [ exceeding ] the allotted numbers for indoor gatherings , ” the spokesperson added .
The State Department declined to respond to follow-up questions , including on how attendees would keep masks on while eating and drinking , whether the events would add undue risk onto employees staffing the events , and why the department is not obligated to comply with the District of Columbia ’ s COVID-19 restriction protocols .
The district has banned outdoor gatherings of over 25 people and indoor gatherings of 10 or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s pledges to take all precautions for the events , some State Department officials and foreign diplomats in Washington who received invitations told Foreign Policy they do not plan to attend , citing fears that the events could spread the virus further in the Washington , D.C. , area , which has already seen cases spike in recent weeks .
Others said attending the events just didn ’ t feel right , given the risk posed to caterers , waiters , chefs , facilities managers , and other event staff .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 900 guests , but also those who don ’ t have the decision to decline an invite because it ’ s their job to serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of State—who could choose not to have these events out of concern for the greater good , ” said one official , speaking on condition of anonymity .
“ Reports about guests catching Covid [ are ] concerning , but what risk do the employees take who have to work all of these events out of obligation ?
” The department has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to invitations obtained by Foreign Policy and statements from officials .
On Dec. 8 , the State Department chief of protocol , Cam Henderson , is hosting a holiday open house and tour of the White House , followed by a reception at the Blair House—the nearby presidential guest house .
There is also an event scheduled for Dec. 15 for families of State Department officials who are serving at posts abroad that can not accommodate bringing family members to live with them , including employees posted in Afghanistan and Iraq .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ scheduled with the foreign diplomatic corps , including foreign ambassadors based in Washington .
One official familiar with the matter said that in years past , such events could attract hundreds of guests .
The Washington Post reported that over 900 invitations have been sent out overall .
In a message sent to department employees on Nov. 25 obtained by Foreign Policy , State Department Undersecretary for Management Brian Bulatao implored all staff to “ closely adhere to our critical safety measures such as social distancing , wearing cloth face coverings , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said the department would encourage employees to work from home and avoid unnecessarily going into the office through the beginning of the new year , given the ongoing risks from the coronavirus .
“ In light of rising cases across the country , and in accordance with the flexibility offered under Diplomacy Strong , domestic bureaus are strongly encouraged to maximize telework from November 26 , 2020 through January 3 , 2021 .
Supervisors should have employees come to the office only to perform duties that can not be accomplished while teleworking , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s “ Diplomacy Strong ” plan for safely returning to work .
But for many , the rhetoric rings hollow .
“ This superspreader event has all of us feeling like the messaging from the top is in direct conflict with their actions , ” said one State Department official .

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is proceeding with plans to host holiday diplomatic parties with hundreds of invitees at the U.S. State Department despite coronavirus lockdown protocols and the department’s advice to its own employees, current and former officials told Foreign Policy .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is proceeding with plans to host holiday diplomatic parties with hundreds of invitees at the U.S. State Department despite coronavirus lockdown protocols and the department’s advice to its own employees, current and former officials told Foreign Policy.
The State Department’s plans to push ahead with annual holiday parties, even as the Trump administration’s own health experts urge people to avoid large gatherings as coronavirus cases surge across the United States, will heighten the risk of exposure and infection for State government employees and contractors required to staff the events, as well as the attendees themselves.
Outside Foggy Bottom, the United States reported more than 2,800 COVID-19 deaths on Wednesday, the highest single-day toll since the beginning of the pandemic.
But catering and waitstaff for the State Department work for contractors, and many are not provided with employer health insurance, according to four officials familiar with the matter, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity. At least one member of the catering staff at the State Department who has worked on the eighth floor, where the department’s lavish diplomatic reception rooms and event spaces are, has already contracted the coronavirus. His family is organizing an online fundraiser to cover the cost of hospital bills, according to several officials.
To some officials, the parties highlight a broader issue with the Trump administration’s approach to the coronavirus pandemic that has killed over 270,000 Americans: Even as the administration’s top health experts are urging strict mask protocols and imploring Americans to stay home and avoid contact with other people, the president and his retinue are downplaying the impact of the virus and spurning the health procedures themselves.
