foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--Myanmar Has Blazed a Path to Democracy Without Rights

Myanmar Has Blazed a Path to Democracy Without Rights The paradox at the heart of the Rohingya genocide has always been Myanmar ’ s leader Aung San Suu Kyi .
Just a few short years ago , the Rohingya regarded the international democracy icon as their champion and defender in an increasingly hostile Myanmar .
Last month , she was standing before the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ) at The Hague , defending the soldiers and politicians who erased the Rohingya from their native lands in Myanmar .
Her history is a lesson for the optimists who thought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ portent of the compatibility of democracy and oppression that ’ s playing out from New Delhi to Budapest .
The Rohingya Muslim minority have been a favorite target for successive Buddhist central governments in Myanmar , previously known as Burma , for almost the entire post-imperial history of the country .
But they have been far from the only target .
Other , smaller , Muslim groups have always been on the radar of the Theravada nationalist military juntas that ruled the country between 1962 and 2011 .
Christian groups and a plethora @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chin , Kachin , Shan , and Karen were also oppressed under the juntas .
Yet so were political dissidents opposed to the military dictatorships , who suffered decades of repression for their pro-democracy politics .
Leading the charge was one Aung San Suu Kyi—a feat that earned her the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 .
And over the decades of shared pain and anguish at the hands of the juntas , all oppressed groups in Myanmar came to call her Daw Suu or Mother Suu , as she championed political reform and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the oppressed seemed natural—and potentially hopeful for a post-junta future.In April 2016 , it seemed like the resistance had won and a renaissance would come to Myanmar .
In April 2016 , it seemed like the resistance had won and a renaissance would come to Myanmar .
After a decadelong constitutional process , the country finally assumed the semblance of a democracy , and Aung San Suu Kyi took office at the head of civilian government .
All looked forward to a brighter future , especially those hit hardest by excesses of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yet as early as that October , the largely autonomous Burmese military initiated a major crackdown against the Rohingya , in response to a number of insurgent attacks against federal security agencies in the western state of Rakhine .
The following year , in August 2017 , the military started so-called clearance operations in earnest .
By January 2018 , some 700,000 Rohingya ( out of a total of 1 million ) , had fled over the border to Bangladesh , in the wake of a sustained campaign of extrajudicial murders , torture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down of villages , crops , and livestock by the federal security agencies .
The Rohingya had been largely driven from the lands of their birth within the first two years of Aung San Suu Kyi ’ s term in office—a feat that had eluded the military juntas for decades .
For most of this time , international observers who had been familiar with Aung San Suu Kyi ’ s pro-democracy efforts were reluctant to place the responsibility for what was happening in Rakhine state on her .
And there were grounds to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For example , Myanmar had not transitioned to a full democracy but rather to a hybrid system where the old military establishment maintained full control over the country ’ s security concerns , foreign policy , and the areas of the country directly ruled by the military , as well as the central pillars of the resource economy .
Aung San Suu Kyi could not have ordered the military to stop their operations against the Rohingya , and it was legitimate to fear that the military would reverse the transition toward democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authority.It was legitimate to fear that the military would reverse the transition toward democracy if the democratically elected government challenged its authority .
But even then , some of us noted at the time that her public defense of the military operations in the international press went beyond meek acquiescence to the power the military establishment still holds in the country .
And after some digging , we also found some possible explanations for her behavior : Her personal views had long had evidence of substantial anti-Muslim bias .
Perhaps the reasons she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rohingya people while the military was waging a genocidal campaign against them was not mere political cowardice .
Perhaps she shared at least in part the military establishment ’ s view of the Rohingya as illegitimate foreigners in Myanmar .
Aung San Suu Kyi ’ s conduct before the ICJ has resolved this question once and for all .
Reports recount how she was sitting “ impassively ” as the prosecution presented testimony and evidence of egregious violations .
As the Times of London described the scene of the testimony : “ … @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soldiers , hung by her wrists from a banana tree and raped nine times so she lost the baby ; a mother forced to watch her 18-month-old son beaten to death .
Throats slit , mass gang rapes in front of family and neighbours , entire villages burnt to the ground … through it all not a flicker of emotion crossed Aung San Suu Kyi ’ s face.
” Myanmar is not even disputing that such abuses took place .
It is merely disputing that they were systematic and aimed at destroying the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ San Suu Kyi refused to utter the word “ Rohingya.
” That perhaps is the most telling of all : Aung San Suu Kyi maintains before the ICJ , as she has done before , that Rohingya is not an identity that should be recognized .
She is reiterating the falsehood , now widely believed in Myanmar , that the Rohingya are immigrants from Bangladesh who entered Myanmar illegally just after independence and created the term “ Rohingya ” to give themselves a new identity and connect them to Myanmar .
That is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law .
This should be an open-and-shut case on this basis alone.Aung San Suu Kyi maintains before the ICJ , as she has done before , that Rohingya is not an identity that should be recognized .
It turns out the enemy of your enemy is not automatically your friend .
Aung San Suu Kyi stood against the military dictatorship in Myanmar , and she fought against many of the human rights abuses the dictatorship perpetrated against its citizens .
But that never made her a liberal or someone who believed in universal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her family ’ s background following her father , Gen. Aung San , is in the anti-British , Burmese independence movement .
The strongest current underpinning that independence movement was Burmese ethnic and Theravada Buddhist nationalism .
She had views , shared with her father , about how such a state should be governed .
They , unlike most of the pro-independence revolutionaries who became the country ’ s military establishment , preferred a democratic socialist system to a socialist dictatorship .
But they were never in much doubt about what they saw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as culturally Burmese and Theravada Buddhist .
That the military juntas oppressed people was a problem so long as the Burmese , like Aung San Suu Kyi , were among the people being oppressed .
But now that the military establishment has moved to accommodate the Burmese pro-democracy movements in the country , oppression of so-called Muslim foreigners like the supposedly Bengali Rohingya is perfectly acceptable along the path toward building an exclusionary Buddhist nation-state .
What Aung San Suu Kyi proves is that truth most offensive to liberal democrats : Democracy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracies , democratic leaders , and , indeed , globally recognizable pro-democracy icons can shed liberal values such as universal respect for human rights and human lives .
Indeed , they never needed to have them .
Majoritarian rule can be as cruel and oppressive as any dictatorship—as long as it targets the right , or the wrong , people .
At least to that extent , Aung San Suu Kyi ’ s fall from grace captures the zeitgeist of the broader global moment .
Those of us who look around the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ populism based on tribal identities and culture wars always believed that more democracy was a reliable path toward greater protection of human dignity and human rights .
But that was only ever the case as long as the democrats are also independently committed to liberal values .
Aung San Suu Kyi proves that you can have a democratically sanctioned genocide .
Indeed , some have speculated that her defense of the genocide before the ICJ is likely to improve her standing in this year ’ s federal elections in Myanmar .
And this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world leaders such as Prime Minister Narendra Modi in neighboring India , who is also now constructing mass internment camps for Muslims .
It seems Daw Suu ’ s legacy may extend beyond her own borders after all .

The paradox at the heart of the Rohingya genocide has always been Myanmar’s leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Just a few short years ago, the Rohingya regarded the international democracy icon as their champion and defender in an increasingly hostile Myanmar. Last month, she was standing before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, defending the soldiers and politicians who erased the Rohingya from their native lands in Myanmar. Her history is a lesson for the optimists who thought democracy would also bring liberalism—and a disturbing portent of the compatibility of democracy and oppression that’s playing out from New Delhi to Budapest.
The paradox at the heart of the Rohingya genocide has always been Myanmar’s leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Just a few short years ago, the Rohingya regarded the international democracy icon as their champion and defender in an increasingly hostile Myanmar. Last month, she was standing before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, defending the soldiers and politicians who erased the Rohingya from their native lands in Myanmar. Her history is a lesson for the optimists who thought democracy would also bring liberalism—and a disturbing portent of the compatibility of democracy and oppression that’s playing out from New Delhi to Budapest.
The Rohingya Muslim minority have been a favorite target for successive Buddhist central governments in Myanmar, previously known as Burma, for almost the entire post-imperial history of the country. But they have been far from the only target. Other, smaller, Muslim groups have always been on the radar of the Theravada nationalist military juntas that ruled the country between 1962 and 2011. Christian groups and a plethora of borderland ethnic groups such as the Chin, Kachin, Shan, and Karen were also oppressed under the juntas.