“I’m flabbergasted. … An indoor event of this kind is dangerous on so many levels,” Ian Lipkin, the director of the Center for Infection and Immunity at Columbia University, told the Washington Post, which was first to break the story.
The State Department plans to follow guidelines “in compliance with health officials’ guidance” and require all attendees to wear masks and social distance, as well as receive temperature checks with forehead scanners before entering the events, a State Department spokesperson told Foreign Policy in an email response.
“We’ve taken every precaution to thin out the number of individuals in all spaces at one time, and plan to keep outdoors space open and available to attendees, weather permitting,” the spokesperson added.
The department is also splitting its annual diplomatic corps reception into two parties and organizing entrance into at least one of the events into three time blocks to limit the size of the entrance lines and gatherings. “We do not anticipate any problems in monitoring the number of individuals in these indoor spaces or [exceeding] the allotted numbers for indoor gatherings,” the spokesperson added.
The State Department declined to respond to follow-up questions, including on how attendees would keep masks on while eating and drinking, whether the events would add undue risk onto employees staffing the events, and why the department is not obligated to comply with the District of Columbia’s COVID-19 restriction protocols. The district has banned outdoor gatherings of over 25 people and indoor gatherings of 10 or more people.
Despite the State Department’s pledges to take all precautions for the events, some State Department officials and foreign diplomats in Washington who received invitations told Foreign Policy they do not plan to attend, citing fears that the events could spread the virus further in the Washington, D.C., area, which has already seen cases spike in recent weeks. Others said attending the events just didn’t feel right, given the risk posed to caterers, waiters, chefs, facilities managers, and other event staff.
“It’s not just about the 900 guests, but also those who don’t have the decision to decline an invite because it’s their job to serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of State—who could choose not to have these events out of concern for the greater good,” said one official, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Reports about guests catching Covid [are] concerning, but what risk do the employees take who have to work all of these events out of obligation?”
The department has at least three holiday parties planned, according to invitations obtained by Foreign Policy and statements from officials.
On Dec. 8, the State Department chief of protocol, Cam Henderson, is hosting a holiday open house and tour of the White House, followed by a reception at the Blair House—the nearby presidential guest house. There is also an event scheduled for Dec. 15 for families of State Department officials who are serving at posts abroad that cannot accommodate bringing family members to live with them, including employees posted in Afghanistan and Iraq. On Dec. 16, another party is scheduled with the foreign diplomatic corps, including foreign ambassadors based in Washington. One official familiar with the matter said that in years past, such events could attract hundreds of guests. The Washington Post reported that over 900 invitations have been sent out overall.
In a message sent to department employees on Nov. 25 obtained by Foreign Policy, State Department Undersecretary for Management Brian Bulatao implored all staff to “closely adhere to our critical safety measures such as social distancing, wearing cloth face coverings, and staying home when ill.” He also said the department would encourage employees to work from home and avoid unnecessarily going into the office through the beginning of the new year, given the ongoing risks from the coronavirus.
“In light of rising cases across the country, and in accordance with the flexibility offered under Diplomacy Strong, domestic bureaus are strongly encouraged to maximize telework from November 26, 2020 through January 3, 2021. Supervisors should have employees come to the office only to perform duties that cannot be accomplished while teleworking,” Bulatao wrote, citing the department’s “Diplomacy Strong” plan for safely returning to work.
But for many, the rhetoric rings hollow.
“This superspreader event has all of us feeling like the messaging from the top is in direct conflict with their actions,” said one State Department official.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Thailand’s Military Is Getting Ready for Another Crackdown

Thailand ’ s Military Is Getting Ready for Another Crackdown The leaders of Thailand ’ s military-royalty complex are growing restless .
The attempt to satisfy popular demands for a return to democracy by offering a military-controlled facsimile has failed .