Yet so were political dissidents opposed to the military dictatorships, who suffered decades of repression for their pro-democracy politics. Leading the charge was one Aung San Suu Kyi—a feat that earned her the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. And over the decades of shared pain and anguish at the hands of the juntas, all oppressed groups in Myanmar came to call her Daw Suu or Mother Suu, as she championed political reform and human rights in Myanmar. A solidarity between the oppressed seemed natural—and potentially hopeful for a post-junta future.In April 2016, it seemed like the resistance had won and a renaissance would come to Myanmar.
In April 2016, it seemed like the resistance had won and a renaissance would come to Myanmar. After a decadelong constitutional process, the country finally assumed the semblance of a democracy, and Aung San Suu Kyi took office at the head of civilian government. All looked forward to a brighter future, especially those hit hardest by excesses of the juntas. Especially the Rohingya.
Yet as early as that October, the largely autonomous Burmese military initiated a major crackdown against the Rohingya, in response to a number of insurgent attacks against federal security agencies in the western state of Rakhine. The following year, in August 2017, the military started so-called clearance operations in earnest. By January 2018, some 700,000 Rohingya (out of a total of 1 million), had fled over the border to Bangladesh, in the wake of a sustained campaign of extrajudicial murders, torture, systematic rape, and the burning down of villages, crops, and livestock by the federal security agencies.
The Rohingya had been largely driven from the lands of their birth within the first two years of Aung San Suu Kyi’s term in office—a feat that had eluded the military juntas for decades.
For most of this time, international observers who had been familiar with Aung San Suu Kyi’s pro-democracy efforts were reluctant to place the responsibility for what was happening in Rakhine state on her.
And there were grounds to give her the benefit of the doubt. For example, Myanmar had not transitioned to a full democracy but rather to a hybrid system where the old military establishment maintained full control over the country’s security concerns, foreign policy, and the areas of the country directly ruled by the military, as well as the central pillars of the resource economy. Aung San Suu Kyi could not have ordered the military to stop their operations against the Rohingya, and it was legitimate to fear that the military would reverse the transition toward democracy if the democratically elected government challenged its authority.It was legitimate to fear that the military would reverse the transition toward democracy if the democratically elected government challenged its authority.
But even then, some of us noted at the time that her public defense of the military operations in the international press went beyond meek acquiescence to the power the military establishment still holds in the country. And after some digging, we also found some possible explanations for her behavior: Her personal views had long had evidence of substantial anti-Muslim bias. Perhaps the reasons she was not mounting a defense of the Rohingya people while the military was waging a genocidal campaign against them was not mere political cowardice. Perhaps she shared at least in part the military establishment’s view of the Rohingya as illegitimate foreigners in Myanmar.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s conduct before the ICJ has resolved this question once and for all. Reports recount how she was sitting “impassively” as the prosecution presented testimony and evidence of egregious violations. As the Times of London described the scene of the testimony:
“… an eight-months-pregnant woman kicked by booted Burmese soldiers, hung by her wrists from a banana tree and raped nine times so she lost the baby; a mother forced to watch her 18-month-old son beaten to death. Throats slit, mass gang rapes in front of family and neighbours, entire villages burnt to the ground … through it all not a flicker of emotion crossed Aung San Suu Kyi’s face.”
Myanmar is not even disputing that such abuses took place. It is merely disputing that they were systematic and aimed at destroying the Rohingya as an ethnic identity—even as Aung San Suu Kyi refused to utter the word “Rohingya.”
That perhaps is the most telling of all: Aung San Suu Kyi maintains before the ICJ, as she has done before, that Rohingya is not an identity that should be recognized. She is reiterating the falsehood, now widely believed in Myanmar, that the Rohingya are immigrants from Bangladesh who entered Myanmar illegally just after independence and created the term “Rohingya” to give themselves a new identity and connect them to Myanmar. That is genocidal intent by legal definition under international law. This should be an open-and-shut case on this basis alone.Aung San Suu Kyi maintains before the ICJ, as she has done before, that Rohingya is not an identity that should be recognized.
It turns out the enemy of your enemy is not automatically your friend. Aung San Suu Kyi stood against the military dictatorship in Myanmar, and she fought against many of the human rights abuses the dictatorship perpetrated against its citizens. But that never made her a liberal or someone who believed in universal human rights.
Her background, and her family’s background following her father, Gen. Aung San, is in the anti-British, Burmese independence movement. The strongest current underpinning that independence movement was Burmese ethnic and Theravada Buddhist nationalism. She had views, shared with her father, about how such a state should be governed. They, unlike most of the pro-independence revolutionaries who became the country’s military establishment, preferred a democratic socialist system to a socialist dictatorship. But they were never in much doubt about what they saw as the proper nature of the state as culturally Burmese and Theravada Buddhist.
That the military juntas oppressed people was a problem so long as the Burmese, like Aung San Suu Kyi, were among the people being oppressed. But now that the military establishment has moved to accommodate the Burmese pro-democracy movements in the country, oppression of so-called Muslim foreigners like the supposedly Bengali Rohingya is perfectly acceptable along the path toward building an exclusionary Buddhist nation-state.
What Aung San Suu Kyi proves is that truth most offensive to liberal democrats: Democracy and liberalism are completely different things, and democracies, democratic leaders, and, indeed, globally recognizable pro-democracy icons can shed liberal values such as universal respect for human rights and human lives. Indeed, they never needed to have them. Majoritarian rule can be as cruel and oppressive as any dictatorship—as long as it targets the right, or the wrong, people.
At least to that extent, Aung San Suu Kyi’s fall from grace captures the zeitgeist of the broader global moment. Those of us who look around the world in dismay at the rise of reactionary populism based on tribal identities and culture wars always believed that more democracy was a reliable path toward greater protection of human dignity and human rights. But that was only ever the case as long as the democrats are also independently committed to liberal values. Aung San Suu Kyi proves that you can have a democratically sanctioned genocide. Indeed, some have speculated that her defense of the genocide before the ICJ is likely to improve her standing in this year’s federal elections in Myanmar. And this lesson has not been lost on other world leaders such as Prime Minister Narendra Modi in neighboring India, who is also now constructing mass internment camps for Muslims. It seems Daw Suu’s legacy may extend beyond her own borders after all.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--5 Takeaways From Trump’s New China Trade Pact

The much-touted “ phase one ” trade agreement between the United States and China was finally unveiled Wednesday and , contrary to U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s claims that it is “ [ o ] ne of the greatest trade deals ever made , ” remains as underwhelming as when the outline was made public last month .
Essentially a cease-fire agreement in what had threatened to escalate into an all-out trade war between the world ’ s two biggest economies , the new agreement is a big purchase order for U.S. goods , topped with plenty of rehashed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intellectual property protection , and leavened with a novel enforcement mechanism that has never been tried before in a trade deal .
With U.S. farmers hurting badly from the trade war in an election year , the deal promising tens of billions of dollars more in purchases of soybeans and other agricultural products appears at least partly designed to boost Trump at the polls in November .
Here are five takeaways from the just released text of the new U.S.-China agreement .
While markets were happy that the deal foreclosed an even bigger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including another tranche of U.S. tariffs , the bulk of U.S. duties on Chinese exports to the United States will remain even after the signing of the deal .
About two-thirds of Chinese goods will still face import taxes that are six times higher than when Trump took office—and most of those are the kinds of intermediate goods that U.S. manufacturers use to make their own products .
U.S. businesses and consumers have already forked over more than $ 40 billion to pay for Trump ’ s import taxes .
China , too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on U.S. exports , including on energy products like natural gas and crude oil .
So the deal , whatever it does , doesn ’ t move the United States much further away from the protectionism it has embraced since Trump took office .
While the Trump administration talks about an eventual “ phase two ” deal with China that could actually tackle structural issues that bedevil the two economies , few trade experts expect much progress , if any , on such an agreement—especially during an election year .
And politics could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than it seems : With Trump ’ s hawkish stance on China a popular one , he may be under pressure this year to go back to his preferred path of confrontation and tariffs to score political , rather than economic , points .
2 .
It doesn ’ t address the core issues that started the trade war .
The United States began its tariff fight with China on the grounds of a so-called Section 301 investigation , which highlighted Beijing ’ s abuse of its state-led economic model , including via @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state-directed cyber-espionage .
Other than some fresh Chinese promises to crack down on intellectual property theft ( more below ) , the deal just signed doesn ’ t address any of those core concerns that supposedly motivated the Trump administration in the first place .
“ This does not in any sense address the big , systemic issues that China and the United States have with one another on trade , ” said Chad Bown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics .
That ’ s particularly true when it comes to China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advantage , for years a bogeyman of Trump and his officials , even when China was doing the exact opposite .
In the new agreement , China reaffirmed commitments it had already made , such as in various G-20 meetings , to avoid manipulating the renminbi for competitive advantage and signed up for the bare minimum in foreign reserve disclosures .