Thailand ’ s students and other young people have risen up , calling for genuine democratic reform , including popular control over the heretofore untouchable monarchy .
Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha , the clownish yet arrogant general who seized power six years ago , has dropped his pretense of accommodation with the protestors .
After refusing demands to resign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proposals for constitutional reform , he blamed pro-democracy activists for his own moves , claiming that “ the government has been straightforward and earnest in trying to find a solution.
” On the ground , with demonstrators harassed , beaten , and arrested , the government doesn ’ t look very earnest .
Facing surprisingly resolute protestors , he threatened : “ It will be necessary for the government and the concerned security agencies to enhance our measures by enforcing all the pertaining laws against protesters who violate the law or infringe on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Left unsaid was the fact that these laws were passed to enforce military rule .
His latest step was charging a dozen protest leaders with lèse-majesté .
This is the first time in two years that the government has invoked the draconian punishment for criticism of the monarchy .
Often deployed for political purposes by the junta , the prosecution is intended to defeat efforts to challenge King Maha Vajiralongkorn , the long-time crown prince who succeeded his father in 2016 , was formally crowned last year and now spends much of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harem .
The German government is evidently annoyed but says no laws apparently have been violated .
His father was beloved by the public ; Vajiralongkorn is not .
After his coronation , he demanded constitutional changes to enhance his personal authority , grabbed control over a couple favorite army regiments , and took over about $ 30 billion in royal assets from the state .
His miniature poodle , Fufu , was an air chief marshal in the Royal Thai Air Force before her death in 2015 .
He anointed a Royal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the first time in a century , fired her , and then restored her .
And apart from his personal failings , he is seen as an ally of the military , which has blocked any reforms .
The students ’ challenge to monarchical abuses broke the biggest political taboo in Thailand .
Alas , that is likely to become the pretext for another coup , formal or informal , renewing military rule .
The army has a long record of intervening in Thai politics .
In 1932 , a coup advanced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But since then , the military has routinely imposed authoritarian rule , staging 12 coups .
The latest round , represented by Prayuth , was a direct attack on the evolution of more democratic , even populist politics .
Prayuth , who took power in a military-led coup in 2014 , has exhibited the sort of narcissistic tendencies so dramatically evident in outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump .
Despite asserting dictatorial powers , the Thai general whined , wailed , and even whimpered .
The media , he complained , “ made me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leader image.
” Although the lack of armed resistance allowed the military to avoid bloodshed , the touchy dictator once threatened to shoot journalists—and no one was sure whether he was joking .
The junta even borrowed from Mao Zedong ’ s Cultural Revolution , summoning people to military bases for “ attitude adjustment ” sessions , though thankfully without mobs baying for blood .
Prayuth designed a constitution that created only faux democracy , ensuring the military ’ s continued rule .
Then he arrested anyone who opposed its approval and made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ formal dictatorship , explaining that its rejection would extend the junta ’ s rule .
Elections were held in March 2019 , and nominally civilian institutions fulfilled the military ’ s expectations by disqualifying opposition candidates and parties and manipulating vote results .
Most dramatically , the regime prosecuted the young billionaire Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit and outlawed his youth-oriented Future Forward party , which came in third while explicitly challenging the military , demanding cuts in the military budget .
Relying on 250 junta-appointed senate members , Prayuth the generalissimo ended up as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to retire once democracy was restored .
Today ’ s demonstrators have persisted in the face of increasingly harsh suppression efforts .
A state of emergency was declared .
Public gatherings were banned .
Scores of protest leaders were detained .
Public transit was closed .
The increasingly desperate authorities even threatened to jail anyone who visited an opposition website or posted a protest selfie .
But the demonstrations continued , attracting an ever-broader swath of Thai society and sparking increasing agitation outside of Bangkok , as well as greater attention abroad .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the city with shipping containers to bar protestors , which the latter avoided by simply shifting the rally ’ s location .
And Prime Minister Prayuth shifted back to generalissimo in threatening tougher action and initiating lèse-majesté prosecutions against protest leaders .