( On Monday , just two days before the signing ceremony , the U.S. Treasury Department abruptly removed China from the list of currency manipulators , just months after adding China to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the trade spat . )
“ The foreign exchange provisions were the most disappointing ” aspect of the deal , said Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations .
“ Of all the various things expected in the deal , they were really underwhelming .
The absence of any genuine , new commitments on the part of China , simply repackaging existing commitments—that was undoubtedly disappointing.
” When the trade fight began , the Trump administration set out to make China a more market-friendly economy .
Instead , the United States has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to using state-owned firms to purchase guaranteed amounts of U.S. farm goods , oil , gas , and manufactured products .
“ Given that attempts to create new opportunities for U.S. exporters by changing rules and policies haven ’ t been overwhelmingly successful in recent years , I can see why the administration might feel that setting out targets and asking a state-dominated economy to meet those targets is a way to do it , ” Setser said .
3 .
It ’ s all about shrinking the U.S. trade deficit .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the new agreement : a Chinese commitment to purchase , over a two-year period , $ 200 billion worth of U.S. goods above and beyond what it bought in 2017 , before the trade war began in earnest .
Big purchases like that have been the focus of the Trump administration ’ s approach since the beginning , because , while the trade professionals launched a formal investigation into China ’ s abusive macroeconomic practices , Trump cares mainly about the U.S. trade deficit with China , which totaled $ 379 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The new agreement calls for China to buy an additional $ 33 billion in manufacturing goods this year and $ 45 billion next year ; an additional $ 12.5 billion in farm products this year and $ 19.5 billion next year ; $ 18.5 billion more in natural gas and crude oil this year and $ 34 billion more next year ; and finally , $ 13 billion more in services this year and $ 25 billion next year .
If all those planned purchases materialize—and there are considerable doubts they will—it could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manufacturers ( assuming they don ’ t just suck away exports from other markets ) .
But there are a few problems .
First , China still has most of its tariffs on U.S. exports , including on many of the goods on that list ; since China insists that it wants commercial considerations to determine its purchases , that could be a problem for U.S. exporters .
Second , those numbers are hugely ambitious .
The biggest-ever year for agricultural sales to China came in at $ 29 billion , for instance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to buy $ 40 billion or more worth of farm goods in 2021 , roughly double what it bought in 2017 .
Similar stretches would be required to meet the export goals in energy and manufacturing—and if the Trump administration believes China isn ’ t meeting its commitments , it can blow up the deal .
Third , such managed trade might be illegal under World Trade Organization ( WTO ) rules , which prohibit discrimination .
Other suppliers of agricultural goods to China , such as Brazil and Argentina ( which have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of turmoil to flood the Chinese market ) , are unlikely to stand idly by if China ’ s new purchases simply come out of their pocket .
If their own exports suffer , they could bring a complaint against China at the WTO for discriminatory practices .
Of course , since the Trump administration single-handedly dismantled the WTO ’ s dispute settlement system last month , such complaints may amount to pounding sand—countries around the world now have no way to ultimately adjudicate their trade disputes thanks to the administration ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration , it ’ s just as well that the WTO is moribund , because the enforcement provisions in the new agreement are entirely bilateral .
Any disputes over compliance with the terms of the agreement will be dealt with in bilateral consultations at a staff level by trade experts .
If they can ’ t resolve it , it can get kicked up to the level of the U.S. trade representative and China ’ s vice premier .
If they still can ’ t solve it , the aggrieved party can retaliate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can ’ t do anything about it .
If the other side doesn ’ t like the retaliation , they have one option , according to the deal ’ s text : “ [ T ] he remedy is to withdraw from this Agreement.
” “ The way it seems enforcement will work is very different than in any other trade agreement ever , ” Bown said .
“ There are a lot of open questions on how this is going to work in practice.
” 5 .
There are some small victories @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ phase one ” deal is hardly the game-changer that Trump or administration officials tout , there are some positives tucked into the 96 pages .
For instance , China reiterated promises it has made in the past to take a tougher line on protecting intellectual property rights .
And China , which denies ever having forced foreign companies to hand over their technology as the price of doing business there , agreed not to do what it says it didn ’ t do anyway .
( At least the central government did—but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on what local and regional officials and firms do , it ’ s not clear the agreement will entirely solve that problem , either . )
The United States and China seem to have torn down a number of non-tariff barriers to U.S. agricultural trade , such as limits on U.S. poultry or beef exports .
Those Chinese commitments to open up greater access for certain farm and fish products , coupled with pledges to buy more agricultural goods overall , could over time start to undo some of the damage wrought by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years .
And the United States did claw greater access for financial services in the huge Chinese market , opening the door for U.S. banks , insurance companies , rating agencies , and electronic payment systems like Visa and Mastercard to fully enter a market that has long been denied them .

The much-touted “phase one” trade agreement between the United States and China was finally unveiled Wednesday and, contrary to U.S. President Donald Trump’s claims that it is “[o]ne of the greatest trade deals ever made,” remains as underwhelming as when the outline was made public last month.
The much-touted “phase one” trade agreement between the United States and China was finally unveiled Wednesday and, contrary to U.S. President Donald Trump’s claims that it is “[o]ne of the greatest trade deals ever made,” remains as underwhelming as when the outline was made public last month.
Essentially a cease-fire agreement in what had threatened to escalate into an all-out trade war between the world’s two biggest economies, the new agreement is a big purchase order for U.S. goods, topped with plenty of rehashed Chinese promises of reforms in areas like intellectual property protection, and leavened with a novel enforcement mechanism that has never been tried before in a trade deal. With U.S. farmers hurting badly from the trade war in an election year, the deal promising tens of billions of dollars more in purchases of soybeans and other agricultural products appears at least partly designed to boost Trump at the polls in November.
Here are five takeaways from the just released text of the new U.S.-China agreement.
1. It’s a truce, not a free trade deal.
While markets were happy that the deal foreclosed an even bigger escalation of trade tensions in December, including another tranche of U.S. tariffs, the bulk of U.S. duties on Chinese exports to the United States will remain even after the signing of the deal. About two-thirds of Chinese goods will still face import taxes that are six times higher than when Trump took office—and most of those are the kinds of intermediate goods that U.S. manufacturers use to make their own products. U.S. businesses and consumers have already forked over more than $40 billion to pay for Trump’s import taxes.
China, too, will apparently keep its own tariffs on U.S. exports, including on energy products like natural gas and crude oil. So the deal, whatever it does, doesn’t move the United States much further away from the protectionism it has embraced since Trump took office.
While the Trump administration talks about an eventual “phase two” deal with China that could actually tackle structural issues that bedevil the two economies, few trade experts expect much progress, if any, on such an agreement—especially during an election year. And politics could themselves make the new agreement more fragile than it seems: With Trump’s hawkish stance on China a popular one, he may be under pressure this year to go back to his preferred path of confrontation and tariffs to score political, rather than economic, points.
2. It doesn’t address the core issues that started the trade war.
The United States began its tariff fight with China on the grounds of a so-called Section 301 investigation, which highlighted Beijing’s abuse of its state-led economic model, including via state-owned companies, industrial subsidies, and state-directed cyber-espionage. Other than some fresh Chinese promises to crack down on intellectual property theft (more below), the deal just signed doesn’t address any of those core concerns that supposedly motivated the Trump administration in the first place.
“This does not in any sense address the big, systemic issues that China and the United States have with one another on trade,” said Chad Bown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
That’s particularly true when it comes to China’s alleged currency manipulation for competitive advantage, for years a bogeyman of Trump and his officials, even when China was doing the exact opposite. In the new agreement, China reaffirmed commitments it had already made, such as in various G-20 meetings, to avoid manipulating the renminbi for competitive advantage and signed up for the bare minimum in foreign reserve disclosures. (On Monday, just two days before the signing ceremony, the U.S. Treasury Department abruptly removed China from the list of currency manipulators, just months after adding China to the list during the darkest days of the trade spat.)
“The foreign exchange provisions were the most disappointing” aspect of the deal, said Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Of all the various things expected in the deal, they were really underwhelming. The absence of any genuine, new commitments on the part of China, simply repackaging existing commitments—that was undoubtedly disappointing.”
When the trade fight began, the Trump administration set out to make China a more market-friendly economy. Instead, the United States has embraced state-managed trade, where Beijing commits to using state-owned firms to purchase guaranteed amounts of U.S. farm goods, oil, gas, and manufactured products.
“Given that attempts to create new opportunities for U.S. exporters by changing rules and policies haven’t been overwhelmingly successful in recent years, I can see why the administration might feel that setting out targets and asking a state-dominated economy to meet those targets is a way to do it,” Setser said.
3. It’s all about shrinking the U.S. trade deficit.
That kind of managed trade is the centerpiece of the new agreement: a Chinese commitment to purchase, over a two-year period, $200 billion worth of U.S. goods above and beyond what it bought in 2017, before the trade war began in earnest. Big purchases like that have been the focus of the Trump administration’s approach since the beginning, because, while the trade professionals launched a formal investigation into China’s abusive macroeconomic practices, Trump cares mainly about the U.S. trade deficit with China, which totaled $379 billion in goods and services in 2018.
The new agreement calls for China to buy an additional $33 billion in manufacturing goods this year and $45 billion next year; an additional $12.5 billion in farm products this year and $19.5 billion next year; $18.5 billion more in natural gas and crude oil this year and $34 billion more next year; and finally, $13 billion more in services this year and $25 billion next year.
If all those planned purchases materialize—and there are considerable doubts they will—it could represent a boon for U.S. farmers and manufacturers (assuming they don’t just suck away exports from other markets). But there are a few problems. First, China still has most of its tariffs on U.S. exports, including on many of the goods on that list; since China insists that it wants commercial considerations to determine its purchases, that could be a problem for U.S. exporters.
Second, those numbers are hugely ambitious. The biggest-ever year for agricultural sales to China came in at $29 billion, for instance; the new agreement would require China to buy $40 billion or more worth of farm goods in 2021, roughly double what it bought in 2017. Similar stretches would be required to meet the export goals in energy and manufacturing—and if the Trump administration believes China isn’t meeting its commitments, it can blow up the deal.
Third, such managed trade might be illegal under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, which prohibit discrimination. Other suppliers of agricultural goods to China, such as Brazil and Argentina (which have taken advantage of the last two years of turmoil to flood the Chinese market), are unlikely to stand idly by if China’s new purchases simply come out of their pocket. If their own exports suffer, they could bring a complaint against China at the WTO for discriminatory practices.
Of course, since the Trump administration single-handedly dismantled the WTO’s dispute settlement system last month, such complaints may amount to pounding sand—countries around the world now have no way to ultimately adjudicate their trade disputes thanks to the administration’s disdain for multilateralism.
4. The agreement’s enforcement mechanism is untried—and risky.
For the Trump administration, it’s just as well that the WTO is moribund, because the enforcement provisions in the new agreement are entirely bilateral. Any disputes over compliance with the terms of the agreement will be dealt with in bilateral consultations at a staff level by trade experts. If they can’t resolve it, it can get kicked up to the level of the U.S. trade representative and China’s vice premier. If they still can’t solve it, the aggrieved party can retaliate as it sees fit—and the other side can’t do anything about it. If the other side doesn’t like the retaliation, they have one option, according to the deal’s text: “[T]he remedy is to withdraw from this Agreement.”
“The way it seems enforcement will work is very different than in any other trade agreement ever,” Bown said. “There are a lot of open questions on how this is going to work in practice.”
5. There are some small victories tucked into the agreement.
While the “phase one” deal is hardly the game-changer that Trump or administration officials tout, there are some positives tucked into the 96 pages. For instance, China reiterated promises it has made in the past to take a tougher line on protecting intellectual property rights. And China, which denies ever having forced foreign companies to hand over their technology as the price of doing business there, agreed not to do what it says it didn’t do anyway. (At least the central government did—but since a lot of U.S. complaints focus on what local and regional officials and firms do, it’s not clear the agreement will entirely solve that problem, either.)
The United States and China seem to have torn down a number of non-tariff barriers to U.S. agricultural trade, such as limits on U.S. poultry or beef exports. Those Chinese commitments to open up greater access for certain farm and fish products, coupled with pledges to buy more agricultural goods overall, could over time start to undo some of the damage wrought by the trade war over the last two years.
And the United States did claw greater access for financial services in the huge Chinese market, opening the door for U.S. banks, insurance companies, rating agencies, and electronic payment systems like Visa and Mastercard to fully enter a market that has long been denied them.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--Is Lev Parnas a Reliable Impeachment Witness?

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : New revelations emerge in Trump ’ s impeachment inquiry , the U.S. Navy debates a plan to increase its fleet , and Russian President Vladimir Putin carves out a new path to stay in power .
If you would like to receive Security Brief Plus in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Lev Parnas , the indicted associate of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s personal lawyer , threw new bombshells into the impeachment saga with a series of television @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressuring Ukraine to investigate a Democratic rival to help his reelection campaign—against U.S. interests .
The efforts were “ all about 2020 , ” Parnas told CNN , referring to Trump pressuring Ukraine to investigate former Vice President Joe Biden and his son , including withholding U.S. military aid from the country .
“ President Trump knew exactly what was going on , ” he told MSNBC in another interview .
Is Parnas a reliable witness ?
That ’ s a top question for lawmakers as the next phase of Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past casts doubt on his reliability , something that Republicans will likely play up .
“ These allegations are being made by a man who is currently out on bail for federal crimes and is desperate to reduce his exposure to prison , ” White House Press Secretary Stephanie Grisham said in a Thursday statement .
Parnas and another Giuliani associate , Igor Fruman , were charged by federal prosecutors with making $ 325,000 in illegal donations to a super PAC for Trump .
Parnas previously ran an insurance company called Fraud Guarantee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t appear to have any clients , but paid Giuliani $ 500,000 in advising fees .
Since his arrest , Parnas has reversed his support for Trump .
The State Department is silent .
The Democrat-controlled House released documents this week that included cryptic text messages between Parnas and a Republican congressional candidate , Robert Hyde , that appeared to indicate that former U.S .
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch—who was ousted from her job after a smear campaign by Giuliani—was being surveilled .
Democratic lawmakers are demanding answers from the State Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Parnas dismissed those claims as the ramblings of a “ drunk.
” It ’ s difficult to assess whether they are outlandish : The State Department has refused to comment on whether the Yovanovitch was being followed .
Its silence on the matter , along with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s refusal to publicly defend Yovanovitch or other department employees dragged into the impeachment fight , have left some current and former diplomats fuming .
Ukraine opens an investigation .
But not into the Bidens , as Trump had hoped .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is opening an investigation into whether Yovanovitch was being surveilled by Giuliani associates , BuzzFeed News reports .
What will become of the Iran nuclear deal ?
This week , European powers triggered the Iran nuclear deal ’ s dispute mechanism , likely spelling the end of the agreement .
Since the United States withdrew from the deal in 2018 , Iran has resumed production of enriched uranium—a key step on the path toward developing nuclear weapons .
Iran argues that the United States ’ withdrawal from the deal and reimposition of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to abide by its own commitments .
In a desperate effort to save the deal , France , Germany , and Britain officially alleged that Iran breached the deal , a case which will be referred to a joint commission including the other signatories .
If they can not resolve the issue after 15 days , it will eventually be referred to the U.N. Security Council , which could reimpose U.N. sanctions lifted under the deal .
Navy debates 355 ships .
Despite Trump ’ s campaign to increase the U.S. Navy ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , its initial budget proposal for 2021 would actually shrink the force by three ships over the next five years .
The proposal may just be the opening salvo in a protracted budget battle : The White House immediately pushed back , ordering the Navy to submit a new plan to get to the promised 355 ships by 2030 .
The Navy ’ s top admiral said this week that he would be happy to increase the size of the fleet—if the service gets more money .
( Meanwhile , Trump is diverting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for his border wall . )
Russia ’ s constitutional shake-up .
Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday proposed sweeping changes to the constitution , a move that appears to be designed to ensure he retains power after reaching his presidential term limit in 2024 .
The reforms would weaken the powers of the presidency and strengthen the prime minister .
In a shocking move , after Putin voiced his intentions , the entire Russian government resigned—allowing Putin to nominate a new prime minister and choose a new cabinet .
FP ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the surprising move from Moscow .
U.S. to decrease troop presence in West Africa .
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced in December that there would be a significant drawdown—if not a total withdrawal—of U.S. troops from West Africa as Washington increasingly focuses its attention and resources on countering the threats posed by China and Russia .
On Tuesday , U.S. allies in West Africa and France criticized the decision .
The planned drawdown is part of a larger realignment of U.S. forces to address the rise of China .
Space Force swearing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Raymond was sworn in as the first Chief of Space Operations , United States Space Force , in a ceremony conducted by Vice President Mike Pence .
The appointment makes Raymond the highest ranking official in the new Space Force , as well as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .
Prior to his Space Force appointment , Raymond spent 35 years in the Air Force .
New ambassador appointments .