The latter step is an act of desperation .
Earlier this year Prayuth said the government had not used the law “ because the king was kind enough to instruct that it should not be used.
” However , that forbearance , by the king , government , or both , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large crowd recently gathered at the Siam Commercial Bank , in which the king is the largest shareholder .
The protest highlighted demands that the king turn over to the public the billions which fund his luxurious and licentious lifestyle .
( Even the British and Saudi royals do not have an office of Public Consort . )
One of the protest leaders summoned on lèse-majesté charges , Parit Chiwarak , told the New York Times “ I am not scared .
I am more worried about the country if they are still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offenses ] in politics like this .
This will cause the monarchy to deteriorate further.
” Indeed , public dissonance is rising in multiple ways .
The king has become the target of hostile graffiti , which would have been inconceivable directed at his father .
Increasing numbers of Thais refuse to stand when the royal anthem is played , as it is before movies and sporting events .
Reviving a widely hated tool against peaceful protestors is likely to reinforce the belief that the junta and monarchy have merged into a single @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the protestors ’ demand for Resign , Rewrite , Reform—ousting Prayuth , redoing the junta-friendly constitution , and creating a genuine constitutional monarchy .
No doubt , the regime hopes that the protests will fade , but so far the youth movement has shown extraordinary dedication and resilience , with new leaders arising when old ones were arrested .
As repression has grown , so have demonstrators ’ demands .
A debate by the rigged parliament over constitutional reform achieved nothing other than to showcase the failure of military rule to satisfy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another election would solve little , since the public knows the system was concocted with the express purpose of maintaining military rule .
In short , Prayuth has failed as both generalissimo and politician , leaving a mess that his uniformed colleagues might feel they must clean up .
Which leaves another crackdown , and possible full-blown coup , as the most likely option .
Tougher tactics against protests and more widespread prosecutions .
Abandonment of the pretense of parliamentary rule .
And almost certainly the defenestration of Prayuth , whose power base @ @ @ @ @ @ @ small satisfaction to his critics in the opposition and military alike .
The Trump administration would do nothing , other than offer a friendly welcome to the new strongman .
However , the Biden team , which has indicated its commitment to promoting human rights , will soon be in charge .
If there is a coup , then what ?
America ’ s influence is limited : Governments rarely dismantle themselves in response to foreign , even U.S. , criticism .
Washington could press for restoration of democracy while limiting arms sales @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not be cost-free .
Unhappy at criticism from the Obama administration , Prayuth improved ties with China , but economics made such a step likely in any case .
Some trade-off between promoting freedom values and tightening security ties is inevitable .
The cost seems moderate today : Bangkok was an important U.S. ally during the Vietnam War , but today not so much .
Moreover , backing , or even silently accepting , an ostentatious return to dictatorship would sour future ties , positioning Washington against the coming generation .
It was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dissent evidenced by the attack on Future Forward that convinced so many young Thais that they had only one option , protest .
For the future , certainly , Thanathorn and other youthful leaders are a better bet than Prayuth , especially since escalating brutality against students might turn currently hesitant parents against the regime .
This moment is more likely the beginning than the end .
“ It ’ s a long saga , but this student-led protest movement is a culmination of Thailand ’ s struggle to arrive in the 21st @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bangkok ’ s Chulalongkorn University .
Ultimately , the abusive business , court , and military elites are responsible for today ’ s political crisis .
Their credibility has waned as demand for political reform has waxed .
No wonder , Thanathorn declared , that this “ is the most exciting time in the history of Thailand.
” With the military regime out of options , another bout of repression seems likely .
If so , people of good will around the globe should back the Thai people ’ s campaign for liberty @ @ @ @ @

The leaders of Thailand’s military-royalty complex are growing restless. The attempt to satisfy popular demands for a return to democracy by offering a military-controlled facsimile has failed. Thailand’s students and other young people have risen up, calling for genuine democratic reform, including popular control over the heretofore untouchable monarchy.