This week , the Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced several ambassador nominations : Todd Chapman as ambassador to Brazil , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Donald Wright as ambassador to Tanzania .
Trump ’ s State Department has struggled for years with scores of empty posts , but that started turning around last year , as FP ’ s Robbie Gramer reported .
Generation Gulag .
Coda Story has produced an incredible reporting project that compiles first-hand accounts of those who survived harrowing conditions in the Soviet Union ’ s forced labor camps .
Though it comes decades after the gulag system was broken up , the Russian government now seems keen to rewrite and whitewash its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ held accountable for running the gulag system , which incarcerated up to 28 million people .
A dire warning .
You shouldn ’ t squeeze inside your musical instrument case to be smuggled out of a country .
That ’ s what Yamaha Corporation is warning its customers , after former Nissan CEO Carlos Ghosn reportedly escaped house arrest in Japan concealed in a large musical instrument case .
“ We won ’ t mention the reason , but there have been many tweets about climbing inside large musical instrument cases .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too late , so we ask everyone not to try it , ” Yamaha tweeted .
Consider yourself warned .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: New revelations emerge in Trump’s impeachment inquiry , the U.S. Navy debates a plan to increase its fleet, and Russian President Vladimir Putin carves out a new path to stay in power.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: New revelations emerge in Trump’s impeachment inquiry, the U.S. Navy debates a plan to increase its fleet, and Russian President Vladimir Putin carves out a new path to stay in power.
If you would like to receive Security Brief Plus in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Trump “Knew Exactly What Was Going On”
Lev Parnas, the indicted associate of U.S. President Donald Trump’s personal lawyer, threw new bombshells into the impeachment saga with a series of television interviews on Wednesday implicating the president in pressuring Ukraine to investigate a Democratic rival to help his reelection campaign—against U.S. interests.
The efforts were “all about 2020,” Parnas told CNN, referring to Trump pressuring Ukraine to investigate former Vice President Joe Biden and his son, including withholding U.S. military aid from the country. “President Trump knew exactly what was going on,” he told MSNBC in another interview.
Is Parnas a reliable witness? That’s a top question for lawmakers as the next phase of Trump’s impeachment begins. Parnas’s checkered past casts doubt on his reliability, something that Republicans will likely play up. “These allegations are being made by a man who is currently out on bail for federal crimes and is desperate to reduce his exposure to prison,” White House Press Secretary Stephanie Grisham said in a Thursday statement.
Parnas and another Giuliani associate, Igor Fruman, were charged by federal prosecutors with making $325,000 in illegal donations to a super PAC for Trump. Parnas previously ran an insurance company called Fraud Guarantee (no joke) that didn’t appear to have any clients, but paid Giuliani $500,000 in advising fees. Since his arrest, Parnas has reversed his support for Trump.
The State Department is silent. The Democrat-controlled House released documents this week that included cryptic text messages between Parnas and a Republican congressional candidate, Robert Hyde, that appeared to indicate that former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch—who was ousted from her job after a smear campaign by Giuliani—was being surveilled. Democratic lawmakers are demanding answers from the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Parnas dismissed those claims as the ramblings of a “drunk.” It’s difficult to assess whether they are outlandish: The State Department has refused to comment on whether the Yovanovitch was being followed. Its silence on the matter, along with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s refusal to publicly defend Yovanovitch or other department employees dragged into the impeachment fight, have left some current and former diplomats fuming.
Ukraine opens an investigation. But not into the Bidens, as Trump had hoped. Ukraine’s interior ministry announced Thursday it is opening an investigation into whether Yovanovitch was being surveilled by Giuliani associates, BuzzFeed News reports.
What We’re Watching
What will become of the Iran nuclear deal? This week, European powers triggered the Iran nuclear deal’s dispute mechanism, likely spelling the end of the agreement. Since the United States withdrew from the deal in 2018, Iran has resumed production of enriched uranium—a key step on the path toward developing nuclear weapons. Iran argues that the United States’ withdrawal from the deal and reimposition of sanctions meant that it no longer had to abide by its own commitments. In a desperate effort to save the deal, France, Germany, and Britain officially alleged that Iran breached the deal, a case which will be referred to a joint commission including the other signatories.
If they cannot resolve the issue after 15 days, it will eventually be referred to the U.N. Security Council, which could reimpose U.N. sanctions lifted under the deal.
Navy debates 355 ships. Despite Trump’s campaign to increase the U.S. Navy’s fleet from 293 ships to 355, its initial budget proposal for 2021 would actually shrink the force by three ships over the next five years. The proposal may just be the opening salvo in a protracted budget battle: The White House immediately pushed back, ordering the Navy to submit a new plan to get to the promised 355 ships by 2030. The Navy’s top admiral said this week that he would be happy to increase the size of the fleet—if the service gets more money. (Meanwhile, Trump is diverting billions of dollars allocated for defense spending for his border wall.)
Russia’s constitutional shake-up. Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday proposed sweeping changes to the constitution, a move that appears to be designed to ensure he retains power after reaching his presidential term limit in 2024. The reforms would weaken the powers of the presidency and strengthen the prime minister. In a shocking move, after Putin voiced his intentions, the entire Russian government resigned—allowing Putin to nominate a new prime minister and choose a new cabinet. FP’s Reid Standish reports on the calculations behind the surprising move from Moscow.
U.S. to decrease troop presence in West Africa. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced in December that there would be a significant drawdown—if not a total withdrawal—of U.S. troops from West Africa as Washington increasingly focuses its attention and resources on countering the threats posed by China and Russia. On Tuesday, U.S. allies in West Africa and France criticized the decision. The planned drawdown is part of a larger realignment of U.S. forces to address the rise of China.
Movers and Shakers
Space Force swearing in. On Tuesday, Gen. John Raymond was sworn in as the first Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force, in a ceremony conducted by Vice President Mike Pence. The appointment makes Raymond the highest ranking official in the new Space Force, as well as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Prior to his Space Force appointment, Raymond spent 35 years in the Air Force.
New ambassador appointments. This week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced several ambassador nominations: Todd Chapman as ambassador to Brazil, Dorothy Shea as ambassador to Lebanon, and Donald Wright as ambassador to Tanzania. Trump’s State Department has struggled for years with scores of empty posts, but that started turning around last year, as FP’s Robbie Gramer reported.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Generation Gulag. Coda Story has produced an incredible reporting project that compiles first-hand accounts of those who survived harrowing conditions in the Soviet Union’s forced labor camps. Though it comes decades after the gulag system was broken up, the Russian government now seems keen to rewrite and whitewash its history. No one has ever been held accountable for running the gulag system, which incarcerated up to 28 million people.
Odds and Ends
A dire warning. You shouldn’t squeeze inside your musical instrument case to be smuggled out of a country. That’s what Yamaha Corporation is warning its customers, after former Nissan CEO Carlos Ghosn reportedly escaped house arrest in Japan concealed in a large musical instrument case. “We won’t mention the reason, but there have been many tweets about climbing inside large musical instrument cases. A warning after any unfortunate accident would be too late, so we ask everyone not to try it,” Yamaha tweeted. Consider yourself warned.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Dan Haverty contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--Who Is Russia’s New Prime Minister?

Who Is Russia’s New Prime Minister?

Who Is Russia ’ s New Prime Minister ?
When Russians woke up on Wednesday morning , most had likely never heard of Mikhail Mishustin , the head of the country ’ s tax service .
But by the time they went to bed that night , Mishustin had been named as Russia ’ s new prime minister after a day that included a flurry of proposed changes to the constitution and a series of dramatic shake-ups that saw the government resign en masse .
It was the first real inkling of the power transfer to come , with President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imposed term limit in 2024 .
During his annual State of the Nation Address , Putin , who is on his fourth and technically final term as president , announced sweeping constitutional reforms that would redistribute some of the powers of the position to the parliament and State Council .
Should Putin head the newly empowered State Council after stepping down , as some analysts expect , he could wield significant influence over whoever succeeds him as president .
The resignation of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and the announcement about Mishustin , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own , caught many analysts and Kremlin watchers by surprise .
The 53-year-old bureaucrat became Russia ’ s newly appointed prime minister and Putin ’ s second-in-command as the country slowly enters a new period of political transition .
It is unclear whether Mishustin is a temporary placeholder or could be groomed as a potential successor down the line .
A largely anonymous figure , Mishustin enjoys a reputation in Russia ’ s business circles as one of the country ’ s most effective technocrats and earned rave reviews as the head of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ During his tenure , he helped modernize Russia ’ s notoriously inefficient and corrupt tax system , earning him the moniker “ the taxman of the future ” in a 2019 Financial Times profile .
Like Putin , the new prime minister is a hockey fan and has been seen at matches with security services officials in Moscow .
According to Bloomberg , Mishustin developed a relationship with Putin as a member of the president ’ s Night Hockey League , and he is also a member of the board of Russia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reportedly an enthusiastic composer who has written a number of songs for well-known Russian singers , according to the Russian financial newspaper Vedomosti .
Married with three sons , Mishustin has few political accolades and worked in government roles related to tax collection since the early days of his career .
Gennady Gudkov , a former opposition lawmaker , called the new prime minister “ a new faceless functionary without ambition , ” while Gleb Pavlovsky , a political analyst and former Putin advisor , told the Russian news agency Interfax that Mishustin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the best sense of the word.
” Why was he chosen ?
While Putin ’ s selection of a relative unknown with no political base of his own caught many observers off guard , the desire to elevate someone who won ’ t erode the president ’ s own authority fits with Putin ’ s other moves on Wednesday to eliminate obstacles on the road to 2024 .
Mishustin appears well suited to deliver as prime minister where Medvedev failed , especially in terms of implementing the Kremlin ’ s so-called national projects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan of $ 400 billion that was put forward by Putin after his reelection in 2018 .
While reducing poverty , economic expansion , and increasing population growth were central to his last presidential campaign , the government has so far failed to properly implement those measures .
By appointing Mishustin , Putin is hoping that his new prime minister can live up to his reputation and wrestle Russia ’ s bureaucracy into delivering results on the national projects .
Unlike other elites who may be looking to enshrine their own power base @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political transition , Mishustin remains an inoffensive choice whom Putin is relying on to deliver economic progress and focus on the day-to-day work of turning the president ’ s proclamations into reality .
Where does he fit into Putin ’ s plan ?
By selecting Mishustin , Putin is looking to learn from his past mistakes during his return to the presidency in 2012 and offer Russians change , while still maintaining his grip on power .
Much of Putin ’ s State of the Nation speech on Wednesday focused on promises and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russians , and his choice of Mishustin as prime minister reflects the Kremlin ’ s concerns about declining standards of living in the country and negative public opinion toward the government .
The booming oil prices and rising incomes that helped propel Putin ’ s popularity in the early days of his presidency have largely passed .
Disposable incomes in Russia are still effectively below what they were in 2013 , and the combination of Western sanctions and lower oil prices have helped dim the country ’ s economic prospects .
Malaise and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Last year saw the most sustained street protests in the country since demonstrations against Putin ’ s return to the presidency in 2011 and 2012 .
Polls have also shown that the public is growing distrustful of state television channels , and Putin has seen his popularity fall to 68 percent from 82 percent in April 2018 , according to the Levada Center , an independent pollster based in Moscow .
Medvedev , meanwhile , leaves his post as prime minister with a dismal 38 percent rating , according to the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experience with the country ’ s vast and cumbersome bureaucracy , Mishustin is now positioned to enact unfulfilled government policies and help quell socioeconomic discontent as Putin ’ s slow-motion power transfer winds toward 2024 .
Putin is betting that Mishustin ’ s pedigree of efficiency will help him deliver on policies and limit public dissatisfaction—thereby providing the smoothest transition for the Russian leader .
As Andrei Kolesnikov , a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center , wrote , Putin is relying on Mishustin to modernize the Russian economy by building “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Service : with reports and inspections , security assets , and—where necessary—the digitalization of the entire country.
” What happens to Medvedev ?
As part of yesterday ’ s shake-up , Prime Minister Medvedev resigned , leading his entire cabinet to stand down too .
Medvedev served as president from 2008 to 2012 , although he was largely regarded to be just keeping the seat warm for Putin ’ s return in 2012 .
U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks in 2010 said that Medvedev “ plays Robin to Putin ’ s Batman.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ deputy head of Russia ’ s Security Council , he will continue to sit under Putin , who leads the body .
A former law professor with a penchant for new technology , Medvedev sparked hopes of liberalization with his ascendancy to the presidency in 2008 , but the few gains he made were largely rolled back when Putin returned to the throne .
Medvedev ’ s image has also taken a battering in recent years as he has been used as a scapegoat for unpopular government decisions and been the target of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Navalny , which sparked street protests across the country in 2017 .
As news broke on Wednesday of Medvedev ’ s resignation , an investigator at Navalny ’ s Anti-Corruption Foundation tweeted , “ Dimon , where are you going , we weren ’ t finished with you yet , ” using a diminutive form of Medvedev ’ s first name .

When Russians woke up on Wednesday morning, most had likely never heard of Mikhail Mishustin, the head of the country’s tax service. But by the time they went to bed that night, Mishustin had been named as Russia’s new prime minister after a day that included a flurry of proposed changes to the constitution and a series of dramatic shake-ups that saw the government resign en masse. It was the first real inkling of the power transfer to come , with President Vladimir Putin set to reach his constitutionally imposed term limit in 2024.
When Russians woke up on Wednesday morning, most had likely never heard of Mikhail Mishustin, the head of the country’s tax service. But by the time they went to bed that night, Mishustin had been named as Russia’s new prime minister after a day that included a flurry of proposed changes to the constitution and a series of dramatic shake-ups that saw the government resign en masse. It was the first real inkling of the power transfer to come, with President Vladimir Putin set to reach his constitutionally imposed term limit in 2024.
During his annual State of the Nation Address, Putin, who is on his fourth and technically final term as president, announced sweeping constitutional reforms that would redistribute some of the powers of the position to the parliament and State Council. Should Putin head the newly empowered State Council after stepping down, as some analysts expect, he could wield significant influence over whoever succeeds him as president.
The resignation of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and the announcement about Mishustin, a technocrat with little power base of his own, caught many analysts and Kremlin watchers by surprise. The 53-year-old bureaucrat became Russia’s newly appointed prime minister and Putin’s second-in-command as the country slowly enters a new period of political transition.
Who is Mishustin?
It is unclear whether Mishustin is a temporary placeholder or could be groomed as a potential successor down the line. A largely anonymous figure, Mishustin enjoys a reputation in Russia’s business circles as one of the country’s most effective technocrats and earned rave reviews as the head of Russia’s Federal Tax Service. During his tenure, he helped modernize Russia’s notoriously inefficient and corrupt tax system, earning him the moniker “the taxman of the future” in a 2019 Financial Times profile.
Like Putin, the new prime minister is a hockey fan and has been seen at matches with security services officials in Moscow. According to Bloomberg, Mishustin developed a relationship with Putin as a member of the president’s Night Hockey League, and he is also a member of the board of Russia’s Ice Hockey Federation. Mishustin is reportedly an enthusiastic composer who has written a number of songs for well-known Russian singers, according to the Russian financial newspaper Vedomosti.
Married with three sons, Mishustin has few political accolades and worked in government roles related to tax collection since the early days of his career. Gennady Gudkov, a former opposition lawmaker, called the new prime minister “a new faceless functionary without ambition,” while Gleb Pavlovsky, a political analyst and former Putin advisor, told the Russian news agency Interfax that Mishustin is “a splendid bureaucrat, in the best sense of the word.”
Why was he chosen?
While Putin’s selection of a relative unknown with no political base of his own caught many observers off guard, the desire to elevate someone who won’t erode the president’s own authority fits with Putin’s other moves on Wednesday to eliminate obstacles on the road to 2024.
Mishustin appears well suited to deliver as prime minister where Medvedev failed, especially in terms of implementing the Kremlin’s so-called national projects: a massive public spending and infrastructure plan of $400 billion that was put forward by Putin after his reelection in 2018. While reducing poverty, economic expansion, and increasing population growth were central to his last presidential campaign, the government has so far failed to properly implement those measures. By appointing Mishustin, Putin is hoping that his new prime minister can live up to his reputation and wrestle Russia’s bureaucracy into delivering results on the national projects.
Unlike other elites who may be looking to enshrine their own power base and promote their own ambitions during the political transition, Mishustin remains an inoffensive choice whom Putin is relying on to deliver economic progress and focus on the day-to-day work of turning the president’s proclamations into reality.
Where does he fit into Putin’s plan?
By selecting Mishustin, Putin is looking to learn from his past mistakes during his return to the presidency in 2012 and offer Russians change, while still maintaining his grip on power. Much of Putin’s State of the Nation speech on Wednesday focused on promises and measures to improve the lives of everyday Russians, and his choice of Mishustin as prime minister reflects the Kremlin’s concerns about declining standards of living in the country and negative public opinion toward the government.