The leaders of Thailand’s military-royalty complex are growing restless. The attempt to satisfy popular demands for a return to democracy by offering a military-controlled facsimile has failed. Thailand’s students and other young people have risen up, calling for genuine democratic reform, including popular control over the heretofore untouchable monarchy.
Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha, the clownish yet arrogant general who seized power six years ago, has dropped his pretense of accommodation with the protestors. After refusing demands to resign and using the appointive senate to defeat proposals for constitutional reform, he blamed pro-democracy activists for his own moves, claiming that “the government has been straightforward and earnest in trying to find a solution.” On the ground, with demonstrators harassed, beaten, and arrested, the government doesn’t look very earnest.
Facing surprisingly resolute protestors, he threatened: “It will be necessary for the government and the concerned security agencies to enhance our measures by enforcing all the pertaining laws against protesters who violate the law or infringe on the rights and freedoms of other citizens.” Left unsaid was the fact that these laws were passed to enforce military rule. His latest step was charging a dozen protest leaders with lèse-majesté.
This is the first time in two years that the government has invoked the draconian punishment for criticism of the monarchy. Often deployed for political purposes by the junta, the prosecution is intended to defeat efforts to challenge King Maha Vajiralongkorn, the long-time crown prince who succeeded his father in 2016, was formally crowned last year and now spends much of his time in Germany with a sizable harem. The German government is evidently annoyed but says no laws apparently have been violated.
His father was beloved by the public; Vajiralongkorn is not. After his coronation, he demanded constitutional changes to enhance his personal authority, grabbed control over a couple favorite army regiments, and took over about $30 billion in royal assets from the state. His miniature poodle, Fufu, was an air chief marshal in the Royal Thai Air Force before her death in 2015. He anointed a Royal Noble Consort, a royal office filled for the first time in a century, fired her, and then restored her. And apart from his personal failings, he is seen as an ally of the military, which has blocked any reforms.
The students’ challenge to monarchical abuses broke the biggest political taboo in Thailand. Alas, that is likely to become the pretext for another coup, formal or informal, renewing military rule.
The army has a long record of intervening in Thai politics. In 1932, a coup advanced democracy by overturning a once-absolute monarchy. But since then, the military has routinely imposed authoritarian rule, staging 12 coups. The latest round, represented by Prayuth, was a direct attack on the evolution of more democratic, even populist politics.
Prayuth, who took power in a military-led coup in 2014, has exhibited the sort of narcissistic tendencies so dramatically evident in outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump. Despite asserting dictatorial powers, the Thai general whined, wailed, and even whimpered. The media, he complained, “made me lose my manners and have ruined my leader image.” Although the lack of armed resistance allowed the military to avoid bloodshed, the touchy dictator once threatened to shoot journalists—and no one was sure whether he was joking. The junta even borrowed from Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, summoning people to military bases for “attitude adjustment” sessions, though thankfully without mobs baying for blood.
Prayuth designed a constitution that created only faux democracy, ensuring the military’s continued rule. Then he arrested anyone who opposed its approval and made public assent the only way out of formal dictatorship, explaining that its rejection would extend the junta’s rule.
Elections were held in March 2019, and nominally civilian institutions fulfilled the military’s expectations by disqualifying opposition candidates and parties and manipulating vote results. Most dramatically, the regime prosecuted the young billionaire Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit and outlawed his youth-oriented Future Forward party, which came in third while explicitly challenging the military, demanding cuts in the military budget. Relying on 250 junta-appointed senate members, Prayuth the generalissimo ended up as the prime minister, despite an earlier promise to retire once democracy was restored.
Today’s demonstrators have persisted in the face of increasingly harsh suppression efforts. A state of emergency was declared. Public gatherings were banned. Scores of protest leaders were detained. Public transit was closed. The increasingly desperate authorities even threatened to jail anyone who visited an opposition website or posted a protest selfie.