The booming oil prices and rising incomes that helped propel Putin’s popularity in the early days of his presidency have largely passed. Disposable incomes in Russia are still effectively below what they were in 2013, and the combination of Western sanctions and lower oil prices have helped dim the country’s economic prospects. Malaise and backlash against the government have also grown. Last year saw the most sustained street protests in the country since demonstrations against Putin’s return to the presidency in 2011 and 2012. Polls have also shown that the public is growing distrustful of state television channels, and Putin has seen his popularity fall to 68 percent from 82 percent in April 2018, according to the Levada Center, an independent pollster based in Moscow. Medvedev, meanwhile, leaves his post as prime minister with a dismal 38 percent rating, according to the same poll.
Through his low profile and experience with the country’s vast and cumbersome bureaucracy, Mishustin is now positioned to enact unfulfilled government policies and help quell socioeconomic discontent as Putin’s slow-motion power transfer winds toward 2024. Putin is betting that Mishustin’s pedigree of efficiency will help him deliver on policies and limit public dissatisfaction—thereby providing the smoothest transition for the Russian leader.
As Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote, Putin is relying on Mishustin to modernize the Russian economy by building “a country that resembles the Federal Tax Service: with reports and inspections, security assets, and—where necessary—the digitalization of the entire country.”
What happens to Medvedev?
As part of yesterday’s shake-up, Prime Minister Medvedev resigned, leading his entire cabinet to stand down too. Medvedev served as president from 2008 to 2012, although he was largely regarded to be just keeping the seat warm for Putin’s return in 2012. U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks in 2010 said that Medvedev “plays Robin to Putin’s Batman.” With Medvedev now set to become deputy head of Russia’s Security Council, he will continue to sit under Putin, who leads the body.
A former law professor with a penchant for new technology, Medvedev sparked hopes of liberalization with his ascendancy to the presidency in 2008, but the few gains he made were largely rolled back when Putin returned to the throne.
Medvedev’s image has also taken a battering in recent years as he has been used as a scapegoat for unpopular government decisions and been the target of investigations led by the anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny, which sparked street protests across the country in 2017. As news broke on Wednesday of Medvedev’s resignation, an investigator at Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation tweeted, “Dimon, where are you going, we weren’t finished with you yet,” using a diminutive form of Medvedev’s first name.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--Why Oman Loves Iran

Why Oman Loves Iran

The death of Qaboos bin Said , the sultan of Oman , last week marked the departure of Iran ’ s closest ally in the Persian Gulf , whose mediation with the United States had recently been critical for Iranian diplomacy .
As tensions between Tehran and Washington reach a new high following the U.S. assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani , the sultan ’ s passing could not have come at a more critical time .
There ’ s good reason , in fact , to wonder whether the special relationship between Oman and Iran will even survive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important sense , it is a relationship forged in the sultan ’ s personal history with Tehran—specifically , the Iranian intervention in Oman ’ s civil war , which helped established Qaboos ’ s reign .
That forgotten history , however , also sheds light on why ties between Iran and Oman remain firmly rooted .
Although Qaboos is gone , his regime survives—and that regime is impossible to understand outside Iran ’ s support at its time of greatest need .
The story traces back to the early 1970s , when Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces defeat a revolution taking place in Dhofar , the southern region of Oman .
At the request of Sultan Qaboos , Mohammed Reza Pahlavi , the last shah of Iran , sent troops and military assistance to back the sultan .
Qaboos , who had become ruler of Oman in July 1970 after a British-led coup , was leading a British-backed war against the Marxist revolutionaries , the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf ( PFLOAG ) .
The guerrillas had waged an 11-year anti-colonial revolution in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ British imperialism in Oman and the region .
With Qaboos ’ s victory , the modern Omani nation emerged .
Sultan Qaboos never forgot the importance of the Iranian role in Oman : After all , they helped him win the war .
Between 1972 and 1975 , several thousand Iranian troops were routinely sent to Oman .
Only after Iran ’ s intervention did resources allow for large-scale operations to take place in Dhofar .
The first Iranian mission was opening the PFLOAG ’ s Red Line , which was a strategic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and western Dhofar .
It was after this victory that the Iranian presence in Oman was publicly announced ; it had previously been kept a secret as it was highly controversial .
Even after the war , small numbers of Iranian gendarmes remained stationed in Oman until 1979 , when the newly founded Islamic Republic of Iran ordered troops to return home , angered at the shah ’ s disposal of Iranian lives .
While the exact figure is unknown , estimates range between a few hundred and a couple thousand Iranian deaths @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War , the shah and Sultan Qaboos had aligned their concerns at the prospect of “ communist infiltration ” in the region .
Sharing the sovereignty of the Strait of Hormuz , they were vulnerable to attacks on oil exports .
Their key concern lay across the border from Dhofar—in the People ’ s Democratic Republic of Yemen ( also known as South Yemen ) , the only Marxist state to exist in the Middle East ( 1967-1990 ) .
It was suspected that Chinese and Soviet aid was reaching Dhofar through South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In reality , the material support for the revolution consisted of light arms , revolutionary literature , and very small financial assistance , which was wholly incomparable to the Iranian and British support for the sultan ’ s forces .
Yet Sultan Qaboos had declared that while the Eastern Bloc remained involved in South Yemen , the sultan would rely on the shah .
It was in their shared interests to contain the perceived Soviet influence in the region .
For Qaboos , Iran had critically helped him when neighboring Arab states had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Sultan Qaboos ’ s memory .
When Qaboos had indeed requested support from other Arab countries in quelling the revolution , the most he had received was a short spell of Jordanian involvement .
He faced criticisms from Arab countries for involving Iran in Arab affairs but defended his decision to ask for the shah ’ s help , arguing that he had every right to ask Iran , not least because it was a Muslim country and a neighboring state .
While the personal connection between Sultan Qaboos and the shah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relationship between Iran and Oman , the relationship has extended beyond the toppling of the Pahlavi dynasty with the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 and continued with the Islamic Republic of Iran .
This has been down to the sultanate ’ s lasting gratitude toward Iran , paired with its neutral foreign policy and self-proclaimed principle of peaceful coexistence .
In recent years , Oman has been a vital conduit for Iran in diplomatic matters .
Most notably , in 2012 , the Omanis facilitated secret talks in Muscat for senior American and Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2015 Iran nuclear deal .
The Omani channel helped resolve differences between the two sides and also made way for the historic phone call between then-U.S. President Barack Obama and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in 2013 .
In other high-profile cases , the Omanis have played an important role of mediation .
They negotiated with the Iranians for the release of three American hikers , who were detained in 2009 .
Leaked cables showed that in a communication with the U.S. Embassy in Oman , Yusuf bin Alawi , the Omani foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both an organizer and a venue for any meeting the U.S. would want with Iran—if kept quiet.
” Similarly , when the Iranian Canadian academic Homa Hoodfar was released in 2016 , she thanked Omani officials for helping to secure her release .
Moving forward , the desire for stability in the region remains at the forefront of Oman ’ s foreign policy , and a strong relationship with Iran is central to that equation .
Qaboos ’ s successor , Sultan Haitham bin Tariq , was personally chosen by the late sultan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sealed envelope—the contents of which were known only by Qaboos .
There had been much speculation over the sultan ’ s choice in the letter since Qaboos ’ s illness in recent years .
The immediate appointment of his cousin Haitham clearly signals a legacy of continuity , with the ruling family choosing to promptly open the letter rather than settle on a successor themselves , demonstrating respect and urgency for the late sultan ’ s wishes .
The University of Oxford-educated Haitham has extensive experience in diplomacy and no military background and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like Qaboos himself .
After being sworn in , Sultan Haitham was quick to announce that he will continue the late sultan ’ s foreign policy of friendly ties and peaceful coexistence .
What does this mean for the special relationship with Iran ?
On Jan. 7 , only days before the sultan ’ s death , Oman ’ s mediation was seen in effect amid escalated tensions between the United States and Iran .
Foreign Minister bin Alawi told officials in a Tehran conference that Washington had been in constant contact with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ de-escalation .
This was , however , only a day before the downing of the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 , which caused 176 civilian casualties and has jolted the United States and Iran into an unprecedented phase of heightened apprehension .
One of Sultan Qaboos ’ s final cables was a message of condolences to Rouhani for the victims of the plane crash and their families .
Rouhani has already indicated the desire for closer ties with the “ brotherly ” nation of Oman in a letter to the new sultan .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there is much to be gained for the United States in recognizing Sultan Haitham as a conceivable interlocutor and ally .
On top of these tensions , the European powers have triggered a formal dispute mechanism over Iran ’ s breaches of the nuclear deal—which Iran claims are legitimate since the United States abandoned the deal in 2018 .