But the demonstrations continued, attracting an ever-broader swath of Thai society and sparking increasing agitation outside of Bangkok, as well as greater attention abroad. The government recently blockaded one area of the city with shipping containers to bar protestors, which the latter avoided by simply shifting the rally’s location. And Prime Minister Prayuth shifted back to generalissimo in threatening tougher action and initiating lèse-majesté prosecutions against protest leaders.
The latter step is an act of desperation. Earlier this year Prayuth said the government had not used the law “because the king was kind enough to instruct that it should not be used.” However, that forbearance, by the king, government, or both, is obviously over.
Nevertheless, a large crowd recently gathered at the Siam Commercial Bank, in which the king is the largest shareholder. The protest highlighted demands that the king turn over to the public the billions which fund his luxurious and licentious lifestyle. (Even the British and Saudi royals do not have an office of Public Consort.) One of the protest leaders summoned on lèse-majesté charges, Parit Chiwarak, told the New York Times “I am not scared. I am more worried about the country if they are still using this 112 [which penalizes lèse-majesté offenses] in politics like this. This will cause the monarchy to deteriorate further.”
Indeed, public dissonance is rising in multiple ways. The king has become the target of hostile graffiti, which would have been inconceivable directed at his father. Increasing numbers of Thais refuse to stand when the royal anthem is played, as it is before movies and sporting events. Reviving a widely hated tool against peaceful protestors is likely to reinforce the belief that the junta and monarchy have merged into a single oppressor. It will reinforce public support for the protestors’ demand for Resign, Rewrite, Reform—ousting Prayuth, redoing the junta-friendly constitution, and creating a genuine constitutional monarchy.
No doubt, the regime hopes that the protests will fade, but so far the youth movement has shown extraordinary dedication and resilience, with new leaders arising when old ones were arrested. As repression has grown, so have demonstrators’ demands. A debate by the rigged parliament over constitutional reform achieved nothing other than to showcase the failure of military rule to satisfy people’s democratic aspirations. Even another election would solve little, since the public knows the system was concocted with the express purpose of maintaining military rule. In short, Prayuth has failed as both generalissimo and politician, leaving a mess that his uniformed colleagues might feel they must clean up.
Which leaves another crackdown, and possible full-blown coup, as the most likely option. Tougher tactics against protests and more widespread prosecutions. Abandonment of the pretense of parliamentary rule. And almost certainly the defenestration of Prayuth, whose power base within the army has shrunk, offering small satisfaction to his critics in the opposition and military alike.
The Trump administration would do nothing, other than offer a friendly welcome to the new strongman. However, the Biden team, which has indicated its commitment to promoting human rights, will soon be in charge. If there is a coup, then what?
America’s influence is limited: Governments rarely dismantle themselves in response to foreign, even U.S., criticism. Washington could press for restoration of democracy while limiting arms sales and military cooperation. Doing so would not be cost-free. Unhappy at criticism from the Obama administration, Prayuth improved ties with China, but economics made such a step likely in any case. Some trade-off between promoting freedom values and tightening security ties is inevitable. The cost seems moderate today: Bangkok was an important U.S. ally during the Vietnam War, but today not so much.
Moreover, backing, or even silently accepting, an ostentatious return to dictatorship would sour future ties, positioning Washington against the coming generation. It was the Thai military’s intolerance of dissent evidenced by the attack on Future Forward that convinced so many young Thais that they had only one option, protest.
For the future, certainly, Thanathorn and other youthful leaders are a better bet than Prayuth, especially since escalating brutality against students might turn currently hesitant parents against the regime. This moment is more likely the beginning than the end. “It’s a long saga, but this student-led protest movement is a culmination of Thailand’s struggle to arrive in the 21st century,” contended Thitinan Pongsudhirak of Bangkok’s Chulalongkorn University.
Ultimately, the abusive business, court, and military elites are responsible for today’s political crisis. Their credibility has waned as demand for political reform has waxed. No wonder, Thanathorn declared, that this “is the most exciting time in the history of Thailand.” With the military regime out of options, another bout of repression seems likely. If so, people of good will around the globe should back the Thai people’s campaign for liberty. So should Washington.