Sultan Haitham thus arrives at a decisive and challenging moment and may want to offer a channel for nuclear conciliation , but it is unlikely that Tehran and Washington will reach any agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Instead , the question of Iran in Arab affairs will require careful mediation .
Unlike his predecessor however , Haitham will not have to defend his position with Iran—it is already assumed and very much needed .
With the potential of further Iranian revenge attacks against U.S. targets in the region , Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) countries hosting U.S. bases remain on edge .
Consequently , the new sultan inherits the position at a delicate moment for the Persian Gulf , and his first challenge comes at the intersection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GCC states , Tehran , and Washington .
In such turbulent times , the Middle East desperately needs a mediator like Sultan Qaboos .
Sultan Haitham arrives at a particularly demanding moment , but he will continue the quest for stability in the region .
Oman ’ s foreign policy of peaceful coexistence , tolerance , and diplomacy—friend to all , enemy to none—will survive Sultan Qaboos and so too will his respected special relationship with Iran .

The death of Qaboos bin Said, the sultan of Oman, last week marked the departure of Iran’s closest ally in the Persian Gulf, whose mediation with the United States had recently been critical for Iranian diplomacy. As tensions between Tehran and Washington reach a new high following the U.S. assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani, the sultan’s passing could not have come at a more critical time.
The death of Qaboos bin Said, the sultan of Oman, last week marked the departure of Iran’s closest ally in the Persian Gulf, whose mediation with the United States had recently been critical for Iranian diplomacy. As tensions between Tehran and Washington reach a new high following the U.S. assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani, the sultan’s passing could not have come at a more critical time.
There’s good reason, in fact, to wonder whether the special relationship between Oman and Iran will even survive Qaboos’s death. In an important sense, it is a relationship forged in the sultan’s personal history with Tehran—specifically, the Iranian intervention in Oman’s civil war, which helped established Qaboos’s reign. That forgotten history, however, also sheds light on why ties between Iran and Oman remain firmly rooted. Although Qaboos is gone, his regime survives—and that regime is impossible to understand outside Iran’s support at its time of greatest need.
The story traces back to the early 1970s, when Iranian troops helped the sultan’s armed forces defeat a revolution taking place in Dhofar, the southern region of Oman. At the request of Sultan Qaboos, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the last shah of Iran, sent troops and military assistance to back the sultan. Qaboos, who had become ruler of Oman in July 1970 after a British-led coup, was leading a British-backed war against the Marxist revolutionaries, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). The guerrillas had waged an 11-year anti-colonial revolution in Dhofar from 1965 to 1976, fighting British imperialism in Oman and the region. With Qaboos’s victory, the modern Omani nation emerged.
Sultan Qaboos never forgot the importance of the Iranian role in Oman: After all, they helped him win the war. Between 1972 and 1975, several thousand Iranian troops were routinely sent to Oman. Only after Iran’s intervention did resources allow for large-scale operations to take place in Dhofar. The first Iranian mission was opening the PFLOAG’s Red Line, which was a strategic route for the revolutionaries in between eastern and western Dhofar. It was after this victory that the Iranian presence in Oman was publicly announced; it had previously been kept a secret as it was highly controversial. Even after the war, small numbers of Iranian gendarmes remained stationed in Oman until 1979, when the newly founded Islamic Republic of Iran ordered troops to return home, angered at the shah’s disposal of Iranian lives. While the exact figure is unknown, estimates range between a few hundred and a couple thousand Iranian deaths.
In the midst of the Cold War, the shah and Sultan Qaboos had aligned their concerns at the prospect of “communist infiltration” in the region. Sharing the sovereignty of the Strait of Hormuz, they were vulnerable to attacks on oil exports. Their key concern lay across the border from Dhofar—in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (also known as South Yemen), the only Marxist state to exist in the Middle East (1967-1990). It was suspected that Chinese and Soviet aid was reaching Dhofar through South Yemen, which was not untrue. In reality, the material support for the revolution consisted of light arms, revolutionary literature, and very small financial assistance, which was wholly incomparable to the Iranian and British support for the sultan’s forces. Yet Sultan Qaboos had declared that while the Eastern Bloc remained involved in South Yemen, the sultan would rely on the shah. It was in their shared interests to contain the perceived Soviet influence in the region.
For Qaboos, Iran had critically helped him when neighboring Arab states had not. This gesture would remain etched in Sultan Qaboos’s memory. When Qaboos had indeed requested support from other Arab countries in quelling the revolution, the most he had received was a short spell of Jordanian involvement. He faced criticisms from Arab countries for involving Iran in Arab affairs but defended his decision to ask for the shah’s help, arguing that he had every right to ask Iran, not least because it was a Muslim country and a neighboring state.
While the personal connection between Sultan Qaboos and the shah certainly formed the foundations of the special relationship between Iran and Oman, the relationship has extended beyond the toppling of the Pahlavi dynasty with the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 and continued with the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has been down to the sultanate’s lasting gratitude toward Iran, paired with its neutral foreign policy and self-proclaimed principle of peaceful coexistence.
In recent years, Oman has been a vital conduit for Iran in diplomatic matters. Most notably, in 2012, the Omanis facilitated secret talks in Muscat for senior American and Iranian officials ahead of the multilateral negotiations for the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. The Omani channel helped resolve differences between the two sides and also made way for the historic phone call between then-U.S. President Barack Obama and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in 2013. In other high-profile cases, the Omanis have played an important role of mediation. They negotiated with the Iranians for the release of three American hikers, who were detained in 2009. Leaked cables showed that in a communication with the U.S. Embassy in Oman, Yusuf bin Alawi, the Omani foreign minister, had “offered Oman as both an organizer and a venue for any meeting the U.S. would want with Iran—if kept quiet.” Similarly, when the Iranian Canadian academic Homa Hoodfar was released in 2016, she thanked Omani officials for helping to secure her release.
Moving forward, the desire for stability in the region remains at the forefront of Oman’s foreign policy, and a strong relationship with Iran is central to that equation. Qaboos’s successor, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, was personally chosen by the late sultan, whose name was confirmed in a sealed envelope—the contents of which were known only by Qaboos. There had been much speculation over the sultan’s choice in the letter since Qaboos’s illness in recent years. The immediate appointment of his cousin Haitham clearly signals a legacy of continuity, with the ruling family choosing to promptly open the letter rather than settle on a successor themselves, demonstrating respect and urgency for the late sultan’s wishes. The University of Oxford-educated Haitham has extensive experience in diplomacy and no military background and is thought to be the candidate most like Qaboos himself. After being sworn in, Sultan Haitham was quick to announce that he will continue the late sultan’s foreign policy of friendly ties and peaceful coexistence.
What does this mean for the special relationship with Iran? On Jan. 7, only days before the sultan’s death, Oman’s mediation was seen in effect amid escalated tensions between the United States and Iran. Foreign Minister bin Alawi told officials in a Tehran conference that Washington had been in constant contact with Muscat over easing the conflict and seeking de-escalation. This was, however, only a day before the downing of the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, which caused 176 civilian casualties and has jolted the United States and Iran into an unprecedented phase of heightened apprehension. One of Sultan Qaboos’s final cables was a message of condolences to Rouhani for the victims of the plane crash and their families. Rouhani has already indicated the desire for closer ties with the “brotherly” nation of Oman in a letter to the new sultan. In this dark moment for U.S.-Iran relations, there is much to be gained for the United States in recognizing Sultan Haitham as a conceivable interlocutor and ally.
On top of these tensions, the European powers have triggered a formal dispute mechanism over Iran’s breaches of the nuclear deal—which Iran claims are legitimate since the United States abandoned the deal in 2018. Sultan Haitham thus arrives at a decisive and challenging moment and may want to offer a channel for nuclear conciliation, but it is unlikely that Tehran and Washington will reach any agreement that does not come with Iranian losses. Instead, the question of Iran in Arab affairs will require careful mediation. Unlike his predecessor however, Haitham will not have to defend his position with Iran—it is already assumed and very much needed. With the potential of further Iranian revenge attacks against U.S. targets in the region, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries hosting U.S. bases remain on edge. Consequently, the new sultan inherits the position at a delicate moment for the Persian Gulf, and his first challenge comes at the intersection of regional and international crisis, balancing the GCC states, Tehran, and Washington.
In such turbulent times, the Middle East desperately needs a mediator like Sultan Qaboos. Sultan Haitham arrives at a particularly demanding moment, but he will continue the quest for stability in the region. Oman’s foreign policy of peaceful coexistence, tolerance, and diplomacy—friend to all, enemy to none—will survive Sultan Qaboos and so too will his respected special relationship with Iran.